THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXX

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

APRIL, 1966

No.2

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

F

EW CONCEPTS in modern philosophy are invested
with such a variety of meanings as the concept of metaphysics. To many, metaphysics has no meaning at all
because it does not even exist. To others, metaphysics is that
part of philosophy dealing with mysterious and occult things
that lie beyond the scope of our senses. For the majority of
philosophers and scientists the term ' metaphysics ' is synonymous with philosophy, as opposed to contemporary science.
Among scholastics, there is a variety of opinions on its nature.
Even Thomists disagree among themselves on both the nature
of this science and on Saint Thomas' own metaphysics.
Saint Thomas explicitly analysed the nature of science and,
consequently, of metaphysics in his Commentary on Boethius'
De Trinitate. In his Commentary on Aristotle's Metaphysics
his thought, though perhaps not so explicit, seems more complete and mature. When he wrote this Commentary nothing
was known about the historical difficulties concerning the composition and unity of Aristotle's work. In spite of this, Saint
109

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Thomas' thought in both books is always the same regardless
of whether there is or is not a gradual evolution in Aristotle's
own philosophical thought.
What is the nature of metaphysics? Are physics and metaphysics specifically distinct? What is the proper mode of
abstraction to which metaphysics corresponds? The answer
to these questions is closely related to the general methodology
of sciences. Since science is primarily an intellectual knowledge,
its division and specifications depend on that element which
makes knowledge possible, namely, immateriality: "It is clear,"
says Aquinas, " that the immateriality of a thing is the reason
why it is cognitive and according to the mode of immateriality
is the mode of knowledge." 1 In the immateriality, and therefore in abstraction, lies the solution of our riddles.
Scientific abstraction presupposes a harmonious relationship
between the object, upon which science falls, and the cognitive
power that operates in order to acquire knowledge. Fundamentally, abstraction depends on the object; but formally,
abstraction is an activity of the mind for it is only in the mind
that the habit of science can exist. To understand the nature
of metaphysics we have to bear in mind this double abstractive
consideration. First, it is necessary to investigate the nature
of the second operation of the mind, the judgment, for the
purpose of applying the results to metaphysics. Secondly, and
not less important, we shall investigate the nature of the
objects upon which the judgment of metaphysics falls.

I.

METAPHYSICS

Is BoRN

Nature of judgment.
" The intellect," says Aquinas, " has two operations, one
called ' the understanding of indivisibles ' by which it knows
' what ' a thing is; and another by which it composes and
divides, that is to say, by forming affirmative and negative
enunciations. Now these two operations correspond to two prin1

Summa Theo., I, 14, I.

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111

ciples in things, the first operation regards the nature of a thing
itself ... the second regards a thing's act of existing." 2
The second operation-the judgment-formally contains the
truth, which is defined as: "the equation of thought and
thing." 3 Accordingly, the judgment signifies the equation of
the thing outside the mind with the concept of the thing in
the mind, that is to say, the thing as known and expressed in
the intellect by means of the enunciative word of the judgment. In other words, truth is the equation between what is
said and enunciated inside the intellect, and the thing itself as
it is outside the mind; the equation of reality and its enunciative word. 4
The primary feature of a judgment may, therefore, be summarized by saying that it simply expresses reality as it is, without changes and subjective interpretations. This concept is of
vital importance to our inquiry.

The judgment of separation in metaphysics.
Saint Thomas relates abstraction and two operations of the
mind. The abstraction proper to physics and mathematics
corresponds to simple apprehension. 5 The judgment, however,
bears upon metaphysics: " one with respect to the operation
of the intellect composing and dividing which is properly called
separation; and this belongs to divine science or metaphysics." 6
So, the judgment proper to metaphysics is ' separation.'
If what was explained above is applied, now, to the judgment
of separation it follows that if the judgment of metaphysics
is truthful, that which the judgment separates inside the mind
must be separated in reality, outside the mind. In Saint
Thomas' words: " Since the truth of the intellect results from
its conformity with the thing, clearly in this operation the
intellect cannot truthfully abstract what is united in reality ...
In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 3.
Summa Theol., I, 16, I.
• Santiago Ramirez, 0. P., La Filo{lofia de Ortega y Gasset (Barcelona, 1958),
2

8

p.

• In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 3.
• Ibid.

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the intellect can truthfully abstract things which are separated
in reality, as when we say 'man is not an ass.'" 7
The first conclusion is therefore clear: the object of metaphysics exists in reality, outside the mind, separately.

The judgment of separation does not fall upon the act of
existence as such.
Some believe that the judgment of separation falls upon the
act of existence. This opinion, however, is totally foreign to
Saint Thomas. The judgment of separation, it is true, falls
upon existing beings, but not upon the existence of these beings
as such. Existence is identical in all beings. Essence is the
principle of distinction of existing beings, as Aquinas clearly
says: " The distinction of beings is not due to their existence:
since they agree in it ... hence things are distinguished because
they have different natures, by which existence is acquired
in different ways." 8
Does the judgment separate existence and essence? Then
essence would not be part of the subject of metaphysics, which
is absolutely false. Does the judgment separate existent beings
from beings without existence? That makes even less sense.
A certain wish to adapt to the contemporary philosophical trend
of existentialism has prompted some scholars to direct their
efforts in that direction, when in truth, it is essence that is
the main concern of metaphysics. As Saint Thomas says:
" Since being is not a genus, then being cannot be of itself
the essence of either substance or accident. Consequently, the
7

Ibid.

Res ad invicem non distinguuntur secundum quod habent esse: quia in hoc
conveniunt . . . relinquitur ergo quod res propter hoc differant quod habent
diversas naturas, quibus acquiratur esse diversimode." Summa Contra Gentiles,
CI,
" ... Unde non sic determinatur esse per aliud sicut potentia per actum,
sed magis sicut actus per potentiam. Nam in definitione formarum ponuntur
propriae materiae loco differentiae, sicut cum dictur quod anima est actus corporis
physici organici. Et per hunc modum, hoc esse distinguitur ab illo esse, in quantum
est talis vel talis naturae. Et per hoc dicit Dionisius quod licet viventia sint
nobilioria quam existentia, tamen esse est nobilius quam vivere: viventia enim
non tantum habent vitam, sed etiam cum vita simul habent et esse."-De Potentia,
1 ad 1.
7,
8; De Verit.,
1 ad 3; Summa Theol., I-II,
8 "

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

113

definition of substance is not ' a being of itself without a
subject,' nor is the definition of accident ' a being in a subject';
but it belongs to the quiddity or essence of substance to have
existence not in a subject; while it belongs to the quiddity or
essence of accident to have existence in a subject .... " 9
The explanation of the judgment of separation lies not in
existence, but elsewhere.
The judgment of separation refers to separation from matter.
The judgment separates the concept of being as being from
the concept of matter and mobility. As we say 'man is not
an ass ' because the concept of man and the concept of ass are
different, we say in like manner that ' being as being is not
material ' on the ground that the concept of being and the
concept of matter are different for, according to Aquinas:
"There are still other objects of speculation which do not
depend on matter with respect to their existence because they
can exist without matter." 10
The judgment of separation expresses an ontological reality.
Accordingly, the independence of being from matter presupposes the existence of immaterial beings. Metaphysics comes
after physics or psychology which demonstrate the existence
of these beings. 11 The new science is aptly named metaphysics,
that is to say, post-physics; " for in the order of analysis it
comes after physics." 12
Is the existence of immaterial beings an absolute necessity
for metaphysics? If by metaphysics we mean a science specifically different from physics, then, their existence is absolutely
necessary. Let us examine this necessity.
a) Aristotle and Aquinas say that if material beings were
the only existing beings, then physics would be the first philosophy. Why? Because if all beings are material and mobile
• Summa Theol., III, 77, 1 ad 2; " Sed naturalis et philosophus primus considerat
essentias, secundum quod habent esse in rebus . . . et per hoc diversum modum
essendi, dicunt esse diversa genera."-In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a. 3.
10 In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. l.
11 In IV Meta., l. 5, n. 593.
12 In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a. 2 ad 3; Ibid., q. 5, a. l.

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ANTONIO

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the part of philosophy treating them would study and give
explanation of ' all ' beings, assuming thus the role of first
philosophy .13
b) The demonstration of the existence of immobile beings
constitutes the goal of the study of motion. The fact of motion,
it is shown, implies the existence of an immobile motor. This
motor is not part of the subject of physics, only its end, 14 and
since that 'motor-being' lies beyond the scope of physics, it
needs to be considered by another science which embraces all
beings: "But if there is a different nature and substance over
and above natural substances, which is separable and immovable, there must be a science which differs from the philosophy
of nature and is prior to it ... and universal." 15
The demonstration of the spirituality of the human soul is
also sufficient; anything immaterial or immobile implies the
necessity of metaphysics: " in the world there are not only
bodies but also certain incorporeal things, as is clear from
' The Soul.' " 16
In a universe composed exclusively of material beings, it is
clear that physics assumes the role of first philosophy, explaining all beings. But our universe is not so; the demonstration
of the existence of immaterial beings has proved it. Therefore,
the separation of the concept of being as being from materiality
follows consequently upon the discovery of immaterial beings:
"There are still other objects of speculation which do not
depend on matter with respect to their existence because they
can exist without matter." 17 Physics is unable to deal with
the problem of being so a new science is born, and it will delve
13 " ••• that if there is no substance other than those which exist in the way
that natural substances do, with which the philosophy of nature deals, the philosophy
of nature will be the first science. But if there is some immobile substance, this will
be prior to natural substance; and therefore the philosophy which considers this
kind of substance, will be the first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be
universal; and it will be its first function to study being as being .... " In VI Meta.,
I. 1, n. 1170; Ibid., III, I. 6, n. 398; IV, I. 5, n. 593.
u In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 2 ad 3.
15 In XI Meta., I. 7, n. 2267; Ibid., IV, I. 5, n. 593.
16 In I Meta., I. 12, n. 181.
17 In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 1.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

115

into the problem of being as such which now appears under
a new light and a new formality: its immateriality. 18
So, the first and most important judgment of metaphysics
expresses the first and most important feature of reality: " The
being as being is not material, it is immaterial."

II.

NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

The whole of metaphysics is immaterial.
The judgment of separation seems to impair rather than to
enhance the intelligibility of beings. On one hand we assert
the independence of being from materiality. On the other, we
are puzzled by the countless multitude of beings manifesting
themselves as material and mobile. Are these material beings
not beings? It seems that we face two kinds of beings, material
and immaterial. How then is the science of metaphysics
possible?
Here is an easy solution to the dilemma: metaphysics deals
with immaterial beings such as the soul and God, leaving to
physics the modest investigation of matter and motion. Those
who are happy with this position fail to see its implication,
namely, the death of metaphysics as first philosophy. The
sphere of metaphysics would be restricted to a few spiritual
beings, leaving totally untouched the thorny enigma of 'ens
commune.'
For others, metaphysics embraces all beings, material and
immaterial, but in different ways. Treating spiritual substances
it leaves behind all matter. But when metaphysics considers
material beings, then, it does not separate from matter, but
treats these beings as they are, material and mobile. This attitude is common, even sensible, but it presupposes a distressing
confusion of the material and formal object of metaphysics.
In truth, metaphysics always does without matter, and not
18 " ••• But if there is some immobile substance, this will be prior to
substance; and therefore the philosophy which considers this kind of substance,
will be first philosophy. And since it is first, it will be universal; and it will be
its function to study being as being, both what being is and what the attributes
are which belong to being as being."-ln VI Meta., I. I, n. II 70.

116

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MORENO

only in treating spiritual beings, but all kind of beings, material
and immaterial. It seems puzzling, but there lies the solution
which baffles the philosopher and confuses the scientist.
1. This position is explicitly asserted by Aquinas in the
Proemium of Metaphysics and in many other places: " ... Now
although the subject of this science is being in general, the
' whole of it' is predicated of those things which are separated
from matter both in their intelligible constitution and in being
(esse) ... not only ... God and the intellectual substance, but
also ... being in general. This could not be the case, however,
if their being depended on matter." 19
2. The unity of science depends on the unity of its subject,
formally considered, not materially. And this formality depends
in its tum on the mode of immateriality. So if there is one
science of metaphysics and not two, its immateriality has to
be the same in all its parts. If metaphysics does without matter
in dealing with spiritual substances, and uses matter in dealing
with material substances, then, evidently, there are two immaterialities and two metaphysics, because as Aquinas says:
" The different genera of knowable things are distinguished
according to the different modes of knowing just as those
things which are defined with matter are known in one way,
and those things which are defined without matter in another." 20
Those who ascribe two immaterialities to metaphysics do
violence to the Aristotelian methodology of sciences.
3. "The terminus of knowledge, in natural sciences," says
Aquinas, " must be in the sense ... ; and knowledge in mathematics must terminate in the imagination .... On the other
hand, there are some things which transcend both what falls
under the sense and what falls under the imagination, as those
that are entirely independent of matter .... Therefore in divine
science we should go neither to the imagination nor to the
19 In Proemium Meta.; Ibid., XI, I. 7, n.
VI, I. 1, n. 1163; "Philosophia
prima est specialis scientia, quamvis considerat ens secundum quod est omnibus
commune, quia specialem rationem entis considerat secundum quod non dependet
a materia et motu."-In II Sent., d.
a.
sol.
In I Phys., I, 1, nn. 1-3.
20 In I Post., Anal., I. 41, n. 11.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

117

senses." 21 The metaphysical judgment always terminates in the
intellect, beyond the external and internal senses. This is a
further confirmation of the total immateriality of its subject.
4. Matter and motion as such do not come directly under
metaphysical consideration: "But to say that a heaven should
be both separated and mobile is impossible, because nothing
separated from matter can be mobile." 22 Mobility implies
necessarily the existence of matter, because prime matter is the
first principle of motion. 23
In addition, St. Thomas asks in the commentary of Boethius:
" Does divine science treat of what exists without matter and
motion? " He answers: " The philosopher says ... that first
philosophy deals with things which can exist separately, that
is, from matter and with immobile things ... so divine science
abstracts from matter and motion." 24 He does not say that
' part of metaphysics ' abstracts from motion and matter, but
simply ' metaphysics.'
So, metaphysics considers all being under the same immateriality and the same abstraction. Metaphysics is one, and
always does without matter.

The immateriality of metaphymcs is ' precimve.'
1. The judgment of separation does not positively preclude
matter. This occurs with spiritual substances, and their science
is theology: " First in the sense that it is not of the nature of
the thing called separated to be able in no way to exist in
matter and motion, as God and the angels . . . the theology of
Sacred Scripture treats of beings separated in the first sense
as its subject." 25
2. The judgment of separation is 'precisive '; namely, it
does without matter in the sense that matter is not positively
precluded nor is it positively included. Matter is not positively
In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a. 2.
In III Meta., I. 7, n. 411.
28 Ibid., V, I. 15, n. 987.
2 • In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 4.
25 Ibid.
21

22

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ANTONIO

MORENO

precluded because then metaphysics would be the science of
spiritual substance only, which it is not. On the other hand,
matter is not included either, for this would transform metaphysics into a physics dealing with mobile beings. The concept
of being is not opposed to the concept of materiality; materiality
simply is not included, and consequently, its 'ratio' or formal
concept is not material: " in the sense that it is not of the nature
of that which is separated to exist in matter and motion." 26
This is so because being and its attributes do not universally
exist in matter, for example, substance, potency, act, and being
itself and this could not be the case if their being depended
on matter: " we say they are separated because it is not of
their nature to be in matter and motion, although sometimes
they are in matter and motion, as animal abstracts from reason,
although some animals are rational." 27
The concept ' animal,' neither includes nor excludes both
rationality and irrationality; neither attribute is of its essence.
In like manner, the concept of being as such does without
matter because matter is not of the essence of its formal concept, though it is not necessarily part of this concept not to
possess matter either, since there are material beings.
Even in material beings, the concept of being does not include
matter. Material beings are not material as beings, but as they
are 'such beings,' namely, material. Aquinas, foreseeing the
difficulties which baffie so many, raises the question whether
matter and motion are objects of metaphysics. After all, they
are also beings and metaphysics cannot dispense with them.
He solves the difficulty with his usual clarity: " the metaphysician deals with individual beings too, not with regard to
their special natures in virtue of which they are special kinds
of being, but insofar as they share the common character of
being. And in this way matter and motion also fall under his
consideration." 28
Metaphysics regards matter and motion as sharing the common notion of being. Physics studies a special kind of being,
•• Ibid.
27 Ibid., ad 5; Summa Theol., I, 3, 4 ad 1; De Pot., 7, !2 ad 6; Ibid., 3, 16 ad 4.
28

In ]Jq(;lth,#

Trin., q. 5, a. 4 ad 6.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

119

namely, mobile being. It is a principle of metaphysics to leave
to particular sciences the role of investigating particular beings.
And it is worth noticing, as Cajetan says, that metaphysical
beings are not compared to physical beings as universal wholes
to their subjective parts, but rather as formal is related to
materiai.2 9 The material object of metaphysics embraces all
beings-material, immaterial, substances, and accidents, even
individuals. But metaphysics considers these objects under the
same formality: being as being. And it considers all these
objects in the light of total immateriality.

The subject of metaphysics.
The subject of a science is that " whose proper passions and
per se accidents demonstration shows." 30 Science investigates
the principles, causes, elements, properties, and proper accidents of its subject.
The subject of metaphysics is " being," " common being,"
"being as being and the quiddity of being." These are expressions of a unique reality. What kind of reality is "common
being"?
1. It is real, as opposed to the being of reason whose existence is only in the mind. So, logic and metaphysics do not
share the same subject, though both are universal sciences. 81
It is created, because only created things belong to the
ten categories. God is not part of the subject of this science.
3. The being of metaphysics is primarily considered as
essence, divided in the ten predicaments:
" But being as
divided by the ten categories signifies the very nature of the
ten categories insofar as they are actual or potential." 32 So,
although it is true that this being, as opposed to the object
29 Caietanus,
Thomas de Vio, Commentaria in De Ente et Essentia (Taurini,
1934), p. 7.
80 In I Post. Anal., 1. 15, n.3.
81 In I Se:nt., d. 19, 5, 1 ad 1.
82 In X Meta., 1. 3, n. 1982; Aliam entis extra animam sive prout ens in rerum
natura, et tunc significat rei essentiam extra animam existentis."-In I Sent., d. 19,
5, 1 ad 1; "significat naturam decem generum."-De Malo, 1, 1 ad 19; "Significat
essentiam rei, et dividitur per decem praedicamenta."-Summa
contra Gentiles,

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ANTONIO

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of logic, is real and existent, existence as such is not the primary
concern of metaphysical investigation.
4. Substance is the principal object of metaphysics because
substance is "the first and principal being." 33 This science
considers the principles, causes, elements, properties, and proper
accidents of substance. Metaphysics embraces all substances
insofar a they share the common genus, that is to say, entia
per se,34 but not insofar as they are 'such substances,' unless
they are spiritual, as in the case of the human soul whose
investigation properly belongs to metaphysics. The investigation of the soul belongs to psychology only insofar as the soul
is considered as the form and principle of motion of the body.
Metaphysics also studies the accidents proper to all substances because every science considers both the subject and
the proper accidents and passions of the subject as well.35
Metaphysics, however, does not investigate the particular accidents of being that pertain to particular sciences, e. g., motion
to physics, and measurement to mathematics.

