THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EmToRs:

THE DoMINICAN FATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH

Publishers:

The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C.

VoL. XXXVIII

OCTOBER, 1973

No.4

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS OF" GOD IS LOVE"

O

I. Problem and Method

UR CONTEMPORARIES discuss statements about
God. Our problem might be expressed in this way:
Nouns in common language are derived from within
this spatia-temporal cosmos, "x ". The really transcendent
God is not enclosed within that cosmos, " non-x." Consequently
affirmations about God seem contradictory: " non-x is x."
Such sentences have been called non-cognitive and literal
nonsense. 1 At other times they are considered literally cognitive though analogous. Many, however, object that the meaning of analogy is not clear; and it admittedly is complex. 2
Rather than adding another plea for analogy in general, we
Alfred J. Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic (London, 1950).
Eleven different kinds of analogy are presented just in an Introduction to the
Philosophy of Being, by George P. Klubertanz, S. J. (New York: AppletonCentury-Crofts, Inc., 1955), p. 290.
1

2

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

might try the currently fashionable analysis of one statement. 3
"Every statement has its own logic" enables today's mind to
ask its meaning before indulging in the fun of hurling about
epithets like truth and falsity. 4
"God is Love" has been thought to express literally an ultimate name of Supreme Being and by that very fact to provide
a distinctive orientation for both speculative and practical
thinking. In spite of modern philosophy's long preoccupation
with problems of knowledge, the fact of love's central position
has been acknowledged in recent years by diverse writers. They
use " Love," though, in varying meanings. When a Divine
N arne detached from God falls on earth, it shows a strange
ambiguous face to men, and faces itself a strange, ambiguous
destiny."
To discover the first essentials of love, and thereby some
principle for evaluating these varying concepts, there is nothing better than to look at the First Lover. But can we? Can
philosophy discover in experience a notion of love which can
be purified to such a degree that when it is analogously affirmed
of God the statement is literally meaningful? Or must natural
human reason be now content with at best a symbolic meaning?
The difficulties are well expressed by Walter Stace:
... let us consider how the statement that God is love will fare at
the hands of the philosophic sceptic. . . . We are, of course, taking
the proposition that God is love in its literal meaning, and not
merely as symbolic .... Love is some kind of emotion or feeling
or attitude or desire or at least a purpose-perhaps the purpose
to act in a certain way, for instance, to achieve the happiness and
good of created beings. But can any of this be literally true of God?
Only, apparently, if God be thought of as a finite centre of con3 This has even been called The Age of Analysis, by Morton White, A Mentor
Book (New York: The New American Library of World Literature, Inc., 1956).
• J. 0. Urmson, Philosophical Analysis, Its Development Between the Two World
Wars (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1956), pp. 179 ff.
5 Jacques Maritain proposes his meaning particularly
in Carnet de Notes (Paris:
Desclee de Brouwer, 1965), pp. 301-354. Cf. "Love in the Thought of Jacques
Maritain" in Jacques Maritain, the Man and His Achievement (ed. Joseph Evans)
by William Rossner, S. J. (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1963), pp.

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sciousness, one mind among other minds. This mind, God, loves
that mind, a human soul. But apart from this, to attribute emotions
to God conflicts with the very definite religious intuition that God
is unchanging .... For it is of the essence of a mind to move, to
change, to be active .... And if we say that this is not true of God's
mind, that we are only using analogies from human consciousness
and experience to help us understand something which is in fact
quite different, if we say this, we may be saying what is true, but
we have abandoned the literal interpretation of God as a mind. 6

Mr. Stace seems to imply here two points which are both
valid and important. First, some sorts of things signified by
the term love can never be affirmed of God. (But this does not
prove that a more patient search cannot discover, besides the
impossible meanings, some meaning of love which does not
preclude such possibility.) Second, no reality within the universe of limited things called love (or any other name) can be
affirmed of God, as it is in limited things. (But this does not
prove that some suitable concept cannot be purified sufficiently
to be affirmable of him.)

II. Toward a Solution
Consequently, if we wish to affirm the literal predication
which Mr. Stace denies, we shall first have to search patiently
through the meanings of love for one which does not preclude
such possibility; and then, if that succeeds, we shall have to
try to purify the likely notion to such elevation that it can be
affirmed of God without contradiction. Such affirmation, however, can never be as summary as the denial. Hie labor est. 7
A. The search for a suitable meaning of love
First we must search through meanings of love, carefully
rejecting the unsuitable in the hope of discovering a suitable
one.
Time and Eternity (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1952), pp. 57-8.
Jacques Maritain, The Degrees of Knowledge (New York: Charles Scribners
Sons, 1959), p. 369, n. 6: "The great Thomists have admirably deepened and
developed the questions concerning the being of knowledge; fruitful principles for
a similar development concerning the intentional being of love and the spiration
of love can also be found in their works. But this development itself is yet to
be made."
6

7

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

Following the method of analysis, we can begin with examples
of the varying uses of " love " in common language. Common
language is used because it preserves for us the enduring insights of our cultural heritage and helps prevent philosophy
from getting lost in an unintelligible stratosphere. In dictionaries, literature, and ordinary speech, we find such usages as
" roses love sunlight " and various plants named " love-plant,"
"love-flower," "love-tree." Or again, we say, "My dog loves
bones" and call animals "love-birds," "love-parakeets." Or
finally: " Parents love their children." " I could not love thee,
dear, so much loved I not honor more." " The score in this
tennis game is thirty-love." Can we conceptualize the meanings
of " love " in such contexts?
1. N aturallove

"Roses love sunlight " and other uses of the word in connection with sub-sentient things sound odd to our modem ears,
for we have bought our advance in understanding of the difference of human nature from nature in general with the price
of dimming our awareness of the continuity throughout the
universe, until we tend to feel no longer at home in a physical
world which appears as a vast f (x) alien to human values.
However, our fathers spoke this way. St. Thomas called this
" natural love." 8 They did not mean, of course, that roses
literally know the sun and consciously strive toward it. Such a
concept could be affirmed of roses only in some non-literal
8 Summa Theol., 1-11, q.
a. 1. H. D. Simonin lists St. Thomas's more important texts about love in Autour de la solution thomiste du probleme de l'amour
(Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et itteraire du Moyen Age, Annee I98I, ed.
Et. Gilson et G. Thery, 0. P. [Paris: J. Vrin,
He considers major: Ill Sent., d.
q. I, a. I; IV Cont. Gent., c. 19; Com. In
He considers minor:
Div. Nom., c. IV, 1. 9; Summa Theol., 1-11, q.
De Verit., q.
a. 4, c.; De Spe, a. 8, c.; De Carit., a. 8, c. There are also, of
course, many other explicit and implicit references. On " natural love " one might
consult: Summa Theol., I, q. 60; 1-11, q. 10, a. I; 11-11, q.
q. U6, a. 1; I Cont.
Gent., c. 80; de Verit., q. 8, a. 6; I Sent., d. I, q. 4, a. I; Ill Sent., d.
q. 1,
I Physic., lect. I5. The order of natural appetite, of which natural love is the
first moment, was studied in The Theory of Natural Appetency in the Philosophy
of St. Thomas, by Rev. Gustaf Gustafson, S. S. (Washington: The Catholic
University of America Press, I944).

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way, a "pathetic fallacy." To have even symbolic meaning,
such predication of love would have to stand for something
literally in roses. 9
Still, roses do literally thrive in sunlight. There is something
in the very nature of roses whereby they tend to grow up out
of the ground toward the sun. They differ from, let us say,
radishes which are inclined to grow down into the ground away
from the sun. What is common to both is that whereby each
tends to move towards what is suitable and good for it. This
natural tendency or appetite is consequent just upon the nature
of the thing, not upon any knowledge within the appetent as
in sense or intellectual appetite.
In each of these appetites, as St. Thomas Aquinas puts it,
love is the first moment, the source of the entire motion tending
to its end. 10 Natural love is an intrinsic principle of change
which is not itself change and is in fact as unchanging as the
nature. He used an example even humbler than the roses, the
gravitas of a heavy body inclining it towards the earth. 11 This
weight, this pondus was the crucial point of departure for an
entire philosophy of love. Amor meus pondus meum. That
gravitas is interesting in being an example, which as a scientific fact has become inadequate in our progress beyond
Ptolemy, but still an example of a philosophic fact which remains correct, the natural love which is the connaturality of an
appetent to that toward which it tends. Without such orientation to something nothing could change, for an indeterminate motion is impossible. This natural love is called a connaturality because it is a naturalness with another, which other
is necessarily entailed as that with which it is to be. This
resonance with and inclination to that other towards which the
• " The condition of legitimate metaphor is that both terms of the symbolic
relation, the metaphor or symbol and that for which it stands, should be present
to the mind. In non-religious symbolic language this means that the symbolic
proposition must be translatable into a literal proposition." Stacc, op. cit., p. 68.
10 "In unoquoque
autem horum appetituum, amor dicitur illud quod est principium motus tendentis in finem amatum." (Summa Theol., I-II, q.
a. 1 c.).
11 " ••• ipsa connaturalitas
corporis gravis ad locum medium est per gravitatem,
et potest dici amor naturalis."
(ibid.). Cf. I-II, q.
c.; III Sent., d.
q. 1, a. 4, sol.; passim.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

thing moves pertains, therefore, to the perfection of the thing
not absolutely, as it is in itself, but as ordered to another beyond its static self.12 By its very nature a being not only is
what it is but also is inclined towards existence beyond its own
limits of "now " and " here " and " such" toward the good of
existing in some further form. And since the good in some form
implies the good simply, it is inclined toward the good simply.
But no limited nature is in itself the good simply; and so it is
inclined to another. 13
Such natural love (inclinatio naturae in aliquid) 14 may be
affirmed literally of both roses and radishes. Even if we include
difference as well as similarity, meaning" roses have an inclination toward the sun and radishes have an inclination toward the
subsoil," we have not lost literalness by going into analogy, for
realities which differ in their very similarity and remain similar
in their very difference have been conceptualized, their inner
intelligibility disengaged before the direct gaze of intellect. In
fact, even if one has not directly studied radishes but does
know his roses, he can still know something literally about the
loves of radishes and of other things too, for he knows what
they are like. 15
In other words it is meaningful to talk about literally predicating one term of different subjects, either univocally, with
the same meaning; or analogously, with meanings which are
different yet somewhat the same; or, finally, equivocally, with
III Sent., d. 9!7, q. 1, a. 4, solutio.
Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 1; q. 6, aa. 3 and 4.
14 " Est autem
hoc commune omni naturae, ut habeat aliquam inclinationem,
quae est appetitus vel amor ... ordinem naturae in aliquid." (Ibid., q. 60, a. 1 c.).
15 " Dicendum quod amor naturalis
non solum est in viribus animae vegetativae,
sed in omnibus potentiis animae, et etiam in omnibus partibus corporis, et universaliter in omnibus rebus; quia, ut Dionysius dicit, IV cap. De Div. Nom.:
' Omnibus est pulchrum et bonum amabile '; cum unaquaeque res habeat connaturalitatem ad id quod est sibi conveniens secundum suam naturam."
(Ibid.,
I-II, q. 9!6, a. 1, ad 3.) Cf. I, q. 59, a. 2; q. 60, a. 1, c.; I-II, q.10, a.1; III Sent.,
d. 27, q. 1, a. 2 c.; I Physic., lect. 15. There would seem to be an implication
here that love is transcendental, but this is a large question which needs a discussion of its own. "Love and Being" in Wisdom in Depth (eds. Daues, Holloway,
Sweeney), by William Rossner, S. J. (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company,
1966)' pp. 187-202.
12

13

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639

simply different meanings. About the equivocal meaning of
love in "The score is thirty-love," where "love " means "nothing " we could simply obtain no clue from our knowledge of
roses. If this literal equivocality could be the case whenever
we affirm terms of God, then, for all we could ever know,
"love " when affirmed of God might mean "nothing"; and we
would never really be able to choose among symbols nor even
in the last analysis attach any meaning to religious symbolic
sentences/ 6 for we would remain in the dark about what they
are supposed to stand for in reality.
What can we do in regard to God with this concept of love
so far attained ? If we exclude God from the class of material
and non-knowing things, then love as the inclination of a nature
lacking knowledge can be literally predicated only negatively:
"God is not that."
However, this entire via negativa, valuable as it is, is not
ultimately self-justifying, for one can not say what something
is not unless he has some knowledge of what it is. We must
search for a higher notion of love which is affirmable of God.
If we succeed we can justify the literal negation and also judge
whether or not the rose itself (or a triangle) is an illuminating
symbol of love divine.
When I speak of searching for a higher concept, I do not
mean to forsake that of natural love. That concept must be
enriched, but not deserted. To abandon the love of nature is
to misunderstand the nature of love. Insight obtained through
scrutinizing the rose and gravity remains crucial in the love of
the dog, of the man, and of God. For a sense or intellectual
appetite remains something with its own inner ontological
structure, one kind of nature; and the prior which is proper
to nature endures in the latter which is some kind of nature. 17
16 " ••• the symbolic proposition
must be translable into a literal proposition.
In religious symbolism this is impossible, because any literal proposition about God
would involve the conceptualization of that which is above all conceptions." Stace,
op. cit., p. 68.
17 " ••• semper
prius salvatur in posteriori. . . . Unde id quod est naturae,
oportet salvari etiam in habentibus intellectum." (Summa Theol., I, q. 60, a. 1, c.).

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2. Sense love

" My dog loves bones " and " love-birds" introduce sense
love. Men as well as brutes experience this inclination toward
objects pleasant to sense, especially food and sex/ 8 In men
sense love is intermingled with and should be subordinated to
the analogous intellectual love; 19 but because of its vividness
and force, the sensual tends rather to draw the intellectual to
itself, not only in practice, but worse in theory. Some thinkers
conceive love itself and consequently all dynamic psychology
according to characteristics true only of sense love. 20
a. as passwn
One characteristic of love which appears vividly in sense
love is that it is a passion. 21 The animal is vehemently attracted
by some things. Within those things exists some suitability,
some congeniality to the animal which makes them agreeable
and pleasant to it. Only when it is known by sense knowledge
can this attractiveness in those things actually allure the animal. The sense knowledge, however, is not the passion-not
even that knowledge which is an awareness of the value of the
object, nor even the delight of the eye in seeing or the pleasure
18 " Propter
hoc etiam pugnae animalium sunt de concupiscibilibus, scilicet de
cibis et venereis, ut dicitur in VIII De Anima." (Ibid., q. 81, a. 2 c.). This would
seem to be the philosophical locus for the root of the Freudian libido.
19 " Alius autem est appetitus
consequens apprehensionem ipsius appetentis, sed
ex necessitate, non ex judicio libero. Et talis est appetitus sensitivus in brutis,
qui tamen in hominibus aliquid libertatis participat, inquantum obedit rationi.
Alius autem est appetitus consequens apprehensionem appetentis secundum liberum
judicium." (Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 1 c.).
20 The characteristics
of sense love may be masked in refined style using the
vocabulary of intellect. St. Thomas warned against this contemporary error.
" ... secundum appetitum sensitivum ... operationes quaeruntur propter delectationem. Non est autem aliquid aestimandum simpliciter secundum ordinem
sensitivi appetitus, sed magis secundum ordinem appetitus intellectivi."
(Ibid.,
q. 4, a. 2, ad 2.). The nature of sense love is a large and important question,
which needs much discussion, particularly in relation to modern thought; but we
can only touch it briefly here.
21 Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 2; I-II, q. 22, aa. 2 and 3; I, q. 20, a. 1, ad 1; q. 81, a. 1;
III Sent., d. 25, q. 3, a. I; de Verit., q. 26, aa.1-3; de Div. Nom., c. 2, lect. 4;
II Ethic., lect. 5.

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consequent upon the natural love of any conscious power for
its operation. 22 Knowledge is a reception, sometimes pleasant,
of the known into the knower.
Love, on the contrary, from its first moment as passion is a
being drawn (trahi) by the external thing precisely as existing
outside the animal and as possessing an attractiveness in itself.
This external thing attracts to itself the whole animal, not just
some particular power. Its allure is felt, consequently, within
the appetite of the animal as such. This fundamental appetite
of the animal was called the concupiscible appetite, from its
most noticeable operation, ooncupiscentia, a desire to be with
another, to acquire an absent beloved.
The existence and nature of this desire for another (and of
the whole process of emotion) is caused by the nature of the
first moment of appetitive activity which is love as passion.
In the concupiscible animal appetite there now exists this
being-tugged-at or pulled by that other thing and toward that
other thing. That thing, as sensibly pleasurable to the animal,
as a bonum delectabile, is the proper cause of love; and its
causality is love as passion, as being wounded, as being conquered and enmeshed and subjected to that other's conquering
allure. The lover is caught, is dragged, is possessed by the
good; love passively surrenders to another.
b. and as action
With apparent paradox love is not only passion but also the
primary action which is the dynamic source of a whole universe
of consequent activity. In fact, because it is passion par excellence, passively drawn to another as it is in itself, love becomes
par excellence active, the principle of actions by which that
other is attained. 28
Love is the first immanent operation elicited by and in the
concupiscible. 24 The animal, being drawn by the good, ratifies
its inclination in actively committing itself to that good. It
22 III Sent., d. 26, q. 1, ad 8.
•• Summa Theol., I-II, q. 22, a. 2 c. and ad 2.
•• Ibid., q. 26, a. 1.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

adapts and proportionates its affection to the good which is now
its beloved. Love becomes an affective coadaption or complacency in that other which is not the lover's good in absolute
ontological reality but which it makes its good appetitively as
its beloved and to be with which it now inclines. 25
Consequently, while the love may not change, it causes
whatever changes are involved in attaining to the actual physical union to which it is an unchanging affective inclination. 26
The external good now dwells as beloved within the love, drawing it like a magnet to dwell in its turn ecstatically outside its
ontological self in that other to whose ontological good it gives
itself. The love sets in motion an entire emotional and physical
life; desires for the beloved when absent, delights in its presence; hatred, aversion, sorrow for what is repugnant to the love;
zeal generating aggressiveness (called by St. Thomas the
irascible appetite) regarding difficulties involving the beloved,
with the consequent hopes and despairs, fear and boldness and
anger; 27 the myriad physical changes and operations which
tend to terminate in existential union with that thing whose
goodness or lovableness had started the whole process.
c. and finally as psychosomatic

A third important characteristic of sense love is that it is
not only psychic, a passion and operation of soul, but also
somatic, essentially material. Because it is psychosomatic
(which like its realism embarrasses post-Cartesian dualism) it
may be viewed as an inclination of animated matter as well
as an inclination of soul animating and acting in matter. 28
The good which as proper cause specifies sense love is the
sensibly pleasurable, a material thing which is proportionate
and suitable to the animal body according to the delectation
25
26

Ibid., q. 'Z7.
Ibid., qq. 'ZS-48.

27 Aggression is not hatred,
nor an effect of hatred; nor are both evil, nor is
love necessarily good, as Plato insisted in the Symposium. The Adlerian aggressivesubmissive personality traits might find their philosophical place in the irascible
passions originating in love's zeal.
28 Summa Theol., I-II, q. 'Z'Z, a. 1; a. 'Z, ad 3; q. 'Z5, a. 'Z; q. 'ZS, a. 5; passim.

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of sense. The resulting sense love contains the bodily reaction
as essentially intrinsic to its nature (which is not true of sense
knowledge) . Corporal change is of the essence of sense pleasure; sense love is inconceivable without it. The very nature of
sense love contains inclination of soul as formal element and
correlative bodily change as material element.
Following from this essential materiality are three characteristics of sense love which are important in the present problem:
it is changing, hedonistic, and self-centered.
Because matter fundamentally is pure potency, its inclination is to be actuated, to be moved, to receive existence. 29 When
it enters sense love, then, it is the first element to be changed
by the psychic or formal element which is the source of this
motion.
Because potency is the principle of limitation, matter is pure
limitation, the principle of individuation. Sense love, therefore, is essentially limited and can attain only the good as an
individual material thing pleasant to the individual animal. It
is true that the useful to the individual and species (as food
and sex) is loved, and that the formal objects of passions subsequent to love are not always apparently the pleasant; bnt
the love itself which begins the emotive process and the joy
in which it terminates have as formal object the sensibly agreeable as such. Sense love is essentially hedonistic.
Finally it is an ego-centric inclination to receive, but in a
way different from knowledge. As I have insisted, sense love
(in fact, any love) has a germ of generosity, for it is first of all
an inclination out to a trans-objective known as it exists in
itself where alone its goodness dwells. This appetitive approval
of the goodness of the good is necessary even for the enjoyment
of the good (as we can see in negative instances of some people
with diseased affections. They get so locked within their citraobjective selves that they no longer respond emotionally to the
trans-noetic attractiveness of being, even their own; and so
they cannot enjoy anything, becoming at times psychotically
•• I Physic., lect., 15; Summa Theol., I, q. 59,

c; 1-11, q.

a. 1, ad 8.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

depressed.) However the inclination, having gone out to the
good, then turns back to the lover, where it rests; for it is an
inclination to a bonum alteri, the pleasant to the lover. The
material nature of sense love makes it inevitably eager to grasp
for its individual self. Self-love is thus by nature archetypal
in sense love.
Sense love is the love most readily understood by men. As
material, it is among the proper objects of the human intellect.
Also it can be known " from within " in that privileged knowledge which each one has of his own inner experience. We are
tempted, consequently, to conceive all love in the image of
sense love. A general trend of modern thought has been to
limit literal meaning to the observable, even using verifiability
by sense observation as the criterion of literal meaningfulness.
I£ such a criterion is accepted, even implicitly or inadvertently,
then the nature of any love will be conceived as mutable,
hedonistic, utilitarian, self-centered. This meaning gives point
to Shaw's Schopenhauerian epigram: "The only thing worse
than to have loved and lost is to have loved and won."
To affirm such a concept of God is literally meaningless and
involves contradiction. It can only be denied of him; or perhaps
it could be meaningfully affirmed in a symbolic manner if some
literal affirmation could be discovered which could guide a discriminating use of such symbolism. But such a concept of love,
no matter how reconditely refined, will always contain these
characteristics of matter; 30 and to remove them would destroy
the concept. Consequently, one must "Sail on."
3. Intellectual love
" I could not love thee, dear, so much,
Loved I not honor more."

The poet is speaking of intellectual love. Love of such intellectually known goods as honor is the fundamental operation
3 ° Kant
translates such love into obedience to law. (Jacques LeClercq, La
Philosophie Moral de Saint Th= devant la Pensee Contemporaire [Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1954], p. 370.) One is also reminded of Spinoza,
epicureanism and utilitarianism.

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of an intrinsically immaterial intellectual appetite in a person.

It is by nature different from, and at times, alas, opposed to
sense love. By no means is it merely a sublimation, no matter
how lofty, of the same sort of inclination. I refuse to yield to
positivism and concede that the poet literally means:
" I love not honor, dear, at all,
I sublimate thy mouth."
Since intellectual love is immaterial, it is not among the
proper objects of a human intellect. However, with due care
it can be conceptualized literally and analogously to the concept
of sense love.
a. Friendship
"Parents love their children" is one of the sentences expressing the loftiest sort of thing within the universe of love. This
noble love between distinct persons who hold each other dear
as other selves is nowadays called at times an "interpersonal
subjectivity" or "personal intersubjectivity."
This interpersonal relation of " I " and " Thou " has been studied by
Johann in his book The Meaning of Love. 31 I have elsewhere expressed the gratitude I feel for many things about the
book,S2 particularly for raising a comparatively lonely voice
about the subject, and for confronting this element of contemporary thought with traditional metaphysics. For our present problem the book offers many helpful insights. Its central
concept of love, however, cannot, unfortunately, be the one
we seek. God might be named Interpersonal Subjectivity in the
supernatural judgment of faith and sacred theology which know
the plurality of Divine Persons. For natural human reason
working within the formal object of philosophy, however, it
remains literally a mysterium stricte dictum which could be
81 Robert 0. Johann,
The Meaning of Love: An Essay towards a Metaphysics
of lntersubjectivity (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1955). The notes and bibliography indicate works of this trend. Niebuhr criticizes Buber for exaggerating this
concept of love, but he admits his own puzzlement as to what it does mean.
•• The Modern Schoolman (May, 1956), pp.

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affirmed at best symbolically. This mutual love of benevolence
existing between equal persons who enjoy intimate life together
was conceptualized somewhat more objectively by St. Thomas
as friendship and can be analogously affirmed by sacred theology not only of the Blessed Trinity but also of the supernatural charity between man and God. 33 One might say that
this is the ultimate meaning of love; but it cannot be literally
affirmed of philosophy's One Divine Nature, for no one is properly a friend to himself. 34
Between love as friendship which is too high and love as material which is too low there exist fortunately other kinds of
love. When parents love their children, their children do not
always love them back. It is a melancholy fact that the love
of one person for another, even a sublimely generous giving
of oneself, does not always command reciprocity and intimacy
of life, sometimes because of inequality between the persons;
and so there is no friendship, but there is a benevolent love like
the love in friendship. Furthermore, although a person is indeed
the most perfect thing in the universe 35 and the only direct
object of friendship itself, still it is not the only good which
can be an object of love, even benevolent, even a self-giving
love. One can love honor, or art, or science, or one's country,
or a cause, even to giving one's life for it. One can even love
music, which is high among aesthetic values, as a relief from
humans, who are the lowest of persons. One can simply judge
something to be good for him and set his heart upon getting it.
" Misers love gold."

b. Love, unlike knowledge, is inclination to something
Consequently it now becomes necessary to analyse these in33

Summa Theol., II-II, q. 23, a. I; cf. qq. 23-46; I, qq. 27-43; I-II, q. 65, a. 5;

III Sent., d. 27, q. 2, aa. 1-4. The love of which Bergson, Merton, and Zaehner
speak is charity.
34 " ••• amicitia proprie non habetur
ad seipsum .... " (Summa Theol., II-II,
q. 25, a. 4 c.).
85 ". • • persona significat id quod est perfectissimum
in natura, scilicet subsistens
in rationali natura." (Ibid., I, q. 29, a. 3 c.)

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tellectual loves with the technical precision possible m our
brief space.
Intellectual love is discovered by human intellect as the primary and fundamental actuality in a human intellectual appetite or will.36 Consequently it is an inclination to something
insofar as it is presented as desirable or good by an intellect. 37
Although the human intellect, acting as it does through sense,
first knows material things as proper objects of its immediate
vision and only secondly rises to knowledge of immaterial
realities, nevertheless even its first object is received into that
intellect according to the intellect's own intrinsically immaterial or spiritual mode of existence without matter or its conditions. The good is now de-materialized; it is not limited to
an individual pleasurable as such, but it is an instance of the
delectable good, or of the useful, or even the good in itself,
known and present according to its own nature and reality as
such and therefore common to various individuals. Intellectual
knowledge is the crucial condition for differentiating intellectual
from sense love. Characteristics of matter which limit the perfection of love are removed. It becomes immaterial.
Intellectual knowledge is an intrinsically necessary condition
for the existence and causality of the intellectually known good
which is the sole proper cause determining the nature of intellectual love. However, in escaping sense we must not go into
another exaggeration, of intellectualism. Knowledge is a necessary condition. But it is not love, nor even a proper cause
specifying or determining the nature of love to the likeness of
its own nature. Knowledge is an immaterial intentional existence of the known within the knower and pertains therefore
to the absolute perfection of the thing knowing as it exists in
itself; knowledge by nature receives something in the mode of
36 " In unoquoque
horum appetituum amor dicitur illud quod est principium
motus tendentis in finem amatum. . . . Sicut amor intellectivus in intellectivo
appetitu."
(Ibid., I-II, q.
a. 1 c.) "Primus enim motus voluntatis, et cuiusIibet appetitivae virtutis, est amor." (Ibid., q.
a. 1 c.)
37 Cf. The Sin of the Angel, by Jacques Maritain,
translated by William Rossner,
S. J. (Westminster, Md.: Newman, 1959), pp. 5-37.

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immaterial identity. Love is quite the converse,S8 but it (or
things pertaining to the appetite, whose nature necessarily partakes of the nature of love as the fundamental appetitive act)
is at times described in such terms as an awareness of a value
or as an attention to or presence of a beloved, or as being specified by knowledge, or as having self-love as its archetype. In
such expressions the existence of a love distinct from both sense
love and intellectual knowledge seems in danger of being
drowned in the epistemological flood. At any rate it is not clear
to me how such a concept could ever be affirmed of God. If the
archetypical nature which we discover in finite being and call
"love" is self-love in the sense that a citra-objective self receives perfection or rests in its own perfection, then it seems
that " God is Love " would either mean the same as " God is
knowledge" or contradict " God is Infinite Perfection." 39
No, the sole proper cause of love remains the good which is
in trans-objective things as they exist in themselves, now with
masking opaque matter removed by intellectual knowledge
which manifests the reality itself to will. The good's causality is
an objective diffusion of its attractiveness, actually attracting
the appetite to itself, both in the order of value as intrinsically
valuable and in the order of existence as end.
38 In fact, because of their quite different natures, knowledge attains God last;
but love, first. (Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 27, a. 4.) Cf. I, q. 80, a. 2, ad 1; 1-11,
q. 27, a. 9, ad 1; q. 81, a. 8, ad 1; q. 80, a. 8, ad 2; de Verit., q. 22, a. 4, ad 1;
q. 25, a. 1, ad 6.
""Pierre Rousselot, S. J. (Pour L'Hi:rtoire du Probleme de L'Amour au Moyen
Age, in Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie des Mittelalters, Sechster Band
(Munster, 1909), p. 1) formulates the "problem of Love" in this way: "Is a
love possible which is not egotistical? And if it is possible, what is the relation
of that pure love of another to love of self, which seems to be the foundation of
all natural tendencies? " This way of positing the problem reechoes through others
before and since, e. g., Martin C. D'Arcy, S. J., The Mind and Heart of Love
(New York: Henry Holt, 1947); Anders Nygren, Agape and Eros, tr. A. G.
Hebert (New York: Macmillan, 1987). It seems to be understood as the problem
of the nature of human intellectual love; and it seems to be a false problem, which
perhaps arises from a failure to disengage the existence of something distinct
from both sense and knowledge, before asking its nature, much less positing as
central a problem based on an unproven presupposition that love is in itself
egotistical. Do we have here a parallel to the Cartesian Cogito?

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Again, then, intellectual love is a passion, analogous to sense
passion, in that it is a passive being attracted and drawn to
the good as outside the will;40 and again simultaneously love
is the fundamental voluntary active inclination to that other
as good.
c. Inclination to get (love of concupiscence)

This inclination may be either an inclination to get or an
inclination to give. Those two were called by St. Thomas
Aquinas the love of concupiscence (amor concupiscentiae) and
the love of friendship (amor amicitiae) .41 But he warns us explicitly that love of concupiscence is not concupiscence and
love of friendship is not friendship. "Love is not divided into
friendship and concupiscence, but into love of friendship and
love of concupiscence." 42 This distinction is important for our
present purpose. For although philosophy cannot literally
affirm of God either friendship (as we saw) or (as we shall see)
love of concupiscence, nevertheless it can affirm of God himself
(and therefore between creature and God) the love of friendship.
Love of concupiscence is like sense love (whose most vivid
effect is concupiscentia, the desire to get an absent beloved) in
being an inclination to get something-for oneself often; but,
if one loves another as oneself, also for this second self. The
object which specifies this love is bonum alterius, the good of
another (other than the good itself) .43 This is a true good; and
so the love first inclines outwards toward it with the incipient
appetitive approval of willingly granting to it its good. But it
' 0 " Sic ergo cum amor consistat in quadam immutatione
appetitus ab appetibili,
manifestum est quod amor est passio; proprie quidem, secundum quod est in
concupiscibili; communiter autem, et extenso nomine, secundum quod est in voluntate." (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 26, a. 2 c.)
41 Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 4; I, q. 60, a. 3; II-II,
q. 23, a. 1; Ill Sent., d. 29, q. 3;
IV, d. 49, q. 1, a. 2; de Div. Nom., cc. 4, 9 and 10; de Spe, a. 3.
•• " Dicendum quod amor non dividitur per amicitiam et concupiscentiam, sed
per amorem amicitiae et concupiscentiae. Nam ille proprie dicitur amicus, cui
aliquod bonum volumus; illud autem dicimur concupiscere, quod volumus nobis."
(Summa Theol., I-II, q. 26, a. 4 ad 1.)
•• Ibid., I-II, q. !l6, a. 4.

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is only good in a certain respect, the good of another; and so
the inclination fails to rest in it but turns away to that other
in which it rests. It is a motio 1·ecurva again, and a self-love.
This inclination to get something cannot be literally affirmed
of an already infinitely perfect God.
d. or to give (love of friendship)
The love of friendship is an inclination to give. The object
of this love is that to which we will good, from which consequently the appetite does not curve away, but in which it takes
its rest. The attraction of the good in itself is final. 44
This love is benevolent and altruistic. However, it is not
mere benevolence. One can will good to something or someone
whom one does not love. Love adds to benevolence the element
of passion and its consequences. The will is captivated by the
good in itself, suffers the wound of this conquering good which
is outside the will itself and of which the will within itself is
now deprived as of its own good. Consequently the will enacts
an operation which orientates a whole universe of elicited and
commanded acts toward the beloved. It voluntarily ratifies
its being drawn by that other good. It willingly commits itself
to that good, generously gives its good to its beloved. This love
is a straight inclination toward that to which one wills good,
to the good simply.
1) to a beloved in potency

The love of benevolence or friendship may will to another
some goodness which the other does not already actually posesss.
From the inclination to make (ad factibilia), to engender in
beauty, for example, springs the creative process of poetry and
the arts. " It is not enough for a painter to be a clever craftsman," said Renoir," he must love to' caress' his canvass too."
Or, the inclination toward moral good to be actuated into existence (ad agibilia) is such a love. This love may give various
44 Ibid., I-II, q. 26, a. 4; I, q. 30, a. 3; II-II, q. 23, a. I; II Sent., d. 3, p. 2, q. 4;
Ill, d. 29, q. 3; IV, d. 49, q.l, a. 2; de Div. Nom., c. 4, lect. 9 and 10; de Spe, 3.

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goods to a person, a home, a school, an institution, a country,
a cause; but all such communications imply the first gift of self,
for love is the first gift and consequently the giving of all other
gifts: of its time, its labor, its existence, the many comniunicative actions actuating beloved potentialities. 45 Such a concept
could sustain purification sufficient for God's Creative Love for
creatures but not for his Love In Itself, if we are to avoid
putting potency and change in him.
2) or to a beloved in act

This love of a lover in act for a beloved in potency, however,
implies a prior love of friendship for a good already actually
existing. "Every picture shows a spot," as Sisley remarked,
"with which the artist himself has fallen in love." The object
which arouses this love already possesses perfection by which
it is actually good in itself, prior to its being loved by this will.
It is actually good but not yet actually beloved. When its
glory is known, it attracts the will to a voluntary approval and
ratification of what already entitatively exists. Simultaneously,
the will, being drawn to and captivated by this external good,
wills to it its goodness. The will generously grants and voluntarily gives the goodness to the good; and since the will is itself
an inclination to the good, it thereby surrenders and commits
itself to this good. This is the simply straight inclination to
another as good. The good exists within this love as term of
the inclination, as actually beloved; 46 and since a present beloved good causes joy, and this beloved is actually good, this
love generously rejoices in the good of the other.
•• " Ratio autem gratuitae donationis est amor; ideo enim damus gratis alicui
aliquid, quia volumus ei bonum. Primum ergo quod damus ei, est amor quo
volumus ei bonum. Unde manifestum est quod amor habet rationem primi doni,
per quod omnia dona gratuita donantur." (Summa Theol., I, q. 88, a. 2 c.)
•• Although love produces no intrinsic term univocal with the concept in knowledge, the arguments against an analogous term need more discussion. Bernard
Lonergan, S. J., "The Concept of Verbum in the Writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,"
Theological Studies, VIII (1947), pp. 404-8; A. J. Bruneau, 0. P., "Dieu, Terme
Immanent de la Charite?" Revue Thomiste (1952-1), p. 225 ff.; William Rossner,
S. J., "The Process of Human Intellectual Love, or Spirating A Pondus," The
Thomist, XXVI, 1 (January, 1972), pp. 89-74.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

This is love simply. 47 Its object is the good simply in which
it begins and ends. Other analogous kinds of love, through
some of the principal types of which we have searched, are
related to the love of friendship as the secundum quid to the
simpliciter: they are this love as qualified. It may be qualified
by intrinsic limitation, as in material loves or love of concupiscence. Or it may be qualified by an extrinsic condition, such as
friendship's need to be loved in return by a person sharing life
with the lover. The principal act of the habit of friendship
itself, however, is to love rather than to be loved; and charity
itself adds, not something foreign to its nature, but further
perfection of this love. 48 We may recall that the generous
nature of this love was present at least germinally even in the
lowest, throughout the hierarchy of love. Here is the perfection
of love, as to exist is the perfection of being which is constitutively present throughout the hierarchy of the real. There is
no obvious reason why this cannot be affirmed of God. Raissa
Maritain express this beautifully,
For each time we give to God our " only," we give all, we give infinitely, and it matters little if this our " only " is but a poor object,
created, perishable, mortal. The life of our soul in this world, indeed
our very life in this world, is our "only"; or our happiness in this
life is our "only"; or the one we exclusively love is our "only."
He who gives his "only "-his soul, his life, his beloved, or his
happiness-gives infinitely. And with his son Isaac, Abraham gave
to God the very soul of his life and of his joy; he consented to the
destruction of all his hope. 49

e. Literal analogous affirmation of God

This intellectual love of friendship cannot be affirmed of God
as it is found in human beings. Like any other metaphysical
accident or limited perfection it must be denied of him. How47 " •••

amor quo amatur aliquid ut ei sit bonum, est amor simpliciter."

(Summa

Theol., I-11, q. 26, a. 4 c.)
•• " Caritas autem addit amorem perfectionem quandam
a. 3 c.)
•• "Abraham and the Ascent of Conscience," translated
S. J., The Bridge, I (Pantheon Books, 1955), p. 40.

amoris .... "

(Ibid.,

by William Rossner,

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653

ever, we can try to disengage from its limitations the pure perfection involved here so that it may be affirmed substantially
and supereminently of its First Efficient, Exemplary, and Final
Cause.
The purification necessary to raise love to divinity is even
more laborious than was the discovery of a concept with which
to start. The difficulties in affirming any name of God are involved in the peculiar problems and mystery of the gospel
name of Love. But this is life, to know God; and the arduous
need not render love's labor lost.
The central problem lies in the very nature of love as an
inclination to another, to an intellectually known good precisely
as existing outside the will, with which the lover is thereby
united in the mode of surrender and gift.
As St. Thomas posits the problem; "Amor est vis unitiva et
concretiva. Love is a uniting and joining power. But this cannot have any place in God, for he is simple." 50 In other words,
love as unitive implies realities somehow distinct to be united.
It is a union precisely because its most intimate nature is presented to us as an inclination to another.
In the reply to this objection, undaunted in the daring of his
speculation, St. Thomas offers a clue. The act of love always
tends to two, namely, to the good which one wills to someone,
and to him to whom he wills the good. " For this is properly
to love someone, to will good to him." An application of this
general position to God's love for creatures would be that his
love gives us existence. But the meaningfulness of Divine Love
for creatures depends on the meaning of Divine Love in itself.
The application to God's love of himself is the primary point.
Here, too Thomas does not falter.
Wherefore, in that someone loves himself, he wills good to himself.
And so he seeks to unite that good to himself insofar as he can.
And in that degree love is said to be a unitive power even in God;
but without composition, because that good which he wills to himself is not other than himself, who is good by his essence. 51
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 20, a. 1, obj. 8.
"' Ibid., ad 8.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

What do we really have here? The Good is not other than
himself; and yet a union with that Good is really present which
would not be present if Love were not really there. Thomas is
not normally a man merely to play with words, particularly in
order to dodge or mask contradictions.
The first step in investigating how there can be a union
implying otherness in God must be to inquire what otherness
can mean when raised to the divine. In other words, if for the
sake of conciseness we formulate love in Latin as " inclinatio
ad aliquid cognitum intellectualiter ut bonum," what could
aliquid mean when raised to God?
Aliquid is a transcendental attained by human reason after
" being " and " thing," and before " one." 52
Once the human intellect has attained metaphysical insight,
it sees reality first as being, existing, that whose act is to be.
Then, secondly, it realizes that only that exists which is intelligible, possessing inner structure or essence, a" thing." Thirdly,
it sees that by the very fact that the being confronting it is a
thing of definite or defined and delimited intelligibility, it is
divided from all the rest. It is some other thing, aliud quid,
another. This division so conceived implies the imperfection of
limitation in the many things presented to us. Hence, in conceiving aliquid, we get the conception of division. Only then
can we conceptualize the one. That imperfection of division is
now denied within the thing itself: "The one" is being as
undivided. Unity in itself is a positive perfection; but it is too
simple and ultimate to be grasped positively by our limited
intellects, and so can be expressed only as a negation of division
in being.
However, and here we arrive at the pertinence of this to the
present problem, aliquid is not just the implied imperfection of
divisions. It is not only, or even necessarily, some other thing,
something else. Like "one," and the others, it is a true transcendental, a vision of a unique aspect of the richness of existence, although it is an incomplete knowledge of that existence.
52

Ibid., q. 11, particularly

ad 4; de Verit., c. 1; de Pot., q. 9, a. 7.

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In " something" the intellect sees the point that existence is
too rich to be confined within any distinct real essence, just as
it is too rich to be comprehended in any one limited concept.
Existence must overflow into others, other ways of existing
which by that very otherness manifest this super-abounding
wealth of existence itself. Aliquid speaks to us of the superabundance of existence. In other words, it is true that aliquid
comes from aliud quid, another thing; but it is not the same.
Otherness emphasizes the division but also implies the positive
superabundance. When applied to God, the division implied
in otherness must be removed and only the superabundance
retained.

B. Solution from the viewpoint of the human concept
Now when " inclinatio ad ali quid" is applied to God, all real
division in reality must be denied. There is no inclination to
another really distinct being or principle of being. God's Goodness is not other (except to our way of thinking) than his
knowledge or his Essence. Our concepts are necessarily different; but the Thing Divine is One. In fact, he is supremely
One, with no slightest possibility of division, for his very
Essence is To Be; and the intellectually known good is in reality
his own Essence as Goodness, which is in reality completely
identified with himself as Subsisting and Knowing and Loving.
However, we note that in the very expressions we have just
used this Unity is affirmed only by negation of entitative division among these distinct concepts. We can only conceive
distinctly and then in judgment deny the objective reality of
the distinction. Even when we speak of God in the most refined
metaphysical conceptions we must speak of his love in some
similar fashion. God conceived as existing and knowing
his own Infinite Goodness is not that Infinite Goodness conceived as loved. Divine Goodness as beloved must be conceived
as aliquid, beyond God conceived as existing and knowing, and
must be so judged and expressed if one is not to falsify. The
Divine Goodness as Actually Known, and also as Actually
Beloved is real. And it is a Reality Beyond that Reality as

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

explicitly expressed in our knowledge of God as Existing and
Knowing. At the peril of falsification, then, we must in that
sense say (we can say it only in human words interior and exterior) that Divine Love is an inclination to himself as other
(according to our way of thinking) than his mere entitative
being. 53
That is considering the problem from the viewpoint of our
human knowledge as related to the Divine Reality. But just
that much is by no means the entire problem or solution. If
we were to leave it there we might be accused of having really
remained in a pure, though refined, via negativa; and of confessing that this mysterious union of Divine Love is not a reality
in God himself, since the distinction implied in union is purely
in our human concepts. No, even within the Divine Existence
as it is in itself, considered independently from the mode of
its conceptualization in our human words, there is a foundation
for our multiple concepts, namely, the Infinity of the Divine
Perfection. 54 Before the difficulty of speaking of such things
the pen is tempted to falter and stop; but one should speak not
only of the limitations of human knowledge but also of its
grandeur, the reality of its grasp of the real, the real similarity
of finite being to the Divine, and the union with God attainable in human knowledge and consequent love.

C. Solution from the viewpoint of the Divine Being
John of St. Thomas remarks that because of its infinite perfection or inner superabundance the Divine Essence is both a
one most simple thing and also virtually multiple. This virtual
multiplicity in God's essence, which is grounded upon its being
other things supereminently, enables it to be conceived truly
though inadequately in diverse concepts. To borrow an example
from supernatural theology, the Father is the Divine Essence,
and the Son is the Divine Essence; but it does not follow that
the Father is the Son, because of this supereminence of Abso•• Summa Theol., I, q.
q. 13, aa. 1-11.
•• Ibid., I, q.13, a.
I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3.

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lute Subsistence and this virtual multiplicity, which is actual
in relative opposition. 55
This offers a clue in our research into the meaning of God's
loving himself as a known good.
Knowledge is an intrinsically necessary condition for the
existence of intellectual love, in finite being. Nothing unknown
can be so loved. This in fact is a metaphysical principle, true
of being as being, and consequently analogously verified in the
Divine Being.
Even in God, the nature of knowledge influences that of
love, for love is an inclination to himself as an intellectually
known Good.
In creatures, knowledge implies an intentional otherness. A
knowing subject must be confronted by an object known. In
becoming known a subject of existence must be objectified,
made an object in a sense which founds the vigorous figure in
the original meaning of the word, " object." It is from the
Latin, objicio, literally " throw against." There is an inescapable
opposition of object "thrown against" a subject confronted
by it and looking at it. Knowledge is that by which a thing
becomes or is another insofar as it is other. Without that intentional otherness persisting there could be no knowledge. There
is indeed an intentional unity here, of knower and known: the
knowing is a knowing only by virtue of knowing this. And the
known is a known only in its existence in an act of knowing.
lntelligere in actu est intellectum in. actu. To know actually is
the actually known. This unity is uniquely intimate. 56
But it is a uniquely intimate unity because it is a unique
unity. It is an intentional unity sui generis, a unity grounded
in intentional otherness without which the very unity is inconceivable. If the thing which is knowing became the known
entitatively, then one would be destroyed. In fact, both knowing subject and known object as such would be destroyed. If
55 Cursus Philosophicus, I, Log. I.P.
Summul. Lib. III, Cap. X; cf. Summa
Theol., I, q. 13, a. 4.
56 Summa
Theol., I, qq. 84 and 85; I Cont. Gent., c. 44; de Verit., q.
a. 2;
Comp. Theol., c. 83.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

there were no other at which to gaze, knowing would be impossible; and if there were no subject looking at something
other, there could be no known object. Intentional otherness
is of the essence of the intentional unity which we discover in
man.
1. Divine Knowledge as precondition of Love

This intentional otherness discovered in human knowledge
cannot itself be predicated of God but from it may be disengaged concepts which are ascribable to him.
The reason why this intentionality itself cannot be literally
affirmed of God is his transcendent unity and the real plurality
necessarily implied in intentional existence. Intentional otherness is not proper to the object of knowledge as such but comes
to the object of human knowledge from the fact that in human
knowledge the thing which is object is other than the thing
which is subject. Human knowledge is to be another insofar
as it is other. The ultimate reason for this is that the actually
known is the actually knowing (intelligere in actu est intellectum in actu), and no creature is itself, by essence, actually
knowing or known. To know implies to be, and no limited
essence is to be. Hence, to know is other than the creature's
essence or entitative existence, as is also the actually known
which is one with the act of knowing. Intentional existence,
therefore, is by nature a unification of the entitatively distinct
and is what it is precisely because of this limitation and multiplication of entitative existence which it perfects. Consequently
intentionality cannot be predicated of God who is supremely
entitatively one.
However, a perfection can be disengaged from this intentional
otherness, a perfection implying no imperfection. It is the subject-object unity in knowledge. But what is that? 57
a. as Object Known

Viewing it first from the standpoint of the object, by the
very fact that it is an object known it not only is what it is
57

Summa Theol., I, qq. 14-18; I Cont. Gent., cc. 45-50; Comp. Theol., cc. 28-31.

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but also, simultaneously and by its very being known, transcends or overflows its being what it is, by communication of
its own intelligible quiddity to the act of knowledge in which
it is known. That is to say, its own inner ontological structure
not only determines and specifies it to be what it is entitatively
but also supra-entitatively determines and specifies the act of
knowledge to be a knowing this. The light of its intrinsic intelligibility with a sort of radiant transparency glows outwards
and illuminates, somewhat as the sun does not just exist as
does a dead star but also radiates light into an eye. This perfection of the object as such, which in the object as human is
intentional otherness, may be called a supraentitative determination or specification of intellect as exercised by the object.

b. Act of Knowing
As to the act of knowing, what is by virtue of its being a
creature's act of knowing the intentional otherness or becoming
or existence is by virtue of its being an act of knowing as such
a supra-subjective existence, or a supra-subjective unity with
the object as object. The more perfectly something is understood, the more intimately its reality and intelligibility is immanent within the act of knowing it. As we say: "He really
grasps that." "I have it now." "It is a part of him." "He is
self-possessed because he understands himself and life." The
known is more and more perfectly assimilated into his very
being. He not only exists but also possesses existence and life
with the more perfect integration and union of understanding.
The knower as such exists with the existence of the object as
well as his own entitative existence. Or, perhaps better, insofar
as an act of knowing is an act of knowing, its own existence is
perfect to the degree it assimilates the determination and specification of the object. It is alight with the brightness of the
ontological structure which is the object as actually understood.
It is an act of knowing precisely in this transcending or surpassing itself. Let us call this perfection of the act of knowing
a supra-subjective existence or supra-subjective unity with the
object.

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WILLIAM ROSSNER

This then is a purification of the concept of the intentional
otherness of knowledge. The perfection of the object which is
disengaged is a supra-entitative determination or specification
as exercised by the object. The perfection of the act of knowing is a supra-subjective existence or supra-subjective unity
with the object. The perfection in the intentionality of knowledge is, consequently, a super-existence in the mode of immaterial identity. Thus super-existence or overflow in creatures
always implies a real melioration, an intentional otherness. In
God there is no melioration, since he is Infinitely perfect by
essence; but the otherness is there superminently. There is the
perfection of the superexistence.
This perfection, then, of the subject-object unity of knowledge is predicable substantially of God. As object known his
Essence not only makes him to be what he is but also radiates
a supra-entitative specification of his knowledge determining
him to know what he is. As Act of Knowing, his Essence is a
supra-subjective Existence, possessing Itself as Known, or a
super-subjective unity with himself as Known. The subjectobject unity of Divine Knowledge is therefore a superexistence
by mode of immaterial identity supra-subjective and supraentitative. He is himself, possesses himself, not only by being
himself but also by the unity of knowing himself.
2. Divine Goodness as Object Loved

This unity of Divine Knowledge offers a clue for the purification of the concept of the union of love necessary for its application to God.
To return to creatures once more, we discover there also a
proper intentionality of love, an esse transcending the merely
entitative esse and also the intentional esse of knowledge. It is
an esse intentionale fluens, a super-existence which is an inclination towards another as known good but an inclination to its
trans-objective concrete subjective existence. We can disengage here the perfections which properly belong, first to the
object loved, and second to the act of loving.
The object in love is the good as actively attracting the lover

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS

OF " GOD IS LOVE "

661

to itself, or acting in the mode proper to a final cause. Present
here is a pure perfection which can be disengaged from the
accompanying imperfections. These imperfections arise from
the fact that good is the cause of which love is the effect. 58
Cause necessitates real distinction from its effect and a real
dependence of the effect upon the cause. 59 The love is really
dependent upon a distinct good. The being drawn is in the will
and from the good. This is implied in the intentional inclination to another which is the proper intentional existence of love
in creatures.
When we remove these relations of in and from, the distinction and dependence, the perfection which remains is the actual
attractiveness and attraction of the good, its proper glory. That
is to say, the goodness exists, not just as real, nor even just
with the supraentitative existence proper to an object known.
It also transcends both these modes of existence in actually
attracting an appetite to its own trans-objective concrete
existence. The good completes the circle, as it were. The process ends where it all began but with a new enrichment. For
the good first exists as subject of entitative existence. Then,
as a known good, it overflows in a supra-entitative objectivity.
Finally, retaining but in turn transcending this objectivity as
known, it draws an intellectual appetite to the very subjectivity of its own existence, now as supra-objective. The very
interiority of its own concrete existence not only transcends
itself as object known but also overflows in turn this transcendence by an attractiveness which allures an appetite over
and beyond the cognitional objectivity back into the subjective
depths of itself as beloved.
This perfection proper to the good, then, is a supra-objective
evaluation and determination of a will in the mode of attraction. It is the pure perfection of self-diffusion proper to the
good: bonum est diffusivum sui.
•• Joannis a Sancto Thoma, 0. P., Cursus Philosophicus Thomisticus, Tomus II,
Prima Pars Philosophiae Naturalis, !l. XIII, De Fine (Turin: Marietti,
1933).

