THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY
EDITORs:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXIX

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

OCTOBER, 1965

No.4

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

PART

THE RATIONAL

E

I

METHOD

OF METAPHYSICS

1. Introduction

VENTS OF THIS century have raised an imposing array
of searching questions which, not submissive to the
ready answer, mercilessly demand a thorough review of
the basic presuppositions of human existence. This pressing
fact, together with the new and continuing inquiry which has
induced man to refocus his attention on many of the same
questions that have dogged his historical footsteps for centuries,
have led him to a forthright recognition, though often a reluctant
one, of the deep human need for and the full justification of a
science of being. Without being man cannot live, for only in
the climate of being is life meaningful.
Yet the old antinomies persist, and today, as in the past,
philosophers sharply disagree regarding the nature as well as

841

JAMES B. REICHMANN

the method of metaphysics. For all, metaphysics is, if ultimates
are admitted, an inquiry into ultimates; but the ultimate is
different things for different philosophers, and there are different philosophies because of different ultimates with correspondingly different ways of realizing them.
The single minded aim of the present inquiry will be an
attempt at a further clarification of the method of metaphysics. That some clarification is welcome is witnesesd to by
the opposing directions of development sometimes noted even
within the Thomist school and by an almost systematic ambiguity often surrounding the metaphysical enterprise itself.
That our inquiry might satisfactorily be contained within
determined limits, we shall presume a common ground of agreement regarding the nature of metaphysics, assuming that it
is the science of being as such, and shall concentrate our principal effort toward pin-pointing and elucidating the notion of
its method.
Working out the methodology of any science contains more
than its share of problems, as the philosophical literature
particularly of the past decade reveals. Yet, when we approach
the question of the methodology of the metaphysician, we
appear to have released the lid from a pandora's box of
antinomies and seemingly insoluble paradoxes. For, as the
most fundamental and universal of sciences, metaphysics must
have a method which matches it stride for stride both in its
fundamentality and its universality, and this means that
neither this science nor its method can rest on presuppositions
for which it itself is not accountable.
The method of a science is nothing more than a ' way of
proceeding' intellectually. As we know, etymologically it
derives from the two Greek words, meta (with, along), and
hodos (way), which together mean 'along a certain way or
path.' Consequently, method is the name given to the manner
in which a scientist pursues a more perfect and more complete
knowledge of the subject of his inquiry. Referring this to
metaphysics we can then say that in general the method of
the metaphysician is the special manner in which he pursues

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

343

his more perfect and complete understanding of being. The
question which we propose to consider in this study is the
method of metaphysics in particular. Hence we wish to know
how it is that the science of metaphysics unfolds and evolves;
what procedures the metaphysician employs in seeking out a
fuller knowledge of his proper subject, being.
That the orientation of this study might appear from the
outset, we shall here indicate in summary form its fundamental
tenet and conclusion. We seek to establish, and, to some extent,
clarify how it is so, that the method of metaphysics is as unique
as the science itself, and that it is for that reason most properly
termed a ' rational method.'
Owing to the pejorative overtones which the phrase ' rational
method ' currently conveys, such a claim is likely to cause
some dismay, for to assert that the metaphysician employs a
mtional method seems clearly to amount to saying that, despite
all the clarifications of the past century in neo-Thomist circles
relating to the nature of metaphysics, one is dangerously
approaching the reactionary position of the rationalists who
saw no need to distinguish between metaphysics and logic.
Yet it is our conviction that the method of metaphysics is
fundamentally and genuinely ' rational,' and that such is indeed
the unequivocal position of St. Thomas. The principal intent
then of this paper envisages the substantiation and explicitation of the above claim.
Our inquiry into the method of metaphysics as St. Thomas
understood it begins with the consideration of a difficult text
which occurs in his commentary on the De Trinitate of
Boethius. 1 Here, in the first article of the sixth question
1 Although this text has been the subject of much comment, the key point, in our
opinion, and to our knowledge, has never been sufficiently explained nor exploited.
We would consider this text to contain in germ St. Thomas' definitive view regarding the method of metaphysics. The following is a partial list of those who have,
in recent years, commented upon this text: Sheila O'Flynn, " The First Meaning
of ' Rational Process ' According to the Exposition in Boethium De Trinitate,"
Laval Theologique et Philosophique, X,
1954, pp. 167-188; Germain Grisez,
Thomist, XXIII, 3, 1960, pp. 469 ff.; Jean Isaac, 0. P., "La Notion de dialectique
chez Saint Thomas, Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, XXXIV,

344

JAMES B. REICHMANN

entitled," Utrum oporteat versari in naturalibus rationabiliter,
in mathematics disciplinabiliter, in divinis inteUectualiter," St.
Thomas begins his response by attending exclusively to the
first part of the question, namely, whether in natural philosophy one ought to proceed rationally. He replies by stating that
in the pursuit of scientific or demonstrative knowledge one
can be said to proceed rationally in one of three ways. 2
2. The Second Way of Proceeding Rationally

Although it is the first of these ways which concerns us
directly, we will, in the interest of clarity, anticipate this
consideration by examining beforehand the second and third
alternate ways of rational procedure before we turn our attention to the first. Though the passage is lengthy, it is decidedly
relevant to our inquiry:
Another way in which a process is said to be rational is from the
term toward which it tends. The last term toward which a rational
inquiry ought to lead is the understanding of principles (intellectus
principiorum), for it is by a resolution into these principles that we
judge. When, however, such a resolution is had, the process or
proof is not said to be rational but demonstrative. Yet, occasionally
our inquiry cannot be terminated at an understanding of principles,
but rather terminates in the act of inquiry itself as, for example,
when we are unable to decide between two alternatives; and this
happens when we proceed according to probable arguments which
are capable of generating opinion or faith but not certain knowledge. Thus such a procedure is termed rational to distinguish it
from a demonstrative procedure, and it is possible that one proceed
rationally in this manner in any science whatsoever, in order that
through probable arguments one might prepare the way for trne
demonstration. This, then, is the second manner in which we
employ logic in demonstrative sciences, not indeed inasmuch as it
is doctrinal, but to the extent that it is applied. Thus, according to
both of the above mentioned ways, a process is termed rational be1950; Ralph Mcinerny, "Some Notes on Being and Predication," Thomist, XXII,
1959, pp. 323 fl'.; Charles De Koninck, " Metaphysics and the Interpretation of
Words," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XVII, I, 1961, pp. 32 fl'.
2 " Dicendum ad primam questionem quod processus aliquis, quo proceditur in
scientiis, dicitur rationabilis tripliciter .... "

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

345

cause of its dependence on the rational science, for in this manner,
logic, which is called the rational science, is employed by the demonstrative sciences, as the Commentator remarks in commenting
on the first book of the Physics. 3

It is clear, then, that in this passage St. Thomas is pointing
out that the term or finis of an intellectual inquiry can be used
to determine whether or not the procedure employed. is a
rational procedure. In short, if the term of an intellective
process is truly certain or demonstrative knowledge, then the
procedure is not rational according to this second meaning of
rational. If, however, the inquiry can do no better than produce
probable knowledge or opinion, then the process is rightfully
termed rational. Thus rational process, according to its second
meaning, is divided against a demonstrative process. The latter
affords scientific knowledge through true demonstration; the
former, the rational process, can produce nothing beyond probability or opinion.
The rational process to which St. Thomas here refers is indistinguishable from a purely dialectical process. 4 Dialectics,
which is a branch of logic, can truly be termed a science,
although it can never conclude with certainty, owing to the
intrinsically unstable condition of the premises from which it
begins. Nonetheless, there is a real certainty to the probability
of its conclusions, 5 and hence, to this extent, it does partake
of the nature of a science.
Further, any intellective inquiry whatsoever can be considered to proceed rationally in this manner, since arriving at
probable conclusions is often but a preparatory step toward the
8 All citations taken from St. Thomas' Commentary
on the De Trinitate of
Boethius are from the critical edition of Bruno Decker, Sancti Thomae de Aquino
Expositio Super Librum Boethii De Trinitate, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1955; author's
translation.
• Not infrequently the distinction between logic and dialectics is overlooked.
This leads to unnecessary obscurity of thought and, occasionally, even to a serious
misinterpretation of texts. Cf. e. g., Jean Isaac, 0. P., "La Notion de dialectique
chez Saint Thomas,' Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques, XXXIV,
1950, pp. 500 ff.; and James C. Doic, C. S.C., "Aquinas on Metaphysics and
Method," Philosophical Studies, XIII, 1964, pp. 27-28.
• Cf. In IV Meta., 1. 4, [576].

346

JAMES B. REICHMANN

realization of a true demonstrative process m which a full
resolution into first principles is had.
In concluding his remarks, St. Thomas incisively distinguishes the rational process, understood as a dialectical one,
from the other two forms of rational procedure by referring to
the fundamental Aristotelian division of logic into doctrinal
and applied logic.6 To proceed dialectically is to employ logic
inasmuch as it is applied only and not as doctrinal. We shall
not delay longer on this distinction for the present, for it will
suffice here merely to bear in mind that when St. Thomas
speaks of the rational process according to this second sense
of rational, he has in mind that type of inquiry after truth in
which logic is employed not as doctrinal but as applied only.
3. The Third Way of Proceeding Rationally

In the last section of the body of the article we have been
examining, St. Thomas explains the third manner in which an
intellectual process can be termed rational;
The third way in which a process is termed rational is when the
procedure respects the proper mode of the rational soul in knowing.
In this sense a rational procedure is proper to natural science, for
natural science in its manner of proceeding respects the proper
mode of the rational soul in a twofold way.
First, because, just as the rational soul receives its knowledge of
intelligibilities, which are more knowable by nature, from sensible
things, which are more knowable with respect to us, so natural
science proceeds from those things which are more knowable to us
and less knowable according to nature, as is clear from the first
book of the Physics. Further, demonstration which proceeds from
a sign or an effect is the type mainly employed in natural philosophy.
Second, because, since it is the function of reason to proceed from
one thing to another, this is especially observed in natural science,
where from the knowledge of one thing one comes to a knowledge
• Henceforth we shall translate the expression logica docens as doctrinal logic,
and logica utens as applied logic. We agree with Father Doic that doctrinal logic
corresponds to the more modern term, formal logic, and that applied logic is equivalent to what is now called material logic. Cf. " Aquinas on Metaphysical Method,"
Philosophical Studies, XIII, 1964, pp. 29-30.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

347

of another, as from the knowledge of an effect one comes to the
knowledge of the cause. And not only does one proceed from one
thing to another according to reason, where there is no real distinction between things, as when from animal one proceeds to man.
. . . But in natural science, in which demonstration occurs through
extrinsic causes, something is proved about one thing through
another thing altogether extrinsic to it. And thus the mode of
reason is especially observed in natural science; wherefore natural
science is the science most conformed to the intellect of man.7
Thus the manner in which the natural philosopher proceeds
is rational because it imitates the mode of knowing of the
rational soul. It does this in two respects:
(1) Just as the rational soul takes its knowledge directly
from sensible things, which, although less knowable in themselves, are more knowable with regard to us, and then proceeds
to a knowledge of that which is more knowable in itself, so
likewise the natural philosopher begins his inquiry with that
which is more knowable relative to us and less knowable
according to nature. Thus the demonstration employed by the
natural philosopher resembles the mode of knowing of the
rational soul inasmuch as it proceeds for the most part from
sign and effect.
(2) The mode of procedure of the natural philosopher is in
close harmony with the mode of procedure of the rational soul
inasmuch as it, like the latter, often proceeds from the knowledge of some thing to the knowledge of another thing entirely
distinct from it. It does this through the employment of
extrinsic causes, and, since this manner of proceeding is singularly appropriate to the natural philosopher, his method of
inquiry is very properly rational in the third sense in which
St. Thomas understands that term. Hence the method of the
natural philosopher is, as most perfectly conformed to the
intellect of man which is rational, the most human.
In this passage, then, St. Thomas wishes to emphasize what
he has said elsewhere regarding the method of the natural
• In Boetii de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad lam quaestionem.

348

JAMES B. REICHMANN

philosopher, namely, that the latter makes use of all four causes
in pursuing a more penetrating knowledge of the subject matter
of his science.8 Though it is proper to the procedure of all of
the sciences to proceed from one ratio or intelligibility to another, with the lone exception of the metaphysician it pertains
exclusively to the natural philosopher to proceed from the
consideration of one thing to another .9 This then is the second
manner according to which the methodological procedure of the
natural philosopher is imitative of the rational soul, and hence
is properly designated rationaU 0
St. Thomas then remarks that this manner of proceeding is
not proper to the mathematician, whose investigation always
takes its point of departure from the form or the essence of
the thing, since it employs only the formal cause, and never the
efficient, final or material causes. Thus, although the mathematician may be able to arrive demonstrably at the definition
of a circle by beginning with a triangle, this he can do simply
because the triangle is potentially a circle and vice versa. 11
St. Thomas concludes his remarks regarding the third manner
according to which an intellectual procedure might be termed
rational by emphasizing that, although a rational procedure
of this type is most fittingly made use of by the natural
philosopher, it is not a manner of proceeding which is exclusively his.;l.2 He has stated elsewhere, for example, that the metaphysician also employs efficient causality in his inquiry, although
he makes considerably more sparing use of it than does the
philosopher of nature. 13
4. The First Way of Proceeding Rationally

Having thus considered the last two of three distinct ways in
which a scientific methodology might be termed rational, we
8 In I Phys., I. I. [12].
• In Boetii de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest., ad 3.
10 Ibid.
llibid.
12 Ibid.
13 In Phys., 1. 1, [12].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD

OF METAPHYSICS

849

can now return to a consideration of the first presented by St.
Thomas. Here we shall see how metaphysics is, with. reference
to the method it employs, the rational science par excellence.
In beginning his response St. Thomas has said, as already
noted, that the manner in which one proceeds in the sciences
can be termed rational in a threefold sense. He then proceeds
to a consideration of the first of this tripartite division of
rational procedure, stating that a method of inquiry can be
termed rational with reference to the principles from which it
proceeds. Thus, if one's inquiry stems from and involves the
operations of reason and their products, such as genus, species,
opposition and similar beings of reason, which the logician
properly considers, the inquiry can be termed rational. 14
St. Thomas then proceeds to explicitate further the manner
and the extent to which a truly scientific investigation, which
is not strictly a logical investigation, can be termed rational.
The subsequent three statements in the body of the article are
crucial regarding St. Thomas' definitive position regarding the
method of metaphysics. 15 It will be helpful to read them first
as a piece, before submitting them to analysis.
Thus a manner of procedure is termed rational whenever in any
science one uses propositions which are set forth in logic; that is,
whenever we employ logic in other sciences inasmuch as it [logic] is
doctrinal. However, this manner of proceeding is not a prerogative
of any particular science, in which error results unless it proceed
according to its own proper principles. Yet this method of procedure can properly and aptly be followed in both logic and metaphysics, since each of these is a common science and, in a certain
sense, is concerned with the same subject. 16

The thought expressed in the opening sentence is deceptively
subtle, for, at first reading, it seems merely to say that an
""Uno modo ex parte principiorum, ex quibus proceditur, ut cum aliquis procedit

ad aliquid probandum ex operibus rationis, cuiusmodi sunt genus et species et
oppositum et huiusmodi intentiones, quas logici considerant." Ibid.
15 There are other complimentary passages occurring in other treatises which we
shall have occasion to consider subsequently.
16 In Boetii De Trin., q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest.

850

JAMES B. REICHMANN

intellectual investigation is rational i£ it employs propositions
and logical intentions in any way whatsoever providing it
applies them to the real order; i.e., the subject o£ its own science. Such an interpretation, however, is promptly overturned
by what is set forth in the remainder o£ the passage. For, i£
what we have just supposed were the correct interpretation,
then it would immediately follow that all real sciences could
properly be termed rational, since it is clear that all make
some use at least o£ propositions and other logical intentions
which properly £all under the legitimate consideration of the
logician. However, St. Thomas expressly underlines the £act
that not all real sciences can be called rational in the sense in
which he is presently using that term. In £act, he expressly
states that there is but one real science which is privileged to
employ logic in this manner, and it is metaphysics. We must,
then, return to the beginning of this passage and initiate a fresh
start.
5. Doctrinal and Applied Logic
Upon closer scrutiny we note that the process in question is
only then rational when it employs logical intentions, not in any
way whatsoever, but only when it employs them as the logician
does, that is, " to the extent that we use logic as it is doctrinal
in the other sciences." The term ' doctrinal logic' (logica
docens) is juxtaposed to 'applied logic' (logica utens) which
is clearly implied in the full context of the statement.
We met with this same distinction in considering the second
way in which a scientific process can be said to be rational. This
distinction has singular importance relative to an adequate
understanding of the special relationship obtaining between the
sciences o£ logic and metaphysics. Hence, there is need for a
more detailed consideration of the distinction between doctrinal
and applied logic, £or the passage we are presently striving to
interpret will yield no meaning whatever unless these notions
are carefully distinguished and clearly understood. 17
17

As indicated above, we translate logica docens as doctrinal logic, and logica

utenl1 as applied logic.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

351

Doctrinal logic is in effect the same as speculative logic. As
such it comprises the consideration of definitions, propositions
and other beings of reason exclusively from the viewpoint of
their intentional existence, and thus attends to the various relationships existing between them. 18
On the other hand, applied logic, as the term indicates,
involves an application of doctrinal logic to real being. 19 In
this connection it should be borne in mind that logic is both
an art and a science which has as its proper subject beings of
reason, and that it is made possible by the very fact that the
human mind is capable of reflecting upon its own act, upon
itself. 20
Further, it is important not to view logic as an end in itself,
for it is esssentially an instrument of the mind directed toward
facilitating and rendering possible a scientific and ordered grasp
of the world of singular existents. 21 This it accomplishes by
presenting to reason for its use all of the intentional instruments
which the logician has fashioned through his consideration of
its own proper subject, beings of reason, such as definitions,
18 The distinction
between doctrinal and applied logic comes in for particular
attention in Prof. Ralph M. Mcinerny's recent work, The Logic of Analogy,
Martinus Nijhofl', The Hague, 1961, pp. 181-121; and in Prof. Edward D. Simmons'
article, "The Nature and Limits of Logic," The Thomist, XXIV, 1961, pp. 67-70.
19 " Dialectica
enim potest considerari secundum quod est docens, et secundum
quod est utens. Secundum quidem quod est docens, habet considerationem de istis
intentionibus, instituens modum, quod per eas procedi possit ad conclusiones in
singulis scientiis probabiliter instituendas; et hoc demonstrative facit et secundum
hoc est scientia. Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina
pertinet ad logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam et ad alias particulares scientias
quae sunt de rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in
utendo principiis rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet,
non utendo intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae
habent ipsam scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica;
quaedam autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa. In IV Meta., 1. 4,
[576-77].
•• In Post. Analy., Proem. [1-2]; In IV Meta., !. 4 [574].
21 " ••• scientiae speculative, ut patet in principia Metaphys. sunt de illis quorum
cognitio quaeritur propter seipsa. Res autem de quibus est logica, non quaeruntur
ad cognoscendum propter seipsas, sed ut adminiculum quoddam ad alias scientias."
In Boetii De Trinit., q. 5, a. 1, ad 2.

35fl

JAMES B. REICHMANN

propositions, the modes of predication, and syllogistic argumentation; all of which are indispensable to the scientist in his
quest for a more perfect knowledge. 22 Since logic is the science
of reason which must always be employed by man as he seeks
more perfect knowledge both of himself and of the world which
surrounds him, it is not merely the method of this or that
speculative science, but is indeed, in a fundamentally true
sense, the method of all the real sciences.23 The canons of logic
which are formulated by the mind through a consideration of
things, as known, are what are referred to by the expression,
doctrinal logic; while the application of these same canons to
real being is what is meant by applied logic.
In regard now to the interpretation of the passage from the
commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, it will help to
bear in mind that, while logic is the common method of all the
sciences, it is not, however, employed by all of them in the
very same manner. As one science differs from another because
of its proper subject, (that concerning which it is seeking more
perfect knowledge), so it will make use of logic in accordance
with the nature and dimensions of its own proper subject
matter.
The natural philosopher will not use logic in the same way
as the mathematician, nor will the mathematician a vail himself
of logic in the same manner as does the metaphysician. This is
a key principle underlying the whole argument of St. Thomas,
for the major premise of that argument is that " a process is
rational when, in any science, one uses propositions set forth in
••" Et ideo logica non continetur sub philosophia speculativa quasi principalis
pars, sed sicut quoddam reductum ad earn, prout ministrat speculationi sua instrumenta, scilicet syllogismos et definitiones et alia huiusmodi, quibus in speculativis
scientiis indigemus. Unde secundum Boetium in Comment. super Porphyrium non
tam est scientia quam scientiae instrumentum." Ibid.
23 " Et hoc etiam consonat
verbis Philosophi, qui dicit in II Metaph., quod
modus scientiae debet quaeri ante scientias; et Commentator ibidem dicit quod
logica, quae docet modum omnium scientiarum, debet quis ante omnes alias scientias
addiscere .... ' Ibid., ad 8. " Et propter hoc debet prius addiscere logicam quam
alias scientias, quia logica tradit communem modum procedendi in omnibus aliis
scientiis." In II Meta., 1. 5, [885].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

353

logic; that is, whenever we use logic in other sciences precisely
inasmuch as it is doctrinal."
We can note then that the special meaning attributed to the
term, rational, in this part of the text is extremely restricted.
Although he admits that all sciences do and must make use of
logic, the rational science, St. Thomas does not grant that
thereby these speculative and real sciences pursue their object
by employing a rational method. In other words, in order for
the method of a science to be termed rational, as that term is
presently understood, it does not suffice that somehow it simply
makes use of logic. It must indeed make use of it in order for
its method to be called rational, but it must also employ logic
in a most extraordinary manner. How? If the manner of
proceeding of a speculative science is rational, in the present
context of that term, then it must employ logic precisely inasmuch as it is doctrinal and not inasmuch as it is applied. However, before continuing with our analysis of this passage there
is yet another precision which must be made and which has to
bear on the distinction between doctrinal and applied logic.
Generally speaking, when logic is employed as an instrument
by the real sciences, it formally ceases to be logic, and is
automatically integrated into the real science which employs it.
This is because logic as such is not a science of real being, but
of intentional being or beings of reason only. 24
Yet there is a branch of logic, commonly termed ' dialectics,'
which can be applied to real being without losing the essential
characteristics of a rational or logical science. The reason for
this is that dialectics begins from propositions which are merely
probable, and consequently, since they never fully attain to
real being, they are beings of reason. Dialectics, therefore, is
the science not of demonstration in the strict sense but rather
of probable argumentation, 25 and as such can be, as a branch of
•• Prof. Simmons has expressed this notion well: "However, no logician, as
logician, can ever say that this or that proposition (in a scientific area other than
logic) is certainly true. Logic is related to the other sciences simply as an instrument to be used by each one of them, without doing the work precisely of any
one of them." Op. cit., p. 64.
•• Cf. In Post. Analy., Proem., [6].

854

JAMES B. REICHMANN

logic, both doctrinal and applied. 26 This feature of dialectics
is altogether unique and is not true of judicative or demonstrative logic which, as logic, is exclusively doctrinal. 21
Demonstrative logic is doctrinal only and can never be
applied as such, for the reason that demonstration, which deals
with necessary and universal principles, concludes not probably
but necessarily and certainly. Consequently, whenever the
principles of demonstration are applied to real being, as they
would be in the context of the passage under consideration,
the certain conclusions which follow pertain not to logic, since
they are not mere beings of reason, but rather real beings. The
result of this is that such conclusions form a part of the body
of a real science, and do not belong to the science of logic,
which has, as its proper subject, beings of reason only. Thus it
should be carefully noted that the real scientist who, in the
pursuance of the object of his own science, employs logic, (as
indeed he always must), is not on that account a logician in
the formal sense, but rather a mathematician, a physicist, a
philosopher, etc., as the case may be.
On the other hand, though he is not formally acting the part
of a logician in exploring the unknown in the realm of the real,
he must, however, have some implicit knowledge at least of
logical principles and procedures which, as forming the common
method of all the sciences, are indispensable to all progress in
the realm of knowledge. 28
2

"In IV Meta., I. 4, [576], cf. note 17.

Sed in parte logicae quae dicitur demonstrativa, solum doctrina pertinet ad
logicam, usus vero ad philosophiam, et ad alias particulares scientias quae sunt de
rebus naturae. Et hoc ideo, quia usus demonstrativae consistit in utendo principiis
rerum, de quibus fit demonstratio, quae ad scientias reales pertinet, non utendo
intentionibus logicis. Et sic apparet, quod quaedam partes logicae habent ipsam
scientiam et doctrinam et usum, sicut dialectica tentativa et sophistica; quaedam
autem doctrinam et non usum, sicut demonstrativa." Ibid., [577].
28 In 11 Meta., I. 5, [335]. We feel that this is an important feature of the nature
of logic and its relation to the real sciences which is gradually being lost sight of
even by some contemporary Thomists. Witness, for example, the remark of Joseph
Owens: " But why cannot these beginnings, in the case of Thomistic metaphysics,
be taught the student independently of an approach either through logic or through
natural philosophy?" "A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," The
27 "

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

355

At the same time, however, it is not the function of the
logician but of the individual scientist to determine the method
of the particular sciences, although obviously this does not
imply that the real scientist is free to use or not to use logic in
implementing his scientific investigation. His only ' freedom '
consists in his determining how he will employ logic in his
particular science, and surely he is to be encouraged, as Prof.
Simmons has remarked, ". . . to introduce his proper investigation with a proemium in which he determines the contraction
of logic which constitutes his own method." 29
An explicit understanding of the methodology of each of the
particular sciences would go a long way towards resolving the
countless discussions which ensue regarding the relationship
between the various sciences, and is really essential if the true
nature and function of logic as a common science is to be
understood and appreciated. 30
We have seen, then, that demonstrative logic is doctrinal only,
and that dialectical logic is both doctrinal and applied. These
considerations will now permit us to penetrate further into the
relationship between the method of metaphysics and logic. As
seen, St. Thomas has stated that a scientific process is ' rational'
when one uses logical intentions precisely as they are set forth
in logic. Viewed in the background of the preceding considerations, the meaning of this enigmatic statement now seems sufficiently clear. He is saying that a scientific process is rational,
according to the first meaning of that term, when a real science
is capable of assimilating the doctrinal canons of logic whole
New Schol., XXVIII, 4, 1954, p. 473. For a well reasoned defense of logic cf.
Henry B. Veatch, Intentional Logic, Yale Univ. Press, New Haven, 1952, Ch. II.
esp., also: Veatch, "In Defense of the Syllogism," The Modern Schoolman, XXVII,
March, 1950, pp. 184-202, and Edward D. Simmons, "The Nature and Limits of
Logic," The Thomist, XXIV, 1961, pp. 47-71.
•• Op. cit., p. 67, n. 20. " Modus autem proprius singularium scientiarum, in
scientiis singulis circa principium tradi debet." Cf. In II Meta., 1. 5, [355].
30 " The distinction between logic as a common mode and its contractions in the
various scientific methodologies must be recognized, understood, and respected for
the sake of logic itself, and especially for the sake of the sciences for which logic
serves as a tool." Edward D. Simmons, op. cit., p. 67.

356

JAMES B. REICHMANN

and entire, and of thus employing them integrally in the pursuit
of a fuller knowledge of its own proper subject.
Were we to entertain any doubt that this be the correct
interpretation of St. Thomas' thought on this point, a careful perusal of the remaining two statements of this passage
would amply reassure us of its basic accurateness. Yet before
moving on to a consideration of these further remarks let us
recapitulate briefly what our interpretation has been. We have
concluded that not every real science which employs logic can
be said to proceed rationally, but only that science or those
sciences which can make use of doctrinal logic without altering
it in the least, and without conditioning it to the specific
exigencies of its own proper subject of inquiry.
6. The Affinity of Logio and Metaphysics

The next question, then, which naturally arises is whether
there is such a science at all, and, if so, whether it be one or
many. St. Thomas gives direct and definitive answers to both
of these questions. There is indeed a science that proceeds in
the above described fashion; it is one and one only; it is metaphysics.
But this manner of proceeding does not, properly speaking, pertain
to any of the particular sciences, in which error is had unless they
proceed according to what is proper to them. 31

By this remark St. Thomas does not intend, assuredly, to
contradict what we have heard him say elsewhere regarding the
common method of the sciences. That is, by now stating that
none of the particular sciences pursue a rational method in the
sense just described, he does not envisage denying that logic is
the common method of all the sciences. This is clearly brought
out by the added condition expressed by the word ' properly '
(proprie). Thus he says that' properly speaking,' no particular
science proceeds rationally, for no particular science, although
it uses logic, employs logical propositions exactly as the logician
81 " Sed hie modus proeedeudi non potest proprie eompetere alieni partieulari
seientiae, in quibus, peeeatum aeeidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur." In Boetii De
Trin., q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad primam quaest.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

357

employs them, but must further modify them to fit its own
proper subject matter.
Thus, as St. Thomas points out, a particular science which
would attempt to employ logical propositions, in the manner
in which he has described, would inevitably incur error in some
form or another, for such propositions have not yet been
tailored, as it were, to fit the limited and determinate subject
matter of that particular science. Hence, although the particular real sciences do make use of logic, and unavoidably so,
they do not, however, use it in such wise that their manner of
proceeding might be termed rational in the first sense.
Finally, in the last sentence of this passage St. Thomas
identifies by name the real science that does proceed according
to a rational method in this restricted sense, and at the same
time he provides the reason underlying his claim. The real
science that proceeds strictly according to a rational method
is metaphysics. The reason this is so is because metaphysics,
together with logic, is a ' common ' science, possessing as it does
a subject that includes all things. Hence, as sciences, logic and
metaphysics are intimately related, for both share in a certain
sense a common subject. There is no other science that can
claim a similar prerogative. In St. Thomas' own words: "This
properly and suitably occurs, however, in logic and metaphysics, inasmuch as each of these two sciences is common and
is, in a certain sense, concerned with the same subject." 32
St. Thomas is restating here what he has said in some detail
in his Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, and it is
quite a simple matter to perceive how profound his thought is
and how far reaching are its implications. There is a genuine
affinity between logic and metaphysics, an affinity that is
altogether unique amongst the sciences, because they alone
have 'being' for their subject. Metaphysics investigates real
being as such, while logic investigates beings of reason as such. 33
••" Contingit autem hoc proprie et convenienter fieri in logica et metaphysica,
eo quod utraque scientia communis est et circa idem subiectum quoddammodo."
Ibid.
33 " Ens autem rationis dicitur proprie de illis intentionibus quas ratio adinvenit

858

JAMES B. REICHMANN

7. The Unlimited Horizon of Logic and Metaphysics

Because, therefore, the human intellect can know all being,
all being can be known as known, and it can be known according to the manner in which it is known, that is, universally as a
second intention. 34 Though the true, direct object of the human
intellect is the material, singular existent, 35 such knowledge is
necessarily mediated through some universal grasp of the
nature of that singular. 36
By reflecting upon the universal form inhering within itself,
the intellect is led to a secure knowledge of the singular thing,
and is capable of ascertaining the non-individual status of that
form as well as the possibility of its being predicated or referred
to numerous singular existents. 37 Such explicit reflective awarein rebus consideratis; sicut intentio generis, speciei et similium quae quidem non
inveniuntur in rerum natura, sed considerationem rationis consequuntur. Et huiusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, et est proprium subiectum logicae." In IV Meta., 1. 4,
[574].

