THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORs: THE DoMINICANFATHERS oF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH
Publishers:

The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017

·VoL. XXXVIII

APRIL, 1974

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT: AQUINAS AND
THE MODERN CONTEXT

I

N TIDS ESSAY we treat of St. Thomas's theology of the
Gifts of the Holy Spirit. However, we are not offering
an historical investigation, nor, for that matter, a comprehensive outline of the thought of the Doctor Communis in this
area. 1 Rather, in a more or less schematic manner, we wish
to indicate how Thomas's theology of the Gifts comes to us
today, with our different context of theological reflection. In
the process of present developments it might well be transformed, but it has much to contribute. Essentially, St. Thomas
has given us an interpretation of St. Paul's "spiritual man"
(I
14 f), thereby indicating his hope for the human condition to be lifted up by the Spirit to new levels of love, liberty,
and holiness.
1 For a complete historical
im.vestigation see 0. Lottin, O.S.B., Psychologie et
Morale aux X lie et Xllle siecles, t. 3 (Gembloux, 1949),
and t.
4 (1954)' 667-736.

193

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

The theology of the Gifts is interesting as a personal expression of St. Thomas's thought. His method and categories are
Aristotelian. His theological priorities are rigorously intellectualist, since sacra doctrina is a science.2 Yet a certain paradox
appears. Though theology is indeed an intellectualist procedure, Christian living breaks out of any intellectual scheme.
When the Spirit possesses man, no systematic reasoning says
the last word. The ultimate meaning of authentic human existence is to be open to the freedom of the Spirit of God. This
enables man to act in a "divine manner," in a "supra-human
mode," beyond the scope of human deliberation. 3 This is the
paradox that Aquinas expressed in his own life when he was
finally brought to disclaim his vast theological labor as so much
straw.
This mention of paradox serves to indicate the important
contribution St. Thomas makes in the present context. In his
interpretation of concrete human existence he proposes a special
model for the cooperation of God and man in human activity.
He determines a special quality of the immanence of God to
human action: man is depicted to be living from within himself, yet only because he is disposed to live from beyond himself; as deliberating and deciding, yet as finding his rational
pattern of activity surpassed by an immeasurably higher principle, which does not check human liberty but enlarges it.
In his brilliant study John T. Marcus has shown the current
need for an understanding of man that will mediate between
the many images of man if contemporary culture is going
to communicate in a common human meaning. 4 We require
• Summa Theol., q. 1, aa. !'l-8.
• III Sent., d. 84, q. 1, a. 1: " Unde Philosophus in VII Ethic. contra virtutem
simpliciter dividit virtutem heroicam quam divinam dicit eo quod per excellentiam
virtutis homo fit quasi deus. Et secundum hoc dico quod dona a virtutibus
distinguuntur in hoc quod vitutes perficiunt ad actus modo humano sed dona
ultra humanum modum." And Summa Theol., I-II, q. 70, a. 4: "Spiritus Sanctus
movet humanam mentem ad id quod est supra rationem."
• John T. Marcus, "East and West: Phenomenologies of Self and the Existential
Bases of Knowledge," International Philos()[thical Quarterly (March 1971), pp.
5-48.

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THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

a concept of self capable of preserving and developing the older
phenomenologies of self that were the organizational principles
of the great classical cultures. For all these classical images of
self, in East and West, have been eroded to the point of collapse. The Western image of self was explicitly formulated as
the perduring reality of a self grounded and acting in history,
capable of progressive expansion in the direction of a more
abundant life. Doubtless, the cultural matrix of this was the
successful practical and theoretical activities of Western man.
Yet this is challenged today. It is challenged from within by
the specialist knowledge of Western culture itself, by the
psychologist pointing to the depths of the subconscious, by the
sociologist expressing the multiple factors that condition human freedom. There is., too, a challenge from the outside, as
hitherto unknown styles of thought, other philosophies of life,
a newer and deeper knowledge of the gl"eat religions of the
world, invite Western man to seek another dimension of his
liberty, a level where he can receive as well as act. He is invited
to transcend his present cultural bias in the direction of deeper
experience of his own humanity in touch with transcendent
meanings. 5
Classical Chinese culture sees the authentic self primarily
as a relationship, be it to the Family or the whole cosmic order.
It sought for harmony and integration in a greater whole.6
The great Hindu culture based itself not on any identification
of the self with the acting empirical ego as in Western culture
but in transcending the false front of this empirical ego which
concealed rather than revealed the truer and higher self. The
deceptive individuality of the ego yields to a merging with the
Brahman. 7
Both these cultures are now seriously challenged by the
inroads of technological society. To the degree that their fundamental principles of organization are affected, they suffer
a profound dislocation. For it appears now to many Eastern
minds that liberation is not to be sought in any escape from
• Op. cit., pp. 43-48.

"Ibid., pp. !U-26.

Ibid., pp. 26-SO.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

individuality and history but in a vigorous return to such a
world.
If Western culture has developed an understanding of selfhood in the immanent abilities of man to transform himself
and his world, the Eastern cultures have organized themselves
around the idea of liberation through a process of transcendence
to the attainment of the true self. The challenge of the present
is to bring these varying understandings of man into a reciprocal relationship in which neither the practical expertise of
the one nor the transcending abilities of the other will be lost.
And theology must mediate religion into such a context, a task
made no easier when all the elements are so mobile and fragmented. A comprehensive theological viewpoint will offer all
these partial understandings of man to the healing and perfecting power of the Spirit of Christ. This appears to be the
major task for theology today.
It is precisely in this context that St. Thomas's theology of
the spiritual man commends itself. His analysis of human
liberty immanently perfected by the Spirit promises a good
model for the understanding of quite diverse anthropologies,
in order to bring them together in a fruitful unified fashion.
Through such an interaction we can grow deeper insight
into the immanence of God to man, into the scale and scope
of man's freedom.
In his treatment of the Gifts, a main metaphysical achievement is a distinction between the virtue and the gift. Both
are seen as immanent dispositions affecting the quality of man's
activity. The virtue is conceived of as disposing man to act
as habitually moved by his rational faculties. 8 This seems to
be a thoroughly "Western" viewpoint. The accent is on the
reasoned judgment, the deliberative choice, the categorial ac8 Summa
Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 1: "manifestum est quod virtutes humauae
perficiunt hominem secundum quod homo natus est moveri per rationem in his
quae interius vel exterius aget. Opportet igitur inesse homini alteriores perfectiones
secundum quas sit dipositus ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur. Et istae perfectiones
vocantur dona non solum quia infunduntur a Deo sed quia secundum ea homo
disponitur ut efficiatur prompte mobilis ab inspiratione divina • . . moventur a
meliori principio quam sit ratio humana . . . ad altiores actus quam sit actus
virtu tum."

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197

tion, the selected scope and definite horizon. But by the Gifts
man is rendered capable of being inspired by God, thus to share
in the divine spontaneity in acting in a way that goes beyond
a deliberative mode of activity. Man is said to be moved by
a principle greater than his reason to higher activities, as by
a divine instinct. To this divine instinct he is attuned by the
Gifts. Here the accent is on the incalculable action, the inspired insight, the instinctive grasp, the surrender of man to
Mystery of God working palpably within him. The limited
scale of human reason is opened to the unlimited expanse of the
wisdom of God. Indeed, this expresses a more " Eastern " expenence.
If Thomas's metaphysical achievement is partially located
in his distinction between the virtue and the Gift., his theological
emphasis is on infused charity that transfonns all the activities
of human existence. From this charity all the Gifts derive and
open man to an experience of self that has not yet appeared
(I Jn. 3:2).
Admittedly all this is a " Western " mode of thinking, yet
it is a kind of thinking that will have increasing relevance
for those who are seeking the contemplative dimension of life
and so to enter with some sympathy into the wider culture of
a whole humanity seeking for an experience of the Transcendent.
Hence our method will be, first, to give a more precise account of the Gifts; second, to outline the shift in the modern
theological context as it affects our question; and third, to give
three examples, one each from modern theology, philosophy,
and experience that can be set in a profitable relationship to
St. Thomas's theology of the Gifts.

I. St. Thomas's Theology of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit 9
Aquinas's thought on the Gifts of the Holy Spirit is heir to
the whole Patristic theology on the role of the Holy Spirit in
• Here I must acknowledge my indebtedness to the unpublished De
templatione of Paul (now Cardinal) Philippe, O.P., which I discovered recently.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

Christian life. There are the three specific influences: the traditional commentaries on Isaiah 11:2-3 describing the sevenfold
(at least according to the Septuagint) Spirit that rests on the
Messiah. There is the Pauline doctrine of the " spiritual man.''
St. Thomas's finest remarks are associated with I Cor. 2 and
Rom. 8 especially. And then, on the philosophical level, we
have the Greek doctrine of " enthusiasm," " divine possession"
or divine " instinctus " in the Latin translations. 10 This strongly
Platonic theme finds its way to St. Thomas through the
Liber de Bona Fortuna, a Latin translation of the younger
Aristotle's VII Eudemian Ethics. It attempts to account for
the fact that certain men are made to act in an heroic manner
by a superior power: "They have no need to resort to human
deliberation for they follow an interior instinct, moved as they
are by a higher principle." 11
Despite the widespread theologizing on the role of the Spirit
in Christian life and the " gratia septiformis Spiritus Sancti "
in both East and West, it was not until the beginning of the
thirteenth century that any clear distinction was drawn between the virtues and Gifts. Phillip the Chancellor in his
Su'1111f1W, de Bono was the first to teach that the Gifts are giV'en
to facilitate the operation of the virtues. St. Albert pushed
the matter further and suggests that the Gifts not only perfect
the virtues but that they are the principles: of a higher mode
of activity, since God acts directly through them. Such is the
proV'enance of St. Thomas's own theology of the Gifts. He
10 On "instinctus " and the meanings implied in it, see Max Seckler, Instinkt
und Glaubenswille nach Thomas von Aquin (Mainz,
and E. Schillebeeckx,
The Concept of Truth and Theological Renewal (London: Sheed and Ward, 1968),
pp. 88 ff. St. Thomas himself speaks of an " instinctus " at all levels of life. Sometimes on a psychological level, sometimes on a pre-conscious ontological level. It
is basically an original impulse given to bring about activity in a defined area
of existence.
11 Summa Theol., 1-11, q. 68, a. 1. J. H. Walgrave, "Een Proeve Tot Thomas
lnterpretatie," Ephemerides Theologicae Lovanienaea XLV (1969), 417-481, contends that it is only in the later writings of St. Thomas that we find an important
role given to the " instinctus divinus." He understands it through an analogy with
the " instinctus naturae," which is already a kind of divine instinct, and as such,
part of the dynamism of divine Providence.

