THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PRoviNCE oF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017
VoL. XXXI

OCTOBER, 1967

No.4

THE ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE "RESET
SACRAMENTUM"

THE SEVENFOLD CuLTIC "STATUS" IN THE VIsiBLE CHuRcH
AS THE EFFECT OF THE SACRAMENTS

I

N THE SCHOLASTIC treatment of the doctrine of the
sacraments, the subject matter has generally been treated
with a certain disregard for the Christian and ecclesial
implications of the sacramental economy. 1 In fact, only several
fragmentary truths have been indicated, for example, that
Christ is the institutor of the sacraments and that the Church
is their dispenser. In such a conception, therefore, the relationship between Christ, Church and the sacraments remains superficial and external, as though, starting from Christ, one could
arrive at the sacraments and their effects through the Church
only per accidens, with no essential or intrinsic continuity
1 Cf. R. Masi, " Cristo, Chiesa, Sacramenti. Aspetto cristologico ed ecclesiologico
dei sacramenti," Miscellanea Antonio Piolanti I (Romae, 1968),
M. J.
O'Connell, "The Sacraments in Theology Today," Thought 86 (1961), 40-58.

381

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

among them. 2 Consequently, the sacraments have been con·
sidered above all simply as a transitory rite rather than as a
lasting activity of Christ and of the Church on the soul of the
individual after the rite has ceased to exist.
Evidently such a treatment cannot provide us with an
integral and radical understanding of the sacramental economy.
The Church, the enduring extension of the Incarnation, cannot
be a natural human society which exists independently of and
separately from Christ; it exists intrinsically in the mystical
unity and acts in the life of Christ the Redeemer. Likewise,
the sacraments must be the enduring redemptive activity of
Christ upon the individual through the Church and the salvific
activity of the visible Church in Christ. 3 They do not cease
with the rite but continue to supernaturally determine the
being of the recipients. Their dependence, therefore, upon the
Redeemer and his visible Church cannot be simply extrinsic
but must also be essential and intrinsic and thus touch the
intrinsic structure itself of the sacraments and determine the
mode of their function and effects.
Some recent theologians, therefore, have been attempting a
new approach to the sacramental economy, in order to arrive at
an integral, global and more organic understanding. They talk
of the enduring christological and ecclesial element of the
sacraments, the sacramental structure of Christ and of the
Church (Ursakrament-Grundsakrament) and the ecclesiological deduction of the sacraments from Christ. 4
• Cf. K. Rahner, Kirche und Sakramentti, (Freiburg i. B., 1961), 9.
8 M. J. O'Connell, loc. cit.; C. McAuliffe, De Sacramentis in Genere (St. Louis,
1960), 158-157; B. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, ed. 2 (London,
1960), ix-x; E. Schillebeeckx, Christ, the Sacrament of Encounter with God
(London, 1968), 64-109.
Cf. B. Leeming, "Recent Trends in Sacramental Theology," The Irish Theological Quarterly 28 (1956), 195-217, esp. 218-217; P. Smulders, "Sacramenten en
kerk. Kerkelijk recht, Kultus, Pneuma," mjdragen 17 (1956), 891-418; " Die
sakramental-kirchliche Struktur der christlichen Gnade," ibid., 18 (1957), 888-841;
M. J. O'Connell, art. cit.; C. Baumgartner, "Bulletin d'Histoire et de Theologie
Sacramentaire," Recherches de Science ReligieUI!e 50 (1962), 264-289; M. Schmaus,
Katholische Dogmatik IV/1, ed. 6 (Miinchen, 1964); C. Vollert, "The Church and
the Sacraments," C. S. Sullivan (ed.) Readings in Sacramental Theology (Engla.
wood Cliffs, 1964), 89-108.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

883

What most characterizes this new approach to the sacramental realities seems to be the explicit or implicit presumption
that the seven sacraments are as such "special" realities with
a cmnm® intrinsic structure and nature, forming, as it were, a
distinct, unique, supernatural reality in the present economy
of salvation. It is quite natural that, if the sacraments are
placed in christologic-soteriological and ecclesial contexts, then,
whether they are called the sevenfold actualization of the
essence of the Church, or the sevenfold encounter of the
recipient with Christ, or the sevenfold embracing of the individual by Christ through the Church, they should be grasped
as ooe reality because of their fundamental common structure
before they are specified and realized as this or that particular
sacrament.
This means that the treatise " on the sacraments in general "
will be taken as a part of Soteriology and Ecclesiology 5 and
will acquire a special importance for a systematic understanding of the sacramental economy. It is true that the explicit
treatment of the general principles of sacramentology belongs
to a later period of the history of sacramental theology; yet
here we must not follow an historical but a theoretical order.
This new approach, because of its usefulness for an exact understanding of the nature of the sacraments, merits special consideration.
The Church teaches that in the New Testament there are
seven sacraments (Denz. 1601). Yet the fons revelationis does
not convey equal explicitness and detail regarding the teaching
of Jesus on each of the sacraments. If, however, the seven
sacraments, insofar as they are sacraments of the Church of
Christ, have a common fundamental structure ascertainable in
a soteriologic-ecclesiological context, then, notwithstanding the
state of our knowledge coming from the foos revelatioois, it
should not be too difficult for us to form a correct and exact
idea of the nature of the sacraments. The decisive points are
that the visible Church emanates necessarily from the Sacrifice
8

Cf. K. Rahner, op. cit., 9-67, esp. 87-SB; E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit.

384

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

of Christ on Calvary, that her nature, substantial structure and
modes of activity are intrinsically determined by the ontological
structure of the Incarnate Word and his salvific activity, and
that sacrament with its concrete nature and structure is an
essential element of this Church. 6 By means of analogy of faith
we can gain from what we know about one sacrament a sure
knowledge and grasp of the nature of the other sacraments
(Denz. 3016) .
Catholic doctrine teaches that a particular sacrament confers
grace ex opere operata on those who receive it rightly. Grace
is the principal, though not the only, effect of the sacrament.
According to the teaching of the Church some sacraments,
that is, Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders, produce, besides grace, a seal of the spirit, an irrevocable consecration of
the soul, which is called in Catholic theology " sacramental
character" (Denz. 1609). Moreover, what is of capital importance for our present concern is that this effect is generally
considered to be the proper effect of these sacraments. In other
words, it is commonly accepted that, while the gifts of grace
can be conferred also extrasacramentally, i.e., without the
actual reception of the sacraments, and while the sacraments
may be received validly but unfruitfully, i.e., without receiving
grace, the sacramental character is caused immediately and
necessarily through a valid reception of these sacraments
(Denz. 1609) ,1 and it is caused only through these sacraments,
so that without an actual reception of the sacraments, the sacramental character would not be conferred (cf. Summa Theol.,
III, q. 64, a. 8, ad fl; IV Sent., d. 4, q. 3, a. 3, qcla. 3). Therefore, if one admits the existence of such an effect of the sacraments, then the sacraments can no longer be simply identified
with the passing rite; one must necessarily recognize an endur6

For example, as regards the institution the points are treated abundantly by

K. Rahner, op. cit., 87-67; E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 187-168; B. Leeming, op. cit.,
408-481.

• Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 10. See A. M. Roguet, "La theologie du
caractere et !'incorporation a l'Eglise," La Maison-Dieu 3rt (1952), 82; M. McAulifl'e, op. cit., 59-69.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

385

ing function of the sacraments, 8 a lasting activity o£ Christ in
us. Consequently, Christ could not be said to be active only
at the moment of the reception, nor could the Church be
taken simply as the dispenser of the sacraments to whom one
must turn to receive them, but from whom one might turn away
as soon as one has once received them.
Yet, as long as we are not convincingly taught that these
three sacraments are to be classed as essentially different from
the other four, so that only they produce such a secondary
effect besides grace, 9 we may with good reason expect that,
although the production of this determined effect (sacramental
character) may be due to the special nature of these three
sacraments, the production itself of one reality besides the
principal effect will be due to the intrinsic common structure
itself of the sacrament as such o£ the New Testament, and that,
therefore, there must be in every sacrament such a secondary
effect/ 0 Indeed, the existence of such an effect, a kind of
consecration, which is something habitual and lasting although
not perpetual, is often affirmed in regard to Marriage or to the
Anointing of the Sick.11
If this is true, the exact understanding of the nature of this
secondary effect and of its role in the sacramental economy
will necessarily lead us to a better and more precise grasp of the
present economy of salvation.
8 Cf. B. Leeming, op. cit., 635-686; N. M. Haring, " The A11gustinian Axiom:
Nulli Sacramento Injuria Faciendai est," Medieval Studies 16 (1964), 87-117.
9 About the origin and development of the theology of the sacramental character,
(Paris, 1958).
see J. Galot, La nature du caractere sacramentel, ed.
10 In the history of the doctrine of the sacramental character
the role and
influence of St. Augustine is decisive. In his teaching on the sacramental character,
however, we must distinguish a double affirmation: i) the sacrament (of Baptism)
causes something besides grace, that is, a consecration of the soul; and ii) this
something, the consecration, is in Baptism irrevocable, that is, a permanent reality
(cf. J. Galot, op. cit., 86-41, esp. 40). What is most valuable and decisive for
sacramental theology is precisely his recognition that the sacrament causes besides
grace a reality such as consecration. The property of the consecration, its
irrevocability or perpetuity, is a secondary question.
11 Cf. Pius XI, " Casti connubii," AAS 22 (1930), 588.
See also A. Berlage,
Katholische Dogmatik VII (Munster, 1864), 78; J. Oswald, Die katholische Lehre
von den heil. Sakramenten (Munster, 1894), 104; M. J. L. Farine, Der sakramentale
Character (Freiburg i. B., 1904) , 77-95.

386

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

In this respect the so-called theory of the res et sacramentum
of medieval theology is worthy of note. According to this
theory, each of the seven sacraments (sacramentum ta:ntum)
produces a reality which is distinct from grace (res tantum)
and which is produced prior to this grace. Medieval theology
called this reality res et sacramentum. There was not a clear
idea about what the seven res et sacramenta were in the concrete, nor was there a sufficient scientific reflection on the
reason why the res et sacramentum had to be produced. 12 It
is also a fact that the production of the res et sacramentum
was maintained by many theologians owing to an erroneous
idea that grace is created, and that since there can be no instrument in creation, the sacrament must only cause some reality
which is not grace but serves in the production of grace by
God. This theory was not inspired, at least formally, by an
attempt to grasp the sacraments organically or systematically
in their common and fundamental structure in the contexts of
Christology-Soteriology and of Ecclesiology. Yet we must have
a high regard for this theory, especially because of its implicit
presumption that there must be in every sacrament some
lasting effect distinct from grace, which is caused prior to
grace and plays some role in the conferral of grace, whether it
is called sacramental character, or ornatus animae. 13
The res et sacramentum has become a subject for close atten10 The question is whether the sacrament has two mutually independent ends, so
that there is no intrinsic relationship between the rea et sacramentum and the
rea tantum except that they are both caused by a common cause (sacramentum
tantum), or the sacrament has two subordinated ends, so that there is an organic
and intrinsic dependence between the twofold effect. The merit of St. Thomas
Aquinas in the history of sacramental theology is his exact and precise grasp of
the organic unity of the sacramental economy. Cf. T. Miyakawa, "St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Relation between ' Res et Sacramentum ' and ' Res Tantum.' "
Euntea Docete 18 (1965), 61-108.
13 Concerning the medieval theory of the rea et sacramentum, see the noteworthy
contribution of E. Doronzo, Tractatus Dogmaticus de Sacramentis, 15 vols. (the
; also L. Billot, De Eccleaiae
last vol. has not yet appeared) , Milwaukee 1946Sacramentis, Romae I (ed. 7), 1981, II (ed. 8), 1947; E. Doronzo, "Originis et
Evolutionis Doctrinae de ' Re et Sacramento ' brevis Delineatio," Revue de l'Uni.
ver8ite d'Ottawa 4 (1984),

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

887

tion in recent Catholic theological circles because of its ecclesial
meaning; it is thought to establish status in the Church. 14 It
is true that among theologians there is much variety in terminology, expression, position of stress, manner of approach to
the question in the interpretation of the nature of the res et
sacramentum. But it is true also that they move substantially
in a common direction, insofar as they attempt a remotely
christologic-soteriological and proximately ecclesiological interpretation of the res et sacramentum. In this sense there is a
focus in their exposition, and because of it their contribution is
decisive for a precise and scientific grasp of the sacramental
economy. I£ indeed the sacrament causes per sea real habitual
contact of the recipient with Christ and his mystery in the
Church and ex se. terminates immediately in the production of
the ecclesial reality-status in the Church-in dependence on
which grace is caused, then the sacramental reality will be
essentially comprised under a christologic-soteriological and
"For example, the following sampling may be cited: i) M. J. Scheeben, Die
Mysterien des Christentums, 1865 (ed. 2, Freiburg i. B., 1951); ii) E. Mersch,
La th6ologie du Corps Mystique, 2 vol. (Paris, 1944), ed. 4, 1954; see II (ed. 4),
165-866, esp. 275-881; iii) 0. Semmelroth, Kirche als Ursakrament (Frankfurt a.
M., 1958), ed. 8, 1968; iv) K. Raimer, " Kirche und Sakramente. Zur theologische
Grundleging einer Kirchen-und Sakramentenfrommigkeit," Geist und Leben 28
(1955), 484-458; Kirche und Sakramente (Freiburg, i. B., 1961); see also Schriften
zur Theologie, 7 vol. (Einsiedeln, 1954-1966), which contain many studies concerning
our theme, and also his articles in F. X. Arnold-K. Rahner-V. Schurr-L. M. Weber
(ed.), Handbuch der Pastoraltheologie I (Freiburg i. B., 1964), 117-229, 828-848,
esp. 828-882; v) B. Leeming, "Recent Trends in Sacramental Theology," loc. cit.;
vi) P. Smulders, op. cit.; vii) E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit.; De sacramentele; Heilseconomie;: theologische bezinning op S. Thomas's sacramenten leer in het licit van de
traditie en van de hedendagste sacramentsproblematiek (Antwerpen, 1952); " Sakramente als Organe der Gottbegegnung," J. Feiner-J. Truetsch-F. Boeckle (ed.),
Fragen der Theologie heute; (Einsiedeln, 1957), ed. 2, 1958, 879-401; viii) J. Fuchs,
De Sacramentis in Genere, De Baptismo et Confirmatione (Romae, 1959), ed. 8,
1968; ix) P. F. Palmer, " The Theology of the Res et Sacramentum with particular Emphasis on its Application to Penance," Proceedings of the XIV Annual Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America (New York, 1960), 120-141,
esp. U0-180; "The Theology of the 'Res et Sacramentum,'" C. S. Sullivan (ed.),
Readings in Sacramental Theology (Englewood Cliffs, 1964), 104-128; x) C. McAuliffe, op. cit.; xi) J. Lhoir, "L'Eglise et les Sacrements," Collectanea Mechliniensia
48 (1968), 262-277; xii) R. Masi, op. cit., 227-252; Cristo, la Chiesa, i Sacramenti
(Roma, 1964), in manuscript.

888

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

ecclesiological examination, and a single act of administrationreception of the sacraments will be placed intrinsically within
the contexts of the Incarnation-Redemption
and EcclesiaChristus totus Mysticus.
This, however, does not yet justify us in concluding that we
have already a theology of the res et sacramentum, that is,
a coherent and unified interpretation. First of all, it must be
pointed out that the focus for grasping this sacramental reality
is still not distinct, and the concepts of Church, of res et sacrarnentum, and of status are often not clear and precisely determined in the usage of these theologians. We often receive the
impression that in their exposition of the so-called "ecclesial"
meaning of the res et sacramentum we are being given unsystematic and haphazard indications of several aspects of the
sacramental economy which have some (proximate or remote)
relationship to the Church. But connecting the seven sacraments with seven particular aspects of the Church does not
provide us with a radical understanding of the " ecclesial "
structure of the sacramental economy. Even in their most
systematic and respected expositions we are not convinced as
to why the sacraments, even presupposing that they produce
some reality besides grace, should terminate immediately (that
is, prior to grace) in the ecclesial reality which is the res et
sacramentumr-status in the Church, or still less why the sevenfold status in the Church should be caused precisely in the
sacramental economy, or what christologic-soteriological and
ecclesiological meaning this status has, or in what relationship
the res et sacramentum stands to the res tantum, or what
organic relationship the seven res et sacramenta have among
themselves, or what supernatural role the reset sacramentum
-status in the Church-plays in our daily life.
What we present here as a hypothesis is a theology of the
res et sacramentum, that is, a scientific theory or a self-contained, coherent and unified interpretation of this sacramental
reality. 15
15 Cf. E. Mersch, op. cit., I, ed. 4 (Paris, 1954), 7-82, 88-156; M. F. Daly, "The
Problem of Speculative Theology," The Thomist 29 (1965), 177-216.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

389

I The Sacraments: Divine Worship and Means of Sanctification
According to Catholic teaching a sacrament is above all the
means and God's instrument for the conferral of grace on the
soul of the recipient. It is Christ's redemptive activity through
the Church for the subjective redemption, that is, the personal
sanctification of the individual.I 6 It confers grace ex opere
operata on those recipients who place no impediments (cf.
Denz. 1451; 1606) . This is the downward movement from
God to the recipient, and the causality is efficient.
But at the same time, the Church has been convinced that
a sacrament is a form of divine worship offered by the subject
who receives it. 17 It is the upward movement from the recipient
to God. It is the praising o£ God and to it belongs a meritorious-moral causality. It glorifies God and implores the conferral
of divine blessings.18 It is true that a sacrament cannot be
taken primarily as divine worship; it is above all a means of
grace. Yet, it must still be considered as intrinsically and formally divine worship, however secondarily. 19 In fact, insofar as
the sacraments themselves pertain to1 the constitutive elements
of the Church of Christ and necessarily emanate from its intrinCf. C. Vollert, op. cit.; K. Rahner, Kirche und Sakramente,
Leo XIII, "Satis Cognitum," ASS 28 (1895-1896),
Pius XII,
"Mediator Dei," AAS 89 (1949), 529; A. Vonier, A Key to the Doctrine of the
Eucharist, ed. 5 (Westminster, Md., 1960), 10-52; M. Schmaus, op. cit.,
0. Semmelroth, op. cit., 82-88; C. O'Neill, Opus operans: a Thomistic lnterpref:a,tion of a Sacramental Formula (Washington, 1958); "The Role of the Recipient
and Sacramental Signification," The Thomist 21 (1958), 257-801, 508-540.
18 " In hoc enim est summa divini cultus agnoscere et revereri Deum ut supremum
dominatorem rerum, cuius in potestate et nos et omnia nostra sunt" (Leo XIII,
" Caritatis studium," ASS 81 [1898-1899], 11).
19 Although slightly differing from us, the view of A. Vonier is worthy of
attention, insofar as he grasps exactly the nature of the sacrament, insisting on
its cultic aspect. " The sacrament, remaining a sacrament, may be a worship as
much as sanctification; in fact, it is more truly a sacrament through the worship of
God than through the sanctification of man. If we go back on the fundamental
concept of the sacrament, that in one way or another it is a representation of
Christ's passion, the element of cult belongs to it intrinsically, as it belonged
intrinsically to Christ's death on the Cross, which before all things and above all
'things was a sacrifice unto God," op. cit., 46-47.
16

11 Cf.

390

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

sic structure, and insofar as they are the actualization of the
essence of the Church, 20 which is intrinsically not only sanctificans but also adorans, we must admit that the sacraments
must be intrinsically and formally divine worship. The sacraments instituted by Christ Himself, being formally and intrinsically divine worship, must, at this point, hold their special
privileged position in the present economy of salvation compared to other realities which may be divine worship, but only
subordinately and extrinsically.
The sacrament of the New Law is, therefore, at the same
time a means of grace and divine worship. 21 But for an exact
grasp of the nature of sacrament, it is not enough simply to let
these two theses stand side by side; we need to seek an organic
and intrinsic relationship between these two aspects of the
sacrament. Yet the task is not so easy. The crucial question
which arises is why the reception af the sacrament is divine
worship. It is true that to be sanctified is to glorify God, that
is, man's personal sanctification implies and accompanies his
glorification of God and thus the reception is ordered to divine
worship. 22 Moreover, reception of the sacrament is a manifestation of the faith of the recipient in Jesus on the Cross,
and consequently is divine worship; the sacrament is in fact an
objectivized profession of faith. 23 Yet these aspects still seem
to be insufficient in order to make the sacrament itself intrinsically and formally divine worship as well as a means of grace.
The fundamental truth to be remembered is that, in the
actual order of being in which we live, there is only one divine
worship in the strict sense of the word, that is, the Sacrifice of
Christ on Calvary. Any other divine worship is such only inas•• Cf. K. Rahner, op. cit., 18-67; 0. Semmelroth, op. cit., 45-68.
01 Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, Christ, the Sacrament of Encounter with God, 75-95,
although the sacrament is here treated as the divine worship of the ecclesial
community.
•• Cf. B. Hiiring, Das Gesetz Christi II, ed. 6 (Freburg i. B., 1961), 150-158.
•• Cf. A. Vonier, op. cit., 1-14; B. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology,
818. See also: " ... omnia sacramenta sunt quaedam fidei protestationes," Summa
Theol., III, q. 72, a. 5, ad 2; J. Gaillard, "Les sacrements de la foi," Revue
Thomiate 59 (1959), 5-81, 270-809.

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM u

891

much as it has analogice a connection with or a dependence
upon this unique worship, princeps analogatum. Thus the
meaning and value of a single religious act as divine worship
depends upon this relationship itself.
The Death of Christ on Calvary was the climax and consummation of his whole terrestrial life of divine worship from
the moment of conception (Heb. 10:5- 7); it functions as a
meritorious-moral cause before God for man's redemption and
implores the conferral of blessings; its value is the reason
which moves God to impart his blessings upon us. If, therefore, the sacrament is intrinsically and fonnally divine worship,
then its dependence upon the Sacrifice of Christ on Calvary
ought to be intrinsic and proper.
This dependence is possible only in the following two ways:
1) a substantial dependence of the reality (divine worship)
upon the Sacrifice through a perfect numerical and ontological
identification of the Priest- Victim in these two cases-thus it
is a sacrifice and divine worship substantially; 2) an accidental
dependence of the worship upon the Sacrifice through an
intrinsic ontological participation of the worshiper in the PriestVictim of the Sacrifice, that is, in Jesus on the Cross-in this
case it is a sacrifice and divine worship accidentally.
The ontological perfect identification of the Priest- Victim
with that of the Sacrifice of Calvary takes place in the sacrifice
of the Mass. 24 For this reason the Mass holds its unique
position as the sacrifice-worship in the present economy of
salvation. Thus it is above all the act of adoration offered to
God. In the Mass the Sacrifice of Calvary is made present
again in the same existential actuality, 25 and thus the Mass is
14 Cf. A. Piolanti, "Aspetti
del Magistero eucaristico del Papa Pio XII,"
Divinitaa 8 (1959), 701-728; also B. Neunheuser, "Die numerische ldentitii.t von
Kreuzeopfer und Messopfer," Opfer Christi und Opfer der Kirche. Die Lehre vom
Measopfer als Mysteriengediichtnis in der Theologie der Gegenwart (DUsseldorf,
1960). 145-147.
90 Cf. Pius XII, "Mediator
Dei": "Augustum igitur altaris Sacrificium non
mera est ac simplex Jesu Christi cruciatuum ac mortis commemoratio sed vera ac
propria Sacrificatio, qua quidem per incruentam immolationem Summus Sacerdos id
agit, quod jam in Cruce fecit, semetipsum aeterno Patri hostiam ofl'erens acceptis-

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

the perpetuation of the presence of the Sacrifice of Jesus on
Calvary in and to the world. In the present economy of
salvation, without the Mass there would be no direct and
substantial presence of the Death as the event in history. 26
"Do this as a memorial of me" (Lk.
19, I Cor. 11:
is the one positive command of Christ which is directed only
to the celebration of Mass, the repetition of the ritual sacrifice
of the Last Supper. 27 The Sacrifice of Calvary is really made
present on the altar, not in the natural-physical order, but in
the sacramental order, that is, in the meta-intentional, infraphysical order under symbols and through the minister. Therefore, although in the Mass we have the same Sacrifice as that of
Calvary, we are still concerned with a specifically and numerically different presence of the sacrifice (cf. Denz. 1743) .28
This means that the only possible way for the sacrament
simam" (Denz. 3847-3848); Vatican ll, "Sacrosanctum Concilium ": "Salvator
noster, in Cena novissima, qua nocte tradebatur, Sacrificium Crucis in saecula,
donee veniret, perpetuaret " (no. 47) . See also Denz. 17·40, 1753. On the viewpoint
of the Church Fathers, see M. Schmaus, op. cit., 404. St. Thomas says: " Sacrificium autem quod quotidie in Ecclesia offertur, non est aliud a sacrificio quod
ipse Christus obtulit ... " (Summa Theol., III q. 22, a. 3, ad 2); " ... sicut Ambrosius .•. dicit, una est hostia, quam scilicet Christus obtulit et nos offerimus, et non
multae, quia semel oblatus est Christus, hoc autem sacrificium exemplum est illius.
Sicut enim quod ubique offertur unum est corpus et non multa corpora, ita et
unum sacrificium" (ibid., q. 83, a. 1, ad 1); " ... non offerimus aliam quam illam
quam Christus obtulit pro nobis, scilicet sanguinem suum. Unde non est alia
oblatio" (Ad Heb., c. 10, 2-3, ed. Marietti, [Taurini, 1958], II, 442).
•• We thus cannot accept the view of H. McCormack ("Eucharistic Problems,"
W orahip 39 [1965], 36-37), who does not admit an essential difference between
Mass and any other prayers, for example, a hymn. The unique position of
the Mass as the princeps analogatum in the cult in the Church is insisted upon also
by Paul VI in his "Mysterium Fidei," (AAS 57 [1965], 763-764). Cf. P. Wegenaer,

Heilagegenwart. Daa Heilswerk Christi und die Virtus Divina in den Sakramenten
unter besonderer Beriicksichtigung von Eucharistie und Taufe (Miinster, 1958), esp.
58-69, 89-110; A. Vonier, op. cit., 76-133; B. Neunheuser, art. cit., 139-151; F.
Clark, Eucharistic Sacrifice and the Reformation (London, 1960), 248-295; J.
Kunicic, "De missa ut vero ac proprio sacrificio secundum S. Thomam," Freiburger Zeitschrift f. Phil. und Theol. 7 (1960), 121-138; J. Guitton, "Le mystere
de la messe, presence de l'eternite dans le temps," La Maison-Dieu 65 (1961),
144-154.
•• C. Journet, La Mease. Presence du Sacrifice de la Crom, ed. 3 (Paris, 1961),
47-122.
•• Cf. ibid., 52-56,
101-102, 125-126, 231, 350.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

393

to be " intrinsically and properly divine worship " must be
through causing the recipient to participate really, ontologically and intrinsically in the Priest- Victim of the Sacrifice,
namely, in Christ (cf. Rom. 6: 3-11) .29 If the sacraments-the
sacraments of the New Law only-cause the recipients to participate intrinsically and really in the Priest- Victim, so that the
recipients will personally 30 offer the Sacrifice in ontological
participation in Christ the Victim, then the reception of the
sacraments will hold an unique position next to the Sacrifice
of the Mass as intrinsic and formal worship in the present
economy.
Now it is worth while pointing out that, whereas we said
before that "sacrament" (a) is the efficient cause of grace, we
say here that " sacrament " (b) is divine worship, insofar as
"sacrament" (c) effects an intrinsic-ontological participation
of the recipient in Christ on the Cross. It is evident that in
these three cases (a, b, c) the word "sacrament" is not used
univocally but analogically. "Sacrament" in the first and the
third cases (a, c) means sacramentum tantum, the organic
whole of the sacramental rite, which is composed of form and
matter, that is, of a double element one of which plays the
role of a determining principle, the other that of a determinable
principle. This whole is the efficient, physical and perfective
instrumental cause of grace. 3 l " Sacrament " in the second case
29 Concerning participation
in Christ through the reception of the sacrament, cf.
Cyril of Jerusalem, PG 33, 1079-1084; Ambrose, PL 16, 449; M. Schmaus, op. cit.,
§ 226, cap. 3 (48-52); cap. 5 (58-73); P. Smulders, "Die sakramental-kirchliche
Struktur der christlichen Gnade," Bijdmgen 18 (1957), 333-341; P. Wegenaer,
op. cit., 22-53. See also: " ... per baptismum aliquis incorporatur passioni et mort·i
Christi" (Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 2).
30 Rom. 6: 1-14; Eph. 1:5.
Cf. 0. Semmelroth, Vom Sinn der Sakramente, ed. 2
(Frankfurt a. M., 1963), 95-106.
31 By sacrament
(sacramentum tantum) we understand the totality of the
sacramental rites, in which is included not only the so-called sacramentum 'in the
treatise of scholastic theology, which is generally taken as composed of matter
and form (cf. E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis in Genere, 33-113), but also the
action, the sacramental character as the instrumental active power and the intention
of the minister as well as of the recipient. Since the sacrament is, strictly speaking,
the saving action of Christ through the visible Church (cf. E. Schillebeeckx,

894

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

(b), on the contrary, means directly reset sacramentum (and
only indirectly sacramentum tantum) , insofar as it is together
with sacramentum tantum opposed to res tantum as cause to
effecL82 Accordingly, when we say that the sacrament of the
New Testament is a cause of grace and is divine worship, we
mean by " sacrament " not only sacramentum tantum but also
res et sacramentum. In fact, they were called by St. Augustine
simply " sacramentum." 88
The sacramentum tantum participates in the efficient causality of the Sacred Humanity. Since the Sacred Humanity is
modified with every actio and passio of the earthly life of
Christ, the whole mystery of Christ from Conception to Ascension may be said to act as the instrumental efficient cause.
Thus we may, servatis servandis, talk of the sacramental
presence of the mystery of Redemption in the sacramentum
tantum, 84 and consequently the sacramentum tantum may be
said to be indirectly divine worship. The presence of the
mystery of the Death of Christ in a strict and proper sense
takes place, however, only in the reset sacramentum, which is
the intrinsic and ontological participation of the recipient in
the Sacrifice of Christ on the Cross, as we shall see.
If the Mass is the Sacrifice of Calvary re-presented in the
sacramental order, then the question naturally arises: "Is the
up. cit., esp. 6!!-64), our usage of the word seems to be more apt to grasp the
sacramental economy in its totality.
•• Cf. T. Miyakawa, loc. cit.
88 Cf. " ... Augustinian expressions such as baptismus, ordinatio, sacramentum
signify, not only a passing visible action, but also a lasting reality within the
recipient" (N. M. Haring, " Berengar's Definitions of sacramentum and their
Influence on Medieval Sacramentology," Medieval Studies 10, (1948], 109-146, esp.
122; also "St. Augustine's Use of the Word Character," ibid., 14 (1952), 79-97;
"The Augustinian Axiom: Nulli Sacramento Injuria Facienda est," art. cit.
•• Cf. P. Wegenaer, op. cit., esp. !!2-58; J. H. Nicolas, "Reactualisation des
mysteres redempteurs dans et par les sacrements," Revue Thomiste 58 (1958),
20-54; I. O'Brien, " The Role of the Sacraments in Relation to the Mysteries of
Christ," The Irish Theological Quarterly !!7 (1960), 152-160; C. O'Neill, "The
Mysteries of Christ and the Sacraments," The Thomist 25 (1962), 1-58; R. Masi,
De Oausalitate aacramentorum recentium opinionum Disputatio Theologica (Romae,
1968), 78-88.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

895

sacrifice which the recipient of the sacrament offers the Sacrifice
of Calvary in the natural-physical-historical order or the Sacrifice re-presented in the sacramental order"?
The Sacrifice in the natural-historical order took place once
for all and has already irreversibly passed away (Heb. 10: 14).
Of course, the effect of Christ's Death remains universally and
perpetually. Moreover, as long as the Sacrifice is the actiopassio of the Incarnate Word, a perpetual and universal presence of the Death as the determined event might be also
possible, because the Death can transcend the limitations of
space and time. But divine wisdom seems not to have seen fit
to do so, but positively to have chosen another way. Christ
instituted the visible Church and commanded her to re-present
the Sacrifice in the sacramental order unceasingly until He
comes again. Thus the Sacrifice still continues to exist really
in the sacramental order and is present to the world and in
the world, and thus unceasingly divine worship is achieved
in the real-objective order. The world coexists, therefore,
secundum tempus in the natural order with the Sacrifice of
Calvary represented in the sacramental order, and also the
recipients of the sacraments coexist secundum tempus with the
Sacrifice re-presented unceasingly on altars everywhere in the
world.35
Christ was made flesh and lived on earth; through an empirical-corporeal coexistence with the world He redeemed the
human race (Jn. 1: 14), although God could have redeemed us
without having lived in the flesh on earth. Man is not only a
spiritual being, but bodiliness also plays an essential role in
his existence and activity. Through his corporeality man perfects himself as a person and develops his personality within
the material world. Thus the Redemption through the coexistence of the act of divine worship with the world in the real36 Recall the prophecy of the Old Testament
(Mal. 1: 11). The sacrifice was to
be offered constantly (ab ortu solis usque ad occasum) and universally (in omni
loco). Cf. G. Rinaldi, "La profezia di Malachia 1, 11 e Ia Messa," A. Piolanti
(ed.), Eucaristia. Il miatero dell'altare nel pensiero e nella vita deUa Chiesa (Rom.a.
1957), 28-80; C. Journet, op. cit.• 61.

896

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

physical order was indeed natural to human nature (Geist in
Welt) (cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 1, aa. 1-2) .86 The preceding
and contemporary world of Jesus was redeemed objectively and
actually (redemptio objectiva in actu secundo) by way of
corporeal coexistence (contact) with the Death of Jesus on Calvary in the historical-real order. His Death was present in and
to his whole contemporary world and through a recapitulation
in and to the whole preceding history of the human race (cf.
Mt. 28: 85-6; Lk. 11: 50-51) ,37 and still in the physical-natural
order. The elect, then, participated in the oblation, the divine
worship, through the contemporaneity-recapitulation, that is,
coexistence secundum tempus with the act of the divine worship in the physical-natural order, so that they may be called
co-offerers of the Sacrifice of Christ. The elect were to be
redeemed subjectively because of their co-oblation of the Sacrifice, their cooperation with God for the redemption of the world
in the " national " participation in the Priest- Victim. Since
Jesus was freely incarnated and redeemed mankind through the
coexistence of the act of worship in the real order with the
world and with the elect, the free and positive mode or way
of redemption adopted seems to have been made absolute and
unique in the present economy of salvation.
Against this background, therefore, it seems that we may
with sufficient reason affirm that the sacrifice which the recipient of the sacraments offers in participation in Jesus the PriestVictim must be the Sacrifice of Calvary unceasingly represented
in the sacramental order. 88 In other words, the recipient of
Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 15-16, 54-59.
Cf. " Omnis dispensatio quae et ante mundum, et postea esse coepit in mundo,
tam invisibilium quam visibilium creatoratum, adventum Dei Filii pollicebatur ...•
In cruce itaque Domini, et in passione eius recapitulata sunt onmia (Joan, XIX,
80), id est, universa in hac &.va.xecpa.ll.a.£wqe'supputata" (St. Jerome, " Comm. ad
Ephes. Lib. I, cap. 1," PL 26, 484).
38 Cf. p. 891 above. With regard to this point, the Mysterientheologieaffords us
valuable ideas. Cf. " Damit der Glaubige in der sakramentalen Feier mit Tod und
Auferstehung Christi verbunden und ihnen gleichgestaltet wird, miissen diese selbst
--sakramental zwar, aber doch wirklich-gegenwartig sein" (B. Neunheuser, "Mysteriengegenwart. Das Anliegen Dom Casels und die neueste Forschung," K. AlanoF. L. Cross (ed.), Studia Patristica II, [Berlin, 1957], 54); 0. Casel, "Die Messe
86

87

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

897

the sacraments offers the Mass with which he coexists secundum tempus. 39

Since the sacrament confers grace and at the same time
causes the recipient to offer the Sacrifice of the Mass, the next
question is how these two effects are related. As long as an
organic unity of the sacramental economy is reasonably presupposed, there must be an organic and intrinsic relationship
and dependence between these two. 40
But, given that the sacraments are above all means of grace
(as their principal effect), it is evident that the oblation itself
should be, in the sacramental process, subordinated objectively
to the conferral of grace. In other words, although the conferral of grace may be subordinated to another superior end, 41
it cannot be a subordinated end within the sacramental
process; grace must be the last reality in which the sacramental
causality terminates. In fact, the order of the two sacramental
realities, divine worship and sanctification, will be the reflection
of the divine worship of Christ. He has consummated divine
worship and precisely through it the redemption of the human
race has been accomplished. As long as the recipient of the
sacrament participates in the Priest- Victim, namely, the Son
of God, God the Father perceives in the recipient his beloved
Son and inclines to him and embraces him-this is nothing
other than grace. This means that worship must have a meritorious-moral causality of grace. The sacrament causes the
als heilige Mysterienhandlung," Benediktinische Monatschrift 5 (1928), 20-28,
97-104, 155-161; "Die Messopferlehre der Tradition," Theologie und Glaube 28
(1981), 851-867; Das christliche Kultmysterium, ed. 4 (Regensburg, 1960); E.
Masure, Le sacrifice du Corps Mystique (Paris, 1950), 29, 41, 91, 119, 129; C.
Tierney, "The Theology of Mysteries," The Australa.sian Catholic Record 85
(1958),
118-125, 276-288; J. Betz, Die Eucharistie in der Zeit der griechischen
Vater I (Freiburg i. B. 1955-1961).
•• The oblation of or participation in the Mass owing to Baptism is explicitly
taught also by the teaching authority of the Church. Cf. Pius XII, " Mediator
Dei" (Denz. 8849-8858); Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium," no. 10.
•• Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit.
41 St. Thomas treats of the sacrament against such a background in IV Sent.,
d. 4, q. 1, a. 1 and ad 5; Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 4, ad 1. See also C. Kiesling,
" The Sacramental Character and the Liturgy," The ThomistJ, 27 (1968), 885-412.

