THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXIX

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1965

No. fl

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL
ABSTRACTION 1

T

HE PRESENT paper is conversant with the relation
of scientific thought to reality, both in mathematics
proper and in the mathematical interpretation of
nature. Our main issue can be formulated as follows. Does
the subject of physics retain, at least within the phase of the
fundamental definitions, the character of a thing of nature?
Or should it be said that from the beginning the physicist deals
with subjects modified by mathematical treatment? From both
a doctrinal and an historical point of view a reflection upon
1 This article by Professor Yves R. Simon, originally dictated to his wife during
a stay at the University of Chicago Clinics and completed at home in South Bend
with the help of his secretary, Mrs. Pauline Ryan, was composed during the two
last years of severe illness. A few very minor changes have been made in the text
by its editor, Dr. Edward D. Simmons, Marquette University, according to his own
judgment or because of minute corrections brought to his attention by Mrs. Yves
Simon and seconded by Mr. Powell Boyd, of Albuquerque, and Dr. John 0. Riedl,
Marquette University.

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YVES R. SIMON

Cartesian idealism seems to be an appropriate approach to this
ISSUe.

Let it be recalled, first o£ all, that in the philosophy o£
Descartes, thought does not apprehend things directly; its
operations are primarily relative to ideas, which are modes o£
the thinking self. It cannot be taken £or granted (that is, held
uncritically) that ultimately thought transcends its own modes
and attains reality. Every experience o£ illusion reminds us
that there are modes o£ thought which do not resemble any part
or aspect o£ the real world. The transition £rom idea to thing
raises a problem. There would be no such problem i£ ideas
were merely instrumental in the attainment o£ things. Again,
there would be no such problem i£ the philosophy o£ Descartes
were an absolute idealism and held that the objects o£ our
ideas are not possessed o£ any being distinct £rom their being
known. But in the system o£ Descartes there exists a world o£
reality faithfully represented by some o£ our ideas, and we shall
know this real world with perfect certainty i£ only we make the
difference between the ideas which actually represent things
and those which lead nowhere. Clarity and distinctness are the
needed criterion. The idea o£ extension is clear and distinct, the
idea o£ red and that o£ sweet are not. Extension is real, whereas
sense qualities are nothing else than modes o£ consciousness.
Thanks to the criterion o£ clarity and distinctness, a causal
inference enables the mind to go beyond its own modes and to
attain things.
The theory o£ ideas is only the first and best known aspect
o£ Cartesian idealism. We still have to inquire into the kind o£
reality represented by the clear and distinct ideas, £or this
reality may itself be affected by some development o£ the
idealistic principle. On this subject, there is a most enlightening
passage £rom the Treatise on the World where Descartes discusses the definition o£ motion. 2 He quotes Aristotle's definition, " act o£ a being in potency as such," and declares it
nonsensical. Then he goes on to indicate that when he himself
2 Le Monde ou le Traite de la Lumiere, c. 7 (Oeuvres de Descartes, Adam and
Tannery, Paris, 1909, vol. 11, p. 89).

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

119

speaks of motion he has in mind what the geometricians mean
when they say that a line is generated by the motion of a point
or a surface is generated by the motion of a line. These expressions are unmistakable: the concept of motion, in the physics
of Descartes, expresses a physical reality which has already
been processed by mathematical abstraction. This conception
of the physical world warrants Descartes' well-known paradox:
" I do not accept in physics any principles that are not accepted
in mathematics." 3
In order to determine the significance of this statement, it is
necessary to ascertain Descartes' views on the truth value of
physical science. The decisive question is whether a physical
theory is supposed to explain reality or may still be good i£ it
merely" saves the appearances," according to the famous words
of Simplicius. 4 Sense appearances being what they are, we
may place under them constructs, hypotheses, from which they
follow of necessity. A system made of such constructs achieves
economy of thought, provides a unified vision of things, and
makes prediction possible. However, other hypotheses might
account for the facts of experience with equal or greater success,
and, whereas the data can be deduced from the theory, the
theory does not necessarily follow upon the data. Concerning
the worth of physical theories so understood, minds are divided
into three groups. Some hold that physics cannot validly produce anything else than constructs which successfully save the
appearances. The most radical exponent o£ this view is also the
best historian o£ the subject, Pierre Duhem. Others consider
that two approaches are possible in the study o£ nature, one o£
which is merely aimed at saving the appearances whereas the
other proposes to explain physical reality in terms o£ unqualified truth. Such is the position of St. Thomas Aquinas.
For him, the astronomer represents the saving the appearances
method. Aquinas sharply contrasts these two thinkers: the
3 Principia Philosophiae, p. fl, prin. 64 (Oeuvres de Descartes, Adam and Tannery,
Paris, 1909, vol. 8, p. 78).
• See the admirable book of Pierre Duhem, Essai sur la notion de theorie physique
de Platon Galilee, Hermann, Paris, 1908.

a

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YVES R. SIMON

physicist (physicus, philosophus naturalis), who is supposed to
explain nature demonstratively, and the astronomer (astrologus), whose hypotheses (suppositiones) merely account for
the data of our experience. Finally, some reject the saving the
appearances method altogether and hold that natural science,
in all its parts, must be a demonstrative explanation of nature.
This was the position of Averroes, whose disciples tried hard to
work out a philosophical astronomy. As for Descartes, his
dogmatism excludes the saving the appearances method, as
well as any method which would not promise unqualified
certainty. Thus, the mathematical vision of the physical world
expressed in the texts that we have quoted, cannot be interpreted as a mere system of constructs. When Descartes says
that motion, in his physics, is nothing else than the kind of
motion referred to by geometricians in their definitions of line
and surface, his statement must be understood in terms of
absolute reality. The physical world of Descartes is that of a
partly idealistic philosophy. It is not reducible to ideas, but it
is not entirely independent of mental influences. Though real
in some respects, it has been conditioned by the mind. A certain
treatment, in which we recognize the characteristics of mathematical abstraction, pertains to its constitution. The conception
of matter and physical reality is controlled by a great epistemological design. Descartes' philosophy of matter is what his
theory of physical science wants it to be.

*

*

*

Let us now consider, through the analysis of a simple example, the contrast that we do not find in Descartes, viz., the
contrast between a physical thing and its mathematical counterpart. The word " triangle " may designate a gadget used to
draw (approximately) right angles. Such a gadget can be
purchased in any office supply shop. It is made of wood, plastic
or metal; and, in the contingencies of physical becoming, it
behaves like any other thing made of the same material. Under
impact, it may lose its shape or break into pieces. If exposed to
high temperatures, the triangle made of metal will melt and

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

the triangle made of wood will disappear into smoke and ashes.
Now, the same word "triangle" may also designate an object
that money cannot buy and that fire cannot destroy. Much can
be learned from the difference between this indestructible
triangle and the gadget available in office supply shops. There
are triangles that are not make of wood or metal. They are not
made of anything involved in the course of physical events,
e. g., changes in temperature or pressure. Out of what are they
made? If "out of" refers to such things as wood, plastic or
metal, it is appropriate to say that they are made out of nothing, and that their having no cause of the "out of" description is the ground of their indestructibility.
A cause of the " out of " description is what philosophers call
matter or material cause. 5 But it is in varying degree that the
character of material cause belongs to the things that are
material causes. Consider the furniture of a home, preferably
as set in order by felicitous arrangement: chairs, tables, bookcases, beds and davenports are that "out of which" the
orderly set is made; but., prior to their function as material
cause of an orderly set, these things had fully determinate
constitutions as works of human art. Again, that out of which
a table is made has a constitution antecedent to its being
shaped into a table. It is wood, and this word, though vague
and confused, expresses with certainty the preexistence of a
natural determination. To identify the matter by reason of
which the gadget called " a triangle " is a thing physical,
engaged in the contingencies of the physical occurrences, and
subject to destruction, we have to follow down to its extremity
the line of the material causes. At this extremity we find matter
5 Matter,
considered in relation to the whole of which it is a part, has the
character of a cause " out of which," and this is the primary and most fundamental
aspect of its intelligibility. Considered in relation to the other part of the whole, i.e.,
the form, matter has the character of a cause " in which." In Descartes, matter is
the thing extended. Essentially, it is neither an "out of which" nor an "in which";
it is a complete substance whose characteristics are sharply opposed to those of
the other complete substance, the thinking thing or mind. This completeness of
matter, in Cartesianism, in most modern philosophies and in current rhetorical
usage, is a serious obstacle to the understanding of Aristotle's philosophy of nature.

YVES R. SIMON

in an absolute sense, the prime matter of Aristotle, the thing
which owes its first constitution to something other than itself,
and which accordingly cannot exist by itself. Ultimately, it is
the presence of prime matter which makes the difference between the triangle that money can buy and the triangle that
fire cannot destroy. In the familiar proposition that mathematical objects are abstracted from matter 6 or, as St. Thomas
puts it with greater precision, " can be understood without
sensible matter," 7 it is fundamentally prime matter that the
word "matter" stands for.

*

*

*

The role of abstraction in the constitution of the various
scientific discourses often is obscured by usages which originate
in empiricist philosophies. In these philosophies, " abstraction "
generally designates the process by which a sense impression
evolves from a state of individuality and high complexity to a
state of relative simplicity which allows it to stand for a multitude of individual cases. Simplicity has distinct advantages in
the handling of signs. But, so far as representation is concerned,
abstraction understood in the empiricist way proceeds from the
same to the same. There is less of the same in the so-called
abstract representation than in the crude sense impression, but
no transmutation has taken place.
To understand the role played by abstraction in the constitution of the sciences, let us turn to the theory of intelligibility
which is, in fundamental ways, common to Plato and Aristotle.
In a celebrated passage of the Phaedo, empirically perceptible
relations of equality are described as an aspiration toward unqualified equality, toward the essence of equality, which will
never disclose itself in any experience. 8 True, the experience of
such things as pieces of wood which, at times, appear equal
and at times unequal, is necessary for us to conceive equality
itself: but Plato has cautiously invited the reader to notice that
• On the Heavens, 3, 1, 299a15; On the Soul, 3, 7, 431bl2.
7 In Boeth. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, c.; In I Phys. 1. 1, n. 2.
8 Phaedo, 74.

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

123

the experience of a thing may bring to our mind what is unlike
it just as well as what is like it. The Phaedo simultaneously
explains that such an object as equality itself is purely interligible and that its understanding does not originate in sense
experience. Thoughout the dialogue and in many other passages of Plato's work, an attitude of aversion to the senses is
powerfully suggested. The meaning of Plato's theory of recollection may be open to discussion. When Plato speaks of a
previous life, in which the soul would have contemplated the
world of the intelligible, does he use a myth to show that our
apprehension of the intelligible can neither be reduced to sense
experience nor derived from it in any way whatsoever? This
question does not need to be decided here. What is relevant is
that Plato, in connection with the theory of intelligibility,
recommends an attitude of aversion to the senses and of
ccmversicm to the innermost parts of the soul. Translators 9
happen to use the word " abstract " to characterize Platonic
types as opposed to the things of this world. No term could be
more infelicitous, for it is not by abstraction but by conversicm
that the soul has access to equality itself or beauty itself. Of
all the lines or surfaces or weights of which we say that they are
equal, we have no way to know, beyond certain limits of approximation, whether they are equal or not, and the probability
is that they are not equal. As W. F. Clifford puts it, it is only
in a practical sense that the chemist, as well as the grocer,
asserts that a thing weighs one pound. But this practical notion
of equality involves a steady approach to an equality that we
can never find in our experience. It makes sense because of a
constant reference to an intelligible form, equality, which can
never be experienced or verified but without which it is impossible to speak of things within our experience as equal.
In any issue involving the relation of the intellect to the
world of sense experience the behavior of Aristotelian thought
contrasts so obviously and significantly with that of Plato that
one may be tempted to overlook the features common to the
• E. g., Jowett.

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YVES R. SIMON

two philosophies. Yet, Aristotle remains a member of Plato's
school inasmuch as he holds as firmly as Plato that there is an
infinite metaphysical distance between sensible and intellectual
representations; the mere working out of sense impressions,
their refinement, their subtle reduction to clear and simple outlines, will never cause the intelligibility of a thing to be
perceived. Sense and understanding belong to different orders.
But Aristotle's attitude toward the world of sense experience
is made of eagerness and confident expectation. The Platonic
theory of conversion to the world of intelligibility implies that
the union of the rational soul with the body and the senses is,
in some way, unnatural. A Platonist is almost necessitated to
assume an original catastrophe as a result of which spirits have
been forced into bodies as prisoners into a jail. The wise man,
far from being afraid of death, considers it as a return to the
normal state of affairs. For Aristotle, on the contrary, the union
of soul and body is natural. But whenever principles are
united by nature., their union is beneficial to the highest of
them: if this were not the case, the law of natural finality
would be broken and nature would be absurd. Being natural,
the union of understanding and sense is beneficial to understanding. The Aristotelian concept of abstraction is an answer
to the crucial difficulty raised by a simultaneous adherence to
these two propositions:
(1) there is between sensible and
intellectual representations a metaphysically infinite distance,
(2) all our intellectual knowledge is derived from the senses.
The intellectual process must start somewhere. It must start
with an act antecedently to which all that exists in the human
mind pertains to the sensible order. It must start with an act
of abstraction that is not directed by any antecedent act of
intellection. The first ideas of the human intellect, those which
cannot be reduced to antecedent ideas, result from acts of
precognitive abstraction. Aristotle gave the name of " active
intellect " to the power by which the precognitive abstraction
of our first ideas is effected. He likened it to light, and thereby
related his own concept of abstraction to the concept of illumi-

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

nation, so often represented in the Platonic tradition. 10 But on
the " active intellect" Aristotle wrote only a few lines. 11 It is
the glory of medieval genius to have understood the significance
of his obscure remarks on such a crucial subject. The diversity
of the interpretations and the size of the debates show that the
philosophers had understood what the creation of intelligibility
means in a system which does not admit of any innate ideas and
yet holds that it is impossible to obtain the slightest bit of
intelligence by mere working out of sense impressions. The first
acts of abstraction, those that are directly traced to the " active
intellect," consist in the disengagement of forms from the data
of sense experience. As the intellect carries on the work of
differentiation which enables it to come ever closer to and adequate grasp of things through a diversity of standpoints and
foci, it is, again, the disengagement of forms that the word
"abstraction" designates primarily. The operation that Cajetan calls " abstractio totalis "- in opposition to " abstractio
formalis" 12-plays but a secondary and strictly subordinate
role. Abstractio totalis is the abstraction of a universal whole
from its subjective parts. Considering, for instance, the features
common to diverse species, the working out of a generic concept
is an abstractio totalis. A universal whole, e. g., a generic concept, has been disengaged from the various subjects of which
it may be predicated. These two operations, the abstraction of
a form and the abstraction of a universal whole, bear opposite
characteristics. Most importanly, whereas the process of formal
abstraction, as it goes on, tends to bring about higher degrees
of intelligibility and definiteness, the process of abstractio
totalis, all other things being the same, is directed toward
vagueness and indetermination. This is nicely expressed by the
everyday use of the word " specific " in the sense of determinate, precise, unmistakable. To know the genus of a plant
without being able to say what distinguishes this particular
10 See Etienne Gilson, "Pourquoi
S. Thomas a critique S. Augustin," Archives
d'Histoire Doctrinale et Litteraire du Moyen Age, 19!'l6, p. 61.
11 On the Soul, 3, 5, 430al0.
12 In de Ente et Essentia, 1, I.

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YVES R. SIMON

species from other species of the same genus is to know this
plant vaguely. The change which takes place when the perception of the specific properties is added to that of the generic
features can be described as an actualization. To know specifically is to know a species in act, but to have a merely generic
acquaintance with a species is to remain in the state of potency
with regard to the specific properties. Thus, a certain kind of
abstraction does not consist in the disengagement of a form.
But it is easy to see that the abstraction of a universal whole
from its subjective parts is necessarily preceded and often
accompanied by the more fundamental operation which consists
in disengaging a form from some kind of matter: without the
antecedent abstraction of a form, the concept of the universal
whole would have no content.
Let us, now, try to characterize, in terms of the two ways of
abstraction described by Cajetan, the process which results
in the constitution of physical concepts, which discloses-in
various degrees of clarity-the intelligibility of physical things,
and which makes possible a science of nature. The transition
from the individual instances apprehended in sense experience
to the universal, whether generic or specific, obviously is the
abstraction of a universal whole from its subjective parts. But
it is equally obvious that, whether the universal under consideration is still vague, potential and generic, or already enjoys
the fully determinate intelligibility of the species, an abstraction
of types, of forms, has been effected. Texts of great significance
describe physical abstraction as the abstraction of a universal
whole, an abstraotio totalis, as if it were nothing else.13 But it
is clear that, like any abstraction consitutive of a scientific
system, it implies a disengagement of types from a definite
matter. If we understand precisely from what matter the
intellect abstracts in the constitution of physical concepts, we
shall understand why it is correct to describe physical abstraction as the abstraction of a universal whole. In our initial
13 In Boeth. de Trin., q. 5, a. S, c: "Tertia secundum eandem operationem quae
est abstractio universalis a particulari; et haec competit etiam physicae . . ." cf.
also In III De Anima, 1, 12, n. 784.

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

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remarks about the triangle that fire can destroy and the
triangle that money cannot buy, we found that the first includes absolute matter, prime matter in the sense of Aristotle,
whereas the second comprises no such matter. The inclusion
of matter is no less essential to the universal concept of a
physical thing than to the representation of a physical individual. For instance, if man, taken in the state of universality,
were conceived as a being which does not comprise the principle
by reason of which physical things are perishable, our concept
of man would be not only inadequate but also mendacious.
Thus, the science of nature does not abstract from matter. But,
like every science, it deals with universal objects. Since matter
is, in composite things, the origin of the distinction of individuals within a species, to consider universals alone is indeed
to abstract from a certain matter, namely from matter as
principle of individuation. Here, the two abstractions coincide
strictly. To abstract a universal whole from its subjective parts
(abstractio totalis of Cajetan) is also to abstract a type from
its individual bearer, and this constitutes a "formal" abstraction. To say that physical abstraction, the abstraction of the
first order, is merely an abstraction of the universal whole from
its subjective parts is correct indeed but conveys a risk of
misunderstanding. It is perfectly true that, in order to have
the concept of a thing physical, all we have to do is to disengage
the universal features of that thing. Should the process of
abstraction be carried any further, the resulting concept would
no longer be that of a thing physical. But, by abstracting
universals from singulars, we have effected the abstraction of
types from matter considered as principle of individuality.
Here, as well as elsewhere, it is a character of formal abstraction which defines and distinguishes a scientific order.
The Cartesian concept of motion shows that there is no
science of nature in the system of Descartes. This is perfectly
consistent with Descartes' ontology. A first insight would make
you believe that, when Cartesianism displaced and replaced the
philosophies more or less inspired by Aristotle, a great simplification was all that happened: where Aristotle perceived an

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YVES R. SIMON

immense multitude of natures, Descartes defines only two
things, namely, thought and extension. On closer examination,
the great simplification effected by Descartes is also a radical
transmutation., for thought is not a nature, and extension, which
could be called space just as well, is not a nature either. The
notion of nature, actually, does not appear in the philosophy
of Descartes. His physics is not about nature, but about something else, which is related to nature as the geometrician's
definition of motion is related to the definition of Aristotle
which Descartes declares unintelligible.
St. Thomas states that in physics " the intellect abstracts the
species of a natural thing from individual sensible matter, but
not from common sensible matter." 14 This is to characterize
physical abstraction both as abstraction of a universal whole
and abstraction of a form. By abstracting from the principle
of individuation, the mind enters into the realm of the universals where the possibility of science begins. And by abstracting a physical type from the principle of individuation, the
mind effects a certain kind of formal abstraction., the formal
abstraction which defines the science of nature properly so
called.
Before we begin to consider the problems of mathematical
abstraction, it is indispensable to recall present uncertainties
regarding the object and nature of mathematics. Prior to the
19th century, it was almost universally held that mathematics
was the science of quantity. This common definition would be
unsatisfactory if it were not an abbreviation implying the
special state in which mathematics considers quantity. The
philosophy of nature and metaphysics also study quantity, but
from points of view and according to methods which are far
remote from those of the mathematician. The relevant thing
is that, until the 19th century, there was almost universal
agreement that quantity should be mentioned in the definition
of mathematics. This is seriously questioned today. Many say
that logic and mathematics are indistinguishable, whether
14

Summa Theol., 1, 85, 1, ad 2.

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129

mathematics is held to be a branch of logic, or logic a branch
of mathematics.
Whenever we are confronted by such problems of unity and
distinction, the wise thing is to look at the most typical cases
before considering those whose type is less definite and which
stand in the vicinity of the uncertain borderline. We can safely
hold that we are in mathematics when we consider figures as
they are treated in the geometry of Euclid, and numbers as
they are treated in elementary arithmetic. Correspondingly,
we are sure that we are in logic as long as we consider such
things as, say, the rules of validity in the diverse categorical
and hypothetical syllogisms. Thus, let it be said that, even if it
should be ultimately concluded that mathematics and logic are
indistinguishable, nothing can be lost by examining the question
"What is mathematics?" primarily in relation to those parts
of the science which deal with quantity.
It is hardly necessary to recall that quantity, one of the
supereme genera or categories of Aristotle, does not admit of a
logically correct definition; yet, in lieu of a definition, a description may work as a satisfactory approach to this indefinable
concept. There is in front of me a desk which I may consider in
terms of quality or in terms of quantity: the contrast between
what I gather from these two standpoints may constitute the
approach that we need. In terms of quality, I would say that
this desk is black; yet, its color is not uniform. It is much
lighter in the areas where the elbows of the reader have rubbed
off part of the paint; also, sunlight gives a strikingly different
appearance to the parts that are not covered by the shade of
the curtains. This desk is made of hard wood; its edges are
sharp. A more elaborate description is unnecessary. In terms of
quantity, this desk is a thing rectangular. I am free to consider
its upper surface as a rectangle and to describe it as if the
qualities mentioned above, as well as the many left unmentioned, did not exist. Then the striking fact is the homogeneity
of the parts. As my attention moves from one area to another,
it moves from a thing of a certain kind to another thing of the
same kind. In the qualitative description, this area is darker

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YVES R. SIMON

and the area next to it is lighter; as my attention moves from
the first to the second, it moves from a thing of a certain kind
to a thing of a different kind. Thus, quality appears as a
principle of heterogeneity. But aU the parts of a purely quantitative whole are of the same kind. And yet they are distinct
from one another. Likewise, in discrete quantity, the units
which make up a set may present all sorts of qualitative
differences. Of ten persons gathered in a room, one is an infant
and another is an old man, one is known for his unusual kindness and another is really wicked, etc. All these diversities are
ignored when I simply count the persons in the room. Each of
them is, in the same way, a unit. Considered as members of a
certain set, they are of the same kind. They are indistinguishable from each other so far as kind is concerned. And yet they
are distinct from each other. Even though diversities of kind
are completely left out of the picture, these ten remain distinct
and no two units are fused together. This is expressed by the
following substitute for a definition: quantity is an accident
which causes parts to be distinct from each other-even though
they be identical in kind-by causing them to be external to
each other.
Quantity can be studied by the philosophy of nature and by
metaphysics. The philosopher of nature considers things in
reference to, and within the limits of, mutable being, the proper
and specifying object of his discipline. The metaphysician reconsiders the case by treating quantity as the first member of
an analogical set which comprises as well properties of being
which are not restricted to the world of mutability. In either
case, though more definitely in the second, what is worked out
is an ontology of real quantity. The crucial thing is to perceive
the difference between the formal abstractions which lead to
the physical or metaphysical science of quantity and the way
of abstraction which distinguishes mathematics. This last is a
formal abstraction by which quantity is considered apart from
all that pertains to sense experience and to the substantial
mutability of things. This is what is meant by St. Thomas
when he speaks of "abstraction from sensible matter." The

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

131

desk in front of me displays a variety of qualities perceptible to
the senses. But if, from that thing rectangular, I abstract a
geometrical rectangle, all sense qualities disappear, and, together with sense qualities, prime matter as that by reason of
which things belong to the world of sense experience and the
world of universal mutability. The triangle that fire cannot
destroy has no color and no sense quality whatsoever. But, if
a triangle is stripped of all sense qualities, it is also pulled out
of the perishable world.
In his description of the three orders of abstraction, St.
Thomas says that the object of mathematics is abstracted from
sensible matter, but not from intelligible matter. 15 This expression, "intelligible matter" (hyle noete), is used by Aristotle
in very few instances. It seems that it has two meanings. On
the one hand, it may designate a logical entity, viz., the genus,
which is analogous to physical matter inasmuch as it is determined by the specific difference just as matter is determined by
form. 16 On the other hand," intelligible matter" may designate
the matter of the mathematicals, an intrinsic principle of individuation and multiplicity without being simultaneously a principle of change. 17 It is the second sense that St. Thomas has
in mind when he defines mathematical abstraction. He understands intelligible matter to be substance considered precisely
and exclusively as that which lies under quantity and without
which quantity can neither exist nor be understood. 18 Quantity
is not a property of being as such. It exists only in the material
world, it follows upon the presence of prime matter. Not all
aspects and effects of matter are left out by mathematical
abstraction. The consideration of quantity implies the presence
of material substance as bearer and as cause of quantity. Even
the triangle that fire cannot destroy retains the mark of prime
matter inasmuch as it is a thing extended, a thing whose parts
are distinguished from each other, independently of any qualiSee supra, note 7.
Metaphysics, 8, 6, 1045a7.
17 Metaphysics, 7, 10, 1036a9.
18 Summa Theol., 1, 85, 1, ad 2; In II Phy., 1, 3, n. 5.

15

16

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YVES R. SIMON

tative diversity, by being external to one another. From the
beginning the situation of mathematical thought is, so to say,
ambiguous, and may be expected to occasion various paradoxes.
Mathematical abstraction takes forms out of the world of
mutability, yet what it considers primarily, viz., quantity, is a
proper effect of the universal principle of mutability, viz.,
matter.

*

*

*

After having compared physical and mathematical objects
from the standpoint of intelligibility, we now propose to compare them from the standpoint of reality. We have been taking
for granted that some mathematical beings have physical
counterparts. The right triangle of elementary geometry has its
counterpart in the gadget used to draw right angles, the sphere
in such things as billiard balls and globes, number four in any
collection of four things, such as four apartments in a house or
four persons around a dinner table. But whether every mathematical entity has its counterpart in the physical world remains
to be seen.
Let our first question be, "Do such mathematical objects as
a sphere, a cube or a real number really exist?" No doubt,
there exist in the real world approximately spherical things,
approximately cubic things, and numerable collections. 19 But
when a mathematical entity comes to exist in the real world,
when, over and above the objective existence that it enjoys in
the mind, it comes to assume existence in the world of reality,
it ceases to be a mathematical entity and has become a physical
one. Even those mathematical entities that are closest to the
real, e. g., a sphere or a cube, imply a condition which forbids
them to exist except in the capacity of objects of thought. This
is the ground of Aristotle's well known remark that, whereas
there is truth and beauty in the world of mathematics, mathematical objects are not good.20 The true and the beautiful do
not imply the relation to existence that the good implies. In
19

20

Whether an infinite collection can exist actually remains a problem.
Metaphysics, 3, fl, 996a29; 13, fl, 1078a3!'l.

