THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

VoL. XXXIV

JANUARY, 1970

No.1

THE RENEWAL OF MORAL THEOLOGY:
THE NEW LAW

I

N THE RENEWAL of moral theology, in its pedagogy,
but more profoundly in its epistemological aspect and the
inspiration deriving from it, the relationship between law
and grace is without doubt the heart of the problem. Moreover, this is no longer a matter of one-sided controversy with
Lutheran theology but, beyond the necessary reaction of the
defense of orthodoxy, of agreement on a radical investigation
of the internal dialectic between law and grace, which Lutheran
intuition has already grasped.
My qualifications in this area are not those of a moral
theologian but rather of a historian of theology, or, more
precisely, in a sociological history, of an historian of the Gospel
among the People of God, at that precise point where the
Gospel is the leaven in the Church, the extent of the mystery
and the place of the Spirit. I do not, therefore, offer a labora1

M.D. CHENU

tory-type scientific analysis of the theoretical relationship between law and grace but, in its effect on concrete behavior (is
this not where the impact of moral theology, a practical
science, lies?) , the relationship of law and grace as it actually
exists in the community life of the Church structured by the
Spirit. My profession as historian has led me to look favorably
upon these experiences, whether authentic or deviate, and thus
has made me ultra-sensitive to the present problem, not so
much in its theoretical articulations, urgent as they may be,
but in its community contexts.
It is commonly agreed that the Council directed neither its
attention nor its decisions explicitly to the field of moral
theology. Certainly, many of its documents, in particular the
Constitution Gaudium et s-pes, furnish copious material; but
today we have to elaborate upon it, drawing inferences from
the many pregnant ideas beneath the texts. Having been
witness to many of them, I would like to note the evangelical
aspiration which impregnates them: how the freedom of the
Gospel, amidst the powers of the world, emanates from the
complex, sometimes turbulent, play of charisms exercised in the
awakenings and movements of poverty in the heart of the
People of God urged forward by its messianic hope: the poor
in the Church are of themselves contesters of the structures,
the moral precepts, the established order, briefly, of the Law
itself. Another example with reference to current controversies:
an accurate knowledge of the concrete relationships between
law and grace will allow us to go beyond the contrasted
positions of " situation ethics."
Right at the beginning I must remark that the category
"moral theology," as distinguished from "dogmatic theology," cannot be employed without reservation. Not that it is
false, but in its pedagogical formalism it separates the elements
of a global perception outside of which truth remains fragmented. It is well-known that this distinction is ill-suited to
the ordo disciplinae of Saint Thomas. It is likewise known
that in the Council where the category of pastoral, by way of
distinction and often by way of opposition, was placed ahead

RENEWAL

OF MORAL THEOLOGY

of that of doctrinal, the impact of the truth of the Gospel on
Christian life--except for the abstract doctrine of apostolic
pragmatism-has not been sufficiently determined. The conditions for a "pastoral" magisterium, as it is called today,
that is, of an authentic teaching in which the "law of liberty"
(a term used by Saint Thomas in referring to the New Law)
dominates and transforms the precepts, cannot be established
except through an integral theology of grace and law. Thus
there is an urgent need to supplant ihe entire theology of the
Counter-Reformation, using constraint when opportune, both
mental and pedagogical. A wonderful hope, of which moral
theologians can be both witnesses and doers.
What then is my approach as an historian, observing the
performance of the "new law," the Gospel in history? For it
is in history, a sacred history, that the New Law finds its
subject and its intelligibility.
SALVATION

HISTORY

To begin with, let us register one very important and meaningful fact which reveals a primary law in the life of the Church:
the " return to the Gospel," according to the full meaning of
this expression, is the condition of a Christian's presence in
his day, of a presence both in thought and in action, as regards
the formulation of problems as well as pastoral insights. Return
to the Gospel, presence in our day: 1 baffling dialectic when
subjected to an abstract and detemporalized analysis; but, for
the historian, a homogeneous knowledge of an economy whose
dynamism emanates from an investment by God in history
between the two comings of Christ.
The "return to the Gospel," by its inspiration, its direct
1 We have here the very tenns of the Council when in the Decree on Religious
Life it defines the radical principle of renewal: "Accommodata renovatio vitae
religiosae simul complectitur et continuum reditum ad omnia vitae christianae
fontes ... et aptationem ad mutatas temporum conditiones " (n. 2). Simul is
employed intt-ntionally in its intensive meaning to signify not only a juxtaposition
but an interference. This perfect formula is valid for the renewal of the whole
of the Church.

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M.D. CHENU

reading, its charismatic thrust, is the very principle-pastorally
and epistemologically-{)£ understanding the concrete situations of today, beyond the data of non-temporal terms and
abstract precepts. This is the way of the Word of God: God
speaks today,-in a community in which the apostolic ministry,
continued by the episcopal ministry, functionally (rule) and
sacramentally (orders) conditions the teaching of the faith
and pastoral conduct. The actual life of the Church, the
hierarchical community of the People of God, is the appropriated theological place, locus ultimo paratus, of theologae and
theological understanding of the" New Law," another name for
grace and the presence of the Spirit. Far from yielding to the
counterposition of grace and law, liberty and obedience, their
theoretical and practical articulation manifest their intrinsic
complementarity. Unobtainable in its perfection, the organic
unity of evangelical liberty and preceptive authority is, nevertheless, the permanent intention of our efforts and our researches.
Today: the Christian economy is defined as a history, a
" salvation history," which faith, hope and charity, the virtuous organism of grace with its equipage of gifts and charisms,
guides and renders intelligible. But, while being " salvific," this
history is nonetheless history, embracing secular history whose
total reality is assumed by the People of God, the Body of
Christ animated by the Spirit. " Spiritus Dei, qui mirabili
providentia temporum cursum dirigit et faciem terrae renovat,
huic evolutioni adest." 2 It is within this active presence of the
Spirit that all laws play their part.
THE REGIME OF THE SPmiT

The most significant and most famous case in the West of
this " awakening of the Gospel " in history is that manifested,
stirred up and nourished by the foundation of the Mendicant
Orders, under the charismatic power of Saint Francis and of
Saint Dominic, the ecclesial context of the theology of Saint
s Gatulium et Spes, n. 26, 4.

RENEWAL

OF MORAL THEOLOGY

5

Thomas, unthinkable without this spiritual disturbance. Here
we can only mention this major episode,-from which expressly
proceed our vocation, our life, our institution, our theology.
Let us observe that it was not merely a movement of moral
reform, with a better observance of laws, but, in today's terminology, a " structural reform," in which the charisms of the
Spirit consubstantially play their part, and, as always, the
sociological index is the call to poverty, for liberation from the
established order.
The episode of the Spirituals in the Order of Saint Francis,
in their criticism of institutions, legalisms, moral precepts,
suggests (and very much so today) that equilibrium is difficult
to maintain in this evangelism. Let us remember that faith in
the Spirit and sensitivity to the movement of history on the
march toward the end-time have been simultaneous from the
beginning. It has been something quite other than the adaptation of a moral teaching, called eternal, to accidental circumstances. It is salvation history in action in history: the
" return to the Gospel " is provoked by the consciousness of a
violent change of a decayed anthropology and of an out-dated
society: they are being contested in the name of the Gospel.
Here the established Church has been subjected to a difficult
testing, which, while extremely beneficial, has not been without
risk or failure, even in the area of theology. Saint Thomas's
treatise on the New Law in the Summa is the scientific formulation, in the intellectus fidei, of this lofty experience of the
People of God.
The ultimate reason for this ecclesial and theological operation is the Incarnation, by which the Word of God becoming
flesh entered into history, which is from now on innervated by
the grace of Christ. Humanization, understood here as moral
and social humanization, is the locus for divinization. Christ
is not a divine being on a visit to the world of men to whom
he would bring, in the nature of a message, the expression of
the general and non-temporal divine will as a super-decalogue.
In him the law is "new"; its precepts and its dogmatic
formulas are but dispositions for justification. (For this reason

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M.D. CHENU

we cannot read the questions of Saint Thomas on law in the
I-II without the III Pars.) .
This double historicity, of man and of God, determines an
economy of movement according to the eschatological dynamism of the accomplishment of God's plan. It is certain that
in Christ the investment is total: all in him, past, present and
future, is accomplished in being, truth and goodness. There
is no longer any need for awaiting another age, an age of the
Spirit, in which all laws, institutions, and even the very
sacraments themselves would be dissolved. Such was the false
utopia promised by the new Gospel under the odd prestige of
Joachim of Flora, which seduced a whole line of "Spirituals,"
including some of the early Preachers. In fact, there is contestation regarding conceptual and institutional data. We know
that Saint Thomas was strongly against these myths.
But this absolute which is Christ does not in any way
preclude distentions in time-the time of the Church-between
the two comings. It is precisely this distention in time (and
in space) which introduces psychological, social and political
dimensions to the history of humanity without impairing its
fidelity to an identical economy. The impact of the Gospel
can be discerned whenever events become" signs of the times."
The apostolic and doctrinal import of this evangelical category,
which the Council fixed as a key position and made into a law,
is recognized by all. The reading of these " signs " is the work
of faith understanding history within the hierarchical Community in which presence to the world is the objective title to a
discernment of these " signs." 3 Thus socialization, a typical
phenomenon of the new civilization, engenders human values
in which the Gospel takes on its " political " dimension in a
fraternal love which takes possession of the collective structures: a newness in act in the law of the Spirit and not merely
the reform of a social doctrine laboriously accommodated to a
drastic evolution. Individual morals and preceptive behavior
• Cf. the Constitution Gaudium et spell, n. 44; and John XXIII, Pacem in tertia,

n, 1(10.

RENEWAL

OF MORAL THEOLOGY

7

may no longer and should not be based on anything other than
this socialization of the Gospel, within the context of salvation
history. A certain spiritualism of the " interior life," affected
by the view of eternity, has for a long time led to grave distortions within the Church and thus become alien to the world and
to history. The "New Law" is the presence of the Spirit in
the evolution of humanity. 4
CREATION

AND INCARNATION

In this historical economy-the Gospel in time-the Christian finds himself defined by the double dimension of two
mysteries, Creation and Incarnation, or, better still, of the
unique mystery of the Word, realized in two operations: the
Word creator and the Word incarnate. There you have, in
fidelity and through fidelity to this mystery, the twofold cause
of the permanent" newness." Ecce nova facio omnia. 5 This is
the axiom of the "New Law."
God did not create a ready-made universe upon which man
would be placed like an angelic spirit upon heterogeneous
matter or as the foreign spectator of a landscape at one moment
fascinating and at another overwhelming. God has called man
to be his cooperator in the progressive organization of a universe of which man himself, the image of God, must thus be
the demiurge and conscience. He is precisely and primarily the
image of God inasmuch as, being associated with his creator, he
is by that very fact, in full liberty and responsibility, the
master and builder of nature.
Now, due to the gigantic progression of man's grasp of
nature, the radical metamorphosis of the conditions of his
cultural and moral growth, the massive involvement of the
construction of societies, we here are becoming aware of this
"continuous creation," in a permanent state of innovation, in
man's creativity. This vision of a history by which man is
continually formed, and in which likewise the Word continually
• Cf. the text quoted from the Council.
• Apoc. 21:5.

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M.D. CHENU

manifests himself, is able to renew the biblical revelation of
creation and to nourish a " theology of event " under the
recapitulation of all reality in Christ. Thus God's Word, once
for all and completely realized in Jesus Christ, preserves riches
forever new in the Church consequent upon the historical and
cultural situations in which they are welcomed and assimilated.
It is the same faith, but it has a history, developments, epochs.
Far from fearing to be dissolved, this faith recognizes, as an
essential condition of its survival, the necessity of being resolutely inscribed in the diversity and succession of cultures
which form human history.
Thus the "New Law" includes in its insights and in its
exercise a consubstantial coefficient of prophecy in order that
this permanent innovation be honored. Greek thought, which
has always fallen short of the all-embracing reality of history,
and Roman law, whose categories do not lend themselves to
this dynamism without rupture, have not, despite their invaluable benefit, adequately responded to this evangelical demand.
It is quite insufficient to say that Saint Thomas baptized
Aristotle; and history is not satisfied with the affidavit Ecclesia
vivit iure romano.
The General Assembly of the World Council of Churches,
which was held July 1968 at Upsala with the active participation of the Catholic Church, had for its theme: Ecce nova
facio omnia, the verse already quoted from the Apocalypse. At
the opening conference the Metropolitan of Latakia, Mgr.
Hazim, presented the subject in this way:
We will not adopt this phrase as simply a program of study and of
action. That would lead us to the impasse of established orders and
of revolutions: to moralize. No, "I make all things new" is not a
program but an event, the sole Event of history. We are the
prophets of the new, the visionaries of the resurrected Christ.

The Eastern prelate went on to describe this creator Newnessthe newness of the law-which cannot be explained by the past
but by the future, in this way:

RENEWAL

OF MORAL THEOLOGY

9

God comes into the world as to his own encounter; he is up front
and he calls, he upsets, he sends, he causes increase, he liberates.
Any other god is a false god, an idol, a dead god, and it is high
time that our modern consciousness bury it. This multiform god
who inhabits the former consciousness of man is in effect behind
man as a cause; he commands, organizes, causes man to regress and
finally alienates him. There is nothing prophetic about him; on
the contrary, he always comes afterward as the ultimate reason for
the inexplicable or the last recourse of irresponsible people. This
false transcendent is as old as death. . . . On the contrary, the
creator newness comes into the world with the world. It does not
invent itself, nor does it prove itself: it reveals itself. It is either
welcomed or refused but it comes as an event ... (It is the action
of the Holy Spirit which makes this newness come into the world.)
Without it, God is far away, Christ is in the past, the Gospel is a
dead letter, the Church a mere organization, authority a domination, mission a propaganda, worship an evocation, and the Christian
way of life a moral slavery.

And he concluded that the Church, the place and sacrament of
this mystery, is " the prophetic conscience of the drama of
this hour."
THE DECALOGml

It is in this context of the mystery acting in history that
is developed and illuminated the dialectic of grace and law
according to which the conceptual and preceptive elements,
transubstantiated by grace, become conditionings, "dispositions," according to the unusual expression of Saint Thomas,
of the life of the Spirit. There is no longer the question of
receiving grace in order to become capable of facing up to the
demands of the commandments (such a notion presided over
the construction of the Counter-Reformation catechisms) but
to live in dependence on the interior movement of the Spirit.
In the long run the ethical ideal resides in the fact that man
is a law unto himself and not in the fact that he obeys God's
command coming from without. Such is the root of Christian
liberty which is certainly not the absence of every norm but
implies the free choice of a line of conduct conformable to
the inner call of grace. Man fixes for himself his own law before

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M.D. CHENU

God: I psi sibi sunt lex. Thus the" evangelical revivals" in the
Church overcome moral reforms: theological intensity of faith,
exaltation of hope both eschatological and terrestrial, personal
and collective disturbance of fraternal charity, challenge to the
outmoded apparel of society and the Church, charisms of the
presence and work of the Spirit, evangelical counsels assented
to in the gratuity of vocations and human relations: so many
blaring indices of the permanent newness of the " New Law "
in the history of the People of God.
Among the many efficacies of this regime, the historian
is able to observe in the facts and theologiGal analyses change
of sense which is operative in the precepts of the so-called
"natural law." A certain insistence upon this "natural law,"
its content, its personal and social constraints, strongly risks
atrophying, with reference to Christ, the " law of liberty"
enjoyed by the Christian.
The history of the exegesis and practice of the Decalogue
is very significant here. At times the Decalogue is presented
as the Word that an eternally unmovable God pronounced
about a people which would be taken out of history through
obedience to this Word,-and not as a Word spoken in history
by a God who is making history to a people inserted in this
history. The Ten Commandments would explain the general
and universal conditions of all morality, providing morality
with a series of pronouncements more perennial and unmovable
than are reputed to come from the mouth of God, who is himself eternal and unchangeable: " Thus speaks the Eternal. ... "
So God says eternally the same thing. That which, in the
preaching of the prophets, indicates the actuality of the Word
of God, is converted into a proclamation of his eternity. There
is certainly some truth in this; but there is the immediate
danger of falling into an abstract deism without history, outside the Covenant of the Old Testament, beyond the evangelical impact of the " new creation " in Christ.
Certainly, going along with the great scientific theology of
the thirteenth century, I continue to think that, without any
detriment to the Gospel and its kerygma, theological reasoning

RENEWAL

OF MORAL THEOLOGY

11

can very fruitfully discern, establish, and analyze the rational
and universal structure of this divine law. Thus Saint Thomas
and Saint Bonaventure consider that the articulations of the
Ten Commandments "recte ordinata sunt." I do not agree
with the Barthian criticism of the Decalogue as natural law.
Under the divine law nature is brought back into its own, and
reason is bolstered in its autonomy of vision and method.
This is what justifies, in documents such as Pacem in terris and
in the Constitution Gaudium et spes, the aforementioned analyses of natural law. It is always true that for the People of
God in the world in formation, an existental consideration
involves the feeling of a presence of the Gospel not only at the
level of pastoral efficacies but at the level of theological and
historical understanding of the Kingdom of God. Otherwise
this " natural law " turns into a catalogue of abstract truths
made all the more rigid in the encounter with the movement of
history. Innovation, discovery, creativity, charisms, are all
eliminated from it. This is what happens in certain presentations of "social doctrine," closer in their uprooted universalism
to W olfian philosophy than to the evangelism of the theology
of Saint Thomas.
An analogous analysis could be drawn of the moralizing
interpretation of the " Sermon on the Mount," which makes
from that which is first of all a prophetic proclamation of love
in the actual coming of the Spirit abstract principles of morality, directed to an accounting of good works.
In the final analysis, such are the relations between ethics
and religion, religion being understood as the "New Law"
in Christ. The difference of application of categories, the very
vocabulary, demonstrate that we are epistemologically confronted by two types of truth: evangelical truth as prophetic
testimony, as the living message, messianic promise, and moral
truth as enunciated by theological reason. " Saving" truth has
in its christological and eschatological concentration a dimension specifically historical: not formally that which is, but
that which happens, that which we concretely experience, the

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M.D.

CHENU

truth of Saint John, pistis and dikaiosune, the power of the
Church manifested in the Word. The Good News proclaimed
in joy, today. Thus the "New Law": the grace of the Holy
Spirit, communicated in faith, and not written law, consigned
in documents and in principles.
M. D. CHENU, 0. P.
Couvent de Saint-Jacques
Paris, France

THE TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

T

HE TEACHING FUNCTION has been for a long
time restricted to an elite class, closely supervised by
political or ecclesiastical authority, and regulated by
corporate statutes. In our own times the very idea of this
type of authoritarian control and corporate regulation raises
objections; in fact, the teaching function has been so diluted
that it can be said to be reserved to no one and is open to all.
The audience reached by a journalist, or even a songwriter, is
often greater, due to the multiplicity and facility of means
of expression, than that reached by a professor with degrees
and official approval.
However, to the extent that the teaching profession still
exists, the training of teachers and the establishment of philosophically-oriented programs are less assured and are subject
to many variations, since they are now more greatly influenced
by the movements of public opinion. Political events, unpredictable as they are, currently have repercusions on the
career and choice of teachers as well as upon the duration of
programs and the spirit of teaching. Teaching must meet the
needs of the people as they are expressed and are capable of
being solved. Hence the demand of truth, to the extent that it
is expressed and wherever it is concretely accompanied by the
willingness to pay the price, bears less on objective and disinterested truth than it does on an exact adjustment of the
student for his future tasks, either by organizing the teaching
of moral theology to meet the need of the Church for confessors, or by channelling the flow of students toward subjects
which will immediately assure them of a good position and
answer the needs of economic development and of social
welfare.
It appears, therefore, that the teacher, because of his concern
18

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JEAN TONNEAU

for effectiveness, especially in the apostolic and the pastoral
area, tries to become a journalist, if not a songwriter, in order
to get a great hearing. He fears that, unless he does so, he will
be thought of as a mandarin.
The democratization of teaching easily tends towards a
" massification." 1 I do not even wish to speak of the at times
troubling overtones which accompany or run the risk of accompanying this symptom: a laziness which precludes sustained
and silent effort; an appeal to the tinkle of vainglory. Above
all there is the objection based on principle: why, what right
have I to oppose them? Even the theologian who, more than
anyone else, should say to himself: " My doctrine is not my
own," experiences similar scruples. These he resists to the
extent that he has not fallen prey to an idealistic epistemology
or to phenomenology which denies "ready-made " truths, that
is, precisely those which are not for everyone to create for
himself, those which constitute the object of a doctrinal tradition.
We should add that the process is one which is auto-accelerating; once a striking formula hits the public ear it resonates
and is amplified so that it seems to be a confirmation of its
truth. It may have been proposed merely as a hypothesis by
the author, but it soon succeeds too well for him to withdraw
his conviction that it is firmly established, and thus it immediately passes for a conclusion of modem science (or an exigence
of the modem conscience) . This is so much so that the author
loses every chance of continuing and of deepening his thinking
on the matter, of keeping his critical spirit on the alert.
Paradoxically, success itself condemns him to psittacism. 2
Moral science, and the theory of law 8 which forms part of
it, are particularly suspect. It is amusing to note that Abbe
1 Cf. G. Gottier, Le langagc de la foi. Fidelite et invention, in Table Ronde, n.
250 (Nov. 1968), p. 67.
• Cf. J. De Bourbon-Bosset as quoted by P. Gache, La France catholique, July
29, 1966, p. 6.
• There is nothing quite as distressing to the public as this word theory, and
authors avoid it as much as possible.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

15

J. M. Aubert begins his work, Loi de Dieu, Loi des hommes,
with humble oratorical precautions, as if he needed to beg
forgiveness for writing on so grim a subject. 4 Not long ago
the manuals showed more boldness; they did not hesitate at all
to affirm as prime and incontestable truths the existence of
divine and human laws, the nature of law, its inviolable power
to bind, etc. We are far from this robust healthiness, which
would pass today for naive triumphalism.
The Abbe Aubert suggests an explanation for this change
of attitude: the decadence of Christian teaching on law. In
the final analysis, I believe that all explanations can be reduced
to this. But it is evident that this decadence depends on many
causes, and it remains to be asked especially what a good
Christian teaching on law should be.
We might think that the rapid and profound changes which
the world has known and is still experiencing are responsible,
to a large extent, for the distrust and even contempt which the
idea of law arouses. Everything changes, challenge is not new,
but it seems that we have a sharper awareness of universal
change. Thus in this constant change it could be said that law
seems to be a stumbling block, an insoluble lump in a universal
fluidity; as soon as a law is established, it weighs down as a
heritage from the past 5 upon a movement which pushes us
forward; it is always by definition a fixed and circumscribed
conception which prevents us from seeing with a clear and
alert eye the perpetual flow of unrecorded situations wherein
we are led to each moment by a living reality. Established laws
make us react awkwardly to these ever new situations with
a slowness that can never be overcome.
This is presuming that change and constant novelty appeal
to us. Rightly or wrongly, we project all our hopes into the
future: change, novelty, fluidity, by dropping the baggage and
• In the collection " Le mystere chretien," published by Desc!ee. I am happy to
say that this work contains nothing grim.
• To resent the heritage of the past considered as something weighing down is a
recent and remarkable phenomenon. Up to now, to benefit from the treasury accumulated by the Fathers and carefully transmitted to subsequent generations had
been considered as an advantage, as the mark of a noble civilization.

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JEAN TONNEAU

impedimenta of the past, appear to us as positive, I mean
favorable, values, even if they involve risks and force us to
abandon vested interests with legitimate regret. No matter
how respectable these regrets, how justifiable our disturbance,
there is no question of fighting shy of the future toward which
we are heading with joyous fervor, as if we were sure that the
balance sheet of every change, of every step forward, was
necessarily favorable and that every tomorrow must necessarily
sing out precisely and uniquely because it is a tomorrow.
If this act of faith were reasonably based, there would be no
point in eulogizing the law. Rather, it would be more fitting
to challenge all established laws, their restraints, their barriers
that slow us up on the incline down which we are rolling. The
conclusion was drawn in this sense. It is a matter of paring
down as much as possible, of dissolving even that which remains of the legal establishment, of rendering the present
situation uncomfortable, unbearable, of aggravating its irritating aspects, and of laying down justifying bases, if we are
to pave the way for the future whatever it may be.
Of course, we know nothing about the future, except that it
will be necessarily better; to pretend that we can impose
upon it in advance a prefabricated or preconceived plan is not
to follow the rules of the game. Our freedom is not only unable
to choose and to prepare for what " must " come, but it would
contradict itself, so to speak, if whatever " must " come could
be read in advance. There remains for us only one thing to
do if we wish willy-nilly to contribute to what is coming, if
not to the construction of the future: demolish everything
that exists, make a clean sweep with the intention of accelerating the course of events. This intention, let us note, is probably illusory, for it gratuitously presupposes that there is at
least a human activity, a subversive activity, which is endowed
with efficacy and which could in a certain manner affect the
future; but this, contrary to the logic of the system, is to
reintroduce a law.
The true logic of the system is that of fate. Man is just a
straw swept along powerless by the stream of becoming. Our
act of faith is only a sentimental aftermath of faith in a

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

17

provident God who directs the course of history. Thus, just
as economic liberalism began by being optimistic, by thinking
that it could read into the fatality of laisser-faire a natural
providential order but soon becoming pessimistic, so now our
naive confidence in tomorrows which will sing can in the
wink of an eye become transformed, with just as much or as
little cause, into the most somber despair.
In any case, we can observe that to raise a question on
the law is to raise a fundamental question, without doubt the
fundamental question, not only in the order of morality but
with regard to reason, one which affects man and his place in
time and in the universe.
The different problems raised by the tract on law can be
grouped under two headings, simply put, those from the viewpoint of doctrina sacra and those from the viewpoint of moral
theology. It is clear what the first point of view entails:
why speak of law in theology when we live by faith and the
Gospel? On the other hand, the theologian, if he speaks of
law, necessarily touches on moral considerations, 6 and if he
borrows from the moralist, he must supervise the quality of
these borrowings. Thus we will have occasion to control from
this philosophical point of view the very definition of law in
general and more particularly the notions of legislative authority and of the moral obligation of law, which is practically
one and the same problem. Finally, a few remarks will be
necessary touching on the relationship between the tracts on
law and on grace in the Prima Secundae. These problems
will be taken up in four parts: I. Law in doctrina sacra; II.
The Thomist definition of law; III. The authority of the legislator and the binding force of law; IV. The relationship between
the tracts on law and on grace.

I. LAw IN Doctrina Sacra
Not infrequently we experience a somewhat saddened surprise in seeing theologians devote so much space to law in their
6 This is the tenn employed by Saint Thomas when he laid down the plan of the
Secunda Pars.

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JEAN TONNEAU

exposition of doctrina sacra; we are inclined to reproach them
for introducing into the simplicity of revelation a foreign
body, a technique, called for by the need or the elegance of
a system. Is this not one more sad result of the treachery of
dialectics? Why water down the pure wine of God's word?
This kind of uneasiness betrays a certain profane, sociological
and juridical idea of law. The latter seems in effect to come
from a world other than that of revelation, for example, from
canon or Roman law, or from Stoicism, in short, from man,
and we believe ourselves authorized to prune doctrina sacra
of these profane superfluities.
In reality, one has but to read the Bible (this is how theology
got its start) to realize that theologians could not do otherwise
than to speak about law. This is not something which they
have freely chosen to do, not a systematic option which they
had need to justify through some technical concern for the
good order of reason. The word itself is found in the sacred
text and cries out for attention, first of all, by the quite large
number of its meanings. 7 Once in a great while the word law
is used in an absolute fashion, without any specification, as
when I Mace. teaches that Antiochus gave orders asking the
Jews either to abandon the law or the books of the law would
be confiscated. These books can designate either the Torah
in its entirety or simply the legislative books, either the
Pentateuch in its entirety or only the Book of the Covenant,
i. e., chapters 20-23 of Exodus. Mathathias distinguishes himself by his zeal for the law, and he mobilizes the troops crying
• This observation has been made by Saint Thomas on many occasions; for
example, twice in a row in his Commentary on the Epistle to the Romans. He
notes first of all (in Chapter III, lect. 2, n. 292) that this word designates either
the whole of the Old Testament or one of its parts: and since the Old Testament
is divided into two or three parts, the word can designate either of two different sets
of books, depending on whether the Bible is divided into the Law, the Psalms and
the Prophets, or into the Law and the Prophets. Further on (Chapter V, lect. 6
n. 462) the enumeration is more complete: the word law can designate either the
Old Testament in its entirety, or the Pentateuch, or the Decalogue only, or the
totality of the ritual precepts, or finally such a ritual precept in particular; Saint
Thomas gives a text in support of each of his affirmations.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

19

out: " Let everyone who has a fervor for the law come out and
follow me." (I Mace. 2: 26-27)
With a specification we often find the expression law of
Moses. Moses in reality is not the author of the law; he
transmits it to the people on the part of God, but God gives
all his laws through the intermediary of Moses, even those oral
laws which have been transmitted from generation to generation and which are all considered to be connected with the
revelation on Sinai. We still speak of the law of God, a consecrated term now become technical, with religious resonances,
and reasonably equivalent to what we call " revelation." Undoubtedly God communicated his revelation through different
means, but in proportion as devotion to the Law developed
after the Exile, the gift of the Law monopolized the whole of
revelation; this gift sums up the best of all God's benefits to
his people.
In the strict sense, the word law has come to stand for any
Scriptural text whatever. The case of John 15:25 is well
known: "But all this was only to fulfil the words written in
their law: they hated me for no reason"; now this citation
refers back to Psalm 35. We should not forget that according
to rabbinic usage as taught us by the Mishnah (Pirke Aboth) ,
"Moses received the law of Sinai and communicated it to
Josuah, and Josuah communicated it to the elders, the elders
to the prophets; the latter entrusted it to the men in the great
synagogue," which brings us to the generation which edited
the Mishnah, during the second century of our era. Torah
means not only the written Mosaic legislation, the 613 mizvot,
positive as well as negative, extracted from the Pentateuch by
the rabbis, but also the whole doctrine which was transmitted
and taught during the course of centuries regarding law under
the more juridical form of Halakah or under the edifying form
of the Haggadah. All of this would have been known by Moses
through the revelation received on Sinai and faithfully transmitted during the course of time to be divulged gradually as
needed. Some of these traditions, as we know, found their
way into the New Testament, for example, that the law was

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given to Moses through the intermediary of angels. (Acts
7: 58; Gal. 8: 19; Heb. 2: 2; cf. I-II, q. 98, a. 8)
Next, the word law appears in the sacred text as a series of
semantic developments with a firm continuity but also with an
unexpected richness which it has received in the course of
centuries and through various translations. This point is closely
linked to the history of the theology of law itself, but it can
be approached here on the level of vocabulary. It is classical to
lament the fact that the Septuagint authors translated the
Hebrew Torah by the Greek Nomos, which necessarily led to
the Latin translation lex. Certainly, if words were once and
for all univocal signs with unique meanings, we could be concerned about bringing together words which have their respective origins and a different history and which are, normally,
involved in systems which are different in their signification.
Etymologically the word Torah would go back, according to
specialists, to a root which evokes the idea of " to cast "
(as in casting lots, an oracle, etc.), the role of the priest
seeming actually to have been originally that of a consultant
who makes known the will of the gods rather than a sacrificer,
a role which could easily have been fulfilled by the head of the
family or clan. Hos. 6:6 relates the word Kahen not to sacrifices but to the Torah and the knowledge of God and his will.
Since God is consulted in the case of trouble or litigation, the
answers or judgments received before God in the sanctuary
easily take on the sense of decisions which, from our point of
view, are juridical decisions; the usage has repercussions, according to a well-known law, on the original (?) or etymological meaning of the word. Similarly, again from our own point
of view, the fact that Yahweh was consulted in order to
resolve problems of conduct gives to the instruction in question
a practical signification, even if the people involved, ignorant
of philosophy, had not even the faintest idea of the distinction
between speculative reason or truth and practical reason or
truth. Let us then avoid introducing into the Bible logical
precisions which do not belong there. Whatever their contents,
the tmot are essentially a teaching, an instruction, a doctrine

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

21

from God, and therefore every time God speaks to men in order
to reveal to them his thoughts, his plans, his wishes, there is
torah. In this wide fundamental sense we can clearly see
evolving under the pressure of practice the meaning of a rule
of conduct, of imperative practical truth. This does not diminish the fact that the Torah also contains historical accounts,
particularly the recalling of God's benefits, or threats, promises,
etc. And especially we must expect to see through the course
of centuries the sense of the Torah becoming more complicated
and enriched as the Law played an ever greater, sometimes
encroaching, role in the life of the people, particularly when
prophecy died out and there was no other voice than the Torah
to know Yahweh's plans; even more so when there was no
longer a Temple or sacrifices and when the Law became in
some way identified with all religion.
When the Seventy translated the Bible into Greek, the word
nomos 8 was already specialized in its different usages and
stood for the written law regulating the life of the city; its
etymological meaning with the connotation of distribution and
of allotment had been generally lost. But in the Jewish milieux
of Alexandria nomos quite naturally inherited the meaning
of Torah. It is not etymology but usage which modifies and
gives nuances to the meaning of words under the mental
context which clarifies their meaning and makes them more
precise. As much must be said for the later translations into
the Latin lex and the French Zoi: these words have their
own origin and history, but, introduced into a Christian,
thoroughly biblical language, they do not allow for the retention of the basic idea of instruction which was the meaning
8 Nomos, unknown to Homer, appears about the eighth century B. C. and invades
the religious, musical, moral and political spheres; it means a melody, a musical
style, a hymn. In religion, it is the order of ceremonies, the ritual, or one of the
ceremonies in the ooncrete. In morality, nomos is the principle of value recognized
by the entire social body and, ooncretely, it signifies good actions or the rules of
conduct. In politics, it is the public order, or the laws, or a particular juridical
institution. At the etymological origin of 1W1IW8 is found the idea of distribution
and allotment. Cf. E. Laroche, Hutorie de la racine NEM-en grec ancien (Paris,
1949).

JEAN TONNEAU

of Torah. It is not surprising to see Saint Thomas, who did
not know Hebrew but was nourished by the Bible, including
the most apt formula to introduce the theology of law: (Deus)
nos instruit per legem (I-II, q. 90, prol.) . I really believe that
the misunderstandings which have arisen from the study of this
tract stem from the fact that we forget or neglect the fact that
the language of this theologian is a Christian language, i. e.,
biblical.
For obvious reasons we shall dwell on the tract in the Prima
Secundae." Its structure is well-known. Having treated of law
9 First
of all, for a very practical reason: our teaching in fact comes from
reading and commenting on this text. There is also a deeper reason: the Thomist
work is the only complete exposition from the point of view of doctrina sacra.
Commenting on the Sentences Saint Thomas is not the master of his plan, and he
approaches the question of law in accordance with the occasions furnished him by
Lombard's text: in Book II, d. 35, the Augustinian definition of sin (" ... quod
fit contra legem Dei "), in Book III, d. 36, how charity contains the whole of the
law; beginning with d. 37, an analysis of the Decalogue; more particularly, d. 40 on
the ninth Commandment which forbids desire is the occasion for a comparison
between the Old Law and the New Law; the study of the sacraments in Book IV
occasions remarks on the sacraments of the Old Law, on circumcision and on
marriage. But the law is never studied for its own sake, either in its general philosophical definition or in its historical realization and its role in the economy of
salvation. Even more interesting are Chapters 111-146 of III Contra Gentes, a
very personal construction of Saint Thomas, very much involved in a highly
structured work and going into great detail. But this exposition, though certainly
theological, lacks the simplicity of intention found in the Summa Theologiae; it is
not solely doctrina sacra. Not that it is philosophical, but it answers to a
specialized task and reflects the theologian organizing the defense of revealed truths
against those who deny them, and this is done using arguments which can be
accepted by the infidels. It is therefore a work of theological wisdom, but a personal
and original work in the line of apologetics and not in that of symbols, of catechesis
and of other kinds of expositions prepared by a believer for the use of other believers
in order to proclaim in good order, as exactly and completely as possible, the totality
of the truths of the faith. Because of its date (between 1261 and 1264) this part
of the Contra Gentes has the additional advantage of being almost contemporary
with the Prima Secundae (1269-1270). In one sense the Thomist commentaries
on the Scriptures come closer to the point of view of the Summa Theol., the latter
having originated precisely to prolong, organize and adapt them to pedagogical
needs (" secundum quod congruit ad eruditionem incipientium " . . . " secundum
ordinem disciplinae "). It is then a greater unity of intention and not only a more
thorough analysis that we would like to see in the Commentary on Saint Matthew,
(nearly contemporary with the Sentences), on the Epistles of Saint Paul and on
Saint John (respectively contemporary with the Summa Contra Gentiles and the

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

28

in general (definition, kinds, effects), Saint Thomas in turn
discusses each of the varieties of law (except lex fomitis) which
he had enumerated in his general introduction. Thus we have
the following chapters: the eternal law, nautral law, human
law, divine law in its twofold expression of Old and New
Testaments. Historians tell us that this manner of organizing
a tract on law was something relatively new; it had been
inaugurated by Franciscans and particularly by John de la
Rochelle and was found in the work entitled Summa theologica
which bears the name of Alexander of Hales (John de la
Rochelle and Alexander both died in 1245) . The tertia pars
of the Summa of Alexander is presented (general prologue)
as a complete exposition of the Christian faith: " Tota christianae fidei disciplina pertinet ad duo: ad fidem et intelligentiam. Conditoris, ... ad fidem atque intelligentiam Salvatoris."
Thus it has already been treated from the point of view of
fides Conditoris; there remains the question of the Savoir: in
his person (Incarnation) and in the work of salvation (sacraments and glory) . This format is followed in the first part
of this third book. But, at the threshold of the second part a
new distribution of material is proposed under the title: De
legibus et praeceptis: Summa theologicae disciplinae in duo
consistit, in fide et moribus. The author declares that he has
already treated of faith (Redeemer), and he is ready to treat
of morals. Now in this respect, he says, it is necessary to
interpose precepts and laws, grace and the virtues, gifts, fruits
and beatitudes: precepts and laws "ut ostendentia debitum
boni faciendi et mali vitandi "; grace, virtues, etc., ... "ut
praestantia facultatem faciendi et vitandi." Actually this
second part is subdivided into two sections: De legibus et
Summa Theologiae). Finally, let us acknowledge the existence of more or less
elaborate reflections, scattered throughout the work of Saint Thomas, on divine
law considered in its precepts (In duo praecepta caritatis et in decem praecepta
legis) or as the ensemble of revelation (the two Principia de commendatione et
partitione sacrae scripturae, as well as various prologues to theological works
which delineate the mission of the Word as Wisdom who reveals God, enlightens
our paths and brings us happiness).

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JEAN TONNEAU

praeceptis, De gratia et 'Virtutibus, which form the second and
third parts of the whole of book three. The section de legibus et
praeceptis embraces a fourfold investigation (inquisitio): 1.
on eternal law; 2. on natural law; 8. on the Mosaic law, first in
general and then in particular in three sections: moral precepts
(in general and de singulis), judiciary precepts, ceremonial
precepts; 4. on evangelical law in two tractatus: de latione et
conditionibus legis evangelicae, de praeceptis legis evangelicae.
The whole tract on law was therefore clearly drawn up before
Saint Thomas. The Summa of Alexander, however, does not
mention human law and omits giving a universal definition of
law. On this last point Saint Albert will be the initiator. But
if we go beyond the mere comparison of matters treated and
prologues and heads of divisions where the author reveals his
intention, we notice that, in favor of the successive modifications of the plan/ 0 matters which should be presented under the
title work of salvation are henceforth entitled De legibus et
praeceptis. In order to justify this title it should be kept in
mind that all theological teaching comes back to that of faith
and morals, and that, the doctrine of faith having been begun
in the study of the Savior in his person (Incarnation), the only
thing left is to take up the teaching on morals, i. e., to speak
of laws and precepts, grace and virtues, gifts, fruits and beatitudes. While perfectly traditional formulas are employed, it
happens that, consciously or not, their realization takes place
in a perspective which is clearly moral. While expecting a
study of the economy of salvation, where law and grace were
placed in the context of the unfolding of sacred history, law and
precepts are given the function of putting into relief the duty
of doing good and avoiding evil, grace and the virtues being
that which gives us the capacity to do this. These considerations are certainly not false, but they keep us on the level
of moral.
10 We should not be overly astonished to see an author announce a plan which
he does not in fact follow; this is not unusual. In the present case, these hesitations
and new starts are probably due to the fact that the Summa of Alexander is com·
piled from preexistent works.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

Once we go on to the tract in the Prima Secundae we notice
that moral is not neglected, that the preceding considerations
are found once more, that the same matters, the same solutions
(more often than not), and the same categories are retained.
But the initial prologue, at the head of q. 90, serving as the
key and the framework, gives the tone to the entire piece and
leaves no doubt regarding the "economic" significance of the
tract. As the indication is circumspect and since the prologue
is usually badly interpreted, it should be reread attentively.
Let us be clear on what should be read and reread: it is
the text of Saint Thomas. In the present case one must be
wary of headings added on by editors, either at the head of a
question or in the table of contents. For a long time theologians believed that for Saint Thomas law and grace were
external principles of human activity; most of them considered
this so obvious that they never bothered to explain it; some,
such as Banez, raised doubts but believed that they had to
base themselves on the authority of Saint Thomas. Actually
the Common Doctor, precisely on the subject of human law,
which could more easily be looked upon as an external principle, says the opposite; 11 the legislator in promulgating the
law gives to those who receive it • quoddam interius principium
actuum." Besides, if the law is not confused with its material
prop support (tables of stone or of bronze, paper, the writing
itself) but is the reality which is reason of which Saint Thomas
speaks in the first article of the tract (with its precisions in
the ad 2) , we will wonder how law ever got to be called an
exterior principle. The text in the prologue is perfectly explicit:
it designates by name God and the devil as the two external
principles. Since the action of the devil was sufficiently treated
in the Prima Pars, there is no need to return to it. There
remains, therefore, toward the end of the Prima Secundae a
11 I-II, q. 98, a. 5c:
"Sicut homo imprimit denuntiando, quoddam interius principium actuum homini sibi subjecto, ita etiam Deus imprimit toti naturae principia
propriorum actuum." . . . The ad 1 compares the promulgation to an impreasio
activi principii mtrimeci quantum ad res naturales.

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JEAN TONNEAU

single exterior principle to study, God, who instructs us by
means of the law and assists us by means of grace. 12

*

*

*

*

*

It could be asked at this point if it is suitable to question the
fittingness, law notwithstanding, of taking God as an exterior
principle. But this time we are on familiar ground. We often
read in Saint Thomas that man is master of his actions because
he is capable of deliberation, that this deliberation is put into
motion by an anterior deliberation, and that at the source of all
this movement of which man is master the initiative necessarily
belongs to an exterior principle. The theme is treated ex
professo in the study de motivo voluntatis (I-II, q. 9, aa. 4-6);
it comes up again at the beginning of q. 109, a. 2, ad 1 and in
many other places as well.13 We can see in what sense the
exteriority of this principium movens ad bonum must be understood: as it often happens in the unfolding of the tract on
human acts, this exteriority is treated in relation to the voluntary (quod procedit a principia intrinseco). What we are talking about then is a divine effect whose initiative does not
depend on the human will; quite the contrary, it is the movement of the will towards the good which depends on this
principle of divine intervention. In the spirit of the Wisdom
literature, as in that of the prologue of St. John, there is no place
in this respect to distinguish between the different sorts of
10 A good point for Billuart basing himself on the text of the Prologue:
God
and the devil without further commentary. The case of Conrad Koellin is to be
noted: he faithfully takes up the text of the Prologue, but he adds: "quia tamen
non determinatur de ea (namely, of law and especially of the New Law) nisi quia
a Deo qui est extrinsecus, ideo tractatus ille vacatur de principiis extrinsecis." The
formula was therefore already accepted in his time (his work: Exposition commentaria on the I-II carries the approval of the Master General, Cajetan, dated
1511). This does not prevent the editor (1589, Venice) from beginning the tract
on law with a heading of his own invention: De principiis exterioribus actuum,
scilicet de lege in communi, quantum ad essentiam, which is an awkward formula
in every respect.
13 See the beautiful study of M. Seckler, lnstinkt und GlaubenswiUe, which has,
among others, the merit of tracing the sources of this doctrine, in particular, for
God and the devil, in Saint Hilary (p. 39). A meaningful connection between law
and the gifts of the Holy Spirit.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

27

" instruction," natural or supernatural, the normal conduct of
Providence or the historical event realized once and for all.
This is why the prologue to question 90 is perfectly proportioned to the contents of the tract. There is no doubt that it
deals with the entire Christian revelation realized through the
mission of the Word.
It is impossible to agree with those who suggest that Saint
Thomas was principally interested in human law considered
as the perfect type of all law and that he understood the
consideration of the Old Law and the New Law only pe1'
modum complementi, by playing more or less on the sense of
the word law and " not without artifice." 14 He did not admit
the concept of lex fomitis. Is it not more exact to think that
he chose to speak of lex fomitis because Scripture invited him
to do so and that he was interested in the Old and New Laws
for the same reason? Juridicism, if juridicism there is, is there
only for those who cannot read the word law without immediately thinking of Gratian or of Roman law.
We are therefore led to the question of the real sources of
this tract on law. At the same time we will notice that its
various parts are well-balanced. Not only is it noteworthy that
of the entire nineteen questions (90-108) eleven treat of the
Old and New Laws (98-108), but some of them are developed
to the point that there are none longer throughout the rest
of the Summa. It is necessary to approach the study of this
tract through the interpretations of commentators to think
u This is the expression employed by J. de Finance, Etre et agir (1960), p. 171,
note 80. And yet this author has the eternal law and the natural law in mind:
"L'artifice est visible chez saint Thomas quand il s'efforce d'appliquer a Ia loi
eternelle et a Ia loi naturelle une definition de Ia loi inspiree des Etyrrwlogies
d'Isidore et du Decret de Gratien." As a reference the author quotes for us q. 90,
a. 4 where in fact is found, in the sed contra, a text from Gratian: Leges instituuntur cum promulgantur; and q. 91, a. I where nothing is found, but that matters
little; in the same a. 1 of q. 91 we find a reference to Prov. 8:28 which is more
significant. It is strange that de Finance (Ethica generalis, 1959, p. 174) finds an
exaggerated juridical flavor in the Thomist definition of law in general! If we
take into consideration the quotations made by Saint Thomas as indications of the
drientation of his iliought, we will be furilier edified.