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199

does indeed accept St. Gregory as his main " auctoritas " on
the Gifts, 12 but he will go on to depth, develop and systematize
the theology that had begun to emerge a few decades before
he wrote.
The key principle of his thinking on the Gifts is the immanence of the Spirit of God to man. Human freedom can be
grasped only as related to a " duplex principium " within man:
the one, man's rational ability, is apprehended as more internal,
more under man's control; the other, God himself, is perceived
as more externaJ.13 Yet God is always implied as the transcendental principle establishing man in the unrestricted horizon of his spiritual activity. Because his intentionality is
finalized and indeed, radically effected by the infinite Being
of God, man can determine means and ends within this spiritual
horizon. 14
St. Thomas would argue that, for the integrated development
of man's intentionality, he must be habitually disposed to
respond to the full potentialities of his immanent life. The
virtues are given so that his authenticity as a reasonable agent
will be maintained and extended through all his. faculties, as
he seeks his final end and the means to it. Yet all this must
be subjected by further dispositions to the higher principle
that informs man's intentionality, God himself. In this way
the human agent is enabled to transcend the provisional, necessarily limited, deliberative mode of his rational activity; thus
to live in the true spaciousness of the Mystery possessing him.15
See especially his Moralia IT, ch. 49 and 56 (PL 75,
598).
Summa Theol., loc. cit.: "In homine est duplex principium movens: unum
quidem interius quod est ratio; aliud autem exterius quod est Deus."
"Ibid., q. 9, a. 4: "et si ipsa moveret seipsam ad volendum opportuisset quod
mediante consilio hoc ageret, ex aliqua voluntate praesupposita. Hoc autem non
est procedere in infinitum. Unde necesse est ponere quod in primum motum
voluntatis voluntas prodeat ex instinctu alicuius exterioris moventis." This fundamental moving principle can only be God. Ibid., q. 9, a. 6 ad 8: "Deus movet
voluntatem hominis sicut universalis motor ad universale obiectum voluntatis quod
est bonum. Et sine hac universali motione homo non potest aliquid velle. Sed
homo per rationem determinat se ad volendum hoc vel illud. . . ."
'"Ibid., q. 68, a. 1.
10
18

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

St. Thomas locates the necessity for these further dispositions
more precisely. There is in man a lack of complete connaturality to the supernatural goal to which he is actually called.
Only by being habitually disposed to the activity of the Spirit
working within him can his supernatural life be properly integrated into human existence so that he will be attuned to
the laws of his new life. Only the Spirit of God can totally incline man to God.16 The theological virtues do indeed establish
man in an objective immediacy to the Divine Mystery. But
man's purely rational mode of operation is insufficiently supple,
intuitive, instinctive in its mode of operation to enable man to
respond completely to the Transcendent Personal Mystery
communicated to him. The manner of his activity must be
habitually disposed to allow for his full integration into the
new life of Grace at work within him. And so the Gifts render
man capable of being more existentially responsive to the
exigencies of his new life.
However, man is not moved by the Spirit unless he is united
to him in some radical and fundamental manner. 17 Such a
radical union is brought about through the theological virtues
of faith, hope, and charity. By such virtues human intentionality is transformed so that it can operate within a specifically divine horizon of immediacy with God. This objective
union with God is the condition for the further reception of
the Gifts and their specific activity.
If the theological virtues in general are the radical condition
for the further activity of the Spirit within us, it is especially
in charity that this condition is fullfilled.18 Faith has its inevi16 Ibid., a. 2:
Quantum ad ea quae subsunt rationi in ordine scilicet ad finem
connaturalem homini, homo potest operari per iudicium rationis . . .sed in ordine
ad finem ultimum supernaturalem, ad quem ratio movet secundum quod aliqualiter
et imperfecte formata per virtutes theologicas, non sufficit ipsa motio rationis nisi
desuper adsit instinctus et motio Spiritus Sancti."
17 Ibid., a. 4 ad 3:
" animus hominis non movetur a Spiritu Sancto nisi
ei secundum aliquem modum uniatur .... Prima autem unio hominis est per
fidem, spem et caritatem. Unde istae virtutes praesupponuntur ad dona sicut
radices quaedam donorum."
18 Ibid., q. 66, a. 5:
" ... nam aliae virtutes important aliquam distantiam ab

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

flO I

dence, since it is about realities not yet clearly seen. Hope has
its insecurity, since it concerns mysteries not yet fully possessed.
But charity attains the divine reality in the most immediate
manner: the lover is affectively united with the Beloved, so
that the loved one can be said to dwell in the heart of the one
who loves.
Hence the Gifts as dispositions to the movement of the
Spirit owe their special character to the exigence of that love
that is poured out into the hearts of those who believe. As
metaphysical categories they show how love takes possession
of the whole being of the person in the state of Grace. They
dispose him to be increasingly responsive to the exigencies of
the Love that possesses him. By such habitual " infused " dispositions man is attuned to the novelty of his Christian existence. Thomas sees in charity the force that holds the Gifts
together as a dynamic whole: man is rendered capable of
obeying the instinct of love at every level of his being.19
Here then we have a theory concerning the manner in which
the personal Love of God possesses man's consciousness and
gives him the full vitality of his divine Sonship (Rom. 8: 4).
The essential nature of the Gifts resides in their character of
adapting man to respond to the instinct of the Spirit, thus to
be habitually submissive to the law of a redeemed existence.
For this reason St. Thomas postulates that the Gifts remain
" in patria." 20
We have just taken note of a major emphasis in St. Thomas's
treatment of the Gifts as they dispose man to be moved by the
Spirit. Another aspect of his teaching must be now introduced
obiecto; est enim fides de non visis, spes autem de non habitis, sed amor caritatis
est de eo quod iam habetur: est enim amatum quodammodo in amante, et etiam
amans per affectum trahitur ad unionem amati. . .. "
10 lbid., q. 68, a. 5: "Omnes vires animae disponuntur per dona in comparatione
ad Spiritum Sanctum. Spiritus sanctus habitat autem in nobis per caritatem
secundum illud Rom. 5:5 ... Unde sicut virtutes morales counectur sibi invicem
in prudentia, ita dona Spiritus sancti connectuntur sibi invicem in caritate .... "
00 Ibid., a. 6:
"quia dona Spiritus sancti perficiunt mentem humanam ad
sequendum motionem Spiritus Sancti, quod praecipue erit in patria quando Deus
erit oumia in omnibus . . et quando homo erit totaliter subditus Deo."

ANTHONY J. KELLY

to complete the picture. Man is not only passive under the
impulse of the Spirit but a new activity follows on this passivity. The quality of man's activity under the impulse of
the Spirit is described as "supra-human," or even as a "divine"
mode of action. 21 This is contrasted with the" human mode"
or rational manner of conduct which we have seen before.
Through the Gifts, then, man is enabled to act as one possessed
by God, impelled by a divine instinct. God himself becomes
the "regula" of this activity. The immanence of man is experienced in its openness to the immanence of God. In some
sense man's horizon is not only that of the unrestricted spirituality of finite intelligence but shares in the unlimited spirituality of God: for God enters into this new manner of human
activity not only as an object but in the very manner in which
the divine object is attained. A divine " instinctus" is communicated to man's activity in an ease and totality that seems
to break out of the laborious patterns of the usual human
manner of acting. The new mode of activity outstrips the
modality of human deliberative abilities. Man is no longer
laboriously rowing the boat, for the sail catches the breeze. He
is more transported than travelling. 22
Something of the divine measure of activity can be inferred
from the the qualities of the Gifts considered in particular.
The gift of understanding leads to a kind of penetrating knowledge, negative in character, that results in a " cleanness of
heart " through which man transcends the limitations of nat91 Ill Sent., d. 84, qcla. 1:
"Virtutes perficiuut ad actus modo humano; sed
dona ultra modum humanum." Compare this with the more mature Summa
Theol., I-II, q. 68, a. 1: "Virtutes perficiuut secundum quod homo natus est
moveri per rationem. Opportet inesse homini perfectiones altiores secuudum quas
dispositus sit ad hoc quod divinitus moveatur." In his earlier treatment Thomas
emphasizes the different modality of human activity; in his more mature treatment he stresses the reason for this, the special movement of the Holy Spirit.
•• See the classic work of John of St. Thomas, The Gifts of the Holy Spirit,
(London: Sheed and Ward, 1951). "Although the forward progress of the ship
may be the same, there is a vast difference in its being moved by the laborious
rowing of the oarsmen and its being moved by sails filled with strong breeze."
(p. 56)

