THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXVIII

The Tho mist Press, Washington 17, D. C ..

JANUARY, 1964

No.1

PAUL TILLICH'S EXISTENTIAL PHILOSOPHY
OF PROTESTANTISM

I

N RECENT years the Christian community has been
blessed with an increasingly urgent sense of the unity of
Christ's church. This has created a special interest in
Protestant theology and led to an ever increasing number of
irenically oriented studies. Such work has contributed much
by pointing to the authentically Christian content of Protestant theologies, from the discussion of which one might hope
for an improved unity of belief.
There remained, nevertheless, an important reservation to a
fully sympathetic and fruitful dialogue, for it was observed that
true ecumenism can be expected as a result of discussions, such
as those on justification, only when the meaning attached to
such terms as God, creature, sin, and new being, has been, if
not agreed upon, at least understood. 1 Most fundamentally,

1 Juan Alfaro, S. J., "Justificacion Barthiana y Justificacion Catolica," Gregorianum, XXXIX (1958), pp. 757-69; Henri de Lubac, S. J., " Zum katholischen
Dialog mit Karl Barth," Dokumente, XIV (1958), pp. 448-54.

1

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

this demanded an appreciation of the philosophical position
which stood as their presuppositions or predeterminants; and
there, lay a new level of divergence. Among Protestant thinkers
these positions were generally those of recent philosophies
reflective of man's contemporary dilemma, whereas among
Catholic thinkers they were of a more traditional philosophy
reflective of the rich insights of classical philosophy. With the
opening of Vatican II, however, this difference more than ever
before has been shown to be one of complementarity rather
than competition. "The Council," said Pope Paul VI, " will
build a bridge toward the contemporary world. . . . The
Church looks at the world ... with the sincere intention ...
not of condemning it but of strengthening and saving it." In
this project the Protestant philosophical insight into man's
contemporary religious dilemma becomes an indispensable element in any solution, and does so in a way which opens a
dimension of ecumenism sufficiently profound to contribute to
all others.
For this reason the study of the basic religious philosophy of
America's foremost Protestant theologian, Dr. Paul Tillich,
takes on a special importance. His thought is contemporary,
reflecting the modern dichotomy of subject and object in the
manner of the existentialist movement. It is ·also Protestant,
stressing the corruption of man and his distance from the
Creator. The investigation of these facets of Tillich's philosophy
will proceed by three stages. First, it will consider his evaluation of the nature and extent of the elements of individuation
and participation in relation to previous forms of Christianity.
Then it will analyse his conciliation of these two aspects in a
philosophy which is religious, Protestant, and contemporary.
Finally it will evaluate his contributions both in themselves and
in relation to Catholicism.
It can be hoped that the study of this recent adaptation of
Protestantism to the contemporary scene will shed light on
two matters of great interest and urgency. One is the nature of
the religious problem expressed in present day thought. The

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

3

other is the nature of the religious system which can answer
these demands. Both contributions should be of assistance to
all in understanding that faith which was given for all days
even unto the consummation of the world.

I. NORMS FOR RELIGIOUS

PHILOSOPHIES

Paul Tillich is much concerned with the relation between
subject and object. His concern extends from its contemporary
modality to its fundamental nature. There has been a general
consensus of opinion that the great tragedy of recent times has
been the subjection of man to the objects he produces. Man is
seen to be reduced to the state of an impersonal object. 2 We
will be able to follow the analysis of this contemporary situation
more completely below. For now, it is sufficient to note that it
is a pressing manifestation of the fundamental polar relation of
self and world, subject and object. Tillich considers this to be
the basic ontological structure because it is the presupposition
of ontological investigation, without itself being able to be
deduced from any prior unity. Idealism has been no more
successful in deriving the object from the subject than earlier
naturalisms have been in reducing the subject to the state of
a physical object. The polarity of the self-world or subjectobject structure is then something which "cannot be derived.
It must be accepted." 3
The polar relation of these elements assumes delicate nuances
according to the nature of the reality under consideration. This
provides a very sensitive norm for evaluating any system of
thought. The strength and weaknesses of a philosophy will
appear clearly from the degree of its success in conciliating the
• Paul Tillich, Theology of Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1959),
pp. 91-94.
• Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), I p. 174.
Cf. "Participation and Knowledge, Problems of an Ontology of Cognition,"
Sociologica, Vol. I of Frankfurther Beitriige zur Soziologie, ed. Theodor W. Adorno
and Walter Dirks (Stuttgart: Europiiische Verlagsanstalt, 1955), p. 201. "Being,
insofar as it is an object of asking presupposes the subject-{)bject structure of
reality."

4

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

twin poles of subj.ect and object in its own area. Tillich applies
this norm in the form of the polar notions of individualization
and participation to various types of religious thought. 4 A
study of his evaluation will provide an insight into his requirements for an authentic religion and reveal what elements of
Protestant and Catholic thought he would retain in his own
contemporary religious philosophy.
While neither of the polar notions can be fully realized without the other, individualization will be analysed first. This
element is implied in the constitution of every being as a self
and points to the fact that it is particular and indivisible. As
particular, the self maintains an identity separate from all else
and opposite anything which might be related to it. As indivisible it maintains its identity by retaining the integrity of
its own self center much as a mathematical point resists partition.5 One can hear the traditional definition of the individual in
these notions. He does fail to extend this to the temporal order
making self-affirmation something unique, unrepeatable, and
irreplaceable. The infinite value of every human soul is a
consequence of its" ontological self-affirmation as an indivisible,
unexchangeable self." 6
While this individuality is an indispensable element in reality,
it is a grave error to consider it without the polar element of
participation. An exclusive insistence on the particular and
unrepeatable brings with it the nominalistic breakdown in the
philosophy of essence.7 This breakdown, in turn, becomes the
source of a number of philosophical positions which have had
great influence on religious ideas. One of the more important
of the nominalistic consequences is the position that "only the
individual has ontological reality; universals are verbal signs
which point to similarities between individual things." 8 An• This is developed at length in The Courage to Be, Terry Lectures (New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1952).
• Syste'TTULtic Theology, I, pp. 170 & 174-75. Cf. "Participation and Knowledge,"
loc. cit., p. 201.
• The Courage to Be, p. 87.
8 Systematic Theology, I, pp. 73, 97 & 177.
7 Ibid., p. 129.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

5

other is the attribution of an element of indeterminacy to the
divine and of radical contingency to finite beings. The epistemological expression of this nominalistic ontology is referred to
by Max Scheler as controlling knowledge. In this the object
is transformed into a completely conditioned and calculable
" thing" to be studied with detached analysis by the methods
of empiricism and positivism. In the ethical sphere it follows
that the determination of ends is outside the competency of
this knowledge, which restricts itself to the consideration of
means and receives the ends from non rational sources such as
positive tradition or arbitrary decision. These are the nominalistic results of a development of individuation without its polar
element of participation.
Concerning the relationship of medieval nominalism to
Protestantism Tillich is particularly circumspect. He has
written some of the strongest contemporary passages on the
inevitability of the ontological question for the theologian.
Nevertheless, he proceeds to detach the Reformers from their
philosophical background and to make their religious experience the sole determinant of their system. 9 In this he manifests
a decidedly different understanding of the Protestant phenomenon than Louis Bouyer who has recently written that " the
Reformers no more invented this strange and despairing universe than they found it in Scripture. It is simply the universe
of the philosophy they had been brought up in, scholasticism
in its decadence." 1 ° Certainly, Luther's famous "Sum enim
Occamicae factionis " must be given progressively less weight
as he gradually dissociated himself from many of their positions. However, through such men as Biel, Trutfetter, and
Paltz, he had been well introduced to the contemporary Occamist school, and it is not surprising to find him retaining much
of its basic philosophical orientation. 11
Ibid., p. 21. Cf. Theology of Culture, p. 19.
Louis Bouyer, The Spirit and Fcmns of Protestantism, trans. A. V. Littledale
(Westminster: Newman Press, 1956), p. 158. This would be in general agreement
with the work of H. Denifle, 0. P. and the research of Catholic scholars since.
11 Cf. note ISO infra., p. 46.
9

10

6

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

If Tillich is slow to point to this fundamental connection of
Luther with nominalism, he does not fail to appreciate the
particular stress laid on individualization by the Reformer and
especially by the theologians who followed him. But for Luther
an immediate implication of this stress, and one so important
that it alone would suffice to guarantee the purity of Christianity, was the rejection of an analogous, internal reality by
which man supernaturally participates in the divine. In its
place he substituted the mere imputation of the divine. This
was something which Ockham had considered possible but insufficient to fulfill the requirements of faith. 12 A related expression of this accent on individualization is the development of
the notion of personal guilt in the Protestant concept of the
Fall into that of the total depravity of man's nature. This
implies that· the power of communion with God has been not
only weakened but lost. The result is that "man is separated
from God, and he has no freedom of return." 13 It is true that
these elements of individualization and guilt call for the notion
of forgiveness as an element of participation. However, historical Protestantism has never managed to integrate these two
elements. This integration was impeded for a century and a
half by the way in which Calvinism and sectarianism stressed
" the unconditional character of the divine judgment and the
free character of God's forgiveness." 14 For this led to
a separation between man and religious truth similar to
that between an abstract subject and object. When at last
there was a return to emphasis on personal guilt and perfection
it only proved to be a step toward rationalism and romanticism
in which the person was attributed such independent dignity
12 Martin Luther,
Vorlesung uber den Riimerbrief, 1515-16, die Scholien, ed. J.
Ficker (Leipzig: Dieterich, 192.5), p. 221. " Bonitas Dei facit nos bonos et opera
nostra bona; quia non essent in se bona, nisi quia Deus reputat ea bona. . . .
Perversa itaque est definitio virtutis apud Aristotelem, quod ipsa nos perficit et opus
eius laudabile reddit." For a variant interpretation of this point and suggestions
for further research see Paul Vignaux, " Sur Luther et Ockham," Franziskanische
Studien, XXXIT (1950), pp. 20-SO.
'"Systematic Theology, I, p. 2.58.
" ThiJ Courage to Be, p. 182. Cf. ibid., pp. 114-18.

TILLICH's

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

7

that the content of his reason or of his person lost all notion of
participation in the divine. Thus it has gone with the various
Protestant conceptions of man. An historical background of
nominalism gave it an excessive individuation from which it has
never managed to free itself.
The insufficiency of this thought is realized by Tillich. He
considers pure nominalism to be untenable because its radical
individualism renders impossible the mutual participation of
the knower and the known. 15 Thus the various forms of
Protestant thought which have emphasized individualization
almost exclusively tended by that 'very fact to cut themselves
off from all meaningful contact with the divine. He feels that
a mitigated, but none the less dangerous, form of this had
already tainted the Catholic theology of. St. Thomas when it
made of God an object for us as subjects. In logical predication
this cannot be avoided. The error of Catholic and much orthodox Protestant theology on this point is seen to be its failure to
reject the ontological implication by which God's holiness is
negated and he becomes an object beside the subject, merely
one being among others. 16 Much Catholic thought on the supernatural is criticized in this light.
At no time has the exaggerated stress on individualization
appeared as inadequate as it has in the contemporary context
of meaninglessness. Neo-Protestantism, built on biblical criticism and the Ritschlian theological synthesis of modern naturalism and historicism, has been shattered. Its social foundations
were destroyed by Marx, its moral grounds by Nietzsche, and
its religious basis by Kierkegaard. 17 The question is no longer
which values are true or how God speaks to us as individuals.
Instead God has been pronounced dead " and with him the
whole system of values and meanings in which one lived." 18
15 Systematic
Theology, I, p. 177. In the ontological realm such radical individualization would remove all basis for the category of relation. The foundations
of religion would thus be destroyed.
'" Ibid., pp. 17!l-73 &
17 " The Present Theological Situation in the Light of the Continental European
Development," Theology Today, VI (October, 1949), pp.
18 The Courage to Be, pp.
&

8

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

Thus the import of the traditional Protestant accentuation on
the meaning of the individual, his sin and forgiveness, is lost
because the contemporary question concerns the very possibility
of
itself. The problem which faces a present day
religious philosophy is that of finding the divine through nonbeing in its most radical form, the anxiety of doubt and meaninglessness.
Given this problem of individualization in the contemporary
situation, we may now turn to its polar element of participation. Despite the history of its exaggerations, individualization
remains indispensable for it provides the terms of the relation
of man to God. But in order to have a basis for the relationship
the corresponding element of participation must also be introduced. Participation points to "an element of identity in that
which is different or of a togetherness of that which is separated.
Whether it is the identity of the same enterprise, or the
identity of the same universal or the same whole, of which one
is a part, in each case participation implies identity." 19
The task of this element is twofold. First, it gives meaning
and content to the individual, keeping it from being an empty
form. It is then an essential perfection, proportionate to the
being and its act. Thus when the individual is on the level
of person, participation has the perfect form of communion.
Second, participation provides the basis in reality for unity
with God by expressing the presence of the divine. No religion
can be without this without being reduced to a secular movement of political, educational or scientific activism. 20 It is the
relationship to the divine which is expressed by the notion of
participation.
Tillich is certain that all religions have some form of this
element of participation because there could be no real religion
without it. However, he considers the notion of the presence of
the divine to be developed in a special degree by Catholicism.
10 " Plll'ticipation and Knowledge," loc. cit., pp. 201-202. He terms the system
which stresses participation mystical realism.
•c " The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism,"
Protestant Digest, III (1941), pp. 2.5-29.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

9

This is expressed in two ways. One is the Catholic retention,
even after original sin, of the integrity of human nature with its
powers of reason and free will. Man thus remains the Imago
Dei and retains some power to return to God. 21 In order to
appreciate this aspect proper to Catholicism it is not necessary
to accept the possible Pelagian implications of Tillich's statement of the Catholic position. It is sufficient simply to note
the difference between the Council of Trent, Session VI, chap.
1, and Luther's notions of the total depravity of human nature,
man's incapacity to do good, and forensic justification. 22
Another Catholic expression of the presence of the divine is
its notion of sacrament. For Tillich "any revelatory experience
transforms the medium of revelation into a sacramental object,
whether it is an object of nature, a human being, an historical
event, or a sacred text." 23 He vigorously points out the great
loss which Protestantism has undergone in failing to develop,
or even to retain sufficiently, this element. Protestantism needs
the continuous influx of the sacramental in order to be more
than a secular movement, and for this reason it needs the
permanent corrective of Catholicism. 24
The correction could well be reciprocated, he feels, for
Catholicism has trouble with some of the forms taken by its
expression of participation. He observes a tendency to view
the sacramental as more than
Il!anifestation of the divine,
to consider particular objects as divine in themselves. This
impression made on others by Catholic devotion is the basis
of the many accusations of idolatry. Here the purifying, prophetic "Protestant principle," would come forward to reject
" the temptation of the bearers of the holy to claim absoluteness
21 Syste'ITUJ,tic Theology, I, p. fl59.
•• Martin Luther, V orlesung iiber den Romerbrief, p. 178. " lgitur peccatum est
in spirituali homine relictum; . . . quod qui non sedule studuerit expugnare, sine
dubio iam habet, etiamsi nihil amplius peccaverit, unde damnetur .... Que non
essent sine culpa (sint enim vere peccata et quidem damnabilia) , nisi misericordia
Dei non imputaret."
•• Syste'ITUJ,tic Theology, I, p. 139.
•• " The Permanent Significance of the Catholic Church for Protestantism," loc.
cit., pp. fl5 & 29.

10

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

for themselves." 25 He finds two other difficulties with the
Catholic realization of participation. One is the distinction
between natural and supernatural, according to which the
· special participation in the divine is realized outside the center
of one's personality. He thinks of this grace as a substance
alongside the person. 26 This would be a natural consequence
from the more radical difficulty which consists in the conceiving
of the divine as an object opposed to us as subjects. When
God is reduced to this less than divine status of one being
among others the possibility of participating in him is severely
limited. 27 Thus, while participation has a place of honor in
Catholicism, its particular realization is considered deficient.
On the other hand, while Protestantism is considered to have
much to learn from Catholicism on this point, it is not without
its own realization of participation. As noted above, Tillich
considers this element to be essential to religion as such. He
considers it to be an important factor in the personal experience
of Luther which, in the midst of the consciousness of guilt,
encountered the divine in an immediate, personal relation of
forgiveness. Luther expressed this by the phrases "he who is
unjust is just" and "justification by faith." Tillich would
express the same in the modern terminology of despair by " the
courage to accept oneself as accepted in spite of being unacceptable." 28 He notes that this is not the courage to be as a part
had by the public nature of· the sacraments; neither is it the
resisting of authority or the transformation of Church or
society. Rather, it is a personalism which stand.s between mysti·cism and individualism, affirming the individual self in its
encounter with the divine person.
This is the very life blood of Protestantism as a religion. He
finds that it has been threatened with dissolution many times.
Hardly had Luther's insight been attained when the attempts
to reduce it to a theological system so stressed " the uncondi•• Systematic Theology, I, p. 227.
•• Ibid., pp. 258-59.
07 Theology of Culture, pp. 18-21. Cf. Systematic ·Theology, I, pp. 172·-7t3.
28 The Courage to Be, pp. 63-64.

TILLICH's

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

11

tional character of the divine judgment and the free character
of God's forgiveness" that the personal situation was replaced
by an objective, and then abstract, moral subject. 29 In this way
the true existential insight of Protestantism was beclouded.
This trend continued as Kant and Hegel developed the notion
of the essential man in a supremely rational world. The development of such exaggerated hopes on the part of man's
reason made the reaction the more pervading. Schelling's
positive philosophy called for an evaluation of things according
to the individual's historical situation rather than according to
" abstract natures." J\llarx, Nietzsche, and Bergson found that
the modern situation was far from realizing Hegel's reconciliation of man with himself. It was, in fact, reducing the individual to a mere object or thing, an empty space without
significance except inasmuch as something else passed through
it. Participation was gone and with it the person. Human
existence had fallen into utter meaninglessness.
It is this situation which has to be faced by anything which
might be called contemporary Protestantism. As religious it
must restore the element of participation in the divine. As
Protestant it must keep this from being confused with any mere
thing and relate it to the individual as personal forgiveness. At
the same time it must be contemporary, facing the problem
in the present context of meaninglessness. Religion today must
not seek meaning or the participation which is its base beside
the totalitarian extension of meaninglessness. It must delve
into the meaninglessness itself and there find meaning. Only
then can it be a contemporary Protestantism.

II.

TILLicH's

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

The varied elements which Paul Tillich intends to integrate
in his contemporary Protestant theology are related to the
notion of creation. For " the doctrine of creation is not the
story of an event which took place 'once upon a time.' It is
•• Ibid., pp.

12

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

the basic description of the .relation between God and the
world." so It includes the complex data concerning God, the
production of his finite effects ex nihilo, and the response of
man from this situation of meaninglessness. Tillich expresses
the dynamic interrelationship of these elements in terms of an
existential dialectic. He holds this to be the contemporary
philosophy because it considers the problems and contradictions of present day existence and does this at a depth where
the ontological principles of essence and existence and the
epistemological principles of subject and object can be correlated.
A complete discussion of the relation of essence to existence is
identical with the entire theological system. The distinction
between essence and existence, which religiously speaking is the
distinction between the created and the actual world, is the backbone of the whole body of theological thought. It must be elaborated in every part of the theological system. 31

Let us see how Tillich's ontological analysis of the present
situation reveals a dialectic which might well be termed a contemporary philosophy for Protestantism, since it goes beyond
the question of the levels of being to consider their interrelation.
It was observed at the beginning that Tillich insists on the
polarity of subject and object as the point of departure for
his analysis of reality because both members are presupposed
for the ontological question. But if they provide his point of
departure, he .leaves no doubt that he shares the modern
concern to proceed to a point of identity where both subject
and object are overcome. This recent concern is the result of
the observation that man has been reduced to the status of
a thing by allowing himself to be subjected to the objects he
produces. 82 The strongest statement of this situation was made
by Nietzsche, but the best known is Marx's description of the
reduction of the worker to a commodity. Reality then must
Systematic Theology, I, p. 252.
Ibid., p. 204.
82 Theology of Culture, pp. 91-94.

80

81

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

13

not be simply identified with objective being, for man must
participate in some deeper principle or lose his value and individuality. However, to proceed to identify reality with subjective being or consciousness would be equally insufficient, for
subject is determined by its contrast with object. Consequently, what is sought is a level of reality which is beyond this
dichotomy of subject and object, identifying the value of both.
The need for a point of identity and its function is better
appreciated as one proceeds beyond the subject-object relationship to the investigation of either knowledge or being. "The
point of procedure in every analysis of experience and every
concept of a system of reality must be the point where subject
and object are at one and the same place." 88 Thus the analysis
of experience turns to the logos, the element of form, of meaning
and of structure. In the knowing subject, or self, the logos is
called subjective reason and makes self a centered structure.
Correspondingly, in the known object, or world, it is called
objective reason and makes world a structured whole. There is
nothing beyond the logos structure of being. 34 It is, of course,
possible to conceive the relation between the rational structures
of mind and of reality in a number of ways. Four of these
possibilities are represented by realism, idealism, pluralism, and
monism. But, according to Tillich, what is of note here is that
all philosophers have held an identity, or at least an analogy,
to exist between the logos of the mind and the logos of the
world. 85 Successful scientific planning and prediction provide a
continual pragmatic proof of this identity.
The philosophical mind, however, is not satisfied with the
mere affirmation, or even the confirmation of the fact. There
arises the problem of why there should be this correspondence
of the logos in the subject with the logos of reality as a whole.
This can be solved if the logos is primarily the structure of the
divine life and the principle of its self-manifestation. For then
•• The Interpretation of History, trans. Part I N. A. Rasetzki, Parts II, III &
IV Elsa L. Talmey (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1936), p. 60.
•• Systl!/matic Theology, I, pp. 156,
&
85 Ibid., pp. 23 & 75-76.