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

133

order to be true and beautiful an object does not need to exist:
but in order to be good, that is, lovable, desirable, it needs to
possess, or at least to be capable of, real existence. Many people
love mathematical sciences, which are real perfections of the
mind; but, whereas it is possible to covet a gadget called a
triangle, it is impossible to fall in love with the triangle
that fire cannot destroy or with the square root of a negative
number.
At this point, it is necessary to recall some fundamentals
pertaining to the division of being into real being and being of
reason. A being of reason is an object so constituted that any
proposition implying that it really exists would be contradictory. Some beings of reason involve internal contradiction and
many do not. One discipline is concerned with beings of reason
exclusively: it is logic, which studies the properties that accrue
to things in virtue of the second existence that they enjoy in
the mind. Since logical properties are born of what is particular
to the existence of things as objects of understanding, it would
be contradictory to say that they exist in another capacity than
that of object. Yet, there is no internal contradiction in any
logical entity. All beings of reason are shaped after the pattern
of real beings; however, they are not said to be grounded in
things unless they derive, from their relation to reality, necessary laws and, consequently, admit of scientific analysis.
Chimeras, undines, zombies and social engineers do not belong
to science; but logical properties do, as well as many fictions
worked out by the sciences of the real. Thus, in metaphysics,
evil, which is a privation, is spoken of as if it were a positive
form, and we cannot study the transcendental properties of
being without using relations of reason. Let us also notice that
a being of reason involving internal contradiction may play a
very important part in scientific thought. An imaginary number such as V- 1 implies contradiction plainly, and yet no
one would question the significance of imaginary numbers.
The common distinction between imaginary and real numbers
warns us that not all mathematical entities enjoy the same
status in terms of reality. The V 16 has a counterpart in the

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YVES R. SIMON

real world, v- 1 does not. Let it not be said that mathematical entities are beings of reason: this would amount to denying,
in all cases, the existence of physical counterparts. But let it
be pointed out that even those mathematical entities that are
closest to the real world imply a condition of reason which
makes it impossible for them while remaining mathematical to
exist outside the mind. Mathematical abstraction terminates
in objects that are beside the world of reality. This law entails.,
so far as the being of reason is concerned, an attitude strictly
proper to mathematics. When a science of the real-say,
metaphysics-uses beings of reason, it is for the sake of understanding better the properties of real being. And logic, whose
whole object is made of beings of reason, is entirely subordinated to science; it is essentially a useful discipline. 21 Thus,
in these two cases, that of a science of the real which happens
to consider beings of reason, and that of a discipline which,
directly at least, considers nothing else, the study of the being
of reason has a character of utility. It is not because of a
dignity of their own that metaphysical or logical beings of
reason are studied, but for a better intelligence of things. 22
The case of mathematics is profoundly different. Because
mathematical abstraction,, from the beginning and as a minimum, brings about a condition of reason, it establishes also,
from the beginning, a framework in which a being of reason is
just as worthy as a real being. This is fairly exampli:fied by the
familiar rule that real numbers and imaginary numbers should
be considered as equally possible values of a complex which,
itself, is neither determinately real nor determinately imaginary.
John of St. Thomas has something to say on this subject.
As he discusses the proposition that every being is good, John
of St. Thomas, after St. Thomas himself and Cajetan, encounters the objection derived from Aristotle's point that there
is no goodness in mathematical entities. His answer is that
21 The utility of which we speak is in no way related to the practical order:
it is for knowledge itself that logic is useful.
•• "Things," here, covers mathematical entities, whose relation to reality we are
trying to define.

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

185

goodness pertains to being, qua existent or capable of existence.
But by reason of the abstraction which is properly their own,
mathematical objects are excluded from the realm of existence. 28
Greater precision in the discussion of the whole issue can
be obtained by comparing the effects of physical and of mathematical abstraction on a thing's ability to exist. If things that
have been processed by mathematical abstraction cannot exist,
should it not be said that things are equally unable to exist in
the state of physical abstraction? Granted that physical abstraction consists merely in the abstraction of a universal whole
from its subjective parts, and implies no formal abstraction
except that of a natural genus or species from individuating
matter, it remains that universals cannot exist in the state of
universality. We come to wonder whether there is anything
distinctive in the case of mathematics. The answer is easily
•• Cursus Theologicus, vol. 1, disp. 6, a. i'l, Solesme ed., vol. 1, p. 533: "To
understand this [viz., the texts of Aristotle on the subject], let us notice with
Cajetan (Commentary on the text that we are discussing, Summa
1, 5, 3)
that quantity can be abstracted in two ways. (1) By abstracting the genus or the
species from individuals, the nature and whatness of quantity remaining entire, as
happens with all the other natures when they are conceived in the state of universality. This abstraction is effected by the intellect which universalizes natures,
and this is how quantity is abstractly considered by the metaphysician. It has lost
neither the character of perfection nor that of the good. (i'l) The abstraction of
quantity can also be effected by stripping it of what makes things perceptible to
the senses. This second kind of abstraction is the work of imagination. Thus, we
imagine a distance of quantity in a vacuum in which our imagination places lines
or surfaces. Such an abstraction is not of the universal from the particular; it
consists only in disengaging unterminated or imagined quantity from the quantity
that falls under senses. Likewise, if in relation we considered exclusively the to
[something] and not the in [something], we would be considering what is common to
the real relation and the relation of reason, and we would not be considering the
perfection and the reality found in relation. Thus, the first abstraction does not
remove from quantity the predicates which constitute it and make up its perfection;
these predicates are the ground of goodness. In quantity, as well as in other natures
conceived in their universality, goodness remains, although its pursuit and its power
of motion are not exercised except in the singular. But the second abstraction
removes the character of goodness because it strips quantity from any sensible
aspect and leaves it in a condition in which it can only be imagined. Imaginary
quantity is not, of itself, prossessed of any goodness. In order to have goodness,
quantity must be perceptible to the senses and exist really as the determination
of a subject; otherwise, its concept applies indifferently to fictitious and true

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YVES R. SIMON

obtained by remarking that in physical abstraction the only
thing to be affected is the state of an essence: the essence itself
is not affected in any way. It is one and the same essence, one
and the same intelligibility, which exists in the real world as
identified with an individual being and in the mind as disengaged from individuating matter and provided with positive
unity. To ask whether an object of physical knowledge, say a
plant or a chemical, admits of real existence is not to ask
whether " cherry tree " or " copper " admits of real existence
in the state of universality. The meaning of the question is
this: can the essence designated by " cherry tree" or " copper,"
which exists in the mind in a state of abstraction and positive
unity, exist also, in the real world, in the state of individuality?
The answer is obviously in the affirmative as far as physical
objects are concerned. Let us now ask the question of whether
quantity ... Now it is clear that in mathematical demonstrations imaginary lines
and figures and real ones behave in exactly the same way [italics supplied by
Simon); for instance, if lines are imagined in a vacuum, the mathematical demonstration will be just as good. And if there is a line in a real matter, the mathematician does not consider its real whatness (this would be the concern of the
metaphysician), but only its mathematical proportion. This is why, by reason of a
certain kind of abstraction, he [i.e., the mathematician) leaves out the character of
goodness. What is being considered in quantity is not its perfection or its agreement
[with some desire) or its ability to lead to some goal, but only imagined extension
inasmuch as it has continuity, commensuration or proportion.
Here it is objected
that when it is so conceived, it is stripped not only of goodness but also of being,
for it has become an imaginary entity. "The answer is that mathematicals by the
force of their appropriate abstraction and mode of conception exclude from quantity
the condition of being perceptible to the senses, and do not consider quantity with
the character of reality which makes it possible for the senses to apprehend it, but
exclusively as imaginable extension, for, as we said, lines and figures shaped in
imagination ... suffice for mathematical demonstration ... Mathematical quantity
is expressed by the positive concept of an unterminated quantity in such a way that
it can be either imaginary or exist with the character of true being and be attainable
to the senses. To conclude, the behavior of mathematical quantity toward the
notion of real and true being can be expressed by saying that it [e. g., mathematical
quantity] admits of [italics supplied by Simon) real and true being; it does not
include it positively and does not consider it adequately, nor does it positively
exclude, by any kind of repugnance, the reality of quantity itself. And this is how
it differs from purely imaginary quantity, which is a being of reason. Mathematical
quantity is not determinately a being of reason; neither is it determinately a real
being, but it is indifferent to either condition and admits of either of them."

NATURE AND THE PROCESS OF MATHEMATICAL ABSTRACTION

137

a mathematical square or circle which exists, indeed, in the
mind, in a state of abstraction from individuating matter and
of positive unity, exists also in the real world, as identified
with an individual square or circle. The answer is obviously
negative, because of the condition of reason resulting from
mathematical abstraction. In the case of the physical essence,
all the difference is one of state. In the case of the mathematical
essence, the difference affects not only the state of an essence
but also its constitution. Physical abstraction leaves the constitution of the physical essence unmodified. This is clearly expressed by St. Thomas when he writes that physical objects can
neither exist nor be understood without sensible matter. 24
N e,ither ... nor ... expresses the similarity of two conditions.
As to metaphysical objects, St. Thomas says that they can both
be understood and exist without matter. Again, both ... and
... expresses the similarity of two conditions. Thus, between
the first and the third orders of abstraction, between two cases
marked by similar conditions for objective and for real existence, there is a case marked by discrepancy: mathematical
objects can be understood without sensible matter, but cannot
exist without it.
The next phase of our research will consist in determining
precisely why there is in mathematics, and in mathematics
alone, a discrepancy between the conditions for being and the
conditions for being understood. Let us briefly remark that
the sheer fact of higher abstraction gives no answer. Metaphysical objects are more abstract than both the physical and
the mathematical objects, and yet nothing interferes with their
real existence, whether in association with matter or in a state
of separation. It is in the unique relation of quantity to the
components of physical nature that we are likely to find the
explanation of the unique behavior of mathematical entities
with regard to real existence.
Mathematical abstraction is made possible by the order
which obtains between quantity and the sense qualities. Both
•• See supra, note 7.

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YVES R. SIMON

quantity and sense qualities emanate from material substance,
but according to a definite order. It would be impossible to
consider color apart from quantity, for any color is the color of
a surface. But it is possible to consider points, lines, surfaces
and solids independently of color or smell. Sense qualities do
not pertain to the intelligibility of quantitative forms and
relations, but they are inseparable from their reality. Here we
find the root of the discrepancy between conditions necessary
for being understood and conditions necessary for existing.
Quantitative forms can be understood without sense qualities,
but without sense qualities they cannot exist. This proposition
becomes clear as soon as we consider the relations that quantity
on the one hand and sense qualities on the other hand have to
matter. Quantity originates in the matter of things. Sense
qualities, considered precisely as qualities, originate in the form,
but, considered as qualities perceptible to the senses, they are
a consequence and an expression of the material component of
bodies. The ceaseless changes which take place in our sensorial
environment signify the presence, in the substantial reality of
things, of a principle, viz., prime matter, which, in the words
of St. Augustine, is mutability itself. Quantity is intelligible
without sense qualities, but, as soon as it is stripped of these
qualities, it is also disconnected in a sense from prime matter,
in which it originates. Thereby, it ceases to be real. Mathematics is by no means an ontology of real quantity. If we want
to know about real quantity, we shall consult sciences that
consider quantity in and with the conditions of its real existence: these are the philosophy of nature and metaphysics.
Ever since the time of Aristotle, at the very latest, enough
has been known about mathematical abstraction for people to
understand that mathematics does not deal with physical
reality, that it does not say what real quantity is and that,
accordingly, its truth cannot be measured by a relation to the
real world of nature, which definitely is not its object. Although
these things have been known for many centuries, it seems
that it is only with the advent of the non-Euclidean geometries
and other revolutionary changes which occurred in the 19th

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139

century, that the ideal of a mathematics which would be both
a natural science and the most exact of the rational sciences
ceased to haunt the minds of men. In most cases, the realization
that mathematics was not the science of real quantity and that
its truth did not consist in a relation of conformity to the
quantitative aspects of things, promoted the belief that mathematics was indistinguishable from logic and enjoyed a truth of
the logical description. Unvoiced in most cases was the postulate that the only possible forms of truth were physical and
logical, and, close to it, the postulate that the only thing which
may cause scientific objects not to be real is the standpoint of
the logician. We are suggesting that the unreality of mathematical objects has a proper cause, irreducible to what causes
logical entities to be beings of reason. Logical entities are beings
of reason because they are properties that the things known
assume within the mind as a result of their being known, as a
result of the second existence that they enjoy, qua objects,
within the mind. Here, the factor of unreality is a mode of
existence, the objective existence that the things possess in the
mind and cannot possess anywhere else. We are suggesting
that this is not the only factor of unreality in scientific objects.
Another one consists in the relation of quantity to sense qualities and to prime matter. This relation we have tried to describe. If our suggestions are correct, the alternative concerning
the truth of mathematics would not hold. Mathematical propositions would possess a truth of their own, reducible neither to
a relation of conformity to nature nor to mere consistency.

t YVEs R. SIMON

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
A CRITIQUE oF CALVINIST DocTRINE

I

INTRODUCTION

N THE FOUR centuries which have elapsed since the
Reformation, the dialogue between Catholics and Protestants has evolved through several distinct phases. In fact,
it is possible to distinguish :five literary genre of this dialogue.
The first reaction of Catholic theologians toward the doctrines of the Reformers was to engage in a point by point
refutation. St. Robert Bellarmine's Disputationes de controversiis Christianae fidei adversus hujus temporis haereses is
the chef d'oeuvre of this type of literature. Taking the
Apostles' Creed as the point of departure, Bellarmine noted
that in the first two centuries of the Church's history the first
article of the Creed was the disputed point. In the following
period the mystery of Christ had to be defended, while in the
ninth century the heresy at issue concerned the mystery of the
Holy Spirit. Finally in the second millenium heretics erred
concerning the last articles of the Creed-the Church, the
communion of Saints, and the remission of sins. In this
category Bellarmine places the Reformers of the sixteenth
century. For this reason his work is divided into three parts:
(I) the section in which he refutes the Protestant doctrines
concerning the Church, Christ her invisible head, the Pope,
Christ's vicar, and, finally, the members of the Church, taken
either collectively (under this head he treats the subject of the
ecumenical council) or individually; (2) a section dealing with
the communion of saints and the seven sacraments; (3) finally,
a treatise on the remission of sins, including a discussion of
grace, Christian liberty, and justification. It is interesting to
note that Bellarmine places at the head of these sections the
140

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

141

more fundamental question concerning the Bible, its interpretation, and oral tradition.
In retrospect, it is possible to see that this minute refutation,
which proceeded according to a scholastic method, lacked a
global or synthetic view of the Protestant position and failed
to examine the dialectic at the origin of the Protestant theses.
Nevertheless, especially in the work of Bellarmine, there is a
presentiment of the organic unity of the Protestant dogmatic.
This particular author actually attempted to reduce all the
differences between Catholic and Protestants to a primary disagreement in the manner of conceiving the Eucharist-1
A second genre in the field of Protestant-Catholic literary
contact is exemplified by the work of L. Bouyer, Spirit and
Forms of Protestantism. Here polemics are put aside, and the
accent is placed upon the common spiritual heritage of
Catholics and Protestants. The attempt is made to place in
the best possible light the positions of non-Catholic brethren.
One can justly name this literary genre, the " Concordances." 2
A third distinct tendancy of the interconfessional dialogue is
that of the "critical history." This genre of literature is characterized by the intuition that every religious community is a
dynamic reality, the subject of development, based upon fundamental principles. In this regard the work of the seventeenth
century Oratorian, Richard Simon (1638-1712), is remarkable.
He was interested mainly in the reunion of the East and the
West, and he saw clearly that much of the misunderstanding
between Rome and the Eastern Dissidents was based on a
lack of comprehension, rooted in tum in a centuries-long inde1 Another author of this same period, Thomas Stapleton, had a remarkable insight
in this same direction. In his De principiis doctrinalibus fidei (1579) and Relectio
principiorum fidei scholastica (1596), he expressed the opinion that the lack of
success of the interconfessional polemic was due to a concentration on particular
problems and a negligence of general, fundamental questions. According to Stapleton
these questions can be reduced to one: the authority of the Church. See M.-J. Le
Guillou, 0. P., "Des controverses au dialogue oecumenique," lstina, 1958, no. 1
(January-March), p. 86.
• Le Guillou (op. cit.) notes that this type of work is more evident in the
dialogue between Rome and the Eastern dissident Christians.

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

pendent development of doctrine and cult. He applied his
principle to the relationship between Catholics and Protestants
in his Moiens de reunir les protestants avec l'Eglise romaine,8
The work of J. A. Moehler 4 marks a definitive passage from
the traditional opposition of thesis vs. thesis to a fourth genre.
Moehler was convinced that it is necessary to go to the root of
the affair and rediscover the leading idea of a given system, the
intuitions which are at the base of all opposition.
It would not be a minor success, if one were able to concentrate
upon the primary object of the debate, and to maintain the conviction that positive progress has been made when the persisting
differences are situated upon their veritable terrain; for then the
adversaries can meet one another with the seriousness and loyalty
which are so necessary in the case of such a grave difference. This
is the only way to collaborate in accomplishing the design which
Providence had in permitting such a lamentable division.5
The limit of Moehler's contribution to the evolution of the
ecumenical dialgue is the fact that he considered almost exclusively the " Confessions of Faith." In the preface to his
Konfessionskunde, Konrad Algermissen 6 notes the necessity of
taking into account other elements, especially the worship and
spirituality of a given Christian community. One might add,
regarding the Protestant communions, that the consideration
of various theologians is especially important, since the
" magisterium " of protestantism is virtually constituted by the
tradition of theological interpretation of the Sacred Scriptures.
Finally, the phenomenon of the ecumenical movement outside the Catholic Church, a phenomenon of the twentieth
century, has been paralelled by a new development in the interconfessional dialogue. On the basis of the recognition that each
8 Cf. Le Guillou, op. cit., p. 93.
• Symbolik oder Darstellung der dogmatischen Gegensiitze der Katholiken und
Protestanten nach ihren offentlichen Bekenntnisschriften, Mainz, 183!'l. English
translation by J. B. Robertson. New York: Benziger Bros., 1906.
• Ibid., preface.
6 Konfessionskunde,
7• vollstiindig neugearbeitete Auflage, Celie, Verlagsbuchhandlung Joseph Giese!, 1957.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

143

Christian confession must be understood as a whole, and that,
although the Protestant communities are rooted doctrinally in
the sixteenth century, nevertheless, the present situation of
protestantism has not the clearly defined characteristics of
"formal heresy," Catholic theologians are engaging in a dialogue which may be called properly ecumenical. The attempt is
being made to reinterpret the various Protestant confessions
in relation to the ecumenical movement itself, and to present
objectively the data in view of a discussion which, it is hoped,
may ultimately result in a reintegration into the visible
Mystical Body of Christ.
In this historical context, the present study of the theme
of the " Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit " is an extremely
modest contribution. It is concerned with the Bible, and in
that measure it is related to the first literary genre. We have
already noted how St. Robert Bellarmine placed this treatise
at the head of his Disputationes. No one needs to emphasize
how fundamental this question is to the ecumenical dialogue.
We must say at the outset, however, that this problem is going
to be considered in its singularity, and that the criticism is to
be made of the Calvinist doctrine at a theological level; for,
after all, the only hope for a successful ecumenical dialogue is a
sound theology-and in this respect the doctrine of St. Thomas
has tremendous import in regard to ecumenical questions.

PART ONE

THE CLASSICAL AND MODERN CALVINIST POSITION
SECTION

1: JoHN

CALVIN

Since the limit of the one term of this comparative study
is the thought of John Calvin, the first task is to determine
the place occupied in his synthesis by the doctrine concerning
the establishment of the divine authority of the Bible. Perhaps
the easiest manner of making such a determination is to take a
brief look at the way in which Calvin proceeds in his principal

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

and only really synthetic work, the Institutes of the Christian
Religion. 7 The aim of Calvin in presenting his doctrine in this
particular form was " to prepare and qualify students of theology for the reading of the divine word." 8 This statement is
significant insofar as it gives an indication at the outset of the
primary role which the Bible will take in the entire work. The
whole purpose of theology, in the mind of Calvin, is to make
the Scriptures better understood. In another place this purpose
is stated in a broader fashion-" The design of the author in
these Christian Institutes is twofold, relating, first, to the
knowledge of God, as the way to attain a blessed immortality;
and, in connection with and subservience to this, secondly, to
the knowledge of ourselves "- 9 but the meaning is the same.
The knowledge of God is the ultimate term of everything to be
proposed in the Institutes. In this regard there is a remarkable
coincidence between the method of Calvin and that of St.
Thomas Aquinas in the Summa Theologiae, wherein the
Angelic Doctor states: " The principal intention of this sacred
doctrine is to deliver the knowledge of God." 10 Nevertheless,
according to Calvin, such knowledge is to be obtained only by
reading and understanding the divine word in the Sacred
Scriptures.
The framework which Calvin uses to present this doctrine,
7 " The first draft of the Institutes came from the pen of Calvin in 1534 or 1535,
but the work did not finally leave its author's hands in its definitive edition until a
quarter of a century afterwards, in the late summer of 1559" (from the literary
history of Institutes, by Benjamin Warfield, which is placed at the beginning of
the English translation of the work used herein. Institutes of the Christian Religion,
transl. from the Latin and collated with author's last edition in French by John
Allen (7th Amer. edition).
Philadelphia:
Presbyterian Board of Christian
Education, 1936 (2 vols.) . The translation from which citations will be made is
based on that definitive revision of 1559. Cf. Corpus Reformatorum (CR), Vol.
xxx, Institutio Christianae Religionis ... Joanne Calvina Autore, 1559, ediderunt
G. Baum, E. Cumitz, E. Reuss. Brunsvigae, apud C. A. Schwetschke et Filium,
1864. The same editors published, the following year, the definitive French translation of the Institutes (CR, xxxi) .
8 Inst., Author's Preface; vol. 1, p. 18 (CR, xxxi, 7-8).
• Inst., General Syllabus; op. cit., vol. I, p. 41.
10 Summa Theol., I, 1, Intro.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

145

the elucidation of what pertains to God as contained in the
Scriptures, is one familiar to Christian tradition.
In the prosecution of this design, [the author] strictly follows the
method of the Apostles' Creed, as being most familiar to all
Christians. For as the Creed consists of four parts, the first relating
to God the Father, the second to the Son, the third to the Holy
Spirit, the fourth to the Church; so the Author distributes the whole
of this work into four Books, corresponding respectively to the four
parts of the Creed. 11

In the execution of this plan, therefore, Calvin begins with
the consideration of the knowledge of God as Creator, and it
is in this first part of his work that the reflexive treatment of
the Bible is contained. The direction of his thought may be
summed up as follows: There are, it is true, various modes of
coming to the knowledge of God. In the first place all men are
endowed with an innate and instinctive knowledge of Him.
Furthermore, the created universe mirrors the divine perfections in an intelligible fashion, so that men can also come to a
knowledge of God in this second way. Due to the so-called
noetic effects of original sin, however, it is impossible for men
to profit either from the innate knowledge or that which is
attained through the created universe. Therefore, it is necessary that God be known in a manner provided immediately by
God Himself; and this is none other than the written word of
God, the Sacred Scriptures. 12
11 Loc. cit. This methodology raises a question which does not pertain
to this
study, but which is, nevertheless, primary to the ecumenical dialogue: to what
extent do the Christian communities that stem from the Reformation use the
tradition of the Church?
12 The first book is on the knowledge of God, considered as the Creator, Preserver,
and Governor of the universe at large, and of everything contained therein. It shows
both the nature and tendency of the true knowledge of the Creator-that this is
not learned in the schools, but that every man from his birth is self-taught ityet that the depravity of men is so great as to corrupt and extinguish this
knowledge, partly by ignorance, partly by wickedness; so that it neither leads him
to glorify God as he ought, nor conducts him to the attainment of happiness.
Though this internal knowledge is assisted by all the creatures around, which serve
as a mirror to display the Divine perfections, yet man does not profit by it.
Therefore to those, whom it is God's will to bring to an intimate and saving knowl-

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MAURICE

B. SCHEPERS

It would be a mistake to suppose that Calvin did not
consider the possibility and the fact that God has revealed
Himself to man in a way other than by means of the written
word. This latter mode, however, he restricts to a particular
moment in the history of the world, viz., to the era of the
patriarchs. In that period alone, he affirms, man was instructed
by God in such a way that the minds of the patriarchs " were
impressed with a firm assurance of the doctrine, so that they
were persuaded and convinced that the information they had
received came from God." ;1.s The matter stands differently
now, however, because" at length, that the truth might remain
in the world in a continual course of instruction to all ages, he
determined that the same oracles which he had deposited with
the patriarchs should be committed to public records," 14 In
the present dispensation, therefore, it is impossible that " man
have the least knowledge of true and sound doctrine, without
having been a disciple of the Scripture." 15 This, it may be
noted, is the first place in the Institutes where Calvin states
what has since been designated the " formal principle " of the
Reformation, sola Scriptura.
Beyond noting the mere fact of the establishment of this
principle, however, one is constrained to ask why Calvin posited
a revelation beside that knowledge of God which comes to us
either spontaneously or by a consideration of His perfections
in the mirror of creation. Evidently the word of God is conceived by him, in the first place, as remedial, insofar as the
other modes of knowledge have proved to be fruitless. This
interpretation is confirmed by the following passage:
Though the light which presents itself to all eyes, both in heaven
and in earth, is more than sufficient to deprive the ingratitude of
men of every excuse, since God, in order to involve all mankind in
the same guilt, sets before them all, without exception, an exhibition
edge of himself, he gives his written word; which introduces observations on the
Sacred Scriptures--that he has therein revealed himself. Ibid.
13 Inst., I, 6, 2; op. cit., vol. 1, p. 82 (CR, xxx, 54).
H
10

Ibid.
Ibid.