•• Summa Theol., I, q. 33, a.l, ad 1.

662

WILLIAM ROSSNER

In God this perfection is supremely actual. He is by essence
Goodness Itself, supremely attractive and attracting. As Goodnes Itself, his Essence evaluates and determines the divine will
in this mode of supra-objective attraction. Divine Goodness
not only exists by essence, not only as known radiates intelligibility in supra-entitative determination and specification of
the Divine Knowledge whereby it is Known Goodness; it also
radiates and diffuses its proper glory as Goodness in its own
mode of attraction or allure or inclination whereby it is to be
Beloved. It overflows or transcends itself as being and as
known, in communicating itself to the Divine Will by determining and evaluating that Will in the mode of inclination,
so that what will be willed primarily is Goodness Itself. The
aliquid which terminates the divine inclination is the superabundance which is the supra-objective allure of Divine Goodness. By virtue of this superabundance the Divine Goodness
not only exists and is known but also attracts the Divine Will
as its primary and necessary object. 60
3. Divine Act of Loving

That is the perfection of the aliquid, the object loved. What
of the act of loving? Its perfection is fundamentally different
from that of knowledge, which is unity, while that of love is
union. The appetitive activity is circular: appetitivus motus
circulo agitur. 61 Good is both principle and term of love. Consequently, two elements or ontological moments must be distinguished within the perfection of loving. The first is in creatures final causality in act which is love as passion; the second,
the active inclination to the other, love as operation.
a. as " passion," being inclined, by way of ESSE
When we consider the first phase, once the imperfections involved in final causality are removed, the perfection remaining
is a pure being drawn or inclined, inclinari.62 This being inclined

61

Ibid., q.l9, a. 1 and
Ibid., I-II, q.
a. c.

62

Inclinari (and Inclinare) become personal in God by virtue of their super-

60

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS

OF "GOD IS LOVE"

663

is a supra-subjective existence and knowing, since it is an appetitive being drawn into the known good as it is in itself. It is
similar to the supra-subjectivity of knowledge in this, that in
both a more intimate and abundant existence is present by
virtue of either knowing or loving something. Love, however,
unlike knowledge is not itself a unity in immaterial identification with the object. To know is by nature wholly active,
actively assimilating and manifesting an object which of itself
is merely being known.
But a reversal of these roles occurs in love. Here the object,
the good now, is active; for goodness is in things. The good is the
principle or source of love as well as its term. It is actively
attracting as well as in a state of being loved. Consequently,
the act of loving possesses a proper correlative state of being
inclined as well as an operation of actively inclining to another;
for the good which is its object is not, like the true, formally
within the love itself but outside it in the thing. Since there is
an actual attraction of the good, there is an actual being attracted in love. This being inclined is a state of existence. It is
an act and perfection but an esse rather than an operation. As
such it is supremely actual in God. As he is supremely attractive, so he is supremely attracted by his Goodness. There is an
enrichment of the Divine Will as there is of the Divine Knowledge. However, in the Divine Will the determination is not as
such in the mode of immaterial identity within that Divine
Will as Will. Rather it is in the mode of a being drawn to the
divine goodness precisely as transobjectively existing in itself.
The "wound" of creaturely love becomes in God's love its
necessity. He is not free not to love his Goodness, for the natural love of his nature is also His Will. 63 That will is necessarily captivated and enraptured by The Good. There is a
super-suprasubjective existence which is the determination and
abundance. (Ibid., I, q. 37, a. I.) They are also essential, for what is personal
necessarily includes something essential since the essence is included in the person.
(Ibid., I, q. 38, a. 1, ad 4; q. 34, a. 3, ad 1.) Here we are attempting to disengage
this essential as natural from the supematural.
•• Ibid., I, q. 19, a. 3.

664

WILLIAM ROSSNER

evaluation of the Divine Will in the mode of being drawn. It
is a super-existence by way of esse, a state of being inclined.
b. as giving, by way of operation
Although God's love for his Goodness is not free, still it is
supremely spontaneous and voluntary. Since freedom and
voluntareity are not the same, this is not contradictory. Freedom is an active indetermination of a will which can determine
itself regarding limited goods precisely because its natural determination is to the good, and not to any particular limited
good; and this natural determination itself is that of a will,
hence voluntary. Voluntariness is the proper inclination of a
will, an inclination from within the will, fundamentally from
its nature and therefore necessary as the will is necessarily
what it is.64 This brings us to the second aspect of intellectual
love, that it is the fundamental voluntary operation of an intellectual appetite.
In this second phase, love is the active inclination to a beloved good. We speak here, of course, of simple love for actual
goodness in itself and for itself. The love willingly gives to
the good the goodness it already possesses entitatively. Love
transcends the subjectivity both of being and of knowing in a
superabundance of generous communication. The perfection
here is a super-existence (which is intentional and meliorative
in creatures, who get the giving, but not in God) . In both
God and creature, as the first phase of love is an act in the mode
of esse, a state of being inclined, so this second phase is an act
in the mode of operation.
The will now ratifies the goodness which is the very existence
of the beloved in its subjectivity and interiority. That goodness
now is present not only by virtue of its being but also by virtue
of its being given to it in a loving will. The good which is being
as desirable or loveable now in actual love attains the fullness of
its proper perfection as actually beloved. And only the active
•• " ... hoc enim importat nomen voluntarii, quod motus et actus sit a propria
inclinatione." (Ibid., I-II, q. 6, a. I c.) Cf. ibid., q. 6, a. 5, ad !i!; q. 6, a. 7 c;
I, q. !i!O, a. I

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS

OF "GOD IS LOVE"

665

love attains union with that goodness as such in generously
giving it to it. Only in the love giving itself to the good does
the good exist as beloved. Only by the love is the ontological
perfection of the goodness as such possessed appetitively and
formally. The good of the beloved is the happiness of the lover,
for it is what he wants. By this generosity and by it alone the
love enjoys the goodness of the good. N emo habet quod non
dat is even more profoundly true than the customary nenw dat
quod non habet. No one fully has what he does not give; and
as the giving increases in perfection so increases the perfection
of possession by will until, in the case of God, where willing
generosity is his own existence, possession is complete.
This super-subjective super-existence which is a superabundance in the mode of giving is in God. He not only is Goodness,
and by knowing his Goodness super-exists in the unity of immaterial cognitional identification with that Goodness, but also
overflows his very subjectivity of knowing, in a willing approval of his trans-objective goodness as it is in Itself.
In other words, as in knowledge there is an esse superior to
merely entitative esse, a super-existence by mode of immaterial
identity, so in love there is an esse superior to merely entitative
esse and to the super-existence of knowledge, an esse of superabounding generosity, a super-existence in the mode of gift.
The three esse's (entitative-of knowledge-of love) are the
very Esse of God. 65
Literally love may be affirmed of God, but analogously, as
both somewhat the same and also simply different from creatures. The affirmation is somewhat the same in creature and
God in that this perfection which we have conceptualized is
predicated of both; but simultaneously the predication is simply
different, for in God it is identified with his Essence, while in
creatures it is not. We have love, but we are not love. God is
Love.
If this is literally meaningless or contradicts the Divine Immutability I should want to be shown how. It seems to me
•• Ibid., I, q. 13, aa. 3-12.

666

WILLIAM ROSSNER

rather to perfect the concept of unchange. A man can have
existence with that participated permanence proper to human
life. He can also in some degree understand existence, of the
world and of himself in the world, thereby attaining union with
the intelligible aspect of being. He can also simultaneously
hate to be. This hatred, an appetitive turning away from life,
decreases his participation in immutability even to the point
of actual suicide.
In fact, however, being is desirable. And one learns to
acquiesce voluntarily in that goodness, if he learns to love to
be, he attains a union with that aspect of existence which is its
glory; and by that very fact he is farther from suicide and
possesses deeper stability.
Analogously, God would be less perfectly immutable if he
were Pure Existence Subsisting of Itself and Knowledge of it
but hated It or at least did not love and enjoy It. However,
he also loves To Be. And this ultimate union of unchanging
Love is an ultimate perfection of Immutability.
The Unmoved aspect of the Unmoved Mover has indeed
been more emphasized in seeing him as Supreme Being and as
Knowledge. Love, it is true, emphasizes the Mover aspect of
Unmoved Mover, for love is the unchanging and in God unchangeable source of change. 66 The dynamic, the active mover
of another, however, is not and cannot be itself changed as such,
for it must be in act and the moved in potency. God's necessary Love of Goodness Itself grounds his free Love of goodness
as communicated to creatures. Creatures' ontological good and
motion to good are God's good appetitively, since he wills our
good with that ecstatic characteristic which is consequent upon
the nature of love. 67 God's love is a point where puzzlingly
expressed insights of a thinker like Whitehead about the mutual
inclusion of God and the world 68 can be welcomed into peren66
67

Ibid., q. 19, a. 7.
Ibid., q.
aa.

68 Alfred N. Whitehead,
Process and Reality
Book Store,
pp. 519 ff.

(New York;

The Social Science

TOWARD AN ANALYSIS

OF "GOD IS LOVE"

667

nial philosophy, emphasizing his Reality as well as process. 69
St. Thomas himself did not hesitate to say that even our defects are taken by God as his own because of the union of love
insofar as he loves us as something of his own. Even sin is a
real evil and offense to God in depriving his consequent Will
of a good which he wills antecedently to us as his other selves.
There are many avenues for further reflection in the important subject of love; 79 but this begins to go beyond the scope
of the present essay whose purpose is to offer some suggestions
toward an analysis of "God is Love."
WILLIAM RossNER,

S.J.

Rockhurst College
Kansas City, Missouri

•• Philosophers Speak of God, by Charles Hartshorne and William L. Reese
(The University of Chicago Press, 1953), p. vii, pp. 273 ff.; cf. pp. 1 ff. and pp.
499 ff. "Non-Being and Hartshorne's Concept of God," by Houston Craighead
and "Could There Have Been Nothing? A Reply," by Charles Hartshorne in
Process Studies, Volume 1, Number 1 (Spring, 1971), pp. 9-28. "The Impossibility of Whitehead's God in Christian Theology," by Robert C. Neville; and
"The Viability of Whitehead's God for Christian Theology," by Lewis S. Ford:
In Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XLIV
(Washington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America, 1970), pp. 130-151.
"Reality and Metaphysics" by Joseph Owens, C. Ss. R., in The Review of Metaphysics, Vol. XXV, No. 4 (June, 1972).
7 ° For example Sikora calls the
transcendentals " meta-concepts " and Renard
calls attention to the fact that in God the perfections predicated contain an
implicit judgment of existential identity.

THE WORK OF OPTATUS AS A TURNING POINT
IN THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

T

HE INFLUENTIAL LECTURES of Pierre Batiffol on
the three zones of papal power in the early Church were
first delivered a half century ago in Strasbourg. The
steady increase of Roman power and influence over the Western
Church, the second zone in Batiffol's construction, is one of the
clear developments of the early centuries. Nevertheless, one
vital section of the Latin Church remained throughout its
history a reluctant witness to the reception of that growth
of Roman power. The Catholic Church of Latin North Africa 1
consistently maintained an ambivalent attitude of simultaneous respect for Rome as a see whose apostolic credentials were
most impressive, combined with a considerable sensitivity
about its own autonomy and traditions.
It is the purpose of this study to consider the position of one
of the lesser lights among the African churchmen, Optatus,
bishop of the Numidian town of Milev or Milevis (fl.c.370),
the earliest theological defender of the Catholic position in the
Donatist schism. Further, it is the contention of the study
that, due to the circumstances in which he lived and wrote, the
1 For earlier bibliography,
see J. Quasten, Patrology II (1953), especially the
articles on Tertullian and Cyprian. More recent studies include:
J. P. Brisson, Autonomisme et Christianisme dans l'Afrique romaine de Septime
Severe a !'invasion vandale. (Paris, 1958). (CyprirL 33-121).
W. Marschall, Karthago und Rom. Die Stellung der nordafrikanischen Kirche
zum apostolischen Stuhl in Rom. (Stuttgart, 1971).
J. Ratzinger, Volk und Haus Gottes in Augustins Lehre von der Kirche. (Munich,
1954). (Tertullian-Cyprian-Optatus,
44-123).
W. Simonis, Ecclesia Visibilis et lnvisibilis. Untersuchungen zur Ekklesiologie
und Sakramentenlehre in der afrikanischen Tradition von Cyprian his Augustinus.
(Frankfurt, 1970).
U. Wickert, Sacramentum Unitatis. Ein Beitrag zum Verstlindnis der Kirche
bei Cyprian. (Berlin, 1971).

668

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

669

discussion of the position of Africa in relation to the Roman
Church attained a new and crucial level with Optatus. It may
even be said that with Optatus the African tradition reached
a turning point in its history but that, as A. J. P. Taylor observed of the year 1848 in German history, it failed to turn.
The African attitude failed to develop much further in its view
of Rome during the years of Augustine and Aurelius of Carthage. It could be profuse in its words of respect, as in the Epistola familiaris,2 or proud and even harsh as in the Apiarius
affair and the question of African appeals to Rome. 8 The
thought of Optatus is an opening for the future but it is also a
development that must be seen in the context of the African
tradition, above all that of the ecclesiological thought of
Cyprian. Therefore, it is necessary first of all to survey briefly
the ideas of Tertullian and Cyprian on the place of Rome in
the world Church.

TertuUian
The attitude of Tertullian (+ after 220) toward the question of the position of Rome in the Church can best be judged
from two writings in particular, the early De Praescriptione
Haereticorum and one of his last works, the De Pudicitia. In
seeking a short way with all heretics, Tertullian brilliantly
takes up and develops the argument formulated by Irenaeus
in his Adversus Haereses. This argument, devised principally
with the spurious traditions of the Gnostics in mind, combines
the elements of the monepiscopate from Ignatius with the idea
of apostolic succession from Clement of Rome. To the Gnostic's
boast of being the spiritual heir of one of the Apostles, usually
one of the more obscure ones, Irenaeus counters that the logical
place to seek the teaching of Christ in the contemporary world
is the Churches which his Apostles founded. Christ undoubtedly
entrusted his teachings to these same Apostles who in tum
passed them on to the Churches they founded. The essence of
the argument applies to any Church of apostolic foundation
• Epistola familiaris =Augustine
8 Marschall, op. cit., 161 ff.

Ep. 177.

(OSEL 44, 669 ff. Goldbacher).

670

ROBERT B. ENO

but, for brevity's sake, Irenaeus confines himself to stressing
the greatness of the Roman community. Though he also mentions Polycarp, and the Churches of Smyrna and Ephesus, subsequent debate has centered on the interpretation of his words
about Rome.
Tertullian's version of this argument is clearer and more
incisive. These Churches of apostolic foundation are the
matrices and originales fidei, which have undoubtedly transmitted through time and space what they received from the
Apostles/ Conversely, then, if any doctrine does not conform
to the teaching of these Churches, it is to be rejected as false,
a foreign body in the bloodstream of the Church's life. Since
dialogue over the interpretation of biblical passages is usually
fruitless, the intelligent activity for the diligent searcher after
truth to pursue is to turn to the Church of apostolic foundation
geographically closest to him. It is at this point that Tertullian
makes it clear that this appeal to the testimony of the apostolic
churches does not place unique emphasis on the beliefs of the
Roman community alone.
"Run through the apostolic churches, where the very
thrones of the apostles preside to this day over their districts .
. . . If Achaea is nearest to you, you have Corinth. If you are
not far from Macedonia, you have Philippi and Thessalonica.
If you can go to Asia, you have Ephesus. If you are close to
Italy, you have Rome, the nearest authority for us also." 5 The
Church of Rome is prestigious in its martyred founder-Apostles,
Peter and Paul (to whom Tertullian adds the legend of John),
but the appeal to apostolic truth is fulfilled with as equal
validity by Ephesus as by Rome. A later echo of this same
reasoning is found in the author's Adversus Marcionem IV.5.1.
From this evidence taken from an early and orthodox point
in Tertullian's Christian life, we move to a moment near the
end of his life when his opinions had become much more extreme. These late references are much more problematical
• Tertullian, De Prae. Haer., 21 (CCL I, 202-3 Refoule).
6 Tertullian,
De Prae. Haer., 36 (CCL 1, 216).

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

671

insofar as the much discussed opponent bishop of the De Pudicitia remains unknown. Earlier scholars were convinced that
the object of Tertullian's scorn was a Roman bishop, possibly
Zephyrinus ( +c.217) , or, more probably, Callistus ( +c.222) ,
who was attacked by Hippolytus, a Roman traditionalist, for
alleged laxist innovations in the penitential discipline. More
recently, the weight of opinion has swung in favor of an African
bishop. 6 At present there seems to be no consensus upon which
a decision can be made in favor of a clear reference to Rome
and its bishop.
It is plain, however, that Tertullian indignantly rejects this
extension of special indulgence to adulterers and fornicators
within the Christian ranks. With heavy sarcasm he sees in his
opponent a " bishop of bishops." 7 It may be said by way of
inference that he rejects this pretention as well. But the significance of such a rejection is lessened considerably by a glance
at what his own ecclesiology has become by this time. Tertullian agrees that the Church has the power to forgive sins,
but this is not the Church which is identified with the numerus
episcoporum. 8 Rather it is the Church of the Spirit through the
man who has the Spirit.
It is in this same chapter that the intriguing phrase occurs:
". . . ad te, id est, ad omnem ecclesiam Petri propinquam."
Tertullian uses the phrase in discussing the opinions of the
bishop who claims the authority to forgive these serious sins.
Inasmuch as the identity or even the location of this bishop
remains a subject of continuing disagreement, one is at a loss
to know how to evaluate such an expression. In short, Tertullian's writings, fascinating as they are from other points of
view, contribute little to answering our questions about African-Roman relations in the early third century. The clearest
references to Rome as a norm of doctrine, in the De Praescriptione, do not attribute to it any fundamentally different or
unique position.
6 See J. Quasten, op. cit., 234-5.
• Tertullian, De Pud., 1 (CCL 2, 1281-2 Dekkers).
8 Tertullian,
De Pud., 21 (CCL 2, 1328) .

67ft

ROBERT B. ENO

Cyprian
The ecclesiological position of Cyprian ( +
is more complex and, from the point of view of its legacy, more significant.
The complexity arises in part from the quantity of material
to be found in Cyprian's correspondence where ecclesial questions predominate. From another point of view, his conception
of the structures of the Church is rather clear and definite. Yet
his use of a certain Petrine terminology has made his theology
a battleground for Catholic and Protestant polemicists over
the centuries.
Cyprian's Church is a communion of essentially equal local
Churches. "His Church is one and the faith is one; and the
cement of fellowship binds all the people together into the
body's solid unity. That unity cannot be broken; that one body
cannot be divided by any cleavage of its structure .... " 9 These
local communities which are the Catholic Church in the various cities and localities around the world are united with one
another by multiple ties/ 0 yet it is in and through the bishops
that these links are most clearly made visible. The Church is
built on the bishops. " Thus through the changes of times and
successions, the ordination of bishops and the organization of
the Church run through so that the Church is governed
through these same leaders." 11 The people are to follow their
bishop closely: " . . . the people united to their bishop and the
flock clinging to their shepherd are the Church." 12 Those who
are not found with the rightful bishop are simply not in the
Church. This Church, which for Cyprian is largely identified
with the numerus episcoporum, is held together by the union
of the bishops among themselves. " ... The Church which is
one, Catholic, is not divided nor rent, but is certainly united
and joined, in turn, by the cement of the bishops adhering to
one another." 13 Though many, they are one, or should be one
• Cyprian, De Unit., 23 (OECT 94 Bevenot).
Similarly for Tertullian. Se De Prae. Haer., 20 (CCL 1, 202).
11 Cyprian to the Lapsed, Ep. 33. I (Ed. Bayard Paris, 1962" 84).
10 Cyprian to Florentius, Ep. 66. 8 (Bayard 226).
18[bid.
10

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

678

" • . . episcopate diffused in a harmonious multitude of many
bishops." 14
Cyprian never specifies exactly what this glutinum concardiae is and, as his later history shows, it could wear dangerously thin in times of friction between Rome and Carthage.
Another of Cyprian's ecclesiological principles almost guaranteed such a crisis. He expresses it succinctly in the De Unitate:
" The authority of the bishops forms a unity, of which each
holds his part in its totality." 15 The whole episcopate is to be
united but, whatever authority and power there is, is held
equally by each bishop. His opening statement to the Council
is equally unmistakable.
of Carthage in September
It remains that upon this same matter each of us should bring forward what we think, judging no man, nor rejecting anyone from
the right of communion, if he should think differently from us.
For neither does any of us set himself up as a bishop of bishops,
nor by tyrannical terror does any compel his colleague to the necessity of obedience; since every bishop, according to the allowance
of his liberty and power, has his own proper right of judgment, and
can no more be judged by another than he himself can judge
another. But let us all wait for the judgment of Our Lord Jesus
Christ, who is the only one that has the power both of prefering us
in the government of his Church and of judging us in our conduct
there. 16

These words, of course, were spoken in the course of the controversy with Stephen, but they do not represent novel ideas
or ad hoc solutions for Cyprian. For example, he had recently
rebuked an African bishop for constituting himself an episcopus episcopi when he judged Cyprian rashly. 17 Unlike
Stephen, Cyprian and his African colleagues do not " apply
force to anyone, nor do we give any law since each leader has
in the administration of the Church, the free will of his own
volition as one who will render an account of his action to
his Lord." 18
Cyprian to Antonianus Ep. 55.
(Bayard 147).
De Unit. 5 (OECT 64) .
16 Sententiae Episcoporum (CSEL 3, 1 435-6 Hartel).
17 Cyprian to Florentius Ep. 66.3 (Bayard
18 Cyprian and other African bishops to Stephen, Ep.
14

15 Cyprian,

3 (Bayard

674

ROBERT B. ENO

Among the early letters of the Cyprianic corpus, there are
several representing an exchange between the Roman clergy,
probably led by Novatian after the death of Bishop Fabian in
the Decian persecution, and Cyprian who had escaped arrest
by going into hiding. In Ep.S the Romans, writing to the
Christians of Carthage, seem to cast doubt on the validity of
Cyprian's decision. In replying, Cyprian apparently feels the
need to justify his course of action to Rome. 19 Some would
see this as evidence of Roman superiority in that Cyprian feels
obliged to explain his decision to Rome and to its presbyterium
at that. The somewhat agitated tone of Ep.9 can be explained
adequately by Cyprian's upset about slanders being circulated
in Rome against him.
More generally, these letters and others must be understood
within the context of the ecclesiology of communio, koinonia.
Each Church is obliged to concern itself with the welfare of
its sister Churches: e.g., Rome for Carthage, Ep.S; Ep.36.4
" For it becomes all of us to be on our guard for the body of
the whole Church .... "; Carthage for Aries, Ep.68.3. Roman
letters of admonition and advice are read in Africa but so are
African letters of similar purpose read in Rome. (Ep. 59.19) 20
Cyprian's principle of the autonomy of each bishop is even
cited with approval by the Roman presbyters in a letter
acknowledging the justice and wisdom of Cyprian's measures
taken during and after the persecution. Minds sanctioned by
the vigor of evangelical discipline are accustomed to be content
with God alone as judge, they say, but Cyprian is doubly
praiseworthy for his modesty in that he has sought approval
for his actions from his brethren. 21 To these sentiments
Cyprian replies by extolling the value of mutual consultation
among the Churches. A similar appeal for consultation directed
Cyprian to the Roman Clergy Epp. 9 and 20 (Bayard 22 and 58) .
Roman Clergy to Cyprian Ep. 86. 4 (Bayard 92); Cyprian to Stephen Ep.
68. 8 (Bayard 286); Cyprian to Cornelius Ep. 59. 19 (Bayard 188).
21 Roman Clergy to Cyprian Ep. 30.1
(Bayard 71). Fr. Bevenot, basing himself
on this reference has suggested that Cyprian's concept of episcopal autonomy
originated in Rome itself. See "A Bishop is responsible to God alone" RSR 89
(1951), 897-415. (Melanges Jules Lebreton I).
19

20

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

675

to Stephen a few years later seems to have fallen on deaf ears. 22
The broad outlines of Cyprian's views on Church organization
and government stand out clearly enough. Where does Rome
fit into this picture? Like all the African authors, Cyprian
honors Rome as the first see of the West because it is a greater
city than Carthage and especially because of its relation to the
greatest of the Apostles, Peter and Paul. But he does not
thereby grant it authority over Carthage, the second see.23
Carthage should be emphasized because there are two instances recorded in Cyprian's correspondence of Roman intervention outside of the Italian peninsula. As usual in these early
centuries, it would be very helpful to have more information
than we do in order to clarify these affairs. In the first instance, that of the deposed Spanish bishops, Basilides and
Martial, the former of whom had appealed to Stephen, Cyprian
urges non-compliance or resistance on the Spanish faithful.
He does not contest Stephen's right to act but simply blames
him for negligence in not ascertaining the facts. We do not
know the outcome of the case, but it can be assumed that some
Roman power of intervention or at least of moral suasion was
recognized because it was sought by the deposed bishops and
its use distressed the Spanish Christians.
Ep.68 presents the opposite situation. Cyprian urges Stephen
to intervene, this time in Gaul where bishop Marcian of Aries is
flaunting his ties with the Roman rigorist, N ovatian. Again,
many of the circumstances are not clear: Why have the other
bishops of Gaul taken no action? What is Stephen being urged
to do? In partial answer to the latter question it should be
noted that one of Cyprian's more pressing concerns here is the
fact that the world Church still appears to tolerate Marcian
in its communion. Marcian insults the college of bishops by his
views but does not yet seem to be cut off.24
Stephen is to tell the local bishops in Gaul to desist from
22 Cyprian to Roman Clergy Ep. 35. I
(Bayard 88) . Cyprian and other African
bishops to Stephen Ep. 72. I (Bayard 259-60).
23 Cyprian
to Cornelius Ep. 52. 2 (Bayard I27) .
2 ' Cyprian to Stephen Ep. 68. 2 (Bayard 235).

676

ROBERT B. ENO

tolerating Marcian by remaining in communion with him.
Furthermore, Stephen should write to the province and to the
people of Aries that another may be substituted in place of
Marcian. This phrase " province and people " has the ring of
a formula indicating a call for a new election in Aries rather
than that Stephen is simply going to appoint a new bishop
himself, as some have claimed. Finally, Cyprian's request that
Stephen inform him of the name of the new bishop points up
Rome's position and function as a center for communicating
such information which is so basic to Cyprian's view of the
Church as a communion.
The terms matrix, radix and others of some import for our
subject occur frequently in Cyprian's correspondence. It will
be recalled that Tertullian referred to the Churches of apostolic
origin as the matrices et originales of the faith. 25 Cyprian's use
of terms like matrix and radix refer normally to the Catholic
Church as opposed to its schismatic rivals and counterfeits
rather than to any local Church in particular. This is true, for
example, in Ep.48.3 where Cyprian, writing to Cornelius, reports that he has advised travellers leaving for Rome to recognize and cling to the " ecclesiae catholicae matrix et radix."
This expression has sometimes been understood as referring to
the Roman Church itself. In reality, it means that the African
Catholics must, upon reaching Rome, adhere to the party of
Cornelius rather than that of N ovatian, for it is the former
that is the Catholic Church in Rome. Novatian, on the contrary, has refused the "radicis et matris sinus," whereas
Cyprian and the Catholics hold to the " ecclesiae unius caput
et radicem." 26
The matrix et radix to which Cyprian refers, then, is the
Catholic Church rather than the Roman Church. In later
literature it becomes clear that Rome is increasingly looked
upon as the center of communion for the Western Church. In
Cyprian, however, this point is sometimes obscure. In some
Tertullian De Prae. Haer. 21 (CCL 1, 202).
•• Cyprian to Cornelius Ep. 48. 3 (Bayard 118); Cyprian to Cornelius Ep. 45. 1
(Bayard 112); Cyprian to Jubaianus Ep. 73.2 (Bayard 263).
25

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

677

places, for example, it seems that Cyprian is referring to communion with Rome precisely as a sign of communion with the
world Church. Writing to Antonianus, an African bishop,
Cyprian notes: " You also wrote that I should forward a copy
of this same letter to Cornelius, our colleague, that casting
aside all solicitude, he might know immediately that you are in
communion with him, i.e., with the Catholic Church." 27 The
context shows, however, that what is in question is, again, the
issue of which Roman leader, Cornelius or Novatian, represents the Catholic Church in Rome. In Ep.55, there evidently
has been some question about which party Bishop Antonianus
supports. Similarly, in Ep.48.3, Cyprian assures Cornelius that
the African bishops " firmly approve and maintain you and
your communion, i.e., the unity and also the charity of the
Catholic Church" as opposed to the communion of Novatian.28
One final aspect of Cyprian's ecclesiology that is most likely
to confuse the modem reader is his use of the phrase Cathedra
Petri and related terminology. In warning his own Carthaginian Christians against the schismatics among them, Cyprian
more than once makes use of the formula: One God, One
Christ, One Church and One "Cathedra ... super Petrum
Domini vove fundata." 29 To the contemporary Catholic reader
such references to Peter and unity, such wording, automatically
triggers thoughts of Church unity under Petrine, i.e., papal
aegis. But another' reality, a more symbolic, i£ not less real
one, is operative in Cyprian's mind.
Cyprian elaborates his ecclesiology in the context of schism
within two local churches, his own and Rome. His aim in invoking Peter looks largely to the unity of the local Church
under one lawful head, Cyprian himself in Carthage and Cornelius in Rome. The Petrine references, then, usually do not
point to Rome alone but to the internal unity of the local
•• Cyprim to Antonianus Ep. 55.1 (Bayard 181).
•• Cyprian to Cornelius Ep. 48.8 (Bayard 118).
•• Cyprian to the Catholics of Carthage Ep. 48. 5 (Bayard 107). See also Ep.
70. 8 (Bayard 255) .

678

ROBERT B. ENO

Church which should be one and undivided within itself under
one bishop. Peter, then, as the one who received the keys,
bears within his person the symbolic reality of the unicity of
the Church. Cyprian writes that in bestowing the keys on
Peter first, the Lord "instituted and manifested the origin of
unity." Peter shows and vindicates unity. The Church is
founded on Peter " origine unitatis et ratione." 30
The principal locus of debate remains, as it has been for a
long time, the treatise on the unity of the Church, especially
chapter four with its rival versions. Without entering the controversy over the authenticity or priority of either version, it
can be stated that the Church polity in either case is the same
and that this polity is consistent with what has thus far been
discerned in Cyprian's letters. The fact that the Church is
founded on Peter shows forth the unicity of the local Church.
The fact that Peter is one and his Cathedra is one is meant to
show forth unity. (TR) Christ established one chair" ... thus
establishing by his own authority the source and hallmark
(rationem) of the (Church's) oneness." (PT) A primatus is
given to Peter. (PT) Here again a word is used without the
connotation with which later centuries would endow it. 31 By
this is meant simply that the unity symbolized by Peter is
heightened by the fact that he received the power and authority
first. What is important to note is that in either version
Cyprian's basic ecclesiology is clearly maintained. "No doubt
the others were all that Peter was," (PT) "endowed with equal
dignity and power," (TR) The meaning of chapter four can
be summarized neatly in Cyprian's own words. " ... The start
(exordium) comes from him (Peter) alone, in order to show
that the Church of Christ is unique (una)." (TR)
The Petrine-Unity symbolism had a long history in the
3 ° Cyprian to Jubaianus
Ep. 73. 3 (Bayard
Cyprian to Pompeius Ep. 74. 11
(Bayard
Cyprian and the African Council of
Ep. 70. 3 (Bayard
.
31 References
to the De Unit., Ch. four are from the Bevenot edition, OECT,
TR = Textus Receptus, PT ="Primacy" text. Attention should be called
to the use of the term primatus by Cyprian with reference to the false claims of
NovatilliD.. See Ep. 69.8 (Bayard

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

679

African ecclesiology. It can probably be seen already in Tertullian.82 It is the most prominent strain in Augustine's interpretation of Matthew 16: 18-19; for him, Peter is the figura or
persona ecclesiae.88 For Cyprian above all, the Cathedra Petri
is the symbol of the divinely willed unicity of the local Church.
As such, this Cathedra is found in every see, not just in Rome.
A significant turning point would be achieved when this PetrineUnity concept would be extended to the contemporary successors of Peter on the cathedra episcopalis of Rome. In at
least one place Cyprian comes close to this key breakthrough.
I refer to the well-known phrase of Ep.59.14, where, in speaking of the boldness of schismatics who have sailed from Carthage to Rome, he refers to their destination as " . . . ad Petri
Cathedram adque ad ecclesiam principalem unde unitas sacerdotalis exorta est . ... " 34
This description of Rome does not contradict Cyprian's
habitual theology as the remainder of the passage abundantly
demonstrates. Here the words "Chair of Peter" are used in
the double sense of rightful unit of the Catholic Church and
the Sedes of Peter himself. What is of more interest is the
designation of Rome as the ecclesia principalis. This may well
be translated not as the " principal Church " but as the " primordial Church" (Bevenot) or the" Urkirche" (Poschmann),
an interpretation for which there are interesting parallels in
Optatus. More importantly, this whole clause, the expression
ecclesia principalis as well as what follows, gives the hint of a
transference of the Petrine-Unity symbolism to the contemporary third-century Church of Rome. Peter the symbol of unity
in the local Church is also the founding Apostle of the local
Roman Church. The theological symbolism associated with
Peter in Cyprian's mind is here transferred to Rome. Peter, the
symbol of the primordial unity of the local Church and whose
temporal priority or primatus is the symbol of the unity of the
•• Tertullian, Scorp. 10, 8 (CCL
1088 Reifferscheid-Wissowa).
•• See A.M. La Bonnardiere, "Tu es Petrus. La Pericope Matthieu XVI,
dans I' oeuvre de S. Augustin," lrenikon 34 (1961), 451-499.
•• Cyprian to Cornelius Ep. 59.14 (Bayard 183).

680

ROBERT B. ENO

Apostles among themselves now sees his symbolic significance
extended to the Petrine local Church par excellence, Rome. In
this sense, Rome, which obviously is not the first Church historically, can be the symbolic primordial Church in that it inherits and extends in time and space the primordial unity symbolized by Peter himself.
Needless to say, all this does not mean that Cyprian recognizes a superior authority of command in the contemporary
Roman Church or bishop. A glance at the final unfortunate
correspondence concerning the baptismal question is enough
to put such thoughts to rest. Cyprian and especially Firmilian
of Caesarea are not impressed by what seem to be Stephen's
claims to authority based on his See and succession to Peter. 35
In summary, then, Cyprian's ecclesiology remains remarkably
consistent and uniform throughout the relatively short period
of his literary activity. It is an ecclesiology of episcopal communion with wide freedom of discretion left to the individual
bishop. There is no bishop of bishops. Only the good will and
moderation of the bishops of the world can preserve the
" ... collegii honor, vinculum fidei et concordia sacerdotii." 36

Optatus
The earliest Catholic apologist of the Donatist controversy
played an important role as a precursor of Augustine. Writing
c.367 Optatus first collected and preserved many of the documents, both civil and ecclesiastical, associated with the complex
origins of the schism. Similarly he made significant initial contributions to the solution of the theological issues of Baptism
and the dotes ecclesiae, a concept suggested by his adversary,
the Donatist leader, Parmenian. For our purposes, the relevant
material is what Optatus has to say about Rome and Peter.
The African situation had altered considerably in the fourth
century. At the Council of Aries (314) the African Catholics
35 Cyprian to Quintus Ep. 71. 3 (Bayard
Finnilian to Cyprian Ep. 75
(Bayard
f.).
36 Sententiae Episcoporum
(CSEL 3, 1, 436); Cyprian to Jubaialllus Ep. 73.
(Bayard

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

681

had finally agreed to abandon their traditional, but increasingly isolated, custom of rebaptizing those baptized in heretical sects. (Canon 9[81) This in itself was something of a
turning point. But the vital element to notice in Optatus's
argumentation is this: the Cyprianic ecclesiology with its stress
on the unicity of the local Church no longer suffices. It is no
longer a question of a division in this or that local Church.
Now a whole great area of the world Church finds itself divided. Every town and village has its representatives of the
two rival communions. Both claim to be the one Church outside which there is no salvation. The question is simply this:
Which is the true Church and which the counterfeit? Ubi
ecclesia? 37 Optatus realized that appeal had to be made to the
Church beyond Africa. In response to this unprecedented
situation he develops the argument from Catholicity as geographical extension and universality, a weapon that quickly
became standard in the Catholic arsenal. As a particular facet
of this line of reasoning, he appealed to communion with Rome
as a decisive sign of communion with the whole Catholica. It
is this last area that concerns us in particular and which has
considerably impressed some modern authors. 38
The Catholic Church is the Church that is spread over all
the lands of the earth. The African faction that is in contact
and communion with this world Church is the Catholic Church
in Africa. The Pars Donati does not fill this description. Thus
the simple and constantly repeated Catholic argument. "Is
she not to be in Spain, in Gaul, in Italy, where you are not?
... in all Egypt and Mesopotamia, where you are not?" asked
Optatus. 39 Is there something wrong with being in communion
87 The importance
of Optatus is recognized by Ratzinger, op. cit., 108 f. and
by Brisson, op. cit., 161.
88 For example:
For Marschall, op. cit., 79!, Optatus goes far beyond Tertullian,
Cyprian, and even Augustine. Also L. Vischer, Basilius der Grosse (Basel, 1958),
Excursus on Optatus, 79!-85. Vischer remarks that Optatus's views seem surprisingly modern when considered in relation to contemporary Roman Catholic
ideas.
89 Optatus,
Contra Parmenianum Donatistam II, 1, 11; III, 9. (CSEL 26, 88,
47, 98 Ziwsa). An English translation of Optatus was made by 0. R. VassallPhillips in 1917.

ROBERT B. ENO

with the Thessalonians, Corinthians, Galatians, and the seven
Churches of Asia? 40 The intent of this line of reasoning is
clear enough.
One of the similarities between Cyprian's terminology and
that of Optatus is to be found in their use of the concept of the
Catholic Church as the radix. Unfilial children that they are,
the Donatists have cut themselves off" from the root of Mother
Church." Catholics, on the other hand, are faithful and remain in the root with the rest of the world." 41 Initially, at
least, Optatus's discussion of the concept of the Cathedra
Petri is also a legacy from Cyprian. In Book I, while discussing
the question of where the original blame for the schism should
be placed, he notes that it was not Caecilian but Majorinus,
the short-lived predecessor of Donatus, who separated himself
"a Cathedra Petri vel Cypriani." This use of the Cathedra
Petri does not refer to Rome but to the rightful see of Carthage.
The present Cathedra of Parmenian, on the other hand, had no
existence before Majorinus wrongfully established it. 42 As with
Cyprian, Optatus has at least the rudiments of the symbolic
use of Peter as the representative of the whole Church, a symbolism which Augustine will expand. For the sake of unity
Peter alone received the keys which he communicated to the
rest. He is the "forma unitatis " and the sanc,tae ec,desiae ...
persona." 48
Optatus's most significant discussion of the Cathedra concept is to be found in Book II, where he considers Parmenian's
theory of the dotes or endowments of the Church. These dotes
are six in number: Cathedra, Angelus, Spiritus, Fons, Sigillum,
and Umbilicus. The first is the decisive one as Optatus realizes.
Parmenian, of course, claimed that the Donatist Church possessed these endowments. Optatus sets out to reclaim them
40 Optatus,

II, 6, 14; VI, 8. (CSEL 26, 42-3, 49, 147).
Optatus, I, 11, 15, 28; III, 7. (CSEL 26, 14, 18, 31, 88).
•• Optatus, I, 10, 15. (CSEL 26, 12-3, 17) .
.. Optatus, I, 10; II, 9; VII, 8. (CSEL 26, 12, 45, 170-1). In Book VII,
Optatus argues strongly against the Donatist rejection of the Catholic Church as
the Church of sinners and traitors by pointing out that, though Peter denied
Christ, he was still singled out for special honor.
41

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

688

for the Catholics. The question, he says, is this: "We must
see who was the first to sit on the Cathedra and where he sat." 44
You cannot then deny that you know that upon Peter first in the
city of Rome was conferred the episcopal chair, on which sat Peter,
the head of all the Apostles, whence he was called Cephas,45 that
in this one chair unity should be preserved by all, lest the other
Apostles might uphold each for himself separate chairs, so that he
who should set up a second chair, against the unique chair would
already be a schismatic and a sinner.46
This passage could be interpreted completely in the same line
as Cyprian's argumentation in the De Unitate Ecclesiae. The
one Chair of Peter has been established to preclude the dangers
of possible centrifugal tendencies on the part of the other
apostles or bishops. Anyone setting himself against this chair
is a schismatic.
Yet it is immediately evident that there is more here. Specific mention has already been made of Peter in Rome and the
passage continues at once with the list of Roman bishops who
have succeeded to that one chair on which Peter first sat. The
list ends with Optatus's contemporary, Siricius, " qui noster
est socius: cum quo nobis totius orbis commercia formatarum in
una communionis societate concordat." 47
The Donatists are challenged to demonstrate the origins of
their Cathedra. At once, a second time the discussion returns
to Rome, for the Donatists also have a Roman bishop. Optatus
easily demonstrates the fatuousness of this argument. The
Donatists constitute only a tiny minority in the city. It is
ludicrous for them to claim the Cathedra Petri since their man
in Rome probably has never even been allowed to approach
the memoriae apostolorum. There is a Donatist episcopal succession at Rome but it can be traced back only to Victor of
Garba in the early fourth century and no further. Optatus
.. Optatus, II, !'l, 5, 6. (CSEL !'l6, 36, 4!'l-3) .
•• Optatus is the first to make the connection: Caput-Kephale-Cephas.
See
Revue du Moyen Age Latin, 8 (195!'l) 5-4!'l.
Y. Congar, "Cephas-Cepha1e-Caput,"
46 Optatus,
II, !'l. (CSEL !'l6, 36) .
47 Optatus, II, 3.
(CSEL !'l6, 37).

684

ROBERT B. ENO

can ridicule the Donatist Church of Rome whose only Cathedra,
he suggests, is the Cathedra Pestilentiae. He labels this Roman
bishopric of theirs a subterfuge, yet he also admits that there
were pastoral motives involved in the original despatch of
Victor from Africa. While the original Donatist motivation
may have been mixed, the discussion of this small Roman community by Optatus must be interpreted as showing that the
Donatists of his day attempted to use it as a proof that they
too were in communion with Rome.
The Cathedra Petri symbolism has been expanded to meet
the new regional challenge of Donatism that has replaced the
old problem of local schism. The Chair of Peter in the old
Cyprianic framework is still a valid concept, but the further
decisive step has been taken of seeing a special Chair of Peter
in the world Church. This is the Church in Rome where Peter
had first sat on the cathedra episoopalis. Rome is now the center of communion, at least for the West, through which pass
those papers of ecclesial recognition, the (litterae) formatae or
communicatoriae. 48 The fact that the Catholics can show that
they are in communion with Rome proves that they alone have
rightful claim to the dos of the Cathedra and through the
Cathedra to the Angelus and the other endowments enumerated by Parmenian. Peter is at the head of the Catholic line
of bishops as opposed to the Donatist line. 49
All of this, let it be said again, does not indicate any belief
on Optatus's part in some kind of modern understanding of
the papal primacy. Even in the question of communion with
the Church outside Africa, Optatus mentions the importance
of communion with the seven Churches of Asia. 50 Yet the new
•• Ibid.
•• Optatus, II, 6, 9. (CSEL
45), According to Optatus, Peter is
39) whereas the Donatists have their own
"princeps noster," II, 4 (CSEL
founders," "principes vestri," VI, 3 (CSEL
147). As with the Cyprianic
" ecclesia principalis " the words " princeps " and " principalis " point to the origin
of the Churches.
50 Optatus,
II, 6 (CSEL
He has the strong statement:
"Extra
septem ecclesias quicquid foris est, alienum est." Optatus probably brings in the
seven churches of Asia at this point because he is discussing the Angelus endow-

OPTATUS AND THE AFRICAN ECCLESIOLOGY

685

element hinted at in Cyprian emerges full blown in Optatus.
This is the transfer of the Petrine-Unity symbolism from the
local level to the world level of the universal Church or at
least of the Western Church. Optatus's use of the Cathedra
Petri concept, while based on Cyprian's usage, has gone beyond it. This leap to a new level of understanding has been
brought about by the new and hitherto unknown experience
of total regional schism with rival groups offering basically the
same doctrines, the same practices, the same sacraments. The
shift in meaning was probably brought about more rapidly by
the appeal to geographical catholicity, the most commonly
repeated argument against Donatist particularism.
A new plateau was reached by Optatus, but there were many
other, much steeper ascents to be made before any conception
of Roman authority comparable to that found in the modem
Western Church would be attained. Yet, intriguingly enough,
it can be argued that neither Augustine nor any other African
theologian ever really advanced beyond Optatus in recognizing
a special position for the Roman bishop in the world Church.
Because the triumph of Islam forever closed the book of the
history of Christian North Africa, we shall never know what
might have been the African reaction to a Gregory VII, a Boniface VIII, or a Pius IX.
ROBERT B. ENO, s. s.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

ment and this brings to mind the Angeli of the book of Revelation. The reference
occurs at other places in this literature, e. g., Cyprian, Ad Fortunatum 11: "Cum
septem liberis plane copulatur et mater origo et radix quae ecclesias septem postmodum peperit, ipsa prima et una super Petrum Domini voce fundata." (CSEL,
3, 1, 338) . Augustine also makes use of the same argument.

THE FUNCTION OF THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE
IN ARISTOTLE

T

O EXAMINE the various uses of reason in Aristotle
from a functionalistic point of view brings forward a
number of questions directed to central concerns in his
speculations. In this essay we are investigating Aristotle's use
of reason in such themes as the moral life, the theoretical life,
animal motion, and the world-system. Reason put to these various uses seems ambiguous and obscure especially considered
from one topic to another. Within Aristotle's teleological
framework we find a dysfunctionalism in man as a part of the
world in relation to the complete world-system. The nous of
theoretical speculation seems described as escaping this limitation and we, therefore, are constrained to ask how it differs
from that nous which is a component of human choice, and
from n.ous expressing purpose for the human being as a natural
entity and a part of a species. The essay comes to no reconstructive conclusions and hazards criticisms, in a tentative
spirit, in the process of locating difficulties.
Aristotle, understanding man to be a rational animal, suggests a cooperative and synthetic arrangement of rational and
irrational aspects in the human soul. He finds these aspects
not separable in considering the efficient cause and origin of
action. This is most significant; for Aristotle, action is uniquely
characteristic of man:
True action cannot be ascribed to any inanimate substance, nor to
any animate being except man; clearly, therefore, it is man who has
this power of originating actions. 1

The moral life depends upon the dovetailing of rational and
irrational aspects; this is emphasized in Aristotle's employment
1

Magna Moralia, I, xi, I.

686

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

687

of " proairesis," sometimes translated as " choice " and sometimes as " purpose."
The origin of action-its efficient,not its final cause-is choice, and
that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view to an end. This
is why choice cannot exist either without reason or intellect or without a moral state; for good action and its opposite cannot exist
without a combination of intellect and character .... Hence choice
is either desiderative reason (orektikos nous) or ratiocinative desire (orexis dianoiatika) and such an origin of action is man. 2
The presence of a rational aspect in choice secures the moral
life from indeterminateness. For moral virtues are not by
nature; that is, unlike, say, the determinate motion of a stone
falling downward, the moral virtues are acquired through exercise. It is through exercise forming dispositions that man's
nature is determined and ought to be determined.
Neither by nature, then, nor contrary to nature do the virtues
arise in us; rather we are adapted for receiving them, by nature, and
are made perfect by habit. 3
Habit expresses the condition of interchange between
person and his environment which, if not arbitrary, must express
a rule of governance. Without such a governance, an orthos
logos, moral life would be arbitrary and indeterminate.
A right rule of action relates to pain and pleasure in terms
of a" view to an end." Ideally, pain and pleasure monitor the
appropriateness of any particular activity. Aristotle takes the
mean between excess and deficiency to express appropriate
choice in terms of pleasure. He suggests each virtue has its
domain (taxis kai kosmos) where pleasure is obtained in a manner maximally beneficial to the organism as a whole, a silstema.
His ultimate view of the virtues is synthetic, based on the principle of the well-functioning whole as the criterion for interpreting the proper function of the parts.
Choice, then, cannot be identified with mere appetite (epithumia) or passion (thumos). These "animalistic aspects"
2
8

Nick. Eth., 1139a3fl fl'.
Ibid., 1103al9.

688

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

of man tend unrestraintly to seek pleasure (though this way of
speaking must not be confused with speaking of the proper
functioning animal. Indeed, the concept of choice makes more
complex the system of nature operating on moral behavior).
An hydrolic mechanism " by nature " conspicuous in other animals seems, if not missing, then modified in man. For example,
a cat will tend to stop eating when physically satisfied, likewise a human infant: to continue would not be pleasurable.
However, though it may be true, to some extent, that a wellfunctioning adult man may by nature respond as the cat or the
infant, having a kind of natural virtue of temperance, we know
his pleasure is usually stimulated and the activity is made to
continue through art, e.g., eating beyond the point of food
nourishing him. It is only by a rational principle employed in
interpreting for himself his concrete situation, either intuitively
or by a maxim, that makes: him forgo such pleasure. The principle working intuitively expresses an habitual (temperate) respone and, working by a maxim, expresses a continent response.
Ideally, a fundamental property of natural functions is the
pleasantness of the temperate response.
Habit, a sort of second nature, can be seen as the organism's
attempt to secure the pleasant and, it is most useful to the
organism when in conformity to the telos of man. It is appropriate to man's telos as an instrument. That the virtues are
considered fixed states of character emphasizes the importance
of art in the proper functioning of man. For, as Aristotle puts
it, the way a man is educated not only makes a difference but,
rather, it makes all the difference for moral action. Habit concretizes the perception necessary for appropriate action. Since
a man's education is intimately dependent on the arrangement
of political and social activities which, on the one hand, expresses and, on the other hand, modifies the generic human
principle of arrangement, so moral virtues will depend, to an
important extent, on the art of politics.
But how one gets from art, with its various possibilities of
making arrangements, to the telos of man is not an easy matter
to understand. Ultimately, one must provide, it seems, an

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

689

explanation of how the virtues which we are adapted by nature
to receive proper pleasure become part of man by nature. Only
thereby the end of man, a fulfilled, well-functioning, and happy
creature, can be an actuality. It seems that part of the explanation depends on the manner in which man uses intelligence to
express his proper function or work (ergon) ; " The virtue of a
thing is relative to its proper work." • For the proper functioning of man is concomitant with the proper pleasure for man.
Man's telos is expressed through his activity; and, granted action is characteristic of human activity, the origin and proper
choice of his actions will help us understand the proper end fo:r
man: the character of action leading to happiness. Further, the
praxis or context of action must be considered: choice is for the
sake of an object of action within our own power. As a synthesis of deliberation and desire choice will surely be important
in investigating man's nature:
The nature of a thing is its end. For what each thing is when fully
developed, we call its nature, whether we are speaking of a man,
a horse, or a family. 5

Choice, considered as a property of the mature person, is
intimately involved in man's realization of happiness and wellbeing:
There are two things in which all well-being consists: one of them
is the choice of a right .end and aim of action, and the other the
discovery of the actions which are means toward it; for the means
and the end may agree or disagree. 6

Dysfunction may be due either to the faulty nature of the
functioning thing or else to the imperfection of the environment or conditions in which it functions. In choosing, either
or both the deliberation or the desire may be faulty. Also, the
situation in which choice is made may not be ideal, to a
greater or a lesser degree. The lower limit of choice, in terms
of the external situation, is the impossible: we cannot choose
the impossible.
•Ibid., 17.

• Politics, 1252b88.

6

Ibid., U2!b26-80.

