THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

VoL. XXXI

The Thomist Press. Washington 17, D. C.

JULY, 1967

No.8

GEORGE EDWARD MOORE'S CRITICISM
OF SOME ETIDCAL THEORIES

I

N HIS Logic and Language, Second Series, A. G. N. Flew
termed George Edward Moore the doyen of British philosophy.1 Although he failed to attract popular attention
as did certain of his contemporaries such as Ludwig Wittgenstein and Bertrand Russell, recognition of his stature as a " philosopher's philosopher" has been widespread and enduring.
The time-spread of his activity is in itself nothing short of
phenomenal: his first published work appeared in 1897, and
the last lectures he published came from the press in 1957,
the year before his death. 2 As a professor at Cambridge and
long-time editor of Mind, he had ample opportunity to leave
his mark on two generations of philosophers in the Englishspeaking world.3
Logic and Language, Second Series (Oxford, 1958), p. 2.
• His Commonplace Book 1919-1953 was published posthumously in 1964.
• Moore's autobiography may be found in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, a
colleciion of essays by various authors edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, !!nd ed.
(New York, 1952), pp. 8-89. An account of Moore's final days appears in "George
1

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GABRIEL FRANKS

Moore has often been compared to Franz Brentano as a
pivotal figure in the history of contemporary philosophy. Just
as Brentano, by his rejection of the post-Kantian idealism of
nineteenth century German philosophy, fostered and inspired
such diverse movements as existentialism and the neo-empiricism of the Vienna Circle, so did Moore change the course of
British philosophy by his rejection of the Hegelianism which
flourished in Great Britain at the turn of the century .4 It was
he who led his fellow-student at Cambridge, Bertrand Russell,
to abandon idealism in 1898, and together they embarked upon
a crusade which led far beyond the goals which either had
envisioned or intended. Not only do the milder forms of logical and linguistic analysis which dominate British philosophy
today derive from the orientation and method which was
Moore's legacy to his followers. The more radical philosophy
of the early Wittgenstein of the Tractatus, and of the logical
positivism of A. J. Ayer and his disciples, are also generally
regarded as having their origin in Moore's rejection of
Hegelianism. 5
The fact that Moore never became well known beyond the
comparatively narrow circle of professional philosophers in spite
Edward Moore 1878-1958," by R. B. Braithwaite, in Proceedings of the British
Academy, Vol. XLVII, pp. 298-809.
• J. Laird, Recent Philosophy (London, 1986), pp. 188 and 129 fl'. Cf. also F.
Copleston, S. J., "Contemporary British Philosophy," in Gregorianum XXXIV
(1958); also Moore's " Preface " to his Principia Ethica, pp. x-xi.
• For the relationship between Moore and the Logical Postivists, see A. Stroll,
The Emotive Theory of Ethics (Berkeley, Calif., 1954); for L. Wittgenstein's
dependence on Moore see the " Introduzione critica" to the Italian translation by
G, C. M. Colombo, S. J., of Wittgenstein's Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, pp.
18 fl'. See also M. White, The Age of Analysis (New York, 1955), pp. 21-26. In
his" A Reply to My Critics" in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore. Moore wavered
toward acceptance of the emotive theory of ethics of the Logical Positivists, but
in a personal conversation I had with him on September 7, 1955, he told ine that
he had definitely rejected such a view. This rejection is confirmed by A. C.
Ewing, who has recently reported that at some date after 1958, Moore said that
"he still held to his old view [that ethical statements have cognitive meaning],
and further that he could not imagine whatever in the world had induced him to
say that he was almost equally inclined to hold the other view." (Mmd, LXXI
[196!!], p. 251.)

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of his great importance is partly due to the fact that his relatively conservative views about strictly philosophical problems were not the sort of thing of which headlines are madesomething which cannot be said, for instance, about some of
Bertrand Russell's propositions concerning morality. G. E.
Moore's lack of popular appeal was also due to the coldly serious manner in which he wrote. His books and articles are
closely reasoned and seemingly repetitious. Professor Ferrucio
Rossi-Landi has noted that
In that tedious and pedantic manner of his, Moore examined a
restricted number of particular questions, holding them under his
nose like a myopic who reads without his glasses, without ever
distracting his gaze from the tiny sector about which he has decided
to busy himself.6

But if Moore's writings did not appeal to the general public,
his work did attain some notoriety through the fact that his
ethical system was studied and esposed by the Bloomsbury
Group, a loosely organized society of avant-garde artists and
writers which revolved around Virginia Woolf in the London
of the twenties and thirties. Moore had no direct contact with
the members of the Bloomsbury Group apart from the fact
that several of its members had studied with him at Cambridge in the early years of the century. But although he
himself deplored the manner in which his name had become
associated with the group, it became inseparably linked with
the activities and ideals of Virginia Woolf and her associates. 7
Moore's ethics appealed to this group, which constituted one of
the most highly cultivated intellectual societies in the history
of the Western world, largely because of the emphasis which he
8 F. Rossi-LDJldi, " L'eredita
di Moore e la filosofia delle quatrro parole," in
Rivista di Filoaojia, XL VI, n. 8 (1955), p. 807.
1 J. K. Johnstone, The Bloomburg Group (London, 1954), Chap. II.
See also
J. M. Keynes, Two Memoirs lLondon, 1949] pp.
8Jld the two volumes of

the autobiography of Leonard \Voolf [Virginia's husband], Sowing [New York,
1960], pp. 44-164, and 169-171, 8Jld Beginning Again [New York, 1968], pp. 21,
24-!M, 40-42, 52, 187-189, 8Jld 148. It was Mrs. Dorothy Moore and various
acquaintDJlces of Moore who infQrmed me that he was not entirely happy about
the way in which his name had become so closely linked with Bloomsbury.

GABRIEL FRANKS

placed on aesthetic values as ultimate ends. But it cannot be
denied that its members were also fascinated by Moore's implicit invitation to cast off certain aspects of Victorian mores.
Although Moore wrote at least as much about problems
which may be roughly summarized as being of an epistemological nature as he did about ethics, it is only with the latter
that we will be concerned here. As to his epistemology, we
must be content to point out here that he believed in a correspondence theory of truth and that the objects of reality consist principally of combinations of sense-data, though what may
be the exact relationship which sense-data bear to the objects
which they constitute and to knowing subjects is a problem
which continued to puzzle him to the end of his days. 8 Though
basically an empiricist, he was willing to admit the reality and
existence of objects and qualities which do not appear to the
senses. This latter fact is of the greatest importance to his
ethical theory.
Moore was neither a notably prolific writer nor one given
to developing a system for system's sake. He himself has
confessed that he would never have been roused to interest
in philosophical problems had he not felt the need to refute
what he considered the outrageous statements and propositions
of various philosophers. 9
Nearly half of Moore's Principia Ethica (first published in
1903; reprinted 1922, 1929, 1948, 1951, 1954, 1956, 1959) , the
work we shall consider here in greatest detail, consists of the
8 A synthesis of Moore's epistemology is to be found in A. White, G. E. Moore-A Critical &cposition (Oxford, 1958), Chap. VITI. Cf. J. Passmore, A Hundred
Years of Philosophy (London, 1957), pp. 208-215, and D. Cleary "An Essay on
G. E Moore" in The DCYI.lYnside Review, Vol. LXXXVI (1968), pp. 216-219. I
should confess that I find the summary of Moore's epistemology as given in
the text to be woefully inadequate, especially in view of Moore's constant shifts in
position. Certainly he was not a mere phenomenalist except for a brief period
around 1918 when he wrote " Some Objects of Perception " (Philosophical Studies,
pp. 220-282), and, possibly, when he wrote Principia Etkica (see, e. g., p. 41).
His final published pronouncement on the status of sense-data was a firm rejection
of what he termed the Mill-Russell view (The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, pp.
581-82).
• G. E. Moore, "An Autobiography," in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, p. 14.

MOORE'S

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OF SOME ETHICAL

THEORIES

refutation of various ethical systems. His later volume, titled
Ethics (London,
took the form of an exposition of the
general tenets of utilitarianism, together with a correction of
this doctrine. Moore's several other essays and articles which
appeared in learned journals and which have reference to his
ethical theory also evidence a more or less polemical character.
I refer to the two essays, " The Conception of Intrinsic Value "
and" The Nature of Moral Philosophy," which were published
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary Volume XI,
(reprinted as Chapters VIII and X respectively
the article" The Value
of Philosophical Studies [London,
of Religion," which appeared in the International Journal of
Ethics, XII (1901); "Is Goodness a Quality?" which appeared
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Supplementary
Volume XII, 1988 (reprinted as Chapter III of Philosophical
Papers [London 1959]); his essay "A Reply to My Critics,"
which concludes the volume titled The Philosophy of G. E.
Moore edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp (1st ed. Evanston,
ed. New York,
and numerous book reviews, in
particular his review of Franz Brentano's The Origin of the
Knowledge of Right and Wrong, which appeared in the International Journal of Ethics, XV (1905).
In this paper concerning Moore's criticism of various ethical
systems I shall follow the method of exposition used by Moore
in his Principia Ethica, since this was his most complete treatment of the subject, but reference will be made to other works
in those cases in which Moore later modified his theory.
Moore begins his Principia Ethica with a general criticism of
all ethicians of the past, and in his Preface he makes the ambitious statement, paraphrasing Kant, that he intends to write
"Prolegomena to any future Ethics which can possibly pretend to be scientific." 10 He takes many philosophers to task
first of all for failing to define the province of ethics/ 1 the
scope of which he proposes to be not only human conduct,
10
11

G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge, 1908), p. ix.
Ibid., p. 1.

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but human conduct insofar as it is good or bad. He maintains that " That which is meant by ' good ' is, in fact, except
its converse ' bad,' the only simple object of thought which is
peculiar to Ethics." 12
This leads to his next great criticism of the great majority
of his predecessors in ethical investigation, namely that they
have generally failed to distinguish between the two principle
meanings of the word " good,'' which can signify either what
is " good in itself " (or " intrinsic good ") or what is " good
as a means." Although Ethics is concerned with good as a
means (for all human conduct, according to Moore, is good
only as a means for the attainment of intrinsic good) , it is
necessary to ascertain the meaning of " intrinsic good," upon
which all good as a means is dependent.
Moore spent a lifetime trying to state clearly what he meant
by " intrinsic good,'' 13 a process whicht was rendered particularly difficult by the fact that he maintained that it is an indefinable concept, and that the intrinsic goodness of things can
be only known by intuition. 14 It is a non-relational quality 15
Ibid., p. 2.
Moore refined his notion of " intrinsic good " especially in " The Conception
of Intrinsic Value" (Chap. VIII of Philosophical Studies [London, 1922]) and in
his" A Reply to My Critics." (The Philosophy of G. E. Moore, esp. pp. 554-611.)
"Moore states that when he calls propositions about good " intuitions," he
merely means to assert that they are incapable of proof; he implies nothing whatever as to the manner or origin of our cognition of them (Principia, p. x) . He
compares the manner in which we know " good " to the manner in which we
know " yellow " (Ibid., pp. 7 and 10) .
In order to test the goodness of things by intuition, they are to be considered
in isolation. The following text from Principia (pp. 83-84) will illustrate how the
test is to be applied: " Let us imagine one world exceedingly beautiful. Imagine
it as beautiful as you can; put into it whatever on this earth you most admiremountains, rivers, the sea; trees, and sunsets, stars and moon. Imagine these all
combined in the most exquisite proportions, so that on one thing jars against
another, but each contributes to increase the beauty of the whole. And then
imagine the ugliest world you can possibly conceive. Imagine it simply one heap
of filth, containing everything that is most disgusting to us, for whatever reason,
and on the whole, as far as may be, without one redeeming feature. . . . The
only thing we are not entitled to imagine is that any human being ever has or ever,
by any possibility, can, live in either, can ever see and enjoy the beauty of the
one or hate the foulness of the other. Well, even so, supposing them quite apart
12

13

MOORE'S

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OF SOME ETHICAL

THEORIES

which he describes as " non-natural," 16 which is dependent
on, or derived from, the various good-making " natural " qualities of objects or states of affairs which Moore's described as
" organic wholes." 17 Furthermore, intrinsic goodness is an
" ought-implying characteristic," 18 or, in other words, to say
that a thing is intrinsically good must entail that it ought to
exist. 19 Or, to be still more precise, " A statement about obligation follows from the very nature of a statement about
intrinsic value." 20
It is Moore's characterization of intrinsic good as being a
non-natural quality which led him to make his principal criticism of many ethical systems, that is, that they commit what
he termed the " naturalistic fallacy." This fallacy consists in
the attempt to identify intrinsic good, a " non-natural " quality
with some other " natural " quality or object. Although Moore
had at least as much difficulty in :fixing the precise distinction
between what he meant by a" natural" and a "non-natural"
quality as he did in making clear the meaning of intrinsic good,
what he means by the " naturalistic fallacy " is clear enough:
it is the identification of intrinsic goodness with any other
quality, characteristic, or object whatsoever. He made it clear
even at the beginning of Principia Ethica that even if good
were a natural quality, and the attempt were made to identify
it with some other natural quality (whatever may be meant
from any possible contemplation by human beings; still, is it irrational to hold that
it is better that the beautiful world should exist, than the one which is ugly?
Would it not be well, in any case, to do what we could to produce it rather than
the other? Certainly I cannot help thinking that it would; and I hope that some
·
may agree with me in this extreme instance."
It is interesting to note that Moore later rejected the conclusions of this intuition. (See note 47 below.)
16 G. E. Moore, "Is Goodness a Quality?"
in Proceedings of the Aristotelian
Society, Vol. XI, p.
(Philosophical Studies, p.
16 Moore Principia, p. 13 fl.
17 Ibid., pp.
It was suggested by H. J. Paton in his contribution to The
Philosophy of G. E. Moore (p. 115) that Moore "would agree with the Provost
of Oriel [Sir W. David Rossl that goodness is a 'totiresultant property.'"
18 Moore, "A Reply to My Critics," p. 605.
19 Moore, Principia, pp. 17 and 67 .
•• Moore, " A Reply to My Critics," p. 575.

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by the term) , he would still call such an. identification an
instance of the naturailstic fallacy .21
The naturalistic fallacy can occur under many forms. Moore
reduces them to two groups, the first of which he terms metaphysical theories, the second of which he calls naturalistic
theories. Naturalistic theories are then suddivided into theories which declare some natural object, other than pleasure,
to be the sole good; and hedonism, the doctrine that pleasure
is the only good-that good and pleasure are identicaP 2
Moore chose to discuss the naturalistic theories before taking
up the metaphysical theories, and of the naturalistic theories
he elected to examine the non-hedonistic varieties before taking
up the question of hedonism itself. The philosophers who are
hailed into court include J. S. Mill, W. K. Clifford, the Stoics,
Rousseau, Herbert Spencer, and M. Guyau.
Moore termed the first group of theories naturalistic because
they identify good with some particular quality or object which
exists in space and time-in the realm of nature. And the first
of such theories is that which equates goodness with ' life
according to nature.' Such a view he attributes to the Stoics
(though he is of the opinion that in their case the theory is
of a metaphysical rather than naturalistic nature) and Jean
Jacques Rousseau. 23
In its most general form, this theory holds that whatever is
natural is good. Moore points out that taken at its face value
this proposition is obviously false, since there are many things
in the world of nature (which he identifies with the visible
universe) which are, in themselves, bad, for example, pain. He
next suggests that such a theory may maintain that whatever
Nature (with a capital" N ") has decreed must be good. This
is rejected for two reasons: a) as an agnostic, Moore cannot
identify Nature with an all-wise God, and hence can see no rea21 Moore, Principia, p. 14.
Mary Warnock has pointed out in Ethics Since 1900
(London, 1960), p. 19, that while the name "naturalistic fallacy" may be misleading, for Moore " the true fallacy is the attempt to define the indefinable."
22 Ibid., p. 39.
23 Ibid., p.

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son why whatever Nature has ordained must necessarily be
good, and b) if what Nature has decreed is taken to mean
that that which is good is that which is normal, then this view
must be rejected by reason of the fact that many abnormal
things are better than normal things. For instance, the genius
of Socrates or Shakespeare must be admitted to be better than
the mediocre intelligence of the average man. 24 He suggests
that the identification of what is normal with what is good
came about through the observation of the fact that what is
normal is usually better than that which is abnormal, but he
maintains that it is clear that this is not universally true. A
third suggestion he makes as to the meaning of " nature " in
the phrase " life according to nature," is that it means the
minimum of what is necessary for life. Apparently, he is in
this case equating the natural with the primitive. By way
of refutation he cites a dialogue of Lucian, in which it is pointed
out how silly it is to hold that the life of lions and bears and
pigs and wild Sythians is a greater good than that of civilized
man. 25
The second sort of naturalistic ethics he undertakes to refute
is cine which systematizes the appeal to nature by holding that
whatever is more evolved in nature is the more perfect. Its
champions would seem to hold that nQt only does evolution
(especially in the Darwinian sense) show us the direction in
which we are developing, but also shows us the direction in
which we ought to develop. Moore cites Guyau and Herbert
Spencer as partisans of this view. He notes that at one point
in his Data of Ethics Spencer seems to indicate that his evolutionist ethics is based on hedonism, that the generalized conclusion may be drawn, in virtue of numerous individual observations, that what is more evolved always brings more pleasure
into the world. As a matter of fact such a generalization would
not show any strict causal relatonship between evolution and
pleasure, but only that the progress of evolution and increase
of pleasure have gone hand in hand in the past. Moore at•• Ibid., p. 48.

•• Ibid., p. 45.

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tempts to show that Spencer actually held an evolutionistic
and hedonistic ethic simultaneously, a position which would
lead to contraditions. For example, Spencer seems to recognize
in the increased production of life a mark of progress in evolution. Moore points out that it is quite possible that a small
quantity of life should give a greater quantity of pleasure than
the greatest possible quantity of life that is only just " worth
living." l!6 And judging evolutionistic ethics on its own merits,
that is, not as related to hedonism, Moore points out that while
it may be true that the actual evolution of the universe has
favored an increase in intrinsically good things, we have no
assurance that it will so continue. Darwin's law of natural
selection, for instance, might, under changed conditions, favor
the evolution of lower forms of life which might be better
only in the sense that they were more suited to those new
conditions. 27
We now tum to the refutation of hedonism, to which Moore
devotes a whole chapter in Principia Ethics. 28 By hedonism,
Moore understands the doctrine that pleasure is the sole good,
a· " vulgar mistake " which is quite widespread because " it is
the first conclusion at which any one who begins to reflect
upon Ethics naturally arrives. It is very easy to notice the
fact that we are pleased with things. The things we enjoy
and the things we do not form two unmistakable classes, to
which our attention is constantly directed. But it is comparatively difficult to distinguish the fact that we approve a thing
from the fact that we are pleased with it " 29 Among the philosophers whom Moore considers to be hedonists are listed Aristippus, the disciple of Socrates, and the Cyrenaic school he
founded; Epicurus and the Epicureans; the utilitarians such as
Mill and Bentham; Herbert Spencer in his non-evolutionistic
moments; and Moore's own predecessor in the chair of moral
philosophy at Cambridge, Henry Sidgwick.
We can here do not more than summarize very briefly the
•• Ibid., pp.
Ibid., p. S7.

21

•• Ibid., Chap. III.
•• Ibid., p. 60.

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s<alient features of Moore's complex and often excellent arguments against the principle that pleasure is the sole good, and
hence we can hardly do justice to them. His arguments in
general may be said to take two principal forms: 1) demonstrations that the writers in question were not consistent in
their hedonism, and 2) an appeal to intuition. The first argument is used against Mill, who, as Moore points out, does not
make pleasure simply the sole and highest good, but distinguishes between higher and lower pleasures, a distinction which
obviously involves some principle of evalution beyond that of
mere pleasure. The appeal to intuition is also brought to bear
against Mill's psychological hedonism, against the proposition
that the good is that which we desire. To this contention
Moore retorts that if it is true, then it is nonsense to speak of
bad desires. 30
In his criticism of Sidgwick, Moore calls intuition into play
on two levels. 31 First he cites the arguments of Socrates against
Protarchus which show that if pleasure is the sole good, then
the life of an oyster (presumably a contented one) is as desirable as that of a man. But Moore recognizes that this argument is unfair, that what most hedonists really wished to
defend was not that pleasure is the sole good, but rather consciousness of pleasure. He admits, for instance, that this is
what Sidgwick really meant to hold. But it is no use: " It
seems to me that a pleasurable Contemplation of Beauty has
certainly an immeasurably greater value than mere Consciousness of Pleasure. In favor of this conclusion I can appeal with
confidence to the sober judgment of reflective persons." 32
Ibid., pp. 61-81.
Ibid., pp. 81-96.
82 Ibid., p. 94.
This is another instance of the test by intuition.

so
81

To my mind
the best example of the application of the method of intuition to the refutation
of hedonism appears in his Ethics (p. 147): "It [hedonism] involves our saying
that, for instance, the state of mind of a drunkard, when he is: intensely pleased
with breaking crockery, is just as valuable, in itself-just as well worth having,
as that of a man who is fully realizing all that is exquisite in the tragedy of King
Lear, provided only the mere quantity of pleasure in both cases is the same. Such
instances might be multiplied indefinitely, and it seems to me that they constitute

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In addition to hedonism in general, Moore also considers two
subforms of it, egoism and utilitarianism.
Egoism, in the form in which Moore is most interested in
refuting it, holds that each man's happiness is the sole good.
Of this view Moore says, " what Egoism holds . . . that a
number of different things are each of them the only good
thing ... is an absolute contradiction. No more complete
and thorough refutation of any theory could be desired." 88
Moore's refutation of utilitarianism can be summarized in
an equally succinct manner. He accuses the utilitarians of a
double error: "1) The best possible results were assumed to
consist only in a limited class of goods, roughly coinciding with
those which were popularly distinguished as the results of
merely ' useful ' or ' interested " actions; and these again were
hastily assumed to be good only as means to pleasure. (And
hence utilitarianism falls with the hedonism on which it is
based.) 2) The utilitarians tend to regard everything as a
mere means, neglecting the fact that there are some things
which are good as means which are also good as ends." 84 He
points out that if every good is only good as a means, it must
be justified by some future consequence which must itself be
only good as a means to some other good, and so on ad
infinitum. 85
Turning now to Moore's criticism of metaphysical ethics, we
must note that for Moore the realm of metaphysics is the realm
of abstract essences. The principal notion considered by metaa reductio ad absurdum of the view that intrinsic value is always in proportion
to quantity of pleasure."
•• Ibid., p. 99.
•• Ibid., p. 106.
•• Ibid., p. 106. It should he noted, however, that if " utilitarian " is understood
in its .etymological sense instead of as a designation for the peculiar forms of
hedonism of Bentham and Mill respectively, then Moore can himself be called a
utilitarian. Indeed, although Moore never gave a name to his ethical theory, it
has often been referred to as ideal utilitarianism (See W. David Ross, The Right
and the Good [Oxford, 1980], pp. 9 and 19). Moore told me he approved of this
designation and preferred it to all others (interview of Sept. 7, 1955). Sir W. David
Ross has suggested the name " agathistic utilitarianism " as being more appropriate
(op. cit., p. 9 note).

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physics in the scholastic use of the word, i.e., being as being,
is not taken into consideration at all by Moore in his ethical
theory. Numbers, for instance, are given by Moore as an example of what he means by metaphysical entities, which, he
maintains, are real, but do not exist. 36 If the material object
of metaphysical is understood to include the objects of universal predication as actually existing or possible things, then
Moore's own theory is a metaphysical one, as was recognized
by L. Vigone, who wrote: " When he wishes to define the
object of ethics he moves decisively to a metaphysical plane,
that of classic metaphysics, which is quite a different thing
from what Moore thinks it is. The most evident proof of
this rests precisely on the fact that he rejects utilitarianism
and pragmatism and says that the object of ethics is the ' good
in itself.' " 37
Moreover, even though Moore condemns what he is pleased
to term metaphysical ethics, he praises metaphysicians for
" insisting that our knowledge is not confined to what we can
touch and see and feel." 38
Among the " metaphysical " ethicians criticized by Moore
are the Stoics (as we have already had reason to note), Spinoza,
and Kant. His principal argument against them is that their
theories hold that human actions are good to the extent that
they conform to some suprasensible thing which is either real,
but does not exist, or, if it does exist, is eternal and unchangable.
If that reality is real, but not existent, then it can indeed suggest some good which can be brought about in the world of
actual existence, but the mere fact that it is real has no bearing of itself on what ought to be done. 39 If the suprasensible
reality is the only reality, as seemed to be true of Spinoza's
concept of the Absolute Substance, then nothing that can be
done in the world of nature can have any ethical value, be•• Ibid., p. Ill.
37

L. Vigone, " L'etica di Giorgio Eduardo Moore," in Rivista di filosofia neo-

scolastica, XLV (1953), p. 363.
88 Moore, Principia, p. 110.
•• Ibid., 114.

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cause the world of nature is unreal. 40 Or ifthe suprasensible
reality is existent but eternal and immutable, then too it can
give us no information about what is to be done, since no
action of ours can possibly have any effect on the suprasensible
reality. The latter argument Moore uses against Kant's view
that ethics is based on a Kingdom of Ends. 41
Another criticism brought against Kant rejects the notion
that to be good means that a thing is willed in a certain way.
Moore holds that a thing is not good because it is willed, though
it may be true that it may be willed because it is good. He
can see no direct relationship between good and will, because,
he says, it is possible to will some things which are evil.42
Before going on to an evaluation of Moore's criticisms, it
would be well to raise the question as to which general school
of ethical thought Moore's system is to be ascribed. Denis
Cleary, I. C., has pointed out that Cambridge philosophy in
general, and Moore as a representative of it, are notably deficient with respect to a profound historical sense/ 3 and in a
way I think this is quite true. Furthermore, A. N. Prior
has maintained that Moore is doing nothing more nor less than
carry on the tradition of Locke and Hume. 44 But I think that
there is a sense in which Moore can be said to be firmly rooted
in Aristotle. Moore first went up to Cambridge as a student
of the classics, and began to read Aristotle and Plato for their
literary value before he became intrigued by their philosophical
content. He records specifically that he became familiar with
Aristotle's Nichomachean Ethics at this time. 45 So far as I
•• Ibid., p. 116.
01 Ibid., p. 118.
I do not intend to defend Moore's interpretation of Kant.
Moore has been frequently accused of refuting an author by attributing to him
ideas which that author would hardly recognize. The argument cited here probably has more cogency against ethicians of the phenomenological school such as
Dietrich van Hildebrand.
•• Ibid., p. U9 ff.
•• D. Cleary, "An Essay on G. E. Moore," The Downside Revimo, LXXXI
(1958)' p.
"In Logic and the Basis of Ethics, quoted by C. B. Daly, "G. E. Moore and
Non-Naturalism in Ethics," Philosophical Studies, XII (1961), p. 61.
•• See "An Autobiography" in The Philosophy of G. E. MoOTe, p.