898

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

recipient to participate personally in the meritorious causality
of the Sacrifice of Calvary, that is, in the personal merits of
Christ. In this participation in Christ the Priest- Victim, the
recipient enters necessarily into a personal relationship with
God. It is true that this relationship may not at times, because
of a voluntary opposition on the side of the individual, be
accompanied by the personal relationship of love, yet it still
necessarily possesses the demands of or the orientation towards
such a relationship.
However, we have not yet arrived at a complete solution.
The question remains: " Why is this sacramental worship
necessary for sanctification"? It is true that there cannot be
any sanctification-subjective redemption in the present economy of salvation-without a participation in the merits of the
Sacrifice (cf. Acts 4: 12). However, there are many forms and
ways of participation, and participation is possible even without an actual reception of the sacraments. Therefore, we must
further inquire into the nature of sacramental participation,
that is, the property of participation in worship precisely
through the actual reception of the sacraments; in other words,
the positive meaning of the actual reception of the sacraments
in the present economy of salvation.
The participation of the recipient of the sacrament in the
divine worship of Christ seems to be, in essence, nothing but a
participation in the Mediatorship of Christ. Christ is above all
the Mediator, someone who stands between God and the
human race and offers sacrifice for the salvation of the world
(I Tim.
Heb. 8: 6; 9: 15; 12: 24. Cf. Summa Theol., IIi,
q. 22, a. 1). Now, Christ the Mediator through his Passion
obtained glorification for himself as the necessary consequence
of the Passion (Lk. 24: 25-26; Phil. 2: 8-9) . What he intended
was the Passion, the worship of God. But through this service
of praise to God for the world he himself was glorified; he
became "Kyrios," a new state in the objective supernatural
order (Jn. 16: 7) .42 Thus it seems that we may say that
'" E. Schillebeeck, ryp. cit., 22-28, 88, 48.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

899

analogically what the sacrament intends objectively is, first
of all, the objective-intrinsic participation of the recipient in
the Mediatorship of Christ, and precisely through and in this
participation, namely, the offering of the Mass together with
Christ, the recipient is to be supernaturally altered, that is,
is to obtain sonship of God or grace.
If this interpretation is supportable, we can clearly see the
essential role the sacraments play in the present economy of
salvation. God does not simply give grace to the recipient of
the sacrament, but first of all he makes him his cooperator in
the salvation of the world, that is, co-offerer of the Mass. Precisely in, through and because of this cooperation he makes
him holy-this is strictly the meaning of sacramental participation in divine worship in the present economy. Since divine
wisdom has freely and positively chosen this way of salvation
for his elect, in the present economy to receive a sacrament is
to be called to participation in the Mediatorship of Christ.
Thus the sacrament is a call of God; its reception is a free
response of the individual to the call of God for cooperation.
In this way the People of God, the Church, is really and intrinsically called to be the coredemptrix of the human race. 48
In short, the sacrament makes the recipient first of all
participate in the Mediatorship of Christ, so that he becomes
an offerer of the Mass, with which he coexists secundum
tempus, for the salvation of the world, and as a consequence
of his cooperation the recipient will be santifi.ed, that is, grace
will be conferred on him. This seems to be the mechanism or
the objective process of sacramental sanctification. This is
really a faithful reflection and an existential actualization of
the essential structure of the present economy of salvation, in
which God seems always to form by election his property,"
namely, means for the salvation of the world. From what we
can perceive from the entire history of salvation until Christ,
•• Cf. C. Journet, L'Eglise du V erbe lncame II, ed. 2 (Paris, 1962), 22-28, 221227, 821-888; La Mease ... , 178, 180-181.
•• According to Gregory of Nazianzen, " Baptism is protection and a sign of
ownership " (" Ort. 40, Bapt.," PG 86, 864) .

400

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA W A

God first selects some from others as his property and makes
them chosen mediators between himself and the world that is
to be saved. This was the role of the People of Israel 45 and
of Christ the Redeemer. Precisely in and through this function
of cooperation with God for the salvation of the world the
mediator was to be sanctified or to make the transition from
one state to a higher state, that is, to be objectively-ontologically and supernaturally changed. While the world is saved
because of the service (offering of sacrifice) of the mediator to
God, the mediator himself is saved because of his cooperation
with God for the salvation of the world. 46 Thus the two different
courses to the same goal, a) the salvation, and b) the election
or call to mediatorship of some from out of the world, seem to
be essential to the present economy of salvation, and this law
of God seems to be decisively realized also in the New Law
through the sacraments of the Church.

II The Role of the "Res et Sacramentum"

m the Economy

From her infancy the Church of Christ has considered that
at least some sacraments confer, besides grace, a secondary
' 5 Cf. H. Junker, "Das allgemeine Priestertum des Volkes Israel nach Ex 19, 6."
Trierer Theologischer Zeitschrift 56 (1947), 10-15; J. Schar bert, Heilsmittler im
Alten Testament und im Alten Orient (Freiburg i. B., 1964),
•• From this it does not always follow that the elect are conscious of their
vocation or that they perform some special act consciously for this purpose. Since
the vocation is an objective reality, which does not depend on a subjective consciousness of the elect, but only on the free determination on the part of God, the
unconsciousness of such a vocation on the part of the elect does not alter the
objective reality of the vocation. As a matter of fact, they are generally not
conscious of it, and participation in the Mediator is achieved often through an
ego-centric, ego-concerned supernatural behavior of the elect. Thus in their religious
cultic behavior the People of Israel were interested subjectively in their own salvation; the Church in the liturgy of the Mass prays especially or mainly for her
members, namely, for herself, not for the world, and the individual receives the
sacrament mainly only because he will be sanctified through it. Yet it is true that
an imperfect or partial or obscure consciousness of the vocation has always existed
both in the People of Israel and in the Church. Although obscurely and imperfectly and in most cases only indirectly, they have been conscious of their
responsibility for the salvation of the world and of its relationship to or dependence
Vatican II, "Ad
upon themselves. Cf. J. Scharbert, op. cit., 300-316,
Gentes."

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

401

effect, some personal elevation, namely, a personal consecration
of the recipient to God. 47 Since St. Augustine such a view has
become more clearly and distinctly recognized, especially regarding the sacrament of Baptism. 48
The reality, which is called "sacramental character" in
Catholic theology, has been commonly considered to be the
proper effect of the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and
Holy Orders. 48 a 1) While there is a possibility of nullity in
the reception of the sacraments with regard to grace, because
of a voluntary indisposition on the part of the subject, there
is no such possibility with respect to consecration, since in this
case the disposition or indisposition of the recipient plays no
role. As long as the sacrament is valid in its administration and
reception (cf. Denz. 781), that is, as long as the sacramental
rite is really a sacramental action of the Church upon the
subject, each of these sacraments necessarily causes the consecration, its conferral taking place through the Sacred Humanity
(ex opere operato) .49
Consequently, while grace caused by
an actual reception of the sacrament may be " quantitatively"
differentiated in each of the recipients according to his dispocf. Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 8), the
sition (Denz.
consecration is caused perfectly and equally in each recipient,
so that no one may be more baptized or confirmed than
another, but each one is perfectly baptized and all are equally
47 In Scripture Baptism is said to seal and sign the soul of the baptized with the
Holy Spirit of God (cf. Eph. 1: 13; 4: 30; II Cor. 1:
I Jn.
Cf. B.
Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, 169-179; J. Galot, op. cit., 19-36.
•• Cf. L. Billot, I, op. cit.,
J. Galot, op. cit., 34-41; B. Leeming, op. cit., 130133, 143-161,
L. Villette, Foi et Sacrement I (Paris, 1959),
••• Cf. p. 384 above.
This means that, as regards this effect, the
•• Cf. B. Leeming, op. cit.,
sacramental causality is most certain. Thus, although the sacramentum tantum
causes with the same causal act both the consecration and the grace, as far as
the matter is considered from the part of the recipient, the certainty or validity
of the sacramental causality is incomparably different in these two. We hope that
from this point of view we can answer the difficulty proposed by K. Rahner about
the notion of opus opemtum (Kirche und Sakramente,
A reflexion of W. A.
Van Roo should have fallen precisely on this point (cf. "Reflexions on Kaxl
Rahner's 'Kirche und Sakramente,'" Gregorianum 44 [1963], 484-488).

402

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

confirmed. 50 8) While grace may be conferred even without an
actual reception of the sacrament, the consecration is caused
only through an actual reception. Thus, this reality or secondary effect of the sacrament is essentially connected with the
true (valid) sacrament, so that there cannot be any real
sacrament (sacramentum tantum) without this effect. In the
history of theology sometimes this effect and the true sacrament (sacramentum tantu.m) were treated without distinction.51
Objective consecration, however, must not be taken as the
property only of the three sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders. We are not taught so convincingly by
Revelation or by theology that these sacraments possess so
important a privileged position in the present economy of
salvation as to justify such a presumption. If, on the one hand,
in these sacraments the sacramental activity of Christ is so
essentially connected with the effect that only it produces the
sacramental consecration and even absolutely and necessarily,
so that the sacramental activity of Christ cannot be totally
made void by the bad dispositions of the recipients, and if, on
the other hand, we must presuppose that the sacraments of the
Church of Christ, as the necessary emanation from the essence
of the Church, form as such one organic and intrinsic reality in
the Christian and ecclesial contexts of the present economy, 52
we must conclude that there has to be an essential common
intrinsic structure in the sanctifying process of the seven
sacraments of the New Law, and that the causation of
the consecration must belong precisely to such an essential
part of the sacramental economy of the Law. This means that,
although the production of the determined effect of irrevocable
dedication and perpetual consecration might be due to the
special nature of these three sacraments, the causation of the
5 ° Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 8, c; C. McAuliffe, "Penance
and Reconciliation with the Church," Theological Studies 26 (1965), 27 footnote, and so-tn.
51 Cf. N. M. Haring, arts. cit.
52 Cf. 0. Semmelroth, Die Kirche als Ursakrament, 45-68; K. Rahner, Kirche und
Sakramente; E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 64-109.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

408

effect other than grace, that is, the conferral itself of a reality,
a consecration of the recipient, must be due to the intrinsic
common structure of the function of the sacrament as such.
Consequently, there must be in every sacrament such an effect,
so that we can speak of a sevenfold consecration through the
seven sacraments with a common nature and a property
peculiar to each. The fact that the sacraments of Baptism,
Confirmation and Holy Orders are unrepeatable must be attributed to the perpetuity or definitiveness of the consecration,
not to the consecration itself. 53 These sacraments consecrate
the recipients once for all, so that they cannot be repeatedly
received. Thus the Council of Trent states: " If anyone says
that in these sacraments ... there is not imprinted on the soul
a character, that is, a certain spiritual and indelible mark, by
reason of which they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema."
(Denz. 1609). Such a perpetuity of consecration is in fact
commonly admitted in a limited manner also in Marriage and
in the Anointing of the Sick,54 so that these sacraments are not
to be repeated as long as the consecration continues. 55
This consecration, then, has been considered in the Church
as a consecration of the soul of the recipient. 56 It is taken as
an ontological-objective reality which totally and entirely
determines the subject as person. 5 7 Because of the consecration•• Cf. " ... nullum sacramentum quod habet effectum perpetuum, debet iterari:
quia ostenderetur sacramentum non fuisse efficax ad faciendum ilium effectum, et
sic fieret injuria illi sacramento. Sacramentum autem quod habet effectum non
perpetuum, potest iterari sine injuria, ut effectus deperditus iterato recuperetur "
(Suppl., q. 88, a. 1). Cf. N. M. Haring, "The Augustinian Axiom.... "
"" Cf. Pius XI, "Casti connubii," loc. cit., 554-556; Suppl., q. 88, a. 1; M.
Schmaus, op. cit., 57; see also footnote 11 above.
•• Cf. Suppl., q. 68, a. 2, ad 1.
•• The Council of Trent teaches: ". . . imprint a character on the soul " (Denz.
1609).
•• Cf. B. Leeming, op. cit.; P. F. Palmer, art. cit., 120-180. With regard to this
point, the contribution of M. J. Scheeben to the theology of the res et sacramentum
is worthy of special note. However, what must be regretted is his limitation of the
sacramental consecrative function only to Marriage (in addition to Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders). Cf. Die Mysterien des Chriatentums, 458-504. See
also C. D. Boulogne, " Le Bapoome, consecration de la personnalite humaine,"
Revue Thomiste 58 (1958), 828-846.

404

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

dedication, Christians are considered to be the property of
God, distinct from the ncm-consecrated, and are taken as
marked to be chosen by God from the world and to be sons
of God. Because of the objectivity of the ontological consecraTheretion, even sinners still remain" sancti" (cf. I Cor. 1:
fore this effect of the sacrament is hardly reducible to a mere
moral-juridical fact whereby some rights are conferred and
correspondingly some obligations are assumed in the cultic
society, the Church. Although such a moral-juridical fact is
doubtlessly effected by a valid reception of a sacrament, what
constitutes the essence of the secondary effect, the res et sacramentum, is an cmtological change in the soul through God's
action. It is a mysterious transformation of the soul in the
objective order. Through a valid (true) sacrament, a real,
ontological change is caused in the supernatural being of the
soul, whether or not one is conscious of it.
Moreover, it is taken as something lasting in the soul, that
is, as an entitative habit. 58 This ontological consecration, affecting the person as such, is considered as being in the same
dimension as habitual grace. In fact, the consecration, the res
et sacramentum, inasmuch as it disposes the soul for grace,
which is its natural fulfilment, may be taken as a material cause
and in the last analysis is the meritorious-moral cause of the
grace; 59 thus it must be in the same dimension as habitual
•• Cf. Rom. 6:2-11. For St. Thomas see IV Sent.,. d. 4, q. 8, a. 2, qcla. 8; Summa
Theol., III, q. 69, a. 10. See also M. J. Scheeben, op. cit., 479-504, esp. 479-488;
M. De Ia Taille, Mysterium Fidei, ed. 8 (Paris, 1981), 828 f., 581, note; H.
Kuehle, Sakramentale Ohristuagleichgestaltung. Studie zur allgemeinen Sakramententheologie (Munster, 1965), 48.
•• Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 86-108. Given the fact that, whereas the res
et sacramentum can remain longer, the sacramentum tantum as a sacramental
rite is transitory, and that the sacrament can revive as long as the res et sacramentum remains, and that the res et sacramenta of Baptism, Confirmation and
Holy Orders are called sacramental characters, while that the sacramental character
is taken as an instrumental physical power, and lastly that the res et sacramentum of the Eucharist is said to be the Body of Christ sacramentally present,
whose causality is that of efficient instrumental cause-all these facts often
induce theologians to conclude that to the rea et sacramentum belongs an efficient
instrumental causality (cf. F. Marm-Sola, "Proponitur nova solutio ad con-

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

405

grace. It disposes the soul in the sense that it makes the soul
of the person worthy to receive the grace of God, not because
of his own merits, but because of the merits of Christ in which
he participates, because of the personal consecration through
ontological participation in Christ the Mediator, as we shall
see.60 With good reason theologians have generally had recourse
to the reset sacramentum in order to explain the reviviscence
of the sacraments, 61 although the function played by the res
ciliandam causalitatem physican sacramentorum cum eorum reviviscentia," Divus
Thomas F. 3 [1925], 49-63; E. Boissard, Questions thiologiques sur le mariage
[Paris, 1948], 69-70). But is it really so simple? The problem of reviviscence has been discussed in a previous article (cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 68-72;
see also footnote 61 below). With regard to the sacramental character, we shall see
later that " cltaracter " is used in Catholic theology analogically; it designates
sometimes a res et sacramentum and sometimes a part of a sacramentum tantum.
Regarding the problem of the Eucharist, we must note that the Eucharist as
sacrifice and the E·ucharist as sacrament must not be confused, and that the Body
of Christ sacramentally present is the main or the substantial part of the sacramentum tantum of the Eucharist as sacrament (cf. footnote 143 below). The view
which takes the res e'b sacramentum to be an efficient cause seems to be scarcely
sustainable, because, first of all, we cannot see why the sacramentum tantum should
not suffice as an instrumental cause without needing another; and, secondly and more
radically, because such a concept, making the role of the· res et sacramentum the
same as that of the sacramentum tantum, reduces the whole sacramental process
to a simple means of grace, and thus neglects the structural, cultic and ecclesial
element of the sacramental economy; and thirdly, because the view simply neglects
the fundamental truth that the notions of sacramentum and of res are analogical.
6 ° Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 2, and ad I.
61 As the intention of Christ is not limited by space and time, the only limitation
is the autonomous limitation of the intention, that is, the limitation which is
intrinsic to the end of the sacrament. As we know, at the moment of the reception
of the sacrament, insofar as it is valid, there is produced necessarily the res et
sacramentum. This means that, as long as the latter remains, the intention of
sanctification on the part of Christ remains. The res et sacramentum functions
as the meritorious-moral cause and is presupposed in the causation of the res tantum
by the sacramentum tantum. In other words, the sacramentum tantum, insofar
as it is the instrumental cause participating in the Sacred Humanity, once existing,
can cause efficiently grace again and again, since its activity persists beyond the
limitation of time and space (cf. J. Brinktrine, "Reviviszenz und physische
Wirksamkeit der Sakramente," Theologie und Glaube 54. [1964], 441-443). But, as
an efficient cause it presupposes the existence of the meritorious-moral causality of
the res et sacramentum, without whiclt it does not function, because its nature
demands it. This means that the sacrament can revive as long as the res et sacramentum remains. The maintenance of the latter varies with each sacrament (Cf.
T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 99).

406

TOSHIYUKI MIYAKA WA

et sacramentum is variously explained by authors. 62
The consecration of the soul to God is in reality an ontological participation in Christ on the Cross.68 In its essence
the cultic meaning of the res et sacramentum does not consist
simply in the fact that the sacramental consecration takes place
through a contact with Christ on the Cross, but in the fact
that it is a participated consecration, a participated dedication
of the Sacred Humanity on the Cross,64 a participated divine
worship of Our Lord on Calvary, an ontological participation in
the Mediatorship of Jesus on the Cross. The new reality which
is produced in the soul of the recipient is thus an objective,
participated being of the Mediatorship of Christ.
Of course, the new being (res et sacramentum) which the
recipient obtains objectively through an· actual reception of a
sacrament varies with each sacrament, so that, just as the grace
caused by each of the seven sacraments is not the same, 65 so
also the seven res et sacramenta must be different among themselves. This follows simply from the fact that Christ has
instituted seven sacraments (Denz. 1601). The sacramentalontological participation in Christ's Mediatorship takes place
with different aspects. The specific differences naturally accompany the differences of intensity in the consecration, so that it
is possible that in one sacrament the consecration is so definitive that it lasts forever, whereas in another sacrament it is not
so definitive and thus disappears after a time.
•• Cf. F. Marin-Sola, art, cit.; L. Billot, op. cit.; E. Doronzo,
Saeramentia in
B. Leeming,op. cit.,
E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit.,
181-189.
•• Cf. " ... per baptismum aliquis incorporatur passioni et morti Christi"
(Summa Tkeol., III, q. 69, a.
" ... baptismus imprimit characterem incorporantem hominem Christo" (ibid., q. 70, a. 4). SeeM. J. Scheeben, op. cit., 458-504,
esp. 479-488; M. Schmaus, op. cit., 48-75; Y. B. Tremel, " Le Bapteme. Incorporation du chrtitien au Christ,"
et
(1956),
P. Wegenaer, op. cit.,
esp. 87-88; H. Kuehle, op. cit.
•• Recall that the Incarnation, the consecration of the Sacred Humanity, is a
dynamic reality. It started at the moment of the conception and, after a gradual
maturation throughout the 'whole earthly life of Jesus, has arrived at its perfect
and full self-realization in the Passion and Death. Cf. F. Malmberg, Uber den
Gottmenscken (Freiburg i. B., 1960),
E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit.,
•• Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 88-97.

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

407

Because, on the one hand, the res et sacramentum is an ontological participation in Christ, and, on the other hand, the
visible Church is Christ the Mediator continuing his existence
on earth and still working in the world (Acts 9: 4-5) ,66 it follows
necessarily that participation in Christ causes as its formal
effect an objective incorporation into the visible Church. 67 Besides, because the reactualization of the Sacrifice of Calvary is
essential to the visible Church 68 (in the order of nature the
Mass precedes the sacraments just as subjective redemption
presupposes objective redemption) , and because without the
Mass there can be no Church, the Mass and the visible Church
being essentially one, we have precisely the same conclusion.
Habitual oblation of the Mass in participation in Christ, accordingly, means nothing but habitual participation in the visible,
cultic Church, that is, habitual or ontological incorporation
into the Church of divine worship.69 Thus we can say that the
" res et sacramentum" is the cultic " status" in the visible
Church in participation in Christ the Mediator.
The view which holds that incorporation into the Church
is the immediate and necessary effect of the sacrament of
Baptism has been common in the Catholic Church/ 0 as well
as the cultic meaning of this incorporation. 71 However, as we
•• Cf. E. Mersch, op. cit.; 0. Semmelroth, " Die Kirche als ' sichtbare Gestalt
(1958),
Die Kirche ala Ursakrader unsichtbaren, Gnade,' " Scholastik
ment,
A. Piolanti, "II mistero del 'Cristo totale' inS. Agostino," Auguatinus
Magister III (Paris, 1955), 458-469; B. Leeming, op. cit., 851-855; E. Schillebeeckx,
op. cit., 55-60.
61 Cf. Rom.
4-5; I Cor. 10: 17;
6: 15; Eph. 4:
5: 80; Col. 1:18. See
J. T. Dittoe, "Sacramental Incorporation into the Mystical Body," The Thomist
9 (1946)'
68 Cf. K. Rahner, "Der Bischof. Primat und Episkopat,'' Sendung und Gnade,
ed. 4 (Innsbruck, 1966),
0. Semmelroth, Vom Sirm der Sakramente, 78-76.
•• C£. M. J. Scheeben, op. cit., 458-504; A. M. Roguet, art. cit., 74-89; J. Giblet,
" Le Bapteme, Sacrement de !'incorporation a l'Eglise selon saint Paul,'' Lumiere
et Vie
(1956), 58-80; B. Leeming, op. cit., 849-881; P. F. Palmer, art. cit., esp.
U0-180.
•• Cf. I. Salaverri, " De Ecclesia Christi," Sacrae Theologiae Summa I, ed. 6
(Matriti,
Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium," nos. 11, 14; "Unitatis
redintegratio," nos. 4,
"Ad Gentes,'' nos. 6, 7.
71 Cf. Pius XII, " Mediator Dei," loc. cit.
655-561. See also J. Lecuyer, Le
aacerdoce dam le Myatere du Chriat (Paris, 1957),

408

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

noted above, special attention should be given to the fact that
the abundance of affirmation about the sacrament of Baptism
alone in the tradition of the Church does not justify the conclusion that only this sacrament causes such an incorporation
into the Church. Inasmuch as the sacrament as such is essentially ecclesial, incorporation into the Church, as well as participation in Christ, must take place in each sacrament, although
there may be various degrees in the intensity of incorporation
and also a special character proper to each incorpora.tion/ 2 On
the one hand, membership or being in the Church is not uniform or static, but it is a dynamic and growing reality, so that
a modification or further maturation of the membership and an
ever deeper saturation in the life of the Church is naturally to
be expected. On the other hand, since being a member in the
Church begins with the reception of a sacrament, the actualization of this membership is also naturally expected to be
achieved precisely through the sacraments. Thus the thesis of
baptismal incorporation into the Church really implies our
conclusion. 73 This means that the recipient of the sacrament,
incorporated into the visible Church in a way peculiar and
proper to each sacrament, is as such an habitual offerer of the
Mass inasmuch as he possesses this proper membership in the
Church.
Thus the res et sacramentum is the cultic status in the
•• We shall treat this point in detail further on. For the present cf. J. T.
Dittoe, art. cit., 469-514; B. Leeming, op. cit., 849-881; P. F. Palmer, art. cit., esp.
120-180.
78 For example, what R. Raurentin indicates in regard to the baptismal character
must be analogically applied also to the other reset sacramenta. Cf. Marie, L'Eglise
et le Sacerdoce I (Paris, 1952), 667; II (Paris, 1958), 161-162, 167, 172. This may
also be said about M. De la Taille (op. cit., 828 f, 581 note). He has grasped almost
exactly the relationship between the baptismal character, that is, the res et sacramentum of Baptism and incorporation into the Church (and the habitual oblation
of the Mass, as 'well as the relationship between our " actional " oblation and
"habitual-ontological" oblation,--about which later). What he lacks is a systematic
understanding of the sacramental economy. He consequently could not but present
a partial exposition without grasping that the relation is due to the nature itself
of the res et sacramentum as suck. See the confusion of his view, for example, of
the confumational character.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

409

visible Church, the status of an habitual offering of the Mass in
the Church in union with Christ the Priest- Victim. As the
concrete form of the habitual oblation varies in the seven
sacraments, the res et sacramentum is in the last analysis the
sevenfold objectively determined habitual position in the
visible Church in her divine worship, that is, in the offering
of the Mass. In this way cultic status in the visible Church
emanates necessarily from the mechanism itself of the present
economy of salvation. All the members of the visible Church
offer the Mass habitually because of the sevenfold membership
in the Church caused by the sacraments. We now see clearly
how not only Ecclesia facit sacramenta, but also Sacramenta
faciunt Ecclesiam. 74
This theory of habitual-ontological offering of the Mass is
founded upon the teaching of the Apostles, according to whom
the People of God is " a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a
consecrated nation ... a people set apart" (I Peter 2: 9-10),
and Christ has made the People of God " a line of kings, priests
to serve his God and Father" (Apoc. 1: 6) / 5 These words can
be taken in the most realistic sense, when we realize that they
indicate the actual, direct and positive participation of the
members of the Church in the sacrifice, that is, their habitual
and ontological offering of the Mass because of membership.
When, for example, " Mediator Dei" teaches that the Mass is
essentially a public and social act (cf. Denz. 3853), it must
mean, at least if it has a real meaning, that all the members of
the Church are really offering the Mass by the very fact of their
being (which is something habitual and entitative) in the
Church. 76
•• Cf. 0. Semmelroth, Die Kirche als Ursak:rament, 55-68.
75 See also A poe. 5: 9-10; 20:6. Cf. G. Soell, " Das Priestertum der Kirche. Ein
Desiderat der Ekklesiologie und ihrer Verkiindigung," J. Auer-H. Volk (ed.),
Theologie in Geschichte und Gegenwart (Miinchen, 1957), 190-195; B. Durst, Die
Eucharistiefeier als Opfer der Gliiubigen (Rotten burg, 1960), 110-185; C. A. Schleck,
"The Lay Priesthood and the Mass," Sciences Ecclesiastiques 12 (1960), 88-108.
76 Although theologians speak of the royal priesthood owing to the baptismal
character, generally they do not give a further explanation about the intrinsic
structure of the priesthood. Seeing that Baptism is only a sacrament of initiation

410

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

Thus, independently of the cultic value-meaning due to
his morally good disposition and devotion or charity (which is
the formal and subjective glorification of God) , the recipient
glorifies God precisely in the habitual participation in the Mass
owing to the res et sacramentum, his status in the Church. 77
This glorification, worship as such, is, therefore, objective and
material. The individual who worthily receives the sacrament
is a mediator who is faithful in his vocation and cooperates with
God. He participates in the merits of Christ worthily and thus
receives necessarily the res tantum, the grace.
The Church, the People of God, makes the Sacrifice of
Calvary to be really present in the sacramental order; re-presenting it, together with Christ the Priest- Victim, the Church
offers it and is offered for the redemption of the world. Although the Mass is above all intended to be the adoration of
God, it has at the same time also other essential functions
(eucharistic, impetratory, propitiatory). If, therefore, we may
talk of the " fruit " of the Mass, the most general fruit; 78
which is for the world, is so essential to the Mass, that every
valid Mass will cause it necessarily, so that there is no need
of a special application on the part of the celebrant. Such a
and that the Christian life is to be deepened and developed more and more through
other sacraments, the latter are naturally expected to have an intrinsic effect on
the priesthood. When Pius XII (" Mediator Dei ") teaches: " according to their
condition, they share in the priesthood of Christ himself " (Zoe. cit., 555) , the
teaching must mean, insofar as it is to be taken according to its fundamental view
of the economy, the sacramental and real-ontological condition, that is, the
objectwe condition and state caused by the seven sacraments, namely, the sevenfold
habitual position of the offering of the Mass in the Church, the Mystical Body.
Cf. P. F. Palmer, "Lay Priesthood: Towards a Terminology," Theological Studies
10 (1949), 285-250. The author thinks that the most apt term here is a mystical
priesthood.
n A contrary view on the point can be found in H. McCormack, " The Act of
Christ in the Mass," Worship 87 (1968), 680-689; "Eucharistic Problems," ibid.
89 (1965)' 85-45.
'" The so-called general fruit seems to be reasonably divisible into two: i) the
most general, which regards the contemporary world; ii) the ecclesial general, which
regards the Church, the people of God. Cf. C. Joumet, La Mease. Presence i!Ju
Sacrifice de la Croix, 176-178; B. Botte-C. Mohrman, L'Ordinaire de la Mease.
Tme critique, traduation et etudes (Paris, 1958), 81, footnote 4.

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE u RES ET SACiU.MEN'TUM u

411

universalism is essential to the spirit of the Mass, which is
in fact a perpetual realization of the universalism of the
Sacrifice of Calvary. 79
In this way a member of the People of God participates
personally in the Sacrifice and in the ascending meritorious
Mediatorship of Christ between God and the contemporary
world. Thus, in this cultic function the People of God realizes
itself as the real ascending mediator, and because of this
service, the People itself will obtain salvation as the reward,
inasmuch as it is faithful to its vocation, namely, inasmuch as
it receives the sacrament worthily.
Accordingly, there is a unity and homogeneity in the Church
insofar as all the baptized form an organic unity, the Church,
the Mystical Body of Christ, the People of God (cf. Vatican
II, Lumen Gentium, No. 32). There is, however, a variety and
heterogeneity within the unity-homogeneity, inasmuch as the
baptized are incorporated into the Church, the mediator, in a
sevenfold different degree, so that they are habitually and
ontologically the mediator in a sevenfold way.
At the same time it must be remembered that here in the
Church an essentially heterogeneous point is unceasingly
formed because of the unceasing celebration of the Mass within
this community of habitual unity-variety in the world: the
celebrating priest of a particular Mass holds in the Mass the
unique position of being an " actional " offerer of this particular
•• Cf. II Cor. 6: 14; I Tim. 2: 4-6; I Jn. 2:2 ( ... sed etiam pro totius mundi ... ) ,
See B. Piault, "De la mediation de la Vierge Marie," Nouvelle Revue Theologique
76 (1968), 102o-I088. In fact, Leo XIII teaches: " Et uberrimam quidem salutis
copiam non singulis modo sed universis hominibus paratam hoc habet augustissimum
mysterium, ut est Sacrificium: ab Ecclesia propterea pro totius muncli salute assidue
offeri solitum" (" Mirae caritatis," ASS 84 [1901-2], 651), and recently also Paul
VI: "Unaquaeque enim Missa quae celebratur, non pro aliquorum tantum sed.
pro totius etiam mundi salute offertur " (" Mysterium Fidei," loc. cit., 761). C.
Journet, as we have just mentioned, correctly perceives this aspect of ihe Mass
(op. cit., 181; L'Eglise du Verbe lncame II, 407-409). A. Vonier, however, denies
this aspect (op. cit., 227-229). For him, the Mass is essentially the sacrifice of the
Church (on this point we perfectly agree) and for the Church (this we do not
deny but think that the Mass is also and above all for the world; cf. footnote 46
above).

412

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

Mass through action, while others are habitual and ontological
offerers through the sevenfold membership in the Church. The
offering of the Mass by the Church 80 is acticmal in the celebrating priest, vicarius Christi, 81 and habitual-cmtological in all
the members 82 because of the sevenfold status in the visible
Church; they do not offer the Mass actionally, namely, through
a special action, but through their existence as a part of this
cultic organism.
The sacramentum tantum produces that which it first signifies. The significance of the sacramentum tantum tells what
it does: it effects what it signifies and signifies what it effects.
This is, as we have seen, an habitual-ontological status in the
cultic society of the Church in participation in Christ, namely,
the possession of an habitual cultic status of offering the Mass
in the Church. Thus the sensibility or visibility of the res et
sacramentum is firmly held in our thesis in the cultic position
of offering the Mass, which in fact is the status in the visible
Church, so that it can be still called sacramentum in relationship to grace (res tantum), sanctification through participation
in the divine nature whose sign and meritorious cause it is.
8 ° Cf. " ... novum instituit Pascha, se ipsum ab Eccleaia per sacerdo·teasub signis
visibilibus immolandum" (Denz. 1741); "Eccleaia ... sacerdotale Jesu Christi
munus in primis per sacram Liturgiam pergit" ("Mediator Dei," loc cit.,
See K. Rahner-A. Haeussling, Die vielen Messen und daa eine Opfer, ed.
(Freiburg i. B., 1966), 71; G. De Broglie, "Du role de l'Eglise dans le sacrifice
eucharistique," Nouvelle Revue ThBologique 70 (1948), 449-460.
81 The celebrant, acting in the person of Christ, pronounces the words of the
double consecration; he plays an unique role as regards the offering of this particular Mass and there are real sharp lines which divide him from the other
members of the People of God. Pius XII teaches: " ... Christus Jesus, cuius
quidem sacram personam eius administer gerit" (" Mediator Dei," loc. cit., 548);
" lncruenta enim ilia immolatio, qua consecrationis verbis prolatis Christus in statu
victimae super altare praesens redditur, ab ipso sola aacerdote perficitur, prout
Christi personam BUBtinet, non vero prout christifidelium personam gerit " (ibid.,
555); "Quoad sacrificii Eucharistici oblationem tot sunt actiones Christi Suunni
Sacerdotis, quot sunt sacerdatBs celebrantea" (Allocutio, ASS 46 [1954], 669).
82 Cf. " ... nos, qui per nomen Jesu instar uni'!tll haminis omnes in Creatorem
universorun1 Deum credimus, per nomen primogeniti illius Filii sordidis vestibus, id
est peccatis, exuti et per verbum illius vocationis inflammati, verum genus sacredotale Dei sumus, ut Deus ipse testatur, cum sibi in omni loco in gentibusl grata et
pura sacrificia ofl'erri dicit. A nemine autem Deus accipit sacrificia, nisi per ipsius
sacerdotes " (Justinus, " Dial. cum Tryphone," n. 116, PG 6, 746).

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

418

III The "Status" in the Church Caused by the Sacrament..<t
of Baptism, Confirmation, and Holy Orders
Our examination of the sacramental economy has led us to
conclude that the res et sacramentum is an habitual sacramental participation of the recipient in Christ the Mediator and
an ontological incorporation into the Church of the Mass, so
that through the reception of the sacrament the individual
obtains a sevenfold status in the visible Church and becomes
an habitual offerer of the Mass in participation in Christ the
Priest- Victim. We must see now how this is realized in each
of the seven sacraments, treating first the three sacraments
which cause a perpetual and irrevocable consecration.
What characterizes these three sacraments is that they cause
an incorporation of the recipient into the Church as a public
society. Now the Church, the Mystical Body, is as society
perpetual, since she is Christ the Mediator continuing his existence and salvific activity on earth (Mt. 28: 20; Acts 9: 5) , and
consequently she is the mediator in the New Law. 88 Accordingly, incorporation takes place in these sacraments in a definite
manner. This is true also about the consecration itself. The
recipients of these sacraments participate formally in Christ
as the Priest on the Cross, and the consecration caused is
irrevocable.
Participation in the Priesthood of Christ and incorporation
into the life of the Mystical Body as society, however, is
naturally differently intensified and rooted in each of these
sacraments. Confirmation makes the baptismal incorporation
of the recipient in the Church more radical and complete; and
the diaconate, presbyterate and episcopacy have respectively a
similar effect, so that in these five we are concerned with a
more and more radical and perfect incorporation of the recipient into the life of the Mystical Body, the Church. It is
especially noteworthy that this rooting and perfection of participation in the Priesthood of Christ and of incorporation
•• Cf. footnote 80 above.

