THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE oF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

VoL. XXXII

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

I.

EXISTENCE

No.2

APRIL, 1968

CRISIS OF FAITH?

OF THE CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM

1. Testimony of the Supreme Pontiff Paul VI to the Synod

P

of Bishops

AUL VI, having frequently deplored the existence o£ the
crisis concerning the Magisterium o£ the Church, especially on the occasion o£ the Wednesday general audiences, deemed it his duty to manifest anew his preoccupations
in his inaugural Allocution to the Synod o£ Bishops, Sept. 29,
1967, in these words:
The earnest concern for the faithful preservation of doctrine, which
was voiced so solemnly at the start of Vatican II, must guide our
post-conciliar period. Indeed, it must now be displayed with even
greater vigor by those in the Church who have received Christ's
mandate to teach and spread the Gospel message and to preserve
the " deposit " of faith; for today the dangers threatening the
deposit of faith are more numerous and more serious, enormous
dangers connected with the irreligious outlook of the modern
mentality and insidious dangers cropping up within the Church

147

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LUIGI CIAPPI

itself. Some teachers and writers are trying to give expression to
Catholic doctrine, but they often seem to be more concerned about
adapting the dogmas of faith to secular forms of thought and
expression than about following the norm of the Church's Magisterium. They thus give free run to the view that, disregarding the
requisites of sound doctrine, one may select only those truths of
faith that are admissible in the judgment of one's personal instinctive preference and reject the rest. As this erroneous opinion would
have it, conscience is free and responsible for its own actions; it
may claim its rights even in preference to the rights of truth,
foremost among which are the rights of divine Revelation (cf. Gal.
1:6-9). Moreover, the doctrinal patrimony of the Church may be
subjected to review in order to give Christianity new ideological
dimensions quite at variance with the theological ones which
genuine tradition, with its immense reverence for God's word, has
traced ouU
2. Awareness of the crisis on the part of the Synodal Fathers
Among the subjects presented to the First Synod of Bishops
celebrated in Rome in October of 1967 figured the following:
Some dangerous modern opinions. A theism. Among these
opinions there was singled out, in the field of ecclesiology, a
certain crisis of the divine authority of the Magisterium of the
Church. In fact, the synodal presentation document spoke of
the opinion of those who reduce the office of the Magisterium to
the task of registering the religious conscience of the community,
gathering together and sanctioning with its own authority
those truths which flourish and are developed in such a collective conscience. Harkening back, then, to the condemnation
which emanated from the Holy Office, with the decree Lamentabili of July 3, 1907, against the Modernists who upheld the
emancipation of exegesis from the Magisterium of the Church
and reduced the task of the Church to that of approving the
opinions prevalent in the learning Church, 2 the same presentation document insinuated that the modern crisis could well be
held as a symptom of neo-modernism.
Another, although less serious, indication of the cnsts was
L'Osservatore Romano, Sept. 30, 1967.
Enchiridion Symbolorum, Denziger-Schonmetzer, ed. XXXIII
n. 3406.
1
2

(Herder, 1964),

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

149

pointed out both in the presentation document offered to the
Fathers and in the report made to them by His Eminence,
Michael Cardinal Browne. After calling to mind that the
Magisterium, even when it does not define, remains an organ
divinely instituted for the teaching of the faithful to which is
due a religious submission, even though this is not to be
identified with theological faith, the two documents lamented
that among Catholics not all profess due submission to the
authentic ordinary Magisterium of the Church.
But, notwithstanding the fact that the report had been made
with moderation in judgment and without any indication of the
seriousness and extension of this crisis, and in a more moderate
tone than that used by the Supreme Pontiff in his inaugural
Allocution, it did not draw unanimity of consent. Nor does
this cause any surprise. In fact, the chronicle of the Synod
has informed us that a great number of the Fathers judged the
presentation document on the actual doctrinal and disciplinary
situation of the Church to be negative, ignorant of the advances
achieved after the Council, not completely responsive to the
reality of the facts, which have many encouraging features, and,
therefore, that the presentation document was alarmist and
should be set aside. The history of Vatican II is, in part,
repeated.
Not all the synodal Fathers, as was expected, shared the
optimism of the protesters; opposition, then, was inevitable and
it exploded with particular vigor in regard to the lamented
crisis of the Magisterium. Without giving the names of the
authors of the various interventions and of the Conferences
represented by them (in order not to violate secrecy and to
give rise to unpleasant reactions), we limit ourselves to reference to the essential content of the opposing judgments.

A. Prevalent agreement of judgments on the existence of
the crisis
a. Crisis of the M agisterium in the conscience of the faithful

The synodal Fathers who, in the name of the Episcopal
Conferences of the more diverse and distant countries of the

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LUIGI ClAPP!

Catholic world, expressed their agreement with what was deplored in the presentation document, brought to light various
aspects of it, more or less serious and widespread. The spreading of an attitude of diffidence and of neglect with regard to the
ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiffs and of the
Bishops was lamented by many of them. Others expressed the
judgment that, among the opinions singled out in the presentation paper, there were some that were not only dangerous but
also false. Someone brought up the existence of signs of doubt
and uncertainty, too, in matters of faith and morals, even
among priests and religious. There was one, moreover, who
deplored the lack of full assent shown by some toward the
solemn documents themselves of the Magisterium. The fact
was likewise brought up that some claim for themselves the
unlimited faculty to discuss even in public the more difficult
and delicate problems of dogma and moral. The crisis of the
Magisterium, another Father observed, is institutional, because
some claim to submit the Teaching Authority to the judgment
of the charismatics, keeping open for discussion all the things
which have not been defined and limiting the normative value
of the documents, even conciliar documents, to the times in
which they emanated.
However, while deploring the obfuscation of faith and of
obedience in the conscience of many of the faithful in their
views concerning the Magisterium, the Fathers reaffirmed with
the Council the right to freedom in scientific research, the duty,
on the other hand, of the Hierarchy to promote studies and
dialogue, in the firm conviction that the Magisterium is not an
obstacle to dogmatic and scientific progress but rather a light
and a salutary guide.

b. Crisis of the M agisterium in the conscience of Pastors
There was no lack of synodal Fathers who humbly and
frankly held that one of the principal causes underlying the
lamented crisis in the Christian people can be found among
many Pastors, namely, in the diminished awareness of their
own responsibilities. Indeed, not all the Masters of the faith

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CRISIS OF FAITH?

151

by divine right seem to have a clear awareness that the grace
of the theologian is one thing, that of the bishop another; that
the bishop is, at it were, the sign of the true rule of faith.
Some of them, not fulfilling with zeal and firmness their proper
office, namely, that of proposing with clarity and authority
the certain and indisputable truths of faith and morals, have
permitted surprise and scandal to arise among the faithful by
the dissensions made evident to them among exegetes and theologians on points of Catholic doctrine which have been held up
until today to be fundamental and definitive. The Bishops,
observed one distinguished prelate with a certain wry humor,
must not be dumb dogs. 3

B. Prevalent disagreement of judgments on the existence
of the crisis
Although not daring to contest the existence of a certain
crisis of the Magisterium, both in the conscience of the faithful
and in that of some Pastors, many Fathers believed it their
duty and right to attentuate the seriousness and the dimensions
of the crisis. Wherefore, not a few were in agreement in saying
that, as with other aspects of the life of the Church, so also in
the functioning of the Magisterium and of the respect due to it
there is a crisis of development rather than one of decay and
serious weakness. In our time, then, both Pastors and faithful
would act substantially in a way more worthy of persons
conscious of their own rights and duties, of the legitimate
autonomy which belongs also to the faithful. Rather, the crisis
must be imputed, at least in part, to the repeated impediments
placed by Authority to scientific research and to the manifestations of personal opinions. Other Fathers singled out the danger
of deeming erroneous what in reality are attempts at progress,
at the conquest of old ideologies, at the purification and
strengthening of the faith. One other made the observation
that the way of Authority does not favor advancement. What
is more important, today, is adaptation to modern thought
3

Cf. "II Sinodo dei Vescovi," La Civilta Cattolica (Nov. 4, 1967), pp. 289-290.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

and manner of speaking. As was expected, none of the Fathers
defending the actual situation thought it opportune to promote
attentiveness to the Magisterium crisis in the conscience and
activity of the holy Pastors.

II.

REMEDIES FOR THE CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM

I. Remedies

indicated and offered by the Holy Father

Paul VI
In his inaugural Allocution to the Synod the Pope constantly
indicated as the first and principal remedy for the crisis of faith,
which is extended also to the Magisterium, the revival of the
exact notion of faith, reminding all believers that:
Faith is not the fruit of an arbitrary or purely naturalistic interpretation of God's word, just as it is not the religious expression
which springs from the collective opinion, deprived of authorized
guidance, of those who say they believe; and much less is it acquiescence in the philosophical or sociological currents of the fleeting
historical moment. Faith is the adhesion of our whole spiritual nature
to the wondrous, merciful message of salvation that has come down
to us through the luminous and secret ways of Revelation. Faith is
more than a process of inquiry; it is above all a certainty. It is
not the fruit of our inquiring search; it is a mysterious gift, summoning us to take part docilely, promptly and trustingly in the
dialogue which God initiates with our souls.4
And in the conviction that faith is not the fruit of our
investigations and discussions but the gift of God (Eph. 2: 8) ,
Paul VI indicates that the arm of defense and the rising
increase of faith lie above all in and through prayer and he goes
on to say:
For this reason we considered the safeguarding of the faith so
imperative after the close of the Council that we invited the whole
Church to celebrate a " year of faith " in honor of the two Apostles
the chief teachers and witnesses of Christ's Gospel. The
of this year is to meditate on the very faith handed down to us and
to assess in the modern context the decisive function this fundamental virtue has for the stability of our religion and the vitality of
• L'Osservatore Romano, Sept. 30, 1967.

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

153

the Church, for building up God's kingdom in souls, for ecumenical
dialogue and for the genuine contact for renewal that Christ's
followers intend to make with the world of today. We wish in
this way to strengthen our own faith as teachers, witnesses and
pastors in God's Church, so that Christ, living and invisible, her
sole and supreme Head, may find it humble, sincere and strong.
We wish also to strengthen the faith of all our children, especially
those who pursue the study of theology and religion, so that with
a renewed and watchful awareness of the Church's unalterable and
certain teaching they may give wise collaboration to the furtherance
of the sacred sciences and to the maintenance, in light and in
fruitfulness, of the inviolable aim of Catholic teaching. 5
Q.

Remedies suggested by some synodal Fathers

There were those among the Fathers who, with the aim of
surmounting the actual crisis of faith in the Magisterium, asked
that the Synod reaffirm the duty of submission to the Supreme
Pontiff. Another Father underlined the necessity of a clear
episcopal magisterium, a necessity advised especially by Seminary professors; another, then, insisted on the duty of an
authoritative concordant teaching, on the collegial level or at
least the fruit of a continuous communion among the Bishops
of individual nations, so as to avoid the situation that one
Pastor would approve opinions that another shortly afterwards
would declare to be false, temerarious or dangerous. It is not
allowed, one Father energetically entreated, that another authority than that of the authentic Magisterium prevail in the
Church.
3. Remedies

proposed by the synodal Commission and
approved by the majority of the Fathers

The members of the Synod-144 out of ISS-demonstrated
that they were without doubt in agreement in maintaining that

the exercise of the authentic Magisterium, singly or collegially,
is the medicine or tonic more adapted to giving vigor and
firmness back to the faith and to the submission due to the
representatives of Jesus Christ, the author and perfecte1· of our
faith (Heb. IQ: 2) .
"Ibid.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

The dogmatic and theological motives that induced the
Fathers to approve also the second principle, expressed above,
as a secure antidote to the " dangerous modern opinions," were
those which had been expressed by the authors of various
interventions and which the text of the Report summed up in
this brief synthesis: According to the doctrine of the Church
the office of teaching matters regarding faith and morals authentically, that is, with the authority of Christ, has been
confided to all the successors of the Apostles. It is the task,
moreover, of the Roman Pontiff, teaching personally, and of
the Episcopal College united in Ecumenical Council, to meet
the spiritual needs of the Christian people with the assiduous
exercise of such a magisterium. But this is not enough, because the individual Pastors in their respective dioceses or
regions are abliged, according to their proper office, to the
same most grave duty. In our day the sacred ministry is
exercized more fittingly in collegial form, that is, through
Episcopal Conferences. But it must be executed by each one
of them in communion with the teaching imparted by the
bishops of the whole world and principally by the Apostolic
See. It will then happen that, with a regard for the needs of
the whole Church, reciprocal help will be offered to us, disturbances avoided and unity reinforced.
On a subordinate but related level, remedies were indicated
which the Pastors ought to suggest to their subjects.
All the faithful, then, must be clearly taught, in ways corresponding
more to today's spiritual needs, about the duty which they have to
offer filial obedience and sincere adherence to the declarations of
the Church, although in various degrees, in keeping with the
distinct character of each of these decrees, as was stated in the
Acts of Vatican Council II. 6

III.

RECALL TO THE DIVINE AuTHORITY oF THE MAGISTERIUM
IN THE YEAR OF FAITH

Given the diagnosis and the therapy that the Synod of
Bishops formulated to surmount the actual crisis of the Magis6

Cf. Dogmatic Constitution Lumen gentium, c. III, n. ft5.

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

155

terium of the Church, one must logically conclude that this
crisis has its true origin in a diminished " sensus fidei " in the
supernatural value of the office of masters that the divine
Savior communicated to His legitimate representatives.
Indeed, if we look at the teaching Church, one has the
impression that not all the Bishops are fully aware of their
proper and incommunicable charism of teaching in the name of
Jesus Christ, and thus with divine authority, to which is due
the assent of faith or at least religious, internal assent even
on the part of men of science, notwithstanding the human gifts
and charisms which these men can boast of or believe they
possess.
On the part, then, of the learning Church, it must be evident
that many, both priests and laypersons, claim that they have
the right to interpret and formulate anew the same dogmatic
definitions, with the optimum intention of rendering them more
intelligible and acceptable to Christians or non-Christians of
our times. Moreover, they claim that they can pass judgment
on the declarations or prescriptions of the authentic, ordinary
Magisterium, because they maintain that it is no longer definitive, infallible and irreformable, and therefore it is to be
accepted, rejected or interpreted in accordance with the value
of the theological or philosophical reasons brought forward by
it to reconcile the assent of the faithful.
In the expectation that the Supreme Pontiff, accepting the
petition made to him by the Synod of Bishops, will issue a
positive document on the truths " of faith and morals " which
seem today to be more opportune to profess, defend and investigate, it will be useful for all good Catholics to reflect in
some degree on their own faith in the divine Magisterium of
the Church in this "Year of Faith " in the light of the documents that the Supreme Pontiffs and the Ecumenical Councils
Vatican I and Vatican II have issued precisely with the intent
of illuminating our path as believers and thus of leading us to
the glorious goal of eternal salvation.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

l. The divine institution of the M agisterium and its object:
the truth to be believed and to be practised

The existence in the Church of a power, not only of vigilance
and of direction but also of full and supreme right of teaching,
in the name of Christ the Redeemer, all the members of the
Church, and, indeed, all men, " the faith they must believe and
put into practice " (" fidem credendam et moribus applicandam ") ,1 is a dogma of faith. It is equally a truth of faith, even
though not defined, that the responsible subject of such power
is the College of Bishops, in communion with the Roman
Pontiff, to whom such power belongs also by personal title,
without any restriction as to its exercise.8 On the other hand,
the subject of authentic but not infallible power, one limited to
determined territories or subjects, is every individual residential
bishop. 9
As to object, that is, doctrinal extension, it is a certain and
incontestable truth that the power of the Magisterium is not
restricted to things of a strictly religious character, but it
embraces the whole domain of the natural law, determining,
interpreting, applying it, under its moral aspect, that is, with
reference to man's actions ordainable and to be ordained to the
highest good and the ultimate end. In other words, the Magisterium does not exhaust its task only within the ambit of man's
relations with God, but it has the right and the duty to interest
itself, to teach and to pass laws also in the very broad field of
the " reality of life." Therefore, numerous and very serious
matrimonial, social, political, cultural questions, by reason of
their intimate and inseparable connection with ethics, with
conscience, with eternal salvation, fall under the authority and
the pastoral care of holy Mother Church. 10
Ibid., n. 25 A.
Cf. ibid .• n. 22 B.
9 Cf. ibid., n. 25 A.
1 ° Cf. St. Pius X, Encyclical Singulari quadam, Sept. 24, 1912; AAS, (1912),
pp. 658-659; Pius Xll, Alloc. "Magnificate Dominum," Nov. 2, 1954, AAS (1954),
pp. 672-673; Cone. Vat. II, Const. dogm. Lumen gentium, c. III, nn. 21-25; Const.
past. Gaudium et spes; F. Hurth, S. J., "Episcoporum triplex munus, Observationes
7

8

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

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157

2. The divine assistance promised to the Magisterium of

the Church
a. The infallibility of the solemn, definitive M agi."terium

It is a dogma of faith, that is, a truth of divine, defined and
Catholic faith, that the Roman Pontiff: " when he speaks ex
cathedra, in virtue of the assistance promised to him in the
person of blessed Peter, enjoys that infallibility with which the
divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining
doctrine concerning faith and morals." 11 The Bishops possess
the same prerogative " when gathered together in an ecumenical council they are teachers and judges of faith and morals";
therefore, " their definitions must then be adhered to with the
submission of faith." 12

b. The infallibility of the ordinary universal M agisterium
Of the greatest importance, in the face of the crisis of faith
or of religious submission which torments the conscience of
many Catholics, is a firm adherence to the three following
declarations:
Pius IX:
The submission which is proper to the act of divine faith must
not be limited to those things which have been defined by expressed
decrees of the Ecumenical Councils or of the Roman Pontiffs or
of this See, but it must be extended also to those things which
are transmitted (" traduntur ") by the ordinary Magisterium of
the whole Church dispersed throughout the world as divinely
revealed and thus by universal and constant consent are maintained
by Catholic theologians as belonging to the deposit of the faithP
ad respectivas Allocutiones Pontificias mense maio et novembri 1954," Periodica de
re morali, tom. XLIII, fasc. III-IV (Rome, Pont. Univ. Gregoriana, 1954), pp.
281-251.
11 Cone. Vat. I, Const. dogm. Pastor aeternus, c. 4, Denz.-Sch., nn. 8074-8075;
Cone. Vat. II, Const. dogm. Lumen gentium, c. III, n. 25 C.
12 Lumen
gentium, n.
B; cf. Msgr. Philips, L'Eglise et son mystere au
deuxieme Concile du Vatican. Historie, texte et commentaire de la Constitution
"Lumen gentium," tom. I (Desclee, 1967), pp.
13 Ep. Quas libenter to the Archbishop of Miinich, Dec. 21, 1868, Denz.-Sch. n.

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Vatican Council I:
By divine and Catholic faith everything must be believed that
is contained in the written word of God or in tradition (" tradita "),
and that is proposed (" proponuntur ") by the Church as a divinely
revealed object of belief either in a solemn decree or in her ordinary
universal teaching. 14
Vatican Council II:
The Bishops ... even when they are dispersed around the world,
provided that, while maintaining the bond of unity among themselves and with Peter's successor and while teaching authentically
on a matter of faith or morals, they concur in a single viewpoint as
the one which must be held conclusively, pronounce infallibly the
doctrine of the Church. 15
c. The infallibility of the M agisterium, both solemn and
ordinary-universal, even in things not revealed but connected with them
Examining the tenor and the import of the declarations
referred to above, it follows that: 1° the primary object of the
infallible Magisterium, both solemn and ordinary-universal, is
those things (deeds and words, truths to be believed and to
be put into practice) which are formally revealed, either in a
clear and explicit manner or at least obscurely and implicitly;
and which, as such, have been "transmitted" (" traduntur ")
or "proposed " (" proponuntur ") ; 2° the secondary object, on
the other hand, is the things which have not been formally
revealed, not even in an obscure and implicit way, but whose
connection with the revealed truths is so intimate that their
denial would imply the danger of failing even as regards the
primary object. 16 This is why Vatican Council II, seeking to
include the primary and secondary objects, does not restrict
the ambit of infallibility to the revealed doctrine of Christ to
be believed with divine faith, but extends it to every matter of
"Const. dogm. Dei Filius, c. 3, Denz.-Sch., n. 30ll.
Lumen gentium, n. 25 B.
16 Cf. F. Hiirth, "Annotationes
in Pii XII Nuntium Rad. 23 martii 1952 et in
Alloc. 18 apr. 1952," Periodica XLI (1952), p. 248.
15

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159

faith and morals taught unanimously by the Bishops as something that is to be retained as definitive (" tamquam definitive
tenendam ") and therefore irreformable. Indeed, even in this
case, the ordinary universal Magisterium " proclaims infallibly
the doctrine of Christ." "This authority (the Council adds) is
even more clearly verified when, gathered together in an ecumenical council, they are teachers and judges of faith and
morals for the universal Church." 17 One must extend "the
submission of faith " as much to the " definitive interpretation "
of the Episcopate dispersed throughout the world, but unanimous in proclaiming it, as to the " definitions " of the
Ecumenical Councils and to the personal " definitive act " of
the Roman Pontiff. 18 Vatican II does not add divina, in order
not to restrict the submission of faith only to the truths contained in the deposit of Revelation.

d. The infallibility of the ordinary Magisterium of the
Roman Pontiff
It is certain that the Supreme Pontiff is infallible when he
speaks ex oathedra (e. g., dogmatic Bulls), that is, when
Lumen gentium, n. 25 B.
Ibid., n. 25 A, B, C. Msgr. Philips, commenting on n. 25 C of Lumen gentium,
writes: "Here we are, once more, before a very compact text which touches on a
great number of problems. I. First of all, it clearly circumscribes the object of
infallibility, a question which Vatican Council I treated only tangentially without
furnishing a complete answer to it. The Constitution Pastor aeternus, c. 4 (Denz.
3070), simply affirms that the assistance of the Holy Spirit is assured to the
successor of Peter ' to guard jealously and explain faithfully ' the revealed doctrine.
The Fathers of Vatican II specify today that the privilege of infallibility extends
as far as is required by the preservation and explanation of the deposit of faith
confided to the Church. That far inclusively, but no farther. Once traced, this
frontier encomposes a certain number of fundamental truths fixed by philosophy
inasmuch as it is the expression of universal human experience. If someone, for
instance, claimed that human reason is forever incapable of grasping any certain
truth, he could no longer admit, logically, an article of faith. But total relativism
and agnosticism are not found condemned by name by revelation, for the simple
reason that neither Scripture nor the ancient Church encountered such error all
along their path. Theologians bring together under the same rubric of ' indirect
object ' of infallibility a whole series of other elements, among which are those
they call dogmatic facts. All that belongs to the domain of professional theology;
the Council, itself, is content to establioh the basic principle and leave the rest to
the care of technical treatises." Op. cit., pp. 327-328.
17

18

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LUIGI CIAPPI

" he proclaims by a definitive act some doctrine of faith or
morals." 19 But one cannot argue from this that he is never
infallible in his ordinary Magisterium, although he would not
be by force of a solemn, definitive sentence (" infallibilis
effatio ") but inasmuch as he proclaims an infallible truth
(" effatum infallibile ") which is such for other reasons. Thus,
for example, the Supreme Pontiff is to be held to be infallible
when he declares his intention to propose, in his ordinary teaching (radio messages, allocutions, and especially encyclical
letters), that which the whole Church has certainly and universally maintained and maintains even today as the doctrine
of faith. Now, the universal Church cannot err about that
which is intimately connected with eternal salvation. 20
It seems to us that the Fathers of Vatican Council I wanted
to include also the infallibility of the ordinary Magisterium of
the Popes (in the aforementioned delineated sense) in this
statement: " For we are fully cognizant of the fact that this
See of St. Peter always remains untainted by any error, according to the divine promise of Our Lord and Savior made to the
prince of His disciples, ' I have prayed for you, that your
faith may not fail; and once you have recovered, you in your
turn must, sterengthen your brethern'" (Lk.
.21 It is a
question, then, of preservation from error, guaranteed to the
constant Magisterium of the Roman Pontiffs, because they are
successors of Peter, with regard to the guardianship of the
faith of the whole Church. In this case the constant teaching
of the Supreme Pontiffs is free from error, not only because
it is in agreement with the constant and universal doctrine of
the Church and of the Ecumenical Councils but also because
it is unthinkable that the Popes would have repeatedly confirmed their Brethren in the faith and the entire Church in
doctrine and morals contrary to divine revelation and harmful
to their eternal salvation. It must indeed be kept in mind that,
given the rarity of Ecumenical Councils
in about two
19

2

Lumen gentium, n. 25 A, C.

° Cf. F. Hiirth, "Episcoporum

21

triplex munus ... , pp. 244-245.
Pastor aeternus, c. 4, Denz.-Sch., n. 3070.

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

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thousand years of the Church's history) and of solemn or ex
cathedra definitions (Benedict XII on the beatific vision:
Denz.-Sch. 1000; Pius IX on the Immaculate Conception of
Mary: Denz.-Sch. 2803; Pius XII on the bodily Assumption of
Mary: Denz.-Sch. 3903), the guardianship of divine truth, the
progress of Christians in faith and morals, the very diffusion
and authentic interpretation of the thought of the Councils,
has depended principally on the ordinary Magisterium of the
Supreme Pontiffs.
Finally, there seems to be no exclusion of the case of an
infallible act (" infallibilis effatio ") based upon a definitive
interpretation (not defining, that is, not pronounced with the
customary formula and solemnity) obliging the whole Church
to the submission of faith. 22 This would be verified (according
to some theologians), for instance, in the condemnation uttered
by Pius XI in his Encyclical, Casti connubii, against the abuse
of marriage. 23
e. The authenticity or divine value of the ordinary Magisterium of the Bishops and of the Supreme Pontiff

There is the pertinent twofold declaration of the Constitution
Lumen gentium:
Bishops are preachers of the faith who lead new disciples to Christ.
They are authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with the
authority of Christ, who preach to the people committed to them
the faith they must believe and put into practice. By the light of
the Holy Spirit(" sub lumine Sancti Spiritus ") , they make that
faith clear . . . vigilantly warding off any errors which threaten
their flock. Bishops, teaching in communion with the Roman
Pontiff, are to be respected by all as witnesses to divine and
Catholic truth. In matters of faith and morals, the Bishops speak
in the name of Christ and the faithful are to accept their teaching
and adhere to it with a religious submission. This religious sub22 I. Salaverri, S. J., "From the certain and manifest intention of obliging all the
faithful to absolute assent, the infallible exercise of the ordinary Magisterium can
be inferred, no matter whether it is the Pope or the Church " (De Ecclema Christi,
n. 468 in Sacrae Theologiae Summa, 5 ed., [BAC, 195!l], vol. I).
23 AAS,
(1930), p. 560, Denz.-Sch., n. 3717.

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LUIGI ClAPP!

mission of will and mind must be shown in a special way to the
authentic teaching of the Roman Pontiff, even when he is not
speaking ' ex cathedra.' That is, it must be shown in such a way
that his supreme magisterium is acknowledged with reverence, the
judgments made by him are sincerely adhered to, according to his
manifest mind and will. His mind and will in the matter may be
known chiefly either from the character of the documents, or from
his frequent repetition of the same doctrine, or from his manner
of speaking. 24

To understand well, and not to undervaluate, the sense and
the burden of these declarations, it is useful to observe, with
the Council itself, that the supernatural value of the Magisterium of the Church does not proceed only from its divine
institution-now remote in time-but from the continual assistance of the Holy Spirit promised to it: usque ad consummationem saeculi: " And know that I am with you always; yes, to
the end of time " (Mt. 28: 20) . In short, it is said of the
ordinary Magisterium of the individual Bishops that they
make clear " sub lumine Spiritus Sancti " the truths of faith
and morals; for the acts of the extraordinary Magisterium of
the Ecumenical Councils and of the Roman Pontiff there IS
mention made of the "assistentia Spiritus Sancti" or, as is
stated, " praelucente Spiritu veritatis." 25
3. The submission of the faithful to the M agisterium of

the Church
a. Submission of divine and Catholic faith. This is due to
acts of the infallible Magisterium. It is thus a question of
divine truths, regarding faith and morals, proposed as revealed
by God or as intimately connected with them. These are the
proper object of such assent of faith, that is, of the act of
theological faith. The formal motive, therefore, that is, the
one truly determining and internally operating, is the authority
of God revealing, because this alone is proportioned in an
absolute manner with the divine truths which are believed,
through the perfect identity existing between God in Himself
•• Lumen gentium, n. 25 A.

25

Ibid., n. 25 A, C, D.

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

163

and God knowing Himself (Veritas Prima in essendo and
V eritas perfecta in cognoscendo) . The proposition of the
Church (in virtue of the divine assistance, that is, of the charism of truth) is only the indispensable condition (conditio sine
qua non) so that our assent of faith might, even from the
psychological and moral point of view, be perfectly tranquil. 26
However, the living Magisterium of the Church is the proximate and universal norm of faith, whose supreme rule will
always remain divine revelation contained in the Sacred Books
and in Tradition. 27

b. Submission of ecclesiastical faith to defined but not
revealed truths
It does not seem that the Constitution Lumen gentium
authorizes the distinction of a twofold faith: one divine and
Catholic, the act of the theological virtue by which one adheres
to formally revealed truths; the other ecclesiastical, which
would be an act of non-theological faith by which one adheres
to truths which are proposed infallibily by the Church as connected with revealed truths. The Constitution speaks only of
the submission of faith (" fidei obsequium ") 28 due to the
26 Cf. C. Journet, L'Eglise du Verbe Incarne, Essai de theologie speculative. I.
Hierarchie apostolique,
ed. (Desclee de Brouwer, 1955), p. fl04.
27 D. Mongillo, 0. P. rightly observes:
"The infallible proposition of the truth
on the part of the Church, even if normally required, is not an essential condition
of the act of faith. Before the dogmatic definition or outside the Church personal
certainty that a truth is revealed by God or connected with revealed datum obliges
to belief. In such a case the truth will be believed with an act of divine faith
which, however, cannot yet be said to be of divine-Catholic faith. Only public
certainty (that guaranteed by a definition of the teaching Church) represents for
all believers the obligatory and infallible norm of the faith " (S. Tommaso
d'Aquino, La Somma teologica, Traduzione e commento a cura dei Domenicani
italiani, XIV, La Fede e la Speranza [Firenze, 1966], p. 19).
28 Msgr. Philips comments:
"Theologians, who are infatuated with exactness,
can devote their attention in this case to a first-class challenge. The Constitution,
a few lines farther on, stipulates that the object of infallibility extends to all assertions, even not formally revealed, but which prove themselves absolutely necessary
to preserve intact the deposit of faith. These necessary affirmations would not
be called into question without revelation itself being shaken by it. Indirectly,
therefore, these truths also enjoy the guarantee of faith. A certain number of

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LUIGI ClAPP!

c. Religious submission of the will and the mind to the
ordinary M agisterium

It is a matter of that submission which the Constitution
Lumen gentium mentions, especially in regard to the authentic
ordinary Magisterium of the Supreme Pontiff, even when he
does not speak ex cathedra. 29
There is thus required on the part of the faithful (not
excepting theologians with respect to the Bishops and the latter
with respect to the Pope) , not a simple " respectful silence "
(silentium obsequiosum) but a" positive assent" (" adhaerere
debent ") ,30 that is to say, an act of the mind; religious, that is,
to be given through a religious motive, such as submission to
the ecclesiastical authority to which the assistance of the Holy
Spirit is promised; internal, inasmuch as it is an act of the
intellect moved by the free will under the impulse of grace;
morally certain, that is, not purely opiniative or dubitative but
such as is required by motives which prudently exclude doubt.
The motives, therefore, for the sincere internal submission
are not the reasons cited by the Magisterium, according to
the principle: " the strength of the authority is no more than
the strength of the arguments." This is true on the plane of
theologians apply here their theory (of rather recent date) of 'ecclesiastical faith.'
Submission to the revealed truth commands, in the case that we are examining,
an assent which excludes all hesitation, but is it opportune to speak of ' eccesiastical
faith?' The term does not seem to us very happy. Certainly, if one reduces faith
to intellectual assent pure and simple, the aforesaid expression incurs no reproach:
the Church demands that our reason be inclined to this assent. But faith is even
more than a mere knowing: it implies a homage to the living and true God, a free
act caused by the grace that the Father accords us by sending us the Son and the
Spirit. We cannot transfer this homage to any other subject in directing it to the
Church. The latter, indeed, is only the sacrament or the means of salvation. The
origin, the term, and the motive of true faith, its formal object, if you will, is
found only in God alone. But God guarantees the declaration of the Church by
affixing His seal to it so that we can ' believe ' what it preaches, not because of
her authority but having Him in mind. These last remarks, it is true, go beyond
the strict commentary on the Constitution Lume:n ge:ntium" (op. cit., p. 326).

conciliar definitions.
•• Cf. Lume:n ge;ntium, n. 25 A.
80

Ibid.