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of his majesty, delineated in the creatures-yet we need another
and better assistance, properly to direct us to the Creator of the
world. Therefore he hath not unnecessarily added the light of his
word, to make himself known unto salvation. . . . And it is not
without cause that he preserves us in the pure knowledge of himself
by the same means; for otherwise they who seem comparatively to
stand firm, would soon fall. For, as persons who are old, or whose
eyes are by any means become dim, if you show them the most
beautiful book, though they perceive something written, but can
scarcely read two words together, yet by the assistance of spectacles,
will begin to read distinctly-so the Scripture, collecting in our
minds the otherwise confused notion of Deity, dispels darkness, and
gives us a clear view of the true God. 16

Calvin notes a second reason for a special divine revelation.
I speak not yet [i.e., in the foregoing section] of the peculiar
doctrine of faith which illuminated [the patriarchs] into the hope of
eternal life. For to pass from death to life, they must have known
God, not only as the Creator, but also as the Redeemer; as they
certainly obtained both from his word. 17

Thus Calvin perceives a two-fold necessity for God's speaking
to man in a special way: first, because the human mind is
clouded by sin and ignorance as to the true nature of the
Creator so manifest in His creatures, i. e., to remedy the noetic
effects of sin; second, because it is necessary for man to know
things about God of which creation does not speak, namely,
that God is a redeemer.
Although this section of the present study is rather expository than critical, a brief pause to consider the significance of
these principles may be profitable, since the later critique will
focus on the superstructure of this foundation rather than the
foundation itself. The first noteworthy element in the development is that for Calvin, as for all the men of his time, man
is still in touch with reality. Even though he harshly diminishes
the ability of man to profit by knowledge gained through
natural means (and profit in this context refers to salvation or
a loving contact with the God who is known in Creation), still
16
17

Iwt., I, 6, 1; op. cit., p. SO (CR, xxx, 53).
lnst., I, 6, 1; op. cit., p. 81 (CR, xxx, 53).

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he would not think of affirming that man's nature has been
changed to the extent that he is completely shut off from God.
It follows also that when God presents himself to man by
special revelation in Scripture, the content of that revelation
will in itself be tailored to the understanding of man, i. e., it
will also be intelligible.
The second point to be noted from what Calvin says here
about biblical revelation is that the total content of that part of
revelation which is supernatural (i.e., above and beyond what
can be known of God by natural means, especially if man be
considered in his original state) is concerned with the mystery
of the Redemption. This is the import of the passage in Institutes which states that for the patriarchs " to pass from death
to life, they must have known God, not only as the Creator,
but also as the Redeemer."
If it is a question of the deposit of divine revelation, i. e., of
knowing where the divine oracles are preserved intact, we have
seen Calvin's unqualified assertion that the Scriptures are the
sole and unique mode. " It is only in the Scriptures that the
Lord hath been pleased to preserve His truth in perpetual
remembrance." 18
From this assertion follows the pri:mary importance for
Calvin's judging as to the divine origin of the Bible, taken as a
whole. When man is confronted by this written witness, its
real value to him depends on whether or not he can say with
certainty, "This is God speaking to me." If he cannot make
this certain judgment he is bereft of all profitable knowledge
of God. To use Calvin's own words, "[The Sacred Scriptures]
obtain the same complete credit and authority with believers
when they are satisfied of its divine origin, as if they heard the
very words pronounced by God Himself." 19 Otherwise man is
condemned to remain in what is practically complete darkness.
Therefore, the question almost spontaneously arises-and
Calvin places it himself-" Who can assure us that God is the
18

10

Inst., I, 7, I; op. cit., vol. I, p. 85 (CR, xxx, 56).
Ibid.

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author of the Scriptures? " 20 With this simple question John
Calvin recognizes the necessity of some criterion by which man
judges of the divine origin of the Scriptures. That God is the
author of the Bible (through inspiration), and, furthermore,
that God speaks to man in the Bible, furnishing him with a
rule for his faith (so that the word of God is said to be canonical or to possess canonicity): these are facts which will have a
key position in all the doctrine which is to be discussed in the
whole course of the Institutes, the purpose of which is to
" prepare and qualify students of theology for the reading of
the divine word." Man will come into contact with these
objective facts through a judgment. "This is God's word, and
it is directed to me in such a way as to be normative of my
faith." To make this judgment man needs a foundation, a
criterion, an assurance, as Calvin puts it. What will this
assurance be?
In Calvin's time, even as now, the Catholic Church proposed
certain definite ideas concerning the process involved in affirming the divine authorship of the Bible, " the sole saving source
of divine revelation." Therefore, to establish his own doctrine,
Calvin endeavors first of all to dispose of these notions, which
he reputed as totally false and disruptive of true religion. 21
20 Ibid., p. 86

(CR, XXX, 56).
The supposition here is that the doctrine which Calvin is ultimately to defend
as his own has its origin with him, that he inherits it from no one in the history of
Christian thought. A Calvinist author of this century asserts as much. "Calvin
had no predecessors in the formulation of the doctrine" (Warfield, Calvin and
Augwltine, p. 116). The same author, however, is at pains to point out what he
terms as certain " historical relations " between the system that Calvin is to adopt
as his own and the thought of some earlier Christian writers, especially St.
Augustine. St. Justin Martyr, St. John Chrysostom, and St. Hilary are cited as
examples of a tendency to consider the interior illumination of the Holy Ghost as
necessary for the accrediting of God's word (ibid.) . It is evident from an examination of the texts, however, that these writers were not concerned specifically with
the question of a universal criterion by which the authority of God's written word
might be established, but were speaking rather in a general sense of the role that
the Holy Spirit plays in opening the mind of man to the understanding of the
revelation of God. Since the thought of Augustine on this point must be considered
explicitly and more in detail in a subsequent section, it does not seem relevant here
to attempt to refute Warfield's assertion (p. 117).
21

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

Calvin's own understanding
lated:

of this doctrine is thus formu-

It depends, [say they], on the determination of the Church to decide

what reverence is due to the Sacred Scriptures, and what books are
to be comprised in the canon .... The Sacred Scriptures have only
so much weight as is conceded to them by the suffrages of the
Church, as though the eternal and inviolable truth of God depended
on the arbitrary will of men.22
To this last inference Calvin adds: "How will the impious
ridicule our faith, and all men call it in question, if it be understood to possess only a precarious authority depending on the
favour of men! " 23
Calvin's refutation of the Catholic doctrine, as he has understood it, has a two-fold foundation. First he goes to the Bible
itself, using a scriptural text to show that the Catholic position
is not tenable. He strengthens this conclusion with testimony
from that doctor of the Church for whom he had such a predeliction, St. Augustine. This latter argument is occasioned by
the assumption on the part of some Catholic authors that the
expressed testimony of St. Augustine is a sure witness to the
finn foundation of the Catholic doctrine. The passage in
question has been the center of much controversy since Calvin
first fashioned his own doctrine.
The Scriptures themselves, Calvin affirms, gainsay the
Catholic doctrine on judging the divine authority of the Bible.
[It is] completely refuted even by one word of the Apostle. He testifies that the church is built " upon the foundation of the Apostles
and prophets" (Eph. fl: flO). If the doctrine of the prophets and
apostles be the foundation of the Church, it must have been certain,
antecedently to the existence of the Church. . . . If the Christian
Church has from the beginning been founded on the writings of the
prophets and the preaching of the apostles, wherever that doctrine
is found, the approbation of it has certainly preceded the formation
of the Church; since without it the Church had never existed.24
Loc. cit.
Ibid.
2 ' lnst. I, 7,

22

23

op. cit., vol. I, p. 86 (CR, xxx, 57).

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A paraphrase of Calvin's argument here could be stated in this
way: To accord the Church the right to pass judgment on the
divine authorship of Sacred Scripture is to reverse an order
established by God, since the Church rather takes her origin
from the Bible. The Church does not have the right to
pronounce approbation upon the documents from which her
very being is derived.
Realizing that the authority of St. Augustine was commonly
brought forth to give strength to the Catholic tradition in this
matter, Calvin next discusses the position of that author. The
Latin doctor, as Calvin cites him, had made this statement:
" If you were to come upon a person who does not yet believe
the gospel, what would your reply be to his,' I do not believe'?
Indeed, I myself would not believe the gospel, unless the
authority of the Catholic Church compelled me to do so." 25
Having quoted the saintly Bishop of Hippo, he continues:
How falsely and unfairly this is cited in support of [the Catholic]
notion, is easy to discover from the context. He was in that [place]
contending with the Manichees, who wished to be credited, without
any controversy, when they affirmed the truth to be on their side,
but never proved it. Now, as they made the authority of the
Gospel a pretext in order to establish the authority of the1r
Manichaeus, he inquires what they would do if they met a man who
did not believe the gospel; with what kind of persuasion they would
convert him to their opinion. He afterwards adds: 'Indeed, I
would not give credit to the gospel, etc.,' intending that he himself,
when an alien from the faith could not be prevailed on to embrace
the Gospel as the certain truth of God, till he was convinced by
the authority of the Church. . . . Augustine, therefore, does not
maintain that the faith of the pious is founded on the authority of
the Church; nor does he mean that the certainty of the gospel
depends on it; but simply that unbelievers would have no assurance
of the truth of the Gospel, that would win them to Christ, unless
they were influenced by the consent of the Church. 26
According to Calvin, then, this passage from Augustine,
adduced by the Catholics, is quite beside the point in the issue
25 Contra Epistolam Manichaei quam vocant Fundamenti (ML 34, 177).
•• lnst., I, 7, 3; op. cit., pp. 87-88 (CR, xxx, 57-58).

MAURICE

B. SCHEPERS

at hand. The Doctor of Grace is but affirming the Church's
role in recommending the Gospel to an unbelieving world. This
is to say nothing of its relation to a person in his acceptance of
the Gospel (which represents the entire Scriptures) as the word
of God. For such a one the Church ceases to function in this
capacity, as Calvin is prepared to demonstrate.
The Reformer of Geneva has thus far been concerned with
arguments that are negative, his endeavor being to show that
the doctrine of the Catholic Church is without foundation. It
is at once contrary to the word of God itself, and to the sentiment of a Father of the Church as renowned as St. Augustine.
Now he turns to his own positive exposition of the criterion of
certain judgment on biblical inspiration.
In order to be able readily to classify the criterion that
Calvin upholds in the Institutes, as it appears from the very
text, it will be helpful to note here that there are really only
three generic possibilities. The triple element involved in the
transmission of God's revelation by the written word are (1)
God Himself,
the inspired human author (with no delineation of the specific character of this inspiration), and (3) the
term or result of the cooperation between God and the hagiographer, the inspired book. Now the criterion for the divine
authority of this product of God and man (however their
cooperation be conceived) will be some internal mark of the
book, or, if that is not sufficient, a testimony exterior to the
book, made either by God or by the human author. These two
only are competent to testify to that which is, properly speaking, their own. Given the statements of Calvin in his positive
defense of that which he deems as the correct choice, one should
be able to place his thought in one of these categories.
The core of Calvin's doctrine in this regard is contained
in a few brief statements, which occur in close sequence, thus
confirming and explaining one another.
The question, how shall we be persuaded of the divine original ...
is just as if anyone should inquire, how shall we learn to distinguish
light from darkness, white from black, sweet from bitter? For the

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Scripture exhibits as clear evidence of its truth, as white and black
things do of their colour, or sweet and bitter things of their tasteP
In the section which follows almost immediately:
The principal proof, therefore, of the Scriptures is everywhere
derived from the character of the divine Speaker .... Now if we
wish to consult the true interest of our consciences; that they may
not be unstable and wavering, the subjects of perpetual doubt .•.
this persuasion must be sought from a higher source than human
reason, or judgments, or conjectures-even from the secret testimony of the Spirit. 28
Again,
I reply that the testimony of the Spirit is superior to all reason.
For as God alone is witness of Himself in his own word, so also the
word will never gain credit in the hearts of men, till it be confirmed
by the internal testimony of the Spirit. It is necessary therefore
that the Spirit, who spake by the mouths of the prophets, should
penetrate into our hearts, to convince us that they faithfully
delivered the oracles which were divinely entrusted to them. 29
Just a little further on:
Let it be considered then as an undeniable truth, that they who
have been inwardly taught by the Spirit feel an entire acquiescence
in the Scriptures, and that ... it obtains the credit which it deserves
with us by the testimony of the Spirit. 30
Finally,
It is such a persuasion ... as requires no reasons ... in which ...
the mind rests with greater security and constancy than in any
reasons; it is ... such a sentiment as cannot be produced but by
a revelation from heaven. 3 ,_
Apparently led by a consideration o£ the first o£ these texts
S. Zarb, 0. P., was inclined to place the criterion affirmed there
as internal to the Scriptures themselves. According to this
author, Calvin "asserts that the Sacred Scriptures are made
known by the very writings themselves. The Scriptures carry
Inst., I, 7, 2; op. cit., p. 87 (CR, xxx, 57).
30 I, 7, 5, p. 90 (CR, XXX, 60).
7, 4, p. 89 (CR, XXX, 58-59).
31 Ibid., p. 91 (CR, XXX, 60).
29 Ibid., p. 90 (CR, xxx, 59).
27

28 I,

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

with them a sense of their truth no less clear than that which
white objects or black have of their own color, and sweet and
bitter foods of their taste." 32 Then he adds:
Beyond this that doctrine is attributed to Calvin which asserts that
Sacred Scripture is inspired not only passively but also actively, i. e.,
in so far as they breathe forth God. The reader of the divine
Scriptures feels in his heart that he is reading the word of God.
This testimony of the Holy Spirit in the hearts of the faithful
results in this, namely, that no one is deceived with regard to the
books that are truly sacred and canonical.33

It must be granted that Calvin did lay great emphasis upon
the power of the Scriptures to move the heart of the reader so
that he is inclined at once to affirm the divine character of these
writings. Yet, on this basis, to say that his ultimate criterion
is internal to the Scriptures does not seem to square with the
texts that follow in quick succession upon this first one. As a
matter of fact the text to which Father Zarb refers, and which
is reproduced at the head of the series of texts placed together,
occurs in that section of chapter seven of the first books of the
Institutes in which Calvin is dealing explicitly with the adversaries of his doctrine, and, in particular, the position of the
Catholic Church. It is separated somewhat, therefore, in its
context from the positive defense of what may be said to be
proper to Calvin. To this it may be added that the entire next
chapter in the Institutes is devoted to what Calvin styles as
rational proofs to establish the belief of Scripture. The evidence
here is that for Calvin all these internal marks result either in
mere probable persuasion, viz., that these books be accepted as
from God, or in a confirmation of a conviction already held.
In concert with writers, Christian or not, of every era he recounts a number of such attributes: the loftiness of scriptural
doctrine, the beauty of the literary style, antiquity, miracles
and prophecies recounted and accomplished, and the resistance
of the Sacred Scriptures to all possible forces of destruction.
82
88

Zarb, S.M., 0. P., Il Canone Biblico', Rome: Angelicum, 1937, p. 42.
Ibid.

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The conclusion of this chapter, however, is that all of these,
taken singly or conjointly, cannot meet the demands of a
criterion that is ultimate and certain. In light of these considerations it is questionable whether or not the best expression
of the genus of Calvin's criterion is to say that it is an internal
character of the Scriptures.
What most clearly appears in this exposition of the doctrine
of Calvin is his acute awareness of the necessity of a divine
criterion to correspond to a divine fact. The sixteenth century
Reformer was literally eaten up with the realization that before
us in the Sacred Scriptures is the Word of God, in a proper
sense; and he would insist on this point with just as much
vehemence as those authors who are most loyal to the divinely
transmitted Catholic doctrine of the inspiration of the biblical
text. Therefore, the position of J. M. Voste, 0. P., namely, that
the criterion, as Calvin conceives it, is properly the testimony
of God Himself, i. e., a testimony external to the Bible-this
position seems preferable to that of Father Zarb. 34
This distinction, however, is not of such great importance as
is the total import of the few but telling texts that can be
gleaned from the Institutes. From these statements Calvin's
doctrine may be epitomized in this wise: the exclusive, sufficient, universal and ultimate criterion on the basis of which a
believer may affirm, " This book is the word of God," (meaning thereby that this book is part of the inspired canon of
Sacred Scripture), is the inward testimony of the Spirit of God.
To be sure, this testimony takes place concurrently with the
reading of the sacred text; but it is, nonetheless, something
really distinct from those qualities that are inherent in the
text. Calvin's own summary of this line of thought is as
follows: " The Scriptures will only be effectual to produce the
saving knowledge of God, when the certainty of it shall be
•• Voste, J.-M., 0. P., De Divina lnspiratione et Veritate Sacrae Scripturae
(editio 2•). Rome: Collegio Angelico, 1932, p. 28. "Calvinus ac plerique primaevi
pseudo-reformatores docuerunt ipsum Spiritum Sanctum, Scripturae auctorem, inspirare lectores credentes, eisque non tantum sensum Scripturae adaperire, sed et
indicare quidnam sit necne verbum Dei."

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B. SCHEPERS

founded on the internal persuasion of the Holy Spirit." 35 He
expresses this same thought in another way later, in the discussion of the exact nature of the inward testimony:
The Lord hath established a kind of mutual connection between
the certainty of his word and of his Spirit; so that our minds are
filled with a solid reverence for his word, when by the light of the
Spirit we are enabled therein to behold the Divine countenance;
and, on the other hand, without fear of mistake, we gladly receive
the Spirit, when we recognize him in His image, that is, in the
word. 36

It appears from the order in which Calvin presents his
doctrine of the inward testimony that, having rejected the
Catholic doctrine (although it is necessary to suspend the judgment as to whether or not he has conceived this latter correctly), he is doing his best to steer a middle course between what
might be termed naturalism on the one hand and illuminism on
the other. Naturalism he excludes in this way:
It is true that, if we were inclined to argue the point, many things
might be adduced which certainly evince, if there be any God in
heaven, that he is the Author of the Law, and the Prophets, and the
Gospel. ... Yet it is acting a preposterous part to endeavor to
produce sound faith in the Scriptures by disputations .... Though
anyone vindicates the sacred word of God from the aspersions of
men, yet this will not fix in their hearts that assurance which is
essential to true piety. 37
Our author is just as loathe, however, to conceive of the
necessary internal witness of the Spirit as a new revelation. In
this sense he is clearly opposed to illuminism., a doctrinal current that was one of the first by-products of the Reformation,
and which had already appeared at the time that Calvin was
composing the Institutes. The entire ninth chapter of the first
book is devoted to an exclusion of this error. The burden of this
particular chapter is that there is, in the present economy of
salvation, an intrinsic connection between the objective word
35

31
37

lnst., I, 8, 13; op. cit., p. 104 (CR, xxx, 69).
I, 9, 3; op. cit., p. 108 (CR, xxx, 71).
I, 7, 4; p. 89 (CR, xxx, 59).

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of God in the Bible and the subjective illumination, if it may be
termed as such, of the Holy Spirit. God only witnesses to His
truth in the presence of the written word. The internal testimony of the Spirit of God is bound, as it were, to the divine
revelation as it is comprised in the Sacred Scriptures. Later we
shall have occasion to see how one modern interpreter of Calvin
has modified his thought in this regard. For now it is enough
to adduce this text of Calvin to illustrate the point:
God did not publish his word to mankind for the sake of momentary
ostentation, with a design to destroy or annul it immediately upon
the advent of the Spirit; by whose agency He has dispensed his
word, to complete his work by an efficacious confirmation of that
word. 38
Far from being an independent illumination, the testimony of
the Spirit is a completion of the objective revelation in the
Bible. Benjamin Warfield seems to have made a just estimate
of the way that Calvin conceived the cooperation of the Scripture and the Testimony of the Spirit to produce a saving
knowledge of God:
Calvin's formula here is, the Word and the Spirit. Only in the
conjunction of the two can an effective revelation be made to the
sin-darkened mind of man. The Word supplies the objective factor;
the Spirit the subjective factor; and only in the union of the
objective and subjective factors is the result accomplished. The
whole objective revelation of God lies, thus, in the Word. But the
whole subjective capacitating for the reception of this revelation
lies in the will of the Spirit. Either, by itself, is wholly ineffective to
the result aimed at-the production of knowledge in the human
mind. But when they unite, knowledge is not only rendered possible
to man: it is rendered certain .... "By His Word and Spirit!"therein is expressed already the fundamental formula of the Calvinistic doctrine of the " means of grace." In that doctrine the Spirit
is not conceived as in the Word ... conveyed and applied wherever
the Word goes: nor is the Word ... conceived as in the Spirit of
revelation and truth. The two are severally contemplated, as
separable factors, in the one work of God in producing the knowledge of Himself which is eternal life in the souls of His people;
38 I, 9, 3; p. 108

(CR, XXX, 71).

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

separable factors which must both, however, be present if this
knowledge of God is to be produced. It is the function of the Word
to set before the soul the object to be believed; and it is the function
of the Spirit to quicken in the soul belief in this object: and
neither performs the work of the other or its own work apart from
the other. 39
A scholastic theologian might be inclined to inquire further
into the psychology of the testimony of the Spirit, but it is impossible to seek in the text of Calvin an answer to such a question as, " How does the testimony of the Spirit affect each of
the several faculties of man?" Neither is it necessary to make
these precisions. It is certain that Calvin does not hold that
the testimony is a new revelation in the sense that the illuminists would have it. The very nature of it, however, demands
that the testimony be expressed in a proposition that is distinct
from any proposition found in the Bible itself, namely, "This
collection of Sacred Literature is truly and entirely and exclusively the Word of God." Evidently this is an act of faith, the
nature of which demands that the mind and the will of man be
involved, each in its own order, the will under the influence of a
divine impetus moving the mind to assent to a truth, for which
assent it is disposed by an illumination from God.
Calvin proceeded in an extremely orderly fashion in the
exposition of this particular doctrine; so much so that it is
easy to sum up the procedure in a more or less strict scholastic
form.
1) He sets forth the Catholic doctrine.
a) The Church determines the sacred canon.
b) This determination has certain necessary consequences.
aa) Objective: the eternal inviolable truth of God
depends on the arbitrary will of man.
bb) Subjective: our faith is based upon the favor of
men.
39

Warfield, op. cit., pp. 83-84.

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2) He refutes the Catholic doctrine thus conceived.
a) By an appeal to the Scriptures themselves. An institution whose origin is posterior to a document of
divine origin, which, moreover, has its very existence
from this document, is not competent to judge (or
determine) the divine validity (authority) of this
document. According to St. Paul the Sacred Scriptures antecede the Church and give her existence.
Therefore, the Church lacks competence to determine
the authority of the Scriptures.
As to the major: it is self-evident.
As to the minor: We are built upon the foundation
of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ himself
being the chief corner-stone (Eph. 2: 20) .
b) By an appeal to the context of a passage of St.
Augustine often used by Catholics to support their
doctrine.
aa) The text of Augustine itself: " I myself would
not believe the gospel unless the authority of
the Catholic Church compelled me to do so."
bb) Calvin's interpretation: in the context Augustine
speaks as an unbeliever, in whose eyes the
Church is a powerful witness. The believer,
however., has no need of such a witness.
8) He proposes his own doctrine, arguing by an analogy.
The believer's faith in the divine authority of Sacred
Scripture corresponds to the prophet's certitude regarding the divine oracles delivered to Him.
God alone (by the internal prophetic light) is witness
of Himself in His own word to the prophet. Therefore, only God, by the "internal testimony of the
Spirit," can furnish a sufficient, ultimate and universal criterion as to the divine authority of Sacred
Scripture.
After having seen the place of this doctrine in the synthesis

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of the Institutes, and also the actual presentation of the case
for the testimony of the Spirit, it is possible to conclude this
section with a judgment on the importance of the doctrine to
the system of Calvin, and the Protestant position which he represents. Our own judgment, moreover, can very well be based
upon the observation of E. Reuss, the nineteenth century
Protestant theologian and historian.
This theory of canonicity based on the interior Testimony of the
Holy Spirit is not an isolated idea, an accidental concept, an
expedient, a product of the imagination set forth for the needs of
polemics. . . . On the contrary, it is related in a most intimate and
natural manner to the fundamental theses of protestantism, to the
dogmas of regeneration, justification, faith, and finally to that
element so precious, namely, the evangelical mystique. 40

What, precisely, is the intimate relation of which Reuss speaks;
and above all, what is this " evangelical mystique " of which
the doctrine of the Internal Testimony is an expression? Such
questions are properly answered in the section of this study
devoted to a criticism of this doctrine, but it seems to be
evident at the outset that Reuss is speaking not of a material,
but of a formal relationship, and that the evangelical mystique
is the total expression of this form. This is to say that,
contrary to the Protestant doctrine on the nature of regeneration, justification, and faith, Calvin's idea on the testimony of
the Holy Spirit has a source other than the text of the Bible
itself. Materially, therefore, they differ. The formal relationship, then, consists in this, that in every case the emphasis of
Calvin and the Protestant school is upon the immediate contact
of God and the soul of man. This immediate contact is apparently what Reuss chooses to call the " evangelical mystique,"
and if the term evangelical be used provisionally to designate
this particular school of theology, the choice is apt. Now it is
possible for us to see how the testimony of the Spirit, the prime
analogue, as it were, of the evangelical mystique, has been
translated into more modern contexts.
•• Reuss, E., Histoire du Canon, Second edition. Strasbourg: Truttel and Wurtz,
1863, p.

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THE TESTIMONY OF THE SPIRIT IN THE REFORMED
CoNFESSIONS

OF FAITH.

The burden of the present section is to show how the doctrine
of Calvin on the interior testimony of the Holy Spirit has been
received, expressed, expounded, and interpreted in that segment of Protestantism which is called the Reformed Church.
The reason for excluding from the consideration the Lutheran
tradition is simply that, in accord with the emphasis that the
German Reformer placed upon the content of the Scriptures as
the ultimate criterion of their divine character, his disciples
have never wholeheartedly embraced Calvin's solution of the
problem.
The first moment, so to speak, in the development of the
thought of Calvin is merely its crystallization in the various
Confessions of Faith which were framed in the early years of
the Reformation, most of them during Calvin's own lifetime.
As will be universally true even up to the present day, the
doctrine of Testimony, as it may be found in these Confessions,
is always imbedded in the presupposition that the Scriptures
are the sole font of revelation. In the first place, therefore, let
us see how that fundamental thesis appears in the various
Confessions.
The Catechism of the Church of Geneva is a work that comes
from the pen of Calvin himself, but we may consider it as an
expression of the Faith of the Reformed Church insofar as it
was used from the beginning, especially in Geneva itself, the
heart of the Reformed movement, to instruct children in the
faith of that Church. The work dates from the year 1541, two
years later, therefore, than the first expression of the doctrine
of Testimony in the Institutes. The Catechism expresses the
unique character of the Scriptures in the following manner:
" What is the means of coming to such a great good as the
knowledge of the truth? To accomplish this, God has left us
his holy Word, which is to us an entrance into the heavenly

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kingdom. But where do you find this Word? As it is comprised
in the Holy Scriptures." 41
The statement as it appears in the Catechism is not as strong
as the more ample explanation given in the Institutes, but the
Confessions of Faith that were composed by Calvin's immediate
followers reproduced the absolute quality with which he desired
that the doctrine be expressed. Thus in Scotland, under the
aegis of John Knox, the Protestants who gave their allegiance to
Calvin affirmed that, " the doctrine taught in our churches is
contained in the written word of God ... in those books, in
the which we affirm that all things necessary to be believed for
the salvation of mankind is sufficiently expressed." 42
The Belgian Confession of Faith (1561), which seems to be
the most orderly presentation of the Calvinist doctrine that
was produced in that spring of the Reformation, is just as
clear: " We believe that this Sacred Scripture perfectly contains
the will of God and that whatever is necessarily believed by
men in order to be saved is sufficiently taught therein." 43
The disciplinary decrees, published in connection with the
so-called Heidelberg Catechism (1563) , indicate how this principle of sola Scriptura was translated into the life of worship of
the Calvinist community of that time: "Since the [Word of
God] is fully contained in the canonical books, all preaching
ought to have them as its source and be founded thereon." 44
This is an inevitable practical conclusion of the principle, of
course, and is of all the greater importance because of the place
that the Predigt, the preaching of the Word of God, holds in
the worship of the Calvinist community and indeed of the
Protestant world as a whole.
41 " Que! est le moyen de parvenir a un tel bien? Pour ce faire, il no us a laisse
sa sainte Parole, laquelle nons est comme une entree en son Royaume celeste. OU
prens tu cette Parole? Comme elle nous est comprise en saintes Ecritures," " Le
Catechisme de l'Eglise de Geneve," Niese!, W., Bekenntnisschriften urul Kirchenordnungen. Zurich: Evangelischer Verlag, 1942, p. 34.
••" The Confession of Faith professit and belevit be the Protestantes within the
Realme of Scotland," (1560), Bekenntnisschiften, pp. 102-104.
43 " Ecclesiarum Belgicarum Christiana atque Orthodoxa Confessio," Bekenntnisschriften, p. 121.
44 " Kirchenordnung der Kurpfalz," Bekenntnisschriften, p. 142.