JEAN TONNEAU

that the intention of Saint Thomas was principally applied to
a philosophico-juridical study of law. Actually, it seems that
these commentators steal away when question 98 comes up.
There is, however, one exception of weight: in 15M3-1554
Dominic Soto wrote a work which was no longer a commentary
on the Summa but an independent book whose success was
immense and whose example was contagious, a De Justitia et
Jure, whose first part devotes two books to law: I) law in
general, the eternal law, the natural law, and human law;
the Old Law, the New Law, comparison between the Old and
New Laws, and the contents of the New Law; the third book
treats of right, of justice in general, of judgment, of divisions
of justice and in particular of distributive justice (since the
latter was not to be treated later). The second part of the
work, starting with the study of dominium, treats of commutative justive; it is the heart of the work. A third part (completiva), in three books, treats of vows, oaths, and the episcopate. The content of the first part has already been noted:
its first two books exactly duplicate and in the same order
the tract on law in the Prima Secundae. The work is obviously
that of a master. The third book admirably sets forth the
beginning of the tract on justice, always following the order
of the questions of the Summa (II-II, qq. 57-61). By deliberate intention 15 the author modifies the order of his exposition in
such a way that it clearly appears that law is the source of
right and that a law which does not eventually create a right
is an imperfect law, by a kind of reductive analogy. 15 "
16 "

Consultius tamen duxi rationem paululum mutare scribendi"

(D. Scoto, De

jusitia et jure Prooemium).
16 • If there is a necessity for renewal in the teaching o£ the tract on law in its
totality, the need is even more urgent for questions 106-108 in particular, relative
to the New Law. While these questions have always been there for us to see
whenever we study the Summa, this tract can be said to be altogether new, as if
it shared in the grace of novelty which belongs to the evangelical law. Altogether
new, most of all because it is practically overlooked by the great commentators,
Thomist or otherwise. Those who, like Billuart or John of Saint Thomas, comment
in the form of dissertation without confining themselves to the order of the articles,
omit it entirely. Billuart includes a solid tract on law but leaves out the Old and

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

i9

Now it is a fact that Saint Thomas did not make his tract
on law a part of the study of justice and right. This is
surprising. Some regret that the Thomist definition of law is
too juridical, others feel that the plan of the Summa does not
stress this characteristic enough and that the study of law
should show a definite connection with that of justice and
right, undoubtedly forgetting that, for Saint Thomas, law
"non est ipsum jus, proprie loquendo, sed aliqualis ratio
New Laws; John of Saint Thomas proceeds directly from the tract on the virtues
and the gifts to the tract on grace. Those who follow the text article by article
obviously cannot do likewise, but even they do not give these three questions their
just due. In broad terms, I find that they comment on this text I) without
properly situating these three questions in the whole of the Summa and, consequently, 2) without delineating the theological significance of this small tract either
as an element of the tract on law (where it figures somewhat as a rather pious and
evangelical appendix), or as an element of sacra doctrina in its entirety.
As for exploring the depths of this tract for its own sake, making a special monograph of it, very few theologians have ever dreamt of doing so. At first glance,
without having made a methodical search of the libraries, I find very few
theologians of the Counter-Reformation, Dominic Soto and Suarez, the first in his
De justitia et jure (see the text) and Suarez in his De legibus; paradoxically, both
of them use this tract against the Protestants, which leads them to interpret it
in a sense which, to be anti-Protestant, lends itself too readily to a juridical
legalism.
In the eighteenth century the Italian Dominican Patuzzi (1700-1769), in the
course of his anti-probabalistic polemics, ultilizes these questions in his Etkica
ckristiana (published in 1781), a work remarkable on many counts and pleasant
to read but still a bit forced or distorted by its preoccupation with polemics (I was
going to say partisanship).
More recently, the Franciscan Antonio de Monda has published an interesting
work entitled: La legge nuova della libertc't secondo S. Tommaso. It is indicative
of a renewal of the tract in the light of the progress made in historical and biblical
studies in our own century. However, the hill is a difficult one to climb, and this
doctoral thesis remains too closely attached to moral and psychological considerations (it is true that these considerations carry considerable weight in the spirit of
the times and that in their own way they contribute something toward the inspiration and sustenance of research) . The work concentrates on the idea, surely
correct, that the New Law is a law of liberty. But that this law has a role more
profound than that normally attributed to it today, that it has an ontological
character in the supernatural physics of grace, has escaped the notice of the author
who has not attempted to fmd among the predecessors of Saint Thomas and
especially among the Fathers a more developed doctrine on the New Law organically linked to the totality of the economy of salvation, and consequently the

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JEAN TONNEAU

juris," 16 where the term ratio needs to be clarified by the
definition found in the I-II, q. 90. Then we will realize that
not only can law not be identified with right, that it is not the
creative source of right, except accidentally and when the
legislative object coincides with an act of government modifying the play of social relationships in that which is called
positive law, but, besides, that law pertains to all kinds of
areas foreign to right.
Before coming to this point, let us continue to draw the
perspectives within which the tract on law is written, such
as we find it in the text of the Prima Secundae. A first impression is given by the citations found there. Without wanting
to attach to them a definitive importance, it is permissible to
expect from them an approximate view of the sources consulted
by the author and of his principal centers of interest. A brief
outline will suffice.
The quotations will be distributed in three columns: A.
Citations borrowed from questions 90-97; B. Citations borrowed from questions 98-108; C. The total of the two preceding
columns reflecting the entire tract. The reason for this division
is to bring out strongly the special character of the questions
of the Old Law and the New Law.
central meeting-place of the doctrines of the Trinity, of the Incarnation, of the
Holy Spirit, of the Church, of Revelation, and of justification by faith.
This tract on the New Law has been renewed not by the achievement of
Scholastic theologians but thanks to the lights thrown upon it by biblical and
patristic studies. These lights have become so alive that they have brought about
an awakening of the School through numerous articles in which Scripture scholars
have tried to cast evangelical doctrines so as to be useful for the Christian life of
souls. (A. Feuillet, St. Lyonnet, C. Spicq, F. M. Braun). In this they have been
authentic thCQlogians.
The bes• study available, not on the tract of the I-II but on the theology of law
in Saint Thomas, is that of a Protestant, Ulrich Kuhn, Via caritatis, Theologie des
Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin, Gottingen, 1965. Written in the ecumenical spirit
of doctrinal rapprochement among the various confessions, it shows a deep and
sympathic knowledge of Thomist thought.
18 II-II, q. 57, a. 1, ad 2.

31

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

Bible
Aristotle
Augustine
Biblical glosses
Isidore
"Jura " (Digest, juriscons. etc.)
Maimonides
Gratian and Gregory IX
Cicero
Denys
Jerome
Chrysostom
Damascene
Ambrose
Gregory the Great
Josephus
Boethius
Hilary
Peter Lombard
Basil
Julius Caesar
Ausonius
Ambrosiaster
Bede the Venerable
Cassiodorus
Hesychius
Pelagius
Pseudo-Chrysostom
Theodore of Mopsuestia
Origen
Plato
Valerianus Maximus

-A-

-B-

-C-

64
48
35
5
25
12
0
8
3
0
0
0
2
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0

660
48
52
28
7
0
9
0
5
5
5
4
0
2
2
2
1
1
0
0
0
0
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

724
96
87
33
32
12
9
8
8
5
5
4
2
2
2
2
2
2
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1

208

841

1049

JEAN TONNEAU

However unfamiliar one might be with Saint Thomas, this
table speaks for itself. His thought is definitely concentrated
on Scripture and relies principally on Augustine and Aristotle.
If it were possible to go into greater detail, we would find that
within Sacred Scripture the most frequently quoted are the
books of the Pentateuch (especially Deuteronomy) and the
Psalms; then come the Wisdom books, Isaiah, Ezechiel, Hoseah,
Job, and Jeremiah. We find about the same thing in Saint
Augustine: citations are taken from a great variety of works,
but two groups dominate, namely, citations from the Contra
Faustum and from the De spiritu et littera in questions 98108, from the De libero arbitrio and from the De vera religione
in questions 90-97. With regard to Aristotle, cited the same
number of times in both groups of questions, the references are
principally to the Ethics, then to the Politics, and then sporadically to the books of the Metaphysics, Rhetoric, and the
Physics. The privileged position of the Ethics and Politics is
possibly more pronounced in questions 98-108 than in questions
90-97.
On the basis of such evidence we are clearly invited to look
for the main inspiration of this tract within Christian thought,
i. e., in the Bible and in all the commentaries and reflections of
the Fathers and Doctors of the Church elaborated on behalf
of the faithful or to avert heresy and which they have transmitted to the theologians of the Middle Ages. In this respect
Saint Augustine and the scriptural gloss condense all the
essential elements of the data and the problems. With Saint
Augustine and the glosses, including the anonymous ones, we
know that the West received much more than what we ordinarily think has been the inheritance of Greek patristics,
expecially that of Origen. 11 But Origen himself, with his genius
17 Even the influence of Philo is recognizable in Saint Ambrose. But we have
far better documentation on the extent and depth of Origen's influence on the West.
On this subject see Jean Chatillon's research in the Melanges bibliques rediges en
l'kcmneur d'A. Robert, p. 537-547: "Isidore et Origene. Recherches sur Jes sources
et !'influence des Questiones in vetus testamentum d'lsidore de seville." It contains
a bibliography on the <-'Onsiderableand somehow renewed influence of Origen in the

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

33

and his extraordinary capacity for work, is not an absolute
beginning; we must go back further to Saint Justin whose
Dialogue with Tryphon already contains the whole theology
of the two Testaments including most of the biblical types and
their spiritual exegesis. We must go back further to the
Apostolic Fathers, especially Saint Irenaeus and, through an
unbroken continuity, to the exegesis of the rabbis and to the
spiritual universe which witnessed the maturing of the revelation of the Old Testament, in the land of exile, or in Palestine,
or in Egypt. It is there that we must now search for the
sources of the theology of law if we wish to understand the
genesis and the authentic sense of the tract in the PTima
Secundae.

*

*

*

*

*

The glory and originality of Israel was evidently not constituted by having lived under law or even by having looked
upon these laws as a gift of God; the same things can be found
among nearly all primitive peoples. That which is proper to
Israel, which characterizes biblical thought and which will
influence the New Testament, is a certain theology of law,
precisely that of the divine law. Now this theology, necessarily
posterior to the very existence of the law, took form toward
the end of the Old Testament under the influence of events
and under divine inspiration according to a movement of
thought and of reflection which is superbly represented in the
twelfth century. The role of polygraphers and of compilers in the style of Isidore
is particularly effective; sometimes we read without noticing it selected bits of
Origen in their collections and encyclopedias (preserved by anonymity). Even
more, "Isidore n'a pas seulement transmis a tous ceux qui l'ont lu ou recopie
quelques themes exegetiques isoles, il a contribue aussi et surtout a introduire dans
Ia pensee medievale une conception des rapports de !'ancien et du nouveau testament et de la signification typologique de l'Ecriture qui s'apparentait directement
a ce que l'exegese origenienne offrait de meilleur et de plus sur." Through Isidore
or through direct borrowing, Claude de Turin (under the name of Eucher) in the
eighth century, Remigius of Auxerre and Rabanus Maurus in the ninth, Bruno of
Asti at the turn of the eleventh to the twelfth century, Richard of Saint-Victor
(Allegoriae in vetus testamentum, in his Liber Exceptionum) at the height of the
twelfth century, the Ordinary Gloss which begins to take form at this time, these
are so many channels through which Origen was received by the West in bulk.

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JEAN TONNEAU

Wisdom books. This trend has been studied for some years;
it is not possible here to give the details, but it is necessary
briefly to trace its broad outline in order to clarify the theology
of law in Christian thought.
There have always been, in Israel as among all peoples, reflections and discourses of wisdom which take the form of
proverbs or of stories, of maxims or of parables. This current
of wisdom in Israel left written witnesses from the time of the
kingdom, especially of Solomon, which was an epoch of commerce and of administrative organization. Although there was
no antagonism in principle between the men of wisdom and
the men of the divine word, they nevertheless are distinct in
principle. It is eminently evident in Moses that the man of
the Word and the man of the Law go hand in hand; they
transmit to the people what they have seen and heard from
God's mouth; they are the men of the Covenant. The wise
man, in principle and according to the rule of literary genre,
communicates to his son or to his disciple the fruit of his
thoughts and of his experience; he addresses the individual as
such, is interested in his trials, the dangers he runs, his destiny,
and in this way his message of wisdom has an international
import. He takes on more importance and grows in wisdom
as he makes contact with nations, either during the Exile or in
the land of the diaspora. Wisdom, whose throne can only be
in God, who is the worker of creation and who is pleased to
dwell among men whom she loves, becomes like a grace of
divine revelation and, more than the Word to which she tends
to become identified, acquires a sort of personality very near
to God himself, while at the same time very much mixed with
that of man, of the people of Israel above all, since she has
chosen Sion for her dwelling, but also, through Israel, of all
nations. She is like a permanent manifestation of Providence,
of God's power and goodness; through Wisdom alone does
prosperity, life and happiness come to men. 18
18 H. Cazelles, "A propos d'une phrase de H. H. Rowley," in Supplement$ to
Vetus Testamentum, Vol. III, Wisdom in Israel and in the Ancient Near East,
1955, pp. 26-82.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

35

But before the end of the Old Testament, notably in Eccli.
and Baruch, this Wisdom which tends to become a person
meets with the Law. This joining is surprising to us, but we
know that rabbinic speculations had given to the Law a prestigious status with characteristics closely resembling those of
Wisdom: preexistence before creation, a directive and regulative role in creation, supreme gift of God, source of life, of
light, of prosperity, a pledge of God's presence, etc.
As Richard Simon remarked: " since those who composed
the New Testament were Jews, it cannot be explained without
a reference to Judaism." 19 After having looked just about
everywhere and especially to Greek thought for the alleged
sources of the New Testament, it appears that today a great
and profound continuity between the Old and the New Testaments is more readily recognized. Due credit must be given,
however, to the considerable influence of Greek thought,
especially after the dispersion of the Church in the Hellenistic
world and after the penetration of the Christian faith among
the educated classes of society. But the fact is that even Palestinian Judaism, and with greater reason Alexandrian Judaism in
permanent contact with the Gentiles, solicitous for apologetic
dialogue and proselytism, had received a great deal from
Hellenistic thought, as the Wisdom books among others testify.
We must also take into account the fact that Jewish milieux
were far from being uniform and homogeneous. The New
Testament would suffice for us to guess that, in a common
fidelity to the Law and to traditional observances, there were
schools of thought as different as the Pharisees and the
Saducees, Baptist currents, Essenes, etc. It is evident that
the young Saul, of Pharisaic upbringing from an early age at
Tarsus and then at the feet of Gamaliel in Jerusalem, could
not read the beautiful text of Deut. 30:11-14 without being
filled with reverence and admiration for this Wisdom become
internalized and identified with the all-powerful Word which is
19 Quoted by J. Steinmann, Richard Simon et les origines de l'exegese biblique,
p. 72.

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no other than the Law. 20 It is enough to refer back to the
books of exegesis to measure the influence of the sapiential
current upon the synoptic evangelists and, perhaps even more
so, upon Saint Paul, Saint John, and the author of the Epistle
to the Hebrews.
At this point in our demonstration let us not imagine that
the writers of the New Testament had the intention of developing this sapiential movement, to bring it to its term by searching, by finding in it the person of Jesus as a representation,
a historical and concrete incarnation. What actually happened
is the exact opposite, an historical encounter: " that we have
heard, and we have seen with our own eyes; that we have
watched and touched with our hands: the Word, who is life."
(I Jn. 1: 1) And for Paul, everything began also with an
encounter which happened to him. It is in listening to and
beholding Jesus that the Apostles were led to express the
mystery of his person and of his mission with the vocabulary
and the biblical notions of Word and Wisdom, bringing,
moreover, to term the development inaugurated under the Old
Testament in such a way as to conclude definitively: The
Word is God, Wisdom is God, because Jesus is God. If not,
the personification of Wisdom and of the Word would remain
what it was in the Old Testament, incomplete, a bold and
poetic metaphor.
The mystery of Christ, this is the resume of the whole of the
apostolic preaching. The word " mystery " means not so much
something incomprehensible as something hidden, something
which is precious to know but which needs to be revealed.
The mystery is in part linked to wisdom, which is also God's
secret that God alone can communicate. In general, according
to the New Testament, to know a mystery is to know (and
at the same time to receive, to touch) the benefits promised
by God, prepared for our glory (formula of I Cor. 2: 6); or
•• Deut. SO: 11-15. Cf. text on p. 49 below. A note in the Jerusalem Bible says
that this text is a source of the theology of the Word, such as it is expressed in
I John, after having matured in the Wisdom books (cf. Prov. 8: !l'l!; Wis. 7: 'l!'l!);
and Saint Paul applies this text to the word of faith in Rom. 10:6-8.

TEACHING OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

37

according to the more extensive formula of Eph. 1: 9: "He
has let us know the mystery of his purpose, the hidden plan
he so kindly made in Christ from the beginning to act upon
when the times had run their course to the end: that he would
bring everything together under Christ, as head, everything in
the heavens and everything on earth." This mystery is nothing
other than the Gospel (cf. the final doxology in Rom. 16:
" Glory to him who is able to give you the strength to live
according to the Good News I preach and in which I proclaim
Jesus Christ, the revelation of a mystery kept secret for endless
ages, but now so clear that it must be broadcast to pagans
everywhere to bring them to the obedience of faith. This is
only what scripture has predicted, and it is all part of the way
the eternal God wants things to be."
This identity between mystery and the Gospel does not
efface the nuances of expression: in the language of mystery
the accent falls upon the impenetrable depth of God's designs
and on the absolute gratuity of their revelation; in the language
of the evangelical message the point of view is that of men
who, until then, were plunged into darkness and to whom the
light comes, the good news of salvation, connoting the laborers
of the Gospel who have been charged to proclaim this good
news everywhere. But the content is the same, it is the totality
of all the good things which God resolved to communicate to
men in the silence of the centuries. This is a far cry from the
esoterica and the syncretistic mysteries of pagans; this is the
true connection with the sapiential teachings: it is especially
to the little ones, to the poor, to the humble, that, according
to the Gospel and as already found in the Wisdom literature,
the mystery is revealed.
These benefits, then, these things which have been revealed,
this good news, are not solely or especially what Our Lord
said; it is not so much a question of the words which he uttered.
It is not that alone which was promised and shown but indeed
Christ himself revealing in his person the whole essence of
the mystery. As we read in the Song of Zachariah (Luke 1:6879), the Incarnation is the culmination and the last word of

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all the sacred words which reverberated in the Old Testament;
all those long discourses, accounts and oracles which could be
written down, held in the hand, kept in cupboards or placed
upon the pulpit. But the word which sums up everything and
which says everything, the verbum abbreviatum, is the incarnate Word. He is the content of Wisdom's plan, the object
of the Father's complacency, or, as Saint Hippolytus of Rome
put it, to thelema tou Patros, the will of the Father, certainly
not a faculty but the summation and the entirety of what God
wants, the fullness of his loving kindness and the totality of
his promises so magnificently and so superabundantly kept. 21
In other words, Christ is not only he who expresses the dictates
of the Father in human language, he is not only the revealer
and thereby the artisan of our salvation; he is salvation, for
he is God's Word, that one which saves; he is God in person
with us, he who sums up every blessing and all promises. He
is not only the way but also the very truth and life.
At this point in our demonstration a problem arises. No
one can ignore the prestigious position of the Law in the Jewish
world and in the rabbinic teaching at the time of our Lord;
it is also readily conceded that sapiential thought had considerable influence on the New Testament, particularly in Saint
Paul and Saint John; it is recognized that the rapprochement
between the Word and Wisdom in the person of our Lord is
solidly attested. But if the Jewish milieux continued more
than ever to identify the Torah with the Word and with
Wisdom as being the full and eternal revelation of God, such
a promotion of the Law seems quite foreign to the New Testament and at the same time to the faith of the first Christians,
who, however, would have been nourished by this doctrine. 22
It could be remarked as an aside, however, that the entire
evangelical teaching could not be contained in the books of the
New Testament: "The world itself, I suppose, would not hold
all the books that would have to be written." (John 21: 25)
21 Saint Hippolytus of Rome, Adv. Noet. xiii; PG, 10, 819.
•• W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism, 1948 (new edition 1963), Chapter
7: The Old and the New Torah: Christ the Wisdom of God, pp. 147-176,

TEACHING OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

39

More precisely on what touches our problem which concerns
the relationship between the new faith and the Jewish law,
the New Testament teaches us through the pens of Paul and
of Luke (his friend and companion who saw everything from
the same point of view), writing during the crisis of the
Judaizers. Certainly, at the Council of Jerusalem in 49 Paul's
views in his quarrel with the Judaizers were officially approved;
James and John" shook hands with Barnabas and me, as a sign
9) but this liberating decision on
of partnership," (Gal.
behalf of converts from paganism in no way implied that the
other Christians had to break away from Judaism; it merely
imposed the duty to be tolerant towards them. John, in
particular, was among those "who intended to break away
from authentic Judaism the least possible." 23
Confronted with the Judaizers Paul also claimed for himself
an " authentic Judaism "; here the anti-Semitism depicted by
Marcion is absent; Paul is just as Jewish, and even more so,
then they are. (II Cor. 11:
Addressing himself to the
he upholds the advantages and the prerogaRomans (3:
tives of the circumcized: "First the Jews are the people to
whom God's message was entrusted," i.e., the law; the latter
is irreproachable, for if it is powerless to forgive sin, it is
because it never pretended to do so. If the Christian is once
and for all set free from the Mosaic law, it is not because the
latter has failed; it has simply done its time as it should have
and fulfilled its task of putting sin into relief in order to
bring out the gratuity of the promise and of salvation. The
Judaizers did not err in observing the law (which in any case
was impossible to observe) but in attributing to its observance
an efficacy for salvation which it did not have and which belongs only to grace. Those whom the Apostle combats do not
constitute the verus Israel which kept the "oracles" of God
which were entrusted to it. In these prophecies there is law.
not law as understood by the Judaizers but law at the service
of the promise now realized in Jesus Christ. There was a time
•• F. M. Braun, Jean le theologien, I, p. SSO.

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JEAN TONNEAU

in the life of the Chosen People when their blind fidelity to the
(Mosaic) law made them unfaithful to the promise. But this
official refusal must not make us forget the first conquests of
the faith within the Jewish milieux. Right up to the episode
of the centurion Cornelius (c. 48) there were mass conversions
among the Jews of Palestine or of the diaspora, including
Pharisees and " a multitude of priests." These converts from
Judaism were perhaps less converts than the representatives of
the verus Israel arrived at its full maturity. Their condition is
truly unique, never will the Church which springs up from
Gentiles ever be comparable to it, and we must await, to again
witness this plenitude, the conversion of Israel announced for
the end of time.
The first Judea-Christian community was made up of the
privileged elite which had without harm passed from the
promise to its fulfillment in Christ. Such was the case of
James and of John; unfortunately we know little about the
details of their teaching since "after having reported in detail
their exchanges of views, Luke centered his attention on the
missions of Paul. The role of John from then on is passed over
in silence." 24
It is conceivable that for Saint Paul at grips with the
Judaizers, or for Saint John writing after the fall of Jerusalem
and the complete separation between Judaism and the Church,
the word Law would ordinarily have designated the Mosaic
law, and even more readily, in a pejorative sense, the Law
would have been viewed as a temptation or obstacle on the
path of the faithful. And in the same measure that Judaism
was concentrated on the Law (the Law was everything for
the Jews), the opposition must have been even more marked:
The Jews have the Law, we have Jesus Christ! We must not
expect in this context to find the Law identified with Jesus
Christ. But pushed to an extreme, the opposition can be
resolved by substituting Jesus Christ for the Law, with the
functions and prerogatives of the latter (truth, way, light, life,
"'lfnd.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

41

food, salvation, sacrament of the presence of God, gift, grace,
revelation, preexistence, role in creation, eternity, etc.) henceforth ascribed to Christ; whereas the Jew glories in the Law,
the Christian glories in Christ, etc.
In the eyes of the Christian, however, grace and Christ are
superior to the Law, for actually the Jews were wrong in
expecting salvation from the Law. Saint Paul pointed out to
them that salvation comes from the promise, which is much
anterior to the law; it is the promise which is constitutive of
the Covenant at the service of which, consequently, the Law
was given. The novelty of the New Law, or of Christ considered as our New Law, is the union which took place between
the Covenant and the Law identified in the person of Jesus
Christ. It is precisely because the New Law contains the fulfilment of the promise that it no longer exhibits the relativity
and the powerlessness of the Old Law; in other words, because
the New Law consists essentially in the grace of the Holy
Spirit, i. e., in the " gift of God " which the " benefits promised
to David" prefigured, the New Law or the evangelical Good
News consists in the event of the death and resurrection of
Jesus, the fulfillment of all the promises. And since Christ had
to die, since "the death of Jesus was bound up with the institution of the New Covenant, it was normal for the Savior to
have been considered not only as a mediator signing the
Covenant in the name of his Father but as a testator who
leaves to those near to him the goods he now disposes of." 25
•• C. Spicq, L'epitre aua; Hebreux. II, Commentaire, Excursus IX, p. !l89. Thus
we see the connection between Covenant and law already outlined in the Old
Testament fully realized in the Christian economy; as for the idea of testament,
somewhat foreign to berith (for, covenant is broken by the death of one of its
contractors, whereas a testament gets its life and strength by the death of the
testator), it was foreign to Jewish thought until the penetration of Roman law,
but at that time it was designated in Hebrew by the transposition of the letters of
the word diatheke. This fact explains the use of diatheke for either covenant or
law, even the commandments or ordinations, and finally for the dispositions of the
testator as in Gal. 8:15-17 and He b. 9:16-17, a development which is related to
the idea of adoption, since the institution of heirs was equivalent to the introduction
of new sons into the family. See also A. Jaubert, La notion d'alliance dans le
judaisme aua; abords de l'ere chretienne (Patristica Sorbonensis, 6), 1968, pp. 811815.

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If then it is true that, according to the canonical writers,
the law, taken absolutely, ordinarily means Mosaic law, and
if the word law needs qualification as the law of Christ, or the
royal law, or the law of the Spirit of life in order to mean the
Gospel as a new way of life in Christ, it can also be stated that
in certain Christian authors, who are no more Jewish than Paul
or John but whose mentality and language further prolong,
through simplicity or through archaism, the language and
mentality of the synagogue, have a way of speaking about
Christ as law which accurately characterizes that which we
have called the Judea-Christian theology. The principal texts
showing this have been assembled by J. Lebreton/ 6 completed
and exploited by J. Danielou 27 and are now easily accessible. 28
There is no need for us give an account of them here; it is
enough to state here with J. Danielou that " the idea of Christ
introducing a new covenant and giving a definitive law was
current in the New Testament. But the importance of the texts
(which are considered here) is that they present a further
element, which is that they identify the Son of God with the
Law and the Covenant." " Christian speculation on the Bible
from the categories of postbiblical Judaism," such texts have
left their mark on ancient liturgical formulas. Later theology
used other categories, especially after Nicea, but these archaic
traces are still recognizable. They moreover draw our attention
by the obstinate recurrence of certain words, certain themes
and of certain biblical texts: wisdom, law, truth, principle
(reshit, arche, principium with the corresponding texts Gen.
1: 1; John 1:1 and Prov. 8:22 the old warhorse of the supporters
of Arianism). Considering the great freedom with which
rabbis, the authors of the New Testament and the Fathers in
their exegesis established their proofs, it can said that the mere
appearance of these words would be enough to evoke Christ
on every page of the Bible. The word Logos, with its am•• J. Lebreton, Origines du dogme de la Trinite, II, pp. 648-650.
•• J. Danielou, Theologie du judeo-christianisme, pp. 216-219.
•• These are passages from the Kerygma Petri recorded by Clement of Alexandria,
from texts of the Shepherd of Hermas and the Dialogue with Tryphon of Justin, etc.

TEACHING OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

43

bivalent meaning of Reason and of Word, should certainly be
added to this list; this should be remembered when embarking
on the Thomist tract on law.
After this review which is perhaps too long and yet perhaps
too concise, what is at stake and the scope of the tract can be
grasped. To tell the truth, it is not so much a tract, an
element of a systematized theology; it is plainly a question of
the first, and for a long time, the only article of faith; this
is why the Gospels were written and to which it was sufficient
to adhere to be Christian. This is the answer to the question
asked by our Lord: " Who do people say the Son of Man
is? " 29 That is to say, what does Jesus, the son of Mary,
represent in the history of salvation? There was no need for
preaching the existence or the unity of God unless the audience
was Gentile. As for the preaching of the properly Christian
mystery of the Trinity, it did not, at the start, have any other
form than the unveiling of everything implied by the mystery
of Christ. Even to the .Jews it was not necessary to prove
God's fidelity to his promise; it was enough to show that these
promises were finally realized and that the novelty of the
present situation, so long awaited for, was nothing other than
" novissime diebus istis " God has spoken through his Son.
The Good News is therefore, after the prophecy "multifariam
multisque modis " addressed by God to the Patriarchs and the
Prophets, the advent of the plenary and definitive Word which
is the Word incarnate. This dogma is not only the first historically, but it contains all the others, and the development
of the faith and of theology consists in deductions from and
articulations of this "revelation." Just as the word revelation
has two meanings, the act of revealing and the matter revealed,
in the same way theology will make progress by displaying, so
to speak, and by organizing in actu exercito in the course of
its tracts all revealed matters; but theology must also apply
itself in actu signata to the description of the very act of
revealing, the fact of revelation. It can be said that it begins
•• Matt. 16: 18.

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in that way, in considering Christ as the revealing Word of
God. The question now is about a tract de revelatione, even
though we would have some difficulty in recognizing it as such,
accustomed as we are to read under this rubric theses which
appear to be philosophical on the human dispositions for the
act of faith, with legitimate apologetical preoccupations. In
reality, before elaborating and putting in order the various
revealed truths, faith and theology are first of all struck by the
fact that God has spoken, that his Word has resounded, and
that this Word always has the realistic efficacy of the Word of
God; it produces what it utters, it transforms being by penetrating it to the core, it guarantees the Covenant, makes us
sons and heirs, it accomplishes all the promises, it saves. It
is this intervention of the Word of God that we must perceive
in, and needless to say throughout, this tract where Saint
Thomas tells us that God "instructs us through the law." 30
It might be objected that this is hardly apparent. Is a great
deal of good will required to draw such a conclusion from so
tenuous an indication as a short phrase taken from the Prologue? I will refrain from pretending that this objection lacks
any weight; it is enough to think of the many commentators
who, in effect, have never dreamed of drawing such a consequence from this little text; they have perhaps never given this
text anything but a rapid and distracted attention. The answer
30 In these conditions there is no need react with undue emotion to the reproach
frequently levied against the Summa Theologiae: the tract on revelation is
missing! We answer this objection in the same way we have answered (see infra)
the one concerning the alleged " absence " of Christ from many tracts in the
Summa.
In the valuable article of A. Robert, "Le sens du mot Loi dans le ps. 119,"
Revue biblique (1937), p. 191, I find a quotation of Grether which summarizes this
conclusion well: "Ainsi dabar s'entend de Ia Ioi mosalque conc;ue non pas comme Ia
somme des preceptes particuliers, mais comme !'incarnation de toute Revelation
divine qui, tantot ordonnant, tantot promettant on menac;ant, vient se presenter
aux hommes. L'unite de Ia Revelation est affirmee si fortement que Ia difference
entre revelation legaliste et revelation prophetique, entre dabar legaliste et dabar
prophetique, s'efl'ace dans cette unite" (Grether, Name und Wort Gottes im alten
Testament, 1934, p. 126). It is sufficient to remember that this revelation is a
progression up to the revelation in Filio, novissime diebus istis.

TEACHING OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

45

to this objection is complex and delicate but, we think, solid.
First of all, there is always good reason to take very seriously
whatever indications Saint Thomas gives in his prologues; they
are always well thought-out and significant, though under a
painless appearance. Sometimes they seem to be on a much
higher level and very remote from what is contained in the
tract which follows; but this is precisely because they dominate
it and, from above, relate it to perspectives broad enough to
clarify it. And this clarification is often very personal: to tell
the truth, one cannot be so sure that the order of the Summa
is particularly original by merely observing the sequence of the
tracts considered as doctrinal blocks. It is only at junctures
and articulations, at the transitions that original explanations
arise, decisive not only for the logical organization of the tract
but for the significance of its contents.
Next, it must be admitted that, although we are enjoying a
biblical renewal, Saint Thomas, nevertheless, was very familiar
with the Bible. However, the evolution of modern thought,
even within the Church, makes it very difficult for us to enter
into the mental world of a thirteenth-century author by simply
reading him. We will see later how this affects the notion of
law. But let us consider for the moment the word reason which
abruptly opens article 1 of q. 90. For us reason means something profane, and the idea never occurs to us (at least at
first glance) that behind this word lies what an assiduous
student of the Bible would almost unconsciously be aware of:
the Word, the Logos. Its translations are even more obscure,
for the system of words in different in each language. In a
Latin Bible it takes us a while before we recognize the Word
whenever the word Sermo is substituted for the word Verbum
[c£. St. Thomas, Commen. in Ep. ad Hebraeos, c. IV, p. 2
(Marietti, n. 217) ].
Furthermore, account should be taken of the fact that the
Summa is a summary for the use of students who in addition
were listening to the normal lectures of the Master of Scripture.
It is principally in the commentaries on Saint John, Saint Paul,
and on the Epistle to the Hebrews (in which the contribution

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of the Greek and Latin Fathers bear fruit) that we find the
complementary lights which illumine the skeletal summary of
the Summa. These commentaries contain more than a biblical
exegesis; they preserve for us a long tradition of disputes
Adversus Judaeos which go back to the origins of Christianity
and which were a very live issue in St. Thomas's time and
beyond it. On another front they were struggling in an antiGnostic battle in order to determine the correct path between
two errors, one which persisted in denying or misunderstanding
the divinity of Jesus Christ, a divinity which implied the
recognition of his salvific mission, and another which consistently denied or diluted the reality of his historic humanity
(" born of David ") . This polemic had been dominated above
all and for centuries by the genius of Saint Augustine. Even
the summary given in schematized form in the Summa bears
the stamp of this tradition. We can understand at the same
time how all the essential elements of the faith could, in
general, be reduced to these two points: to believe in the
divinity and in the humanity of Christ the Savior (De articulis
fidei et eccl. sacram., n. 598 ed. Marietti) . This is exactly the
echo of the words of Saint John: The Word became flesh and
dwelt among us, or of Saint Paul: God all in all, through a
unique and decisive intervention of God in human history. 31
Finally, without pretending to be complete, I would add
that the sapiential character of the prefaces and prologues
which Saint Thomas placed at the beginning of most of his
theological writings leaves no room for doubt; whether we
examine the prologue which opens the scriptum on the Sentences, or the dedicatory prologue of the Catena aurea, or that
of the Compendium theologiae, most of the time the same
sapiential texts traditionally applied to Christ are used. They
31 A unique
intervention but one which continues throughout the history of
humanity and which culminates in the Incarnation. Thus, with regard to the rite
of Baptism, we read in 4, d. 6. q. 2, a. 2, ad I, that the catechetical summary of
tl1at which is absolutely essential can be reduced to this simple expression: "in
quadam summa, ut scilicet videat (the catechumen) quomodo in quolibet statu
mundi Deo cura fuit de hominibus."

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47

show that Wisdom is not only creative but that it conserves
and perfects all things, especially spiritual creatures made in
the image of God. This solicitude is expressed in a teaching
which is light, life, happiness, and is a kind of completion of
creation in that it makes men the children of God. All these
words of salvation scattered throughout his writings seem to
be summed up in the unique and shortened expression (verbum
abbreviatum of Rom. 9: 28) which means in tum and at the
same time the Incarnation and the evangelical preaching, without prejudice to the synopses and compendia which the symbols and the works of theology offer of them. 32
82 The Commentary
on this passage from the Epistle to the Romans, 9:28
(Marietti, n. 803 and 804) is probably the best summary of this efficacia verbi.
The Gospel has a double efficacy, following the two epithets consummans and
abbrevians in aequitate employed by Saint Paul. Consummans, i. e., perfecting,
since the Law has brought nothing to perfection (Heb. 7: 19), but the Lord has
come, not to abolish but to perfect the law (Matt. 5: 17), 1) to the law as type
he adds the reality (veritatem); 2) as for the moral precepts of the law, he has
explained them as they should be, he has suppressed the occasions for transgressing
it and has even added on to them counsels of perfection. The Lord could then
rightly say to the rich young man: If you want to be perfect (he had already
practiced the commandments of the law), there is only one more thing you must
do, go and sell everything you have, etc. (Matt. 19: 21), and he could say to his
disciples: " You must therefore be perfect just as your heavenly Father is
perfect." (Matt. 5:49)
In the second place, the Gospel has the efficacy of being terse, and this conforms
well with the first type, for the more a word is perfect the more it is profound and
consequently simpler and briefer. Hence the evangelical word abbreviates the words
of the law, for all the figurative sacrifices of the law are in the Gospel comprised
in the one, true sacrifice in which Christ offered himself up as victirn for us (Eph.
5: 2). And he has enclosed all the moral precepts of the law in the two precepts
of charity (Matt. 22:40: " On these two commandments hang the whole Law
and the Prophets also ") .
And since in this summary nothing is lost or forgotten of the multitude of figures
and precepts of the law which are all presen·ed in the brevity of the Gospel, the
latter is justly said to be abbrevians in aequitate, according to Psalm ll8: 72, Omnia
mandata tua aequitas. And it is remarkable that (n. 804), wanting to give the
reason for this efficacy, the Apostle evokes the author of this word Dominus super
terram; it is the Lord, dwelling on earth as a man, who was to be this abbreviated
word, and to quote the text of Baruch: Post in terris visua est et cum hominibus
conversatus est (Bar. 3: 88), in which the Latin version has translated into the
masculine a common verbal form applicable to both genders but whose subject
is Wisdom; the latter, moreover, is identified with the Law in the following verse

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There should be no trouble over the fact that the teaching
of wisdom often looks vague and hazy in the patristic literature
and the biblical commentaries. In reality, thanks notably to
the De Trinitate of Saint Augustine, this theology has taken
a scientific form. In Saint Thomas the place for this study is
found in the tract on God and in the tract on the Trinity.
Its elaboration has involved a certain complexity in the heirarchy of laws. For the rabbis, the Mosaic law was at the same
time qualified as divine law and eternal law. Under the influence of philosophy, especially that of Stoicism, eternal law was
situated in the world of divine ideas which are the rationes of
all created things; the precepts of the eternal law are the
rationes agendorum. Often enough, for example, in the Contra
Gentiles, the expression divine law simply designates the
eternal law. So, it is only in the Summa Theologiae, at least in
the tract on laws in the I-11, that Saint Thomas employs a
more articulated vocabulary in which divine law designates the
positive divine law and not the eternal law. Nevertheless, this
properly theological elaboration maintains the reference to
Christ that we have recognized in the wisdom and patristic
literature. In the tract on the eternal law (1-11, q. 93, a. 4, ad
2) it is expressly stated that the Son of God was not subject
to the eternal law but that, according to the doctrine of Saint
Augustine in de vera religione, c. 31, the Son of God is the
eternal law instead, by a kind of appropriation. To clarify
this overly succinct statement, references could be made to a
few passages, especially from the commentary on Saint John,
where the influence of Saint Augustine is obvious.
In John c. 5, lect. 4, when our Lord says that "Every judgment comes from the Father," Saint Thomas uses an interpretation of Hilary and Chysostom which he develops in this
way: at the same time that the Father begets the Son and
gives him life, he also gives him all judgment, he begets him
precisely as judge, and that because the Son is none other than
(same text in the exergue of the Principium, Mar., p. 485). This theme of verbum.
abbreviatum is an ingenious way for the prologue of the Compendium theologiae to
introduce the matter, but is not without precedent.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

49

the conceptus paternae sapientiae; hence it is by the fruit of
wisdom that each pronounces his judgments. That the Son
is the Word, i. e., the conceptus paternae sapientiae, has been
established at the very beginning of the commentary in the
Prologue (c. I, lect. 2) when discussing" omia per ipsum facta
sunt."
Further on, in John 12:49-50, we are given a more detailed
explanation (lect. 8) : "For what I have spoken does not
come from myself; no, what I was to say, what I had to speak
was commanded by the Father who sent me, and I know that
his commands mean life eternal." All the divine commands,
we read, are in the mind of the Father because the commands
are nothing but the rationes agendorum. Thus, just as the
reasons (ideas) for all creatures produced by God are in the
mind of the Father, so also the reasons for all the things which
we should do are found there. And both of these derive from
the Father in the Son, who is the Father's wisdom. Saint
Thomas remarks that, when the Father commands the Son, it
is the same thing as begetting him. And a little further on he
explains that " his command is life eternal " by recalling that
the Son is himself the command of the Father, ipse enim Filius
est mandatum Patris, an assertion based on I John 5:21: Hie
est verus Deus, et vita aeterna.
One final text, taken this time from the commentary on Rom.
10:5 ff, will suffice. Speaking on the opposition between the
justice born of the (old!) law and the justice born of the
faith, Saint Paul recalls one of the most beautiful passages in
Deuteronomy (Deut. 30:11-14 very strongly colored by sapiential influences where the " interiority of the Law " is proclaimed:
For this law which I enjoin on you today is not beyond your
strength or beyond your reach. It is not in heaven, so that you
need not to wonder: "Who will go up to heaven for us and bring
it down to us, so that we may hear it and keep it?" Nor is it
beyond the seas, so that you need to wonder: " Who will cross the
seas for us and bring it back to us so that we may hear and keep
it?" No, the Word is very near to you, it is in your mouth and in
your heart for your observance.

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These vain attempts in the heavens and beyond the seas can
be recognized as the sapiential style and the mode of Job 28
or of Baruch 3:29 ff. Hence Saint Paul plainly attributes to
the Word of faith what Moses understood of the Law; and what
must be received in the heavens and brought down, or what
must be received at the bottom of the deep and brought up, is
simply Christ who has in fact come down from the heavens
and returned from the dead. Conclusion: the word is very near
to you on your lips and in your heart. Saint Thomas explains
this text from Saint Paul in this way without giving the
impression that the Apostle's exegesis is the product of a heady
boldness; he reassures his reader: "Nee est inconveniens si
quod Moyses dixit de mandato Legis, hoc Apostolus attribuit
Christo, quia Christus est Verbum Dei, in quo sunt omnia Dei
mandata."
All that we can permit ourselves to observe without doing
injustice to formulas consecrated by an elaborate (I almost
said stale) theology is that Christ or the Word of God is a
much more comprehensive conceptus divinae mentis: for if he
bears the ideas of the whole universe of creatures, he first of
all expresses the fullness of the divine Being; it is in this fullness that he contains the ideas of all that proceeds from this
creative plenitude. Furthermore, and this is the sense of the
expression eternal law, he bears the reasons of all movements
and created activities. Among these reasons there are some in
which irrational creatures participate passively and others in
which rational creatures participate actively (natural law).
Positive laws, both those which men make for themselves
(human laws) and those or that (according to an historical
development) by which God instructs men in order to guide
them on the way to happiness (Old and New Law), are derived
from these reasons. Perhaps now we are better prepared to
understand what the word " reason " means in the initial
mention made of it in q. 90: Utrum lex sit aliquid rationis?
Otherwise, we will see nothing but a scholastic refinement or
elegance ( ?) in the care taken by the ad 2 of Article 1 to make
a conceptus mentis of the law, purposely (by opposing it to an

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51

operatio), an operatum, a fruit of reason, aliquid per hujusmodi
actum constitutum, with the customary parallel between speculative and practical reason. What pertains to speculative
reason, the proposition in relation to its conclusion, must also
be said to pertain to practical reason, law in relation to its
operation, i.e., law is both an universal active principle and a
director of operation.
On this level, of course, there is no further obstacle to the
unity o£ the tract and especially the universality o£ the definition of law given at the end o£ Question 90.
II.

THE THO MIST DEFINITION

OF LAw

We think it opportune to introduce the next two sections,
which are very moralizing and the product o£ philosophical
analysis, by a summary discussion o£ the concept o£ moral
theology. Most certainly there is no question here o£ forgetting
that Saint Thomas attempted to group what he calls moral
considerations (I-II, q. 6, Pro!.) in the Secunda Pars. It was
this part o£ the tract on law which led moralists, at least the
vast majority o£ them, to look upon law as the indispensable
and ultimate reference £or discerning between good and evil
actions. 33 This placed the tract on law in an unexpected perspective and light, namely, o£ moral science, by suggesting that
law plays the role o£ pivot in morality. It was certainly not
Saint Thomas's intention to lead us down this moralizing road;
the misinterpretation occurs whenever the tract is read with a
frame o£ mind characteristic o£ those sciences which are formally moral. I£ it has been believed opportune to displace the
tract on law, it is because we have sought in it answers to
33 This is the reason which leads authors
of manuals to treat of law before
taking up the question of the morality of human acts, a strategem foreign to Saint
Thomas who sees in law essentially a doctrina taking into account that which it is,
a type of knowledge which plays the part of rule, since it allows acts to be
measured and directed as is fitting and not as a source of morality constituting
certain acts as good and others as evil. This formalistic conception, if we should
carry it into the realm of technical rules, would make us think that the goodness
of an omelet, for example, consists in the fact that it has been made exactly
according to the directions of the cookbook.

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questions which Saint Thomas never pretended to resolve.
What is more serious is to approach it with prejudices which
distort its understanding. Briefly, then, remember that moral
sciences-whether moral philosophy or what today is called
moral theology-constitute bodies of knowledge which not only
serve to direct practice but which are formally and methodically organized to give this service. But this is not, basically the
nature of theology; it cannot be defined as a science in the
service of practical living; like the faith itself, it is somehow
the environment of a living spirit; it does not dispose for an
end, it contains that very end; it is Christian wisdom, knowledge of God, meaning not simply discourses on God and divine
things but the receiving of God's revelation and imparting a
beatifying introduction to the life of God himself. That this
exercises a considerable influence upon human conduct there is
no doubt at all, for this is the case for every truly speculative
knowledge which is presented as a life in which the great
realities of end and beatitude are assimilated; but this type of
knowledge must not because of this be conceived and structured according to formally moral or practical bodies of knowledge in view of an end which is not properly its own. Not
only is it inappropriate to build a moral theology to provide,
as has already been pointed out, 34 an apprenticeship for the
ministry of the confessional; without falling so low, the very
idea of placing theology at the service of anything whatsoever,
even at the service of the Christian life, cannot be maintained
as such. It is true that the theologian has a certain role to play
in the Church, that theology eminently educates the faithful,
that it also defends the faith against errors. But theology itself,
understood in its complete Christian dimension, with the faith
whose rational and methodical fructification it is, is not a
•• In the article Tribut of the Dictionnaire de theologie catholique, Vol. XV,
c. 1588. Here is the interesting section: (If we wish to appreciate the true worth
of certain critics) " il ne faut pas oublier le point de vue et Ia tache propre de Ia
theologie morale: avant tout elle entend preparer le futur pretre a son ministere
penitentiel et le mettre a meme de ne pas manquer a la justice vis-a-vis de ses
penitents."

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53

school, preparing for the Christian life, it is itself the exercise of
the Christian life. Nothing is more dangerous here than to
oppose the doctrinal and pastoral functions: with what bread
will pastors nourish their flocks if not with that of the word
of God which they should ruminate and contemplate so
that the faithful, too, may ruminate and contemplate it. Theology is too tied up with the faith not to be, in all its parts,
like the faith, essentially contemplative. Faith does not prepare us for eternal life, it communicates this life to us, as
was said to us at Baptism. Of course, this does not preclude the
role of a supernatural synderesis; theology has certainly played
a part in the conduct of human life, and this is why moral
considerations are part of its make-up; but even so, theology
remains a participation in the beatifying mystery, an entrance
into the possession of the end (through faith, of course). Like
faith and by faith, theology (even in its moral considerations)
puts us in touch (gropingly, as through a veil, while awaiting
the definitive revelation or the unveiling of the vision) with the
term, beatitude, the end itself, beyond the reach of any " ad
finem, behaviors organized and regulated by the moral sciences
Otherwise, we would be led to understand that theology and
consequently faith could be put in the service of another end,
of a better end, higher and worthier than that offered us here
below through our knowledge of God and the mysteries revealed to us. There is a certain primacy of contemplation that
we cannot fail to recognize without ceasing to be Christian.
To return to the relationship between pastoral theology and
sacred doctrine, the pastoral function which consists in giving
just laws to the Christian people is nothing other than the
current application adapted to circumstances of the doctrinal
function by which the bread of divine truth is distributed. 35
35 This idea is expressed in a work where we would not expect it:
" La fonction
de regir le peuple de Dieu n'est done qu'un appendice de Ia fonction de l'instruire
des choses divines" (L. Boyer, La decomposition du catholicisme, 1968, p. 96).
The idea is quite justified, only the word " appendice " seems insufficient to me.
I would say that the essential thing in pastoral theology consists in the exercise
of the doctrinal function, but that it is secondarily extended to its applications and

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Assume, then, without further discussion since this would
take us too far afield, that moral theology remains indeed a
genuine theology. It is also true that theology, when it deals
with moral considerations, must be wary of the quality of
notions and arguments that it borrows from moral science.
The theologian must not be confused with the moralist, 36 but
neither must his work be compromised by accepting the services of any moralist whatsoever. Saint Thomas is a theologian
and not a moralist, but he knew what the Philosopher had
said in his Ethics, he studied it, criticized it, and made use of
it as a theologian "cui omnes aliae artes deserviunt." The
realm of morality is particularly dangerous in view of the fact
that it is of interest to everybody and that everybody, more
or less, believes himself competent in it. This realm is the
favorite dwelling place of ready-made ideas, accepted without
criticism, on the basis of unsuspected pseudo-evidence.
In what concerns his theory of law there is no need to come
to the defense of Saint Thomas; his definition of law has been
rightly accepted by all as excellent; it is hailed and admired
on all sides and is in everybody's memory. I quote it here with
the punctuation found in the Leonine edition:
QUAEDAM RATIONIS

ORDINATIO

AD BONUM COMMUNE,

AB EO QUI CURAM COMMUNITATIS

HABET, PROMULGATA

(q. 90, a. 4c).
Since there is no solid support for this punctuation in the manuscripts, it necessarily reflects the interpretation of the editor;
this particular one evidently represents an interpretation which
is currently accepted in our schools as the classic one. However, we must point out that all is not clear in this formula.
consequences at times remote. As for what pertains, for example, to jurisdiction
and the judiciary function, let us recall what Saint Thomas says: "unusquisque
per conceptum suae sapientiae judicat," and thus he sees in the fact that Christ
is Wisdom the foundation of the power to judge which has been given him by the
Father (In Jo., c. 5, lect. 4, Marietti, n. 768).
86 See I-ll, q. 7, a. 2, ad 8.