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GEORGE F. MCLEAN

it is the medium of creation, mediating " between the silent
abyss of being and the fulness of concrete individualized, selfrelated beings." 86 The identity or analogy of the rational structures of mind and of reality will follow from the fact that both
have been mediated through the same identical divine logos.
In this way " reason in both its objective and subjective
structures points to something which appears in these structures
87 Logos
but which transcends them in power and
becomes the point of identity between God, self, and world.
Of these three, the logos of God is central and is participated in
by self and world as they acquire their being. Thus the logos of
reason gives us a first introduction to the concept Tillich has
of God overcoming the separation of subject and object to
provide a deeper synthesis of the reality of both.
This conclusion of the analysis of experience has definite
implications for an analysis of being. For the identity is not
merely an external similarity of two things to a third without
a basis in the things themselves. The identification of subject
and object is the divine and this is within beings. The only
nonsymbolic expression of the divine is the term " being itself," 88 which, in relation to us, is the ultimate concern. But
God is within beings as their power of being, as an analytic
dimension in the structure of reality. 89 As such he is the
" substance " appearing in every rational structure; the
"ground " creative in every rational creation; the " abyss "
unable to be exhausted by any creation or totality of creation;
the "infinite potentiality of being and meaning" pouring himself into the rational structures of mind and reality to actualize
and transform them. 40 God is then the ground not only of truth
•• Ibid., p. 158.
87 Ibid., p. 79.
•• Ibid., pp. 238-89. Cf. "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," in The Theology
of Paul Tillich, Vol. I of The Library of Living Theology, ed. Charles W. Kegley,
and Robert W. Bretall (New York: Macmillan Co., 1956), p. 885. To this single
nonsymbolic expression of the divine he has added severe limitations.
•• Systematic Theology, I, p. 207.
•• Ibid., p. 79.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

15

but of being as well. In fact, he can be the ground of truth
precisely because he is the ground of being.
These ideas have had a long history in the mind of man. In
the distant past the
viewed the Brahman-atman
both cosmically as the all-inclusive, unconditioned ground of
the universe from which the conditioned emanate, and acosmically as the reality of which the universe is but an appearance.
The absolute is the" not this, not this" (neti neti), "the Real of
the real" (styasya satyam) .41 This line ofthought can be traced
through Plato and Augustine to the medieval Franciscans and
Nicholas of Cusa. Tillich is fond of relating· his thought to
these older sources. The proximate determinant of his thought
in positing this ontological principle of identity beyond the
subject and object is Schelling. At the very first Schelling
agreed with Fichte in making the "Absolute Ego " of consciousness the ultimate principle and reality. It is this consciousness
which dialectically " becomes " the world of nature. But on
further consideration Schelling failed to see the particular
connection between the infinite Ego and the finite object. For
this reason he moved the "Absolute Ego " from the conscious
side of the dichotomy to a central, neutral position between
and prior to both objectivity and subjectivity. 42 Thus the
Absolute is now called not "Ego " but "the unconditional "
and" identity." The
is no longer subjective, but ontological. This is the insight of the early Schelling which Tillich
readily accepts. Thus he traces the line of his thought in
between, but distinct from, both the subjective idealism of
Fichte and the objective realism of Hobbes. Both sides of the
polarity must be maintained; the Unconditional will be equally
the ground of subject and object. 43
Two important specifications must be added to this notion of
a divine depth dimension beyond both subject and object. One
II. i. 20 & IV. ii. 4, cited by T. M. P. Mahadevan,
"The
in History of Philosophy, Eastern and Western, ed. Sarvepalli
Radhakrishnan (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1952), I, pp. 62-63.
.. Theology of Culture, p. 92.
•• Systematic Theology, I, p. 171.

16

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

regards the incapacity of limited beings to exhaust or adequately represent the divine. This indicates the radical individualization of the divine. The other concerns the way God is manifested in the essence of finite beings. This points to the way
they participate in him.
The first of these specifications which Tillich is careful to
make concerning the point of identity of subject and object is
that it is gnostically incomprehensible and ontologically inexhaustible, the former reflecting the latter. "This power of
being is the prius which preceeds all special contents logically
and ontologically." 44 It is not even identified with the totality
of things. For this reason the divine is termed the " abyss "
because it cannot be exhausted in any creation or totality of
creations. 45
Human intuition of the divine always has distinguished between the
abyss of the divine (the element of power) and the fullness of its
content (the element of meaning), between the divine depth and
the divine logos. The first principle is the basis of Godhead, that
which makes God, God. It is the root of his majesty, the unapproachable intensity of his being, the inexhaustible ground of being
in which everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely
resisting nonbeing, giving the power of being to everything that is.46

This position of the divine as the inexhaustible depth dimension of reality is the basis of the distinction and individualization of God in relation to creatures. In the realm of being
it implies what Tillich calls the Protestant principle, the protest
against any thing being raised to the position of the divine.
This extends to any creation of the church, including the
biblical writings which it will not allow to be identified with
the divine ground of all.47 No bearer of the holy may be permitted to claim absolute status for itself. · This reinforces the
element of individualization which has always marked Protestantism as leaving man alone before God.
•• Theology of Culture, p. 25.
••" Symbol and Knowledge: a Response," Journal of Liberal Religion, II
(Spring, 1941), p. 208. Cf. Systematic Theology, II, p. 6.
' 6 Ibid., I, pp. 250-51.
"Ibid., pp. 87 &

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

17

In the order of knowledge this implies that, if man is to
proceed beyond finite realities to an awareness of what is truly
divine, he must leave behind the rational categories of technical
reason. Such categories limit the infinite. They make God an
object, " a" being among others rather than being itself. For
this reason God cannot be conceptualized. 48 To say that God
is the depth of reason is to refuse to make him another field of
reason. In fact, he precedes the structures of reason and gives
them their inexhaustible quality simply because he can never
be adequately contained in them. Schelling has termed the
divine the Unvordenkliche because it is "that before which
thinking cannot penetrate." 49 It was the error of idealism to
think that this could ever be completely reduced to rational
forms. Tillich is protected from this error by his basic ontological observation of the various levels of reality. "There are
levels of reality of great difference, and ... these different levels
demand different approaches and different languages." 50 The
divine is assigned to the deepest of these levels, and consequently, must be known and expressed in a manner quite different from that of ordinary knowledge and discourse. It is this
same fact to which Tillich is referring when he introduces the
dialectical relationship between these levels and speaks of the
divine as the prius. Here too it will be necessary to proceed
beyond conceptualization to an intuitive, personal awareness
of the divine. This will be described below, but one thing is
already clear. Since the categories are the basis for the objective element in knowledge and the means by which it is made
common, the intuitive awareness will have to be personal and
marked by subjectivity.
The other specification made by Tillich concerning the depth
dimension concerns its manifestation in the essences of finite
beings. The notion of essence is found in some form in practi•• The Courage to Be, pp. 184-85.
•• The Protestant Era, trans. James Luther Adams (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago
Press, 1948), p. 76.
••" Religious Symbols and our Knowledge of G<ld," The Christian Scholar,
XXXVIll (September, 1955), p. 19!l.

18

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

cally all philosophers, but classically in Plato and Aristotle.
Plato attempted to solve the problem of unity and separation
in knowledge by the myth of the original union of the soul
with the essences or ideas. Recollection and reunion take place
later and in varying degrees. Tillich stresses the point that in
Plato the unity of soul and ideas is never completely destroyed.
Although the particular object is strange as such, it contains
essential structures " with which the cognitive subject is
essentially united and which it can remember." 51
In Aristotle there is a retention of the notion of essence as
providing the power of being. Essence is the quality and structure in which being participates. But this is still potential; it
is the actual which is real. Tillich accepts the Aristotelian
position in these general terms and then uses it in order to
develop his conception of creation. The divine was described
above as the inexhaustible, creative abyss. In order that this
divine principle might, in fact, be creative, an element of
meaning and structure must be added. This is the second divine
principle, the logos. It makes the divine distinguishable, definite
and finite. The third principle is the Spirit " in whom God
' goes out from ' himself, the Spirit proceeds from the divine
ground. He gives actuality to that which is potential in the
divine ground. . . . The finite is posited as finite within the
process of the divine life, but it is reunited with the infinite
within the same process." 52
In these terms Professor Tillich expresses the positive side of
the dialectical relationship of the essences of finite beings to the
divine. He attempts to show how these essences can contain,
without exhausting, the power of being, while God remains this
power. As exclusively positive it might be said to express only
the first element of creation. This leaves the essences of finite
beings, as it were, in a state of dreaming innocence within the
divine life from which they must awaken to actualize and
realize themselves. 53 Creation is fulfilled in the· self realization
by which the limited beings leave the ground of being to " stand
61

Systematic Theology, I, pp. 94-99.

•• Ibid., p. 251.

53

Ibid., pp. (l88 & !l55.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

19

upon" it. Whatever we shall say in the negative section about
this moment of separation, the element of essence is never
completely lost for "if it were lost mind as well as reality would
have been destroyed in the very moment of their coming into
existence." 54 It is the retention of this positive element of
essence which provides the radical foundation for participation
by limited beings in the divine and their capacity of pointing
to the infinite power of being and depth of reason. As mentioned
in the first section, such participation in the divine being and
some-awareness of it is an absolute prerequisite for any religi<?n.
This concludes our consideration of the first or positive stage
in Dr. Tillich's dialectic. By placing the divine as the point of
identity beyond both subject and object he has introduced bot.h
elements according to which he evaluated previous religious
philosophies. The element of participation so necessary for any
religion has appeared, and along with it the element of individualization which seems to be a hallmark of Protestantism.
We must now investigate Tillich's attempt to give both of
these a context which can be truly called contemporary. The
second, or negative, stage of his dialectic provides this for
individualization. It will remain for the third phase of the
dialectic, the synthesis, to present a contemporary understanding of participation in the divine.
Dr. Tillich turns to the second phase of his dialectic in order
to specify the basic infinite-finite structure of the thesis by a
contemporary form of individualization. Since a strong statement of this element has always been a distinctive mark of
Protestantism this phase will be of great importance in his construction of a Protestant philosophy. Its contemporary nature
lies in its particular relation to nonbeing. Nonbeing is had in
God. But it is in him as dialectically driving being out of its
seclusion to make him living. It is also in God as dialectically
overcome, thus placing being itself beyond the polarity of the
•• Ibid., p. 88. Cf. "A Reinterpretation of the Doctrine of Incarnation," Church
Quarterly Review, CXLVII (January, 1949), p. 141.

flO

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

finite and the infinite negation of the finite. 55 In beings less
than God the nonbeing is not overcome. The classical statement " creatio ex nihilo ,. means that the creature "must take
over what might be called 'the heritage of nonbeing.'" 56 It has
this along with its participation in being, its heritage of being.
"Everything which participates in the power of being is
'mixed' with nonbeing. It is being in the process of coming
from and going toward nonbeing." 57 This is finite being.
But if one is to understand this more completely he must
integrate what has been theologically stated as the Fall of man.
This implies the necessity of avoiding an Hegelian understanding of the dialectical expression of being by nonbeing. Hegel
would make existence simply a step in the expression of essence.
However, profound observation of the modern world, especially
of the cataclysm of the First World War, forced home the point
that reality is also the contradiction of essence.58 This has been
expressed by the concept of estrangement taken from Hegel's
earlier philosophy and applied to the individual by Kierkegaard,
to society by Marx and to life as such by Schopenhauer and
Nietzsche. In fact, since the later period of Schelling it has
been commonplace for a whole series of philosophers and artists
to describe the world as one of fragments, as a disrupted unity.
Its result is that individualization has become excessive and
led to a loneliness of man before his fellow men and before
God. This, in turn, drives man toward his inner experience so
that he becomes still further isolated from his world.59 The
presupposition of this tragic nature of man is his transcendent
Fall. 60
•• Systematic Theology, I, pp. 179-80 & 188-91. Bohme's Ungrund, and Schelling's
" first potency " are examples of dialectical nonbeing in God.
•• Ibid., p. us.
•• Ibid., p. 189.
•• Ibid., pp. 202-208. Some such distinction of essence and existence is presupposed
by any philosophy which considers the ideal as against the real, truth against
error or good against evil.
•• Theology of Culture, pp. 104-105.
•• Systematic Theology, II, pp. 24-25 & 45. Cf. The Interpretation of History,
pp. 60-65.

TILLICH's

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

21

How is this Fall with its existential estrangement to be understood? First, its possibility is traced to man's finite freedom.
As seen above, finite man is excluded from the infinity to which
he belongs. In this state freedom gives him the capacity to
cont:J;adict himself and his essential nature. Furthermore, he is
aware of this finitude, of the threat from nonbeing. This adds
the note of anxiety to his freedom, producing a drive toward
transition into existence. But once this freedom is aroused man
finds a double threat rooted in his finitude and expressed in
his anxiety. It is the threat either of not actualizing his
potencies and thus not fulfilling himself, or of actualizing them,
knowing that he will not choose according to the norms and
values in which his essential nature expresses itself. 61 In either
case he is bound to lose himself and his freedom.
The finite nature of man's freedom implies an opposite pole,
called destiny. This applies even to the freedom of selfcontradiction. "It is possible only within the context of the universal
transition from essence to existence " and every isolated act is
embedded in the universal destiny of existence. 62 This means
that the estrangement of man from his essential nature has
two characteristics, the one tragic coming from destiny, the
other moral (guilt) coming from freedom. Destiny of itself
connotes universality. Since the Fall is the presupposition of
existence, there is no existence before or without it. 63 Everything, then, that exists participates in the Fall with its twin
character of tragedy and guilt. This applies to every man,
every act of man, and every part of nature as well.
The conciliation of this absolute universality of the Fall with
the freedom which is presupposed is somewhat of a problem.
Tillich finds his extension of a part in guilt to nature justified
by recent evolutionary theories and depth psychology. But
how the inevitability and the freedom of estrangement are to be
conciliated remains an enigma. In one recent statement he
61 " The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," Journal of Religion, XIX
(July, 1939), p. !WS. Cf. Systematic Theology, II, pp. 31-35.
•• Ibid., pp. 82 & 38.
68 " A Reinterpretation
of the Doctrine of Incarnation," loc. cit., p. 142.

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

affirms the necessity of something in finite freedom for which
we are responsible and which makes the Fall unavoidable. In
another work he considers estrangement to be an original fact
with" the character of a leap and not of structural necessity." 64
Despite these difficulties in explaining how man's estrangement
is free, Tillich is definite in presenting it as the ontological
realization of the Fall of mankind.
This negative phase in the dialectic is mediated to the level of
consciousness by the general, and presently acute, phenomenon
of anxiety which arises from the nonbeing in finite reality ..
" The first statement about the nature of anxiety is this:
anxiety is the state in which a being is aware of its possible
nonbeing." 65 It is, in fact, the expression of finitude from the
inside. As such it is not a mere psychological quality but an
ontological one, present wherever finitude and its threat of
nonbeing are found. Anxiety is then simply inescapable for the
finite being. Were it a particular object it might be· directly
feared, attacked and overcome. But nothingness is not an
'object.' There is no way for the finite to overcome nonbeing.
Thus anxiety lies within man at all times. This omnipresent
ontological anxiety can be aroused at any time even without
a situation of fear. The emotional element is but an indication
of the totality with which finite being is penetrated by the
threat of absolute separation from its positive element of
infinity, that is, by the threat of annihilating nothingness. 66
The non being of finitude and estrangement is present on each
level of being and is there in three ways: ontic, spiritual and
moral. This produces three corresponding types or characteristics of anxiety. Ontic anxiety is the awareness that our basic
self-affirmation as beings is threatened proximately by fate,
the decided contingency of our position, and ultimately by
death. Spiritual anxiety is the awareness of the emptiness of
the concrete content of our particular beliefs. It is, even more,
the awareness of the loss of a spiritual center of meaning result•• Systematic Theology, II, p. 44.
•• The Courage to Be, p. 35. Cf. Systematic Theology, I, pp. 191-92.
••" The Conception of Man in Existential Philosophy," lac. cit., pp. 211-14.

TILLICH's

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

23

ing in ultimate meaninglessness in which "not even the meaningfulness of a serious question of meaning is left for him." 67
Moral anxiety is the awareness that, in virtue of that very
freedom which makes man man, he continually chooses against
the fulfillment of his destiny and the act:ualization of his
essential nature, thus adding the element of guilt. 68
All three elements of anxiety-death, meaninglessness and
guilt-combine to produce despair, the ultimate or" boundary"
situation. One element or another may stand out more clearly
for various people or in various situations, but all three are inescapably present. It is guilt that seals Sartre's "No Exit." For
if there were but the nonbeing of death and meaninglessness,
man could affirm both his antic and his spiritual meaning by
his own act of voluntary death. But guilt makes all this
impossible. "Guilt and condemnation are qualitatively, not
quantitatively, infinite." 69 They point to the dimension of the
ultimate and the unconditional from which we have become
estranged through our own responsible act. In this way Tillich's
contemporary understanding of the situation of loneliness and
despair is ultimately specified as Protestant by the pervading
element of guilt.
The element of nonbeing is extended beyond this field of
being to that of knowledge. After recognizing that existence is
both the appearance and the contradiction of essence, he adds
that " our thinking is a part of our existence and shares the
fate that human existence contradicts its true nature." 70
Reason is affected by the nonbeing of finitude and of estrangement. Under the conditions of exitence it is torn by internal
conflicts and estranged from its depth and ground. Another
note of the existential situation of knowledge is its inclusion of
actualized freedom. This not only separates thought and being,
The Courage to Be, p. 48. Cf. Systematic Theology, I, p. 189 & II, p. 74.
Freedom in the Period of Transformation," in Freedom: Its Meaning, ed.
Ruth Nanda Anshen (New York: Harcout, Brace and Co., 1940), pp. US-!M &
61

08 "

131-S!'l.

•• The Courage to Be, p. 54.
70 The Interpretation of History, p. 61.

24

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

but holds them apart. There results a special kind of truth, one
which is attained, not in an absolute standpoint at the end of
history, but in the situation of the knower. Subjectivity be- ·
comes the hallmark of truth, which is thereby stamped with the
Protestant note of individuality. Furthermore, this subjectivity
is of a contemporary nature since it results from separation and
despair. "Truth is just that subjectivity which does not disregard its despair, its exclusion from the objective world of
essence, but which holds to it passionately." 11 This kind of
knowledge is then both Protestant and contemporary.
Through this negative stage of the dialectic there remains the
original positive element, the bond to the divine. " Man is
never cut off from the ground of being, not even in the state
of condemnation." 72 However, in this state of existence he
does not actualize, but contradicts the essential manifestation
of the divine ground. This is more than individualization. It
is the tragically guilty estrangement of being and knowing from
the divine, and from ourselves as images of the divine. This is
the nature of Tillich's systematic analysis of the predicament
of modern man. It manifests the true dimensions of the exaggeration of individualization which is experienced as a sense
of loneliness and expressed theologically as the Fall of man.
It does this in the contemporary context of meaninglessness by
questioning not only the supports of previous generations, but
the very meaning of support.
The first stage of Tillich's existential dialectic presented the
essential or potential state of finite reality in union with the
divine. The second or negative moment of this dialectic placed
individualization in its present context of meaninglessness. This
was a powerful and profound expression of the difficulty in
actualizing the element of union or participation in the divine
which is indispensable to religion. Let us see how the third
stage attempts to provide this element in a contemporary
fashion, and how well this coincides with the nature of Protestantism.
71

Ibid., pp. 68-64.

" Syste77Uttic Theology, ll, p. 78.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

25

Since the existential separation and disruption leaves man
opaque to the divine, Tillich will not allow the divine to be
derived from an analysis of man's experience. 73 If then, God is
to be the answer to the existential question of man, he must
come "to human existence from beyond it." 74 The divine
depth must break through in particular things and particular
circumstances. This is the phenomenon of revelation in which
the essential power of natural objects is delivered from the
bondage of its existential contradiction. The finite thing or
situation can now be said to participate in the power of the
ultimate. In this way revelation provides more than a mere
representation· of the divine. It opens up levels of mind and of
reality hidden till now and produces an experience of the divine,
itself the most profound of these levels. The appearance of the
divine does vary according to the particular situation. Experienced in correlation with the threat of nonbeing, God would
have the form of the "infinite power of being resisting nonbeing," that is, he would be being itself. In correlation with
the question in the form of anxiety, God as the answer would
be "the ground of courage." 75 Each would be a form of the
particular participation in the divine wJ:tich takes place in this
situation. It is this same participation which bases symbols of
the divine. Consequently, their diversification and continuance
will depend on the situation.
For a better understanding of the contemporary nature of
Tillich's religious philosophy it is necessary to investigate
further his development of the situation of revelation in the
present context of meaninglessness. As cognitive this encounter
includes two elements. One is objective and termed a miracle
or sign event; the other is subjective and named ecstasy or
inspiration. The objective and the subjective are so strictly
correlated that one cannot be had without the other. The
•• This, he says, would be the humanistic-naturalistic or the dualistic approach
to God .
.. Syste11UJ,tic Theology, I, pp. 64-65.
•• Ibid., p. 61.

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

truth of revelation is truth only for him who is grasped by the
divine presence. 76
Tillich insists that miracle does not mean a supernatural
interference with the natural structure of events. To make this
clear he prefers the term sign event as signifying that which
produces numinous astonishment in Otto's sense of that connected with the presence of the divine. Such a sign event can
be realized in the context of meaninglessness because it presupposes the stigma of nonbeing, the disruptive tensions driving
toward man's complete annihilation. In particular situations
this stigma becomes evident and manifests the negative side of
the mystery of God, the abyss. However, such situations also
imply the positive side of the mystery of God. For their very
reality manifests the divine ground and power of being over
which nonbeing is not completely victorious.
The characteristics which Tillich attributes to a miracle will
now be sufficiently evident. He speaks of a miracle as " an
event which is astonishing, unusual, shaking, without contradicting the rational structure of reality; . . . an event which
points to the mystery of being, expressing its relation to us in
a definite way; ... an occurence which is received as a signevent in an ecstatic experience." 77 The subjective element pertains to the very nature of a miracle. Thus, even a person who
later learns about the sign-event must share in the ecstasy, if
he is to have more than a report about the belief of another.
An objective miracle would be a contradiction in terms.
The subjective element of ecstasy is described as " standing
outside one's self" by the term itself. It indicates a state in
which the mind transcends its ordinary situation, its subjectobject structure. Miracle was seen to be negatively dependent
on the stigma of nonbeing. In the mind there corresponds to
this stigma the shock of nonbeing, the anxiety of death, meaninglessness and guilt. These tend to disrupt the normal balance
•• Ibid., p. 111. Cf. "What is Divine Revelation," The Witness, XXVI (April,
194S), pp. 8-9.
71

Systematic Theology, I, p. 117.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

'1.7

of the mind, to shake it in its structure and to force it to its
boundary line where it openly faces nonbeing. There it is
thrown back on itself. But again it is forced to its extreme
situation, to the very limit of human possibilities, and there it
finds the all pervading "no." It is there, face to face with the
meaninglessness and despair which one must recognize if he is
serious about anything at all, that one is grasped by mystery.
For in the act of despair one accepted meaninglessness and the
acceptation itself was a meaningful act. It could be done only
on the power of the being it negates. 78 In this way there is
manifested within oneself the reality of a transcending power.
This is revelation. The power of being is present in the
affirmation of meaninglessness and in the affirmation of ourselves as facing meaninglessness. It comes to one by affirming
itself in him in spite of nonbeing. 79 In true ecstasy one receives
ultimate power by the presence of the ultimate which breaks
through the contradictions of existence where and when it will.
It is God who determines the circumstances and the degree in
which he will be participated. This rules out the possibility of
natural revelation whereby reason grasps God whenever it
wills. Natural knowledge of self and world can lead to the
question of the ground of being and reason, but in the state of
existence it is God who must grasp man. 80
Tillich calls the cognitive aspect of ecstasy, inspiration. In
what concerns the divine he replaces the word knowledge by
awareness. Furthermore, in this area the awareness is not of
new objects. This would be to invade reason with a strange
body of knowledge which could not be assimilated, and hence
would destroy its rational structure. Rather, that which is
opened to man is a new dimension of being. It is participated
in by all but still retains its transcendence.
The Courage to Be, p. 176. Despair supposes something positive. "The
by the positive which it negates." Love, Power, and Justice:
Ontological Analysis and Ethical Applications (New York: Oxford Univ. Press,
78

negative 'lives'

1954)' pp. 88-89.
79

Christianity and the Problem of Existence (Washington: Henderson Services,

1951), pp. S0-81.
80

The Protestant Era, pp. 79-80. Cf. Systematic Theology, I, pp.