414

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

into the Church as society takes place in the presbyterate in
such a definitive manner that the habitual-ontological priesthood of the presbyters and of bishops is essentially or qualitatively different from that of the others. 84

Baptism
A definitive consecration of the soul through an habitual
participation in the Eternal Priesthood of Christ and the consequent fundamental-static incorporation of the recipient into
the cultic Church as society-this is the reset sacramentum of
Baptism. The incorporation into the Church is static in the
sense that the Church consists fundamentally of the baptized,
so that the baptized are incorporated into the existence of the
Mystical Body. Thus an individual by his reception of Baptism
is. constituted above all a member of this cultic society. 85
•• Regarding the priesthood owing to the baptismal res et sac:ramentum and the
priesthood owing to the presbyteral-episcopal res et sacramentum, see: " Sacerdotium autem commune fidelium et sacerdotium ministeriale seu hierarchicum, licet
essentia et non gradu tantum differant ... " (Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium," no.
10). The essential difference between these two priesthoods (which we call the
fundamental ontological-habitual priesthood and sacerdotal ontological-habitual
priesthood) consists, therefore, in the difference of the grade of incorporation
into the Mystical Body as society and of the ontological participation in the
Eternal Priesthood as such.
86 Baptism is called, therefore, the sacrament of incorporation into the visible
Church (cf. Denz.
1814, 1671,
8685). Since the "incorporation"
should talte place in every reception of the sacrament, the Jjaptismal incorporation
intended here is to be precisely called a " fundamental " or " static " incorporation
into the Mystical Body as society, and thus it is, as such, a special incorporation.
Concerning the relationship of Baptism and this fundamental incorporation, that is,
the so-called membership of the visible Church, see, for example, I. Bonetti, " TI
battesimo e l'appartenenza alia Chiesa," Studia Patavina 7 (1960),
C.
Joumet, "Qui est membre de l'Eglise?" Nova 6t Vetera 86 (1961),
K.
Moersdorf, " Kirchengliedschaft 1," Lea-ikon f. Theologie u. Kirche VI, ed.
(Freiburg i. B., 1961),
C. O'Neill, "Members of the Church: Mystici Corporis and
St. Thomas," American Ecclesiastical Review 148 (1968), 113-U8, 167-184; "St.
Thomas on Membership of the Church," The Thomist
(1963), 88-140; K.
Raimer, " Die Gliedschaft in der Kirche nach der Lehre der Enzyklika Pius' XII
' Mystici Corporis," Schriften zur Theologie II, ed. 6 (Einsiedeln,
7-94;
E. Sauras, " The Members of the Church," The Thomist
(1963), 78-87; M.
Schmaus, Katholische Dogmatik III/I, ed. 5 (Miinchen, 1958),
0. SemG. Vodopivec, "Membri in re ed appartenenza in voto
melroth, op. cit.,

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

415

Because of incorporation into the Mystical Body through participation in the Priesthood of Christ on the Cross, all the
baptized participate habitually in the sacrifice of the Mass
under the most general title of fundamental membership in the
cultic society, the visible Church. In other words, Baptism, as
the sacrament of fundamental membership, ipso facto constitutes the recipients as ontological-habitual priests but only in
a basic degree. 86 It is a genuine priesthood, since all the
baptized under the title of static-fundamental membership in
the Mystical Body really, although not actionally (but habitually), offer the Mass as priests and are offered as victims.
Each person by his reception of Baptism, therefore, obtains
the objectively determined cultic status of a static-fundamental
member of the visible Church, the offerer of the Mass. This
,,tatus is a particular participation in the Mass, insofar as it is
a decisive and static incorporation into the cultic organism, the
Church as society; on this point it differs from the other forms
of habitual offering of the Mass through the other six res et
sacramenta. But at the same time it is a general and common
status, insofar as it is the fundamental participation (janua
sacramentorum) presupposed by the other participations,
which may be taken as further ontological determinations of
the baptismal participation (cf. Denz. 1314), so that the
baptismal participation is needed absolutely for the validity
(that is, for the existence) of the other sacramental participations and consecrations. 87 Since they compose the visible
Church, the baptized materially coincide with the Church of
alia chiesa di Cristo," Euntes Docete 10 (1957), 65-104; B. Willems, "Who belongs
to the Churchi'" Ooncilium 1 (1965), n. 1, 6(t-71.
•• Therefore, the notion of our fundamental habitual-ontological priesthood should
not be simply identified with the so-called common or mystical priesthood. Cf. P.
F. Palmer, art. cit., (t85-(t50; J. Lecuyer, op. cit., 169-249; E. Doronzo, De Ordine
n, 445-609.
87 Cf. E. Doronzo, De Sacramentis Vn Ge:nere, 865. Very often theologians talk
about the right or power for active or passive participation of the baptized in
ecclesial worship. It must be noted again that the immediate effect of Baptism is
the fundamental incorporation into the Church through the static, fundamental
participation in the Priesthood as such of Christ. The right or power is only a
subsequent emanation from the entitative consecration-incorporation of the soul.

416

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

divine worship, 88 and thus they form fundamentally the People
of God (I Peter 2: 9-10) .
Each baptized person, besides this most general participation
in the sacrifice, obtains by means of the other sacraments more
specialized habitual relationships with the Mass. 89 The ontological consecration in each sacrament as a formal cause gives
a special and more determined cultic status of habitual offering
of the Mass in the visible Church. Thus the visible Church
through these six sacraments deepens the incorporation and
makes the bond of the baptized with herself in her divine
worship more intimate. 90
OonfiTmation

Confirmation makes the participation-incorporation caused
by Baptism more perfect and complete. The res et sacramentum of Confirmation is a decisive consecration of the soul
through a dynamic participation in the Eternal Priesthood of
Christ, the Priest- Victim on the Cross. This consecration
causes, as a formal cause, a decisive dynamic incorporation of
the recipient into the Church as society and makes him a more
perfect member of the Mystical Body, a dynamic offerer of the
Mass. Thus in Confirmation, a baptized person obtains an
objectively more determined and more perfect particular cultic
status in the visible Church.
The time of the Church, that is, the time between Our
Lord's Ascension and his Second Coming, from his Passover to
his Parousia, is essentially a time of growth of the cultic
organism, the Church. This growth has a double aspect, comprehensive or vertical and extensive or horizontal. 1) First of
all, the Church as a living organism should not only be supernaturally alive, but it also should grow in sanctity. 91 She is
88 Cf. I. Bonetti, art. cit.; also Y. M. J. Congar, Sainte Eglise. Etudes et approches ecclesiologiques (Paris, 1964), 21-44; " The Church: the People of God,"
Concilium 1 (1965), n. 1, 7-19.
80 We may say also that Christ embraces us in more particularized forms through
these six sacraments. A similar illustration is given in 0. Semmelroth, op. cit., 47-48.
•• Cf. M. J. Scheeben, op. cit., 446-448, 458-479.
01 Eph. 4:15.
E. Mersch, Le Corps Mystique du Christ I ed. 8 (Paris, 1951),

8-288.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

417

thus essentially dynamic. A confirmed person is a special
member of the Church who is incorporated also into this
dynamism of the Mystical Body. Through the reception of
Confirmation he obtains a special being in the Church of the
Mass, that is, the being of a participant in the supernatural,
intrinsic growth of the Church. 2) A confirmed person is a
dynamic member of the Church in the sense that he is incorporated into the dynamic movement of the Mystical Body in its
extensional or horizontal expansion. This expansion is the increase of the number of the baptized. As Christ was sent by
the Father, he is the missionary pa1· excellence. The Church
is Christ continued upon earth. If, therefore, a man is to come
into contact with God on earth, he must come into contact
with Christ, and this contact with him can be realized only in
the Church in which he is really present (Acts 1: 8) . Thus, the
visible Church of her own nature tends to expand and to grow
extensively. A baptized person, through his reception of Confirmation, participates habitually in this dynamism and so is
also constituted a missionary in this natural movement of the
Church.
Thus, as regards both the qualitative and quantitative
growth of the Church, both vertically and horizontally, we are
concerned with incorporation into the dynamism of the Church,
into the vital growth of the cultic society of the Mass. In
this way a confirmed Christian is constituted a special habitual
offerer of the Mass under a special title, because of his special
membership in the Church. Precisely in this sense Confirmation may be said to be the sacrament of the apostolate and
mission. We do not mean that a confirmed person is destined
ani called to be a missionary and apostle through formally
missionary activity, or is obliged to perform such an act, 92 but
•• This is certainly true. However, 'we are not here concerned with such a moral
or pastoral aspect of the sacrament of Confirmation. Dogmatic theology should
examine the theological meaning of the res et sacramentum, that is, what Confirmation produces in the order of being. In fact, a confirmed person obtains a
special entitative habit and special cultic status in the visible Church, and this
effect is equally given in all the confirmed, whether one is an active member of a

418

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

that he is already and ipso facto, because of his having received
Confirmation, incorporated habitually into the apostolic and
missionary movement which is intrinsic or essential for the
Church, and which consequently is, given together with the
existence itself of the visible Church as an orientation or stimulation, without any actual formal activity of the kind. 98 Therefore, as growth (dynamic) and existence (static) are the two
aspects of a vital and living being and one cannot be without
the other, so the two sacraments of Baptism and Confirmation
are intimately connected. Through them a man is constituted
as a member of the Church, the society which is as a living
organism both static and dynamic. Therefore, Baptism and
Confirmation are the sacraments of Christian initiation 94 and
they constitute an individual a Christian in the full sense, that
is, both static and dynamic. 95
Thus what characterizes the habitual offering of the Mass
by the confirmed, especially in comparison with the baptized,
is the ecclesial dynamism. On this point Confirmation makes
the incorporation of the baptized into the Mystical Body
more complete; through Confirmation the partial incorporation
caused by Baptism is made total and global. It is indeed
because of such a dynamic incorporation into the Church that
Confirmation is often called the sacrament of an adult member
of the Church. 96 An adult is one who has matured enough to
Catholic action group or not. From the viewpoint of moral theology the treatment
of J. Fuchs (op. cit., for example, 89) is recommended.
•• Thus the Church is essentially missionary (cf. Vatican II, "Lumen Gentium,"
no. 18). See R. Schuackenburg, Die Kirche im Nooen Testament (Freiburg i.
B., 1961), 122-126; R. Hoffman, "Towards a more dynamic Ecclesiology," American
Ecclesiastical Review 151 (1964), 898-408.
•• The intimate connection between these two sacraments is commonly recognized. Theologians attempt to give theological explanations or interpretations of
the historical fact. See, for example, B. Leeming, op. cit., 201-222; K. Rahuer,
Kirche und Sakramente, 46-50; E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 198-210.
•• Cf. Y. :M. J. Cougar, Jalons pour une theolog·ie du laicat, ed. 8 (Paris, 1964),
46-84; also K. Rahner, "Die sakramentale Grundlegung des Laienstandes in der
Kirche," Geist und Leben 88 (1960), 119-132 (Schriften Z!tr Theologie VII, 830350).
•• Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 72, aa. 1, 8. See J. Latreille, "L'adulte chretien, ou
l'effet du sacrement de confirmation chez saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

419

be able to procreate, that is, one who is participating in the
vital increase of the human race. Analogically a confirmed
person is supernaturally or sacramentally an adult as a member
of the visible Church (cf. Summa Theol., III, q.
a. I), since
he is incorporated also into the vital growth of the cultic
society, and as such, is an habitual offerer of the Mass. Such a
dynamic participation also explains why traditionally a confirmed person is called a soldier (cf. ibid., a. 10, ad
The
function of a soldier is to defend and to conquer, to expand the
territory of his fatherland. Expressions like " spiritual combat
against enemies of the faith" (cf. ibid., a. 5), "public profession of faith in Christ" (cf. ibid., ad
which are often used
in order to explain the nature of the sacrament, must therefore
be interpreted in the same vein.

Holy Orders
The res et sacramentum of Holy Orders, the sacrament of
ecclesial service, is a decisive and more radical conceration of
the soul through a more perfect participation in the Eternal
Priesthood of Christ. This sacramental consecration causes as a
formal cause a more radical and perfect incorporation of the
recipient into the Church as cultic society. The recipient thus
obtains an objectively determined cultic status of an ontological-habitual priesthood of a grade superior to that of the
baptized and of the confirmed in the visible Church, and he
habitually offers the Mass as long as the res et sacramentum
remains. The sacrament of Holy Orders has three grades
according to the differences of radical or complete incorporation of the recipient into the Mystical Body as cultic society,
namely, the diaconate, presbyterate and epicopacy.
This sacrament is above all the sacrament of the cultic
mediatorship of the New Law, which is clearly actualized to
the full in the actional oblation of the Mass. At the moment of
the oblation, namely, of the double consecration, the celebrant
assumes the role of Christ: he pronounces the words of consecration in the person of Christ. Christ the Mediator is actually
57 (1957),
58 (1958),
maturita crist£ana (Padova, 1961).

F. X. Pancheri, La cres£ma. Sacramento della

420

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

and really present in the celebrating priest at this moment. 97
Therefore, a person formally and in the technical sense offers
the sacrifice of the Mass only when he actually consecrates, and
so at this moment alone is he formally a priest. 98
Such a priesthood in the strictest sense of the word naturally
and proximately presupposes an active power for the eucharistic
consecration in the celebrating person, and fundamentally a
special, habitual and most radical consecration of the soul,
a special and most radical incorporation into the life of the
Church, the Mystical Body. He can in fact offer the sacrifice
actionally, because he has a special active power to do so,
and such a power, on its part, exists only because his soul is
consecrated habitually and definitively in a special degree,
namely, because he is incorporated most radically into the life
of the Mystical Body as supernatural cultic society. Accordingly, if we call such a priesthood in the strict sense the
sacerdotal priesthood, it consists, in the last analysis, in a
special entitative habit because of which the individual is able
to consecrate and actually does consecrate whenever he celebrates the Mass.
Therefore, for the sacerdotal priesthood the relationship to
the act of the double eucharistic consecration is essential. 99
Thus, to the episcopate, the "plenitudo sacramenti Ordinis,"
belongs entirely and fully the celebration of the Mass. 100 To
the presbyterate the celebration of the Mass belongs formally
and perfectly but as a participation in the episcopate. 101 To
•• Denz. 8852. See also the allocution of Pius XII on 22 Sept. 1956 (AAS 48,
717-718). Cf. M. Bordoni, "L'Incarnazione e l'eucaristia," Divinitas 8 (1964),
256-259.
•• Cf. the allocution of Pius XII on 2 nov. 1954 (AAS 46, 668-670); also Denz.
8852. Cf. p. 891 above.
•• Cf. E. Doronzo, De Ordine I, 215-217.
10° Cf. " Episcopus, plenitudine sacramenti Ordinis insignitus, est ' oeconomus
gratiae supremi sacerdotii,' praesertim in Eucharistia, quam ipse ofiert vel ofierri
curat, et qua continuo vivit et crescit Ecclesia" (Vatican ll, "Lumen Gentium,"
no. 26). See G. L. Diekmann, "The Theology of Worship," Theology Digest 10
(1962), 187; C. Davis, " Episcopate and Eucharist,'' Worship 88 (1964), 502-515,
esp. 518-515.
101 Cf. J. Pascher, "Bischof und Presbyterium in der Feier der hl. Eucharistie,''
theologische Zeitschrift 9 (1958), 161-170; " The Relation between

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE '' RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

the diaconate, however, the celebration of the Mass does not
belong.102 In the strict and technical sense, therefore, only
the bishops and presbyters are sacerdotal priests, insofar as
they alone are so radically consecrated through a full sacramental participation in the Eternal Priesthood of Christ and
thus so radically incorporated into the Mystical Body as
society that they alone are able to play the role of Christ the
Mediator and achieve the eucharistc consecration in the person
of Christ/ 03 who is the Head of the Mystical Body, the visible
cultic society of the Church. Deacons are properly and radically incorporated into the Church so that they possess a
personality in the cultic society of the Church ontologically
superior to that of the simply baptized and the confirmed.
Wherefore they, as especially called and elected to cultic service
in the Church, belong to the hierarchy/ 04 but their personal
consecration and participation in the Priesthood and incorporation into the Church, the cultic society as such, is not radical
enough to empower them to achieve the eucharistic consecration.
What constitutes an individual sacerdotal priest is thus radical and perfect ontological incorporation into the Mystical
Body as cultic society. This means that the special character
of the participation of a sacerdotal priest in the Mass consists
not only in actional oblation, but also and above all and fundamentally in the special character of his habitual relationship
to the Mass. An ordained presbyter or bishop on the one hand,
and a deacon or a non-ordained Christian on the other, are
Bishop and Priests," Concilium 1 (1965), n. 2, 14-16; D. Grasso, "Osservazioni
sulla teologia della parrocchia," Gregorianum 40 (1959), 297-814; J. Lecuyer, "Le
celebrant: Approfondissement theologique de sa fonction," La Maiaon-Dieu 61
(1960)' 5-29.
102 Only a bishop or a presbyter can be a minister of a valid eucharistic consecradivina institutione,
tion. Cf. E. Doronzo, De Eucharistia I, 740-748. A deacon,
is the official ministeT of the celebrating priest, who actionally offers the sacrifice in
peTsuna Christi (cf. "Lumen Gentium," no. 29).
108 Cf. Pius XII, " Mediator Dei," loc. cit., esp. 548. See also his allocutions of
2 nov. 1954 (AAS 46, 668-670), 22 sept. 1956 (48, 716-718).
104 Cf. E. Doronzo, De Ordine I, 851 fl., 860, 871, 875, 888, 915, 962,

422

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

primarily and fundamentally not the same m the habitual
offering of the Mass.
As we have just seen, in these sacraments the res et sacramentum is a decisive habitual consecration of the soul through
sacramental participation in the Eternal Priesthood, and its
formal effect, an habitual incorporation into the Mystical
Body as society. Insofar as it is a decisive consecration and
incorporation of the soul, it determines irrevocably the mode
of being of the recipient in the Church (cf. Denz. 1609). Since
the Church is a perpetual social organism of worship on earth,
it is natural that the three social and public sacraments which
cause the recipients to be incorporated into the life of the
Church as society should give a decisive, irrevocable consecration and incorporation. This perpetual indelible consecration is
called sacramental character. 105 It is a physical disposition for
grace, and is an entitative habit 106 adhering in the substance of
the soul.
A special power for cultic activity emanates from consecration or status in the Church. This potency empowers the
recipient to perform validly visible, public, cultic and ecclesial
106 Among the many studies of modem authors on the theology of the sacramental
character, 'we highly regard the contribution of M. J. Scheeben. Cf. Die Mysterien
des Christentums, 479-488. See also E. Boularand, " Caractere sacramentel et
Mystere du Christ," Nouvelle Revue Theologique 72 (1950), 252-274; F. X.
Pancheri, "TI carattere sacramentale in una nuova prospettiva (M. J. Scheeben) ,"
Studia Patavina 4 (1957), 459-472; B. Fraigneau-Julien, L'Eglise et le Caractere
aacramentel selon M. J. Scheeben (Paris, 1958), esp. 156-178, 211-256.
108 When Aquinas says that the sacramental character is not a habit but a power,
he seems to be concerned only with operation, and so he means by " habit " only
an operative habit, not an entitative habit. Cf. ". . . nullus habitus est qui se
possit ad bene et male habere.
autem ad utrumque se habet: utuntur
enim eo quidam bene, alii vero male. Quod in habitibus non contingit: nam habitu
virtutis nullus utitur male, habitu malitiae nullus bene. Ergo relinquitur quod
character sit potentia" (Summa Theol., Til, q. 63, a. 2, sed contra). This means,
therefore, that there is no substantial difference between us and St. Thomas. Since
the order of activity follows and emanates from the order of being, it is reasonably
to be concluded that even the so-called " sacramental character" taken as potency
presupposes and emanates from entitative reality, some entitative habit. And so
it is no wonder that the power should be called " sacramental character " by reduction, as will soon be seen, because of its natural connection with the res et
sacramentum, which is the sacramental character in the real and proper sense.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

423

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

acts within the community of the Church. 107 In other words,
the character, that is, the ontological, habitual consecration of
the substance of the soul, the entitative habit, bears some
supernatural active power in the intellect of the recipient.
The power may be called "sacramental character," but only
by reduction. It is used as an instrumental cause; 108 it is, therefore, not the res et sacramentum but a part of the sacramentu,m
tantum (cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 63, a. 5, ad 1 and ad
Above all, for the validity (namely, for the existence itself)
of the sacramental action of Christ, there is needed on the part
of the recipient a kind of cooperation, that is, reception with
the proper intention (although there is diversity among the
sacraments as to the degree of the positive cooperation of the
recipient-in Penance and Marriage, for example, the recipient
even places a formally positive action) . For that cooperation
there is needed an active power, with the exception of Baptism.109 Moreover, there is often needed on the part of the
minister some special active power. Consider,. for example, the
cases of the sacrament of Marriage, in which the active power
of Baptism is required, and of the sacrament of Penance, in
which without the sacerdotal active power there can be no
valid absolution. The reception of sacraments as a cultic act
is an essentially publiv act in the Church: it is, in fact, a
sensible manifestation and confession of faith. 110 To be ministers of the sacraments is also to act publicly in the cultic
Church, since the administration of the sacraments is essentially
107 Cf. " Divinus autem cultus consistit vel in recipiendo aliqua divina, vel in
tradendo aliis. Ad utrumque autem horum requiritur quaedam potentia: nam ad
tradendum aliquid aliis, requiritur potentia activa; ad recipiendum autem requiritur
potentia passiva. Et ideo character importat quandam potentiam spiritualem
ordinatam ad ea quae sunt divini cultus" (Summa Theol., ill, q. 68, a.
It is;
therefore, not simply a commission or competence for a visible activity in the
Church in a general sense. The sacramental character must be grasped in context
of formally sacramental existence and activity of a person in the visible society
of the Church.
108 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q.
a. 5, and
109 The so-called passive power is nothing else than the consecration of the soul
itself, considered as the material cause for the further sacramental consecration.
11 ° Cf. J. Gaillard, loc, cit.; also C. O'Neill, op. cit.; art. cit.

a

'.rbslti"fUl(t M!YAKAWA

social and ecclesial. Thus the power is essentially ordered to
public, cultic action in the Church. This supernatural power is
given only in the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation and
Holy Orders, 111 which cause the recipient to be incorporated
into the visible Church as society. In any case, in the question
of the res et sacramentum of the three sacraments it is fundamental to note that the power is only an emanation of the res
et sacramentum (the sacramental character or entitative
habit) and as such it is not the res et sacramentum but only
indirectly or by reduction, that is, only insofar as it is a
natural emanation from the habitual entity which is properly
the res et sacramentum. It is interesting to perceive a similar
relationship between sanctifying grace and the infused habits.
The former is an entitative habit, the latter are operative
habits. From sanctifying grace (entitative habit) the infused
habits emanate; but the infused habits, which are operative
habits, are almost new powers.112

IV The "Status" in the Church Caused by the Sacraments of
Marriage, Penance, the Anointing of the Sick and the
Eucharist
We have seen that the sacraments of Baptism, Confirmation
and Holy Orders cause the recipient .to be incorporated into
the Church as society, and so they are of themselves social
and public sacraments. According to the objectively determined different degrees of this incorporation properly caused
by each of these sacraments, each of the recipients obtains an
objectively determined personality of different cultic-ontologic
111 Cf. Summa Theol., Ill, q. 68, a. 6 and ad 1. See also J. R. Quinn, "The
Sacramental Character as the Key to understanding Christian Life," American
Ecclesiastical Review 142 (1960), 82-40.
110 L. Billot writes: " Vides ergo similitudinem virtu tis supematuralis cum virtute
acquisita, vides et dissimilitudinem. Similitudo est in hoc, quod utraque supervenit
potentiae naturali tamquam perfectio suo perfectibili, ut ei conferat quoddam posse
operari. Dissimilitudo est in hoc, quod naturalis virtus perficit ad operationem
ordinis humani; perficit, inquam, non quoad primum naturale posse quod praesupponitur, sed quoad bene et facile posse quod superadditur. Virtus vero supernaturalis perficit ad operationem ordinis diviui, idque dando ipsum connaturale
pwae simpliciter (De Virtutibua lnfusis, ed. 4 [Romae, 1928], 28).

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

value within the Church, ranging £rom the lowest to the highest,
namely, the baptized, the confirmed, deacons, presbyters and
bishops. Since it is a matter o£ the objective order which is
due to the different degrees o£ sacramental consecration o£ the
members o£ the cultic society, it is evidently independent o£
the personal value o£ the individuals with respect to their
personal sanctity or sanctifying grace. It is thus possible £or a
simple baptized person to be personally more holy and more
loved by God than a bishop. Moreover, we are concerned only
with the degrees o£ objective value o£ persons in a mtltic society,
not in a civil society. It is recalled that deacons are permitted
to perform some liturgical acts in the Church, which may not
be performed by others who are only baptized-confirmed, and
that presbyters or bishops can perform some cultic acts validly,
which other members o£ the Church cannot-truly these facts
are due to the humanly unchangeable, divinely originated
difference o£ the value o£ members in the cultic society owing
to the diverse grades o£ the consecration-incorporation caused
by these different social sacraments.
Now, the other sacraments, namely, Marriage, Penance, the
Anointing o£ the Sick and the Eucharist, on the contrary, are
concerned rather with private matters o£ the recipient in the
visible Church. Although they also cause the baptized person
to be more consecrated through a more particularized participation in Christ on the Cross and more incorporated into the
Mystical Body and so cause the recipients to offer the Mass
habitually as more deeply incorporated special members o£ the
Church, yet the consecration does not take place through a
participation in the Priesthood o£ Christ, nor is it an incorporation into the Church formally as society. Therefore, we are
here concerned with a further perfection and development o£
the baptismal consecration-incorporation, differently directed
than in Confirmation and Holy Orders.

Marriage
The res et sacramentum o£ Marriage is the sacred bond or
habitual relationship o£ conjugal love between a determined

426

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

man and a determined woman (matrimonium in facto esse),
insofar as it participates in the genuine love of Christ for the
Church. 113 In other words, the matrimonial res et sacramentum
is the habitual consecration of the soul of both partners 114
through sacramental-ontological participation in the love of
Christ the Priest- Victim for his Church which he has obtained
on the Cross and which is the supernatural cooperatrix of his
activity for the redemption of the world.115
The consecration, the sacred bond, causes as formal cause
an objectively determined special cultic status of oblation of
the Mass in the visible Church, that is, the cultic status of
Christ's cooperator in the Sacrifice through the conjugal family
life. Therefore, the matrimonial res et sacramentum is, different
from the sacramentum tantum which consists in matrimonium
in fieri, not a contract but an institution, a lasting state. 116
This means that to be married is a special form of worshiping
God; m it is a special offering of the sacrifice of the Mass
through a sacramental participation in Christ in his love for the
visible Church, his cooperatrix in the Mission, and by a sacramental incorporation into the Church in her response of love to
Christ on the Cross.118
118 Cf. Eph.
See also E. Boissard, op. cit., 60-70; P. Adnes,
(Tournai, 1963), 183-185.
114 Cf. Pius XI, "Casti connubii," loc. cit., 548-549; M. J. Scheeben, op. cit.,
488-504; B. Leeming, op. cit., 366-369; U. Ranke-Heinemann, "Zur Theologie der
Ehe," Trierer Theol. Zeitschrift
(1963),
esp.
D. Flanagan,
"The Sacrament of Marriage," E. McDonagh (ed.), The Meaning of Christian
Marriage (Dublin, 1963), 36-61.
116 Thus St. Thomas:
". . . matrimonium . . . passioni Christi . . . conformat
. . . quantum ad caritatem, per quam pro ecclesia sibi in sponsam conjungenda
passus est" (Suppl., q.
a. 1, ad 3).
116 Cf. E. Boissard, op. cit,, 66-70; G. A. Beck, "The Contemporary Crisis," in
The Meaning of Christian Marriage, 6, 10.
117 Cf. F. Taymans
D'Eypernon, La Sainte Trinite et les sacrements (Paris,
1949), esp. 98-99; P. Anciaux, "La Mission de la communaute conjugale et familiale
esp ..
U.
dans l'Eglise," Collectanea Mechliniensia 39 (1954),
Ranke-Heinemann, art. cit.,
118 Cf. Vatican IT, "Lumen Gentium," no. 11. See also Y. M. J. Congar, Jalons
pour une theologie du laicat,
G. Oggioni, "Saggio per una lettura del tema
matrimoniale nella Sacra Scrittura," La scuola cattolica 87 (1959),
81-107,
esp. 97-104.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

4fl7

The natural matrimonial bond between a determined man
and a determined woman, namely, the matrimonim in facto
esse, is of itself an habitual relationship. Through the sacrament of Marriage the natural habitual state of the spouses is
state in the Church. 119 The Church teaches
elevated to a
that the true relationship of conjugal love between the baptized
is necessarily sacramental, that is, the sacred bond. 120 This
means that the true relationship of conjugal love between two
who are consecrated and incorporated into the Church through
Baptism is necessarily elevated objectively and consecrated
through a participation in the love of Jesus on the Cross for
his Church, so that the partners more deeply participate in
Christ and consequently are more deeply incorporated into
the Church.
Also, the increase of participants in the sacrifice of the Mass
through the procreation and education of a new generation 121
is expected from the sacrament of Marriage as its natural effect.
If because of this sacrament the sacrifice of the Mass is assured
of having participants or fundamental habitual offerers from
generation to generation, thus renewing the members of the
visible Church, then a sacramental reason exists for the ecclesiastical need of infant Baptism. Sacramental Marriage thus
prepares future members of the People of God. Children of
Christian parents are destined to be cells and organs in the
cultic organism.
The fact that the love union finds its most intimate expression in the procreational act throws light on a most important
aspect of the matrimonial res et sacramentum. The habitual
relationship consecrated in the sacrament of Marriage is not
the relationship of conjugal love union between the partners
119 Cf. A. Perego, "Fine ed essenza della societa conjugale," Divus Thomas
(Piac.) 56 (1958), 848-861; 57 (1954), rt5-52; A. M. Henry, "Le Mariage,"
Initiation Tkeologique IV, ed. 8 (Paris, 1968), 754-768; P. Adnes, op. cit., 111-201.
10° Cf. F. A. Sola, "De Matrimonio,"
Sacrae Theologiae Summa IV, ed. 4
(Madrid, 1962), 788-747, 752-754.
121 Cf. Vatican II, "Gaudium
et Spes," no. 48: "Indole autem sua naturali,
ipsum institutum matrimonii amorque conjugalis ad procreationem et educationem
prolis ordinantur iisque veluti suo fastigio coronantur." See also E. McDonagh,
"Source of Life," The Meaning of Christian Marriage, 8ft.

428

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

taken in isolation, but the relationship inasmuch as it necessarily implies also the relationships of love among the members
of the family, insofar as these relationships are based on it and
participate in it. Thus, in the sacrament of Marriage the
natural love between parents and children and among the
children themselves is also consecrated, although only indirectly, and elevated to become cultic love in the Church.
Therefore, through the reception of the sacrament of Marriage,
the baptized not only put their mutual lifelong relationship of
conjugal love union under divine consecration, but indirectly
also all the relationships that originate from their conjugal
union. This means that through the reception of the sacrament
the whole of the natural state of family life is elevated to a
supernatural state of worship in union with Christ. Their
natural love is altered decisively in the objective supernatural
order and is offered to God for the redemption of the world in
participation in the mutual communication of love between
Christ and the Church.

Penance
St. Thomas teaches that the res et sacramentum of Penance
is the interior penance or repentance of the recipient.m As
the commentators are not unanimous among themselves about
the meaning of this teaching, 128 the real mind of Aquinas must
be drawn out with the help of his general teaching on the res
et sacramentum. Since the contrition which the penitent manifests is a part of the sacramentum tantum, 124 it is impossible
for the poenitentia interior of Aquinas to mean simply contrition (whether perfect or imperfect). In fact, the reset sacramentum is the effect of the sacramentum tantum, not the
contrary, and the sacramentum tantum is not a material cause
but an efficient cause. Accordingly, it can only mean a new
being which the repentant soul of the penitent obtains because
121 Cf. Summa Theol., ill, q. 84, a. 1, ad 8; IV Sent.,
q.
1, qcla.
and ad 1, ad
123 Cf. E. Doronzo, De Poenitentia II, 188-144; Z. Alszeghy, "Carita ecclesiale
nella Penitenza cristiana," Gregorianum 44 (1968), 11-18.
19 ' Cf. Summa Thaol., III, q. 84, aa. 1-4; q. 86, a. 6; q. 90, aa. 1-8.

ECCLESIAL MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM,;

429

of the sacramental penance (sacramentum tantum), namely,
some special objective new state of the repentant souJ.126 The
thomistic principle " vi clavium ex attrito fit contritus " also
must be interpreted in this direction.
If St. Thomas may be interpreted in this way, his teaching
and our view are not far distant from each other, when we
consider that the res et sacramentum of Penance is an habitualontological consecration of the repentant soul through a sacramental participation in the suffering of Christ the Priest- Victim
because of our sins. This poenitentia interior or consecration
causes the recipient to participate in the meritorious causality
of Christ in his suffering, and for this reason it has the ratio
dispositiva et exigitiva of grace, namely of the res tantum. 126
Recent studies of the Church Fathers have made it clear
that the notion of " pax cum Ecclesia." is fundamental in their
teaching on Penance. Thus many recent theologians talk of
" reconciliation with the Church " as the res et sacramentum of
this sacrament. 121 Although what they affirm is, at least in the
present state of exposition, not free of difficulties,us yet subm Although not perfectly coinciding with ours, the views of C. Dumont and
P. F. Palmer are still in the same direction, insofar as they would reject the
"popular " juristic interpretation of the reB et sacramentum of Penance. Cf. C.
Dumont, "La reconciliation avec l'Eglise et Ia necessite de l'aveu sacramentel,"
Nrmvelle Revue Tkeologique 81 (1959), esp. 585-586; P. F. Palmer, art. cit., 186-

188.

Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 91-106.
For example, we have: B. F. Xiberta, Clavia Ecclesiae. De Ordine Absolutionis
Sacramentalia ad Recoociliationem cum Ecclesia (Romae, 19!!2); M. De la Taille,
op. cit., 581 note; E. Amann, "Penitence," DTC XII, 787-789; H. De Lubac,
Catholicisme, ed. 5 (Paris, 195!!), 61-68; E. Mersch, II, op. cit., 299-804; P. Charles,
"Doctrine et pastorale du sacrement de Penitence," NrmveUe Revue Tkeologique
75 (1958), 449-470; 0. Semmelroth, Die Kirche als Ursakrament, 65-66; K. Rahner,
"Vergessene Wahrheiten iiber das Buss-sakrament," Schrifttm sur Theologie II,
148-188, esp. 175-188; " Buss-sakrament," Lwikon f. Theol. u. Kirche II, 826-888;
Kirche und Sakramente, 88-85; B. Leeming, op. cit., 265, !!75, 849, 861-866; P.
Anciaux, Le sacrement de la Penance, ed. !! (Paris, 1960); "La dimension ecclesiale
de la penitence chretienne," Collectanea Mechlinitmaia 46 (1961), 465-482; E.
Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 184-187, 217; C. Dumont, art. cit., 577-597; P. F. Palmer,
"The Theology of the 'Res et Sacramentum' •.. ," 120-141, esp. 181-141; J.
Lhoir, art. cit., !!66; Z. Alszeghy, art. cit., 5-81.
108 On this point the reeent contribution of C. McAuliffe ("Penance and Reconciliation with the Church," loc. cit., 1-89, esp. 1-SO)l is worthy of special mention.
128

121

480

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

stantially we can agree with them. The general structure of the
sacramental economy tells us that the Christian aspect of the
res et sacramentum causes as a formal cause an ecclesial, cultic
status of the recipient. In fact, such an ecclesial effect of
Penance (pam cum Ecclesia) must be nothing other than the
supernatural reality which the interior repentance causes as a
formal cause (cf. Vatican II," Lumen Gentium," no. 11).
A Christian is constituted as an ontological-habitual priest,
at least because of Baptism. He offers the Mass, and in and
through this oblation he himself is to be sanctified. He is a
member of this consecrated supernatural cultic society, the
People of God, which is to be a faithful cooperator of Christ
and is to be sanctified in and through its mediation. Consequently, the sin of a Christian must be naturally grasped
precisely in the ecclesial context of the present economy. His
mortal sin or opposition to the love of God is thus nothing other
than an offense against the visible Church of the Mass, against
her supernatural being of mediatorship itself. Inasmuch as
God intends the mediator to be sanctified precisely through and
in his cooperation in the redemptive activity of Christ, the
habitual offering of the Mass should be, ex natura sua, fruitful,
that is, should cause grace in the mediator. This is really the
divinely originated natural mechanism of the salvation of the
chosen People of God. The existence of a valid and fruitless
sacrament, therefore, does not indicate a natural separation of
the two sacramental dimensions of validity and of fruitfulness.
Naturally they should coincide and the separation is only
accidentally tolerated because of the debility of fallen nature.
This separation, therefore, remains an abnormal, deformed
state and an offence against the cultic nature, the existence
itself of the Church. 129 Even venial sins tend to spoil the charitable nature of the priesthood and of the Mystical Body,
Briefly, the radical defect of their exposition seems to be the ambiguity of the
notions of Church, 8tatus, reconciliation, etc., as we pointed out in; the beginning.
129 Cf. M. Schmaus, op. cit., IV, 586-588, 666-670;
K. Rahner, "Vergessene
Wahrheiten ... , 145; J. Hamer, L'Egli8e est une communion (Paris, 196!'2), 88-86,
178-!'281.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

431

weakening the fervor of the mediator, the Church in her
essential act of divine worship. 130
If the sin of a Christian means in this economy of salvation
an opposition to the visible Church of worship, it is natural
that the reconciliation of a sinner with God, the restoration of
the disturbed order of the economy, should be realized precisely
through reconciliation with the Church of the Mass. 181 Just as
the sin of a Christian has negatively such a sacramental and
cultic meaning, so also the reparation and restoration of the
just order must be achieved in a cultic and sacramental context
of the Church; thus it is natural that Christ should have
instituted a sacrament of restoration. Penance is indeed such a
sacrament. It consecrates the recipient, making him participate
in the suffering of Our Lord on the Cross for our sins, and thus,
makes him a special member of the Church. The repentant
sinner is now objectively elevated to be a special participant in
the offering of the Mass by the Church, a special member of the
cultic Church, one who has once sinned and desecrated his
vocation as well as his status in the Church, but who now
1·epents of it and has restored the natural cultic status in the
Mystical Body. Such a new status in the Church-which
" reconciliation with the Church " can only really mean-is the
meritorious-moral cause of the res tantum, since the Christian
now begins to offer the Mass and to be a cooperator in the
redemptive activity of Christ under this new title of a repentant
sinner (-which title makes him really a fruitful offerer-)'
adding to the other titles which he has possessed hitherto. In
any case, it is not correct to understand reconciliation with
the Church simply as a removal of the ecclesiastical penalty or
readmission to full enjoyment of rights or as reunion with the
Church. What is essential in this question of the " pax cum
Ecclesia" is the sacramental and cultic meaning of the sin of
the baptized and of the reconciliation of such sinners. Overlook this aspect, and you cannot obtain a sacramental doctrine
18

° Cf. K. Rahner, loc. cit., 147.

In this way we can solve the difficulties often presented regarding the theory
of the "pax cum Ecclesia." Cf. E. Doronzo, De Pvenitentia II, 150-151.

TOSHIYUKI MIY.A.KAW .A

of the res et sacramentum of Penance, but at most only a social
or juridical doctrine.
The sacrament of Penance thus makes the recipient participate habitually in the Mass as a sinner reconciled with the
Church of the Mass, that is, formally as a contrite 182 and
consequently fruitful participant in the Mass offering. Since
through the sacrament of Penance the private state of the
contrite Christian is elevated and consecrated to be an ecclesial,
cultic state of a special habitual-ontological priest, the res et
sacramentum cannot exist if the recipient is not contrite (either
perfectly or imperfectly). This means that, insofar as the
sacrament of Penance is concerned, there cannot be a sacrament
which is fruitless and at the same time valid/ 83 and the res et
sacramentum physically remains as long as the repentance
remains.