690

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

Let us consider what it would mean for the deliberative component of the choice to be faulty. First, it is appropriate to
point out that the separation of deliberative components from
the situation in which it functions is merely for the purpose of
analysis since in reality we lose choice when we separate. When
Aristotle treats the rational he always emphasizes that it is the
nature of the rational qua rational not to err; therefore, the
breakdown of the deliberative component in choice is due to the
physical basis of its operation, e.g., remembering.
Now mind is always right but appetite and imagination may be
either right or wrong. That is why, though in any case it is the
object of appetite which originates the movement, this object be
the real or apparent good.7
A dysfunction in choice is more usually attributable to the
element of desire. A breakdown of the proper movement toward or away from pleasure and pain: desire initiates movement. Aristotle's discussion of the practical syllogism clearly
makes exactly that point. We find the animalistic element of
human action the most vulnerable.
The animalistic element makes for movement toward or
away from an object. Unlike intellectual activity per se, which
is considered simply pleasurable, physical pleasures reside in a
domain where pain is also a possibility. (Aristotle even comments that seeing, which seems solely pleasurable, is a " mixed
pleasure," has a painfulness to which we are accustomed.) The
moral virtues have this imperfection, a tendency to disorder.
One is reminded of Plato's "Wandering Cause" in the Timaeus,
a metaphysical theme. It is difficult to know how much to
make of this for Aristotle's functionalism, in what framework
one ought to place statements like the following:
Every man should be responsible to others, nor should any one be
allowed to do just as he pleases; for where absolute freedom is
allowed there is nothing to restrain the evil which is inherent in
every 11Wn.8
7

De Anima,

8

Politics, 1319al-4.

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

691

Are we to take " inherent in every man " to mean that the
ratiocinative desire of the individual is in principle imperfect
and, consequently, no man can become a good man? This not
only in some unqualified sense but even to the extent of being
a healthy, well-functioning individual:
The good man is he for whom because he is virtuous, the things
that are absolutely good are good; it is also plain that his use of
these goods must be virtuous and in the absolute sense good.9
But this interpretation is absurd; it goes against the main
thrust of Aristotle to consider man incapable of well-being and
appropriate moral perception; the very raison d' etre of the
Ethics.
The external conditions for human choice must, after all, to
some extent also be dysfunctional. Certain classes of action
such as chastisements, punishments, etc., speak to imperfect
external conditions, conditions intrinsic to the realm of becoming: "The conditional action [chastisements, punishments]
is only the choice of a lesser evil." 10 In these actions we see
the possibility of a healthy organism adapting itself to less than
optimum conditions, though, in one way, we can think of the
conditions of correction as part of an appropriate functional
development or education, e.g., in the case where a person
might enjoy correction because it is for the sake of becoming
better. The correction is not enjoyed per se whereas an activity
of health, needing no correction, is enjoyed per se.
These considerations bring to mind the more difficult discussion: the moral life in relation to the supreme end of man,
contemplation. Aristotle tells us:
Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, and to
those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more truly
happy, not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the contemplation; for this is of itself precious. Happiness, therefore, must be
some form of contemplation. 11
Now, if contemplation is man's proper function, it is also his
proper pleasure: "Each animal Is thought to have a proper
• Ibid., 1832a28.

10

Ibid., 16.

11

Nick. Eth., 1178b28-88.

692

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

pleasure, as it has a proper function, viz., that which corresponds to its activity." 12 Thus, we seem to find the bodily
and animalistic elements of man, a condition of human contemplation, also an impediment to the "fullness" of man's
striving for total and continuing happiness. What is crucial to
notice is that the impediment is not merely in the imperfection
of physical activities, e.g., the pleasure/pain syndrome involved in nourishing the organism. More important, it is in the
human condition itself. The composite nature of man demands
a physical condition for its fulfillment where the end per se
does not express itself in an enmattered, complex condition.
This suggests a previous point, i.e., moral training is somewhat
painful. Learning habits and dispositions, the ground of virtues, are not only impeded by a more or less imperfect political
life, (which itself provides a guidance for education taken
either or both as paideia or as askesis) but, more deeply, it is
impeded by the very developmental and sustaining conditions
of animal existence. Let us recall, Aristotle ultimately finds
supreme pleasure to be unimpeded activity in contemplation
and this, taken to be the end of man, makes the moral life with
its enmattered, animalistic basis at best merely the condition
for this end. The moral life does not have authority over the
end from beneath, though it must be fulfilled as the condition
of the noblest human aspiration, contemplation.
What does it mean to be fulfilled in this sense? It does not
mean perfected per se but only perfected for the sake of that
for which it is the necessary condition: contemplation. Therefore, only God, the self-contemplator, whose necessary and
sufficient condition is his own contemplation, is functionally
perfect. Man is not a functionally perfect creature. A gap exists
between the moral and the theoretical life, for which the moral
is, at most, merely a necessary condition for the bios theoretikos.
This implies that we should not be startled to find a measure
of dysfunction even in the ideal life pictured for man and also,
of course, in the generally good life. On the other hand, a func12

Ibid., 1176a3-4.

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

698

tional inspection of man is the very way we come to this truth,
which, if it adds a measure of" ontological modesty," need not
cause angst .
. . . the activity of reason, which is contemplative, seems both to
be superior in serious worth and to aim at no end beyond itself,
and to have its pleasure proper to itself . . . all attributes ascribed
to the supremely happy man are evidently those connected with
this activity, it follows that this will be the complete happiness of
man .... But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not
insofar as he is a man that he will live so but insofar as something
divine is present in him; and by so much as this is superior to our
composite nature is its activity superior to that which is the exercise of the other kind of virtue, ... that which is proper to each
thing by nature best and most pleasant for each thing; for man, the
life according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more
than anything else is man. This life, therefore, is also the happiest. 13
This passage clearly expresses the view of a certain ontological disorientation in the human situation. Man is not made
for the divine, rooted in becoming, the best in his existence,
naus, seems to share in being, in some sense beyond the ontological complexity of the material substratum. It is wise to
retreat from the heights of this conclusion about man's ultimate
dysfunctionalism.
We will start afresh by considering man,
and animals generally, in terms of dysfunctionalism on anothe1
level, that of physical movement, (of kinesis rather than energy ea.) Introducing this discussion, we present a remarkably
suggestive passage from De Motu Animalium:
The movement of animals may be compared with those of automatic puppets, which are set going on the occasion of a tiny movement; the levers are released, and strike the twisted strings against
one another .... Animals have parts of a similar kind, their organs,
the sinewy tendons to wit and the bones; and bones are like the
wooden levers in the automation, and the iron; the tendons are
like the strings, for when they are tightened or released movement
begins. However, in the automata ... there is no change of quality
... In the animal ... this chang.e of quality is caused by imaginations and sensations and by ideas. 14
13

Ibid., 1177b17 fl'.

14

De Motu Animalium, 701b.

694

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

What strikes one as crucial in the passage is the implied
distinction in a principle of movement between the automatic
puppet and an animal. The characterization of this difference
rests upon the notion of change of quality. In the case of animals, change of quality relates to " imagination, sensations,
and ideas." (More precisely, all animals have sensations but
not all animals have imagination and none except man, have
thought.) Since we are told "the affections of the soul are
inseparable from the material substratum of animal life" 15 and
" the affections of the soul are enmattered formulable essences " 16 we must conclude that the material factor in the
automatic puppet is dissimilar to the qualitative or formal
factor of an animal. The truth of this, and the manner in which
it is true, should be disclosed by observation.
But what in our observation of the puppet shows us that it
does not have a change of quality? We seem to be looking for an
indication in the automatic puppet which shows its movements
to be unrelated to a change in its essence, as say, an essential
change in the sequence of movements whereby an acorn becomes an oak. Essence for the living thing is taken as the ratio
of parts in its development and not that the mature individual
of a species is the fulfillment of the callow individual: the oak
the fulfillment of the acorn. The latter would not provide a
characterization of different movements.
The quality or essence is not changed in the automatic puppet whereas this is not so in the acorn or the animal. We may
speak of a well-functioning child as well as a well-functioning
man. Therefore, some principle is disclosed by the organization
of matter in animals which makes their motion fundamentally
different from that of the puppet.
If, however, we were to construct a zooid, an entity whose
movements involve a feedback system so that future movements would be changed just because of past movement, then
we seem to eliminate the important difference between the
movement of animals and the movement of mechanical devices: devices, like the automatic puppet, do not change in
15

De Anima, 403bl8.

16

Ibid., 403a24.

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

695

their quality or essence by the fact of their movements. Aristotle does not have available such a zooid for his consideration
whereas we have: Turing machines, retrieval systems, etc.
In other words, goal-directed activity is present simply whenever (1) a sequence of events is for the sake of a certain state
of affairs or end E, (fl) the functioning which promotes E is
either repeated or continued, and (3) with repetition the functioning of X for the achievement of E (and the continuance
of E) makes for or tends toward making every aspect of the
functioning relevant to achieving E. This teleological approach
seems to exclude the non-qualitative changes of automatic puppets. Also, it excludes such natural phenomena as rivers running
toward the seas, which is ultimately important to Aristotle's conception of the world. (In this instance, the exclusion is because there is no negative-feedback; the river cannot,
except metaphorically, be considered as a whole for it is difficult to conceive it to be a simple thing.) This teleological model,
however, does include animals and zooids. Consequently, it is
not from an examination of their motions that we can exclude
some fabricated entities from a teleological view. Our conclusion is against Aristotle's ascription of action (or learning)
only to human beings.
Aristotle's characterization of nature is teleological: in a
broad sense nature does nothing in vain though it can make
" small " mistakes. It is to be assumed, a teleological approach
excluding the river's motion must be amended when the world
system is considered. Perhaps, the character of mind (nous)
in nature provides for order and purpose in nature, allowing
one to deal teleologically with the river in its relation to nature
as a whole. The world is finite for Aristotle. The logical ground
is it could not be otherwise considered a system. Without finitude it would not be determinate and purposeful, and, consequently, capable of expressing mind. (Aristotle, after all, called
Anaxagoras " a sober man among drunkards " for introducing
the principle of nous into cosmology, though he criticizes him
for not showing its: efficacy.)
In one sense nothing but the entire universe can be considered

696

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

as a whole; though here, as in the human soul, the relationship
of nous to activity is problematic and obscure. Is nous to be
considered a part of the universe? How a part? Men or even
their organs, e.g., liver, heart, etc., can be considered both as
complete systems and, also, as systemic parts. A complete
functional explanation of them will be a kind of diastole and
systole investigation where their activity is considered in terms
of both " wholes " and parts. Can nous either in man or in the
system of nature be so treated? Is nous necessary as the " inner
principle " of any teleological explanation? Is it more than an
explanatory principle, is it an entity?
For those things are natural which, by a continuous movement
originated from an internal principle, arrive at some completion:
the same completion is not reached from every principle; nor any
chance completion, but always the tendency in each is toward the
same end, if there is no impedimentY

If we take the motion of the automatic puppet as its particular activity we contrast it to the motion of an animal or a
zooid. But, if the goal-directed movement of the animal or
zooid is unimpeded, what makes for discovering an internal
principle of motion here, when we could not find one in the
motion of the puppet? Could we find a different arrangement
of physical parts in one and not in the other explaining nous
as a principle of internal movement? 18
That the one may be more complex than the other, even if it
were invariably true, does not make for the distinction. Aristotle says, "Whatever comes to be is always complex." 19 Complexity, in itself, cannot make for an ontological distinction
Physics, 199b15-20.
An interesting passage in the Physics indicates nous, or some principle, itself
unmoved, is the cause of the motion in God, "the supreme reality," and "in that
which is coming to be." What is obscure is how this principle works in two such
substantially different ontological orders.
"Now the principles which cause motion in a physical way are two, of which
one is not physical, as it has no principle of motion in itself. Of this kind is
whatever causes movement, not being itself moved, such as (1) that which is
completely unchangeable, the primary reality, and (2) the essence of that which
is the end or 'that for the sake of which'." (Physics, 198a35-b3).
19 Physics, 190b10.
17
18

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

697

among things that come to be, either by nature or by art. The
invariability of performance that one (the mechanical) might
tend to have cannot in our ideal example make for the distinction: " In natural products the sequence is invariable, if there
is no impediment." 2 ° Consequently, a natural goal-directed
entity, e.g., an acorn, granted it satisfies the logical condition
that it has no conflicting elements, considered from the standpoint of an ideal environment-if it would invariably fulfill
its nature-its development would be sequences of proper motions in each stage toward its end. If its parts move without
being impeded, a parallel in variance exists with the mechanical.
We conclude that impeded motion is necessary to natural entities. It is in their very " imperfection" that they can be contrasted to the artificial.
Suggestively, Aristotle tells us "Reason forms the startingpoint, alike in works of art and in works of nature." 21 On
this account, it does not seem to be reason per se which makes
for the distinction between the motions of one and the other
but how reason is manifested. The motion of automatic puppet
or toy wagon, a non-zooid work of art, has one quality or
essence, its activity is in time but not of time: it does not
develop into a mature individual whose quality has changed
through time. (Note: by idealizing the motion of animals
we have divested them also of the temporal. Not that time
in itself is anything for Aristotle but it is precisely the domain
of impediments.) The puppet has no need to exercise the
virtue of reacting properly to impediments. This is not a
matter of a distinction between reason and non-reason, in
the sense that to the puppet can be ascribed a rational end and
proper functioning. In another sense, however, because of the
difference of the manifestation of reason in terms of the origin
and quality of the movement involved, Aristotle often seems
to make just such a distinction:
... some things can produce change according to a rational formula
and their potencies involve such a formula, while othe:r things are
•• Ibid.,
21 Parts of Animals, 689bl6.

698

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

non-rational and their potencies must be in a living thing, while
the latter can be both in the living and in the lifeless; as regards
potencies of the latter kind. When the agent and the patient meet
in the way appropriate to the potency in question, the one must
act and the other be acted upon, but with the former kind of potency this is not necessary. For the non-rational potencies are all
productive of one effect each, but the rational produce contrary
effects, so that if they produce their effects necessarily they would
produce contrary effects at the same time; but this is impossible.
There must, then, he something else that decides; I mean by this
desire or will (proairesis). For whichever of two things the animal
desires decisively, it will do, when it is present and meets the
passive obj.ect, in the way appropriate to the potency in question.
Therefore everything that has a rational potency, when it desires
that for which it has the potency and in the circumstances in which
it has the potency, must do this. 22

Perhaps, after this rich passage, it is not too misleading
to say that choices develop the rational creature. We must
note the ambiguity or shift in meaning in Aristotle's use
of" choice." Previously, we saw it applied, seemingly, only to
human beings, thereby emphasizing the synthesis of desire
with reason as something distinctively human: choice leads to
action, a unique characteristic of human beings. Yet, in other
than Aristotle's ethical writings, "choice" applies to animals
generally, and the quality or kind of reason is not differentiated
between man and other animals. However," choice" or" purpose " or " will "-proairesis-is not considered as a synthetic
capacity in animals; their desires indeed have an element of
reason, as does man's desires-" rational potencies "-but they
lack the deliberative component of human choice. The rational
is after all, in the broad teleological view, "disseminated"
through the world-system. Compare the following general
statement of animal activity:
For all living things both move and are moved with some object,
so that this is the term of all their movement, the end, that is, in
view. Now we see that the living creature is moved by intellect,
imagination, purpose, wish and appetite, and all these are reducible
to mind and desire .... The1;efore the object of desire or of intellect
•• Metaphysics, 1048al-15.

THE RATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

699

first initiates movement, not, that is, every object of intellect, only
the end in the domain of conduct. Accordingly, among goods that
which moves is a practical end, not the good in its whole extent.
For it initiates movement only so far as it is the object of that
which is for the sake of something else. And we must suppose that
the seeming good may take the room of the actual good, and so may
the pleasant, which is itself a seeming good. 23

For animals generally, the principle of desire may be corrupted and activity may be dysfunctional. In man, some examples of dysfunction involving desire are brutishness, vice,
and either incontinence or continence. In brutishness the principle of desire is corrupted to an extent where it is dissimilar
to desire in a human being or, a breakdown occurs in choice
in the synthesis of desire and reason; at any rate, the brutish
individual engages in unhuman activity. In vice, desire is corrupted so that a right relation to pleasure and pain does not
occur: "For virtue and vice respectively preserve and destroy
the first principle." 24 For continence, desire is corrupted, as in
vice; however, here a rational faculty makes the appropriate
choice despite bad desire. Unlike the vicious condition, choice
is not led by the corrupted desire, thus continence may be considered a retrieval system by which the habitual application of
the right rule leads desire into harmony with the right rule or
" first principle." It makes for temperance, the proper virtue.
Let us return to consider that a purposive and rational principle works throughout the universe. That this principle is not
a producer of perfect rational order is attested to by monstrosities in nature and, seemingly, by the fact of brutishness, vice,
and continence j incontinence in man. Indeed, nature's plan for
man is most complex and, as we have suggested, proper virtue,
rather than natural virtue (which is a sort of" blind appropriateness ") depends on habit becoming part of the efficient
causality of the moral life. In the final analysis, the moral level
of human functioning is a condition for man's proper end, the
contemplation of theoretical truth. Praxis is for the sake of
theoria, the highest goal of nous, uniting man with the divine.
23 De Motu Animalium,
"'Nick. Eth., 115lal5.

700

MARTIN A. BERTMAN

" Nature, habit, and reason " work together for the health
of the person. A central philosophical difficulty arises in that
nature and art or habit both are a cause, principium, (and a
manifestation) of rationality. Therefore, how is rationality the
same and different in each? Man needs art seemingly to supplement the apparent deficiencies of nature, but since man is
by nature equipped to use art for this purpose we ultimately
find art not in opposition to nature but an expression of a
natural condition relative to man's activity. The virtues,
grounded in habit, educated, depend on art as a necessary
condition for their development. We can see the dependence as
natural. Art is natural to man's attainment of his telos; yet,
on another level, natural virtue is contrasted by Aristotle with
moral virtue. In fact, the contrast is expressed in terms of the
manifestation of rationality, so it seems "rationality" is used
ambiguously. In natural virtue and in moral virtue the same
objects are chosen, also the performance is the same, yet, in the
former, Aristotle says, " the individual is as if blind " (in some
ways a mere mechanism viz., the social virtue of bees.) Aristotle also states that "rationality is reflexive " when we perceive or think we know that we are doing it. This is rather
mysterious: its functional importance is obscure.
Consider: could there be a perfectly functioning human being
in terms of the moral life if all of that individual's virtues were
of the natural kind? Would not man be closer to the zooid?
This is difficult to deal with in two respects. First, we are
tempted to say no because the individual would be morally
deaf to intentionality-some development of the rational principle in a non-mechanistic manner seems missing; yet, how are
we to characterize in theoretical terms this difference? Second,
considering the contemplation of truth the final cause of human
activity, why cannot natural virtue be as, or more, efficient as
its proper condition for contemplation than that achieved
through educated habit, and, thereby, for man's ultimate good?
But Aristotle holds that the intellectual element in properly
functioning virtues, practical wisdom, cannot be excluded. It
is necessary for a conception of the human. There does then

9 5 8ATIONAL PRINCIPLE IN ARISTOTLE

701

seem to be a relationship between practical reason and theoretical wisdom, but it is obscure. This relationship seems much
stronger than Aristotle suggests in the Ethics when we approach
it, as we have, through viewing the function of the rational
principle. 25
This rather aporetic incursion into Aristotle's functionalism
does not wish to suggest that the problems or " the problematic " of a rational principle is not philosophically answerable, nor, for that matter, that Aristotle himself did not provide
an adequate answer. Rather, the inquiry wishes to elaborate
the difficulty and elusiveness of understanding nous and
proairesis, in relation to man and in the teleological view of the
natural system. These concepts are inextricably connected and
make for overlapping questions. The accumulation of the right
questions is itself no easy task and, as Kant pointed out, the
kind of questions one asks determines the kind of answers at
which one arrives: the right questions are the only philosophic
propylaeum to the right answers.
MARTIN A. BERTMAN
State University of New York
College at Potsdam, New York
25 The following passage emphasizes the epistemic condition in practical activity.
Though Aristotle at times expressly denies it, it is hard not to assume that the
rational principle in practical activity is ultimately the same as that in contemplation.

" What affirmation and negation are in thinking, pursuit and avoidance are in
desire; so that since moral virtue is a state of character concerned with choice,
and choice is deliberate desire, therefore both the reasoning must be true and
the desire right, if the choice is to be good, and the latter must pursue just what
the former asserts. Now this kind of intellect and of truth is practical; of the
intellect which is contemplative, not practical or productive, the good and the
bad state are truth and falsity respectively (for this is the work of everything
intellectual); while of the part which is practical and intellectual the good state
is truth in agreement with right desire." (Nick. Eth., ll89a21-81).
Of course, the rub is that " right desire " is also something we wish to see as
having a rational principle just as deliberation has a rational principle and one
might wonder, along with Hegel, if they are ultimately equally grounded in their
rationality.
For a study focussing on the relation of pleasure to happiness compare my
" Pleasure and the Two Kinds of Happiness in Aristotle," A peiron: Journal of
Ancient Philosophy and Science, Vol. 6, No.

SUBSTANTIVE AND METHODOLOGICAL TELEOLOGY
IN ARISTOTLE AND SOME LOGICAL EMPIRICISTS

"M

EN DO NOT THINK they know a thing till they
have grasped the 'why' of it," observes Aristotle
in the Physics. 1 "Why?" however, is not a
simple question. According to Aristotle there are four different
senses in which the question may be taken, each determined by
a different kind of causal condition for being and change. One
might, for instance, seek to discover that out of which a thing
is composed, or what agent produced it, or what its essential
features are, or what its function is. Of the four senses of the
question the most important for Aristotle is the last: What is
that for the sake of which it is? Or more simply: What is its
final cause?
In opposition to Aristotle many contemporary philosophers
of science, particularly the Logical Empiricists/ contend that
teleological categories are eliminable from the substantive
analysis of goal-directed systems and that, consequently, the
explanatory framework for such systems can-and some say
should-avoid a teleological construction. On the contrary, I
believe that teleological categories and explanations are logically acceptable and in important ways indispensable not only
for goal-directed systems but for all explanatory analyses in
science. In order to test these convictions I propose in this
study first to investigate Aristotle's doctrine of finality, and
1 194bl9-20.
Throughout this study I have used the Hardie and Gaye translation of the Physics as found in The Basic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon
(New York: Random House, 1941).
2 " Logical Empiricists " is not an altogether
precise designation. By it I mean
especially to refer to those philosophers of science who accept the covering law
model of scientific explanation. Thus Braithwaite, Carnap, Feigl, Hempel, Nagel,
Oppenheim, Pap, Reichenbach, Rudner, etc.

702

SUBSTANTIVE

AND METHODOLOGICAL

TELEOLOGY

708

then to measure its suggestive implications against the considerations of Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel in their interpretations of and objections to teleological categories and explanations.

I.

THE .ARISTOTELIAN DocTRINE OF TELEOLOGY

A. Explanation according to the conditions of change. Since
science for Aristotle is not simply a catalogue of empirical observations of natural phenomena but reasoned demonstrations
according to the necessary conditions of things, a methodological requisite is that those conditions be distinguished with
respect to their type. There are four kinds of condition which
must be determined before we may be said to have full scientific
knowledge of any natural object: the material condition, "that
out of which a thing comes to be and which persists"; the formal
condition, " the statement of the essence, and its genera, . . .
and the parts of the definition"; the efficient condition, "the
primary source of the change or coming to rest"; and the final
condition, " [the] end or ' that for the sake of which ' a thing
is done." 3
Of the four kinds of condition the physicist must consider in
order to fully explain the changes which natural objects
undergo, the formal and telic coincide both in the ontological
and logical orders. In the ontological order it is the essential
structures of things which dynamically determine them to develop into all that they potentially are. The paradigm example
for Aristotle of this kind of form-end identification is the biological development of an individual of a certain species: each
member of a given species carries the plan of its own evolvement within itself, and through the course of its transformations it becomes structured according to that plan. 4 In the
• Phys., 194b24-34.
• The notion that species, just as individuals, evolve and assume new genotypic
characteristics would be foreign to Aristotle. It was his consistent view that
end-directed activity is engaged in only by individuals, not by their substantial
forms. However, insofar as teleology is understood in an Aristotelean, non-vitalistic
fashion, there seems to be no reason for not analyzing species evolution using

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logical order it is the same description of the structure of each
object which, according to the use made of it, can be considered now the essential description of the species, now the plan
of development for members of the species, that is, the description of the set of goal-directed functions and behaviors characteristic of the species.
B. Empirical evidence for substantive teleology. Aristotle
laments 5 that most philosophers have given their attention
only to the material and efficient conditions of physical change,
while overlooking the most important-the final conditions.
Empedocles and Anaxagoras, for instance, assume that nature
works according to the absolute necessity of her efficient and
material states; they reason that since, for example, the rain
does not fall in order to make the corn grow but because of the
antecedent conditions involved, natural types generally, biological and inanimate, operate in a similar way. On these
grounds the appearance of biological types, in the opinion of
Empedocles, 6 is the necessary result of the efficient activity of
antecedent conditions. That certain features of animals and
plants seem to indicate purpose (e.g., that the front teeth of
men are sharp and fit for tearing and the back ridged and fit
for grinding) is simply fortuitous-these occurred spontaneously and because of survival value they endured.
Aristotle believes that the early philosophers had overlooked
some important facts which demand the notion of teleology in
order to make them intelligible. 7 (1) Substantial natures function for the most part in certain ways: the spider spins his
web and usually in the same fashion; the seed, through definite
stages, normally develops into the tree, etc. This would not
be the case if such functions were merely the result of unlawful
chance and spontaneity; for these latter do ndt occur "always
substantial teleological categories. As a matter of interest Ayala (" Teleological
Explanations in Evolutionary Biology," Philosophy of Science, 87 [1970], 1-15)
does precisely this.
• Meta., 988b6-16; Phys., 198a88-S4.
• Phys., 198128-88.
7 Ph'IJS., 198b88-199b82.

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or for the most part." 8 If chance and spontaneity did hold
sway in the developmental process, then the seed should not
always mature into the tree but rather be transmogrified in
perfectly random ways. (2) If we use intelligent action as a
model, we see that where there is a terminus to such action
the earlier stages have been accomplished for the sake of the
later; but since in nature we too find action coming to term,
we may assume that nature also acts for the sake of certain
ends. (3) Even the lower animals manifest activity which is
analogous to human intelligent action; this seems to indicate
that they likewise act for ends. (4) The fact that we recognize
monsters shows that there are definite teleological vectors in
nature; for " monster" has no meaning except where there are
normal kinds. (5) There is a definite maturational progression
observable in all species. (6) In addition to the telic activities
of animals, non-intelligent plant life responds in certain characteristic ways to changes in the environment: a plant deprived
of water will send its roots searching for it; injuries sustained
are repaired through its self-preservative action, and so on.
(7) To deny ends to nature simply because nature does not
consciously deliberate is unwarranted. The artist does not
ponder every brush stroke, he is not immediately aware of
every twist of the palette knife; yet it would seem unreasonable to deny that each of his actions was for the sake of the
completed picture.
8 Spontaneity
and chance, for Aristotle, do not imply lack of causation but
rather "the unforeseen meeting of two chains of rigorous causation" (W. D. Ross,
Aristotle [New York: Barnes and Noble, 5th ed., 1956], p. 78). Specifically,
Aristotle analyzes chance, which occurs only with intelligent creatures, and spontaneity, which happens only to the nonhuman, in this manner. Chance and
spontaneity are names for that type of sequence of events which occurs in either
of two ways: (I) when the proper result of a purposive action (either intelligently
deliberative or 'naturally telic) is incidentally concomitant with another event which
might have been, but was not in fact, an object of the purposive action; or (2) when
a purposive action, by reason of a concomitant action, leads to a result which
might have been, but was not in fact, an object of purposive action. In other words,
event A is said to cause B by chance if either B is a concomitant of C, which is
the proper effect of A, or A is incidentally cojoined to C, which is the proper
cause of B.

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These arguments support three major propositions of Aristotle's theory of teleology: (1) The dynamic structure (i.e., the
form) and consequent goal-directed development and activities
of natural objects are to be understood in terms of the physical
laws which determine their character. (2) The fundament in
nature for the intelligibility of these lawful sequences lies in
their accomplished termini. (3) Consciousness is not a necessary feature of telic activity; it is simply a component of the
most familiar kind of such activity.
C. The necessity of nature. The question of finality in nature,
for Aristotle as well as for many contemporary philosophers,
hinges upon the type of necessity that obtains in the world.
Aristotle believes that necessity must reside in nature, otherwise the physicist could have no determinate knowledge of
natural objects. However, reflection reveals two different kinds
of natural necessity, simple and hypothetical. 9 Simple necessity is that attendant upon the mechanical determination of a
temporally subsequent state of a natural object by prior material and efficient conditions. Many physicists, observes Aristotle, locate the necessity of nature in the process of production;
they see the states of a natural object as being mechanically and
unswervingly determined by preceding states. On this account
it is the terminus of a thing which is necessitated by its antecedent stages. But this explanation is short-sighted from the
Stagirite's viewpoint, for it would be as if a wall came to exist
as a necessary result of blocks being of a certain weight and
shape, the mortar of a certain consistency, etc. Rather, " though
the wall does not come to be without these, it is not due to
these, except as its material causes: it comes to be for the sake
of sheltering and guarding certain things." 10 Hence Aristotle
does not deny that changes in things demand materials of certain kinds-in any natural process material causality is required-yet the things are not due to the materials but to the
end. 11 So in this view, the necessity which governs the coming• Phys., 199b34-200b10.
Phys., 200a5-7.
11 Phys., 200a7-9. It would be a mistake to think that for Aristotle efficient and

10

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to-be of certain structures in nature is a hypothetical necessity:

if a given term is the outcome of a natural process, then stages
of a certain kind must precede it. In nature, of course, changes
are sometimes wrought which require only material and efficient causes for their analysis. These changes are governed
by simple necessity, and occur when objects impinge upon one
another in chance ways. Thus, for example, rain produces a
healthy corn crop, though this does not mean that summer
showers were necessitated by the corn. On the other hand, if
the corn has attained vigor, water must have been present in
an earlier stage of its development-though
not necessariJy
from rain.
While Aristotle's discussion of hypothetical necessity is provocative, a rendering of it as an ontological analysis leaves several questions dangling. Is simple necessity concomitantly
operative with hypothetical necessity, or are these merely two
perspectives on the same thing? Are the changes in natural
objects the result of the form-end also acting as an efficient
cause? 12 Yet these difficulties are alleviated if Aristotle's immaterial causality are excluded by teleological causality. As is evident from his
analysis, in the complete account of natural kinds all four causes must be employed.
In the contemporary discussion this point has been observed by Mace (" Mechanical and Teleological Causation," in Readings in Philosophical Analysis, ed. Feigl
and W. Sellars [New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts,
1949], p. 538): " ... it is
obvious that on this view mechanical and teleological causation are not to he
conceived as alternative or opposed processes. On the contrary, to as&ert that a
process exhibits teleological causation entails that the end in question and each
of the intervening phases of the process are mechanically determined."
12 The identification
of efficient causality with formal-final causality, with its
consequent conceptual confusion, is sometimes abetted by Aristotle himself; and
certainly Ross (pp. 74-5; 98-9) urges that this kind of identification is made by
Aristotle. However, I think there are sufficient grounds in Aristotle for regarding
agential action as always extrinsic to the thing changed--else natural objects
become unmoved movers. It is the Stagirite's fundamental and persistent view
that the motion of both animate and inanimate beings is not self initiated, but
arises from other terrcstial motions ultimately translated from the eternal movements of the spheres (see especially Phys., Bk. VIII, ch. vi). Consequently, those
who attack Aristotle's doctrine of causality on the basis of this supposed identity
(e. g., C. S. Pittendrigh, "Adaptation, Natural Selection and Behavior," in Behavior and Evolution, ed. A. Roe and G. Simpson [New Haven: Yale University,
1958], p. 394) are perhaps tilting against a shadow rather than a substance.

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plicit distinction between physical and methodological teleology
is made explicit and the roots of his analysis of the former are
traced through the soil of the latter.
D. Physical an.d methodological priority of final conditions.
The discussion of finality in Aristotle takes place on two levels,
often confused in the text. The first level, the one emphasized
in the Physics, ostensibly governs the second. The first level
is the physical. It is the empirical confrontation with nature,
especially biotic nature, which establishes in Aristotle's mind
the reality and priority of ends in nature and their typical kind
of necessity. Ontic priority is given to final causality, since,
according to Aristotle, the direction of natural development is
determined by the specific teleological orientation fixed by the
lawfully ordered structure of the object. The hypothetical
necessity proper to the telic activity of nature occurs, then, in
this fashion: if this is a natural object of a given kind, it must
develop and behave according to the structure of its kind.
The second level of the discussion of finality, and perhaps
really the controlling level, is methodological. Here Aristotle's
four causes become logical conditions for the scientific explanation of natural transformations; in this sense they are not ontic
features of things but principles of demonstration. It is on
this level that the question recurs concerning which principle
is to be judged most important for scientific explanation. The
very logic of explanation compels Aristotle once more to choose
telic principles. His reasons are two. The first is sketched in
an interesting argument in the Posterior Analytics:
Can causes and effects different from one another form, as they
seem to us to form, a continuous succession, a past effect resulting
from a past cause different from it, and an effect which is comingto-be from a cause different from and prior to it? Now on this
theory it is from the posterior event that we reason (and this though
these latter events actually have their source of origin in previous
events-a fact which shows that also when the effect is coming-to-be
we still reason from the posterior event), and from the prior event
we cannot reason (we cannot argue that because an event A has
occurred, therefore an event B has occurred subsequently to A but
still in the past-and the same holds good if the occurrence is
future)-cannot reason because, be the time interval definite or

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indefinite, it will never be possible to infer that because it is true
to say that A occurred, therefore it is true to say that B, the subsequent event, occurred; for in the interval between the events,
though A has already occurred, the latter statement will be false. 13

In this argument Aristotle is discussing causal activity which
takes place over an interval of time, i.e., when the cause is
temporally antecedent to the effect, which seems to be the case
in most scientific explanations of empirical events. In such
cases, he reasons, one cannot argue that because an antecedent
event has occurred a definite consequent must occur. One cannot argue in this fashion because in the interval it simply will
not be true; and, to expand his line of reasoning, because of
possible intervening factors the expected effect might never
occur. The only assurance of an actual connection between a
putative cause and its effect is that the effect has actually taken
place. When an effect has actually occurred then we can argue
that its specific cause has necessarily also occurred. In short,
we can only produce necessary scientific explanations when we
argue from outcomes, that is, from ends to their efficient and
material conditions. Hence the very logic of scientific explanation demands that a teleological pattern be employed and that
priority be given to the description of the end of the natural
process as the controlling methodological factor. 14
18 Post An., 95a24-34, the G. R. Mure translation
in McKeon. See also On the
Parts of Animals, 639b32-640a8. The pattern of argument sanctioned by the
quoted passage displays this kind of logical form:

(where D is an event or state which is temporarily subsequent to A). To illustrate this pattern Aristotle provides an argument demonstrating that a house
having been built (a final condition) necessitates stones having been quarried:
" The reason is that a house having been built [D] necessitates a foundation
having been laid [C], and if a foundation has been laid blocks must have been
shaped beforehand [A]" (Post. An., 95b31-34). The syllogistic pattern offered is
obviously valid. Doubts arise, however, concerning the justification of the premises.
These difficulties will be studied from various vantages in the remainder of this
essay.
14 It might be objected that the teleological pattern
of explanation for which

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To this analysis the contemporary philosopher of science
might object that we can have no assurance that an effect of a
particular kind must be produced by only one sort of efficient
or material cause; he might retort that a given event or object
may be producible by a rather large set of different conditions,
and therefore that the existence of a particular explanandum
event does not necessitate the prior existence of a specific antecedent cause. 15 Although this objection has some force, the
search for specific antecedent conditions could not even begin
unless an assumption is made that an effect has been necessitated by a cause of one certain general kind (e.g., that malignant growth occurs because of some particular arrangement of
nucleotides in the DNA of the cell-though we are presently
ignorant of the specific arrangement that directs abnormal cell
development). This as well as related defenses will be more
thoroughly discussed below. Objections to Aristotle's positive
doctrine aside, his criticism of a purely mechanistic interpretation of explanation is sound: though explanans statements of
certain conditions and relevant laws may necessitate a determinate conclusory statement, they nonetheless do not necessitate
the occurrence of the event described in the conclusion.
In the Parts of Animals Aristotle offers a second reason,
similar to the first, for maintaining the priority of finality. In
Aristotle is here arguing does not meet his requirements for scientific explanation
(Post. An.,
One of those requirements is that a scientific demonstration must proceed from prior causes to subsequent effects. But since the logical
movement of teleological explanation is from effect to cause, it fails to be a case
of valid scientific demonstration-so the objection might run. A twofold response
can be made to this objection. First, even if it were sound, Aristotle's remarks
concerning explanations of temporally disparate events remain cogent. Second,
I do not believe the objection is sound. The use of the terms "cause " and " effect "
is not confined by Aristotle to efficient causes and their effects. The term " cause "
is used analogously and can refer to any of the four causes. Thus in the case of
teleological explanation one is not formally arguing from effects to their efficient
causes, but from final causes to their " effects." As a matter of interest, in the
Posterior Analytics the causes which Aristotle feels best exemplify his criteria for
valid scientific explanation are formal causes, i.e., the kind of causes used in
mathematical demonstration.
16 Hempel makes this observation
in " The Logic of Functional Analysis," in
his Aspects of Scientific Explanation (New York: Free Press, 1965), pp.

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noting that many philosophers select the efficient and material
conditions as primary in their attempts to explain natural
transformations, he contends that from the logic of the situation this cannot be done:
Plainly, however, that cause is the first which we call the final one.
For this is the Reason, and the Reason forms the starting-point,
alike in the works of art and in works of nature. For consider how
the physician or how the builder sets about his work. He starts by
forming for himself a definite picture, in the one case perceptible
to the mind, in the other to sense, of his end-the physician of
health, the builder of a house-and this he holds forward as the
reason and explanation of each subsequent step that he takes, and
of his acting in this or that way as the case may be. 16

This passage indicates, at least seminally, a major philosophical insight concerning the methodological necessity of teleology: in order for the physicist to explain certain natural changes
he first must, logically must, be aware of both the particular
and the generic termini of those transformations. To illustrate
more exactly what is involved here, consider this example: a
mercury thermometer is placed in hot water; there occurs a
temporary drop in the column, then a swift rise. How are we to
explain this? We do it, according to the Logical Empiricists,
by stating certain antecedent conditions (e.g., a glass tube
thermometer is partially filled with mercury and it is immersed
in hot water) and by producing certain relevant laws (e.g.,
laws of the thermic conductivity of glass and the thermic expansion of mercury and glass) ; from these the description of
the change can be deduced. However, even to begin to construct this explanatory framework one must first be aware of
the completed phenomenon to be explained; one must have
prior knowledge of the end (in this case the temporary drop in
the mercury and then the swift rise) in order to select the particular antecedent conditions and the general laws one is going
to employ to explain the final condition.
The requirement of prior conceptual elaboration and, per16

On the Parts of Animals, 639b14-20, the William Ogle translation in McKeon.

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ROBERT J. RICHARDS

haps, linguistic description of the end or explanandum event
may seem obvious. However, it is methodologically and epistemologically significant beyond the immediately apparent. To
conceptually construe an event means we have placed it within
the common-sense or scientific framework at our disposal. Thus
located the implicit rules governing concepts within the framework determine the direction of our search and the permissible
selection of conceptual descriptions for the explanans. If the
proper explanans has yet to be discovered (e.g., the cause of
cancer), then the direction in conceptual space is general and
the permissible set of descriptions could characterize several
possible explanans events; if the explanandum event already
has a definite explanans sanctioned by the framework (e.g., the
fall and rise of mercury in the glass tube), then the direction
and descriptions are specific.
This thesis may be put more formally and can serve as an
example for the formalizing of subsequent theses, which, in
this study, will be only informally expressed. Let" L " stand for
a given language system (e.g., the system composed of the
interlocking subsystems of contemporary theories in genetics,
cell biology, and virology) and "Lc" for the equivalent conceptual system. 17 • Let" A1, A2, ... An; B1, B2, ... Bn; C1, C2,
... Cn" be terms in L and "A1e, A2e, ... An°" etc. the
equivalent concepts in L 0 • Let "R1, R2, ... Rn" refer to
the semantic rules governing L (i.e., rules of formation, transformation, and conformation) and let" R1c, R2c, ... Rnc" refer
to the equivalent rules of Lc. Now among the rules of Lc will
be a subset Rc' which relates definite syntatical arrangements
of members of Ac with members of Be. Thus, for instance,
"Rse' (A1e, Bse)" says that there is a definite relation
RGc' between A1c and Bsc. This rule will be isomorphic with a
certain law spoken of in L. In addition to the subset Rc' of Lc
there will be another subset Rc* which is a set of authorization
17 The kind of semantical-epistemological theory that would justify this equivalence, as well as several other formal devices employed, is argued for by Wilfrid
Sellars. See for instance chapter three, his Science and Metaphyaics (London:
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1968) .

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rules. These rules state what classes of concepts can be permissibly arranged together and what general kinds of arrangements are possible. Thus Rsc* (Ac, Be) would permit only
members of Ae and Be to be related in the general syntatical
structure Rse*, and thus would prohibit N and ce in that kind
of arrangement (note that Rse* is a functor whose arguments
are class constants and refers only to more general syntatical
structures, not specific-just as, in the material mode, the
young Newton contended that the law of universal gravitation
would have to be an inverse square law, without having yet
discovered its specific numerical value) .
Now the thesis that in constructing an explanation we must
select certain antecedent events as part of the explanans by
reason of our conceptual construal of the explanandum may be
formally exampled in this fashion:
If some explanandum event is conceived as A{x · A4ex · A5ex, then

we must postulate as its antecedent cause event y, conceived as
B1eY · B3ey by reason of rules R3e' and R6c' of Le.
The thesis that our conceptualization of the hitherto unexplained event x guides our search and gives a definite direction
within conceptual space (of V) may be formally exampled by:
If explanandum event x is conceived as A6ex · A7ex · A9ex, then a

definite direction is established in conceptual space Le such that a
possible explanans event is conceivable only through use of members of the set Be by reason of R 5e* of Le.
These examples of our two theses are expressed in the formal
mode. If they were to be expressed in the material mode of
speech, they would state reasons for constructing explanations
in a certain way and for developing hypotheses of a certa.in
type. 18 These reasons, of course, would be those imbedded in
18 From hypotheses of a certain type the particular one we select for development
and investigation may have indeed been chosen at random and by chance. This
is the valid point made by those who contend hypothesis generation cannot be
rationally analyzed. For a provocative though not completely satisfactory theory
of problem solving within constraints see Donald Campbell's "Blind Variation
and Selective Retention in Creative Thought as in Other Knowledge Processes,"
Psychological Review, 67 (1960), 380-400.

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the theories and assumptions in light of which we describe the
phenomena to be explained. These two theses, incidentally,
support Hanson's general distinction between reasons for accepting hypothesis and reasons for suggesting an hypothesis in
the first place; consequently they articulate, I believe, at least
two foundational principles for a rational reconstruction of the
process of scientific discovery. 19
Another aspect of our general thesis, which was originally
prompted by Aristotle's considerations and which will later be
more fully expanded, is the recognition that in inquiring after
antecedent conditions of a hitherto unexplained phenomenon,
the very significance of those conditions will be more finely
specified by the conceptual appraisal of the terminus: the conceptual significance of a particular chain of nucleotides, for
instance, will be determined by the fact that it directs the development of cancerous cell growth. Termini achieved by
objects in various circumstances fix the conceptual meanings
deployed within the explanatory framework for those objects. 20
19 Hanson gives a brief explanation
of his distinction in his " Is There a Logic
of Discovery," in Current Issues in the Philosophy of Science, ed. H. Feigl and
G. Maxwell (New York: Holt, Reinhart and Winston, 1961). His position and
the thesis expressed here is in opposition to the orthodox view of the Logical
Empiricists that discovery is not a rationally analyzable process. As Popper
expresses it (The Logic of Scientific Discovery [New York: Basic Books, 1968]):
it is not " the business of epistemology to produce what has been called a ' rational
reconstruction ' of the steps that have led the scientist to a discovery-to the finding
of some new truth" (p. 31). The orthodox view is also maintained by the
unorthodox historiographer of science Thomas Kuhn when he contends that the
discovery and promulgation of major theories is not a matter of rational consideration but of individual and social psychology.
Ironically, support for the rational reconstruction of discovery which I have
offered does come from psychology. Newell and Shaw, in their "Elements of a
Theory of Human Problem Solving" (Psychological Review, 65 [1958], 151-166)
argue that scientific discovery is amenable to a logical analysis. Their own view,
similar to the one I am proposing, is that the discovery of solutions for particular
problems does " depend on problem ' structure,' " and that in generating possible
solutions one " works backward from the problem expression." They conclude
that their analysis indicates " the concept of proceeding in a ' meaningful ' fashion
is entirely clear and explicit. Trial-and-error attempts take place in some ' space '
of possible solutions."
20 Support for this thesis may be drawn from several quarters.
Further on in

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This, then, is the hypothetical necessity which governs methodological procedures: if this particular phenomenon is to be
explained, these particular antecedent conditions and laws must
be employed. It is in this respect that the scientist must first
be aware of the terminus of the transformation in order to
bring to bear a particular explanatory apparatus. In addition,
he must be aware of what I have called above the generic
terminus, which is characterized by the laws governing natural
changes. Such laws describe the certain kind of end that a
particular kind of thing achieves in given conditions. In order
to establish these laws he must be apprised of the specific
ends a certain kind of thing usually attains in given circumstances, and in applying the laws he must bring to the particular
case the knowledge of the ends an object of a certain kind
usually achieves. The conclusions of an Aristotelian analysis
of methodological teleology are, therefore, that in all demonstrative explanations in science one must begin, by tacit assumption at least, with the particular and generic final conditions; and that these latter conceptually determine the antecedent conditions and explanatory laws.

II. TELEOLOGY IN CoNTEMPORARY

LoGICAL EMPIRICISM

A. Common elements in the Logical Empiricists' view of
teleology. The Logical Empiricists, taking Nagel, Braithwaite,
and Hempel as fair representatives, generally accept four
theses concerning the status of teleological notions in scientific
discourse. First, consonant with one stream of Aristotelian
interpretation, they hold the explanatory category of teleologithis essay Dewey's views are brought to bear. In the more contemporary discussion Wilfrid Sellars' semantical and epistemological theories are pertinent. Sellars
contends (" Concepts as Involving Laws and Inconceivable without Them,"
"Philosophy of Science, 15 [1948], 287-315) that our concepts of objects and
events are infused with meaning by reason of the physical laws and relationships
into which those objects and events enter. Or, putting this in the formal mode,
Sellars argues that the significance of a predicate within a linguistic system
reciprocally determines and is determined by its relation to the array of other
predicates to which it is referred by reason of the rules of conformation (these
latter being similar to Carnap's P-rules).

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cal causality to be conceptually and logically distinct from that
of efficient causality (though Nagel does see a special logical
relation between the two) . Second, they do not regard " consciousness," divine or cosmic, to be a necessary component of
the concept of teleology. Third, they concede that teleological
concepts are often helpful in the analysis of goal-directed systems; Nagel and Braithwaite even contend that in some measure
such concepts can function legitimately in scientific explanations. Finally, even in acknowledging some legitimacy for such
concepts, the Logical Empiricists-again judging the three
that, if teleological
mentioned to be representative-believe
concepts and explanations are taken to be essential to any of
the sciences, then the task of bringing either substantive or
methodological unity to science is rendered extremely difficult
if not impossible. Consequently they have attempted to demonstrate the eliminability, in principle at least, of teleological concepts and explanations from the various sciences, without,
however, affording any loss of validly asserted content to the
body of those sciences.
In the following pages I wish to examine the arguments
offered by Nagel, Braithwaite, and Hempel for what will be
called the eliminability thesis of Logical Empiricism, namely,
that teleological categories can in principle be dispensed with
in the sciences. With the aid of Aristotle's distinction between
substantive and methodological teleology and his analyses
particularly of the latter, I believe it can be shown that the
arguments for the eliminability of teleology are unsound. Indeed, even more: that for all the sciences the logical character
of explanation requires teleological concepts for its adequate
analysis and that in those sciences dealing with goal-directed
systems the concept of substantive teleology is indispensible.
B. Nagel: the eliminability thesis. Nagel and most contemporary investigators of the problem agree that, though conscious
purposes are frequently useful as conceptual tools in the examination of human behavior, they need not be regarded as
analytic to the meaning of teleological explanations in general.
For, especially in the biological sciences, " explanations are often

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said to be ' teleological ' only in the sense that they specify the
functions which things or processes possess." 21 What is necessarily characteristic, then, of teleological locutions is that they
signify a "means-ends" nexus. 22
'
Despite the efforts of many of the Logical Empiricists the
biological and other sciences yet contain explanations which
depend on appeal to functional laws. To take a well-worn
example of such from Nagel: "The function of chlorophyll in
plants is to enable plants to perform photosynthesis." Provided
with the empirical observation that plant A performs photosynthesis a functional law of this kind can apparently be used
to explain why plant A contains chlorophyll. Yet, because of
certain methodological and philosophical considerations, Nagel
insists that functional explanations of this sort can easily be
replaced by explanations devoid of telic import.
Nagel argues 23 that the functional law just exampled can be
adequately reformulated " without loss of asserted content "
to state only necessary efficient conditions; to wit: " A necessary condition for the occurrence of photosynthesis in plants
is the presence of chlorophyll." This translation does not explicitly ascribe a function to chlorophyll, and in this sense is
not a teleological law. Nagel believes this reformulation may
be used as a paradigm for all functional explanations.
It is noteworthy that Nagel's reformulation in terms of necessary conditions is logically identical with Aristotle's formula for
"hypothetical necessity" (e.g., "If photosynthesis is to occur
in plants, chlorophyll must be present ") . The two philosophers
are thus in agreement that teleological or functional laws imply
propositions stating necessary antecedent conditions. Aristotle's
analysis, however, suggests that more is implied by teleological
propositions and, consequently, that such propositions cannot
without loss of content be replaced by propositions stating only
necessary conditions. But here too the views of these philoso21 Ernest
Nagel, The Structure of Science (New York:
World, 1961), p. 40fl.
22 Ibid., p. 408.
•• Ibid., pp. 408-406.

Harcourt,

Brace, and

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phers are not completely divergent; for Nagel also believes that
more is implied by teleological propositions. According to Nagel,

though, this " more " plays no part in the explanatory power
of such propositions; its value is only heuristic. Nonetheless he
feels compelled to expunge even this component of any teleological flavor. We will return shortly to his attempt at this
expurgation.
An objection has frequently been brought against Nagel's
translation hypothesis, which could as well be lodged against
Aristotle's affirmation of the implicatory relation. The objection
holds that Nagel's hypothesis renders a translation which
makes an unsupportable assertion: for though chlorophyll may
be a sufficient condition for photosynthesis, it need not be a
necessary condition; conceivably some other chemical could
perform the function of chlorophyll in plants. 24 We have already
seen this objection during the investigation of Aristotle's concept of hypothetical necessity, and there a partial reply was
suggested. Nagel himself is not unmindful of this particular
objection. He responds:
... although living organisms (plants as well as animals) capable
of maintaining themselves without processes involving the operation
of chlorophyll are both abstractly and physically possible, there
appears to be no evidence whatever that in view of the limited
capacities green plants possess as a consequence oftheir actual mode
of organization, these organisms can live without chlorophyll. 25

Expanding on this reply it can be argued, in an Aristotelian
vein, that laws stating necessary conditions (and functional
laws for that matter) find their place within the logical structure of a given science; hence, the validity of their modal character is secured by the skein of physical and biological laws and
theories operative at the time such laws are used. Thus, in the
example of chlorophyll, biochemical investigation and theory
reveal that no other chemical has the requisite properties of
24 Michael Ruse
("Discussion: Functional Statements in Biology," Philosophy
of Science, 88 [1971], 87-89) takes this objection to be damaging to Nagel's analysis.
25 Nagel, p. 404.

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producing photosynthesis and doing so in a way which is not
detrimental to the plant.
Nagel does admit that the meaning of a teleological explanation is not exhausted by its translation into an explanation
employing only necessary conditions. " For the former presupposes, while the latter normally does not, that the system
under consideration in the explanation is directively organized." 26 But this presupposition is declared by Nagel merely
to add " surplus meaning " and only to be " connoted " by
functional explanations. 27 He thereby implies that this fund of
meaning is inessential to the adequate rendering of the concept
of teleology within the explanatory structure of a given science.
(In the Aristotelian analysis, of course, the reference to goaldirectedness plays a necessary part in the concept of teleology;
indeed, since for Aristotle the final cause is substantively the
same as the formal cause-this latter being the expression of
the congeries of natural laws dynamically interacting in the
government of organic activity-goal-directedness
is a feature
of the behavior of all physical objects.) However, though
Nagel maintains an explanatory isomorphism between teleological and correlative conditional explanations, he thinks a
translation of laws in the physical sciences into their logically
equivalent teleological form would be decidedly odd. 28 He thus
acknowledges that teleological explanations "presuppose" that
we are dealing with goal-oriented systems, whereas conditional
explanations do not. How this acknowledgement is to accommodate his suggestion that such reference is " surplus " meaning
is unclear.
Perhaps because of his uncertainty about precisely what a
teleological explanation does imply, Nagel moves to purge the
concept of goal-directedness of any teleological import. The
conclusion of his analysis, strongly supportive of the thesis of
•• Ibid., p. 421.
•• Ibid.
28 Ibid. Aristotle also holds that explanations using necessary antecedent
conditions do not of themselves imply that the conditions and their result are involved
together in a directively organized system.