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know, Moore has nowhere, in his published works, discussed his
dependence on the Nichomachean Ethics in writing Principia
Ethica, nor has anyone else raised the question. In all probability, it never even occurred to Moore. To read and absorb
Aristotle's Ethics was the normal thing for the undergraduate
of Cambridge or Oxford in his day, and to ask whether he was
influenced by Aristotle would be something like asking whether
the average American is influenced in his political thought by
the Declaration of Independence.
And yet the point is well worth making. Once the comparison has been suggested, it is easy to see a remarkable parallel
between the Principia Ethica and the Nichomachean EthiC$,
especially Book I. Both Aristotle and Moore start off with a
discussion of the good in general (which Aristotle, like Moore,
distinguishes into good as means and the " good which we
desire for its own sake ") 4<6 followed by a discussion of what
is the good for man. Both reject sheer hedonism, and although
Moore does not describe the end of man as " happiness," the
goods which Moore thinks the highest and the chief components
of happiness according to Aristotle closely coincide. If the cultured Athenian gentleman was Aristotle's ideal, the life of the
proper Edwardian gentleman would seem to embody for Moore
all that was best in the universe. For Aristotle, the highest
good is contemplation of the truth. This is not far from those
high esthetic states of mind so valued by Moore. 47 Moore
was quite conscious of this close relationship. 48 Moore differs
•• Nichomachean Ethics, Book I, Chapter 11,1 1094".
01 See Principia Ethica, p. 188:
" By far the most valuable things, which we
know or can imagine, are certain states of consciousness, which may be roughly
described as the pleasures of human intercourse and the enjoyment of beautiful
objects." However,
varied his view slightly over the course of years. At
the time he wrote
he believed that there are some purely material things
which are good in themselves (p. 8!i!-83) . He later changed this view when he
wrote " Is Goodness a Quality? " in which he maintained (p. 1!i!3) that only
experiences can be good. He again changed his mind in his " A Reply to My
Critics" in The Philosophy of G. E. Moore (p. 618), where he held that not only
are experiences good, but also the sum total of experiences-a view which he did
not consider incompatible with maintaining that " no state of affairs can be good,
unless its existence entails the proposition that somebody is having some experience."
•• G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 199.

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notably from Aristotle in giving short shrift to virtue, which
he thinks is good mainly as a means 49 and hence should be relegated to Casuistry rather than Ethics. 50
I mention all this by way of bringing up the question whether
the "intrinsic good" which forms the cornerstone of Moore's
system is the same good " at which all men aim," which Aristotle speaks of in the opening lines of the Nicomaohean Ethics.
In at least one of his obiter dicta, Moore clearly makes this
identification. He states in his essay, "The Nature of Moral
Philosophy," written in 1921:
One thing, I think, is clear about intrinsic value-goodness in
Aristotle's sense-namely that it is only actual occurrences, actual
states over a period of time- ... that can have any intrinsic
value at all.51
This in turn raises the question whether the good which
forms the basis of the moral order in the mainstream of the
Aristotelian tradition as represented by a) St. Thomas Aquinas,
and b) the contemporary neo-Thomists, is to be identified with
intrinsic good in Moore's sense.
This is a quite difficult question to answer, partially because
of difficulties in terminology, partially because the question at
hand is seldom raised. That the question is seldom asked is
quite surprising because it is a crucial one.
Perhaps the simplest way of formulating the question is to
ask whether the Bonum in Communi spoken of in Part One
Question Five of the Summa Theologica is the same as the
bonum which faciendum est et prosequendum in the First Part
of the Second Part, Question 94, Article 2, which is Aquinas'
formulation of the fundamental principle of the natural law.
At least one Thomist commentator on Moore has asked the
question this way: is Moore's "intrinsic good " to be identified with " transcendental good," and does St. Thomas
•• Ibid., pp. 176-177.
•o Ibid., p. 4.
01 Printed in
Philosophical Studies (London, 1922), p. 827.

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struct his ethics on a metaphysics of good.52 I feel that this
is not a very good way of stating the question because moral
good is itself good in a transcendental sense. I would prefer
the following way of putting the problem (following a terminology suggested by Sertillanges) : is the moral good based on
the ontological good? 53
As I mentioned above, this question is seldom raised by
Thomists, especially in the English-speaking countries, but most
textbook writers seem to implicitly answer in the negative by
making such a clear-cut distinction between physical and moral
evil that there is no way left to relate them. One wonders,
after all is said and done, what possible relation moral good
can have to the bonum commune. One American textbook
on ethics, Right and Reason, by Austin Fagothey, pp. 56-65,
devotes a whole chapter to " The Good as Value," and then
separates moral values from all other values so that one wonders
why he raised the question in the first place. 54
It should by now be apparent in which direction the sympathies of the present author lie. But let us consider what sort
of case can be made for the view that, for Thomas, moral good
is not based on what I have been pleased to term ontological
good. One Thomist who has written about Moore and who
has rejected the view that Thomas' bonum in communi (which
he terms " transcendental good ") is the basis of ethics is Carl
W. Grindel, C. M. 55
Although Grindel admits that some Thomists would deny
•• C. Grinde!, C. M., "Ethics Without a Subject: The Good in G. E. Moore,"
in Thomiatica Morum Principia (Rome, 1960), pp. 78 fl'.
58 A. D. Sertillanges, Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy, p. !!49.
•• Actually Fagothey seems to contradict himself in this chapter. Thus on
p. 57 he states that "Values, though not wholly realizable, clamor for realization.
They should exist, they deserve to be, even if we have no way of bringing them
into existence." To say they should exist seems to give them a moral reference.
But on p. 60 he states that " The common estimate of mankind separates moral
values from other values," and goes on to develop this thought in such a way that
being a good man apparently has nothing to do with actualizing values. Nevertheless, the fact that Fagothey does devote Chapter 5 (and possibly Chapters 6
and 7) to what seems to be " intrinsic good " in Moore's sense, indicates that he
at least senses that it should have some relation to natural law. For this reason I
consider Fagothey's text better than any other currently available.
•• C. Grinde!, op. cit., p. •79.

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his interpretation, he holds that his view is a valid inference
from several texts of St. Thomas. 56 According to Grindel, St.
Thomas, in his commentary on the Sixth Book of the Ethics
of Aristotle (Lect. 7, n. 1211), says that ethics should be taught
after natural philosophy and before metaphysics. This is true,
but I think Grindel tries to make much too much capital out
of this observation. In the first place, the reason given by
St. Thomas for this ordering of things is not that metaphysics
is irrelevant to ethics, but that it is too difficult to master at
an earlier age, because, although the principles of nature are
not separated from sensible objects, and although the nature
of mathematics is not obscure to young men because mathematical proofs concern sensibly conceivable objects, things
pertaining to wisdom are purely rational.
As a matter of fact, what is probably the best argument possible for the contention that St. Thomas thought that the good
studied in metaphysics is the basis of ethics is to be found in
this same commentary. We have already noted that in the
First Book of the Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle begins with
a discussion of good in general as the basis of ethics. As a
matter of fact he devotes a goodly part of the first five chapters to this question. But then, in the sixth chapter, Aristotle
abruptly (in true Aristotelian fashion) decides: " But perhaps
we should now leave these subjects, for a precise determination of them belongs to another branch of philosophy." Aristotle does not tell us what that branch is, but St. Thomas confidently volunteers the information: it is metaphysics! 57
From this point on, Aristotle abandons the consideration of
the nature of intrinsic good, and like Moore, turns his attention to what things are good. And by a process which Moore
would call " intuition," and St. Thomas (and Aristotle himself)
would term an exercise of practical reason, he gives his conclusion: it is happiness.
Grindel's second text is similar to the first. It is a quotation
from Aquinas' Commentary on the Liber de Causis.58 In it
•• Ibid., p. 79.
•• In I Ethic, Lect. 8, n. 97.
•• Lect. 1 (ed. Mandonnet, Opuscula Omnia I, p. 195) .

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Thomas merely states as a fact that the ancients studied logic,
mathematics, philosophy of nature, moral philosophy, and
metaphysics in just that order. Apart from the inversion of
the order of learning mathematics and philosophy of nature,
and the fact that it mirrors what Aquinas thought was done,
rather than what he thought Aristotle thought should be done,
this quotation proves no more than did the first. Even if it is
true that Thomas thought that metaphysics is to be formally
studied after ethics, this would hardly exclude a sufficient,
though rudimentary, knowledge of good in general. One might
just as well argue that the God spoken of as the finis ultimus
in the First Part of the Second Part of the Summa is not the
God of the Five Ways-which are presumably a metaphysical
treatment.
Grindel goes on to develop his view of Thomistic ethics as
being grounded in an empirical study of human nature. He
seems to proceed in the spirit of the sort of biologism which
many Thomists have come to reject of late as being more Suarezian than Tho mist. 59
There is a growing movement to see human good as the
basis of Thomist ethics. Germain Grisez has developed this
view both in his book, Contraception and the Natural Law 60
and in a recent article on the first principle of practical reason
as treated of in the Summa Theologica.61 Certainly there is
good reason for holding that human good is the basis of ethics. 52
The point is interesting because, although Grinde! recognizes
that Moore bases his ethic on those intrinsic goods which are
human goods,68 another Thomist critic of Moore, C. B. Daly,
•• Cf. G. Grisez, Contraception and the Natural Law (Milwaukee, 1965), p. 46.
60 Ibid., p. 107 ff.
61 G. Grisez, "The First Principle of Practical Reason:
A Commentary on the
Question 94, Article
Natural Law Forum, X (1965),
Summa Theologiae,
p. 184.
62 Cf. Summa Theologica, I-II, q. 94 a. 2:
"The order of the precepts of the
natural law is according to the order of natural inclinations. . . . There is in
man an inclination to good according to the nature of his reason, which nature
is proper to him."
68 C. Grinde!, op. cit., p. 82. Grinde! hardly does Moore justice by commenting

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writing in the Irish journal, Philosophical Studies, condemns
Moore for failing to take human good into account. 64 Moore
recognized that human goods might be only a part of the sum
total of intrinsically good things, but that they are of great
importance to ethics since by definition they are the only goods
which we human beings can know.65 Grisez sees some sort of
conflict between transcendental good and human good-a conflict which would render Thomistic and Moorean ethics incompatible if it does exist.66 I think therefore that it is worthwhile to show that at least one eminent commentator on I-II
q. 94 a. 6 of the Summa has seen no such conflict. What is
more, this passage is not unknown to Grisez, who cites it on
p. 168 of his study. Since Schuster presents his case with great
precision, I think it will be well to quote the passage in full:
The question has been raised whether bonum is to be understood
here as bonum honestum or only in the most general sense as bonum
transcendentale. If the concept of value is to be the very first in the
apprehensio practica, this is possible only if it is conceived as unconditional value, as bonum transcendentale. Moreover, St. Thomas
teaches (I, 5, 6) that the division of bonum into honestum, utile,
and delectabile, fundamentally has reference only to human good,
but that more profound consideration reveals that it is anchored
in bonum as such, insofar as it is appetible and the terminus motus
that Moore mentions the human good only " in passing," since the greater part of
pages 188, 184, and 186 of Principia Ethica are devoted to the subject, as Grindel
himself notes.
•• C. B. Daly, "G. E. Moore and Non-Naturalism in Ethics," Philotrophical
Studietr, XII (1968), p. 64.
•• G. E. Moore, Principia Ethica, p. 184.
•• Despite my criticism of this point in Grisez' article, I consider it all in all
to be of considerable value, especially in that he has recognized that the bonum
which faciendum etrt et prosequendum is not to be restricted to moral actions
(p. 168).
Grisez has restated his position in a less formal way in a more recent article in
The Thomist (Vol. XXX, 4, Oct. 1966). At first sight he seems to have modified
his view of a year earlier. There he states (p. 847) that " I would suggest that the
only adequate ultimate standard for right and wrong in human acts is the total
possible good that man can in any way attain." Such a formulation would be in
perfect accord with Moore's views. But then he t·everts to the position (p. 848 ft.)
that there are privileged values which may never be slighted even though their
actualization may be in conflict with the total welfare of man and the universe.

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in our article, an ultimate,
and
appetitus. But
therefore universal foundation of principles is being sought, the concept of bonum should not be restricted to an ethical meaning. On
the other hand, St. Thomas is most concerned with the bonum
humanum. A praeceptum legis is only thinkable in its proper
sense with regard to rational creatures. This is most especially
true with regard to the more special laws, quae ratio practica naturaliter apprehendit esse bona humana. These are ethical goods in
the strict sense of the term. But it is still true that for the foundation of the ethical principles and fundamental precepts a more universal theory of value and a metaphysical relationship are called
into play. Even for irrational beings, certain modes of action are
right-they correspond to nature-and are therefore intended in
the natural law of the divine will. And thus the formula, bonum
faciendum, binds men in the strict ethical sense.67
•• J. Schuster, S. J., "Von den ethischen Principien: Eine Thomasstudie zu S. Th.
I• II••, q. 94, a. 2" in Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie LXXV (1988), pp.
54-55: " Es wurde die Frage aufgeworfen, ob das bonum hier im streng ethischen
Sinne als bonum
oder nur im allgemeinsten Sinne des bonum transcendentale zu fassen sei. Wenn der Wertbegriff der allererste in der apprehensio practica sein soil, so kann doch, wie es scheint, nur an die unbestimmte Werthaftigkeit
oder das bonum transcendentale gedacht sein. Ausserdem lehrt der heilige Thomas
(P. I, q. 5, a. 6.) dass die Einteilung des bonum in honestum, utile und delectabile
zwar urspriinglich nur vom menschlichen Gute gelte, dass sie aber bei tieferer
Betrachtung schon im bonum als solchen verankert sei, insofem es appetibile und
terminus motus appetitus sei. Weil nun in unserem Artikel doch eine letzte, metaphysische und damm allgemeine Fundierung der Prinzipien erstrebt wird, sei der
Begriff des bonum nicht auf die ethische Bedeutung eingeschriinkt. lndes ist es
dem heiligen Thomas zu allermeist urn das
humanum zu tun. Ein praeceptum legis ist doch nur fiir verniinftige GeschOpfe im eigentlichen Sinne denkbar.
Erst recht gilt das fiir die spezielleren Gesetze, quae ratio practica naturaliter
apprehendit esse bona humana. Diese sind aber im strengen Sinn ethische Giiter.
Dabei bleibt es wahr, dass zur Begriindung der ethischen Prinzipien und auch des
hOchsten Grundsatzes ein allgemeineres werttheoretisches und metaphysisches Verhiiltnis herangezogen wird. Auch fiir die unverniinftigen Wesen sind gewisse Handlungen richtig, naturentsprechend und darum im Naturgesetz des Schopferwillens
intendiert. Der Satz: bonum faciendum, gilt also fiir den Menschen im streng
ethischen Sinn."
A similar development is given by Gregory Stevens, 0. S. B., in " The Relations
of Law and Obligation." Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XXIX (1955), p. 198. Grisez comes close to admitting the thesis in
question on p. 199 of his Natural Law Forum article, where he states, "Of course,
' good ' in the primary precept is not a transcendental expression denoting all
things. Nevertheless, it is like a transcendental in its reference to all human goods,
for the pursuit of no one of them is the unique condition for human operation, just
as no particular essence is the unique condition for being."

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In the course of attempting to refute Grindel's thesis, I have
given, in effect, a certain amount of proof that Thomas (and
Aristotle before him) held that ontological good (or transcendental good, or bonum in communi) is the basis of the moral
order. To give a detailed proof citing a concatenation of
Thomist texts is beyond the scope of the present article. I
shall rest my case therefore, with an appeal to the authority
of various Thomist writers in addition to that of Schuster:
A. D. Sertillanges, 0. P., Les grandes theses de la philosophic
thomiste, p. 282, also Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy,
p. 249; E. Elter, S. J., Compendium philosophiae moralis, ed. sa,
p. 8J; B. H. Merkelbach, 0. P., Summa theologiae moralis, Vol.
I, #246; Odon Lottin, 0. S. B., Morale fondamentale, p. 207-08;
Jacques Leclercq, La philosophic morale de Saint Thomas devant la pensee contemporaine, p. 227 ff. and 267. To these we
may add, although some would deny that they (especially the
latter of the two) are in any sense Thomists: Bernard Lonergan, Insight, pp. 596-605; Teilhard de Chardin, The Divine
Milieu (Harper Torchbooks edition), pp. 58-62.
The same Father Cleary who questioned Moore's historical
sense had to admit that " Once the nature of good [in Moore's
theory] has been clearly established on a metaphysical plane,
it will be seen that much of Moore's thought will fit more than
adequately into traditional ethics." 68 In this judgment I
concur, especially in view of the fact that, as pointed out above
(p. 11), Moore's theory really can be considered a metaphysical
one, despite his disclaimer to the contrary.
In evaluating Moore's criticism of various ethical systems,
I would say that the most valuable criticism which philosophers
of the Aristotelico-Thomistic tradition could take to heart
would be that which calls to task those ethicians who fail to
distinguish between good as means (which is, in general, in his
view, moral good) and good as end (intrinsic good) . I have
noted above the infrequency with which English-speaking
Thomists have busied themselves with the relation of bonum
•• D. Cleary, typ. cit., p. 220.

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in communi to the bonum which is the object of the first principle of the natural law.
The second most valuable criticism made by Moore I would
say to be his rejection of hedonism. I have found that the
arguments of Principia Ethica have been helpful allies in many
a formal or informal confrontation.
The third valuable criticism which Moore has to make concerns his refusal to identify the natural with the primitive.
Some Thomists have of late made similar observations. 69 I
have often wondered if they in any way derive from Moore's
observation of 1903. If Moore's ethic is, in the last analysis,
in the line of traditional ethics, and if his system can hang
together without identifying the natural with the primitive,
then there is good reason to hope that the tradition as a whole
may be so favored.
GABRIEL FRANKS, 0. s. B.
Immaculate Conception Seminary,
Conception, Missouri

•• E. g., Louis Dupre, Contraception and Ca.thoUcs, p. 41 n.; Germain Grisez,
Contraception and the Natural Law, p. 28.

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

F

REUD, considered a genius by scientists, is generally
rejected in religious circles because of his materialistic
view of man. The popularity of Jung among religious
people on the other hand, cannot be denied. Jung is the
modem psychologist who has restored the religious factor in
man, thus setting up the long awaited bridge between psychology and religion.
Not everybody shares such an optimistic viewpoint: "I am
alarmed," says Cyril Connelly, "at the popularity of Jung's
ideas on the Catholic Church." 1 And Glover: "Jung's system
is fundamentally irreligious. Nobody is to care whether God
exists, Jung the least of all." 2 H. L. Philp says: "After many
years of psychological study . . . I find too much sectarianism
and often too much dogmatism ... I have been disappointed
in my search." 3
Are the opinions of these psychologists objective? Are Jung's
ideas on religion dogmatic and dangerous? A synthetic study
of Jung's own writings shall help us to elucidate· the problem.
Philosophical Background
Jung's ideas on religion and God cannot be understood without the knowledge of some of his philosophical principles. The
most important principle for understanding Jung's conception
of analytical psychology is the principle of opposites. According
to Jung, the root of psychological drives lies in a double polarity
which constitutes the quintessence of life. " Old Heraclitus,
who was indeed a very great sage, discovered the most marvellous of all psychological laws: the regulative function of
opposites. He called it enantiodromia, a running contrariwise,
Edward Glover, Freud or lung? (New York: Meridian Books, 1957), p. 7.
• Ibid., p. 168.
3 H. L. Philp, lung and the Problem of Evil (New York:
Robert M.
1959)' p. xi.
.
1

282

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

288

by which he meant that sooner or later everything runs into its
opposite." 4 The tension between the two opposites is the
source of energy and the greater the tension of opposites the
greater the energy that comes from them. Energy is crucial in
Jung's system and there is no energy without the tension of
the opposites. The opposites are the key to the dynamics of
human personality.
If polarity and opposition are universal laws, then, nothing
can exist without its opposite and, therefore, " every psychological extreme secretly contains its own opposite or stands in
some sort of intimate and essential relation to it." 5 As a consequence of this polarity everything in nature is found in natural
pairs, a prerequisite for polarity and opposition. For instance,
good and evil, masculine and feminine, death and life, conscious
and unconscious, anima and animus, persona and shadow, and
so forth.
The opposites are compensatory of each other, that is to
say, one opposite compensates the deficiencies of the other
opposite, thus balancing the complex elements of human personality. The compensatory function of the opposite is an
expression of the self-defense mechanism; for example, extroversion compensates introversion, the unconscious compensates
the conscious mind, the ego compensates the anima, and viceversa. Compensation also exists in the realm of ethics where
evil compensates the good and vice versa. The compensatory
function of the opposites is automatic, free from the arbitrary
control of our will.
Opposition and duality play an important role in the development of human personality. Duality is not a luxury but a
prerequisite of growth, and needs to be preserved by all means.
In the last stage of the process of development, however,
duality and opposition are harmonized and integrated into a
higher synthesis. It is unity and wholeness, says Jung, the
• C. G. Jung, The Collective Works of C. G. Jung (New York: Pantheon Books),
hereafter referred to as C. W., 1, p. 71.
6 Ibid., 5, p. S75; 9, 1 p. 96.

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ANTONIO MORENO

goal of man, which is symbolically expressed by the most
important archetype of man, the archetype of the self. The
process of man towards his goal, namely, wholeness, which is
intimately connected with religious content, is called by Jung
the process of individuation.
The law of evolution is also a universal law of nature. The
origin of man has to be found in animality; and animals, in
their turn, proceed from other inferior beings. The whole
cosmos is evolving towards consciousness, which is the remote
goal of everything existing.
Existence of religious factors
Does a religious factor exist in man? (Jung's views on
religion differ radically from those of Freud). For Jung the
existence of a religous factor in man is not an a priori principle.
It is rather an empirical conclusion derived from the examination of countless numbers of patients who came to him for
help: " The soul," he says, " possesses by nature a religious
function. . . . But were it not a fact of experience that supreme
values reside in the soul, psychology would not interest me in
the least, for the soul would then be nothing but miserable
vapour. I know, however, from hundredfold experience that it
is nothing of the sort, but on the contrary contains the equivalents of everything that has been formulated in dogma and
a good deal more, ... I did not attribute religious function to
the soul. I merely produced the facts which prove that the
soul is naturaliter religiosa, i. e., possesses a religious function." 6
The manifestations of the religious function in man are so
extraordinary and unusual, and its properties are so different
from those of other human functions, that there is no possibility
of reducing religion to any other human activity. The spiritual,
Jung says, appears in the psyche as a drive, indeed a true
passion. It is not derivative from another drive but a principle
sui generis, namely the indispensable primitive power in the
world of drives. " Since religion is incontestably one of the
8

Ibid., 1!!, p. 1!!-lS.

JUNG's

IDEAS ON RELIGION

earliest and most universal expressions of the human mind, it
is obvious that any psychology which touches upon the psychological structure of human personality cannot avoid taking
note of the fact that religion is . . . something of considerable
personal concern to a great number of individuals." 7

Nature of religion
Religion is directly connected with the contents of the
collective unconscious. But, how is it possible to know these
contents? These contents are known through revelation. This
is not the Christian revelation, which presupposes the manifestation of a transcendent God, existing outside man and
outside the universe. No, the Jungian revelation is a personal
and unique phenomenon which everybody can experience if
properly disposed. This unique experience manifests the secrets
hidden in the unconscious, because " revelation is an unveiling
of the depths of the human soul, a ' laying bare '; hence it is
an essentially psychological event." 8 In other words, " religion
is a careful and scrupulous observation of what R. Otto aptly
termed the numinosum, that is, a dynamic agency or effect
not caused by an arbitrary act of the will, . . . it seizes and
controls the human subject who is always rather its victim
than its creator." 9 Religious experience is so powerful that it
produces deep psychological effects, even transformations of
human personalities, and alteration of consciousness. 10
The root of religion is revelation, so the nature of religionand, as a consequence, of God-will depend, psychologically
speaking, on the nature of the experience of the numinous. It
will depend also on the nature of the contents of the collective
unconscious which erupts into consciousness as revelation opens
the treasures stored in the depths of the human psyche. The
collective unconscious reveals itself as full of power, with a
sense of mystery and strong feelings. This kind of human
experience Jung calls religious experience. The factors pro7

Ibid., 11, p. 5.

s Ibid., 11, p. 74.

• Ibid., 11, p. 7.
Ibid., 11, p. 8; 11, p. 7; 11, p.

10

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ANTONIO

MORENO

clueing this experience are the archetypes of the collective
unconscious. The contents and ideas appearing in consciousness are Gods: "Gods are personifications of the collective
unconscious, for they reveal themselves to us through the
unconscious activity of the psyche." 11
Causes of religious experience

Which are the religious factors producing that special state
of mind called the numinous? To answer this question, pure
empirical observations are insufficient. We have to cross the
threshold of Jung's working hypotheses: the factors producing
the experience of the numinous are the archetypes of the
collective unconscious.
There is a personal unconscious which stores memories and
repressed material, and a collective unconscious made up of
archetypes. The archetypes of the collective unconscious are
the most important elements composing Jung's structure of
human personality. They are also the most original and problematic. The archetypes are the elements composing the inner
part of our objective psyche. They are forms and images of
collective nature, universal human dispositions of our mind,
invested with power, which bring us protection and salvation.
Because they are not personal but collective, they contain the
treasures and secular experiences of the whole human race
transmitted through heredity. As such, they are the most
valuable and, at the same time, the most dangerous potentialities of the human personality. 12
Religion has always been an important factor in human
behavior. Therefore the archetypes, which store ancestral experiences, have to contain " the whole spiritual heritage of
mankind's evolution born anew in the brain structure of every
individual." 13 And since religion is universal and underlies all
events, the history of religion, in its wide sense, is a treasure
11 Ibiil., 11, p. 168.
'"Ibid., 11, p. 50; 11, p. 517; 9, 1, pp. 44; 5, p. 66; 9, 1, p. 156.
13 Ibid., 8, p. 158.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

house of archetypal forms. Especially important is the archetype of the self.14
Religious experience follows the general rules governing the
activities of the unconscious. The contents of the unconscious
erupt into consciousness generally in the second half of life,
that is to say, over thirty-five. At that time the unconscious
spontaneously invades consciousness, and since consciousness
and unconsciousness are the extreme of a dual polarity, religion
appears as compensatory of consciousness. The great religions,
says Jung, confirm the existence of a compensatory ordering
factor which is independent of the ego, and whose nature
transcends consciousness.15
The contents of the collective unconscious appear in the
beginning as autonomous complexes, independent of the control
of the ego, and of the arbitrary power of the will. They are
dangerous because, in addition to being autonomous, they are
charged with tremendous energy. These contents, and consequently those of religion, are automatically projected upon
external objects which absorb part of their energy. The process
and techniques leading to the differentiation and assimilation
of these contents by the conscious mind constitute the most
important steps towards individuation. And since the archetypes of religion are the most important archetypes, religion
and individuation are intimately interwoven. Throughout these
pages the analysis of dogmas and Gods is always simultaneously
parallel with the steps of the process of individuation.
Contents of Religion

Psychologically speaking, Jung identifies God with the contents of the collective unconscious. And since man is in continuous evolution, these contents, though essentially always
the same-because they are collective-appear, however, in
different ways, according to the degree of consciousness of man,
and the concrete circumstances in which man finds himself.
Since these contents are collective they have little to do with
" Ibid., 12, p. 82.

15

Ibid., 11, p. 294; 11, p. 488.

288

ANTONIO

MORENO

the ego and much to do with the archetypes. Since they are
experienced, they have little connection with an external God
and are strongly related to our feelings and passions.
In primitive man the contents of the archetypes appear as
myths; myth is a process of the unconscious. Consequently,
since the contents of religion are identified with the contents of
the unconscious, myth is no more than a living religion; its
ritual is magic. 16 Although myth is archaic, it is nevertheless
connected with the process of individuation of primitive man,
and the ritualistic performances carried out for the purpose of
producing the effect of the numinous were the prerogative of
the medicine man, such as invocation, taboos, sacrifices, and
incantation. Therefore, myth is the religion of primitive man,
and since man's evolution towards consciousness is a slow
process, the contents of religion in modern man are underlined
by mythical contents. Myth is therefore the crux for understanding religion. For instance, Jung calls Christ the living myth
of our culture, asserting that the myths of Near and Middle
East underline Christian dogmas, 17 and that the history of
dogmas goes back into the grey mist of neolithic prehistory.
They were ancient mysteries protecting man against the uncanny things that live in the depths of the psyche. From myth
to religion, says Jung, there is only one step. 18
Since the collective unconscious contains the whole heritage
of mankind's evolution born anew in the brain of every individual, as man evolves dogma appears as the substitute of
myth. Dogma stems from myths and
a slow
evolution of them. In dogmas the contents of myth are replaced by Gods who appear as the expression of the psyche,
as the hero appears in myth. The ritual of dogmas is not, as
in myth, the prerogative of the medicine man, but " of physicians, prophets and priests; finally at the civilized age, of
philosophy and religion." 19
Dogma, says Jung, expresses an irrational whole by means of
16

17

Ibid., 9, 1, p. 154.
Ibid., 9, !i!, p. 179.