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

165

rational conscience, not on the plane of faith. 31 No, the true
motive of assent (even when there is question of the interpretation of the natural law) to the proposition of the Magisterium
is " the secure charism of truth (carisma veritatis certum)
which exists, has existed, and will exist always in the Bishops the
successors of the Apostles" (St. Irenaeus, Advers. haer. IV,
PG 7, 1058 C). Therefore, that which seems better and more
in conformity with personal thought or with that of the age in
which one lives must not be upheld; on the contrary, the
absolute and immutable truth preached from the beginning by
the Apostles should never be believed, never be interpreted in
PL 40) .32
another sense (Tertullian, De praescript., c.
However, while the charisms, the gifts and the reasonings of
the theologians cannot be convincing, both as to their existence
and as to their probative value, the apostolic and episcopal
charism is indisputable both as to its persistence in the Church
and as to its genuine divine value. The reasons adduced by the
Magisterium are not the true motive either of the assent to the
truths of faith or of the assent to the proposition of the Church,
but they render the one and the other easier, prompter and
psychologically more satisfying. 33

d. Is it permissible, in the name of religious freedom and the
freedom of science, to suspend assent and to discuss the
doctrine of the M agisterium?
The Decree Dignitatis humanae, on religious freedom, after
having declared the right of man to freedom from every external coercion in seeking, embracing and professing divine
truth, declares that the Catholic has the religious duty to
adhere to the certain doctrine proposed by the Magisterium
of the Church.
In the formation of their consciences, the Christian faithful ought
carefully to attend to the sacred and certain doctrine of the
Cf. Pius XII, Alloc. Magnificate Dominum, AAS, 46 (1954), p.
St. Pius X, Motu proprio Sacrorum antistitum, Sept. 1, 1910; Denz.-Sch., n.
2147.
33 Cf. F. Hi.irth, "Episcoporum
triplex munus ... ," p.
31

32

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LUIGI CIAPPI

Church. 34 The Church is, by the will of Christ, the teacher of the
truth. It is her duty to give utterance to, and authoritatively to
teach, that truth which is Christ Himself, and also to declare and
confirm by her authority those principles of the moral order which
have their origin in human nature itself. 35

The obligation just noted is of its nature grave, because
required by the duty of submitting oneself to the legitimate
authority o£ the Church within the limits of its competence.
Besides, it is a matter of avoiding a serious danger in the field
of faith and morals.
But, if in an exceptional case someone had clear arguments
for doubting that the doctrine of the Church, not definitive and
irreformable, is true, or that its decisions are just, he would not
be held to internal assent, and yet the obligation of " silent
submission" would remain. However, he cannot claim to find
himself in such a situation by the sole fact that he is in the
process of presenting some difficulties but not of adducing new
and convincing arguments in favor of the contrary opinion,
or of producing some new and relevant element in regard to the
extension and the weight of the arguments already known.
One can even admit that in some case there is a subjective good
faith, based on the judgment of a mistaken conscience, for
not adhering to the teaching of the Church; but no objective
justification exists for a like negative attitude. 36 On the other
hand, one cannot admit good faith in one who discusses in
public, especially if it is in books or reviews destined for the
general public, the teaching or the decisions o£ the ordinary
Magisterium. 37
•• Cf. Pius XII, Radio message, May 23, 1952, AAS, 44 (1952), pp. 270-278.
•• Declar. Dignitatis humanae, n. 14.
36 Cf. F. Hiirth, " Tuto doceri non potest," Divinitas V (1961), p. 842.
37 Pius XII:
" But if the Supreme Pontiffs in their official documents purposely
pass judgment on a matter up to that time under dispute, it is obvious that that
matter, according to the mind and will of the same Pontiffs, cannot be any longer
considered a question open to discussion among theologians." (Enc. Humani generis,
AAS, 42 [1950], p. 568) . Msgr. Philips has observed, commenting on Lumen
gentium: " But we cannot pass over in silence the case of a competent Christian
who would have serious motives for preferring a divergent manner of thinking to

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

167

e. Living M agisterium and dead M agisterium?

Pius XII recognized that theologians have the task of indicating in what way are contained in Sacred Scripture and in
divine Tradition, explicitly or implicitly, those truths which are
taught by the living Magisterium of the Church; and he adds:
Together with those two sources [Sacred Scripture and Tradition]
God has given to His Church a living Magisterium to elucidate and
explain what is contained in the deposit of faith only obscurely and
implicitly. This deposit of faith our divine Redeemer has given for
authentic intepretation not to each of the faithful, not even to
theologians, but only to the Magisterium of the Church. 38

From the context of the Encyclical Humani generis it appears
to be clear that Pius XII, speaking of the living Magisterium,
intends above all to signify the teaching of the Church of today,
that is, of the Roman Pontiff and living Bishops, that is, of
men of our time: it is to this Magisterium, the sole authentic
intepreter of Scripture, of Tradition, of the Ecumenical Councils
and of the pontifical documents of the past that the duty and
right of being the proximate and universal norm " in matters of
faith and morals" belong.
The authentic judge, therefore, of dogmatic and theological
progress in the Church remains alone the Magisterium of the
Sacred Hierarchy, just as it is the one only authentic author of
dogmatic definitions, which guarantee a secure and irreversible
grasp of the truth, opening at the same time the way to new
investigations and new grasps. Although innumerable masters
of the faith are dead, as Peter himself is dead, the gates of
hell (Mt. 16 : 18) , that is, the forces of error and of death,
the official directives, or who could cause founded motives to be produced for
leaving the question in doubt. He would not, with the best will in the world, be
forced to an interior assent. Besides, no one forbids him to continue his investigations as long as he avoids throwing discredit, through spite or intellectual pride, on
the declarations of the Magisterium. In practice, this man would have to observe
a great prudence in order to prevent a public debate in which sentence would be
pronounced by a tribunal of incompetents. This attitude is commanded of him by
the respect due not only to the Magisterium but also to his brethren in the faith,
whom it is not lawful to cast temererally and without any profit into inextricable
conflicts of conscience" (op. cit., p. 323).
88 Enc. Humani generis, loc. cit., p. 569.

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LUIGI CIAPPI

have not prevailed, nor will they ever prevail against the
indefectible and infallible Magisterium.
From what has been said to this point, one will have to
conclude logically that new dogmatic formulas, although activating a true conceptual progress over and above terminology,
cannot render vain, surpassed and useless, or have held to be
false or adapted only to the philosophical mentality of other
times, the formulas with which the Magisterium has expressed
divine truths in its documents. In fact, the definitions formulated by the Ecumenical Councils of antiquity, of the Middle
Ages, of Trent, of Vatican I, and those pronounced personally
by the Roman Pontiffs, have been the true, proper and exact
expression of divine revelation and of the truths intimately
connected with it, even though in a human and conceptual, and
thus analogical and imperfect form. Under this aspect one can
speak of only " approximate " truth, compared, that is, to the
divine reality, infinite, not possibly contained within the limitations of concepts and words, ineffable. But the absolute
transcendence of divine truth is not synonymous with total
diversity, even though there is a greater diverity than similarity
between uncreated and created truth. 39
IV.

OVERCOMING

THE CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM

IN THE

YEAR OF FAITH

The Synod of Bishops, in which a widespread and preoccupying crisis of faith even in the authentic Magisterium of the
Church was deplored, has been celebrated, providentially,
during the " Year of Faith."
Paul VI, although he lamented such a crisis also in his
Apostolic Exhortation Petrum et Paulum, sent to all the
Bishops of the Catholic Church on the 19th centenary of the
glorious martyrdom of Saints Peter and Paul, has expressed
the confidence that in this very year such a crisis will be
overcome.
•• Lateran Council IV: "Between the Creator and the creature so great a likeness cannot be without the necessity of noting a greater dissimilarity between
them " (Denz.-Sch. 806).

CRISIS OF THE MAGISTERIUM,

CRISIS OF FAITH?

169

But here now we have this anniversary of the Apostles, come round
again on the wheel of time, to strengthen our faith in the true meaning of that term, to encourage study of the teachings of the recent
ecumenical council, to sustain the energies of Catholic thought in
its search for fresh and original expressions while remaining faithful
to the doctrinal " deposit " of the Church, eodem sensu eademque
sententia. This anniversary offers to every child of holy Church
the happy opportunity of giving to Jesus Christ, the Son of God,
the mediator and accomplisher of revelation, a humble and exalting
" I believe," the full assent of intellect and will to His word, His
person and His mission of salvation; it thus offers an opportunity of
giving honor to those distinguished witnesses to Christ, Peter and
Paul, by renewing the Christian commitment of a sincere and
effective profession of faith, theirs and ours, and by continuing to
pray and work for the reestablishment of all Christians in the unity
of the same faith. 40

The "Year of Faith " will thus have to revive in all Catholics
the persuasion that " on the faith of Peter reposes the whole
edifice of the holy Church" (c£. Mt. 16: 16-19) and that,
consequently, on the faith and on the Magisterium of his
successors the whole dynamism of our spiritual, supernatural
life, which thus irradiates its influence in apostolic action by
contact with the modern world, must find conscious and tranquil solidity. In other words, the sensus fidei of the learning
Church must be in accord with the sensus fidei of the teaching
Church because, although there is only one Spirit of truth who
illumines directly the minds of believers by leading them to the
sweet assent to divine truth and inciting them to develop the
seed of the faith received in Baptism, the full certainty of
following the illuminations of the Spirit is not had except in
adhering to the objective, authentic teaching of the Bishops,
and, above all, of the Roman Pontif£.41 If the Fathers of
Vatican Council II have required such submission of all true
disciples of Christ, they have done so, not from ambition to
dominate or from a spirit of paternalism but because they are
convinced of having received with episcopal consecration itself
40

41

L'Osservatore Romano, Feb. 23, 1967.
Cf. Lumen gentium, n. 25.

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LUIGI ClAPP!

the certain charism of the authentic M agisterium in the service
of divine truth and of the whole People of God, according to
the words of Jesus Christ to His apostles: "Anyone who listens
to you listens to me; anyone who rejects you rejects me, and
those who reject me reject the one who sent me " (Lk. 10: 16) ;
" Go out to the whole world; proclaim the Good News to all
creation. He who believes ... will be saved; he who does not
believe will be condemned." (Mk. 16: 15-16).
The Magisterium, therefore, has full awareness of being
above the People of God, not as though it were not, even its
Pastors, the sheep of Christ, members of His Mystical Body;
but the Bishops know that they are over others inasmuch as
they are true representatives of Christ the Head of the People
of God, although they also are equal to others by communion
in the same faith and by the bond of the same ecclesial charity.
The Holy Father has nobly expressed this awareness, proper
to the Hierarchy, on the day sacred to the Purification of the
Blessed Virgin and the Presentation of the Child Jesus, "Light
of the Gentiles," in the Temple:
Illumined obedience seeks the divine design which beholds in the
People of God the presence and action of Christ's representatives
as a cause which we well understand is instrumental but genetic
and natural. These representatives are endowed with Christ's
pastoral authority and the charisms of magisterium, of leadership
and of sanctification for the service and the salvation of the community of the faithful. The Church is hierarchical, not inorganic,
and not even democratic in the sense that the community itself
should have a priority of faith and authority over those whom the
Holy Spirit has placed at the head of Church of God (cf. Acts
20: 28); that is to say, that the Lord wanted some of the brethren
to have the unquestionable mandate (cf. I Cor. 4 :4) of giving to
other brethren the service of authority. of leadership as a principle
of unity, of order, of solidarity, of efficiency, always so as to
form that economy of truth and of charity which is called " His
Church." 42
LUIGI CrAPPI, 0. P.
Master of the Sacred Apostolic Palace
Vatican City
•• L'Osservatwe Romano, Feb. 3, 1968.

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY: THE THEOLOGIAN IN
THE PRESENCE OF THE REVEALED GOD
(Concluded)

PART

IV.

THE NoN-CONCEPTUAL
LOGICAL

W

II

IN THE DYNAMISM OF OuR THEO-

THOUGHT

E HAVE elaborated a certain dynamism present in
our theological knowledge of the divine Reality. In
so doing we showed the possibility of by-passing
certain problems in theology (e. g., in reference to Malet) by
realizing i) that our concepts, though expressing something that
was formally in God, looked for their verification in an order
of infinite simplicity, where God is indeed the "Ineffable One,"
and ii) that these concepts were affirmed of the divine Reality
as concretely given in salvation history.
Of itself, this would indicate a certain necessary dynamism
in our knowledge before the transcendent Reality of the revealed God. It indicates, too, the direction in which we should
look for a non-conceptual depth in our theological knowledge,
in that the Reality that is presented to our intelligences can
be apprehended only in and through faith, with its firm, dark,
personal " Yes " to all that God is and has done. Accordingly,
insofar as faith has a non-conceptual element, and because
theology is a reflection-in-the-faith, we may look for a nonconceptual element in our theological thought. In this way we
shall be able to see the realism of the theological noetic, in its
attainment of its object, in that the conceptual element lives
from a non-conceptual element which grounds it and gives it a
depth of realism that any purely notional knowledge would not
have. In other words, here is a chance to see how the " objective orientation" of our concepts occurs, to use the phrase of

171

ANTHONY

J. KELLY

E. Schillebeeckx.Ho He has drawn our attention to the fact of
the non-conceptual in our knowledge, but in so doing he has
lessened the formal role of the concept in our knowledge of God
who was known merely in a non-conceptual way.
In this process of knowing, the whole knowing subject is
involved; to this extent there must be not only an objective
signification in our knowing but also a depth of personal
significance. 141 This aspect of significance surrounding and
enveloping our notional knowledge calls for close consideration.
And an increasing number of theologians have become interested in the question. 142 On the philosophical level the problem
of our non-conceptual knowledge has been one of the great
preoccupations of the modern post-Kantian era. 143 This contribution will be made from the " Thomistic standpoint " (in
the sense explained, with the necessary speculative flexibility in
the face of more modern insights) and with a necessary limitation, for here we must be content with sketching merely the
basic principles.
Implied in the notion of faith is the assent to the divine
Reality through a conceptual determination. 144 Our study
uo Revelation et theol., 108 ff. Cf. also 343: "a proprement parler nous
n'appliquons pas le concept lui-meme a Dieu, mais le contenu conceptuel tend vers
Dieu." Here we take up the question of how does the concept " tend towards "
the divine Reality, having shown the fact that the concept is, in a sense, properly
applied to God, not as representing Him but as formally directing our affirmation
of the divine Reality.
" 1 " Signification " I here define as the abstract conceptual, expressable content
of our concepts. " Significance" is the non-fully conceptualizable "plus " in our
consciousness, in that our whole personal life is axiologically orientated toward a
given reality and implicitly recognized as such.
" 2 E.
Schillebeeckx, op. cit., 106-110;
ff., etc. J. Mouroux,
"Presence de Ia raison dans la foi," loc. cit.,
C. Cirne-Lima, Der Personale
Glaube (Innsbruck, 1959), engl. Personal Faith (New York, 1965); L. Melevez,
"Theologie contemplative et theologie discursive," Nouvelle Revue Theologique, 86
(1964),
M. Dupuy, "Experience spirituelle et theologie comme science,"
ibid. (1964)' 1137-1162.
148 Cf. J. Girardi, "Les facteurs extra-intellectuels
de la connaissance," Revue
Philosophique de Louvain,
(1964),
477-500; G. Klubertanz, "Where
is the evidence for Thomistic Metaphysics," ibid., 56 (1958),
144 " Ad fidem duo requiruntur:
quorum unum est cordis inclinatio ad credendum;
et hoc non est ex auditu sed ex dono gratiae. Aliud autem est determinatio de
credibili, et istud est ex auditu." Ad Rom., c. 10, lect.

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

178

must concentrate on the connection between these two; thus
by examining the dynamism of faith we can arrive at some
further conclusions regarding the unique noetic of theology,
which is the prolongation of faith into reflection. E. Brunner
has well characterized the position of the theologian as being a
wandering between two worlds, for in theological thought there
is a doubleness: the theologian is at once a scientific thinker
comprehending objectively and a believer darkly affirming the
revealed God: " this is the particular burden and difficulty of
theology." 145
The burden enters in when the theologian, in accord with the
scientific exigencies of thought, is forced to elaborate and
analyze the realities of Revelation on a purely conceptual level,
which of its nature seems a long way from that personal
encounter with truth experienced in faith and Revelation. This
sense of doubleness and burden would be mitigated, were it
realized that theology, in its vital connection with the affirmation of faith, has a unique non-conceptual depth springing from
a special dynamism which is at work.
I. A philosophical note on the dynamism of personal knowledge

There is a great deal of literature available to help us in this
note. As was remarked before, it has been one of the great
preoccupations of post-Kantian philosophy to ground our conceptual knowledge, to have not merely a notional affirmation
of reality but a " real " affirmation of it. This distinction
originated in the writings of J. H. Newman and has been much
popularized by Blondel, Olle-Laprune, and other modern philosophers.146
" 5 E. Brunner, Wahrheit als Begegnung (Ziirich, 1963), engl. Truth as Encounter
(London, 1964), 113.
" 6 J. Girardi, op. cit.; G. Klubertanz,
op. cit.; C. Cirne-Lama, op. cit.; W. Kern,
" Das verhiiltniss von Erkenntnis und Liebe als Philosophisches Grundproblem bei
Hegel und Thomas von Aquin," Scholastik 34 (1959), 394-427; A. Forest, "Connaissance et Amour," Revue Thomiste 48 (1948), 113-122; M. Roland-Gosselin, "de
Ia connaissance affective," Revue des sciences Philosophiques et Theologiques 27
(1938) 5-27; J. de Finance, Etre et Agir dans la philosophie de S. Thomas (Rome,
1960), J. Lebacz, Certitude et volonte (Paris, 1962), an excellent bibliography for
modern work.

174

ANTHONY

J. KELLY

Our concern here is to stress, not so much the " real " content
of our knowledge in general but the special depth of our
notional knowledge regarding another person, and this again,
not in general but insofar as this person is the object of our love.
The first observation that can be made is that our knowledge
is situated in a larger noetic process than that represented by
the formally and statically signifying role of the concept. The
whole knowing subject is involved.
There is, indeed, a notional element, that is, various intelligible aspects of the reality are disengaged by the intellect;
these can be formally expressed in their precise meaning and
validly analyzed; they can be correlated and finally synthesized
into one intuition of the known object whether it be personal
or not; in the evidence of this intuition, the reality in question
can be affirmed to be such and such. This is the necessary
objective and formal aspect of our knowledge. As such, it
is the interior necessary component of any objective appreciation of extra-mental reality; for the reality is signified, represented to us through our concepts in its essential meaning, in
its formal intelligibility; we could call this type of knowledge
the knowledge of " signification."
But there is another element, subjective where the other is
objective, "real " or " existential " when the other is notional
or essential, dynamic where the other is more statically representative. The reality in question is present to our consciousness, not merely as a thing objectively expressed but as a reality
which is " lived." In this way, it is not apprehended as objected to us, exterior to our personal life, but as something or
someone which intimately pertains to us. The reality is not
thrown up to our minds as to an analytical faculty for speculative appraisal and notional assent, but as a reality which is
part of our life, part of our " self consciousness," part of ourselves; it is " significant." 147
This appreciation of reality as something significant as well
as signified is based on what has been traditionally called
147

J. Girardi, op. cit., 802 ff.

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" connatural " knowledge. This type of knowledge enables us
to put the cognitive process into a more existential and personal
context. Along with the conceptual attainment of the reality in
itself, in its ontological essence, the knowledge of connaturality
implies an axiological attainment of the reality; this axiological
"touching" of the reality takes place in the object's livedreference to the person, in its functional role toward the knowing subject, as "quid intime suum." As J. de Finance has
remarked, man is by no means "pure thought"; there is, and
must be, an " au-dela " to our concepts. 148
Whatever spiritual activity we talk about, whether it be
cognitive or volitional, it must not be forgotten that it is the
person who is acting; knowing and loving are the two dimensions of personal life. Not only are these two operations to
be considered as springing from the one spiritual subject but
lived in the one consciousness: the person is present to himself
in these operations, conscious of himself as the one who is, in
this double way, opened out to the infinite expanse of being.
Consequently, knowledge and love, despite their inverse orientations, do not exist, as it were, in two parallel and independent
lines of personal life but as two aspects of the one personal
openness to the unlimited horizon of being and perfection.
There is in this double fecundity of personal life, on the one
hand, an expression of the perfection of reality to oneself in
knowing; and, on the other, through this interior expression of
the other-ness of reality to oneself, within oneself, there results
an inclination toward the reality as it exists, a love of reality
in its actual present existence. Knowledge is terminated within
the spirit; love finds its term in the real order of things, in their
full existential actuality. Hence, reality has a double relationship to the person, in his openness towards the Infinite and the
Absolute:
Now a thing is found to have a twofold relationship to the soul:
one by which the thing itself is in the soul in the soul's manner and
not in its own, the other by which the soul is referred to the thing
148

Etre et Agir, 337.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

in its own existence. Thus something is an object of the soul in two
ways. I) It is so inasmuch as it is capable of being in the soul, not
according to its own act of being, but according to the manner of
the soul, i.e., spiritually. And this is the essential constituent of the
knowable insofar as it is knowable.
Something is the object of
the soul according as the soul is inclined and oriented to it after the
manner of the thing itself as it is in itself. This is the essential
constituent of the appetible insofar as it is appetible. 149
Here we have a clear expression of the inverse orientation of
spiritual life of the person, fruitful in the sense of " owning," according to the spiritual manner of being of the knowing subject,
reality, in an objective interior expression of it. Together there
is a complementary tendency of the knowing subject toward the
reality in its real existence, affecting the spiritual subject
toward the real in itself, attracting it to a good outside itself.

*

*

*

*

*

Since then it is the one reality attained under two aspects
and the one person open spiritually to the totality of the
existent, the life of the spirit can be expressed as a circular
movement, as the person in his spiritual consciousness expresses
the perfection of the reality outside of himself, within himself,
and through that expression tends to the full attainment of that
reality in its actual existence. 150
This circular movement in the spiritual life of the person
results in a mutual interpenetration of the two spiritual
faculties: the mind understands the good as the good of the
whole person and in this understanding presents it to the will
to be sought for and attained; the will desires truth for the
mind, so that the personal life will be based on objective
reality and so that the person, through the knowing faculty,
will express the perfections of reality within himself and thus
be established in communion with the totality of the existent
order. In other words, in the spiritual life of the person there
149
150

a. 1.

De Verit., q. 22, a. 10.
Ibid., q. 1, a. 2; de Divinis Nominibus, c. 4, lect. 10; Summa Theol., I, q. 16,

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is union and communion in that double fecundity of knowing
and loving which is proper to the person as a spiritual being. 151
The spiritual presence of the objective reality within the mind
of the persons enables the will to be determined, specified; thus
informed by the intellect it attains or tends toward the existent
reality in its full axiological and existential dimensions, as this
reality is concretely referred to the person. On its part, the
faculty of love adds a depth of real content to the knowledge
of the intellect, especially to the purely intellectual or conceptual knowledge that it enjoys: in the one personal knowing
consciousness the will, in its actual tendency toward the
existent reality as it exists in its concrete existence, aligns our
conceptual knowledge with the actual existent thing; our conceptual knowledge is " clothed over " with the tendencytoward-the-real under the influence of the love in the will. It is
only by mutual envelopment that each faculty develops in the
line of its own attainment; the will being enveloped by the
knowing faculty attains the true good, and the intellect,
enveloped in the movement of the will; is conscious of the
whole reality. Thus the possibility of dynamism in our knowledge becomes apparent; there is in the knowing consciousness
a conceptual and non-conceptual element. The conceptual
element is indeed a valid, formal expression of reality, but it
is completed by a non-conceptual affective knowledge which
gives it an existential depth, which the concept taken abstractly,
in itself, does not have.
As has been said, the reason for this mutual interpenetration
of the faculties in the full dynamism of knowledge is because
both faculties are pertaining to the one conscious personal life.
The person, in the presence of some meaningful reality, is
conscious not only of the meaning of the reality in itself but
also of an existential content of that reality in reference to him.
He knows it as his reality, as a thing not merely "known"
but "lived": he knows it as something that belongs to him,
pertains to his life. And this is all the more the case when it is
151 On this interpretation
of intelligence and will cf. W. Kern, "das Verhiiltnis
von Erkenntnis und Liebe ... ," Scholastik 34 (1959), 415-421.

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considered that through an act of "free-will," of self-commitment, he has invited this reality, whatever it be, into his
conscious personallife. 152 Obviously this has the utmost pertinence when we speak of interpersonal knowledge; there is not
only the conceptual knowledge of the person as an object, but
in the consciousness there is the presence of this person as a
" thou " because of the love experienced toward this person as
part of oneself. This consciousness is heightened the more the
person is affirmed as a " thou " by the supremely conscious
and personal act of free commitment with regard to that
person, so that the whole personal consciousness of the " I " is
" affected " by the living presence of the " thou." In such a
case our intellectual conceptual knowledge would be immensely
enriched by an" au-dela" which, while remaining inexpressible,
would give a personal and existential depth to the whole process
of conceptual knowledge.
The presence of the beloved person to the consciousness of
the loving-knowing subject is partially based on what he has
already apprehended about the object of love; but the knowing
power of the mind does not rest in the consciousness that it has
exhausted the full mystery of the beloved. Impelled by love the
intelligence continues to seek a deeper insight into the object of
love by the contemplation of every aspect that is accessible
regarding the life and personality of the " thou ":
As to the apprehensive power, the beloved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as the beloved abides in the apprehension of the lover ...
the lover is said to be in the beloved, inasmuch as the lover is not
satisfied with a superficial apprehension of the beloved, but strives
to gain an intimate knowledge of everything pertaining to the
beloved, so as to penetrate into his very soul,153
Thus the knowing life of the lover is dominated and concentrated in a striving to understand more intimately the
reality of the beloved.
However, it is not only the conscious orientation of the
152

For a good analysis of this aspect, see C. Cirne-Lima, op. cit., 415-421, and

J. Girardi, loc. cit., 62 (1965), 336-346.
153 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 28, a. 2.

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knowing powers that is a constituting factor of the presence of
the "thou" but also that consciousness of the attraction that
the loved object exerts over the heart of the lover; this increases
the mutual inherence of the beloved and the lover that makes
the knowledge of the " thou " more and more real to the consciousness. The lover is conscious of his axiological affection
toward the beloved which is mysteriously grasped as present in
this tendency: " the object loved is said to be in the lover,
inasmuch as it is in his affections by a kind of complacency.
• • ." 154
This consciousnes of the beloved as a presence is
completed by a sense of being" in the other," in a sympathy, in
an affective oneness of life and love " ... the lover ... seeks to
possess the beloved perfectly, by penetrating into his heart, as
it were ... as though he were become one with him." 155 The
beloved person is not merely esteemed as a good for oneself
but esteemed as oneself, as another " I," a presence in one's
consciousness that cannot be expressed in merely conceptual
terms, even though these conceptual elements are necessary
ones for initial knowledge, objective appraisal and communication. Nonetheless the knowing-loving subject is conscious of
the inadequacy of conceptual expression to express this mystery
of the " thou " which he lives.
Thus conceptual knowledge may have a depth of non-conceptual knowledge, an axiological and affective element creating
the dynamism of connatural knowledge by which the mind is
borne beyond its notional and conceptual grasp of reality to
a more intimate yet inexpressible knowledge of this reality.
There is always the objective signification of the known reality,
but, through the influence of affective knowledge, there is also
the factor of subjective significance.

*

*

*

*

*

This total, dynamic view of human knowing allows for
attentional and intentional aspects 156 which do not pertain to
the conceptual level of knowledge, as such.
15<Jbid.
155

Ibid.

156

For an elaboration of this division, cf. J. Girardi, op. cit., passim.