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One last witness may be adduced to complete the formation
of the background upon which the early Calvinists expounded
the doctrine of Testimony. It is a text which brings us back
to Switzerland, the birthplace of the Calvinist movement, and
it belongs to the Confession of Faith of the Swiss Church of
1566. The importance of this text lies in the fact that the
Confession was to be adopted as the norm of the faith of the
Calvinist Churches not only of Switzerland, but also of Poland
and Hungary. In this latter country Calvinism was to blossom
forth and gain many adherents, so that even to this day the
Calvinist Church of Hungary is an important element in the
Hungarian community. The text, moreover sums up in a
trenchant way the affirmations of the previous formulae: " We
believe and confess that the canonical Scriptures . . . are the
true Word of God .... In these Holy Scriptures the universal
Church of Christ has exposed [for herself] whatever pertains to
salvifio faith and also that which pertains to the right formation
of a life pleasing to God." 45
None of these statements can be said to be a development
of the doctrine of sola Soriptura as first affirmed by Calvin.
Taken together, however, they do show the solidarity with
which the Churches of the Reformed movement followed his
lead in this regard. The same solidarity will be noted in the way
in which the Confessions echo the thought of Calvin specifically
on the doctrine of Interior Testimony.
Once again the Catechism of the Church of Geneva, written
by Calvin, but adopted by the Reformed Church, is the most
primitive text.
Are we able to attain true faith by ourselves, or does it come from
God? The Scriptures teach us that it is a singular gift of the Holy
Spirit, and experience shows the same thing. In what way? In
so far as our understanding is too weak to comprehend the spiritual
wisdom of God, who is revealed to us by Faith. Moreover, our
hearts are inclined to diffidence, or, rather to a perverse confidence
••" Confessio et Expositio Simplex orthodoxae fidei et dogmatum Catholicorum
syncerae religionis Christianae concorditer ab Ecclesiae Christi ministris, qui sunt in
..
Helvetia, etc." Benkenntnisschrijten, p.

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in ourselves and creatures. But the Holy Spirit enlightens us. to
make us capable of understanding that which would otherwise be
incomprehensible to us, and strengthens us in certitude, sealing and
imprinting the promises of salvation in our hearts. 46
This particular passage occurs in a context where the subject
is the articles of faith in general. Later, in a section where the
Catechism deals with sacraments, the same testimony is repeated in equivalent terms:
In what way can we use the Scriptures to draw profit from them?
By receiving them with full certitude of conscience, as truth which
has come from heaven, by submitting ourselves to them in strict
obedience, by loving them with a true and whole-hearted affection,
and by having them imprinted on our hearts to follow them and
conform ourselves to them.
Is all of this in our own power? Not at all. It is God who works
within us in this way by His Holy Spirit. 47
Neither of these texts, however, is nearly so explicit as is that
of the Institutes.
What the Catechism of Geneva may lack in clarity, or at
least fullness, is more than supplied by the subsequent documents of early Calvinism. The Church of Scotland took a
rather negative point of view in its summary of the question,
however:
As we beleve and confesse the scripture of God sufficient to instruct and mak the man of God perfect: so do we affirme and avow
the aucthoritie off the same to be of God and nother to depend of
men nor Angelis. We affirme thairfore, that sicke, as alledge the
scriptur to haif na authoritie but that quhilk it resaveth from the
Kirk, to be blasphemous aganis God and iniurious to the trewe
Kirk, quhilk alwayis heareth and obethe the voce of hir awin
Spousse and Pastor, but taketh nocht upoun hir to be Maistre over
the same. 48
This passage corresponds to that section in the Institutes which
removes from the Church the right to declare definitively con•• Bekenntnisschriften, pp. 14-15.
Bekenntnisschriften, p. 34.
•• " Confession of Faith of 1560," Bekenntnisschriften, p. 104.
47

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cerning the divine character of the Scriptures. There is not a
word, however, concerning the testimony of the Spirit. May
we understand from this that the Scotch Calvinists did not
agree with John Calvin on this point, or was it a case of having
the doctrine from another source? The latter is the more
probable.
The " Confession de Foy Ecclesiastique," composed by the
French Calvinists in 1559, and also the "Ecclesiarum Belgicarum Confessio" of 1561, have statements that do the doctrine
of Interior Testimony more justice. The first of these is the
less complex.
We recognize these books as canonical and the certain rule of faith
not so much by the common accord and consent of the Church as
by the testimony and interior persuasion of the Holy Spirit, who
makes us discern them from the other ecclesiastical books, upon
which no article of faith can be established, even though they may
be useful.49
The phrasing of this canon indicates that the men who framed
it did accord the Church some function in the accrediting of
the Scriptures, the definitive decision being that of the Holy
Spirit in the heart of the believer. The Belgian Confession
contains more elements, and it seems to be the richest source
with regard to the Interior Testimony.
We confess that the Word of God was neither given nor transmitted
by the will of man; but that the holy men of God spoke, influenced
by the Holy Spirit ... and that later God, because of the singular
care which He has for us and for our salvation, commanded the
Prophets and the Apostles to consign these, his oracles, to writing.
. . . For this reason the writings are called the holy and divine
scriptures.
It is only these books that we accept as sacred and canonical so
that we draw from them the rule of faith and learn and are
strengthened upon them as upon a foundation. We believe without
any doubt all that is contained therein, not so much because the
Church receives and approves of them as such, but in the first place
because the Holy Spirit testifies in our hearts that they come from
•• Bekenntnisschriften, p. 67.

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God, and because, moreover, they themselves bear His approval.
For even the blind perceive, as if by touch, that the things that are
pronounced therein do come to pass. 50

In this short passage is contained a rather beautiful statement
of the primitive Calvinist theory of divine revelation, a theory
which gravitates toward the Interior Testimony of the Holy
Spirit as toward the ultimate term of expression and the logical
foundation. In the first place, the " holy men of God " receive
the divine oracles. This would be revelation, properly so-called.
Then the Prophets and the Apostles receive the mandate from
God to put these oracles into writing; and in obeying this
command they are inspired, so that the term of result of their
labors is really the word of God Himself. Therefore, the written
oracles may be looked upon as the rule of faith. Now in the
establishment of this last moment in the sequence of events,
namely divine faith in the written word of God, the same Holy
Spirit who gave the " holy men the oracles," who inspired the
Prophets and the Apostles so that they could transmit them
faithfully, breathes within the faithful soul "testifying in our
hearts that they come from God." Finally, the Holy Scriptures
may be said to bear the divine credentials insofar as even the
obtuse can see that what they have predicted has come true.
This expression of the theory is faithful in its entirety to the
principles laid down by Calvin. Especially noteworthy is the
emphasis it places upon the necessity of divine credentials to
verify or certify a divine reality, a necessity of which Calvin
himself was acutely aware and which he found could only be
solved by recourse to the immediate witness of the Holy
From these authentic sources of early Calvinism it appears
how the formulation of this doctrine by Calvin himself was only
confirmed by the various churches in Europe which answered
his call to a return to a truly evangelical religion. They are
unanimous in proclaiming the absolutely unique character of
the Bible as a source of revelation, as a point of contact between God and man; and they are in substantial agreement
•• Bekenntnisschriften, pp. 120-121.

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that the only valid means of certifying this contact is a divine
activity which consists in a private and interior experience on
the part of the Christian, by which he feels the Holy Spirit
impelling him to accept the Word of God as such.
SEcTION

8:

THE TESTIMONY

oF THE SPIRIT

ACCORDING

TO

KARL BARTH.

When the doctrine of Interior Testimony first appeared in
the sixteenth century, it was expressed in a context that one
might term as classical. Although by comparison with Catholic doctrine, Calvin and the other Reformers exaggerated
the effects of original sin upon human nature, still the Protestant system as it was then formulated was characterized by a
relative optimism about the situation of man. In other words,
according to Calvin once contact has been re-established between God and man by divine revelation, that contact will be
continuous, particularly in the souls of the elect. From the
moment their hearts have been sealed with the interior testimony and faith has been conceived these chosen ones are living
in an atmosphere of which the divine is the very life breath.
Thus for Calvin the work of the testimony of the Spirit and
the operation of divine grace of which it is the foundation is
meant to re-establish a harmony between God and man, the
presupposition being that human nature, for all its corruption,
remains essentially capable of being healed and raised to the
level of permanent communication with God. 51
To suppose, however, that this system, expressed as it is
within the categories of what one writer has called the " philosophy of common sense," is on the only possible framework
in which the doctrine of Interior Testimony can find a place
would be an unwarranted judgment. As a matter of fact in these
latter days one may find the doctrine in the writings of such a
theologian as Karl Barth, whose departure from the classical
51 We may note, however, that this permanent communication is far from being
the life of grace as it is conceived according to Catholic theological principles,
namely, an elevation to an order that is intrinsically and substantially supernatural.

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categories is well recognized. For this reason, it is somewhat
necessary, before showing how he has expressed the doctrine of
Testimony, to recapitulate a few cardinal points of his system
which have a direct bearing on this particular subject.
What then, according to Barth, is the present relationship
between God and man, especially as regards contact which has
an intelligible content? It may be summed up in this phrase,
one that the present day Protestant theologian is fond of repeating: Peccator non capax verbi divini. This statement,
moreover, must be taken in an absolute sense. This is to say
that the privation of a capacity for receiving the word of God
is a wound of human nature that cannot be remedied. It is a
permanent state, one that will never be altered so long as man
is living on earth. The early reformers, by the doctrine of the
extrinsic imputation of the merits of Christ, had insisted that
the will of man, even after justification, remains so perverse
that it is impotent to accomplish any just work in the eyes of
God. Barth goes a step further and affirms that the intelligence
of man is subjected to a blindness in the face of divine truth
that is of an equal degree in its own order. Both the intelligence
and the will are radically incapable of having any contact whatsoever, even if it be purely passive, with the gift of God. 52
This means, of course, that the knowledge of God which is
clearly spoken of by St. Paul in the Epistle to the Romans, as
attainable from the creatures of this world which mirror His
perfections, is not only fruitless (and this Calvin himself
vigorously affirms), but even impossible. Whether it be directly
due to original sin or not, understood in the traditional sense,
the fact is that in the mind of Barth, God is utterly out of the
reach of the human intelligence, and to affirm the contrary is a
scandal to him as a theologian.
Yet Barth speaks of a knowledge of God; or, perhaps, better,
he, precisely as a theologian, speaks of God. From this one
52 A well documented summary
of this part of the Barthian synthesis may be
found in the work of Fr. J. Hamer, 0. P., Karl Barth, Bruges: Desclee de Brouwer
and Co., 1949. (Eng. transl. by D. M. Maruca, S. J. Karl Barth. Westminster,
Md.: The Newman Press, 1962). See especially pp. 48 ff.

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might legitimately suppose that he has fashioned a way of
escape, so to speak, from the impasse that seems to confront
man in his search for divine truth and its verification. This
passage-way is the Barthian doctrine of the Word of God, a
term which has its own proper signification (as do others in the
system of the Swiss theologian). For Barth the Word of God
or revelation has a meaning that is in no way derived from the
thought of his remote progenitor in the Protestant movement,
John Calvin. Barth's doctrine in this respect may be summed
up in the following propositions: 1) The Word of God is fundamentally identical with the divine substance. 2) The activity
of the Word of God depends entirely upon the divine free
choice. 3) In relation to man this activity is an intermittent
event, having nothing permanent about it. 4) The event which
is the result of this activity remains opaque to the man with
whom God chooses to come into contact, so that there is no
direct and certain knowledge of it. 53
It is upon such a background that Karl Barth affirms, in no
less uncertain terms than did John Calvin and his faithful
disciples, that the Holy Scriptures are the sole font of divine
revelation. Here Barth represents a radical reaction to the
liberal rationalism of the nineteenth century, wherein the contact between God and man is no more than the extension of a
psychological experience. For him, as for other Protestants of
the present day who are re-examining the foundation of their
position, the Bible must be accepted as a norm outside the
spirit of man. In this return these present day theologians, true
to the Protestant tradition, make the Bible, moreover, the
umque norm.
For all this fidelity to the Protestant position in this narrow
sphere, however, the doctrine of Barth even regarding the
Scriptures must be qualified carefully. The modifications stem,
of course, from what he has established as the character of the
Word of God, in its generic sense. In the first place the genesis
of the Scripture will have a specifically Barthian character. If
53

See Hamer, op. cit., pp. 168 II.

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

the Word of God is essentially an event that is imperceptible to
the man who is its object (one can scarcely speak of man as the
subject of a Word that has no permanency about it), it will
follow that Inspiration of the Bible, a doctrine so well developed in the Calvinist system, will be correspondingly elusive.
Indeed, if one may speak of Inspiration of the Scriptures at all,
it will only be insofar as at the moment of the production of
the Sacred Text the hagiographer is possessed by the Divine
Substance, manifesting Himself in a transient manner and in
such a way that once that experience is a thing of the past, the
result of the labor of the human author remains nothing but
his work. Intrinsically, therefore, the Bible has nothing divine
about it: it is merely a sign of an event of the past, and so it
is necessary that once again it become the Word of God.
[The Bible] is there and always there as a sign, as a human and
temporal word-and therefore also as a word which is conditioned
and limited. It witnesses to God's revelation, but that does not
mean that God's revelation is now before us in any kind of divine
revealedness. . . . The men whom we hear as witnesses speak as
fallible, erring men like ourselves. What they say, and what we
read as their word, can of itself lay claim to be the Word of God,
but never sustain that claim. It can be subjected to all kinds of
immanent criticism, not only in respect of its philosophical, historical and ethical content, but even of its religious and theological.
... We may have to admit that we can make little or nothing
of large tracts of the Bible, as is often the case with the records of
other men. We can take offence at the Bible. And in the light of
the claim or the assertion that the Bible is the Word of Godgranting that the miracle of faith and the Word does not intervene
-we are bound to take offence at it. 54

This becoming of the Word of God, here and now, through
the medium of the reading of the Scriptures is exactly the place
where Karl Barth makes use of the Calvinist doctrine of the
Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit. It is evident that, given
the nature of the Bible as he has described it-and the fallible
character that follows from it-Barth will have to posit some
54 Barth, Church Dogmatics
(Eng. transl. edited by G. W. Bromley and T. F.
Torrance), Edinborgh: T. T. Clark, I, 2, p. 507.

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force by which the Christian of the present day will be able to
profit from the reading of this human word. That force is the
Interior Testimony; and in this Calvinist doctrine, Barth,
having departed from Calvin right from the beginning of this
own synthesis, appears to meet the thought of the early Reformer in this fundamental thesis.
Reconstructing the process by which Barth affirms the Scriptures are accredited, however, is not quite so simple as this.
Calvin had to take into account the existence of a visible
Church, and so does any present day theologian. For this
reason, it is possible to distinguish in the thought of Barth at
least three different types of judgments with regard to the
certification of the Scriptures.
In the first place, Barth will say that the Bible needs no
criterion whatsoever, that it stands by itself. "The Bible is
constituted by itself as a Canon. It is the Canon because it
imposes itself forcibly as such upon the Church and will always
do so." 55
This statement must be understood, however, in the light
of the whole Barthian system. Barth will actually go on to
discuss the criterion for establishing the divine character of the
Bible, at least in the moment in which it appears as such.
Therefore, it seems that there he is merely emphasizing the
absolute freedom of the Word of God in its communication
to man, namely, that it cannot be brought down from heaven
but rather comes as the result of a supemely free divine choice.
That choice cannot be prejudged; it has no criterion. It follows,
therefore, that the result of the activity stemming from this
choice, also is free from all exterior judgments.
Karl Barth is well aware, however, of the existence of a
Church, and thus he is constrained also to attribute to her
some role in the accrediting of the Scriptures. To begin with he
affirms that,
whatever [the individual's] private judgment may be, even his private judgment of faith, however much it may diverge, he must
•• See Hamer, op. cit., p. 165.

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always listen to the Church. . . . The so far unaltered judgment of
the Church radically precedes as such the judgment of the individual, even if it is the judgment of quite a number of individuals
who have to be reckoned with seriously in the Church. 56
Taken by itself this statement seems to be a departure from
the Protestant and Calvinist conception of the place of the
Church in the economy of salvation. Indeed, it is evident that
Barth is acutely aware that the visible Church has an integral
part in God's plan for man; but one should be guilty of selfdeception to conclude that this is a return to the traditional
Catholic way of thinking. In a passage which follows a few
paragraphs after that cited above Barth says:
The Church can ... regard and proclaim its decision [with regard
to the Scriptures] as a direction-an indication seriously meant and
therefore to be taken seriously. If it is not to call in question the
lordship of Jesus Christ and of the Holy Spirit, and therefore
revelation and its own being-it cannot regard and proclaim it
as a divine law. In respect of the Canon, it will always be open to
further instruction. 57
This is a remarkable expression of the thought once formulated
by Calvin himself, insofar as each author considers that the relationship between the Word of God and the Church is that
which exists between a cause and an effect. Calvin, it will be
remembered, argued to this from the text of St. Paul: " You are
built upon the foundation of the Apostles and the prophets."
Here Karl Barth states that the Church is " constituted " by
the revelation of God. Of course, it is not possible to conclude
that the minds of these two Protestants leaders, one of the
sixteenth century and one of the present day, are expressing
the very same thought; because each of them presupposes a
definite concept of the Word of God. Thus there is some
equivocation involved, but it is an equivocation that is susceptible in some respects of a common criticism.
If Calvin and Barth coincide materially in their judgment
with regard to the relation of the Church and the Word of God,
•• Op. cit., p. 480.

57

Ibid.

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the similar mode of expression is even more striking when it
comes to stating definitely how the Christian is to share in
the revelation that God offers to man. In recapitulating Barth's
thought, as it is contained in his Dogmatics, it may be useful to
distinguish his general affirmation, which foreshadows in some
way his approval of the doctrine of Interior Testimony, and his
specific adoption of the doctrine of the Institutes. Texts of
the first genus might be multiplied, but the following will
suffice to indicate the direction of this thought:
The Bible is God's Word so far as God lets it be His Word, so far as
God speaks through it. [We cannot] abstract from God's free act in
which and through which here and now He lets it be true in us and
for us, that man's word in the Bible is His own Word.58
Also," the Lord who gives the Word is also the Lord who gives
faith. The Lord of our listening, the Lord who gives faith,
the Lord through whose act the openness and readiness of man
for the Word is true and real-is not another God but the one
God in this way-and that is the Holy Spirit." 59 For Barth
then there are two moments in the transmission of the Word
of God. Here, again, he agrees materially with Calvin. The
first of these is the occasion when the word is first given by
God to the prophet, leaving aside the manner in which he
himself is able to receive that word. This event is traditionally
given the name, biblical inspiration. The second moment is
that in which the believer is confronted here and now with
that word in its written form, the moment in which that word is
rejected as such or else faith is conceived.
In this respect Barth sees himself as returning to the authentic expression of the primitive Reformation. In his mind this
return is necessary because of the apostasy especially of the
nineteenth century neo-protestants, such as Schleiermacher,
who reduced religion to mere sentiment and did away with the
necessity for the Bible as the sole means of coming to the
knowledge of God. Here it will be helpful to quote him somewhat at length:
58

Church Dogmatics, I, 1, p. l!'l3.

59

Ibid., p. !'lOS.

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MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

The Reformers restored the context in which the inspiration of the
Bible must be understood on the other side as well. As Luther
insisted in innumberable passages the word of Scripture given by
the Spirit can be recognised as God's Word only because the work
of the Spirit which has taken place in it takes place again and
goes a step further, i. e., becomes an event for its hearers or readers.
. . . And it was on the same point that Calvin expressed himself so
vigorously. As he worked it out in Instit. I, 7, 4 and the Commentary on 2 Tim. 3:16 (CR, 52, 383), his view was this. There
exists an exact correspondence between the certainty with which
the word of the apostles and prophets was the Word of God in itself,
or for them, and the certainty with which it as such illumines us.
In both cases only God can bear witness to God: Deus solus de se
idoneus est testisin suo sermone, first, and then in hominum
cordibus. And in both cases the God who attests Himself is the
Spirit: no one else, but the same Spirit; idem ergo Spiritus, qui per
os prophetarum loquutus est, in corde nostro penetret necesse est.
In the very same power in which the Word of God dwells in the
human word of the biblical writers and goes out from it, it must
come to us, i. e., must be known and received by us as the Word
of God, so that we see that God has used the prophets to teach us
(eorum se ministerio usum esse ad nos docendum) and they faithfully transmitted, what was commanded them (fideliter protulisse
quod divinitus erat mandatum). That is how the concept of
inspiration begins and ends on this side. We cannot speak of the
inspiration of the Bible without that royal act of the original
inspiration in which the risen Christ gave His own a part in His
own divine Spirit. But no more can we speak of it without that
other royal act-which is only a continuation of the first-in which
the inspiration is imparted to us, in which here and now we are
forced out of our position as spectators of the word and work of
the biblical writers, in which the calling of the prophets and
apostles becomes an event to us by the ministry of their word and
work. 60

For the most part this text speaks for itself and needs no
comment. It may be helpful, however, to point out two salient
features of Barth's use here of the doctrine of Interior Testimony. First of aU, it is characterized by that acute realization,
which is his heritage from the most authentic expressions of
Calvinistic Protestantism, that there must be a perfect corre6

°Church Dogmatics, I, 2, pp. 521-522.

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spondence between the divine activity which is productive of
the written word of God and the recognition of that word as
such, so that this recognition must be founded also on a
divine witness. We are reminded not only of Calvin's own
insistence upon this point, but also of the development of the
argument by the theologians of this school of the seventeenth
century. The second mark of this text, which serves to distinguish Barth's thought somewhat from the previous expressions
of the doctrine (even aside from the obvious insertion of it in
a synthesis that is distinct from that of Calvin himself) , is the
manner in which Barth makes the recognition of the word of
God by the reader a function of inspiration, " so that we take
part essentially in the vocation of the prophets and the
apostles."
After having followed to its ultimate term Karl Barth's
doctrine of the transmission and recognition of the word of
God, it is possible to summarize briefly his line of thought
in this regard. Barth begins his whole treatment of the question
by assuming that God is, so to speak, totaliter aliter. To the
fallen rational creature He is entirely unintelligible. Nevertheless, this seemingly infinite chasm is bridged by the Word of
God, God revealing himself, in a manner, however, that leaves
Him quite opaque to the human intelligence. This divine
activity might be called an illapsus divinus that is momentary
and wholly dependent on the free divine choice, and, moreover,
beyond the grasp of man. In the present economy of salvation
the condition of this activity on God's part is the Bible. It is
only by this means that the Word of God leaps from his throne
on high. The Bible, since it is the product of an entirely free
divine choice, stands by its own self, though it is received and
approved by the visible Church, of which it is the very foundation and canon. In the final analysis the Bible itself can only
become the Word of God, here and now, if God once again
chooses to make it the occasion (and this is the word aptly
chosen by Fr. J. Hamer to characterize the whole Barthian

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B. SCHEPERS

system with regard to divine revelation) of this revelation to
men who are existing today .61
Barth speaks for himself in this summary fashion:
The Bible must be known as the Word of God if it is to be known
as the Word of God. The doctrine of Holy Scripture in the
Evangelical Church is that this logical circle is the circle of selfasserting, self-attesting truth into which it is equally impossible to
enter as it is to emerge from it: the circle of our freedom which as
such is also the circle of our captivity .... Unfortunately, Calvin
found many later imitators in the enumeration and development of
[the] secondary grounds, but not in his definitely expressed perception of the abysmal difference of these grounds from the one
primary and real ground. The testimonium Spiritus sancti internum, on which alone he and the Reformation as a whole based faith
in the Bible as the Word of God, at a later date gradually but
irresistibly became one ground with others, and the other grounds
gained an interest and acquired an importance as though they were,
after all, autonomous. . . . When we say ' by the Holy Spirit ' we
mean, by God in the free and gracious act of His turning to us.
When we say ' by the Holy Spirit ' we say that in the doctrine of
Holy Scripture we are content to give the glory to God and not
to ourselves. 62
MAuRICE

B. ScHEPERs, 0. P.

Dominican House af Studies,
Washington, D. C.

(to be continued)

61 Fr. L. Bouyer, in his recent book paraphrases
Barth in this fashion: "The
Word is not primarily, still less exclusively, what is said, thoughts which are
communicated to us, but the living act by which God comes to us in person."
(Spirit and Forms of Protestantism, Westminster, Maryland: Newman Press, 1956,
p. 127). In light of this just statement of the Barthian doctrine of the Interior
Testimony it is difficult to see how Fr. Bouyer can criticize Fr. Hamer for "his
complete lack of sympathy for this magnificent doctrine " (ibid.) . It is one thing
to appreciate the intention which an author has in striking out on a given course
and another to agree with him in the road he takes to achieve that objective. In
this regard it seems that Fr. Bouyer concedes too much to the doctrine of the Swiss
theologian.
6 " Loc. cit., pp. 585-587 (passim).

