THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXXI

The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C.

JANUARY, 1967

No.1

MAN IN EVOLUTION: A SCIENTIFIC STATEMENT
AND SOME THEOLOGICAL AND
ETHICAL IMPLICATIONS*

I

N 1864, Thomas H. Huxley wrote that " The question of
questions for mankind- the problem which underlies all
others, and is more deeply interesting than any otheris the ascertainment of the place which man occupies in nature
and of his relations to the universe of things. Whence our race
has come; what are the limits of our power over nature, and
of nature's power over us; to what goal we are tending; are the
problems which present themselves anew and with undiminished interest to every man born into the world." In the
Origin of the Species, published in 1859, Darwin indicated that
* I am indebted to Professor Th. Dobzhansky and to Father J. S. McCormack,
0. P., who read an earlier draft of this paper and offered many valuable suggestions.
I am, of course, solely responsible for any existing errors of omission or commission.
Variants of this paper were presented at tlJ.e University of Toronto, on January 12,
1966, and at the University of Virginia on March 18, 1966.
1

FRANCISCO JOSE AYALA

the theory of evolution would throw light on man's origin, and
in his Descent of Man, published in 1871, he argued that man
and apes share a common ancestry.
Mankind is a biological species: it is a part of nature. Like
other living things, man has evolved from humbler beginnings.
Our not very remote ancestors were not human. The species
Homo sapiens is of very recent origin when placed on the
geological time scale. At the present time, the evolution of man
from non-human ancestors is regarded as a well established
theory by persons qualified to judge the relevant evidence.
The main steps of that evolutionary development are known
with reasonable certainty.
Life originated on our planet some 8,500 million years ago.
The first vertebrates appeared about 500 million years ago,
and the first mammals about 400 million years later. The evolutionary line of descent giving origin to modern man separated
from that of our closest animal relatives, the great apes, some
25 million years ago. The sequence of anatomical changes leading to modern man includes progressive development of bipedal
locomotion, erect posture, greater flexibility of hand, a tongue
and mouth cavity capable of emiting a greater variety of
sounds, and a larger brain and brain case. The transition
occurred probably in tropical Africa between 2,000,000 and
500,000 years ago. The Australopithecines, who lived during
that period, are believed to be the early members of the family
to which man belongs. The most advanced members of that
group were toolmakers.
The earliest members of the subfamily Homininae, undoubtedly men by all criteria, were of the species Homo
erectus. Their fossil remains have been found in Java, China.,
Algeria, Tanganika and, as recently reported, in Hungary, near
Budapest. They were not only toolmakers, but the use of fire
and rock shelters had allowed some of them to extend their
range beyond the tropics. The average brain size of Homo
erectus was twice that of Australopithecus, which scarcely exceeded that of a gorilla. These early men were successful and
widespread; they lived during the Middle Pleistocene times,

MAN IN EVOLUTION

8

between 600,000 and 300,000 years ago. By the end of the
Middle Pleistocene, men had evolved beyond the Homo erectus
stage and included variable types constituting the stock from
which emerged the two races of Homo sapiens, neanderthalensis and sapiens. The brain case of the Swanscombe skull,
belonging t01 that group and more than 100,000 years old, had
a capacity of 1,325 cc, close to the average in modern man.
Neanderthal men were eventually replaced or absorbed by
Homo sapiens sapiens, people of entirely modem type, the
only group of man living on earth for the last 40,000 or 30,000
years.
Evolution from near man to modern man, Homo sapiens,
occurred, then, during a relatively short period of time when
viewed on the geological time scale. The most notable change
occurred perhaps in the size, complexity, and functional properties of the brain. The Australopithecines, making simple bone
and pebble tools, and walking fully upright, had small cranial
capacities. Their descendants of some 500,000 years later had
a cranial capacity nearly three times as large. By most evolutionary standards, that is a very fast pace indeed. The genetic
variants responsible for larger brain size must have been
strongly favored by natural selection.
Man has not only evolved, he is still evolving. Evolution is
a continuous process. Living things do not stand still at any
time; they are unlikely to reach fixation. A biological form
unable to cope with new challenges of the environment is
headed for extinction. That man is still evolving can be shown
because the necessary and sufficient conditions for biological
evolution exist in the human species. Given genetic variability
and environmental change, natural selection will result in some
genetic variants being transmitted more or less frequently
depending on their adaptive values to the new environments.
That is biological evolution. Changes affecting the frequencies
of single genes or groups of genes have been sometimes referred to as microevolutionary. There is no reason, however, to
think that macroevolution is anything more than microevolutionary processes accumulated over a longer time scale.

4

FRANCISCO JOSE AYALA

It is the main purpose of this paper to state that there
exists, in twentieth century mankind, a great wealth of genetic
variability, and that new environmental challenges are continuously arising. In other words, that man is evolving biologically. This fact has momentous implications for human life.
Some of the theological and ethical questions arising from the
biological fact of human evolution will be pointed out in the
final part of the paper.
Mankind is engaged simultaneously in two kinds of evolutionary development, the biological and the cultural. Human
evolution can be understood only as a result of the interaction
of these two developments. They correspond to the two kinds
of heredity existing in man, the genetic and the cultural, what
Medawar has suggested calling endosomatic and exosomatic
systems of heredity/ Genetic inheritance in man is very much
like that of any other outbreeding, sexually reproducing
species; it is based on transmission of genetic information in
the form of deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) from one generation
to the next, via the sex cells. A fertilized human egg cell
(technically, a zygote) contains two homologous sets of genetic
information, which by interaction with the environment direct
the development of the anatomical, physiological and psychological characteristics of the individual which will develop from
it. The somatic cells of a human being contain also two homologous sets of genetic information; his sex cells, however, contain only one set. When a female sex cell, or ovum, is fertilized
by a male sex cell, or spermatozoon, the double set of genetic
information is restored. From that zygote a new human individual will develop carrying hereditary material coming in
equal amounts from each one of his or her parents. By this
process of sexual heredity the genetic endowment of the species
is reshuffled every generation.
In addition to his biological system of inheritance, man
transmits to other members of the species a cultural inheritance.
Cultural inheritance is based on transmission of information
1

P. B. Medawar, The Future of Man (New York: Basic Books, 1959), p. 92.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

5

by a teaching-learning process, which is, in principle, independent of biological parentage. Culture, in the sense used here,
is a very inclusive concept; it is the sum total of habits, ways
of life, techniques of doing things, language, religious and
ethical traditions,
art and technology; it includes, in
general, all that people know or do as a result of having so
learned from other human beings. Culture is acquired by every
person from his parents, relatives and neighbors, and from the
whole human environment, through imitation and direct communication, and through books, newspapers and radio, television and motion pictures, and by any other means of communication. Because of his cultural inheritance man can
accomplish something impossible to any other organism, he
can transmit cumulative experience from generation to generation and incorporate its results directly into the evolutionary
system. A favorable genetic mutation newly arising in an
individual can be transmitted to a sizeable part of the human
population only through innumerable generations. A new
scientific discovery or technical achievement of the human mind
can be transmitted to the whole of mankind, potentially at
least, in a single generation. Cultural evolution is specifically
human and provides man with a power of adaptation to the
environment not available for other organisms. Ortega y
Gasset said that the greatest advantage of man over lower
animals consists in humans being invested with what he called
a social memory, besides the individual memory that they
share with lower animals.
Adaptation of a living species to its environment is the chief
agency promoting and directing biological evolution. The
adaptation takes place through natural selection which promotes differential survival and reproduction of the genetic
variants present in the species. In man, however, and in man
alone, adaptation can take place also by cultural change. In
fact, culture is an instrument of adaptation considerably more
efficient than the biological mechanism. It is more efficient
because, among other things, it is more rapid. The efficiency
of cultural adaptation can be easily indicated. In fact, for the

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FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

last few milenrria man has been adapting his environments to
his genes more often than his genes to his environments. In
order to extend its geographical habitat a population must
become adapted, through slow accumulations of genetic mutations sorted out by natural selection, to the climactic conditions, different sources of nutrition, different competitors, etc.,
existing in the geographic area to be colonized. The discovery
of fire, and the use of clothing and shelter has allowed man to
spread over the whole earth, except for the frozen wastes of
Antarctica, without the anatomical development of protective
fur or hair. Man did not wait for genetic mutants promoting
wing development; he has conquered the air in a somewhat
more efficient and versatile way by building flying machines.
Mankind travels through rivers and seas without gills or fins.
The exploration of outer space does not require mutations providing some humans with the ability to breathe with low oxygen
pressures or adapted to conditions of weightlessness. The moon
and other planets will be explored by astronauts carrying their
own oxygen and specially equipped pressure suits. Man has
replenished the earth and is on his way to conquer outer space
not by adaptation of his genes to the new environments, but
by modifying the environment according to the needs of his
genes. It was the appearance of culture, a superorganic form of
adaptation, that made mankind the most successful living
species. From his obscure beginnings in Africa man has become
the most abundant species of mammal on earth. Numbers may
not be an unmixed blessing, but they are one of the measures
of biological success.
Nevertheless, the superorganic has not annulled the organic.
I see no foundation to support the opinion that biological evolution stopped with human progress. Cultural and biological
evolution interact and reinforce each other. The maintenance
and development of human culture is possible only so long as
the genetic basis of human culture is maintained or improved.
There can be no human culture without human genotypes. At
the same time, the development of culture is perhaps the most
important source of environmental changes promoting the

MAN IN EVOLUTION

7

biological evolution of man. There exists a feedback cycle
involving genetics and culture.
Biological evolution can be defined as change in gene frequencies in response to challenges from the environment.
Heredity is basically self-copying of genes. Heredity is, therefore, a conservative force. Occasionally, however, genes produce
imperfect copies of themselves. This is genetic mutation. Mutation is the ultimate source of all genetic variability. Without
mutation there could be no evolution. All the genetic variability present in human populations has arisen by mutation
in our immediate, remote, or very remote ancestors. The
frequency of a particular genetic mutant in the population will
increase or decrease depending on the selective value of the
individuals carrying it. That is, if the average effect of a
mutant gene in the environments in which the species lives is
favorable, natural selection will tend to increase its frequency
in the population. The selective value of a mutation is ultimately determined by the environment. Mutations favorable
in a certain environment may not be so in a different one. The
constellation of genes and the arrangements of these in present
day populations are, therefore, determined by the environment
to which the population has been exposed in the past. And
today's environments condition the present and future genetic
constitution of the population.
The limitation to the action of natural selection sorting out
new genotypes comes from the availability of genetic variability. That human populations store a tremendous amount
of genetic variability can hardly be doubted. No two human
individuals, with the unimportant exception perhaps of identical twins, are genetically identical. Let me explain why it is
so. Genetical studies involving a number of organisms, from
bacteria through fruit flies to man, allow us to give 500 as a
reasonable estimate of the minimum number of genes in a
pairs of chromosomes existing in
chromosome. With the
man, we can assume a minimum of 11,500 pairs of genes. Those
genes carry the necessary information to direct the process of

8

FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

development from a zygote to an adult human being. The two
members of each pair are not necessarily identical. Genes may
exist in two or more alternative forms called' alleles.' Different
alleles arise by mutation. Let us assume, now, that mutations
exist in only 200 of the 11,500 or more pairs of genes of man.
Moreover, let us assume that there are only two alleles in each
of those 200 loci. According to the simple rules of Mendelian
heredity the number of possible human genotypes would be 8200 ,
or approximately 1 followed by 95 zeros. That number far
exceeds the number of human individuals who lived or will
ever live on earth, or to put it in a different way, that number
is many billion times larger than the number of atoms existing
on earth. And it is a gross underestimate. Mutations are actually known in man at more than 200 loci. Probably they exist
or are possible at most if not all of the 11,500 loci that we
assumed as a minimum number of gene pairs. Besides, at many
loci there are more than two alleles; up to 15 different alleles
are known to exist at certain loci. How a larger number of
alleles increases the number of possible genotypes can easily
be shown. For blood groups, there are in man at least 11 sets
of alleles. If only two alleles existed at each locus the number
of potential blood groups would be slightly larger than two
thousand. More than two alleles exist at least at six of those
loci, and the number of possible blood groups is considerably
larger than two million.
All this amounts to saying that the existing genetic variability in the human species is essentially inexhaustible. Moreover, new variability is continuously arising in human populations by mutation. Genetic mutations occur in man as in any
other living species. Due to the increased use of X-rays for
diagnostic purposes, to the use of certain chemicals, and to
exposure to atomic fall-out, mutation rates in man are probably
higher today than they were in the past. And they are
probably highest in technologically advanced countries. Rough
estimates of the frequency of mutations in man are available.
A majority of the mutation rates calculated for some drastic
mutants, which produce fatal hereditary diseases and spectacu-

MAN IN EVOLUTION

9

lar malformations, lie between one and ten mutations per
100,000 cells per generation. Small mutations with less dramatic effects are more difficult to observe, but they are believed
to be several times as frequent as: drastic ones. The average
mutation rate per gene is then probably of the order of two
per 100,000 (2 x 10-5 ) or somewhat higher. I£ we assume that
every human being contains only 10,000 pairs of genes, it will
be a conservation estimate that 2 x 10-5 x 20,000 or 40 per
cent of all people will carry one or more mutant genes newly
arisen in the sex cells of their parents. The supply of genetic
raw materials for the operation of natural selection is, therefore,
ample.
Most of the mutations studied in man have negative selective
value, having deleterious effects which affect his welfare. Many
other mutations affect characteristics such as color of the eyes,
hair or skin, shape of the head, face or nose, tendency to be fat
or slender, and many other aspects of the anatomy or physiology of a person which are not directly observable. Do these
mutations have any effect on the survival and reproduction of
the individual or are they adaptively neutral? One can speak
of the usefulness or harmfulness of a genetic variant only in
and with respect to a certain environment. A genotype which
suffers in one environment may flourish in another. A well
known case is the sickle-cell gene. The fact of being heterozygous for that gene makes a person at least relatively immune
to certain forms of malaria. This is quite useful if one lives in a
country where malarial infection is likely to occur, but not so
where malaria is absent. The case is that almost every gene
which has been adequately studied has proved to have some
effect on the fitness of the individual, at least in certain
environments.
Through the process of genetic recombination the harmful
and beneficial genes present in the population become combined
into new genotypes in every generation. Not all potential
genotypes are realized in nature, but if genetic variants have
different selective values in certain environments, natural selec-

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FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

tion will propagate them differentially in the following generations. Natural selection is the principal agent of evolutionary
change. The mutation process provides the genetic variability,
the raw materials upon which natural selection acts. Without
hereditary variations natural selection would have nothing
transmissible to work upon. Mutations, however, originate at
random independently of their effects on the individuals in
which they arise. Mutation is a chance process, without natural
selection it would produce only chaos. The anti-chance force in
evolution is natural selection. Natural selection is the essential
directive force in evolution, as Darwin saw it. Natural selection, however, must not be understood in the metaphorical sense
of " struggle for existence " that Darwin overemphasized. N atural selection is basically differential reproduction. To say that
natural selection favors certain genotypes is simply to state that
those genotypes are transmitted to the following generations
more frequently than others. In many human environments,
where early mortality, except for some drastic mutants, has
been greatly eliminated, natural selection acts mainly through
differential fertility. As Dobzhansky puts it:
The selectively fit, or, if you will, the fittest, is not necessarily a
fellow with big muscles, or a lusty fighter, or a conqueror of all his
competitors. He is, rather, a paterfamilias who has raised a large
number of children who in turn become patresfamilias." 2

Natural selection is continuously shifting its effects on man as
a result of the endless variety and continuous change of the
human environments. During the last fifty years or so the
forces of selection acting on human beings have changed drastically, and will go on doing so in the future. Haldane expressed
the opinion that for the last ten thousand years, in fact since
man ceased to be a rare animal, selection has been mainly for
immunity from infectious diseases.3 During the nineteenth
• T. Dobzhansky, Heredity and the Nature of Man (New York: Signet Science
Library Books, 1966), p. 158-154.
8 J. B. S. Haldane, "Biological Possibilities for the Human Species in the Next
Ten Thousand Years" in Man and His Future, ed. G. Wolstenholme (Boston:
Little, Brown and Co., 1968), pp. 887-861.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

11

century, tuberculosis was the most important cause of death
among young adults in Europe and North America. Rene
Dubos has convincingly shown that the fall of death rate due
to tuberculosis in recent times has been brought about not only
by the improved living conditions and better medical services,
but also by selection of more resistant genotypes. 4 Less susceptible genotypes were favorably selected, particularly during
epidemic periods. Today, however, a large part of mankind
lives in an enviornment where most people can go on without
any serious infectious disease, except some virus diseases as
common colds which we cannot yet control. Selection for
resistence to infectious diseases is no longer operating, at least
not with its past intensity.
An extreme example of how improved hygiene and medical
services may change the selective value of a gene is the case
of the gene for sickle-cell anemia mentioned above. Heterozygous individuals for that gene have an inborn resistance to
subtertian malaria and enjoy higher selective values than the
homozygotes for the " normal " gene in places where malaria
is rife. But the price paid by the population to enjoy that
inborn resistance in some of its members is high. In a population with
per cent of its members resistant heterozygotes,
9 per cent will be born homozygous for the gene and will suffer
a severe form of anemia and die mostly before reproductive age.
In countries where malaria has been eradicated by modern
medicine, the sickle-cell gene loses its relative adaptive advantage and will gradually disappear. The population will not
suffer from malarial infection, and the high price paid for the
inborn resistance will no longer be justified. Reduction of the
frequency of the gene has been observed in the Negro population of America at about the rate we should expect if malaria
had ceased to be a scourge to it
or 300 years ago, i. e.,
when their ancestors came from malaria infected countries.
Improvements in human welfare may also have important
genetic effects in the population. An example may be taken
• R. J. Dubos and J. Dubos, The White Plague: Tuberculosis, Man, and Society
(Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,

FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

from the recently published work by Reed and Reed 5 on
mental retardation. Nearly 50 per cent of a large sample of
retardates in Minnesota proved to have one or both parents
mentally retarded. If the mentally retarded would not reproduce, the frequency of mental retardation in the population is
expected to be reduced by nearly half in a single generation.
Institutionalized retardates have a considerably lower average
reproductive rate than comparable retardates living outside
the institutions. The provision of institutions for the mentally
retarded has, then, a notable effect in reducing the frequency
in the population of genes affecting mental retardation.
Some of the most radical changes in human environments
have arisen from there being more humans. The world population has grown from 700 million to three billion during the
last
years. If the present rate of population growth continues, there will be more than six billion humans by the end of
this century. The genetic consequences of such " population
explosion " are complex, but different attitudes towards birth
control practices are creating new selective forces everywhere.
Other associated phenomena, such as urbanism and mass migration, are of no less biological import.
Examples of natural selection in human populations could
be multiplied at will. Natural selection continues to operate
in man and is expected to continue doing so. To do away with
natural selection a genetically identical mankind would have to
be produced living in an environment where mutation does not
exist. Or if genetic variability would exist, every pair of human
beings would have to produce the same number of children,
who would survive, marry and produce the same number of
children. Other equally fantastic or practically not realizable
methods of suppressing natural selection could be devised.
So long as there is genetic variability and environmental change
different genotypes will be differentially transmitted to the
following generations. Human environments are changing
faster than ever because of rapidly changing human culture.
5 E. W. Reed and S. C. Reed, Mental Retardation.: A Family Study (Philadelphia: Saunders, 1965). See Tables S!e and SS, pp. 46-47.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

18

It is hard to think of any element of human culture that could
not have, directly or indirectly, repercussion on the gene pool
of mankind. Religious and ethical convictions, educational and
fiscal laws, medical practices and social habits, and any act
of legislation have genetic consequences because they modify
the human environment. Environment instability presents
challenges to the organism. These challenges are passed to
the organism by natural selection which preserves the relatively
fit and eliminates the relatively unfit. These changes in the
hereditary endowment of the species create new environmental
conditions, which in turn are responded to by new genetic
changes. The process is expected to go on indefinitely. The
only alternative to change is extinction if the organism is
unable to cope with the environmental challenges.
Where is human evolution going? Biological change is guided
by natural selection. However, natural selection is not a benevolent spirit guiding evolution towards sure success. It is an
agent bringing about genetic changes that often appear purposeful because they are dictated by the requirements of the
environment. Nevertheless, the end result may be extinction.
The number of animal species which existed in the past and
have disappeared without leaving descendants far exceeds that
of living species. Natural selection has no purpose; man alone
has purposes and he alone may introduce them in his evolution.
The problem of directing human evolution raises a number of
ethical questions of great import. Some of these questions I
want to raise here. First, however, let us consider a theological
problem.
The human body is the result of evolutionary development
leading from non-human ancestors to man. The evidence in
favor of this hypothesis is overwhelming. That evidence makes
no sense on any other hypothesis. Anthropological transformism, as this question is referred to in theology, may be accepted
in Catholic theology as stated by Pius XII in the encyclical
"Humani Generis." Accepting transformism raises, however, a
number of related questions of great theological import. One
of them, and one continuously discussed in the literature, is

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FRANCISCO JOSE AYALA

that of monogenism versus polygenism. Polygenism, as defined
in this context, implies that the human race descends not from
a single pair of human ancestors, but from a group of human
beings larger than two. Monogenism implies that all living
humans descendi from a single human pair.
That all living men are derived from a single evolutionary
line of development, what is called monophyletism, is strongly
supported by the available evidence and the understanding of
evolutionary processes. Most evolutionists reject the opinion
that the developments leading from non-human ancestors to
the races of modern man occurred independently in several
lines of descent. 6
If monophyletism is strongly supported by the evidence from
the natural sciences, monogenism certainly is not. The main
theologicai reason against polygenism comes from the Catholic
doctrine concerning the universality of original sin, which is
transmitted by hereditary descent from the sin committed by
Adam. The case was strongly stated by Pius XII:
The faithful cannot embrace that opinion called "polygenism"
which maintains either that after Adam there existed on this earth
true men who did not take their origin through natural generation
from him as from the first parent of all, or that Adam represents
a number of parents, [because] it is in no way apparent how such
an opinion can he reconciled with that which the sources of revealed
truth and the documents of the teaching authority of the Church
propose with regard to original sin, which proceeds from a sin
actually committed hy an individual Adam and which through
generation is passed on to all and is in everyone as his own.7

I do not want here to minimize the difficulty in explaining
the compatibility of the Christian teachings concerning original
sin with the polygenistic explanation of the origin of man. I
do want, however, to make two remarks. First, that theologians
discussing this question should take into account the scientific
evidence. This has seldom been done with any degree of
8

7

See, however, C. S. Coon, The Origin of Racea (New York: Knopf,
Pope Pius XII, Encyclical Letter " Humani Generis," Acta Apostolicae Sedill
(1950), 561-577. See H. Denzinger, Enchiridicm Symbolorum
ed. (1958),

n.SMS.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

15

success. The discussion on the matter in a recent article by J. J.
O'Rourke, who states in reference to polygenism that " genetics
constitutes a difficulty for the evolutionist in any case," 8 reflects insufficient understanding of both genetic and evolutionary processes. K. Rahner begins his discussion of " the possibilities for a metaphysical proof of monogenism " with the
assumption that" from the point of view of the natural sciences
polygenism even as a scientific hypothesis possesses no greater
probability than monogenism." 9 Such an assumption cannot
go unchallenged by those scientists who find the evidence in
favor of polygenism convincing. This brings about my second
remark, namely, that from the point of view of the natural
sciences only polygenism makes sense. Evolution does not
happen in individuals, but in populations. The population is
an integrated unit of individuals sharing in a common gene
pool. Genetic variability arises in the population by mutation
and recombination, and natural selection propagates more frequently those genotypes with higher selective value to the
environments in which the population lives. The gene pool of
the population is not constant throughout any considerable
period of time. It fluctuates from generation to generation, and
also frequently has long-range trends of change. Anagenesis,
evolutionary change leading to progressively higher grades of
organization, occurs by gradual accumulation of many innumerable small mutants in a genetically heterogeneous population.
Cases in which a new species has arisen by a single step are
known, to be sure, but they cannot apply to the evolution of
man. There is no known mechanism by which the human
species might have arisen by a single step in one or two individuals only, from whom the rest of mankind would have
descended.
I can see only two possible alternate solutions for the Catholic
theologian. One, to find an explanation which would make.
polygenism compatible with the doctrine of original sin - an
8 J. J. O'Rourke, "Some Considerations About Polygenism," Theological Studies
26 (1965)' 407-417.
9 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations, Vol. I, 2nd ed. (Baltimore: Helicon,
1968) • p. 286.

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FRANCISCO JOSE AYALA

explanation that, according to Pius XII, does not appear likely
to be forthcoming. Two, to bring additional theological hypotheses in support of monogenism. Such hypotheses are not
available from, and are consistently opposed by, the natural
sciences.' 0
Whatever the difficulties, theologians should be careful in
their statements and reflective in their research, without compromising too hurriedly the Christian faith against the results
of science. The situation is perhaps not very different from
that aroused by Galileo's discoveries in the first third of the
seventeenth century. The opposition between the discoveries
claimed by Galileo and the Christian faith seemed to be obvious
to many a theologian. Upon examination of the question, the
Inquisition arrived at the following conclusions:
The first proposition, that the sun is the centre and does not revolve
about the earth, is foolish, absurd, false in theology, and heretical,
because expressly contrary to Holy Scripture. . . . The second
proposition, that the earth is not the centre, but revolves about
the sun, is absurd, false in philosophy, and, from the theological
point of view at least, opposed to the true faith.U
I find no more emphatic way of recommending serious refl.exion
to the Catholic theologian than reminding him of that sad
page in the history of the Church.
Mutation rates in man have probably increased with the
industrial civilization due to radiation exposures and by contact
10 M. M. Labourdette
(Le Peche Originel et lea Origines de l'Homme, Paris:
Alsatia, 1953) admits that according to science species arise as populations rather
than as single individuals. but he feels that God could and did intervene to overcome this awaited emergence of mankind through an evolving population, and thus
achieved the transition from animal to man through a unique couple. A similar
position has been taken by Robert North, " Teilhard and the many Adams,"
Continuum 1:8 (1968), 829-842.
Among the theologians suggesting interpretations of the Catholic doctrine of
original sin that are compatible with a polygenistic origin of man are A.-M. Dubarle
(The Biblical Doctrine of Original Sin, Herder and Herder, 1964), P. Schoonenberg
(Man in Sin, Notre Dame Univ., 1965), P. Smulders (La Vision de Teilhard de
Chardin, Brouwer: Desclee, 1964) and R. T. Francoeur (Perspectives in Evolution,
Baltimore: Helicon, 1965) .
11 Quoted after Bertrand
Russell, Religion and Science (New York: Galaxy
BOoks, 1961)' p. 37.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

17

with and ingestion of some of the drugs and chemicals to which
almost every body is exposed. The increase in mutation rates
is, at best, a mixed! blessing. Genetic variability must exist for
evolution to occur, but the great majority of newly arising
mutants are harmful. Because of the rapidly improving living
conditions, in particular the increasing power of modern medicine, the elimination of some harmful mutants from human
populations is no longer taking place as rapidly and effectively
as it did in the past. Many kinds of hereditary disorders are
cured today, and their carriers are able to survive and leave
offspring, therefore transmitting their hereditary infirmities to
the following generations. The more hereditary diseases and
defects are " cured," the more of them will be there to be
cured in the succeeding generation.
Some biologists have raised warning voices. H. J. Muller
predicts a gloomy future for mankind if remedy is not provided.
In a not very distant future, he writes:
Our descendants' natural biological organization would in fact have
have been replaced by complete disorder ....
disintegrated
It would in the end be far easier and more sensible to manufacture
a complete man de novo, out of appropriately chosen raw materials,
than to try to refashion into human form those pitiful relics which
remained. 12

It is undoubtedly true that with respect to some hereditary
weaknesses and disorders natural selection has been tapered if
not completely suppressed. But that is not the whole story.
As Dobzhansky has noted " With respect to some genetic
variants natural selection in civilized societies has become more,
not less, rigorous." 18 Emotional strains, for instance, and
nervous tensions are far stronger in our modern cities than they
were in the past. Overeating and food sophistication seem to
be partially responsible for the high incidence of heart disease,
peptic ulcer, diabetes, and other diseases common in abundant
12 H. J. Muller, "Our Load of Mutations," American Journal of Human Genetics
2 (1950)' 111-176.
18 T. Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving (New Haven:
Yale Univ. Press, 1962),
p. 806.

18

FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

communities. 14 Many other examples could be added. Natural
selection has not ceased to operate in the human species since
differential reproduction of genetic variants exists.
The problem, however, remains that some undesirable hereditary conditions will spread more and more every generation
if their carriers are cured and reproduce. The science and art
of eugenics deal with the subject of the betterment of the
hereditary endowment of mankind. Two forms of eugenics can
be distinguished. Negative eugenics seeks methods to avoid
the spread of undesirable genes, while positive eugenics encourages the spread of desirable ones. I cannot discuss in
detail here the subject of eugenics, but I consider it worthwhile
to point out the kind of ethical questions which are raised.
Essentially, the basic problem here is that of the rights of the
individual versus the rights of the community. A lot of thinking
is needed here in the light of the new perspectives raised by
modern science, and Catholic theologians have a difficult task
to face in meeting the problems which are being raised.
The main difficulty in the field of eugenics is the lack of
adequate knowledge in many areas. But whatever knowledge
we have we must use. The negative attitude of" hands off" or
the simplistic attitude of "nature knows best" can hardly be
acceptable. When we are affiicted with a disease or infirmity
we do not let nature take care of it or wait for a miracle, but
make use of the appropriate remedies to restore our health.
We must act as rational beings in guiding our actions according
to whatever knowledge we can master.
Programs of positive eugenics have been proposed in recent
years. Preferential multiplication of the genotypes of wellgifted individuals can certainly be accomplished in man. The
problem is, however, which criteria to use to decide what characters to multiply. There is another question, namely that we
do not know what parts of many desirable traits are genetically
and what parts are culturally determined. G. W. Beadle has
made this point emphatically:
u J. F. Brock, "Sophisticated Diets and Man's Health" 'in Man and His Future
(see footnote 8), pp. 86-56.

MAN IN EVOLUTION

19

" Few of us would have advocated preferential multiplication of
Hitler's genes through germinal selection. Yet who can say that in
a different cultural context Hitler might not have been one of
the truly great leaders of men or that Einstein might not have been
a political villain." 15
I fully subscribe to his opinion that at the present time, " in
the absence of much more understanding than we now have,
we will do best to preserve maximum genetic diversity." 16 He
claims one exception only, that is those who are clearly and
significantly genetically defective, to whom negative eugenics
must be applied. This leaves still a number of unanswered
questions. Should the cured carriers of fatal dominant genes
be sterilized to prevent transmission of the gene? Should they
be prohibited legally from having children, without sterilization? Should they merely be advised not to have children?
What can be done if they do not comply, since half of their
progeny is expected to have the same fatal defect? Could
they, in that case, be considered as criminals and punished
with sterilization or confinement? Another basic problem would
be where to draw the line with respect to less severe disabilities
equally transmitted as dominant genes. As for recessive deleterious mutants, how far can we go in legally prohibiting reproduction or should only marriage of two carriers be advised against,
when one out of four children is expected to be homozygous for
the deleterious gene?
Each case should perhaps be judged in its own merits, but
some general principles ought to be considered. The problem
is a serious one and it is being continuously aggravated with
medical and biological progress. The collaboration of social
scientists, lega] experts and biologists will be needed here. The
magnitude and social implications of certain eugenic problems
is staggering. As a specific example, the studies on mental
retardation quoted earlier could be considered. Reed and Reed
found that 48.3 per cent of an unselected sample of mental
16 "

Genes, Culture and Man," Columbia Univ. Forum, vol. 8, no. 8, 12-16.