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ANTHONY

J. KELLY

a) The attenticmal ncm-ccmceptual element. Conceptual
knowledge seeks to express reality in its formal and essential
fulness; to do so, it must abstract, analyze, correlate, synthesize
and judge. But because reality is attained in a non-conceptual
as well as a conceptual manner, some aspects of that reality will
draw our attention in the conceptualization of that reality more
than others, and this because we are axiologically affected
toward that reality. Different aspects capture our interest and
draw our attention, because there is a prior connaturalization
regarding those aspects; there is a previous concern; there is a
"point of view." This is immediately obvious with regard to a
" thou," a " subject," an expression of our knowledge which
would be attentionally qualified by this person's relation to me.
But to illustrate this on a general level, witness the different
philosophies that have come into being, each proposing a
different metaphysical system expressive of one and the same
reality, e. g., the philosophies of Schopehauer, Nietzsche,
Blondel, Marcel, Heidegger, the whole personalist and existential movement with all its approaches and variations. A
prior non-conceptual axiological attainment of reality conditions the organization and development of our conceptual
knowledge, points to holding certain principles as "key-principles " and certain categories as being the most basic. Also, in
the different phases of knowing our attention can be focused
on more abstract or concrete considerations, according to the
direction in which our attention is turned by the mentality or
point of view at that moment. As a stage in one's own personal
knowledge, or as a stage in " the historical development of the
metaphysical sciences," the reality subjected to our knowing
could be appreciated, for example, in its essential meaning
according to its position in the whole hierarchy of beings; an
approach, which could be conditioned, on the axiological level,
by a deep evaluation and appreciation of the order and harmony of the world. The Aristotelian " scientia," " cognitio
necessaria per causas," is rightly put down as belonging to
this attentional approach. While especially today our attentional approach is conditioned by concern for the development,

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the emergence, the evolution, the inner dynamism of reality,
the Aristotelian approach can consequently seem at once too
ambitious and too static for the modern mentality. 157
b) The intentional, non-conceptual element. The non-conceptual connatural knowledge makes its contribution by manifesting the reality known in a depth of significance over and
above the conceptual signification. It gives more evidence than
that offered by merely conceptual knowledge. In the case of
interpersonal knowledge, there is a deeper and richer manifestation of the " thou." So the mind is drawn into a more
vital affirmation of the other than knowledge by way of
concepts alone would justify. It is in the last analysis evidence
proper to mystery, that is to say, evidence proper to that
personal reality with which a person is in communion as
pertaining to his life and with which his destiny is bound up.
Thus in the total context of knowledge, we can attain and
appreciate the reality of the " other," not merely as a static
quidditative expression of the reality concerned but in a more
existential way, in its whole meaning, in its "significance" as
well as its " signification."
c) Interplay between conceptual and non-conceptual. This
extra-conceptual dimension in our knowledge does not lead us
into an anti-intellectual relativism; on the contrary. It introduces a new rigor and penetration into our conceptual knowledge, because we see it as the formal expression of something,
or someone, which in its meaningfulness to the knowing subject
demands to be objectively known and expressed in all its
reality. It is not a question of functional knowing, which would
involve knowing the reality only in its actual reference to us;
our concepts do express the inner meaning of the reality, at
least in some fashion. However, there is more in our personal
knowing of things than the sum total of our concepts about
them. There is the axiological knowing of the reality as well.
This, nonetheless, is subjected to the abstract conceptual
element for ultimate evaluation, so that its authenticity can be
157

J. de Finance, op. cit., 13-15; 3ft9-35.

ANTHONY

J. KELLY

gauged; for our knowing remains the knowing of realities, not
our subjective impressions about them. All things considered,
however, we can say that our axiological attainment of reality
invests our conceptual knowledge with an unconceptualizable
"plus"; the knower attains the reality, the objective reality,
but in his own manner.
Hence, set in its proper noetic dynamism, human personal
knowledge looks to the reality of a " thou " above all, not
merely as a problem to be solved or a puzzle to be pondered
over but as a "lived" reality, a personal mystery, a subject
with which the knower is, here and now, conceretely involved.
It attains this reality as fraught with significance, which
significance is partially expressed in the formal conceptual
categorical type of knowledge significative of that reality. Now
this signification on the conceptual level is itself, in a reflexive
manner, the object of an axiological evaluation; it is seen as a
presence of the reality known to the knowing subject, a weak,
more abstract expressive presence than that of the affective
order, it is true, but nevertheless authentically and ontologically revealing the real formal nature of the object known.
Furthermore, this conceptual knowledge is appreciated in its
dialogal service in interpersonal exchange, thus rendering the
relationship ultimately more significant and more personal.
To sum up this philosophical excursus in the content of our
conceptual knowledge in the sense of its complementary nonconceptual depth, it may be said that knowledge is one manifestation of the person-in-action; as persons we are open to the
whole expanse of being in our spiritual nature. We are open
to the good through the faculty of love and to the truth
through the faculty of intelligence. Through these two basic
spiritual activities the person exists in fulfilled relationship to
the unlimited expanse of being. Because it is the person-inaction in both cases, because the person is living all reality in
his consciousness, there is a reciprocal penetration of knowledge and love which brings our conceptual knowledge closer to
reality, in its non-conceptual depth, and makes love authentic
in the attainment of the true good. In studying this interplay

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183

and interpenetration, my primary interest has been to see the
non-conceptual depth of our knowledge. Having shown this,
principally because of this interpenetrating and the resulting
dynamism it can now be seen that our conceptual knowledge is
part of the whole vital context of our knowledge. There is an
evidence and a depth of reality, especially of a personally
meaningful reality, greater than conceptual knowledge can give.
Now we are in a position to take our findings to the area of
divine faith and, consequently, to theology in its affirmation of
the revealed God.
2. The non-conceptual in the dynamism of the act of fa:ith

The foregoing section has shown that our knowledge is at
once conceptual and non-conceptual; in the dynamism in which
these two elements are linked vitally together, the knower has
a perception of, and an intuition into, the known reality; his
affirmation of it is " real " as well as " notional." The same
applies, though in a far higher way, to the affinnation of faith.
In the discussion of faith there are two aspects which demand
consideration and which in a living integration make for a
uniquely personal yielding to Christ: " Two things are required
for faith: one of them is the inclination of the heart to believe;
and this comes, not from hearing but from the gift of grace.
The other is the determination of what is believable, and this
comes from hearing." 158 There is the interior movement of
the heart, provoked directly by the action of God, and the
propositional or conceptual determination of the assent. First
a word on this latter.
a) Conceptual element in faith. The conceptual element of
our affirmation of the divine Mystery comes to us radically
from the history of salvation, mediated to us here and now
through the Church. The affirmation of faith demands that
there be present in our minds concepts about the mystery to
which we give our assent, for God has spoken to us revealing
Himself to us through the terms of our knowledge in analogies
158

Ad Rom., c. 10, lect.

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ANTHONY

J. KELLY

taken from this world. He has spoken in language we can
understand, even if we do not see the full evidence of the
Reality expressed. Speaking in our language, He has spoken
using our concepts, and by means of these concepts, each with
a definite intelligible content, He calls forth our affirmation of
the divine Reality. To this extent our assent is to a " proposition," that is to say, the divine Mystery is conceptually
proposed to the believer, presented to him through specific
concepts. Thus our assent is determined in a precise direction,
and our affirmation is terminated by the God of Salvation, the
Blessed Trinity, and is not some kind of blind assent to a God,
absent and unknown. Because what comes to the believer " ex
auditu " immediately represents some conceptual content, and
because this conceptual content expresses a precise even if
limited intelligibility in the terms of the proposition, the affirmation can be made: "For man cannot assent by believing
what is proposed to be believed without understanding it in
some way." 159
b) Love and the act of faith. Whilst this propositional and
conceptual element is a necessary part of God's dialogue with
man, the whole process is sublimely interiorized within the
heart of every believer. There is a supernatural inclination of
the heart, a love given to the " heart " of the believer which
enables him to affirm the mystery of divine Love in all its
infinite gratuity and power as a" supernatural" mystery. This
inclination within the heart of the believer is the direct result
of the action of the three divine Persons within the human
spirit, just as the propositional-conceptual element arises from
the hearing of God's 'iVord from an external source. Man does
not yet " see " the Reality he is called upon to affirm, for intellectual evidence is lacking, and must be lacking, for that
matter, in this life. However, there is a true manifestation of
the Reality in this inner personal call, in this " inclinatio
cordis " which supplies for any defect on the part of the intelligence. Thus faith " moves," as Thomas says, not by way
159

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 8, a. 8, ad 2.

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of the intelligence in clear evidence but more by the way of the
will/ 60 by way of love, by way of connaturality toward the
divine, the proper " light" of faith. 161
St. Thomas in his profound meditations on the doctrine of
St. Paul and St. John identifies this inclination of the heart as
the " interior call which is nothing else than a certain instinct
of the mind by which man's heart is moved to assent." 162
In his commentary on St. John, Aquinas calls it the "tractio
Patris ": "thus the Father draws many to the Son through the
instinct of the divine operation moving man's heart to
believe." 163 This call of the Father is further identified as
Christ, the Truth of God: ... " the interior instinct by which
Christ could manifest Himself without exterior miracles pertains to the power of the first faith which interiorly enlightens
and teaches man." 164 And Christ Himself works this instinct
within us through the operation of the Holy Ghost: " ... the
very Son of God speaking in the organ of His humanity does
not avail, except He work interiorly through the Holy
Spirit." 165
This whole life of intimate communion produces an affirmation which, working through the conceptual content of the
propositions, terminated not in the complexity of these concepts
and propositions but in the Persons they represent, in the
mystery of Love which is the Blessed Trinity. 166
And so, the believer, in his personal act of yielding to the
divine Mystery, has his life based not only on propositions, or
knows it merely in its conceptual expressions, but attains to
the Reality itself: "the act of the believer does not terminate
in a proposition but in a thing." 167
160

In Boeth. de Trinitate, q. 3, a. 1, ad 4.

161

J. Alfaro, "Supernaturalitas

fidei iuxta sanctum Thomam," Gregorianum 44

(1963). 765.

Ad Rom., c. 8, lect. 6.
In Joan., c. 6, lect. 5.
164 Quodl. II, q. 4, a. 6, ad 3.
165 In Joan., c. 14, lect. 6; I Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1.
166 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 11, a. 1; q. 2, a. 7.
167 Ibid., q. 1, a. 2, ad 2.

162

163

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ANTHONY

J. KELLY

Thus, in the divine dynamism of the affirmation of faith
there are two elements: i) the propositional with its conceptual
basis, and ii) the divinely worked inclination of the heart
toward the divine reality, the light of evidence in which the
assent is made.
c) The non-conceptual and faith. Already it can be seen that
there is a non-conceptual depth in the affirmation of faith.
In the ordinary human case the extra non-conceptual depth
comes from the presence of subjective as well as objective
elements in our knowing. This subjective depth arises because
the person is connaturalized toward the reality in question,
in love, in free committment of self; hence there is a nonconceptualizable presence of affection to the knower over and
above his conceptual knowledge. By this non-conceptual
element there is a manifestation of the beloved object in the
consciousness of the knower which conceptual knowledge alone
cannot give; the depths of the loved object enter into his
knowing; he knows the loved person as a " thou."
Likewise here in the loving knowledge of faith; the believer
is connaturalized toward the divine Mystery by the supernatural instinct worked in his heart and by the consequent free
commitment of himself to that Mystery. In his knowledge he
can be conscious of God as a " thou," not merely as the sum
total of his concepts, or as a Reality expressed merely through
propositions. There is the added significance over and above
the bare signification, but there is also far more.
Whereas in the case of the non-conceptual dimension of
" significance " in our knowing the reality is known as a lived
" presence," that is, as a subjectively present reality penetrating
the consciousness by way of love, the presence of the Divine,
founding the non-conceptual " plus " in the affirmation of faith,
is more real. There is the subjective presence in that the
believer realizes that what he conceptually knows is his
mystery, intimately belonging to his personal life. Yet over
and above this there is the actual reality of the presence; it is
an objective as well as subjective presence; it is a real as well

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as an affective presence. He is present not only as evoking
our assent, as the supremely attractive Reality, but as causing
it in the sheer gift of His grace. He is at once manifesting Himself, exteriorly through the proposition and concept, interiorly
through the attraction of grace toward the ultimate Truth;
and at the same time He causes us to recognize and to acknowledge this manifestation by way of real assent and personal
affirmation.
Thus the presence at the heart of the act of faith is affective,
real, and dialogal: affective, in the sense that the believer
affirms the divine Reality, through force of love of that reality,
as the absolute Truth for him; real, because the divine Persons
cause this response of loving affirmation; and dialogal, in that
in the " here and now " of salvation history the divine Persons
are manifesting themselves through the concepts and propositions that determine our assent and give us through force of
their intelligible content a conceptual knowledge of the divine
Reality in itself.
Thus, the concept in its role in the act of faith looks not
merely to a depth of significance but to a depth of Personal
presence. In the full unfolding of ordinary human knowledge
the conceptual signification has a depth of significance. But
here, in the knowledge accessible to us in faith, there is an
interplay of thought and presence.
The presence is identified by the thought, by the objective
signification, in its static conceptual components, as being that
of the divine Reality. The thought, the conceptual signification, lives from, and leads to, the depth of personal presence,
which conceptual knowledge does not express.
Thus our affirmation with its conceptual determinant does
really attain the divine Reality. The concept directs our judgment to the inner depths of the Mystery of God through its
formal intelligible content; and thus we preceive a non-conceptualizable depth to our affirmation of faith which is in fact
the presence of the divine Reality as a term, as an Agent, and
above all as a divine " Thou."

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

Now we shall treat of the noetic of theology in the perspectives that have been opened up by the preceding comments.
3. The non-conceptual in the dynamism of theological knowl-

edge
a) Faith and theology. Theology comes into being from the
very nature of the act of faith. There is a complete self-commitment of the believer with regard to the divine Mystery; but
this is made in the darkness of love's impulse, not by the clear
sight of the mind. Nonetheless the believer seeks to reduce this
tension as much as possible, to remedy this fundamental conceptual inevidence as much as he can: "When a man's will is
ready to believe, he loves the truth he believes; he thinks out
and takes to heart whatever reasons he can find in support
thereof." 168 Theology becomes in truth the extension of the
life of faith into the rational life of man. But it is a prolongation into reflection of the act of faith, not a distinction from
it; it cannot find the Reality it considers except in faith, and
in this sense faith is the foundation of theological activity.
Thus, in this living relationship within the thinking believer
there is not an abdication of the perception of faith in favor of
an evidence that theology can furnish; rather, theology contains
within itself all the conceptual and non-conceptual depth that
faith itself possesses. Faced with the Mystery of God, theology
will ask, reverently and lovingly," Quomodo" and" Cur" and
find its systematic reflection capable of being influenced by the
non-conceptual element inherent in faith, in an " attentional "
and "intentional" manner.
b) Theology is inflnenced " attentionally ." The quality of
theological thought should be attentionally influenced, first of
all, in a general way. Even though the theologian embarks
upon an extremely abstract and speculative speculation with
regard to the divine Reality, it will always be " in view " of
the present personal Mystery which he lives in the darkness of
faith. Speculative knowledge will not be mere theorizing, but a
true" speculatio" of God in His present Reality; for, grounding
168

Ibid., q.

a. 10.

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and suffusing the whole speculative effort of theology is that
unique non-conceptual depth to our knowledge arising from the
dynamism of faith. Theology will always be a " personal "
knowledge, even though the notional expressions signifying the
divine Reality may not at a given stage of theological development be notably so. The whole concern of this theological
thought is to give a greater expression of the beloved Personal
Mystery of God, which is " lived " and known in a non-conceptualizable depth through faith.
Then again, this attentional element can be evidenced in a
particular fashion. Through the conceptual and non-conceptual
elements of his knowledge, the theologian is orientated to the
fulness of the revealed Reality. The conceptual element lives
from the dynamic connaturalization of the believer towards
the Reality in which he believes, and therefore in its static
signification it is only a partial expression of it. In different
ages of the Church, under the impulse of the Holy Spirit, the
minds of the believers will be attracted to different aspects of
the divine Reality which a mere analysis of the notional
contents of dogma could not explicate of itself. Theology,
though it worked from these static dogmatic principles, is attentionally affected along a certain line, toward certain values
in the mystery of salvation which in the providence of the
Lord are most necessary for that age or situation in the Church.
In this way theqlogy is guided, in a sense, by its non-conceptual
depth to a vital and dynamic theological life in the Church.
Indeed, if we consider the presence of the non-conceptual in our
theological thought, we will see that " theology " will demand
" theologies " according as different connaturalizations of the
Church to different aspects of the mystery she lives will impel
her theological thought along ever fresh and relevant lines and
preclude the possibility of theology ossifying in a static, abstract conceptualism.
c) Theology is influenced "intentionally."
Intentionally,
i.e., regarding the evidence we have of an object of knowledge,
the non-conceptual depth which our theological knowledge has
through faith will have its influence. This non-conceptual di-

190

ANTHONY

J. KELLY

mension which is the basis of our real affirmation of God makes
us perceive the divine Reality above all as a Mystery of Personal
communion, as the divine " Thou " revealed to our faith in its
non-conceptual depths. This evidence should never desert our
theology with the result that we would come to regard the
evidence of theology as being purely according to the norms of
human logic. We must be content with evidence proper to the
mystery we study. God has revealed Himself as the Three
communing with us in the working out of redemption, each
divine Person being the " Thou " in reference to the believer in
a distinct personal relationship to man. Purely conceptual evidence can take us only so far. The "thou-ness" of the Three
in relationship to the redeemed, explained on a notional level,
will always be something of a puzzle to the rational mind. One
can consider grace, for instance, as a participation in the
common divine nature and explicate the personal element
through appropriation, or the category of " quasi-formal causality " can be used, with its own advantages and difficulties. 169
The notional evidence is limited of necessity; to be kept strictly
faithful to Revelation it must take into account the non-conceptual attainment of the divine Reality, which is personal and
inter-subjective, and thus have a deeper evidence that the
notions and categories of this world can offer. In this manner,
theology will prevent itself from being "logicized" to the
detriment of its personal content. It must be faithful to that
first and fundamental perception of God, experienced in the
non-conceptual attainment of faith: " non in dialectica complacuit Deo salvum facere populum suum." 170
On the other hand, there will always be need of the rational
process and conceptual analyses for the full appreciation of the
content of faith; but in this objective, conceptual expression,
there should be a place for a truly personal language, based
first on the data of Scripture and the experience of faith, and
169

Cf. the discussion amongst P. de Letter, "Divine Quasi-Formal

Causality,"

Irish Theological Quarterly £7 (1960), 2£1-£28; K. O'Shea, "Pure Formal Actuation," ibid. !'ZS (1961), 1-15; B. Kelly, "Divine Quasi-Formal Causality," ibid.
(1961), 16-£9.
170 St. Ambrose, de Fide I, 5 n. 42:
PL 16, 537.

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

191

second, on the human categories of interpersonal relationship.
The non-conceptual element in our theological knowing will be
more adequately conceptualized in this manner, and there will
be a stricter correspondence between the two orders of our
knowledge. In this way theology will become not a rigorously
impersonal analytical science in the sense of being too objective
but will be a discipline of faith interpreting in personalist
categories, and in language of love and union, the immediacy
of God to our faith.
d) The via negativa in this context. This last point concerning the personal character of theological knowledge brought
about by the evidence on its " intentional " dynamic will be
clarified by examining the concrete exercise of the " via
negativa."
The darkness of " unknowing " enters into every aspect of
our theological knowledge. As such, it purifies our conceptual
knowledge and directs it to the eminent order of Gad-in-Himself and, analogously, to Gad-in-Himself-for-us of salvation
history where the divine Mystery is concretely revealed. All
this has been treated in the discussion of the formal and
mysteric moments in our knowledge.
Now when we take account of the dynamism of our knowledge by which faith enables it to open into a non-conceptual
depth of knowing, the " via negativa " can be see in its concrete reference and bearing. The inherent negative character
of our knowing leads us, not to a noetic darkness before an
anonymous Divinity, not even before the revealed God merely
objectively considered and irrespective of the knowing subject,
but before the divine Mystery" lived" and perceived as "Our
Mystery." Hence it is part of a concretely personal noetic, as
it brings the abstract and objective affirmations a termination
in the present and supremely Personal Mystery of our faith.
Though we conceptually affirm God as a divine "Thou" in
the dialectic of our affirmations, in the life of theology as
concretely exercised the " via negativa " awakens us to the
obscure presence of the divine " Thou." It functions in purifying our concepts of finite significations when applied to God;

192

ANTHONY J. KELLY

it directs our attention to salvation history where God is concretely revealed; and it reaches its achievement in making us
aware of the presence of an ineffable Mystery which is personally ours and present to us. The use of the" via negativa" can
be taken as an indication that theology realized its non-conceptual dimensions and the obscure presence of the divine
Reality therein implied. 111
e) Value of our conceptual knowledge. This analysis enables
us to see the value of our conceptual knowledge. It lives in a
complex dynamism; it is a prolongation of faith into reflection;
it is a true " cogitatio fidei." Consequently we can speak of
this conceptual knowledge itself having a significance for us,
as believers and theologians, greater than its mere objective
signification would warrant. Just as we can be axiologically
affected by the divine Reality, we can be similarly affected
regarding the knowledge of that Reality; it can be appreciated
as a value and esteemed as a knowledge of God. Despite its
abstract and inadequate character, it will appear to the possessor in its positive achievment, i.e., as truly and validly
expressing something of the Reality of God, no matter how
weak that conceptual representation may be, for it can truly
direct our affirmation to the divine depths. As a formal expression of the divine Reality it is a share of God's knowledge of
Himself, as St. Thomas says. 172 From this point of view it has
a place in the total dialogal context of God's dealings with man;
it is part of the " Incarnation " of the divine Word in the
rational life of man, the hallowing of that life by the presence
of God in it. And thus the pursuance and cultivation of
theology has a deep significance for man, the believer, and a
deeply religious value. It is part of the reverent response to
Revelation that man must make and part of his service to his
brethren in the Church in their striving to know God.

*

*

*

*

*

The above philosophical note outlined for us the whole
171

172

L. Malevez, art. cit., 248; J. Mouroux, art. cit., 190 ff.
Summa. Theol., I, q. 1, a. 2; a. 8, ad 2.

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

193

dynamic complex of our knowledge wherein it was seen that
our knowledge wherein it was seen that our conceptual knowledge is the abstract expression of a reality attainable in a.
non-conceptual manner, above all when it is the knowledge of
a" thou." We applied the conclusions of this philosophical note
to the consideration of divine faith, that personal " Yes " to
the divine Mystery and all its implications for us. Here we
saw that the conceptual propositional element of faith, lived
from, and lead to, a depth of personal presence of the divine
Reality towards which the mind was opened by an intimate
connaturalization worked in it by the divine action. Theology
being faith prolonged into reflection has, from the previously
elaborated principles, not a self-made object of conceptualizations, nor even for its aim a static representation of the divine
Mystery in its laboriously abstract notions, but it is polarized
completely by the presence of the Mystery to which it is a
response and to the real affirmation of which, in its present
actuality, it proceeds. It does this first (logically taken)
through its formal conceptualizations, which are objectively
orientated through the dynamism of faith, to a non-conceptual
attainment of the Reality they weakly but formally signify.
Thus we come to consider the noetic of theology as a truly
charismatic one, for the non-conceptual element will influence
our conceptualizations, according to divinely worked connaturalizations of the theologian in the Church, to different aspects
of the fullness of the Mystery. We recognize, fundamentally,
that our theological knowledge is necessarily charismatic because of the transcendence of the divine Reality with regard
to our theological knowledge; no theologian and no age of the
Church can ever express the Mystery she fully possesses. And
whilst theological principles can remain the same, their application will vary according as our attention is drawn to more
immanent or transcendent aspects of the revealed God; but
always HE will remain ineffable in His Mystery and transcendent in His presence. 173
173 This transcendence-in-presence
is a translation into theological language of the
mysterious character of revelation: " God, no man has ever seen . . .
only

194

ANTHONY J. KELLY
CoNcLUSION

Against the background of all the problems that we have
treated, we can immediately conclude that our theological
knowledge of the transcendent revealed God is not a static
representational conceptual framework but a complex and
dynamic noetic. This implies a movement in darkness towards
the divine Reality of God-in-Himsel£, not merely as an ontological Object but as the concrete " Thou," identified through
His Self-Revelation in salvation history, now darkly present to
the believing mind.
This conclusion was reached by exploiting the Thomistic
doctrine of negative knowledge and by placing it always in the
context of salvation history and faith.
To express the matter in a different way, there is in our
theological knowledge of the revealed God a non-systematizable
"plus" and a non-conceptualizable "'plus": non-8J}ste11ULtizable, because, despite the validity of the formal categories
which we use to designate the Deity, their usefulness relies
completely on an accompanying awareness of the radically unknowable character of God-in-Himsel£. This must exist with
the recognition of God's free, historical relationship with man
as a divine " Thou." Hence we have postulated the duality of
the formal and mysteric moments in our theological knowledge
of the revealed God. Everything that is formally and darkly
stated of the divine Reality " in abstracto " we see concretized
in an historical and experienced fashion that no theological
system can explain. The living God eludes systematization in
the recognition of His ineffable ontological Personality along
with the originality of His historical Self-disclosure.
On the other hand, the non-conceptualizable " plus " is
present in that it arises from the non-conceptual depth that our
knowledge possesses, giving our concepts a dynamic orientation
toward the divine Mystery in its totality that no purely
notional knowledge could achieve. Thus, our theological knowlSon has made Him known," Jn. 1 : 18; also I Tim. 6 : 16; summed up in the words
of St. Thomas, " Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur," Summa Theol., I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1.
schichte,' Mysterium Salutis II, 317-398, (Einsiedeln, 1967).

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

195

edge in its full range has a unique real content. Our concepts
are pointing to the presence of the divine Mystery, realized
consciously to be inexpressible, in the sense that we know more
about God than our concepts express: the believer is always
affirming God in the connaturality established by faith, far
more significant to him than the abstract signifying power of
mere conceptualization.
In short, theological knowledge of the transcendent Mystery
of the divine Three possesses a noetic structure of conceptual
and non-conceptual components of static signification and the
depth of personal significance; of darkness, because of the
necessary negativity of our knowledge, yet of positive direction:
because this darkness is always leading the theologian into a
deeper knowledge of the divine "Thou": "Deo quasi ignoto
coniungimur." 174
Now we can reflect very briefly on the three main problem
areas that have provided the framework for the greater part of
the discussion.
The first frame of reference was St. Thomas's approach to
the Mystery of the Trinity, through his " ordo doctrinae," in
the" de Deo Uno-Trino" schema, that was typical of him and
the great Thomists that came after. The more modern approach, represented above all by K. Rahner, 175 would find this
schema and the method of approach not altogether adequate to
the Mystery of the Trinity, because of its divorce from the
concrete setting of revelation, salvation history. Our attention
is not to reconcile the two approaches, but, after what has been
said, a few remarks are in order: 1) Both approaches work in
the same unique theological noetic in an effort to conceptualize
the divine " Thou," obscurely present to the believing mind
and expressed in the Sacred Scriptures as read in the Church,
in His concrete relationship with sinful man.
The objective
expression of both these approaches lives and has its meaning
from a non-conceptual depth of theological knowledge which is
not fully expressed by either, so that in the rather abstract
Summa Theol., I, q. 1!l, a. 13, ad 1.
K. Rahner, ' Der dreifaltige Gott als Transzendenter
schicte, Mysterium Salutis II, 317-398 (Einsiedeln, 1967).
17 •

175

Urgrund der Heilsge-

196

ANTHONY J". KELLY

and formal expressions of the one there is a personal content,
and in the inter-personal expressions of the other there must
always be understood to be present that God is the Transcendent Reality in the ontological sense (despite the fact that this
might not be formally expressed) . 3) Though the theological
noetic at the basis of these two approaches is many-sided and
complex, it can be stated as a general principle that any
methodological approach must adopt a certain temporal order,
because it cannot hope to express the fulness of its insight all
at once, without there first being a precise clarification of principle and presupposition. The Thomistic approach passes from
God-in-Himself to the " economia," whilst the salvation historical approach reverses, in general, this procedure. In this
latter, a certain attentional influence is discernible: the great
appreciation of intersubjective dialogal values. This attentional
influence was presumably not so intensely felt by St. Thomas,
who is rather more taken by the fact that God is really acting in
our world and history (effectus naturae et gratiae), and thus
putting man in possession of a supreme form of knowledge, that
of " God in Himself " ... " id quod notum est sibi soli de seipso
et aliis per revelationem communicatum." 176 So, in this more
objective appreciation of the divine Reality there is a more
transcendentally sapiential point of view, since through this
knowledge the theologian enjoys the highest form of human
wisdom. 177
It does not seem to imply an exaggeration to postulate the
possibility of these two approaches complementing one another,
as reflection takes place in the Church on the transcendent
Reality of God. The adoption of one system cannot imply the
fundamental invalidity of the other.
The Thomistic approach can be reminded by the other
method that all theology is an attempt to know a divine
Subject, in the full modern sense of the word, not merely to
categorize an ontological object. Though God is not measured
by His concrete reference to man as a divine " Thou," He is
176
177

Summa Theol., I, q. 1, a. 6.
Ibid.: " ... sacra doctrina maxime dicitur sapientia."

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

197

known first and foremost in this reference, which is not a merely
abstract metaphysical relation, though, of course, abstract
metaphysical objectivization must follow if the believer is
humanly to realize that it is GOD who is communicating Himself.
The salvation historical method alerts the Thomistic approach
to the uniqueness of the Reality it is considering. It reminds
the classic Thomist that he must make explicit within theology
an awareness of the mysteric moment in our knowledge, in
the consciousness that the living God cannot be adequately
affirmed in the abstract formal content of our conceptualizations.
A directly salvation historical approach can be aided by the
Thomistic one to appreciate adequately that the God that is
encountered is an ontic Reality, in the sense that He is in
Himself what He reveals Himself to be, and is not confined or
measured by the concrete " economia " of His communication.
In fact, this is a necessity if the believer is going to appreciate
thereality of God's Self-gift and the efficacy of our salvation in
Christ.
Thus, the transcendence of the Revealed God really demands
the existence of both these approaches and affects each with
the need to learn from the other.
The second problem we examined as background for our
study was the Essence-Person problematic of Malet. 178 This
was with regard to the Trinitarian theology of St. Thomas.
In retrospect it would seem that this author did not fully
realize the true character of our knowledge of the revealed God.
I£ it is to be considered purely as something of the conceptual
order, with no realization that our concepts are meant to yield
to a higher process of negation before the fulness of what God
is in Himself, a problem is bound to arise. Our knowledge
would then be fragmented into a static distinction of concepts
where nature is not person, goodness not wisdom, etc. Thus, it
becomes possible to overlook the fact that these concepts are
178

Cf. First Part of this present study, The Thomist XXXII (1968), no. 1, pp.

3; 41-43; 56.