•• "Prima enim intellecta sunt res extra animam, in quae primo intellectus intelligenda fertur. Secunda autem intellecta dicuntur intentiones consequentes modum
intelligendi: hoc enim secundo intellectus intelligit in quantum reflectitur supra se
ipsum, intelligens se intelligere et modum quo intelligit." De Potentia, q. 7, a. 9,
resp.; cf. also: In I Sent., d. 27, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; Summa Contra Gentiles IV, c. 11;
In I Sent., d. 33, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3.
35 " Unde ilium quod est obiectum intellectus
nostri non est aliquid extra res
sensibiles existens, ut Platonici posuerunt, sed aliquid in rebus sensibilibus existens;
licet intellectus apprehendat alio modo quidditates rerum, quam sint in rebus sensibilibus. Non enim apprehendit eas cum conditionibus individuantibus, quae eis in
rebus sensibilibus adiunguntur." In II De Anima, 1. 8, [717]; cf. also: De Potentia,
q. 7, a. 9, resp.
86 Ibid., also:
" ... intellectum est in intelligente immaterialiter per modum
intellectus, non autem materialiter per modum rei materialis." Sum. Th. I, q. 85,
a. 1, ad 1.
37 " ••• idest dictum est solum in universali, quod substantia est illud, quod non
dicitur de subiecto, sed de quo dicuntur alia; sed oportet non solum ita cognoscere
substantiam et alias res, scilicet per definitionem universalem et logicam; hoc enim
non est sufficiens ad cognoscendum naturam rei, quia hoc ipsum quod assignatur pro
definitione tali, est manifestum. Non enim huiusmodi definitione tanguntur principia rei, ex quibus cognitio rei dependet; sed tangitur aliqua communis conditio rei
per quam talis notificatio datur." In VIII Meta., 1. 2, [1280]. Van Roo formulates
the genesis of the being of reason succinctly as follows: " To the nature, existing
as one and undivided by reason of its abstraction from matter and the conditions

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

359

ness on the part of intellect of the immaterial and universal
status of the very intelligibility enlivening its own act of understanding generates a second intention, or a being of reason, 38
and such beings of reason, which receive their very actuality
from created intellect, and hence exist as such only in intellect, 39
constitute the exclusive and unique field of investigation of the
logician. 40
At this point it can be remarked that, although the second
intention is the result of a reflective act of intellect, and although it exists nowhere as such save within intellect itself,
all entia rationis are indirectly though necessarily dependent
upon the form or similitude received by intellect through the
intellective illumination of the phantasm. The presence of this
form within intellect permits it first to understand and then
reflectively to grasp that presence as intentional, and it is, as
indicated, this reflective grasping of the intelligible species
which generates the being of reason or second intention. 41
of matter, are added the intentions of universality or predicability, which are a
kind of relation which the nature has to the many subjects in which it exists (or
can exist) outside the intellect, as one nature common to all and predicable of all."
William A. Van Roo, S. J., "The Study of Genus," The Modern Schoolman, XX,
1943, p. 241.
88 " Nee tamen intellectus est falsus:
quia ea quorum sunt istae rationes, scilicet
gemts et species, non attribuit rebus secundum quod sunt extra animam, sed solum
secundum quod sunt in inteUectu. Ex hoc enim quod intellectus in se ipsum
reflectitur, sicut intelligit res existentes extra animam, ita intelligit eas esse intellectas: et sic sicut est quaedam conceptio intellectus vel ratio, cui respondet res
ipsa quae est extra animam; ita est quaedam conceptio vel ratio, cui respondet res
inteUecta secundum quod huiusmodi; sicut rationi hominis vel conceptioni hominis
respondet res extra animam; rationi vero vel conceptioni generis aut speciei respondet
solum res intellecta." De Potentia, q. 7, a. 6, resp.
89 " ••• inde apparet quod aliud est intelligere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam
intentionem intellectam, quod intellectus facit dum super opus reflectitur; unde et
aliae scientiae sunt de rebus et aliae de intentionibus intellectus. Quod autem
intentio intellecta non sit ipse intellectus in nobis, ex hoc patet quod esse intentionis
intellectae etiam in ipso intellectu consist,it, non autem esse intellectus nostri, cuius
esse non est suum intelligere." Sum. Contra Gentiles, IV, c. 11.
•• Ibid.
41 Et quidem quod praedicta intentio non sit in nobis res intellecta, inde apparet
quod aliud est inteUigere rem et aliud est intelligere ipsam intentionem intellectam
quod intellectus facit dum super suum opus rej!ectitur." Ibid.

360

JAMES B. REICHMANN

Since, therefore, there is nothing to prevent intellect from
achieving, in the manner just described, a reflective grasp of
all intentions or forms inhering within it, i. e., from the aspect
of their inherent universality and hence predicability, it follows
that the subject of the science of logic is as wide as the horizon
of metaphysics itsel£.42 Whatever metaphysics considers it
•• "Et hujusmodi, scilicet ens rationis, est proprie subjectum logicae. Hujusmodi
autem intentiones intelligibiles, entibus naturae aequiparantur, eo quod omnia entia
naturae sub consideratione rationis cadunt. Et ideo subjectum logicae ad omnia se
extendit, de quibus ens naturae praedicatur. Unde concludit quod subjectum logicae
aequiparatur subjecto philosophiae quod est ens naturae." In IV Meta., 1. 4, [574],
cf. also: Ibid.,
A parallel passage is found in the opusculum, De Natura
Generis, whose authenticity is accepted by some; rejected by others; Cap. 4, [486],
Opuscula Philosophica, Spiazzi, 0. P., ed., Marietti, I954, p. ISO.
Since we will have occasion to refer to this Opusculum again, a word about its
authenticity seems in order. Cajetan rejected the opusculum on the grounds that
it contained some points in open contradiction with the teaching of St. Thomas.
For a critique of Cajetan's theory of the formal constitutive of the created person,
cf. J. Reichmann, " St. Thomas, Capreolus, Cajetan and the Created Person," The
New Scholasticism, XXXIII, I959, I, pp. I-33;
pp.
The authenticity of De Natura Generis is also rejected by Perrier (Opuscula
omnia, Sancti Thomae Aquinatis, Vol. I, Paris, Lethiellieux, I949, p.
Perier's
position is unequivocal: " ... prorsus non S. Thomae; cum vehementer discrepet ab
eius doctrina." Similarly, Mandonnet, according to Msgr. Grabmann, rejects the
work as spurius because it is not mentioned in the official catalogues of St. Thomas'
works.
On the other hand, Grabmann's own study of the ancient catalogues and manuscripts led him to conclude that the De Natura Generis is indeed an authentic work
of St. Thomas (Die Echten Schriften des Heiligen Thomas von Aquin, Aschendorfl'and
More recently the
schen Verlagsbuchhandlung. MUnster,
pp.
studies of C. F. Rossi, C. M., have led him to the same conclusion as that of Msgr.
Grabmann. Cf. Rossi, "Gli Opuscoli di S. Tommaso d' Aquino: Criteri per cognoscerne l'authenticita," Divius Thomas, (PI), I953, p. 388. The same conclusion has
been reached more recently still by F. Pelster, S. J., "Die Thomas von Aquin
ausgeschriebenen Opuscula, De instantibus, De Natura Verbi intellectus, De principio individuationis, De genere, De natura accidentis, De natura materiae, De
quattuor oppositis, und ihr Verfasser," Gregorianum, XXXVI, I955, pp.
Adrian Pattin also accepts the authenticity of the De Natura Generis, cf. "Bijdrage
tot de Kronologie van St. Thomas' Werken," Tijdschrift voor Philosophie, XIX.
I957, pp.
Finally, it is interesting to note that Capreolus himself expressly
considers St. Thomas to have been the real author of the De Natura Generis. Cf.
In Ill Sent., d. 5, 3, 3, ad I arg. Scoti, Vol. V, p. I05, col.
Defensiones Theologiae
Divi Thomas Aquinatis, ed., Pabanet Reques, Paris, I904. The contrary view is
supported by H. F. Dondaine, 0. P., Bulletin Thomiste, IX, I954, p. 94, who agrees
with Mandonnet.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

361

regards from the aspect of being, and logic, because of its
common nature, is competent to keep pace.
Yet there remains a very important difference in both the
material and formal subject of their considerations, for the
metaphysician considers real being from the aspect of real
being; while the logician considers rational being or second intentions from the aspect of its rationality or their intentionality.43
The metaphysician considers the forms of things not absolutely, as does the logician, but concretely as they subsist in
an act of existence intrinsic to the singular thing and extrinsic
to and independent of the activity of created intellect. 44 Conversely, the logician considers forms absolutely, that is as they
exist in intellect apart from all material conditions. 45 This is
why the logician considers whatever he considers as a logician
from the vantage point of its intentional existence. He is concerned with the signification of intentions or ideas, but only as
they signify as existing in intellect itself.
Although the metaphysician is concerned with forms only to
the extent that they delimit and determine the act of being
of a singular thing independently of the activity of intellect,
yet he does concern himself with intentional or rational being
in a certain sense. This he does, not strictly inasmuch as they
are intentional, but only to the extent that such intentions
represent real modifications of operative intellect.
Expressed somewhat differently, the metaphysician considers
•• "Unde logicus, qui considerat intentiones tantum, dicit hoc nomen, corpus,
de omnibus corporibus univoce praedicare: sed esse hujus naturae non est ejusdem
rationis in corporibus corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus. Unde quantum ad metaphysicum et naturalem, quia considerant res secundum suum esse, nee hoc nomen,
corpus, nee aliquid aliud dicitur univoce de corruptibilibus et incorruptibilibus .... "
In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; "Logicus enim considerat modum prae®candi et
non existentiam rei." In Vll Meta., 1, 17, [1658].
«" Logicus enim considerat absolute intentiones .... ", In Boetii De Trin., q. 6,
a. 3, resp., " Logicus enim considerat aliqua secundum quod sumuntur in ratione,
et ideo considerat substantiam secundum quod per actionem inteUectus subest
rati01ni universalitatis . ... " De Natura Generis, c. 4, [503]; cf. also, Sum. Contra
Gentiles, IV, c. 11, cf. footnote 39.
•• Ibid.

362

JAMES B. REICHMANN

beings of reason just as he does prime matter, material forms,
whether substantial or accidental, and whatever else he considers, namely, simply inasmuch as these are ordered and related
to the act of being itself of the singular thing in which they
inhere and of which they are principles, and not inasmuch as
they are related to an intentional or mental act of existence
which has been supplied the form inhering within intellect by
that power itself, of whose act of understanding the form is a
determining principle.
It is for this reason that both logic and metaphysics have
unlimited horizons. Neither science considers any particular or
formal determination of being as such, for neither esse intentionale nor esse reale contains determination in and through
itself. 46 Whatever determination it possesses it has received
from the form which it actuates. Each of these sciences views
its respective subject matter, common being, from an existential
vantage point which, in the case of logic, is intentional, and, in
the case of metaphysics, is real.
The metaphysician attends to how things exist in the rt>al
order and why; i. e., he considers them independently of the
effect of the activity of created intellect, while the logician
attends to the manner in which ' things,' i. e., beings of reason,
or second intentions, exist in created intellect. There is a
striking similarity between these two sciences, but all the same
this likeness is solidly permeated by a profound difference.
Because, then, of the unique manner in which the logician
considers and analyses his subject matter, logical propositions
are universal, not only in the sense that concepts of material
things are universal because they are abstracted from matter,
and are thus immaterial, but also in the sense that they contain,
as they are viewed by the logician, no formal determination
whatever. The logician considers them from the exclusive viewpoint of their being ordered to an intentional act of existence.
Were the matter otherwise, the logician's inquiry would be
•• De Ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.; S. C. G. III, c. 66; S. T., I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3; S. C. G.,

I, c. 43; S.C. G., II, c. 52; Quaest. Un. de Anima, a. 1, ad 17.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

363

limited to a specific or generic class of intentional beings, and
would not be open to all beings of reason, with the resulting
necessary denial of its special status as a ' common ' science,
as well as of its truly remarkable and singular affinity to metaphysics. Were logic burdened by such a supposition, it would
simply be incapable of keeping pace with the dynamic and
ubiquitously searching inquiry of the metaphysician, who, in
his inquiry, is free of even the most rudimentary inhibitions.
Wherefore, since the metaphysician considers all being from
the standpoint of its very being, and shows no direct concern
for the being's formal or essential determination save as a
determination of being/ 7 he is in a position to apply the propositions of the logician to real being directly. As seen, St.
Thomas has expressly ruled out the possibility of such an
exchange between logic and the other real sciences on the
exclusive ground that none of the ' particular ' sciences could
make this transfer without first readapting the proposition to
the limited subject of each respective science.48 To employ
logic in this way, however, is not to employ it precisely as logic,
i. e., as doctrinal.
Since, therefore, the subject of metaphysics is not thus
47 Whatever science directs
conscious attention to a particular aspect of being,
is, by that very act, a particular science. Metaphysics and logic are, however, as
St. Thomas has remarked, 'common' sciences. In IV Meta., 1. 1, [530].
48 " Sed hie modus procedendi
non potest proprie competere alieni particulari
scientiae, in quibus peccatum accidit, nisi ex propriis procedatur." In Boetii De
Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad primam. "When propositions that have been established in
this rational science serve to elucidate the subject of another science, the process
involved is called rational, and constitutes a particular use of logic. Inasmuch as
this use consists in providing scientific knowledge, logic is said to be used according
as it teaches in another science. However, although any particular science can
use logical propositions in this way, ... they are not appropriate to the more
limited subject, for what is logically common does not actually contain what is
really distinct and particular. The process which starts from second intentions is of
course proper to logic, but it is also appropriate to metaphysics, for metaphysics
and logic are both common and deal with common things, the logical communia
being founded on the real communia-and thus they somehow have the same
subject." Sheila O'Flynn, " The First Meaning of ' Rational Process ' According
to the Exposition in Boetii De Trinitate," Laval Theologique et Philosophique, X,
2, 1954, p. 181.

364

JAMES B. REICHMANN

limited, for being does not of itself bespeak limitation, the
metaphysician is in a position to employ a ' purely ' logical
method; something which is forbidden to any other science. It
is for this reason that St. Thomas maintains that the rational
method, in the sense of a strictly logical method, is proper to
metaphysics alone.49
PART

II

THE RATIONAL METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

AND PREDICATION

Our foregoing study of the method of metaphysics has led
us to conclude that its method is rational in a unique and
exclusive sense. Although logic is not a science of the real, and
metaphysics is the science of the real par excellence, considering
whatever it considers from the viewpoint of its being real, 50
these two sciences have much in common, for both are ' common' sciences having being as their proper subject.
As seen, this singular fact enables the metaphysician to
employ logic in a manner that no other science can-to make
use of logical intentions as though they were not logical intentions at all, i. e., by employing them just as the logician does.
The sole ' difference ' lies in the fact that the metaphysician
directs them toward real being, being that is not dependent for
its being on an act of a created intellect.
Because, therefore, the logician employs not only what are
commonly termed second intentions, (e. g., genus, species, difference, opposite, etc.) , but also entire propositions and forms
of argument in meeting the requirements of his own science, it
will follow that the metaphysician, who is entitled to borrow
from the logician whatever intentional instruments he may
•• In addition to emphasizing this point in the corpus of the article, as seen, St.
Thomas also returns to it in his response to the first objection. The objector had
contested that it was wrong to attribute a ' rational ' process to the philosophy of
nature since it seems to be totally diverse from the rational science, logic. St.
Thomas grants the force of the objection when applied to ' rational ' process taken
in the first sense; denies it relative to ' rational ' process taken in the second sense.
Ibid.
50 In IV Meta., I. 1, [530].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

865

have fashioned, and to exploit their utility in investigating the
subject of his own science of the real, is fully within his rights
in employing logical propositions as well as second intention
concepts, just as the logician has employed them, to advance
the cause of his own metaphysical inquiry. 51
Consequently it is to the metaphysician's own special manner
of handling ' logical ' propositions that we now wish to direct
our attention, hoping thereby to throw some additional light
on the rational method of metaphysics. It follows, then, that
we intend to explore at least some of the metaphysical implications of predication.
I. An Instance of the Application of the Logical Method

The third lesson of the seventh book of St. Thomas' commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle provides us with a
passage very much to our purpose. This passage refers expressly to the important text in the commentary recently
considered, 52 and repeats in condensed fashion the main features
of the argument in the commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate.
It does more, however, than merely repeat what has been set
down in these other passages, for it expressly indicates the
relation existing between the rational method of metaphysics
and predication, canonizing this teaching both with a concrete
example and express approbation.
Beginning with the third lesson of his commentary on the
Metaphysics of Aristotle, St. Thomas observes that Aristotle
divides his consideration into two parts. In the first he will
consider the essence of sensible substances through logical and
common arguments, (per rationes logicas et communes) .53 In
51
52

In Boetii Trin., q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad lam quest.
In IV Meta., I. 4,

53 " Postquam
determinavit Philosophus ordinem procedendi circa substantias,
hie incipit determinare de substantiis sensibilibus, sicut praedixerat; et dividitur in
duas partes. In prima determinat de essentia substantiarum sensibilium per
rationes logicas et communes, [578]. In secunda per principia substantiarum sensibilium in octavo libro, ibi [691], 'Ex his itaque dictis syllogizare oportet.'" In VII
Meta., 1. 3, [1306].

366

JAMES B. REICHMANN

the second part he will consider the essence of sensible substances through the principles themselves of sensible substances.54
Aristotle begins his analysis by determining what essence is,
and this he does through the application of the logical method. 55
St. Thomas then defends the legitimacy of employing this
method in a metaphysical treatise by underlining the fact that
metaphysics has a special affinity to logic, since both are
common sciences. 56 Consequently, he argues, the logical method
is proper to the science of metaphysics, and hence it is fitting
that the metaphysician begin with it. 57
St. Thomas' next comment is truly significant with regard to
the correlation obtaining between the method of metaphysics
and predication. Aristotle had remarked that he would begin
his investigation of the essence of sensible being by instituting
a ' logical ' consideration of them. St. Thomas now explains
the meaning of the term ' logic ' (7r€p£ avrov A.oy(KW>) as Aristotle
here understands it, pointing out that he employs the term in
this context because his investigation of sensible being commences with an application to it of the way of predication, and
this approach, St. Thomas adds, properly pertains to logic.58
St. Thomas' comment, therefore, removes all doubt as to
the legitimacy of the metaphysician's use of predication as a
means to obtain a true knowledge of being. He thus carefully
underlines the fact that, although Aristotle says that he will
first proceed according to the ' logical ' method, he does so only
inasmuch as he recognizes that the ' logical ' method is a method
altogether consonant with and appropriate to metaphysical
inquiry. It is clear, then, that, when Aristotle speaks of proIbid.
Ibid., [1398].
56 " Sicut enim supra dictum est, haec scientia habet quandam
affinitatem cum
logica propter utriusque communitatem." Ibid.
57 " Et ideo modus Iogicus huic scientiae proprius est et ab eo convenienter
incipit." Ibid.
58 " Magis autem logice dicit se de eo quod quid est dicturum, inquantum
investigat quid sit quod quid erat esse ex modo praedicandi. Hoc enim ad logicum
proprie pertinet." Ibid.
54

55

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

367

ceeding logically in this text as well as in others, he does not
intend that such an investigation be considered as pertaining
to the science of logic, for, though the method is rational, the
investigation is metaphysical. This is because demonstrative
logic is doctrinal only, and, when applied to real being, becomes
one with the science applying it. Demonstrative logic, is, as
logic, doctrinal only. 59
Since, then, there is no such thing as a demonstrative procedure which pertains to the science of logic, it follows that
whenever St. Thomas speaks of investigating real being demonstratively according to the logical method his words are not to
be interpreted to mean that he considers the investigation a
logical one. He merely means that the metaphysician is at
work investigating real being according to the logical method,
which is the method proper to the science of metaphysics, since
it, like logic, is a common or transcendental science.
Clearly, then, the teaching contained in this passage from the
commentary on the M etaphysic8 is in every way consonant
with the teaching previously considered in the article from St.
Thomas' commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, where it
is stated that the rational method pertains, among the real
sciences, only to the science of metaphysics. 60
To return now to St. Thomas' statement that Aristotle will
investigate the nature of sensible being by analyzing it through
predication, we note that he immediately undertakes to accomplish just that. " When we inquire about the essence of
anything," he says, " we are unable to give a suitable answer by
naming those things which pertain to it only accidentally." 61
For example, when one asks, ' what is man? ' one cannot reply
59 That the metaphysician
does proceed ' rationally ' is a rather central point in
Thomistic and Aristotelian metaphysics which does not seem to have been properly
emphasized nor indeed, in some instances, fully realized by some very competent
and widely respected contemporary Thomists. We shall return to this observation
later after having concluded our analysis of the relation between metaphysics and
predication.
6 ° Cf. In Boetii de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, resp. ad lam quaest.
61 In VII Meta., l. 3, [1309].

368

JAMES B. REICHMANN

that he is white or that he is seated, or that he is
From this it follows that none of those things that are predicated
' accidentally ' of a being pertain to its essence so as to be
constituitive of it. 63 On the other hand, when per se predication
is had, something at least (if, for the sake of argument, we
prescind from proper accidents) of the essence of the subject
is expressed even though the predicate may not express the
entire essence.64
Thus an analysis of predication is a perfectly legitimate
method for determining what pertains to the essence of an
individual, determinate being, and what does not; and this
analysis is conducted not on the logical but on the metaphysical
level.
It might, of course, be thought that to place so much reliance
on predication is to lean dangerously in the direction of the
development of a thoroughly subjective metaphysics. Such
anxiety, however, is ill-founded, for predication, while it does
represent an act of reason, is not on that account subjective.
If, for example, we return for a moment to the proposition St.
Thomas proposed as an instance of per accidens predication,
viz. that ' This man is white,' we might justifiably ask how we
know that this is in fact an instance of per accidens predication.
Is it not because we have at some time observed that, though
there are men who are white, there are also others who are
not? From this we were led to conclude negatively that
' white ' does not pertain to the essence of man. The act of
predicating follows upon man's experience of being in its limited
and determinate forms, and hence primarily and directly reflects things as they are, not as they are thought.
62

Ibid.

"Et ideo nihil eorum, quae praedicantur per accidens de aliquo, pertinent ad
quod quid erat esse illius rei: non enim musicum esse, est tibi esse." Ibid.
6 ' " Et ideo sequitur quod musicum esse non est tibi esse; quia, ea quae pertinent
ad quidditatem musici, sunt extra quidditatem tuam, licet musicus de te praedicetur.
Et hoc ideo, quia ' tu non secundum teipsum es musicus,' idest quia musicum non
praedicatur de te per se, sed per accidens. lllud ergo pertinet ad quod quid est tui,
quod tu es ' secundum teipsum,' idest quia de te praedicatur per se et non per
accidens; sicut de te praedicatur per se homo, animal, substantia, rationale, sensibile,
et alia hujusmodi, quae omina pertinent ad quid est tui." Ibid., {1310].
63

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

369

2. Predication and the Real

Indeed the act itself of composing and dividing is the human
intellect's way of consciously knowing the other, and it is
grounded on the real. 65 Though it may and will employ terms
having logical and universal overtones, such as ' substance,'
'body,' 'animal,' etc., the intellect does not directly and naturally avert to the logical aspect of these terms or concepts, but
rather employs them as an inner expression of that which is
extrinsic to intellect and which is the determining and formal
cause of its knowing. 66
All logical intentions are consciously and reflectively acquired, since they depend upon the intellect's turning back
upon its own act and upon the product of its own act and
attaching to that product a relation which is derived through
having made a comparison of concepts; as, for example, that
' animal ' is the genus of ' man,' since it indeterminately includes man. 67
65 "Uncle qui putat dividi quod est divisum in rebus, verus est in sua opinione;
ut putat hominem non esse asinum: et similiter qui putat componi quod est compositum in rebus, ut qui putat hominem esse situm in rebus, ut qui putat hominem
esse animal. . . . Quod sic considerandum est, non enim ideo tu es albus, quia nos
vere existimamus te esse album; sed quia tu es albus. Uncle manifestum est, quod
rei est causa veritatis in opinione et oratione. . . . Et ideo, si talis operatio
intellectus ad rem debeat reduci sicut ad causam, oportet quod in compositis substantiis ipsa compositio formae ad materiam aut eius quod se habet per modum
formae et materiae, vel etiam compositio accidentis ad subiectum respondeat quasi
fundamootum et causa veritatis, compositioni, quam intellectus interius format et
exprimit voce. Sicut cum dico Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis
causatur ex compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam
Socrates est hie homo .... " In IX Meta., 1. 11, [1896-98].
66 "Praedicatio
enim est quoddam quod completur per actionem intellectus componentis et dividentis, habens fundamentum in re, ipsam unitatem eorum quorum
unum de altero dicitur. Uncle ratio praedicabilitatis potest claudi in ratione huius
intentionis quae est genus, quae similiter per actionem intellectus completur.
Nihilominus tamen id cui intellectus intentionem praedicabilitatis attribuit, componens id cum altero, non est ipsa intentio generis, sed potius id cui intellectus
intentionem generis attribuit, sicut quod significatur hoc nomine 'animal.'" De
Ente et Essentia, c. 3, [20], Spiazzi, ed., Marietti, Romae, 1954.
67 " In conclusion, then, it is the relations of reason which the intellect finds
among its concepts, and only these (contrary to the opinion of most contemporaries), that constitute the intentions which form the subject of the science of

370

JAMES B. REICHMANN

The fact that the human intellect is capable of spawning an
almost unlimited number of beings of reason merely by explicitly recognizing the various relations which exist between the
concepts contained within it, accounts for the very possibility
of the existence of the science of logic. Ultimately, the reason
why such a network of relations of reason is possible at all is
because all the natural concepts of intellect which directly refer
to some aspect of real being, exist immaterially in the intellect,
and because, owing to the abstractive manner of the human
intellect's knowing the real material existent, there can be many
concepts in intellect which owe their origin to one single individual being. 68
It is clear, therefore, that a suitable understanding of the
origin and nature of these second intentions is of paramount
importance to the metaphysician, if he is to avoid falling into
the same state of utter confusion as those who have failed to
distinguish between metaphysics and logic. Thus a failure to
attend to the origin of second intentions and their relation to
real being, brings in its train a serious oversight with regard to
the function of predication in metaphysics, which in turn leads
to an insidious undermining of the science of being, which so
heavily depends upon predication for the exercise of its own
unique and singularly effective rational method. 69
logic. For it is by the establishment of these relations that the concepts are
ordered and the rational work formed by the art of logic.' O'Flynn, Sheila, op. cit.,
p. 181. " Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo
considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni
universalitatis." In VII Meta., 1. 13, [1576]. For a detailed study of the nature
of genus, cf. "A Study of Genus," by Wm. A. Van Roo, S. J., The Modem Schoolman, XX, 1943, pp. 89-104; 165-181; 230-244.
68 De Veritate, q. 2, a. 7. Cf. also: Sum. Th. I, q. 58, a. 5 and q. 85, a. 5.
•• St. Thomas emphatically underlines this point in the introduction to his
treatise, De Ente et Essentia: " Quia parvus error in principio magnus est in fine,
secundum Philosophum, primo Caeli et :Mundi, ens autem et essentia sunt quae
primo intellectu concipiuntur, ut dicit Avicenna in primo libro suae Metaphysicae;
ideo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem aperiendam,
dicendum est, quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo in diversis
inveniantur, et quomodo se habeant ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus, speciem,
et differentiam." The Opusculum, De Natura Generis, also emphasizes the relation
between logical intentions, predication and the real order: "Ex dictis patet quod,

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

371

Since the logician considers things inasmuch as they exist in
the mind 70 and the metaphysician or philosopher considers
them inasmuch as they exist' apart' from their being known, 71
it follows that the logician, when he makes use of predication,
considers merely the mode of predication without averting
to what is ultimately signified, 72 whereas the metaphysician
considers not merely the mode of predication, but at the same
time considers the significative determination of the mode as it
refers to the real order of things. 73
It is, then, because predication is first and foremost an
expression of real being 74 that the different ways in which the
considerando entitatem rerum in se sicut facit Philosophus primus, in substantia
nulla foret praedicatio unius de altero, quae tamen in substantia reperitur secundum
logicum, secundum quem substantia quodammodo induit similitudinem inhaerentiae
accidentalis, ubi est proprie dici de altero etiam secundum primum Philosophum.
Ex quo facile deprehenditur error volentium in natura rei multiplicare formas
substantiales, unde sumuntur praedicta substantialia, sicut et formae accidentales
multiplicantur in re, de qua multa praedicantur accidentalia realiter; cum tamen in
substantia non sit praedicatio aliqua secundum veram naturam rei, sed per actum
intellectus, ut dictum est. Unde ponentes plures formas substantiales in re una,
ignorant naturam et originem propositionum in quibus aliquid de aliquo praedicatur,
et differentiam etiam inter substantiam et accidens." c. 5, [513].
70 " Logicus autem considerat res secundum quod sunt in ratione; et ideo considerat substantias prout secundum acceptionem intellectus subsunt intentioni
universalitatis."
In VII Meta., 1. 13, [1576]; cf. also: De Nat. Generis, c. 4,
[503]; "Considerat enim logica, sicut subiecta, syllogismum, enunciationem, praedicatum, aut aliquid huiusmodi. Pars autem logicae, quae demonstrativa est, etsi
circa communes intentiones versetur docendo, tamen usus demonstrativus scientiae
non est in procedendo ex his communibus intentionibus ad aliquid ostendendum de
rebus, quae sunt subiecta aliarum scientiarum." In I Analy. Post., 1. 20, [171].
71 " Sed philosophus primus considerat
de rebus secundum quod sunt entia; et
ideo apud eius considerationem non differt esse in subiecto et de subiecto." In
VII Meta., 1. 13, [1576].
72 Logicus enim considerat
modum praedicandi, et non existentiam rei. Unde
quidquid respondetur ad quid est, dicit pertinere ad quod quid est; sive illud sit
intrinsecum, ut materia et forma; sive sit extrinsecum, ut agens vel finis." In VII
Meta., 1. 17, [1658].
73 " Sed philosophus qui existentiam quaerit rerum, finem vel agentem, cum sint
extrinseca, non comprehendit sub quod quid erat esse." Ibid.
70 " Cum autem in re sit quidditas
eius et suum esse, veritas fundatur in esse
rei magis quam in quidditate, sicut et nomen entis ab esse imponitur; et in ipsa
operatione intellectus accipientis esse rei sicut est per quamdam similationem ad
ipsum, completur relatio adaequationis, in qua consistit ratio veritatis." In I Sent.,
d. 19, q. 5, a. I.