11Jbid.

20

FRANCISCO

JOSE AYALA

retardates had one or both parents retarded. 17 Similar results
were obtained by Benda and his associates, who working with a
smaller sample of mildly retarded persons found that 48.7 per
cent of them had one or both parents retarded. 18 There are five
million mildly retarded persons in the United States. If the
above results have general value, preventing the mentally
retarded from having progeny would reduce the number of
retardates in the population to half its present frequency in a
single generation. This seems a socially desirable objective,
but how to achieve it? As Reed and Reed have written:
It is unlikely that voluntary abstinence will be very effective with
the retarded, and it would be unrealistic to expect the rhythm
method to work with any appreciable proportion of them. 19

Other alternatives are open, like institutionalization and voluntary or compulsory sterilization. Would the welfare of the
community make ethically acceptable such measures? This is
but a single case of many where our present and growing
knowledge gives new dimensions to old problems and demands
fresh and responsible thinking. The answer cannot come from
biology alone. For, as Dobzhansky has written:
Man, if he so chooses, may introduce his purposes into his evolution. . . . The crux of the matter is evidently what purposes, aims
or goals we should choose to strive for. Let us not delude ourselves
with easy answers. One such answer is that a superior knowledge
of biology would make it unmistakable which plan is the best and
should be followed. Another is that biological evolution has implanted in man ethical ideas and inclinations favorable for this
evolution's continued progress. Now, I would be among the last
to doubt that biology sheds some light on human nature; but for
planning even the biological evolution of mankind, let alone its
cultural evolution, biology is palpably insufficient.20

FRANcisco JosE AYALA, 0. P.
Providence Co71ege
Providence, Rhode Island
" Op. cit., pp. 46-47.
18 C. E. Benda, N. D. Squires, M. J. Ogonik, and R. Wise, "Personality Factors
in Mild Mental Retardation," American Journal of Mental Deficiency 68 (1968),

!!4-40.
19 Op.
.• p. 76.
10 T. Dobzhansky, Heredity and the Natwre of Man, p. 16!!.

THE ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL
FORMULA: SACRAMENTUM TANTUM, RES

ETSACRAMENTUM,RESTANTUM

T

HE terminology :OJacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum, res tantum is today, and has been since the
thirteenth century, a commonplace in sacramental theology. It is a well known fact that Saint Thomas used this
formula in his explanation of the sacraments both in his Commentary on the Lombard's Sentences and in all of the sacraments that he treated in his unfinished Summa Theologiae.
What is not so well known is the history of the evolution of this
sacramental formula as it took shape, implicitly in the antiBerengarian writers of the pre-Scholastic period, then explicitly in the Sentences of Anselm of Laon; how it was used only
in reference to the Eucharist up to the time of Peter the Lombard and then applied by him, by analogy with the Eucharist,
to the sacrament of Penance; how its use was extended further,
in the thirteenth century, to Baptism and then to all of the
sacraments. I have traced the development of this tripartite
formula from its shadowdy beginnings in the Berengarian controversy up to the time of Saint Thomas.
In order to put this study into proper historical perspective,
it is necessary to review a few of the salient facts connected
with the Berengarian controversy over the Eucharist. This is
so because our first three sources-Lanfranc, Guitmond of
Aversa, and Alger of Liege-in whom we find the first foreshadowings of what was to evolve into the tripartite sacramental formula, all wrote in the context of this controversy.
As we will see in the course of this study, two strongly contributing causes to the development of the tripartite formula
were the reaction against Berengar' s Eucharistic teaching and
the influence of the Augustinian concept of sacrament as a lasting consecration of the recipient.
!ll

RONALD F. KING
THE BERENGARIAN

CoNTROVERSY

Two definitions of "sacrament" were current in Berengar's
time. 1 One of them," sacramentum est sacrum signum," was
literally of Augustinian origin. 2 The other, "sacramentum est
invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma," was attributed by Berengar
to Saint Augustine. 8 While this second definition is certainly
of Augustinian spirit it cannot be found literally in any of
Augustine's works, and at least one very reputable authority
maintains that it was an original expression of Berengar himsel£.4 The first definition does not appear in Berengar's De
Sacra Coena, but it was prominent in the writings of Lanfranc
and Alger of Liege. It was the second definition that Berengar
used to explain the sacrament of the Eucharist. In this definition, the word " forma " was understood to be synonymous
with " visible appearance " or " that which falls under the
senses." Thus, the definition could be translated as " a sacrament is a visible expression of invisible grace." 5 Berengar,
using this definition and claiming St. Augustine's authority for
it, emphasized strongly the concept of sacrament as symbol
and maintained that the sacrament of the Eucharist is the
consecrated bread and wine which is not physically the body
and blood of Christ but the sign of the body and blood of ·
Christ. Through consecration these material elements " are
endowed as symbols with the value of Christ's body under
the aspect of His passion." 6 Thus Berengar limited the concept of a sacrament to a visible, corporeal, mutable element.
Therefore, the Body of Christ, which is invisible, eternal and
immutable, could not possibly be the sacrament of the Eucha1 Charles Sheedy, The Eucharistic Controversy of the Eleventh Century Against
the Background of Pre-Scholastic Theology. Catholic U. of America Press, 1947,
p. 100.
• De Civitate Dei, C. S. E. L., 40:
Also quoted by Lanfranc from Berengar's
opuaculum, PL 150:
B.
• Berengar of Tours, De Sacra Coena, Vischer edition, 1884, p. 114. Cited by
Sheedy, p. 100.
• J. de Ghellinck, "Une chapitre dans l'histoire de la definition des sacraments
au XII• siecle," Melanges Mandonnet," (Bibliotheque thomiste, 14), 1980, p. 87.
• Sheedy, p. 101.
• Sheedy, p.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

fl8

rist. The Body of Christ could only be the res sacramenti,
which the sacramentum brings to mind but does not contain
in any realistic way. For Berengar, "the sacraments do not
contain the res, but rather through their representative function, put the mind of the receiver in relation to the res." 7
To prove that his understanding of sacramentum as applied
to the Eucharist was the correct one, Berengar pointed to the
sacramentum of Baptism. Citing the Augustinian axiom, " accedente verbo ad elementum et fit sacramentum," he insisted
that just as the water of baptism remained water after its
" consecration ". by the words, so also the bread and wine remained bread and wine after their consecration. The consecrated water is the sacramentum of Baptism and the consecrated bread and wine is the sacramentum of the Eucharist.
The term sacramentum, then, was understood by Berengar to
be a univocal one, to be applied in exactly the same sense to
both Baptism and the Eucharist. Haring sums it up this way:
His (Berengar's) theory centers on sacramentum defined as material, visible, mutable, temporal, element in strict contrast to the
res or virtue as spiritual, invisible, immutable, eternal reality. His
opposition to what later theologians will call transubstantiation
rests on the assumption tha.t the definition of sacramentum applies
in the same manner to Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist. 8
Berengar claimed Augustine's authority for the interpretation of sacramentum, but it was a baseless claim. Augustine's
concept of that term was a much broader one than this, as can
be seen from these words:
If it is assumed that, by Baptism or sacramentum, Saint Augustine meant only a transitory external rite or, perhaps, the consecrated element, his terminology-and what is more importantpost-Augustinian sacramentology, will never be fully grasped. Let
us examine some sentences, chosen at random, to show that, in
numerous instances, Augustinian terminology implies more than a
visible signum or forma: " Sicut baptismus in eis, ita ordinatio
mansit integra."
Sheedy, p. 103.
N. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum and their Influence on
Medieval Sacramentology," MS (Toronto) 10 {1948), pp. 110•111.
7

8

24

RONALD F. KING

"Ipsum baptismum admittere non potest."
" Haerent sacramenta christiana."
" Baptismus corrumpi et adulteri non potest."
'' Baptismum quem habent . . . integer manet."
"Sacramenta insunt."
This list of phrases, which could easily be doubled or tripled, offers
sufficient evidence that Augustinian expressions such as baptismus,
ordinatio, sacramentum, signify, not only a passing visible action,
but also a lasting reality within the recipient. If this concept of
sacramentum does not occur in Berengar's writings, the omission
was scarcely deliberate, for it was only in the latter part of Berengar's life that scholars began to turn their attention to St. Augustine's anti-Donatist writings which constitute the basic works of
his sacramentology. . . . Berengar's adversaries were hardly more
familiar with them up to the end of the eleventh century, when
the results of a more intense study of Augustine's sacramentology
begins to be felt throughout the theological literature of this time.
Alger of Liege reaped the benefit of this progress, though he still
failed to take full advantage of it. The neglect of St. Augustine's
anti-Donatist writings accounts for the fact that his usage of baptismus or sacramentum as lasting consecration was extremely rare
before the second half of the eleventh century. 9

What is important to note here is that the anti-Berengarians
refused to accept Berengar's limitation of the meaning of sacramentum. They did not deny that the Augustinian axiom
" accedente verbo ad elementum et fit sacramentum " was
valid, but they were shocked at the conclusion that Berengar
reached by a univocal rather then analogical application of
the axiom to Baptism and the Eucharist. Without submitting
Berengar's terminology to a critical examination, Lanfranc refused to accept his limitation of sacramentum and it is this
refusal and the subsequent attempts of Lanfranc, Guitmond
and Alger to explain the sacrament of the Eucharist in an orthodox way that led to the sacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum, res tan tum terminology.
In summary we can say this: Berengar wanted to limit
sacramentum to material, visible, mutable elements and denied that the sacramentum of the Eucharist was the physical
• Haring, pp. 121-12!!.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA 25
Body of Christ. Taking their cue from the Patristic and postPatristic use of sacramentum in a wider sense than this, the
anti-Berengarians continued to use the term in its broader
meaning. With Alger of Liege, more penetrating study of
Augustinian sacramentology began to bear fruit and gave a
solid foundation to an ever more precise understanding of what
a sacramentum really is.10

I. PRE-SCHOLASTics: foreshadowings of the tripartite formula.
Berengar's unorthodox views on the Eucharist became widely
known around 1047, and between then and 1060 several treatises were written against him.11 All of them were quite short
and contained nothing that was not better said by later theologians. Therefore, it will be quite sufficient for our purpose
to consider only the works of the three great anti-Berengarian
writers of the period: Lanfranc, Guitmond of Aversa and Alger
of Liege.12
1. With Lanfranc we get our start on the road to the tripartite formula. His De corpore et sanguine Domini adver8U8
Berengarium Turonensu1n 18 was written shortly before 1070,
and thus before Berengar's famous De Sacra Coena, but after a
now lost opusculum of his, from which Lanfranc purports to
quote his teaching. 14 Lanfranc's work is in the form of a dia10 Further insight into this rather complicated problem can be had from a study
of other articles by N. Haring on and around this point. Besides the article
already cited: "St. Augustine's Use of the Word Character," MS 14 (1952), pp.
79-97 and " The Augustinian Axiom Nulli Sacramento Injuria Facienda Eat,'' MS 16
(19li4), pp. 87-117.
11 Cited by name and place in Sheedy, p. Sli.
12 Sheedy, p. 89.
" The classification together of these three writers .•. is
traditional, going back to the tribute of Peter the Venerable, Abbot of Cluny, in
the twelfth century: ' Concerning the Body of the Lord, Lanfranc has written
bene, plene, perfecte; Guitmond meliua, pleniua, perfectiua; and Alger optime,
pleniaaime, perfectiaaime.' "
18 PL 150: 407-442.
14 Sheedy, p. Sli, ftn. S.
The author shows that Lanfranc's treatise was written
after a now lost opuacula of Berengar, which was written shortly after the Roman
Council of 1059. Berengar's De Sacra Coena is a polemic against Lanfranc's work
and it was written sometime before 1079.

RONALD F. KING

Iogue between the two antagonists.
saying that

He quotes Berengar as

The sacrifice of the Church is composed of two things, one visible
and the other invisible, namely, the sacrament-um and the res sacramenti, and the res sacramenti in this case is the Body of Christ.
This Body, if it were actually before our eyes, would be visiblebut it isn't because it has been taken to heaven and now sits at the
right of the Father until the time of the restoration of all things. 15
Lanfranc answers that this is like Caiphas speaking-most of
what he says is true but unfortunately he doesn't realize the
deep truth of it. He goes on in this vein
For this is just what we say ... what we want to prove against
you and your followers, namely, the sacrifice of the Church is composed of two things, the visible species of the elements and the
invisible flesh and blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ, the sacramentum
and the res sacramenti; which res (to use your own words) is the
body of Christ. As the person of Christ, as you admit, is composed
of both God and man, since Christ Himself is true God and true
man . . . so is the sacrifice of the Church, again by your own
admission, composed of sacramentum and res sacramenti, that is,
the body of Christ. Therefore, there is a sacramentum and a res
sacramenti, the body of Christ. 16
In this passage, Lanfranc says no more than what he had
attributed to Berengar in the previous quotation: the visible
species constitute the sacramentum and the invisible flesh and
blood of Christ constitute the res sacramenti. However, a
little further on he adds that
His flesh which, hidden under the form of bread, we receive in
the sacrament, and his blood, which under the species and taste of
wine we drink, is the sacrament of the body of Christ, insofar as it
regards the fact that the Lord Christ himself was immolated on the
cross. The flesh is the sacrament of the flesh and the blood is the
sacrament of the blood. By the invisible, intelligible, spiritual flesh
and blood is signified the visible, palpable body of the Redeemer.H
PL 150: 421 A. The translations throughout this study are roy own.
PL 150: 421 B-D.
17 PL 150: 428 D-424A.
1"

16

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION

OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

27

And then, he says, " Christ, therefore, is the sacrament of
Christ." 18
In these latter passages, then, Lanfranc terms sacramentum,
what he had previously called res sacramenti. Thus, his real
importance lies in his refusal to accept the restrictions that
Berengar wanted to put on the word sacramentum. He insisted on using the term in a broader sense, and this insistence
was to have far reaching consequences in sacramental theology.
2. With Guitmond of Aversa we have what Sheedy, expressively if somewhat inelegantly, refers to as the "throwing forward" of the significance of Christ's body in order that it
embrace us who share the life of Christ in this sacrament. 19
By this he means that Guitmond progresses on Lanfranc's
insistence that the Eucharistic body of Christ is a sacrament:
while Lanfranc related it backward to the natural and historical body of Christ, Guitmond thrusts its signification forward
and calls it a sacrament of the body of Christ which is the
Church.
Guitmond's treatise on the Eucharist 20 is largely in the form
of a dialogue between the author and his Benedictine confrere,
Roger, and its purpose is to refute Berengar's opinions on various questions. While Guitmond does not call the Body of
Christ a sacramentum et res in so many words, what he says
about it surely comes to the same thing. He admits, as Lanfranc before him did, that there is no contradiction in saying
that Christ's Body in the Eucharist is both a sacrament and
something substantiaJ.2 1 He holds also that the natural body
of Christ which was born of the Virgin Mary is the sign and
figure and sacrament of the body of Christ which is the
Church. 22 More on our point, he clearly speaks of the Eucharistic Christ as sacrament of the Church:
Most fittingly and reasonably, then, is this sacred offering called
a sign, both of many good things and also of the body of the Lord,
19 Sheedy, p.
PL 150:
C.
PL 149:
De Corporis et sanguinis Ch-risti veritate in Eucharistia.
21 PL 149:
1457 C, 1458 A, 1460 C-D.
22 PL 149:
1459 B.

18

20

28

RONALD F. KING

that is, of the Church [gathered together] from many men as from
many grains of wheat. . . . Where it is stated that the Eucharist
is called the sacrament of the body of the Lord, we explain the
meaning of these words in this way: the Eucharist is a sacrament
which is the body of the Lord in such a way that It itself is truly
the body of the Lord and truly the sacrament of other things,
namely of the aforementioned good things. . . . Certainly we
understand this to mean that the Eucharist is the body of the
Lord, namely, of the very Word of God, and the sacrament of the
body of the Lord which is the Church. . . . Therefore it is false
to say that no sign is a sign of itself for ... the same Christ is
the sacred sign, that is, the sacrament, of Himself.28
To avoid any possible misunderstanding, Guitmond adds
again that, although he is calling the body of Christ the sacrament of something else, he is not in any way denying that It
itself is a reality which is the true body of Christ Himself. 24
Can there he any doubt that this is equivalent to what we
mean when we call the Body of Christ the res et sacramentum
of the Eucharist?
8. In the treatise of Alger of Liege we get the most satisfying answers so far to some of the problems involved in the
Eucharist. 25 Alger insists, for example, that the Eucharist is a
sign just as the other sacraments are. 26 But it is also different
from the other sacraments, in that its material components
actually become what they signify, and this through the words
of consecration. 27 For Alger, sacramentum in its most proper
sense can be predicated only of the visible species of bread
and wine remaining after consecration, 28 but at the same time
he speaks of the Body of Christ in the sacrament as both signified and signifying: it is signified by the species of bread
and wine, and it signifies the body of Christ in His passion, 29
and also signifies the body of Christ which is the Church-but
it does this only as existing under the species of bread and
wine. 30 This concept of the Body of Christ as sacramentum,
•• PL 149: 1460 B-D.
•• PL 149: 1461 A-B.
•• PL 180: 789-851, De Sacramentis Corporis et Sanguinis Domini.
•• PL 180: 716 D.
•• PL 180: 761 A.
•• PL 180: 792 C-D.
80 PL 180: 794 C.
•• PL 180: 752 C.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

29

not in itself but insofar as it is related to the external species,
was obviously perceived by Alger, but he did not elaborate
on the point. If Alger had perceived this fully he could have
answered the objection against the Body of Christ as a sacramentum on the grounds that it does not fulfil the definition
" invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma." As it turned out though,
it is only the theologians of the thirteenth century who perceive this distinction clearly enough to clarify this problem.
That Alger recognized the fact that only the visible species
of bread and wine could be called sacramentum in the proper
sense, is evident. But he also insisted that the visible sacra1nentum was really distinct from the invisible Body of Christ,
which, at the same time, is the res of the visible sacrament
and signifies the Church. 81
As Sheedy has well noted, with Alger's insistence on the real
distinction between the sacramentum of the Eucharist and the
Body of Christ as its res, we have a precision of no little
importance:
We are at first startled to see Lanfranc, Guitmond and Alger
after him, assert that the Body of Christ in the Eucharist is itself
a sacrament and a sign. In their attribution to the actual Body of
Christ of a truly sacramental function we believe that we find
their principal contribution to the study of the Eucharist as a
sacrament, and the heart and center of an orthodox Eucharistic
symbolism: the doctrine, namely, of the real body of Christ as the
sacramentum et res in the economy of salvation. None of them
uses the actual term, and none of them seem to have grasped the
full significance of the idea. 32

II.

FORE-RUNNERS:
prelude to the famous theological "schools" of the twelfth century.

IMMEDIATE

Before attempting to trace the use of the tripartite formula
in the various theological schools of the period, it is necessary
to look briefly at two works which influenced the earliest of
these schools, that of Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux. While neither of these works uses the tripartite formula
81 PL 180:
D.
•• Sheedy, pp. 115-116.

30

RONALD F. KINQ

explicitly, both of them are further proof that the origin of
this terminology is found in the theological speculations on the
nature of the Eucharist.
1. The Sententiae A trebatenses treats, among other things,
the sacraments of Penance, Baptism, Confirmation, Marriage
and the Eucharist. 38 The terminology that we are concerned
with does not appear under Penance or Baptism, which have
only the distinction between sacramentum and res sacramenti,
nor under the Confirmation or Marriage, which do not use even
the sacramentum-res sacramenti terminology.
But in discussing the Eucharist the author has this to say:
The species of bread and wine are the sacramentum, that is, the
sign of a sacred thing, namely, of invisible grace. . . . The res of
this sacrament is Christ, who does not exist under these elements
in another nature, since these two natures, namely divinity and
humanity, are undivided in Him. Or the res of the sacrament is
union and the bond of charity which is conferred in the sacrament
. . . and the body of Christ which is handled on the altar is the
sign of a sacred thing, even of this union and charity which is conferred in Him. . . . Whence the Body of Christ is also called a
sacrament because it signifies that visible body of Christ which
hung on the cross.34

Drawing out the contents of this passage more explicitly we
find this: the sacramentum is the species of bread and wine:
the res sacramenti is twofold: Christ, and union or bond of
charity. But Christ, who is the res of the visible species is
also sacramentum of union and charity which is conferred in
Him, as well as of his own physical body. The author of this
•• This text is found in RT AM 10 (1938), pp. 205-224 and 344-357. In his
article, "Aux origines de !'ecole theologique d'Anselme de Laon," in RTAM 10
(1988), pp. 101-122, Dom Lottin discusses this work and its influence on the
" school " of Anselm of Laon. By a textual comparison of several works of this
school-the Sententiae divinae paginae, the Sententiae Anselmi, and the collection
"Prima rerum origo," he comes to the conclusion that the Sententiae Atrebatenses
is prior to all of them and exercised a strong influence on Anselm's school. The
author of the work remains unknown, although Lottin positively excludes William
of Champeaux (p. 116) and says that it could possibly have been Anselm himself but there is no definitive proof of this.
•• Op. cit., pp. 851-352.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

81

work, then, relates the signification of the Eucharistic Body
of Christ both backward, to the visible Body which hung on
the cross, and forward, to union and charity which is conferred
in this sacrament. It is evident that all of the elements of the
tripartite formula are present here; all that remains to be done
is to put them together.
The collection of sentences called " Deus de cujus principia et fine tacetur" has been studied by Father Weisweiler.35
He places it chronologically after the Sententiae A trebatenses
and before the Sententiae Anselmi, and reaches the conclusion
that it is " a primitive source of the school of Anselm of Laon
and William of Champeaux, and for this reason, of great importance for an understanding of the fundamental principles
of the school, which had not yet been elaborated." 36 The collection treats of the sacraments of Baptism, Marriage and the
Eucharist and is of interest here for a passage at the very end
of the section " de sacramento altaris."
It must also be noted of the Body of the Lord, that the same
thing is both figura and res and that it is even a figura of itself.
For it signifies to us that already we begin to be united to Him,
to whom we will be fully united in the end. It signifies to us that
we will have Christ Himself, that is, eternal life.37

It is legitimate to equate figura with signum, as many writers
of the period use the two words synonymously. Thus, Christ
in the Eucharist is both signum and res. While not every
signum is a sacramentum, it would not seem to be stretching the
point too far to equate the two terms in this context, for certainly our union with Christ is a" sacred thing."

III.

THE THEOLOGICAL ScHOOLS oF THE TWELFTH CENTURY

A. The School of Anselm of Laon and William of Champeaux. 38
•• H. Weisweiler, "La recueil des sentences ' Deus de cujus principio et fine
tacetur ' et son remaniement," RT AM 5 (1988), pp. 245-274.
•• Weisweiler, p. 251.
87 Weisweiler, p. 269.
38 The order adopted in this s'tudy of the various schools will follow, as much
as possible, the order set out in the works of A. Landgraf, Einfiihrung in die Ge-

32

RONALD F. KING

1. It is in the Sentences of Anselm of Laon that we find the
first explicit use of the tripartite formula. 39 There is nothing of
importance to our search in the De Divinae Paginae. In the
Sentences, the author takes up the sacraments of Baptism,
Penance, Marriage and the Eucharist. For Baptism, Penance
and Marriage, the division of sacramentum-res sacramenti IS
used, 40 but of the Eucharist he has this to say:

The sacramentum is threefold: bread, wine and water, for bread
is the sacramentum of the Body of the Lord, wine of the Blood,
and water either of the water which :flowed from His side or of
the faith of the Church . . . bread is also the sacramentum of
charity, wine of hope, water of faith, without which, namely, without faith, hope, and charity, union with and conformity to Christ
is not possible. The res of this sacrament is this threefold conschichte der Theologischen Literatur der Friihscholastik (F. Pustet, 1948), and
Martin Grabmann, Die Geschichte der katholischen Theologie. The Spanish translation of Grabmann's work (Historia de la teologia catolica by P. David Gutierrez,
Espasa-Calpe, S. A., Madrid, 1946) was the only one available to me at the time
of writing. Where critical editions of various works differ on points of influence,
dating, etc., the conclusions of the critical editions are used instead.
•• The text used here is the one edited by F. Bliemetzrieder, "Anselms von Laon,
Systematische Sentenzen," Betriige Zur Geschichte Der Philosophie Des Mittelalters, 18 (1919), pp. vi-xxv (Forward), 1*-87* (Introduction) and 1-158 (Text).
The exact date of the work is not known, but it is most probably within the first
three decades of the twelfth century. Bliemetzrieder, in an article in RT AM 7
"L'oeuvre d'Anselme de Laon et Ia literature theologique
(1985), pp.
contemporaine: Hugues de Rouen," concludes that Anselm was the author of the
De; Divinae Paginae but not of the Sententiae Anselmi. He holds that the Sententiae were written by one of Anselm's pupils, and that they are very similar to
the writings of Hugh of Rouen. Other works used in studying this particular
school were the following: F. Bliemetzrieder, "Trente-trois pieces inedites de
l'oeuvre theologique d'Anselme de Laon," RTAM
(1980), pp. 54-79; F. Bliemetzrieder, "L'oeuvre d'Anselme de Laon et Ia literature theologique contemporaine,"
RTAM 5 (1988), pp.
(on Honorius d'Autun), RTAM 6 (1984), pp.
and RTAM 7 (1985), pp.
(on Hugues de Rouen); H. Weisweiler,
"L'ecole d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux," RTAM 4
pp.
and 871-891; 0. Lottin, "Aux origines de l'ecole theologique d'Anselme
de Laon," RTAM 10 (1988), pp.
0. Lottin, "Nouveaux fragments theologiques de !'ecole d'Anselme de Laon," RTAM 11 (1989), pp.
and8051!'l (1940), pp. 49-77; 18 (1946), pp.
and !'l61-!'l81; 14 (1947), pp. 5-81
and 157-185.
•• Bliemetzrieder, Betriige Zur Geschichte, etc.: Baptism, pp. 118-114; Penance,
p. 1!'l0; Marriage, pp. 184-185.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A 1SAOOMENTAL FORMULA

S8

formity to Christ, and Ghrist Himself. . . . Therefore Christ is
both sacramentum and res sacramenti. His. Body, which under
diverse aspects is both visible and invisible, is the res of the visible
sacramentum and the sacramentum of the heavenly and invisible
bread by which the angels live. 41

Drawing out the content of this passage, we find that the
sacramentum is bread, wine and water; the sacramentum et res
sacramenti is Christ Himself; the res is conformity to Christ
through faith, hope and charity. While not all of the elements
are arranged here as exactly as they would later be, it is undeniable that this is an authentic use of the tripartite formula.
It should be noted that the author makes absolutely no mention of this type of threefold division for the other sacraments
that he discussed. For them, there is only the division of sacramentum-res sacramenti. This terminology then, began with
the Eucharist and is used most properly when applied to that
sacrament. When the formula is later extended to the other
sacraments it is only by way of analogy to the Eucharist. It
might be mentioned here that I have found no author who
mentions the Sententiae Anselmi as the first use of the tripartite terminology. Most of them attribute its origin either to
the author of the Summa Sententiarum, or to the Sentences of
Peter the Lombard, depending on which chronology they follow
for these two works. Certainly the Sententiae Anselmi are
earlier than either of the two other works and it is clear that
this is an authentic use of the formula even though, as has
been mentioned, later authors do not classify some of the elements involved in exactly the same way as this author did.
In the tract of Stephen of Balgiaco, Bishop of Autun/ 2
we find the tripartite formula used in a way more closely
approximating our own way of saying it. In chapter seventeen
of the treatise, Stephen says this of the Eucharist:
Three things in this sacrament seek faith and entice the mind of
one who is rightly wise and faithfully intelligent to believe: one is
the species of bread and wine, another the body and blood of the
41 Op. cit., pp. 116-118.
•• PL 172: 1271-1808, Tractatus
sacramento altaria. According to the" Notitia Historica," 1272 B-C, the most probable date of this work is 1186.

de

84

RONALD Jl'. KING

Lord, the third is the union of members and head. . . . The second
is the res of the first, the third is the effect of the second. For the
species of bread and wine is the sacramentum tantum, that is, the
visible sign of an invisible and sacred thing. . . . The body and
blood of the Lord Jesus Christ is called the res sacramenti, as hidden
under the aforesaid species, and is the sacramentum of another res,
namely of that grace and love which is given. Therefore the first
is the sacramentum tantum, the second is the res sacramenti et
sacramentum, the third is the reset non sacramentum. 48

After these distinctions have been made, Stephen discourses on
the two-fold way of receiving the sacrament, sacramentally and
spiritually, which distinction is based on the twofold res of the
sacrament, and is found in nearly all the authors of the period.
Both the good and the bad receive sacramentally but only the
good receive spiritually, i.e., all who receive receive the Body
of the Lord, but only the good receive that union with Him
which is the result of a worthy reception.
4. A final work of this first school 44 which could be mentioned is a treatise which Dom Lattin calls the Florilege de
Saint-Amand. 45 There is a passage in this work which is almost
a verbatim transcription of the passage from the work called
"Deus de cujus principia et fine tacetur." 46 After stating that
the body of the Lord in the Eucharist is both " figura " and
" figuratum," the author argues against those who deny that
this is possible. However, it must be admitted that the
example he uses to prove his point is not overwhelmingly
convincing.47

B. The School of Hugh of St. Victor
1. Hugh of St. Victor, whose De Sacramentis 48 was of crucial
importance in the early scholastic period, clearly taught the
•• PL 172: 1295 C-1296 D.
•• Honorius of Autun and Hugh of Rouen do not add to our study of this school.
•• 0. Lottin, "Noveaux fragments theologiques de l'ecole d'Anselme de Laon,"
RTAM 11 (1989), p. 809. Neither the exact author nor the date of this work is
known, but it shows the influence of the school of Laon and very probably dates
from the third or fourth decade of the twelfth century.
•• See footnote 87.
01 Lottin, " Noveaux fragments, etc.," p. 809.
•• PL 176: 178-816.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

35

doctrine of the tripartite division of the Eucharist, although
he did not explicitly use the tripartite formula. He has nothing that even resembles the tripartite in his teaching on the
other sacraments. The pertinent passage on the Eucharist is
found in chapter seven of Book Two:
For while there is only one sacrament, three different things are
contained in it: namely, the visible species, and the truth of the
Body and the power of spiritual grace. The visible species, which
are visibly seen, are· one thing; quite another is the truth of the
body and the blood which are contained invisibly under the species
and believed; still another is the spiritual grace which, with the
body and the blood, is invisible and is spiritually perceived. . . .
Nor do we believe only that the body and the blood are signified
by bread and wine, but that under the species of bread and wine
the true body and the true blood are consecrated, and the visible
species are indeed the sacramentum of the true body and the true
blood, and the body and blood are the sacramentum of spiritual
grace. . . . Therefore, the sacrament of the altar and the Blessed
Eucharist, in the true body and blood of Our Lord Jesus Christ, is
an image in relation to the species of bread and wine in which it is
perceived, and is a res when considered according to the truth of its
own substance. . . . Therefore, the most blessed Eucharist, which
is handled visibly and corporally on the altar according to the
species of bread and wine, and according to the truth of the body
and blood of Christ, is sacrament and sign; and it is also the image
of that spiritual participation of Jesus, which is perfected within
the heart through faith and love. 49

So, according to Hugh, bread and wine is the visible sacrament
of the Body and Blood of Christ, which is its res, and this res
is also the sacramentum of spiritual grace. The Body and
Blood is an image, i. e., a signum, when considered as existing
under the species of bread and wine, and it is a res when considered as something substantial and true.
2. While Richard of St. Victor has nothing whatever to offer
on our topic of research, 50 the famous Summa Sententiarum,
which for a long time was thought to be a work of Hugh of
•• PL 176: 466 C-467 B.
•• PL 196: 1011-1018, De BUperexcellomti Baptismo Christi; 1159-1178, De potestate ligandi et 8cilvomdi.