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203

ural images and distorted notions to discern the divine reality
with greater directness. 23 Knowledge, similarly negative, bears
on the meaning of creation judged in the light of God. The
mind is lead to a deep assessment of the ambiguity and fragility
of the world. It is a kind of mourning over the vacuity of
world not yet fully possessed by God. 24 The gift of fear is a
deep poverty of spirit expressing itself in a reverent sensitivity
to the activity of God in a way quite compatible with a loving
relationship. Man goes beyond himself and all created things
to rely only on God. 25
The greatest Gift for St. Thomas is the Gift of wisdom. As
a divine activity it transcends the perfect use of reason, for
it is born out of a loving connaturality to the things of God; it
is a feel for the divine mysteries that comes from the judgment
of love. 26 With the gift of counsel man is disposed to the in•• Summa Theol., IT-II, q. 8, aa. 1-8: " ... indiget homo supernaturali lumine
ut ulterius penetret ad cognoscendum quaedam quae per lumen naturale cognoscere
non valet." (a. 1) " .. non cognoscitur quid sit aut quomodo sit sed tamen
cognoscitur quod ea exterius apparent veritati non contrariantur; inquantum scilicet
homo intelligit quod propter ea quae exterius apparent non est recedendum ab
his quae sunt fidei." (a. 2) " .... munditia mentis depuratae a phantasmatibus
et erroribus ut scilicet ea quae a Deo proponuntur non accipiantur per modum
corporalium phantasmatum nee secundum haereticas perversitates." (a. 7)
•• Ibid., q. 9, aa. 1-4: " ... certum et rectum iudicium de eis discernendo credita
a non credendis." (a. 1) "absque discursu rationis." (ad 1) "Ad scientiam proprie
pertinet rectum indicium creaturarum. Creaturae autem sunt ex quibus homo
occasionaliter a Deo avertitur . . . qui scilicet rectum iudicium de eis non habet
dum aestimat in eis esse perfectum bonum. Et hoc danmum homini innotescit
per rectum iudicium de creaturis quod habetur per donum scientiae. Et ideo
beatitudo luctus ponitur respondere dono scientiae." (a. 4)
25 Ibid., q. 19, aa. 1-12: "ad hoc quod aliquid sit bene mobile ab aliquo moventi
primo requiritur ut sit ei subiectum, non repugnans quia ex repugnantia mobilis
ad movens impeditur motus. Hoc autem facit timor filialis in quantum per ipsum
Deum reveremur et refugimus nos ipsi subducere." (a. 9) " ... timori autem
respondet paupertas spiritus. Ex hoc autem quod aliquis Deo se subiicit desinit
quaere in seipso vel in aliquo alio magnificari nisi in Deo." (a. 12)
•• Ibid., q. 45, aa. 1-6: "Sapientia importat quandam rectitudinem iudicii
secundum rationes divinas. Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere dupliciter:
uno modo per perfectum usum rationis, alio modo propter counaturalitatem
quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum . . . huismodi autem compassio
sive connaturalitas ad res divinas fit per caritatem quae quidem unit nos Deo."
(a. 2)

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

spiration of the Spirit in the domain of practical action. He
transcends the usual mode of human deliberation through a
union with the Spirit, the supreme rule of human morality. 27
Fortitude is an openness to the Spirit manifesting itself in a
resoluteness that overcomes all fears inevitably associated with
the actual realization of a Christian vocation. Man is confirmed
in an insatiable desire for justice. 28 And piety opens man to
the guidance of the Spirit so that, in a gentleness that excludes
all impediments to filial affection, man can relate to God in
a childlike manner. 29
As we have mentioned, the inspirational activity of the Spirit
does not destroy man's liberty but carries it on to a new completion. He remains a free agent. 30 He is not reduced to being
a mere passive instrument. In his Commentary on the Romam
we find St. Thomas's best statement on the perfection of man's
liberty through the Gifts of the Spirit. 31 The spiritual man
27 Ibid., q. 52, aa. 1-4:
"rectitudo rationis humanae comparatur ad rationem
divinam sicut principium motivum inferius ad superius. Ratio enim aeterna est
regula suprema omnis humanae rectitudinis. Et ideo prudentia quae importat
rectitudinem rationis maxime perficitur et iuvatur secundum quod movetur et
regulatur a Spiritu Sancto. Quod pertinet ad donum consilii." (a. 2)
28 Ibid., q. 139, a. 1: " .. sed ulterius, a Spiritu Sancto movetur animus hominis
ad hoc quod perveniat ad finem cuiuslibet operis inchoati et evadat quaecumque
pericula imminentia. Quod quidem excedit naturam humanan ... sed hoc operatur
Spiritus Sanctus in homine dum perducit eum ad vitam aetemam quae est finis
omnium bonorum operum et evasio omnium periculorum. Et huius rei infundit
quandam fiduciam menti Spiritus Sanctus contarium timorem excludens."
•• Ibid., q. U1, a. 1: "movet nos Spiritus sanctus ad hoc quod affectum
quendam filialem habeamus ad Deum secundum illud Rom. 8:15 .•.. " And q.
121, a. 2: "per mansuetudinem tolluntur impedimenta actuum pietatis."
30 Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 3, ad 2: " .. tale autem instrumentum non est homo sed
sic agitur a Spiritu Sancto quod etiam agit in quantum est Iiberi arbitrii."
31 In Ep. ad Romanos, VIII, lect. 3:
" .. homo autem spiritualis non tan tum
instruitur a Spiritu Sancto quid agere debeat sed etiam cor eius a Spiritu Sancto
movetur. Ideo plus intelligendum est in hoc quod dicitur ' quicumque spiritu
Dei aguntur.' llla enim agi dicuntur quae quodam superiori instinctu moventur.
Unde de brutis dicimus quod non agunt sed aguntur quia a natura moventur et
non ex proprio motu ad suas actiones. Similiter autem homo spiritualis principaliter
ex instinctu Spiritus Sancti inclinatur ad aliquid agendum Non tamen per hoc
excluditur quin viri spirituales per voluntatem et liberum arbitrium operentur quia
ipsum motum voluntatis et liberi arbitrii Spiritus Sanctus in eis causal secundum
illud Phil. 2:18. . • ."

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205

is not merely inspired in what he should do but he is moved
by the Spirit in the actual execution of the inspiration. With
this there is a certain parallel with the force of natural instincts
as in the animal world. The animal does not so much act;
it is rather acted on, through the impulse of nature to achieve
natural ends. In somewhat the same sense man is " acted on "
to achieve the goals of his supernatural vocation by the divine
instinct communicated to him. But there is a difference: man
is moved to act freely. He acts out of his own immanent liberty
that is enlarged and perfected with regard to its goal and the
manner of attaining it. God works within us both the will and
the deed (Phil. 2: 13). Hence the passivity of man under the
Spirit, as the theology of the Gifts expresses it, consummates
the liberty of man rather than destroys it. The basic accent
is this: God acts that man might act fully. Man's liberty comes
to perfection as dynamically open to the liberty of God.
The supra-human mode of activity through the Gifts appears
as a liberated liberty for man. It recasts man's rational world
and invites him to enter new horizons of immediacy with God.
The whole perspective of this presentation of the Gifts as we
find it in St. Thomas expresses human existence as habitually
disposed to the incalculable Mystery of God. They bring to
expression the enduring novelty of God as much as they express
a hope for the larger dimensions of human existence. Insofar
as they highlight the divine initiative they are akin to other
situations when the only explanation for man's activity is a
" divine instinct " communicated to man, beyond the resources
of his natural mode of activity, for example, when a human
being makes his first choice of the unlimited Good, and in the
sinner's return to God. In these instances, man's activity is
not attributable to some prior human activity. His liberty is
influenced only by Grace. Another Liberty has influenced him
to be free.82
In summing up this brief sketch of some of the main points
of the Thomist theology of the Gifts, I would emphasize the
following aspects.
11

See Su'TT111114 Theol., I-ll, q. 111, a. !l; ill, q. 86, a. 6, ad 1.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

First, when the Gifts are presented as habitual dispositions
readying man for the incalculable activity of the Spirit, we are
hearing something about man and something about God. It
means that man's deepest fulfillment is in living beyond himself
in the expectancy of a higher level of life which is offered only
as Grace. Man's existence is proleptic, provisional. It needs
fulfilment if man is going to act according to the full scale of
his liberty. Grace dominates his growth to freedom.
It means too that God is not a self-enclosed Absolute but a
communicating personal freedom, incalculably involved in
man's life. He is for man always the God who is to come, his
Spirit an eschatological gift surprising man in his provisional
schemes and rational patterns of operation. It does not seem
too trivial to speak of a divine " Playfulness " in this context,
so delicate and vital is the interplay of human freedom in its
expectant attitude towards God, and this God who surprises
man with ever fresh opportunities of growth in vision and freedom. God is manifest as the Living God, in a personal, free,
loving relationship to man.
Second, Love is the basic principle of the whole dynamism
of the Gifts. The Gifts are presented as the instruments of
Love enlarging and consummating man's liberty. The theology
of the Gifts is indeed a metaphysics, but a metaphysics of love,
possessing and transforming man in mind and heart. The gifts
are postulated in their metaphysical form to give expression
to the truly communicative relationship between man growing
to full personhood and the transcendent personhood of God
himself.
Third, it is significant that man's freedom is not threatened
by the freedom of God but enlarged and redeemed to its full
proportions. The Gifts enable man to yield himself totally to
the sway of the Spirit of God's Love; thus, he participates
in the Freedom of God.
Fourth, human existence as possessed by the Spirit is described according to the principle of a higher connaturality to
God. The gifts give expression to man's complete attunement

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

fl07

to the Absolute in his life, concretely appreciated as a lifegiving Mystery. Man's deepest religious perceptions are characterized by a " feel " for the ultimate Reality, his religious
actions by a spiritual elan, his religious knowledge by a flair
for the Living God, intimately though darkly, encountered as
a Love enabling man to be free.