The Anointing of the Sick
Through alli actual and valid administration-reception of the
sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick a Christian in a serious
illness 184 obtains a new habitual mode of membership in the
Church. This sacrament necessarily and immediately causes a
130 Therefore, the case of a confession of venial sins, or of a confession of sins
already sacramentally absolved, offers no difficulty for our thesis (cf. C. McAuliffe,
art. cit., 8()..89). If the recipient is "contrite" (true contrition is possible even for
the venial sins or the sins already absolved) , he can participate as such in the Mass
and be incorporated as such into the Church.
188 A contrary view is given in P. Anciaux, op. cit., 212-218; "La dimension
ecc!esiale . . . ," 480.
184 Although 'we limit our discussion in the present instance to a treatment of the,
ecclesial meaning of the res et saeramentum of the Anointing of the Sick, the fact
that this sacrament is considered in the Church as coosummativum of the sacrament of Penance (Denz. 1694), and that hope for a bodily cure seems to be intrinsic
to the use of the sacrament in the Church (cf. P. DeLetter, "The Meaning of
Extreme Unction," Bijdragen 16 [1955], 258-270; Z. Alszeghy, "L'efl'etto corporale
dell'Estrema Unzione," Gregorianum 88 [1957], 885-405), suggests to us that a
radical understanding of the meaning of the sacrament in the present economy
must presuppose an exact grasp of the theology of sin and of sickness in the
Scriptures. Cf. T. Worden, ·'The Meaning of 'Sin,'" Scripture 9 (1957), 44-58;
J. Betz, "Krankensalbung,'' H. Fries (ed.), Handbuch Theologischer Grundbegriffe
I (Miinchen, 1962), 859-865.

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

488

proper habitual consecration of the soul 185 through sacramental
participation in the physical suffering of Christ the PriestVictim on the Cross.186 This consecration makes his illness 187
and bodily agony participate ontologically in the Lord's physical suffering on the Cross for the redemption of the world.188
Thus because of this personal and habitual consecration the
sick Christian is made a cum-patiens with Christ the PriestVictim. In this way the recipient of this sacrament is a special
participant, as long as the res et sacramentum remains, in the
meritorious causality of Christ the Man physically suffering
on the Cross. Such a consecration of the soul is, accordingly,
the ratio exigens and objectively disponens of the res tantum
on the souJ.189
This consecration, as a formal cause, gives him a special cultic
status, special cultic position in the visible Church, that is, the
135 Generally in sacramental consecration, that which is consecrated is the soul
only. But because of the intimate union between the soul and hody, even the body
(that is, the whole person) must be said to be consecrated. Such a whole personal
consecration is realized, of course, in each sacrament, but especially noticeable in the
sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick (cf. Z. Alszeghy, art. cit.). This is also no
less important in the case of Holy Communion.
188 Cf. M. Schmaus, up. cit., 695-697, 7Hl-714; K. Rahner, Zur Tkeologie du
Todu, ed. 5 (Freiburg i. B., 1965), 70-71; Kirche und Sakramente, 100-108; B.
Studer, " Letze Oelung oder Krankensalbung," Freiburger Zeitachrift f. Ph. u. Th. 10

(1968). 49-51.
187 Cf. Vatican II, "Sacrosanctum
Concilium," no. 78. See also B. Botte,
"L'Onction des malades," La Maison15 (1948), 91-107; J. R. Quinn, "The
Time of the Administration of Extreme Unction," American EcclesiMtical Review
185 (1956), 292-299; Z. Alszeghy, art. cit., 885-405; C. Davis, The Study of
Theology (London, 1962), 276-805; P. F. Palmer, " The Purpose of Anointing of
the Sick: A Reappraisal," Theological Studies 19 (1958), 809-844; B. Leeming,
up. cit., 655-657; J. Betz, art. cit.; B. Studer, art. cit., 83-60; J. M. Egan, "Extreme
Unction: Sacran1ent of the Sick or the Dying?" Proceedings of the XVll Annual
Convention of the Catholic Theological Society of America (New York, 1968),

195-205.
138 The view of St. Thomas that the res et sacramentum of this sacrament is
"an interior devotion, nan1ely, a spiritual unction" (cf. IV Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. !!,
qcla. 8, sol. 8; Suppl., q. 80, a. 8, ad 8) does not seem to substantially differ from
ours. The unction-devotion, insofar as it is considered as the res et sacramentum,
must naturally be talten above all as an objective and ontological reality. Cf. E.
Doronzo, De Extrema Unctione II, 261-275.
18 ° Concerning the res tantum of this sacran1ent, see Z. Alszeghy, art. cit., 716719; B. Studer, art. cit., 52-58.

484

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKAWA

state of a special oblation of the Mass, the ecclesial state of a
physically suffering cum-patiens with Christ on the Cross. He
is thus constituted, newly and additionally under this special
title, an habitual-ontological priest, a cooperator with Christ
for the redemption of the world. 140 Precisely in and through
this cooperation he is to be sanctified.
We need not, therefore, envy the good luck of the thief who
was crucified with Christ and obtained in the last and most
important moment of life the sure blessing: " Indeed, I promise
you, today you will be with me in paradise " (Lk. 9l8: 48) . The
sacrament of the Anointing of the Sick ex ope1·e operata (and so
without fail) puts the recipient in the situation of the good
thief, and causes him to cry out: "Jesus, remember me when
you come into your kingdom,. (ibid., 49l). Thus this sacrament is the sacrament of consolation in the individual's grave
moment of serious, death-threatening sickness.
In this way the sick member of the Church is constituted as
a special habitual-ontological priest, as formally cum-patiens
with Christ through his being in a serious situation of sickness.
Through this sacrament his natural and private state of sickness and agony is objectively consecrated and altered to be a
supernatural, public state, a cultic state in the visible Church,
the state of a cooperator with Christ. Accordingly, the res et
sacramentum remains objectively as long as the state of the
grave, death-threatening sickness remains. 141
The Eucharist 142
In the sacrament of the Eucharist, that is, in Holy Communion, 143 the habitual-ontological consecration of the soul of
uo Cf. K. Rahner, " Die sakramentale Grundlegung des Laienstandes in der
Kirche," loc. cit.,
101 Cf. B. Leeming, op. cit., 596, 655-657.
, .. In the Eucharist we must distinguish the double eucharistic consecration (thesacrifice of the Mass) and Holy Communion (the sacrament).
The single
eucharistic consecration (taken in isolation from the othe1·), however, is the so•
called confection of the sacrament of the Eucharist. Thus, one can perceive the
intimate relationship of the sacrifice of the Eucharist and the sacrament of the
Eucharist notwithstanding their distinction.
143 The sacramentum tantum of the sacrament of the Eucharist
is composed of

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

435

the recipient takes place precisely through his physical-corporeal union 144 with Christ sacramentally present (sacramental
union with Christ Himself) . A valid reception of this sacrament in fact immediately, necessarily and properly effects this
consecration. 145 The severe words of St. Paul also illustrate the
many elements: i) Christ the Person (vi verborum only the substance of Body
under the species of bread, and only the substance of Blood under the species of
wine; but vi conoomitantiae all the other parts) sacramentally present; ii) the
species of bread and the species of wine, that is, the eucharistic accidents. Generally
speaking, accidens non habet esse, and so we cannot take accidens as something
independent; but the eucharistic accidens is exceptional. It has its own actus
essendi, so that it exists ad modum substantiae (cf. H. Degl'lnnocenti, "Quomodo
sustineantur in existentia accidentia eucharistica," Divinitas 8 [1964], 276-288), and
so we may designate the species as an element and an important element of the
sacramentum tantum; iii) the act of administration-reception and the character
and intention of the minister and of the recipient. Of these, the most important
or essential element is evidently the Body (and Blood) of Christ existing under
the species. It is the substantial part of the sacramentum tantum of the Eucharist.
Accordingly, one naturally concentrates on it, so that generally in the Eucharist
the confectio of the sacrament and its U8U8 are distingnished, and the importance
of the former (eucharistic consecration) is stressed and here the whole essential
sacramental rite of the Eucharist is investigated. Truly the existence of the
sacramental Body (and Blood) of Christ depends upon the eucharistic consecration,
not on its reception (cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 74, a. 7; q. 78, a. 1, ad 2). From
this, however, it follows that commonly the Body (and Blood) of Christ is not
taken as (the principal part of the) sacramentum tantum, but rather as an effect of
the sacramentum tantum, namely, as the res et sacramentum. ·Thus it is said that
the sacramentum tantum of the Eucharist is the species with the words of consecration; the res et sacramentum is the Body (and Blood) of Christ (cf. E. Dcironzo,
De Eucharistia I, 601-604) . Although we do not find any serious difficulty in such
a (commonly taken) approach, yet we prefer another way of grasping the matter
and would say that the Body (and Blood) of Christ is the most essential or
incomparably important part of the sacramentum tantumJ of the sacrament of the
Eucharist, namely, of Holy Communion. The sacrament, in fact, is by its intrinsic
structure the means of subjective redemption or personal sanctification of individuals. And so formally the sacrament as such consists in its USU8. Therefore, to
speak of the " species with the words of consecration " as a sacrament, without at
least indicating an essential orientation to Communion, would mean an equivocal
use of the term " sacrament." For us, the particular quality of the sacrament of
the Eucharist consists in this that, whereas in every other sacrament the element
of the sacramentum tantum (and consequently also the sacramentum tantum itself)
cannot exist as such except in its actual use-for example, in Baptism the water has
meaning as a component of the sacrament of Baptism only when it is poured by the
minister on the recipient with the form of Baptism,-in the Eucharist the most
substantial part of the sacramentum tantum, the Body (and the Blood) of Christ,

436

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

matter. To unite an unclean self with the Body of Our Lord
and thus to receive an habitual consecration is most disrespectful to Him. To be consecrated unworthily, to enter into union
with Him unworthily is the gravest sacrilege (cf. I Cor. 11: 'l78'l). Although this may be applicable in a sense to all sacramental habitual consecration achieved by the other sacraments,
yet the matter is especially grave here in the case of Holy
Communion, because here we are concerned with union with
Christ Himself substantially present.146 Although in modern
theological literature on the res et sacramentum a similar view
is scarcely encountered/ 47 we may with good reason affirm that
can exist as such (that is, as the most substantial part CYj the 'sacramentum
tantum ' of the Eucharist) independently of its actual
that is, even
before and after the reception, as long as the species remain; in short, the sacraon its actual
mental ea:istence of the Body (and Blood) of Christ does not
but on the eucharistic consecration. Cf. the Connell of Trent (Denz.
1654, 1689) .
, .. Such a physical nnion of the Body of Christ and the recipient should not be
taken, of course, in the strict sense of the word as if it were a proper corporeal
compenetration or commixture. It is impossible that in the proper meaning of the
word the Body of Christ should physically make contact with the body of the
recipient, since the Body of Christ in the Eucharist exists not pe:r modum
quantitatis but per modum substantiae (cf. A. Piolanti, ll mistero eucaristico, ed. 2
[Firenze, 1962], 207-227) and is present because of the relationship which the speci88
as the extrinsic continens has to the Body (cf. ibid.). Therefore, the physical union
can only be that union which is founded on the physical-corporeal nnion of the
8peci88 with the recipient (E. Doronzo, De Eucharistia I, 468) .
"" Cf. C. McAuliffe, De Sacramentis m Gene:re, 65-66; " Penance and Reconciliation with the Church," loc. cit., 28, footnote 94. When the consecrated Host
is received invalidly, there exists only a material contact of the speci88 with the
stomach.
uo Cf. " Sed alia est ratio, praestantissima quidem, qua Christus praesens adest
Ecclesiae suae in sacramento Eucharistiae, quod est propterea inter cetera Sacramenta ' devotione suavius, intellegentia pulchrius, continentia sanctius '; continet
enim ipsum Christum et est ' quasi consummatio spiritualis vitae et omnium sacramentorum finis.' Quae quidem praesentia ' realis • dicitur non per exclusioncm,
quasi aliae ' reales ' non sint, sed per excellentiam, quia est substantialia, qua
nimirum totus atque integer Christus, Deus et homo, fit praesens " (Paul VI,
" Mysterium Fidei," Zoe. cit., 763-764).
" 7 Accordingly we have Ill high regard for the view of C. McAuliffe who writes:
" Eucharistia vero, si respicitur una cum sua receptione, habet fortasse alterum
' res et sacramentum,' quod non videtur esse corpus et sanguis Domini. Haec enim,
sacramento recepto, non significantur et efficiuntur, sed jam adsunt. Unde
efformant una cum speciebus ' sacramentum tantum.' ltaque in hoc sacramento

ECCLESIAL MEANING OF THE

11 RES

ET SACRAMENTUM

H

48')'

the res et sacramentum of the sacrament of the Eucharist is the
habitual consecration of the soul through sacramental union
with Christ Himself, that is, physical-corporeal union with the
Body (and Blood) sacramentally present. It is the most
intimate participation or consecration, and all other res et
are ordered to this consummate consecration and
participation in Christ the Priest- Victim on the Cross.148
Such a consecration causes as formal cause a special cultic
status of the communicant in the visible Church. He becomes
a special habitual offerer of the Mass under the title of a
Christian ontologically united with Christ Himself sacramentally present. The intimacy of the sacramental participation in
Christ in this sacrament naturally means that the incorportion
of the recipient into the life of the Mystical Body is most
perfect. 149 This state in the cultic Church continues as long as
the consecrated species remains. During this period the recipient is a special member of the Church and habitually offers all
the Masses which are celebrated during the period by the
visible Church in the world.150 Inasmuch as sacramental participation in Christ the Priest- Victim and ontological incorporation into the life of the Mystical Body is in this sacrament
most intimate and radical, his ontological-habitual participation in the Mass is most perfect in the Eucharist. This means
. . . fit aliquid insolitum in quantum ' sacramentum tantum ' non est totaliter
sensibile. Compendiose ergo, putamus, salvo meliore judicio, quod ' sacramentum
tan tum ' Eucharistiae receptae est ipse Christus et species consecratae. ' Res
tan tum ' est gratia sanctificans quae per sumptionem sacramenti infunditur. ' Res
et sacramentum ' materialiter spectatum est status quo recipiens potest speciali
modo fovere amorem Dei. Formaliter vero, est jus ad gratiam. Hoc jus efficitur
solum per Communionem. Est ' res ' quia immediate producitur per sumptionem
Hostiae. Est etiam ' sacramentum ' quia denotat grati8.lll ex opere operato infundi
in recipientem qui est dispositus " (De Sacramentis in Genere, 66).
148 Cf. C. Journet, La Mease ... , 264; T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 86-97.
149 Cf. M. Schmaus, CYp. cit., 501-507; J. T. Dittoe, art. cit., 496-514.
160 At the moment when the existence of the consecrated species terminates, this
special habitual oblation also ends. Then there remains in this Christian at least
the habitual offering of the Mass because of the baptismal res et sacramentum. If
he is already confirmed, he continues to be an habitual-ontological priest also
because of the confirmational res et sacramentum. The same must be said also
about Holy Orders, Marriage, the Anointing of the Sick and Penance.

438

TOSHIYUKI MIYAKA WA

that the habitual-ontological offering of the Mass by the individual achieves its climax and consummation in Holy Communion. Therefore, the sacrament of the Eucharist is the
sacrament of the Passion (cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 78, a. 5, ad
fl) and the sacrament of perfect participation in the Sacrifice.151

001Wlusion
What we have seen in this study can be summarized in the
following way. a) The reset sacramentum is a sevenfold, ontological, habitual consecration of the recipient through a sevenfold sacramental participation in Christ the Priest- Victim on the
Cross. This Christian effect of the sacrament causes as formal
cause a sevenfold membership in the People of God, a sevenfold
habitual offering of the Mass in the visible Church for the
world. Thus as the immediate, necessary and proper effect of
the sacrament, namely, as the reset sacramentum, we have a
sevenfold cultic status in the visible Church. 152 Through
Baptism one becomes a fundamental-static offerer of the Mass;
through Confirmation a dynamic offerer; through Holy Orders
one is constituted as a public ministerial offerer of the Mass;
through Marriage one is made a special offerer through conjugal
and family life; through Penance one becomes a contrite and
therefore formally fruitful offerer; through the Anointing of the
Sick one is made a special offerer as a physical cum-patiens
with Christ; through the Eucharist one offers the Mass in a
physical-corporeal union with Christ Himself sacramentally
present. The administration of the sacrament means without
qualification: "you are a static-fundamental member of the
Church of the Mass," " you are a dynamic member of the
Church," " you are a public minister of the cultic Church-you
are a bishop, a presbyter, a deacon," " you are a married
member of the Mystical Body," " you are a contrite member
of the Church of the Mass,"" you are a member, who is cum151 Cf. M. Schmaus, op. cit., 456-466; A. Piolanti, O'fl'. cit., esp. 400; R. F. Jorge,
" La communion eucaristica, plenitud, de Ia participaci6n," La participaci6n de los
fieles en la misa (Salamanca, 1959), 198-288.
152 Cf. B. Leeming, op. cit., 226, 248, 880-881, 882, 889.

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM "

439

patiens with Christ on the Cross," " you are a member who
is united physically with Our Lord Himself sacramentally present." Through such sevenfold incorporation into the Church
of divine worship the whole being of the recipient is elevated
supernaturally, altered objectively and obtains a new cultic
meaning in the present economy. His whole being is orientated
objectively to the habitual-ontological offering of the Mass,
with which he co-exists during the period of the duration of
the status. In other words, such an habitual oblation continues
as long as the reset sacramentum as a physical entity, that is,
as an ontological consecration of the soul, remains. This sevenfold status in the visible Church, the res et sacramentum, is
visible; although it is not immediately sensible, its relationship
to the visible Church makes it mediately sensible/ 53 so that it
can sufficiently function as the sign of the res tantum, which is
the sanctification of the soul. The People of God thus consists
of such sevenfold habitual-ontological priests.
In this way the People of God is an offerer of the Mass in
participation with Christ the Priest-Mediator. The members
are all personal participants in the Sacrifice of Calvary because
of their cultic status in the Church. Thus the Church offers the
Mass as priest and is offered as victim. The Church offers: and
is offered actionally only in the celebrating priest (or priests,
in the case of concelebration) of the particular Mass, who in
the persona of Christ acting immolate (s) and offer (s) the
Victim; the Church offers and is offered at the same time also
habitually in all her members, including even this (these)
celebrating priest (s). This double participation of the Church
in the Sacrifice of Cal vary is founded on the res et sacramentum, and the People of God is thus the ascending mediator
in the present economy of salvation in participation in and
subordination to Christ; the Church is in this sense the corredemptrix 154 of the world.
Cf. 0. Semmelroth, op. cit., 60.
The People of God is also descending mediator because of the indestructible
supernatural active power which is the emanation of the sacramental character
(tha res et sacramentum of Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders). We cannot
treat this point here. Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 80-81.
108

154

440

TOSIDYUKI

MIYAKA WA

b) The recipient of the sacrament thus participates personally in the unique Sacrifice of Calvary/ 55 which personal participation is his personal response to the calling of God. Thus
we are already in the dimension of personal relationship with
God, that is, the dimension of subjective redemption/ 56 The
recipient is ·consecrated personally through sacramental participation in Christ the Priest- Victim. The sacramentum
tantum causes grace as an instrumental physical cause in those
who do not place obstacles. The sacramentum tantum, however, does not cause grace unless there exists prior in the order
of dependence the res et sacramentum which meritoriously
demands its infusion. This means that the personal consecration, that is, the sevenfold cultic status, is the habitual disposition BXiigens gratiam morally and meritoriously, thanks to the
merits of Christ in whom the recipient participates. The res
tantum can be caused, consequently, as long as the reset sac-ramentum remains. The causality of the sacramentum tantum
and that of the res et sacramentum are, therefore, not in the
same dimension but in different spheres, and are mutually
complementary .157
Since the individual has this personal, sacramental and
habitual relationship with God as long as he exists in the determined cultic status which is proper to each of the seven sacraments, the grace caused by the sacrament is naturally different
155 P. Smulders
(" Sacramenten en Kerk. Kerkelijk recht, Kultus, Pneuma,"
Bijdragen 17 [1956], 891-418) offers us a very thought-provoking study on the
relationship of the sacrament to the Sacrifice on the Cross. It is only regrettable
that this illustrious theologian seems to give no place (if we understand him
correctly) to the sacrifice of the Mass in the exposition and that he does not
consider the possibility of a participatio multiplll'X in the Sacrifice.
158 Cf. E. Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 96-100.
157 Cf. 0. Semmelroth, "Personalismus
und Sakramentalismus. Zur Frage nach
der Ursiichlichkeit der Sakramente," J. Auer-H. Volk (ed.), Tkeologie in Gesckickte und Gegen1vart (Miinchen, 1957), 199-218. Although we think that in the
sacramental production of grace the duality of the efficient physical causality of the
sacramentum tantum and the meritorious-moral causality of the res et sacramentum
is essential, yet he agrees with us on the point that a cultic element in the
mental process is, as a moral cause, the ground and presupposition of the
mental conferral of grace. Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 61-108.

ECCLESIAL MEANING

OF THE "RES ET SACRAMENTUM"

441

in each sacrament. 158 Inasmuch as the grace is the presence of
the love of God for the recipient, it is qualitatively the same in
every sacrament (sanctifying grace); inasmuch as the grace is
the love of God for this personal, special participant of the
Mass, the grace is not the same, but different qualitatively in
the seven sacraments (sacramental grace). Since, however,
sacramental grace and sanctifying grace are not two different
graces, but sacramental grace is nothing other than sanctifying
grace with the intrinsic habitual modification and strengthening
by which the supernatural organism of this individual is ordered
to the end of the sacrament/ 59 we can clearly perceive here the
eccleaial character of the grace caused by the sacraments. In
other words, the "res tantum" is the life of the Holy Trinity
communicated to the individual insofar as he is in the cultic
"status" in the visible Church.160 God embraces him and loves
him as " an individual in the cultic status in the Church." The
recipient of the sacrament thus lives the life of the Holy Trinity
as a cultic individual, as a personal, special habitual offerer of
the Mass in the Church. In such a community of divine life
subjective redemption is fully actualized in this individual, and
he can say together with St. Paul: Christ " loved me and
sacrificed himself for my sake" (Gal. 2: 20) and "Life to me
... is Christ " (Phil. 1: 21) .
Thus, seeing that this status is intrinsically fixed and determined precisely by the mutual relationship of the double
essential function of the Church, the seven sacraments and the
Mass, the status is really immanent in the Church, and is the
status " in " the Church in a strict sense of the word. It is
also in a proper sense the status " of " the Church, since the
Cf. T. Miyakawa, art. cit., 84.-85, 88-97.
Cf. A. Piolanti, I Sacramenti, ed. 2 (Firenze, 1960), 188-152. We .may say
that the rea tantum is the grace extended by the rea et aacramentum to an effect
which grace does not produce Without it, which, however, it has by itself the power
to produce (Cf. J. H. Nicolas, "La grace sacramentelle," Revue Tkomiste 61
[1961], 191).
10 ° Cf. P. Smulders, "Die
sakramental-kirchliche Struktur der christlichen
Gnade," Bijdragm 18 (1957), 888-84.1, esp. 886-887; J. H. Nicolas, loc. cit., 165192, 522-588.
158

169

442

TOSHIYUKI

MIYAKA WA

visible Church consists of the sevenfold habitual members.
We see thus clearly that not only Ecclesia facit sacramenta but
also that really Sacramenta faciunt Ecclesiam, and that not
only Ecclesia facit Missam but also that really Missa facit
Ecclesiam. This status, moreover, is that which is caused necessarily and only through a valid sacrament. It is thus the core of
the present economy of salvation, which is essentially sacramental. Although the sacrament is primarily and fundamentally a means of the conferral of grace, this grace is both extrinsically (by extrinsic causality) and intrinsically (by intrinsic
causality) determined by the sevenfold status in the Church,
which is the proper and necessary effect of the sacrament.
Against the background of such a grasp of the ecclesial
function of the res et sacramentum the sacramental foundation
of being a Christian in the present economy is now evident to
us. As we have seen, because of the res et sacramentum the
whole being of the recipient is objectively altered and obtains
a new, proper (to the particular sacrament) cultic meaning in
the Church. His whole being is objectively ordered to the
habitual offering of the Mass in participation in Christ the
Priest- Victim on the Cross for the redemption of the world.
The habitual participation in the Mass continues as long as
the res et sacramentum as physical entity remains in the soul
From the fact that the sacramental character remains perpetually and that every Christian has at least the baptismal
character, it follows that the whole being of every Christian
has been definitely placed in the objective sacramental context
of the economy. In the proper sense of the word, for a Christian
there can be no grace extrasacramentally bestowed in this life,
nor is there any prayer which is not sacramental. Grace is for
him totally and properly the grace of the Mass, the gratia
eucharistica. Once one is baptized, his whole life is characterized intrinsically by such cultic, religious meaning; he is
decidedly incorporated into the mechanism of the. present
economy in order to play a positive role.
According to the objective mechanism of the present economy of salvation, the chosen ones, the mediators are sanctified

ECCLESIAL

MEANING

OF THE " RES ET SACRAMENTUM

H

448

precisely through and in their cooperation with God for the
redemption of the world. Christians are indeed those whom
God has chosen and called to this position. Owing to this
vocation, we Christians are consecrated sacramentally ex opere
operato. Such habitual offering of the Mass, or cooperation,
has, of course, many diverse forms in the concrete. Besides
the essential and intrinsic division of the habitual-ontological
oblation into seven different forms according to the seven different sacraments, there can be many accidental and extrinsic
divisions. In treating the res et sacramentum of Penance we
touched on one of these divisions, namely, the division into a
fruitful and an unfruitful oblation. This is the most important
division, which radically determines the whole being of the
sevenfold habitual oblation. The habitual oblation ought to
be, in itself, a fruitful participation in the Mass. We Christians
must respond with love to the invitation and call of divine love
and so realize this sacramental deputation in many possible
ways, making our oblation ever more truly fruitful. It can
now be clearly seen that the so-called spiritual offering of the
sacrifice of the Mass by a Christian is theologically nothing
other than an habitual-ontological oblation which a Christian
consciously offers with zeal and enthusiasm in an effort to
make his cooperation with Christ more fruitful. 161 Our calling
and election, in fact, according to its very intrinsic structure,
demands that we Christians are not only objectively consecrated but also personally sanctified and increasingly so.162
161 Cf. Jn. 4: 28-24; Heb. 10: 19-25. See P. Dabin, Le sacerdace royal des fideles
I (Paris, 1941); Y. M. J. Congar, Jalcms prYU1" une theologie du; laicaf!; B. Durst,
DaN W esen der Eucharistiefeier und des christlichen Priestertums (Rome, 1958),
esp. 185-187; Die Eucharistiefeier als Opfer der Gliiubigen (Rotten burg, 1960), esp.
110-185. From recent studies see, for example, C. Schleck, "The Sacramental
Character of Baptism and Worship," Readings in Sacramental Theology, 165-186,
esp. 178-188. The author correctly perceives the differences of the roles of the
celebrating priest and of the others. What we would expect from him is a treatment
of the problem in a more general and systematic way, Without restricting the
discussion to the meaning of the baptismal character alone.
••• On this point the moral theologians should be consulted. We must especially
mention, from recent studies, the work of J. Fuchs (De Sacramentis in Genere. De
Baptismo et Confirmatione, ed. 8, Romae, 1968) . The author touches often on the

444

TOSHI'WXI MIYAKAWA

This theory of the res et sacramentum affords us insight into
the intrinsic dynamism of the Christian vocation from objective
consecration to personal sanctification, which after growth and
maturation in this life must arrive at its consummation in the
beatific vision in the next life. Thus this ecclesial theory, which
as a systematic interpretation of the economy theoretically
founds the objectively consecrated state of us Christians in the
habitual-ontological priesthood and our responsibility for the
salvation of the world in an ardent response to God, has a very
great significance, especially in the present state of renewal
and progress of the Church of Christ through Vatican Council
IT.
TosHIYUKI MIYAKA WA
Pontifical Urbanian University
Rome, Italy

doctrine of the ru et aacramtmtum from the viewpoint of moral theology. Thoughtprovoking also are the articles of K. Rahner on the ru et sacramtmtum in. F. X.
Arnold-K. Rahner-V. Schurr-L. M. Weber (ed.), Handbuck der Paatoraltheologie
(Freiburg i. B.) I (1964), II/I (1966), II/2 (1966). Cf. D. Tettamanzi, " Sacramenti e diritto-dovere dell'apostolato dei laici," La acmola cattolica 92 (1964), 19-46;
G. Diekmann, "Two Approaches to understanding the Sacraments," Readings in
Sacramental Theology, 9-11; A. Brunner, "KreuzuCYpjer und MusCYpjer," Geist und
Leben 88 (1965), 89-49.

SACRAMENTAL

T

CHARACTER: THE STATE OF
THE QUESTION

HE PRINCIPAL TASK assigned to Vatican Church
Council II was to enable the Church to come to an
awareness of herself and her mission. The Council
made its fundamental theological statements on the Church in
terms of sacramentality and community. In doing so, it
reached back beyond the twelfth century to revive the broad
sense attached to the term " sacrament " before it was applied
exclusively to the seven principal liturgical rites and defined the
Church as a " kind of sacrament " in Christ. For the Church is
a sign, the visible manifestation in the world of men's union
with God and of their consequent union among themselves. At
the same time the Church is an instrument, the means through
which God achieves this communion. The Mystery of the
Church, the sacramental community of the People of God, discloses the great depth and beauty of our life in Christ. " It is
now no longer I that lives, but Christ lives in me." (Gal. 2: 20)
The liturgy, an exercise of the priestly office of Jesus Christ,
is the summit towards which the activity of the Church is
directed.
The special sacrament-community orientation of Vatican II
theology invites renewed attention to the doctrine of the sacramental character. For in the traditional sacramental synthesis
this instrumental participation in Christ's priestly power and
mission is vitally involved in both the existential liturgical
action and in its continuing influence on the Christian soul.
The character is essential to every phase of the Church's sacramentality; it is a dynamic influence in whatever contributes
to the unity of all who believe and worship in Christ. In spite
of its high priority, especially for Thomistic sacramental theology, the role of the sacramental characters has yet to be given
its full evaluation in relation to the theological developments
of Vatican II.
445

446

JOHN M. DONAHUE

The present article proposes merely to survey the state of the
question: it treats the development of the doctrine of the
sacramental character, both as to the fact and as to the
theological interpretation of the fact. What is immediately
at stake is the relevance of the Thomistic doctrine of the
sacramental character. But the problem ha.s wider dimensions.
The character doctrine is integral to the Thomistic teaching
on the causality of the sacraments, on membership in the
Church, and on the distinction of powers and functions of the
hierarchical structure. It is not immediately clear how this
thesis fits into the biblical-pastoral theology of Vatican II, or
how it can be explained in terms of personalism and modem
phenomenological studies.
I Sources for the study of the sacramental character

A most complete bibliography on the sacramental character
is given by Pere Jean Galot. 1 This covers not only the primary
medieval sources but also modern studies to the year 1955.
Since Galot's work is readily available, it does not seem necessary to include an extended bibliography for the period which
he covers. In the time since Galot's publication, an extended
study of M.-J. Scheeben's notion of the character has been
done under the direction of Louis Bouyer. 2 This thesis finds
the essence of the Church in the unity of Christians with Christ
and in the union existing among themselves through the sacramental characters. In more recent times theologians have been
treating the character as part of their more general sacramental
studies as., for example, the works by Schillebeeckx and
Rahner. 8 An essay by Father Thomas Marsh in a. publication
1 Jean Galot, S. J., La Nature du caractere sacramentel (Paris:
Desclee de
Brouwer, 1955), 242 pp., bibliography p. 1-18.
• B. Fraigneau-Julien, L'Eglise et le caractere sacramentel selon M.-J. Scheeben
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1958),
pp. Cf. also F. S. Pancheri, ll Pensiero
Teologico di M. J. Scheeben et S. Tommaso (Padua, 1956); Louis Bouyer, " OU
en est Ia theologie du Corps mystique? " Recherche de Science Religieuse, (1948);
N. Oehmen, "L'ecclesiologie dans la crise," Questions sur l'Eglise et son unite,"
lrenikon (war edition), pp. 1-11; C. Lialine, " Une etape en ecclesiologie, Beflexions sur l'encyclique Mystici Corporis," lrenikon (1946-47).
8 E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

447

of the Maynooth Summer School papers of 1963 is the most
up-to-date summary of the character in English. 4 In 1963,
Father G. J. Connolly, S.M., published a dissertation on the
Sacramental Character in Five Famous Medievals. 5 Reference
should be made to the biblical studies of Father Benoit and the
patristic work of Father Thomas Camelot for the specific exemplification of the baptismal character. 6 Father Galot has a
short article on the layman's role in the Church as developed
out of the sacramental doctrine of the character in Theology
Digest_T

II The factual reality of the sacramental character
For four centuries the dogmatic textbooks have been content
to establish the existence of the character from positive sources
dating from the twelfth century. The factual reality of the
sacramental character was said to be certain, de fide catholica
at least, from a letter of Pope Innocent 111,8 from the Council
of Florence 9 and from the Council of Trent. The Council of
York: Sheed & Ward, 1968), p. 158-171; K. Rahner, S. J., The Church and the
Sacraments, Quaestiones Disputatae (New York: Herder and Herder, 1968), no.
9, p. 88.
'Thomas Marsh, "The Sacramental Character," Sacraments, the Gestures of
Christ, ed. Denis O'Callaghan (New York: Sheed & Ward, 1964), pp. 109-188.
0 G. J. Connolly, S.M., Sacramental Character ·in Five Famous Medievala (Rome,
1968).
8 A. Benoit, Le bapteme ch.retien au second siecle (Paris, 1958); J. de la Potterie,
"L'Onction du chretien par la foi," Biblica (1959), 40, 1, pp. 15-!l!l; for patristic
study, Thomas Camelot, 0. P., Spiritualite du bapteme (Paris: Editions du Cerf,
1960), pp. 201-286. For the systematic treatment of the character of baptism, cf.
Emmanuel Doronzo, 0. M. 1., De Baptismo et Confirmatione (Milwaukee: Bruce,
1947)' pp. 78-95.
• J. Galot, S. J., "The Sacramental Character," Theology Digest, XI, 8,
(Autumn 1968), pp. 175-180.
8 "Tunc ergo characterem sacramentalis imprimit operatio, cum obicem voluntatis
contrariae non invenit obsistentem." (Letter of Pope Innocent III, "Majores
Ecclesiae causas." Cf. Denzinger-Bannwart, Enchiridion Symbolorum Definitionum,
et Declarationum de Rebus Fidei et Marum. Fribourg, ed, !l6, Umberg-Rahner, n.
411.)
• " Inter haec sacramenta tria sunt: baptismus, confirmatio et ordo, quat> characterem, id est, spirituale quoddam signum a ceteris distinctivum, imprimunt in
anima indelible. Unde in eadem persona non reiterantur. Reliqua vero quatuor

448

JOHN M. DONAHUE

Trent defined: " If anyone shall say that in three sacraments,
scil., Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders, a character is
not imprinted on the soul, that is, a certain spiritual indelible
sign, whence they cannot be repeated, let him be anathema." 10
The definition of Trent established five points as pertaining
to faith: 1) there are sacramental characters; 2) three sacraments, Baptism, Confirmation and Holy Orders, imprint characters; 3) the character is subjected in the soul; 4) the character is spiritual; and 5) the character is indelible. Nothing
directly concerning the specific or essential formality of the
character has been pronounced by the magisterium of the
Church. But the Catechism of the Council of Trent, it may
be noted, is cited as favoring the Thomistic opinion that the
character is to be placed in the species of power or potency.
The Catechism states that by the character " one is deputed to
divine worship or rendered fit to receive or to give sacred
things." 11
The above could be described as the state of the question
immediately prior to Vatican Council II. The Church has made
no further pronouncements on the sacramental character since
Trent, although she continues to make reference to the presence
of the characters. 12 The Constitution on the Church of Vatican
II states: " Incorporated into the Church through baptism,
the faithful are consecrated by the baptismal character to the
exercise of the cult of the Christian religion." 13 It is noteworthy, however, that when the Council describes the effects
of baptism in the Decree on Ecumenism, it does not use the
characterem non imprimunt, et reiterationem admittunt." (Council of Florence, in
"Deer. pro Armenis," Denz. 695).
1 ° Council of Trent, Sess. 7, can. 9, de sacramentis in genere, Denz.
11 Catechism of the Council of Trent, ch. 1, p.
q.
Cf. Doronzo, De
Sacramentis in Genere (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946), p.
12 For example, Pope Pius Xll in the encyclical Mediator Dei says that baptized
Christians offered the Eucharist " in virtue of the character that is engraved, so to
speak, on their souls." Paul Palmer, S. J., Sacraments and Worship, Sources of
Christian Theology (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1955), I, p.
18 Constitution on the Church, no. 11, trans. in The Documents of Vatican II,
Walter J. Abbott, S. J., Gen. Ed. (New York: America Press, 1966), p.

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

449

word character. Yet it makes clear reference to incorporation
with Christ, rebirth in the divine life and to " a sacramental
bond of unity linking all who have been reborn"; but nothing
is said about a reality which is spiritual and indelible in the
souJ.l'
In the light of today's ecumenical trends, it would seem
that new studies concerning the factual reality of the character
are needed. The definition of Trent was occasioned by the
denial of Luther and the reformers. 15 Calvin denied altogether
the doctrine of the character on the grounds that it was unbiblical and unpatristic. 16 The doctrine of the character is
foreign to Protestant thinking today; it is not likely that
the current presentation of the biblical doctrine of the seal
(sphragis) or the Augustinian teaching of the military brand
will gain wide acceptance in Protestant circles.
Marsh's essay, which closely parallels Galot's, tries to establish the biblical basis for the character through a study of the
Greek word sphragis or seal. He traces the use of the word to
Job 9:7 and Daniel 9:24 and finds a sealing in the New Testament (of Christ) in John 6:27, (of Christians) in Apoc. 7:2-4.
St. Paul Eph. 1:18, 4: 30; li Cor. 1:22 are developed to show
that, although the biblical doctrine of the seal is " much too
general," it is " nevertheless a source of great significance for
character theology." 17
Manualists and sacramental theologians have been almost
unanimous in their attempts to found the biblical basis of the
u Decree on Ecumenism, no. 22, The Documents of Vatican II, op. cit., p. 864.

