THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: VoL. XXVIII The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. OCTOBER, 1964 No.4 HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? T HE QUESTION of the pleasurable good presents two levels of difficulty. One is the level of understanding. What do we mean by the pleasurable good-the bonum delectabile? After analyzing this notion, and noting that the expression bonum delectabile has more than one meaning, we can, at this level, suggest an answer to how good the pleasurable good is. The second level of difficulty concerns more the practical problem of the role of pleasure in moral life. To what extent, or how, can we seek a pleasurable good as an object of desire? We shall be concerned primarily with the first level of difficulty, but in the light of what we can show about the nature of the pleasurable good, we can also discuss in a general way the role pleasure can play in moral life. It is hardly necessary to dwell on the occasion for discussing pleasure in relation to human life. It is enough to suggest that pleasure is frequently misunderstood, both as to what it is and what part it can play. The hedonist approach offers one solution-pleasure above everything else is to be sought at all 391 392 JOHN A. OESTERLE times; moral life consists in gratifying our pleasure-seeking instincts. There is, of course, the opposite extreme: pleasure is somehow not a real good unless it can be related to some intrinsic good; it is basically only instrumental in character and hence not something to be sought in any way in and of itself. It is difficult not to gravitate toward one of these extreme positions. The task is to see if there is truly a mean position which will establish just how good the pleasurable good is-that it may not be as good as some think, but on the other hand that it is, after all, a good. Let us consider first how Aristotle introduces and develops the notion along with some observations St. Thomas has to make. In Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, after considering the purpose of moral philosophy, Aristotle seeks an answer to the most important question of practical knowledge: What is the ultimate good or end for man? "Verbally there is wide agreement; for both the general run of men and people say that it is happiness, and they identify living well and doing well with being happy; but with regard to what happiness is, they differ.... " 1 Note that there is general agreement, not only in the name "happiness," 2 but also in identifying living well and doing well with being happy. This identification of happiness with activity of some kind is necessary for understanding the problem we are investigating, for, as we shall see, pleasure implies activity or operation. Nicomachean Ethics I, 4 (1095a 16-20). • The translation of eillia.tp.ovla. as " happiness " is objected to by Sir David Ross in the following terms: " The conventional translation ' happiness ' is unsuitable in the Ethics; for whereas ' happiness ' means a state of feeling, differing from 'pleasure' only by its suggestion of performance, depth, and serenity, Aristotle insists that eillia.tp.ovLa. is a kind of activity; that it is not any kind of pleasure, though pleasure naturally accompanies it. The more non-committal translation 'well-being' is therefore better." (Aristotle, Meridian Books, Inc., New York, 1959, p. 186.) However, the very ambiguity of the word " happiness," signifying indeterminately " a state of well-being," is particularly appropriate, for at the outset everyone can agree that we seek something like this, familiarly known as " happiness," leaving open the question in what it determinately consists. The whole of moral philosophy will then be devoted principally to giving, so far as possible, a resolution to this basic question. 1 HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 898 Following his usual procedure, Aristotle begins to inquire into the various opinions on happiness. Significantly enough, the first one he reports identifies happiness with pleasure. Having noted that this view is "not without some ground," Aristotle proceeds to distinguish three principal kinds of life: the life of pleasure, the political life, and the contemplative. In commenting on Aristotle at this point St. Thomas says, with respect to these three principal kinds of life, "Et has dicit [Aristoteles]maxime excellentes." 3 St. Thomas goes on to explain this point by saying that whatever one is most influenced by so he reputes his life to be; now, one is influenced most by what one deems to be a supreme good; and thus lives are distinguished by a diversity of what is taken, at least implicitly, as an ultimate end. In this context St. Thomas, after pointing out that the end has the nature of good, divides the good into three kinds: bonum utile (the useful good), bonum delectabile (the pleasurable good) and bonum honestum (the honorable or noble good) . St. Thomas then adds: "Two of these, namely the bonum delectabile and the bonum honestum have the nature of an end, because each is desirable for itsel£."4 The significant point here is that St. Thomas speaks of the bonum delectabile, and not only the bonum lwnestum, as " desirable for itself," opposing them both to the bonum utile, which is understood as only good for something else. However, some ambiguity of meaning still remains in the phrase bonum delectabile, which also carries over into the English "pleasurable good." Two distinct, though related, meanings are present. Before indicating them, it should be pointed out that both meanings have in common a reference to delight or enjoyment. The difference is that in one meaning of "pleasurable good," the delight signifies a good possessed by the senses. • In I Ethic., 5, n. 58. The Greek text reads 'Tpe'is "tap den p.u.X&cr'Ta ol 'lt'pollx.ov.,.es. Both the Oxford and Loeb editions translate '1t'p011X.OV'TES as " prominent." The Latin maxime exceUentes seems closer to the Greek; cf. Liddell & Scott, G'Teelc Dictwna:ry, under 'lt'poex.CJJ from which the participle 'lt'pollx.ov.,.esderives. •" Quorum duo, scilicet delectabile et honestum, habent rationem finis, quia utrumque est appetibile propter seipsum." In I Ethic., 5, n. 58. 894 JOHN A. OESTERLE This is the first or strict meaning of " pleasurable good," for no doubt this is what the expression was first imposed to signify, sensible being which we first know. In the second meaning, an extended one, "pleasurable good " signifies delight in some bonum honestum, understood as something over and above mere sense-what we might call "intellectual pleasure" or "intellectual delight." St. Thomas is aware of the ambiguity, for he goes on to say: " The good called honestum, which is the good according to reason, has also a delight conjoined to it. Hence the pleasurable good, as divided over and against the bonum honestum, is the pleasurable according to sense." 5 Let us look first at the extended meaning of bonum delectabile, the resting of desire in the possession of a good according to reason, for it is significant that we associate the pleasurable with a good of the mind as well as more familiarly with a good of sense. Now we speak ?f such intellectual pleasure in several distinct ways. There is a wholly intellectual pleasure we can experience in the delight of sheer knowing, in the understanding of something for its own sake. We also take delight in acting according to moral virtue; indeed, pleasure or delight is a sign that we have this or that virtue; the truly temperate man, for example, is pleased in not being indulgent. Finally, there is pleasure in contemplating works of art, in listening to good music; this is quite a special sort of pleasurable good, peculiar to human beings. It is at once a delight in a good of the mind and of sense, mirroring the intimate union of sense and intellect in human beings. We are concerned, of course, with the pleasurable good in the primary and strict meaning, the good in which the sense appetite comes to rest. However, in discussing such pleasurable good, we cannot escape reference to the extended meanings of " pleasure " because, as we shall see, human pleasure cannot be understood only in its strict and primary meaning, since 5 "Honestum autem dicitur, quod est bonum secundum rationem, quod quidem habet delectationem annexam. Unde delectabile, quod contra honestum dividitur, est delectabile secundum sensum." Ibid. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 395 man never lives merely a life of sensation. On the other hand, we do have such a life, and in this life the pleasurable good is first realized. Hence, first of all, what is it precisely and wherein lies its goodness? Now it seems at the outset that such pleasurable good has no other motive than the pleasure it gives, insofar as it has the nature of purpose-an appetibile propter seipsum. St. Thomas seems quite explicit on this point, not only in the passage we have already quoted from the Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, but in the Summa Theologiae as well. In the latter work, defending the division of good into the three kinds, St. Thomas states, in meeting an objection, " Now those things are properly called pleasurable which have no other aspect of desirability except pleasure, even though at times they are harmful and unbefitting." 6 The import of this last clause, as well as the fact that St. Thomas is dividing the bonum delectabile off from the bonum honestum and the bonum utile, seems clearly to suggest that he has the strict meaning of bonum delectabile in mind and that such pleasurable good has the nature of purpose. In refining our notion of the pleasurable· good, we must take into account two elements involved in sense pleasure: perception, an act of sense knowing, and a rest of desire in the good received. So far we have stressed the latter element, the formal aspect of pleasure, for when a good is possessed then desire is at rest, precisely as terminating the movement of unsatisfied desire. It is in this that pleasure or delight consists, even though we can make some allowance for a certain pleasure in the anticipation of pleasure. Pleasure, therefore, supposes something other than just presence of and rest in an object; it is both a knowledge of and an appetitive rest in a good. Hence, in defining pleasure it is not enough to say that it is a termination of the movement of desire when a good is present; 6 " Dicuntur tamen ilia proprie delectabile, quae nullam habent aliam rationem appetibilitatis nisi delectationem, cum aliquando sint et noxia et inhonesta." Summa Theologiae I, 5, Art. 6, ad. 2. 