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

It matters little that the contemporary situation of scepticism and meaninglessness has removed all possibility of a
content for this act. What is important is that we have been
grasped by that which answers the ultimate question of our
very being, our unconditional and ultimate concern. This is
Tillich's phenomenological description of God. "Only certain
is the ultimacy as ultimacy." 81 The ultimate concern provides
the place at which the fides qua creditur and the fides quae
creditur are identified, the place where the difference between
the subject and the object disappears. The source of our faith
is present as both subject and object in a way that is beyond
both of them. The absence of this dichotomy is the reason why
Tillich refuses to speak of knowledge in this realm and insists
instead on awareness. He compares it to the mystic's notion of
the knowledge God has of Himself, the "truth itself" of St.
Augustine. 82 It is absolutely certain, but the identity of subject
and object means that it is also absolutely personal. Consequently, this experience of the ultimate cannot be directly
received from others. 83 Revelation is something which we ourselves must live.
In this experience it is necessary to distinguish the point of
immediate awareness from the breadth of content. The point
of awareness is expressed in what Tillich refers to as the ontological principle. "Man is immediately aware of something
unconditional which is the prius of the interaction and separation of both subject and object, both theoretically and practically." 84 H:e has no doubt about the certainty of this point,
although nonsymbolically he can only say that. this is being
itself. However, in revelation he has experienced not only its
reality but its relation to him. 85 He expresses the combination
81 Dynamics of Faith, Vol. X of World Perspectives, ed. Ruth Nanda Anshen
(New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 17.
82 Ibid., pp. 8-11.
88 The Problem of Theological Method," Journal of Religicm, XXVIII (January,
1947), pp.
•• " The Two Types of Philosophy of Religion," Unicm Seminary Quarterly
Review, I (May, 1946), p. 10.
85 Systematic Theology, I, p. 109.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

fl9

of these in the metaphorical terms of ground and abyss of being,
power of being, ultimate and unconditional concern. Furthermore, generally this point is experienced in a special situation
and in a special form. The ultimate concern is made concrete
in some one thing. It may, for instance, be the nation, a god
or the God of the bible. This concrete content of our act of
belief differs from ultimacy as ultimacy in that it is not immediately evident. Since it remains within the subject-object
dichotomy its acceptance as ultimate requires an act of courage
and venturing faith. The certainty we have about the breadth
of concrete content is then only conditional. 86 Time may reveal
this content to be finite. In that case our faith will still have
been an authentic contact with the unconditional itself. It is
only the concrete expression which will have been deficient. 87
This implies two correlated elements in man's act of faith.
One is that of certainty concerning one's own being as related
to something ultimate and unconditional. The other is that of
risk, that of surrendering to a concern which is not really
ultimate and may be destructive if taken as if it were. The
risk necessarily arises in the state of existence where both
reason and objects are not only finite, but separated from
their ground. It places an element of doubt in faith which is
neither of the methodological variety found in the scientist
nor of the transitory type often had by the sceptic. The doubt
of faith is rather existential, an awareness of the lasting element
of insecurity. Nevertheless, this doubt can be accepted and
overcome in spite of itself by an act of courage which affirms
the reality of God. Faith remains the one state of ultimate
concern, but as such it subsumes both certainty concerning the
unconditioned and existential doubt. 88
Can a system with such an uncertainty concerning concrete
realities still be called a realism? Tillich believes that it can,
but only if it is specified as a beliefful or self-transcending
realism. In this the really real, the ground and power of every••" The Problem of the Theological Method," loc. cit., pp. 22-28.
87 Dynamics of Faith, p. 18.
•• Ibid.

30

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

thing real, is grasped in and through a concrete historical
situation. The value of the present moment which has become
transparent for its ground is, paradoxically, both all and
nothing. In itself it is not infinite and "the more it is seen in
the light of the ultimate power, the more it appears as questionable and void of lasting significance." 89 The appearance of
self-subsistence gradually melts away. But by this very fact
the ground and power of the present reality becomes evident.
The concrete situation becomes theonomous and the infinite
depth and eternal significance of the present is revealed in an
ecstatic experience.
Up to this point the positive exposition of Tillich's thought
could have been developed without special relation to Christianity. However, he sees in his system the need for a central
manifestation of God to serve as a point of over-all unity, and
definitively to conquer the contradictions of existence. It is
here that Tillich introduces Christ as the final revelation. We
shall present this aspect of his system briefly in order to
indicate the direction taken by his thought as it enters the
properly theological realm.
Since reason remains finite and retains its state of existence
even after receiving revelation, new difficulties continue to arise.
The corruption was broken in its final power and the conflicts
of reason were replaced by reconciliation when man's total
structure was grasped by its ultimate concern. Still, because the
corruption "is conquered but not removed," 90 it is able to rise
again and attack the elements of revelation.
leads to a
mistaking of the bearers of revelation for the ultimate itself,
so that faith tends to become idolatrous. Furthermore, the
remaining corruption can lead to a loss of the ecstatic, transcending power of reason. In this case reason forgets that it is
but an instrument for awareness of the ultimate and tends to
become an ultimate itself.
Fortunately these distortions of faith and reason can be
definitively conquered. The means of this victory is called final
•• The Protestant Era, p. 78.

•• Dynamics of Faith, p. 79.

TILLICH's

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OF PROTESTANTISM

31

revelation. There are various criteria, but all are bound up with
the qualities a revelation must have if it is to be the ultimate
solution to the conflicts of our
in the .state of estrangement. The criterion on the part of the miracle is the power
which final revelation must have "of negating itself without
losing itself." 91 The definitive revelation must overcome the
danger of substituting itself for the ultimate by sacrificing itself.
This is Christ on the cross, perfectly united with God, who in
the surrender of all the finite perfection by which he could be
a bearer of revelation becomes completely transparent to the
mystery he reveals. He thus becomes a bearer which merely
points and can never be raised to ultimacy. This is the perfect
fulfillment of the very essence of the sign-event concept. In
turn, Christianity receives an unconditional and universal claim
from that to which it witnesses, without Christianity as such
being either final or universal. On the part of reason another
criterion of this special revelation is its capacity to overcome
the conflicts in reason between autonomy and heteronomy,
absolutism and relativism, emotionalism and formalism. The
success of Christ in solving these conflicts provides a continuous
pragmatic manifestation of Christ as the final revelation. 92
The need for a definitive and incorruptible manifestation of
the ground of being is cared for by final revelation. As such
it is not only the criterion but the fulfillment of otheF revelations.93 It becomes the" center, aim and origin of the revelatory
events" which preceded and surrounded it. 94 The preparatory
series of revelations mediated through nature, men and events
is called universal revelation, though it occurs only in special
and concrete circumstances. It has the function of preparing
both the question and the symbols without which the answer
provided by final revelation could neither be received nor understood.94 But with the advent of final revelation preparatory
revelation ceases, and the period of receiving revelation begins.
Systematic Theology, I, pp. 188-85.
lbid., pp. 147-54; Dy=miCJS of Faith, pp. 78-79.
93 Systematic Theology, I, pp. 132-33.
94 Ibid., pp. 138-39.
91

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GEORGE F, MCLEAN

It is now the Church which becomes the bearer of the original
fact of Christ and continues the process of reception, interpretation and actualization. Along with this certainty, it too has
the risk of faith. For as final, it believes that it cannot be
surpassed by a new original revelation, since its revelation has
the power of reformation within itsel£.95
Taking this risk with courage, final revelation is the definitive
point where the estrangement of essential and existential being
is overcome, where finitude is reunited with infinity, man with
God, anxiety with courage and mortality with eternity. This
is the eschatological reunion of essence and existence, foreshadowed and momentarily grasped in universal preparatory
revelations. It is definitively established by this final revelation
in which Christ becomes the " new being " and God becomes
incarnate. 96 This is "realized eschatology." It has happened
only in principle, that is, in power and as a beginning. "Those
who participate in him participate in the "new being," though
under the condition of man's existential predicament and, therefore, only fragmentarily and by anticipation." 97
In this context morality need not remain the empty or
arbitrary self-affirmation of a spiritual being. It has an ultimate
impulse, a final aim in the expression of a transcendental ground
of being. However, its particular contents are received from
· the culture, and hence remain preliminary and relative. In this
way man's actions are to reflect his being as provisional manifestations of the divine depth dimension.
This system, in its expression of the fragmentary nature of
reality, includes the objectivity of positivism without its refusal
to penetrate into· the nature of existence. In its attempt to
transcend reality, it also includes the subjectivity of idealism
without desiring to remain in the realm of essences.98 Both of
these insights are synthesized and transcended in a new mysticism. This is not the classical mysticism which disregarded the
•• Ibid., pp. 148-44.
of the Doctrine of Incarnation," loc. cit., pp. 144-45.
Systematic Theology, II, p. 118.
•• Ibid., I, p. 286 & The Protestant Era, pp. 66-68, 76-77 & 217.
•• "A Reinterpretation
97

TILLICH'S

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PIDLOSOPHY

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33

cosmos for a direct union with a transcendent absolute. Instead
it points by faith to the abysmal character of the ground of
being and the depth of life as a prius of both subject and object.
By restoring the element of participation in the divine it is
truly religious. Furthermore, Tillich presents two reasons for
considering this mysticism to be more Protestant than Catholic.
One is its refusal to elevate anything finite to the position of
the divine. The other is its search for the essence of objectivity
in the depth of subjectivity, approaching God through the
soul.99 Lastly, since this approach is made in the context of
total meaninglessness, it is also contemporary. Tillich thus concludes to a philosophy of religion which is both Protestant and
contemporary.

III.

REFLECTIONS

ON TILLicn's

ExiSTENTIAL

PROTESTANTISM.

How successful has been this attempt of Paul Tillich to
provide a
philosophy for Protestant theology?
There can be little doubt that he has had great success in presenting the basic notes of Protestantism in a way adapted to
the problems and spirit of much of today's thought. He has
found an ontological structure according to which creatures
participate in the divine. This provides a foundation for the
reality of the individual which obliges man to turn toward the
divine in an act of religion. In a dialectical motion Tillich has
specified this act by the contemporary notes of estrangement,
anxiety and meaninglessness. These express the Protestant
conception of the corruption of human nature and reinforce its
subjectivity. The result is a penetrating ontological and psychological analysis of the nature of God and man and of the
relations between them.
Tillich has been able to do this because his thought has
always been marked by exceptional height and breadth and
depth. The height stems from the focusing of his attention on
the divine. When he arrived in America some twenty-eight
years ago he was able to write, " As a theologian I tried to
00

Ibid., pp. 69-78 & Theology and Culture, p. 107.

34

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

remain a philosopher, and conversely so." 100 If anything, his
years in this country have seen his attention focus even more
closely on the divine-the central point of what he would refer
to as a "theonomous philosophy." In this his affinity with St.
Thomas has been remarked in many quarters. Tillich " shows
a concern to relate theology to all knowledge and all culture
which reminds one more of St. Thomas than of any contemporary Protestant thinker." 101
Perhaps Tillich's greatest contribution to the American scene
has been his resulting defense of the transcendence of God.
Whatever might have to be said about his projection of the
divine beyond subject and object, it has provided a defense of
God's transcendence. The need for this contribution can be
appreciated only when it is observed that the religious atmosphere was dominated by humanistic theism or, at best, neonaturalism. Even should it be remarked that his conception of
the divine as a depth dimension of reality is itself too much
influenced by humanism and naturalism, his defence of divine
transcendence in these terms must still be voted, in the circumstances of the day, the most likely to succeed.
Tillich's thought not only aims at the heights, it also has
breadth. Traces of his God are sought in all reality and thus.
every field of human enquiry becomes a possible mirror for
the revelation of the divine to man and to the present age.
It is traces of God that he is seeking in painting, depth psychology, social structure and all phases of culture. Thus, though
wandering far he always seems at home. The reason for this
is that here breadth is not allowed to excuse a lack of depth.
If his patience breaks down at any point it is with those who
would deny the need for an epistemological and ontological
foundation. They blind themselves deliberately to the basic
principles which determine their thought. 102 Tillich's insistence
The Interpretation of History, pp. 40-41.
Walter M. Horton, "Tillich's Role in Contemporary Theology," in The
Theology of Paul Tillick, p.
102 Systematic
Theology, I, pp. 163 & 187; "Reply to Interpretation and Criticism," in The Theology of Paul Tillich, p. 335.
100

101

TILLICH's

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35

on an open examination of the philosophical foundations of
thought is an explicit rejection of the 19th century neo-Kantian
and of our recent positivists. But it is also extended to narrowly
biblical theologians, for they must be able to explain the
content of their terms and their relation to reality. 103 One
cannot but heartily applaud the strenuous objections of orthodox protestants to Tillich's evisceration of biblical inspiration.
But these objections lose much of their force because they are
based on such a disrespect for reason that they imply that any
statement about God which is not based on revelation is subjective.104 While much is still to be said about Tillich's epistemology, it is a vigorous and articulate step in the right direction.
It is, moreover, the depth of penetration which permits
Tillich to correlate trends in thought as widely divergent as
that of Augustine and Wieman. H the interpretation is not
infrequently excessively free, the comparison stimulates the
reader to deepen his comprehension of the precise position of
each. The key to both the depth of penetration and the freedom
of interpretation is the use of the dialectical method. This
allows him constantly to shift his frame of reference from thesis
to synthesis and back to either the positive or the negative
aspect of the antithesis. As an existential rather than Hegelian
dialectic these shifts are between contradictories rather than
contraries. Man, he says, has the freedom to contradict his
essential nature and his fate is to stand under the servitude of
this contradiction. 105 The challenges encountered by the mind
in following these steps are not to be underestimated, but
neither should they be omitted if they can contribute insights
concerning the central issues of a religious philosophy. Paul
Tillich' s breadth of vision makes it necessary to focus the
evaluation on the central issues, first of knowledge, then of
being, and finally of participation.
If a realism is to be successful, and Tillich does want to be
Systematic Theology, I, pp. 19-9H, 163 & 187.
David H. Freeman, " The Philosophical Theology of Paul Tillich," Philosophm
Refrmnata, XXll (2nd Quarter, 1957), p. 54.
105 "A Reinterpretation
of the Doctrine of Incarnation," loc. cit., pp. 140-41.
103
10 '

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GEORGE F. MCLEAN

a realist, the thing itself, as the object, must be the source of
the content of knowledge. This can be adequately realized
only if the notions and concepts are abstracted from reality in
order to give a report on this same reality. But, unless they
pertain to being inasmuch as it is, it is not necessary to affirm
that they pertain to everything that is. Thus, there are finite
and contingent notions which are derived from reality, or at
least have a foundation there and tell us about what exists.
But because they do not pertain to existence as such they need
not be predicated of every being. Along with these there are
other notions, also derived from reality, which pertain to beings
inasmuch as they exist, and hence to all beings. Tillich's
system is quite different. [His categories]
are the forms in which the mind grasps and shapes reality ....
[They] are forms which determine content. They are ontological,
·and therefore they are present in everything .... The categories are
forms of finitude; as such they unite an affirmative a'nd a negative
element. . . . Both the basic ontological structure and the ontological elements imply finitude. Selfhood, individuality, dynamics,
and freedom all include manifoldness, definiteness, differentiation,
and limitation. 106

Two difficulties are of special note here, for each leads to an
element of limitation in the divine or excludes any rational
knowledge of God. The first of these difficulties is Tillich's
position that all ontological elements and categories bespeak
limitation. The reason he gives for this affirmation is that
selfhood and individuality imply definiteness, which, in turn,
implies limitation. "To be something is not to be something
else." 107 Likewise substance cannot be had without accidents
and change. It is evident that his approach is limited to finite
beings; and while one must always attend to the limitations
consequent upon the human mode of knowledge, these cannot
be predicated of that knowledge as intellectual or of its
object, being. Accidents do require a substance in which to
exist. But there is nothing in the positive notion of exist106

Systematic Theology, I, pp. 189-90 &

107

Ibid., p. 190.

TILLICH'S

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OF PROTESTANTISM

37

ing in oneself which bespeaks the limitation or negation of
this perfection of existence. The same applies to the selfhood of such a being. To say that it is not another being
does not imply any lack of perfection for this substance, any
more than the further multiplication of beings would imply a
lessening of the perfection of those which already exist. In fact,
the very multiplication of the instances of the perfection of
being necessarily implies the existence of a being which simply
is this perfection subsistently and without any limitation. This
is the classical and necessary sense of that notion of participation of which Tillich makes so much. For when a perfection
is had in a limited degree, it cannot be said to be had by that
being of its very nature. This implies that the perfection is
received from another which does possess it of itself and without limitation.
There is than no liberty in constructing the idea of the
divine. The implications of the principle of causality impose
the recognition that all pure perfections are found in the divine.
They must be there formally lest the cause lack some of the
perfection of the effect, and they must be there in a subsistent
way lest God not be the ultimate cause of all. This remains
true through the many purifications by the via negativa and
the via eminentiae which the mode of our finite knowledge
must undergo. To deny any pure perfection of God is to
deny the divine itself, the simple, infinite and all-perfect
being. God is the most perfect and the most determined being,
not the common and indetermined notion of being. "We
are not able to know God by understanding him not to be good,
just as we cannot know man by understanding him not to be
animal: for this removes the substance of God which is goodness." 108
It would seem that the closest approach of Tillich to this
position is his recognition of a point of contact with the divine
and his affirmation that the faith which is generated in this
contact does have content. Any affirmation of this today, how108

St. Thomas Aquinas, Q. D. de Potentia, Q. 7, a. 4, ad 8.

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GEORGE F. MCLEAN

ever, must face the problems of meaninglessness, scepticism,
and atheism which constitute the contemporary context. The
way in which Tillich describes this problem and his intention
of meeting it are important road marks for Christian thought.
However, given the limited nature for him of all ontological
notions, one might fear that he runs the risk of contracting the
disease in attempting its cure, for only the absolute in being
and the possibility of some knowledge of it by the intellect can
provide immunity against the spreading contagion of meaninglessness.
These fears seem to be borne out when he makes the negation
which is meaninglessness the very position of the question of
the divine, though that which requires an extrinsic causal
principle is rather the positive perfection of limited beings.
While the positive element is not eliminated by Tillich in
existing being, it is retained only as the essence which the
existence contradicts. In this situation the very excellence of
the analysis of meaninglessness as a statement of the contemporary situation leads to a disproportionate emphasis of a via
negativa which cannot then be balanced by a via affirmativa
in the via eminentiae, especially when reduced to ontological
terms which are necessarily finite in their intelligible content.
As a result his statement that "the nonbeing of negative theology means ' not being anything special,' " 109 which could be
understood simply as a negation of all limitation in God, is
not left with any positive counterpart. There is no way of
affirming God as the most determined, and under threat of
atheism one is left with the choice of affirming God as " being
everything" and removing all special content from faith. 110
God becomes unavoidable because as nothing special in this
context he must be either "everything" or nothing at all.
Tillich thus becomes quite willing to assert " an element of
pantheism " for in the religious realm it has become the only
alternative to utter meaninglessness.
The other difficulty which leads Tillich to insert an element
109

Systematic Theology, I, p. 188.

110

The Courage to Be, p. 182.

TILLICH's

EXISTENTIAL

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OF PROTESTANTISM

39

of limitation in the divine and to turn from rational knowledge
of God would remain even if it were established that some
notions did not imply limitation. This problem stems from the
origin which he attributes to the categories and to the ontological elements. As the basis for the objectivity of knowledge
Tillich is content to assert that all things have in themselves a
structure either identical or at least analogous to the finite
categories of the mind. This general correspondence of objective
and subjective rational structures is explained by the origin of
all from a common logos. Their particular connection in the act
of kU:owing is attributed to factors on the part of the will and
emotions. " Emotion is the vehicle of receiving knowledge." 111
He specifies that it is a criticizing agape because he wishes to
retain critical caution. However, subjectivity remains an
indispensable element, alternating with moments of objectivity
which are insufficient in themselves. 112 It is difficult to agree
with this analysis of knowledge which has led Tillich to limit
rational knowledge to the finite and to project the divine
beyond the realm of being. The rejection of abstraction by
Kant and the resulting search by the idealists for a source
beyond both subject and object is not unfamiliar, but neither
are the difficulties thus raised for realistic and objective knowledge. This is demonstrated only too well in Tillich's turn
to the emotive in order to connect the separate logical structures of mind and reality. He is sufficiently precise not to say
that this gives objective content, and much too keen to be satisfied with mere subjective union. However, his resignation to a
situation in which the two alternate is quite unsatisfactory.
True knowledge will be had only when the knower and the
known are bound together in a union which is itself objective.
Furthermore, since the categories are not considered to be
abstracted from beings, there can be no selective attribution
of them to beings. Consequently all the categories, including
those which of their very nature imply limitation, are indis111

Systematic Theology, I, p. 98.
Participation and Knowledge," loc. cit., pp. 206-209.

112 "

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GEORGE F. MCLEAN

criminately attributed to· all beings. The result of this is the
effective elimination of the analogy of being. This is reflected
in Tillich's statement that the categories of being are ontological, and therefore in everything. 113 By proceeding in this
manner he must conclude that everything which is is finite, for
each being must have all the finite categories of the logos structure. " To be something is to be finite." 114 Everything which
is is limited and subject to the categories of time, space and
cause which express this finitude. The natural implication of
such thought is that the divine itself is limited. However, while
Tillich is not at all willing to free completely the divine from
such elements of limitation, he does not want to say that the
divine is simply finite. Consequently God cannot be said to be
something, or a being, or good; although these cannot be simply
denied concerning him. God must be placed beyond things,
beyond the realm of beings, beyond the subject-object dichotomy of rational knowledge. Our knowledge then, if it be objective and rational, never will be able to reach the divine or
reflect it. For this reason it must be replaced by an awareness
of the immediate presence of God as truth itself within the
subjectivity of the individual.
In this way the divine is sought in the place and with the
instruments with which modern man is most likely to be concerned. Certainly it is most adapted to the more individualistic
character of Protestantism. More generally, it is well adapted
to the recent more universal appreciation of one's relation to
God as the most important and profoundly penetrating dimension of one's life. But if awareness is spoken of, then the
intentional order is being distinguished from that of being,
for one can speak of an awareness of one's being. In regard to
this intentional order something must be done to express its
particular mode of presence of the divine. To do this Tillich
uses "awareness" because he does not feel that "knowledge"
sufficiently expresses the personal union. But the act of intentional presence is precisely what is meant by knowledge,
113

Systematic Theology, I, p. 192.

