THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EDITORs: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: VoL. XXXI The Thomist Press, Washington 17, D. C. APRIL, 1967 No.2 SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 1. Introduction T HE PROBLEM of the relationship between science and faith is an old one. St. Augustine was confronted with . it when he tried to evaluate the Platonic philosophy, which he had studied, in the light of Christian faith to which he was converted in later years. To Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas the problem presented itself as the necessity of finding room within Christian thought for the-at least for the Middle Ages-overwhelming riches of Greek-Arabian philosophy, science and technology. With the rise of modern science since the seventeenth century the relationship of faith and science reached a critical phase. The new science contradicted many points which were believed to be essentials of Christian faith. Many scientists were confronted with the serious choice of which to adhere to: their scientific conviction or their faith. Later on it became clear that the contradictions were less real 137 188 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN than they seemed to be at first sight. The friction between science and faith diminished to such a point that it looked as if science and faith had nothing in common. As a result the Christian scientist had a feeling of living two different lives, one as a scientist and one as a Christian. Dissatisfied with this situation Christian scientists longed for a kind of synthesis of faith and science, such as the Middle Ages had known. This modem synthesis would, of course, differ from that of the Middle Ages; its content should be adapted to modem scientific insights, but its spirit could be the same. In this paper we will try to show why such a modem synthesis of faith and reason cannot be possible. This does not mean, however, that science and Christianity have nothing in common and that a Christian scientist is of necessity a split personality. It would be wrong, however, to approach the problem of the relationship between science and Christian faith only from the view-point of the desire of the Christian scientist to integrate his personal life as a Christian and as a scientist. The problem has wider dimensions. We are living in a time in which Western science is rapidly spreading out over the whole world. Western science is demonstrating that it is a universal of culture and not just a specific Western cultural product. Can the same be said of Christianity? Thus the twofold subject-ma:tter of this paper is given. First we will examine in what way science can be considered a universal of culture and in what way Christianity can be considered a universal of culture. The result of this examination will then enable us to draw some important conclusions about the relationship of both universals. 2. The Tensions in the Western Culture The respective ways in which science and in which Christianity can be considered as universals of culture differ. This may be gathered from the respective attitudes which non-Western cultures take with respect to both universals. Roughly stated, it may be said that confronted with Western culture, in which science and Christianity form the basic ingredients, SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 139 non-Western cultures do not hesitate to recognize science as a universal of culture, whereas in their eyes Christianity seems to be a typical Western brand of religion, not suited to their needs. What is the reason for this different attitude? Does it mean that Christianity and science do not belong together and that their combination in Western culture is merely accidental? The question is not so easy to answer. On the one hand, it may be argued that the friction between Christian faith and modern science, which since the rise of modern science characterizes the history of Western civilization, proves that Christianity and science in its modern form cannot be ingredients of the same culture, at least not in a harmonizing way. On the other hand, there is also historical evidence that this very friction has all the characteristics of a friction between parent and offspring. To mention only one point: it was Christian theologians, such as Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, who introduced Greek-Arabian philosophy, science and eulture to Western thought. They acknowledged the autonomy of human reason and experience, and created room for the cultivation of profane knowledge along with theology. They were convinced not only that both types of knowledge did not contradict each other, but even confirmed each other in such a way that a real synthesis could be formed. When profane knowledge got the chance to grow up in a favorable spiritual climate and in the seventeenth century became an adult science, what else could we expect than a conflict between parent and offspring? This conflict does not in the least prove that Christianity and science are incompatible. Let us not, therefore, conclude too easily that there is no intrinsic relationship between the two main universals of Western culture. The matter needs further reflection. However, before going into the question of the relationship between Christianity and science, we should consider another problem which is closely connected with it, and which enables us to widen the dimensions of our investigation. Whatever may be the relationship between Christianity and modern science, this much is clear, Christianity is certainly not the only 140 .ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN parent of modern Western science. Another parent is Greek philosophy, the Greek view of man and of nature. The science which medieval scholars took over from the Arabs found its main source in Greek philosophy. It is interesting to note that in modern European history not only Christianity and science have not been on speaking terms. Not only they have formed two cultures in Europe, the same holds true with respect to the humanistic tradition and science. To be exact: if nowadays the slogan of two cultures not being on speaking terms is heard-1 am referring, of course, to the famous booklet of Snow 1-the two cultures meant are not Christianity and science, but the world of the sciences and the world of the humanities, the world of material culture and the world of spiritual culture. The fact of two kinds of cultural dichotomy in Western culture warns us to be extremely careful in evaluating the tension between Christianity and science. Part of the tension could be caused by the tension between humanistic culture and science. I am aware, of course, of the ambiguity of the term "humanistic culture." The term could mean the cultural movement in Europe beginning with the Renaissance. This movement remained within the scope of Christianity, although it was opposed to the medieval philosophical and theological traditions which, in its eyes, had devaluated the Greek cultural heritage. Humanism can, however, also