II. The Present Context
Such, then, is our brief indication of the direction and accent
of St. Thomas's treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. We
now come to make some general remarks about the shift that
has occurred in modern theological thought; and from this we
may be able to appreciate the bearing of Thomist thought in
the present context. First, we make mention of the transition
from faculty analysis to intentionality analysis to see how this
affects the theology of the Gifts. Then, second, we pass from
intentionality analysis to community experience as presenting
the data for such a theology. After that, third, we look to
the wider categories supplied by world religions to mediate our
theology into the most fruitful context.
a) From Faculty to Intentionality Analysis
Thomas's presentation of the Gifts has largely been in terms
of a faculty analysis. 33 Here is man with his rational soul; his
intellect and will must be progressively transformed in view
of his supernatural life and his exalted goal. All this is construed through an elaborate metaphysical categorization: the
Gifts are seven and each perfects a faculty under a determined
aspect. Lonergan's Method in Theology has put powerfully
before us the necessity of effecting a transition to an intentionality analysis, the better to situate theology in the context
of contemporary culture, and indeed, to respond to the genuine
advances that have been made. 34 Instead of a metaphysical
consideration of a rational soul, a concrete, historical analysis
83 Ibid., I-II, q. 68, a. 4.
•• Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (DLT: London, 1971).

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

of the existential subject is called for. We are invited to attend
to the data of our own consciousness as we respond, in our
individual and corporate existence, to the challenge of continually transcending ourselves in the direction of the Real, the
True, and the Good. Primarily, such a process must be interpreted not in metaphysical terms but in psychological ones.35
The method is a critical self appropriation at each phase of
our personal development. The metaphysical expression is controlled by the subject's own experience of his conscious self.
The result, presumably, is that the Gifts will be interpreted
less as the metaphysical complement of the rational soul with
its panoply of virtues and more as the relevant expression of
man's experience of Grace, in the height, depth, and vitality
of concrete human existence transformed by the Spirit.
Lonergan has made the point that the older, more metaphysically turned theology drew its systems of meaning from
common sense and theory, the priora quoad nos and the priora
quoad se.36 Theory, with its metaphysical categories, gave consistent and systematic expression to the symbolic and affective
content of common sense. Grace is considered, we might suggest, not so much as light, or fire, or a fountain of living water,
or an adornment, but as an entitative habit infused into the
soul, implying thereby a whole system of virtues and Gifts.
However, because theology did not expressly attend to the
interiority of the knowing subject, because it did not ask itself
what it means to know, and what are the conditions and limits
of knowing, these outer realms of meaning, common sense, and
theory, assumed an independence of one another which could
only give rise to confusion. For theory, common sense would
remain an unintelligent naivete; for common sense, theory
85 " The point to making metaphysical terms and relations not basic but derived
is that a critical metaphysics results. For every term and relation there will
exist a corresponding element in intentional consciousness. Accordingly, empty
and misleading terms and relations can be eliminated, while valid ones can be
elucidated by the conscious intention from which they are derived. The importance of such critical control will be evident to anyone familiar with the vast
and arid wastes of theological controversy." op. cit., p. 848.
•• Op. cit., pp. 120 f.

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209

would be dismissed as mental gymnastics. But when we begin to acknowledge interiority as the inner realm of meaning that ties the exterior realms of common sense and theory
together in a dynamic of phased reflection, we come to a different understanding of Grace. We acknowledge it as the fundamental being-in-love with a Transcendent Personal Mystery,
beyond our expressions, unrestricted in measure. 87
Because the older account was basically metaphysical, rather
complex and slightly contrived questions arose. They expressed
the effort to systematize the theoretical meanings of the faculties with regard to their perfect operations, how the virtues
disposed man through his faculties to the truly good; how the
Gifts perfected the virtues in their operations; how the beatitudes expressed the perfect activities of the Gifts; how the fruits
of the Spirit were the harvest of man's new status as the son
of God. The existential unity of all these aspects of Christian
anthropology is the subject himself consciously intending a
more complete self-transcendence under the impulse of the
Spirit. This was not practically appreciated. As a metaphysical
" convenientia " of all the various elements, it may have been
well expressed, but not as a homogeneous psychological dynamic.
For the concretely existing subject acts out of a dynamic
unity of his conscious acts. His experience offers material for
insight. His insights offer evidence for true judgment. His
judgments exact a total personal commitment to what is truly
good. As the subject rises from experience to insight, through
reflection to decision, there is a growth to an ever more complete responsibility.
That such a responsibility be consciously maintained and
developed, a threefold conversion is continuously demanded.
This conversion is intellectual, moral, and religious. The thrust
towards self-transcendence invites us to leave behind appearances for reality, bright ideas for considered judgments, detached intellectualism for moral commitment exchanging the
87 Op.

cit., pp. 81-85.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

whole world of our anticipations for the One who comprehends
the origins and goals of the universe. 88
To understand the full reach of our freedom and self-direction, we must allow for a double aspect of liberty. Horizontal
liberty pursues development along the stable lines of personal
and social milieu, according to the potentialities of our usual
world. But then there is a vertical exercise of liberty when our
former world simply falls away, and we are never the same
again: there is a fresh and deeper experience of reality, a new
range of more radical demands, a new horizon of personal activity, a different quality of life as we experience and respond
to the Mystery that has more deeply possessed us. 89
Now, if we seriously admit interiority as a realm of meaning
giving the inner psychological grounding to our knowledge, we
must ask the question, what difference does this make to the
Thomist theology of the Gifts? Does a definitive option for
intentionality analysis over faculty analysis render the whole
Thomist theology of the Gifts superfluous? After all, the scriptural expressions of the Gifts belong to the symbolic and affective world of vital common sense. Would it not be better to
leave to the exegete the whole expression of the Gifts and to
systematic theology the task of constructing a theology of the
Spirit's activity with more psychologically grounded categories?
No doubt the old literalism and contrivance must go and
yield to a theology of the Spirit and a psychology of Grace.
This would profoundly transform the " unattached " metaphysical description of Grace in which the Gifts perfect already
existing virtues, where the seven Gifts are linked specifically to
different faculties, in particular contemplative or practical
operations, where the beatitudes express a special act of the
particular Gifts, where a special fruit is related to a special
beatitude and so forth. 40
On conversion, see especially op. cit., pp. 180 f, 287-244.
See pp. 40, Hl2, 287 ff.
•• The Gifts are habits disposing man to the movement of the Spirit; the
beatitudes are related to the Gifts as special acts (Summa Tkeol., q. 69, a. 1)
and the fruits are the outcome of the acts. (Ibid., q. 70, a. 1)
88
89

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211

We might dismiss all this complexity as the conceit of medieval intellectualism. But some difficulties remain.
I can see easily enough that intentionality analysis is the
method that theology, especially theological anthropology, must
follow. Yet the problem here is to come to a sufficiently discerning understanding of what St. Thomas is trying to say
despite the faculty analysis that moulds his thought. He does
bring to expression a theology of Christian intentionality, even
if it is in an implicit manner. He does offer us an interpretation
of developed Christian existence in the context of the mystical
tradition of the Church as it has absorbed and lived the realities
that Scripture attests. For the bearing of the Thomist treatment is characteristically on the divine initiative in the life of
man, on this infusing love into man's heart, thus co-naturing
him to God. This love in turn demands that he be habitually
disposed to the activity of the Spirit in his life; and that, finally,
this openness will bear fruit. Perhaps it is not a theology that
is in question here but a hope that God will always be semper
maior, that man will increasingly experience God as vitally
involved in his life; that man in his knowing and willing the
Mysteries of God remains always open to an unpredictable enrichment through the activity of the indwelling Spirit.
To let the theology of the Gifts slip unnoticed out of theological reflection would be to ignore a highly significant breakthrough in the history of Christian thought. The danger would
be to regress in our appreciation of the dimensions of redeemed
existence as it has been habitually experienced in the devotion
of the Church and beyond it. In other words, even though the
data is not explicitly stated, Thomas does offer perennially valid
principles for the interpretation of Christian existence, even
though his categories are largely metaphysical.
Notwithstanding St. Thomas's achievement, perhaps even
because of it, a theology of the Gifts along the lines of intentionality analysis seems quite feasible. Theology could appeal
more directly to the subject's own experience of "being-in-love"
as a principle of ever-growing self-transcendence.

ANTHONY J. KELLY

The metaphysical description of the Gifts as an habitual disposition to be readily moved by the Spirit looks to a psychological experience. This is the data of religious community
and the individual seeking to realize the process of conversion,
of consciously living from God in ways that defy the steady
bias of secular wisdoms and the " social construction of reality."
It relies on the experience of our most authentic life as a gift
made to us out of an infinite Love. Our usual priorities are
deeply and often dramatically restructured. The transition
from a metaphysically structured psychology to a psychologically modulated metaphysics of the person in his religious existence is made in some measure by St. Thomas himself. This
is especially the case when he gives his descriptions of the individual Gifts. With the help of more refined phenomenology,
a renewed appreciation of the personal and interpersonal aspects of knowledge accenting the intuitive and the affective,
genuine development seems possible here.
In the older theology the Gifts are distinguished by their
inherence in the various faculties. Might we not translate this
as the new quality of consciousness that comes about when
.man enters definitively into the horizon determined by Infinite
Love, existentially appreciated as the real space of his living?
Thereafter all his activities of experiencing, understanding,
judging, and deciding have a new modality: he experiences an
integration, a simplicity, a fuller freedom as the former ambiguities of his religious existence are left behind. He yields
himself now totally to God who is practically appreciated as the
"regula" of his activity.
Is not the" divine" or" supra-human" mode the experience
of vertical liberty? In this the former mundane and limited
horizons of knowing and loving are left behind for something
immeasurably more personal and complete, something darkly
and intimately felt, beyond the capacities of language and
thought, which dismantles former perspectives and breaks out
of all categories. It is indeed a deeper experience of freedom
as enlarged and extended by the activity of God himself.