396 JOHN A. OESTERLE it must also be understood that there is cognitive awareness in the presence of this good. 7 The perception of sense is therefore necessary for delight; still, delight does not terminate in perception but is completed in bringing desire to rest. These two elements, accordingly, are inseparably linked together in the pleasurable good: the sense perception, which is itself agreeable, and the delight in this agreeableness by sense desire. This is properly the bonum delectabile which men and animals share. However, we cannot simply reduce sense pleasure as man experiences it to the level of " raw" sense pleasure as it is found in animals. Man certainly enjoys a pleasure which, considered abstractly, is the same as that of the animal; however, he does not experience it as mere animal but as man. In effect, this means that man will enjoy a pleasurable good better than an animal and in a way no animal could; it also means that he can experience it worse than an animal ever could because only man can pervert sense enjoyment by not relating it to something characteristically human. In this way man becomes more bestial than any animal. Allowing for all this, it still remains true that the pleasurable good in the strict sense is sense pleasure, that properly speaking the pleasurable good is uniquely of the sense order, that is, it is something peculiar to the sense order. Moreover, as we have already pointed out, such a pleasurable good belongs to the order of an end and has an attraction all its own. It therefore appears that such pleasure is related to the sense order as the virtuous is related to the intellectual and moral order, each providing an object of repose for the respective appetites. This is why the attraction of sense pleasure is similiar to de'Cf. Sum11Ul Theologiae I-II, 81, Art. 1. "Respondeo dicendum quod motus appetitus sensitivi proprie passio nominatur ... Affectio autem quaecumque ex apprehensione sensitiva procedens, est motus appetitus sensitivi. Hoc autem necesse est competere delectationi." Cf. Jean Langlois, S. J., "La Definition de la delectation," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, 1949, Vol. V, n. 2, pp. 170-196. Fr. Langlois considers at length the definition of delectation, shoWing in particular that while the perception of sense is necessary for delectation, still it does not terminate in the perception but is completed in the appetite. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 397 light in the intellectual order provided it always retain some ordering to a characteristic human good; at the same time, the delight in a good of sense still differs formally from the delight in the good of reason and is not wholly reducible to it. The whole problem, therefore, consists in sufficiently recognizing, on the one hand, the strict pleasurable good as a distinct kind of good, somehow truly an end, not simply reducible to the bonum honestum and in which the bonum delectabile in the extended sense is found, that is, a distinctive intellectual delight. The problem is aggravated by the fact that the pleasurable good of sense often occupies an ambiguous position in the minds of some moral philosophers and theologians who tend to reduce it simply to the bonum utile or to the bonum honestum, making either too little or too much of it. The problem therefore is more involved than at first appears. In order to see all aspects of the problem so as to resolve the problem satisfactorily, we need to analyze more fully, somewhat more subtly, what the bonum delectabile is, both in the broad and strict meanings, and what part it plays and should play in human life. In Book X of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle, and St. Thomas following him, treat pleasure most fully, and for a reason assigned at the outset by Aristotle: pleasure is most intimately connected with our human nature, and to enjoy the things we ought and to hate the things we ought has the greatest bearing on virtue of character.8 Here we will consider only some of the more important points made in Chapters 4 and 5 of Book X. Delectation, pleasurable delight, is a certain perfect operation. In the activity of sense, there is the sense power itself 1 The treatise on pleasure runs from chapter one through chapter five; it is particularly chapters four and five which are relevant. It should be kept in mind that Aristotle is approaching the final resolution, so far as it can be made, as to what human happiness is, and the role of pleasure is inextricably involved in this determination. True, enough, in this context it is the bonum delectabile of the intellectual order that is now primary, but the role of sense pleasure is also relevant and best seen in this ordering. 398 JOHN A. OESTERLE as the principle of operation, and the sensible-what is sensed -the object of the activity. For this activity to be perfect, there must be the best disposition on the part of each. Sense operates perfectly when the operation of sense is well disposed to something " beautiful," i.e., to what is most fittingly proportionate to sense; there is delight, for example, in seeing beautiful color. Consequently, when an operation is at its best it is also most pleasurable or delectable. This relation extends throughout human knowing and appetitive operation. "For there is delectation not only according to touch and taste, but also acaccording to all sense. And not only according to sense, but even according to the speculative operation of the intellect. ... " 9 Now pleasure perfects operation, not efficiently, but formally; not formally, however, in the sense of bringing about the intrinsic form of a thing, but as that which follows upon a thing already constituted in its kind. It is by this precision that we can see how pleasure perfects an activity as a certain end, that is, as a certain perfection which is inevitably consequent, just as, to use the happy analogy of Aristotle, the bloom of youth follows upon those in the flower of their age.10 Such pleasure is found only in the operation of sense and intellect for a reason we have already indicated, namely that knowledge of the presence of the good is a necessary condition for pleasure. Each activity has its proper pleasure, not only as sense differs from intellect but as sense differs from sense. We thus have a basis for the graduation of pleasure. The more immaterial the activity, i.e., the less it is embedded in matter, the more the pleasure. Thus, the pleasure following upon seeing or hearing is superior to the pleasure following upon taste or touch, even though the latter at times may be more im• " Est enim delectatio non solum secundum tactum et gustum, sed etiam secundum omnem sensum. Nee solum secundum sensum, sed etiam secundum speculationem intellectus ... " In X Ethic., 6, n. '" " Pleasure completes the activity not as the corresponding permanent state does, by its immanence, but as an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their age." Nicomachean Ethics X, 4, 117ab 30. (Ross translation.) HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 399 mediately vehement; similiarly, the pleasure following upon intellectual activity is superior to that of the senses, though again the latter may at times be more immediately intense and obvious. We thus see that the bonum delectabile, as a good and as an end, cannot be isolated from the sort of activity upon which it follows. We can only enjoy what is, as it were, the fruit of an activity, and our various activities are specified in terms of their principles, the powers and the objects. Yet, and it is a point of no small consequence, though all dogs enjoy pleasures in the same way, and so with other kinds of animals, men differ in the pleasures they enjoy. The ultimate reason for this is the following: "The operations and pleasures of animals other than men follow upon a natural inclination, which is the same in all animals of the same species. But the operations and pleasures of men arise from reason, which is not determined to one thing. Hence it is that some men delight in some things and other men are pained by them." 11 An allied reason for this diversity is that some men are better disposed according to reason than others not so disposed. This, of course, leads to the consideration of virtue which is the measure by which we judge which are true pleasures, even as to sense, and which are not, for the man of virtue delights in what are truly pleasures. The point of this exposition of pleasure as drawn from Book X of the Ethics is to note and underline the true and proper role of pleasure in human activity. The bonum delectabile is thereby seen to be a distinct kind of good, worthy of seeking in terms of the activity it complements. Nevertheless, this view of the role of pleasure in human life, and particularly the view that pleasure seems worthy as an end, can readily pose some questions and difficulties. What we have said so far, as 11 " Cuius ratio est, quia operationes et delectationes aliorum animalium consequuntur naturalem inclinationem, quae est eadem in omnibus animalibus eiusdem speciei. Sed operationes et delectationes hominum proven'iunt a ratione quae non determinatur ad unum. Et inde est quod quaedam quosdam homines delectant, et quosdam contristant." In X Ethic., 8, n. 2060. 400 JOHN A. OESTERLE drawn from Book X of the Ethics, treats pleasure primarily in the extended sense, intellectual pleasure. Can we really speak of sense pleasure in this way? In order to consider sense pleasure more specifically, and to remove difficulties which may still linger as to the value of sense pleasure, we have to turn to Book Vll of the Ethics. This Book treats continence and incontinence, at the conclusion of which pleasure and pain are discussed since they form the matter of continence and incontinence. Now if we confine ourselves to sense pleasure, it may well appear that the bonum delectabile is not really a good in itself and not really an end. The following quotation from the Commentary of St. Thomas appears to make this very point: Some bodily pleasures [i. e., those which are not naturally bad] are medicine for some defect. A sign that this is the case may be seen in the fact that only the needy experience them, for a man finds no pleasure in food when he does not need it. Thus the pleasure of food is a remedy against pain of hunger. Now it is clear that it is better to be perfect than to become perfect. But pleasures of this kind, which we say to be remedial belong to those who are becoming perfect, not to those who are perfect, for they are caused by a need of nature being removed. Therefore, they are not good in themselves, but accidentally, namely insofar as they are necessary for something else.U An author, commenting recently on this very passage, says: " They are good, in other words, only as means, not as ends." 13 But the matter is not quite so simple. The whole of Lesson XIV in Book VII of the Ethics, in which the quoted passage occurs, expressly delineates the character of bodily pleasures. 12 " Quaedam vero delectationum corporalium sunt medicinae contra aliquam defectum. Et huius signum est, quia non sunt nisi indigentis. Non enim aliquis delectatur in cibo, quando non indiget. Et sic delectatio cibi est medicina contra tristiam famis. Et manifestum est quod melius habere aliquem iam perfectum quam fieri. Huiusmodi autem delectationes, quas dicimus esse medicinales, accident his qui perficiuntur, non autem his qui iam sunt perfecti. Causantur enim ex hoc quod per id quod non sunt bonum secundum se, sed per accidens, inquantum scilicet sunt ad aliquid necessariae." In VII Ethic., 14, nn. 1525-15!l6. 18 Thomas Dubay, S. M., "An Investigation into the Thomistic Concept of Pleasure," The New ScholasticWm, Vol. XXXVI, n. 1, Jan., 196!l, p. 9!!. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 401 Earlier in the lesson it was pointed out that bodily pleasures are good in some way-as removing contrary pains. 14 In other words, they are good, not unqualifiedly, but up to a certain point. It should not come as a surprise that sense goods are restricted goods. And it still remains true that it is not from the fact that a man seeks and enjoys bodily goods that he is bad, because all men in someway enjoy tasty food or wine, and other such pleasures; they become blameworthy only in that they enjoy these not as they ought. 15 The passage from St. Thomas quoted above actually appears in the context of a parenthetical remark made by Aristotle as to why pleasure is not thought to be good, and such a context makes quite a difference in understanding the passage. Two reasons are indicated why some think pleasure is not a good: 1) some pleasures are activities belonging to a bad nature, and 2) others are meant to cure a defective nature. It is this latter reason St. Thomas is commenting upon in the passage. It would seem to be reading St. Thomas a little hastily to have him mean that any pleasure which is not bad is only accidentally good and therefore only a means and not an end; moreover, the passage appears in the context of those who need to get into a healthy state, not for those who are in it. In addition St. Thomas, along with Aristotle, points out significantly that some men adhere only to sensible things and do not enjoy intellectual pleasures; now because such men have no other pleasures in which they recreate, it is not reproachable if they accept bodily pleasures as long as such " " Primo enim dicit, quod delectationes corporales sunt aliqualiter bonae, inquantum scilicet sunt necessariae ad depellendas contrarias tristitias. Quia· etiam per hunc modum, omne illud quod non est malum ex sua natura potest dici bonum." In VII Ethic., 14, n. 1518. 15 " Et huiua signum est, quod ex hoc aliquis dicitur pravus quod horum bonorum superabundantiam quaerit, etiam si nulli alii noceat. Non tamen ex hoc ipso, quod quaerit corporalia bona, et delectatur, est pravus; quia omnes homines aliqualiter gaudent pulmento, vino et venereis: sed ex hoc vituperantur aliqui, quod gaudent in eis, non secundum quod oportet. Ex quo patet, quod delectatio corporalis est bona usque ad aliquam mensuram, superabundantia autem ipsius est mala." Ibid., n. 1520. 402 JOHN A. OESTERLE pleasures are not injurious, either to themselves or others. 16 It is not reproachable because they need them as remedy against pain. In many respects, pain comes to man because of his natural movements and activities; the animal nature is always in labor. 11 Even seeing and hearing cause pain, hence the need and pleasure of sleep. It is not surprising, therefore, to find pleasure referred to in this context as medicative and curative; on the contrary, it throws light on an important role of sense pleasure. Pleasure and pain are contraries, and hence one will remove the other. We therefore seek pleasure, in conformity with the animal nature we have, as a relief from bodily pain. We are thus led to see an important difference between the pleasure of sense and intellectual pleasure. Intellectual pleasure has no contrary. Pleasure of sense, on the other hand, has to be understood in relation to its contrary, and it is in this sense that bodily pleasure can be understood in its curative role, which is not to deny that it is still a good and still worthy of desire. Let us therefore be clear on this point. Even though sense pleasure and pain are contraries, in which respect pleasure can be understood in relation to pain, as curative of it, nonetheless pleasure is not to be reduced wholly to a remedial function. Pleasurable goods which only relieve a need or cure an imperfection are only incidentally pleasurable. A pleasurable good is intrinsically good in the sense it naturally complements our various activities. It is our composite nature which gives rise to contrariety of pleasure and pain in the sense order and which demands a curative role at times for pleasure. 16 " Dicit ergo prima, quod quia corporales delectationes sunt vehementes, quae· runtur ab his quo non possunt aliis delectationibus gaudere, scilicet ab hominibus qui solum sensibilibus inhaerent et delectationes intellectuales non percipiunt. Et inde est quod tales homines praeparent sibiipsis quamdam sitim talium delectationum, dum scilicet sponte seipsos incitant ad earum concupiscentiam, sicut dictum est (n. 1524) de illis qui comedunt salsa, ut concupiscant potum. Et ideo, quia praedicti homines non habent alia delectabilia in quibus recreentur, non est increpabile si corporales delectationes accipiant, dum tamen tales delectationes non noceant, nee eis nee aliis; si autem sint nocivae, hoc est pravam et increpabile, sicut patet delectatione adulterii et cibi nocivi." Ibid., n. 1528. 17 " Semper en'im animal vigilans est in lahore." Ibid., n. 1529. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 403 Let us now try to take into account all aspects of the bonum delectabile and bring them together so as to reach some conclusion as to just how good the bonum delectabile is. First, pleasure, whether of sense or intellect, is the rest of an appetitive power in some good that is loved, and that it terminates activity. Since pleasure results from activity, we must see that what is properly willed is an operation which pleasure complements. In this precision, we see that pleasure is not willed precisely as an end, since any pleasure is relative to the activity concerned. Hence, pleasure in general is not enjoyed, but the pleasure of tasting, the pleasure of seeing, or the pleasure of contemplating. Nevertheless, we have quoted from the text of St. Thomas in which he speaks of the bonum delectabile as having the nature of an end and as desirable in itself. How are we now to understand this? By grasping how pleasure perfects operation, and in explaining this point St. Thomas distinguishes in what way pleasure does operate as an end: Pleasure perfects operation in two ways. In one way, by way of an end, not according as an end is that on account of which a thing is, but according as every good which is added to a thing and completes it can be called its end. In this way the Philosopher says that pleasure perfects operation as a supervening end, that is to say, inasmuch as to this good, which is operation, there is added another good, which is pleasure, which implies the rest of the appetite in a good that is presupposed. In a second way as an agent, not indeed directly . . . but indirectly, inasmuch as the agent, through taking pleasure in his action, is more eagerly intent on it, and carries it out with greater care.18 18 " Respondeo dicendum quod delectatio dupliciter operationem perficit. Uno modo, per modum finis; non quidem secundum quod finis dicitur id propter quod omne bonum completive superveniens, potest dici finis. Et secundum hoc dicit Philosophus in X Ethic., (1174b Sl) quod delectatio perficit operationem sicut quidam superveniens finis inquantum scilicet super hoc bonum quod est operatio, supervenit aliud bonum quod est delectatio, quae importat quietationem appetitus in bono praesupposito. Secundo modo, ex parte causa agentis. Non quidem directe . • . lndirecte autem: inquantum scilicet agens, quia delectatur in sua actione, vehementius attendit ad ipsam, et diligentius earn operatur." Summa Theologiae, I-ll, Q. ss, Art. 4. 404 JOHN A. OESTERLE The bonum delectabile, therefore, is an end in the sense that it is the delightful termination and rest of the appetite in an apprehended good. On the one hand, what formally motivates the agent is the known good; on the other hand, because of the pleasure to be taken in the activity, the agent is as a consequence more eagerly intent on the possession of a good and carries out the action with greater care and desire. Both points are made in saying, for example, that one wills the good of eating food which is tasty; one wills the contemplation of truth, which is delightful. When pleasure is inescapably connected with an activity, it does motivate or lead one to will the activity itself; pleasure operates as a necessary property of the good and is willed along with it. In this context, St. Thomas can say: It amounts to the same thing to seek good and to seek pleasure, which is nothing else than the appetite's rest in the good. . .. Hence, just as good is sought for itself so pleasure is sought for itself and not for something else if the word for signifies final cause. If, however, it signifies formal cause, or rather the motive cause, then pleasure is sought for something else, i. e., for the good, which is the object of pleasure, and consequently its principle and gives form to it, for pleasure is sought because it is a rest in the desired good.19 We may therefore put the matter generally this way. We delight in something for its own sake absolutely only when we delight in what is the final and ultimate end. We delight in other things insofar as an end being known and willed as good is, when possessed, delightful by reason of its form. Whatever has an inherent goodness is delightful, which need not entail that it be the ultimate end. The good of virtuous action, for ex19 " ••• dicendum quod eisdem rationis est quod appetatur bonum, et quod appetatur delectatio, quae nihil est aliud quam quietatio. appetitus in bono ... Unde sicut bonum propter seipsum appetitur, ita et delectatio propter se, et non propter aliud appetitur, si ly propter dicat causam finalem. Si vero dicat causam formalem, vel potius motivam, sic delectatio est appetibilis propter aliud, idest propter bonum, quod est delectationis objectum, et per consequens est principum eius, et dat ei formam: ex hoc enim delectatio habet quod appetatur, quia est quies in bono desiderato." Summa Theologiae, I-ll, Q. Art. 6, ad 1. HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 405 ample, though not the end of man, is an end as having an inherent goodness and is by that fact delightful or pleasurable to the man of virtue. 