mean the modern movement whose basic philosophy is opposed to the very idea of Christianity itself, at least with respect to its supposed supernatural origin. To this last movement belong representatives of both modern cultures. This simple fact shows how complicated the cultural situation of the Western world is. There are Christian humanists and Christian scientists as well as humanists. humanistic scientists and Let us try to unravel the cultural Gordian knot, not by cutting it, but by trying to find the historical threads out of which it is made. The first point to command our attention is the 1 C. P. Snow, The Two Cultures and the Scientific Revolution, Cambridge, 1959. SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 141 interesting fact that in history the first periods of culture are indicated in terms of materials. We speak, for example, of the stone-age, the bronze-age, the iron-age. The names are sufficient proof to characterize these periods as mainly material cultures. Later cultural periods, however, have quite different names, we speak of Hellenistic culture, of Roman culture, of Christian culture, of medieval culture, of the Renaissance, of the age of reason, the age of enlightenment and so on. The names may partly stem from geographical, political or historical categories, but the cultural periods, thus indicated, have in common that their main characteristic does not lie in a certain stage of technological evolution, but in some pre-eminent spiritual value. Very recent periods, however, are again characterized by more or less material cultural aspects. We speak, for example, of the first or second industrial revolution, of the technological, the atomic or the space-age. What does this mean? Could it be that mankind, after having discovered spiritual values as the main ingredients of culture, has relapsed into some kind of material culture? After having given preference to cultivating philosophy, science, art and religion, Western civilization seems again to give material values the highest priority. There can be no doubt that the shift of emphasis from spiritual to material culture has alarmed both Christians and humanists, the new development seems a deviation from the Christian and the humanistic tradition. This fact is one of the causes of the typical internal uncertainty of Western culture, and the same uncertainty characterizes the university and the whole academic world. It should not surprise us. The development of modern science, especially of modem technology, has fundamentally changed our total cultural outlook. In many respects the previous direction of attention has been reversed: from the past to the future, from heaven to earth and from theory to praxis. . 3. The Cultural Situation of the Past In order to evaluate correctly these changes of directions, it is necessary to spend some thought on the cultural situation 142 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN of Europe before the rise of modern science, and especially on the main determinants of European culture. One of these determinants has been the Greek ideal of knowledge. This ideal was knowledge for the sake of knowledge, disinterested love of truth. Truth made man happy, because it made him realize what he was meant to be: not just a material structure amidst other material structures in nature, not just an animal among other animals, but that kind of being for which the whole universe existed. Through cultivating science the human mind could master the whole universe, man could appropriate it, make it his own. To know, says Aristotle, is to become the other. Consequently, the specific position of man in nature was not to master nature in a material way, but to do so in a spiritual way through knowledge. This Greek view of knowledge was, of course, partly due to the fact that the possibilities of mastering nature in a material way hardly existed in antiquity. In the Middle Ages the view of knowledge and of man hardly differed from the corresponding view of antiquity. Man still experienced in himself the great distance between, on the one side, his intellectual and moral capacities transcending nature, and on the other, the extremely limited possibilities of his body which entirely belonged to the material world. Accordingly, the Middle Ages did not see any really progressive perspective for the life on earth. The scope of his life was forever determined by the immutability of material nature, which in its autonomy lay far beyond the control of man. Man could understand nature, but not change its course. The Middle Ages had no reason to doubt the cultural view of antiquity in the light of the Christian doctrine that the ultimate destiny of man did not lie on earth, but in heaven. On the contrary, it seemed as if this very doctrine confirmed the Greek view which set the highest value on the contemplation of the truth. The Church knew that it could give the final answer to the questions the ancient philosophers had formulated about man: about his origin and destiny. His origin was God and his destiny would be that eternal life in which SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 148 he would meet his Creator, the source of all reality. The aim of knowledge, the contemplation of truth, would find its fulfillment in heaven, in the visio beatifica of God. In short, Christianity did not change the fundamental orientation of the Greek view of knowledge and of culture. This fact explains why the Christian medieval theologians honestly could believe in a synthesis of Christian faith, based upon divine revelation, and of scientific knowledge, based upon the study of nature, product of divine creation. The ultimate aim of both faith and science seemed to direct man's attention to his real life, the life of the spirit. Even while man lived on earth his soul had to be in heaven. The immediate consequence of this view of life on earth was the dominant position of the Church not only in the field of science, but in the whole of culture. Symbolized in the dominating positions of its buildings-the cathedrals in medieval towns, the churches in villages-the church patronized every aspect of life: from educaton to economic life (the guilds); from the arts to the care of the sick and poor. If life on earth had no other aim than preparation for heaven and if the Church represented heaven on earth, then the dominant position of the Church in medieval culture is only logical. The theoretical fundament of this position of the Church should be sought in the synthesis of faith and science, in the fact that they mutually confirmed each other with respect to the aim of human life on earth. The rise of modem science was destined to destroy the medieval synthesis of faith and reason, because it contradicted one of its essential assumptions. What was this assumption? It was one that is characteristic of any synthesis, namely, the conviction that the components of the synthesis are more or less complete. This was believed to be the case with the medieval synthesis of faith and science. With respect to the first component, faith, there could be no possible doubt. Faith was based upon divine revelation, which was completed by Christ. Its content was laid down in the Holy Scriptures and the tradition of the early Church. Nothing could be added to it. In 144 .ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN revelation the definite Christian view of life on earth was given. With respect to the second component, science, the situation was, of course, different, at least in principle. Yet, according to the best available evidence, it seemed that human knowledge too had reached its natural fulfillment in Greek culture. This is not to say that the Middle Ages were not convinced of the relative value of the synthesis they had found. After all, it was the work of man and what was human knowledge compared to divine knowledge? The medieval scholars did not doubt, however, that their synthesis was more or less final. In judging this medieval view, let us never forget that the idea of a truly progressive human knowledge could not yet have arisen. It is true, of course, that already Aristotle was aware of a certain historical development of science and philosophy-he even carefully recorded its history-but Aristotle thought of this history as a development to a certain fixed maximum that could not be transgressed. Following his lead, Thomas was convinced that in the past there had been a progression in knowledge, but Thomas was equally convinced that in Greece this progression had already reached its natural fulfillment. The idea of a progression in knowledge and in culture that would go on forever could only come up after modem science had revealed its possibilities. In this connection it is interesting to note that Renaissance and humanism, notwithstanding their criticism of medieval scholasticism, were no more than the Middle Ages inspired by the idea of progressive evolution. They too looked back to Greek culture. Although their interest in Greek culture may have been broader than that of the Middle Ages, their interest remained inspired by the idea of the completeness of Greek culture. 4. The Rise of Science and Its Consequences Let us now consider in what way, since its rise in the seventeenth century, modem science changed the whole situation, and why science was destined to reverse the direction of cultural attention from the past to the future, from theory to praxis and from heaven to earth. At first sight these three SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY .AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 145 different changes of direction are rather unconnected. Yet the truth of the matter is that they are three aspects of one and the same change and, to make matters still more complicated, this change is, strictly speaking, no change at all. It was simply the logical result of the very essence of both sources of European culture: Greek philosophy and Christianity. In order to prove my point, we must, of course, go to the heart of the matter. From a superficial glance the differences between the Middle Ages and modern times seem great, indeed. Science is no longer inspired by disinterested love for truth, but seems to be in the service of technology. Pure theory may still be important, but only insofar as it ultimately serves practical aims. And practical aims are material aims. Theory gives way to praxis. This praxis opens up new possibilities for the life on earth; instead of the future in heaven for which knowledge prepared, the future on earth becomes the center of interest. Consequently, study at a university nowadays no longer aims at mastering the cultural traditions of the past, it means preparing for highly practical jobs. The university is no longer reserved for the happy few who by birth could be considered to belong to the cultural leading circles. In modern times the university became the most powerful ferment in the future development of science, of technology and of society as a whole. The changes are enormous. It seems as if the cultural ideals of the past are definitely left behind. But what do we see if we look below the surface? And whatever changes may have taken place, looking below the surface will remain forever one of the characteristics of the academic attitude of mind. It is striking, of course, that the old sciences such as theology, philosophy and mathematics made use of only a minimum of material means, while modern physical science endeavors to use these means to the fullest extent. Could any more persuasive argument, we may ask, be found in favor of the thesis that the spiritual orientation of the old science has given way to the materialistic orientation of modern science? Yet, the simple truth is that it was his very desire to know 146 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN that has forced man to appeal more and more to material means. He gradually came to realize that the search for truth was doomed to sterility if he did not make intensive use of his senses. This realization meant a shift from contemplative to empirical science, a shift which took place in the seventeenth century. At the same time it became evident that to appeal to the senses demanded instruments and experiments, i. e., man had to interfere actively with his hand in material reality to make instruments and to produce experimental situations. For only in experimental situations could the senses discover what the scientific mind is interested in. Thus it dawned upon man that matter was not so much an impediment to knowledge as an indispensable means to acquire knowledge, provided, of course, that matter was handled properly. This new insight is extremely important. Even if under the threat of technological dangers or the materialistic aspects of technology we should be inclined to do without technology as much as possible, it would still remain true that this same technology cannot be dispensed with for the sake of pure and disinterested knowledge. And let us beware of thinking that it is only physical science which needs technical means, because its interest lies in studying matter. Anyone who is acquainted with the history of Western philosophy knows to what extent philosophical reflection is codetermined by the progress of physical science and technology. The fact that nature was formerly looked upon as a stable whole of fixed forms which man could not transform explains why in Greek culture and not only there, but in all higher cultures of the past, culture was above all cultura animi, spiritual self-realization. The supposed discrepancy between the spiritual and material possibilities of man was the main argument for the dualistic conception of man. When man came to realize that nature was not a stable whole of fixed forms beyond human intervention, but an infinite realm of possibilities for transformation, this realization threw a new light upon man himself. Man was not the dualistic being he was supposed to be. His material position in nature SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALs 011' CULTURE 147 did not fundamentally differ from his spiritual position. He