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218

I think the answer must lie in this direction. Yet it is one
thing to speak of a transposition from the more external faculty
analysis to a more interior intentionality analysis and another
thing to effect it. In the same way, it is one thing to do it only
in the historical community of one's shared meanings and
another thing in a wider universal context in categories that
will mediate the appropriation of religious consciousness in a
sufficiently open and intelligible fashion. Such categories are
presumably to be drawn from the phenomenology of world religions, from inter-faith dialogue and experience, from all contemporary attempts to plot man's path to the transcendent.
However, it remains Thomas's permanent achievement to
have expressed in metaphysical terms his hope for humanity
transformed by the Spirit. Theology in the modern context
has yet to achieve this.
b) From Intentionality Analyms to Community Experience

The relocation of theological method, though widespread as
a need, is yet novel as a program. The anthropological turn
in modern theology has been often stressed. Perhaps the best
example of this is Rahner's theology of the Trinity in which
he identified the immanent and the economic Trinity. 41 The
shift has occurred from the abstract to the concrete, from the
ontological to the historical, from the metaphysical to the psychological, from God understood in himself to God as involved
with man. For the theology of the Gifts, this would mean a
much closer inspection of human existence as looking for the
completion the Gifts offer. In practice, this would mean a
critical appraisal of the contemplative quality of man's experience and the variety of ways he has a sense of the Transcendent. In the next section we will indicate some directions
in which an adequate spiritual anthropology could begin to
develop.
If our theological awareness has been structured more along
the lines of an anthropology, the data for this is to be found
" K. Rahner, The Trinity (London: Burns and Oates, 1970), pp. 15-!t1; SS-108.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

in the experience of the religious community. The Church experiences in the abiding awareness she has of herself in her
missionary involvement in the world the Mystery of the
Incarnation, the Mystery of Pentecost as a lasting Mystery
in the life of the church. For the Church is precisely that community that has its beginnings in the outpouring of the Spirit,
and its persistence and growth in history as the express bearer
of the eschatological gift of God. A scrutiny of the life of the
Church must lead to a knowledge of the real principle of that
life, the Spirit operative in all ecclesial activity. In her awareness of corporate love and faith the Church finds herself asking
not what is novel in her mode of operation but what kind of
divine Spirit is revealed in the new energy, inspiration, and unity
that has come into world of men. 42 The life of the Church must
reveal the character of the given Spirit. In this connection it
would be quite fascinating to ask what kind of God is revealed
in St. Thomas's theology of the Gifts of the Spirit? We would
have a good methodological way of rounding out his doctrine
on the Spirit through his use of the psychological image. This
would be more deeply grounded in what he took to be the
Church's experience of God. A much more imaginative investigation of the "Thomist doctrine of God" would be called for.43
The stress today is, therefore, less on the construction of a
theology of how the Gifts of the Spirit operate and more on
the manner in which the Spirit is manifested in the believing
community. The community of faith is to bear witness to the
eschatological character of the Spirit of sonship and brotherhood in Christ. Theology has yet to discover how a sociology
of religion can present us with new data on the presence of the
Spirit and the vitality of his activity amongst us. We have a
community of love with all its surpassing and unaccountable
•• See Bernard Cooke, Beycrnd Trinity

(Milwaukee:

Marquette

Univ. Press,

1969).

•• Naturally, this is implied in what St. Thomas says in his doctrine on the
I, q. 43, aa. 1-8). However,
" missions " of the divine Persons (Summa
our present reflections might unite the " invisible" and "visible " aspects of the
missions in a different way.

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215

manifestations. Despite the evidences of structural decline
there remains a hope that perdures beyond all human hopes;
whilst the faith of the community shows a flair for the deep
things of God despite the cultural shifts and uncertainties that
are the feature of our age. We might say the Gifts are there
to be discovered in their corporate shape, in the common aspirations and shared meanings of the Church. A metaphysical analysis cannot exhaust the meaning of the vitality of the religious
community. Even intentionality analysis, which is linked more
with the awareness of the individual subject than the corporate
experience of the group, falls short. So it seems we must turn
to a sociology of religion (or even to a religious use of sociology?) to find an adequate description of the manner in which
the Gifts operate in the Church today. Unaccountable fortitude, contemplative certainly, the eager desire to worship and
celebrate which might transcend the " human measure " that
sociology predicts, the way value systems are transformed, the
manner in which structures are remodelled in the name of
some inexpressibly new factor that is suddenly operative,-all
such data may be interpreted by a sociology of religion in the
right theological context to give us today some inkling of what
the Gifts of the Spirit might mean. One wonders if, when we
come to a greater objectivity regarding the period of Vatican
II, we will not have some unique data to contend with; and in
that, have an opportunity to supply theology with a striking
description of the activity of the Spirit in the community of
those who believe.
c)

From Community Experience to World Religions

If the sociology of religion provides the possibility of further
insight into the meaning of the Gifts of the Spirit, the phenomenology of world religions does this in an even more explicit
fashion. We have long known that the Spirit breathes where
he will. Consequently, the Gifts of the Spirit are to be found
beyond the frontiers of explicit Christianity. The real God can
be everywhere known through his Gifts. It has been recently
shown with considerable insight that the vestige doctrine of St.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

Augustine, the Trinitarian Creation theology of the Greek
Fathers, and the Western theory of Trinitarian appropriations
can be useful expressions of this conviction. 44
Further, we might point out with Professor Panikkar, that
there is a unique confluence of religious consciousness in our
day due to the meeting of the great world religions.45 Such a
meeting takes place most realistically, not on the level of doctrine but in the intimate area of spirituality. Here spirituality
means the characteristic manner in which the Transcendent is
experienced, the manner in which man is inspired to a unique
self-awareness through his relationship to an Absolute, however
he might conceive of it. Panikkar, in considering the great
spiritualities of the world, suggests that only a Trinitarian concept of the Absolute can effect a reconciliation between three
apparently irreducible notions of the Absolute. 46 The Trinity
is to be considered as a junction where all authentic spiritual
dimensions of religions meet without fusion or mutual dilution.
For example, the " spirituality of the Father " has a stress on
the silent, the unobjectifiable, the inexpressible: the primordial
mystery of the Father is revealed only through the Son; there
is no approach to the Father dwelling in inacessible light save
through the Son (Jn. 14: 17; 15:
. This negating, apophatic
type of spirituality is akin to the Buddhist's approach to the
absolute, for such a spirituality refuses to objectify, refuses to
to define, abiding in a reverence for the totality of all that is.
A " spirituality of the Son," who is the personal mediator between God and man, brings to expression the main concentration of Judaic and Islamic spiritualities which base themselves
on the claim of personal revelation of the Absolute in words
and images. Completing the picture we have a " spirituality
of the Spirit " well exemplified in advaitan Hinduism. The
u Ewert Cousins, "The Trinity and World Religions," JouT'IUil of Ecumenical
Studies 7 (1970), ftft3-ft54.
•• Raymond Panikkar, "Towards an Ecumenical Theandric Spirituality," JES
5 (1968), 507-534; and The Trinity and World Religiow (Madras: Christian
Literature Society, 1970).
•• Panikkar, The Trinity and WMld Religi07UI, pp. 41-43.

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

217

Hindu speaks of his liberation through a merging o£ himself
with the immanent Absolute, the true Sel£.47 Through such a
junction of spiritualities in the complete Christian spirituality
of the Trinity not only are the seemingly irreducible spiritualities
that characterize man's search for the Absolute mututally complemented but the Christian himself is stimulated to activate
dimensions of his faith that were hitherto inert.
Hence, in the briefest possible fashion we have indicated the
kind of redemptive mediation that is possible between the
various modes of religious consciousness. The Trinity itself has
been exhibited as the medium for this process. It shows not
only how each mode of consciousness looks for a redemption
in a broader approach to the absolute but that all are tied together in the very reality of God himself as he communicates
himself to man.
Such a mediation is relevant to our considerations o£ the
Gifts of the Holy Spirit. Precisely within this broad context
there is a place for the Thomist theology of the Gifts. I think
that it could be suggested that the theory of the Gifts represent
Thomas's attempt to respect these modalities of religious consciousness, even though he could not have possibly been informed on the scale in which it is possible today, and even
though he simply did not operate in the context of world religions as we must in the present. The apophatic, negating
stress is contained in what he says of knowledge, fortitude, and
fear of the Lord. For these lead man to a right evaluation of
the empirical world as infinitely less than the absolute Mystery
of God.48 The katophatic, express side of religious consciousness is akin to what St. Thomas has called piety} understanding,
and counsel. In these man is positively, though inexpressibly, involved with God and his manifest will.49 The immanent dimension of loving identity, the experience of God as intimately
present, is similar to what he describes as wisdom.50 And if
Op. cit., pp. 44-67.
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 9, aa. 1-4; q. 19, aa. 1-12; q. 189, a. 1.
'"Ibid., q. 8, aa. 1-8; q. 121, a. 1; q. 54, aa. 1-4.
•• Ibid., q. 45, aa. 1-6.
47

' 8

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

we note that each of these Gifts implies an experience of the
Transcendent as the source and goal of our activity in its
" supra-human " mode of operation, we must see that the theology of the Gifts has much to profit from this new context.
In itself it remains a methodological key to unlock doors of
interfaith dialogue that were formerly shut. The theoretical
achievement of the Thomist theology of the Gifts appears to
have a greater relevance outside the current suppositions of
Christian theology in the broader context of the great religions
of the world. 51
Hence, the theory of the Gifts, like the mystery of the
Trinity itself, can hold together the various understandings of
religious consciousness: for the Gifts are in their own way an
expression of the transcendence, the immanence, and the personal character of God.
We have been asking what bearing the Thomist theology of
the Gifts has in a newer context. This context is characterized
by a transition from metaphysical theory to an awareness of
the existential subject, by an awareness of the experience of
community as revealing the personal, energizing role of the
Spirit, by a greater openness to the experience of world religions. Even so, we must remark that St. Thomas's achievement in this area has its own uniqueness. He did not pluck it
out of the air; for his concern, quite simply, was to give expression to the Gift of God as an abiding and active reality. The
Spirit is given and man is transformed; he exists in a new way,
he has new capacities for action. This mystery at work in man
is not disclosed by any method, however exigent it might be.
God is greater than our hearts; and the reality remains greater
than the method employed to disclose it. Though Thomas's
51 See Mariausai Dhavamony, "Christian Approaches to Hinduism"
(Gregurianum
53 1972), 112 f: "It becomes evident that this basic involvement with the Hindu
religion of love is God's gift of his love and man's response to him. The features
of this bhakti religion contain many basic insights into this religious experience
of being in love." Also R. Panikkar, "Advaita and Bhakti. Love and Identity
in Hindu-Christian dialogue," JES 7 (1970), 299-309; and " Nirvana and the
Awareness of the Absolute," in The God Experience (New York: Newman Press,
1971).