JAMES B. REICHMANN

intellect executes the act of predicating accurately reflect the
diverse ways in which real being is.75 The copula, 'est,' although it signifies the composition of subject and predicate,
does this secondarily. What it first signifies is the actual inherence of the form expressed by the predicate in the singular
existing things represented and signified by the subject of the
enunciation, 76 and hence the copula primarily signifies the
limited actuality of being as determining and experienced by
the knower. 77
Because this actuality of being, which is known directly, i.e.,
in man's present condition, is both determined and actualizing,
it is composite; 78 and this very composition is what the composition of enunciation reflects as it announces the mind's conformity with its object. 79
75 " Unde dico, quod ipsum esse rei est causa veritatis, secundum quod est in
cognitione intellectus." Ibid. ". . . si consideretur ipsum esse rei, quod est ipsa
ratio veritatis, sicut dicitur in II Meta. (com. 4) eadem est dispositio rerum in
esse et veritate; unde quae sunt magis entia, sunt magis vera .... " Quaest. Un. De
Caritate, a. 9, ad I.
76 " Sic igitur Aristoteles valde subtiliter manifestavit quod absoluta unitas enunciationis non impeditur, neque per compositionem quam importat verbum, neque
per multitudinem nominum ex quibus constat definitio. Et est eadem ratio utrobique, nam praedicatum comparatur ad subiectum ut forma ad materiam, et
similiter differentia ad genus: ex forma autem et materia fit unum simpliciter."
In Peri Hermeneias, L. I. 8, [98]. " ... compositio autem intellectus est signum
identitatis eorum quae componuntur." Sum. Th. I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 8; " ...
enunciatio est judicanda una non ex unitate nominis, sed ex unitate significati."
In Peri Hermen., L. I. I. 8; cf. also: In IX Meta., 1. 11, [1898].
77 " Quia vero actualitas, quam principaliter significat hoc verbum est, est communiter actualitas omnis formae, vel actus substantialis vel actus substantialis vel
accidentalis, inde est quod cum volumus significare quamcumque formam vel actum
actualiter inesse alicui subiecto, significamus illud per hoc verbum est, vel
simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus;
secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum,
'est,' significat compositionem." In Peri Hermen. I, I. 5, [78]; cf. also: Sum. Th.
I, q. 14, a. 14, ad 2.
78 " Esse autem,
in quo consistit compositio intellectus, ut affirmatio, compositionem quamdam et unionem indicat .... " In IX Meta., 1. 11, [1900].
79 " Sicut cum dico Socrates est homo, veritas huius enunciationis
causatur ex
compositione formae humanae ad materiam individualem, per quam Socrates est
hie homo: et cum dico, homo est albus, causa veritatis est compositio albedinis ad
subiectum: et similiter est in aliis." In IX Meta., 1. 11, [1898].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

373

As is clear, the concepts employed by intellect in the enunciation to express its oneness with the complex object known are
initially obtained through the first act of the mind; for, St.
Thomas says, " The enunciation follows upon apprehension,
and thus we necessarily express things as they have been understood." 80 Thus, although the enunciation is many materially, 81
it signifies as one, 82 so that what the intellect understands and
expresses through its act of judging is a singular subject in
which is found a particular form or perfection. 83
Because, then, the intellect gives expression to the material
thing known according to its own mode, that is, immaterially,
there is, despite this difference of hierarchic levels of being, a
genuine isomorphism or conformity between the intellect knowing and the material thing from which the intellect's act of
knowing has received its formal determination, viz. the object
known.
Stemming from this isomorphic structure which exists between the intellect knowing and the thing known, which is
unequivocally and irreversibly announced in any affirmative
judgment, is found the absolute validation of the employment
of predication as an unerring tool of metaphysical method.
Through predication one is placed in contact with the real, for
the mode of the act of predication reflects the mode of the
80 " ••• enuntiatio
sequitur apprehensionem. Unde secundum quod intelligimus
aliqua, oportet quod enuntiemus ilia." In I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1, sol.; 'Unde
secundum diversitatem rationum format praedicatum et subjectum, et secundum
identitatem componit." Ibid., ad 1.
81 " Sed ilia compositio vel divisio, qua intellectus
coniungit vel dividit sua
concepta, est tantum in intellectu, non in rebus. Consistit enim in quadam duorum
comparatione conceptorum; sive ilia duo sint idem secundum rem, sive diversa."
In VI Meta., 1. 4, [1241].
82 "Et sic etiam intellectus quando considerat propositionem,
considerat multa
ut unum; et ideo inquantum sunt unum, simul intelliguntur, dum intelligitur una
propositio quae ex eis constat .... " De Ver., q. 8, a. 14; Sum. Th. I, q. 14, a. 14;
In I Peri. Hermen., 1. 3.
83 "Compositio
autem est quaedam imitatio unitatis." DeVer., q. 2, a. 7, ad 3;
"Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicata praedicantur; ita
tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subiecto de quo praedicantur, et unicuique eorum
quae de 'ipso praedicantur' id est diversa quidditas et essentia." In VII Meta.,
1. 2, [U87].

374

JAMES B. REICHMANN

being of the thing known. In St. Thomas' words: ". . . the
manner of predicating is proportioned to the things themselves
about which predication is made." 84
3. Predication, the Predicaments, and the Modes of Being

The subject of metaphysics is ens commune, (common being) ,85 and, because common being contains within it no express
determination whatsoever, it is exclusively through predication
that it is diversified. 86 The most general, all inclusive diversification of common being by means of predication is represented
by the ten predicaments, each of which represents a mode of
being found by the intellect in the existing thing which is
known. 87 Thus the predicament, substance, does not add a
8 ' " •••

modus praedicandi proportionatur

ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio

.. "; In 1 Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a. 2, ad 1. " ... quot modis aliquid praedicatur,
' toties esse significatur ' idest tot modis significatur aliquid esse." In V Meta., 1. 9,
[890]; " ... diversus tamen modus existendi impedit univocam praedicationem ";
De Bot., q. 7, a. 7; "Modi autem essendi proportionales sunt modis praedicandi."
In Ill Phys., 1. 5, [322].
85 " Cum enim haec scientia metaphysica consideret ens commune sicut proprium
subjectum quod quidem dividitur per substantiam et novem genera accidentium .
. . ." In Ill Meta., 1. 1, [1682]; " ... quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret,
non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subjectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune." In Meta., Proem.
86 " Ens enim non est genus ... quia in quolibet genere oportet significare quidditatem aliquam, ut dictum est, de cujus intellectu non est esse. Ens autem non
dicit quidditatem, sed solum actum essendi, cum sit principium ipsum .... " In 1
Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 2, ad 2; " ... hoc nomen res imponitur a quidditate tantum;
hac vero nomen ens, imponitur ab actu essendi .... " In IV Meta., 1. 2, [553];
" Uncle oportet quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum modum
praedicandi, qui consequitur diversum modum essendi; quia ' quoties ens dicitur '
idest quot modis aliquid praedicatur, 'toties esse significatur,' idest tot modis
significatur aliquid esse. Et propter hoc ea in quae dividitur ens primo, dicuntur
esse praedicamenta, quia distinguuntur secundum diversum modum praedicandi." In
V Meta., 1. 9, [890].
87 "Nam ens quod significat compositionem propositionis est praedicatum
accidentale, quia compositio fit per intellectum secundum determinatum tempus. Esse
autem in hoc tempore vel in illo, est accidentale praedicatum. Sed ens quod dividitur
per decem praedicamenta, significat ipsas naturas decem generum secundum quod
sunt actu vel potentia." In X Meta., 1. 3, [1982]. "In nullo enim praedicamento
ponitur aliquid nisi res extra animam existens. Nam ens rationis dividitur contra
ens divisum per decem praedicamenta ut patet in V Meta., (com. 13, 14). De Pot.,

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

375·

new dimension to being, for this new dimension or new nature
would itself belong to being. Rather, " ... by the name of
substance is expressed a certain mode of existing, namely, of
per se existence; and so similarly in the other predicaments
(genera) ." 88
Thus the predicaments are distinguished according to the
diverse manner of predicating, and this latter is directly dependent upon and proportionate to the diverse modes of being
found in the singular existent. 89 Consequently, although the
predicaments are classifications of the most basic modes of
predication, the differences found in the modes of predication
themselves are not the sole work of intellect, but are caused by
the really different modes of real being. The predicaments are
not, therefore, mere subjective classifications of being having
no counterpart in the world of real being, but rather reflect
and mirror the actual ways in which being is participated by
things independently of the mind's knowing it. 90
It is this proportion between the modes of predicating and
the modes of being which permits the philosopher to make use
of predication in seeking out a further knowledge of his own
proper subject, and it is this, plus the fact that metaphysics and
logic are both 'common' sciences, that permits and justifies
the metaphysician's employing the modes of predication in
precisely the same way the logician does, funneling its activity
now toward real beings rather than toward beings of reason.
q. 7. a. 9, resp., " ... nihil quod est ens tantum in anima, in genere determinato
collocatur." In I Sent., d.
q.
a. 1, sol., " ... quia ens contrahitur per decem
genera, quorum unumquodque addit aliquid super ens; non aliquod accidens, vel
aliquam differentiam quae sit extra essentiam entis, sed determinatum modum
essendi, qui fundatur in ipsa essentia rei." De Ver., q.
a. 1, resp.
88 " Sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis
secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi
essendi, et iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera. Substantia enim non
addit supra ens aliquam differentiam, quae significet aliquam naturam superadditam
enti, sed nomine substantiae exprimitur quidam specialis modus essendi scilicet
per se ens; et ita in aliis generibus." De Ver., q. 1, a. 1, resp.
89 " Unde oportet
quod ens contrahatur ad diversa genera secundum diversum
modum praedicandi . . . qui consequitur diversum modum essendi. . . ." In V
Meta., 1. 9, [890].
90 " ••• modum praedicandi proportionatur
ipsis rebus de quibus fit praedicatio .
. . ." In I Sent., d. 19, q. 4, a.
ad 1.

376

JAMES B. REICHMANN

Ultimately, this is what grounds the legitimacy of the via
praedicationis as a thoroughly metaphysical method and procedure, so that, through a consideration and comparative
analysis of predication, the metaphysician is quite able to reach
truly scientific conclusions regarding the metaphysical and
transcendental aspects of the real.
4. Predication and Prime Matter

We have already witnessed an instance where St. Thomas
fully approved of Aristotle's use of the' way of predication' to
begin his inquiry into the nature of sensible being. 91 The
consideration of other noteworthy instances of this same procedure will prove rewarding. One is found in the same seventh
book of the Metaphysics where it is a question of the metaphysician's establishing, as a metaphysician, the reality of an
indeterminate essential principle of sensible being. 92
The validity of the proof of prime matter from motion as
employed by the philosopher of nature is not called into
question. Yet St. Thomas, approving of the procedure which
Aristotle has followed, will affirm that this is not the only
possible way in which the reality of primary matter can be
demonstrated. The metaphysician, he points out, establishes
the distinction of matter from all determinate forms per viam
praedicationis, which, he immediately adds, " is proper to Logic,
and which in the fourth book of this treatise he [Aristotle] has
declared to be closely related to metaphysics." 93
The fact that the nature of matter can be established by
different sciences employing different methods of procedure
ought to present no real problem, for there is here an overlapping of their material subjects, and, though both the natural
philosopher, arguing from motion, and the metaphysician, argu91
92

Cf. In VII Meta., 1. 8, [1808].
In VII Meta., 1. 2, [127-89].

93 "Attamen diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non probat Philosophus per
viam motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed per
viam praedicationis, quae est propria Logicae, quam in quarto huius dicit affinem esse
huic scientiae." Ibid., [1287].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

377

ing from ' the way of predication,' arrive at the same or a
similar conclusion, 94 they do so through an entirely different
medium. Hence the basic methodological canon that each
science must conduct the investigation of its own subject matter
with a method specifically proper and proportionate to it,
remains inviolate and unchallenged.
Though it may appear to be an unwarranted assumption
that the metaphysician should consider primary matter at all,
for this seems to be the exclusive preserve of the philosopher
of nature, whose proper subject formally includes matter, it can
be pointed out that the metaphysician does not consider matter
precisely inasmuch as it is a co-principle of the essence of
sensible being, but exclusively from the viewpoint of its participation in common being. 95 Though it is perfectly true that
the metaphysician is primarily concerned with the formal and
final causes of being, his total interest also extends to the efficient and even at times to its material cause. 96
•• Relative to the overlapping of the material subjects of the sciences the following passage is instructive, and seems quite applicable in the present context: " ...
scientiae mediae, de quibus dictum est, communicant cum naturali, secundum id
quod est materiale in earum consideratione, differunt autem secundum id quod in
earum consideratione est formale, et ideo nihil prohibet has scientias interdum cum
naturali easdem habere conclusiones. Non tamen per eadem demonstrant . ... "
In Boetii De Trin., q. 5, a. 3, ad 7.
96 ". • • metaphysicus
considerat etiam de singularibus entibus non secundum
proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum quod participant
communem rationem entis, et sic etiam pertinet ad eius considerationem materia et
motus." In Boetii de Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 6.
•• " Omnis autem substantia vel ens per seipsam, si sit forma tantum; vel si
sit composita ex materia et forma, est ens per suam formam; unde inquantum haec
scientia est considerativa entis, considerat maxime causam formalem. Primae autem
substantiae non cognoscuntur a nobis ut sciamus de eis quod quid est, ut potest
aliqualiter haberi ex his quae in nono determinatur: et sic in earum cognitione non
habet locum causa formalis. Sed quamvis ipsae sint immobiles secundum seipsas sunt
tamen causa motus aliorum per modum finis; et ideo ad hanc scientiam, inquantum
est considerativa primarum substantiarum, praecipue pertinet considerare causam
finalem, et etiam aliqualiter causam moventem. Causam autem materialem secundum seipsam nullo modo, quia materia non convenienter causa est entis, sed alicujus
determinati generis, scilicet substantiae mobilis. Tales autem causae pertinent ad
considerationem particularium scientiarum, nisi forte considerentur ab hac scientia
inquantum continentur sub ente. Sic enim ad omnia suam considerationem extendit." In Ill, Meta., 1. 4, [384).

378

JAMES B. REICHMANN

For this reason the metaphysician can establish the existence
of a purely material and indeterminate principle of sensible
being through his own logical method which, precisely because
it is a ' common,' indeterminate method, is capable of being
applied to all things without qualification, provided only that
they be considered from the aspect of their existential indeterminacy, i.e., as participating common being. The metaphysician, then, considers matter, not as related to sensible form,
for this pertains to the investigation of the philosopher of
nature, but simply as matter; that is, as an indeterminate
essential principle of being.
Similarly, the metaphysician is permitted to extend his inquiry to the material forms of sensible beings, although he does
not consider them as material, but strictly as forms, that is, as
principles of being. 97
The argument for the existence of an indeterminate essential
principle of sensible being from predication can be briefly
presented as follows: From the nature of denominative predication it follows that there must be a subject which is formally
and essentially distinct from whatever is predicated of it, and
hence we must ultimately arrive at a subject which is de se
indeterminate. This subject is primary matter. Let us attempt
to explicitate and clarify the argument.
First of all, in denominative or concrete predication we note
that the essence of the subject is distinct from the essence of
the predicate. 98 Thus, e. g., while it is true that this man is
white, it is not true that man is whiteness, or that humanity is
97 " Et ideo dicit quod de principio formali, utrum sit unum vel plura, et quot
et quae sint, pertinet determinare ad Philosophiam primam, et usque ad illud
tempus reservetur; quia forma est principium essendi, et ens inquantum huiusmodi
est subiectum primae philosophiae." In I Phys., 1, 15, [283].
98 " Sciendum autem est quod id, quod hie dicitur, non potest intelligi de univoca
praedicatione secundum quod genera praedicantur de speciebus, in quarum definitionibus ponuntur; quia non est aliud per essentiam animal et homo, sed oportet
hoc intelligi de denominativa praedicatione, sicut cum album praedicatur de homine;
alia enim quidditas est albi et hominis, unde subjungit, quod alia genera praedicantur hoc modo de substantia, scilicet denominative, substantia vero praedicatur
de materia denominative." In VII Meta., I. 2, [1288].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

379

whiteness, because the forms signified by the subject, ' man,'
and the predicate,' whiteness,' are simply diverse. Similarly, it
is true that this material thing is a man, although it is not true
that matter is man, or that matter is humanity .99 A comparative analysis of the truth and falsity of propositions such as
these leads St. Thomas to conclude that matter is essentially
distinct from all substantial forms. "Concrete or denominative
predication itself shows that, just as substance is essentially
distinct from its accidents, so matter is essentially distinct from
substantial forms." 100
The reason underlying this conclusion is that there must be
an absolutely first subject grounding each act of denominative
predication, if such predication is to be at all possible. As seen,
in denominative predication the ' essence ' of the predicate
differs from the ' essence ' signified by the subject, and this is
why denominative predication must always be concrete. Its
subject and predicate must connote complete supposits and
cannot merely signify an abstract form, such as humanity or
whiteness, considered independently of the singular subject in
which it inheres, for the only possibility of predicating two
different forms of each other is that both forms be found
inhering in the same subject or supposit. Thus, when I say that
this man is white, I am not identifying his humanity with
whiteness, but am merely affirming that both forms are found
in the same identical subject or supposit.
Hence, the ratio itself of denominative predication demands
an absolutely first subject/ 01 for the very condition of the
possibility of such predication rests on the assumption that the
form signified by the predicate and the subject are distinct.
From this it follows that in denominative predication the subject is related to the predicate as potency is related to act. 102 If,
•• Ibid., [1289].
Ipsa ergo concretiva, sive denominativa praedicatio ostendit, quod sicut
substantia est aliud per essentiam ab accidentibus, ita per essentiam aliud est
materia a formis substantialibus." Ibid.
101 Our discussion is concerned only with material supposits in which the essence
itself is composite.
102 " Ita tamen fiat talis praedicatio, quod semper id quod est in potentia secun100

380

JAMES B. REICHMANN

therefore, there were no absolutely first subject of predication,
it would mean that there could then be an instance of denominative predication wherein the subject and predicate were
related as equals, as act to act, i. e., as simply the same in
essential signification, a condition which contradicts the prior
condition of the very possibility of denominative predication,
viz., that the subject be related to the predicate as potency is
related to act.
From this then it follows that the ultimate or primordial
subject of denominative predication must be free from all
formal determination, for, if it possessed such determination, it
in turn could be predicated of some other subject less determined than itself, and so on ad infinitum, until a formless
subject were reached. This is why St. Thomas concludes that
the ultimate subject of denominative predication must be
fully indeterminate in the order of essence. " Whence it follows
that, strictly speaking, the ultimate subject is neither a quiddity (that is, a substance), nor a quantity nor any other thing
that pertains to any of the genera of being." 103
Such then is the way in which the metaphysician, by using
the logical method, can establish the existence of a purely
indeterminate, essential principle in material being. 104 It is
not the only way in which the indeterminate nature of matter
can be scientifically explicitated, for the natural philosopher also
arrives at a similar conclusion by beginning his analysis from
motion. However, this is a sound and legitimate metaphysical
proof of primary matter, and the only one available to the
metaphysician. Hence it is not to be relegated unceremoniously
dum modum determinatum, praedicatur de eo, quod est immediate posterius." In
IX Meta., I. 6, [1840].
103 "Quare
sequetur quod illud quod est ultimum subjectum per se loquendo,
'neque est quid,' idest substantia, neque quantitas, neque aliquid aliud quod sit in
aliquo genere entium." In VII Meta., I. 2, [1289].
10 • Note that the argument
is not circular. It is not the existence of material
being which the metaphysician is proving or attempting to prove, nor the existence
of a material principle which he already grasps confusedly, but rather the precise
nature of that material principle. His analysis of the modes of predication reveals
to him the completely indeterminate nature of matter.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

381

to the humble status of a mere exercise in logic. On the contrary, both the inquiry and the conclusion are genuinely metaphysical in character .105
5. The Logic-al Method and the Unic-ity of Substantial Form

Another striking instance of the metaphysican's use of the
' logical ' or ' rational ' method to establish a metaphysical conclusion is found with regard to the unic-ity of substantial form.
We observe that St. Thomas repeatedly employs the via praedic-ationis (way of predication) to prove that in man there is
but one substantial form; that by this single form or soul he is
living, sentient, and intelligent.
It is impossible, he argues, that in man there be three substantial forms, and this impossibility becomes manifest from an
analysis of the very manner of predicating.1.oa For whatever
terms derive from diverse forms are predicated of each other
either per ac-cidens (when, i.e., neither of the two forms are
necessarily ordered one to the other), as, e. g., 'sweet' is predicated of ' white,' or per se according to the second mode, as
when the subject is placed in the definition of the predicate. 107
Thus, in the proposition: ' a plane body is colored,' since the
subject will inevitably enter into the definition of the predicate,
the predication is per se, but according to the second mode
only.1.os
105 " Attamen
diversitatem materiae ab omnibus formis non pro bat Philosophus
per v!am motus, quae quidem probatio est per viam naturalis Philosophiae, sed
per viam praedicationis, quae est propria logicae, quam in quarto hujus dicit affinem
esse huic scientiae. Dicit ergo, quod oportet aliquid esse, de quo omnia praedicata
praedicentur; ita tamen quod sit diversum esse illi subjecto de quo praedicantur, et
unicuique eorum quae de 'ipso praedicantur,' idest diversa quidditas et essentia."
In VII Meta., l,
106 " Sed si ponamus animam corpori uniri sicut formam, omnino impossible videtur
plures animas per essentiam differentes in uno corpore esse. . . . Secundo, hoc
apparet impossible ex modo praedicationis." Sum. Th. I, q. 76, a. 3, resp.
107 " Quae enim sumuntur
a diversis formis, praedicantur ad invicem vel per
accidens, si formae non sint ad invicem ordinatae, puta, cum dicimus quod album
est dulce; vel, si formae s!nt ordinatae ad invicem, erit praedicatio per se in secundo
modo dicendi per se, quia subiectum ponitur in definitione praedicati." Ibid.
108 " Sicut superficies praeambula
est ad colorem, si ergo dicamus quod corpus
superficiatum est coloratum, er!t secundus modus praedicationis per se." Ibid.

382

JAMES B. REICHMANN

Before continuing with this analysis it will help first to clarify
somewhat the meaning of per se predication according to the
second mode. What St. Thomas understands by such predication is simply that the subject and predicate are so ordered to
each other that the subject could not exist without containing
the perfection of the predicate, and, similarly, the predicate
could not exist without existing in the subject. In the proposition, therefore, ' a plane body is colored,' we note that there
can not be an instance where there might be a plane body
which is not colored, and, at the same time, it is also obvious
that there cannot be a colored thing or color which is not
found in a plane body as in a subject. This type of predication
is called per se because it is necessary predication. It is called
per se predication according to the second mode because the
predicate does not express the substance or nature of the
subject. Only when this last condition is fulfilled is per se
predication according to the first mode actually had, and whenever one does find per se predication according to the first
mode, which looks directly to the form and not to the matter,
it is impossible that the subject be predicated of the predicate.
Thus, e. g., the proposition, 'man is an animal,' is erroneously
converted to 'animal is man.' 109
Wherefore, St. Thomas argues, if it be true that man is said
to be an ' animal ' by reason of one form, and ' man ' by reason
of another, it follows that neither of these two forms could be
predicated of each other save per accidens, unless they be somehow necessarily ordered one to the other. 110 Granting, however,
109 " Si igitur iste ordo facit praedicationes esse per se, hoc non erit secundum
ilium modum dicendi per se qui accipitur secundum formam, sed secundum ilium
qui accipitur secundum rnateriam, et subiectum, sicut dicitur superficies colorata.
Hoc autem est impossible, quia in isto modo dicendi per se, id quod est formale,
praedicatur per se de subiecto, ut, cum dicimus, superficies est alba, vel numerus
est par. Et iterum in hoc modo dicendi per se subiectum ponitur in diffinitione
praedicati, sicut numerus in diffinitione paris. Ibi autem e contrario accidit. Non
enim homo per se praedicatur de animali, sed e converso. Et iterum non ponitur
subiectum in diffinitione praedicati, sed e converso." S.C. G. II, c. 58.
110 " Si ergo alia forma sit a qua aliquid dicitur animal, et a qua aliquid dicitur
homo; sequeretur quod vel unum horum non possit praedicari de altero nisi per

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

383

that they were so ordered, they could only be predicated one
of the other according to the second mode of pre se predication
inasmuch as one form would be a necessary condition for the
existence of the other.m
However, neither of these alternatives is acceptable. The
reason they are not itself rests upon the mode of predication,
for ' animal ' is predicated per se of 'man ' and not per accidens;
and, furthermore, it is impossible that ' animal ' be predicated
of man according to the second mode of per se predication,
since ' man ' is never placed in the definition of ' animal.' 112
Hence there can ultimately be but one substantial form in man
simply because we are able to say: man is an animal; while we
are unable to say that ' an animal is a man.' 113
Thus, one of the most basic tenets both of the philosophies
of nature and of being, namely, the unicity of substantial form,
either in material substances or in immaterial beings, is at
bottom a metaphysical problem, 114 and it can be established by
the metaphysician through the ' logical ' method, that is,
through an analysis of the modes of predication. 15
accidens, si istae duae formae ad invicem ordinem non habent .... " Sum,, Th. I,
q. 76, a. 8, resp.
111 ". • • vel quod sit ibi praedicatio
in secundo modo dicendi per se, si una
animarum sit ad aliam praeambula." Ibid.
112 " Utrumque autem horum est manifeste falsum, quia animal de se de homine
praedicatur, non per accidens; homo autem non ponitur in definitione animalis. sed
e converso. Ergo oportet eamdem formam esse per quam aliquid est homo;
alioquin homo non vere esset id quod est animal, ut sic animal per se de homine
praedicetur." Ibid.
113 Ibid.
'" " Utrum [principium formale] sit unum vel plura, et quod et quae sunt,
pertinet determinare ad philosophiam primam ... quia forma est principium essendi,
et ens inquantum hujusmodi, est subjectum primae philosophiae,'' In I Phys., I. 15,
[283]. The proposition, ' man is an animal ' has experience itself as its irreducible
and infallible source, for every proposition such as this which is per se nota is
infallibly known to be true once the terms of the proposition are understood. Cf.
De Ver., q. 10, a. 12, resp.; and In IV Meta., I. 6. We know that animal is predicated per se of ' man ' because we understand that this is the nature of man,
Cf. also: In VII Meta., I. 8, [1825-26].
115 For parallel instances where St. Thomas has analysed the modes of predication
to establish the unicity of substantial form, cf. S.C. G., II, c. 58; Quaest. Un. de
Anima, a. 11; De Spirit. Creaturis, a. 8.

884

JAMES B. REICHMANN

6. The Logical Method and the Distinction Between Essence

and Existence
Another instance, perhaps more celebrated than any of the
foregoing, in which St. Thomas employs the via praedicationis
to reach a conclusion in the order of metaphysics is found in
the fourth chapter of his opusculum, De Ente et Essentia. Here
St. Thomas makes use of the ' logical ' method to show that
the essence and existence of material beings are distinct. His
argument can be summarized as follows: Whatever does not
pertain to the intelligibility of an essence, comes to it from
without, forming a composition with it, for no essence can be
understood without whatever constitutes a ' part ' of the
essence.116 However, every material essence can be thought of
without considering whether or not it actually exists. 117 Therefore, it is manifest that its " existence is distinct from its
essence or quiddity." ;ns
Since, by reflecting on the modes of predication, I come to
realize that I do not predicate necessary existence of any of the
quiddities I directly experience, I can conclude that the essence
or quiddity is of itself indifferent to an existence apart from the
intentional or mental existence it has in my own mind. Because
the modes of predication follow upon and reflect the modes of
the being of things, I know that the essence of things is truly
distinct from its existence.
Although this argument occurs with some regularity in
various works of St. Thomas, 119 and is never expressly qualified
" 6 "Quidquid
enim non est de intellectu essentiae vel quidditatis, hoc est adveniens extra, et faciens compositionem cum essentia; quia nulla essentia sine his
quae sunt partes essentiae intelligi potest." De Ente et Essentia, c. 4.
117 Ibid.
118 Ibid.
119 "Invenitur enim in omnibus rebus natura entitatis, in quibusdam magis nobilis,
et in quibusdam minus; ita tamen quod ipsarum rerum naturae non sunt hoc ipsum
esse quod habent: alias esse esset de intellectu cujuslibet quidditatis, quod falsum
est, cum quidditas cujuslibet rei possit intelligi etiam non intelligendo de ea an sit.
Ergo oportet quod ab aliquo esse habeant, et oportet devenire ad aliquid cujus
natura sit ipsum suum esse, alias in infinitum procederetur." In II Sent., d. 1, q. 1,
a. 1, sol.; " Esse autem secundum quod dicitur res esse in actu, iuvenitur ad diversas

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

385

as being of dialectical value only, but, rather, is always presented in a ' scientific ' context, there are, nonetheless, those
who wish to interpret it as a merely dialectical or logical argument, and who see in it no grounds for justifying a metaphysical
conclusion. Thus, for example, Father Joseph Owens seriously
questions its validity/ 20 as does Pere Jean Isaac. 121
In plain truth, neither seems to have appreciated the true
nature of this argument, nor the reason for its validity, for
naturas vel quidditates diversimode se habere. Quaedam enim natura est de cujus
intellectu non est suum esse, quod patet ex hoc quod intelligi potest esse cum hoc
quod ignoretur an sit, sicut phoenicem vel eclipsim, vel aliquid hujusmodi. Alia
autem natura invenitur de cujus ratione est ipsum suum esse, immo ipsum esse
est sua natura." In II Sent., d. 8, q. 1; a. 1; " ... si illud esse [scil. divinum] potest
intelligi sine ilia essentia, sequitur quod ilia essentia accidentaliter se habere ad illud
esse.... " S.C. G. I, c. 22; "Essentia enim uniuscuiusque rei est illud quod significat definitio eius." Compend. Theol., c. 10; "In quocumque enim aiiud est essentia,
et aliud esse eius, oportet quod aliud sit quid sit, et aliud quod aliquid sit:
nam per esse suum de quolibet dicitur quod est, per essentiam vero suam de
quolibet dicitur quid sit: unde et diffinitio significans essentiam, demonstrat quid
est res." Ibid., c. 11; " ... esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae; non enim
bonitas vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus earn esse. Oportet
igitur quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus
ad potentiam." Sum. Th., I, q. 8, a. 4, resp.; " ... quia omnia quae sunt in genere
uno, communicant in quidditate vel essentia generis, quod praedicatur de eis in eo
quod quid est. Differunt autem secundum esse; non enim idem est esse hominis
et equi, nee huius hominis et illius hominis. Et sic oportet quod quaecumque sunt
in genere, differant in eis esse et quod quid est, idest essentia." Sum Th. I, q. 3, a.
5, resp.
12 ° For example, Fr. Owens writes:
" Because one can know what a man or a
phoenix is without knowing that any such thing exists in reality, one is supposed to
see that the being is in reality other than the essence. Such an understanding of
the argument would seem to take for granted that one has a direct and immediate
perception of the essence as a reality complete and rounded-off in itself as though
it prescinded from being, and a similar perception of existence as a distinct reality.
This has been called the ' logical ' proof of the real distinction. But as found in
St. Thomas, it does not enter the logical order at all. It starts from the nature
considered absolutely, and so as common to both the logical and real orders, and
proper to neither." St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics, Marquette University Press, 1957, p. 95.
121 " Nous crayons que Ia preuve du de Ente et Essentia est purement dialectique;
on ne demontre pas !'existence de Dieu par Ia distinction reelle de !'essence et de
!'existence, mais vice versa." Bulletin Thomiste, VIII, 1951-52, p. 58. As
indicated earlier, Pere Isaac does not seem to have distinguished adequately between
logic and dialectics, but tends to identify every ' logical ' method with a dialectical
one. Cf., note 4.