18
19

Ibid., 11, p. 800; 9, 1, p. l!i!.
Ibid., 11, p. !i!94.

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

!!289

imagery and reflects the spontaneous and autonomous activity
of the objective psyche, the unconscious. Dogmas are not only
expressions of the contents of the archetypes, but also of their
dynamic autonomous activity; they symbolize the motions of
the libido. Dogmas are imbued with emotional values and
express the soul more completely than scientific theories because
they last for centuries, as against the dialectical nature of
scientific theories. 20
Since the existence of the collective unconscious is a psychological hypothesis and dogmas are symbolic expressions of
the contents of the unconscious, dogmas are intimately related
to psychology. Hence, for Jung, the Catholic way of life is
completely a psychological problem, and Catholic dogmas are
psychological expressions of Catholic man: " almost the entire
life of the collective unconscious has been channelled into
dogmatic archetypal ideas and flows alone like a well-controlled
stream in the symbolism of creed and ritual. It manifests the
inwardness of the Catholic psyche." 21 Therefore, since the
archetypes of the collective unconscious can be shown empirically to be equivalents of religious dogmas, the better these
dogmas express the unconscious, the better they are, the longer
they last, and the greater the possibility of success. In conclusion we may say that Christianity has come to stay because
it fits in with the existing archetypal pattern. 22
Moreover, dogmas are healing systems for the ills of the soul
because they control the terrific emotional values of the unconscious. In this sense dogmas " protect man against the uncanny
things that live in the depths of the soul. . . . This was the
purpose of rite and dogma; they were dams and walls to keep
back the dangers of the unconscious." 23 Dogmas, therefore,
canalise the libido, the energy of the unconscious, protecting
man from the perils of the soul.
What happens, then, in a religion without dogmas? Jung
warns of the dangers of this kind of religion, referring especially
•• Ibid., 11, p. 46; 11, p. 45-46.
•• Ibid., 9, 1, p. 12.

•• Ibid., 9, 1, p. 14; 12, p. 17.
•• Ibid., 9, 1, p. 22.

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ANTONIO MORENO

to Protestants. Protestantism, having no dogmas, lacked the
protecting walls, and therefore the energy liberated went into
the channels of curiosity and science. Many Protestants abandoned dogmas to embrace science but, says Jung, in this way
Europe became the mother of dragons that devoured the
greater part of the earth. 24 Jung, the psychologist, sees in
history the influence of the healing factor of dogmas when he
says: " Christianity was accepted as a means to escape from
the brutality and unconsciousness of the ancient world. As
soon as we discarded it, the old brutality returns in force as
has been made clear by contemporary events . . . a long step
backwards into the past." 25 The energy of the unconscious
free of the protective walls of dogmas finds its outlet in communism, Hitlerism, fascism, etc., the modern dragons that
threaten to devour the earth. Whoever throws Christianity
overboard, he adds, is bound to be confronted with the old
problem of brutality.
Why are religions invested with therapeutic power? Because
religion is an important factor in human personality and,
consequently, its absence produces natural psychic disturbances. The conscious mind may ignore its presence, but the
factors are there, in the unconscious, and the more the ego
tries to repress them, the greater the disturbances, and the
greater the autonomy and power of the complexes of the collective unconscious. Religion is, in this sense, a form of psychic
therapy, and one of the greatest helps in the psychological
process of adaptation. 26
Even more, Jung asserts that neurosis is never cured unless
the religious factor is restored: " During the past 30 years,
people from all civilized countries have passed through my
hands, . . . among all my patients in the second half of life
there has not been one whose problems in the last resort was
not that of finding a religious outlook on life. It is safe to
•• Ibid., 11, p. 47; 9, 1, p. 22.
•• Ibid., 5, p. 280.
•• Ibid., 4, p. 155; 16, p. 121; 16, p. 16.

JUNG' S IDEAS ON RELIGION

say that everyone of them fell ill because he had lost what the
living religions of every age have given to their followers, and
none of them has been really healed who did not regain his
religious outlook." 27 Furthermore, he asserts that " side by side
with the decline of religious life, the neuroses grow noticeably
more frequent . . . the mental state of European man shows
an alarming lack of balance." 28 Jung sees in psychic sufferings
the symptoms of a wrong attitude coming from the total
personality. Even the moral attitude is a real factor with
which psychology must reckon. General conceptions of spiritual
nature are indispensable constituents of psychic life.29
Dogmas are valuable insofar as they are rooted in religious
experience. Experience, and not faith, is their starting point.
This experience is irrational, and if dogmas become too external
and void of experience, then they are completely obsolete, no
more than relics of the past. The rational mind has to keep in
touch with the unconscious, and according to the nature of
the unconscious, so the experience and formulation of dogmas
has to be. Here Jung departs from Christianity because, according to the theory of opposites, evil is a factor as' important
as good, and since the uniconscious contains both good and evil,
dogmas cannot dispense with evil.30 Therefore a formulation
of dogmas which is rooted only in good is incomplete and
does not do justice to the whole nature of the archetypes. In
consequence, the Gods who appear in consciousness cannot
only be good since " evil needs to be pondered just as much
as good . . . in the last resort there is no good that cannot
produce evil and evil that cannot produce good." 31 The Gods
of the collective unconscious are dualistic, and the Church has
become detached from the world of nature, because Christianity
has dispensed with the dark part of God, Satan.
To attain full individuation in the Jungian sense it is necessary to withdraw the external projection which dogmas pre•• Ibid., 11, p. 884.
•• Ibid., 11, p. 885-886.
•• Ibid., 8, p. 885-886.

Ibid., H!, p. !lO; 12, p. 15.
•• Ibid., 12, p. 81; 12, p. 85.

30

ANTONIO MORENO

suppose: " It [individuation] can only happen when you
withdraw your projection from an outward historical or
metaphysical Christ and thus wake up Christ within. The
self cannot become conscious and real without the withdrawal
of external projections." 82 Faith, in the Christian sense, entails
both the existence of a transcendent God and of a historical
Christ. But since an exclusively religious projection may rob
the soul of its values, and since dogmas express the contents
of the collective unconscious, in the last resort, the contents
belong to the unconscious, not to external Gods in which they
are projected. The withdrawal of the projection is a natural
consequence of his views: " Jung rescues religion from dogma,"
says Joseph L. Henderson," he shows me how to withdraw the
mistaken projection." sa At the end Jung gets rid of dogma
altogether.
Myths and dogmas are not only expressions of the contents
of the unconscious, but of what, perhaps, is more important:
its motions and life. " Myths and dogmas are self portraits of
the movement of the libido. Thus the sun, the snake, the fire,
the horse are its symbols." 84 For instance, the course of the
sun in myth is an expression of the movement of the libido;
the sun's nocturnal journey means the repression of libido; the
sun's journey across the heavens means progression of the
libido.
Therefore, on the Christian level dogmas are symbolic expressions of the life of the unconscious of the Christian man.
For instance, the mystery of the Eucharist, says Jung, transforms the soul of the empirical man into his totality, symbolically expressed by Christ. The Mass is, in this sense, the rite
of individuation process. The humanity of Christ symbolizes
the ego; his divinity, the unconscious. The Mass expresses
therefore symbolically the union of the conscious and the
•• C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, p. 288.
33 Joseph L. Henderson, "C. G. Jung:
A Personal Evaluation" in Contact with
Jung (London: Tavistock, 1968), p. 222.
•• Hans Schaer, Religion and the Cure of Souls in Jung's Psychology (London:
Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1951), p. 71.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

fl93

unconscious in the process of individuation. In archaic man
the numinous experience of the individuation process was the
prerogative of shamnans, the medicine men. They experienced
sickness, torture and regeneration. These experiences in the
Christian man, at a higher level, " imply the idea of being
made whole through the sacrifice, of being changed by transubstantiation, and exhalted to the pneumatic man." 35 For Jung,
the Mass is a symbolic expression of the motion of the unconscious in order to obtain full individuation and consciousness.
He describes the life of the unconscious in the language of
dogmas. He says that though his writings sound as if they
were a sort of theological speculation, it is in reality modern
man's perplexity expressed in symbolic terms. For instance,
when using the term " crucifixion " or " sacrifice of the cross,"
one should understand " realization of the four functions " or
of " wholeness." 36
Jung finds in the writings of the alchemists the best manifestation of his ideas. The alchemists did not actually try to
find the philosophical stone. They were not pioneer chemists,
but rather mystics who through the unconscious projection into
matter of the contents of the archetypes were expressing in
that way the motions of their psyche towards individuation. 37
Gods
Jung is agnostic with respect to the existence of a transcendent God. To me, he says, the question whether God
exists at all or not is futile. It is futile because his metaphysical
attitude is essentially Kantian: " Epistemological criticism
proves the impossibility of knowing God but the psyche comes
forward with the assertion of the experience of God. God is
a psychic fact of immediate experience." 38 This is a cornerstone for the understanding of Jung. The whole idea of God
is based on experience, not on the hypothesis of the existence
of a transcendent and personal Deity, which he considers
unattainable .
•• c. w., 11, p. 294; 11, p. 278.
•• C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, p. 245 .
. 37

c. w., 12, p. 462.

•• Ibid., 8, p. 828.

294

ANTONIO

MORENO

Jung does not totally exclude metaphysical truths, although
in practice he rejects them as useless and even as "actual
impediments on the road under development," 89 especially if
these truths have lost touch with personal experiences. Existence for him is synonymous with experience; existence of God
is therefore experience of God; God is an object of personal
expenence.
The God of J ung is inside and he calls a systematic blindness
the prejudice that God is outside man. God is inside, because,
psychologically speaking, the God-image is a complex of ideas
of an archetypal nature representing a certain sum of energy
which appears in projection. 40 The soul, says Jung, must
contain in itself the faculty of relation to God, i. e., a correspondence, and this correspondence is, in psychological terms,
the archetypes of the God-image. What is therefore God? The
soul's deepest and closest intimacies is precisely what God is.
If God lies in the deepest and closest intimacies of the soul,
his properties will reflect-at least psychologically speakingthe properties of the unconscious where he lies. The properties
of God have to be imbued with anthropomorphic traits, the
qualities of the unconscious. For instance, since man is continuously evolving, God is also evolving and appears in different
ways.41 As Jolande Jacobi says: "the metamorphosis of the
Gods in our outward and inward worlds is inexhaustible, and
never ceases."
The evolution of God and man follow parallel lines. His
creation has also to manifest this characteristic of God, " since
all creation ex nihilo is God's and consists in nothing but God,
with the result that man, like the rest of the creation, is
simply God become concrete. It was only quite late that we
realized that God is Reality itself and therefore-last but not
the least-man. This realization is a millennia! process." 48
•• Ibid., 9, p. 84; 5, p.
•• Ibid., 5, p. 56; 11, p. 58; 11, p. 10-11.
"Ibid., 11, 84.
•• Jolande Jacobi, Complex, Archetype, Symbol in the Psychology of C. G. lung
(New York: Pantheon Books, 1959), p. 118.
•• 0. w., 11, p.

JUNG' S IDEAS ON RELIGION

295

Jung's conception of creation has nothing in common with
that of Christians. Creation implies the acquisition of consciousness of the universe, especially of man. Why? Because
the purpose of creation is connected with the transformation of
God; the encounter with the creature changes the creator. The
purpose of creation is the necessity of a greater consciousness
in God. This is clear in the Book of Job.
Yahweh is the God of the Jews, but a God without consciousness. How is this to be proved? Because of his encounter with
Job. Job sees through the injustice done to him the duality
and imperfections of Yahweh. Job possesses a superior knowledge of God which God himself does not possess. He realizes
God's inner antinomy and to his horror he discovers that
Yahweh is in a certain respect less than human. This explains
the behavior of Yahweh, the behavior of an unconscious being
who cannot be judged morally. Yahweh is amoral, jealous,
irritable, good and evil, but he is not responsible for his actions
because he is too unconscious to be moral; morality presupposes
consciousness.44
What happened after God's encounter with Job? Here are
Jung's own words: "The victory of the vanquished and
oppressed is obvious; Job stands morally higher than Yahweh
... Joh superiority cannot be shrugged off. Hence a situation
arises in which real reflection is needed. That is why Sophia
steps in. She reinforces the much needed self-reflection and
thus makes possible Yahweh's decision to become man ...
Job is morally superior to him and therefore he has to catch
up and become human himself ... Yahweh must become man
precisely because he has done man· a wrong . . . he must regenerate himself." 45 Job possesses greater consciousness than
Yahweh and, therefore, psychologically speaking, the incarnation of God is a necessity in order to obtain, through suffering
in his human nature, a greater consciousness. The Gods of
Jung evolve from unconsciousness to consciousness. The in•• Ibid., 11, p. 872; 11, pp. 867-888; 11, p. 428.
•• Ibid., 11, p. 405.

296

ANTONIO

MORENO

carnation of God is the crux for his understanding and, therefore, the Book of Job is for Jung what Genesis and the fall of
Adam is for Christians: " Christ did not come to deliver
mankind from evil . . . when God becomes man it means
nothing less than a world-shaking transformation of God." 46
Therein lies the Copernican revolution of Jung's ideas on God.

Trinity
Jung's ideas on the Trinity are not intellectual explanations
of the dogma. On the contrary, Jung says that as a metaphysical truth the Trinity remains inaccessible to him, and has
never contributed in the slightest to his belief or to his understanding. Jung, always cautious, however, does not deny the
possibility of metaphysical truths that may possibly underlie
archetypal statements.
Jung explores the New Testament and says that there is not
a single passage where the Trinity is formulated in an intellectually comprehensible manner. Even more, he adds, "the
New Testament contains no Trinitarian formulae," that is to
say, no intellectual formulation which makes the Trinitarian
formulae understandable. How, then, does Jung explain the
Trinity? As usual, by resorting to the unconscious: "They
nevertheless occur and are clear indications of an active archetype operating beneath the surface and throwing up triadic
formulations." 47 So, the existence of the Trinity is proved
through the numinous revelation of the archetypes of the
collective unconscious which project their contents in triads.
In other words, " the development of the Christian idea of
the Trinity unconsciously reproduces the archetype of the
homoousia of Father, Son, and Ka-mutef which first appeared
in Egyptian theology ... that is to say, man's conceptions
of God are organized into triads and trinities." 48
Following the theory of evolution Jung relates the apparition
•• Ibid., 11, p. 401.
""Ibid., 11, pp. 138-139; 11, p. £00.
48 Ibid., 11, pp. 148-149.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

297

of the Trinity with a gradual development of consciousness in
man. On an archaic level there is not Trinity, but unity, so the
Trinity entails a gradual unfolding of the archetype in man's
consciousness, and its absorption into the pattern of ideas
transmitted by the culture of antiquity. 49 This culture is not
merely Christian culture, but goes back four thousand years.
Thus the archetypes of the unconscious follow a slow process
of transformation. Their objective content, expressed in projection, depend both on the state of evolution o£ the collective
unconscious and on the ideas and culture in which the contents
of the unconscious appear. Jung points out that nobody can
doubt the manifest superiority of the Christian revelation over
its pagan precursors. 50
How then is the appearance of the symbol of the Trinity
explained psychologically by Jung? Although his reasoning is
obscure, nevertheless it is possible to synthesize his ideas. The
Father represents the state of culture lacking self reflection;
this kind of consciousness sees everything as one, the Father.
To prove it, Jung tells how he had the occasion of observing
this phenomenon in a tribe of negroes in Mount Elgin, in
Africa; they believe that the creator had made everything good
and beautiful. For primitive people, man, the world, and God,
form a whole (oneness), a unity unclouded by criticism. It
is the world of the Father. 51
But a reflective consciousness, like that of Job, realizes the
duality of God, his lack of self-reflection, the imperfection of
his creation, and the necessity of the incarnation of God. Then
the Son appears. " Hence the " One " has to be supplemented
by the " Other " ... the world of the Father is fundamentally
altered and is superseded by the world of the Son." In this
way, " the One becomes a Father by incarnating in the Son,
and by so doing becomes definable. By becoming a Father
and a man he revealed to ma.n the secrets of his divinity." 52
Once again we see the struggle of God on his road to consciousness ..
•• Ibid., 11, p. 140.
•• Ibid., 11, p. 187.

51 Ibid., 11, pp. 188-184.
•• Ibid., 11, pp. 184-185.

298

ANTONIO

MORENO

But the world of the Father and the Son is incomplete
because the incarnation of the Son is not continuous. Here
lies the necessity of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit appears
as a continuation of the incarnation of God. God is indwelling
in the empirical man through the Holy Spirit. As man gains
consciousness, making the unconscious contents conscious, God,
who dwells in man, gains also consciousness, with the help of
empirical man. The Holy Spirit represents the final and complete stage in the evolution of God and the divine drama. 53
To summarize, the collective unconscious evolves both
through centuries and individually in man in order to obtain
consciousness. But in the Christian man the unconscious ob""
tains consciousness in a way symbolically represented by the
Trinitarian formula. The Trinity, says Jung, is a revelation not
only of God but also of man.

Quaternity
The Trinity is not a complete expression of the process of
the unconscious. "Whereas the Christian symbolism is a
Trinity, the formula presented by the unconscious is a quaternity ." Which is the element missing in the Christian formula? The missing factor is the devil, " the dogmatic aspect of
the evil is absent from Trinity and leads to a more or less
awkward existence of his own as the devil." 54
In terms of creation J ung explains the necessity of the evil
factor as it appears in the poisonous quality of the prima
materia. Matter, he says, is not included in the Trinity formula,
but, since the material world is real and is an intrinsic part of
the divine "actus purus," then the devil is there. 55 In other
words, if everything real is part of God and matter is real,
it has to be included in God. Consequently, this situation gives
rise to a quaternity, because the devil cannot be destroyed;
he is eternal, he is the fourth. There is no total creation
without the dark side, the devil; there is no principle of individuation without the dark side, the shadow. Once again we
•• Ibid., 11, p. 186.

u

Ibid., 11, p. 59.

•• Ibid., 11, p. 195.

JUNG' S IDEAS ON RELIGION

299

see the working power of opposites, the tension of opposites
that makes energy possible.
The quaternity formula includes Lucifer as the dark side
of God. But on different occasions Jung speaks of a quaternity
as including a feminine factor. The symbol of the Trinity is
exclusively masculine in character. The fourth element was
the earth or the body, and they were symbolized by the Virgin.
In this way the feminine element is added to the Trinity,
thereby producing the quaternity. 56
The number four is, for Jung, a magic number. He sees
quaternities everywhere. The quaternity is the religious symbol, not only of Catholicism, but of many other religions. In
Catholicism, however, the fourth element is Mary: " The Three
are the Summum Bonum and the devil is the principle and
personification of evil. In a Catholic quaternity, the fourth
would be the Mother to 99 per cent divine. The devil does
not count, being an empty shadow owing to the privatio
boni." 57 Catholics dispense with the devil because evil according to Saint Augustine has no positive entity, and Mary is
almost divine. Hence, a Catholic quaternity includes the
feminine element.
Jung gives a special importance to the dogma of the Assumption. He sees the force of nature behind the pontifical definition, and in God and Mary a cautious approach to the solution
of opposites. But he warns Catholics, who say that the quaternity is without a shadow that the devil is there. Psychologically speaking the feminine part of the quaternity is the
symbol of the archetype of the anima, a feminine figure, our
feminine element of the unconscious; the anima is " the matrix
of the quaternity, a Mater Dei." 58
If the psychological quaternity appears sometimes as the
devil, the dark element, and at other times as the feminine
element, namely, Mary or Sophia, then it seems that the
""Ibid., 11, pp. 62-68; 11, pp. 196-198.
57 C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, p. 216.
58 C. W., 11, p. 68;
and the Problem of Evil, p. 219.

800

ANTONIO

MORENO

quaternity would make a quinary. To this obvious objection
Jung answers: " The quaternity is a hypothetical structure,
depicting a wholeness. It is not a logical concept, but an
empirical fact. The quinarius or quinio (e. g., in the form of
4 + 1, i.e., quincunx) does occur as a symbol of wholeness
(e. g., in China and occasionally in alchemy) but relatively
rarely. Otherwise the quinio is not a symbol of wholeness, quite
the contrary (e. g., the five-rayed star of the Soviets or of the
U.S. A.). The latter is rather the chaotic prima materia." 59
We are unable to interpret this mysterious answer.

Christ
The history, nature, and concrete life of Christ is for Jung
of very little importance. Why? Because Jung's approach to
Christ is psychological, neither theological nor metaphysical.
Jung sees in the person of the Redeemer a "collective" figure
fulfilling the expectations of the unconscious of the people who
lived at that time. So, the question of who Christ really was is
irrelevant. Christ personifies the collective expectations of the
unconscious because he lived the concrete, personal life which,
in all essential features, had at the same time archetypal
character. Since the archetypes of the collective unconscious
are not personal, but universal, the life of Christ symbolizes
the eternal life of the species, and thus what happens in the
life of Christ happens always and everywhere. 60 Here lies the
central idea of Jung's approach to Christ: the life of Christ
is a perfect expression of the needs of the archetypes of the
unconscious.
Consequently, in the Gospels myth, legends, and factual
reports are interwoven into a whole: the archetypal and the
individual. Hence, says Jung, the Gospels would immediately
lose their character of wholeness if one tried to separate the
individual from the archetypal. Christ, as an expression of the
unconscious, is a myth, " the living myth of our culture
""C. G. Jung, in H. L. Philp, Jung and the Problem of Evil, p. 216.

•• c. w., 11, pp. 88-89.

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

301

and regardless of his historical existence embodies the myth of
the Divine Primordial man, the mystic Adam." 61
Jung asks two questions: 1) what was in man that was
stirred up by the Christian message? 2) What was the answer
Christ gave?
1) What the Christian message stirred up was the archetype
of the self in the soul of every man, with the result that the
concrete Rabbi Jesus was rapidly assimilated by the archetype,
because Christ realized the idea of the self. The archetype of
the self represents the psychic totality of the individual, and
symbolizes the union of consciousness and unconsciousness; the
opposites are united in the self. Historically, says Jung, the
self is identified with the God-image and, consequently, with
Christ, because Christ represents a totality of a divine or
heavenly king, a glorified man, a son of God, and unspotted
by sin. 62 The connection between Christ and the self, the self
and the God-image, and the myths which symbolize this Godimage, is summarized in this important text: "Since he [the
hero of more than human stature] is psychologically an archetype of the self his divinity only confirms that the self is
numinous, a sort of God, or having some share in the divine
nature. In this mythologem may lie the root of the argument
in favor of ' homoousia.' For psychologically it makes a vast
difference whether the self is to be considered ' of the same
nature ' as the Father, or merely ' of a similar nature.' The
decision in favor of homoousia was of great psychological importance, for it asserted that Christ is of the same nature as
God. But Christ, from the point of view of psychology and
comparative religion, is a typical manifestation of the self. For
psychology, the self is an imago Dei and cannot be distinguished
from it empirically; the two ideas are therefore of the same
nature. The hero is the protagonist of God's transformation in
man; he corresponds to what I call mana personality." 63
Ibid., 9, 2, p. 38; 11 p. 89.
Ibid., 9, 2, p. 37; 11, p. 156.
•• Ibid., 5, pp. 391-392.

61

02

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ANTONIO MORENO

Hence, psychologically ·speaking, the " more· than human
properties " of the mythological hero confirm the divine nature
of the self. But Christ is a perfect symbol of the archetype of
the self because Christ symbolizes the hero's attributes: a
divine father, hazardous birth, precocious development, miracles, death, choir of angels, shepherds, etc. Therefore, it was
Christ's attributes which make him an embodiment of the self.
He stirred up the archetype of the self because Christ expresses
better than anything else the contents of this archetype: "He
became the collective figure whom the unconscious of his contemporaries expected to appear." 64 The self of man responded
to the Christian message.
2) What was the answer Christ gave to that which was
stirred up by the Christian message? The answer is individuation in man; incarnation in Christ. Since in psychological
terms Christ and the self are identical, everything that happens
to Christ is happening to man. The process of individuation
presupposes a long and painful road towards wholeness and
rebirth. At the end the archetype of the self unites all pairs
of opposites. Individuation involves suffering, a passion of the
ego, from the violence done to one by the self. The sufferings
of Christ, who is man and God at the same time, symbolize the
sufferings of the ego towards wholeness, torn apart by the
violence of the self. The humanity of Christ represents the
ego; his divinity, the self; thus, as a consequence of the integration of consciousness and unconsciousness, the ego enters the
"divine realm" where it participates in God's sufferings. The
cause of suffering is the same in both; for man means individuation and wholeness; for God means incarnation and consciOusness.
Jung sees in the life of Christ projections of the inner life
of the unconscious. For instance, he says: " The three days
descent into hell during death describes the sinking of the
vanished value into the unconscious, where, by conquering the
power of darkness, it establishes a new order, and then rises
•• Ibid., 11, pp. 154-155.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

308

up to heaven again, that is, attains supreme clarity of consciousness." 65 But if the life of Cluist does not represent
perfectly the inner life of the unconscious, then the answer
given by the Christian message is good, but not perfect. This
is Jung's contention, and his ideas are connected with two
things: the process of individuation, and the necessity of evil
for duality.
1) The process of individuation. Jung is careful to make a
sharp distinction between wholeness and perfection. The goal
of individuation is not perfection but wholeness: " Nat ural as
it is to seek perfection in one way or another, the archetype
fulfills itself in completeness ... the individual may strive
after perfection, but must suffer from the opposite of his
intentions for the sake of his completeness. I find then a law,
that, when I would do good, evil is present with me." 66 This
is an unusual idea; the ego may look for perfection, as in the
Christian attitude, but the self looks for completeness. Completeness and not perfection is the supreme human goal.
2) The necessity of evil for duality. This is in a sense a
consequence of the first, because without the integration of the
evil there is no totality, and the figure of Christ is not a
totality, for he lacks the nocturnal side of the psyche's nature,
the darkness of the spirit, and is also without sin. 67 Therefore,
although the attributes of Christ make him out as an embodiment of the self, looked at from the psychological angle, says
Jung, he corresponds to only one half of the archetype. According to the metaphysical doctrine of privatio boni wholeness
seems guaranteed in Christ. But in the plan of empirical
psychology, "one must take evil rather more substantially,
there it is simply the opposite of good." Jung is amazed when
a Protestant theologian had even the temerity to assert that
God can only be good. Thus, Christ can only lead to perfection,
not to wholeness.
Jung finds the psychic complement of Christ in the doctrine
of the two sons of God, Satan and Christ. In consequence, the
•• Ibid., 11, p. 90.

•• Ibid., 9, 2, p. 69.

•• Ibid., 11, p. 156.