36

RONALD' F. KING

St. Victor, is an example of this school.51 As has been mentioned previously, I accept the chronological priority of this
work over the Sentences of the Lombard. 52 All of the sacraments are discussed here, with the exception of Holy Orders.
On Baptism, the author speaks of the "two things which
must be considered in every sacrament: the sacramentum and
the res sacramenti. 53 Confirmation is dismissed with thirty-one
lines, and the author is content to say that it is a sacrament
and that it confers the Spirit " ad robur " as in Baptism He
was given " ad remissionem." 54 He doesn't use the tripartite
formula in Penance, but divides the sacrament into compunctio,
confessio and satisfactio. 55 Extreme Unction has the sacramentum-res sacramenti division,S6 but Matrimony has neither
this nor the tripartite. 57 The Eucharist, however, does have the
tripartite, and the clearest enunciation of it that we have yet
encountered. Despite the fact that five other sacraments were
discussed, three of them at considerable length, it is only the
Eucharist to which the tripartite formula is applied. That the
author of the Summa Sententiarum does not use the tripartite
formula for penance also, while, as we shall see, the Lombard
does, is another argument for his chronological priority.
In chapter three of his teaching on the Eucharist, the author
states:
It is necessary to consider three things here: one which is sacramentum tantum, another which is sacramentum and res sacramenti,
•• PL 176: 43 A-174.
•• It seems to me that Weisweiler clearly establishes the priority of the Summa
Sententiarom over the Lombard's Sentencea in his article " La ' Summa Sententiarum ' source de Pierre Lombard," RT AM 5 (1934), pp. 143-183. He shows
that both works used the Sentencea of Anselm of Laon, and shows that the Lombard used them indirectly and in dependence on the Summa Sententiarum. Hugh
of St. Victor's De Sacramentis was also a source of the Lombard's work, and a
point to note is that if the Summa Sententiarom is said to be after Lombard's
Sentencea one must then be able to explain why the author of the Summa always
omits those passages which the Lombard has taken from Hugh's work. Weisweiler
favors Othon of Lucques as the author of the Summa Sententiarum and sets its
date between 1140-1146.
•• PL 176:
•• PL 176: 137-139.
•• PL 176: 153 B-154 C.
•• PL 176: 154 D-174.
•• PL 176: 146 D-153 B.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

37

and a third which is res tantum. The visible species of bread and
wine are the sacramentum et non res . . . the true Body and Blood
of Christ is the sacramentum et res: res in relation to those species
by which it is signified, but this res is also a sacramentum of another
res, namely of the unity of head and members which faith in the
body and blood of the Lord effects, and this res sacramenti is called
virtus. For it is called the spiritual flesh of Christ. 58
That this is the clearest use of the tripartite to date is, I think.
beyond doubt. But that it is the first real use of this formula,
in my opinion, cannot be sustained-and this for reasons which
have already been given. Despite the wealth of careful and
penetrating information in Haring's articles, the author seems
to attribute the origin of the tripartite formula to the Summa
Sententiarum. 59

C. The School of Peter Abelard
1. Of all the works attributed by Migne to Peter Abelard,
only one of them throws any light on our subject-and that
one is the Epitome Theologie Christianae, which actually was
not written by Abelard himself but by one " Magister Hermanus." 60 It is interesting to note the different approaches
taken in Abelard's Sic et Non and in the Epitome. In the
former, Abelard speaks only of the visible sacramentum and
the invisible res sacramenti, the one being the species of bread
and wine, the other the Body and Blood of Christ. 61 But in
the Epitome, while the author uses the sacramentum-res sacra._
menti terminology for Baptism, 62 he uses different terminology
for the Eucharist. Here, he speaks of the bread and wine being
merely bread and wine before its consecration, but after consecration " the bread is truly the Body of Christ and the wine
•• PL 176: 140 A-C.
•• Note especially the article "Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum, etc.," in
MS 10 (1948), p. 127 and footnote 8 on p. 128.
•• The works consulted were the following: PL 178: 979-1114, lntroductiO> ad
theologiam; PL 178:
Theologia Christiana; PL 178: 1889-1610, Sic et
Non; PL 178: 1685-1758, Epitome Theologiae Christianae. The first two works
have nothing of interest to our topic; the last two will be discussed in the text.
61 PL 178:
A-B.
•• PL 178: 1789 B.

38

RONALD F. KING

is His Blood." 63 And then he adds, " this Body is the sacrament of the body which is the Church." 64 Isn't the author
saying here, in effect, that the Body of Christ, while it is the
res of the visible species, is also the sacramentum of another
res? If this is so, and it seems to me that it is, certainly it is
equivalent to the tripartite terminology and our " Magister
Hermanus " would be at least one representative of the Abelardian school to teach its meaning, even if not with its actual
phraseology. However, we don't have to be content with this,
as there are several other representatives of this school who are
explicit in espousing the tripartite for the Eucharist.
2. The Sententiae Florianenses, of uncertain date but after
1138,65 has the typical Abelardian format of "fides, caritas,
sacramentum." The author of this treatise does not use the
tripartite formula when teaching on the Eucharist, nor does he
use the sae1·amentum-res sacramenti pattern, but he does speak
of Christ's Body being a sign of the Church and His Blood a
sign of the gifts of the Holy Ghost. 66
3. The Sententiae Rolandi 67 takes up all of the sacraments
except Holy Orders, but does not use the tripartite for any of
them. In fact, except where he speaks of the Eucharist, he
concentrates primarily on what he calls the "effect" of the
sacrament. On the Eucharist, his terminology is a bit confusing. He wants to be explicit on the sacramentum-res sacramenti, but since sacramentum has three definitions these two
factors will differ accordingly. Using the definition, " sacrar
mentum est sacrae rei signum," he says that the visible species
of bread and wine are the sacramentum and the true body of
Christ, or the Church, is the res sacramenti. 68 Nowhere does
he say anything about the Body of Christ being a sacramentum
of anything else.
•• PL 178: 1741 A.
•• PL 178: 1741 B.
•• H. Ostlender, Sententiae Florianenses (Florilegium Patristicum XIX), Bonn,
1929. For the date, cf. "Prolegomena," p. VII.
•• Ostlender, p. 80.
67 A. M. Gietl, Die Sentenzen Rolanda, nackmals Papstes Alexandre Ill.
Freiburg-im-Breisgau, 1891.
•• Gietl, pp. 215-!t16.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION. OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

89

4. The Sententiae Parisienses 69 is a work of unknown authorship, but certainly of the Abelardian school/ 0 which Landgraf dates between 1189-1141.71 The author maintains that
"in every sacrament there is a sacramentum and a res sacramenti," 72 and proceeds to point to the exterior and interior
washing of Baptism, and the Body of Christ and body of the
Church, as the respective parts of the sacrament of Baptism
and of the Eucharist. 73 Although the Body of Christ is called
a sacramentum here, it cannot be stated certainly that the
author had a tripartite division in mind because he omits any
mention of the species of bread and wine.
5. But it is a completely different story with the Ysagogue.
This treatise bears the name of one Odon on its title page/ 4
but the work has so many obvious contrasts that it is hardly
possible to attribute it to one man only. Although it does not
follow the typical Abelardian formula of " fides, caritas, sacramentum," Landgraf maintains that it does belong to this school
and he dates it, "with sufficient probability," between 1148
and 1152.75
Before taking up each of the sacraments individually, although here again there is no discussion of Holy Orders, the
author has this to say: " in every sacrament two things must
be considered, namely the sacramentum and the ·res sacramenti," 16 although he only spells these two things out in Baptism, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist, making no further
mention of them in his treatment of Penance, Marriage and
Confirmation. After indicating specifically the sacramentumres sacramenti of Baptism 77 and of Extreme Unction/ 8 he says
of the Eucharist:
•• A. Landgraf, Ecrits Tkeologiquea de L'Ecole d'Abelard. (Spicilegium Sacrum
Lovaniense, Etudes et Documents, Fascicule 14.) Louvain, 1984. This edition contains both the Sententiae Parisienses and the Ysagogue in Tkeologiam.
70 Landgraf, p. xxx sq.
n Landgraf, pp. xxxix-xl.
•• Landgraf, p. xliv.
70 Landgraf, pp. 4Q-41.
•• Landgraf, p. liv.
78 Ibid.
•• Landgraf, p. 181.
77 Landgraf, p. 188: "Ablucio quoque exterior sacramentum est, res autem intema mundacio."
78 Landgraf, p. 199: " Sacramentum quidem est ipsa unctio, res vero sacramenti
delictorum remissio exteriore unctione collata."

40

RONALD F. KING

The sacramentum et non res is the visible species of bread, wine
and water. . . . The species of bread and wine are the sacramentum of the Body and Blood of the Lord. . . . Bread and wine
are also the sacramentum of that body of Christ which is the
Church. . . . But the res et non sacramentum is the union of
Head and members which faith in the Lord's body and blood
effects. . . . The sacramentum et res is the very body and blood
of the Lord: it is res in relation to the species by which it is
signified, and sacramentum in relation to the aforesaid union of
Head and members which it signifies.79
Landgraf puts the passage just quoted in italics in his edition
of the Y sagogue, indicating, as he points out in his introduction,
that this is either an explicit or an implicit citation of another
author's work. This passage obviously depends on the Summa
Sententiarum, and indeed Landgraf holds that this Summa is
the principal source of the Y sagogue.80 But there is a progression here over what was said in the Summa, in that the sacramentum tantum is now explicitly said to be the sacramentum
of both of the res which follow it, that is, of the res et sacramentum and of the res tantum. The Summa Sententiarum did
not bring this facet out into the open. Again here, the twofold res of this sacrament is the basis for the distinction between
sacramental and spiritual eating of the Eucharist. 81
6. Because of the general trend of his teaching, we can include Robert of Melun in the school of Abelard. It should be
remarked, though, that his editor insists that Robert cannot
be put into any of the schools of the period because " he rises
above the theological schools of the twelfth century, as much
by his expository work as by his critical work." 82 Only circumstances kept him from being the head of his own school,
although it is known that in his theology the work of Hugh of
•• Landgraf, pp. 204-205.
80 Landgraf, p. li.
81 Landgraf, pp. 206-207.
82 R. Martin, fEuvrea de Robert de Melun: Tome Ill, Sententiae. Two volumes.
(Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Fascicle 21.) Louvain, 1947, p. xiv.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

41

St. Victor, and especially of Abelard and his followers, exerted
great influence on him. 83
In Robert's Commentary on St. Paul, which dates from
1145-1151, "he treats only of those things of which St. Paul
speaks: baptism, Eucharist, and marriage." 84 He speaks very
briefly on Baptism 85 and Marriage 86 and says nothing of interest to our study. But in discussing the Eucharist he uses
the tripartite formula very explicitly. However, since he says
n'othing which Is really new at this stage of progress, it will be
sufficient to quote the pertinent passage in the footnote. 87

D. The School of Gilbert de la Porree 88
1. The Sententiae Divinitatis 89 is the first study of the Porretan school to supply us with a usage of the tripartite formula,
and here again it is only used in reference to the Eucharist, even
Martin, Sententiae, pp. xiv and xx.
R. Martin, lEuvres de Robert de Melun: Quaestiones de Epistolis Pauli.
(Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Fascicle 18.) Louvain, 1988, p. xxv.
86 Martin, Quaestiones, pp. 94-95 and 175-176.
86 Martin, Quaestiones, pp. 195-199.
87 Martin, Quaestiones, pp. !t07-208: " Sunt autem in altari sacramentum et res
sacramenti, que ibi secundum tria considerantur. Quia sunt quiddam tantum significantia, ut species pani et vini, que corpus Christi significant. Bunt autem
alia que significant et significantur, ut corpus et sanguis Domini, que significantur
per speciem panis et speciem vini; significat autem corpus Christi quod specie panis
et vini sumitur, que ex diversis vel granis vel accinis conficiuntur, corpus Ecclesiae
quod ex diversis colligitur. Corpus vero Ecclesiae ibi tantum siguificatur."
88 There is nothing of interest to our study in the writings of Gilbert himself,
although he does take up the sacrament of the Eucharist in his Epistle to Matthew
(PL 188: 1255 A-1258 B). Robert Pulleyn is hard to classify, however, Grabmann
is content to say that he belongs chronologically between the time of Hugh of
St. Victor and the Sentences of the Lombard. (Cf. M. Grabmann, Die Geschichte
der ko,tholischen Theologie, Spanish translation by P. D. Gutierrez, Historia de la
XX Teologia Catolica, p. 51.) Robert uses the sacramentum-res sacramenti division for baptism, but not for the other sacraments (PL 186: 689-1008, esp. col. 842
A-C and 846 B).
89 B. Geyer, Die Sententiae Divinitatis:
Ein Sentenzenbuch Der Gilbertschen
Schule. (Beitriige Zur Geschichte Der Philo8ophie Des Mittelalters, 7 (1909),
pp. 1-62 (Introduction) and pp. 1*-171* (Text).) It is difficult to establish the
date of this work, for various scholars have reached different conclusions. One
of the chief points in the attempt is the relation of this work to the De.
88

84

RONALD F. KING

though other sacraments are discussed in the work.90 The
author makes several interesting statements in reference to the
Eucharist. He says that the Eucharist has a privileged status
among the sacraments:
Because, while in the other sacraments only grace is given, in
this one not only grace but also the giver of grace. . . . So we
must see what, in this sacrament, is the sacramentum and what the
res sacramenti. Three things must be considered here: one is the
sacramentum tantum, another the sacramentum et res sacramenti,
and the third is the res tan tum. 91

He goes on to point out that the visible species are the sacramentum of two res: Christ and the Church, the former being
both signified and contained and the latter signified and not
contained. 92 Further, he tries to show how the Body of Christ,
which is the res of the exterior sacramentum, is itself a sacramentum: "This res, namely the Body of Christ, is made from
many members vivified by one soul, and so also the body of
the Church is drawn from many members joined together by
the bond of charity: behold, then, how this Body is a sacramentum." 93
The most important thing here, I think, is the explicit statement that this sacrament gives both grace and the giver of
grace. It shows why the tripartite terminology was applied
mentia of Master Simon. Geyer holds for a common source for these two works.
Grabmann (Geschichte der scholastichen methode, IT, p. 488) and Dhanis (" Quelques anciennes formules septenaires des sacrements," Revue d'hiatofre ecclesiastique,
26 (1980), p. 574 sq.) hold for a priority over Master Simon's work. However, it
seems to me that Weisweiler in Maitre Simon et son groupe (Spicilegium Sacrum
Lovaniense, Fascicle 17) , pp. xlvi-lxiii, marshals the best arguments-and he holds
for a dependance of the Sententiae Divinitatia on Master Simon's work. As far
as our particular point is concerned, the Sent. Div. uses the tripartite formula for
the Eucharist, and Master Simon does not. Note that this Master Simon is not
the same person as Simon of Tournai.
90 On Baptism, the
author distinguishes between " efficacy " and " dignity "
(p. 109*) and between sacramentum and virtus sacramenti (p. 128*) . On Confirmation, the distinction is between sacramentum and virtus aacramenti (p. 127*) .
On Penance, there is nothing approaching the terminology that we are looking for.
91 Geyer; p. 128* and 185*.
•• Geyer, pp. 185*-186*.

•• Ibid.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

48

exclusively to the Eucharist for so long, while the sacramentumres sacramenti fonnula was felt to be perfectly adequate for all
of the other sacraments. It was not until the Lombard reflected that the sacrament of Penance gives more than the grace
of the remission of sins that the tripartite fonnula is extended
to another sacrament and " interior penance " takes on the role
of the res et sacramentum.
The Disputationes of Simon of Tournai date from approximately 1165, and Warichez has shown that Simon was
familiar with both Gratian's Decretum and the Lombard's
Sentences. It is important to note that this Simon wrote some
thirteen years after the Lombard, for he too mentions the tripartite formula in relation to the sacrament of Penance. 94
While the author treated, somewhat extensively, of sacramental
efficacy and of the effect of Baptism and of the Eucharist, it
is only in his discussion of Penance that we find the tripartite.
In Warichez's edition of the Disputationes this is not found
explicitly, but there is a discussion which borders on it. 95 However, Anciaux has reproduced a passage from Simon's Summa,
written before 1175 and at present still existing only in manuscript form, in which Simon states that
Others say that the signum tantum is exterior penance because
it signifies interior contrition; they call interior contrition the
signum et res because it is the res of exterior penance, by which it is
signified, and the signum of the remission of sins, which it signifies.
They say that the res tantum is the remission of sin.96
Simon introduces this opinion with the nebulous " dicunt alii "
and opposes it to an opinion which said that in Penance the
•• J. Warichez, Les Disputationes de Simon de Tournai. (Spicilegium Sacrum
Lovaniense, Fascicle
Louvain,
Cf. Introduction, p. xxxii sq. for discussion of dating the work and the influence of Gratian and the Lombard on the
author.
•• Warichez, pp. 97-98.
•• Cited by Anciaux, La Tkeologie du Sacrement de Penitence au XII• Siecle,
Louvain, 1949, p. 878. For a long time this work was attributed to Stephen
Langton, but modern scholars reject this. The general consensus is that the work
is of English origin and that it manifests a definite dependence on Peter Cantor
(cf. Anciaux, pp. 98-94 and footnotes).

44

RONALD F. KING

signum is the " afRictio corporis " and its res is " contritio et
humilitas cordis." This "alii ... alii" here almost certainly
refers to Gandulph and the Lombard (cf. ft. 129 where the text
of the Lombard is reproduced). As an objection against this
tripartite division of Penance, it is alleged that sacraments
must cause what they signify. Therefore, in this division, exterior penance would produce contrition, which would effect
the remission of sin-but de facto this is not the case because
sin is remitted by God alone, and because the sin is remitted
the sinner now has interior contrition, and because he has contrition he is sorrowful in body and mind. So it seems that
the tripartite way of looking at Penance confuses cause and
effect and, therefore, is not true to fact. Simon rejects this
and insists that there are signs which follow the reality signified, and therefore the sign need not necessarily come before the
thing signified by it. This difficulty was a very common one
for those who applied the tripartite to Penance, and the answer
which Simon gives to it, obviously, is not a sufficient one. The
most popular theory of this time on the remission of sins was
that God alone remits the sin, and therefore the sacramental
sign in Penance was simply a sign and not a cause. This is
why the sacrament of Penance at that time was considered to
be sui generis among the sacraments of the New Law-its
sacramental sign merely signified but did not produce the sacramental effect. Theologians tried to explain this by saying that
Penance had been instituted in the Old Law and was only
observed in the New Law, and therefore it did not have the
characteristic of being both sign and cause which these sacraments which were instituted in the new Law had. A similar
position was later taken in reference to the sacrament of Matrimony. These aspects will be brought out in some of the sources
which we will study presently.
Before leaving Simon it must be noted that, despite his attempted defense of the tripartite for Penance, his own personal
opinion is not along tripartite lines. He holds that satisfaction
is the signum of contrition and the priest's absolution is the
signum of the remission of sins, which remission is the res sacramenti. In this opinion he is similar to Robert Pulleyn.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SAcRAMENTAL FORMULA

45

8. The author of the Summa " Breves dies hominis," written

between 1180-1185 and also of the Porretan school, is aware of
the tripartite formula in its application to Penance. 97 The
author wants to pinpoint the sacramentum and the res sacramenti of Penance. He rejects contritio as the sacramentum
because it is not always present, as when one approaches the
sacrament ficte. He seems to reject both confession and satisfaction as the sacramentum, because if this is a sacrament of
the New Law then it must effect what it signifies and these
two things are rather effects than causes. Perhaps, he indicates, this can be gotten around by saying that only those
sacraments which are exclusively of the New Law must cause
what they signify, and Penance is a sacrament which, while
used in the New Law, was in existence even before the Mosaic
Law. Finally he mentions that" alii dicunt" that both contrition and exterior satisfaction form one sacramentum of Penance-just as the species of bread and wine form one sacramentum of the Eucharist. He continues,
And just as there [in the Eucharist] something is both sacramentum et res sacramenti, namely the body of the Lord, and something is the sacramentu1n et non res namely the exterior form, so
also here [in Penance] they say that something is both sacramentum
et res sacramenti, interior contrition, which signifies and causes the
remission of sin. However, exterior satisfaction signifies it [i. e.,
contrition] and sometimes effects it. 98

This author, without indicating his own preference in the
matter, at least makes it perfectly clear that those who apply
the tripartite formula to the sacrament of Penance do so by
analogy with the Eucharist.
4. Our next witness to the tripartite as applied to Penance
is Raoul the Ardent, whose work, Speculum Universale, devotes
its eighth book to the Incarnation and the Sacraments. 99 Raoul
designates exterior satisfaction as the sacramentum tantum,
interior contrition as the sacramentum et res, and remission
•• Cited by Anciaux, p. 878.

•• Ibid.
•• Cited by Anciaux, p. S79.

46

RONALD F. KING

of sin as the res tantum. And he adds that the first signi£es
the second, the second is signi£ed by the first, the third is only
signified.100 It might be noted here that Raoul teaches that
Penance " properly speaking " is interior contrition, while satisfaction is Penance " improperly speaking," since it is only the
sign of Penance. 101
Raoul is also aware of the problem that the sacraments of
the New Law must cause what they signify, and therefore, in
the tripartite division, exterior penance causes interior penance
which causes the remission of sin. But this appears to be wrong
for the simple reason that it seems to be inverted. Actually,
the remission of sin effects interior penance, which in turn
effects exterior penance. Therefore, in the hypothesis of a tripartite division, the res would precede the signum, while in the
other sacraments the signum precedes the res. A solution?
Raoul says:
To this they reply that Penance and Matrimony are ancient
sacraments and this is not required of them [i. e., that they cause
what they signify.] Or, this is said: a sacrament causes what it
signifies-and this is to be understood in this way: it signifies that
something is effected. For the sacraments are not efficient causes
of the things which they signify, but only instrumental causes, or
causes " sine qua non." The sacraments of the Old Law did not
cause nor signify that something was caused in the present, but
rather foreshadowed that something would be caused in the future.
So, it is not incongruous if the signum sometimes follows the res.102

It isn't clear from this passage alone what Raoul's view on the
whole topic is. His importance to us here is in his role as
witness to the tripartite in its application to Penance, with its
indication that some theologians were trying to show that this
application was valid despite the fact that the res sometimes
precedes the signum, and that Penance was a true sacrament
of the New Law even if it didn't cause what it signified.
5. The anonymous treatise known as "Quartum salutare
1oo
101
109

Ibid.
Cited by Anciaux, p. 859.
Cited by Anciaux, p. 879.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTiON OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

47

sacramentum " is another Porretan witness to the tripartite in
Penance. 108 In naming the various elements of the tripartite
division, this author lists confession and satisfaction as the
sacramentum tantum, contrition of heart as the res et sacramentum, and remission of sin as the res tantum. 104 The author
also goes into the question of how confession can be a sacrament of the New Law, since as such it ought to cause and precede contrition, while actually it is caused by and follows
contrition. In his reply he makes several distinction: a sacrament can be a sacrament of the New Law if it is observed in the
New Law, even though it was not instituted in the New Law.
Thus, confession is a sacrament of the New Law, because it is
observed in ·the New Law-even though it does not effect what
it signifies.105 He reports that some hold that confession and
contrition are one sacramentum of the remission of sin, and
that the sacramentum which is confession does cause what it
signifies but not all that it signifies: it causes remission but
not contrition. ·Confession as sacrament (i. e., as joined to contrition) causes what it signifies, but confession simply as confession doesn't-for it doesn't take its nature as sacrament from
confession but from contrition. Since both confession and contrition are one sacrament, that which precedes the res in contrition, precedes it not in time but in nature, but follows in
confession and satisfaction. 106
These last few lines were not given to throw any real light
on our problem, but merely to manifest the mental gymnastics
that some of these theologians went through to show that Penance is really a sacrament of the New Law.
6. Although Alain of Lille wrote on the sacraments in several of his works/ 07 he does not use the tripartite in any of
lbid.
'Ibid.
••• Anciaux, p. 180.
••e Ibid.

108
' 0

••T PL !UO: 807-480, De Fide Oatholica Contra Haereticos Sui Temporia, in which
he names all seven of the sacraments and discusses each of them.· He insists that
Baptism, Confirmation and Orders are not repeated-but the reason he gives for
this is not the characters of these sacraments but because Baptism represents

48

RONALD F. KING

them, and in his De Fide doesn't even use the sacramentum-res
sacramenti formula for the sacraments. When speaking of Baptism in his De .Articulis Catholicae Fidei, he refers to the baptismal character as the reason why Baptism cannot be repeated
but he doesn't even hint that the character might be called the
sacramentum et res of this sacrament. 108
7. The Opuscula of Cardinal Laborans, also of this school,
has nothing at all on the sacraments. 109
8. The final representative of the Porretan school will be
the famous " Master Martin," who also gives us an example of
the use of the tripartite formula in the sacrament of Penance.
Martin is another man who is quite difficult to classify as belonging to a school. His teaching on Penance borrows much
from Simon of Tournai, of the Porretan school, but also from
Peter of Poitiers, whom we will classify under the school of
Peter the Lombard. Of more interest to us than his place, or
lack of it, in a specific school, is his witness to the use of the
tripartite-and this, at least, is incontestable. 110
The general context of the section which we will discuss is
the question of whether the sacrament of confession belongs
to the Old or to the New Law. Martin's answer is a blend of
two sources, Simon of Tournai and Peter of Poitiers. Among
other things, he says that confession belongs to the Old Law
by "introduction" and to the New by "approbation."
He
maintains that "confessio" involves avowal of sin, contrition
of heart, and a resolve of not sinning again. When it is said
the Passion which was once for all, and because of the dignity of the two other
sacraments (847 A-858 C). His Theologiae Regulae, col. 621-684, also, treats the
sacraments but does not use the tripartite formula. In a later work, the De
Articuli8 Catholicae Fidei, col. 595-619, he speaks of the Baptismal character as
the reason for this sacrament's non-iteration, but he does not use the tripartite
formula. Finally, there was nothing pertinent to our study in his Liber in Di8tinctionibus dictionum theologicalium, col. 685-1012, Liber Sen.tentiarum, col. 2!!9252, and Memorabilia, col. !!58-264.
m PL 210: 614 B.
1•• A. Landgraf, Lqborantia C11rdinalia Opuscula (Florllegium Patristicum, FasCicle 82). Bonn, 1982.
' 11 ° Cited by Atici\i.ux, pp. 881-$82.
I

1

,

f

•

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF· A •SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

49

that confession is a sacrament, the word " confessio ?' here
embraces not only the avowal of sin but also the absolution of
the priest-and this because confession is both signum and
signatum: the signum is the priest's absolution and the signatum is the remission of sins. Because confession is a sacrament of the New Law, it causes what it signifies, and it signifies cleansing from sins. But it doesn't seem as though confession does this, since this is what contrition does. To solve
his dilemma, Martin calls on the tripartite division of the
sacrament:
Concerning the sacrament of confession we must consider three
things: exterior confession of word, contrition, and cleansing. The
first is the signum and not the res signi; the second is the signum
et res signi; the third is the res and not the signum.111
To make this division seem plausible, he recalls the fact that
exactly the same type of division is demanded by the Eucharist.112 Then he comes to the point of the res [contrition] preceding the signum [confession], but contents himself by admonishing his readers not to wonder at that because sometimes it
happens that way. Martin concludes his explanation by mentioning that some say that confession is not a sacrament of
the New Law because it is the work of man and not of God,
and it doesn't have any " power " except through the working
of charity. 113 This, too, was a common objection of the period
against Penance as a sacrament: sacraments operate through
the power of God, while Penance seems primarily the work
of man. This objection is brought out very explicitly in the
work of Peter of Poitiers.

E. The School of" Master Simon."
This last group of writers before Peter the Lombard and
his followers is both small and, for our purpose here, comparatively insignificant. It embraces only two works, and none
111 Anciaux,

llO]bid,,
111

Ibid.

p. 882.

50

RONALD F. KING

of them gives us a clear example of the use of the tripartite
formula.
1. Simon's own De Sacramentis was written somewhere
between 1145-1160. 114 He maintains that in every sacrament
there are two things, a " sacrum signans " and a " sacrum
signatum," and both of these are commonly called "sacramentum." 115 In Baptism, he distinguishes only between the
visible sacrament and the res sacramenti; 116 in Penance, he
uses no terminology resembling what we are looking for; in
Extreme Unction, he has all the ingredients for the tripartite
but doesn't seem aware of it; 117 in Matrimony, he makes a
distinction between the virtus sacramenti and what he refers to
as decorus; 118 in Order, he distinguishes between the vis and
the reverencia. 119 We fare only slightly better in his discussion
of the Eucharist. Simon speaks of the " two things which are
in this sacrament of the altar, the true Body of Christ and
that which is signified by it, His mystical body which is the
Church." 120 A little later he makes a distinction between the
good and the bad reception of the Eucharist: " the bad receive only the sacramentum, while the good receive both the
sacramentum and the res sacramenti." 121 As we have seen,
this distinction is usually based on the twofold res of the sacrament of the Eucharist.
1 " H. Weisweiler, Maitre Simon et son groupe. De Sacramentis.
(Spicilegium
Sacrum Lovanieuse, Fascicle 17.) Louvain, 1987. This edition also has an appendix containing the De Sacramentis of Peter Comestor, which we will use later.
As already remarked, Weisweiler accepts the priority of this Simon over the Sententiae Divinitatis (cf. especially XLVII), and he holds for a common source for
the De Sacramentis of Simon and the " Treatise of Madrid " which will be discussed next.
116 Weisweiler, p. 1.
116 Weisweiler, p. 4.
117 Weisweiler, pp. 42-48. Here Simon speaks of the oil consecrated by the
Bishop and giveu to the dying as the sacramentum, and the remission of sins as
the res sacrament._and he adds that this rea is conferred through the " interior
anointing." Saint Thomas later says almost exactly the same thing, save that he
gives the role of res et sacramentum to this interior anointing.
118 Weisweiler, p. 49.
119 Weisweiler, p. 69.
100 Weisweiler, p. 27.
111 Weisweiler, p. 84.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

51

of Madrid," or, as it is also called, De
septem sacramentis ecclesiae, dates from between 1160-1175.
Its author is unknown, but the work has been classified by
Weisweiler, who made a study of the matter, as one of the
" group " of Master Simon. In its discussion of Baptism, Penance, Matrimony and Order, there is nothing whatever of
interest to our research. While treating the Eucharist, he
speaks of the real Body and Blood of Christ as being sub sacramento, and through it the mystical body of the Church is signified. This could, perhaps, be drawn out to mean that the
Body of Christ is the res of the visible sacrament and also the
sacramentum of the Church, but the author does not make
such a connection. 122 Further on he does say explicitly that
the Eucharist contains a twofold res, Christ and the union of
charity. 123
2. The "Treatise

F. The School of Peter the Lombard.
Finally we come to the Master himself. There is no question at all that the tripartite formula is applied not only to
the Eucharist but also to Penance in the Lombard's Sentences.
At first I was very uneasy in accepting the fact that this application to Penance originated with the Lombard. So much
of the content of his Sentences consists of borrowings from
the works of others that one is hesitant to attribute an absolutely original thought to the Master himself. However, continued research on the subject has not turned up anyone who
uses the tripartite formula for Penance prior to Peter, nor have
I found any author who claims this privilege for anyone else.
The logical conclusion, albeit one that may be overturned as
new sources for the period are brought to light, is that this
extension of the tripartite formula from the Eucharist to Penance is an original Lombardian contribution.
120 Weisweilerl p. 91.
After speaking of the real Body of Christ as being sub
sacramento, he adds " sub tali sacramento, ut per verum corpus misticum significetur, scilicet Ecclesia."
128 Weisweiler, p.
" Hoc enim sacramentum duas in se res continet: Christum
et unionem caritatis."