>H

Ibid., p. 190.

TILLICH's

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41

and, as will be observed in detail below, it is only the problems
of a particular ontological tradition which places an opposition
instead of a unity-even an identity-between subject and object. That it be an accident does not separate it from the
personal center of the knowing individual, but rather affirms
a new way in which that person realizes his existence. In this
case it is the greatest of all ways, for it is the realization of His
existence. Finally, since this is really the person knowing, it
cannot be isolated or opposed to the person loving God; instead
the two must be united.
Ontological problems of the most serious nature could not
but accompany these epistemological difficulties of the Protestant philosophy of Paul Tillich. Their background is found
in a system of thought earlier than modern idealism and in
relation to a difficulty deeper than that of the origin of the
concept. Plotinus appreciated that the summit of his pyramid
of reality must be occupied by that which is most perfect and,
consequently, most one. He felt, however, that knowledge,
while it seems to be a perfection, requires a dichotomy between
subject and object, nous and being. This dichotomy, in turn,
implies that each of its elements is finite. 115 Consequently, the
supreme One can not be simply being or knowing. At the same
time, the One is not less perfect than these two, since it is the
source of both. Therefore, in an improper sense and as a
synthesis of both, it is both being and nonbeing, knowing and
non-knowing. Nicholas of Cusa expresses these tendencies in
his notion of the divine as the coincidence of opposites. Tillich
follows in this line of thought, but with a more pantheistic and
dialectical accent.
As the ground of being, the divine must have the ontological
elements. But as transcendent, God is neither potentiality nor
actuality, neither becoming nor rest, neither dynamics nor form
in the proper sense of these terms. It is just as wrong to speak
of God as becoming as it is to speak of him as pure act. In the
115 It is this polar relationship between subject and object which Tillich considers
to be the irreducible point of departure for all metaphysical speculation and the
norm of all religious thought.

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GEORGE F. MCLEAN

former case he would be an absolute accident, in the latter he
would not be alive. Furthermore, since none of these elements
are properly in God, the divine cannot be said to be constructed
of a simple combination of each pair. It is possible to affirm
each of these elements of God only symbolically, though this
implies a true participation in their reality. God unites and
balances all of these elements so that there is no tension, or
even distinction, between them. Thus God symbolically has
form as intellect and dynamics as will, but they are perfectly
balanced in what is properly a higher synthesis. He is the
"absolute participant," but only as the "absolute individual,"
because both are united in the divine life which is " equally
' near ' to each of them while transcending them both." 116 As
the ground of being he has a negative element. This is overcome as negative in the divine process, but in creatures, where
it is not overcome, it remains the basis of their negative
element. 117 For this reason simple perfections cannot be properly attributed to the divine, but must be accompanied by a
limitation and a negation. The negative is not meant merely
to deny that in God these perfections share the limitations of
their created state. It is in God as the foundation of the
negative element in creatures.
Since these problems arose from the requirement of a subjectobject dichotomy and limitation for knowledge, it would seem
that the true solution might well be sought in these same areas.
The requirement of the dichotomy is true in the case of finite
beings precisely because of their potential element. However,
of its very nature knowledge is not a passive reception, but the
act of an agent. Consequently, where the reality is pure act
and knows itself directly it is by identity both actual intelligence and actual intelligibility. By formal identity God is both
subject and object. 118 The act of knowing does not of its nature
produce something else. It itself is the perfection intended.
117 Ibid., pp. 246-47.
Systematic Theology, I, p. 245.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, I, Q. 14, a. 2 & Q. 16, a. 5, ad 2.
" His existence is not dissimilar to His intellect."
116

118

TILLICH's

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OF PROTESTANTISM

43

This is true of all immanent or vital actions. 119 For this reason
it is impossible to accept Tillich's general statements that life
must include a separation of potentiality and actuality, or
that the nature of life is actualization rather than actuality. 120
The pure act of scholastic philosophy is unjustly accused of
being a static God. He is, in fact, supremely dynamic because the pure act, the supreme being, is the very subsistent
act of knowledge, love and life. In attempting to add an
element of dynamics to the divine, modern philosophy corrects its own deficiency, which is based on its interpretation
of form in a Platonic and passive fashion. The Thomistic
conception does not share this deficiency because of its Aristotelian orientation, according to which form is active. 121
It will be noted that there is a considerable difference from
Plotinus in Tillich's conception of the divine as being itself. It
is true, he would affirm, that because of the divine perfection
and transcendence the ontological elements and categories can
be predicated of God only symbolically. God is neither existing
nor non-existing, neither a person nor not a person. He is
beyond cause, substance and even being. However, and on this
Tillich quite insists, this is not to say that he is above beings,
for this would make him an idol.122 The transcendence of God
consists in his being the power, the creative ground, the depth
within being, without himself being anything special. This
would seem to reduce the divine to what is most common
because most indetermined and abstract, the common notion
of being. However, since Tillich does not want his God to be
119 ln order to retain the true perfection of the divine, motion must be distinguished from operation. The former is always from potency to act and transient;
the latter is not transient but only an act and perfection of the agent. As act it
does not imply change and consequently is entirely consonant with pure act.
120 Systematic Theology, I, p.
121 Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., The Doctrine af Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysic8
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1957), p.
122 The Interpretation af History, pp.
"Avoid ... placing the unconditioned meaning heside the conditioned meanings or even beside the totality of
meanings. . . . In every ' above ' lies a ' beside ' and in every ' beside ' a • conditioned.'"

44

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

an abstraction or a supreme genus, he adds to his conception of
the divine "an element of pantheism." If what is nothing
special is to be anything real, it must in some way be everything. Creation becomes a type of auto-limitation of the absolute, for this absolute has suffered a basic misfortune. It has
been confused with a notion of being which is not truly analogous but univocal and, in a sense, pantheistic.
According to Tillich, this pantheism, which considers God to
be the substance or essence of all things, is necessary for
Christianity. It is the very foundation of that divine presence
which becomes actual and manifest in the circumstances of
revelation. However, this note of pantheism is mitigated by a
dialectic which " tries to unite the structural oneness of everything within the absolute with the undecided and unfinished
manifoldness of the real." 123 In this conception the divine is
first positively in himself. Then he moves out from himself to
the negative state of existence, and returns to himself in the
eschatological state. There are expressions in the writings of
Tillich which might lead one to conclude that the dialectical
movement is sufficiently strong to dissipate the pantheism
indicated above. It is remarked that being itself "is not identified with the totality of things," 124 but infinitely transcends
every finite being. This is possible because the abyss is conceived as tlie inexhaustible ground of being. This notion of
the abys,s is undoubtedly received from Schelling who held it
because of the problem of distinguishing things entirely from
God without placing them outside of him. This was solved
"by things having their basis in that within God which is not
God himself, i.e. in that which is the basis of his existence." 125
However, in Tillich's philosophy this abyss is the primary
essence of God and there is no " existing" God to be clearly
distinguished from it. Furthermore, it is potential and mediated
to us by the other element of God, the logos. The dialectic and
us Systematic

Theology, I, pp. 234-35.
Ibid., II, p. 6 & I, pp. 237 & 250.
126 Friedrich
Wilhelm Joseph Schelling, Of Human Freedom, trans.
Gutmann (Chicago: The Open Court Publishing Co., 1936), p. 33.
12 •

James

TILLICH'S

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OF PROTESTANTISM

45

its structural determinations fail adequately to expunge pantheism while reinforcing the element of potentiality already evident in his God.126
This question of pantheism being ontological, such a position
could not but place a radical deficiency in his ontological
dialectic. The divine is made an analytic depth dimension of
all reality. In these circumstances it becomes necessary to
choose between a denial of individualization, limitation and
world on the one hand, and the denial of pure act on the other.
Tillich's option for the latter leaves the world without a sufficient reason, and justly labeled as simply meaningless. But in
this case the lack of meaning merely reflects that of the
pantheism which imposes such a false dilemma. 121
We may now turn to an evaluation of Tillich's notion of
participation. Since he placed this notion at the heart of
religion, it is the particular realization of this which must
specify his whole philosophy as Protestant and contemporary.
Indeed, it was in order to provide a foundation for participation
without a loss of individualization that Tillich affirmed both
pantheism and elements of limitation of God. What now must
be said of his conception of participation as religious, as Protestant and as contemporary? How successful has· it been in
providing a speculative synthesis of these factors?
As noted above, Tillich fully insists on the central position of
participation in the fact of religion, and in this he is quite
correct. To whatever degree we are, we participate in the
divine. This is the foundation of our knowledge of God and of
our duties toward him. But the question arises whether Tillich's
stress on participation is not a turning away from traditional
Protestantism and toward the perennial position of the Church.
In point of fact, he considers participation, and consequently
106 Syste'TTU.Ltic Theology, I, p.
"If we say God is being-itself, this includes
both rest and becoming, both the static and the dynamic elements."
127 Tillich's final decision against simple pantheism is based on the evident fact
of man's freedom. While this saves him from the excesses of some pantheists it
does not modify his insistence on " an element of pantheism " as has been described
above. Ibid., p.

46

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

the substance of religion, to have been best realized and preserved in Catholic doctrine and practice. It is in this light that
he has spoken of Catholicism as a permanent corrective for
Protestantism. 128
In this same context it is of special interest that he should
choose the Aristotelian ontology when explicitly comparing it
with that of Ockham. 129 While the Venerabilis Inceptor and his
school were far from being accepted in their entirety by the
reformers, they were considered to be the best of the Scholastics. Their influence on Luther was extensive, especially in
opposing analogy and participation in the realms of justification, church and the sacraments. 130 The trend Luther most
abhorred was the Aristotelian.m This contrast of historical
perspective is seen to imply doctrinal opposition when it is
remembered that much of Luther's objection to Aristotelian
thought was directed at its defense of nature and its powers.
On the contrary, Tillich's dissatisfaction with Ockham stems
from the fact that he has so forgotten essence and nature that
participation is reduced to " an arbitrary commandment imposed by an all-powerful existent on the other existents." 132
This type of objection to Ockham logically extends to the
notion of forensic justification, according to which man's nature
remains corrupt and his actions evil although God no longer
imputes this to him. This was held not only by Luther's
128 " The Permanent Signification of the Catholic Church for Protestantism,"
loc.
cit., pp.
Systematic Theology, III, pp. 6, 168-71.
129 Systematic Theology, I, pp.
"" J. Paquier, "Luther," Dictionnaire de Theologie Catholique, ed. A. Vacant,
IX-I
cols. ll87-88 & 12.51-53; H. Grisar, S. J., Luther, trans. E. Lamond
(London: B. Herder, 1914), I, pp. 180-65; Robert Fife, The Revolt of Martin
LutAer (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp.
"He has put
together the framework of a theological structure which is now all but complete ....
Despite his attack on. the Schoolmen its foundations were laid on the doctrine of the
powerful, irrational will of God as he had learned it from the Erfurt nominalists."
131 The strength of this abhorrence may be gauged from Luther's characterizations
of Aristotle as "the prince of darkness," and "the damned, arrogant, sarcastic
heathen." Such expressions become more frequent and violent as Luther progressively separates himself from many of his earlier philosophical positions.
m Systematic Theology, I, pp.

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

47

followers, but by the Reformer himsel£.133 For these reasons it
would seem that Tillich:s development of the importance of
participation is, in fact, a decided step away from classical
Protestant thought and toward Catholicism.
These orientations of Tillich's notion of religious participation lend special interest to his attempts to provide it with a
Protestant modality. Positively, these center on a reevaluation
of the personal character of participation, according to which it
effects even the most intimate aspects of man as an individual
subject. There is much in this which commends it. It brings
out the totality of one's dependence on God and its penetration
to the center of one's personality. In this thought nothing is
closer to the Christian, nothing more real, than the divine. This
is what the great mystics have attempted to express in more
poetic language. Unfortunately, it is at this point that Tillich's
own stringent and necessary requirement of pairing participation with individualization places a problem which he cannot
solve. He had been right in appreciating the necessity of participation, but wrong in attempting to realize it by " an element
of pantheism." Now his authentic demand that participation
have a personal character bears out the previous error, for
when God is a depth dimension of man the individuality of
both is lost.
Negatively, Tillich's attempt to provide a Protestant modality for participation led him to twin objections to the
Catholic conception of this notion. His first difficulty is with
its conception of God as a separate thing. The factors underlying this objection have already been examined. It is sufficient
to remark that real participation can be had only in a context
of being which is transcendent. This extension of being to the
infinite and the supernatural is manifested by the rational
proofs for God's existence and by revelation respectively. It is,
183 Luther, op. cit., p. 108. "Numquid
ergo perfecte iustus? Non, sed simul
peccator et iustus; peccator re vera, sed iustus ex reputatione et permissione Dei
certa, quod liberet ab illo, donee perfecte sanet. Ac per hoc sanus perfecte est in spe,
in re autem peccator, sed initium habens iustitiae, ut amplius querat semper, semper
iniustum se sciens."

48

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

in fact, the very infinity of the first cause which necessitates its
real distinction from its finite effects.
The second difficulty applies the full force of the accusation
of extermi1ism and impersonality to the Catholic notion of
supernatural participation by grace. It should be recalled, however, that grace is an accident, the nature of which is to modify,
not itself, but the subject. The result of such a modification
could not be simply an external addition. On the contrary, it
makes the subject itself exist in a new manner. 184 The person
now exists as participating in the divine in this new way. The
personal character of this modification is made even more evident when it is appreciated that all is ordered to charity which,
Tillich himself would be the first to insist, is the antithesis of
the impersonal. It would appear then that one cannot but
heartily agree with Tillich's stress on the personal character of
participation. Increase in spiritual perfection consists in making
this union intimate and more total. But while this is perfectly
consequent upon a system of transcendent being, realized by
dynamic and static participation in the orders of nature and
grace, it is incompatible with the element of pantheism.
The last aim of Tillich's Protestant philosophy is to be contemporary by realizing participation in the very midst of meaninglessness. Evidently, this cannot be a participation in nothing
and he strongly objects to placing anything above the world.
Thus, he turns to a divine depth dimension of the real which,
in the situation of revelation, breaks through to produce such
phenomena as justification and symbols. The solution of the
contemporary problem of meaninglessness by turning in the
equally contemporary direction of subjectivity is an important
development of religious thought for today and points up
some elements only poorly stressed in the past. It is unfortunate, but not surprising, that this work should include
the difficulties mentioned above.
However, this does not negate Tillich's many valuable in'"'St. Thomas, Summa Theologiea, I-ll, Q. 55, a. 4, ad 1. "Accidents and nonsubsistent forms are called beings, not as if they themselves had being, but because
things are by them."

TILLICH'S

EXISTENTIAL

PHILOSOPHY

OF PROTESTANTISM

49

sights into the nature of the contemporary religious problem.
These have been stated above in the positive exposition of
his system. It has been the penetrating nature of such analyses
of today's crisis of meaning and the ingenuity of the solutions
stated in terms of this problem that have made him one of the
most influential religious thinkers in the world today. What
remains to be done here is to weigh the implications of this
contemporary solution drawn from within the emptiness and
despair. A discerning light might be shed on this by a consideration of his election of Aristotle over Plato in regard to the
foundation of meaning. Tillich's reason for this choice is that
Aristotle allows existence to add to essence while keeping it
strictly dependent on God. 135 In this way he leaves room for
a special participation in the divine which will provide meaning in the midst of today's meaninglessness. One would not
question the profound ontological affinity of man for an added
participation in the divine beyond that had in the first and
second stages of Tillich's dialectic. An analysis of man's
spiritual nature would show that, even in the uncorrupted first
stage, its ultimate and definitive perfection could be had only
in a direct vision of the divine and the whole order which leads
to this. Even if such a vision would be beyond the capacities
and potential condition of any creature, the fact that it alone
would completely actualize and immobilize man's spiritual
capacities points to man's singular affinity for such a participation in the divine beyond that had by his nature. Furthermore, a phenomenological and philosophical analysis of the
second, sinful stage more than bears out man's moral inability
to observe all of the natural law for a considerable length of
time without some special help. This points once again to the
moral necessity of an additional participation in the divine.
In this there appear both the validity of Tillich's analysis
135 Systematic Theology, I, p. 208. For a discussion by the present author of
Tillich's assertion that his symbol participates in the reality of that for which it
stands and is the same as St. Thomas' analogy, cf. "Symbol and Analogy: Tillich
and Thomas," Revue de l'Univeraite d'Ottawa, XXVTII (Oct.-Dec., 1958), pp.
198*-!i!SS*.

50

GEORGE F. MCLEAN

and the debility of his solution. His contemporary existential
analysis unveils the antinomy that is man: a creature torn between the grandeur of his spiritual aspirations and the poverty
of his created condition, a capacity which can be filled only
by a special participation in the divine. Unfortunately, his
solution seeks this participation from within. This places the
divine as an interior dimension of all beings, too limited to be
pure act and too unlimited to allow for the full individualization
of God and creatures. If then this participation must rather be
sought from without, adding to the essence and existence of the
first and second dialectical stages, it cannot be denied the title
of supernatural. Despite the considerable distaste which Tillich
manifests for this term and the systematic reality it represents,
it would seem that it is hardly less called for by his attempt to
realize a special participation in the divine in relation to contemporary contradictions, than it is by the notions of deification
expressed by the apostles Paul and John. St. Paul speaks of
participating as coheirs in the proper heritage of God's divine
Son/ 36 and St. John insists that "we should be called the
children of God; and such we are .... We shall be like him,
for we shall see him just as he is. And everyone who has this
hope in him makes himself holy, just as he also is holy." 137
GEoRGE F. McLEAN, O.M.I.

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

136
137

Rom. 8, 14-17; Gal. 4, 1-7
I John 2, 29 & 8, 1.

ST. PAUL'S NOTION ON
THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

S

T. PAUL'S unique view of the new status of redeemed
man is that he is an adopted son of God. To express this
hallmark he chose the Greek term hyiothesia. This word
is used by and has its background in contemporary legal literature/ but its occurrence in the Sacred Scriptures is limited to
the New Testament, and there it is used only five times,always by St. Paul (Gal. 4, 5; Rom. 8,
9, 4; Eph. 1, 5) .
Of these five occurrences, one (Rom. 9, 4) refers to the relationship of the Israelites to God in the Old Testament dispensation; 2 the remaining four speak of Christian hyiothesia,
of adoptive sonship as it is bestowed on the believer in Christ
because of his faith in Jesus, the Son of God. Of these four,
one (Rom. 8,
depicts hyiothesia as something that will be
ours after the resurrection of the body; 3 the remaining three
(Gal. 4, 5; Rom. 8, 15; Eph. 1, 5) describe it as something already shared here on earth. 4
1 The term occurs
profane writings from the times of Pindar and Herodotus.
Cf. G. Wilkius and L. Grimm, Lexicon Graeco-Latinum in Libros Novi Testamenti,
(Lipsiae: Zehl, 1903) sub voce; A. Deissmann, Bible Studies, (Edinburgh: Clark,
1901) page 239.
• M. Schoenberg, "Hyiothesia: The Adoptive Sonship of the Israelites" in
AER CXLIII (October, 1960) 261-273.
3 For this reason, as also because of new manuscript evidence (P 46), modern
authors do not consider the word in this text authentic. See P. Benoit, "Ncus
gemissons, attendant Ia delivrance de notre corps" (Rom VIII, 23)-Melanges
Lebreton; Recherches de Scie:nce Religieuse 39 (1951) 267-281; S. Lyonnet, in his
recent study and translation of the Epistle to the Romans, Les Epltres de Saint
Paul aux Galates et aux Romains in La Sainte Bible traduite en francais sous Ia
direction de !'Ecole Biblique de Jerusalem (Paris: Cerf, 1953) omits hyiothesia
entirely and translates without further comment either in the text or in the footnotes: " Et non pas elle seule: nous-memes qui possedons les premices de !'Esprit,
nous gemissons nous aussi interieurement dans l'attente que notre corps soit delivre."
• The same three texts have an intriguing interchange of pronouns from the first
to the second persons in their immediate context (See Gal 4, 5 f: . . . hina ten
hyiothesian apolabomen ... hoti este hyioi .•. kardias hemon; cp. Gal 3,

51

52

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

In tum, two of these (Gal. 4, 5 f; Rom. 8, 14 f) bear such
close textual resemblance to each other that it is practically
impossible to say which is the voice and which the echo; so
much so that exegetes are of the opinion that "the two texts
ought not be separated, for they mutually throw light upon
each other." 5 Yet when considered separately and within their
own context, even these will appear to have an emphasis and
connotation all their own.
It is the purpose of this study to examine in chronological
order the three texts (Gal. 4,5; Rom. 8,15; Eph.1, 5) where St.
Paul speaks about adoptive sonship in this life in an effort to
obtain a better acquaintance with the Apostle's contribution
and doctrine on the precise nature of our Christian status.
GAL. 4, 4-6

The Epistles to the Galatians and the Romans have a remarkable similarity between them, both as to general subjectmatter and to development. Father Benoit compares them in
this to two other epistles of St. Paul which are also strikingly
similar, namely, Colossians and Ephesians. It is his opinion
that in each group there is much the same atmosphere between
the two with this difference that Galatians and Colossians are
written in the heat of controversy, whereas Romans and
Ephesians are written when the pitch of the crisis has passed
and victory is secure. 6 Prat even goes so far as to consider the
shorter epistle in each group as a first-draft, a sketch of the
longer/
second person; Gal 8, 18-15 -first person; Gal 8, !l6-29-second person. Likewise
Rom 8, 15 ... elabete ... krazomen; and Eph 1, U-15 ... hemas .• , humeis
... humfm ... hemiin. Furthermore, all of them have an unmistakable reference
to the Old Testament dispensation in their larger context (See Gal 8; Rom 7; Eph
1, 8-14).