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

treatment is not timelessly complete, he has given striking expression to his surpassing hope for man.

III. Three Examples
In this final section we propose to give, very briefly, three
examples of how the thology of the Gifts may be influenced.
We draw on modern theology, philosophy, and contemporary
evaluations of the Zen experience. The Thomist theology of
the Gifts is at once challenged to re-express itself in new
categories and, at the same time, challenges these contemporary
expressions to appreciate the novelty of the Christian experience of God.

a) Macquarrie's Theology of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit 52
The speculative underpinning of Macquarrie's treatment of
the gifts is thorougly trinitarian. He presents the Trinity in
the language of Being as it is derived from Heidegger. Each
of these divine persons is a mode of Being. So the Holy Spirit
is Unitive Being relating man to the Father, Primordial Being,
and to the Son, Expressive Being. 53 Man's nature is characterized by his openness to Being; 54 with the result that authentic existence is possible only in the measure in which he accepts
his existence in the light of Being. Thus he becomes a" guardian of Being" in a responsible cooperation with the Mystery
that possesses and summons him. In such an existentialist context Macquarrie works out his theory of the immanence of
God. God does not impose anything on man from the outside
but awakens and empowers him to live up to the true possibilities of his being. These he can accept or let slip. The Holy
Spirit is a gift only in the sense that man is awakened through
the Unitive mode of Being to achieve the genuine possibilities
of his particular existence.
Particular aspects of this fulfilment are interpreted under the
52 John Macquarrie,'' The seven Gifts of the Holy Ghost," Studies in Christian
Existentialism (London: SCM, 1965), pp.
58 Op. cit., pp.
f.
"' Op. cit., pp.
ff.

ANTHONY J. KELLY

headings of the seven Gifts, the relevant phenomenological
categories of existential consciousness that Heidegger has employed. To put it briefly, the Gifts are interpreted as "qualities"
of man's existential development. The fear of the Lord is
the sense of awe at the promise and fragility of what is
offered to man through his existence. 55 Piety is the basic
reverence for the source of man's existence, acknowledged as
gracious. 56 Knowledge is primordial thinking. It enables Being
to occur in human consciousness.H It takes man beyond a
calculative, manipulative style of thought to a point of submission to what has grasped him. Fortitude is the courage to
accept fully the challenge of existence; and to live out the responsibilities inherent in it. 58 Counsel is not a casual illumination but the discernment of God addressing man through some
agency in this world, be it through the Scriptures, through a
person or an event. 59 Understanding appears to be the appropriation of the meaning of existence wherever it occurs in
mankind's universal experience of the Spirit. 60 Wisdom is seen
as the consciousness of all our existence and activity in the light
of Being itself, in happy contrast to the truncated and distorted
wisdom of the world. 61
Even from this very brief indication, we can see a certain
similarity to the Thomist treatment of the Gifts. The metaphysical categories are transposed to existential ones; Aristotle
yields to Heidegger.
There is a real value in Macquarrie's treatment. It proposes
an excellent model for the reinterpretation of the Gifts of the
Spirit, and achieves a considerable success. On the other hand,
"" Ibid., p.
•• Ibid., p.
" But Being does not only encounter us in strangeness but also
in kinship, for we ourselves are, we participate in Being."
"'Ibid., p.
"" Ibid., pp.
f.
"" Ibid., pp.
f.
•• Ibid., pp.
f: "Every mature Christian has a duty so far as he can
to think out, to understand, to appropriate the meaning of the faith within
which he belongs.... "
01 Ibid., pp.
f.

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

Macquarrie's treatment has not mediated the full medieval
achievement of St. Thomas into the present context,-if only
for the reason that he had no intention of doing so. However,
it would be well worth doing. If we consider the above treatment in the light of the Thomist treatment, serious questions
arise about the real novelty of new life in the Spirit. Is it to be
generalized into ordinary existentialist categories? Are these at
once too mystical and too secular? Mystical, in the sense that
a surrender to Being is demanded as the total ground of human
authenticity; secular, in the sense of an over-generalization of
Grace that leaves no special novelty in human existence open
to the revelation of Christ and the influence of the Spirit.
Thomas seems to cope with an excessive mysticism by allowing
for a human mode of operation for the virtues, even the theological virtues, while reserving the "supra-human" mode to
the Gifts themselves. He counters a secularizing or generalizing
tendency by appealing to charity as the fundamental union
with the Spirit of God, which makes the operation of the Gifts
possible. The Gifts derive, as we have said before, from the
exigency of love, infuse the whole existence of man.
Given the brevity of Professor Macquarrie's treatment, it is
not quite fair to push this criticism too far. The real point is
that the Thomist theory of the Gifts deserves to be more seriously confronted in its positive implications, even though it will
gain much by a more existential location of its significance.
b)

Heidegger's Gelassenheit 62

The second example comes from contemporary philosophy.
In his Discourse on Thinking, Heidegger presents us with his
teaching on Gelassenheit. This is translated as " releasement,"
a kind of abandonment, implying a release " from " for the
sake of being released " for," a kind of dialectic between detachment from objects and a being-attached to the real Ground
of existence. This fundamental description of the nature of
•• Martin Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking. A Translation of Gelasaenheit. by
John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund (New York: Harper Torchbooks, 1969).

ANTHONY J. KELLY

human existence seems more pronnsmg for our particular
project than the more specific categories already referred to.
Of course, Heidegger is not concerning himself with theology
or religion, and so we must be careful to take what he says
only as type of discourse that could be useful in theology. With
such a qualification, it seems to me that Heidegger opens up a
style of thought in which we can gain an inkling of the promise
of man's existence transformed by the Spirit.
He introduces his concept of Gelassenheit in the " Memorial
Address." There he diagnoses the malaise of modern man as
a flight from meditative thinking . This implies a releasement
regarding things, especially the technological world of things,
and an openness to the mystery that is implied. Here releasement is almost equivalent to a deep detachment from an excessively controlling or preoccupying relationship to the world,
as it opens man to a sense of proportion regarding the real
dimensions of his life. It promises the possibility of dwelling
in the world in a new and wholesome way, through persistent
courageous thinking. 63
What is this " thinking " ? In his " Conversation on a.
Country Path about Thinking," he attempts to evoke the
answer to this question. He suggests that thinking, as the fundamental character of human existence, is to be found in no
intense analysis or inspection of the activity considered as a
self-enclosed activity. There must be a "looking away" from
thinking. There is no question of representing or willing thinking as an object in itself. It is non-acting, or a higher activity
of receptivity to what possesses us.64
In this " looking away " from thinking we do not imply a new
relationship to specific objects, or even to the horizons of our
activities in which the objects occur. The implication is that
there is a special kind of total relationship to that which enables
all objects and all horizons to present themselves. 65 This is
The Region (die Gegnet in old German, translated as " thatwhich-regions"). This is disclosed as Truth, Being itself,
•• Op. cit., pp. 53-56.

"' Ibid., pp. 58-61.

•• Ibid., pp. 64, 78, 80.

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

though Heidegger does not actually use this word in his
Disoourse. The Region cannot be described or represented. We
can be released toward it only in an objectless attitude of openness. 56
This releasement to the mysterious all-encompassing Region
alone reveals the true nature of man. It is not a question of
occasional activity but of a steadfast indwelling in this relationship if authentic existence is to be achieved. 67
Such a releasement to the Mystery is possible because the
Region has already appropriated man to itself. Man orginally
belongs to it. 68 This relationship of openness to the Region
constitutes the abiding space of true development. In this relationship the real nature of the " spontaneity of thinking" is
manifest. 69
Releasement, it must be stressed, is not a categorial activity.
There is no representational knowing, no defined willing. It is
a higher activity that looks to being possessed, to receptivity,
rather than to activity and control. Hence the relationship is
an openness. And this openness takes our thinking and willing
beyond their usual scope, into an unrestricted receptivity to the
all-pervading Region. For this a patient noble-mindedness is
needed. Man must wait for he knows not what. His waiting
"upon" leaves open his usual waiting "for." Only in this total
expectancy can Truth reveal itself to him and through him. 70
This might serve sufficiently as an indication of the profounJ
reflection on human existence that Heidegger offers us. There
is a higher activity that is essential to man. The inner character of man's thinking is revealed in this total relationship to
Ibid., pp. 65-68.
Ibid., pp. 81 f.
•• Ibid., p.
"Authentic releasement consists in this: that man in his very
nature belongs to that-which-regions, i. e., he is released to it."
69 Ibid., "The indwelling in releasement to that-which-regions would then be
the real nature of the spontaneity of thinking."
70 Ibid., p. 90:
" By way of waiting . . . if this is released . . . and human
nature remains appropriated to that ... from whence we are called." Needless to
say these footnotes are minimal. The text is such an evocative whole that themes
cannot be isolated in the ordinary manner.
66
67