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eliminability, is that even the" surplus meaning of teleological
statements can always be expressed in non-teleological language." 29 His emetic examination yields the following conditions that a directively organized system must satisfy: (1) Sis
a system having parts or processes (say A, B, C) which are
causally relevant to the occurrence in S of some property or
mode of behavior G. (2) If S is in a G-state and there is a
change in the value of only one of the variables A, B, or C,
then Swill be taken out of its G-state. (3) The parts A, B, and
C are so related that, when the primary variation in S occurs,
the remaining parameters also vary such that the combined
values are precisely those required to maintain the G-state of
S. (4) The parts of S are organized such that a variation in
one (within certain parameters) is compensated for by a variation in one or both of the other parts so as to maintain S in its
G-state. A system which satisfies these conditions is, according
to Nagel, a directively organized system. 3° From this analysis
Nagel concludes that the
prima facie distinctive character of so-called "goal-directed" or
teleological systems is thus formulated by the stated conditions for
a directively organized system. The above analysis has therefore
shown that the notion of a teleological system can be explicated in
a manner not requiring the adoption of teleology as a fundamental
or unanalyzable category. 31

Whether the untoward notion of teleology has been excised
so easily is not as obvious as Nagel suggests. For instance, his
conditions (3) and (4) speak of a system in which the parts
are so organized as to maintain a certain state despite changes
(within certain limits) of the parameters of one of those parts.
But what is this other than a teleological or functional system?
It seems Nagel has assumed the notion of teleology to analyze
the concept. (Compare: A necessary condition for something
being a triangle is that it be a three-sided plane figure; thus the
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., pp. 414-415.
" 1 Ibid., p. 417.

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concept of triangularity is eliminated.) 32 However, if we take
Nagel's analysis as explicative of the concept of teleology,
rather than eliminative of it-as surely we must-then it would
not disturb Aristotle. For Aristotle's own investigations of substantive teleology are such that they describe a natural object
as manifesting telic behavior if its parts are so organized into a
system that they lawfully accommodate one another to preserve or achieve a certain end state. In both Nagel's analysis
and Aristotle's the notion of a system of parts mutually compensating for each other in lawful ways for the attainment and
maintenance of a certain state-i.e., what is commonly called a
teleological or functional system-this notion is primitive and,
hence, not eliminable. The concept by any other circumlocution is still that of teleology.
Of course, Nagel's failure to eliminate what he takes to be
the deleterious concept of teleology does not mean that all such
82 " Concept "
might mean sever:tl things depending on one's semantic proclivities. It could refer to the term. The elimination of the concept would then
consist in the replacement of the term by one or more equivalent terms or definitions. But surely this is not what Nagel has in mind; for any proponent of
teleology might well agree to the replacement of the term by another term or
terms, as long as the meaning was equivalent. The argument is not merely over
words. "Concept" could refer to the individual object or property. Thus the
phrase " concept of teleology " would denote a particular property of a goaldirected system. However, Nagel cannot mean this. For when a concept is eliminated Nagel surely does not suppose that something has been eliminated from
the physical world. "Concept" could refer to a mental entity. But if we eliminate
the concept is it simply that we refuse to mentally entertain it any longer?
Certainly this is not what is meant. Perhaps in eliminating the concept we refuse
to use it in thinking about goal-directed systems. This seems to be closer to
what Nagel has in mind. However, would we indeed eliminate the concept of
teltJology if we replaced it by another concept of equivalent meaning-perhaps a
complex concept-whose meaning is constituted by the four conditions Nagel
isolates? If with Wilfrid Sellars (Science and Metaphysics, pp. 60-90) we hold
that concepts as mental entities have the meaning they do by virtue of the role
they play within the mental economy, then if two concepts, complex or simple,
have the same role or use, they have the same meaning and are thus the same
concept (just as the word "the" is the same whether it is printed all in capital
letters, lower case letters, or written in various hands). One does not eliminate
a concept by replacing it with a complex concept or set of concepts which have
the same role and, therefore, the same meaning-yet this is what Nagel
attempts to do.

ROBERT J. RICHARDS

attempts are likewise doomed. However, until a way is offered
to construe goal-directed behavior which avoids the logical
structure of the Aristotelian analysis of substantive teleology,
the latter remains presumptively coherent and adequate.
C. Braithwaite: the plasticity of behavior. Braithwaite observes that a common misconception concerning teleology is the
view that a teleological explanation implies the determination
of an explanandum event by a future event. Rather what is
characteristic of a teleological system is that such a system
" can attain the same goal under different circumstances by
alternative forms of activity making use frequently of different
causal chains." 83 What is distinctive of those systems which
we call teleological, therefore, is their plasticity of behavior.
The analysis (in a slightly abbreviated form) which Braithwaite offers of a goal-directed system is this. 84 Let b equal a
goal-oriented behavior system (an animal organism, for instance); let c equal any causal chain, or stages in b's behavior;
let e equal the initial state of b; let f equal the field or environmental conditions which impinge upon b; let G equal the final
goal-achieved event; let those c's which are able to attain G
(and there may be many of them, just as there are several ways
a hungry dog can attain food) equal T; and finally, let V equal
that class off's which uniquely determine those c's which are
members of T.
Now, argues Braithwaite, in order to give an efficient causal
explanation instead of a functional explanation for any given c
one must be able to determine what f's comprise the variance
(the class of V). Thus, for example, to give an efficient causal
explanation of the behavior of a dog seeking food-his barking, licking the food dish, bringing the dish to his master, etc.one must be able to specify those environmental conditions (the
cla.ss of V) which are the necessary determiners of each of those
chains of seemingly goal-directed behavior (the c's in T). In
such instances, Braithwaite asserts, we are almost never, by
•• Richard Braithwaite, Scientific Ewplanation (New York: Harper Torchbooks,
1960)' p. 829.
"' Ibid., pp. 829-SM.

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rettson of the undeveloped state of psychology, in a position
to specify the determinate conditions which necessitate the
particular chains of behavior. What we typically do in these
instances in order to explain such activities is to argue from
past experiences of similar behavior which we know to have
terminated when a certain goal was reached; in other words, we
argue by analogy from previous cases of similar goal-directed
behavior. Hence in these cases, where relevant laws of efficiency are unknown, we must settle for teleological explanations
based on generalizations from experience:
It is when our knowledge of the relevant variancy has been obtained

independently of any knowledge of the causal laws concerned that
a teleological explanation is valuable. For in this case we are unable,
through ignorance of the causal laws, to infer the future behavior
of the system from our knowledge of the causal laws; but we are
able to make such an inference from knowledge of how similar
systems have behaved in the past. 35
Though teleological explanations are expedients of our ignorance and subject to replacement when relevant mechanistic
explanations become available, Braithwaite does not wish to
deny them a valid explanatory function in science. This is
quite consonant with his instrumentalist interpretation of scientific explanations, theories, and theoretical concepts. In lieu
of precise causal determinations, if such explanations function
to organize "our empirical knowledge so as to give both intellectual satisfaction and power to predict the unknown," they
can serve a legitimate explanatory role. 36
In spite of this degree of legitimacy granted to them, Braithwaite, as most philosophers in the tradition of Logical Empiricism, maintains that teleological explanations are a measure of
our lack of empirical knowledge rather than an indication of
an intrinsic feature of the subject matter or of the very character of our knowing ability. Contrary to this view, if the
Aristotelian analysis is correct, the kind of descriptions and
explanations we offer for goal-directed systems is not due simply
36

Ibid., p. 839.

•• Ibid., p. 884.

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to our ignorance but stems precisely from the nature of the
knowing subject and the known object.
What Braithwaite fails to show us is how laws of efficient
causality can' be arrived at in any other manner than that in
which we establish teleological explanations-namely, by semiinductive generalizations from the typical behavior organisms
of a certain species exhibit. Moreover, the Aristotelian logic
of science implies that we cannot even begin to formulate a
causal law or develop a theory from which such can be derived
unless we are first apprised of the typical goals systems achieve
under given circumstances. 31 This characteristic of our epistemic endeavors accommodates the nature of the subject of
such explanatory attempts: the behavior of a complex system
whose parts are governed by various natural laws but whose
laws of interaction remain underivable from those antecedently
specifiable laws of independent parts. In fact, because of the
ever-changing environment-internal
and external-in which
the system operates, new contextual grounds are continually
provided for the development of hitherto unspecified laws of
interaction. Our only recourse in dealing with behavior systems exhibiting these features is to examine persistently various contexts in which activities occur and then to formulate
rather broad laws of behavior on this basis.
To highlight and expand these objections to Braithwaite's
conclusion the observations of John Dewey are pertinent and
clearly within the Aristotelian vein. The concept of a reflex
arc as the determiner of behavior in an organism appears to
be the kind of concept Braithwaite has in mind when he suggests that the ideal explanation would isolate those various
environmental factors which impinge on the organism and produce certain behaviors. Dewey, however, opposes the use of
•• If one accepts the Aristotelian position that theories and generalizations arise
from semi-inductive procedures based on empirical occurrences, this does not entail
acceptance of an Aristotelian intellective induction yielding necessary universals.
(For Aristotle's discussion of this latter see the Posteriur Analytics, 99b-100b17.)
The first position can well support a neo-Kantian epistemology which argues that
our very observations are controlled and shaped by prior theoretical conceptions.
More of this will be briefly discussed in the conclusion of this presentation.

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the reflex arc concept in the analysis of organismic behavior.
His fundamental objection is that the concept supposes that
stimuli are simply given to the organism and evoke precisely
determinable and mechanical responses. This view overlooks
the fact that the " stimulus " emerges out of the momentary
" coordination " of the organism and receives its value from
that coordination. By " coordination " Dewey means that matrix of conditioning history, momentary biochemical and physiological states, present goal-directed activity, and surrounding
environmental variables. These all combine to form the " coordination " of the organism which uniquely determines the
precise value it bestows on any stimulus at a given moment.
Thus the organism actively endows the efficient cause with a
value which both comprises the meaning of the response and
is reciprocally determined by that response. Using these notions, we can examine the situation of a sound frightening a
student at study and causing him to get up and run. Dewey
observes:
We do not have first a sound and then activity of attention, unless
sound is taken as mere nervous shock or physical event, not as
conscious value. The conscious sensation of sound depends upon
the motor response having already taken place; or, in terms of the
previous statement (if stimulus is used as a conscious fact, and not
as a mere physical event) it is the motor response or attention
which constitutes that which finally becomes the stimulus to another act. Once more, the final " element," the running away, is
not merely motor, but is sensori-motor, having its sensory value
and its muscular mechanism. It is also a coordination. And finally,
this sensori-motor coordination is not a new act, supervening upon
what preceded. Just as the "response" is necessary to constitute
the stimulus, to determine it as sound and as this kind of sound,
of wild beast or robber, so the sound experiences must persist as a
value in the running, to keep it up, to control it. The motor reaction involved in the running, is, once more, into, not merely to, the
sound. It occurs to change the sound, to get rid of it. The resulting
quale, whatever it may be, has its meaning totally determined by
reference to the hearing of the sound. It is that experience mediated. What we have is a circuit, not an arc or broken segment of
a circle. This circuit is more truly termed organic than reflex, because the motor response determines the stimulus, just as truly as

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sensory stimulus determines movement. Indeed, the movement is
only for the sake of determing the stimulus, of fixing what kind of
stimulus it is, of interpreting it. 38
Thus Aristotle and Dewey offer persuasive arguments against
a Braithwaitean analysis of teleology. They suggest that an
adequate discrimination and appraisal of the initiating external
stimulus can only be made in light of the organism's typical
kind of behavior and goal orientation at the moment of evocation of behavior. The very selection and meaning of the stimulus depend on the " coordination " of the organism; prior determination of the efficient cause is impossible. Because of this,
attempts at a purely mechanistic explanation gain their plausibility only by ignoring their foundations within an essentially
teleological context.
D. Hempel: the logic of functional analysis. Hempel, in a
tough-minded move, draws what must be the ultimate implication from the treatment afforded the concept of teleology and
teleological explanation at the hands of the Logical Empiricists.39 He insists that teleological or functional explanations
really have no explanatory power, either deductive or inductive, and at best serve only an heuristic role. This conclusion
is derived from his very careful analysis of the logic of functional explanations.
Hempel observes 40 that a functional explanation is designed
to account for some recurrent activity or behavior pattern in
an individual or group, with the ultimate aim directed toward
the contribution which that activity or pattern makes to the
preservation or development of the individual or group. More
exactly, the object of a functional analysis is
38 John Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," Psychological Review,
3 (1896), 362-363. Though Dewey's observations and arguments are sound
models of functionalistic psychology, yet their epistemological foundations are
not without some difficulty. See my "Materialism and Natural Events in Dewey's
Developing Thought," Journal of the History of Philosophy, 10 (1972), 55-69.
39 The analysis is found in " The Logic of Functional Analysis," in his Aspects of
Scientific Explanation.
40 Ibid., pp. 304-805.

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some " item " i, which is a relatively persistent trait or disposition
(e.g., the beating of the heart) occurring in a system 8 (e.g., the
body of a living vertebrate); and the analysis aims to show that 8
is in a state, or internal condition, Ci and in an environment representing certain external conditions Ce such that under conditions
ci and Ce (jointly to he referred to as c) the trait;, has effects which
satisfy some " need " or " functional requirement " of 8, i.e., a condition n which is necessary for the system's remaining in adequate or
effective, or proper, working order.41
A functional explanation, according to Hempel/ 2 displays
the following pattern:
(1) 8 functions adequately in setting of kind c at time t
('2) 8 functions in c only if a certain necessary condition, n,
is satisfied
(3) If trait i were present in 8, then, as an effect, condition n
would be satisfied
(4) Hence at t, trait i is present in 8
Hempel urges that this kind of argument is obviously invalid,
for premise (3) affirms the consequent. The conclusion, proposition (4), could be validly deduced from the three premises
if the third premise stated that only trait i could satisfy condition n. But this is exactly the kind of information to which we
are not privy in most cases. Thus the functional or teleological
pattern gives us no logical grounds for expecting the explanandum event, and, consequently, cannot serve as an explanatory
tool in science.
Perhaps, however, a functional explanation might be construed as an inductive argument" which exhibits the occurrence
of i as highly probable under the circumstances described in the
premises?" "Might it not be possible," muses Hempel/ 3 "to
add to the premises [of the argument] a further statement to
the effect that the functional prerequisite n can be met only
by i and a few specifiable functional alternatives?" (This possibility grounds Nagel's hypothesis of an isomorphism between
41 Ibid., p. 306.
•• Ibid., p. 310.
•• Ibid., pp.

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functional and conditional explanations.) But Hempel rejects
this possibility: for, "in most, if not all, concrete cases it would
be impossible to specify with any precision the range of alternative behavior patterns, institutions, customs, or the like that
would suffice to meet a given functional prerequisite or need.
And even if that range would be characterized, there is no satisfactory method in sight for dividing it into some finite number
of cases and assigning a probability to each of these." 44 Since
a functional pattern of analysis violates both deductive and
inductive requirements for explanations Hempel concludes that
it is not truly a legitimate form of explanation, but at best
serves an heuristic purpose.
Hempel's conclusions concerning the inadequacies of the teleological pattern of explanation would constitute a telling case
against the employment of such putative explanations in science
if his own covering law model, which he uses as a standard for
acceptable explanation, were not liable to the same difficulties.
But I believe it is. If this case can be sustained, then it would
be quite arbitrary of Hempel and those accepting his account
to credit his nomological-deductive and statistical models with
the ability to bear adequate explanations, but to refuse it to
the teleological model.
In his classic characterization of the covering law model,
"Studies in the Logic of Explanation" (1948) / 5 Hempel stipulates four methodological requirements for an adequate explanation in science: (1) the explanandum must be a logical
consequence of the explanans; (2) the explanans must contain
general laws which are actually required for the derivation of
the explanandum; (3) the explanans must be capable of empirical test; and (4) the sentences constituting the explanans
must be true so as to yield a correct explanation. Since his
original statement these requirements have come under close
scrutiny and briefs have been lodged against each as variously
•• Ibid., p. SUI.
45 Originally published in Philosophy of Science, 15 (1948), 135-178, and reprinted
in his Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp.

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requiring too little or too much. In his more recent work 46
Hempel has dealt with these objections, and, most importantly,
has informally enlarged his criteria of adequacy in recognition
of strong claims against the nomological-deductive model. For
our considerations that important broadening of his criteria
consisted in remarking the necessity of offering explanations
against a background of implicit assumptions. 47
To the extent that we are unable to make certain assumptions
about auxiliary hypotheses and antecedent conditions, to that
extent a profferred explanation, according to Hempel, becomes
less adequate:
When ... the relevant conditions or laws remain largely indefinite,
a statement of causal connection is rather in the nature of a program, or of a sketch, for an explanation in terms of causal laws;
it might also be viewed as a " working hypothesis " which may
prove its worth by giving new, and fruitful direction to further
research.48
But for the Hempelian model the question of " relevant conditions" becomes poignant. It is precisely on this question that
Hempel has judged teleological explanations to be logically
inadequate. But what answer must we make when the question
is put to the nomological-deductive model?
The assumption of certain background conditions can only
be made by examining the " relevant " evidence and in light of
that evidence and certain " relevant " theories concluding, for
instance, that no intervening causes were present. But, we may
ask, what is the probability that we have isolated all the relevant conditions? What is the probability of the evidence supporting the application of a particular background theory and
thus the conclusions that theory offers concerning the background conditions? Indeed, what is the probability of the
•• "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp.
881-496.
47 Ibid., pp. 848-849; see also his Philosophy of Natural Science (New Jersey:
Prentice-Hall, 1966), pp. 22-25.
•• "Aspects of Scientific Explanation," in Aspects of Scientific Explanation, pp.
849-850.

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" truth " of that particular theory in respect of the available
scientific data? The information these questions demand is
not the kind of which we are ordinarily apprised. Yet without
satisfactory answers to these questions it seems we should not
accept the nomological-deductive model as logically adequate
for the purposes of scientific explanation. Recall that these are
exactly the arguments constituting Hempel's indictment of the
teleological pattern of explanation. Hence, for him to credit the
nomological-deductive pattern with the ability to bear the
burden of explanation and yet refuse it to the teleological pattern is surely arbitrary.
Not only is Hempel's dismissal of the teleological pattern
arbitrary, but if our Aristotelian analysis is correct, there is a
logical dependence of the nomological-deductive pattern on the
teleological pattern. The construction of an explanation of
efficient causality (i.e., a nomological-deductive explanation)
logically depends on a conceptual characterization of the end
or terminus of the causal process in question. That is, given
the semantic and conceptual constraints of our characterization
due to the background data and theories at our disposal, we
argue teleologically to the antecedent conditions that must
have obtained if the terminus is to have obtained. If we are
unable to argue in this teleological manner for the reasons
Hempel suggests, then we will be unable to construct an
Hempelian kind of explanation; and to the degree the teleological pattern of argument lacks adequacy, to that degree
so also will the nomological-deductive pattern of argument.
Thus, not only is it arbitrary of Hempel to exclude teleological
explanation from scientific discourse, to the extent that his
arguments tell against that type of explanation, to that extent
his own preferred model is rendered unacceptable. It may be,
of course, that Hempel's exclusory arguments are telling unwittingly against both the teleological and nomological-deductive models. While I do not think this is the case, a discussion
of that possibility falls outside the scope of the present examination. The major purpose of this study has been to argue for
the logical adequacy of teleological explanations and for the

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necessity of teleological considerations in the analysis of the
discovery and construction of the type of explanations sanctioned by the Logical Empiricists. In light of my purposes, the
demonstration of arbitrariness is sufficient to preclude the easy
elimination of teleological explanation from scientific discourse
by Hempel and those persuaded of his general view.

III. CoNCLUSION
In Aristotle's analysis of teleology two complementary
aspects of that concept are isolated: the logical-methodological
and the ontic. He contends it is a methodological prerequisite
that we begin our investigation of any phenomenon to be explained with the final conditions; these in tum guide our selection of the proper antecedent material and efficient conditions
of explanation. Without a knowledge of the end of a process
under consideration, the selection and meaning-endowing determination of those antecedent conditions and the formulation
of appropriate laws could never occur. This situation indicates
one way in which teleological considerations are built into the
construction of any explanation in science. But for Aristotle
there is not only this teleological feature to all explanations,
there is also an absolute priority of teleological explanation to
any other kind: for logically we cannot hold that because certain material and efficient conditions obtain, therefore an explanandum event obtains; we cannot hold this because in the
interim between the explanans event and the explanandum
event such as explanation will not be true, and, too, in the interim conditions may intrude to prevent the actual occurrence
of the event. The only assurance we have of an actual connection between a cause and its putative effect is that the effect
has already occurred. Hence, the most basic form of explanation for Aristotle is that wherein the effect necessitates the
efficient conditions.
Though Aristotle's objections to mechanical explanation are
compelling, his argument for the priority of teleological explanation suffers slightly from difficulties analogous to those
of which he complains-i.e., assumption of a connection between

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effect and putative necessary cause. Nevertheless, within the
Aristotelian approach can be found the requisite analesic.
That approach suggests that our analysis of causal relationships takes place within a matrix of more comprehensive
theories and empirical information. From this matrix we can
generate teleological explanations with appropriate scientific
assurance.
The grounds for Aristotle's methodological considerations
are his empirical theories concerning the nature of physical
objects, organic and inorganic. These objects have natures
which are so constituted that they behave in certain ways in
given environmental contexts; what determines the behavior
of these objects and thus their essential character is simply the
complex of interacting natural laws.
l\1ost strains of Logical Empiricism have rejected Aristotle's
logical and ontological views concerning teleology. Nagel,
Braithwaite, and Hempel have argued that, though teleological
explanations appear in the sciences, their explanatory power
is really grounded in explanations of nonteleological import
(Nagel); or that they are at best analogical explanations which
should be replaced in due course (Braithwaite) ; or that because
of their logical defects their value is merely heuristic (Hempel).
In short, the Logical Empiricists plead that teleological explanations are at best temporizing measures and are in principle
replaceable by those employing only explanans of efficient conditionality.
These representative positions have been examined in the
light of the Aristotelian analysis. We have seen that in Nagel's
treatment of the dispensability of teleological concepts he replaces them by concepts which are teleological save only in
name. The investigation of Braithwaite led to the conclusion
that his suggestion of developing conditional explanations to
replace teleological ones must also indicate how we can arrive
ultimately at such explanations in any other way than that
which we employ in arriving at the less reputable kind. Finally,
we tested Hempel's objections to functional or teleological explanation by subjecting his nomological-deductive model to the

SUBSTANTIVE

AND METHODOLOGICAL

TELEOLOGY

733

same criteria and discovered that his model suffers from the
same deficiencies and is remedied in the same manner as the
teleological model.
If teleological considerations are indispensable for scientific
explanations, a way is provided for looking at the lawful activities of natural objects which indicates a reversal of Aristotle's assumption of dependence of methodology on ontology
yet preserves his analysis of methodological teleology. Several
philosophers of science with neo-Kantian inclinations (e.g.,
Wilfred Sellars, 49 Nicholas Rescher 60 ) have recently argued that
our concept of physical bodies and the properties we attribute
to them are dependent not so much on our sheerly empirical
observations and experiments as on the explanatory schema or
theory through which we come to observe and test them. Recher
maintains:
Kant finds the source of lawfulness in the way in which the mind
inherently works. We find its source in the conceptual
that we in fact deploy for explanatory purposes: As we see it, lawfulness demands an imputational step made in the context of a
certain concept of explanation. Both these divergent views agree,
however, in making lawfulness fundamentally mind-dependent. 51

If the laws and lawful properties of things we "find" in
nature are the result of the imputation or projection of explanatory schemata on the natural world and if teleological
explanations and schemata are legitimate and even indispensable, as we have urged, then there seem to be no immediately
obvious objections to the imputation of functional laws. The
neo-Kantian thesis wedded to the Aristotelian analysis suggests our acquiescence in final causality as an ontological and
physical category.
RoBERT

J. RicHARDS

Creighton University
Omaha, Nebraska
•• See especially Sellars' Science and Metaphysics, chapters 3-5.
50 See especially Rescher's "Lawfulness as Mind-Dependent," in Essays in Honor
of Carl G. Hempel, ed. N. Rescher (Dordrecht, the Netherlands: D. Reidel, 1970),
pp. 178-197.
51 Ibid., p. 190.

HEGEL:

THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS
DIALECTIC

S

HORTLY BEFORE he died of cholera in 1831 Hegel
completed a third edition of the Encyclopedia of the
Philosophical Sciences. Since he bestowed on no other
one of his ponderous works comparable care, this one has therefore special authority. It is, moreover, the most comprehensive
single statement of his thought and, of all his strictly theoretical
writings, the one easiest to read and understand.
This relative lucidity of the work was due to the circumstance that Hegel wrote it for the classroom. And although in
that situation he made considerable demands upon his students/
he could not totally disregard their ability to understand and
to react. Responding to these restrictions he had therefore
of necessity to give the Encyclopedia something of the form of
a dialogue. He had to curtail metaphors and speak more directly to the point.
As a consequence of this he left in the work clearer evidence
of how he in the first instance came to posit the dialectic as the
principle of nature and thought, and how, subsequently, he
developed his notion of it. In the Encyclopedia he shows that
it has at least three consistent sources: Aristotle's doctrine of
the N ous; Kant's expose of the antinomies of Pure Reason; and
the Christian doctrine of the Trinity.
By terminating the work with the citation from Aristotle's
Metaphysics, Hegel strikingly acknowledges the first source:
Now thinking in itself is concerned with that which is in itself best,
and thinking in the highest sense with that which is in the highest
sense best. And thought thinks itself through participation in the
1 Hegel's Letter
to Niethammer, cited in Owl of Minerva
p. 1.

734

4 (June, 1971),

HEGEL;

THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS DIALECTIC

735

object of thought; for it becomes an object of thought in the act of
apprehension and thinking, so that thought and the object of
thought are the same, because that which is receptive of the object,
i.e., essence, is thought. And it actually functions when it possesses
this object. Hence it is actuality rather than potentiality that is
held to be the divine possession of rational thought, and its active
contemplation is that which is most pleasant and best. If, then, the
happiness which God always enjoys is as great as that which we
enjoy sometimes, it is marvelous; and if it is greater, this is still more
marvelous. Nevertheless it is so. Moreover, life belongs to God.
For the actuality of thought is life, and God is actuality; and the
essential actuality of God is life most good and eternal. We hold
then that God is a living being, eternal, most good; and therefore
life and a continuous eternal existence belong to God; for that is
what God is.2
By terminating the Encyclopedia with this text Hegel approved it as a resume of what he was trying to say. And by
this approval he professed his essential agreement with Aristotle that everything begins and ends in the self-consciousness
of the supreme Nous. All that is not this Nous, he thereby
implied, is from and for it. The dialectic, which structures such
intermediary things, is therefore a relational and dynamic
structure grounded in absolute self-consciousness, which selfconsciousness is, as Aritotle puts it, the highest thought thinking itself, God living on the loftiest plane.
Hegel came to this conclusion, the Encyclopedia reveals, by
critical reflection upon the implications of Kant's antinomies.
The section in which he describes this reflection is perhaps the
best in the work. Essentially it argues the thesis that Kant
made the most important contribution to the philosophy of
his day by discovering that the use of the categories of judgment to think the transensible necessarily leads to contradictory assertions. But he did not fully understand the significance
of this result. He thought that it served only to demonstrate
the impossibility of metaphysics. But if he had applied it not
only to cosmology but also to the analysis of all representations,
concepts, and ideas whatsoever, he would have realized that it
• Metaphysics xii, 7, 107fl b 18.

736

KEVIN WALL

actually discloses the inner structuring principle of thought and
reality. 8 It reveals, in short, the dialectic which, as lifting contradiction in synthesis, sustains it and thereby sustains all that
lies between N ous as ground and N ous as end. Philosophy is
essentially the knowledge that this is so. For critical reflection,
to know this is to have the supreme insight.
The third source which led Hegel to this same conclusion
was Christian Trinitarian doctrine. 4 In the Encyclopedia the
dialectic can be seen as a filtrate of this too. It is, in other
words, an abstraction from the formal structure of the traditional Christian Trinitarian God. That Hegel should so see it,
is consistent with his grounding of the dialectic in Aristotle's
doctrine of the Nous. For the younger Augustine, this was the
legitimate ground for Trinitarian doctrine on whose basis, he
thought, the N eo-platonists, using natural reason alone, had
discovered the doctrine. Although he later energetically retracted this opinion, nevertheless, he continued to use the
doctrine of the Nous to ground ·a more tentative presentation
of Trinitarian theology. In the Encyclopedia Hegel makes it
clear that he was similarly motivated. The dialectic, which was
for him the essence of philosophical insight, arises out of religious consciousness which reveals its existence and its character. It is therefore a filtrate of Christian religious consciousness. To have this knowledge is to bring concept to religion,
but in this importation religious consciousness has priority
such that without it there is no philosophical consciousness.
In · other words, religious consciousness can exist without
philosophical but philosophical consciousness cannot exist without religious.
Thus to make explicit the structure of the Christian Trinitarian God as this is found in Christian religious consciousness
is to reveal the dialectic which is, in the last analysis, N ous
thinking itself, that is to say, God living his life. And this is
I, A, 48.
• J. F. Findlay, Hegel (London, 1958), pp. 80, 181. Findlay refers to Hegel's

'a ltncyclopedia

" long brooding " on the meaning of Christian faith while he was in Bern and
Frankfort.

HEGEL:

THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS DIALECTIC

787

what, surfacing in the Kantian analysis of Pure Reason, creates
the antinomies.
There are therefore these three sources for the doctrine of
the dialectic, but they are not independent. For Hegel, they
all spring in the final analysis from religious consciousness
which, in its Christian Trinitarian form, alone embraces the
dialectical structure of the Godhead. This being so, what was it
then that Hegel saw in Aristotle's keenly penetrating doctrine
of the Nous? It contained the movements of the dialectic, but
it did not recognize them as such. Aristotle could not, in this
analysis, have known the significance of the movements. A
purely natural theology could not have made this possible for
him. Theoretical thought arising from speculative
ness could not suffice, since it does not contain God as triadic
and therefore does not contain the dialectic in a way which
makes it accessible to critical reflection and reveals it as the
root structuring principle of all being and thought. Thus theoretical insight will not of itself rise to philosophical consciousness understood properly as ultimate insight, namely, as insight
into the ultimate nature and function of the dialectic. This is
contained in an accessible way only in the worship attitude of
Christian religious consciousness. Philosophical consciousness,
reflecting on this, explicates its structure, thereby bringing the
concept to conceptless religious piety and revealing the dialectic.
Recollecting the long line of theologians who have speculated on Christian Trinitarian doctrine, one sees that Hegel
followed a similar path. He too saw Christian piety as both
the fundamental consciousness and as fides quaerens intellectum, a worship attitude ordered intrinsically to the quest of
understanding.
The truth contained in conceptless piety could be seized upon
in knowledge of the dialectic. This truth, so grasped, made it
possible for Hegel to understand why Kant, when he analyzed
pure reason, discovered antinomies. It showed him also why
Kant's purely theoretical discussion of these, divorced from
their grounding in religious consciousness, could not reveal
their true significance. When Hegel then iutrodqced religious

788

KEVIN WALL

consciousness to discover this true significance, he could then
understand what Kant was really about and, by the same token,
the meaning of all contents of thought and manifestations of
nature.
His conviction that Aristotle had at least a glimmering of
this understanding was undoubtedly the basis for Hegel's deep
respect for the Stagirite. 5 This was the conviction which
prompted him to terminate the Encyclopedia by citing the famous text on the Nous from the Metaphymcs. In it he saw the
key to the dialectic.
The fact that Aristotle should have had this key without
grounding it in Christian consciousness was not, from Hegel's
point of view, an inconsistency. The non-Christian religious
consciousness was for him simply an imperfect Christian one,
containing therefore in potentiality what the latter has in act.
Aristotle, by the acuteness of his mind, was able to transcend
this limitation and dimly perceive the truth. Such is the implication of the citing of the M etaphymcs text.
On the basis of these considerations Hegel is therefore able,
as he sees it, to conciliate speculative reason and religious
consciousness. He does this by making philosophical insight
ultimately depend upon religious piety. At the same time he
thinks that he does justice to philosophy when he concedes it
what he does not concede to religious consciousness, namely,
insight. 6
The purpose of philosophical consciousness thus becomes by
this the conceptualizing of religious consciousness. In achieving this end, it guarantees that religion will survive. In Hegel's
opinion conceptless piety alone cannot guarantee this. Of its
very nature it seeks, as faith, understanding and, if it cannot
find this, perishes.
While obviating this possibility by bringing the concept to
piety, philosophical consciousness itself comes into being, that
is to say, it emerges as the actualization of a capacity of re5 Logik I, ft, I, A.
• Encyclopedia, Preface to flud ed., p. 15.

HEGEL:

THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS DIALECTIC

739

ligious consciousness. Religious consciousness, or piety, remains therefore always immanent in it. For Hegel this is the
insight which provides the key to the understanding o£ all
thought and reality. For all understanding whatsoever, then,
religious consciousness is the ground.
The depth and power o£ this conviction in Hegel's mind is
indicated by what he has to say in the foreword to the third
edition of the Encyclopedia. In this statement, made so shortly
before his death, he angrily rejects the charge that he has in
£act destroyed religion and Christianity by making man to be
God. 7 He finds the charge outrageous. It could only be made
by one who pretends to have the power to judge in the name o£
Christ what constitutes true Christianity and who is a true
Christian. Hegel will allow no one to make that claim and
judge him. And i£ anyone should attempt to do so, he would
not accept his judgment, nor would he, on its basis, or any other
basis, divorce himself £rom Christian tradition or £rom Protestant piety. By his philosophy he wants only to introduce
science into both. This, in his opinion, is necessary £or their
survival. At least in intention i£ not in execution, this late
statement shows that he had, in his own judgment, made the
Christian religious consciousness his point o£ departure o£ all
o£ his philosophical life.
Other serious thinkers have agreed that this is so. Kierkegaard thought that Hegel was in £act trying to philosophize
on the basis o£ the Christian religious consciousness, although
he came to the conclusion that Hegel misrepresented this
consciousness and, because o£ this, constructed a false philosophy. For Kierkegaard, however, even a true evaluation o£
Christian consciousness could not ground the construction o£
a rational, systematic philosophy, such as Hegel's was, which
would be true to being. Reason even in this circumstance could
always grope £or insight, but it could never terminally attain it.
Its insight would therefore never truly transcend religious
consciousness as Hegel proposed.
7

Encyclopiidie, Preface to 3rd ed., p. 23.

740

KEVIN WALL

Nietzsche held the same opinion. For him Hegel proved that
German philosophy was really theology in disguise.8 In his
opinion, this was what had ruined it. He did not, however,
agree with Kierkegaard that Hegel had falsified the Christian
consciousness and that this falsification corrupted his philosophy. Quite on the contrary for Nietzsche Hegel's picture of
Christian consciousness was accurate. The inadequacy of
Hegelian philosophy lay not in this but in the defectiveness of
Christian consciousness itself. A philosophy grounded on it
could not be valid. It would of necessity canonize the imperfect will of the mediocre mass man. It would exalt the moral
standards of the weak. It would not reflect the will and the
morality of the excellent man. The very rationality of Hegelian
philosophy, essentially a negation of will, was a sign of this as
well as its effect. In this harsh judgment, if Nietzsche does
nothing else, at least he agrees with Hegel that the latter's
philosophy arose from his theology.
That is why, in Henrici's opinion and that of many other
Hegelian scholars, if not all, theologians instinctively turn to
Hegel more than to any other modern or contemporary philosopher when they want to enrich their theological thought with
philosophical concepts. 9 They find in him not simply tools for
theological discourse, such as they find in every other philosopher too, but a theology from which the tools naturally arisea theology, therefore, which not only explains but also creates
them.
This may be what theologians are now beginning to realize.
And their consequent use of Hegelian terminology and conceptualizations to state their points of view make them inevitably
feel that Hegel's thought is again theologically relevant. At the
very least they have become aware that they cannot do what
they want to do theologically without employing this thought.
That itself may have something to say about its relevance.
Section 10.
Peter Henrici, S. J., "Hegel und die Theologie," Gregorianum 48, 4 (1967),
706.
8 Anti-Christ,
9

HEGEL:

THE THEOLOGICAL ROOTS OF HIS DIALECTIC

741

But there are indications that this practical approach to
Hegel's accomplishment is not the only one involved. The socalled "theologians" of hope use more than Hegel's formal
philosophical tools. In part, at least, they agree with the spirit
of his approach, and they can point to no other modern philosopher with whose spirit they can similarly agree. In their eschatologies and in their attempts by these to transcend scientific
consciousness, they too ground philosophy, such as they present
or imply it, in religious consciousness. True, this is not so much
the consciousness of the Christian assenting to the Trinitarian
God as that of the Christian assenting to the Kingdom of God
to come. But as this message is presented in the gospel of
Christ, it implies and involves the Triune God. Its Christology,
to this extent, is intimately connected with its Trinitarianism.
What they are finding in this is again the uniqueness of
Hegel among modern philosophers. In a non-theological period
such as the present, this uniqueness is what makes him so difficult to understand. He simply does not fit into the categories
by which the present makes itself intelligible to itself. As
Fackenheim justly puts it, when one confronts him one confronts, as in no other modern philosopher, not only the modern
period but also the medieval and the ancient. 10 One cannot
therefore, simply by seeing him in relation to the Kantian
critique, understand him adequately. One must see him also in
relation to the scholastics and to the ancient Greeks. The fact
that he should terminate the Encyclopedia with the quotation
from Aristotle is indicative of this. No other modern thinker
could meaningfully have done the same.
Hegel could do this because he saw in Aristotle's text a core
doctrine which in the hands of the Neo-platonists provided a
philosophical basis for the Christian theology of the Trinity.
For Hegel, this was a theological insight of prime importance.
To him it seemed to show that religious consciousness can and
must give rise to philosophy which, in its highest realization, is
the consciousness that the dialectic is the structuring principle
of thought and reality.
10

The Religi®s Dimension in Hegel,s Thought (1967), Preface, xii.

742

KEVIN WALL

No wonder that he took the theological criticism of his work
so seriously and, in the Encyclopedia, devoted so much space
to a reply. His attitude in this was entirely different from
Kant's, for whom theology was peripheral. This is why it is
imperative for one who would sound the meaning of the dialectic to probe into Hegel's theological convictions and specifically
his understanding of the traditional doctrine of the Trinity.
This is why, in the present upsurge of theologies of hope, Hegel,
in his theological roots, again begins to surface.
KEVIN WALL,

Graduate Theological Union
Berkeley, California

0. P.

SUBJECT ANALYSIS IN THE PHILOSOPHY
COMMUNICATIONS

OF

L

T "SUBJECT ANALYSIS" stand for any complexity

of probes aimed at understanding the subjects that men
sub-ject to predication. Subject analysis is distinguished, therefore, from the attention that we focus on predicates, upon what is said of subjects. Subject analysis looks
principally to the beings grasped in subjects and only functionally to meaning expressed in predicates. Let " saying " or
" talking " mean not only communication in the language of
words but communication in the broadest sweep of its complexity, even the communication that a man carries on with
himself.l Subject analysis presupposes a certain epistemology
of judgment, i.e., the subject component, whatever it is that we
are " talking about," is grasped in sensorial perception and,
more often than not, is symbolized as opposed to predicated
meaning; the predicate is an intelligible formality or " aspect "
under which the subject is understood here and now in this act
of judgment. Given that the subjects about which we talk.
which engage our attention, very often form symbolic patterns
which reveal diverse ways of being and styles of life, the use
of subject analysis is valuable for whatever light it might throw
on men themselves and on their cultures. Subject
finds its constitutional charter to philosophical existence in
Socrates's" Know Thyself."
When the same subjects are reiterated in constantly repeated
symbolic structures we encounter the iconic. Let " icon " stand
for form in the sense of Gestalt or structure constituted by a
tissue of images, often metaphors, that are repeated without
1 Walter J. Ong, "Communications
Currents (Fall, 1969), pp. 462-480.

Media and the State of Theology," Cross

748

744

FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

perspective and hence without conscious irony. What Susan
Sontag says about poster art is an admirable instance of a
species illustrating the genus of the iconic: " Posters have come
to be regarded as mysterious cultural objects, whose flatness
and literalness only deepen their resonance, as well as ... rich
emblems of society." 2 The iconic, due to its flat literalness, is
repeatable because any one of its elements is interchangeable
with any other. This recalls Aristotle's insistence that metaphor
obey the structure of any proportion, "a transference being
from either genus to species, or from species to genus, or on
grounds of analogy." 3 Irony, on the contrary, always involves
the critical interjection of a fresh consideration, a perspective.
All subject analysis partakes of the ironic.
It is by no means perverse that Arthur Koestler's study of
creativity commences with an analysis of humour as paradigmatic of the novelty marking all creative thinking. The iconic,
however, eschews novelty, and its very flatness and lack of
perspective permits the anticipation of the iconic act. This
familiarity, to return to Susan Sontag's observations on poster
art, indicates that we are confronting an art form which " is
usually parasitic on other forms of art-on the world itself, or
a highly stylized image of it." 4 The American cowboy, our
icon, acts in a predictable way or the genre is offended. 5 The
iconic, as understood in this essay, must not be narrowed to
staged and stylized theater. Iconography embraces every playing dimension of life in Huizinga's sense of the term. 6 A classical
" Saturday night on the town " with the boys is an iconic gesture in that it involves a series of repeated and anticipated
acts whose specific content will often vary but whose formal
structure is rigidly predictable. The issue is well illustrated by
games: the content of chess or baseball, for example, always
2 Dugald Stermer, Introductory
Essay by Susan Sontag, The Art of Revolution,
Castro's Cuba 1959-1970 (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1970), p. xx.
• Aristotle, Poetics, p. 21, 1457b-1458a.
• Stermer/Santag, op. cit., p. xx.
• Jane Bret, and Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, The War In Man: Media and
Machines (Athens, Ga.: University of Georgia Press, 1970), pp.
0 Johan Huizinga, Homo Ludens (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1955).

THE PHILOSOPHY OF COMMUNICATIONS

745

changes but the rules remain the same, and it is the game, not
its content, that is played. Repeatability and predictability are
the rule. The novel monkey wrench of humour spoils the sport.
The iconic, therefore, mixes the univocal and the analogical
(in the Thomistic understanding of these terms). An iconic
structure is univocal in that it is repeatable and hence predictable; it possesses a model or paradigmatic structure. This is
true even when the icon is a man. J. Edgar Hoover," the closest
thing to a national icon " we possessed in America according to
Life, had a consistent image and the nation expected him to
behave according to a fixed pattern. 7 But the internal structuring of the iconic Gestalt is thoroughly analogical. Icons are
not understood by tracing " rational connections " between
clear and distinct Cartesian ideas but by an insight in depth
of likenesses within unlikenesses. There is no reduction of the
grey flannel suit associated with the popular image of an F.B.I.
agent, the close cropped hair, the attache case, the submachine
gun, the American flag, etc., to any generic or specific intelligibility. The unity between these images is analogical. This is
a Gestalt fashioned by a set of proportions that reflect one another analogically. Univocal predictability ad extra linked
with analogical diversity ab intra are marks of all icons.
The icon is shattered only when a fresh consideration invades
the structure and renders it a subject illuminated by a new
predicate. Irony always is the interjection of a" point of view"
or a perspective from beyond the cluster of imagery forming
the icon. A man who can laugh at himself is literally " on top
of his icons." This univocal invasion of the quasi-sacral, often
fully sacral, character of the icon is the mark of the iconoclast,
the breaker of images. The iconic must be lived with deadly
seriousness, especially when it is comic, e.g., laughing at a professor's jokes or the humour of an after-dinner speaker. Tacitus'
"Capax imperii nisi imperasset" is classically iconoclastic in
that it consists of a judgment in depth looking to a failure of
proportion within a given proportion: i.e .., imperial rule stands
7

Tom Wicker, "G-Man Under Fire," Life, Vol. 70, N. 13, April, 1971, p. 55.

746

FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

to the emperor as does the emperor stand to that rule. Thanks
to the introduction of the univocal " capax," the proportion is
turned on its head without any alteration of the poles: he would
have made a marvelous emperor had he not been one! This
type of ironic perspective is forbidden the fully iconic structure.
Authors Kinser and Kleinman of The Dream That Was No
More a Dream subject the German historical experience from
Wilhelm IT to Gotterdammerung under Hitler to a searching
analysis which illustrates our understanding of the iconic.8
Germany, according to the thesis of the book, emerged as a
nation annealed into unity by Bismark which then found itself
constrained to actualize historically its own mythic or lived
understanding of its corporate existence. Granting the ambiguity of the term " myth," Kinser and Kleinman distinguish
between myth as the non-rational ground which produces a
conscious and rational structure of meaning and myth as the
very structure thus produced. The stunning success of the book
makes an admirable introduction to the theme of this study:
the elucidation of icons through an analysis of the subjects
making them up. The work in question details a number of
typical self-representations of the German experience in the late
nineteenth and twentieth century: the stab in the back of the
German Hero of the Wagnerian Ring of the Niebelung; the
exaltation of vigorous male childhood; the Knight in Armor,
der alte deutsche Michel; the castle on the Rhine; the betrayal
of the grandfather by the son and the mystic bonds uniting
betrayed old age with the promised vengeance by youth; The
Watch on the Rhine; the Enemy from the East; and, again, the
feudal castle; containment; heroic defence frustrated by treason
from within.
Without elucidating the thesis of the authors, let it be noted
nonetheless that the conceptual articulation of the German
Dream destroys the myth. The Knight in Armor is illustrative
of this truth. He is always without family. He is never por8 Bill Kinser, and Neil Kleinman, The Dream That Was No More a Dream:
A Search For Aesthetic Reality in Germany, 1890-1945 (New York, Evanston, ood
Books, Harper and Row, 1969).

THE PHILOSOPHY

OF COMMUNICATIONS

747

trayed as a father. Usually he is quite young or quite old.
Rationally, of course, there is no intelligible " connection " or
" link " between a Knight in Armor and the single state of life.
The disappearance of the father before the militant child and
the militant grandfather is mythic. Conceptually we can
ideate a Knight in Armor who is neither all that old nor all that
young and who is also the father of a family. Symbolically,
however, the father stands for the generation that betrays the
nation: the future (warrior child) embraces the past (warrior
grandfather) by repudiating the evil present. The symbolic
imagery at play cannot be grasped by the analytic articulation
of com-possible Leibnizian predicates with subjects. The authors of The Dream That Was No More a Dream suggest that
the German tragedy consisted of a massive national will to
convert the myth into historical reality, a tragedy compounded
by irony in that Germany's own past had produced the myth.
It would seem to follow that there is something in the structure of the icon that is consubstantial with man's encounter
with being, something mythic which is part and parcel with
reality but which is hostile to historic existence, to time. We
suggest that this constant dimension in man's psychic life is
rooted in the intentionality of knowledge, both sensorial and
intellectual. The mythic belongs more properly to simple understanding and the historic to judgment. The terms are used
in their strict Thomistic sense. The mind, bathed in the sensibility, is capable of halting the projector of being and of freezing the dynamism of the real, thereby producing a still life or
a slide of the cosmic motion of the universe. 9 The mind knows
• " When the essence or common nature is shared by several supposits, it has
to be participated according to other and other being. Because it has different
being in every case, it is divided as often as it is participated. The difference or
otherness of being in every instance becomes the reason for the division of the
common essence among different supposits. Essence is regarded as the principle of
unity, being is viewed as the principle of otherness or division. The unifying
principle, essence, and the diversifying principle, being, are known through two
different intellectual operations. What is (ens) is grasped in the manner of a
picture (imaginatio intellectug). As such it may well be complex in the way of
a still life painting that consists of different and related elements; but it is not

748

FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

a complexity which was grasped initially in judgment as complex, but the mind knows this complexity as though it were
"incomplex " or " simple." This grasping of a complexity
through a simple gaze or " look " stiffens reality into a Gestalt.
This both mythologizes history and halts time. In motion and
time, of course, no being is already constituted as a completed
given or datum; all things, rather, are now " being-constituted "
through an active synthesizing and unifying of a kaleidoscope
of principles which are and are as they are in dynamic fluidity
and concrete individuality. 10 This "togethering" or "heaping
together " of the principles of the real is esse's function as an
active composing which follows on esse as absolute act. 11 If
the act of existing had already completed its job of composition,
being in the active sense would now be done and over with.
Being would be a past. " To be " would then entail " not to
be." This ultimate contradiction would render reality nonsense.12 The real is never " already done " unless we reduce the
real to biography. It follows that reality as grasped in judgment is always open to the future and hence to novelty and
complex in the sense of exercising
engagement or variation in motion and
time. It is regarded as though it were something steadily looked at, fixed in
itself before the mind's eye as somehow a still and permanent unit." Joseph Owens,
"Diversity and Community of Being in St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies,
22 (1960), pp. 288-4. Owens' description of a "common essence" differentiated
in several units through its reception in diverse acts of existing is the epistemological spine, we are convinced, of all iconic structures.
10 " unumquodque
secundum idem habet esse et individuationem," Q. de Ani'I7W,
q. 1, a. 1 ad 2; ed. Calcaterra-centi, IT, 284a.
11 " Ideo autem dicit quod hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia
non earn principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod
cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute; nam EST, simpliciter dictum,
significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi. Quia vero actualitas,
quam principaliter significat hoc verbum EST, est communiter actualitas omnis
formae, vel actus subst81Iltialis vel accidentalis, inde est quod volumus significare
quamcumque formam vel actum actualiter inesse alieni subiecto, significamus illud
per hoc verbum EST, vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem
secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et
ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem." In Libros Peri
Her?7Wneias, L. V. n. 22.
10 Cf. Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, The Paradoxical Structure of Existence (Irving,
Texas: The University of Dallas Press), pp. 75-77.

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surprise. This teaching is consubstantial with Aquinas's insistence that the very touchstone of all knowledge is our sensorial marriage to a fleeting and moving and surprisingly novel
creation. Nonetheless, we are capable of understanding the
"being-now-composed" as an "already-there-composed." The
principles of the real-in this state of existence and when known
to be in this state of existence-take on the timelessness and
universality of intentional being. When distended into analytic
differentiation, nature so understood yields science in the older
Aristotelian meaning of the term. When suspended within the
sensorial imagery in which reality is first grasped, the " simple
understanding" of things is converted into the mythic and the
iconic. The Gestalt is precisely this kind of suspension of time
and motion. The fleetingness of life is halted. The agony of
personal decision in an unrepeatable moment of crisis is tempered. The repetition of theater is experienced as being more
real than history itself. The permanent is known and the bitterness of the inexorable failure of all being subject to time is
softened. To fashion icons is human. To adore them, presumably, is blasphemy.
Let us call myth the here and now unconscious backdrop to
rational discourse/ 3 Let us restrict the term " icon " to a moreor-less rational (hence more-or-less non-rational) Gestalt or
formal structure. The mythic produces iconic structures such
as conventional ways of greeting people, ceremonial acts, ritual,
and " parasitic " art forms aimed at convincing, motivating,
and comforting. Iconic structures can be penetrated critically,
but one does so by running the risk of alienation, of emptying
the psyche of everything salve the purely temporal and historical. Paul Ricoeur suggests that the critical penetration
of the myth, demythologization, can be followed by a reentrance into the mythic which permits us to " hear " again what
we have now" interpreted." 14 Reminiscent of Vico's "spiral"
18 Walter Ong, S. J., "Myth and the Cabalas," The Modern Schoolman, XXVII,
March, 1950; Frederick D. Wilhelmsen, "The Philosopher and the Myth," The
Paradoxical Structure of Existence (University of Dallas Press, 1970), pp. 157-175.
14 Paul Ricoeur, Symbolism of Evil, trans. Emerson Buchooan (Boston, 1969),
pp. 450-1.