20 Intellectual pleasure causes no real difficulties since it is the rest of the appetite in a bonum honestum. But does not the position that sense pleasure is a good desirable as an end (even in the qualified sense we have described) run counter to the teaching of a certain number of moralists? Such a view maintains in effect that sense pleasure must be sought always in conjunction with the bonum honestum or the bonum, utile with which it is associated by nature. Pressed to its logical conclusion, such a position would demand that the pleasure of eating or drinking must be associated in intention with the nourishment of the body. The bonum delectabile therefore could not be sought in any way as an end; it could only be a means. But such a position would reduce the bonum delectabile to the bonum utile and would deny that the bonum delectabile is in its way desirable for itself and has an attraction all its own. It would seem to be excessive moral rigorism to require that a drink of coffee in the middle of the afternoon had to be taken for the explicit intention of nourishment of the body. It is not only permissible, but desirable, to drink coffee, not necessarily and only for the sake of physical nourishment, but for the pleasure it gives as related very generally to a life ordered to the attainment of a bonum honestum, for example the good of conversation or some other aspect of sociability. The last clause of the preceding sentence suggests the distinction which should be made and which appears to be overlooked in an excessively rigorist position. The partial truth in that position is that man cannot seek the good of pleasure as an end absolutely or simply, but it does not follow from this truth that the bonum delectabile in no sense is an end. There is a lot of ground between what is purely a means and hence in no way desirable in itself, and what is wholly an ultimate end, either absolutely •• Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-IT, Q. 70, Art. 1, ad 406 JOHN A. OESTERLE or in a given order. In between lies a host of ends which are legitimately sought for themselves but which in turn serve also as means to higher ends. The bonum delectabile belongs to this order of ends which are also means, and if such ends cannot be considered wholly apart from still being referred or ordered to something else, they are nonetheless ends of a kind. With this precision, we can say that man, being an intellectual creature, in understanding and enjoying the bonum delectabile for itself must nevertheless understand and enjoy it by analogy with the bonum delectabile of the intellectual order and thus as associated with the bonum honestum; in brief, he is to seek the pleasurable good of sense only in the way in which he seeks the pleasurable good of the spirit, as referrable to a bonum honestum. However, we should acknowledge a diversity or graduation within sense pleasures. The pleasures of touch and taste, the most vehement of all, are the most instrumental in character, ordered as they are to the good and preservation of nature itself; yet as a bonum delectabile they terminate and repose appetite however transiently. It is because of their vehement character and because they can so easily go to excess that the man of reason and virtue must deal carefully with them, but it is precisely by being dealt with according to reason that they can be good and can have an attraction all their own. The pleasure of seeing and hearing are more immaterial; the good of seeing and hearing and the consequent delight in those activities are accordingly more worthy of desire. In tliis respect, we can suggest what is most excellently sense pleasure for man, the delight in experiencing works of art. It is the pleasure which is proportionate to man, not as basic and common as pleasures of touch and taste, nor as lofty as the pleasure of purely intellectual contemplation, but sense pleasure at its finest as far as man is concerned. The composite nature of man lends itself to pleasure of this kind; a form of contemplation which is not abstract; a sense and intellectual delight joined together, disinterested and yet intense, beyond any animal need and still necessary in its way for the human animal. Per- HOW GOOD IS THE PLEASURABLE GOOD? 407 haps the experience of hearing music is most revealing in this respect. The sense appetite is aroused in the very hearing of music; music represents in its distinctive way the movement of emotion; the art of music, being an intellectual virtue, forms tonal progression so that in the hearing of music the sense appetite is aroused and resolved in accord with reason. We thus have a bonum delectabile that is not wholly within sense, as the pleasure of touch and taste, nor wholly within intellect, as the pleasure of philosophical contemplation, but an intimate union of sense and intellect in which man delights in an activity for its own sake. True enough, the contemplative delight in a work of art has its further ordering, to the life of attaining the full bonum honestum which is the life of intellectual truth and goodness, but it is nonetheless a good desirable in itself and with an attraction all its own. Although it is beyond the scope of this investigation to consider explicitly a supernatural point of view, nothing that has been laid down here on the basis of moral philosophy is in contradiction with a supernatural ordering. From an asceticpoint of view, progress in love of God and desire for ultimate union with Him should not be sought simply for the sake of some pleasure it gives. Hence it is that one can renounce the sense bonum delectabile more and more if he finds this conductive to achieving closer union with God, just as one can temper the sense bonum delectabile for achieving even the natural bonum honestum, since sense pleasure can easily distract and even fetter reason. 21 But the whole order of mortification and penance presupposes that one is renouncing a lower good for a higher good, not denying that the lower good is a good with a certain attraction in and of itself. Moreover, a right understanding of the nature of the bonum delectabile and the role it plays in human life offset the dangers of a false ascetism and scrupulosity. Among the most perverse men were those who would never drink, never smoke and never eat meat; some of the holiest men have done this too, but there is a world of difference, a difference between deviltry and sanctity. What must 21 Cf. Summa Theologiae, I-II, Q. 78, Art. s. 408 JOHN A. OESTERLE be kept in mind is the nature of man, composite of flesh and spirit, sense and intellect. One can deny" creaturely comforts," those pleasures which form so intimate and widespread a part of human life, only if one is much more than man, and this state is achieved by grace, not by mere human will power. Man as man will become perverse if he denies himself of the sense bonum delectabile altogether. Let us summarize by returning to the threefold division of the good. The bonum utile and the bonum honestum are at extremes: the bonum utile is only a means and never properly an end; the bonum honestum is wholly an end, at least in its own order, and not as such a means. The bonum delectabile holds something of the position of a mean. The intellectual bonum delectabile is a rest in the bonum honestum and therefore partakes of the character of the bonum honestum. The sense bonum delectabile is varied. The pleasure of touch or taste tends toward the bonum utile without being wholly that, for such pleasure still has an attraction of its own which the bonum utile does not have; the pleasure of seeing or hearing, especially in enjoyment of works of art, tends toward and even participates in a certain way in a bonum honestum. The sense appetite in such respects comes to its proper repose in the presence of a good connatural to man, just as in another way the sense appetite comes to its proper repose through moral virtue in the practical order of human conduct, for virtuous acts are pleasurable acts. The temptation is easy and the tendency frequent to reduce the bonum delectabile simply to the bonum utile or to the bonum honestum. The first way leads to a denial of human nature and scrupulosity; the second way leads to sensualism and hedonism· The bonum delectabile is neither. It is that good for human nature, attraetive in itself, which is enjoyed so as to enable such composite natures as we are to attain better our wholly human delight of the bonum honestum, naturally and supernaturally. JoHN A. OESTERLE University of Notre Dame Notre Dame. Indiana. THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS REGARDING THEIR NATURAL END F EW who make an intelligent study of St. Thomas' tract on the angels in the Summa Theologiae can set it aside without having acquired a new awe for the genius of its author. Taking as his starting-point little more than a tangle of half-truths proposed by non-Christian philosophers on the separated substance and a mass of disorganized references to the angels scattered throughout the writings of the Fathers, St. Thomas was nonetheless able to sift what was true, order what was haphazard, and, by dint of his own metaphysical and theological acumen, add to this data not only scientific order, but new profundity. This work of St. Thomas will be our chief guide in examining St. Thomas' theology of the angels as it bears upon the question of impeccability regarding their purely natural end. The traditional interpretation of the great commentators of St. Thomas has been attacked by many outstanding Thomistic scholars. 1 It is our task to re-examine the pertinent texts of St. Thomas and his commentators on this question and endeavor to show the solid position of the conclusions of classical Thomism in the architectonic scheme of the entire synthesis of St. Thomas. Although at first this subject may seem to be an over-refinement of scholastic subtlety, its investigation necessitates a thorough understanding not only of the entire treatise De Angelis but also of the vital question of the nature of free will. Freedom in man is an elusive thing; immersed as it is in matter, the human will is extremely difficult to study, as modern psychology has so keenly demonstrated. In the angel, however, we are faced with the same problem of finite liberty, 1 Notably: J. Maritain, Chas. Journet, F. de Blic, Phillippe de la Trinite. The various opinions of these writers will be considered later in this paper. 409 410 RAYMOND E. MARIEB but stripped of the complications and obscurities arising from matter. By studying the angels we can better understand ourselves, as well as go through them to God. THE PROBLEM The question of the angels' ability or inability to sin can raise a host of problems. For instance, one might ask what kind of sin an angel could commit, and a compilation of the Fathers' opinions on this point could fill a volume. Again, the question might arise which was so dear to the older commentators: whether through God's absolute power there could be created an intellectual creature who per se would be absolutely impeccable. 2 None of these topics will be treated here, except perhaps in passing. Our formal inquiry will be limited to demonstrating this thesis: there exists de facto intellectual creatures (angels) who per se prima, directly and immediately are incapable of sinning as regards their natural end taken alone (praecise sumptum) .3 We use the terms per se prima, directly and immediately because we do not deny that the angels could sin against their natural end ex consequenti, indirectly and mediately. One sins in the former way by willing something that is contrary to the good of nature, or God as he is the natural end. Lying and stealing are examples of this manner of sinning. On the other hand, one can sin per se primo, etc., against his supernatural end and therefore consequently, indirectly and mediately sin end. One can sin against his natural end against his indirectly, even though it were impossible for him to sin directly against it. By definition, the supernatural order cannot be connatural to any creature. 