Demonstration in metaphysics.
Insofar as metaphysics investigates the essence of the ten
predicaments it demonstrates chiefly through the formal cause:
" Hence inasmuch as this science considers being, it considers
the formal cause before all the rest." 36 In this sense the consideration of metaphysics is analytic, not synthetic as in
physics.
Metaphysics also demonstrates through the efficient and final
causes. On the other hand, since its object is always abstracted
from matter, the material cause, in the strict sense, is precluded:
" To consider the material cause in itself does not belong to
it in any way, because matter is not properly a cause of being
III, 9; " Hoc nomen ens, secundum quod importat rem . . . . significat essentiam
rei, et dividitur per decem genera."-Quodlib. Q, 3; Nomen rei exprimit quidditatem
sive essentiam entis."-De Verit., 1, l.
83 In II Met-a., I. 5, n. 391.
•• Ibid., XI, I. 1, n. 2153.
•• Ibid., II, I. 4, n. 318; In II Phys., 3, n. l.
86 In II Meta., I. 4, n. 384.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

121

but o£ some definite kind o£ being, namely, mobile substance." 37
Wherefore St. Thomas summing up the diverse ways o£ demonstration due to the sciences says: "Not every science demonstrates through all the causes. For mathematics demonstrates
only through the formal causes. Metaphysics through the
formal and final causes principally but also through the agent.
Natural science, however, demonstrates through all the
causes." 38
The way o£ demonstration o£ metaphysics is a further proof
o£ the total immateriality o£ its subject.

God is not part of the subject of metaphysics.
God does not enter into this science as its subject, but as
the principle and cause o£ being. To every scientific discipline
belongs not only the study o£ its subject, but also that o£ the
cause o£ its subject. The purpose o£ a science is the knowledge
o£ its subject, and this is achieved when we know the subject's
properties, causes, and principles. 39 Sometimes these causes and
principles are not complete and independent beings, but essential elements o£ the subject, as, £or instance, matter and form
in natural science. In this case the principles are parts o£ the
subject, and the consideration o£ them belongs to the science
o£ the subject whose principles they are. 40 On the other hand,
when the causes are complete and independent in themselves,
they are not integral parts o£ the subject, but external to it.
The study o£ these causes and principles in themselves will
belong to another distinct science. 41 This is the case with metaphysics, which is concerned with: (a) the properties o£ being as
being, and (b) the causes o£ this being (final and efficient),
namely, God. Since God is the proper cause o£ being, metaphysics considers God not in Himself, but in His effect, being.
It is impossible, therefore, to have a philosophical science
whose subject is God. From the knowledge o£ being as such,
Ibid.
In I Phys., l, n. 5.
89 In Proem. Meta.; In I Post. Anal., I. 15; In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 4.
•o In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 4.
H Ibid.
87

38

ANTONIO

MORENO

we can demonstrate no more than God's existence, and some
of His attributes: Creation, conservation, providence, goodness, and love. But even this little bit is the most valuable
part of metaphysics. 42

Metaphysics and the " primum cognitum."
It is important to distinguish between the concept of ' beingas-such ' and the concept of being which we acquired in our
first cognitive notions. The first concept which falls under
our apprehension is being, and this concept contains in act,
although confusedly, all beings, because outside this concept
literally nothing exists. One must avoid the danger of identifying this concept of being and that of ' being-as-such.' The
former is superficial and confused knowledge; it is easily
grasped and is common. The latter abstracts from all matter
and is acquired only after a protracted intellectual analysis:
" and so the ultimate end of this kind of analysis is the consideration of being and the properties of being as being . . .
it is learned after physics and the other sciences inasmuch
as intellectual consideration is the end of rational consideration .... " 43 Metaphysics comes at the end of a long road and
presupposes a profound meditative and reflective judgment on
the concept of being. Materially, not formally, the first cognitive notions and the subject of metaphysics are identical. 44
Cajetan observes that the being of metaphysics is known
formally only by a few.45

III.

THE UNITY OF METAPHYSICS

The unity of metaphysics depends on the unity of the concept
of being, its subject. And since the idea of being varies accord•• In I Meta., 1. 8, n. 60.
43 In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, 1 ad 3 .
.. "Propter quod haec duo sunt simul cera, et quod huiusmodi termini sunt
primi cogniti ab homine cognitione intellectuali confusa atque imperfecta per
simplicem apprehensionem, et quod sunt ultimo ab eo cogniti cognitione intellectuali
distincta et perfecta per viam iudicii reflexivi atque resolutionis."-Santiago
Ramirez, 0. P., De Ordine (Salamanca 1968), p. 96.
45 " Secundo modo ens est terminus metaphysicalis; et forte adhuc viris doctissimis
non innotuit."-Caietanus,
Commentaria in De Ente Essentia, p. 6.

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

123

ing to different philosophical schools, so, also, does its unity.
If the essence of substance is numbers, as seems to be
Pythagoras' and Plato's thought, then the unity corresponding
to metaphysics comes to the unity proper to numbers, that is
to say, quantitative and absolute. 46
For Parmenides, the concept of being shares the quality of a
genus, imparting the same signification to all the inferiors.
So the unity of metaphysics is again absolute and perfect,
unity proper to a nature which is the same in all its parts. 47
Aristotle fought bitterly the univocist conception of being.
Being is not univocal and uniform but, at the same time, one
and diverse, equal and different. The unity of being, consequently, cannot be the numerical unity of Pythagoras, nor
Parmenides's generic unity. Its unity is analogous. 48
St. Thomas, following the Greek philosopher, rejects the
static and univocal conception of Parmenides in both the book
of physics and metaphysics. 49 Being is analogous, 50 not univocal and so metaphysics in its search for unity has to find it
in the unity proper to analogy-not univocity. What kind
of analogy corresponds to being? The concept of being is
analogous with the analogy of intrinsic attribution, and this
analogy presupposes a common perfection which is partaken
by all its inferiors according to different degrees. In addition,
it implies causality from which the analogy stems. 51
The unity corresponding to attribution is not perfect inasmuch as its formal concept applies to its inferiors with a certain
•• In IV Meta., l. fl, nn. 556-560.
47 Ibid., I, l. 9, n. 139.
•• Aristotle, IX Meta., II 1, 1053b 10-15.
•• In I Phys., 7, n. 11; In I Meta., l. 9, n. 139.
•• In IV Meta., l. 1, n. 534.
51 " Analogum
analogia attributionis intrinsecae dicitur de pluribus secundum
prius et posterius, et dividitur in partes vel modos suos sicut totum potentiate in
partes potentiates. Quinque conditiones huiusmodi analogi: a.) quod habeat unum
primum et maximum ad quod cetera referantur vel a quo cetera dependeant,
b.) quod illud primum sit, qua tale, principium et causa ceterorum secundum
aliquod genus causae, c.) quod ideo illudmet participetur a ceteris secundum prius
et posterius, d.) quod det eis formam et perfectionem, e.) quod ponatur in
definitione eorumdem inferiorum analogatorum qua talium." Santiago Ramirez,
0. P., De Ordine, p. fl71.

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unity mixed with diversity. The unity is due to the first
analogue to which all the inferiors refer; its diversity, to the
different relations with which these inferiors refer to the common term. 52 These references are not based on abstraction
like those of a universal whole with respect to its subjective
parts. The analogous references stem from causality, imply
subordination, and presuppose a single term. 53 For instance,
in the concept 'healthy,' the first analogue, and consequently
the giver of unity, resides in the 'health of man.' But this
term is also applied to food, air, color, etc., inasmuch as these
things refer to the health of man following a cause-effect relationship. The unity lies in human health because human health
is the only term to which all the things are referred. The
multiplicity resides in the different relationships to man's
health. Thus the unity in the diversity.
Unity of substance and accidents.
To being as being corresponds a double intrinsic analogy of
attribution: the first unifies substances and accidents; the
second unifies God and creatures: " and so, in a certain hierarchical order all beings are reduced to certain principles." 54
The unity of being, of course, cannot be the unity proper
to a genus. Being-as-such transcends these ten supreme categories and is common to all of them. 55 So, its unity is analogous
because the concept of being is endowed with all properties
characteristic of the analogy of intrinsic attribution.
1. Substance is the first analogue to which all accidents
refer in one way or in another: " Others are called beings
because they are affections or properties of substances . . .
52 " The same inasmuch as these different relationships
are referred to one and
same thing ... different inasmuch as they simply imply different relationships ...
according as each one by its own relationship is referred to that one same thing."
In IV Meta., l. I, n. 536.
53 Ibid., n. 536.
54 In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 4.
55 " ••• et ideo ens dicitur per prius de substantiis
et per posterius de aliis; et
ideo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis, quia nullum genus praedicatur
per prius et posterius de suis speciebus."-De Principiis Naturae, Chapter 6.

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125

others because they are processes toward substance, as generation and motion . . . others because they are corruptions of
substances ... again, certain qualities or accidents are called
being because they are productive or generative principles of
substances." 56
2. Substance is the cause and principle of all accidents:
"The subject is both the final cause, and in a way the active
cause of its proper accidents. It is also as it were the material
cause, inasmuch as it is receptive of the accidents." 57 That is
to say, the accidents refer to substance as one and the same
thing, reference being based in a triple causality, efficient,
final, and material.
3. Substance and accidents partake the concept of being
in a certain hierarchical order. First is substance, then accidents, and among these there is also a subordination: " Accidents, however, befall substance in a definite order. Quantity
comes first, then quality, then passions and motion," 58 and
finally relation.
4. The accidents partake the perfection of being due to
substance: " even as an accident is called a being, in relation
to substance, in reference to the imperfect notion of being." 59
Since the unity of metaphysics depends upon that of being,
its unity is analogous. The unity emerges from substance to
which all accidents refer. The diversity arises from the variety
of relations with which the accidents are related to substance.
It is the imperfect unity, mixed with diversity, proper to
analogy.

Unity of God and creatures.
The distance between God and creatures is infinite. Nevertheless, there is a relation which gives unity to Creator and
creatures. The unity is analogous and based in causality; God
is the proper and adequate cause of all beings. The reduction
In IV Meta., I. 1, n. 539; " ... omnia dicuntur ens ex eo quod attribuuntur
quae est subjectum aliorum."-De Principiis Naturae, Chapter 6.
57 Summa Thea., I, 77, 6 ad 2.
59 In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 3; In IV Meta., I. 1, nn. 539-543.
59 Summa Thea., I-II, 88, 1 ad 1.

56

substantiae,

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to unity, though similar, is not identical to the case of substance
and accidents, as Aquinas demonstrates: " Creator and creatures are reduced to one, not with the unity proper to univocity, but proper to analogy. And such ... can be twofold:
first, inasmuch as some beings share one perfection according
to different degrees ... as substance and accidents. Secondly,
inasmuch as one receives existence and nature from another,
such is the analogy corresponding to creature and Creator.
Creatures do not have existence unless they receive it from
First being, and cannot be called beings unless they imitate
Him." 60
Metaphysics does not consider God directly, but indirectly,
as the ultimate explanation and proper cause of the created
being. And it is noteworthy that for metaphysics, the first
analogate is not God but substance. God's causality refers to
substance, the principal subject of this science.61
The hierarchy of beings and the primacy of substance are
cornerstones for the understanding of metaphysics. If the subordination is overlooked, then, the formality of this science is
lost, reducing metaphysics to a motley variety of disconnected
material objects. Metaphysics refers everything to substance,
its principle subject. The more other beings resemble substance,
the more they fall under the consideration of metaphysics.
And since, as has been shown, substance is immaterial, the
rest of beings through their reference to it partake of the
immateriality, 62 and the formality of substance in the same
way as in theology all objects, material and immaterial, share
the immateriality of God to Whom they refer: " about creatures
insofar as they are referred to God either as a principle or
an end." 63
Although Thomists unanimously agree, in theory, with regard
to immateriality as the formality of sciences, they forget the
In I Sent., prolog., q. 1, 2 ad 2.
Deum vero sive ens increatum, indirecte et propter ens creatum, veluti
causam propriam et primam eius." Santiago Ramirez, O.P., De Ordine, p. SSO.
62 ". • • non enim unus habitus se extendit ad multa nisi in ordine ad unum,
ex quo habet unitatem."-Summa Theol., I-II, 54, 4.
68 Ibid., I, 1, s ad 1.
60

61 "

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

principle in practice, especially in metaphysics. And no wonder,
because our intellects are not metaphysical like God's and the
angels', but rather physical, as long as we are pilgrims on
earth. So, metaphysics: "is not a human possession ... nor
again is it subject to man's command, because man cannot
acquire it perfectly." 64
After all, Saint Thomas himself explains our limitations, and
justifies our failures.

IV. METAPHYSics

AS A PoTENTIAL WHOLE

Metaphysics as a science is also a whole because all the
sciences partake of the nature of a whole. There are three kinds
of whole, explained by Saint Thomas in this way:
It must be observed that there are three types of whole. One is
universal, which is present to each part in its complete essence and
power; hence it is properly predicated of its parts, as when we say:
man is an animal. A second type is an integral whole, which is
found in any one of its parts neither in its full essence nor by
virtue of its total power; in no way, then, is it predicated of a part,
for example: a wall is not a house. A third type of whole is a
potential whole, which is a mean between the other two; for it is
present to each of its parts in its complete essence, but not in all
its power. Consequently, it is predicated in a manner which is
midway between that of other two types: for it is sometimes
predicated of its parts, but not properly. 65

The potential whole bears upon metaphysics, and its properties are as follows: 1. All its parts share the essence of the
whole.
The parts do not share the total virtuality of the
whole, and among them some partake of this virtuality more
than others. 3. As a consequence of the two first conditions,
a potential whole implies order and subordination: the inferior
parts are subordinated to the superior according to the degree
of participation of the power of the whole.
For example, the human soul is a potential whole in respect
to its three different functions, intellective, sensitive, and vegetative. These three functions partake of the essence of the soul
•• In I Meta., I. 3, n. 60.
•• De Spiritualibus Creaturis, a. 2 ad 2; Summa Theol., I, 77, I ad I.

ANTONIO

MORENO

but not the totality of its power. In addition, the vegetative
soul is subordinated to the sensitive, and both to the intellectual to which they are ordained. The supreme function of
the soul is intellectual, but even this function does not share
the complete virtuality of the soul, illustrating thus the nature
of a potential whole.
Metaphysics, because of its material object, is an integral
whole. It contains many different parts upon which its consideration falls, such as substance, quantity, quality, act, potency, essence, existence, and so forth. Integral parts are
common to all the sciences. All of them have material parts,
brought together by the unitive power of the habit. 66
In addition, metaphysics makes a potential whole: " The
same is to be observed in potential whole, wherein one part
is more perfect than another; . . . For it is thus that science
depends on understanding as on a virtue of a higher degree;
and both of these depend on wisdom, as obtaining the highest
place, and containing beneath itself both understanding and
science, by judging both of the conclusions of science, and of
the principles on which they are based." 67
Metaphysics is a sort of potential whole in possession of a
variety of functions: it is wisdom, science, and understanding.
As science, it derives conclusions from principles. As understanding, it uses the first principle of knowledge. Metaphysics
is also wisdom, containing virtually and in a high degree the
qualities of science and understanding. As wisdom it is superior
to understanding because: " wisdom makes uses of indemonstrable principles which are the object of understanding, not
only by drawing conclusions from them, as other sciences do,
but also by passing its judgment on them, and by vindicating
them against those who deny them. Hence it follows that
wisdom is a greater virtue than understanding." 68
Metaphysics as wisdom also contains in a superior way the
habit of science, because metaphysics considers the objects in
a deeper way than particular sciences, judging their concluSantiago Ramirez, 0. P., De Ordine, p. 32.
Summa Theol., I-II, 57, 2 ad 2; In II Post. Anal., 20, n. 15.
68 Ibid., I-II, 66, 5 ad 4.
66

67

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129

sions and resolving them with the first principles of knowledge
and not only with their own proper principles as particular
sciences do.
Let us see, therefore, how metaphysics, as a potential whole,
exercises these functions.

The functions of metaphysics with respect to its proper object.
Scientific functions.
1. Metaphysics considers both the common concepts, and
proper properties of being as being. These concepts and properties are found in all the sciences. But, precisely as they are
common to all sciences, in no way can they be proper to any
of them, because what is proper in one science cannot be proper
in another. They are proper to being as being which all the
sciences share: " Whatever principle pertains to all beings,
and not just to one class of beings distinct from the others,
belongs to the consideration of the philosopher." 69 And so,
metaphysics considers these concepts, common possession of
all sciences and all men-oneness, goodness, truth, beauty,
analogy, identity, distinction, similitude, equality, act, potency,
finity, infinity, necessity, contingency, essence, existence, cause,
effect and so forth.
The analysis of these common concepts and properties is
through the formal cause. It is a consideration proper to metaphysics in its scientific function.
2. Metaphysics treats also the ten supreme categories. It
studies their essences, principles, properties, causes, and the
relation among them. Again, metaphysics is here a science, and
derives conclusion through the formal and final causes chiefly,
and also through the efficient cause and material cause in qua,
not the strict material cause.
a)

b) Sapiential functions of metaphysics with respect to its
object.
1. Metaphysics considers first principles, chiefly the principles of contradiction, identity, and exclusive medium. These
•• In XI Meta., l. 4, n.

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MORENO

principles are the foundation and root of all knowledge and as
such they are indemonstrable. Metaphysics does not attempt
the foolish task of trying to demonstrate them. But since the
formulation of these principles depends upon the apprehension
of the first concepts, metaphysics, as wisdom, grasps and penetrates them with a better insight than does understanding, and
consequently, knows better the principles which depend upon
them: "Now to know the meaning of being and non-being, of
whole and part, and of other things consequent to being, which
are the terms whereof indemonstrable principles are constituted,
is the function of wisdom." 70
The defense of these principles is also an important function
of metaphysics, especially now that criteriology is a relevant
part of philosophy. Criteriology belongs to metaphysics, not
to logic, nor to psychology as many believe: " The inferior
sciences neither prove their principles nor dispute with those
who deny them; but leave this to a higher science; whereas
the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can dispute with one
who denies its principles, if only the opponent will make
some concession; but if he concedes nothing, it can have no
dispute with him, though it can answer his objection." 71
The defensive function of metaphysics goes beyond the defense of the first principles and is exercised also against those
who deny the possibility of knowledge, the existence of motion,
the reality of the external world, etc. How metaphysics defends
the principles and conclusions of particular sciences we will
treat later.
Metaphysics is wisdom with respect to the first causes
and principles of its object. Metaphysics shows the essential
dependence of the whole universe on God, an important sapiential function that presupposes the investigation of the ultimate
causes of being as being: "Although the first cause, namely,
God, is not part of the essence of created beings, existence,
which is inherent in created beings, cannot be understood unless
70

Summa Theol., I-II, 66, 5 ad 4; In I Meta., I.

nn. 588-598.
n Summa

Theol., I, 1, 8.

n. 46; Ibid., IV, I. 5,

THE NATURE OF METAPHYSICS

181

it is derived from divine existence, in the same way as a proper
effect cannot be understood unless it is derived from its proper
cause." 12
Metaphysics as wisdom delves deeply into reality and
searches the root and causes of being, its subject. It finds the
essential dependence of being from God, who is, as well, the
final cause of the universe and motion: " But even though
they are immobile in themselves, they are nevertheless the
cause of motion in other things after the manner of an end." 73
Hence it especially pertains to metaphysics to consider the
final cause.
8. The supreme sapiential function of metaphysics is the
contemplation of the order of the universe: " As the philosopher says ... it is the business of the wise man to order. The
reason for this is that wisdom is the most powerful perfection
of reason whose characteristic is to know order." 74
The good of the universe is bonum ordinis 15 which manifests
itself in a two-fold way, first, in the order of the different parts
of the universe among themselves, and secondly, in the order
of the whole universe with respect to its end which is God.
It belongs to metaphysics to contemplate both orders but
specially to contemplate the latter because: "This is the principle order, for the sake of which the first exists." 16
Metaphysics considers the order of beings, their hierarchy,
the subordination of accidents to substance, the diversity of
the different kingdoms of animals, plants, and minerals as well
as their relations and dependence. But even more important
is the contemplation of the subordination of the whole universe with respect to man. Metaphysics finds in man the
purpose and end of the whole material cosmos, 11 reaching, thus,
the following conclusion: " ... subsistent intelligences are
guided by divine providence for their own sakes, and other
things for their sake, in this sense, that the good things which
DIJ Pot., 3, 5 ad 1; Ibid., ad 2.
In III Meta., I. 4, n. 384.
74 In I Ethic., I. 1, n. 1.
75 In III Sent., d. 6, 3, 1 arg. sed contra.; Summa contra Gentiles, IV, 49.
76 lrt l Smt., d. 44, 2; Summa Theol., I, 103, 2 ad 3.
72
73

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MORENO

are given them by divine providence are not given them for
the profit of any other creature: while the gifts given to other
creatures by divine ordinance make for the use of intellectual
creatures ... The final end of the universe being God, the
intellectual nature alone attains Him in Himself by knowing
Him and loving Him." 78
Even more, metaphysics does not stop in man and, ultimately, finds in the love of God the final explanation of the
universe and man: " The love of God infuses and creates
goodness." 79 Creation, conservation, motion, and providence
are but manifestations of this love. No wonder that metaphysics
is so important for: " however small the amount of divine
knowledge that the intellect may be able to grasp, that will
be for the intellect, in regard to its ultimate end, much more
than the perfect knowledge of lower objects of understanding." 80 Therefore, metaphysics must consider the highest and
universal end of all things, and in this way all the other
sciences are subordinated to it as an end. 81
And so, the natural beatitude of man, as man, consists in the
description of the order of the whole universe.