• F. Prat, The Theology of St. Paul, translated from the 11th. French ed. by
John L. Stoddard, (2 vols., Westminster: Newman, 1952) IT, 185.
6 P. Benoit, "L'Horizon
Paulinien de I'Epitre aux Ephesiens" in RB 46 (1987)
pages 509 f.; E. Driessen, "De Auxilio Dei et salute hominis apud S. Pauium" VD
eo (1940) 58.
• F. Prat, o. c. I, 280.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

53

The discussion of such introductory questions as origin, date,
and destination of the Epistle to the Galatians need not detain
us here. For these the manuals of Introduction to the Scriptures as also the introductory sections of monographs on this
epistle can be consulted. Suffice it to say that authors are
unanimous in their opinion that Galatians was written before
Romans; and that the majority of writers date it from St. Paul's
stay at Ephesus during his Third Missionary Journey, though
they vary somewhat (from 53 to 57 A. D.) as to its probable
date. This makes Gal. 4, 4-6 the first text chronologically in
which St. Paul used the term hyiothegia.
In the original, this passage has its proportion of variant
readings, which are noted in the critical editions. However, all
of them are minor, thus showing that the tradition of the text
is constant. What is striking is that here alone the term
hyiothegian is preceded by the definite article ten. There is no
variant reading which would omit or alter it. This is all the
more worth noting, since in the other texts in which St. Paul
speaks of Christian hyiothegia there is no article with the
substantive and no variant text whatever which proposes adding one.8 It is only when St. Paul speaks of the hyiothegia of
the Israelites in Rom. 9, 4 that he again uses the definite article.
The fact that the definite article is used with hyiothegia in
both Gal. 4, 5 and Rom. 9, 4 does not necessarily correlate the
notion of the noun in the two texts. In the Greek language
the definite article was originally a demonstrative pronoun, and
it has retained this quality of pointing out, or specifying something. Though it may not always be clear to us what the author
had in mind, yet the fact that he uses the article shows that
he had something definite in view.9 An article is usually found
with a concrete noun since such a noun signifies a particular
object, and the article calls attention to an object as such. The
article is generally omitted with an abstract noun since the
• Rom 8, 15; Eph 1, 5. Even Rom 8, Sl3 (if authentic, see fn. 3) does not have
the article.
• M. Zerwick, Graecit!M Biblica exemplis illustratur (ed. 3a., Roma; P. I. B.,
1955) n. 1S!Sl.

54

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

latter stresses the nature or quality of the thing rather than the
thing itself. Hence if an article is used with an abstract noun it
merits special attention, as does also the omission of an article
with a concrete noun. 10
In Gal. 4, 5 we have an abstract noun used with a definite
article. That the sacred writer used the definite article and
therefore had some very specific concept in mind and wished
to present it as such is certain. What this particular aspect
was we do not know. St. Paul may be referring to the" wellknown» Christian hyiothesia about which he had instructed
the Galatians in his oral teaching, and which was now their
privilege and their assurance of future inheritance; but he may
also be going a step further, and connecting the Christian
hyiothesia with the hyiothesia of Israel as type and anti-type.
Unfortunately, very few writers pay any special heed to the
meaning of the article in the text under discussion. From the
tenor of their comments only implicit allusions to the article
are made by Eusebius of Emessa, St. John Chrysostom, and
Lagrange, since all three refer to the sonship contained in the
Law and the promises. Referring to ten hyiothesian Eusebius
of Emessa (*859) explains it as "that which was already in
store in the promises but which was kept hidden in the meantime while the Law was in effect and the appointed times had
not yet been fulfilled." 11 St. John Chrysostom (354-407) comments on Gal. 4, 5 as follows: "Here he states t:wo objects and
effects of the Incarnation, deliverance from evil and supply of
good things which none could compass but Christ. They are
these: deliverance from the curse of the Law, and promotion
to sonship. Fitly does he say, that we might receive (be paid),
implying that it was due; for the promise was of old time made
for these objects to Abraham, as the Apostle has himself shown
at great length. And how does it appear that we have become
sons? He has told us one mode, in that we have put on Christ
who is the very Son; and now he mentions another, in that we
10

11

Ibid., nn. lSI, ISS.
In K. Staab, Die Pauluskatenen, (Romae:

P. I. B., 1926) p. 50.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

55

have received the Spirit of adoption." 12 Lagrange avers that in
hyiothesia St. Paul widens the horizon of the divine dispensation which was described in the preceding verses so that it
includes God's supreme intent in the activity of Christ, which
is the conferring of adoptive sonship through the union of the
faithful with the natural Son of God; something which had
already been promised. 13
E. De Witt Burton, on the other hand, makes an explicit
reference to the article. After giving his view on hyiothesia and
expressing his opinion that for Paul it is " God's reception of
man into the relation to him of sons, objects of his love and
enjoying his fellowship, the ultimate issue of which is the
future life wherein they are reclothed with a spiritual body,"
he takes special note of the article and continues: " The article
ten is doubtless restrictive, pointing to the thought of vv. 1-2
that at the time appointed of the father the child is released
from subjection to tutors and governors, and comes into direct
relation to the father as a mature son-an intimation more
fully developed in v. 6." 14
Thus all these writers see in the Christian hyiothesia some
sort of evolution and fulfillment of the promises made to
Abraham which already included the hyiothesia of Israel.
The connection between the Christian hyiothesia and that of
Israel, with the latter being a type of the former, is developed
at greater length by S. Zadda. 15 This writer affirms explicitly
that in his letter to the Galatians St. Paul considers the Church
as the continuation and the antitype of ancient Israel. This is
the full meaning of the phrase "And to thy offspring" (Gal. 3,
16); it underlies the expression "Israel of God" of 6,16. To
this new Israel belong all the prerogatives with which the old
12

Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, in A Library of the Fathers,

(Oxford, 1860) V, 62.
13 M. J. Lagrange, Epitre aux Galatea, p. 198.

"A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians, (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1921) p. 220 f.
10 L' adozione a figli di dio e ln Spirito Santcr-Storia
deU' interpretazione ll
teologia miatica di Gal 4, 6, (Roma: P. I. B., 1952) p. 148.

56

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

Israel was endowed (Rom. 9, 4); and first among these was
adoption to divine sonship. As a matter of fact, the new Israel
shares all these privileges in virtue of the same covenants and
promises. Hence St. Paul is able to write: "For if the right
to inherit be from the Law, it is no longer from a promise. But
God gave it to Abraham by promise .... Now we, brethren,
are the children of promise, as Isaac was" (Gal. 3, 18; 4, 28) .
There is only one Israel, and we are all sons of God and of
Abraham. In St. Paul's mind the one is equivalent to the other.
"For they are not all Israelites who are sprung from Israel;
nor because they are the descendants of Abraham, are they all
his children; but 'through Isaac shall thy posterity bear thy
name.' That is to say, they are not sons of God who are the
children of the flesh, but it is the children of promise who are
reckoned as posterity" (Rom. 9, 7.8).
This same connection between the hyiothesia of Israel and
the Christian hyiothesia, with the latter being the fulfillment
of the former, can also be traced in the interesting interplay of
personal pronouns in Chapters 3 and 4. Since St. Paul is writing to the Galatians to counteract the Judaizers, and especially
since the Christian community is basically a Gentile one (Acts,
chs. 13-14; Gal. 4, 8), who are being enticed to adopt Jewish
practices (4, 11) and to observe the Mosaic Law (4,21), he
uses the pronoun of the first person (we) in 3, 23-25 16 and
4, 35 17 to describe these obligations as they were incumbent on
the Jews and includes himself among them.
18 Such commentators as take note of the person of the pronoun in this section
are unanimous in referring it to the Jews. Thus e. g.: M. J. Lagrange, Epitre aua;
Romains, p. 71; R. C. H. Lenski, The Interpretation of St. Pavl's Epistl6 to th6
Galatians, etc., p. 179.
11 Concerning the people St. Paul has in mind in ·these verses there is no uniform
opinion among exegetes. On the whole, the authorities are divided about equally
between two groups:
a) those who hold that hemeis-hMnein--Bmetha--apolabomen refer to all the
Galatian converts, whether Jewish or Gentile. Such are: E. De Witt Burton, o. c.,
p. 215; Lagrange, o. c., p. 88; J. B. Lightfoot, St. Pavl's Epistle to the Galatians,
(34th. ed., London, Macmillan, 1867), p. 146.
b) those who think that by the pronoun of the first person plural in this passage
St. Paul refers to himself and to his Galatian Jewish converts only: S. Buzy,

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

57

Thus in 3,19-22 St. Paul explains the purpose of the Law.
It was really meant to lead to Christ. In Christ the Jews who
believed received their full status of sonship. But the Gentiles
also have become sons of God through faith in Jesus Christ
(vs. 26), and have the same full status as the Jews, since they
have the same faith. There is no difference of rank or status.
As a matter of fact, by their faith they are really" offspring of
Abraham," and heirs of the promise made to him (vs. 29).
Although the Jews were really God's own people, recipients
of the promises, the Law, etc. (Rom. 9, 4), yet they were in a
state of expectancy and imperfection because the end (Christ)
for which these things had been given them had not yet
appeared. But now that Christ has come and the promises have
been fulfilled, the Jews who believe in Christ have at length
received their full status of sonship ("that we might receive the
adoption of sons " Gal. 4, 5) . But the Gentiles are also truly
sons of God (Gal. 3, 26) , and that they are sons is evident from
the fact that God has sent the same Spirit of his Son into their
hearts as He did into the hearts of the Jewish believers (Gal.
4, 6).
Can the Apostle's view on the nature of this hyiothesia,
which he uses here for the first time, be specified in more
detail? In his commentary on this passage Burton states that
for Paul hyiothesia is " God's reception of men into the relation
to him as sons, objects of his love and enjoying his fellowship,
the ultimate issue of which is the future life .... " 18 What is
this relation to God as sons? Is it merely external and juridical?
or is it also internal and ontological?
These questions are very specific, but since authors in general
are not making a special study of this point, they do not give
us a specific answer. We must seek our answer concerning their
opinion in their manner of explaining the terms hyiothesia and
its effect, hyioi theou, in their broader context. By consulting
Epitre aux Galatea (in La Sainte Bible, vol. XI, 2me. partie) p. 453; R. C. H.
Lenski, o. c., p. 194; A. Steinmann, Die Briefe an die Thessaloniker und Galater
(Bonn: Hanstein, 1935), p. lSI.
18 o. c., p. 220.

58

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

a number of such authorities we soon see that there are two
major categories of opinions on the question. There is the
opinion which holds that hyiothesia means adoption as a legal
or juridical act, and that to be a son of God in our context
means maturity, independence, freedom andjor moral likeness
and spiritual fellowship with God. Such is the view maintained
by Burton/ 9 Lenski/ 0 Lightfoot/ 1 Massie, 22 Stamm/ 3 Sieffert. 24
The other view, defended by Cornely, 25 Lagrange, 26 Steinmann, 27 Candlish, 28 and Zahn, 29 is that hyiothesia also produces
an internal effect, the result of which is an ontological change
within a man, whereby he shares the divine nature and becomes
truly a new being, a son of God. What are we to think of these
opinions?
To answer our question we must examine the context in
which the term hyiothesia occurs. The general context can be
readily ascertained by a reading of the entire epistle to the
Galatians, which is quite short, and in which the development
of thought is strongly marked. After a brief introduction
(1, 1-10) and an ardent defense of his apostolate (1, 11-24)
and gospel (2, 1-21) St. Paul launches into the doctrinal portion of his epistle (3, 1-4, 31). This is followed by some moral
counsels of a general (5, 1-26) and specific character (6, 1-10);
and the whole is ended by a brief conclusion (6, 11-18).
o. c., p. 202.
o. c., p. 185.
21 J. B. Lightfoot, St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians, (Srd. ed., London:
Macmillan, 1869), p. 148.
22 " Testament,"
in A Dictionary of the Bible, edited by James Hastings, M.A.,
D. D., (5 vols, Edinburgh: Clark) IV, 720.
23 R. T. Stamm, Introduction and Exegesis-The
Epistle to the Galatians, (in
The Interpeter's Bible, X), p. 518.
24 F. Siefiert, Der Brief an die Galater, in Meyer's Kommentar
iiber das Neue
Testament. (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1899) p. 226.
•• R. Comely, Epistolae ad Corinthios altera et ad Galatas, in Cursus Scripturae
Sacrae, (Parish: Lethielleux, 1892), p. 517.
26 0. c., p. 92.
27 o. c., p. 128.
28 " Adoption " in Hastings, A Dictionary of th6 Bible, I, 41.
•• T. Zahn, Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater, (3 Auflage, in Kommentar zum
neuen Testament, Band IX, Leipsig: Deichert, 1922) , p. 202.
19•
20

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

59

We are specifically interested in the doctrinal or dogmatic
part of the Epistle. This portion is succinctly outlined by J. E.
Steinmueller, 30 who expresses its theme as "Justification from
Faith," and then develops its context into three headings. In
the Introduction St. Paul reminds the Galatians that they
" received the Holy Spirit and the charisms, not in virtue of
the works of the Law, but by reason of their faith in Christ
(3, 1-5) ." As Argument the Apostle invokes the authority of
the Scriptures, thus showing "that Abraham attained justification, not through circumcision or through the observance of
the Law, but through faith, so that all believers will be justified
by faith · (3, 6-9) . The Law, which does not rest on faith, instead of bringing justification, brings those who trust in its
inherent sanctifying power under a curse (3, 10-14). This Law
which was given 430 years after the promise to Abraham because of his faith did not annul or supplant that promise (3, 1518) ." For its Purpose, "the Law was divinely intended to be a
protection to the Hebrews, to serve as a moral guide which
would make them sin- and guilt-conscious and would thus lead
them to Christ (3, 19-25) . With the advent of Christ its task
of tutoring came to an end, and the time for the cessation of the
Law arrived (3, 26-29), just as in the natural order guardianship ceases when the child has reached its majority (4, 1-7) .
Were the Galatians to abandon their present religious freedom
and submit to the slavery of the Mosaic Law, Paul's labors
among them would have been in vain (4,8-11). He begs them,
therefore, to rekindle their love for him and abide by his
gospel (4, 12-20) . They are by no means slaves, but free men,
children of promise and sons of the free woman as is illustrated
by the story of Abraham, and it is Christ who has made them
free (4,21-31) ."
St. Paul thus recalls to the Galatians their personal experience of the Holy Spirit and of his charisms, and reminds them
that these were received through faith in Christ, as free gifts of
God, and not through the works of the Law as something they
30

A Companion to Scripture Studies, (New York: Wagner, 1943) III, fl66.

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MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

had earned. In this the Galatians are like Abraham who was
also justified by faith and not by the Law. As a matter of fact
the Law is later and cannot annul the promise previously made
(3, 17) . On the contrary its very purpose was to prepare the
way for the fulfillment of that promise. With the coming of
Christ this purpose was accomplished and now that the promise
made to Abraham is fulfilled the temporary arrangements of
the Law are no longer binding. The Apostle then clarifies this
last assertion with an illustration taken from the legal practice
of his day whereby a father appointed a guardian over his son
and his possessions up to a certain time (4, 1.2). This, however,
does not necessarily imply that he considers the fulfillment of
the promise and its object as an exclusively legal entity.
From all this an important truth, which throws some light
on our inquiry, becomes evident. It is this: St. Paul does not
describe hyiothesia and its effects precisely because of themselves. They may very well be worth a separate discussion,
as are so many other things. But the fact remains that in the
Epistle to the Galatians hyiothesia is introduced not for its own
sake but as an adjunct in the description of the character and
the purpose of the Law. It consequently comes into play only
in so far as it helps to clarify that question. And the point
which St. Paul is driving home to the Galatians is that they are
free from the Law. This means that through faith in Christ,
all-whether Jew or Gentile-have acquired a new status; they
are now sons of God.
This sonship is not merely external and juridical; on the
contrary it is internal, and affects their whole being. St. Paul
does not take up specifically this point on the nature and constitutive elements to filial adoption-much as we would like
to have him do so. But he does give us a hint of its internal
character and power through the examples he uses. In connection with the hyiothesia of the Israelites (Rom. 9, 4) he
illustrates his meaning by the metaphor of a lump of dough
and of the branches of a tree (Rom.ll, 16-22) .31 In like manner
31

Schoenberg, o. c., pp. !l66-!l7!l.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

61

the overtones of an interior and ontological efficiency are present in the context under discussion. After having told the
Galatians that they are all the sons of God through faith in
Jesus Christ (3, 6) , he continues: "For all you who have been
baptized in Christ, have put on Christ. There is neither Jew nor
Greek; there is neither slave nor freeman; there is neither male
nor female" (3, 27-28) . The contrast between Jew and Gentitle,
and between slave and freeman may not appear as striking or as radical to us as it did to St. Paul and to his readers;
and we can very well imagine the change from the one to the
other as something merely external without in any way affecting the substance of the person involved. But the third example
used, in which St. Paul states that among the children of God
there is not even the difference of male and female is one which
cannot escape even us. To become a person without the distinction of sex is certainly an internal and ontological change.
· The best indication of St. Paul's view on the interior character of hyiothesia, however, is given in vs. 6, where he says
that "God has sent the Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying,
Abba, Father." In the original Greek the gender of the participle is neuter, thus unquestionably referring to the Spirit,
namely, pneuma . .. krazon. Hence it is the Spirit which cries
within us, or as St. Paul explains in Rom. 8, 15, through
whom we cry, en hoi krazomen. This Spirit infuses into us a
new vitality and makes us partakers of a nature above the one
with which we were born. 32
RoM. 8,15
Our attention has already been called to the great similarity
in general subject matter of the Epistles to the Galatians and
to the Romans and between Gal. 4, 5-6 and Rom. 8, 14-15
in particular. In his special study on Gal. 4, 6 concerning the
32 A. Steinmann, o. c., p. 186.
T. Zahn, o. c., p. 202; 205 f. "Dasz es sich hierbei wie bei dem Begriff hyiothesia,
v. 5., urn eine Einfloszung einer neuen Lebenkkraft, einer hoheren als der angeborenen
Natur (2 Petr. 1, 4) handelt, zeigen die Worte krazon: Abba, ho Pater.

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MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

relationship between adoption to divine sonship and the operation of the Holy Spirit S. Zedda appeals to Rom. 8, 15 as the
final and the strongest argument in favor of his exposition and
notes that Romans is a clearer and more explicit explanation of
what the Apostle had already said in Galatians. 33
Rom. 8, 15 is chronologically the second time that St. Paul
uses the word hyiothesia. Here, however, he does not use it
as a self-standing noun, nor with a definite article. Here
hyiothesia is used as the genitive modifier of another noun,
namely, pneuma hyiothesias. This recalls to mind a phenomenon already noted in our consideration on Gal. 4, 6. From
the study of the context there it was evident that hyiothesia
was not developed because of itself, but rather as an adjunct to
another idea. The same is true in the present instance. Hyiothesia is not developed because of itself; it is again an adjunct
to another idea.
In Chapter VIII of Romans St. Paul develops the positive
aspect of the Christian life. Having shown his readers that
through Christ's redemptive death we are now freed from sin
and death (5, 1-21), from our old self (6, 1-23), and from the
Mosaic law (7, 1-25), the Apostle now encourages his readers in
their new life by stating that" Christians, who are incorporated
in Christ Jesus and live according to the Spirit, can fulfill the
law of God (8, 1-11), and, as adopted children of God with the
Holy Spirit dwelling within them, are joint heirs with Christ
and consequently heirs of future glory (8, 12-30) . The faithful
therefore have nothing to fear; nothing can separate them from
the love of Christ (8, 31-39) ." 34
A quick reading of Chapter VIII will show anyone that the
leading thought here is the gift of the Spirit as the vital prin83 o. c., p. 142 "Finalmente
!'ultimo argomento ( ... ) e forse il piu valido, che ci
fa vedere anche in questo testo espressa l'azione dello Spirito Santo sulla filiazione e
il passo parallelo Rom 8, 14-16; ora e certo ( ... ) che l'estrema concisione di Gal si
deve spiegare con Ia piu esplicita e piu chiara lettera ai Romani. Come Ia dottrina
sulla guistificazione per Ia fede e sulle relazioni tra Iegge e peccato e appena abbozzata in Gal, e trova piu ampio sviluppo in Rom, cosi anche Ia dottrina sui nesso tra
l'adozione e lo Spirito Santo."
•• J. E. Steinmueller, o. c., p. 96.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

63

ciple of the Christian life. The word pneuma accordingly occurs
twenty-one times within twenty-seven verses, and except for
two instances (in vss. 10 and 16 where it unquestionably refers
to our human pneuma) it can be interpreted either of the Holy
Spirit or of his gifts. No wonder that C. H. Dodd writes "The
key-word of this whole chapter is the word spirit. It has already been used sporadically (some five times in all) but in
this chapter it occurs over twenty times. Thus we see at once
that the new state can only be described in terms of spirit
(as the old state was characterized by flesh) .... " 35
It would be an intriguing study to inquire into the precise
meaning of the word pneuma as used by St. Paul, but it is
neither necessary nor possible here. 36 It will suffice to refer to
Prat's introductory study of the term where he notes that
"perhaps no word causes so much perplexity to exegetes of the
New Testament as this. Out of 145 cases where it is employed
by St. Paul, the precise sense of half of them remains more or
less doubtful and disputable." 37 Prat then goes on to list the
possible meanings that pneuma can have: a) wind, the air in
motion. This usage is not found in St. Paul. b) breath, the
air expelled from the lungs; 2 Thess. 2, 18; c) an intelligent and
immaterial substance, angel or demon; according to some in
Eph. 2, 2 and 1 Tim. 4, 1; d) the spirit as the thinking principle
in man; I Cor. 2, 11; e) the activity of the Holy Spirit in man,
or man under the influence of the Holy Spirit; I Cor. 14, U;
and f) the person of the Holy Spirit.
Prat concludes his study with the following observation:
" All exegetes are agreed in declaring that the distinction
[between e and f as given above] 38 is a very delicate one.
35

The Epistle of St. Paul to the Romans, (London:

Hodder and Stoughton,

1949) p. 116 f.
3 " As a token of the extensive study that has already been made of this word and
its notion, as well as for more complete bibliography on the matter, the reader is
referred to the long articles on the subject in the Dictionaire de la Theologie
Catholique, V. vol. 675-828, and Kittel's Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen
Testa=t, VI, 280-458.
37 o. c., II, 405.
88 The insertion within the brackets is mine.

64

MARTIN W, SCHOENBERG

This will be appreciated if Rom. 8, 2-16 be examined. Out of
17 cases where the word spirit occurs, the present Vg. writes
Spirit with a capital letter only 4 times (apart from the requirements of punctuation-that is to say, when the Spirit is in
opposition to the Son or Father, or forms opposition to our
spirit, our supernaturalized intellect. It writes spiritus Dei,
doubtless taking Dei in the sense of God without distinction of
persons." 39
Applying all this to our particular text Zedda makes the wry
observation that not all exegetes understand pneuma .in the
phrase pneuma hyiothesias of the Holy Spirit as a person. He
recalls a few examples and then concludes that the uncertitude
of the exegetes is justified. In fact, he continues, it is not always
easy to determine whether in St. Paul the word pneuma means
the Holy Spirit as a divine person or an effect or gift produced
by Him. In any event it is either the one or the other and
thus always has reference to the Holy Spirit. 40
Here one question might plausibly be added. It is this:Must one necessarily distinguish? Did St. Paul actually distinguish? If the word pneuma can bear a double signification
in Rom. 8, 15 as also in other places, could not St. Paul have
used the term with an awareness of this twofold meaning and
deliberately have intended both as a fuller expression of what
he really wanted to say on the matter? This seems to be the
more probable case.
To return to a more detailed consideration of the word
hyiothesia as it occurs here in Rom. 8, 15 we again ask ourselves: -As it is used in the text is there some way of ascertaining whether St. Paul looks upon it as something external and
juridical exclusively, or is it internal and ontological? Does
St. Paul himself give us some idea of how he viewed the matter?
It seems that here again, as in Galatians earlier, we have two
such indications.
The first and the more evident one is had in the verses
immediately following our text where St. Paul says: "The
•• ibid., 407.