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

theory of history in which one age takes to itself as ideals activities and stances which were once social and economic necessities, Ricoeur's hermeneutic tactic still leaves a certain ambiguity between rationality and non-rationality. The tension
is only thoroughly destroyed when " playing the myth," but
knowing that we are playing is reconverted into "being the
myth": i.e., secularized and thoroughly westernized Japanese
kamikaze pilots in World War II coming finally to truly believe
in the divinity of the Emperor; Dr. Joseph Goebbel's ultimate
acceptance of his own sorcerer's den of lies as the truth, a warning to all men who would use myths rather than be used by
them. 15
By symbol we mean the participation of reality in a meaning
which both englobes and transcends its carrier. 16 The mythological roots of all icons proliferate in symbolization, but not
all symbols are iconic. The icon, as suggested by its origin in
the Greek " eikon," image, must lack perspective, and therefore
it must lack any consciously articulated or experienced tension.
Icon is both cliche and archetype. 17 Both the splendid Virgin
of Guadalupe and the plastic Madonnas of the style of Saint
Sulpice are iconic; they resemble (verb "eiko ") each other.
The same is true of the classically Byzantine Christus Pantokrator. Iconic art is expectation, repeatability, timelessness.
A new icon can be created, but once created the symbolization
forming its structure invites repetition.
This comforting timelessness is not typical of artistic creativity as such. Genuine poetic tension, involving-as shall be
indicated, the introduction of novelty-destroys the iconic.
The poetic symbol (in this context) involves the use of disconnected relationships, patterns, which mirror one another aes15 Willi Boelcke, The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels: The Nazi Propaganda
War 1939-1943, translated by Ewald Osers (New York: E. P. Dutton and Co.,
1970). The subtle transformation from the use of propaganda to the being used
by propaganda is evident in this work which sees Goebbels passing from victory
to defeat.
16 Our use of the term " symbol " corresponds roughly to that of Paul Tillich,
cf., Systematic Theology, Vol. II, pp. 48-49.
17 Cliche as point of departure
and archetype as culmination.

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thetically through what logically would be contradiction. The
art of Robert Louis Stevenson is an admirable instance of noniconic tension. In The Master of Ballantrae the Devil is a gentleman but he is none the less very much the Devil. Logically,
to be the Devil is one thing and to be a gentleman is something
else indeed. But within the texture of the novel both meanings
are fused, not by being mixed together but by permitting the
one to refract and thus deepen the other. The analogy is not
strictly speaking an analogy between meanings. " Meanings "
ultimately are univocal and are only used analogically. The
analogy in the novel in question is a proportional relationship
within an existent bearing a diversity of meanings held in tension. Stevenson's Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde is a double analogical triumph because the outside excitement belongs to the
world of Conan Doyle and the inside to that of Henry James. 18
Cleanth Brooks, in a now celebrated essay that has become
a minor classic in criticism, " The Language of Paradox," defined tension in terms of paradox. 19 Following Eliot, Brooks
insisted that paradox was " that perpetual slight alteration of
language, words perpetually juxtaposed in new and sudden
combinations. . . . The tendency of science is necessarily to
stabilize terms, to freeze them into strict denotations; the poet's
tendency is by contrast disruptive. The terms are continually
modifying each other, and thus violating their dictionary meanings." 20 Allan Tate maintains that good poetry " is a unity of
all the meanings from the furthest extremes of intension and
extension." 21 A kind of " synthetic accretion " permits the poet
to fuse literal " extension " and " intension," an intensity of
meaning that moves inwards. 22 This recalls Hopkins' "inscape."
The active synthesizing (Aquinas would have called this,
18 Gilbert Keith Chesterton,
The Victorian Age in Literature (London: The
Home University Library of Modem Knowledge, 1932), pp. 243-49.
19 Cleanth Brooks, " The Language of Paradox," Critiques and Essays in Criticism, 1920-191,8, selected by Robert Wooster Stallman (New York: The Ronald
Press Co., 1949), pp. 60-79.
20 Ibid., p. 70.
01 Allan Tate, " Tension in Poetry," ibid., p. 59.
•• Ibid., p. 60.

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

" active composing " or " togethering ") of all these meanings
in poetic imagery is tension. Marshall McLuhan aptly named
this "the analogical mirror." 23 Every symbolic image within
the poem mirrors every other image, not by " resembling "
anything but simply by being intensely itself. Poetic tension
is proper proportionality in the Cajetanian sense of the formula.24
The above-mentioned critics have explored mimesis in action.
Their conclusions are proper to literary criticism but their
epistemological structure presupposes the theory of judgment
as articulated by St. Thomas Aquinas. Very briefly, the principles at play can be rehearsed in a number of basic and wellknown propositions. " To know is to be the other " and not
to sketch or form an image or idea of the other. 25 In knowing,
both sensorially and intellectually, everything that there might
be of activity is the knower's and everything there might be of
structure is of the thing known. Quidquid recipitur recipitur ad
modum recipientis. When I know the real I play-do, exercise,
perform-that reality according to my own mode of being. If
an American watches a Chinese play, the play is converted into
American theater. ·we put on the world according to the measure of our own personalities. Mimesis in knowledge is an analogical interfacing in action of knowing and known. The principle of knowing, in turn, is reality itself acting on man's knowing powers where the real produces, through specification, the
sensible and intelligible species. This determination is the act
of knowing's formal content, given that the determination is
actively the knower's; it belongs to him: "to know" is "to be
the other as other." In judgment-the understanding of the
complex as complex, as indicated-the determination is the
predicate, full conscious " meaning," Tate's "extension," the
dictionary" denotation," rationality in full act. This rationality
23 Marshall
McLuhan, The Interior Landscape, selected and edited by Eugene
McNamara, (New York, Toronto: McGraw-Hill, 1969), esp. "The Analogical
Mirrors," pp. 63-74.
"'Thomas de Vio Caietanus, De Nominum Analogia, ed. by P. N. Zammit, O.P.
(:Romae: apud lnstitutum Angclicum, 1932) .
25 Cf. my Man's Knowledge of Reality (Prentice-Hall,
1956), esp. pp. 50·75.

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plays over and is applied to a subject of being which, in judgment, is grasped as a moving and individuated (imaged, perceived) reality in time, concreted in matter, the intentional
reiteration of the real in phantasm or percept. The subject is
known by its being reiterated or mimetically done in the interplay of the diverse sense powers which are bathed fully in the
emotional and volitional life of man. The symbolic interplay
of pre-conscious meanings and affectivities clustering around
the subject of judgment, absorbed into the psyche through the
alchemy of imagination and memory, constitute the dimensions
of connotativity and intension wrapped thoroughly in the intentional being of reality thus lived on the level of cognition. The
two orders-consciously intended or predicated meaning and
the symbolic meanings carried by the subject-when set in
tension, when constituting a paradox, together form an analogical whole. This whole, when paradoxical, possesses an
ironic depth which is poetic but poetic in a non-iconic fashion.
When this tension of meanings is understood, thanks to their
having been synthesized in the intentional being exercised by
predicate in subject, the full import of poetic symbolism
emerges. Paradox and tension, to say nothing of irony and
humor, are constituted by this logical disparity of extension
and intension. Rationality and symbolic resonance form the
paradox of poetic language. Mimesis is often mockery. Antonyms become synonyms.
This tension, we have maintained, shatters the iconic. The
issue can be illustrated in a myriad number of instances. Here
we choose a marching song sung during the Spanish Civil War
by the Carlist requetes: "iViva Dios que nunca muerel ":
" Long live God who never dies
And if He dies, He rises
Long live the woman who has
A love affair with a Carlist." 26
•• " Viva Dios que nunca muere
Y si muere, resucita
Viva la mujer que tiene
Amores con un carlista." (anon.)

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

The extreme of all paradoxes, Christ's conquering of death in
Resurrection through dying, is formed out of the twin paradox
of an Eternal God who dies and of anybody who rises from
the dead: two logical impossibilities; two contradictions in
terms. This double intensity is then contrasted and relieved
by the soldier's praising the woman who will have a love affair
with him or his companions in arms. The iconic Risen Lord of
the classical Byzantine tradition, the Pantocrator of Ravenna,
when brought into tension with the iconic crucified Christ of
the Latin West form a paradox which shatters the iconic structure of both. Eternal Lordship of the Universe-saluted by the
" iviva! "-is logically incompatible with divine death. Death
is equally incompatible with life. The theological paradoxes
are so intensely baroque that they can be relieved only by another paradox, ironic and humourous in nature. The Carlist
soldier is a soldier for Christ, but he is very much a man. By
confessing cheerfully his predilection for the arms of a woman,
he refuses to take himself too seriously no matter how seriously
he does take his cause. He winks at his own dedication, and
this wink achieves distance, perspective, a stance. No such
distance or stance is permitted the participant in Leni Riefenstahl's magnificent propaganda film of the Nazi Nuremberg
Party Convention in 1934, Triumph of the Will. No external
critical perspective was permitted; participation was total and
with that totality went the death of all paradox and irony.
Whatever tensions did exist in the film (e.g., the medieval city
next to the ultra-modern weaponry of the German army) were
thoroughly intrinsic. Their intrinsic resonances invited an absolute identity that blocked not only humour and irony but
criticism as well. Triumph of the Will is the cinema's greatest
iconic achievement thus far in history.
The" iViva Dios que nunca muere!" contrasts sharply with
the elegaic German barracks song often sung at military
funerals, "Ich hat ein Kamerad." A simple soldier mourns the
death of a fallen comrade. The situation is perennial to all
war. The emotion is expected. When played by a military
band the dirge is stately, monotonous, comforting. Without

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irony or paradox, bereft of surprises or tricks of any kind, the
German song recalls the brilliant and overwhelming flatness of
Cuban revolutionary poster art. Although the former is reflective and mournful whereas the latter aims at " ideological
mobilization," 27 both share the iconic because both are repeatable and undisturbed by external perspective. The iconic, to
recall Susan Sontag's description, is "parasitic" in that it borrows forms already invented. They can be projected forwards
in time and can be extended quantitatively in space. In this
sense of the term older artistic media become the content of
newer media, e.g., the novel of the motion picture; the motion
picture of the television; the road of the radar screen. The
master of the media knows what to expect because he has seen
the genre at work before. What once may have been fresh with
novelty and creativity has now hardened-the term is not used
with disapproval-into the iconic structure.
The hermeneutics of iconography is subject analysis. Subject
analysis was defined provisionally at the beginning of this study
as the rational penetration of subjects of which meanings are
predicated. It involves the conversion of subjects into predicates in order to understand what is " being done " within the
iconic act or structure. Speech is the paradigm of subject analysis. Predicate analysis, on the contrary, is conscious insight
into fully conscious rationality. It is an "after the fact" situation. The performance is roughly equivalent to what Bernard
Lonergan means by an insight into an insight. 28 The mark of
successful insight by one man into the insight of another man
is the former's capacity to think through the conclusion of the
second man by resolving the reasoning back to its premises.
Checking out the evidence, following upon an understanding
of understanding, issues into communication between two or
more men. Communication does not necessarily involve agreement because communication in meaning leaves untouched
the question of affirmation or negation, judgment. In fact
genuine disagreement on the level of judgment demands previ27
28

Sontag, op. cit., xii.
Bernard Lonergan, Insight (New York:

Philosophical Library, 1957).

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

ous communication in meaning. Meaning is not being any
more than essence is identically existence. Were it otherwise,
false judgments would be meaningless, and a man in error
would not know literally what he was talking about.
The subject analysis of speech does not proceed in this
fashion. Here the probing act does not seek a univocal communicated meaning predicated of subjects nor does it search
out the identity of a major and minor through their identity
in a middle term. Subject analysis seeks a pattern not precisely
" between " subjects but " in" subjects which form a structure
or a situation. This pattern is not comparable to mathematical
proportions which are always orchestrated by a generic proportion. Casual conversation as a social art is an instance in
question which is highly illustrative of subject analysis; speech
is crucial in all communication because it is the highest species
within the genus.
There is only one constant in free owing conversations: i.e.,
that there be none. " Changing the subject," often maliciously
restricted by men to women, is the rule. But subjects are not
changed according to set rules-so much time for this subject
and so much for the next as in the iconic structure of a committee meeting. In casual or social conversation the spoken
word designating a predicate given a subject by one conversational participant suggests another subject to a second participant. In this fashion the conversation proceeds, not in linear
sequence, but by skipping from one issue to another. These
" topics " are not linked analytically or logically but are scattered into random discontinuity. Every meaning is simultaneously present in free spoken discourse because, as McLuhan
insists, the auditory field is simultaneous. 29 Continuity in time
in the life of an:y sane man permits this compactness of meanings signifying through one or more spoken words to be distended in use " backwards " or " forwards " towards new or
old subjects of conversation. Knowing what magic words will
29

Marshall McLuhan,

The Guttenberg Galaxy (University of Toronto Press,

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757

trigger off a bore on his favorite hobby horse permits a skillful
conversationalist to steer a conversation into safe waters. The
trick of subject analysis consists in judging accurately analogical
proportions between subjects. Metaphysically, everything, of
course, is proportionately like everything else. This truth is
the extramental root of casual conversation as of other iconic
structures, but it is not of much help in determining why any
given random set of subjects forms the unity of any given conversation. We must appeal to the cognitive power of the symbolic image or phantasm, including, as it does, the spoken
word, to concentrate within itself a host of meanings simultaneously entertained, any one of which can designate a subject
and prompt a predicate, which subject, in turn, can suggest
another predicate; or, more commonly, which predicate can
shift attention to another formally unrelated subject. These
symbolic structures reflect a life and a history, affectivities and
decisions, interests and fears. 30 They form icons whose ultimate content (in conversation) is not any sequential link between subjects through univocal predicates but the user of
these subjects. 31 The catalyst here is Eliot's "logic of the
imagination" which implies an historical continuity. Where the
history of a man is shattered by neurosis or psychosis the discontinuity between subjects is accentuated, and it takes professional skill to discover the causes at work. In normal situations the causes of subject-Gestalt are more readily discernable.
Anti-pornography zealots are as obsessed by sex as are atheists
by God. The subjects people " think about," talk about, reveal
who these people are and where their priorities are located. The
analysis of subject-preoccupation is a far better tip-off to what
a man or a society is than are articulated ideologies or even
reasoned doctrines. An in-depth insight into a man (or a culture) is not revealed through his predicates which very often
designate priorities and commitments only "notionally " enter3 ° Cf. my Man's Knowledge of Reality, "Judgment:
Its Structure and Meaning,"
pp. 101-121.
31 The suggestion that the user of any medium is its content was made to the
author by Dr. Marshall McLuhan in private correspondence.

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

tained (to use Newman's language). Human iconic structures
are revealed, therefore, by subjecting subjects to submarine
analysis. Discover what a man talks about and note well how
he brings up the subjects he talks about and in what formed
pattern, if any. Conversation is not only a good instance of
iconography as a social form but it illuminates the human
icons who participate therein. This type of formed pattern,
spontaneous and uncontrolled from without, is far more revelatory of personality and character than are the more mechanical
and electronic devices in use generally today.
Speech is but a supreme instance of the iconic which is the
warp and woof of culture. Hitherto little attention has been
given by philosophers to the iconic as such. Although it is difficult to document this contention in any satisfactory fashion,
we are convinced that the basic cause of this absence of interest
grows out of efforts to understand the mythic either in terms
of comparative history (e.g., Eliade) or in terms of its genesis
(Freud). Granting the fruitfulness of these approaches to the
mythic, we insist that they fail to provide a technique for moving a critic into iconic structures as forms to be explored. The
very flatness and lack of perspective within the purely iconic
blocks effective Freudian depth analysis. Unquestionably
every iconic structure has a history but the effects made on the
participant of the icon are not reducible to its historical causes.
An understanding of iconic causes is no more an understanding
of icons than an understanding of a painter's life is an understanding of his painting. The iconic, in a most special way, cannot be grasped by getting behind it. This is supremely true
today when speeded-up time cuts down the old Freudian tensions
between subconscious and conscious, between the clash of the
constructs of" id-ego-censor." In a highly oral culture such as
our own is rapidly becoming, everything tends to be spoken out
loud. Nothing-or very little-seems to be suppressed or hidden. This is a mark not only of the Youth Culture and the
Counter Culture but of the age itself. Whereas the Freudian
depth analysis of the hidden symbolic springs behind conscious
behavior may well have been a proper hermeneutic for the

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Victorian Age and for the early to mid-twentieth century, today
we need a methodology capable of grasping intentional relations between actively exercised structures forming an imagery
related proportionately or analogically in patterns. These patterns are tissues of meanings that are simultaneously present
in act within the iconic play itself. Understanding is less the
consequence of seeking a background than the effect of exploring a foreground without depth perspective. It goes without
saying that the perspective must come from the practicioner
of subject analysis who rises above his age in order to understand it.
Kinser and Kleinman in The Dream That Was No More a
Dream illustrate their thesis in a " Discourse Through Pictures "
which does for the nonverbal what we have suggested can be
done for the verbal:
To understand uniqueness, one must also be able to place individual
examples within a larger continuum. An individual gesture will
make no sense unless one has seen the gesture in a number of different situations which .expose its meaning and implications. The
grammar of gestures is very much like the grammar of language:
meaning accumulates with an increased experience with different
patterns of usage .... Analyzing the nonverbal, then, is very much
like using a microscope; each setting exposes a different slice ·of the
total structure. No one setting is completely right; but then, no
one setting is completely wrong. The truth of the whole rests in
being able to remember the details of the individual layers while
trying to reconstruct the total structure from which the slices have
been cut. 32

The iconic structure of the Germanic myth bears characteristics which were detailed in our analysis of conversation as
form. No one" individual example" or" subject" talked about
of itself reveals an iconic whole. " The grammar of gestures is
very much like the grammar of language": one topic leads to
another but it does not do so in sequential fashion. Internal
imagery refracts internal imagery thanks to the catalyst of the
mythic imagination working through the polysymbolic function
of phantasms, perceptual images, which reiterate subjects of
•• Kinser and Kleinman, op. cit., p. 25.

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FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN

existence. Penetrating the " total structure " involves the capacity" to remember the details of the individual layers." No
visual generic imaginatio emerges as a result of understanding
the "Discourse Through Pictures " anymore than any conceptual imaginatio is formed as a result of patterning the subjects forming an iconic conversation. The effect is a judgment
discovering an analogical unity between disparates. The rationalist mentality is incapable of coming to grips with iconic unity
because iconic unity defies either visual representation or conceptual definition. Reductionist solutions must be discarded
along with psychoanalytic reduction to causal genesis. The
conclusion seems inevitable: iconic forms are experienced on
their own terms through critical judgment. It follows that the
difference between grasping or failing to grasp the iconic is
measured precisely by that very difference. Paul Ricoeur
"wagers" that he will have a better understanding "of man
and of the bond between the being of. man and the being of
all things if I follow the indication of symbolic thought." 33 Our
study has suggested that the best way to place the bet, to follow the indication, is to take analogy seriously, not by necessarily articulating it in " signified act " as a philosophical conclusion but by " exercising " analogy as an effective cognitive
instrument for understanding iconography.
Insights into the icon as icon, collecting the wager, will involve judgments made from a stance beyond the iconic itself,
but this "beyond" will have been rendered possible only because the iconic has been initially lived from within itself.
Ricoeur's reintegration is more of a risk than he suggests, although it would be unfair to state that he is not aware of some
risk to the undertaking. Masters of the Lie of Propaganda, such
as. Dr. Joseph Goebbels and those who massage us daily with
the lures of advertising, often fall for their own lie. Total surrender to an iconic existence is Pavlovian. Subject analysis
reveals this failure in irony by noting that action and reaction
can be predicted in men who cannot transcend their own myths.
And whatever can be predicted is at least open to control and
•• Ricoeur, op. cit., p. 855.

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manipulation. We need only think of how many friendships
have been ruined; how many commercial transactions frustrated; how many positions lost; how many romances shattered,
because an enemy on the outside knew how to trigger into
action opposed mythic structures. In a post-modern world of
shifting myths and dissolving cultural patterns, the irony provided by subject analysis may be an effective instrument of
communication in an increasingly divided and tribalized world.
Subject analysis is demythologization, but demythologization with philosophical sophistication, not as a banner. Actually
existent mythic content in discourse-and, by extension, in that
larger discourse which is history-is penetrated rationally by
the critical consciousness. But total demythologization is an
impossibility. Because the mythic is the potentially rational;
because this potentiality inevitably accompanies the subject
component in judgment; because the mind can entertain in any
one act at any one time only one defined and specified intelligibility, that of the predicate, it follows that the removal of one
symbolic-mythic structure implies the introduction of another.
Nobody can be totally rational and critical about everything
falling within the structure of any one knowledge act. A radical
divorce of reason from the mythic would involve the total
separation of predicates from subjects. This is an evident contradiction because predicates are only in subjects. Nonetheless,
the ideal of complete purgation of the mythic is a late Cartesian
dream which would separate consciousness from sensation,
memory, and affectivity; in a word, from the historic continuity of the human thing. Immersion in mythic iconography
is dangerous, but it is not as dangerous as being duped into
thinking that pure rationality, pure critical exegesis or analysis,
is a desideratum. There are no" objective observers." The last
fool is the man who believes himself to be untroubled or unbuttressed by the mythological. The non-ironic character of
the icon is a final irony.
FREDERICK

University of Dallas

Irving,

D. WILHELMSEN

A NOTE ON WITTGENSTEIN AS AN UNWILLING
NOMINALIST

W

AS WITTGENSTEIN a Realist or a Nominalist in
pistemology? Wittgenstein considered himself to be
neither. If you are a Realist you maintain that the
" thing" and relation words people use have extramental, objective counterparts in one way or another. If one is a strict
empiricist and holds the preeminence of particulars the Realist
position is unacceptable because it would seem to necessitate
the extramental existence of something simultaneously both
universal and particular. But such a combination is impossible.
If you are a Nominalist " thing " and relation words have no
outside counterparts but instead are entirely the work of the
human knower who arbitrarily sets up ideas and names for the
particular things and particular situations he experiences. To
an objectivist in epistemology such an approach is unacceptable because the subjectivist approach makes knowledge empty
and hollow. It reduces meaning to the arbitrary whim of the
one who creates the idea or name.
For ages philosophers have struggled with the so-called problem of universals, and more recently scientists, especially biologists, have had to face the issues squarely. 1 The thought of
Wittgenstein, which is one long epistemological dialogue spread
out over many years, represents one of the more modem attempts to escape between the Scylla and Charybdis of this
problem. That some escape is needed seems to have finally
become clear to both Wittgenstein himself and his disciples.
That the " second " Wittgenstein remained empiricistically inclined and so rejected Realism outright requires no defense.
What marks him as different from his empiricistically inclined
1 See, e. g., F. F. Centore, " Neo-Darwinian Reactions to the Social Consequences
of Darwin's Nominalism," The Thomist, 85 (1971), 118-142.

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AS AN UNWILLING NOMINALIST

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predecessors (including himself) , however, is that he also rejected Nominalism. 2
As he matured Wittgenstein became more and more concerned about the dangers of the various forms of extreme subjectivism. Nominalism represented an extreme subjectivism.
How does one ever manage to escape his own little private inner
world and achieve communication with the great outside
world? Wittgenstein devotes a great deal of space to the problem in his Philosophical Investigations. The topic is usually
referred to today as the " private language problem." 3 "But
could we also imagine a language in which a person could write
down or give vocal expression to his inner experiences-his feelings, moods, and the rest-for his private use .... So another
person cannot understand the language[?]," asks Wittgenstein. 4
His answer is an emphatic no. An affirmative answer to the
question would mean that a " language," which would always
involve at least one communicator and one receiver, could be
had even though there was nothing common between the
speakers of the language. That is to say, "If language is to be
a means of communication there must be agreement not only in
definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments." 5
There must be some way of determining when a word means
the same thing. But in a strictly private series of sounds (they
cannot really be called a language) this would be strictly impossible. How, for instance, would one ever know that another
person was " in pain " if there were not some public, extramental, non-subjective way of telling? There would be no way
of knowing. As Malcolm has put it, "On the private-language
hypothesis, no one can teach me what the correct use of ' same '
is. I shall be the sole arbiter of whether this is the same as that.
What I choose to call the ' same ' will be the same." 6 In other
• On the earlier and later Wittgensteins see G. Pitcher, The Philosophy of Wittgenstein (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, 1964) .
8 See, e. g., J. T. Saunders and D. F. Henze, The Private-Language Problem
(New York: Random House, 1967).
• Philosophical Investigations (translated by G. E. M. Anscombe, 2nd ed.,
Oxford: Blackwell, 1958),
5 Ibid.,
6 N. Malcolm, "Wittgenstein's
Philosophical Investigations," Wittgenstein: The

764

F. F. CENTORE

words, there would be sheer arbitrariness with respect to the
relationships between ideas and names and those extramental
realities for which they are supposed to stand. Wittgenstein
would have nothing to do with a doctrine which so obviously
flew in the face of one of the great facts of human existence,
namely, meaningful intersubjective communication. 7
But what are the alternatives? Wittgenstein was sure that
whatever the solution might be it had to depend upon something objective. What is objective can be shared, and so objective knowledge can be shared. But what could the objective
counterparts to the knowledge represented by ideas and names
possibly be? Names can label resemblances, but how does one
know where to look for resemblances? In any event, Wittgenstein knew where one should not look to see them. In his The
Blue And Brown Books he tells us what he could not accept.
First of all, the abstract Realism of a Plato or of the early Russell is eliminated. Rather than one, single, extramentally real
common nature the most Wittgenstein could allow was a system of interlocking and overlapping family resemblances. Secondly, the approach of those who wanted to reduce meaning to
some kind of general picture or image that could be pointed
to had to be discarded. The " craving for generality" could
not possibly be satisfied by so contradictory a notion as a universal particular, even though the notion was superficially at
least very empiricistic. An image was something concrete and
material. But could it simultaneously be common? 8
At this point the later Wittgenstein felt constrained to adopt
his now well-known contextual linguistic doctrine concerning
Philasophioallnvestigations (ed. by G. Pitcher, Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1966), p. 78.
7 Wittgenstein was so much opposed to subjectivism that he tended toward
Behaviorism. However, he actually never went so far and in fact disputed some
of its main points. See, e. g., P. I., #880 ff.
8 See Preliminary Studies far the "Philosophical Investigations," Generally known
as the Blue and BrCYWn Books (Oxford: Blackwell, 1960), pp. 17-18. He goes on
to give two psychological motives for wanting generalization, namely, confusing
a state of consciousness with an extramental state of a mechanism and the scientific desire to simplify and condense phenomena into general laws. Cf. P. I., #115,
#189, #140, #801.

WITTGENSTEIN

AS AN UNWILLING NOMINALIST

765

the meaning of words. Ordinary, every-day language understood as a tool is the key to understanding how knowledge can
be objective without having to commit one's self to an abstractionistic Realism. Wittgenstein reasoned that the only classical
empiricistic way of accounting for extramental generality was
via some sort of ostensive fuzzy material image. But this was
impossible. However, he could not accept the mere arbitrariness of Nominalism. This posed quite a dilemma: How to explain generality in terms of all-important particulars without
becoming a hollow and empty Nominalist? "The idea that
in order to get clear about the meaning of a general term," he
argued, " one had to find the common element in all its applications has shackled philosophical investigation; for it has not
only led to no result, but also made the philosopher dismiss as
irrelevant the concrete cases, which alone have helped him to
understand the usage of the general term." 9 What is individual and concrete and yet can account for generality? The best
answer he could find was language. Words and syntax are
intersubjective. They are there, outside of us. We can be
trained in their use. They are real, and in and among them we
find how it is possible to speak in generalities.
At times Wittgenstein tends to look upon the outward combinations of words and signs (i.e., the material parts of language) as something substantial and even alive. They seem to
become objective beings taking the place of the older but antiempiricistic pure possibles and extramental universals. He
states: " Every sign by itself seems dead. What gives it life?In use it is alive. Is life breathed into it there?-Or is the use
its life?" 10 Use becomes the soul of the material parts of language causing them to spring off the page like living creatures.
How far, though, can such a metaphor be pushed? Just how
objective and independent of personal dictate is language?
Wittgenstein certainly wanted to think of language as independent of individual minds. We grow into a language; it does
not grow out of us. Words do not stand for something intra• Ibid., pp. 19-20.
P. I., #482. Cf. ibid., H-8.

10

766

F. F. CENTORE

mental, neither immaterial concepts nor sensations or images
of which we are conscious. There is no internal mental essence,
no "what" expressed by a word. 11
Where, then, does language come from? Wittgenstein's great
problem is that he must treat language as somehow existing on
its own and yet always and everywhere tied up with an everchanging society. "To obey a rule, to make a report, to give
an order, to play a game of chess, are customs (uses, institutions) . To understand a sentence means to understand a language. To understand a language means to be master of a
technique." 12 " The common behaviour of mankind is the
system of reference by means of which we interpret an unknown
language." 13 " The point here is not that our sense-impressions
can lie, but that we understand their language. (And this language like any other is founded on convention.)" 14 "The
rules of grammar may be called' arbitrary,' if that is to mean
that the aim of the grammar is nothing but that of the language." 15 These statements are only a few of those in which he
either explicitly or implicitly acknowledges the transitory and
arbitrary nature of the matter and syntax of language.
How then can Wittgenstein be interpreted, either by himself
or others, as being neither a Realist nor a Nominalist? 16 There
seems to be an inner strain and conflict in Wittgenstein's
See ibid., #363, #371, #373, #501 ff.
Ibid., #199.
13 Ibid.,
14 Ibid., #355.
15 Ibid., #497.
16 The best over-all critique of the later Wittgenstein
is that by L. J. Cohen,
The Diversity of Meaning (New York: Herder and Herder, 1963). H. J.
McCloskey in his article " The Philosophy of Linguistic Analysis and the Problem
of Universals," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research,
(1963-1964),
338, also makes some telling points. Ryle and others, he states, were attacking
straw men when they argued that universals were merely substantializations of
sentential subjects and predicates. Also, neither Wittgenstein, Pears, nor Bambrough ever properly stated the problem of universals. He does not, however,
mention Wittgenstein as a Nominalist. It is mainly R. Bambrough who is remembered for defending the epistemological neutrality of Wittgenstein. See his " Universals and Family Resemblances," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 61
(1960-1961)'
11

12

WITTGENSTEIN

AS AN UNWILLING NOMINALIST

767

thought of which he never became fully aware. On the one
hand, he wanted to avoid the contra-factual yet necessary
consequence of Nominalism while, on the other hand, he wanted
to reject the anti-particularistic stand of Realism. The main
problem with Nominalism is the way it makes everything
private and peculiar to just one person. A common language
enabling its users to recognize some things as similar seemed
to be the solution, the happy medium, the ideal compromise. 17
It is, however, no compromise at all. As it turns out, and as
Wittgenstein himself admitted, language is founded upon societal customs. These are conventions, that is, arbitrary rules
which could have been otherwise. But does this solve the problem or merely multiply it many times over? How can a series
of arbitrary decisions add up to any less arbitrariness than the
arbitrariness of one person?
Although his intentions were good, and although he was
working in the right direction, his linguistic solution was really
no more objective than the position he was fighting against. In
the end he succeeded in only substituting a group arbitrariness
for a one-man arbitrariness; a corporation Nominalism for a
do-your-own-thing Nominalism. If he had attempted with respect to things to determine what in similar things accounted
for their similarity he might have been on his way to Realism. 18
But he stopped short of that. His epistemological barrier was
an arbitrary linguistic screen interposed between the knower
and the world. He could have penetrated it in order to try to
discover some not so obnoxious moderated Realism-but then,
if he had, he would not have been Wittgenstein.

F. F. CENTORE
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario
17 Cf. P. I., #!'ll5:
"Then are two things the same when they are what one
thing is? And how am I to apply what the one thing shews me to the case of
two things? " The answer is said to be built into the rule-governed grammar of
language. Once the technique is learned, "I obey the rule blindly." (P. I., #!'ll9).
18 As R. I. Aaron has pointed out, this would have made Wiittgenstein
into a
traditional thinker on the subject. Sec The Theory of Universals (flnd ed., Oxford
U. Press, 1967), pp. 167-168. Aaron, however, does not comment on his failure
to escape the traditional alternative positions.

BOOK REVIEWS
The Theology of the Primacy of Christ according to St. ThomatJ and its
Scriptural Foundations. By THOMAS R. POTVIN, 0. P. Fribourg: The
University Press, 1973. (Vol. 50 of Studia Friburgensia, New Series)
Under the direction of J. H. Nicolas, 0. P., Fr. Thomas Potvin has
published his thesis which is a through study of Christ's primacy
according to the theology of St. Thomas together with its scriptural
foundations.
Since any authentic theology must flow from God's revealing word as a
reflection upon it Potvin begins his study by considering the biblical context
for Christ's primacy or lordship. He finds this in the term, "Head," a
multi-faced term involving the notions of leadership and influence as
well as the biblical categories of " recapituation " and " principle. " When
Paul speaks of reestablishing all things in Christ he is speaking of making
Christ the Head, and this implies the Semitic concept of authority based
upon preeminence and the Greek concept of a life principle. The Greek and
Latin Fathers emphasize the notions of plenitude and of influence on the
part of the Head toward the members. St. Thomas underlines the
preeminence of the Head in terms of dignity, nobility, and perfection; it
is likewise a principle or source. The relationship between Head and
members is one of distinction and conformity: distinction by virtue of its
dignity, its role of governing, its causality; conformity through nature,
order, and continuity.
Of great importance for the question of Christ's primacy is Phil. fl:5-ll
which is possibly Pauline in origin, according to Potvin. In this text we
probably have the beginnings of the Church's meditation on the preexistent
Christ, a reflexion initiated by the experience of Christ on the part of the
early Christian community. What seems to be emphasized here is the
dignity of the preexistent Christ. The exaltation of Christ to the position
as Lord of the cosmos, though mentioned in the context of his preexistence,
would seem to be the result of God's gracious act toward the historical
Christ who had suffered and died of obedience.
In regard to Col. I: 15-flO the author believes that modern exegesis sees
an immediate reference to the second Person of the Trinity in his state of
preexistence. Christ is seen " from above, " as God coming to man. Any
reference to the Incarnate Christ is due to the communication of idioms.
The preexistent Christ is seen to be already present in the cosmos before
presiding over mankind's history; in Col. 1:18-flO there would be a

768

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769

reference to Christ's earthly mission seen in the light of its fulfillment with
his glorification.
Potvin considers John's doctrine of the Logos as in fact Johannine.
Logos is not merely a functional title but also an ontological one,
describing Christ's divine nature. Augustine and Thomas legitimately
utilize the Johannine doctrine on the Logos to express the inner-Trinitarian
life of God. He finds in the Prologue the pattern of pre-existence,
descent-ascent.
The message of Hebrews 1:1-4 is likewise centered around the pre-existent
Son who participates in creation. He has become one of us in order to
deliver us from sin. His divinity and preexistent glory have been manifested
to us through his glorification and enthonement.
The primacy of Christ in the scriptural message of the sacred authors is
placed within the context of salvation history: the manifestation-actualization of God's salvific plan for man. Yet ultimate questions concerning
the identity of Christ in terms of preexistence, equality with the Father
and distinction from him are also posed and answered by the New Testament
authors. Christ's authority and lordship, according to these authors, are
rooted in his divine Sonship. As Son of God Christ is active in creation;
as Incarnate-Son he is the summit and perfection of all creation. The New
Testament provides the basis for such a systematization.
In chapter three Potvin undertakes a study of Christ's role in creation,
beginning with methodological principles. " Functional " theology and
" ontological " theology are not mutually exclusive. Revelation cannot be
reduced to salvation history; there is a theology of the sacred authors which
must be taken into account. St. Thomas's methodological schema is
founded upon notions of causality implied in the " exitus-reditus " schema
of Neo-Platonism and also in the scriptures.
In the fourth chapter the author considers creation in St. Thomas's
theology. He begins by applying the theme of the " exitus-reditus ' to
creation. God is the first and final Cause of all things; his goodness is the
ultimate reason for creation. From a consideration of God as the one
Principle of creative work he passes to a consideration of the doctrine and
role of appropriation. This will contribute to a better understanding of
Thomas's thought on Christ's primacy of order in creation.
St. Thomas speaks of creation according to the one divine essence and
according to the Trinity of Persons. On the one hand, creation is common
to the three Persons; on the other, the three Persons make an individual
contribution to creation: as an artificer works through an idea and is
motivated by an intention, so too God the Father creates through his Word
and out of love. There is an order in this creative power: the Son receives
his creative power from the Father while the Spirit receives his from Father
and Son.
In considering the intratrinitarian relations in terms of creation we see

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that the Father speaks himself and all creatures in his Word. The divine
Word expresses not only the Father but all creatures, even though it is a
personal name of the Son. This is so because the (divine) nature is
included indirectly in the name of the Person. Because he is a principle
from a Principle, the Word is a source of creation. From all eternity he
proceeds from the Father as his Word and through his Word the Father is
related to all creatures.
Appropriation is described by Potvin as " bringing a common name to
play the role of a proper name. " It is founded upon a likeness between
what is appropriated and the property of a particular Person within the
Trinity. Appropriation enables us to express more clearly the mystery of
the Trinity without falling into either Tritheism or a rigid monotheism
(in the sense of a monopersonalism). Creation is a work common to the
three Persons with attributions of its various aspects being made to the
three Persons individually. The Father is the Source, the Son the Exemplar,
the Spirit Love. Father, Son, and Spirit are commonly the Creator on
the level of efficient causality; they likewise share commonly in exemplary
causality; yet the humanity of Christ, God's most perfect work, is a
subordinate model of creation. For St. Thomas, Father, Son, and Spirit
alone can be and are the ultimate end of creation; Christ's human nature
can be said to be the end of the universe in an intermediate, subordinate
sense.
Chapter five deals in more detail with the question of Christ's role in
creation. In the Summa the role of Christ's humanity in creation is
described in terms of recreation. This role is ultimately due to the
hypostatic union. In the Summa St. Thomas mentions many reasons for
the fittingness of the Incarnation.
There is some discussion as to the
implications of these reasons, yet all agree, says Potvin, that they are
based upon the " exitus-reditus " schema: God is the beginning and the
end of all things.
The first reason given by St. Thomas for the fittingness of the Incarnation
is an application of the axiom " Bonum est diffusivum sui," a principle
based upon the notion of final causality: God's own goodness is willed by
him of necessity; God, however, freely chooses to diffuse his goodness
outside of himself; the actual order of creation is not proportionate
to God's wisdom which is infinite. Potvin asks whether in order to speak
of the fittingness of the Incarnation the only possibility is that of positing
a necessity of supposition, namely, on the supposition that God chose to
communicate himself to his creature, it was convenient that he do this
in the highest degree possible, i.e., through Incarnation.
We know only
what God has, in fact, revealed to us: according to God's plan, the
highest possible union with God is realized in the Incarnation and that is
in conformity with God's goodness.
St. ThomM distinguishes between the common notion of person

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emphasizing subsistence and particular modes of subsistence proper to each
of the Persons of the Trinity.
In speaking of the Incarnation he
utilized the common notion of person and thus he never spoke in terms of
an intrinsic, necessary reason why the Son assumed human nature rather
than the Father or the Spirit. He did, however, give fitting reason for
the Son's assumption of humanity.
In regard to filial adoption, the exemplar for this is natural filiation. In
the Trinity the Father speaks the Word and he is the Son. In the spoken
Word the Father knows himself, the Son, and the Spirit, and all created
reality. Adoptive sonship through grace is intended to be a manifestation
of the whole Trinity. Since the whole of creation is spoken in the Word,
it is fitting that all creation be recapitulated in the Word. In this way the
Son becomes the Exemplar of creation by appropriation. The reason why
it is an appropriation is the fact that we do not have a scientific knowledge
of the contrasting relations in the Trinity; we do not have a grasp of the
absolutely singular character of each of the divine Persons.
Potvin then touches upon the fittingness of the Incarnation from the
point of view of man's proper nature. He examines closely the notion of
obediential potency and concludes that man's obediential potency
(understood as a non-repugnance) to see God as he is, is the foundation for
the fittingness of the Incarnation according to the nature proper to man.
Because man is capable of God his nature can be assumed by the Person
of the Word. This assumption was fitting because man's nature was in
need of restoration.
Finally, Potvin arrives at the question of the motive of the Incarnation:
if man had not sinned, would the Word of God have become man? There
are two aspects to St. Thomas's answer: a) theological-we know God's
will only from Revelation; b) ontological-there is no absolute necessity
for a divine Person to assume a human nature.
St. Thomas was
inclined to hold that the Son of God would not have become man if man had
not sinned because Revelation tells us that this is in fact why he did
become man. He admits, however, that the other opinion is tenable.
For St. Thomas, those texts which speak of a predestination by which
man is called to share in Christ's power and sonship do not mean that
God's decision is determined by what he foresees will happen. Sin in no way
causes the Incarnation; by one eternal, simple act God ordains that sin
be permitted and that it be repaired by the coming of his Son into the
world. Christ is. no less Lord of the universe because he came into the
world to destroy sin.
In chapter six the author considers the headship and judicial role of
Christ. In the third section of this chapter he considers the lordship of
Christ and its relation to merit. He had already spoken of Christ's
headship, judiciary power, and lordship in terms of the hypostatic union
as flowing quite naturally from it. Now he asks whether through his earthly

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activity (passion, death, resurrection) Christ merited to be Lord. St.
Thomas emphasizes the theandric (ontological) status of Christ in relation
to glory: he is always glorified since he is always Son of God; his human
soul enjoyed the beatific vision from the beginning. Yet St. Thomas also
indicates the " functional" aspects of Christ's glory. His body is glorified
in the resurrection; men do come to appreciate his glory through his
resurrection because of which they recognize his divinity.
The seventh and last chapter presents a lucid synthesis of the major
points under consideation.
This work has much merit. It clarifies and reiterates many points of
Thomistic doctrine which have either been misunderstood or forgotten.
The author is aware of the limitations of St. Thomas's thought on some
issues; yet he helps one to better understand the reason for these
limitations, and in so doing he creates an atmosphere for a greater
appreciation of the contribution made by Thomas to the theology of the
Incarnation.
The bibliography is quite extensive and well arranged. There are a
few typographical errors as well as misspellings and expressions which seem
to be literal translations of French expressions. These do not, however,
detract to any serious degree from the overall value of this thesis.
GEORGE KmWIN,

0. M. I.

Oblate OoUege
Washmgtoo, D.C.

A Companion to the Study of St. Anselm. By JASPER HoPKINS. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1972. Pp. 300. $10.50.
In his preface Jasper Hopkins speaks of a recent renascence of Anselmian
studies. His own translations-with Herbert J. Richardson-of various
theological and philosophical works of Anselm that were all too little known
in the English-speaking world have made a major contribution to that
renascence. The present work promises to prove equally beneficial.
First, it should be noted that Hopkins' Companion to the Study of St.
Anselm is precisely what its title proclaims it to be-namely, a guide for
those who intend to study St. Anselm and bring to that task all the
serious effort which the subject demands. For those who would prefer a
brief synoptic presentation of Anselm's spirit there are a number of simpler
works available-notably Gerard Phelan's delightfully readable The Wisdom
of St. Anselm (regrattably absent from Hopkins' bibliography). But for
those intent on probing the wisdom of Anselm in all its wealth through
careful study of the texts, there is perhaps no better starting point or

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companion for their journey than the present work, whose chief merit lies in
the fact that the author attempts to present the principal problems of
Anselmian scholarship in all their complexity, setting forth for the reader
the diversity of opinion on the questions under consideration and at the
same time making his own position quite clear.
After an opening chapter on the general nature and background of
Anselm's writings a chapter each is devoted to the relation of faith and
reason and to the ontological argument. Then, in keeping with Hopkins'
and Richardson's wish in publishing their earlier translations to extend the
scope of interest beyond these perennially controverted issues, there follow
three chapters on the doctrine of the Trinity, the doctrine of man, freedom
and evil, and on Christology and soteriology respectively. Finally, an
appendix entitled "Anselm's Philosophical Fragments" provides the first
complete English translation of the work published by F. S. Schmitt under
the title Ein neues unvollendetes Werk des hl. Anselm von Canterbury.
I will here mention and comment on a couple of specific points, particularly with regard to faith and reason. First, while it is surely correct t.o
assert that Anselm offers no formal definition of faith, it seems somewhat
misleading to go on to affirm, as Hopkins does, (p. 87) that he never
overtly explicates or distinguishes various notions of faith. For, over and
above the numerous implicit distinctions which he makes (Hopkins on p.
102 mentions what seems to be a rather dubious distinction between fides
catholica and fides christiana) , Anselm on several occasions compares and
contrasts modes or aspects of faith. His most basic distinction is between
fides viva and fides mortua. Since the faith which he as a theologian is
concerned with is a living, ·fruitful, grace-:filled reality, he asserts quite
baldly that fides mortua is not really faith at all and proceeds in various
passages throughout his writings to explicate various aspects of living faith.
Living faith, he says, is operative faith, which works through charity and
leads to rectitude of will and the keeping of God's commandments. His
favorite formula for the expression of faith as assent, corde credo et ore
confiteor, shows how the believer's acceptance of the divinely revealed and
ecclesiastically mediated truth leads him irresistibly to the worshipful
proclamation of that truth. To illustrate the difference between the two
basic types of faith, he employs (Hopkins says " we may be sure that he
was familiar with and subscribed to ") the distinction used by Augustine
between credere in Deum and credere Deum esse (or credere Deo) . The
first formula alone expresses living faith, he says, because it alludes to the
believer's movement along the way toward full and complete uniop with the
object of his belief.
Furthermore, as fides quaerens inteUectum, Anselmian faith involves the
quest for intellectual understanding of what one has at first simply believed.
Here arise all the disputes concerning whether Anselm's elaboration of
rationesnecessariae for divinely revealed truths makes him or his theological

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method rationalist and whether his derivation of arguments sola ratione
for the existence of God makes him an apologist vis-a-vis the unbeliever.
The dispute over the latter question has centered about the Proslogion
with Karl Barth and Anselm Stolz each stoutly denying that it was written
in order to lead the infidel by a rational demonstration from unfaith to
faith. Such a procedure, they say, would subvert the order of the credo ut
intelligam and besides is ruled out by the genus literarium of the work
In insisting on the apologetic character of the Proslogion, although agreeing
that it was written primarily for believers, Hopkins follows a traditionalist
interpretation and takes up a hard line against Barth and Stolz. He does
not mention the middle way proposed by Henri Bouillard, who suggests
that the argument is not an apologetic directed to the unbeliever but
rather the product of the believer's contemplative reflection on the Psalmist's words about the fool's denial of God. It is thus a theological
argument, arising from faith and developed in order to nourish the
prayer of the man of faith. At the same time, Bouillard maintains against
Barth, it is a philosophical argument inasmuch as it seeks to elucidate
the rational structure of the experience of faith. Hopkins, it seems,
maintains a good deal more when he writes:
The command crede ut intelligas is addressed fundamentally to the Christian .... The
skeptic, on the other hand, is challenged first to understand ... and on the basis of
this understanding to believe. (p. 48)

Nowwhere, however, does Anselm indicate that he expects by his argumentation to impart an intellectus to the unbeliever, nor does he ever speak
of an intellectual understanding as either a possible or necessary foundation of faith.
(Hopkins does affirm that for Anselm faith and the
intellectus fidei are gifts of divine grace.)
On the question of the rationes necessariae Hopkins asserts that Anselm
intended to keep them distinct from mere convenientiae and suggests that
the two species are conflated in the Cur Deus Homo only when something
is found to be inappropriate to God. (pp. 50-51) In doing so he neglects
a text found toward the end of chapter 10 of Book I (Schmitt, II, 67:
1-6) -and which he himself cites later, on p. 65-which asserts that the
slightest reason (either affirmative or negative, it would seem) concerning
God assumes the force of necessity unless it is contravened by a weightier
reason.
With regard to the question of demonstrating the existence of God, the
reader-after years of having heard the positions of St. Anselm and St.
Thomas simply contrasted-may be interested to discover that Hopkins
finds a fatal similarity between the. Anselmian " modal argument "
(the second separate and distinct ontological argument, outlined in
Proslogion, chapter S, according to many modern interpreters) and the
Thomist via tertia. For, although Anselm and Aquinas have somewhat

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775

different notions of necessity, both, Hopklls claims, misapply the logic
of necessary propositions and hence, in analogous ways, come up with
invalid arguments. (pp. 78-89)
Finally, the detailed bibliography of texts, translations, and studies is
excellent, although-as is perhaps inevitable--incomplete. Modesty forbids
mentioning whose article the present reviewer particularly missed. However,
a check among the listings of translations for Pedrizetti's " Letters of
Saint Anselm and Archbishop Lanfranc " suggests that the author has
simply overlooked one important, if little-known, journal-namely, Tke
American Benedictine Review.
VxcroR W. RoBERTS, 0. S. B .
.St. Greg0'1'1J'I1 Co1lege
Sha:umee, Oklahoma

Cardinal Newmatn In His Age: His Place In English Tkeology and Literature. By HARoLD L. WEATHERBY. Nashville: Vanderbilt University
Press, 1973. Pp.
$11.50.
One fascinating aspect of Cardinal Newman's thought is its seeming
coincidence of opposites. This stubborn individualist and arch-defender
of the primacy of conscience is the most obedient of men; this insistent
proponent of the subjectivity factors active in the mind's grasp of truth,
above all religious truth, dedicated his life to a defense of the authoritybased Catholic tradition. These and other intriguing polarities provide
Harold Weatherby, associate professor of English literature at Vanderbilt
University, with his subject matter and with a bold, clear thesis. Weatherby
argues that, despite his best efforts, the epistemological principles which
Newman embraced inexorably lead to the subjectivism and relativism
which mark the rapid dissolution of Catholic thought since Vatican TI.
In pursuit of his thesis Weatherby first strives to establish the idealistic
nature of Newman's epistemology by contrasting him with the straightforward realism of Richard Hooker, the Caroline divines, and the Metaphysical poets, a realism inherited from the medieval scholastic tradition.
Subsequently, he argues Newman's affinity for the platonized world-view of
the Alexandrian Fathers, Coleridge, and Wordsworth. Weatherby then
reviews and passes a detailed, negative judgment on the various
"safeguards" by which Newman sought to reconcile his premises with Catholic orthodoxy. The consistent point of contrast here is the epistemology of
classical Thomism. The closing, and perhaps weakest, section of the book
considers the broad socio-political and literary consequences of Newman's
thought. Newman's fixation on the ,. idea," or "spirit," of an institution,
and his interpert'ative view of symbols, renders his approach to any and all

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traditional inherently relativistic. Weatherby concludes that Newman's
attempted synthesis of Catholic orthodoxy with his epistemological premises
was a predicatable, tragic failure.
Clearly Weatherby has written a provocative book. He states his
thesis boldly and argues it tenaciously in clear, attractive prose. Yet, I
fear, the end result is more caricature than penetrating analysis. Putting
aside the assumption that the epistemology of St. Thomas Aquinas provides
the sole philosophical validation for " the Catholic tradition of fifteen
hundred years," a large assumption indeed, Weatherby's exposition of
Aquinas's epistemology leads to attributions scarcely different from the
axioms of eighteenth-century rationalism as found, for example, in Paley's
Evidtmees. Beginning with the premise that the only true knowledge of
which the human mind is capable consists in the apprehension of the
quiddity of sensible, external objects of this world, Thomism is made to
assert the following. In the acquisition of all knowledge the human mind
is essentially the passive recorder of intelligble species by a congenital
process of abstraction universally operative in all men. The achievement
of truth on any level proceeds by way of rigorous, rational scrutiny of
the objective evidence, that is, evidence patently manifest to any
reasonable man. The only valid religious experience of God possible to man
in this life is by the way of abstract reasoning on objective evidence. The
God of Christianity is plainly manifest in the objective harmony present in
the laws of created nature and civil society, as well as in received moral and
religious tradition.
Christian faith is ultimately grounded neither
on personal experience, nor on the authority of the Church, but on the
rigorous exercise of autonomous reason. Other attributions might be added:
man never really knows concrete, singular beings, only universals; the
genuine Catholic assent of faith is necessarily " notional, " never " real "
in Newman's sense; St. Thomas accepted the doctrine of transubstantiation not on authority but on grounds of its inherent reasonableness.
In a word, Thomism is represented as irrevocable at odds with intuitive,
interpretative reasoning.
To what extent this represents a balanced assessment of St. Thomas's
thought, much less of the scope and drift of " the Catholic tradition of
fifteen hundred years," I leave to those more learned. Certainly Aquinas's
intellectus agens demands an intuitive grasp of being itself, prior to the
abstraction of particular intelligible species. Certainly Schillebeeckx,
Rahner, and Lonergan find much in St. Thomas's epistemology that is
interpretative and intuitive. Certainly the sacramental world-view, so
deeply imbedded in the biblical, patristic, and Augustinian traditions, and
so dear both to contemplatives and ordinary faithful, is more than a
dangerous tendency in the body of Catholic thought.
Equally unconvincing is Weatherby's interpretation of Newman's
epistemology. Newman certainly held that, both in the religious and