Functions of metaphysics with respect to other sciences.
a) All the particular sciences borrow from first philosophy
the concepts common to all the sciences, such as cause, effect,
similitude, substance, accident, relation, essence, existence, etc.
The particular sciences use these concepts analogously and
adapted to their proper subjects. But since these common
notions properly belong to metaphysics, it is to metaphysics
that the explanation and defense of them belong, and not to
the particular sciences which do not use them in their whole
domain but rather contracted to their particular subjects. 82
77 " Omnes creaturas corporales ordinantur ad spirituales, et totus motus deserviens
generationi et corruptioni ordinatur ad generationem hominis."-ln Heb., 1,
Iect. 5, n. 75.

Summa contra Gentiles, III,
Summa Theol., I,
Ibid., 44, 4.
80 Summa contra Gentiles, III,
81 In I Meta., I. 8, n. 59.
82 In IV Meta., I. 15, nn. 590-595; Ibid., XI, I. 4, n.

78

79

In I Post. Anal., lect. 17.

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133

b) The particular sciences also borrow from metaphysics the
general principles of knowledge: the principle of contradiction,
identity, etc., as explained above. The sciences utilize them
with analogy, adapted to their particular subject. First philosophy assumes the role of defending and explaining them,
even when contracted to a particular subject. 83
c) The definition of the subject of sciences is the principle
of demonstration of properties of this subject. From their subjects the sciences derive conclusions. But it is a well known
principle of methodology that the particular sciences neither
prove the existence of their subjects, nor are capable of discovering their natures. It is the task of metaphysics to do it,
and so, the particular disciplines are subordinated to first
philosophy, in a certain way: "Therefore the other particular
sciences make 'no mention of,' i.e., they do not investigate the
'whatness ' or quiddity of a thing and the definition signifying
it. But they proceed ' from this,' i. e., from the ' whatness'
itself of a thing, to other things, using this as an already established principle for the purpose of proving other things." 84
It is obvious that particular sciences cannot defend their
principles. Such would imply a vicious circle, that is to say,
the defense of the principle by the same principle, or by means
of the conclusion which in its turn presupposes the principle.
Metaphysics, as supreme wisdom, comes to their defense: " It
is to be borne in mind, in regard to the philosophical sciences,
that the inferior sciences neither prove their principles nor
dispute with those who deny them but leave this to a higher
science; whereas the highest of them, viz., metaphysics, can
dispute with one who denies its principles ... " 85
d) The task of metaphysics is not to derive conclusions
proper to other sciences. It must, however, judge the conclusions of the particular disciplines, and should reject them when
they are opposite to its own. 86 For example, if physics teaches
In IV Meta., 1. 5, n. 591.
Ibid., VI, I. 1, n. 1148.
85 Summa Theol., I, 1, 8; Summa contra Gentile!!, III, 25.
86 Summa Theol., I, 1, 6 ad 2.

88
84

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that motion is possible without a motor, then, metaphysics
denies the validity of this conclusion as opposite to a more
general principle, and one which is absolutely certain, namely,
everything that goes from potency to act requires a being in act.
e) Metaphysics, as wisdom, directs all other sciences to its
own proper end. The different functions of a potential whole
are subordinated to each other, and therefore the inferior
sciences are ordered to the superior, and all of them to metaphysics: " So, the practical arts are ordered to the speculative
ones, and likewise every human operation to intellectual speculation, as an end. Now, among all the sciences and arts which
are thus subordinated, the ultimate end seems to belong to the
one that is preceptive and architectonic in relation to the
others .... In fact, this is the way first philosophy is related
to the other speculative sciences." 87
Metaphysics with respect to philosophy and itself.
Metaphysics is the only discipline capable of speculating on
the nature, division, properties, and methods of philosophy as
such, in itself. Logic is impotent because it deals with the being
of reason, while philosophy deals with the real. Physics treats
only mobile beings, and, obviously, philosophy is not mobile
being. Mathematics studies quantity as measurable and the
nature of philosophy is not that of quantity.
Speculation about this thorny problem belongs to metaphysics as wisdom. And it entails great difficulty because it
implies reflection upon our own thought, which is even more
difficult than the reflection proper to logic, and sometimes
to psychology. The more immaterial the knowledge, the more
it is capable of reflection. 88 And since metaphysics is the most
immaterial of the sciences, the speculation which implies the
maximum reflection should belong to it. Why is this reflection
so difficult to achieve? Because the reflection proper to psychology falls upon the act of the intellect as vital; the reflection proper to logic upon the intentions made by our mind;
Summa contra Gentiles, II, 4.
•• De Verit., 1, 9; Summa Theol., I, 14, 2 ad 1.

87

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135

but the reflection required to speculate the concept of philosophy does not fall upon the act or the intention of the mind,
but upon the consideration with which it deals with the concept
of philosophy in the abstract. From that maximum reflection
comes, as a consequence, the philosophy of philosophy in itself. 89
In addition, to metaphysics, as wisdom, belongs not only
the contemplation of the admirable order of the universe and
its Creator, but also the contemplation of the order among the
sciences, the consideration of their natures, properties, and
methods. The speculation about this order ' as a whole,' is
exclusive to metaphysics. To the particular sciences corresponds the inference of conclusions, the division of their subjects, and so forth.
Since philosophy in itself is an analogous and complex whole,
its consideration presupposes knowledge of the different sciences
-their properties, elements, and causes. Then metaphysics,
in possession of this complex totality, reflects upon its own
nature, making the philosophy of philosophy. This speculation
due to its difficulty and complexity should be undertaken
at the end of metaphysics.
A good metaphysics is like the symbol of a healthy philosophy. Philosophy without metaphysics is crippled and seriously incomplete. So, and to sum up, let us recall Hegel's
words: " It is a remarkable thing when a nation finds that its
Constitutional Theory, its customary ways of thinking and
feeling, its ethical habits and traditional virtues, have become
inapplicable; it is certainly not less remarkable when a nation
loses its Metaphysics, when the intellect occupying itself with
its own pure essence has no longer any real existence in the
thought of the nation." 90
ANTONIO MoRENo,

O.P.

Notre Dame University
Notre Dame, Ind.

89

Santiago Ramirez, 0. P., El Concepto de Filosofia (Madrid, 1958), pp. 18-80.
Hegel, Science of Logic (New York, 1945), p. 93.

90

THE GNOSEOLOGICAL TRANSCENDENCE IN
NICOLAI HARTMANN'S METAPHYSICS OF
COGNITION: PART TWO

I

INTRODUCTION

N PART ONE of this study certain notions preliminary to
a consideration of gnoseological transcendence in Nicolai
Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition were considered: his
notion of metaphysics in general; his concept of the metaphysics
of cognition; a general outline of his theory of methodology;
and finally, his use of the principle of the maximum of data.
Hartmann's approach to the central problem of this study
depends upon these basic notions. A summary of them affords
a prospectus of the remainder of the study: using the optimal
maximum of data as a basis of his orientation, Hartmann will
collect the data phenomenologically; he will investigate the
phenomenological result critically in his aporetics; and form his
own theory regarding the solution of the problems.
Part Two of this study will be divided, accordingly, into a
study of his phenomenology, his aporetics, and his theory of
gnoseological transcendence. At the conclusion of the exposition
of Hartmann's thought, a critical evaluation of his position will
be presented.
1.

THE PHENOMENOLOGY

OF GNOSEOLOGICAL

TRANSCENDENCE

Hartmann starts his collection of characteristics of the phenomenon of cognition with the statement:
Cognition is an act, which transcends consciousness. That is
fundamental. The subject is confronting the object. The object
presents itself in space, is empirical, is something.1
1 Nicolai Hartmann,
Einfuehrung ... , p. 68: "Erkenntnis ist-das ist hier
grundlegend-ein Akt, welcher das Bewusstsein ueberchreitet. Das Subjekt steht
dem Gegenstand, der sich raeumlich, empirisch, dinglich darstellt, gegenueber."

136

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

METAPHYSICS

OF COGNITION

137

Thus, cognition is not recognized as simple conscious act, as,
for example, thinking, recalling, imagining, dreaming. These
acts originate in the subjective realm, function in it, and their
orientation is immanent. That means they urge the subject to
an expression in the subject or by the subject. In Hartmann's
statement cognition is recognized from the very beginning as
an act which transcends 2 the subject's consciousness. 3 A grouping of cognitions with the immanent conscious acts leads to
error. Therefore, it must be understood that the cognitive act
transcends. Neither the subject as such, nor the object as such
are transcending. The objects remain always "without"
(extramental) ; the subject remains always " within" (in itself)
in the entire cognitive process. It is the act of cognitionaccomplished by the subject-which transcends the subject's
limit. As a rule every transcendent act
is connected with the subject from one side only. Its other end
transcends the subject. The latter connects with the real which
becomes through it the object-4
Actually man is in connection or relation with his environment
through numerous such acts. Every action, for example, is a
transcendent act. But in contrast to cognition-which leaves
the object unchanged, although the effect of the object becomes
" registered" in the subject-action seeks to alter the object.
The act of willing always nourishes the inclination to seize the
Nicholai Hartmann, Einfuehrung . . . , p. 68.
Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 15: " Kant . . .
reduced everything to an affection of the senses through the Ding-an-sich (thething-as-such). He failed to trace the aporias which are contained in this position.
The transcendental aesthetics, too, touches only on the apriori element of sensuality,
Nevertheless, so much is clear that Kant recognized very well the transcendental
relation in the sense data and took it seriously.-Younger
theories ignore this
relation and therewith begins the distortion of the problem of cognition. This
decline has led on the one hand to psychologism, on the other hand to logicism.
To the latter belong all those interpretations
which identify cognition with
judgment-regardless
of how these theories may differ otherwise. Thinkers such
as Natorp, Cassirer, Rickert, Husser!, and Heidegger succumbed in this regard
to the same error. They opposed the same psychologism which shared with their
logical theories the misjudging of the transcendence in the phenomenon of cognition."
• Nicolai Hartmann, " Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., I, p. 21.
2

8

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

extramental world in order to accomplish something in it. The
direction of these acts flows from within, that is, from the
subject to the world of the objects. But there are other acts,
too, which move in the opposite direction, and are nevertheless
transcendent acts. The source of these acts is an extramental
(extrasubjective) object, as is the case, for instance, with the
act of experience, suffering (Erleiden), sympathy, empathy,
compassion, and with all the acts of cognition. In all of these
cases an object with its determining effect is received. In the
phenomenon of cognition, too, there is always a relation between
an object and a subject: a being which is recognized and a
being which recognizes. Both are beings, both anchor in being.
The something which is recognized becomes first o£ all through
cognition something that stands opposite (=object) which
means the something becomes objectified for a subject by the
cognitive relation and within this relation.
This fact causes Hartmann to ask whether anything in the
existential mode of the objectified thing becomes changed
through such a relation of cognition, or whether the existential
mode of the object turns into a pure objective mode.
The answer is clear: Cognition cannot and does not change
the existential mode of the object. The existential mode o£
every recognized object remains a "being-in-itself" (Ansichsein).
However, in regard to the transcendent character of the phenomenon o£ cognition one has to understand that " cognition is
the objection (=objectification) o£ an existent to a subject,
the turning-into-object o£ being." 5
In such a context, "transcendent" always means, according
to Hartmann, transcendere or" crossing over." But it is significant that " transcendent " is predicated of the act: it is not
predicated o£ the objects o£ the act. "Transcendent" is predicated o£ the functional mode o£ cognition but not of the
cognitive object.
• Nicolai Hartmann, " Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., p. flO.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S
DIAGRAM
Empirical
Awareness

Concept

Subject

METAPHYSICS

OF THE PHENOMENA

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139

OF TRANSCENDENCE
Empirical
Object

Idea.

Object

The subject stands opposite of the object (confronts the object).
Cognition is nothing else but the coherence, the relation between
subject and object. Consciousness and the object, only the two
together amount to the total real world. If one takes as basic
phenomenon the direction of intention from consciousness to the
object then the essential character (of cognition) is seen, namely,
that the limit of the consciousness is transcended. Therefore, cognition is a " transcendent act." " Transcendent " in this sense (or
application) does not contradict the meaning of transcendence
(stepping across), but it differs in regard to the usual application
to transcendent objects distinguished from immanent objects, for
the objects do not transcend a borderline, but the acts transcend. 6

Hartmann recognizes therewith as the fundamental phenomenon of cognition: "the grasping of something." This basic
phenomenon, however, must still be analyzed into its elements
which are so essential that-if they remain unnoticed-the
errors of the philosophical schools/ as proved by history, may
6 Nicolai Hartmann, Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, p. 68.
• Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., p. 17:
" One had been accustomed to understand cognition either as a conscious act,
or as a logical construct (judgment). The proper meaning of "grasping" (comprehending) of something had submerged in oblivion. In regard to this fact logicism
was in no way safer than psychologism.

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

reappear. Hartmann begins his analysis of the phenomenon of
cognition with an investigation of these elements:
1. "Being-subject

(Subjektsein) of an object is different from
being-object (Objektsein) for a subject." 8 The function of
both of these elements is essentially different, for
a) the subject (=a being endowed with intellect or consciousness) actualizes the transcendent act of cognition;
b) the object affects the subject:
Act
Object

Subject
Effect

2. These two functional roles in the relation are not interchangeable, for
a) the subject comprehends (grasps) the object:
b) the object is comprehensible and is comprehended, or the
object is intelligible and is understood.
Hartmann describes the " grasping " as:
"the subject's reaching beyond its sphere, a reaching into the
sphere of the object-which is a transcendent and heterogeneous sphere in regard to the subject-a seizure of the determinations of the object within the sphere of the object ... , a
bringing-in and an inclusion of the comprehended determinations within the sphere of the subject." 9
3. The subject, by accomplishing the act of cognition, has necessarily to transcend by its act, that is, it must "leave itself."
But in order to become aware of the determinations of the
object, the subject must function within its own sphere. Therefore, according to Hartmann, the function of cognition presents
itself as
a threefold act of the subject:
a transcending,
a being-without-itself,
a returning to itself. 10
4. The object remains untouched by this subjective act. It does
not become immanent through this act but remains the some• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 44.

• Ibid.
10 Ibid.

NICOLAI HARTMANN's

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thing in the homogeneous existential sphere. The object's
determinations through which the object affects the subject do
not become shifted
through " being-comprehended " and " being-included" in
the sphere of the subject. 11
The bringing-in to the subject (collecting) of the determinations of the object is not an inclusion of the object itself, but
" only the repetition of the determinations of the object reoccurring in a construct which becomes the content of the
subject's consciousness, namely, in the cognitive construct or
the image of the object." 12
5. Accordingly, change takes place
a) not on or in the object: the object remains (and behaves)
indifferent towards its recognition;
b) but in the subject through the function of cognition.
" On the object no novel phenomenon occurs; in the subject,
however, there originates the object-awareness with its
content, the image of the object." 13
Thus, Hartmann sees the " something of comprehension " as
one of the pillars of the phenomenon of cognition. He fixes its
limit through what is proper to this " something of comprehension": the characteristic "being-in-itself."
Prior to any presentation of a being as an object is the object's "being-in-itself,"
for
All cognition aims according to its nature at something in existence
inasmuch as this being exists prior to cognition and independent
from it. 14

If the object were not a being-in-itself, it would be possible to
recognize whatever one wishes, just as one can think, or will
what one wants to think, or to will. The in-itself-existence of
the object is clear through the act of perception.
Nobody believes that the thing perceived comes into existence
11

Ibid.

12

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 44.

18

Ibid.

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 44: "Aile Erkenntnis geht ihrem
Wesen nach auf Seiendes, sofern es auch vor ihr und uuabhaengig vor ihr
besteht." Cf. ibid., p. 51.
14

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

with the act of perception, for example, by a looking at it, or by
a glance. The general knowledge is that the thing is and is before
it is perceived. It is independent of perception. 15

Otherwise any relation of cognition to a given, that is to
existents, would be untenable, and " every difference between
comprehending and failing the object, or the difference between
truth and error, would perish." 16 The natural awareness of
reality needs no proof when facing the real. It can be demonstrated on the phenomenon, that the object has a being-initself:
Cognition is the grasping (comprehending) of a being-in-itself;
that is a relation between subject and existing object, or, more
exactly a relation between the notion (concept) which the subject
attains of something and the very something itself, inasmuch as
the latter exists independently from the first. 17

Therefore, cognition is not a mere " phenomenon of consciousness," for the cognitive act crosses over, transcends consciousness. Cognition has its antic roots in the object, and in the
subject. Thus, it is evident that the problem of cognition is
not only a gnoseological problem. It is a metaphysical problem
too. This finding is now investigated under the aspects of the
object and of the subject.
A. The Object
The previous inquiry showed that the being-in-itself (Ansiehsein) of the object is an essential factor of the object. Hartmann
stresses:
Any being (without exception) when becoming the object of
cognition becomes an object posterior to its existence. There is no
being whose essence is so constituted that it is necessarily object
of a subject or of a consciousness. The" being-in-object" originates
only when a subject appears on the plane of the world which
recognizes the object and establishes a relationship of confrontation.18
Idem., "Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., p. 18.
Nicholai Hartmann, " Systematische Selbstdarstellung," in op. cit., p. 18.
17 Ibid., p. 19.
18 Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 17.