TEACHING OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

55

Should we excuse ourselves for going into such grammatical
minutiae, or rather admire the translators and commentators
who have intuitively resolved them without bothering to justify
their reading? Since this formula is given in the last article of
question 90 as the summary of the four articles of this question,
it might be thought that each member of this definition corresponds to one of these articles. The number four spontaneously
invites us to look for the four causes: the formal cause in Article
1, the final cause in Article
the efficient cause in Article 3,
while Article 4 introduces an existential or subjective consideration of promulgation, which is not without reference to the
material cause, namely, the subjects" affected by" this promulgation.
But this reading presents an anomaly. The phrase ab eo qui
curam communitatis habet, being logically related to what
precedes, leaves the promulgata isolated in apposition; the first
three parts would constitute the integral definition from the
essential point of view the whole being projected into existence
through promulgation. There is the impression, however, that
this formula is defective in that the first statement lacks a
verb: quaedam rationis ordinatio ad bonum commune, ab eo
qui curam communitatis habet. This is the way this definition
should be read, if account is taken of the contents of the
articles the formula is supposed to be summing up. In effect,
the author of the promulgation is not discussed in Article 4,
whereas, after speaking of the multitude which is a true cause
of law, Article 3 mentions this persona publica quae cnram
habet multitudinis. Nevertheless, to follow the natural drift of
the grammatical construction, ab eo, etc . ... has to be referred
to promulgata.
Translators are inclined to believe that the author of the
ordinatio rationis is the same as the one who promulgates. In
order to arrive at a grammatically correct and complete
sentence, they add a verb in order to sustain the logic of the
ordinatio . . . ab eo; there is then a certain verbal force in the
noun ordinatio; their is the idea of a putting in order by someone. This is the sense obtained in Father Laversin's translation

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in which he adds the word established which doubles the promulgated, the result being this: "On ordinance of reason in
view of the common good, established and promulgated by one
who has charge of the community." J. Kaelin's translation is
perhaps preferable for it is more literally exact: " An ordinance of reason in view of the common good, established by
one who has charge of the community, and promulgated." 37
In both translations it is obvious that quaedam simply becomes
the indefinite article une. In both these cases also-and it was
inevitable-there is no longer any question of the one who
curam habet multitudinis, the multitude itself remains in the
background; it could be sustained in theory that the multitude
has charge of itself because of its key position, but the fact is
that in Article 3 the one who has charge of the community is
a distinct person, an "official" personage, or as Laversin says,
a persona publica.
I do not pretend that my explanation of this text is new or
altogether satisfactory. It is possible, after all, that the text
itself is not perfect, either from the grammatical point of view
or as a resume of the content of the articles. It is definitely to
these articles that we must look for a sure and faithful understanding of the definition which pretends to be their summarization.
It can be easily seen that Article 4 stands apart relative to
the others; we read there that, if law is to have that virtus
obligandi that is proper to it, it should be applied to men whose
actions are to be regulated, and this application properly
constitutes a notification. This is an interesting idea, and it
agrees with the longer exposition on the study of conscience
found in q. 17 of de Veritate. We will come back to this.
Let us go back to Article 3. The title which we find immediately at the beginning of the articles in our printed
editions is borrowed, everyone knows, from the first words of
the first objection. The authentic title given to the article
81 Saint Thomas Aquinas, Des Lois, texte traduit et p7esente part Jean de la
Croix Kaelin, 0. P. (Paris, 1946), p. 88.

TEACHING OF THE THOMIST TRACT ON LAW

57

by Saint Thomas in the prologue to the question is De causa
ejus (sc. legis) . But the first objection opens the battle with
a lively and impressive formula: Anyone's reason can make
laws. To the question thus raised it is not possible to answer
otherwise than by acquiescing. Naturally it is not up to the
first one who comes along to make a law at the drop of a hat.
Saint Thomas does not contradict this, but it is not so certain
that our thinking corresponds exactly to his. If we are men
of our times, we make a distinction between the multitude,
which is subject to a law imposed from above, and the one
qui curam communitatis habet, namely, authority. Now Saint
Thomas undoubtedly granted that it did not belong to a
particular isolated individual, nor even to all individuals taken
collectively, to make law, but he did categorically affirm that
this legislative activity belongs to the multitude, for the decisive reason exposed in the preceding article that law has for
its end the common good, the good of the multitude; for in
any domain he who ordains for an end is always the one to
whom this end belongs as his own. I might add that Saint
Thomas does not stop here: the power to legislate, he states,
belongs either to the multitude taken as a whole, or to a person
whom he describes as persona publica quae totius multitudinis
curam habet, or again, aliquis vice gerens totius multitudinis.
In any case the principle remains: to ordain for the common
good of the multitude belongs to the one for whom the common
good is properly an end, namely, in the final analysis, the
multitude.
It is here that we risk losing the authentic sense of the
Thomist formulas we repeat so often. We quite naturally,
I mean spontaneously, believe that, faced with a multitude of
individuals in which each must seek his own proper good, i. e.,
his particular good, since the particular good is the proper good
of the individual as such, there must be above and beyond
this multitude of individuals one who has charge of it, someone
who is both qualified and authorized to legislate for the common good of this multitude. But such a schema leads us astray.
Such a prince is exactly the one who in a classical sense has

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been called a tyrant. For this alleged common good for which
he legislates is not a common good but rather a collective good,
that of a great number of individuals; even a complete assemblage of particular goods does not make up the common good;
what we call a multitude of individuals does not constitute a
multitude in the technical sense of social philosophy, i.e., a
community. We know that within the multitude each has his
own, individual subsistence; but what constitutes a multitude
out of this collection of individuals in the sense of a political
and social community is that, since each individual is naturally
endowed with reason, his proper good is not a particular good;
it constitutes the common good insofar as, independently of the
subjective limits and oppositions found among individuals,
there truly is a good which is common to all and which is
precisely the proper good of the human multitude, being
recognized and sought by every being endowed with reason
and following his rational inclination.
It is different in the case of a flock. The image of the
shepherd king, indeed, the idea of pastoral government, cannot
be held except analogously. The shepherd is authorized to rule
(but not exactly to legislate) over his flock because he is
endowed with reason; he thinks and ordains in view of the
collective good of his sheep, and when we see the flock prosper
in rich pastures, we commend such a shepherd and expect that
shepherd kings or ecclesiastical pastors will follow such a beautiful example. Now, the univocal transposition from the good
shepherd to the government of men is the tyrant. He is a
tryant not because he might be bloodthirsty and act brutally
(we assume that he is good toward his sheep and perhaps
becomes exhausted in the effort), but he is a tyrant because he
substitutes for the multitude in the conception and organization
of a collective good falsely declared to be the common good.
Classically it is said that the tyrant governs for the sake of
his particular good instead of for the common good; this can
be granted, providing that we take a cold view of things, of the
positive conception of the shepherd, but it seems that the
classical definition of tyrant no longer applies to the analogous

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59

conception, pious and romantic as it may be, of the shepherd
king, who precisely seems to act not at all as egoist and who
is all attention for his " sheep " who are his subjects. But it
must be clearly stated that even in this case there is tyranny
involved; for we do not claim that this particular good which
is sought and commended by the tyrant is an egostic good, but
it remains that the collective prosperity of individuals each
seeking his particular good is still a particular good and that the
conception and service of this good (even if it be the blissful
satisfaction of the subjects), being reserved to the prince who
makes it his business, is properly speaking the particular good
of the tyrant. This is precisely the way that we imagine a good
tyrant to be, not only an enlightened despot but one with a
generous, even sensitive, heart.
It is therefore not incorrect to say that the author of law is
the multitude, understood in the sense of the community of rational beings. This is verified even in monarchical regimes
whose pastoral form of representation should not necessarily be
interpreted literally but rather analogically, the basis of which
is the devotion the prince has for the welfare of his subjects.
Conversely, it should not be imagined that a democratic form
of government necessarily guarantees the success of the community and the intention of the common good; it can happen
that such a regime will result, somewhat mechanically, in many
particular wills which no common good can ever establish into
a community, wills sufficiently informed that each is aware of
the resistance of the others in order to avoid a war in which all
would suffer and to benefit at least from the possibilities offered
by the regime for an increase in the particular happiness of
each. All that is asked of the shepherd king, then, is that he
maintain a state of equilibrium, a favorable and enriching
milieu conducive to the profit of each individual. This concern
is therefore the work, the proper task of the tyrant, it is the
end which is defined for him; but since there is no genuine
community, it is clear that this proper end is the particular
good of the tyrannical government. Thus, to the extent that a
human collectivity fails to constitute a community (which

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requires more than the external forms of mutual tolerance,
discretion and politeness), it can only oscillate between anarchy
and tyranny; at times, the instinct for self-preservation makes
it prefer a tyranny which, if it is clever and efficacious, assures a
favorable external context allowing particular wills to live side
by side while avoiding conflicts and damaging infractions.
However, it is clear that this is not the proper good of power,
nor of individuals, nor even of the collectivity of individuals.
It should be admitted that this representation of a tyrannical
power, which adopts the idea and assures the promotion of
welfare in the collectivity without attaining a unity of views
and intentions which would constitute a common good and
make of it a " multitude " in the classical sense, is the image
which we spontaneously form of political power, so much so
that it seems to us normal and almost desirable. The legitimacy
of this power depends on a single condition: that it was instituted in some way by that which is called its base, the collectivity of individuals; nothing is more logical, since the
individuals entrust to political power the task of setting up
conditions for existence for all. In other words, we have here
again a lex regia, by which the people invests the prince with
this authority which, henceforth, as long as they continue to
consent to it, will properly belong to him. The normal rule,
in our estimation, is that authority should stem from the
collectivity, but it should properly reside, with power, in the
head of the collectivity, who will henceforth exercise it and
therefore legislate.
Now this representation effectively saves the empirical appearances and corresponds to the imperfection of political communities which history has described for us, but it does not
satisfy Saint Thomas. 38 Saint Thomas is not ignorant of the
•• To tell the truth, this is the reproach which a " realistic " spirit will make
against the Thomist idea: to make the multitude the proper subject of legislative
authority seems to disregard the fact that the " communities " are always more or
less divided, or as we modestly say, pluralistic. And is this not to forget that every
political regime which history has known has bequeathed to us an image of itself
corresponding to the schema of tyranny? The answer is twofold:

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61

practical necessities of life in society which often prevent the
multitude taken as a whole from carrying on its legislative
work; this is why he makes room for a vicem gerens totius
multitudinis. Still it is necessary to take into account the
massive fact of purely customary laws which ruled humanity
for thousands of years to the exclusion of all written law; it
clearly seems that the multitude was the cause of this; the
first instance of written law generally consisted in codifying
customs. But in any case, if there is a vicem gerens, Saint
Thomas does not conceive him in the sense of intersubjective
relationships according to the contractual figures of the mandate, of delegation or of representation. He is referring instead
to a specific differentiation of multitude, hierarchically organized in its being, so that certain persons analogically assume the
role of organs specialized for diverse functions. Whoever has
charge of the multitude is referred to as a " persona publica,"
which we should envisage, it seems, as the personification of
the community. 39 Thus, for the moment, 40 the head must not
a) We concede first of all that in a large measure the multitude is made up
of imperfect men who can never constitute a perfect community; it follows that,
to this extent, it is resistant to a political government, that it must be directed
by other processes than that of law and that there are definitely less laws worthy
of the name than there are of texts so designated in the official literature.
b) In the second place, it should be remarked that a political reality is only
known by us through the descriptions that are made of it; as these are imperfect,
more or less penetrating or complete, it is infinitely probable that in politics there
are realities which are not explicitly recognized and described and which would
probably be the most plain, profound and lived rather than explained; political life
would then be more complex and better on the whole, more human, than the
analyses and explanations of theoreticians \vould have us believe. In these conditions, we will not be too astonished at the rigorous, apparently unattainable,
requirements of the political thought of Saint Thomas. Understood in depth, man is
without doubt !,'Teater and more admirable than he appears to be in his superficial
and empirical manifestations.
39 The idea of person in this context
must obviously be understood in the
analogical sense. It is clear that in the proper sense all human beings, whatever
their social status, are persons. In social philosophy the term " person " is reserved for those who are active, or more precisely, for those who have voice in
community assemblies and whose acts make some impact, count for something
within the society. The force of the analogy is such that, on this level, some human
beings who are true persons from the ontological point of view are not conceived

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be thought to be a distinct person who enters into interpersonal
relationships with the community in a contractual way; undeniably there are such relationships, but they envisage the
" individual " who is vested with this function, an individual
for whom it is necessary to find a position in relation to the
community. We are now at a point which is logically anterior,
and we are considering the community in its head as in one of
its members who personifies it, because it is in him that it
affirms itself as a person, that it speaks, that it acts; the
other members are not so involved to the point that we can
recognize in their words and actions the words and actions of
the community. In the prince, on the contrary, the community
acts in the principal way, the community affirms itself as a
principle of action. 41 Certainly, it should be repeated, all the
as having a personality; in return, personality is accorded (this is the artificial part
or the fiction which belongs to every analogy) even to reasonable beings and
institutions whose counsel or agreement is imposed on others, i.e., who act (on
the social level actions are always operations which terminate in others and resound
in them). The point of the analogy, regulating and justifying its application, is
evidently that persons are recognized as principles of action and that reciprocally
everything which is a principle of action is recognized as a person. It is on this
basis that persons enter into social relationships: they oppose each other, adjust
to each other, they are subjects of rights, in brief, they are the "others." We
can see that the analogy was born and remains on the level of social transactions
and that it owes practically nothing, except perhaps its point of origin, to metaphysical researches on the formal constitutive of personality. We must avoid
ascribing to analogical personality a metaphysical reality which only belongs,
according to Boethius, to the rationalis naturae individua substantia, as much as
we must avoid reducing the metaphysical personality of persons properly so-called
to their social personality defined in terms of others with whom they enter into
relationship by their operations.
4 ° For the moment,
for we must not forget that we are living in the time of
social structure; it is evident, and it is even the most evident thing in our daily
experience, that once society is structured, with everyone in his place and carrying
out his function, persons will enter into relationships by the very play of their
activities: we will see come into being, in the distinction of agents, the opposition,
the equilibrium of distinct subjective rights, as well among the members of societv
as among each of them and society considered as a person having rights
them and intervening in their activities.
41 Tradition
recognizes a record of reflections revolving around the Principium
and the Caput (In principia ... In capite libri ... ) . The theme occurs often in
Saint Thomas, with references to Aristotle. It follows from this that every being
is essentially defined by that which is principal in it (I-II, q. 29, a. 4). Thus what

TEACIDNG OF THE THO MIST TRACT ON LAW

63

members act both by reason and will, otherwise there would
be only a herd and not a political community; but the other
members cannot pretend to play the role of principle of activity
in such a way that the community would be considered to be
acting in each of their actions.
We can now understand the sense of the alternative vel ...
vel ... given in Article 3; it does not imply that whoever is
in charge of the multitude is a transcendent subject separated
from the multitude after having been invested with authority
by it. There is in reality but one authority, whose proper
subject is always the multitude; but it can happen that this
multitude, few in number, remain relatively disorganized; all
the members can assemble, deliberate, decide, or rather, i£ we
remain faithful to the lesson of history, there is an implicit and
tacit consensus, but well determined and very firm, which
founds this form of law which is unwritten law or custom.
Otherwise in larger and more developed communities the social
structure will be different; certain organs will be consciously
recognized as having the power to legislate/ 2 in agreement with
men accomplish by reason is taken as being done absolutely and in the highest
degree by themselves (In IX Ethic., lect. 9, n. 1871). The motive in this is that
" unaquaeque res illud videtur esse quod in ea est potissimum, ut Philosophus
dicit" (I-II, q. 106, a. 1). This is then applied to the structure of the social
being: "Alio modo dicitur homo esse aliquid secundum principalitatem, sicut
princeps civitatis dicitur esse civitas" (II-II, q. 'i!5, a. 7). And again: " Unumquodque maxime videtur esse illud quod invenitur in eo esse principium; omnia
autem alia videntur ei quod est principium adhaerere et ab eo quodammodo
assumi, inquantum id quod est principium aliis utitur secundum suam dispositionem:
quod quidem patet non solum in ordinatione civili, in qua principes civitatis quasi
tota civitas esse videntur, et aliis utuntur secundum suam dispositionem, ut sibi
adhaerentibus membris; sed etiam in ordinatione naturali. Licet enim homo
naturaliter constet ex anima et corpore, principalius tamen videtur homo esse
anima quam corpus, quod animae adhaeret et quo anima utitur ad operationes
animae convenientes " (De rationibus fidei, n. 980).
•• It seems that, in French, words such as "legiferer," "legislation," "legislateur,"
etc., were very little used before the French Revolution; they have come strongly
into vogue only since that date. Now, if they etymologically derive from the Latin,
from a historical reality, it is not directly from the Latin that they have been
borrowed but from the English language; this enrichment of language is due to the
influence of the political ideas of England on the philosophers of the Continent.
Cf. Sten Gagner, Studien zur ldeengeschichte der Gesetzgebung, p. 57. This

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the multitude which gives its more or less explicit consent, and
even sometimes a tacit adherence to the state of affairs. But
it is not in virtue of personal authority that they do this; on
the contrary, it is because they are the organs of law that they
are invested with this authority, just as in a regime ruled by
custom the wise men and the elders who speak the law are
consulted on points of custom, and speak with the authority
which is attached to custom. Thus it is clear that this reference
aims at the multitude and that the authority of the multitude
can be none other than that of reason.
We will see what has become of this Thomist doctrine in
later history. Let us tum to the second Article. We do not stop
here for long, since the remarks already made regarding the
multitude as author or cause of law have led us to treat
sufficiently of the bonum commune of Article Q. Let us at least
point out that the expression " common good " is somewhat
obsolete, if not worn out, and that it lacks attraction for most
people. From one aspect this falling from favor is irreparable,
since we are forced to choose an absolutely universal and
abstract term if the definition of law is to be applied to all that
is defined in its innumerable varieties and species. If this
difficulty (which stems most of all from the lack of philosophical culture on the part of our audience), were to be overcome, it could be observed that the attractive reality of the
common good is a datum anterior to the law. It is not the law
which forces us to adhere to a desirable common good; without
this desirability there is no community, much less a law. It
is desirable for the audience to possess a certain maturity, an
experience of human life which will give them a sense of the
different desirable objects which constitute, at all levels, the
indicates, at least to us, that under the Ancien Regime, if not among the specialized
authors, at least in current language, the nature of the act of legislating and its
author were not hotly discussed. No one claimed to make law: the king would
mete out justice according to the laws of the kingdom, the judges, would render
judgment, etc. But the law was considered as a popular datum which was sometimes expedient to look into without proving the need to do so or granting the
right to do it.

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65

common good in which men will share because it is good to join
in anything which shares in reason. In the domain of action the
end is the principle, and the principle of principles can only be
the end of all ends, beatitude, i.e., God. No law, not even
divine law, can prescribe for us the obligation of adhering to
this ultimate end which is the principle of all law. In a profound sense the law does not create obligation, it discovers it;
if we are already obligated, related to God, no law, not even
divine law, can touch us or bind us.
Let us state once again that God who is the universal end
and the common Good of all men is the same God who is the
object of love. We ordinarily think of God as the sovereign
authority; this difficulty justifies a special section (III) . But
the question is actually about infinite lovableness, such that
in the order of integral nature all men would naturally love
above all things, that which we love out of charity in the order
of healing and elevating grace.
Maintaining all due proportions, the same thing can be said
of human laws; there is a priority of the common good over the
law. Certainly the requirements of the common good become
more and more contingent and complex as the communities
they are applied to are more particular; 43 it can be maintained
that the existence of good laws is an element which contributes
to the common good of the community. But this a posteriori
consideration does not obliterate the direct and fundamental
consideration, which is that the end is not the law but the
common good. It is the common good which is, in relation to
the law, a first principle.
The notion of principle serves as a transition to the first
Article. Remember its title: the law is "aliquid rationis."
This is a curious intrusion into what is supposed to be a theological tract. The word mtio is one of those which discourages
the translator. For us, in keeping with the current use of the
word in Saint Thomas, it can mean cause or motive, argument,
••" Bonum commune constat ex multis " (I-ll, q. 96, a. lc). This is precisely a
question of human law.

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the meaning or notion of a thing; again, it can designate a
faculty of the human soul, or an act of this faculty, or a certain
habitus of this faculty. The second objection points out this
diversity of meanings and contests that none of them agrees
with law. In his answer Saint Thomas makes a general remark
on the ambiguities of ordinary language. The same word, often
intentionally so, such as " construction," can designate either
an activity or the result of this activity. The activity ceases
when the masons leave the construction; and in this sense
construction ceases. But the resulting construction happily
remains. If we take the word ratio in the Latin sense of
calculation it signifies an activity which is performed, and, if
successful, ends in a result. The word ratio is also ascribed to
this result which has a durable mode of existence independently of the activity which produced it; this kind of calculation
served later on for an indefinite number of paradigms or rules
for other constructions; thus, once the value of 3,1416 has been
determined as the proportion between a circumference and its
diameter, this calculation made once and for all serves as a
tool, a rule, a measure for making other calculations. Hence,
and this is the starting point for the argumentation, given
what is not demonstrated but is universally accepted, law is
the rule or the measure of human acts (speaking here provisionally of that which is better known, the law which rules in
human societies, but the definition ought to apply to every law,
eternal, natural, divine). This is what is meant when it is said
(and it is said often today, so it is not very likely false) that
law binds us to do this or to avoid that. 44 We are then in agree44 Curiously,
authors have been stopped by this formula: (lex) obligat ad
agendum, and want to see in it a valuable teaching of the article. The logical
course and flow of the article clearly show that it is only a start; it is the first and
uncontested datum, in no wise elaborated, of what everybody understands by the
word law: it is something which obliges you to do this or to avoid that. Saint
Thomas translates this into his own language: it is a rule of human activity, and
he does not feel the need to push the point, since in the main this is exactly
what everybody means by the term. That this beginning is illustrated by a
recourse to the etymology of lex a ligando (a little further on, recourse will be
had to another etymology: lex a legendo) is nothing but a recourse to first and

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67

ment: law is essentially a rule of human conduct; there are
many kinds of laws, but that matters little: the word rule
covers a great number of things; a thing can be a rule in many
different ways. Thus if we are speaking of regulating human
acts, this, of course, is considered an appeal being made to
reason; this has already been demonstrated, and it is enough
to dispel all doubt to recall what man is and what a human act
entails.
More precisely, we speak of a rule or measure. While this
may be slightly redundant, the two notions are not absolutely
identical. Every rule is a measure but every measure is not a
rule. To measure is basically an operation destined to give
us knowledge of some object. This is valid first of all for objects
which have extension, volume, weight, or number, in short, in
the category of quantity; this is analogically extended, without
any special problem, to every kind of knowledge, whether
speculative or practical. And it is good to note that, in order
to measure, we make use of a unit of measurement which plays
the role of touch stone, of principle of knowledge. It is that
which is known previously and whose truth will found and
justify the knowledge of everything else in that order. It does
not matter much whether this truth be had naturally, as in the
first principles of reason, or be instituted through convention,
as in the meter or the kilogram; in any case we possess knowledge (sufficiently proximate for the case of the meter or of
the kilogram for which our imagination or senses have a certain
appreciation) which allows us to measure, i.e., to know, all the
rest, that is, all which in the same order derives from this
principle of knowledge. The unit of measurement enjoys then
a certain kind of perfection, first as unit and then as principle
within a given order. This remark is important, as we will
immediate insights common to everyone. We can therefore base our reasoning on
the above. What strikes me in this case is what little attention Saint Thomas pays
to the avenues opened to him by the etymology of a ligando if these avenues were
in fact of interest to him. It is obvious that he does not even think about them.
The important thing is ad agendum; to say that a law obliges makes no sense unless
we precise it further: to do this or to avoid that.

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see when discussing the notion of rule. I know very well that
the unit of measurement is often chosen rather arbitrarily and
that one cannot without caution attribute absolutely and in the
ontological order a privileged position to this unit of measure
rather than to another; there is no reason why the meter should
be preferred to the kilometer, considered in itself. However,
if we go beyond the realm of material mensurations and strive
to measure and to appreciate spiritual dimension, the unit of
measurement is the perfect; any given quality will be small or
great depending on whether it is nearer to or more remote
from pure perfection. But even in quantitative measurements
the choice of the units of measurement is not necessarily arbitrary; a certain technique will measure in terms of feet or
inches, or meters or kilometers, or light-years, or microns; the
reason for this is that techniques also are aliquid rationis. But
we are now dealing with measures which are also rules.
Among the things which need to be measured to be known
are our deeds and our operations; the measure in this case is
called the rule, which means nothing else than the measure
of practical intention which properly rules movements. 45 All
measures in moral matters are rules, because human actions are
considered as movements. Etymologically, to rule denotes the
notion of rectum, and consequently a rule can be looked upon
as knowledge directing us in the light of the principle which
rules the whole order of human actions, namely, reason. To rule
in the moral sense means, then, to introduce into those movements which are human acts the perfection proper to movements, the rectitude (whose contrary or absence is disorder)
which has reason as its unit of measurement, the principle.
There is no way, therefore, to escape the conclusion that if the
law, as everyone claims, is the rule of human acts, then it must
pertain to reason.
•• I leave aside as useless for our discussion the case of measures which share
in the nature of rules because, while being foreign to practical reason and belonging to a kind of speculative reason, their usage implies operations. It is to meet
the exigencies of these operations and to render them, in a certain sense, more
practicable, when it is not so simply by professional tradition, that different units
of measurement are chosen by different techniques or sciences.

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69

Having concluded with a rapid reading of question 90, we
see that the definition of law proposed in Ariticle 4 is at the
same time very rigorous and very comprehensive; it leaves no
types of law which merits the name of law in the proper sense
[except for lex fomitis which bears the name of law only in an
analogical roundabout way (indirecte); but it is not properly
a law SECUNDUM QUOD (lex) est regula vel mensura. 46 ] In fact,
it is only the authority of the Apostle which authorizes such
talk.
III. AuTHORITY OF THE LEGISLATOR AND THE BINDING
FoRcE oF LAw
Because the two problems originated together historically,
are logically bound together, and constitute but one and the
same difficulty in teaching, I have decided, for the sake of
brevity, to consider in one section both the author of law and
the problem whether law is the source of obligation.
The commentators on Saint Thomas today have difficulty
dissociating themselves from the modem idea that law expresses the will of authority. They are particularly careful to
justify the existence and the vis obligandi of law, to base it on
an authority transcending the multitude ruled by law. And
yet, historians for some time now have already done justice to
this anachronistic perspective. 47 From the historical point of
I-II, q. 91, a. 1c, and reply.
See, for example, the classical work of the brothers R. W. and A. J. Carlyle
(whose writings date back as far as
entitled A History of Medieval Political
Theory in the West, especially Vol. I for its beginnings and the Fathers of the first
centuries, and Vols. V-VI for the thirteenth century and the two centuries following.
Also important are the works of G. de Lagarde, especially La naissance de l'esprit
& 3rd ed. from 1956 on). Even more
laique au declin du moyen age
significant are authors who are in no way specialists in the history of political
doctrins but have an interest in some author of Christian antiquity, such as
Tertullian, and who end up by realizing that our notion of law is vastly different
from that which was prevalent in remote times.
Here are a few warnings given by the brothers Carlyle mentioned above: " We
are so much and so naturally, if not very intelligently, influenced by belief in the
existence of a conscious sovereign authority, of which law is the expression, that
we find it difficult to understand the state of mind of these ages when the conception
46

47

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view there is no room for doubt; even the theologians have
begun to take account of this. 48 Let us attempt to study the
problem by means of rational analysis. The idea which came to
light in philosophical literature much before it found its way
into the political and constitutional realm can be traced back
to a legal formalism already marked in Jewish thought and
even more so in Stoicism (chiefly in its distinction between
kathekon and katorth6ma) , and found again later on in Kant:
in order to obey the law in a perfectly virtuous way it is not
enough to observe its tenets because such conduct is good,
answers inclinations of nature and satisfies the reason; law
must be observed, without any reference to its content, formally because the law commands it. There is a certain nobility,
a bit forced but sometimes heroic, in this position; it has
attracted many. What is new toward the end of the thirteenth
of the sovereign, in the modern sense of the word, hardly existed " (A History ... ,
Vol. V, p. 42). "It is really time that historical scholars should recognise that to
think of the mediaeval king as in his own individual person a legislator is really
to misunderstand the whole structure of mediaeval life and society, and to read
back into it conceptions which belong to a later world" (Ibid., p. 462). " The first
appearance of the conception that the prince was the legislator was due to the
revived study of Roman law, but it remained till the end of the thirteenth
century merely academic and had no effect upon the constitutional practice of
mediaeval societies, and very little en political theory" (Ibid., p. 468). And here,
in what regards Tertullian, is the conviction of a specialist, E. Langstadt, Some
Observations on Tertullian's Legalism, in Studia patristica, Vol. VI, Part IV (1962).
I summarize: we project into the ancient texts a very particular conception of
law, the modern conception. Among the concepts which have never been criticized,
it is curious that the most fundamental appears in the theology of Tertullian, that
of law and the idea of God as Legislator. We are speaking of "law" in general
and in the abstract. But we always take this term in the specific sense of a formal
law, a sovereign will imposed by a sovereign power. This is not law but the modern
conception of law which, without crying " Look out! " has been received as the
general notion of law, by nature and by definition, in modern thought, i.e., ours.
Starting with this formal notion, all the rest follows with a strict logic, and we
come to deny to the religion of law every serious consideration. Law thus conceived
must necessarily rest on fear and on the hope of rewards as the only motives for
obedience; what God expects of man can be reduced to the precepts of law, and
thus we come to the acquisition of merit according to our good works.
•• Precisely on this subject, with the " Gerson case " and the quarrel between
Vasquez and Suarez, see, for example, L. Vereecke, Cl)nscience morale et loi
humaine (Desclee et Cie, 1957).

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and the fourteenth centuries is that this theory has, so to
speak, been given its letters of Christian nobility and has
become like a cyst in the tissue of nominalist theology. With a
religious sense pushed to the absurd, the omnipotence of God
(de potentia absoluta) was so insisted upon that this omnipotence was " liberated " from every rule other than the principle
of non-contradiction. Whereas the tracts on law, as we have
already seen, had been bathed until then in the atmosphere of
wisdom, henceforth they were inscribed under the title of the
perfectly free and omnipotent will of God. Connected with this
general position, let us note a consequence which is in no way
fortuitous: since liberty supposes the absence of every motive
which would bind it, its perfection consists in absolute detachment and a supremely indifferent free play; up to that time the
will was envisaged as an appetite which behaves with a certain
passivity, an attachment or a radical attraction to the good;
from then on, the perfection of this faculty consisted in not
being involved with anything so as to allow for self-determination in an entirely autochical fashion; it was no longer passive,
it was all realizing, effectrix, energy.
The moral good is no longer defined in terms of its active
attraction upon the will; this is strictly what our manuals call
physical good. To be moral, no matter what its physical reality
is, it is necessary and suffices that it obliges the will, and as a
will can only be obliged by the precept of a superior will and
ultimately of the divine will, it follows that the nerve of all
moral goodness depends on God's will. Not only is all that
God commands morally good (all are agreed on this) but
nothing is morally good except what has this title and is done
for this motive. Certainly, since God commands justice or
temperance, it is right to acquire the virtues which give us a
taste for them; but if it is good to acquire the taste for virtuous
actions, it is to help us to do them and consequently to attain
the unique moral value which consists in submission to the
divine precept.
The importance that the lawmaker has in this perspective
is obvious. Until then it was thought that all truth was good,

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no matter who uttered it. Now, at least with regard to that
truth which serves as a practical principle, what counts is the
authority which imposes it upon us. A moral life consists less
in being good and becoming better that in doing all that is
necessary in order to maintain good relations with the superior.
Outside the area circumscribed by the will of the superior there
is only moral liberty, i.e., the absence of moral good and evil.
Here ·again that kind of detachment characteristic of nominalist
liberty is encountered.
We have then the germ of modern moral theology: in
principle one is free (in the sense mentioned above); moral
begins with the notion of obligation, when a legitimate authority imposes certain restrictions on the natural field of freedom.
This is why this morality is founded on law, but on law which
expresses in a clear way the quantum of obligation imposed by
the sovereign. Hence the author of law cannot be the multitude, because the multitude is ourselves, and we cannot impose
obligations upon ourselves; there is no voluntary limitation in
the freedom of a will. The author of law should therefore be
vested with an authority that raises him above the multitude,
otherwise his claim would not be founded and his law would
not have the power of binding the multitude in conscience.
With an intrepid logic certain theologians marked by nominalism, such as P. d' Ailly and Gerson, concluded that no human
law obliges in conscience, since there is no human authority
that has the power to oblige in conscience. 49 They scarcely
received a following, but what response could be made to them
to preserve the force (in conscience) of human law? A detour
was taken: certainly, the human legislator does not have the
power of obliging in conscience directly, which would imply, so
they say, that he had the power to send transgressors to hell;
but he defines a certain positive order rendered morally good
by the divine sanction, which is then imposed on the conscience,
and whose infraction thus becoming a sin will be punished by
•• Except, of course, when authority and human law merely restate the divine
precept.

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God in the hereafter. This solution made of the human legislator God's minister, a thought which is not at all strange and
which is supported by many pages of the Bible; the lawmaker
is charged by God to complete in their contingent application
the solemn prescriptions of the divine law and of the natural
law. There was no pretense that he discharged this mandate
with a continuous and complete success, but, despite all his
limitations, the human legislator shares in the divine authority
and, through him, it is ultimately God whom we obey.
Basically, if we have been led to this apotheosis of the human
lawmaker, it is under the influence of an idea of law quite
different from that of Saint Thomas. There is certainly no
question of discussing the premise: law does oblige. Although
the Thomist definition of law does not mention obligation, and
although it is not even mentioned in question 9'2 (on the effects
and acts of law), the manuals, even the Thomist manuals, cannot keep themselves from speaking about it. If they comment
on the Thomist definition of law, they insist upon the word
ordinatio in such a way as to evoke the idea of order, in opposition to counsel; if they explain question 90, they propose a
theory much more subtle than the text of the Summa, in which
all the acts traditionally attributed to law (command, forbid,
permit, punish) are related to a unique act which they call
the formal effect of law, to oblige.
The nominalist definition of law, which I have taken from
Gabriel Biel, is unambiguous: " Lex obligatoria " (i. e., true
law as opposed to counsel) "est signum verum creaturae
rationali notificativum rectae rationis dictantis ligari eam ad
aliquid agendum vel non agendum." (Super 3 Sent., d. 37, q.
unic., art. 1, notabile lm) . In this view it would be possible
to maintain that law is an external principle, by definition in
some sense, since law is only a sign (it is not a first principle of
practical truth), and what it signifies necessarily is the thought
of the lawmaker (who is necessarily someone else, since he
obliges); finally, it is lacking nothing, what is signified is a
thought whose content is formally that the subject is bound,
i.e., obliged, to do this or to avoid that. In recto, what law

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says is that you are obliged, more precisely, that the sovereign
imposes an obligation upon you, puts you under restraint; all
that remains is to inquire about the extent of this obligation
and, as each one defends his own freedom, seeing that it
(freedom) is "in possession," it is believed that the limits of
this obligation will be duly controlled. As for the intrinsic
value of those things which are rendered obligatory, this is
especially the concern of the conscience of the human legislator;
he will have to account for the way he has legislated, for the
acts he has imposed, or for the abusive limitations which he
has imposed on his subjects. But for the moral subject (I mean
the one who sees things only from this point of view, no matter
what the orientations of his appetite might be, no matter what
are his likes or dislikes), only one point deserves consideration:
to know exactly to what he is obliged. Modern moral would
then be casuist and (human weakness impelling thither) probabalist, that is to say, animated by a perpetual spirit of
challenge to the law. Little by little, when the religious spirit
weakens, all that will remain of " traditional " moral is this
frightful paradox: instead of being the sign of the grandeur of
man "made to God's image," it will be the sign that man is
quite inferior to God (who himself escapes moral, since he has
no superior to oblige him). Law is then a shameful reminder,
and man will always believe that he is being freed, coming of
age, becoming God, in shaking off his moral obligations. 50
50 The accusation of alienation
articulated against morality dates further back
than today. In the I Sent., d. 43, q. 11, a. 2 Saint Thomas asks whether God acts
de necessitate justitiae or not. The sixth objection is very interesting: God cannot
be necessitated in his power by a created justice (for such a justice is not the rule
of divine operations), nor by uncreated justice, for the latter does not contradict
either the divine power or the divine will. This type of reasoning with its
cutting logic is perfectly nominalistic; the objection supposes then that the necessity
of a rule implies at least the possibility of a contradiction between the rule and
the power ruled. In terms of the moralist, a rule becomes necessary only in the
measure that there is at least the possibility of disagreement between it and the
will. Since obligation is a kind of necessity, we can see that the rule ceases to be
natural, becomes properly obligatory (or morally necessitating) when the will
resists, or at least when it is presumed to be capable of resisting, the rule. This
is also what Kant assumes when he sets pure will against holy will (Critique de la

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The fundamental problem is what is called moral obligation.
Certainly this notion does not play in the Thomist system the
role that it subsequently usurped. But it would be absurd to
imagine that Saint Thomas did not understand this term from
daily language and misconstrued its notion. Obligation is like
conscience; these notions are recognized and used, but when
it is question of a scientific determination and when Saint
Thomas is personally involved and speaks his own technical
language, he substitutes something else for them, or rather his
synthesis is built in such a way that these themes find no
particular place there. It cannot be said that the notion of
obligation is a false one: this would make no sense. The word
obligation arouses in the spirit the idea of something everybody
knows and which is quite real. To say that law does not oblige
is shocking to any good man; he will justly protest. It is as
if I were to say that the sun will not rise tomorrow morning.
In both cases (unless I am to be taken for a fool) I am
suggesting a false idea to my listener: the idea of a cosmic
cataclysm which would plunge us into endless night; or this
raison pratique, I, 1, § 7; I, 8). Saint Thomas gives the following answer (ad 6):
"Dicitur Deus non posse injuste facere, non propter justitiae suae contrarietatem
ad suam potentiam, sed propter injustitiae incompossibilitatem. Haec enim sunt
incompossibilia, quod Deus aliquid faciat et illud justum non sit."
There is perhaps a connection between the formalism of Kant, the trifle
case he makes of goods, of theso-called materialist morality, and the Protestant
attitude with regard to deeds. Cf. the Institution chretienne of Calvin
(ed. Belles-Letters, Vol. I, pp. 202-208). Assuredly, Calvin has cause for reprimanding the mercantile calculation of bad Christians who rely upon their works
according to the law in order to obtain justice; but this was no more the fault of
the evangelical law than it was of the Mosaic law; these bad Christians correspond
to the bad Jews. Calvin had been nourished by a theology which had lost contact
with Saint Thomas; we will see that, properly speaking, it is not law which obliges
us to accomplish certain works for the sake of reward; before the Law, there is a
belonging to God through faith, and it is this which obliges us to God first of
all and then to a conduct in keeping with the grace received. The practice of the
Christian law is only the employment of grace, it is not the cause of grace. The
study of the Christian virtues traditionally comes in theology after the study of
grace, of which it is the prolongation, the explicitation and the exacting manifestation. This is somewhat like the precepts of the natural law as related to the
rational natme which nature has given us. If the good tree yields good fruits, why
would these works, in which grace bears fruit, not be good?

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other cataclysm, not less frightful, of a law which would not
be the rule of good action. But if we explain ourselves, if we
raise ourselves to a sufficiently technical level, we will say
without shocking anybody that tomorrow morning (or any
other morning) it is not really the sun that will rise on the
horizon but the portion of the earth on which we live that
will begin to turn towards the sun.
Quite often, with regard to obligation, Saint Thomas speaks
like everybody else; he says that law should have a vis obligandi
quod est proprium legis (otherwise, what good are laws?). At
the beginning of Article 1 of Question 90 Saint Thomas starts
off with the banal idea, not false but common and not technically elaborated, that law, for everybody, is that which obliges
to do this or to avoid that, and consequently that law is indeed
essentially a rule of human activities. This is enough, as a
starting point, to indicate what the question is all about. But
the analysis remains to be had. Here it is merely a question
of knowing of what we speak, as moralists, in this atmosphere
which is not that of a bank, when we talk of obligation (qualified as moral obligation when necessary).
Etymology is not much help here: recalling the bonds by
which the Law of the Twelve Tables kept debtors insolvent
gives us the occasion to say that we do not wish to speak of
a constraint or a physical limitation of liberty. However,
there is indeed some analogical kinship between the two cases
and ours does insinuate (especially in the modern doctrine of
liberty) something like a limitation placed on liberty (we must
add, here again, moral) .
A friend has suggested: "The obligatory is what is imposed
hie et nunc, taking into account all the circumstances, and
what consequently is imposed universally whenever the exact
same circumstances are present." It is obvious that this friend
is a professor of philosophy and that he is not ignorant of Kant.
It is true that we do not deny the quality of obligatory to
universal principles which do not touch us hie et nunc; for
example, a celibate is quite capable of judging and declaring
that the rules proposed as obligatory in the Encyclical

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Humanae vitae are indeed so; they are obligatory, and yet it
is clear that they do not oblige in the precise sense of the word,
for they do not touch or concern him hie et nunc. We can even
say (even though negative precepts extend absoluately: sempe1·
et ad semper ... ) that these rules do not oblige married
persons hie et nunc at every instant but only when the question
is put. And yet, I repeat, for everybody and at every moment
the question is being put of knowing whether these rules are
obligatory. 51 Not only can it not be maintained that a universal
rule, because it is universal, possesses no vis obligandi, but if
in fact it does oblige hie et nunc, it is because there is already
some obligation (perhaps under a different form) attached to
the univeral rules. On the contrary, there is not less obligation, quite the contrary, in universal principles than in conclusions; but this allows us to proceed a bit further in our
analysis.
There is more truth, more necessity in universal principles;
but this necessity is not yet in contact with the act which is
itself always singular, without precedent or repetition. Here
we come once more to the idea proposed by Saint Thomas
when he approaches the question technically with regard to
obligation: it is a kind of habitudo, a contact, a position in
the network of circumstances, which causes the rule to enter
into contact with the act which is to be regulated; in a word,
it is the position "en marche," the application of the rule
hie et nunc. The fault of modern moral philosophy, when it
gives obligation an explanatory value, is to think that a rule,
provided that it is applied, provided that the human act has
not transgressed it, i. e., remains in contact with the act from
beginning to end, as does the hand of the pupil on the wooden
ruler when he draws a line, necessarily guarantees the perfection
of the act. Certainly, if the rule is not applied, the act is not
regulated! But if the application of the rule or the obligation
51 This was Abbe Oraison's contribution to the discussion of the encyclical during
a radio dialogue; and yet, neither the person of the orator, nor the place, nor
the other circumstances allowed for the slightest hesitation over the non-obligation
hie et nunc.

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has some moral force, it is because it is a true rule. If a pencil
carefully follows a crooked ruler, the line will not be straight.
We find here the same formalism already denounced. It is very
true that a rule is made to be applied, (quod est proprium
legis); but to stick to the application of the rule to explain
the morality of acts is to stick to the consideration (not the
formal but the formalist and therefore material consideration)
of submission or non-submission, contact or non-contact, obligation or freedom, all subjective and interesting considerations
but posterior and secondary. After all, if there is any technical
or moral interest in applying a rule, it is because this rule is
true, with a practical truth which calls for application, but an
application which would have no sense if it were not an application of truth. Men have long accepted the duty of applying
rules; little by little they have begun to wonder why rules are
to apply. This is the point where we are now. The situation is
not at all catastrophic. It is enough to fill the substantial void
which has left in moral theology a nominalist way of thinking
which is careful only to adjust the exact relations of conformity
and submission, relations, however, empty of all substance, of
all attraction for the appetite, since they were ignoring the
specific quality of the terms thus related. It is not for submission or for application of rules that the rational creature
hungers. It is for truth. Having said that, the rules which
instruct us in the truth will be loved and a joy given in applying them, because submission itself is based on truth.

IV.

THE RELATIONSHIP

BETWEEN THE TRACTS ON LAW

AND ON GRACE

We usually say that the Prima Secundae contains a tract on
law and a tract on grace. And immediately two things come
to our attention: first, that the most beautiful part, the very
summit of the tract on law, the evangelical law, consists
essentially in the grace of the Holy Spirit. Once we come to
Question 109 we pride ourselves on finding a tract on grace,
and we then make this second statement: this tract is really
too short and incomplete. What are we to think of this?

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Has not Saint Thomas given us all that he promised or are we
expecting from him what he had no intention of giving us?
His intention is manifested in the prologue to Question 90. He
does not announce a tract on law or a tract on grace; he wants
to tell us how God instructs us through law and aids us by
grace. But what about the content? How is the program
announced in the prologue fulfilled? The tract on law seems to
be complete; it may even contain too much including, as it
does, the important chapter on an evangelical law which consists essentially in the grace of the Holy Spirit. Actually, that
the law is a gift, a grace from God, is a thought which goes
back a long way, to the Old Testament; we are in the thread
of a beautiful and solid tradition, or rather we are at the
end of a long wait, and we are witnesses to the realization of
ancient promises; we have seen that this is precisely what the
Good News is. There is, therefore, not even for an instant, any
question of dissociating the tract on this grace which is the
evangelical law from the tract on law; this would be tantamount
to the dethronement of the whole Christian economy, the
divestment of its salvific significance.
Thus, it should be admitted that questions 109-114 do not
constitute a complete tract on grace; let us be logical. It is
not the tract on grace, since what is lacking in it is much more
than a mere accessory development or such nuances as can
be found elsewhere, as, for example, in the tract on the divine
missions. This tract, this so-called tract, is only interested in
the manner in which grace helps man to good, or rather in
which God aids man by grace.
This is no discovery: for a long time it has been noticed that
these questions 109-114 have been peculiarly dominated by the
Augustinian perspective in its struggle against Pelagianism.
There was no sparing of reproach for the poverty of this tract
for ignoring an aspect so dear, as they said, to Greek theology,
the aspect of grace as illumination, of adoption, and of divinization. We will be less embarrassed to recognize this if we
admit that Saint Thomas's intention was not to assemble in
these few questions all the elements of a doctrine on grace.