•o o. c., p. 148.

ST. PAUL ON THE .ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

65

Spirit himself gives testimony to our spirit that we are sons of
God. But if we are sons, we are heirs also ... " (8, 16-17) .41
In the original Greek, however, the word translated by sons is
tekna, not hyioi. The difference is important. Granted that
the two words are synonymous, and that those who were called
hyioi in vs. 14 are called tekna in vs. 16. Nonetheless the fact
remains that St. Paul chose to use two different terms; and
there is a difference in their connotation.
Teknon lays the stress on origin and descent, "the natural
relationship of child to parent," whereas "hyios implies, in
addition to this, the recognized status and legal privileges
reserved for sons." 42 This idea is explained in greater detail
by T. Rees in his article on" Children of God" when he writes:
"Tekna contains the idea of origin or descent, but also that of
personal relation, and is often used metaphorically of that
intimate and reciprocal relationship formed between men by
bonds of love, friendship, trust, just as between parents and
children. Hyioi, too, conveys the idea of origin and of personal
relation, but the latter in the fuller form in which it appears
in mature age." 43
In Rom. 8,12-18 St. Paul certainly intends stressing the
rights and obligations of the new filial status which the believers
·in Christ have acquired. Thus he reminds them first negatively
that they are not "debtors to the flesh" (vs. 12), then positively that under the influence and leadership of the spirit they
are sons (hyios) of God (vs. 14). Hence they are no longer to
live in an atmosphere of fear (vs. 15) but in one of love and
' 1 This is the CCD translation. The RSV translates:
•• it is the Spirit himself
bearing witness with our spirit that we are children of God, and if children, then
heirs . . ." The italics are mine. The word children instead of sons seems to me to
be a preferable translation.
•• W. Sanday and A. Headlam, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on The
Epistle to the Romans (Edinburgh: Clark, 1908) p. 202.
A similar notion is expressed by H. Cremer in his Biblical Theological Lexicon of
New Testament Greek ... , (Edinburgh: T. and T. Clark, 1878( sub voce teknon,
which is " distinguished from hyioa in that teknon expressed the origin, hyioa the
fellowship of life."
•• In International Standard Bible Encyclopedia, James Orr, M.A., D. D., General
Editor, (5 vols., Chicago: The Howard-Severance Co.), I, 608.

66

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

confidence as is had by natural-born children (tekna) who are
secure in their rights and position as heirs (kleronomoi, vs. 17) .
St. Paul manages ably to stress both elements of the idea by
his choice of words. Teknon emphasizes the interior reality of
their sonship, 44 while kleronomoi assures them of their legal
status and its rights.
This brings us to the second but the surer indication of St.
Paul's opinion of the nature of our adoptive divine sonship.
This second indication is the word pneuma in all of chapter
VIII. We have already called attention to the fact that in
Rom. 8, 15 hyiothesia is not introduced for its own sake. It is
used in qualifying another idea, and that idea is pneuma. In
the larger context of the entire chapter the Spirit is an efficacious principle. He frees us from sin and death (vs. 2); he
makes us" belong to Christ" (vs. 10); he will raise our mortal
bodies from the dead as he raised Jesus Christ from the dead
(vs. 11). Furthermore," whoever are led by the Spirit of God,
they are the sons of God" (vs. 14) and the "Spirit himself
gives testimony to our spirit that we are tekna of God" (vs.
16). He helps our weakness (vs. 26) and pleads in our behalf
(vs. 27).
In underlining this efficacious character of the work of the
Spirit St. Paul is not teaching anything new. Instead he is
continuing the tradition of the Old Testament, where from the
first page of Genesis the Spirit is already portrayed as an
efficacious
Thus in Gen. 1, 2 the sacred writer imagines the spirit of God hovering over chaos and by its vivifying might producing "heaven and earth and all their host"
(Gen. 2, 1) . " In order to bring deliverance to the Chosen People
in times of crisis, or to lead them back again after they had
apostasized, Yahweh equipped certain individuals with spirit
in a special manner. This spirit roused up the will to fight in
the judges Othoniel, Gedeon, and Jephte ... (Judg. 3, 10; 6, 34;
.. J. Huby, Epitre aux Romains, Traduction et commentaire. (Verbum Salutis
X) Ed. llme., Paris: Beauchesne, 1940: "Le mot tekna 'enfant' que l'Apbtre va
employer aux verset 16 et 17, marque plus fortement que hyioi 'fils' ce ca.ractere
de filiation reelle et non purement juridique."

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

67

11, 29). By the spirit of God Samson was enabled to exercise
preternatural strength (Judg.14, 6-19; 15, 14); and Saul ...
quickly rallied the Israelites to battle when the Spirit of God
had come upon him (I Sam.ll, 6) .... The true prophets were
conscious of being filled with the spirit of Yahweh (Mich. 3, 8;
Is. 48, 16; 61, 1; Zach. 7, 12) . Moses was filled with the spirit
of God (Num.ll, 17) .... The spirit of God came upon
Azarias (2 Chr.15, 1), Jahaziel (2 Chr. 20, 14) and Zacharias,
the son of Jojada the priest (2 Chr. 24, 20) .... The spirit of
God impels the sinner to repent, transforms him and enables
him to persevere, ' Create a clean heart within me, 0 God;
instill a new, a stable spirit within my breast' (Ps.l43, 10) .
Most important will be the inner transformation which the
spirit of God will effect in messianic times, a transformation
not only of Israel, but of the whole world. Of course sinful
Jerusalem will first be purified 'by the spirit of judgment and
the spirit of destruction' (Is. 4, 4) who will exterminate those
who have sinned against God's holy will. But after this spirit
has re-enlivened Israel languishing death-like in exile, the
spirit from on High will be poured out and it will transform the
wilderness into a paradise (Ez. 37, 1-14) -a picture of the
spiritual operations of grace as it transforms and enables men
to live in a manner pleasing to God (Is:32, 15-18; 44, 3-4) ....
The operations of the spirit of God will extend into the most
distant future (Zach. 12, 10) because the messianic age will be
characterized by it (cf. Is. 59, 21), and through it the Gentiles
will be led to the knowledge of the one true God (Is. 44, 3-5) ." 45
Thus we may rightfully conclude that when St. Paul says in
Rom. 8,14 that "whoever are led by the spirit of God, they
are the sons (hyioi) of God" and in 8, 16-17 that "we are
children (tekna) of God" he means just that. In verse 15 he
tells how we become such children, namely by the pneuma
hyiothesias.
•• Heinisch-Heidt, Theology of the Old Testament, (Collegeville, Minn.:
Liturgical Press, 1950), pp. 116-119.

The

68

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

EPH. 1, 5

The last usage of the term hyiothesia by St. Paul chronologically and also ideologically is found in the Epistle to the Ephesians (1, 5) . Here it occurs in the introduction of the epistle,
without article or further determinative, and with a tranquil assurance of its content and import, as is evident from the context
of the entire pericope (1, 3-14) . The phrase in which it occurs
forms part of an extremely long sentence, in which one idea
rushes upon the other, to be replaced by still another, all of
them adding one more note in a grateful hymn of praise to God
the Father for his beneficence toward man as effected through
Jesus Christ.
The relationship of the Epistle to the Ephesians with that to
the Colossians, its close associate among the Captivity Epistles,
has already been noted. The Epistle itself is described by D. J.
Leahy 46 as " a non-controversial exposition of how mankind is
one in Christ, and of God's purpose for the world through the
Church. St. Paul sees the redeemed, Jews and Gentiles, bound
together in one body ascending from earth to Heaven, to the
body's head. In short, the doctrinal part of the epistle is a
theological treatise of the Church." Medebielle calls it " a
perpetual sur sum corda." 47
The introduction of the Epistle, which contains the phrase
under discussion, has been the subject of much study. 48 Authors
•• The Epistle to the Ephll8ians (in a Catholic Commentary on Holy Scripture,
New York: Nelson, 1958) p.
"R. P. Medebielle, Ep!tre aux EphesillnS, (in La Sainte Bible, publiee sous Ia
direction de L. Pirot, Paris: Letouzey et Ane) vol. Xlll, 1988, p.
•• Articles of special interest that have appeared on Eph 1, 8-14 in recent years
are those written by:
J. M. Bover ," Dovologiae Epistolae ad Ephesios logica partitio" (Eph 1, 8-14)
in Biblica
458-460.
G. Castellino, "La Dossologia della lettera agli Efesini (1, 8-14); analisi della
forma e del contenuto" in SaliJSianum 8 (1946) 147-167.
E. Driessen, " Aeternum Dei propositum de Salute hominis et de redintegratione
omnium rerum per Christum (Eph 1, 8-14; Col 1, 19 s)" in Verbum Domini
(1944) 120-U4; 151-157; 184-191.

J. T. Trinidad, "The Mystery Hidden in God" (Eph 1, 8-14) in Biblica 81
(1950) 1-26.

The reader is referred to these articles for further bibliography, for possible and
probable divisions, etc.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

69

are lavish in their encomiums on its elegance and inspired
thought. Leahy calls it Paul's "Magnificat," 49 and Steinmueller describes it as " a hymn of praise to God for the greatness of the spiritual blessings which all the faithful are receiving
through Jesus Christ." 50 Still others call attention to the
difficulty of analyzing the passage due to its richness in thought
and conciseness in expression, 51 forming as it does, one unbroken
sentence in the original.
From reading the entire pericope it becomes directly manifest
that here as also in Gal. 4, 5 and Rom. 8, 15 hyiothesia is not
introduced nor developed as the leading subject, but forms an
adjunct in the expression of another idea, in this instance, a
hymn of praise to God the Father for his benevolent economy
of salvation on behalf of mankind. Contrary to its usage in
Gal. 4, 5 and Rom. 8, 15 hyiothesia here stands alone, without
article and without modification. The absence of the article
receives attention from only one commentator who deduces
from this that hyiothesia is not yet a technical term in the
Pauline teaching on salvation. 52 The observation concerning
the article is apropos, but not the conclusion.
Unless the analysis made thus far is erroneous, it has been
established that there is an evolution in St. Paul's manner
of exposing the notion of filial adoption as sons of God. This
does not mean that there· is an evolution in the notion itself, at
least not as discernible in the Epistles. Rather, we have here
another example of the semitic manner of expressing ideas concentrically, whereby a subject is introduced under a certain
aspect, sufficient to serve its present purpose, and later on is
taken up again with an additional note, until the whole has
been satisfactorily represented. That is the stage which St.
Paul has reached in Eph. 1, 5 and hence he writes simply that
' 9 o. c.,

p. 11!!1.

•• o. c., ill, 814.
01 G. Estius, In omnu D. Pauli epistolaa, item m catholicas commentarii, (3 vols.
Kirchemii: Holzhamer, 1858-9) II,
01 P. Ewald, Die Briefe des Paulus an die Ephuer, Koloaaer und Philemon, in
Zahn's Kommentar zum Neuen Testament,
ed., Leipsig: Deichert, 1910),
p. 70.

70

MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

" God has predestined us to hyiothesia through Jesus Christ,"
without offering any further explanations or additions. Hyiothesia is now in plena jure possessionis and his readers are
expected to understand all the apostle wants to express by
that term.
Once again we ask whether hyiothesia as used by St. Paul
is merely juridical and its efficacy only external, or whether it
is also ontological and internal? Many exegetes explicitly
assert the ontological character of hyiothesia in Eph. 1, 5.
Thus Meinertz, while commenting on the phrase hagious kai
amomous (1, 4) takes occasion to note that if someone is
blameless before God, he is so because of his inner sanctity
and there is no question of merely external appearances. 53
Bonsirven 54 and Medebielle 55 both make it a point to emphasize that hyiothesia does not denote a juridical fiction only.
So do Haupt and Lenski. 56
So much for the opinions of exegetes on the meaning of
hyiothesia in Eph.l, 5. Their testimony is obviously only external. What about St. Paul himself? Does the context in
which the term occurs give us any clue as to what value the
Apostle attached to it? It seems that it does.
•• M. Meinertz, Der Epheserbrief, p. 68.
•• J. Bonsirven, L'Evangile de Paul, (Paris: Aubier, 1946) p. 99, "Cette filiation
est designee par le vocable juridique 'adoption,' mais puisqu'elle se produit par
Jesus-Christ, notre aine a qui nous devenons conformes (Rom 8, 29), il fait voir Ia
plus qu'un rapport moral et extremseque.
55 R. P. Medebielle, Epitre aux Ephesiens, p. 28 " Mais il ne s'agit pas d'un fiction
juridique."
56 E. g., E. Haupt, Der Brief an die Epheser, (7te Aufiage, Gottingen:
Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1902) p. 9; R. C. H. Lenski, o. c., p. 861. Their point of
depa!ture, however, is quite different. Both these authors take pains to stress the
fact that Christ alone is son of God by nature.
T. K. Abbott, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistles to the
Ephesians and Colossians, (Edinburgh: Clarke, no date) p. 9, appears at first
sight to hold a contrary opinion. This, however, is not the case. Abbott is dealing
here expressly with the phrase eis auton, which he thinks refers to the Father
rather than to Christ. He does not think that full hyiothesian can be obtained in
this life, but that we must still look forward to its completion in the hereafter
according to Rom 8, 28. For his view on the inward character of Christian
hyiothesia we must examine his commentary on the phrase einai hemas hagious k'ai
amiimous katenopion autou (vs 4), p. 7 f.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

71

The first such indication is had in the preceding phrase, einai
hemas hagious kai amamous katenopion autou, wherein St.
Paul states simply but unequivocally that God has chosen us
"that we should be holy and blameless in his sight." Meinertz
is correct when he says that if we are holy and blameless
before God we are so because of an inner sanctity and not
only because of external appearances or imputation. 57 Commenting on Eph.l, 4 Abbott disagrees sharply with some authors who hold that the phrase is to be understood of imputed
righteousness. 58 Haupt maintains that the participial phrase
of vs. 5 proorisas hemas eis hyiothesian dia Jesou Christou eis
auton is an explanation of the content of vs. 4, and thus repeats
the infinitive phrase einai hemas hagious kai amomous through
the concept hyiothesia. 59
The second indication of St. Paul's view on the character of
hyiothesia is in vs. 7 where he affirms that "in him" (i.e., in
Christ) we have redemption through his blood, the remission
of sins." The notion of the term apolutrosis receives attention
from all commentators and is subject for a complete study in
itself. What interests us here is the apposition which is added
to it as an explanation, ten aphesin ton paraptomaton, namely,
"the remission of sins." P. Ewald notes on aphesin that it
means a covering or protection against the wrath of God. 60
This, however, is hardly correct, since the noun aphesis in the
New Testament practically always means forgiveness (by God)
and is frequently followed by the genitive determinative of
sin or fault. 61 In vs. 7, therefore, St. Paul affirms simply and
unequivocally that our sins are completely removed, because
"in him (i.e. in Christ) we have redemption through his
blood, the remission of sins." This is an interior reality, not
•• o. c., p. 68.
•• 0. c., p. 7.
09

E. Haupt, o. c., p. 9.

Die Briefe des Paulus an die Epheser, Kolosser, und Phileomon, (Leipzig:
Deichert, 1905) p. 76.
61 Thus R. Bultmann in Kittel's Theologisches Worterbuch zum Neuen Testament,
I, 508.
60

7"

MARTIN W, SCHOENBERG

only an external covering 62 or protection against God's wrath,
nor merely a juridical fiction as though the sins did not exist.
The context of our present text is of special interest since
it is replete with explicit references to the Old Testament, which
by their great number and consistency show that the comparison is not a matter of accident. Quite to the contrary, the
whole passage (Eph.l, 3-7) is built up with a conscious reference to God's dealings with the people of Israel, all of which are
now applied to Christians as the new and spiritual Israel, the
Israel of God (Gal. 6, 16).
Thus vs. 3 starts out by blessing God the Father who in his
infinite goodness chose (exelexato, vs. 3) 68 us, as he chose
Israel; and that from all eternity, even before the foundation
of the world. God's purpose in choosing us was that we should
be holy and blameless (vs. 4), as Israel had also been chosen
to be a holy people (Ex.19, 6; cp.l Petr. 2, 9). Not only that,
but God had even predestined us to become his children by
adoption (vs. 5) as Israel had also been chosen to be his son
(Ex. 4, 22) . All this is an expression of God's loving-kindness
(vs. 6) 64 and is effected through Jesus Christ, his beloved 65
•• M. Meinertz, o. c., p. 64.
63 Such terms as hagios, agapetos, apolutrosis, charis, eklektoa, ldetos, all have
their own meaning and their special application to the people of Old and New
Testaments. All of them, as expressing the relationship of the one to the other, are
subject matter for individual exegetical studies. The reader is referred to the
shorter studies on them contained in such sources as Kittel's Theologiaches Worterbuch; and also in· the works on the theology of the Old and New Testament such
as Heinisch-Heidt, o. c., L. Cerfaux, La Theologie de l'Egliae auivant s. Paul,
ed., Paris: Cerf, 1948).
•• This is the translation for charis proposed by J. A. Montgomery, "Hebrew
IJ,esed and Greek charis," in Harvard Theological Review, XXXII (1989)
This notion of God's loving-kindness is strengthened by the double repetition of the
same word in verses 6 and 7, sci. charitos ... echariwsen ... charitos.
•• The term egapemenos likewise is material for a detailed separate study. Among
the shorter expositions already made the reader is referred especially to S. Lyonnet,
Exegesis Epistulae ad Roma.nos (Cap. I and VIII), Ad usum privatum auditorum
(Romae: P. I. B., 1957) pp. 88-44; and J. A. Robinson, St. Paul's Epistle to the
Ephesians, pp. 229-288. Both authors show how egapemenos is a Messianic title,
applied to the people of Israel in the Old Testament and to Christ in the New, the
one being a type of the other.

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONSHIP OF CHRISTIANS

73

son. Through the blood of Christ we have received deliverance
(vs. 7), just as at the time of Israel's deliverance from bondage
to Egypt blood was also the sign for the revenging angel to
bypass the homes of the Israelites (Ex. 12, 7-12).
The latter part of the introductory section (1, 8-14) is
equally pregnant with allusions to the Old Testament, but
especially to the doctrine St. Paul has already developed in his
earlier writings. The Apostle calls attention to the superabundance (vs. 8) of God's loving-kindness, which he showered on
us in his wisdom thus making known the mystery of his will
(vs. 9; cp. Rom.l6, 25; Col. I, 26-27), which he planned to
carry out in Christ (vs. 9, cf. Rom. 3, 25), when the fullness of
time had come (vs. 10; cf. Gal. 4, 4). For it is God's will that
everything in heaven and on earth should be unified in Christ
(vs. 10; cp. Col. I, 20) through whom we become heirs also (vs.
11; cf. Dt. 9, 29; Gal. 3, 18; 4, 7), heirs of God and fellow-heirs
with Christ (Rom. 8, 17) . As the Holy Spirit came down on
Christ at his baptism (Mt. 3, 16 par.) , so also, when we believed, we were marked by the seal of the promised Holy Spirit
(vs.l3), who is the advance installment of our inheritance (vs.
14; cp. 2 Cor.l, 22; Rom. 8, 23) . And the ultimate purpose of
all this is the praise of God's glory (Eph. 1, 6-12-14) .
Thus we see that in Eph.l, 5 hyiothesia is used by St. Paul
as the leading motif in his hymn of praise to God. Hyiothema
through Christ is the Father's great gift to man. This idea was
already introduced in Gal. 4, 5 and enlarged in Rom. 8, 14-17.
In Eph. 1, 5· it has reached its central position in expressing the
divine economy of salvation as envisioned by St. Paul. One
might almost say that the Epistle to the Ephesians is devoted
to a grand final exposition of the nature and resultant obligations of hyiothesia since it is a treatise on the nature of the
Church as the Mystical Body of Christ-or in other words,
Christ extended in time so that the intended adoption to divine
sonship is available to all men,-and the moral ideals that it
holds up before all.
As in Gal. 4, 5 and Rom. 8, 15, so the hyiothe8ia of Eph.l, 5

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MARTIN W. SCHOENBERG

refers to the present privilege and condition of Christians as
followers of Christ. As Gal. 4, 5 and Rom. 8, 15, so also Eph. 1, 5
is surrounded by references to the Old Testament in its immediate context, which shows that St. Paul is thinking within
the framework already outlined in the Old Testament.
As a characteristic note of its own,-and one that is not had
in Gal. 4, 5 or in Rom. 8, 15-Eph. 1, 5 draws an explicit connection between (the gifts of) the Holy Spirit already received
and between final redemption, with the implication that the
former are a first installment of the latter (vs. 14).