discovered that his task was to unveil the hidden possibilities of nature and to bring them to actualization. At this stage of the argument it should be stressed that the point at issue is not the technological praxis as such, but the consequences of the discovery of the technological possibilities for pure and disinterested knowledge. Whatever the importance of technology may be in its own field, it has at least thrown new theoretical light upon man himself and upon his position in nature. Consequently, to say that modem science is subservient to technology is true, but it is only half the truth. The other half is that modem technology is subservient to pure and disinterested' science, even to philosophy (and we may add " even to theology," but that will have our attention later on) . In pursuing disinterested science man has discovered that his cognitive and his technical grip on reality belong togther. Without technical grip there is no cognitive one, without cognitive grip there is no technical one. This is the lesson the history of science teaches us and it is an important lesson. We do not know what the future may have in store-continued progress, catastrophes, or a mixture of both-but one thing seems certain: the theoretical and practical grip on reality will be unified. Man has discovered that they intrinsically belong together. For better or worse, any new theoretical insight, any new insight into reality, be it nature, society or history, means a new way of mastering that reality. It could be that by a future catastrophe scientific and technical achievements would be lost, not just in one culture (as has happened in the past), but even on a global scale. This much is certain: prompted by his quest for knowledge man will again arrive at the same unity of theoretical and practical knowledge. Consequently, when we speak of universals of culture, which will be an ingredient of any culture and therefore an inspiring force in the coming world civilization whatever its concrete form, the mutual interconnection between theory and praxis is such a universal. Or to put it otherwise: the development of science shows a trend which is based on human nature. Man-spirit- 148 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN in-matter as he is-is dependent upon both his cognitive and operative contact with matter in order to find new possibilities of cultural self-expression and self-realization. The important point is, however, that the existence of these possibilities could be known only after the actual development of science has taken place. This is one of the consequences of the unity of theory and praxis, of the cognitive and the experimental grip on reality. Before this unity was known, there seemed to exist a more or less restricted field of experience. Once this field had been examined the science of it came to a natural end, to its natural fulfillment. An experimental science, however, does not know a restricted field of experience, because such a science develops reality, it does not only study reality as it is, but also the hidden possibilities of reality. With the progress of science, reality shows new possibilities. These in their tum furnish science with new data. This mutual dependence does not only exist with respect to natural science and technology. The same dependence exists with respect to human knowledge in general. Former generations could not know the intrinsic relationship of scientific theory and technological and cultural praxis before this relationship revealed itself in the actual development of science. We can understand why the Greeks partially misjudged the nature of scientific knowledge, for only as the logical result of the Greek quest for disinterested knowledge could the real nature of human knowledge eventually be revealed. This simple fact also shows why we were entitled to say that, notwithstanding the great changes the development of science has brought about, strictly speaking no change at all has taken place. Nowhere has a deviation from the Greek initiative taken place, but now its logical consequences have become visible. However natural and logical the process which brought forth modern progressive science may have been, Western culture has nevertheless had great difficulty in accepting the consequences of it. What was the reason? In the second part of this article we said that the uncertainty of Western culture was caused not only by the friction between Christian faith SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 149 and modern science, but also by a friction between humanistic tradition and modern science with its offspring, technological culture. As a result of the foregoing consideration we have come to the conclusion that if there seems to be a friction between the humanistic tradition and modern science, this friction cannot be based upon an intrinsic incompatibility. The causes can only be accidental. Modern science and technology serve the aims of Greek culture, the origin of the humanistic tradition; they have made possible a new way of " humanizing " the world. For this reason there can be no doubt that after the development of modern science and technology the value of the " humanities " has rather increased than diminished. For how could we know what " humanizing " is, if we do not know what humanity is? It should be clear, however, that a simple passing on of traditional humanistic values is no longer enough; a critical analysis is needed in the light of what later developments have revealed about human possibilities. 4. The Friction of Faith and Science If the reason for our cultural crisis is not that modern science is a deviation from the Greek cultural initiative, then the real reason for this crisis must lie in the fact that the whole development was a deviation from the way in which Christianity " baptized " Greek humanism. This thought is confirmed when we consult history. From the very beginning the Church has been in conflict with the new science. The Church has opposed not only the new cosmological world-picture, which was based upon the astronomical theories of Galileo and Newton and the biological theory of Darwin; but the Church has also opposed the technical, political and social reforms resulting from the possibilities opened up by the new scientific approach in which theory and praxis implied each other. In the eyes of the Church the history of modern times seemed to be determined by a progressive worldly-mindedness, a choice for the earth against heaven. Was not the driving force of the development a secularization of the Christian idea of redemption, a redemption to be attained by man's own power? The new secularized 150 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN culture did not believe in a " paradise lost," but in a paradise to come, the result of man's quest for knowledge and his relentless endeavor to master nature. Yet these historical facts as such are not sufficient proof of an incompatibility of Christian faith and modem world-picture. The historical friction could easily be explained by the Church's loss of