4 It is this complete lack of proportion between • An excellent summary of the pros and cons in this matter may be found in the Salmanticenses, Cursua Thevlvgicua (Paris: Victor Palme, 1877), vol. IV, disp. 9, dub. 1. "Ibid. ' " Ecclesia Catholica definivit supernaturale ... praecise: quod est supra omnem THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 411 the supernatural order and the creature's natural powers and exigencies that explains the radical peccability of all creatures with respect to that higher order. 5 Obviously, then, any creature can sin directly against the supernatural good. In doing so, however, he necessarily sins against his natural end, but only ex oonsequenti and indirectly. This is true, as John of St. Thomas explains, because the objects of the natural and supernatural ends are so related that one cannot sin directly against one end without thereby sinning indirectly against the other. 6 To desecrate the Blessed Sacrament is to sin directly against the supernatural order, but it is also contrary to the natural law which commands us to handle sacred things in a sacred manner. St. Thomas, with his metaphysical skill, proved that no creature can be absolutely incapable of sinning by his own natural powers; that is, no creature can be absolutely impeccable with respect to both natural and supernatural orders. 7 In this paper we are abstracting from the supernatural order. We do not deny the clear teaching of St. Thomas that the angels were created in grace and immediately to the supernatural order; the supernatural end is merely left out of naturam creatam, prout excedit vires et exigentias cuiuslibet naturae creatae ... " (R. Garrigou-Lagrange, De Revelatione, Rome: F. Ferrari, 1950, vol. I, p. 18). 3 Ibid. •" Q.uod vero in elevatione ad supematuralia ita connexa sint ista obiecta, et ordinatio in utrumque finem supematuralem et naturalem, quod si avertatur ab uno, avertatur ab alio, ex eo constat quod, si avertitur a fine supematurali, hoc ipso, non amat Deum super omnia; ergo non subicit illi omnia; ergo nee etiam in ipsa naturali dilectione illi perfecte subicitur. Quia naturalis dilectio, etsi directe solum tendat in naturalem finem, tameD. etiam petit ut non repugnet perfectam subiectionem in naturalibus retinere. Unde non potest aliquis a supematuralibus cadere, quin etiam in naturalibus vulneretur; nee aliquod peccatum est· contra supematuralia, quin etiam sit contra naturam; quia non potest peccatum esse nisi sit contra ordinem rationis et dispositionem naturae: quia etiam in ordine ad supernaturalia ratio dictat ut illis non repugnet neque avertatur, quia bonum est naturae sic elevari ad supematuralem finem." (John of St. Thomas, CuriiU8 Theologicus, ed. Solesmensium, vol. IV, Paris: Desclee and Co., 1953, diss. 43, a. 1.) • De V eritate, 24, 7 c. Translations throughout article are taken from that of Robert W. Mulligan, S. J., Truth (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1952-1954), vols. I-ll. 412 RAYMOND E. MARIEB the question. Though hypothetical, it is possible to treat the matter under this formality. In summary, then, our assertion is this: the angels are incapable of sinning directly against their natural end. THE OPINIONS In theological questions an appeal to the authority of the Fathers of the Church is important. Unfortunately, such an appeal is impossible in this question, since the problem was never treated by them. They were much concerned with sin of the angels, but their sole objective was to establish the fact of their sin as recorded in Scripture, to explain the nature of their sin and to insist on the absolute peccability of all free creatures. Only with the advent of the Scholastic Commentators was the problem first formally considered. Even St. Thomas does not raise the problem explicitly. The majority of the classical commentators affirm our thesis. Chief among them are Capreolus, Cajetan, Bannez, the Salmanticenses, John of St. Thomas, Gonet and Billuart. Their particular explanations will not be discussed here since we will have reason to cite them frequently later on. Principal among the older Scholastics denying our thesis are Vasquez, Suarez and Molina. In his tract on the angels Suarez presents three opinions regarding the impeccability of the angels. Two of these he labels " extreme " and the third opinion, his own, he regards as the middle and true position. 8 The first " extreme " is the position of Capreolus, etc., which maintains the impeccability of the angels with respect to their own proper order. The second "extreme" is the opinion of Vasquez, who held that the angels could not help but sin if left in their natural state without the help of divine grace. Suarez' own " middle and true " position is that the angels are free as to specification in such a way that they can sin in the natural order if they so choose.9 8 Francis Suarez, S. J ., De A ngelis (vol. II, Opera Omnia, Paris: Vives, 1854) , m,ch.7. • Loc. cit. THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 418 The question lay dormant for two centuries, but in our day the war cry was again raised. The antagonist was Henri de Lubac, S. J., and his book was entitled Surnaturel. In his book, de Lubac proposed an unprecedented interpretation of the teaching of St. Thomas and his contemporaries on the distinction between natural and supernatural love. He claimed that they were opposed not as an act that is proportioned to nature is opposed to an act that surpasses nature, but rather as a necessary act is opposed to a free act. From this theory he concluded that the beatific vision is the unique ultimate end for the moral life of all intellectual creatures. A purely natural end for such creatures could not exist even hypothetically. He concludes that God is free to create or not create the angels, but if he does create them, he must also order them to a supernatural end. 10 Although few theologians accepted de Lubac's fundamental principles, his opinion concerning the peccability of the angels due to the exigencies of their freedom won many adherents, even in Thomistic circles. Two years before the publication of Surnaturel Father J. de Blic, S. J. had published an article 11 on the peccability of the angels according to St. Thomas in which he charged that the Angelic Doctor juxtaposes in his works two irreconcilable . theses: 1) the thesis that the angelic nature is intrinsically peccable and therefore capable of sinning in the natural state, the thesis that the angels are peccable only with regard and to the supernatural order. To accuse as careful a thinker as St. Thomas of contradicting himself is no light matter; it is understandable that St. Thomas would change from an opinion of an earlier work, but de Blic claims that he has contradicted himself in the same work and even in the same article! 12 Father Phillip of the Trinity, 0. C. D., re-examined the opinions of the traditional Thomists, de Lubac and de Blic and u Henri de Lubac, S. J., Surnaturel (Etudes historiques, Paris: Aubier, 1946), p. 459. 11 F. de Blic, "St. Thomas et l'intellectualisme moral a propos de la peccabilite de l'ange," Melangu de science religieuse, 241-280, fascicule 2, 1944. 11 loc. cit. 414 RAYMOND E. MARIEB regarded none of them as satisfactory. He then proposed his own thesis: " According to the thesis which we propose, the spiritual creature is capable of an ultimate good which would be connatural and supernatural (contrary to the interpretation of Fr. de Lubac), and there is the possibility of the angel sinning in one state as well as in the other (contrary to the current interpretation of Thomistic commentators); the thought of the Angelic Doctor presents no antinomy (contrary to de Blic) ." 18 Father Charles Journet is in full agreement with Father Phillip of the Trinity and quotes Jacques Maritain to support their position. Maritain claims that the sin of the angels would have to consist in a purely voluntary non-consideration of the 1·egula morum: " The law according to which every being is peccable would be applied to the angel, if the angel had been created in the state of pure nature-! do not speak with regard to a possible supernatural order; I am talking about the natural order itself. St. Thomas never said the contrary ... In the state of pure nature, the pure spirit would have been able to fall into pride just as he did in the state of grace,-to love without measure his own excellence." 14 Yet it seems that Maritain himself is guilty of holding irreconcilable positionsor at least an evolution has occurred in his thought-for in his •• Phillippe de Ia Trinite, "Du peche de Satan et da Ia destinee de I' esprit d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin," pp. 44-46. (Satan, Etudes Carmelitaines, Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1948). " Selon Ia these que nous proposons, Ia creature spirituelle est susceptible d'un bonheur ultime soit connaturel, soit sumaturel (contre !'interpretation du Pere de Lubac), et il y a possibilite de pecher, meme pour ange en l'une et !'autre vocation (contre !'interpretation courante des commentateurs thomistes), Ia pensee du docteur angelique ne presentant aucune antinomie (contre le Pere de Blic) ." •• Jacques Maritain, Neuf sur les notions premieres de la philosophie moral, pp. 129-184. Cited by Charles Joumet, "L'univers anterieur a l'eglise," Rll'IJ1.te Thomiste, 58:446, ill, 1968. ". . . ii peche en voulant d'une maniere mauvaise une chose bonne en elle-meme . . . La loi selon laquelle tout etre est peccable se serait appliquee a l'ange,-si l'ange avait ete cree dans l'etat de pure nature,-je ne dis pas seulement a l'egard d'un ordre sumaturel possible, je dis a l'egard de l'ordre nature! Iui-meme. Saint Thomas n'a jamais dit le contraire ... Dans l'etat de nature pure, Ie pur esprit aurait pu, comme il I'a pu dans I'etat de grace, tomber dans Ia suoerbe,-aimer sans mesure sa propre grandeur." THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 415 published lecture delivered to the Aristotelian Society o£ Marquette University in 1942 he said: ". . . even the angels, who cannot sin with respect to the natural order alone, are fallible with respect to the supernatural order." 15 An answer to these charges was attempted by Father C. Courtes, O.P., in an article that appeared in Revue Thomiste. 16 Father Courtes attacked the problem from a new angle. His argument proceeds from the metaphysical notion o£ the perfection o£ the end as being that which wholly satisfies the appetite so that the faculty can never swerve £rom it. The angels, at the moment o£ their creation, are in immediate possession o£ their natural end; consequently they are incapable o£ defecting £rom it by sin. As we shall see in our development o£ the traditional position, this answer, true enough as far as it goes, is inadequate. Now that we have briefly stated some o£ the opinions on this question we can proceed to expose the doctrine o£ St. Thomas as interpreted by commentators whom we £eel to be more faithful to his thought and his theological synthesis. PRINCIPLES PARTICULAR FOR A SoLuTION CONCLUSIONS REGARDING THE ANGELIC INTELLECT Since an angel is a purely spiritual substance not united to a body, it possesses only the two faculties o£ intellect and will. Since angelic sin is an act which involves these faculties, we are very much interested in the nature o£ these powers and their mode o£ operation in the angel. A. The immaterial objects known by angels. The first question that comes to mind regarding the angelic intellect is: precisely what constitutes the object o£ their knowl15 J. Maritain, St. Thomas and the Problem of Evil (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1942) pp. 5-6. 