886

JAMES B. REICHMANN

neither seems aware of the special manner in which the metaphysician is qualified to employ the logical method and apply
it to real being.122 In none of the instances in which we note
that St. Thomas employs this argument does there appear the
slightest justification to assume that he is arguing dialectically
only. The argument is presented in full seriousness and apodictically; from it he immediately concludes to the existence of
subsistent being. Moreover, oftentimes this is the only argument employed in a context that is calculated to establish
the real distinction between created essence and its existence.
On the other hand, if one has not clearly realized the peculiar
relevancy of logic to metaphysics, and the spee;ial manner in
which the metaphysician is privileged to employ logic in developing his own science, it is understandable that one should
be skeptical of St. Thomas' procedure, and should seek to
neutralize its significance.123

7. Logw and Metaphysics
If the foregoing interpretation of the 'logical' method of
metaphysics is correct, then it seems time that one seek to
restore logic to its rightful place of dignity and importance in
the academic world. The current tendency often to associate
logic with idealism and to ease it out of the philosophical
curriculum cannot but have profound repercussions for metaphysics and for the whole of philosophy. It is inevitable that,
by losing sight of the method of metaphysics, one will eventually lose sight of metaphysics itself, or, what would prove
122 One author who does not seek to minimize the 'logical'
argument and is not
embarrassed by it is Germain G. Grisez. In a review article of M. Gilson's book,
The Elements of Christian Philosophy, p. 14, he writes: " Further, although this
argument is in a way very similar to dialetical argumentation, I do not think it is
dialectical; rather, it is an example of the metaphysical method which Aquinas
himself explicitly describes and distinguishes from dialectic, (In Boetii de Trin.,
q. 6, a. 1) ." The Thomist, XXIII, 3, 1960, p. 469.
123 For an outstanding
example of a recent, sympathetic evalution of the science
of logic, cf. Intentional Logic, Henry B. Veatch, Yale University Press,

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

887

equally as disastrous, confuse metaphysics with the science of
logic.
Further, the foregoing analysis heavily underlines not only
the easy availability of the 'rational' or 'logical' method in
furthering a metaphysical investigation, but it indicates at the
same time the metaphysician's need for an understanding and
appreciation of that method, and, consequently, of the nature
and the function of the science of logic. Though these two
sciences are indeed distinct as sciences, they are, nonetheless,
in a very real sense more closely related to each other than to
any other of the sciences, for logic and metaphysics are the only
' common ' sciences sharing in a certain way a ' common ' subject, being.124
Thus, although logic is the method of all the sciences, yet in
the fullest and most proper sense it is the method of the science
of metaphysics. Therefore, precisely because the rational
method consists in the application of the " modes of predication " to real being, just as the logician analyses the modes
of predication in order to exploit the subject of his own investigation, beings of reason, it follows that the metaphysician must
have a thorough grasp of at least the fundamentals of logic,
and of the various modes of predication themselves, if he is to
honor the demands made upon him by his own science.125
This, then., can be ranked as a classic instance of the applicability of St. Thomas' opening remark in his opusculum, De
Ente et Essentia, that a small error in the beginning becomes a
large one in the end. If indeed the metaphysician has an
imperfect understanding of the meaning of predication and the
significance of its various modes, surely he cannot long avoid
erring in applying these modes to the subject of his own science,
real being.
12 • We do not intend to imply, however, that the study of logic, as such, is
exclusively a logical inquiry, for, as E. Coreth points out, it is also a metaphysical
one. " Die begriindung der Logik kann aber nicht Aufgabe der Logik selbst, sondem
nur Aufgabe der Metaphysik als Grundwissenschaft sein." Metaphysik: Eine
Methodisch-Systematische Grundlegung, Tyrolia-Verlag, Innsbruck, 1961, p. 85.
125 Cf., note 82.

388

JAMES B. REICHMANN

In his opusculum, De Natura Generis, St. Thomas has
dramatized this point very effectively by indicating how a
confused understanding of the nature of predication, through
a failure to distinguish adequately between per se and per
accidens predication, has led some into the error of supposing
that a single being can contain a plurality of substantial
forms. 126
Further, in his Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas warns against
a wooden and mathematical application of logical intentions to
the real order, which can easily lead to an arbitrary and artificial multiplication and division of the real. 127 Besides, as
already seen, in his proemium to the De Ente et Essentia he
expressly mentions the philosopher's need to recognize the
manner in which ' essence ' and ' being ' are related to logical
intentions, if, in the carrying out of his investigation, he is to
a void error .128
126 " Ex dictis patet quod, considerando entitatem
rerum in se sicut Philosophus
Primus, in substantia nulla foret praedicatio unius de altero, quae tamen in substantia reperitur secundum logicum, secundum quem substantia quodammodo induit
similitudinem inhaerentiae accidentalis, ubi est proprie dici de altero etiam secundum
primum philosophum. Ex quo facile deprehenditur error volentium in natura rei
multiplicare formas substantiales, unde sumuntur praedicta substantialia, sicut et
formae accidentales multiplicantur in re, de qua multa praedicantur accidentalia
realiter cum tamen in substantia non sit praedicatio aliqua secundum veram naturam
rei, sed per actum intellectus, ut dictum est. Unde ponentes plures formas substantiales in re una, ignorant naturam et originem propositionum, in quibus aliquid
de aliquo praedicatur, et difjerentiam etiam inter substantiam et accidens." Caput 5,
[513]; "Ponit enim [scil. Avicebron] omnes formas secundum se consideratas accidentia esse; dicit tamen substantiales esse per comparationem ad aliquas res in
quarum definitionibus cadunt, sicut albedo est de ratione hominis albi. Sed haec
positio tollit quidem veritatem materiae primae. . . . Tollit etiam logicae principia,
auferens veram rationem generis et speeiei et substantialis differentiae, dum mnnia
in modum accidentalis praedicationis convertit." De Substantiis Separatis, c. 6,
[69-70], Divi Thomae Aquinatis Opuscula Philosophica, M. Spiazzi, 0. P., ed.,
Marietti, Taurini, 1954.
127 " ••• non oportet
secundum diversas rationes vel intentiones logicas, quae
consequuntur modum intelligendi, diversitatem in rebus naturalibus accipere; quia
ratio unum et idem secundum diversos modos apprehendere potest." Sum. Th. I,
q. 76, a. 3, ad 4; Cf. also, De Natura Generis, cap. 5, [513], cited in the preceding
footnote.
128 " ••• ideo, ne ex eorum ignorantia errare contingat, ad horum difficultatem

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

389

Lastly, in his commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius,
in reply to an objection, St. Thomas returns to this point while
expressly intent upon emphasizing another. He concedes that
for the most part a scientific inquiry should begin with what is
simpler and easier in itself and then proceed to what is by
nature more difficult, unless necessity demands otherwise. 129
For, on occasion, there is need to begin one's inquiry not with
what is easier for us, but with that upon which the understanding of what is to follow depends. 130 This, he maintains, is
the situation with regard to logic, for it is by no means an easier
discipline than the other sciences; on the contrary, it is one of
the most difficult. Logic is difficult precisely because it deals
with second intentions (secunda intellectis) .131
Nonetheless, a study of logic should precede a consideration
of the other sciences, because their unfolding depends upon it,
inasmuch as logic provides the method of proceeding in all of
the sciences. Clearly some knowledge of the method of a science
is a prior condition for the acquisition of the science itsel£.132
aperiendam, dicendum est, quid nomine essentiae et entis significetur, et quomodo
in diversis inveniantur, et quomodo se habeant ad intentiones logicas, scilicet genus,
speciem et differentiam." De Ente et Essentia, Proem., [1].
129 " ••• in addiscendo incipimus ab eo quod est magis facile, nisi necessitas aliud
requirat." Q. 6, a. 1, ad 2 am quaestionem, ad 3 obj.
130 " Quandoque enim necessarium est in addiscendo incipere non ab eo quod est
facilius, sed ab eo, a cuius cognitione sequentium cognitio dependet." Ibid.
131 " Et hac ratione oportet
in addiscendo a logica incipere non quia ipsa sit
facilior ceteris scientiis, habet enim maximum difficultatem, cum sit de secundo
intellectis .... " Ibid. In an article in which the role of logic and its relation to
metaphysics is expressly discussed, Sheila O'Flynn seems to argue against St.
Thomas on this point, for she states that logic should be studied first simply because
it is easier than metaphysics, and that, were this not so, the natural order of
learning would be inverted. " There is another point to be considered, so important
that, if it were lacking, the logical approach would be in vain. Not only can the
second intentions be distinctly known independently of a distinct knowledge of the
reality upon which they are remotely founded, they can, besides, be known more
easily than the objects of metaphysical inquiry. If this were not so, the logical
introduction to a metaphysical study would be contrary to the order of learning."
Op. cit., p. 186. Italics mine.
132 " ••• sed quia aliae scientiae ab ipsa dependent, in quantum ipsa docet modum
procedendi in omnibus scientiis. Oportet autem primo scire modum scientiae quam

390

JAMES B. REICHMANN

There is a latent paradox in the remark that the knowledge
of the method of a science must precede its actual appropriation. What is more, the paradox is particularly disconcerting
with regard to the first of the human sciences, metaphysics.
On the one hand it appears that one must first know the
science before he can determine the method appropriate to it,
and, on the other, it seems impossible that he have actually
appropriated the science to any degree without first having
employed the method proper to it. As indicated, the problem is
especially acute in establishing the method of metaphysics, for,
as a universal and common science, it excludes nothing from its
consideration. 138
Yet, the conclusions at which we have arrived regarding the
unique method of metaphysics permit one to escape the horns
of this dilemma, for it has been pointed out that the method of
metaphysics is the ' other ' common science, logic, which the
metaphysician employs precisely inasmuch as it is doctrinal.
This fact, then, permits the ' future metaphysician ' to develop
the method which he will later be able to employ as the method
of metaphysics, before he need have any express notion of a
science of metaphysics, or indeed of its method as such.
In acquiring a knowledge of logic he is unconsciously preparing and rendering possible the great intellectual adventure of
seeking out a deeper understanding of being, and it seems likely
that he will have begun to metaphysicize implicitly long before
he has an express understanding of the nature of his inquiry,
and, perhaps, even much less of the manner in which it is being
conducted. Yet, if his performance is truly that of a metascientiam ipsam, ut dicitur in II Metaphysicae." In Boetii de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad
quaest., ad Sam obj.
183 "A method
can direct activity to a goal only by anticipating the general
nature of the goal. But the only question to be settled in metaphysics is the general
nature of the goal of knowledge, for all questions of detail have to be met by the
science and by common sense. Accordingly, it would seem that every method in
metaphysics must be involved in the fallacy of begging the question. By the mere
fact of settling upon a method, one presupposes as settled the very issue that metaphysics proposes to resolve." Bernard J. Lonergan, S. J., Insight: A Study of Human
Understanding, Longmans, London, 1958, rev. ed., p. 401.

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

391

physician, he is using the method of metaphysics, i. e., the
rational method, and this necessitates his having gained some
explicit mastery at least over the mysterious workings of his
own mind, for logic, as the science of second intentions, involves
just this.
In this manner the apparent circularity of the ' methodscience' process is broken, for, in exploring the structure of his
intellectual operations and reasoning processes, one is indeed
shaping and forging for use the very instrument he will have
need of to carry on all manner of scientific endeavor, and
especially that of seeking out the diversification as well as the
causes of common being. Indeed, were it otherwise, and were
the method of metaphysics anything other than logic itself, in
the sense already outlined, the objection would be unanswerable. Then one would have to understand the nature of metaphysics before he could devise a method proper to it, and he
would, on the other hand, require a consciously possessed
metaphysical method before determining upon the nature of
the science of metaphysics. 134
8. Logic and Contemporary Thomism

The precise and nuanced manner in which logic constitutes
the method of metaphysics has, to the detriment of the working out of a systematized development of St. Thomas' metaphysics, often been neglected by some of the more prominent
expositors of Thomism, and, in some instances, views concern134 Father Lonergan replies to this dilemma with a distintion between latent and
explicit metaphysics. However, because his notion of a latent metaphysics does not
seem to involve a partially explicit logic which will serve as the method of metaphysics, we would suggest that the analysis presented above adds a needed complementary dimension for a fuller explanation of the possibility of the priority of
metaphysical method over the science of metaphysics. At the same time, however,
Lonergan does insist that the method of metaphysics is grounded on explicit anticipations of consciousness, and by this, perhaps, he understands very much the same
thing we feel St. Thomas does by doctrinal logic. ". . . there is only one method
that is not arbitrary, and it grounds its explicit anticipations on the anticipations
that, though latent, are p1·esent and operative in consciousness." Lonergan, op. cit.,
pp. 401-02.

392

JAMES B. REICHMANN

ing logic seem to have been entertained which run counter to
the foregoing interpretation of logic as uniquely constituting a
metaphysical method.
One notes, for example, that M. Gilson tends to consider
logic as a genuine philosophical liability. Indeed, he does not
hesitate to suggest that
rather than being a valuable
instrument of inquiry for the metaphysician, tends rather to
lead him astray. As a consequence the more we " ... rid it of
logic, the closer we are to metaphysics." 135 In the place of logic
he would substitute a rejuvenated grammar which he apparently conceives of as a kind of ' existential ' logic. He will even
suggest that logic has been at the root of most, if not all, of
man's metaphysical troubles, and proposes as a workable
remedy ridding grammar of logic altogether, that grammar
might serve as an unmixed and pure instrument available to
the metaphysician as he seeks to deepen his knowledge of
being. 136
While this indictment is directed toward Aristotelian logic
principally, its tenor seems to indicate that its author somehow considers logic an unqualified metaphysical liability which
should, as far as possible, be kept at a discreet distance from
the science of being lest it contaminate it. 137
Being and Some Philosophers, Toronto, 1947, p. 198.
We might have better luck with contemporary grammarians, for whom the
logic of Aristotle is but a thing of the past. True enough, such scholars feel in no
way concerned with philosophical problems. Language is for them a fact to be
objectively studied, such as it is. But this is precisely what we need, and it may
well appear, on closer investigation, that grammar is nearer metaphysics than formal
logic itself is. The more we rid it of logic, the closer we are to metaphysics." Ibid.
With all their emphasis on the importance of logic, both Aristotle and St. Thomas
always display a great respect for the art of grammar and the meaning of words,
a point which M. Gilson seems to overlook, but of which Prof. De Koninck is
keenly aware. " The modest objective of this paper was simply to draw attention
to the truth that no explanation in metaphysics will be adequate-that none indeed
will be soundly grounded-unless the need for this simple but thoroughly fundamental investigation of the meaning of words is acknowledged. In this respect
Aristotle, and St. Thomas after him, are abreast of the most urgent problems of
philosophy in our own time." " Metaphysics and the Interpretation of Words,"
Laval Theologique et Philosophique, XVII, I, 1961, p. 84.
137 Op. cit., p. 196.
135

136 "

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

393

Clearly, such an attitude has very little in common with St.
Thomas' view that there is a special affinity between logic and
metaphysics, since both sciences share in a certain way the
same subject, common being, and that this permits the metaphysician to employ logic in his own investigations of real being
in precisely the same manner the logician uses his own science
in investigating beings of reason.us
All of which leaves us little choice but to conclude, despite
our profound respect for M. Gilson as a philosopher, that St.
Thomas himself would hear the views he expresses on the
nature of logic, and its overall place in the philosophical enterprise, with frank astonishment. It is doubtlessly undeniable
that the science of logic has been abused, and that the ' logicism,' which Gilson himself so masterfully dissects in his work,
The Unity of Philosophical Experience, has played an important role in the history of modern philosophy. 139
Yet, let us not hastily condemn logic for the abusive way in
which it has been handled by undiscerning philosophers. Today
it is still the metaphysical instrument par excellence,140 just as
it was for St. Thomas and for Aristotle, and it finds its nobility
precisely in this, that it is mediately ordered to assist, in an
unique and singular fashion, in man's greatest merely' human'
undertaking, the quest for the causes of what is.141
138 For a critique
of Gilson's conception of the function of logic in metaphysics
of Christian
similar to our own, cf. Germain G. Grisez's review of Gilson's
Philosophy, The Thomist, XXIII, 8, 1960, pp. 467 fl'.
139 (lfl4)
Chapter I.
140 In the proemium to his commentary
of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle,
St. Thomas summarizes the nature and function of logic with his accustomed
penetration and clarity: " Si igitur ex hoc, quod ratio de actu manus ratiocinatur,
adinventa est ars aedificatoria vel fabrilis, per quas homo faciliter et ordinate
huiusmodi actus exercere potest; eadem ratione ars quaedam necessaria est, quae
sit directiva ipsius actus rationis, per quam scilicet homo in ipso actu rationis
ordinate, faciliter et sine errore procedat. Et haec ars est logica, idest rationalis
scientia. Quae non solum rationalis est ex hoc, quod est secundum rationem (quod
est omnibus artibus commune); sed etiam ex hoc, quod est circa ipsum actum
rationis sicut circa propriam materiam. Et ideo videtur esse ars artium, quia in
actu rationis, nos dirigit, a quo omnes artes procedunt."
141 " Sed quia logica ordinatur
ad cognitionem de rebus sumendam, significatio

394

JAMES B. REICHMANN

As for grammar, necessary and important as its function is,
it does not attend to a consideration of the immediate signification of words as signs of concepts, and as employed in propositions and reasoning, but rather to the remote and abitrary
meaning of words as employed in individual and particular
languages. 142 Hence grammar could not possibly take over the
function of logic. Accordingly, it is surely with unfeigned
wonderment that St. Thomas would entertain the suggestion
that the metaphysician be perennially on his guard against
the incursion of logic into his science, and even that he would
do well to alienate himself from logic as much as possible.
Rather his conception of logic and its function is such as to
permit and to encourage a far more amicable relationship
between logic and its sister science, metaphysics. 143
Metaphysics is not logic, yet neither can the metaphysician
carry out his sacred assignment to investigate the real without
logic. Although logic deals with beings of reason, it is not on
this account entirely unrelated to the real; it is this factor,
gigantic in its implications for philosophy, which, as Pere
Philippe, 0. P., has pointed out, distinguishes Thomist from
Nominalist logic.144 The logic, therefore, of St. Thomas and
Aristotle essentially faces toward the real, and loses its very
identity if understood in any other context. 145 Unfortunately,
vocum, quae est immediata ipsis conceptiorribus intellectus, pertinet ad principalem
considerationem ipsius. In Peri Hermen., I, 1. 2, [13].
142 " ••• significatio autem litterarum,
tanquam magis remota, non pertinet ad
eius [sci!. logici] considerationem, sed magis ad considerationem grammatici." Ibid.
143 On the importance
of logic to metaphysics cf. "Aquinas on Metaphysical
Method," by James C. Doig, C. S.C., Philosophical Studies, XIII, 1964, pp. 81 ff.
144 "Analyser
Ia logique de S. Thomas sous Ia lumiere de Ia logique formelle
mathematique, c'est Iaisser echapper !'essential de Ia logique thomiste, qui presuppose
une philosophie de l'etre et de Ia substance et ne peut se comprendre qu'en fonction
de cette philosophie. Certes, Ia logique de S. Thomas a bien un subjet qui lui est
propre, l'etre de raison, analogue au sujet de Ia metaphysique (In Meta., IV, 1. 4,
[574]) mais cet etre de raison se fonde sur Ia nature en tant que connue et ne peut
s'isoler de cette nature. C'est ce qui distingue Ia logique thomiste de Ia logique
nominaliste." M.-D. Philippe, 0. P ., BuUetin Thomiste, Tome X, 1957-59, Fascicule
I, p. 271. Cf. also, note 141.
145 In Peri Hermenias, I, 1. 2, [13].

LOGIC AND THE METHOD OF METAPHYSICS

395

once the real nature and function of logic is lost from view, the
possibilities of metaphysics' itself permanently slipping over
the precipice of the human horizon are frighteningly real. 146
JAMES

B. REICHMANN,

s. J.

Moont St. Michael's,
Spokane, Washington.

146 Witness, for example, Henry D. Aiken's remark concerning logic and a subsequent comment on the nature and function of philosophy. "Logic, by general
consent, is no longer a philosophical subject, and all logicians are, or wish they
were, members of the departments of mathematics .... The 'fate' of philosophy
then is now, as ever, to be neither a science, an art, or even a discipline. It has
no principles; nor as philosophy can it ever acquire any. It is always and forever
a personal 'activity' of the human soul." Philosophy in the Twentieth Century,
Vol. I, William Barrett and Henry D. Aiken, editors, Random House, New York,
1962, pp. 17-18. Yet one could hardly wish for a harsher critique of logic than that
supplied us by Heidegger: ". . . to invoke logic for purposes of delimiting the
essence of thinking is a questionable approach, if only because logic as such, and
not merely some of its doctrines and theories, is questionable. . . . Logic arose in
the curriculum of the Platonic-Aristotelian schools. Logic is an invention of
schoolteachers, not of philosophers." Martin Heidegger, An Introduction to Metaphysics, Ralph Manheim (trans.), Yale University, 1959, pp. 120-21.

MORALITY AND REAL RELATIONS

B

ACKED AS he is by the experience of his predecessors,
each philosopher simultaneously faces the problem of
stating his insights in a manner meaningful to his contemporaries. This article suggests a way for the moral philosopher to catch the attention of men living in this age of
sensitivity to time's irreversibility, this era of field-theory psychology and of increased awareness both of inner tensions and
of community. A relational, not relativistic, view seems suitable for today and suggests that the ethician look around
carefully before he looks upward or forward.
Attempting to explain the nature of moral reasoning, philosophers who wish to take account both of the invariant features
about man as well as his gradual approximation to goals or a
goal are, like all humans, liable to err. Karl Rahner portrays
the results of overplaying the heavy hand of the law-giver or
of overstressing the fixity of natures.
The situation [in reigning deductive moral theologies], as it were,
gives the cue for the choice of the universal norms to be considered
here and now. What is carried out and applied, are the universal
norms and they alone. The situation is conceived tacitly and as a
matter of course as simply pre-existent to the finding of the norm
and the making of one's decision. 1

Situation and norms, in such cases, are the only factors required
to find the concrete imperative. The pure objectivity of the
deductive approach in theology which Rahner is decrying has
also been caricatured whenever ivory towers are taken to be
the natural habitat of philosophers.
A similar accent on objectivity is apparent in any moral
1 Theological Investigations, vol. II:
Man in the Church, tr. Karl-H. Kruger
(Baltimore: Helicon, 1963), 221.
For a discussion of two basic ways to view natural law, see V. J. Bourke, "Two
Approaches to Natural Law," Natural Law Forum, I, 1 (1956), 93-4.

396

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

397

philosopher who considers man's ultimate end as some rather
static extrinsic object. At least a suggestion of this mentality
peeps out in the following passage.
Our actions are always directed at a limited set of circumstances
apart from which the distant goals remain vague and ineffectual.
And the future reference of present action does not make the
present a means to the future; on the contrary, it makes the present
more an end in itself than otherwise could be. 2

The circumstances and future goals of the moral act cannot
be overlooked by the ethician, of course, but if their connection
with the very being of the agent is not recognized, necessary
lawfulness again is replaced by such severe objectivity that it
may become difficult to elucidate personal moral responsibility.
The " relational morality " explicated below is frankly an
effort to span a frequently encountered subjective-objective
dichotomy which does not seem to hold up under intense
scrutiny. 3 The science of ethics must take into account not
only the commoness of human nature but also the rich variety
of human tendencies to ends. In its efforts to acknowledge
these systematically, ethics need not fall into extremes like the
ones just mentioned. Taking all relevant reality into account,
the ethician can admit that man is a tendential being really
related to others and really ordered within himself. What
activities suit such a being can then be determined. Of course,
the tendencies themselves are known through a study of
activities.
To admit the reality of relations without falling into relativism, or wandering forever in a Bradleyan world in which all
contingent things are merely adjectival of the Absolute, is not
an easy task. 4 If relation is viewed solely as a categorical
• Otis Lee, "Value and the Situation," Journal of Philosophy, XLI, 13 (June ilil,
1944)' 360.
3 See V. J. Bourke, "Natural
Law and the Contemporary Mind," in Teaching
Thomism Today, ed. G. F. McLean, O.M.I. (Catholic University Press, 1963), 31-0.
• Gestalt psychology seems to have a similar problem in bounding its " fields "
without excluding relevant structures. See M. Wertheimer, "Some Problems in the
Theory of Ethics," in Documents of Gestalt Psychology, ed. Mary Henle (University of California Press, 1961), 36-37.

398

SISTER THERESA CLARE

accident conveniently mediating between beings without entering into their very existence in a real though accidental way,
the failure of any relational ethics is inevitable. But if the
experience of various kinds of human relations is carefully
surveyed, the conviction that man is actually marked by them
may emerge. The metaphysical basis for these important relations can then be uncovered, and a logical way to express the
findings can be decided on. This article attempts such a survey,
indication of foundations, and expression of the results.

I. ExPERIENTIAL EviDENCE FOR RELATIONS
When one attempts to state fully all the important relations
of man, several approaches suggest themselves. To avoid excessive complexity in this admittedly involved survey, we will
first look briefly at man as a part of various kinds of wider
wholes 5 and then glance at him as a whole with intrinsic
parts. The procedure can be described as a gradual narrowing
of focus on the field of relations.
A. Wholes of Which Man is a Part
Because they do not bring themselves into existence, all
creatures are necessarily connected in a relation of dependency
for their very being on God, the source of their existence.6
An obligation to acknowledge this dependency follows if the
creature becomes aware of it. This order of creatures to Creator
is inescapable, and the built-in tendencies man finds in himself
as well as in other creatures pose their own demands. Not the
least of these tendencies is man's lingering dissatisfaction with
anything less than the very source of all being. He has no choice
about the fact that he is made the way he is, a tending being. 7
5 See Helmut Kuhn, "Le concept de l'ordre,"
Gregorianum, XLIII, fl (196fl),
fl57, for a discussion of order as togetherness.
6 Summa Theologiae, I, fll, 1 ad 3; Ottawa vol. I, 1491. See also ibid., 13, 5c;
Ottawa vol. I, 81.
7 See Thomas Davitt,
S. J., "St. Thomas Aquinas and the Natural Law," in
Origins of the Natural Law Tradition, ed. Arthur L. Harding (Dallas: Southern
Methodist University Press, 1954), 33.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

899

It is by an examination of activities which indicate these inclinations, however, rather than by a direct vision of their
Source that man can discover what actions are most appropriate
for him. Even someone who doubts the ultimate ordination
of all things to God can learn much from a study of experienced
inclinations which seem universal.
The widest whole of which man finds himself a part seems to
be the cosmos. That there is give and take on all levels
within the system is attested to by abundant scientific data.
Looking at his relations to non-human things, man finds himself dependent on them for necessary shelter and food, for his
very continued living. They in turn depend on man, the only
culture-producing animal, for their full actualization. Communication and expression are dependent on material media,
and in these processes there arise new relations which bind
individuals together. It seems correct to say that the average
man of 1965 is involved in a melange of real relations with his
environment more diverse than that of his counterpart living
in the year 965. The intelligibility of these environmental
influences is part of the ethician's concern. 8
Relations with other persons rather than with inanimate
things or irrational animals seem more clearly, however, to influence the being of man and enter into his moral activity. He
finds himself to be a member of many groups besides the organizations he may form or join voluntarily. That man is by
nature sociable is argued to not only from his gregarious
tendencies but also from the evidence that group life is necessary for the fulfillment of human capacities on all levels and at
all ages.9 Hermits are remarkable exceptions, but even they
8 See V. J. Bourke, "Freedom
as a Moral Value," Proceedings of the Xllth
International Congress of Philosophy, vol. III (Firenze: Sansoni, 1960), 63-64 and
also Jacques Leclercq, La vie en ordre, vol. IV in Essais de morale Catholique
(Paris: Casterman, 1947) , 67.
9 "Yet although the person is a substance and as such can sustain relations, he
does not possess the gift of aseity; he exists not in isolation but in a particular
situation and hence ill relation to other things. Indeed he cannot exist without
these relations, because it is through them that he attains self-awareness and selffulfillment. He is continually being made and unmade and remade again by them,

400

SISTER THERESA CLARE

cannot be said to be islands. They cannot shake off their real
dependence on their Creator. Recluses are often cited as
supreme examples of the exercise of human freedom, but
persons who live in free societies provide the moral philosopher
with examples of more complex interplays of relations both
necessary and free. 10
It is interesting to observe how psychiatrists and psychologists, who purport to have individuals as their chief concern,
insist that they must take into consideration the social milieu
of their clients. Kurt Goldstein, to take one, contends that
" a true insight into the condition of the individual is to be
gained only if the individual is considered as part of the whole
of nature, particularly of the human society to which it belongs." 11 Man considered apart from the society of his fellows
is a useful but in a sense a false abstraction.
The group needs man, for without him there is no group. Man
needs the group, for his fullest actuality as man cannot be achieved
so that at times he may seem to be no more than a cluster, a criss-cross of
relations. The relational being of society has the effect, therefore, of making the
person other than he would be if, by an impossible supposition, he remained
unrelated, or if, more plausibly, he were part of a different relational pattern."
Joseph Folliet, Man in his Environment, tr. Martin Murray (New York:
Hawthorn Books, 1963), 16.
10 " In its most general sense, personal freedom is a certain relation:
the free
agent stands in a definite reference to his surroundings and to the various components of his consciousness.
"Social freedom introduces greater complexity into this relation. The free society
adds to the consituent freedoms of its members a new complexus of inter-personal
relations. A well organized group of persons presupposes self-determination within
the group and some non-restriction from outside the group. The moral value of
societal freedom is analogous to that of the person but is constituted of additional
facts, ideals and relations." Bourke, "Freedom as a Moral Value," op. cit., 66.
11 Human Nature in the Light of Psychopathology
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1951), 6.
See Wertheimer, op. cit., 38, 40, for similar statements by a psychologist.
Abraham Maslow asserts, " I would now add to my former statement which
stressed the pursuit of identity as a major preoccupation of existential psychology,
the additional problem of the need for community, of self-realization via community, and of the real, deep, and possibly insoluble problems of the relationship
between identity and community." "Further Notes on the Psychology of Being,"
Journal of Humanistic Psychology, III, 1 (Spring, 1963), 128.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

401

except by those autonomous acts of voluntary action involved in
social living. Reason, the hallmark of man, employed in the understanding of one's self, leads one toward the actualizing of multiform
relationships. Intentional human action in accordance with the
natural law of one's being cannot be in natural conflict with the
same in any other being living under reason.12

If man deliberately tries to live in a group without being of
a group, tensions may develop to the point of endangering his
own healthy equilibrium.
The family, the smallest social unit, can provide myriad
examples of many types of influential inter-personal relations.
Although the biological element certainly figures in family
relations, it is not the constitutive element which distinguishes
the human from the animal organism. Person goes with sociaJ.13
Human need of a group seems most obvious in the case of
human infants, who are more helpless than any animal young.
Their dependence on their parents is a very real relation with
evident moral implications for father and mother. Conversely,
an experiential basis for oughtness lies in the child's awareness
of owing something to his parents that he does not owe to other
men.
Children themselves not only would behave differently but
would have different "personalities" if they had different
parents. Thus within the family all sorts of superior-inferior,
mutual, or symmetrical-asymmetrical relations obtain. An indication of this two-way interplay is the effect which creative
education of children has on the parents themselves. Even a
cursory survey of relations of man as a part of a family and
of other social units can serve as convincing proof that every
man is different intrinsically because of his group memberships.
The inter-personal ties just discussed may be regarded as
extrinsic relationships in the sense that man is the subject
12 R. C. Baldwin, "A Note on Obligation," Proceedings of the X lith International
Congress of Philosophy, vol. VII (Firenze: Sansoni, 1961), 43-44.
13 J. Messner, ,Ethics and Facts (St. Louis:
Herder,
30-31, lists the determinants of precisely human existence belonging to the world of values as: personality, family, and society.