RONALD F. KING

1. Peter the Lombard has a section dealing with the sacraments in general and then he treats each of the sacraments in
particular, but it is only in the Eucharist and Penance that
he applies the tripartite division. 124
On the Eucharist, he speaks of the " twofold res, one of
which is signified and contained and the other signified and
not contained. The former is the Flesh of Christ which he
took from the Virgin and the Blood which he shed for us. The
latter is the unity of the church." 125 A little later he spells
out the elements of the tripartite: " the sacramentum et non
res is the visible species of bread and wine; the sacramentum
et res is the very flesh and blood of Christ; the res et non sacramentum is his mystical flesh." 126 The Lombard shows how
the visible species is a sacramentum of both res, 'because it both
signifies and is similar to both of them: just as bread sustains
and wine rejoices, so the flesh and blood of Christ both spiritually fills and rejoices the interior man; just as bread is made
from many grains of wheat and wine from many grapes, so also
the " proper " body of Christ is composed from many immaculate members and his mystical body is made up of many persons who have been freed from the stain of sin.127
In his section on the sacraments in general, the Lombard
had set down two conditions that a sacrament be a true sign:
that it bear a likeness to the thing signified and that it be
visible. He goes to great pains to show how the sacramentum
'"• PL
Sententiarum Libri Quatuor. The Sacraments in General are treated
but the tripartite formula is not mentioned. He treats
in Book IV, col.
Baptism in col.
(Dist. Ill- VI), and speaks of receiving the sacramentum
et rem sacramenti, of receiving the sacramentum and not the rem, and of receiving
the rem and not the sacramentum-but none of this is a use of the tripartite
formula. Confirmation is treated very briefly in col. 855-856 (Dist. VII) and has
no mention of the formula. Extreme Unction covers col. 899-890 (Dist. XXIm
and there is no use of the formula, although here again all the ingredients are
present. In discussing Holy Orders, col. 900-900 (Dist. XXIV-XXV), and
mony, col. !)08-948 (Dist. XXVI-XLIT), he neither uses the tripartite formula nor
explicitly sets out the sacramentum-rea sacramenti of these sacraments.
857.
••• PL
118

Ibid.

111

PL 192: 858.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

58

tantum is the sacramentum of both res, but he is weak on
explaining how the res et sacramentum really fulfills the requirements of a true sacramentum-for, while it does have a
likeness to the res of which it is a sign, it itself is not visible.
The Lombard's major contribution to this particular aspect
of our research, as has now been said repeatedly, is his application of the tripartite formula, at his time commonly applied
exclusively to the Eucharist, to the sacrament of Penance. 128
The importance of this application demands that we quote
liberally from the text and clearly emphasize two or three facets
that might otherwise go unnoticed.
In Book IV, distinction twenty-two, number three, the author
sets out to clarify the sacramentum and the res sacramenti of
Penance. After stating that a sacrament is a sign of a sacred
thing, he asks:
What then is the signum here? Some say, as Gandulph, that
the sacramentum here is what is done externally, namely, exterior
penance, which is the sign of interior penance, namely, of contrition
of heart and of humility. But if this is so, then not every sacrament of the New Law causes what it signifies. For exterior penance
does not cause interior penance; but rather interior is the cause of
exterior. But to this [objection] they say that this [i.e., sacraments
cause what they signify] is to be understood of those sacraments
instituted in the New Law, as the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and the Body of Christ. But the sacrament of Penance, as
Marriage, existed before the time of grace, even from the very
beginning of the human race. Both were instituted at the time of
the first parents. Also [another objection] if exterior penance is
the sacramentum and interior is the res sacramenti, then it happens
more often that the res precedes the sacramentum, than vice versa.
But neither is this incongruous, for it often happens in other sacraments which do cause what they signify. But others say [here
begins the second opinion] that both exterior and interior penance
form the sacramentum, and this does not J;D.ake two sacraments
but one only-just as the species of bread and wine form one, not
two, sacrament. And just as in the sacrament of the Body, so
also in this sacrament, they say that one thing is the sacramentum
tantum, exterior penance, another the sacramentum et res, interior
penance, and a third is the res et non sacramentum, the remissiqn
1111

Penance is discussed in col. 867-899 (Dist. XIV-XXIT).

54

RONALD F.. KING

of sins. Interior penance is the res of the sacramentum, that is, of
exterior penance, and the sacramentum of the remission of sins,
which it signifies and causes. Exterior penance is the signum of
both interior penance and of the remission of sins." 129
There are several things here which should be drawn out
explicitly. First, the Lombard introduces both opinions with
a " quidam dicunt," which would seem to indicate that both
were current at the time that he wrote the Sentences. Certainly the first opinion was current, but to my knowledge no
one has found any writer prior to the Lombard who offers
this second possible explanation. Secondly, while he brings
objection against the first opinion, and offers some answers to
these objections, he doesn't mention any objections to the tripartite explanation. This would seem to me to favor our
contention that this was a brand new opinion, particularly in
the light of some of the objections which were brought against
it by later authors. Thirdly, the Lombard is explicit on the
fact that it is interior penance which signifies and causes the
remission of sin. Exterior penance is only the sign of the remission of sin. This is in line with the Abelardian position
that contrition causes the remission of sins, even in the sacrament. Note, too, that there is no mention of the priest's role
in the remission of sin, even though the composition of the
sacrament of penance is under discussion. Finally, earlier in
his sacramental study he had defined what he meant by exterior and interior penance, and so he didn't have to do it here.
For him, exterior penance was the sacrament of Penance, and
interior penance was a virtue of the mind. Both of them were
causes of salvation, each in its own way, although he was not
explicit on their precise relationship. 180
As mentioned earlier, there is some dispute on the relative
dating of the Sentences and the Summa Sententiarum. On the
basis of present evidence, I accept the fact that the Sentences
are subsequent to and dependent on, among other sources, the
Summa Sententiarum. The pertinent references on the dispute
109
180

·PL
PL

898-899.
869.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

55

appear below.131 However, that the Lombard's work was of
extreme importance is denied by no one, and the importance
of his use of the tripartite formula can be summed up in this
brief statement of Haring's:
Through Peter Lombard's Sentences it [i.e., the tripartite formula] gained such wide acceptance that, in the year U02, it was
even used in an official document, issued by Pope Innocent III.
Henceforth it was above debate that the Eucharistic Body is sacramentJum et res.182

2. The De Sacramentis of Peter Comestor dates from between 1165-1170.133 He uses the tripartite formula, as the
Master did, for both the Eucharist and Penance, but makes
no mention of it in discussing the other sacraments. Since
he doesn't add any new insight into what the Lombard had said
on both points, it doesn't seem necessary to reproduce Peter's
text in this work. We will content ourselves with noting that
he joins the ranks of those who, when faced with the problem
of how Penance can be a sacrament of the New Law when it
doesn't cause what is signifies, answers that it, like Matrimony,
was instituted in the Old Law and thus is not bound by this
stipulation.
8. One of the outstanding characteristics of the sacramental
teaching of Gandulph of Bologna 134 is his acceptance of the
notion of sacramentum as a lasting consecration of the recipient.
131 M. Chossat, La Somme des Sentences, ouvre de Hugues de Montagne vera
1155 (Spicilegium Sacrum Lovaniense, Fasc. 5), Louvain, 19!l8. P. de Ghellinck,
Le Mouvement tkeologique du XII• siecle, Paris, 1914. P. de Ghellinck, "Un
chapitre dans l'histoire de Ia definition des sacraments au XII• siecle," Melanges
Mandonnet II (Bibl. thomiste, 14) , Paris, 1980. 0. Lottin, "La Summa Sententiarnm est-elle posteriure aux sentences de Pierre Lombard?", Revue neo-Sckolastique, !l8 (19!l8). H. Weisweiler, "L'ecole d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de
Champeaux," RTAM 4 (198!l). H. Weisweiler, "La 'Summa Sententiarnm '
source de Pierre Lombard," RT AM 6 (1984) .
180 N. Haring, " Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum and their Influence on
Medieval Sacramentology," MS (Toronto) 10 (1948), p. 1!l9.
188 R. Martin, Pierre le Mangeur, De Sacramentis. This work forms the appendix
of H. Weisweiler's Maitre Simon et son groupe. For the date of the work, cf.
XXVID*, and for Peter's dependance on the Lombard, cf. XXID* sq.
18 ' J. de Walter, Magistri Gandulpki Bononiensia, Sententiarum Libri Quatuor.
Vienne, 19!l4.

56

RONALD F. KING

His Sentences were written most probably between 1160-1170,
and the fourth book deals with the sacraments. 135
In defining what a sacrament is, Gandulph makes a remark
which we haven't come across before. Referring to the popular
definitions of sacrament, he points out that the definition
"invisibilis gratiae visibilis forma" is not always applicable.
The reason given is " for the body of Christ is not only a sacred
secret but also sign of a sacred thing, and thus it is a sacrament, even though it isn't a visible form of invisible grace." 136
In treating the sacraments individually, he names all seven
of them but then omits any discussion of Extreme Unction. 137
The tripartite formula is not applied to Baptism, but he does
make a couple of interesting statements concerning this sacrament. For him Baptism is the sacrament of interior washing
and therefore those who approach it ficte do not receive this
interior washing and therefore do not receive a true but only a
false sacrament of Baptism. 138 This view of the sacrament
explains his rejection of St. Augustine's statement concerning
those who receive the sacrament ficte and later get rid of the
fictio and begin to receive the fruit of the sacrament. 139
There is no trace of the tripartite formula in his discussion
of Confirmation, nor does he line up the sacramentum-res
sacramenti for this sacrament.
When Gandulph takes up the Eucharist we do find the tripartite formula, but he adds nothing new to what others have
already said. He says of the Body of Christ that " et veritas
et figura est, i. e., res sacramenti et sacramentum." He also
speaks of the twofold 1·es of this sacrament, one hidden under
the species of bread and wine and the other signified only.
Finally, he gets around to lining up the various elements in
the now consecrated tripartite formula. 140
The sacrament of Penance receives a rather rambling treatment. A number of problems are taken up, with no seeming
order in the method of procedure. It is only in the last few
••• de Walter, "Einleitung,"
de Walter, p. 885.
187 de Walter, p. 896.
188 de Walter, p. 420.

txvm.

188

••• de Walter, p. 414.
uo de Walter, p. 442-448.

omGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

57

sentences of his study that he says a few words of interest to
our research, but even here he does not use the tripartite explicitly and is content to point out that exterior humiliation
is the sign of interior humiliation, and adds that sometimes
the sacramental effect precedes its sign and sometimes it
follows it. 141
In Holy Orders, the sacramentum is the spiritual power and
office of the priest, and the res sacramenti is grace. 142 In Matrimony, the bond is said to be the sacramentum. 143
Although Gandulph himself applied the tripartite formula
to the Eucharist only, it would not be stretching the point to
.see in his writings the foreshadowing of a much wider application. As we stated at the beginning of this study, the Augustinian notion of a sacrament as a lasting consecration of the
recipient was one of the contributing causes of the development
of the tripartite terminology in sacramental theology. Gandulph's insistence on this notion, with its consequent insistence
that the real sacramentum of Order is the spiritual power, of
Matrimony is the bond, of Baptism is the interior cleansing,
etc., seems to me to be a definite step in the eventual broadening of the formula to apply to these sacraments also. The
actual application was not to come for some time yet, but certainly we can look on these writings as part of the foundation
for what was to be made explicit by later authors.
4. Gerhoh of Reichersberg, a canonist and not really a part
of any of the major schools of theology, can be listed here because the general tenor of his teaGhing is basically Lombardian-despite the objection that he brings against the use of
the tripartite formula. 144 He might be called a "backhanded
witness " to the now common use of the formula, in that he
is violently opposed to its use in the Eucharist. He speaks
of bread as the sign of the unity of the Church, but refuses
to admit that Christ's Body signifies that same unity: Christ's
de Walter, p. 498.
u de Walter, p. 505.
148 de Walter, p. 588.
1 " PL 194: 1855 B-187ft D, Tractatua Adver8'U8 Simonaicua.
" 1

1

58

RON.ALI> F. XING

Body cannot possibly do this because it is hidden from our
eyes under the visible species, while a sacramentum must be
visible. Further, this Body doesn't signify a sacred thing but
it is a sacred thing and, according to Gerhoh, these two just
do not go together. Finally, he says that he stands back in
wonder at those teachers who say that the invisible flesh and
blood of Christ can signify the visible body of Christ, because
he had always been taught that invisible things were signified
by visible ones and not vice versa. 145 This objection which
Gerhoh raised was indeed a pertinent one, which in his day
had not been sufficiently answered. Alger of Liege's comment
that the Body of Christ is a s.acrament only insofar as it is
related to the external species had not yet fully penetrated
theological thinking.
5. The Summa of Peter Cantor, written between 1191-1197,
has just been edited within the last ten years. 146 We also have
Migne's edition of his Verbum Abbreviatum. 141 The" Cantor"
of Paris uses the tripartite formula for the Eucharist only and
gives his reason, at some length, for so doing. While discussing
Baptism, he takes up the question of those sacraments which
106 PL 194: 1866 D-1867 B.
"Sententiam quorundam magistrorun1 aflirmantiuni
quod carne et sanguine Christi utroque invisibili intelligibili significetur corpus
Christi visibile et palpabile cogor admirari, cum potius invisibilia per visibilia, quam
visibilia per invisibilia soleant significari."
uo J. A. Dugauquier, Pierre le Chantre Summa de Sacramentia et Animae
Consiliia. (Analecta Mediaevalia Namurcensia, Fasc. 4, 7, 11.) To date, only
three volumes have been edited: Fasc. 4 (1954) contains Cantor's teaching on
Baptism, Confirmation, Extreme Unction and the Eucharist; Fasc. 7 (1957) takes
up Penance and excommunications; Fasc. 11 (1961) is entitled Prologomena and
studies various MSS problems, the date of composition, influences on the author,
the question of simony, etc. The editor uses the Troyes MSS as the most ancient
and dates it from the end of the twelfth century (cf. Fasc. 4, pp. X and XCI).
On the date of the Summa itself, he says that it is definitely later than the third
Lateran Council of 1179 (cf. Fasc. 11, p. 179), and establishes its terminus a quo
at
and its terminus ad quem at 1197, the year of Cantor's death (cf.
Fasc. 11, p. 185).
1 .. PL
This could be called a "moral summa " and a summary of
some of Cantor's works. It is a practical treatment of virtues and vices and gives
practical advice to confessor and penitent. Though he discusses the sacrament of
Penance, he does not use the tripartite formula.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL

FORMULA

59

are confected and conferred simultaneously and whose confection consists in their conferral, as opposed to the sacrament
of the Eucharist, which is first confected and then conferred.
Because of this distinction, the Eucharist remains a true sacrament whether it is actually conferred or not. Not so with the
other sacraments. This, plus the fact that only in the Eucharist do the elements cease to be what they were and become
something else, form Cantor's basis for restricting the tripartite
to the Eucharist. In his own words:
In the sacrament of the Eucharist there are three things: a
signum tantum, a res tantum, and a middle term which is both
signum et res, namely the body and blood of the Lord, which is the
res of the exterior signum, namely of bread and wine, and the
signum of another res, namely the unity of the Church. The matter
of the sacrament is bread and wine, but this passes away. Not so
in the sacrament of Baptism. For water in some way is the matter
of the sacrament, but by its blessing it doesn't change into something else, so that here [i.e., in Baptism] only two things constitute
the sacrament, namely the exterior " intinctio " and the interior
cleansing, which is the res sacramenti.148
He then goes on to insist that this threefold distinction is to
be retained in the Eucharist, while a twofold distinction is
retained in the other sacraments, because in the Eucharist the
elements are changed into something else and remain after the
sacrament has been confected, while in the other sacraments
this does not happen. 149
Later, treating the Eucharist specifically, he returns to the
tripartite formula and the problem that it involves pertinent
to the definition of sacramentum. Can Christ really be called
a sacramentum? After repeating what he previously said about
the three things present in this sacrament, he adds "If it be
granted that Christ is a sacramentum, it would be inferred that
He is a visible form of an invisible and sacred thing, and thus
visible Himself. Further, of what res is He the forma? One
replies to this that the inference is false." 150 And he goes on
"" Dugauquier, Fasc. 4, pp. 66-67.
1 '"

Ibid.

160

Dugauquier, Fasc. 4, pp. 187-188.

60

·RONALD F. KING

to say .that this inference is false because Christ is not a visible
forma in se, but only through the medium of something else,
namely, through the external species which are the sacramentum in the proper sense. Therefore, the Body of Christ can
be said to be " visible " while existing under the species of bread
and wine in much the same way that a hand is " visible " when
encased in a glove-strictly speaking the only thing that we
see is the glove, but we do speak of seeing the hand. 151 Cantor's
solution to this problem of Christ as present invisibly in the
Eucharist and yet a sacramentum, when taken in conjunction
with visible species of bread and wine, is basically the same
position on the problem which Saint Thomas later adopts. The
statement originally made by Alger of Liege has finally been
brought to bear on this problem in a convincing way.
6. The Sentences 152 of Peter of Poitiers date from 1170-1176
and their importance is such that two modem scholars, Msgr.
Grabmann and Fr. de Ghellinck, have largely credited to them
the success of the Sentences of the Lombard throughout the
Middle Ages/ 58
Of the five sacraments that he discusses, Peter used the tripartite formula in two of them, the Eucharist and Penance.
On the Eucharist he adds nothing that hasn't been said before.
He spells out the elements of the tripartite and shows how the
visible species are the sacramentum of both the Body of Christ
and of the unity of the Church, and also shows how Christ is
the sacramentum of the Church, because, just as the Body of
Christ is composed of many immaculate members, so also the
unity of the Church is composed of many faithful persons. 154
His explanation of this last point satisfies the need for similarity
between sign and things signified, but says nothing of visibility.
Dugauquier, Fasc. 4, p. 188.
••• The edition of P. Moore and M. Dulong, Sententiae Petri Pictaviensis, Publications in Mediaeval Studies, University of Notre Dame, is not complete. Volume
1 (Book I) came out in 1948 and volume 2 (Book II) in 1950. Since Peter discusses Penance in Book III and the other sacraments in Book V, I had to take
the text from Migne, PL 211: 789-1280. However, the introduction to volume one
of the Moore-Dulong edition is very valuable for background material, dating, etc.
••• Moore-Dulong, vol. 1, pp. VI-VII.
••• PL 211: 1241 D-1242 A.
101

ORIGIN AND EVOLU'l'ION OF A SACRAMEN'l'AL

FORMULA

61

Peter discusses Confession under his section on grace in Book
Three. He does use the tripartite and at the same time makes
some interesting statements. The complete text can be found
in the footnote; here we will limit ourselves to pointing out a
few of its highlights. 155 Peter does not emphasize the tripartite
but merely presents it as one of several possible solutions to the
problem of Penance as a sacrament. He doesn't seem to accept
the division himself, since he holds that this sacrament is one
of the Old Law and therefore the signum need not either cause
or precede its res. However, his main reason for saying that
Confession is a sacrament of the Old Law is the fact that it is a
human act whose efficacy depends on charity, while the sacraments of the New Law are the work of God.
7. Robert of Courson, the star pupil of Peter Cantor, applied
the tripartite to Penance in his Summa Theologie M oralis.156
155 PL !HI:
1070 B-1071 B. "Confessio est sacramentum novi testamenti. Ergo
efl'ecit quod figurat, sed figurat mundationem a peccatis, ergo earn efl'ecit: quod
falsum est; imo contritio; item, confessio est signum mundationis interioris, ergo
praecedit mundationem interiorem, ergo contritionem, quod falsum est. lmo contritio praecedit confessionem. Ad hoc dicimus quod Evangelium non dat expressum
mandatum de confessione, nee tamen est insufficiens, quia alibi iD. Novo Testamento
satis invenitur ut in Epistola canonica: ' Confitemini alterutrum peccata vestra
(Jac. V) .' Q.uod tamen credimus dictum fuisse de confessione venialium, quae fit
his in die et in completorio. Dicimus etiam quod confessio praecepta fuit ibi: ' lte
ostendite vos sacerdotibus ' (Luc. 17) : sciendum est quod confessio est sacramentum veteris testamenti, nee efficit quod figurat, sicut nee conjugium. Alii autem
dicunt quod confessio non est sacramentum, sed sacramentale sicut aqua benedicta
et panis benedictus. Verius tamen videtur quod confessio sit sacramentum. Quod
autem objicitur quod res praecedit signum, id est contritio praecedit confessionem,
non est miram. Quandoque enim in multis rebus res et signum simul sunt, ut
circulus et tabema. Quandoque signum praecedit rem, ut nubes obscuritatem, vel
pluviam. Quandoque signum praecedit res, ut vestigia quae denotat aliquid praecessisse. Alii etiam dicunt quod confessio et contritio unum sunt samcrmantum,
sicut panis et vinum non sunt duo sacramenta, sed unum, et distingnunt ibi tria,
mundationem interiorem, confessionem, contritionem. Mundatio est res tantum.
Confessio est sacramentum tantum. Contritio est res et sacramentum. Sed quidquid dicitur, verius videtur quod confessio sacramentum sit, et res signum praecedat,
et non est sacramentum novi testamenti. Quod etiam sic ostenditur: quia confessio non est opus Dei, sed hominis, nee habet aliquam vim nisi ex charitate, ergo
confessio non est sacramentum novi testamenti. Est itaque certum quod remissio
peccati praecedit confessionem."
158 V. Kennedy,
".Robert Courson on Penance,"MS 7 (1945), pp.
Kennedy has here edited the first part of Courson's Summa, and fortunately it is

62

RONALD F. KiNG

And this he does, despite the fact that his master was adamant
on limiting it to the Eucharist. Robert insists that the sacrament of Confession is a sacrament of the New Law, and therefore causes what it signifies. To the objection that it can't
cause the cleansing from sin because contrition does this, Robert
replies that contrition alone doesn't do it but confession must
also play its part. 157 Of the tripartite elements themselves,
confession is the sacramentum tantum, contrition the res et
sacramentum, and cleansing from sin the res tantum. He concludes by noting that the sign sometimes precedes the thing
signified and sometimes follows it. 158

IV. THEOLOGIANS

OF THE THIRTEENTH

CENTURY UP TO

SAINT THOMAS AQUINAS

It was in the thirteenth century that the tripartite formula
really came into its own, being extended from the Eucharist
and Penance to embrace all of the sacraments. As we shall
see however, its use in the Eucharist and Penance is more highly
refined than its use in the other sacraments and it is in these
two sacraments especially that the formula becomes a very
useful vehicle for integrating the various divergent elements
of the sacraments.
1. With the opening years of the thirteenth century, we
find the first official use of the tripartite formula in an ecclesiastical document-the " Cum Martha circa " of Pope Innocent
III which was issued on November 29, 1202.159 In it, the Pope
singles out explicitly the various elements of the Eucharist in
tripartite fashion: there is the visible form, the true Body of
Christ, the spiritual " virtus." The Eucharist, he adds, is the
" Mystery of Faith " because what is seen in it is other than
what is believed and what is believed is other than what is
seen.160
the part that we need for our study. (For the detailed plan of the entire Sumnna,
see Kennedy's article, " The Content of Courson's Summa," MS 9 (1947), pp.
81-107.)
169 PL 214: 1121 B.
167 Kennedy, p. 805.
160 PL 214: 1121 A.
158 Kennedy, pp. 805-806.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

68

2. In one brief published excerpt that we have from the
Summa of Praepositinus, we can find intimations of the tripartite mentioned in connection with the sacrament of Baptism.

We say that in this sacrament three things are to be considered:
one, which signifies and does not remain, another which both signifies and remains, and a third which is signified. That which
signifies and does not remain is water; the one which signifies and
remains is the seal, which man has because he is baptized according
to the rite of the Church; the thing signified is the cleansing grace.
All three are called baptism. 161
We will have more to say about this passage when we discuss
Hugh of St. Cher.
Praepositinus in his Summa, can also be listed as a witness
to the use of the tripartite in the sacrament of Penance. He
does not set up the tripartite formula as we have seen it so
often already, but he certainly is aware of it when he sets out
to establish the sacramentum and the res sacramenti of the
sacrament. He speaks of satisfaction as the sacramentum, with
contrition as its res, and adds that the remission of sins is the
res of contrition. The very least that we can say is that all
of the tripartite elements, as they were understood in that time,
are present here. Praepositinus is thinking along tripartite
lines, although he doesn't explicitly couch his thought in the
consecrated tripartite formula. 162
8. An anonymous Summa, "Ne ad mensam" also dating
from the beginning of the thirteenth century, uses the formula
in the sacrament of Penance. This one is expressed in the form
161

Cited by A. Landgraf, " Sentenzenglossen des beginnenden 18 Jahrhunderts,"

RTAM 10 (1988), p. 44.
102 This work of Praepositinus still exists only in MSS, but the passage that we
refer to is reproduced by Anciaux, pp. 886-887. George Lacombe pointed out that
this Summa was composed at Paris between
when the author was Chancellor there. Lacombe also noted that this work is not a commentary on the
Lombard but an original and independent work, built on its own definite plan.
(The New Scholaaticiam, "Praepositinus, Cancellarius Parisiensis," 1
pp.
807-819.) J. Garvin and J. Corbett have edited what they call The Summa Ormtra
Haereticos, Ascribed to Praepoaitinus of Oremrma (Publications in Mediaeval
Studies, No. 15), University of Notre Dame Press, 1958. This work treats of
Baptism and the Eucharist, but it does so from a strictly Scriptural point of view
and there is nothing like the tripartite formula to be found in it.

64

RONALD F. KING

of a search for what really constitutes the sacrament of Penance. Confession is proposed, but the old objection is brought
up against it that it does not precede its res. Another school
of thought proposes confession and whatever else is done exteriorly as the sacrament, and adds that these things do not
have to cause what they signify since this is not a sacrament
instituted in the New Law. A third possibility is that confession and contrition constitute one sacrament, like the species
of bread and wine in the Eucharist, and within this context
the tripartite formula is set up. The three elements of the tripartite are confession, contrition and interior cleansing. The
author's parting shot on this whole discussion is worth reproducing: " We don't accept any of them and maintain that none
of them is the sacramentum, although in some way they are
signs. Every sacrament is a sign, but not vice versa." 163
4. Stephen Langton is not always consistent in the teaching
he presents on the sacrament of Penance in his Quaestiones/ 64
but at least he does furnish us with another example of the
tripartite in use. There will be no reference here to his Summa,
both because it remains unedited and because its authenticity
is still unsettled. 165
Within the context of the question, " Is contrition a sacrament of the New Testament? ", we find two different answers,
but each of them uses the tripartite formula. To the objection
that contrition is not a sacrament of the New Testament because it does not always cause what it signifies, as when an
unrepentant person receives it, Langton answers that it is a
Anciaux, p. 888.
Anciaux, p. 888-885.
16 " Dom Lottin rejects Langton's authorship of the Summa, in his article " L'authenticite de Ia Summa d'Etienne Langton," RTAM 1 (1929), pp. 497-504. But
George Lacombe doesn't fully agree with Lottin. In " The Authenticity of the
Summa of Cardinal Stephen Langton," The Nmo Scholasticism 4 (1980), pp. 97-114,
he concludes with this: " Do I believe that Langton wrote the Bamberg Summa?
I would not like to go further than this: if we would reject the testimony of the
rubricator of the Bamberg MS Patr. 186, who writes: ' Summa. Magistri Stephani
Cantuarienses Archiepiscopi,' we must find other arguments, I think, than those
offered by Dom Lottin. For myself, I have great faith in the scribes of the early
thirteenth century when they are neither Victorines nor Franciscans."
168
164

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

65

sacrament of the New Law because it is observed in the New
Law, although it originated in the Old Law. Although he says
no more than this, I think we can presume that Langton felt
that this answered the objection. Since this sacrament originated in the Old Law, it doesn't have to cause what it signifies.
He goes on to say that this sacrament has three parts: contrition, confession, satisfaction. The first of these is twofold:
interior and exterior. Therefore, says he, exterior contrition is
the sacrament of interior contrition, which is the sacrament of
the remission of sin. The first of these is the sacramentum
tantum, the second is the sacramentum et res, and the third is
the res tantum. And, as if to justify this type of division, he
makes explicit reference to the tripartition of the Eucharist. 166
Just how satisfaction and confession, which he called the other
two parts of the sacrament of Contrition, fit in here is not
made clear.
From another manuscript of Langton's, Anciaux cites an
answer to the same question which has a slightly different twist,
although the part that we are concerned with here remains
the same:
And as in the sacrament of the Eucharist there are three things:
the first of which is the sacramentum, the second res et sacramentum, the third res tantum, so also here there are three things:
exterior contrition, interior contrition, the remission of sin. And
contrition has a likeness to the remission of sin, because, as a man
who is contrite both humbles himself and dies to self, so also sins
which have been forgiven are annihilated. And thus contrition
causes what it signifies.167
In this passage Langton obviously wants to show how contrition can be a sacramentum, and so he emphasizes its similarity
to the remission of sin. Shortly after the section just quoted,
Langton says explicitly that the sacraments which were instituted in the Old Law and only observed in the New, like Penance and Matrimony, do not effect what they signify. 168 In
Anciaux, p. 883.
Ibid.
188 Anciaux, p. 884.

188

187

66

RONALD F. KING

another place, he further confuses the issue by stating that
confession is really not a sacrament but a sacramentaJ.l 69
As can be seen from all this, even though the tripartite formula is used here it has not yet reached the stage where it
can embrace all of these divergent and complex elements of the
sacrament of Penance and mold them into a unified whole.
5. A disciple of Stephen Langton, Godfrey of Poitiers wrote
his Summa between 1213-HH5. 170 This work is noteworthy on
two counts: its statement that there are three things in the
sacrament of contrition just as there are in the Eucharist, and
its explicit reference to another res in Baptism besides grace.
On the first point, Godfrey states that " contrition is a sacrament, and as there are three things in the sacrament of the
Eucharist, so also are there in this sacrament of contrition.
Exterior contrition is sign and cause of the remission of sins
and so it is a sacrament." 171 He also refers to the three things
which make up the Eucharist, a reference which authors who
are proposing a tripartite formula for Penance frequently do,
but Godfrey is not proposing the tripartite. The three things
that he has in mind are contrition, confession, and satisfaction.
Further on he adds that confession is a sacrament when it is
accompanied by grace, and satisfaction is a sacrament on the
same condition. 172 Godfrey seems to be unique in this arrangement, and he is not a partisan of the tripartite for Penance.
For Godfrey's comment on Baptism, we rely on a passage
from one of Father Haring's articles. 173
Godfrey of Poitiers
accepts Courson's view of baptism
almost to the letter. 174 Worth noting is his observation that the impression of the baptismal character is a signum of grace, the res
principalior of baptism. If grace is described as the res principalior,
one may be entitled to ask whether, besides grace, there is another
1oo Ibid.
170 P. Anciaux, "La date de composition de Ia Somme de Godfroid de Poitiers,"
RTAM 16 (1949), pp. 165-166.
171 Anciaux, La Theologie du Sacrement, etc., p. 889.
1 .. Anciaux, pp. 889-890.
173 N. Haring, " Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum and their In:il.uence on
Medieval Sacramentology," MS 10 (1948), p. 187.
m On this point, see A. Landgraf's article " Die Friihscholastische Definition der

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

67

res in baptism, as is obviously implied by the comparative principalior. Though no explanation is offered, we are here confronted,
for the first time, with the concept of a baptismal res other than
grace, as we shall later find in the distinction sacramentum et res in
Baptism.