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MORENO

coming of the Antichrist is not just a prophetic prediction, but
an inexorable psychological law. Hence if Christ is half the
archetype of the self, namely, the light side, "the other half
appears in the Antichrist, which is just as much a manifestation
of the self, except that he consists of its dark aspect." 68 Psychologically the Antichrist corresponds to the shadow of the self,
the dark side of human personality.
The coming of the Antichrist is related to the conception of
Yahweh. Yahweh was a totality including both good and evil,
that is, Satan and Christ as his two sons. In the Book of Job,
the devil was still on good terms with Yahweh and Christ. At
the time of Christ's incarnation, however, Satan became detached from Yahweh, fell from heaven and was hidden not in
hell, but in matter. Since the incarnation presupposes a worldshaking transformation of God, the incarnation of the dark side
is logical, and " nothing less than the counterstroke of the devil
provoked by God's incarnation; for the devil attains his true
stature as the adversary of Christ . . . only after the rise of
Christianity." 69
Taking into account Jung's ideas on God as a duality his
views are logical. The primitive God, Yahweh, lacked consciousness; the incarnation is the solution to acquire it. But
since Christ and Satan are both parts of God it is natural to
expect a double incarnation, the incarnation of the light side
represented by Christ, and the incarnation of the dark side
represented by Satan, who is to become the Antichrist.
For Jung, the solution of individuation lies not in the Gospels
but in the Apocalypse. St. John's consciousness was Christian,
his unconscious collective. His ego was identified ·with the
Gospel of love and, consequently, the imitation of Christ creates
a shadow in St. John's unconscious. His consciousness sees only
the light side of God and, as expected, a tremendous enantiodrO'Jny takes place that John himself could not understand
and failed to see. The unconscious compensates for the one•• Ibid., 9,
•• Ibid., 9,

p. 44; 9,
p. 41; 9,
p.
11, p. 401.

p. 46.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

305

sided attitude of consciousness, and the opposites collide in his
visions. His visions are not personal, but collective, and a
consequence of an unusual tension between consciousness and
unconsciousness. 70 What St. John sees is "the power of destruction and vengeance"; his visions are, therefore, the visions
of the dark side of God missing in the Christian message and
symbolized as " monsters with horns, the sun-moon child," etc.
Like Job he saw the fierce and terrible side of Yahweh. The
missing quaternity is restored, and the God of St. John is both
perfect and imperfect, a duality: " God has a terrible double
aspect; a sea of grace is met by a seething lake of fire, and the
light of love glows with a fierce dark heat of which it is
said-it burns but gives no light. That is the eternal, as distinct
from the temporal Gospel: one must love God but must fear
him." 11

Critique of Jung's Ideas on Religion
Jung' s methodology
Jung has steadily insisted that his views on religion are not
theological or metaphysical, but simply empirical. He relies
on empirical observation rather than on abstract theories which
he humbly confesses he is unable to comprehend. However, no
modern science is merely a collection of facts, and though Jung
says that he finds access to religion only through the psychological understanding of inner experiences, he also points out
that his psychology, like every empirical science, cannot go
along without auxiliary concepts, hypotheses and models. 72 His
method is descriptive, but he is also aware that nowhere does
the observer interfere more drastically with experiment than in
psychology. Psychic experience, he says, is very difficult.73
Likewise, he sees that in dealing with the numinous factors his
feelings are challenged as much as his intellect, and that he
cannot write in a coolly objective manner, but must allow his
emotional subjectivity to speak. 74
10

Ibid., 11, p. 444; 11, p. 488.

7' Ibid., 11, pp. 450-451.

'" Ibid., 11, p. 306.

""Ibid., 17, p. 86.
•• Ibid., 11, p. 868.

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In " Two essays of Analytic Psychology " he says that his
work is a pioneer work, and often a bitter one, " hence not
everything I bring forth is written out of my head, but much
of it comes from the heart also, a fact I would beg the gracious
reader not to overlook." 75 In " Religion and Psychology "
Jung realizes that he is beyond the territory of psychology.
Furthermore, he asserts that " he can throw light on theology
and Sacred Scripture more than theologians." 76 He also points
out that the great mistake of Freud was to tum his back on
philosophy and, finally, he writes: "I fancied I was working
along the best scientific lines, establishing facts, observing,
classifying, describing causal and functional relations, only to
discover in the end that I had involved myself in a net of
reflections which extend far beyond natural science and ramify
into the fields of philosophy, theology, comparative religion,
and the human sciences in general. This transgression, as
inevitably as it was to suspect, has caused me no little worry." 77
In other words, the work of Jung is basically empirical, sometimes partially empirical, and, on occasions, theoretical rather
than empirical. It is important to bear in mind this distinction
in order to give a fair evaluation to Jung's work.
But whether the work is empirical or not, we must be aware
of the different approaches to religion of Jung, the theologian,
and philosopher. Jung's ideas on religion are rooted in the facts
observed in the experience of the numinous. With these observations in hand he speculates psychologically in order to discover the auxiliary hypotheses, explanations of the empirical
facts. But it is relevant to point out that Jung not only relies
on the facts of immediate experience, but also on a more or less
world religious literature ranging from myth, astrology, alchemy,
gnosticism, and oriental mysticism to Sacred Scripture and the
dogmas of Christianity. He uses everything available to support
his psychological views. Jung considers doctrines and objects
Ibid., 7, p. 116.
Ibid., 11, p. 458.
77 C. G. JWlg, "The Spirit of Psychology" in Spirit and Nature (London: Ed. J.

75

76

Campbell, 1955), p. 426.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

807

which strictly belong to theology or metaphysics from another
point of view: the psychological one. For instance, Christ, for
theology, is God; for Jung, Christ is a symbol of the archetype
of the self. Psychology and man are the pillars of Jung's
approach to religion; all the rest revolves around them and is
subordinated to them. He attempts to build a science of
religious functions rooted and ending in man, a closed human
system.
A close look at the work of Jung shows also a manifest connection between psychology and history. The nature of the
psyche is fully evaluated when viewed from the historical point
of view, because history is contained in each individual,
especially in the archetypes of the unconscious. Jung studies
history observing the behavior of the psyche, and studies the
psyche analyzing its continuous manifestations through the
centuries.
Scientists and philosophers accustomed to the analytic and
detailed empirical approach find difficulty in reading his works,
and even more difficulty in understanding them. Moreover,
clarity is not Jung's special gift. As Ira Progoff remarks, Jung
often gives up the reductive study of man in terms of efficient
causes to adopt a teleological point of view. Jung also stresses
the social approach in psychology, " whereas the psyche had
previously been biological, it now becomes inherently social,
and for Jung, it meant that the psyche now had to be understood in historical terms. Jung took this step and asked the
question: What are the historical roots from which the contents
of the psyche are derived? " ' 8
Furthermore, different points of view on God usually pose
serious semantic problems. The same words may entail totally
different significations. This is the case here. Jung himself is
aware of its implication, as the source of bitter misunderstanding between his views and those of theology and metaphysics.
" One of the main difficulties lies in the fact that both appear
18 Ira Progofl', lung's Psychology and its Social Meaning (New York:
Grove
Press, 1958), p. 267.

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ANTONIO

MORENO

to speak the same language, but this language calls upon their
mind two totally different fields of association ... take, for
instance, the word God. The theologian will naturally assume
that the metaphysical ens absolutum is meant. For the empiricist, on the contrary, God is a mere statement, or at most an
archetype." 79 For the theologian trained in traditional ways,
and for the layman, the semantic problem encountered in the
reading of Jung is almost insurmountable.
Is Jung's method with regard to religion totally justified?
Although Jung's initial attitude claims to be neutral, it is not;
it is philosophical and as old as philosophy itself. The initial
rejection of a transcendent God, of the possibility of metaphysics, and of a relativistic morality, is common in the
history of thought. Jung's initial attitude, although essentially
Kantian, is at times more radical than that of Kant himself.
Both Kant and Jung deny the possibility of the science of
metaphysics. But the German philosopher compensates for this
denial by means of the postulates of the practical reason. The
existence of God, and the spirituality of the soul, are the
starting points of Kant's ethics. Not for Jung, who sometimes
maintains a relativistic idea of morality without any reference
to anything but man. God and man are intimately related; but
not for him, who seeing religion only from man's point of view
fails to transcend the limits of human nature. There lies the
incompleteness of Jung's conception. A closed system is only
possible in the Creator, not in the creature; in God, not in man.

Sources and inte1·pretation of sources
Christian revelation is founded on an unusual manifestation
of a transcendent God, who reveals himself to man by means
of the prophets, apostles, and Christ himself. It presupposes a
special intellectual illumination called "inspiration." Jung's
ideas on revelation are legitimate, according to his point of view;
revelation is a manifestation of the collective unconscious which
manifests itself in the experience of the numinous. The starting
•• C. W., 11, p. SOS.

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

309

point of his psychology is therefore empirical; the numinous
experience of his patients is empirical. But to support his ideas
on revelation and religious functions he uses sources which for
centuries have been considered not necessarily as projections
of the unconscious, but rather as conscious manifestations of
man, and even as objects existing independently of human
consideration. Furthermore, these sources, from myth to Sacred
Scripture, are of such a variety of origin and nature that the
first and most urgent need is the empirical critical evaluation of
them, as well as of their applicability to the psychological problems which religion poses. The selection of the material that
Jung uses is not always based on the intrinsic value of these
manifold sources, but sometimes on their usefulness for supporting his ideas on religion and man.
Moreover, Jung's interpretation of these sources, although
psychological, is not without difficulties. For instance, he considers Yahweh as a symbol expressing the motion of the libido
of the objective psyche, according to his psychological point of
view. But the theologian cannot help having misgivings concerning the plausibility of his approach because, (i) Jung's
conception of how some of the books of Sacred Scripture were
written, e. g., St. John's Apocalypse, differs from the Christian
interpretation.
(ii) Because Jung's interpretation of their
contents, although claiming to be psychological is sometimes
opposed to the interpretation of theologians. Consequently, he
has been accused of holding heretical doctrines. Jung, sensitive
to criticism, was infuriated by the imputation, and reassured
the reader by saying that he asserted nothing positive or
negative about the existence and nature of a transcendent God.
On the contrary, he adds, " Psychology thus does the opposite
of which it is aceused ... it opens people's eyes to the real
meaning of dogmas, and far from destroying them, it throws
open an empty house to new inhabitants." 80 His answer is
partially true, but not totally convincing, because, although in
theory his views and those of theologians belong to different
so Ibid., 12, p.

15.

810

ANTONIO

lVIORENO

realms, in practice it is not always easy to keep thetn independent, or to harmonize them. For instance, theologians
consider God as a Trinity; Jung's psychological approach
demands a quatemity.

lung's positive philosophical attitude
Jung calls himself an empiricist, but he also says that it is
impossible to write psychology without models, auxiliary concepts, and hypotheses. Hypotheses, concepts, and models are
tentative principles set up by the scientist to explain facts and
laws. With them scientists try to explain their respective
.fields; with them Jung tries to explain man. His hypotheses are
dialectical principles established to make the complex facts of
human behavior understandable. Jung holds for a structure of
personality based on the theory of opposites; a dynamic of
personality based on the concepts of psychic energy, the law of
conservation of energy, and psychic entropy. He also professes
a philosophy of individuation. Jung's initial attitude, as explained before, is not neutral but philosophical. His views on
the unconscious of man, on the four functions and two attitudes
are philosophical. His ideas on duality and opposition, on
morality and evil, on evolution, etc., are philosophical ideas
that influence every one of Jung's voluminous writings.
And we do not blame him, because there is no possibility of
being a psychologist without being a philosopher: " Insofar as
it was purely a question of method," says Baynes, " Freud and
Jung found themselves in harmony, but the study of psychological processes can never remain a mere question of method;
sooner or later it must challenge the investigator to produce a
philosophical standpoint. And here a basic psychological difference began to make itself felt . . . a psychology that excludes
the most vital problems of life from its sphere of responsibility
requires no further criticism. It is already moribund." 81 Psychology challenges the investigator, and poses the perennial and
most important problems of philosophy, like morality, religion,
immortality, death, suffering, passions, knowledge, and love.
81

H. G. Baynes, in C. W., 6, pp. iii-iv.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

311

·There is something more. As Jung honestly professes, he
writes with his heart as much as with his mind. Every single
page of his work manifests not only facts, but also the unequivocal imprint of the man, of Jung. His erudition is phenomenal,
perhaps without a par in Western tradition. But this erudition
sometimes betrays him because, leaving aside any material
which jeopardizes him, he selects other materials which enhance
his views. The work of Jung is a mixture of facts, marvelous
intuitions, philosophical concepts, amazing erudition, and the
continual projection of his unusual and extraordinary personality.

Religious functions
Is it possible to investigate the religious function of man?
Yes, there exists a psychology of religion simply because the
phenomenon of religion is a human manifestation which psychology cannot overlook. Jung studies the religious psychological manifestation characterized by the numinous. The amount
of empirical material he has gathered as a psychotherapist is
so important that it is simply impossible to evaluate; perhaps
it is unique in modern research in this field. He describes the
properties of the numinous; the contribution of the rational and
irrational factors in religious experience; the relation between
the numinous and the collective unconscious; the connection
between dreams and religious factors; the meaning of myth
and its religious implications; the manifestation of religion
according to different cultures, in the Western, world, in primitive and Oriental people&; the connection between types and
their religious characterizations; the relation between ministers,
priests, and the needs of the faithful; the meaning of the
symbols appearing in contemplation, in addition to many other
things.
Jung is indeed a pioneer in the field of religious phenomenology, but his research on the therapeutic value of religion is
itself unique. Jung knows the weaknesses, passions, sufferings
and problems of modern man perhaps better than any psychologist of the present century, and as a psychiatrist he was

312

ANTONIO

MORENO

especially interested in the connection between mental health
and religion. Through the practical knowledge of thousands of
patients who passed through his hands he saw the absolute
necessity of religion as a factor in the integration of man. He
also investigated the relationship between neurosis and religion,
the function of religion in the development of human personality, and the abnormal manifestations of religion.
Scientists should consider very carefully Jung's priceless contribution to the phenomenology of religion, his best empirical
work in a field which until recent years has been untouched.
Neither scientists nor those engaged in pastoral theology and
religious psychology can afford to ignore the material and the
observations gathered by him in sixty-five years of pioneer
work.
Man's ideas of God
The psychology of religion, Jung points out, is not a question
of God at all, but of man's ideas of God. There are people who
do have such ideas and who form such conceptions, and these
things are the proper study of psychology. 82 However, we
must be cautious in respect to this truth. Man's ideas of God
are one thing and Jung's ideas about man's ideas of God are
another. The interpretation he gives to the contents of man's
ideas of God is sometimes strange to those who had such ideas.
Jung, the philosopher-psychologist, interprets man's ideas of
God within the framework of his own ideas of God. In this
area of research his position, although very valuable, is open to
doubt and requires further investigation. This occurs mainly in
Jung's psychological interpretation of the content of Christian
dogmas, namely, God, the Trinity, Christ, and the Holy Spirit.
Dogmas
The formulation of Christian dogmas does not entail the
unveiling of the depths of our unconscious. They are expressions concerning an infinite and transcendent God, and not the
archetypes of our psyche. But it is also true that our ideas of
Ao (1.

W., 11, p. 168, footnote.

.TUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

313

God usually bear anthropomorphic traits of both a rational
and an irrational character. The common man, even the educated one, knows a little about a spiritual God, much about a
picture of him framed somewhat by his mind but more so by
his senses, as well as by the irrational needs of our appetite.
Jung sees only the human projection, which is not necessarily
nor exclusively unconscious, and he investigates the psychological characteristic of its contents in the light of the religious
literature over the centuries.
It is the relationship between dogmas and the needs of the
human psyche, discovered empirically, which makes Jung's
ideas of dogmas valuable. There is in man a religious instinct,
endowed with energy, which finds it natural object in dogmas,
especially Christian dogmas. In other words, aside from the
truths about God that dogmas contain, dogmas fulfill a collective and individual psychological function related to the
unconscious needs of our psyche. There is a true psychological
affinity between the needs of the unconscious and the Gods
formulated in dogmas. Moreover, dogmas absorb the perilous
energy of the unconscious; they are like dams or walls storing
and keeping its energy under control. Without the protecting
walls of dogmas the energy released by the unconscious erupts
into consciousness overpowering the ego of man and thus
disposing the individual soul for neurosis, and even psychosis.
The nations without the protecting shields of dogmas are easy
prey to collective destructive ideas which in modem times have
appeared exemplified as " isms," communism, Hitlerism, fascism, etc. Repression of religion, he says, presupposes mass
murder on an unparalleled scale.83
Dogmas are the objects of faith, but the pure and exclusive
intellectual surrender to an object, which, by definition, is
obscure and transcends the possibility of our understandingas are all Christian dogmas-finds no room in Jung's approach,
unless it goes together with experience. St. Paul defines faith
as "the substance of things to be hoped for, the evidence of
•• Ibid., 7, p. 104.

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MORENO

things that appear not," (Reb. 11: I). Faith inclines man to
assent to truths which are not apparent to the mind: the
Trinity is the object of Christian faith. Thus there is always
an obscurity in the act of faith which, because its object lacks
evidence, needs the impulse of the will in order to give assent.
For Jung the object of faith lies not in the existence of an
infinite God, outside man, but rather in the contents of the
collective unconscious, as they reveal themselves in consciousness: "The religious point of view, understandable enough,
puts the accent on the imprinter, whereas scientific. psychology
emphasizes the typos, the imprint-the only thing it can understand. The religious point of view understands the imprint as
the working of an imprinter; the scientific point of view understands it as the symbol of an unknown and incomprehensible
content." 84 Jung stresses experience, as against Christianity
which stresses the intellectual surrender, even against our own
in periods of aridity, and especially in the
feelings, as
mystic purification of faith, the dark night of the soul. But,
although faith in itself depends essentially on the intellect and
will-the two spiritual potencies, it is also true that it is
man who believes, the whole man, and feelings and human
experiences undoubtedly help the assent of the act of faith,
especially in the first stages of Christian life.
God

The God of Jung is not transcendent, but it "includes the
idea of the ultimate, of the first or last, of the highest or
lowest." 85 Hence God is reduced to a human factor, very
important, indeed, but human.
Does Jung make any distinction between God and man? It
is difficult to say, since he asserts that the God-image in man
is homoouma, namely, of the same nature as God; and not
homoiouma, which is of similar nature. But, especially in his
last years, he leaves open the possibility of the existence of a
transcendent God. Jung defends himself against the critics who
accuse him of deifying man saying: "I have been accused of
"'Ibid., U, p. 17.

65

Ibid., 11, p. 455, footnote,

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

815

''deifying' the soul. Not I but God himself has deified it .. ·.
I merely produce the facts which prove the soul is naturaliter
religiosa." 86 We are in sympathy with him; he is not deifying
the soul, but perhaps humanizing God, because religious ex-'
perience, religious factors, and Gods themselves, do not transcend the human domain. They are considered as human psychological factors, leaving unsolved their relationship to a personal God. It is more difficult to follow Jung when he invests
God with the properties of omniscence, eternity, and other
attributes of this kind, unless we strip these words of their
traditional meaning. These attributes belong exclusively to a
transcendent and infinite God.
The psyche is evolving, consequently, God, the expression of
its contents, is evolving also. Yahweh is an unconscious God of
dual nature, evil and good, just and unjust, light and dark.
The starting point of the redemption is not sin but the confrontation of an unjust God, Yahweh, with a just man, Job.
Man is more just and conscious than God, therefore God must
incarnate both in order to obtain a greater consciousness and
redress the wrong done to Job.
Are these ideas then a symbolic expression of the process of
individuation? For Jung, yes; but are they also the conception
of the author of the Book of Job? Certainly not; the Book of
Job confronts a just man with the mysteries of the Providence
of God, which are beyond human understanding. Jung prefers
his own to the traditional interpretation. But it is not sufficient
to resort to psychology in order to justify his views, because
that would imply that this Book symbolizes the motions of the
collective unconscious of the writer, a principle impossible to
prove empirically. Jung himself is aware of the implications of
his views. He says: " The idea of a God has become burningly
topical. It is no longer a problem of experts in theology
seminaries, but a universal religious nightmare . . . the layman
in theology like myself-must make a contribution." 87
Again, interpreting the Book of Revelation Jung asserts that
88

Ibid., U, pp.

87

Ibid., 11, p. 458.

S16

ANTONIO MORENO .

the psychotherapist has more to say on these matters (the
visions of St. John) than the theologian. Consequently, the irritation of theologians who accuse Jung of intruding into their
field is understandable, although their interpretation of Jung's
ideas is usually wrong. Reading Jung's "Answer to Job," we
do not know much about Yahweh or Job, but we certainly know
a great deal about Jung's ideas and personality. What Jung
actually attempts is to pose and to solve the thorny problem of
evil. He chooses the Book of Job simply because this book
affords him the opportunity to expand his ideas. His interpretation is unique, astonishing to the neutral reader unaware of the
problem of the unconscious.
Jung's attitude is human, understandable; he sees and touches
evil; he witnesses wars, proverty, injustice, murder, tragedy,
suffering, neurosis and death. No wonder, if driven by his
feelings, he rejects St. Augustine's formula of evil as "privatio
boni." His approach is not metaphysical and abstract, but
rather psychological and concrete; he speaks from his heart,
even from his passions. The Augustinian solution teaches him
nothing.
The belief of Jung in the existence of evil is natural, even
logical. But less natural and logical is the solution he proposes
through duality and opposition. Evil is a positive factor and as
essential for man as is good; without evil there is no opposition
nor tension and consequently no psychic energy. Therefore we
have to assimilate evil as we assimilate good. Here Jung is a
tentative philosopher groping in the dark. As he humbly confesses, he lacks the power of abstraction, so important in philosophical thought.

Trinity
The dogma of the Trinity, psychologically speaking, is a
symbol representing the process of the collective unconscious
towards consciousness. The projection of the Trinity presupposes a developed consciousness which is non-existent in archaic
man, whose unconscious projections are myths. The Trinity is
the outcome of the natural evolution stemming from myth in

JUNG'S IDEAS ON RELIGION

817

the same way as modern man is the natural evolution of archaic
man.
The study of myth and its relationship to religion is very
important in Jung's writings. His contribution in the study of
this factor is original and important. But insofar as dogmas go,
Christians look with skepticism at the idea that the mystery of
the Trinity symbolizes the process of assimilation of the unconscious by the ego. It is true that Jung is always coming up
against the misunderstanding " that a psychological treatment
reduces God to' nothing but' psychology." 88 But is it possible
to harmonize the two viewpoints, namely, the psychological
and the theological? The theologian considers the Trinity as
existent outside man and the universe and only known by
external revelation. Jung considers the Trinity, however, as the
projection of a psychological unconscious process, and known
by internal revelation; as if a little Trinity were hidden in the
inner recesses of our psyche. Jung's treatment is essentially
an unconscious process, as against St. Augustine's interpretation which finds in knowledge and love the analogy of the
Trinitarian formula. Are both points of view harmonious?
Perhaps, if we remember that Jung sees in the Trinity not a
dogmatic formula expressing the nature of God, but rather a
psychological symbol which expresses the needs of the Christian
psyche.
But the theologian rejects as false the idea of a quaternity,
which Jung claims to be the voice of nature. The Trinity
should be a quaternity, he says, because Satan-the dark part
of God-or Mary-the feminine partner-are missing. The
proof that Jung provides, in spite of the amount of material
ranging from literature to alchemy and gnosticism, bears no
conviction. Why? Because Jung rejects as invalid a much more
important wealth of material supporting the Trinity, namely,
all the writings of the Fathers and almost twenty centuries of
Christian theology. Jung, moreover, adduces gnosticism and
alchemy, plus his own personal interpretation, to prove his
88

Ibid., 11, p. 163, footnote.

318

ANTONIO

MORENO

point. But both E. J. Homyard and H. E. Stapleton, the former
a specialist in alchemy, the latter in magic circles, deny the
importance of the number four. 89 The operations of the unconscious do not prove the inadequacy of the Trinity. The visions
of the mystics were always Trinitarian, and the presence of the
Trinity in the soul of Christians not only is a dogmatic truth,
but also a mystery experienced experimentally by a multitude
of souls.

Christ
The historical Christ is irrelevant for Jung. But Christ as a
symbol of the archetype of the self is the living myth of our
culture. His miraculous life expresses faithfully the needs and
motions of the collective psyche. The life of Christ is, consequently, collective, embodying myth as constituting the quintessence of the Gospels.
What can be said about this unusual conception of Christ?
Reading " Psychology and Religion," and especially " Aion,"
one cannot help admiring Jung's tremendous erudition. But his
style is so obscure and the materials he chooses so diverse that
the reader ends up quite perplexed. We subscribe, however, to
his conclusion, that the life of Christ is in perfect harmony with
the needs of the unconscious, and even that there are probably
mythical elements in the Gospels. But to identify, for instance,
the mythical death of the hero with Christ's death is, in
Jungian terms, equivalent to saying that Christ's death symbolizes the regression of the libido into the unconscious. His
resurrection, likewise, is a symbol of the coming into consciousness of the contents of the collective unconscious. Jung's psychological treatment, if partially true, is relevant to psychology,
but of little bearing for the believer. It is chiefly the reflective
and conscious consideration of the life of Christ which attracts
Christians to the Redeemer: his doctrines, his wisdom, his
evangelic life, his miracles, his compassion and love, his mercy,
his poverty, his self denial, and the panorama of the beatitudes,
•• E. J. Holmyard & H. E. Stapleton, Cited by H. L. Philp, op. cit., p. 74·75.

JUNG's IDEAS ON RELIGION

819

The message of Christ appeals to the unconscious, but chiefly
to the ego, as a symbol of everything good and worthy in life.
Christians are surprised by Jung's ideas on the incarnation.
The purpose of the coming of Christ is not the redemption of
mankind from sin. Rather, he comes to beg the help of man in
order to acquire a greater consciousness, arid to redress the
injustice done to Job by an unconscious God. Where is the root
of the psychological interpretation to be found here? In individuation, because the unconscious-which represents the divinity of Christ-and the ego-which represents his humanity
-have to endure struggles and sufferings in order to acquire
wholeness. The sufferings of Christ symbolize these sufferings;
his humanity (the ego) is suffering the tension and the opposition of his divinity (the unconscious).
But Jung's own words seem sometimes to be a dire_ct denial
of the traditional interpretation, as, for instance, in this passage
taken from" Psychology and Alchemy": "whereas Catholicism emphasizes the effectual presence of Christ, alchemy is
interested in the fate and manifest redemption of substances,
for in them the divine soul lies captive and waits redemption
. . . the captive soul appears in the form of the ' Son of God.'
For the alchemist, the one primarily in need of redemption is
not man, but the deity who is sleeping in matter .... His attention is not directed to his own salvation through God's grace,
but to the liberation of God from the darkness of matter." 90
Moreover, since in the practical realm the process of individuation entails the necessity of withdrawing the projection
from the figure of the Redeemer, Jungians and Christians in
the end follow different roads leading them to their goals. For
Christians, Christ is the way, the truth, and life, hence his
imitation is their goal. Jungians treat dogmas as projections
of the contents of the objective psyche; their goal, therefore, is
not an external Redeemer, but wholeness.91 The withdrawal of

w.,

c. 12, 299.
Cary F. Baynes, in C. G. Jung, Modern Man in Search of a Soul (New York:
Harvest Books, 1988), p. viii.
90

91

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ANTONIO

MORENO

the external projection, however, is only possible to a few
exceptional individuals.

Individuation
Jung offers his ideas on individuation as the solution to the
problems puzzling modern man. Current religions are good,
but incomplete. Atheism is not the answer; man is his own
healer and his own goal. And to develop the human personality
the religious factor is the most important factor leading toward's individuation. But his presentation of individuation is
obscure, and it is difficult to express his views, and to do justice
to them. The root of the obscurity resides in Jung himself and
in the difficulty of the subject. The goal he tries to offer
lies beyond the sphere of empirical psychology and religious
phenomenology.
Many have violently attacked Jung's ideas on individuation,
especially Glover, who says that it is impossible to convey to
the reader the immense wordiness, confusion, contradictions,
and nebulosity in Jung's ideas on individuation. These words
are unfair, although there is a certain obscurity and nebulosity
in some of Jung's ideas, especially in the last stages of the
process. For instance, Jolande Jacobi says that the archetypes
of the" old wise man" and "magna mater" are: "primordial
images representing in man materialized spirit, in woman
matter impregnated with spirit. . . ." 92 What is that?
Jung divinizes man in the sense that he finds not in God,
but in man himself, in the self, the solution for the problems
haunting modern man. His religion is in this sense too human;
he leaves unsolved the burning question of the relationship
between religious experience and the existence of a transcendent
God. He teaches us the necessity and importance of religion in
our lives, but he refuses to go beyond man himself.
ANTONIO

MORENO,

O.P.