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The fact that we find in questions 106-108, under the title of
New Law or law of grace, an obvious part of the tract on grace,
has not been sufficiently acknowledged, as if we had remained
traumatized by the Pauline polemic against the " law " which
opposed the law of faith. Justifiably, Saint Paul is fighting a
Judaizing idea of the law, an idea which was an obstacle to the
" economic " unfolding of the plan of salvation; but Saint Paul
himself and Saint John after him, in meditating on Christ aE
Wisdom and Christ as the Word of God, show us that this
obstacle should be met and the leap taken. The progressive
convergence of the notions of Word, Wisdom, and Law, their
conjuncture in the person of Jesus, the need for safeguarding
the theocentricity of a Christocentric faith, all invite us to
consider the incarnate Word not only as the intermediary, the
word-bearer who transmits God's revelation, but also as the
epiphany, the theophany of God in a Word which "dwells
among us " to act in us as the Word of God does. From this
comes an ontological or entitative modification which makes
the new man, with the Son as exemplar, with the adoption, the
inheritance rights, and the communication of divine secrets;
the human act of adherence to this new covenant is faith in
Jesus Christ, but more than ever we should translate the word
Covenant here by diatheke in order to put the absolute and
gratuitous initiative of God into relief.
From that time we would tend to judge the notion of law as
insufficient unless care was taken of the biblical connection
between ratio and word in logos. Is it deluding ourselves with
empty verbal images to say, with so many ancient Doctors,
that the incarnate Word, received and so to speak mystically
begotten in our hearts by faith, is the key word which summarizes and brings to term the economy of salvation? One
would have to be certain of knowing" what the gift of God is"
to dare to contest it. Let us glean some more indications from
Saint Thomas. On the one hand, he writes that what is essential, the principalitas (cf. above and note 41) of the New Law,
what in it is principium, is the grace of the Holy Spirit who is
given by faith (106, 1); on the other hand, he writes that the

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principalitas legis novae consists in the grace of the Holy Spirit
who " manifests himself in faith working through charity "
(108, 1). Thus the principalitas which pertains to the grace
of the Holy Spirit (or again the Spirit of Christ, to speak as
Saint Paul does) is presented, on the one hand, as principium
of the New Law, which is to say that by faith the Holy Spirit
accomplishes his work in hearts by conforming them to the
First-Born, by divinizing them by a kind of spiritual generation
perfectly appropriated to the Holy Spirit as life-giver.
But, on the other hand, the same grace of the Holy Spirit
is presented as principium of the New Law insofar as it is
manifest in faith working through charity: under this aspect,
which is secondary and deriving from the first, grace is principium of the New Law understood precisely as law, i.e., as
rule and measure of Christian activities. Grace then can be
considered as a new nature (it is not a matter of Aristotelian
physics, but justice must be done to the second birth announced
in the Gospel, or rather to the Gospel itself) ; according to this
nature the New Law is indita homini 52 by an inherence analogous to that of natural law in human nature. Parallel to
nature, this grace is at once principle of life in the entitative
and in the operative sense; it seems that, precisely as law, it
should be understood in the second sense. It is in this sense
that it is rule for the activities of the new man.
Now if there is one point solidly affirmed by Christian
tradition and raised again by Saint Thomas, it is that, contrary
to the Old Law which announced a program of life without
giving men the interior impulse necessary to fulfil it (as if the
Creator had paused after having modelled in clay the figurine
of the first man and omitted to breathe into him the breath of
life), the New Law gives us this breath and in that brings us
""I-ll, q. 106, a. 1, ad
The translation of indita by internal is a little weak;
but if it were translated otherwise, it would not apply to the case of natural law
pertinens ad naturam humanam but could be said of the New Law, which is
aliquid inditum . ... quasi superadditum per gratiae donum. We could have said
" inscribed " in the wide sense if the article precisely did not oppose the written
law to the law indita: all things considered, inherent seems to me to be the least
poor translation,

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the indispensable help to lead effectively the kind of new
life which it delineates for us. Therefore, questions 109-114
should be considered as the continuation of questions 106-109.
We see there actually, in the Augustinian perspective which is
dominated by the anti-Pelagian struggles, how God's help by
grace is combined with the play of the human will, more
precisely on the level with free will, notably in that which
concerns the two crucial questions of justification and of merit.
In both cases the solution comes back to always giving an
absolute priority to the action of grace (which gives God the
initiative in the granting of the diatheke), but insisting (and
this is the key which permits us to escape contradiction) upon
the interiority, the immanence, the "radicality " of this action
as interior principle. The insertion of the principle is so
radically profound that it does not interfere with the unfolding
of human activity of which it is the source and which it
embraces by strengthening it on the level of a simplex velle.
Once this strengthening has taken place, the material program
of acts to accomplish or to avoid is hardly different from the
prescriptions of reason according to the natural law, since,
once the judicial and ceremonial precepts of the Old Law have
been abrogated, there remain only the moral precepts which are
known to be valid in any hypothesis " quia secundum se pertinent ad rationem virtutis "; 53 in that, the New Law is already
to a great extent liberating. But, it is especially liberating in
that, with the limited program which remains, it makes us
fulfill it more freely " in quantum ex interiori instinctu gratiae
ea implemus." 54 Let us note well that this liberty should not
be understood as the free play of a wheel gone wild. This
liberty is too deeply rooted not to be an intense and determined voluntariety, "ex principio interiori cum cognitione
finis." The libertarian error consists in thinking that the free
man is one who is at his own disposal, i. e., who has not yet
made up his own mind, committed himself to some end. Such
•• I-ll, q. 108, a. 8, ad 8.
•• Ibid., a. 1, ad 2.

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a man is not even yet able to make up his own mind by a
process of deliberation, because one can only deliberate in view
of an end which has hold of you prior to this deliberation. In
other words, one cannot hover between the world and God
without belonging to one or the other. It is a delusion of the
imagination that causes us to give a privileged position to this
vain and unreal indifference as if it were pregnant with all the
promises of the future. There is no future or promise of life
except for the man who is attached to life's source: Homo
quanto Deo magis conjungitur, tanto efficitur melioris conditionis.55 In this union which binds us, obliges us to God, God
has the initiative and the auctoritas of principle, for it belongs
to the Father who gives life. The precepts of the New Law,
isolated from this principium, are nothing but an empty letter,
and it is always opportune to recall this truth to keep us from
judaizing. But, under this auctoritas the precepts of the New
Law trace the kind of life and the condition which suits the
" reborn"; it is the glorious livery of the people of God, in
signum obligationis suae, not as a book of obligations but as
the manifestation of his belonging, 56 for "the Law was made
by the Word, old law new word, both coming forth ' from Sion
and Jerusalem' (Isa. 2: 3) , and the commandment has been
made grace, the figure reality, the lamb the Son, the sheep man,
and man God?." 57
JEAN ToNNEAU,

Paray-le-Monial
Franc/J

•• Ibid., q. 98, a. 5, ad 2.
•• Cf. II-II, q. 111, a. 2, ad 2; q. 185, a. Sc; q. 186, a. 7, ad 2.
•• Melitus of Sardis (second century), Homelie sur la Paque.

0. P.

LAW AND GOSPEL
LuTHER's TEACHING IN THE LIGHT OF THE DisiNTEGRATION
OF NoRMATIVE MoRALITY

S

INCE THE REFORMATION, the accusation has been
raised against Luther that with his original and peculiar
definition of the relationships between faith, grace, and
good works he has destroyed the foundations of Christian ethics
and has paved the way for a collapse of all moral striving.
Already in his " Sermon on Good Works " of
a time
when Luther was neither excommunicated or even threatened
with excommunication 1-he had to defend himself against the
insinuation that he slighted good works: " Thus it happens,
when I place so much emphasis on faith and reject faithless
works as I do, they lay it up to me that I forbid good works,
though in fact I will gladly teach the proper good works of
faith, and want to do so." 2 Even so, not until our own century
has the charge been laid to rest, that Luther, if not in his
1 This little book was written
between March and May, 1520, and, as we learn
from a letter of Melanchthon's dated June 8, was available in print in the
beginning of June. The bull "Exsurge Domine," which threatened Luther with
excommunication, was issued June 15, 1520.
• 6/205, 11; cf. 10 I 1/410, 14; 56/233, 20; 286, 7. These page numbers refer to the
complete critical German edition of Luther's works, Weimar, 1883- (called WA, =
Weimarer Ausgabe): citations are given according to volume (in given cases, one
must add half-volume and section: thus, 10 I 1), page and line. In these footnotes,
the line indicated will be that at which the text in question begins, and thus the
reader should understand "sqq." whenever this would apply. Besides the Weimarer
Ausgabe we have also 0. Clemen's practical school edition: (8 v.) Luthers Werke
m AU8Wahl (Berlin, 19666 ), which contains all of Luther's more important works;
and the Munich edition: Martin Luther, Ausgewiihlte Werke, ed. H. H. Borcherdt
and G. Merz, 6 v.
7 suppl. v. (Munich, 19483 ), reprinted 1962/1963. This
edition gives not only a German translation of Luther's Latin works but also a
modern German version of his German writings. Both of these editions, moreover,
indicate in the margin the corresponding pages of the WA, and thus also handy
reference to the citations.

+

84

LAW AND GOSPEL

85

intention, at least in his effect in the de facto order, did open
up the way for the modern decay of moral norms and solid
ethical convictions. 3 If we undertake to pass a moral theologian's judgment on this decay and to this end inquire what
Christian tradition has to say on the theme " Law and Freedom," then an investigation of Martin Luther's theology takes
on special importance. We must test out whether and to what
extent Luther's theology really does occasion and justify the
above accusation. And if not, then we should ask what judgment Luther's theology for its part would give concerning this
modern decay of normative morality: is it the bastard child
of an illegitimate union between his theology and modern secularism? Or is it the neglected, spoiled child of an authentic
Christian spirit brought to life by Luther? In which case,
possibly, just a little care and rehabilitation could offer this
child the chance for a new Christian generation.
The question we have raised would fit squarely under the
above-mentioned headings " Law " and "Freedom." Luther,
for his part, considered "Law " and " Freedom " as opposed,
contrary, antagonistic concepts: one need only think of his
programmatic document of
" On the Freedom of the
Christian Man," addressed in its expanded version to Pope
Leo X, a document which Luther scholars and church historians count among the "classic Reformation texts." 4
Thus, among Luther scholars our theme is treated under
precisely this rubric." However, "Law and Freedom" is for
Luther no fixed technical formula. The way we stated the
3 Cf. K. A. Meissinger, Der katholische Luther
(Munich, 1952), pp. 101-108. A
large number of examples from Catholic textbooks of Dogmatics is assembled in
A. Hasler, Luther in der katholischen Dogmatik. Darstellung seiner Rechtfertigungslehre in den Katholischen Dogmatikbiichern (Munich, 1968), 52 sq., 77 sq., 85 sq.,
96, 98.
• 7/20-28; following the Latin Yersion, 7/42-78. Also pertinent here is the "De
servo arbitrio," written in 1525 against Erasmus, 18/600-787, where at great length
and under many aspects the relation between law and freedom is discussed.
5 The most important
study in recent years on this theme is: W. Joest, Gesetz
und Freiheit. Das Problem des Tertius usus legis bei Luther und die neutestamentliche Paramese (GOttingen, 8 1961).

86

OTTO HERMANN

PESCH

question rather focuses our attention quite involuntarily on
another formula of Luther's: " Law and Gospel." If, as may
be presupposed here, the essential and typical note of Christian
ethics always finds expression in the fact that law and legalistic
behavior take on a pejorative overtone, as something to be
overcome, to be transcended-then, the counter-concept which
one sets up over against the concept "Law," and the very
manner of the opposition, will necessarily show forth our understanding and evaluation of "Law," on the one hand, and the
starting point of Christian morality on the other. For Luther
the concept opposed to "Law" is not "Grace" (as it was,
e. g., for Saint Thomas), but" Gospel." All the other counterconcepts, such as " Freedom," are of secondary importance. 6
Consequently, we can answer our question only by searching
out the meaning of this formula in Luther.
1. The Meaning of the Formula" Law and Gospel" in Luther's

Theology.
Our undertaking is faced with a two-fold difficulty. First of
all: this formula, " Law and Gospel," does not constitute a
single doctrine or treatise, as, for example, we can speak of
Luther's doctrine on baptism or the Last Supper. Instead, this
formula leads us to the very center of his entire theological
thinking. Luther himself often said as much. "Practically the
whole of Scripture and the understanding of all theology
depend on a correct understanding of Law and Gospel." 7 The
distinction between Law and Gospel is " the highest art of
Christianity." 8 " Oft have ye heard, that there is no better
way of teaching, preserving pure doctrine, than that we follow
the method, namely, that we divide Christian doctrine into
two parts, namely, into Law and Gospel." 9 Should anyone,
as, for example, Erasmus of Rotterdam, not take this distinc• For Luther, concepts synonymous with "Gospel" are "Verheissung"
ise ") and " Zusage " (also " promise ") .
7 7/502,84.
8 86/9,28.
• 89 I/861, I.

("prom-

LAW AND GOSPEL

87

tion to heart, he understands nothing of the Sacred Scriptures,
however much he might know about them. 10 We have here
expressions from the early, the middle, and the last years of
Luther's activity. They allow us to recognize the central place
of this theme "Law and Gospel." On the one hand, Luther
thinks that "Law and Gospel" fully sums up materialiter the
two statement-complexes of the Christian message; on the other
hand, he teaches that the distinction of "Law and Gospel"
shows us f01"maliter the way in which each and every statement
of Scripture and Theology is to be examined and thought
through. The Protestant theologian and Luther scholar, Gerhard Ebeling, is consequently quite right in his formulation:
"Law and Gospel " is for Luther the "fundamental formula
of theological understanding." 11
Thus the formula, "Law and Gospel," seen as the recapitulation of Luther's theology, opens up many lines of research.
Indeed the enlightenment contained therein, which our interest
in the contemporary disintegration of normative morality has
driven us to seek, is from Luther's point of view a problem
relating to the entirety of the Christian Gospel, not merely
of a "moral theology " pursued as a thing in itself. The distinction between "Law" and "Gospel" is, to begin with, a
hermeneutic principle, i.e., a methodological indication for the
proper interpretation of Sacred Scripture. A prime complaint
of Luther against the theology of his predecessors, leveled again
and again in many variations, is that their exegesis has made a
law out of the Gospel, indeed a more oppressive one than was
the Law of Moses. A classic expression of this view is the
well-known sentence from his " great Confession "' of 1545,
where Luther, looking back over his struggles as a reformer,
sees his Reformation break precisely at the point of his turning
10 18/693,

5; cf. 680, 28; 40 I/207, 17; 486.26.

G. Ebeling, "Luther: Theologie," in Die Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, v. IV (1960), pp. 495-520: p. 507. Further testimony of this is brought together in 0. H. Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas
von Aquin. Versuch eines systematisch-theologischen Dialogs (Mainz, 1967), p. Sl,
n. 5.
11

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OTTO HERMANN

PESCH

away from that confusion of Law and Gospel of which he
accuses Tradition. In effect, the aged Luther sees everything
as dependent on a correct understanding of Paul's expression
"the justice of God " in Rom.l: 17. He had felt himself forced
by Tradition to understand "God's justice," of which the
Apostle speaks, as the active, punitive justice of God. This
view, however, confronts Luther with the tormenting question,
" Shall it not then be enough, that the wretched sinner, eternally damned through Original Sin, should be afflicted in the Law
of the Decalogue with miseries of every kind? Must God then
even through the Gospel heap sorrow on sorrow and threaten
us in the Gospel, too, with his justice and his wrath"? 12
As a factual account of Luther's Reformation break, such
statements are to be accepted with a certain reserve, 13 but they
do show where the Reformer, looking back over his theological
life-work, places the accent and wishes it to be placed: the
Gospel (and after all Paul does want to preach the Gospel!)
is misunderstood to the point of despair when one conceives
it as serving the same function as the Law, indeed as intensifying the working of the Law. The distinction between Law and
Gospel, consequently, alone makes Scripture clear and shows
forth its message as a saving, liberating word. 14
Secondly, the distinction between Law and Gospel takes on
in this light a direct dogmatic significance. We make contact
here with the doctrine on the justification of the sinner, which
for Luther, as everyone knows, is the "articulus stantis et
cadentis ecclesiae." 15 If the sinner is justified before God, not
54/185, 30.
Not to be overlooked is the scholarly discussion focused on this text since the
beginning of the century. Cf. 0. H. Pesch, "Zur Frage nach Luthers reforrnatorischer Wende. Ergebnisse und Probleme der Diskussion urn Ernst Bizer, Fides ex
auditu," in Catholica 20 (1966), 216-243, 264-280. The most important contri·
butions to the discussion are reprinted in B. Lohse, ed., Der Durchbruch der reformatori;when Erkenntnis bei Luther (Darmstadt, 1968).
u Luther's theological impulses are detectible and have their effect even on into
modern Protestant answers to actual moral problems. As a typic-al example, one
might take the Protestant position on divorce and remarriage.
15 40 III/352, 3; cf. 39 I/205, 2; 40 I/33, 16; 50/199, 22. One begins to see how
all hangs together; if the doctrine on justification is the " articulus stantis et
12

13

LAW AND GOSPEL

89

through the law but through its opposite, the Gospel, then
the sinner is not justified through that which the law demands,
namely, works, but through the very opposite of this: through
his being set free from the works demanded by the law, that is,
through pure grace, which man must allow himself to accept as
a gift, without seeking to make any payment. Thus from
"Law and Gospel" a path leads directly to those "particula
exclusiva" of the Reformation:
" solus Christus," " solus
Deus," " sola gratia."
And yet the precise point of Luther's teaching on justification
is by no means adequately labled with the formula " sola
gratia," unless we add thereto " sola fides ": this also follows
logically from the distinction between Law and Gospel. For
one thing, this is so because " faith " for Luther means precisely
this: to let oneself accept a gift and to renounce self-justificatory works, the "fulfillment of the Law." We will come back
to this aspect. 16 But "faith" is also man's response to the
" Word." Thus, seen as a consequence of the distinction between Law and Grace, the "sola fides" implies the fundamental affirmation that salvation and forgiveness of sin are
communicated to man through the Word, and still further,
that the Gospel itself is in fact the promise and proclamation
of forgiveness of sins and of God's grace and mercy. From this
follows notable consequences for understanding the salvific
effectiveness of the Sacraments: Luther bitterly defended the
sacraments against the Zwinglians and those other dissident
Reform groups, whom he himself calls "Schwarmer" (vision(fanatics), and against any dearies) or "Schwarmgeister"
valuation of the Sacraments he appealed to the fact of their
establishment by Christ. But he emphasized, against the halfmagical sacramental usages of his time (which he wrongly
identified with Catholic tradition) , that salvation lay only in
the relation of God's word and man's faith-response, and that
cadentis ecclesiae," and yet the distinction between Law and Gospel is " the highest
art in Christianity," then, if both are to hold true together, the entire teaching ou
justification must be summarily included in "Law and Gospel."
•• lnfm, p. 94.

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OTTO

PESCH

one could rightly understand the Sacraments only by seeing in
them a Christ-founded institution in which this relationship
is brought about. 11
It is impossible for us to pursue all these considerations in
the present article. We had to mention them, however, so as to
avoid in what follows the fallacy of taking the part for the
whole. If there is ever a case of the part being intelligible only
in the light of the whole, this is true in the case of Luther.
Consequences that initially shock us, when seen in the context
of the whole, appear convincing and almost self-evident. Given
a grasp of a certain few basic premises, the conclusions seem
altogether simple and direct: once we concede a Christian
legitimacy to these basic premises, we can no longer avoid
their consequences. It is just this which makes our dialogue
with Luther so fascinating and stimulating.
The particular aspect of the "Law and Gospel" formula of
concern to us here may be designated: Freedom and Obligation. We must recognize from the outset that one can refuse
to hear Luther on this subject only if he considers any Catholic
confrontation with the decisive statements of Luther's theology
as fruitless and illegitimate.
A second difficulty confronting us is bound up with the
question: where can we find Luther's authentic conception of
"Law and Gospel " ? Unlike a Thomas Aquinas, for example,
Luther wrote no Summa Theologiae at the end of his life that
might have systematized his thought and provided us with a
standard source for his definitive teaching. Quite the contrary,
the writings of Luther's last years, from 1580-1545 or thereabouts, should in no sense be seen as tying together or putting
precise finishing touches to Luther's thought. The polemical
writings of this period are aimed chiefly at defending positions
he had reached long ago against opponents in his own camp;
the disputations and class lectures of this period seek to impart
to a second generation of Reformed theologians, in easy-tograsp classroom style, a theology thought out long before. The
17

Cf. Pesch, Theologie der Rechtfertigung, pp. 326 sqq.

LAW AND GOSPEL

91

claims made on him by problems of church politics no longer
allowed Luther the leisure he had enjoyed in early years to
prepare his lectures. Add to this that on the whole the greatest
part of Luther's published works represent transcriptions of
his oral conferences in the pulpit or the classroom and that the
reliability of the transcription varies, depending on who is
responsible for the same. With all this in mind it can be appreciated easily enough how difficult it will be to give Luther's
doctrine on any particular point with critical certitude and how
tremendous are the methodological problems confronting historico-critical Luther scholarship. Fortunately, in the "Law
and Gospel " questions we do not labor under the full weight
of these difficulties. Above all, we are spared the most difficult
of all the questions involved here, that of Luther's "Reformation break": in other words, that of the date after which
Luther had so clearly stated his Reformed positions that the
Church (at least that of the sixteenth century) would be no
longer willing to recognize him as orthodox. 18 It is methodologically evident that whatever Luther had to say before this
point in time cannot be regarded as evidence for his Reformed
Theology but rather must be measured for their " Lutheran
authenticity " against the unequivocally Reformational statements. Now if the assignment of this date in current research
varies between 1512 and 1518, by the same token the source
value of Luther's important earlier writings, notably the First
Commentary on the Psalms (1513/15) , the Commentary on
Romans (1515/16), and even the documents of the Indulgence
controversy (1517/1518) , is equally controverted. In terms of
the question of" Law and Gospel" we get around this difficulty
in that, as the research reveals, the content of the formula
appears early enough in Luther's writings, but the technical
elaboration and application of this formula as the " basic
formula of theological understanding " is first discernable after
the latest cut-off date of the "Reformation break," namely,
after 1518.19 Moreover, Luther, fortunately for us, was com18
19

Cf. n. 13 supra.
On this, see G. Ebeling, " Die Anfiinge von Luthers Hermeneutik," in Zeitschr.

OTTO HERMANN

PESCH

pelled at every stage of his teaching career to speak out on
the " Law and Gospel " theme, so that in view of the theme,
the audience, and the opponents of the moment, everything
conspired to clarify the problem in a precise and exhaustive
way.
Thus we have first-class sources for Luther's " Law and
Gospel " theology at our disposal, unshadowed by any literarycritical problem, namely, the two Commentaries on Galatians
(the so-called "small" Galatians Commentary of 1519) and
the " great" Commentary on Galatians, presented as a course
in 1531 and published with alterations in 1538/ 0 the" De Servo
Arbitrio " (1525) / 1 and the three disputations against the
"Antinomians" (1532/38) ,22 to which we can add sermons on
pertinent Scripture texts. 23 Guided by these texts, and basing
ourselves on the intense research effort they have provoked,
we can in the following pages develop Luther's thoughts on
"Law and Gospel," or better, present a systematic sketch of
them.
2. The Radicalizing of the Law.

Countless texts reveal that, to begin with, Luther understands by "Law" nothing different from the theology of his
own and earlier epochs, namely, God's will promulgated to
men. This does not, as it were, enter into force with the Law
of the Old Covenant. Rather, it is an eternal law, written
fii,r Theologie und Kirche, 48 (1951), 172-230; 208-216; Ebeling, Luther: Einfiihrung in sein Denken (Tiibingen, 1964), pp. 100-122; E. Bizer, Fides ex auditu: Eine
Untersuchung ilber die Entdeckung der Gerechtigkeit Gottes durch Martin Luther
(Neukirchen, 3 1966), pp. 15-22; H. Bornkjamm, "Zur Frage der Iustitia Dei beim
Jungen Luther," part I in Archiv filr Reformationsgeschichte, 52 (1961), 16-29;
part II, ibid., 53 (1962), 1-60: II, 18-22. Further references in Pesch, Theologie
der Rechtfertigung, p. 32, n. 6.
20 In
epistolam Pauli ad Galatas M. Lutheri commentarius: 2/443-618; In
epistolam S. Pauli ad Galatas commentarius, ex praelectione D. Jl. Lutheri collectus:
40 I/15-688; 40 II/1-184.
21 18/600-787, esp. 671-688.
29 39 L/342-584.
23 Esp. 36/8-79:
"Wie das Gesetz und Evangelium recht griindlich zu unterscheiden sind ... " (iiber Gal. 3:23-29, 1532.

LAW AND GOSPEL

93

in the hearts of men, which corresponds content-wise to the
Law of Moses, notably the Decalogue, and would have been
binding of itself had Moses never given a Law. The need for
this latter Law is traced to the darkening of reason and poisoning of the will through sin. Moses, then, gave no new law, but
had only recalled anew God's eternal law. Christ, too, had
simply interpreted and reinforced this law and had in no sense
abolished it. 24
But to speak of the Law only in this sense is, for Luther, to
miss the point of the Law's meaning for concretely-given man,
i.e., for man after Original Sin. In this case the Law would be
an affair of the angels; for man, such talk about the Law would
be "empty." 25 For, from Paul, Luther has learned that the
Law accuses, visits threats and demands upon the sinner. The
Law is lex accusans, reos agens, exactrix. 26 This and nothing
else is for the present the function-a function necessary for
salvation-of the Law. 27 The Law exercises this function in
that it reveals to man that he has failed God's will and still
constantly fails it. More exactly, the concrete detailed prescriptions of the Law allow man, first of all, to recognize his
violation in detail, convey to him, that is, his actual sins. 28
But this is not the decisive point. For even if one were to
succeed in fulfilling all the detailed prescriptions of the Law,
in this case the accusatory role of the Law would by no
means be exhausted. On the contrary, it would then become
plain that man was able to fulfill the Law only at the price of
extreme personal effort; in other words, he in no sense carries
24 39 l/374, 2; 387, 5; 413, 14; 454, 4; 478, 16; 539, 7; 540, 1; 549, 8; 17 11/102, 24;
2/580, 7-23; 56/198, 8. Here as in the rest of the article we mention only a few
" loci classici." A more thorough listing and interpretation may be found in my
study mentioned in n. 11 above, esp. pp. 35-76, 296-317.
25 " Whenever we speak of Law, we speak not of an empty Law, ... as the
angels might speak of it, ... but of a Law which accuses, a Law which acts in us
and exacts from us." (translated from the Latin) 39 l/434, I.
26 Cf. the text quoted in n. 25.
01 2/466, 3; 10 III/338, 4; 39 1/363, 19; 412, 2; 277, 1; 40 I/506, 24; 18/673,40684, 29; 766, 25 .
•• 89 l/540, 8; 40 l/257, 22.

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PESCH

out God's will with that generous devotion that his outward
behavior might appear to indicate-in effect he fulfills the Law
only "slavishly" (serviliter); he lacks "affectus" and "sponta.nea voluntas." 29
A final issue is that man seeks to fulfill the Law without
faith. But this is directly counter to the Law's intent: the
first commandment of the Decalogue, to have no strange gods
besides God, demands that we let God alone be God, which is
to say, to acknowledge God as all-powerful Creator and allgenerous Love. 30 If one does so, he can no longer will to stand
before God other than through God's love and grace. This
attitude is one of the central contents of the concept "Faith."
To wish to be just before God through following the Law, and
indeed through following the Law servilely and not out of total
devotion, is the very opposite of this: unbelief. Herewith we
have the explanation of Luther's famous thesis that every sin
is at root lack of faith and that lack of faith is the sin
absolutely speaking. 31 Were man only to believe, he would
then fulfill the Law out of gratitude and devotion to the praise
of God's glory. But, since and because of Adam's fall, man
rduses to believe and would rather fulfill the Law as master
of himself, in order to be justified before God through his own
personal achievement. 32 However, this must fail, since this was
never within the intent or possibility of the Law. Thus in the
Law man encounters despair and hatred towards the God who
gave us such an over-demanding Law. 33 So the Law entangles
29 6/353, 15; 56/200, 13; 253, 25; 255, 4; 274, 11; 289, 15; 242, 33; 249, 9; 1/227, 26;
376, 26; 376, 26; 2/587, 27; 7/335,6.
30 40 I/399, 18; 419, 13; 39 I/428, 14; 531, 2; 581, 9; 5/395, 6; 40 III, 343, 4. In
addition see the exposition by P. Althaus (based on an earlier investigation which
Die 1'heologie Martin Luthers (Glitersloh, '1963), pp.
still remains important):
119-127, 230-232.
31 Besides the texts cited in n. 20, cf. those analysized in Pesch, 1'heologie der
Rechtfertigung, pp. 85-88.
•• 40 II/393, 25; 404, 26.
•• 39 I/557-559; 2/527, 35; 5/210, 1; 557 sqq.; 10 I, 453, 2; 464, 2. Since man will
never be free of this relationship to God and his Law, this is the point of departure
for Luther's theory of lingering sin and ultimately for his formula " simul justus et
peccator." Cf. Pesch, op. cit., pp. 78-85; 109-122.

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95

man even more deeply in sin; it works "anger," as Luther
following Paul expresses it; it" kills." 34 The Law opens up no
possibility of a way to God, it simply brings to consciousness
the possibilities already forever closed off; it not only makes
clear to a man his own actual sins, it also reveals to him the
self-righteousness lying beneath his outward obedience. This
means his irremovable, radical sinfulness, in that he thereby
sees that he thus constantly violates the commandment of
faith. Man not only commits sins, he is through and through a
smner.
Without gainsaying here the broader problematic of which
Luther himself is quite conscious, 35 it must be emphasized that
God so wills it. 36 The Law itself, in its literal meaning, does not
so will it. The Law wills a generous fulfillment of itself. But
God wills with his Law, rebus sic stantibus, to drive men into
despair. He wills that man's self-assertiveness should come to
grief upon the Law, even at the price of letting man sink deeper
into sin. To be sure, he does not will this despair, this sinfulness for its own sake. The Law and its death-dealing effect are,
as Luther likes to put it, God's" opus alienum "-his "fremdes
Werk." God engages in this for the sake of his "own work by
right," his " opus proprium." 37 This latter is the Gospel, as we
are now to show. Let us first, however, pause for a moment and
cast a glance at the results we tentatively expect to arrive at in
our pursuit of this question.
The Law, considered as a code of detailed prescription, IS
H 39 l/557, 18; cf. 347, 29; 363, 19; 412, 2; 477, 1.
•• Here we should seek further information from Luther's teaching on God: if
God's Law drives us into sin, is not God then responsible for sin? Also of special
importance here is the work "De servo arbitrio." Cf. Pesch, op. cit., pp. 106-109,
377-382.
86 The controversies raised by Karl Barth's little book, Gesetz und Evangelium
(Munich, 2 1956), have plunged Luther scholarship these last three decades into a
discussion with implications both for the history of theology and for systematic
theology. Cf. Pesch, op. cit., pp. 46-51. The most important contributions to this
discussion have been brought together in Gesetz und Evangelium: Beitriige zur
gegenwiirtigen theologischen Diskussion, ed., E. Kinder and K. Haendler (Darmstadt, 1968) .
•• 1/112, 24; 356, 39; 5/503, 26; 7/531, 30; 9/101,37.

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important for Luther in that man learns thereby just how far
he falls short of the mark. Luther, indeed, in his sermon on the
Judgment and in the light of Biblical texts concerning the Last
Judgment, speaks quite concretely about the detailed prescriptions of God. 38 At the same time, however, the detailed
prescriptions of the Law are far less important for Luther than
they would be for a moral theology in the traditional sense.
For, as God's "opus alienum," the Law is assuredly not
supposed to indicate how we should act or answer questions
about the proper behavior of Christians but rather nothing
other than to reveal the fundamental sin of self-righteousness
and lack of faith. It is supposed not only to make us aware of
actual sins but rather, through this, to lay open the " wicked
heart," the root and source of all wicked deeds. In reference to
our problem this means: upon an understanding of the Law
there arises, for Luther, not a moral theology problem of freedom and obligation in Christian behavior, of" freedom of conscience " and " formation of conscience " but rather-before
all such questions-the theologico-anthropological problem, of a
liberation of man's existence before God. The question put by
Luther to the Law is not "What shall I do"? but "Who
rescues one from the death-dealing word of the unfulfilled Law
of God?" or, more briefly, "Who rescues one from the curse
of the Law? "
We are in no position here to pursue further the question,
so far-reaching in its import, of Luther's justification in appealing to St. Paul for his theology of the Law. 39 One thing is sure:
he did take quite seriously Pauline thoughts which, from the
earliest times-out of understandable motives and interests 40had been, as it were, " domesticated " by the traditional
38 E. g., 7/207 sqq.; 6/231, 35; 242, 22.
•• Cf. the work of Joest (n. 5 supra); also G. Ebeling, Wort und Glaube
(Tiibingen, 1962), pp. 263-277; P. Blaser, "Gesetz und Evangelium," Catholica 14
(1960) 1-23; 7-20; on a more general level cf. B. Lohse, Lutherdeutung heute
(Gottingen, 1968), pp. 19-32.
•• With the Epistle to the Galatians alone it would be impossible to build up any
!IOrt of orderly Church life!

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exegesis.41 On the other hand, we have an important distinction
to make: the" Law" to which the Apostle ascribes the aforesaid effects represents for Paul an historical quantity, an epoch,
in a word, the constitution of the Chosen People. Now that
the time of grace and the Spirit has dawned, this epoch has
been brought to an end and left behind. " Lawful " behavior
marks a regression to this bygone age. The time of the " pedagogue" (Gal. 3: 25) is past, the Christian is the adult grown to
full maturity. For Luther, on the contrary, the Law is, to
use modern terminology, an existential. It qualifies human
existence in an absolute way-the Law, the Decalogue is indeed
written in man's heart. It is overcome not, as for Paul, once
and for all, but anew each day, through belief in the Gospel.
From here we can trace a direct path to Luther's much misunderstood formula: simul justus et peccator, which Paul in any
case did not know in this Lutheran formulation. 42
In the two we see a shift in the historical situation of the
Church. Paul's Church is a missionary church: adult baptism
is quite naturally experienced as the great turning point and
continuing sinfulness as the carry-over from a bygone age.
Paul need only say to his Christians: "Become what you are!"
But Luther's Church is a "Volkskirche," an established national church based on infant baptism; in place of that great
turning point is the experience of continual sin, of a heart as
rebellious as ever before. The accusatory function of the Law
now accompanies the Christian throughout his whole life, and
Luther must say to him: "Become each day anew that which
you are not (until you die)"! Exegetically Luther has not
been true to Paul: he has stretched the Apostle's text. But his
interpretation of Paul is nonetheless a piece of authentic history
" Thomas moves in a broad stream of exegetical tradition when in the Summa
Theologiae, in reference to Rom. 5: 20, he explains that the " killing " of the Law
takes place not " effective " but " occasionaliter," and that the " ut " of " ut
abundaret peccatum" is to be understood consecutively, not finally; see I-11, q. 98,
a. 1, ad 2; 99, a. !l, ad 3. On the difference with Luther, see Pesch, op. cit .. pp,
431-432, 459-460.
•• Cf. Joest, 2., "Paulus und das Luthersche simul justus et peccator" in
Kerygma uml Dogma 1 (1955), pp. 269-320.

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of the faith, just as the "domestication" of Paul's statements
in Tradition is in its turn exegeticaUy false but still an interpretation of Scripture in reference to some concrete reality of
the Church's existence.
3. The Gospel as Deliverance.

Who overcomes for man the curse of the Law? The answer
is not straight-away " the Gospel " but rather " Christ." Every
attempt (and incidentally, this represents a whole school of
thought) to explain this overcoming of the Law apart from the
central role of Christ may indeed have its good reasons and be
perfectly intelligible in the light of its own historical context,
but it cannot stand as an historically faithful interpretation of
Luther. Here as elsewhere, Luther's theology is, in contradiction to current conceptions, decidedly Christocentric. 43
Christ is the only man to have fulfilled the Law whole and
entire with all the generous devotion due to God. 44 He has
thereby satisfied God in a twofold sense: he has made recompense before God for all man's defections; and also, by that
very fact, he has delivered man from the excessive burden of
bringing about his own justification before God by a personal
fulfillment of the Law. 45 Of man it is now demanded only that
he believe in Christ, the fulfiller of the Law; or more exactly, to
believe in God who, through Christ, himself the one just man
by his fulfillment of the Law, delivers us from the curse of the
Law and ascribes Christ's justice to those who believe in
him. 46 The proclamation of this is the Gospel, and one will
seldom find in Luther a definition of the Gospel in which
•• In the footsteps of the great Lutheran theologian and church historian, Karl
Holl (and his " school "), the Catholic discussion with Luther likes to regard his
thoughts on the "unique effectiveness of God" as the way to approach .Luther's
theology. In opposition to this, the Evangelical theologians (chiefly German),
whose Luther scholarship has been influenced by Karl Barth, stress the Christocentric starting point of Luther's thought, whether from the historical or from the
objective-systematic viewpoint.
u 56/260, 18; 2/466, 14; 497, 28; 523, 15; 10 I 1/74, 7; 17 II/240, 24; 291, 19; 31
I, 317, 7.
•• 1/505, 24; 2/479,28/490, 32; 492, 17/563, 35; 39 I/357, 19.
•• In addition to the texts cited in n. 45: 24/4,11/5/169, 14.

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Christ's name does not appear. 47 As a message of peace,
forgiveness of sin, and grace, the Gospel frees us from the
accusation, the despair, the death, into which the Law plunges
man. " The Law says ' Do, what you are supposed to do! ' The
Gospel says, ' Your sins are forgiven you! " 48 " The Gospel is
in its essential definition the promise of Christ, who frees us
from the terrors of the Law, from sin and death, and brings
grace, forgiveness of sin, justice and eternal life." 49 The Law
is thus for one who believes and hears the message of God's
working in Christ divested of its authority: God rescues the
sinner " contra legem." 5 ° For the sake of Christ, the just and
sinless one, the salvation of man no longer depends on whether
or not the man himself has fulfilled the prescription of the Law.
Shall this be taken to mean that God's imperative "Thou
shalt" is no longer meant to be taken seriously? It is meant
seriously and remains so at all times, and this with all the
embarrassment, not for its own sake but for the sake of Christ.
As long as man has not come to doubt the possibility of becoming just before God on the basis of his own power, he cannot
understand what God has done in Christ. He must therefore
live out his entire life under the Law in this ineradicable quest
for self-justification, even to the bitterly confused end. Only
then can God's saving love fully open up to him in the Gospel,
in that same moment in which the Law is overcome and God's
honor as all-generous love is reestablished, in that man finally
does what he had refused God from the beginning. Passively,
in the "posture of pure reception " (Paul Althaus) , he lets
himself receive through Christ the gift of grace and justice as
the ground of his life. "So long, Christ says, must the Law
terrorize and disturb your conscience, until John comes and
points out the Lamb, who takes away the sins of the world.
Once I learn this and accept this, then must I bid a long farewell to all these Laws that accuse and condemn me, yea, even
"2/500, 11; 39 I/478, !W; 479,4 (cf. infra, nn. 53, 54) .
•• 2/466,6.
•• 89 I/887, 2.
•• 89 I/!!19, 21.

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to the Decalogue." 51 Even to the Decalogue? Yes, in all
seriousness even to the Decalogue: 52 " For to one justified, the
Law ought not to be exposed and preached as something to
fulfil but (it is to be preached to them) as fulfilled, for the
justified already have in Christ what the Law demands of
them." 53 " Thus the demands and accusations of the Law fade
before the pious, for what shall it still demand when Christ is
already there .... " 54
How seriously all this is meant is illustrated by Luther's
bitter polemic against the description of Christ as " legislator,"
and therewith against an understanding of the Gospel as " nova
lex," even if it be a " lex caritatis." Under no conditions is
Christ a new Moses; he is not a "legislator," but rather a
" propitiator " and a " salvator." 55 "Where Christ is, there
shall Moses the old peasant give way." 56 Or as Luther puts
it, short and to the point: "Lex est negatio Christi." 57 This is
a point especially emphasized by Protestant Luther scholars:
" Where Christ becomes a ' legislator ' and the Gospel a ' nova
lex' a ... weakening is brought about: the tremendous ' But
now! ' of the Gospel is reduced to a shadow of what it was and
is thus robbed of its explosive force over against man's ' cramp '
of self-assertiveness." 58
To do justice, we must note here that, even as they continue
Luther's own emphasis on this point, contemporary scholars
have come to show more reserve in arraigning before Luther
certain prominent theologians of the Catholic tradition. Recent
Catholic works 59 have alerted Protestant scholars, and Luther39 1/455, 3.
It is not as though only the ceremonial precepts of the Old Law had been
brought to an end with the Gospel, but so also has been the Decalogue: 2/468, 32;
492, 5; 18/764, 35; 40 1/229, 34 .
.. 39 1/478,20 .
.. 39 1/479, 4.
6 " 40 1/232, 29; cf. 298, 13; 2/494, 9; 8/70, 20; 40 1/114, 13-20.
68 40 1/262, 9; cf. 259, 26; 56/339, 3.
67 40 11/18, 4.
" 8 Joest, Geaetz, und Freiheit (cf. supra, n. 5), p. 28 sq.
•• Above all, the works of G. SOhngen, Geaetz und Evangelium (Munich, 1957);
"Gesetz und Evangelium," Catholica 14 (1960), 81-105; F. BOckle, Geaetz und
61

69

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101

an research itself has shown, for instance, that St. Thomas's
teaching on the " nova lex Evangelii " has nothing in common
with what Luther is out to attack. 60 I£ for Thomas the "nova
lex " is identical with the grace of the Holy Spirit won for us
by Christ, if this grace comes not through works but through
faith and the Sacraments, if everything other than this grace
which is identified with the New Law has at most a preparatory
or manifestative function, never a meritorious efficacy, with
respect to grace, if all good actions stem from the inner
" ought " ("lex indita "!) of the freedom of the children of
God, then all that Luther seeks has been objectively realized.
At most, one may quibble about the opportuneness of using the
word " lex " in this context. 61 The same is true of " Christus
legislator ": for Thomas, Christ is a " legislator" only in the
measure that the New Law is a "lex." This means: he is a
" legislator " chiefly in that he bestows on us the grace of the
Holy Spirit and institutes the Sacraments, and only secondarily
in that he preaches the Sermon on the Mount. Thus, the
novelty in Luther is not the substance of his doctrine: what
Tradition held important, Luther also holds important. The
novelty is a certain crisis over the concept " lex," and a polemic
arising out of this, in which Luther felt constrained to defend
himself against something which Tradition as such had never
taught.
As we bring this section to a close, let us once more focus
clearly on what we are aiming at in this discussion. I£ it be
true that the above understanding of the Law in no way gives
rise to the moral theologian's problem of freedom and obligaGewissen: Grundfragen theologischer Ethik in okumenischer Sicht (Luzern-Stuttgart, 1965).
60 At this point, a reference is in order to the praiseworthy
achievement of U.
Kiihn, Via caritatis: Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin (Berlin, 1964/
Gottingen, 1965). See my review, "Thomas von Aquin in Licht evangelischer
Fragen: Zu drei neuen Thomas-Monographien," Catholica QO (1966), 54-78. 65-72,
76-78.
61 If Thomas does so, this is obviously because he places more emphasis on the
continuity between Old and New Covenant than does Luther, whose thought is
based entirely on Saint Paul.

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tion, since Luther understands the Law as a radical accusation
of human existence before God, it is equally impossible that the
problem should arise from his understanding of the Gospel,
since the Gospel abolishes every Law. The Gospel is no" nova
lex " over against which some freedom might be set and then
discussed in terms of its limits. On the contrary, the Gospel is
itself freedom, because it is a deliverance of man from his guilt
and fallenness before God.
The sum-total of our considerations thus far, then, can only
read: the formula " Law and Gospel " has, in its immediate
meaning and in its theological function, no bearing whatever
on the moral theologian's problem of freedom and obligation, of
conscience and the decay of moral norms.
4. Luther on Christian Ethics.

Only at first sight is this result disappointing. For it goes
without saying that, for Luther, the justified sinner, the Christian in other words, does have ethical duties. 62 Luther cannot
block out this question or put it in parentheses or even give it
only limited attention. The contrary is assured not only by the
New Testament itself, to which after all he appeals for his
understanding of Law and Gospel, but also by his controversy
with the old Church. For, as already mentioned, the latter
had not hesitated at an early moment to accuse him of endangering moral-ethical effort.
If, however, Luther holds so inexorably to his affirmation
that the Gospel brings about freedom from the Law and that
this is the key to an understanding of the entire Christian
message, then this must surely have consequences for the
foundations of Christian ethics and the guidance of Christian
action. Definite foundations, definite modalities are in any case
excluded in the light of this distinction between Law and
Gospel. As for Luther's manner of arriving at a determination
•• Lutheran theology treats this problem under the heading " Justification and
Sanctification," a terminology admittedly found in Luther's own writings but never
in a technical sense, and for that matter not always in the same sense. See Pesch,
'fheolopie der
p. 287 sq.

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of norms for Christian action, without reversing the overcoming
of the Law by the Gospel, we must bring to light what the
formula "Law and Gospel " does have to say about norms and
freedom of conscience. What norm is Christian behavior to
follow?
Lutheran theology after Luther's time, following Melanchthon, developed in this connection the formula " tertius usus
legis." 63 This is intended to mean: God's Law, like any human
law, has as its first function to repress sin in the outward
dimension of life, to keep order in the life of society, to provide
for the upbringing of the young, to secure freedom, to protect
the preaching of the Gospel. This is the so-called " primus usus
legis," also called " usus politicus," " usus civilis." 64 Following
this we have the " secundus usus legis " through which all that
we have spoken of above is effected: manifestation and multiplication of sins (thus it is called "usus elenchtius "; a negative
preparation for justification (thus "usus theologicus," "usus
sanctus," " usus salutaris ") and an education unto Christ
(thus, "usus paedagogicus "). But what of now? Have the
prescriptions of the Law no further meaning for the justified
" after " 65 the " usus elenchticus " has done its work? Quite
obviously they do! ea And to explain this, first Melanchthon
and then Lutheran theology of the post-Luther period (including the Lutheran creedal statements themselves) developed
the theory of "tertius usus legis." Meant here is a function of
the Law whereby it does teach man what the will of God
demands but no longer terrorizes, menaces, and " kills." For
man, insofar as he believes, no longer follows the Law " serviliter," as do the self-righteous, but rather out of joyful and
•• See Ebeling, Wort und Glaube (cf. n. 39 supra), pp. 50-68.
••" Usus " is difficult to translate (i. e., into German); perhaps the best possible
would be " Funktion," itself a borrowed word.
•• This "after" (German "nach ") is surely meant here in an altogether peculiar
sense; because of continual sin (cf. supra, n. 39) man never experiences until his
death a time " after " the " usus elenchticus legis."
•• After elimination of all that is time-conditioned in the Law and which was
valid only for the political existence of the Chosen People. See the relevant text
39 I/540, 8; and on this, Ebeling, op. cit., p. 228.

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thankful devotion to God. The doctrine of the " tertius usus
legis " appears therefore to hold together in happy fashion not
only the distinction, indeed the break, between the state of sin
and that of justification but also the continuity of the one will
of God, ever remaining the same. At the same time the basis
of Christian ethics is explained: an obligation to the will of
God as promulgated in the Law out of the free devotion of
faith springing from the heart itself, this is the source and the
essence of Christian behavior.
Luther himself is unfamiliar with the terminological formulation "tertius usus legis." He knows only (and this in a
thoroughly untechnical sense) the formula "duplex usus
legis." 67 Thus our research is faced with the question: did he
know the reality expressed by this "tertius usus legis"? A
whole string of statements from Luther argues that he did.
Christ does not do away with the Law but builds it up in the
proper way, by his new interpretation of it; 68 by the same
token the Law is interiorized for the believer; he seals "friendship" with the Law. 69 Luther emphasizes the permanent significance of the Biblical admonitions as directives for Christian
life. 70 These observations have led a considerable number of
scholars to the conclusion that the objective reality corresponding to the "tertius usus legis" was upheld by Luther.
An even larger number, however, are of the very opposite
opm10n: with this theory of the " tertius usus legis " the
whole point of Luther's understanding not only of the Law
but also (and notably) of the Christian condition would be
obfuscated. 71 And this for two reasons. The first, on terminological grounds. "Law" according to the tenor of Luther's
expositions is that which exercises against men this function of
See Ebeling's study mentioned in n. 63 supra.
39 I/387, 5; 2/580, 7-23.
69 4/467, 7; 5/562, 31.
70 6/207, 26; 18/693, 1; 39 I/542, 16.
n Cf. Lutheran positions on one side or the other collected in Pesch, op. cit., p.
73 sq. Understandably, Catholic theologians are inclined to speak out in favor of
the " tertius usus legis."
67
68

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accusation and death: for Luther, the Law is defined precisely
in terms of this function. A Law that does not accuse is not a
law, however much its content may happen to correspond with
that of the Law which accuses. Thus the later formulation
marks a departure from Luther's own way of using words.
But this-and this is the second, reality-oriented reason-is
more than just an argument about words! Whoever seeks to
regulate the life of the Christian through the " tertius usus
legis " forces him, no matter how much generous devotion
of will might be involved, to look back once again to the letter
of Holy Scripture to discover what he is supposed to do. It
seems indeed to be no coincidence that, in reference to the
Christian, Luther no longer speaks of Law but only of " admonition" (exhortatio) and" commandment" (mandatum), and
indeed explains quite explicitly that this is to indicate a
"weakening" of the Law for Christians. 72 Luther ought to
have thoroughly dispelled all doubt, when alongside his disquisitions on the permanent positive meaning of the Biblical
directives we can find his incisive remark that Christians would
make for themselves " new Decalogues " even better than that
of Moses. Paul himself had gone far along this very road
with his long lists of virtues/ 3 Quite plainly, Luther will stick
to the end by his conviction: the Gospel brings freedom,
and the Law can place no man, for whom Christ has interceded
before God, under any condition whatever for salvation, save
that of faith. Not only must the form of Law, the "exactio,"
give way to freedom, the content of the Law, too, must be
subordinated to this freedom, no matter what restrictions must
still be made in view of unintelligent, simple men who as such
will always need leadership. The " tertius usus legis" is chiefly
for these objective reasons un-Lutheran. So then, where does
this leave us? Are there no more norms for moral action?
Licence all down along the line, even to the notorious " pecca
iortiter, sed fide fortius? " 74 How does Luther approach the
foundation-laying of a Christian ethics?
•• 39 I/474, 8-475, 6; cf.
78 39 I/47,
.