THE PROBLEM OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

PART ONE
THE PossiBILITY

S

AND SIGNIFICANCE

oF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

OME MINDS have always seen a fundamental opposition
between " life " and the pursuit of knowledge. In the
history of Christian thought, the antipathy for speculation has sometimes been expressed in strong terms; one finds
a classic example in The Imitation of Christ. At worst, there
appears to be a conflict between opposed demands; at best, a
tension. When the question of the nature of theology arises, it
is not surprising to see that it becomes the focal point of
dispute and tension. This was especially evident in the thirteenth century. Again in our own time, this paradoxical problem has emerged as a subject which demands close attention
and re-examination, for the antithesis between life and knowledge is affirmed with vigor by many modern thinkers. The
importance and timeliness of examining the question of speculative theology is therefore evident.
1. The Theory of the Subalternation of Sciences as Applied to

Theology
The likeness of theology to scientia Dei et beatorum is, in
Thomistic thought, the fundamental reason for the speculative
character of theology and for its contemplative end. By speaking of an impression of divine science in the theologian, St.
Thomas indicates that there is a relationship of continuity and
dependence. 1 The epistemological theory used in his later works
to explain this is the subalternation of sciences. It is his application of this theory to theology which we shall first examine.
Speaking of sciences which are humanly transmitted, St.
Thomas says that some of them must suppose their principles
1

Cfr. Cajetan, In I, 1, 4 n. 5.

177

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MARY F. DALY

from superior sciences. This is the case with subalternated sciences, which supposed and believe from superior and subalternating sciences certain things which are not known per se, except in
the superior sciences. Applying this to theology, he says that
the articles of faith, which are the principles of this science, are
related to the divine knowledge in such a way that those things
known per se in God's knowledge are supposed in our science.
In fact, we believe that which is indicated to us by His messengers, as the physician believes the physicist that there are
four elements. 2 An extraordinary case, surely; nevertheless, the
subalternation of our theology is comparable to that of other
sciences. The role of faith is that of binding or joining our
theology to the divine knowledge, which is its source. Theology
as a subalternated science is only possible because of illuminating faith, which is its proximate principle and which effects the
continuation of theology to its first source and bestows upon
this science its dynamism to its last end. 3
However, certain difficulties are attached to the application
of the subalternation theory to theology. The well known and
classic dispute to which these difficulties have given rise has been
revived in our own time. We shall examine the difficulties here,
for the answer which we think to be St. Thomas' own opens the
way to the solution of the immediate problem-the problem of
the possibility of a speculative theology.
The notion of subalternation of sciences occurs in the
Posterior Analytics of Aristotle. 4 We shall briefly consider St.
Thomas' commentary on this passage, for he gives here a purely
philosophical interpretation of the theory, explaining it according to its original meaning. He distinguishes two ways in which
a science may be understood to be under another. This occurs
in one way, when the subject of one science is a species of the
subject of a superior science, as, for example, animal is a species
of natural body-and thus the science of animals is under
natural science. It happens in another way, when the subject
• In Boet. de Trin., q.
a.
ad 5 (Decker, p. 89).
Ibid., q.
a.
ad 7 (Decker, pp. 89-90).

3

'Book I, c. 7 (75 b. 14); c.

(87 a.

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OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

179

of the inferior science is not a species of the subject of the
superior science, but rather is compared to it as the material to
the formal. An example of this is the subalternation of perspectives to geometry. Whereas geometry is about lines simply,
perspectives is about visual lines, and thus it is under geometry
by the application of what is formal to what is material. 5 In
another passage in the same commentary, St. Thomas adds
that one science (the inferior) in such a relationship uses quia
demonstrations, whereas the other (the superior) uses propter
quid demonstrations. 6
In this purely philosophical work, therefore, St. Thomas
admits two kinds of subalternation, both of which involve a
distinction of subject. In the first case, the distinction between
the subjects is as that between a species and the genus under
which it is contained. In the second case, it occurs by reason of
the addition of sensible matter. In both cases, consequent upon
the distinction of subjects in the two related sciences, there is a
difference of method.
An attempt to apply this conception of subalternation of
sciences, as St. Thomas explains it in a philosophical context,
to his teaching concerning theology as it is related to the science
of God and of the Blessed, immediately reveals that this case of
subalternation is extraordinary. He clearly teaches that God is
the subject of our theology. He maintains that theology seeks
primarily to know the divine essence, and to study other things,
including human actions, insofar as they are related to the
divine essence. St. Thomas does not, therefore, admit a distinction of subject in this case of subalternation. It is true that our
theology is only a finite and dim reflection of scientia Dei et
beatorum, but the theologian, enlightened by faith, seeks a
knowledge of the same reality which is the object of God's
knowledge. Moreover, one could hardly apply the distinction
in " method," as if there were in scientia divina a use of propter
quid demonstrations.
The subalternation of theology, therefore, does not follow the
6

In Post. Anal., lib. 1, lect.

n.

• Ibid., lib. 1, lect.

n. 6.

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MARY F. DALY

usual pattern. Since there is not, properly speaking, a distinction of subject, it is not " outside" the subalternating science,
as the science of perspectives is in regard to geometry, or music
in regard to arithmetic. What it does have in common with
these " normal " cases, is that it proceeds from principles established by the light of a higher science-that is, there is the
dependence which is characteristic of a subalternated science.
On the other hand, our theology does not have the autonomy
or independence which in a certain respect other subalternated
sciences have, because of the fact that they have a new
epistemological object. 7
This lack of autonomy which sets apart the unique case of
theology is very significant. In other cases of subalternation,
the one who has the inferior science need not be curious about
the superior science. He is not concerned with the same subject.
In theology, on the other hand, there arises from its relationship
of subalternation-from its non-autonomous nature-a dynamism to go beyond itself. We shall examine the implications of
this richly suggestive conception further on. The question with
which we are concerned here is the following: In view of the
unique condition of theology, is it enough, simply on the basis
that it receives its principles from the science of God and the
blessed, to justify maintaining that it is truly a subalternated
science?
Cajetan states that subalternating sciences proceed from
principles which are known per se, whereas subalternated
sciences proceed from principles which are not known per se,
but by the light of a superior science. 8 The essential difference
is that in the former the conclusions are " visible " from and in
the principles immediately, that is, without any mediate habit,
whereas in the latter the conclusions are seen from and in principles which are known mediately, that is, by means of the
subalternating scientific habit. All the other conditions,
7 Cfr. M-D Chenu, 0. P. La theologie comme science au XIII• siecle (Paris:
Vrin, 1957), pp. 80-85.
8 In I, 1, 2, n. 2.

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181

Cajetan says, are merely consequent upon this, making such
and such a kind of subalternation, not subalternation as such.
Elaborating further, he points out that it is true of every
science that its conclusions are visible "in another." In the
case of a subalternated science, its scientific status depends
upon continuation or continuability to the superior science. Its
habit of proximate principles is the subalternatng scientific
habit. Moreover, the two sciences are not necessarily opposed
on the part of the object, or on the part of the subject; in fact,
they can exist together in the same subject. 9 Cajetan concludes
in his commentary that the text in the Summa Theologiae
intends subalternation simply: our theology is imperfectly but
simply subalternated. 10
This explanation differs from the Aristotelian theory, as
interpreted by St. Thomas himself. The meaning of the term
has changed, for subalternation of subject is no longer essential.
All that is essential is that the conclusions of the inferior science
be " visible " in principles known per se only by means of a
higher scientific habit. His interpretation of the text, to mean
that theology is simply subalternated, assumes that a distinction of subjects is accidental to subalternation. For this reason,
Cajetan's solution does not seem to be altogether satisfactory.
John of St. Thomas, in the first part of his Cursus Theologicus, says that in theology there is found essential subalternation, which is on the part of the principles. He adds that there
is no subalternation on the part of the subject and according to
those accidental conditions which are not always required.
Like Cajetan, therefore, he makes subalternation of subject
non-essential. Our theology fulfills the essential condition, since
its principles are known by the light of the science of God and
the blessed. He says that it is the manifestation (notificatio)
of these principles, not their revelation through faith, which St.
Thomas reduces to the superior science. Explaining this, he
says that if St. Thomas were speaking of the revelation of faith,
he would not reduce the manifestation of our principles to the
• Ibid., n. 3.

10

Ibid., n. 10.

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MARY F. DALY

science of the blessed, since the manifestation of our faith is
not made to us by the blessed, but by God. 11
The interpretation of John of St. Thomas gives much insight.
In stressing so clearly the basic dependence of theology for its
knowledge of its principles, he puts into clear outline the nonautonomous status of our theology. Like Cajetan, however, he
seems to depart from the Aristotelian conception of subalternation.
St. Thomas, it is clear, considers the subalternation of theology to be unique. It seems reasonable and consistent with his
thought to admit that this is in fact a case which is analogous
to the subalternation of other sciences, for not all of the conditions are present. Like other subalternated sciences, theology
depends upon the superior science for its principles; unlike
them, it does not have a distinct subject. To cover this situation, St. Thomas uses the expression " quasi-subalternata."
He explains that one science can be under another in two ways:
(1) by reason of the subject; (2) by reason of the mode of
knowing. In the second way theology is under the science of
God, for we know only imperfectly that which God knows
most perfectly. Moreover, just as a subalternated science supposes something from a superior and proceeds through that as
through principles, so theology supposes the articles of faith
which are infallibly " proved " in the science of God. It believes
these, and proceeds to prove those things which follow from
the articles. St. Thomas concludes that theology is " quamsubalternated" to the divine science. 12 That is the term "subalternated" when used to describe theology is not to be taken
in a strictly univocal sense.
The imperfect subalternation of theology is indicative of the
excellence of this knowledge. It is true that theology is imperfect as science, insofar as it lacks the autonomy which is
11

Cursus Theologicus, In I Partem, q. 1, disp.

a. 5, n. 5: Solesmes ed., T. 1,

p. 868.
12 In I Sent., Prol., q. 1, art. 8, sol.
This passage is found in the Prologue of
the Commentary on the Sentences in the Mandonnet edition, but probably belongs
to the later writings.

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183

usual even for a subalternated science. Yet, paradoxically, it is
more perfectly contemplative than philosophy, for the following
reason: the consideration of speculative sciences is a certain
participation of true and perfect beatitude, which consists in
the vision of God. Our theology of its very nature is ordered to
this same vision. By reason of its lack of autonomy-of its lack
of a distinct subject-it has a tendency to "over-reach" itself,
to seek the vision which it can never attain in this life. For this
reason, it participates in this fulfillment, which is the Beatific
Vision, more fully than does any other speculative science.
In this sense, it is more perfectly contemplative than philosophical wisdom.

Subalternation and Positive Knowledge of the Divine
Essence

Q.

The doctrine of theology as a subalternated science is
fundamentally incompatible with a negative conception of
theology which denies that we can in this life participate in
God's understanding of Himself. This is the position of Bernard
Lonergan, S. J., who holds that any understanding we do attain
is negative, that is, a refutation of objections or a grasp of the
absence of inner contradiction. Fr. Lonergan maintains that
although we do not understand God in any positive fashion,
we can understand revealed truth in a positive way. 13 Opposed
to this idea is the fact that the act of the believer does not
terminate in the enunciable, but in reality. We form enunciables only in order that through them we may have knowledge
of things: this is true both in science and in matters of faith. 14
In this perspective, it is inconceivable that we attain a positive
understanding of the articles of faith but no positive understanding of God.
In order to support his position, Fr. Lonergan appeals to the
idea of a subalternated science. He says that although the
subject of theology is God, theological understanding is not of
13 "
14

Theology and Understanding,"

II-II, 1, 2, ad fl.

Gregorianmn 35 (1954) pp. 630-648.

184

MARY F. DALY

God Himself, for then the science would not be subalternated
but subalternating. 15 What he seems to be doing is applying
the notion of subalternation in the strict sense, so as to require
a distinct epistemological object for the subalternated science.
However, as we have seen, St. Thomas himself does not force
the issue of subalternation in the strict sense. Rather, he says
that a science can be under another in two ways: (1) by reason
of its subject; (2) by reason of its mode of knowing. Theology
is under the science of God in the second way, and thus we
know that which God knows, by a finite and imperfect participation of His knowledge.
For St. Thomas, therefere, the situation is quite the opposite
of what Fr. Lonergan would have it to be.16 In fact by the use
of the theory of subalternation he explains that theology does
attain God. In order to grasp this it must be understood that
subalternation is not applied univocally to theology. This is a
case of the analogous application of a term. If one lacks an
awareness of the importance of analogy (we might call this
awareness a "sense of analogy," for it is somewhat intuitive),
there is always a strong possibility of misinterpretation both of
the letter and of the spirit of Thomistic writings.
8. The Subalternation of Theology and "Conclusionstheo-

logie."
The conception of theology as a subalternated science, if
properly understood, is totally incompatible with the Conclusionstheologie which J. Beumer, S. J. sees as an evil of
Thomism. Fr. Beumer thinks that the result of the application
of the subalternation theory to theology is a dissociation of the
science of conclusions from the understanding of principles. He
sees this as a turning away from the Augustinian tradition. 17
Op. cit., p. 635.
In support of his position, Fr. Lonergan cites the wellknown passages f1·om
II-II, q. 8, a. 2 and a. 7. These articles deal with the gift of understanding; it
seems a questionable method, to apply these passages out of context to the case of
theology itself.
17 "Thomas
van Aquin zum Wesen der Theologie," Scholastik 30 (1955), pp.
195-214.
15
18

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OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

185

However, there are two basic points of St. Thomas' doctrine
which are clearly opposed to a Conclusionstheologie, that is, to
a theology concerned only with deducing conclusions.
First: The role of reasoning is not merely to proceed from
principles and then leave them behind in the process of drawing
conclusions. Rather, intellec.tus itself is also the term of the
reasoning process. There is an exitus and a reditus, in which
reasoning leads to a greater understanding of principles. This
basic idea is often repeated and emphasized. 18 Moreover, it is
especially the case with divine science (natural or revealed)
that it proceeds in this way. 19 First philosophy and theology
tend, more than other sciences do, to understanding.
Second: There is a close connection between theology's
tendency to understanding, to intellectus fidei, and the subalternation of theology. Faith is merely the proximate principle
of theology, and faith is in us in order that we will come to
understand what we believe. The reasoning process in theology
is ordered to an understanding of its principles, the articles of
faith, which have their evidence in the science of God and the
blessed. It follows that theology, in seeking to penetrate its
principles, tends to a certain participation of the vision of God.
This, then, is the " direction " of theology, and by reason of
the fact that it is subalternated to scientia Dei such a conception is hardly reconcilable with a Conclusionstheologie. On the
contrary, the unique perfection of theology which is implied in
its status of subalternation to the science of God and of the
blessed is indicated by the term " wisdom." It is wisdom, not
only because it considers the highest cause, as does first philosophy, but also for an additional reason, which makes it to be
wisdom preeminently. This reason is the manner in which it
considers the first cause, which is not by the light of reason
alone, but of reason illumined by faith. 20 Moreover, the
18 In III Sent., d. 85, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2; In I Post. Anal., lect. 1, no. 6; In Bo,et. de
Trin., q. 6, a. 1, c, sol. 1 and 8, De V er., q. 15, a. 1; q. 10, a. 8, ad 10.
19 In Br>et. de Trin., q. 6, a. I, sol. 8: Decker pp. 2ll-212.
The text refers to first

philosophy, but since theology uses metaphysics, it is applicable to our argument.
20 I, 1, 6c.

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MARY F. DALY

superiority of theology is in the speculative order itself. Thus,
it is not to be confused with that wisdom which is a gift of the
Holy Spirit, and which judges of divine things by way of inclination; the wisdom which is theology judges by way of cognition.21 The reason why theology is wisdom in the speculative
order is its special relation to scientia Dei et beatorum-a
relation which finds its technical expression in the special application of the theory of subalternation of sciences.
In the light of what has been said, we must conclude that
Fr. Beumer's interpretation of Thomism as a theology of conclusions fails to take into consideration the context and implications of the Thomistic notion of theology, and falsifies by
taking the part for the whole.
4. The Theological and Philosophical Context
Speculative Theology is Possible

in Which

The conception of theology as primarily speculative, which
takes its character from its continuity with and participated
likeness to the knowledge of God and of the blessed, finds its
setting in a view of the universe which is characterized by a
fundamental paradox. In this view of the universe there is a
hierarchy of orders of being and perfection, in which there is a
continuity from one level to the next; yet, this continuity is
possible only because of a real distinction between one order
and another, between one nature and another.
The principle of distinction and continuity applies not only
within the order of nature; it applies also to the relation between the natural and the supernatural worlds. Since grace
does not destroy nature, but rather perfects it, so it is necessary
that natural reason subserve faith, just as the natural inclination of the will serves charity. 22 That is to say, nature does not
lose its essential identity. Rather, without losing the inclinations proper to it, it is elevated to operations of a supernatural
order. These supernatural operations are not contrary to
nature. Rather, they have a certain correspondence and fitting21

I, 1, 6, ad 3.

22

I, 1, 8, ad 2.

THE PROBLE]d OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

187

ness to the nature which is elevated; that is, there is a continuity between the two orders.
How can reason serve faith? The answer to this can be found
by considering two points, which are in fact two expressions of
this continuity. First, there is the reality with which reason is
concerned. In the imperfect there is found an imitation of the
perfect. So, in those things which are known by natural reason
there are certain similitudes of what is transmitted through
faith. It follows from this also that whatever pertains to philosophy cannot be contrary to that which pertains to faith,
although the former is inferior to the latter. 23 Second, there
is the faculty of reason itself, whose openness to faith is a
manifestation of obediential potency. St. Thomas sees in the
human soul, as in fact in every creature, a double passive
potency. One potency is in regard to a natural agent; the
other is in comparison to the first agent, who can reduce any
creature to an act higher than that to which a natural agent
can reduce it. The latter is called the obediential potency of a
creature. 24
It is possible for St. Thomas to maintain that there is continuity without confusion between the natural and the supernatural orders, because he holds that creatures possess intrinsically their own forms, by reason of which they are. It is true
that they have being by participation and are thus totally
dependent upon the first cause; nevertheless, they have an
intrinsic ontological principle of stability. The idea of the participation of creatures in being is related to and complemented
by the notion of efficient causality of things by God. 25 Creatures
are really caused; thus, they are distinct entities. If elevated to
the supernatural order, their natures retain their integrity.
The unity of the natural and the supernatural orders is not a
confusion; it is a true unity. That is to say, it presupposes a
real distinction.
In Boet. de Trin., q.
III, 11, I.
25 I, 44, lc.

23

24

a. 3: Decker, pp. 93-94.

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MARY F. DALY

5. The Philosophical Option of St. Thomas
Whereas St. Augustine, after Plato, attributes the production
of things to their participation in the divine ideas; St. Thomas,
following Aristotle and pushing his doctrine of causality to the
last logical consequences, attributes it immediately to the
divine efficient causality. It is true that efficient causality and
participation are to be found in both St. Thomas and St.
Augustine. In St. Thomas, however, the conception of efficient
causality achieves full force and meaning.
That St. Thomas was fully conscious of the difference between his own philosophical option and that of St. Augustine
is indicated clearly in a well known passage from the Disputed
Question on Spiritual Creatures. He says there that Augustine,
who followed Plato insofar as the Catholic faith permitted, did
not hold that the species of things are per se subsisting, but
rather, placed the rationes of things in the divine intellect; he
held that through these we judge of all things according to an
intellect illumined by divine light. It is not that we see those
rationes, for this would be impossible unless we could see the
essence of God; rather, they are imprinted in our minds. 26 At
the end of this brief summary, St. Thomas remarks that Aristotle proceeded in a different way. Gilson points out that in
order to say that the philosophy of St. Thomas is the same as
that of St. Augustine, it would have to be possible to describe
him as he himself describes St. Augustine-as a man imbued
with Platonic philosophy, who follows this philosophy as far as
his faith permits. However, it suffices merely to open St.
Thomas to establish that what Augustine does with Plato, he
himself does with Aristotle. 27
In choosing as his rational instrument the philosophy of
De Spir. Great., a. 10, ad 8.
Etienne Gilson, " Reflexions sur Ia controverse saint Thomas-saint- Augustin,"
Melanges Mandonnet (Paris: Vrin, 1930), t. I, pp. 371-383. Cfr., by the same
author, " Le Christianisme et !a tradition philosophique, "Les sciences philosophiques et thfwlogiques 1-2 (1941-42), pp. 249-266; "Pourquoi saint Thomas a
critique saint Augustin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen lige
I (1926-27), pp. 5-127.
26

27

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OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

189

Aristotle, St. Thomas selected a conception of nature, of man,
and of human knowledge which is radically different from
Platonism. This is not to say that one should adopt an oversimplified view of the historical situation, to the point of thinking that Platonism was a kind of" first" Christian philosophy,
which was completely superseded by Aristotle. The fact is,
however, that the metaphysical decision on the part of St.
Thomas profoundly affected his rational development of the
problem of the relation between nature and grace, and of the
relation between reason and faith.
A consequence of this philosophical option is a fundamental
difference between the noetics of St. Thomas and the illuminism of the Augustinians. The Thomistic conception is radically
opposed to Avicennist Augustinianism according to which God
is agent intellect and fulfills the functions of the separated
intelligence of Avicenna. It is also different from those doctrines
which combine the illuminism of St. Augustine with the notion
of an agent intellect which is proper to the individual, and
which produces concepts but is incapable of conceiving truth.
For St. Thomas, the human mind is itself capable of conceiving
truth from sensible reality. Abstraction is meaningful because
creatures are recognized as capable of producing effects. Man
is naturally endowed with the light of the agent intellect,
which, without any special collaboration of a separate agent, is
capable of producing the intelligible in the human souJ.28 Given
this philosophical context, some of the serious obstacles to the
affirmation of the speculative character of theology, which were
inherent in the Augustinian tradition, are removed.
6. Positive Knowledge of God from Creatures

Can creatures be the source of positive knowledge of the
divine essence? The question is often disputed. Yet, if such
positive knowledge is not possible, there cannot be a speculative
theology. Such a theology intends a knowledge of the divine
essence. Although its principles are revealed, it uses concepts
•• I, 79, 3c.

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MARY F. DALY

which are derived from creatures. If the judgments which it
makes, using these concepts, do not attain in some positive,
though imperfect, manner the essence of God as revealed, then
this theology is hardly an impressio divinae scientiae. The
possibility of a speculative theology rests upon the ability of
reason enlightened by faith and using concepts derived from
creatures to have positive knowledge of the divine essence.
Among modern interpretations of St. Thomas the position
of Gilson is a seemingly moderate one; yet, his emphasis upon
the negative aspect of our knowledge of God seems to place
him quite close to the side of Fr. Sertillanges, according to
whom we do not lmow at all what God is. 29 Gilson says that to
interpret St. Thomas as teaching that we have a knowledge, at
least imperfect, of what God is, is to betray his thought. He
maintains, correctly, that St. Thomas denies that we can know
in this life quid est Deum. Gilson interprets this to mean that
our knowledge of God in this life consists finally in our aptitude
to form affirmative propositions concerning Him. That is to
say, that whereas the concept which we form from the effect
cannot be transformed into the concept of God which we lack,
nevertheless, we can attribute to God by an affirmative judgment the name which designates the perfection corresponding
to this effect. We found ourselves upon the certitude that the
creature resembles God. 30
First of all, there seems to be a serious contradiction involved
in Gilson's interpretation.
He seems to forget that for St.
Thomas the judgment, which is expressed by a proposition,
attains reality. 31 If, then, we can form affirmative propositions
concerning God, we do have some knowledge of what God is.
Second, it is important to try to understand what St. Thomas
means by the technical expression, scire quid est. Is his denial
that we can know the quid est o£ God 32 equivalent to a denial
29 "Renseignements
p. 383.

techniques,"

Some theologique (Paris:

30

Le Thomisnw, 5e edition revue et augmente (Paris:

31

II-II, 1, !'l, ad !'l.

32

For example:

Desclee, 19!'l6), t. IT,

Vrin, 1945), pp. 155-157.

I Contra Gentiles, c. 30; De Pot. q. 7, a. !'l, ad 11.

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that we can have affirmative knowledge o£ the divine essence?
In the De V eritate, St. Thomas says that the intellect is said to
know the quid est o£ anything when it defines it, that is, when
it conceives a form which corresponds completely to that thing.
Therefore, since whatever our intellect conceives o£ God is
deficient as a representation o£ Him, the quid est remains
hidden. 33 To know this would be to have definitive knowledge.
There is every reason, therefore, to agree with Maritain that
scire quid est is not exactly equivalent to" to have affirmative
knowledge," and that a denial o£ the possibility o£ this total,
definitive knowledge o£ God in this life is not equal to a rejection o£ all affirmative knowledge o£ Him. 34 Certainly, the
possibility o£ the Beatific Vision in this life is excluded, but
such texts do not exclude positive knowledge o£ some kind.
It is true that there are a number o£ Thomistic texts which
emphasize forcefully the predominantly negative aspect o£ our
knowledge o£ God. 35 However, every negation concerning some
reality is founded upon something existing in reality. Thus, i£
ignorance is denied o£ God, this is because o£ something which
is in Him, and so it is necessary to posit in Him the opposite o£
ignorance. 36 The understanding o£ a negation is always founded
in some affirmation, which is evident from the £act that everything negative is proved through an affirmative. Hence, unless
the human intellect knew something positive o£ God, it could
deny nothing o£ Him: 37 Thus, the two aspects o£ our knowledge
o£ God, affinnative and negative, are complementary and inseparable. The significance o£ the priority o£ the negative
aspect can be seen only within the context o£ the three-fold way
o£ naming God. We can say, for example, God is wise, because
there is in Him the similitude o£ the wisdom which flows from
DeVer. q. 2, a. 1, ad 9. Cfr. also In Boet. de Trin. q. 6, a. 3.
Jacques Maritain, Distinguer pour unir, ou Les degres du savoir, 6e edition
revue et augmentee (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1959) Annexe III, pp. 827-843.
35 For example:
I Contra Gentiles, c. 30; De Ver., q. 2, a. 1, ad 9; De Pot., q. 7,
a. 5, ad 14.
36 In I Sent. d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, ad 2.
37 De Pot., q. 7, a. 5.
33

34

MARY F. DALY

Him. On the other hand, we can say, God is not wise, because
wisdom is not in God as we understand it. Yet, since wisdom
is not denied of God because He is lacking in this, but because
it is more supereminently in Him than is said or understood,
it must be said that God is " super-wise." 38 So it is that the
two aspects, which are emphasized separately in the way of
causality and the way of negation find their union in the way
of eminence, which itself is meaningful only if seen in relation
to the preceding ways. There is a positive content in the way
of eminence, as well as a negative content. To say that God is
"super-wise" is not to say "super-x." We judge that there is
infinite wisdom in God, and in so doing, although we are surrounded by darkness, we see well enough to say a name.
There is an extremely delicate balance between the two
aspects of our naming of God. We cannot name Him in the
sense of expressing a comprehensive knowledge of Him. In
this sense, God has no name. 39 Yet absolute and affirmative
names do not merely express remotion and causality. If such
were the case, there would be no reason for using one term
rather than another. Moreover, names said of God would then
be taken in a secondary sense, and in a sense against the
intention of those who speak of God. Rather, names which
signify the divine substance are predicated substantially of
God, although they fall short of a full representation of Him.
Thus, when we say, God is good, we do not mean, "God is
the cause of goodness," or" God is not evil." Rather, we mean,
" Whatever good we attribute to creatures, pre-exists in God,
and in a more excellent and higher way. 40 One sees the balancing of this tension between the negative and the affirmative
aspects, therefore, in the way of eminence.
Our paradoxical and deficient manner of knowing God is
due to the fact that names are properly said of God in regard to
the reality which is signified, but not in regard to the mode
of signifying. 41 The mode of signifying must necessarily be
deficient, for it is taken from creatures, which represent God
Ibid., q. 7, a. 5,
•• I, 13, 1, ad 1.