ANTHONY J, KELLY

the Region, the Mystery, the real space that enables all objects
to be offered and all horizons to be illumined. Man cannot act
toward this total Mystery in a controlling way. He must wait
in courage for the moment of truth, with all the wonder, surrender, and openness that this demands. Such is his true nature.
The dimensions of human existence evoked by Heidegger
offer something worthwhile for a theology of the Gifts. Man's
receptivity to the Spirit acting within him, is illuminated in
the way Heidegger describes the nature of human existence as
openness, as waiting, as a higher activity beyond objective
thinking and willing. The gifts indicate a kind of "Gelassenheit"
in which man yields to the total Mystery of his being: the
partial perspectives of even good actions are transcended in
favor of a more complete relationship through which the
Mystery more intimately possesses him. In so doing it becomes
the real space and atmosphere of his activity.
A theology of the Gifts does not, of course, stop here. It
must talk of the transformation of human existence by the
Spirit of Christ. In such a theology The Region would be identified as the Father in his self-communicating love, the dark
ultimate mystery that has seized man's limitations, and opened
human existence to an immediacy with the divine. Our waiting, in the Heideggerian sense, is for the progressive revelation
of this Ultimate Love. Releasement is specified as a selfsurrender to the exigencies of this infinite Love working
creatively and redemptively in the universe. Through it we
are summoned to a freedom confirmed, enlarged and transformed in an ever-growing connaturality to Divine Liberty that
is the final " measure " of creation. Such a receptivity to the
divine will be qualified as the novel modality in our activity
as we know and love the ultimate mystery. God himself is
revealed as the real, vital space of our existence.
In short, human existence, even in the grandeur of Heidegger's interpretation, needs the Redeeming Spirit. Still, it must
be conscientiously allowed that the traditional theology has
much to learn from existentialist thought: the deep structures
of man's receptivity as a condition for authentic existence is

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

225

stated. There is the necessity of releasement, of a fundamental
" letting go " in view of the Mystery that has involved itself
with man. Yet a theology of the Gifts will take this up to a new
level of personal relationship and spontaneous love.
c) Zen Enlightenment

We have given an example from theology and philosophy;
now we turn to a specific human experience that will serve
an understanding of the theology of the Gifts. Though Zen
characteristically eschews any definition of itself, the least we
can say is that it is a quality of human experience apparently accessible to a number sufficiently large to justify an extensive
literature: it all points to a mode of consciousness with the
features of enlightenment and liberation. We are not maintaining that this is a " gift of the Spirit," but merely pursuing our
purpose to indicate representative areas that have a bearing on
a full spiritual anthropology.
Any survey of the specialist or popular literature on this topic
makes the would-be describer of Zen extremely cautious. 71 This
is especially the case given the present limitations of space.
However, certain general qualities of this mode of consciousness are consistently reiterated; and seemingly they have been
understood across the cultural frontiers of East and West. For
our present purposes the following four main features would
guide further investigation. 72
i. In Zen enlightenment a special integration of personal consciousness appears to take place. There is a novel experience
of unification and harmony This has been variously explained.
It could be a breakthrough of higher levels of consciousness
into the domain of the empirical ego. The result of this would
be a certain experience of " egolessness,'' in that a consciousness
71 See for example, Peter Kreeft, " Zen Buddhism and Christianity:
an Experiment in Comparative Religion," JES 8 (1971), 518-588; Alan Watts, 'The Way of
Zen (Pelican, 1962); William Johnston, "The Zen Elightenment," Thought (Summer, 1967), pp. 165-184; and for an excellent bibliography, J. Masson, "Le Chretien
devant le Yoga et le Zen," Nouvelle Revue Theologique 94 (1972) 384-399.
72 See Kreeft, op. cit., pp. 515-517.

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ANTHONY J. KELLY

of self comes to the fore unrestricted by the usual organizations that characterize man's being in the world. 78 Thus, personal consciousness is marked by a totality and a power of
transcendence, going beyond the mundane involvements that
form man's usual conscious image of himself. The true self
is experienced in its openness, its universality. Man becomes
conscious of himself as a spiritual being. Thomas Merton has
written:
The foundation of this experience is no doubt the sudden intuitive
penetration of the value of our spiritual being. It is a profound
metaphysical awareness of our own reality, not the trivial psychological surface self that is engaged in the pursuit of many
temporal desires and the flight from many fears, but the deep substantial reality of our personal being. In this moment of light, the
soul may taste something of the inborn liberty that is due to a
thing of the spirit. (74)

The process implied seems to be an eschatological experience
of personhood itself. The individual catches up with his unique
self in its independence and relatedness to the universe. There
is a remarkably similarity between such a process and what
has been recently advanced in Boros's recent theology of
death. 75
ii. In this experience of integration the usual subject-object
dualism tends to break down and yield to a different experience
of intentionality. It would be rather captious to maintain that
the subjective and the objective actually disappear from man's
experience. More plausibly, both are experienced in their true
dimensions. The subjective polarity of human existence is
deepened so that the empirical ego, in its manifold, superficial
and truncated involvements, is superseded by an experience of
78

See William Johnston, "Zen and Christian MysticiSm," IPQ 7 (1967), 441-

469.
74 The Ascent to Truth
(London: Hollis and Carter, 1951), pp. 145 f. This
is quoted with approval by H. M. Enomiya-Lasalle, Zen, Way to Enlightenment
(New York: Taplinger, 1968), pp. 41 f.
75 L. Boros, Mysterium Mortis (New York:
Herder and Herder, 1965), especially
in the first 81 pages where he seeks to express the development in human exiStence.

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

the true self in its original orientation to the universe as a
totality. Likewise the objective pole is not left to be merely
the outcome of the possessive, selective, all controlling activity
of man but is deeply experienced as a " given," as the totality
in which man is tendentially involved: mere objects are replaced by a consciousness of a universe. The fundamental connaturality of human existence, with all that is, is felt. The usual
thematic apprehensions of subject and object are dismantled
in favor a more profound experience of relationship, of existence
through co-existence with the universe. 76
iii. The result is not a higher yield of conceptual knowledge
nor some definite progress in volitional activity. On the one
hand, this new mode of consciousness is characterized by an
experience of the void of ego-lessness, of objectless activity.
On the other hand, there is a sense of enlightenment and liberation. Man knows he has entered more fully into his own, as he
enjoys a larger dimension of his liberty. There is a transcendence of the limits of a particular world in the direction of
the actual universe of what is.
iv. This new mode of consciousness is a sudden surprising
breakthrough. It does not appear to be a structured development. Traditional Zen asceticism has its own special rigor as
it attempts to dispose body and mind for the moment of truth.
But this as an actual moment appears to be beyond the subject's control. 77
There are clearly striking similarities between the Zen experience and Heidegger's Gelassenheit in that both accent the
attitude of waiting, wonder, and receptivity to the original
Mystery of the universe. Peter Kreeft has nicely indicated
this. 78
•• Johnston writes: "Perhaps it means that I reach the point of my manhood
not when I stand distinct from and in opposition to the universe. Perhaps it is
the acute realization that the soul of man is, in a sense, all things (intellectus
est quodammodo omnia) ." " Zen and Christian Mysticism," p. 448. And Kakichi,
"Ways of Knowing: A Buddhist-Thomist Dialogue," IPQ 6 (1966), 574-595.
77 Op. cit., pp.
78 " Zen in Heidegger's Gelassenheit," IPQ 11 (1971),

ANTHONY J. KELLY

In applying the Zen model of experience to the theology of
the Gifts many promising avenues of exploration immediately
open up. The phenomenological basis for a theological statement about higher states of consciousness is more securely established. The structure of this higher consciousness is indicated in a way that would throw some light on the Thomist
categories of" human" and " supra-human" modes of activity:
a certain passivity and receptivity are features of this higher
human activity. A kind of regression from the various levels
of the empirical ego in favor of a deeper experience of one's
authentic and total self is indicated. There is a suspension of
" ordinary " activities for the sake of being possessed by a fuller
mystery of life and existence.
For its part, the Thomist theology of the Gifts expresses the
redemption that is offered to this deeply contemplative experience. In individual cases we cannot judge what is "natural"
or "supernatural." But in terms of a systematic reflection on
the dimensions of human existence such a theology both allows
for a search for a deeper self and confirms man in such a quest.
It further identifies the Spirit as a Mystery of Grace operative
in human freedom. And so it enlarges man's apprehension of
receptivity and gives a reason for it; it invites him to see love
as the key to enlightenment and indicates that the ultimate
mystery is not only an enlarged and liberated self but a self
possessed by the Infinite, which freely and spontaneously involves itself in the life of man. Man is ultimately liberated
only by the liberty of God.