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ANTHONY

J. KELLY

being applied to God, in His infinite simplicity, transcending
the limited conceptual expressions we use about Him. It seems,
then, that this is Malet's main problem: failing to take into
account the radical transcendence of God over our concepts
about Him, he worked out a primacy of person in the order of
our concepts alone, and then he found it necessary to keep a
distinction in the divine Reality itself.
Another reason for the existence of this Essence-Person problem is the failure to realize the mysteric givenness of the
Mystery of the Trinity with regard to our knowledge. This
is not confined to the formal abstract order, but it begins from
and returns to the concrete reality of Revelation as found in
the history of salvation. If this is not realized, difficulties
readily present themselves, which arise not from the revealed
Reality of the Trinity but from a conceptually fabricated
Deity. Thus, we are forced to labor to see how the Father alone
is Father, why the Son, too, does not have the power to
generate, etc. In these cases we take the divine simplicity too
abstractedly and draw conclusions from it irrespective of THIS
Father, THIS Son ... THIS Mystery of God. The elaboration of
such abstract thought does not take place as it should, within
the Mystery of faith, but in abstraction from it. The givenness
of the Mystery is not sufficiently realized before reflection takes
place about it. So it became necessary to " prove " a personalism in the Trinity that could not have really been doubted,
and in an effort not to sacrifice nature to person, the divine
simplicity was sacrificed, through the introduction of a distinction into it, to a failure to realize the true character of our
theological knowledge when faced with the Transcendence of
God.
Lastly, with regard to the problem of the" concept of God"
as we outlined it, the following remarks suggest themselves in
retrospect. On the one hand, the abstract nature of the concept was mentioned, on the other, care was taken to place it in
the affirmative context of judgment. In this way it can be
legitimately said that the concept we have through the affirmative power of judgment turns our minds to the unconcept-

TO KNOW THE MYSTERY

199

ualizable Reality of God in Himself. Our conceptual knowledge
is polarized, not within itself but beyond itself, of necessity
yielding to the darkness in which our minds are positively
directed the divine ineffable Mystery. In this way there is
truly a dynamism in our knowledge, which is complemented
by a non-conceptualizable " plus " of the special personal order
of our knowledge as was described. There in modest fashion
we tried to give the general principles of the" objective orientation " of our conceptual knowledge of God, which E. Schillebeeckx postulated but did not sufficiently explain. An attempt
was made to indicate how our conceptual knowledge was set
in the dynamic of faith's attainment of reality; hence we
suggested that in all theological thought there is a non-conceptual depth present and that our conceptualizations are in
fact living from and leading back to the personal presence of
the divine " Thou." The darkness inherent in all our conceptualizations of the divine Reality was seen to be opening out into
an immensely personal type of knowledge, which is the special
characteristic of theological thought. Because of this nonconceptual " plus " in our knowledge, there is room for theology
to be influenced, not only in the evidence it has of the reality
it considers but in its attentional consideration of different
aspects of that reality. According as theology is attentionally
influenced by its non-conceptual depth, in this or that direction,
the number of "theologies " will increase, e. g., as is already
the case with different religious orders in their appreciation of
the Mystery of Christ. The recognition of this non-conceptual
depth enables us to see our theological noetic as demanding a
variety of charismatic expressions (always with respect for the
dogmatic articulations of the Magisterium). This would be a
practical recognition of the transcendence of the God who has
spoken over, not only a specific theological system but over our
conceptual expressions and over our whole theological awareness. God is always the "Beyond," the abiding Mystery, transending our knowledge in His union with the believing mind.
Since our theological knowledge is of this unique type, with
its special noetic structure when faced with the transcendence

ANTHONY

J. KELLY

of God, some results for pedagogy in this area should follow
from the principles that have been outlined.
The first thing that stands out is that the student of
theology, when faced with the ever present Mystery of the
Revealed God, must be alerted to the precise nature of the
knowledge he is looking for. If this does not happen, he will
conceive theology either after the pattern of the positive
sciences, and so look for the wrong type of evidence and so
expose himself to a greater or less degree of dissatisfaction
throughout the whole course of his theological education, or, on
the other hand, he might conceive of theology as merely abstract conceptual theory and so see the whole purpose of his
task in the categorization of the living God in neat easily
memorized formulas. The backlash of this type of approach
would be predictable.
Also, when solutions are arrived at or positions established,
there must be this accompanying awareness of what we are
about. Theological positions must be expressed in conceptual
terms; thus they appear to be limited static representations of
the divine Reality. Only when both student and educator arc
alive to the dynamism of our knowledge of the living God can
the true relevance of an acquired position be appreciated. The
theological attempt is not to encapsulate the Divinity in our
concepts but to open our minds, in however dark a fashion, to
the ineffable Mystery of the Trinity.
One can believe, then, that an alertness to the dynamics of
the theological noetic can do much to take the impression of
excessive and arid abstraction out of the " courses " that are
given on the Revealed God.
And so we conclude, remarking merely that, because our
theological knowledge is of God, it is at once limited and rich:
limited because God is infinitely beyond it; rich, because God
has spoken and called us to Himself, an abiding Mystery of
Truth and Love.
ANTHONY

St. Mary's MonasteTy
W endouree, Victoria
Australia

J. KELLY, C. SS. R.

LINGUISTIC ANALYSIS AND INFERENCE
ABOUT GOD

I. THE CHALLENGE

OF ANALYTIC

PHILOSOPHY

NYONE WITH even a superficial knowledge of analytic
philosophy will readily grant that some of its currents
represent a great challenge, if not a threat, to theistic
philosophers. And it would be unscientific, if not puerile, to
dismiss this challenge with a few well-chosen words and rest
secure in the sanctuary of tradition.
The purpose and limits of this presentation are indicated in
its title. Hence, it will not be necessary to trace the history of
analytic philosophy. As far as this topic is concerned, practically all analytic philosophers would refuse to admit the
validity of any philosophical demonstration of the existence of
God based upon the inference from empirical data.
Some, still under the spell of Hume and Kant, would dismiss
any claim for our philosophical knowledge about God. Thus,
after discussing the principle of causality and the notion of a
timeless being, John Hospers concludes:
However a timeless God (or any timeless entity) might be
related to the temporal universe, the relation could hardly be a
causal one, for the causal relation is a relation among temporal
events. 1
Others would reject a philosophical demonstration for the
existence of God on the grounds that the conclusion of such a
demonstration is meaningless and absurd. In discussing the
existence of God, J. J. C. Smart has this to say:
The greatest danger to theism at the present moment does not
come from people who deny the validity of the arguments for the
1 John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (New York:
PrenticeHall, 1958), p. 881.

9l01

VINCENT

V. FONTANA

existence of God, for many Christian theologians do not believe that
the existence of God can be proved, and certainly nowhere in the
Old or New Testament do we find any evidence of people's religion
having a metaphysical basis. The main danger to theism today
comes from people who want to say that " God exists " and " God
does not exist" are equally absurd. 2
And the author goes on by assuming that the question " Does
God exist? " is a proper question. He then asks himself:
Can a study of the traditional proofs of the existence of God
enable us to give an affirmative answer to this question? I contend
that it can not. 3
And the author's argument for defending his contention is
based on the logical analysis of the expression " necessary
being " used by traditional philosophical theism to describe
God. In modern logic the term " necessary " is a predicate of
propositions, not of things. The conclusion of the cosmological
argument, therefore, would be a proposition that is only logically necessary. 4
Faced with this atheistic attitude, a number of theistic
analysts have limited themselves to making an attempt to show
that theistic convictions are significant independently of any
philosophical grounding. Farrer, for example, takes the position
that, since nothing can be really demonstrated, religious utterances, as well as statements about science and art, find their
own justification in their own use.
The old method of philosophizing about theology was the
endeavor to prove. . . . Such a method or proceeding is now out
of fashion, not so much because theology cannot be philosophically
demonstrated as because nothing can; not, that is, in the implied
sense of "demonstrated." Every science, art, or manner of speaking
is now supposed to find its own justification in its own use.5
2 J. J.
C. Smart, "The Existence of God," in New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, ed. by A. Flew and A. Macintyre (New York: Macmillan, 1966),
pp. ftS-9.
3 Ibid.
• Ibid., p. 38.
5 Austin Farrer, "A
for the Philosophical Examination of Theological Belief," in Faith and Logic, ed. by Mitchell (Boston: The Beacon Press,
1957)' p. 9.

LINGUISTIC

ANALYSIS

AND INFERENCE

ABOUT GOD

208

Farrer does not seem to realize that statements about God,
if they are to possess any universal validity and significance,
should be grounded in a philosophical demonstration of the
existence of God.
A similar line of thought is persued by Crombie. In his
reply to A. Flew and A. M. Quinton, who contend that religious
utterance are meaningless, he says:
Let us begin by dismissing from our inquiry the troublesome
statement " There is a God " or " God exists." As every student
of logic knows, all statements asserting the existence of something
offer difficulties of their own, with which we need not complicate
our embarrassment. 6

And referring to the logical structure of religious belief, whose
logical mother he calls undifferentiated theism, Crombie states
that:
Her function is, not to prove to us that God exists, but to
provide us with a " meaning " for the word " God." 7

As in the case of Farrer, Crombie does not seem to see the
need for relating analytic theism to a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. It is to be admitted that both
Farrer and Crombie have a point. The significance of religious
discourse is explained by them in terms of personal experience.
This, of course, has its value and should not be minimized.
But the approach is too exclusive. For one may wonder
whether a truly significant language about God would have a
solid consistency if based only on emotive grounds. Crombie,
however, discovers the claim to an existential significance of
our religious statements in Christ. " Christ, then, is the word
of God to us; both the evidence of the reality of God, and
also the declaration of Him to us." This approach is very
6 I. M. Crombie, "Theology
and Faloification," in New Essays in Philosophical
Theology, p. 110.
7 Ibid., p. 116.
8 I. M. Crombie, " The Possibility of Theological Statements,"
in Faith and Logic,

p. 68.

VINCENT

V. FONTANA

fruitful, for it makes appeal to the history of redemption and
thus avoids the difficulties that may be implied in a philosophical demonstration of the existence of God. Yet, man's rational
exigencies would seem to demand some philosophical foundation even for a belief in the mysteries of redemption.
In Religion in the Making, Whitehead points out that, without some metaphysical foundation, religion would be in danger
of emotional degeneration.
Religion requires metaphysical backing; for its authority is endangered by the intensity of the emotions which it generates. Such
emotions are evidence of some vivid experience; but they are a
very poor guarantee for its correct interpretation. 9

II.

THE NATURE OF CAUSAL INFERENCE

The general reluctance on the part of theistic analysts to
ground our language about God in a philosophical demonstration seems to be due to the fact that the terms " proof " or
"demonstration" have now taken on a more specialized meaning than in the past. 10 By "proof" today is meant a purely
formal process reducible to the principle of contradiction. Now,
since all our philosophical language about God is based on
causal inference, the question facing us is this: is the principle
of causality or of sufficient reason reducible to the principle of
contradiction? If it is, then there should be no quarrel between
analysts and modern scholastics who, in their explanation of
the traditional proofs for the existence of God, make use of
this method. If, on the other hand, the principle of causality
cannot be reduced to the principle of contradiction, then what
would be the nature of the " proof " for the existence of God
and other natural religious truths? The answer to this question
will come as a corollary to our general analysis of causal
inference.
9

Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, Meridian, p. 81.

1

° Cf. W. Norris Clarke, S. J., "Analytic Philosophy and Language about God,"

reprinted from Christian Philosophy and Religious Renewal, ed. by George F.
McLean, 0. M. I. (Washington: The Catholic University of America Press, 1966),
p. 47.

LINGUISTIC

ANALYSIS

AND INFERENCE

ABOUT GOD

205

1. Inference and Personal Identity

The office of a philosopher is to give a rational explanation
of the reality of human experience. Now, if in the realm of
human experience there should be things which cannot account
for their existence or activities, the inquiring mind will have to
seek for an explanation and try to find a principle or cause
which would be responsible for the deficiency of the things
under consideration. Or, to put it in a different way, how can
we account for things which are not immediately evident to
our experience? The answer to this question will reveal to us
both the dynamism of the human mind and the peculiar character of causal inference.
A brief analysis of our own personal identity or unity will
make these things more intelligible. This mode of procedure is
justified by the simple reason that, if we do know anything at
all, we ought to know ourselves, because nothing is closer to
us than we are to ourselves.
The question may be stated this way: do I have a direct
insight into my personal unity? It is a fact that in our ordinary
language we say, "I am gaining weight,"" I see and hear,"" I
understand," " I want this or that." Is this sort of language
justified? And if so, how?
Now, if I had a direct insight into my ego, there would be
no reason for asking such a question. I would be able to see
the very source of my activities and thus have a comprehensive
knowledge of them. The fact, however, is that our knowledge
of the self proceeds in an exactly opposite direction. I know
myself first as acting. Our knowledge starts from the operations, the immediate fact of our experience, and, by following
an inductive method, tries to grasp their source. 11
But why must the immediate consciousness of my activities
postulate a central principle of unity? The answer is to be
found in the very nature and purposive character of my activities. These activities are many and irreducible. My intel11 "

The nature of each thing is shown by its operation," Summa Theol., I, q.

76, a. 1.

206

VINCENT

V. FONTANA

lectual activities cannot be reduced to my volitional activities,
and my rational activities cannot be reduced to my sensitive
activities, and these latter cannot be reduced to my vegetative
activities. To put it crudely, I "catch" myself in a variety of
ways.
Now, considered in themselves, all these irreducible activities
would require a distinct source or principle. I am conscious,
however, that all of them have a common intrinsic purpose,
namely, the good of the whole, my individual self. And this
realization will serve as the basis for the causal inference: all
these irreducible operations must have a common principle, a
source or cause which directs them toward the good of the
individual self.
But what is the nature of such an inference? Two answers
can be given: a) since the activities work for a common goal,
it follows that there is a common principle or cause; b) since
the activities have a common goal, this fact would be unintelligible unless there were a common principle or cause. There
is a remarkable difference between the two types o£ conclusions. The first would go directly to the source of the activities,
the second, on the other hand, points to it. The first says
"it is there"; the second states "it must be there." The first
type of inference does not seem to correspond to reality, for we
never have a direct grasp of the individual nature itself but only
through the mediacy of the operations-which, however, should
not be conceived as intellectual eyeglasses or binoculars. Even
when, by a more penetrating introspection, we succeed in having a better knowledge of ourselves, the ego will always remain,
as it were, shrouded in mystery.
The function of the operations, therefore, have the character
of " vectors," of arrows pointing to something beyond themselves without giving us the vision of the reality that lies
beyond. This fact, however, does not by any means imply that
the existence of a principle of central unity can be subject to
doubt. This existence is required by the intelligibility of the
common intrinsic purpose of the operations we experience. And

LINGUISTIC

ANALYSIS

AND INFERENCE

ABOUT GOD

fl07

because of this intelligibility, the intellect thrusts itself into the
affirmation of the existence of the cause.

Inference and Things Other than Ourselves
If our own personal nature is a mystery to us requiring a
humble intellectual attitude, it follows that the natures of
things outside us are even more mysterious. Things of the
external world are known by us according to the pattern of
our own nature. And the more they differ from us, the less we
experience them; and the less we experience them, the more
the intellect will have to thrust itself byond the screen of the
empiriological manifestations. This fact reveals to us the analogous character of the causal inference. We are only able to
grasp the specific, abstract nature of man. In respect to realities on the subhuman level, we have to content ourselves with
a rather generic and vague definition. Thus, we define animals
in terms of irrationality in opposition to rational animals, men.
Even the positive description, " a living sensitive substance,"
is rather generic and does not say much. And should we try to
define a horse or a dog, we would find ourselves completely lost.
St. Thomas was very much aware of this fact, so much so that
he seems to be amused by this particular problem, as the
following words will testify.
Our knowledge is so imperfect that no philosopher has ever been
able to make a perfect investigation of the nature of one fly. We
are told that a certain philosopher spent thirty years in solitude
in the endeavor to know the nature of the bee. 12

This quotation alone should be sufficient, though others could
be adduced in order to show St. Thomas's mind on the matter.
The natures of things are not known to us. We know them in
a vague, very generic way. It follows then that the scholastic
expressions, " essentiae rerum cognoscuntur non per se sed per
accidens," or, "essentia rei materialis est sensibilis per acci12 In Symbolum
Apostolorum, Prologus, 864, Opuscula Theologica, ed. Marietti
(1954).

VINCENT

V. FONTANA

dens," need not have the meaning usually given in textbooks.
The essences of corporeal things are known in a manner analogous to the knowledge we have of our individual self.
3. Inference and Knowledge about God

If what has been said stands to reason, it follows that when
we attempt to explain the whole realm of human experience
in terms of a supramundane or transcending cause, the task
of the human mind becomes even more difficult. Here the
human mind comes, as it were, face to face with its own limited
power, and only its dynamic character will allow it to make
the leap beyond the realm of experience. Let us briefly analyze
this problem.
All the traditional proofs for the existence of God are based
on the principle of causality or sufficient reason. The contention
of many modern scholastics is that the denial of the conclusion
reached by this demonstration would involve the denial of the
principle of contradiction. Let us see how this is done by
analyzing the most fundamental characteristics of the being
of human experience, namely, becoming and esse. This mode
of procedure will at the same time show the weakness of the
modern scholastic analysis and the true nature of the causal
inference about God.
a. Analysis of Becoming. The problem is this: is becoming or
change self-explanatory? The answer to this question demands
an analysis of the elements implied in becoming. First, we
have an existing subject, e. g., water. Secondly, a capacity in
the subject to become in some sense " other," e. g., hot. Thirdly,
the process of becoming itself, e. g., water no-longer-cold, and
not-yet-hot. Finally, the terminus ad quem of becoming, e. g.,
hot.
Are all these factors self-explanatory? Could water become
hot by itself? If this were the case, then the subject which
undergoes the change (water) would itself be the source of
change, and no patient, as such, can be its own agent. For a
potential existent that would be able to fill by itself that

LINGUISTIC

ANALYSIS AND INFERENCE

ABOUT GOD

!209

capacity is a contradiction in terms; for it would both not be
that perfection (because being only capable of it) and be that
perfection (because having its source within itself). Hence,
"quidquid movetur, ab alio movetur."
Now, there is nothing wrong with the principle itself, provided, of course, it is properly understood. But is it really true
that the denial of this principle would involve the denial of the
principle of contradiction? To my knowledge, St. Thomas, whom
such scholastics say they are following, never says this-and,
I believe, for a very good reason, namely, because there is no
contradiction. Contradiction is always between two contradictory terms, such as being and non-being, living and non-living;
and in our present case the contradiction should be between
capacity for being and non-capacity for being, and this is
obviously not the case; for what is contrasted in the contention
is not capacity for with non-capacity for, but capacity for with
to-be. The conclusion, therefore, should be this: unless we
admit a source of becoming, becoming itself would be unintelligible. And this is the meaning of the principle. This point
will be elaborated in our next analysis.
b. Analysis of Esse. The problem is this: do the things of
human experience contain within themselves the whole explanation of their esse? The common solution given to this
problem may be expressed as follows.
It is a fact that there are many existents. They are of such
and such a nature. Hence none of them possesses the fulness
of esse, but each one of them participates in esse. In other
words, they have esse; they are not esse. Now, a participated
esse is a caused esse, for an uncaused participated esse would
be a contradiction in terms, because an uncaused esse is the
fullness of esse, esse itself. Hence, whatever exists by participation is caused by another.
As is evident, this case is analogous to the foregoing. I am
not saying that a participated esse is not a caused esse. What
I am saying is that there is a contradiction between participated esse and non-participated esse, but not between uncaused

QIO

VINCENT

V. FONTANA

esse and participated esse. It is quite true that the expression
" uncaused participated esse " does not make sense. And it
does not make sense because it is unintelligible. A comparison
might clarify the issue. Let us take these two expressions:
" a square circle " and " an uncaused participated being." It is
evident that in the first expression the predicate adjective
denies the subject, whereas in the second there is no such
denial. Both expressions are unintelligible but for different
reasons: the first because it is a contradiction in terms, the
second because a participated being must be explained in reference to a cause. And this, it seems to me, is the mind of St.
Thomas. Here is one of his statements on the subject:
Though the relation to its cause is not part of the definition of
a thing caused, still it follows, as a consequence, on what belongs
to its essence; because from the fact that a thing has being by
participation, it follows that it is caused. Hence such a being
cannot be without being caused, just as man cannot be without
having the faculty of laughingP

As is clear, St. Thomas does not equate " being by participation" with" caused being." The fact of being caused follows
(sequitur) from the fact of being by participation, as the
faculty of laughter follows from rational nature. This doctrine
may be explained briefly by the following analogy: beingcaused : being by participation : : risibility : man. And as
risibility is a property of man, so being caused is a property of
participated being; and as man cannot be without risibility, so
participated being cannot be without being caused.
This, however, does not mean that should I deny risibility
I would, eo ipso, deny man. Let me explain. To use scholoastic
terminology, the propositions "man is risible" and "participated being is caused " belong to the second mode of per se
predication. Now, it is quite true, as St. Thomas says, that
man cannot exist without the capacity for laughter, nor can
such a capacity exist without man; this refers to the existential
order of reality, and it is in this sense, it seems to me, that a
13

Summa Theol., I, q. 44, a. 1 ad 1.

LINGUISTIC

ANALYSIS

AND INFERENCE

ABOUT GOD

211

property is convertible with its subject. On the strict logical
level, however, the case is not quite the same, because a
property is a part of the subject, the whole, and no part can be
equated with the whole. And this is the reason why I can think
of a property apart from the whole. In a contradictory proposition the predicate denies the whole of the subject, and a
property, being a part of the subject, does not perform this
function. Now, to be caused is a property of participated being.
Hence, its denial does not necessarily involve the denial of the
participated being itself.
These considerations perhaps point out the logical mistake
of those who contend that the denial of the principle of
causality would necessarily imply the denial of the principle of
contradiction. These two principles are altogether different in
character. The principle of contradiction is static, like any
other logical rule; the principle of causality, or of sufficient
reason, on the other hand, is dynamic. This should be sufficiently evident from what has been said.
As a further clarification of the present problem, however,
we may ask ourselves: what is the function of risibility or of
any other property in general in relation to its principle or
cause? We are told that properties manifest the nature of a
given entity. And this statement is quite true. St. Thomas
himself makes use of it rather frequently. But what is its
meaning? Again, we cannot equate the verb " to manifest"
with the verb " to render evident " in the sense that we have
a direct insight into the nature or cause. The properties put
us, as it were, on the path leading to their respective principle
or source, but they will never allow us to enter the sanctuary
itself. They are vectors, indicators pointing to something beyond-nothing more. And they are all the mind needs in
order to make the affirmation: the " something beyond " must
be there, or else I cannot account for the intelligibility of my
experience.
If what has been said is correct, then the nature of the causal
inference from the world of human experience to God will be
analogous to the nature of the other causal inferences based on

VINCENT V. FONTANA

our existential world. There is no need to repeat our basic
theme. Briefly, just as I cannot say: "since the activities work
for a common intrinsic purpose, therefore there is a common
principle or cause," so I cannot say: " since the world is intelligible, therefore God exists." On the other hand, just as I
can say: " the common intrinsic purpose of the activities would
be unintelligible if they had no common principle," so I can
say: " the world would be unintelligible, if God did not exist."
The analysis of the world of human experience reveals the insufficiency of such a world, and this insufficiency is the vector
pointing to the existence of a self-sufficient cause, God. This
fact will also reveal to us that:
... at the roots of man's entire intellectual life there is uncovered a radical act of what might be called natural faith, in the
sense of commitment to what cannot fully be seen and justified
without residue by one's own powers, in response to a mysterious
summons or invitation issuing from the depths of the innate natural
dynamism of one's created intelligence.14

*

*

*

*

*

If the foregoing makes sense to the reader, then it would
seem that the challenge of analytic philosophy can be accepted
by the Thomist with fruitful results. A re-evaluation of the
principle of causality along the lines indicated in this presentation might also prove to be acceptable to analysts with theistic
convictions and thus open the way to a structuring of language
about God upon contemporary philosophical grounds.
VINCENT

Fordham University
New York, N. Y.

"W. Norris Clarke, op. cit., p. 49.

V. FoNTANA, 0. P.

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

T

EILHARD DE CHARD IN inherited the fragmented
world of our age. Due to many factors, among these the
evolutionary theory, the idealistic strain in philosophy,
the wars, the man of our times had become dissociated from
his past traditional views, from his environment, from himself,
and from God. Like many other thinkers of our age, Teilhard
too sought to re-establish man in his world. He attempted a
synthe:ds in which man, God, and the universe would once
more been seen as a harmonious whole.
This task was not easy. Many today feel that Teilhard failed
in his venture. It is our purpose here to examine this synthesis
in the context which nurtured it, for only in this way may it be
properly understood. Particular attention will be paid to the
argument for the omega point. As it stands, the omega point
furnishes Teilhard with the unity he desired, and its arguments
could be proposed as evidence for the existence of God. Finally,
we will treat a few of the contemporary objections against
Teilhard's synthetic approach to the problems about man, God,
and the universe.

I.

TEILHARn's

PERSONAL
OF

AwARENESS

OF THE PROBLEMS

Hrs AaE

Teilhard de Chardin was privileged to feel within himself the
very agonizing issues of our day. And his resolution of these
personally-felt dichotomies gives to his synthesis its personal
flavor. The major problem of his life was to resolve the
apaprent discontinuity he experienced between his love of the
world and his love of God.
Paraphrasing Genesis, we might say that" in the beginning"
Teilhard first loved the world. This is evident, for example, in
his apparent passion for stones which preoccupied him as a
young student. Nothing else seems to have interested him.

213

214

DAVID THOMASMA

He never lost this interest in what were, for a French Catholic
of his day, " worldly matters." His love of the earth led him
to paleontology, an area in which he became in later life a
recognized authority. A summary of the issues highlighting
his concern for the world would read as follows: a concern for
scientific research, for personal self-development made available
to all men, and for human achievement which would advance
the progress of the world. Research, development, and achievement. These three issues dominate his love of the earth.
However, Teilhard held a deep interest in religion as well.
Taught the Christian faith according to the standards of the
times, he gradually became aware that the teachings on God
and man he received were not in accord with his own welldeveloped love of the world. This doxic dichotomy was
especially notable in three areas corresponding to the " three
loves " of the world mentioned above. Apparently opposed to
scientific research was the data of revelation. Standing against
a deep self-development in the world was a formidable call for
Christian detachment from the world. Finally, how was he to
reconcile human efforts and achievements with his call, as a
Christian, to the Kingdom of Christ, a Kingdom not of this
world?
Turmoil is bound to result when two profoundly-rooted
facets of a man's life seem to conflict so readily. In one so
sensitive as Teihard, this became all the more evident.
Obviously a way out had to be sought. The usual historical
pattern is a rejection of one irreconcilable element for the
other; faith rejected for the world, or more rarely, the world
for faith. The Jesuit priest did neither.
Teilhard went through an acute period of experience of the
absurdity of the world. In this " religious experience " he did
not abandon the world. What kept him on an even keel was his
anxiety about unbelief. He was aware that a lack of faith often
led to a profound pessimism about the world.1 Through faith,
1 C. F. Mooney, S. J., Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (New York:
Harper & Row, 1966), p.
For a more detailed exploration of Teilhard's life,

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

215

both in God and in the world, he was able to resolve the turmoil
within him. As a result o£ this victory o£ faith, a constant
optimism flowed £rom his pen. What furnished the source o£ this
optimism about the world was a personal religious conviction.
This conviction, simply stated, was that Christ was physically
conjoined to the universe. God could not abandon the world.
As God, man, and the world were unified in Christ, neither God,
nor man and his world could perish £rom Teilhard's life. Man
was not £aced with a choice between God or the world. Rather
he was £aced with a synthesis o£ God and the world in Christ.
Therefore unity became Teilhard's "way out." His was a
poetic vision o£ unity. "Pull a flower, trouble a star," said
Francis Thompson. This was the type o£ vision which Teilhard
constantly sought to render clear, even to himsel£.2 The universe, man and God become in his writings a super-cosmic
whole.
We have mentioned a scientific, religiously poetic, and theological Teilhard. These three facets are continually interlarded
in the writings o£ the French Jesuit, and these £acts are not
always clear to the reader. Mooney offers a helpful hint in
reading Teilhard. In speaking o£ the evolution o£ the universe,
Teilhard is concerned as a scientist; as a theologian, he reflects
upon Christ's physical union with the cosmos; and it is as a
religious visionary that Teilhard seeks to help others work out
their salvation, in Christ, but also in the world. 3

II.

PROBLEMATics:

THE CoNTEXT

OF TEILHARn's

SYNTHESIS

"What a wretched man I am! Who will rescue me £rom this
body doomed to death?" (Romans 7: 24) In speaking £or the
anguish o£ mankind, St. Paul also asks the same question which
troubled Teilhard. We will see this to be the case, by pointing
out the principal problems about the world, about man, and
see ibid., pp. 1-32; De Lubac, S. J., Teilhard de Chardin: The Man and His Meaning (New York: Mentor, 1967).
• Mooney, op. cit., p. 13.
• Ibid., pp. 34-5.

216

DAVID THOMASMA

about God which challenged Teilhard. How could these
challenges, which spelled pessimistic doom for the universe in
his eyes, be answered?
1. The ComLic Problem

We have already seen that the challenges offered by science
to Christian thought were staggering. Science had developed its
firmest theses outside of, if not in direct contradiction to, the
Church. The vitality of science could be seen in direct contrast
to a seemingly stagnant Church. Foremost among the scientific
theses which opposed the authority of the Church as well as the
latter's traditional thought were Galileo's discovery that the
universe was not geocentric, Newton's apparent destruction of
the theory of natural place and intrinsic final causality of
inanimate things, and Darwin's introduction of historical process for the previous specific identities. The chief ecclesiastical
thesis opposing science, in Teilhard's view, was the notion that
moral life "transcended" the world. 4
Nevertheless Teilhard faced an even greater problem, parallel
to St.Paul'shumanityin Romans quoted above. His love of the
world made this problem all the more pressing; is the earth to pass
away? 5 The scientific evidence points vividly to the fact that
it will. In the ultimate analysis, some five million years from
now the sun will burn up its nuclear, life-giving energy. The
earth will come to a frigid end. If the earth is doomed to death,
so are man's endeavors, all of them. In view of this evidence, a
very real pessimism about the world seems to be sufficiently
justified. In his optimism, Teilhard wants the earth to last and
man's endeavors with it. How will he solve this dilemma to his
own satisfaction?
2. The Human Problem

The predominant challenges about man came from two
quarters, from Marxism and from existentialism. Since science
• The Future of Man, pp.
5 For a taste of how deeply Teilhard loved the world, see Hymn of the Universe,
p. 33.

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

217

seemed to show the world to be self-sufficient, the Marxist
offered this challenge to Christian thinking about man: either
man is to work for a this-worldly utopia, or his life is drugged
by escapism as he turns to a " spiritual " God whose existence
seems superfluous if not insidious. What troubled Teilhard
most about this challenge was not the denial of God as much as
the either/or alternative in which it was couched. The alternative is a dichotomy between God and the world. In addition,
Marxism seemed to Teilhard to deny and destroy something of
the dignity of man himself. For even though it stressed work as
the highest dignity of man, it also presented production of
goods for the use of others as a type of Hegelian self-alienation.
Man was alienated from his labor in the very act of laboring
for others. Furthermore, the dialectic of history seemed to
depersonalize man. He was trampled on by the inexorable
"course of history." 6
As we are learning today through Marxist-Christian dialogues, the view of the Christian as an "escape-hatch" human
has been an historical determinant. By " escaping " through
his " hatch " of supernatural reward, the Christian falsely
justified both his defense of the status-quo and its deprivations
and his own withdrawal from the world of everyday matters.
This view of the Christian as essentially one who chooses the
supernatural in opposition to the world grows naturally out of
the conditions prevalent in the age in which Marxism and
existentialism were first formulated. We can readily see that
Teilhard agreed with the existentialist challenge about man. In
total unanimity with Kierkegaard and Nietzsche he could
deride such "escape-hatch" Christians as lukewarm humans. 7
In place of escapism he will offer collective effort based upon a
profound cosmic-Christie communality; in place of a herd
mentality, he too will offer a deep personal commitment to God
in the world.
6 The Future
of Man, p. 268. As we shall see, Teilhard's synthesis is not
altogether free of the same objection. The person seems to be lost in the cosmic
process.
7 Ibid.

!218

DAVID THOMASMA

3. The Divine Problem

The principal challenge offered Teilhard about God, and this
was a direct challenge placed at his feet by the followers o£
Sartre in Paris, was this: does an examination of the phenomenal world leave an opening for a transcendent Being, a God?
If Sartre's postulational atheism is correct, then the world is
absurd. 8 As we have already mentioned, there seemed to be
good scientific evidence for an ultimately pessimistic view as
well. This was the challenge which evoked the Phenomenon of
Man.