St. Albert's College,
Oakland, California
•• Jolande Jacobi, The Psychology of C. G. Jung (New Haven:
Press, 1954), p. 165.

Yale University

ECUMENISM IN LOGIC

T

HAT THERE exists today not a little opposition,
bordering on hostility, between two major schools of
Logic, the Traditional and Non-Traditional, is no big
secret in the academic world.1 In other domains of erudition
similar situations are prevalent. It is an experiential fact that
opposition can at times be a healthy sign; at other times it is
a phenomenon that is quite understandable. Yet, whenever
opponents' views are frequently dismissed as puerile or subjected to ridicule, the chasm between camps only widens. This
is one of the major problems today in the field of Logic.2 But
it is not an insoluble one, for polemics is never a good substitute
for genuine proof.
In our view the animosity between the major schools of Logic
is triggered and fostered by those who neglect or refuse to
·praise others for their contributions to the development of the
" art of arts." There are some logicians who are of the opinion
that Logic reached its apogee with Aristotle and the medieval
Scholastics; others believe that Logic did not start until a
century ago with the insights and writings of Boole, Frege,
and Peano. By viewing Modern Logic as only a sophisticated
amalgam of higher Mathematics, as many members of the
Traditional school are wont to do, these latter tend to avoid
any serious acquaintance with its general principles, techniques,
and alleged benefits. On the other hand, not a few members of
the Non-Traditional school are altogether too willing to scrap
Traditional logic without any sort of personal investigation
into the matter. In light of its many contributions to the
evolution of Logic, it is unfair to dismiss Traditional logic as
1 Cf. An Introduction to Logic, by M. Cohen and E. Nagel, especially page v of
the Preface and Chapter IX (Routledge & Kegan Paul Ltd.-London, 1968) .
s Cf. A History of Formal Logic, by Fr. I. M. Bochenski, 0. P. Trans!. by Fr. lvo
Thomas, 0. P. (Notre Dame Press, 1961), pp. 5-18.

821

DENNIS C. KANE

monolithic or as a system of mere historical value. In either
milieu not much listening to the " other side " goes on; yet
listening to the " other side " is often the first step to the
solution of a problem of this scope. Because of this communications gap, the Traditional school will not be made aware that
it probably is, as is alleged, too philosophically-oriented; and
the Non- Traditional school will continue to claim naively that
it is philosophically neutral, which it is not, as Fr. Bochenski
observes: ", .. for never before have formal logicians been so
divided by mutually opposed philosophies as here. We need
only instance Frege's outspoken Platonism, and Boole's nominalism and even psychologism .... " R The truth of other
charges would probably escape both schools.
Positive measures, then, are necessary if a solution is to be
had soon. Perhaps logicians of both major schools of Logic
should make it their business to learn something from the
ecumenical efforts being mutually carried on today by leaders
of Christian and Non-Christian sects. They are seriously trying
to understand and appreciate each other's views in many
areas of religion. Actually, in the last fifteen years some appeals
for ecumenism in Logic have been made by stalwart logicians
of both schools:
... The exaggerated notion of the cleavage between the old and
new logic fosters the very ignorance which engenders it. Scholars
engrossed in the logical tradition tend to be unaware of the degree
to which old results with which they are familiar have come to be
integrated into the modern science of logic; ...
. . . But if it is deplorable to exaggerate the cleavage between the
old and the new logic, it would be yet more deplorable to underestimate the novelty and importance of the new .... It behooves
scholars interested in any phase of logic to acquaint themselves
with the fully scientific stage of their subject; and it behooves the
elaborators of this growing structure to acquaint themselves with
the long tradition whose hither end they are helping to fashion. 4
• Bochenski, op. cit., pp.
• W. V. Quine's Preface to Conventional Logic and Modern Logic, by Fr. J. T.
Clark, S. J., Ph. D. (Publ. Woodstock Coli. Press).

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

... The decision as to which group's theory will prevail, depends
ultimately on the truth of the matter. However, the possibility of
a rapprochement between the two rests as much on the Aristotelian iogician as it does on the Mathematical logician. If both
sides decide upon a sniping campaign which will consist solely in
exposing genuine flaws or feigned short-comings in each system,
then the ugly gap that has separated philosophy and modern
science will open between the old logic and the new.... 5
These words imply both a warning and a challenge to all
responsible logicians. The warning should no longer go unheeded. To this important challenge we hope to offer a modest
response. We shall try to show quite simply that it is not
impossible for the logicians of the " opposed camps " to gain a
better understanding of and appreciation for each other's brand
of Logic. In initiating such a dialogue we have designedly
chosen the area of the Non-Categorical Syllogism for two
reasons: (1) because it is so central a topic in both schools
of Logic; (2) because it is a subject that lends itself to a
worthwhile comparative study much more easily than many
others. As a consequence, it will be more likely that our chief
purpose here will be more perfectly realizable. It is also hoped
that others may be stimulated to face up to this ecumenical
challenge m even more difficult areas in the universe of discourse.

*

*

*

*

*

Because they are extremes in the same logical genus, the
Categorical and Non-Categorical syllogistic forms have a
polarity of major differences. Yet they do have very much
in common: e. g., their inferential character, their logical purposes, their partial composition. Because the Non-Categorical
syllogism is usually composed of some Categorical propositions,
and because in Traditional Logic the treatise on the NonCategorical syllogistic pedagogically follows the treatise on the
Categorical syllogistic, it would seem feasible here to present
• Whitehead's Concupt of Logic, by Fr. Raymond Smith, 0. P. (Thomistic Studies
#6, The Newman Press), pp. 1, 175-177.

324

DENNIS

C. KANE

the reader in capsule form some of the salient features of the
Categorical type of argumentation. With such an orientation it
is hoped that the treatise on the Non-Categorical syllogistic
will be more understandable.
Historians of Logic are almost unanimous in crediting Aristotle as the inventor of the syllogism. However, like most
inventors, he was not totally original. There is strong historical
basis for the opinion currently in vogue that in no small way
his theory of the syllogism reflects a dual influence: (1) the
propositional technique so well worked out by Eudoxus (400347 B. C.) ; and (2) the methodology employed so often
throughout the dialogues of his teacher, Plato. For such
pioneering efforts in the development of the syllogistic the
Stagirite has been highly praised by many internationallyrecognized contemporary scholars in the field of Logic, and
even hailed as the " originator of formal logic." 6 Over the
centuries Aristotle's theory of the syllogism has also had its
share of critics-some of whom were more bitter than constructive.7
His formal presentation of the syllogistic can be found in
the early chapters of his Prio1· Analytios I, which in the course
of history has been subjected to interpretations with many
shades of difference. 8 Like every genuine syllogism, the Categorical syllogism is a perfect composite expression (because it
generates a complete meaning) in which, certain things being
6 Cf. Aristotle's
Pri01· and Posterio1· Analytics (Greek text, with introd. and
commentary), by Sir W. D. Ross (Oxford University Press: London, 1957), pp. !l4,
!l9; also ibid. (Bochenski) , pp. 70-71.
7 Cf. the writings of the Stoics, Theophrastus,
Alexander of Aphrodisias, Thomas
Aquinas, Albert the Great, I. Kant, A. de Morgan, John of St. Thomas, Peter of
Spain, C. S. Peirce, Ivo Thomas, J. Lukasiewicz, A. N. Prior, and H. Veatch, and
many others. But these authors will give a good cross section of the criticism.
8 Cf. Formal Logic, by A. N. Prior (Clarendon Press:
Oxford, 1955), p. 116, in
which he strongly disagrees with the statements expressed by Jan Lukasiewicz in
his monumental work, Aristotle's Syllogistic (2nd edit.) : ". . . the implicative
forms which Aristotle uses are a perfectly natural way of talking about syllogisms
(asserting their validity), but a statement about a syllogism is not itself a
syllogism; and on the few occasions when Aristotle gives actual examples which he
calls syllogisms, they are not implications, but inferences."

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

325

given, other things will tend to follow necessarily. 9 Such a form
of discourse is generally to be constructed of three simple
propositions or "truth-value" statements, which are to be
mutually related as to the content-matter signified by the
concrete terms or as to the supposition involved in the termvariables employed as the extremes in the propositional
formulae. 10 An example of the former employing concrete terms
would be: All Logicians Are Not Geniuses; an example of the
latter employing term variables would be: Some A Are Not
B. In Non-Traditional Logic it is stylish to call the Categorical proposition an atomic proposition, insofar as it does
not contain any kind of " sentential connective," i. e., a propositional copula, e. g., " if . . . then. . . ." 11 However,
unlike the Categorical syllogism, in which the propositionalTerms are so intimately interrelated (i.e., the Major and
Minor extremes with the Middle term), the Non-Categorical
syllogism is characterized by the formal connection between
the propositions in the Antecedent and the Consequent. This
is a radical difference. This difference, in turn, is the basic
reason for the two sets of proximate logical norms employed
in Traditional Logic for determining the probative value of
arguments cast in these different syllogistic forms.
The Non-Categorical syllogism has, more or less, a standardized form: i.e., the Major premiss will usually be a NonCategorical proposition, the Minor premiss and the Consequent (Conclusion) will usually be Categorical propositions.
These will be its most common notes of identification. Since
this is the logical framework in which the Non-Categorical
syllogism is commonly cast, any differences in structure would
be merely accidental, in the sense of being more complex. The
type of Non-Categorical syllogism will be ordinarily determined by the kind of Non-Categorical proposition found m
its Major premiss.
• Cf. Aristotle's Prior Analytics, I, chap. 1.
° Cf. ibid., chaps. 1-4; also Posterior Analytics, IT, chap. 16 where he writes:
" All vines are deciduous," etc.
11 Introduction to Logic, by PatriCk Suppes, p. 12.
1

3fl6

DENNIS C. KANE

Non-Categorical propositions, known also in Traditional
Logic as Hypothetical propositions, can take many different
forms. 12 Yet they all are similar insofar as each is a perfect
composite meaningful statement signifying more than one
mental judgment and declaring something to be either True
or False. In its normal shape the Non-Categorical proposition
openly appears to be nothing else than two or more atomic
statements concatenated by a sentential copula, as " if . . .
then": e. g.," If (you ask the Father anything in My name),
then (He will give it to you)." These types of complex statements have, according to Aristotle, a very definite unity, but
not as perfect a unity as that possessed by the Categorical
proposition itsel£.18
For the most part, Non-Categorical statements are easily
recognizable as their sentential connectives are usually quite
manifest; however, those called exponibles do not appear at
first to be Non-Categorical. 14 Traditionally, Non-Categorical
propositions fall into three distinct classes because of their
different logical forms: (1) the Conjunction, (fl) the Disjunction, (3) the Conditional. The Conjunctive proposition is indicated always by such sentential-connectives as: and, 1TW'!'eover, but, etc.: e. g., "God hates sin, but He loves the sinner."
The Disjunctive proposition (sometimes called Alternation) is
generally discernible because it contains some version of the
12 Summulae
Logicales, Tract 1, pp. 7-8 (Marietti; author's translation), by
Peter of Spain, (Pope John XXI) : " ... this follows concerning the hypothetical
proposition. It is that type of proposition which has two categorical statements as
its own subordinate principal parts, as " if man runs, man is moved." And it is
called " hypothetical " from the word hypos which means " under " and thesis
which means "position," as if suppositive, because one part is placed under the
other. Of hypothetical propositions one is conditional, another is copulative, still
another is disjunctive. . . ."
18 Cf. Aristotle's Perihermeneia (On Interpretation),
chap. 5.
u Exponibles are really disguised Compound or Non-Categorical prop<isitions,
containing such words as only, except, insofar as, e. g., "Only men have a sense of
humor "; " No college students, except the vegetarians, are obese"; " Men, insofar
as they can perceive relationships, exhibit the power of ratiocinating." These
statements can ultimately be reduced to some conventional form of the normal NonCategorical propositional-form, and, therefore, need no special consideration.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

327

sentential-connective, "either ... or ... " : e. g., "Either you
will hate the one, or love the other." The Conditional proposition (not infrequently called Material Implication in Modern
Logic) usually employs some form of the sentential-connec. dea f , th en a
" z'f . . . th en . . ." : e. g., " If anyone IS
.
t 1ve,
hearing aid might prove helpful." It might be well to mention
here that, despite the difficulties occasioned by the truth-tables
of Modern Logic, the views of the Traditional and Non- Traditional schools concerning the "truth-values" of these classes
of Non-Categorical propositions are very similar, as is evident
in the following passage:
. . . For the truth of the Conditional it is exigent that the Antecedent not be able to be true without the Consequent, as " if man
is, then animal is"; whence every true Conditional is necessary, and
every false Conditional is impossible. However, for its falsity, it
suffices that the Antecedent can be true without a true Consequent,
as " if man is, then he is white." For the truth of the Copulative it
it necessary that both parts be true, as " God exists, and, Man is an
animal." For its falsity it is enough that one part be false, as " Man
is an animal, and, a horse is a stone." For the truth of the Disjunctive it is sufficient that one part be true, as " Man is an animal,
or, a raven is a stone." It is also permissible that both parts of it
be true, but not so properly, as " Man is an animal, or, a horse is
capable of whinnying." For its falsity it suffices that both parts be
false, as " Man is not an animal, or, a horse is a stone." 15
In every genuine Non-Categorical syllogism, then, one can
expect to find that the Major premiss will have some one
form (or combination of such forms)' of these manifestly NonCategorical propositions. Regardless of their distinctive structure and functional differences, all Non-Categorical syllogisms
will have this common element. Another likeness in this kind
of syllogistic-form will be that, both in the minor premiss and
in the Conclusion, there will appear an atomic or categorical
proposition which in some way will be related operationally
to, (i. e., positing or destroying) its Major premiss: e. g., " If
Communists are deceivers, then they are immoral; bu,t,
15

Summulae Loaicales. Tract 1, p. 8 (Marietti Edit.), by Peter of Spain.

328

DENNIS C. KANE

Communists are deceivers; thm·efore, they are not immoral."
In this example the Minor premiss (Communists are deceivers)
is said to have posited (i.e., affirmed) one part of the Major
premiss, namely, the Antecedent, by restating it as it is written;
at the same time, the other part of the Major premiss, namely,
the Consequent, is being destroyed (i.e., denied) in the Conclusion. It is obvious that there is a logical blunder in
the above example because of an operational infraction of a
logical law of validity. Logical laws forbid indiscriminate positings and denyings; valid procedures in Logic are far from being
arbitrary. For Non-Categorical syllogisms to be of any worthwhile logical value, special logical norms governing operational
procedures for each kind of Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms
must be rigorously observed. Since the most common forms of
Non-Categorical arguments are the Conditional and the Disjunctive, or are reducible to these, they will receive a more
detailed treatment than the Conjunctive syllogistic. The Conjunctive syllogism also deserves only a minimal consideration
because of its real and/or apparent lack of implicational being.
Of all the compound or hypothetical forms of the syllogism,
the Conditional is generally considered by logicians to be the
most commonly used in everyday social discourse. Perhaps
the basis for such a judgment is the undeniable fact that the
human mind has such a natural proclivity to draw out implications or inferences from most statements. Since the Conditional Syllogism must contain a Conditional proposition in
its Major premiss, such a propositional-form is essentially composed of two parts, technically known as the Antecedent and
the Consequent. That the Antecedent be first in place in a
compound statement is not absolutely necessary, though most
frequently that will be its position. It can easily be detected in a statement, for it will be the proposition containing
the condition and be ordinarily preceded by the particle, " if " :
e. g., "If the Congo's deeply-rooted political problems are
solved, then African unity will soon be a reality." Sometimes,
however, the particle, " if," is merely implied in conditional
statements. In such instance it may be less easy to identify:

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

329

e. g., "Had I known you wanted to go to MY FAIR LADY, I
would have bought you a ticket." The Consequent, on the
other hand, will generally signify what results or does not result
from the fulfillment or the non-fulfillment of the earlier condition, and will be preceded usually by the particle " then," as
was seen above.
Besides having some sort of a Conditional propositional-form
as its Major premiss, the Conditional syllogism will necessarily
have its Minor premiss and its Conclusions structured from
Categorical statements logically operating on the parts of the
Major premiss-i.e., by affirming or denying. Though some
syllogistic arguments may appear to be Non-Categorical, they
. are not strictly speaking considered to be so, unless the above
conditions are satisfied. Ordinarily, such synthetic hypothetical
syllogisms are easily reducible to the normal Categorical
syllogistic-form: e. g.,

If M is, then N is;
@ If 0 is, then M is;

Therefore: If 0 is, then N is.
This is reducible to:
(If) All M is N;
(and if) All 0 is M;
(Then- Therefore) : All 0 is N.

Prior to actually exposing the canons of validity, proper
to the Conditional syllogism, it might be feasible to inform the
Non-Traditionally oriented logician that a normal Conditional
statement for the Traditional school of Logic is not formed
merely from any two or more causally unrelated atomic propositions haphazardly joined together by the sentential-connective," i£ ... then .... " Rather, the Traditional logician tends
to look for some necessary and/ or causal dependence of the
Consequent on the Antecedent: e. g., "If you fool with fire,
then you will be burned." In other words, the Traditional
school of Logic tends to view implications to be quite formal

330

DENNIS C. KANE

in character. From such a frame of reference very many of the
Material Implications of Non-Traditional Logic are considered
by the Traditional logician only in a per accidens mode. Subsequently it will be shown why the Non-Traditional school of
Logic is inclined to give such emphasis to material implication
and simultaneously to minimize the importance of the causal
nexus between the Consequent and the Antecedent in the
standard propositional and syllogistic forms involving Conditionals. Its close affinity with Mathematics is one of the
basic reasons, because physical causality is not the natural
concern of sciences in that degree of abstraction. This type of
implication is not a creation of Modern Logic, as so many
erroneously think, but is really as old as the ancient Stoic
logicians. 16 Material implication may be typically exemplified
by this proposition: "If Judas had not betrayed Christ, then
it is snowing out." As to an appraisal of the validity of syllogistic arguments involving any kind of material implicational
statements, the " informed " Traditional logician is not less
capable of appreciating their logical shape or structure than is
the Non-Traditional logician. However, in so doing, the Traditional logician is in no way agreeing that statements are true
merely because someone arbitrarily assigns such a " truthvalue " to them. Truth is a relationship with much deeper
roots!
Experience has frequently made us aware that not every
Conditional syllogistic argument is logically valid. This defect is usually brought about by some logically wrong operational procedure involving the Minor premiss and/or the
Consequent as related to the Major premiss of the syllogism. Though each of these atomic propositions can posit or
each can destroy either part, or both parts, of the syllogism's
Major premiss, still the choice of proceeding validly is very
limited for both the Minor premiss and the Conclusion. Even
the seqnerwe of these logical functions performed in by each of
16 Cf. Method8 of Logic (Henry Holt & Co.:
New York, 1955), by W. V. Quine;
pp. 12, 17.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

881

these Categorical propositions is extremely important. The key
to every valid operation in the Conditional syllogistic is primarily with the Minor premiss, for the Conclusion should follow
its direction. To function validly, the Minor premiss must
posit (i.e., affirm) in a standardized way, and must destroy
(i.e., deny) in a standardized way. Otherwise, the syllogisticform will inevitably be logically defective for it will have
violated a basic rule of logical reasoning, as happens when
anyone commits the fallacy of affirming the consequent 17 :
" When two things are so related to each other, that if the
one is, the other by necessity is, then if the latter is not, the
former will not be either; but if the latter is, it is not necessary
that the former should be." The two simple rules every valid
Conditional syllogism must satisfy may be formally stated in
this manner:
a) If the Minar premiss" posits" (affirms), it must affirm the
Antecedent of the Major premiss, and then the Conclusion
must affirm the Consequent of the Major premiss: e. g.,
If M is N, then 0 is P;
(anteced.)
(conseqt.)
@ M is N (the Antecedent is identically restated) ; thentherefore: 0 is P (the Conseqt. is identically restated).
and
If M is not N, then 0 is not P;
(anteced.)
(conseqt.)
@ M is not N (the Anteced. is identically repeated);
then-therefore: 0 is not P (the Conseqt. is identically
repeated).
b) If the Minor premiss "destroys" (denies), it must deny
the Consequent of the Major premiss, and then the Conclusion must deny the Antecedent of the Major premiss:
e.g.,
If M is N, then 0 is P;
(anteced.)
(conseqt.)
, 17

Cf. Aristotle's Prior Analytica, chap. 4; also his De SCYph. Elen., chap. 5.

332

DENNIS C. KANE

@ 0 is not P (the Conseqt. is negated, contradicted) ;

then-therefore: M is not N (the Anteced. is also negated).
and
If M is not N, then 0 is not P;
(anteced.)
(conseqt.)
@ 0 i.'l P (the Conseqt. is negated, contradicted); thentherefore: M is N (the Anteced. is negated, contradicted) .
In the concrete these rules are not difficult to understand.
(a) asserts simply that it would be a logically invalid procedure
to infer conversely the fulfillment of any of the many possible
or specific conditions in the Antecedent, for there would be no
real or logical assurance that one depended on the other: e. g.,
"If I fall asleep (go to the cinema; watch T-V, etc.), then I
will flunk the semester examination; but, I did flunk the
semester examination; therefore, I fell asleep." Both the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of Logic are in substantial
agreement with the soundness of the logical law invalidating
such an argument-form. This law is traditionally known as
the modus ponens. (b) states that the non-fulfillment of the
Consequent of the Major premiss reasonably allows for the
inference of any one or even of all of its possible conditions in
the Antecedent, insofar as the Consequent did not de facto
occur and none of the alleged conditions which would induce
the Consequent were fulfilled: e. g., "If I overeat, then I shall
get sick; but, (de facto) I did not get sick; therefore, I did not
overeat." Both the Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of
Logic are also in complete accord as regards the soundness of
the logical law validating this argument-form. It is traditionally known as the modus tollens. Further on these two logical
laws will be shown to be valid or tautologous by means of a
rather modern logical device used often as a decisional procedure and known as the truth-table method.
Like all Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms, the Disjunctive
syllogism also has a genuine Non-Categorical proposition as
its Major premiss and both its Minor premiss and its Conclusion will be a Categorical proposition. The Non-Categorical

ECUMEN1S1VI lN LOGIC

proposition in the Major premiss will always be Disjunctive in
its structure, insofar as it will be made up of two or more
atomic statements joined together by the special sententialconnective, "either ... or ... ": e. g., "Either Russian ships
approaching Cuba will submit to being searched, or they will
be sunk." In order that there might be unity in this syllogistic
form, as was also necessary in the Conditional, its Minor
premiss and its Conclusion must be operationally related
to the constituent parts of the Major premiss. The Disjunctive syllogistic, taken strictly, always contains a Major
premiss which asserts that
and only one of the two
or more disjuncts is true. This is so because of the mutual
incompatibility that exists really between the disjuncts, i. e.,
at least one of them is true and only one of them is true:
e. g., "Either you will pass this final examination, or you will
flunk for the semester." However, there is no orderly sequence
that has to be followed for validity by the Minor premiss and
the Conclusion as regards their proper functions of positing
and destroying in relation to the Major premiss. Because the
disjuncts are usually so fundamentally opposed, the rule for
proceeding validly is quite simply expressed in this manner:
If one part of the Major premiss is affirmed in the Minor
premiss, the other part must be denied in the Conclusion; and,
If one part of the Major premiss is denied in the Minor premiss,
the other part must be affirmed or posited in the Conclusion:
e.g.,

one

(i) Either John passes the final exam, or he flunks for the
the semester;
@ John does pass the final exam;
Therefore; he does not flunk for the semester.
(ii) Either John passes the final exam, or he flunks for the
the semester;
@ John does not pass the final exam;
Therefore; he does flunk for the semester.
That there are two vastly different types of Disjunction is
not a discovery of modern logicians, as some logicians mis-

S84

DENNIS C. KANE

takenly think. The history .of Logic shows unequivocally that
even in Megarian-Stoic Logic this logical phenomenon was
recognized/ 8 The strict or pure Disjunctive syllogism is often
referred to as the Exclusive Disjunctive and even in NonTraditional Logic it is often given a separate consideration as
a tmth-function. However, by far the more popular type of
Disjunction is called weak or Non-Exclusive. Usually the NonExclusive Disjunctive syllogistic will contain a Major premiss
that has an incomplete list of alternatives, one of which at
least will be tme. Not infrequently it happens that two or
more of the alternatives may be tme; e. g., "Either you can
have lobster, or some southern-fried chicken, or, a full course
steak dinner"; again," Either one can fly from Chicago to New
York, or walk, or take a train, or even drive over the new
highways." Sometimes this type of syllogistic-form is called
Alternation; historically it was known as the quasi-Disjunctive
syllogism.19
Unlike the Exclusive Disjunctive syllogistic-form, in its valid
formulation the Non-Exclusive Disjunctive syllogism is quite
standardized as to its sequence of positing and destroying. In
this weak kind of Disjunction, because an alternate is affirmed
(i. e., posited) , it does not lead one validly to conclude to an
outright denial (i.e., destroying) of the other alternate or even
alternates: e. g., "Either the cross-country varsity won, or it
lost the race; but, it did not win; therefore, it lost the race."
Such a conclusion is factually unwarranted and logically invalid, for the possibilities (i.e., the alternates) of the outcome
were insufficiently stated, since the varsity team could have
tied. Thus, the proper sequence of logical operations (i. e.,
positing and destroying), if the Alternative syllogistic is to be
valid, is for the Minor premiss first to deny or destroy one part
of the Major premiss, and then for the Conclusion to affirm or
posit the other part (s) : e. g.,
Lloyd is either in the Army, Navy, Marines, Coast Guard,
0'1' Air Force;
18

Cf. Bochenski, op. cit., pp. 119-l!W.

19

Cf. W. V. Quine, op. cit., pp. 11-18;

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

335

@ Lloyd is not a Marine;

Therefore: He is either in the Army, Navy, Coast Guard,
or Air Force.
Only a brief treatment is to be given to the Conjunctive
syllogistic-form, for it is the least common of the Non-Categorical syllogisms. Like all the other Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms, the Conjunctive syllogism (some times called the
Copulative) will ordinarily have a Major premiss composed of
two or more atomic statements joined together in a unit by a
special sentential-connective: and, moreover, but, etc.: e. g.,
"John Kennedy was assassinated and Johnson took the oath
of the Presidency in the airplane a few hours later." Generally,
its Minor premiss and its Conclusion will be atomic or categorical propositions, related to the Major premiss both in
content-matter and by some type of logical operation, i. e.,
either positing or destroying, or both. However, in this syllogistic-form, ifit is to be valid, only the positing (i.e., affirming)
of the parts constituting the Major premiss is permissible, for
in every conjunctive proposition all the parts must be true if
the proposition as a whole is to have the value of truth. The
Traditional and Non-Traditional schools of Logic are quite
unanimous in their agreement on this point; the latter school
customarily shows this most clearly in its definition of the
conjunctive functor by the truth-table method. This will be
exhibited later.
The implicational features of Conjunctive syllogisms become
most apparent when they are re-cast into the more common
types of the Non-Categorical syllogistic-forms already treated.
After such reconstructions, however, their validity is then regulated by the norms proper to that syllogistic-form: e. g.,
"John Kennedy was assassinated, and
Johnson took the oath of theJ Presidency in the airplane."
N. B. Both conjuncts are true (de facto) .

Reccmstructed: "It is false that either John Kennedy was not
assassinated, or that Johnson did not take the oath of the
Presidency in the airplane."

386

DENNIS C, KANE ·

N. B. It is false that either disjunct is false. The rest of
argument would be subject to the rules of validity
governing the Disjunctive syllogistic.
Thus we conclude the Traditional presentation of the Compound or the Non-Categorical syllogistic. That such a presentation can be definitely complemented and perfected by some
formal features studied by the Non-Traditional school of Logic
will be shown in the remainder of this comparison.