38

•• I, 13,
41

In I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1,

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198

only faintly and imperfectly. Because God is the cause of
creatures, names taken from them can analogously and properly
he said of God in regard to the reality signified. Because God
is not a univocal but an equivocal agent, they are not said
properly in regard to the mode of signifying. However, this
mode can be considered as accidental by the human mind,
which knows that they exist in a super-eminent manner m
God. 42
We have noted a certain priority of the negative aspect. It
is not the same case, however, with philosophical and theological knowledge of God. Even in theodicy there is a reconciliation
in the way of eminence. However, this is only the high point of
metaphysics, and it attains God only in regard to what He has,
so to speak, proportionally in common with creatures. It does
not attain the hidden mystery of God. The object of theology,
however, is precisely this hidden mystery. For this reason it is
more negative in a sense than theodicy. But because it proceeds
by a higher light than that of reason alone, and because this
light gives it its finality to the Beatific Vision, which is the only
perfectly positive knowledge of God, theology by its tendency
or finality is a more positive knowledge of the Divine Essence
than is philosophical wisdom.
We have seen, then, that speculative theology, as St. Thomas
conceives this, presupposes a continuity between theology and
the science of God and the blessed. This is possible, because he
sees a distinction and continuity between the natural and the
supernatural orders. Moreover, because creatures are efficiently
caused by God, they truly are distinct entities and are sources
of true and positive knowledge of God. The concepts which
man derives from creatures are used, by way of analogy, to
form judgments which by the efficacy of the light of faith joined
to the light of human reason, attain in a positive manner the
divine reality. I£ the judgments which we make in theology
could not attain the divine essence in some positive, though
imperfect manner, a speculative theology would be impossible.
42 On this point, the observations of C. de More-Pontgibaud
are helpful, in Du
fini a l'infini (Paris: Aubier, 1957), p. 84.

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MARY F. DALY

7. Implications of the Role of Creatures as Source8 of Theo-

logical Knowledge
The role of creatures as sources of theological knowledge,
as this role is understood in Thomism, makes theoretically
possible a rapport with profane science and culture, such as is
incompatible with the Augustinian notion, according to which
creatures have value for theology only as symbols. Since
creatures have full ontological status, the concepts which are
derived from them, when these are used in theological judgments, are instruments of knowledge in an especially efficacious
way. While he does not deny the symbolic value of creatures
and the legitimate use of metaphor-although it is possible
that he did not place sufficient stress upon this 43-St. Thomas
emphasizes the role of creatures in supplying concepts which
can be applied analogously in theology, without losing their
literal meaning.
It is evident that the evolution of the sciences and of culture
can affect theological thought. New problems, judgments, and
arguments are gradually assumed into the texture of theology
itsel£.44 The theologican can accept with gratitude whatever
relevant truth may come to him from any of the sciences, as
helping toward an understanding and application of his own
principles. The presentation of new problems forces him to reexamine some of his former interpretations, and should be a
safeguard against narrowness. Moreover, the keen sense of
history which is characteristic of modern thinking gives a
certain sense of perspective, so that one realizes that what was
emphasized in a certain country at a certain time need not be
important or even essential. It is true progress in the understanding of revelation to distinguish that which is temporal,
and perhaps temporary, and relative, from that which is ab•• Ibid., p. 35: "La valeur de la metaphore et du symbole et leur role dans la
connaissance des choses divines n'ont pas ete suffisamment mis en relief par saint
Thomas, qui ne semble pas percevoir le dynamisme de la metaphore."
44 Some interesting possibilities along this line are explored by E. L. Mascall, in
Christian Theology and Natural Science (London: Longmans, Green, and Co,
1957).

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

195

solute and timeless. Such perspectives are especially necessary
for questions concerning the evolution of dogma, the Church as
a society, and man in society. Such knowledge and such perspectives, however, do not arise from the formal source of
theology, that is, from revelation. They come from a study of
things pertaining to the temporal order. They have a right to
a place in theology only if the ontological reality of that order
is recognized.
We have said that this rapport with profane learning is
theoretically more possible in Thomism than in a system of
thought which places less or no stress upon efficient causality
by God and the ontological reality of creatures, and this is
because it is speculative in the strict sense and gives full play
to creatures as sources of knowledge. This is to say that
Thomism, by reason of its philosophyical orientation, opens the
door to this influence into theology in a way which is unique
and which has epistemological consistency. We have stressed
the term" theoretically," because it is obviously not possible to
make a statistical survey of Thomist and non-Thomist theologians on such a point, and at any rate such head-counting
would be irrelevant. We merely point to the fact that in the
thought of St. Thomas himself there is a bridge between the
temporal and the supra-temporal, and between the natural and
the supernatural. If his disciples often fail to use this bridge
and if others often do use it, this is " per accidens."
We have said that one implication of the truly speculative
character of theology is the possibility of a rapport with other
sciences. It is more than a possibility, it is an obligation of the
theologian, for a theology which is " open " to the natural world
is by this fact committed to an acceptance of whatever relevant
truth may become available from this leveU 5 It is clear that
good judgment is required. Theology should avoid prematurely
assimilating data from other sciences, before sufficiently examining them by its own light, for this can only result in a
45 II Contra Gentiles, c. 4: "Manifestum
est autem ex praedictis quod considerationem circa creaturas habet doctrina fidei Christianae inquantum in eis resultat
quaedam Dei similitudo, et inquantum error in ipsis inducit in divinorum errorem."

196

MARY F. DALY

superficial and temporary concordance. On the other hand, a
misconception of the relationship, or a lack of awareness of the
possibility of its existence, can result in a premature rejection of
such data, and in a moribund conservatism which is as lacking
in speculative depth as it is in courage.
A consequence of this conception of speculative theology and
of the role of creatures is a removal of the confusion of this
knowledge with experiential knowledge. To see the difference
between these two ways of knowing is to take the first step
away from the error of demanding of theology something which
it is not intended to do, and toward respecting it for what it
intends to do. Much of the hostility toward theology among
modern Catholic writers can be explained on this basis: that
they are asking of it something which it cannot give, and are
therefore missing the point in regard to its real value. In other
words, they are looking for an experiential, intuitive knowledge
of God, for that which is traditionally called infused wisdom.
The valuable insights of Kierkegaard have stimulated many
contemporary Protestant theologians, and without doubt his
influence has been felt in Catholic circles as well. There is no
reason to adopt a negative attitude toward this influence, which
has helped to bring about a healthy reaction against the sterile
text-book approach to theology. At the same time, there is a
possibility of misapplying Kierkegaard's conceptions, of forcing
them into an alien context. His either/ or approach to the problem of religious knowledge is expressed in the following words:
" The existing individual who chooses to pursue the objective
way enters upon the entire approximation-process by which it
is proposed to bring God to light objectively. But this is in all
eternity impossible, because God is a subject, and therefore
exists only for subjectivity in inwardness." 46 Here Kierkegaard
suggests that there are two ways of seeking God. One is
objective and without value; the other is subjective and is the
only way that matters. The first way appears to be a futile
substitute for the seeking of God in inwardness. The following
•• Concluding Un11cientijicPosfllcript, in A Kierkegaard Anthology, ed. by Robert
BretaU (New York: The Modern Library, 1946), p. 211.

THE

OF SPECULATIVE

statement of Kierkegaard
either/ or problematic:

THEOLOGY

197

reflects even more strongly this

Now when the problem is to reckon upon which side there is the
most truth, whether on the side of one who seeks the true God
objectively, and pursues the approximate truth of the God idea;
or on the side of one who, driven by the infinite passion of his need
for God, feels an infinite concern for his own relationship to God in
truth ... the answer cannot be in doubt for anyone who has not
been demoralized with the aid of scienceY
However, one may well ask if the alternatives need be such as
Kierkegaard proposes them. We have distinguished between
theological and experiential knowledge. However, theological
knowledge need not be purely " objective " in the sense intended by Kierkegaard. In fact, it cannot be such. It is not,
as we have seen, a work of intellect operating in isolation from
will. The theologian should be aware that God is a subject.
He should feel an infinite concern and this concern is manifested
in his pursuit of truth. He knows that he is in darkness, but
that in this darkness there is also light. This is the true theologian: one who experiences the co-existence of two ways of
knowing, between which there is a constant tension and a
mutual influence, and between which there is a hidden harmony, which will be realized fully only in patria.

PART
THE NECESSITY

Two

OF SPECULATIVE

THEOLOGY

In its most general and fundamental form, the problem with
which we are now concerned presents itself as follows: Is the
existence of a speculative theology a necessary consequence of
the influence of faith upon human reason? This is a manyfaceted problem, whose dimensions reveal their complexity in
the process of seeking a solution. We shall consider the question
from two aspects: (1) from a general or abstract point of
47

Ibid., p. 212.

198

MARY F. DALY

view-on this level the problem concerns the necessity of speculative theology for human nature perfected by grace, or for the
Church;
from a particular or concrete point of view-here
the problem concerns the individual's need for theology so
conceived. Before attempting an adequate statement of this
dual problem and a solution thereof, we turn our attention to
the more general and ambiguous question of the necessity of
sacra doctrina.
1. Preliminary Consideration: "Sacra Doctrina"

When St. Thomas wrote in the first article of the Summa
Theologiae his response to the question: "Whether, besides
philosophy, any further doctrine is required?" he left his disciples with a riddle which they have taken great pains to solve.
The resulting interpretations are varied, and the problem of
what was meant is still with us.
The position of M.-J. Congar, 0. P. is that the term sacra
doctrina means instruction proceeding from divine revelation.
It goes beyond theology in the strict sense and includes with it
Holy Scripture and all the modes of teaching of the Christian
faith. Sacred Scripture and theology are, then, parts distinguished at the interior of sacred doctrine. 48 A certain ambiguity
arises here concerning the relationship among the parts. Fr.
Congar maintains that it is the teaching of St. Thomas that
sacred doctrine merits the name of science in one of its functions
or activities. 49 But how is this scientific function related to the
others?
In his effort to develop the basic idea of Fr. Congar, which is
that sacra doctrina means instruction proceeding from divine
revelation, Fr. Gerald van Ackeran, S. J. makes certain precisiOns.
Sacred Scripture, sacred doctrine, and the habit of sacred theology
are distinct realities in a causal series proceeding from God, man's
principal teacher, and terminating in the disciple's habit of acquired
supernatural wisdom. Sacred doctrine itself is the action of a
48 In Bulletin thomiste V (1938-39), pp. 495-496.
••" Theologie," in Dictionnarie de theologie catholique, XV/1, col. 379.

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OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

199

teacher received in a disciple terminating in the knowledge of salvation. Sacred Scripture is one of the instrumental causes of this
action; the habit of acquired supernatural wisdom is the term of this
action when it is adequately received by man here on earth.
[Thus] the habit of sacred theology is related to sacred doctrine
as its proportioned final cause. Sacred doctrine itself is an action
proceeding ultimately from God as principal cause, received in man
through the instrumentality of human teachers and their verbal
and written discourse, some of which is immediately inspired, and
terminating successively in faith, understanding, and wisdom, according to the measure in which this action is received. Sacred
doctrine can be defined as instruction in divine knowledge by way
of revelation. 50

There are certain difficulties which arise from the position of
Fr. Van Ackeran. In this context of thought, it would appear
that it is necessary for a full Christian life that theology be
possessed by everyone. Moreover, it is difficult to see how
theology's character as an acquired science is saved in this
interpretation. 51 When sacra doctrina is restricted to mean
precisely an action, which is instruction by way of revelation,
and theology is understood as a final cause of such an action,
the place of theology seems to become exaggerated or distorted.
Fr.Chenu also says that sacra doctrina is teaching proceeding
from revelation. He does not press the point that doctrina
means an action. Rather, he understands the term in a broad
sense as including all the resources which flow from revelation,
with all the treatments which it can admit of in the mind of
man, from the reading of the bible to theological deduction.
The term is, in fact, ambiguous, for the development of terminology had lagged behind the development of thought. It is
a vestige of an earlier state of theology, when methodological
diversification had not been accomplished." 2 This position
avoids the pitfall of attempting to find great precision where
in fact this does not exist. A forced interpretation can create
as many problems as it solves.
Sacra Doctrina (Rome: Catholic Book Agency, 1952), pp. 51-52.
Cfr. J-H Nicolas, 0. P., "Chronique de theologie dogmatique," Revue thomiste
57 (1957)' pp. 357-362.
•• La theologie comme science au XIII siecle, p. 79.
50
51

200

MARY F. DALY

It is consequent to Fr. Chenu's interpretation

that in the
first article St. Thomas is not directly and explicitly proving the
necessity of theology properly so called. He teaches here the
necessity of instruction proceeding from revelation, and this
obviously involves both the action of instruction and the knowledge which is its effect. Does this imply the necessity of theology? The answer to this question is suggested by the principle
that everything which is imperfect is intrinsically ordered to
its proper perfection. 53 Since knowledge held on faith or held
for probable reasons is imperfect as knowledge, whereas science
is perfect knowledge, the former is intrinsically ordered to the
latter. Therefore, the relation of pre-scientific knowledge of
doctrine to theology is not that of part to part in the sense that
taken together they would constitute an integral whole which
would be sacra doctrina. Rather, general and pre-scientific
knowledge had by revelation is somehow ordered to theology.
But a serious difficulty immediately imposes itself, for it would
then appear that the normal development of the life of faith for
everyone should be directed toward the acquisition of theological science.
2. Statement of the Problem
Some ambiguity is evident in the statement and application
of the principle which we have given above: Since imperfect
knowledge is ordered to science, knowledge had by revelation is
ordered to theology. One may indeed immediately ask what
is implied in the expression, " knowledge which is had by
revelation," and one may want to know precisely what is
meant by "ordered to theology."
If we consider the intellectual effort which is the fruit of the
marriage of faith and reason, it is normal that this begin with
probable arguments. The imperfect knowledge which is the
result of reason's effort to understand faith is as a disposition
53 This
principle is implied everywhere in the Summa Theologiae. It is, for
example, at the heart of the argument in I,
1: "Utrum aliquis intellectus
creatus possit Deum videre per essentiam?" It is expressed succinctly in I, 6, 1:
"Unumquodque autem appetit suam perfectionem."

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

to theological science. It is of itself ordered to science, as everything imperfect is de se ordered to its own perfection. 54 Here
then, there is a case of an acquired disposition tending to the
acquired habit which is its fulfillment. Such knowledge, that
is, the acquired disposition to theology, the beginning of reason's
effort to understand the things of faith, may be said to be
ordered to theology.
However, to say that faith itself is ordered to theology as to
an intermediate end is another matter. The ultimate end of
faith is the Beatific Vision, which is scientia beatorum. It is
not the case that theology is an intermediate end of faith and
a necessary means to the Beatific Vision, in such a wa.y that
faith, theology, and vision represent, so to speak, three stages
in the same line of progression. It is evident that this is not the
case, for these three realites do not pertain to the same order.
Whereas faith is an infused supernatural habit, theology is an
acquired habit. It is true however that theology is engendered
by a union of faith and reason. That is, granted that it is
essentially an acquired habit, its principles are of the supernatural order, and the rational effort involved is an attempt to
understand these principles. We therefore pose the following
question: Is the life of faith somehow necessarily ordered by its
conjunction with reason to the engendering of a rational effort
which culminates in this life in the possession of speculative
theology?
It would seem that the answer must be at least in some way
affirmative. Faith is in the intellect and orders the intellect to
God. Moreover, in man there is a natural desire to understand.
Since grace perfects nature, it would seem to follow that there
is an intrinsic necessity that this tendency be assumed into the
supernatural order, in an effort to understand what is believed.
Speculative theology then would appear to be the normal fulfillment in this life of the life of faith.
In opposition to this is the evident fact that not everyone
•• This is, of course, not to exclude, but rather to imply, that it is ordered to
wisdom, which includes science eminently and formally.

QOQ

MARY F. DALY

has the capacity or the opportunity to study theology. Moreover, there are others who have both the ability and the
opportunity, but whose intellectual preferences are not in this
direction. It would be foolish to judge the quality of their interior life on this basis. It is clear that the call to the intellectual life is a special call, qualified in many ways by outward
circumstances and individual temperament. Even more particularized is the vocation to the intellectual life which is
precisely that of a theologian. Briefly the possession of theology
as a science is not for everyone, and its absence is not an indication of mediocrity as a Christian. 55
This seemingly flagrant opposition suggests that the problem
must be analyzed on two levels. We shall study it first on a
universal or abstract plane. Here, the problem concerns the
necessity of the existence of speculative theology for human
nature perfected by grace, that is, for the Church. Second, we
shall analyse the problem on the plane of the individual.
3. The Neces8ity for Speculative Theology in the Church

Since faith is an infused supernatural virtue and theology
is an acquired habit, they are not of the same order. Faith in
the human intellect gives birth to theology when the necessary
dispositions and circumstances are present. Then the intellect's
natural dynamism to understand is perfected in the supernatural order, for the object of faith is supernatural. It is
evident, however, that the dispositions and circumstances which
favor the fulfillment of faith's seeking to understand by the
acquisition of theology are not always present. Of course,
according to Christian teaching, there is another form of understanding and another kind of wisdom apart from the acquired
habit of theology. These are gifts of the Holy Spirit and they
are in all who have grace. It might seem, therefore, that these
infused gifts fulfill the necessity for intellectus fidei, and that
speculative theology, while it is satisfying to some types of
55 I. Hl, 6; Contra Gentiles III, c. 58. It is not theological science, but the degree
of charity which one has, which determines fullness of participation in the light of
glory.

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

203

minds, is nevertheless peripheral and strictly speaking unnecessary. This position, moreover, would seem to have support
from the fact that the gifts have always existed in the Church,
whereas speculative theology was late in developing. Accordingly we shall examine the nature of experiential knowledge of
God, in order to see if its existence precludes the necessity of
speculative theology in the Church.
A. The Nature of Experiential Knowledge of God
The knowledge of God which is experiential and affective, is
distinct from the science of theology. Whereas theology is a
habit acquired by study, this experiential knowledge proceeds
from the supernatural motion and " instinct " of the Holy
Spirit, that is, from a certain " connaturality " with divine
things. 56 It is true that there is a certain likeness between
theology and the gift of wisdom. Of the three wisdomsmetaphysics, theology, and the gift of the Holy Spirit-theology is somehow " in between." Its principles, its object, its
motive, pertain to the supernatural order, and in this respect it
is close to infused wisdom. However, the habit itself of theology
is acquired by natural discourse and study, which accounts for
its closeness to first philosophy, which is purely natural, and
for its distinction from the gift.
The special light of experiential knowledge of God which is
had in this life, seems to come proximately from the will. It
is true that the will cannot formally illumine the intellect.
However, John of St. Thomas explains that it can perfect the
light of the intellect, insofar as it renders the object more
united to itself through love, and immediately " touched and
tasted." 57 It is true that love depends upon knowledge, for the
will cannot go out to that which is totally unknown. Yet, on
the part of the mode of attaining the object, the will can be
better united to the object than as proposed to it by the intellect
since the will is borne to the object immediately and in se.58
56 John of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, In lam
Donis Spiritus
Sancti, a. 4, n. 17: Collectio Lavallensis: Sectio Theologica" III (1948) n. 596.
57 Ibid., a. 4, n. 15 (Laval n. 592) .
58 Ibid., a. 4, n. 13 (Laval n. 589).

fl04

MARY F. DALY

In fact, he writes: " affectus transit in conditionem objecti."
This happens insofar as from such an affective experience the
object is rendered more conformed, proportioned, and united to
the person. Thus the intellect is borne to that object as experienced, and in this way love moves in the genus of objective
cause. 59
There is a difference, therefore, between the gift of wisdom
and acquired wisdom, whether the latter be philosophical or
theological, in the manner of knowing supreme causes. The gift
of wisdom attains divine reality in an affective and mystical
way. John of St. Thomas speaks of a" taste" and a" touch"
by which the will has internal contact with spiritual reality.
The soul is, as it were, connaturalized to divine things, and so it
can distinguish them by " taste " from sensible and created
things, in this life imperfectly, per viam remotionis, in the next
life perfectly and by positive evidence. 60
According to the doctrine of St. Thomas it is in fact the
connaturality of charity which is used by the Holy Spirit in
men. Uncreated Wisdom first unites itself to man through the
gift of charity and consequently reveals mysteries to him, the
knowledge of which is infused wisdom. 61 The inspiration of the
Holy Spirit uses the connaturality of charity to make one judge
of divine things. This happens in such a way that he attains,
in the obscurity of faith, not only an object absolutely supernatural, as faith itself does, but moreover according to a mode
of knowing which is itself supernatural.
All of this points to a certain superiority of this infused
knowledge. The eminent dignity of this affective and " connatural " knowledge is suggested by St. Thomas in pointing out
a likeness between the scientia which is a gift of the Holy
Spirit and divina scientia, which is not discursive, but absolute
and simple. 62 Moreover, he indicates the supereminence of this
mode of knowing in saying that through the gift of wisdom man
is transformed into a similitude of the highest causes. 63
59
60

Ibid., a. 4, n. 11 (Laval n. 584).
Ibid., a. 4, n. 6 (Laval n. 563) .

II-II, 45, 6 ad
II-II, 9, I, ad I.
63 In III Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a.
61

62

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

205

It might appear in view of this dignity of " connatural
knowledge " of God, that its existence precludes the necessity of
speculative theology, which is acquired and discursive. This
might seem to be all the more true, when we consider that the
natural gifts and external circumstances which are necessary
conditions for the acquisition of theology need not be present
in order that the gifts exist and operate. These latter are in
fact in a real sense universally available. I£ the wisdom which is
theology is necessary, therefore, this can only be because there is
an insufficiency on the part of this infused knowledge in relation
to human nature. I£ theology is necessary, it is because human
nature perfected by grace requires a certain complementing of
infused wisdom, by an acquired wisdom having its source in
faith and charity.

B. The Incompleteness of Experiential Knowledge
The superiority of experiential over theological knowledge of
God is because in the former the mode of knowing itself is
supernatural. It operates out of " divine instinct," rather than
proceeding from the judgment of reason. 64 It attains God more
closely, through a certain union of the soul to Him. 65 However,
this mode of knowing, considered from another point of view,
has a certain incompleteness. Precisely because of its superiority, it has, from a human point of view, an inherent insufficiency. That is to say, because it is a superhuman knowledge it is not communicable in human terms or strictly speaking
" thinkable " in human concepts. The subjective certainty of
the person having this knowledge may be great, but there is
no way in which others can share in this certainty.
The experiential knowledge of the mystic, because of its
supernatural mode, is less proportioned to the human intellect
than is acquired wisdom. It is true that he himself may have no
personal need for a porportioned, that is, conceptual knowledge,
such as the science of theology. But this is no indication that
such a need does not exist in the Church. In a society of men,
•• I-II, 68, 1, ad 4.

65

II-II, 45, 3, ad 1.

fl06

MARY F. DALY

an acquired and communicable wisdom is needed. Thus, the
totality of the needs of nature perfected by grace cannot be
judged by considering an individual case. There are, moreover,
innumerable cases of persons who do experience the necessity
for scientific theology, and these are sometimes-certainly this
is the case with the great doctors of the Church-also highly
" gifted " with experiential knowledge of God.
In fact, the need does exist in the Church for scientific
knowledge of revealed truth because of the nature and structure
of the human intellect. This is an intellect which draws its
knowledge from the external world, from the senses. Given
grace, there is another source: the Word of God. Speculative
theology is the fruit of the union of these sources, and it is a
fragile offspring, depending always upon them to give it continued and increased life. If it is cut off from either source, it
soon is reduced to a skeleton (although in its assumed indeM
pendence it can become quite arrogant for a skeleton) . Yet,
granted its almost pathetic fragility, this speculative theology
represents the union within the human mind of the natural and
the supernatural orders.

C. The Interiority of theN eed for Speculative Theology in the
Church
Whereas many individuals do not need to possess scientific
theological knowledge, it would be an unjustifiable generalization to say that there is no such need in the society which is
the Church. In a society of men, some communicable form of
knowledge is necessary. To have said this much, however, is
not to have expressed the full dimensions of the necessity for
speculative theology, for it might then appear to be reduced
to a kind of functional necessity for the society which is the
Church. However, far from being merely this, it is" an exigence
springing from the interior of the human spirit, a result of the
impression of faith upon man's reason." 66 It is the interiority
of this exigence which we shall now try to bring into focus.
66 A. Hayen, S. J., St. Thomas d'Aquin et la vie de l'eglise (Louvain: Publications
universitaries, 1952), p. 43.

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

207

In order to see the dimension of depth in the Church's need
for speculative theology, we shall do well to consider the alternatives to the existence of such a theology. What are these
alternatives? We may reach the answer by considering that
within the context of Christian thought it appears to many that
there is a conflict or at least a tension between the pursuit of
knowledge for its own sake and the exigencies of " the human
condition." The human mind can take three basic positions in
regard to this apparent conflict: (1) One may emphasize
purely rational knowledge, in practice making philosophy the
supreme science, while relegating all knowledge of revelation
to the side of subjective experience, creating a schism between
reason and faith; (2) One may stress affectivity, admitting the
legitimacy of speculation only insofar as it is finalized by this;
or (3) One may sustain a point of view in which the tension is
accepted, so to speak, at white heat. That is, one may affirm
with its fullest implications the Christian doctrine of the primacy of charity in this life, and at the same time affirm the absolute
primacy of intellect over will and the full implications of this.
There is no possibility in this attitude for the happy repose of
the simplist, which may account for much of the resistence
which it inspires. It is this last attitude which permits and
sustains the existence of speculative theology. The first and
second viewpoints suggest the alternatives. They seem to be:
(1) the relegation to philosophy of all rational scientific effort
to answer ultimate questions; (2) the development of a theology which is truly a work of fides quaerens intellectum, but
in which the role of intellect is subordinated to that of the will
and, consequently, in which the role of philosophy is lessened.
That these are the alternatives seems to be confirmed in the
"laboratory" of history, at least according to F. Van Steenberghen's analysis of the three dominant orientations of thought
at Paris in the second half of the thirteenth century. Under
Siger of Brabant a school was constituted professing a Platonizing Aristotelianism of a radical and heterodox character. The
conceptions of pagan philosophers were reassumed without regard for the teachings of Christian revelation. This rationalist

MARY F. DALY

current provoked a strong reaction, among the theologians,
against Aristotelianism. At the head of the opposition was
Saint Bonaventure. The great conflict then was really between
the philosophical spirit and the theological spirit, and this was
resolved harmoniously by Albert the Great and Thomas
Aquinas, by elaborating a philosophy which was at once autonomous in its methods and fully compatible with Christian
doctrine. 67
The first of the alternatives to the development of a theology
which is speculative in the strict sense amounts to an abandonment of the spirit of fides quaerens intellectum. It is simply a
substitution of philosophy for theology, a failure to respond to
the problem, resulting in a dichotomy of reason and faith. The
second alternative is more promising, and it is the position of
the second group mentioned in Van Steenberghen's analysis
which is interesting for us to consider here.
In the Bonaventurian conception of theology, knowledge is
subordinated to love; theology is an affective habit. 68 What
are some of the implications of this? First, theology as an
affective habit will be knowledge whose end pertains to the
affective order; theology will seek a loving knowledge which is
in fact that of the mystics. Second, it would seem that since
such an understanding cannot be achieved directly by speculation which uses concepts taken from experience of the created
universe, the role of creatures as sources of theological understanding will be minor. Third, it is logical that a theology
which sees itself as an affective habit will tend to assign a
humble role to reason, or at least to have little confidence in
it, for it seeks a way of knowing which is quite beyond the
pedestrian ways of reason. These implications of theology as
an affective habit are not irrelevant, perhaps, to what happened
in the neo-Augustinian school, after the time of St. Bonaventure. In William of Ockham the role of reason is devaluated to
67 F. Van Steenberghen, "Le mouvement philosophique a Paris au XIII• siecle,"
in Proceedings of the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy (Amsterdam:
North Holland Publishing Company, 1949), pp. 1110-1118.
68 Saint Bonaventure, In I Sent., Proem., q. 8:
Quaracchi I, p. 13a.