We will reserve comment on this statement until we treat
Hugh of St. Cher, and then put Praepositinus, Godfrey and
Hugh together.
6. With Hugh of St. Cher, we have an explicit application
of the tripartite formula to the sacrament of Baptism. This
discussion of Hugh will involve three works: his Commentary
on the Sentences, written between U33-U43, the anonymous
Gloss, Filia M agistri, written after Hugh's work and probably
before 1243, and an anonymous Summa of Bale, which dates
from the U50's. 175
Of Hugh, Haring says:
The analogy between Baptism and the Blessed Eucharist which
we have encountered on various occasions found its final evolution
in the mind of Hugh of St. Cher. If we distinguish sacramentum
tantum, res et sacramentum and res tantum in the Blessed Eucharist, Hugh reasoned, the distinction could be put to good use in
the clarification of baptismal problems. Hence he is the first scholar
to teach that the sacramentum tantum is the water sanctified by
the word of life; res tantum is the infusion of grace and the remisTaufe," Gregorianum 27 (1946), p. 886. The author points out that for Courson,
Baptism was not a sacramentum which was a visible form, but rather the resultant
of three factors: form, element and intention. He held that Baptism was really
the character, the seal of the Christian religion in the baptized, by which he becomes a member of the Church and is distinguished from all unbelievers.
176 As all three of these works remain unedited, I am drawing on reproductions
of some passages which have appeared in articles of two outstanding writers
on the period: H. Weisweiler, "Theologiens de !'entourage d'Hugues deS. Cher,"
RT AM 8 (1986), pp. 889-407, and N. Haring, " Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum, etc., MS 10 (1948), pp. 109-147. The first article establishes that the
" Filia Magistri," a famous abridgement of Hugh's Sentences, was definitely not
written either by Hugh or by William of Auxerre, but that it depends on both of
them-with Hugh being the primary source. Weisweiler maintains that Hugh
wrote his Sentences between 1280-1245, and insists that the "Filia Magistri" is
absolutely no later than 1250. In the same article, he shows the dependence of
the anonymous " Summa of Bale," so called because it was uncovered at Bale University, on Hugh. He also holds that this Summa cannot be dated much later
than the very first years of the second half of the thirteenth century,

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RONALD F. KING

sion of sin; sacramentum et res is the baptismal character .... To
the objection that character cannot justly be called sacramentum
because it is not a visible forma, Hugh replied that visibilis could
be taken to mean sensibilia, and that the definition is sufficiently
safeguarded as long as at least one component is visible. It had
also been objected that character cannot be identified with Baptism because the effect is distinct from its cause. The objection,
Hugh reports, is based on what is sacramentum tantum, hence, it
cannot validly be raised against character or Christ's Body, both
of which are sacramenta et res rather than sacramentum tantum.
But how can character be called signum? It is a signum for both
men and angels; but for men only in the life hereafter. 176
While Haring talks about what Hugh says, Weisweiler actually reproduces, at some length, his teaching on baptism. 177
Parts of both the Filia Magistri and the Summa of Bale are
also reproduced by Weisweiler, both of which have the same
teaching as Hugh's Sentences, but in a more brief form. 178
While there are very strong overtones of tripartite thinking
in relation to Baptism in the passages that we have seen from
the works of both Praepositinus and Godfrey of Poitiers, it
must be admitted that neither of them explicitly applies the
tripartite formula to the sacrament. Hugh of St. Cher certainly
makes an explicit application of the formula to Baptism, although he is weak in explaining how the character can be called
a signum. If we pose the question of who was the first to
explicitly apply the tripartite formula to Baptism, then Hugh
would have to receive the laurel.
7. Alexander of Hales is the first of the four great theologians of this century whose works we will discuss. 179 The
Haring, pp. 188-189.
Weisweiler, pp. 408-404.
178 Weisweiler, pp.
179
in Quattuor Libras Sententiarum, vol. IV, (Bibliotheca Franciscana
Scholastica Medii Aevi, Tome XV), Quaracchi, Florence, 1957. (William of Auxerre,
author of the influential Summa Aurea, could also be considered as one of the
great theologians of this period. However, he will not be considered here because
he did not make use of the tripartite formula in his sacramental writings. We
have not made a personal study of the Summa Aurea because Brommer, who made
such a study, says that the tripartite formula is not found there, See his Die Lehre
von sakramentalem charakter in der Scholastik bis Thomas von Aquin inklusive,
Paderborn, 1908, p. 48 sq.)
176

171

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69

material that we will be using was written between 1222-1229.180
In discussing the sacraments in general, Alexander gives various definitions of sacrament and then proposes some objections
against them. One of the objections is centered around the
characters of Baptism, Confirmation, and Order: the character
is a sign of grace to be conferred but it is not a visibilis forma
and therefore not a sacramentum. His answer:
We reply: one thing is called visible secundum se and another
insofar as it is visible sub olio. The water of Baptism is visible
secundum se and it is the sign of the character, but the character
is the sign of the remission of sin. Therefore the remission of sin
is the signatum tantum; character, as it is the middle term, is both
signans and signatum; the water is tantum signum. And so the
character is visible insofar as it has this function from the water
itself. The same objection is made to the Body of Christ: there is
the bread, and the Body of Christ, and the mystical Body. Both
the bread and the Body of Christ are sacraments. 181

Later, in trying to understand the Augustinian formula" accedente verbo ad elementum et fit sacramentum," he asks what
the word sacramentum means here. His answer is that" there
are three things in this sacrament: one which signifies and
doesn't remain, the sanctified water; another which signifies
and remains, the character, which is indelible; a third which is
signified and doesn't necessarily remain, grace." 182 After proposing objections to each of the three, he concludes that all are
called sacramentum, but in different ways: "Properly, however, Baptism is the character, not the character simply but
insofar as it receives the function of sign from the water sanctified by the word." 183
I could find no use whatever made of the tripartite formula
in his discussion of the sacrament of Confirmation. 184
The Eucharist, of course, does receive the tripartite treatment. In fact, his very lengthy discussion of this sacrament
Glossa, p. 44*.
Glossa, p. 14 (IV, Dist. I, # 6).
189 Glossa, p. 51 (IV, Dist. II, # 6).
188 Glossa, p. 58 (IV, Dist. III, # 6) .
18 ' His treatment of this sacrament was quite brief, pp. 1!!8-182.

180

181

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RONALD F. KING

is completely framed within the tripartite terminology. However, he doesn't add anything substantially new to what we
have already seen in the writings of others, so it will be sufficient to indicate in the footnote several of the places where
explicit mention can be found. 185
Within his one hundred and eighty page discourse on the
sacrament of Penance, Alexander asks how Penance can be
one sacrament when it has three signs-confession, contrition,
satisfaction-and each sign seems to have its own signification.
He answers that, although these three signs do exist in perfect
Penance, which is the sacrament of the Church, nevertheless
they do not constitute three sacraments but one. The reason
is that a sacrament is not perfected from its signification but
from its causality, and all three are geared to causing one thing,
the remission of sin, of which perfect Penance is the sign. Then
he continues:
If it is asked what is the sacramentum, what the res tantum and
what the res et sacramentum: according to the Master, exterior
penance, which is in satisfaction, is the sacramentum tantum; interior penance, which is in contrition, is the res et sacramentum:
remission of sin, both as to fault and as to punishment, is res
tantum. And according to this one must say that the aforesaid
definition of sacrament does not fit Penance as it is sacramentum
tantum, but as it is sacramentum et res, as it also happens in the
sacrament of the Eucharist. 186

The tripartite is not used in Extreme Unction. He only
speaks here of the sacramentum as the " anointing with the
oil of the sick performed by a priest whose duty it is, with the
intention of doing what the Church does and with the prayer
of faith " and then adds, " the res sacramenti is the interior
anointing which is completed by the remission of sin and the
increase of virtues." 187 In another place he does speak of
185 Glossa, pp. 47-48 (IV, Dist. III, # 8); p. 188 (IV, Dist. VIII, # 7); p. 140
(IV, Dist. VIII, # 9); p. 148 (IV, Dist. VIII, # 11); p. 150 (IV, Dist. IX); p. 179
(IV, Dist. XI, # 14); p. 401 (IV, Dist. XXIV, # 2); p. 429 (IV, Dist. XXIV,
#11).
186 Glossa, p. 888 (IV, Dist. XXII, # 2).
187 Glossa, pp. 886-887 (IV, Dist. XXIII) .

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

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Extreme Unction being a sign of two res, but this is not a reference to the tripartite formula. 188
Holy Orders does not receive a tripartite treatment, but
Matrimony does, and in this it seems that Alexander scores a
first. As we have seen so often before, there is an explicit
reference made here to the use of the formula in the Eucharist.
He speaks of " external consent made in words " as the forma
visibilis of Matrimony and says that this consent signifies the
" consensus animorum " which is, properly speaking, the sacrament. Then,
For as the species of bread and wine are not called that through
which invisible grace is conferred, but the Body of Christ under
the species of bread and wine [is called this], so also the consent of
minds expressed by the words is properly called sacramentum.
Therefore there is something which is sacramentum tantum, external consent; something which is sacramentum et res, internal consent; something which is res tantum, the union of the faithful soul
with Christ or the union of the Church with its head. But this
division is on the part of the sacrament as sign; considering the
sacrament as cause, another division is given.189

8. Saint Bonaventure, disciple of Alexander of Hales, uses
the tripartite formula liberally in his Commentary on the fourth
book of the Lombard's Sentences. 190
He doesn't mention the tripartite explicitly in his section on
the Sacraments in General, 191 but he does seem to suppose it
when he speaks of how the sacraments are causes sine qua non
of gratia gratum faciens: efficient causes of the character or
the ornatus animae, and dispositive causes of efficacious grace
and healing. 192
Taking the sacraments individually, we find the following.
The formula is used quite explicitly in Baptism. Bonaventure
188 Glossa, p. 890 (IV, Dist. XXTII, # 2):
" Unctio enim extrema duo habet
significata, quorum unum est causatam, scilicet dimissio venialis peccati in praesenti,
alterum significatum tantum, scilicet plena gratia quae habetur in susceptione
utriusque stolae."
188 Glossa, p. 455 (IV, Dist. XXVI, # 5).
180 S. Bonaventurae Opera Omnia, Tomus IV. Ad Claras Aquas (Quaracchi), 1889.
191 Bonaventure, IV, D. I, p. 1, art. I, q. 1-6.
192 Bon., IV, D. I, art. 1, q. 1, conclusio.

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RONALD F. KING

asserts that Baptism is something permanent; baptism in the
proper sense, that is, the sacramentum exterius, perseveres only
in its effect-which is also sometimes called baptism. He says
then,
In Baptism there are three things: one is sacramentum tantum,
the visible element; another is the res tantum, healing grace; a
third is the sacramentum et res sacramenti, the character. The res
sacramenti is commonly called baptism; the res et sacramentum is
properly called it; the sacramentum is more properly called it; the
washing is still more properly called it, and the element in the act
of washing is most properly called it.193
In Confirmation, there is no one place where he sets up the
tripartite formula explicitly, but there is an allusion to it. Discussing whether the same grace is conferred in Baptism and in
Confirmation, he speaks of the sacrament, character and grace
of Confirmation in contrast to these same elements of Baptism,
but he does not line them up in the tripartite formula as he
had done in the first sacrament. 194
The tripartite is used for the Eucharist, and a whole question is devoted to its discussion. 195 We won't go into all the
details here, but Bonaventure gives some very clear and perceptive answers to a number of problems which had been raised
against the tripartite: how the visible species are similar to
the real and the mystical Body of Christ, how the sacramentum
tantum signifies but does not cause the sacramentum et res
except insofar as it is joined to the words of consecration, how
the sacramentum tantum causes the res tantum only through
the medium of the sacramentum et res, how the res et sacramentum does not have the aptitude secundum se of signifying
anything else, but only as it " subest speciebus visibilibus," etc.
From reading his treatment here, one comes away with the distinct impression that in Bonaventure's capable hands the tripartite formula has finally become a very effective means of
integrating and clearly explaining the various elements of the
Eucharist.
Bon., IV, D. III, art. 1, q. 1.
Bon., IV, D. III, art. q.
195 Bon., IV, D. VIII, p.
art. q. 1.

198
19 '

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73

In Penance also, Bonaventure uses the tripartite to very
good effect. In the body of the article " De sacramento poenitentiae quoad significationem," he says that one must distinguish between Penance as reconciling one with God and as
reconciling one not only with God but also with the Church.
In his words:
Insofar as it is a sacrament reconciling with God, it has the remission of sins as its res; it has exterior humiliation, either in mind
or in word, as its signum; and interior penance as its res et signum.
It isn't necessary that the first be the cause of the middle, but
rather conversely-and this because it is from natural reason and
therefore the external proceeds from the internal, and the external
does not cause what is internal. But insofar as it is a sacrament of
the Church, having institution, it has the ratio of cause and sign, as
do the other sacraments; the ratio of causality resides with that
which is formal, and the ratio of sign with that which is material.
The material thing in this sacrament is the humiliation of the penitent either as to the act of contrition, or as to the words of accusation or as to the penalty of satisfaction; the formal thing is the absolution of the priest. These two joined simultaneously signify interior
penance, insofar as through it is the perfect remission of the sin,
both to punishment and to fault. As for the remission of sin as to
fault, the external sacrament has the ratio of sign; as to remission of
punishment, it has in some way the ratio of cause. Thus it is evident
what in this sacrament is the res-the pedect remission of sin;
and what is the signum-exterior penance according to the ecclesiastical form, in which there is humiliation and absolution; the res
et signum is interior penance.196
One must be careful to read this exactly as Bonaventure has
written it. He attributes the remission of sin, both as to fault
and as to punishment, to interior penance. And he says that
exterior penance, precisely as exterior penance, is only the sign
of the remission of sin as to fault. This does not mean that
the sacrament of Penance is not the cause of the remission of
sin as to fault. The " whole sacrament " is composed of both
exterior and interior penance, and it is this " whole sacrament "
which causes the remission of sin as to fault. That this is
Bonaventure's view on the subject is made clear in his answer
188

Bon., IV, D. xxn, art. 2, q. 2.

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RONALD F. KING

to an objection in this same article. The third objection states
that in the sacraments the signum is the cause of the signatum,
but exterior penance is not the cause of interior penance. The
reply:
To what which is objected, that interior is the cause of exterior,
it must be said that this sacrament is partly of natural reason and
partly of institution; therefore, the external sign in one way is
caused, and in one way causes. For interior detestation, insofar as
it is detestation, indeed makes man exteriorly humbled; but insofar
as it absolves wholly from fault and punishment, it has this from
exterior absolution and penitence.197
We would make two comments on this passage. First, it is
an application of a principle which he will spell out in more
detail in his discussion of Matrimony. Secondly, what Bonaventure says of interior penance here is almost identical with
the way Thomas describes it: it can be considered as a certain
virtue, and then it is the cause of exterior penance; or, it can
be considered as" an act operating towards the healing of sin,"
and in this way it is the signatum of exterior penance, the reset
sacramentum of the sacrament of Penance.
The tripartite is also used for Extreme Unction, but it plays
a very insignificant role and is mentioned almost as an obiter
dictum. 198 The signum tantum is the exterior anointing, the
signum et res is the spiritual anointing which is an arousal of
devotion in the soul, the res tantum is the cure of venial sins.
After searching carefully through the entire section of Holy
Order, I could find no explicit use of the formula. However,
scattered throughout the tract, he refers to three elements of
this sacrament: the sacrament, the character, and grace--and
in one place he calls the character a res et signum. 199
Finally, in Matrimony, we have the last usage of the tripartite formula in Bonaventure's writings. 200 It is here that
he develops the idea that we mentioned previously under PenBon., IV, D. XXII, art. 2, q. 2, adS.
Bon., IV, D. XXill, art. 1, q. 1.
199 Bon., IV, D. XXIV, p. 1, art. 2, q. 2.
••• Bon., IV, D. XXVI, art. 2, q. 1.
197
198

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75

ance. He says that the tripartite formula is in general use in
the sacraments, but it differs in its way of bringing the various elements together-and this for two reasons: some sacraments are regulated totaUy because of the way that they were
instituted (as Baptism and the Eucharist), while others are
regulated partly by their institution and partly by their own
intrinsic natures, as Matrimony and Penance.
9. The exact date of the De Sacramentis of St. Albert the
Great is hard to determine, but the work was written, certainly, before 1246.201 The first striking thing about his treatment of the sacraments is that on the very first page of his
work he refers to the tripartite formula and immediately incorporates it into his theory of sacramental causality. He starts
with a problem: it is said that God is the efficient cause of
grace and the sacraments are disposing causes. But how can
this be, since a disposition can only dispose matter to receive a
form, and it does this when one form expels another from the
matter. We say that the sacraments dispose the soul to receive
grace, and therefore they must be able to expel from the soul
that form with which grace cannot exist-namely, sin. To do
this as a disposition would do it, the sacrament must be contrary to sin. But there is no contrariety between a corporeal
element, such as a sacrament, and sin. Therefore, how can the
sacraments expel sin? 202 The reply:
In every sacrament there is something which is the signum
tantum, and something which is signum et res in relation to diverse
things. The very being of a causing sacrament is in this, that it is
a signum et res, and not in the fact that it is a signum tantum.
That [i.e., signum et res], however, is contrary to sin in every sacrament. Nevertheless, we agree that the sacrament does not take
away the sin, but disposes towards its removal, just as in natural
things a disposition does not take away a substantial form but
disposes towards its destruction. 203
201 Alberti Magni Omnia Opera, Monasterii Westfalorum in Aedibus Aschendorll'.
Tome XXVI: De Sacramentis, De lncarnatione, De Resurrectione, was edited and
published in 1958. See page X of the " Prologomena " for the date of the De
Sacramentis.
000 Albert, Q. 1, 2.
008 Albert, Q. I, 2, ad 2.

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RONALD F. KING

A little further on, he says again " that which is the signum et
res indeed touches the soul " 204 and is therefore able to dispose it.
Notice the role that Albert is here assigning to the signum
et res: the disposition leading to the destruction of sin. He
seems to be saying that it is a spiritual quiddity, since it is
contrary to sin, and can dispose the soul to sin's destruction by
its contrariety to it. The sacramentum tantum cannot have
this effect because it is corporeal. Thus, the sacramentum
tantum acts through the sacramentum et res in effecting the
res tantum.
In discussing Baptism, he states that it is something permanent in the baptized and therefore the Lombard's definition of
it as " tinctio in aqua facta verbo vitae sanctificata " is not
acceptable. In reply to this, he mentions the signum tantum
and the signum et res of Baptism, the latter being the character, and says that it is the sacramentum " not in itself but
insofar as it is manifested in the first, for those two things have
a united power. Although the tinctio, as tinctio, passes, it does
not pass insofar as its power is united to the power of the
character, and it is in this sense that the second is called baptism." 205 A little further on, in the context of remission of
sin as the res of the sacrament, he again emphasizes the role
of the character as a spiritual power which disposes the soul
to the reception of grace by which it will be interiorly cleansed.
God does the cleansing as the efficient cause, with the sacrament in the role of the disposing cause. 206
Albert does not apply the tripartite to Confirmation-but
neither does he identify the character as the res et sacramentum. That he held the latter seems certain, and if we
knew why he didn't say so explicitly perhaps we would also
know why he didn't use the tripartite formula.
There are several references to the tripartite in his study of
••• Albert, Q. 1, 2, ad 2.
••• Albert, Tract lli, Q. 1, ad 1.
••• Albert, Tract ill, Q. 2, art. 2, ad 8.

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77

the Eucharist, but his use of the formula here adds nothing
to what we have already seen. 207
In Albert's study of Penance we find an article entitled
" Quid sit res, quid signum et quid res et signum et materia
et forma." 208 The article begins by stating an Augustinian
definition, " signum est quod praeter speciem quam ingerit
sensibus aliud facit in cognitionem venire," and then pointing
out four specific problems here: (1) it seems that there is no
sign in contrition; (2) confession and satisfaction seem to be
signs of contrition, since they are external and it is internalbut if this is so it goes contrary to the fact that a sign is a
sign of a subsequent, not a preceding, thing; (8) confession
and satisfaction seem to have no likeness to contrition; (4)
contrition is not the res of confession and satisfaction, but the
signatum is always the res of the signum. The body of the
article, for the unique twist that it gives to the tripartite formula in Penance, is worth quoting in full.
There is a difference in the parts of Penance and in the parts
of other wholes. Therefore we say that in each of those parts there
is something as signum, something as res, and something as signum
et res-all of which, however, are united in relation to one end, as
has been said. In contrition, then, there is exterior contrition which
is the signum tantum, and which consists in a humble countenance
and in other external signs manifesting interior sorrow. And there
is interior sorrow, which is the signum et res. And there is remission of part of the punishment and all of the fault, which is the
res tantum. Likewise in confession, there is the narration of sin
with external signs of abomination, which is the signum tantum;
and there is interior recollection and abomination of individual
sins, which is the signum et res. The external narration of sin
according to its diverse species is the sign that he interiorly recollects and abominates the individual sins. . . . And there is the
remission of part of the punishment, which is the res tantum. Also
in satisfaction, there is the external acceptance of the assigned pen••• A few of the places where the tripartite formula appears in Albert's study
of the Eucharist: Tract V, P. I, Q. 1, art. 2, solutio, 19; Tract V, P. I, Q. 1, art. 8,
solutio, 6; Tract V, P. I, Q. 4, art. 1, 2; Tract V, P. I, Q. 4,. art. 5; Tract V, P. II,
Q. 2, solutio; Tract V, P. II, Q. 8, solutio.
208 Albert, Tract VI, P. I, Q. 2, art. 2.

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RONALD F. KING

ance, which signifies the interior obligation of the will to perform
the assigned penance, which further signifies the remission of all
punishment. 209
Having said this, Albert immediately adds "in this is evident
the solution for all of the things asked concerning the res and
the signum of this sacrament." 210 It is obvious, of course, that
this use of the tripartite formula is not a satisfactory solution
to the problems involved in the sacrament of Penance. Fortunately, Saint Thomas did not follow his teacher in this, and his
application of the formula to Penance provides a much more
cogent solution.
In Extreme Unction, Albert poses the problem of whether
this sacrament imprints a character-since in every sacrament
there are three things, the sacramentum tantum, the res et
sacramentum, and the res tantum. There must be these three
things here too, and it looks as though only a character could
be the res et sacramentum of Extreme Unction. The reply:
In each sacrament there are three things, but the middle one is
not necessarily a character. If it be asked what the middle term is
here, we say that it is the interior disposition to grace, which is the
res of the exterior anointing and the signum of grace, which is the
res tan tum. 211
The tripartite comes up twice in Albert's teaching on Holy
Orders. It is used the first time in reconciling the Lombard's
definitions of Ordo, in which he states that these two definitions
are really one and do not differ except that the second is an
explanation of the first and puts more emphasis on the character as reset sacramentum. 212 The second use of the formula
comes in the discussion of which species of quality character
belongs to, and in this discussion he makes some interesting
observations. Almost everyone holds, he says, that character
is in one or other of the species of quality, and they all seem
to be led to this position because they consider the character
as the whole sacrament of Order. They proceed in this way:
Ibid.

111

uo Ibid.

JU

JOD

Albert, Tract VII, Q. 8, solutio
Albert, Tract VIII, Q. 1, ad a:

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since the external act passes and the sacrament is said to remain, they conclude that the sacrament must be either the
sacramentum et res or the res tantum. The latter is rejected
because it is an effect and the sacrament is its cause, and therefore all that is left for them is to say that the res et sacramentum, the character, is really the sacrament of Order. But
Albert rejects this and says that the character is also an effect
of the sacramentum-otherwise it wouldn't be the res et sacramentum. The essence of the sacrament, then, isn't the character, but this essence remains in the character as a cause in a
perpetual effect. The essence of the character, he insists, is
wholly ad aliquid, while the essence of the sacrament is a
medicinal habit against the diseases brought about by sin. He
concludes from this that it is the sacrament which perfects the
potency to act, and therefore it is a habit and quality, while
the character, which is an effect of the sacrament, is not a
quality but a relation. 213
One article in the discussion on Matrimony is devoted to the
tripartite formula in its application to this sacrament. 214 He
notes that matrimony can be considered either as an office, or
as a sacrament, or as both. When it is considered strictly from
the viewpoint of sacrament, we find that the signum tantum is
the consent manifested in sensible signs, the signum et res is the
interior consent, and the res tantum is the " effect of medicinal
grace." 215
With Saint Albert the Great, we have completed our study
of the use of the tripartite formula in the theological writings
prior to Saint Thomas. It will be well to summarize briefly
the conclusions which we can draw from this survey.
CoNCLUSIONS

1. The tripartite formula came into existence as a result of

orthodox theologians' attempts to disprove the heretical Eucharistic doctrine of Berengar of Tours, combined with a fuller
213 Albert, Tract Vill, Q. 4, art. 1.
•u Albert, Tract IX, Q. 1, art. 2.
215 Ibid.

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RONALD F. KING

appreciation of the Augustinian concept of the " lasting sacrament." Through Lanfranc's refusal to accept Berengar's limitation of the meaning of sacramentum, Guitmond of Aversa's
declarations that the Body of the Lord in the Eucharist is both
the real Body of Christ and a sacrament of His mystical body,
and Alger of Liege's not-fully-perceived insistence that this
Body is a sacrament only insofar as it is considered as existing
under the visible species, the stage was set for later theologians to integrate these facts and produce the tripartite formula as an explanation of the Eucharist.
2. The tripartite formula was first used explicitly in the
Sentences of Anselm of Laon. Although more elements were
involved in the formula here than when it was further perfected by later theologians, it is undeniable that this is an
authentic and pristine use. It is used only to explain the
Eucharist although the components of several other sacraments
were discussed by the author. The formula was further refined,
in its application to the Eucharist, by other writers of this
same school.
3. In the Y sagogue Theologiae, of the Abelardian school, a
further refinement of the formula is found. Both the sacramentum and the sacramentum et res are sacraments of the
final res. Later theologians gave examples to show how this
is possible, but almost without exception they stress only the
sacrament's similarity with its res, while neglecting the other
characteristic of sacrament, its visibility. Not until the thirteenth century does the distinction which Alger of Liege had
made come into its own to show how the sacramentum et res
can be " visible."
4. In the Sententiae Divinitatis, of the Porretan School,
we find the first explicit statement of why the tripartite is
applied to the Eucharist and not to the other sacraments:
while the other sacraments give only grace, and hence the sacramentum-res sacramenti division is sufficient to explain their
components, the Eucharist gives not only grace but also the
Giver of grace, and hence a tripartite division is necessary to
explain its components.

ORIGIN AND EVOLUTION OF A SACRAMENTAL FORMULA

81

5. The Sentences of Peter the Lombard affords the first example of the tripartite applied to any sacrament other than the
Eucharist, and here it is applied to Penance. It should be
noted that the Lombard, and many of the writers after him
who use the tripartite for Penance, explicitly indicate their
realization that this formula finds its most perfect application
in the Eucharist and is extended to Penance only by analogy
with the sacrament of the altar. The use of the tripartite for
Penance gave rise to several difficulties. The principal ones
were that the sacrament, couched in this formula, did not cause
what it signified, and that its res preceded its sacramentum.
It should also be noted that, in the examples given of the tripartite's application to Penance, little mention is made of the
priest's absolution within the framework of this formula.
6. The Summa of Peter Cantor, despite the fact that it is
of the Lombardian School, adds two other reasons why the
tripartite should be applied to the Eucharist only: only in the
Eucharist do the elements cease to be what they were and
become something else, thus necessitating a division of this
sacrament into three parts, and only in the Eucharist does the
sacrament remain after its confection. That these reasons were
not judged to be valid can be seen in the writings of Peter's
most adept pupil, Robert of Courson, who ignores his master's
thought on this point and applied the formula to Penance also.
7. The opening years of the thirteenth century saw the first
official use of the tripartite formula in an ecclesiastical document, the " Cum Marthae circa " of Pope Innocent III.
8. Gandulph of Bologna foreshadowed a wider application
of the tripartite than the then common use of the formula for
the Eucharist and Penance; Praepositinus and Godfrey of Poitiers at least foreshadowed the formula's application to Baptism; but Hugh of St. Cher must be credited with explicitly
making this application to the first sacrament.
9. Saint Bonaventure applied
tripartite formula to every
sacrament except Order. His use of the tripartite in Penance
is noteworthy, and his delineation of the res et sacramentum

RONALD F. KING

of that sacrament is almost identical with the explanation given
by St. Thomas.
10. Saint Albert the Great is important in this regard because of his very explicit use of the tripartite formula in his
system of dispositive causality.
RoNALD

Kenrick Seminary

St. Louis, Missouri

F. KING, C.M.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION IN JUDGMENT

X

INTERESTING aspect of Thomistic judgment theory
which offers a number of difficulties is the question of
composition in judgment. What is judgmental composition in general? Which of the several compositions involved
in judgment pertains to the essence of the act? How does
composition arise from the simplicity of abstraction? These
and other problems concerning composition in judgment could
each be considered separately and in detail. However, it is also
possible to organize all the problems around a central thesis of
the nature and genesis of judgmental composition. Such is
the approach that will be followed in the present article.
Judgment theory is in some sense the common property of
three major fields of philosophy -logic, psychology, and epistemology. Logic is concerned with the mode of composition
of judgment as a proposition, with special emphasis on the
proper combining of concepts necessary for truth in judgment
itself and as a principle of the reasoning process. 1 Epistemology
is primarily concerned with the truth value of judgment, and
more especially with the ways in which this truth value can be
ascertained and guaranteed. 2 Psychology's interest is more
directly concerned with judgment itself as an act of the mind.
Consequently, questions concerning the nature and genesis of
the various compositions involved in judgment fall most properly within the field of psychology. Of the three approaches,
then, the one most pertinent to the present investigation is
the psychological. Logical and epistemological considerations
will be adduced where they seem appropriate, but their roles
will be secondary to that of psychology.
The problem of composition in judgment is central in St.
1 St. Thomas, In Pe:rikerm.,Prologue, Nos. 1-8.
• L. M. Regis, Epistemology (New York: Macmillan, 1959), pp. 188-89.

88

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PAUL R. DURBIN

Thomas' judgment theory. For St. Thomas to judge is "to
understand by composition and division." 8 St. Thomas considers that this presents a problem: Our intellect can understand only one thing at a time; how then can it understand
all at once the several things involved in a composition? 4 To
one who is aware of St. Thomas' mode of procedure within the
tight organization of the Summa theologiae - where this objection is raised- it will be apparent that this difficulty is not
placed where it is by chance. Read in context it indicates that
St. Thomas purposelJ set up his consideration of judgment by
means of the doctrine that the mind can know only one thing
at a time, with the consequent difficulty regarding judgment.
Hence the importance of St. Thomas' reply to the objection;
in it he outlines the psychological approach to the composition
of judgment. The composition of judgment, he maintains, is a
unity-in-composition, a composition reduced to a simplicity
that can be known all at once.5 The implications of this point
on judgment theory are in a sense obvious, yet so manifold
and diverse that specific details would require extensive consideration. In a general way it is the aim of this study to
spell out some of these implications, to treat in an extended
way what St. Thomas has compacted into such a small space
and so few words.
TYPES OF COMPOSITION

INVOLVED

IN JUDGMENT

Before giving any details of the procedure in a psychological
consideration of judgment, it is necessary to give a preliminary
sketch of the various types of composition which are involved
in judgment. The first and most fundamental is the composite
mode of being which is, properly speaking, the object of judgment.6 A second composition involved in judgment is a composite phantasm which represents the composition of the object
to the mind. On the intellectual level there are two more
compositions, of the impressed and expressed species of judg8
£

Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 5.
Ibid., obj. I.