its dominant position in culture, with the result that the Church was naturally disposed to distrust the new developments. Much more important, however, is the fact that in its own eyes the dominant position of the Church was not accidental, it was based upon the conviction that life on earth had to be orientated toward heaven. We have seen that this view of life on earth was closely connected with the medieval synthesis of faith and science. We have also seen that this synthesis was based upon the assumption that both revelation and human knowledge were complete. By becoming progressive, science has been emancipated from this assumption; but could Christianity ever change its conviction about the uniqueness of Christ and the completeness of His revelation? Could Christianity ever forget the past and direct itself to the future? And with respect to that other characteristic of modem science, its experimental character, must it not be said that this too is incompatible with the very idea of Christian faith? Faith is based upon certain dogmas, which once and for all determine what must be held true. The spirit of an experimental science and of an experimental attitude is, however, to wait for the unknown, for what is not yet revealed, but will gradually be revealed by the adventure that is called human life. To sum up: Christianity may have had merits for shaping Western culture in the past, it cannot be considered as a universal of culture, not as an ingredient of a future world civilization. 5. The Necessity of Re-interpreting Christianity Is this conclusion unavoidable? In the eyes of many it is. Yet it overlooks one essential point. The conclusion is only correct insofar as it concerns Christianity as it has interpreted itself SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 151 in the past. Or to put it plainly: if Christianity is to be a uhiversal of culture, it must be prepared to re-interpret itself continually. However, such re-interpretation can make sense only if readiness to continual re-interpretation belongs to the very essence of Christianity. If not, the re-interpretation should take place only from outside, only by way of adjustment and not from internal development. In this manner the re-interpretation would not only be artificial, but also remain sterile. It would prolong Christian life, but not inspire it. With respect to the mere possibility of an adaptive re-interpretation of Christianity it is easy to show that this possibility does exist. It is true, of course, that Christianity is inclined to think that the Christian view of the world and of man can be found in the Holy Scripture and in the decisions of the Church. What we find there is, however, never the pure Christian view. It is always inserted in the view of the world and the view of man which belonged to the cultures of the time when the Holy Scripture was written or the decisions were made. The way Christianity of a certain time understands what revelation says about man and human life reflects the way in which man understands himself. As long as science did not show its progressive character, Christianity interpreted divine revelation in accordance with the supposedly static character of knowledge. Divine revelation seemed to deal in this more or less static character. There can be no doubt, therefore, that the possibility of re-interpreting revelation does exist. The important question, however, is whether or not the necessity of such a re-interpretation is caused by developments which remain entirely outside revelation itself. It could be that this necessity is the result of something brought about by the dynamic character of the revelation itself. Only if the latter is true, could it be said that the necessity of continual selfre-interpretation belongs to the very heart of Christianity. We must, therefore, examine whether or not the development of science in the Western world has some relationship with its being a Christian world. Christianity has been considered as a conservative factor. But is it really conservative? 152 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN In his book The Coming World Civilization the American philosopher W. F. Hocking writes: " If we rightly read the story of the genesis of modern science and answer the question why its relentless logic appeared only in Europe, we shall see that it is the religion of Europe which begot the empirical conscience, and thus indirectly all its fruits. It is not an accident that Bacon in formulating the principle of empirical observation fell into a form of words recalling the fundamental paradox of Christian morals, ' He that loseth his life for my sake shall find it.' Bacon's words are: ' We cannot command nature except by obeying her '-clearly the mental phase of that same paradox." 2 Let us follow this line of thought a little further. We have seen that empirical science has quite naturally developed into experimental science, and that the unity of the cognitive and the technical grip, which at first was characteristic only for modern natural science and technology, has proved itself to be a universal attribute of human knowledge as such. As a result, nature and society are no longer natural surroundings for man. Man has to lose what seemed to be his natural life in order to find his real life, i. e., a life of humanizing nature, humanizing society and humanizing the whole earth; perhaps he even has to lose the earth as his natural abode in order to humanize the whole cosmos. If we look back in history with the words of Christ ringing in our ears we are astonished to find how well they have predicted human history. Again and again man has to lose his life in order to find it. Of course, not all the consequences of these words could be known at the moment they were spoken. We can understand that in the beginning these words were applied in a moral sense only, we can understand that they directed the attention of man to his future life in heaven, but this former limitation does not mean that Christianity must stick to this limitation. Unfortunately, it has only too much stuck to it. The Church • W. F. Hocking, The Coming World Oivilizaticm, New York, 1956, p. 60. SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 153 had installed itself in medieval culture, believing in the synthesis of faith and science, believing in its dominating position in which it patronized the whole of culture: science and art as well as diplomacy and the care for the sick and poor. The Church had to lose its medieval life in order to find its real life. Yet, if we want to be fair judges of the past, we must take into consideration that the Middle Ages did not know and could not know the dynamic and progressive character of science. Consequently, we cannot blame the Church for having interpreted revelation the way it did. However, once the truly dynamic character of human knowledge and human life on earth is understood, Christians should recognize this dynamism as of Christian origin. It is not an accident that precisely in Christian Western culture science showed its real