402

SISTER THERESA CLARE

and something outside him is the term. There are other more
intrinsic relations which can be called " reflexive " because man
is both their subject and term. These are orderings found or
made within himself. Not even a Robinson Crusoe is without
such relationships, for he surely would experience some inner
tensions which many philosophers would attribute to the conflict of sense appetites and reason. " Reflexive " here does not
mean to imply that a man must be aware of them. They are
real whether or not they are reflected on. Of course, to be or
become aware of them is an important component of moral
activity.
B. Man as a Whole of Parts
When a man is ordered within himself, order in his relations
with others is often spontaneously engendered or recovered. 14
This is not true only of recent or contemporary men. Yet it
seems that systematic investigation of the individual psyche
has been a characteristic of modern thought since the Renaissance. The scrutiny of subjectivity and reflection on conscious
activity are aspects of many modern philosophies. Instead of
examining such philosophical systems, however, this section
will pay more attention to what a few present-day psychologists
are discovering and concluding with regard to human internal
harmony. They seem to provide data of interest to the moral
philosopher.
1. Psychological Integration

Herbert Fingarette, a practicing psychiatrist reflecting on his
findings, concludes that all insight therapy has a moral dimension. He thinks that neurotic and ontic guilt are inseparable
and that guilt feelings are associated with unconscious, unintegrated sub-selves. Sub-selves which a person cannot accept are
repressed, and guilt feelings become associated with such repressions.15 Are such statements significant for an ethician? He
See S. T. I-II, 36, Sc; Ottawa vol. II, 914.
Herbert Fingarette, "Real Guilt and Neurotic Guilt," Journal of Existential
Psychiatry, III, 10 (Fall, 1962), 156-7.
14

15

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

403

might speak of virtues and vices instead of " sub-selves," but
the ethician would probably agree that integration is indeed
a sign of moral maturity. Every moral act seems to be a
product of veritable constellations of virtues in dynamic interplay and with shifting patterns.
Abraham Maslow, another existential psychologist, holds
that
... ultimately, the best way for a person to discover what he
ought to do is to find out who and what he is, because the path to
ethical and value decisions, to wiser choices, to oughtness, is via
isness, via the discovery of facts, truth, reality, the nature of the
particular person. 16

What a man is doing is thus to be distinguished both from
what he could do and what he ought to do. All three aspects
are viewed by Maslow as some function of what kind of being
man is. He continues,
The more he knows about his own nature, his deep wishes, his
temperament, his constitution, what he seeks and yearns for and
what really satisfies him, the more effortless, automatic and epiphenomenal become his value choices. . . . Many problems simply
disappear; many others are easily solved by knowing what is in
conformity with one's nature, what is suitable and right.H

The vocabulary, again, is different from that of many philosophers; but Maslow shares their conviction that there is
some community in human nature. He thinks that through
therapy a person comes to find out what he is, and this description is found to be almost the same as the description of what
he ought to be. Part of what he now is, he himself has constructed. Some dissatisfaction with the edifice has led him to
therapy in the first place.

Realizing Ideals
The end for which the patient is striving is not extrinsic but
rather the existing self. One way to fuse what he is and what
"Fusions of Facts and Values," American Journal of Psychoanalysis, XXIII,
(1963),

16

17

Ibid.

404

SISTER THERESA CLARE

he ought to be is to redefine his expectations so as to make
them come closer to actuality and attainability. This may lead
to a kind of Spinozistic learning to love the inevitable. On the
other hand, it may be that the patient's ideals are unrealistic.
Not only is there the problem of actualizing dormant possibilities, there is also the task of distinguishing truly human
capacities and freeing the patient from arbitrary " neurotic
shoulds," his distorted notions of what is fitting to his deepest
needs. The psychical illnesses consequent upon not fulfilling
true potentialities or upon trying to actualize idealistic nonfulfillable ones are just as symptomatic as sickness resulting
from choosing food unsuitable to one's digestive system. 18
The importance of knowing human nature in all its ramifications is stressed by Maslow.
. . . if one becomes disillusioned with humanness as one gets to
see it more deeply, then this is the same as saying that one had
illusions or expectations which could not be realized or could not
stand the light of day, i. e., which were false and unreaU 9

Here we see Maslow widening his perspectives to make observations about humanness as such. In the following excerpt, a
priest-psychologist tries to narrow his view so as to give an
intelligible account of moral individuality.
It is impossible for the virtue of prudence to play its integrative
and dynamic role in the normal moral development without mature
and well differentiated psychological equipment. This equipment
consists of adequate reality perception and testing, of correct estimation of past events and precise anticipation of future possibilities,
of elaborate experience and logical reasoning, of sound sensitivity to
guilt and efficacious inhibitive powers. 20

The recognition by both these authors of man's interior complexity is noteworthy.
18

See Karen Horney's discussions of these inner conflicts of the neurotic in Our

Inner Conflicts (New York: W. W. Norton, 1945).
19 •· Fusions ... " op. cit., 19!3.
20 Noel Mailloux, 0. P., "Morality
and Contemporary Psychology," Proceedings
of the Catholic Theological Society of America, IX (1954), 54. See Rahner, op. cit.,
227.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

405

3. Reflection

Recognition of inner conflicts certainly points to the fact
that the " parts " within man are not automatically ordered.
His precise task as a rational being seems to be to reflect on
himself, a task he cannot accomplish by some simple intuition
but rather by laborious observation of his own behavior in
relational complexes. Reasoning itself is an example of relating
or measuring, a bringing together of objects in order to see
whether they fit. Maslow says that
if we wish the facts to tell us their oughtness, we must learn to
listen to them in a very specific way which can be called Taoistic .
. . . the facts themselves carry, within their own nature, suggestions
about what ought to be done with them. 21
"Listening" calmly to genuine but usually unexpressed reactions and being attentive to surroundings are prerequisites
for the reflection needed to reach moral decisions whether in
prudential judgments or more general moral maxims. The
moral scientist must admit the importance of reflecting on one's
own will acts. 22 To determine what he should do, one must
know as thoroughly as possible what he is equipped to do. A
man usually reflects on a certain object which he is willing
unless he is swayed by passion or circumstances or hobbled by
Ignorance or error.
This moment of reflection is also the moment of freedom, for it
reveals at least that he need not continue to think about that
object, and in the case of most objects it may show some deficiency;
in some cases it may completely change the object from good to
bad or vice versa. 23
21 Maslow, "Fusions ... " op. cit., 129-130.
The " structure " of these inner relations must not be misunderstood. Goldstein,
it seems, sets up a false dichotomy and leaves the impression that one cannot both
be a rational animal and have drives, by which he probably means something like
"sense appetites." Op. cit., 7.
22 See Bernard
Lonergan, S. J., Insight: A Study of Human Understandt'ng
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1956), 601-602.
23 G. P. Klubertanz, S. J., "The Root of Freedom in St. Thomas's Later Works,"
Gregorianum, XLII, 4 (1961), 716.

406

SISTER THERESA CLARE

Moral virtues ensure the reflectivity of choices. The virtuous
person performs better human acts more humanly than the
person customarily led by passion and sugggestions received
through his senses. This is not to deny the importance of
sensory observation for moral decision, of course.
Maslow explains that his " B-cognition " is the " perception
of the Being, the otherness, or the intrinsic nature of the person
or thing." 24 Healthy people perceive the deeper facticity as
well as the oughtiness of the object. By " oughtiness " Maslow
means "an intrinsic aspect of the deeply perceived facticity,"
a "demand character, or requiredness or built-in request-foraction." 25 His insistence on the importance of reflection for
better acceptance of responsibility is worthy of attention. 26
Mailloux also observes:
The leading of a life of freedom, that is to say, of a genuine virtuous
and moral life, necessarily implies, besides its intrinsic difficulties
which too readily monopolize all our attention, the initial risk of
making one's own decisions and of accepting one's full responsibility
for them and their possible consequences. 27

Relinquishing the security of conformity to ready-made standard moral judgments and taking the initiative and full responsibility of one's own destiny often appears equivalent to facing
complete indeterminacy. One less painful substitute is to get
lost in a group. It is possible to assimilate the value-orientations of one's culture in a unique and personal way, however.
On the one hand, if men had no access to the accumulated
experience of their ancestors, there would be no moral science
because life would be too busy and short to permit this type of
reflection. If the embodiment in concrete styles of life of the
•• "Fusions ... " op. cit., HlS-129.
25 Ibid.
26 Maslow could be criticized, however, for tending
to treat " value" as a
quality among others which can be isolated by the methods of empirical science.
Moral goodness does not seem to be such a simple quality.
27 Mailloux, op. cit., 57.

MORALITY

AND REAL REl..ATIONS

407

wisdom of one's forebears is at odds with what one fundamentally is, however, conflicts ensue. 28
0. H. Mowrer contends that
once one has made a choice and committed himself to a given moral
order or system, then he is not free to cheat on that system, no
matter what it is .... No one can play "fast and loose" with
the rules of his reference group without being in trouble with his
conscience (if he has one) and fearful, "shy," and "insecure" with
respect to the group itself. 29

Because he and the other psychologists just mentioned arrive
by different routes at similar conclusions about reflection and
responsibility, ethicians should be interested in their findings.
Verified conclusions of present day psychology and psychiatry
may provide stimulus for moral reasoning which does not stay
in the law-duty pattern.
To summarize, man finds order to some extent within himself
as well as in the world. But depending both on his clear vision
of what already is as well as his prevision-paradoxical1y possible only upon reflection-of what really can be, he may and in
many cases must further make order. He may even destroy
order if he acts contrary to what really suits his tendencies and
the proper inclinations of the beings with which or with whom
he interacts. Actions are unsuitable not only if they frustrate
the development of others but also if they hamper the satisfaction of the agent's true needs or lead to his destruction. 30
28 See Adrian van Kaam, C. S. Sp., "Sex and Existence," Insight, II, 3 (Winter,
1964)' 6.
29 " Science, Sex, and Value," Personnel and Guidance Journal, XLII, 8 (April,
1964),
Mowrer thinks that the " details of different social systems naturally
vary; and at this level of analysis, morality is, to be sure, relativistic, ' pluralistic.'
But the fact of one's sociality, of one's 'belonging' and being committed to some
social system is undeniable, universal; and it is from this circumstance that we
reach a kind of moral bedrock, or ' absolute.' If one is functioning in a given social
system, then one is honor-bound to ' play the game ' as prescribed in the system.
Or, if one must deviate from it, to do so openly, honorably, and take the stipulated
consequences of such disobedience, or else leave the system." Ibid., 751.
8 ° Charles Fay notes that recent scientific discoveries indicate that the "really
revolutionary change in human knowledge and power centers on man's altered
relation to himself. . . . From now on, evolutionary progress will not occur in

408

SISTER THERESA CLARE

Man can, by a laborious reasoning process, come to recognize
what his tendencies are. He can also discover what fits them by
considering his relations with others as well as the inter-relations of various capabilities he discovers within himself. Recognizing that one exists in a relational context can stimulate
reflection on what would be appropriate to a being who becomes
truly whole, well-rounded and developed (rather than straightlaced or unfulfilled) only as a partner with others. The toil of
taking into account all these relevant imbrications appears to
be the ethician's very vocation.

II.

SOME ATTEMPTS

TO CONSIDER RELATIONS

IN ETHICS

This section surveys a few ethical systems which seem inadequate because they consider relations as some kind of
exterior " betweenness " or else overlook the aspects common
to some moral situations. This contrast may enhance the
viability of the relational viewpoint being proposed in this
article.
Kurt Baier does not seem to recognize the moral significance
of what we have called reflexive relations. He holds that
morality arises out of the relations between individuals, that there
would be no need for and no point in having a morality if people
had no sort of contact with others, that the solitary individual
could employ his reason in practical matters only from the point
of view of self-interest, never from the moral point of view. 31

This would mean that persons living alone cannot affect one
another, so, morally speaking, there is nothing that they may
not do or refrain from doing. A world of Robinson Crusoes, he
holds, has no need or use for a morality. The fact is, however,
humans without their awareness but is initiated and controlled by them. Man is
now on the verge of exercising human dominion over the bio-cultural modification
of human existence. It belongs to man that he complete, in the light of finalities
or evolutionary tendencies of his nature, his imperfect bio-psychological structures,
his largely potential principles of action." " Human Evolution: a Challenge to
Thomistic Ethics," International Philosophical Quarterly, II, 1 (February, 1962), 77.
31 The Moral Point of View (Ithaca, New York:
Cornell University Press, 1958),
215.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

409

that no one person is ever utterly unrelated to others. In
Baier's system, nothing could be said about the moral fittingness of an anchorite's activity.
The following statements by an instrumentalist rightly indicate that an ethician must consider circumstances and relations.
We are always acting within a limited setting which includes
various circumstances, and probably other actors in addition to
ourselves. In this sense the situation, including both agent or
agents and the circumstances confronting him or them, is the unit
of experience.32
This real unit is said to contain the basis of the ideal, the
resolution of unsatisfactory aspects, and to be always relative to a specific state of affairs. Actions strive for the good
which completes the situation, making it determinate and actualizing value potentialities. When a problematic situation is
thus taken as a unit and its completion is taken as a goal, value
seems to become utterly objective.
The incompleteness of the situation is said to call out the
agent's desire for completeness, and it is admitted that not all
situations are social. But does the action in any way complete
the agent himself? Or is he just a kind of Kantian " dator
formarum "? It seems easy, in such a theory, to consider the
agent a mere cog in a big machine and to regard relations as
more important than the things related.
Lewis Hahn, a contextualist, is similarly concerned with the
situation and its completion, saying that
any given situation sets up some order among the activities involved. If a goal is demanded, the means necessary to achieve that
goal are also demanded. Though not just any means will fit into
a demanded pattern, certain alternatives are usually possible.33
He also tries to allow for some subjective ground of value by
insisting that the " felt quality of an experience " affords a
ground for prizing.
Lee, op. cit., 889.
"A Contextualist Looks at Values," in Value: a Cooperative Inquiry, ed.
Ray Lepley (New York: Columbia University Press, 1949), 118.
32

88

410

SISTER THERESA CLARE

Individuals of the sort contextualism finds are not isolated, independent centers of desire or introspection. A large part of what
they are is due to their environment. The culture of an era or
epoch is a very significant factor in the prizings of an individual. 34
This stress on non-atomicity seems correct, but whatever the
admitted " individual quality " of an activity may mean, contextualism does not seem to take sufficient account of the
variety and intrinsic order or disorder of human powers as well
as of their affinity to extrinsic goals. Even before he enters a
situation, a man is already related to whatever in the context
could answer some genuine need or realize some capacity of his.
The unrepeatability of situations is also stressed in another
theory, relativistic ethics.
Norms are universal, but man as an existent is the individual and
unique in each case, and hence he cannot be regulated in his
actions by material norms of a universal kind .... There remains
then as " norm " of action only the call of each particular unique
situation through which man must pass successfully.85
There is no point in trying to find similarities between men
who are so unique. This position does not overlook the real
relations of the agent but rather exaggerates their singularity. 36

•• Loc. cit., 123-4; see 470.
Rahner, op. cit., 218. Furthermore, Bahner states that insofar as "the same
man subsists in his own spirituality, his actions are also always more than mere
applications of the universal law to the casus in space and time; they have a
substantial positive property and uniqueness which can no longer be translated into
a universal idea and norm expressible in propositions constructed of universal
notions." Ibid., 226.
•• David Bidney indicates two presuppositions underlying such an ethics: 1)
all moral evaluations are culturally conditioned or determined and hence their
validity is limited to the social and cutural context in which they originated, fl)
it is impossible in practice to establish universally acceptable criteria for measuring
and comparing moral values, so each moral system has equal validity. " The
Philosophical Presuppositions of Cultural Relativism and Cultural Absolutism,"
Chapter IV in Ethics and the Social Sciences, ed. Leo Ward, C. S.C. (Notre Dame,
Indiana: University Press, 1959), 59-60.
35

MORALITY

III.

METAPHYSICAL

AND REAL RELATIONS

411

BAsis FOR REAL MoRAL RELATIONS

In contrast to the ethical systems just sketched, this article
maintains that relatedness is a characteristic intimately modifying the actual being of the moral agent. F. H. Bradley's
insights into the relational context could serve as correctives
for such excessive empiricisms.
If you wish to remove one part from a whole, and maintain it away

from its original context, you must find what elements constitute
that whole, and you must find exactly what each contributes. For
you cannot tell otherwise what it is you are taking, and how much
is left. Your cutting may not merely loose the string of the
bundle. It may have utterly destroyed the connection which
maintains the parts in existence. And the result of this is that
correct abstraction is guaranteed by nothing save actual experiment.37
Note, however, that Bradley is in danger of a return to isolated
parts if he maintains that a connection (which might be construed as an extrinsic " betweenness ") is constitutive of existence. This would be exaggerating relations almost to the point
of substantializing them.

A. Reality of Relations
Although relations can be regarded as rather uninfiuential,
in reality a consideration of them can even be a genuine starting point of metaphysics, as James Collins asserts.
Metaphysics makes its proper start with the integral human
experience of the community of existing natural beings. It is here
that we obtain the foundational meaning for .the concretely real.
Our act of acknowledging natural existents in their active relations
is more basic for metaphysics than the contrasts which we draw in
relatively abstract and limitative ways for purposes of analysis and
inference concerning the concrete natural beings.38
The universe can truly be viewed as a huge whole of tendential
87

The Principles of Logic, vol. II (London:

Oxford University Press, ] 958),

560-561.
88

Three Paths in Philosophy (Chicago:

Regnery,

875.

412

SISTER THERESA CLARE

beings mutually acting and reacting in numerous kinds of
relationships.
1. Tendencies of Man

On the basis of the outline of various human relations in
section I above, perhaps one could make a list of the basic
tendencies which cause a man spontaneously to take a position
with regard to many things and events. Because these inclinations can be satisfied only if he contacts and uses resources
beyond himself, they might be considered as ties binding man
to others. Such tendencies are dynamic and ongoing reachings,
however, because appropriate actions alleviate but do not
terminate these fundamental desires. St. Thomas tried to draw
up such a list centuries ago. As Thomas Davitt explains, man
connaturally-that is, without any reasoning-judges that all those
things to which he has a natural inclination are good and ought to
be sought after and that their contraries are bad and should be
avoided. Therefore his elementary judgments as to what is good
and bad follow from the knowledge of his inclinations. 39

All men judge that self-preservation, sexual union, life in
society, and use of intellectual and volitional powers are good.
Not to do these things is judged bad. These are not names
for simple appetities but more like generic terms for groups of
tendencies. Their demands vary, and judgments with regard
to them are influenced by environment, education, or personal
habits. The inclinations themselves may even demand that
the judgment that it is good to preserve one's life, for example,
give way to the judgment that it is better to give one's life.
Such a judgment is made in spite of the persistent and continuing drive to self-preservation. 40
The foregoing has viewed man's basic needs, as it were, irom
within. Because of man's way of knowing, considerations must
be thus piece-meal, even though in actuality they are united in
one agent. The reciprocity of appetite and whatever satisfies
39
40

Davitt, op. cit., 34. See S. T., I-II, 94, £c.
Ibid., 37-38.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

413

it may, nevertheless, also be viewed from the outside m, as
Maslow seems to suggest, for
when anything is clear enough or certain enough, true enough, real
enough, beyond the point of doubt, then that something raises
within itself its own requiredness, its own demand-character, its
own suitabilities.41
Facts call for definite kinds of action. The lure is from outside,
but only because of its affinity with something inside. Some
notion of relatedness seems to be the only way to deal adequately and intelligibly with a being who finds himself necessarily oriented to something other than himself for his own
completion, not only on the biological or physical level but
on all the " levels " as well as " parts " into which he may be
divided for convenient consideration.
Even without explicit admission of a Creator as the ultimate
cause and end of striving, it seems that the reflective man can
recognize that he is obliged to try to satisfy his wants/ 2 Tendency, relation, finalization-these are inextricably intertwined.
If anyone denies that a basic drive of human nature is to do
all possible to preserve and enhance existence, the only way to
argue with him seems to be to urge that he is not acknowledging things as they really are. By yielding to this kind of drive
to continue in being, each creature also makes for the continuance of all creatures. 43
2. Suitability

Whatever satisfies the basic needs just discussed is apt for
the subject of those needs. The ethician must, of course, go
on to consider the pertinent circumstances and ends of various
species of activity, but the basic fittingness to tendency remains
the root consideration for whoever would judge moral activity.
Fusions ... " op. cit., 127.
Leclercq, La philosophie morale de saint Thomas devant la pensee
contemporaine (Paris: Vrin, 1955), 404.
43 See Linus
Thro, S. J., "Moral Values and Obligation in the Light of
Tendency," Proceedings of the Xllth International Congress of Philosophy, vol.
VII (Firenze: Sansoni, 1961), 437.
41 "

40 See Jacques

414

SISTER THERESA CLARE

Lee, as already noted, refers to the situation as resolving an
incompleteness. 44 This article has stressed, rather, that for the
development of his various kinds of capacities, man requires
objects of various sorts which he attains by a variety of activities. Not what suits the rational appetite taken in isolation
but what will result in the completion of human nature adequately and fully considered-this is what is suitable for man.
An adequate account of human nature must consider man's
essential intrinsic and extrinsic relations as well. What man
should do, then, would seem to be whatever he can maximally
do given not only his physique but also his degree of interior
balance of sense appetites, his status, his circumstances, and
the whole meaningful situation in which he acts. To find out
what is really conducive to full human well-being, one must
study experienced tendencies and their objects. Such a study
of finality is necessarily a study of relations, or vice versa.

B. Community of Essence
Stressing the complexity of human drives and the panoply of
relations which affect man intrinsically could, possibly, lead to
insufficient acknowledgment of the universality of human nature
and of general norms which can be found when investigating
real similarities. For that reason, this article would be unbalanced without a brief look at what is meant by human
nature or essence.
Louis Dupre states: " Man does not belong to the world of
things but is the meaning-giving principle of this world, he has
no fixed essence but is essentially free development." 45 He says
that man's nature is
" Op. cit., 338.
45 " The
Philosophical Stages of Man's Self-Discovery," Proceedings of the
American Catholic Philosophical Association (1963), 224.
St. Thomas speaks of the mutability of human nature in several places. "Natura
autem hominis est mutabilis." S. T. II-II, 57, 2 ad 1; Ottawa vol. III, 1715 b.
" Et hoc contingit pJ:Iopter mutabilitatem naturae humanae et diversas conditiones
hominum et rerum, secundum diversitatem locorum et temporurn." De Malo, ques.
II, a. IV, ad 13.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

415

not entirely given once and for all; in man " nature" is never
allowed to follow a course independent of a " person." . . . To talk
about human nature as if it were an immutable entity given in
its entirety is to ignore the most essential characteristic of human
nature. 46
What Dupre has in mind when he uses the word " person "
seems similar to Robert Johann's meaning. Man, he holds,
is radically and fundamentally a person. It is not an intellect or a
mind that thinks; it is a person who thinks. But a person can fulfill
· himself-indeed, a person can really be himself-only in dialogue
and communion with other persons.47
Such dialogue cannot take place in private soliloquies. Other
persons are available only in the everyday round of experience.
The notion of a changing human nature may seem shocking
at first. If nature is not taken as a concept of bare substantial
form and if it is admitted that knowledge of nature grows as
men witness more activities which display it, then the idea that
a thing's nature admits of some change (at least in the sense
that there may still be undiscovered human capacities) is not
so absurd. Perhaps in truly new future situations man's
abilities will find expression in fresh ways of acting.
The discovery of unsuspected potencies would certainly affect
the moralist's notion of human nature. As Charles Fay suggests:
The fact that alterations introduced by evolution are accidental
modifications of human nature does not mean that they are simply
accidental moral determinants .... St. Thomas compares circumstances in the moral order to " accidents," but this does not simply
•• " Toward a Re-examination of the Catholic Position on Birth Control," Cross
Currents, XIV, 1 (Winter, 1964), 69. Lest Dupre be made out to be a complete
relativist, it should be added that he is fighting a conception of natural law as
entirely unvarying and static, somewhat like the usual view of the laws of physical
nature.
See Emil Fackenheim, Metaphysics and Historicity (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1961), 15.
47 " The Return to Experience," Review of Metaphysics, XVII, 3 (March, 1964),
321.

416

SISTER THERESA CLARE

mean that what is accidental in the physical order is accidental in
relation to right reason. 48

Rapidly changing conditions in today's world do indeed support
the contention that man is a being essentially conditioned in
that he is really and sometimes radically changed by intercourse with others. He is also essentially conditional in his
basic dependency on God for existence. An ethician blind to
biological advances such as artifical selection of genes may be
cut off from discussion with his contemporaries and even untrue
to his calling to take account of all relevant factors of moral
activity. 49

IV.

Lome OF INQUIRY INTO MoRAL RELATIONS

Can the relational ethics being advocated here be expressed
logically? How can oughtness 50 be derived from isness? If
it can, then it appears that " ought " and " being " are very
closely related, if not even identified, i. e., that a person is
obliged to do what he is equipped to do. Do facts not only
indicate but even generate values?
One way to express logically the theme of this article is to say
that a judgment of a moral scientist on a type of activity, such
as " Sharing food is good," or " Masturbation is bad," can be
considered as the conclusion of a conditional rather than a
categorical syllogism. The major would be: " If such a type
of activity is suitable (or unsuitable) to human nature, then
such a type of activity is good (or bad) ." " Good " and "bad "
mean suitable and unsuitable, it is true; but perhaps they may
be taken to have a wider meaning when not followed by the
phrase " for men." The major means to say that if man's true
•• Op. cit., 65. See S. T. I, 5, 1, where St. Thomas speaks of relative perfection.
Bidney speaks of nature as absolute and of cultural constructs as relative means
to conquer reality. Op. cit., 67. This polarity could prove misleading if the
contention that there are accidental but real modifications of human nature is valid.
•• See Fay, op. cit., 78.
50 We do not intend
to equate oughtness with formal obligation or personal
conscience felt as binding, but rather with acknowledged appropriateness.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

417

ends (and, of course, his ultimate end) are to be attained, then
certain means are to be used or not used.
The minor of such a syllogism would be: " But the given
action is suitable (or unsuitable) for human nature." This
would require demonstration. It seems the only way to show
fittingness or unifittingness is to examine whether the results
of the activity do or do not further the full development of the
agent without injury to others. 51 Such an examination must,
we have been arguing, view man in his context of real relations.
Thus an immutable statement nevertheless includes variables.
The way man is and the way things are with regard to him
dictate what is of value for his more complete realization.
Maslow's non-atomistic approach in psychology is similar to
the one being urged for ethics. He holds that
facts are dynamic and not just static; that they are not scalar
(magnitude only) but rather vectorial (having both magnitude
and direction) . . . many of these dynamic characteristics of
facts, these vectorial qualities, fall well within the semantic jurisdiction of the word " value." At the very least, they bridge the
dichotomy between fact and value which is conventionally and
unthinkingly held by most scientists and philosophers to be a
defining characteristic of science itsel£.52

Man himself is a kind of vector in that he is certainly directed
and directional. Tendency is a thing's direction or real relation
to an end. The notion of real relation includes capacity and
also a goal wider than the tending being itself. Whatever
51 Of course, one need not wait to have personal experience of appropriateness
or
inappropriateness before taking a stand. Mowrer mentions, for example, that the
Soviet experiment with relaxed divorce laws in the 1920's should be taken by everybody as an instructive example of the consequences of thwarting basic human
tendencies. "Here is an instance of ' vicarious feedback ' that is a report of what
happened in another contemporary society which also thought it could eliminate
the restraints and sacrifices which sexual morality presupposes." Op. cit., 750.
52 " Fusions ... " op. cit., 126. " Blindness to future possibilities, change, development, or potentialities leads inevitably to a kind of status quo philosophy in
which 'what is' (being all there is or can be) must then be taken as the norm.
Pure description merely is . . . an invitation to join the conservative party.
' Pure ' value-free description is, among other things, simply sloppy description."
Ibid., 129.

418

SISTER THERESA CLARE

completes a genuine human tendency is already related to man,
is already valuable for him even before he may come to admit
its convenience. It remains valuable even though he never
acknowledges its value. It has moral worth if it is in any way
involved in an agent's moral activity.
Viewing " values" relationally, it seems difficult to say
whether they are subjective attitudes or objective facts. Is
not a valuable thing an extrinsic (usually, but not always)
object which suits an intrinsic tendency? Is not value real
suitability to real need? If so, it is not conferred by the agent.
There does not seem to be a gap to span here except when one
tries to imagine a link instead of admitting the connection is
intelligible, although it is sensible in some cases, as in biological
or dietetic suitablity. And the intelligible is not unreal.
There are facts and there are values, but it is a mistake to conclude that ontologically these compose two disparate universes.
Nor is it necessary to say that every proposition is a value judgment, or ev.ery " fact " an "idea." Realism is anti-reductionist, in
any direction. That is to say, it is empirical; things, including
selves, have essential structures which reason can investigate and
know. But things are never merely essences. And selves are never
merely essences either, but are coming-to-be through the fulfillment
of potencies which are natural to the sort of thing they are. 53

Human selves are by nature in relation. Man's being-for-himself essentially or constitutively includes being-for-others.
There is in reality no barrier here which moral philosophy must
try to surmount.
A non-atomistic realism also overcomes any artificial isought distinction. Myriad relations permanently establish and
underlie an act's suitability for a human agent. What ought to
be done expresses not merely a relationship of suitableness, but
an existential situation which subjects the moral agent to a
certain claim. Neither autonomous self-determination nor the
ideal of self-realization adequately covers the existential
situation.
58

Baldwin, op. cit., 43.

MORALITY

AND REAL RELATIONS

419

But now view the perfection of oneself as the object of the tendency
of man as man, together with the added consideration that no
finite agent is simply good in himself, but rather through the
possession of the good which is not himself, the perfectly fulfilling
goal. . . . In this context " ought " means obligated to fit oneself
freely into the designs of the supreme Legislator, whose will for
man is expressed in his nature and its tendencies.54
Becoming aware of this larger context, man is obliged to
acknowledge the claim, make his own personal commitment,
and act accordingly.

V. CoNCLUSION
Because the study of the human relational-but very realcontext is complicated, on-going, and not productive of exact
scales of values, it probably is not very appealing as a suggested
way to develop an ethics. The recognition of the great number
of relevant real relations which need to be investigated may
prove dismaying even to one who admits that a lack of fixity
need not imply an utter relativism.
The relational viewpoint would also be rejected, it seems, by
anyone who regards man as autonomous and basically selfsufficient. Although this article was not intended as an exhortation to atomists, its conclusions would certainly be unpalatable
to them.
If the circumspect way of moral reasoning advocated here is
admitted to be fruitful, however, the habit itself of right
reasoning in moral matters could be defined as a habit of
deliberate openness to and recognition of real and enduringbut dynamic and complicated-extrinsic and intrinsic relations.
An ethician with this habit would also be open to the Creator
of tending beings which have community of nature. He would
not, however, leap to law and God in the initial steps of ethical
mqmry.
SISTER THERESA CLARE,

St. Louis University,
St. Louis, Missouri
•• Thro, op. cit., 439, 441.

c. D.P.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY OF THE HOLY SPIRIT
PART
CRITIQUE

SEcTION

T

1:

III

oF THE CALVINIST

DocTRINE

Calvin's Negative Arguments

HE OBJECT of this concluding critique is the doctrine
of the Interior Testimony and its foundation. One part
will deal with the doctrine expressed by Calvin and his
immediate followers; another with the doctrine of Karl Barth
and his attempt to return to the fonts of the Reformation in a
modern way. Finally, the fact that, aside from the manifest
distinction in their expressions of the doctrine, they are both
susceptible of one common critique will be shown.
If the theological system of John Calvin is viewed as an
edifice and the place where the doctrine of the Interior Testimony finds entree is sought, beyond doubt, the portal will be
found in his position concerning the single font of revelation.
En bloc it is precisely in this respect that the two structures,
Calvinism (and servatis servandis the Protestant schools that
adhere to his general principles) and Catholicism differ. At
this point it is just to ask, what was the basis for this modification of the Catholic system.
The answer is evident in the fourth book of the Institutes
which deals with the constitution and power of the Church
(and in a subsidiary fashion of the state also, insofar as Calvin
considered it as an adjunct of the Church) , and in the ninth
chapter in which Calvin discusses the ecumenical council. This
is the occasion of returning to the theme we have seen proposed
in the beginning of the Institutes, but in a way that reveals
another aspect of Calvin's thought.
To subject the oracles of God to the authority of men, so as to
make their validity dependent on human approbation, is a blasphe-

420

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

my unworthy of being mentioned. . . . If the authority of the
Scripture be founded on the approbation of the Church, what
decree of any council can be alleged to this point? I believe none
at all. . . . They alledge an ancient catalogue, which is called the
Canon of Scripture, and which they say proceeded from the decision of the Church. I ask them again, in what council that canon
was composed. To this they can make no reply. Yet I wish to be
further informed, what kind of canon they suppose it to be. For
I see that ancient writers were not fully agreed respecting it. And
if any weight be attached to the testimony of Jerome, the two
books of Maccabees, the history of Tobit, Ecclesiasticus, and other
books will be considered as apocryphal; to which our opponents
will by no means consent,l

This passage can be made the occasion, first, of general
remarks with regard to Calvin's attitude toward Tradition,
and, second, of a more detailed reply to the questions he asks
regarding the tradition of the Canon of Scripture. In general,
then, it seems evident from Calvin's use of the term "decree
of the Church," here and elsewhere/ that he did not grasp
sufficiently well the distinction between Tradition, strictly socalled, and the ecclesiastical magisterium. It is to be wondered,
therefore, if even today this same misunderstanding is not
propagated to some extent among Protestants who follow
Calvin's footsteps. This is not a denial that the "decree of
the Church," of which Calvin speaks, if conditioned by those
things which are required of an infallible pronouncement, possesses a quality which is a guarantee for the faithful that it is
free from error. Nevertheless, we do maintain that there is a
real distinction between a font of revelation, which from a
positive point of view contains the word of God; and a proposition of the truth contained therein, which proposition is negatively protected from a false presentation of the divine revelation. The former characterizes Tradition; the latter, the
"decree of the Church."
Granted, therefore, that Calvin did make this unwarranted
composition, it becomes somewhat easier to perceive the root
Inst., IV, 9, 14; op. cit., vol. II, p. 447 (CR, XXX, 867).
• E. g., lnst., IV, 8, 16; ibid., p. 432 (CR, XXX, 857-858).