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77"/

Christian faith experience, the believer achieves a knowledge of God which
exceeds those instinctive processes of intellection necessarily operative in
all men by the fact that they are men. Religious knowledge is personal
in that it is in function of definite, prior judgments which arise in the
mind only in proportion to a man's fidelity to conscience, and hence, viewed
psychologically, are man's personal achievement. Moreover, for Newman,
this pre-conditioning of the knowing subject fits the general pattern of
all human knowing once one passes beyond the immediate knowledge of
sense objects imposed by our nature. The ability to achieve truth, wherever
truth is not self-evident, is always in function of certain antecedent
judgments, or " first principles," which we bring to the data, judgments
gained from experience in the light of some interpretative standpoint. This
is why otherwise intelligent men evaluate the same objective data
differently; this is why some men consistently achieve true judgments in
a given field while others do not. The intellect which is informed by the
right antecedent judgments necessary to a given field of inquiry is called
by Newman the "illative sense." In the ethical and religious sphere the
right judgments necessary to arrive at truth are formed only through exact
fidelity to conscience. Hence, Newman certainly held that human knowing
is much more interpretative than we normally realize, and that the
validity of the process of interpretation rests on the validity of the mind's
habitual, antecedent judgments, or first principles.
Weatherby understands this in a general way, but two misrepresentations
largely vitiate his interpretation of Newman. First of all, Weatherby
strongly implies that Newman's theory derives from his temperament,
which is defined in terms of fragmentation, alienation, and fear in face
of the visible world, whereas Newman himself claimed to base his view
on empirical data, namely, the teaching of Scripture and our experience of
how men actually do come to believe. Moreover, Newman consistently
pointed out serious difficulties in the object-centered epistemology which
Weatherby defends. For example, if all valid knowledge consists in the
instinctive abstraction of quiddities, then there can be no fundamental
difference between the way we know a tree and the way we know a person.
If the religious and Christian faith experience does not bring a distinctive,
personal knowledge of God beyond that available to any intelligent man,
then faith belongs to the purely affective order; believer and non-believer
possess exactly the same cognition of God. If faith, to be valid, must be
grounded on the rigorous assessment of patently objective evidence, then
faith in children and the uneducated can never be more than superstition.
If the cognitive content of faith is grounded on demonstrative reasoning,
then unbelief is either inaccurate reasoning or hypocrisy, never a
consistent or honest state of mind. If faith is grounded on objective
reasoning, then there can be no ultimate deference to the authority of a
teacher guided by the Hoy Spirit, that is, the Church. For Newman,

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none of these inferences squares either with scriptural teaching or with
experience. Yet Weatherby never presents Newman's objections to the
interpretation of human knowing which he defends, nor does he take any
noticeable account of the strong empirical bent of Newman's mind.
Secondly, Weatherby misrepresents Newman's teaching both on conscience and on human reasoning. Conscience is portrayed as an epistemological faculty which impresses a clear image of God directly on the mind,
independent of the normal rational processes which accompany the reception
of sense data. This image, fully constituted, precedes all reasoning and
can be known by a simple turning inward. Weatherby then easily reduces
Newman's conscience to an innate idea or infused species and represents
the inward-turning process (which he identifies with Newman's "implicit
reasoning, " informal and natural inference, " and " illative sense ") as an
esoteric mode of cognition which is known only to the privileged few and
remains beyond the reach of rational discourse.
But this is a serious misrepresentation. Newman's descriptive analysis
of the genesis of religious and Christian faith purports to be grounded on an
empirical analysis of all human knowing, and he consistently gives the
data. This is true of his fundamental insight that, beyond what is
self-evident, the mind does not simply record but achieves truth, and
achieves it in terms of definite foundational judgments which are the
personal acquisition of the knowing subject. Moreover, Newman insists
that in the ethical and religious sphere these foundational judgments are
timeless and true; they do not arise in function of temperament or
culture but in function of submission to that sense of sanction (conscience}
which is a constitutive element of human nature. They are, then, grounded
in the objective real. It is unfair to dismiss such an epistemology as
hopelessly at odds with metaphysics, or as bearing a tendency toward
scepticism and idealism. Weatherby's object-centered epistemology bears
·an equal tendency toward a crude rationalism which can never escape a
desiccated natural theology.
Furthermore, for Newman, conscience is not a kind of second intellect
which imposes a fully constituted image of God, much less the God of
Christianity, independently of our normal cognition of the visible world.
By conscience Newman normally means that vague, undefined sense of
moral contingency which is achieved intuitively in our immediate awareness
of ourselves. This instinctive sense that we live under an imperious
summons to transcend· our natural desires is the necessary, prior condition
for acknowledging the binding force of those particular moral judgments
which, in their initial state, are partly instinctive and partly derivative
from one's culture. Conscience, then, is not a faculty so much as a
descriptive term for one aspect of the human person's self-awareness; it
is an insistent pressure, a horizon which, when faithfully submitted to
enlightens our normal intellection. Reductively this awareness of sanction

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779

is an intuitive awareness of God, but only reductively. The image of God
arises in the intellect slowly, laboriously, in proportion to strict fidelity
to conscience, yet, in the end, never of itself represents more than a
supreme Someone. It is only in and through the Christian tradition that
the vague God of conscience is known clearly. Hence, for Newman,
conscience can never directly impress the image of the God revealed in
Christ, as Weatherby implies, nor can it be an independent judge of the
content of Christian revelation. Conscience inherently needs Christian
revelation, though the judgments it induces are the necessary preconditions for seeing Christian;ity as true. Hence, Newman's firm
adherence to the received Catholic tradition is not a voluntaristic leap but
an exigency of his own understanding of the function and limits of
conscience.
Professor Weatherby, then, has written a thoughtful, earnest book
which defends the kind of epistemology which Newman rejected as
consonant neither with empirical facts nor with the teaching on faith implies
in Scripture. This is fair enough. To what extent his attribution of this
view to St. Thomas is accurate, I have severe doubts. His interpretation
of Newman's mind I find uncovincing, for it is based on misrepresentations
which are pervasive and cumulative.
RoBERT E. O'DoNNELL,

S. J.

Fairfield University
Fairfield Connecticut

Dogma 4: The Church Its Origin and Structure. By MICHAEL ScHMAus.
Translated by Mary Ledderer. New York: Sheed and Ward, 197fl.
Pp. 214. $3.95 (paper).
Professor Michael Schmaus presents a straight-forward description of
the Church which is sensitive to the contemporary theological questions
of ecclesiology but avoids becoming involved in controversies. The
simplicity of his arguments belies the depth at which he treats problems
and the care with which he balances disputed questions. We have here the
work of a master dogmatician suitable for use as a textbook in the
college classroom or the adult study club.
The basic research upon which this work rests is Schmaus's Die Lehre von
der Kirche (Munich 1958) . This monumental 933 page treatise which
includes 46 pages of bibliography, which ranks with those of Journet and
Cougar as preparatory of Lumen Gentium, considers the origin of the
Church from the viewpoint of God, salvation history, and the foundation
in Jesus Christ. This conditions the divine-human character of the Church
which is presented around the biblical images People of God, Body of Christ,

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and Spouse. From the nature of the Church flows the mission and
structure of the visible organization, treated in terms of services for
salvation.
Dogma 4 follows the outline of the De Lehre but updates the treatment
to incorporate Vatican II documents and the ecclesial theses of contemporary theologians, especially colleagues and former students of Schmaus at
the university of Munich. There are four parts to the work: a kind of
introductory section on the Church as mystery of faith; next, the
substantial treatment of the role and the relation of Christ and the Spirit
in the Church; thirdly, the development of the theology of the Church;
and finally, the extensive section on the structure of the Church.
Schmaus shows his awareness of contemporary Protestant exegesis,
e. g., that the Church was born out of the common faith of Jesus'
disciples, but argues for the Roman Catholic interpretation, e. g., that
Christ is the origin of the Church and the continuing ground for its life
and existence. His teaching on the activity of the Holy Spirit in the
Church exemplifies the celebrated thesis of Schmaus's student, Heribert
Muhlen, which expresses the relation of the Spirit and the Church
analogously with the mystery of the Trinity and the Incarnation: " One
Person in many persons. "
Schmaus's historical study of the development of ecclesiology follows
Yves Congar's treatment of this subject and traces three periods of
development: the age of the Fathers to the seventh century (Isidore),
the Middle Ages, and the modern era.
Ecumenists will find that Schmaus is faithful to the Vatican II documents
on the unity of the Church's structure; his presentation is open to
development, but it does not go beyond the Decree on Ecumenism. He
follows a theme on the unity of the life of the Church in faith, hope,
and charity which is very close to that of Congar and Thomas Aquinas.
The treatment of the laity reads like Congar's revision of Lay People
in the Church. The sections on the Primacy of the Bishop of Rome and
Papal Infallibility manifest a greater originality on the part of the
author but a similar balance or orthodoxy and openness to development.
The quality of this volume of Dogma matches that of the first three
volumes and leads us to anticipate the fifth and final volume on the
Church's sacramentality.
JoaN M. DoNAHUE, O.P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

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781

John of Damascus on Islam. The" Heresy of the Ishmaelites." By DANIEL
J. SAHAS. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1972. Pp. 187. 61 guilders.
The present work, arising out of a dissertation for the Hartford Seminary
Foundation, is a contribution to the Christian-Islamic dialogue from the
historical point of view, and, in this case, to John Damascene's role in that
dialogue. The author inve!ltigates the relevant declarations of the Synod
of 754 and their significance in the first chapter, the familiar background
and the political developments in Syria at the time of the Islamic
conquest in the second, and the life of John Da:nascene in his Islamic
environment in the third. With the fourth chapter the author enters into
the most important part of his work, an examination of c. 101 in John
Damascene's catalogue of heresies-first of all, its tradition. Then, in the
fifth chapter, he deals with its contents, particularly (and in great detail)
with the express reference to the Koran; but he also seeks to uncover
traces of the Koran which appear in a general sort of way throughout the
Damascene's theological writings. The sixth and seventh chapters are
dedicated to the Dialogue between a Christian and a Saracen, and this is
analyzed in the same fashion that c. 101 of the catalogue of heresies is
analyzed. The author comes to the conclusion that both works (the latter at
least according to its contents) are original texts of John Damascene and betray a great familiarity with the Koran and early Islamic theology. In its
present format the Dialogue does not come from the Damascene, although
its contents seem to; it is an expansion and a development of the introductory questions in Haer. 101, a summary of the most essential doctrines
of early Islamic theology and thus an aid for the Christian in an encounter
with Islam. Between Haer. 101 and the Dialogue there is a mutual
dependence. In the eighth chapter the author touches upon still more
writings, whether rightly or wrongly attributed to the Damascene (De
draconibus, strygibus, The Life of Peter of Capitolias, The Refutation of
the Moslems, the Formula of Abjuration), and he shows that these contain
no position regarding Islam and should not be denied him. In the appendix
the texts of Haer. 101 and the Dialogue are given in both Greek (Migne)
and English. Pp. 160-168 list pertinent literature, and an index of names
and of subjects follows on pp. 169-171.
Sahas is repeatedly obliged to note that particular questions cannot be
answered because of the lack of a critical text (e. g., pp. 66, 67', 74). The
relevant selections in the new edition of John Damascene are not yet
ready for publication. Of Haer. 101 only the most important manuscripts
have been collated so that, as a preliminary, some things can be brought up,
namely, the discussion concerning uKda in place of 8pTJCTKEla (p. 68); this
reading is either the peculiarity of a previously unestablished manuscript
or simply a printing error. In 769
as a more serious variant to ti}v

BOOK REVIEWS

xaf3afHw there is still only rov xaf3o0av; TOV ya{3ofUv and TOV f3ax0av
probably have no significance whatsoever. Four manuscripts read xaf3ap
instead of xaf3lp (769 B5; cf. p. 86). The epilogue of Haer.
ff)
is no longer considered certainly genuine, so that its statements prove
nothing more with reference to the extent of the 100 chapters (cf. p. 57).
It should be stressed here, however, that, according to the witness of the
manuscripts, Haer. 101 is authentic (pace Poggi in Or. Chr. Per. 38
514) and that the conclusion of Haer. from Migne cc. 99 and 101 is able
to stand. Whether c. 101 ends with
D8, as is the case in nine manugen. tree g), or
scripts (cf. my tJberlieferungsgeschichte, pp. 196 and
with 773 A5 has yet to be determined.
The current edition of the chronography of Theophane the Confessor
would be that of C. de Boor, Leipzig 1883, reprinted in Hildesheim 1963,
that of Georgios Kedrenos by I. Bekker, 1838/39 (cf. p. 31 ), that of
John Zonaras by Pinter and Biittner-Wobst, 1841/97 (cf. p. lln.)-both
likewise in the Bonn Corpus. With regard to Beser (p. 10"), in Byz. Z 56
(1963) 6 B. Hemmerdinger gives a newer meaning; he is answered in
For Byzantine theological literature Ehrhardin
Byzantion 33 (1963)
Krumbacher has been outstripped by Beck's monumental opus; this should
be indicated (cf. pp. 44", 59",
99'). In the survey of the Damascene's
writings (pp. 5If.) , and especially when dealing with questions of authenticity and tradition (e. g., p. 99), the work of Hoeck or Beck should have
been mentioned.
Probably contemporaneous with Sahas, N. Q. King
worked on what was to a large extent the same subject, "S. Joannis
Damasceni De haeresibus Cap. CI and Islam, " in Studia patristica VIII
(TU 93) Berlin 1966, pp. 76-81. E. Trapp also deals with the Formula
ff.) in the introduction (p. 15*f.) to his work on
of Abjuration (pp.
Manuel II. Palaiologos, Dialoge mit einem "Perser" (Wiener byz. Studien
Vienna 1966.
For John Damascene's acquaintance with Arabic the author adduces
the fact of the Arabic environment of the monastery of Mar Saba as well
as the fact that Arabic was spoken within (p. 47) , but no proof for this
is given. Thus it is an arguable point. Two hundred years earlier the
monastery had been a polyglot community, and the different groups had
celebrated the Liturgy of the Hours each in its own language, coming
together in the church only for the Eucharist. Sahas contests the common
opinion that the Damascene had already died by the year 754, and he
mentions VailM's demonstration, but he puts his own argumentation, with
a reference to Sauget, in some doubt (pp. 47, 484 ). Garitte's article in
Anal. Boll. 77 (1959)
or Hoeck's in LThK on John Damascene
would have been valuable here. " Codex
of Regium " should read
"Paris., B. N. gr.
(Fontebl. Reg.
" (p. 561 ), and "Codex R.
should be ibid. gr.
(Mazar. Reg.
The Damascene

BOOK REVIEWS

788

could hardly agree to all if, in Sahas' opinion (p. 76) , he was concerned in
the Expositio fidei primarily with the knowability of God and not with his
existence and his essence. Otherwise why would he have devoted his first
chapters to a proof of God's being and unity and set down at length his
Trinitarian doctrine in the eighth chapter? With reference to Peter of
Capitolias on p. 124, his Passio has only been transmitted in Georgian, and
it is ascribed here to the Damascene; cf. the pertinent literature in Hoeck's
article (Stand und Aufgaben), no. 80. The Damascene's encomium of
Peter is mentioned by Theophane in his chronography (ed. de Boor I 417,
14s). Mansi is not numbered by pages but by columns (cf. p. 95). "BS"
(p. 484 ) is not explained in the index of abbreviations.
nvri!p.a (765 AI5) remains untranslated.
In the
On p. 78, line 7, xat
same place as well as on p. 135 the translation is free, not to say incorrect;
the reader wonders why what was correct was not immediately put in the
text and why the mistake was only mentioned (as an afterthought?) in
footnote 12. In the same place add the word " for" at the beginning of
line 11. If it had already been determined on p. 624 that Akominatos
was a pseudonym it should not have been used thereafter; cf. excursus
4 in G. Stadtmiiller's monograph on Michael Choniates (Orientalia Christ.
91) Rome 1934. The sayings on the cow in Sure II of the Koran appear
in verses 63-66 and not 67-71. The index is not exhaustive, which is a pity.
The following typographical errors are to be noted: p. 19" should have
"Delespine" rather than "Delessine"; p. 531 "Hans-Georg" rather than
"Hanz-Georg"; p. 100• "Vorsehung" rather than" Forschung" (cf. also
p. 161); p. 113" "Book III" rather than" Book IV"; p. 123 "Strygibus"
rather than "Stygibus" (twice); p. 142, line 3, "XCVI" rather than
" XCIV "; p. 156, line 2, "XCIV " rather than "XCVI "; pp. 66" and
163, under Hoeck," XVII" rather than" XVI" (p. 1238 and 9 are correct).
Typographical errors in the Greek, aside from the frequently unusual
accentuation taken over from Migne: p. VII, line 4, should have €rrrtv
rather than €rrnv; p. 4, line 1 of the Greek text,
rather than
ibid. line 8,
rather than
p. 6 2 €Vayy(>..{t·rrratrather than
roayy£Att£rat; p. 9, line 11, MavuoVp rather than Mavuoilp; p. 123 £KKA'YJIT{q.
rather than lKKA'YJIT{a; p. 27 6 <lv rather than 6v; p. 40, line 9, rch rather
than nt<>; p. 545 Kat rather than Ka{; p. 731 'Ef3pa{ot<> rather than 'E{3patot<>;
p. 1046 ra rather than nf; on p. 134 insert Kat after Mwvulw., in C7, and
after oi\n in Bl; p. 136, line I, 8£6v rather than 8£ov, and in A3 'Ay&.p
rather than
yap.
The mistakes that have been pointed out do not detract from the
essential value of this book, which seems to me to lie in the fact that the
author introduces into the study of Christian-Islamic relations the invaluable
element of a solid professional knowledge of the Koran and of the
spiritual and intellectual history of early Islam. This together with his

ro

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listing of the relevant literature and his calm, factual point of view, puts
the reader deeply in his debt.
BoNIFATIUs KoTTER, 0. S. B.
Byzantinisckes lnstitu-e
Sckeyern, Germany

Savoir et Pouvoir. Philosophie thomiste et politique clbicale au XXXe
siecle. By PIERRE TamAULT. Quebec: Les Presses de l'Universite
Laval,
$10.00.
The thesis of this book is simple: theories of knowledge are theories of
power. Pierre Thibault originally presented and defended this work as a
thesis at the Sorbonne early in 1970. It was then entitled L' origine et le
sens de la restauration du thom·isme au XIXe siecle and had been directed
by Henri Gouhier. He was awarded the title, docteur de l'Universite de
Pan-is. M. Emile Poulat, who wrote the Preface to this volume, had sat
on the jury.
It is an exciting book: it will excite some to fear, resentment, even fury;
it will excite others to further research. The author applies the sociology of
knowledge to a philosophical development in the 19th century. The great
discovery of the sociology of knowledge was that thought, the content of
the mind and its structure, are socially grounded, are reflections of the social
and political conditions of the thinker's world. While in biblical studies this
principal has been accepted and is referred to as Formgeschchte (with its
interest in the Sitz im Leben), philosophers and theologians have in general
overlooked this. The author tries to show that various philosophical trends
in Catholicism have built into them certain social and political consequences
and that the struggle of the papacy to affirm neo-thomism was not only a
wrestling in the intellectual order but also an affirmation of a particular
view of society over against the social and political implications of the
competing philosophies.
It is not a these de recherche (in the French sense); it does not offer new
documentary evidence; indeed, the author leans heavily on the work of
Hocedez, Aubert, Foucher, Pelzer, Dezza, Masnovo, Walz (spelled "Waltz"
in the text), Van Riet, T'Serclaes, Des Houx, Daniel-Rops, Rougier,
Lagarde, Arquilliere, Gilson, etcetera. However, he interprets the evidence
in such a way that it opens up new perspectives on the whole history of
thomism, not only in the 19th century but in the 13th as well. In the
Avant-Propos the author tells us that his book is a settling of accounts.
" But one settles an account to the past only by rendering an account "
("On ne regie son compte au passe qu'en rendant compte,'' p. xxiii). In
a sense, then, the work is a therapeutic exercise.

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786

According to Thibault, the restoration of thomism in the 19th century
is the restoration of an ideology. Thomism (with its conception of the world
in general, its naturalism, its theory of ideas-especially that!-and its
theory of indirect power (Taparelli d' Azeglio and Leo XIII) was precisely
the savoir the Church (the clergy, especially the Pope) required to
legitimatize its strategy, namely, to maximize priestly power (pouxiors)
in the new order: " le savoir y est discours de legitimation." (p. xxvi}
The epistemologies of traditionalism (Louis de Bonald) and ontologism
(of Kantian variety, Rosmini; of Malebranchian-Hegelian variety, Gioberti) were unsuitable for the Church's purpose: traditionalism because
of its irrationalism; ontologism because of it subjectivism. In France,
traditionalism, while it supported Rome's ultramontane claims and seemed
to be an antidote to Cartesian skepticism, " upset the bases of Christian
polemics, of religion itself, and of all certitude" (Chaste!, quoted on p. 55).
Ventura presented St. Thomas as a traditionalist. He denied any natural
metaphysics in the name of a thomism that required the absolute subordination of reason to faith. The damage done by traditionalism was great.
However, in its polemic with eclecticism (Cousin), it was the unconscious
promoter of ecclesiastical thomism (the thesis of Michelet and Foucher
adopted by Thibault, see pp. 8-5) .
In Italy, ontologism was the Christian platonism or augustinianism of
the 19th century.
Kleutgen, the German-Roman thomist, said that
ontologism attributes to the natural power of reason a knowledge which
belongs to the supernatural order. The divine essence could be grasped
It
directly by the intellect. It was antischolastic and anti-aristotelian.
was unfavorable to any extension of the doctrinal and dogmatic authority
of the Holy See. In a way, ontologism was the ideology of the Italian
national movement. Paradoxically enough, Rosmini and Gioberti were
the harbingers of neo-guelphism! After 1848 the Pope and the Jesuits
were opposed to this kind of liberalism and modernity. At Vatican I the
most eager adversary of ontologism was Cardinal Joachim Pecci (future
Leo XIII) . He demanded that the proposition, naturalis est homini
cognitio Dei immediata et directa be condemned.
In Germany, the attempt of Hermes to assimilate kantian criticism to
Catholic philosophy failed because he made faith the term of a philosophical reasoning process. He was condemned by Gregory XVI because
he denied the liberty of the act of faith, et cetera. The hegelian Gunther
gave Catholic thought the kind of rationalism the epoque sought, but
he made faith the very object of philosophical reasoning. This eliminated
the notion of mystery. His writings were condemned in 1857 by Pius IX.
The criticism of Hermes and the idealism of Gunther were too threatening
to the teaching magisterium (clerical power) because they were philosophies either deprived of objective ideas or in which ideas could be
grasped directly by the individual subject.

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After the Avant-Propos and Introduction Thibault's book comprises
three parts, an appendix, a conclusion, a bibliography and an index of
proper names (in that order).
In the Avant-Propos the author briefly outlines the history of his own
research and explains his thesis in sociological terms. Aeterni Patris had
been his point de depart at the start of his research; it became, however,
his point d' arrivee. His initial proposal was to examine how the encyclical
Aeterni Patris of 1879 had been so effective in Catholic milieux. He laid
aside certain commonplaces regarding the restoration of thomism (e. g.,
that the focus was the Dominicans, that thomism was essentially a response
to the need for an apologetics, et cetera) when he realized that the
political implications of thomism were overwhelming. It was the political
dimension that would explain the extraordinary interest Leo XIII took
in thomism-Leo XIII who was not much of a philosopher at all. Thomism
had an essential meaning and function beyond its explicit discourse.
Part I, the longest portion of the book, is " The origins of neo-thomism, "
and covers a lot of ground. The first chapter deals with the various
philosophical orientations in Europe in the 19th century, e. g., ontologism
in Italy, traditionalism in France, critical rationalism in Germany, scholasticism in Spain, the reappearance of thomism in Italy (Piacenza, Rome,
Naples), and the good relations that obtained between the early thomists
and the other catholic intellectuals (Buzzetti and La Mennais, Taparelli
and Rosmini, Gioberti, Cousin). I feel Thibault could have taken G. F.
Rossi's work more seriously, especially in view of the retractation of A.
Pelzer and the review of A. Mansion. He incorrectly allies Fabro with
Pirri. (p. 29, fn. 67)
Chapter I dealt with the reappearance of thomism; chapter II deals
with its restoration. The story of the foundation of the Civilta Cattolica
in Naples, its transferral to Rome, and its conversion to thomism in
1853 is told briefly and in an interesting way. This doctrinal review would
be the antidote of revolutionary ideas and be the ally of papal politics
in the 19th century. It would go back to the Middle Ages and restore in
the modern world the role played then by the Church. A number of events
paved the way for this restoration: Ventura's lectures in Paris, Taparelli's
defense of Ventura, the diffusion in Rome of Balmes' Filosofia fundamental
in 1853 and Kleutgen's Theologie der Vorzeit in the same year, the Jesuit
Ordinatio Studiorum of 1858 prepared by Liberatore, Taparelli, Kleutgen,
Sordi, and Curci, the debate on hylomorphism between the Roman College
and the Civilta Cattolica in 1861, Minerva's support after 1860 and that
of the Syllabus in 1864.
A whole section is devoted to les grandes Polemiques (pp. 52-67) :
traditionalism, ontologism, and German rationalism. The author finally
underscores the importance of Vatican I. Quanta cura and the Syllabus

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of 1864 condemned practically everything that was not scholastic. The
proclamation of papal infallibility was in conformity with the spirit of
thomism and created the conditions which made its official and authoritative restoration possible. The relative impenetrability of the mysteries
(proclaimed by the Con.stitutio dogrnatica de fide.. catlwlica) rendered the
role of the ecclesiastical magisterium necessary to explain them. Thibault
then outlines briefly the effects of the Council in France, Italy, Spain, and
Germany. Throughout this whole development the author keeps us very
aware of the influence of Pius IX's struggle with the Risorgimeuto on the
restoration of thomism. Restoration meant the setting up of things in
the closest approximation to conditions as they had been before the
Revolution (of 1848).
Chapter III is entitled " A Certain Apologetics at Stake. " The early
thomists were obsessed with epistemology or its anthropological foundations.
Thibault contends that it was not primarily a question of saving Catholic
dogmatics by saving the Aristotelian ontology integrated in it. Rather,
it was a question of restoring in philosophy a catholic, social, practical
frame of mind so as to dislodge an omnipresent subjectivism which
engendered a heterodox and anti-social spirit, hardly suitable for action.
What was involved was a certain conception of the Church and of clerical
power. The fall of monarchies and the weakening of national churches
allowed one to envisage the restoration of that conception. The ultramontanes wanted to restore the bureaucratic design of medieval Christianity
which had elaborated the Catholicism of the Counter Reform and
which had clashed with royal absolutism and the autonomy of universities
and national churches. Of course, with Leo XIII, political ultramontanism
under the form of indirect power became a reality. The Jesuits were the
chief force behind its establisment. Thibault says that Dollinger knew
what the real stakes were. In 1863 he uncovered the sociological conflict
within the clerical world that the philosophical polemics of Roman scholasticism masked. The epistemological problem did not arise from
philosophical research. It was imposed by disciplinary and political
imperatives and the expediency of their theological implications. In other
words, theological and political objectives had posed the problem. The
political objectives needed no justification. To realize these, a suitable
formulation of the problem had to be found a posteriori. Thibault proceeds
to demonstrate why traditionalism failed to provide a rational apologetics
and a natural foundation for the preambula fidei. The obsession of the
Roman thomists with authority and spiritual unanimity is manifest.
Spiritualism and anthropological dualism had to be suppressed also, because
they constituted the soil in which cartesianism, criticism, and ontologism
grew. For example, the theory of innate ideas in Descartes implies human
dualism, human dualism implies idealism, and this leads to pantheism.

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Subjective and idealistic pantheism exalts the autonomy and dynamism
of the individual soul in religious experience and hence is a constant threat
to the authority of the clerical machine. Taparelli had said in 1854: " In
spiritual matters, lay people are incompetent and powerless. " Thirty
years later Liberatore will defend clerical supremacy. It is of divine
institution. " The church of Jesus Christ is essentially clerical, because
the clergy is the formal element in it. " (see p. 94) In a section on
" Thomism and Clericalism " the author contends that clerical power,
an institutionalized spiritual power, is a ministerial power. It becomes
absolute when its source and mandate are undisputed and are directly
acessible only to the one who exercises it. This power is exercised in the
moral and metaphysical domains; it is founded on the monopoly of essential
theological truths and the exclusive right of access to the source of their
revelation. The justification for such a prerogative is the object of apologetics and cannot be accommodated by any epistemology. Thomism,
however, was appropriate.
In Chapter IV, "A certain Politics at Stake," Thibault shows that
the history of Catholic philosophy in the 19th century has a political
dimension without which the rise of thomism is unintelligible. Political
thomism did not appear with Leo XIII; it was advocated by the neothomists from the beginning. Social and political considerations won
Taparelli, Sanseverino, and Liberatore to thomism after 1850. Taparelli
and the Civilta Cattolica were the formulators and promoters of indirect
power. Balmes had set forth the thomistic political naturalism that was
the basis of the doctrine of indirect power. In 1872 Liberatore wrote la
Chiesa e lo Stato defending papal supremacy in Hildebrandian fashion.
So that, Thibault concludes, as far as ecclesiastical politics go, thomism
already had the characteristics and ambitions it will display under Leo
XIII-once he officializes it. Aristotelian-thomistic epistemology responds
to the need of establishing precise apologetical and political positions,
characterized by the absolute supremacy of the Holy See over bishops and
theologians and over civil authorities. (p. US) Throughout the chapter
the author emphasizes once again that it is against the backdrop of the
vicissitudes of papal politics (especially the internal situation of Italy and
its alliances with the Holy See) that one must see the astonishing dialect
which characteries the history of Catholic liberalism into which neo-thomism
will be inserted. (p. ll4)
Part Two deals with the intervention of Leo XIII in three chapters,
culminating in chapter VII, " Papal Thomism. " Thibault gives a resume
of some twelve encyclicals and official acts of Leo XIII (from 1878 to
1901) to recall how he has systematically sought to restore a certain
politics, the philosophical framework of which was the thomistic doctrine.
Leo XIII's " grande politique " assumed a certain relationship between the

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Church and secular governments: the latter were indirectly subject to
the former. The Church alone possesses the solution of social problems.
She can offer her services to the established powers disquieted by the
rise of socialist aspirations.
Part Three is concerned with the permanent vocation of thomism. While
reading this section the reviewer remembered a statement from one of
Christopher Dawson's Medieval Essays: "It is impossible to understand
the history of the medieval church, and its relations with the State and
to social life in general if we treat it in the analogy of modem conditions. "
Thibault contends that what thomism was for Leo XIII in the 19th century
has always been its vocation. In the Middle Ages the success of Thomist
politics precedes that of its apologetics. The thomists rallied to the defence
of Boniface VIII over the gallican question (Phillip le Bel) . Thomism
is situated in the long tradition of clerical theocracy. Thibault says,
quoting Gilson, that " with St. Thomas, we remain on the level of papal
theocracy, which does not consist in suppressing the temporal power of
princes, but in subordinating it to the royalty of the earthly vicar of Christ
the King. " (p. 207) He seems to think there is a connection between the
career of St. Thomas at the papal court (1259-65, 1267, 1268) and the
content of his doctrine. The pattern set by St. Thomas vis-a-vis the
augustinians and averroists is the very same pattern we find throughout
the history of thomism. An important section in this part of the book is
"Epistemology and Power."
I think this Part Three needs to be
challenged most. I wonder what Ignatius Eschmann would have said
about it. His edition of the De Regimine Principum is not listed, but
apparently it has not been studied.
Recently J. K. Galbraith wrote a book in which he demonstrates that
economics is a branch of politics in contemporary America. Pierre Thibault
has written this book in which he shows, with the help of the sociology of
knowledge, that theology and philosophy in the 19th century were branches
of papal politics. It is indeed a challenging book. In the age of Watergate
the language is alas too familiar! Let the author have the last word:
Pour le thomisme, done, l'exigence de la transcendance et de sa revelation
surnaturelle est en droit accessible a tous. On peut pretendre sommer !'intelligence
de la percevoir, ou au moins taxer d'infirmite ou de malhonnetete quiconque
pretend n'en avoir pas une vision claire. Mais cette demarche de !'intelligence
ne peut que la conduire humblement a la porte de l'Eglise-le thomisme est une
sorte of Canossa inteUectud-laquelle detient seule l'essentiel de la verite. (p.
author's emphasis)

THoMAS J. A. HARTLEY
Centennial College
Scarborough, Ontario
Canada

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Problems of Marriage and Sexuality Today. By PETER J. RmA. New
York: Exposition Press. Pp. 126. $5.00.
The prolific Peter J. Riga has in this book turned his hand to some of
the problems surrounding the understanding of sexuality and the meaning
of marriage in a way that is much less than the " definitive treatment "
advertized on the jacket of the book. What we have here is a popular
exposition of some of the themes drawn from the biblical and phenomenological fields that are now the argot of a renewed moral theology. There
is also a treatment of several specific problems arising to-day:
"The
New Morality" Abortion, Over-Population, Women's Liberation, etc., as
well as several pages of advice to pastors on how to direct their
apostolates towards the needs of the threatened nuclear family. This is a
useful book for young adults, young marrieds, and those who serve them.
WILLIAM J. HAYES, O.P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Psychology for Church Leaders Series. By GARY R. CoLLINS. Vol. m.
Fractured Personalities: The Psychology of Mental Illness. Carol
Stream, Ill.: Creation House, 1972. Pp. 217. $2.95.
This volume is not intended to be a comprehensive introduction to the
field of mental illness but psychological conclusions which are most relevant
and practical for a church leader. An earlier volume imparted an understanding of counseling skills. More than skills are needed, and so this
book's purpose is to give the church leader some knowledge about the
nature and causes of mental illness. The author does this very well.
According to Collins, a normal person is one who is at peace with society,
himself, and God. A person is abnormal if he is at odds with the social
expectations of his society or experiences internal conflict which leads to
intense and prolonged feelings of insecurity, anxiety or unhappiness.
Finally, a person is abnormal if he is alienated from God.
Abnormality is considered under the concepts of cause, symptom,
diagnosis, treatment, and types. Collins is more successful in integrating
the religious dimensions than in previous volumes of this series. Each
chapter contains a discussion of the related religious dimensions, and he
is convinced that religion has a role in overcoming mental stress. In fact,
the pastor has a unique role in dealing with the mentally disturbed, and
he should be a member of the hospital team. Clinical Pastoral Education
and similar programs are assisting chaplains and pastors to handle this

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791

role in hospital settings. Collins is of the opinion that many forms of
therapy ignore the spiritual needs of man.
The church counselor should let his values be known, because " the
counselor's ethics, values and philosophy influence and even determine the
goals of therapy. It follows that counselor values will also influence the
methods and techniques which are means toward these goals." (p. 109)
He seems to opt for the idea that a client should choose a counselor with
the same value system.
The rather complex material of abormal behavior is handled with great
clarity of language. Its intended audience should be able to grasp the
material with relative ease.
The present volume makes more generous use of case studies and
overcomes one of the criticisms this reviewer made about volumes I and II
in the series. Each chapter has a short annotated bibliography, and the
general bibliography and index are also most helpful.
Fractured Personalities is a good introduction for the seminary student or
church leader with little background in abnormal behavior. It can also
serve as a refresher or a handy reference book for the busy experience
pastor.
WILLIAM J. NESSEL, o. s. F. s.
Cluster of lndepemdent Theological Schools
Washington, D. C.

The Self Beyond: Toward Life's Meaning. By BENJAMIN S. LLAMZON.
Chicago: Loyola Press, 1973. Pp. 184. $5.95.
The meaning of life is correlative to the nature of personhood; the
meaning of life is the meaning in terms of the person, and a person, as
reflective consciousness, is perforce intimately connected with " meaning. "
As the author puts it: " the problems of the self and the meaning-of-life
question are merely two different aspects of the very same reality." (p. 37)
Granting the correlation, there are many ways the reality may be
approached. Dr. Llamzon, whose book is a moderately long philosophical
essay on the topic, chooses to strike for the heart of human personhood and,
in terms of his solution of this long-debated puzzle, unfold what he
conceives to be the essential dynamic in terms of which its meaning-of-life
emerges.
He selects, for the essence of the person, the free and reflexive will, the
juncture in man of being and becoming, the meeting ground of the " is "
and the " ought. " He proposes, as the meaning-full process of the self,
the growth in love as a wholing process, the impulsion of the fragment
towards the whole.

BOOK RlllvD!IWS

By way of evaluation, we should note what this procedure accomplishes
and what it leaves unaccomplished. The first point at issue is, of course,
the election of " free and reflexive will " as the essence of human personhood,
which invites us to re-introduce the unending debates of the intellectualists
the voluntarists. It is probably wiser, however, to resist the
invitation. A review of this caliber is not the forum in which core
philosophical controversies are best debated, nor is Dr. Llamzon concerned
in his work with the final distinctive nicety which most aptly defines the
person. As long as voluntarists admit that the will is the will of a conscious
being whose knowing what he is willing is the significance of the willing,
and intellectualists allow that a self-consciousness without a self-determinism
is an unreal and eviscerated conception, there is enough agreement for
progress. In any realistic consideration of human personhood both aspects
have to be given full valuation, and if it exercises and intrigues subtle
minds to inquire into their relative preeminence, minds with other concerns
can validly, without prejudice to the arguments they are further developing,
decide the issue by simple election.
Dr. Llamzon is, in any event, not presenting a tightly argued position.
He proceeds from point to point juxtaposing his progressive steps rather
loosely, depending on the appeal of the over-all position more than on
the intrinsic necessities of his series of links. Furthermore, he does not
aim at presenting a total picture of the dynamics of the human person in
relation to the meaning of life. He singles out what he considers the
primal and ultimate dynamic-love as a wholing process, and relates this
dynamic and its implications to several of life's crucial issues-encounter,
infinity, marriage, death, and rests his case. This procedure leaves
essential elements of the human person unconsidered and unrelated. There
are the vital differences of sex and individuality, the intricate process of
growth and maturation and the critical issues of "timing " in relation to
a person's successful wholing. There are the issues of love as a sharing
process and reverence as a recognition of the unsharable, the relation of
achieving and sharing as mutually enchancing one another or as mutually
opposing each other, the relation of .the individual to those he loves within
the system of rights and obligations established by community, the
relations of needs to be fulfilled to the call to transcend needs, the
relations of individuals as fragments to each other's whole and participations in a divine whole, the relation of urge and affect pressures on the
cognitive processes and the subrelation of their effect on the actual process
of arriving at meaning in life.
There are the inequalities of persons and their consequent distribution
into hierarchies and the effects this has on their modes of wholing, and
there are the balances of freedom and commitment and submission to
restraint to be worked out as the wholing process unfolds. There is
personal vocation and destiny to be sought within and perhaps outside of

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798

whaling and incidentals like premature tragedy and unforeseen good fortune.
And finally, if the thrust toward wholing is the supraordinate dynamic in
life, the subordinate dynamics must somehow be related to it: tension
discharge, unfolding, adaptation, homeostasis, personal fulfillment.
It would be unfair to demand that the author engage in the discussion of all these issues in a book that purposes to limit itself to one vital
issue, but it is fair to point out that they exist and must be considered
eventually.
What Dr. Llamzon does is simpler. After an introductory chapter
pressing home the depth of the obscurity of the mystery of the meaning
of life, he argues to the conclusions that the heart of man is the free,
reflexive will, and the meaning of life is the whaling process of love. He
touches briefly on Greek and Medieval ideas of love as whaling, and
then, more extensively, on Christian love as purely altruistic (Bishop
Anders Nygren) and Christian love as both self-and other-centered (Martin
D'Arcy, S. J.), with additional insights from Kierkegaard and Bonhoeffer.
He enlarges the concept with contributions from depth psychology
(Freud), and existentialism (Marcel), and finally, to bring all the
preceding into focus and to indicate where his own preferences lie, he
presents Jules Toner's theory of radical love. In the last three chapters
of the book he applies his conclusions of love to friendship, to love in
marriage, and to love and death.
In sum, Dr. Llamzon has presented the results of his own earnest study
of the meaning of self and self's meaning in life, not to end but further
the search.
MICHAEL STOCK 0. P.
St. Stephen's Priory
Dover, Mass.

Plato. By GEORGE KIMBALL PLOCHMANN. New York:
Co., Inc., 1973. Pp. 543. $1.95.

Dell Publishing

The Unity of the Platonic Dialogue. By RoDOLF H. WEINGARTNER.
Indianapolis and New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., Inc., 1973.
Pp. 215. $2.95.
Despite the different aims of these two books there is a common ground:
their authors share a conviction that interpretation of Plato must take into
consideration the wholeness and unity of the Platonic writings. Indeed the
authors see their task as partly the rescue of Plato from the hands of
contemporary philosophers who persist in dissecting his writings into short
passages and subject them to analysis, apart from the context of his
dialogues.

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Thus Weingartner is critical of approaches to Plato that tend to
isolate and interpret independently parts of what Plato wrote from the
context of the whole dialogue, and also of those scholars who take the
pronouncements of the participants of the dialogues to be in a sense beyond
the dialogue in which they occur, to be contributions to a Platonic doctrine.
He sums up this approach-which he calls the "doctrinal view "-as
follows:
Whatever the variations, however, the distinctive mark of this approach to Plato's
work is the dual assumption that some personages in his dialogues are merely
masks for their creator and that the words they speak may be removed from
their dialogic context and then conjoined to make up a continuous exposition of
the Platonic doctrine. (p. 2)

He is also critical of the approach whereby
Particular arguments, conceptions, or myths, as well as passages that contain
more or less elaborated philosophic principles, are detached from their contexts
and subjected to detailed scrutiny. That Plato wrote dialogues is more often than
not ignored: the words are taken as if they were asserted by their author; no
attention is paid to the fact that they are spoken by one of the characters of his
creation. (p. 3)

Weingartner insists that, despite the fact that the extraction of Platonic
doctrines and the scrutiny of individual passages might produce important
philosophical insights, these approaches are inadequate for understanding
Plato and most probably will lead to distortions of his thought and
intentions. What Plato said cannot be understood without considering the
whole of which isolated passages, arguments or speeches are parts:
Plato wrote dialogues. The dramatic context of a particular argument or speech
may have important bearing on its meaning; to consider a speech or argument
in isolation-however interesting it may be when taken up for its own sake--may
not lead to an understanding of what the dialogue actually says. And because
Plato wrote dramatic works, the whole is greater than the sum of its parts. It
therefore cannot be taken for granted that when interpretations of isolated passages
are placed side by side, the result will be an understanding of a Platonic dialogue
as a whole. (pp. 3-4)

Similarly, Plochmann is concerned with the dangers of scrutinizing
individual passages without considering the unity of the Platonic dialogue:
Not everything is of equal weight in assuring the unity and coherence of a
dialogue, not everything is of equal weight in forcing a correct interpretation upon
us. The " seeing" of truth which the dialogues in some measure afford us is
contingent upon our being aware of the sources of the unity of each work; this
is a far cry from happening across some impressive passage and pulling it out of
the dialogue and merely agreeing with it, for such a reading, however sympathetic,
is really a dismemberment, and plunges us back into the particular, the episodic-into becoming (p. 98).

BOOK REVIEWS

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In fact, Plochmann finds faults with the common ways of interpreting
Plato. (pp. 31-34) And although he will use the good features of these
types of interpretations, he himself insists that the Platonic writings must
be looked at in the way that is appropriate to a dialogue. He distinguishes
three components of the dialogue form as perceived by Plato: (a) Sentences
of opinion and of reasoned conviction; (b) The dialogic component-i.e.,
the participants of the dialogues, each with his character, experience,
background (pp.
(c) The dramatic devices-i.e., scene, movements
And although
of participants, entrances and exists, gestures. (pp.
the author seems to agee with most scholars that philosophical ideas are
of paramount importance for Plato, he nonetheless claims that Plato wrote
as he did for good reasons, namely,
... to demonstrate the relation between what a participant says and what he
himself is... .Philosophical concepts are not connected in propositions in a vacuum,
but in a concrete context of human beings and their very complex interrelationship.
What Plato is attempting to accomplish is nothing less than a union, little tried
and very rarely succeeded in by other philosophers, of a drama and conflict of
ideas and the similar but not quite parallel drama and conflict of persons .... To
both of these the " dramatic touches " provide vivid clues, but only clues, for they
are not substantive statements and proofs. (pp. 26-27)

I do not think many scholars would disagree with Plochmann's contention
that the dramatic elements of the Platonic dialogue must be taken into
account. To do so, however, in a way that is both interesting and illuminating philosophically is not an easy task-and is moreover a task at which
Plochmann largely fails. He contents himself with sporadic generalities and
vague statements about the dramatic elements of the dialogues which fail
to provide insight into the philosophical ideas Plato is examining.
Plochmann's book consists of selections from Plato's writings with
schematic outlines (pp. 155-534) and a long introductory essay. (pp. 9-155)
The selections include the Ion, Protagoras, Symposium, Apology, Phaedo,
Republic (Books VI in part, VII, VIII, IX in part), Timaeus (in part),
and Critias. The author uses the Jowett translations but only mentions
this indirectly on p. 158, an unhelpful omission. The introductory essay
contains some biographical material (pp.
and some general remarks
about the Platonic corpus and the problems with interpreting it (pp.
;
but the greatest part is devoted to a discussion of the Platonic Philosophy,
(pp.
and of Platonism and the History of Western Thought. (pp.
The discussion of the Platonic Philosophy covers God and the
Gods, Cosmos and Animal, Man's Soul, The Virtues, The Arts, The State,
Education, Mathematics, Types of Cognition, Ideas or Forms, Truth and
Being, Dialectic, Eight Impostor Methods. These same topics are then
discussed in the section on Platonism and the History of Western Thought,
where the author traces the influence of Platonism in subsequent Western
thought.

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It would be impossible to discuss all of the above topics critically and in
detail here. I will therefore make some general comments and then briefly
touch on two or three of these topics. Plochmann's writing is certainly
neither the most clear nor the most precise in the philosophical literature.
Excessive use of figurative, metaphorical, and allegorical language often
makes it difficult to see what he has in mind. What is gained, for example,
by writing in the following manner?
It seems that something would try to creep in and occupy the honorable
place of dialectic, unseat it, shame it, and dismiss it as being of no consequence. To
accomplish this such an imposter would be required either to look very much like
dialectic-so that only a close dialectical examination could show up the differences--or else be able to refute dialectic, or both. (p. 116)

At other times it is hard to believe that Plochmann is serious-especially in
his discussion of the history of Platonism. This part of the introductory
essay consists primarily of vague generalizing statements without clearly
defined terms, and of assertions without evidence, concerning the influence
of Platonism that will certainly amaze even the most fertile imagination.
On p. 131 he writes that
... the conception of a host of lesser divinities and demigods which we find in
the Timaeus, Republic, Phaedrus, and elsewhere, is transmuted into the Christian
doctrine of the angels, principalities, and powers, levels of goodness and semi-divine
strength.

And noticing that in contemporary thinking the existence of these divine
beings has been denied, Plochmann concludes by saying that
This does not mean that the issue is settled, but we should point out again that
the struggle in the pulpit mirrors exactly the dilemmas which Plato's Socrates
had to face, both within himself and in the court of his accusers.

On the same page, commenting on Plato's influence on later conceptions
of the Cosmos and Animal, Plochmann writes:
Plato's atomism is joined with his theory of an active soul in the monadic centers
of spiritual force that are forever associated with the name of Leibniz, and his
atoms, deprived of their ability to develop spirituaJ!y, are again found in the
"hard, massy particles that never wear" of Sir Isaac Newton.

we learn that " a theory, called vitalism, is a simplification of
On p.
what Plato says concerning the primacy of reason and soul. " On
p. 134 that " one interesting sidelight on the influence of Platonism in
the twentieth century, especially in the United States, is the tremendous
upsurge of enthusiasm for the art of astrology." The list of assertions of this
type is far too long to be given in its entirety here. But no reviewer of
this book would want to deprive his readers of the following two passages

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797

which seem to me to be some of the more bewildering assertions about the
history of Platonism. Discussing Plato's contribution as a philosopher of
education on pp. 140-141, Plochmann writes:
Socrates' method seems to require individual attention, penetrating insight, and
many gifts of patient and inspired explanation and interrogation.
Where does
one get a chance to practice this? Perhaps in the best graduate colleges or
tutorial systems, but certainly nowhere else. Consequently the educators have
proposed that machines supplement live teachers, and do the drilling. This
overlooks the fact that the drilling is not always a matter of bare repetition,
which thus far is all that a computer can perform. On the other hand, computers
are barely three decades old, and perhaps some day a little part of the Socratic
ideal might be realized in them.

And concluding his discussion of the influences of Plato's theory of Forms
on subsequent thought, Plochmann writes:
Because devices of persuasion of the masses have received so much suspicious
attention in the past four decades, we have become highly sensitive to the use of
universal expressions. Thus, " glittering generalities " is a term of disapproval,
and indeed one need do little more than charge an opponent with using one of
these in order to discredit him. By coincidence, we have in these same decades
seen the decimation and even the disappearance of species after species of animal,
owing to the befouling of earth and atmosphere, and this too has shaken the belief
in any kind of type or form more permanent than the individual. At the moment,
then, the existence of the species as anything more than a word is generally held
up to doubt, if not to scorn.