*

*

*

*

*

Before presenting some of the more common techniques employed by Non-Traditional logicians in appraising the logical
value of very many Compound arguments, some form of introduction to the Non-Traditional school of Logic seems to be
both feasible and necessary. This orientation is chiefly for
those who are not too well-acquainted with thiS' relatively new
kind of Logic. This introduction will consist of a somewhat
brief and simple exposition of this New Logic, as it is sometimes
called, in the following areas: (1) its distinctive features, (2)
its salient purposes, (8) its historical genesis and evolution,
and (4) its basic elements.
The Non- Traditional school of Logic has, since the turn of
the century, outstripped by far all other schools of Logic both in
popularity and prestige. This is a fact that in fairness cannot
be denied by the " informed " members of the Traditional school
of Logic. In some ways it is quite a departure from Traditional
Logic, and for many reasons it is rightly labeled THE NEW LOGIC.
It is also known as theoretical logic, mathematical logic, exact
logic, symbolic logic, and modem logic. Each of these labels
reflects some facet of this novel brand of Logic. Like so many
others, the writer tends to prefer mathematical logic as its
most fitting name. This choice of name is based on the fact
that Non-Traditional Logic has four features which really
distinguish it from all other kinds of Logic, i. e., Ancient,
Medieval, and Indian: (1) it is built normally along the lines
of a calculus in which formalism is the general principle employed in a logical methodology; (2) it is deeply concerned

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

837

with the project of devising the most perfect formal systems
of reasoning in order that more exact interpretations of arguments and more rigorous proofs can be effected; (3) it has the
natural proclivity to formulate its own basic logical laws,
axioms, and theorems in a thoroughly artificial language; (4)
its object language, which comprises variables, functors or
. constants, quantifiers, etc., is made up almost exclusively of
arbitrarily-designated symbols which are ideographic in character, (e. g., p
rather than the conventional phonographic
symbols (e. g., words).
This mathematically-oriented Logic offers many solid reasons
for its existence, but only those directly pertinent to the scope
of Logic itself are of immediate interest to this discussion.
Since the validity of discourse is the chief preoccupation of the
logician, he will be much more concerned with the fO'rm or
structure of arguments and argument-forms than with their
Content-matter. The Non-Traditional school alleges that this
detachment from the matter of arguments is quite characteristic of genuine formal logicians and is the paramount reason
for their creating a new kind of scientific language. With such
a technical medium that is not unlike the equations and other
formulae so often found in the sciences of Mathematics and
Chemistry, more arguments would have greater probative
value and most of the dangers to rigorous deduction would be
noticeably minimized. Some of the common fallacies anticipated are solecisms, equivocations, and other errors of discourse
rooted in the ambiguity of everyday language. Even deceptions
springing from rhetoric and emotionalism, which are so inherent
in natural languages, would also be more frequently avoided.
Like musical notes, such a technical language would have both
an universal intelligibility and an operational flexibility which
would far surpass that of any natural language. In other
words, it would be functionally more efficient in evaluating
arguments than is the popular version of Arabic numerals
(compared to the ancient Roman) in performing calculations:
e. g., compare 20 x 20, and XX x XX. Thus, programming the
arguments of everyday intercourse into this exact kind of

338

DENNIS C. ·KANE

communication would become an easy task and assure greater'
accuracy in testing their logical validity. Leibniz expresses this
purpose of the New Logic with a great deal of confidence:
Then, in case of a difference of opinion, no discussion between two
philosophers will be any longer necessary, as (it is not) between two
calculators. It will rather be enough for them to take pen in hand,
set themselves to the abacus and (if it so pleases, at the invitation
of a friend) say to one another: calcule'""'ua!
Ordinary languages, though mostly helpful for the inferences of
thought, are yet subject to countless ambiguities and cannot do the
task of a calculus, which is to expose mistakes in inference owing to
the forms and structures of words, as solecisms and barbarisms.
This remarkable advantage is afforded up to date only by the
symbols (notae) of arithmeticians and algebraists, for whom inference consists only in the use of characters, and a mistake in
thought and in the calculus is identical. 20
Peirce and Frege have expressed similar views about the goals
which the New Logic can accomplish in the domain of discourse.
Exact logic will be that doctrine of the conditions of establishment
of stable belief which rests upon perfectly undoubted observations
and upon mathematical, that is, upon diagrammatical, or iconic,
thought. We, who are sectaries of exact logic, and of exact philosophy, in general, maintain that those who follow such methods
will, so far as they follow them, escape all error except such as will
be speedily corrected after it is once suspected. 21
Inference is conducted in my symbolic system (Begriffsschrift) according to a kind of calculation. I do not mean this in the narrow
sense, as though an algorithm was in control, the same as or similar
to that of ordinary addition and multiplication, but in the sense
that the whole is algorithmic, with a complex of rules which so
regulate the passage from one proposition or from two such to
another, that nothing takes place but what is in accordance with
these rules. My aim, therefore, is directed to continuous strictness
of proof and utmost logical accuracy, along with perspicuity and
brevity. 22

•• Cf. G. Leibniz, Abhdlg. ohne Uberschr. I, 200, as found in Bochenski, op. cit.,
p. 457.
21 Cf. Charles S. Peirce, The regener. Logic (CPlll), 268. (Noted in Bochenski,
op. cit., p. 280.
•• Cf. G. Frege, Grundgesetzen der Arithmetik (1893), p. 316 (Noted in
Bochenski, op. cit., p. 284.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

889

Non-Traditional logicians are in almost total agreement that
all these primary objectives can be fulfilled by this New J..ogic.
It is an undeniable fact that actually the majority of these
.
purposes have been already to some extent achieved.
Although Modem Logic tends to the almost total use of
ideographic symbols in its myriad systems, in no way is this
to be looked upon as an original creation in the domain of
Logic. This type of symbolization was not unknown either to
the ancient Hellenic logicians or to many of the logicians in
the Middle Ages. Yet, the historians of Logic unanimously
agree that the use of ideographic symbols was quite limited in
the sphere of Logic up until the year 1666 when Gottfried
Leibniz (1646-1716) wrote his scholarly work on Mathematical
Logic, De Arte Combinatoria. Regardless of the fact that this
highly original masterpiece, and others like it, remained unpublished until the end of the nineteenth century when it was
discovered by Bertrand Russell, Leibniz is almost universally
acclaimed by contemporary logicians as the founder and
originator of the New Logic. Many other factors, too, were
important over the centuries in conditioning the growth of
Non-Traditional Logic, e. g., the prolonged and chronic dissatisfaction with the perfection of the Euclidean system. This
disenchantment amongst mathematicians was to crystallize in
the middle of the nineteenth century with the innovation of
non-Euclidean geometries created by Nicolai Lobachevsky, a
Russian mathematician, and Bernhard Riemann, a German
mathematician. 28 About the same time, this new approach to
Logic was to come of age and was really put on a most solid
footing by the publication of two famous works of George
Boole (1815-64) : Mathematical Analysis of Logic (1847) and
The Investigation of the Laws of Thought (1854) . To record
the contributions and their authors in Modem Logic would fill
volumes. However, some of the greatest contributions to the
constant and inexorable evolution of Non-Traditional Logic
•• Cf. W. M. Kneale, The Development of Logic (Oxford University Press,
pp. 878-888.

340

DENNIS C. KANE

have since been made by such scholarly and mathematicallyoriented logicians as De Morgan, Peirce, Frege, Peano, Hilbert,
Russell, Whitehead, Lukasiewicz, Tarski, Bochenski, Carnap,
Thomas, GDdel, and Church. 24
Of the ideographic symbols employed in the many systems of
Logic in the Non-Traditional school, the most common and
most fundamental are called variables and constants (functors). Like numerals in Arithmetic (e. g., 2 cats; 4 goats),
variables are nothing more than conventionally-approved signs
used by logicians to represent: (a) things, classes, and ideas
in propositions; (b) both categorical and compound statements.
Those in (a) are designated as Term Variables; those in (b)
are known as Propositional Variables. In some systems of
Logic, even in the Traditional school, the notations for Term
Variables are arbitrarily established as capital letters, such as
A, B, C. In such systems the atomic statement, all hyenas are
odorous, would be written symbolically as, all A are B. This
in no small way enables the logician to concentrate on the
form of statements and arguments. Aristotle was not unaware
of this advantage and was inclined to use Term Variables in
most of his theoretical expositions of the Syllogism. However,
from a cursory study of his logical treatises it seems quite fair
to admit that he did seem to be unaware of extending the
notion of the variable to the propositional-level.
This contribution was to be first made by the Stoic logicians
soon after the demise of the Stagirite. In the development of
Logic, especially the Non-Traditional brand, this stretching of
the variable to symbolize almost any kind of propositionalformula was to prove invaluable. In not a few systems of NonTraditional Logic the small letters (p, q, r, s,) are arbitrarily
employed as symbols representing propositions, especially the
atomic kind, in very many logical operations in the universe
•• This listing is not intended to be an exhaustive or a graded enumeration.
Rather, its aim is merely to show the scholarship that has been going on quite
noiselessly in the development of both Mathematics and Logic. Yet, it is an
anomaly that so few logicians of the Traditional school, until recently, have been
1
keenly aware of this activity.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

841

of discourse. Using such Propositional Variables in place of
the Antecedent and Consequent of the Conditional statement,
"If (Kenya is a new Republic), then (more Africans are free),"
it would be written: " If (p) then (q) ." Further on it will be
shown that even the sentential-connective will also have its
own distinctive operational symbol. Thus, discourse for the
logicians can be symbolized completely in what is called the
object language, a medium most suitable for efficiency in
logical operations. In most systems of Logic, sentential-connectives (traditionally called propositional copu..lae) are referred to as Constants or Functors. These logical constants or
functors are in many ways quite similar in their purposes to
the operational symbols in the field of Arithmetic: e. g.,+,-,
+, X. None of these constants, however, can be properly used
except in some connection with a propositional-variable; but,
unlike the commonly-used arithmetical operational-symbols,
in Non-Traditional logic there is a variety of symbols for the
same logical function. 25 As a result, to many logicians the
symbols in the object language of a system other than their
own are often as strange and devoid of meaning as the words
of a foreign language with which they are unacquainted. 26 This
is undeniably one of the major imperfections in the New Logic.
In Non-Traditional logic functors are necessary instruments
for all logical operations involving propositional variables. As
will be shown immediately, some symbol in every system must
represent negation or contradiction. It is a functor indispensable in all systems. This is why it is generally considered to be
prirnitive. It is generally unilateral in scope too, for it exercises
its operational influence on a propositional- variable (or more than
one) in only one direction, i.e., it affects everything that follows
it: e. g.,- p;- (p v q). Most other functors or constants are
•• This radical disagreement in symbolization among the schools of Non-Traditional logic is clearly illustrated in the famous stroke-function of Sheffer, e. g., pjp;
in the unique notations of Lukasiewicz, e. g., Cppp; in the use of the arrow or the
horseshoe, etc., to signify material implication.
•• Here, because of their simplicity, we will employ the notations of PeanoRussell-Whitehead as found in the second tome of the Form.ulaire de Mathem.atiques
(1895-1908) of Peano, and in the famous Pricipia j\!Jathem.atica (1910) by Lord
Russell and A. N. Whitehead.

842

DENNIS C. KANE

said to be binary or dyadic
their ·scope is two-directional, for they express a relational operation between at least
two propositional-variables and are always placed between the
propositions or arguments they are meant to affect: e. g.,
(p v q) ; (p q) . The functors used in the above examples
will now be properly identified, and each will be defined by
what is known as the truth-table method. 27 Then will be
shown the important role each plays in the domain of discourse
as viewed by the Non-Traditional school of Logic. This tabular
method is regarded by logicians as a very convenient device for
many logical purposes, especially for the defining and interdefining of logical functors. Somewhat mathematical in appearance, this simply constructed schema clearly manifests how the
truth-values of all non-categorical propositional-forms are determined formally and functionally by the Constant or Functor
with which statements are logically related. In such logical
relationships, propositional-variables are known as truth-functional expressions, and truth-values (which every proposition
possesses) are said to be either true or false.

==

1) The Contradictory Function.: The constant symbolizing
this function usually appears like a rippled minus sign and is
not infrequently called the Tilde " -." It simply indicates that
negation is to be applied to a statement or a group of statements taken as a whole, e. g.," -p ", "- (p. q) ." It can take
the place of such everyday expressions as, " it is not the case
that," or, "it is false that," or just simply "not" with a verb:
e. g., It is false that (John Kennedy is President of the USA) ;
It is not the case that (all saints are negroes). Substituting
the propositional-variable, "p ", for each statement in parentheses, each of these propositions would be correctly symbolized in the same way by Modern logicians: "- p ". 28 In
drawing up the " truth-table " by which this constant is logically defined, it will become clear that the negation of any true
•• Historically, it is a fact that Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein perfected the
Megarians' notion of Truth-Tables.
•• Sometimes logicians prefer to superimpose the negation symbol on the propositional-variable itself, e. g., " p "; either system of notation is permissible.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

843

statement becomes false, and the negation of any false statement becomes true:

p

-p

T

F

F

T

2) The Conjunctive Function: The constant representing

this rather common operation in logic is written by many
Modern logicians simply as a point or period and is called the
"dot" " . ";being a binary functor, it is always flanked by one
or more propositional-variables, e. g., "p. q ". It signifies that
common relationship implied by such words in everyday conversation as: " and," " but," " however," " although," and so
forth. In the compound conjunctive proposition, " all dogs are
animals, and all angels are spirits," if the propositional-variables, " p " and " q ", were used to symbolize each of these
categorical propositions, then the whole proposition would be
correctly symbolized in this manner: "p. q ". 29 In constructing
the "truth-table" by which this constant is logically defined,
it will become clear that the only conditions in which such
compound propositional-forms have a " truth value" of T are
when all the constituent propositions have a true "truthvalue." Otherwise, compound conjunctive propositional-forms,
taken as a unit, will have a "truth value" ofF:
p q ::: p.q
T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

T
F
F
F

3) The Disjunctive Function: The constant employed by
most Mathematical logicians to signify this function is ordin•• Many logicians do not follow this form of notation. They prefer to omit this
symbol altogether and just place the propositional-variables in juxtaposition, e. g.,
"pqr ". Quine and Lukasiewicz are representatives of this notation.

344

DENNIS C. KANE

arily called the " wedge " and appears like the letter " v ".
Derived from the Latin word, " vel," it is a symbol used to
represent the
weak or
type of compound
disjunctive proposition. In " natural " language the
tive function is usually
when the
nectives, " either . . . or," are used between propositions and
propositional-forms: e. g., "Either (the students will ride
downtown), or (they will go for a long walk)." In such instances there exists a number of possibilities, as in the example
above, for the students could do both--by walking back from
downtown! Substituting the propositional-variables, "p" and
"q ", respectively for the above statements, the whole proposition would be correctly symbolized in this manner: " p v q ".
In setting up the " truth-table " by which this constant is logically defuied, it will be evident that any compound disjunctive
propositional-form of this type will have, as a unit, a " truthvalue " of F only when none of the constituent propositions has
a "truth-value" of T. Otherwise, such compound disjunctive
forms will always have a "truth-value" of T
because at least one of the disjuncts is true or possible of
realization:
... pvq
p q ...
T T
T F
F T
F F

T
T
T
F

4) The Alternative Function: The constant employed by
many Modem logicians to stand for the strong or exclU8ive
type of disjunction appears as an " inverted wedge," " A ".
Based on the exact meaning of the Latin word, "aut," it
signifies the strict " either . . . or " relationship between propoIt represents the dichotomy
sitions and
that either one course of action or thing can be chosen, or its
opposite to a greater or lesser degree, but not both simultaneously: e. g., "Either (this semester exam will be passed), or

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

345

(our football hero will not graduate) ." Substituting the propositional-variables," p" and' q ",respectively for those propositions in the parentheses, this compound proposition would be
validly symbolized in this manner: " p 1\ q ''. From an examination of the "truth-table" definition of thiSI functor it will be
rather obvious that a compound alternative propositional-form,
as a unit, will have a "truth-value" of T only under those
conditions when only at least one and at most one of its
alternates has a" truth-value" ofT, i.e., the joint or combined
truth of its propositions or propositional-forms is definitely excluded:
... p/\q
p q ...
T
T
F
F

T
F
T
F

F
T
T
F

5) The Material Implicative Function: The exact meaning
of this logical function is the subject of not a little controversy
in Modern Logic. However, the constant used to express this
conditionally inferential relationship between propositions and
propositional-forms has the appearance of, and is aptly called,
the " horseshoe," " :::J ". Being a binary or dyadic constant, it
logically affects both what precedes and what follows it. In
everyday intercourse this symbol takes the place of the sentential-connectives, "if ... then," or, "if ... therefore" e. g.,
"If (the majority of voters iilJ the USA want Johnson as their
President), then, (he will be President in the years to come)";
or, "If (there are seven sacraments), then, (it is snowing)."
Substituting the propositional-variable, "p ", for the Antecedent of each of these statements and the propositional-variable, "q ",for the Consequent of each of these statements, each
of these compound conditional propositions would be properly symbolized in this manner: " p :::J q ". From the tabular
definition of this constant, it will be evident that, regardless
of the content-relevance or non-relevance of the Antecedent

846

DENNIS C. KANE

and Consequent in this propositional-fonn, the compound propositional-fonn involving material implication will have, as
a unit, a false " truth-value " only in that instance when the
antecedent has a true " truth-value " and the consequent has a
false "truth-value." Otherwise, such compound propositionalfonns, as a whole, will have a true "truth-value":
p q ... p:::Jq

...

T T
T F
F T
F F

T

F
T
T

6) The Material Equivalence. Function: This logical operation is generally represented in Mathematical Logic by the
binary constant which appears as three horizontal bars placed
parallel to each other," e:= ". This functor is used to symbolize
a kind of " bi-conditional " statement and is usually interpreted
to translate the " if and only if " relationship in everyday discourse: e. g., " If and only if (he remains a Democrat) , will
he receive that important Federal office." Replacing with
logical supposition the statements in parentheses with the
propositional-variables, "p" and "q ", the compound proposition indicating material equivalence would be correctly written in this manner: "p e:= q ". By the common" truth-table"
method it will be manifest that this truth-functional expression
is the truncated fonnula of the statement," (p :::J q). (q :::J p) ,"
and that two or more propositional-fonns are materially equivalent only in those conditions in which both the constituent
propositions have the very same " truth-values ": i. e., either
both are true, or, both are false:
... pe==q
p q ...

T T
T F
F T
F F

T
F
F
T

ECUMENISM

847

IN LOGIC

All these constants' definitions oon be summarized in this
schema:

p q::: -q::: p.q::: pvq
TT:
TF:
FT:
FF:

F
T
X
X

T
F
F
F

T
T
T
F

::: p 1\ q::: p:)q::: p==q
F
T
T
F

T
F
T
T

T
F
F
T

Before concluding this section, there are two phases of
Modern Logic that must be explained, (1) the need for punctuation, and (2) the pattern for constructing any " truth-table."
In natural languages and in mathematical formulae not infrequently the meaning of a statement is ambiguous. This
common situation is occasioned usually by the lack of
proper " grouping " of words and phrases; sometimes it even
arises from a syntactical mistake. In the famous Rule of Saint
Augustine for Religious living in common a rather humorous
misunderstanding could spring from such improper grouping of
words: e. g.," Fast from food and drink as much as your health
will ailow," if one were to pause after the word "food"! In
Mathematics, too, formulae can occasionally be ambiguous and
even meaningless: e. g., 10-2 x 8 can equal either 4 or 24,
depending upon what " grouping " of numerals and operations
is followed. It ought to be apparent, then, why some simple
form of punctuation is necessary, for vagueness is undesirable
in both science and conversation.
Logic, too, has to come to grips with the problem of punctuation for it is not totally immune from meaningless and ambiguous expressions either. Consisting mostly of parentheses and
brackets of divers shape and size, logical punctuation ensures
logicians that their formulae will be" well-formed," i.e., meaningful and non-ambiguous. However, not every system of
Modern Logic employs the very same symbols for the same
purposes. Some systems use a method made up of " dots "
(e. g., :, .) in lieu of parentheses and brackets; other systems,
as in that of Lukasiewicz, have a built-in notation so tailored

$48

DENNIS C, KANE

that any other bracketing, etc., would be unnecessary: e. g.,
Cppp (If p and p then p) . Despite their tendency in very
complex arguments to create a nuisance factor, parentheses
and brackets usually have been the method of punctuation adopted in this treatment. Thus, any bracketed or parenthesized
propositional-form is to be treated as a unit in itself before any
operation is to be effected: e. g., (p v q) = (-p => q); or in the
"truth-functional" expression "- (-p. -q) ," the conjunctive function is first understood, and then what is bracketed is
wholly negated.
Finally, it remains for us to show the reader the easiest procedure for the constructing of a" truth-table" under ordinary
circumstances. After more than five propositional-variables
appear in any argument or proof, the "truth-table" method
becomes rather awkward operationally. For such circumstances
Modern Logic has many less cumbersome, but not less efficient,
methods of deciding on the value of arguments: e. g., the" reductio ad absurdum," the indirect proof, etc. The procedure
for determining the number of horizontal columns in any
" truth-table " will be determined by the number of propositional-variables employed with the same signification in the
argument. In a mathematical manner this determination is
symbolized as 2°, in which the " nth " power represents the
number of propositional-variables, either expressed affirmatively or negatively: e. g.,
2 1 (prop.-var.>willhave two horizontal columns in its truth-table;
2 2 (prop.-var.>willhave four horizontal columns in its truth-table;
2 8 (prop.-var.)will have eight horizontal
"
" "
"
2 4 (Prop.-var.>willhave sixteen "
"
" "
"
2 5 (prop.-var.)will have thirty-two "
"
" "
"
In the construction of any truth-table, regardless of the number
of propositional-variables, the easiest and safest procedure to
follow is to halve successively the truth-values directly under
each propositional-variable according to the number of horizontal columns. This suggested method can be perhaps better
understood by an illustration:

ECUMENISM

p

q

T
T
T
T

T
F
F T
F F

F
F
F
F

T
T

849

IN LOGIC

r

T
T

T

F
F T
F F

The truth-table method is not only useful for the defining
and interdefining of constants or functors, but is also a very
common procedure for making definitive decisions on the logical value of moderately complex arguments. Employing this
tabular method, as simple as it is practical, arguments up to
five propositional-variables can be lineally arranged in such a
way that their logical value can be easily and effectively determined. By this logically-approved " decisional procedure ' complex arguments can be classified with certainty into two major
types: (1) tautologous, i.e., logically true; (2) non-tautologous, i.e., logically false or invalid.
Any argument-form is said to be tautologous, i. e., valid, if
and only if all the "truth-values" in the main column of its
"truth-table" appear as true. The main column of any" truthtable " is normally recognized to be the column immediately
under the constant with the widest scope. Any argument or
argument-form that proves to be tautologous is formally or
reflectively a "logical law." The law of contraposition, which
asserts that the Antecedent and the Consequent of any Implication or Conditional can be validly interchanged provided they
both are negated, aptly illustrates this logical fact in the following "truth-table":
-p p q -q

q] -== [-q

[p

F T T

F

T

FTF

T

F

T*
T

-p]

T
F
*indicates the main column.

850

DENNIS C. KANE

TFT
TFF

F
T

T
T

T

T
T

T

On the other hand, all arguments, which for some reason or
other do not satisfy the rigorous demands of logical validity,
are said to be non-tautologous or invalid. Non-tautologous
arguments are further sub-divided into those that are contingent and those that are contradictory. Any argument-form is
considered to be contingent, if not all, but at least one of the
"truth-values" in the main column of its "truth-table" is
false. Whereas, if all the " truth-values" in the main column of
any "truth-table " are false, then that argument or argumentform is said to be contradictory or totally invalid. These points
about the non-tautologous types of argument are clearly exhibited in the following " truth-tables ":
(1) Contingent: (i.e., not un-conditionally invalid)
-p p q -q
[p q] v [-p]
FTT
FTF
TFT
TFF

F
T
F
T

T
F
T

T*
F
T

T

T

F
F
T

T
* indicates the main column.

(2) Contradictory:

(i.e., under no conditions valid)

-p p q -q :::: [p v -p]
FTT
FTF
TFT
TFF

F
T
F
T

T
T
T
T

- [q v -q]
F*F
F F
F F
F F

(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)

* indicates the main column.

*
* * * *
The remainder of this presentation will be concerned with
illustrating some of the more common techniques, especially
the " truth-table " method, by which the value of arguments is
ordinarily appraised in a systematic way by very many of

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

851

those schooled formally in Non-Traditional Logic. Now, having
been sufficiently oriented, it is hoped that the reader will be
able to appreciate these techniques peculiar to Mathematical
Logic. These arguments will be clothed in everyday language,
then translated into symbolic notation for operational purposes
by the logician. Arguments involving from two to five propositional-variables will be shown.
a) Two Propositional-Variables: (i.e., 2" = 22 : four horizontal
columns)
(1) "If I fall asleep, then I will miss the train. But, strangely enough I fall asleep. As a 1·esult, I will miss the train."
Substituting the propositional-variables "p" in place of the
statement (I fall asleep), and "q" for the statement (I will
miss the train), this argument symbolically would read as indicated below in this " truth-table ":
-p p q -q ::::::

F T T
FTF
TFT
TFF

F
T
F
T

[ (p :J q) . (p) ] :J [ q]

(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)

T (t) T * T
F (t) T F
F (f) T T
F (f) T F
* indicates the main column.

The methodology of Traditional Logic as regards the " rules for
determining valid arguments " is also confirmed in this " truthtable " showing this argument to be tautologous, for this argument-form is nothing else than the " logical law" known for
centuries as the " modus ponens." It is now known in Modern
Logic as a Rule of Detachment. 30
(2) "If I do not fall asleep, then I will not miss the train.
Moreover, I just will not miss the train. Therefore, I am not
going to fall asleep." Employing the same propositional-variables in their substitutive role as in the above example, the
8

° Cf. ibid. (Bochenski, op. cit.), pp. 887-888.

352

DENNIS C. KANE

invalidity of this argument will be most apparent in the following " truth-table." Besides, this argument-form is a manifest
violation of an approved" logical law," traditionally known as
the "modus tollens." By some logicians this non-tautologous
argument-form would be easily recognized as the fallacy of
affirming the consequent:
-p p q -q ::::::

FTT
F.T F
TFT
TFF

F
T
F
T

[ (-p ::J -q) . (-q) J::J [-p]
(t)
(t)
(f)
(t)

..

....

F (f) T* F
T (t) F F
F (f) T T
T (t) T T

* indicates the main column in which a false truth-value appears.

b) Three Propositional-Variables: (i. e., 2n = 23 : eight horizontal columns)
"If all men have immortal souls, then all men have special
inalienable rights. Beside8, if all men have special inalienable
rights, then all men are essentially equal. Therefore, since all
men have immortal souls, all men are essentially equal."
Substituting the propositional-variables "p" for the statement (all men have immortal souls), "q" for the statement
(all men have special inalienable rights), and" r" for the statement (all men are essentially equal), this argument would be
registered on a "truth-table" in the following manner:
p q r ::::::

TTT
TTF
TFT
TFF
FTT
FTF
FFT
FFF

[ (p ::J q) . (q ::J r) ] ::J [p ::J r]
(t)
(t)
(f)
(f)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)

T

F
F
F
T
F
T
T

(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)

T*
T
T
T
T
T
T

T

T
F
T
F
T
T
T
T

* indicates the main column.