18 C. Courtes, "La peccabilite de l'ange chez S. Thomas," Revue Thomiste, 58: 188-168, I, 1958. 416 RAYMOND E. MARIEB edge? We are not interested in their knowledge of material things; these are not to our point. As to the immaterial objects of their understanding, however, we are more concerned with how they know than with what they know. The mode in which angels apprehend immaterial objects of knowledge has immediate bearing on our issue. We must ascertain two things: 1) the perfection of their comprehension, and 2) whether the objects are known through infused species or through the very form of the angel. The immaterial objects which might conceivably be known by an angel are three: the angels's own being, other angels and God. We will consider only the first and third of those objects, since they alone pertain to our subject. Assertion: Since the angels are immaterial, they are subsistent forms, and consequently are intelligible in act. It follows, then, that they know themselves through their form which is their substance. 17 Cajetan reminds us in his commentary of this matter that no thinking man would hesitate to affirm that the angels know themselves. Yet to answer how they know themselves is not an easy matter. 18 The problem is to determine whether the angels know themselves through their own substances or whether they require an infused species for this knowledge. Two conditions are necessary for all immanent intellection. The first is that the object be united to the knowing power so that they become one in intentional identity. The second condition is that the object must be a formal principal of knowledge with respect to the knowing power. However, for sorne acts of intellection, two other conditions are required: the subject must be moved by the object, and the object must inhere in the subject as an accident. The four conditions, then, are conjunction, causality, motion and inhesion.19 17 I, 56, 1 c. References to the Summa Theologiae, other than translations, are from the Opera Omnia (ed. Leonina, Rome: Typ. Poly. Vat. 1889). References to the Commentary of Card. Cajetan will he from the Leonine Opera Omnia also. 18 Cajetan, op. cit., I, 56, 1, n. 1. 1 " Ibid., I, 56, 1, n. !l. THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 417 That the angelic substance and intellect meet the per se requirements for intellection is quite obvious. Since the angelic substance is a purely spiritual form, it is necessarily intelligible in act (actu intelligibilis) and as such can as a formal principle of intellection. The union that is required between the intelligible object and the knowing power exists in a most intimate fashion in the case of the angelic substance and the angelic intellect. The intellect emanates from the angelic substance as a necessary property, and like any other property it is radicated in its proper substance. This union whereby the angelic substance is actually known (actu intellecta) and the angelic intellect is actually knowing (actu intelligens) establishes between this object and faculty and intentional identity which is the greatest of unions according to Averroes. 20 The angelic intellect, while not being the substance of the angel, 21 is nevertheless in the angel's essence and the angel's essence is in his intellect. As St. Thomas puts it: There is no reason why one thing cannot be in a second and the second in the first if this is in different ways, such as the ways in which a whole is in its parts and the parts are in the whole. The same is true here: the essence of the angel is in his intellect as an intelligible is in a knower, and his intellect is in his essence as a power is in a substance. 22 The two requirements which per accidens accompany intellection are not present in the angel's knowledge of itself. The knowing faculty is moved by its object only when it is in a previous state of potency with regard to that object. Man's intellect, since it is in a state of potency regarding all intelligibles, must always be moved by its object. This is due to its imperfection in the hierarchy of intelligences. 23 However, since the angelic intellect emanates immediately from its essence •• Averroes, De Anima ill, Comm. V, Digressionis parte ult., in Solut. q. 2; cited by Joseph Gredt, 0. S. B., Elementa Philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomi8ticae (Barcelona: Editorial Herder, 1946), vol. I, p. 860. 11 I, 54, 1 c. •• De V eritate, 8, 6, ad 6. ,. I, 79, 2 c. 418 RAYMOND E. MARIEB with temporal simultaneity, it is clear that it must immediately comprehend its own substance, for all the essential conditions for knowledge are present: the substance, as an unreceived subsistent form, is necessarily intelligible in act; and its intellect, as a natural property, is perfectly proportioned and intimately united to this substance from which it emanates. Thus, the angelic intellect is never in a state of potency with regard to its essence as an intelligible object, and consequently need never be moved by it. The angel's intellect is always in act as regards its essence, even though it may be in potency with respect to those things for which it requires infused species. St. Thomas in his De V eritate has shown the position of the angelic intellect between the human and divine intellects on the basis of potency and act. It deserves to be cited here: Now, in beings there are grades of act and potency. One being, prime matter, is in potency only. Another, God, exists only actually. All other intermediate beings exist both actually and potentially. Similarly, in the genus of intelligibles, one being, the divine essence, is in act only; another, the possible intellect, is only in potency, and for this reason the Commentator says that the possible intellect in the order of intelligibles is like prime matter in the order of sensibles. All the angelic substances lie in between; for they have something of potency and of act, not only in the genus of being, but also in the genus of intelligibility. Now prim'e matter cannot perform any action unless it is perfected by some form ... Similarly, our possible intellect can understand no'thing before it is brought into act by an intelligible form . . . But since the essence of an angel, which is in act of the genus of intelligibility, is present to it, an angelic intellect can understand this intelligible reality within itself, namely, its own essence-and not through any likeness of it but through the essence itself. 24 Because of the intimate union existing between the angelic essence and intellect-a union of intentional identity-and the perfect proportion of one to the other, it follows that the angels know themselves with a perfect and absolutely comprehensive knowledge. The angel's essence is the primary object of its •• De Veritate, S, 6 c. THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 419 knowledge and the formal ratio of its knowledge of all things other than its own substance. 25 Assertion: Because the image of God is impressed upon the very essence of the angels., they know God through their essence precisely as it is a similitude of God. The importance of this conclusion in relation to our solution is vital; yet those who do treat it often explain it inaccurately or quite falsely. The heart of the difficulty is to determine exactly what it means to know an object in an image, for this is how an angel knows God in the theory of St. Thomas. The image in which God is known is the angel's own essence. St. Thomas is consistent in this opinion in all the places where he explicitly treats the matter. 26 In general, there are three sorts of knowledge: 1) knowledge through the presence of an essence in the knowing power; 2) knowledge through a similitude or species of the object in the faculty; and 3) knowledge not immediately through a species of the object, but through something else in which the similitude is found. 27 The first mode of knowledge is that by which the angel knows his own substance. However, God cannot be known in this way outside the beatific vision.28 The third mode is that which is proper to man after the Fall. We know God by analogy with his similitude found in creatures, yet this knowledge is very imperfect since material creatures reflect God only as vestiges, not as images. 29 The angel's knowledge of God in the natural state stands •• " Essentia autem angeli est ei ratio cognoscendi omne quod cognoscit . . . cognoscit enim omnia per modum substantiae suae, ut dicitur in lib. de Causis, et secundum propriam virtutem et naturam, ut dicit Dionysius, 7 cap. de div. Nom." Ibid., a. 4, ad 6. Cf. also I-ll, 50, 4 c. •• St. Thomas, Super Libras Sentent. (ed. Mandonnet and Moos, Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47), II, dist. 28, q. 2, a. 1; Contra Gent., ITI, 41; De V eritate, q. 8, a. 8; q. 18, a. 1, ad 16; I, 56, 8. •• I, 56, 8 c. •• Ibid. •• I, 45, 7 c. 420 RAYMOND E. MARIEB midway between these extremes, partaking of both with a leaning towards the latter. 80 This is knowledge through image. St. Thomas defines the representation of an image as an effect that represents its cause as to a similitude of its form. 81 Knowledge through an image is formally distinct from knowledge through a sign, just as intuitive knowledge differs from discursive knowledge. An image is that in which (in quo) we contemplate directly the thing imaged; a sign is that from which (ex quo) we indirectly and mediately perceive the thing signified. It is well to remember that we are speaking of an image precisely as image and not as a thing (prout imago et non res) . If we consider an image precisely as such, the knowledge of the image and that which is represented by the image is attained by one and the same motion. This is not the case if we consider the image merely as a thing (res) . This is St. Thomas' explicit teaching in the De V eritate: An image of a thing can be considered in two ways. First, it can be considered in so far as it is a certain thing; and since as a thing it is distinct from that of which it is an image, under this aspect the motion of the cognitive power to the image will be other than its motion toward that of which it is an image. Second, it can be considered in so far as it is an image. Under this aspect, the motion toward the image will be the same as the motion toward that of which it is an image. Consequently, when a thing is known by means of a resemblance existing in its effect, the cognitive motion can pass over immediately to the cause without thinking about any other thing. This is the way in which the intellect of a person still in this life can think of God without thinking of any other creature. 