15

16

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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According to Hartmann, the notion of the "being-in-itself"
of an object is at first
in no way an ontological concept, that is, this notion is not the same
as the concept of " being-as-such," for it originates entirely from
the gnoseological considerations. Hence, it is from the sphere-or
formed in view-of the intentio obliqua. 19

But if the notion " object " stems from the aspect of the

intentio obliqua or from reflection, then it is a gnoseological
concept. Since some thinkers and schools disagree on that
point, Hartmann devotes some deliberations to the distinctions
of gnoseological being-in-itself 20 and ontological being-in-itself. 21
In his Grundzuege einer Meta physik der Erkenntnis, he says:
the gnoseological being-in-itself signifies only the essential independence from the degree of cognition and therewith also from the
subject on the whole.22

But this being-in-itself is essential for the gnoseological relation
because all object cognition necessarily means some being independent from cognition. In this, Hartmann sees the reason
why cognition distinguishes its object from the conceptual
image of the object. "The latter has the index of objectivity.
The object shows the index of being-in-itself." 23 It is clear that
the notion of "being-in-itself "-as Hartmann sees it-is "an
expedient of reflection, a counter-concept to the notion of
appearance or of the phenomenon of the object." 24 Such a
counter-concept occurs in the gnoseological relationship alone.
The subsequent reflection or the intentio obliqua conditions the
emergence or the development of the notion of being-in-itself in
Ibid., p. 152.
Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung ... , pp. 51-53.
21 Ibid., pp. 58-60.
22 Ibid., p. 51:
"nur die prinzipielle Unabhaengigkeit vom Grade des Erkanntseins und dadurch auch ueberhaupt vom Subjekt."
23 Ibid., p. 52:
" Die letztere traegt den Index der " Objektivitaet," das Objekt
den des "Ansichseins." Cf. also "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in
op. cit., pp. 131-132.
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung . . . , p. 152.
19

20

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

order to signify existence gnoseologically. Hence, the notion of
being-in-itself designates independence within the gnoseological
correlation.
This independence, however, is unessential for the ontological
being-in-itself, for
if something is "in-itself "-that is, if something is subsistent in
the ontological sphere-then it does not matter whether its existence is related to any other being such as, perhaps, to a real
subject. 25

With this neutrality or indifference, the ontological being-initself actually absorbs the gnoseological being-in-itself
whereby it is directed not towards the subject, but towards being
as being. Seen from the point of view of the subject, all being-initself becomes or is a being-for-me (Fuermichseiendes) or something
that confronts me. Seen from the point of view of being as being
both are identical, namely being. Hence, the ontological concept
of being-in-itself returns here from the intentio obliqua to the
intentio recta. 26

On this point, however, gnoseology turns to ontology, therefore Hartmann's phenomenology of cognition has only to indicate the facts.
As a result of such an inquiry, Hartmann considers neither
the subject the center of gravity in the phenomenon of cognition nor the gnoseological relation, for
the real center of gravity lies neither between subject and object,
nor beyond the subject, but it is found beyond the object: in the
transobjective (sphere) ,27

Hartmann expresses phenomenologically the emergence of
the deeper ontic relation which is found beyond the gnoseological relation. The latter is embedded in the ontic relation for
the ontic sphere not only encompasses gnoseological elements:
subject, object, gnoseological relation-it transcends all of them,
stretches beyond all of them. For all of these cognitive factors
25 Nicolai Hartmann, Zur Grundlegung ... , p. 153.
•• Ibid., pp. 153-154.
01 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 58.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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have not only their own existence, that is their own ontological
gravity, but are embedded in the sphere of being on the whole.
Hartmann describes this arrangement of the data and he
sketches them accordingly in his diagram. In his scheme the
gnoseological and the ontological spheres are not the same. The
ontological sphere encompasses the gnoseological sphere. In
reality, the sphere of being is not only prior to, but also deeper
than the sphere of cognition. In Hartmann' diagram, the
relation between both of these spheres is obvious.
DIAGRAM oF THE SPHERES OF CoGNITION AND OF BEING 28

The limits of cognition are found within being. The limits
of being stretch far beyond cognition. The radius of cognition
reaches only from the subject to the being objectified at any
given time. Only in the realm of cognition being becomes objectified. The subject, however, is an existent. It follows that
through cognition and through objectification a gnoseological
zone is cut out of being, and the things which are taken into
28

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege .

0

o , po fl05o

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

that zone of cognition, form the "circle of objects" around the
subject. Theoretically and potentially the circle of objects is
unlimited. However, being remains indifferent towards cognition. As being, it does not resist recognition. 29 In actual cognition, however, the sector of the existential sphere which becomes known, or which becomes the gnoseological sphere, is
relatively limited, for it becomes the zone of objectified being,
surrounded or framed by the zone of transobjective being.
Through such a synopsis, the way is opened to correctly arrange
cognition within the total coherence of life and being. There was a
time when man thought the world was nothing else but the opposite
pole of the knower, namely mere object. Now it is seen differently,
cognition itself is a sector, a piece of the whole world, a link and
truly a link of a chain of many other pieces, which are prior to and
independent from cognition. 30

At the same time, this arrangement causes another insight,
namely, that cognition is not static but dynamic and" a different one in content for every new level of position." 31 This level
changes and changes in one and the same subject, therefore, the
sector of the objectified is
another one for the naive position, another for the scientific one,
and for the scientific view it is again another one than for the
philosophical position. 32

The quality of cognition, however, does not alter the general
validity of the fundamental relationship between the objectified
and the transobjective. Hartmann calls this range of the cognitive relation of the subject to its surrounding in its total circumference the "circle of objects." The circle of objects or the
limited zone of the objectified existents is, however, on its part
again surrounded or enclosed by the unlimited sphere of being. 33
29 Naturally there is a resistance against" being recognized." For instance, certain
plants and animals close themselves when touched. Animals escape when approached. A child " hides " something when detected in doing wrong. But such
resistance does not occur by reason of being, for what is can be recognized as
being.
80 Nicolai Hartmann,
" Die Erkenntnis im Lichte ... ," in op. cit., p. ISS.
81 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 204.
•• Ibid.
•• t&id.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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This latter sphere is the not yet disclosed or the still sealed
sphere of knowledge. It is the truly transobjective sphere. The
transobjective sphere is not sealed off forever to cognition, but
it is the necessary precondition on the side of the objects for
the progress of cognition.
This second limit, too, does not exist as such. It is given for the
subject only. It functions as a limit in regard to the subject's ability
to move the limit of objectification. 34

Thus, the relatively limited circle of objects emerges from the
unlimited ocean of being which in itself remains indifferent or
neutral to cognition. The circle of objects, as part of this ocean
of being, is recognized, hence, objectified and related to the
subject. Hartmann summarizes: "Obviously, the ratio cognoscendi ... presupposes a ratio essendi, an existential relation
between the subject and its objects." 35
Although both the object and the subject belong to the identical sphere of being, nevertheless, they constitute within it the
counterpoles of an identical sphere of cognition. The object and
the circle of objects have been presented so far from various
aspects. Now we have to turn to the subject in order to render
the other of the two poles of cognition intelligible and demonstrate the metaphysical grounding of both.
B. The Subject
The subject, too, is an existent. As an existent and as an
independent being, it is situated in the homogeneous existential
sphere in which the objects are. Therefore, what has been found
in regard to the object applies also to the subject. If the subject
would be nothing else but the counterpole of the objects within
the gnoseological relation, we would have to assume that it
becomes totally merged or absorbed in this relation. In regard
to the objects, we saw that the objects transcend this relation,
that they are prior to this relation, and that they are more
than objects within this relation for they are in themselves.
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p.
•• Ibid.

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They root existentially and essentially in being, display their
various functions, and they have many relations to other existents beyond and without the gnoseological relation to a subject.
Can that be said also in regard to the subject?
The subject, too, stretches beyond the gnoseological relation
to its object. It is not exhausted by this relation. The subjectjust as well as the object-is existentially and essentially rooted
in being. It is not only a cognizant being, a knower; it is prior
to cognition an existent, a being who wills, desires, loves, acts,
feels, thinks and reflects. The subject is a person capable of
many other acts and functions than to cognize and to know.
It is clear: the subject as well as its objects is interwoven in
numerous primary connections of being, of life, and of the
cosmos. It is interlaced in many relations which precede cognition. The subject does not merge totally in the gnoseological
relation. 36 In restricting the subject's being to a mere knowing,
that is, in making it a mere gnoseological subject, it becomes
uprooted from its original existential ground. The theories
developing from this are numerous and shown in the history
of philosophy.
Therefore, the problem and its roots must be investigated and it
must be asked in how far the gnoseological relation is possible
between a subject which is not only a knower, and an object, which
is not only a known, and which are the requirements of such a
relation. 37

Hartmann's scheme of the spheres of being and cognition 38
shows that these spheres can neither become identified, nor
separated, that the sphere of being lies before, above, beneath
the sphere of cognition, and that the latter is embedded in the
first. It is equally impossible to clarify the problem of the subject without consideration of these data, as it is impossible to
explain the problem of the object without seeing it rooted in
these connections. Consequently, the entire problem of transcendence depends on these data.
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , pp.
87 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p.
88 Cf. Hartmann's
"Diagram" reproduced on p. 145.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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In regard to the object, these data become comprehensible
through the object's interlacing with the circle of objects and
the transobjective,
but in reference to the subject these existential relations become
comprehensible through the fact that the subject itself contains
principles, whose functions and mode of being the subject does not
penetrate, that is, principles whose being evidently is other than
the being of consciousness.39
The existential sphere of the subject " seen from the point of
view of the consciousness toward within " 40 transcends the
subject itself. Besides it furnishes transsubjective conditions
which keep the subject rooted in a "sphere of transsubjective
existential relations." 41 Thus, the homogeneity of the subjective and the objective sphere of being is at once recognizable,
since " the subject understands itself as being existent in the
same way as the object is." 42 Therefore, it is clear that both
the cognizing subject and the recognized object are "embedded
in a common sphere of being in which they are perfectly
embraced . . . and conditioned by multilateral relations." 43
According to Hartmann:
The relation of cognition which we know ... as a one-sided determination of the subject by the object ... , must be understood
as one which is capturing the multiple connection of being, or,
exactly, as the relation which appears in the phenomenon of
cognition.44
Such statements show Hartmann as an ontologist who brings
his theory of cognition with the given, who weighs and measures
reality and the cognition of reality. Hartmann himself declares:
What at first appears to be of great disadvantage proves, in
closer analysis, an invaluable advantage, and appears to be the
natumlly given practicable way of gnoseological research. . . .
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 231.
Ibid.
41 Ibid .
.. Ibid.
•• Ibid .
.. Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 321.
89

40

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

The independent existential character of subject and object is that
which takes both of them away from isolation and shows them
joined in the nexus of relations. Isolation exists only for the most
restricted horizon of subjection. The independence of isolation is
a relative one, that is one which is insuperable for ratio only. 45
In these data, Hartmann also anchors his theory o£ irrationality:
As long as one maintains the impossibility of irrational relations,
naturally one is cut off from the insight into this ontological situation. In the moment, however, when one grasps that relations have
not to be more rational than substrates and that they ... are as
neutral towards intelligibility as all the other existents, then the
ontological condition becomes clearly seen. 46
Therefore, Hartmann considers also
the ontological understanding of the irrational in its principles a
necessary condition for the understanding of the basic gnoseological
relation 47
o£ subject and object within the sphere o£ being. Evaluating the
theories o£ knowledge, he points out:
this sphere is not a constructed, clear-cut unity, as is the one of
speculative monism, but it is a relationally restricted and divided
multiplicity. Theory cannot judge about the sphere's principle of
unity. All the inconsistencies of monistic attempts to derive multiplicity from unity are insufficient. It is likewise with the open
systems of dualism (for instance, the Cartesian dualism) which
rest upon a similar mistaking of the sphere, namely upon the purely
subjectivistic isolation of subject and object, which, to be sure,
cannot be avoided on a certain level of speculation but which is
easily removed ontologically. Through a removal of that isolation
all these speculative theories, and those idealistic and realistic
theories, too, which try to overcome the subject-object dualism by
constructed means, become superfluous. Constructed means are
not necessary ... because the problem for the solution of which
they had been constructed does not exist. Subject and object are
originally joined in the sphere of being. 48
'"Ibid.
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p.
47 Ibid., p.
•• Nicol!ti liartmann, Grundzuege .. , , p.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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Hartmann's theory then is based on the fact that" the subject
is an existent among other existents," 49 and that the other
being (=object) affects the subject by conditioning and
determining it. For
where everything is joined, and mutually conditioned and determined, it would be unintelligible if the subject would not be
precisely included in the net of these relations and if the subject
would be exempt from being determined by the other beings.50
Such deliberations concerning the subject led Hartmann to
his definition of cognition: cognition consists in the process that
an" in-and-for-itself existent," a subject, becomes "determined
by another existent, the object" 51 on the intentional, that is,
on the gnoseological level. The determining element remains
thereby unchanged in its own being-in-itself. The object does
not become totally objectified, it rather remains in a certain
sense supra-objective. The subject, however, becomes gnoseologically enriched and intentionally determined by the object,
more exactly, by the content of the object. Hence, the relation
of cognition means ontologically the unilateral modification of
a subject by an object which for itself remains totally untouched by or indifferent in regard to the entire event. One is
tempted to say that cognition is a one way street, for it is " a
unilateral, irreversible determination of the subject by the
object." 52 The latter does not become determined through the
subject and its cognition-it remains before and after cognition
the same-but the agent itself becomes "impressed"; the
subject becomes modified through what is recognized. Therefore, it is justified to speak here with Hartmann of a " sphere
of content of the subject itself." 53 As a matter of fact, on the
side of the subject, a " sphere of images is facing the circle
of objects." 54 These images are formally subjective images or
•• Ibid.
50 Ibid., pp. 322-323.
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 323.
Ibid., p. 206.
53 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 208.
51
52

•• Ibid.

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

constructs, that is, they originate and exist in the subject. They
are with the subject and wither away with the subject in spite
of their transcendent (non-immanent) origin. But truly they
result from the object-reality, or from the object-effect upon
the subject through the subject's act of cognition.
Materially, they stem from the object's sphere. Hence, they
are not subjective in content. Their content is the cognized
object, therefore, the content is materially objective. Consequently, it is clear, cognition happens in the subject; through
this a gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject originates. But since the subject itself is an existent, this
gnoseological counter-sphere of object-images in the subject is
also rooted in the ontological sphere. It follows that through
cognition an entrance is opened for the subject into the being
of the object. Therefore, the subject, or
the knower is to be defined ontologically as that being in which
this relation which connects the subject with the other beings,
produces a modification which is typical for such a relation, that is,
a sphere in which the homologous links of this unilaterally determined relation join, a sphere of modifications which resemble their
counterlinks scattered in all directions of reality. 55

It appears, then, that the sphere of the subject is not one of
psychological limitations. Empirical psychology deals more or
less with the functional only, with factors and phenomena of
the stimulus-response relation. Rational psychology, however,
deals with the mode and being of the psychic; it asks for
essence and existence of the soul as such, which is a concern
with the ontic sphere, a sphere prior to all the stimulus-response
relations, prior even to the modi. It is the existential sphere of
the objects and the existential sphere of the subject with its
cognition by which being becomes ennobled. In this situation,
therefore, the subject becomes visible as "that summit of
integer being where being reflects itself." 56
Summing up, we find the subject embedded in the same
sphere of being in which its own objects are found, so much so
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p.
•• Ibid.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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that this or that subject even can become an object of cognition
of other subjects.
Therefore, in this very sphere of being which comprises everything, the subject excels by its very nature. It is the "highest,
the most individualized, the most different," 57 and the most
complex being. Through cognition, the subject receives a
unique superiority which is found in no other sensible being.
Cognition, namely, expands the sphere of the subject according
to the measure of the known objects within the subject to " a
multifarious world of representations of being as such." 58 This
closed sphere of the subjective gnoseological content,
which develops in universal relation, reflection, and representation,
and forms in itself a counter-world to the existing real world, is the
sphere of objective content in the cognizing consciousness. Its
inner aspect is the consciousness itself.59
The uniqueness of the subject in the midst of other beings is
clear, for the other existents are the subject's objects; being-anobject, however, means (in the original sense) to-becomereflected. "Objection" (objectification) in this sense is the
strict correlate to the representation in a subject. The arrangement of the spheres depends on the relation of the objects to the
subject (according to the measure of the subject's understanding) and it exists in this order only for the subject within the
ontic sphere. The circle of objects " is nothing else but that
fraction of being which comes to a representation in the subject,
that is the fraction of being which is reflected." 60 Therewith
the subject itself becomes a gnoseological cosmos-depending
at any given time on its own noetic potential and activity,-a
"modulus of reflection" 61 of those objects which transcend the
subjective sphere by their effect on the subject. Therefore,
whatever is known of being is attained by cognition.
Hartmann anticipates 62 that such an interpretation will find
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. !l09.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. lS!l; cf. also, pp. !l09-210.
60 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. !llO.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 828.

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a certain opposition because it assumes a transcendental relation of causality between object and knower, for the image,
resulting in the subject, is understood as effect of the object on
the subject. Object and subject, however, are heterogeneous
poles, thus it would follow that they are also heterogeneous as
cause and effect.
Besides, it is difficult to see how " a mental construct should
be the effect of something that is extramental." 63
In meeting these objections, Hartmann explains two misunderstandings which obscure the facts.
First: A causal relationship cannot be refuted on the basis
of mere transintelligibility. In the realm of nature the causeeffect relation remains unintelligible, that is, the function, the
" how " of the generation of the effect, the structure of the
causal nexus, and the proper essence of this dependence remain
irrational. The law of efficient causality as universal formula,
however, is generally accepted by the natural sciences, at least
hypothetically.
By the same privilege then, one may consider valid-at least the
ontological hypothesis of the theory of cognition-a determination
which transcends the object and becomes an object-image in a
subject, regardless of whether this determination of the subject by
the object is understandable or not. 64

Secondly, this noetic determination is not one which is totally
merged in the causal relation. Such " is the case with the
dependence of space-temporal phases of certain processes from
which its formulation originated." 65 But in regard to the noetic
image in the consciousness, this object-image is-apart from
its psychological genesis-an adimensional one. Therefore, it
cannot be the effect of a four-dimensional object or cause.
Furthermore, we may remember that there are other determining relations, too, besides efficient causality. For instance,
there is the relation of reason and logical consequence as demonstrated in mathematical theorems. There is also the relation of
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 323.
Ibid., pp. 323-324.
65 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grunzuege ... , p. 324.

68

64

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means and purpose (finality). But, these relations do not
provide a solution regarding the gnoseological subject-object
relation. How then have we to deal with this problem?
In cognition the situation is that subject and object-although heterogeneous as such-belong nevertheless to the
ontological sphere. Due to this homogeneous sphere of being
then, and in it, the phenomenon of the gnoseological relation
is possible.
In the ontological realm many different beings are connected
with and related to one another by reason of the all-embracing
ens. The type of determination which prevails in this realm, of
course, can be much more universal than the type of determination
within the causal nexus.66
In seeing that the object and the subject exist prenoetically
and ontologically in a homogeneous realm, to Hartmann one
of the gnoseological difficulties becomes transparent. This is
not so, however, in a philosophy of immanence, inasmuch as
such a philosophy operates simply immanently. Hartmann's
theory that an extra-mental object can determine a recognizing
subject in such a way that this determination becomes the
representation of the extramental object in the subject must
appear to representatives of any philosophy of immanence as
a theory of "extreme absurdity." Realistically seen, however,
it is clear that
a mere ontological relation, which conditions and connects object
and subject, suffices to impress the object's traits upon the structure
formed in the subject (=object image); and to make this image
"objective." 67
Summing up Hartmann's inquiry of the gnoseological condition, we find in cognition:
Firstly: The transcendent subject faces the object.
Secondly: The transcendent object faces the subject.
Thirdly: Cognition as such is transcendent.
This particularity of confrontation or transcendence (= ob""Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege .•. , p. 325.
•• Ibid., p. 326.

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jectivity in the original sense) is shown by every object determination. The knower knows of this transcendence, for normally the knower does not consider these determinations his
own. He distinguishes them as those of the object. Indeed, the
entire cognitive structure in the subject is objective, for " objective is not the object as such but the image of the object in
the intellect inasmuch as it shows the traits of the object." 68
In being conscious the subject knows of both data: of the
object and of the object-image, for the subject discriminates
the objective image in itself from the extramental object.
Furthermore, the subject is aware of itself and of its relationship
to the object. In this then, properly speaking, the object
awareness consists.
Under such conditions, the object and the object-image, therefore,
are not understood as one although they are identical in their
content. 69

In describing the phenomenon of cognition, Hartmann states
four distinct notes or concepts of cognition of which each one
expresses a complex of essential characteristics of the gnoseological problem. These concepts, although they overlap, are
not identical as the enumeration shows. They are:
First:

The relation of cognition (or the essential subject-object
relation).
Second: Cognitive structure or object-image (object representation) in the subject.
Third: Truth, or concord, of the object-image and the object.
Fourth: Progress of cognition, or the tendency of development of
the image in order to absorb or represent more and more
the total content of the object.

The description of these gnoseological phenomena forms the
basis for Hartmann's advancement to the whole problem of
the gnoseological transcendence. Again Hartmann's pioneering
attitude leads him now only to a deviation from the usual
analytic method of the phenomenologists/ 0 his attitude towards
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 48.
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 48.
70 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege • . . , p. 77: " [The phenomenologists] keep

88

69

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the " dogmatic attempts for a solution," 71 too, determines
Hartmann's original approach to the problems of transcendence.
By accepting the transcendence as the original phenomenon in
cognition, Hartmann opens for his phenomenology the way
to metaphysics, for metaphysics of cognition is his great concern. Of course, it is a metaphysics according to his own understanding. As previously shown/ 2 this is neither the traditional
subject-matter metaphysics, nor the speculative systematic
metaphysics, but a metaphysics of problems. Consequently,
Hartmann's phenomenology, which is his analysis of the phenomenon of cognition, proceeds further to the aporetics of
cognition or to the inquiry of the problematic elements of
cognition.