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

858

Since in the main column of this " truth-table " all the " truthvalues" appear as true, this argument by this" decisional procedure " is said to be tautologous, i.e., logically true. As a
matter of fact, this logical schema illustrates the validity of
an argument-form, which is a "logical law" known as the
law of transitivity of implication. 31 It might interest theologians to know that the Angelic Doctor employed this and
many other logical laws throughout the hundreds of articles in
his famous Summa Theologiae.82 In our examples of four and
five propositional-variables, arguments from this famous work
will be used.
c) Four Propositional-Variables: (i. e., 2n = 24 : sixteen horizontal columns)
I answer that, there is will in God, as there is intellect: since will
follows upon intellect. For as natural things' have actual existence
by their form, so the intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible
form. Now everything has this aptitude towards its natural form,
that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when it has it, it
is at rest therein. It is the same with every natural perfection,
which is a natural good. This aptitude to good in things without
knowledge is called natural appetite. Whence also intellectual
natures have a like aptitude as apprehended through its intelligible
form; so as to rest therein when possessed, and when not possessed
to seek to possess it, both of which pertain to the will. Hence in
every intellectual being there is will, just as in every sensible being
there is animal appetite. And so there must be will in God, since
there is intellect in Him. And as His intellect is His own existence,
so is His will.88

Substituting the propositional-variables, "p" for the statement (every non-cognitive thing tends to desire or rest in its
own natural form), "q" for the statement (such things have
a natural appetite), "r" for the statement (every intellectual
being has a similar tendency proportionate to its own intelligible form), and" s" for the statement (such beings have an
81 Cf. Fundamentals of Symbolic Logic, by A. Ambrose and M.
pp. 185-187.
•• Cf. e. g., III, q. 5, a. 4: [ (-p ::> (-q. -r)). (q. r)) ::> [p). This is a valid instance

of the Modus Tollens.
•• Summa Theel., I, q. 19, a. 1 (Benziger edition).

354

DENNIS· C. KANE

intellectual appetite), then the argument of Aquinas would be
tested on a truth-table in the following manner:
p q r s :::::::::::
(1) TTTT
(2) TTTF
(3) TTFT
(4) TTFF
(5) TFTT
(6) TFTF
(7) TFFT
(8) TFFF
(9) FTTT
(10) FTTF
(11) FTFT
(12) FTFF
(13) FFTT
(14) FFTF
(15) FFFT
(16) FFFF

[ (p :::J q) . (r :::J s) . (r1)] :::J [s1]
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)

(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)
(t)

(£)

(£)

(f)

(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)
(t)
(t)

(£)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)

(t)TT * T
(t) F 'I' F
(f)FT T
(f)FT F
(t)FT T
(t)FT F
(f)FT T
(f)FT F
(t)TT T
(t)FT F
(f)FT T
(f)FT F
(t)TT T
(t)FT F
(f)FT T
(f)FT F

N. B. *indicates the main column.

Because all the truth-values appearing in the main column of
this truth-table are true, this theological argument is said to be
tautologous, i. e., it is cast in a logically true or logically valid
argument-form. Notice, too, that the Antecedent of the argument calls for only one major operation as regards its " parts "
because all the major functors within it are the same. Only for
the sake of the content of the argument have the iota subscripts
been used with the singular categorical propositions, "God's
intellect is His own Existence" represented by "r;" and
"There is a will in God-His very Essence" represented
by "Si ".
d) Five PrCYpositional-Variable.'l: (i.e., 2n = 2 5 : thirty-two
columns)
I answer that. as is said (De Eccles. Dogm. ii) : The Son of God
was not born in appearance only, as if He had an imaginary body;

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

355

but His body was real. The proof of this is threefold. First, from
tbe essence of human nature to which it pertains to have a true
body. Therefore granted, as already proved (q. 4, a. I), that it was
fitting for the Son of God to assume human nature, He must
consequently have assumed a real body. The second reason is taken
from what was done in the mystery of the Incarnation. For if His
body was not real but imaginary, He neither underwent a real
death, nor of those things which the Evangelists recount of Him,
did He do any in very truth, but only in appearance; and hence it
would also follow that the real salvation of man has not taken
place; since the effect must be proportionate to the cause. The
third reason is taken from the dignity of the Person assuming,
Whom it did not become to have anything fictitious in His work,
since He is the Truth. Hence our Lord Himself deigned to refute
this error (Luke 24: 37, 39), when the disciples, troubled and
frighted, supposed that they saw a spirit, and not a true body;
wherefore He offered Himself to their touch, saying: Handle and
see; for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see Me to have. 34

Substituting the propositional-variables "p" for the statement (Christ fittingly assumed a genuine human nature)," q"
for the statement (He must have assumed a real body), "r"
for the statement (He did not assume an imaginary body) , " s "
for the statement (the salvation of mankind would not have
really taken place), and "t" for the statement (the Gospel
narratives about Christ would be in error), then the theological
argument of the Angelic Doctor would be programmed on and
tested by the truth-table method, as on page 856.
Since all the truth-values appearing in the main column (asterisked) of this table are true, this theological argument is
tautologous. It should be evident, too, that this tabular-method
would be cumbersome in dealing with an argument involving
six propositional-variables, thus necessitating sixty-four horizontal columns.
Whenever an efficient decision about the logical value of a
rather complex argument is desired, especially if the truth-table
inethod is deemed impractical, Non-Traditional logic has access
to a tried and common technique. It is a vulcanized version of
•• Ibid., III, q. 5, a. 1 (Benziger edition).

356

DENNIS C. KANE

p q
(1)
(2)
(8}
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
{10)
(11)
(12)
(18)
(14)
(15)
(16}
(17)
(18)
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
(28}
(24)
(25)
{26)
(27)
(28)
(29)
(80)
{81)
(82)

5

t r -r :::::: [ (p :::> q) . (q :::> r) . [ (-r) :::> (s. t) ]] :::> [p :::> r]

TTTTTF
TTTTFT
TTTFTF
TTTFFT
TTFTTF
TTFTFT
TTFFTF
TTFFFT
TFTTTF
TFTTFT
TFTFTF
TFTFFT
TFFTTF
TFFTFT
TFFFTF
TFFFFT
FTTTTF
FTTTFT
FTTFTF
FTTFFT
FTFTTF
FTFTFT
FTFFTF
FTFFFT
FFTTTF
FFTTFT
FFTFTF
FFTFFT
FFFTTF
FFFTFT
FFFFTF
FFFFFT

...
...
...

...

...

...
...
...
...

...
...
...
...
...
...

...

...
...
...

...

(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)
f
(f)
(f)
(f)
(f)
(f)
(f)
(t)
(t)
(t)
t
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)

(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)

(t)

...

t
(t)
(t)

(t)
(f)
(t)
(f)
(t)
(f)
(t)
(f)
(t)
t
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
(f)
(t)
f
(t)
(f)
(t)
(f)
(t)
{t)
(t)
(t)
(t)
t

(t)
(t)

[t]
t
t

f
t

f
t

f
t
[t]
t
f
t
f
t
f
t
t
t
[f]
t
f
t
f
t
t
t
f
t
[f]
t

f

T T* T
FT F
TT T
FT F
TT T
FT F
TT T
FT F
FT T
FT F
FT T
FT F
FT T
FT F
FT T
FT F
TT T
FT T
TT T
FT T
TT T
FT T
TT T
FT T
TT T
TT T
TT T
FT T
TT T
FT T
TT T
FT T

* indicates the main column.

the reductio ad absurdum well-known to the Traditional school
of Logic since the time of Aristotle. Of most methods accept..
able to the devotees of the New Logic for evaluating arguments,
this technique is highly ranked, even to being " superior to any
other." 85 It is easy and efficient to operate. Simply, it endeavors to show that in every valid argument, regardless of its
complexity, a truth-value inconsistency will occur amongst the
•• Cf. Symbolic Logic, by I. Copi (New York:
also his book, Introduction to Logic, pp. 274-801.

Macmillian, 1954), pp. 40-65;

ECUMENISM

357

IN LOGIC

propositions whenever eac-h of the premisses in an. argument is
assigned a truth-value of T and its conclusion is assigned a
truth-value of F. This would happen only if a propositionalvariable is assigned a dual truth-value simultaneously in the
very same argument: e. g.,

T

T

F

(G v H) :::J (I. J) (J v L) :::J M

(-GvM)

t

Explanation of this example: In this decisional procedure, the
Conclusion will have a truth-value ofF logically, if and only if
both "-G " and " M " are assigned simultaneously a truthvalue of F. That should be the first step in this technique.
Then, many avenues of analysis and assignation are possible. In
the first premiss the antecedent, (G v H), will have a truthvalue ofT, since already in the Conclusion" -G" has a truthvalue of F; and if that first premiss, as a unified truth-function,
is now validly to have a truth-value of T, then both propositional-variables in its consequent must be assigned truth-values
ofT. Moreover, the propositional-variable, "J "; appears also
in the second premiss, (J v L), and retaining its former truthvalue of T will simultaneously render that antecedent true.
However, if the second premiss, taken as a unified truthfunction, is to be properly assigned an overall truth-value ofT,
then its consequent, "M ", must also have assigned to it a
truth-value ofT. In such a maneuver, a truth-value inconsistency would arise in relation to the propositional-variable,
"M ". Such a truth-value inconsistency in an argument-form
through this technique is a guarantee that it is logically valid.
In other words, if such logical assignations of truth-values could
be made without such a truth-value inconsistency arising in the
argument-form, it would be non-tctutologous. This logical device in many ways reflects the sound doctrine of the Traditional
school of Logic on the nature of a Good Consequence so fundamental to any kind of validity in the universe of discourse: " ...
in regulating the goodness of any sort of consequence one most
universal principle is offered, from which the rest are derived,

358

DENNIS C. KANE

and to which they are reduced, namely: in a good consequence
the antecedent cannot be given as true and the consequent
false; but if the antecedent w true, so too the consequent.
"86

*

*

*

*

*

The purpose of this study of the Non-Categorical syllogism
was to show that actually the members of the Traditional and
Non-Traditional schools are more alien than hostile to each
other's teachings. Mutual appreciation is generated only from
mutual understanding. In other words, logicians of the two
major schools are related to each other more as foreigners than
as foes. After all, one can hardly expect to learn to like Japan
and the Japanese without knowing their language, customs, and
culture. Logicians must face up to this fact. If any worthwhile
progress in solving this problem is to be achieved, then all concerned logicians must admit (1) that a knotty problem exists
between the major schools, but is not insoluble, and (2) that
insularity and self-righteousness are the two biggest enemies of
any ecumenical movement-even in the field of Logic. Aristotle
in his Metaphysics offers all of us helpful guidelines in this
project:
. . . The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another
easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able
to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, we do not
collectively fail, but every one says something true about the nature
of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to
the truth, by the union of all [italics mine] a considerable amount
is amassed . . . ;
. . . We must with a view to the science which we are seeking,
first recount the subjects that should be first discussed. These
include both the other opinions that some have held on the first
principles, and any point besides these that happens to have been
overlooked. For those who wish to get clear of difficulties it is advantageous to discuss the difficulties well; for the subsequent free
play of thought implies the solution of the previous diffculties, and
it is not possible to untie a knot of which one does not know. But
36 Cf. John of St. Thomas, Logica (Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus), Tome 1,
Book 8, chap. 11, p. 67 (Author's translation).

ECUMENISM

IN LOGIC

859

the difficulty of our thinking points to a " knot " in the object;
for insofar as our thought is in difficulties, it is in like case with
those who are bound; for in either case it is impossible to go forward.
Hence one should have surveyed all the difficulties beforehand,
both for the purposes we have stated and because people who
inquire without first stating the difficulties are like those who do
not know where they have to go.... 37
DENNIS

c. KANE, O.P.

Providence College,
Providence, R. I.

37 Metaphysics, Book II, chav. 1, and Book Ill, ehap. 1 (from The Basic Works
of Aristotle, McKeon edit.) .

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exposed its erroneous extremes but did not yet possess the theological
tools for a positive response to the difficulties involved. This volume of
Concilium, theology in the age of renewal, is one sign that the Church is
in the process of confronting the real crux of the Modernist crisis. It
represents the relevant progress that has taken place in this regard during
the past half century, culminating in the conciliar documents of Vatican II,
particularly the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation. This, however, marks only the beginning of future development necessary in this
post-conciliar age. Anthropological and epistemological problems must be
solved and added to the advances in historical and scriptural studies in
order to meet the challenge of contemporary thought to Christianity and of
the questions which have lingered on after the crisis of Modernism. As the
editors of this volume put it in the preface: " Every branch of theology
has already felt the far-reaching changes that are taking place, particularly
in the fields of anthropology and epistemology. For all the faithful, the
basic issue arising from all this is the question: What is the relation
between man as man and man as believer? And this obviously leads to
questions about revelation, faith, dogma and the magisterium or the teaching function of the Church." The central question always appears to be:
How do we give adequate consideration to the complete context of human
history and still attribute a unique moment in that history to Christ?
Continuing the same characteristic format of the Concilium series, Part
I of this volume contains a number of articles on various aspects of the
general theme. The introductory article, by Peter van Leeuwen, traces the
development of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation from the
original plan of the preparatory theological commission in 1960 through the
schemas of 1962-68 to the final text of 1964 that was the basis of the
conciliar document as ultimately approved. During this long and laborious
process some very significant changes were made. Principal among these
were the definition of revelation and the principle of its transmission. The
earlier schemata had proposed a concept of revelation as exclusively
propositional and identical with revealed teaching. But the Constitution
adopted a definition of revelation as salvation history with Christ at its

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361

very center (p. II). Likewise, concerning the principle of transmitting
revelation the magisterium was not considered as identical with tradition,
but rather as having the " special function of authoritative judging and
guiding in the truth in an authentic way-i. e., with official authority, in
union with the whole People of God, and not standing above the Word of
God, but rather serving it " (p. 15) . Fr. van Leeuwen concludes by
commenting that the Constitution has provided the context for the fruitful
posing of such ecumenical questions as the" dominion of God's Word over
the Church, the distinction between tradition, traditions and the function
of the magisterium, and particularly the pope's pastoral function within
the function of the episcopal college and the whole community of the
faithful " (p. 19) .
In light of the general orientation given by the first article the subsequent essays treat of the more specialized aspects of the problems revolving
around the relationship between nature and grace in man. Leo Bakker,
in his article, "What Is Man's Place in Divine Revelation?" starts off
by showing how the problem, as it stands today, has come down to us from
the Age of Enlightenment through the Modernist crisis. The fundamental
question asks whether divine revelation is a supernatural speaking by
God completely from outside man, or do faith and revelation have some
necessary connection with man's self-understanding, his experience, his
projects, etc. Because the Constitution rejected a purely intellectualist
approach to revelation as a communication of truths, it opened the way to
overcome the dilemma of " God " or " man," and the opposition between
"from without" and" from within." As Bakker expresses it: "Christianity,
however, lives by the mystery of the incarnation: not either God or man,
but both God and man, in an indissoluble unity of grace. We now begin
to see the truly human aspect of divine revelation and of our faith. We
also begin to understand scripture, i. e., the book through which God's
Word can reach us, as a genuinely human book. We begin to better realize
how a Man from within our history is proclaimed as embodying the fullness of God's revelation. This fully human dimension of revelation reduces
the intellectual aspect; it also prevents revelation from being regarded as
a communication of truths that God would speak to us, as it were, apart
from man, even though by means of man " (p. 34) . At the same time,
we must avoid the extreme theories of Modernists like Tyrrel and Loisy
who completely divorced the experience of faith from its dogmatic formulation and denied the divine uniqueness of Jesus Christ in our history.
The next article, "Revelation and History in the New Testament:
Biblical Hermeneutics," by Anton Vogtle, pursues further some of the
implications of the Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation in the
context of interpreting the Gospel account of Christ. He points out that
one must be open to the possibility that God could manifest himself in the

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form of an historical Person before he can understand Christ's claim to be
the final revealer and mediator of eschatological redemption. Then it is
necessary to have an adequate conception of the genuinely progressive
historical character of revelation in Christ. Referring to the Constitution's
teaching that the Apostles enjoyed a fuller insight into the words· and
deeds of Christ after the resurrection, he proceeds to show how unfounded
it is to interpret the New Testament accounts of Christ as though they were
a story told in retrospect. For in the primitive Church Jesus was primarily
a present living personality rather than a figure of the past, so that the
kerygmatizing of his earthly life was not seen as a distortion of its historical
character, but as a developed understanding of its significance in light of the
revelatory events of the death, resurrection and sending of the Spirit. This
is especially evident in St. John's Gospel wherein the activities of the
earthly Christ and the exalted Christ interprenetrate one another. And
this is a testimony to the conviction of the early Church about the unity
of the divine plan beginning with the Incarnation, culminating in Pentecost
and moving toward final fullfillment in the Parousia. New Testament
exegesis, therefore, must start out anew from the experience of our risen
Lord.
Juan Alfaro, in his article, "The Dual Aspect of Faith: Entrusting
Oneself to God and Acceptance of the Christian Message," develops a
theology that balances well the divine and human elements of belief. After
a brief summary of the biblical concept of faith as man's total response to
God, he analyses the two-fold aspect of faith. Acceptance of the Christian
message is necessary because without this intellectual aspect the mystery
of Christ would cease to be real, and without a definite doctrine there
could be no visible community of believers. But faith, in the final analysis,
is the acceptance of the reality expressed in the doctrine, the giving of
himself by God as our Father in Christ. And so faith essentially includes
the entrusting of oneself to God, and the desire to love him. God calls man
from within by grace, and from without through the message of salvation.
Man responds freely in a true choice of faith by either accepting or
rejecting God. The act of faith is constituted by the dynamic fusion of
both the personal-inner and doctrinal-outer aspects. The difficult question
remains, however, whether faith can exist apart from the acceptance of
the Christian message. On the basis of a series of statements in various
documents of Vatican II the author concludes that such an act of faith, as
a genuine response to the primary aspect of God's grace, would be true but
incomplete and embryonic. Since only in light of God's revelation in
Christ can man come to a full understanding of himself, the choice of
faith cannot achieve a completely human expression without knowing the
Christian message, to which it is inherently orientated.
Consequent to these concepts of revelation and faith is the continuous

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challenge to the Church that her preaching and teaching strive to render
the unique revelation of God in Christ relevant at all times. This seems to
be especially true in contemporary society where the process of secularization is separating the religious more and more from the structures of this
world. Today, therefore, persons have a particular need for assistance to
find God's revealing presence in their lives. The other articles in this
volume of Concilium are concerned with certain dimensions of this crucial
problem. Gregory Baum's " The Magisterium in a Changing Church"
makes some clarifications that can contribute to current theological discussions of the difficult question about how to reconcile the indefectibility and
infallibility of the ecclesiastical teaching authority with the doctrinal
changes that have been taking place. He distinguishes the continuous
magisterium from the intermittent magisterium. The former is exercised in
the liturgy and its preparation and is the ministry of the Word by which
Christ teaches continually the local Churches through his ordained ministers. The latter is exercised by ecclesiastical decrees which strengthen the
continuous magisterium, and which must be viewed in the wider context of
the teaching of the whole Gospel. He suggests that Catholic theologians
seriously consider whether " the Church may find herself in a situation
where she must change the formulation of her doctrine in order to announce
the unchanging Gospel infallibly and defend the immutable character of
divine truth" (p. 81). Baum proposes that the universal magisterium,
for the sake of exercising its supreme function, should always be in
dialogue with the whole Church, and cites Ecclesiam suam as an excellent
example of the way to search out a relevant presentation of the GospeL
In the article, Truth and Life, Hans Urs von Balthsar brings out the
special existential character of a truth of faith in summoning man toward a
total commitment in life. Consequently a dogmatic formulation can never
be interpreted as though it were concerned with a purely theoretical truth.
The concluding article, "Theology as an Ecclesial Science" by M.-D.
Chenu, offers a brief but brilliant reflection upon the work of the theologians
at Vatican II. He finds this experience an excellent illustration of the
necessity of theology, which must be of continuous service to a community
of faith. His own words express the idea quite forcefully: "As opposed
to a purely empirica,l pastoral attitude, a summary supernaturalism, a
short-winded exegetical positivism or a false dogmatism, theological learning with its own laws is a vital necessity for the Church as the People of
God, enabling it to breathe in the world" (p. 104).
Since the whole problem of doctrinal development is essentially connected
with the theme of this volume, Part II provides a bibliographical survey
in two studies on the question. Herbert Hamman's " Recent Catholic
Views on the Development of Dogma " is a fine summary of current
opinions considered in the context of older theories. In "The Problem of
Doctrinal Development and Contemporary Protestant Theology " George

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A. Lindbeck, a teacher of the history of doctrine at Yale University
Divinity School, and Lutheran observer at Vatican II, indicates that
doctrinal development is not a major theological problem for Protestants
who do not think of it as resulting in infallible dogmas as Roman Catholics
do. Although they are chiefly concerned with the problem of development
within the New Testament period, there are questions about the attitude
of the Reformers regarding the relation of scripture to creeds and confessional formulas. The sixteenth century view is no longer tenable since
historical studies and awareness have shown that the Church's doctrines
do " go beyond " scripture. After giving the points of agreement and
disagreement among contemporary Protestant theologians about such problems of development, he concludes: " the present hermeneutical debates
may perhaps produce a deeper and more ecumenical understanding that the
biblical witness should operate as that supreme norm of all later developments which God uses to keep his Church faithful to the Lord who has come
and is coming again" (p. 149).
Part III, DO-C Documentation Concilium, provides an essay on an
historical approach to the problem of the relationship between Gospel and
Dogma by Walter Casper in which he emphasizes the need for " an interpretation of dogma which is dynamic, related to man and his problems, and
spiritual and biblical in character" (p. 167). Finally M. C. Vanhengel and
J. Peters make a brief report on the international theological Congress held
in Rome, October, 1966, which covers very
the ten categories
considered there.
This twenty-first volume of Concilium has achieved its general purpose
of providing the perceptive reader with an understanding of the problems
regarding the relationship between man as man and man as believer. Also
the proposed solutions or, at least the approaches that might be pursued in
searching for answers to the questions, are worth careful consideration.
As much as one might have hoped that here and there the writers would
have developed their ideas more fully, this seems to be beyond the scope
of such an undertaking as Concilium. However, it is hoped that the
volumes in this series will soon be made available at more popular prices
for the many who can benefit by reading them.
FREDERICK M. JELLY, 0. P.
Dommican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

Philosophical Anthropology. By J. F. DoNCEEL, S. J. New York: Sheed
and Ward, Inc., 1967. Pp. 477 with bibliography and index. $5.00.
Philosophical Anthropology is the title chosen by },r. J. F. Donceel, S. J.
for the third and revised edition of his earlier work Philosophical Psy-

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365

chology. The change in the title is indicative of more than the enlarged and
enriched scope of the present edition; it is reflective also of the perennial
problem of writers of textbooks on psychology, namely, how to present a
systematic account of the human mind which is at once clear, terse and
substantiated by hard facts, and, at the same time, expressive of the rich
and elusive qualities which characterize and distinguish the human spirit,
the qualities which, well described, elicit from the reader the happy recognition of himself as he truly is. As one recent book states the case: " As one
lives life or observes it around him (or within himself) or finds it in a
work of art, he sees a richness that somehow has fallen through the present
screen of the behavioral sciences" (Berelson and Steiner, Human Behavior,
p. 666) Fr. Donceel aims at avoiding this regret, and indicates his purpose
by giving his work the broader and at the same time more penetrating title
of ' anthropology.'
In a work which intends to capture the full range of human behavior as
it is peculiarly human, and along with its context and meaning, an author
is obliged to appeal to more than one methodological approach, and this
the present author does. He draws first o:f all on the perennial philosophy
in the Ai-istotelian-Thomistic-Marechalian vein for many of his fundamental
insights. He complements this approach with extensive contributions from
contemporary phenomenological and existential psychologies. He employs
experimental and descriptive data wherever apt, and, insofar as he incorporates, for example, conclusions from Freudian psychoanalysis and from the
phenomenology of Teilhard de Chardin, he can be said to depend on their
somewhat specialized approaches. He appeals moreover to scholastic metaphysics for support of many discussions and arguments and, in fact, leans in
some cases on Catholic theology. The approach of the book is wholeheartedly eclectic.
With such disparateness of approach, one of the major problems of the
book is to find an intrinsic unity, a theme to hold together the insights,
conclusions and contributions from so many points of view. The author
succeeds very well in setting up a central or core idea on which to frame his
development of the philosophy of man. Starting with the subjective " I " as
expressed in phenomenological analysis, which tells us WHOM we are
studying, he proceeds by way of the objective psychologies to describe
WHAT man is, in himself and in relation to the universe he is in, beginning
with the " lower " and " outer " aspects and gradually penetrating deeper
into the spirit, until he arrives at the center of man again, where he finds
the " I " with whom he began. As a framework, the theme is simple and
effective.
Enlarging on this framework, Fr. Donceel succeeds in touching on almost
all of the major psychological (or anthropological) questions of interest to
contemporary scholastic philosophy. A brief listing of the topics discussed

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will serve to jndicate the scope of the book: the concept and nature of
life, the origin of life, evolution of life and of man (Teilhardian) , sensations
and learning in animals, the differences between animals and men, and the
future of man (also Teilhardian), perception and affect in man, Gestalt
psychology, intelligence and intelligence testing, will power and its development, drives and man's deepest urges, personality, temperament (Sheldon's
system) , Freud's psychoanalysis and derivative depth psychologies, characterology, the nature of knowledge, the scholastic division of sense
faculties, interpersonal knowledge, the nature of love, the immateriality of
the intellect and the universality of ideas, the origin of ideas, the act of
affirmation and its metaphysical implications, freedom of will and determinism, the immortality of the soul, the relation between soul and body,
the origin of the human soul, and man as a person, plus two appendices:
Evolution and Theology, and Christology and Anthropology.
This list of major topics illustrates the comprehensiveness of the author's
treatment and its relevance to the questions being asked presently in
Catholic colleges. Moreover, the specific topics are generally handled in
excellent brief and clear statements of position; the phenomenological contributions are especially good. If there is anything to criticize in the text,
it is the defect which almost inevitably dogs the trial of the eclectic, and
especially in a field as knotty as psychology, and most especially in a book
which draws on so many and such disparate sources. The criticism is of
lack of penetration-the contributions from the various sources have not
been presented at a depth and with a delicacy profound and accurate
enough to yield a consistent and thoroughly satisfying (intellectually)
philosophical anthropology. There are many approaches, but no integration.
This is most apparent in the repetition of topics: the senses, perception,
emotion or appetites, intellect, will and person are each given two separate
treatments, one empirical or descriptive and one scholastic, and the
challenge of uniting the insights from both points of view into one coherent
statement is not met. Again, one can legitimately question the validity of
presenting some of these authors in a seemingly homogeneous text, without
careful explanation of the sometimes deep diversity of fundamental point
of view. For instance, Teilhard does not simply complement and extend
scholastic conceptions-his dictum that all that is always was, and his
strictures against distinguishing and dividing reality into compartments,
do not fit in comfortably with scholastic categories and principles.
Although the major inspiration of the text is, as Fr. Donceel points out,
Aristotelian-Thomistic-Marechalian, the key thesis of Thomistic psychology
and anthropology is passed over and practically disavowed. This is the
definition of the act of knowledge. The author, in fact, claims that the act
of knowledge cannot and must not be defined (p. 284). The reason given
for this, and it seems astonishing, is that, since definition is an act of

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knowledge, defining knowledge puts the defined into the definition (p. 280)!
By the same token, then, one could not define understanding (since it certainly enters into the grasping of a definition) nor predication, nor subject
and predicate and copula (they are all in definitions} and so on. In fact, unless
one accepts the dictum that the defined shall not enter into the definition as
referring to the term defined and its synonyms, one rules out the possibility
of defining any number of easily definable items. Actually, the author uses
the classical Thomistic definition of knowledge in terms of immateriality to
elucidate the nature of knowledge (pp. 285-286} , but without the ex
profesao analysis of the act of knowledge, this exposition does not enjoy
its wonted force.
Perhaps lying at the root of this diffidence about defining the act of
knowledge, and extending even to the failure to thoroughly penetrate and
relate the contributions of the disparate sources used in the book, is the
author's concept of the philosophy of nature itself. For Fr. Donceel,
natural philosophy is the data of experience (enlarged and confirmed by
experiment) plus metaphysical principles, that is, empirical fact illumined
by the most abstract and universal principles. He does not allow place for
a genuine philosophical approach grounded in fact and yet looking for
proximate and proper causal relationships, within a limited area of reality
and in terms of the principles of this limited area. For instance, he would
apparently not admit a philosophy of living things which does not depend
for its principles on metaphysics. He would rule out what are now being
called metapsychologies and metabiologies, and the like. And yet it is
within these spectra of reality and at these levels of abstraction that most
approaches to the study of man make their more significant general
statements, and engage in controversy and discussion. And it is therefore
at this level of analysis that a comprehensive and consistent theory of
human nature, or philosophical anthropology, must locate its principles,
draw its conclusions and judge the claims of competing theories.
MicHAEL STocK, 0. P.
St. Stephen's Priory,
Dover, Mass.