... WA, Letters,

3; 513, 8.

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1. First of all, we should note that Luther, in opposition to
Tradition, sees the basic and complete Christian act not in
" caritas " but in faith. If I compare the contents of the two
concepts, their difference falls away almost to nothing. Everything that Tradition brings together under the concept of
"caritas "-the grace-filled yet spontaneous self-giving of the
soul to God for his own sake which ties together and directs
all the other aspects of our relationship with God such as
trust, hope, fear, assent and the like--all these Luther subsumes
under the concept of faith. For him, "caritas " is above all
love of neighbor, not love of God. Conversely, that which
Tradition conceptually understands by "faith "-the assent of
the reason (assensus) to the revealed word of God-is only one
element in Luther's complex concept of faith to which, if considered all alone by itself, Luther himself never did and never
would ascribe the justification of the sinner. The greater part
of the polemic on both sides over the matter is built on mere
terminological misunderstanding. 75
And yet there does remain something that cannot be brought
together, something hard really to put one's finger on, since it
transcends the theoretical domain and belongs to the level of
one's personal relationship with God, one's spirituality. Anyone who uses the word " caritas " in the traditional sense does
not think at once of his sins, but he does think quite readily of
duties: not without significance the question of the " ordo
caritatis" comes to the surface immediately. 76 Anyone who
speaks o:f "faith" in Luther's sense thinks right away of his
sins, faith places him under God's forgiveness and releases him
from the oppression of the Law. "Faith" therefore excludes
this immediate thought of duties. To put it another way,
•• Here we can give only a general reference to the exhaustive presentation of this
problem in Pesch, op. cit., pp. 735-747. See also the important articles by J. Lortz,
" Luthers ROmerbriefvorlesung: Grundanliegen," Trierer Theologische Zeitsckrift
71
129-153, 216-247,
and P. Manns, "Fides absoluta-fides incarnata: Zur Rechfertigungslehre in Luthers grossem Gala.terkomentar," in R&formata Reformarula: Festschrift fiir H. Jedin (Miinster, 1965), v. 1, 265-3U,
•• Cf. St. Thoma.s, Summa Tkeologiae, II-II, q. 26.

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"faith" as the fundamental Christian act in Luther's sense implies primarily, in the light of his distinction between Law and
Gospel, man's total passivity, his "death" so far as his "will
to achieve " is concerned, the absolute gift-character of salvation, from which nothing can be taken away by any " partnership-like" contribution on man's part.
The reverse side of this is a conclusion directly relevant
for ethics: radical freedom. Where God has made man's
salvation entirely his own affair, man's own action is no longer
in any way bound up as a condition with salvation; no particular behavior is any longer an objectively necessary precondition for receiving salvation. Faith and the " freedom " of
a Christian are correlative. If one asks in a precise sense what
the Christian must do to attain salvation, the answer is equally
precise terms can only be: nothing. 77 He receives it as a gift,
literally for nothing. Should he want to do something toward
it, this would mean a denial of faith. Thus the fundamental
premise of Christian ethics, for Luther, will be: man has no
ethical duties whatsoever in relation to his attainment of God's
justifying grace. Put more briefly: Towards God (" erga
Deum ") there is no ethics.
2. So what then, no duties and norms? Naturally, of course,
there are, but in relation to God only insofar as such duties
are nothing more than the reverse side of faith. Luther knows
and admits only one such duty: the struggle against sin, or
in a word, penance. 78
A faith, which did not take up an active struggle against
self-seeking, mediocrity, and pride would deny in life what
it affirmed in faith-that sin is against God and that God's
judgment of the sinner is a just one. The struggle against sin,
together with the genuine if always fragmentary advance of
real justice, is so important for Luther that he can declare
77 " Novitas nostxa est quidem necessaria, sed non ad salutem, non ad justificationem nostxam. Ad salutem seu justificationem nostram necessaria est sola
8).
misericordia Dei, quae apprehenditur fide." (89
•• For more detailed treatment see Pesch, op. cit., pp. 288-295, where further
references are given to the literature on this question.

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quite unambiguously that without this struggle-progress faith
and the Gospel are in vain. 79
Thus penance and the struggle against sin are also of ethical
significance, for they stand in service of that very freedom
which is the gift of faith. For this reason, continued sin is the
enemy of freedom, for the quintessence of sin always remains
rooted in man's seeking to justify himself, through which he
brings himself anew under the oppressive weight of the Law.
Every inch of ground conquered from the sway of sin increases
freedom, which God at once gives to man and demands of him.
Paradoxically expressed: because no ethic holds before God,
Christians have the ethical duty of fighting against sin, because
sin ultimately consists in the desire to be justified before God
by one's own ethical achievement.
3. But where does man go from here with this God-granted
freedom? Naturally he becomes involved in works and deeds,
and he should do so. Are there still no norms for this? Do
not ethical demands somehow hold at this stage of the game?
When Luther pronounces himself on " Faith and Works " his
first concern, in the light of his polemical situation, is to
emphasize that faith does not derive its power to justify from
any works that may accompany or follow it. " When faith is
not lacking in every (sort of) work, even the slightest, it does
not justify, indeed it is not even faith in this case." 80 This
statement from his theses of 1520 characterizes the constant
accent in all his pronouncements on the theme. But the thesis
we have cited reads on: "It is, however, impossible for faith
to exist without zealous, numerous and great works."
After the epoch of polemical line-drawing, which served to
sharpen Luther's own position and make it one-sided, contemporary Luther scholarship sees clearly that, without any desertion of the "sola fide," works, i.e., ethical behavior, take
on an essential place in Luther's understanding of what it
means to be a Christian. And so one might arrive at the
..
80

7.

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formulation that Luther's formula should not read "sola fide "
but, to be true to reality, it should read: " sola fide numquam
sola." 81
But how does the relation between this faith free of works
and the works necessarily bound up with it shape up? If we
try to summarize in thesis form the essential viewpoints emphasized by Luther, we must eventually come up with some
such thing as the following: Faith is the ground of works and
is related to them as the tree to its fruits, that is, faith makes
the works good, but good works do not give faith its salvific
power. 82 They are necessary, therefore, not as a condition of
salvation but as an expression and evidence of salvation. 83 As
such they are the life-form of faith: it exercises and indeed
"incarnates" itself in them. 84 Luther can express this in the
optimistic words: faith hardly stops first to ask if good works
are to be performed; before even asking, it is already involved
in doing them. 85 Conversely, Luther draws the conclusion from
all of this that, where no good works are in evidence, one may
be sure that no salvific faith is present. 86 At times Luther can
explain in the most beautiful traditional manner that Christian
life consists in faith and works. 87
With this we have succeeded in laying a foundation for
Christian ethics, though a concrete ethics itself is yet to be
worked out. Faith makes our works good before God: they are
no longer the fruit of the sin which still dwells in us. But
faith of itself does not spell out just which works we are to
perform here and now. Who can determine this, if the Law
can and ought no longer do this not even in the sense of a
"tertius usus legis"? Luther's answer is: only he for whorn
81 This is the title of a little article by Althaus, Una Sancta 16 (1961), 227-235;
it is also the tenor of his Theologie Luthers, pp. 213 sqq., and the works of W.
Joest we have mentioned.
80 2/492, 21; 39 I/46, 28; 288, 9; 39 II/188, 37; 38/646, 20.
88 39 I/114, 28; 292,8; 47/789, 29; 10 III/225, 35.
8 •14/23, 17; 6/249, 7; 40 II/158, 1. Cf. Manns' article mentioned
inn. 75 supra.
8 " WA, Deutsche Bibel, 7/11, 10.
8 "10 III/287, 20; 12/289, 29; 39 I/46, 20; 92, 17; 106, 24; 114, 24; 39 Il/248, 14.
81 U/289, 29; 10 I 2/88, 2; 17 I/98, II.

110

OTTO HERMANN

PESCH

the works are good and who needs them. That is by definition
not God who freely bestows salvation and forgiveness without
works, but only man, our neighbor. Luther distinguishes between "pious" (" formmen ") and "good" (" guten ") works.
The "pious" work is one that one performs "for God's sake"
(a pilgrimage, for instance). Such works fall under the total
condemnation of " justification through works," insofar as they
are undertaken in view of some special meritoriousness before
God; and Luther is unaware of any "pious" work that is not
undertaken for this motive. The " good " work, on the contrary, is that which is directed toward our neighbor and his
welfare. " Have you ears to hear, and a heart that can attend,
well, listen and learn for God's sake, what good works are and
mean. A good work is called good, because it serves and benefits and helps the one toward whom it is directed." 88 " And
we call good works, not those which we do for God but those
we do for our neighbor, these are good works." 89
On this fundamental position Luther bases his critique of
monasticism, 90 on the one hand, and his professional ethics
(" Berufsethik "),on the other. 91 Good works in this sense are
a simple exigency of our gratitude toward God in Christ: as
God has done for sinners, so shall the redeemed sinner do for
his neighbor; freely has he received, freely ought he to give. 92
In this way the Christian becomes another Christ. 93 In full
accord with the " sola fide numquam sola," we find in Luther
the paradox: " A Christian man is a free master of all things
and subject to no one. A Christian man is a useful servant of
all things and subject to everyone." 94
88

10 I 1?/39, 3.
10 III/98, 16.

For a formulation which sums everything up beautifully:
"Opera gratiae sunt necessaria, ut testentur de fide, ut glorificent Deum patrem,
qui in coelis est, ut serviant proximo." (39 I/225, 3).
90 On this, see Pesch, "Luthers
Kritik am Monchtum in katholischer Sicht," in
Strukturen christlicher Existenz, ed. A. Pereira et al. (Wiirzburg, 1968), pp. 81-96.
91 See G. vVingren, Luthers Lehre vom Beruf (Munich, 1952).
•• 7/36, 3; 37, 32; 6/516, 32; 10 I 2/168, 17 .
89

•• 7/35, 34; 66, 3; 11/513, 8; 15/504, 14 .
•• 7/21, 1.

LAW AND GOSPEL

5. Questions posed by Luther's Theology
present-day Catholic .111oral Theology.

111
of Freedom for

It would be impossible for us to discuss in full all the important questions that Luther's teaching on " Law and
Gospel " poses for Catholic moral theology in our time. Let
us at any rate close by at least intimating these questions.
Luther's theology ordinarily considers this question under a
presupposition not always appreciated in Lutheran circles:
Luther's concrete ethical pronouncements are no more adequate for our day than are those of St. Thomas and St.
Augustine. The "neighbor " whose need Luther made the
measure of good works was the man of an agricultural or at
best of a small town society, the society from which Luther
himself came. The direction, to serve one's neighbor in your
calling with the "tool" (" Handzeug ") that God gives you,
is sufficient here. But even in Luther's day, it was insufficient
to cover the social, political, and economic changes that were
already underway all around him. 95 And they are surely insufficient for the problems of modern industrial society and the
economic ethics such a society requires, or for the problems of
our " one World," the atom bomb, the total manipulability of
the world and even of man himself. It is not his concrete,
detailed prescription 96 which raise questions for us but rather
the underlying structure of his theological ethics.
For the sake of clarity and to avoid any misunderstanding,
I have intentionally formulated these questions in as brief and
pointed a way as possible:
1. Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit that God
has granted us salvation with no reference to works whatever,
but unconditionally, for the sake of Christ?
Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit that God
wants, not our " pious " works but only our " good " works•• Cf. a recent presentation of this by R. Friedenthal, Luther: Sein Leben un<l

seine Zeit (Munich, 1967), esp. part Ill.
•• Rich material on this may be found in P. Althaus, Die Ethik Martin LutJhertJ
(Gutersloh, 1965).

112

OTTO HERMANN PESCH

for himself only thanks and praise, and apart from this only
the passing on of his gift in our service to men?
3. Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit that any tying
together of the question of salvation with that of ethics,
whether on a conditional or final basis, and by the same token
any conception of works as condition or means and salvation as
purpose or end, can only serve to corrupt moral theology
itself and to corrupt the works for good measure?
4. Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit that (precisely
because of this) the modern decay of ethical norms has nothing
to do with the conditions of man's salvation, that is to say,
nothing directly to do with God but only with the success or
failure of the life together of God's children, and thus ultimately but only by such a detour, with God?
5. Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit seriously that
the sole criterion of ethical goodness is not some abstract norm,
neither is it some impersonal "natural law," nor is it even a
special revealed commandment of God himself (for there are
no such commandments) 97 but is instead man in the necessities
of his individual, interpersonal, social existence?
6. Is Catholic moral theology ready to admit seriously that
man is free to discover in the world about him (as the case may
be) both these necessities and the corresponding ethical norms,
and is also free to test our situation for this purpose, and
precisely this in the order of creation to which he is subject?
7. Finally, is Catholic moral theology ready to refrain from
wanting to know a priori what is good and to trust that, in
ethical struggle, and for that matter in ethical failure in face of
situational exigencies, the people of God is indeed led by the
Spirit of God, even in the case when no answer is immediately
forthcoming?
Certainly Luther's theology of Christian freedom awakens
97 For the New Testament, see J. Blank, "Zum Problem 'Ethischer Normen,' " in
"Neuen Testament," Concilium S (1967), 856-S6!l; for the Old Testament, D.
Arenhoevel, "Die Gesetzgebung am Sinai," in Wort und Antwort 10 (1969), !ll-!l6;

45-51; 71-74.

LAW AND GOSPEL

118

the impression of a radical situation ethics. Only by the de
facto circumstances of his own century was it prevented from
having its most devastating effects. But in a time when decay
of moral norms is a fact, and when all the discussion about
natural law has at least been brought to a close, the exegetical
insight that above and beyond this radicalization of ethical responsibility through the Christ-event there is simply no ethical
revelation, specific in its content, available to us, and that we
are instead thrown back upon real service to the world-in such
a time the words " situation ethic " should no more frighten
us than Augustine's remark: "Ama, et fac quod vis."
What a success it would be for Christian ethics were it able
to deal realistically with contemporary situations, human situations! For this it should be glad to pay the price of not
knowing whether what it says today will be still relevant to the
situation of 500 years from now. Luther reminds us here that
the task of Christian ethics is not to " extort " 98 the works of
the Law but to bring forth the fruits of the Spirit. Fruits grow
from within. They are such, as is the tree itself. And they
should serve man.
OTTO HERMANN

Albertus-Magnus Akademie
Walberberg, Germany

•• Cf. 2/492,28.

PESCH, O.P.

GABRIEL BIEL ON LIBERUM ARBITRIUM: PRELUDE
TO LUTHER'S DE SERVO ARBITRIO

R

CENT CONCENTRATION of scholarly interest upon
the late medieval period and, in particular, upon that
era's theology, has called for a contemporary examination of the thought of Gabriel Biel of Speyer (d. 1495) ,
professor of theology and later rector of the University of
Tiibingen. 1 Biel's theology exerted a significant, if not crucial,
influence which recent scholarship increasingly discovers to
have been more pervasive and profound. Ample evidence of
Biel's direct influence upon Luther himself is not difficult to
find. In his Randbemerkungen zu den Sentenzen des Petrus
Lombardus Luther explicitly refers to Biel's Collectorium, the
latter's own commentary on the Sentences. 2 In addition,
Melanchthon tells us that Luther was able to quote Biel and
Peter d'Ailly from memory. 3 And, of more interest for our
1 Particularly
noteworthy examples are the recent studies of Leif Grane, Contra
Gabrielem: Luthers Auseinandersetzung mit Gabriel Biel in d!ff Disputatio ccmtm
scholasticam theologiam 1517 ([Copenhagen]: Glydendal, 1962), and Heiko
Augustinus Oberman, The Harvest of Medieval Theology: Gabriel Biel and Late
Medieval Nominalism (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1963).
• D. Martin Luthers Werke: Kritische Gesamtausgabe (Weimar, 1883-), ix, 40.
36 and 74. 9. [Hereafter cited as W. A.] Luther's Randbemerkungen is dated c.
1509-10. It is not certain that he had direct access to the 1501 edition of Biel's
CoUectorium; his references here may derive from his courses under Jodocus
Trutvetter and Bartholomaus Arnold von Usingen. Cf. Robert Herndon Fife, The
Revolt of Martin Luther (New York: Columbia University Press, 1957), pp. 49-50.
Fife also notes that Luther used either Biel's Lectura super cancme Missae (Reutlingen, 1488) or the Epithoma ea;positionis canonis Missae (Tiibingen, 1499).
Ibid., p. 97. Curiously Fife is under the impression that Biel was a member of the
Augustinian order: "The basic work he [Luther] used ... was that of an eminent
member of his order, Gabriel Biel. ... " Ibid.
8 " Gabrielem et Cammeracensem pene ad verbum memoriter recitare poterat."Corpus Reformatorum, Philippi Melancthonis Opera Quae Supersunt Omnia, ed.
Carolus Gottlieb Bretschneider (Halis Saxonum Apud C. A. Schwetschke et Filium,
1839), VI, 159.

114

GABRIEL BIEL ON " LIBERUM ARBITRIUM "

115

subject, we have Luther's own marginal notes in the Wittenberg monastery's copy of Biel's CoUectorium in the 1514
Lyons edition. 4 The notes are not extensive and their importance can be easily exaggerated. But they are directly concerned with the question of justification and the role of the
human will in salvation. The Disputatio contra scholasticam
theologiam of December 4, 1517 5 attacks Biel's doctrine and
can be directly connected with the Collectorium passage
annotated by Luther.
These preliminary remarks are meant to set the stage for
a discussion of Gabriel Biel's concept of liberum arbitrium, a
doctrine which would prove to be of crucial importance in the
eventful years of the early sixteenth century. Our chief source
is Book II, distinctio 25 of Biel's Epithoma pariter et collectorium circa quatuor Sententiarum libros (Tiibingen, 1501).
A brief historical comment on the notion liberum arbitrium
will introduce our examination of Biel's teaching; we will
conclude with some remarks regarding the clearest expression
of Luther's reaction to the theory-his famous De servo
arbitrio.
HISTORICAL

NOTE

By the fifteenth century the term liberum arbitrium had a
thousand years of history behind it, and the concept to which
the term referred was centuries older. For the medieval thinker
the term was a classical one, part of the technical vocabulary
of the philosopher-theologian. Its roots were unquestionably
philosophical, dependent in large part on Aristotle's treatment
of choice and the voluntary in his Nicomachean Ethics. Christian thinkers had little difficulty integrating his doctrine with
revelation. In the Scriptures man's psychological freedom of
choice is a presupposition rather than an assertion. The drama
• Paul Vignaux, "Luther, lecteur de Gabriel Biel," Eglise et TMologie, )!2 (March,
1959), 88. For the text of these marginal notes cf. Hermann Degering, Luthers
Randbermerkungen zu Gabriel Biels Collectorium in quattuor libros sententiaru11b
und zu dessen Sacri canonis missae expositio (Weimar: Verlag Hermann BOhlaus
Nachfolger, 1988).
• W. A. i. 221-HS.

116

JAMES E. BIECHLER

of both the Old and New Testaments rests upon man's power
of self-determination, at once personal and unpredictable, implicit and yet undeniable. Specific references to man's free will
are not rare in the writings of the Fathers, some of whom
found it necessary to defend human liberty in the face of the
fatalism or determinism of the Stoics and other pagan thinkers.
Once raised, the question of the source of man's power of
self-determination was destined to play not only a distinguished
but a distinguishing role in Western thought. Between Boethius, who situated freedom of choice in the undetermined
deliberation of reason, and Scotus, who saw freedom only in
the will, whose indetermination was alone complete, the outer
limits of the spectrum of possible positions were established,
and thinkers were destined to be labeled " voluntaristic " or
"rationalistic" by reason of their viewpoint on this question. 6
The question of the locus of the faculty of free choice was
not a pressing problem for either Augustine or Anselm who
were concerned rather with explaining how the will can remain
free in the face of divine grace and predestination and, equally
preoccupying, how to preserve the will's dependence on grace
without reducing the former to impotence. Anselm felt it
necessary to define freedom in such a way as to exclude
" ability to sin" from the definition, otherwise God, who cannot sin, would not be free. Thus, for Anselm, liberum arbitrium
is the ability to keep uprightness of will for its own sake. 7
While no one can lose this natural ability he can refuse to use
it and thereby sin; in this eventuality the will is powerless to
regain righteousness but must await the action of God.
The basic questions pertaining to liberum arbitrium inherited by the Christian thinkers of the late Middle Ages were
psychological-in what faculty of the soul is man's freedom of
choice ultimately to be found?-and theological-how do grace
• Cf. Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Medieval Philosophy (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1949), pp. SU-813.
7 "Libertas
arbitrii est potestas servandi rectitudinem voluntatis propter ipsam
rectitudinem."-8.
Anselmi Cantuariensis Archiepiscopi Opera Omnia, ed. F. S.
Schmidt (Edinburgi: Apud Thomam Nelson et Filios, 1946-1961), I, 212, 19 f.

GABRIEL BIEL ON " LIBERUM

ARBITRIUM "

117

and sin affect man's freedom of choice and what power does
free choice have with respect to eternal salvation? While the
theological import of these questions is too obvious to need
mention, even a cursory study of Biel's treatment supports the
assertion that theological questions sometimes had to rest
content with philosophical answers. Nevertheless, from our
vantage point it is not only legitimate but necessary to keep
the theological dimension in mind as we turn our attention to
Gabriel Biel and his teaching on the notion liberum arbitrium.
BIEL's DocTRINE

The modern reader may be surprised as he comes to his
reading of Biel with current notions of individual liberty and
psychological freedom of choice to find that the term liberum
arbitrium, although literally translated as "free choice," is not
really an ability or capability but is an existential reality of a
substantive order, a res. Indeed, it is not essentially distinct
from the human soul itself. To be specific, liberum arbitrium
is nothing other than the human will as cause of its willing. 8
In Biel's psychology man's intellect and will are not two separate entities and are not actually distinct from the soul itsel£.9
While these powers are conveniently distinguished for the
purpose of discussion, no real distinction is postulated. But
even should one subscribe to the opinion which affirms that
the distinction is not merely logical but real, one would not,
according to Biel, assert thereby that liberum arbitrium is in
reality two powers. Freedom of choice must still be regarded
as essentially voluntas. The reason for this is that true freedom
does not reside in the intellect itself which Biel (following
Scotus) sees as being necessitated or determined by something
distinct from itself, namely, truth. One cannot refrain from
giving intellectual assent to what is clearly true, while one
8 "Quamvis
libertas arbitrii non fit sine ratione obiecti volibilis ostensiva est
tamen essentialiter et realiter voluntas sue volitionis productiva."-Biel, Collectorium, II, d. 25, q. un., art. 2, cone!. I (G). Hereafter cited by number alone.
• 'Potentie anime rationalis intellectus et voluntas eodem realiter non distinguuntur ex natura rei aut formaliter."-II, d. 16, q. un., art. 2.

118

JAMES E. BIECHLER

can refuse to choose what the intellect presents as good. Thus,
liberty is in the will, and it is there that liberum arbitrium
must, in the last analysis, reside. But this does not imply
independence from reason. The will can choose only what is
presented by reason; the latter has an indispensable function.
Thus Biel can define liberum arbitrium as " the rational will
freely willing something shown or presented to it by the
intellect." 10
In an earlier discussion of freedom Biel approvingly referred
to the opinion of Robert Holcot (d. 1349) that, no matter how
freedom is understood, it is essentially nothing but the will
itself seen from a particular viewpoint. Thus freedom from
sin denotes the will in grace, freedom from misery denotes the
will without punishment, freedom from necessity denotes the
will as not subject to coercion, freedom of indifference denotes
the will neither more nor less inclined to one of two opposites.
All these terms stand for one thing-the will itself. This, of
course, means that the freedom of the will is not some quality
added to or inhering in man's will but is its very essence. Even
God cannot separate the will and its freedom. 11
Preserving liberum arbitrium from any intrinsic alteration
does not mean that the acts it produces will be of the same
quality, however. It is obvious to Biel that habit has a bearing
upon the facility with which one acts. Grace also is essential
if the act should enjoy the quality " meritorious." And with
respect to grace, a will can be more or less responsive. Despite
all this, liberum arbitrium itself is not altered; the essential
equality of all men with respect to this basic faculty is not
impaired. For it is not in the faculty itself that the inequality
resides but in its habits. 12
Given the essential identity of liberum arbitrium, libertM
and voluntM, the inalienability of the will's freedom becomes
apparent. Destroy man's freedom and he ceases to be man;
10 " ••• voluntas rationalis libere volens aliquid ostensum sive praesentatum sibi
per intellectum."-II, d. !l5, q. un., art.
concl.
(G).
11 II, d. 1, q. 6, art. 8, dub. 1 (D).
10 II, d. !l5, q. un., art.
concl. 5 (H).

GABRIEL BIEL ON "LIBERUM

ARBITRIUM"

119

libertas is an ineluctable implication of rationality in the classic
definition of man as animal rationale. But, although even God
cannot destroy man's liberty without at the same time annihilating his humanity, this does not mean that God cannot
affect the human will at all. The power and freedom of God
are key themes in nominalist thought and Biel does not rest
easily in limiting divine omnipotence merely to preserve the
integrity of a definition! He applies himself to this problem:
whether the will can be forced by God.
Biel had already made it clear that the will is not subject to
force, for it cannot will against its will. But there are texts
from Scripture which, he says, seem to use the language of true
force: " ... and compel them to come in" (Luke 14: 23);
" no one can come to me unless the Father who sent me draw
him" (John 6: 44); "I see another law in my members, warring
against the law of my mind and making me prisoner to the law
of sin .... " (Rom. 7: 23) All of these convey the notion of
coerciOn.
In the first place, with respect to the external acts commanded by the will, these are obviously subject to compulsion
not only by God but also by creatures. This is certain, Biel
says, because a person can be dragged to church against his
will. Even Scripture attests to this. With respect to its internal
acts the will can be moved or induced and, by fear or promises,
can be changed in such a way that it abandons its former
position and comes actively to will the opposite. Experience
gives ample evidence for this, Biel asserts. Under this heading
he inserts the tractio divina, that special motion of the Holy
Spirit by which man is enabled to give up vice and choose the
good. 18
But God is able to do even more. He can force the free will
in such a way that it cannot will a " willable " object. This
follows from his ability utterly to annihilate the will; a fortiori
he can do the lesser. Moreover, God is able to take away the
13 " ••• recedere a vitiosis volitionibus et elicere bonas."-ll,
d. 25, q. un., art. 8,
dub. 1, prop. 2 (J). Biel here speaks of volitio as though it were an object of will
rather than as the will act itself.

120

JAMES E. BIECHLER

use of reason from the will. In that eventuality no will act
would be possible since it is reason which presents the will with
an object of choice. 14 Or God could simply suspend his general
concurrence; the human will which functions on the level of
secondary causality could not act if the primary cause withheld
its concursus. These are indubitable facts for the Christian,
Biel remarks. In this way God truly forces the will not to act. 15
In a somewhat similar fashion God is able to compel the
will to choose something in such a way that it would be unable
not to will it. This proposition finds its proof in the undeniable
creative power of God by which he is able to create in the
will (and there conserve) an act of volition. For, just as the
intellect cannot fail to understand knowledge actually existing
within it, so the will cannot fail to will when it has within itself
an existing volitional act. What else is an act of willing, Biel
asks, than to have volition in the will?
All of this is not yet to force the will to act involuntarily, in
Biel's judgment. Despite these external influences the will is
not acting against itself, it is not being voluntary involuntarily.
Still, Biel is not satisfied that God should be limited even here.
Perhaps no essential contradiction is involved. He feels he
must pursue the matter further.
Suppose, for example, a given act of willing a certain object.
Within that same will God can create an act of not willing
(nolitio) the same object. He is able to conserve these contrary
acts simultaneously by his absolute power (per suam potentiam absolutam) .16 The will would thus (and, we would think,
to its great surprise) find itself willing and unwilling at the
same time and in the same respect. At this point, Biel complains that grammar itself cannot bear the burden of this
Cf. supra, pp. 117-118.
II, d. 25, q. un., art. 8, lub. I, props. 1-8 (J).
18 Potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata are familiar terms in the nominalist
vocabulary; their full meaning and implication lie far beyond the confines of this
presentation. For our purpose let it suffice to define the former as the unlimited
power of God by and in which he is totally free; the latter, that power by which
God acts within the order which he has in fact established. By means of the former,
God could, for example, decree lying to be an act of virtue.
u

10

GABRIEL BIEL ON " LIBERUM

ARBITRIUM "

121

thesis, unable as it is to signify the two acts with simultaneity!
Furthermore, he realizes that one could object to classifying
" willing " and " unwilling " as contraries. Technically they
may be such, but actually they amount to contradictories and
thus cannot find simultaneous existence in the same subject
with respect to the same object. His reluctance " to deny anything to the power of God which does not involve a contradiction " leads Biel to forego making a decision on the case requiring the intervention of the potentia absoluta and concludes
that, simply speaking, the will cannot be made to will
unwillingly .17
When he asks the question whether it can be proved that
the will is free, Biel relies on the arguments of Ockham and
Gregory of Rimini and states that the freedom of the will is
evident from experience and no demonstration is more evident
than experience/ 8 Man's experience testifies that, even though
reason tells him something or other ought to be chosen, the
will is able to do otherwise. In addition, all human counsel
would be pointless, no one could be rewarded or punished
for his acts and, if one needs more convincing, the ordinances
of God in the Scriptures would otherwise be without meaning.
Biel makes no pretense that these arguments are original; they
were commonly used and would be used again by Erasmus in
his Diatribe seu collatio de libero arbitrio of 1525.
We should rightly expect that after his formal treatment of
man's liberum arbitrium Biel would apply himself to a discussion of the practical implications of his teaching. He does this
in distinctio 28 of the same book where he turns his attention
to the threefold question: Is the liberum arbitrium of man
able, without grace, to (1) elicit a morally good act; (2)
avoid mortal sin, and (3) fulfill divine precepts?
The first question offers him little difficulty. Because the
II, d.
q. un., art. 3, dub. 1, prop. 5 (L).
Quod voluntatem esse liberam libertate contingentiae est evidens per exdub.
perientiam et ideo non potest per aliquid evidentius demonstrari."-Ibid.,
(M) . The reliability of personal experience in the search for theological truth was
also destined to find a place in Luther's own theory of justification.
17

18 "

122

JAMES E. BIECHLER

intellect, of its own natural power, is able to know and judge
that good should be done and evil avoided for a natural end,
namely, love of virtue and honor, the will is able to conform
itself to that judgment by eliciting a good act for the same
motive. Such an act is morally good. To prove that the will
can do a morally good act one need only remember that the
will of its own power can dispose itself for the reception of
grace; it cannot do this by an act not in conformity to reason
but only by one morally good.
Furthermore, by the same power and for essentially the same
reasons, the will in the state of mortal sin is able to avoid
committing a new mortal sin. Indeed, freedom of the will
means that one is potentially able to choose one of two opposites. If one does not have the power not to sin, neither has
he the power to sin, for to be able to sin requires liberty.
Against this conclusion Biel raises a dubium, incredible as an
objection, the solution of which strikes a rather harsh note
in the post-Reformation ear. It seems that without the gift of
grace the will cannot really avoid every kind of mortal sin. For
man is bound at some time to love God above all things; always
to omit this act cannot be without mortal sin. Whoever fulfills
this precept and does love God above all things, thereby avoiding mortal sin, disposes himself, by that very act, for the
simultaneous infusion of divine grace, which, in fact, takes
place. Thus, one could not be said to have avoided mortal sin
without the gift of divine grace(!). This objection was not new;
the lines of its solution had already been drawn nearly two
centuries earlier by Duns Scotus in his own commentary on the
same distinctio. Even though the act of love of God above all
things is the complete and perfect disposition for the infusion
of grace, this is not the result of any absolute incapacity of
liberum arbitrium. To love God above all things is within
the capacity of the will in virtue of its own natural power even
if grace were not infused. Only the generosity of God can be
adduced as the cause of the gift of grace even though naturally,
if not chronologically preceded by the dispositive act. Furthermore, " grace is not required to elicit the act by which man is

GABRIEL BIEL ON " LIBERUM ARBITRIUM "

disposed for the reception of grace, simply speaking, but is
added over and above to the act as a previous disposition by
which the subject is disposed for the reception of grace." 19
Since it has been shown that man is able by his own natural
resources to love God above all things, one should not be
surprised to hear Biel explain that man without grace is able
to fulfill the precepts of the divine law at least substantially,
though not with respect to the divine intention. This latter
implies the act's orientation toward God as one's ultimate end,
and this involves the order of grace. Only by meritorious work
which requires grace can man act toward his ultimate end. 20
Already at this point one would be prepared to accuse Biel
of heresy even by the standards of the pre-Tridentine Church.
Where can there be found a statement more deserving of the
label " Semi-Pelagian" than that quoted above: " Grace is
not required to elicit the act by which man is disposed for the
reception of grace"? But Beil has not yet revealed the full
extent of man's power. Granted that man does perform acts
morally good in se, that he can, even in the state of mortal
sin, refrain from committing new mortal sins, that he can substantially fulfill the divine precepts, what is the maximum power
of liberum arbitrium vis-a-vis eternal life and union with God?
We immediately realize that with this question we have come
to the heart of our topic, to a kind of turning point or climax,
a question whose answer will place Biel forever in the unorthodox land of the Semi-Pelagians. Let us follow his reasoning as he takes us to the summit of liberum arbitrium' s power
and reveals to us her crowning glory.
It is by liberum arbitrium that man "does what is in his
power" (facit quod in se est), a technical phrase found
throughout scholastic theology denoting the capability of
19 "Et immo non requiritur gratia ad eliciendum actum ilium quo disponitur ad
suscipiendum gratiam simpliciter sed superadditur actui tanquam previe dispositioni
quo subiectum disponitur ad susceptionem gratie."-II, d. l!S, q. un., art. 8, dub. 1
(L) . Unfortunately, Biel does not disclose the basis for the latter portion of the
statement.
20 Ibid., art. l!, cone!. 8 (K) ,

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JAMES

E. BIECHLER

nature unaided by grace. The soul" does what is in its power"
by the act of removing obstacles to grace and by eliciting a
movement of itself toward God. This act of doing all in one's
power is acceptable to God, and because of his liberality,
though not due in justice, he grants the first grace of salvation.
God must look with favor upon all who tum to him, otherwise
he would be wicked. He therefore receives those who do what
is in their power-it is necessary that he do so, Biel says. God
receives them by infusing grace. This, he notes, marks the
limits of the capability of liberum arbitrium.
It is clear that Biel is not simply describing the process by
which God justifies man. Despite his demurrer that all of this
is not " ex debito iusticie sed ex sua liberalitate," he is nonetheless prepared to speak in terms of necessity and absoluteness:
God looks with favor on those who have recourse to him, otherwise he would be wicked. But it is impossible that he be wicked.
Therefore it is impossible that he not receive those who have
recourse to him. But one who does what is in his power does have
recourse to God. Therefore it is necessary that God receive him. 21

As long as such a statement is allowed to stand, all subtle
distinctions about meritum de congruo and other nay-saying
will not suffice to counterbalance the unrighted scales. Biel
was undoubtedly saved from accusations of unorthodoxy both
by his own care in maintaining at least a verbal distinction
between meritum de congruo and meritum de condigno and
by his ability to take refuge in the split-level world of nominalist potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata. On the former
level there was no criterion by which one could measure orthodoxy, for it was a realm beyond human knowledge and divine
revelation. Evidence of what we would be inclined to call
"schizoid " theology appears even in Biel's sermons:
No doubt He could have simultaneously made us His friends and
accepted our work as meritorious without this gift of grace. . . .
21 " Deus respicit confugientes ad se. Aliter in eo esset iniquitas. Sed impossibile
est quod non recipiat confugientes ad se. Sed faciens quod in se est confugit ad
ipsum. Ergo necesse est quod ipsum recipiat."-11, d. 27, q. 1, art. 2, cone!. 4 (K).

GABRIEL BIEL ON "LIBERUM

ARBITRIUM"

125

Thus God has established the rule [covenant] that whoever turns
to Him and does what he can will receive forgiveness of sins from

While the dichotomy between the two orders of God's power
is definite and unmistakable, Biel does succeed in avoiding
many of the excesses characteristic of nominalist thought in
its speculation on the endless possibilities open to God's absolute power. 23 In our judgment, however, he not only did not
succeed in remaining within the bounds of traditional orthodoxy with regard to justification, but he also would be a
catalytic element in the precipitation of Luther's own Rechtfertigungslehre.
THE REACTION

oF LuTHER

Biel's own doctrine of justification, clearly Pelagian as it
was, apparently provoked little or no pre-Lutheran opposition.
His general orthodoxy was of a high degree and his influence
as a theologian was widespread. 24 'Ve are on safe historical
ground in accepting Biel's theology as an example of the via
moderna at its best. Thus, it would also be safe to assume that
the practical implications of this doctrine would find their way
into the hearts and lives of the faithful. Little wonder, then,
that pious Christians strove " to do all in their power " to
achieve righteousness before God. And Luther himself was not
untouched by this moral optimism. The depth of his despair
and the intensity of his frustration are indices of the strong
22 Sermones
de festivitatibus Christi, (Hagenau, 1510), " De Circumcisione
Domini," Sermo II, in ordine 14, quoted in Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Forerunners
of the Reformation (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1966), p. 173.
23 Cf. C. Ruch, " Biel, Gabriel,"
Dictionnaire de Theologie catholique (Paris:
1909-1950), II, col. 817.
"' Oberman points out that " the name of Biel and his fellow schoolmen is not
only absent from the Trent Index of Forbidden Books; but in an appendix to the
1569 edition of the Index published by the diocese of Munich, Biel's name is
included under the suggestive heading: ' Most select list of authors from which a
complete Catholic library can properly be constituted.' " The Harvest of Medieval
Theology, p. 427. Cf. B. A. Gerrish, Grace and Reason: A Study in the Theology
of Luther (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962), p. 49.

126

JAMES E. BIECHLER

grip in which the facere quod in se est held the fervent young
Augustinian. Once the grip was released the reaction could
almost be predicted. 25
Luther's De servo arbitrio, written expressly in answer to
Erasmus, strikes one immediately as an over-reaction. Erasmus's remark early in his own work that some will compare
him to a fly contending with an elephant 26 might also be
aptly applied to the relative importance each placed on the
matter at issue and even to the size of the books. Erasmus
numbers liberum arbitrium among those " superfluous questions" which men ask with "irreligious curiosity." 27 But for
Luther the issue was far different. In the conclusion of his
work he wrote:
Finally, I strongly praise and commend this in you, that you
alone before all others have attacked the real issue, that is the heart
of the matter. You have not worn me out with those peripheral
matters about the Papacy, purgatory, indulgences and similar trifles
rather than issues, about which almost every one up to now has
hunted me down in vain. You and only you have seen the hinge of
things and have aimed at the main point. For that I thank you
from the bottom of my heart. 28

In view of Erasmus's own statement that this matter was really
a superfluous question, Luther's praise was extremely generous.
2 ' Cf. Thomas M. McDonough,
The Law and the Gospd in Luther (Oxford:
University Press, 1963), pp. 35-38.
26 " Hie scio quosdam protinus
obturatis auribus reclamaturos: "Avw
Erasmus audet cum Luthero congredi, hoc est cum elephanto musca? "-De Libera
Arbitrio DIATPIBH Sive Collatio per Desiderium Erasmum Roterodamum, ed.
Johannes von Walter. Vol. 8 of Quellenschriften zur Geschichte des Protestantismus,
ed. Joh. Kunze und C. Stange (Leipzig: A: Diechert'sche Verlagsbuchh. Nachf.
(Georg Biihme), 1910, p. 2 (Ia2).
27 " ••• haec, inquam, tenere meo iudicio satis erat ad Christianam
peitatem nee
erat irreligiosa curiositate irrumpendum ad ilia retrusa, ne dicam supervacanea, an
deus contingenter praesciat aliquid, utrum nostra voluntas aliquid agat in his, quae
pertinent ad aeternam salutem .... Ibid., pp. 6-7 (Ia8).
28 " Deinde et hoc in te vehementer lando et praedico, quod solus prae omnibus
rem ipsam es aggressus, hoc est summam caussae, nee me fatigaris alienis illis
caussis de Papatu, purgatorio, indulgentiis ac sirnilibus nugis potius quam caussis,
in quibus me hactenus omnes fere venati sunt frustra. Unus tu et solus cardinem
rerum vidisti et ipsum iugulum petisti, pro quo ex animo tibi gratias ago .... "W. A. xviii, 786, 26-tH.

GABRIEL BIEL ON " LIBERUM

ARBITRIUM ,

127

That Erasmus had not, in fact, " seen the hinge of things " is
evident from his own admission. On the other hand, Luther's
appraisal did not apply to Erasmus's arguments or conclusions.
He was disappointed that his learned antagonist came against
him with such puny weapons. Who should be awarded the
palm of victory remains a matter of opinion. That Erasmus
considered himself bested may be gathered from the necessity
he felt to make a rejoinder, and that in two sizeable volumes,
Hyperaspistes Diatribae adversus servum arbitrium M. Lutheri
(1526, 1527) .

These data need not be strained to support the assertion
that, while Erasmus was the immediate cause of Luther's writing his De servo arbitrio, he was not, to use the terminology
of scholasticism, the causa sufficiens. The stature, fame and
importance of the man Erasmus demanded a reply; the same
can hardly be said of his argument. Had an unknown author
produced the Diatribe, one could say with some assurance that
Luther would not have responded at that time. The magnitude
and vehemence of his reaction in the De servo arbitrio must
be attributed at least in a significant degree to the "pelagianizing" which its author saw so widespread in the schools and
experienced so keenly in his own life.
Unfortunately, it lies beyond our present scope to examine
the De servo arbitrio in detail. Its relentless passion and indefatigable argumentation, often enough tinged with the sophistry Luther so detested, is well-known. Our present contention
is that the thrust of this masterpiece remains unappreciated
unless the work is seen not simply as Luther's reply to Christian
humanism but as his most serious statement of opposition to
nominalist theology and in particular to Gabriel Biel's doctrine
of liberum arbitrium.
JAMES

La Salle College
Philadelphia, Pa.

E. BIECHLER

BOOK REVIKWS
Theological Science. By THOMAs F. ToRRANCE. New York: Oxford University Press, 1969. Pp. 363. $11.75
In a mod-colored drug culture where Roman Catholics argue publicly
and desert in droves, it is a strange experience to open the covers of this
book and to read that theology is "The science of God." (p. viii) In a
day in which atheism is a sweeping tide Professor Torrance finds the
presence and being of God bearing upon his experience and thought so
powerfully that he " cannot but be convinced of God's overwhelming
reality and rationality." (p. ix) Certainly we cannot deny that this may
be true for the author; it is just that this is so counter to so much
experience today that the reader quickly moves on to see if the book will
make God this real for him.
Unfortunately (at least for this reader) so much is assumed about God
and so little is said directly that no new insight into the divine nature is
really forthcoming. Primarily this book is an epistemological study; that
is, it is an elaborate discussion of many modes of knowledge, particularly
logical and scientific, and an assertion that God can be known in a way
comparable to these. One might have thought that the struggle to turn
theology into a " science " had been abandoned, but certainly it has not.
on the pages of this volume. However, the real question is not whether
theology might qualify as a " science " but how many readers will be able
to make the assumptions which Torrance needs to make in order to pose
his question in this way.
There is no doubt but that we are dealing with a major work. The
author has amassed a vast amount of recent philosophical theory, and
he deals with theology in relation to this in an attempt to show that it
can be reconciled with contemporary theoretical sophistication. This is a
masterful attempt at the integration of theories, and it is impressive on
that score alone. However, its underlying tone is "dogmatic," that is, the
author simply and flatly states, time and again, his most conutroversial and
basic assumptions. Perhaps any attempt to understand this book should
begin with a consideration of the acceptability of its major premises.
Torrance says: "How God can be known must be determined from first
to last by the way in which He actually is known," (p. 9) and "Knowledge of God is essentially a rational event." (p. 11) But perhaps this
statement is the most important: " Theological thinking . . . pivots upon
the fact that God has made Himself known and continues to make
Himself known, that He objectifies Himself for us, so that our knowledge

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is a fulfilled meeting with objective reality."