CoNCLUSION

From the context in which St. Paul uses the word hyiothesia
it is evident that for him it expresses one of the central themes
of his doctrine. It is the burden of his apostolate to convince
the Christian of his proper status and to motivate him to live
accordingly. He does this by reminding the Christian that he is
no longer what he was, a slave to diverse desires and passions
(Tit. 3, 3) , subject to the law of sin and death (Rom. 8, 2) .
The Christian is no longer carnal, but spiritual (Rom. 8, 9) .
He is now a new creature (2 Cor. 5, 17; Gal. 6, 15), a new man
(Eph. 2, 15; 4, 24), a child and son of God (Rom. 8, 17; Gal. 4,
5) , and, as such, heir of God (Rom. 8, 17; Gal. 4, 7) , joint heir
with Christ (Rom. 8, 17) his first-born brother (Rom. 8. 29). ·
The Chnshan has become all these things through hyiothesia.
Each of the three texts dealing with Christian hyiothesia has
some peculiarity which throws a special light on the Pauline
usage of the term. The article in Gal. 4, 5 reminds us of the
Israelite sonship under the Old Law (Rom. 9, 40) ; its employment as genitive modifier to pneuma in Rom. 8, 15 explains the
source and character of our Christian hyiothesia; and the unmodified usage of the term in Eph.1, 5 implies that St. Paul's
readers are now fully aware of what he means by it.
Furthermore, the immediate context of each of these three
passages indicates each in its own way the specific character of

ST. PAUL ON THE ADOPTIVE SONS HIP OF CHRISTIANS

75

the Pauline notion of Christian hyiothesia. Thus Gal. 4, 5 is
surrounded by a context telling Christians that as such they
lose their racial and social distinctions (3,
and that they
must be aware of a new principle of action within themselves
(4, 6) . Rom. 8, 15 is followed by a statement that the Christians
are God's own children (tekna, 8, 16-17); it is surrounded by
affirmations of the interior and efficacious character of the
pneuma wJ:V.ch they have received (8,
. Before
reminding the Ephesians that God has predestined them to
adoptive sonship (1, 5) St. Paul calls to their minds that God
has chosen them to" be holy and blameless in his sight" (1, 4),
and immediately after he assures them that through Jesus
Christ their sins are actually forgiven (1, 7) . In this, all three
texts bear a similarity to Rom. 9, 4 which in its context is also
surrounded by examples of interior activity, such as the leaven
and the dough, and the root and the branches (11,
Hyiothesia is thus a very comprehensive term which St. Paul
uses as distinctly his own for expressing the specific character of
the salvation which God will give to everyone who believeswhether Jew or Greek (Rom. 1, 16; 10 f; Gal. 3,
. The
choice is a felicitous one. With it the Apostle is able to underline the proper nature of our Christian existence. For hyiothesia
contains the implication that Christ is the Son of God by
nature; we are sons of God in a different way, namely by
adoption (cp. Rom. 8,
with 8,
. Yet at the same
time hyiothesia in the Apostle's usage is more than a metaphor.
It is a statement of fact. A Christian is not merely like a son
of God, he is a son of God (Rom. 8,16 f; Gal. 4, 7).
MARTIN

Crosier House of Studies,
Fort Wayne, Indiana

W. ScHoENBERG, 0. S.C.

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

T

HE perennial philosophy is a philosophy of natural
realism and common sense. Doubtless these are qualities which account for the fact that this philosophy
outlives all fads and fallacies and survives all wounds inflicted
even by its teachers and supporters. These same qualities
appeal to the beginner in philosophy, and seem to promise that
his effort to study and understand will not be in vain. However, they do not guarantee that the task will be an easy one.
Beginners soon learn that the path of realism and common
sense leads into many a thorny thicket, with no edible fruit
in sight, or yet ripe for eating.
A common source of difficulty is the fact that words and
phrases, even of the great masters, are used in so many different
senses, and are combined in so many paradoxical statements, that the thread of our understanding becomes snarled.
Questions arise to which the student can see no consistent
answers, and he may begin to wonder whether the last state
of a philosopher is not worse than the first. Even though he
keeps the indispensable faith of a philosopher and firmly
believes that a little knowledge of higher things is more desirable than perfect knowledge of lesser things, still he krl.ows
that a philosopher cannot live by faith alone, but must achieve
a bit of understanding.
In this paper we shall consider some of the difficulties
which arise from classical statements concerning existence and
causality. These topics are close to the heart of philosophy,
because a philosopher is one who desires to know not only
the facts but also the causes or reasons why they are so.
We do not now inquire why something exists rather than
nothing, or why these things exist rather than others. We
acknowledge things as they are: God and his creatures, material
ones and immaterial ones. By existence in a finite being we
76

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

77

understand that by which it is or exists, by which it is distinct
both from nothing and from its causes. Existence pertains
primarily and properly to the -whole being, not to the parts. 1
The whole is that which is, and which is created or generated,
then moved or modified in this way or that. The fundamental
parts, both matter and form, coexist in the whole by the
existence of the whole, whereas the accidents inhere or exist in
the whole, not simply in themselves. Existence in finite beings
is not that which exists, or which is created or generated or
made. When we speak of finite existence we mean something
really distinct although not separated from something called
essence or nature, which receives, supports and determines or
specifies the existence. 2 When we speak simply of the being
we mean the whole as existing, distinguished only by reason
from other determinations which specify the whole, whether
it be man or beast.
Thus there are two kinds of distinctions, which must be
carefully maintained, particularly in logical and metaphysical
matters. There are real distinctions and distinctions which are
not real but rational, that is, introduced by reason itself. In
ordinary life and thought, and even in the particular sciences
such as physics and mathematics, we are concerned with the
real distinctions which we find in things, and with their like1 " ••• to be created is to be made in a certain way. Furthermore, the being made
is ordained to the being of the thing. Hence those things are properly made or
created which have being. But being properly belongs to subsisting things, whether
simple ones, as the separated substances, or composed ones, as material substances.
For being properly belongs to that which has being, and this is something which
subsists in its own being. But forms and accidents and the like are not called beings
as if they themselves are, but because something is by them, as whiteness is called
a being because by it a subject is white." Sum. Theol. I, Q. 45, Art. 4.
• ". . . Although in an angel there is no composition of matter and form, nevertheless there is act and potency in him. This can be seen from the consideration of
material things, in which a double composition is found. The first is that of form
and matter, from which a certain nature is constituted. Yet the nature thus
composed is not its own existence, but existence is its actuality. Hence the nature
itself is compared to its existence as potency to act. Taking away matter, therefore,
and granting that the form itself subsists without matter, there still remains a
comparison of the form to the very existence as potency to act." Ibid., Q. 50, Art.
i, Reply s.

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WILLIAM H. KANE

nesses and differences. We find this being distinct from that,
with parts in the whole, and with motions, powers and other
accidents existing in the whole. With some difficulty we
succeed in distinguishing between the primary or substantial
being and the secondary or accidental being. When we carefully consider moving or changing things, we find that they
are not simple but composed of something actual and something potential. The first subject of change in a natural substance is something purely potential, called primary matter.
This matter is not capable of existing by itself, but is ordered
to existence through its first actual determination, called substantial form. Matter anfi form are not complete beings: they
are positive and essential principles which together constitute
the essence or nature of the whole. They are really distinct
from each other, but lack existence of their own, and coexist in
the whole by the existence of the whole. Hence there is a
double composition in material substances, with real distinction
between matter and form and between essence and existence,
although neither primary matter nor the essence has any
existence distinct from or apart from the existence of the whole,
which is the being simply, or that which is.
The acknowledgment of these real distinctions between
matter and form, essence and existence, is an advance beyond
ordinary thought, and pertains to scie.nce or philosophy. The
human mind first grasps its object as the vague and confused
totality of what is intelligible to man. Only gradually do we
attain distinct knowledge of things. First we distinguish this
from that, or non-being from being, as these are presented to
the mind. Thus we come to know distinction by distinguishing
or separating this from that, or denying that being is not-being.
Our natural realism is achieved on the basis of experience by
employing our knowledge of distinction, of being and non-being,
and acknowledging the real distinctions which we find in being:
being this or being that, or in this manner or that. The whole
is known in an imperfect and confused way before the parts
are known distinctly. We must distinguish one whole from
another before we can distinguish the parts of one. We do

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

79

not at first know essence as distinct from existence, but first
we know the whole. Then by judgment we know distinction
and proceed to distinguish and to acknowledge the distinctions
which we find among things and their parts: this one and that
one, substance and accident, matter and form, essence and
existence. To conceive an essence or nature without knowing
whether or not it exists is an achievement of the logician or
metaphysician, beyond the attainments of ordinary thought.
As for distinctions which are not real but merely introduced
by the mind, some of them are natural and spontaneous whereas others are highly sophisticated. It is easy and natural for
us to attain the universal abstracted from the singulars of
sensory experience, and even to distinguish between the generic
and specific aspects of the singular. In doing so the mind
introduces distinctions which are not real but made by the
mind itself, and it does so for the sake of clear and orderly
understanding. The world consists of many things of many
different kinds: some are living and others are not; some are
rational and others are not. The mind naturally distinguishes
the universal from the singular, but in the singular we do not
sponstaneously distinguish between its various generic and
specific aspects. Nevertheless, on the basis of the real distinctions and differences found among things, and for the purposes
of better understanding, we can and do introduce distinctions
which are not real on the part of things but merely rational,
that is, made by the mind in its consideration of things. Thus
in regard to one and the same man, we can distinguish between
the singular as such, in which aspect he is unique, and the
generic and specific aspects which he shares with many others.
As human, he is the same as you or I. We can consider him
also as an animal or an organism, as a natural body or simply
as a being. Considered as a being, he is both distinct from
every other being and like every other being, although two
beings as beings are not exactly alike, but only analogously,
and the determinations of each being are distinguished in and
from the being itself not really but merely by our own reason.
Our first question concerning the existence of finite beings

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WILLIAM H. KANE

is this: is existence a form? We know that St. Thomas speaks
of existence as something formal, even most formal: maxime
formale; 3 formale respectu omnium. 4 On the other hand, he
also says that existence is the actuality of all forms; 5 of all
things, even of forms; of all acts and of all perfections. If
existence is the actuality of all forms, and forms are not their
own actuality or existence, then existence is not a form.
In order to solve this difficulty we must determine what is
meant by form. St. Thomas tells us that act is form, 6 and that
form as such is act. 7 Moreover, God by his very essence is
form; 8 and the divine essence is form exceeding the measure
or proportion of every creature. 9 But the divine essence is
identical with the divine existence. 10 In God, existence, act,
perfection, form and essence are all one and the same. Hence
if form is taken in the sense of act or perfection, then existence
is also form, and the existence in finite beings is not only something formal but also a form. However, there is another sense
•" That which is most formal of all is existence itself." Ibid., Q. 7, Art. 1.
• "Existence is that which is most intimate to each thing, and most fundamental
of all, since it is formal with respect to all that is in a thing." Ibid., Q. 8, Art. 1.
• ". . . existence itself is most perfect of all, because it is compared to all as
actuality. For nothing has actuality save inasmuch as it exists; hence existence
itself is the actuality of all things, and even of forms themselves. Hence it is not
compared to other things as receiver to the received, but rather as the received to
the receiver. For when I speak of the existence of a man, or of a horse, or of any
other thing, the existence itself is considered as formal and received, not as that
which has existence. Ibid., Q. 4, Art. 1, Reply S.
• ". . . the term of creation is a being in act. But the very thing which is act is
form." Ibid., Q. 66, Art. 1.
• " ... a form, as such, is an act." Ibid., Q. 75, Art. 5.
.
8 " ••• every agent acts by its form: hence as a thing is with regard to its form
so it is as an agent. Therefore, that which is first and of itself an agent must be
primarily and of itself a form. But God is the first agent, because he is the first
efficient cause. He is therefore by his essence a form, and not composed of matter
and form." Ibid., Q. 8, Art.
• Ibid., ill, Q. 9, Art. 8, Reply S.
10 " ••• existence is the actuality of every form or nature:
for goodness or
humanity are not said to be actual unless they are said to exist. Therefore the
very existence must be compared to the essence which is really distinct from it as
act to potency. But since there is nothing merely potential in God, it follows that
in him essence is not something other than his existence. Therefore his essence is
his existence." Ibid., I, Q. 8, Art. 4.

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

81

in which form is not the ultimate actuality in a being, but only
the first actuality which, although something actual with respect to matter, which is merely potential, nevertheless is
potential with respect to existence.11 A form which is only
the first act in a finite being, whether determining and specifying the potency of matter or separated from matter, is not its
own existence, nor is its existence a form in this sense. When
we consider the structure and composition of material things
and speak of form as the act of matter, but not the ultimate
act, we deny that existence is a form. But there is that other
sense in which form is perfection and first in the order of act,
not in the order of potency or imperfection; existence is a form
in this sense. Indeed, nothing is more formal than existence,
and it is most perfect of all, because it is the actuality of all
perfections. Nothing more formal can be added to existence,
nor is existence determined by anything as potency is determined by act, or matter by form, but only as act is limited
and determined by potency. Existence as the ultimate actuality
of all forms is more perfect than life or knowledge, although in
the hierarchy of beings the living is more perfect than the nonliving, and the rational more perfect than the non-rationa1. 12
Existence is something received in form or essence, but is not
a receiver; it is limited but not perfected by the special determinations which receive and support it and which it actualizes.
Existence is something most perfect, which can only be limited
as act is limited by potency, not perfected as potency is
perfected by act. Existence is form in the sense of ultimate act;
11 ". • • no part of a compound can be absolutely first of all beings, not even
matter or form, which are the first parts of composite beings. For matter is in
potency, and potency follows upon act, simply speaking. But the form which is part
of a composite is a participated form ... whereas God is the first being absolutely.
Ibid., Q. S, Art. 8.
u ". . . the perfections of all created things pertain to the perfection of existing,
because things are perfect inasmuch as they exist in some way." Ibid., Q. 4, Art. !!.
Reply S of the same question and article: " ... although existence is more perfect
than life, and life itself than wisdom, if these are considered as distinguished by
reason, nevertheless a living thing is more perfect than one which merely exists;
and someone wise is both a being andt a living being." Cf. also Dl' , •• PotentiG,
Q. 7, Art. !!, ad 9.

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WILLIAM H. KANE

it is not form in the sense of something potential and imperfect
which is perfected by the addition of something more formal
and actual than itself.
Next we inquire whether existence is a cause. The understanding of cause is not something absolute, but related to
something else as a reason of its being. A cause is that from
which something, called the effect, follows with necessity if the
cause is perfect and able to necessitate the effect.13 It is a
positive principle giving being to the effect, or contributing to
the being, and on which the effect depends in order to be.
Although it may seem more natural to think of existence in
creatures as an effect, still there is both authority and reason
to admit that it is a cause.
Gilson writes: ". . . existence happens to essence in a most
peculiar way, not as some sort of accidental determination, but
as
supreme act, that is, as the cause of its being as well as
of its operations." 14 Again he says: ". . . to be does not
contradict being, since it is the cause of being." 15 St. Thomas
speaks formally and cautiously and says that being (ens) does
not have the aspect of cause, save only that of formal cause,
whether inhering or exemplary. 16 He adds that the causality of
being extends only to those things which are in act, and does
not extend to operation. 17
The formal causality of existence can be understood in the
following manner. An intrinsic formal cause is an actual principle which exercises its causality by communicating itself to a
potential subject and thus actualizing it. This is exactly what
existence does for essence in finite beings, and so existence is a
formal cause. But operation follows upon being in creatures,
II-II, Q. 88, Art. 1.
" Being and Some Philosophers, Etienne Gilson; Pontifical Institute of Medieval
Studies, Toronto, Can., p. 214.
'" Ibid., p. 215.
16 " Being implies the habitude of formal cause only, either inherent or exempla.ry:
and its causality extends only to those things which are actual." I, Q. 5, Art. 2,
Reply 2.
17 " ••• life itself in a certain way includes operation, but existence does not."
Ibid., Q. 10, Art. 1, Reply 2.
13

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

83

and pertains to efficient causality, and so the causality of
being as such, that is, simply as existing, does not extend to
operation.
Here the question arises whether existence is a final cause.
If existence does not extend to operation, must we conclude
that it does not have the aspect of final cause? By final cause
we understand the good for the sake of which, or on account
of which, something is done. The good is the object of appetite:
that which everything desires. But everything desires its own
existence and perfection, and so existence as such is good. As
act and perfection it is first, last and best, and so it is both
beginning and end, and can be a final cause. The final cause is
first in the order of intention, and in its own way it moves the
agent to act, not indeed properly as an efficient cause, but
metaphorically, as being desired and being that for the sake of
which something is done, or for which the agent acts. By its
action the agent disposes the matter for the form which brings
existence and perfection. However, in the effect itself there is
first the form from which existence follows, then the power by
which the effect is perfect in being and able to produce something like itself, and lastly the attainment of ultimate good
or perfection. Thus it is not existence or being simply which
has the aspect of final cause, but rather being with ultimate
good or perfection, for the sake of which something is done.
Being simply is good fundamentally, whereas the final cause
is good simply, which is being as perfected by final act or
operation. 18
Now we inquire concerning existence as an effect. St. Thomas
states that everything that exists is either a cause or an effect.19
. 18 " •.•• according to its first existence, which is substantial, a thing is called a
being simply and a good with respect to the fact that it is a being; but according
to its ultimate actuality something is called a being respectively and a good simply."
Ibid., Q. 5, Art. I, Reply 1.
19 " ••• although the relationship to its cause does not enter into the definition
of a being which is caused, nevertheless it follows upon what pertains to the essence
of the thing: because from the fact that something is a being by participation it
follows that it was caused by another. Hence a being like this cannot be without
being caused; just as a man cannot be without the property of laughing. But since

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WILLIAM H. KANE

Among created things, one and the same can be both cause
and effect under different aspects, and so we ask whether
existence in creatures is an effect as well as a cause. In the
case of things which are not eternal, but come to be and cease
to be, it is clear that their existence is an effect.20 They do
not come from mere nothing, nor do they cause their own
existence. St. Thomas asserts: " It is not possible that the
existence itself be caused by the very form or quiddity as by
an efficient cause, for then something would be the cause of
itself, and would produce itself, which is impossible." 21
As for things which might be eternal, it is not so clear that
they have a cause. However, since only God is subsistent being,
existing of and by himself, all other beings are caused and
somehow participate their existence from him. God is the first
efficient cause, the exemplary cause and the final cause of all
other beings, and he causes them properly as created or caused
beings. In this way St. Thomas explains the statement that
" the first of created things is existence (esse) ," 22 namely, that
the proper aspect of the object of creative causality is existence,
just as the formal object of vision is color, although that
which is seen is the colored thing, and that which is created is
the creature or subsisting thing. Created or caused existence
is the proper effect corresponding to the first agent cause. This
includes the whole being of the creature, not only its existence
but also everything in it which is ordered to existence, namely,
the matter, form, properties and other accidents. 28 To produce
to be caused does not pertain to the essence of being simply, therefore a being
uncaused can be found." Ibid., Q. 44, Art. 1, Reply I.
•• " The world leads more manifestly to knowledge of the divine creative power
if it has not always been, than if it had always been; for whatever has not always
been manifestly has a cause, but this is not so manifest of that which always was."
Ibid., Q. 46, Art. 1, R. 6.
11 De Ente et Essentia., !!!!.
•• ". . . when it is .said that the first of created things is existence, the word
existence does not refer to the thing created; but refers to the proper aspect of the
object of creation. For something is spoken of as created from the fact that it is
a being, not from the fact that it is this being: since creation is the emanation of
all existence from the universal being." Ibid., Q. 45, Art. 4, Reply I.
••" That which is the cause of things inasmuch as they are being, must be their

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

85

created existence simply and as such is to produce the whole
being of all creatures, without presupposing anything in the
creature, because whatever exists does so by its existence, without which it is not, or does not exist. This is to create in the
strict sense, that is, to make the whole being from nothing, or
at least to produce the whole being simply as caused out of
matter previously created, and such causality is proper to God
as the first cause. Only God, who is the pure act of subsistent
being, can cause being simply and as such in creatures. Created'
existence simply and as such is the most perfect and most
universal effect, and is the proper effect of the first cause. 24 No
finite efficient cause is able to produce the very existence of
its effects in this way, that is, simply, absolutely and as such.
As Gilson says: "I£ one maintains that a finite cause can
cause another being, not merely to be in this and in that way,
but absolutely to be, or to exist, then he is in fact attributing
to a finite being the causal efficacy proper to God." 25
But is existence in no way an effect of finite causes? If only
God as subsistent being can produce created existence, it might
seem that there are no finite causes of existence. Yet St.
Thomas asserts that created existence, which is the proper
effect of God, is somehow caused by other principles. 26 Divine
providence employs created means, because God governs the
lower by the higher, not through any defect of his power, but
on account of the abundance of his goodness, in order that he
cause not only inasmuch as they are such by accidental forms, or thue by substantial forms, but also according to all that pertains to their existence in any way
whatever. And thus we must admit that even primary matter was created by the
universal cause of things." Ibid., Q. 44, Art.
•• " The more universal effects must be attributed to the more universal and prior
causes. But among all effects the most universal is existence itself. Hence this
must be the proper effect of the first and most universal cause, which is God. . • .
But to produce existence absolutely, not as this or that belongs essentially to
creation. Hence it is evident that creation is the proper action of God himself."
Ibid., Q. 45, Art. 5.
•• Elements of Christian Philosophy, by Etienne Gilson, Doubleday & Co., New
York; 1960, p. 176.
•• " Created existence, which is the proper effect of the first agent is caused by
other principles." De Potentia, Q. 7, Art.
ad 10.

86

WILLIAM H. KANE

might also share the dignity of causality with his creatureS. 27
Created existence depends not only on the first cause but also
on the finite agent and the form. 28
First we consider existence as an effect of form. It is commonly admitted that the existence of a thing depends somehow
on its form. Existence is said to be the first effect of the form. 29
The form gives existence, 30 and existence follows upon the form
as roundness from a circle. 31 Indeed, if the form is something
subsisting, e. g. the human soul, its existence belongs to it
necessarily and is naturally inseparable from it. However, the
form does not cause its own existence as an efficient cause, and
this for two reasons: first, because existence belongs to the
whole, whereas the form is only a part, at least in material
things; and second, because the form must be before it can
act: it cannot produce itself. Nor is the form a final cause of
its own existence, because the form itself is ordered to existence
as to its perfection and end. Furthermore, the form is a formal
cause only in material things and with respect to matter, of
which it is the first act and perfection, not with respect to
27 " Two things pertain to providence, namely, the plan of order among things
provided for an end, and the execution of this order, which is called government.
As regards the first of these, God i=ediately provides for everything. Because in
his intellect he has the notion of all, even the least; and to whatever causes he has
placed over certain effects he has given the power to produce those effects. Hence
he must have had in his mind beforehand the order of those effects. As for the
second, there are certain intermediaries of divine providence. For he governs the
lower things through the higher; not because of any defect of his power, but because
of the greatness of his goodness, in order to share the dignity of causality even to
creatures." Sum. Theol., I, Q. 22, Art. 8.
28 " The form causes the matter to be, and so does the agent." Ibid., Q. 75, Art.
5, Reply 8.
29 " The first effect of the form is existence, for each thing has existence according
to its form." Ibid., Q. 42, Art. 1.
30 " The substantial form gives existence simply."
Ibid., Q. 76, Art. 4.
31 " What belongs to something considered in itself can never be separated from
it. . . . Roundness cannot be taken from a circle, because it belongs to the circle
as such. . . . But existence belongs to the form considered in itself, because each
thing is a being in act according to its form. Indeed, matter is a being in act
through the form. Therefore a composite of matter and form ceases to be in act
by the separation of the form from the matter. But if the form subsists in its own
existence, it cannot lose its existence." Ibid., Q. 50, Art. 5.

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

87

existence. Even though the form specifies the existence. it does
so as something less actual and less perfect, not as something
more actual. The form is as something potential which receives
and limits existence to this or that manner of existence, and
so its causality is merely that of a potential subject or material
cause receiving, limiting and sustaining existence. Form and
essence are to created existence as the transparent body is to
light, that is, as potency is to act, or the less perfect to the more
perfect. Even in the case of subsistent forms, the simple essence
is as a material or potential principle, while the formal principle
in them is their participated existence. 32 Separated substances
do not have a formal cause distinct from their own existence. 33
Is existence as an effect of finite agents or efficient causes?
Although God is the proper cause of that universal being in
all things, and is the only first cause, still he is not the only
efficient cause. St. Thomas states that for something to be the
cause of another, it is not necessary that it be the first cause. 34
Besides the first cause, there are also secondary causes. By
reason of its own excellence of power the agent communicates
the power of acting also to its effects. God indeed acts in all
things as first cause, but creatures themselves have their proper
operations and are secondary causes. 35 Operation follows being;
and just as finite beings actually are, so also they are efficient
causes. Everything which operates is in some way a cause of
existence and makes something to be actual, either according
to substantial being or according to accidental being. 36 Finite
agents actually are and operate, and are somehow causes of
existence in their effects.
••" In the soul the simple essence itself is as something material, whereas the
participated existence is something formal in it, which indeed of necessity is together·
with the essence of the soul, because existence belongs to the form of itself." Ibid.,
Q. 90, Art. 2, Reply I.
33 Ibid., Q. 61, Art. 1, Reply 2.
•• " For one thing to be the cause of another, it need not be the first cause."
Ibid:, Q. 83, Art. 1, Reply S.
30 " ••• it is due to the power of the agent that it give the power of acting to its
effect. . . . It should be understood that God operates in things in such a manner
that the things themselves have their proper operation." Ibid., Q. 105, Art. 5.
38 " Everything
that operates is in some way the cause of existence, either substantial or accidental." Contra Gentiles, liT, 67.