1

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

of his indignation when he exclaims that subjecting God's word
to human approbation is a" blasphemy unworthy of being mentioned." Catholic theology by no means grants that an authentic dogmatic decree of the Church is tantamount to " human approbation," because such a decree is possessed of the negative
quality of infallibility. But the same theology does recognize
that this decree is but a re-expression of a truth the immediate
source of which is the mouth of God, speaking either in the
Scripture or in Tradition.
In the history of the Church's magisterium we can point to
some relatively ancient witnesses to her care in preserving
and proposing integrally what was committed to her by an
apostolic tradition, the Canon of the Scriptures. The " ancient
catalogue . . . called the Canon of Scripture " is not a document that comes from apostolic times. Of this tradition we
have no proper ecclesiastical pronouncement earlier than that
of the provincial council of Rome
the acts of which
were subject to the approval of Pope St. Damasus I. In this
decree the Canon as it is now comprised in the Latin Vulgate
is proposed as that which the " whole Catholic Church receives."3 The third provincial council of Carthage, fifteen years
later, reproduces the same list. 4 In the fifth century the decrees
of Pope St. Innocent I and Pope Gelasius witnessed to the
same Tradition. 5 Finally, in the century previous to that of
Calvin, the seventeenth ecumenical council of Florence (1449l)
recapitulated the identical canon. 6 These examples might be
considered as a partial answer to Calvin's query. "If the
authority of the Scripture be founded on the approbation of the
Church, what decree of any council can be alleged to. this point?
I believe none at all." 7
The last portion of the paragraph cited from the Institutes
at first sight does seem to present a difficulty for the Catholic
view. If the establishment of the Canon of the Scripture really
4 D.
5 D. 96,
6 D. 706.
D. 84.
The question here is not what authority Calvin would concede to this or that
particular Council, provincial or ecumenical, but rather the fact that within the
Church such witness is to be found.
3

7

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

is based upon an apostolic tradition, what is the significance of
the position of a doctor of the Church of such authority as
Jerome, who, as Calvin affirms, rejected some of the so-called
deutero-canonical books? In reality this historical truth serves
well to show the manner in which the magisterium of the
Church functions to clarify doubts which may arise from time
to time even with regard to the deposit of revelation. In this
particular case it seems that St. Jerome had come under the
influence of the Jewish rabbis during his sojourn in Palestine.
These doctors of the Jewish community had come to reject
some of the books of the so-called Alexandrine Canon of the
Old Testament (the canon as it is exemplified by the LXX) ,
and their arguments seemed conclusive to St. Jerome. Fr. Zarb
observes, however, that the "Apostles, who in their very
ministry had made ample use of the Alexandrine Greek version,
by their example left a clear doctrine with regard to the
number of the sacred books, i. e., that they are not only those
of the Palestinian canon, but also those contained in the
Alexandrine version." 8 It is precisely for this reason that
"three African councils immediately replied to Jerome's contention, and prescribed the complete Canon of the Sacred
books. 9 From that time though one or another individual may
have wavered in the acceptance of this canon, mostly because
of St. Jerome's ancient opinion, nevertheless the teaching of
the universal Church is constant and clear. This bit of history
does point out the corrective function of the Church in the
proposition of divine revelation.
In Calvin's particular defense of the doctrine of the Interior
Testimony the first three arguments are negative, by which he
excludes the basis which the Church offers for establishing the
authority of Scripture. The first of these is, logically speaking,
a reductio ad absurdum. If the establishment of the Scriptures
is to depend "on the determination of the Church," if the
Church is to decide " both what reverence is due to the Scrip8

Zarb, S., 0. P., op. cit., pp. 194-195.

• Ibid., p. 196.

424

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

ture, and what books are to be comprised in its canon," 10 then
it follows that, objectively, the truth of God is limited by the
will of man, and, subjectively, faith has no more firm a foundation than merely human favor. These consequences, however,
destroy the very foundation of religion. Therefore, the condition is to be rejected.
It can be seen from the previous discussion of the Catholic
position in itself that it is precisely the sense of that condition, namely, "the determination of the Church," which is
at stake. Considered in a critical fashion, " the determination
of the Church " might conceivably be taken in two different
senses. From one point of view it is the inquiry which the
Church made in the early centuries of her existence in examining the credentials which might be adduced as indicative of
the canonicity of one book or another. It must be admitted
that the entire Church was not always explicitly aware of the
full content of the Tradition concerning the canon, delivered to
her by the Apostles. Therefore, it was necessary to conduct an
investigation with regard to this Tradition. The criteria for
this investigation were such things as, for example, prophetic
or apostolic authenticity and, notably, the use of a book in the
liturgical services of the early Church. It does not matter here
which of these was considered as definitive. That this inquiry
took place is evident from the discrepancies which appear in
the list of books comprising the canon of various early Christian
authors. Evident too is the fact that this investigation on the
part of the Church was a determination in a historical sense.
The Church, as an historical institution, made use of ordinary
historical apparatus, viz., external testimony and internal coherence, to set the limits of the canon.
The process involved, if analysed today, takes on the appearance of the construction of a syllogism:
Whatever books, guaranteed by one or another quality, were delivered to the Church by the Apostles as divinely inspired and the
rule of faith must be accepted on faith as canonical. The following
10

Inst., I, 7, I; op. cit., vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX, 56).

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

books, moreover, meet the requirements. Therefore they must
be accepted on faith as canonical.
So far we see no need for special divine intervention. The
process of fashioning the syllogism, therefore, is not the determination which is the basis of the note of canonicity making
these books a rule of faith. The investigation proceeded on a
natural level, by the sifting out of evidence, by the balancing
of one authority against another. The rule of faith, however,
cannot be of this natural level, because faith transcends the
natural. In this sense, then, the determination of the Church
cannot possibly be the criterion of canonicity.
If we consider the act by which this " syllogism" is brought
to a conclusion, namely: " These are the canonical books of
Scripture"; then the determination of the Church takes on an
entirely new sense. The teaching Church, aside from any previous historical investigation and controversy which may have
attended it, comes to a definitive decision. Since by divine
institution it belongs to the teaching Church to fix conclusively
and with authority the boundaries of the list of canonical books,
when she comes to this decision it is no longer merely in light
of historical evidence that she judges, but in virtue of a divine
commission, which she exercises with God's guarantee of infallibility.
The significance of this decision is explained by the Church
herself, in a statement made by the Vatican Council:
The Church recognizes these books as canonical, not because they
have been subsequently approved on her authority, after once
having been put together by merely human ingenuity, nor again
solely because they contain revelation without error, but for the
reason that, written under the inspiration of the Holy Ghost, they
have God as their author, and as such have been delivered to the
Church.U
In other words, the Church herself declares that she gives no
validity to the Scriptures which they do not themselves have.
It is not a matter of the subsequent ecclesiastical approval of
11

Session III, "Dogmatic Constitution of the Catholic Faith," D. 1787.

426

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

merely human works. The Church's decision does not look
God-ward, as it were, and dictate to the Author of the supernatural order what instruments He must use to make His
revelation known. Rather the decision is all for the benefit of
the members of the Church, indeed, for all mankind, the men
who receive the revelation as from God. The Church vouches
to them for the Bible's supernatural character, giving their
supernatural faith the objective criterion that the faith of men
in God requires.
Where, then, it may be asked, is the dependence of God's
truth on man's will? It is certain, first of all, that no man forces
God to reveal Himself to others. There is no dependence here.
Neither can the dependence be said to consist in the transmission of the spoken or written word. Thoughout the process of
transmission God remains the Master, with full control over
the means He employs to accomplish His designs. What power
has a pope or a college of bishops sitting in plenary council to
declare (" to determine," in the words of Calvin) that these
books contain truths proposed with divine inerrancy for the
foundation and growth of faith? Considered in themselves they
are but men, and their powers are human. They live in a particular era and their judgments take on the historical coloring of
their time and environment. They are little fit to serve as a
criterion, in any sense, of the supernatural faith of men. Yet,
not by divine dependence, but rather by divine condescension
and largesse they are endowed with the dignity of possessing
the prerogative of separating that which has intrinsic divine
worth from material which, though it may recommend itself
for beauty, composition, and lofty doctrine, simply has not
been delivered to the Church as divinely inspired.
In the same vein we may reply to Calvin's second conclusion,
namely, that such a system results in faith's being founded on
human favor. This is the subjective aspect of the problem,
and it is to be solved on the bases of the principles expressed
above regarding the act of faith. It is incontestable that the
mind and will of man are, in their innermost reality, an in-

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

violable sanctuary that no one enters, but God alone.12 " What
man knoweth the things of a man but the spirit of a man, that
is in him" (I
11). It is in this sanctuary of the mind and
will that faith comes to be. However rationally sound may be
the system of proposing or declaring the truths to be believed,
the act of faith needs an inner impetus, which can only come
from God. Faith is an interior light, and the light is divine.
The mind of man, in its very enlightenment, needs also to be
moved to assent to the truths of faith, for they " appear not,"
and this movement, in the will, is a divine movement. All this
is necessary, and it is doctrine that is integral to the Catholic
theology of faith. No claim is made for the Church in the sense
that she, as an instrument, penetrates into the soul of man and
there produces faith in divine revelation, by enlightening and
moving the mind and heart to assent to divine truth.
The role of the Church is precisely that of a teacher. God
is the Supreme Master, and the Church receives from Him an
objective deposit of truth which, if men give assent, can be
subjected to an act of faith. The Church is the proximate
criterion of the revelation of God. Her proposition of truth is
objective, i.e., she is committed by God to lay before men an
object which may be grasped, to lay it before them in such
a way that it is easy to grasp. To grasp this object requires,
however, more than mere proposition. It requires an efficient
or moving cause, enlightening and inclining a man to believe.
In the Catholic tradition the motion and the light which
have their origin in God are comprised in the generic term,
grace. This grace, the result of which is living faith, must be
carefully distinguished from Calvin's "inner testimony of the
Holy Spirit." According to the Catholic view, when God has
revealed Himself and transmitted this revelation to the Church,
and the Church fulfills her function of teaching all nations, all
is accomplished that needs to be done in the objective order.
Grace intervenes, interiorly, to make this revelation effective.
12 The foundation of this inviolability is the immediate ordination of the rational
creature to God, an ordination which is unique. cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 2,
a. 8, c.

428

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

On the other hand, according to Calvin, something is still lacking to revelation, as set forth in the manner described above.
The " testimony of the Holy Spirit," then, although taking
place in the soul of man, that is, interiorly, would have a twofold role. First of all, it gives that last objective approbation
or determination to the revelation in Scripture, which, in the
Catholic view, is the Church's proper function. Second, this
testimony brings about the subjective assent as Calvin would
conceive it.
Our criticism is that no further objective approbation is
required, once the Church has declared what the true canon
is. We must emphasize that this present discussion is not concerned with possibilities. The Church is not an instrument
that God needs, from which, therefore, He could not dispense.
She is an instrument He has devised for the benefit of man,
and so the need is rather on man's part to fit into the plan
of God. The Church's determination of the canonicity of the
Sacred Sciptures, in the sense now evolved, is not more nor
less than a divinely given opportunity to verify, in the objective
order a divine truth in a manner which accords perfectly with
the needs of human nature. Man is a creature who assimilates
truth proposed in a concrete dynamic fashion. This is the
manner in which this divine truth is delivered to man by God.
Passing now from Calvin's mistaken view of the Catholic
position in this matter, let us examine his own use of Scripture
to refute what he supposed to be false doctrine. The passage
which he adduces, it will be remembered, consists in words of
encouragement addressed by the Apostle Paul to the Ephesians.
As far as textual criticism is concerned there is no difficulty
here. This verse comes to us with no variation that would
alter in any way the sense. Both the Douay and King James
versions translate the verse: " [Ye are Jbuilt upon the foundation of the apostles and prophets, Jesus Christ Himself being
the chief cornerstone."
In the context the Sacred Writer is speaking to non-Jewish
converts to the Christian faith and telling them of the reconciliation which has been accomplished by Jesus Christ, not

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

429

only between themselves and God, but also between the heretofore separated segments of the human race, namely, Jew and
Gentile. The Apostle, speaking as a Jew, says that whereas in
previous times the Jews obtained a special favored position,
now all belong to the Church, Gentile and Jew alike. " This,"
says Father Voste, "is the object of the entire second chapter
of the epistle, wherein the status of the Gentile as regards both
sin and origin is vividly set in opposition to their present state
of sharing in the benefits of Christ." 13 By abrogating the
Mosaic Law Christ has made Israel and the Gentile nations to
be a single people, one in its access to God through Him who
has effected this reconciliation. Thus the Sacred Writer concludes: "You [Gentiles] are no longer strangers and foreigners,
but fellow-citizens with the saints and the domestics of God,
built upon the foundation of the Apostles and prophets, Jesus
Christ Himself being the chief cornerstone."
The unity achieved among men through Christ was an object
aptly described by the Apostle through the figure he uses,
namely, that of a building. This is not the only occasion in
which St. Paul spoke of the Church in this way. He used the
same manner of expression, and even more explicitly, when
writing to the Corinthians: " You are God's building. According to the grace of God that is given to me, as a wise architect
I have laid the foundation, and another buildeth thereupon.
But let every man take heed how he buildeth thereupon.
For other foundation no man can lay, but that which is laid,
which is Christ Jesus" (I Cor. 3: 9-11). There are striking
similarities between these two texts. In both cases the Church
is likened to a building. The foundation of the building is
brought into both metaphors. Christ's role in constituting the
foundation is equally evident in each. Yet, because of the richness of the figure, there is not complete correspondence, the
most striking difference being the variant designation of Christ,
merely as the foundation in I Corinthians, and, more specifically, as the chief cornerstone, in the epistle to the Ephesians.
This is a crucial difference too, because the meaning of the
13

Voste, J., 0. P., Commentarium in Epistulam ad Ephesios, p. 35.

480

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

phrase, " built upon the foundation of the apostles and
prophets," is precisely what is in question when Calvin adduces
the text as proof that the Church is validated by the Scriptures,
and that the Sacred Writings in no wise depend upon the
Church's determinations.
Modern exegetes, Protestant and Catholic alike, concede
three possible meanings to the phrase, " the foundation of the
apostles and the prophets." The first, which is dismissed universally, is that the foundation is Christ Himself. The sense
would be: " You are built upon Christ, who is the foundation
of the apostles." This seems to be ruled out reasonably by the
subsequent redundant reference to Christ as the chief cornerstone.
The second meaning proposed, the one adopted by Calvin in
the Institutes, is that the word foundation is to be interpreted
as the doctrine set forth by the Apostles. Thus Calvin says,
" If the doctrine of the prophets and apostles be the foundation
of the Church, it must have been certain, antecedently to the
existence of the Church." 14 The International Critical Commentary adduces Bengel to the same effect. " The testimony
of the apostles and the prophets is the foundation of all believers." 15 The parallel passage of I Corinthians, already cited,
is brought to bear in support of this interpretation. This same
commentary indicates the inherent difficulties to such an interpretation:
Nowhere is the gospel or any doctrine called the foundation of the
Church. Moreover, it would be rather incongruous to assume as the
foundation the system of teaching about Christ, and as the cornerstone Christ's person. . . . Moreover, the building consists of
persons. In I Cor. 3:10 the figure is different, the building there is
doctrine and the foundation naturally doctrinal, " Christ," i. e.,
teaching about Christ. Still further, if this view be adopted, the
point that is brought in is an incidental one, quite unessential to the
connection. 16
"Inst., I, 7,
op. cit., vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX, 57).
15 Abbott, T. K., International
Critical Commentary on the Epistle to the
Ephesians, p. 70.
16 Ibid.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

431

The difficulty with this interpretation can be summed up
as two-fold: one, contextual, the other, the incongruity of the
text itself. The Apostle's whole argument deals not with a
unifying doctrinal system, but rather with a unifying personal
relation, in which every Christian is made an integral part of
the building which is the Church, by incorporation in the person
of Christ. Textually, the assumption of this position makes
for the difficulty of conceiving of a foundation which is doctrinal, while the cornerstone is clearly the person of Christ.
The last possible meaning of the phrase is that the " foundation of the apostles and prophets " is none other than the
apostles and prophets themselves. Grammatically, the construction is conceived of as a genitive of apposition, so that in
the English version the preposition, of, stands for the sign of
equality. This interpretation is supported by the ancient and
weighty authority of St. John Chrysostom, and is adopted by
all present day exegetes. Aside from authority, the chief argument which makes this view appear most acceptable is that of
the resulting parallelism of the passage. The Church, or rather,
its members, constitute a building. The apostles are this
building's foundation, i.e., the stones upon which the whole
edifice rests, for in Him " all the building, being framed together, groweth up into an holy temple in the Lord " (Eph.
This position is also strengthened by a consideration of who
is designated by the terms, " apostles and prophets." There is
little doubt but that the former term refers to the Twelve
(including St. Paul) , and also to those pillars of the primitive
Church, who are given this name in the Acts of the Apostles.
Now although an older opinion with regard to the "prophets"
was that the reference is to the seers of the Old Testament;
today exegetes commonly hold that St. Paul is speaking rather
of that college of privileged members of the primitive Church,
subjects of the charisms according to which they spoke in the
assembly of the faithful for the edification of the Christian

432

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

community. 17 The locutions of these prophets did not as such
pertain to the doctrine which is the core of Christian belief
and practice, but had to do presumably with the vicissitudes,
etc., of the Church of that day and age. If this be the true
sense of the phrase, " apostles and prophets," (a view confirmed
by the very order in which the terms are placed, for if it were
a question of the Old Testament prophets, the natural order
would seem to demand the precedence of " prophets," whereas
this construction seems to indicate some subordination of the
prophets to the apostles) it is quite impossible that the foundation of which St. Paul speaks is evangelical doctrine.
Adopting this latter interpretation, therefore, as the authentic
meaning of the passage, we cannot concede that Calvin used it
aptly in support of the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. St.
Paul in this place is not making even passing reference to the
relation between the Sciptures and the Church. He is merely
giving a full picture of the make-up of the Church, with a
special emphasis upon its apostolicity.
Even granted the possibility that the inspired writer has the
doctrine of the apostles in mind when speaking of the foundation, neither does it follow that the passage constitutes a patent
contradiction of the Catholic position. Several elements need
to be considered here, which Calvin does not bring into focus.
The first is the fact that the writer himself is an apostle. He
speaks of himself as such in the prologue to nearly all the his
epistles. In the present one he begins, "Paul, an apostle of
Jesus Christ, by the will of God" (Eph. 1: 1). Moreover, he
writes at a time (about 63 A. D., according to the common
estimate) when the Church, if not entirely, at least for a great
part, was in the hands of the apostolic college as to its regimen.
It was this group of men which had been commissioned immediately by Christ to rule the infant Church, and to give to its
members the doctrine Christ Himself had delivered to time.
In other words, this is the primitive Church.
17 Ceuppens,
F., 0. P., Quaestiones Selectae ex Epistulis S. Pauli. Rome:
Marietti, 1951, pp. 173-174. See also the places to which Father Ceuppens refers.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

488

Several consequences follow, bearing directly upon these
facts. The first, and perhaps the most evident, is that no
certainty can be had as to whether the doctrine to which St.
Paul allegedly refers is oral tradition or the canonical scriptures. It is certain that not all the Scriptures are involved,
because this is not the Apostle's last epistle. It is beyond
question that the New Testament of canonical writings, as we
know it, was non-existent at this time. Perhaps all that the
Ephesians had learned of the Gospel was from the lips of St.
Paul and his companions.
The second consequence to be noted has to do with the
relation which existed between the Apostle Paul and the people
to whom he was writing. We may characterize this relationship
as that of master to disciple, and it is precisely that connection,
which, according to the Catholic position, obtains between the
present day teaching Church, i.e., those authorized to deliver
Christian doctrine intact to all believers, and the members of
the Church with whom such power is not vested. Obviously
the cases are not exactly equivalent because today the Church
does not add new revelation to that delivered in the authentic
fonts of revelation. Neither is the infallibility, which is the
Church's endowment, of the same nature as biblical inspiration.
The Church's function is merely to accredit the objective
validity of the doctrine which is received in tradition and the
Scripture.
To solve, therefore, Calvin's objection that " this doctrine
must have been certain, antecedently to the existence of the
Church," 18 we should make the distinction implicitly contained in the foregoing paragraph, viz., between the teaching
Church, as just explained; and the believing or learning Church,
i. e., the entire body of the faithful of Christ, to whom the
divinely revealed data proposed by the teaching Church is
the key to a share in eternal life. The teaching Church performs
an active function in setting forth the revealed data, not by
giving intrinsic divine certainty to something that is in the
18

lnst., I, 7, 2, op. cit., vol. I, p. 86 (CR, XXX. 57).

434

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

first instance merely human, but by accepting it as divine from
God and as such validating this acceptance for the benefit of
men generally. The believing or learning Church actively
receives the doctrine of faith. In this sense alone does Calvin's
statement have truth, the major difficulty being that this is
not precisely the sense in which he proposed the argument.
Having seen that it is impossible to find a refutation of the
Catholic doctrine in the Epistle to the Ephesians, let us reexamine Calvin's position with regard to St. Augustine. We
may assume that the occasion of Calvin's discussion with
regard to the text, " I would not believe the Gospel, were it
not that the Catholic authority moved me to do so," was its use
by Pope Leo X in the Bull, Exsurge Domine, composed in 1520,
the burden of which was the condemnation of the theses which
Martin Luther had defended in Wittenburg. Calvin takes this
occasion to explain that in reality for St. Augustine the
Church is a witness to an unbelieving world, a witness that
ceases to be necessary for a believer.
This assertion of Calvin is not merely of historical interest.
Whether or not St. Augustine can be adduced in support of
the Catholic doctrine is an important point for the theologians
of the Calvinist school; first, because of the very intrinsic
authority of St. Augustine, and, second, because, granted his
support, the Protestant movement can point to a fore-runner
of its point of view. In fact Pannier, writing in France at the
turn of the century, speaks of the relation between Calvin and
Augustine on the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in this
vem:
There is certainly not yet [in St. Augustine] the whole of the
witness of the Holy Spirit. . . . But St. Augustine has the intuition
of a mysterious work which is wrought in the soul of the Christian,
of an understanding of the Bible which does not come from man
but from a power external to him and superior to him; he urges
the role which the direct correspondence between the Book and
the reader must play in the foundation of Christian certitude. In
this as in many other points Augustine was the precursor of the
Reformation and a precursor without immediate continuers.19
19

Pannier, J., Le Temoignage du Saint Esprit, Paris, Fischbacher, 1893, pp. 67-68.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

435

In America Benjamin Warfield took up this same theme with a
degree of enthusiasm: " In point of fact Augustine is just as
clear as the Reformers that earthly voices assail only the ears
. . . and he differs from them only in the place he gives the
Church in communicating that grace out of which comes the
preparation of the mind to understand as well as of the heart to
believe, and of the will to do." 20
In light of these tendencies to see in St. Augustine an incipient Reformer, a tendency that is but a reflection of four
centuries of discussion with regard to the text which occasioned
the controversy/ 1 the admission of Karl Barth is striking and
important. The theologian of Basle is willing to grant that St.
Augustine is speaking from a Catholic point of view:
The saying [of]Augustine-which the Reformers attempted in vain
to interpret . . . in meliorem partem-now became possible: in
answer to the question what we are to tell those who still do not
believe in the Gospel, Augustine has to confess, obviously on the
basis of his personal experience: Ego vero evangelio non crederem,
nisi me catholicae ecclesiae commoveret auctoritas. That I have
the Gospel and can believe in it is obviously, as Augustine sees it
Warfield, op. cit., p. 47£.
Warfield gives a history of the various arguments which have been adduced
to support Calvin's view by theologians of his school. If this text were the only
place in Augustine's writings where he touches the problem being considered, it
would be worthwhile to relate them in detail. For the present, it appears sufficient
to summarize. Thus a contemporary of Calvin, P. Melancthon, states: "Augustine
means that he is moved by the consentient testimony of the primitive Church"
(Warfield, p. 458). Another contemporary, Peter Martyr: "Augustine wishes to
signify . . . that much is to be attributed to the ministry of the Church. . . .
It cannot be inferred from this, however, that the authority of the Gospel hangs
on the Church in the minds of the auditors" (p. 459). Later the Protestant
scholastics were to propose the so-called " philological argument," according to
which St. Augustine, by the use of a peculiar tense (the imperfect, where the
pluperfect was called for), inferred that this experience was his own, as an
individual; so that nothing can be deduced from his statement with regard to
others. In the nineteenth century, however, there were not lacking Calvinists, such
as W. G. T. Shedd, who admitted that Augustine actually accorded to the Church
at least more authority than to any one member on this particular point. Warfield
himself seems to recognize this when he grants that St. Augustine " differs " from the
Reformers in the "place he gives the Church, etc." (p. 47£) . For this entire
historical consideration see pp. 449-470.
20

21

436

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

and as he was rightly understood in later Catholic polemics, itself
a gift of Church tradition. Therefore the saying foreshadows that
inclusion of Scripture itself into the tradition which was expressly
accomplished at a much later date. 22
Here Barth departs completely from the traditional Calvinist
view, and the reason for his departure is his unique theory
of how external authority in the Church tends to petrify the
vitality of religion, and how this hardening of the core of
Christian doctrine began, by an unconscious movement even
in the first centuries of the Church, so that the Reformation
was a glorious moment in the battle, which must constantly
be waged, to keep the word of God absolutely free to do its
work.
The difficulty of establishing with precision the true position
of St. Augustine in this regard is manifest. In the first place,
neither the passage which Calvin takes into consideration or
any whole work of Augustine deals ex professo with the relation
between the Church, the Scriptures, and the act of faith. It
has been observed often enough that St. Augustine's writings
are, for the greater part, of an occasional character. Therefore,
we must always try to view them as a whole. This in itself is
a formidable task. We will attempt, however, to offer some
evidence which indicates that, had he written a tract on the
establishment of the divine authority of the Scripture, his
doctrine would coincide in its lines with that exposed in
the Catholic Church today. 23
Four points will be considered here: 1) What did St. Augustine think with regard to the immediate activity of God in the
act of faith? 2) What was his doctrine as to the intrinsic worth
of Sacred Scripture? 3) What does he have to say about
Tradition as a font of revelation? 4) What was his attitude
toward the magisterium of the Church? It will be readily seen
that, if a reasonable degree of certitude can be found regarding
•• Barth, op. cit., I, 2, p. 549.
23 The work of P. Batiffol, La Catholicisme de S. Augustin, treats in a definitive
way of this entire question, and the following portion is written in close dependence
upon the references he adduces.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPffiiT

437

these points, the judgment with regard to the text, "I would
not believe the Gospel, etc.," should be made more easily.
There is no doubt about St. Augustine's doctrine on the part
that God must have in the conceiving of faith.
The sound of our words strikes the ear; the Master is within. We
may admonish by the sound of our voice; if He who teaches is not
within, our speaking is idle. . . . Have you not all heard these
words? Yet how many will leave not having grasped the truth?
Whomever the Holy Spirit has not taught retires as ignorant as
before.24
This is merely St. Augustine's rhetorical way of expressing the
truth which is part of the doctrinal patrimony of the Catholic
Church, namely, that in the subjective order, that is, within
the soul, only God is able to work.
Neither is there any question but that, according to St.
Augustine, to the inner voice of God corresponds an objective
revelation which carries with it its own authority of validity.
So constantly does St. Augustine return to the theme of the
intrinsic value of the Scriptures and the quality of inerrancy
which they possess, that it seems useless to quote any one text.
One must notice, however, that for Augustine the inner voice
and the authority of Scripture complement one another.
We have already noted with what force the Fathers of the
Church assert the existence of an authority whose source is
apostolic (and, therefore, divine, since in the minds of the
Fathers the mission of the Apostles was but the final term of
the visible mission of the Son of God), which is distinct from
the Scriptures. St. Augustine's witness with regard to apostolic
tradition is just as strong as that of any of the Fathers. We
may note that the lack of explicit controversy on this question
prevented St. Augustine from writing to the point as much as
we might now appreciate; but the following texts are an indication of his mind.
I believe that the custom [of receiving Christians baptized in heretical sects] comes from apostolic authority-just as many things
•• Ep. Joan. ad Parthos, tract. III, 13 (ML 35, !2004).