Turning now to the discussions of the various topics that make up the
Platonic Philosophy, it is obvious that, although the discussions vary
somewhat in quality, all suffer from lack of clarity, vagueness, and the
author's unwillingness to discuss in depth the main ideas of Plato. Although
the discussions of Cosmos and Animal, Man's Soul, and Dialectic fare better
than those of other topics, some of the important topics of Platonism,
however, are treated in the most inadequate way. Take for example the
discussion on the State, and in particular Plochmann's account of the
Republic. Plochmann in one paragraph mentions very briefly the whole
problem of social justice and its relation to the individual soul. His
account is simply that,
The excellences, or virtues, of the three pairs [three parts of the soul and three
classes] are, in order, wisdom, courage, and temperance.
But this ignores the
unity, the cohesiveness, both of the soul and of the state, and justice is the principle
of this balance in the soul and the state. To each faculty, to each class, belongs
its own function; this is the essence of political justice, as opposed to busybodying or meddling, which is the principal meaning of injustice. (p. 65)

I doubt that this discussion will be of any use to a student of Plato
attempting to understand the important problems of the Republic. I find

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the discussion on Education equally inadequate. Commenting on the
apparent contradiction between the conclusions of Meno-that virtue comes
from divine dispensation-and that of the Protagoras-where Socrates
claims that virtue is not knowledge and hence is not teachable, and
Protagoras claims the contrary-Plochmann says that this seems to be
contradictory till we see the following: (a) In the Meno, unlike the
Protagoras, " we are dealing with rough-and-ready formulas about
virtue .... which may or may not be satisfactory (the gods will decide!) as
(b) "In the Protagoras the issue
a guide to action in the community."
is between the Sophist's day-to-day compound of instruction and persuasion
which is evidently not based upon sound principles ... and Socrates' more
exact, thoughtful instruction which uses the most careful tests for all ideas
at issue, and which is aimed at the reform of one's character. " (p. 74)
Plochmann never makes clear where the apparent contradiction between the
conclusions of M eno and the Protagoras is nor how the above distinctions
do away with it. He then argues that this same problem can be viewed
from a different perspective, i. e., the role of tradition in education. He
takes Plato and Socrates to have emphasized this role of tradition and
writes:
Plato, then, is telling us that tradition is one of the fundamental factors required
in any successful grasp of teaching, whether it be the dry and pedestrian arguments
of Parmenides or the lightfooted treading by Socrates in his more prankish moods.
The sense of time and of the past and change is of the utmost importance to
Plato, who evidently scorned those who thought they had been born yesterday.
(pp. 75-76)

He then turns to the "politics of education" where he discusses Plato's
account of education in the Republic. This discussion stays on the whole
close to the surface and fails to bring out any of the philosophical issues
and problems. Why does Plato think that his account of education would
be conducive to virtue? What are the psychological theories underlying his
views on education?
The discussion of the Forms and of Being and Truth seem to me, however,
to be the most inadequate. In reading Plochmann's account of the Forms
I found it impossible to determine what he takes these entities to be. He
writes,
It makes a difference to man whether ideas exist; the only thing is, they exist
in many senses, but to assert that they also exist in certain other senses winds
up in nonsense. Socrates is not impartial. but he is highly selective. We might
say that all beautiful girls are beautiful, for example, not because of certain
details of nose, eyes, hair, etc., but because they imitate or participate in an idea
of beauty-this is Socrates' proposal, and Parmenides misses the point in thinking
that there must be a part-by-part or whole-by-whole correspondence between
thing and idea. (p. 94)

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799

Whatever the first part of this passage means, the last part of it is
certainly mistaken. Parmenides had a point and Plato was well aware of
its significance, which Plochmann misses. In trying to elucidate the
permanence of the Forms, he writes:
We should say that the idea of the number three, which is different from the
number two, is permanent in the sense that whatever is two will never become three,
what is even will never become odd (Phaedo 106b), and what is intelligible in
this way will never become unknowable. (p. 96)

This cannot be true. If it was, then the idea of Beauty (Justice, Piety,
Goodness, Largeness, etc.) is permanent in the sense that whatever is
beautiful (just, pious, good, etc.) will never become ugly (unjust, impious,
bad, etc.). If Platonists ever agreed about anything, it seems to me they
agree that Plato never said anything like the above.
I will conclude by touching upon Plochmann's discussion of Being. He
says with regard to change that there are four possibilities: (1) "No
changes, only static being";
(Q) "only uniform change, with no other
(3) "only random change";
(4) "If, on the other
being, no fixity";
hand, the world at large is made up of all of the first three ... then what
we have is a vastly complicated set of adjustments as being, uniformity,
and randomness rule, now in one way, now in another." (p. 99) Plochmann
thinks that Plato takes the cosmos to be as described by the last
alternative, i. e., that it has all three aspects. He then tries to show that
the dialogues themselves display this threefold " layered " aspect: fixed
structures, e. g., the necessities of proof; transient but predictable
events, e. g., the execution of Socrates after sentence had been passed and
after he had refused to escape from prison; chance occasions, e. g.,
unforeseen meetings, interruptions, misunderstandings. He then goes on to
argue that all these aspects must be reconciled in order to see the true
relation between being and becoming in Plato's thought:
These three are not easy to reconcile, but they must be reconciled, or we miss what
is most important in Plato. Nor is it easy to tag a single incident or personage
with a single designation: wei are tempted to think of Socrates, the man having
wisdom, as representative of being, of stability, of permanence. But at the end of
the Symposiumr--a colossal masterpiece, by the way-he is not deified, he is
not revealed as anything more than a man who is somewhat baffiing to his admirers:
and he goes about the business of the day, which is to say he is again taken up
with becoming. In the Phaedo, which can well claim to be the literary .equal of
the Symposium, Socrates really dies and is not resurrected, as we have already
pointed out. So in any literal sense we cannot assume for him any special privilege
of a higher cosmic rank, a divine nature. (p. 100)

I hope the reader will find this explanation of Being and Becoming more
illuminating than I do--otherwise he will be in the dark.
I am quite certain that the reader will find Weingartner's book vastly

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superior to Plochmann's. Weingartner writes clearly and precisely. He
judiciously examines the Platonic texts as well as the secondary literature
on the topics he discusses. The reader will profit from the careful
analysis of these texts, even if he disagrees with some of Weingartner's
interpretation. The most important aspect of Weingartner's book is its
thesis about the way the Platonic texts must be interpreted in order to
determine what Plato himself wanted to say, convey, or show.
Weingartner points out that Plato wrote dialogues in which he never
himself appears as participant. It would be a mistake therefore to
disregard this dramatic idiom and take the utterances of the participants
of the Platonic dialogues as being statements of Plato's own philosophical
positions:
Plato wrote dialogues: a mind-one that is not identical with the minds of
Socrates, the Stranger, Parmenides, Callicles, Protagoras, Meno, and all the
rest-composed each of the works, and for a purpose that is not the same as the
purposes displayed by these characters. p. 6)

It would be equally a mistake, according to Weingartner, to take the
dialogues to be historical accounts of what these participants said and did
at particular places and times. Rather
The existence of those words and gestures can be accounted for only by reference
to the author of the dialogue in his role as philosopher-artist .... Once again we
must interpret the various components of the dialogue as fulfilling an authors
purpose, a purpose that goes far beyond recording what might in fact have
happened. (p. 10)

Plato's purpose, acr.ording to Weingartner, is to "speak to his readers
through his dialogues. " Plato, by means of his dialogues, conveys
philosophical themes. A theme is something that unifies a particular
dialogue itself:
Plato is not reduced to choosing between showing and saying: a dialogue may
have a theme-even a conclusion-which is Plato's and not that of his creatures,
a theme which is upheld by the entire work, although it may never be explicitly
stated within it ... The theme of a Platonic dialogue is extrinsic to it only in the
sense that it is not stated as such by one of the participants in the discussion;
in a vital, though different, sense it is an all-pervasive feature of the work. (pp.
6-7)

But if a theme is not stated in a dialogue, what is the evidence that Plato
was conveying such themes? We can only support a claim about the theme
of a particular dialogue by a close examination of that dialogue, by showing
how the theme unifies the dialogue and makes its parts intelligible:
No evidence can be given for such a claim about the Platonic dialogues in general;
support must come from the detailed examination of particular works ... Evidence
that Plato was conveying specific philosophical themes by means of his dialogues

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801

must take the form of showing how, on the one hand, that theme unifies the
work and renders it a whole and, on the other, how it makes intelligible its
component parts-- speeches, arguments, characterizations--in
relation to each
other. (pp. 7-8)

The aim of Weingartner's book is precisely this: to examine three of
Plato's dialogues-CratylU$, Protagoras, and Parm.enides-and show how
each one of them conveys a philosophical theme. But, first, it is not
clear to me on what grounds we can make the general claim Weingartner
makes that what the participants assert are not their own nor Plato's
philosophical views. Undoubtedly this is true in some cases. But are
we to say that what Socrates asserts about the Forms in the Phaedo and
Republic are not Plato's positions-at least at that stage of his philosophical
development? And are we to say that Socrates' assertions in the Republic
regarding Justice, the State, etc., are not accounts of Plato's views on
these matters? I doubt that Weingartner would want to say this. For he
himself takes the Parmenides to be primarily an effort to resolve some of
the difficulties with the theory of Forms of the Middle Dialogues, a theory
which he takes to be Plato's own theory. Second, there is a danger in
finding a theme extrinsic- to a dialogue-even if such a theme unifies the
whole dialogue-and claiming that this is what Plato wants to convey.
For there is always the danger of leaving the texts behind and making
claims about Plato's philosophical beliefs which are not to be found stated
anywhere in the texts. We shall see below that Weingartner himself does
not manage to avoid this danger.
Turning now to a brief discussion of the individual dialogues, Weingartner
claims that, through the subject of discussion in the CratylU$ is the true
nature of names, the " single overriding purpose " (p. 15) is to convey the
following theme: " Hermogenes and Cratylus maintain theories of naming
which, were they sound, would make dialectic impossible. Plato's aim is
to keep the way clear for dialectic inquiry." (p. 8, see also p. 16)
Weingartner then sketches the theories of Hermogenes and Cratylus about
the nature of names and attempts to show how they would make dialectic
impossible. He then argues that Socrates puts forward a third theory which
would make dialectic possible. I cannot discuss here all of Weingartner's
contentions about the Cratylus, although I think that many of them are
not borne out by the text. I will say a few things about the three
theories of the nature of names and their relation to dialectic. In discussing
Hermogenes' theory Weingartner focuses only on Hermogenes' extreme form
of conventionalism, or what we should rather call naming by fiat or
autonomous idiolects. He fails to see that Hermogenes puts forward several
other forms of conventionalism. Weingartner then claims that Hermogenes'
naming by fiat makes dialectic impossible. (p. 18) However, even if this
"\Vere true, it is not clear that it applies to all the other forms of convention.;

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alism advanced by Hermogenes at. the opening of the Cratylus. In any
case, one would not find in the text any indication that even naming by
fiat makes dialectic impossible. No such thing is discussed in Socrates'
attempt to refute Hermogenes' extreme form of conventionalism. And
Weingartner's only evidence comes from Socrates' remarks against
Heracliteanism at the end of the dialogue. But I fail to see what this has
to do with Hermogenes' position. Concerning Cratylus' theory Weingartner
claims that, if the nature of names were what Cratylus claims it is, one
would have the nature of the thing named represented in the name. And
therefore there would be no room for dialectic inquiry into the nature of
things. Again there is nowwhere in the dialogue a discussion that I know
of concerning this claim. In any case I find this a worthless argument
against Cratylus and one that it is not likely to be Plato's argument. I
know of no place where Plato makes dialectic an end in itself. He rather
thinks of it as a means to attaining the truth about the nature of
things. And if one has the truth in the names of things, so much
the worse for dialectic. Indeed, Socrates expresses a preference for a
for
language consisting of natured names-in Cratylus'
the reason that such names would give one the truth about the nature of
things. Weingartner claims, contrary to what practically all others have
written, that Socrates puts forward a theory on the nature of names which
is different from the ones advanced by Hermogenes and C:t:atylus. He
nowhere, however, states precisely what his theory is. At one point he says
that " If the shift from names to naming is not seen, the fact that
Socrates and Cratylus maintain very different positions can never become
clear.,. (p. 29) He then goes on to say that it is the user of names who
determines their adequacy in relation to their function. (p. 84) And that
for Socrates
correctness of names is measured by their suitability for
the dialectician's work. (p. 85) I do not see, however, how all this
constitutes a theory. And I think a close reading of the text shows that
Socr!ltes' .discussion of the function of names is but one step in a long
argument to refute Hermogenes' conventionalism and establish that there
must be what Cratylus calls natural correctness in names. All in all,
I believe a close examination of the text will show that Weingartner's
claimed theme has very little to do with what the Cratylus is all about-but
this is no place to discuss what the theme of the dialogue is.
Weingartner's discussion of the Protagoras, to which the greater part of
his book is devoted, is certainly on better grounds. The author makes
niany :
remarks about the personages of the
bli:ck!!'l'oui::td, mannerisms, behavior, speeches, claims to
carefully. analyzes
is . asserted by .them. At the same time he'
oontinuously focuses the discussion on what he takes to be the theme of·
. and tries to shpw how each part of the dialogue points
the
this theine:
·
·

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803

Plato pits two conceptions of morality and education against each other and
shows, by means of a dramatic interchange between Socrates and Protagoras, that
the very problems the Sophist aims to solve require the philosophic methods and
commitments of Plato's Socrates. The many components of the dialogue can,
in this way, be seen as constituting a unified work. (p. 10, see also pp. 45, 46, 47)

Protagoras, according to Weingartner, represents the uncritical educator
and moralist. He accepts without examination the customs, practices, and
precepts of the many as being what the good life is-although, unlike the
poets, he reflects upon these practices, customs, etc., by finding and
articulating the principles that are implicit in them (p. 65) . And he
professes to be an educator of virtue without examining whether and how
it can be taught. Socrates, on the other hand, represents the critical
mind. He forces Portagoras to see the problems and even contradictions
in the views of the many about morality-e. g., the unity of virtue, the
relation of knowledge and virtue, the involuntariness of evil, the role of
knowledge in action, etc. He also forces Protagoras to examine what he
takes for granted in his role as the great teacher: that virtue can be taught.
Here then Plato paints a contrast of two types: the unphilosophic one who
does not inquire but settles for easy answers, and the philosophic one whose
method is critical and whose goal is truth.
The last chapter of the book deals with the Parmenides. The relation of
the two parts of the dialogue has always been a puzzle. As Weingartner
points out, even Ryle, who ventured a suggestion as to how the two parts are
related, later admitted his attempt to unify the dialogue " may have been
gratuitous." Weingartner thinks that Ryle gave up too easily. He claims
that there is a theme which the dialogue conveys and which in turn
unifies its two parts:
Plato is here [in the Parmenides] engaged in revising his views on both the method
by which knowledge is attained and on the nature of the objects of knowledge
themselves.
This principal not only holds together the two major parts
of the dialogue, but serves as a key, as well, to the puzzle of the first
section .... I propose to show that if the arguments Parmenides makes against the
forms are taken mtmulatively, that is, in relation to one another and to the purpose
of the entire series, a good deal of the mystery that has surrounded them
disappears (pp.

Weingartner concentrates almost exclusively on a discussion of the first
part of the Parmenides, and at the end of the chapter indicates how the
problems raised in the first part are related to those raised in the second.
He claims that in the first part Plato is re-examining the theory of Forms
that was presented in the Middle Dialogues. In that theory Forms play
various roles: they are paradigms, exemplars of the highest reality and
value, having causal functions, and they are also universals. The Forms are
the only objects of knowledge and the method of knowledge in the Middle

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Dialogues is " hypothesis and deduction." In the Parmenides he came to
realize that there are problems and contradictions involved in the above
conception of the Forms. In a careful discussion of the two versions of the
Third Man Argument, Weingartner argues that Plato comes to realize that
it is the self-predication of Forms-a necessary element in the conception of
Forms as exemplars-that leads into infinite regress and that therefore it must
be abandoned. (pp. 155-178, 191-194} This criticism, together with the other
ones raised by Parmenides, of the conception of Forms as exemplars, is
related to what Plato discusses in the second part of the dialogue. For
Plato there, according to Weingartner," investigates a number of hypotheses
regarding the relation of the One to the other Forms." (p. 195) That
is, we have here a preliminary working out of the method of Collection and
Division which is to be developed fully in the Sophist and Statesma:n. This
method studies the " weaving together " and " blending " of the Forms.
But, Weingartner argues, " self-predictional paradigms are eminently unfit
for such exercises, " since paradigms are viewed as " super-particulars "
which do not blend. (p. 196) Thus emerges is a new theory of Forms,
which is articulated fully in the later dialogues.
Such forms cannot be model instances, but are more likely criteria which models
of that sort must satisfy. They are not super-things to be seen by the mind's eye,
but definitional principles to be arrived at by reflection... the form of Plato's
late dialogues are genuinely objects of knowledge: while it would be wrong to
say that they are linguistic in nature, they are very like the definitions that tell
what characteristics things have (p. 197) .

I certainly find the above suggestion of Weingartner concerning the
unity of the Parmenides to be interesting. It seems to me, however, almost
impossible to determine its validity without a careful examination of the
second part of the dialogue. Weingartner does not offer an analysis of
that part to show that in fact Plato there investigates how the One blends
with the other Forms. But whatever the results of such an analysis might
be, it seems to me there is a puzzle here in calling the suggestion about
the unity of the Parmenides the theme of the dialogue. For in what sense
is this extrinsic to or conveyed by the dialogue? The arguments of the first
part are explicitly a re-examination and criticism of the Forms and do not
merely " convey " or " point " to a certain theme. This, however, does
not detract from the value of Weingartner's suggestion concerning the unity
of the dialogue; it only raises a doubt about the preciseness of the notion
of a theme as a tool for interpreting Plato's writings and the usefulness of
its application to every dialogue.
Finally, the book closes with a brief discussion of the place of the Timaeus
in the order of the dialogues. Weingartner is aware that the theory of
Forms in the Timaeus is the theory we find in the Middle Dialogues and
not the theory which, according to Weingartner, Plato held in the late

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805

dialogues. And this conflicts with the traditional view that the dialogue
is one of the latest. The author is not eager to accept G. E. L. Owen's
thesis that the Timaeus belongs to the period close to the Republic,
although it would be consistent with his own view of the development of
the theory of forms. And he is not willing to accept that the dialogue
belongs to the late period and " exemplifies a reversion, on the part of
Plato, to an earlier view; the dialogue is a symptom of a relapse, so to
speak." (p. f.!OO) Weingartner then offers an interesting suggestion which
is consistent with placing the Timaeus in the late period but does not fall
back to claiming a relapse on Plato's part. Rather, he claims that the
different conceptions of Forms were arrived at by Plato in order to solve
at least two types of problems: logical and metaphysical. And that in the
Parmenides Plato does not really abandon either of these conceptions but
rather separates them or sorts them out. Plato, then, never made a final
choice between these conceptions but utilized the one which was appropriate to the problems that concerned him at the moment:
One conception of forms is subsequently utilized in the late " analytic " dialogues
as the object of a dialectic that is understood to be collection and division, while
forms as exemplars are utilized in the cosmology of the Timaeus . ... Without
impatience, he [Plato] refrains from a final commitment and eschews converting
reflections into doctrines. (p. 201)

GEORGIOS ANAGNOSTOPOULOS
University of California
San Diego, California

Language and Belief. By JEAN LADRIERE. Notre Dame:
Notre Dame Press, 197f.l. Pp. f.l04. $10.95.

University of

Collected essays written at unrelated occasions are by their nature
likely to be slightly disparate, occasionally repetitious, and generally
sketchy in their argumentation.
In view of those inherent defects one
is all the more struck by the unifying power of Ladriere's collection. The
author, professor in the philosophy of science at the University of Louvain,
skillfully controls a number of fields and manages to create synthetic unity
out of an impressive diversity of subjects. Specialist in formal logic and
the philosophy of science, he handles philosophy of religion, ethical theory,
structuralist theory with equal competence. One of the few important
linguistic analysts outside the Anglo-American world Ladriere refuses to
copulate analysis to the empiricist assumptions which it adopted from the
cultural tradition of its country of origin. In fact, he constantly connects
it with such leading trends in continental philosophy as hermeneutics and
phenomenology, disciplines which the average analyst here has relegated
to the antipodes. Thus Ladriere throws solid bridges between the formal

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systems of the natural sciences, the hermeneutic methods of the human
sciences and metaphysics the science of the totality of real as such. The
first part of his essay on " Science, Philosophy and Faith " is a classic that
deserves to be anthologized in every collection on the scope and method of
philosophy. Yet, beyond this "novum organum" of human knowledge,
Ladriere still feels the need for a further horizon which places the sciences
themselves in a new perspective-the dimension of faith. His discussion
of revelation, religious language and, especially, of the nature and function
of myth reveals an intimate acquaintance with the problems of faith and
its theological articulation.
Personally I feel some reservations about treating faith and revelation
exclusively from a Christian and, indeed, Barthian perspective, without
placing it in the totality of the religious experience as such. The scientia
universalis becomes somewhat abruptly connected with a particular
theological interpretation of God's "word."
Aside from the selftranscendence suggested in modern science by the principle of indeterminacy
and an allusion about philosophy as circumscribing the locus of revelation,
Lang'!Wge and Belief contains little of what used to be "natural theology"
and what has at least partly been revived and rejuvenated in contemporary
studies on the universal nature of the religious experience. The author
feels no need to establish the existence of a religious " universal, " a
" natural " connection with God independent of the particular nature of
the revelation, even though he never denies such a connection.
One other limitation of this rich and evocative book is that, despite its
title, little space is devoted to religious language as such. The conclusion
which deals most directly with it presents more a statement of the problem
than a solution. It focuses on the unique combination of constative with
performative language, which induces the believer to make truth claims.
At any rate, the reader will undoubtedly desire to see this further developed.
But, rather than critizing the author on problems to which he himself
has introduced us, we ought to be grateful for what he has given. Anyone
interested in the question of religious language in its wider scope, or, for
that matter, anyone interested in situating the problem of science within
a fully human context with all its dimensions, may learn from this
excellent book.
Loms DUPRE
Yale University
New Haven, Conn.

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807

Du Langage, A. Martinet et M. Merleau-Ponty. By GHYSLAIN CHARRON.
Editions de L 'Universite d'Ottawa, Collection Philosophica,
Pp. 187.
This book is a careful and intelligent piece of analysis which will be read
with profit by any philosopher interested in the philosophy of language
and, more particularly, in the philosophical (i.e., conceptual) investigation
of contemporary linguistics.
But there is something a little schizophrenic about this work. It
consists of two parts which are more juxtaposed than interrelated. The first
part is a careful, analytical exposition of the major conclusions of A.
Martinet's work in linguistics. The second part is an exposition of the
linguistic philosophy of Merleau-Ponty.
The purpose of the author, as
stated in the preface, is to teach philosophers something of what they need
to know about contemporary linguistics and at the same time to teach
the linguists why philosophers continue to be interested in the problems
of language even after the creation of their new science. Why is it that even
after the advent of Structuralism some questions about language still
remain which the linguist is incompetent to answer?
Charron takes the corpus of Martinet as typical of the structuralist
approach to language as it was developing in France from 1980-1960, at
the very time during which the first major philosopher of the French
(or any other) tradition began to address himself to its problems in
their importance for philosophy. This exposition is meant to serve as the
basis for a discussion of what the structuralists, on the one side, and the
phenomenologists, on the other, have in common in order to focus on the
points at which they diverge (if we are hard-headed) or at which they
complement one another (if we are more eirenic). The trouble is that
the author is very good at putting himself in the place of and in speaking
the language of each of the combatants; what does not quite come off
is the dialogue which is supposed to take place between them.
The section on Martinet's contributions to linguistics will be very useful
for the non-specialist philosopher who is unacquainted with linguistics.
It is, in fact, an excellent non-technical introduction to the methods of
linguistic structuralism as exemplified in the work on phonology by this
one author. But it is by the same token considerably out of date and
will be of little value to those who have followed the development of
linguistics past Martinet up to the present time, since a large number of
the theses Martinet propounds arid defends {such as, for instance, his
attempt to ·suppress the concept " word " as being insufficientJy rigorous
to be useful in scientific linguistics, pp. 45 ff.) can only be fully understood
in the light of later criticism, refinement, and development. It will also
dissatisfy the linguist inasmuch as we are given here. only Martinet's

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conclusions and none of the reasoning which led him to them. While, at
the same time, the philosophical reader will remark that Martinet was only
one of the structuralists whom Merleau-Ponty read and by whom he was
influenced, others, like Saussure and Guillaume especially, had a much wider
and deeper influence on him.
Nevertheless, in spite of these criticisms, this book serves a good and
important service at the present time. Merleau-Ponty was the first major
philosopher we know of to concern himself with linguistics as a science and
with the importance of this developing science for philosophy.
By
contrast, until most recently, Anglo-American philosophical analysis (in
Wittgenstein, in Ryle, in Austin, in Strawson and their numerous colleagues
and followers) has limited itself almost exclusively to the commonsensical
analysis of speech-acts without showing much interest in the science of
linguistics as such. This state of affairs has now begun to change rapidly,
and we find that many of the younger American philosophers of languageparticularly as a result of the challenges of Chomsky and his students-are
becoming more and more sensitive to scientific linguistics and its value for
philosophy-not only because it gives us a body of scientific literature
which nobody, least of all philosophers, can neglect, but also because of
the importance of the methods of structural linguistics for philosophical
methodology itself.
It is now being proposed by many that the science of structural linguistics
provides us with the best (and perhaps, in the whole history of science,
the first) model of scientific explanation uniquely and specifically applicable
to the human sciences. This structuralist model may very well serve in
the near future to free all the social sciences from their awkward and
increasingly indefensible reliance on the " Galilean " model of scientific
explanation used in the physical sciences. Though most social scientists
still pretend to be using a model of explanation received from physics and
chemistry, the day of Structuralism is dawning and hardly anyone who
has reached his intellectual maturity since 1960 doubts that the discoveries
of structural linguistics (and the various less well developed structuralisms
it has spawned) will revolutionize scientific work as it applies to
specifically human social behavior.
But before we begin to make grandiose claims concerning the importance
of the discoveries of linguistic structuralism for the human sciences in
general we should, perhaps, turn first of all to its importance for philosophy
and that is the aim of the book under review (and it is this which, in
spite of its defects, makes this book worth careful study) . Philosophers
have a special interest in language; from antiquity they have been the
custodians of logic and rhetoric, of the artes sermocirudes, and until the
nineteenth century the only serious studies of language which were
undertaken were from a philosophical and logical point of view; Perhaps
this
the initial reluctance on the part of philosophers to learn still

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another new science. In any case there is no point in our blaming now
either Husserl and the early phenomenologists or their later contemporaries,
the Logical Positivists, for their ignorance of linguistics. Linguistics is a
very young science, younger even than depth psychology, having developed
in recognizable form only within the last forty years. Its founders were
people like Troubetzkoy and Jakobson at Prague, Bloomfeld and Sapir in
the United States, and, above all, Ferdinand de Saussure in the Frenchspeaking world. Martinet, whose work in linguistics is exclusively
examined in this volume, already belongs to the second generation, while
we are living in the third or fourth.
In this book Mr. Charron expounds the thought of Martinet almost
without reference to Merleau-Ponty and then, as if de novo, gives us a
repetition of some well-known themes from Merleau-Ponty's philosophy
of the body, of expression, of the intersensorial unity of human perceptual
experience, almost without reference to Martinet. While his exposition of
Merleau-Ponty's thought on language is very sure and very sound (it is,
in fact, a good introduction to Merleau-Ponty's thought as a whole), it
contains no new revelations or surprises, no new interpretations--not even
in its repetition (following Ricoeur and Lagueux) of Merleau-Ponty's
recklessly unhistorical reading of Saussure for his own purposes. (pp. 97
ff.)
Those who have already followed Merleau-Ponty through his
unconscionably inaccurate expositions of Husserl, Hegel, Marx, Heidegger,
Gurwitsch, Goldstein, Piaget, and the Gestalt psychologists (in which he
nevertheless frequently gets his sources to say better than they themselves
could have what they really meant) will not be disposed to become
exercised now over his misrepresentations of Saussure. What is more
disconcerting in this account is Mr. Charron's failure to zero in on those
few texts we have from Merleau-Ponty which were written after his
discovery of linguistic structuralism and to describe and assess his
reaction to this new science.
The name of Saussure does not occur in any of Merleau-Ponty's early
works, including The Structure of Behavior and the Phenomenology of
Perception. It was only during the period after 1945, when he was also
beginning to confront the problems of the philosophy of history, that
Merleau-Ponty took up the subject of linguistic structuralism, most
particularly Saussure's Course in General Linguistics. He first used this
and other linguistics materials in the course on language which he taught
at Lyons in 1947-1948, and which he then greatly expanded and developed
in the courses he gave at the Sorbonne after he moved there the following
year, namely, "Consciousness and the Acquisition of Language," and
"Phenomenology and the Sciences of Man" (which contains a special
section entitled " Linguistics " ) . From this point onward (1949)
Merleau-Ponty's writings on language multiplied rapidly a;qd his expressions
of discipleship to Sausslire "Were, for a few years, total. This ne\V

mterest

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culminated in his Inaugural Lecture at the College de France in 1958 in
which he states that the linguistics of Saussure provides us with a " theory
of signs " which could serve as a sounder basis for a philosophy of history
than the thought of either Marx or Hegel (to whom he had first turned).
From 1949-1958 Merleau-Ponty wrote a number of important essays on
structuralism all of which are collected in Signs {including " On the
Phenomenology of Language," "The Philosopher and Sociology," "From
Mauss to Claude Levi-Strauss," and others). But, after 1958, this special
interest in linguistics begins to diminish and his work on the posthumously
published manuscript, The Prose of the World, which was his major concern
at the time he assumed his chair of philosophy at the College de France,
gradually languished until he completely lost interest in it after 1959 and
left it unfinished and unpublished during his lifetime.
It is nevertheless in these works primarily that Merleau-Ponty worked
out his own attitude towards linguistic structuralism, adopted certain of
its features and methods, and attacked its shortcomings as a complete
account of language. Charron does mention most of these works, at
least in passing, and even quotes from them-but always casually and
without clearly focusing on Merleau-Ponty's primary linguistic concerns.
He never confronts the problems of the relation of thought to language,
of the levels of meaning, of the relation of words to syntax, of the possibility of universal grammar as these problems were dealt with by
Merleau-Ponty.
He pays most attention to the works, primarily the
Phenomenology of Perception and The Visible and the Invisible in which
linguistics as such is hardly mentioned, and certainly never evaluated in
detail.
The concluding section of this book, in which the theses of Martinet and
Merleau-Ponty are finally brought together, is extremely short and remains
more of a juxtaposition than the kind of dialectical confrontation we had
been promised. Charron's major conclusion (pp. 168 ff.) seems to be that the
kind of philosophy of language espoused by Merleau-Ponty "anticipated"
the kind of scientific linguistics eventually produced by Guillaume and
Beneviste-but not by Martinet. Martinet and Merleau-Ponty had almost
nothing to say to one another (certainly nothing good as Charron shows on
p. 151) during their historical co-existence, and Mr. Charron does not
manage to get them to say much to one another now. This rather dissappointing and negative conclusion leads one to ask why Martinet was
chosen as one of the two principal interlocutors in this debate and whether 1t
would not have been more profitable to widen the linguistic scope of the
discussion.
Finally, we have to say that the whole discussion is a bit too" Frenchy,"
a bit . too provincial. Charron seems unaware of the fact that the
principal works he treats (of Merleau-Ponty but also of Martinet) have
t.raJ;l&l_ated .into English and other languages and that there is a

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considerable body of literature available on the subjects he deals with in
languages other than French. There are a few English titles in his
bibliography (as often as not by Dutch authors) but almost none in his
footnotes, and the only works of such writers as Husserl, Hegel, Gurwitsch,
and even Chomsky which are listed are those which exist in French
translation. Does the author of this work feel that the discussions of these
problems which can be found in English, German, Dutch, Spanish, and
Italian, to go no further, are irrelevant to his investigation? In asking this
question I am not suggesting an impossible extension of his panorama; I
am speaking only of those specific issues in the philosophy of language
and in the relevance of linguistic structuralism for philosophy which concern
Merleau-Ponty, Martinet, and their possible dialectical confrontation.
This book, therefore, presents us with an interesting and stimulating
discussion of topics which are of central relevance to contemporary
philosophy, but it can be recommended to other scholars only with
reservations.
JAMES

M. EDIE

Northwestern University
Evanston, Illinois

Logic Matters. By P. T. GEACH. Berkeley: University of California Press,
1973. Pp. 347. $11.50.
This collection anthologizes articles published during the last twenty-five
years by P. T. Geach, Professor of Logic at the University of Leeds and
Fellow of the British Academy. There are forty-nine articles all together,
ranging in scope and content from brief discussions originally published in
Analysis-there are fourteen articles reprinted from Analysis-to extended
treatments on various structural and historical topics relating to what
scholastic philosophers would call formal and material logic. Professor
Geach states that this collection contains all of his articles not previously
collected or edited in any of his other works such as Reference and Generality, Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege and Mental Acts.
Geach has arranged the articles not in a chronological fashion but rather
topically under ten different headings. With the exception of a major
rewriting of his 1963 article, "Quantification Theory and the Problem of
Identifying Objects of Reference, " each article appears as it had been
published originally, except for, Geach notes, the incorporation of some
" stylistic changes " and the removal of some " incidental errors."
As would be expected in a collection of articles representing nearly a
quarter century's work of an exceptional philosopher, the breadth and scope
of this anthology is vast. There are studies providing in-depth elucidation
of problems in the structural history of logic (e. g., "Aristotle on Con-

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junctive Propositions," "Plato's Euthyphro," "A Medieval Discussion
of Intentionality," and Geach's 1968 inaugural lecture on being the first
recipient of the Chair of Logic at the University of Leeds, " History of
the Corruptions of Logic " ) , insightful if not generally accepted discussions
into the weaknesses of traditional logic (e. g., "Distribution:
A Last
Word?" and "Strawson on Symbolic and Traditional Logic"), and brief
and extended discussions illustrating Geach's contention that the mathematical logic instituted by Frege and Russell is a necessary condition for
solving some old philosophical chestnuts (e. g., "Some Problems about
Time, " and " The Identity of Propositions ") . In reference to the last
point, passages found in many of the articles illustrate Frege's contribution
to the development of mathematical logic. Of particular interest to
scholastic philosophers will be Geach's claim asserting that tremendous
structural similarities exist between Frege and St. Thomas. I will develop
this point later. There are four articles dealing with the "ascriptivism " of
the Oxford philosophers and Geach's elucidation of the logic of moral
discourse (e. g.," Imperative and Deontic Logic" and" Kenny on Practical
Reasoning"); obviously, R. M. Hare's The Language of Morals provides
the background for the Geach's discussion on these questions of modal
logic. Finally, there are articles dealing with the role of logic in ontology
and theology (e. g., "Nominalism" and "God's Relation to the World").
In all of these essays Geach is determined to convince his readers that
in doing philosophy indeed logic does matter, I think it fair to say that
the over-riding theme of Geach's philosophy is, to paraphrase Wittgenstein,
that all logical differences are big differences. In his article, " Assertion, "
Geach claims that when philosophers fall into error, the reason all too often
is that they have little regard for formal logic as a valuable philosophical
instrument. To quote Geach:
For myself, I think logicians have an all-purpose utility, as accountants have for
all kinds of business; and the resentment at oo accountant's inquiries is not a
healthy sign in any business. When a philosopher manifests annoyance at someone's
counterexamples to a theory that runs smoothly enough for the philosopher's
own chosen examples, he acts like a delinquent clerk: " Why should the accountant
meddle with that book, when these other books are all right? " But logicians,
like accountants, are paid to look out for discrepancies. (p.

Geach is convinced that a necessary condition for doing philosophy well
is the possession of the tools and techniques of formal logic. Understandably, Geach is aghast at the suggestion made in the Dutch Catechism
(p. 220 of the English edition) that the theological application of a,
" developed formal logic " and " the burning of witches " were two signs of
the degeneracy of the late medieval church. In fact, there are times in
the book when one feels that one is back listening to St. Thomas debate
the Latin Averroists over the relation of the propositions of faith to the

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813

propositions of philosophy. Geach is concerned that logical errors often
found in scholastic manuals of logic-especially the two-name theory of
of predication-can lead to serious errors in dogmatic theology. Ockham,
Geach claims, is a good historical exemplification of this type of position.
Geach also asserts that some of Ockham's alleged theological truths were
in fact N estorian heresies. On the relation of logic to theology Geach
affirms the following three propositions (found in "Nominalism," which
was originally read to the Priest's Philosophical Group of London) :
1. If an argument has true premises and a heretical conclusion, then a logical
rule that would make it out formally valid is simply a bad bit of logic.
2. A statement of a logical rule will not be correct if it is vitiated by a theological
counter-example; nor, in order to avoid this, will the rule expressly advert to
theological prospositions.
3. Whenever a logical form is shown to be invalid by a theological counter-example,
we could if we were clever enough construct a non-theological counter-example.
(p. 299)

In this analysis by Geach any similarily to the theological irrationalism
characteristic of Kierkegaard is obviously absent.
At this point I think it important to discuss briefly Geach's understanding of the nature of logic. I believe it fair to say that Geach regards
logic as second intentional. In "Nominalism" Geach argues explicitly
that no particular terms of first intention-whether theological, geological
or psychological-fall under the scope of logical rules. On the contrary,
" a logical rule must contain only syncategorematic words and second
intention terms." (p. fl97) A second intention, however, must not be
understood as pure formalism. Geach does not consider that the rules of
logic are mere marks on paper. In referring to the widely-accepted logic
text by Lewis and Langford, Geach claims that Lewis and Langford begin
their analysis of the nature of logic by asserting that " whatever more it
may be, the matrix method at least is a certain kind of game which we
play with recognisable marks, according to certain rules. " Geach argues
that all this amounts to is that in doing logic we must write down definite
symbols in an orderly way. This, Geach tells us, throws no light at all upon
the nature of logic. (p. 104) When disputing Quine's claim that the
distinction between concept and object is unnecessary in logic (" Class and
Concept ") Geach responds that " I hold with Frege that this distinction
is founded in the nature of things, and that a logical system will either
express it somehow or turn out inconsistent." (p. fl34) Since Geach has
already argued that the rules of logic are not first intentional and has
indicated that formalism says nothing important about the nature of logic,
I suggest that one proposition found in Thomistic manuals of logic with
which Geach would agree deals with the fundamental second intentional
characteristic of logical rules.

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There is a further Aquinian strain found in some of Geach's discussious
about topics usually classified under the rubric of material logic. In "The
Identity of Propositions " Geach notes that the Polish logician, Kotarbinski,
has vigorously argued for an ontology recognizing only concrete objects
and has an aversion for postulating Platonic entities. Geach notes that
"I should like to think that this programme could be carried out." (p. 166)
I suggest that Geach's claims can be interpreted as a suggestion for an
ontology structurally similar to Aquinian primary substances. Of course, one
might retort that this could also be nominalism. Not so, however, as Geach
notes in the concluding remarks of " The Identity of Propositions " :
Allowing pvedicates like "necessarily P " commits us to denying Locke's thesis
that there is nothing essential to individuals; but those who uphold this thesis,
so far as I know, have little to say for it beyond bare assertion. Quine has
sometimes said that quantified modal logic would commit us to Aristotelian
essentialism; but why should we not be Aristotelian essentialists? (p. 174)

This remark about Aristotelian essentialism is very interesting. This
indicates that formal logic and ontology are indeed far from incompatible.
I suspect that there are very some very interesting structural similarities
to be unearthed between the ontology of Geach and that prosposed by
Everett J. Nelson. It should be remembered that Professor Nelson was one
of the founders of the Journal of Symbolic Logic. This hardly deterred him
from a rigorous pursuit of metaphysical issues. For example, in his 1966
Presidential address to the Western Division of the American Philosophical
Association, "The Metaphysical Presuppositions of Induction," Nelson
argued forcefully for the real existence of the categories of substance and
causality. I have suggested elsewhere that Nelson's ontological categories
might indeed be structurally similar to St. Thomas's notion of substantial
form. At any length, the examples of Geach and Nelson-both excellent
formal logicians-should forever nail the coffin lid on the suggestion that
analytic philosophy and Thomistic metaphysics are a priori incompatible.
As I indicated earlier, Geach argues that the techniques of modetu Iogie
serve as necessary conditions for successful philosophical analysis. The
converse of this claim is that traditional logic is insufficient for the
analysis of some philosophical problems. At times, it is difficult to figure
out exactly what Geach means by traditional logic. He assumes at times
that everyone will automatically know the nature of traditional logic.
There are places where Geach argues that " class " logic is traditional logic.
In addition, any logician who adopted the " two-name " theory of predication is lumped together with those who adhere to traditional logic. Those
who continue to expound exclusively on traditional logic as if no contributions have been made to logical studies by mathematical logicians are
located in what Geach continually refers to as the" Colleges oi Unreason."
At any length, Geach wants his readers to both become aware of and

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815

acknowledge the fact that traditional formal logic is incompetent to resolve
some problems which only modern logical theory can handle. For example,
Geach argues that the use of " scope!' and " quantification " are instruments
capable of providing solutions to some problems unsolvable in traditional
logic. Also modern logic holds that not every proposition admits of a
subject-predicate analysis. Geach also strongly indicates that modal logic
is a necessary instrument for adept philosophical analysis. An example of
the necessity for using modal logic is found in " Some Problems about
Time "-which, incidentally, Geach presented before the British Academyin which he suggests that the rules for employment of temporal
connectives--" at the same time," "before," "after "-belong to modal
logic. Geach provides a promissory note suggesting that much fruitful
research is to be expected in the area of reducing the rules governing
temporal discourse to modal logic. On this point, incidentally, Geach
criticizes Russell for not paying close enough attention to modal logic. In
addition, Geach believes that modal logic is indispensable for a thorough
analysis into the foundations of mathematics. Geach expresses this belief
in the following way:
What I think is not to be hoped for is a satisfactory foundation of mathematics
in a conceptual scheme that admits neither modal operators nor quantifiers over
an infuiite domain. (p. 166)

Geach's criticisms of traditional logic are not to be taken as a wholesale
repudiation of past efforts into logical research. By his many favorable
references to medieval logicians Geach shows that he takes Russell's
epigram seriously: "Not all wisdom is new, neither is all folly out of date. "
In his discussion of Buridan's logic in " A Medieval Discussion of Intentionality" Geach writes as follows:
I hope this paper shows why modern logicians still need to take medieval
logicians seriously. In a great measure their problems are ours; for some of
these, like the problems of suppositio, modern logic provides adequate solutions,
but there are other problems, about modal and intentional contexts for example,
that are still wide open; and the talent that was shown by medieval logicians in
wrestling with their problems demands our deepest admiration. {p. 138)

Acknowledging this respect for the medieval logicians, nevertheless Geach
has been influenced very much by the progress made in formal logic during
the first half of the twentieth-century. Geach argues that the development
of " genuine " logic is due to the logical works of Frege and Russell.
Although Geach doesn't mention this in any of these papers, certainly Boole
and deMorgan· had something to do with symbolic logic too. Moreover,
Geach appeilrs convinced that a logician can maintain very high standards
of rigor without exercising any of the special apparatus of numbered
theorems, unique symbols, new terminology, excessive formulation of
meUrla.nguage, and so forth. Geach notes that much of Frege's·work ;ri

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semantics maintains very high standards of rigor without excessive use
of any formal apparatus. On the other hand, Geach also argues that
the use of formal apparatus alone does not prevent philosophical blunders.
As examples of works containing errors notwithstanding the presence of an
overwhelming formalism Geach mentions Camap's Logical Syntax of
Language and Meaning and Necessity. All philosophers who are not formal
logicians per se will appreciate Geach's remark that "perhaps after all it
is not so foolish to undertake 'direct analysis' in language everybody can
read. " (p.
Given the above discussion, it should be obvious that the modem logic
of Frege and Russell is called" symbolic" or" mathematical," not because
of the use of symbols or mathematical notation but rather because of new
and sophisticated techniques involved in elucidating the matters of logic.
It should be apparent by now that the figure of Gottlob Frege stands
behind much of Geach's work. Geach's review article of Austin's translation
of Frege's Grundlagen (A Logicomathematical Enquiry into the Concept
of Number) is perhaps one of the most crisp and succinct expositions of
Frege's thoughts about number that I have read. Geach shows how Frege
was very concerned about Mill's view that numbers are physical properties.
Shades of the ontological worries found in Wittgenstein's Tractatus appear
in Frege's concern about postulating a physical property for zero. Frege
also attacks subjectivist account of number-e. g., William James's account
as found in the Principles of Psychology. For the interested reader Geach
has treated these problems, especially the relation of abstractionism to
logical and mathematical concepts, in Mental Acts.
Geach is not alone in attributing to Frege's work the importance it
deserves as a pivotal set of writings in the development of modem logic.
Quine has noted that " all of modem logic owes an incalculable debt lo
Frege. If anyone can be singled out as the founder of mathematical logic,
it is by all odds he." ("On Frege's Way Out," Mind, LXIV-1955-p.
159)
I suspect that, historically, Geach owes much of his interest in Frege to
his former mentor, Wittgenstein. Frege was one of the few philosophers
that Wittgenstein took seriously. Wittgenstein's Tractatus appears to hover
over much of Geach's philosophical work. Of course, there are differences.
Logical rules for the early Wittgenstein, although they could be shown but
not said-every one is all to familiar with the last line of the Tractatus
"What we cannot speak about we must pass over in silence."-nevertheless
had an ontological ring about them. For Geach, as I noted earlier, logical
rules appear to be second intentional. Nevertheless, there is much about
Wittgenstein which has influenced Geach. This is true of both the early
and the later Wittgenstein. That Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations
reshaped twentieth-century Anglo-American philosophy is obvious. Yet
Geach, although certainly influenced by some of the insights provided by

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the Investigations-! believe this influence is more explicit in Mental
Acts-is not an excessive ordinary language philosopher. In a number of
places Geach attacks the minute linguistic investigations that. philosophers
like Austin and his followers at Oxford have carried out during the last
twenty years. The following two passages indicate Geach's apparent
disdain for the Austinean methodology: " It helps to make things clear;
and if people protest in the name of ordinary language, they are probably
the sort of people who don't want things made clear "; (p. 160) and
" ... the natural selection of words is not so uniformly beneficent as John
Austin perhaps supposed." (p.
I suspect, if one must classify Geach's
philosophy, he would fit under the rubric of "Descriptive Metaphysics"
as this concept has been elucidated by Strawson. Yet there are certain
"Logical Reconstructionist" tendencies apparent in Geach's work also.
But I suspect Geach is more of a realist than many of the Logical
Reconstructionists. As always, it is very difficult to classify the work of
a good philosopher.
There is one. final point which must be considered in any discussion of
Geach's philosophy. Gustav Bermann once wrote that," In what a great
philosopher says there is a pattern. It all flows from one source, a few
fundamental ontological ideas. In the light of this source and only in this
light, it can all be understood. " I suggest that Geach's strong affirmation
of the radical difference between subject and predicate in any analysis
of predication and the corresponding denial of the " two-name " theory of
predication is one of these " fundamental ontological ideas " which pervade
Geach's philosophy. This notion of the uniqueness of subject and predicate,
Geach asserts, found its way back into contemporary logical discussions
with the writings of Frege. Geach suggests that this theory of predication
had its historical orgins in Plato's Sophist. Plato put forward the view
that the simplest form of a proposition was composed of two heterogeneous
elements, a noun (onoma) and a verb (rhema). For instance, "Man
walks " and " Theaetetus flies. " On the other hand, a string of nouns-like
"man lion" or a string of verbs, like "runs walks "-is not intelligible
discourse at all. Given this account of predication, Plato suggested that
any predicative proposition must split into two logically heterogeneous parts,
a noun and a verb. Geach claims that in De lnterpretatione Aristotlebefore the "Fall," as Geach would say-accepted Plato's view of predication regarding the relation of subject to predicate. However, in the
Prior Analytics, Aristotle changed his position. Geach suggests that the
reason behind Aristotle's change of view was the development of the
syllogism. Instead of the view that the subject and predicate were indeed
heterogeneous, Aristotle adopted the position that predication is an attachment of one term (horos) to another term. On this view, it is impossible
for any term to be essentially predicative. Geach notes that " Aristotle's
going over to the two-term theory was a disaster, comparable only to the fall

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of Adam. " (p. 47) The two-term theory evolved into the two-name
theory in medieval logicians like Ockham and Buridan and nineteenthcentury logicians like Mill. Geach claims that it was Frege and Russell
who restored to logic most of the insights that were lost by "Aristotle's
fall. " To Frege, Geach suggests, modern logicians owe the insight
demanding an absolute category difference between names and predicables.
Geach's review article," Frege's Grundlagen," provides a good discussion of
how Frege viewed a " concept " as essentially predicative and incomplete.
A logical predicate-a concept-is in need of completion. It can be
completed only by the addition of a name of an " object. " The individual
object then assumes the role of a " logical subject. " Frege held that only
expressions exemplifying this sort of incompleteness could possibly stand for
concepts. There is a very important ramification entailed by this type of
predication theory. It removes the need for having a connective relation
between the subject and predicate. I suspect that Bradley's idealism which
hung together only by his denial of the possibility of relations-and the
relation of predication was a prime example Bradley used to illustrate the
infinite regress in any relational context-together with Wittgenstein's claim
that subjects and predicates hang together like "links in a chain" provide
the structural background for appreciating the extreme importance Geach
attributes to Frege's claim of heterogeneity regarding subjects and predicates. Geach agrees with Frege that " the 'is' of predication, die blosse
Copula, has no force at all." (p. 265) As a corollary, Geach categorically
asserts that " the class of 'terms' which can be indifferently subject and
predicates is in fact empty." (p. 291)
Of interest to Thomistic
is Geach's claim that St. Thomas
explicitly rejected the two-name theory of predication and truth. Aquinas,
Geach suggests, indeed held that subject and predicate terms have different
roles. In Aquinas's system a subject related to a suppositum and a
predicate related to a form or nature. The truth of an affirmative
predication consists, Geach suggests, "in con-formity-the form that exists
intentionally in the mind, signified by the predicate, answers to the form
in the thing .... " (p. 300) Geach further suggests that, because St.
Thomas took the subject-predicate distinction seriously, he can provide a
better account for some of the philosophical problems which proved to be
pitfalls for two-name theorists like Ockham and Buridan. Geach also
suggests that there are two other important logical distinctions emphasized
by Aquinas but ruled out by the proponents of the two-name theory: 1) the
distinction between substantival and adjectival terms, and 2) the claim
that true predication depends not only on what the subject term signifies
but also on what the modus significandi of the subject term. (p. 301)
Accordingly, Geach places the theory of predication held by St. Thomas
with the "genuine" expositions of logical rules found originally in Plato's
Sophist, developed in Aristotle's De Interpretatione and reinstated rein-

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stated contemporarily by Frege. For further development and analysis
of the manner in which Geach utilizes Frege's philosophy in providing
conceptual elicidations of St. Thomas's philosophy I suggest that the
interested reader consult Geach's 1955 paper, "Form and Existence,"
which originally appeared in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
(1954-55, pp.
and is reprinted in Anthony Kenny's anthology,
Aquinas: A. Collection of Critical Essays. These notions have been
incorporated in Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege (Cornell
University Press, 1961) which Geach co-authored with Elizabeth Anscombe.
This important article, regretfully, does not appear in Logic Matters.
It should be emphasized that Geach believes that the Fregean notion c.f
concept is not only of historical importance. In " Quine on Classes and
Properties " Geach suggests that if property is used as Frege elucidated
Begriff-i. e., in the sense of what a logical predicate stands for-then
abstract expressions cannot serve as names of properties. Obviously, Geach
accepted in principle the notion of " naming " as referring which Frege,
Russell, and the early Wittgenstein opted for: " .. .for I agree with
Parmenides that one cannot name what is not there. " (p. 153) Geach
explicitly attributes to Russell's theory of descriptions the important claim
that significant-many-worded expressions-e. g., " the present king of
France "-can never possess the logical role of" naming." As Geach notes:
" What is not cannot be named-anymore than you can christen a baby,
bell or battleship that is not there to be christened." (p. 155)
Geach further suggests that an interesting consequence of this logical
understood as Frege's Begriffe-is that a
role for predicates-properties
paradox like Russell's-i. e., the paradox concerning the class of all classes
that are not members of themselves-cannot be generated. This insight on
Geach's part does away with any need for a theory of types. I suspect
this is all to the good, as the theory of types never did work well anyway.
In this discussion of predication, and the role of " naming, " there is
one point on which I am confused. In his 1968 inaugural lecture at Leeds
Geach made the following remark:
What we still have got is a formal theory that recognizes the status of some
general terms as names without blurring the distinction between names and
predicables. " (p. 61)

This demand for a logical rule capable of handling general names is
reiterated in his 1970 Analysis paper, " Contradictories and Contraries. "
Yet in his 1964 paper," Nominalism," Geach claims that he totally agrees
with Aristotle's requirment that names must be "syntactically simple."
Geach goes on:
Complex names are a chimerical category. For the role of a name is simply
to stand for the thing named; and then a name must signify its bearer directly,
and not via other signs in the language, as any complex sign would have to do.
(p. 290)

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BOOK REVIEWS

I am confused about the nature of " general " and " complex " names.
Are they structurally the same? Has Geach changed his mind? Or is Geach
using " complex " in order to refer to contextual expressions like " the
present king of France " ? If the latter is the case, then a complex name
is like an incomplete symbol for which Russell devised the theory of
descriptions. This would make a category difference between general and
complex names. A general name, nevertheless, is certainly more complex
than a simple name, even if a general name is not an incomplete symbol.
More analysis of these issues is obviously needed, especially to theoretically
elucidate how general names do not vitiate the category distinction between
subjects and predicates, a worry which Geach himself acknowledges.
This is a significant and often rather demanding collection of essays.
It is an anthology putting together the uncollected works of an important
twentieth-century philosopher. Many of the articles treat one or another
of the more important issues considered by analytic philosophers during
the last quarter-century.
Of significant importance to philosophers interested in researching the many topics contained in Logic Matters is the
inclusion in this anthology of a rather extensive eight-page name-topic index.
All too frequently this type of scholarly aid is omitted from anthologies.
With the exception of the historical essays analyzing the structure and
development of problems in logic, this book is probably not the best place
for a scholastic philosopher unfamiliar with Geach's work to begin. I
would suggest reading the first forty-four pages of Mental Acts and the
" Aquinas " section in Three Philosophers: Aristotle, Aquinas and Frege
before attempting to unearth the philosophical nuggets in Logic Matters.
I must end this review on a sad note. It is indeed unfortunate that
many members of the American Catholic intellectual
scholastic philosophers interested in the principles found in the philosophy
of St. Thomas-have by and large so throughly overlooked the writings of
the single philosopher who has done more during the last twenty-five years
than anyone else to
the philosophical insights of St. Thomas known
and appreciated by Anglo-American philosophers. It is to be hoped that
this oversight will not continue.
ANTHONY J. LISSKA
Denison University
Granville, Ohw

BOOK REVIEWS

821

A Guide to Philosophical Bibliography and Research. By RICHARD T. DE
GEORGE. New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1971. Pp. 149. $5.95.
New Encyclopedia of Philosophy. By J. GROOTEN and G. Jo STEENBERGEN,
with the cooperation of other contributors. Translated from the Dutch,
edited and revised by Edmond van den Bossche. New York: Philosophical Library,
Pp. 468.
The first of the above titles is one of the best research instruments to
have appeared in many years, and is invaluable for the student and professor
of philosophy alike. The author has culled through hundreds of source
materials, limiting himself for the most part to work produced after 1900
and emphasizing those available in the English language, although also
describing sources written in French, German, Italian, Latin, Russian, and
Spanish. De George starts with dictionaries as sources of definitions, and
then proceeds through encyclopedias, histories of philosophy, philosophical
classics, bibliographical tools and specialized bibliographies, library and
trade catalogues, philosophical journals, guides to writing and publishing,
and biographical sources. He concludes with information on works conceming philosophical professional life. For each entry there is a brief but
accurate descriptive or evaluative comment. The end result is a work that
is comprehensive but simple to use, and on this account can serve as an
introduction for the beginner who wishes to get an overview of the sources
and tools of philosophical research, or as a guide for students writing papers
and dissertations, or finally as a handy reference manual for the teacher
and professional. The work is very well indexed, and its price is reasonable
considering the vast amount of information it contains. Users of this guide
will wish that the publisher had decided to use a larger type size, but this
is one of the few criticisms they will be able to make of an otherwise
excellently produced book.
By contrast the second title listed above can only be disappointing. This
one-colume work, an English translation of the Filosofisch Lexicon appearing
originally in 1958, is hardly an encyclopedia by any standard, and at best
can lay claim to being a dictionary. Brief articles have been contributed
by over thirty European philosophers, and a goodly number of entries are
identified by the authors' initials, but the majority are unsigned. In general
the English translation is good, but there are places where it is awkward.
There are also editorial slips, as in the article on Rudolf Carnap, where it
is announced that he " is now professor in Los Angeles " and then in the
next sentence that he died in 1970. (p. 64) Again, in the entry for Regis
Jolivet, his birth date is given but no mention is made of the fact that he
died in 1966, six years before this work's publication. (pp.
The
type size is large and legible, but, considering the amount of information
this permits the publisher to put in the compass of 468 pages, the price is

BOOK REVIEWS

exorbitant. It is difficult to see what use such an expensive work can
have, considering the availability of so many superior instruments of
philosophical research listed in De George's Guide.
WILLIAM

A. WALLACE, O.P.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

The Philosophy of Biology. By MicHAEL RusE. London:
University Library, 1973. Pp. 224. £3.