129

(p. 29) If these various
statements can be accepted, the greater part of Torrance's argument can
be granted. If God did or does in fact act in this way, the theologian's
task has been made easy. Yet, the real question is: Does God in fact
present himself in this way? Is that really the way the controversial
events surrounding Jesus' life and death are to be interpreted?
I suppose that any reader will have to concede that God might act in
this way if he wanted to. He could have given us a firm basis for a science
about him. It is possible for him to provide us with certainty; but, when
we look at the founding events of Christianity and its history, does it
really appear as if God " objectified " himself? There is nothing absurd
in itself in saying that he aimed to provide us with this kind of certain
knowledge about himself, except that that leaves the uncertainty and the
puzzles which have surrounded Christianity unexplained. And it is equally
possible to assume that God had no such intention to provide man with
the basis for a science about himself.
Throughout the whole book the intentions of God are assumed as given
and not really argued to as opposed to other theories which would not
see science as God's aim at all. And it would seem that theology's first
task is to argue in support of the view of God's nature and actions which
it accepts. Torrance thinks, for instance, that theological thinking is
"more like a listening than any other knowledge," (p. 30) but the real
question is whether God did or did not intend to make it that easy for us.
Torrance is right: " Unless we have a word from God . . . we are
thrown back upon ourselves to authenticate His existence and to make
Him talk by putting our own words into His mouth and by clothing
Him with our own ideas." (p. 31)
It would be nice if God did act to remove our uncertainty and responsibility in that way, but the real issue is: Con we assume that this is what
took place in Jesus' life and death? Did God really " utter Himself in
His Word"? (p. 32) It is not at all clear that we can simply assume that
he did, since the events recorded in the Gospels equally leave open the
possibility that God remained hidden and not directly visible. We know
that Jesus preached and healed and died, and Christians came to believe
that God had intervened to reverse his death, although they did not
see this event itself. Can we really say, then, that what God does is
to give himself to our thinking, that "He objectifies Himself for us "?
(p. 37)
What is the evidence that God's intention was to make himself so
unavoidably plain and present as this? When Torrance says " God gives
Himself to be known as personal subject," we have to ask whether these
are God's words or Torrance's interpretation of certain events which in
themselves never said quite that. It is not wrong to give our interpretation
of God's actions: it is only questionable when we assume our theories to

1SO

BOOK REVIEWS

be words spoken by God himself. Probably all Christians have asserted
that God became " known " in Jesus Christ, (p. 45) but we must not
assume that " to know " God in this instance means to be able to develop
anything like scientific knowledge about him. God may have acted, but
why do we assume that his intention was to produce " knowledge "?
As Torrance rehearses current scientific theory (Chap. II) we must ask
him: Are we forced to become amateur physicists in order to do theology,
and why? Our author wants us to engage in " scientific dialogue," (p.
105) but this assumes that theology should be "vigorous, disciplined,
methodical and organized knowledge." (p. 116) Now, God might be a
being subject to such precision, but, on the other hand, it could be that
God is of such a nature that knowledge of this kind about him is
simply not possible (as the mystics have always argued). Torrance goes
into a long discussion of "truth" (Chap. IV), but most of the major
issues are assumed. For instance, he simply asserts that theological statements have an " empirical relation " to the active, living, speaking God.
(p. 175) But if God is that "empirical," how can we account for the
widespread scepticism and apostasy?
It would appear that God has not left the matter quite as clearcut as
Torrance would like to have it in order to construct his " science." He
and we may have to learn to live with a great deal more uncertainty than
that. This does not make faith impossible; it makes it necessary if any
conclusion is to be reached. Torrance wants us to verify our statements
by an "appeal to judgments of God Himself," (p. 195) but what if, for
his own reasons, God decides to turn down our appeal for such assured
confirmation? Thomas's desire for empirical verification was not denied
by Jesus, but neither was it made the ideal of faith.
In an era which is used to uncertainty and probability Torrance's
Chapter on " Logic " perhaps sounds the strangest to our ears. To call
Jesus "the Logic of God" (p. 205) does not seem to fit the variable
accounts given of him in the Gospels. As a figure he seems more indirect
and hidden and not that clear, although how God acted upon him in
death may have become clear to Christians after the fact. Is it to oversimplify the " incarnation " vastly and to intellectualize it impossibly to
say that it evoked from us "organic forms of knowledge in conformity
with it "? (p. 222) . Certainly even a slight grasp of the vast history of
discussion in theology fits into no such neat picture. This book is a work
of vast sophistication and intricacy, but all of its major assumptions about
God's nature and intention go unchallenged.
Can we really say that" what Jesus requires of each man is an objective
apprehension of Himself"?
(p. 302-3) Or, are the demands of Jesus
more moral and religious and less intellectual than that? Yet, we reach
what is perhaps Torrance's major assumption that needs to be challenged
when we read: "We are confronted with a complex fact that includes

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181

its own interpretation as part of its facticity." (p. 326) It would be
convenient for men if this were true, but the New Testament does not
report this crucial epistemological rule. And, it just may be that our
difficulty is that God has confronted us with certain acts and yet has not
provided us with their interpretation, but rather he has left that to
us-as his demand and as his test.
FREDERICK SoNTAG

Pomona College
Claremont, California

God and Man. By E. ScHILLEBEECKX, 0. P. New York: Sheed & Ward,
1969. Pp. SOB. $6.95.
This third volume of " Theological Soundings " is a collection of Fr.
Schillebeeckx's essays and lectures during the period 1958-1967. As the
title indicates, the subject matter encompasses a variety of problems, all of
which are at least indirectly related to secularization and the counter" ecclesial " tendency in the world. In this collection the purpose is " to
clarify the fundamental principles which, in the opinion of the author,
govern the practical problems involved " (p. vii) in these tendencies.
Difficult as it is to find an intrinsic unity to such a collection, it might
be suggested that, save for the final essay on situation ethics, a unifying
theme lies in Schillebeeckx's constant insistence on the correlation of man's
natural and theologal communion with the personal God and the consequences of this communion on the individual person as well as on his
interpersonal relations with others. In the opening chapter it is suggested
that the erroneous concept of God which fractured this unity brought in
its wake a cultural inertia and in turn gave rise to an atheistic rejection of
such an error. Schillebeeckx sees in the secularizing process which has
produced an awareness of the absence of God a plus factor in bringing
man to " the point at which the question of personal communion with
God arises . . . even though he is incapable of reaching it by his own
resources." (p. 25) The lectures given to the philosophical faculty at
Nijmegen, which constitute the third chapter, continue this theme by
explaining that the very experience of our contingency compels surrender of
self to the transcendent God.
Perhaps the most significant contribution of the volume is Section II
of Chapter 4. After an extensive critique of Robinson's Honest to God in
Section I, Schillebeeckx proceeds to attempt an answer to the question:
" Can we and may we experience this Christianity in its evangelical
purity and human authenticity in the spirit of radical ' horizontalism '? "

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(p. 161) His response is directed to the believer who expressly accepts
Christ and his Church.
The believer, according to the author, asserts that the secular transcendence of man, his capacity to determine himself and also to transcend this
determination, is " only possible through man's so-called ' vertical ' transcendence, his constitutive dependence on the absolutely transcendent:
God." (p. 163) Hence the believer must affirm that the ground of his
being, God, is the transcendent Third in all human experiences, an
affirmation which commits him to responsibility for the world. But, as
Schillebeeckx notes, this interiority of God does not negate the affirmation
of God as a transcendent personal God. Nor does the inability clearly to
understand the divine personal existence negate this personal nature. The
denial of the created modes of being as proper to him leads to some
positive knowledge. From the natural affirmation of God as person a
"demand for self-surrender, which is constitutive of man as such, breaks
through the purely horizontally transcending of human existence in this
world." (p. 171) This consequence of such a demand "shatters the vision
of radical 'horizontalism '," for it is a prototype of the Christian surrender
in faith. On a purely natural level trust in God is expressed by trust in
fellow man. But is there a demand for an immediate personal intercourse
with God beyond love of one's fellow man? To this question the author
clearly affirms " that there is immediate intersubjectivity with God: we
do have to do with the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, of whom om
experience of contingency gives not the faintest idea." (p. 181)
But it is at this point that I would take issue. Schillebeeckx writes:
" In the final analysis we are able to experience only our own existence,
which is personally addressed by God. We are personally united to God
only in faith, i.e., in the surrender to the unseen and unexperienced." (p.
204, italics mine) He insists in Chapter 5 (written some five years previous
to the contents of Chapter 4) that " man becomes himself only in moving
outwards from his own centre of life towards God ... more accurately,
to experience personally God's presence within him." (p. 211) If we are
to take the author at his word in Chapter 4 that God is an unexperienced
person, then the major thesis of these essays will not stand. While it is
true that the intersubjectivity of faith does not provide us with an
intuitive encounter with the glorified Jesus, by chnrity we do attain his
person directly. By the operation of the gifts of the Holy Spirit there is
granted a personal experience of the glorified Jesus. Lacking such an
experienced personal encounter with Christ, the Christian person will never
practically experience the shattering of his radical horizontalism. To limit
the realization of our earthly intersubjectivity with the man Jesus to
Scripture and to the Church is an invitation to the continuance of the
formalism which has characterized so much of what we have called
"spirituality." Schillebeeckx insists that the experience of Christ through

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188

these signs must be called direct, but he fails to explain the reason for
such instances.
This volume provides an enlightening view of a renowned theologian's
response to the problems of secularity. Though his insights may appear
outdated in the light of recent developments, taken in the context in which
they were written, they give evidence of his theological acuity in dealing
with the impact of secularity on traditional Christian teaching.
REGINALD MASTERSON, 0. P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Beyond Trinity.
Milwaukee:

The Aquinas Lecture, 1969. By BERNARD CooKE, S. J.
Marquette University Press, 1969. Pp. 73. $2.50.

Few areas in the on-going theological task of reconceptualizing the basic
beliefs of Christianity have been as neglected as that which is most central
and determinative of all the others-the specifically Christian theistic
concept of God as Triune in Personality or as a Trinity. Fr. Bernard
Cooke, in this Aquinas lecture for 1969 given at Marquette, draws attention
to the present inadequacies of the traditional formulation of this mystery
somewhat as Leslie Dewart has more graphically but in an overly facile
way done in his Fut1tre of Belief. Still, few positive suggestions have been
forthcoming which are not variations on Rahner's essay in the early
fifties, "Theos in the New Testament." Fr. Cooke has given this approach
as rich and updated expression as is currently available. In fairness, his
own declared intention here is not to attempt creative theology but "to
suggest the possibilities for more understanding of the God we love and
worship." (p. 5) His own suggestion is that we look "beyond Trinity,"
by which he ostensibly means that the doctrinal formula stretching from
Nicea to Florence, while not to be jettisoned, ca.n no longer truly serve as
a faith-symbolum. He argues strongly-with scholarly reserve and personal
faith engagement-that man's sole cognitive approach to the identity of
the Father, Son, and Spirit lies in the historical realities of Jesus' human
life. This is achieved by living faith which from past historical faithevents encounters Jesus' present consciousness (one fully achieved only
after the Resurrection and possession by the Spirit) of his precise relationship to the Father in and by their Spirit. Good! And well said by Fr.
Cooke whose respect for tradition keeps him from a possible pitfall here,
namely, an over-emphasis on the Trinity of the economy of salvation (the
human experience of which is recorded in the New Testament) which runs
the risk of suggesting a crypto-modalism. This accords with the insistence

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of Tertullian and Origen that Jesus' earthly life was a revelation of the
inner life of God himself, of the "immanent" Trinity. Primitive Christian
worship, at any rate, was historical in an unprecedented way, and Fr.
Cooke views " the present moment as continuing what had broken forth
in history." (p. 47)
What this implies is that trinitarian theology should begin with the
missions (as Scheeben suggested) rather than ending with them. This may
well be the author's strongest point. But, surely some intellectual conceptualization of the unique divine Personhood of the Word and his real
distinction from the Father and the Spirit is humanly unavoidable. The
humanity of Jesus is a nature; even though it is God's own humanity, it
should not be looked upon as a " surrogate God." It is the reality of God
as revealed in Jesus Christ that faith seeks to know. What Fr. Cooke
questions is "the extent to which the idea 'trinity' corresponds (to this]."
(p. 4) The troublesome concept for him is that of "person" as it stands
over and against that of " nature." But, does his substitution of "community of persons" for "unity of nature" (pp. 59-60) really surmount
the difficulty? Is it not itself a formulation fraught with overtones of at
least a crypto-tritheism? While there is no juvenile disparagement of metaphysics here, there is a headlong flight from any engagement with that
science in " doing" theology. The question that this raises is whether the
shift of focus from the concerns of metaphysical anthropology to the social
dimensions of man's existence can be as total as Fr. Cooke and so many
others wish.
In some respect systematic trinitarian theology is set over against faithexperience rather than seen as originating from and being sustained by it.
It can hardly be denied that the hiatus did exist in the past, and
disastrously so. But I do not find justification for the stress that Fr.
Cooke betrays when he writes that "systematic trinitarian theology tends
to view God as One who in his creative work 'ad extra' reveals nothing
of his immanent life." (pp. £4-25) The real concern here is to understand
the distinction of the divine Three as something far more mysterious than
that which characterizes distinct essential perfections and to avoid misconstruing this as even analogous with the latter. Fr. Cooke interprets St.
Thomas's insistence on the creative power pertaining to the divine nature
as if the distinctiveness of the Persons is somehow lost in their commCJn
activity "ad extra." Actually St. Thomas is denying that creation is
proper to any one Person (" proprium alicuius personae ") , and he makes
clear that each of them causes as the unique hypostasis he is. (cf. III, q.
45, a. 6) Moreover, he adopts St. Augustine's triad of" mode, species, and
order" as an insight into the likeness of the Trinity that is impressed on
every creature, even the infra-rational and the inanimate. (ibid., a. 7) And
the theory of appropriation may not be as " thin a gruel " as Fr. Cooke
thinks (p. 19), especially as taken formally wherein what is appropriated

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to one Person cannot in the same way be appropriated

to another.

(cf.

I Sent., d. 31, q. 1, a. 2, ad Sum) Contemporary investigations into the
phenomenon of language tend to confirm the propriety of this sort of
linguistic device in speaking of the divine.
All in all, a certain inadequacy of Fr. Cooke's attempt continues to force
itself upon us. Contemporary theologians seem not to have ventured
beyond the endeavor to seek a delicately balanced dialectical movement
between preconceptual, lived theology and notional theology. The reemphasis on existential faith-experience below the threshold of concepts has
been a welcome corrective to a cerebral re-ifying of logical entities. But
we have now reached a sort of halfway house; the real task remains. Here
and now the theological tools to forge such concepts may be lacking, but
there are such clues as Wittgenstein's notion of the person as not " the
thinking, presenting subject ... but the metaphysical subject, the limitnot a part of the world." (Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 5.631-5.641)
The question needs to be asked whether in such thinking insights are
being newly discovered out of the perspective of today's intellectual milieu,
insights that bear continuity with those of primitive Christian theology and
their elaboration in the High Middle Ages but that will be differently
rendered into concepts and hopefully somewhat deepened. At any rate,
the theological task is still that of seeking to conceptualize what in
reality lies beyond concepts but is affirmed by faith. Thus there remains
the need to employ the metaphysical resources of human intelligence
(either as reflective science or in a spontaneous, ordinary, "vulgar" way)
to conceptualize the realities of faith simply because, if the perfective
term of every cognitive act lies in the existential grasp of reality and
union with it as it actually is, this is humanly possible only from that
angle of insight and at that depth of intelligibility that comes to birth in
the concept. This is not less true as regards our cognitive union with the
Three Persons of God, where it IS more a case of our being grasped by
Ultimate Reality.
WILLIAM

J. HILL, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

Acta Congressus lnternationalis de Theologia Concilii Vaticani II. Ed.
by A. ScHOENMETZER, S. J. Rome: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1968.
Pp. 881.
An international congress met in Rome from September 26th to October
1st, 1966, to discuss the theological implications of the Second Vatican
Council. This volume presents the papers that were read, along with the

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scientific apparatus to verify, expand, and elucidate the texts. The points
made regarding institutional and doctrinal development offer a broad conspectus of thought among Roman Catholics at what historians will likely
regard as a turning point in the life of the Christian churches.
The episcopal college and the origin of the office of bishop formed the
subject matter of eleven conferences. Here an outstanding contribution is
that of Dr. Jean Colson, who treats the period from the election of
Matthias in the Acts of the Apostles to the letters of Ignatius of Antioch.
What the author brings out most clearly is his conviction that an evolution
was taking place within the New Testament regarding the special teaching
role of certain Christians. This was continued, he maintains, in the period
to which the Apostolic Fathers belong.
Dr. Colson's performance is of the quality Jaroslav Pelikan has indicated
theologians must achieve if dogmatic development is not to be regarded
as too important a topic to be left to them. He establishes what is a
scientifically respectable case for a line of continuity in the New Testament. First, through the election of Matthias, the apostolic college that
had been depleted by the loss of Judas is expanded. The role of apostle at
the beginning of Acts is to be understood as the Christian analogue of
the priestly paqid or mebaqqer of the Jewish sects. And the addition of
Matthias completes the college of twelve in such wise that the eschatological state of Israel (symbolized by the HW there present) had a representative of the Lord at the head of each of its twelve groups of ten. The
addition of Paul enlarged the apostolic college so as to correspond to the
new dimensions of an Israel extending itself to all the nations. As to his
own view, Paul seems to vindicate for himself less the title of apostle (this
is similarly a designation of Barnabas, Acts 14: 14; Andronicus and Junias,
Romans 16: 7) than the directness with which that role was conferred on
him by Jesus Christ. In other words, he is not the delegate of the twelve
but has delegates as do they. Thus there was an extension of the apostolic
office, which was conferred on others by Paul and the Twelve. Here Dr.
Colson speaks of apostolic delegates in the case of Timothy and Titus. The
term is not intended to convey the frequent Roman Catholic connotation of
papal diplomats; indeed it is used in the same context by J. N. D. Kelly in
Epistles (New York, Harper-Row, 1963).
his Commentary on the
It designates auxiliaries whose role assumes greater importance with the
passage of time and the contemplated or actual death of the first apostles.
Obviously, the distinction of having witnessed the glory of the risen Jesus
could not be transmitted to others who had not in fact seen him. But the
mission consequent thereupon, namely, that of leadership in preaching the
Gospel, could be and was.
One notes with interest the similarity between this presentation and
that of a contemporary American biblical scholar (cf. Myles Bourke, " The
Catholic Priest: Man of God for Others," in Worship 43 (1969) 68-81).

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But the systematic theologian interested in seeking an understanding of the
human intermediary in all Christian Faith will likely proceed further in
reflecting on the line of development here presented.
In his Quest of the Historical Jesus Albert Schweitzer saw the history
of Christian dogma to be the result of disillusionment experienced first
by Jesus and then his followers with regard to a delayed parousia. Others
have seen a great apostasy as early as the Apostolic Fathers with regard
to a reality as central to Christianity as is grace itself. More recently,
Ernst Kiisemann has given a most negative judgment with regard to
church-life as described and commended in the Pastorals because of the
nexus they establish between an ordained ministry and the action of the
Spirit. It is obvious, therefore, that the notion of development within the
New Testament is the object of considerable study. The question has been
raised as to whether there are not implications in all of this for the
normative character of those same Scriptures in relation to Christian Faith.
To put this concretely, Colson sees a line of development from the
Acts to the monarchical episcopate of the Ignatian letters. To be sure, there
are serious problems in this regard within the writings of the Apostolic
Fathers; those he treats elsewhere (cf. Ministre de Jesus-Christ ou Le
Sacerdoce de l'Evangile: etude sur la condition sacerdotale des ministres
Chretiens dans l'Eglise primitive, Paris, Beauchesne, 1966). But, all in all,
he makes the assumption of such a continuity a responsible position historically and a credible religious stance as well. What he does is to show
the gradual association of Gospel-preaching with particular Christians
endowed with a special teaching function. Within the New Testament
this is a fact.
One can ask, although Dr. Colson does not, what significance, if any,
this has for church order and faith of later ages. Here Christian traditions
since the Reform have not agreed. Is this development within the New
Testament the work of the Spirit or a purely human (perhaps even sinful)
phenomenon? This question regarding the normative character of that
development must be faced squarely. It will not do to say there are many
church orders represented in the New Testament. There are to be sure.
But that does not lead necessarily to the conclusion that all present ones
are equally founded or unfounded there. Nor does it preclude the fact
that actual forms of existence at one period are not for that fact and
without further ado permanently viable possibilities. Development to a
definite term in the New Testament cannot be a priori ruled out as having
normative consequences for subsequent faith and order in the Christian
churches.
A similar notion regarding the normative character of development is
suggested by the extraordinarily perceptive paper Pierre Benoit read at
the same Congress. It has to do with the nature of truth in the Bible.
That truth, he maintains, is concrete and not speculative; religious rather

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than secular; expressed by way of adaptation and literary creation; proposed progressively and not all at once or in any one book, but after
the close of revelation complete and decisive for the faith of subsequent
ages. His point is that, in the gradual development present in the composition of the biblical canon, God makes corrections (e. g., regarding the
nature of human survival after death) or, better, tolerates certain outward
appearances of error which he little by little eliminates. This is divine
pedagogy from which men are to learn. Is the divinely directed process of
development itself (and not simply the final truth attained) intended to be
instructive? An affirmative seems the warranted answer and does not keep
the doctrine of life everlasting from being the truth for future ages.
Perhaps the development with regard to the office of Christian teacher in
the New Testament deserves to be considered in an analogous way.
Unless questions regarding the normative character of the direction
development took in the New Testament are faced, Christians run the risk
of needless ecumenical disillusionment. Projected unions of churches may
be rejected for good as well as for ignoble reasons. If the good ones point
at some future date to the fact that systematic theologians are not doing
their homework now, the cause of Christian unity will not be well served.
I may be mistaken on this but it is my view. It is also the reason why
I consider the historical studies of Colson and Benoit so important for those
concerned with the past and future development of Christian institutions
and doctrines.
CARL J. PETER
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Philosophy and the Future of Man: Proceedings of the American Catholic
Philosophical Association. Edited by GEORGE F. McLEAN, 0. M. I.
Washington, D. C.: Catholic University, 1968. Pp. 245.
In recent years social thinkers mainly in France, the United States, and
Great Britain have increasingly turned attention to the track of the future
and especially the shape of the human city in the year 2000. According
to Daniel Bell, Chairman of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences
Commission on the Year 2000, a combination of the old and new may
throw some light on the upsurge of futurism and the special fascination of
the year 2000: the old, a residual strain of chiliasm; the new, an overweening technological optimism, complacently trustful that man will be able to
create new mechanical miracles. A deeper reason seems at work; contemporary man, who, in the somewhat self-prt>ening phrase, has " come of age,"
feels confident that techniques like linear programming, decision-making

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theory, systems analysis, plus advances in social theory may bring within
reach a conjectured prevision, if not control, of certain sectors of the future.
For reflections and projections concerning things to come, various symposia
have drawn on physicists, chemists, zoologists, social psychologists, psychiatrists, social theorists, political scientists, economists, anthropologists, communications experts, ethnologists, State Department professionals, military
analysts, computer experts, and theologians. The lack of philosophers
among participants in futuristic conversations seems glaring in the light of
philosophies of history propounded by Vico, Spengler, Sorokin, Comte,
Hegel, and Marx among others that have endeavored to foretell at least
glimmers of what lies ahead and that, some hold, have remotely inspired
futuristic ambitions. To remedy in part this deficiency " Philosophy and
the Future of Man " was adopted as the 1968 ACP A convention theme.
Considering how doubly hard it appears in an age adoring nonconformity to
get philosophers (sometimes self-analyzed as a particularly ornery breed)
to hew to any set intellectual policy, some may judge it a minor thematic
triumph that all seven plenary session papers directly or indirectly ponder
lines of the future and, of fifteen panel session papers, seven touch on the
meaning of the future in some way. Because of the nature of the theme,
roughly two-thirds of the papers are concerned with practical issues. Two
other unlinked items may be noted. Thirteen papers are presented by
thinkers not connected with church-related institutions. Curiously, little
or nothing throughout bears on or derives from Teilhard de Chardin, a
seer celebrated for his grand vision of the future.
Robert Kreyche's presidential address, given the same title as the
convention theme, calls for a realistic metaphysics that pursues humanistic
issues through analysis of the cognitive conditions of practical wisdom.
Canonizing the linguistically trivial, he warns, has quietly garroted the
quest for logos in the majority of American philosophy departments.
Gently, at time wittily, he holds the mirror up to other current behavioral
debits: a pathetic obsequiousness to the nonprofundities of foreigners (so
pronounced, one may add, that in some circles delivery in broken English
of itself assures utmost respect for a paper} and a distressing proclivity to
acclaim any idea, no matter how grotesque, so long as it is supposed new.
Also concerned with the state of philosophy is the address of Aquinas
medalist Josef Pieper, accorded a handsomely appropriate introduction by
Msgr. J. K. Ryan. Locating the core of modern philosophical malaise in the
divorce of philosophy and theology, Pieper offers some reasons and
directives for their cooperation. Without acquaintance with the science
and philosophy of the day theology may stagnate and the theologian become unable to translate his interpretation of revealed data into contemporary idiom. For theology progresses, not as suggested by the feeble analogy
of vegetative growth but under human conditions, with all the tensions due
to mental conflict and moral stress. Encounter and rapport bring philoso-

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phical gains also, the largest of which is immunity from all-explaining
deductions of nature and history. Breakdown of communication with
theology disposes philosophers to consecration to the nugatory and the
elaboration of pseudo-salvific programs. We remain utterly in the dark
about what ideas will hold the field in the generation or two ahead. Revelation de novissimis is silent about the state of philosophy in the penultimate hour of human history, but close to the stroke of doom, Pieper
surmises, perhaps only believers will be genuinely philosophizing.
In " The Challenge to the Computer " Mortimer Adler poses the question
whether it is in principle possible to construct a Turing machine capable
of carrying on an open-ended conversation. Such a robot would not
replicate but simulate intelligent behavior, for built into it would be
" infant programming," i. e., not a knowledge of a particular natural Iangauge but a randomness of connections enabling it to learn a natural
language. Apparently, Adler concludes, a Turing machine that worked
would nullify arguments for an immaterial source of concepts. The literature Adler is familiar with, however, contains grounds for a more astringent
skepticism than he evinces. As M. Taube has shown, no mechanical translation can be formalized (in other words, no MT machine can handle puns
or simple homonyms), and for similar reasons a machine able to learn a
natural language and converse openendedly simply cannot be formalized.
In this connection Giidel's proof, according to J. Lucas, cancels out all
possibility of formalizing any language in a closed fashion. Aside from
laboring under the fallacy of analogy (equivalent to calling an adding
machine a young mathematican), the Turing proposal, moreover, doubly
begs the question. Thinking is behavioristically assumed to be mere
mechanical verbalization. And it is illicitly supposed that true language
can occur in the absence of a central nervous system and a highly developed
brain, neither of which is mechanically reproducible. Again, as the delightful incongruity of the well-known New Yorker cartoon indicates, no
machine can say, Cogito, ergo sum, for an artifact has essentially no more
subjectivity and self-awareness than a stone. Furthermore, the mathematician Euler, according to an old story, once nonplussed a mathematically
ignorant Diderot by interweaving a few equations, then proclaiming,
" Therefore God exists! " It seems most doubtful that anyone will build
a Turing machine in the next fifty years. Instead, within a half century
or century perhaps a generation less liable to be taken in by philosophical
bizarreries of scientists will dismiss Turing's proof of a thinking machine
as an unwitting quasi-McLuhanesque spoof of no more value than Euler's
proof. Indeed, even today it seems questionable whether anyone really
believes a machine can think any more than anyone really acts on the
belief that Bertrand Russell and his disciples are nothing but Russellian
bags of sense data.
Contemporary man is a bridge to Superman; so hypothesizes James

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Feibleman's "The Human Future from Scientific Findings." Increasing
control of the environment favors the expectation that man can actively
make straight the path for his evolutionary superior-actively because we
have it within our hands to decide the sort of Superman we want to emerge.
This is, on the whole, a disappointing effort from an ordinarily fertile and
sensitive spirit. In addition to being, as R. De George's commentary notes,
practically devoid of consecutive argument, it musters no scientific findings at all in advocacy of a next evolutionary leap but simply keeps the
nco-Darwinian faith in mutation, actually a retrogressive mechanism.
Somewhat better control of scientific data marks William Pollard's "The
Key to the Twentieth Century." Envisaging the earth as a spaceship (a
figure originating with Adlai Stevenson and popularized by Barbara Ward)
with limited energy and food to maintain its occupants, Pollard paints a
grim picture of the social paroxysms, especially famine, that will convulse
underdeveloped countries, mainly because of a population crisis, in the next
decade or so. The means for increasing energy, expanding food production,
and repossessing wastelands lie within technical grasp, but myopic national
self-interest is thwarting formation of international organizations to apply
these techniques. In his commentary P. Kuntz raises doubt about Pollard's
extrapolations from current population figures and effectively questions the
spaceship analogy of a paper almost bare of philosophical analysis.
Whereas most give short shrift to the philosophical implications of what
lies beyond the horizon of the present, " Philosophy and the Futurists," by
Paul Durbin, a promising young thinker, adventurously tries to pin down
some of the philosophical tasks growing out of futurism. Borrowing his
contextual frame from G. H. Mead, he deems the intellectual sphere a
society of knowers, the most significant part of which is a scientific
subculture; and within this subculture the most enterprising wing of social
scientists consists of futurists like B. De Jouvenel, D. Bell, and H. Kahn
who, armed with an assortment of predictive techniques, are striving to
fashion a systematic mode of forecasting. Geared to the future, philosophical activity should aim at becoming an " integral part of human evolutionary adaptation," be radically open, give itself to teamwork, and initiate or
identify itself with a social movement. The hypothesis of social evolution,
however, seems largely discredited and, on the practical side, the pluralism
which Durbin blesses clearly vetoes any pooling of resources among those
of broadly diversified philosophic persuasions. In spite of some defects,
Durbin's venture commends itself as a forceful exercise in the tentative
thinking on fundamentals he believes best defines philosophizing.
In "Secular Man and his Religion," the most enthusiastically received
address at the convention, Louis Dupre argues that because of an inescapable secularity religion can never more claim to be the only sovereign
integrating factor in society but must reconcile itself to the fact of
competing world views like terrenistic humanism and Marxism. Restriction

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of religious hegemony flows from secular man's conception of religious faith
as completely interiorized. Dupre, a thinker rising in prominence and influence, concludes to the absolute inwardness of faith from discerning
analyses of the dialectic of the sacred vis-a-vis the secular and from modern
alienation. The sacred assimilates the profane by negating it. Indeed, as
transcendent, it is a coincidentia oppositorum. The modern loss of the
sacred, on Dupre's reckoning, has estranged man from his own being. Yet,
though inherently antagonistic to the sacred, alienation remains potentially
religious. In the context of alienation modern man no longer directly
experiences the sacred so that his faith becomes a strictly interior commitment, which carries implicit recognition that religion can no longer hold
title to an all-embracing integrative power. This rich, acute paper is
unfortunately somewhat marred by a forced polarization of sacred and
profane. The two are not contrarily but relatively opposed, and far from
being mutually cannibalistic, they are meant to harmonize in a dynamic,
extrinsically finalistic pattern, the goal of the lower being ordered to, but
not gobbled up by, the end of the sacred. In this connection a sacred order
in which all opposites blur together looks suspiciously like either a nest of
paradoxes or a night in which all cows are black. Again, an alienation
entailing the loss of the sacred might be better called privatively instead of
potentially religious. Dialectical shuffling also probably underlies the odd
observation that sex libertinism among revolting youth must be countenanced as a novel epiphany of the religiously authentic. A purely interiorized
faith, moreover, seems vulnerable to the devastating charge against Kierkegaard's dictum that truth is subjectivity: how is one to distinguish
authentic faith from the no less inward vision of a lunatic? Finally, in
predicting, "Religion will never again be the integrating factor of society,"
Dupre seems to fall victim to a twentieth-century parochialism besides, as
H. Boers' commentary observes, contradicting an earlier contention that
religion is the meaning-giving ingredient in society.
One of the most impressive of the afternoon panel session papers, " The
Problem of Balance in the Philosophy of Religion," by Kevin O'Neill, a
former student of Dupre's, penetratingly examines inconveniences arising
when one unwarily essays to do full justice to the integrity of both
philosophy and religion. Clearly both philosophy and religion, taken
separately, must be guaranteed autonomy, else one or the other becomes
paralyzed. Yet when taken together, as in some interpretations of the
character of philosophy of religion, one or the other must surrender
autonomy. If religion remains autonomous, philosophy must defer to extrarational factors. On the other hand, conscientiousness about philosophic
autonomy tends to stifle the independence of religion; religious data has
to be chopped to fit prior philosophic assumption-structures.
Though
O'Neill does not explicitly draw the conclusion, the upshot, it would seem,
is that philosophy of religion cannot lay claim to a disciplinary status equi-

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valent to that of philosophy of nature or philosophy of man. It is merely
a curricular hybrid nonsystematically canvassing topics principally from
natural theology and fundamental theology. O'Neill's remarkable paper
trumpets a warning against a still virulent strain of Enlightenment
rationalism that, in arbitrarily decreeing that reason sit in judgment on
all religion, threatens to dereligionify religion and invites the destruction of
Christianity. The companion piece in the philosophy of religion section,
James King's "Is Relation to God Impossible?", nicely and, for the most
part, justly disentagles the multiple sense of man's relation of God.
Absolutely speaking, it is logically impossible to become related to God;
such a becoming implies alteration in or production of God himself. If
there is a God, we are, strictly, already related to him. Striking and,
for some, stinging corollaries spring from this fine distinction: all language
about suddenly entering into relation with God is meaningless; since religion
is synonymous with existence, all actions are religious; phenomenology is
worthless for resolving the God-question. Still, King adds, we may legitimately speak of becoming related to God in a qualified manner, according
to our dateable mode of awareness. It is not captious to wonder whether
King's slighting of relations of reason has flawed some of his analysis.
If only real relations obtain between man and God, God is modified by
our being, apart from our becoming, related to him; and if the relation is
one of reason on his side, our becoming absolutely related to him does not
modify him one whit. Again, if all actions are labelled religious, trying to
pinpoint the religious qualities in murder and cruelty may prove embarassing.
Edward Rousseau's "Historical Causality and Civilization" furnishes
one more sign of surging interest in the import of history. Though historical statements fall short of precise necessity and universality, they can
attain, we are told, an artistic necessity and a sort of causative universality.
Just as a plausible inevitability attends the denouement of a major
Shakespearian tragedy, so a certain factual determinancy is laid bare in a
perspicacious historical rendering of what might have been otherwise. The
historian also concentrates on human analogates of what pre-Galilean
physics named universals in causation (the sun in reference to the earth
was one such universal):
the impacts of a George Washington or a
Battle of Leipzig stretch far beyond their temporal span. Seeing the
historian as quasi-dramatist, however, leaves the gap between history and
assured knowledge as great as ever; the valuational standpoints of a new
generation of historians may reverse or reject predecessors' conclusions.
Disanalogous factors weigh heavily against the suggestive idea of a causative universality. For one thing, the nature of historical event remains
woolly. More importantly, long-term "causal" sequences in history result
from historians' reconstructions; long dead historical " causes " simply can
not operate like natural causes. Not history but history of philosophy

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is the concem of A. Robert Caponigri's " Reason and Death: The Idea
of Wisdom in Seneca." A study marked by a measured style as well as
shrewd analysis meditates on a theme to which latter-day Stoics, the
existentialists, have given fresh urgency. For Seneca death has three analogous significations: physical dissolution itself; the slow wearing away of
life temporally experienced as nausea or accidie; and, in the ultimate sense,
the severance of human reason from cosmic reason. The main business of
philosophy consists in wedding individual reason to the reason of nature
so that this union spells the defeat of the other two deaths also. For the
man of wisdom in tune with Reason's changeless life, death becomes a
liberating gateway to life at its fullest. Because Caponigri cites no texts, it
is not easy to determine whether he is reading out of or into Seneca certain
Spinozistic and Heideggerian accents. Too, the parallel of the Senecan
Sage's serenity with Paul's cry of triumph, " 0 death, where is thy
victory? " seems more contrived than spontaneous.
The meaning of death also partly occupies Edward Ballard's " Toward
a Phenomenology of Man." Biological birth and death, he maintains, are
only metaphorically applied to their human correlates. Indeed the reverse
of common opinion is the case: it is by human birth and death that we
analogically come to understand their biological similars. Human birth is
indirectly experienced in an awareness of one's capacity to solve problems
and creatively to enjoy a concert or painting. Best exemplified in the
passing of a Socrates, human death is a fruition to which the successful
fulfillment of a plan approaches. It seems misguided, however, to speak
seriously about a human birth and death in some literal, i.e., experienced,
sense. Too, solving a problem in calculus does not evidence birth of
mathematical capacity but brings awareness of an aptitude already there.
Nor is death the crown of life; the tolling bell laments the termination
but hardly the culmination of life. Coupled with Ballard in the section on
phenomenology is Calvin Schrag's excellent paper, "Substance, Subject,
and Existenz," according to which the notions of substance and subject
have to be superseded by Existenz to achieve a rounded portrait of man.
An irremediably cosmological Aristotelian substance, while admittedly
dynamic, perforce neglects the historicity of man. The concept of subject
also situates man in a totality of facts and splits private and public worlds.
Existenz, "the center of concem projected against a background of
natural and historic meanings," catches all that is opulent and manysplendored in individual lived-out experience. But, in selecting process or
event as his prime category, Schrag tums man into a collection of events,
which is tantamount to a photo-copy of the atomic dust of the Humeans.
Again, lopsided stress on man the doer may tend to cut man off from his
roots in nature and from the scientific side of culture.
Both Edward Manier and Desmond Fitzgerald wrestle with the problem
of human mutability in an evolutionary framework. In " Genetics and the

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Future of Man: Scientific and Ethical Possibilities " Manier discusses
scientific means available for a limited genetic control of human evolution
intended to check the alarming rise of potential mutations in the gene
pool. The ethical possibilities are only skimpily explored, and considered
moral judgments on the problem are postponed. Manier might well have
allotted a line or two, one feels, to reprehending the terrible simplifications
of the neo-Maltlmsian K. Davis and B. Eckland's almost weird theory that
the family must be scrapped. Fitzgerald answers a characteristically
thoroughly researched, convincing "yes" to the question in his title, "Is
there an Unchanging Human Nature?" Man has probably undergone
considerable physical modifications in passing from an australopithecine to
homo sapiens, but his essentially rational nature has stayed unaltered. It
is possible, he holds, that future physical traits such as size, musculature,
and range of senses may further vary without substantially affecting the
theorizing, good-captivated, and artistic animal. Some of the evolutionary
sources, it may be remarked, merit a somewhat less reverential treatment.
Among his colleagues, Leakey, sometimes disparaged as a bone hunter, does
not enjoy the most envied of reputations for accuracy and reserve, and even
the authority of E. Mayr cannot win assent for the classification of a skull
with a capacity of only 500 cc. as truly human.
Adapting Scheler's triple division of life-community, formal organization,
and person-community, Ernest Ranly, in "Ethics and Community,"
vibrantly searches for ways to ground the propositions of the natural law
in person-community, "essentially a religious community," and thus, while
retaining the universal scope of natural law principles, to apply general rules
in an analogous and personalistic rather than a univocal and legalistic
manner. Ranly, however, is not altogether successful in clarifying the
character of person-community. In one respect his description sounds like
a philosophic version of a nowhere-exemplified natural People of God. Too,
a universality analogously applied may have trouble steering clear of the
reefs on which situationists founder. Robert Ashmore's essay, "Situation
Ethics and the Human Situation," tackles, apart from a communitarian context, some of the problems that engage Ranly. Absolute rules of behavior
are not imperatives imposed from above but formulations expressing the
necessity of certain means to satisfy needs like food, shelter, mating, and
the welfare of larger social groups. Certain moral prohibitions are absolute,
because the acts proscribed are unjustifiable by definition. Yet, because
of infinitely varying circumstances, exceptions are at times permissible.
Indeed because it is empirically grounded, the moral code itself can vary
inasmuch as man in his total situation varies according to " evolutionary or
technological process." The slightly veiled situationism making its entrance
toward the close clashes sharply with Ashmore's earlier unmistakable
espousal of absolute rules. Apart from this incongruous shift, Ashmore's
hesitant relatiYism will fail to carry conviction so long as he neglects to

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specify the " evolutionary and technological " conditions that will radically
alter fundamental moral precepts and declines to instance cases in which
absolute rules like that barring murder admit of unambiguous, honorable
exception.
For Jesse Mann and Fr. Robert Roth, S. J., a beneficent pragmatism
yields a general philosophic style and a sane social policy. Mann finds
the basis for " The Role of the Tentative in John Dewey " in Dewey's
picture of the nature as a continuum of ceaseless flux, in the ongoing cognition of which risk and incertitude preponderate. A hypothetically employed
scientific intelligence narrows the band of the indeterminate and experimentally proffers solutions to moral problems. Mann's unqualifiedly admiring appraisal might have gained balance by a critical scrutiny of a
notoriously amoral scientific intelligence so aptly manageable by Kremlin
con men. Roth's "American Philosophy and the Future of Man " judiciously counts on pragmatism to hit the mean between pessimistic and optimistic readings of the present and future states of American civilization.
Earlier L. Mumford chided older pragmatists for acquiescence in depersonalizing tendencies. Lately H. Marcuse has been summoning social
thinkers to " the Great Refusal," an anathematizing of all evil in contempporary living. From pragmatistic resources, Roth believes, we can harvest a
melioristic blending of valid acquiescence and refusal: acceptance of the
sturdy, rejection of the sleazy in our institutions. The pragmatistic outlook
applauds the healthy lineaments of science and technology but levels
strictures on social forces that balk the freeing of the human spirit,
particularly an individualism judged and found wanting in the light of
Dewey's faith in ideals communally aspired to. This study, however, does
not seem sufficiently alert to the perils, commonly associated with pragmatism, of social engineering and of total commitment to a social-minded
naturalism that hallows expediency and genuflects before the status quo in
the name of scientifically emancipated morality.
Papers on disparate topics by Charles Breslin and Ivan Boh are
grouped under the rubric of logic, language, and epistemology. Breslin,
in " The Logistic Interpretation of Aristotle's Categorical Syllogism," expertly surveys a number of modern logical systems and concludes that not
one adequately duplicates Aristotle's categorical syllogistic. Frege's predicate calculus cannot handle subalternation, contrary and subcontrary opposition, and other laws. In general, the algebra of logic of Boole, Venn, and
Schoeder provides no room for subalternation, since A is nonexistential and
I existential. Even Lukasiewicz is unable to assimilate Aristotelian
syllogistic to modern logical structures. Brentano-Hillebrand existence
theory implies a logical formulation equivalent to an NI system, and this,
too, is forced to exlude certain core features of Aristotle's formal logic.
The reason why modern systems cannot be made coextensive with
Aristotelian logic lies in their extreme existential neutrality, symbolized by

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the null class. This stance widely diverges from the existential reference
stamped on Aristotelian logic, which Breslin calls "a logic of Being." This
last phrase, however, seems elliptical. It may be more accurate to esteem
Aristotle's logic an instrument for ordering operations of the mind dealing
with the nature of things; it is, in other words, a work of the mind concerning second intentions bearing on first intentions. On this alternative view,
then, Aristotelian logic, though instrumentally existential, is a noetic structure that is in itself existentially neutral. Thus one basic error of modern
logicians seems to be in part the reverse of what Breslin argues for:
despite a drift to formalization for its own sake, modern logics tend to
be over-existential in the sense that they focus on first intentions (according
to H. Veatch) or treat second intentions as first intentions (according to
F. Wade). But the absurdity of the null class, we may add, seems to be
traceable to another mistake, an overstress on extensionality. Vienna-born
Gustav Bergmann's swing from indoctrination in logical positivism to an
investigation of problems not negotiable by log-ic, natural sciences, and
mathematics captures Boh's interest in " Reflections on Bergmann's Ontology." To the question, why do we look upon two red spots as numerically
different but qualitatively alike, Bergmann replies that the spots are bare
particulars, ontological simples, somehow sharing in the universal red and
joined to the universal by a nexus of exemplification. Existence continues
to bedevil inquirers: " John exists " is not translatable into a propositional
function, and existence resists inclusion in a thing-ontology. The problem
of existence, in one reader's opinion, might look less formidable if, breaking
free from Kant here and critically reviewing Frege's logic, we saw existence
as a determinant able to be predicated of a subject.
Capitalizing with surprising success on elementary relations in modern
logic, William Martin's " The Order of Teaching and Learning " deftly
limns the structure of teaching. First, the relation is triadic: a teacher
teaches knowledge to a student. Second, the relation is asymmetrical: no
teacher as such learns from a learner as such. Third, the relation is
transitive: without exaggeration, we may take Descartes to be the remote
teacher of a student mastering analytic geometry. From the denial of their
relations stem certain ills of educational theory. Dropping knowledge from
the triad encourages schooling that virtually manipulates minds for social
adjustment. Indifference to asymmetry robs the teacher of authority.
Finally, out of suppression of transitivity are bred contempt for the past
and a cult of the shallowly utilitarian.
Whitehead's view that great thinkers in science and philosophy are
" ultimately the rulers of the world " seems to smack of a certain academic
inbreeding that may affiict even the best. Too intellectualistic a perspective
underplays the massive forces of passion, fantasy, deep-rooted loves and
loyalties, not to speak of what lies in another realm altogether, the
strength of the genuinely supernatural. Though it may be extravagant to

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believe it is primarily ideas that make the world go round, reason cannot
be denied its indispensible moiety to contribute to the building of a City
of Man open to God. So (to indulge one more imaginative roving about the
future) , should a generous philosophic reader yet unborn stumble upon
this volume thirty or one hundred years hence, he will probably be warmed
by the retrospect of professionals dedicated to the hard work of thought,
eschewing the spectacular and oracular, struggling for his sake as much as
theirs to push back the edges of darkness a little bit.
JoHN M. QuiNN, 0. S.A.

Biscayne CoUege
Miami, Florida

Two Logics: The Conflict between Classical and Neo-Analytic Philosophy.
By HENRY B. VEATCH. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University
Press, 1969. Pp. 288. $8.00.

What can be said of Prof. Veatch's Two Logics can be said of few other
recent books in philosophy: it deals with issues that are at once topical
and fundamental in a style that is free of abstruse or hypertechnical
language. For what Veatch proposes to do in his latest book is no less
than to explain how the present, often recognized conflict between our
scientific and humanistic cultures arises out of a fundamental difference in
their respective logics, i.e., in the way or method by which each of these
opposed cultures achieves knowledge and understanding. Concretely,
Veatch suggests that whereas the humanistic disciplines seek to understand
things for what they are in fact and in reality, that is, seek to know
things in their " whats " or natures, scientific disciplines seek to know things
in their relation.<J to other things. And so, the one uses a what-logic while
the other uses a relating-logic.
Now Veatch's ultimate aim is to show that each of these two logics is
quite legitimate for its own purposes, so that it is not and should not be
a case simply of either the one logic or the other. Moreover, in his concluding chapter Veatch argues that, while they are distinct and equally
justifiable cognitive instruments, our humanistic and scientific logics are
not so independent of each other " as to exclude a possible ordering . . .
one with respect to the other," in such a way that the relating logic of
modern science is shown to be subordinate to the what-logic of the
humanities.
To substantiate his ultimate thesis Veatch presents a detailed, lucid and
really illuminating comparison of the character and function of both propo-

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149

sitions and arguments as the latter are construed in the context of a whatlogic and a relating-logic respectively. The general point of the comparison
is to show the inappropriateness of either saddling science with a theory
of propositions and argumentation designed to meet the needs of humanistic
knowledge or, vice versa, saddling humanistic knowledge with a doctrine of
propositions and inference tailored to the specific purposes of scientific
knowledge.
But Veatch's method is not merely expository but necessarily defensive
and critical as well. For, as in centuries past some of the later Schoolmen
tried to foist a what-logic on human beings in their role as scientists,
explaining particular physical phenomena in terms of hidden essences or
substantial forms, so today, according to Veatch, we find neo-analytic
philosophy committing the opposite error of foisting a specialized relatinglogic on all of us simply in our role as ordinary everyday human knowers.
The proximate cause of this contemporary error according to the author
is the widespread, if uncritical, acceptance by neo-analytic philosophers of
the analytic-synthetic dichotomy
among propositions. For that distinction
rules out in principle what is the very core of a what-logic, namely, the
possibility of making statements that are at once necessary and about the
world. But Veatch argues both that the common notion of an analytic
truth amounts to a sheer impossibility and that the nominalistic presuppositions that originally gave rise to the analytic-synthetic distinction
in Hume and Kant-presuppositions
which go unquestioned or unseen by
many neo-analytic philosophers-are unwarranted. In fact, Veatch maintains, it is this outright dismissal of real essences or natures by contemporary followers of Hume and Kant that constitutes the ultimate cause
of the present-day eclipse of a what-logic in favor of a relating-logic. And
lest anyone doubt that contemporary scientists as well as contemporary
analytic philosophers owe much of their method to Hume and/or Kant,
Prof. Veatch ably shows how the celebrated Kantian method of transcendental justification (according to which there is no such thing as necessary order in or experience of nature apart from the activity of human
minds) has become "the very foundation stone of almost the entire edifice
of contemporary philosophy of science." (p. 179)
Nevertheless, quite apart from the dubious logical and ontological
grounds on which the present-day elimination of a what-logic rests, the
error of abandoning a what-logic altogether may be seen more immediately
according to Veatch by noting how, precisely because of their abandonment
of a-what-logic, neo-analytic philosophers fall prey to a certain logical
fallacy when it comes to analyzing certain prima facie what-statements.
This fallacy Veatch calls "the fallacy of inverted intentionality."
Specifically, and according to the neo-analyst, a statement like "red and
green cannot be in the same place at the same time " does not intend any
real impossibility in the world but is rather a mere linguistic truth or a

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" veiled grammatical rule " for the use of " red " and " green." But Veatch
argues that, if this is not to commit the logical fallacy of confusing use
with mention, it is surely to commit the logical fallacy of inverted intentionality or, in other words, the fallacy of ignoring the order of priority
among the various levels of intention. For, clearly, it is only because of
the real impossibility of red and green being at the same place at the same
time that there is a grammatical rule governing the use of " red " and
"green." Or, put more generally, it is only because of what words are used
to signify in first intention (i.e., it is only in making what-statements)
that we can in second intention utter certain linguistic or logical rules for
the use of these same words. But, having removed all necessity and
impossibility from the world, the nco-analyst must artificially construe a
necessary statement in first intention as a necessary statement in second
intention (i. e., as a linguistic truth, a veiled grammatical rule, etc.) . And
yet, the very condition of the second intentional statement is that the
first intentional statement be taken at face value, i. e., taken as a first
intentional or " what " statement.
The reviewer finds the author's criticism of nco-analytic philosophy very
telling and his overall comparison of a what-logic with a relating-logic
superb. And yet, the reviewer feels that by insisting on the fallibility as
well as the necessity of the what-statements of traditional logic, the
author falls into the very error he accuses the nco-analyst of making,
namely, the error of construing necessary logical relations as entirely independent of any real necessity-relations that are in no way " dictated by
reality." For, according to Veatch, a statement like "the whale is a fish"
exemplifies the necessary logical relation of species to genus, even though
the statement is in fact false.
Moreover, this fallibility thesis as regards what-statements seems (ironically) to lead Veatch himself to a form of the fallacy of inverted intentionality. For if the genus-species relation is not based on any real necessity,
then it follows that the necessity of, say, the second intentional logical or
grammatical rule: " ' animal ' is the genus of ' man ' " cannot be determined by what the words "animal" and "man" are used to signify in first
intention. In other words, instead of the necessity of the logical rule in
question being determined by some real necessity between being a man
and being an animal, the necessity of that rule holds quite independently
of what animals and men are in fact and in reality. To avoid this
embarrassment, perhaps Veatch should have said that it is not what-statements themselves that are fallible, but rather that it is we human beings
who are fallible in judging that a statement is or is not a what-statement.
JoHN

University of Rhode Island
Kingston, R. I.