As we will see, Teilhard will turn to the scientific record o£
evolution in order to show that the world's process has meaning.
Being in the process, man himself derives a direct meaning from
it, even if this meaning would be only to the extent of selfdevelopment, a notion with which Sartre would agree. However, and this is Teilhard's strong point, being in process is not
the only meaning in the world. Another meaning, the meaning,
is derived from the end of the process, the omega point. The
totality of the meaning of the cosmos, and of man in the
cosmos, is to be for the omega point. " For " here is the key
term. What, in effect, Teilhard has done, is to re-introduce the
idea of an intrinsic finality into the process of Life, or more
specifically, into the process of increasing consciousness in the
world. In short, then, Teilhard's answer to the Sartre school
is that the world has a meaning. It is not absurd. And
this revelation should make Sartre's postulational atheism
untenable.
We have briefly observed some of the problematics which
faced Teilhard and whose answers composed his synthesis.
Hence we may turn to the elements of the synthesis of God,
8 The basic reason for the rejection of God in Sartre can be traced to his notion
of consciousness as developed in The Transcendence of the Ego. If consciousness
has no content, then it is nothingness, pure freedom, pure creativity of all meanings,
even of the self and the ego. In short, there is no substantially given meaning.
Even though it is an absurd pressure, man continually tries to become like a God
in that he continually is creating meanings. Teilhard's view of consciousness differs
considerably from Sartre's and will lead him to an answer about the problem of God.

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

man, and the world, to see how the French thinker felt they
answered the problems posed him by his age.

III.

THE SYNTHESis

oF TEILHARD:

THE GRoANING

CosMos

One of the deepest urges of the human spirit, Henri Dumery
calls it the basic religious experience, is a drive for unity.
Teilhard is hardly exempt from this urge. In fact, it is the
dominant feature of his life. As a result, his synthesis mirrors
his own drive for union. Like St. Paul's vision of creation,
Teilhard's universe is groaning toward the omega point. 9 Only
at the omega, the end, will the universe and man with it find a
full expression.
There is no question that Teilhard's synthesis itself owes a
great deal to Blonde!; his letters to Blonde! clearly indicate
this/ 0 We might point to the most obvious similarity, that in
which the natural order is seen to press toward another higher
order of existence, commonly called the supernatural. In
Blondel's thought, the action of willing, thinking, and of being
all progressively lead to an awareness of the infinite and to a
confrontation with it. The supernatural order is seen as a necessary complement to the natural. This view has caused no end of
difficulties, especially with the problem of the gratuitous nature
of the supernatural order of salvation. The same difficulty
appears in Teilhard's synthesis, and it is subject to an identical
critique. For the priest-scientist examines nature to the same
effect. Since we are doing no more than indicating a similarity
of vision with Blondel at this juncture, we could conclude this
observation with a passage from Paul Chauchard:
For Teilhard, what is essential is not the historical analysis of
nature. It is rather that such analysis, sometimes claimed as
• However, there is this difference: Paul's was a static vertical view common to
the Greeks, while Teilhard's is a horizontal process in time. "From the beginning
till now the entire creation as we know, has been groaning in one great act of giving
birth; and not only creation, but all of us who possess the first-fruits of the Spirit,
we too groan inwardly as we wait for our bodies to be set free." Rom. 8
1 ° Cf. de Lubac, op. dt., various places throughout the book; Mooney, " Blonde!
and Teilhard," Thought (winter,

DAVID THOMASMA

atheistic, necessarily leads the reason not to agnosticism, or vague
religious sentiments, or to dim notions of a marginal God for
philosophers and scholars, but straight to mystic encounter with
Jesus Christ, the God of love.11

It is precisely the necessity of this outcome which will preoccupy us in the following pages. What are the reasons advanced for the necessity of the ever-present omega point? What
is the evidence?
Another interesting parallel in methodology can be noted
between Teilhard and the principles enunciated by Engels in
his Dialectics of Nature. The now-familiar principles of dialectical materialism are three-fold: (1) the law of transformation of quantity into quality; (2) the law of the interpenetration of opposites; (3) the law of the negation of the negation. 12
Corresponding to the law of transformation might be seen
Teilhard's law of complexity I consciousness. By development
through stages of qualitative leaps to higher forms of consciousness, this law merges with another which Teilhard calls
the law of tangential I radial energy. In this sense, then,
Teilhard accords with observations of the dialectical materialist. He too regards the qualitative leaps, e. g., from non-life
to life, as being due to a greater quantitative complexity or at
least accompanied by such. The law of complexity I consciousness might also be seen as a form of the law of interpenetration
of opposites. The latter is supposed to explain all changes and
events in terms of immanent principles, inherent in the universe. No" useless" god need be posited. It is here, however,
that Teilhard departs from pure materialism. He identifies
complexity in the same way as the dialectical materialist. But
his consciousness is another matter altogether, somehow identified as a part of the Divine Milieu. Thus an" external" principle is introduced at this point, external, that is, insofar as
this principle is not part of the process itself. We will see later
11 P. Chauchard, Teilhard de Chardin on love and suffering (Glen Rock, N. J.:
Paulist Press, 1966), p. ll.
12 F. Engels, Dialectics of Nature (New York:
International, 1960), p. 26.

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

fl21

on how this Divine Milieu lifts Teilhard by the bootstraps out
of the pantheistic mire. Finally, the law of the negation of
the negation is the logical and cosmological principle of dialectical contradiction upon which the whole of Marxism is
based. But it is exactly in this matter that we feel Teilhard
differs mostly from any Hegelian procedure in examining process.
Although containing certain resemblances with an Hegelian
dialectic, Teilhard's synthesis is definitely not an Hegelian
system. In support of this contention we would offer the
following observations. The three terms of the synthesis are
not seen as antithetic or contradictory. God, man, and the
world are not viewed as vigorously engaged in negating one
another or in alienating themselves. In other words, the
synthesis does not obliterate the uniqueness of each of the
individual elements. The reason for this difference lies in
Teilhard's personal center of unity, the person of Christ. In
one sense, the synthesis has already taken place in the person
of Christ. In another, we are still developing toward Christ
as Lord of the Universe, the end or omega point. The universe
and man are caught between the already and the not yet.
Because of the different conception of the Absolute, Teilhard's
synthesis might be characterized as a discontinuity in continuity. The transcendent affirmation of God and the immanent affirmation of the world, like two right-angle vectors,
are resolved in a third vector, in Jesus Christ. 13 Teilhard's
union of seeming contradictions does not obliterate the differences in a higher stage of process but differentiates them. 14 His
synthesis differentiates in the same way that the higher form
The Future of Man, pp.
E. g., the
The Divine Milieu, p. 108; The Phenomenon of Man, p.
synthesis in The Divine Milieu of both attachment to the world and detachment
from it, is accomplished by viewing both as renunciations in an impluse toward the
omega point. A good commentary and critique of Teilhard's Divine Milieu and
Phenomenon of Man can be found by J. J. Duyvene de Wit, "Pierre Teilhard de
Chardin," in ed. Hughes, Creative Minds in Contemporary Theology (Grand
Rapids: Eerdman's press, 1966), pp. 407-50. We will cite this work as an example
of strict Dutch calvinistic thinking on Teilhard.
13

u

DAVID THOMASMA

of life in its organization does not destroy the functions of its
parts held in common with lower forms but in its greater unity
demands of the parts a greater differentiation of function.
A human brain is more highly differentiated in functional parts
than that of any other animal.
This type of union, a unification of individual elements, is
dominated by the end, the purpose of the functions. And this
is the secret of the value of Teilhard's slogan: Whatever rises
must converge. Going forward means going upward. Previously we noted the importance of the word " for " in Teilhard's thought. It is being for the omega point that will
constitute the meaning of the cosmic process as it groans
forward and upward.
We are now prepared to investigate Teilhard's thought on
the elements of his synthesis: the world, man, and God. In
particular the focus will remain centered on his arguments
that God is not a " useless " adherent of the cosmos but both
produces and is the finality of the groaning of the universe.
1. The cosmos

As we have briefly indicated, evolution answered Sartre. At
least this was the conviction of Teilhard. In itself, evolution
can neither prove nor disprove the existence of a God. 15 But
it does seem to contradict Sartre's view of the absurdity of the
world and further suggests that his postulate of atheism might
in fact be wrong. For Teilhard there is order and not chaos. 16
And man is very much a part of this contextual order, this
whole.
The point du depart of Teilhard from Sartre actually lies in
the former's view of the nature of consciousness. For Teilhard,
man has an identity. The polarization of life's activities would
Teilhard will offer the additional premises required however.
R. J. Nogar, 0. P., The Lord of the Absurd (New York: Herder & Herder,
1966). Fr. Nogar in speaking with Simpson finds himself in the surprising position
of stressing change more than that famous evolutionist. This stress allows Nogar
to emphasize the unexpected and the absurdity of faith. In this sense, he has
advanced further than either Teilhard or Sartre.
15

16

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

223

demand that a person would have a frame of reference, an axis
within himself, to which he relates the whole of his experiential
life. This " within " is directly observable in man. It is the
principle of intelligibility or consciousness. The noosphere, the
layer of life in which consciousness knows that it knows,
constitutes the starting point of the analysis of the universe
for Teilhard. Contrary to Sartre's view, consciousness must
have a content, since it can be an object to itself.
By a further step which Teilhard calls extrapolation, he
extends the reality of the power of consciousness to all living
and non-living entities. In these latter, consciousness is not
directly phenomenal. But the important point is that in man
it is. The core of the phenomenon of man is consciousness.
And it is upon this basis that radial energy towards ultrahominization and the cosmic person of Christ is constructed. 17 It is
clear that at this point Teilhard does not feel that his faith has
entered his conditions at all. We wonder if it has.
What, then, is the evidence for the evolution of the universe
toward the omega point? For if the evidence is phenomenal at
its root, Teilhard's arguments would be a form of reaching the
existence of God through the evidence of an immanent act of
consciousness. It would be an argument from immanence in
the universe to transcendence, from the Divine Milieu of conscious energy to the omega point.
2. Scientific observation and theory?

Clearly, Teilhard spoke in the Phenomenon of Man as if his
synthesis flowed from a detailed examination of the facts of the
scientific record along with a precise reflection: " We have
seen and admitted that evolution is an ascent towards consciousness. That is no longer contested even by the most
materialistic, or at all events by the most agnostic of all
humanitarians. Therefore it should culminate forwards in some
sort of supreme consciousness." 18 The missing premise is
17
18

The Phenomenon of Man, p.
Ibid., p.

DAVID THOMASMA

obviously that an ascent towards consciousness will culminate
in some one point. But is this argument simply a pursuing of
the " logic and coherence of facts to the very end? " 19 Let us
examine the premise more closely. In this examination we
will take a notion of " scientific fact " a bit more broadly
than is usually assumed by positivistic thinkers. It will cover
not only the phenomenal event, a happening directly observable
by the senses, but also the probable events of which we have
only meager or scant evidence. 20 In this sense then, evolution
is strictly called a " scientific fact." The thinking of Teilhard
is then seen as a theory to explain the facts.
The first premise, that the scientific record shows an evolution in an ascent towards consciousness, seems at first sight
to be a conclusion based upon the evidence. Indeed it is
this. But it is also more. There is some reflection already
built in as is evidenced by the word " ascent." The law
of complexity I consciousness is certainly verified by the facts
of the record. The greater the complexity, the greater the consciousness. But Teilhard also feels that the reality of things
does not disappear. In order to explain this, he posits another
law about the energy which keeps things in existence. This
is the law of tangential I radial energy, which is designed to
explain the notion of ascent towards greater consciousness.
Tangential energy is the power and preservative force which
both increases the number of living things in a phylum (evolvitive group of forces) and causes greater complexity in the
members of the phylum. In short, tangential energy is an
aggregational link with the other members of a class. Radial
energy, on the other hand, is responsible for drawing an entire
phylum toward a higher centricity. That is to say, it segregates
a class from previous environs and causes a qualitative leap to a
higher form of consciousness. 21
19
2

Ibid.

°For a complete discussion on the nature of a scientific fact, see: R. J. Nogar,

0. P., Evolutionism: its Power and its Limits (Washington:
196!l).
01 The Phenomenon of Man, p. 65.

The Thomist Press,

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

225

It is evident, then, that the first premise rests upon the
observation of evolution, the fact that higher forms of conscious
life have appeared in the history of the cosmos. In addition, it
is supported by two laws, observations upon the facts. Thirdly,
it rests upon the judgment that the reality of beings does not
disappear. In all of this we would consider the type of thinking
to be scientific. Here" scientific" is taken in the sense contrary
to positivism. Science need not be confined strictly to the
enumeration of facts. The mind also plays a part by elaborating
a theory to explain the facts if possible.
However, when we tum to the second premise, the missing
one, we are confronted with a more metaphysical approach.
What evidence is there that consciousness is converging to a
single ultimate point of supreme consciousness? One could cite
the two laws mentioned above which, taken together, seem to
lead to this conclusion. If this is true, then the premise, too,
would be scientific in the sense elaborated above and the argument would not be metaphysical. The without of things is
directly, phenomenally visible and observable. To explain the
without of things (their complexity) we posit a within. 22 Nor
have we departed from a scientific mode of thinking, since the
within, though only indirectly observable in complexity, is
directly observable in man. 23 Man's act of consciousness is
aware of its own act. To extend this consciousness back into
even inanimate objects seems to be anthropomorphism, a type
of metaphysical stance. Teilhard considered it rather to be
extrapolation and a legitimate scientific procedure. 24
But our contention that the second premise contains metaphysical presuppositions ultimately derived both from Teilhard's personal insight and faith is not limited to pointing to
what seems to be anthropomorphism. The two presuppositions
which appear most obvious to us are that consciousness is too
great a phenomenon to recede back to nothingness, and that
space-time is of a convergent nature. The first seems to stem
from Teilhard's respect for life, and the second from his judg•• Ibid., p. 49.

•• Ibid., p. 55.

•• Ibid., p. 56.

DAVID THOMASMA

ment that the structure of the noosphere is a closed and
centered whole. Both his poetic vision of unity and his religious
faith in a personal center of the cosmos (Christ) contribute to
the latter metaphysical view. Apparently, Teilhard's whole
view, in the ultimate analysis, is both poetic and religious. It
is not strictly scientific nor is it clearly metaphysical. 25 Let
us turn now to some references which would support thiFo:
contention.
3. Evolutionism?

The personal intuition of Teilhard about the necessity of the
omega point rests ultimately upon a religious experience both
poetic and religious in scope. 26 Due to this necessity, Teilhard's
evolutionary theory is now elevated to an evolutionism in which
the necessity of the outcome is assured. 27 His faith allows him
to hypostasize " evolution " as a personal center of the cosmos.
The question remains, is this necessity merely hypothetical or
is it absolute? If it remains hypothetical, the force of its
conclusions are merely probable but confirmed by one's faith
in Jesus Christ. This is the position of Mooney, and it is the one
being opted for in this consideration. 28 If its necessity is
absolute, it presents us with a metaphysically certain argument for the existence of God. Many interpret Teilhard in
terms of a metaphysical stance by pointing to his evolutionism
in which the transmission of life is more real to him than
individual lives. 29 Others of a more positivistic bent accuse
25 Some criticisms
of Teilhard accuse him of reversion to " outdated " Greek
notions of act/potency as the ultimate basis for his arguments. We do not agree;
complexity and consciousness bear only a remote kinship with potency and act;
for the necessity does not flow from this law of consciousness itself either. We
are contending that it comes from a personal intuition of faith. See: L. Dewart,
The Future of Belief (New York: Herder & Herder, 1966), pp. 43-6; Dooyeweerd,
A New Critique of Theoretical Thought (1953), I, pp. 181-3.
26 E. g., Hymn of the Universe, p. 33.
27 The Phenomenon of Man, pp. 140; 218.
28 Mooney, Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ, p. 196.
29 For example, the interpretation
of Cuenot in his many writings. We feel that
the usual critiques of Teilhard go astray by missing the fundamental theologal
vision which characterizes his thought. This is certainly the case with the otherwise

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

227

Teilhard of transformism beyond the scientific" facts." In this
sense, then, he acquires an abominable metaphysical coloring. 30
But neither approach allows the interpreter to accept Teilhard's
vision. Interpreting his argument as absolutely metaphysically
certain leads to a rejection of it simply because, under the
metaphysical gaze, it is at best inconclusive and at worst pure
dribble.
In support of the view that Teilhard's argument for the
existence of the omega point is meant to be taken merely as
an hypothesis which is confirmed by a religious vision, we would
offer the following remarks. First of all, as Mooney has indicated, Teilhard continually spoke in conditional terms about
all of his thinking. He was constantly trying to verify it and
clarify it, even to himself. To interpret him" metaphysically"
is to miss his own words, e. g., the" should culminate" in the
argument quoted from the Phenomenon of Man.
Undoubtably there are ambiguities in his writings for this
very reason. And the progression of the Phenomenon does seem
to indicate that Teilhard thought that his science led him to the
assurance of an ultra-hominization pole. It seems to begin as
a cosmology based on the principles of moving things, move
into a metaphysics upon the discovery of necessity of the omega
point, and conclude as a " surprising " footnote that this very
omega point is the God of Christianity. But upon closer examination we see that this is not the case. True, it does begin as a
cosmology. However, the basic principles of this cosmology, we
have already indicated, are ultimately based upon a religious
vision. Furthermore, the Divine Milieu, written some years
before the Phenomenon, attributes the source of the segregative
and aggregative activity of evolution (later the law of radial j
tangential energy) to the center of the unity of the universe,
good critiques by W. A. Wallace, 0. P., and M. Stock, 0. P. in The New Scholasticism, XXXVI (July, 62), 8, 858-80.
30 De Wit, op. cit., pp. 480 ff. De Wit's position as a more positivistic interpreter
of the " facts " is in accord with his Calvinistic faith. Instead of a broad interpretation of the record, he offers instead a " spontaneous generation " as the only
judgment warranted by the evidence.

228

DAVID THOMASMA

the omnipresence of action, the " omnipresence of christification." It is clear, therefore, that what appears as a supplement
in the Phenomenon is actually the starting point of the synthesis: the religious experience of Christ's physical conjunction
with the universe. In addition, we have indicated that the
intermediate " metaphysical " stage of the discovery of necessity is actually only of hypothetical necessity. This is the
necessity proper to a cosmology in the highest stage of its
argumentation. Underlying this hypothesis are admittedly
what could be termed metaphysical presuppositions. One example of such a supposition was that consciousness is too noble
a reality to vanish from the cosmos. Nevertheless, these suppositions as well are further traced to their root in faith. Consequently, we must investigate briefly the role of faith in Teilhard, the root of all his necessity and suppositions.
4. The Role of Faith

The cosmic vision of Teilhard is an intellectual synthesis
built upon an originary religious experience and justified by
the same. If one has had this same experience, one can accept
it wholeheartedly. If one has not had the vision, he must be
satisfied with the suggestion that the universe leads one upwards and forwards toward unity.
In this originary religious experience two kinds of faith can
be discerned. The first is Teilhard's faith, a fundamental faith
in the forward progress of the world. To be sure, this faith has
a scientific basis, namely, the evidence of past irreversibility.
But it remains a faith in the necessity of the future, a faith
demanded by all reductive (inductive) processes of thought.
Coupled with this " natural " faith is the religious conviction
that the universe is also moving upward to God. This conviction Teilhard receives from God. From Christian revelation
Teilhard synthesizes the upward-forward movement in the
person of Christ. Within the confines of what we have chosen
to call the " natural faith " of Teilhard we can further distinguish two levels. The first is his confidence about the without of things, i. e., his evolutionism; the second level is his

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

229

humanistic confidence about the within of things, the creative
freedom of the universal process, a sort of Leibnizian " divine
within." 31
How could we best characterize Teilhard's synthesis? From
what has been said, it might be best to call it in its origins and
ultimate justification a theologal vi8ion of cosmological proportions. By" theologal" is meant simply the relation of man to
God in faith. 32 By coupling " theologal " with "vision " we
wish to emphasize the poetic character of his work. It is not a
theological synthesis in the sense that what results is a science
of theology available to all who accept the principles of the
science. No, Teilhard's vision is definitely not available to all.
For full commitment, it demands that one have the same
vision. In the last analysis, therefore, his method is not scientific but poetic. It is an attempt to recreate his vision or at
least to point to the possibility of this vision in the minds of his
readers. By adding the words, " of cosmological proportions,"
we mean not only to indicate the sweep and scope of the vision
but the hypothetical nature of any of the " scientific arguments " advanced within. The arguments are built upon
scientific theory and are not meant to be taken in the absolutist
Cartesian sense of " metaphysical."
Having discussed Teilhard's answer about the world in some
detail, we can now turn to his observations about man and
his place in the world. One could note once again how faith,
both in the world and in God, crops up here as well.
The key to the understanding of Teilhard's view of man is
his notion of hominization. What is it? It is a term describing
all processes after the advent of man upon the evolutionary
scene which lead to greater complexity in socialization. It is a
natural process akin to that of greater complexity caused by
tangential energy in all the lower phyla. Because of homini31 This entire area of " faith " in science is strongly objected to by De Wit,
op. cit., p. 496. Could it be that his own Protestant heritage leads him to react to
reason and reliance upon hypothesis as a corruption of faith?
82 This term is borrowed from E. Schillebeeckx, 0. P., Christus, sacrament van
de Godsontmoeting (Bilthoven: H. Nelissen, 1961), p. 25, footnote 18.

230

DAVID THOMASMA

zation and the future it foretells of man, Teilhard can cry out:
" The age of nations is passed; our task is to build the
earth!" 33
The evidence for hominization is the same as that for the
omega point; hominization is the present stage which will lead
eventually, and after even greater social complexity, to the
qualitative leap of a new form of consciousness-the omega
point. To explain the hominization process, then, it is sufficient
to produce the two laws of complexity I consciousness and
tangential I radial energy. However, the role of faith becomes
even more evident in this process than in the lower forms.
For in the lower phyla, there is some record of a continual
evolution of species, e. g., the horse phylum. But in the case of
man, no evidence in the fossils is present which could point to
the evolution of man from some lower species. 34 The evidence
of where, when, and how man appeared on the scene is totally
absent. He just arrived! What we have, then, is a simple
case of trust or faith in the powers of human reason to extrapolate, theorize, and fill in the gaps in the record through the
transformist principle of the evolutionary theory. This constitutes a very real part of the sweep of Teilhard' s vision and
the hardest part for a just-the-facts-man scientist to swallow.
Unlike the previous record providing a faith in future development by the irreversible process in the past, the evolution of
man from lower forms demands of us an additional act of faith
in our hypothesis about the past. We are willing to make this
act of trust, provided its hypothetical character is preserved.
Once again, to insist upon a metaphysical certitude seems
absurd.
By the force of the law of tangential I radial energy, we have
a real possibility for the future of mankind opened before us.
For if tangential energy is responsible for the greater social
complexity, its complement form of radial energy, too, will
Building the Earth, p. 6 (introductory leaf).
Dobzhansky, Mankind Evolving
Species and Evolution (1968), p. 687.
88

•• See:

p. 187 and F. Mayr, Animal

THE SYNTHESIS OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

enter the science. Ultrahominization, the qualitative leap to the
omega point, must eventually take place, i. e., in the context of
the hypothesis. There are at least grounds for optimism,
according to Teilhard. Hominization offers a thrilling vision of
the future of man. The first ground for optimism is that man
is totally and radically unified with the whole universe. 35 Were
the universe to perish, then this ground would appear ridiculous. Man would perish with it. But the second ground for
optimism is the unity of Christ with the universe, precisely in
his physical humanity. Since Christ is God, the universe cannot perish! Christ dies now no more. Consequently, man's
work in the world is assured. 36
The seeds of answers to both Sartre and Marxism are contained in what we exposed above. In response to Sartre,
Teilhard counsels men that a commitment to the world and not
to the self is demanded by ultrahominization. Man finds his
fulfillment in being-for the universe and not for himself. And
being for the cosmos is to be for Christ: " But if they
[humanity] are to share in this joy and this vision they must
first of all have had the courage to break through the narrow
confines of their individuality, cease to be egocentric and become Christocentric." 37 Since Teilhard's synthesis is based
upon a union that differentiates, Marxian depersonalization is
overcome. Man's organizational identity in the universe does
not deprive him of self-fulfillment but fosters it. This is not to
say, however, that Teilhard is not faced with serious problems,
especially that of freedom and necessity and lack of concern
for the individual in the face of the sweeping process. 88
We have now arrived at the final term included in the
synthesis, God. The ultimate necessity of evolution towards
the omega point stems from faith. In addition there is present
The Phenomenon of Man, whole first chapter.
The Divine Milieu, p. 101. This insight and similar emphases by Teilhard
influenced the writing of the widely incarnational document on the Church and
the Modern World of Vatican II.
37 Hymn of the Universe, p. lQO; also see p. UQ.
38 This problem is frankly faced by Mooney, op. cit., pp. 199-Ql8.
35
36

232

DAVID THOMASMA

a hypothetical approach to it in view of the laws of energy
and consciousness. God is at the core of evolution. He is the
immanent divine energy in all things spurring them on toward
the omega point. If such an immanent God were all Teilhard
had to offer, we would be dealing with just another form of
pantheism. However, Teilhard seems to be more open to
criticism as a panpsychic thinker than a pantheist. It is important to see, however briefly, how Teilhard avoids pantheism.
Apart from his own disavowal of a pantheistic stance, he
seems to rise up from the quagmire of pantheism in at least two
other ways. 39
In the first place, pantheism is expunged in his synthesis of
disparate elements into a whole. It is usually at this juncture,
when a thinker becomes aware of the unity of the whole of the
cosmos, that he is tempted to include all of this unity under
the notion of " god." Hegel can be convicted of this fault.
The reason is that the contradictories, the Absolute and the
world of Nature, are synthesized in a unity only by the selfalienation of the Absolute itself into Nature. In other words,
distinctions are obliterated in the final whole. Nevertheless,
for Teilhard, who also began with the insight of the tremendous
unity of the cosmic whole, the unity is achieved without such
an obliteration. Although at the core of evolution, God is also
distinct from this process. He is not the process itself but its
energy, its milieu, its driving, creative force. This is the brunt
of the distinction, the reason for extrapolation, to discover
within the process, but different from it, its inner dynamism.
Closely related to the inner dynamism or energy is the
culmination of the process. The culmination, too, is not the
process of evolution but its end. The omega point, then,
furnishes us with the second way in which Teilhard avoids
pantheism. For he identifies the omega point with God. God
is not the process but its terminus. He is the transcendent
omega point which is actively engaged in drawing the entire
process to the unity which is himself. And it should not be
89

Cf. The Future of Man, pp.

The Phenomenon of Man, p.

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

283

feared that the "utopia" such a culmination represents would
obliterate all distinctions. All men and creation, in Teilhard's
view, will not be conglommerated in a sticky mass of unity;
rather, in consistent accord with Teilhard's notion of the unity
which maintains differentiations, the leap to the omega point
will be a transformation to an even higher level of differences.
The law of complexity / consciousness continues to operate.
The unity of consciousness at the omega point will also be
accompanied by the highest degree of complexity, of differentiation of roles and attitudes.
What Teilhard has done, then, is to introduce teleology into
the process of evolution, a concept of end which has been
missing for some ages in cosmic philosophy. His God is the
dynamism of the process and its term, without being totally
identified with the process itself.
This latter point can better be illustrated by projecting
Teilhard's synthesis against the screen of two other processphilosophies, those of Dewey and Whitehead respectively.
Only in Dewey do we find a consistently processional philosophy. All things are in process, man, the world, thinking,
technology. Nature with a capital" N" summarizes the entire
whole-in-development and is Dewey's basic philosophical principle. In fact, he uses this principle to critize all other previous
thinking (e. g., in Experience and Nature). Were Dewey to
consider himself in any way a theist, and this is doubtful, he
would have to espouse an open pantheism. For there is found
no principle outside of or apart from the process which is
Nature.
Whitehead wished to accomplish something similar to Dewey
on a more traditionally metaphysical plane, that is, in the
context of a rationalistic system of philosophy. He wished to
account for the creativity of the universe in process without
seeking a principle apart from the process itself. There is no
beginning nor end to the process, unless we would consider the
notion of the" superjective" nature of" god" as an end. The
latter is hardly to be taken in a teleological sense, however,
-for it simply accounts for the relative stability of patterns of

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DAVID THOMASMA

actual entities as complexes which endure for some length of
time. Yet these patterns too are in process. Nevertheless,
Whitehead's attempt to describe the creativity of process without appealing to an " external " principle breaks down in his
notion of " eternal ideas." These latter are indeed found in the
process as the summary of the possibles for all actualities.
However, they themselves are not processionally evolving.
By comparison, Teilhard has at least two agencies " outside "
of the process. Unlike Dewey and like Whitehead's "eternal
ideas," the French Jesuit finds a place in the evolution of the
cosmos for a permanent, non-evolving principle within that
very evolution ... and this is the" Divine Milieu," the energy.
The energy within things does not evolve but is responsible for
the evolution of these things. In addition, unlike either of the
two thinkers mentioned above, Teilhard has a teleology, another principle " apart from " the process. This is the famous
omega point. It is interesting that he identifies both principles
as one and the same God, apart from the process yet within it,
transcendent and immanent; in this way, panthesism is avoided.
Therefore the argument for the existence of God from immanence to transcendence may be presented in the following
fashion:
(1) The world is evolving toward higher forms of complexity
/ consciousness. [This premise has scientific certitude, for it
is based upon the record of evolution, a theory of evolution,
and the law of complexity j consciousness.]
(2) But everything that rises must converge, ultimately at
an omega point. [This premise is based upon the law of radial
energy, several presuppositions, which are ultimately based
upon a theologal vision. Consequently, it has both hypothetical
certitude and a confirmation in the faith of the reader.]
(3) Therefore the world is evolving towards the omega
point. [conclusion]
(4) In addition, evolution is a necessary process. [hypothetical necessity flowing from the record and evolutionary theory,

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

285

plus a theologal necessity should one be privileged to have had
the same religious experience as Teilhard.]
(5) Hence the world is necessarily evolving toward the
omega point, God. [conclusion having no more certainty than
expressed in 1, 2, and 4.]
(6) But the omega point is a conscious force already drawing the universe in the present, as is directly observable through
the within of man. [Again a premise composed of extrapolation,
theory, and the faith.]
(7) So that the omega point is clearly an ontic reality.
In view of the multifarious justifications for the various
steps in the argument, the very admixture we might expect of
a poet, scientist, and theologian who thinks simply as one
single man, what sort of persuasion does the argument have?
If one were to have had the religious experience of Teilhard,
then the argument is confirmatory of what one already has by
faith. If he were not to be graced by this vision, then the
argument at best would indicate a possibility that there might
be a God. It remains to treat of a few major objections to
Teilhard.

IV. OBJECTIONs

To TEILHARD's

SYNTHESis

AND CoNCLUSION

Rambaud objects to Teilhard in this way: everything must
fit the system. Life seems more important than individual
lives; progress more important than truth. And most uncongenially, Christ also seems subsumed in the system. We are
not presented with a loving Christ but with a sort of impersonal
goal and source of evolution. 4° Fr. Raymond Nogar brings to
bear another objection. Teilhard's system leaves no room for
what is called the absurdity of faith, for the unexpected, for
the chancy. Caught up in a vision of order, he clearly forgot
the tentative hesitating steps of man's progress both in the
world and in faith. And how in this vision can he account for
40 Henri Ram baud, Tradition franQaise (1964) . Another critique of Ram baud is
to be found in de Lubac, op. cit., pp. 186-7.