Hutchinson

Professor Ruse has written a good work in the nco-Positivistic tradition.
It is one in spirit with Nagel's The Structure of Science and Rundner's
Philosophy of Social Science. In style, the work combines a literary
approach with scholarship. There are few notes in the usual sense, but
there are many remarks put in brackets, along with abbreviated references
to sources, in the text. The presentation is a straightforward problemstheses-objections-answers approach which could easily be rearranged into
a little summa.
In ten chapters we see that for Ruse the philosophy of biology mainly
means: (1) a defense of the covering-law model of the theory of natural
selection based upon population genetics against rival theories;
(2) a
discussion of which nominalistic theory of classification in biology is best;
(3) the role of teleology; (4) the possibilities for reductionism.
According to Ruse, the covering-law or axiomatic-deductive system is
the ideal scientific model of explanation toward which all true scientists
should work. Since the ability to predict is not an essential ingredient in
such scientific models anyway, the fact that evolutionary theories based
upon such models usually are not predictive is no mark against them.
Regardless of their predictive value, such models are the paradigm cases in
the ideal science of physics, and in order to protect the dignity of biology
as a science it too must use such models. (see pp. 26, 41) This in a
nutshell is his main thesis.
In defending and developing his thesis Ruse concentrates on the
one main theory of evolution, namely, "Evolution is, to put it simply, the
result of natural selection working on random mutations. " (p. 96) To be
a true living evolutionist means accepting this true mechanism of
biological change. The theory of evolution, though, should not be confused
with the history or actual course of evolution. In this regard, even though
evidence for the theory may be great, evidence for the course of change
may be small. (see pp. 120-1) One need not, therefore, worry too much
about the poor fossil record. Instead, one must concentrate upon what

BOOK REVIEWS

SflS

genetics teaches now and then interpolate by analogy backwards to show
what must have happened long ago.
As a philosopher I think one has a right to feel uncomfortable about
this arrangement. Are there not at least three elements to be separated
out: (1) Evolution as a slow change from common beginnings to different
and qualitatively higher levels of being. In its theistic form, at least the
potentials for such development were created by God. In its atheistic form,
the claim is that from eternal matter chance and " leaps " explain all.
(2) The mechanism of development (natural selection, Lamarckism, saltation or macromutations, orthogensis, etc.). (3) The actual path (s) of
change. As far as philosophical theory is concerned,
(I) is of prime
importance. Yet Ruse starts and ends with (2) .
With respect to speciation Ruse assumes a nominalistic approach and
then struggles with the problem of reintroducing objectivity. He discusses
gene-pools and morphology, as well as genealogical and phenetic taxonomy.
His own view is a combination of the gene-pool theory and morphology
with overtones of Wittgenstein.
(see pp. 133-7) Again, although the
delineation of the various positions is good, there is no real coming to
grips with the underlying philosophical issues. Indeed, his myopia in this
regard is so strong that in another context he states that some biological
entities can be both unique and identical. Instances of Mendelian genes,
for example, " are absolutely identical. If I pass on a blue-eye-causing gene
to my son, .. .instances of my gene and instances of his gene are the same
kind. They are not more or less alike; rather, just like two hydrogen
(even to God)." (p. 210) Such
atoms, they are indistinguishable
confusion is the price one pays for not understanding the philosophical
issue in the first place.
As far as theology is concerned, there isn't any in any so-called traditional
sense. In 1973 the author is still fighting off the old bugaboo about
" future causes. " How can the future, which doesn't exist, act as an
efficient cause now? It can't. Consequently, reasons Ruse, "strong"
teleology must go, to be replaced with straightforward matter-of-fact
statements about actual processes. At this late date in history it
is a shame to see so much effort expended upon hacking to pieces the
same poor old straw man.
Ruse ends with a discussion of reductionism in biology. He would like
to see it happen, but it does not seem possible right now. He shows little
sympathy with the organicists on this question. He presents five arguments
used in favor of organicism (which he seems to confuse with vitalism)
The central argument, however, namely, the unity and
for refutation.
self-acting of living things, is not given.
In the course of the book many interesting points are raised. For
instance, on page 40 he attempts answering the charge that the theory of
evolution is merely a tautology (the survivors survive) by saying that

824

BOOK REVIEWS

sometimes in fact those more fit do not survive. Saying this implies that
he has some objective standard or design in mind. It is, in effect, saying:
" Look, those creatures are the fitter and should be surviving but they're
not. Too bad! " How can the biologist appeal to designs which supposedly
do not exist? Ruse seems to forget that, according to his own view,
evolution means never having to say you are sorry.
On pages 151 to 158 an interesting logical issue is raised: can biologists
violate the rule that each genus must have at least two species and get
away with it? This seems to happen when evolutionist taxonomists classify
the aardvark. Ruse's solution is to switch from "extensional" to
"intensional " definitions. Instead of listing individuals (Joe, John, Mary),
list their characteristics (two-legged, big brained, etc.). Thus, to be in
a broader class (e. g., primate) would require certain traits (e. g., twolegged) while belonging to a narrower class (e. g., man) would require
added traits (e. g., big brained). Although he does not quite make it,
Ruse seems to think it is very modern to return to Aristotelian logic.
Over-all, the work leaves two general impressions. One is that it is a
parochial operation. Ruse gives numerous objections and answers but
they are almost all from the same closed circle of neo-Positivistic thought,
i. e., there is no attempt to go out to other traditions for new insights and
points of view. Most of his time is spent acting as a mediator among
conflicting scientific views rather than handling philosophically such views
from all sides. This is in keeping with the tradition wherein one does not
presume to have factual knowledge over and above that possessed by
scientists. The first leads to the second. Ruse leaves you with the feeling
that the only real task left to biology is to make itself obsolete thus doing
away with the philosophy of biology altogether.
The book itself is well-made and can be acquired in either hardback or
paperback.
F. F. CENTORE
University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario
Canada

Science Is Philosophy. By CHARLES HoLLENC:AMP. Carthagena, Ohio: The
Messenger Press, 1978. Pp. IIS. $8.00.
The aim of this book, as the author himself puts it, is to introduce the
philosophy of nature as physical science and physical science as the
philosophy of nature. To do this Charles Hollencamp give us first a
synthetic historical survey of the philosophy of nature from the early Greek
thinkers to the various systems of contemporary philosophical thought.

BOOK REVIEWS

This is the best part of the book and a necessary introduction to the
problem of philosophy of nature in its relation to modem science, for science
and philosophy had been considered to be the same discipline until the
sixteenth century. Scientists were philosophers of nature, and philosophers
of nature considered themselves scientists. Now, however, the majority
of scientists and philosophers believe that science and philosophy are
essentially two independent disciplines. This is paradoxical because even
now it is difficult to perceive concrete scientific problems which are not,
at the same time, problems of philosophy. True, the methodology of
science is different from the methodology of philosophy, but both science
and philosophy study the same subject matter, namely, the cosmos,
man, and God. Hence the artificial dichotomy which started chiefly
with Descartes and which has harmed philosophy as well as science.
More than ever the insight of philosophy is necessary for the better
understanding of science, and equally the data of contemporary science
should be taken into consideration by philosophy if philosophy is to be
worthy of its name. All the great scientists have been outstanding
philosophers of nature. This book helps us to understand this historical
conclusion.
We must bear in mind that strictly speaking, the problem of science and
philosophy is not a problem between scientists and philosophers but of
philosophy and science as such. Hense it is crucial for the sake of
clarity to set up the philosophical principles of the division and
specification of the sciences as they are found in Aristotle's Posterior
Analytics. In this sense the book is somewhat incomplete. The author
shows too much dependence on Vincent Smith and Charles De Koninck.
Perhaps more explanation based on original sources would have improved
the understanding of the philosophical principles involved in this thorny
problem. The volume is recommended to all those who are seeking a
brief historical and philosophical introduction to the philosophy of nature.
ANTONIO MORENO, 0. P.
Graduate Theological UniO'T&
Berkeley, California

The Christian Faith In The Doctrinal Dow,ments Of The Catholic Faith.
Edited by J. NEUNER, S. J. and J. DUPuis, S. J. BANGALORE:
Theological Publications in India, 1973. Pp. 710.
This new collection of the Church's doctrinal documents is the fruit of
the collaborated effort of the professors of the two theological faculties of
Vidyajyoti, Institute of Religious Studies, Delhi, and of Juana-Deepa,

826

BOOK REVIEWS

Institute of Philosophy and Religion, Pune, under the able editorship of
the Jesuit professors Joseph Neuner and James Dupuis.
Stemming from the 1938 publication by J. Neuner and H. Roos of
Der Glaube der Kirche in den Urkunden der Lehrverkundigung and down
through the 1967 and 1969 English The Teaching of the Catholic Church,
deriving in a measure from other collections, especially Denziger-Schonmetzer, the present book provides a number of more relevant and recent
documents. A long introduction on the value, limitations, and use of such
a collection of doctrinal texts is a sound contribution and caution, and a
valuable guideline for the reader. Chapters have been rearranged and new
ones inserted. The prefaces to the chapters and the evaluations of the
individual documents or offerings have been in great part presented to
reflect later scholarship and the viewpoint of Vatican II. A concordance
with other familiar collections follows the usual indexes.
This new collection may be used with profit by those who are interested
in an authoritative guidance provided by doctrinal documents which serve
as witness of the Faith.
NICHOLAS

HALLIGAN,

0. P.

Dominican House of Studit!8

W1Uhington, D. C.

A Reply to Vernon J. Bourke's final judgment-" an example of how not
to interpret a philosophical classic "-on: Aquinas On Metaphysics.
A historicodoctrinal study of the Commentary on the Metaphysics.
By JAMES C. Dow.
When I first read Prof. Bourke's review of my historical study of
Aquinas's Commentary on the Metaphysics, I became concerned. I am
still concerned, and not because of the statement I have chosen as a title,
nor for these other words either: " This is a grandiose project: it would
take a marvelous mind and very mature scholarship. . • " etc.1 I, no more
than anyone else, like to read such words when they refer to oneself,
but these are not the source of my concern. Ordinarily I would try to
shrug off such comments and the review containing them. Yet I find I
cannot shrug off this review, for there is something very peculiar about it,
to wit: I) the review contains completely inaccurate statements about
the medieval period and uses them as the basis for judgment on my work;
2) the reviewer leads the reader to form what are obviously false impressions
about the content of my book; and 8) the review seems to indicate that
its author failed to notice Chs. III-VI of the book (186 pages). As
1 The

87, (Jan. 1978), p.

BOOK REVIEWS

noted, I would ordinarily attempt to ignore the type of comment chosen as
title, or all other comments of a personal nature. Yet I do not think it
proper to shrug off the review itself. Aquinas's CO'mmentary on the
Metaphysics is an important work, and it would be wrong if the study of
it were to suffer because of Prof. Bourke's improper attack on my book.
Accordingly I feel obligated to stand up in defense of what surely is the
proper way to study Aquinas's work; I feel it necessary to defend it
against what apparently passes in this country as " scholarly medieval
criticism," that is, the type of thing found in Prof. Bourke's review.
Medieval studies, and in particular scholarship in the study of medieval
philosophy, not to mention Aquinas's Commentary on the Metaphysicsthese are important to me. Hence I am responding to Prof. Bourke's
review and responding in the only way I judge proper, that is, by speaking
directly to him on the following topics:
1) the value of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala edition of Aquinas's Cvmmenta1'1J;
2) the five Latin versions of the Metaphysics used by Aquinas in his Commenfu1'1J;
8) the date of Albert's Commenta1'1J on the Metaphysics; Albert's knowledge of
Averroes; Albert's influence on Aquinas;
4) Neplatonism in my study of Aquinas;
5) Aquinas's view on knowledge of esse;
6) miscellanea, including the dating of Aquinas's Commenta1'1J.

+

+ +

+ +

Dear Professor Bourke:
Over 700 years ago Thomas Aquinas :finished his Commentary on the
Metaphysics. This is a work which would have established his reputation
as a brillant philosopher had he never written anything else. Because of
this I have always found it very strange that after seven centuries no
book-length study of Aquinas's CD'mmentary had ever been published!
What is more, only four men other than myself have bothered to write
articles about the work! Because of this, Professor Bourke, I truly expected
at least a small " thank you " for my effort. After all, as one of our
American philosophers has said, " if something is worth doing, it's worth
doing poorly." Even were we to suppose that I have written a rotten
book, at least I would have focused attention on an important medieval
work. In this regard, I deem it inappropriate to refer to my study as " a
grandiose project, " and then to explain this by " it would take a marvelous
mind and very mature scholarship" to carry it off. However, I am not
writing to take you to task for such statements. I have decided to
write this response because I think it important that we clear up certain
inaccuracies and false impressions promulgated by your review. These
inaccuracies and false impressions are important because, if accepted, they
will undoubtedly keep philosophers and historians from studying Aquinas's

828

BOOK REVIEWS

Commentary in the proper way. I have grouped these inaccuracies and
false impressions under the six points that follow.
1) The value of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala edition of Aquinas's Commentary.
You seem to imply, Professor Bourke, that at the present time, that is
today-1978-no one should spend a great deal of time and effort studying
Aquinas's Commentary on the Metaphysics because our world does not
yet possess a critical edition. I cannot convey the consternation with
which your words fill me! Philosophers and historians have quoteG. this
work for centuries. Yet you say " solid interpretation will have to wait "
for a critical text! 2-In this regard I would call the following to your
attention. In the Biblioteca Nazionale in Naples there is a most interesting
manuscript (no. VIII F. 16) which was written in part by the scribes to
whom Aquinas dictated his revisions of Books II-III, and of Books V, 7,
856-VII, 16, 1647. It is true that this manuscript does not contain a
complete Commentary dictated by Aquinas, but it does contain a
complete Commentary: to these dictated, revised sections, were added the
remainder of Aquinas's exposition of the Metaphysics. So we have here an
interesting 13th century manuscript copy of Aquinas's Commentary. Now
the scholars have studied this, but,
course, you know that because you
could read it in my book, and one conclusion reached is that this manuscript presents roughly the same text as our present edition-even in those
sections dictated by Aquinas, which after all constitute over one-third
of the Commentary. 3 So it would seem that our Spiazzi-Cathala edition
does with some probably deserve to be studied.-lf you do not wish to
take my word on this issue, I suggest you read the work of the quite
reputable scholars to whom I have just referred in footnote 3: T. Kiippeli,
A. Mansion, J. Duin. (Incidentally, did Cajetan have a critical edition of
the Summa?)

2) The five Latin versions of the Metaphysics used by Aquinas in his
Commentary.
Now let us turn to the Latin versions which Aquinas used in composing
his exposition of the Aristotelian Metaphysics. I explain in my book that
2 Ibid.,

p. 242.
a Cf. T. Kiippeli, "Mitteilungen iiber Thomashandschriften in der Biblioteca
Nazionale in Neapel. II. Ein Autograph des Metaphysikkommentars
des hi.
Thomas?," Angelicum, X (1933), 116-25. A. Mansion, "Saint Thomas et le
'Liber de causis'. A propos d'une edition recente de son Commentaire," Revue
Philosophique de Louvain, LIII (1955), 63-64. J. Duin, "Nouvelles precisions
sur la chronologie de 'Commentum in Metaphysicam' de S. Thomas, " Revue
Philosophque de Louvain, LID (1955), 511-34.-I discuss this manuscript in
my book, cf. pp. 10-14.

BOOK REVIEWS

829

Aquinas used five of these translations: Vet'U8, Arabica, Media, Moerbecana, and Litera Boethii. Now my claim in this regard is quite accurate.
More to the point, I do not simply claim that Aquinas used these five
versions; I devote several pages to summarizing the research on this issue.
I might mention too that I refer to some 20 separate works of scholars who
have studied this problem, works by men such as Grabmann, Minio-Paluello,
Dondaine, Geyer, Salman, Pelster, De Couesnongle, and A. Mansion-a
veritable " who's who " of scholarly research, would you not agree? Imagine
then my surprise, Prof. Bourke, when I read in your review: " Whether five
versions were really used by Aquinas, as Doig suggests, I do not know."•
Of course Aquinas used these five versions. However, if you choose not
to take the word of these scholars, why not avail yourself of the numerous
quotations of and references to these Latin versions that I give in my book?
Prof. Bourke, if you really want to know whether Aquinas used these
five Latin versions of Aristotle, just get to work and compare Aquinas's
text with them and discover the answer yourself. This is an important
point. I have presented the evidence. When you write, " I do not know, "
does that not serve to mislead the reader into thinking one of these: a)
either no one has studied the issue or at least not studied it sufficiently;
or b) the authorities do not agree; or c) this Doig fellow has not given
the evidence needed to decide? Let me assure you that all three are false.
3) The date of Albert's CommentaTY on the Metaphysics; Albert's know-

ledge of Averroes; Albert's influence on Aquinas.
We must tum now to the relation between Aquinas's CommenfaTY and
that of his friend Albert the Great. You have made several errors
in regard to Albert's Commentary on the Metaphysics. First, you are out
of touch with medieval research when you give the date of tiie work;
'second, you are wrong in thinking that Albert's Commentary does not
show a great deal of influence from Averroes; and finally, you are also
wrong in saying we are ignorant of the manner in which Albert's work
influenced Aquinas. I regret that I must take you to task on these issues,
Professor, but to paraphrase what Aquinas wrote about his relation to
Aristotle, " more a friend to truth than to you. " Let us examine then
each of your views about Albert. In the first place, it is not at all correct
to say, as you do, that his Commentary "could have been produced at
any time betwen 1255 and 1275." 5 I was quite amazed by that statement,
and it took me quite awhile before I realized what you must mean.
Surely you refer to the theory advocated by F. Pelster in 1920 and 1982, the
theory now sometimes referred to as the " extreme " theory. According
to Prof. Pelster, Albert's Aristotelian commentaries were written between
4
5

Thomist, loc. cit. p. 242.
Ibid., p. 241.

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BOOK REVIEWS

1256 and 1275-surely that is where you got those dates; however, he
claims the Commentary on the Metaphysics was written between 1270
and 1274.6 Yes, there is (or maybe we should say, there was) such a
theory concerning the dating of Albert's work. It does not, of course, as
has often been pointed out, conform very well to the fact that Roger
Bacon angrily criticized his contemporaries for regarding so highly Albert's
commentarieS, and all this between 1240 and 1248!7 Be that as it may,
there is another and quite contrary theory, that of P. Mandonnet, according
to which Albert's Aristotelian commentaries date from between 1245 and
1256.8 So you see, there are these two theories, and even though you
write as if everyone knows the first is correct, there are some, and you may
count me among them, Prof. Bourke, who think the first theory, and the
second one too, to be wrong. I'm not asking you to accept this on my
authority, of course, but can you not accept the word of J. Weisheipl and
D. A. Callus? They have both published some interesting discoveries on
a little known work of Albert that he wrote circa 1271. In this context
Prof. Weisheipl claims that we can now "establish definitively" that
Albert's Commentary on the Metaphysics was completed before 1271 and
maybe even by 1267.9 But I find Prof. Callus's discovery even more
interesting (Prof. Weisheipl did not see it until after he had finished
writing his own comments, but he introduced a note to bring what he
called this" astonishing" discovery to the attention of his readers.) 10 Prof.
Callus has found evidence showing Albert was nearly blind in 1271 and that
all his work had been completed by that time. On the basis of this
discovery, we now know, as Prof. Callus explains, that Albert's Commentary
was completed by 1262-63, in plenty of time to come to the attention of
Aquinas who began to write only after 1265.11 I hope I am not repeating
s Cf. F. Pelster, Kritische Studien zum Leben und zu den Schriften Alberts des
Grossen (Freiburg i. B., 1920), esp. pp. 156-61; "Zur Datieruug der Aristotelesparaphrase des hi. Albert des Grossen, " in Zeitschrift fUr katholische Thealogie,
LVI (1982), 428-86.
7 Some information of this topic may be found in M.-D. Chenu, Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas (Chicago: Regnery, 1964), p. 42.
s P. Mandonnet, "Polemique Averroiste de Siger de Brabant," Revue Thomiste,

v (1897). 95-105.
Determinata XLIII ascribed to Albertus
9 J. Weisheipl, "The Problemata
Magnus (1271)," Mediaeval Studies, XXII (1960), 815.
10 Ibid., p. 808.
11 D. A. Callus," Une oeuvre recemment decouverte d'Albert le Grand: De XLID
problematibus ad Magistrum Ordinis (1271)" Revue des sciences philosophiques,
XLIV (1960), 259-60. B. Geyer's view in the introduction to his critical edition
of Albert's Commentary should be mentioned here; approaching the dating of
Albert's work from evidence other than that noted by Callus and Weisheipl, Geyer
nonetheless concludes that Albert's exposition was finished not long after 1262-68,

BOOK REVIEWS

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myself needlessly- perhaps you read about Prof. Callus's discovery in
my book on page 5, note 8, referred to also on page 83, note 1.
A second place where you are incorrect in your view of Albert concerns
his knowledge of Averroes and the extent to which he was influenced by
him. You say that, if Albert's Commentary was early enough to be used
by Aquinas in his exposition, then it would show little awareness of
Averroes but much of Avicenna. Prof. Bourke, you do Albert a great
injustice. As Prof. De Vaux showed in 1933, Albert should be regarded
as a pioneer in the effort to introduce Averroes to the Latin world! During
the first decade or so after Michael Scot translated Averroes very few
seemed to know anything at all of him. No one in fact seemed to pay
much attention until Albert in his Summa de creaturis-written circa
to use him; to get down to facts, De Vaux listed some 48
12
citations of Averroes in the first two parts of that work from circa
I am surprised that everyone does not realize how highly Albert regarded
Averroes. Not only did Prof. De Vaux bring this out, but Prof. Robert
Miller in 1954 agreed with De Vaux and in addition showed how Albert's
comprehension of Averroes had improved by a56. 18 Even more, the
indices of the new critical editions of Albert's exposition of the De Anima
(finished by
and of the Metaphysics contain fairly lengthy lists of
references to Averroes. So on this issue too, your are incorrect in your
view of Albert, Prof. Bourke, and therefore once more your criticism of my
book flounders on the hard, cruel rocks of fact.
There is a third and final aspect of your statement about Albert to which
I must beg permission to object. You write that we are ignorant of the
manner in which Albert's metaphysics influenced Aquinas. 14 I assume that
you mean we do not know how Albert's Commentary on the Metaphysics
influenced Aquinas's Commentary, because that is the only relation of Albert
to Aquinas that my book deals with. I assure you Professor, I am correct
when I say that Aquinas wrote his Commentary with the exposition of
Albert (and the exposition of Averroes too) open before him. Why I
have shown in my lengthy comparative analyses of Albert and Aquinas
how Aquinas used or opposed Albert as the occasion demanded! I will
not give a detailed explanation of this in my letter, as Chs. ID-V were
written to show primarily the fashion in which Aquinas used or opposed
Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert-and used and opposed them as was needed
and then ends on this note: " ... certo constat commentarium Alberti Ionge ante
commentarium Thomac confectum esse." Cf. p. viii of Alberti Magni Opera Omnia,
T. XVI, P. I, (1960).
12 R. De Vaux, "La premiere· entree d'Averroes chez les Latins," Revue des
sciences phuosophiques et theologiques, XXII (1988), 198-242.
1a R. Miller," An Aspect of Averroes' Influence on St. Albert," Mediaeval Studies,
XVI (1954), 59-69.
14 The Thomist, 87, (Jan. 1978), p. 242.

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to bring out what he, Aquinas, thought Aristotle's metaphysics was all
about. I do not want to enter into any detail at this point as my book has
done that abundantly. But permit me, Prof. Bourke, to ask one question
here. Why does your review present its " I do not know " and its " we may
wonder at the value " and at the same time hide from its readers the
fact that my book presents nearly 800 pages of comparative analyses of
Averroes, Avicenna, Albert, and Aquinas? More, why does your review
hide from its readers the fact that all assertions I make about Albert's
relation to Averroes, and of Aquinas's relation to both, rest on the evidence
of these comparative studies? Let me underline this as it is important.
My contention, clearly expressed again and again in my book, is that one
must compare Aquinas to his predecessors in order to understand his
Commentary on tJ,e Metaphysics. These comparisons are the basis of all
my affumations about these philosophers, and yet your review never even
hints at this aspect of my book but goes its own way, " wondering " at the
value of a comparison of Albert and Aquinas. There is no need to wonder
when the comparisons are there in the open to be studied and judged.
4) Neoplatonism in my study of Aquinas.

Before turning to one of the central issues of Aquinas's Commentary
I would like to speak of your statements regarding my book and Neoplatonism. What is involved is this: I said, as you noted, that certain
Neoplatonic elements in Avicenna's metaphysics were irrelevant to what
Aquinas does in his Commentary. Seeing how you use this, I wish I had
phrased it differently; however, in the context I feel it was fairly clear that
I meant that we could understand the essential points of Aquinas's
metaphysics without comparing his thought with Avicenna's Neoplatonic
views on divine attributes, on emanation, and " so on. " In other words,
I was saying that we need not bother with these few doctrines. You take
this statement of mine and charge: " These things are not irrelevant:
one cannot understand the metaphysics of any of these men in the Middle
Ages without some awareness of the influence of Nco-Platonism." 1 5 Come
now, Professor! You know I did not say Neoplatonism was irrelevant. If
I had, then I woud gladly help you start the bonfire. But nowhere
do I state or imply such a patently absurd thing as that Neoplatonism was
unimportant to Avicenna, Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas. However, your
reader, who surely skims his reviews rather rapidly, will carry away the
impression that my book ignores Neoplatonic elements. Let us set the
record straight. I am not overly fond of titles, tags, and categories as I
believe they hinder us in thinking, and so I am not given to littering the
landscape with terms such as "Neoplatonic."
Yet the reader will find
many discussions of Neoplatonic doctrines in my book. For example:
ts Ibid., p. 241.

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888

" metaphysics as defining all things in terms of 'God' " (page 44} ; "the
sending forth of being by the prime mover " (page 47} ; " quiddity as a
reality is a radius and a light of the first form, God " (page 50} ; " a real
quiddity is intelligible because it is saturated with the light of the intellect
from which it comes" (page 50}; "the movement of metaphysics is to
search for the light proceeding from God into the first entity and substance
of things" (page 52); and so forth and so forth.

5) Aquinas's view on knowledge of esse
Now then we come to my principal objection to what you have written.
It is my principal objection because first, it would seem to be most important in your mind, taking up as it did nearly 25 per cent of your review;

and second, because the very nature of your objection hides most effectively
the historical aspects I judge essential to the study of Aquinas. I will
begin by quoting some of your words; I wish us to have them before us,
as they express a certain esprit that I wish us to feel, even though I perfer
to leave it unnamed.
What lies behind all of this is Doig's understanding of intellectual conception
and judgment. He is sure that " the 'is' of judgments never means exists,"
and he can be quite critical of Aquinas (1) for not havilng understood this in his
early period, and (2) for not saying it in his later writings... The fact of the
matter is that Doig approached his task with an obvious preconception. He is
dead set against any suggestion that metaphysical esae is expressed or known in
the judgment. Gilson and his associates are wrong on this point, in the view of
Doig. Indeed, in the course of his discussion Doig disagrees with almost everyone
in the Thomist establishment (Fabro, Forest, Geiger, Maritain, Marechal, Owens,
Phelan, De Raeymaeker, Van Riet, and Van Steenberghen) except Charles Hart
and Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange!' What is important in Doig's mind is the concept
of being, taken both essentially and existentially. His book should stand as an
example of how not to interpret a philosophical classic.18

In the jargon of our youth: " WOW! " But let us be serious. What on
earth is this " Thomist establishment? " Do all those learned men actually
agree on anything? Why Fabro and Geiger cannot even define "participation " in the same way! And as for the Louvain scholars you mention
(Van Riet, Van Steenberghen, De Raeymaeker} , why they hardly entertain
a single view that would be accepted as Thomist by Gilson, Owens, and
Phelan! And Marechal! Mon Dieu! I thought he was the KANTIANThomist! If the members of the " Thomist establishment " can be as
diverse as these, then the fact that I disagree with some aspect of each'
work should make them receive me with open arms!
But let us tum to a substantive issue. Your readers can be very certain
1G Ibid.,

pp. 242-48.

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that you believe I approach Aquinas with a preconception, namely, that
metaphysical esse is not known in a judgment. It is this charge, and your
emphasis on it, that hides most effectively what I consider to be the only
correct method of studying Aquinas, the historical method. Now perhaps
I have presupposed this-it is possible; but before we state this definitely,
permit me to ask you this: do my words and my procedure truly show you
the presence of this preconception? I must insist on phrasing my question
this way, because I try in my book always to insist on asking what the
words and procedures of Aquinas really mean; I try in my book always
to anchor my interpretations in the sense of the words and procedures
themselves .. So Prof. Bourke, do my words and my procedure show you
this preconception? I suggest we look to those places where I claim to have
discovered that Aquinas would not want to say that " is " means " exists. "
In this regard, you do your readers an injustice when you write that the
"kernel of Doig's view of judgment is based on his reading of certain
texts in the Commentary (In IV Meta., lect. 17, n. 736; In V Meta., lect.
9, nn. 889 et 895; In VI Meta., lect. 4; see Doig, p. 349) .17 You do your
readers an injustice. You refer them to page 349 on which they will find
listed, but not explained, nor analyzed, those texts you list. But what
am I doing on page 349 and in the entirety of Chapter VII, Prof. Bourke?
Permit me to answer my own question by parphrasing what I presented as
the raison d'etre of that chapter: "the necessity of studying Aquinas's
Commentary through textual analyses may have obscured some aspects of
his metaphysics; therefore the final chapter of my book will present the
most important doctrines of the Commentary, though now independent of
any analysis of texts. " 18 The references to those few texts you find on
page 349 and elsewhere are references to texts in which the reader can find
the notion that esse is not known in a judgment; those references are not
references to the texts on which I primarily base my reading of Aquinas.
What your statement does, Prof. Bourke, is to obscure the issue once again;
you have managed to hide from your reader: 1) the fact that I interpret
Aquinas's thought on knowledge of esse by reading his Commentary in the
light of the parallel expositions of Aristotle, Avicenna, Averroes, and Albert;
and 2) the fact that I find Aquinas saying or implying that esse is not
known in a judgment in a fairly large number of texts and doctrines which
are scattered through his Commentary.
This brings me to a point that I truly regret mentioning in this fashion,
but as I have said, " more a friend to truth than to you. " You write in
your review, Professor, as if you failed to note the lengthy comparative
analyses presented in my Chs. III-VI. I have mentioned this oversight
earlier, but now it seems I must underline it. What is my book, Professor?
17 Ibid., p.

18 P.

341,

BOOK REVIEWS

835

And by asking that question, I am not trying to claim total truth for it.
But what is it? Let us be fair: it is a quite lengthy analysis of the text of
Aristotle, Avicenna, Averres, Albert, and Aquinas. Yet nowhere in your
review do you clearly state that! To the contrary, your "I do not know "
about the Latin versions of Aristotle, your " area of doubt " about the value
of studying the Spiazzi-Cathala text, your " we do not know " about the
date of Albert's Commentary, your "we may wonder at the value" of
comparisons of Albert and Aquinas, and your throwing the charge of
"obvious preconception "-all these serve one end which I truly hope was
not intended: they hide from your reader the content and method of my
book, while they lead him to conjure up an image of a book whose
conclusions are founded on assumptions, oversights, omissions, and
preconceptions. Now even were all theseassumptions, oversights, omissions,
and preconceptions in my book, there would still remain a mountain of
evidence I present for my conclusions.
But let us return to what you call an " obvious preconception. " I will
try to summarize, as briefly as I can, a few of those places in which I
try to show why we must conclude that Aquinas rejected the theory that
metaphysical esse is known in a judgment. (Of course, I am speaking of
the Aquinas of the Commentary on the Metaphysics; in the beginning of
his career, Aquinas held that esse was known in a judgment, but after his
study of Boethius's De hebdomadibus he grew ever further away from that
early view.) 19
a) Ch. II, pp. 24-35. The context is a short summary of Avicenna's
view of metaphysics. My book notes that for Avicenna everything studied
by the Metaphysician is grouped around esse. Avicenna seems to have
had an unusual notion of .esse as he wrote such cryptic things as this: to
study the esse of motion is to study the concrete reality of motion, " not in
so far as it is in matter, but according to the esse it has." I was initially
puzzled by this view, and I am sure, Prof. Bourke, that you will agree
that it is somewhat unusual: does it not seem to you that the " esse of
motion " and "motion insofar as it is in matter" must be inseparable and
the same thing? Where after all does motion exist if not in matter! But
it is precisely because the existence of motion is material that I was
convinced that Avicenna did not mean by esse what we would think he
meant. And so, as I explain in this section of my book, we need to
discover what exactly he did mean.
My treatment of Avicenna continues by noting the following: if we
accept the distinction of existence and essence (which, of course, Avicenna
did) , we would not ordinarily say that a concrete being is existence: we
19 In my study of Aquinas I treat this point in footnotes, e. g., p.
p. 847, !J.Ote I; p. 860, note I; p. 862, note 1.

note I;

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would not say that ens eat esse. Nor would Avicenna say such a thing.
Rather, he claims that "a concrete thing is an essence which is, or which
exists "-" ens est certitudo seu essentia quae est. " In all beings one has
to distinguish the esse of a thing and the essence or certitude by which a
thing is what it is. It is precisely the fact of having a certitude or an
essence that Avicenna refers to as esse proprium--proper existence. When
he attempts to explain exactly what he means by esse Avicenna clearly
indicates that he is referring to the de facto presence, here and now of a
quiddity. Ease signifies what is often referred to by contemporary philosophers as" brute facticity." Accordingly, one can say that the study of
esse qua esse is the study of the "fact of having a quiddity, considered
precisely as such a fact. "
Let us pause here a moment, Professor, to make certain we understand
this point. I am claiming that for Avicenna metaphysics must study things
qua esse. That means the formal object. our point of view is ease. And
ease taken as a point of view becomes the " fact of having a quiddity,
considered precisely as such a fact." With this in mind let us consider
the following text of Avicenna, which I have put into English for convenience.
Everything has a certitude by which it is what it is. . . And this is what perhaps
we call proper esse; nor do we mean by that expression wnything but the meaning
[or concept] of affirmative esse, because the word ens signifies many meanings,
[or concepts], among which is the certitude by which each thing is; and this is
like the proper esse of a thing.

By " proper ease " then is meant the " affirmative esse " ; ens is said to
mean many things, among which is essence-these doctrines appear to be
references to the Aristotelian theory of ens as meaning either " predicaments
of substance and accidents " or " truth. " In speaking of ens in the first
sense one refers to "what a thing is"; in the latter, to "that a thing is."
To know " that a thing is " is to give an affirmative answer to the question
an est? is to posit the "affirmative ease "-the Eat! It would appear thus
that by the proper esse of a thing Avicenna is thinking of the knowledge
we have" that a thing is "-Eat! Not that Avicenna confuses our knowledge
with the existence of a quiddity. Rather, in the passage quoted above
he merely wished to pin-point the act of knowledge in which we grasp the
existence proper to a thing. In other words, for Avicenna it is in answering
the question " Is it? " that we grasp the " fact of having a quiddity. "
If I may be permitted to summarize my explanation, I shall simply say
that, for Avicenna, the metaphysical point of view is " factually present,"
or as I often put it in my book, " here-and-now presence " that we know
when we judge the truth of our knowledge. One cannot help but note the
great similarity between my understanding of Avicenna and M. Gilson's
view of Aquinas! I point this out because in the next section we shall note

BOOK REVIEWS

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how Averroes and Aquinas reject this Avicennian position because it is
un-Aristotelian. 20
b) Ch. IV, passim. On page 161 I explain that Averroes, in order to
attack Avicenna's metaphysics, had but to point to some fallacy in the idea
or theory of esse. Earlier I showed that Averroes thought "Avicenna
sinned greatly" regarding esse (page 145}. In addition my book claims the
crux of Averroes's criticism is this: the source of Avicenna's error was a
fundamental misunderstanding of the difference between ens as referring
to the truth of our knowledge and ens as referring to substance and
accidents; when we speak of that ens which refers to truth, we are
speaking of an act, of an act we perform; we do not thus refer to the
categories of substance and accidents (page 162).
I trust Averroes's position is clear, Prof. Bourke; he is rejecting the
act in which we know truth, he is rejecting the " is " of the act of
judging-the " is " of the judgment " Socrates is real." This " is,"
Averroes means, has nothing to do with metaphysical being. I find this
very interesting, because it shows what Averroes would have thought of the
so-called " existential Thomism " so much in vogue in some quarters. But
let us return to this thorny issue of esse.
Aquinas's attacks on Avicenna parallel those attacks found in Averroes's
Commentary, as my book explains on numerous occasions. One of these
attacks, owing a great deal to Averroes, is
on pages 112-114.21
But the later treatment on page 164ff is more important to us at the
moment. Here I will simply steal from my book.
But without examining Thomas' second attack on Avicenna (In X Meta., S,
1981-82), we can not correctly understand what Thomas has done either to
Aristotelian metaphysics, nor to the Avicennian theory of the real distinction.
Even the briefest reading of pargraphs 1981-82 reveals how Thomas has followed
Averroes' criticism. Avicenna was deceived by the multiple uses of the word ens,
writes Thomas, practically copying Averroes' expression. There is a difference,
unnoticed by Avicenna, between the ens which signifies the truth of a proposition,
and the ens which is divided into the ten predicaments. The ens which signifies
the composition of a proposition is an accidental predicate. That is, when we
say (judge): "Socrates is white," the "is" is our way of denoting that we have
correctly joined " Socrates " and " white" ; such a joining is made by the
intellect today, instead of yesterday or tomorrow. What we do in a judgment
is express that our present knowledge is true. It is completely accidental to
Socrates, however, whether we know him today or tomorrow. "Is white" may be
20 Albert rejects this Avicennian theory as well, but I am omitting
all discussion of his position here for reasons of space; in my study Albert's view of
this theory is treated on pages 145-52 and 168-64.
21 For Averroes and Albert on this text of Aristotle and their influence on
Aquinas, see pages 145-52.

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actual accident of Socrates; yet the fact that we know it is (or the fact that
we say knowledge is true), this is totally accidental to the reality of whiteness in
Socrates. Hence, when Avicenna tried to study all things " here-and-now realized, "
he was actually studying them as " here-and-now known by us as realized. "
Metaphysical tmS is not that type or ens, Thomas writes; metaphysical tm11 is that
being which is divided into the ten predicaments, and which expresses thus· the
natures of the ten genera of beings.
Thus it is that Thomas categorically rejects the Avicennian metaphysics which
studied all things as realized here and now. Yet Thomas accepts the distinction of esse and essence. How he manages to distinguish esse from essence,
and what exactly he means by esse, these are topics to which we shall return in
Chapter VI (pages 164-65).

Bill

It would seem Prof. Bourke, on the basis of such expositions that my
book attempts
present evidence for the following points. 1) Avicenna
held that the formal object of metaphysics was " here-and-now existence "
or" presence "-the" is" known and expressed by a judgement.
Both
Averroes and Aquinas reject this, saying that the" here-and-now presence,"
or Avicennian esse, is the mind's realization that it has correctly known
some object; as such this esse is not important for the constitution of
real being. 3) Yet Aquinas retained esse in his metaphysical view expressed
in the Commentary, through just how is not shown until Ch. VI.
c) Chs. V-VI, passim. We must follow this point just a bit further,
so let us be patient Professor. I devote Ch. V to a further comparison
of the interpretations of Aristotle given by Avicenna, Averroes, Albert,
and Aquinas. Here, however, I concentrate on three topics: the relation
of universal science (the study of· being as such) to the first science (the
study of the first cause of being) ; the study of communia (the notions
such as "being" which are common to all knowledge); and metaphysics
as " lord" of the sciences (metaphysics as giving principles, subject matter,
etc. to the other sciences) . What I discover in these analyses confirms
what was noted in Ch. IV concerning the object of metaphysics. Aquinas is
everywhere presenting a single, unified metaphysical synthesis in opposition
to the other three commentators; moreover, Aquinas constantly indicates
this metaphysical synthesis is Aristotle's, even though it is tainted from end
to end with esse as a metaphysical principle-but esse means something
other than the Avicennian notion which Aquinas has rejected. This is indeed
a complex situation, don't you agree Prof. Bourke. In fact, it is so
complex with all the analyses carried out in my book that, even if I did
begin with a presupposition, it would be a monumental task to discover
exactly where I first slip it in! But back to the grindstone. What
exactly did esse mean for Aquinas? That question I try to answer in Ch.
VI.
I really wish it were possible to present the discussion of this issue as

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I give it in Ch. VI but this letter would become much too lengthy were
I to do that. For you see, Prof. Bourke, in Ch. VI I undertake the task
of reconstructing the metaphysics operative in Aquinas's Commentary.
To do that I enter into the following:
1) a listing of the basic doctrines bearing on the movement of metaphysics from
its birth to affirmations of God (pages 239-241)
2) a discussion of the texts dealing with the birth of metaphysics (pages 241-247)
3) a study of what Aquinas has called the "investigation of predication," an
investigation to be used in metaphysics (pages 247-255)
4) a study of how Aquinas seems to have used the investigation of predication
to discover the concept of " being " (pages 255-275); and to discover the
distinction of matter and form (pages 275-281)
5) a study of texts dealing with the discovery of the existence of God (pages 281295)
6) a study of texts dealing with the human attempt to speak of God (pages 295302)

Throughout these 64 pages I am trying to reconstruct the metaphysics
which is demanded by Aquinas's opposition to Avicenna, Averroes, and
Albert, and which as well is demanded by his intention to present his
understanding of Aristotelianism. It is in this context that I try to
explain the meaning of esse that this complex historical reality of the
Commentary seems to demand, and that is demanded too by the six
groups of texts mentioned above. What is this meaning of esse demanded
by these six groups of texts and by this historical situation? This is
undoubtedly the question, Prof. Bourke, and so I shall attempt to answer
succinctly. I} Esse is known in the first operation of the intellect-in a
concept.
Esse is understood as "actually received" or "actually
present, when it needn't be. " Because of this I describe the meaning of
ens as " actualized essence. " To know something as ens is to see " the
essence actually constituting the thing what it is, when the essence need not
be so constituting it. " Such formulations may sound strange, but they
seemed necessary to take into account the following historical facts.
1} Avicennian esse is rejected because it is un-Aristotelian:
Aristotle knew the ' is " of judgment to be metaphysically uninteresting;
2) Esse was retained in the metaphysics Aquinas saw as Aristotle's;
3) " manifestly false is the opinion of those who say Aristotle does not have a
proof of a first cause of being "-so Aquinas informs us at the very point Averroes
and Albert give the contrary opinion; and esse as the creature's participation in
its First Cause seems to be the corner-stone of the proof. Such an esse cannot
be the esse known in a judgment because brute facticity needs only an efficient
cause and involves no participation.
4) Ens and esse will be found through an "investigation of predication," says
Aquinas, echoing Averroes. By " predication " Aquinas and Averroes (not to

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mention Albert) did not mean what goes on in judgment, but they meant the
concept used (and I stress used) in the first act of the intellect. " Socrates is a
philosopher " is the expression of the first act of the intellect, an expression of the
use of a concept to know Socrates. " It is true to conceive Socrates as a
philosopher" is the expression of judgment. Avicenna took his esse from the
"is true" of judgment; "nonsense," said Averroes, Albert, and Aquinas, who
insist on taking ens from the " is a philosopher " of the first act of the intellect,
and there too Aquinas found his esse.

These are some of the more important historical aspects surrounding the
Commentary of Aquinas, and bearing on the meaning of esse; but there
are many more, Prof. Bourke, that you will find discussed in Chs. III-VI.
Still different historical facts are found in other works of Aquinas too,
and I try to mention some of those in footnotes. Among those is the
following:
5) " Esl!e as known in a judgment " was the metaphysical

principle Aquinas
valued prior to the time he commented on Boethius' De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus. The
Platonism of Boethius wrought a profound change in Aquinas' metaphysics however,
and gradually that esse, derived from Avicenna, disappears from Aquinas' thought.
Note for example the change in arguments for God: prior to the study of the
De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus,the proof from esse is one of causality, afterward it is through
participation and causality (see footnotes on pages 360 ood 290 for example);
prior to the De hebdCYI7/A,l],ibus,esl!e is a brute fact, afterward it is the actuality of
actualities-the richest notion of all (see footnotes on pages 362 and 347).

I suppose it is fair to ask where we are after all this. To answer my
own inquiry, we are right here: regardless of whether or not my view
of Aquinas is correct, these brief remarks about the content on my
historical study show that you, Prof. Bourke, were somewhat hasty in
saying that I wrote with an obvious preconception.
6) ]Jfiscellanea, including the dating of Aquinas's Commentary.

Prof. Bourke, I fear I have demanded much of, your patience in asking
you to read all this. I trust, however, that you do not begrudge me this,
since we are both seeking truth, whatever it might be. It was necessary
in this case, I felt, for me to point out certain failings and short-comings
in your review. To be quite honest about it, it seems that I have taken
you to task for all save one or two small aspects of your review. Though
it pains me to point this out, you have erred in those remaining elements
too. Your statement that I think there were two redactions of Aquinas's
Commenta:ry, "one from 1265-67 in the Papal States" and the second
from 1270-72 is Paris, is not exactly what I said. 2 2 What I concluded was
2 2 The Tkomist, 37,

(Jan. 1973), p. 242.

BOOK REVIEWS

841

But
as follows. 1) There were two drafts-you were correct on this.
we do not know which of the following is true as they all fit our evidence:
a) the Commrntary was begun and finished in Paris between
and
b) an early draft was written in Italy (U65-67) and reworked in Paris
or in Italy (after
or c) the first draft dates from the
Paris period and the second after the return to Italy (after
.2.11
In this connection I would like to note what Prof. A. Pattin, in a
review of my book in Tijdschrift voor Filosofie has pointed out. Aquinas
in paragraph 468 (In III Meta., lect. 11) refers to Simplicius's exposition
of the Categories, translated by Moerbeke in
This parapragh then
has to be after that date 24-this is something I had missed.- This paragraph is in that section revised by Aquinas sometime after June,
in
that dictation-session I referred to much earlier. If the Naples ms.
VIII F. 16 shows this to be one of the revisions I speak of in Ch. I,
then we still do not know when Aquinas wrote the first draft. If, however,
the Naples ms. does not show the reference to Simplicius as something new
in
then we know it is possible that the first draft of Book III was
written only after
The final element of your review that I will mention concerns the three
books you mention; one you chide me for not listing or using, while by
implication you seem to say I missed something important in overlooking
the others. However, Prof. Bourke, the book that you say I neither listed
nor used, the work by Garceau, was published in 1968 which is the year
after the completion of my work, as I indicated by the date "April, 1967 "
on page xvi. The work of Peghaire, Intellectus et Ratio, is one I enjoyed,
and in fact cite on page 65 when I am treating those terms in Aquinas's
thought. You are, however, quite correct if you intended to imply that the
third work, by Muller- Thym, was not used by me. I am not certain, but
I believe that book deals with the various metaphysics positions of Albert
that lead one to conclude that he did not have just one metaphysics; as
I say, I am not certain, but I would suppose that, if it does treat that
topic, the reason I did not cite it is because I was dealing only with the
way Albert's Commentary might have influenced Aquinas's Commentary.
Hence the question of what metaphysics Albert actually held was irrelevant
to my work.
Now I come to the end of this letter. Let me remind you again why
I wrote. I was concerned over your review, as it seemed to he founded
on historical inaccuracies, incorrect implications about the content of my
book, and criticism based on your apparent failure to notice a central
2.ll Cf.

pages 20-21 for these conclusions.
voor Filosofie, 87 (1972), p. 578.

24 Tijdsckrift

BOOK REVIEWS

section of 9l86 pages, namely, Chs. III-VI of my book. Yet it was not the
content of your review, nor the fate of my book, that directly bothered
me. It was what could result to the study of Aquinas's Commentary if
I did not respond and point out the true issue. You are wrong when you
call my approach " an example of how not to interpret a philosophical
classic." Nor have you pointed to anything in my book that justifies
your conclusion. My book has taken the only correct approach to the
study of Aquinas's Commentary, namely:
1) a study of the Latin Aristotle and the commentaries on Aristotle that Aquinas
knew;
2) only through that study, and on the basis of that study, is a conclusion reached
concerning the nature and content of Aquinas' work.

Undoubtly my work has faults, and perhaps no one can be more aware
of that than I. But no evidence has been evoked to show it has faults
of method. Quite the contrary, medieval research supports my method.
The faults of my book, whatever they are, will concern the implementation
of that method, not the method itself. I would welcome criticism, Prof.
Bourke, if it were really directed to my book, because such criticism
would benefit scholarship in the field of medieval philosophy, such criticism
would help us understand Aquinas's magnificent Commentary.
Respectfully,
JAMEs

Clayton Juni01' College
MMrow, Georgia

C. Dom

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Adams Press, Chicago, Ill.: Value Systems. The Moral and Eudemonic
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Alba House: Traces of God in a Secular Culture, by George F. McLean,
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· Barnes & Noble: Reason, Truth and God, by Renford Bambrough. (Pp.
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Cedam, Padova: Tomismo e Principio di Non Contraddizione, by Maria
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Consejo Superior de investigaciones cientificas: Jacobus M. Ramirez, 0. P.,
Opera Omnia. Tomus V De Passionibus. In I-II Summa
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Dept. of Philosophy, University of Kansas: Reflections on Evil, by Albert
Hofstadter. The Lindley Lecture 1973. (Pp. 24)
Editorial Universidad de Buenos Aires: Continuidad de la Materia. Ensayo
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Harper & Row: The Concept of Peace, by John MacQuarrie. (Pp. 82,
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Macmillan Publishing Co.: The Inquisition, by John O'Brien. (Pp. 244,
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Negation de la Negation, by Michel Delsol & Henri-Paul Cunningham. (Pp. 242, $5.95)
The Print Shop of Edina: Logical Analysis: A New Approach, by Richard
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The Seabury Press: The Mission of the Church, by Edward Schillebeeckx.
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843

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Sheed & Ward: Abortion and Social Justice, ed. by Thomas W. Hilgers &
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Verlag Josef Knecht: Gottes Wirken in der Welt. Ein Diskussionsbeitrag
zur Frage der Evolution und des Wunders, by Bela Weissmahr.
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