Le Thomiame et la penaee italienne de la renaissance. By PAUL OsKAR
KRISTELLER. Conference Albert-le-Grand 1965. Montreal: Institut
d'etudes medievales, 1967. Pp. 292, with index of names. $6.00.

This study is a pioneer attempt to fill a lacuna in Thomistic and Renaissance scholarship. In it Professor Kristeller traces skillfully the mutual
influences between Thomism and Italian thought from the 13th to the 16th

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centuries, with particular emphasis on the relationships of Italian Dominicans to secular Aristotelians such as Pistro Pomponazzi, to humanists such
as Lorenzo Val_l,a, Ermolao Barbaro, and Baptista Mantuanus, and to
Platonists such as Pico de la Mirandola and Marsilio Ficino. In each
instance Kristeller takes cognizance of the uses of St. Thomas and the
evaluations of his thought provided by these scholars, as well as of the
references (and replies) of Thomists to their Averroist, humanist, and
Platonist contemporaries. To support his thesis he further supplies, in an
appendix, edited texts of two opuscula that are extremely valuable for understanding the interchanges described in the study. The first is the Opus
aureum in Tlwmistas, composed by the Carmelite Baptista Mantuanus, and
the second is the Opusculum ad Laurentium M.edicem quod beatitudo
hominis in actu intellectus et non voluntatis essentialiter consistit of Vicenzo
Bandello (de Castronovo), a Dominican Master General celebrated for
his work on the Immaculate Conception, who engaged in controversy with
Lorenzo de Medici on the subject of man's final beatitude. Kristeller's
account of the background of the latter controversy and his analysis of the
arguments of both protagonists will be illuminating to present-day
Thomists, who will find that their attempts at dialogue with partisans of
other schools (and the attendant disagreements and terminological misunderstanding) are far from being without precedent in the history of
thought.
This essay is magisterial in its competence, if not in its tone. The author
provides references to innumerable little-known texts and articles that are
indispensable for serious work on his subject. Especially noteworthy are
the animadversions on the history of Thomism with which he prefaces his
study (pp. 14-41); these take on special value at a time when so many
scholastics have confused ideas as to what the term " Thomism " means and
are generally ignorant of the historical conditioning to which its synthesis
has been subjected.
By way more of emendation than of criticism, the reviewer suggests that
a perusal of the physical treatises of such Italian Dominicans as Giovanni
Graziadei (de Ascoli) and lsolano de lsolanis, neither of whom is mentioned
by Kristeller, as well as of the physical works of Capreolus, Cajetan,
Javelli and other better-known Thomists, might prove helpful for tracing
further relationships with the Italian Renaissance. The concepts discussed
by these writers had bearing on the evolving science that was soon to be
transformed by Galileo, and they also show awareness of the nominalist
tradition that formed a part, albeit not prominent, of the intellectual
ambience of the period. The reviewer has been engaged in a similar study
of Domingo de Soto and the Salamancan school, and has found a parallel
situation existing in Spain during the 16th century. Soto, for example, was
broadly acquainted with the secular scholarship of his contemporaries
(Italian and French, as well as Spanish) , and even came under attack

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369

from his countrymen, the Averroist Diego Hurtado de Mendoza and the
classical Aristotelians Francisco Valles and Gaspar Cardillo de Villalpando.
Whatever one might think of Soto's Thomism, it was cognizant of the
complex currents that characterized early 16th century thought, and quickly
came to be regarded as a significant (if arguable) contribution to the
learning of the period.

w. A. WALLACE, 0. P.

Harvard University,
Cambridge, Mass.

Religious Liberty: An End and a Beginning. By JoHN CouRTNEY MuRRAY,
S. J. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966. Pp. 199t. $4.95.
War, Poverty, Freedom, Concilium Vol. 15, New York: Paulist Press, 1966.
Pp. 168; Religious Freedom, Vol. 18. Pp. 188. $4.50 ea.
Two months after Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom was
promulgated, Loyola University's Bellarmine School of Theology organized
an Institute on Religious Freedom in which theologians, lawyers, and
political scientists of different faiths participated. The papers read at this
conference have been published by Macmillan under the editorship of John
Courtney Murray, S. J., who himself contributed the first of the essays.
Murray relates the genesis of the conciliar declaration itself, of which he
is the acknowledged architect. He points out the change from the earlier
drafts, which were rather abstractly theological, to the later and final
versions which took more adequate account of the historical and political
dimensions. Particularly stressed is the shift in the central premise from
freedom of conscience (which has always been fraught with theological
difficulties) to the richer concept of the dignity of the human person.
Dean Jerald Bauer of the University of Chicago School of Theology then
discusses the philosophy behind the traditional American notion of religious
freedom, perhaps overdrawing somewhat the influence of the Enlightenment
at the expense of other independent factors such as the English common
law and the unique American experience itself; he then argues that modern
person-oriented philosophies are needed to give adequate basis for a
contemporary understanding of religious freedom. Francis Canavan, S. J.,
of America, shows the coherence between the Vatican II document and
traditional natural law doctrine, while criticizing the conciliar declaration
for insufficient attention to the political aspects. Scriptural dimensions
are explored by David Noel Freedman of the San Francisco Theological
Seminary, who focuses on the Old Testament which was bypassed in the
declaration, and by John L. McKenzie, S. J., who uses the opportunity
mainly for a statement of his own highly controversial views on the freedom
of Christians within the Church.

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The next two papers turn to. legal and political elements of the issue.
Victor Rosenblum, political scientist at Northwestern University, has considerable praise for the Council's declaration as a statement of constitutional
principles, precisely because of its general and vague language about which
others have expressed such keen disappointment and suspicion. On the
other hand, a negative appraisal is given by Philip Denenfeld of Western
Michigan University (active in the American Civil Liberties Union), who
sees the declaration as concerned more with religion than with freedom and
is especially distressed at its implications for the American controversy
over whether parochial schools should be included in government aid to
education. The final two essays, respectively by J. V. Langmead Casserley
of Seabury-Western Theological Seminary and George van Massenhove,
S. J., of Belgium, reintroduce theological perspectives into the discussion.
Appended to the published essays is the text of the Vatican Council's
declaration.
Two recent volumes in the Concilium series also deal extensively with
religious freedom. Volume 15 opens with an article by John Courtney
Murray discussing the development of doctrine (particularly during the
nineteenth and twentieth centuries) which culminated in the work of
Vatican II. Roland Bainton offers a Protestant's view on " Truth, Tolerance, and Freedom," arguing for religious freedom on the basis that
scientific certitude is not possible in religious matters and then offering
tentative opinions on a variety of practical questions such as whether there
should be paid chaplains in the Congress and Armed Forces (negative
answer), national holidays with religious overtones (all right if the national
and religious aspects merely coincide and are not identified) , prayer at
Presidential inaugurations and the like (perhaps merely a period of silence
if there is objection to prayer) , etc. Other articles in this volume, not
directly related to the present subject, include Yves Cougar's "Poverty in
Christian Life amidst an Affluent Society," and Alois Muller's "Authority
and Obedience in the Church " (based on his book published in translation
by Newman Press, 1966).
Volume 18 is devoted entirely to " Religious Freedom," and included
somewhat curiously under the general category "Canon Law." The opening historical survey by Joseph Lecler, S. J., is especially valuable for its
insights on the intolerance of heretics in medieval Christendom. Rabbi
Arthur Gilbert contributes the essay," Religious Freedom in Jewish Tradition and Experience." Teodoro Jimenez-Urresti discusses "the case of
Spain " with considerable understanding for both the Spanish national and
religious heritage and the new attitudes reflected in Vatican II. Other
articles deal with the problem from the viewpoints of the World Council of
Churches, Islam, and Hinduism.
A. B. WILLIAMS, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies,

Washington, D. C.

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871

Loring, L. M. Two Kinds of Values. Forword by KARL R. PoPPER. New
York: Humanities Press, Inc., 1966. Pp. 199. $5.00.
Although it would be untrue to assert that Miss Loring's judgments about
recent ethical theory are optimistic, Two Kinds of Values is a hybrid of
strengths and weaknesses. There are several reasons for saying that it is a
work deserving of the designation "useful." By its survey of opinions on
several major axiological questions in the light of certain established
thinkers, i. e., Aristotle, Kant, Bentham, Moore and Hare, it contributes to
a deeper understanding of recent ethical discussion. The author is fearless
in addressing herself to the views of these men as she expresses her disagreements, criticisms and distinctions with directness and clarity. It is
regrettable that her affirmations, on the other hand, are somewhat concealed. She does offer several significant conceptions as she takes part in
the ongoing discourse on value. Among these must be included " nonethical values," " basic evaluation," and " moralism," expressions which are
at the center of her argumentation. Her presentation of them deserves to
be taken seriously, since they serve to point the direction toward a truly
adequate axiology, a need which Miss Loring appreciates correctly and
sensitively.
Certain limitations appear to be present in this work, if one views it
from the vantage point of comprehensive axiological inquiry. The work is
inclined to ·slight the total system of the major authors analysed. In
particular, it considers the ideas of Aristotle reported in the Ethics, while
deftly skirting the metaphysical conceptions either of the De Anima or of
the Metaphysics, as these propose an interpretation of human nature. It
builds its notion of the Ethical Good upon the Kant of the Critique of
Practical Reason and the Critique of Judgment but becomes shy before the
influence of the Critique of Pure Reason where the Kantian epistemology
sets the groundwork for his Ethical Good. In my opinion, the ontological
dimension is essentially required for dealing with Miss Loring's " nonethical evaluation " concept or with her " basic values " concept. This
point is consequential because the author strives for
to questions
which are broader than the strictly ethical. Karl Popper asserted this
judgment explicitly and correctly in the foreword. Miss Loring seeks an
axiology, but is reluctant to admit the ontological dimension in it, which has
occasioned an inadequacy in her estimation and treatment of the authors
with whom she has found so much dissent.
It ·should be admitted, however, that Two Kinds of Values as well as the
author's suppositions in it concerning the ontological dimension spring from
an emphasis on the psychological phenomena in human action. Her term
" basic evalution " is the. major hint for this judgment. It is undeniable
that non-ethical experiences and evaluations must be comprehensively
analyzed in order to understand, as well as to integrate, the ethical in. the

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human situation. Nevertheless, psychology provides one exclusive set of
categories. To set the stage for an adequate axiology other disciplines
must be listened to and assimilated into the body of the analysis. Precisely
speaking, anthropology, sociology, economics, epistemology. history of philosophy as well as psychology have a right to be heard in axiological inquiry.
Two Kinds of Values overlooks the comprehensive and interdisciplinary
approach at a time in the history of axiology when such an approach seems
to have won the day.

G. L. CoNCORDIA, 0. P.
Providence CoUege,
Providence, R.I.

The Dynamism of Biblical Tradition. Concilium, Vol. 20. New York:
Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. !Wl. $4.50.
When we view the bible primarily as the revelation of the Godhead,
we have a tendency to limit our perspective merely to the content of
scripture. We tend to forget that the bible is also a witness to man's
8truggle for truth, to man's struggle to see God in history. Once we
broaden our gaze to encompass not only the content of God's word but
also the manner of its transmission, we begin to appreciate the human
dimensions of scripture and the dynamism of biblical tradition. This
aroused awareness and appreciation will in turn help us to better understand the role which tradition must play in the life of the Church. It is
to this concern that a distinguished group of biblical scholars address
themselves in this volume of Concilium. Each in his turn points up and
explores the dynamic aspects of biblical tradition.
The opening essay by Pierre Grelot emphasizes the fact that the Old
and New Testaments are the products of a living tradition-not merely
a handing down of words but the result of a continual development that
constantly goes on. Joseph Schreiner explores the development of the
ancient Israelite credo. Orginally a liturgical proclamation of Yahweh as
the God of Israel, it always remained open to the ongoing development of
their faith. Joseph Blenkinsopp also investigates the Israelite creed in
order to show the enriching influence the exodus had on the old confession
of faith. Raymond Tournaly shows us how the sages of the post-exilic
period formed a theological synthesis with new perspectives.
,
The New Testament is also the result of the development of living
tradition in the early church. Basic to this development are the sayings
of Jesus and the preaching of the apostles. Frans Neirynck takes Mark
9: 33-50 and develops an interesting theory based on key word association.
With regard to the kerygma, David Stanley optsl for the position that the
kerygma is the key to the unity of the New Testament. Jules Cambier

S'fS

BOOK REVIEWS

analyzes Paul and illustrates both the perduring and dynamic aspects of
tradition. The concluding article of this volume by M. C. Vanhengel and
J. Peters concerns itself with the problem of the historicity of the gospels.
Also contained in this volume are six bibliographical surveys on the
homily which, besides discussing the nature of the homily, give a very
useful and enlightening resume of the literature now available in the
various languages discussed.
The subject of this Concilium volume is of very great importance and
an understanding of its content will help all of us in our endeavor to make
the Word of God revelant to twentieth-century man.
WILLIAM

F. HEALY, o. P.

CoUege of St. Mary of the Springs,
Columbus, Ohio.

Spirituality in the Secular City. By CHRISTIAN DuQuoc, 0. P. Concilium,
$4.50.
Vol. 19. New York: Paulist Press, 1966. Pp.
This volume contains some useful insights on secularity, desacralization,
the theology of earthly realities, modern asceticism. The line of thought
pursued throughout is that secular realities have an integrity of their own
which must be respected and in which we can find God. Chardin is
mentioned frequently and his basic vision is accepted by most of the writers.
Among them are two Americans, Bernard Cooke and Ernest Larkin, and
one Canadian, Elmer O'Brien. The rest are Europeans, mostly French.
The translations are good, except for the first essay, which is awkward.
David Reisman's 'inner-directed' comes into English from whatever it
was in the French as ' introdetermined ' (p. 8) . Christian Duquoc, the
editor, has a very strong essay on the role of the theologian today, somewhat overstated but nonetheless provocative. The best essay, probably, is
Claude Geffre's on the process of desacralization. The most interesting is
the brief report at the end of the volume on ' The Brothers of the Virgin
of the Poor,' a new group founded in 1956 who desire to be at the same
time children of the ancient monks of the East as well as disciples of the
message of the hermit of Tamanrasset.
The volume is not the last word on secular spirituality but it is a
good first word, a good introduction.
THOMAS R. HEATH, 0. p.
Dominican House of Studies,
Washington, D. C.

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BOOK REVIEWS

Information and Prediction in Science, Proceedings of a Symposium ·of the
Academie Internationale de Philosophic des Sciences (1962). Edited
by S. Dockx and P. Bernays. New York: Academic Press, 1965.
Pp. 272. $9.50.
Science is technology. Science is scientists-theoreticians
and experimentalists and administrators and science teachers. Science is a body of
knowledge, but it is also M. I. T. and Cal Tech. Science is the history of
science: it is Newton and Darwin and Einstein, and your local lab
technician as well. Science is sociologists, is city-planners and computers.
It is also a method, or a set of methods, or a way of looking at things, even
a way of life. And, of course, science is physics, natural history, cryogenics,
entomology, psychology, and theoretical medicine.
Science is, simply, too complex to be captured in any one description.
All attempts to say what science " really is " amount to a description of an
aspect of science that has caught the fancy of the interpreter. Must one,
then, despair of describing science at all? Or, if someone makes the
attempt, must he simply hope that his perspective will turn out to be an
important one?
Today the case is less bleak than all this would make it sound. For a
sociology of science is in the making that may offer a theoretical structure
of science complex enough to manage at least a great number of aspects,
perspectives, and descriptive data. And to complement this theoretical
structure 111 number of exciting new views on the nature and epistemology
of science, and on discovery or creativity in science, have come into being.
In this atmosphere a concept that has been proposed as a key to the
understanding of this complex structure is information theory. In such a
view the exchange or communication of information becomes the operative
concept. Information and Prediction in Science, the proceedings of a
symposium held in 1962, is an attempt to explore this concept. The
meeting centered very largely around the contribution of Leon Brillouin, an
eminent theoretician in the field of information theory, discussing " how the
human mind establishes a law of science from experimental information "
(Preface).
Other contributors were Satosi Watanabe: "Une Explication Mathematique de Classement d'Objects," Andre Mercier: " La Physique et
!'Information," and D. M. MacKay: " Information and Prediction in
Human Sciences "-a fascinating amalgam, to say the least, of high-level
mathematical theory and concrete application.
Needless to say, as with all such symposia the results are uneven. A
favorable reviewer can find plenty to commend, a critic can come down
hard on a weak article or two. (For instance, I found the article by van
Duiju rather insubstantial, and, at the opposite extreme, I would question
the pertinence of the long and thorough article by Alonzo Church.) How-

BOOK REVIEWS

875

ever, it seems more to the point to question (a) the extent to which the
volume as a whole fulfills the promise of its basic theme, and (b) the
relative importance of that theme.
On the first point it seems fair to say that the volume throws a good
deal of light on the problems information theory must face if it is to
serve as a key to the analysis of scientific practice. The second point is
more complex: Is the time ripe, at this stage in the history of science
and its new interpretations, to look for a key to the complex structure of
science? If by " looking " is meant a detailed, careful, theoretical or
experimental search for pieces to be fitted into a slowly-developing construct-then the time is always ripe. If, however, looking means a speculative search for a grand scheme, then I would guess that the time is not
yet ripe-the theory of information is still too young, new approaches to
science are only beginning, even the sociology of science, which might
offer an undergirding, is yet in its infancy.
In sum, Information and Prediction in Science is an interesting volume.
It brings together in congress representatives of many specialties in many
countries in interdisciplinary dialogue, and it presents some tentative
beginnings in the extension of information theory into larger fields. But
information theory is not yet the key to a grand description that will do
justice to the complexity of science.
PAUL R. DURBIN, O.P.
St. Stephtm's College
Dover, Mass.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Belaval, Yvon. Philosophers and Their Language. Transl. by Norbert
Guterman. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1966. Pp. 147.
$4.00.
Benoit, Pierre, Murphy, Roland E. (Ed.) Concilium. Vol. 20. The
Dynamism of Biblical Tradition. New York: Paulist Press, 1967.
Pp. 218. $4.50.
Blandio, Giovanni, S. J. Peccato Originale E Poligenismo. Forli: Edizioni
di Ethica, 1967. Pp. 48. L. 450.
Bourke, Vernon J. Ethics. New York: Macmillan, 1966. Pp. 497.
Copi, Irving M. and Gould, James A. Contemporary Readings in Logical
Theory. New York: Macmillan, 1967. Pp. 842. $4.50.
Cowan, Wayne H. (Ed.) Witness to Generation. New York: BobbsMerrill, 1966. Pp. 272. $1.75.
D'Arcy, Martin, S. J. Of God and Man. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 178. $1.25.
De Chardin, Pierre Teilhard. The Vision of the Past. Transl. by J. M.
Cohen. New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. 285. $5.00.
--- and Blondel, Maurice. Correspondence. New York: Herder and
Herder, 1967. Pp. 174. $4.95.
de Lubac, Henri. The Religion of Teilhard de Chardin. New York:
Desclee, 1967. Pp. 880. $5.95.
Donceel, J. F., S.J. Philosophical Anthropology. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1967. Pp. 496. $5.00.
Donovan, John F. M. M. The Pagoda and the Cross-The Life of Bishop
Ford of Maryknoll. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp.
228. $5.95.
Dubuois, Jacques Marcel. Le temps et ['instant selon Aristote. Paris:
Desclee de Brouwer, 1967. Pp. 478. 420 FB.
Emery, J. K. (Ed.) The Concept of Morality. University of Colorado
Studies Series in Philosophy. No. 8. Boulder, Colo.: University of
Colorado Press, 1967. Pp. 94. $2.50.
Ferre, Frederick. Basic Modern Philosophy of Religion. New York:
Charles Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 465. $7.50.
Gaboury, Placide. Matiere et Structure-Rejlexions
sur l'Oeuvre d'art.
Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1967. Pp. 184. $8.60.
Gallagher, Donald and Idella. The Education of Man. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 191. $2.25.
Gardeil, H. D. Introduction to the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas IV.
Metaphysics. St. Louis: Herder, 1967. Pp. 829. $5.25.

376

BOOKS RECEIVED

877

Garner, RichardT. and Rosen, Bernard. Moral Philosophy-A Systematic
Introduction to Normative Ethics and Meta-ethics. New York:
The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 867. $6.95.
Grunbaum, Adolf. Modern Science and Zeno's Paradoxes. Middletown,
Conn.: Wesleyan University Press, 1967. Pp. 148. $6.50.
Hanley, Katharine Rose and Monan, J. Donald, S. J. A Prelude to Metaphysics. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967.
Pp. 177.
Hayen, Andre. San Tommaso D'Aquino e La Vita Della. Chiesa Oggi.
Milano: Ente Editoriale Dell'Universita, 1967. Pp. 151. L. 1900.
Hospers, J. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis. (second edition).
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc., 1967. Pp.
$7.95.

Kennedy, Robert F. Just Friends and Brave Enemies. New York: Benn
Hall Associates, Popular Library,
Pp. 174. $.60.
Kim, Arthur G. (Ed.) G. B. Phelan Selected Papers. Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Medieval Studies, 1967. Pp.
Laistner, M. L. W. Christianity and Pagan Culture in the Later Empire.
Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1967. Pp. 145. $1.95.
Lawrence, Nathaniel and O'Connor, Daniel (Ed.) Readings in Existential
Phenomenology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.
Pp. 411. $8.50.
Lee, Edward N. and Mandelbaum, Maurice. Phenomenology and Existentialism. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 268. $8.00.
Lehmeir, Ludvig, S. V. D. The Ecclesial Dimension of the Sacrament of
Penance from a Catechetical Point of View. Cebu City, Phillipines: University of San Carlos, 1967. Pp.
Loew, Cornelius. Myth, Sacred History and Philosophy. New York:
Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. Pp.
$2.95.
McCaffrey, Patrick J. Films for Religiou11 Education. Notre Dame,
Indiana: Fides Publishers, 1967. Pp. 106. $1.00.
McDonagh, Enda. Freedom or Tolerance? The Declaration on Religious
Freedom of Vatican II. Albany, New York: Magi Books Inc., 1967.
Pp. 155. $8.95.
lVIaly, Eugene H. and McNeill, Rt. Rev. Msgr. Leon A. New Horizons for
the Word of God. Wichita, Kansas: Confraternity Bookstore, 1967.
Pp. 96.
Mackey, J. P. The Grace of God, The Response of Man. Albany, New
· York: Magi Books Inc., 1967. Pp.
$8.95.
Manier, Edward and Houck, John (Ed.) Academic Freedom and the
Catholic University. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc.,
1967. Pp.
$4.95.
Marcel, Gabriel. Problematic Man. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967.
Pp. 144. $8.95.

878

BOOKS RECEIVED

Marou, Henri !renee, Russell, R. P., 0. S. A., and Paparella, B. A. (Ed.)
The Resurrection a;nd Saint AugUBtine's Theology of Human Values.
Villanova, Pa.: Villanova Press, 1966. Pp. 5!!. $!!.25.
Mauriac,
Anguish and Joy of the Christian Life. Notre Dame,
Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967. Pp. 110. $1.!!5.
Melden, A. I. (Ed.) Ethical Theories. A Book of Readings (second edition
with revisions). Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1967. Pp. 550. $7.95.
Muckenhirn, Sister Charles Borromeo, C. S. C. The Implications of Re. newal. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1967. Pp. !!!!9.
$5.95.

Nishida, Kitaro. Intelligibility and the Philosophy of Nothingness. Trans!.
by Robert Schinzinger. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1958.
Pp. !!51. $5.50.
O'Flaherty, James. Hamann's Socratic Memorabilia. Translation and Commentary. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 229.
$7.50.

Olafson, Frederick A. Principles and Persons. Baltimore: The Johns
Hopkins Press, 1967. Pp. 258. $7.50.
Osborne, William. The Segregated Covenant. New York: Herder and
Herder, 1967. Pp. !!5!!. $5.95.
Parker, Francis H. The Story of Western Philosophy. Bloomington,
Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1967. Pp. 388.
Pereiia, L. and Perez Prendes, J. M. (Ed.) Francisco De Vitoria. Relectio
De India. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Cientificas,
1967.
!!39. 450 pesetas.
Prall, D. W. Aesthetic Judgment. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967.
Pp. 878. $1.95.
--, Aesthetic Analysis. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1967. Pp.
!!11. $1.95.

Rahner, Hugo, S. J. Man At Play. New York: Herder and Herder, 1967.
Pp. 105. $.50.
Rawski, Conrad H. (Ed. and Transl.) Petrarch: Four Dialogues for
Scholars. Cleveland: The Press of Western Reserve University,
1967. Pp. !!09. $7.45.
Regan, Richard J., S. J. Conflict a;nd Consensus. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1967. Pp. 21!!. $5.95.
Ricoeur, Paul. The Symbolism of Evil. New York: Harper and Row,
1967. Pp. 357. $8.50.
Robinson, James M. and Cobb, John B., Jr. (Ed.) Theology as History.
New York: Harper and Row, 1967. Pp. !!76. $6.00.
Roth, Robert J., S. J. American Religious Philosophy.' New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1967. l.>p. 211. $!!.95.

BOOKS RECEIVED

879

Rubenstein, Richard L. After A.U8chwitz: Radical Theology and Contemporary Judaism. New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1966.
Pp. 287. $1.75.
Schlegel, Richard. Completeness in Science. New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, 1967. Pp. 280. $7.50.
Sheets, John R., S. J. The Theology of the Atonement-Readings in
Soteriology. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1967. Pp. 288. $8.50.
Skolimowski, Henryk. Polish Analytical Philosophy. New York: Humanities Press, 1967. Pp. 276. $7.50.
Smith, Marvin W. Philosophic Dicta. Seattle, Wash.: Craftsman Press,
1967. Pp. 71. $8.95.
Struve, Nikita. Christians in Contemporary RU8sia. New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1967. Pp. 464. $7.50.
Sullivan, Sister Bede, 0. S. B. Movies: Universal Language. Film Study
in High School. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers Inc., 1967.
Pp. 160. $2.45.
Sullivan, Mark W. Apuleian Logic: The Nature, Sources and Influence of
ApuleiU8's Peri Hermeneias. Amsterdam: North Holland Publishing Company, 1967. Pp. 266. $12.00.
Thils, Gustave. Theologica et Miscellaneis. Louvain: E. Warny, 1960.
Pp. 484.
Trese, Leo J. Orw Step Enough. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers
Inc., 1966. Pp. 191. $8.95.
Ullrich, Lothar. Fragen der Schopfungslehre nach Jakob von Metz, 0. P.
Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag, 1966. Pp. 888.
Utz, Arthur. Ethique Sociale. Tome III. Philosophie du droit. Fribourg:
Editions Universitairellj Fribourg Suisse, 1967. Pp. 868. Fr. 86.
Wagner, Johannes (Ed.) Concilium. Vol. 22. Adult Baptism anul the
Catechumenate. New York: Paulist Press, 1967. Pp. 189. $4.50.
Watzlawik, Joseph, S. V. D. Leo XIII and the New Scholasticism. Cebu
City, Phillipines: University of San Carlos, 1966. Pp. 226.