5
6

Ibid., ad 1; 4c and ad 4; q. 58, a.
Regis, op. cit., pp.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

85

ment- the enunciable and enunciation. Finally, there is a
composition which compares the enunciation with reality,
applies it to reality. This has been interpreted in two ways,
as the essence of the judgmental act, 7 or as a property of
judgment. According to the latter view, the essence of judgment lies in the enunciation, that is, in joining two concepts
of simple apprehension. 8 Since both of these views have solid
textual support in St. Thomas, deciding which of the two is
correct will be one of the most difficult problems of the present
study.
The order of procedure in investigating these various compositions is well defined: it should center around the principles of
judgment. The investigation must presuppose the general nature of knowledge and its acts, 9 but the questions asked about
knowledge in general should be repeated with respect to this
particular kind of knowledge which is the act of judging. What
is it in itself? What are the principles of the act? What is its
object? 10 However, according to St. Thomas, the proper psychological order of these questions is to go from object to act
to principles of the act. 11 Here, the nature of the act, viewed
in terms of its object, will be treated briefly. The same is true
of the principles of judgment in general and the extrinsic principles in particular. The major concentration will be on the
intrinsic principles of judgment, and only then on the controversy about the essence of judgment as enunication or affirmation-assent.
The nature of judgment: Dependent upon an objective structure in reality that is represented in the phantasm and simple
apprehension, the second operation of the mind contains two
acts: a synthesis of concepts and an affirmation of the existence
or objective validity of the synthesis. The term " judgment "
is more appropriate when applied to the second of these acts
since it is a " judging " of the objective validity of the synthesis
• Peter Hoenen, Reality and Judgment according to St. Thomas (Chicago:
p. 187.
Regis, op. cit., p.
• Ibid., pp. 187-89.

Regnery,
8

10

11

Ibid •• p. 155.
In II De anima, lect. 6, No. 808.

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PAUL R. DURBIN

of concepts according to a proper measure- namely, the mode
of being of the object. 12 This judgment is not based on a reflection- as will be seen further on- but it does include an
improper, unconscious (in actu exercito) reflection, not on
the entity of the enunciation or the mental act as such, but on
the terms joined in it. 13 These two points will be crucial in the
discussion of the enunciation-vs.-assent controversy; here they
are mentioned merely in a preliminary way, as more plausible
possibilities.
As such they are in agreement with the nature of judgment
as it is reflected in an introspective, " phenomenological " analysis of the act of judging. The experience of judging is so
commonplace that it must sometimes be emphasized that not
everything that appears to be a judgment really is. An ordinary
human, without training in logic, is apt to mistake any number
of statements, whose argument form is hidden, for simple
judgments or even unquestionable truths. 14 On the other hand,
a true judgment can be concealed in a one-word expression or a
simple nod of the head.
Within the context of this universal experience, a great
variety of judgments can be distinguished. 15 Judgment begins
soon after the dawn of intellectual awareness in the child, with
simple straightforward expressions of the child's needs. Implicit
already in these simple expressions are the first principles of
human understanding, which form the foundation for all subsequent thinking. As the child matures judgments become more
and more complex; soon he will be making, in addition to
12 De verit., q. 10, a. 9:
"A judgment about anything is made according to
that which is its measure." This etymological sense of the term "judgment" is
what St. Thomas has in mind when he applies the term to sense knowledge (Summa
theol., I, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2), simple apprehension (ibid., q. 85, a. 6), wisdom
(ibid., q. 1, a. 6), as well as the second act of the mind (In I Periherm., lect. 8,
No. 81).
18 John of St. Thomas, Our8U8 theol., ed·. Solesmes (Paris:
Desclee, 1984), II,
625, No. 18.
u V. E. Smith, The Elements of Logic (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1957), p. 120.
10 T. W. Guzie, The Analogy of Learning (New York: Sh!led and Ward, 1960),
pp. 178-79.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

87

simple expressions of need, the earliest speculative judgments
involved, for instance, in simple addition and substraction.
And so it goes, until at the end of a long life a truly wise man
can sum up the fruits of his learning and reflection in simple
statements with a density of meaning as far removed as possible
from the simple need-expressions of the child. Yet even these
statements are expressed in the form of a judgment.
Based on this experience of judging, a concrete psychological
description of the act might take the following form. Judgments are normally expressed in verbal form, arid the most apt
of these for introspective examination are the simple and uncomplicated judgments of concrete experience.
For instance, we may imagine a typical newspaper headline: " Escaped Convict Apprehended." If the convict was
armed and threatening a man's neighborhood, his reaction
would very likely be a relieved " I'm glad." Here are two
concrete statements of fact. One describes a:n internal, purely
personal reaction, the other describes an actual event of public
significance. The structure of the statements, however, is basically the same, a subject plus an activity- in one case emotional, in the other impersonal and public. Of the two elements,
the more important is the predicated activity, since any number
of other subjective impressions could have been· predicated of
the man with the emotional reaction, and any number of other
eventualities could have happened to (and been predicated of)
the escaped convict. It is the predicate which narrows down
these possibilities to the one actually predicated. St. Thomas
expresses this by saying that the predicate is the formal element
in a proposition, the subject the material element. 16 Internal
experience corroborates this. What the man in the example is
most aware of when he says, " I'm glad," is the emotional reaction he feels. What the newspaper is attempting to express
about the convict is that he has been apprehended. Yet in each
case the total experience is of a composite - an activity affecting a subject.
18

Summa theol., I, q. 13, a.

In I Periherm., lect. 5, No. 54.

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PAUL R. DURBIN

The question then arises: Is the subjective experience one of
mentally joining two concepts (as it is of verbally joining
several words)? Unquestionably it is not. However, internal
experience can determine no more than this. Whether in fact
judgment is a unified operation (an "entitatively simple"
act) 17 or a combination of psychological entities must be determined by rational analysis. The following is St. Thomas':
As unity of term is requisite for unity of movement, so is unity of
object required for unity of operation. Now it happens that several
things may be taken as several or as one-like the parts of a continuous whole. For if each of the parts is considered separately, there
are many of them; consequently, neither by sense nor by intellect
are they grasped by one operation, nor all at once. In another way
they are taken as forming one in the whole, and thus they ar.e
grasped both by sense and by intellect all at once and by one operation, as long as the entire continuous whole is considered. . . . In
this way our intellect understands together both the subject and
the predicate, as forming parts of one proposition.18
It cannot be said that internal experience demonstrates this,
but rational analysis does- and it is in full accord with the
experience. A recent author refers to the same text and the
same aspect of judgment, speaking of a " unified judgmental
act " which cannot possibly be a " linking of two meanings or a
combination of mental words." 19 This conclusion is supposedly
based on a " phenomenological analysis " of a " fact of consciousness." 20 Whether this is true or not, it is certainly a fact
that consciousness is in accord with St. Thomas' rational
analysis, and that, psychologically speaking, judgment is a
simple and not a complex act.
This is not opposed to the normal definition of judgment, as
the act of the mind in which it composes or divides, in affirmation or denial. The definition is sufficiently broad to allow for
almost any explanation of judgment. 21 These explanations will
of St. Thomas, Cursus tkeol., II, 627, No. 25.
Summa tkeol., I, q. 58, a. 2.
19 Guzie, op. cit., p. 119.
•• Ibid., pp. 116, 131, n. 8.
01 F. M. Tyrrell, Tke Role of Assent in Judgment: A Tkomistic Study (Washington, D. C.: Catholic University, 1948), p. 69.
17 John
18

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

89

be put aside for the moment in favor of a consideration of the
principles of judgment.
Extrinsic principles of judgment: There are five chief categories of psychological principle: (1) principles which are at
the same time subject and eliciting agent in psychological acts
-the person acting, the soul, psychological faculties, and the
species which determine them; (2) active principles- the
agent
and the phantasm acting instrumentally in intellectual knowledge; (3) the object, the thing itself outside the
knowing subject, as specifying principle; (4) habitual inclinations- habits and dispositions; (5) principles in the logical
sense - the first principles of understanding and other scientific
principles.
With one or two exceptions, all these come into play in
various degrees in judgment theory. The most obvious exception are the logical principles; judgments themselves, these
cannot be principles of judgment in the sense intended here.
The various meanings which are applicable must be understood in a specific sense when applied to judgment. For
instance, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic principles now refers to whether or not the principles are intrinsic
or extrinsic to the possible intellect eliciting the act of judgment.
In this sense the agent intellect is an extrinsic principle. The
possible intellect itself is of course the best example of an
intrinsic principle.
Of these principles the agent intellect and a composite
phantasm are the most important as extrinsic principles of
judgment. As principles they are correlative, co-causes in the
order of efficiency - the agent intellect as principal efficient
cause, the composite phantasm as secondary and instrumental
cause. Their efficiency is exercised, not in the eliciting of judgment itself, but in the preparation of the composition whereby
the possible intellect is enabled to elicit the act of judgment.
The role of the agent intellect is not often noted, perhaps
because St. Thomas himself seldom mentions it explicitly. 22 He
•• Regis, op. cit., p. 817.

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PAUL R. DURBIN

most often speaks of an " intellectual light " with respect to
judgment. It is by the power
such a light that the intellect
is enabled to make a judgment on data apprehended/ 3 or " by
which the first principles are known," 24 or " by the natural
light of the intellect man assents to first principles." 25 And
there are other texts, but St. Thomas does equate this " intellectual light " with the light of the agent intellect in at least
two places. 26 Hence it is safe to say that the manifold texts
which refer to an intellectual light with respect to judgment
may be taken as referring to the agent intellect.
There is a difficulty about the role of the phantasm in
judgment. Is a prior composition in the phantasm the cause
of composition in judgment? Or does the judicative composition begin with the mind and entail, as a consequence only,
a composition in the phantasm? Or is there a third, intermediate possibility?
A necessary preliminary to deciding the question is a consideration of composition in the phantasm. The coordination
of phantasms 27 has been interpreted by Hoenen as though it
were aimed at the production of a composite species, the
affirmation of the objectivity of which would constitute judgment properly so called. 28 He goes so far as to say that "according to St. Thomas the connection between the subject and
predicate which is affirmed or denied by a judgment is found
already represented in the intellective apprehension which precedes judgment, and - even earlier- in the sense data." 29
This is going far beyond the premises of what St. Thomas says
in the text upon which the analysis is based. It takes the
coordination of phantasms mentioned by St. Thomas as ordered
to the production of a composite species, whereas St. Thomas
Summa theol., II-II, q. 173, a. ft.
De verit., q. 11, a. 1.
25 Summa theol., II-II, q. ft, a. 3, ad ft.
26 Cont. gent., II, 79, No. 9; Summa theol., II-11, q. 171, a. ft.
27 Summa theol., 11-11, q. 173, a. ft.
28 Op. cit., pp. 14-17.
•• Ibid., p. 18.
23

2•

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

91

actually says that it is ordered to the production of " various
intelligible species." 80 In other words, a coordination of phantasms is required for any species; if a special coordination is
required for judgment, this cannot be affirmed simply on the
basis of the texts alleged.
Certainly such a coordination for judgment will not function
in the same way as for the production of a simple species.
Judgment is not an abstractive process. 81 On the other hand,
judgment is not exempt from the general conditions of intellectual knowledge- illumination by the agent intellect of an
intelligible content presented in phantasms. The work of the
agent intellect in judgment is to enable the possible intellect to
make a judgment about contents already received in apprehension.82
Two possibilities remain open: the composite phantasm may
be simply consequent upon the intellectual composition, or else
it may be consequent in one order while having a priority in
another order. To answer the question, an appeal will be made
to Thomistic positions not directly at issue in the present
question.
The first of these is St. Thomas' doctrine on first principles,
that they are affirmed immediately and necessarily on the
understanding of the terms involved. 38 This seems to favor a
simple priority of the intellect in judgment. The phantasm
would have a role- rendering each of the terms separately
intelligible (instrumentally) -and, materially, there would
follow a phantasm-connection or composite phantasm, representing the intellectual connection verbally. However, this does
not seem to do full justice to the instrumental role of the
phantasm.
Hence appeal can be made to another Thomistic doctrine the role of the teacher in disposing the phantasms of his
students. And in this case there seems to be an instrumental
Summa theol., II-II, q. 178,
Regis, op. cit., pp. 882-88.
•• Summa theol., II-II, q. 178, a. 2.
88 Summa theol., I, q. 17, a. 8, ad 2, and many other places.
80

81

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PAUL R. DURBIN

priority attributable to the phantasm. A teacher's words, represented in verbally precise phantasms elaborated and appreciated according to the capacities of the student, are represented in the form of a proposition to which the student gives
affirmation or withholds it according to whether or not he sees
the intelligible connection. If he does, then it is obvious that the
teacher's verbal proposition, received as a phantasm in the
student's imagination, has been instrumental in seeing it. 8 '
Consequently, it would seem that a composition in phantasms,
most often verbal, 35 has a real though instrumental priority in
judgment in the order of material causality - that is, as representing the object (the "matter") which is the norm and
measure of the intellectual composition. (Priority in the formal
order, obviously, belongs to the intellect itself seeing the connection.)
An explanation of this crucial point - necessarily briefmust be made in terms of the agent intellect and an analogy
with corporeal light often employed by St. Thomas. In judgment the key to the role of the agent intellect is its illuminative
function. While parallel to the role of the agent intellect in
abstraction, its function in judgment is essentially distinct. In
judgment the agent intellect does not simply illuminate or
bring out the intelligibility of a composition already given. In
the view proposed here, it illuminates a non-judicative composition in the phantasm (even in those cases involving verbal
propositions) , and this serves as a norm and measure in the
properly judicative composition which is initiated formally by
the intellect. Paralleling the matter-form relationship of the
objects of the agent intellect and the phantasm in abstraction, 36
there is a similar relationship in judgment. The enunciation
comes formally from the intellect (elicited by the possible
•• What of the first principles according to which the teaching is said to be
received by the student (De verit., q. 11, a. I)? Though these are not received in
the same way through verbal propositions, extramental reality itself, as represented
in phantasms, could play the parallel required role.
•• De verit., q. 11, a. 1, ad 11; cf. Regis, op. cit., pp. 245-46.
•• Regis, op. cit.., pp. 257-89.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

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93

intellect, made possible by the agent intellect),
from the phantasm. The composition in the phantasm is
materially prior to and instrumental in the formation of the
intelligible composition; the latter, the properly judgmental
composition, comes formally from the intellect itself seeing the
intelligible connection.
THE INTRINSIC

PRINCIPLES

OF JUDGMENT

The intrinsic principles which are most important in judgment theory are the intellect itself, with its natural finality and
tendency toward unity, and what may be referred to as the
quasi-impressed species of judgment- a species " impressed "
on the mind in its second operation and derived from the
expressed species of the first operation. The causality of each
of these principles is complex. The intellect as a principle of
judgment can be considered in two ways, under the aspect of
its intrinsic finality and as eliciting agent and subject of judgment.
The natural finality of the intellect, its natural direction, is
toward the knowing of truth, which is attained only in and
through judgment. " All men by nature desire to know," as
Aristotle states in the opening words of the Metaphysics. 37
This desire is for true knowledge, not for error or even mere
opinion. St. Thomas states the case simply: truth is the endthe goal and perfection- of the intellect. 38 In simple apprehension the mind has concepts that are true, that are adequate
to represent reality; but they do not represent reality as it is in
its concrete mode of existence. Abstraction is not falsification,
as St. Thomas insists, 39 yet it does present_ the mind with a
multitude of isolated concepts which do not, as such, represent
the composite character of created reality. In other words,
formal truth is not present in simple apprehension, 40 and a
Bk. I, chap. i, 980 a.
Summa theol., I, q.
a. 8; In VI Metaphys., lect. 4, No.
89 Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 1.
40 Ibid., q. 16, a.
87
88

94

PAUL R. DURBIN

further act of combining or synthesizing the concepts of
simple apprehension is required in order to satisfy the intellect's
yearning for truth. 41
St. Thomas sums all this up very well in an article in the
Summa theologiae: "The lower, namely, the human, intellects
obtain their perfection in the knowledge of truth by a kind of
movement and discursive intellectual operation; that is to say,
as they advance from one known thing to another." 42 Having
stated what the perfection of the intellect is, St. Thomas then
gives the reason why it must arrive at that perfection gradually: " But, if from the knowledge of a known principle [human
intellects] were straightway to perceive as known all its consequent conclusions, then there would be no discursive process at
all." 43 Further on in the same article he says that " this comes
from the feebleness of their intellectual light." In the subsequent article he ultilizes the same principles- the desire for
perfection on the part of the intellect and its natural weakness
or debility - to explain the need for judgment as well as
discursive reasoning. Thus it is the mind's desire for truth,
together with the imperfection of abstraction, that furnishes the
motive power or impetus toward judgment.
This tendency toward unity from which judgment springs is
not an isolated aspect of human knowing. It is at the very
heart of the metaphysical exigencies of knowledge in the human
being. For the ultimate finality of the intellect is not only to
know truth, but to know the first truth, God Himself. 44 The
highest pursuit of intellectual knowledge is wisdom, in which
knowledge is organized around the ultimate and highest
causes.45 The process of intellection in humans goes from simplicity to multiplicity and back again to simplicity, in a simple
intellectual understanding of first principles, with God as the
absolutely first principle, and of all other things in relation to
them. 46 Thus judgment with its synthesis of multiplicity in
., Ibid., q. 58, q. 4.
' 3 Ibid •
•• Ibid., 1-11, q. S, a. 8.
•• Ibid., a. S.
•• Ibid., q. 57, a.
•• Ibid., I, q. 79, aa. 8, 9; De vl!ll'it.,q. 15, a. 1.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

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95

unity is in accord with the innermost principle of human knowledge. It is natural to man in a singularly unique way, and the
finality of the intellect is a principle of judgment in a way that
is similarly unique and important.
That the possible intellect is a principle of judgment as
subject and eliciting agent is easy to prove. For St. Thomas
defines judgments as " understanding by composition and division." 47 Judgment is a real and specifically distinct modality
of knowing. But of the two intellectual faculties it is the
possible and not the agent intellect which knows- the role of
the agent intellect is that of rendering objects intelligible or
understandable, not of understanding them itself. Similarly and
for the same reasons intellection is rooted as in a subject in
the possible rather than in the agent intellect. Consequently,
judgment, as a genuine mode of knowing, is elicited by and
subjected in the possible intellect. In this sense the possible
intellect is the most immediate of the intrinsic principles of
judgment. Its causality is that of proper and proximate subject,
as well as efficient cause, of judgment.
The next intrinsic principle of judgment- an important one
-is what was referred to earlier as the quasi-impressed species
of judgment. Of all the compositions that are involved in judgment, this is the single most important one. The fundamental
problem raised in this study- How does the composition of
judgment come about? - will find its answer here. There is
the further problem of which composition is of the essence of
judgment, but that will, in a sense, be easy to answer after
the solution of the difficulties that arise in connection with the
enunciative composition.
The existence of a quasi-impressed species of judgment is
attested by John of St. Thomas, who refers to it simply as an
impressed species of the enunciation. 48 The reason for referring
to it here as a quasi-impressed species is that it is an impressed
species of an altogether peculiar kind, a species " impressed " on
47 Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 5.
•• Oursus theol., ll, 630-31, Nos. 33-34.

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the mind in its second operation and derived from the terms,
the expressed species, of the first operation. 49 The existence of
such a species is demanded by any theory of judgment which
locates the combining of concepts in the second operation of the
mind- hence only Hoenen's theory, of the three to be outlined
further on, would deny the existence of this quasi-impressed
species of judgment. Hoenen would either place this species
earlier, in simple apprehension, or deny it altogether, claiming
that the composition or nexus between subject and predicate of
a proposition is presented in sense data. 50 Since Hoenen's view,
on this point, has been rejected earlier, and since the rejection
of Hoenen's opinion entails the postulating of a quasi-impressed
species of judgment, the existence of such a species can be considered to have been negatively proved already.
A positive argument for the existence of a quasi-impressed
species of judgment can be formulated, on the basis of the
existence o£ the expressed species or enunciation. Where there
is an enunciation, there must be an enunciable; where there is
an enunciation in act, there must be a preceding enunciation in
potency, an enunciable. This argument is implicit in John of
St. Thomas, in the place in which he postulates the existence of
an impressed species of the enunciation. He is there replying to
an objection against the entitative simplicity of the enunciation.
The need for an impressed species is first brought up in the
objection, but John of St. Thomas makes the doctrine his own
in his reply. Both the objection and the reply proceed on the
grounds that where there is an expressed species -the enunciation- there must be an impressed species.51 Therefore there is
a necessity for a quasi-impressed species of judgment, i. e., for
an enunciable.
The nature of the enunciable must be determined indirectly,
through a consideration of the enunciation - in general potencies are known through their acts, and this is especially true
•• John of St. Thomas, Cursus phil., ed. Reiser (Turin: Marietti, 1980-87), ill
(IV Pars), p. 868.
•• Op. cit., p. 18.
51

Cursus theol., II, 680-81, Nos.

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of the potencies and principles of psychological acts. 52 The
nature of the enunciable is not in itself clear or evident. A
number of questions arise, about its simplicity or composition,
its content and intrinsic make-up, and especially about its
genesis in the mind. All these questions can be answered by
applying the principle that potencies are known through their
acts, an application that can be carried out by means of a
parallel consideration, first of the nature of the enunciation,
then of what this implies with regard to the nature of the
enunciable.
Is the enunciable simple or complex? This is the most general
and fundamental question about the quasi-impressed species
of judgment, and the question that must be answered first. The
view taken here is that the enunciable is entitatively simple
because the enunciation is. This is the opinion with the greater
intrinsic probability. 53 The enunciation is formally simple, presuppositively complex - as presupposing two simple concepts
that have been compared. 5 4 The simplicity of the enunciation is
demanded by the nature of the human intellect, which can
know only one thing at a time. 55 This necessitates that the
subject and predicate of an enunciation or proposition, in order
to be known at once, must be known in the unity of a single
species.56 This species contains within itself the intelligibility
of both subject and predicate. Because of the unity of its term
the act of eliciting the enunciation, like the enunciation itself,
is simple, one with the unity of operation. In such a unity
several species can be utilized in the eliciting of a single act
without detriment to its unity. 57 Applying all this to the
enunciable gives a picture of it as entitatively simple, like the
enunciation itself, yet able to be elicited- without detriment
to its unity - from a multiplicity of concepts in simple apprehension.
•• In II De anima, lect. 6, No. 808.
•• John of St. Thomas, CurBUB phil., I, 152.
•• John of St. Thomas, CurBUB theol., II, 628, No. 26.
•• Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 4.
•• Ibid., q. 58, a. 2.
n John of St. Thomas, CurBUB theol., II, 681, No. 84.

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The composition of enunciation is, according to John of St.
Thomas, an " artificial construction which from several acts
of knowledge is formed in knowledge itself." 58 The artificial
character is that of a logical relationship between the terms of
the enunciation - subject, predicate, and copula where it is
distinct from the predicate. This logical artifact is the mind's
attempt to represent the composite mode of being of the object
of judgment. It is artificial only insofar as it is a product of
the mind itself, not something simply abstracted from reality. 59
It is not artificial in any sense that would imply that the
mind's composition was not adequate to represent the composition in things. This same artificial character of being initiated
by the mind rather than abstracted from things is found also
in the enunciable. It contains in itself, in a simple way, the
complexity of subject and predicate, not yet as enunciated but
as enunciable.
This logically artificial complexity is possible within the
enunciative simplicity of the enunciation and enunciable because of their character as comparisons. The subject and
predicate of an enunciation are known together in a single
species as terms of a comparison. 6 ° Comparisons are of several
kinds - for instance, a sensible comparison of two contrasting
colors, or an intellectual comparison of two quantities in a
mathematical ratio. Judgmental comparison, in which two
simply apprehended species are related to one another, is
specifically distinct from all other types. For judgmental comparison, as pertaining to the second operation of the mind, is
ordered to the knowing of composite modes of being in reality. 61
The actual comparing of the subject and predicate of a judgment is actualized in the enunciation. But the same comparative character is found also in the enunciable.
The specific type of comparison involved is that of parts to
•• Cur8U8 phil., III (IV Pars), p. 868.
59 De verit., q. 1, a. S:
"When the intellect begins to judge, ... then its
judgment is something proper to itself-not something found outside in the thing."
60 Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 5, ad 1; a. 4, ad 4.
61 Regis, op. cit., pp. 828-88.

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a whole, of the subject and predicate as parts in relation to
the proposition as a whole. St. Thomas says that the terms
of the comparison, the parts of the proposition, are known
in a single species of the whole.62 Such knowledge of parts in
a whole can be either confused or distinct, according to whether
or not the parts are known distinctly when the whole is known.
Since the comparison in any given case is of a particular type,
it will imply a particular relation of the terms to one another
and to the whole. Knowledge of this particular relation, which
is had in the species of the comparison as a whole, includes
a knowledge of the related terms. 63 This knowledge of the
terms, of the subject and predicate in a judgmental comparison,
would be confused if the terms were not known explicitly.
However, such a knowledge of a proposition without knowledge
of its terms is obviously impossible in an explicitated enunciation. Therefore the comparison involved in an enunciation
demands explicit knowledge of the terms, the subject and
predicate, in the species of the whole. In the enunciable or
quasi-impressed species, on the other hand, the knowledge of
the comparison would not be explicit or actualized; nevertheless, the species is comparative in the same way as the expressed
species or enunciation- that is, it contains subject and predicate as terms of a relation to the whole in a species of the
whole.
In an enunciation the relation between subject and predicate
is similar to that of matter and form- the subject is the
material element, the predicate or verb the formal element. 64
The explicit details of this relationship are worked out by St.
Thomas in his commentary on Aristotle's Perihermeneias,
where the consideration is in terms of verbal propositions.
However, since words are signs of concepts, 65 what is said there
about the verbal composition may be
with due precautions, to intellectual composition as well. Hence, just as
nouns and verbs are distinct as subject and predicate in verbal
•• Summa theol., I, q. 58, a. 2.
•• Ibid., q. 85, a. 4, ad 4.

•• In I Periherm., lect. 5, No. 54.
•• Ibid., lect. 2, No. 13.

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propositions, so also in the mental composition or enunciation
there is a distinction of subject concept and predicate concept,
or noun concept and verb concept. 66 Simiarly, just as the
verb is the formal element in a verbal sentence, and completes the sense,67 so also the verb concept or predicate concept
is the formal element in the intelligibility of the whole proposition or enunciation. The enunciable, as potency in relation
to the actualized enunciation, and as principle or quasi-impressed species, also contains these material and formal elements, the subject concept and the predicate or verb concept.
In sum, then, the nature of the enunciable, as inferred from
the nature of the enunciation, includes the following elements.
It is entitatively simple- formally simple though presuppositively complex. This simplicity, however, is that of a reduction
to unity of more than one element. The enunciable is an artifact of the mind, a comparison of the judgmental order containing the terms of the comparative relation, subject and
predicate, in a single species of the whole comparison or relation. The relationship between the terms of the enunciable
is that of material and formal parts, the subject as material,
the predicate as formal element. Thus there is within the
quasi-impressed species of judgment a wealth of matter to be
actualized in the enunciation and function as a principle of
judgment.
The details of the genesis of the enunciable - and through
it of the enunciation and judgment- present an interesting
problem, the essence of which can be stated in a question. How
does the complex unity-in-composition of the enunciable come
to be out of the fragmented multiplicity of abstraction? There
is no easy solution, since the principle that potencies are known
through their acts is no longer of any help - the enunciation
contains the same unity-in-composition as the enunciable and
therefore presents the same problems in explaining its origins.
In addition, the origin of the enunciation is best explained
through and by means of the genesis of the enunciable rather
•• Regis, op. cit., pp.

•• In I Periherm., lect. 5, No. 54.

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than the other way around. However, a way is open to a
solution in the fact that the enunciable and enunciation are
comparative - analysis of a comparison better known than
these two can funish the analogy needed in order to understand
the genesis of the enunciable, and through it of the enunciation.
A comparison which bears a resemblance to the whole-part
relationship of the enunciable and enunciation, andl the genesis
of which has the advantage of being explained by St. Thomas,
is that of part and whole in a definition. 68 In definition the
defining parts are known in relation to the whole definition in
the composite ratio of the definition as a whole, just as subject
and predicate are known in the single species of the whole
proposition. Furthermore, this knowledge of the defining parts
is explicit; otherwise the definition would not truly define,
would not make known the constitution of the object. The
problem in regard to the genesis of definition is how the defining
parts are known explicitly in relation to the whole. The process
outlined by St. Thomas is as follows: first the defining parts
are known in themselves; then the whole is known in a vague
and confused way; finally the parts are seen in relation to the
whole, and the whole is seen as containing the parts. 69 St.
Thomas calls the definition a quasi-integral whole/ 0 just as he
refers to the subject and verb as quasi-integral parts of the
proposition or enunciation. 71 This is because in each case the
parts are contained actually in the whole.
In a general way the genesis of the enunciation comparison
parallels these steps in the genesis of definitions. There is
first the knowledge of the parts or terms in isolation, in the
multiplicity of simple concepts in apprehension. At the end of
the generative process there is knowledge of the parts in relation to the whole and 'of the whole as actually containing the
parts- in this case the subject and predicate. Only the middle
step is not an exact parallel. For there is no step in which the
88

In I Pkys., lect. 1, No. 10; Su'I'I'I/I!W, fheol., I, q. 85, a. 8, ad 8.

•• Ibid.
70
71

In I Pkys., lect. 1, No. 10.
In I Periherm.,lect.
86.