82 This knowledge of God by the angels, however lofty it may appear to us, nevertheless falls infinitely short of perfect knowledge of God. It is knowledge through a created image, and no created species can perfectly represent God. 83 Yet it would be 80 "Unde magis ista cognitio tenet se cum speculari: quia et ipsa natura angelica est quoddam speculum divinam similitudinem representens." I, 56, 8 c. 81 I, 45, 7 .c. •• De V erit., p. 8, a. S, ad 18. •• Cf. I, 12, 2 c; I, 56, S c. THE IMPECCABILITY OF THE ANGELS 421 wrong to conclude that this knowledge is merely knowledge in confuso simply because it is n Grunbaum presents his arguments well and in considerable detail; one may not agree with his conclusions, but is generally not at a loss in following the line of thought. Yet the overall presentation would have been more comprehensible had the author been more precise in defming the problems in which he was interested and in summarizing the results toward which his lengthy, discursive analyses were directed. The inherent difficulty of this book argues against its receiving attention from many Thomists, even those interested in the philosophy of science and of mathematics. Of interest to all, however, is a section in which Grtlnbaum reveals the extent of the differences between an empiricist view of geometry and that of the moderate realist (pp. 147-151). The section occurs in a critique of Einstein's philosophy of geometry wherein Griinbaum attacks Maritain's analysis of the geometrically real, as expounded in the latter's Degrees of Knowledge. The statement of Maritain that gives GrUnbaum most trouble is one maintaining that "the geometric properties of existing bodies " are " those properties which the mind recognizes in the elimination of all the physical" (p. 151). Reading the earlier, defective translation of Maritain's work, Griinbaum is understandably puzzled as to what Maritain can possibly mean. Throughout Griinbaum's discussion, however, no appraisal or critique is given of the doctrine of abstraction, on which Maritain'.s statement is clearly based, nor, throughout the book, is there any recognition by the author that space may be treated differently by the geometrician than it is by the physicist. The obscurities of Maritain's presentation notwithstanding, there is little profundity in Grilnbaum.'s analysis and rebuttal. Or, to put it in another way, the basic presupposi· tions of the two authors are so different that they almost preclude any intelligible discourse between them. Much the same could possibly be said of the general empiricist position on these matters when compared to that of the moderate realist. * * * If these two volumes reveal that the realist commitments of contemporary empiricists differ from the realist commitments of Thomists, they also reveal that the empiricists' position is not as monolithic in the 1960's as it has been in the first half of this century. As the active discussion and controversy from which these volumes emerged continue, one may reasonably expect a broadening of the base of contemporary empiricism to a point where moderate realists can enter, with profit, into its controversies. WILLIAM The Catholic of A1MriC4 Washin1jtcm, D. 0. A. WALLACE, O.P. 530 BOOK REVIEWS Syllogistic and Its Extensions. By OTTO BIRD. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xii and 116. A Modern Formal Logic. By MILTON FrsK. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964. Pp. xi and 116. These two monographs are the first to appear in the Prentice-Hall Fundamentals of Logic Series. The five authors wrote or are writing these monographs while members of the faculty of the University of Notre Dame. The other titles and authors in this series are: Language and Logic by Ernan McMullin, Method in the Sciences: An Introduction by Harry Nielsen, and History of Logic by Ivo Thomas, 0. P. The series, under the general editorship of Ernan McMullin, is intended to present to the teacher and the student the general principles, scope, and development of logic. Though there are many and varied texts in the field of logic, this series has merit in that many authors are able to treat subjects best known to them. These first two monographs deal with logic as a formal system. Otto Bird in Syllogistic and Its Extensions treats syllogistic in the first two chapters and he reserves the last three chapters for the extensions of basic syllogistic. Since his concern is syllogistic, he does not proceed in the same manner as the authors of traditional texts on logic in which the treatment of logic is divided into the three acts of the mind. Rather, Bird begins his study of syllogistic with an introduction of all the necessary elements of syllogistic argumentation. The notion of syllogism itself is introduced by way of description and analysis and its definition remains for a later section. Syllogistic in the first part of the book is restricted to general, affirmative and referential names. Since Bird stresses the formal character of logic, he does not discuss concrete statements but functors and variables. For functors he uses the traditional symbols A, I, E, and 0. The subject and predicate are replaced by name-variables b and a. In explaining the laws of the square of opposition Bird uses Euler circles and a truth table. Having defined syllogism in Aristotle's terms, Bird discusses validity. Validity does not depend on the truth or falsity of the premises. A valid syllogism occurs if the premises are true, then the conclusion will be true. If from true premises one infers a false conclusion, then that argument is invalid. Using these as criteria Bird analyzes validity in the various figures and moods of syllogistic arguments. In explaining the valid moods he uses Venn diagrams and the traditional verse containing all the valid moods. Realizing that syllogistic laws are numerous and difficult to handle, Bird in the second chapter discusses the systematizing of syllogistics. There is a short treatment of Aristotle's reduction to the first figure. The notion of indirect reduction is used as a bridge to introduce antilogism which applies the law of compound transposition. The remainder of the chapter is concerned with logic as a formal axiomatic system. The expressions, rules, axioms, and definitions of system CS, categorical syllogism, are enumerated BOOK REVIEWS 531 and explained. Employing this system Bird derives all the traditional laws of basic syllogistic. The final part of this chapter deals with the properties of a formal deductive syStem: the independence of its axioms, its consistency, and its completeness. System CS can not handle negative terms. And in his explanation of negative terms Bird mentions the difficulties that arise in using transcendental terms and terms that mutually exclude everything else in the universe. However, with the introduction of negative terms more operations are possible: contraposition, obversion, and inversion. Employing these operations and the octagon of opposition, Bird shows that negative terms can be reduced to affirmative terms and with some restrictions on system CS, system CS (n) is introduced. Syllogistic with nonreferential terms is the subject for the fourth chapter. Empty terms in system CS (n) make some of its operations invalid. In explaining the admission of empty terms Bird uses Venn diagrams and Boolean algebra. In this chapter there is a detailed discussion of the notion of existential import. The final chapter contains short discussions on four additional extensions to syllogiStic: singular terms, modality, sorites, and quantification. In an appendix Bird explains the use of truth tables in evaluating arguments. Bird had set out to explain syllogistic and this he has done with success. He has treated syllogistic as contained in the old logic and he has introduced the reader to the new logic by his mention of Boolean algebra, quantification, and truth tables. His explanations are enlightening and quite adequate especially those dealing with negative and empty terms. However, in some of his explanations he uses Venn diagrams but does not fully explain how these diagrams are to be set up and how they are to be interpreted. Bird also includes an annotated bibliography as well as an index. This book alone could well be used as a text in a logic course, for Bird treats logic as a method of discourse and this notion is carried throughout the entire work, even though the concrete application of the principles and laws evolved are left to the exercises at the end of the book. In Milton Fisk's Modern Formal Logw there is a different approach to the study of logic. Fisk holds that there is a rich conceptual dimension to logic and for this reason he does not present a mere survey of modern logic, but rather he sets out to investigate ordinary discourse and develop a system of logic. In the first chapter, entitled "Validity," Fisk begins with an investigation into arguments in general and the various types of arguments. It is the argument types that lend system to logic, for if an argument type is valid, then an argument representing this type will be valid also. Throughout this chapter he uses modus ponens as his basic example of an argument. Since there are several provinces in the field of logic, each of the remaining three chapters is devoted to one of three provinces: " The Logic of Sentences," " The Logic of Monadic Predicates," and " The Logic of Polyadic Predicates." 532 BOOK REVIEWS In the second chapter Fisk introduces the symbols and notations to be used in the remainder of the book. After giving the basic principles and rules for system S, the logic of sentences, Fisk explains the definition of proof and the method of proof. The method of proof is similar to that used in proving theorems in geometry. To complete the treatment of proof Fisk concludes this chapter with a short section on the use of truth tables. In the next chapter Fisk proceeds to discuss the logic of monadic predicates. This entails a long explanation of quantification. Before developing system P, the logic of monadic predicates, Fisk has a short section on the relation between syllogistic logic and predicate logic. The remainder of the chapter follows the same outline as the previous one: basic principles, rules of system P, and then a discussion of proof. It is in this chapter that Fisk introduces the notion of the singular and the problems this entails. The final chapter is concerned with the logic of relations. The majority of the chapter deals with the translation of sentences into the correct symbols. Included with this treatment is a discussion of predicates and predicate substitution. The discussion of system R, the logic of polyadic predicates, follows the same lines as the preceding two chapters. This similarity of arrangement aids in the reading of each chapter. Unlike the first book, the exercises appear right in the text itself. And rather than a general bibliography Fisk has supplied a reading list for each chapter. The readings are intended as a supplement to the text and not as an explanation. A name and subject index has also been included to facilitate quick references. This book gives a detailed treatment of argumentation in general and the three provinces of logic, but it does so from a particular point of view. As Eman McMullin remarks in the Editor's Note (p. vii) this work "builds up formal logic from the whole range