'" " Quantum ergo e Scripturis docemur, cum mlnisterium sit, id quod nos
sacredotium vocamus, prorsus non video, qua ratione rursus nequeat laicus fieri
semel sacerdos factus, cum a laico nihil differat, nisi ministerio. . . . Nam commentum illud caracter'is indelibilis, jam olim irrisum est. Concedo ut caracterem
hunc Papa imprimat ignorante Christo." Luther, De captivitate babylonica, De
sacr. ordinis, t. ii, p. 299. Cf. P. Pourrat, V. G., Theology of the Sacraments (St.
Louis: Herder, 1980), p. 205.
16 " Quod de charactere indelibili fabulantur, ex eadem ("mdoctorum monachorum)
prodiit officina: nam veteribus hoc ignotum fuit, et magis consentaneum est
incantationibus, magicis, quam sanae Evangelii doctrinae. Eadem ergo facilitate
repudiabitur, qua excogitatum fuit." Calvin, Antidotum concilii Tridentini, ad sess.
VII, can. 9, cf. Pourrat, op. cit., p. 206.
11 Marsh, op. cit., pp. 110-118: Galot mentions also Rom. 4: 11, op. cit., pp. 22-28.

450

JO:&N M. DONAHUE

sacramental character on the single notion of the sphragis.
The consequent attempts to integrate the theology of the
sacramental characters into ecclesiology have not been satisfactory. Pere LeGuillou writes: "To found the theology of the
Church on the character, however, is to give it a valid but at
the same time excessively narrow basis, and testifies to the
· general uneasiness of Catholic theologians when faced with the
Thomistic synthesis." 18
There is need for a broader development of the sacramental
character theology which will relate it more directly with the
Pauline notion of the Body of Christ and the corporate personality concept of Isaiah's Servant of Yahweh. The identity of
Christians with the physical body of Christ is unique and much
more than the union of members of a society with the governing
authority and with each other. 19 When the Pauline teaching of
incorporation into Christ and his priesthood is seen as a configuration to Christ which implies a permanence, the biblical
foundations of the Thomistic development of the sacramental
character are more clearly seen.
When St. Thomas uses the texts about the sphragis. (in Ill,
q. 68 he uses all the texts referred to by Marsh), he is not
attempting to establish the existence of sacramental characters
through these passages. Rather, a reading of the Summa
question will establish quite easily that he is using the image
of sphragis to describe the manner of the Christian's incorporation into or, in the more scholastic terminology, configuration
to Christ. The participation or configuration about which St.
Thomas is talking in reference to the character is always in the
efficient order. The Christian is initiated into the likeness of
Christ by the characters in order to worship in and through
Christ.
The sacramental character is a certain participation of the priesthood of Christ in his faithful, so that, namely, just as Christ has the
18

M. J. LeGuillou, 0. P., Christ and tke Ckurck (New York: Desclee Co.,

1966), p. 862.
19

Cf. John L. McKenzie, S. J., Dictionary of tke Bible, (Milwaukee: Bmce,

1965), "Body," pp. 100-102; "Servant of the Lord," pp. 792-794.

SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER: THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

451

full power of a spiritual priesthood, so his faithful share some
spiritual power in regard to the sacraments and those things which
pertain to divine worship. And it is on this account also that it does
not belong to Christ to have a character, but the power of his
priesthood is compared to the character as that which is complete
and perfect to some participation of it. 20

What has been said about the usual Catholic approach to the
biblical basis of the character is carried over to patristic studies
also. " Turning now to the Fathers, we find that the early
patristic teaching relevant to the character is again concentrated on the seal." 21 Marsh and Galot, as well as Pourrat and
Dolger 22 before them, present the development of the doctrine
for the first eleven centuries as the history of the sphragis or
seal. The writers of the first three centuries associated the seal
with the sacrament of baptism, and later it was applied to
confirmation. With some of the Greek Fathers, sphragis became another name for baptism. Galot makes the point that
the Fathers, particularly the Alexandrians, see the seal as a
sign of aggregation to the community and a transforming
mark. 28 He finds no support for the characters as a power for
worship and explains this from the fact that the Fathers did
not connect the character with Holy Orders. The scholastic
teaching on the character as a cultal power, he believes, probably comes through Pseudo-Dionysius. 24 The distinction for
them between the seal and grace was not an explicit question.
Nevertheless, Father Leeming says: "Not a single Father or
ecclesiastical writer can be cited as clearly stating that the seal
can be lost, while many state clearly that grace can be lost;
many say explicitly that the seal is indestructible." 25
•• St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae (Rome: Marietti, 1948), III, q. 68,
a. 5.
•• Marsh, IYJJ. cit., pp. 118-14; cf. also Galot, op. cit., pp. 28-86, "The sphragia
in the patristic epoch; " Camelot, op. cit., " L'Onction et le Scemll," pp. 200-285,
contains copious references from the Fathers on the character of baptism as a seal.
"'F. J. DOlger, Sphragis, cine altchristliche Taufezcichnung, (Paderborn, 1911).
•• Galot, op. cit., p. 29.
•• Ibid., p. 82.
•• B. Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology (London, 1956), quoted by
Marsh, IYJJ. cit., p. 116.

452

JOHN M. DONAHUE

Augustine is the first author to use the term "character" in
connection with baptism, although he did not abandon the use
of " signaculum." Pourrat gives several quotations from the
Doctor of Grace which point the way to a distinction between
character and grace, but Augustine does not develop the character much beyond the earlier Fathers. 26 He strongly emphasized, however, that the character seals one as belonging to
Christ and the Church. Historians note complete lack of
interest in the character from after Augustine to the early
scholastics. Galot has traced this history in his study of the
character. 27 Briefly, the development was as follows: a change
took place toward the end of the twelfth century with Peter
Lombard, i.e., the permanent inward effect distinct from grace
is clearly called a character; the character was defined as
"holiness" in William of Auvergne; the character as "qualitas
passiblis " in William of Auxerre; the identification of the
sacrament as an effect and the distinction of various characters
in Roland of Cremona; the sacramentum et res of Hugh of St.
Cher; the configuration of the character as presented by
Alexander of Hales and others; St. Albert the Great's early
teaching on the character as relation and later his change to
potency; St. Bonaventure's doctrine, which was much like that
of Albert the Great; and the synthesis of St. Thomas.
With the twelfth century came the distinction of sacramentum tantum, res et sacramentum and res tantum. With
Hugh of St. Cher, the character was seen clearly as an effect
produced by the external rite but mediating between the
external rite and the grace effect.28 With this distinction, the
way waS! prepared for the scholastic solutions on the nature of
the sacramental character.
In tracing the patristic references along the narrow lines of
the sphragis and character, historians of the sacramental character seem to have cut themselves off from the wider tradition
which could serve as the patristic basis for development of a
•• Pourrat, op. cit., pp. 227-234.
•• Galot, op. cit., pp. 63-146.
•• Galot, op. cit., p. 87.

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

458

more ecumenical presentation. For example, St. Thomas'
doctrine of the character's configuration to Christ or participation in the priesthood is seen in the doctrine of incorporation
into Christ in St. Justin Martyr/ 9 recapitulation in Irenaeus, 80
the image of God in Cyril of Alexandria 31 and the solidarity of
mankind with Christ in Gregory of Nyssa. 32 St. Thomas and
19 St. Justin Martyr,
Writings of St. Justin Martyr, trans. Thomas Falls, The
Fathers of the Church (New York, 1948). Incorporation in Christ:

" For what the Divine Spirit called through the prophet ' His robe ' are those
believers in Christ, in whom dwells tha seed of God, namely, the Word." (I Ap.,

" An example of this is had in a human body: although it is made up of many
members, it 'is called, and is, one body. So also in the case of the people and the
Church: although they are many individuals, they form one body and are called
by one common name. Therefore, if I were to enumerate all the other Mosaic
precepts, my friends, I could show that they are types, symbols and prophecies of
what would happen to Christ and those who were foreknown as those who would
believe in Him .... " (Dial.,
" ... the more we are persecuted, the more do others in ever increasing numbers
embrace the faith and become worshippers of God through the name of Jesus.
Just as 'when one cuts off the fruit-bearing branches of the vine, it grows again
and other blossoming and fruitful branches spring forth, so it is with us Christians.
For the vine planted by God and Christ the Redeemer is His people." (Dial., 110)
80 Irenaeus,
Ante-Nicene Christian Library, trans. Alexander Roberts, James
Donaldson (Edinburgh, 1884), V. Recapitulation:
" It was necessary, therefore, that the Lord coming to the lost sheep, and making
recapitulation of so comprehensive a dispensation, and seeking after His own handiwork, should save that very man who had been created after His image and likeness, that is Adam, filling up the times of his condemnation, which had been
1)
incurred through disobedience." (Adversus Haereses, III,
81 Cyril of Alexandria:
" In his infinite wisdom he took upon himself our nature that he might communicate
to us his own." (PG
688B)
"It was essential that he who always is should also be hom according to the flesh
and thus take upon himself our nature so that we who were marked out for death
and damnation might abide in him who in taking on our nature at the same time
made us partakers of his own." (PG 75, 1268C)
" The whole purpose of the mystery of the incarnation was that through his
becoming like us we might become like him." (PG
•• Gregory of Nyssa:
" For as the principle of death took its rise in one person and passed on in
succession through the whole of humankind, in like manner the principle of the
resurrection-life extends from one person to the whole of humanity."
(Oratio
catechetica magna, Ch. XVI, LNPF, vol. 5, p. 489)

"Just in the same way as, in the instance of this body of ours, the operation of one

454

JOHN M. DONAHUE

the scholastics did not have the benefit of the rich sources of
the Greek Fathers, which we today possess; and the Greek
Fathers lacked the logical precision to distinguish sphragis from
grace. We are in a position today, however, to fuse the work
of each into a more acceptable doctrine on both grace and the
character.
To summarize: The factual reality of the sacramental character is more evidently a part of Catholic teaching from the
time of the Council of Trent; in order to overcome Protestant
opposition to this point of doctrine, the biblical and patristic
basis for the existence of the character needs to be developed
out of the broader base of incorporation and recapitulation. I
suggest that St. Thomas Aquinas' sacramental principle of the
character's configuration to Christ's Priesthood is consistent
with this broader biblical view.88 I am suggesting further that
much more of biblical and patristic doctrine de Christo Salvatore and de Ecclesia Christi is relevant to the fact of sacramental character than has customarily been indicated.

III The theological interpretation of the sacramental character
Having established the fact of the sacramental characters,
Catholic theologians pursue the question of the essential nature
of the character. To develop this phase of the discussion, one
must have recourse to scholastic philosophy and its technical
distinctions. Scholastic theologians have given conflicting responses to the nature of the character; each theologian has
developed an interpretation which fits his own peculiar system
of the organs of sense is felt at once by the whole system, as one with that member,
so also the resurrection principle of this Member, as though the whole of mankind
were a single living being, passes through the entire race, being imparted from the
member to the whole by virtue of the continuity and oneness of the nature."
(Ibid., Ch. XXXII, p. 499)
•• Father Colman O'Neill's Meeting Christ in tke Sacraments (Staten Island:
Alba House, 1964), presents St. Thomas' sacramentology against the broad background of the Priesthood of Christ. The first chapter develops the Epistle to the
Hebrews, the Exodus and New Alliance of the People of God, the mystery of the
Temple and the Priesthood of Christ in himself and in Christians as mediating the
return of man to God. (Pp. 19-41)

SACRAMENTAL CHARACTER: THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

455

of thought. It should be noted, however, that in spite of their
preoccupation with all inclusive systems of thought, the great
scholastics preserved a sense of the interrelatedness of ChristChurch-Sacraments and of Priesthood of Christ-sacramental
characters. 34 The task of a modern interpreter of the character
will be to keep alive the mystery of Christ, his Priesthood and
his Church, while discovering new terminology for the developing doctrine. Hopefully, some of the rich scholastic insights
will be uncovered.
Discussion of the nature centers on the generic unity and the
specific differences of the three characters. Scholastics search
the Aristotelian categories for models in terms of which to
describe the phenomenon. The categories of relation and
quality are most often proposed. From the time of the Council
of Trent there is common agreement that the character is not
a mere relation of reason but is something real in the soul.
Tanquerey speaks for the manualists when he says that today
the opinion of Durand that the character is a mere relation of
reason is opposed to the definition of Trent. 35
The Thomist Gonet argues against Scotus that the character is a quality and not a real relation. 36 There have been discussions of the species of quality, mainly over the first and
second species of quality: habit and power. Bellarmine, Suarez,
Vazquez and others argue for the position that the character is
a habit. 37 St. Thomas and his school are cited as holding that
the character is a power or potency. 38 Aquinas taught that the
u For example, St. Thomas introduces the study of the sacraments in the
Summa: "Post considerationem eorum quae pertinent ad mysteria Verbi incamati,
considerandum est de Ecclesiae sacramentis, quae ab ipso Verbo incarnato efficaciam
habent." (III, q. 60, intro.) Nearly always St. Thomas refers to the sacraments
with a modifier attached: sacTamenta ecclesiae, sacramenta fidei, sacramenta
Christi; and to the character as character sacTamentalis, character Christi, participatione8 sacerdotii Christi, ab ipso Christo derivatae.
•• Cf. Tanquerey, Synopsis Theologiae Dogmaticae Specialis (Cincinnati: Benziger Bros., 1911), II, p. 191.
•• J. B. Gonet, 0. P., Clypeus Theologiae Thomisticae (Paris: Vives, 1895), Vol.
VI, Disp. IV, a. II, n. XXII.
37 Ibid.
33 Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 2.

456

JOHN M. DONAHUE

character is" a certain spiritual power," and, furthermore, that
this power is instrumental. " It must be observed," he writes,
"that this spiritual power is instrumental: as we stated above
of the virtue which is in the sacraments." 89
Thomists logically argue against the position of Suarez that a
habit for Aristotle and Thomas is capable of ordination to
good and evil, but the character is indifferent towards the goodness or evilness of the subject in which it inheres. 40
The positive arguments proposed by adherents of the thesis
that the character is a potency are these. First, the character
gives a new capacity for supernatural activity; second, the
character is a principle of this activity; and third, it looks to
the validity of the action and not to its moral worth. All of
these points indicate that character adds to the soul a new
supernatural power both to give and to receive things of divine
worship. " The worship of God," Aquinas argues, " consists
either in receiving divine gifts or in bestowing them on others.
And for both of these purposes, some power is needed. . . .
Consequently, a character signifies a certain spiritual power
ordained unto things pertaining to divine worship." 41
The Thomistic position that the character consists essentially in a spiritual instrumental power has received its historical
development in a tradition from Aquinas through Cajetan, John
of St. Thomas and Gonet. It would be represented today by
Doronzo, Dafiara and most of the manualists. 42 Some of the
later scholastics, exemplified by Suarez, who could not conceive
of a supernatural power or potency, continued to opt for one
•• Ibid.
•• " Character autem ad utrumque se habet: utuntur enim eo quidam bene, alii
vero male. Quod in habitibus non contingit: nam habitu virtutis nullus male
utitur." (Ibid., sed contra)
" Ibid., a. 2.
•• E. Doronzo, 0. M. I., De Sacramentis in Genere (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1946);
M. Daffara, 0. P., Cursus Manuali.s Theologiae Dogmaticae (Turin: Marietti,
1944), De Sacramentia et de Novisaimis; August Ferland, Commentariua in
Summam D. Thomae, De Gratia et de Sacramentia in Genere (Montreal: Grand
Sem. Faculty of Theology, 1988). Note: Doronzo on the Thomistic position of
the nature of character: " All theologians after St. Thomas who treat this
question ex profeaso have commonly defended (op. cit., p. 292) ."

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

457

or another species of quality and to defend it as best they
could. The discussion, as Cajetan points out, is really a metaphysical question, but one very fundamental to the understanding of the character.
A second and even more controverted point about the
character is its physical or moral virtuality. To say with St.
Thomas that the power is ministerial, i.e., incomplete and
instrumental, is not to affirm that this power is physical. The
following statement of Tanquerey would have even more universal application among theologians today: " Whether the
character is a physical or moral power is controverted. This
question has affinity with the controversy of the physical and
moral causality of the sacraments." 43 The physical virtuality
of the character was developed particularly by John of St.
Thomas and Gonet.
Briefly, the following argument is advanced by John of St.
Thomas and Gonet to prove that the character is a physical
potency. The character, as St. Thomas says, is a deputation to
give and to receive divine things in worship. But divine
election and deputation confers a physical power on the one
who receives it. Therefore, the character must be a physical
power. As to the second premise, divine deputation is different
from human deputation. Man chooses as his ministers only
those who are apt for or capable of performing the work
that must be done. God, on the other hand, in selecting a
creature for a special work or effect, by the very selection
confers upon it capability of achieving the effect.
This is merely saying that divine deputation, like divine
love, causes a real physical effect in man. Just as God by loving
man causes grace in his soul, so also by deputing a man to
service, he confers the power to carry out the deputation.
Gonet writes:
Friendship among men does not cause an intrinsic effect, but divine
love places a form and causes a divine quality in the soul, namely,
sanctifying grace. Likewise, . . . men are inscribed in a corporal
militia without corporal character (being placed on their soul) . . .
43

Tanquerey, op. cit., p. 192.

458

JOHN M. DONAHUE

but it pertains to divine Providence to mark spiritual soldiers with
a spiritual, internal and indelible character, so that the excellence
of the Priesthood of Christ and his sacraments and their force and
efficacy be more resplendent and more conveniently disposed. 44

J'ohn of St. Thomas is even more explicit:
The deputation by which God deputes his ministers for peculiar
actions is far different from that by which a king deputes his
ministers. For the deputation of a king can be only moral and
extrinsic, not physical and intrinsic. But just as God by loving
and electing a man effects something (intrinsic) in him, scil., grace,
so by giving a ministry to man he gives him the power and
strength for it. What men accomplish exteriorly, and even God
himself did exteriorly in the Old Law, God does now interiorly
through the character which he impresses. 45

At this stage it will be profitable to step back and to view
the positive contribution of this scholastic investigation to the
development of the character doctrine. A positive advance
towards a real synthesis of doctrine on the character is apparent.
From St. Thomas and his followers we discover: 1) that the
formal object of the character is Christ's act of worship; 2) that
this divine worship is achieved in a sacramental mode; and 8)
that through the instrumentality of the character we attain
not only a static likeness of Christ but also a dynamic configuration to the worshiping Christ. The reality the Greek
Fathers described in terms of recapitulation and imaging has
been given more precise terminological description by the
scholastics. This last statement can be established by contrasting the model of human and divine friendship, as it is used
by Gonet in order to make a precision between the character
presence and the sanctifying grace presence, with the teaching
of some of the Fathers cited earlier.
If the stronger position of physical instrumentality is
accepted, then the importance of the character's influence in
the sacramental area, in the area of religion and worship and in
the total view of faith is greatly increased.
"Gonet, op. cit., Disp. IV, a. I, n. XXI.
•• John of St. Thomas, Cur8U8 Theologicus (Paris: Vives, 1885), Tom. IX, Disp.
XXV, a. II, n. XLVID.

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

459

The importance of all the characters for participation in the
sacraments is capital in the Thomistic synthesis. In 1988 G.
Thils pointed out the danger of reducing the comparison of the
baptismal power to the ordained priest's power as sacerdotium
morale and sacerdotium sacramentale. On the one hand, this
reduction seems to eliminate the characters of Baptism and
Confirmation from the sacramental order. On the other hand,
it seems to concede the univocal power of the priesthood (in
its active sense) to the baptismal power. As an alternative,
Thils suggested the phrase pouvoir cultuel du baptise to describe the baptismal character. 46
In the Vatican documents the sacramentality of the Church
has been highly emphasized. The importance of the character
for participation in a sacramental Church is highlighted by
Cajetan: " By means of the baptismal character from the
priesthood of Christ ... man has capacity (esse capacem) for
the rest of the sacraments derived from the priesthood of
Christ. And it is proportionately the same for the rest of the
sacramental characters." 47 John of St. Thomas develops the
notion of sacramentality as distinguished from the natural
action in explaining the necessity for passive characters. " The
character (of Baptism) is a passive potency to receive all the
other sacraments, not naturally, but sacramentally." 48
John of St. Thomas also argues that the minister and the
recipient are physically joined to the source of sacramental
energy. Stated in a modern idiom, Christ produces the saving
effects of grace in a Church that is sacramental, somewhat like
electricity reproduces the sound of the human voice and carries
it across telephone wires. In order to give and to receive
things which pertain to the worship of Christ, both minister
and recipient must be " plugged in " to the system. The active
' 6

G. Thils, "Le Pouvoir Cultuel du Baptise," Ephimeredes Theologicad Loooni-

enses, XV (1988), pp. 688-689.
•• Cardinal Cajetan, 0. P., Commootarium in Tertiam, Leonine Edition of the
Opera Omnia Sancti Thomae Aquinatis (Rome: Polyglotta, 1906), Tom. XII, III,
q. 68, a. 8, n. iv.
' 8 John of St. Thomas, op. cit., Tom. IX, Disp. XXV, a. II, n. CXX.

460

JOHN M. DONAHUE

and passive characters serve as physical instruments, sending
and receiving at the command and the impulse of Christ. The
following text brings out the sacramental system developed by
John of St. Thomas:
Just as to confect the sacraments not only insofar as they are
natural actions, v. g., absolution, anointing, washing, etc., but also
insofar as they are sacramental, a man needs a certain active
physical power, which is the character; so to receive the same
actions insofar as they are sacramental, a man needs a passive
physical power, upon which in the genus of material cause the
sacrament depends, as it is a sacrament, i. e., not as a pure element
or as an elemental action, but as it has the excellences in which the
sacrament participates from the power of Christ. 49

The more recent development of the Thomistic thesis by M.J. Scheeben and E. H. Schillebeeckx is in the direction of
bringing out the total configuration to Christ which the character effects.30 Scheeben accents the configuration which is similar
to the seal that the divine nature puts on the human nature
in the hypostatic union. The configuration to the status of
Christ implies configuration in the order of life and grace. As
we share in Christ's grace as mediator and in his priestly role,
so, too, Scheeben sees the kingly and prophetic role as a part of
the priestly participation of the character. 51
Schillebeeckx introduces the word " commission " or " mandate" to describe the nature of the character. In his sacramental view of the Church the character becomes a commission
to carry out the visible activity of the Church. The sacraments
of Baptism and Confirmation are seen as two stages of our
initiation into the mysteries of Christ, clearly distinct-as
Christ's death and resurrection are from Pentecost-yet together they form one redeeming mystery.
•• Ibid., a. IT, n. XCCI.
60 M.-J. Scheeben, The Mysteries of Christianity, trans. Cyril Vollert, S. J. (St.
Louis: Herder, 1946), "The Mystical Nature and Significance of the Sacramental
Character," pp. 582-592; E. H. Schillebeeckx, 0. P ., De sacramentele heilseconomie,
Theologische bezinning op S. Thomas' sacramentenleer in het licht van de traditie
en van de hedendaagse sacramentsproblematiek (Anvers, 1952), pp. 485-555; Christ
the Sacrament of the Encounter with God, pp. 153-173.
01 Scheeben, op. cit., pp. 587-589.

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

461

A baptized member of the Church receives the commission and
therefore the competence, duty and right to take an active part in
the ecclesial mystery of Easter. 52 ••• Baptism gives the priestly
commission visibly to live in the Church as children of the Father,
participating in the worship and apostolate of Christ's service. 53

The value of the Thomistic doctrine of the sacramental
characters for treating the problem of membership in the
Church has been recognized.54 St. Thomas shows that the very
possibility of membership with Christ is tied to external membership in the Church through a visible sacrament. He writes:
Adults who already have saving belief in Christ (credentes in
Christum) are incorporated into him mentally (mentaliter). When
later they are baptized, they are incorporated into him in a certain
bodily fashion, that is to say, by means of the visible sacrament;
and unless it was their intention to receive the visible sacrament,
they could not be incorporated even mentally. 55

Colman O'Neill has an interesting discussion of the influence of the baptismal character in offering Mass with the
priest. He does not, however, go beyond the traditional teaching that the baptismal character gives validity to the intention
of those who participate in the external sign-action and that
the non-baptized, though they may be believers, cannot offer
Mass with Christ. 56
In the early days of the Catholic Action and lay apostolate
movements there were attempts to find a theological basis in
the character of Confirmation; but the thesis has not won widespread approval. 57 The role of the priestly character in a
bishop is a topic that has not been brought up to date with the
•• Schillebeeckx, Sacrament of the EncounteJr, p. 168.
•• Ibid., p. 166.
64 Colman O'Neill, 0. P., " St. Thomas on Membership of the Church," The
Thomiat, vol. XXVII (1968), pp.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 69, a. 5 ad 1.
•• O'Neill, op. cit., pp.
•• Cf. James R. Gillis, 0. P., The Effects of the Sacrament of Confirmation
(Washington, D. C., 1940), pp. 170.174; Pierre-Thomas Camelot, 0. P., "Toward
a Theology of Confirmation," Theology Digest (St. Mary's Kansas: St. Mary's
pp. 67-71.
College), vol. VII (1959), no.

JOHN M. DONAHUE

decree of Vatican Council IV 8 With the restoration of a
functional diaconate, the question is also raised as to the nature
and power of the deacon's sacramental character. 59
A major problem for character theology to develop is the
relation between the sacramental characters and the conferral
of sacramental and non-sacramental graces.60 God's grace
comes more frequently and more easily to one who possesses
the sacramental characters; the passive character opens broad
avenues for a person to receive the fruits of redemption and
the active character makes one a fountain of life and holiness
for others. St. Thomas sees the sacramental character as both
a cause and an effect of grace. To cite only a few places, St.
Thomas says in the Summa that the character is a " remote
disposition " from which grace flows " as a consequence." 61
Again in the Summa he says that grace proceeds from the
character " as from a form." 62 In the Sentences, in the answers
to two successive objections, he calls the character first a
" cause of grace " and second a " disposition for grace through
a certain dignity or congruity." 63 A development of the character-grace relationship would shed much needed light on the
problem of the so-called "anonymous Christianity."
•• " This sacred Synod teaches that by episcopal consecration is conferred the
fullness of the sacrament of orders, that fullness which in the Church's liturgical
practice and in the language of the holy Fathers of the Church is undoubtedly
called the high priesthood, the apex of the sacred ministry." Dogmatic Constitution
on the Church, The Documemts of Vatican II, op. cit., no.
p. 40.
•• Among the new functions assigned to the deacon are: " to be custodian of the
Eucharist and to dispense it to himself and others, . . . to direct the Liturgy of the
Word, particularly in the absence of a priest, ... to guide legitimately, in the name
of the parish priest and of the bishop, scattered Christian communities." (Motu
but
Proprio Sacrum Diaconatus Ordinem, published by Pope Paul VI on June
dated June 18, 1967.)
80 I have developed the relation of the character to grace in an unpublished
thesis, The Sacramental Character: An Instrumental Potency for Grace (Washington, D. C., 1956); typed copy in the Library, Dominican House of Studies,
Washington.
81 Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 4 and 1.
•• Ibid., q. 69, a, 10.
83 St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentum in Quatuor Libras Sentemtiarum (Parma:
Ficcadori, 1858), Vol. II in IV SentJ., dist. 4, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.

SACRAMENTAL

CHARACTER:

THE STATE OF THE QUESTION

468

A further development of sacramental character theology is
called for in St. Thomas' teaching on the extension of the
work of the character into the areas of religion and faith.
"All Christian religion is derived from Christ's priesthood." 64
" The character is ordained unto things pertaining to the divine
worship, which is a protestation of faith expressed by exterior
signs." 65 As a power subjected in the practical intellect, the
character properly and most effectively influences the practical
profession of faith. The character elevates even bodily actions
to the order of Christ's acts, so that we give and receive the
very merits and graces connected with his mysteries.

III Ccmclusion
The causality or the activity of the character can be explained by analogy, with the Priesthood of Christ, which is the
exemplary cause of the sacramental characters. Christ is cause
of our interior justification and sanctification through his redemptive acts both in the order of efficient and meritorious
causality. "Christ's Passion, according as it is compared with
his Godhead, operates in an efficient manner. But insofar as
it is compared with the will of Christ's soul, it acts in a meritorious manner." 66
In the Thomistic thesis of physical instrumental causality
God uses sacramental words and actions as instruments of our
sanctification, just as he used the actions and sufferings of Our
Savior, i.e., as the physical instrumental cause of salvation.
The sacramental characters, thus, are physical instrumental
causes connected with the words and elements of the sacraments in producing the sacramental rites and in receiving their
effects, just as the Sacred Humanity was the conjoined instrument of the Divinity. When we participate fruitfully in the
sacramental rites, grace is given and received through the
instrumentality of the various character-participations m
Christ's Priesthood.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 68, a. 8.
•• Ibid., a. 4 ad 8.
•• Ibid., q. 48, a. 6 ad 8.

464

JOHN M. DONAHUE

There is also a second very important way in which we
share in Christ's graces through the character. Just as Christ
merited for himself and for his members by voluntarily undergoing the Passion, so, too., Christians enter more fully into
Christ's Priesthood by their more willing and more worthy
participation in the sacramental rites. The sacramental character, as Schillebeeckx states in the above quotation, is the
Christian's " commission " or his " mandate " to extend the
saving effects of Christ's Priesthood. The character is a moral
title for a share of Christ's graces; the degree of our participation in the divine economy to save the world through Christ will
be according to our subjective dispositions. The RahnerVorgrimler Theological Dictianary compares the character to
grace in this way: "The sacramental character is distinct from
grace, but refers the Christian to his duty to possess grace and
offers him grace." 67
Theological opinion on the nature of the sacramental character is not clear and unanimous. St. Thomas' teaching that the
character is an instrumental power is generally accepted; but
there is a tendency to soften the efficient activity attributed to
the character. The character is viewed as a commission or
mandate or seal which validates sacramental action. Karl
Rahner returns to the signum spirituale et indelible of Trent
to explain the character as" the Church of Christ's express and
enduring claim to the baptized person, produced by a sacramental and historical event." 68 My own conviction is that a
more vigorous presentation of the Thomistic doctrine on the
sacramental character, especially as developed in the commentaries of John of St. Thomas and Gonet, would contribute to a
broad understanding of the Church and her members as a
sacramental community of Christian faith and worship.
JoHN

M. DoNAHUE, O.P.

St. Vincent Ferrfll' Priory
New York, N. Y.
87 Karl Rahner,
S. J., Herbert Vorgrimler, S. J., Theological Dictionary, ed.
Cornelius Ernst, 0. P., trans. Richard Strachan (New York: Herder & Herder,
1965) ' p. 72.
68 Karl Rahner, S. J., The Church and the Sacraments, op. cit., p. 89.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

R

CENT DECADES have given evidence of a healthy
volume of discussion in Thomistic metaphysics in"
volving the problem of properly grasping the im"
portant role of God in the metaphysics of St. Thomas. Much
of this contemporary dialogue surrounding the place of God in
metaphysics has raised problems of a methodological nature,
problems whose solution will require a precise understanding
of the nature of metaphysical procedure as a properly scientific
inquiry into the ultimate nature and causes of being. It is
with these methodological considerations of metaphysical procedure in the scientific inquiry into the ultimate explanation of
being as being that we will be concerned.
Thomists writing today on the question of the place of
God in metaphysics are generally agreed that the sharp curricu"
lar distinction frequently made between general metaphysics
or ontology and natural theology is doctrinally unfounded.
They have argued that this dichotomy would tend to invalidate
natural theology by removing from beneath a study of the
nature and attributes of God its logical metaphysical underpinnings in the proof (s) of his Existence/ that the special
science of natural theology or " theodicy " is the result of
"foreign accretions" introduced into Thomism by eighteenth
century pioneers as a result of their alien backgrounds, 2 and
that consequently, "there is no adequate distinction between
metaphysics and natural theology." 3
Our concern will not be primarily with God as the subject
1 Cf. Fernand Van Steenberghen's "Reflexions sur Ia systematiSation philosophique," Revue N eoacolastique de Philosophie 41 (1938), p. 208.
• See the fine study by Fr. Joseph Owens of this "emptying" of the content of
Thomistic being," Theodicy, Natural Theology, and Metaphysics," Mode:rn Schoolman 28 (1951), pp. 126-137.
8 Klubertanz, George P., S. J., "A Comment on 'The Intelligibility of Being,'"
Gregorianum 36 (1955) p. 195.

465

466

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

of natural theology, but only as the cause of the subject of
metaphysics which is being as being or common being. This
inquiry will at times touch upon the relevant problem of the
starting-point of metaphysics, so much discussed in recent
years, but we will be concerned with it only to the minor
extent that it becomes inevitable. Our primary concern will be
for the methodological aspects of this metaphysical approach
to God as the First Cause of being, for the scientific aspects
of this metaphysical inquiry. There has been an implicit
"tension" in recent discussion of this problem between metaphysical science as conforming to the norms of what a science
should properly be, on the one hand, and its cognitional dependence upon the more ontological aspects of its uncovered
evidence, on the other. It is our hope that this" tension" need
not prove to be an unhealthy polarity within the metaphysician's inquiry. We have confined ourselves, in section II, to
an examination of only one of St. Thomas' works, his commentary In Librum Boethii de Trinitate, and to only the Fifth
and Sixth Questions of this commentary, which deal with the
division and methods of the sciences. To acquire a complete
grasp of the Thomistic notion of metaphysics as a science,
however, it will be necessary for one to examine other works
of St. Thomas, particularly his commentaries on the First
Book of Aristotle's Posterior Aruilytics and on the latter's
Metaphysics. Although Aristotle's Posterior Analytics provides
the classic Greek norms for a genuine " science," St. Thomas'
commentary In Librum Boethii de Trinitate contains some
cardinal indications of his own conception of what a properly
scientific metaphysics should be, and is in fact the most
profitable single work of his concerning our question of the
methodological constitution of metaphysics.
The problem of the approach to metaphysics as a science
and the problem of the order of that science are complicated
ones. It is our conviction that a proper grasp of the correct
order of learning is necessary for an adequate understanding
of the metaphysical procedure. It may be, however, that there
are several methodological levels or orders distinguishable and

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

467

operable in the area of metaphysics. The de facto pedagogical
order of discovery, or via inventionis, is obviously important
to both teacher and student, and can be considered synonymous with the student's progress through the philosophical
curriculum, with a variety of nuances brought about by the
textbooks used, the formats employed by various teachers, and
the student's own subjective response to the evidence offered.
There may be, however, an order of learning whose directional
procedure is dictated by the subject matter of the particular
subject matter in question, independent of and normatively
prior to the methodological " license " which is often considered the prerogative of the creative teacher. Such a procedure dictated by the subject matter of a science might admit
of many parallel avenues or viae which cut across the intelway or via is chosen, what is important is that along that via
there be a graduated order of resolution in the scientific penetration of the meaning of those particular aspects of the
subject, an order which the teacher is obliged to respect and
inculcate as best he can in his presentation of that subject.
Sapientis est ordinare. It is the exclusive function of the wise
man to govern or order many considerations of lower sciences
which are dependent upon his " first " philosophy. Should
there be an order of learning dictated by the subject matter of
his own science, it is imperative that the wise metaphysician
respect it.
We have adopted a quite simple format in dealing with the
scientific aspects of the metaphysical approach to God in contemporary Thomism. Our first section contains a summary
survey of recent discussion in Thomistic circles of this problem
of God in metaphysics, a discussion which usually revolves
about our methodological theme. In the second section we have
undertaken a critical scrutiny of some cardinal indications of
St. Thomas' own position here in his Fifth and Sixth Questions
ligible structure of that subject in question; 4 but, whichever
• Such is the case, for example, of the (adequately bolstered) traditional Five
Ways of proving the existence of God.

468

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

In Librum Boethii de Trinitate, questions whose answers contain much of St. Thomas' thought on the proper division and
methods of the sciences. Our conclusions we have divided into
three parts dealing respectively with the threefold aspects of
the philosopher's basic science as (A) "Metaphysics" or
"First Philosophy," as (B) the" Science of Being qua Being,"
and finally as (C) " Divine Science."

I A SURVEY OF RECENT DISCUSSION
In 1948 Mortimer Adler, discussing the presuppositions involved in the customary theological context of St. Thomas'
writings, wrote that, "the proof of God's existence is a work
of natural theology, and in the proper order of natural learning,
it can come only at the very end of metaphysics." 5 The
statement that the proof of God's existence can come " only
at the very end of metaphysics," however, has been challenged
from several points of view in recent years, and has been
considered by many to require considerable methodological
clarification.
Vincent Smith, in fact, always a staunch defender of the
integrity of the philosophy of nature, has even suggested 6
(tongue in cheek?) that not only does the proof of God's
existence come before the end of metaphysics, but that there
is even required at a pre-metaphysical level such a proof
of the existence of a Prime Mover. Dr. Smith argued that St.
Thomas' commentaries on the M etaphysicw and particularly
the Physics of Aristotle clearly indicate that " the philosophy
of St. Thomas requires such a proof as the necessary approach
to metaphysics-without which metaphysics, as a science, cannot come into existence." 7 Dr. Smith's remarks have raised the
question, of course, of the proper starting-point of metaphysics,
a question which we have designed to avoid as much as
possible since it is a separate though relevant issue. But they
The Demonstration of God's Existence," Thomist 5 (1948), p. 196n.
The Prime Mover: Physical and Metaphysical Considerations," Proc, of
(1954), pp. 78-94.
A mer. Oath. Phil. ABsoc.
Y Ibid., p. so.
5 "

6 "

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

469

have also raised the question of the requirements for a properly
scientific metaphysics. Dr. Smith called attention to the fact
that on three occasions St. Thomas admitted that if there were
no separate substances, the philosophy of nature would be
the first and primary philosophy. Dr. Smith stressed that this
higher realm of separate substances can be known only by a
negative process of discovery; just as we know mathematical
points only by negating the properties of lines, so, Dr. Smith
argued, we can come to a knowledge of the attributes of the
Prime Mover in the philosophy of nature by negating qualities
of the physical world. 8 Without this negative analysis on an
infra-metaphysical level leading to the recognition of a Prime
Mover, Dr. Smith challenged the validity of metaphysics as a
proper science, contending that it would " tend to be a dialectical study of predicates all lacking a proper subject." 9 He
argued that " the· subject of metaphysics is not being as a
predicate but being, known by way of the philosophy of nature,
as a universal in causation, beginning with the causality of
substance and extending to the causality of God." 10
More recently Fr. Melvin Glutz has suggested a more
moderate approach to the relation of natural philosophy to
metaphysics. 11 Recognizing the transcendent status of the
formal subject of metaphysics, Fr. Glutz nevertheless suggested
that it is possible to discover the existence of immaterial beings
in the order of learning before the beginning of the science of
metaphysics. Fr. Glutz conceded that the proof of the Unmoved Mover at the end of general physics does not strictly
lead to God as Pure Act, but only to the recognition that there
exists some Mover of a different nature from the mobile beings
studied in the philosophy of nature. 12
Undoubtedly the most prodigious contributor to the discussion of metaphysical methodology has been Fr. Joseph Owens,
Ibid., p. 86.
• Ibid., p.
10 Ibid., p. 98.
8

11

Cf. his "Being and Metaphysics," Modem Schoolman 85 (1958), pp.