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proposition as a whole is known without explicit knowledge of
subject and predicate. Consequently, the case with the genesis
of the enunciation seems to be that the middle step belongs to
the potential aspect of the enunciation, namely, the enunciable.
The steps would thus be three, paralleling the three steps in
definition: apprehension of the terms or parts separately, their
composition in a whole potentially in the enunciable, and the
explicitation and actualization of the whole as containing the
parts in the enunciation. Each of these steps could be considered in detail, but it will be sufficient here to give special
emphasis to the second step while describing the whole process
in detail.
Before giving this description, however, it is necessary to
recall, as preliminaries to the discussion, certain things that
have been said earlier. The generation of composition in the
enunciable and enunciation is begun through the initiative of
the intellect, not as moved by the object. The motive behind
the process is the natural tendency of the mind toward unity
and synthesis. However, the composition is not a product of
the mind either as arbitrary or in a Kantian sense as being a
previously imposed mental form - the composition genuinely represents the composition of reality. The way in which this
can be realized is through the illuminative activity of the agent
intellect which elevates a composite, non-judgmental phantasm
to an instrumental role as norm or pattern for the mind's
composition. This is not an abstraction of composition from
the phantasm but an intellectual formation of a composition
dependently upon the prior instrumentality of the phantasm
in the order of material and specifying causality - in the order
of formal causality the priority lies strictly with the mind itself.
Each of these points must be kept in mind as the steps in the
genesis of the enunciable are outlined.
In the generation of an enunciable what comes first is the
apprehension of different aspects of reality in isolation, through
the instrumentality of simple concepts or species. The objects
of these apprehensions might be extremely varied, but precisely
as simple they will all be unrelated to one another. Now, if

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there is ever to arise a judgmental composition from this multiplicity of simple apprehension, the mind must at some point
apprehend an object in a concept that is not simple; this will
be in a verb concept, which represents an action or state of
being which requires a subject in which to inhere. 72 As such it
is no longer simple but related to a subject- when it is seen
formally as verbal, it is necessarily seen as related to something
else. And since related things are known simultaneously, 73 the
knowing of one term of a relation leads to knowledge of the
other term. Immediately this sets up a comparison of the terms
in relation to one another and to the whole of which they are
parts. The intelligible species in which this is done -in which
a verb or predicate is presented as related to a subject, with
the two as parts of a whole proposition able to be enunciatedis the enunciable or quasi-impressed species of judgment. This
explanation of the genesis of the composition in the enunciable
is confirmed by a statement repeated several times by St.
Thomas in his commentary on the Perihermeneias: "The verb
implies a composition in which a predicate is joined with a
subject." 74
Four objections can be raised against this interpretation,
each of them presenting a real and not merely verbal difficulty.
Hence an answer to these objections will be a positive aid in the
understanding of the process of generation of the enunciable
and its composition. The first objection can be stated in the
following terms: If the process, as claimed, depends upon the
knowledge of the verb or predicate as such, then, since such
knowledge involves second intentions, the steps as outlined
might indeed pertain to a logical consideration, but they would
have nothing to do with direct, non-reflexive judgments. This
objection can be answered by making a distinction in regard to
knowledge of the predicate or verb as such. Knowledge of a
predicate as such, in the formal sense, is a logical consideration.
And knowledge of verbs as such, in the formal sense, pertains
In I Periherm., lect. 5, No. 59.
Aristotle, Categories, Chap. vii, 8 a. 35.
u In I Periherm., lect. 5, Nos. 59, 60, 54; lect. 8, No. 96.

72

78

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PAUL R. DURBIN

to the science of grammar. But knowledge through a verb
concept of an act or state of being as demanding a subject in
which to inhere is not necessarily either a grammatical or a
logical consideration. Such is the knowledge of the verb as
such which functions in the genesis of the enunciable. A logical
or grammatical consideration would obviously be impossible in
the judgments of first principles, which are at the root of all
elaborated and scientific knowledge acquired later on. All that
is required for the formation of the enunciable is that one of
the objects of apprehension be presented in a non-simple way,
that it present itself as related to something else in that particular kind of relation which is termed by St. Thomas " verbal " that is, all that is required is that it present itself as implying
composition with a subject.
The second objection follows from the answer to the first. If
the process of generation of the enunciable depends upon an
implication of a subject by a verb or predicate concept, then
the process is not judgment but reasoning. This would be true,
and the objection would be valid, if the implication of a subject
were formal, if the joining of subject and predicate depended
upon their relation to a third term, to a medium or middle
term. But such is not the case; there is no formal implication
of the subject by the predicate. The implication involved is no
more than the mind's being led by the knowledge of one term
of a relation, as related, to the other term, on the basis of the
principle that the terms of a relation are known simultaneously.
There are indeed similarities between judgment and the reasoning process, as St. Thomas points out/ 5 but these do not at all
imply that the " implication " in judgment is the same thing
as the formal implication of reasoning.
A third objection can be formulated in terms of this same
judgmental implication: If the apprehension of verb as verb
implies comparison with its subject, then every judgment is
necessary and the existence of error is impossible. Here again,
the objection can be answered by means of a distinction. While
75

Summa tkeol., I, q. 58, a. 4.

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it is true that every verb implies composition with a subject, it
is not true that every predicate implies composition with a
definite subject proper to itself. Only in necessary and selfevident propositions, in which the subject is contained in the
predicate, is the relation such that knowledge of the predicate
term implies composition with a specific and precise subject.
The relation to a subject in non-necessary judgments might be
any one of several kinds, differing according to the different
types of judgment. At times, in singular judgments, the only
connection between predicate
subject will be a connection
of phantasms representing contiguity or some other merely
accidental relationship- in such cases there is the obvious
possibility of error simply on the basis of an error in sensation
or imagination. But in all cases other than necessary judgments that are self-evident error is equally possible because
the relation between verb or predicate and subject is not a
necessary one.
The fourth objection sums up all the others but attacks the
conclusion from a different angle. If
generation of composition is based on the comparison with a subject implied by a
verb, then the initiative in judgment is with the object presenting itself verbally, not with the mind as has been claimed. This
would seem to be supported by St. Thomas: " The possible
intellect . . . is, of itself, no more determined to adhere to a
composition [affirmation] than to a division [negation], or vice
versa." 76 But, St. Thomas then says, indetermination can only
be removed by some agent, and " the possible intellect is not
moved except by two things, namely, its proper object ... and
the will." 77 Thus St. Thomas clearly says that it is the object
which moves the intellect to affirm or deny, and this would seem
to rule out saying that the intellect moves itself, takes the
initiative in affirming or denying. However, St. Thomas' statement is no more opposed to placing the initiative with the
mind than is the fact that the process begins with a verb
implying composition. As regards St. Thomas' statement, it
78

De verit., q. 14, a. 1.

•• Ibid.

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may be taken as simply repeating the general truth that in a
realistic theory of knowledge judgment like any other act is
determined by the object rather than by some innate formno more than this is demanded by the context, and certainly
nothing is demanded of the details of how this determination
of judgment by its object might take place. As regards the
verbal presentation, the answer to this objection must be
similar to the answer to the previous objection, namely, that
there is a difference between necessary and non-necessary judgments. In necessary judgments or self-evident principles, while
the general rule holds that the formally enunciative composition begins with the mind, it is also true that the mind is
led necessarily to initiate the composition by the very fact of
in such judgments. For
apprehending the verb or
the predicate in self-evident propositions necessarily implies its
proper and corresponding subject. 78 But in non-necessary judgments, where the verb or predicate only implies some subject
and not necessarily the proper one, only the mind can supply
the impetus toward composition. Not that it does so arbitrarily
or by chance - its composition is formed according to the
norm or pattern of a phantasm illuminated and elevated by
the agent intellect. In addition, it is led to the composition by
its own intrinsic finality, by its tendency to unity and synthesis.
In summary, there are three steps in the production of the
enunciable: apprehension of the terms separately in simple
abstraction; recognition of one of them as verbal, as implying
composition with a subject; and the consequent forming of the
species in which the terms are able to be seen in relation to the
whole proposition. The motivation behind this composition is
the naturalness of judgment, the finality of the intellect as
ordered to the knowledge of truth, which is only attained in
the composition of judgment. Thus the most fundamental
intrinsic principle of judgment is the intrinsic finality of the
intellect itself. Under another aspect, however, the possible
intellect is the most immediate principle of judgment, as being
78

Summa tkeol., I, q. 17, a. 8, ad 2.

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the subject in which the process of composition takes place
and which ultimately elicits the act of judgment. Finally, the
intrinsic principle of judgment most closely tied up with the
central point of this study - the problem of composition in
judgment- is the unity-in-composition of the enunciable or
quasi-impressed species of judgment. This species is entitatively simple, yet a reduction to unity of more than one concept
of apprehension in an artifact of the mind, a comparison of
subject and predicate in the single species of a composite able
to be enunciated. The composition of the quasi-impressed
species. of judgment is thus the composite character of the
enunciable.
AFFIRMATION

AND JUDGMENT

Up to this point care has been taken to explain the compositions involved in judgment without identifying any of them
with the essence of judgment. Now the explicit question can
be raised: Which of the compositions is to be identified with
the essence of judgment? There are three basic positions on
the question- one holding for assent simply, another for combining of concepts, and the third for an intermediate position
between the other two.
The view that judgment is to be identified simply with
affirmation or assent is proposed by Peter Hoenen in his Reality
and Judgment according to St. Thomas. Basing his view on
St. Thomas' statement that " the first operation of the mind
is concerned with quiddity, the second with existence," 79
Hoenen claims that the object of judgment is the existence
or objectivity of a complex quiddity. 80 This existence which is
the object of judgment may be either actual or possible.81
Having settled on existence as the object of judgment, Hoenen
accordingly defines it as an affirmation or assent to the existence
or objectivity of a complex representation within the mind. 82
•• In Boet. De Trin., q. 5, a. 8; In I Sent., d. 19, q. 5, a. 1, ad 7.
80 Hoenen, op. cit., pp. 86-52.
"'Ibid., p. 47.
•• Ibid., pp. 24, 187.

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Other important points in Hoenen's theory of judgment include the following: (1) The synthesis of concepts or "objective structure " (" habitudo terminorum," " Sachverhalt,''
" nexus ") is not only found in the apprehension preceding
judgment; it is found " as early as the phantasm," 83 and even
in the thing itsel£.84 Judgment is only an affirmation or denial
of this structure. 85
The affirmation or denial is made on
the basis of a reflection which discloses the conformity of
the structure with the objective real. That is, the reflection
discloses the objectivity or existence of the structure, which is
then affirmed or denied. 86 Here Hoenen is careful to avoid any
misunderstanding: the reflection is not philosophical, 87 nor is
it a comparison of something in the mind with reality outside. 88
Positively, the reflection that furnishes the motive for the
affirmation is a discovery of the conformity of a particular
content, or the intelligibility of a particular objective structure
- in this respect it is not a reflection on the nature of the
intellect as a faculty conformed to reality in general, another
possible misinterpretation. 89 The perfection that judgment adds
over and above simple apprehension is an advance in knowledge
insofar as, by its reflection, the mind now knows its concrete,
here-and-now conformity with reality. 90
The second view, that judgment is to be identified with
the joining or synthesis of concepts, is proposed by L. M.
Regis in his work, Epistemology. Regis rejects Hoenen's
opinion explicitly and formally. 91 His own view is that
enunciation is the immanent term of judgment, and consequently that judgment is to be defined as " the composition or synthesis of concepts with which simple apprehension
has already enriched the intellect." 92 The perfection that judgment adds over and above apprehension is, then, nothing other
than judgment itself - its role is precisely to perfect appre88 Ibid., p. fl4.
"'Ibid., p. 63.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 161.
87 Ibid., pp. 149-50.

Ibid., pp. 150-51.
Ibid., pp. 161-6fl.
00 Ibid., p. fl9.
91 Op. cit., p. 3fl7.
9 • Ibid., p. SflS.

88

89

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hension in ordering and synthesizing the contents of abstraction
and thus allowing knowledge to imitate the concrete way in
which things exist. 93 Despite these differences, Regis agrees
with Hoenen in saying that judgment is related to extramental
reality. For Regis this is the truth relation of judgment, a
property consequent upon the enunciation as immanent term of
judgment. To this extent, then, existence can be considered the
object-term- though not the object-principle- of judgment;
in this context, however, it signifies "mode of existing" rather
than " act of existence." 94 Again, Regis agrees with Hoenen
in saying that truth is known by reflection. In fact, he goes so
far as to say that the intellect can simultaneously give birth
to and be aware of truth. 95 Nevertheless, he certainly does not
agree with Hoenen in making judgment depend upon a previous
reflection. For him the reverse is true- reflection can only
fall upon an already constituted judgment. 96
The intermediate position between those of Hoenen and
Regis is that of John of St. Thomas. His doctrine on judgment
is elaborate and extensive, and can be found in four distinct
places in his works. 97 The sense in which John of St. Thomas
presents an intermediate view is this: against Regis he would
maintain that judgment is to be identified with assent rather
than with the synthesis of concepts; against Hoenen he would
maintain that the synthesis of concepts, although it does not
constitute judgment, does belong to the second act of the
mind:
It is our supposition that, of the three acts of the intellect, the

second, which is called composition and division, has or forms two
acts; one which apprehends or forms a proposition; another which
judges; and the first is called apprehensive enunciation, the second
judgment. Both are said to pertain to composition and division
because the act of each comes about, not merely by a simple term,
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 829.
•• Ibid., p. 849.
•• Ibid., p. 412.
·•• Ouraus theol., II, 622-81; Oursus phil., I, pp. 144-57; and 289-47; III (IV pars),
pp. 866-78.

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but by a union or copula and a verb, which either joins the extremes, or judging falls on the things joined: as when I say ...
" Something, is, or is not, so." 98
Other important points in the doctrine of John of St. Thomas
on judgment include a rejection of any reflex theory of judgment- the act of judging does not depend upon a previous
reflection in any sense of the word. 99 It has already been noted
that John of St. Thomas is a strong proponent of the entitative
simplicity of judgment as a psychological act or operation.
In addition, he is perhaps the greatest among the Thomistic
commentators in his treatment of the logic of propositions.
Finally, and most importantly for the present study, he offers
many insights on the genetic approach to judgmental compositions (used in the preceding section).
To resolve these differences it helps to recall the basic approaches that can be taken to the question of judgment theory.
The logical approach would obviously tend to emphasize enunciation, to focus attention on the combining of the concepts of
subject and predicate. It is remarkable that, though he is
notable for his logical approach, John of St. Thomas is not led
thereby to an unbalanced emphasis on the combining of concepts. The epistemological approach tends to emphasize the
truth value of judgment- with widely divergent results. It
has led Hoenen to the conclusion that the reflex guarantee of
truth is to be identified with judgment itself; it has led Regis
to view assent to truth as a property of judgment already
constituted. Finally, a psychological consideration leads to possibilities almost exactly parallel to the epistemological alternatives: judgment, viewed genetically in terms of the compositions leading up to and involved in it, could be interpreted
either as combination of concepts or as affirmation-assent.
Since the view taken here will favor assent-affirmationthough in the balanced version of John of St. Thomas rather
Cur/IUIJ theol., II, 6ftft, No. 11.
It is not properly a reflection, because the judgment does not turn back
upon the understanding itself, or the entity of the enunciation, but falls upon the
extremes represented in it." Ibid., p. 6ft5, No. 18.
98

89 "

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

111

than that of Hoenen - principal attention will be paid to
answering Regis' objections. For his view Regis suggests two
principal arguments. The first of these is mainly negative, an
argument against the reduction of judgment to a superior type
of abstraction whose object would be existence. The argument is thus based on the mode of knowing proper to judgment, a mode specifically distinct from that of abstraction.
His second argument is more positive, based as it is on the
specific perfection that judgment brings to human knowledge.
In the first argument Regis sets up a disjunction between
two views, one holding for the extramental real as the object of
judgment, the other holding for the joining of concepts. He
disproves the first possibility, thus concluding to the second
view as the only one with a genuine claim to the truth. The
disproving of the first possibility takes the following form: If
existence is the object of judgment in the same way that
essence is of simple apprehension, then judgment is no more
than a superior type of apprehension in which the highest
perfection of the real- existence - is known. This would
reduce the distinction between simple apprehension and judgment to a difference of degree of perfection, rather than a
specific diversity in modes of knowing. Such an idea would
be alien to the whole Thomistic tradition. Therefore such a
view of judgment must be rejected, and, consequently, judgment must be equated not with an act whose object is the
extramental real but with the joining of concepts. 100
The second argument - the argument based on the perfection brought to human knowledge by judgment- takes as its
first premise the fact that simple apprehension leaves the mind
with a multiplicity of simple concepts, with a fragmentation of
knowledge which does not adequately represent the concrete
mode of existence of reality. Therefore a further act is required
to correct the fragmentation of abstraction and to put synthesis
and order into the concepts of apprehension. In this further act
the mind possesses the truth of its knowledge, just as in appre100 Op.

cit., pp. 82!!-28.

PAUL R. DURBIN

hension it possesses the truth of things. Therefore the second
operation, in perfecting the knowledge of apprehension, has the
role of synthesizing and ordering the concepts of abstraction,
and consequently is to be identified with joining of concepts. 101
The cogency of these two arguments is unquestionable. Any
theory that would lessen the distinction between apprehension
and judgment is by that very fact suspect. For St. Thomas
defines judgment as a composition in the very same breath, as
it were, in which he distinguishes it sharply from apprehension.102 Again, St. Thomas is explicit in differentiating judgment from apprehension on the grounds that in judgment the
mind takes the initiative," begins to have something proper to
itself." 103 Finally, it is clear that the second act of the mind is
meant to perform an operation that the first act cannot perform, and that this operation constitutes the perfection of
human knowing. 104
Although the arguments are unquestionably cogent, do they
prove beyond doubt that judgment is to be identified with the
synthesis of concepts? In order to answer this question it is
necessary to be extremely precise as regards exactly what
Regis' arguments prove. They prove: (1) that an apprehensive
theory of judgment is impossible;
that the second act of
the mind gives the synthesis and composition of human knowledge; (3) that this process overcomes the imperfections of
abstraction and is, in fact, the perfection of human knowing.
What must be appreciated fully in these conclusions is the
phrase, " the second act of the mind," of the last two. Regis
does not prove that judgment does these things, but that the
second act of the mind does. If judgment is identical with the
second act of the mind, then he has proved that judgment is a
synthesis of concepts. But if the second operation is not identical with judgment- as John of St. Thomas maintains- then
Ibid., pp. 312-13; 323.
Summa theol., I, q. 85, aa. 4-6.
103 De verit., q. I, a. 3; Summa theol., I, q. 14, a. 14; q. 85, a. 2, ad 3; 1-11, q. 94,

101

102

a. I.
10 •

Summa theol., I, q. 58, aa. 3-4.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

113

the question remains open as to which of the two operations of
the second act of the mind, synthesis or affirmation, is to be
identified with judgment.
Consequently, the arguments in favor of identifying judgment with assent or affirmation must now be examined. The
arguments adduced here will be principally textual, based on
texts in St. Thomas which seem to favor the identification of
judgment and affirmation. The first of these arguments is
simple and almost purely textual; it is intended to prove that
St. Thomas identifies what he calls " composition and division "
with affirmation and denial. In a representative number of
texts St. Thomas says precisely this, that composition is affirmation and division is denial. In the clearest of these texts he
uses the two sets of terms in an appositional way, as complementary and mutually explanatory. In the first of these texts
he says: " In our intellect ... there is a twofold operation. . ..
The second operation of the intellect is that in which it composes and divides, affirming and denying." 105 In the second
text to be quoted here he uses practically the same expression:
". . . before the intellect composes and divides by affirmation
and negation." 106 Therefore for St. Thomas that composition
which is properly signified in his phrase, " composition and
division," is to be identified with affirmation.
A far more important text is found in the commentary on
the Perihermeneias. There St. Thomas raises an objection
against Aristotle's statement that truth and falsity are found
in the second operation of the mind, in " composition and
division." He says, " It would seem that, since a division is
made by resolution into indivisibles or simple [elements], therefore just as there is not truth and falsity in simple [concepts],
so also there is not in division." 107 In reply to this difficulty
St. Thomas first makes a distinction with regard to conceptions
106 De verit., q. 14, a. I:
" lntellectus nostri ... duplex est operatio. . . . Alia
operatio intellectus est secundum quam componit et dividit, aflirmando et negando.,.
106 Summa theol., I, q. 85, a. 8: " ... prius quam intellectus componat et dividat,
affirmando vel negando."
107 In I Periherm., lect. S, Nos. 25-!!6.

114

PAUL R. DURBIN

and other things that pertain to the mind- namely, that they
can be considered either in themselves or as images of things
outside the mind. He then applies the distinction:
If we consider those things which pertain to the intellect in them-

selves, there is always composition where there is truth and falsity,
which are nev.er found in the intellect except by reason of the fact
that the intellect compares one simple concept with another. But
if reference is made to reality [i. e., if the composition is considered
as image], sometimes it is called a composition, sometimes a division.
[It is called a] " composition" when the intellect compares one
concept with another as apprehending the conjunction or identity
of the things of which they are conceptions; [it is called a] "division," on the other hand, when it compares one concept with
another in such a way as to apprehend the things to be diverse. 108

Here several things are noteworthy. St. Thomas says that
as a mental reality, as a construction within the mind, the
conception involved in truth and falsity is always a composition, a comparison of two simple concepts. However, when this
comparison or construction is looked at under another aspectwhen it is viewed with reference to its object as a; similitude or
image of that object- then it is not always called a composition even though its structure is always composite; rather,
the composite structure is called " composition " if it represents
a conjunction in reality, " division " if it represents a separation
in reality. Therefore there is always a combining of concepts
in the second operation of the mind, but this composition is not
the one from which the name for the second operation, " composition and division," is derived. Consequently, the composition of " composition and division " does not refer to the combining of concepts as such, but to the composition under the
aspect of image or representation of a conjunction or identity
in the object. Obviously, then, in this text St. Thomas is
identifying " composition and division " with affirmation and
denial, and not with the combining of concepts.
These textual arguments are not in every way conclusive Is this composition which is identified with affirmation the same
108

Ibid., No. 26.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

115

thing as judgment in the modern sense of the term? This identification of what is today called judgment with affirmation and
denial can be supported by the etymological sense of the term
"judgment." It is derived from court proceedings and refers
to the act in which it is determined which of two competing
parties is in the right with respect to the law. This usage is
recognized by St. Thomas: " A judgment about anything is
made according to that which is its measure." 109 According to
this derivation it is difficult to see how a mere combining of
concepts could be called a judgment. However, if the combination or composition were looked at against a norm of
measurement- namely, in the present context, the composite
object of the second act of the mind- then the case would
be different, and the act could legitimately be characterized as
a discerning of which party, affirmation or denial, was in the
right with respect to the norm. Hence affirmation of a composite, the enunciation, as adequate with respect to its composite object, better deserves the name " judgment " than does
enunciation.
It is interesting to note the way in which Regis treats the
etymology of judgment and the text from the Perihermeneias.
He interprets the text in a way that would make it a confirmation of his thesis. When St. Thomas speaks of the composition
in the mind in itsel£,110 Regis identifies this with judgment. 111
When, on the other hand, St. Thomas refers the composition
to reality, Regis takes this as applying to the truth relation of
judgment- that is, as applying to an act that follows upon as
presupposing an already constituted judgment-112 In answering
this it is necessary first to recall that for Regis the truth relation
of judgment is based on an explicit reflection; it is explicit
knowledge of the truth of a particular judgment. 113 However,
the text of St. Thomas, even in the general context, does not
state whether he is taking the knowledge of truth in either an
explicit or an implicit sense - the context requires only the
De verit., q. 10, a. 9.
In I Pmlumn., lect. 8, No. 26.
111 Op. cit., p. 818.
109

110

110
110

Ibid., p. 828.
Ibid., pp. 858, 412.

116

PAUL R. DURBIN

commonly accepted teaching that truth is found in judgment,
whether the truth be known explicitly or not. Even more important, the text is clear beyond a doubt in saying that the
mental composition or structure, precisely a combining of concepts, is not the composition of " composition and division."
How Regis can ignore this it is difficult to see.
Again, it is equally difficult to credit Regis' interpretation of
the etymological sense of the term " judgment " as it applies to
the second operation of the mind. In metaphorical terms
Regis says that judgment resembles a judicial process in that
the subject of a judgment takes the place of the accused, the
predicate or predicates the place of the crimes charged or
attributed to the subject, and the judgment itself is the sentence
of guilty or not guilty that is handed down. 114 On this basis
he concludes that the judgment or sentence falls upon the
joining of concepts and not on the extramental real. With this
one can agree- the judgment does not fall upon the extramental real. But it is difficult to see how the joining of concepts
could be " declared guilty or not guilty " without reference to
the extramental real as measure of the conjunction. Hence
even Regis' way of stating the analogy should lead to the
conclusion that it is not the joining of concepts alone that is
judgment but their joining with respect to reality as measure
- that is, it should lead to the conclusion that judgment is
affirmation. The joining of concepts certainly presents the
matter to be judged, but the " sentence," to revert to the
metaphor, is only handed down with respect to the composition as in accord or not in accord with some norm or measure.
Antecedent to this there is nothing that could properly be
called a judgment or " sentence." Merely placing things side
by side is not the same as judging them- that requires further
reference to a norm.
The crucial point for Regis, the thing that seems to force
him to take the position he does, is the fact that the object of
judgment is not- as some have maintained- the extramental
114

Ibid., p. 822.

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

117

real or existence as such. Judgment is not a superior sort of
abstraction whose object would be existence as the highest
perfection or reality. However, to grant the truth of this does
not necessarily lead to the identification of judgment with the
joining of concepts or to the rejection of affirmation. This seems
to be a point worth stressing. It is possible to agree with Regis
-that the composition of concepts is the object of judgmentand yet, at the same time, maintain that judgment is to be
identified with assent or affi'rmation. For the combining of
concepts- as noted by St. Thomas in the text from the Perihermeneias 115 - can be considered either in itself or as a representation, as an image, with respect to the reality of which it
is an image. In this latter sense, the combining of concepts, or
rather the composition of combined concepts, would be the
object of judgment; but the act of judgment itself would be an
affirmation of the adequacy of that composition with respect to
reality as its norm and measure. The act would; in this sense,
truly be a judgment, a " passing sentence " on something- to
go back to the metaphor.
Another point that needs to be stressed here is the possibility
of knowing the truth relation of judgment in two ways.
Cajetan supplies the terminology for this distinction, saying
that truth can be known either explicitly (in actu signata) or
not explicitly (in actu exercito) .116 It is the latter sense that is
operative in normal, non-reflexive judgments. 117 In every affirmation of a connection between a subject and a predicate
there is at least this knowledge in actu exercito of the adequacy
of the connection in representing the composition of reality.
Beyond this there is the explicit knowledge of truth in a reflective sense, in actu signato. Regis makes out a cogent case for
correlating the latter with the proper notion of assent - in the
strictest sense, assent means a certain assent to a true proposition.118 In doing so he denies a view that would equate judg115

In I Prierm., lect. 8, No. !l6.

Commentary on the Summa theol., I, q. 16, a. 2 (in the Leonine edition, sec.
vi, in lac.) .
117 Ibid.
118 Op cit., pp. 412-16.
118

118

PAUL R. DURBIN

ment with assent. It is for this reason that in the present
discussion the term " affirmation " has been used in place of the
term " assent." For the term " affirmation " does not have the
connotations of formal assent to formal truth as explicitly
known that are associated with the term "assent." Nevertheless, the term " assent " could be used, and it expresses very
well the truth of the matter: affirmation is an assent to the
adequacy or objectivity of the mind's composition, with respect
to the real- not to the adequacy as known in actu signato'·
but in actu exercito. In point of fact, John of St. Thomas is
not at all reluctant to use the term " assent " as applying to
judgment. 119
This affirmation of a proposition is not based on a prior
reflexive knowledge of its adequacy to represent reality. 120 Nor
does it consist of a comparison of the composition in the mind
with reality outside. 121 In order to see just what it does imply
in a positive way, it will be useful to outline once again the
psychological steps leading up to judgment. The process presupposes a number of different kinds of composition in reality
-it is the role of judgment to mirror these compositions. In
knowledge there is a graduated series of compositions- in the
phantasm, in simple apprehension in a limited sense, and in
judgment. In the phantasm composition is non-judgmental,
even when the phantasm is a verbal representation of the
judgment that will ultimately be formed and of which it is the
measure. In simple apprehension there is no composition properly-so-called, but there is a verbal concept which implies and
leads to composition. Within the second operation of the mind
the status of composition is highly complex. The central composition is that of the enunciation or joining of concepts, but
this actualized composition of enunciation is preceded by the
potential stage of the enunciable or quasi-impressed species
of judgment. The enunciation itself is the expressed species,
and it can be considered in two ways: first, as the actual comCur8Ul/ phil., I, 145.
John of St. Thomas, Our8Ull theol., IT, 625, No. 18.
181 Hoenen, op. cit .• pp. 150-51; Regis, op. cit., p. 858.
110

100

UNITY AND COMPOSITION

IN JUDGMENT

119

bination of concepts and term of knowledge in itself - in this
sense it is the enunciative composition properly-so-called;
second, as image or representation of reality- in this sense it
is the matter for the affirmational composition, that is, for
affirmation itself.
Thus there are within the second operation of the mind two
distinct acts- a synthesis of concepts and an affirmation. Of
the two it is the affirmation that is more properly identified
with judgment. The arguments offered here in favor of this
view have been primarily textual: St. Thomas frequently
affirms the complementary character (as mutually explanatory) of " composition and division " and affirmation and
denial; furthermore, in one text he clearly shows that the composition of " composition and division " is affirmation and not
the synthesis of concepts. In confirmation of these texts an
argument can be added on the basis of the etymology of the
term " judgment," which indicates that affirmation or assent
better deserves the name than does the joining of concepts.
What can be said of these arguments? Certainly they are
not demonstrative. They represent no more than an effort to
substantiate a probable opinion- that is, one which has: arguments in its favor. Whether the opinion is more probable than
the opinion of Regis that judgment is a joining of concepts is
open to question. However, it can be maintained that the view
proposed here is closer at least to the words of St. Thomas, and
it is beyond doubt the opinion of John of St. Thomas-hence
it has considerable traditional weight. The view of John of St.
Thomas seems to be both more balanced and more complete
than either that of Hoenen or that of Regis. This is true
especially in the fact that the view explicitly affirms both acts
within the second operation of the mind - synthesis and affirmation. The view would also seem capable of standing up
against any objections that could be raised by either Hoenen
or Regis. However, the point here is that the opinion of John
of St. Thomas is in agreement with what seems to be the
correct answer to the question treated in this section -Which

120

PAUL R. DURBIN

of the compositions involved in judgment pertains to the essence
of the act?
Finally, it can be noted that the view that it is affirmation
which pertains to the essence of judgment is not based solely
or even primarily on the authority of St. Thomas or John of
St. Thomas. The psychological approach to judgment leads to
a consideration of the act in its own right, and introspective
analysis seems to indicate that judgment should be identified
with affirmation rather than with the synthesis of concepts.
However, the details of this consideration have been subordinated to the dialectics of considering various opinions in the
present article. Nevertheless, a certain number of psychological considerations have been inserted where they seemed
important in the discussions of the opinions, and it can be
maintained that reflection would verify each one of the steps
outlined in the dialectical procedure- and reflection is the
ultimate test in a psychological consideration. Hence the conclusion of this discussion can be stated with a certain amount
of assurance: The second operation of the mind contains two
acts- synthesis and affirmation- and it is the second of
these, affirmation, that is to be identified with judgment.
PAUL R. DURBIN,

St. Stephen's CoUege

Dover, Mllllsackmetts

O.P.