II.

THE APORETICS OF GNOSEOLOGICAL

TRANSCENDENCE

The phenomena of the gnoseological transcendence, namely:
subject, object, cognitive relation, were presented in the light
of Hartmann's interpretation. Hartmann approaches now the
enigmatic nature of the gnoseological transcendence. In other
words, we have to deal now with the perennial problematic
character of cognition which was indicated by the phenomena
but has not become completely translucent by their analysis.
Therefore, the aporias of the gnoseological transcendence have
to be explored. Hartmann stresses that
... the mark of its metaphysical nature lies ... in the perennial
problematic character which reaches beyond solubility.73
Hartmann explains:
exclusively to the immanent elements in the phenomenon and ignore the original
transcendent elements. Such a procedure is not so much an inconsequence of
their method as a bias of their interest for the phenomenon or a remnant of
their predetermined position. Phenomenology today finds itself restricted in its
own development by the boundary of immanence which-in its last analysis-is
based upon an idealistic prejudice. This boundary is ignored by our analysis of
the phenomenon of cognition. The transcendence of the object of cognition definitely
belongs to the phenomenon and has to be described."
71 Ibid., p. 91.
72 Ibid., pp. 11-12.
78 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 38.

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Aporetics has to follow without restriction its own laws, its own
inner logic, ... the latter does not consist in a coherence of the
data . . . , but in a coherence between the given and what is
searched for. This liberty can be secured for aporetics only through
the broadest possible survey of the total results of the phenomenological findings.74
Therefore, aporetics (or the science of philosophical insoluble
problems) must follow the phenomenological description. It
can never precede phenomenology. This requirement has been
fulfilled in the previous inquiry. According to Hartmann,
phenomenology as well as aporetics precede " principally all
theory, all positions and their metaphysics." 75 Nevertheless,
phenomenology and aporetics are different. The latter no longer
describes, it compares, examines, arranges the given, states the
discrepancies contained in the given. It formulates the acuteness of the paradox which is characteristic of all opposition in
actuality. "Aporetics has not to concern itself with the overcoming of the opposition. This is the concern of the theory." 76
But the perfection or completion of aporetics depends on the
question whether and how it approaches and masters its assignment. The more aporetics can point out " the intellectual
pathlessness of the opposition," 77 and the more it succeeds
in establishing the boundary of the intelligibility of the problem,
the more it is what it ought to be: " The meaning of the word
' aporia ' . . . is the stopping of the method in the face of the
actual." 78 In this sense it was used by the Greeks and the
literal translation" pathlessness" stresses the original meaning.
The further elaboration of a problem consists in the re-opening
of the way; all theory is a finding of a path, a creation of a new
method. 79
Thus Hartmann marks out the methodical span of aporetics.
It leads from the accomplished phenomenological description
to the " threshold of the theory without ever crossing its
.. Ibid., p. 39.
75 Ibid., p. 40.
76 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 40.
78 Ibid.
77 Ibid.

79

Ibid.

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limits." 80 Aporetics has to lead from the given to the assignment.81 The assignment is nothing other than the development
of the problems.
In the preceding pages the " given " of the gnoseological
transcendence has been presented. These given elements
pointed beyond themselves towards the problem. The problem
then in Hartmann's formulation is" the union between subject
and object in the cognitive relation and the transcendence of
the object in the direction of the subject," 82 in its enigmatic
complexity. It originates from the confrontation of two propositions, the proposition of consciousness or interiority and the
proposition of the exteriorization of the subject or the subject's
reach beyond itself.
In his presentation of the general aporia of cognition, Hartmann distinguishes three elements:
1. The subject-object relation.

2. The standpoint of the subject.
3. The standpoint of the object.

The result of Hartmann's phenomenological study was that
"in every cognition ... a knower and a recognized object confront one another." 83 With this the problem begins, for this
very fact presses towards the question:
How can an actual relation consist between these two (subject,
object), since their levels or spheres are definitely separated and
transcend each other so that each of them exists also outside or
independent of this relation. 84
Some alternatives seem likely: either the relation levels out
the transcendence of subject and object: then they form a unit;
or the relation is " neither essential nor actual " 85 for one of
the two.
80

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 40.

Ibid.
82 Ibid., p. 92.

81

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 44.
Ibid., p. 61.
86 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege . . . , p. 61.

88
8'

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These alternatives are incorrect: subject and object are not
a unit, they are not identical. Subject and object are ontologically as well as gnoseologically separated. 86 I£ they were
identical, it would mean that each would be present in the
other, or " with the subject, the object would be necessarily
given," 87 and, in reverse, with the object the subject would
be given. This is not the case, and, although this erroneous
position is held in "every philosophy of identity," 88 the evidence of the phenomena, the evidence of reality, refute it.
The second of the two alternatives is also incorrect, for the
cognitive relation is not at all" unessential and inactual" to the
subject and for the object. For it is through this intellectual
relation-and, to be sure, within this relation only-that the
subject is a knower and the object is a recognized or known
something.
From where does this unity stem which is given in the cognitive
relation of the positively separated beings? How is such a relation
possible? 89
Here it becomes obvious that the cognition of cognition has
arrived in a pathlessness or at an aporia. Hartmann remarks:
In its most external and most schematic part already the problem
of cognition presents its metaphysical nature. 90
The problem becomes even more obscure when dealt with
separately under the aspect of the one or the other, because
from "the standpoint of the subject, cognition is the comprehension of an object." 91 Hence, the object is precisely, through
this relation, through the object-image, placed in the subject.
However,
It is essential to consciousness that it can obtain only its own
content, for it never can leave its own sphere ... When the intel86

Ibid.

87

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 61.

Ibid.
89 Ibid.

88

90

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 61.

91

Ibid.

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lect aims at an extramental something, the something in truth is
put in the intellect, it is thought about, it is conceived, it is sensed.
The intellect transforms the independent object about which it
thinks-precisely by doing so-into a dependent object, namely
into the object-thought-of. The immanence of intellection is, so to
say, more powerful than the intention of the transcendent subject.
The intellect (or the consciousness) cannot break through this
restricted ring, the " circle of thinking," in spite of all the objectivity of the resulting idea. The consciousness remains forever
enclosed in itself and dependent on the world of its own determinations and ideas. 92

Unequivocally, we deal here with the theorem of consciousness
or of the content of the subject. The cognizant subject's world
is a closed one, a world in the subject only. This natural
" seclusion " of the intellect or of the consciousness in the
subject-in spite of all the transcendent elements-belongs,
therefore, essentially to the notion of the subject. 93 The subject
claims, as has been demonstrated, not only to be a being-initself, but also a being-for-itself and is capable of accomplishing
many other functions besides cognitive acts.
Hartmann studies also the historical origin of the theorem
of consciousness and reports his findings:
The theorem that the consciou5ness can comprise nothing else
but its own content, and that it is therefore irretrievably imprisoned
in itself had not to wait for modern subjectivism. It was used
by skepticism of antiquity, but its origin seems to date as early
as the sophists. If the witnesses of posterity are trustworthy, the
first formulation is found in the teaching of the Cyrenaics. By
declaring their inner states and concepts insufficient, they locked
themselves up, as it were, in "a state of siege" [hogper en poliorkia]
in their own subjective state of mind, cut themselves off from any
exterior influence in order to get some information about the things.
This picture of the state of siege is the exact phenomenological
description of the condition in which the intellect (or the consciousness) finds itself when it begins to reflect (or to think) about its
relationship to its comprehensible own content. This picture characterizes an apriori intelligible trait of the intellect which-once
•• Ibid., pp. 61-6fl.
98 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege .•. , p. 6fl.

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

recognized-leaves no doubt about the nature of the intellect. It
is only astonishing that in the history of philosophy so many keen
gnoseologists failed to see that. 94

After such considerations it appears the more complicated
to understand that nevertheless " from the point of view of the
subject ... cognition is the grasping of an object." 95
Hence, the subject must be able somehow to reach beyond its
own sphere for the object. Consequently, it must "protrude
and be without itself in order to be able to comprehend." 96
How could the subject otherwise reproduce in itself the
object-image, showing the determinations of this or that object
of the concrete order? The determinations of the object-image
must be the replica of the determinations of the extra-mental
real object. Since the object is neutral to cognition, its neutrality testifies for its non-participation in the act of comprehension. Consequently, comprehension must be accomplished
solely by the act of the subject, which means that the subject
must reach outside itself, in spite of its immanence of consciousness, for only by doing so can it attain the determinations
of the object. " This getting outside of itself of the subject in
the cognitive function is the enigma." 97 For this externalization
of the subject in the cognitive process is clearly contradicting
the subject's characteristic seclusion-in-itself. In this contradiction the " antinomy of consciousness," as Hartmann calls it,
becomes evident. Hartmann formulates it as follows:
Thesis:
The consciousness must exteriorize itself inasmuch as it has to
grasp something outside itself, that is, inasmuch as it is cognizing
conscwusness.
Antithesis:
The consciousness cannot exteriorize itself inasmuch as it can
grasp its contents only, that is, inasmuch as it is cognizing consciousness.98
•• Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , pp. 93-94.
05 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 61.

•• Ibid.
97
98

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ..• , p. 61.
Ibid., p.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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Obviously, transcendence and immanence of the noetic function
are in contradiction, or the nature of cognition seems to be
opposed to the nature of the intellect.
But this opposition is
unavoidable because only the intellect or the consciousness can
have cognition. It follows that either the nature of cognition dissolves or neutralizes through the antinomy of consciousness, or the
antinomy of consciousness becomes dissolved by the phenomenon
of cognition. 99
Hence, an aporia presents itself again. Hartmann divides this
aporia. He says:
In the antinomy of consciousness phenomenon stands against
phenomenon. This did not become clear in the development of the
first aporia because the phenomenal character of the theorem of
consciousness was not seen yet. This character could not be dealt
with in the analysis of the phenomenon because the analysis had
to adhere to the natural point of view, that is to the naive as well as
to the scientific one. The knowledge of the self-seclusion of the
intellect belongs to the philosophical reflection already.
The antinomy of consciousness is indeed a gnoseological antinomy.
But this does not make it necessarily a proposition of the theory.
It can very well be a mere expression of a phenomenon, but of
course, of a phenomenon which becomes seen only when the philosophical deliberation has departed from the natural position which
is always directed towards the object, which is clearly expressed
in the skeptic character of the antinomy .100
We deal here then with two propositions which are equally
significant as expression of the phenomenon, but which are
at the same time contradictory to each other.
The antinomy does not admit a solution as long as the thesis
and the antithesis share the same degree of apriori certainty. If
it should be dissolved, one of the two propositions is supposedly
false. Concerning the consciousness only one of the alternatives
can be true: either the subject is secluded in itself, or it is capable
of exteriorization. But both cannot be true at the same time.
There is another alternative, however: if it were possible to demonstrate that the two propositions have to be interpreted in a different
99

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p.
Ibid., pp. 93-94.

100

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

sense. The latter requests the highest and most difficult speculation.
It was, therefore, long overlooked and perhaps only Leibniz used

this interpretation in his theory of the " windowless monad," which,
in its own representations, can indirectly grasp a transcendent.
This way out of the difficulty, however, is a purely aprioristic way
and can be used only at the expense of the independence of the
sensual data. It comes into conflict with the phenomenon of the
empirical givenness.101
The third consideration begins with the aspect of the object.
Descriptive phenomenology has shown that from this point
of view
cognition ... reaches for the determinations of the object in order
to bring them to the subject. It is the indirect determination of the
image in the subject, through the real determinations of the
object. 102
As has been previously shown, the object of cognition proves
indifferent, neutral towards cognition. It does not transfer to
or into the subject. It remains unconcerned before and after
its cognition and it remains outside, not being secluded or
locked up in the consciousness, for it does not at all become the
"image" in the subject. The act of cognition, as well as the
consciousness or intellect itself, distinguish clearly between
object and object-image. The object stays transcendent when
confronting the subject. It never inhabits the subject. But,
this aporia has been ignored in every philosophy of immanence
because in it the awareness of the being-in-itself has been overlooked which accompanies every object consciousness.103
From the point of view of the object then, a new antinomy
results. It is, so to say, the counterpart, or the reverse side
of the antinomy of the subject or the antinomy of consciousness.
Again, Hartmann offers his formulation:
Thesis:
The determinations of the object must in some way become
transmitted to the subject inasmuch as cognition takes place; the
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , ppo 94-95o
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege o o o , Po 95o
103 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . o • , Po 63o

101
102

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image in the subject can be " objective " (that is, shows the traits
of the object) only if the object can convey the traits in some
way to the subject. However, in this conveyance, the transcendence
of the object for the subject is broken through.
Antithesis:
The determinations of the object cannot become conveyed to the
image in the subject. They remain transcendent to the sphere of
the subject, for in the object awareness the transcendence of the
object for the subject is not violated. It remains intact. The
object awareness means precisely the object as a being-in-itself
which is indifferent to its being recognized.104
The difficulty from the point of view of the subject consists
in the contradiction between the nature of cognition and the
nature of the intellect or consciousness. The difficulty from the
point of view o£ the object consists again in a contradiction;
this time, however, it is a contradiction between the nature of
cognition and, in difference to the first, the nature of its object.
Here, too, the contradiction" is unavoidable, for only an object
can be recognized, or, because cognition always deals with an
object." 105 Hartmann finds again an alternative:
Either the phenomenon of cognition neutralizes itself on the
transcendence of the object-a transcendence which belongs to
the phenomenon; or the transcendence of the object dissolves itself
on the phenomenon of cognition. 106
Here, too, all thinking winds up in wondering. for an aporia
presents itself again. Hartmann says:
The alternative: either the given is an illusion, or the transcendence
is an illusion is basically the same as: Either the grasping of the
object as such is an illusion, or the enclosure of the consciousness
is an illusion. A solution of the aporia can result only from a
synthesis which reconciles the approved phenomena.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that the antinomy of the
object which in its content is the direct reverse of the antinomy
of consciousness, or of the subject, in no way coincides with the
latter. Here we deal solely with a breaking or a not-breaking of
Ibid.
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 63.
1oo Ibid.

104

105

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

the relation or transcendence between subject and object; a beingwithout-itself, as in the case of the subject, is not the question here.
Therefore, it would be very well thinkable ... that a solution of
the object antinomy would draw along with itself the solution of
the antinomy of consciousness so that the latter could be treated
indirectly from the side of its objective counterpart. But for such
a solution it would be necessary to find a unifying synthesis
bridging the opposites. 107

Related to the aporia of the object is the problem of perception, the nuclear phenomenon of every aposteriori cognition.
This problem emerges automatically in such a philosophizing.
It seems that perception makes graspable the transcendent 108
(that is here, according to Hartmann, the totally other, or,
from the subject's station, the object).
In perception, the perceived is to the intellect the part alloted
directly from the object to the subject. Therefore, an aporia
originates again:
How can a subject receive (or perceive) the object if the object
is not given to the subject? But how can the object be given to
the subject when the object is transcendent (totally other, totally
separated) to the subject in the relation of cognition, that is, when
the object remains indifferent to the subject? 109

The dilemma is obvious: Is the transcendence or is the given
an illusion? As is known, idealism denies the transcendence of
the object (the total otherness, the total separation) . Skepticism denies the givenness (Gegebenheit) . But,
If the giving act is an act of the object, then it cannot be understood how it can reach into the sphere of the subject. If the act,
however, is an act of the subject, then it cannot give to the subject
any determinations of the transcendent object; it can transmit only
the determinations of immanent object awareness. 110

The intellect, in dealing with this problem experiences a kind
of confusion because aporetics proves to be a " pathlessness."
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 95.
Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 44 and 47.
109 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 64.
110 Ibid., p. 64.
107

108

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Therefore, the intellect turns to the gnoseological relation in
order to grope its way back to the actuality of the thing and
of the knower. In other words, reason seeks the ground of the
gnoseological transcendence. Therefore, the intellect turns
naturally to the close ally of cognition: to being. All the gnoseological problems lead, when rightly considered, to the ontological condition. This is documented, for example, in the history
of Monism and Dualism, in the history of Idealism and of
Realism and in their variations. Hartmann has pointed out
some of the important theories in regard to this phenomenon
found in the history of ideas. He grew on these theories and
he purged his own views by learning from the mistakes and
their consequences.
At the beginning of Western thought Parmenides presented
a theory of identity: thinking and being are one; they are the
same, they are simply being. Heraclites, too, offered an identity
philosophy, differing from the first only by its dynamic pantarhe-view of the world. The logoi of Heraclites, however, are
found in two very differentiated spheres: in the cosmos and in
the soul. 111 Hartmann comments:
In this teaching the logos is at once the subjective and the objective law ... which leaves untouched the differentiation of the sphere
of consciousness and the sphere of being, as well as their mutual
independence.11 2

In Plato's theory of the ideas, human questioning reaches its
classical peak. Plato has
discovered the logical sphere in the realm of ideas, but the main
insight, thereby, was that the ideal sphere was also a metaphysical
sphere of principles of being. That means, the basic thought was
an explicitly ontological one: the essence of the ideal forms (for
instance, of the mathematical proportions) is also the nature of the
real being; thus, one can fairly summarize the transcendent as
identity of the principles as presented in the theory of ideas. 113
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 356.
Ibid., pp. 356-357.
118 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 357.
111
112

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The dualism of Aristotle deviates from Plato's theory. Matter
becomes the attribute of real being and distinguishes it from
thinking and from the eide of the logical sphere. Form, identical with the eide, is in both. Hence, the Aristotelian" essence"
appears as having a dual nature, namely, as being in the logical
and in the ontological sphere. "The idea is the substantial
form of the existent, but the things are actualizations of the
idea in matter." 114 In this twofold occurrence of essence Hartmann sees the centre of truth of the Aristotelian system. He
thinks that
a certain and universally valid cognition of being is possible only
when logical essences exist which simultaneously are the essences
of things.115
This was also the teaching of the medieval scholastics up to
Christian Wolff (Wolf; Hartmann uses one "f "). Erroneous
theories, too, developed in the course of history through identification of the logical with the ontological. However, this
erroneous identification usually appears as a relapsus in the
"Eleatic identity theory of thinking and being," 116 a ground
from which grew, for instance, the ontological proof of the
existence of God in which the boundary between essence and
existence is effaced. But " the logical and the real cannot be
taken identically, however, their essences or principles are the
same," 117 in the logical and in the ontological sphere.
In the modern era by means of the methodical doubt a
philosophical catharsis is noticeable.
The thought which is the strongest antithesis to the thesis of
identity stands as pioneering accomplishment on the threshold
of this development; it is the open dualism of extensio and cogitatio,
or Descartes' theory of the two substances.118
In Descartes' system, a categorical separation of consciousness and the extramental world is accomplished. Each confronts
'"Nicolai Hartmann, Grundrouege ... , p. 857.

••• Ibid.
116 Cf. ibid., p. 859.
117

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 857.

118

Ibid.

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the other. Each opposes the other. Each is essentially separated
or transcendent-so much so that the hiatus remains unbridged
even by Descartes' theory of the Pineal gland.
In Kant's philosophy, the key concept is synthesis. Applying
it to the problem of cognition, Kant came to the conviction that
in the sphere of the empirical human subject there develop gradually the notions, judgments and finally the theories. On the one
hand, they are constructed of the material provided by empirical
cognition which stems from the affection on our senses caused by the
Ding-an-sich (thing-as-such), on the other hand, however, they
originate apriori in the sphere of the categories. The objects can
only result from a synthesis of both. The intellect has to provide
the unity.l1 9
Hartmann shows here very distinctly the extreme point of
Kant's error. Although he himself had been a Neo-Kantian
in the beginning of his philosophical development, he no longer
agrees with Kant that " the objects ... can result from a synthesis only " and that " the unity must be given by or stem
from reason."
The discovery of this error served Hartmann as weapon
against the Marburg School. He criticized the Neo-Kantians:
the idea of the synthesis is also the root of Neo-Kantianism. The
essence of the object develops for the Neo-Kantians in the course
of the historical process which presents itself as a great process of
cognition. The historical process consists in the fact-as this strange
Idealism assumed-that the world becomes more and more perfected in its ideas. Kant still found the Ding-an-sich hidden behind
the empirical thing; the objects of the Neo-Kantians, however,
result from the synthesis only. There is no other world behind the
ideas. Therefore, it appears that the progress of cognition is nothing
else but a steady inner construction of ideas.
We do not believe that the world is nothing but such a cognitive
progress. We distinguish precisely the ideas from nature. Nature
remains always the same. Only our notions of nature have changed
and have become more correct. 120
Hartmann does here neither deny the sphere of the ideas, nor
the steady expanse of this sphere through the progress of cogni110
120

Nicolai Hartmann, Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, p. 106.
Nicolai Hartmann, Einfuehrung •.. , p. 106.