236

DAVID THOMASMA

the ugliness of war, social injustice, and the lack of personal
freedom we feel in this " scientific " and " technological " age? 41
These are truly difficulties. They can only be resolved in part
and, in many cases, are precise critiques of Teilhard's failings.
We might point out, as we have before, that Teilhard's is a
unity which still preserves the individuals in the whole. There
is some room, advanced by Teilhard himself, for a true personalistic humanism in the faith. One fulfills oneself by becoming
Christocentric. Then, too, Rambaud seems to have misunderstood the primal place of Christ in Teilhard's view. He is the
beginning, middle, and end. Christ is the resolution of our
doubts about God and about the world. He is not subjected to
the "system" but is its source, its life, its energy, and its
goal. It is hard to imagine anything more scriptural and
Christian than this view. Nogar's objection is more telling.
Nevertheless, he himself seems to have ignored the order in the
universe by which the absurd is measured. And again there is
a definite opening for a development of absurdity in Teilhard,
which he cerftainly did neglect, in the one pole of Christian
resignation discussed in the Divine Milieu. Moreover the omnipresence of christification means that there is an omnipresence
of suffering like Christ in the world as well.
The principal suggestion we might make towards a resolution
of difficulties with Teilhard is this: we have deliberately avoided
the word " system" as descriptive of Teilhard's thought. And
this is the very way that Rambaud and Nogar view him. He
is not, decidedly not, just another metaphysical systematizer.
We have chosen the term "synthesis" instead. Whitehead
gave the best definition of a system we have: "a coherent,
logical, necessary [structure] of general ideas in terms of which
every element of our experience can be interpreted." 42 Teilhard's vision is coherent and somewhat logical but it is not a
necessary structure, as we have taken pains to show. In addition, the synthesis is open-ended, capable of constant progres"Nogar, The Lord of the Absurd, pp. lll-N6.
•• Whitehead, Process and Reality (New York:

Harper, 1960), p. 4.

THE SYNTHESIS

OF TEILHARD DE CHARDIN

237

sion and novelty. As such, elements or ideas of the synthesis
are capable of being either changed or rejected without a
necessary rejection of the whole of his thought. However, once
the theologal vision is attained, the whole does become a system
to this extent-there is a necessity in faith, and all elements
of experience are interpreted in terms of this faith-vision.
Nevertheless, even in this case, the "system" could not be
seen as an absolute closed vision of reality. For faith is about
the unknown, the mysterious; it is constantly developing, and,
in the light of the expression of Fr. Nagar, faith is often absurd.
St. Paul has been cited twice to show the affinity of Teilhard's thought with his. In conclusion we quote the passage
which best expresses the sweep of the French Jesuit's christocentric thought: "Everything is yours! ... the world, life,
death, the present or the future; they all belong to you! For
you belong to Christ, and Christ belongs to God! " 43
DAVID THOMASMA,

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

•• I Cor. 3:21 ff.

O.P.

THE SUMMA IN SYMBOLS

A REPLY

I

N A RECENT issue of The Thomist, Fr. Dennis C. Kane
undertakes to show that the problem presented by the
opposition between the proponents of the Traditional and
those of the Mathematical schools of logic are not insoluble. 1
So much has been written to demonstrate the basic unity of
formal logic, by whatever method presented, that it is disappointing to discover that such opposition still goes on. 2 The
discovery is the more disappointing to me in that I also have
made some efforts in the interest of irenicism. 3
Several points in Fr. Kane's paper seem to me to be not
altogether satisfactory, but in view of my complete agreement
with his thesis it would be ungracious of me to pick flaws in
his manner of developing it. Some passages, however, appear
to be so misleading as to impede rather than to advance the
cause of ecumenism. These occur in the treatment of two
articles of the Summa Theologiae, which he employs to illustrate the application of the methods of Mathematical Logic
to the interpretation of the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas.
About these passages I wish to make four observations.

I. My first observation is that, whatever is the correct answer
to the question whether Aristotle's syllogisms are implications
or inferences/ Aquinas's arguments are certainly inferences.
For he states not only that the premises imply the conclusions
but also quite definitely that the premises are true and that
"Ecumenism in Logic," The Thomist 31 (1967), pp. 321-359.
E. Moody, Truth or Consequence in Medieval Logic (Amsterdam, 1956); P.
Boehner, Medieval Logic (Chicago, 1952); I. Bochenski, "On the Categorical
Syllogism," (Dordrecht; Holland, 1962); Manley Thompson, "On Aristotle's Square
of Opposition," Philosophical Review 62 (1953), pp. 251-265.
3 J. Doyle, "John of St. Thomas and Mathematical
Logic," New Scholasticism
27 (1953), pp. 3-38; "The Square of Opposition in Action," New Scholasticism 35
(1961)' pp. 41-75.
• D. Kane, op. cit., p. 324, n. 8.
1
2

THE "SUMMA"

IN SYMBOLS

: A REPLY

239

in consequence the conclusions are true too. Fr. Kane presents
the arguments in the form: p
q; Aquinas would state them
in categorical form as: p :. q. 5
II. Secondly, in the analysis of each article the antecedent
of the conditional proposition contains superfluous material,
having no bearing on the truth of the consequent and thus
contributing nothing to the force of the argument. In one
example, the first member of the tripartite antecedent is redundant, for the conjunction of the second and third entails the
consequent, neither needing nor getting added strength from
the first member. Fr. Kane presents the argument in this
manner:

[ (p

8) . r]

q) . (r

8 6

It is equally valid in this form:
[ (r

s). r]

8

In the other example, the second member of the conjunctive
antecedent is excess baggage, since the first member entails the
consequent. It is stated thus:

[ (p

q). (q

r). [ (-r

(s. t)]]

(p

q) 7

The argument would be complete in this form:
[ (p

q). (q

r)]

(p

r)

St. Thomas does not clutter up his arguments with verbose
irrelevancies; his style is notably succinct and parsimonious,
often not stating propositions that can be gathered from the
context but allowing the reader to supply them for himself.
He does indeed interject explanatory or supplementary re5 John of St. Thomas distinguishes these two kinds of arguments as argumentatio
rationalis and argumentatio conditionalis. The truth of the latter requires only
that there be a bona consequentia; for the former to be true it is also necessary
quod antecedens et consequens sint vera. Cursus Philosophicus I Ars Logica (Turin,
1982) P. I, bk. II, ch. 5, p. 28.
6 D. Kane, op. cit., p. 854.
• Ibid., p. 856.

240

JOHN J. DOYLE

marks, but these are clearly distinguishable from the main
line of his demonstrations. I am sure that he would not construct an argument like either of those here shown.
III. Thirdly, in the former of these examples, the conclusion
presented is not the proposition Aquinas is proving. The
question he answers in this article is simply this: " Is there a
will in God?" Moreover, all three objections try only to show
that God has not a will; and the " On the contrary " merely
quotes the admonition of the Epistle to the Romans that we
should seek "to discern the will of God." 8 Nowhere is there
even a remote allusion to the identity of will and essence in
God; nor does any part of the proof have a bearing on this
point. The conclusion, which alone follows from the premises,
is only this: "There is a will in God." Nothing in the premises
justifies the affirmation that God's will is his essence. To be
sure, the final sentence of the article is: " And as his intellect
is his existence, so is his will." But this sentence seems to be
one of those supplementary remarks to which I have referred,
a sort of corollary. It certainly refers to an earlier Question
in the Summa, wherein St. Thomas proves that God's act of
understanding must be his essence and his existence. 9 Here,
with his characteristic economy, he refrains from repeating the
demonstration, suggesting that the interested student can make
his own proof by substituting " will " for every occurrence of
" intellect " in that other article.
The basic argument in the present article is whole and
entire in the first sentence. It is a categorical syllogism, which
can be reworded without any distortion of its meaning in the
mood Barbara:
Every being having an intellect has a will.
God has an intellect.
Therefore, God has a will.
Since the minor premise has been proved in the earlier Question,10 Aquinas does not bother with it but devotes the
8

Suwma Tkeol., I, q. 19, a. 1.

• Ibid., q. 14, a. 4.

10

Ibid., a. ft.

THE "SUMMA"

IN SYMBOLS

: A REPLY

f241

remainder of this article, except for some explanatory remarks,
to the proof of the major. The argument seems to be far more
elaborate than anyone examining Fr. Kane's truth table would
suspect. The propositions making it up I take to be these:
p . . Everything has this aptitude towards its natural form

that when it has it not, it tends towards it; and when
it has it, it rests therein.
q . Everything has a like aptitude towards its natural
perfections.
r . A natural perfection of a being having an intellect is
actually understanding through an intelligible form.
8
• A being having an intellect has an aptitude towards the
good as apprehended through an intelligible form so
as to rest therein when possessed and when not possessed to seek to possess it.
t .. Every being having an aptitude to seek a good apprehended when not possessed and to rest in it when
possessed has a will.
u .. Every being having an intellect has a will.
v .. God has an intellect.
w . . God has a will.
The argument proceeds in this manner:

l.p
2. p ::) q
3. :. q
4. r

5. (q.r)::)8
6. :. 8
7. t
8. (8. t) ::) u

9. :. u
10. v
11. (u.v)::) w
12. :.w

In addition to the final sentence, two others seem to be
explanatory and parenthetical. These are:
This aptitude to good in things without knowledge is called
natural appetite.
In every sensitive being there is animal appetite.
Certainly these add nothing to the force of the argument, for
only by analogy does the existence of natural or sensitive
appetite intimate that there is also an intellectual appetite,

JOHN J. DOYLE

and St. Thomas does not resort to arguments so weak as that.
The premise necessary for the proof is that everything has some
kind of appetite for its natural perfections; this premise is
stated elliptically as a special case of the principle that everything has an inclination toward its natural form. That the
other two kinds of appetite exist follows from the same principle; St. Thomas's mention of them seems to stem from his
penchant for making his enumerations complete.
Proposition r I take to be the meaning of the sentence: " As
natural things have actual existence by their form, so the
intellect is actually intelligent by its intelligible form." This
interpretation is borne out by a statement in the Question
referred to before: " The act of understanding is the perfection
and act of the one understanding." 11
The argument contains eight propositions and would require
a truth table of 256 rows to show its validity; such a method
of validation is, of course, out of the question. All the proofs,
however, are by modus ponens and so are acceptable to all.
One of them may not be intended as a proof at all: perhaps,
instead of the application of a general rule to a special case,
Aquinas considers propositions p and q to be equally selfevident and states the former merely to clarify the latter.
IV. My fourth observation concerns the second truth table, 12
intended to illustrate the proof that the Son of God assumed
a true body. 13 Here the oversimplification is more strongly
marked than in the former case. For here, though St. Thomas
clearly and emphatically states that his argument is threefold
and presents three independent proofs, Fr. Kane presents it as
a single proof with all the premises coordinated along one
line of reasoning. Furthermore, the implicative character of
the presentation is even more pronounced than in the former
case; for here even the consequent is itself not a categorical
proposition but a mere conditional. Since the argument 1s
threefold, its analysis must present three separate proofs.
Ibid., a. 4: " N am intelligere eat perfectio et actus intelligl!/1/,tis."
D. Kane, op. cit., p. 356.
13 Summa Theol., III, q. 5, a. 1.
11

10

THE "SUMMA"

IN SYMBOLS

: A REPLY

A.
The first proof is again a syllogism in Barbara. These are the
propositions:
p .. Whoever assumes human nature assumes a true body.
q . . The Son of God assumed human nature.
r . . The Son of God assumed a true body.
The proof is:

l.p

S. (p. q)

q

r

4. :. r

B.
The second proof is more complex. It really comprises two
proofs, but since one is merely an abbreviation of the other,
they are presented as one. The propositions entering into these
proofs are:
. The Son of God assumed a true body.
q . . The Son of God underwent a real death and did the
deeds the Gospels narrate.
r .. The real salvation of man has taken place.
8 • • Every effect is proportionate
to its cause.
t . . A fictitious death is proportionate to the real salvation
of mfln.
p

The proofs are as follows:

(a) 1.-p
q

s. :. p

-q

(b) 1. -p -q
[r (8
-q
3. 8
4. -t
5. :. 8 .-t

t) J 7. r
8. :. - [r
9. :. q
10. :. p

c.
The third proof has these propositions:
p . . The Son of God assumed a real body.
q . . The Son of God does some fictitious things.

r . . The Son of God is the Truth.

(8

t)]

244

JOHN J. DOYLE

The proof then is as follows:
1. -p ::J q

2. q ::J -r

3. :. -p ::J -r

4. r

5. :. p

In several places I supply propositions that St. Thomas takes
for granted without putting them in words; these are all so
evident, however, that it seems unnecessary to mark them.
The order in which I have presented the arguments is in some
instances arbitrary, for it is impossible to know in just what
sequence St. Thomas orders the propositions; in particular,
proposition B. (b) 2. could be replaced by any one of a large
number of other propositions, each of them leading with equal
validity to the same conclusion. There is in these two articles
a notable variety of arguments: categorical syllogisms; modus
ponens; modus tollens; the contradiction of a conditional by a
conjunctive affirming the antecedent and denying the consequent. I should venture to say that a study of a representative
sample of articles of the Summa would turn up a considerable
number of the axioms, postulates, rules, and theorems contained in a treatise on Mathematical Logic, and would find no
form of argument not contained therein.

MsaR. JoHN J. DoYLE
Marian CoUege
Indianapolis, Indiana

BOOK REVIEWS
Toward a Christian Ethic. A Renewal in Moral Theology. By WILLIAM
H. M. VAN DER MAReK, 0. P. Westminster, Md.: Newman Press,
1967. Pp. 176. $3.95.
Das Peccatum Mortale ex toto genere suo. Entstehung und Interpretation
des Begriffes. (Studien zur Geschichte der kath. Moraltheologie 14).
By ANTON MEINRAD MEIER. Regensburg: Verlag Friedrich Pustet,
1966. Pp. 405. DM 45.
This little book of Fr. van der Marek contains so many theological
novelties that it must be regarded as an attempt to renovate not only
moral theology but theology tout court-dogmatic, moral and fundamental
-together with revolutionizing the philosophical basis of all sound theological thinking as well. And all this he proposes doing in the name of
St. Thomas (see p. 6) . The author is well aware that he is attempting
something daring and revolutionary and it is quite obvious that he is not
altogether at ease in his undertaking, as witness the frequently recurring
restrictive " as I see it," " as it seems to me," " I have the impression," etc.
He is fully conscious that others may very well not see things as he sees
them and, as is no more than right, he makes full allowance for that
eventuality. l\Iany of his contentions and assertions, in fact very many
of them, appear at first sight so extraordinary and far-fetched as to be
both theologically and philosophically inacceptable. But then there are so
many such contentions and assertions concerning Church teaching and
St. Thomas's mind that one is constrained willynilly to come to the conclusion that he is using language in a novel and personal way. That, I
suppose, he has a perfect right to do. It is, however, a great pity that he
does not make perfectly clear in what precise sense he is using language.
Had he but done that, the dialogue between him and his readers would be,
it is hoped, very much more profitable. The following examples, taken more
or less at random, will show what I mean. We are told that nature is grace
(p. 14); God did not become man by being born of the Virgin Mary in
Bethlehem, for the Incarnation is seen to be a salvational event from the
very foundation of the world and in that way the jarring dualism of the
divine and human natures in Christ is successfully overcome (p. 16);
man's body is his soul (p. !?!4); end is the same thing as means and means
as end (p. !?!4) ; person is community (p. !?!7) ; divine and infused virtue is
human and acquired virtue (p. 84); will is intellect, intellect is will (p. 160161). On the face of it, these are all strange and novel sayings. Had the

245

BOOK REVIEWS

author only told us clearly what he understands by the verb " to be " and
the copula " is," all would have been well. Then we could perhaps have
entered into dialogue with him. For that, indeed, the question of linguistics
or semantics is obviously of prime importance. It is not my intention to go
into these matters. I merely wish to record them for their intrinsic interest
and on account of their direct or indirect bearing on the matter formally
in hand, namely, the renewal of moral theology, which is the main concern
of the author.
As to renewal of or in moral theology, which is van der Marek's prime
concern, the author's theory may quite legitimately be reduced to two
fundamental positions: a new conception of moral science as such in general
and a completely new understanding of the Christian or theological ethic
in particular. Everything the author has to say in his book must be
understood in the light of his new and very personal approach to these
two fundamental questions. With regard to moral science as such the
renewal proposed and demanded by him may be put very briefly in this
way. Moral science must no longer be regarded as normative, at least not
in any generally accepted sense of that term; it is merely descriptive of what
people do in this or that particular community, in this or that age. He
writes: "neither the concrete ethic nor the fundamental ethic is normative,
unless and insofar as they are taken precisely to be the formulation and
expression of the ethos proper to the community .... Not ethics, but ethos
and thus the community itself establish norms." (p. 4) In other words, to
put the matter succinctly and clearly, the norm of moral activity is what
people do in fact. It is the business of the reflexive or scientific ethic to
keep step with, to describe and explain carefully the actual behavior of
the community; it is not its business to direct that behavior. And for that
reason the reflexive or scientific ethic is " always some steps behind the
factual situation." (p. 5) The fundamental principle-the only one that
would appear to be universally valid-of this renewed moral science might
be put in this way: everyone (or the majority) does it; therefore it is the
right thing to do. The author realizes that such a principle may well cause
difficulty in the domain of theology and for that reason he hastens to
insist: " the theological tradition itself is normative, but it is normative
precisely, primarily, and formally as a theological tradition and not as an
ethical one." (p. 146)
And that brings me to the author's new and very personal understanding
of the Christian or theological ethic. For him there is no such thing as a
Tevealed morality. God did not speak to men in order to tell them how
to live and fashion their lives but only to tell them what to believe. The
teaching and example of Christ have no bearing on the way men, followers
of Christ and children of God by grace, fashion their lives. Man is called
to live independently of all that, to shape his life and living autonomously.

BOOK REVIEWS

247

" Scripture," proclaims the author, " does not give us an ethic, but only
the certainty that the human ethos itself signifies salvation or the lack of
it." (p. 19-20) Or more insistently still: "What scripture and revelation
brings us is not primarily an ethic. They do make it clear to us, however,
that ethos and ethics are man's concern, just as man's autonomy is man's
own concern, and that an autonomous, human ethic is part of the task
entrusted to us in the context of God's plan of salvation." (p. 28) " Thus
we speak of a Christian ethic," he elaborates, " not in order to indicate a
conviction that there might be a non-Christian ethic as well, but simply
in order to say that the human ethic is, in fact, Christian." (p. 15) From
that it necessarily follows that the Church may never set itself up as the
custodian of faith and morals; it has to do with matters of faith alone.
What is good or bad, right or wrong, is determined by the ethos of the
community, by what the community (all, or the majority) does and
practices here and now, whether it be a question of practices of mortification, fasting and abstaining, or lying, or abortion, or birth control, or
whatever else. Nothing, in fact, maintains the author, is intrinsically good
or evil, right or wrong; all that depends on the actual behavior of the community and ultimately on what he calls intersubjectivity. (c£. pp. 55, 69 ff.)
That is the substance of van der Marek's renewal in moral theology.
It should be scarcely necessary to point out that traditionally moral science
has never been considered as a mere phenomenologically descriptive science
of what people actually do but rather a normative science of what people
should do (whether they do it nor not is beside the point!) and, if it be a
question of moral theology, of how men should live in the light of the moral
message of the gospels as children of God and brothers of Christ Jesus.
One has only to read the New Testament with one's eyes open to realize
that it contains a moral message. It is difficult to know which is more
pernicious, to deny, as van der Marek does, that the New Testament
contains a moral message at all, or admitting it, to proclaim that it is
impossible to live, as other would-be moral theologians would have it.
In recent years much has been done towards the renewal of moral
theology. Many serious works have appeared on the subject and very
much progress has in fact been made in the serious business of revitalizing
the science of Christian morals and that, above all, by a return to the
sources. Van der Marek unfortunately seems to be unaware of all this
effort. The ruminations he presents in this present volume would appear
to be a beginning ab avo. His work must unfortunately be judged as a
most inadequate presentation of Church teaching and as a complete missing
of the point in the matter of St. Thomas's mind on the matter. His work
can in no way be regarded as a serious contribution to this very serious
discussion on the renewing of Moral Theology.
A more successful contribution to the goal of renewing moral theology is
that of Anton Meier. As a very important element in the serious business

BOOK REVIEWS

of revitalizing the Church and bringing it up-to-date (aggiornamento) to
meet the needs of modern man and play its part as the salt of the earth in
the world of today, the Second Vatican Council in its decree on the
formation of priests (Optatam totius Ecclesiae renovationem) has pointed
out and insisted upon the urgent necessity of rejuvenating and revitalizing
theology and the whole organization of theological studies. Sacred Scripture
is declared to be the very soul of all theology (Zoe. cit., n ° 16 § 2), and this
is seen to apply in a special way to moral theology (ibid. § 4). However,
the Council has been very careful to point out that all this work of renewing theology in general and moral theology in particular must be done " in
the light of faith " and " under the guidance of the teaching authority of
the Church" (ibid. § 1). And precisely this point would seem to be of
the utmost importance. For if it be forgotten or neglected, then the
return to the sources,-the ressourcement of theology, as the French have
it,-has shown itself over and over again to be a not unmixed blessing.
Thus it is that some advocates of a rejuvenation of moral theology tell us
that the Bible does not offer us an ethic, nor does it proclaim a specifically
Christian way of life and living. They go so far as to insist that the
criterion of good and bad, of right and wrong, is not what Christ practised
and taught but common opinion and practice. How that fits in with the
Pauline paraenesis is very difficult to see, to mention just one very
obvious moral section of the New Testament. St. Paul insists, for instance:
" Do not model yourselves on the behavior of the world around you, but
let your behavior change, modelled by your new mind" (Rom. 12: 2) .
Others, on the other hand, tell us that there is an ethical teaching of Jesus,
but that right now it is impossible to live. Common sense and experience,
they will insist, tell us that man cannot accept the ethical teachings of
Jesus as laws of conduct which are always obliging in similar circumstances.
St. Paul, again, fully conscious of the difficulty inherent in the Cross and in
the putting on of Christ proclaims, for all that, that with the grace of
God everything is possible (cf. I Cor. 15 : 10; Phil. 4 : 13) . What would
seem to be lacking in all such attempts to renew moral theology is another
element upon which the Council insists, namely, the scientific and speculative exposition of revealed morality, of the "donne revele moral." And
here precisely lies the great interest of Meier's work on the origin and
meaning of the notion: peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo. His prime
concern is with the revealed reality and mystery of sin (p. 34) .
That moral theology as presented in the manuals of the last hundred
years, let us say, was in need of reform and renewal no one will deny.
Whereas the scathing criticisms directed by the French physiologist and
politician, Paul Pert (La Morale des Jesuites, Paris, 1880), against Catholic
moral theology may well be regarded as grossly exaggerated, it must, however, be admitted that there were grounds, indeed very serious grounds,
for dissatisfaction. In fact, during the past 100 years or more, since the

BOOK REVIEWS

time of J. M. Sailer (1751-1832), valiant efforts have been made to present
Christian moral teaching in a new way, with emphasis on the biblical
foundation of it all and on its essentially christocentric character, together
with insistence on growth in innerliness and Christlikeness and a breakaway
from the exaggerated preoccupation with the negative aspect of human and
Christian life, with sin. This preoccupation with sin, a preoccupation that
amounted almost to a fascination, brought it about that moral theology
gradually came to be regarded as a kind of theological discipline the object
of which is to show how far one may go without committing serious or
mortal sin. In passing let it be said that a contributory cause of this state
of affairs was the setting up of ascetical and mystical theology as a
discipline or science distinct from that of moral theology. Were one to
attempt to pinpoint the root cause of all this dissatisfaction with the moral
theology as taught in study houses and seminaries through the medium of
the moral manuals, then one might justifiably maintain that it is to be
found in the teaching on the peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo and on
the term and concept of parvity of matter so closely linked with the other.
In the manuals (Priimmer, Merkelback, Noldin, etc.) we are told that a
sin is called mortal ex toto genere suo when its object or matter admits
of no degrees as, for instance, blasphemy, idolatry, murder, and all sins
against the sixth and ninth commandments. In this connection there is also
to be found in the manuals a tendency to determine with almost mathematical precision when a disordered human act becomes exclusive of the
kingdom of heaven, in other words, become mortal! This approach to the
Christian life has been undoubtedly the main source of much mental
anguish and scrupulosity and has given rise, to a very great extent, to
what modern psychologists have come to call " ecclesiogenous neurosis."
Now Meier set himself the task of tracing, in the long history of theology,
the origin of these two cognate terms (parvity of matter, and mortal
sinfulness ex toto genere suo) and of identifying the various meanings
attributed to them in the course of centuries.
Meier in the course of his meticulous investigation has some extremely
interesting things to tell us. The term parvitas materiae (or obiecti) made
its appearance in moral science at a very early date; the expression ex toto
genere suo is not met with until modern times, not until the 18th century
in fact. The investigation begins with Gilbert Porreta (1080-1154), whose
followers were the first to use the technical term peccatum genere mortalepeccatum genere veniale, and finishes with the work of the Cologne Jesuit,
Claudius Lacroix (1652-1714), with an indication of the continuation or
reassumption of Lacroix's work by his confrere Peter Scavini (1790-1869)
about a hundred years later. That is, it covers a span of just 600 years
and in its thoroughness has recourse not only to printed works but also
to unpublished manuscript material.

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The term parvitas materiae has its remote or1gm in the Aristotelian
doctrine of the op6o> A.6yo> and p.w6r7J>• of right reason and the virtuous
mean, which does not consist in a mathematical point but may be attained
and realized with more or less exactitude, in a greater or lesser degree of
perfection. The term itself is found for the first time, it would appear, in
the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. He uses it, however, principally in the
domain of the virtue of justice; there the medium rationis is precisely the
medium rei (cf. p. 388). That is by and large true; but, I think it should
be pointed out, too, that St. Thomas does apply it also to the vice or the sin
of envy (cf. de Malo, q. 10, a. 2 in fine corp.), which is in the domain not
of justice but of charity. And that, it seems, is of vital importance. The
term and concept were of very secondary importance for St. Thomas, and
continued to be so right up to the 16th century. The all-important thing
for him was the greater or lesser disorder caused in the order of charity
(the subiectio hominis ad Deum and the foedus humanae societatis [see
II Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 4; also Summa Theol., I-11, q. 88, a. 2; de Malo, q. 7,
a. 1; q. 10, a. 2l), together with the intensity and depth of personal involvement. I think Meier's penetrating expose would have gained much in
clarity and precision had he gone to the trouble of explaining in a special
section the very important notion of a moral object. St. Thomas, then, was
ever conscious of the immense complexity of human action and ever
avoided the pitfall of over-simplification. For that reason, I cannot altogether agree with Meier when he maintains that St. Thomas understands
the term exclusively of the material object of an act of justice (nur
sachbezogen, p. 350) and proceeds to see in that a discrepancy between
the mind of Aquinas and that of Cajetan (p. 353-354) . St. Thomas always
sees human activity in its totality, in its objective or essential determinedness and in its subjective, intersubjective and existential relatedness. Meier
very rightly sees in that the special genius of Aquinas (p. 391). From the
16th century on there appears a complete shifting of emphasis that
utlimately leads to the heated discussions caused by the teaching of
Sanchez that delectatio venerea admits of levity of matter (p. 360-361).
St. Thomas's comprehensiveness of view was gradually and definitively lost
sight of and all human activity was reduced to legal and lifeless categories.
It is in this theological climate that the peccatum mortale ex toto genere suo
first makes its appearance in the Theologia moralis (Cologne, 1707-1714) of
CLAUDIUS LACROIX. The expression is the crowning product of a depersonalized and devitalized moral theology. It was not immediately accepted by
moral theologians, as its absence from the works of Billuart and Alphonsus
de Liguori witnesses. However, it was taken up again over a century later
by Scavini in his Theologia moralis universa ad mentem S. Alphonsi de
Ligorio (Novara, 1847) and put forward as an Alphonsian category! Thence
in passed into the manuals of today.