88

WILLIAM H. KANE

However, finite agents are not independent of God, who is
the first cause. All other agents which give or cause existence
are able to do so inasmuch as they act under the power and
influence of God. 37 Created existence itself is something first
and most perfect in all effects, and each particular effect is a
certain determination of existence. Finite existence as such is
the proper effect of God, the first and most universal cause.
Secondary causes are those which, as it were, particularize and
determine or specify the influence of the first cause, and they
produce as their proper effects, not existence itself, nor being
simply as caused and existing, but other effects which limit and
determine existence.
But according to the statement of St. Thomas, this distinction of first and secondary cause does not mean that the effect
of the secondary cause is something really distinct from the
effect of the first cause. 38 The same effect is from both the first
and the secondary cause, because divine providence produces
its
through the operations of secondary causes. While
it is true that a single action does not proceed from two agents
of one and the same order, still there is nothing to prevent one
and the same action to proceed from the :first and the secondary
cause. 39 God is the first cause, and under him are the secondary
causes. Actual existence is the common effect of all agents, and
as such it is the proper effect of God. Other agents produce this
effect inasmuch as they are ordered under the first cause and
act by his power (virtute Dei) .
Is existence produced by finite agents as instruments of God?
An instrumental cause is a mover moved by another. Precisely
as instrument it acts solely through the motion with which it
. is moved by the principal cause. 40 It does not produce the effect
as a whole, nor does it act by its own power, but depends upon
••" Nothing gives existence save inasmuch as it acts by the power of God."
Ibid., III, 66.
88 " ••• that which is from the secondary cause and £rom the first cause iS not
distinct; for divine providence produces effects through the operations of secondary
causes." I, Q.
Art. 5.
•• I, Q. 105, Art. 5, Reply
•• "An instrumental cause does not act by the power of its own form, but as
moved by the principal agent." III, Q.
Art. 1.

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

89

the principal agent for movement and also upon a subject on
which to act. Every finite agent presupposes not merely its
own being, which has been caused by another, and a subject
on which to act, but a,.lso presupposes its power to operate
when moved under the influence of the first cause. Finite
agents are movers moved by another, ultimately by the first
mover, and so they act under the power of God. They cause
the existence of their effects as movers moved ultimately by
the first cause, and so they act as instruments of God. Just
as no finite form is its own existence, or produces its own
existence, so no finite power is its own operation or causes its
own operation or its effect save as moved ultimately by the
first cause. In respect to the existence considered as general
and common to all effects of finite causes, God only is the first
and proper cause, whereas finite causes act and produce existence as a common effect only as instruments of God. As
instruments of God they are rather moved than movers, and
their effects depend rather upon God than upon themselves. 41
Is existence produced by finite agents as principal causes?
Our last question concerns created agents as principal causes of
existence: do at least some of them somehow produce existence
as secondary principal causes? A secondary principal cause is
a created agent which acts of itself (pe_r se). In order to act
of itself, a cause must exist of itself, that is, subsist with at least
some degree of complete, permanent and stable existence. 42 As
a secondary cause it acts under God, but as a principal cause it
acts also in virtue of its own form and power, and produces
something like itself in kind or species. Action follows being,
and both being and action follow form. Each agent operates
inasmuch as it is in act, and the mode of the action is according
to the mode of the act, as the hotter body heats more vigorously. Hence an agent which is limited and determined with
respect to genus, species and accident has limited power determined to effects which are similar to itself as the agent, and it
acts to produce something similar to itself. Only the first
cause can produce the first and most universal and most perfect
u Ccmtra

ill, 67.

'" Sum. Tkeol., Ill, Q. 6!!, Art. 4.

90

WILLIAM H. KANE

effect, namely, being or existence as such, which embraces the
whole effect and all that is in it. Secondary causes do not
produce the whole effect and all that is in it, but always presuppose something, and then· produce as their proper effects,
not existence as such, but other perfections which limit and
determine existence. 43
First of all, secondary causes do not produce the matter or
subject on which they operate and by which their effects are
individuated and distinguished or separated from the causes
themselves. A cause which is limited in being can produce
something similar to itself, but not something diverse, and so it
cannot produce an effect distinct from itself as such, that is, as
distinct.
In the second place, created causes do not produce the specific
nature of their effects, in which nature they also share, because
in this respect they are themselves effects, and they cannot
produce themselves, which would be the case if they produced
the specific nature as such.
Third, created causes are not always causes of the proper
being of their effects, but often only causes of becoming or production.44 Effects in act depend upon their causes of being in
act as long as they continue to exist, and they cease to exist
when the cause of their being ceases to act, as a room becomes
dark when the light goes out. But an effect depends upon the
cause of its production or becoming only when it is actually
being produced, as a building depends upon the
and
it does not cease to be in act when the cause of its production
ceases to act or even to be.
Fourth, created agents are not in all cases perfect agents. 45
In some cases they cannot necessitate their effects, but can be
impeded in one way or another. In other cases they cannot
•• " This man cannot be the cause of human nature absolutely, because then he
would be the cause of himself; but he is the cause that human nature be in this
man begotten. Thus he presupposes in his action a determinate matter by which
the man is this individual." Ibid., Q. 45, Art. 5, Reply 1.
" " An agent can be the cause only of the becoming of its effect, and not directly
of its existence." Ibid., Q. 104, Art. 1.
•• Ibid .• IT-II, Q. 83, Art. 1.

EXISTENCE AND CAUSALITY

91

produce the final and perfect form, which is the proper effect
of a higher agent, but can only produce a less perfect form, or
merely dispose the matter for the perfect form, as is the case in
human generation.
Lastly, no finite agent can produce existence as such, simply
and absolutely, which is the proper effect of God as creator
and first efficient cause.
But within proper limits we can admit that finite agents do
produce the existence of their effects, not merely as instruments
of God, but also as principal causes, whether causes of production or of limited being, as the case may be. St. Thomas says
that according to the order of divine providence things which
can be produced by secondary causes are not produced by God
without the cooperation of these causes, save in the case of
miraculous production. 46 It pertains to God's power to communicate his causality, and to the dignity of creatures to share
in this causality. Just as creatures participate in being, and
have their own being by which they subsist in themselves,
although dependent upon God both to be and to endure or_
continue to be, so also they have their own actions and their
own effects, even though entirely dependent upon the first
cause. The fact of genuine causality is evident from sensory
experience, by which we perceive sensible things acting on the
sense, and indeed
we cannot sense them. Moreover, if
natural things were not able to act and to· produce their own
effects, it would be in vain for them to have their proper forms
and powers. 47
However, this does not mean that finite causes are equal to
God, or produce the effects which are proper to God, save
when they act as mere instruments of God. In the case of each
natural being we find that it is a being, that it is a natural
being, that it is of this or that kind and has certain accidents.
The first aspect is common to all beings; the second is common
to all natural things; the third, common to one species; the
fourth, proper to one individual. Inasmuch as it is a caused or
•• Ibid .• I-II. Q. 68, Art. S, Obj. 1.

"De Potentia, Q. S, Art. 7.

92

WILLIAM H. KANE

natural being, it acts as an instrument of God. As an individual
of a species it acts as the proper cause of its own operations
and effects, and it is a secondary principal cause of its effects
under this limited aspect. Thus the carpenter does not produce
a being as such, nor the wood on which he works, but he makes
a wooden chair, that is, he makes or causes this wood to become
a chair by causing the form of a. chair to become actual in this
wood. He is a principal cause of the existence of the form,
not indeed as being, but as such a form of being produced in
this subject. Furthermore, an organism is a principal cause of
the production or generation of its offspring, not as being or
existence absolutely, nor as being of this kind specifically, but
as this kind of being produced in this particular subject or
matter.
In the special case of human generation, the parents are
disposing causes, not perfecting ones. The intellective soul is
not made from the potency of matter, but depends directly
upon God as the perfecting cause. The parents do not cause the
matter as such, nor the form or soul as such of their offspring.
However, they do cause the individual matter to become disposed for the form, and thus they apply and join this matter to
the form which comes from the Creator. The matter thus
proximately disposed and applied by the parents is the material
cause determining, receiving and supporting the form and
existence of the offspring. Here the axiom applies that the
cause of the cause is the cause also of the caused. The human
parents are secondary principal causes of the existence of their
offspring, not as being absolutely, but as being of this kind
produced in this matter proximately disposed and applied by
the generative action of the parents themselves. 48
WILLIAM

H. KANE, O.P.

Dominican HO'U8e of Studies,
River Forest, lllinou
•• " The disposing cause . . . is more properly an efficient cause if it brings about
the final disposition upon which the form follows with necessity, as man generates
man without causing the intellective principle, which is from without." In V Met.,
lect. 2, n. 767.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
GEORGE F. McLEAN, 0. M. I., S. T. L., Ph. D., national secretary of the
Catholic Philosophical Association, associate professor of Philosophy
at The Catholic University of America, is director of the Summer
Workshop in Philosophy entitled "Christian Philosophy and Reat The Catholic
ligious Renewal" to be conducted June
University of America, Washington, D. C.
MARTIN W. ScHOENBERG, 0. S.C., S. S. L., S. T. D., professor of Scripture
and Biblical languages at the Crosier House of Studies, Fort Wayne,
Indiana, a member of the summer school faculty at the University
of San Francisco, has published a commentary on the Macchabees in
the Old Testament Reading Guide series of the Liturgical Press
and contributed to many scholarly journals.
WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P., Ph. D., S. T. D., founder and long-time director of
The Albertus Magnus Lyceum, River Forest, Illinois, co-author of
Science in Synthesis, frequent contributor to THE THOMIST, Review
of Metaphysics, and The New Scholasticism, continues his teaching,
scholarly research and writing at the Dominican House of Studies,
River Forest, Illinois.
RAYMOND SMITH, 0. P., S. T. L., Ph. D., professor of Pedagogy at the
Dominican House of Studies, Dover, Massachusetts, is the author
of two studies, God Exists and The Natural Law, published by the
Paulist Press.
LAWRENCE CoNcoRDIA, 0. P., S. T. L., past professor at Emmanuel College,
Boston, Massachusetts, and contributor to the Newman Lecture
Series, is continuing his studies at the Pontifical University of
St. Thomas Aquinas in Rome.

98

BOOK REVIEWS
Formal Logic: An Introductory Textbook. By JoHN A. MoURANT. New
with index. $5.50.
York: Macmillan, 1963. Pp. xvi,
The Christian Wisdom Series of philosophy textbooks has published a
genuinely superior volume in John A. Mourant's Formal Logic. What would
seem an impossible assignment, namely, presenting the traditional logic,
symbolic logic, and a very adequate section on induction in one book, has
been achieved with clarity of style, ample excercises for the student, and
excellent references for further reading. What is more, the author writes
with such charming graciousness that he makes one realize that the richness of Aristotle's contributions are in no way impaired by the possibilities
of the modem logic, and neither system should be the foe of the other.
Dr. Mourant, who is a professor of philosophy at Pennsylvania State
University, does not indulge in polemics but prefers to be positive throughout. Constantly he updates the traditional logic but does it in such a
sympathetic way that he enhances one's respect for this great methodology.
Then Professor Mourant sets forth precisely the fundamentals of the new
logic. Finally, in the concluding part he expounds some of the theories old
and current on induction.
Covering so much matter required Professor Mourant to be succinct.
Yet, in the first part he treats all the standard material of formal logic,
concluding with a delightful chapter on logical fallacies. A superb essay
opens the second section and explains the connections between Aristotelian
logic and the modem logic and what exactly this new logic is attempting
to do. The author is especially helpful in his explanations of various
terminologies used and perspectives adopted in all fields of logic.
Professor Mourant's work marks a reversal in the trend of many recent
books on traditional logic which were aimed at demonstration or so-called
material logic. One regrets that once again the apex of Aristotle's logic
will fade to the background. However, since symbolic logic is the generally
accepted system of the day,. our Catholic university and college students
must be taught it or suffer a serious void in their philosophical training.
RAYMOND

Saint Stephen's College,
Dover, Massachusetts

94

SMITH, 0. P.

BOOK REVIEWS

95

SAHAKIAN:
Systems of Ethics and Value Theory. New York:
Philosophical Library, 1963.

WILLIAMS.

Systems of Ethics and Value Theory should be judged a useful and
helpful piece of consultative literature for college courses in the history
of ethical and value theory. The author devotes elaborate attention to a
survey of writings in the field, reporting on writings from the golden age
of Greece, on sources traditional in western religion, and on modern as
well as contemporary authors. The method of presentation, which avoids
being a collection of " clipped pages," succeeds in stimulating interest in
original sources. One limitation of this, however, is that the reader has
difficulty distinguishing editor from authors in the presentation of ideas.
The two are so closely interwined that there is danger of confusion.
Although the editor strives to present criticisms of the ethical positions
presented, the comments suffer from brevity or intellectual immaturity in
certain instances.
The lists of recommended readings were made in an uncritical fashion,
missing an opportunity to assist the reader.
On the whole, this work is a worthwhile introduction to the problems of
its title because it concerns itself with a summary presentation of ideas and
statements rather than mere historical or biographical facts.

G. L. CoNcORDIA, 0. P.
Angelicum,

R0111o8

BOOKS RECEIVED
Anderson, Alan Ross (ed.). Minds and Machines. (Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: ·
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii, 114. $i.i5.
Barfield, Owen. Worlds Apart. Middletown, Connecticut: Wesleyan University Press, 1964. Pp. 211. $5.00.
Chappell, V. C. (ed.). Ordinary Language. (Contemporary Perspectives
in Philosophy Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1964. Pp. viii, 114. $U5.
Durrwell, F. X. In the Redeeming Christ. New York: Sheed and Ward,
1963. Pp. xi, 292. $5.00.
Hastings, Adrian. One and Apostolic. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1964.
Pp. xiv, 200. $4.50.
Kiing, Hans. The Council in Action. New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963.
Pp. ix, 276. $4.50.
Oesterreicher, John M. The Israel of God. (Foundations of Catholic
Theology Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1963. Pp. ix, 118. $3.95 (cloth) and $1.50 (paper).
de.Parvillez, Alphonse. Joy in the Face of Death. (Transl. by Pierre de
Fontnouvelle). New York: Desclee Co., 1963. Pp. 254. $3.95.
Pieper, Josef. Leisure the Basis of Culture. (Intro. by T. S. Eliot). New
York: Pantheon Books. 1964.
Pike, Nelson (ed.). God and Evil. (Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1964. Pp. viii, 114. $2.25.
Pitcher, George (ed.). Truth. (Contemporary Perspectives in Philosophy
Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964.
Pp. viii, 118. $U5.
Pols, Edward. The Recognition of Reason. (Foreword by G. K. Plochmann). Carbondale, Illinois: Southern Illinois University Press,
.
1963. Pp. xi, 256. $6.00.
Rahner, Karl. Mary Mother of the Lord. New York: Herder & Herder,
1963. Pp. 107. $2.95.
Sellars, W. F. Science, Perception, and Reality. (International Library of
Philosophy and Scientific M,ethod). New York: Humanities Press,
1968. Pp. viii, 366. $8.50.
Tomas, V. (ed.). Creativity in the Arts. (Contemporary Perspectives in
Philosophy Series). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall,
Inc., 1964. Pp. ix, 110. $!U5.
Troisfontaines, Rogers. I Do Not Die. (Transl. by F. E. Albert). New
York: Desclee Co., 1963. Pp. 295. $4.75.

96

THE GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VoL. XXVIII (1964)
INDEX OF AUTHORS

PAGE

ANDERSON, JAMES F. In Defense of Etienne Gilson: Concerning a
Recent Book about Thomistic Metaphysics .
373
BEIS, RICHARD H. Some Contributions of Anthropology to Ethics
174
BLACKSTONE, WILLIAM T. Thomism and Metaethics .
225
KANE, WILLIAM H. Existence and Causality .
76
LA PLANTE, HARRY. Etienne Gilson and the Concept of Existence
302
MAcKINNON, EDWARD M., S.J. Understanding According to Bernard
J. F. Lonergan, Part I
97
Part II .
338
Part III .
475
MARIEB, RAYMOND E., 0. P. The Impeccability of the Angels regard409
ing their Natural End
McLEAN, GEORGE F., 0. M. I. Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy
of Protestantism .
1
OEsTERLE, JoHN A. How Good is Pleasurable Good? .
391
REID, JoHN PATRICK, 0. P. Marx on the Unity of Man
259
ScHOENBERG, MARTIN W., 0. S.C. St. Paul's Notion on the Adoptive
51
Sonship of Christians
STUHLMUELLER,CARROLL, C. P. The Prophet and the Word of God . 133

INDEX OF ARTICLES
Adoptive Sonship, St. Paul's Notion on the -- of Christians.
MARTIN W. ScHOENBERG, 0. S.C. .
Angels, The Impeccability of the -- regarding their Natural End.
RAYMOND E. MARIEB, o. P. .
Anthropology, Some Contributions of -- to Ethics. RICHARD H.
BEIS
Causality, Existence and--. WILLIAM H. KANE, O.P. .
Christians, St. Paul's Notion on the Adoptive Sonship of --.
MARTIN W. ScHOENBERG, 0. S.C. .
Concept of Existence, Etienne Gilson and the --. HARRY LA
PLANTE
Contributions, Some -- of Anthropology to Ethics. RICHARD H.
BEIS

51
409
174
76
51
302
174

PAGE

Defense of Etienne Gilson: Concerning a Recent Book about Thomistic Metaphysics. JAMEs F. ANDERSON
373
Etienne Gilson and the Concept of Existence. HARRY LA PLANTE . 302
Ethics, Some Contributions of Anthropology to --. RICHARD H.
BEIS
174
Existence and Causality. WILLIAM H. KANE, 0. P.
76
Existence, Etienne Gilson and the Concept of --. HARRY LA
PLANTE
302
Existential, Paul Tillich's --Philosophy of Protestantism. GEORGE
F. McLEAN, 0. M.l. .
I
302
Gilson, Etienne -- and the Concept of Existence .
Gilson, In Defense of Etienne --: Concerning a Recent Book
about Thomistic Metaphysics. JAMES F. ANDERSON .
373
God, The Prophet and the Word of--. CARROLL STUHLMUELLER,
C.P.
133
391
Goon, How Good is Pleasurable --? JoHN A. OEsTERLE
391
How Good is Pleasurable Good? JoHN A. OEsTERLE .
Impeccability of the Angels regarding their Natural End, The.
RAYMOND E. MARIEB, 0. P.
409.
Lonergan, Understanding according to Bernard J. F.--. EnwARD
M. MAcKINNON, S. J. Part I
97
Part II .
338
Part III .
475
Man, Marx on the Unity of--. JoHN PATRICK REID, O.P.
259
Marx on the Unity of Man. JoHN PATRICK REID, 0. P. .
259
Metaethics, Thomism and--. WILLIAM T. BLACKSTONE .
225
End, The Impeccability of the Angels regarding their --.
RAYMOND E. MARIEB, 0. P. .
409
Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of Protestantism.
GEORGE F.
McLEAN, 0. M. I.
I
GEORGE
Philosophy, Paul Tillich's Existential-- of Protestantism.
F. McLEAN, 0. M. I. .
I
Pleasurable Good, How Good is --? JoHN A. OESTERLE
391
Prophet and the Word of God, The--. CARROLL STUHLMUELLER,.
C.P.
133
Protestantism, Paul Tillich's Existential Philosophy of--. GEORGE
F. McLEAN, 0. M. I. .
I
Thoinism and Metaethics. WILLIAM T. BLACKSTONE .
225
Tillich's, Paul-- Existential Philosophy of Protestantism. GEORGE
F. McLEAN, 0. M. I. .
I
Some Contributions of Anthropology to Ethics. RICHARD H. BEIS . 174
St. Paul's Notion on the Adoptive Sonship of Christians. MARTIN
ScHOENBERG, 0. S.C. .
51

PAGE

Understanding According to Bernard J. F. Lonergan. EDWARD M.
MAcKINNON, S. J. Part I
97
Part II .
338
Part III .
475
Unity of Man, Marx on the--. JoHN PATRICK REm, 0. P. .
259
Word of God, The Prophet and the--. CARROLL STUHLMUELLER,
C.P.
133

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS
BIRD, OTTO, Syllogistic and Its
Vol. IV. (Robert V.
Devine)
FEIGL, HERBERT and MAXwELL, GROVER (ed.), Minnesota Studies in
the Philosophy of Science, Vol. III. (W. A. Wallace, 0. P.)
FISK, MILTON, A Modern Formal Logic, Vol. IV. (Robert V. Devine)
GALLAGHER, DoNALD and IDELLA, The Achievement of Jacques and
Ra'issa Maritain, Vol. III. (Frank Keegan)
GRUNBAUM, ADOLPH, Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, Vol.
IV. (W. A. Wallace, 0. P.)
MARITAIN, JACQUES, Dieu et la Permission du Mal (Textes et Etudes
Philosophiques), Vol. IV. (Thomas R. Heath, 0. P.)
MouRANT, JoHN A., Formal Logic: An Introductory Textbook, Vol. I.
(Raymond Smith, 0. P.)
MuRA, ERNEST, The Nature of the Mystical Body, Vol. III. (Philip
Hanley, 0. P.)
NoGAR, RAYMOND J., 0. P., The Wisdom of Evolution, Vol. III. (Cyril
Volert, S. J.)
RAHNER, Huoo, Greek Myths a.nd Christian Mysteries, Vol. II.
(James M. Egan, 0. P.)
RAHNER, KARL, The Church and the Sacraments, Vol. II. (Bernard
Cooke, S. J.)
SAHAKIAN, WILLIAMS., Systems of Ethics and Value Theory, Vol. I.
(Lawrence Concordia, 0. P.)
SHEPHERD, MAsSEY H. (ed.), Worship in Scripture and Tradition,
Vol. II. (Kevin Seasoltz, 0. S. B.)
ScHILLEBEECKX,EDwARD, 0. P ., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter
with God, Vol. II. (Bernard Cooke, S. J.)
WEYL, NATHANIEL and PossoNY, STEFAN, The Geography of Intellect,
Vol. II. (Michael Stock, 0. P .)

530

524
530
387

524
533

94
384
382

254
251
95
257

251
248