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tion, 121 but he opposes the one-sided interpretation of the
idealistic and rationalistic philosophies by pointing strongly to
the primary given in reality which precedes any gnoseological
experience and without which the latter would not at all be
possible. In this criticism Hartmann's own philosophical position becomes demonstrated. He stresses that
the ideal solution ... has to search for an original unity of subject
and object which lies beyond their non-identity, hence, a unity
which embraces subject and object. 122

Here Hartmann points to the rooting of the gnoseological problem in the ontological sphere and in being itself. Thus Hartmann not only confronts cognition with being, he actually puts
cognition into the sphere of being because it not only stems
from the thinking subject, it is also founded in the object,
although the latter is essentially separated (urgeschiedenen)
from the subject. Hartmann sees in the problem of cognition
"certain points ... in which the gnoseological problem runs
in a straight direction into the ontological problem." 123 He
is convinced of the metabasis (Plato) , because, " behind the
' object ' there emerges the existing thing, behind the relation
of cognition there appears the relation of being," 124 and both
confront one another as " being and being instead of as knower
and the known." 125
As mentioned earlier in this work, being by becoming an
object may remain totally indifferent or neutral to its objectification. It also may react as it is, for instance, in the case of
objects which are other humans. But it is clear that the
establishment of cognitive relations does not change the being
121 Hartmann continues in the quoted paragraph:
" Such a continuous construction of ideas actually takes place. Therefore, the transcendental question and the
total transcendental method are so highly actual. They survived Idealism and are
today still of significance. This is clearly seen on the status quo of the sciences,
for example, of the science of nature if one compares today's insights with the
previous levels of development."
122 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , pp. 173-174.
128 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 174.
1UJbid.
125

Ibid.

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of the objectified existent. The noetic relation as such also does
not change the ontic relation. However, when a being becomes
a knower, when an intellectual being recognizes an object, in
such a case being does not remain indifferent in regard to the
other pole because of the act of cognition which is necessary
in this relation. Therefore, the recognizing being " tends to
embrace the existent thing in the relation (of cognition) more
and more intensively." 126 From this angle Hartmann sees all
the gnoseological problems and relations grounded in the ontological sphere. He says:
To the degree to which the transobjective is still understandable
... that means inasmuch as it belongs to its nature to be intelligible,
to such a degree it still fits in the gnoseological relation, at least
one would be justified to presume that it exists only in and for
the gnoseological relation. However, to the degree to which the
transobjective contains elements of the irrational, or better, of the
transintelligible, to such a degree it will not be absorbed by the
gnoseological relation, regardless of how extended the latter may
become. In this condition its relation to the subject is no longer
one of real or possible cognition but it is simply a confrontation of
two existents, the relational structure of which although it cannot
be questionable, may nevertheless be intelligible. Therefore, it is
clear that this relation is an ontological one. 127

Such firm footing on the ontological basis prevents Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition from deviating into relativistic
positions, such as, for example, those shown in Greek philosophy, 128 and those perceptible in contemporary trends, for
instance, Heidegger's existentialism. 129 Hartmann proved the
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 174.
Ibid., p. 74.
128 Cf. Nicolai Hartmann,
Einfuehrung in die Philosophie, p. 94.
129 Cf. idem, Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie, p. 43:
" Martin Heidegger instead
of asking for being as being, asks being for its meaning. An ontology which does
not clarify this question is blind. This was the reason why the ancient ontology
had to decline. A new beginning must be found. It is to be discovered in existence
(Dasein), which on its part becomes restricted to the existence of man. This
existent is superior to the other being because it is being which understands itself
in existence. All existential understanding is rooted in it. Therefore, ontology
must be based upon the existential analysis of this 'Dasein.' From this position
it follows that all being must be interpreted relative to man ... : the world in
126

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untenableness of such positions. The object, the subject and
the gnoseological relation of both of them are truly encompassed by being. Therefore, contrary to relativistic theories,
Hartmann teaches that finally all gnoseological problems must
turn into ontological questions, for behind all cognition, there
is waiting the question for being.
By pointing to the emergence of the ontological problems
behind or beyond the gnoseological questions a methodical way
is visible which leads from the aporetics of cognition to the
theory. Theory, in Hartmann's philosophy, does not mean an
even solution of problems. Theory is the treatment of problems
described by phenomenology, and explored in aporetics. Hartmann confesses in all theory: lgrwramus et ignorabimus, that
is, he admits the insolubility of the perennial problems, and
the limitation of consciousness which is experienced when confronted with the transintelligible sphere.

III. THE THEORY OF GNOSEOLOGICAL

TRANSCENDENCE

Aporetics of cognition, in the last analysis, must arrive at
the sphere of being for " the nature of the thing is not exhausted
by an objectification for a subject." 13 ° Consequently, for the
subject, too, the object is an existent, a Ding-an-sich. This
condition challenges human cognition to search. 131
But the searching subject itself is an existent. Hence, the
relation between these two real beings which becomes established by cognition is, so to say, in the foreground only a
which I am is at any given time my world (je meinige), but can very well be
another for any other man. Similarly is the truth my truth (je meinige). (Cf.
Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit, Halle, 1927, especially the introduction and the
first part.) Therewith, the question for being as being is eliminated. What is asked
for is only being as it is for me, given to me, understood by myself. This is a
predetermination of the basic ontological question throughout and, to be sure,
through the formulation of the question ... "
180 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege . . . , p. 182.
181 Hartmann
who analyzed the problem of cognition thoroughly, is, of course,
aware of reflection. But in his investigation, he limits cognition to its primary
givenness in the ontological realm in order to explore unhindered the primary
condition of all cognition.

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gnoseological one. Its background or its basis is an ontological
one, namely being.
Hartmann uses these findings in his theory in order to illuminate the gnoseological aporetics. He says:
A theoretical treatment ... has to attempt to see the gnoseological nature of the subject-object relation against the background of
its ontological nature. 132
Therefore, Hartmann divides his theory or treatment of the
aporetics of cognition into an ontological and a gnoseological
mqmry.
In the ontological part, Hartmann treats the problem of the
object as being the introduction to the problem of being. He
says that
when at all, then only from this point can the ontological relation
be seen, a relation which is hidden in the gnoseologicalnature of the
relation of cognition.133
Hence, the problem of the object is the recognized exemplum
crucis in the noetic problem.
In the approach to Hartmann's theory of cognition, it seems
advisable to secure the premise that the object is confronting
the consciousness of the subject. Therefore, we must ask what
Hartmann means by consciousness? Hartmann criticizes the
" widely spread view which identifies spirit, mind, with consciousness." 134 This would allow the equation spirit= consciousness. However, although consciousness falls within the
range of spirit, nevertheless, not all spiritual being is consciousness. Besides, there is
also a very unspiritual consciousness. One cannot deny that it
possesses practical shrewdness and a certain amount of intelligence,
but all this remains tightly bound to the service of vital needs. It
shows in no way an autonomous intention. 135
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 182.
Ibid., p. 188.
, .. Nicolai Hartmann, Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 48. This view is,
according to Hartmann, " not only found in Psychologism; the idealistic theories
too, suggest it." But Hartmann objects to it for this view does not aspire high
enough.
185 Ibid. He continues: " We know this from the higher animals .••.• Perhaps
182

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

The actual genesis of spirit from unspiritual consciousness,
which during the last decades has become a controversial issue
in the academic world of the natural sciences and philosophy,
is not the question here. Hartmann thinks that " from the
aspect of consciousness alone spirit cannot be understood." 136
It is clear to him that the consciousness of man is of another
kind than the consciousness of even the highest developed
animals. Hartmann points out the factor which differentiates
the spiritual consciousness from the lower. It is the severance
or detachment from the tension of the drives, the freeing from
the vital urges, the distance of spiritual consciousness from the
matter with which it has to deal. Therefore, spiritual consciousness is not restricted to the vital level of the individual. The
individual's environment is not limited to needs,
it is widened in its content, and, strictly speaking, it is without
determinable limits. It can expand as far as experience and conjecture will lead it .... Therewith it shows an essentially different
relationship to the real world in which the individual lives, than
other beings, namely, an objective relation coined by penetration
and comprehension. 137

For that reason, consciousness is truly " an existent, a being,
a species of being," 138 which has a very definite univocal
meaning. The latter becomes clear
if a privation of consciousness is spoken of, the tacit supposition of
any non-ontological theory of cognition is that there i8 consciousness, which means that consciousness i8 something. 139
one can at least say, that where sense organs are found, there may well be a
beginning of consciousness."
186 Nicolai Hartmann,
Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 48. Hartmann had
pondered deeply in these themes. He even wrote on " Philosophische Grundfragen
der Biologie," in Kleinere Schriften, III, pp. 78-187. Within the hierarchy of being,
the spiritual consciousness means to Hartmann " a novum, which is added, but
which is not another continuum of the successive levels. With spiritual consciousness
it is the same as it is with the organic life which is added to the inorganic nature.
Nobody doubts the coherence, but the organic cannot be explained by mechanics,
not even by the most advanced forms of the latter."
187 Nicolai Hartmann,
Das Problem des geistigen Seins, p. 109.
18 ° Cf. Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, p.
18• Ibid.

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Therewith, the ontological supposition supports all the cases.
Futhermore, it becomes evident that all cognition and all the
theories of cognition are based on this presupposition.
The cognizable elements of being can only be determined gnoseologically. But the being of cognition and of its object can only be
understood ontologically. One cannot treat these problems separately; only in abstracto can one isolate them. 140

In the following presentation of Hartmann's theory, only
those parts of his ontology and gnoseology are referred to which
stand directly in relation to the gnoseological transcendence.
Hartmann's inquiry centralizes at first-as previously seenon the object by viewing its ontological and its gnoseological
aspects. From the object, the theory proceeds to the subject
and finally to the noetic relation in which both become intentionally united.
Ontologically seen, the object is in itself. It is completely
indifferent towards recognition and towards intellectual comprehension and penetration. " From the natural and from the
philosophical point of view of cognition the object is the transcendent," 141 for cognition is never outside the subject, or,
cognition is in the subject, and " the mode of cognizing an
object is always the mode of a subject." 142 Hence, any artificial orientation of cognition towards its object in the existential sphere is unnecessary, for the orientation or the direction
of the subject-even in reflection-is towards an object. Therefore, Hartmann considers it necessary to clarify the problems
first from the point of view " of ontology before treating them
gnoseologically-hence, this is not a theoretical arrangement
but it is the natural order." 143 Naturally the realistic tendency
of cognition reaches deep into the ontological realm, because
it not only advances to the object and to the transobjective,
but in comprehending the nature of being, it recognizes itself,
140

Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 318.

m Ibid., p. 183.
142 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 183.
HB[bid.

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the subject, and with it the transsubjective also. Hartmann
adds that the sphere of ontology has to be thought of " as
the homogeneous unifying sphere of the transcendent and of
the immanent." 144 This is due to the object, for being is one
in spite of being shared by the many." 145
The object of cognition at any given time is, therefore, always
a " sector of the sphere of being " 146 woven into the nexus of
reality, exposed by it for cognition and yet never severed from
it. This sector is, to be sure,
potentially unlimited for the existent on its part does not resist
any further objectification. It is indifferent towards it. Cognition
can explore it in every direction-at least principally .147

Gnoseologically seen, this sector of reality, however, is precisely an existential sector and therefore, a limited something,
determined and enclosed for the subject. What lies beyond it
is excluded from the momentary cognition. It is the transobjective which lies beyond the momentary comprehension.
Through this condition the existential spheres of objection 148
at any given time become distinguishable. No further demonstration is necessary to make clear that the ratio e8sendi, which
is searched for by cognition, precedes the ratio cognoscendi.
The uniqueness of the intellectual being in the midst of
being puts the noetic object which emerges from the plane
of being at any given time in position to itself (= subject) and
transforms the relation therewith into a gnoseological one. It
is in the subject that through the cognitive process there originates the ratio cognoscendi or the object-image, which stems
from the ratio essendi. Therewith is shown that the subject is
the very point in reality in which being is reflected-and, since this
re:flexion causes a multitude of representing images-the point in
Ibid., p. 200.
This position reminds us of the Aristotelian problem of the one and the many,
but it is not dealt with here by Hartmann. However, as is seen, it is presupposed.
146 Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege .•• , p. 204.
1 " Ibid.
148 Cf. diagram The Spheres of Cognition and of Being, p. 145.
1"

145

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which this reflexion takes place widens to a cosmos of multiform
representations of being,149
which, on the other hand, are the subject's own representations,
because they exist in the subject and through its act, or briefly,
because they are subjective representations of objective images.
In regard to their content, these subjective representations are
object-determined, wherefore they are rightly called objectimages. These images are the obtained aspects of the extramental object in the noetic cosmos of consciousness. This
sphere of the subject is, therefore, not simply a psychological
sphere, but it is the inner sphere, or the countersphere of the
objects, that is, it must be understood as gnoseological sphere.
Hartmann does not claim that the determinations of cognition presented here are an " explanation or even a theory of
consciousness." 150 They may, however, be used as an outline
towards the progress of the theory. In any case, they seem
necessary in order to arrange the spheres of the problems of the
theory according to its areas. Hartmann distinguishes three
such areas:
I. A limited psychological sphere.
2. A logical (ideal) sphere.
3. An ontological sphere.
In this three fold confrontation of psychology, logic and ontology
the field of the proper (narrower) problem of cognition takes a
special middle position through which it connects the other problem
areas with one another, but it does not level them out. 151

Whatever sphere may be considered, according to Hartmann,
each one is based on the antic sphere, on being. A philosophical
analysis, therefore, cannot ignore the import of the ontological
moments upon the problems.
Hartmann's demonstration of the ontological roots of the
gnoseological aporias is not an artificial speculation. It begins
with the empirical natural cognition which always presupposes
being. The relation, too, between subject and object is a
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, p. !'l04.
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. !'l09.
161 Ibid., p. !'liS.

149

160

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

natural phenomenon. The seclusion of the conscious subject
in its sphere does not make it isolated from other beings. But
a certain " subjection to a definite kind of relation " 152 takes
place in which the noetic appropriation of the determinations
of the object result as object-images in the subject. This result,
however, belongs to the sphere of knowledge already. It is
no longer purely gnoseological or object of cognition. As objectimage, the result of cognition has become the intentional content
of the intellect or of the consciousness and therewith leaves
the sphere of the gnoseological transcendent. Hence, now it can
be seen that the gnoseological transcendence in Hartmann's
theory is a comprehending of a being-in-itself; this is the clear
restriction or the boundary of the genuine act of cognition
compared to all the other intellectual acts.
Cognitive intention transcends simply not only the sphere of the
subjective states but also the sphere of the mere intentional objects,
or, of the for-me-existents; it penetrates to the being-in-itself. 153

In regard to a solution of this basic aporia, Hartmann holds
that it is sufficient to have
a mere ontologically conditioned relationship between object and
subject ... in order to transmit the determinations of the object
upon a subjective construct; thereby the latter is made objective. 154

Such a position, however, does not claim to have found a final
solution for-as Hartmann explicitly states-the " how of the
transmission of the object-image into the subject, the genesis
of the images in the consciousness remains irrational " 155
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 3!i!8.
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege . . . , p. 118. Hartmann still remarks: " Of
course, there are many kinds of transcendence, just as there are many peculiar
borderline relations. For instance, the transobjective remainder of the momentary
objection is transcendent; furthermore there is the realm of the transintelligible to
reason; values transcend being; God (as extra-mundum) transcends the world, etc.
But all these kinds are not the gnoseological transcendence, with which we are
concerned here."
'"'Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , p. 326.
155 Cf. ibid., p. 238:
Hartmann, as is known, distinguishes also between the
gnoseological and the ontological irrational: " the meaning of the first is irrational
in the sense of the unfathomable which, in the ontological order, would mean
152

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( = transintelligible) at least for today's understanding. Nicolai
Hartmann then accepts as a solution of the basic gnoseological
aporia the summary of his findings:

In the determination of the subject through the object the mutual
transcendence fully remains. This transcendence caus·es no contradiction to the phenomenon of object-awareness. The object is independent from the latter. It stands indifferent towards its cognition.
The relation of cognition ... is a transcendent relation; it is an
ontological relationship which cannot resolve in any inner aspect
of the subject. 156

Hartmann checked this result of his theory by comparing it
with other theories. He measures on them again and again his
own position. In general, he criticizes many contemporary
thinkers who display a kind of "atavism," that is they cling
to a theory which teaches that
cognition is a production within the consciousness, a forming of
notions and ideas, or at least a transforming, hence, a process which
is characteristic of the synthetic judgment. 157

Not only the idealistic schools are based on such a theory.
From them it is to be expected. But the correlativism of the
theory of knowledge, too, is not free from it, because this correlativism "assumes the insolubility of the mutual connection
chance; in the gnoseological order it means the incomprehensible, the unknowable,
that which is unaccessible to reason and lies beyond the limits of cognition, or
which is the transintelligible." In the latter sense it is used here.
156 Nicolai Hartmann,
Grundzuege ... , p. 362. In the same passage Hartmann
adds about the admitted irrationality or transintelligibility that it "is not in
need of a special justification. It is naturally ontological. However, for that
reason, it is not less certain than iu the case of a clear understanding of its structure
and function. It possesses a degree of hypothetical certainty which marks the
unavoidable minimum of metaphysical assumptions."
157 Idem, "Die Erkenntnis
im Lichte der Ontologie," in Kleinere Schriften, I,
p. 123. " This interpretation is taken as Kantian with reference to the authority
of the Critique of Pure Reason by its representatives .... In Kant there are
indications which seem to support such an assumption-most distinctly so in the
"transcendental deduction of pure reason." (2nd ed.) There Kant taught that
the objects originate directly through intellectual action in a synthesis only. Of
course, one seems to forget that many a contrary statement from the same Critique
of Pure Reason can be quoted."