of argument-forms found in ordinary discourse and constructs a powerful and original system of ' natural inference ' that is in important respects different from the less intuitive 'material implication ' system given in the majority of elementary textbooks." However, this leads to a difficulty. Using the statement that principle two is "clearly correct" (p. 4) as an illustration, it seems that no standard is given for asserting that this principle is correct. Granted that some principles are arrived at intuitively, this does not mean that they are outside the realm of rational explanation. In an important section on " Logic, Practice, and Meaning," (pp. !il8-30) Fisk seems to offer an explanation for the correctness of principles. But this explanation gives general acceptance and success as the foundations of correctness. This is true to a point but intellectual reflection also plays an important role in establishing the correctness of logical principles. In another important section on categoricals and quantification (pp. 73-75) involving the notion of existence, Fisk seems to go outside the realm of his intended subject matter, formal logic. Aside from these two observations the book as a whole presents a distinc- BOOK REVIEWS 533 tive treatment on formal logic. Each of these works has its own particular merits. If modern formal logic is the subject under study, then Fisk's book along with the readings offers a good basis. Whereas Bird's book with its treatment of traditional syllogistic could well be used in a course on traditional logic. Bird's book also serves as an introduction to modern logic. Naturally the use of either of these books will depend on the purpose of the teacher or the reader. RoBERT V. DEVINE WMhington, D. C. Dieu et la Permission du Mal (Textes et Etudes Philosophiques). JAcQUEs MARITAIN. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963. Pp. 111. By Three seminars conducted by Maritain for the Little Brothers of Jesus in Toulouse, during May, 196fl, make up this book. The style is simple, colloquial. The occasion was chosen as a means of responding to some objections by one of his Dominican friends, P. Jean-Herve Nicolas, who wrote in the Revue Thomiste partly against Maritain's theories expressed in Court Traite de ['Existence et de l'Existant (translated as Existence and the Existent). Maritain's central purpose, however, is to go more deeply into questions that he has been thinking about all his life and into the manner of facing them which, he believes, is more than ever valid. He treats, in order, (1) the innocence of God regarding sin; (fl) some difficulties in the classical Thomist school, "la bonne ecole"; (3) his own position as expressed in the Court Traite regarding the non-consideration of the rule, the shatterabie motion from God, and the divine permissive decree consequent to the non-consideration of the rule; (4) the objections of P. Nicolas; (5) how God knows evil; (6) the divine eternal plan; (7) finally, predestination and reprobation. Briefly, P. Nicolas had taken Maritain to task for departing from the traditional Thomist position by introducing the idea of a shatterable motion from God that has no definite term (thus an indeterminate divine motion, which, to a Thomist, is unthinkable), and for positing a consequent rather than the traditional antecedent permissive decree. Maritain rather humbly admits that some of his doctrine regarding the shatterable motion was poorly expressed and takes back a long footnote of the Court Traite, written, as he says, in haste; though he does not back down from his basic hypothesis. He in no way backs down from his doctrine on the consequent decree, but firmly defends it. His defense is based on his conception of God's knowledge of existing things. It is not, he says, like a dramatist's knowledge of the characters he creates, since that puts all the emphasis on the pre-knowledge and the 534 BOOK REVIEWS antecedent decrees, and makes mere puppets of God's free creatures. Since every moment of time is present to the divine eternity there is no question of a time before time; everything takes place in the eternal instant. Maritain's elaboration of this concept is quite complex, yet exceedingly worth reading. He avoids Molinism by insisting on the radical dissymmetry between the line of good and the line of evil. God has the initiative in the first, the free creature in the second. Regarding any act that is placed by the creature in the line of good, or being, l\'Iaritain shows that there can be absolutely no determination of God. In the line of evil the creature begins with a non-act, a pure negation, which causes the privation of sin. Be it noted that P. Nicolas includes Marin-Sola and Muniz among the adversaries of the classical Thomist position. Whether or not Maritain is correct in all aspects of his theory, he has given us some fresh insights into an old, old problem. This reviewer for one hopes that the book is read seriously by anyone who ever has been perplexed by the problem of how the antecedent will of God that all men be saved is reconciled with the doctrine on predestination. In the last part of the book Maritain confronts this problem and handles it with his characteristic vigor and skill. THOMAS St. Mary's School of Theology Notre Dame, Indiana R. HEATH, 0. P. BOOKS RECEIVED Bea, Augustin Cardinal, Unity in Freedom (edited by R. N. Anshen). N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1964. 9l79l pp. $5.00. Bourke, Vernon J., Will in Western Thought. N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1964. 9l47 pp. $5.00. Bouyer, Louis, The Spirituality of the New Testament and the Fathers. N.Y.: Desclee, 1963. xviii, 541 pp. Brettschneider, Bertram D., The Philosophy of Samuel Alexander. N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. xii, 177 pp. $5.00. Brou, A., Saint Madeleine Sophie Barat. N.Y.: Desclee, 1964. ix, 190 pp. $3.50. Buber, Martin, Daniel. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. x, 144 pp. $4.00. Christian, William A., Meaning and Truth in Religion. Princeton, N.J.; Princeton Univ. Press, 1964. ix, 9l73 pp. $6.00. Cuddon, J. A., Acts of Darkness. N.Y.: David McKay _Co., 1964. 389l pp. $4.95. Daim, Wilfried, Depth Psychology and Salvation (translated and edited, with an intro. by K. F. Reinhardt). N.Y.: Ungar, 1963. 315 pp. + illus. $8.50. De Marco, Angelus A., A Key to the New Liturgical Constitution. N.Y.: Desclee, 1964. 139l pp. $9l.95. Farrelly, M. John, Predestination, Grace and Free Will. Westminster, Md.: The Newman Press, 1964. ix, 317 pp. with index. Gilson, E., The Spirit of Thomism. N.Y.: P. J. Kenedy & Sons:, 1964. 19l7 pp. $3.50 Goldman, Lucien, The Hidden God (trans!. by P. Thody). International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method. N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. xi, 426 pp. $12.50 Gracian, The Best of, trans!. by Thomas G. Corvan. N.Y.: Philosophical. Library, 1964. 84 pp. $3.00. Guttmann, Julius, Philosophies of Judaism (trans!. by D. W. Silverman with intro. by R. J. Zwi Werblowsky). N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. x, 464 pp. $7.50. Hayes, Edward J. and Paul J., Kelly, Dorothy E., Moral Principles of Nursing. N.Y.: Macmillan, 1964. 257 pp. $5.00. Henry, Desmond P., The De Grammatico of St . .Anselm. Notre Dame, Ind.: Univ. of Notre Dame Press, 1964. xii, 169 pp. $4.95. Isaac, Jules, The Teaching of Contempt: Christian Roots of Antisemitism (biographical intro. by C. H. Bishop). N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. xii, 154 pp. $4.00. 585 536 BOOKS RECEIVED N.Y.: George Braziller, 1964. Kahler, Erich, The Meaning of History. viii, 264 pp. $5.00. Kemp, J., Reason, Action and Morality (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method). N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. 208 pp. $6.00. Klauder, Francis J., The Witness of History. Newton, N.J.: Don Bosco College, 1964. vii, 35 pp. Klausner, Samuel Z., Psychiatry and Religion. N.Y.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. xvi, 299 pp. $6.95. Laing, R. D. and Cooper, D. G., Reason and Violence (foreword by J.-P. Sartre). N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. 184 pp. $5.00. Lazerowitz, Morris, Studies in M etaphilosophy (International Library of Philosophy and Scientific Method). N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. xi, 264 pp. $6.00. Leahy, Louis, Dynamisme Volontaire et Jugement Libre. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1963. 171 pp. Letona, Francisco P ., Los Fundamentos Ultimos de los Derechos del Hombre. San Salvador: Ministerio de Educacion, 1964. 399 pp. Lanning Per, The Dilemma of Contemporary Theology. N.Y.: Humanities Press, 1964. 140 pp. $3.00. Lowith, Karl, From Hegel to Nietzsche: The Revolution in Nineteenth Century Thought. N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964. xiii, 464 pp. $8.50. Lyon, Bruce (ed.), The High Middle Ages, 1000-1300. N.Y.: The Free Press of Glencoe, 1964. 273 pp. $1.95 (paper). Man and Transformation (Papers from the Eranos Yearbooks, 5). N.Y.: Bollingen Foundation, 1964. xviii, 413 pp. $5.00. Maritain, Jacques, Moral Philosophy. N.Y.: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1964. 467 pp. $7.95. Mart1mort, A. G., The Signs of the New Covenant. Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1963. xiv, 320 pp. $4.75. Montessori, Maria, The Montessori Method (intro. by Martin Mayer). Cambridge, Mass.: Robert Bentley, Inc., 1964. xli, 377 pp. $6.50. Mouroux, Jean, The Mystery of Time. N.Y.: Desclee, 1964. 319 pp. $5.50. Patka, Frederick, Value and Existence. N.Y.: Philosophical Library, 1964. vii, 239 pp. $4.75. Peter of Spain, Tractatus Syncategorematum and Selected Anonymous Treaties (transl. by Joseph P. Mullally). Milwaukee, Wise.: Marquette Univ. Press, 1964. ix, 156 pp. $3.50 (paper). Perrin, H., Priest and Worker (transl. with intro. by Bernard Wall). N.Y.: Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1964. v, 247 pp. $4.95. Philippe, Archbishop Paul, The Ends of the Religious Life. Athens and Rome: Fraternity of the Blessed Virgin Mary, 1964. 89 pp. BOOKS RECEIVED 537 Schleck, Charles A., The Sacrament of Matrimony. Milwaukee, Wise.: The Bruce Publ. Co., 1964. xii, 290 pp. $5.00. Simard, Emile, Communisme et Science. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite Laval, 1963. 527 pp. Studia Moralia, I, Academia Alfonsiana. Roma: Ancora, 1963. 449 pp. Taylor, Charles. The Explanation of Behaviour. N.Y.: Humanities Pres!!, 1964. ix, 278 pp. $6.75. Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, The Future of Man. N.Y.: Harper and Row, 1964. 319 pp. $5.00. St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: vol. 2 (16 , 2-11), Existence and Nature of God (transl. by Timothy McDermott, 0. P.). N.Y.: McGraw-Hill, 1964. xxvii, 239 pp. $6.75. vol. 13 (Ia, 90-102), Man Made to God's Image (trans!. by Edmund Hill, 0. P.). N.Y. McGraw-Hill, 1964. xxxi, 227 pp. $6.75. Ward, Maisie, Unfinished Business. N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1964. viii, 374 pp. $5.95. The Word (Readings in Theology with foreword by R. A. F. Mackenzie). N.Y.: P. J. Kenedy and Sons, 1964. xii, 301 pp. $4.95.