F. PETERsoN

BOOK REVIEWS

An Interpretation of Existence. By JosEPH OwENs. Milwaukee:

151
The

Bruce Publishing Company, 1968. Pp. 160.
This interpretation of existence follows familiar Thomistic lines but is
not mere repetition. It is set forth in the context of the historical background and the pluralistic currents of contemporary thought. The author
remarks that genuine philosophy must be creative, not, indeed, a creation
out of nothing but a creative evolution which is the continuing of a
developmental process and the growth of insights marking the progress of
human understanding. " A Thomism that is narrowly ' Thomistic ' cannot
hope to be a genuine Thomism." (p. 147) The present work is refreshingly open to the interests of philosophers not only of the West but in this
ecumenical age hopefully also of the East.
The problem of existence arises from the fact that, although the
existence of things is admittedly known, the interpretation of this fact is
by no means easily achieved or agreed upon. Is the existence of things a
mere historical event which can be passed over as philosophically trivial,
or is it pregnant with the most far-reaching and all-important of philosophical consequences? The answer, we are told, depends upon how existence
is grasped and conceived.
Our original grasp of the existence of things is not attained in any
concept, because concepts do not have existential content. Conceptually,
one hundred dollars are the same, whether the dollars exist or not. By
intellect we can consider the thing and the existence separately, and the
concepts themselves even in combination, such as a real mountain of gold,
do not express the fact that something exists. It is not in the act of mere
conceiving but in the act of judging that we grasp the existence of things
in such a way as to know that something exists. Conceptualization and
judgment always accompany each other, but they are two different kinds of
intellectual activity, each with its own object. Judgment is a dynamic and
synthesizing activity, and it is conditioned by time. Existence as the object
of judgment is also a synthesizing, dynamic and temporally conditioned
actuality. There are two ways or levels of existence, real and cognitional,
and these are known by different judgments.
Existence as first known by judgment is analyzed and interpreted so as
to set forth the high points of realistic metaphysics in a way that is, for
the most part, clear and convincing. This is a work which merits and
will well repay careful study. In striking ways it brings out the cardinal
position that our knowledge of existence is attained through judgment, not
through mere apprehension. The analysis of existence as first grasped
through judgment is pursued to the source of existence in an efficient cause
which is itself subsistent existence, and from this principle synthetic consequences of vital importance are drawn concerning the imparting of existence
to created things, particularly in regard to human freedom and the
human soul.

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Some reservations, however, must be made. In the first place, the author
does not analyze or critically justify the realism which he assumes. He
does not indicate the necessary order in our primitive concepts and
judgments through which we know that something exists with its own real
or natural being distinct from our knowledge of it. This analysis was
made by St. Thomas both in the Summa Theologiae (I, q. 11, a. 2 ad 4)
and elsewhere, and indeed was one of his great achievements. Moreover,
one might object to the way in which the author contrasts the objects of
conceptualization and of judgment and the way he relates these different
acts. The intellect can conceive a thing and its existence separately, but
this does not seem to be the usual way of conceiving. Ordinarily we must
know that something exists before we can know what it is, and some
primitive apprehensions must precede judgment, which is made by combining or dividing concepts in the light of the objects known. It would
seem that apprehension must attain existence in some way, even if not
distinctly or explicitly, and once explicitly known through judgment this
knowledge can be included in the concept of the thing at least implicitly.
In a word, to empty all concepts of existential import seems highly artificial, if indeed it is at all possible. Furthermore, the author does not
interpret the main line of Aristotle's thought as does St. Thomas, who
explained Aristotle's doctrine of form, not as a being or a whole but as
a part and a cause of being, always dependent upon a first cause which
imparts not only motion but also being even to eternal and incorruptible
things.
WILLIAM

H. KANE, 0. P.

Aquinas Institute, School of
River Forest, IU.

Moral Reasoning. By R. W. BEARDSMORE. New York:
1969. Pp. 143. $4.95.

Schocken Books,

R. W. Beardsmore, of the University College of North Wales, Bangor,
has provided us with an essay on moral reasoning and moral arguments
that is simultaneously fascinating and frustrating. It is fascinating both
because Beardsmore's critique of the positions taken by R. M. Hare and
Mrs. Foot is so telling and instructive and because much that he has to
say positively about the nature of moral reasoning makes such good sense.
It is frustrating because, after one has finished and begun to reflect on
Beardsmore's own position, one is suddenly aware that the position set
forth, although plausible in many respects, is ultimately a linguistic game
that simply fails to come to grips with the issues.

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153

Beardsmore's essay is intended to show (l) that the two principal
accounts today of the nature of moral reasoning-in his view those represented by R. M. Hare and Mrs. Patricia Foot-are erroneous and
that
an alternate account, one proposed in the course of the essay by the
author, is more plausible.
Hare maintains that moral judgments have no subject-matter proper to
themselves and that a moral judgment is such not because of what is said
but because of the way it is said. According to Hare, a moral judgment
makes sense if it follows as a logical conclusion from a syllogism whose
major premise states a principle of conduct and whose minor premise is a
statement of fact. On this view moral evaluations, although based on
factual statements, are not reducible to facts but consist of facts plus an
added ingredient-an evaluative judgment that can serve as the major
premise in a moral argument. For instance, Hare argues as follows: One
ought never to say what is false; but X is false; therefore one ought not to
say X. Among the objections that Beardsmore poses to Hare's position is
that it logically entails the absurd consequence that anything can count
as a moral reason, provided that it is possible to devise an appropriate
major premise. Thus, according to Beardsmore, one could legitimately
argue, if Hare is correct in his evaluation of the nature of moral reasoning,
as follows: One ought always to hit one's brother-in-law on Tuesdays;
today is Tuesday; therefore you ought to hit your brother-in-law.
Mrs. Foot, on the other hand, holds that there are very strict limits as
to what can count as a moral reason. In Beardsmore's view, the limits
assigned by Mrs. Foot are too strict, too mechanical. For Mrs. Foot there
is, in principle, no reason why agreement on moral questions cannot be
reached on the same basis on which agreement is attained in scientific,
empirical arguments, because for her there is no real difference between
the two types of arguments. Consequently, on her view there is no real
difference between moral judgments and factual judgments inasmuch as
the former can be reduced to the latter by means of arguments based on
considerations of function and utility. Although Beardsmore does not
make this comparison, it would seem that Mrs. Foot's position is, on
utilmate analysis, the same as that of the utilitarians. An act's rightness
or wrongness depends on its utility as a means to achieve a certain end;
if the end in question contributes to the well-being of men, then the act
in question will be right. And the determination of the act's utility can
ideally, be decided on empirically verifiable grounds. Beardsmore objects
to Mrs. Foot's position chiefly because it is so rigid that it is impossible to
see how it can allow room for legitimate disagreements in moral matters,
disagreements that cannot be resolved in the same way that electricians,
for example, can resolve disagreements over what is wrong with a given
electrical system.
In the place of either of these two positions Beardsmore offers one,

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inspired in part by Wittgenstein, that is intended-contra Hare-to show
that only certain kinds of things can count as moral reasons and-contra
Foot-to allow room for serious conflict and disagreement over moral
questions. Beardsmore maintains that " there is a range of concepts
(murder, adultery, suicide, truth-telling, etc.) which are in some sense
constitutive of a morality." (p. 44) These concepts, moreover, are bound
up with factual states of affairs, so that all those who accept these
fundamental concepts are bound " to the same conclusion " because " for
them the facts already possess evaluative import. They are not just
facts." (p. 74) These concepts, in short, determine what significance the
facts can have for us, that is, they "determine our ideas of morality."
(p. 79)
For Beardsmore such judgments as " murder is wrong " or " one ought
to tell the truth " or " one ought not to commit adultery " are not, as both
Hare and Foot and most other moralists maintain, " moral principles."
Rather they are a web or network of evaluative judgments accepted as
factual statements by those who adhere to a given way of life or who
have been entrusted with a given tradition or heritage. As a result, all
those who belong to a given way of life-for example, Catholics-assign a
given meaning to certain types of activity (e. g., suicide) and within the
framework of this fundamental moral code we can find the framework for
and disagreement. (cf. p. 121) Beardsmore holds, however, that
by proposing the view that moral judgments make sense within a given
way of life or basic moral code he is not joining those who say that morality
is a matter of " convention " pure and simple. He claims that in his view
the basic moral code or way of life provides the context for telling whether
a particular reason can count as a moral reason but that it does not mean
pure conventionalism. For one thing, he holds that this basic code or way
of life, to be morally significant, cannot simply be accepted as something
imposed from without but it must be interiorized. Although a particular
individual within a given way of life does not decide what will count as
a moral fact-this is simply a result of the cultural milieu in which he is
immersed-still there is plenty of room for personal decision and responsible
judgment. Yet he does hold that irreconciliable disagreements will arise
when individuals with basically different moral codes engage in argumentfor example, when a Catholic argues about suicide with a Japanese Samurai.
Although it is possible that one will be " converted " to the other way of
life, this rarely happens, and when it does it means that a person has come
"to see that in some important way his views are wrong." (p. 90) But
as long as persons of radically diverse moral codes adhere to these codes,
there is simply no way of reaching agreement, because they cannot agree
on what will count as a moral argument.
This, in brief, is Beardsmore's position. As I said at the beginning, his
essay is both fascinating and frustrating. He has done a real service, I

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155

believe, in showing the inadequacies of the views of Hare and Foot; he
is surely correct in arguing that not everything can count as a moral reason
and that the intelligibility of a moral argument depends on agreement
over certain fundamental concepts and ideas. He is also quite right in
stressing the role that cultural background, heritage, traditions, and
membership in a given political and/or religious community play in providing these concepts and in offering us a framework within which meaningful discussion can take place. Yet his position logically leads to moral
relativism, for he is incapable of offering any reasons why any particular
moral code should be preferred to any other. In final analysis, this means
that there is ultimately no irrefutable reason why any type of human
activity should be considered right or wrong. The ultimate criterion,
consequently, of the rightness or wrongness of a human act, must be
non-rational. Although Beardsmore's position illuminates many aspects
of the rational character of moral discourse, it finally issues in the absurd.
WILLIAM E. MAY
Corpus lnstrumentorum
Washington, D. C.

The Nature of Moral Judgment: A Study in Contemporary Moral Philosophy. By PATRICK McGRATH. Notre Dame: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1969. Pp. 327. $6.50.
The decade of the 1960's may well be remembered by future historians
of ethics as a period of stock-taking and consolidation. After nearly
50 years of unparalleled vitality and development, a growing number of
moral philosophers in the Anglo-American world seem to be '-:'eady to slow
the pace for a moment in order to assimilate and reevaluate the rapid steps
of the recent past. The evidence for this is twofold: first, the rather
surprising dearth of novel, groundbreaking work in ethics during the last
ten years and, second, the near simultaneous appearance of a number of
books devoted in large measure to the task of giving a critical, historical
review of the development in Anglo-American ethical philosophy since
G. E. Moore.
The Nature of Moral Judgment falls squarely into this latter category
and as such will inevitably be compared with such excellent recent works
as The Revolution in Ethical Theory by George Kerner and G. J.
Warnock's Contemporary Moral Philosophy. Any such comparison, however, is bound to yield a favorable judgment of Father McGrath's work.
His treatment of individual theorists is remarkably fresh, and his view-

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point provides a valuable and much needed perspective on the issues
under consideration.
All of the previous works of this genre have been written by philosophers
who stand squarely in the tradition of linguistic-analytic philosophy itself.
Warnock and Kerner, for example, are both students of the late J. L.
Austin. And while their assessments of the fruitfulness of the direction
which recent ethical thought has taken vary widely, they share many
assumptions in common with the philosophers whose work they discuss.
Father McGrath, by contrast, approaches the analytic tradition in ethics
with the concerns of traditional moral philosophy uppermost in his mind.
The result, however, is not an unsympathetic diatribe against "linguistic"
philosophy of the sort which has been all too common in recent years.
Instead, one finds a balanced and generally sympathetic presentation of
the views of all the " classic " ethical theorists in the analytic tradition,
along with constructive criticism of each.
McGrath's book is divided into four parts, the first three devoted to
exposition and criticism and the fourth to a development of the author's
own constructive views. Part One, " The Emotive Theory of Moral
Judgment," presents sketches of l\foore's refutation of naturalism and of
the theories of meaning developed by Logical Atomism and Logical
Positivism. It then goes on to probe the emotivist ethical theories of
A. J. Ayer and Charles Stevenson, showing them to be a near inevitable
response to Moore's work in view of the theory of meaning extant among
the early analysts.
Part Two, " The Function of Ethical Statements," is devoted to a careful
analysis of the ethical writings of J. 0. Urmson, R. M. Hare and P. H.
Nowell-Smith. What separates the work of these philosophers from that
of the emotivists is a heightened appreciation of the subtlety and diversity
of linguistic functioning. Here McGrath correctly notes that this new
emphasis on looking at language at work in ethical contexts, as a means
of clarifying the nature of moral judgment, is due largely to the theory of
meaning implicit in the work of the " later " Wittgenstein.
In Part Three, " The Good Reasons Approach," McGrath considers the
work of Stephen Toulmin and Kurt Baier as exemplifying an approach to
ethics which, though Wittgensteinian in orientation, differs markedly from
that of the men discussed in Part Two. Urmson, Hare and Nowell-Smith
have been primarily interested in clarifying the use and significance of key
ethical terms such a " good " and " ought." Toulmin and Baier are more
concerned to lay bare the distinctive inferential patterns involved in giving
reasons and formulating arguments in ethics.
The exposition in these first three sections of the book is uniformly
excellent. Each theory is laid out simply, clearly and directly, with an
economy of expression that belies the true level of sophistication involved.
While this feature of the book recommends it highly to those seeking an

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introduction to recent developments in ethics in the analytic tradition, the
repository of evaluative criticism in these chapters will be of interest to all
students of moral philosophy. Father McGrath obviously believes that a
philosopher's views are no sounder than the arguments on which they rest.
His method of criticism is thus the devastatingly effective one of taking
crucial theses from each theorist, laying out the arguments which support
them, and then challenging the arguments with counterexamples and
counter arguments of his own. While his criticisms are not all of equal
weight, many are novel and important and will have to be taken seriously
by anyone convinced of the essential correctness of the theory in question.
Indeed, anyone fascinated by sheer argumentative skill will find much to
appreciate here.
In the fourth and concluding section of the book the author presents
his own positive theory of moral judgment. The explicit rationale which
is intended to tie together the first three critical sections with this fourth
constructive part is that, while all traditional moral theorists presuppose
a theory of moral judgment, " they seldom expound it and even less often
provide any evidence to show that it is true." (p. ix) Thus it is important,
from McGrath's point of view, to develop his own objective theory of moral
judgment out of a dialectical confrontation with the explicit, non-objective
theories of moral judgment put forward by ethicians in the analytic
tradition.
While this intention is clear, its execution is less so. This is not to say
that McGrath's own views are not stimulating and provocative. In a
relatively brief space, Part Four presents not only a spirited defense of
the objectivity of moral judgments but a definition of " good," an ultimate
criterion for moral judgment, and an answer to the question of why we
should be moral! The surprising thing is that, while echoes of the Greeks,
Scholastics, Kant and Bradley are all clearly audible in this section,
virtually no attempt is actually made to relate the views being expressed
to those of the theorists whose work was the subject of the previous
sections. The reader is left to his devices in sorting out and evaluating the
areas of agreement and disagreement.
In sum, one is left with the impression that there are two distinct
monographs between the covers of this book. Each is worthwhile in its
own right, but they rest somewhat uneasily side by side. Had the author
been able to weld them together more seamlessly, what is without a doubt
a good book would have been an excellent one indeed.
VAUGHN

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

R. McKIM

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ll fondamento etico-religioso del diritto secondo S. Tomm(Uo d' Aquino. By
P. REGINALDO M. PIZZORNI, 0. P. Rome:
Pp. 231.

Lateran University, 1968.

Una discussione sul' etica della F elicit a. By Gmv ANNI BLANDINO, S. J .,
BERNARD HARING, C. SS. R., GIANFRANco 1\'IoRRA, PAoLO VALORI, S. J.
Bologna: Edizioni di Etica, 1968. Pp. 99. L.600.

ll fondamento etico-religioso del diritto secondo S. Tom=o d'A_quino is
an ample, thoroughly thomist and well-documented thesis on the necessary
dependence of positive law on the natural law and of both on the eternal
law of God. There are many conclusions to be drawn. One that is of
interest in the changing world today is that law should not be changed for
frivolous reasons. St. Thomas's warning is timely: " qui facile mutat
legem, quantum est de se, debilitat legis virtutem." Much modern thought
about the relativity of natural law is rooted in the false notion that it is
something bound up with nature as we understand it and not as the
Wisdom of God has designed it. What we call divine positive law, God's
many personal interventions in our moral affairs, is a check on the tendency
of man to be a subjectivist where morality is concerned. The growth of
atheism has increased this danger so much that even believers think it is
suitable to formulate the theory that there can be law or morality without
reference to God. It is a theory that division among Christians has
indirectly fostered; for this pluralism causes the State to shy at identifying
itself with the truth as preached by one or other Christian denomination,
and in its passion for secularism it ends by failing to give practical recognition in its lawmaking to the existence of God and his Wisdom.
This book has a vital message. Indeed, it is a recall to sanity, if only
intelligent men have the patience to read through it slowly and thoughtfully.
With all the names l'Etica della Felicita looks like a notice of a film
coming shortly. Father Blandino the protagonist of the thesis that a
sytem of Ethics could be suitably built on the intention in every action of
contributing to one's own and other people's happiness. It is introduced
by Gianfranco Morra of Bologna University, and the theory is discussed
by Father Haring, C. SS. R., and Father Valori, S. J., of the Gregorian
University.
The merits of the thesis are fairly appraised, but disagreement centers
on two points-Father Blandino's idea that an Ethic can be established
without reference to God and because felicity, pleasure or happiness are
much too vague and indefinite concepts on which to base one's moral
judgment.
It seemed to me that, in a discussion on morality, there was an absence

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159

of realism. Morality remained very much an idea and reflected experience
neither of God nor of people. However, now that discussion is so popular,
many will find it interesting.
JEROME ToNER, 0. P.
St. Charle'8 Seminary
Nagpur, India

Participated Eternity in the Vision of God: A Study of the Opinion of
Thomas Aquinas and his Commentators on the Duration of the Acts
of Glory. By CARL J. PETER. Rome: Gregorian University Press,
1964. Pp. 808.
If one had to summarize Peter's lengthy doctoral dissertation in one
sentence, one might say that the duration of acts of glory was for Thomas
Aquinas participated eternity but for Duns Scotus aevum. If one were
allowed two sentences, one could add that Thomists tended to side with
Aquinas and Franciscans with Scotus but three Jesuits (de Toledo, Bellarmine, Vazquez) considered the two to be saying the same thing:
Aquinas's participated eternity was Scotus's aevum (see " Conclusion,"
pp. 253-68) . Of course, such a summary does not do justice to the nuances
of doctrine within the thomistic or the scotist schools, nor to Peter's paleographical work (see "Appendices," pp. 281-88) or his careful textual
exegesis (at times quite detailed) of at least thirty-nine theologians stretching from Aquinas (1223-1274) to John of St. Thomas (1589-1644).
As an exegetical instance let us outline his study of Aquinas, which
forms Part One of his book. (pp. 5-71) The question raised, he begins,
concerns " the duration of the beatific acts in intellectual creatures." More
exactly, does "the very permanence itself of the acts of glory" involve "a
true supernaturality "? (p. 5) There are two ways of answering, the first
of which consists in comparing various durations. God's is eternity (pp.
7-12), and spiritual creatures' in their natural existence and operations is
aevum. (pp. 12-20) But these latter in their supernatural and beatific
operations of contemplating and loving God also enjoy what Aquinas calls
a "participated eternity " (pp. 20-24) -namely, "the duration of an act
that completely exhausts the potency of its subject for immediate knowledge and love of God; that is, its subject is open to no greater perfection."
(p. 32) It is " the measure of the acts of glory in intellectual creatures.
This vision introduces man into an immediate union with God Himself
and His duration. It implies a share in what is properly divine and consequently excludes the possibility of change. The glorified subject is simply
not open to greater perfection, to more perfect knowledge and love of
God, as it was in its natural state." (p. 33)

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The second way of deciding whether the permanence of the beatific
vision is supernatural is to investigate that vision as a psychology state,
especially in the immutability of mind and will which it entails (pp. 3544), the cessation in it of hope (pp. 44-49), and the knowledge of contingent futures which a blessed attains. (pp. 49-67) From those three considerations the conclusion is again drawn (pp. 67-71) that spiritual existents
They attain
in the beatific vision "pa1ticipate in God's eternity."
" grades of interminability or immutability " because " there change is
found neither in act nor in potency." Although the operations of beatific
knowledge and love are not " absolutely unlimited perfections," still
'"through them the Blessed have the ultimate perfection of which their
natures are capable. And if the latter be the case, there remains no
potency in the nature for further perfection; and consequently, the acts in
question have a duration characterized by the supreme degree of immobility
possible in creatures and the closest approximation to that of God." (p.
68) They are, also, supernatural since they transcend the highest natural
knowledge and love possible to angels and separated souls (namely,
through God's image in their created natures; p. 69). They arise only
through "God's communication of Himself in a finite mind and will,
[and thereby] the creature participates in a perfection which is properly
God's. By sharing in God's own beatitude, the creature is blessed by
participation. By sharing God's nature, he is divinized or deified by participation. So too by sharing in the immutability of eternity, he is eternal
by participation. And that participation in eternity is supernatural." (p.
70)
The topic Peter chose for his book is important (see pp. 268-71 for its
relevance to current theology) and, obviously, difficult. His approach by
cataloguing the answers which theologians subsequent to Aquinas gave to
the problem is helpful. But his treatment of Thomas himself can, in my
judgment, be improved. One improvement would be to trace (at least to
some degree) the positions of Thomas's predecessors on the beatific vision
and related matters. In justifying his inclusion of Scotus, Peter himself
stated: "When the thought of one mind depends on that of another, the
fair exposition of the former [here, Thomistic commentators] involves some
familiarity with that of the latter [here, Scotus]." (p. 3) Surely that
statement holds with equal force in reference to Aquinas and those preceding him. Especially is this true in the light of the controversy on the
beatific vision which raged during the first four decades of the thirteenth
century and which culminated in the condemnation in 1241 of anyone
holding that in heaven neither men nor angels see the divine essence
("Primus [error], quod divina essentia in se nee ab homine nee ab angelo
videbitur "; H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis
Parisiensia [Paris, 1889-1897], I, 170). Peter should have used studies
devoted to the condemnation, one of which he mentions but does not

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161

pursue (that by H. F. Dondaine), but others he bypasses entirely (e. g.,
those by P.M. de Contenson, J. M. Alonso, V. Lossky). Again, he should
have structured his exegesis of Aquinas according to a chronological order
of writings. However much one may disagree with B. J. F. Lonergan's
Neo-Kantianism in other writings, his series of articles running in the
Theological Studies from 1941 to
on "Saint Thomas and Gratia
Operans" established firmly the necessity of such chronologically arranged
investigations. In his " Preface " Peter admits receiving invaluable assistance from Lonergan " through the years " and, in fact, lists those Theological Studies articles in his bibliography. Unhappily, they seem not to have
assisted him sufficiently.
Finally, what seems somewhat lacking in Peter's pages on Aquinas is
what appears most essential to a dogmatic theologian: a genuine intellectus fidei and intellectus textuum Sancti Thomae. One looks in vain for
an intrinsic understanding and explanation of what participated eternity
itself consists in, an inner realization of what (so to speak) it does to and
in the spiritual creature elevated to the beatifying contemplation and love
of God by his direct presence. One thinks of the sort of theological
reflection which grounded Maurice de Ia Taille's theory of the lumen gloriae
and which issued into his article, " Actuation creee par acte incree,"
Recherches de Science Religieuse, 18
I find little of that
sort in Peter's book (in fact, de Ia Taille's article is not even listed in his
bibliography). He does not discuss what "participation" might mean in
Aquinas. On occasion he refers to Geiger and Fabro. In a footnote on
the final page of his section on Aquinas (p. 71, n. 131) he refers to J. S.
Dunne's article, " St. Thomas' Theology of Participation,"
Theological
Studies, 17 (1957),
where (Peter reports) Dunne" notes that this
use of the term participation by Aquinas refers to a reality that stands in
opposition not merely to that which is being through essence but also to
that which an intellectual creature is or can be, left to its own resources."
There seems to be no other attempt to tie down definitely what participation of eternity might itself ontologically entail for Aquinas. I find this
almost incredible in a book whose title is Participated Eternity in the
Vision of God.
LEo SwEENEY, S. J.
Creighton University
Omaha, Nebraska

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The Doctrine of Thomas Aquinas Regarding Eviternity in the Rational
Soul and Separated Substances. By CARL J. PETER. Gregorian University Press, Rome, 1964. Pp. 124.
This volume is the author's doctoral thesis which was submitted to the
faculty of philosophy at the University of St. Thomas (Angelicum) in
Rome. Like many published doctoral dissertations it does not appear to
have been sufficiently reworked prior to its appearance in book form.
What the author has attempted to do, and in this he has for the most
part succeeded, is to give a careful account of St. Thomas's philosophical
position on duration in separated substances (angels) and the human soul.
The book is divided into three chapters of very unequal length. The first
presents a brief general conspectus of the meaning of aevum in the writings
of Aquinas. The second, comprising the bulk of the volume (76 out of 124
pages), presents a kaleidoscopic view of Aquinas's teaching on duration.
The author examines all of Aquinas's works save his commentaries on
Sacred Scripture. The concluding chapter presents a rather loose synthesis
of the findings of chapter two.
The author draws four main conclusions from his investigation. 1) Only
in God is duration eternal; 2) Duration in created persons may be eternal
by participation; 3) The duration of contingent beings is inversely proportional to their mutability; and 4) Aevum is used of separated
and of the human soul in a fundamentally uniform manner, when the latter
is viewed in its relation to its act of existence rather than to its temporal
union with body. Thus, regardless of slight differences of emphasis and
varying phraseology, the author finds that Aquinas does not refer aevum
to the human soul and to angels in ways that are contradictory but complementary. While in his concluding remarks the author does state that
the key to the understanding of Aquinas's whole teaching on the problem
of duration is the degree to which he views each being as possessing its
act of existence, it is regrettable that this point was not more fully exploited. It would have provided a more easily digestable synthesis and
made a comparison between the teaching of Aquinas and twentieth-century
thinkers on this point considerably more meaningful and more rewarding.
What, however, this reviewer found consistently irritating was the manner
in which the author chose to present the findings of his research. In this
instance it is difficult to see any advantage gained in analyzing each of
the works of Aquinas separately and in chronological order. Granted that
some questions might profitably be investigated in this way, the question of
duration does not seem to be one of them. Here the end result of this
approach is a needless proliferation of quoted passages from Aquinas and
an obscuring of the latter's overall teaching on duration. Had the author
learned from his study of Aquinas's works that there was indeed a genuine
progression in his theory of duration, a chronological presentation of texts

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would surely have had merit. But the reader can only ask whether such
an approach was truly helpful when at the end of his study the author
concludes that the Angelic Doctor's treatment of eviternity (aevum) in his
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard and the Summa Theologiae, while differing perhaps verbally, is in effect, "really equivalent in
the framework of his system." (p. 114)
Equally questionable is the manner in which the author has incorporated
so many lengthy, untranslated texts into his main narrative. In numerous
instances the author's purpose could just as easily have been served by
synthesizing and/or incorporating parts of the texts themselves into his
narrative and relegating the full Latin text to a convenient footnote.
The final synthesis, too, lacks satisfying sharpness and precision. Even
here the reader is confronted with an additional ten pages whose narrative
is often interrupted by fresh Latin texts. Yet, despite these shortcomings,
all the more unfortunate since a thorough revision of the dissertation's
original format could have eliminated most of them, this work is surely
representative of thorough and sound scholarship, and should prove helpful
to students of Aquinas wishing to explore in depth his teaching on duration
in the separated substances and the human soul.
JAMES

B. REICHMANN,

s. J.

Seattle University
Seattle, Washington

The Concept of Order. Edited by PAUL G. KuNTZ. Seattle & London:
The University of Washington Press, 1968. Pp. 518. $12.50.
The concept of order has always been one of the pivotal notions in
philosophy. Thoughout the centuries many attempts have been made to
discuss order (or disorder) and the implications which it has for philosophy.
Today any attempt to discuss order must begin not only with a philosophical analysis but with the way in which other disciplines rest upon a concept
of order. Science, art, history and the social sciences as well as philosophy
all demand a penetrating analysis of order.
This book is a collection of twenty-eight essays on order plus an introductory essay by the editor. The work is the fruit of a seminar on order
held at Grinnell College in 1963-1964. The authors represent a wide variety
of academic disciplines, and one of the important features of the collection
is its interdisciplinary character. In the attempt to describe a basic
concept from a variety of perspectives the authors bring into sharp focus
the necessity of broadening one's point of view. The different approaches
to order come to be seen as complementary and the richness of the notion
of order emerges.

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In certain ages the concept of order was regarded as a simple idea, and
it was believed that by reason man could come to know the basic order of
the universe. This unifying concept of order was thought to be one which
would bring together the way in which the concept was employed in
different disciplines. Thus, it was thought that there was a basic order at
the foundation of the physical sciences whose laws could be expressed in
relationship to this basic order. When interest was centered upon the
philosophy of history, it was thought by some that man would uncover
the basic order which was behind the process of history.
The authors who write in this collection do not represent one point of
view, but they do agree on the need for a sophisticated understanding of
order. Thus, for example, Eric Voegelin finds in history not a simple order
but the co-existence of various movements and institutions which tend to
be found together. These he calls configurations, and he is able to find some
order in history in terms of recurring configurations. Arnold Toynbee
appreciates the importance of Voegelin's analysis and attempts to find the
foundations of order in history in the regularity and uniformity stemming
from man's subconscious.
The order which is uncovered by the physical sciences is expressed in
laws which indicate a statistical determinism. As John Greene indicates,
however, the physical idea of order is by no means simple. The entropy of
the laws of thermodynamics is not easily reconciled with an evolutionary
understanding of order. In fact, the concept of order is employed by
evolutionists who do not explain why random variation and natural
selection should produce order.
The definition of order is itself a basic subject for discussion, and in these
essays one can find many attempts to define or describe order. While the
authors do not settle on one definition, it does become evident that the
definition of order must take into account both a whole and its parts. The
concept is relational, and in many instances it could be rooted in the unity
and integrity which are dimensions of an ordered whole.
If one defines order in terms of harmony, balance, unity and integrity,
however, it is equally necessary that provision be made for disorder, chance,
accident and randomness. The essayists who write from the point of view
of aesthetics are clear about the importance of both an order in an
artifact and variations of order. Perfect order could be static, repetitive,
or boring; and, on the other hand, disorder without order can be chaos.
Various authors underscore the importance of maintaining a tension
within one's understanding of order. The biologist, Paul Weiss, shows how
the discovery of order in the gross is paralleled by the discovery of disorder in the small; Monroe Beardsley speaks of the same phenomenon in
aesthetics. Hartshorne shows how such concepts as purpose and causality
demand chance and are not efforts to deny the reality of chance; he also
reveals the tension between predictibility and control of nature.

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The final two sections of the book are perhaps the most engaging, for
here the eight essays concern order in human society and order as a
challenge to contemporary society. Talcott Parsons shows the importance
of distinguishing values and norms, while Samuel Stumpf elaborates the
distinction between law and morality. Present concern about Law and
Order should not neglect the process of protest, which Stumpf finds is
part of the very life of the law.
Iredell Jenkins and Hans Hofmann both indicate the order which man
must establish in society. It is important that man's efforts to create order
are truly creative; he does create order. The political order which he
creates must be flexible enough to permit change and to allow the existence
of divergent points of view. Yet the success of the order demands that it
not only provides procedural safeguards for freedom but substantive
principles on the basis of which such procedures have meaning.
The book does not contain a theological investigation of order; this
omission is unfortunate and, given the wide scope of the title, strange.
The final essay, by Joseph Wall, does bring the reader to the theological
question. After showing that the most frightening concept of God which
man can employ is that of a god who is absurd or mad, the author faces
the disorder which man sees around him. He sees how modern men have
inherited ever since the scholastics a belief in order and logic which today
seems naive.
The collection of essays which Paul Kuntz has brought together deserves
wide recognition. It is an introductory, not a definitive study of order. It
is a significant study because of its cross-disciplinary character and because
of the distinguished scholars who have contributed to it. The reader
benefits both from the insights of the individual essays and the general
perspective which emerges from reading the whole collection. Hopefully,
the work will stimulate further research on the concept of order, especially
on the concept as it is employed by theology.
RoBERT

School of Religion
University of Iowa
Iowa City, Iowa

L. STENGER, 0. P.

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St. Augustine and Christian Platonism (The St. Augustine Lecture 1966).
By A. HILARY ARMSTRONG. Villanova University Press, 1967. Pp. 66.
$2.25.
Augustine and the Greek Philosophers (The St. Augustine Lecture 1964).
By JoHN F. CALLAHAN. Villanova University Press, 1967. Pp. 117.
$3.50.
Great Thinkers on Plato. Ed. by BARRY GRoss. New York:
1968. Pp. 345. $6.95.

Putnam,

The series of annual St. Augustine lectures at Villanova University is
designed to show the relevancy of aspects of St. Augustine's thought for
our own time. Through the work of specialists, the lectures are in general
aimed at a non-specialist public and, as such, two of them have fallen into
the hands of a non-specialist reviewer.
The lecture by Professor Armstrong is the more immediately interesting
of the two. Though overtly concerned with Augustine, it constitutes in fact
a rather convincing plea for the re-introduction of Platonism as a vitalizing
force in Christian theology. Students of Christian spirituality in particular
should find it of absorbing interest. At a time when traditional approaches
to spirituality are being called into question on the grounds that they are
to a large extent tributaries of a Plotinian-Platonic world-view that is
basically un-Christian, it is refreshing to find such an eminent Plotinian
scholar as Professor Armstrong underlining the deep harmony that exists
between many aspects of the Christian and the Platonic approach to the
life of the spirit. He also stoutly maintains at times that, if there are
certain narrownesses in the theology and spirituality of such great Christian
Platonists as Gregory of Nyssa and Augustine, this, far from being the
result of Platonic corruption, is due rather to an incomplete grasp and
faulty assimilation of rich elements in the Platonic tradition. There are
points, of course, on which the differences between Christianity and
Platonism are irreducible; the merit of Professor Armstrong's little work is
to emphasize how few in fact these are.
In the lecture of Professor Callahan we have a scholar speaking primarily
to scholars, and the non-specialist will find the going somewhat heavier.
The first section, which suggests that the ontological argument of St.
Anselm be grand-fathered on St. Augustine, will be of interest to the
theologian. The third and final section, which shows us Augustine wrestling
with the problem of time and traces the genesis of his psychological
approach to the question, is of more general interest. Over and above the
detailed questions discussed, Professor Callahan's lecture is of value in that
it shows us how even a thinker as original as St. Augustine remains a man

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167

with a history, and how such giants of the spirit are more aptly described
as builders rather than creators.
The third volume under review is an anthology of critical comments on
Plato by great philosophers from Aristotle to our own time. I would
recommend it as an ideal bedside book for a Platonist. For those of us
who feel more at home with 'Vodehouse, the volume, assuredly the result
of painstaking research, serves at least to back up the contention of
Whitehead that " the safest general characterization of the European
philosophical tradition is that it consists of a series of footnotes to Plato."
NoEL MoLLOY, 0. P.
St. Charle's Seminary
Nagpur, India

Medieval Philosophy, from St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa. Ed. by
JoHN F. WIPPEL & ALLAN B. WoLTER, O.F.M. New York: The Free
Press; London: Collier-Macmillan Limited, 1969. Pp. 487. $3.95
paper.
For many years the only available collection of readings in medieval
philosophy in English translation was Richard McKeon's Selections from
Mediaeval Philosophers (19:29). Today the student of medieval philosophy has a choice of several good volumes of translated texts, varying in
range and interest. The latest of these, edited by Fathers Wippel and
Wolter, is particularly suited for undergraduate students in medieval
philosophy and the general reader who is looking for information about
the subject. It covers a thousand years of philosophical speculation, from
St. Augustine to Nicholas of Cusa. Selections have been made from
twenty-four of the most important thinkers of this period. The volume
has a competently written introduction of thirty pages, sketching the
main outlines of philosophy in the Middle Ages. Each chapter is prefaced
by a brief account of the man whose text is translated in it. The
bibliography at the end of the book contains general histories of medieval
philosophy, other volumes of translations, and specific bibliographies for
each chapter. These bibliographies are up-to-date and generally well
compiled.
A few comments are in order concerning the editors' selection of
passages for translation. Any selection is bound to be somewhat arbitrary
and dependent on the special interests of the translator. The texts in this
volume are on the whole well-chosen. They are varied in subject matter
and representative of the major figures in medieval philosophy. A few
obvious lacunae should be mentioned. It is unfortunate that there is no

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text from St. Albert the Great, who was surely one of the greatest of
medieval thinkers. It is also regrettable that none of the Greeks who so
profoundly influenced the philosophy of the Latin West are present, e. g.,
Denis the pseudo-Areopagite, John Damascene, or Nemesius. The Arabs
and Jews are represented by Avicenna, Averroes, and Maimonides, but the
text selected from Avicenna, and two of those from Averroes, are from
works unknown to the scholastics of the Middle Ages. In my opinion, it
would have been preferable to have chosen texts from the Arabian philosophers that had a deep impact on medieval Christian thought. However, it is true that the Christian scholastics knew but a portion of Muslim
philosophy through Latin translation and that it is necessary to correct
their partial viewpoint by reading the other works of the Arabs.
The text from Honorius of Autun on the medieval picture of the
world is of greater interest to the student of medieval science than of
medieval philosophy, and Odo of Rigaud's question on theology as a
science is directly theological and not philosophical. Ockham is represented
by a text " On possibility and God " which, though important, is not best
suited to introduce a reader to his thought. The interesting short treatise
of Fridugis on "Nothing and Darkness" has been made available in
English for the first time.
For the most part, the translations were made specially for this volume
by the editors. A spot check reveals that they are usually accurate and well
done. The English is clear and modern. In several cases the editors could
have improved on the translation taken from other sources, e. g.,
Shapcotes' translation of Aquinas's " On the Power of God " and Heron's
version of Cusa's " On Learned Ignorance."
It is admittedly difficult to put Boethius's De Hebdomadibua into
English. But the use of the word "essence " in the title and elsewhere in
the work is apt to mislead the reader. Since the scholastics distinguished
between essence and existence, this word has taken on a meaning that is
not present in Boethius's treatise. "A conception common to the mind"
(p. 97) should be " A common conception of the mind." In the translation
of Anselm's Proslogion, " based on faith" (pp. 154-155) does not translate
de ratione fidei. It is unfortunate that more of Chapter I was not translated; this chapter is a necessary introduction to the famous proof of God's
existence by exhorting the mind to shut out the external world and turn
inward upon itself. In Chapter II (p. 155) the description of God as
"something greater than which we can conceive of nothing" is rather
awkward.
These are but minor criticisms of a book that is generally excellent. It
is a useful aid to students of medieval philosophy .

Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies
Toronto, Canada

.ARMAND MAURER, c. s. B.

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169

Scholasticism After Thomas Aquinas and the Teachings of Hasdai Crescas
and His Predecessors. By SHLOMO PINES. Jerusalem: The Israel
Academy of Sciences and Humanities, 1967. Pp. 101.
The Teachings of Maimonides. Ed. by ABRAHAM CoHEN. Prolegomemon
by Marvin Fox. New York: KTAV Publishing House, 1968. Pp. 389.
$8.95.
Professor Shlomo Pines of the Hebrew University in Jerusalem, who a
few years ago produced the definitive English translation of Maimonides'
Guide of the Perplexed, presents now an original thesis which opens wide
possibilities for further research. While historians of medieval philosophy
have traditionally emphasized the influence of Arabian philosophers on
Jewish thinkers such as Maimonides, and the influence of both sources on
Aquinas and other Christian scholastics, Pines's present essay explores
evidence of influence exercised by later Christian scholastics on their
Jewish contemporaries. Using ample textual comparisons, Pines suggests
several points of affinity between post-Thomistic scholasticism (Scotism in
particular} and the theories of such Jewish thinkers as Yeda'aya ha-Penini
Bedersi, Gersonides, Joseph ibn Caspi, and Hasdai Crescas. The instances
of relationship includes Bedersi's doctrine of personal forms, which resembles Scotus's haecceitas; the discussions by Gersonides and ibn Caspi
concerning God's knowledge of future contingencies, which strongly recall
the Christian scholastic debates on the same subject; and the criticisms
levelled by Crescas at the Aristotelian foundations of Maimonides' proofs
for the existence of God, which parallel somewhat the objections against
the Thomistic proofs from Christian adherents of the " new physics."
Observing that fourteenth and fifteenth-century scholasticism itself still
remains to be investigated in much more depth, Pines concludes with the
remark that any advance in this field of research is likely to shed light on
the Jewish philosophy of the same period.
The Teachings of Maimonides is a KTAV republication of a volume
which first appeared in 1927. Its author and editor, Dr. Abraham Cohen,
was a scholar who won considerable recognition for his work as general
editor of the Soncino Books of the Bible, his contributions to the Soncino
English edition of the Babylonian Talmud, and his own book, Everyman's
Talmud. In this volume he proposed to present an orderly compendium of
Maimonides' views on religious and philosophical subjects. Since Maimonides himself never gave a systematic exposition of his entire thought
in any single treatise, Cohen's undertaking was designed to introduce the
essentials of Maimonidean teaching to a wide range of readers who would
lack the ability or patience to struggle through the medieval thinker's vast
and labyrinthine writings. Selected passages from these writings comprise
almost the entire contents of the volume, so that Maimonides is allowed

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to speak for himself except for transitional paragraphs and abundant
explanatory footnotes supplied by Cohen.
For the bulk of the volume the arrangement of materials follows the
order of Maimonides' "Thirteen Principles of Faith," covering the existence and nature of God, the structure of the universe, religion and revelation, providence, reward and punishment, and eschatology. There follows
a section on "Psychology," stressing the nature and functions of the human
intellect, and then a section on " Ethics," by far the longest in the book
(forty-eight pages), covering the classification of virtues and vices, the
virtuous mean, asceticism, the requisites for physical health as well as for
moral and social well-being, and the goal of human life. Under each of
these subject headings Cohen's procedure is to assemble excerpts from
widely scattered writings of Maimonides in such a way as to suggest a
clear, coherent and consistent teaching.
In terms of the purpose which Cohen set for it, the anthology is certainly
a contribution. It can serve to introduce unfamiliar readers to many important elements of Maimonides' thought, and in so doing it incidentally
makes available passages from several of his works which still have not
been published in English translation. Any compendium of this kind runs
the obvious risk of oversimplifying and misrepresenting an author's
thought by selecting passages from different works out of their respective
contexts and thus giving more of an impression of consistency and continuity than is warranted. As Professor Marvin Cox of Ohio State University observes in his introduction to the new KTA V edition of Cohen's
volume, this danger is especially present in the case of a thinker like
Maimonides, who deliberately wrote in so obscure a fashion as to hide his
real teaching from all but the most diligent readers. Scholars now are
unable to offer a definitive consensus as to the essential orientation of
Maimonides' thought: whether he accepted the supremacy of Aristotle at
the expense of orthodox Judaism while trying to conceal his heresy; or
whether, on the contrary, he merely posed as an Aristotelian while trying to
undermine the Stagirite's philosophy which he recognized as irreconcilable
with his Jewish beliefs; or whether, finally, he accepted the truth of both
Aristotelianism and Judaism and tried to show their harmony, in the way
that Aquinas would later do with Christian revelation. Indeed, research
during the forty years since the original publication of Cohen's volume
has made it increasingly doubtful whether Maimonides' thought constitutes
a unified system at all. The anthology is serviceable as an introduction and
reference for beginners, provided that the above difficulties be kept in
mind.
Christian philosophers in particular, who would naturally be interested
in possible evidences of affinity between Maimonides' thought and that of
Aquinas and other scholastics, are likely to note with some disappointment
the anthology's scanty and sometimes inaccurate presentation of philoso-

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phical issues as compared with issues bearing more directly on Jewish
belief and practice. In the chapter on "God the Creator," for example,
Cohen omits to reproduces Maimonides' proof of God's existence with the
twenty-six Aristotelian propositions which they presuppose (Guide of the
Perplexed, Part II, Introduction and Chapter I) , remarking that " the
Propositions are too long, and the argument which Maimonides bases upon
them too intricate, to be quoted in extenso." (p. 315, n. 7) When he does
attempt to explain the concept of accidental motion, a key element in the
first of Maimonides' proofs, he erroneously identifies accidental motion with
all motion which is initiated by an external agent. (p. 315, n. 11) The
chapter on " The Attributes of God " gives ample evidence of Maimonides'
preference for negative attributes in general but almost no hint of his
obscure position on the value and meaning of positive attributes; nor do
the footnotes refer at all to the controversy with the Mutakallemim, out
of which Maimonides' discussions of the divine attributes arose.
This lack of interest and precision concerning philosophical matters
should probably not be taken as a deficiency of the anthology but rather
as an illustration of the typical attitude of traditional Jewish scholarship
toward Maimonides. To the Jewish community, Maimonides' principal
value has consisted in his great systematic commentaries on the Torah
and the Talmud; his philosophical speculations, when not rejected as
heretical, have generally been treated with comparative indifference. If
indeed he was endeavoring to harmonize Aristotelian philosophy with
Jewish belief, his efforts have never won the acceptance from institutional
Judaism that those of Aquinas were to win from the Catholic Church.
BRUCE

A. WILLIAMS, 0. P.

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

Leo Baeck: Teacher of Teresienstadt. By ALBERT H. FRIEDLANDER.
York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1969. Pp. Q94. $8.95.

New

Rabbi Albert H. Friedlander has made an important contribution to the
field of religious and Jewish scholarship. His book, Leo Baeck, Teacher of
Thersienstadt, is a significant, scholarly, erudite and readable work on Leo
Baeck. This book and other studies about Baeck, which are expected in the
near future, will probably give his works far greater recognition as well
as· increase the value of his teachings to the contemporary scholar, both
Christian and Jewish. Friedlander has presented a persuasive case for a
stronger appreciation of the contributions of Leo Baeck the late rabbi
teacher, theologian and scholar of rabbinic literature as well as of Greek
and Latin.