face. 6. Science and Charity This conclusion is confirmed when we consider not only the dynamic and progressive character of science, but also its experimental character and especially the unity of theory and praxis. We have seen that this unity was a logical and natural consequence of man's quest for pure science. For this reason we have concluded that modem experimental science is not a deviation from the Greek preference for pure and disinterested science. It is obvious, however, that this way of approach was one-sided, the result of this one-sidedness being that praxis was made subservient to theory. And we may question whether this is fair to praxis. Has praxis not its own authentic and original value, not derived from its relationship with theory? The answer must be in the affirmative and it is again Christian inspiration, which gives an unsuspected dimension to our natural inclination to praxis. The most specific contributions Christianity has made to Western culture have been preaching, promoting and practising charity. Christianity has taught the world a new form of" humanization," namely, the care of the sick and the poor. Christianity has taught charity simply because Christ himself had declared that the care of the fellowman in need belonged to the very heart of His teaching. Chris- 154 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN tianity did not believe that this care would cure sickness or remove poverty; these were considered to be inevitable ingredients of life on earth, they were natural conditions. However, in this respect too, the teaching of Christ has shown dimensions which surpasses all human understanding. Up till modern times it seemed as if the care for the fellow-man in need could only be ineffective, at least measured with the yard-stick of earthly measures. Its only effectiveness seemed to lie in heaven. Yet the " disinterested " care for the fellow-man in need has been an important ferment in searching for means to make the care as effective as possible. Thus the law of charity has stimulated effective care. But not only that. When the time was ripe, when science was emancipated and discovered the unity of theory and praxis, when it became clear how effective charity could be, the Christian law of charity was able to show the real meaning of this effective unity of theory and praxis. By this unity scientific and technological " labor " is closely connected with the works of charity in the best sense of this word. Formerly charity seemed to be related only to some aspects of life. It had nothing to do with scientific research or professional duties. Charity concerned the care of those who stood outside normal life because they could not help themselves. They were helped in free time (not paid for) , and with freely given alms. Consequently, charity was above all the task of those who, belonging to religious orders, had withdrawn from the" world." Nowadays the care of the fellowman in need has become part of professional interest. At first sight this seems to point to a diminishing of charity in modern society. On closer inspection, however, the possibilities opened up by modern science and technology are pointing in quite another direction. Charity should inspire all our work, especially our professional work. For it is precisely this work, be it scientific research, education, designing or constructing machines, building houses, plants or roads, growing crops, legislation, or whatever it is-all leads in one way or another to removing sickness and poverty: they all are " works of charity." If this is true, then only one conclusion is possible. SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 155 Charity should become a universal factor in our whole life, not just in that department formerly reserved for the works of charity. If we reflect a little further on this point, it becomes clear that not only charity is able to show the real meaning of the unity of theory and praxis, but also that this unity has given a new meaning to the law of charity, because it has universalized its cultural meaning. What we have shown with respect to charity exemplifies the way we must consider the human value of Christianity, its value as a universal of culture. Christianity is an invitation to man to transcend continually his own possibilities, but in such a way that in each new situation he will not be lost. He will have lost his former life, his former natural situation, his former security and certainty; but he will find a new life and a new task which he will recognize as a new dimension of what Christianity demands him to be. Looking back he will discover that what he seemed to have lost was1 not lost at all. In conclusion: there can be no doubt that Christianity is a universal of culture and especially a universal which prepares man for new tasks, i. e., tasks whose consequences we are not able to distinguish clearly in advance, tasks presented by modern culture whose development is caused by the possibilities opened up by modern science with its experimental character. 7. The Creative Possibilities of Man It is precisely this conclusion which for many Christians creates a problem. They will not question the conclusion insofar as it shows that Christianity can be considered a universal of culture, but they are afraid that by considering -Christianity a universal of culture, its most specific character, namely, its supernatural character, gets lost. They may ask whether the final conclusion of this article should not be that Christianity has lost its supernatural character. Does not this whole article tend to secularize Christianity? The objection is to the point. I did secularize Christianity, but this does not mean that, by being secularized, Christianity would lose its 156 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN supernatural origin. If we really believe in this origin, then what reason could there be to fear widening the worldly dimensions of its doctrine? If the reason would be that this widening could endanger the supernatural dimensions of Christianity, then there is only one answer-our idea of these dimensions is too limited. We must rather think the other way around. We must take for granted that our ideas and our dogmas concerning God, Creation, Fall of man, Redemption and Eternal life are too limited. Consequently, we should be grateful for any development that helps us to correct our ideas. The new dimensions of human life on earth are such corrective factors. Let us never forget that the first thing which Christianity teaches us about man is that man is created as an image of God. And why should we then be afraid of the overwhelming creative possibilities opened up for human life on earth? Not that Christians know in advance all the answers. Christians have believed this in the past, but it has been proved wrong. God did not mean, by His revelation, to take away the adventure from human life. Man has to find out for himself what could be made out of his life. " To be created as an image of God " is not just a word, it means that man has to create his own