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between subject and object." 158 In the "as-if-philosophy''
(Als-Ob-Philosophie) of Hans Vaihinger 158 this erroneous idea
is found. The historical relativism, too, is firmly convinced
"that man cannot advance to the objects ... as they are, and
retains nothing of them but changing opinions." 160 Edmund
Husserl's phenomenology, too, as presented in the Ideen does
not advance further. Husser! supplements the intuition of the
ideas (eide, W esensformen) with reflective studies of the
spiritual (mental) acts which lead finally to the level of the
essences.
But where do such theories finally lead, theories which
make it impossible to arrive at the truth either because of
erroneous premises, or because of a lack of distinction between
the true and the false? Such theories actually deny to cognition
its proper object, therefore, in their last consequence, these
theories arrive at a denial of being. Thus, any genuine knowledge and any true science disappears. Cognition divorced from
its object-as is the case in the above mentioned theories-can
no longer be called cognition. The tendency of such systems
towards total scepticism becomes considerable for they succumb
to the circle " into which all such procedures usually run. They
come under their own law of the suspension of univocal truth,
whereby they extinguish themselves." 161 All these theories
Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzul?!ge . . . , p.
Werner Ziegenfuss, op. cit., II, p. 767. "According to Vaihinger thinking and
willing are originally only media in the service of the wall. Thinking is not able
through pure theological cognition to comprehend the given, the immediately
experienced reality. Such a cognition cannot obtain truth in the sense of an accordance with reality. Cognition must be taken as if it were true, that means as
fiction. Fictions are inadequate and subjective; they are imaginary modes of
notions, the conclusiveness of which in reality is barred from the very beginning."
(Die Philosophie des Als-Ob, p. 606.)
160 Nicolai Hartmann,
" Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in op. cit.,
158
159

p.
161 Nicolai Hartmann,
" Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie, in op. cit.,
p. 128. See there also Hartmann's evaluation of the natural sciences, especially
of physical theory, of the micro-mechanics of the atomic processes, etc. He states
that any positivism " which makes the empirical data subjective because they are
rooted in sense-data " is unable to provide a final answer and therefore, needs a
conversion to ontology.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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fail because they do not have the proper basis. They begin
with the supposition that
cognition consists in a mental forming (constructing), and because
the forming starts from a given, it must be a transforming. If one
identifies the content of the data with the variety of perception,
the mode of being of the data, however, with reality-as the unwise
Neo-Kantian understood it-then the outcome must show that the
intellect by its scientific procedure does change (or transform) the
given real into a more or less unreal something and that the intellect
issues as true cognition what it does change.162
Therefore, the real is not recognized but it is mistaken, for
" the real is never given as such, either through the senses, or
in any other elementary form of cognition." 163 It lies always
"outside" the subject (=intellect or consciousness) and,
therefore, must necessarily be searched for. " Real, in the strict
sense of the word, is simply the real existent only." 164 But the
gnoseological transcendence stretches-although in varying degrees-from the lowest to the highest levels of human intellection. "The scientific experience teaches us that we have again
and again to return to the data in order to exhaust them." 165
Hence, the object is the important factor which makes the
gnoseological theory a true or false theory of cognition. For
naturally with the object, the essence of cognition either stands
or falls. If the object is seen erroneously as being in the subject,
better, as being in the consciousness (as is the case when sense
perception, conception, ideation or any other performed functions of the consciousness or any results of such functions are
taken as the starting point of cognition) then, indeed, an object
as being-in-itself and existing in the extramental sphere cannot
be found. Such " cognition " (erroneously so called in this
case) does not need to search for objects in the sphere of being,
Ibid., p. HM.
Nicolai Hartmann, " Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in op. cit.,
p. 125.
16 • Ibid.
165 Ibid. Cf. the work by Karl Rahner, Geist in Welt, Muenchen, Koesel-Verlag..
1957, in which the author analyzes the Conversio inteUectu11 ad phantal!mata of
Thomas Aquinas.
162

163

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and, consequently, does not need to seize an object in order
to appropriate it. Such a function, however, ceases to be a
cognitive one. Such operations of the intellect belong to the
immanent sphere of thought. Naturally, the gnoseological
transcendence is ignored, for it is not needed to reach the extramental being or a being-in-itself. The realm of reality and the
realm of consciousness, however, are bridged or connected only
through this transcendence, hence, they can come to each other
solely through this transcendence, and this transcendence is the
basic phenomenon of real cognition. Theories, systems, speculations, etc., which do not take account of this phenomenon,
necessarily are doomed to failure.
Hartmann wonders how the notion of the object-in-itself
was ever put in opacity, or how it could be so totally ignored,
"since the normal consciousness (or intellect) -when it becomes attentive to that notion (which happens in the conflict
of opinions)-never mixes the notion up with the real object." 166
The ponderability of this question led Hartmann to the disputed discovery of the " circle of thinking " (Zirkel des
Denkens) by tracing the errors and demanding from the erroneous theories an answer to the question of the real object.
Thereby, he comes across a position which abolishes the confrontation of object and subject, in other words, a position
which ignores the heterogeneity of object and concept. This
theory asks:
What-if anything-do we know of the object which is not contained in our concept (idea) of it? The concept and the judgment,
both of them are on the level of the concept and are transformations
of the concept. Hence, what then does confront the concept (or
what is opposite of the concept)? In last analysis, it seems that
this confrontation itself consists merely in our mode of conception,
the independence of the object from thought (Meinung) is itself
only an object-we-think-of, a thought. If we suppose in our judgment the object as being-in-itself, this being-in-itself is a supposed
one only. If one thinks of the object as an independent structure
166 Nicolai Hartmann, " Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in op. cit.,
p. U7,

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in the extramental sphere, the independence and with it the extramental sphere too are spheres of thought. 167
This circular current of thought is truly a vicious circle which
returns to its starting point within the sphere of consciousness.
It presents the argument of the " circle of thinking," which in
such an illusory manner acquits itself of the real in-itselfexisting object. If the objects were accepted, this deception
would fall back into the ancient error of the duplicity of the
world, which is criticized in Plato's philosophy. According to
Hartmann, it would be more exact, however, not to speak of
a doubling but of a multiplication of the world, for " in every
consciousness the concept is different, whereas the object remains identical with itself." 168 The criterion of all cognition
versus thinking remains positively bound to the gnoseological
transcendence which is not only conditioned by, but necessary
for the object-subject relation, for
in the cognizing consciousness an object-image originates which is
adequate to the external object, but the latter remains forever a
transcendent object-in-itself, which is not identical or one with the
image.169
Therefore, cognition neither is, nor can be a mental construct.
It is an act, " which is in continuous progress by dealing with
the enigmatic nature of being. The transcendent cognitive
relation progresses with cognition, and it, too, increases its range
within the surrounding world." 170

IV. EvALUATION AND CRITIQUE
The detailed presentation of Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence is now open to an evaluation and a critique. A
critique proves itself justified if it can show its point of de167

Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in op. cit.,

p. 127.
168
169

Ibid., p. 131.
Nicolai Hartmann, "Die Erkenntnis im Lichte der Ontologie," in op. cit.,

p. 130.
170

Ibid., p. 176.

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parture, or its basis. The critique offered here views the problem
of the gnoseological transcendence from two perspectives,
namely,
1) from the immanent point of view of Hartmann's metaphysics
of cognition, and
2) from a realistic (orthodox realistic or traditional scholastic)
perspective.

Seen from the immanent point of view, the gnoseological
transcendence is the cardinal point from which the logical
Idealism and Neo-Kantianism can be attacked and overcome.
For the non-identity of object and subject, or their gnoseological
heterogeneity, established with the proven gnoseological transcendence, points unequivocally to and shows the object's
foundation in being, i.e., the object's pre-gnoseological existence. Therefore, it is proven that the object of cognition is
being-in-itself and is, therefore, causally independent of and
prior in time to cognition by a subject. When the production
of an object through a subject is either assumed or actually
taking place, then it is no longer real cognition but thinking,
imagining, or phantasy. For-as Hartmann shows-the object
of cognition is not produced or generated by a cognizing subject.
The object which at any given time is recognized is extramentally given-according to Hartmann's view of the hierarchy
of being-on a certain existential level or in a sphere of being
and is a being-in-itself whether it is ever recognized by a subject
or not. Such a given real object when recognized influences
through its effect the subject and challenges, so to say, the
subject to accomplish an act of cognition. Thus the original
givenness of the object is the first prerequisite of any possible
cognition. Therefore, the cognitive intention of a subject is not
aiming at an "intentional" but at a real object. This fact
is indicated also in the original meaning of the word " object,"
signifying the" standing against" of two given beings. Through
such a direction or alignment of the intention, cognition penetrates the " brazen ring " of consciousness and causes it to
transcend or to step over itself by aiming at an object which

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is being-in-itself and therefore is a transcendent object, i.e.,
a being of another kind than the subject. Accordingly, in real
cognition always real subjects face real objects and both become
the poles of a genuine gnoseological relation.
The object of cognition is a being-in-itself and is therefore
never in the cognizing subject, it remains neutral to its being
recognized, unaltered by it, may even outlast the subject and its
own recognition. But the result in the subject is an image of
the recognized, external object through the effect of the object
and the cognitive act of the subject. The more exact in the
subject is the generated and existing image of the object, the
more perfect is the cognition. And the more perfect the cognition is, the more justifiably is it called a truth in view of its
relation to the object, which it pictures. Hence, in Hartmann's
theory we meet again a notion of truth which equals the
adaequatio intellectus et rei of the Scholastics. However, Hartmann's truth is subject-immanent, i.e., resulting and existing
in the subject and therefore the logical or gnoseological truth
only. His concept of truth therefore is neither the one of
Antiquity, nor the one of the Middle Ages, for the ancient and
the medieval notion of truth was unequivocally based upon
the truth of reality, or the ontic truth. Cognition was considered a more or less perfect grasping of the essence of beings
through which the recognizing intellect participated in the
intellectus archetypus. In Hartmann's philosophy this is not
accepted. The admitted apriori elements of cognition, occurring
on all levels of cognition, have hypothetical character, i.e.,
they are subject-produced assumptions for the phenomenology
of cognition shows that a recognizing subject does set up, first
of all, certain assumptions or hypotheses stimulated by experience, in order to prove them by re-checking the given reality
with them, and, when proven, to apply them to reality. Here,
too, Hartmann's method or criterion of "several instances"
becomes applied. It follows, that Hartmann's apriori elements
of cognition are of a hypothetical nature and subject-conditioned, but they are not founded upon the unchangeableness
and eternity of essences. However, they meet the real, given

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

object from the subject's side with certain notions of categories
and of being. This is the case, not only on the scientific, but
on any noetic level. Hartmann stresses, however, that such
identical elements in object and subject" are not the categories
themselves," as Hegel and other idealists assumed, and that
they are not " even definitions of them; they are the hypothetical representations of the undefinable and in their nucleus
actually never graspable categorical essences only." 171
Within Hartmann's theory of cognition such a forming of
hypothetical apriori notions and principles or laws becomes
a necessity for any objective cognition, because the progress
of knowledge is based upon an awareness of an insufficient
cognition of beings or upon the knowledge or cognition of notknowing. Only the cognition of a lack of knowledge, of an
imperfection of insight or grasp, stimulates the mind to conquer
more and more the realm of the trans-objective reality. And
truly, the" circle of (recognized) objects "is always surrounded
by the immeasurable ocean of the unknown, and perhaps, for
human grasp, even unobtainable, impenetrable given. In other
words, according to Nicolai Hartmann the real object remains
transcendent, and the subject is ever newly challenged to transcend its own consciousness because reality remains to a certain
degree supra-rational, irrational. It seems then that this is the
new formulation, the new admission of the ancient confession
"Ignoramus et ignorabimus."
Built upon such insights Hartmann's theory of cognition
becomes, therefore, an aporetic metaphysics of cognition. He
expresses that already in the restrained, prognostic title of
Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis, i.e. basic characteristics of a metaphysics of cognition, for it, too, cannot
determine and predicate the ultimate and the last of human
cognition in spite of the advanced information of the twentieth
century. In the preceding study Hartmann's theory was therefore presented as an aporetic metaphysics, precisely in reference
to Nicolai Hartmann's distinctions between ontology and metaphysics, between problematic and systematic thinking. Within
171

ed.,

Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege einer Metaphysik der ,Erkenntnis,
p.

NICOLAI HARTMANN's

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this frame, the gnoseological aporias were introduced, and with
the gnoseological transcendence the breakthrough and a breaking-away from idealism of any form was possible. This was
Hartmann's great concern: to deliver cognition from the logicoidealistic bondage. Therefore, this is considered Hartmann's
proper merit: the in-itself-being object of cognition can no
longer be an illusion for a generating mind does not produce it.
Whoever will follow Hartmann's thought will be led to a cognition of the real object in its own existence, for Hartmann's
philosophy points to the real world with its proper hierarchy of
being, its own structures, categories, principles and laws, with
its relations and its dependence. Hartmann's advancement to
the gnoseological transcendence then-intended and shown by
Hartmann as the necessary basis for realism-can be considered
by realistic thinkers at least a highly valuable attempt, a
beginning or even a road to cross over the idealistic border and
to refute logical Idealism.
What then can be said about Nicolai Hartmann's gnoseological transcendence from a realistic (Aristotelian-Scholastic)
point of view?
First of all the basis of such a criticism is to be shown. The
orthodox realist knows about and acknowledges the gnoseological transcendence. Without such a transcendence, truth
(a true cognition of the world, of essences of beings, even partial
cognition) would not be possible. But the truths, the essences
are not only recognized or known. They cannot be recognized
or known if they are not first in themselves and before any
cognition. The orthodox realist, therefore, holds that there is
an antic, an ontological truth, or in this context, a pre-gnoseological truth in the things.
Whenever such a realistic thinker gets acquainted with Hartmann's aporetic metaphysics of cognition, he will be at first
surprised at Hartmann's thought, which in many points is in
concord with Aristotle, Aquinas and Scholasticism. This impression may have caused Gottlieb Soehngen to admit:
"Nicolai Hartmann's metaphysics of cognition has many essential starting points in common with the Aristotelian Scholastic

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

thinking." 172 This is not astonishing. Hartmann himself says
that " it needs a total revolution of the world view through
which the phenomenon of the natural object-awareness becomes
changed (auf den Kopf gestellt wird) " in order to be able to
agree with the idealistic thinkers. "For regardless how much
one may attempt to interpret transcendence into its reverse
(immanence), one cannot ignore it in the phenomenon." 173
Nevertheless, the realistic thinker has to get down to the
individual problems and the differences of the positions.
The greatness of a philosopher may be measured, at least
partially, on the attitude the thinker displays in regard to the
real problems and especially to those urgent and pertinent in
his own era. Hartmann states that no thinker begins in
philosophy with a blank. To everyone a certain level of problems, of knowledge and of principles is transmitted. Indeed,
even Aristotle found a certain problem-situation given, i.e.,
he found the Sophistic, the Platonic and other theories in which
the epigone could detect inevitable provocations and valuable
premises. Aristotle saw and responded to the pre-Aristotelian
positions with critique, corrections and agreements. What made
Aristotle immortal was the fact that he bent the pre-Aristotelian
thinking to realism by measuring the theorems of his forerunners on reality.
During the Middle Ages the phrase was coined of the " waxen
nose of the authority " which could be shaped or reshaped.
Thomas Aquinas acted accordingly when he, in the wealth of
thought characterizing the thirteenth century and in the wealth
of Christian tradition, accomplished his great philosophical
synthesis by adjusting transmitted ideas to the " modern "
level of his own times.
Immanuel Kant was, according to his own report, " aroused
from slumber" by the bias of the English empiricists. Hence,
to this problematic situation of the eighteenth century the
world owes the three Kantian " Critiques."
112 Gottlieb Soehngen, Sein und Gegenstand, Muenster, Aschendorff'sche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930, p. 103.
118 Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , 1925, p. 76.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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In the post-Kantian, post-Hegelian era Nicolai Hartmann
found himself philosophically challenged by the gnoseological
situation and therefore, he dealt with the idealistically imbalanced problem of cognition. Nothing had made philosophy
more disrespected than the theories of the neo-Kantian rationalists and of the logical idealists. These systems preconstructed
their theories in order to explain and interpret reality and truth
according to their immanently generated ideas.
Besides, Hartmann recognized early that the error of a system of thought does not remain limited to an ideology. It
spreads contagiously to other large and significant regions of
human existence. For instance, during his own life time, Hartmann had experienced in Russia the effects of Dialectical
Materialism and later in Germany those of the superman
ideology. Therefore, it seems, Hartmann felt obliged to break
away from any form of Idealism and to tum radically to
Realism. He devoted himself strongly, courageously and completely to this task. His separation from the Marburg School
was taken as a necessary consequence of this decision. Hartmann began to follow up the " idea" and to pursue it into its
origin in reality. He searched back on the phenomena of the
given to the object of cognition and found it a being-in-itself.
From there he took his gnoseological orientation and completed
his philosophical synthesis. He did it with inexorable logical
accuracy and in a brilliant style. From then on he considered
himself no longer an idealist, but an ontologist, for his philosophy had become realistic and independent as he stated in the
first sentence of his fundamental and important early work
Grundzuege einer M etaphysik der Erkenntnis:
The ... enquiries are based on the understanding that cognition is
not a creating, a generating or producing of the object as the
Idealism of the old and of the new version wants to teach us, but
it is a grasping of something which exists already before any cognition and which is independent of it.

This basic orientation and attitude of Hartmann cannot be
ignored by realistic thinkers.
For the criticism here it is now especially important to see

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

what Hartmann actually means by cognition. He described it:
" Cognition always is a grasping of an object which is in itself,
and therefore, it is not a having of an objectivity, of a mere
intentional object." 174 In this statement lies in nuce also the
thesis of the gnoseological transcendence. Three issues are here
especially important for a critique of Hartmann's thought:
1. The object.

The truth.
3. The progress of cognition.

On all three issues, depending more or less on a transcendence,
the critique must measure Nicolai Hartmann's realism.
1. As shown in the previous exploration Hartmann's concept
of the object is in concord with the one of the orthodox realist.
Both hold that cognition does not aim at the image of the
object in the intellect but at the real, extramental thing-initself. This was expressed by the Scholastics in the statement
that cognition does not aim at the object's esse intentionale
but at the object's esse reale. The Scholastics called this intellectual alignment or direction the intentio prima. Hartmann
introduces in his theory the term intentio recta as equivalent to
intentio prima; the term intentio obliqua for the Scholastic
intentio secunda, which reflects on the image. Hartmann wants
these fundamental differences clearly distinguished in his gnoseological theory. So did the Scholastics. For the intentio obliqua
deals with the picture of the extramental object in the intellect
and can therefore be influenced by the receiver. It is indeed
more or less perfect according to its degree of similarity with
the thing-in-itself and the mode of the knower. But this image
is never the object of the intentio recta. Hartmann's theory
harmonizes here with the traditional realistic notion of the
object. Gottlieb Soehngen even asks, "whether the notion of
transcendence was formulated as radically by Thomas as it is
done in Hartmann's Metaphysik der Erkenntnis." 175
The second issue is the problem of truth. The transcend174

Cf. Nicolai Hartmann, Grundzuege ... , pp.

110

Op. cit., p. 53.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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ent concept of cognition necessarily comprises the transcendent
concept of truth. Gnoseological (logical) truth or error, is
always respectively either the agreement or the disagreement
of the obtained cognitive image with the thing-in-itself. This
is strongly underlined in Hartmann's theory. 176 Such a concept
of truth harmonizes with the Scholastic Veritas est adaequatio
intellectus ad rem. However, this is the gnoseological (logical)
notion of truth only. The orthodox realist knows also the
ontological truth which is found in the essence of the thing and
which is considered the measure of all logical, or gnoseological,
truth.
Hartmann now takes strictly the gnoseological truth as truth
proper. He was certainly influenced by his Aristotelian study
and by the phenomenological method (sui generis) according
to which truth in the proper sense of the word can be spoken of
only in regard to cognition and knowledge but not in regard
to the thing. Truth as property of the thing presupposes the
agreement of the thing with its idea, its original design, or,
Thomistically speaking, with its "eternal exemplar." Hartmann does not accept this concept of truth. He limits his notion
of truth to a subject-immanent (consciousness), human truth.
In his philosophy he neither presupposes nor accepts a personal
creative, divine intelligence. As a hypothesis it would not be
helpful, and the possibility to prove or demonstrate it is not
seen by Hartmann. Such a divine intelligence would be to
Hartmann a trans-metaphysical mystery, with which he would
refuse to deal, for it would be beyond philosophical reasoning.
Here then the critical questions must be asked. Does not Hartmann's concept of truth overburden the gnoseological transcendence from the side of the subject? Is not Hartmann's own
realism weakened or even endangered by idealism? Followed
to its ultimate consequences, such a concept of truth-and
finally, also, of certainty-seems to open the door to an encroachment of the immanent idealistic view. Hence, from this
point of view, the immunity of Hartmann's realism seems in
danger.
176

Cf. Grundzuege ... ,

pp. 54-56.