'"Ibid., p.

-4t70

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

who has perhaps been most responsible both for restoring the
original Aristotelian notion of theology as well as for helping
to remove the foreign crust of Wolffi.an distinctions which had
obscured the proper place of God in Thomistic metaphysics. 18
:Fr. Owens questioned the adequacy of Dr. Smith's alternatives
that metaphysical being should be either the " being " treated
by the metaphysician as a predicate isolated by dialectical
study, or else a subject of predication reached by natural
philosophy. 14 Fr. Owens suggested instead that the subject of
metaphysics is constituted neither as a subject nor as a predicate, but rather as the verb, " is," and " is " used absolutely
as the act of being rather than as a copula joining subject and
predicate. 15 In Fr. Owens' opinion the probative value of the
Five Ways stems from an analysis of sensible change in terms
of existential principles which are radically different from and
independently superior to the physical arguments of Aristotle;
in the First Way, Fr. Owens argues, "using the external
structure and technique of the Aristotelian argument from
motion, St. Thomas reads into its formulae his own metaphysical notions." 16 The notion of potency in a
peculiarly Thomistic metaphysical sense does not stem from any
analysis of change. It does not arise from any study of Aristotelian
act and potency. It has an origin which is independent of any of
the notions that are established in natural philosophy.U
Thus Fr. Owens argued that the inability of any other science
to isolate the Thomistic notions of entitative act and potency is
sufficient guarantee of the independence of the starting-point
of Thomistic metaphysics. Fr. Owens admitted that, "pedagogically the prior study of natural philosophy may be a considerable help in familiarizing the student with the notions of
act and potency," 18 but his insistence upon the radically
18 Cf. his article cited in note 2 supra.
""A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," New Scholastici8m 28
(1954), pp. 454-455.
10 Ibid., p. 461.
18 "The Conclusion of the Prima Via," Mode:rn Schovlman 80 (1958), p. 2a.
17 " A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," loc. cit., p. 469.
18 Ibid., p. 470.

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

471

different sense in which these notions are employed in Thomistic metaphysics forced him to disallow any doctrinal approach
to the science of being through the philosophy of nature.
Fr. Owens suggested that for St. Thomas
the participle" being" (or ens) can have two significations. On the
one hand, it can denote the thing which has being. . . . On the
other hand, the participle " being " can be used in the directly
opposite sense, and so signify the act of being in contradistinction
to the thing which has that act. 19

Fr. Owens conceded that the subject of Thomistic metaphysics
is expressed under the conceptual form of " common being,"
but he contended that this subject can only remain metaphysically viable as long as its basis in real and actually exercised
existence is kept in mind; thus he suggested that "the aspect
of being (ratio entis) comes entirely from the act of being
which is other than the thing." 20
It is a well-known characteristic of any science that it should
deal only with what is necessary. 21 Now every existing thing,
even the most contingent among them, has something of the
necessary about it. 22 But, Fr. Owens argued, " whatever necessity is involved in the existence, precisely as such, of sensible
things seems to many to be merely factual." 23 It is Fr. Owens'
conviction that, as the subject of metaphysics is constituted
by the act of existing, there can be no science of metaphysics
in the proper sense of the term until necessity is seen to pertain
to some act of existing, that is, until we have proven the
existence of God. In regard to the act of existing, then, Fr.
Owens asked, " how can such an act be scientifically treated
The Intelligibility of Being," Gregorianum 86 (1955), p. 174.
•• Ibid., p. 181.
•• Ostendit quid pertineat ad scientiam, et ponit duo ad earn pertinere: quorum
(Leonine edition).
unum est quod sit universalis. In l Anal. Post .• lect. 44, no.
•• Contingentia dupliciter possunt considerari. Uno modo, secundum quod
contingentia sunt. Alio modo, secundum quod in eis aliquid necessitatis invenitur:
nihil enim est adeo contingens, quin in se aliquid necessarium habeat. Summa
Theologiae, I, q. 86, a. 8c.
•• " The Intelligibility of Being," loc. cit., p. 171.
19 "

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

except in reference to the Being whose essence is to exist, in
whom the act of existing is absolutely necessary?" 24
In support of his contention Fr. Owens called attention to
the statement of St. Thomas that the being which is in created
things cannot be understood except as derived from the Being
of God. 25 Therefore, Fr. Owens argued, the intelligent grasp of
any principle of being must depend upon a prior grasp or
recognition of the existence of God:
if the being of creatures is not intelligible prior to a philosophical
knowledge of God, how can the principles of being, entitative act
and potency, be grasped, or its properties, the transcendentals, be
metaphysically explained, prior to the knowledge of subsistent
being? 26

Fr. Owens here seems to imply that a metaphysical grasp of
being as being demands at least the recognition of the fact
of existence of a being whose nature it is to exist; in fact, in
his recent textbook he has even suggested that
only after the demonstration that being is a real nature, that is,
after the demonstration that subsistent being really exists, has one
obtained sufficient ground to prove a real distinction between a
finite thing and its being in reality. 27

Prior to this philosophical recognition of the existence of a
being existing by nature Fr. Owens finds it difficult to see
" how any teaching of general metaphysics . . . can be other
than a catechetical recitation of propositions which are taken
on faith from textbook and teacher." 28
Joseph Bobik entered the lists with Fr. Owens in 1959 and
the two have since engaged in a very stimulating dialogue
dealing directly with our problem. Basing his objections on
the nature and properties of properly scientific knowledge, Dr.
••" Theodicy, Natural Theology, and Metaphysics," op. cit., p. 187.
•• Esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse
divino. De Potentia, q. 8, a. 5, ad 1. Cited by Fr. Owens, ibid., p. 170.
•• Ibid., p. 170.
•• An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1968), pp. 108-104.
•• " The Intelligibility of Being," loc. cit., p. 198.

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

478

Bobik disagreed with Fr. Owens' contention that it is the act
of existing which constitutes the subject of metaphysics:
that which constitutes something as the subject of a science is
what is first in the science, i. e., it is the source of the demonstrative
intelligibility in the science. The cause of the subject of a science
is what is last in the science.29

Dr. Bobik conceded that existence, proven to be a nature
above the dependent natures in the finite world, is certainly
the most meaningful of concepts, but only quoad se and not
quoad nos. Quoad nos it was Dr. Bobik's contention that the
Existing Nature of God is in reality the least meaningful. Dr.
Bobik argued that what constitutes the subject of a science is
identical with the source of the propter quid reasonings in that
science, so that, since it is the act of existing which constitutes
each of the individual beings which come under the metaphysical " category " of common being, the Act of Existing of
God as really distinct from the existence of common beings
cannot constitute the subject of metaphysics. Moreover, Dr.
Bobik continued, " existence is not what formally constitutes
the meaning of the words, 'being', 'substance', and 'essence.'" so In Dr. Bobik's opinion that which formally constitutes the meaning of a word like " being " is the totality of all
that belongs to the meaning of that word-and" clearly, existence is not all that belongs per se to the meaning of the word
'being'; for it is not true to say that being means existence.'' 81
Basing his arguments on St. Thomas' commentary on the First
Book of Aristotle's Posterior .Analytics, Dr. Bobik contended
that one of the conditions of a proper subject genus for any
science is that the subject be composite, and also that it be
composed of absolutely .prior constitutive elements which can
be the source of a movement of reason toward a knowledge of
the properties and causes of the composite subject. 82 And since
••" Fr. Owens' 'St. Thomas and tke Future elf Metapkyaica,'" Ntw> Sckolasticiam 88 (1959)' p. 75.
•• Ibid., p. 79.
81 Ibid., p. 80.
•• Ibid., pp. 82-88.

474

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

the Existing Essence of God is not composite, and since
the individual acts of existing of the various beings of our
experience (as complementary correlatives of their essences)
are not the sources of the demonstrative intelligibility of the
subject of metaphysics, it was Dr. Bobik's conclusion that Fr.
Owens had misunderstood the sources of scientific intelligibility
of the subject of metaphysics.
Fr. Owens replied to Dr. Bobik's charges with the admission
that the metaphysical procedure of St. Thomas was not
identical with the formal scientific procedure of the PosteriCYr
Analytics. 38 Fr. Owens suggested instead that the norms of
the PosteriCYr Analytics must be transformed from the formalistic realm of Aristotelian science to the existential atmosphere
of the metaphysics of St. Thomas, that Thomistic metaphysics
does not have to "shrink itself into the formalistic pattern of
any Procrustean bed seen in the PosteriCYr Analytics." 34 Fr.
Owens contended that being is prior to and constitutive of all
finite natures, and that as such being " grounds necessary
demonstration that ultimately reaches subsistent being. In this
way it satisfies to the full the requirements of the strictest type
of science." 85
Dr. Bobik rejoined, in tum, to several specific statements of
Fr. Owens', continuing the tenor and theme of his previous
criticisms. Dr. Bobik questioned the ambiguity latent in Fr.
Owens' statement that metaphysical science is a causal knowledge of things, " a knowledge of things in the light of their
deepest causes." 36 Dr. Bobik argued that to reason to extrinsic
causes is not the same as knowing things in the light of these
causes, and urged instead that we avoid the phrase "in the
light of " when the cause in question is the unfathomable
Essence of God. 37 Moreover, rather than stating that it is the
St. Thomas and Elucidation," New Scholasticism 85 (1961), pp.
•• Ibid., p. 488.
•• Ibid., p. 489.
86 Ibid., pp.
486 and 444.
87 " Some Remarks
on Fr. Owens' 'St. Thomas and Elucidation,'"

88 "

Scholasticism 87 (1968), pp. 59-60.

Ntnv

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

475

act of esse which constitutes and explains the metaphysical
status of created beings, Dr. Bobik stated that the esse of
creatures, while carrying within itself a certain formally explanatory function, still must itself be explained as a merely
finite act of existing. 88 Fr. Owens had suggested that metaphysics is " the most perfect type of science, in the exact sense
of the term 'science'" 89 (a provocative statement to make
before as prim a metaphysical scientist as Dr. Bobik!). Dr.
Bobik conceded the primacy of metaphysics by virtue of the
nobility of its objects, but disagreed sharply with metaphysics
taken as a " primary " or " model " type of science; " the
scientific character of metaphysics is far from being primary
or model in type, for there is no metaphysical middle term
which is a definition by intrinsic causes." 40 Dr. Bobik suggested that a " strict " type of science gives the impression of
propter quid demonstration, and, of course, the proof of the
existence of God as the Cause of the subject of metaphysics is
only a quia proo£.41
In his counter-rejoil).der to Dr. Bobik, Fr. Owens persisted in
his emphasis upon the fact that "the being that constitutes
the subject of metaphysics has to be existential act. There is
just no other kind of being." 42 He conceded, however, that the
most convenient manner of expressing the subject of metaphysics is the traditional formula, " common being " or " being
as being," explaining that
the therapy required to explain the use of "existential being" in
the formula would be too burdensome to warrant its use in any
other context. To be represented as the subject of a science,
existential act has to be represented as "something," as an "it."
This way of representing it is legitimate and necessary, but one has
to explain that strictly what exists is not the existential act but the
88 Ibid., p. 62.
••" St. Thomas and Elucidation," loc. cit., p. 487.
•• " Some Remarks on Fr. Owens' ' St. Thomas and Elucidation,' " loc. cit.,

p. 62.
41 Ibid., p. 68.
••" Existential Act, Divine Being, and the Subject of Metaphysics," New
Scholasticism 87 (1968), p. 860.

476

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

thing it actuates. Why not, then, keep the phrasing in the order of
what exists? Much more convenient in general contexts is the
statement that the subject of metaphysics is being as being, or
beings as being.43
Fr. Owens also made the interesting suggestion, in the face
of Dr. Bobik's insistence upon the prerequisites of any properly
scientific knowledge, that perhaps the subject of the metR'physician's inquiry should only be determined in retrospect:
surely it is not something to be determined in advance and set up
as a logical framework in which the science will proceed. Rather,
should not metaphysics be permitted first to attain its own development? ... Then one can look back and see what it has been doing,
what its subject exactly is, and the way whatever else it has treated
is related to the subject. This is a reflexive look over the whole of
the science after the work of the science has been accomplished.44
Surely such a retrospective glance ought to decide the question
of the way in which existential act constitutes the subject of
metaphysics, as well as pointing out how God is the cause, but
not part, of the subject of metaphysics.
In his reply to the counter-rejoinder of Fr. Owens, Dr. Bobik
took issue with Fr. Owens' contention that the real distinction
is only adequately grasped after we have once proven the
existence of God. Not only does the real distinction precede the
proof of God's existence, Dr. Bobik contended, but the composition of essence and existence within really existing creatures
"affords the middle term of that proof." 45 Dr. Bobik again
denied the possibility of proper (that is, the kind described in
the Posterior Analytics) propter quid demonstrations in metaphysics, definitions in which the middle term would have to
be a definition of intrinsic causes. 46 Dr. Bobik also questioned
Fr. Owens' interpretation of St. Thomas' statement that
created beings are understood as derived from divine Being in
'"Ibid.
''Ibid., pp. 861-862.
••" Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," New
Scholastici.tm87 (1968), p. 425.
•• Ibid., p. 416.

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

477

a way similar to that in which proper effects are understood as
derived from their proper causes; 47 Dr. Bobik argued that to
know a proper effect as proper would entail knowing the
intrinsic nature of its cause-and, of course, we cannot grasp
the divine Essence by our natural intellectual powers. 48
Fr. George Klubertanz has contributed some remarks relevant to our problem which deserve mention in their effort
toward resolvent clarification. Fr. Klubertanz defended Fr.
Owens' claim that St. Thomas' procedure in his commentary
on the Physics of Aristotle is properly and novelly metaphysical.49 Fr. Klubertanz pointed out that " the only meaning of
'exists' in the philosophy of nature is 'exists changeably,'" 50
so that to deny change within the scientific ambit of the
philosophy of nature necessarily entails the denial of existence
(rather than proving the existence of an Unmoved Mover).
Fr. Klubertanz, however, elsewhere criticized Fr. Owens for
seeming to ignore the via inventionis in his exclusive concern
for the via judicii.51 Fr. Klubertanz contended that
our only knowledge of God, the First Cause, is precisely as cause of
the beings of our experience. Hence, we must first understand, at
least to some extent, the beings of our experience as beings before
we can know God in terms of those beings. It follows that we must
have a fair amount of experience, and at least some knowledge of
our universe before we can do metaphysics. 52

And, in regard to the methodological sequence that obtains
between the real distinction and the proof of God's existence,
Fr. Klubertanz argued that" we can understand being as being,
truly even if indaequately, before we know that God is sub•• Esse, quod rebus creatis inest, non potest intelligi nisi ut deductum ab esse
divino; sicut nee proprius effectus intelligi potest nisi ut deductus a causa propria.
De Potentia, q. 8, a. 5, ad I.
•• " Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," loc. cit.,
pp. 418-414.
•• "Being and God According to Contemporary Scholastics," Modern Schoolman
(1954). p. 11.
•• Ibid., p. 10.
51 " The Teaching of Thomistic Metaphysics," Gregorianum 85 (1954), p. 198n.
•• Ibid., p. 199.

478

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

sistent esse." 53 Nevertheless, "the full intelligibility of being
is not reached until our study of the causes of experienced being
has led us to the existence of God." 54 Fr. Klubertanz also
suggested that we cannot have a complete understanding of
the doctrines of participation or of analogy prior to the proof
of God's existence. 55
In his lengthy " Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence
in Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics," Fr. Thomas O'Brien
suggested the use of two simple explanatory principles to
quickly introduce the prospective student to the place of God
in Thomistic metaphysics, two norms which he found had often
been violated in traditional " Thomistic " metaphysical literature. 56 Fr. O'Brien suggested a "principle of extension" to
express the fact that " the consideration of God does pertain
.to that science whose subject is being in common," and a
restrictive " principle of limitation " to point out that " this
science considers God not as subject, but as principle of its
subject." 57 Fr. O'Brien criticized Fr. Owens who "seems to
take the exaggerated position that the subject of metaphysics
is the act of existence, common to God and creatures," and
urged that metaphysics is always the study of existing things
within our experience rather than a concern for the isolated
act of existence. 58 Fr. O'Brien repeatedly insisted that the
metaphysician's attention must be focused exclusively upon the
proper subject of his science, and that any proof of the existence
of God is only formally relevant to Him as an explanation of
the ens commune before the metaphysician:
all the proofs as philosophical processes resolve the formalities with
which they begin into a cause proportioned to the explanation
•• Ibid., p. !W4.
64 " A Comment on ' The Intelligibility of Being,' " Gregorianum 86 (1955),
p. l!i5.

•• Ibid.
•• Tkomist
(1960), pp. 1-89;
These articles have also been
published in book form as Metaphysics and the Existence of God (Washington:
Thomist Press, 1960) •
'
67 Ibid., p. 214.
68 Ibid., p. 288.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

479

which the formalities as they are found demand. What demands
and justifies a resolution into the absolutely first cause of each
effect involved, is the very character of metaphysics as it evaluates
its discoveries in absolute terms of act and potency .... What the
formality may be in itself by which the cause is constituted such a
cause is another question, one not immediately involved in, or
8olved by, the resolution of the effect itself.59

It was Fr. O'Brien's contention that if metaphysics is allowed
to attain the existence of God as the princip]e of its subject
only through concentrating formally upon the rigid exigencies
of dependence discovered through that subject, it will emerge a
more perfect instrument and handmaid in the theological
question
the existence and nature of God. 60
There has been considerable discussion in recent years &urrounding the proper starting-point of Thomistic metaphysics.
One of the most noteworthy approaches in this discussion
has been that which calls for an immediate intuitive experience of existential being. 61 It was Fr. Henri Renard's
however, that St. Thomas' approach to metaphysics
·'does not depend upon intuitive insights and existential
moments, but that it proceeds by way of reasoned arguments,
based upon intellectual analyses of conceptual knowledge "
(consideratio rationum) .62 Fr. Renard argued that the subject
of metaphysics, ens commune, is arrived at only as the term of
a long reasoning process, rather than by any intuitive insight,
a consideratio which terminates along the way of resolution
(via resolutionis) in the recognition or grasp of the universal
notion of common being. 63 Fr. Renard agreed that the act of
existing, rather than the quiddity, must be stressed in the
notion or ratio of ens commune, since the ratio entis is taken
from the act of existing. 64 He contended, however, that "ens
•• Ibid., p. 445.
•• Ibid., pp. 898-899.
81 Cf., for example, the Aquinas Lecture of Fr. R. J. Henle, S. J., Method in
Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ. Press, 1951).
•• " What is St. Thomas' Approach to Metaphysics," New Scholasticiam 80
(1956)' p. 64.
•• Ibid., pp. 78-74.
p. 76.

480

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

oammune never signifies the act of existing," since " the act
of existing is attributed essentially only to God" while ens
cammune " is divided into the ten genera and therefore encompasses essentially only these ten classes of limited beings." 65
While the notion of ens cammune is arrived at only through a
long process of reasoning, still Fr. Renard saw no need of a
proof of God's existence prior to our recognition of ens commune as the subject of metaphysics. 66 His disallowance of any
such proof preceding our grasp of ens commune and our recognition of the controlling importance therein of the act of existing was not, however, as radical as Fr. Owens' outright rejection
of any similar earlier mode of demonstrative progression.
Whereas Fr. Renard recognized no intrinsic dependence of
metaphysics upon the phllosophy of nature either in the formulation of its subject or in the proof of an Existing God, nevertheless he submitted that
it is unquestionable that pedagogically the philosophy of nature
should prove a tremendous help to the study of metaphysics.
Indeed, we are convinced that some general knowledge of the
philosophy of nature, for example, an understanding of the problem
of motion, is essential for the student of metaphysics, and the
more perfect the knowledge the better. 67

While St. Thomas never envisioned a natural theology whose
subject would be God, Fr. Renard yet suggested that such a
philosophical theology is not unthinkable, that by abstracting
from the determination of the " habitude " to esse in the notion
of ens commune the intellect is able to form a concept of
" transcendental being " which would not imply whether
essence is distinct or identical with the act of esse.68 Ens transcendentale would thus be the subject of a natural theology as
the last chapter of a philosophy of being whose subject would
be both created and divine being. It is interesting to note that
ens transcendentale would be attributable to God per praedicationem but not per causalitatem, in contrast to ens cammune
•• Ibid., p. 75.
•• Ibid., p. 80.

67 Ibid., p. 81.
•• Ibid., p. 88.

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

481

which is only attributed or extended to God per causalitatem
and not per praedicationem.
In a more recent article 69 Fr. Owens has further clarified his
position even to the point of arguing now that Thomistic
metaphysical procedure does meet the specifications of a
genuine Aristotelian science! 7° Fr. Owens continues to place
almost exclusive emphasis upon finite beings' participated acts
of existing, and argues that their existential dependence upon a
being whose nature it is to exist is the necessary linkage which
qualifies Thomistic metaphysics for genuine Aristotelian "scientific " status. Fr. Owens still maintained that) "(f) or St.
Thomas, the new subject genus is common being, understood in
a way that leaves being outside the nature of every one of its
instances." 11 Although "real beings are immediately known
... as beings " as " the subject of metaphysics is immediately
given to human cognition," 72 nevertheless, Fr. Owens argues
that, "(r) easoning to subsistent being is ... an initial stage
in Thomistic metaphysical procedure ... (and) is required in
order to determine the nature of the subject genus for the
discipline." 78 Finally, Fr. Owens argues that, having constituted the subject of metaphysics by demonstrating the existence of a being whose nature it is to exist, a propter qttid or
" completely demonstrative " science of the divine Being and
Its transcendental properties (Truth, Goodness, etc.) can now
be elaborated in a rigorous scientific manner. 74
In our second section, however, we will examine the actual
words of St. Thomas in his replies to Questions Five and Six
In Librum Boethii de Trinitate, devoting particular attention
to those passages which might serve to effect some sort of
resolution or reconciliation of the tensions we have noted in
69 "The 'Analytics'
and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure," Mediaeval Studiea
26 (1964)' pp. 88-108.
•o Ibid., especially pp. 90-96.
01 Ibid., p. 100.
•• Ibid., p. 101.

•• Ibid.
n Ibid., especially pp. 108-105.

CONNOR J, CHAMBERS

these recent interpretations of Thomistic metaphysical methodology.

II· AN ExAMINATION

oF

ST.

THoMAs'

LIBRUM BOETHII DE ThiNITATE,"

CoMMENTARY

QUESTIONS

"IN

v AND VI

In the previous section we noted several tensional oppositions
that have arisen in recent Thomistic metaphysical dialogue.
There was the dispute over the relevance of natural philosophy
to metaphysical inquiries, with Dr. Smith and Fr. Owens on
opposite sides of the forum. The crucial divergence of emphasis
between Fr. Owens and Dr. Bobik regarding the relative
importance for metaphysics of the prerequisites for any properly Aristotelian science, on the one hand, and metaphysics'
scientific dependence upon a subsisting divine Being, on the
other, hinges largely upon their respective notions of" science."
There was Fr. Renard's contention that, despite much current
interest in initial existential moments and intuitive insights
inaugurating metaphysics, the subject of Thomistic metaphysics is only arrived at after a long process of reasoning.
And both Fathers Renard and Owens, in their separate ways,
envisioned a genuinely scientific account of the nature of God
and of His transcendental properties or Attributes. In the
present section we will examine some indicationS! towards resolution of the above polarities as contained in St. Thomas'
commentary In Librum Boethii de Trinitate.
An important source for discovering a process of evolution or
of clarificatory progress toward more significant and universal
precision in both the thought and terminology of St. Thomas
himself is his Reply to Question Five, Article Three in the
autograph manuscript of his commentary on the De Trinitate
of Boethius. Fr. L. B. Geiger's study of this Article revealed
that St. Thomas rewrote his Reply several times, and that
only in the final redaction do the important theses of the central
roles of the judgment of separation and of the act of existing
grasped in and by this judgment come to the fore.75 It need
75 " Abstraction et separation d'apres saint Thomas," Revue des sciences pkiloaovhiques et theologiques 81 (1947), pp. 8-40. These redactions have been edited

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

488

hardly be mentioned that St. Thomas' conception of abstraction and of the hierarchy of the sciences owes much to Aristotle.
Yet these efforts at greater precision pointed out by Fr. Geiger,
at a precision whose object was doctrinally independent of and
beyond the formal doctrine of Aristotle, should put one on his
guard against speaking unwarily of any "Aristotelico-Thomistic " doctrine of scientific methodology, especially in metaphysics.
A speculative science is an intellectual habitus whose
siderations are determined in large measure by the subject of
that science. The proper subject of a science may also be
termed the object of that science, and its formal meaning or
intelligibility (the ratio objecti) is the universal norm of consideration to which other more specific rationes or intelligibilities must conform or relate if they are to be considered in that
science. This normative characteristic of the subject allows it
to be called also a "subject genus," since it functions as a sort
of quasi-genus in uniting the various speculable rationes that
come under its scientifically specifying ratio. These speculable
mtiones. however, including that of the subject genus, are not
already given in the world of our experience but must be
painstakingly sought out by a slow and often laborious process
of metaphysical inquiry. Fr. Geiger's study of Question Five,
Article Three of St. Thomas' commentary bears out the point
that must be insisted upon if we are to grasp the Thomistic
notion of scientific methodology, viz., that the various operations of the intellect play an important role in the determination of the subjects of the various sciences. As Fr. Maurer
observed, in discussing the advance made by St. Thomas over
the more Platonic position of Boethius,
the sciences are no longer considered as differentiated according to
a distinction of forms ready-made in the world, but according to
distinctions the mind itself makes in the course of its investigation
of reality. Thus he (St. Thomas) changes the very notion of the
object of a science. It is no longer a form in the Boethian sense,
by Fr. Uccelli, S. Tkomae Aquinatis in Boetium de Trinitate Expositiones (Rome,
1880)' pp. 385-887.

484

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

even though he sometimes uses the language of Boethius. Each
science is said to have its own BUbject (BUbjectum), which differentiates that science from every other .... The term also designates
the formal perspective (ratio) under which these things are considered in the science.76

Mindful of this essential role played by the speculative powers,
St. Thomas is able to describe characteristics of any object of
a speculative power in terms of characteristics on the side of
the habitually knowing power itself. Thus he can say that any
object of a speculative power must be necessary on the side of
the habit of science, since science is of the necessary, and must
also be immaterial on the side of the power itself, as an intellectual power.77 The various speculative sciences can then be
distinguished among themselves by their varying degrees of
separation or removal both from matter (as immaterial) and
from motion (as necessary) .78 The correlation of knowing
power with speculable object (i. e., of the scientific habitus with
a necessary object, and of the knowing power with an immaterial object) at this initial stage of distinction among the
sciences suggests the possibility of a correlative identity later
on-and Fr. Geiger's study, for example, has home out this
suspicion in outlining St. Thomas' final stress on the distinctive
role of the judgment of separation in grasping the distinctive
act of existing of its object. The significance of the negative
judgment of separation, however, would lead us into another
problem area, whereas we would confine ourselves as much as
possible to only the methodological aspects of the metaphyThe Diviaioo and Methods of the Sciene88. Questions V and VI of St.
Thomas' Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius, translated with Introduction and Notes (Toronto: Ponti£. lnstit. of Med. Studies, 1958), p. xv.
77 Speculabili autem, quod est obiectum speculativae potentiae, aliquid competit
ex parte intellectivae potentiae et aliquid ex parte habitus scientiae, quo intellectus
perficitur. Ex parte siquidem intellectus competit ei quod sit immateriale, quia et
ipse intellectus immaterialis est; ex parte vero scientiae competit ei quod sit
necessarium, quia scientia de necessariis est, ut probatur in I Posteriorum. In
Boeth. de Trin., V, 1c. Wyser edition (Fribourg, 1948), p. 26.
n Sic ergo speculabili quod est obiectum scientiae speculativae, per se competit
separatio a materia et motu, vel applicatio ad ea. Et ideo secundum ordinem
remotionis a materia et motu scientiae speculativae distinguuntur. Ibid.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

485

sician's inquiry. All that we wish to stress at this point is the
respect of St. Thomas in this initial article of Question Five for
the subjective or intentional requirements and limitations of
the speculative power and of the habitus which perfects it.
Whatever may be the obscure historical origin of the word,
" meta-physics," it is agreed by most, including St. Thomas,
that first philosophy is called by this name, " that is, ' transphysics,' because in the order of learning it comes after physics
for us who must rise from sensible things to what is beyond the
sensible." 79 Not only, however, does the scientific speculator
proceed to discern more necessary and immaterial rationes as
he leaves the realm of the natural sciences to enter that of
metaphysics, but there are also concomitant methodological
differences which are involved. There is, for example, a sort of
condensation of the
consideratio as he enters the
sphere of metaphysics. The method of the natural philosopher
was primarily a rational method, a method most congenial to
scientific progress in the changing world of the senses, although
a grasp of intellectual principles by a sort of immediate recognition was important, too. In the area of metaphysical investigation, however, the emphasis is decidedly upon intellectual
insight, for the metaphysician is expected to develop his science
by penetration rather than by a movement of extension; the
cognitional " distance " between his premisses and conclusions
is less than it was in the philosophy of nature. The method of
metaphysics or " divine science " is more the method of intellect than that of reason, for it is distinctive of the metaphysician to understand or grasp rationes in a unified way rather
than to divide his attention toward many things. 80
•• Quae alio nomine dicitur metaphysica, id est trans physicam, quia post
physicam discenda occurrit nobis, quibus ex sensibilibus oportet in insensibilia
devenire. Ibid.
80 Dicendum quod, sicut rationabiliter procedere attribuitur naturali philosophiae
eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus rationis, ita intellectualiter procedere
attribuitur divinae scientiae eo quod in ipsa maxime observatur modus intellectus.
Difiert autem ratio ab intellectu sicut multitudo ab unitate. . . . Est enim
rationis proprium circa multa difiundi: et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem
colligere. . . . Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam et simplicem veritatem

486

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

Although less complicated than the rational method of the
natural philosopher, the intellectual method of metaphysics is
still conceded by St. Thomas (with Aristotle) to deal with
subject matter that is beyond the reach of the cavillers of
adolescence, as concerned with rationes which " transcend the
imagination and demand a robust intellect." 81 Accordingly,
there is a simplicity of unity about the method of the metaphysician which does not admit, however, simplicity of attainment.
We have seen in our first section various contemporary
arguments concerning the necessity of natural philosophy as
an indispensable prolegomenon to metaphysics. This pedagogical sequence, however, reflects an often obsolete historical contingency that need not apply to a contemporary society's or
individual's particular educational situation. 82 What is evident,
though, is the need for considerable previous experience
(whether it be in the" natural sciences" or elsewhere) before
the budding metaphysician can adequately comprehend the significance of the subject of his science, ens commune. Prior to
the formal commencement of metaphysical inquiry there is a
usually lengthy process of reflective reasoning along the path
of discovery (the via resolutionis), a process of reasoning which
culminates in the more unified considerations of metaphysics. 83
Rational consideration thus leads into intellectual consideration
by way of analysis or resolution, inasmuch as reason gathers
one simple truth from many things. 84 Now what is simpler is
considerat et in ilia totius multitudinis cognitionem capit. Ibid., VI, 1, 8c. Wyser,
pp. 57-58.
81 Cf., for example, St. Thomas' commentary on the Sixth Book of Aristotle's
Ethics, lect. 7, where he describes the fitting order of learning which locates
metaphysics at the opposite end of the curricular spectrum from the initial instructions in logic and mathematics.
•• Cf. Fr. Klubertanz's helpful articles in Volume 85 (1954) of Gregorianum,
especially " The Teaching of Thomistic Metaphysics," pp. 187-!W5.
88 Tota autem consideratio rationis resolventis in omnibus scientiis ad considerationem divinae scientiae terminatur. In Boeth., de Trin., VI, I, 8c. Wyser, p. 60.
•• Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem terminatur
secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et simplicem
veritatem. Ibid.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

487

usually more universal. And what is most universal is common
to all beings; and so, " the ultimate end of analysis in this life
(sic) is the consideration of being and the properties of being
as being." 85 The via resolutionis or way of discovery moves
from effects to causes, from ontologically posterior conclusions
to prior principles, from the particular to the universal, from
the multiple to the simple. Only at the terminus of the via
resolutionis or way of discovery do the ratiocinations of lower
sciences culminate in the consideratio of the most common,
unified and universal of all the rationes of our experience, viz.,
ens commune. 86 Not before is the formally constitutive subject
of metaphysics, common being, recognized.
St. Thomas, however, follows Aristotle in referring to metaphysics also as " first philosophy." 87 It is certainly not " first "
in the way of discovery, along the via resolutionis, although it
would be difficult to deny the involvement of philosophical
notions and principles functioning at a level prior to that on
which the subject of metaphysics is formally constituted.
Metaphysics, however, can be considered as " first " philosophy
in the synthetic way of composition (the via compositionis vel
inventionis) ,88 inasmuch as metaphysical principles are ontologically prior to and operative in lesser, more specific principles
85 This is Fr. Maurer's translation of:
Terminus resolutionis in hac via ultimus
est consideratio entis et eorum quae sunt entis in quantum huiusmodi. Ibid.
(Maurer, p. 59). " Via" (or "way"), however, rather than "vita" (or "life"),
is more correct as it stands, referring to the via resolution-is.
88 Cf., for example: Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem
terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit unam et
simplicem veritatem. In Boeth. de Trin., VI, 1, lie. Wyser, p. 60.
87 Et exinde etiam est quod ipsa largitur principia omnibus aliis scientiis, in
quantum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis, propter quod dicitur
prima philosophia. Ibid., pp. 60-61.
88 This via. composition-is vel invention-is, as contrasted with the via resolution-is,
must not be confused with the more familiar usage of " via invention-is " as a
" way of discovery " in contrast to the via judicii. The former " via invention-is "
is an a priori process which hardly involves " discovery .. in that the ontological
principles ·involved are known beforehand, and indeed is practically identical with
the via judicii. The latter "via invention-is" is much closer to the via resolution-is,
although it is not in our opinion confined to a strictly linear order dictated by the
science's subject matter.

488

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

which may be operable in the lower sciences. The metaphysical
principles of entitative act and potency, for example, can be
found to be at least implicitly operative in more specific and
composite situations; indeed they are operative in any instance
of a finite being. The reverse is not true, however, for the
natural philosopher's principles of matter and form perform
explanatory functions which are confined to the Thomistic
order of essence, beneath the metaphysician's order of existential constitution. They are wholly on the side of entitative
potency (although they can help the metaphysician to discern
the precise way in which material beings are
limited).
But there is another " via inventionis," however, a via resolutionis or " way of discovery " which is identical with the
psychological process whereby each student approaches a grasp
of the subject of metaphysics, a process which may be in considerable directional contrast even with that via resolutionis
dictated by the various strata of rationes which must be
penetrated to come to a knowledge of the significance of ens
commune. By way of an example, a student in a metaphysics
course may be told at the time of registration by one of last
semester's students that a certain teacher will gear his entire
course to the notions of entitative act and potency, or to the
doctrine that " esse cannot be limited except by a potency
which receives it." The prospective student may not know
very much about the meanings of these words, " act '' and
"potency," but to the extent that he realizes at least imperfectly their significance, it can be said that he is beginning the
course with an awareness, however imperfect, of the cardinal
metaphysical principle, that principle which would be expected
to come only at the end of the course. It is our opinion that for
such a student the subsequent course would be essentially a
process of "filling in," of re-tracing a road (the via resolutionis) he had never trod in the first place, of gaining a grasp
of what entitative act and potency do not mean in more specific
and less common principles and notions operable on levels
beneath that of the metaphysician. While he may not have to

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

489

make an exhaustive survey of the various principles operative
in the natural sciences, surely such a critical survey would be
very useful, if only by way of contrast. More important,
though, even taking account of his pre-registration counsel,
such a student's progress in metaphysical clarification will still
proceed in general directional unison with that sequence toward
metaphysical unification dictated by the dynamics of the metaphysical learning process. In view of man's need to work
through the senses to gain his intellectual knowledge, and to
work through various "strippings away" or abstractions, culminating in a negative judgment of separation (the very words
suggest knowledge gained by way of contrast), the positive
knowledge gained by the metaphysician owes much to the
refinements by way of limitation that have gone before. And
whether a student need enter metaphysics through the natural
sciences or not, the hierarchy of rationes involved in that
approach, the methodological differences between the rational
philosopher of nature and the intellectual metaphysician, and
the more simple and universal rationes attained by the metaphysician-all these suggest the normative existence of a
generally directive via resolutionis dictated by the respective
subject matters and methodologies of the various sciences.
Once the formal subject of metaphysics has been recognized
as ens commune or being as being, however, it has still not
been fully explained. All that has been accomplished is that one
now knows precisely what he must explain. Formally enfranchised in his professional endeavor, the metaphysician has discovered that there are intrinsic principles of entitative act and
potency which are common to all beings by way of predication
(per praedicationem) .89 The implications of his consideratio
by way of predication, however, suggest almost immediately
•• Sicut autem uniuscuiusque determinati generis sunt quaedam communia
principia, quae se extendunt ad omnia principia illius generis, ita etiam et omnia
entia secundum quod in ente communicant, habent quaedam principia, quae sunt
principia omnium entium; quae quidem principia possunt dici communia ... uno
modo per praedicationem, sicut hoc quod dico: ' forma est commune ad omnes
formas,' quia de qualibet praedicatur. In Boeth. de Trin., V, 4c. Wyser, p. 47.