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251

It is impossible to do justice to Meier's work in a short review. It is a
piece of historico-speculative research competently and even brilliantly
done. Strange as it may seem for such a technical and scientific work, it
pulsates with life and must certainly be regarded as one of the major
contributions towards an authentic renewal in moral theology produced in
recent times. Meier is convinced that no true advance and no true renewal
can be realized in the field of theology unless it be built upon tradition.
Through study and pastoral experience he is fully aware of the modem
Problematik and of the pressing need for new answers to new problems and
questions. And with that in view he sets about attempting to point up the
authentic theological tradition in one single, but very important, corner of
the immense field of Christian moral theology. His historical investigation
is fully documented, meticulous and, according to the demands of the
problems under examination, complete. His speculative and scientific presentation and understanding of an extremely complex and delicate problem
-the mystery, namely, of sin-is subtle, profound and satisfying.
Meier is careful to point out that right along the line of the authentic
tradition in Christian moral theology sin was always and ever understood
in the context of the history of salvation, of the Heilsgeschichte; it was
always understood with reference not so much to a law of some kind or
other but to a person, to the person of God and of Christ the Savior, and
then and only then in reference to a law, when that law is understood as
the law of charity which implies, of necessity, the subiectio et reverentia
hominis ad Deum and the convictus societatis humanae (cf. de Malo, q. 7,
a. 1, in fine). In that sense moral theology, and in a special way its
approach to sin in the life of Christ's followers, may be considered not only
theocentric and christocentric but also nomocentric.-The only important
critical remark with regard to Meier's work as a whole has been made
above, namely, with reference to the absence of any special treatment of
the meaning of moral object. The notion, technical as it may appear, is of
the utmost importance in both the sphere of speculative and scientific
investigation and in that of practical life. Meier does touch on the
question frequently in passing. But in the end one is left wondering what
a "moral object" really is. As the present reviewer sees things, it is only
through a very precise notion of what a moral object is that one can attain
to an understanding of the full meaning of parvity of matter with all its
implications. That St. Thomas's concept of the object (and end) of vice
or virtue, of sin or merit or of the whole moral life as such, was not
exclusively matter-centered or object-centered (as Meier would seem to
imply on p. 350) is clearly shown by this word of Thomas: "bonum illud
ad quod virtus ordinatur non est accipiendum quasi aliquod obiectum
alicuius actus; sed illud bonum est ipse actus perfectus, quem virtus
elicit " (de Verit., q. 14, a. 3, ad 3: this text is to be found verbatim in

BOOK REVIEWS

the commentary of St. Thomas's favourite student, the later Cardinal
Annibaldo degli Annibaldeschi, on the third book of Lombard's sentences,
dist.
art.
ad
a work that was often attributed to St. Thomas
himself and is found is the complete edition of his works by Vives, t. 30,
p. 539b). For St. Thomas the whole of moral theology, and the whole of
moral life a fortiori, is at one and same time both object and subject
centered. That is why he insists so strongly on the fact that human actions
are specified by the end (cf. Summa Theol., I-II, q. 1, a. 3; q. 18, aa. 4 & 6)
and receive their moral structural specification, their ratio boni et mali,
not from the matter or object alone of the act, but also from the subjective
disposition of the moral agent, ex aliqua dispositione agentis (ibid., I-II,
q. 88,
in fine corp.). That is why, too, one may be allowed to think that
St. Thomas would have answered Lacroix and the rest: there can be no
such thing as a peccatum mortale ex TOTO genere suo! On one other
point-and it is not unconnected with what has just ben said--one ventures
to express a certain disagreement with Meier: St. Thomas's teaching on the
parvitas materiae, as far as it goes, is seen to be an application, on the
theological level and in the context of the life of those striving to attain
to the full stature of the grace of Christ, of Aristotle's teaching on the
virtuous mean: as "the man of practical wisdom would determine it"
(Aristotle, Eth. Nich., ch. 6, 1107 a 1), that is, as the man enlightened by
attachment to Christ in a faith shot through with love for and devotedness
to the person and example of the Savior would determine it.
Meier's book is so important that one dares to hope that the translator
and publisher will be found to bring out an English version of it.
CoRNELIUS

WILLIAMS,

0. P.

895 Kaufbeuren
Germany

The Pilgrim Church. By GEORGE TAVARD. New York: Herder & Herder,
1967. Pp. 176. $4.95.
Today in the American Catholic Church we are witnessing a widening
gap between a relatively small but sophisticated group of people who are
already moving well beyond the newer insights of Vatican II and the vast
majority of Catholics who lag behind and whose ideas about the Church
have undergone little change since the Council. What is needed, at least
in part, is a greater abundance of solid, yet popularized theological literature.
Many a Catholic, layman or priest, is lost between the superficialities of
Time magazine on the one hand and the obscurities of Rahner and
Schillebeeckx on the other. George Tavard's new book, " The Pilgrim

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253

Church," is admirably suited to this large section of the Catholic population
that has yet to assimilate fully the teaching of the Council. What we have
here, then, is not another theological specialist writing for his fellowspecialists but a knowledgeable theologian who succeeds in elaborating the
main themes of the Council Constitution on the Church in a simple, yet
not over-simplified language.
" The Pilgrim Church " is, in the main, a collection of lectures given by
Tavard on various occasions since the Council on the principal themes of
the Vatican II document on the Church. When he does touch on other
declarations of the Council, it is only insofar as they relate to the central
topics of the Constitution on the Church. Tavard's book is not, however,
a chapter by chapter commentary on the Council document. Thus, while
he has separate chapters on chapters I (the Mystery of the Church), II
(the People of God), III (the Hierarchy) and VI (Religious), he combines
his treatment of chapters V (the Universal Call to Holiness) and VII (the
Eschatological Nature of the Pilgrim Church) of the Constitution in one
chapter. Tavard has no separate consideration of the chapters on the
Blessed Virgin Mary and the Laity, although the latter theme is necessarily
included when he speaks of the people of God in general.
The professional theologian will perhaps be most interested in his opening
chapter where he writes of the theological setting of Vatican II. The author
gives a brief but balanced over-view of the theological context of the
Council, particularly the post-war period leading up to the opening of the
Council. It is Tavard's judgment that the theologians who usually got the
major share of publicity during the Council were not " the true pioneers
without whose prophetic work the Council could not have taken place."
(35) On the whole this reviewer agrees, but it is difficult to understand how
Tavard can exclude Rahner from the ranks of the true pioneers of the
Council.
Throughout these essays Tavard is at pains to emphasize the continuities
between the teaching of Vatican II and past Church teaching. Any
Catholic whose theological knowledge has remained on the level of superficial slogans will be surprised to read: "I would tend to rehabilitate the
Counter-Reformation as a providential link between the great theology of
the Middle Ages and that which may characterize, let us hope, the dawning
21st century." (36) Tavard himself has already begun this rehabilitation
process in the area of scripture and tradition in his worthwhile " Holy Writ
or Holy Church." At this point, however, it is good to keep in mind the
distinction between the Counter-Reformation and the post- Tridentine
period. Oftentimes the latter period did little more than parrot the answers
of the previous age.
Tavard's stress on continuities is evident at many other points. Thus
" the common priesthood has ever been an essential point of Catholic

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teaching." (75) He also sees nothing new in the Council's statements on the
collegiality of the bishops, " except, to some extent, the word." (95)
Tavard certainly has historical evidence on his side. Such doctrines as the
universal priesthood and the collegiality of the bishops have been propounded in some way down through Christian history. However, we must
be less sanguine when we refer to popular preaching, especially in the period
between Vatican I and II. The average layman was completely unaware
of his share in the priesthood of Christ. Indeed, the Council debates showed
that many bishops had a very poor realization of their own collegiality.
Now the primary exercise of the Church's teaching office is in and through
the liturgy. Therefore we can find small consolation that such doctrines
were taught in some past age or on some higher level when they were
neglected in ordinary preaching.
The only place in the book where Tavard develops his own thought
beyond the Council documents in a significant way is in his chapter on
religious. He finds the specific characteristic of religious life in community
rather than in the three traditional counsels.
PETER DEMAN, 0. P.
Berkeley Priory
Berkeley, California

A New Catechism: Catholic Faith for Adults. New York:
Herder, 1967. Pp. 510. $6.00.

Herder and

This generally excellent translation presents to English-speaking peoples
the effort of many Dutch Catholics-bishops and theologians, priests and
lay folk-to express Catholic doctrine in contemporaneously meaningful
terminology and in a style judged suited to present Western culture. The
prevailing "mood" of this book is existentialism and Teilhardism ecumenically oriented. Consequently, it will appeal very strongly to a rather welldefined segment of Western society. The sustained, vigorous effort to
present the faith to that segment, and to all twentieth-century men, is
completely admirable.
The work qualifies as a true catechism for it is a highly systematic, even
lengthy, presentation of Christian doctrine and morality. Unlike most
catechisms, it is written in continuous narrative form; its approach is more
historical than dogmatic; its discussion of the meaning of doctrine usually
begins from human experience rather than from the implications of the
terms in which God's revelation is communicated to us. But the Catechism's
most striking single characteristic is its embrace and extensive use of the
existentialist- Teilhardian categories and rhetoric.

BOOK REVIEWS

By a familiar paradox this outstanding strength is closely related to the
book's most remarkable vulnerability. The near-total embrace of the
favored outlook and terminology (other factors may be involved) often
works to hide full Catholic doctrine rather than to communicate it, to
suppress rather than to express. To discuss, even to cite, all instances of
this would be undesirable, perhaps impossible, in a brief review. Instead,
in two areas, namely, Catholic dogma and morality, this review will suggest
a few " samples " illustrative of tendencies characteristic of the work as
a whole.
1. In the field of Catholic dogma.

a) Catholic faith holds that Christ " was born of the Virgin Mary" and
that Mary is " ever-virgin." Discussing what this dogma says or means,
the author writes that the evangelists Matthew and Luke " proclaim that
this birth does not depend on what men can do of themselves ... This
is the deepest meaning of the article of faith ' born of the Virgin Mary ' ...
The gospels do not say that she (Mary) had other children after him
(Jesus)." (pp. 75-77) Both the statement that the mystery's "deepest
meaning " is mystical and the statement about the silence of the gospels
are patently true. But do the two statements adequately communicate the
Church's understanding of this mystery? Never denying a "deepest"
mystical sense to the mystery, the entire Catholic community has always
affirmed that the dogma has an obvious, physical sense also, namely, that
"the Mother of God, the holy and ever-virgin Mary ... conceived God
the Word without seed ... and without corruption brought him forth"
(Council of the Lateran, a. 649, can. 3; Denz.-Schon. 503), so that "the
unspotted virginity (of Mary) did not know (experience) ... coitus"
(Council of Toledo XI, Symbolum fidei, Denz.-Schon. 533). The Catholic
tradition understands this physical meaning to be the basis of the deeper,
mystical interpretations of the mystery; and this first meaning the Catechism leaves simply unmentioned.
In the question of the perpetuity of Mary's virginity is Catholic belief
communicated by stating only that the gospels are silent on the point?
Conceding evangelical silence, the Catholic community nevertheless asserts
that Mary's perpetual virginity is divinely revealed, so that "if anyone
shall not confess (that the Word of God) was incarnate of the holy ...
and ever-vigin Mary . . . " he is in heresy (II Constantinople, can.
Denz.-Schon.
. Catholic liturgy expresses the same truth in the way
appropriate to liturgy.
One is aware that some persons today and in the past find all this " a
hard saying," but an open exposition of Catholic faith cannot successfully
evade the fact that the Church has said, and does say, that Mary is evervirgin in the realest sense.

BOOK REVIEWS

b) Catholic faith asserts that Christ "descended into hell "-again
an unwelcome affirmation, perhaps, in our culture and in many cultures.
The Catechism discusses the mystery: "The expression 'descended into
hell ' is obviously composed of elements which are no longer part of our
world of thought . . . By saying ' he descended into hell ' Christians
affirm that he was really dead. It means the humiliation of being dead
... Jesus was imagined as announcing the redemption, immediately after
his death, to the souls in hell." (pp. 176-177)
But the Catholic community understands this article of faith to mean
more than the Catechism states. Scripture teaches that when Christ "had
died . . . in the spirit he went to preach to the spirits in prison " (I
Peter 3 : 18-19). An event is here described; an event subsequent to Christ's
death, therefore distinct from it; an event in which a certain mysterious
activity is ascribed to Christ in his " spirit " or soul. If this is Petrine
" imagining," if no corresponding event or activity occurred, Scripture
would be deceptive.
The Fourth Lateran Council defined that Christ " suffered and died,
descended into hell, arose from the dead, and ascended into heaven; but he
descended in his soul, arose in his body, and ascended in both." (Cap. 1;
Denz.-Schon. 801). Each of the four is a distinct article, as signified by
identifying (inadequately) distinct subjects for each. In particular, the
descent into hell, manifested according to Scripture in his preaching " to
the spirits in prison "-an activity other than the condition of being deadis more than a restatement of the Lord's death, as well as more than the
work of imagination, granted, of course, that imagination is at work in
every human statement.
c) The Catechism's account of the holy Eucharist, especially of Christ's
Real Presence therein, is, as an account of Catholic faith, troublesome.
The dogma of transsubstantiation
(defined by the Mystical Body as
divinely revealed, cf. Trent, sess. XIII, can. 12; Denz.-Schon. 16512)
receives a one-sentence mention after being identified as a medieval way
of" expressing the mystery." Then we read: "when we consider the matter
in terms of present-day thought we should say that the reality, the nature
of material things is what they are . . . for man. Hence it is the nature
of bread to be earthly food for man . . . at Mass, however . . . the bread
is essentially withdrawn from its normal human meaning or definition and
has become the bread which the Father has given us, Jesus himself."
(p. 343)
To the revealed doctrine which the Catholic community expresses in
terms of transsubstantiation, the Cathechism's theory of transsignification
(or transfinalization) need not involve opposition. The two are not at all
answers to the same question. Transsubstantiation answers the question:
in the Eucharist, what existing reality underlies the sense-perceptible

BOOK REVIEWS

appearances of bread and wine; whereas transfinalization, directly concerned
only with " meanings for man " and not with reality in itself, seeks to
answer the question: what meaning should man see in the Eucharist?
Each question and each answer has validity in its own way.
The Catechism's presumptions that the two are different answers to the
same question, that they are opposed as medieval and present-day answers,
that the value of the dogma of transsubstantiation was restricted to the
Middle Ages (one wonders at the reckoning which places the Council of
Trent, which defined this dogma, in the Middle Ages) do make one pause.
All are aware that in his encyclical on the Eucharist Pope Paul VI writes:
"These formulas (Tridentine formulas proposing the eucharistic mystery)
express concepts that are not tied to a certain specific form of human
culture, or to a certain level of scientific progress, . . . Instead they set
forth what the human mind grasps of reality through necessary and
universal experience, and what it expresses in apt and exact words . . .
these formulas are adapted to all men of all times and all places . . . it is
the teaching of the First Vatican Council that ' the meaning that ... the
Church has once declared is to be retained forever and no pretext of deeper
understanding ever justifies any deviation from that meaning . . . ,' " so
that no one may " take doctrine that has already been defined by the
Church and consign it to oblivion, or else interpret it in such a way as to
weaken the genuine meaning of the words or the recognized form of the
concepts involved" (Ency. Mysterium Fidei, Sept. 3, 1965).
Catholic faith in the holy Eucharist does not describe transsubstantiation
as a medieval "way of expressing the mystery," a way to be now supplanted by transsignification. The Catechism here misrepresents authentic
Catholic understanding and Catholic teaching.
d) Of the Catechism's treatment of original sin many aspects, quite
predictably, invite discussion. The following observations merely suggest
the tenor of some of them.
" The sin which stains others was committed by . . . every man ... It
includes my sins . . . Original sin is the sin of mankind as a whole
(including myself) insofar as it affects every man ... It may be said that
it only takes on concrete form in our personal sins," (p. 267) even in the
ultimate sense that " no one is condemned for original sin alone," (p. 267)
which implies, of course, that "there must be a way by which unbaptized
infants are saved." (p. 252) Neither the views expressed nor the manner
of expression lacks appeal. But how do these views relate to the Catholic
faith which the Catechism sets out to present?
The inspired Scripture teaches that " by one man sin entered the world,"
(Rom. 5: 12) so the Catholic community holds as revealed bv God that
"when the first man Adam had transgressed God's comm;ndment he
immediately lost sanctity and justice ... for himself and his offspring, and

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transmitted
. sin
. to the entire human race" (Trent, Sess. V, can.
1, 2; Denz.-Schon. 1511, 1512).
In Catholic doctrine " original sin is contracted without consent "
!Innocent III, Ep. "Majores ecclesiae causas "; Denz.-Schon. 780), so that
it was the act of " the first man Adam " alone, and not a sin committed by
"every man," (though it infects mankind). Again, in us, prior to any
personal sin, or any personal act at all, this sin has " form " in the sense
that it is the real deprivation of " holiness and justice"; it is a true
modification of our nature, consequently, the statement that it " only takes
on concrete form in our personal lives " distorts more than reports
Catholic thinking. And the outlook that "no one is condemned for original
sin alone " hardly expresses the Catholic teaching that " the punishment
for original sin (as distinct from personal sin) is lack of the vision of God"
(Innocent III, loc. cit.) .
e) Discussing life-after-death, that is, the condition of the dead prior to
the general resurrection, the Catechism in unsatisfactory, incomplete. It
reads: " we should keep to the words of Scripture ' they have fallen asleep'
... They wait-they are about to rise." (p. 474) Are such men (or souls)
beatified? Even the question is not raised; no activity except "waiting"
is assigned to the dead. Yet the Church holds as divinely revealed that
" the souls of all the saints . . . even before the resumption of their
bodies . . . see . . . the divine essence . . . the souls of those who die in
actual mortal sin descend to hell immediately after death . . ." (Benedict
XII, Const. Benedictus Deus; Denz.-SchOn. 1000-1002) . " They wait "but not for ecstatic fulness of life which is already theirs. " They are
asleep "-in the body, not asleep to infinite fulfillment. What the Catechism
teaches is truth, a partial truth and obvious in one sense. The awesome,
God-revealed truth goes undisclosed.
The Catechism's teaching on who are members of, or belong to, the
Church (p. 235 and elsewhere) is different from the Magisterium's teaching and simply does not report the Church's position on the point.
The existence of angels and of the devil the Catechism treats as an
open question. (cf. p. 482) Yet an ecumenical council has defined that
" from nothingness " God created " the spiritual and the bodily creature,
namely, the angelic and the earthly, then the human creature" (IV
Lateran, cap. 1; Denz.-Schon. 800; I Vatican, cap. 1; Denz.-Schon. 3002).
These two positions, that angelic existence is a question and that God
created "the spiritual ... namely, the angelic creature" seem not to be
identical. As to Satan, the ordinary Magisterium teaches that he was " a
good angel, made by God" (and not the substance of evil). (cf. Council
of Braga, can. 7; Denz.-Schon. 457) . In Catholic doctrine the question left
unanswered by the Catechism has an answer.
On the doctrinal points mentioned (and on some others) it seems clear

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259

that the Dutch Catechism is less than a straight-forward, frank report of
Catholic teaching.
In the field of morals. The moral sections of the Catechism, which
have often struck reviewers as ideally addressed to teenagers, present some
related difficulties, which can be more briefly suggested in very few
"samples."
Predictably, given the book's characteristic "mood," the general problem
of sin is treated most subjectively. "Is it (sin) not folly and blindness?
Is it really done knowingly? Is the will really free? Sin is . . . so impenetrable. We recognize nevertheless that it exists. Something in our
Christian experience tells us that it is more than things taking an unfortunate turn ... The good is comprehensible ... Evil is a breach of good
order . . . Hence one cannot do evil with as full knowledge as one does
good." (p. 451)
Beyond " something in our Christian experience " as giving awareness of
sin (which in a given instance may be real enough) is the objective
revelation of God and the instruction of that apostolic college to which
Christ said: " He who hears you hears me ... whatsoever you shall bind
on earth shall be bound also in heaven " (Luke 16 : 16, Matt. 18 : 18) .
Sinful unease within " Christian experience " is neither alone nor ultimate in
the Christian's moral judgment, for this latter is instructed, gnided by
God's explicit law and by the directives of Christ's authority within the
community. These give objective, reliable norms of moral good, and evil;
they are truly directive even of Christian moral experience.
The statement that " one cannot do evil with as full knowledge as one
does good " is pregnant with metaphysico-psychological implications, but
these are not directly moral, for the most part, nor much concerned with
Catholic truth. But to any reader of the book whose own philosophy is
one of realism, the outlook succinctly expressed in the statement would
be intriguing, if perhaps also questionable.
More in particular, the Catechism's discussion of birth control practices
is summed up in the simple statement, " The last word lies with the
conscience." (p. 403) This is no doubt true in the pragmatic sense that
each person makes his own decision and for his own reasons. But as a
statement of the Catholic position on birth control, it is not adequate.
Catholic discussion cannot simply ignore (as does the Catechism) that the
authority of Christ in the person of Pope Paul VI has reaffirmed as binding
the directives of Pius XI and Pius XII in this matter. Even if one
considers that the natural reasons to which these directives appealed are
questionable (as many honest Christians seem to consider), it remains true
that to ignore the Papal moral teaching is to ignore Christ's authority here
speaking.
The Catechism's teaching about cases in which Christian persons freely,

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knowingly, and validly married, divorce and marry other persons (outside
the Church, necessarily) is subject to similar criticism. (cf. pp. 396-397)
It again ignores Catholic belief and conviction that Christ's authority is
found, dynamic, within the Christian community.
It should be noted that Christian exegetes who accept the Church's
Magisterium would have special problems with this Dutch Catechism. One
illustration suffices. In Christ's miracles of exorcism, the possessed, we are
told, are to be understood as " men who give ... signs of insanity." (p.
109) The interpretation is hardly new; but as a statement of Catholic
faith it is new, together with its inevitable implication that the Lord was
indeed a giant in the practice of "instant" psycho-therapy. In general,
the Catechism's account of miracles simply as events in which men see
the power of God at work, although men cannot know whether in fact
purely natural forces are at work, (cf. p. 107) is less than a restatement
of the Catholic understanding expressed by Vatican Council I, namely, that
miracles a) are divine deeds (facta) which clearly indicate God's omnipotence and infinite knowledge, b) are most certain signs (of divine revelation) , c) are proportionate to all men's understanding, and d) can be
known with certainty (in some instances, at least) (cf. Sess. III, Const.
De Fide Catholica, cap. 3; Denz.-Schon. 3009; and can. 4 de fide; Denz.Schon. 3034) .
It seems to the reviewer that this work must appeal to many intelligent,
vocal, zealous Christian men and women, keenly alive to outlooks and
convictions current in contemporary Western society. But it also seems
that the work needs important revisions. What divides, and will divide,
is faith's attitude
readers into "revisionists" and "non-revisionists"
toward the Magisterium of the Church. The Dutch Catechism at times
obscures the teaching of the solemn Magisterium, at time departs from the
ordinary Magisterium. Is the resulting work truly a Catholic catechism
as it stands? Or is it, in part, some person's private reinterpretation of
Catholic teaching? Pope Paul VI declared: " ... There are limits which
cannot and must not be imprudently exceeded by the exegete, the theologian .... These limits are marked by the living Magisterium which is
the proximate norm of truth for the faithful " (Allocution, Siamo particolarmente lieti, July 11, 1966) , and Vatican II declared that " sacred
tradition, sacred scripture, and the teaching authority of the Church . . .
are so linked and joined together one cannot stand without the other "
(Const. De Revelatione, Chap. fl, n. 10). To those who accept the papal
and the conciliar teaching there is no sure way of grasping the word of
God except through the voice of Christ. His voice speaks within the
Church, through her Magisterium. It is this voice of Christ's body, this
voice of the Magisterium, which is so often muted in the Dutch Catechism.

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Each reader of this work is faced perhaps by the important question: shall
he or shall he not believe in action as in theory that he who hears the
Magisterium hears Christ?
THOMAS u. MULLANEY, 0. P.
Providence College
Providence, R. I.

Divine Science and the Science of God. A Reformulation of Thomas
Aquinas. By VICTOR PRELLER. Princeton University Press, 1967. Pp.
281 $8.50.

The ruthless honesty with which a number of basic questions relating to
our knowledge of God are treated makes this book a work of importance.
The intention of the author is a worthy one: he is attempting to rethink
the problem of the meaningfulness of religious language " in the context of
the explicit rejection of the epistemological presuppositions of traditional
empiricism " (p. vii) . The problematic in which the matter is treated is
the linguistic discussions of the past decade in the Anglo-Saxon world.
Though the author is not a " Thomist " of any recognizable school, his
constant reference point is the work of St. Thomas, whose positions he
revises and corrects when necessary in terms provided by the philosophy of
Wilfred F. Sellars (with particular reference to his book, Science, Perception
and Reality [London, 1963]) .
It would be unjust in this short space to attempt to give even the main
lines of the author's argument. However, the general movement of the book
is as follows: first, we are introduced into the real problem of referring to
God in language. This is developed further in a special note on the use of
philosophy in theology, especially as performed by St. Thomas. (Ch. 1)
The next chapter is no less than an attempt to reform basic positions in
Thomistic epistemology. Thus, the way is opened for a direct consideration
of special problems in our linguistic reference to God. Through an analysis
of the relation of experience to the conceptual system that informs it, and
by showing that the intelligibility of what is known is derived from the
logic of the syntax of the system, which in turn originates from the
"radical intentionality" of the intellect itself (p. 74), what results is an
extremely negative qualification of our knowledge of God. God can never
be understood in an affirmative judgment by appealing to the intelligible
content of our particular conceptual system. Consequently, Chapter Three
shows that the " Five Ways " are significant in that the existence of an
unknown entity is posited, whose relationship with the world remains also
unknown. A more positive interpretation of these proofs would mean an
unjustifiable extrapolation from our own conceptual system. The final

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chapter treats on the role of faith in our discourse on God. The " material
moves " of theological language are rendered intelligibile only in the light
of faith, interpreted as a radical conformity to the divine intentionality.
Whereas Professor Preller's aim is laudable and the performance suggestive, it will be surprising if there is not much stringent comment from
even the more flexible of Thomists. There is so much that is not quite
clear, e. g., the key notion of concept and conceptual system. Furthermore, it seems that many Thomistic positions on analogy, even if influenced
by Cajetan, are not as "horrendously naive" (p. 19) as the author
suggests. It is hard to see how the author could hope for a convincing
performance without a more ample viewpoint. One feels that at least some
cognizance of modern theories on analogy is demanded {e. g., that of
Schillebeeckx and de Petter in their clear rejection of Cajetan). Likewise,
the distinctly Kantian slant of the author's position might have been
remedied by an incorporation of some elements of the transcendental
method as favored by so many modern Thomists. However, that is to
anticipate the dialogue that must result. Though this book may suffer
{and merit) quite drastic refutation, honest questions have been asked
and a highly intelligent attempt has been made to reinterpret the best of
St. Thomas in the light of the best in modern linguistic philosophy.
A. J. KELLY, c. ss. R.
St. Mary's Mrmastery
Wendouree, Victoria, Australia

Infallibility of the Laity. By SAMUEL D. FEMIANO, C. S. B. New York:
Herder and Herder, 1967. Pp. 155. $4.95.
The growing interest in the thought of John Henry Newman has
produced several recent studies which have attempted to trace the historic
development of Newman's thought in particular areas. The present work
carries the catchy title of "Infallibility of the Laity." The author's own
phrase which designates the purpose of his undertaking, viz., "Newman's
thought on the voice of the laity in the Church " (p. 3) , more accurately
reflects the major portion of the book.
Newman's prevailing interest was focused on the continuity and witness,
especially doctrinal, of the Church with her beginnings, as evidenced by his
researches on tradition and the development of doctrine. It is in this sense
that "the gradual evolution of Newman's thought on the laity was linked
to his studies on the Church and on tradition." (ibid.) The "legacy of
Newman" has exerted its influence upon the periti of this century and
found echoes in the teaching of Vatican II and more recently and explicitly

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263

in the collective pastoral of the American hierarchy, The Church in our
Day. One of the contributions of this legacy regards the infallibility of
the laity.
The " infallibility which the Roman Pontiff, the head of the college of
bishops, enjoys in virtue of his office " is that " infallibility with which the
divine Redeemer willed His Church to be endowed in defining a doctrine of
faith and morals " (Vatican II, Lumen Gentium, n. Q5; Vatican I, Pastor
Aeternus, ch. 4) . Thus the Church as a whole, " the holy People of
God, . . . spreads abroad a living witness to Him. . . . The body of the
faithful as a whole ... cannot err in matters of belief ... it manifests this
unerring quality when ' from the bishops down to the last member of the
laity,' it shows universal agreement in matters of faith and morals"
(Luman Gentium, n. IQ) .
In what does the infallibility of the laity consist? Father Femiano traces
the thought of Newman on this point by the current method of formative
years, Anglican years, Catholic years, and special problems, in this case
Newman's controversy in the Rambler on "consulting the faithful." For
Newman the laity's role in the communication of the truth of the faith is
one of bearer of tradition and of witness to the church's doctrine; witnessing,
not judging or defining, is the laity's function.
From his earliest years Newman had regard for the position of the laity in
the Church. Here, as with the broader topics of his reflections, his thought
had fundamentally crystallized by the time of his entrance into the Catholic
Church. He had always been impressed by the doctrinal steadfastness of
the faithful in the Arian crisis. The statements of Pius IX that he had
sought the opinion of the faithful regarding the Immaculate Conception
weighed heavily with him as an argument in his later writings on the sensus
fidelium and in his controversy in the Rambler.
This book brings together in a short survey one area of Newman's
investigations in which he was in advance of his time, misunderstood and
suspected, but which today is the subject of considerable theological and
pastoral inquiry.
NICHOLAS HALLIGAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

The Commentary of Peter of Auvergne on Aristotle's "Politics" (The
Inedited Part: Book III, less. I-VI). Introduction and critical text by
GuNDISALvus M. GRECH, 0. P. Rome: Desclee (Pontifical University
of St. Thomas Aquinas), 1967. Pp. 137.
The value of a commentary on Aristotle's Politics should be gauged on
a twofold basis, namely, a finn grasp of the science of politics as the

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BOOK REVIEWS

Stagirite presents it in this work and as much pertinent erudition as
possible. This erudition is indispensable, inasmuch as politics demands far
more experience than that required for simple ethics, whether this experience is the investigator's own experience or information gleaned from other
observers, past or present. In his paraphrase, St. Albert expresses considerable doubt anent many portions of the Politics, probably because he could
not get the pertinent information. Thomas Aquinas has penned the most
outstanding commentary on the first three books (up to about half of the
fifth chapter of Book III [lesson 6]) . The Peter of Auvergne who, a native
of Crocq (Auvergne), became a student and master in the Faculty of Arts,
and for some time Rector, of the University of Paris, and eventually Bishop
of Clermont, has produced what presently seems to be the most fruitful
work on the latter portion of the Politics by way of a continuation of the
Aquinas commentary. "The [printed] texts, however, of the commentaries
of Peter and Thomas are far from reliable. They were produced by
humanists who not only removed from them the inelegant, non-classical
Latin elements, but also made regrettable changes-interpolations,
modifications, additions and omissions-which affected the technical aspect of the
text and also betrayed the author's thought." (pp. 10-11) This editorial
note suggests the urgency of a critical edition of Peter's Continuation,
notably as regards his explanation of Aristotle's teaching about education
under its civic aspect (Book VIII) .
" Out of twenty-seven extant manuscripts containing St. Thomas's commentary, sixteen also give Peter's Continuation, and twelve of these include
the six parallel lessons on the Third Book." (p. 11) The editor's report on
his evaluation of these twelve manuscripts (pp. 63-66) is a model of clarity
through consciseness and serves as a guide for those who may be encouraged
to edit at least portions of the Continuation. Grech's presentation of the
established history concerning Peter, the authenticity of Peter's commentary
on the Politics, the relation of the inedited part of this commentary to the
six parallel lessons of St. Thomas, the critical apparatus relevant to the
reconstructed text, and his indices of manuscripts and names make this
book a necessary reference for future studies concerning this most famous
Auvergnian.
FRANCIS

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

c. LEHNER, 0. P.