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

An excursus appears helpful here. Thomas Aquinas himself
accepted the Aristotelian concept of truth. Through the Christian tradition-which, although it was known to Hartmann,
was not Hartmann's background-the Augustinian verum est
id quod est was assigned to Thomas, and the rationes aeternae
pointed the way to the roots of the truth of things in the Divine
Intelligence. To Thomas Aquinas and to Nicolai Hartmann
truth is and remains relational, i.e., it is subjectively objective.
In the philosophies of these thinkers truth means not an object
of, but the objectivity of, cognition in the subject.
Naturally, Thomas had the invaluable adventure which
Hartmann did not accept, that he understood noetic subjectivity
within the human realm as a determined, partly passive and
!imitating subjectivity. In the divine order, however, truth
was to Thomas a determining, measuring, creative, personal
intelligence. Consequently, there was no difficulty in maintaining the relational character of his concept of truth. His
concept of truth was not only not endangered but deepened,
safeguarded and elevated in the Divine Spirit. Therefore,
Thomas can say, convinced and convincingly:
The Divine Ideas are certain principles or forms or the stable
and incommunicable reasons of the things which have no other
causal forms and which are therefore eternal, immutable and dwell
in the Divine Intelligence. But although they themselves neither
develop nor vanish, it is assumed that all the other things which
may develop and vanish, or which actually develop and vanish, are
formed according to them. 177
And again Thomas explains:
What the Greek called " ideas," is called by the Latinist " form."
Therefore, with ideas are meant forms which are valid for other
things and which exist for themselves outside the things. Such a
form can serve a twofold purpose: either it is the original reason
of the thing of which it is the form, or, it is the intelligibility in
which sense it is spoken of when referred to the forms of intelligible
things that they are in the knowing intellect. In both cases the
supposition of ideas is necessary.178
177

Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, I, q. 15, a. fl.

178

Ibid., a. I.

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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On such grounds Saint Thomas comes to the conclusion:
Hence, the things of nature are constituted between two intellects
and are said to be true according to their similarity with the one
or the other of the two. Namely, the things are said to be true
according to their similarity with the Divine Intellect inasmuch as
they fulfill the end towards which the Divine Intellect has ordered
them . . . A thing is said to be true according to its similarity with
the human intellect, inasmuch as nature aims to produce a true
opinion of itself. The first relation of truth spoken of is prior to
the other. For the relation to the Divine Intellect precedes the relation to the human intellect. Even if there were never such a thing as
a human mind, nevertheless the things would be called true because
of their relation to the Divine Intelligence.179
Hartmann never arrived at such a conclusion bridging with it
the gnoseo-ontological hiatus. The gnoseological transcendence
in Nicolai Hartmann's theory of cognition shows no such final
anchorage of cognition either in a theory of participation or
in an analogia entis. Hartmann's transcendence remains in the
horizontal dimension of cognition, i.e. inner-worldly, innercosmic. It is not secured through a connection with the vertical
line of cognition which ascends and transcends to the metacosmic realm of the Divine. This then is the reason for not
having a final solution either for cognition or for truth. I£
Hartmann's excellent and clear dealing with cognition-although it is throughout inner-worldly oriented-could find and
incorporate the vertical dimension of the idea, it would no
longer remain a mere aporetic metaphysics, for it could view
the summit of transcendence and from there it could find a
still more satisfactory answer and its last and ultimate transcendence.
3. The third point for measuring Hartmann's theory of the
gnoseological transcendence is the progress of cognition.
Through the knowledge of the unknown or through the cognition of the inadequacy, of the incorrectness, of the lack of
cognition the human intellect is urged again and again to strive
for greater similarity, for more exact adequacy, which is for
179

Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 1, a. fl.

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

truth. Therefore, the intellect strives for deeper comprehension
of the real, of the world, of the universe and its cause.
In the progress of cognition there again appears a transcendence which is, according to Hartmann, a transsubjective and
a transobjective one. For in progressing cognition aims at an
element of the thing which is not yet known, which is not yet
objectified. Hence, the consciousness transcends not only the
subjective sphere but also the objectified region. This phenomenon gives new strength to Hartmann's proof of the transcendent, i.e., in respect to the argument against the production or generation of the idea in the subject as it was taught
by the logical idealists of Marburg. Precisely through the progress of cognition it becomes obvious that the thing remains in
itself, remains neutral, indifferent towards cognition. The phenomena show that the object of cognition in its existence and
essence remains untouched by any changes and variations
which do, however, occur in the cognition of the individual
as well as in the general knowledge of mankind and in the
sciences.180
Here another moment of agreement with Scholasticism can
been seen. In his Summa Saint Thomas distinguishes: " Alius
est modus intelligentis in intelligendo, quam modus rei in
existendo." 181 The existing thing in itself, which is recognized
and acknowledged in Thomas' and Hartman's philosophy, however, is in the Thomistic theory firstly an idea embedded in a
created being, as shown in the previous excursus, secondly, an
idea ordered toward a created intellect. Hartmann sees the
human intellect ordered towards a cognition of things (cf. his
a-teleological concept of the universe) which are never completely exhaustible. They retain always a mysterious, impenetrable remnant, a particle of trans-intelligibility or irrationality.
Hartmann, greatly influenced by modern phenomenology and
the findings of scientific psychology 182 takes the limitations of
18

° Cf. Grundzuege ... , pp. 52-54, 67-71, 99-102 and others

Summa Theologiae, I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.
Modem Ganzheits- and Gestalt-psychology have shown, for instance, that
the " naked" perception of an isolated fact or being or thing proves to be an
illusory abstraction in every regard.
181
182

NICOLAI HARTMANN'S

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the human intellect as the borderline of possible objectification.
Consequently, he diverges again from the Scholastic viewpoint
according to which all things are ordered to man, but man is
ordered to God. Here too, Hartmann remains consciously
inner-worldly and sees the progress of cognition, in spite of its
obvious transcendence, within the anthropological sphere. Hartmann measures the phenomena and the dimensions of currently
achieved human knowledge and draws the line between the
objectified and the transobjective. The transobjective region,
be it in a single thing, be it in the universe, becomes the basis
for Hartmann's theory of irrationality or of trans-intelligibility.
Apparently impressed by Hegel's notion "The truth is the
whole," Hartmann concludes that only when the whole of being
could be grasped, penetrated and known, can the single thing,
which is a cosmic momentum, a mesh of the whole, be truly
recognized and known. Thus, the full meaning of being-initself can be applied only to the world as a whole. The whole
world is the "proper object" of a cognizing subject, although
the subject itself is a part of the whole. In this sense then,
too, all transcendence, all progress of cognition leads to the
ontic sphere.
But the human intellect cognizes the determinations of the
whole and of a single being-as the phenomena show. These
determinations which are known by the individual and/or by
mankind are given always within and through the basic ontic
relation. They are proportioned to the pre-gnoseological existential relation: man-world; they determine only that "part of
the universe" which is so far objectified and they therefore can
be the assignment of an individual, of many, or of the specialized sciences. Whatever man objectifies anew of the transobjective sphere can be obtained only through the gnoseological transcendence which enlarges the "circle of objects."
But human cognition will never exhaust the trans-objective
realm.
This summary and critique then shows that through Hartmann's philosophy in general, through his metaphysics of cognition and his theory of the gnoseological transcendence in

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CAROLINE E. SCHUETZINGER

particular, a philosophical progress was achieved. It may be
pointed out that Hartmann's contributions appear as a broad
basis for a continuation of the domestic dialogue and as a
challenge especially for N eo-Scholasticism. It offers a promising
possibility to advance, and this not only because of the concord
of certain positions found in both philosophical systems (certainly many more may be found than those discovered and
elaborated so far) , and which doubtlessly will result in surprising affirmations of traditional views, but especially also
because of the diverging positions. The latter seem a suitable
starting ground for reciprocal corrections and complementations
and may therefore contribute to a new transcendence as is to
be hoped for in any progress of human knowledge.
CAROLINE

Mercy College of Detroit,
Detroit, Michigan.

E. ScHUETZINGER

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
ANTONIO MoRENO, 0. P., Ph. D., whose scholarly studies in Philosophy of
Science and Psychology have been published in Spanish journalsArbor (Research Center, University of Madrid} and Estudios Filosoficos (Pontifical Faculty, Santander, Spain) -is Visiting Professor,
Philosophy Department, at the University of Notre Dame, Notre
Dame, Indiana.
CAROLINE E. ScHUETZINGER,Ph. D., author of The German Controversy on
St. Augustine's Illumination Theory, contributor to Philosophy
Today, The Personalist, Modern Schoolman and other scholarly
journals, is Professor and Chairman of the Department of Philosophy
at Mercy College of Detroit, Detroit, Michigan.
L. ELDERS, S. V. D., Ph. D., who has just completed a special study of
G. Siegmund's works, is a member of the Department of Philosophy
at Nanzan University, Nagoya, Japan.

RICHARD H. RosswuRM, recently with the staff of the Philosophy Section
of The New Catholic Encyclopedia, is now completing the requirements for his Doctorate in Philosophy at the University of Maryland, College Park, Maryland.

197

BOOK REVIEWS
N aturordnung als Quelle der Gotteserkenntnis: N eubegrundung des telologischen Gottesbeweises. By GEORG SIEGMUND. Fulda, Germany:
Verlag Parzeller and Co., 3rd Edition, 1965,
pp.
This study is based on extensive biological research, undertaken by the
author in the twenties. The book witnesses indeed to solid biological
knowledge. It may conveniently be divided into three parts. In a first
historical section, which runs from p.
top. 169, the importance attached
by the main philosophers to the teleological argument (and to teleology
in nature) is discussed. A second section is a study on teleology as found
is purely philosophical
in living beings. A third section (pp.
in nature: it presents the teleological argument as well as some inferences
from it and a refutation of some contrary positions.
It follows from the above that the book is extremely wide in scope :and
covers much material: the author shows an enviable acquaintance with
the history of philosophy, biology and ontology. Generally speaking he
seems to this reviewer to have succeeded in establishing his point, viz.
the teleological argument of the existence of God. The book is well written,
very clear and stimulating. As one would expect, on points of detail some
criticisms must be voiced.
It is certainly not true that Homeric man did not reach the level of
Athena repeatedly suggests a course of action to
self-decision (p.
Odysseus," if he wishes himself."-' Kosmos' may originally have signified
'frame,' 'battle array,' rather than decoration (p.
In the pages
consecrated to Aristotle one misses a study of the place of chance and
failure in Aristotle's physics.
The mentality which led to cosmic religion is hardly discussed. The
author should have mentioned (and quoted) the very important book by
Festugiere La revelation d'Hermes trismeqiste: Le Dieu cosmique, where
the history of the cosmological argument is traced. (The author almost
exclusively used German works; he does not mention Simpson nor R.
Ruyer's Neo-finalisme.)
We read on p. 53 a quotation from J. Hirschberger to the effect that
the empirical world lies wholly outside St. Thomas Aquinas' interest. In
its obvious sense this statement is sheer nonsense as every student of St.
Thomas knows. The author remains unaware of a certain contradiction
on these pages: with Steinblichel he assumes that Thomas should have

198

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199

verified that there is finality on every level of being in nature, but shortly
afterwards he quotes Hirschberger to the effect that finality is a metaphysical principle. If so, verification in all instances is clearly unnecessary.
What Siegmund writes on p. 55 (the mutual connection of things and
their sharing in a common order is outside their nature) , is true in one
sense, but one may also maintain that the mutual connection of things
is because of their natural capacity and desire of such an order.
We read on p. 57 that the fourth argument of St. Thomas for the existence of God has no validity insofar as it is based upon the transcendentalia.
The author writes this because he did not understand that by ' verum '
St. Thomas here means the so-called 'veritas ontologica causalis,' i.e., the
intelligibility of things. Siegmund overlooks the fact that we do find
varying degrees of intelligibility in the world, which ask for an explanation.
He unduly constructs an opposition between the teleological argument of
the Summa contra gentes and the Summa theologica.
The author is rather pessimistic on pp. 91 ff. concerning the future of
the cosmos which would go towards "grosstmoglichen, vollstiindigen
Unordnung." This insight becomes the basis for a following assertion, viz.
that a teleological argument is only possible starting from living organisms.
The present reviewer is ready to concede that teleology appears most clearly
in living beings, yet he feels that there is a much greater unity and cooperation between the anorganic world and life than Siegmund is prepared to
admit.
Siegmund is right with his assertion insofar as finality appears to
require a certain duality of things at different levels, as, for instance, of
different functions in the same animal, of an organ and its object, an
animal and its environment. If there would be no living beings, the
anorganical world would be so uniform and such a unity that we could
no longer speak of finality. On pp. 96-100 the author makes the important
observation that Kant's criticism against the traditional demonstrations
of God's existence was directed against the formulation in which he knew
these, i. e., the version of Leibniz.
The second section of the book is the most valuable one. It appears to
be an attempt to mobilize the results of biological research as available
in the thirties to form the basis of a teleological proof. The present reviewer
is not in a position to say whether later biological research has brought
many new facts to light, but the thesis of Siegmund seems to have been
well established: in order to explain life and the formation of the different
organs, finality is necessary; a psychovitalistic force is not sufficient (individual plants or animals would not have the time to gather the necessary
experience); likewise instinct is not a sufficient explanation.
The last section of the book presents a formulation of the teleological

BOOK REVIEWS

proof and makes some inferences. On these pages the author remains
close to the generally admitted scholastic pattern of questions and answers
concerning the relationship between God and the world.
In spite of quite a few over hasty statements, on the whole the book
is solid, scholarly, interesting and well worth reading with sympathy and
interest.
L. ELDERS,
D.

s. v.

Nanzan University
Nagoya, Japan

Theories of the Political System: Classics of Political Thought and Modern
Political Analysis. By WILLIAM T. BLUHM. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.:
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965. 488 pp. + index. $7.95.
Considerable ferment and little consensus exist in political theory today.
The classics have an unsure status, and contemporary work is diversely
fragmented. Scant attention is given to political values and much emphasis
is placed on various political facts; seldom do the two realms face each
other, rarely do they meet. Most students of politics recognize these
problems, but few have attempted their solution. Bluhm has broken
ground. He makes a significant beginning in addressing them.
Bluhm argues very convincingly that the relevance of the classics need
not be doubted; their relevance is evident from their influence on, or
thematic recurrence in, contemporary theory. He spends most of the book
pointing out, by heuristic comparisons, the affinity of a number of the
more significant contemporary positions to classical systems. Examples of
his pairings are Plato with Leo Strauss, St. Augustine with Reinhold
Niebuhr and Hans Morgenthau, St. Thomas with Jacques Maritain (Bluhm
gives the latter pair a fair hearing, along with some penetrating and
significant questions and criticisms), Rousseau with Carl Friedrich, and
John Stuart Mill with Christian Bay. Bluhm's expositions and comparisons
are well done, though not always with maximum profundity and not always
without some strain to make a case.
In order to deal adequately with the diverse theories that he presents,
Bluhm coins two categories that account for two broad positions on the
real, the good, and the knowable. He calls them noumenalism and naturalism, assigning special meaning to each term. Noumenalism is the position
that identifies the good political order, known by teleological reason, with
a divinely ordained set of values taken to have the fullest reality. Within
noumenalism, however, transcendentalism sees the good order as radically
apart from the empirical world, whereas immanentism finds the good order
inherent in the empirical world. Naturalism is the position that assumes

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201

reality, insofar as it is knowable, to be coextensive with the empirical
world; this reality and its purposes are essentially unintelligible.
Bluhm's noumenalism-naturalism categories closely parallel the common
ought-is, value-fact distinctions. Although Bluhm does not side with
noumenalist philosophy as opposed to naturalistic science or with science
as opposed to philosophical inquiry into the political good, he lays the
ground for and calls for bridge building between the two positions for the
sake of a unified discipline, in both its ethical and factual dimensions. This
problem is vital. Bluhm's major contribution is his bringing the issue to
the surface, establishing a historical perspective, and indicating some possible approaches to a solution. It remains for students of politics and of
philosophy as well-most of all, Christian students-to take up the issue
in earnest.
RicHARD H. RosswuRM
University of Maryland
College Park, Maryland

BOOKS RECEIVED
Anderson, James F., St. Augustine and Being. The Hague: Martinus
Nijhohh, 1965. Pp. 76. $9.90.
Beck, Heinrich, Der Akt-Charakter Des Seins. Mlinchen: Max Hueber
DM
Verlag, 1965. Pp.
Beck, Lewis White, Studies in the Philosophy of Kant. New York: BobbsMerril. Pp.
$6.50.
Bochenski, J. M., The Methods of Contemporary Thought. DordrechtHolland: D. Reidel, 1965. Pp. 185.
Cameron, J. M., Images of Authority. Yale University, 1966. Pp. 81.
$4.00.
Connell, Richard J., Ph. D., Matter and Becoming. Dubuque: Priory
Press, 1966. Pp. 197. $5.00.
Darms, Gion, Averroes. FreiburgjSuisse: St. Paul, 1966. Vol. XI. Pp. 106.
FRjDm 18.
Daues, Vincent, S. J., Holloway, Maurice, S. J., Sweeney, Leo J., S. J.,
(editors), Wisdom in Depth. Milwaukee: Bruce, 1966. Pp. 260.
$5.00.
De Deo, Congressus Thomistici International. Vol. 1. Rome, Italy. Pp.
817.
De Pater, W. A., S.C. J., Les Topiques D'Aristote et Dialectique Platoncienne. FribourgjSuisse, 1965 X. Pp.
Fr. 80.
Dhavamony, Mariasusai, S. J., Subjectivity and Knowledge in the Philosophy of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Rome: Gregorian University Press,
1965. Vol. 148 # 14. Pp. 168.
Dougherty, Kenneth, S. A., Metaphysics. New York: Graymoor Press,
1965. Vol. IV. Pp.
$5.00.
Guerard Des Lauriers, Michel L., 0. P., Le Peche et la Duree de Lange.
Rome: Desclee, 1965. Pp. 855.
Hartshorne, Charles, Anselm's Discovery. LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1966.
Pp. 888. Hardback $6.00. Paper

Kegley, Charles W. (Editor), The Theology of Rudolph Bultmann.
New York: Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 320. $5.75.
Kiesling, Christopher, 0. P., Before His Majesty. River Forest, Ill.:
Aquinas Library, 1965. Pp.
Luyten, N. A., 0. P., Teilhard De Chardin. Univ. of Fribourg, 1965.
Pp. 68. Fr. 4.80.
Monzel, Nikolaus, Katholische Sociallehre. KOln: J. P. Bachem, 1965.
Pp.
DM. 80.
Morris, Charles, Festival. New York: George Braziller, Inc., 1966. Pp. 85.
$4.00.

BOOKS RECEIVED

Robert, A. and Feuillet, A., Introduction to the New Testament. Paris:
Desclee Co., Inc., 1965. Pp. 919.l. $15.75.
Ryan, John K. and Bonansea, Bernardine M., John Duns Scotus, 12651965. Wash., D. C.: Catholic Univ. Press, 1966. Vol. # 3. Pp. 384.
$6.95.

Seiler, Julius, Das Dasein Gottes Als Denkaufgabe. Stuttgart: Raber Verlag
Luzern, 1965. Pp. 39.l8. DM. 9.l8.
Shine, Daniel J., S. J., An Interior Meta-Physics. Weston, Mass.: Weston
College Press, 1965. Pp. 198. $9.l.50.
Siegmund, George, Belief in God and Mental Health. New York: Desclee,
1965. Pp. 210. $4.50.
Simon, Gabriel SS. CC., Die Achse der Weltgeshichte nach Karl Jaspers.
Vol. 147, # 13. Rome: Universita Gregoriana, 1965. Pp. 9.l14. $5.00.
Siwek, Paulus, S. J. (editor), Tractatus De Anima (Aristotle). Rome:
Desclee, 1965. Pp. 374.
Taylor, John F. A., The Masks of Society. New York: Appleton, Century,
Crofts. Pp. 273. $5.00.
Teilhard de Chardin, Pierre, The Appearance of Man. New York: Harper
and Row, 1966. Pp. 286. $5.00.
Tulane Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XIV. New Orleans: Tulane Univ.,
1965. Pp. 110. $9.l.OO.
Vogel, Arthur A., The Next Christian Epoch. New York: Harper and Row,
1966. Pp. 111. $3.50.
Wheelright, Philip {editor), The Presocratics. New York: The Odyssey
Press, 1966. Pp. 337.