NOTES ON OUR CONTRIBUTORS
FRANciscoJos:E AYALA, 0. P., S. T. L., Ph. D., whose investigation into biological evolution and its philosophical and theological implications
has yielded frequent contributions to such learned journals as The
American Naturalist, Genetics, La Ciencia Tomista, and to books
in Spanish and in English, is engaged in continuing research in the
Department of Biology, Providence College, Providence, Rhode
Island.
RoNALD F. KING, C. M., S. T. D. (Fribourg), who taught Dogmatic Theology at St. Mary's Seminary, Perryville, Missouri from 1961 to
1968, is presently Academic Dean and Professor of Dogmatic Theology at Kenrick Seminary, St. Louis, Missouri.
PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P., S. T.L., Ph.D., author of a book on plausible reasoning in the process of publication by the Bruce Publishing Co.
and Philosophy of Science: An Introduction soon to be released by
the McGraw-Hill Co., is Professor of Philosophy, St. Stephen's College, Dover, Massachusetts.
DAVID TuoMASMA, 0. P., M.A., Ph. L., whose book reviews have previously
appeared in THE THOMIST and in other scholarly journals, is presently
engaged in theological studies at the Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

121

BOOK REVIEWS
Who Is Jesus of Nazareth? Volume Eleven of Concilium. Edited by
E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P. and B. Willems, 0. P. New York, Paulist
Press, 1966. Pp. 168. $4.50.
Christ the Center. By DIETRICH BoNHOEFFER. New York, Harper & Row,
1966. Pp. 125. $8.00.
Jesus Christ. By YvEs CoNGAR, 0. P: New York, Herder & Herder, 1966.
Pp. 228. $4.95.
Teilhard De Chardin and the Mystery of Christ. By C. F. MooNEY, S. J.
New York, Harper & Row, 1966. Pp. 287. $6.00.
Jesus of Nazareth is unique. Yet each age interprets him according to
its need and its understanding of itself. Bonhoeffer, Congar, and Teilhard
are theologians who reflect the emphases of three such interpretations in
our own day. Each theologian speaks of Christ. All three are concerned
with the same realities and problems in the contemporary world; and all
three stress the mission rather than the ontology of Christ. But each
theologian brings to his understanding of Christ his own focus, his own
paint and brushes. Although many of their considerations overlap, they
still emphasize in a unique way some aspect of Christ. Bonhoeffer's reflections lead him to a human and compassionate Christ, a present Jesus
working pro me and forming an ecclesial community among needy men
in the world. In a straightforward presentation of Christ as the Word,
the Church, and the World, Bonhoeffer manages to emphasize his own
view of Jesus as lending a sacredness to every individual in the world.
Christ is at the center of every activity of man.
Congar turns in his meditations to Christ as eternal revealer of the
Father and the concrete manifestation of the Father's love for me. In
this richly scriptural and patristic view, the French Dominican friar emphasizes Christ in His Church as the link between God and man. In this
way, the Church receives special attention, as we would suspect, for Congar
has worked untiringly in the area of ecclesiology for many years. Christ
is for him at the center of every activity of the Church.
Finally, Teilhard envisions Christ as force of unity in the cosmos. Fr.
Mooney has masterfully collected this sweeping vision out of the disparate
references to it in Teilhard's many works. Christ is the pressure of cosmic
unfolding, the core of the rise of consciousness in the world. But he is
also seen as the magnetic omega point drawing the whole universe into its
convergent unity. Because of Christ, the world does not end " with a

BOOK REVIEWS

whimper " but with a " bang," a bang of resurrection. Hence, for Teilhard,
Christ is at the center of the cosmos. If we were to oversimplify, we might
say that Bonhoeffer's Christ is a human one, Cougar's an ecclesial one, and
Teilhard's a cosmic one.

I
Before examining these three Christologies in greater detail, let us first
turn to the Concilium volume. In this volume we are presented with an
accurate report of the present state of Christological thinking in Catholic
theology. Teilhard felt during his lifetime that Christology had ossified.
In his opinion, this ossification was due mostly to the static view of the
universe in which it was nurtured. But lately, and particularly since the
recent war, there has been a great resurgence of studies on the mystery of
Christ. Several factors have contributed to this renewal. Among these
factors are the debates on the historical Christ, the deep penetration into
the meaning of liturgical and sacramental actions, renewal of ecclesiological
studies, the rise of existentialism, the introduction of the phenomenological
method, and of course, the war itself. However, of all these influences,
perhaps the greatest is that of the scriptural research during the past
seventy years. The Concilium issue is devoted to this scriptural resurgence and endeavors to bridge the dangerous gap between what Cougar
calls "the double truth "-the dogma of recent centuries and the new
scriptural findings about Jesus of Nazareth. After all, the most sensitive
nerve of any theology is its answer to Our Lord's question: " Who do you
say I am? " Do recent findings in the biblical accounts of Christ and in
science alter our answer in any way?
The answer is yes. As Father Schillebeeckx has already pointed out
in his Christ, the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, everything that
Christ does is an action of God in human form. But the accent today is
on these actions as being human as well and M ens-zijn is menswording;
being man is becoming man. The emphasis is now placed on the historical
and concrete action of God through Christ. " Unquestionably a firstfruit
of this renewed study of the sources has been the realization that Christianity is a history" (Cougar, Concilium, p. 6). Today, then, we are more
aware of the difference of the Greek concept of time from the llebrew
concept of time. The Greeks felt holiness to consist in a certain " out-oftimeness," while the Hebrew genius lay in developing faith and holiness
" in " time. The resultant force of this recognition of ours leads to a
functional rather than ontological approach to the mystery of Christ. We
ask less what Jesus is, and more what he does.
In the same article, Congar shows the significance of " I am who am,"
" I am the bread of life," and other " I am " statements to lie not so much
in a direct revelation of who the " I " is, but rather in what the " I " does

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BOOK REVIEWS

for us. The ecumenical import of the functional approach adopted today
by Catholic thinkers cannot be missed. The Protestants have always had
an aversion to the more" ontological" approach. Yet Congar, in following
Dupont, Cerfaux, Boismard, and Cullmann by stressing the functional,
also warns that the ontological cannot be neglected. He feels that this is
evident from the fact that the " I " in the statements mentioned above,
must obviously be a " someone."
With great clarity and penetration of today's issues, Congar aids our
understanding of the present state of Christology in this article. At its
conclusion, he points out five areas of research, some of which he investigates in his book, Jesus Christ. Among these areas the most significant
and the most important is the further development of the functional
approach to Christ. God must not again be "out there" ontologically,
for " Man and the world without God that we are now living in were
born in part as a reaction against such a God without man or the world "
(p. 22).
Continuing its reports of the Christ of history, of the bible, and of dogma,
the volume presents us with articles on the historical Christ, the well-known
Christological hymn in Phil 2:7, scriptural studies of redemption and resurrection, the universal Kingship of Christ {largely influenced by Teilhard) ,
and the problems both about Christ's knowledge of his mission and about
who he was.
Joseph Bourke, in "The Historical Jesus and the Kerygmatic Christ,"
surveys the present standing of Christology in relation to the fruitless
search for the historical Jesus which took place at the turn of the century
and the contemporary Bultmannian demythologizing process. In an excellent critique of Bultmann, Bourke shows with considerable force that the
early Christians were incapable of myth-making to the extent Bultmann
would demand, that Bultmann himself is infected with a Greek notion of
myth and quite a bit of rationalism, and that the Christ-event was not
simply a gesture, but a sacramental gesture, effecting what it signifies. The
most telling objection to Bultmann is taken from the work of Gerhardsson
which stresses oral tradition in the early Church. Bourke considers Gerhardsson's contribution capable of totally revising the whole field of" Demythologizing." He concludes that the historical Jesus and the kerygmatic
Christ are one and the same person.
In an excellent article by Piet Schoonenberg, S. J., a follower of Teilhard,
the kenosis of Jesus is examined. In the past, remarks the author, the
starting point of Christology has been the Lordship of Christ, the Christ
of heaven. However, this is not the only beginning available to us. For
example, in St. John's gospel there is found a tension between the Christ
of heaven and the Servant, Jesus, on earth. Rather than starting with the
pre-existence of the Son, Schoonenberg opts for the other alternative. He
concentrates upon the kenosis theme of the famous hymn in St. Paul . He

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125

sees Jesus gradually becoming aware of his mission during his lifetime. In
this approach, the manhood of Jesus and his human choice of the best
means to proclaim his message are preserved. For what could he have
emptied himself of? What was kenosized? Since it is obvious that Jesus
did not empty himself of being God (Phil
5ff) , he must have emptied
himself of all that men thought the Messiah should be. The proclamation,
"God is love," is set amidst the context of human unbelief. Jesus demonstrated this love by choosing the path of a suffering servant. In his book
on Jesus Christ (to which we shall return), Congar faces the same mystery,
but with a Thomistic orientation. He suggests that there might be something in the very nature of God which, in love, allows him to enter the
world as the lowest and most despised. Schoonenberg, using a completely
functional approach, places this lowliness of the suffering servant of Jahweh
in a free choice gradually made more explicit on the part of the God-man
on earth. Both ideas are attractive.
Jose Maria Gonzalez-Ruiz examines the close link between the redemption and the resurrection. The " flesh " becomes the " life-giving spirit " in
Jesus the Christ. The blood of the lamb becomes his glory. Although this
was partly lost in a Platonic or Epicurean cast of Christianity, the hope
of future freedom and the awareness of a bodily, biological resurrection now
carry the Christian forward in a true view.
The discussion on the consciousness of Christ by Gutwenger graphically
illustrates the desire to interpret Christ in terms of our own age. The
new phenomenological and psychological disciplines have led to an increased
awareness of the operations of man's mind. And these discoveries are applied to the God-man: Did Christ know who he was? Some theologians
are skeptical of the validity of even asking such a question. Others, such
as Bultmann, consider the whole question irrelevant, since we only encounter
the kerygmatic Christ in the scriptures and have, as a consequence, no
way of getting to the historical Jesus. But as Bourke indicated in his
article, the historical Jesus underlies and gives meaning to the Kerygmatic
Christ. The question then is not: Can we ask about the consciousness of
Christ? But rather the question is: How profitably can we ask about
the consciousness .of Christ? We are impeded by two seemingly insurmountable obstacles. First, the evidence in scripture is inadequate to
answer the question fully; secondly, the bond between God and man in
Jesus the God-man is a mystery. However, Gutwenger does not consider
the question either irrelevant or without some hope of solution. And he
offers good reasons. His basic tool for analysis is man's own awareness of
a conscious " I " in the midst of his acts. Of course, the article is not meant
to be a complete, objective summary of all the positions on this question.
Riedlinger in" The Universal Kingship of Christ" examines the question
of the Lordship of Christ over the entire universe and Rousseau presents
an historical survey of the idea of the Kingship of Christ. In the latter

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instance, Rousseau shows that the kingship was never identified with temporal power. Nevertheless, in this kingship, Christ dominates all human
accomplishment. Both of these articles were inspired by Teilhard's vision
of Christ. The entire Concilium volume provides the reader with an excellent reference for contemporary problems as well as directions for future
investigations.

II
Let us now look at Bonhoeffer's thoughts on Christ. His Christology is
a thoroughgoing Protestant view of Christ. At this early stage in his career,
his thinking was still influenced a great deal by Barth. Hence it contains
the usual mistrust of philosophical research on Christ. The book itself is a
carefully compiled set of lecture-notes delivered by Bonhoeffer to a class in
Berlin in 1933. Besides a penetrating analysis and synthesis by E. H.
Robertson, the book contains two parts of the projected tripartate lecture
series. For this reason, we find an early Bonhoeffer who is just awakening
to the demands of Christian commitment in Hitler's Germany. His work
is an incomplete Christology. The section on "The Eternal Christ" was
never completed because political troubles disrupted the series. But this
does not mean that the work is without value. Though Bonhoeffer holds
here a more " orthodox " Protestant view of Jesus than he was compelled
to propose in later years, this volume will be important both for Bonhoeffer
scholars and for those interested in his central concerns which are concealed
beneath his polemic remarks.
Bonhoeffer does not want a Christology built upon pseudo-answers to the
question: How? This is an example of his Barthian, and in general,
Protestant mistrust of reason. It will never do, in his opinion, to ask
questions such as: "How was God in Jesus?" Since the Logos is transcendent, it defies all philosophical answers. Evidently, the reaction is
against Hegel's philosophy and its all-embracing Universal Spirit. But
there is an additional reason for not asking philosophical questions about
the "nature" of Christ: such questions are irrelevant. They would not
answer the needs of men today. In place of a philosophical approach to
Christ, Bonhoeffer describes him in terms of his function and place in
human affairs. In this respect, his Christology anticipated the general
trend of contemporary Catholic thought and provides a basic agreement
upon which to build a dialogue.
For Bonhoeffer, Christ is the center. Of what and why? He is at the
center of human development because only he can assure it. He is central to my personal development and he is central to the world's development. He is the power and the person functioning for me as Word, Sacrament, and Community. He works in my place," between me and myself,
between the old existence and the new" (p. 61). However personal and
subjective the Christ of Bonhoeffer might seem, he does complement this

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U7

view with that of Christ guiding all human history (here he would agree
with Teilhard). Central to our own personal existence and to man's communal one, Christ is present for me. Bonhoeffer also stresses the fact that
the present Christ is simultaneously the historical Christ (without, of
course, asking how). Our faith tells us this in view of the empty tomb.
We can only bemoan the fact that the section on the Eternal Christ
was never produced, for Bonhoeffer's whole problematic demands a Christ
revealing the Father, coming forth from him and pointing back to him.
The need is for an Eternal Christ who mirrors the glory of the Father.
The theology about God as such became a central concern of Bonhoeffer
toward the close of his life. How can we speak about God; how can we
talk about him to our modern age? This concern was to be an acute
source of anguish to the young theologian. Why?
In order to preserve human freedom and divine freedom, Bonhoeffer
accepted Barth's notion of God as the " Ganz-Andere." With a whollyother God, both God and man are free. God does not need men; he does
not depend upon their religious whims to call men to himself. On the other
hand, man does not feel an interference with his own freedom. We can
see how Bonhoeffer was arguing against Schleiermacher's subjectivism,
whereby faith in God was dependent upon some individual's inner experience of him. But he was also demanding involved Christians, as was
Kierkegaard before him, and, like the existentialists, sought to preserve
man's freedom against a determining God. But the problem remains: in
the light of such a wholly transcendent God, how is it possible to speak
about him? How can we know he even exists? As we may remember,
philosophical arguments are ruled out a priori. There remains only Christ.
God can only be revealed in the Christ. And this revelation comes not so
much in what Christ is, as in what he does for me and for others. Obviously, a section dealing with the Eternal Christ as revealing the Father,
making the Father close at hand, would have been an enormous help in
understanding the place of Christ, in seeing how I am to transform myself
to him in being-for-others. In this transformation, I would then be a revealer of the Father, and by my actions," talk" about God to the modern
world.
Consequently, Bonhoeffer's picture of the Lord as presented in this
volume is incomplete. What he presents, though, is excellent. In his
portrayal, beyond the merely " social-worker " Christ, there is room for
both the Eternal Christ and the Lord of the universe, aspects felicitously
brought into relief by Congar and Teilhard respectively.

m
Yves Congar is a master-theologian. In Jesus Christ he offers us meditations on Christ from the rich abundance of scriptural, patristic, and
Thomistic sources. At the same time, a unifying theme plays throughout the

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BOOK REVIEWS

work: Christ as pointing to the Father. Following the plan of St. John's
prologue, the Son is seen as the image of the invisible God, existing before
the world, then as mediator between God and men, entering fully into
our history, and finally as the Lord of the Church and the world. The
best chapters are those on the poor as revealers of God to us (an address
delivered to the conciliar Fathers at Vatican IT) , and on Christ as the
leader of the Church.
In the former chapter, on the poor, Congar emphasizes the self-revelation effected in us by the poor. All of our pretensions vanish before their
need. Their eyes reflect the judgment of Christ upon our lives. In the
latter chapter, that on Christ as the leader of the Church, Congar offers
us his reflections after many long years of attention to the problem of the
nature of the Church. In this chapter Congar does an outstanding job of
reinterpreting, of gaining the initial insight of St. Paul into the " Leadership " of Christ over the Church. The same insight is also stressed in the
Constitution, Lumen Gentium, which Congar helped to compose. The
often-used bodily metaphor of Christ as the head and we as the members
of the body did not do justice to St. Paul's idea of leadership. Actually in
the letter to the Hebrews and in the captivity epistles, Christ is seen as a
leader, an active" first-born" already having accomplished our warfare and
showing us thereby the way. However, he not only shows us the way,
he decisively leads us toward the Father. As can be seen, this corrective
interpretation of " leadership " lends a force and dynamism to the conception of the Church that was lacking in the bodily metaphor. Rather than
a static or at best, vertically growing body, we have a picture of the Church
as an historically developing people of God with Christ as its leader out in
front.
Uniting the notions of Christ as revealer of the Father and as Lord of
the universe, Congar is able to offer a magnificent picture of Christ. Although Teilhard too envisions Christ as the Lord of the universe, Congar's
vision differs in many ways. The Dominican theologian's starting point
is not man, as it is for Teilhard, but God, " God Himself who speaks of
Himself " in Christ (p. 16) . A true humanism is desired by both thinkers.
Yet because of their differing starting points, their methods differ. Teilhard begins with the scientific record and his method is to seek an answer
to the pressures and desires of man's own fulfillment in the world. For
this search he draws somewhat on Blondel. Congar, on the other hand,
prefers to begin with the revelation of God's immense love. Nevertheless,
his approach does not end, as it could, with a simple " substantism."
Instead of defining what God is, he concentrates on " theophanic " love,
that is, God-for-us. " The solution, to the extent it depends on us, is not
to increase our bid with regard to man and the world. It lies in a return to
the full truth of the Living God . . . the God of salvation history "
(p. 45).

BOOK REVIEWS

129

Just as the first section of the work was devoted to Christ as revealer
of the Father, the second section deals with Christ our Mediator. Congar's
emphasis here is upon the teaching authority of Christ. Jesus demands
filial obedience to the Father. However, this filial obedience is not blind
servitude. For this reason, Jesus teaches us in parables. The parables
demand some response, it is true. But the response is born out of a dialogue in which our freedom "must unfold and declare itself" (p. 124}.
In the final section, Christ is seen as Lord. We have already noted how
the leadership of Christ is not as head to trunk, so much as a loving
authority, the principle and the end of life and growth in history. Jesus
as leader is not only" ahead of us" in drawing us to the Father, he is also
a standard of our own lives. As a result, Congar views the Church as a
sphere of communication of Christ's actions. This area of research could
serve as a fruitful source for a theology of authority in the Church. The
final chapter is devoted to Christ's Lordship over the world. Here Congar
sees him as ruler of all things, even of the powers which presently resist
him. The " powers " he takes to mean all of the significant movements of
history. The translator has added an appendix explaining difficult foreign
terms for the reader.
Fr. Congar's presentation of Christ is a meditation is every sense. It
shows a lifetime of loving labor in theology and contemplation of the Lord
himself. And we are in tum inspired by the book to a deeper penetration
into the vast and complex mystery which is Jesus of Nazareth, the Lord.
Although abundantly documented, its readable style contributes to the
continuity of thought. To date, Congar's attempt at synthesizing the
traditional " substantial " view of Christ and the new " functional " insights
is the best we have.

IV
Americans have taken strongly to Teilhard. Our optimism and scientific
orientation aid in this acceptance. If any theology of Christ be formulated
for our nation, it will have to be pragmatic to some degree, functional, and
in accord with the best scientific research. In our desire to be " scientific "
we are led quite characteristically to an impersonality in approach. Teilhard's vision seems best to suit our needs, but it has this concomitant shortcoming. The cosmic Christ seems to leave the simple carpenter of Nazareth in his wood shavings.
Despite this shortcoming, we are carried along by the sheer force of
Teilhard's sweeping vision. In order to realize what an outstanding work
Mooney has performed for theology, let us look for a moment at Teilhard's
vision and its difficulties. Briefly stated it is this:
The record of evolution points to a magnificent convergence toward
unity. As matter slowly evolved into more complex configurations, a
concomitant consciousness increased until, with the appearance of man.

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:OO.OK. REVIEWS

consciousness was able to reflect upon itself. Teilhard formulates his central principle in the form of the law of complexityI consciousness-the
greater the complexity, the greater the consciousness. The emergence of
living matter from non-living matter, of animal life from vegetable life,
and finally of human life from animal life also demands another law:
that of tangential and radial energy. Tangential energy is responsible for
the multiplication of·individuals within a phylum, whereas the radial energy
draws the phylum toward an even greater complexityI consciousness and is
responsible for the qualitative leaps to higher levels of life (e. g., from
non-living to living) .
Today, Teilhard observes, man is tangentially growing in complexity of
social and political structures leading to an even greater unity. Hence,
mankind is on the brink of an even greater complexityI consciousness-he
is evolving toward an ultrahominization, a convergence toward unity which
is called the omega point. Because of the force of the law of complexityI
consciousness, the omega point will necessarily come about. Radial energy
will cause another leap in evolution to the consciousness of the omega point.
Aiid this omega point is the Christ of the parousia.
The difficulties with this vision are many. First and foremost, we wonder
what Teilhard is trying to do. Why did he construct such a synthesis?
Aiid in so doing, is he a visionary, a poet, a scientist (as he claims to be),
a theologian? But among the many difficulties one stands out supreme:
why does Teilhard consider the world to be necessarily heading for the
omega point? This necessity seems to depend upon the validity of the law
of complexityI consciousness. Yet is this law merely based on scientific
evidence? The notable gaps in the record of evolution, particularly the
lack of a single fossil linking man back to some common animal form with
the ape, seems to militate against this position. Is the law based simply
upon scientific hypothesis then? Certainly Teilhard felt this was the case
in the Phenomenon of Man. However, a case could be made out that the
necessity of the convergence of the universe was thoroughly worked out in
an earlier publication, the Divine Milieu, totally in the realm of faith. Is
it based on faith then? Some interpreters hold that it is based on a
thoroughgoing evolutionism, a faith in the natural processes of the universe, now " ultimized " to a metaphysical stance. Still another case could
be presented which would hold that Teilhard built his whole vision upon
a personal intuition of unity in the universe. As can be readily seen, the
whole of the vision is undermined by varying opinions as to its principal
source, the law of complexityI consciousness.
We are now prepared to discover the invaluable contribution of Mooney's
work. Father Mooney has fashioned a theological synthesis out of the
many writings of the French Jesuit. Allowing Teilhard to speak whenever
possible, the author nevertheless reveals his own genius for order in the
melange of Chardin's insights. There is a resume at the beginning of each

BOOK REVIEWS

131

chapter of what has preceded and at the end of each chapter, a summary
of important points. From the excellent introduction giving the context
of Teilhard's vision to the theologically critical remarks upon Teilhard's
entire endeavor at the end of the book, Mooney's clear style and precise
thinking add up to an outstanding effort. Few thinkers have been privileged to have so devoted yet so objective a disciple.
Our first problem is in understanding what difficulties Teilhard was
addressing. Mooney recognizes that there is no text without a context,
no story without a history. In the introduction, he clearly states Teilhard's problematic as well as what Teilhard is. Teilhard's starting point
is a re-thinking of revelation so that he could embrace all that is best in
human aspirations (p. 6) . For before all else, he loved the world. But
his constant Leitmotiv is the unity between God and the world. This
unity is not enforced on the world; it is already there. For this reason, Teilhard desired at all times to see; to detect a unity that was hidden in the
world: " My whole driving power is to try to see. A whole which unfolds "
(p. 14). Mooney contributes to our understanding of Teilhard by clearly
aligning himself with those who hold that the evolutionary vision is dependent upon a personal intuition of unity. The other scientific factors,
or theological factors in the vision serve as additional supports and modes
of clarifying the vision.
Teilhard personally experienced the anxiety of the existentialists about
the world. He saw the record of evolution leading, in human terms, to
some sort of death of his beloved universe. The universe would end, or
at least human life would end. In faith, he sought a way out for man.
Is there some way to insure the happy outcome of the universe? The
incarnation and resurrection were his answers. In the incarnation, he could
conjoin his love of the world as a scientist and human being with his love
for God. In faith, he saw the end of the universe to be life and not death.
The whole cosmic process leads to unity and this unity is Christ. It is
Christ who directs the entire movement; both the human evolution and the
Christie point of the Parousia converge in him.
It is often remarked that Teilhard's vision of Christ is like St. Paul's.
Mooney carefully shows how in some ways it is the same and yet totally
new. Teilhard agrees with St. Paul, as for example in I Cor. 3:fll ff.: the
world belongs to man because man belongs to Christ and Christ belongs
to God. Christ is viewed as the cosmic leader of mankind. But the difference in Paul and Teilhard lies precisely in the type of cosmos being led.
Paul's was a static universe of the Greeks; Teilhard's is an evolving universe. Man's spiritual efforts carry the world upward (toward God in
faith) and forward (toward greater unity in human achievement) in Christo
Jesu. And this is precisely the guarantee: that Christ is physically one
with our universe. For this reason, it cannot end, for Christ is God. There
can be no question, then, about whether man's endeavors will be successful.
They will be in Christ.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Mooney performs another invaluable service in showing how Teilhard
operates on three different levels almost simultaneously. These levels always
overlap, and are never clearly distinguished: (1) the evolutionary level
unfolding in a cosmic process, not by chance, but by personal direction;
the theological level with the principle, dominant throughout his
writings, that Christ is physically unified with the world by the incarnation; (3) and a personal intuitive level which sees Christ as Lord of all
human efforts because he is the unity toward which the world is drawn.
In short, Mooney considers the necessity of the outcome of the universe,
in Teilhard's hypothesis of a converging universe, to rely upon the personal
religious experience that Christ quarantees its necessity through his physical
conjunction with it. In this respect, he sets the whole vision back in order
again, for it depends not upon scientific evidence, nor upon a scientific
hypothesis, nor upon an evolutionary metaphysics for its necessity. Rather
it depends upon Christ.
In the concluding chapter, Mooney establishes the dangers of Teilhard's
theological synthesis. Teilhard's vision, he maintains, was based on a personal religious experience (cf., Hymn of the Universe, p. 33), his language was always poetic and strove to render his vision clear, even to
himself. There is little doubt that his view will modify all future Christology (e. g., cf. Schillebeeckx, Christ, The Sacrament of the Encounter with
God, Chap I) .
However Mooney cautions us on several points. Perhaps Teilhard had
too much faith in the power of evolution itself to open revelation. This
is the danger of taking any structural system of our own making to be part
of revelation itself. Secondly, Teilhard seems to have neglected both the
personal choice and the personal salvation of each individual man. This
is due to his natural tendency as a thinker to be fascinated by the necessary
and the absolute vision of God's total plan for the cosmos. Finally, even
though Teilhard's omega point (Christ) is designed to unify the transcendent God and the immanent Divine energy in things, the emphasis
upon the incarnation of Christ and his immanence in the world's structures
could lead to a destruction of the sense of the transcendent (p. 206) .
We would suggest for further research the physical presence and unity
of Christ with the world in the light of traditional Christological thinking
and its relation to the sacraments. A further line of development has been
taken by R. J. Nogar, 0. P., in his The Lord of the Absurd (N.Y.: Herder
& Herder, 1966), wherein Teilhard's Lord of order and unity is contrasted
with a Lord even of absurdity and evil. Nogar has reacted to the points
enumerated by Mooney above, and has sought to preserve the individual
from the over-synthetic account of life found in Teilhard. Some answer
by Teilhardians will be in order. Perhaps they could cite the Divine Milieu,
which Teilhard himself considered his best work. In the Christian approach
found therein, there is a definite place for absurdity and its relation to
Christian resignation.

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All three theologians, Bonhoeffer, Congar, and Teilhard, offset the lessdeveloped areas in the others' view. Bonhoeffer's personal view of Christ
can aid both Congar and Teilhard in stressing the personal. Congar's
ecclesial view, on the other hand, can complement Bonhoeffer's and certainly enrich Teilhard's gap in considering this point. Finally, Teilhard's
emphasis upon the " already " and the " not yet " of human endeavor, an
emphasis taken up by the Church in the final decrees of Vatican II, can
offer an historical dynamism to Congar and Bonhoeffer's portraits of Christ.
Fortunately, Jesus of Nazareth is too complex a mystery ever to be contained in any one man's synthesis. For this reason, we can hopefully look
for many more Christologies in the years to come.
DAVID THOMASMA,

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

O.P.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Althaus, Paul, The Theology of Martin Luther. Fortress Press, 1966.
Pp. 464. $8.00.
Callahan, Daniel, The New Churchr-Essays in Catholic Reform. New
York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1966. Pp. !t!t!t. $4.50 (hardcover).
Copi, Irving M. and Robert W. Beard (Editors), Essays on Wittgenstein's
Tractatus. Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 414. $6.95.
Doherty, Dennis, The Sexual Doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan. Verlag Friedrich Pustet: Abbey Press, Indiana, 1966. Pp. 37!t.
Doronzo, Emmanuel, Theologia Dogmatica, Vol. I. Washington, D. C.:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1966. Pp. 9!t4.
Dupre, Louis, The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism. Harcourt Brace,
1966. Pp. !t40. $!t.95.
de Finance, Joseph, Connaissance de L'Etre. Desclee De Brouwer, 1966.
Pp. 513.
Gilson, Etienne, Forms and Substances in the Arts. Charles Scribner's
Sons, 1966. Pp. !t56. $4.95.
Grenet, Paul, Thomism, An Introduction, tr. James F. Ross. Harper &
Row, 1967. Pp. 130. $4.00.
Heston, Edward L., C. S.C., The Press and Vatican II. University of
Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 134. $4.95.
Hick, John (Editor), The Existence of God. The Macmillan Company,
1964. Pp. 305. $1.95.
Hughes, Kathleen, The Church in Early Irish Society. Cornell University
Press, 1967. Pp. 303. $7.50.
John, Helen James, S. N.D., The Thomist Spectrum. Fordham University
Press, 1966. Pp. 196. $5.00.
Lain-Entralgo, Pedro, L'Attente et L'Esperance. Desclee De Brouwer,
1966. Pp. 586. 390 FB.
Laistner, M.L. W., Thought and Letters in Western Europe. Cornell University, 1966. Pp. 416.
de Lubac, Henri, S. J., Teilhard de Ckardin, The Man and His Meaning, tr.
Rene Hague. The New American Library, 1967. Pp. !t06. $.75.
Menard, Etienne, 0. P., L'Ecclesiologie Hier et Aujourd'hui. Desclee De
Brouwer, 1966. Pp. 144. $3.55.
Mommsen, Theodore E., Medieval and Renaissance Studies, ed. Eugene F.
Rice, Jr. Cornell University Press, 1966. Pp. 353.
Runes, Dagobert D. (Editor) , Baruch Spinoza, Letters to Friend and Foe.
Philosophical Library, 1966. Pp. 109. $3.75.
Salgado, Pedro V., 0. P., Psychology of the Unconscious. Manila: University of Santo Tomas, 1966. Pp. 104.

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185

Spicq, Ceslaus, 0. P., Agape in the New Testament, Vol. 3, tr. Sr. Marie
Aquinas McNamara, 0. P., Sr. Mary Honoria Richter, 0. P. St. Louis
& London: B. Herder Book Company, 1966. Pp.
$6.95 (cloth).
Sprott, W. J. H., Social Psychology. Methuen & Co., Ltd., Social Science
Paperbacks, 1967. Pp.
$3.50 P., $U5.
St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologia, Vol. 3 (la.
Knowing and
Naming God, tr. Herbert McCabe, 0. P. McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp.
117. $5.75.

--, Summa Theologia, Vol. 4 (la. 14-18) Knowledge in God, tr. Thomas
Gornall, S. J. McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp. 138. $5.75.
--, Summa Theologia, Vol.
49-54) Dispositions For Human
Acts, tr. Anthony Kenny. McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp. 140. $5.75.
--, Summa Theologia, Vol.
Courage, tr. Anthony
with
Ross, 0. P. and P. G. Walsh. McGraw-Hill, 1966. Pp.
appendix. $6.75.
--, Summa Theologia, Vol. 60 (Sa. 84-90) The Sacrament of Penance,
tr. Reginald Masterson, 0. P. and T. C. O'Brien, 0. P. McGrawHill, 1966. Pp. 178 with appendices. $7.00.
Wicker, Brian, Toward A Contemporary Christianity. University of Notre
Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 305.
Woozley, A. D., Theory of Knowledge. Barnes & Noble, 1967. Pp. 196.
$1.75.

Zimmerman, Wolf-Dieter and Ronald Gregor Smith (Editors), I Knew
Dietrich Bonkoeffer. Harper & Row, 1966. Pp.
$4.95.