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265

The Chinese Mind, Essentials of Chinese Philosophy and Culture. Edited
by CHARLES A. MooRE with the assistance of ALDYTH V. MoRRIS.
Honolulu: East-West Center Press, University of Hawaii Press, 1967.
Pp. 402 with index. $9.50.
This book, together with The Japanese Mind and The Indian Mind,
comprises a series of three studies of the Oriental mind. All articles
selected for this anthology were given at the East-West Philosophers'
Conferences at the University of Hawaii and published subsequently in its
Proceedings of 1939, 1949, 1959 and 1964. The purpose of this anthology
is to give Western readers a comprehensive picture of the Chinese mind
from the philosophical perspective. There are fifteen articles in all, not
counting the Introduction by C. A. Moore. The last six papers deal with
the same topic: the individual in Chinese philosophy. Each article is
reviewed in the order as it appears in the book.
1. Chinese Theory and Practice, with Special Reference to Humanism.
By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 11-28) The author presents, first, the Chinese
notion of truth and, second, its relation to practice. The Chinese conceived truth to be the discoverable and demonstrable principles in human
affairs. Thus all truths have a moral quality. Since truth has to do
with human events, human history at once becomes the test as well as the
deposit of truth .. While Wang Yang-ming (1472-1529) is of the opinion
that truths exist primarily in the mind, Chu-Hsi (1130-1200) thinks that
truths are inherent in things and human events.
Because of the Chinese unique conception of the relation between truth
and history, all historical events are considered as the unfolding and
functioning of eternal principles. Consequently, Chinese classical history
exercises supreme authority as a natural law over government, religion,
society and other spheres of Chinese life.
If truth is moral, then it implies an ethical ought. Confucius was the
first to advocate the unity of knowledge and action. This doctrine was
accepted by all Chinese thinkers and expressed in the Chinese maxim:
" knowledge is the beginning of action and action is the completion of
knowledge." The consequence of this theory is the practical orientation of
all sciences, including philosophy, which has been considered not a science
of pure speculation but also of doing.
The discussion on truth is too brief, and the major portion of the article
is devoted to practices in poetry, art and drama. The author also fails to
observe the distinction between truth and knowledge and used the two
terms interchangeably.
2. The Story of Chinese Philosophy. By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp. 29-76)
The history of Chinese philosophy is divided into three symphony-like
movements: from 600 to 200 B. C. a period of three major themes of

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Confucianism, Taoism and Moism, plus four minor ones of the Logicians,
Neo-Moism, the Legalists and Yin-Yang Interactionism. The second movement from
B. C. to 1100 A. D. is that of synthesis of Chinese philosophy with a counternote of Buddhism introduced from India. The third
movement from 1100 to the present unfolds the melody of Nco-Confucianism.
This article is neither profound nor original. It seems futile to recount
in a brief article the whole history of Chinese philosophy.
3. Epistemological Method in Chinese Philosophy. By E. R. Hughes.
(pp. 77-103) The author aims to prove two things: that there is an
epistemology in Chinese tradition and that this epistemology is primarily
linguistic, as shown in their linguistic experiments and their use of abstract
categories. He believes that the Chinese consider philosophy a critique of
language and a checking of this critique by a critique of history. Therefore, Northrop's theory that Chinese thinking is intuitive and not postulational is questionable, since linguistic method is postulational, not intuitive.
He concludes that, in comparative philosophy, linguistic method is the most
useful.
I agree with the author that, unless we have an adequate understanding
of the nature of Chinese language, we would never fully appreciate Chinese
philosophy. However, many of his suppositions are by no means correct.
For example, he says that Chinese philosophy is a critique of language or
communicated meaning. This opinion is totally unwarranted. On the
contrary, the Chinese consider language a poor vehicle for philosophy.
Oftentimes silence is preferred over dialogue. Zen Buddhism is a perfect
example of this development. When the author claims that the Chinese
thought in terms of abstract categories, he again makes an unverified
supposition. It is a common teaching that the Chinese think modo concreto
not modo abstracto. There is a Chinese term for this man and a term for
man as all men, a generic term, but no term for manhood. What the author
considers to be abstract categories, such as Yin, Yang, the five Hsings,
are generic terms. The only possible abstract terms are Tao in Taoism and
Fa (Dharma) in Buddhism.
.
4. The Scientific Spirit and Method in Chinese Philosophy. By Hu Shih.
(pp. 104-131) F. S. C. Northrop has expressed the opinion that the
East's failure to develop natural sciences was due to the fact that " the
method of intuition and contemplation became the sole trustworthy modes
of inquiry." This Dr. Hu considers to be historically untrue. He says that
no race or culture " ... admits only concepts by intuition." Man, being a
thinking animal, is compelled by his daily needs to make inferences. That
sciences were neglected in the East was due to historical reasons.
The author points out that the Chinese had a scientific spirit and method
which were first embodied in Confucius's teachings, such as his agnosticism
and naturalism. By rejecting ancient myths Confucius was truly . the

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267

Socrates of China. During the Nco-Confucian renaissance this scientific
spirit and method were further developed by Chu-Hsi, whose school
singled out the The Great Learning from the Book of Rites for special study
because it contained a new logical method as a Novum Organum. Chu-Hsi
writes: "Investigate with an open mind. Try to see the reason with an
open mind. And with an open mind follow reason wherever it leads you."
Chang Tsai has said: "The student must first learn to be able to doubt.
If he can find doubt where no doubt was found before, then he is making
progress." To this Chu-Hsi adds: " but should also learn to resolve the
doubt after it has arisen. Then he is making real progress." This the
author considers to be Chu-Hsi's scientific method of hypothesis and
verification by evidence. He further points out Wu Yii's literary investigation of phonetics in the Book of the Odes as a shining example of the
Chinese scientific spirit.
There are some flaws in the author's argument. First, Confucius never
developed a Socratic method. Second, Chu-Hsi's method was nothing but
a method of literary criticism. All the doubting, searching and verifying
were concerned with commentaries on the classics.
5. Synthesis in Chinese Metaphysics. By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp.
148) The author lists four periods in the history of Chinese philosophy
when metaphysical syntheses were supposed to have taken place. The
first synthesis took place in the classical times when the Yin-Tang Interactionism was absorbed into the Great unity of Taoism and the Confucian
doctrine of the Mean. The second synthesis was found in the meeting
of Buddhism and Taoism; the third in the synthesis of Buddhism and
Taoism into Nco-Confucianism. The last synthesis is now taking place
between Western and Chinese thought. However, the main article is
concerned with the following topics of synthesis: being and non-being; Li
(reason) and Ch'i (ether, matter); the one and many; man and the
universe; good and evil and knowledge and conduct.
This article leaves something to be desired. To equate Yang with
being and Yin with non-being is grossly misleading. Some of the topics in
no way represent a process of synthesis but a quest for unity in thought
which is the life of all philosophies.
6. The Basis of Social, Ethical and Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy. By Y. P. Mei. (pp. 149-166) First of all, the author believes that
all classical Chinese philosophers were religious thinkers and that their
teachings truly established the foundation of all values. Confucius was a
religious man who affirmed life in his doctrine of Jen (love). Mencius was
not only religious but in fact a mystic. Mo-Tzu believed in a personal
God and preached universal love for all men. Though Lao-Tzu and
Chuang- Tzu rejected God, they both insisted upon Good and Tao as
the highest reality. Historically, however, many of these assertions are

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debatable. Mei displays certain theistic bias. His exposition is good, but
it is too broad to provide any deep insight.
7. Filial Piety and Chinese Society. By Hsieh Yu-Wei. (pp. 167-187)
The Chinese as a race is best known as a family people. This is not without
a long historical tradition and a philosophical foundation, which this article
eloquently explains.
In the Confucian scheme of things, filial piety is the root of all virtues
and of social and cosmic harmony. The Confucian len (love) is the
cardinal virtue, and its germination and development depend upon the
cultivation of filial piety. As Mencius says: "The substantiation of len
begins with service to one's parents."
The Confucian notion of man is primarily relational, i. e., man has five
dimensions in society, the principal of which is that between children
and parents. Once this primary relation is made harmonious, then the
others would follow. It is said in the Classic of Filial Piety: "Filial piety
at the outset consists in service to one's parents; in the middle of one's
path in service to his sovereign; and in the end, in establishing oneself as
an authentic man." Unfortunately, the exaltation of filial piety was not
without some ill effects. It hindered the development of individuality and
freedom and perpetuated the subjugation of women and paternalism in
politics.
8. The Development of Ideas of Spiritual Values in Chinese Philosophy.
By T'ang Chlin-I. (pp.
A value is considered spiritual if: 1)
presented or revealed to the spirit, that
created or realized by the spirit;
is, " for the spirit "; 3) self-consciously recognized as such in 1 and
The
author believes that the history of Chinese philosophy is a history of the
development of such values. The author's assertions seem to be nonsequiturs, since he has not first established (I don't think he can) that the
Chinese have looked upon the spirit in the same way as the West. What
others call humanistic values, he terms spiritual.
9. Chinese Legal and Political Philosophy. By John C. H. Wu. (pp.
The foundations of Chinese political authority, according to the
author, are three: the mandate of heaven, the people's will and the ruler's
virtue. The government has a double function: to enforce laws and promote
morality. This is because the Chinese consider law and morality to be
identical. This identity is based on the notion of law as a system of duties
rather than of rights. As Lao- Tzu says: "The man of virtue attends to his
duties; while a man of no virtue attends to his rights." This emphasis on
duty has rendered all laws subject to ethics. Only a virtuous ruler can
be a good ruler and only a virtuous citizen is a loyal citizen.
The purpose of both government and law is to achieve harmony in human
affairs. The author's arguments are cogent and his documentation relevant.
However, he omitted the discussion of Li (propriety) and music, which are
considered integral parts of the whole legal system.

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269

10. The World and the Individual in Chinese Metaphysics. By Thome
H. Fang. (pp.
This article covers all three major Chinese schools:
Confucianism, Taoism and Buddhism. The Confucian metaphysics takes
the Tao of Heaven as the creative power whereby the dynamic world
of all beings comes into existence and considers man as a participating
nature in congruence with the cosmic order. Individual dignity and
finality consist in man's cooperation and reciprocation with nature for the
harmonious completion of the total order.
With Taoism the emphasis was shifted from man to Tao-in-itself. It is
anti-social in that man's total concern is not with his fellow men or society
but with union with Tao. They are extreme individualists. With the
advent of Buddhism a metaphysical synthesis took place and resulted in
Chinese Buddhism, which teaches the search for the Ultimate through
self-annihilation. The author's thought is often obscured by his style, which
is at times terse and at times pedantic.
11. The Individual and the World in Chinese Methodology. By T'ang
Chiin-I. (pp.
This is an epistemological study of the principles
of individuation. The most important discussion is found in the first part.
For the Moist, there is only species and no individual. Universal love
is fostered at the expense of individuality. Mo Pin, a later Moist, holds that
all names are class-names, whether of a species or genus. There is no proper
name, since every such name is universalizable. Logicians concede that
individuals can be known and pointed to but not conceptually determined.
Hiin- Tzu teaches that an individual is spatia-temporally determined. Attributes and properties do not determine an individual, because they are
universal terms. Therefore, things are determined by the ways in which
they variously relate to each other. Yin-Yang School considers the individual to be a ultirelational system. An individual is one of the reciprocal
relations with others.
It is unfortunate that the author does not mention whether or not the
Chinese philosophers ever discussed the intrinsic principles of individuation.
To my knowledge, the Classic of History and the Book of Changes contain
some pertinent passages on this subject.
The Individual in Chinese Religion. By Wing-Tsit Chan. (pp.
306) No native Chinese religion was ever institutionalized, and this, the
author believes, was due to their religious convictions: 1)
purpose of
Chinese religions is self-realization;
this is achieved through natural and
self-oriented means; 3) ultimate salvation is union with Heaven in Confucianism, identification with Nature in Taoism and Nirvana in Buddhism.
The author fails to distinguish between Chinese religions and the philosophical schools, even though the public has often confused the two.
Confucianism never has been a religion nor has the Taoist religion followed
faithfully the Taoist philosophy. A religious Taoist believes in earthly

BOOK REVIEWS

immortality, not identification with Nature, which is a philosophical
doctrine.
13. The Status of the Individual in Chinese Ethics. By Hsieh Yu-Wei.
This article reads like an apologetics. The author tries to
(pp.
prove that the status of the individual in Confucian ethics is that of
equality and freedom. However, he fails to add that equality is an equality
of duties, not of rights, and freedom is that of doing the necessary, not a
freedom of autonomy. In the Confucian family system and social structure
equality and freedom were indeed very limited, if they existed at all.
14. Tke Status of the Individual in Chinese Social Thought and
Practice. By Y. P. Mei. (pp.
This is another apologetic. To
determine the exact status of the individual, all facts, whether favorable
or unfavorable, must be submitted for judgment. The author discusses only
what favors the individual status and omits all the social practices which
had subjugated millions of Chinese under the benign tyranny of Chinese
tradition.
15. The Status of the Individual in the Political and Legal Traditions
of Old and New China. By John C. H. Wu. (pp. 340-364) This article is
by far the most objective discussion on the individual status in Chinese
tradition. The discussion on the old legal system is fascinating. All laws
in China were penal laws. There was no civil law. Any immoral act
constituted a crime. The principle was: "whoever does what ought not
to be done shall be punished." All persons, including the Emperor, were
equal under the law, but the law itself was discriminating. Eight categories
of people were exempted from punishment unless imposed personally by
the Emperor. The law decreed that members in a family be unequal according to their status. The law also discriminated against women, who were
made totally dependent upon men. Man was allowed to divorce his wife,
but a woman was never permitted to divorce her husband. These inequalities were remedied only after the promulgation of the new law under
the Republic.
The book as a whole shows a total lack of editorial control. Being an
anthology, it is not expected to have a uniform theme and style, but
some of the repetitions and even contradictions in the various articles
could be eliminated. However, these flaws do not alter the fact that it is
a rich source bf Chinese philosophy in the English language. Though the
Chinese mind is not made totally scrutable, it has been unveiled.
PAUL

Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

K. K. ToNG

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271

The Indian Mind: Essentials of Indian Philosophy and Culture. Ed. by
CHARLES A. MooRE. Honolulu: East-West Center Press, 1967. Pp.
458. $9.50.
The East-West Center at the University of Hawaii provides a bridge oi
communication between philosophers from both sides of the world. Its
East-West Philosophers' Conferences were held in 1939, 1949, 1959, and
1964. The Indian Mind is a selection of papers from those conferences
brought together and edited by the late Professor Charles A. Moore. All
but one of the essays were re-edited by the authors themselves especially
for this publication.
This reviewer is strongly convinced that Western thinkers, and especially
" Thomists," should become broadly acquainted with Eastern thought, since
much is to be found there that blends with and leads to a better understanding of Western thought. The Indian Mind will serve well those who
seek a starting-point for extended reading in this area.
Raju's "Metaphysical Theories in Indian Philosophy" is a distinctive
contribution as a general introduction to Hindu thought. Raju presents a
comprehensive view of many Hindu schools and gives special place to
Vedanta as " the essence of Indian Philosophy " and to Samkara's
Advaita [meaning non-duality] as" the most popular expression of Vedanta
thought." This reviewer does not disagree with Raju's evaluation of
Samkara, but he does feel that thomistically orientated thinkers will find
the later Vedantist Ramanuja's doctrine of non-duality-with-differences
more compatible with their doctrine of analogy and their
moderate realism.
Even though it is difficult to pick and choose among the essays, this
reviewer found " Buddhism as a Philosophy of ' Thusness ' " by Takakusu
to be a most informative presentation of the Buddhist doctrine of causality
and some of its allied principles. Despite the technical language, this essay
brings into rather clear focus some of the basic elements of Buddhism and
gives Western thinkers specific grounds for comparison and judgment.
Some may find the Buddhist notion of causality too polaristic, but they
can also see in it some of the implications of finite causality.
In view of contemporary Western concern with the relations between
the religious and the secular dimensions of human life, there should be
much interest in Radhakrishnan's "The Indian Approach to the Religious
Problem," Nikhilananda's "The Realistic Aspect of Indian Spirituality,"
and Raju's " Religion and Spiritual Values in Indian Thought." Mahadevan
in " Social, Ethical, and Spiritual Values in Indian Philosophy " brings into
value structure
his discussion of the metaphysical basis of the
the same prayerful fragments from the
as were
quoted by Pope Paul during his visit to India.

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Five of the authors discuss the individual from different aspects: Bhattacharyya, the metaphysical; Murti, the religious; Desgupta, the ethical;
Saksena, the social; and Chand, the institutional aspect. These present
a well-rounded approach to the problem of individualism so prominent in
the West today.
In the limits of so brief a review, all essays could not be treated individually. All are informative and important. The book is highly recommended as a doorway to more extensive reading in Indian thought.

E. RussELL NAuGHTON
La Salle CoUege

Philadelphia, Pa.

The Making of Men. By PAUL WEISS. Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1967. Pp. 152 with index. $4.95.
In this book, which is a series of reflective glances at the educative process
in the twentieth century in the United States, the author, a philosopher,
offers philosophical evaluations of the various ingredients which comprise
the present-day system of schooling young men from early grades to college.
The book is more evaluative than descriptive. Moreover, it is not argumentative nor even insistently persuasive; the style is simple didactic and
the content represents the matured judgments of the long-trained philosopher and educator, expressing with a certain finality the wisdoms which
years of thoughtful experience have refined. Therefore, the book's impact
does not derive from the power of its syllogisms but from the character
and authority of the man who is presenting in it the best results of his years
of involvement.
As must be expected, the man whose making interests Paul Weiss is the
civilized, cultivated, perceptive, virtuous man; he is concerned with the
educational process insofar as it is ordained to the formation of wise,
urbane, creative, humane and sensitive human beings. Several touchstones
are consistently applied to gauge the worth of all the educational ingredients at each stage of the process. To be truly educative, the materials
offered to the developing skills, talents and mind of the growing person
must be challenging enough to stir interest but not so difficult that they
frustrate, nourishing in a way which satisfies the appetite and still whets it
for more. At every stage, the growing individual must be treated as he is
at that stage, the child as child, the youth as youth, the young man as
young man, each with his proper needs and aspirations, which are different
from those of an adult and not merely those of an adult-scaled-down-tosize, but each qualitatively appropriate. While the mind is taught, the spirit

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273

must also be formed, in the childhood by stories, in teen-age by heroes, in
youth by the records of great men and events in history. Techniques and
procedures are not part of the properly educative process; they are appropriately taught in vocational institutions. True education prepares the
mind to grasp and assimilate final goods, the goods which make life worth
living, and men truly men. These materials are the materials which
embody universal principles and values, as opposed to those which are
particular and technical: philosophy, for example, as opposed to forestry,
chemistry and physics as opposed to engineering, biology as opposed to
medicine, art as opposed to craft.
Inevitably the author is designing his criteria with an eye to his key
evaluation, his ultimate evaluation of the genuine good life and the
genuinely fulfilled man. This is, of course, not only the heart question of
the book but one of the heart questions of the whole history of philosophy.
Whoever in any compelling way answers this question, which is also a
great question in theology, religion and politics, will be called greatest of the
great, and therefore it cannot be expected that Paul Weiss, although he is
wise, will have finally located the key to the mystery. He examines the
claims of pleasure, knowledge, wealth, power, fame and security; he
estimates the contributions of engineers and other producing people,
politicians and other organizing people, humanitarians and other serving
people, scholars and other thinking people; he beautifully balances the
values of each and the limitations inherent in each and acknowledges that
none of them is the answer to the ultimate good life and happy man. But
then he must provide his own answer. He frames first a subjective answer:
the good life must be correlative to man, must fulfill the promises of mind,
body and emotions in a harmonious way and enable good men to live in
harmony with each other. Hardly anyone will argue with this, but the
crucial question remains: what is objectively correlative to man in this
way? What objects respond thus to his needs and promises? The author's
answer is a kind of weighted blend of things permeated with reflectiveness:
a happy man is primarily involved in the dedicated use of one power while
all his other powers have some play; he is vitally concerned in one great
area of endeavor while appreciative of all the others. He will find a center
in himself which will leave him open to the clustering riches around him.
This is all true and good and broad enough to include almost any good
life, even a life which finds its center in some way outside itself. But it is
not a definite answer and not truly an objective answer. The blend of all
good things adapted to the individual's individual wants truly describes
what will make life good, but the defining process seems to be a subtle
projection of the subjective criteria to the objects proposed rather than a
recognition of a goal as ultimate in its own right. Moreover, attractive as
it is, it does not seem to be for all men-only men capable of deep thought

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and enjoying considerable leisure can achieve it. It is a philosopher's answer
for the philosophically oriented.
Nevertheless, within these bounds, important things are being said about
man's ultimate goods and his happiness, which education, as an institutionalized, civilized procedure, should take into account. It must be acknowledged that even the finest educational process will not by itself produce the
good man; other factors enter into the mixture even at the level of essential
constitutives, e. g., sexual and familial love. And at the level of actual
constitutives, still other elements must be considered; how is suffering
integrated into the full life's plan, and how are men to achieve the maximum
possible of the good life in view of the myriad compromises and compensation they are obliged to make because of personal deficiencies and unyielding circumstances? These questions are outside the scope of this book,
but they must be recognized and answered before the whole design of the
good life is clear. In the meantime, Dr. Weiss has written an illuminating
and even moving account of the part that schooling should handle.
MICHAEL STOCK, 0. P.
St. Stephen's Priory
Dover, Massachusetts

St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, vol. 10 (1a. 65-74) (Cosmogony),
ed. WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967.
$U5.
Volume 10 of the new English translation of the Summa theologiae
contains St. Thomas's cosmogony or hexaemeron. The editor, William A.
Wallace, 0. P., makes no exaggerated claims for this section of the Summa.
He notes that " the fact that St. Thomas's treatment of the Hexaemeron
is so immersed in patristic exegesis and in the science of the Middle Ages
has long made it an antiquarian piece even for Thomistic scholars " (p.
xxi), and he refers to this as one of St. Thomas's "weakest expositions"
(p. xxiii). And yet it is Father Wallace's contention that "the marks of
his genius are still discernible. . . . On the difficult topic of the Hexaemeron
he could not offer a correct and definitive solution. Even in error, however,
his efforts compare so favourably with those of others that they deserve
careful analysis and thoughtful appreciation" (p. xxiii).
The section in question is, of course, a commentary on the Genesis
account of the six days of creation. Here St. Thomas is forced to deal with
such traditional problems as the creation of light on the first day and of the
luminous celestial bodies (the principal sources of light) three days later,
the perplexing claim that there are waters above the firmament, and the

BOOK REVIEWS

fl75

suitability of the various terms employed in the Scriptures to describe
God's creative work. Other problems appear to have acquired new urgency
for St. Thomas through the recovery of the whole corpus of Greek and
Islamic science in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. Thus he inquires
into the possibility that God employed intermediaries in producing the
material world; he asks if the celestial bodies are animate; he questions
whether matter was formless for a time before diversification.
St. Thomas reveals his ample knowledge of science and natural philosophy
as he faces the exegetical problems associated with Genesis I and 2;
contemporary astronomy, physics, optics, biology, and metaphysics are all
brought to bear on the text. This fact reflects St. Thomas's relatively strict
"scientific concordism ": the Scriptures are to be interpreted literally, and
the Scriptural and scientific accounts of the world must agree in detail.
But as Father Wallace points out, in spite of St. Thomas's concordist views
and his command of scientific knowledge, this particular section of the
Summa is predominantly Biblical and patristic-it was so determined by
the great abundance of patristic literature on the subject of the Hexaemeron.
Thus on each question St. Thomas faithfully records the views of the
various Fathers of the Church and attempts to mediate between their
differing viewpoints; and his solution to a problem is more often drawn
from a Scriptural text than from a scientific argument.
As editor of this volume, Father Wallace has brought to bear on the text
of St. Thomas's Hexaemeron not only the" careful analysis and thoughtful
appreciation " which are its due but also a vast amount of erudition. His
explanatory notes will surely be helpful to those not versed in medieval
natural philosophy. Similarly, appendices 3-6, although sometimes going
beyond the minimum required to understand St. Thomas, present a succinct
and nearly impeccable summary of ancient and medieval astronomy,
Aristotelian physics, medieval optics, and medieval biology. Appendices
7-10 provide a most illuminating introduction to literature on the Hexaemeron from the patristic period to the present, thus enabling the reader to
view St. Thomas in historical context. The translation is always lucid and
usually faithful, though occasionally the attempt to be modern and
colloquial strains the meaning of the text ever so slightly.
Inevitably there are quibbles. One wonders why, in this entire edition,
references in the text to particular treatises are always left untranslated
(is it really advantageous, for example, to render "ut habetur Matt." as
" as Scripture records "? [pp. 138-9]) and why punctuation is omitted at
the end of footnotes. Minor errors appear occasionally in the notes and
appendices: a Newtonian view of inertia was not held by Kepler, as Father
Wallace suggests (p. 123). The great circle in which the sun moves is more
properly referred to as the ecliptic than as the zodiac (pp. 185, 219) . An
epicycle is not the path traced out by a point moving about a small circle,

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BOOK REVIEWS

the center of which is moving about a larger deferent circle; rather, the
epicycle is the small circle itself (p. 186). The commonly accepted date of
Roger Bacon's death is not 1!294 but 1292 (p. 194) . But surely these
objections are of a most trivial sort, and they in no way detract from the
high standard of scholarship displayed throughout the book. Father
Wallace has performed a most valuable service for both Thomistic scholars
and historians of medieval natural philosophy.
DAVID

c. LINDBERG

University of Wisconsm
Madison, Wisconsin

Reflections on the Analogy of Being. By JAMES F. ANDERSON. The Hague:
Mattinus Nijhoff, 1967. Pp. 88.
Imagine that twenty years ago you wrote a book which (along with
brilliant chapters on the history of analogy) set down Thomistic analogy
according to the schema of Cajetan. Subsequently a vast literature on the
subject appeared through which runs an anti-Cajetanian thread: by and
large, people argue that Cajetan's views on analogy are not those of
Aquinas, make not much sense considered in themselves and ought to be
discarded. Knowing this literature, having the opportunity to write another
book, what would you do? If you are Professor Anderson, what you do is
offer substantially the same book minus the historical chapters.
The book is divided into discussions of analogy of inequality, analogy of
attribution, metaphor and analogy of proper proportionality. I would like
to report that, in his restatement of his position, Professor Anderson has
achieved a tightness and clarity which surpass the measure of clarity
reached in The Bond of Being. I would like to say that Professor Anderson,
recognizing as he does the difference between establishing a position as
being that of Aquinas and arguing for it convincingly in propria persona,
has done one or the other or both. Professor Anderson makes no effort to
show that his views are those of Aquinas, though he seems certain of the
coincidence. He makes nothing like a convincing case for his own views.
In order to convince his reader, Professor Anderson needs more precision
in his statement. His book begins with the promising reminder that
" analogy " has first of all a mathematical meaning, but he immediately
rejects the significance of this. We are then told that there are many
kinds of analogies which are analogously analogies because they participate
in various ways in what is truly analogy, analogy of proper proportionality.
The latter has never before been so firmly equated with being. Analogy
of proper proportionality involves proportional-that is, analogous-unity.
Being is explained in terms of proper proportionality and proper proportion-

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BOOK REVIEWS

ality is explained in terms of being. One cannot help wondering what
would have happened if Professor Anderson had asked himself what kind
of analogy is operative in his claim that his three (or four) kinds of
analogy are analogously analogies. From the very outset of the book, what
is to be explained is invoked to explain itself.
This reviewer hopes that the present book represents a warm-up exercise
and that Professor Anderson will soon turn his genial and cultivated mind
to some, at least, of the difficulties that have been advanced against his
Cajetanian views during the past several decades. As an echo of his past
work, this book is disappointingly anachronistic; as possible fanfare for
further and more persuasive stuff, it whets the intellectual appetite.
RALPH

MciNERNY

University fY/ Notre Dame
South Bend, Indiana

A Short Account of Greek Philosophy. By G. F. PARKER. New York:
Barnes & Noble, Inc., 1967. Pp. 194. $5.00.
Plato and His Contemporaries. By G. C. FIELD. New York: Barnes &
Noble, Inc. Pp. 242, University Paperback Edition, 1967, $2.25.
Deny to the life of mankind any semblance of continuity, deny any value
to history and the role of the historian amounts to little more than a
collector of facts, interesting perhaps but unrelated to modern life. Affirm
a community to life, accept the experience of living as a fact which, while
ancient with years, has maintained its identity through the passage of time,
the appearance and disappearance of cultures, of social and political
institutions, then the search into the past of life must be viewed as a labor
capable of yielding authentic values for life in the twentieth century.
The authors of these two works share the conviction that life is an
experience of both the past and the present. They also share a commitment to the thesis that history, the recorder of the experiences in living
from the past, can be profitable for life in the present. It is this double
assent which explains the two studies of Greek Philosophy.
G. F. Parker's A Short Account of Greek Philosophy draws its incentive
from an awareness of the gulf that separates the " two cultures." And its
purpose is to provide a bulwark against the possible tragedy of " Science,
adrift from its moorings in humanism and history, (becoming) a ravening
monster, while the Arts, oblivious of new areas of reality revealed by
Science, (become) as arid as the deserts of the moon" (p. 4). For the
author, the study of Greek Philosophy is one "of a number of common
platforms on which those who wish to be both literate and numerate can

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meet " (p. 5) , since " Greek civilisation is the common source from which
the divergent streams of art and science flow down to us" (ibid)·
G. C. Field is more modest in his appeal to history. He addresses his
study on Plato and His Contemporaries primarily to those whose interest
in philosophy is already assured. Describing the book as a " preliminary
or supplementary essay to a study of the philosophy of Plato " (preface,
p. v), Field directs his major effort to the task of bringing into proper focus
the circumstances of history in which that philosophy emerged and developed. Only in a minor way does the platonic system itself occupy the
author's attention.
In the pursuit after his purpose Field achieves an admirable success. His
study of the platonic historical milieu offers the initiated valuable insights
into the genesis of the problems to which Plato addressed himself. It gives
that philosophy a sense of being involved in the cross currents of the life
of those days. For those who have yet to encounter Plato through a
systematic study of his philosophy the work makes that philosopher and the
problems with which he wrestled something more than academic incidents
far removed from life.
And Parker, too, achieves a goodly measure of success in his effort to
construct a bulwark against the tragedy of mutually distrustful science and
art. His invitation to today's men of science to spend time in the company
of the philosophers of the 7th to the 4th centuries B. C. is cleverly couched
in terms that should elicit something more positive than a hasty, unthinking refusal. His portrayal of the thinkers and searchers of those times as
men made restless by the challengers offered them by the universe cannot
impress the modern man of science as a sort of self-portrait. The
invitation is attractive and its benefit, if accepted, makes available history's
story of intellectual life which is not without consequence to living today.
There is, however, a phase of the portrait of the thinkers of Greece
which, to my mind, merited more care in its delineation than the author
actually gave it. It seems to me that, in his effort to woo the scientist to
cultivate an acquaintance with the era of Greek philosophy, Parker fails to
present with sufficient vibrancy the figures of those philosophers whose forte
was located outside and beyond the limits of the Philosophy of Nature.
These are indeed mentioned and their thought presented with commendable
fullness. But their relevancy is not adequately emphasized. And they
are relevant. The paths traversed by Socrates in his ethical philosophy, of
Plato and Aristotle in their search for a First Philosophy were the result of
the demands of the spirit of man who found himself threatened with being
engulfed almost to the point of insignificance by the world of the naturalists.
Modern man is experiencing a like feeling.
JosEPH

Dominican H01U1e of Studit!$

Waskinvton1 D. (},

C. TAYLOR, 0. P.

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The Moral Philosophy of Mo-Tze. By AuGUSTINUS
$6.00.
China Printing LTD, 1965. Pp.

A.

TsEU. Taiwan:

This book (originally a doctoral dissertation) is published under the
auspice of Fu-Jen Catholic University on Taiwan. Since the philosopher
Mo-Tze is so little known in the West, this study of his moral philosophy
is a welcome addition to the English sources of Chinese philosophy.
A contemporary of Mencius, Mo-Tze was a unique Chinese philosopher,
because he, unlike Lao-Tze or Confucius, was not of scholarly or aristocratic stock but a common man. Furthermore, he reacted against the
naturalistic tradition of Taoism and Confucianism and replaced it with a
religious philosophy of Heaven. The basic tenets of his system are:
Heaven is loving and intelligent, provident and just; and the will of Heaven
is the moral law for man. This will of Heaven as discovered by the
ancient sages and Mo himself is universal love for all men. Good or evil,
rewards or punishments, prosperity or misfortune, all hinge on whether or
not the will of Heaven is realized in one's life. Being of poor origin, MoTze shunned luxury and extravagant rituals. He advocated absolute
equality among men and a pacifistic policy among nations. He instituted
a tightly organized fraternity with numerous loyal followers.
However, Mo-Tze's teachings declined immediately after his death,
partly because the Han dynasty adopted Confucianism as the orthodox
teaching of the Empire, and partly because Mo-Tze's philosophical spirit
was at variance with the tradition and temperament of the Chinese people.
Universal love without distinction and absolute equality of all men were
considered lofty doctrines but too impractical if the social and family
structures of that time were taken into consideration. Therefore, Mo-Tze
remained almost unknown until the Nationalist Revolution in this century.
Since that Revolution, as every revolution, initiated a strong anti-traditional sentiment, Mo-Tze as the antagonist of Confucius again captured the
imagination of the modern Chinese. Many works on Mo-Tze's philosophy
have come off the press in recent times.
The author's study is detailed and cogent; however, his scholastic background has prejudiced his judgments on controversial issues, and also his
exposition is too argumentative. His digression in Chapter two, section one,
is cumbersome, and typographical errors abound in the book. Nevertheless,
I feel that sinologists may find the book valuable.
PAUL

Catholic University of America
WC18hington, D. C.

K. K. ToNG

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fl80

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