world and his own future. Revelation did not set boundaries to this task; on the contrary, it showed perspectives otherwise undreamed of. It may be true, therefore, that, on account of the progressive character of human knowledge, science and faith will never reach again a synthesis such as the Middle Ages thought possible, but this does not imply that science and faith have nothing to do with each other. Due to the new dimensions of human life revealed by science we are able to deepen our understanding of what God revealed about man, whereas divine revelation in its turn can help us to understand better the true meaning of the revelations about human destiny made by science. Let me make one more comment on this point. The world today seems to be in a pessimistic mood. Man is afraid that he cannot cope with the task before him. He hardly believes in the future, he does not even believe that human life has meaning. SCIENCE AND CHRISTIANITY AS UNIVERSALS OF CULTURE 157 This does not necessarily mean that man would deny the perspectives opened up by the unity of theory and praxis, but he shrinks from the responsibilities, because he does not trust himself. To all appearances man is simply too small for the task which by his own doings he has gradually discovered. The whole historical process which has led to the scientific and technical explosive development, seems to be without sense, if man is not able to cope with the moral responsibilities of his new type of life. Of course, he will continue to cultivate science and technology, he will teach other cultures the blessings of science, but what would be the point? And we may add: even if the whole world would accept not only science but also that other universal of Western culture, Christianity, what would be the point? What has been the result of twenty centuries of Christianity? Two world-wars, the possibility to destroy the whole world and a wave of materialism. In the light of these facts there seems to be every reason for pessimism for Christians and non-Christians alike. And are hard facts not more decisive than more or less idealistic philosophical discourses about the universal cultural values of science and Christianity? Hard facts have the last word indeed, but let me also add that it is not so easy to evaluate facts. For example: we have spoken about the fact that man is too small for the tasks he has discovered. But what do we really know about the creative possibilities of man? Man, as he is, is too small, but can he already be considered an adult? 3 The facts would force us to be pessimistic if man were the static being that former generations had reason to think he was. The conclusion of our examination of the two universals, science and Christianity, has, however, been that man is not such a static being. He has to lose his static life, in order to find his real life: a creative one, in which his main creative task is not humanizing the world, important as that may be; his main creative task will be that of humanizing himself. By following the precepts of Christ to help our fellow-man in need, we 8 Cf. A. G. M. van Melsen, Evolution and Philosophy, Pittsburgh, 1965, Ch. VIII. 158 ANDREW G. VAN MELSEN have. discovered that we all are men-in-need and not only those, who are subject to the classical forms of need, the sick, the poor and the disabled. The creative process that lies before man is not a kind of hocus-pocus, it is a long-range program. For reason the fact that twenty centuries of Christianity may seem to be a failure does not say anything, for what are twenty centuries? We simply do not know. Insofar as we do know something through our knowledge of evolution, there is every reason to believe that twenty centuries are just a few minutes. In the perspective of the time scales by which evolution is measured, man is extremely young. Moreover, if it is true that " man is created as an image of God," and if the way in which science is creative may be considered the indication of the human way of being creative, then there is every reason to expect that the process of Christianizing the world will take time. The process of humanizing the world has just started, why should it be different with the process of Christianizing it? In the light of what the universals of culture reveal about these radical possibilities, there is no reason to be pessimistic, even if we do not know the future. For what we know and what we believe is sufficient to inspire our work and our life. ANDREW University of Nijmegen, The Netherlands G. VAN MELSEN THE SITUATION OF HEIDEGGER IN THE TRADITION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY T HE THOUGHT of Martin Heidegger is strange not only in its language, but in its effect upon philosophers of the most diverse orientations. As is well known, he has caused reactions ranging from adulation to virulence. But within scholastic circles both philosophical and theological, as well as among Protestant intellectuals, his writings seem to have created more than anything else a ferment and stirring of ideas already bearing rich fruit through influences felt in the writings, among others, of Rahner, Bultmann, and a number of fine scholars of Louvain. This sphere of influence, particularly within scholasticism, provides some important clues as to the nature of Heidegger's "Thought of Being." Dondeyne, Rahner, De Waelhens, and the centers of thought they represent-all were profoundly influenced by the scholasticism of Joseph Marechal in its overriding concern with the history and theory of the problem of knowledge.1 In these currents of Marechalian scholasticism Heidegger's notion of Being has remained, as elsewhere, disconcertingly enigmatic, but with this difference: the notion somehow seemed to match the mood and share the spirit of that thought which first brought scholasticism into confrontation with the full complexity and radical concerns of the epistemological problematic. It is by no means incidental to note that the deepest influence of Heidegger has been in this circle of scholasticism. Another quite distinct and highly influential circle of scholasticism is that of Gilson and Maritain, which has primarily affected the intellectual clime in America (even as Marechal's 1 According to Joseph Donceel, the " school " of Marechalians " has begun to call itself the Thomasian system of philosophy or transcendental Thomism." " Philosophy in the Catholic University," America, 115 (24 September, 1966), 881. 159 160 JOHN N. DEELY strongest influence has been toward Germany), and where the Heideggerean thought of Being has found little resonance or deep sympathy. This scholastic circle was stirred in its depths and centered originally not by Kantian critical philosophy, as was the case for Marechal's research, but by Bergson: " What Banes considered the correct interpretation of the Thomistic notion of being has been spontaneously rediscovered by some of our own contemporaries, and it is worthy of note that among these there is hardly one who, at one time or another, has not been under the influence of Bergson." 