490

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

(since his is a method of intellect) by the ubiquitous presence
of potency within the entitative constitution of all the beings
of his experience, that an adequate explanation or justification
for their actuality is demanded. And so, besides the principles
of act and potency which can be extended by way of analogous
predication to all beings of our experience, the metaphysician
is also aware of the need of a principle by way of causality,
just as all things subject to generation require the vivifying
light of the sun. 90 And this ultimate principle per causalitatem
is, of course, the divinely subsisting God in Whom Essence and
Esse are identical.
Besides referring to metaphysics as "first philosophy,"
Thomas also followed Aristotle in calling it " divine science,"
and even went so far as to say that metaphysical science is
legitimately called "divine because God is the principal thing
knpwn in it." 91 The radical composition within the beings of
our experience demand, for the accountability of their actuality,
a divine being (s) which is supremely and exclusively in act:
since the principle of being for all things must be supremely being,
as the Metaphysics says, such principles must be most perfect and
therefore supremely in act, so that they have no potency whatsoever or the least possible, because actuality is prior to, and more
excellent than, potentiality, as the Metaphysics says. And for this
reason they must be without matter, which is in potentiality, and
without motion, which is the actuality of the potential. And of this
sort are divine beings. 92

While the potential elements recognized by the metaphysician within the " common being " of his subject require a
00 Alio modo (quidem principia possunt dici communia) per causalitatem, sicut
dicimus, solem unum numero esse principium ad omnia generabilia. Ibid.
•• ld est scientia divina, quia praecipuum in ea cognitorum est Deus. Ibid., V,
lc. Wyser, p.
•• Et quia id, quod est principium essendi omnibus, oportet esse maxime ens,
ut dicitur in II Metaphysicorum, ideo huiusmodi principia oportet esse completissima, et propter hoc oportet ea esse maxime actu, ut nihil vel minimum habeant
de potentia, quia actus est prior et potior potentia, ut dicitur in IX Metaphysicorum. Et propter hoc oportet ea esse absque materia, quae est in potentia, et
absque motu, qui est actus existent:is in potentia. Et huiusmodi sunt res divinae.
Ibid., V, 4c. Wyser, pp. 47-48.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

491

Being which is perfectly in Act, and while such a supremely
Actual Being must be supremely knowable in itself, nevertheless, metaphysics as the " first " of the human sciences can
never comprehend God within its proper subject except as the
First Cause demanded by implications within that subject:
even though such first principles are most knowable in themselves,
our intellect stands to them as the eye of the owl to the light of the
sun, as the Metaphysics says; and so we can come to them by the
light of natural reason only in so far as we are led to them by their
e:ffects.93
In fact, even with the aid of the supernatural light of Revelation we are still unable in this life to grasp the Essence of
God. 94 Nevertheless we can at least know the fact of God's
Existence; and we can get some " inkling," some faint notion of
what the Essence of God must be, for " we cannot know that
a thing is without knowing in some way what it is, either
perfectly or at least confusedly." 95 Thus St. Thomas says that
we can come to know divine being by way of causality, or by
transcendence, or by negation. 96 In regard to knowledge of
God and of other immaterial substances by way of negation,
98 Quia autem huiusmodi prima principia, quamvis sint in se maxime nota, tamen
intellectus noster se habet ad ea ut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, ut dicitur in
II Metaphysicorum, per lumen naturalis rationis pervenire non possumus in ea
nisi secundum quod per effectus in ea ducimur. Ibid. Wyser, p. 48.
•• Unde de substantiis illis immaterialibus secundum statum viae nullo modo
possumus scire " quid est " non solum per viam naturalis cognitionis, sed etiam nee
per viam revelationis, quia divinae revelationis radius ad nos pervenit secundum
modum nostrum. Ibid., VI, 8c. Wyser, p. 67.
•• Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re potest sciri an est, nisi quoquo modo
sciatur de ea " quid est" vel cognitione perfecta vel saltern cognitione confusa.
Ibid. Wyser, p. 68.
98 Quaedam vero sunt, quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub sensu et id quod cadit
sub imaginatione, sicut ilia quae omnino a materia non dependent neque secundum
esse neque secundum considerationem, et ideo taJ.lum cognitio secundum iudicium
neque debet terminari ad imaginationem neque ad sensum. Sed tamen ex his, quae
sensu vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum cognitionem devenimus vel per
viam causalitatis, sicut ex effectu causa perpenditur, quae non est effectui commensurata, sed excellens; vel per excessum vel per remotionem, quando omnia quae
sensus vel imaginatio apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus. Ibid., VI, 2c.
Wyser, p. 64.

49fl

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

St. Thomas offers an interesting explanation to the effect that,
" the more negations we know of them, the less confusedly do
we know them, for subsequent negations limit and determine a
previous negation as differences specify and determine a remote
genus." 91 God is " included " within the subject genus of
metaphysical ens commune only by means of the narrow ladder
of causal logic-and this causal ladder 1 moreover, does not
function univocally in both directions! Our unidirectional
causal dependence upon God must always be kept in mind,
for while " creatures can be said to be similar to God in some
sense, God can in no way be said to be similar to creatures "! 98
Thus any correct grasp, however meagre, of What God must
Be by way of negative predication must not involve likening
him to created beings, but rather should be structured by an
awareness of the dependence and need of created beings for
God whose image they are and without whom they cannot
exist. A metaphysical approach to God by way of causality or
transcendence, however, can come to the realization that God
is not dependent upon those beings which are subject to the
predications of ens commune, that he can Exist by and for
himself alone. This consideration, however, also entails recognition of the fact that the subjects of ens commune cannot be
considered as "proper " effects of God in the strictly scientific
sense of the term, for the ratio creationis must remain a metaphysical mystery. But while any contemplative "happiness"
here on earth must always remain imperfect in that we can
never grasp the divine Essence, nevertheless, we are endowed
with the scientific and moral tools to enable us to prepare for
that quidditative knowledge of the supernatural Beatific Vision.09 Although man can never by his natural ability alone
attain to that supreme Vision, still he is naturally inclined or
97 Et quanto plures negationes de eis cognoscimus, tanto minus contusa est earum
cognitio (est) nobis, eo quod per negationes sequentes prior negatio contrahitur et
determinatur, sicut genus remotum per differentias. Ibid., VI, Sc. Wysel', p. 69.
•• De Veritate, II, 11, ad 1.
•• Dicendum quod nobis sunt indita principia, quibus nos possimus praeparare ad
illam cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, non auteill quibus ad ea:m
possimus pertingere. In Boetk. deJ Trin., VI, 4, ad 6. Wyser, p. 76.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

498

directed to seek after such knowledge,100 for which the proper
nurture of his scientific habitus of metaphysics is a humble
means of preparation.

m SoME CoNCLUSIVE SuGGESTIONS
Here we shall indicate some of the avenues toward resolution
which appear to us to be suggestive of some form of a consistent perspective in the problem of the methodological approach to God in contemporary Thomistic metaphysics. These
indications we present, not as dogmatic conclusions, but in the
manner of suggestions indicated by the text of St. Thomas
and by the nature of the problem, suggestions toward some
measure of resolvent precision and unanimity. Certainly an
exhaustive treatise on this methodological problem would have
to involve a very careful study of St. Thomas' commentary of
the First Book of the Posterior Analytics, for example, and
would entail taking more account of such subordinately
relevant problems as that of the starting-point of metaphysics,
the role of the negative judgment of separation, and the
problem of intentionality. Nevertheless, when the contributors
to this methodological dialogue are so emphatically divergent
that one (Dr. Smith) demands a proof of a Prime Mover at a
pre-metaphysical level while another (Fr. Owens) denies any
scientific validity to the metaphysical procedure before the
existence of a Being whose Nature it is to Exist has been
proven, and still a third (Dr. Bobik) considers the preceding as
completely ignoring the requirements of any proper scientific
procedure as set down by Aristotle-indeed in such a situation
even mere suggestions toward unanimity will mark an advance.
We have divided this concluding section into three parts: the
first (A) concerns metaphysics as first philosophy, as going
beyond the attainments of the lower sciences and in tum
ultimately validating their principles; in (B) the second part we
will consider some of the problematic aspects surrounding the
100 Quamvis enim homo naturaliter
inclinetur in finem ultimum, non ta.men
potest naturaliter limn consequi, sed solum per gratiam, et hoc est propter
eminentiam illius finis. Ibid.

494

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

subject of metaphysics, or being qua; being; and finally in (C)
the third part we will propose some restrictive suggestions
regarding metaphysics as " divine science," even though without a cognitive grasp of the First Cause the created beings of
the metaphysician's subject must remain ultimately unaccounted for.
A. Metaphysics or First Philosophy
There is almost universal agreement among the contributors
we have considered that for pedagogical reasons, at least, it is
helpful to introduce the student to the terminology and principles of the natural sciences before ·initiating him into the
scientific procedure of metaphysics. In our opinion such an
introduction, or a similar counterpart in broader contemporary
curricula, will more faithfully conform to the normal sequence
of human learning. It would seem that Fr. Owens, as Fr.
Klubertanz suggested, has ignored perhaps too hastily the via
inventionis, the process of resolution whereby the student
comes to acquire his metaphysical knowledge. Fr. Owens himself has contended that the teaching of metaphysics ought
"first and foremost to develop in the student's mind a living
habit of thinking,'' that metaphysics is primarily " a vital
quality and activity of the intellect, and not a collection or
systematic organization of data either in print or in the
memory." 101 William Baumgaertner has urged that it would
be better to teach metaphysics in the order of natural dependence quoad nos on inferior sciences, arguing that
the proper force of the principles would then be more evident to the
students and the problems of metaphysics would better be recognized as proper to metaphysics. The "wonder" which is the
starting point of any scientific investigation would in this way be
assured at the start of metaphysics. 102

We have considered Vincent Smith's extreme claim that a
scientific metaphysics even requires a proof for the existence
101

An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, op. cit., p, viii.
Metaphysics and the Second Analytics," New Scholasticism

10 " "

419.

(1955), p ..

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

495

of a Prime Mover at an infra-metaphysical level; such a demand
is surely an overclaim from the side of natural philosophy and
Dr. Smith himself probably does not subscribe completely to
its provocative stringency. Fr. Glutz's more moderate suggestion is probably closer to a more correct perspective in this
matter:
there is no reason why a science/ 03 investigating its own formal
subject and noting effects that it is perfectly capable of seeing,
should not judge that its own subject is inadequate to explain those
effects and that therefore some other cause must exist, transcending
its own
But the arguments in favor of an approach to metaphysics
through the lower sciences are not limited in our opinion to
merely psychological considerations, are not confined to merely
safeguarding the student's sense of "wonder" before intelligible reality. One's attitude toward the methodology proper
to a science and toward the prolegomena! prerequisites dec.
manded by it will depend largely upon his general notion of
the nature of a science, as well as upon his notion of the subject
matter of a particular science.
The term, " science," ordinarily denotes a refined body of
knowledge held together tightly by a framework of propter
quid demonstrations whose premisses contain the intrinsic
causes and definitional sources of such demonstrations. Aristotle and St. Thomas, moreover, urged that logic be taught
at the start of the scientific curriculum, " since logic teaches
the method of the whole of philosophy." 105 St. Thomas'
allusion, however, in his commentary In Librum Boethii De
Trinitate to the role of the various operations of the intellectual
power in discerning the various levels of scientific rationes, and
his stress on the simpler and more universal characteristic of
metaphysical rationes in contrast to the more particular
rationes attained by the more rational method of the natural
103 "

Scientist " conveys a more accurate notion than " science."

10 '

Op. cit., p.

105

St. Thomas, In VI Ethic., lect. 7. Maurer translation, p. 85.

496

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

philosopher, point to the conclusion that one's conception of
the direction of metaphysical methodology should depend largely upon the subject matter of metaphysics as well. And Fr.
Renard's contention that St. Thomas proceeds in his approach
to metaphysics by way of " reasoned arguments " rather than
by any " series of existential moments or intuitive insights " 106
must, we feel, be correctly understood, since the method of the
metaphysician is much more intellectually unified than the
" reasoned arguments " of the philosopher of nature, for
example.
While metaphysics must be expected to conform to the
general requirements of scientific knowledge (at least once it
has been constituted in its ultimate principles at the terminus
of the via resolutionis), still its subject genus and the various
metaphysical rationes contained within that subject genus
play a decisive role in specifying its methodological procedure.
In the ascending via resolutionis the reasonings of the natural
sciences gradually lead into the predominantly intellectual
method of the metaphysician, since a more unified ratio objecti
permits a higher mode of knowing. We find it difficult to agree
with Fr. Glutz's projected reconstruction of a Thomistic metaphysics into which "no concept is introduced before it can
be rigorously established in the light of knowledge already
acquired by the student," a metaphysics " constructed according to the requirements of the method of propter quid demonstration." 107 In fact metaphysics is " constructed " by a resolvent process of discovery and refinement, although it does not
owe the validity of its ultimately attained metaphysical principles to any temporally anterior principles which validate the
lower sciences. As a process of discovery that supersedes
natural science, the metaphysician's progress is somewhat
similar to the homeward climb of one of the Old West's cliffdwelling Indians, who required a ladder to reach his " apartment," but who could discard or draw in that ladder once he
had reached his lofty home. Once he has been formally "in108

Cf. note 62 tfll:pra.

107

Cf. Glutz, op. cit., p. 282.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

497

stalled " in his professional habitat, the metaphysician can then
proceed " downward " from rationes which are prior and more
known simpliciter (rather than merely quoad nos), to subsequent rationes on the a priori via compositionis. In this respect
metaphysics can be considered as" first" philosophy, a science
which owes no rigorous allegiance to any lower science other
than for the historical genesis and explanatory richness of its
" habitual " content. Metaphysics as a science may be " built
around propter quid demonstrations," 108 and the ratio of esse
commune may be anterior to the particularizations it receives
from additional special modes of being/ 09 but these considerations are both made only after the" paving" of the via compositionis of metaphysical science, only after the formal subject
of metaphysics has been adequately formulated. On the other
hand, Fr. Owens' contention that Thomistic metaphysics " need
not shrink itself into the formalistic pattern of any Procrustean
bed seen in the Posterior Analytics" 110 is, we believe, too hasty
a rejection of the usual conditions for scientific knowledge; once
the via resolutionis has been traversed and the metaphysician
has a sufficient grasp of the various rationes pertinent to ens
commune, he thereby also becomes aware of many well-knit
(according to the method of intellect) propter quid relationships within and among those rationes, rationes which are the
genetic terminus of a graduated series of considerationes extending back to the more specific and loosely-knit rational considerations of, for example, the natural sciences. Fr. Owens'
point is well made, however, when he frequently stresses that,
for St. Thomas," the being that is in created things cannot be
understood except as derived from divine being." 111 While ens
commune is the formal subject of metaphysical science, still it
is never adequately grasped or accounted for until it has been
shown to depend upon the divinely subsisting Being whose
Ibid., p. 288.
Cf. Fr. Owens, " A Note on the Approach to Thomistic Metaphysics," op. cit.,
p. 468; also, Summa Tkeologiae, I, q. 3, a. 1, ad 1.
110 " St. Thomas and Elucidation," op. cit., p. 488.
111 Cf. note 25 aupra.
108

109

498

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

Nature it .is to Exist. Consequently, we feel that Fr. Renard's
remark must be properly qualified when he said that, " once
we have reached the knowledge of being this conceptio (viz.,
ens in communi) stands first in the process of composition." 112
While ens commune may be the formal subject whose various
rationes determine the methodological perspective of the metaphysician, and while metaphysics is prior in via compositionis
to the other natural sciences, nevertheless, ens commune in all
the finite beings in which it is realized and from which it can
be derived everywhere contains the element of entitative
potency, an element of dependence which logically necessitates
the existence of a purely Actual Being. In the line of efficient
and exemplary causality only a being which is Pure Act can
be absolutely first in the via compositionis of metaphysics, even
though that Being must remain formally beyond its factual
support of the subject of metaphysics.

B. The Science of Being " Qua" Being
Fr. Owens has done metaphysical research a great service
by his painstaking analysis of the meaning of " being as being "
or " ousia ,, in Aristotle, and has also helped to restore the
original· Thomistic notion of " being qua being " or " ens commune " as formally constituted by an existential principle.m
Fr. Owens has argued that for Aristotle first philosophy was
directed primarily to a study of the separate divine beings,
while the" beings" of our experience were only entitled to that
name by a sort of" pros hen" equivocity. Moreover, according
to Fr. Owens, even from the distinctively existential standpoint
of the Thomistic metaphysician, while a thing's being "is a
principle or a cause in a way that it is a component . . •
without being a reality in itself," 114 still Fr. Owens describes
the subject genus (ens commune) of Thomistic metaphysics
Renard, op. cit., p. 75.
Cf., for example, his study of The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics (Toronto, 1951); also, "Theodicy, Natural Theology, and Metaphysics,"
op. cit.
1 a " The ' Analytics ' and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure,': op. cit., p. 10Sn.
110

118

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

499

"in a way that leaves being outside the nature of every one of
its instances." 115
In the face of. the merely factual necessity of the created
beings responsible for the scientific " coinage " of ens commune,
we have seen Fr. Owens suggest that the existential being of
finite beings cannot be treated in genuine scientific fashion
without reference to the Necessarily Existing Being of God.
This severe claim, however, must in our opinion be properly
and restrictedly understood-even corrected from a methodological viewpoint. In fact, we must reject Fr. Owens' contention
that the teaching of metaphysics can be no more than a " catechetical recitation of propositions taken on faith " prior to the
philosophical knowledge of the existence of God. In our
opinion, and that of Fr. O'Brien, it is the subject of metaphysics, ens commune, which must be stressed as the source
(albeit only in the way of discovery) of whatever certitudes
and existents we subsequently recognize:
in all this, the notion of the subject must be the norm of interpretation, the key to discovery, and the source of properly scientific
knowledge of what necessarily and certainly pertains to the total
comprehension of that subject. 116

The attention of the metaphysician is not formally directed to
God as to the subject of his considerations, but only as the
required principle justifying the existential perfection of that
formal subject. Fr. Glutz's careless statement that" this is the
formal subject of metaphysics ... namely, that which exists," 117
is unacceptable, since God exists supremely without being included in the subject of metaphysics as scientificaHy knowable
in genuinely propter quid fashion. Rather, the subject of metaphysics, ens commune, is a conceptual expression which nonetheless must originally be judgmentally derived from the individual existents which comprise the beings! of our experience. 118
Cf. text cited by note 71 supra.
O'Brien, op. cit., p.
117 Glutz, op. cit., p.
118 For a description of the psychological genesis .of the concept of ens commune,
cf. Fr. Owens' An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 60-64.
116

118

500

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

Precisely when this concept of ens commune formally begins
to constitute the metaphysical investigation is not specifically
our problem here. 119 What is important for our purposes is that,
whenever the subject is once formally recognized, it is this
notion of ens commune which can be said to control subsequent
metaphysical considerations. The content of this subject is
recognized as involving an entitative composition between the
whatness or quiddity of the objects predicated under ens
commune and their respective acts of existing. There is conse. quently a realization of the capability as well as the exigency
of this subject to lead to an absolute explanation of all the
beings of our experience, and the fulfillment of this capability
and need · will constitute the total process of metaphysical
science itself. The explicitating proofs employed by the metaphysician must resolve the formalities with which they begin into a cause proportioned to the explanation which those formalities demand. Evaluating these formalities or rationes in terms
of entitative act and potency, the metaphysician ultimately
arrives by a quia process of explicitating demonstration at the
knowledge of the fact that a conserving God exists. The subject of the metaphysician's inquiry, consequently, is subject to
principles both per praedicationem as well as per causalitatem.
These principles of entitative act and potency, and of the
causal influence of God, are complementary in their respective
functions and require each other for their explanatory validity;
neither can function adequately without the simultaneous imontological composition
plication of the other in explaining
and dependence of ens commune. As Dr. Bobik has pointed
out, " esse exercises no causality at all [at least in any efficient
sense] in relation to the created existent. It is the esse of the
creature which is to be explained." 120 But what precisely
demands such an explanation is the entitative composition
119 Fr. Owens' suggestion that ens commune as the subject of metaphysics is only
recognized by " a reflexive look over the whole of the science after the work of
the science has been accomplished," deserves more attentive clarification. " Existential Act, Divine Being, and the Subject of Metaphysics," op. cit., pp. 861-862.
120 " Some Remarks on Fr. Owens'' St. Thomas and Elucidation,'"
op. cit., p. 61.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

501

within the created being. Consequently, Dr. Bobik's contention
that " existence is not what formally constitutes the meaning
of being," 121 is true in that "being qua being" refers to the
entitative composition of existential act and essential potency,
although we should not, of course, allow the scientific formula
of the metaphysician's subject to blind us to the exclusive
actualizing role played by the act of existing of each individual
being within its entitative composition.

C. Divine Science
Although! St. Thomas, in contrast to Aristotle, restricted the
subject of metaphysics to the beings of our natural experience,
he yet retained the Aristotelian name of "divine science" as
another synonym for metaphysics, and often asserted that
metaphysics" deals with divine things." 122 Though recognizing
the actualizing or ontologically constitutive role of esse in the
constitution of finite beings, we have preferred to stress the
scientific character of metaphysics, its intellectual method, and
the specifying role of its universal subject. While all the
actuality that a being contains is on the side of its act of
existing, as ultimately derived from God, it is our conviction
that the rich explanatory value of metaphysical knowledge
derives largely from its use of such principles and notions as
entitative act and potency, participation, proportional analogy,
and even its incidental employment of lesser and more restricted principles, such as the principle of matter and form of
the natural philosopher.
Fr. Owens, however, has preferred to stress almost exclusively
the efficiently causal role of God in constituting the existential
perfection of created beings. Fr. Owens admits that "necessities may' be seen in the act of being of each sensible thing." 128
but he confines his attention to the " reason why " of those
finite acts of existing. He admits that "existence as such ...
Fr. Owens' 'St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics,',
Cf., for example, Summa Contra Gentiles, I, 4 (S).
198 " The Intelligibilityt of Being," op. cit., p. 191.
101 "
199

op. cit., p. 80.

502

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

cannot be the subject of the science (of metaphysics)," but he
insists that "existence remains the aspect from which things
are treated in Thomistic metaphysics," 124 and, again, describes
the subject genus of Thomistic metaphysics " in a way that
leaves being outside the nature of every one of its instances." 125
Fr. Owens permits reference to the proof of God's existence
as a "process of making explicit what is implicit in the fact
of existence," as long as one keeps in mind that the efficiently
causal God is beyond the beings which require him. 126 Moreover, not only are such created beings dependent upon him for
their actuality, but in Fr. Owens' opinion the metaphysician
himself depends upon his proof of God's Existence as the only
sufficient ground to enable him to prove the cardinal real
distinction between a finite thing and its act of existing. 127 We
would agree with Fr. Owens to the extent that the proof of a
subsisting God enables us to reach a fuller understanding of
ens commune, and also with Fr. Klubertanz that "the full intelligibility of being is not reached until our study of the causes
of experienced being has led us to the existence of God"; 128
surely a knowledge of the existence of God is the most perfect
object we can know and the first knowledge in the via compositionis of the science of metaphysics. It is our conviction,
however, that the full wealth of implication of this knowledge,
and of the rich significance of the subsequent notions of participation and analogy, for example, can most easily and profitably be obtained only by the metaphysician's sustained attention to the many rationes contained within the proper
subject genus of his science, ens commune.
St. Thomas asserts in the Third Book of the Summa Contra
Gentiles that " first philosophy is wholly ordered to the knowing of God as its ultimate end." 129 Though it is generally
12 •

St. Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics (Milwaukee: Marquette Univ.

Press, 1957), p. 49.
125 Cf. text cited by note 71 supra.
108 Cf. An Elementary Christian Metaphysics, op. cit., pp. 95-96.
107 Ibid., pp. 108-104.
1os" A Comment on ' The Intelligibility of Being,' " op. cit., p. 195.
109 III Cont. Gent., c. 25 (9).

PRIME MOVERS

AND PRIM PROVERS

503

agreed nowadays that natural theology is not a separate area
from metaphysics, Fr. Klubertanz among others has suggested
that metaphysics might be studied at two levels of which
the first might be called " introductory metaphysics " and the
second "natural theology." 130 Such a natural theology would
involve a much more explicit study of God, in what ways he
is a cause, how we may name him, and so on. Dr. Bobik has
spoken of a phase at the end of metaphysics " using the description of God yielded in the proof of his existence to account for
the properties of God." 131 Such a phase in our opinion would
be too limited to yield much in the way of a fuller notion of
the divine Being. Fr. Klubertanz, though, suggested that "the
full contributions of the philosophy of nature can be used for
the final study of God," 132 and perhaps the employment of
analogous relationships between the metaphysical perfections
of finite beings and the divine Being might also be considerably
more helpful than merely analyzing the proof for his Existence.
There would, however, be a certain (efficient, final or exemplary) causal " structure" implicit in such predications by
analogy.
But while God can be known by causality, by negation, and
by transcendence, there remains the fact that what we know
of him by these various approaches is not his Essence but
rather only the truth of the proposition that " God exists." 133
And since God is the proper efficient, final and exemplary
Cause of created beings, we must agree with Dr. Bobik, in
opposition to Fr. Owens, that while metaphysics is the primary
science by reason of the nobility of its object, it is hardly the
primary or model type of science in any Aristotelian sense of
the term 134 (despite Fr. Owens' claims that the efficiently
130 "
131 "

A Comment on 'The Intelligibility of Being,' " op. cit., p. 195.
Some Disputable Points Apropos of St. Thomas and Metaphysics," op. cit.,

p. 415.
132 "A Comment on 'The Intelligibility
of Being,'" op. cit., p. 195.
138 Cf. for example, Summa Theologiae_ I,. q. 3, a. 4, ad 2; also, I Cont. Gent.,
c. 12(7).
1 "'" Some Remarks on Fr. Owens 'St. Thomas and Elucidation,'"
op. cit., p. 62.

504

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

causal dependence of finite beings upon God constitutes genuine
scientific linkage) .
Several contributors have suggested an even more universal
science than metaphysics, a sort of philosophical theology ( ?)
whose subject would be "transcendental being" (the specter
of Scotus begins to suggest itself here). Fr. Renard proposed
that " ens transcendentale is the subject of a metaphysics which
is concerned with divine being and creature." 135 Fr. Glutz
spoke of the " supreme moment of metaphysics, in which all
our knowledge is ultimately unified and the concept of being is
extended to its absolute transcendentality so as to embrace
even God." 186 Formally constituted by a supreme negative
judgment, such a science would have to rely heavily upon
analogous predication since, to our mind, God could no longer
be more profoundly known by way of (at least efficient)
causality. Fr. Owens has also defended the serviceable validity
of a metaphysical science of " ens transcendentale," arguing
that, once having demonstrated the existence of a being whose
nature it is to exist, " nothing prevents it [viz., the " nature of
being ... reached by the quia argument from effects"] from
furnishing a higher type of knowledge than that obtained by
reasoning directly from being as merely participated act." 187
Such a transcendental science would be properly metaphysical,
according to Fr. Owens, and its antecedent quia proof of God's
existence " does not at all weaken the capacity of being to
constitute a subject that serves as a basis for ' completely
demonstrative' reasoning from nature to properties." 188 That
is, the antecedent proof of God's Existence does not weaken a
rigorously demonstrative science of the transcendental divine
properties or Attributes (such as Truth, Goodness, Beauty,
etc.).
It may be objected that we have biased our survey of contemporary Thomistic dialogue by adopting in advance a preRenard, op. cit., p. 88.
Glutz, op. cit., p. 284.
187 " The ' Analytics ' and Thomistic Metaphysical Procedure," op. cit., p. 97n.
188 Ibid., p. lOS.
186
188

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

505

judicial methodological viewpoint, a perspective which might
seem especially biased in the questions of metaphysics' status
as" divine science" and especially of any metaphysical science
of " ens transcendentale." Surely the merits and fruits of any
" transcendental metaphysics " such as Fathers Renard and
Owens separately envisioned seem to us to be meagre and
nebulous at best, though perhaps worth the effort. But it is
our thesis that the momentous (re) discovery of the cardinal
importance of the real distinction in the metaphysics of St.
Thomas, and perhaps the subsequent exuberance that Thomists
had now achieved solidly based status on the current century's
existential bandwagon, have often obscured the decisive fact
that the metaphysician's acceptable proof (s) of God's Existence rest upon sharply restricted and even optimally selective
premisses (despite their tradition-bolstered status). Even so
fundamental a notion as the real distinction leaves many metaphysically significant factors of (especially human) reality
largely untouched. The fact that the act of esse may be the
intentionally ultimate metaphysical principle says little about
the problems of human freedom and responsibility, or about the
classical metaphysical incubus of the problem of evil.
The demonstrative passageway up to the notion of " ens
transcendentale " is a slender corridor that, despite its alleged
genuinely scientific rigor, reaches up into an atmosphere of
mounting metaphysical rarefaction and obscurity. True, many
of the accepted proofs of the fact of God's Existence are surely
demonstrative and provide justificatory news; but, like the best
informatively aesthetic classified advertisements, it is always
selectively controlled good news. The metaphysicians of " ens
transcendentale " must face the hard fact that the via judicii
is no wider (though more solid) than the preceding via resoluticmis. "Horizontal " inference on the level of " ens transcendentale," as envisioned by Fr. Owens, for example, in trying
to construct logical bridges linking the various divine Attributes (though of course, as everyone knows, God is Simple),
runs the risk of a sort of " theo-logical deism" by dint of the
metaphysician's occupationally hazardous professional myopia.

506

CONNOR J. CHAMBERS

For every premiss selected to prove (even indirectly) the
Goodness of God, a sturdy counter-argument can be formulated
to question the divine " permission " that, for example, infants
may suffer horribly, or that innocent and generous people may
find themselves more or less on the ontologically cruel short
end of the vital" dynamics of generosity."
It is our contention, therefore, that the logical bridges linking
" transcendental " properties or Attributes of God appear increasingly tenuous to the extent that they are seen to span
many abysmal metaphysical problems, such as that of the
existence of evil. And this is due precisely to the " transcendental" metaphysician's neglect of the sharply restricted and
almost sanguinely selective character of the premisses of his
metaphysical edifice-an objection which cannot be rebutted
by any appeal to the intensional ultimacy of the act of existing. If the ghost of Bafiez confronts the prim methodology of
Dr. Bobik, the specter of Molina must surely haunt the" transcendental metaphysics " of Fr. Owens.
For ourselves we would adhere to our original methodological
theme and subscribe or aspire to a metaphysical enterprise
whose subject is no more than ens commune. It has been our
growing conviction that despite the need to recognize and
appeal to the all-perfecting influence of the First Cause of all
finite beings, still, ens commune as the subject of metaphysics,
and even that Firsti Cause itself, can be better understood and
penetrated to the extent that the metaphysician is alert to the
intentional characteristics of his intellectual operations, and to
the various methodological procedures dictated by the structured rationes within the subject genus of his science.
As the eye of the owl is blinded by the brilliance of the
sun/ 39 so the metaphysician can only attain a quia demonstration of the existence of the First Cause of his formal subject.
He can come to a knowledge of what God " must be like " and
can recognize the created beings of his experience as similar to
God in some sense (though God cannot be considered as similar
139

Cf. the text cited in note 93 supra.

PRIME MOVERS AND PRIM PROVERS

507

to creatures, since the Exemplar cannot be said to be similar
to the image). Like the cautiously reticent owl, however, who
has been traditionally revered as a sort of sylvan sage in the
shadowy world of the evening, so the metaphysician can attain,
besides the knowledge of the fact of God's existence, a considerable number of well-knit rationes and principles which cut
across every category of limited being as being. And if he
remains faithful to the methodological exigencies of his professional procedure, and particularly to the universalizing
sequence of the via resolutionis which ultimately enfranchises
him in the unified consideration of his proper subject genus,
the final result can only be a richer knowledge of the subject
of his science and a more profound and meaningfully reverent
suspicion of the Essence of its First Cause.
CONNOR

Saint Louia University
Saint Louia, Miasouri

J. CHAMBERS

BOOK REVIEWS
Ethical Theories. A Book of Readings. Second edition, with revisions.
Edited by A. I. Melden. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc.,
1967. Pp. 550, with index. $7.95.
Moral Philosophy. A Systematic Introduction to Ethics and Meta-Ethics.
By Richard T. Garner and Bernard Rosen. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967. Pp. 367, with index. $6.95.
Making Moral Decisions. An Existential Analysis. By Louis D. Kattsoff.
The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965. Pp. 279, with index. Paper.
The Melden book has already achieved a well established reputation in
the first and second editions of the work. The advantage of the book then,
and now in its revised second edition, is that it contains, for the most part,
complete essays, avoiding the tendency elsewhere observed to present many
authors in an abbreviated and too fragmentary manner. To some extent,
this advantage of the Melden book is somewhat tempered by the fact that,
in an effort to represent adequately selections from past great authors in
moral philosophy, the book stops short of the contemporary period (the
last entry being Prichard's well-known essay in 1912 on "Does Moral
Philosophy Rest on a Mistake? ") . The omission of the lively contemporary period in ethics limits the usefulness of the book; no doubt, consideration of length and the desire to present lengthy excerpts from great moral
philosophers of the past dictated this choice for Melden, and it is true, on
the whole, that his selections of past authors are well chosen for an approach
to, and understanding of, the extensive contemporary period. The book
would be best used, then, where a two semester course in ethics permits
one semester's being devoted to the contents of the Melden book and the
other to the contemporary period.
The present work is a revision of the second edition. In this version, the
author has handled better the choice of selections from St. Augustine;
Mill's essay on utilitarianism is now presented in its entirety; Aquinas is
at least represented with his treatise on law; and Nietzsche also gets some
space. Somehow, the appearance of the selections in double columns
(though not observed in the Bentham selection) is not attractive. The
introductory essay, "On the Nature and Problems of Ethics," seems
rather rambling and not too helpful an illumination of just what the nature
of ethics is and what constitutes its problems. But the main appeal of the
book, comprehensive selections from representative great moral philosophers
up to the contemporary period, remains intact.