438

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

which are not found in their writings, nor even in the councils of
their successors; which, nevertheless, because they are kept by the
universal Church, are believed to be handed on and commended
by these very Apostles. 25

In another place, where the discussion is not merely about a
practice which presupposes a dogma, but about a dogma,
properly speaking (namely, the meaning of Christ's "descent
into Hell"), St. Augustine writes thus:
Practically the entire Church agrees that [He freed Adam from
Limbo at that time]. . . . And it is to be held that she has
not believed this in vain, from wherever it may be handed down,
even though the expressed authority of the canonical scriptures
cannot be adduced on this point. 26

Since it is impossible to find in the writings of St. Augustine
a comparison of the Scriptures and Tradition, and in light of
these texts, the interpretation by Warfield of St. Augustine's
thought seems to lack sufficient basis.
A presumptive apostolicity may lend to the immemorial customs
of the universal Church an authority which only arrogance can
resist; and to the Church, which was founded by the Apostles and
made by them a depository of the tradition of truth, a high deference is due in all its deliverances; but to the Scriptures alone belong
supreme authority because to them alone belongs an apostolicity
which coalesces with their entire fabric. 27

Actually the apostolicity of tradition is no more " presumptive " than is the divine authority of the Scriptures. In fact
if we make use of the figure afforded by the term " font " of
revelation, the doctrine of St. Augustine and the other Fathers
appears to amount to this, namely, that the content of Scripture and Tradition coalesce to form a single stream. Scripture
and Tradition are the source of dogmas which are the elements
in the body of the doctrine of Christianity. When Tradition is
the source of a dogma, the case is evident from a comparison
25 De Bapt. contra Donat., II, 12 (ML 43, 133) .
•• Epist. 164, 6 (ML 33, 711).
•• Op. cit., p. 442.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

439

of the Scriptures with Tradition, as crystallized in some authentic organ of the transmission of revelation. The dogmas
that are founded in the Scriptures themselves are evident from
an examination of the text and authentic exegesis. When these
two sources do coalesce into a single stream, its contents are
kept within its banks, so to speak, by the infallible Church.
This last point brings us to the consideration of St. Augustine
and infallibility. Aside from the evident fact that he depended
from the very beginning of his conversion on the Church's
magisterium, can we infer from his own writing that his thought
on the infallibility of this teaching authority coincides perfectly
with the doctrine as it is presented today? We must keep in
mind that a span of almost sixteen centuries makes a difference
in the manner of explicitness of expression; and in this light the
following texts are remarkable for the clarity with which they
set forth the doctrine of the Magisterium.
Truth abides in the bosom of the Church. Whoever is separated
from this bosom of the Church is bound to speak falsely....
From the mouth of truth I acknowledge Christ, Truth personified;
from the mouth of truth I acknowledge the Church, who shares
in this Truth. 28
Then with regard to the stability of the Church's magisterium

in the setting forth of the true meaning of tradition:
Thus, even though a certain example ... cannot be adduced from
the canonical Scriptures; in this matter we still hold to the truth
of those same Scriptures, as long as we do what the universal
Church has determined-the Church which is herself commended
by a scriptural authority. And so, since the Scriptures cannot be
wrong [in their commendation] let whoever fears to be mistaken by
the obscurity of this question consult the Church on it. 29
The considered judgment of Fr. Batiffol with reference to St.
Augustine's thought on the authority of the Church, as exemplified in the plenary council seems, therefore, to be correct:
" The soverign authority of a plenary council does not make
Enarratio in Pso 57, 6 (ML 36, 678-679)
•• Contra Crescono I, 38 (ML 43, 465)

28

o

o

440

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

the truth, but only disengages it from controversy and confirms
the traditional Catholic faith." 80 Thus we see that all the
elements of the doctrine of the Catholic Church are to be found
in the writings of St. Augustine; and it is within this remote
context that one should view his assertion with regard to faith
in the divine authority of the gospels. The immediate context
of this passage has its own proper significance. The paragraph
runs as follows:
You might be about to read to me from the Gospel, and try to
show from your reading that it speaks of the person of Manichaeus.
But if you would meet with someone who did not yet believe the
gospel, how would you answer his, " I do not believe? " But I
would not believe the Gospel, were it not that the authority of the
Catholic Church moved me to do so. Therefore, since I obey them
when they say, " Believe the Gospel," why ought I not to obey
their "Do not believe Manichaeus?" Take your choice: If you
say, " Believe the Catholics," the difficulty is that they warn me
to accord you no belief; and so if I believe them I can do nothing
else but withhold faith in you. If you say, " Do not believe the
Catholics," you do not act fairly by inducing me to believe in
Manichaeus through the Gospel, because I have come to believe
the Gospel itself because of Catholic preaching. 81
The background against which St. Augustine constructed his
argument was the peculiar doctrine which the Manichaeans
held in regard to the authority of the Sacred Scriptures. In
order to lure converts, they asserted that their system offered
something to which the Catholic Church made no claim. They
guaranteed the members of their sect a conviction of truth
more perfect than faith. Rational demonstration,
they
Op. cit., vol. I, p. 36.
Evangelium mihi fortasse lecturus es, et in de Manichaei personam tentabis
asserere. Si ergo invenires aliquem qui Evangelio nondum credit, quid faceres
dicenti tibi Non credo? Ego vero Evangelio non crederem nisi me catholicae
Ecclesiae oommoveret auctoritas. Quibus ergo obtemperavi dicentibus mihi, Crede
Evangelio; cur eis non obtemperem dicentibus mihi, Noli credere Manichaeis? Elige
quid velis. Si dixeris, Crede Catholicis; ipsi me monent ut nullam fidem accomodem
vobis; quapropter non possum illis credens, nisi tibi non credere. Si dixeris, Noli
Catholicis credere; non recte facies per Evangelium me cogere ad Manichaei fidem,
quia ipsi Evangelio Catholicis praedicantibus credidi. Contra Epist. Manichaei
quam vocant Fundamenti (ML 34, 176) .
30

81

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

441

affirmed, was to be had of the apostleship of their prophet,
Manichaeus. In establishing this demonstration, however, they
claimed the use of the gospels. Their contention was that the
gospels demonstrated Manichaeus to be a true prophet. St.
Augustine, in turn, demonstrates the fallacy of the Manichaean
position by setting up the dilemma which it presents. Granted
the authority of the Catholic Church to transmit the Word of
God, the Manichaeans must be rejected; for the Church herself
spurns their doctrine as false. On the other hand, with the fall
of the Catholic Church's authority, the Scriptures lose their
power to form a finn basis for any system which claims them as
a foundation. Why is this so? Evidently St. Augustine does
not mean to say that the Scriptures take their intrinsic worth
from the Church's subsequent approval, so that the Church
would " create " the Scriptures. Again, it is a question of an
objective criterion which God provides for the benefit of mankind, according to a pre-established order. Cardinal Cajetan,
a contemporary of Calvin, interprets the thought of Augustine
in this vein:
Thus does Augustine speak in regard to the proposition and
explication of the things to be believed by us who hold the second
place as far as faith is concerned. He says that he would not
believe the Gospel save that the Church proposes it to be believed;
for we accord faith to these books rather than to others for the
reason that the Church proposes these as worthy of belief. It is
otherwise with the prophets, who hold the first place as far as faith
is concerned; for they were taught by God Himself and wrote the
very books. 32

Cajetan here takes occasion to distinguish the faith of those
who either receive revelation immediately from God, or at
least are inspired by Him to transmit that which He wants
written for the common good of the Church, from the faith of
32 Et similiter auctoritas Augustini quoad proponendum et explicandum credenda
nobis, qui secundum locum in credendo tenemus, loquitur. Uncle dicit quod non
crederet Evangelio nisi Ecclesia proponeret illud credendum: propterea enim
credimus magis his libris quam aliis, quia Ecclesia hos proponit credendos. Secus
autem est de Patribus qui primum locum in credendo tenent: qui scilicet a Deo
instructi sunt et libros ipsos scripserunt. Comm. in Summa Theol., II-II, q. 1, a. 1.

442

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

those who receive the revelation of God or His inspired Word
mediately, i. e., through the instrumentality of the Church. It
is this latter faith of which Augustine speaks, says Cajetan;
and he goes on to point out, in concert with St. Thomas, that
the mediate position of the Church in no way destroys the
divine motive for faith. The Church receives the commission
from her Founder to be the condition without which faith is
not conceived, at least in the ordinary working out of God's
plan.
Thus we are left to choose between this explanation of St.
Augustine's thought and the explanation of Calvin, namely,
that the Church's confirmation of the Scriptures is merely an
"act of piety," not the transmission of a divine tradition of
apostolic origin. Taking into consideration Augustine's general
doctrine regarding divine revelation, we are much inclined to
take the part of Cajetan.
This view is confirmed by an examination of the work of St.
Augustine, which Calvin recommends as providing conclusive
proof of his interpretation. 33 In this very work St. Augustine
speaks of the Scriptures and the Church in the same breath, as
it were: "Nothing appears more prudent, chaste, and advantageous to religion than all those Scriptures which the
Catholic Church holds fast." 34 He also emphasizes the necessity of the Church in her magisterial function as an interpreter
of divine revelation. 35 In fact, throughout this treatise the
writer links faith and the Catholic Church as if one could not
be spoken of without the other. " Follow the road of Catholic
teaching which comes to us through the Apostles from Christ
Himself, and thence will proceed to those who follow." 36
To sum up, therefore, the criticism of Calvin's supposed
33
34

De Utilitate Credendi; cf. Inst. I, 7, 3; op. cit., vol. I, p. 88 (CR, XXX, 58).
De Utilitate Credenti; (ML 4!<!, 74).

35 Nulla imbutus poetica disciplina Terentianum
Maurum sine magistro attingere
non auderes; Asper, Cornutus, Donatus et alii innumerabiles requiruntur, ut quilibet
poeta possit intelligi, cujus carmina et theatri plausus videntur captare: tu in eos
Libl'os, qui quoquo modo se habeant, sancti tamen divinarumque rerum pleni, prope
totius generis humani confessione diffamantur, sine duce irruis. Ibid., (col. 77).
36 Ibid., (col. 79) .

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

448

refutation of the Catholic doctrine, or, perhaps better, his
refutation of the supposed Catholic doctrine, we offer the
following statements:
1) Because he misconceived the true nature of that font of
revelation which is divine tradition, Calvin drew false conclusions with regard to the consequences of the Church's
position.
2) His argument from the authority of St. Paul lacks foundation in the biblical text.
S) In view of St. Augustine's whole body of writings, and
with particular regard for the text which is adduced by Catholic
authors in support of the Church's doctrine, it appears that the
Bishop of Hippo can in no wise be considered as a " precursor
of the Reformation, but a precursor without immediate
followers." It might better be stated that in his thought is
the germ of the Catholic synthesis which is the common heritage of Catholic theology today.
SECTION

2: The Unique Position of Karl Barth

Apparently the next step in this criticism should be the
consideration of Calvin's positive defense of the doctrine of
the Interior Testimony. This will be postponed briefly, however, to give place to a few remarks about what is specific to
the doctrine of the Interior Testimony in Karl Barth. The
reason for this arrangement is that the criticism which is
common to all expressions of this doctrine necessarily takes into
account what Calvin has to say about its foundations.
It is already evident that the doctrine of the Interior Testitnony in Karl Barth is modified radically by his beliefs regarding revelation. In fact we may say truly that the change in
point of view is so fundamental that the doctrine of the Interior
Testimony in Barth would be unrecognizable to John Calvin. It
is no longer a divine light which illuminates the mind to see a
permanent quality about the Scriptures, a quality, in other
words, that is really the1·e; rather it is an intermittent divine
activity which places man in immediate contact with God, of

444

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

which the Scriptures are merely the occasion.37 Actually, in
this respect Barth is much further from the truth than was
Calvin. The Catholic doctrine includes a Bible endowed with a
permanent quality (summed up by the word, canonicity), to
which there corresponds a permanent conviction on man's part,
conditioned by a permanent commission of the Church to
administer the transmission of God's Word. Calvin
the commission of the Church; Barth takes away the real
canonicity from the Bible. 38
Barth's most fundamental error, however, seems to be not
his acceptance of the unwarranted conclusions of some modern
biblical criticism, to the effect that since the Bible contains
many imperfections and even errors, the old theory of divine
inspiration is no longer tenable. His whole methodology is
rather based on an even more radical subtraction from the
truth, " an agnosticism, from which he attempts to escape by
fideism." 39 It is, therefore, a criteriological error, insofar as
it is a denial of the value of the thought processes of the
rational creature, at least when the object of thought is God;
but it is theological to the degree that this denial is based
ostensibly upon a misconception of the effects of original sin.
Father Hamer's labelling of the basic attitudes gives us the
occasion of designating the element in Barth's doctrine in which
this " fideism " reaches its final term. That element is, of
course, the doctrine of the Interior Testimony. This means
that since Barth chooses to limit himself in this instance to the
terminology of the primitive Reformation, at the same time
categorically affirming that he adheres strictly to the principle,
sola Scriptura, his fideism, which on the part of God is but a
37 Fr. Hamer
has shown with sufficient clarity that this Occasionalism is a
characteristic note of the whole Barthian system.
38 It might be noted that there is an intermediate
step in this process, namely, a
retention of a Bible to which may be attributed at least some degree of intrinsic
divine value, along with a denial that the Testimony of the Holy Spirit results in
a permanent attitude of faith. This latter is the doctrine of J. Pannier, whose
work is cited above, and who conceived the Interior Testimony as intermittent with
regard to its subject, man. Cf. op. cit., p. 200.
39 Hamer, op. cit., p. 171.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

445

sudden thrust which pierces momentarily the opaque cloud of
agnosticism, consists in the illapsus divinus which is the Interior
Testimony of the Holy Spirit.

The Foundations of the Doctrine of the Interior
Testimony of the Holy Spirit
Finally, let us take this doctrine and see if it cannot be
subjected to some common criticism, even though its proponents differ widely in their orientation. In so doing we shall be
attempting to take a truly theological viewpoint, trying to
perceive the causes or motives which have inclined Protestants
of the Calvinist tradition to found their system upon this rock,
the Interior Testimony of the Holy Spirit.
One analysis which is commonly adduced is summed up by
the familiar phrase "private judgment vs. authority." The
Protestants are presented as children of the Renaissance, participating in that general tendency to emancipate human reason
from what were considered the bonds of medievalism. In rejecting the authority of the Church, they would merely have
substituted the authority of the individual. It should be evident that this criticism does not meet squarely the problem
which is posed by the Calvinist doctrine of the Interior Testimony. Calvin, in fact, begins with the axiom that only God
can bear witness to His own Word; and in our own day Barth
considers as a datum of Christian dogmatics that without the
testimony of God, man can make no judgments about divine
things. The Interior Testimony, except in the case of the sentimentalists who reduce all religion to a merely natural " religious
experience," is an authority which stands outside man. A contemporary Calvinist theologian, writing on the Interior Testimony, states: "Let us say at the outset that [this] Holy Spirit
is in no way immanent to my spirit; that He belongs just as
properly to God as my spirit belongs to me." 40
To institute a criticism that is more telling, we should begin
SECTION

3:

•• Preiss, Theo., Le Temoignage du Saint Esprit. Paris, Delachaux et Niestle,
1946, p. 16.

446

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

by indicating the extent of agreement between Calvinists (even
Karl Barth) and the Church in this matter. Then we can
proceed to expose the foundations of the Protestant doctrine,
first, by explaining the Catholic viewpoint on what is legitimate,
though over-emphasized, in the Protestant system; and second,
by showing exactly where the Catholic and Protestant doctrines
stand opposed as contraries.
The points of agreement are important ones. In the first
place, it is common to the various Calvinist and the Catholic
systems of theology to consider revelation as something that is
wholly supernatural in its origin. In whatever form it is
proposed the theology which is Calvinist in its origins is faithful to that truth expressed by Christ: "No one knows the
Father but the Son, and he to whom it shall please the Son to
reveal Him" (Matt. 11:
and repeated by St. Paul: "Eye
hath not seen nor ear heard, nor hath it entered into the heart
of man, what things God has prepared for those who love
Him" (I Cor. 9). We are well aware that investigation of
the precise sense of the word " supernatural " in all itS' applications will also reveal striking dissimilarities; but this much is
certain, namely, that if God be viewed as the efficient cause of
revelation, Catholic, orthodox Calvinist, and neo-Calvinist theologians are in basic agreement. For all, this cause operates in
a manner that exceeds all the powers of this world. No man
ascends to heaven to draw God down.
The doctrine of predestination, which is rightly considered as
characteristic of the system built by John Calvin, is in one way
a corollary of this initial supernaturalist orientation. Since
there is agreement regarding the first; there will be a certain
concord upon the second matter. Again, we are familiar enough
with the departures of Calvin from orthodox Catholicism in
the lengths to which he carried the doctrine of positive reprobation, as a part of predestination. The point of agreement,
however, should not be overlooked. Just as in the consideration
of God as the source of revelation; here again in the consideration of the various effects of predestination, there is common
agreement that the movement toward God (particularly, voca-

THE INT]lRIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

447

tion and justification; cf. Rom. 8: 80) is based upon a divine
determination or choice. Catholics and Calvinists are at one,
therefore, in affirming the font of religious truth to be out of
reach of man, and the contact between God and man in the
order of religious truth and personal engagement to be based
upon a divine choice.
The distance from these basic assumptions to the doctrine of
the Interior Testimony in the Protestant system is not great.
The question for the Catholic theologian should be: Are there
legitimate elements in the traversing of this distance? That is
to say, when in the positing of the Holy Scripture as the sole
means through which God accomplishes a vocation (one of the
principal effects of predestination) , Calvin and his disciples
close their system with the doctrine of the Interior Testimony.
Can the Catholic theologian also agree that here is an element
of truth?
Again the answer is in the affirmative; but since by the
principle of sola Scriptura the Protestants have introduced an
element that is entirely foreign to Christian orthodoxy, the
agreement must be much more restricted. This is the place
to note a certain over-emphasis in that system. We have
already seen that in the Catholic doctrine of the establishment
of faith in the truth: "The Scriptures are the Word of God,"
the testimony of God proposed in Tradition through the
infallible Church is complemented by divine grace, a motion
and a light-an interior testimony, but certainly not of the
character which the Calvinists attribute to their Witness. In
the Catholic system there is even another point which shows
the legitimacy of Calvin's tendency, without confirming in any
way the form that it took. According to the doctrine of St.
Thomas once faith has been conceived the believer is able to
judge by a certain connaturality concerning those things which
pertain to the object of faith. 41 Now the divine character of
"See Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 1, a. 4, ad Sum. Sicut enim per alios habitus
virtutum homo videt illud quod est sibi oonveniens secundum habitum ilium, ita
etiam per habitum fidei inclinatur mens hominis ad assentiendum his quae conveniunt rectae fidei et non aliis.

448

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

the Scriptures is of this genus, and so by the instinct of faith
the believer is able to perceive, with a marvelous certitude (less
in degree, however, than the certitude of Calvin's "fiducial "
faith) , that this is truly the Word of God.
In this explanation we assume, of course, as a necessary
condition of faith the transmission of the testimony of God
through the proposition of the Church; but, with this understood, it must be admitted that the Protestants are in contact
with a profound truth. Unfortunately their expression of it is
not contained within an orthodox context. Were it framed in
this background, we should marvel at the beauty, and accuracy,
of their insight.
The [Testimony of the Holy Spirit] makes the phrases of the
Bible written in the third person to speak in the second person. It
makes of the Bible a personal letter. From Adam to Jesus Christ
the believer discovers a history which embraces his own destiny.
He sees himself as perverted and condemned with Adam, and
saved in Jesus Christ. [The Spirit] is able to accomplish really that
which can and ought truly to be called a " religious experience." 42

The Testimony of the Holy Spirit in this Catholic sense is an
effect of that elevation of human nature and the faculties of
man to participate in the life of God, to the end that more and
more it is the Holy Spirit who is, in virtue of His gifts, the
moving force of the Christian's activity. It is not strange that
the Author of the Scriptures should call the attention, as it
were, of the Christian to the divine character of the Word of
God.
In the presence of the present day exposition of the doctrine
of the Interior Testimony by Protestant authors more or less
faithful to all of Calvin's principles, the exact manner in which
this activity is attributed to the Holy Spirit, as the Third
Person of the Blessed Trinity, should be kept well in mind.
We have no reason to attribute other but an orthodox sense to
Calvin's statement-the sense, namely, whereby this divine
work ad extra would be appropriated to the Holy Spirit as
being particularly consonant to what is distinctive of His
42

Preiss, op. cit., p. 29.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPffiiT

449

personality, i.e., to proceed from the Father and the Son in
an ecstasy of love. In modem authors, however, such as Barth
and Preiss, the doctrine of the Trinity is clouded by the
tendency to distinguish the Persons of the Trinity on the basis
of their very activity regarding man (e. g., the Word, because
He reveals God to man; the Holy Ghost, because He witnesses
of God's love to us in Jesus Christ). Catholics can benefit from
this Calvinist doctrine only if these distinctions and restrictions
are used to keep the doctrine in its proper perspective.
To point out what seems to be the most basic contrary
opposition between Catholicism and Calvinism, ancient or
modem, on this point, we must return to the Calvinist theme
of predestination, and see what relation it has to this particular
question. First of all, the order of the theological synthesis of
St. Thomas calls our attention to the truth that predestination
is really a " part " of divine providence, distinguished from
ordinary providence by the end toward which those who are
ruled by each tend-the attainment of which, in the case of
the rational creature, is of an exceptional order. St. Thomas
makes a second point too in this tract, which is of primary
importance here. He points out that between the order of
divine providence (or predestination) and the execution of this
order, called the government of the universe, natural and supernatural, there is a striking difference. In his own words the
difference consists in this: "[As far as the order of providence
is concerned) God oversees all things immediately . . . [But
with regard to the execution of this order] there are certain
means of divine providence. For He governs the inferior by
means of the superior." 43 The predestination of those God has
foreknown and elected " to be made conformable to the image
of His Son," means that God comprehends, immediately and
perfectly, the place each of His elect is to have in the heavenly
Jerusalem, as well as every inch of the path each will take to
reach that goal. It does not mean, however, that God is
43 " Quantum
igitur ad primum horum, Deus immediate omnia provideto
Quantum ad secundum sunt aliqua media divinae providentiae. Quia inferiora
gubernat per superiorao .
Summa Theolo, I, q.
a. 3, in corp.
0

0

."

0

•

450

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

constrained to furnish immediately all the means that each of
His elect will employ, according to His comprehensive foreknowledge. On the contary, the perfection of this latter aspect
of predestination, the government of the elect in leading them
to eternal life, is enhanced by the employment of means,
secondary causes, to accomplish God's plan. Such management
of the execution of God's predestination of the elect is not,
indeed, "on account of any defect in His power, but because
of the abundance of His goodness, so that He communicates to
creatures the dignity of causality." 44
The "dignity of causality " communicated to creatures in the
supernatural order of the execution of the predestination of
the elect is really the point where the Catholic position is
sharply distinguished from that of Calvin and his school, right
down to the present day. It is a point that extends itself to
form a line that marks the separation of the two syntheses.
Before seeing exactly how this separation is effected in the
matter of the establishment of the canonicity of the Scriptures,
we may carry the exposition of the Catholic doctrine one step
further. The causality, shared by God with creatures in the
execution of predestination, takes place in two distinct ways.
The most commonly discussed created cause in this order is
the instrument. This is not the place to evolve the precise
44 Ibid. St. Thomas discussed this same question later in the same part of the
Summa, p. 103, a. 6. Here he assigns the root of the difference in the order of
providence and its execution:
Cujus ratio est quia, cum Deus sit ipsa essentia bonitatis, unumquodque attribuendum est Deo secundum sui optimum. Optimum autem in omni genere vel
ratione vel cognitione practica, qualis est ratio gubernationis, in hoc consistit, quod
particularia cognoscantur, in quibus est actus; sicut optimus medicus est, non qui
considerat sola universalia, sed qui potest etiam considerare minima particularium;
et idem patet in ceteris. Unde oportet dicere quod Deus omnium etiam minimorum
particularium rationem gubernationis habeat.
Sed cum per gubernationem res quae gubernantur sint ad perfectionem perducendae; tanto erit melior gubernationem, quanto maior perfectio a gubernante rebus
gubernatis communicatur. Maior autem perfectio est quod aliquid in se sit bonum,
et etiam sit aliis causa bonitatis, quam si esset solummodo in se bonum. Et ideo
sic Deus gubernat res, ut quasdam aliarum in gubernando causas instituat; sicut si
aliquis magister discipulos suos non solum scientes faceret, sed etiam aliorum
doctores.

THE INTERIOR TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPffiiT

451

notion of instrumental causality. As examples of the employment of divine instruments we cite the sacraments; and we
note in this example a characteristic common to all instruments,
namely, that of itself instrumental causality is a phenomenon
that is transient. We note, secondly, that according to common
Catholic doctrine, the instruments which God employs are
dignified to the extent that they are not merely the occasions
but real efficient causes of internal grace.
The second type of created cause in the supernatural order is
the minister. Since this notion is not quite so common, and
also because it is more to our point, it may be helpful to note
several characteristics of the ministerial cause. 45 First, to which
of the genera of causes does it belong? It is clear that the
minister is not an efficient cause. For example, the ambassadors
of a government, who function as ministers, do not act as
moving causes in the strict sense in the accomplishment of this
or that mission. They are, rather, dispositive, and operate in
the order of material causality. From the same example of the
ambassador we may derive other notions. First, there is a
certain permanency about the office of a minister, although
its duration is dependent entirely upon the will of the authority
in whom the minister's mission originates. Second, the degree
of dignity with which the minister is endowed is also to be
determined by the supreme authority for whom the minister
acts.
The point at issue here is, of course, that in the present
economy of the execution of predestination the Church founded
by Jesus Christ, the Minister of the New Testament (who is
more than this too) , is the minister through which the elect are
disposed to receive the graces according to which they are to
be made conformable to the image of the Son of God. If it
must be admitted that there has been neglect on the part of
Catholics to emphasize the function of the testimony of the
Holy Spirit (as explained above) in the verification of the
45 The ministerial cause which is spoken of here is not to be confused with the
sacramental minister, who is truly an instrumental cause. Cf. St. Thomas, Summa,
11-11, 188, 4, ad 1.

452

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

Scriptures; we may ask the Protestants of today if in their
synthesis they have not overlooked this last point.
The answer to this question must be in the affirmative, and
it must also be amplified, because it is not merely a question of
neglect, but rather of a gross misunderstanding. The neglect
consists in not taking into account the ministerial role of the
Church in the accrediting of the Scriptures. We have seen that
the minister does not work in the same intimate way as the
instrument. The Church administers, in the certification of the
Scriptures, an external grace; while in the sacrament of Baptism,
for example, internal grace is really conferred. But this is not
to diminish the function of the Church to nothing, to a mere
" act of piety," because in the exercise of her ministry of preserving, proposing and explaining the contents of divine revelation she exercises a permanent ministry according to a commission of her Divine Founder, which charter includes the
guarantee of infallibility.
How this aspect of the execution of predestination escaped
Calvin can be seen from his writings. In the very discussion of
the Interior Testimony he observes:
That alone is true faith which the Spirit of God seals in our hearts.
And with this one reason every reader of modesty and docility will
be satisfied: Isaiah predicts that " all the children " of the renovated Church " shall be taught of God." Herein God deigns to
confer a singular privilege on his elect whom he distinguishes from
the rest of mankind. 46

Another remarkable passage is that in his commentary upon
the second epistle of St. Paul to the Corinthians (1: 22): "It
is necessary that the spirit who has spoken through the mouth
of the Prophets enter into our hearts and touch them to the
quick to persuade them that the Prophets have faithfully set
before them that which was committed to them from on
high." 47 Preiss correctly interprets these passages: " This is
to say that the Church and each Christian today recognizes the
Bible as the word of God by a testimony and with a certitude
46

47

lnst., I, 7, 5; op. cit., vol. I, p. 91 (CR, XXX. 60).
Cited by Preiss, op. cit., p. 13.

THE INTERIOR

TESTIMONY

OF THE HOLY SPIRIT

453

both of which are direct." 48 Finally, Karl Barth states the
identical doctrine in his own way:
We cannot speak of the inspiration of the Bible ... without that
other royal act-which is only a continuation of the first-in which
the inspiration is imparted to us, in which here and now we are
forced out of our position as spectators of the word and work of the
biblical writers, in which the calling of the prophet and apostles
becomes an event to us by the ministry of their word and work.49
These statements taken together show that in the Calvinist
tradition the secondary cause is not considered in the execution
of predestination. Contact between God and the elect must be
immediate, or, according to this view, there is no contact at
all. It is significant that Calvin and Barth both speak explicitly
of the prophetic vocation in this connection and liken the
Christian vocation to it. In reality the prophets enter into the
plan of predestination in an utterly unique manner. The gift
according to which they serve God and the elect is a charism,
not pertaining directly to their own salvation, but given primarily for the benefit of the Church. Also because of this
unique character of the prophetic gift, these specially chosen
ones "hold the first place in believing," as Cajetan observes
in the place cited. Holding this position they are among the
superiors through whom the elect are governed. From the
point of view of their having received divine revelation immediately and having been enlightened and moved to transmit the
word of God to writing by the gift of biblical inspiration, the
prophets were truly instruments of God. From the point of
view of the witness that they bear toward the elect of all ages
they are ministers of the covenant between God and His Chosen
People-" Let a man so account of us, as of the ministers of
Christ and the dispensers of the mysteries of God " (I Cor.
4: 1).
The truth that the ministry of the prophets, based upon a
charism, was not connected necessarily with the effects of their
own predestination, notably vocation and justification, is of
great moment here. It is this very formal separation between
48

Preiss, ibid., p. U.

•• Barth, op. cit., I, 2, p. 522.

454

MAURICE B. SCHEPERS

holiness and the ministry that seems to have been a scandal
to Calvin, and remains so to the Protestants of today. We say
" formal separation " because the evidently preferable situation
is the joining of the two, as it is exemplified in the prophets
such as Isaiah and Jeremiah, and the Apostles. It is this formal
separation too which gives the teaching Church its special
character as a minister in the execution of God's plan for the
recapitulation of all things in Christ, and, in particular, the
administrator of the revelation of God in Tradition and the
Scriptures, to which she bears witness by giving an infallible
guarantee to their divine origin. In other words, the public
exercise of this gift of infallibility pertains to the order of
charisms.
In light of all this we wonder if the following presentation of
the Church's position is justified (a presentation that is current,
having been published within the last decade):
Who has written the Bible, who has made the collection of the
books contained therein and put them in a single volume, declared
them to be normative and canonical? The Church of the first
centuries, without any doubt. Therefore, the Church of Rome
concludes triumphantly, it is the Church who has created the
Scriptures. 50

The Church's claims are certainly more modest than this! She
only stands firm in the precise position she holds in the
execution of predestination and this not because of any defect
either in the power of God, or the efficacy of His revelation in
the Bible-" for the Word of God is living and effectual, and
more piercing than any two edged sword, reaching unto the
division of the soul and the spirit, of the joints also and the
marrow, and is a discerner of the thoughts and intents of the
heart" (Hebr. 4: 12) -but because of the superabundance of
God's goodness, who even shares with creatures the dignity of
causality.
MAURICE

Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.
•• Preiss, loc. cit., p. 11.

B. ScHEPERs, 0. P.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
JAMES B. REICHMANN, S. J., S. T. L., Ph. D., (Gregorian), a contributor to
The New Scholasticism, is now engaged in research in Metaphysics
and Philosophical Psychology at Mount St. Michael's (College of
Gonzaga University), Spokane, Washington.
SISTER THERESA CLARE MoRKOVSKY, C. D.P., M.A., affiliated with Our Lady
of the Lake College, San Antonio, Texas, is preparing her doctorate
thesis entitled, " Freedom in the Philosophy of Henri Bergson," at
St. Louis University, St. Louis, Missouri.
MAURICE B. ScHEPERS, 0. P., S. T. D., Professor of History of Dogma on
the Pontifical Faculty of Theology, Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C., has recently published a volume in the Foundation of Catholic Theology Series entitled The Church of Christ.
R. KEVIN SEASOLTZ, 0. S. B., S. T. L., J. C. D., author of House of God and
The New Liturgy published by Herder and Herder, is affiliated with
the Department of Religious Education, The Catholic University of
America, Washington, D. C.
CHARLES STINSON, M.A. (Phil.) , who attended Georgetown University, is
currently pursuing graduate studies in the Department of Religious
Education, The Catholic University of America, Washington, D. C.