2 What is important to us is the difference in primary concern separating these men from the Marechalian circle. It is the domain of conscious awareness taken precisely as such: primary in Marechalian thought, it definitely plays a secondary role in the thought of, say, Maritain. True enough, a major work of Maritain is titled The Degrees of Knowledge, and even states at one point that " ' philosophy of being ' is at once, and par excellence, ' philosophy of mind.' " 3 But this affirmation must be seen in context, as an affirmation of the organic place of noetic within the larger and more fundamental concerns of Metaphysics: " Critique of knowledge or epistemology does not exist as a discipline distinct from metaphysics.'' 4 Moreover, " the task of critique is purely and exclusively reflective and secondary (not only in the order of time but by its very nature as well) .'' 5 The vocabulary of Metaphysics " has to do with the operations and means of knowledge taken in their relation to extramental being.'' 6 What would happen if a methodology were founded which precisely circumscribed and in that sense isolated the full noetic problematic as such from, or better, within metaphysics? " To • Etienne Gilson, The PhiloBophllT and Theology, trans. by Cecile Gilson (New York: Random House, 1962), pp. 157-8. 8 Jacques Maritain, ThB Degreu of Knowledge, trans. from the 4th French ed. under the supervision of Gerald B. Phelan (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1959), p. ix. • Ibid., p. 80. " Ibid., p. 75. 8 Ibid., p. 898. HEIDEGGER IN THE TRADITION OF CHIUSTIAN PHILOSOPHY 161 give it a separate existence is to set a third term between realism and idealism, between yes and no." 7 We shall return to this. The Thomistic scholasticism of Joseph Marechal faces the problematic of human awareness more directly and radically than that of Jacques Maritain. ·one the other hand, Maritain is more careful to locate and sketch the exact perspective which that problematic presents within the larger ' framework,' or better, the spiritual organism 8 of Thomistic philosophy. With the help of Maritain's careful sketch, I shall show why Heidegger's way of philosophizing thrives best in the scholastic atmosphere of a Marechal; but I shall do this by locating that area of philosophical reflection where Thomas' analyses and the thought of Heidegger literally share a common concern. That is what I mean by the situation of Heidegger in the tradition of Christian philosophy. The core of the analysis I shall undertake here was originally developed in a paper under the less ambitious title, " Heidegger: Phenomenological Thought of Being." There, my sole concern was to touch on the primal intuition or experience at the origin of Heidegger's thought-indeed, it was Heidegger who verified for me the truth of Bergson's reflections on the philosophical mind gathered under the title "Philosophical Intuition": You recall how the demon of Socrates proceeded: it checked the philosopher's will at a given moment and prevented him from acting rather than prescribing what he should do. It seems to me that intuition often behaves in speculative matters like the demon of Socrates in practical life; it is at least in this form that it begins, in this form also that it continues to give the most clear-cut manifestations: it forbids. . . . Is it not obvious that the first step the philosopher takes, when his thought is still faltering and there is nothing definite in his doctrine, is to reject certain things definitively? Later he will be able to make changes in what he affirms; he will vary only slightly in what he denies.9 • Ibid., p. 80. 8 Ibid., p. xiii. • Henri Bergson, Tke Creative Mind, trans. by Mabelle L. Andison (New York: The Philosophical Library, 1946), pp. 109-10. 162 JOHN N. DEELY Bergson's observations are certainly verified in Heidegger. Heidegger's initial and continuous experience of the Beingquestion (" Seinsfrage ") forbids him to accept its formulation in Aristotle. In terms of Heidegger's original flash of intuitivity, Aristotle's question concerning the ultimate nature of Reality overlooked and bypassed the phenomenon of Being, literally forgot Being (" Seinsvergessenheit "). For many, this profound opposition of thought still remains more or less concealed in the language superficially common to the two lines of thinking. Because I was concerned in my original essay with bringing out both that and how the question of Being as Heidegger experiences it is different from that framed by Aristotle and subsequently advanced by Aquinas, I was likewise concerned with the radically anti-philosophical opinion which still enjoys some currency that Heidegger's fundamental orientation to the Being-question cannot be achieved outside the cultural angle built into the German philosophical language. Although Dasein is an everyday word in Germany and had been in use in German philosophy for many, many decades before Heidegger, I was convinced that his employment of the term stands apart from both of these usages in an altogether proper appropriation. For the Heidegger of Sein und Zeit, the idea of Dasein (therefore of Being) and the idea of Phenomenology stand in a reciprocal relationship. The former can only be understood in terms of the latter, as a hat must be understood in terms of a head. It seemed to me that Dasein as Heidegger fashioned the notion should be characterized as a new point of departure for a new way of thought, much more concrete in the sense of prior to, because more fundamental than, the initial concerns of both Idealism and Realism. For the very same reason his notion is incapable of housing the ground-question of Thomistic metaphysics or occupying a share of its primary concern. All this seemed to me important and worth bringing out in view of the fact that these several key points seemed to be nowhere taken together or consistently understood by scholastic thinkers of either the existentialistin the sense of "esse "-orientation (Maritain) or the cogni- HEIDEGGER IN THE TRADITION OF CHRISTIAN PHILOSOPHY 163 tiona!, " transcendental," orientation (Marechal) . Let me provide some justification for this allegation. Gilson achieved a decisive insight when he wrote that " the phenomenology of Dasein is without a counterpart [in any genuinely thematic sense] in the doctrine of Saint Thomas." But in a certain sense he betrays this same insight when he writes in the very next sentence: " Concerning the notion of Being itself, and that of metaphysics which is bound up with the notion of Being, the comparison is on the contrary possible and the Heideggerean ]anguage is perfect." Basing his remarks on the text of Heidegger, Was ist M etaphysik, Gilson considers that " the terminology of the new Metaphysic is comparable to that of tradition. Heidegger distinguishes in effect between existence or 'to be' (Sein) and being (das Seiende). This is the Thomistic distinction between esse and ens . ... " 10 Following up this false lead of Gilson, Lotz, in a fascinating and provocative analysis, attempts to show that latent in Thomas' use of en.