THE PROBLEThf OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

such an extent that there is nothing left of fides quaerens
intellectum. As Guelluy remarks, Ockham distinguishes acts
but does not describe tendencies; he analyses the content of
thought without interest in the movement by which it is
animated. 69
It seems clear that there was a deterioration, and if one
seeks the reasons for this, the reflections of Fr. Hayen are
suggestive. To the thirteenth century Augustinians, scientific
rigor presented itself, he observes:
as an exigency coming from the outside, and proper to philosophy.
Thus they considered authentic theology to be the summit of an
experience. It does not go so far as to be a speculative science, at
once scientific and supernatural, truly scientific because truly
supernatural. For them, as for the radical Aristotelians, there was a
conflict between life and scientific knowledge.70
In the present life infused supernatural wisdom and the
acquired wisdom of theology remain distinct, although their
ultimate finality-the Beatific Vision-is the same. The temptation to blur the distinction is very strong; it is perhaps a
manifestation of the desire for that simplicity of knowledge
and unity of vision which belong to the next life. However,
if one attempts to identify supernatural infused wisdom and
acquired wisdom, the result is similar at least in one respect
to the consequence of the rejection of theology in favor of
philosophy. That is, the value of the rational effort toward
intellectus fidei is minimized. The necessity for speculation concerning the truths of faith may be admitted, but there will be
a tendency to see this chiefly in the functions of defending
revelation, of preaching and of teaching. In this perspective,
the necessity of theology is rather a utility. On the other hand,
when the necessary distinction is affirmed, theology is seen as
supernatural in its origin and ultimate finality, but in itself an
acquired habit. It can then be seen that it is from the interiority of the human person whose intellect is formed by
living faith that the exigency for theology arises.
69 Robert
Guelluy, Philosophie et theologie chez Guillaume d'Ockham (Paris:
Vrin, 1947), p. 357.
70 Op. cit., p. 43.

MARY F. DALY

4. The Individual's Need for Speculative Theology

It is clear that in many cases the desire for wisdom must
be satisfied almost entirely on the plane of affective knowledge. It is true also, that without the attainment of this level
in the individual, speculative knowledge is an empty shell.
The fact remains that some recognize the need that two forms
of wisdom find realization within themselves. With regard to
acquired wisdom, it is true that this is not an absolute necessity.
Rather, it is a means and a support without which their selfrealization as Christians would be far more difficult to achieve.
But now the simple and obvious question arises: For whom
is theology necessary? Despite its obviousness, the answers
proposed by modern theologians are often so cloaked in vagueness that one wonders if the question in its most primitive and
fundamental sense has been understood.

A. The Call to Possess the Wisdom of Theology
If one asks who is called to possess theology, the answer
may be generally formulated as it would be in regard to any
vocation. That is, there must be a desire, an intellectual and
temperamental capacity and fitness, and due circumstances.
These requirements are essential for all times, but aside from
their absolute dimension there is evidently a dimension of
relativity, for human beings are born into the temporal order.
In examining this aspect of relativity, it would be well to
recall some basic differences between the medieval society into
which Thomistic theology was born and our own. In medieval
society, outside of the world of the clerics, there was little
intellectual life. Thus the " profane," thinking that the scrutiny
of mysteries of faith did not pertain to their state, put their
trust in the theologians. 71 Society was pervaded by a sense of
hierarchy, and in this order the theologians occupied an eminent
position. According to this hierarchical vision of life, which
vision was somehow communicated even to the ignorant, it
71 Robert Guelluy, "La place des theologiens dans l'Eglise et Ia societe medievales," in Miscellanea historica in honorem Alberti de Meyer (Louvain: Bibliotbeque de l'universite, 1946), p. 580.

THE

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

211

appeared that the faith of the Church is perfect if the belief of
" the little ones " is bound to that of the learned, and finds its
justification and explication in the science of the theologians. 72
However, economic and social developments brought with
them the evolution of a class of educated bourgeois. There has
been a steady evolution of a distinct lay culture, which shows
little dependence upon scholasticism. Thus, whereas in the
Middle Ages it was almost accurate to equate the educated
class with the clergy, on the one hand, and the ignorant class
with the laity on the other hand, this is now completely false/ 3
Moreover the rigid conception of hierarchy extending into all
domains, which was acceptable to the medieval mind, is profoundly repugnant to this new intellectual elite, so strongly
individualistic in its character and thought. These men and
women place great value in the realization of their capacity to
be complete human personalities. They do not want to have
their thinking done for them.
If we return to our three criteria for the " vocation " to the
possession of the acquired wisdom which is theology, it is
evident that their application will be different in modem times
from what it was in the past. First of all, let us consider the
desire to know theology. It is evident that one is less inclined to
desire that which he is not in any way prepared to receive. In
the past, and until quite recently, only the clergy and a few
laymen had access to an intellectual milieu in which intelligent
curiosity about theological matters was stimulated. Today, the
layman who is trained in the liberal arts and the sciences and
whose Christian faith is alive is driven to question and to seek
answers which cannot be obtained by occasional reading. In
regard to capacity and fitness, it is clear that as universal
education becomes more and more a reality, native intelligence
is given a chance to develop. It is true that here nature has
imposed a " hierarchy " and that the ineducable can never be
72 Ibid., p. 578.
Cfr. II-II, 2. 6. Changing social conditions and educational
opportunities make it more and more difficult to see a sharp and clear distinction in
the concrete.
73 Ibid., p. 586.

212

MARY F. DALY

educated. However, there is little correspondence between this
hierarchy of nature and the distribution of opportunities which
has existed in the past and which still exists in most countries. 74
It is hardly a small detail, for example, that one half of the
human race was until recently automatically excluded from the
possibility of full intellectual development. In regard to the
third criterion, " due circumstances," this has already been
sufficiently indicated and can be summarized in the simple
observation that social conditions have developed in such a
way that there are new countless Christians, men and women,
who are not members of the clergy and who have become
intellectually adult.
In the case of some of these adult Christian laymen the
necessity to possess some degree of theological culture is clear
and explicit. This exigence coming from spiritual and intellectual maturity is evidently not the same in all who experience
it, nor are the circumstances the same. Many who are " called "
to know theology are not called to become full-time professional
theologians.

B. Inadequate Solution: Two Theologies
A number of theologians writing in the thirties and early
forties sought to provide a solution for today's needs by proposing a new " kerygma tic " theology. While this was not a
monolithic group, one can describe certain general tendencies
which were present from the beginning of the movement. Probably the most basic of these tendencies was the wish to develop
a theology which adheres to Christ as its primary object.
Although they did not all wish to do away with scholastic
theology, some would have liked to see another theology
developed along side that which is strictly scientific (F. Lakner,
J. B. Lotz). This second theology would be a kind of knowl74 There is perhaps no country in which the advantages and drawbacks of universal education have been made more explicit than in the United States. Despite
the disadvantages attached to such a system, it has resulted in the saving and
fostering of countless good minds. For this new elite, the absence of theological
culture is a privation, whether or not it is recognized as such.

THE PROBLEM

OF SPECULATIVE

THEOLOGY

!US

edge which is vivid and concrete, whose laws of development
would be different from those of strictly scientific theology, and
whose order of presentation would, of course, be different. It
was proposed that whereas the progress of scientific theology
is by way of clarification of concepts and logical connection of
truths, this new theology would progress according to the vivid
and concrete expression of Catholic doctrine. The movement
later spread to America, where it seems to have developed into
the notion that there should be distinct theologies for the clergy
and the laity. 75
The theory, as it was developed by its early proponents,
lost popularity in Europe. 76 Such progressive theologians as
Karl Rahner, S. J., have clearly rejected the idea that there
should be two theologies. 77 It is true that much of theology
does not bear witness for modem man, that a profound and
far-reaching reform is needed. But the creation of a " second
theology " only confuses the issue.

C. Participatirm in One Theology
·Participated being is limited to the capacity of that which
participates. 78 That is, a participated perfection is necessarily
limited because it is shared in according to the capacity or
potency of the participating subject. Such a limited perfection
implies an unreceived and infinite perfection and also implies
varying degrees of participation according to varying capacities
or potencies into which the perfection is received. Theology
may be considered in this way, as a participated perfection.
Knowledge of God is possessed completely only by God, who
alone has comprehensive knowledge of the divine essence. It is
•• There is evidence of this in some textbooks currently used in colleges and
universities.
•• R. Aubert, La theologie catholique au milieu du XX• siecle (Paris: Casterman,
1954), pp. 47-48. " L'idee premiere . . . de mettre sur pied, parallelement a Ia
science theologique classique, une seconde theologie, kerygmatique, semble de plus
en plus abandonnee."
.. K. Rahner, S. J., "Kerygmatische Theologie," l&dkon fiir Theologie und
Kirche 6, col. l!l6.
•• I, 75, 5, ad 4.

214

MARY F. DALY

possessed by the blessed in heaven in varying degrees, for one
sees more perfectly than another, according as he has greater
charity. It is obvious that it would be absurd to imagine that
on earth our theology be had equally by all. It might be worthwhile to consider this last point more carefully, however.
First, there is always a danger that the participation of a
perfection be considered in terms which are too quantitative.
We speak of" more and less," and this is normally tied in our
psychology to images of measure. It is important to remember
that theology is a habit, that is, a kind of quality. It would be
ridiculous to imagine it as a monolithic lump, of which some
possess more, some less. There are qualitative differences in our
possession of theology. The truth of this fact becomes more
evident if we consider the great complexity of human psychology. Since none of us can fully possess theology-not even the
greatest theologian-it is right that what is lacking be " filled
up " to some extent by the vision of other minds, proceeding
from different experiences and points of view, emphasizing
different aspects. Infinite truth can be refracted in" an infinite
variety " of ways. To recognize this is not to forget the unity
of theology, but to see the richness within that unity.
A second observation in connection with the idea that theology is not had equally by all is that there is no neat line
between theologians and non-theologians, between those who
have the habitus and those who only have a disposition toward
theology. It may seem convenient to speak of "the simple
faithful " as opposed to " the theologians," but in fact it may be
too convenient. Men and women who are truly developed in
the study of philosophy, of the humanities, and of the sciences
cannot remain " little ones " in theological matters without
suffering a deep deformity within themselves. It is true that
circumstances may prevent them from learning " much " theology in a quantitative and material sense. However, a habit
is not intelligible in quantitative terms. It is not necessary that
theology as presented to such people be qualitatively inferior,
sub-scientific, and " concrete." In fact, the result of such a

THE

presentation
caricatured.

OF SPECULATIVE THEOLOGY

can only be contempt

215

for the science thus

CoNCLUSION

The eminent Protestant theologian, Paul Tillich, has written:
A theological system is supposed to satisfy two basic needs: the
statement of the truth of the Christian message and the interpretation of this truth for every new generation. Theology moves back
and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and
the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received.
Not many theological systems have been able to balance the two
demands perfectly. Most of them either sacrifice elements of the
truth or are not able to speak to the situation. Some of them combine both shortcomings. Afraid of missing the eternal truth, they
identify it with some previous theological work, with traditional
concepts and solutions, and try to impose these on a new, different
situation. 79

It is worthwhile to consider the import of these words. There
can be little doubt that the work of St. Thomas " balanced the
two demands" in his temporal situation. There is a grave
temptation, however, to imagine that this balance was achieved
once and for all. But Tillich's point was precisely that such a
thing cannot be " once and for all." Constant change and
adaptation are necessary.
It has always been true, unfortunately, that the most deadly
enemies-unwitting but deadly enemies-of a great thinker
have been his disciples. There is evidence that St. Thomas has
not escaped this curse. Karl Rahner has pointed out that much
of theology does not have relevance for modern man. 80 Hans
Kung lists " Thomism " among complaints on the part of
Catholics (together with such items as Roman centralism,
episcopal bureaucracy, scandals among the clergy, and the
pilgrimage racket) .81 To fail to recognize any validity in this
79 Systematic Theology (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1951), Vol. 1,
p. 3.
80 Op. cit., col. 126; also the opening pages of Theological Investigations, vol. 1,
trans. by C. Ernst, 0. P. (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1961).
81 The Council and Reunion, trans. by Cecily Hastings (New York:
Sheed and
Ward, 1961), p. 230.

216

MARY F. DALY

charge, to be defensive, is to confirm it in the minds of those
who make it.
The Anglican Bishop Robinson's book, Honest to God, has
had great popularity among Catholic intellectuals as well as
among Protestants. 82 One of the astonishing things about the
book is that many of the ideas which the Bishop seems to think
are revolutionary, which appear to him as a break with traditional theology, are in fact very ancient. The Bishop-and
.perhaps most of his readers-do not know how traditional he
is, that what he is rejecting is in large measure a caricature of
tradition. 83 The same phenomenon is common enough among
critics of Thomism, and it is reasonable to suppose that this
reflects a failure in understanding and in communication on
both sides.
Speculative theology in its most profound sense is totally
incompatible with ultra-conservatism (the" heresy" par excellence because it is most opposed to the life of the spirit), and
yet this is its most deadly caricature, proposed and accepted as
its real self. In fact, insofar as it is true to itself, it is open to
the real world, the world of experience, and recognizes a need
for growth and change. Welcoming all the new knowledge
which the world can bring to it, a theology which is speculative
in the deepest sense remains open to the future.
MARY

F. DALY

Fribourg, Switzerland

82 John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (London:
SCM Press, 1968).
•• Rev. Herbert Me. Cabe, 0. P. has an interesting review-article on Dr. Robinson's book in Blackfriars, July, 1968, in which he 'points to a number of specifics
in which the Bishop actually takes a very traditional position while thinking himself
to be very revolutionary.

THE EUCHARIST:

A REGENERATIVE

SACRIFICE

S

INCE EARLY times Christians have sensed that the
sacraments have meaning at two different extremes. One
extreme, or point of origin, is God and the economy of
grace, and it yields nuggets of understanding only to faith.
The other equally-mysterious extreme is Adam and the panorama of creation, and science's comprehension of the latter is
quite as arduous and certainly more piecemeal. H the sacraments, like Christ, are stretched between heaven and earth,
then the search for their intelligibility must go simultaneously
upwards and downwards; and so in fact we find, in Christian
thinking, two pursuits as distinct as astronomy and geology.
A ready example of geology (but of astronomy as well) in
primitive Christianity is Tertullian's de Baptismo. It spends
several chapters establishing the dignity of ordinary water and
water's innate suitability as matter for the sacrament of our
rebirth. Much more recently Louis Beirnaert, following Mircea
Eliade's Traite d'Histoire des Religions, goes further and
shows how " on all planes--cosmic, anthropological, ritual-the
waters bring death and rebirth. They are an abyss of destruction and a womb of regeneration." 1 As a specifically Christian
thing, of course, baptism does not refer primarily to the
" mythic arche but to the death and resurrection of Christ." 2
It is grounded in archetypes but validated by the new ingredient, Christian faith. Water, if you like, has been baptized.
In this essay I propose to examine the sacrament of the
Eucharist, using the twofold method of Tertullian and Beirnaert. We will see how one aspect of sacrifice brought to light
by Eliade is common to archaic and Hebrew-Christian thought,
and consequently forms an important part of the sign-content
of the Eucharist.
1 Caoss

CuRRENTS, Fall 1951, p. 69.

2

n7

Ibid., p. 70.

218

ANSELM ATKINS

Death and Life

Already in the NT., in Paul, the opposites death and life have
been used conjointly to illuminate the content of a sacrament,
namely baptism:
Know you not that all we who are baptized in Christ Jesus are
baptized in his death? For we are buried together with him by
baptism into death: that, as Christ is risen from the dead by the
glory of the Father, so we also may walk in newness of life.'
We are going to find both death and life also present as a
pair in the eucharistic sacrifice-we might have expected to
find them there anyway simply on the grounds of the many
other relationships which obtain between baptism and the
Eucharist.
It is commonly held in Catholic theology that the separate
or " double " consecration of the bread and wine is symbolic of
Christ's death, reminiscent of the separation of his body and
blood on the cross. The death-symbolism is more basic still:
for the NT itself describes the rite of the Last Supper as a
memorial of the passion of the Lord, and as the inauguration of
of the new blood-covenant. As a sacrifice, then, and with
special reference to the consecration of the elements, the Eucharist declares "the death of the Lord" (I Cor. 11: 26). The
life of the Lord, on the other hand, which we receive when we
partake of the sacrificial meal at communion-time, is considered
as a distinct phase of the Eucharist, with the result that the
life-symbolism in its stands in isolation from, and in contrast
to, the death-symbolism of the sacrifice-as-such.
It is the thesis of the present study, however, that lifesymbolism can be found at the very heart of the sacrifice
itself, quite apart from, and in addition to, the life of the Risen
Lord present on the altar and received in the Sacred Meal.
The very sacrifice spells life and death at one and the same
time, just as baptism does.

8

Romans 6:8, 4.

THE EUCHARIST:

A REGENERATIVE

SACRIFICE

The Passion as Lifegiving

It should not be taboo, even in these post-Durrwellian years,
to connect our redemption with the death of Christ. Indeed,
there is no intention of minimizing Christ's Resurrection or of
emending Father Durrwell's contributions. What is said here
leaves the Resurrection's causality intact. Let us leave modern
Resurrection-theology aside, then, and take a look first at St.
Thomas' position.
In St. Thomas' view, the redemption comes from Christ's
death in one way, and from his Resurrection in another. He
says:
Justification is a new life of grace, and in this respect it can be
viewed as coming from the Resurrection (as terminus ad quem) .
But insofar as justification is a release from guilt, it seems to come
more from the passion (terminus a quo) .4

Starting from zero (guilt), our first stage of participation in
Christ's life (justification) is his act of liberation, trap-springing, effected by his kenosis. For just as surely as our rising to
a new life is a co-ordinate of Christ's Resurrection, our dying
to sin and the old man depends on his death and descent into
the tomb. Seen from this limited perspective, the early and
medieval theology of the harrowing of hell retains some
validity. 5
In the same article St. Thomas asks whether " the sacraments of the new law get their power from the passion of
Christ." In answering, he states that the passion accounts for
the destruction of sin in us. And what accounts for life? The
passion, he says; he does not, in this place, include the Resur• Summa theol. III, q.

a. 5 ad 3.
An excellent theological development of the harrowing of hell is found toward
the end of William Langland's Vision of Piers Plowman, which combines the
classic-patristic and the Anselmian notions of the Atonement; for the classicpatristic, cf. G. Au!en, Christus Victor, tr. A. G. Hebert (SPCK 1931). For an
important explicit linking of classical Atonement theory with the Eucharist, see the
eucharistic prayer of St. Hippolytus of Rome discussed in J. Jungmann, S. J., The
Early Liturgy to the Time of Gregory the Great, tr. F. Brunner (Notre Dame,
1959)' p. 67-73.
5

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ANSELM ATKINS

recti on. In other words, not only is Christian death (dying to
sin) referred to the passion, but the Christian's new life is as
well, at least in one way. The life St. Thomas is talking about
is the cult of God in the religion lived by Christians. Here is
the passage:
Christ freed us from sin chiefly through his passion, which provided
the cause, the merit, and the necessary reparation. Likewise by the
passion Christ put into effect the central rite of the Christian
religion, " offering himself as an oblation and victim to God," as
Ephesians 5:2 says.6
He thus temporarily suspends his Resurrection-theology to connect life (the life of worship) with the passion itself.
But in what way does Christian cultic life derive from the
passion? Taking cultic life in function of the Church and the
sacraments, the Fathers' and later theologians' opinion that the
Church and sacraments were born from the side of Christ on
the cross becomes apropos. St. Thomas uses the image at the
end of article five:
It is clear that the sacraments of the Church derive their efficacy
mainly from the passion of Christ. The energy the passion released
is transmitted to us when we receive them. As an illustration of this
you have the water and blood flowing from Christ's side while he
hung on the cross. The water and blood are reminiscent of baptism
and the Eucharist, the two most powerful sacraments. 7

Christ's death, then, is situated at the quiet place where
Christian life originates. On Holy Saturday, something germinates. On the holy Sabbath, someone works. Put more technically, the Christian sacrificial cult, namely the passion together
with its Eucharistic memorial, is a cult of vivification. Sacrificial immolation itself means life. Sacrificial death means
regeneration. How so? Because of these words: "If a grain
of wheat drops to the ground and dies it will be seed for a
whole new wheat plant" (Jn. 12: 25) .

• Summa theol. III, q. 62, a. 5.

7

Ibid.

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221

Mythical Regeneration through Sacrifice
According to Eliade in Cosmos and History, sacrifice involves, besides death, the re-creation, regeneration, or renovation of sacred cosmic energy. The two contrasting poles
"death-regeneration" are often found linked, in the religious
consciousness of archaic man, with sacrifice. And man's religious consciousness, being the this-world anchor of the sacraments, is not irrelevant. Since sacrifice is a religious act
evidently invented by man himself, the meaning of the act,
too, is left up to man. To say that sacrifice "is" this or that,
it is enough to show that man attributes this or that meaning
to it. Some meanings, however, are more valid than othersespecially those corresponding to, or in harmony with, the
original intentions of the inventors. This does not mean that
a later user of the act cannot re-validate it, as it were, by
superimposing a newer and perhaps more meaningful meaning
on the earlier one., and so re-define the act; indeed, the concept
" Christian fulfillment " requires some such openness in the
natural acts of fallen man. It remains true, nevertheless, that
even though archaic man's theories do not pre-empt the meaning of sacrifice once and for all, they do hold a privileged, or at
any rate instructive, place in reference to our own interpretation of our Christian sacraments. Granting this methodological
principle, then, let us survey Eliade's material.
Archaic man was driven by his terror of the flux and
contingency of historical time to try to place himself in the
initial timeless period of creation when being had not begun
to lose itself in becoming. His religious rituals were designed
to re-establish the primordial instant so that time could begin
again with a fresh and perfect start, free of misfortunes and
faults. Sacrifice was one of the many means of re-inaugurating
the " beginning ":
The erection of an altar dedicated to Agni is merely the microcosmic
imitation of the creation. Furthermore, any sacrifice is, in turn, the
repetition of the act of creation, as Indian texts explicitly state. 8
8

Eliade, Cosmos and History, New York, 1959, p. 11. Also: "But if the raising

ANSELM ATKINS

Sacrifice reactualizes creation because
in certain archaic cosmogonies, the world was given existence
through the sacrifice of a primordial monster, symbolizing chaos
(Tiamat) .... 9
Sacrifice had another function, especially sacrifice of the firstborn. It kept up the " circulation of sacred energy in the
cosmos (from the divinity to man and nature, then from manthrough sacrifice-back to the divinity, and so on) ." 10 The
firstborn was considered a "divine" child (so it was, in a
different way, with Isaac, Samuel, and Jesus). An unmarried
girl often slept in the temple to supply herself with a suitable
sacrificial victim: the priest or " stranger " with whom she had
sexual relations was the god's representative. 11 Consequently,
the sacrifice of this first child restored to the divinity what belonged
to him. Thus the young blood increased the exhausted energy of
the god (for the so-called fertility gods exhausted their own substance in the effort expended in maintaining the world and ensuring
it abundance; hence they themselves needed to be periodically
regenerated) .12
I take it as established, therefore, that sacrifice, in archaic
man's mythological world, was closely bound up with the
notion of restoration of life. Life, life-energy, and regeneration
were the product not of some other act over against sacrifice,
but of sacrifice itself. Sacrifice in its own right was regenerative.
of the altar imitates the cosmogonic act, the sacrifice proper has another end: to
restore the primordial unity, that which existed before the Creation. For Prajapati
created the cosmos from his own substance; and once he had given it forth, ' he
feared death ' and the gods brought him offerings to restore and revive him. In
just the same way, he who today celebrates the sacrifice reproduces this primordial
restoration of Prajapati . . . with every sacrifice, the Brahman reactualizes the
archetypal cosmogonic act ... " (p. 78) .
• Ibid., p.
Also: " The sacrifice performed at the building of a house, church,
bridge, is simply the imitation, on the human plane, of the sacrifice performed in
illo tennpore to give birth to the world" (p. 30).
10 Ibid., p. llO.
11 A more widespread interpretation
of temple-sleeping is that it procured " union
with the divinity."
12 Ibid., p. 109.

THE EUCHARIST:

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SACRIFICE

Sacrificial Regeneration in the Old Testament
Needless to say, the regeneration-creation sacrifices described
by Eliade do not correspond exactly to Hebrew or Christian
sacrifice. As J. Van der Veken points out, sacrificial theory
depends on the theory of godhead. 13 Yahweh does not need to
be regenerated. Christians do not need to abolish time and
restore any original arche. Still, the difference is not total.
There is, mutatis mutandis, a re-creation and vivification theme
running through both Hebrew and Christian sacrifice. NearEastern cultures, in which we can safely assume an archaic
mentality, lent lavishly to Hebrew religion. The Hebrew forms
were, in tum, the model for most, if not all, of the NT cult.
Of course, as sacrificial theory evolved, it underwent changes,
differentiations, specializations, and extinctions, pari passu with
God's own gradual self-revelation. For example, there is the
gradual interiorization of sacrifice at the hands of the prophets.
But this qualification need not imply that all pagan leitmotifs
are absent from Hebrew and Christian sacrifice.
Let it suffice for our purpose here to review some OT insititutions in coarse outline. At an early date (beginning, say,
with Abraham) Hebrew sacrifice sealed a covenant with God.
As biblical theologians insist, " covenant " is a very central
concept in salvation-history. What did the covenant do? It
began, it begot, God's people; it marked their conception as a
community existing before God's face. It was a creation, a new
creation, a fresh start in a history of starts. Each sacrifice by
the patriarchs was an enlargement of the fetus in the womb
of God. The Sinai-covenant was the birth of the people; it
reorientated, re-created, their life with God. And new covenant-creations continued throughout Hebrew history, though
not always in sacrificial contexts. Thus the law written on the
heart was a fresh beginning (in theory); Ezechiel's spiritual
temple represented another; the important re-creation theme
in II Isaiah is another.
18 "

41.