BOOK REVIEWS

There were a number of reasons for the delayed recognition that apparently will now be paid to Leo Baeck. The first probably had to do with
his importance as a community leader, rabbi and pastor to his flock in
the concentration camp. His spiritual nobility overshone his intellectual
endeavors. The quarrel over how much responsibility the victims of the
despicable Nazi conspiracy had for their own destiny, i.e., their own death,
and the time needed to regain our own sanity after Auschwitz, certainly
added to the difficulty of evaluating the scholarship of Leo Baeck.
Friedlander also points out some of the other factors that presented
difficulties in giving the recognition to Baeck that is his due.
Those who think of Lee Baeck " solely " as a rabbi and communal leader ignore
the intellectual dimensions of his religious leadership. Baeck was the great
apologete and polemicist of the Jewish community, bringing a completely new
emphasis into the Jewish-Christian dialogue. Within his own community, he was
the systematizer of modern Jewish theology. In Jewish scholarship, he opened up
new areas in the field of early Jewish preaching and in Jewish mysticism. And
Christian scholarship is only now cognizant of his contribution to New Testament
interpretation, where his emphasis upon Jewish traditions has received the support
of recent findings. The basic difficulty in coming to terms with these various
facets of Baeck's thought is that they are scattered through some four hundred
articles written over a sixty-year span. Two basic texts do exist: The Essence of
Judaism, written in 1905, and This People Israel, published half a century later.
But the internal structure of those works only comes into view when other
writings, many of them unknown to most scholars, are placed alongside the betterknown works. In turning to this task, we face the additional difficulties that little
of Baeck's writings has been translated; that much of the material is scattered and
some of it lost; and that there are no full-length studies of Baeck's works, no
study of his life. But there are devoted scholars of Baeck's works; as we draw their
findings into a unified whole, the essence of Baeck's teachings begins to emerge.
(p. 6)

Freidlander has made a significant contribution in his study. In his
bibliography he lists some nine major works of Leo Baeck and more than
sixty other primary sources. He also presents a brief biographical portrayal
which he believes necessary to an understanding of Baeck's works. Albert
Friedlander uses the insights revealed in the later writings of Baeck to
clarify and illuminate his earlier writings or, more correctly, to indicate the
development, extension or refinement of earlier concepts. There is in
Friedlander's work not only a depth of scholarship but also a quality of
prose which is often almost. poetry.
The biographical sketch of Baeck, traces the development of a young
German Jew through his transition from traditionalism to Jewish liberalism.
Friedlander discusses Baeck's capability in the field of scholarly endeavor
including his concern for insignificant detail. Nevertheless, his emphasis
was on the total gestalt rather than the isolated elements. Baeck served

BOOK REVIEWS

17S

as a rabbi in the Berlin community, and at the same time he taught
midrash and homiletics at the Lehranstadt at which he had been ordained.
He served as a chaplain in the German army during the First World War.
Community leadership was constantly urged upon him even up to and
during his incarceration in the concentration camp. Friedlander quotes H.
G. Adler, one of the survivors of Terezin, writing about Leo Baeck as
follows:
The most memorable personality in the Council of Elders was Rabbi Leo Baeck
. . who was universally respected among all prisoners and regarded with even
higher esteem for his readiness to help. He never withdrew from the camp, but
it did not seem to exist near him; none of its filth could touch him. Peace
emanated from him. He could be gentle ... but could also speak with zealous
anger, for he knew the demand of the hour, knew of the fateful failings to which
he and everyone else in the framework of history was subject. This oppressed and
saddened him, but could not break him. For he always held himself ready for new
tasks, tenaciously, bravely, he never refused them. He knew that he was a witness
to the fact that there still had to be a different world from this "ghetto." Incorruptible, he saw weakness and corruption in his surroundings. He exerted his
influence against them, particularly through the purity of his own example.
He was a shining beacon in the salt tear ocean of despair. (pp. 45-46)

Baeck's first major encounter with Christian thought resulted in his
polemic against Adolf Harnack, who in 1899-1900 wrote about The Nature
of Christianity, eliminating theological dogmas, ornate rituals or ecclesiastical claims to power. The teachings of Jesus with regard to the fatherhood
of God and the brotherhood of man was presented by Harnack as the
essence of Christianity. Both the Judaism of the earlier times and the
Christian thought of later times were dismissed as irrelevant and unnecessary. Harnack insisted that, so long as Christianity did not become independent of the Old Testament, it would thus be unable to make any
progress. Baeck believed that Harnack dismissed almost everything in the
gospels except those ideas that had meaning for him. Baeck believed that
the chief value of Christianity is found in its Jewish roots, that the New
Testament requires the Old Testament for Christian ethics, that the
Pharisees were condemned by Christians because of prejudice and a lack
of scholarship. Baeck used both Jewish and Christian sources to attack
Harnack in the field of history and theology. He applied a sound knowledge of "Jewish" texts to the study of the New Testament. The polemic
against Harnack's description of Christianity served as preparation for his
work on Jewish apologetics presented in his book, The Essence of Judaism.
In this work Baeck is concerned with presenting the Jew and his faith.
He utilizes his conception of himself as a Jew because there is self knowledg-e. The Essence of Judaism presents Judaism as a living configuration
which speaks for itself out of its existence as a covenant people linked with
God who is the genesis of the system. The Deity is accepted on faith as

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BOOK REVIEWS

the" One God whose essence is the moral law." Baeck's twofoldness, i.e.,
his polarity, begins to unfold. Hermann Cohen's teachings of optimism,
the significance of reason, and the importance of the ethical deed, are
major concerns of Baeck. But there is also the inner experience for him.
Both man's dependency upon God and the stress upon the commandment
of freedom, i. e., personal choice, are stressed.
Baeck remains consistently true to his emphasis on the ethical act.
Duties must precede the knowledge of God or dogma can lose the redeeming quality of the ethical act through the institutionalization of religion.
The Jewish people acting ethically in accordance with the commandments
moves toward the mystery. Religious thinking is transmitted through the
chain of generations.
The ethical act was of paramount importance to Baeck. He rejected
Christianity as a religion of creed without the emphasis on the deed.
Friedlander discusses Baeck's fear of dogma based on what the late rabbi
considered the failure of the Christian experience:
"Protestantism places importance in the so-called witnessing .... It is assumed
that the word and particularly its profession can be fully possessed." Baeck makes
the distinction that " in Judaism, religion is not experienced but lived." It does
not present itself from outside of life; it is life. The universal teaching embraces
all; the right deed is demanded from all. And it is the right deed for Baeck which
brings man to belief: We can only believe that which we do; faith, too, is rooted
in will. One who does not become aware of God through good work ... will also
not become aware of God through an inner experience. (pp. 70-71)

Revelation for Baeck as a liberal scholar is found in the inner consciousness of the people. Their existence is the revelation; their history is the
details; and their ethical actions are the future of that revelation. The
election of Israel refers to a people created in God's image becoming
aware of itself and its role. Baeck saw the particularism of Israel culminating in Israel's mission to mankind-to be a light unto the nations and to
lead all nations into the path of ethical actions.
Friedlander also presents a significant study of Leo Baeck and the
Religion of Polarity. Polarity refers to the complementary aspects of an
act or a philosophic concept. If the Jew fulfills mitzvot or commandments,
he does so as an affirmation of God. Thus both the deed and the dogma
are united. Through Hermann Cohen's concept of correlation which indicates that man cannot be thought of without God (and God cannot be
thought of without man} , Baeck moved ahead to the polarity of religion.
The human, for example, dwells in the Divine .. God speaks to man and
man speaks to God.
Through the meaning of life death is defined. Death is a caesura, a cutting into life. Since man is part of the creative act of God he can not die.
The child dies and man is born. The creative bond unites death and life.

BOOK REVIEWS

175

All is established out of human experience. Existence does not come before
essence nor essence before existence because each is contained in the
other and explains the other. There is a unity (an entity) with different
aspects which are necessarily united in order to achieve a totality.
Baeck views Christianity as a romantic religion removed from life and
encumbered by dogma. He views Judaism as a classical religion which
teaches the importance of the ethical act, the importance of the collective
experience of the people, the importance of historical continuity. He is a
master of midrash of retelling the idea over and over in different ways
in order to bring many different rays of light to reveal its true spirit and
essence. Baeck sees the Christian emphasis on dogma as a withdrawal
from a proper perspective which can lead all the nations to a reign of peace.
For him, impossible ideals that man cannot achieve further create a sense
of guilt, unworthiness and defeat in terms of seeking ethical ideals. These
factors he views as factors which helped establish a climate in which the
evil of Nazi Germany could exist.
As Baeck sees Judaism and the Jewish people as a totality, so does he approach
Christianity as a unity in which tragic errors of thought have torn the fabric of
human experience itself. Theology in our time can only ascend into the realm of
ideas through the torn fabric of twentieth-century existence. Baeck stands before
Christianity as an ancient prophet; if Christians would re-enter their sanctuary,
there must first be acknowledgment of sin; there must be atonement. The way to
(;Qd leads through fellow man. (p.

Baeck's polemic against Christianity became milder in his later writings.
Yet he retains the attitude of a parent rebuking a child out of love. He
still seeks a personal sense of responsibility from the Christian for what
has happened to the Jew. He requires an accounting from Christianity not
of its beliefs but of its actions. Many in Jewish life have asked if the
current emphasis on dialogue means the acceptance of the Jew as an equal
with the Christian by the Christian churches and communities. Many Jews
were deeply disturbed by the silence of the Church during the Six Day
War in Israel. It is the hope of many in Judaism that in the "challenges
of the aftermath of war," when new pains have to be alleviated, that there
will be a new opportunity for church and synagogue to strive for a world
of peace. When Christianity becomes reconciled to the continuing fact of
Jewish existence, it will be able to accept the Jew as a witness of God.
Then church and synagogue will be able to work together to establish the
Kingdom of God. Then a true dialogue can come to life.
Albert Friedlander's book is a book that should be read and reread both
by Christian and Jew. It should be used as a text shared by interreligious groups to help build a bond of understanding. This book should
prove valuable to almost all religious segments. It is a book which
presents an ongoing search for a religious meaning in life, as experienced

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BOOK REVIEWS

by Leo Baeck. It is challenging without seeking to defeat. It is a rejection
of some religious ideologies with an attempt at adding a balance to what
was viewed as unbalanced. It is an acceptance of Jewish life as experienced
by the Jewish people and an appreciation of seeking to spiritualize the soil
of the land of Israel. But most of all, it is a book in which there is an
affirmation of life, an optimism in living even while recognizing the depths
of degradation to which man can descend. It is a book which presents the
religious development of a significant scholar, the influences upon him and
the meaning of his life and his teachings for the contemporary Jew and
the contemporary Christian.
RABBI LEONARD

w. STERN

Temple Sinai
Amityville, N. Y.
St. John's University
Jamaica, N. Y.

The Cosmic Christ: from Paul to Teilhard. By GEORGE A. MALONEY, S. J.
New York: Sheed and Ward, 1968. Pp. 305. $6.95.
It is true to say that no phrase of Teilhard de Chardin's has been viewed
\Yith so much caution as " the Cosmic Christ." Father Maloney takes this
phrase as the title for his book. He starts with the premise that modem
man needs Christ. But does the Christ traditionally presented to him at
school, in lectures, in sermons, have any relevance for him? Today, he is
absorbed in the fascinating business of fashioning a new world. He cannot
reconcile a Christ that can be found only by withdrawing from the world,
with the strong attraction he feels toward the world. If he is to find
Christ at all, he must find him in the world.
The thesis of the book is that Christ is the centre of the life of the
world-the spiritual and material world. God created the world, and he so
loved that world that he sent his only-begotten Son into the world to
establish his kingdom there. Christ came into the world to transform and
complete God's creation. The cosmos itself participates in the Redemption.
Instead, then, of trying to escape from the world in order to find Christ,
we must search for him and find him in it. This is what has come to be
termed the " cosmic " dimension of Christ. The phrase is Teilhard's. But
the book shows that the same vision of Christ in the universe is to be found
in the New Testament and in the early Fathers. So the first five chapters
of the seven of the book sketch the relation of Christ to the cosmos in
the writings of Paul and John, and in the ante- and post-Nicene Greek
:Fathers. These chapters, the author handles very well, and in addition to
the text he gives in an appendix selected quotations from each Father.

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Some readers, however, may find fault with his interpretation of some texts.
A fault of the book is that it has nothing to say on the period between
Maximus the Confessor (7th cent.) and Teilhard de Chardin. It is dismissed simply" after Maximus the Confessor, for reasons too many and too
complex to be developed here, Christ's dynamic presence and activity in
the world was not sufficiently stressed .... " (p. 15) The chapter on
Teilhard de Chardin is an excellent summary of his Christology.
This is not a book everyone will be able to read. But for those really
interested in the problem of cosmic Christology, it makes a valuable
contribution to the literature on the subject.
ANTHONY MORRIS,

0. p.

St. Charl1!8' Seminary
Nagpur, India

What Is Religion? By PAUL TILLICH. New York: Harper and Row, 1969.
Pp. 191. $5.95.
This volume contains three early works by Paul Tillich: " The Philosophy of Religion," which originally appeared in
" The Conquest of
the Concept of Religion in the Philosophy of Religion " and " On the Idea
of a Theology of Culture," originally presented in
and 1919 respectively. The main themes of Tillich's central work, his Systematic Theology,
appear in these early essays. With interest these three essays are read in
the reverse order in which they are published in this volume. Then one can
see the progress of Tillich's thought as he grapples ever more profoundly
with the problem of the relation of religion and theology to culture. On
the other hand, the essays in the order in which they are published lead
reasonably from more general notions of religion and the philosophy of
religion to the specific task of theology vis-a-vis culture.
Tillich's notion of the philosophy of religion is not the common one.
Philosophy of religion is not a detached, objective study of religious
phenomena. It is the first part of a " normative cultural science." Such a
science in the case of religion involves: (I) a determination of the criteria
for authentic religion and the categories for comprehending religious phenomena (the philosophy of religion);
a cultural history organizing the
data of the empirical sciences of religion according to the norms determined
in the philosophy of religion; and (3) a concrete normative science of
religion (theology) which is elaborated in the light of the norms and
categories of the philosophy of religion and on the basis of the materials of
cultural history.
Tillich hopes to overcome the opposition between philosophy of religion

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and theology, between reason and revelation, without falling into pure
rationalism and yet without a supernatural which is isolated from the
totality of culture. All of this theory is grounded in Tillich's own metaphysical vision. The problems of both the theory and its underlying
metaphysics have been raised in appraisals of other works of Tillich. The
only comment here is that, if Tillich's insight is valid and a true solution to
the problems of the relation between religion and culture, philosophy of religion and theology, reason and revelation, some language must be employed
to sell it to contemporary Americans other than the language of classical
German philosophy. The first essay in this volume is " heavy " reading,
full of broad abstractions and sweeping generalizations, with occasional
references to empirical facts which appear to be examples to corroborate the
creative imagination rather than empirical evidence from which the abstractions and generalizations are gathered.
Most interesting in the volume is the final essay, "On the Idea of a
Theology of Culture." Such a theology would replace a theological ethics
developed out of dogmatics, out of a body of knowledge given from on
high in revelation, extrinsic to, and separate from, other knowledge. If
religion is a dimension of all reality, of all culture, namely, its relation to
the Unconditional, then what is needed is a theology which embraces not
only ethics but all the functions of culture: a theology of culture. Theology
of culture stands in contrast to Church theology; the former is based on the
idea that religion is a dimension of all culture and generally embodies
religion; the latter envisions religion as distinct from culture, the sacred as
a special realm within the secular. The problematic here is couched in
terms slightly different than those of Catholic theology, but the problem is
found in Catholicism as well as Protestantism. Tillich's thoughts are
provocative and helpful.
In these pages one sees with special clarity how subsequent theologians
who have pronounced the death of God and declared a total secularization
of reality can claim that they found their initial inspiration in Tillich. It
is equally clear, however, that in drawing that radical conclusion they
departed from Tillich's metaphysical vision which cannot tolerate the
death of God (at least as Tillich understands God) or bless a "religionless
religion."
CHRISTOPHER

Aquinas Institute
Dubuque, Iowa

KIESLING,

0. P.

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BOOK REVIEW'S

Bonhoeffer: The Man and his Work. By RENE MARLE:, S.J. Glen Rock,
N. J.: Newman Press, 1968. Pp. 141. $4.50.
When Bonhoeffer's name is mentioned many of us make an immediate
association: religionless Christianity. This small book is valuable because
it puts that association into the perspective of Bonhoeffer's whole life and
whole teaching. The life reveals a man of deep faith in Christ and in the
Church, a man of constant prayer. The teaching reveals the essential
complexity of his thought. No one after reading this book would ever dare
to sum up his thought by the phrase " religionless Christianity " nor
identify him with the secularity movement today.
Perhaps MarJe's best contribution to fuller understanding of Bonhoeffer's theology is his juxtaposition of the religionless Christianity theme
from the Letters and Papers with other themes from the same book and
from the Ethics, which Bonhoeffer was also writing in prison. For example,
Bonhoeffer never gave up on the necessity of intense, personal prayer while
dialoguing with religionless men. Also, while insisting that the Christian
must have true affection for this world and its peoples before one could
have true appreciation for Christ's work, since Incarnation (or God
t>mbracing the world) comes before Redemption, the Old Testament before
the New, the penultimate before the ultimate, still what is important in the
end is Redemption, justification, salvation; what is important in the end
is religion.
Bonhoeffer does not make the connection between religionless Christianity and Incarnation, Old Testament, penultimate things explicit, but
Marie shows that it is no distortion of his writings to say that the connection is strongly implicit. I believe Marie is right.
In all, this is a very useful book for these seeking a few handles into
the study of this great Lutheran theologian who was conservative in his
ecclesiology, yet open to ecumenical dialogue; who stood stubbornly with
the Confessing Church, while sharply criticizing it; who wrote a highly
subtle book on Christian ethics, yet lived a basically simple life; and who
died a hero's death.
THOMAS

R. HEATH, 0. P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

Un Cardenal, Fil6sofo de la Historia, Fr. Zeferino Gonzcilez, 0. P. (18811894). By FRANCO DrAZ DE CERro, S. J. Rome: Lateran University,
1969. Pp. 197.
Four articles published in 1870 under the title "La Filosofia de la
Historia " (" The Philosophy of History ") are taken as basic writings for
a study on Cardinal Gonzalez's notion on the subject. They first appeared

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in the journal La Ciudad de Dios; augmented by Cardinal Gonzalez
himself later on, they were also included in Estudios religiosos, cientificos Y
sociales (2 vol. Madrid, 1873). The author of this book, a Gregorian University professor, states in the introduction that the ideas contained in
those articles signified an important contribution to the Philosophy of
History. Such a point is never proved in a book that even has an illconceived title.
The work starts out with a bibliography of Cardinal Gonzalez and his
writings. It is well organized, complete and undoubtedly very helpful for
scholars devoted to the study of the Thomist restoration in the last century.
Some of the works included, however, touch the subject merely in a very
indirect way.
Though the book does not purport to be a biography, the first part gives
that impression. Moreover, this first section comprises a very .lengthy
collection of praises by many contemporary friends of the Cardinal, and
it fails to give the impression of a carefully written biography. Very often
the appraisals border on the ridiculous, and almost always they refer to
small details without any bearing on the supposed purpose of the book.
In the monotonous litany of quotations the only refreshing one is taken
from Unamuno.
The second and third chapters are devoted, respectively, to the notions
of Philosophy and of History of Philosophy. One gets the impression that
Cardinal Gonzalez was just beginning to work his way out of an incredibly
poor intellectual environment and that his merits are to be considered in
this perspective. His notion of philosophy as quoted here, for instance, is
at best confusing because of lack of sufficient precision regarding the relations between philosophy and science and the objects dealt with in each.
Some remarks about how a textbook should be written sound incredible
and even ridiculous to our ears today, but probably they were understandable and useful in the second half of the last century. Fr. Diaz's book
fails adequately to point out what that situation was like. Had he done
this, many a statement by Cardinal Gonzalez would sound less preposterous.
In the chapter devoted to the notion and conditions of the History of
Philosophy the author quotes two statements concerning Hegel's idealism
which are at least apparently contradictory, without noticing the contradiction and without bothering to reconcile them. The cross references in this
chapter, as well as the headlines, are somewhat misleading.
Chapters IV and V on Philosophy of History as such are more interesting
and better developed. But the overall important notion of the discipline
and consequently the distinction between History, Philosophy and Philosophy of History are never explained in a satisfactory way. This is complicated even more by frequent affirmations of the type " only History can
tell what History is." When Cardinal Gonzalez discusses whether Philo-

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181

sophy of History is science or not, it seems that he is talking about History
as such, and the need to add " Philosophy of- " is not seen. A similar
difficulty arises in Chapters VI and VII: are the laws he points out
something else than merely historical laws?
The last two chapters are rather concerned with a Theology of History,
but some of the statements Cardinal Gonz:ilez makes and which Fr. Diaz
quotes without criticism are wrong from a purely historical viewpoint.
Luis CAMACHO, 0. P.
Dominican HOWle of Studiea

Washington, D. C.

Superstition and Irreverence. Trans. by T. F. O'MEARA, 0. P. and M. J.
DuFFY, O.P. Volume 40 (9la9lae, qq. 99l-100) Summa Theologiae.
New York: McGraw-Hill, 1968. Pp. 169. $6.75.
Every journey has its desert places, and McGraw-Hill's pilgrimage
through the Summa must pass through less endearing sections. So it is
that O'Meara and Duffy of the Midwest Dominicans try their hand at
"de vitiis religioni oppositis." The translation of the text measures up to
the usual high standards of this series. Thomistic jargon and Latin syntax
do not get in the way of the meaning. Indeed, some sentences become
rhetorical questions and the overworked " Socrates " is retired in favor of
"John Doe."
Over and above the Summa text, however, this volume does not have
a great deal to offer. Angels, much less devils, have a bad press today, so
the editors' preference for " demonic " over " demon " is understandable.
They do succeed in suggesting points of contact between this tract and
contemporary discussions. What is sadly lacking is an historical interpretation of the text. How does St. Thomas compare with other medieval
writers on the subject, and what were the lines of development up to the
13th century and since then? The scholar will have to look to the appendices of other volumes, hopefully not in vain.
MATTHEW RzEczKowsKI, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies

Washington, D. C.

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BOOK REVIEWS

CoveMnt and Creation. By PIET ScHoONENBERG, S. J. Notre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1969. Pp. 213. $5.95.
In 1955 the author published the first part of a dogmatic treatise on
the Apostles' Creed designed for the laity and entitled Het geloof van ons
doopsel (" The Faith of Our Baptism ") . This ambitious project was never
finished, not only for lack of time but also because of the radical changes
which theology itself was undergoing. However, the work contained many
valuable insights, and the present volume represents selections taken from
it. The rationale of this book is the author's desire to expound dogmatic
truths within their biblical categories and at the same time to make them
meaningful to modern readers. Trained in both Scripture and dogmatic
theology, Fr. Schoonenberg comes to his task well-equipped.
The first part of the book contains a resume of salvation history. The
author gives us a biblical portrait of the God of the Covenant (and dates
the emergence of monotheism with Abraham) . The " absolute " attributes
of God are examined first: holiness, mercy, faithfulness, illustrated in their
Old Testament context. Then follow his " relative " attributes: God as
Creator, Father, Savior. The purpose of this historical survey is to underscore the personal dimension which the notion of covenant involves.
In the next section the author elaborates the concept of creation in
depth. He is at pains to show from his analysis that what theologians call
God's " conservation " and " governance" represent a continuation of creation. The creative element involves newness: conservation represents
newness in respect to duration; governance represents newness in respect to
activity. In the case of man, God's creativity is apparent in the former's
free decisions (which provide a unique element of newness). Fr. Schoonenberg sees law as governing only the fixed elements in created activity, not
their newness. Thus, man's free actions-along with the freaks in nature-are not subsumed under the law.
Now comes the author's principal interest: a consideration of "supernaturality." In the Old Testament, he points out, the gratuity of God's
"hesed " in connection with the Covenant foreshadowed this concept. In
the New Testament, supernaturality lies beneath the gifts attributed to the
Holy Spirit. A lengthy analysis of human versus divine covenants in the
context of interpersonal relationships leads the author to conclude that the
supernatural consists essentially in God's gratuitous, unpredictable exceeding of man's needs and expectations: an uninterrupted series of unmerited
surprises. These reflections cause Fr. Schoonenberg to see that covenant
is implied in the very act of creation.
Perhaps that most intriguing portion of the book is that which deals with
miracles. Reacting against the Scholastic tendency to place the sign value
of a miracle in its going-beyond-the-laws-of-nature, the author insists that
it is to the religious context that we are to look for the sign value. He

BOOK REVIEWS

188

builds his case on the observation that modern science has tended to debunk
the notion of God's immediate action in miracles: he seems always to use
secondary causes. (Teilhard de Chardin's theory of " hominisation " is
cited at this point). A survey of some of Christ's miracles tends to bear
this out: they were never performed as stunts nor simply as proofs of his
own authority; they normally presupposed a minimal faith and carried with
them a symbolic message (exorcisms and healings not only taught the
lesson of God's mercy, but also pointed to the dawn of the messianic era).
Actually, miracles represent "no intervention from without, no removal
of the forces of creation, but a heightened involvement (of God) .... "
(p.
Indeed, " The extraordinary is at all times to be expected from
God." (p.
The reader who is willing to study this book will be richly rewarded.
Perhaps the best recommendation which this reviewer can offer is that
he has just finished using it as a satisfactory text in a course entitled,
" Man and Grace."
MARTIN K. HoPKINs, O.P.
University of DaUas
Irving, Texa3

'l'he One Bread. By MAX THURIAN. New York:
Pp. 159. $4.50.

Sheed & Ward, 1969.

The American publisher, Sheed & Ward, has here given us in one English
volume a collection of essays of Max Thurian which appeared in the
original French in two short volumes. The first part is a collection of essays
on the Eucharist and related topics. The second part, however, has little
to do with the Eucharist and can be unified around the theme of faith, if
around anything.
Much of what Thurian has to say on the Eucharist he has already said at
greater length in his more substantial 'l'he Eucharistic Memorial. The
present book, then, stands or falls as a work of popularization. Thurian
continues to write in that calm and optimistic tone that characterizes all
his efforts. These essays reflect his generally broad theological culture with
a strong biblical emphasis. The author maintains a proper respect for
divergent traditions, whether Protestant or Catholic, together with a desire
to bring these divergencies together in an overarching unity. He thinks
that many of the disputes that have had a long history in Christian
theology are solvable at a deeper level. Thus, " Simplistic oppositions
must be abandoned; liberty-institution, spirit-liturgy, prophet-priest are
oppositions that have no sense in the message of Christ. Rather, it is a
matter of complementary terms; and the first vivifies and opens eschato-

184

BOOK REVIEWS

logically on the second, which in turn serves the first as support and
language." (p. 56)
The author shows considerable respect for the traditions of different
churches on the question of inter-communion, but he definitely thinks the
time has arrived for moving beyond the present practice to an actual
sharing of the one bread. Thurian attempts to give some theological
support for this plea by his view that faith is a " process " and not simply
adhesion to a series of statements of belief. Traditional Catholic theology
is familar with the distinction between implicit and explicit faith. Thus
Thomas Aquinas and a peasant in medieval Sicily may have both belonged
to the sames church, but the level of the explicitness of their faith varied
widely. Thurian wants to apply this distinction to the question of intercommunion between churches today. The fulness of truth regarding the
Eucharist is an eschatological goal toward which the doctrines of different
churches tend. Therefore, it seems in order that the Catholic or Orthodox
Churches, heretofore opposed to inter-communion, should feel free to allow
inter-communion at least occasionally to members of other churches whose
Eucharistic teaching they view as less complete or explicit.
Thurian adduces no substantiation for this position from Vatican II.
Certainly no student of the conciliar documents would expect any direct
support from that source. However, Vatican II did place new emphasis
on the historical or " process " aspect of the Church. The Church as the
People of God has a past and moves forward to its future. Then too, the
concilar decree on ecumenism acknowledges in an unprecedented way the
theological importance of other Christian churches. These churches, Protestant as well as Orthodox, have some ecclesiological meaning as churches
and not just as collections of good but invincibly ignorant Protestants or
Orthodox. These considerations, in this reviewer's opinion, should lead
the Catholic Church to a renewed evaluation of its traditional opposition to
inter-communion. If Thurian's little book helps lead to this reconsideration
of positions, it will have more than made its publication worthwhile.
PETER DEMAN, 0. P.
Berkeley Priory
Berkeley, California

Autobiographies of Ten Religious Leaders: Alternatives in Religious Experience. By RAnosLAV A. TBANOFF. San Antonio: Trinity University
Press, 1968. Pp. 804. $7.00.
Radoslav Tsanoff was born in Sofia, Bulgaria, and emigrated to the
United States as a young man in 1908. He graduated with honors from
Oberlin College and in 1910 received his doctorate in philosophy from

BOOK REVIEWS

185

Cornell University. Practically his entire professional life has been spent
at Rice University as a professor of philosophy. Since 1961 he has been a
Distinguished Trustee Professor of Humanities at Rice University.
Among his previously published works the following titles deserve special
mention: The Problem of Immortality: Studies in Personality and Value
Religious Crossroads (1942); The Moral Ideals of Our Civilization
(1942; second impression 1947); Ethics (1947; revised edition 1955);
The Great Philosophers (1953; second edition 1964). Professor Tsanoff's
most recent work, prior to the present volume, was Worlds to Know: A
Philosophy of Cosmic Perspectives (1962) .
In the present volume Professor Tsanoff offers an ecumenical panorama
of outstanding religious personalities, starting with St. Augustine and terminating with Pope John XXIII. He does not restrict himself to Catholic
figures nor even to European Christians, although he does exclude from his
study the Oriental mysticism of Asia and India. Thus, the reader will
find in this volume a stirring account of the religious experiences of ten
Christians who have emerged influential leaders in the course of the
centuries: St. Augustine, St. Teresa of Avila, George Fox, John Bunyan,
John Wesley, Cardinal Newman, Ernest Renan, Leo Tolstoy, Albert
Schweitzer and Pope John XXIII.
As in any selective anthology, readers may argue about the inclusion or
emission of certain individuals. Some may be unwilling to admit that
Bunyan, Renan and Tolstoy deserve to be classified as religious leaders in
Christianity. Others may be disappointed to find that Professor Tsanoff
omitted from his list such persons as St. Paul, St. Jerome, Luther, St. John
of the Cross, Calvin, Fr. Liebermann, St. Therese of Lisieux, de Foucauld,
and others. Perhaps the historian of Christian spirituality would judge that
the author's greater fault was in the omission of certain persons who are
unquestionably influential leaders of Christian life and thought.
A second criticism of the book is that it does not fulfill the promise made
in the Foreword, where the author states that " the purpose of this book is
to examine principal varieties of Christian experience as they have been
expressed in the intimate autobiographies of great religious leaders." (p xi)
Except for the study on Albert Schweitzer and Pope John XXIII, the
direct witness by way of autobiographical material is totally inadequate.
This is difficult to explain or excuse, especially in the case of St. Augustine
and St. Teresa of Avila, who have left such a wealth of autobiographical
material. All too often the author becomes involved with the biographical
data of the life of his subject instead of discussing the religious experience
of the individual, which is promised in the sub-title of the book: "Alternatives in Religious Experience."
These two criticisms of the book are serious ones, and yet it must be
admitted that Professor Tsanoff writes with great sensitivity and with a
good understanding of the basic principles of the Christian life. His book

186

BOOK REVIEWS

could well serve as an antidote to the poison of contemporary pagan
humanism, and it might even prod some of the moderns, alienated from
God and religion, to face the disturbing problem of Christ and the Gospel.
JoRDAN AuMANN, 0. P.
Chicago, IUinoia

Icon and Pulpit. The Protestant-Orthodox Encounter. By CARNEGIE
SAMUEL CALlAN. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1968. Pp. 220.
$6.50.

Ecclesia Sponsa Apud S. Ambrosium. By JoANNES JosEPHUS MARcoLic,
T. 0. R. Rome: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1967. Pp. 175.
The understanding of other religious traditions is certainly a giant step
in ecumenical conversations. Dr. Calian's book is a contribution toward
that understanding. His background is ecumenical, for he was baptized in
the Orthodox tradition and raised as a Protestant. Now a Presbyterian
minister, Dr. Calian teaches at the University of Dubuque Theological
School, a Presbyterian institution closely united with Lutheran and
Catholic seminaries.
The book, while presenting Orthodoxy to a Protestant audience, tries to
go beyond this immediate aim and to lead to a deeper understanding of the
Church by a renewed appreciation of the Eastern or Greek dimension of
its life and heritage. After a brief historical survey of Protestant-Orthodox
relations, Dr. Calian contrasts the ecclesiology of Orthodoxy with that of
Western Christianity, and in a concluding section he points out the distinct
contribution to Church renewal that can come from a full incorporation of
Eastern themes into Western Christianity.
One defect worth noting: although Dr. Calian distinguishes Eastern Rite
or Oriental Catholics from other parts of Eastern Christianity, he seems
then to ignore the distinction. Thus, liturgical practices and theological
or juridical positions common to Eastern Christians are attributed to the
Orthodox alone, and Roman Catholicism becomes identical with Latin
Catholicism.
Despite this unfortunate tendency to ignore Eastern Catholics the book
does give a useful introduction into important themes of ecumenical
concern. An eleven-page bibliography is a useful addition.
Taking the wider dimension, the past decade has been marked by ever
growing interest in the Church as an object of theological investigation.
Ecclesia Sponsa apud S. Ambrosium examines one title or analogy, frequent
in Scripture and the Fathers, by which the Church is described: the

BOOK REVIEWS

187

Church as Bride or Spouse of Christ. In particular, this theme is studied
in. the works of St. Ambrose of Milan.
For Ambrose this theme was not something incidental but a central motif
through which he presented doctrinal, moral, and ascetical teaching. The
redemptive work of Christ, the sacraments (especially Baptism and the
Eucharist) , the relation of the Holy Spirit to the Church, the condition
of the sinful or apostate Christian: these and other doctrinal themes are,
in the thought of Ambrose, aspects of the fundamental comparison between
marriage and Christ's union with the Church. Ambrose, as an energetic
pastor, found this theme of great value also in describing the love of God
for men and in reminding his people of their moral obligations. Although
Ambrose continued the earlier patristic theme that the title " Spouse of
Christ" belongs in a special way to those who lead a virginal life in the
Church, he also developed a less common patristic notion that the union of
every Christian to Christ might aptly be described in terms of spiritual
matrimony.
The author notes that Ambrose is at times not particularly original but
merely summarizing and putting into order theological themes presented
in a disparate way by earlier Fathers of the Church. This can enhance his
value for us, since he is not so much a single witness as a sign of an entire
theological tradition. He has a significant place in the patristic writers of
the West, especialJy because of his influence on St. Augustine.
Besides its obvious value to those working in ecclesiology, this book has a
further usefulness. In it those searching for a truly pastoral theology can
learn of that fruitful union of dogmatic and moral teaching so frequent in
the Fathers. Often they were concerned with the formulation of doctrine,
but they also labored to make it operative in the lives of those they
taught.
JusTIN HENNESSEY, 0. P.
Albertus Magnus CoUege
New Haven, Conn.

Patterns of Promise. Edited and published by THE CHRISTIAN BROTHERS.
Winona, Minnesota: St. Mary's ColJege Press, 1968. Pp.
$8.60.
There is certainly something deficient about this book, but it is difficult
to pinpoint. Perhaps it is the publicity, so grossly exaggerated, for it is
claimed that this is the first basic text for adult education written by
American authors for American Catholics, that it examines and clarifies
the essential theological issues of the second half of the twentieth century,
that it explores in depth the conclusions of modern biblical scholarship and

188

BOOK REVIEWS

theology regarding the past, present and future of the Church. Not one of
these claims is fulfilled in this book. Indeed, the very subtitle is misleading,
for Patterns of Promise is not, by any stretch, even a survey of " Christian
doctrine, yesterday, today and tomorrow."
Perhaps the deficiency is the lack of a discernible plan for the book.
Eight men and women are listed as " principal contributors " of the seven
chapters and two appendices, but no one seems to claim credit or blame for
editing, and so one wonders if it was indeed edited at all. After reading
the book, some may be convinced of it.
Perhaps the lack of depth is the real deficiency, and thus it deserves the
description of pop theology. Supposedly, it is intended for adults, but I
daresay it would be easily understood by most high school students of
today, and possibly be better accepted by them, especially in its chapters
on liturgy and social responsibility. Attempts are made to treat of hope,
in two distant chapters, but this is also a disappointment.
Maybe it is not just one thing that is deficient; it's everything about
the book. To be sure, there are isolated paragraphs of value. The total
effect, however, is negative. When I first read that the New Book Review
listed this among a dozen " worst books," I was shocked at the vitriol,
but now on retrospect I am inclined to agree:
Can an adult catechetical study guide that quotes Man of La Mancha and
The Wizard of Oz, alludes to Lew Alcindor, Humphrey Bogart and Chairman Mao
as well as regulars like Teilhard, John XXIII and the Holy Spirit, be all that bad?
A loaded question. This !.'Ort of pop theology makes one wonder if the aggiornamento was worth it. Pius XII would have condemned Patterns of Promise . . .
as " not only dangerous but nefarious." And so it is.

JAMES J. DAviS, 0. P.
Providence CoUege
Providence, R. I.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Appleton-Century-Crofts:
A Contemporary Approach to Classical Metaphysics, by George J. Seidel, 0. S. B. (Pp. 136, $1.95): Human
Being & Being Human. Man's Philosophies of Man, by Edmund F.
Byrne & Edward A. Maziarz (Pp. 438, $6.00).
George Braziller, Inc.: Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge, by
Elizabeth Ramsden Eames (Pp. !i!40, $6.00).
Burgess Publishing Co.: The Concept of Equality, ed. by W. T. Blackstone
(Pp. 210).
Editions J. Duculot, S. A.: Le Dynamisme de la Morale Chretienne, by
P. Anciaux, J. Ghoos, F. D'Hoogh (Vol. I, pp. 174; Vol. II, pp. 200,
120 FB each) .
Paolo VI uno stile poietico, by Eduard Landolt,
Edigraf Editrice:
Salesiano (Pp. 207, L. 1,800).
Free Press: Process and Reality, by Alfred North Whitehead (Pp. 44!i!
paperback, $3.95).
Harper & Row: The Future of God. The Revolutionary Dynamics of
Hope, by Carl A. Braaten (Pp. 186, $5.95).
Humanities Press, Inc.: Naked Ape or Homo Sapiens? A Reply to
Desmond Morris, by John Lewis & Bernard Towers (Pp. 134, $3.50).
Lateran University: Tomismo e Pensiero Moderno, by Cornelio Fabro,
C. S. S. (Pp. 469); Il Corpo Mistico e le Sue Relazioni con L'Eucharistia in S. Alberto Magno, by Antonio Piolanti (Pp. 211); De
Theodoro Balsamone. Analysis Operum ac Mentis Juridicae, by
Gerardus Petrus Stevens (Pp. 36!i!); Un Pretre de Toujours. MarieJoseph Chiron (1797-1852). Fondateur de Sainte-Marie de l'Assomption, by Edmond Pognon (Pp. 288); La Pace e Paolo VI, by
Luigi Bogliolo (Pp. 89).
Lawrence Publishing Co.: The Other Americans. Minorities in American
History, by Kathleen Wright (Pp. 182, $2.00).
Macmillan Co.: Anatomy of the New Testament. A Guide to its
Structure and Meaning, by Robert A. Spivey & D. Moody Smith
(Pp. 5!i!8) ; Reflective Naturalism. An Introduction to Moral Philosophy, by Vincent C. Punzo (Pp. 398, $7.95); Determinism and
Freedom in the Age of Modern Science, ed. by Sidney Hook (Pp.
!i!52 paper, $1.50).
La Nuova Cultura Editrice: L'Ultimo Maritain, by Giuseppe Zappone
(Pp. 167, L. 1,500).
Oxford University Press: Thessalonians. The New Clarendon Bible, by
D. E. H. Whiteley (Pp. 115, $4.00).

189

190

BOOKS RECEIVED

Pastoral Educational Services/NCRD: Belief in Human Life, by Anthony
T. Padovano (Pp. 96, $5.00) .
Philosophical Library: Rays of Hope. The Universe-Life-Man, by Robert
Lloyd Gregory (Pp. 26S, $7.00).
Priory Press: The World in the Church, ed. by Jordan Aumann, 0. P.
(Pp. 161, $5.95).
Friedrich Pustet: Der Moraltheologie J. Geishuttner (1763-1805), I. Kant
und J. G. Fichte, by Ursicin Derungs (Pp. 34S, DM 39).
Van Nostrand Reinhold Book Corp.: Issues in Religion. A Book of
Readings, by Allie M. Frazier (Pp. 3SO).
Scepter Publishers: St. Augustine on Nature, Sex and Marriage, by John
J. Hugo (Pp. Q49, $5.95) .
Charles Scribner's Sons: Belief, Knowledge, and Truth. Readings in the
Theory of Knowledge, by Robert R. Ammerman & Marcus G. Singer
(Pp. 532, $4.95).
Sheed & Ward: The Gospel of Irreligious Religion. Insights for Uprooted
Man from Major World Faiths, by Lowell D. Streiker (Pp. ISS,
$4.95); Humiliation and Celebration: Post-Radical Themes in
Doctrine, Morals, and Mission, by Gabriel Fackre (Pp. 315, $6.95);
Can These Bones Live? The Failure of Church Renewal, by Robert
S. Lecky & H. Elliott Wright (Pp. Ql9, $5.50).
Shocken Books, Inc.: Without Answers, by Rush Rhees (Pp. IS3, $6.00).
Union Panamericana: Examen Critico de la Ensefianza Superior de la
Filosoffa en America, by Diego Dominquez Caballero (Pp. 53,
$0.75).

THE GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOL. XXXIV (1970)
INDEX OF AUTHORS
PAGE
BANDERA, ARMANDO, 0. P., Recent Church Teaching on Religious

Profession: Temporary or Perpetual?
BEDELL, GARY L., Bradley's Monistic Idealism
BIECHLER, JAMES E., Gabriel Biel on LIBERUM ARBITRIUM: Prelude
to Luther's DE SERVO ARBITRIO .
BuRKE, PATRICK, Faith in Other People: Three Views .
CAHALAN, JoHN C., Analogy and the Disrepute of Metaphysics
CALIFANO, JosEPH, J., Bergson's Concept of Motion
CAMPBELL, HARRY M., Religion as Illusion in the Philosophy of

Santayana .

584
568

114
438
387

555
533

CHENU, M.-D., 0. P., The Renewal of Moral Theology: The New Law
CHIRico, PETER, S. S., Dewart's THE FouNDATIONs OF BELIEF: A

Review Article

1
460

CosTANZO, JosEPH F., S. J., Academic Dissent: An Original Ecclesi-

ology. A Review Article .

636

KAINZ, HoWARD P., The Suarezian Position on Being and the Real

Distinction: An Analytic and Comparative Study .
KELLY, ANTHONY J., C. SS. R., God: How Near A Relation?
KING, J. CHARLES, The Inadequacy of Situation Ethics .
MAY, WILLIAM E., Knowledge of Causality inHume and Aquinas
MEAGHER, RoBERT E., Thomas Aquinas and Analogy: A Textual

191

Analysis
PESCH, OTTO H., 0. P., Law and Gospel. Luther's Teaching in the

Light of the Disintegration of Normative Morality
Greek Ethics and the Way Back
to the Future
ToNNEAU, JEAN, 0. P., The Teaching of the Thomist Tract on Law
WILHELMSEN, FREDERICK D., Metaphysics as Creativity

84

SoNTAG, FREDERICK, Existentialism:

306
13
369

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWS

ACPA, Philosophy and the Future of Man (J. M. Quinn, 0. S. A.)
138
ADAMS, J. L., Paul Tillich's Philosophy of Cuture, Science, and
675
Religion (F. M. Jelly, 0. P.) .
ADLER, M. J., The Time of Our Lives. The Ethics of Common Sense
(J. A. Oesterle) .
477

PAGEl

ANcrAux, P., GHoos, J., D'HooGH, F., Le Dynamisme de la Morale
Chretienne (L. Weeks)
513
ANSELM OF CANTERBURY, Why God Became Man and the Virgin Conception and Original Sin (J. R. O'Donnell) .
695
ARMSTRONG, A. H., St. Augustine and Christian Platonism (N.
166
Molloy, 0. P.)
BAuscH, W. J., It is the Lord! Sin and Confession Revisited (J. M.
Donahue, 0. P.)
706
BEARDSMORE, R. W., Moral Reasoning (W. E. May) .
152
BLANDING, G., HARING, B., MoRRA, G., VALOR!, P., Una discussione
sul'etica della Felicita (J. Toner, 0. P.)
158
BoGLIOLO, L., La V erita Dell'Uomo (M. Schneider, 0. F. M.) .
343
BouBLIK, V., Incontro con Cristo. Credibilita della Religione
Cristiana (J. Toner, 0. P.) .
335
BoUYER, L., Eucharist (R. Kugelman, C. P.) .
334
BRANDON, S. G. F., Religion in Ancient History (R. J. Siebert)
679
CALLAHAN, J. F., Augustine and the Greek Philosophers (N. Molloy,
0. P.)
166
CALLAN, C. S., Icon and Pulpit (J. Hennessey, 0. P.) .
186
CAMPBELL, R. (ed.), New Morality or No Morality (B. A. Williams,
502
O.P.)
CHRISTIAN BROTHERS (ed.), Patterns of Promise (J. J. Davis, 0. P.) 187
CoHEN, A. (ed.), The Teaching of Maimonides (B. A. Williams, 0. P.) 169
CoNGAR, Y., 0. P., A History of Theology (D. L. Balas, 0. Cist.) . 315
CooKE, B., Beyond Trinity (W. J. Hill, 0. P.) .
133
CoRTESE, A., Del Principia di Creazione o del Significato (R. S. Laura)
352
Cox, R. L., Bet1oeen Earth and Heaven (P. van K. Thomson) .
527
De Doctrina Vaticani Primi (N. Halligan, 0. P.) .
704
DELFGAAUW, B., Twentieth Century Philosophy (J. B. Davis, 0. P.) 668
DEuTSCH, E., Advaita: A Philosophical Reconstruction (W. Cenkner,

m
DIAZ DE CERro, F., S. J., Un Cardenal, Fil6sofo de la Historia, Fr.
Zeferino Gonzalez, 0. P. (1831-1894) (L. Camacho, 0. P.)
DoMINGUEZ CABALLERO, D., Examen critico de la ensenafiza superior
de la filosofia en America (L. Camacho, 0. P.) .
DoNCEEL, J. (ed.), A Marechal Reader (J. P. Burns, S. J.)
EAMES, E. R., Bertrand Russell's Theory of Knowledge (D. E.
Byrne, Jr.)
EBACHER, R., La Philosophie dans la cite technique (C. R. Dechert)
ELLIS, P. F., C. SS. R., The Yahwist. The Bible's First Theologian
(R. T. A. Murphy, 0. P.) .
FABRO, C., Exegesi Tomistica (J. B. Reichmann, S. J.) .
---, Tomismo e pensiero moderno (B. M. Bonansea, 0. F. M.)
--, God in Exile: Modern Atheism (J. P. Reid, 0. P.) .

179
498
667
494
360
522
338
499
689

PAGE
FACKRE, G., Humiliation and Celebration: Post-Radical Themes in
Doctrine, Morals and Mission (T. H. Hearn, Jr.) .
FRAZIER, A. M., Issues in Religion (W. C. Cenkner, 0. P.)
FRIEDLANDER, A. H., Leo Baeck: Teacher of Teresienstadt (R. W.
Stern) .
FROST, S. B., Standing and Understanding: A Re-appraisal of the
Christian Faith (M. J. Lapierre, S. J.) .
GRoss, B. (ed.), Great Thinkers on Plato (N. Molloy, 0. P.) .
RARDON, J. A., S. J., The Spirit and Origins of American Protestantism
(A. P. Leonard, 0. P.) .
HEATH, T. R., 0. P., St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, vol. 51
(3a, 27-30) Our Lady (E. R. Carroll, 0. Carm.) .
HoRVATH, T., S. J., Caritas est in ratione. Die Lehre des HZ. Thomas
iiber die Einheit der Intellectiven Begnadung des Menschen
(T. Prendergast, S. J.) .
HuGo, J. J., St. Augustine on Nature, Sex and Marriage (C. Williams,
0. P.)
KLAUSER, T., A Short History of the Western Liturgy: An Account
and Some Reflections (G. Austin, 0. P.) .
KURTZ, P. G. (ed.), The Concept of Order (R. P. Stenger, 0. P.) .
LARCHER, F. R., 0. P., & DuFFY, M., 0. P., St. Thomas Aquinas.
Commentary on Saint Paul's First Letter to the Thessalonians
and the Letter to the Philippians (E. H. Maly) .
LoNERGAN, B. J., Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas (J. Counahan,
MADDEN, E. H., HANDY, R. FARBER, M. (eds.), The Idea of God.
Philosophical Reflections (A. J. Kelly, C. SS. R.) .
MALONEY, G. A., S. J., The Cosmic Christ: from Paul to Teilhard
(A. Morris, 0. P.)
MARLE, R., S. J., Bonhoeffer: The Man and His Work (T. R. Heath,
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