455

BOOK REVIEWS
The Church and the Liturgy: Liturgy Vol.
Concilium. Edited by
JoHANNES WAGNER. Paulist Press, Glen Rock, N. J., 1965. Pp. 191.
Cloth, $4.50.
What strikes one most forcibly in reading the Constitution on the Sacred
Liturgy is its determination that the renewed liturgy shall be the means by
which the People of God are sanctified and enabled to worship their
Creator in spirit and truth. The principal concern of the Constitution is to
make the Church's worship meaningful to modern man, but if the intention
of the Council is to be realized, not only will there be need for specific
reform measures on the part of the post-conciliar liturgical commission but
there will also be need for proper instruction, or more precisely, a genuine
education, in the sense of the Church which is both constituted and expressed through the liturgy. The way to a thorough renewal has already
been partially prepared by theoretical specialists, but their thought must
filter down to the practical administrative levels of the parish, religious
house, and school.
In a way, then, the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy is both a beginning and an end. It is the beginning of a new phase in the life of the
Church's liturgy, but it is also the culmination of years of historical research,
theological development and pastoral experimentation. The second volume
of Concilium, edited by the distinguished German liturgist, Johannes
Wagner, is devoted to the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy, but the
editors and the contributors have attempted above all to see the document
in terms of the Church and its growth in recent years. As Wagner points
out in his preface to the volume, " The liturgical movement . . . is ultimately but a part, the specific expression and an important interpretation
of a much greater and more comprehensive process that has been going on
in the Church irresistibly for a long time: the image of the Church is
seen in a new light; it is seen and made a reality in a new and profound
manner."
Since the liturgy is the mystery of the Church's own life, it is the greatest
treasure which the Church possesses and therefore the object of heavy
responsibility for the bishops who possess authority in the Church. As the
Constitution points out, it is first of all in his celebration of the Eucharist
that the bishop manifests the true nature of his episcopal office as a
successor of the apostles. It is in and through the liturgy that he continues
the apostolic work of building the Church as the Body of Christ through
the proclamation and celebration of the Paschal Mystery so that men might
be made one in Christ's Body, dead to sin and risen in glory. The Church

456

BOOK REVIEWS

457

is built where the apostolic ministry gathers men together in the name of
Christ by proclaiming the gospel to them and by breaking for them the
Bread of Life. In view of the vital role which the bishop plays in the
liturgical life of the Church, the first four articles of The Church and the
Liturgy delineate various aspects of this topic. Dom Cyprian Vagaggini
illustrates the theological bases upon which rests the full range of bishopliturgy relationships, Joseph Pascher outlines the relation between bishop
and priests according to the liturgy Constitution, Frederick McManus discusses the juridical power which the Constitution has vested in the
episcopal conferences with regard to the liturgy, and Joseph Jungmann
discusses the bishop's role in the development of the devotional life of the
Church.
But since it is impossible for the bishop always and everywhere to
preside over the whole flock in his Church, " he must establish smaller
groupings of the faithful. Among these the parishes, set up locally under
a pastor who takes the place of the bishop, are the most important, for in
some manner they represent the visible Church constituted throughout the
world" (Constitution, paragraph
Because each parish celebrates the
Eucharist in union with the local bishop and because every bishop is in
union with the Pope as the Bishop of Rome, the Church is visibly manifested to the world above all though the celebration of the mystery of
Christ. In this sense, the liturgy is always a public and communal action.
Hence to minimize in practice this character of the liturgy is to oppose its
very essence. By the very fact that there can be no liturgical celebration
which is not public in principle, every celebration should be carried out
in the most public way. This especially applies to the celebration of the
Eucharist. Likewise it is opposed to the essence of the Eucharist, which is
above all the sacrament of the Church's unity, that more than one Mass be
offered at the same time and in the same place. Hence whenever distinct
Masses are not required for distinct assemblies of the faithful, the only
normal way to celebrate the Eucharist is concelebration.
The background to the conciliar teaching on this matter contained in
paragraphs 57 and 58 of the liturgy Constitution is concisely presented in
the survey of the recent literature on concelebration given by the Dutch
Redemptorist, Hendrik Manders. The present writer feels that this is the
most important contribution appearing in The Church and the Liturgy.
As Manders points out, the contemporary interest in concelebration is
not really new but is rather the result of fifty years of movement leading
up to the stage which the decisions of the Council have taken as a starting point. During the period from the medieval theologians to the beginnings of the modern liturgical movement, any interest paid to concelebration
was not very favorable. At best, theologians were interested only in the
validity of consecration, since they lived in a spiritual climate where con-

458

BOOK REVIEWS

celebration could not really be theologically understood. In the nineteentwenties there was a change in attitude limited to a small circle of
theologians. Manders attributes this change to a more profound contact
with the life and liturgy of the Eastern Churches-a development spurred
on by Pius XI-and also to the development of a pastoral orientation given
to the liturgical movement through the efforts of Dom Lambert Beauduin.
It was an address given by another Belgian, Dom Placidus De Meester in
1923 which clarified the basic theological principle behind concelebration:
" Its function," he said, is " to express, first, the communal character of the
Church's prayer; secondly, the principle of the hierarchic nature of the
Church, and thirdly, the close bond of unity which the Church received
from her Founder " (p. 138) .
In 1927 the Belgian Jesuit, J. M. Hanssens published an historical study
of concelebration which greatly influenced later investigations. It was
Hanssens who first introduced the distinction between sacramental and
ceremonial concelebration, a distinction which complicated later discussions
of the problem and which tended to obscure the theology of the rite.
Following Hanssens' work, the problem of concelebration in the-W est lay
quiet. Although several isolated articles on the subject appeared during
World War II, the topic did not come to life until 1949. By that time the
liturgical movement had succeeded in reviving a consciousness of the social
aspect of the Mass: however, the communal character, which Hanssens had
stressed, was not equally appreciated. Opposition to individualistic forms
of celebration naturally provoked resistance from those who were inclined
to an individualistic piety. Among these were certain ecclesiastical authorities who often made decisions which hindered the development of concelebration but which nevertheless fostered theological research on the problem.
In general the Holy See seemed reluctant to open the door to the establishment of concelebration as a general practice in the West. In this regard,
Father J. Loew wrote to Father Manders in 1953: "Rome, today, and
especially the Congregation of Rites, which has competence in the matter,
is strongly against any attempt to introduce concelebration."
However, following World War II the phenomenon of large conferences
of priests emphasized the inconvenience and often the incongruity of a
multitude of private Masses. Since concelebration was canonically excluded
as a possible solution to the problem, a remedy was often found in a
messe communautaire at which one priest celebrated while the others
participated and received Communion. This type of celebration implied a
tendency toward concelebration, but it also brought up new problems,
especially concerning the value of many Masses as compared with one
Mass celebrated collectively by a number of priests. Influenced by Father
F. Hiirth, a Jesuit from the Holy Office, Pius XII discussed the problem of
the messe communautaire in two major addresses that are still misunder-

BOOK REVIEWS

459

stood and misinterpreted today. However it should be emphasized here
that in the allocution, Magnificate Dominum, delivered in 1954, and again
in his address to the Assisi Congress in 1956, Pius XII did not reprobate
the messe communautaire but rather said it could continue provided it was
approved by the bishop and did not scandalize the faithful.
But as Manders notes, behind the messe communautaire lay the more
searching question that is vital for the spirituality of the priest: How
much is individual priestly celebration a positive element in the spiritual
life of the priest? In the discussion as to whether daily celebration is a
genuine spiritual value, the meaning of concelebration was re-evaluated.
Soon the question of concelebration became a question of co-celebration or
collective celebration so that all participating priests could renew Christ's
sacrificial act individually by pronouncing collectively the words of consecration. The situation threatened in which concelebration becomes a
synchronized Mass in disguise.
Since the messe communautaire was experienced as a communal celebration that manifested the solidarity of the priesthood, concelebration was
looked upon as the ideal expression of this communal bond. However,
concelebration came to be thought of as a celebration only of priests and
not as a celebration of the whole Christian community. Thus while the
liturgical movement was seeking to de-clericalize the celebration of the
liturgy there developed a tendency toward a clericalization of concelebration. As Manders states, " the principle of concelebration as manifestation
of the hierarchical unity of the Church, so strongly emphasized by the older
authors in conformity with tradition, found itself in competition with the
idea of co-celebration in which all participants collectively express their
unity in the priesthood on an equal level" (p. 143).
Recent studies by G. Danneels, P. Fransen, P. Weber, M. C. Vanhengel
and P. Tihon have analyzed the rite of concelebration in the light of
contemporary sacramental theology and have thus laid the theological
foundation for the statements on concelebration made by Vatican II. These
authors seem to agree that a genuine concelebration presupposes a principal
celebrant and a college of priests who celebrate the Eucharist together with
the principal celebrant but under his hierarchical guidance-all in the midst
of a participating community. Other authors apply the term concelebration
also to the more recent form in which all the priests celebrate the Eucharist
on the same level, with or without a participating community. Both H.
Schmidt, who introduced the term "co-celebration" for this latter form,
and Danneels wonder just to what extent this type of celebration realizes
the full meaning of concelebration.
Actually the form of concelebration has not been constant in the Church,
either in the East or the West. In general the basic distinction in the forms
is between a spoken and silent concelebration or, to use Hanssens' term-

460

BOOK REVIEWS

inology, between sacramental and ceremonial concelebration. Authors did
not agree in what sense these forms of concelebration did in fact consecrate
the Eucharist; in practice, however, the problem was settled by a declaration of the Holy Office on May 23, 1957, which stated that the silent form
of concelebration is not in fact co-consecratory today in the Western
Church. It should be noted here that the silent form of concelebration by
one principal priest and participated in by others is essentially the same as
the messe communautaire.
Following the Holy Office decree, various authors drew the conclusion that
the silent form of concelebration and also the messe communautaire were
forbidden; however, both Hiirth and Nicolau stressed that this conclusion
was incorrect. As Hiirth pointed out, the intention of the Holy Office was
simply to make it clear that at a silent concelebration and hence also at a
messe communautaire only the principal celebrant actually consecrates.
Following the 1957 decree, there was no doubt about the discipline for
the Latin Church-the recitation of the formula of consecration by all
concelebrants is considered to be essential to the sacramental sign. The
Church's power to formulate such a decree arises from her authority over
the matter and form of the sacraments, save for their substance, as stated
by the Council of Trent (D. 931). The Holy Office decree also affirmed
that what it decreed is so ex institutione Christi. In this regard the decree
went beyond Pius XII's previous allocutions. Although it would seem that
something more than sacramental discipline is involved here, most authors
agree that the Holy Office did not intend to give a dogmatic definition to the
effect that the recitation of the consecratory formula is of divine institution.
It is with this background that Manders approaches the real problem of
the true theological meaning of concelebration. The real problem is not the
scholastic question of whether a number of priests can jointly pronounce
the words of consecration validly, nor is it the question of whether only
the spoken word effects the consecration. The latter question was prompted
by a very narrow view of both the nature of the Eucharist and the function
of the priesthood. It found its origin in the idea that the only strictly
priestly action in the Eucharist consists in performing Christ's sacrificial
act by pronouncing the consecratory formulae. However one must not
limit the theology of concelebration to the collective rite by which the
Eucharist is confected or to the collective renewal of Christ's sacrifice by a
group of priests. The first sense of concelebration is that "it is the manifestation of the hierarchical unity of the Church" (p. 148) .
All of the sacraments are celebrations of the Church in which the Church
herself comes to a true realization of her own nature as the sacrament of
Christ Himself. It is the whole community of the Church which celebrates
the mystery of Christ, but each member functions according to the status
which he has in the hierarchical community as a whole. As Manders points

BOOK REVIEWS

461

out, the sacramental rite of concelebration " makes real the unity of the
college of priests in the one Spirit of the ministry in the midst of the
community for which their function was given. Each functionary, performing the sacramental task for which the Church ordained him, cooperates
sacramentally with the bishop or his delegate as the center of this unity.
And thus the unity of Christ's Body becomes manifest, as it must be manifested in the world" (p. 149).
Precisely because the unity of priests and their bishop becomes a sacramental reality in the rite of concelebration, the practice of having but one
principal celebrant is the norm for any eucharistic celebration which should
reflect the nature of the Eucharist itself. In this regard Manders quotes
the following significant passage from Danneels:
... Christ is the chief celebrant who offers his sacrifices only within the unity
of his Church, and here supreme power resides in the entire Ordo sacerdotalis as in
her womb. The concelebrating presbyterium is then the manifestation within a
definite ecclesiastical community of that Ordo, and the actualization, here and
now, of this sacrificial power. For even when the priest functions alone . . .
he can only perform an ecclesiastical symbolic action, doing this in virtue of
Christ's priesthood insofar as this is present on earth in the entire Ordo sacerdotalis.
Even as an isolated celebrant, the priest still functions as a member of a sacerdotal
hierarchy and in virtue of powers possessed by that Ordo as a college. In concelebration, that which is always implied becomes implicit by signs: a collegium of
priests enters into the very sign of the eucharistic celebration, in order to support
the activity of the chief celebrant" (p. 149-150).

The unity of the priesthood is especially implied when priests concelebrate
with their own bishop, above all when newly ordained priests concelebrate
with the bishop at the moment when they are admitted to the priestly
college and receive their mission from him. The bond between various local
churches that make up the universal Church is shown forth when bishops
of various dioceses concelebrate together or in union with the Pope in the
presence of a community.
In concluding his survey, Father Manders points out that articles 57
and 58 of the liturgy Constitution deal only with concelebration including
a collective consecration. The practice of ceremonial concelebration or the
messe communautaire still remains licit, and it continues to give a suitable
manifestation of the unity of the priesthood and the hierarchical structure
of the Church.
Another important detail concerning the eucharistic celebration as the
achievement of the Church's unity is the re-establishment by the Council
of Communion under both species for all the Christian people. The high
level of scholarship which Father Manders manifests in his survey of the
literature on concelebration is also manifested by Father Godfried Danneels

462

BOOK REVIEWS

in his brief but thorough bibliographical survey of " Communion under
Both Kinds."
Although the other articles in The Church and the Liturgy are not so
significant, the volume as a whole is a representative survey of contemporary Catholic theological thought concerning the ecclesial aspects of the
Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy. Hence it fulfills the aim which the
editors had in mind when they inaugurated Concilium.
R. KEVIN SEASOLTZ, 0. s. B.
The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late Medieval
Nominalism, by HEIKO AuGUSTINUs OBERMAN. Cambridge, (Mass.):
Harvard University Press, 1963, pp. xv + 495, with bibliography and
index.
Harvard awarded its Robert Trout Paine Prize for
to this work.
The University's judgment has never seemed better. Prof. Oberman has
produced a model of historico-theological investigation. Well organized,
impressively documented in both primary and secondary sources, lucid and
tranquil in style, it is a pleasure to read. Even when he feels himself obliged
to dissent from the views of earlier scholars in the late medieval field, names
such as Seeberg, Vignaux, Hagglund, Feckes, Lortz and others, Oberman is
unfailingly courteous and amiable about it. This reviewer will find it
necessary to question several of Oberman's ultimate evaluations of Rieland of Ockham as well; but there can be no question about his command
of the field. With this treatise, Oberman has obviously established himself
as the leading contemporary student of Biel; it is difficult to see how his
work could be surpassed. Reference to this volume will be a sine qua non
for ttny future treatment of Nominalist theology.
Oberman intends, fundamentally, "to come to a reassessment of the
impact of Nominalism on 16th century thought, especially of the elusive
relationship-both negative and positive-between Gabriel Biel and Martin
Luther" (p. 3). In entering into the thicket of 14th and 15th century
dogmatics, Oberman realizes that he is dealing with " emotionally and
He finds three
denominationally colored presuppositions"
(p.
"Schools" of interpreters already long at work there: the "Background
of the Reformation" school which "stresses contrasts" between Nominalism and Luther's thought; the " Thomistic " school which views Aquinas'
doctrine as the " apex " of the Middle Ages and hence Nominalism as a
" disintegration " and " collapse " which led to the Reformation; and the

BOOK REVIEWS

468

" Franciscan " school which, following in the spirit of the late Ockham
scholar, Philotheus Boehner, is "willing to defend the orthodoxy of
Nominalism" and considers Luther's teaching "an erroneous interpretation
of the theology of such a Nominalist as Gabriel Biel."
In the midst of conflicting perspectives, Oberman desires to study Biel
for himself, to "take with utmost seriousness" the Rex Theologorum who
taught at Tiibingen from 1484 into the early 1490s and instructed two of
Luther's teachers, Bartholmaeus von Usingen and Johann Nathin. By
placing Biel " within the context of the Tradition which he himself acknowledges to be authoritative," Oberman hopes to demonstrate that the
thought of this 15th century Doctor and, indeed, Nominalism in general, is
neither simply " the aftermath of High Scholasticism " nor merely " the
background of the Reformation." For Oberman, "Nominalism" has a
theological position and even a certain religious value of its own. Besides
employing Biel's Collectorium on the Sentences and his Expositio of the
Mass, Oberman breaks relatively new ground by having frequent recourse
to Biel's pastoral works, his Lectures and, above all, his Sermons. Oberman
insists that Biel's Sermons "must be taken seriously as documenting his
thought "-a point well made. Up to now, on the basis of the Collectorium
alone, Divus Gabrielis has usually been judged-and more or less dismissed
-as but a verbose echo of Ockham. This still common impression Oberman
corrects, in large part, a least.
Oberman projects the full spectrum of Biel's dogmatic and moral theology
as it appears in both his academic and pastoral writings. He finds that Biel
accepted but toned down, in a suitably pious manner, the Ockhamist
concept of an Absoluta Dei Potentia. Biel stressed, far more than did
Ockham, the " wisdom " of God's use of His Power; the " congruity " and
reliability of the moral-soteriological order " established " de facto by God;
and the absolute changelessness of the Divine Misericordia as expressing
the Divine Voluntas. In successive chapters of this rich and complex study
-whose high points can only be indicated here-Oberman analyzes Biel's
"anti-manichean" anthropology in which human freedom of will vis-a-vis
God is absolutely central, in which the damage wrought by Original Sin
may vex but cannot destroy the natural human liberty of moral-religious
choice, in which sin is caused more by ignorance, really, than by malice;
Biel's Scotist-Ockhamist conception of naturally acquired (and fundamentally important) virtues of Faith and Charity, and their relationships
to the extra Gifts of infused Faith and Charity, to "historical" belief, to
apologetics and the several planes of theological reasoning; Biel's twofold but unified view of the decrees of Justification and Predestinationone an eternally gratuitous Acceptatio decreed " ante merita praevisa ";
the other an equally free Divine arrangement decreed for rewards "post
merita." Oberman sums up Biel's Ockhamist doctrine here: "God has

464

BOOK REVIEWS

graciously committed Himself to accept good deeds that are only in order
of priority related to Acceptation as ' causes ' of His Acceptation," though
" strictly speaking, even virtuous works performed in a state of grace do
not cause Acceptation " (p. 192). Oberman notes-not without a trace of
wonderment at the verbal-conceptual cleverness of the Ockhamist schoolthat "Biel has a remarkable doctrine of Justification: seen from different
vantage points, Justification is at once sola gratia and solis operibus! "
(p. 176) . Oberman analyzes Biel's moderately contritionist view of Penance
as virtue and as sacrament. Biel's Ockhamist Christology Oberman defends
against the common charge of quasi-nestorianism; he sees it, instead, as an
attempt to avoid a semi-monophysite position; he does note, however, that,
in conceiving the Atonement, Biel has a strong tendency to an Abelardian,
man-ward moral exemplarism, rather than to the Anselmian idea of a
God-ward satisfaction. As to Biel's Eucharistic theology, Oberman finds
that it does more to " distinguish " than to " unite " the Eucharistic
Sacrifice and the Sacrifice of Calvary, and hence tends to make the daily
celebration of Mass a separate, if admittedly secondary, effort " ad provocandam Dei misericordiam." As an Evangelical, Oberman is, naturally
enough, cooler to Beil's Mariology than to any other aspect of his thought;
in its popular form, as seen in the copious Sermons, Biel's intercessorymediatorial concept of Mary seems to Oberman to " undermine " the
Chalcedonian faith in the real Humanity of Christ, and even to encroach
partially on the traditional offices of the Holy Spirit. Yet Oberman concedes that in comparison with the reigning style of 15th century Marian
speculation, Biel's utterances are "restrained."
He is rather more impressed with Beil's ability to combine Nominalism with an "affective"
and " non-speculative " popular mysticism-which he terms a kind of
"democratization of mysticism "-i.e., a life of penitential devotion well
within the reach of the ordinary, mediocre but well-intentioned Christian
in the world. This combination appears to Oberman to belie the common
claim that Nominalism and "mysticism "-in a broader sense of that term
-were incompatible. Finally, Oberman sees Biel as, in effect, a proponent
of the theory of not one but two separate fonts of Revelation, and hence
as foreshadowing the " partim-partim " mentality of the Fathers at Trentor at the least that mentality as Oberman intuits it. It is in this area of
Scripture and Tradition especially, and in the domain of Mariology as
well, that Oberman sees Biel as a clear forerunner of much Post- Tridentine
thought.
Oberman presents this " Gabrielistic " synthesis, in both its strong and
weak points, against a panorama of the dogmatic thought of the time.
In addition to the excellent textual footnotes, there are several long comparative excursuses into various parallel doctrines taught by other doctors:
not only Anselm, Lombard, Albert, Aquinas, Bonaventure, Scotus and

BOOK REVIEWS

465

Ockham, but major secondary figures like Gregory of Rimini, Robert
Holkot, Jean Gerson and others less well known. The excursus on Scripture
and Tradition traces the problem of what is meant by " Tradition" back
as far as Basil the Great and Augustine. For the benefit of those who might
be confused by the proliferation of Nominalist terms, Oberman helpfully
supplies a glossary; and for still others who might need some help wandering
through Biel's nomenclature, Oberman has drawn several large schematic
charts in a style not unlike that to which M. Maritain was once addicted.
The general picture which Oberman wants his reader to have of Biel is
that of a substantial theological thinker and a religious man in his own
right: " Biel's pastoral works provide us with the evidence that the
Ockhamistic system, preserved in its full integrity, is perfectly suited for
. Here, this reexplicitly theological and pastoral application" (p.
viewer finds himself unable to agree with the author. It seems, rather, that
Prof. Oberman's superb textual documentation-and his own recurrent,
penetrating judgments-tend to damage this flattering picture. When
Divus Gabrielis' theological profile is sketched in completely, what we
discern is a thoughtful and industrious divine, yes. But by no means a
profoundly searching one. Working within Ockham's system, Biel was led,
by his own deep personal piety, to mitigate its worst tendencies to amoralism and to a frivolous playing with the themes of Revelation. Unfortunately, he could not, while remaining an Ockhamist, also extricate himself
from the influence of his master's very thinly veiled pelagianism. An allpervading exaltation of nature and a corresponding trivialization of Original
Sin combine to impoverish Biel's well-intentioned theology of Grace, Faith
and Charity. Oberman has to a certain degree brightened up Biel's image,
but the previous severe judgment on Ockhamist or "Nominalist" theology
must continue to stand unchanged. As a dogmatic meditation on the
Mystery of the New Testament, the soteriology of Ockham and Biel
remains not only defective, but beyond any remedying.
Oberman himself appears to reveal a curious ambivalence within his
own view of Biel's theological value and his relationship to the Latin
Church. On one hand, doubtless in abreaction to the violent language of
Bouyer, Iserloh, Vander Pol and others, Oberman is led to judge that Biel
and the Nominalists in general are "orthodox" Catholics: "We are altogether willing to defend the thesis that late medieval Nominalism should be
However, by the
viewed as a basically Catholic movement" (p.
"orthodoxy" of Nominalism Oberman seems to mean only those aspects of
it which are " forerunners " of Trent on " Mariology " and the " relation of
Scripture to Tradition." But these are not the central aspects of Nominalist
thought which its modern Catholic critics single out for such bitter condemnation. They are principally concerned with its metaphysically loose and
over-humanized soteriology and its shallowing-out of sacramental theory.

466

BOOK REVIEWS

It seems, in a word, somewhat beside the point to defend the "orthodoxy " of Biel and Ockham on the grounds that, for the modern Catholic,
there is nothing fundamentally wrong with their attitude towards Scripture
and Tradition or with their Marian speculation (though Biel's could stand
some vigorous pruning) . The real problems lie within the doctrines of sin,
Grace, Faith, Charity and Beatitude. And concerning these themes,
Oberman himself has many a shrewd observation: For Biel "the tragedy of
man" consists "in a lack of knowledge which is not primarily explained as
a result of his Fall and loss of Original Justice, but as a natural consequence
of his status as a creature" (p. 68); " Acquired faith seems to be Biel's
real and main concept of faith . . . as always when there is an option
between a naturally acquired or an infused habit, one senses his suspicion
of all heteronomy, all that may imperil the freedom of the will" (p.
Biel, in misreading Augustine's De Libero Arbitrio, III, 5, 15, shows "a
striking lack of sensitivity for the important distinction between metaphysical and psychological freedom of the will" (p. 104); "Doubtless for
Biel sin has not made it impossible for men to act rightly without the aid
of Grace .... Not absence of Grace, but improper cognition prevents men
from acting rightly" (ibid.); an infused habitus of Grace is "required for
acceptation " but " only ... within the context of the Eternal Decree and
not [by] a metaphysical necessity" (p. 168). It is hardly surprising, then,
that Oberman should conclude that " at least comparatively there is an
explicit tendency towards naturalism, as acts performed under the general
influence of God are said to be more completely in man's own power than
those performed under the influence of created Grace" (p. 50).
As an Evangelical, Oberman could find Biel's soteriological views no
more congenial than Luther himself could. However, Biel's thinking is no
less repugnant to Thomists than to Evangelicals. Following the mature
doctrine of Aquinas, Thomists view created " actual " Grace as a special
and ontologically necessary aid given by God beyond His " concursus
generalis"; and without that special help, no human being can perform a
good moral act or even " prepare himself " for Grace by " doing what lies
within himself." Oberman hints broadly that it is because of their predilection for Aquinas that modern Thomists judge Scotus, Ockham and Biel
as perpetrators of the theological " collapse " of the Middle Ages. A
certain continuing rivalry among the Orders cannot be entirely discounted,
of course, but it is more probable that Thomists see the Pauline-Augustinian insight into Grace first endangered and then all but destroyed by late
Franciscan Nominalist dogmatics.
Heinrich Denifle accused Biel of being an incompetent " halbwisser "
who misreported Aquinas' teaching on special Grace and the " concursus
generalis." Oberman manages to acquit Biel of this charge. Biel did take
the early teaching of Aquinas (liS, D.
for his definitive view; and

BOOK REVIEWS

467

Oberman believes that Aquinas entirely reverses himself later on in the
Summa (I-II, Q. 109); but Oberman then points out rightly enough that in
Biel's day most theologians still esteemed the Commentary on the Sentences
the more authoritative of Aquinas' works.
Since no review is quite complete without at least one carping at a
typographical error, we might note that on page 256, note 21, referring to
a passage in Aquinas' Sentences, directs us, rather puzzlingly, to Ox. IllS,
D. 2, Q. 1, Art. 1.
However, these judgmental reservations are more or less peripheral. In
its expository substance, The Harvest of Medieval Theology can be recommended most cordially to all who are interested in medieval and reformation dogmatics, and in the history of dogma as well. Oberman has produced
an exhaustive, a detailed and, at times, a brilliant account of Tiibingen's
" King of Theologians "-that piously pelagianizing German divine whose
work the young Luther admired so much as to memorize whole portions of
it; and for whom, but a decade or so later, a disillusioned and more mature
Luther would reserve some of his most acrid language.
This is the first of a projected two-volume study of Biel and Luther
promised by Prof. Oberman. The second volume is to deal with Luther,
and we await its appearance with much interest.
CHARLES STINSON

The Catholic University of America,
Washington, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED
(continued from July)

Guardini, Romano, The Faith and Modern Man. Chicago: Regnery,
Logos Edition, 1965. Pp.
Paper, $1.45.
Guelly, Robert, Christian Commitment to God and to the World. N.Y.:
Desclee, 1965. Pp. 178. $3.95.
Guitton, Jean, Great Heresies & Church Councils. N. Y.: Harper, 1965.
Pp. 101 with index. $4.00.
Hagerstrom, Alex, Philosophy and Religion. N. Y.: Humanities, 1964.
Pp. 320 with index. $7.50.
Harris, Errol E., The Foundations of Metaphysics in Science. N. Y.:
Humanities, 1965. Pp. 512 with index. $10.00.
Hayden, D. E. and Alworth E. P. (editors), Classics in Semantics. N. Y.:
The Philosophical Library, 1965. Pp. x, 382, $10.00.
Hopkins, Martin, 0. P., God's Kingdom in the New Testament. Chicago:
Regnery, 1964. Pp. 247 with indices. $4.50.
Hurlbutt, R. H., III, Hume, Bewton and the Design Argument. Lincoln,
Nebraska: University Press, 1965. Pp. xiv,
$5.00.
Lepp, Ignace, The Authentic Morality tr. with introduction by Bernard
Murchland, C. S.C. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1965. Pp. 203. $5.00.
Luijpen, William A., 0. S. A., Phenomenology and Atheism. Pittsburgh:
Duquesne, 1964. Pp. 344 with indices. $6.50.
Magill, Frank N., Masterpieces of Catholic Literature. N. Y.: Harper's,
1965. Pp. xxii, 1134 with index. $9.95.
Marcel, Gabriel, Philosophical Fragments. Notre Dame: University Press,
1965. Pp. 127. Paper, $1.75.
Maritain, Jacques, Approaches to God. N. Y.: Macmillan, 1965. Pp. 125.
Paper, $.95.
Martel, Jean, Des Homes, Des Idees et Des Dieux. Lyon: Vitte, 1965.
Pp. 154. 9.00 F.
McLean, George F., 0. M.l., (ed), Philosophy in a Technological Culture.
Washington: The Catholic University, 1964. Pp. 438. Paper, $5.95.
Munitz, Milton K., The Mystery of Existence. N. Y.: Appleton, Century,
Crofts. Pp.
with index. $5.00.
Natanson, M. and Johnstone, H. W., Jr. (editors), Philosophy, Rhetoric
and Argumentation. University Park, Pa.: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1965. Pp. xiii, 176. $5.00.
Palmer, Geoffrey, The Junior Bible Encyclopedia. Cleveland: The World
Publishing Company, 1965. Pp. 140. $2.95.
Paper,
Peguy, Charles, Basic Verities. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. Pp.
$1.95.

468

BOOKS RECEIVED

469

Pieper, Josef, Guide to Thomas Aquinas. N. Y.: Mentor-Omega, 1964.
Pp. 160 with index. Paper, $.60.
Pieper, Josef, The Silence of St. Thomas. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. Pp.
122. Paper, $1.25.
Pikunas, J., Fundamental Child Psychology. (2nd edition revised with
contributions by L. T. Gratson and Robert P. O'Neill; foreword by
A. P. Farrell). Milwaukee: Bruce, 1965. Pp. x, 460. $5.40.
Rahner, Hugo, S. J., Our Lady and the Church. Tr. Sebastian Bullough,
0. P. Chicago: Regnery, 1965. Pp. 131 with index. Paper, $1.25.
Riedl, John P., The University in Process (The Aquinas Lecture, 1965).
Milwaukee: Marquette, 1965. Pp. 78. $2.50.
Scheckle, Karl Hermann, Discipleship and Priesthood: A Biblical Interpretation. N. Y.: Herder & Herder, 1965. Pp. 142. $3.50.
Schmemann, A., Ultimate Questions: An Anthology of Modern Russian
Religious Thought. N. Y.: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965. Pp.
309. $6.95.
Simon, Yves, The Tradition of Natural Law: A Philosopher's Reflections.
Ed. Vukan Kuic. N.Y.: Fordham, 1965. Pp. 194 with index. $5.00.
Sweeney, Leo, S. J., A Metaphysics of Authentic Existentialism. Englewood
Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965. $6.75.
Tavard, G. H., The Church Tomorrow. N. Y.: Herder & Herder, 1965.
Pp. 190. $3.95.
Teilhard de Chardin, P., Letters from Egypt, 1905-1908. N. Y.: Herder &
Herder, 1965. Pp. 256. $4.95.
Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, Hymn of the Universe. N.Y.: Harper & Row,
1965. Pp. 158. $3.00.
Thomas, George F., Religious Philosophies of the West. N.Y.: Scribner's,
1965. Pp. 454 with index. $7.95.
Van Caster, Marcel, S. J., The Structure of Catechetics. N. Y.: Herder &
Herder, 1965. Pp. 253 with index. $4.95.
Ward, Leo R., Ethics: A College Text. N. Y.: Harper & Row, 1965. Pp.
3.90 with index. $4.50,