Sacrifice in God's Saving Design," CoLLECTANEA

MECHLINIENSIA

2:57, p. 288-

ANSELM ATKINS

The paschal sacrifice, which is so natural an analogate of the
Eucharist that Christ used it as the setting for the Last Supper
and St. Thomas could take it as the summary of all OT
eucharistic types, 14 was a new-life ceremony. The Israelite firstborn were as good as dead men, but the lamb-blood turned the
angel of death away, and they got a new lease on life. Again,
the Egyptian exile was a no-life for the Hebrews; their exodus
from that death was an entrance into fresh life, the beginning
of a new creation. 15
The sacrifice of firstfruits passed from natural religion into
the Law-without, of course, child sacrifice or the need for
" restoring God." Firstfruit offering is based on a desire for
fertility in man, beast, and field. It is clearly a vestige of
fertility religion and so pertains to the vivification theme with
which we are concerned. The firstfruits ritual described in
Deuter-onomy 26, for instance, includes a description of the
land "flowing with milk and honey." The ritual further includes a recounting of the exodus-event which, as we have
seen, was a passage from death to life.
Even the Mosaic legislation as such can perhaps be linked
with vivification. Note two connections: first, the faithful
execution of the Law was seen as having a causal influence on
Israel's well-being-expressed as fertility:
If you walk in my precepts and keep my commandments, and do
them, I will give you rain in due season; and the ground shall bring
forth its increase, and the trees shall be filled with fruit. The
threshing of your harvest shall reach unto the vintage, and the
vintage shall reach unto the sowing time .... 16

When we recall that much of the legislation in the Torah is
specifically sacrificial, a second connection-weak it may bebetween sacrifice and vivification is established. 17
Summa theol. III, q. 73, a. 6.
L. Bouyer, Liturgical Piety (Notre Dame, 1955), p. 120. C£. also C. Stuhlmueller, "The Holy Eucharist: Symbol of the Passion," WoRSHIP, 4:60.
16 Leviticus 26:3-10.
17 If it were within the limits of this survey we might go on to find traces of
regeneration-vivification in several other OT themes (which, however, have no bear14
15

THE EUCHARIST:

.A REGENERATIVE

SACRIFICE

How far have we come from the re-creative sacrifice detailed
by Eliade? Archaic man sacrificed to restore the cosmos and
its gods-evidently not the case with the Israelites. But what
did Hebrew sacrifice restore? The Israelites themselves. Covenant-sacrifice, which temple-sacrifice perpetuated, was their
bond with God. It was their bounden share in the act whereby
God kept them alive before his face. It was they, not Yahweh,
whom the sacrifices regenerated.

Sacrificial Regeneration in the New Testament
Christian sacrifice goes a step further in this new direction.
Instead of man insuring God's vivifying action by sacrificing
created goods, man's vivification is now accomplished by the
self-sacrifice of the very author of life, God himself: "You
killed the author of life, whom God raised from the dead "
(Acts 8: 15). The NT consistently likes to describe Christ's
redemptive work in the language of OT sacrifice. Christ is the
"lamb of God who takes away the sin of the world" (John
1:
the immolated paschal lamb (I Cor. 5: 7), the lamb
" slain before the beginning of the world " (Apoc. 18.8) who
presides as Lord of history over the new aeon (Apoc.
Clearly, Christ's voluntary death is conceived as a sacrifice.
It remains to be demonstrated how this sacrifice can be said
to deliver from sin, inaugurate a season of new-life, restore
creation, and give man the possibility of becoming a new being.
Theology often understands Christ's sacrificial work as a
propitiation or appeasement of divine wrath and justice, as a
ransom or paying-off of a dept or price, as a scapegoat-substitute. Such notions as these are derived from profane Greek
sources, however, and not from OT usage-if we accept the
findings of S. Lyonnet, S. J. 18 Lytrousthai, for instance, suging on sacrifice): Jerusalem-delivered, the remnant, the Day of Yahweh (with the
cosmic cataclysm which always precedes a new order of things), and messianism.
18 De Peccato et Redemptione 2: De Vocabulario Redemptionis
(Rome, Pontifical
Biblical Institute, 1960). Much the same line is present in Protestant biblical
scholarship as early as the thirties (C. H. Dodd, C. A. A. Scott, V. Taylor; references in J. Lawson, cited below).

ANSELM ATKINS

gests not the payment of a price, but simply God's deliverance
of his people from Egypt or other evil circumstances.
skesthai does not mean that man placates God, but that God
pardons sin; guilt is removed, but it is God himself who
lovingly acts to remove it. Nor, finally, is the notion of Christ
being a "scapegoat" biblical. Lyonnet's thesis has been
roborated by L. Sabourin, S. J., who shows that the redemption
accomplished through Christ's sacrifice is principally a
tion which, like the exodus, is initiated by God.19
Christ's sacrifice is an announcement of deliverance, an act
of obedience which reverses man's sinful attitude and elicits
God's pardon. We can appreciate this perspective at once if we
put Christ's death in the setting of his life as a whole. The
Incarnation is a kenosis, as Philippians has it: "He emptied
himself . . . and, found like man in form, humbled himself
and became obedient unto death, death, indeed, by crucifixion"
(Phil. 2:7, 8). Christ's sacrificial death brings the Incarnation
to a sharp, unequivocally expressive point: complete
giving obedience to God's will on man's part, complete generous
self-giving to man-pardon-on God's part. When Christ went
into the synagogue at Nazareth and announced his mission in
terms of the Servant-song of Isaiah 61, he described his lifework and his death equally well, but without including the
idea of "propitiation": "He has sent me to announce release
for the captives . . . to proclaim the acceptable year of the
Lord " (Lk. 4: 18) .
It has been necessary to discuss, however briefly, the character of Christ's sacrifice in itself, since the eucharistic sacrifice
is a re-speaking (as the Last Supper was a pre-speaking) of
that exact same sacrifice. Now we are in a position to ask
again, How is Christ's sacrifice, seen in the light of the above
considerations, to be thought of as regenerative and vivifying?
We have first to note that deliverance, the common thread
of OT-NT salvation history, can easily be taken as an entrance
'" Redempticm sacrifideUe: Une enquete exegetique, Studia: Recherches de philosophie et theologie publiees part les facultes S. J. de Montreal 11 (Brussels:
Desclee, 1961).

THE EUCHARIST:

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fl27

into a new condition or fresh hold on life. Secondly, the newcovenant in blood, the death which the Eucharist announces
(I Cor. 11:25, 26), is, like the OT covenants, a source of life
for those who share in it (Jn. 6). Thirdly, we observe that
Christ's work (which we know was sacrificial) was seen as a
re-creation. Paul's "new-being" theology takes that tack:
"The old things have passed away-see, they are made new"
(II Cor. 5: 17) ; also the "cosmic birth-pangs" of Romans
(8: 19-23); also the "recapitulation in Christ" of Ephesians
(1: 10); and the" second Adam" theme, in which the last lifegiving Adam destroys death and assures our resurrection (I
Cor. 15: 35-58) .
In the fourth place, the theme of Christ-as-firstborn merits
closer attention. Already in the Synoptics (Lk. 2: 7) the Son
of Mary is called "firstborn." The author of Hebrews applies
the word to Christ (1: 6) and to the redeemed people (12: 23) .
For Paul, Christ is the firstborn of many brethren (Rom. 8: 29)
-that is, we ourselves are not really born until we are called
in Christ. Christ is the firstfruits (aparche) of the dead (I
Cor. 15: 20), the redeemed being the rest of the same harvest.
Most significant, though, is the liturgical hymn Paul uses in
Colossians. Christ is:
the image of the invisible God, firstborn of all creatures. For in
him everything was created. . . . All things were created by him
and in him.... He is the arche, firstborn from the dead ....
Because in him, it hath well pleased the Father that all fullness
should dwell: and through him to reconcile all things unto himself,
making peace through the blood of his cross (I: 15-20) .
Christ-the-first born begins the new creation. In him Genesis
is done over again, this time with an everlastingly happy ending. The cosmos is restored, and man, by Christ's life-blood, is
brought back to life and received by the Father. If we now
re-read Eliade's texts, we cannot help being struck by the
juxtaposition in the NT of the concepts " firstborn-sacrificeregeneration-restoration." We may conclude at this point, or at
least strongly suspect, that Christ's sacrificial death as such is
regenerative.

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ANSELM ATKINS

lrenaeus: the Offering of Firstfruits
St. Irenaeus of Lyons has surely connected regenerative
sacrifice with the Eucharist. Now, it cannot be claimed that he
proposed a thesis exactly like mine, but he came startlingly
near it. It will not be a waste of time to inspect a few passages
to see how regenerative sacrifice might work-does work-in
terms of the Eucharist itself. What I have to say in this
section is not a proof, but rather an illustration.
Irenaeus' redemption doctrine agrees, by and large, with the
one outlined by Lyonnet and Sabourin. 20 Irenaeus holds, in
his well-known teaching on "recapitulation," that Christ, the
second Adam, went back over Adam's mismanaged work and
corrected it. Christ did what archaic man longed to do, viz.,
he restored things to their original state, and so gave the
human race a new start. 21
When He became incarnate, and was made man, He commenced
afresh the long line of human beings, and furnished us, in a brief,
comprehensive manner with salvation; so that what we had lost in
Adam ... we might recover in Christ Jesus (3-18-1) .22

Recapitulation also included the notion of " summing up,
bringing to a climax." In this connection we must notice
Irenaeus' frequent use of the word firstfruits. Christ is the
initial fruitful instance in a long series of fruits derived from
himself. It is the first-fruitful Christ who., in offering (sacrificing) himself, brings men back to life:
[Christ descended] to those things which are of the earth beneath,
... and ascend[ed] to the height above, offering and commending
to His Father that human nature which had been found, making in
His own person the firstfruits of the resurrection of man (3-19-3).

The human nature he offers is his own; and it is a firstfruit; and
its sacrifice recalls the rest of us to life.
Now see Irenaeus saying nearly the same thing in a Eucharistic passage:
2 ° Cf. John Lawson, The Biblical Theology of Saint lrenaeus (London, 1948),
pp. 144-49; 168-98;
21 Ibid., p. 143.
22 References are to Book, chapter,
and selection of Against Heresies in The
Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. A. Roberts and J. Donaldson (New York,

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229

Again, giving directions to His disciples to offer to God the firstfruits of His own created things-not as if He stood in need of them,
but that they might be themselves neither unfruitful nor ungrateful
-He took that created thing, bread, and gave thanks, and said,
"This is My body." And the cup likewise, which is part of that
creation to which we belong, He confessed to be His blood, and
taught the new oblation of the new covenant; which the Church
receiving from the apostles, offers to God throughout all the world,
to Him who gives us as the means of subsistance the firstfruits of
His own gifts in the New Testament ... (4-17-5).
Archaic man, we saw, sacrificed to restore the gods just as the
Hebrew, reversing the beneficiary, sacrificed to restore himself.
Yahweh doesn't need sacrifice. Irenaeus found it necessary to
labor this point-even Augustine had to, several centuries
later (de Civ. Dei, X). The disciples, then, offered the Eucharist "that they might be themselves neither unfruitful nor
ungrateful"; it is to us that Christ "gives the means of subsistence." And the source of our subsistence is those very
"firstfruits "-which Irenaeus identifies with Christ.
We need not doubt, as Lawson does/ 8 that Irenaeus means
to call the Church's Eucharist a real sacrifice, or that it is
Christ himself, as the bread and wine, who is sacramentally
offered. For first, Irenaeus' " non-substitutionary exposition of
the death of Christ " is in no way contradicted: the sacramental offerring is theologically (as well as numerically) identical with Christ's once-for-all deliverance-sacrifice. Christ's
redemptive life simultaneously a) was offered kenotically to
God, b) exercised nothing on God, but rather worked its effect
on men. Irenaeus carefully distinguishes Christian sacrifice
from any sacrifice imagined to be something God wants or
needs. Nevertheless the Eucharist, which is over and over
called on offerring, oblation., and sacrifice, is right in line with
Hebrew sacrifice-with the difference that the Eucharist is a
"pure" sacrifice (4-18-1) made by "freemen" instead of
slaves (4-18-2).
We may also take exception to Lawson's belief that Irenaeus
thinks of offering only the material elements. For Irenaeus
23

Lawson, op. cit., p. 270 and n. 1.

230

ANSELM ATKINS

stresses " creation " in these Eucharistic pericopes to emphasize
the fact that we are not giving God anything: what we are
giving him is His-he made it. He created it; how could he
need it? And so we do not have to restrict the" things offered"
to the bread and wine qua created, as if the body and blood
of Christ (which are also of the creation-Irenaeus insists
against the Gnostics-3-19-3,
3) would thereby be excluded from the offering. Irenaeus nowhere implies that only
one aspect of the Eucharist-the visible-is offered. The
Eucharist, which is the body and blood of the Lord, is offered.
For we offer to Him His own, announcing consistently the fellowship and union of the flesh and Spirit. For as the bread, which is
produced from the earth, when it receives the invocation of God, is
no longer common bread, but the Eucharist, consisting of two
realities, earthly and heavenly; so also our bodies, when they receive
the Eucharist, are no longer corruptible, having the hope of the
resurrection to eternity (4-18-5; cf. Frag. 37).

It is not thinkable that either the offering or the reception of
the merely material reality would suffice to effect our resurrection; on the contrary, only the offering of the " human
nature " of Christ makes the " firstfruits of the resurrection of
man" (3-19-3). The "corn of wheat ... serves for the use
of man"; but only after it receives "the Word of God" and
" becomes a Eucharist, which is the body and blood of Christ "
does it nourish us unto resurrection (5-2-3).
Our conclusion about Irenaeus' conception of the Eucharist
as a regenerative sacrifice is this: in the Church's Eucharistic
sacrifice we offer to God Christ, who stands at the center of
the sacrifice as the firstfruits of the universe, the new creation
in which we his members are the ones re-created. Here is
Irenaeus one more time:
And as we are His members, we are also nourished by means of the
creation (and He Himself grants the creation to us, for He causes
His sun to rise, and sends rain when He wills). He has acknowledged the cup (which is a part of the creation) as His own blood,
from which He bedews our blood; and the bread (also a part of the
creation) He has established as His own body, from which He gives
increase to our bodies

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281

Conclusion
The second offertory prayer of the Roman Rite Mass has
an interesting reference to regeneration: 24
God, who marvelously established human nature, and more marvelously renewed it (reformasti), given us, through the mystery of this
water and wine, the power to share Christ's divinity, since he
designed to assume our humanity.

The Creator has renewed human nature in Christ. The original
creation and NT renovation are referred to in the phrases in
apposition to " God." Then " give us " begins a petition for
renovation in the present, through the mystery of the water
and wine now being offered. The daily Eucharist is, therefore,
a continual source of renovation and renewal. And how?
through Christ who, by partaking of our humanity, became the
firstfruits of us.
Baptism, the sacrament of regeneration, does not outdo its
sister-sacrament in creative outpour. Water is life-and death.
Christ's blood is death-and life: Christ's death and life, and
ours. The "burial" of baptism signifies both death and life
in the one selfsame act. The Eucharistic sacrifice, in itself and
quite apart from the Communion banquet, signifies life no less
than death. Now:, the sacraments bring into being what they
signify. And we have seen how the act of sacrifice, as it has
existed on earth among men, including Hebrews and Christians,
does express the idea of rebirth and re-creation. The Mass,
then, by making present Christ's once-for-all sacrifice, in some
sense effects a daily regeneration for us. A sentence in Emile
Mersch catches the thought very nicely, and summarizes our
thesis.
We may say that the Mass is Christ's sacrifice which is the regeneration of mankind; it is Christ's sacrifice, the supreme human
act, installing itself at the origin of all human activity. 25
ANSELM ATKINS,

0. c. s. 0.

Monastery of the Holy Ghost,
Conyers, Georgia
Cf. also the second communion prayer: " vimificasti."
•• The Theology of the Mystical Body (St. Louis, 1955), p. 585.

24

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
t YVEs R. SIMON, Ph. D., who until his untimely death was affiliated with
the Committee on Social Thought, University of Chicago, was the
author of several books including The Philosophy of Democratic
Government and A General Theory of Authority and contributor to
numerous scholarly journals. The present article was edited by
Edward D. Simmons and is published with the permission of Mrs.
Paule Simon of Albuquerque, New Mexico.
MAURICE B. ScHEPERS, 0. P., S. T. D., Professor of History of Dogma on
the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies, and
Visiting Professor in the Religious Education Department, The
Catholic University of America, has recently published a volume in
the Foundation of Catholic Theology Series entitled The Church
of Christ.
ANSELM ATKINS, 0. C. S. 0., B. A., who has published articles in Blackfriars,
Life of the Spirit and other scholarly journals is currently teaching
philosophy at the Monastery of the Holy Ghost, Congers, Georgia ..
MARY F. DALY, S. T. D., teaching philosophy in the Junior Year Abroad
Programs in Fribourg, is preparing for the doctorate in philosophy
at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland.
PAuL R. DuRBIN, 0. P., S. T. L., M.A., after assisting the faculty of
Philosophy at St. Stephen's College, Dover, Mass., is continuing
graduate work at Aquinas Institute of Philosophy, River Forest, Ill.
MANNES BEISSEL, 0. P., M.A., S. T. B., is continuing in his theological
studies under the Pontifical Faculty of Theology at the Dominican
House of Studies, Washington, D. C.

BOOK REVIEWS
Worlds Apart: A Dialogue of the 1960's. By OWEN BARFIELD. Middletown, Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1963. Qll pp. $5.00.
Since C. P. Snow set off discussion on the problem of the " two cultures,"
the range of solution offered has been wide indeed. Jacques Barzum offers a
basically humanist answer in Science: The Glorious Entertainment; at the
opposite pole stands Dennis Gabor's Inventing the Future. In between,
personal attempts are made to bridge the " gap " between science and the
humanities by taking a stand in both camps-notable attempts of this kind
have been made by Julian Huxley and by Snow himself. All these, and
many other attempts besides, have sought to discuss the issue in one way
or another; Owen Barfield, in Worlds Apart, attempts to display the" two
cultures " gap, in almost shocking starkness, and in this way to point
toward a solution.
Imagine a lawyer with intellectual interests broad enough to think
Platonic dialogue practicable in the twentieth century. Imagine this lawyer
rounding up a group of scientists, philosophers, and educators for a weekend retreat devoted to such Platonic dialogue on the very contemporary
problem posed by the "two cultures" controversy. Imagine, finally, that
the sessions are recorded on tape. Imagine all this, and you have the
plan of Barfield's book in broadest outline.
To sharpen the focus and supply something of the flavor, it helps to get
to know some of the characters Barfield has imaginatively assembled.
There is Ranger, the technologically expert physicist, who shows all the
wide-eyed enthusiasm of narrowly trained youth when made aware of
broader speculative issues. There is, still within the same field but at the
opposite extreme, an older and more reflective physicist given the name
Brodie. He plays the respondent's role in a "staged" Platonic dialogue,
which is the real core of the larger dialogue which makes up Worlds Apart.
In this dialogue-within-a-dialogue Socrates is played by Burgeon (the
narrator, who happens to be a lawyer with broad enough intellectual
interests to think Platonic dialogue practicable in the twentieth century),
and there are such deliberate slips as "I am not sure, Socrates-Burgeon,
I mean." Brodie, for all his broadmindedness, finds Socrates-Burgeon an
elusive adversary. Finally, there are five additional, equally interesting
characters, ranging from an irascible, even rude, linguistic philosopher, to
an effusive and thoroughly committed evolutionary biologist.
Worlds Apart, obviously, is a clever and imaginative attempt to face the
" two cultures " issue at once squarely and in broadest scope. The work is
thoroughly serious in intent and deserves every recommendation. Whether

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the attempt succeeds or not is another question. To this reader, it seemed
to fall short of its intended mark if only because (a) it is questionable
whether Platonic dialogue is practicable in the twentieth century, and (b)
the very attempt at fidelity to the real situation could leave a definite
impression that the " gap " is unbridgeable. Even so, one can only admire
the author for his originality and hope that his attempt will convince at
least someone of the urgency of the issues involved.
PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P .
.Aquinas Institute of Philosophy,
River Forest, JU.

William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union. By WALTER H.
PRINCIPE, C. S. B. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
1968, (Studies and Texts, # 7) . Pp.
Authority and the use of auctoritates are essential to the methodology
of theology. Hence, an historical study of an outstanding theologian of
the past is always of genuine interest. For, as the medieval expression has
it, " Authority is like a putty nose: you can twist it any way you like."
If theological science is not to be twisted " any way you like," the
auctoritates must be understood as well as used. For that, an intelligent
grasp of their temporal theological context is indispensable. Fr. Principe
is attempting to reconstruct, at least in part, by this offering and three
subsequent volumes the theological context in which the medieval masters
were produced and worked. {The volumes now in preparation also deal
with the theology of the hypostatic union: according to Alexander of
Hales, Hugh of St. Cher, and Philip the Chancellor.)
The present volume's subject is the best-known of the "William of
Auxerre's," the secular Master, who began teaching at Paris well before
His principal work was done in Christology and Sacramental
Theology. William's appointment by Gregory IX to a commission for the
correction of editions of Aristotle to be used in the schools points up one
value of studying his work: it is a concrete instance of how much
Aristotle influenced the developing Parisian theology. Yet, William was a
" logical realist," inheriting his essentialist view of reality from Boethius,
through Alan of Lille, and Simon of Tournai. (His attempt to render
intelligible the fundamental Christological dogmas without a distinct notion
of existence vividly illustrates the value of the later work of St. Thomas.)
However, William was one of the first to aim at a genuine sythesis and he
was not above a good deal of eclecticism, bringing philosophical doctrines
of widely divergent origin to bear upon the Christological problems of his
day.

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A detailed presentation of William's thought is impossible here. It is
enough to say that Fr. Principe presents that thought and elucidates its
context with admirable skill. Unlike previous studies, his makes detailed
analysis of William's philosophical position in vital areas, such as the use
of the term, esse, individuation and singularity, personality. Moreover, he
is carefully concerned to compare and contrast William's position on these
and properly Christological questions with those of his contemporariesmaking his book truly a door opening upon the whole theological period.
In addition he has given the reader a compendious set of explanatory and
source notes, a critical text of pertinent parts of William's chief work, the
Summa Aurea (done by Fr. Principe), a copious bibliography, and a complete index. We hope the subsequent volumes will meet the standard of
this one. Together they will provide an admirable source for understanding
the context in which many authoritative statements, used in the presentday Christological debates, were hammered out.
MANNES BEISSEL,

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

0. p.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Anuario de Ia Asociation Francisco de Vitoria, Desarme Atomico, Vol. XIV.
Madrid: Clavileno,
Pp. 185.
Brentano, Robert (ed.). The Early Middle Ages, 500-1000 in the series,
Sources of Western Civilization, Herbert Rowen, General Editor.
New York: The Free Press of Glencoe, Collier-Macmillan, 1964. Pp.
806. $1.95 paper.
Browning, Douglas. Act and Agent: An Essay in Philosophical Anthropology. Coral Gables, Florida: University of Miami Press, 1964.
Pp. 184, with index.
Chenu, M. D., 0. P. Towards Understanding St. Thomas. (Trans!. by
Albert M. Landry, 0. P. and Dominic Hughes, 0. P.). Chicago:
Regnery, 1964. Pp. 886, with indices. $6.00.
Dohen, Dorothy. The Fascinating Female. Glen Rock, New Jersey: Deus
Books Paulist Press, 1964. Pp.
Paper . .95¢.
Englebert, Orner. The Lives of the Saints. (Transl. Christopher and Anne
Freemantle.) New York: Collier Books, 1964. Pp. 576. $1.95.
Gallagher, Kenneth T. The Philosophy of Knowledge. New York: Sheed
and Ward, 1964. Pp. 808 including index. $4.50.
Gelin, Albert, P. S. S. The Psalms are our Prayers. Collegeville, Minn.:
The Liturgical Press, 1964. Pp. 61. $1.95 cloth; 85¢ paperback.
Guilead, Reuben. Etre et Liberte: Une etude sur le dernier Heidegger.
Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1965. Pp. 184. 180 FB.
Hillerbrand, Hans J. The Reformation. New York: Harper and Row,
1964. Pp. 495, with index. $7.50.
Huant, Dr. Ernest. Naitre ou ne pas nattre. Paris: Bloud and Gay, 1963.
Pp. 117.
I, Michaelangelo, Sculptor. Ed. Irving and Jean Stone. New York: Signet
Books, 1964. Pp.
with index. Paper, .75¢.
Joseph de Maistre. Works. Edited and translated Jack Lively. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1965. Pp. 808, with index. $8.95.
La Verite: Actes du XIIe Congres des Societes de Philosophic de Langue
Franr;aise. Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1964. Pp.
FB.
Martins, C. M. F., Jose Saraiva. Escritura e Tradicao segundo o Concilio
de Trento. Piacenza: Collegio Alberoni, 1964. Pp.
Ottaviano, Carmelo. La Tragicita del Reale ovvero La Malinconia Delle
Cose. Padova: Cedam, 1964. Pp. 775, with indices.

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237

Pieper, Josef. Guide to St. Thomas Aquinas. New York: Mentor-Omega,
1964. Pp. 160, with index. Paper, .60¢.
Rickman, H. P. Preface to Philosophy. Cambridge, Mass.: Schenkman
Publishing, 1964. Pp.
$4.95.
Ryan, Louis A., 0. P. Design for Happiness: Here and Hereafter. Mt. St.
Joseph, Ohio: College of Mt. St. Joseph, 1964. Pp.
Lithoprinted in binder,
The Essential Augustine. Edited by Vernon J. Bourke. New York:
Mentor-Omega, 1964. Pp.
Paper, 75¢.
The Little Flowers of St. Francis and other Franciscan Writings. Transl.
Serge Hughes. New York: Mentor-Omega, 1964. Pp.
Paper,
75¢.
Von Campenhausen. Men Who Shaped the Western Church: Seven
Sketches of the Latin Fathers. New York: Harper and Row, 1965.
Pp.
with index. $5.95.
Weiss, Paul. Philosophy in Process, Fascicle 5. Carbondale, Ill.: Southern
Illinois University Press, 1964. Pp.
Paper,