608

BOOK REVIEWS

509

The Garner and Rosen book is an interesting and worthwhile attempt
to do two things somewhat at once: summarize views on major topics in

moral philosophy; and support the views the authors think are correct, with
reasons given for rejecting the views they consider wrong or inadequate.
books in philosophy seek
The second effort is a refreshing one; too
merely to present views all the while indulging in the fiction that views can
be presented with utter objectivity and lack of commitment on the part
of the respective authors. Garner and Rosen argue forthrightly for moral
positions while presenting various views in moral philosophy, and the net
result is a book that engages the reader while informing him. Moral
philosophy comes alive in this sort of presentation.
Part One considers the more important normative theories in ethics,
including an opening chapter on how to evaluate theories in ethics,
followed by a chapter on the place and function of logic in normative ethics.
The remaining chapters of Part One consider the teleological theories concerning judgments of moral obligation under the topics of egoism and
utilitarianism, with the authors arguing for a version of utilitarianism;
deontological theories of obligation are next considered, and here the
authors argue for "act deontology"; theories of value are then examined,
with the authors maintaining the position that there are intrinsic values;
this position leads to a consideration of what things have intrinsic value
under the general question of what the good is, and here the authors
somewhat skirt a comprehensive resolution, contenting themselves with
saying that there are a number of things with intrinsic value, notably
pleasure. Part Two, on "Related Normative Questions," lays the foundation for the view that there is one best normative theory (or that at least
some views are better than others) by refuting the claim that moral
judgments are (simply) relative and, in a succeeding chapter, defending
a freedom of the will.
Part Three is devoted to meta-ethics. After an opening chapter on the
distinction between normative ethics and meta-ethics, the authors consider
cognitivist definist theories, cognitivist nondefinist theories, and noncognitivist theories. The authors find the most important cognitivist definist
positions wanting; they argue for one cognitivist nondefinist theory, the "a
posteriori act" theory, but also recognize that within the noncognitivist
camp, the " multifunctionalist performative " theory has merit. Hence, they
conclude that, in the field of meta-ethics, two theories are mote or less
equally tenable, whereas in the field of normative ethics, the one theory of
act deontology emerges as the single candidate.
The hook is highly commendable especially because the authors are
committed and, by being committed, engage the reader to make a similar
or different commitment. The various views, on the whole, are well
enough presented to enable the reader to make well-formed judgments on
his own (one exception is an inadequate, even faulty, presentation of a

510

BOOK REVIEWS

supposed illegitimate transition by Aristotle from the desired to the desirable
on pages 123-124; the authors fail to take into account the peculiar character of the one final end Aristotle is discussing in Book I of the Nicomachean
Ethics. where, in this context, an identity can be established between what
is and what ought to be). Helpful and adequate bibliographies accompany
each chapter. The book is handsomely printed and, given the content,
reasonably priced.
The Kattsoff book is interesting from another point of view. It moves
quite definitely away from theory in moral philosophy and puts its emphasis
on the process of making concrete moral decisions, taking into account the
existential moral situation individuals find themselves in when making
moral judgments. The approach is not in terms of moral philosophers but
what ordinary people say about these matters, though the author considers
the foundations underlying the views ordinary people have and the
decisions they make.
The opening two chapters, " Morals and Ethics," and " The Moral
Situation," raise preliminary distinctions and lay down the broad dimension
of a moral situation. Succeding chapters consider the form and characteristics of moral principles, and the specific moral principles which can serve
as norms for arriving at decisions in moral situations, for example,
hedonism, theological principles, the principle of duty, self principles,
societal principles, survival principles, and opportunistic principles. The
book then moves on to more practical problems aiming at deciding whether
or not an agent is acting morally or immorally. Some of the areas covered
are ends and means, judging the act, judging ends in terms of the good,
motives and consequences, and judging the person. The book then moves,
somewhat backward in trend of thought, to discuss the justification of
moral principles and the nature of moral statements, before going on to
consider such items as moral disagreements, and freedom and responsibility.
One chapter is devoted entirely to euthanasia, as an example of making
moral decisions. The author chose a diflic;ult example for illustration.
Kattsoff's resolution is not a very happy one. In an effort to try to bring
in the relevance of various principles, theological principles, the principle
of duty, a societal principle, and a hedonistic principle, the issue finally
becomes somewhat lost or, at best, confused. A rather devastating indication that this is what happens is Kattsoff's conclusion: "It is necessary
to say that an act [of euthanasia] may be praiseworthy even though
immoral. Its praiseworthiness may come from some of the consequences it
induces; its immorality from the fact that it goes counter to a moral
principles " (p. 255) .
On the other hand, the final chapter, " Temptation and Struggle," provides an interesting and worthwhile reflection on the distinction between
temptation and struggle, and on the special significance of struggle in man's
moral life. Whether Kattsoff is warranted in extending temptation in any

511

BOOK REVIEWS

significant sense to animals as well as men is a question to be discussed,
but apart from this point he recognizes the special moral character of
struggle, and puts the matter well in saying: " Struggle against temptation
means the awareness of a dichotomy in the world-good versus evil. The
anguish of soul that such struggle involves is the token of the knowledge
that morality is better than immorality" (p. 269), leading to the final
sentence of the book, " The ability to struggle against temptation is the
sign of the truly human being."
JoHN

A. OEsTERLE

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

The Sexual Doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan. By Dennis Doherty, 0. S. B.
Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet, 1966. Pages 389. Band 12,
Studien zur Geschichte der kath. Moraltheologie, Herausgegeben von
Michael MUller.
Giacomo de Vio Gaetano (1469-1534), known to history as Cardinal
Cajetan, is remembered both as a scholar and as an important figure in the
historical events of his own time. His scholarship is evidenced in his
commentaries on the Bible and on certain works of Aristotle. The principal
contribution which he made to theology is his commentary on Thomas
Aquinas' Summa theologiae.
Thoughout his life, from his entry into the Dominican Order when he
took the name Thomas until his death, he wished to be the faithful
exponent of the Angelic Doctor. So successful was he at this purpose that
it is difficult to elaborate a doctrine of Cajetan apart from that of Aquinas.
Cajetan's commentary was not only the first complete commentary on the
Summa of Aquinas but it remains the magisterial commentary. Thus, it is
printed in the Leonine edition of Aquinas' work and contemporary
Thomists rightfully question whether an opinion can be ascribed to
" thomistae communiter " if it is not taught by Cajetan.
As a man of his own times, Cajetan held influential positions in his own
Order, of which he was Master General, and in the Church, in which he
often served as Papal Legate. He was involved in such pressing contemporary problems as the marriage dispute of Henry VIII and negotiations
with Luther in Germany.
Intellectually, he appears better characterized as a medieval than as a
humanist. This judgment is that of Congar and it remains true in spite of
several recent attempts (e. g., J. Mayer, R. Bauer, M.-H. Laurent) to make
of him a humanist. Although he was devoted to the primacy of reason when
there was no solution to be found in Revelation, this method was more that

BOOK REVIEWS

of Aquinas than of the humanists. By rejecting a method based upon a
multiplication of authorities or upon an unnecessary multiplication of distinctions, he was only being faithful to Aquinas and attempting to revive
Thomism from the poor state in which it was found in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries.
Cajetan's general approach to theology was also true of his moral
theology: he remained the commentator on Aquinas. His writings share
the weaknesses and strengths of Aquinas. One such weakness is the
negativity towards sexual pleasure which characterized Catholic moral
teaching before Aquinas and found its way into his works, especially via
his respect for Augustine. Yet the reader of today must be cautious about
judging history in the light of present emphases on conjugal love and sexual
fulilllment within marriage. A second weakness is the androcentric orientation of traditional and Thomistic moral teaching. Again, however, feminism
is a social movement characteristic of the twentieth century.
On the doctrinal plane both Thomas Aquinas and Cajetan understood
human sexuality in a way which denied any validity to a dualistic approach. Doherty explains this well in developing two key principles of
Thomistic moral theology. The first of these principles is that the pleasure
proper to an action must be judged in terms of the goodness or evil of the
operation. Since sexual actions are obviously in accord with man's nature,
and thus are intended by the Creator, they cannot but be good; so also the
pleasure associated with them must be good.
Another principle of Aquinas which Cajetan explained and defended is
that concupiscence is not the formal determinant of original sin. Contrary
to certain sixteenth century views of man's depravity, Cajetan refused to
view human sexuality or human weaknesses in this area as constitutive of
original sin. Doherty also explains well the clear distinction which Cajetan
made between aversio and conversio in sin. This is definitely a contribution
which Cajetan made to theology and it remains today as a necessary principle in the understanding of moral evil.
With respect to marriage, Cajetan followed Aquinas concerning the ends
or goods of marriage. One can find in Cajetan, however, an important
distinction between the ends of sexual intercourse (the act of marriage) and
the state of marriage. Using the biological data at his disposal, he viewed
seminatio and thus the begetting of children as the end of the act. The
reader wonders why Doherty regards the biological data which the theologian employs as inconsequential; much of the recent discussion of marital
morality stems precisely from a better knowledge of the physiology of
sex in both men and women.
One area in which Cajetan did little to expand the thought of Aquinas
is that of Natural Law. Cajetan's contemporaries, Vitoria and Soto, made
significant contributions to moral theology in their explanation of the iU8
naturale. Doherty frequently mentions that, where Cajetan does not

BOOK REVIEWS

518

comment upon Aquinas or where his commentary is brief, one must understand his complete agreement with him. One wonders, then, why Aquinas'
full development of his idea of Natural Law is not given in more detail.
Lottin and others have traced the influence of Roman Law conceptions
(twofold or threefold division of ius; a ius common to men and animals)
through Isidore and Gratian to the thirteenth century.
As Doherty indicates, Albert the Great rejected a ius naturale which
would be common to both men and animals. Thomas Aquinas, while
mentioning the Roman Law authorities on the division of ius, always speaks
of reason as the formal element in law. Thus, while it is possible to distinguish the various metaphysical grades in man, it does not follow that
these grades as such constitute a moral law for man. The only moral law
for humans is a product of reason. What is prior in the order of being
(from a metaphysical point of view) is not prior in the order of morals.
Doherty seems to indicate that the generic, less properly human elements,
are the criterion for human morality. It seems doubtful that Aquinas or
Cajetan considered what is non-rational as a more basic principle of man's
moral law than what is specifically rational.
Cajetan did hold a rather strict position with respect to sexual sins.
Thus, he regarded kissing and other signs of affection as naturally ordered
to coition and thus seriously evil (except for the engaged!) . He presented
the traditional teaching on the reception of the Eucharist after pollution or
coition. Yet in principle he did teach that an act was not more virtuous
because it was more difficult and that the use of marriage was not sinful
for the partners.
Doherty's work concludes with a brief chapter in which he describes the
condemnation of certain of Cajetan's teachings on sexual morality and
Cajetan's response to these objections. There is a particularly valuable
bibliography of eleven pages and a comprehensive index.
The work is marred by only a few instances of poor translations from
Latin to English, e. g., " Pope Innocence VIII," " Difference is according
to agency and patience," " sins of luxury." In a work of this character
(a dissertation and a serious study) certain comments by the author seem
out of place, e. g. that Adam's feelings toward Eve are experienced by all
bachelors, that casuistic moral teaching is a morality of plumbing, a reference to Heloise in connection with Abelard's moral teaching, that the
casuists were proccupied with sexual questions even during prayer, that
fast laws are Mosaically interpreted (also an unwarranted slur on Moses
and the Jewish Law). It would also have been better for the author to omit
superficial references to serious contemporary moral problems, e. g. birth
control and celibacy for the clergy. The context in which Cajetan wrote
is surely not that of today and it would require a study far beyond the
limits of Doherty's treatment to attempt an application of Cajetan's principles to today's problems.

514

BOOK REVIEWS

This work provides an introduction to the life and writings of one of the
greatest Catholic moral theologians. The reader is led step by step through
the major areas of Cajetan's teaching on sexual morality and marriage.
It provides, especially for English-speaking theologians, a welcome addition
to the history of moral theology.
RoBERT

P. STENGER, 0. P.

Aquinas Institute School of Theology
Dubuque, Iowa.

The Emergence of Philosophy of Religion. By James Collins. New Haven:
Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 528. $12.50.

It would be interesting to know how many teachers of the philosophy of
religion have often wondered just exactly what it is that they are teaching.
Natural theology as a discipline is relatively clear, even though historically
there has been a difference of opinion as regards the source of evidence. · In
the Thomistic tradition natural theology i's the metaphysics of God, i. e.,
what man can know about God, however little, on the basis of reason alone,
even though inspired by revelation. In orthodox protestantism, especially
Calvinism, the emphasis was on revelation, not reason, and hence it consisted
in what man could say about God from the standpoint of reason, but only
insofar as the metaphysical could be deduced from faith, for the relative
autonomy of reason was denied.
But what is the philosophy of religion? James Collins has brought his
tremendous scholarship to bear upon this. question. However, he considers
the problem historically, not systematically, except for the last chapter. I
was under the impression that the philosophy of religion was born with
Kant and matured with Hegel. However, Collins would say that it began
with Hume. He is correct, if it is true-which is something I have been
completely unaware of-that " Hume would agree with Hobbes and Vico
that we know only what we can somehow make " (p. 88) . I had always
thought that the confusion of knowing with making began with Kant, and
that Hegel had to make Kant consistent by identifying, not confusing the
two.
Professor Collins has undertaken a task that needed to be done. He
attempts to show how the philosophy of religion came into being. I know
of no equivalent work. Only a few philosophers would be qualified to attempt the task. Collins mal{es all the correct distinctions. The critical
reader may read along, perhaps expecting to find Collins overlooking
something, some important distinction, some little nuance. But, no, it is
always there on the next page, or fifty pages later.
In the last chapter Collins wants to perfect the philosophy of religion by

BOOK REVIEWS

515

putting it on a realistic basis, a " theistic realism." This is a systematic
problem, and partly one of the" order of knowledge." Hence there must be
a clarification of both subject matter and method if the philosophy of religion is to make knowledge-claims. " The subject matter of the philosophy
of religion is the active relationship--conative as well as cognitive, social as
well as individual-between man and the living spiritual reality wherein
he seeks fulfillment (p. 443) ." The method is that of" integrative analysis,"
and this implies an autonomy for the discipline which has as its function
also the " religionizing of the Theory of God." In fact, the discipline is
to be the most autonomous of all, for it is to integrate metaphysics, ethics,
psychology, and comparative religions. This is understandable in terms of
some kind of neo-Hegelianism, but it seems to me quite unintelligible in
terms of realism. Was not one of the crief aims of Hegel that of getting
rid of the " realistic consciousness "?
I believe that Collins senses the difficulty. At one time he will deny the
autonomy of the philosophy of religion (p. 484) ; yet, at another time he
will seem to be a perfect Hegelian when he speaks of the philosophy of
religion in terms of the "evaluation of religion" (p. 483). Evaluate in
terms of what? Collins admits that the philosophy of religion on a realistic
basis does not as yet exist, but is in the making (pp. 425, 448, 481, 483,
488). I suspect that many philosophers, for different reasons, will doubt
even the possibility of this.
To accuse Collins of naivete is, perhaps, to condemn oneself. Yet, I
wonder. A plausible critique of Collins' thesis might be an: alternative one
which, apparently, he has never considered. It might begin with the last
two pages of the volume, in which Collins discusses the " university matrix "
of the philosophy of religion.
Could it be that (a) the philosophy of religion is not. a knowledgecategory .at all; (b) its being is based on the confusion between knowing
and making; (c) it is primarily an institutional and ideological category
demanding the relativizing of all religion; (d) it has meaning only in terms
of the increasing socializing of education, especially the state ownership of
universities, after the Enlightenment and the French Revolution; (e) its
essence as a " discipline " demands the denial of any " one, true religion "?
It is a thought, anyway!
WM. OLIVER MARTIN

University of Rhode ltland
Kingston, R. I.

516

BOOK REVIEWS

Gilbert of Poitiers: The Commentaries on Boethius. Edited by Nikolaus
Haring. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1966. Pp.
458. $9.00.
Fragen Der Sc/Wpfungslehre nach Jakob Von M etz 0. P. By Lother Ullrich.
Leipzig: St. Benno-Verlag GMBH, 1966. Pp. 895.
These two volumes are splendid contributions to the mounting treasure
of critical studies concerning medieval theology. Bishop Gilbert II of
Poitiers, one of the most important theologians of the first half of the
twelfth century, and at least the equal of Peter Lombard, was supported
by Pope Eugene III (1145-1158) after those who accused him of heterodoxy
failed in the course of Gilbert's own defense at the consistory of Reims.
Dr. Haring's historical record of the problems attendant upon the attacks
and defense of Gilbert's method and teaching is most admirable (pp. 8-18).
It is interesting to note that the number of manuscripts anent Gilbert's
commentary on the opuscula sacra of Boethius as discovered within this
century has mounted from eight to over thirty-nine, the latter number
consulted by Dr. Haring for his present edition. His notes on the manuscript tradition (pp. 84-42) and· on Gilbert's text of the Opuscula sacra
(pp. 48-47) could hardly be excelled. Since Boethius's work embraces his
two books, De Trinitate, the tract De Bonorum Hebdomade, and his defense
of the faith entitled Contra Euticen et Nestorium (addressed to John, a
Roman deacon), Dr. Haring presents Gilbert's commentaries in this order,
along with Gilbert's own prologue.
The editor's claim that Gilbert was a greater theologian than Peter
Lombard may be disputed by some readers. What can hardly be disputed
is Gilbert's outstanding contribution to theological method, as can be seen
in several examples: De Trin., I, 8, 12; Ibid., 6, 28 and 6, 29; De Heb.,
Prol. 10; Contra Euticen et Nestorium 8, 19. Finally, we congratulate Dr.
Haring upon the high quality of his index on authors, editors, place, and
manuscripts mentioned in this edition and his splendid glossary.
James of Metz taught at the University of Paris at the end of the
thirteenth century and the beginning of the fourteenth. Although he was
not so widely recognized as John (Quidort) of Paris, these two Dominicans,
centered at St. Jacques, were strong representatives of the Thomistic
school of that particular era. Dr. Ullrich presents the teaching of James
in reference to four problems anent creation: the possibility of absolute
creation, the fact of creation and its accomplishment by God, mediation in
creation, and particular questions about angelic knowledge. These problems
are presented especially as they are examined by James in his Commentary
on the Sentences.
By way of introduction, Dr. Ullrich offers the following literary classification of James' position in the field of commentaries on the Sentences

BOOK REVIEWS

517

and of theology taken generally: (1) The textual tradition of .James'
Commentary on the Sentences;
James of Metz and Thomas Aquinas;
(8) James of Metz and Herve Natalis; (4) John (Quidort) and his
Lectures on the Sentences: (5) The Thomasina Reading and the
anonymous Commentary on the Sentences found in the Bruges Codex
(Staatsbibliothek 491); (6) The writings on the Sentences from Durandus
of St. Porciano; and (7) Other relevant material.
As regards the textual tradition of James' Commentary of the Sentences,
the editor summarizes the conclusions of Decker, Grabmann, and Koch
concerning the history of James' teaching, namely, (a) that a Dominican
James of Metz read the Sentences in two distinct courses (Koch); (b)
that the record of his first reading is a Reportatum (Koch); (c) that his
second reading of the First Book of the Sentences is recorded by way of
Additiones; (d) that his first reading of the Sentences is concordant with
that of John of Paris; that James knew the Commentary of William Peter
of Godino and had read in the presence of Durandus of St. Porciano; and
(e) that James does not always adhere to the principles and conclusions of
Aquinas.
Basing his textual criticism on eleven manuscripts, for which he provides
an abundant analysis (pp.
the editor devotes the remaining portion
of the book to doctrinal analysis and summary. The special value of Dr.
tnlrich's work lies, not so much in his doctrinal summaries as in his
presentation of comparable texts (that is, among the aforementioned
authors) and comparable versions of James' writings.

F. c. LEHNER, o. P.
Dominican HoUBe of Studiea

Washington, D. C.

Fate, Logic, and Time. By Steven M. Cahn. New Haven and London:
Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 150, with bibliography and index.
$5.00.

A man is free, by Calm's definition, if and only if it is within his power
to perform a certain action and within his power to refrain from it.
Fatalist arguments of various types deny that men possess this dual power.
Cahn's book attempts to penetrate a type of fatalist reasoning derived from
the principle of Excluded Middle. According to one reading of that
principle, it is either true or false now that I will perform a specified act
at a specified future time. If it is true, then I and others are powerless to
prevent my doing it; if it is false, nothing in human power can make the
performance happen. Either way, it seems, the outcome is fated. Cahn i.'!

518

BOOK REVIEWS

convinced of, and puzzled by, the appearance of formal validity in this
argument, and sets out to determine how such an untoward inference could
flow from a law of logic. He first clears the air by exposing a current
misunderstanding that renders fatalism merely preposterous. Fatalism, he
explains, does not assert that an event will occur no matter what anyone
does, but rather that the actions men do perform are the only ones in their
power to perform.
A third chapter looks back to Aristotle, who exempted future contingent
propositions from the law of Excluded Middle, thereby reducing its
generality. The chapter following offers a study of the " Master Argument "
of Diodorus Cronos, which concludes that the events and actions that in
fact take place are the only ones possible. In his replies to objections raised
against Diodorus, Cahn advances Aristotle's solution as the only real escape
fron:t fatalism. The fifth chapter examines schools of theological fatalism,
with reference to major thinkers from Augustine and Boethius to the
present day. Cahn develops his own theological proof of fatalism. If we
allow that God knows every truth, he argues, then free will would make
it possible for me to render false some of the propositions God knows to
be true concerning my future actions. Chapter Six reviews an argument
drawn up by Richard Taylor who, like the author himself, does not profess
fatalism but feels that no attempts to refute this form of it have
succeeded.
A seventh chapter discusses the laws of logic. The fatalist arguments,
Cahn maintains, are logically unexceptionable if one accepts a hard,
" synthetic " version of Excluded Middle: " Every proposition must be
either true or, if not true, then false." The only way to avoid fatalism
is, again, Aristotle's way, which amounts to adopting a three-valued logic
in which future contingent propositions take the value " indeterminate,"
and retaining the " analytic " form of Excluded Middle: " Every proposition must be either true or false." This form of the law holds only as a
disjunction, and does not permit the philosopher to make trial assumptions
about the truth-value of either disjunct. From those now prohibited
assumptions the fatalist dilemmas can be generated. In his final chapter
Cahn attacks the static conception of propositionall truth upheld by many
modern logicians. He argues, once more on the side of Aristotle, that tense
is an uneliminable element of propositions, and that the truth-value of
certain kinds of proposition must be regarded as open to change. The book
closes with a critique of metaphysical positions that question the reality
of time.
Cahn's helpfully repetitious prose is marred in the chapter on Taylor by
an almost solecistic use of the word " condition." For example, " Assume
. . . that a sufficient condition of my having gone to a lecture yesterday is
my having my own notes from it " (p. 96) . On a more important point,
in setting up the fatalist arguments Cahn is much stricter with himself on

BOOK REVIEWS

519

questions of formal validity than on questions of meaning. This reveals
itself in his willingness to tolerate a premise that crops up in every one
of those arguments: " Assume that it is true at time t 1 that so-and-so will
perform an act A at a later time t 2 ." I assume at noon, let us say, that
the bank manager will lock his doors at the posted closing time, three
o'clock. But what does it mean to assume that it is true at noon that he
will close the bank at three? How does one make the latter assumption,
from which fatalist consequences appear to follow, as opposed to making
the former assumption, from which they do not follow? Cahn gives his
reader no instruction on this point. The fatalist premise, though it seems
perfectly in order as a sentence, remains at least unclarified if not hopelessly
unclear. It contains a phrase, "that it is true," whose only evident
function in the sentence is to bring on dilemma.
His trust in the clearness of that premise does not, however, prevent
the author from working out one way of disarming fatalist arguments. It
is a more labored way than the one he might have followed by putting
questions to the· key fatalist locution, but a clear and patiently reasoned
way in any event.

H. A. NIELSEN
University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory. By Irving M. Copi and James
A. Gould. New York: The MacMillan Company, 1967. Pp. 842, with
index. $4.50.
This book is a happy sequel to the authors' earlier collection of texts
which was entitled Readings on Logic. Whereas that book cited passages
from the great logicians from the time of Plato, Contemporary Readings in
Logical Theory concentrates on texts from twentieth century authorities.
The selections are grouped into nine headings: The History of Logic,
The Formal Approach, Meaning and Reference, The Theory of Types, Logic
and Ontology, Logic and Ordinary Language, Modal Logic, Deontic Logic
and Many Valued Logics. It is evident that all of the major areas in
contemporary logic are touched upon. The authors do an excellent job at
arranging the texts so that the reader can grasp the disputes and current
disagreements among logicians today. It is the opinion of this reviewer
that a teacher could build a fine course on the texts found in this book.
The reader must understand, however, that the authors have chosen to
limit themselves to texts which are in the tradition of symbolic logic, and,
to a lesser extent, of linguistic analysis. There are no texts from logicians
who devote themselves to the logical theories of the Far East, nor are there

520

BOOK REVIEWS

any selections from Neo-Scholastics. The passage from the writings of
Hao Wang does not deal with Buddhist logic, while the discussions of the
universal found in the fifth section on Logic and Ontology are in a
positivistic context only. This book contains a fine set of texts, but does
not exhaust the subject. Nevertheless, a skillful teacher can use the texts
that are presented and bring in other texts if he wishes. This is possible
because of the truly generous range of logical thought which the authors
provide.
A final observation remains: the authors have selected passages which
are readable. This is no mean feat. Many of the articles written by
contemporary logicians, especially in the tradition of symbolic logic, are a
hopeless jumble of symbols. Many readers despair of understanding them.
Copi and Gould have found texts which are difficult, but which are within
the scope of the average reader.
Now that the ramifications of symbolic logic are so complex that computers are preferred to the human brain, it is refreshing to see a revival of
interest in logical theory. In this area, the college student can be brought
to ponder the humanistic dimension of our technological society. A book
which accomplishes this is surely to be recommended.
EuGENE BoNDI, 0. P.
St. Stephen's Priory
Dover, Massachusetts

The Philosophical Foundations of Marxism. By Louis Dupre. New York/
Chicago/Burlingame: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1966. Pp. 240.
$2.95.

Professor Dupre has made in this work a very valuable contribution to
the understanding of Marx and Marxism. As he says in his preface, " a
book is still needed to introduce the reader directly to the original texts
of the major works of Hegel and Marx." Professor Dupre supplies this
direct introduction in a form which is as ideally suited to his purpose as
it is difficult to carry through. In each chapter he begins by sketching the
historical context and ends with critical observations and comparisons. To
his credit it must be said that he succeeds admirably in keeping his
exposition free of subjective elements. The reader is thus able to acquire
an accurate knowledge both of Marxism and of its Hegelian foundations.
To our knowledge, this is the first time such a presentation has been
accomplished in English.
In the first chapter the author follows the development of Hegel's social
theory. The second concentrates on Hegel's Philosophy of Right: its

BOOK REVIEWS

521

presentation of the Hegelian conception of the dialectic of individual and
state is a veritable tour de force. Chapter Three describes the formation
of Marx's philosophy in terms of the influence of the left Hegelians on
Marx. This is followed by two chapters which carefully analyze Marx's
evolution from criticism of Hegel to the development of his own brand
of humanism. The sixth chapter isolates The German Ideology as the
first clear formulation of Marx's specific contribution to human thought,
i. e., historical materialism. In Chapter Seven Professor Dupre discusses
Marx's application of historical materialism in The Poverty of Philosophy
and The Communist Manifesto. The final chapter is entitled "A Critique
of Historical Materialism."
It is in this final chapter that we find a key sentence: " By his acceptance of the dialectic as both a real and ideal ultimate, Marx remains faithful to the basic Hegelian thesis that the rational is real, and the real
rational." Although much to the point, this statement is ignored in
current works-especially Soviet-on latter-day Marxism and MarxismLeninism.
A reader versed in contemporary Marxism and Marxism-Leninism would
be tempted to fault Professor Dupre for calling into question the use of
the term "materialism" to describe Marx's views. "At first sight, certain
passages seem to prove Marx's materialism beyond question. . . . Yet,
Marx never discusses the nature or origin of the mind itself. . . . Ontological problems are never brought up by Marx, and whenever they appear,
as in the discussion of French materialism, they are reinterpreted in the
humanistic terms of historical materialism." The fact of the matter is that
this is the case and it needs to be stressed in view of the constant distortions found in Soviet works on Marxism. However, Professor Dupre does
not leave the matter there. He goes on to show that the later misunderstandings of Marx's materialism were due, at least in part, to Marx
himself. By limiting his dialectic to a specific social-historical situation,
i.e., capitalism, Marx undermines the necessary character his dialectic
would need in order to survive as an over-all heuristic principle. This
negatively affects the dialectical humanism of Marx's historical materialism.
That Professor Dupre is basically sympathetic to Marx's dialectical
humanism is evident from the paragraph with which he closes his book:
" One cannot but regret this trend toward economism in a philosophy which
contained such a profound and original theory of action. The subject of
Marx's philosophy is man as a self-creating, dynamic, and historical being
who shapes his destiny in a real (not a purely ideal) relation to the world.
Its starting point is the pre-reflective and wholly given reality of the praxis
by which man, in communion with his fellow man, appropriates nature. Its
end is a messianic salvation of man so total that all need for a transcendent
redemption ceases to exist. Yet, its economistic limitation has converted
this humanism into a rigid system of oversimplifications which as a rule

BOOK REVIEWS

of action leads to terror and constitutes a dangerous threat to human
dignity." This is also why the Soviets make no pretence at liking Dupre's
view of" Marx the existentialist" (cf. V. V. Lazarev, "Ekzistenvialistskaja
koncepcija celoveka v SsA," in Voprosy filosofii No.3, [1967], pp. 160-169).
Professor Dupre's book is an indispensable prolegomenon for the understanding of contemporary Marxism and Marxism-Leninism. It could be
profitably followed up by Richard T. DeGeorge's Patterns of Soviet
Thought (University of Michigan Press, 1966) and the publications of the
Institute of East-European Studies, which specializes in dealing with what
Marx has become in the form of contemporary Soviet philosophy.
THOMAS

J. BLAKELEY

Boston College
Cheatnut Hill, Mass.

Completeness in Science. By Richard Schlegel. New York:
$7.50.
Century-Crofts, 1967. Pp.

Appleton-

Richard Schlegel has investigated the notion and the possibility of
completeness in science. His work is especially valuable for distinguishing
the various types of completeness. Our description of nature can never
be complete because of the countless facts that can be discovered, and also
because we could never hope to completely describe every act of description
(i. e., we always need another new description to describe the present act
of description-and this leads to an infinity of descriptions). Scientific
explanations are likewise incomplete for two reasons: any given theory is
concerned only with a limited aspect of the universe, and any theory must
begin with certain assumptions unexplainable within the theory.
The most obvious example of incompleteness arises from quantum
mechanics; the Uncertainty Principle is a statement of the limitations on
our knowledge of subatomic phenomena. It is quite generally agreed that
the physicist is unable to gather a complete description of these microparticles due to the fact that the very act of measurement alters the
properties of the particles. Schlegel draws an analogy between: (1) the
scientist's inability to describe his own descriptive acts;
the indecisiveness (incompleteness) stated in Gi:idel's Theorem; (3) the loss by atomiclevel entities of properties that may be described in macroscopic physics.
There is also a section discussing possible completeness in cosmology.
I think that Schlegel's attempt to give a complet6 analysis of completeness leads to some rather meaningless conclusions. This is especially true
of his discussion of complete descriptions. Common sense tell us that it is
impossible to describe every property of every single atom and particle in

528

BOOK REVIEWS

the universe; no detailed philosophical discussion is needed to know this.
The book would have been more profitable had Schlegel investigated in
greater detail generalized descriptions (e. g., "all sodium atoms in the
unexcited state have eleven electrons ") ; generalization always gives us a
degree of completeness. A complete description might imply an enumeration of all properties of a particular entity, or it might be a statement
valid for all the entities of a similar nature. It is these latter generalized
statements which are the usual material of a science, and it is only here
that we need look for any complete descriptions.
This weakness is totally overshadowed by Schlegel's excellent treatment
of incompleteness in quantum theory. He very clearly exposes the allimportant role of the observer in quantum measurements. The reader must
be familiar with the concepts of quantum mechanics in order to follow this
section, but there is no need for a special competency in the mathematics.
There can be no doubt that science gives us an incomplete knowledge
of nature. The lesson of Schlegel's book is that we should look to other,
non-scientific, types of knowledge in order to learni more. In our scientific
age we tend to think that, if we wait long enough, some scientist will find
the answer. Schlegel reminds us that the non-scientists should also give
some answers.
JoRDAN FINAN,

0. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Waakington, D. C.

The Domain of Logic According to Saint Thomas Aquinas. By Robert W.
Schmidt, S. J. The Hague: Martinus Nijho:ff, 1967. Pp. 368 with
bibliography and index. 4ii! guilders.
The precise subject of Logic has been problematic since the era of
Aristotle, its recognized founder. Attempts at the solution of this multidimensioned problem have been made, some of which have been relatively
successful. But the shift of emphasis in Logic over the last century to
mathematics and linguistic analysis has brought about an unexpected rise
in its popularity and added novel dimensions, and more confusion, to the
original problem. Reputable logicians like Morris Cohen and Ernest Nagel,
authors of An Introduction To Logic, have expressed their concern about
this problem: "there is a bewildering Babel of tongues as to what logic is
about." Most contemporary logicians, aware of this problem and hopeful
that its adequate solution is not far off, are equally aware that this
problem is indigenous to Logic because of its ambivalent nature as both an
art and a science.
Through the instrumentality of Thomas Aquinas, the author of this

BOOK REVIEWS

book offers some partial answers. Fr. Schmidt clearly states in the Preface
the reasons which prompted him to undertake such a scholarly study:
" its aim and scope is to determine what St. Thomas considered Logic to be,
exactly what its domain is, and, more specifically in Thomas' own terminology, what constitutes the subject (the genus subjectum) of which this
science of logic treats." Fidelity to this stated plan is one of the singular
values of the book. Fr. Schmidt vindicates his role of being an intermediary
in this scientific investigation by an excellent choice of quotations relevant
to the problem under discussion. He is equally scholarly in his frequent
interpretation of ambiguous and disputed texts. As a result, this book is,
in the opinion of the reviewer, a genuine contribution to the field of Logic.
Its distinctive historico-exegetical approach to the problem enhances its
value and attractiveness.
The author constantly addresses himself to the original problem in
order " to discover and delimit the domain of logic" (p. 175}. Employing
the dialectical method, he clearly: delimits the partial problems and makes
the quotations of the Angelic Doctor more meaningful. In the opening
chapters of the book Fr. Schmidt is concerned with the exact status of
Logic in relation to the Arts and Sciences. His conclusions are more
directional than genuinely demonstrative, insofar as they tend to favor
its natural uniqueness. This major conclusion can hardly be labeled
original, yet the analysis is sufficiently profound. Then, in Chapters Three
to Six he pursues an in-depth study of the various entities alleged to be
the proper subject of Logic: " the operations of reason, ens rationis, intentions, the mode of predication, and the true and the false" (p. 49). He
concludes rather forcefully that the proper subject of Logic is nothing other
than positive rationate being, i.e., those entities which have existence only
in the realm of thought but do not have non-existence in their definition.
Next, he analyzes the intentional and relational dimensions of positive
rationale being itself. The purpose of this multi-dimensional investigation
is to determine how, if at all, either or both of these forms of rationale
being are grounded in real being. In Chapters Seven to Nine he shows wlvy
the mind develops many forms of intentionality in its normal ratiocinations: universality, attribution and consequence. The Conclusion of the
book is a capsule summary of the doctrine already delineated in the
main chapters.
For many readers of the Traditional school this book will prove to be
a good review of some basic logical notions. It is likewise an excellent
introduction to the fundamental elements of Traditional logic for logicians
who really have little o:u no acquaintance with it. Traditionalists who are
enga,ged in the teaching of Logic will find this book to be a handy anthology
of Thomas' writings on basic logical points.
This reviewer noted a few shortcomings: the unnecessary retention of
Latin in the pertinent quotations of Thomas, the tendency to labor the

BOOK REVIEWS

obvious and needlessly to repeat some phrases. Though he seriously tried to
analyze the relationship between Logic and Mathematics, the author's results
left much to be desired. Frequent shifting in languages (Latin-English)
might sufficiently account for the score of typographical errors. It is important to note that " deductione " on the last line of page 273 should read
"inductione." Notwithstanding these minor criticisms all logicians are
indebted to Fr. Schmidt for his scholarly contribution.
DENNIS

c. KANE, O.P.

Providence OoUege
Providence, R. I.

Petrarch: Four Dialogues for Scholars. Edited and newly translated into
English by Conrad H. Rawski. Cleveland: The Press of Western
Reserve University, 1967. Pp. 209, with notes, bibliographies, and
indexes. $7.45.
Among all the Renaissance writers of the Black Death era, the Venetian
Petrarch clearly reflects the melancholy which was to characterize the
movement through the early part of the sixteenth century. Dr. Rawski
has aptly selected four dialogues which clearly represent the dialectics of
his time: " On the Abundance of Books," " On the Fame of Writers," " On
the Master's Degree," " On Various Academic Titles," and appended three
letters which offer a clearer indication of his character: A Letter to
Boccaccio, from Pavia, October 28, 1366; a Letter to Donato Albanzani,
from Padua, April 22, 1367; and a Letter to Giovanni Malpaghini, from
Arqua, sometime before the end of 1370. In the last-cited letter, Petrarch
not only recognizes the illness of his time (melancholy), but also what
seemed to be the most obvious natural remedy, namely, study as involving
as much travel as possible.
Dr. Rawski's scholarship, as manifested in his extensive bibliographie&
and notes, can hardly be disputed. His record of historical events related
to Petrarch's life, his cross references to ancient Roman and Greek authors
(notably\ Cicero, Seneca, and Boethius), other Petrarch works not directly
represented in this book, as well as both common and contemporary
medieval sources, and his accounts of Latin and English philology make
this book an especially valuable reference work on the fourteenth-century
culture of western Europe.

F. c. LEHNER, 0. P.

Daminican H ouae of StudiiJ8
Washington, D. 0.

BOOKS RECEIVED
A New Catechism, Catholic Faith for Adults, New York: Herder and
Herder, 1967. Pp. 510. $6.00.
Adolfs, Robert, The Grave of God. New York and Evanston: Harper and
Row, 1967. Pp. 157. $4.50.
Community of St. Severin, Introduction by Rev. John E. Corrigan, Confession, Meaning and Practice. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 127. $.95.
Conway, Msgr. J. D., What They Ask About Marriage Morality. Notre
Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 118. $.95.
de Albornoz, A. F. Carrillo, Religious Liberty. New York: Sheed and
Ward, 1967. Pp. 209. $5.00.
de Clety, Charles Winckelmans, S. J., The World of Persons. New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1967. Pp. 444. $8.50.
de Smedt, Emil-Joseph, Parent-Adolescent Dialogue. Notre Dame, Indiana:
Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 96. $.75.
Danielou, Jean, S. J. Introduction to the Great Religions. Notre Dame,
Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 159. $.95.
Davis, Charles, A Question of Conscience. New York: Harper & Row,
Publishers, 1967. Pp. 278. $6.95.
Evely, Louis, Credo. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967.
Pp. 179. $8.95.
Gotesky, Rubin, Personality: The Need for Liberty and Rights. New
York: Libra Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 92. $8.50.
Hazo, Robert G., The Idea of Love (Concepts in Western Thought Series).
New York/Washington/London:
Frederick A. Praeger, 1967. Pp.
488. $7.95.
McGill, V. J., The Idea of Happiness (Concepts in Western Thought
Series). New York/Washington/London:
Frederick A. Praeger,
1967. Pp. 860. $6.95.
Moore, Charles A. (Ed), The Chinese Mind. Honolulu: East-West Center
Press, 1967. Pp. 402. $9.50.
Moore, Charles A. (Ed.), The Indian Mind. Honolulu: East-West Center
Press, 1967. Pp. 458. $9.50.
O'Neill, Colman, 0. P. New Approaches to the Eucharist. Staten Island,
N. Y.: Alba House, 1967. Pp. 126. $8.95.
Ong, Walter J. S.J., The Presence of the Word. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1967. Pp. 360. $6.95.
Oraison, Marc, Harmony of the Couple. Notre Dame, Indiana: Fides
Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 120. $.95.

526

BOOKS RECEIVED

527

Parker, G. F., A Short Account of Greek Philosophy. New York: Barnes
& Noble, Inc., 1967. Pp. 194. $5.00.
Richard, Robert L., S. J., Secularization Theology. New York: Herder &
Herder, 1967. Pp. 190. $4.95.
Schachem Harold, The Meaning of the Second Vatican Council. Notre
Dame, Indiana: Fides Publishers, Inc., 1967. Pp. 95. $.95.
Staude, John Raphael, Max Scheler-An Intellectual Portrait. New York:
The Free Press, 1967. Pp.
$6.95.
Vander Marek, William H., O.P., Towa:rd A Christian Ethic. Glen Rock,
N. J.: The Newman Press, 1967. Pp. 170. $4.95.
Weiss, Paul, The Making of Men. Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern
lllinois University Press, 1967. Pp. 157. $4.95.