* * *
Such, then, is the schema we propose for the development of
a spiritual anthropology from the Thomist theology of the Gifts
of the Holy Spirit. We located our question in the situation
where the classical images of man have tended to break down.
Then the first section dealt with predominant aspects of St.
Thomas's theology. The next section tried to locate this in the
broader context of present reflection, the developing subject in
the context of the Christian community experience, and all

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229

this in the larger field of world religions. Then we gave three
representative instances that influence the understanding and
presentation of a theology of human existence possessed by the
Spirit.
As we reflect on such a schema, some conclusions and questions emerge that will guide the elaboration of a spiritual
anthropology.
The most general conclusion we might come to deals with the
" mystical " element in the thought of St. Thomas. It is true
that the intellectualist concentration affected his organization of
the Summa and did not allow for a great amount of space in his
treatment of the Gifts of the Holy Spirit. However, his actual
theology of the Gifts takes us into a new level of understanding,
the reciprocal relationships between man and God, when the
"divine manner" incalculably exceeds the "human manner."
It is still rare to find any appreciation of the role of the Gift.'>
even in Thomistic treatments of Grace, to say nothing of the
dictionaries and popular works that would give with startling
brevity St. Thomas's teaching on the theological virtues and
such like. A rediscovery of the " mystical " in the Thomist
treatment of the virtues has considerable relevance to those
who seek the meaning of contemplative existence and more
inspired patterns of activity. The various Charismatic Communities might find in a reading of St. Thomas on the Gifts of
the Holy Spirit an inspiration and a balance that will serve
them well.
A more precise conclusion bears on the " sensorium " of the
Thomist theology of the Gifts. It is beyond dispute that the
visual has provided the dominant categories for interpreting
man's deepest spiritual experiences, especially in recent times
when the accent has been so firmly placed on evidence, analysis,
"seeing the result." Thomist theology, too, it must be admitted, falls into this category. But, on the other hand, in
the Gifts it breaks into a wider sensorium. It becomes a more
tactile theology, allowing for a kind of feeling, touching, tasting
of the divine. This is explained through " connaturality " to

230

ANTHONY J. KELLY

the divine Mysterious, the affinity and attunement brought
about by the Gift of love." Being in love with God" is not
left altogether undefined as a spiritual experience. Thomas
makes it a " being in touch with the Spirit." To this degree
present-day theology is faced with a serious question, especially
as the whole cultural sensorium is changing. 79 Are we too slow
to follow up the Thomist theology of the Gifts and attempt to
express man's vital relationship to God in other than visual or
aural categories? Is there room for feeling, touching, tasting
the reality of God? The way St. Thomas has handled his
theology of the Holy Spirit and his Gifts would seem to indicate that there is.80
A third conclusion touches on the understanding of the self
implied in the Thomist theology we have considered. Essentially, we are presented with a "released self" in a sense akin to
Heidegger's Gelassenheit. In this "released self," and in the
dynamism of its activity and full freedom, we are led to a concept of the immanence of the Spirit that could be powerful
in its consequenences. Here we allude once more to the context
of the meeting of the world religions. These are organized
around different conceptions of the immanence and transcendence of the Absolute. As has been shown, there is reason to
to think that we have in the distinctive Thomist conception of
man acting in the Spirit a notion that will help all sides of the
interfaith dialogue. At least it enables the Christian to learn
from a range of culture and religious experience that will
broaden his faith instead of confusing it. It is, too, an opportunity to commend to other religious cultures, especially
the Hindu and the Buddhist, a Christian fulness that redeems
and completes.
Lastly, it is worth mentioning where a new beginning might
be made. We have been contructing a schema for the understanding and development of the theology of the Gifts of the
•• See especially, Walter J. Ong, The Presence of the Word (Yale University
Press, 1970) .
80 In this connection, the conclusions of Geoffrey Wainwright's Eucharist and
Eschatology (London: Epworth Press, 1971), pp. 151 fi., are interesting.

THE GIFTS OF THE SPIRIT

231

Spirit. Fundamentally, the whole thing relies on the New
Testament witness to the Spirit as the final Gift of God, the
principle of a new relationship to God and the community.
St. Thomas expressed this radically New Testament theology
in the Aristotelian categories available to him. We have indeed
pointed to the metaphysical structure of Thomist thought,
based as it is, in the present instance, on the Greek doctrine
of divine possession, enthusiasm, divine " instinct." What we
have not referred to is the myth behind the metaphysics, the
Greek notion of hero. Until this is analyzed and confronted
with the figure of Christ as the " new hero " for humanity, and
until this is set in its proper context, namely, the role of the
prophet and judge in the Old Testament, our task is incomplete.
However, it must remain so. Within a narrower frame of
reference we have examined St. Thomas's theology of the Gifts
of the Holy Spirit. We saw how such a theology may well be
of great value in modern context of theology, especially in the
understanding of the immanence of God to man and spiritual
dimensions of man's freedom. After these seven hundred years
St. Thomas continues to inspire us as we try to walk in the
Spirit. He gives us a theology that he not only produced but
lived.
ANTHONY J. KELLY, C.S.S.R.
Yarra Theological Union
M elbCYUme, Australia

THE QUODLIBETS OF ST. THOMAS AND
PASTORAL CARE

X

THE NAME SUGGESTS, the Quodlibet or Quaestio de
quolibet was an open, " free for all," debate in which
the questions discussed were not, as in the Quaestio
disputata, announced and specified beforehand, but were put
at random from the floor on the day of the debate. 1
The procedure of the medieval quodlibetal disputation was
first established by P. Glorieux in his pioneer work, La
litterature quodlibetique, in 1925, and his findings were later
refined in articles over the next forty-five years, as well as in
his second volume on La Litterature quodlibetique in 1935.2
According to Glorieux, this type of unprepared public discussion first came to be used at Paris in the Mendicants' schools,
and probably during the student strike of 1229-1231. From
Paris it later spread to Oxford, Toulouse, Cologne, and the
Roman curia. Altogether some 356 Quodlibets are extant from
the Paris schools, and some Paris and Oxford masters, e. g.,
Henry of Ghent, Geoffrey of Fontaines, and Roger Marston,
became so enamoured of the form that they made the Quodlibet
their chief means of literary expression. 3
1 " de quolibet
ad voluntatem cuiuslibet," as the General of the Dominicans,
Humbert de Romanis, put it in his lnstructiones de officiis ordinis, c. 12, ed. J. J.
Berthier, Beati Humberti de Romanis Opera de Vita Regulari, II (Rome, 1889),
p. 260.
2 P. Glorieux, La litterature quodlibitique de 11160 a 13120, I
(Kain, 1925), pp.
11-95, II (Paris, 1985), pp. 9-50 "Le Quodlibet et ses procedes redactionnels,"
in Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 42 (1989), 61-98; "Ou en est Ia question du
Quodlibet? ", in Revue du moyen age latin 2 (1946), 405-414.
8 P. Glorieux, "L'enseignement
au moyen age. Techniques et methodes en
usage a Ia Faculte de Theologie de Paris au XIIIe siecle," in Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 48 (1968)' 65-186 at pp. 128-184. Quodlibets
were not confined to university circles but were common where the various orders
of friars had schools and at chapters of these orders: see L. Meier, "Les disputes
quodlibetiques en dehors des universites," in Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique 58
(1958) 401-442.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL

CARE

233

Like the more formal Quaestio disputata, the Quodlibet was
held under the direction of a regent-master of the University,
after whom the Quodlibet was named (" Quodlibet Petri,"
" Quodlibet Thomae," etc.) . It was held twice a year, in Advent before Christmas and in Lent towards Easter, and seems
to have been designed to test both the bachelors who were
preparing for the degree of master and the regent-masters themselves. That the Quodlibet was a rough test there can be no
doubt, for only an exceptional bachelor would be able to field
without flinching a series of unpredictable questions from an
audience composed of masters, students, and visitors. 4
Some modern authors, however, give the impression that the
Quodlibet was first and foremost a test of the regent-master,
and that it was such a formidable test that " many a master
refused to risk himself at it, or felt satisfied when he had done
so once in his career." 5 There is possibly some exaggeration
here. For one thing, a Quodlibet involved two really distinct
sessions, a " Disputatio generalis de quolibet " and a " Determinatio de quolibet." In the General Disputation the master's role was hardly more than that of referee, immediate answers to questions from the floor being left to the Responsalis,
that is, to the bachelor who was being put through his paces
in public. If the regent-master entered at all into the discussion, it was probably only to stress a point here or make more
explicit a point there, in the replies of the Responsalis. Sometimes, indeed, the master might throw in a question himself,
as Robert Holcot certainly did in the early part of the 14th
century: " In disputatione generali de quolibet proponebantur
a sociis decem questiones praeter duas quas proposui ego ipse." '1
From the regent-master's point of view the second stage of
• For some examples, with names, of those who were bachelors or who submitted objections at Quodlibets at Oxford, see A. G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford
Theology and Theologians, c. A.D. 1!28!2-130!3 (Oxford, 1984), pp.
5 M.-D. Chenu, Toward understanding St. Thomas, trans. A. M. Landry and
W. D. Hughes (New York, 1964), p.
• Oxford, Balliol College, MS.
f. 257v. On the Quodlibets of Holcot see
Glorieux, La litterature quodlibetique (henceforward cited as Glorieux, Litterature,
I or II), II, pp.

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LEONARD E. BOYLE

the Quodlibet, the " Determinatio de quolibet," was much
more important. For if the purpose of the General Disputation
seems to have been to expose a bachelor or bachelors to random
questions from the audience, the scope of the Determination
was to demonstrate to the bachelors and the master's immediate students how best to handle these questions. What is
more, the Determination did not take place on the same day
as the General Disputation but rather on the day following
or on the next teaching day, so the master had a chance in the
meantime to ponder the questions and to reduce them to some
sort of logical order. As James of Viterbo put it at a Determination in 1293-1295, "In disputatione de quolibet praehabita quaesita sunt in universo viginti duo, que ut enumerentur non ordine quo fuerint proposita sed secundum ordinem
alicuius connexionis . . . procedendum est." 7 In a word, the
regent-master was not expected to provide an exhaustive
answer off the cuff to the questions proposed at the General
Disputation. Rather, the General Disputation was an occasion
on which the master was presented through his bachelor or
bachelors with a series of questions which he had to " determine " or answer definitively at a Determination at a later
date. 8
Glorieux and others are inclined to think that this second
or " determining " session of the Quodlibet was not as open
to the general public as the first or General Disputation session
and that the Determination took place " in the quiet of the
classroom" with only the master's own students present. This
seems a little odd, since it was only at the second session that
the master delivered his measured reply to the questions to
which he had given only the sketchiest of responses (or no
• Glorieux, Litterature, I, p. 216.
8 See the preface of Nicholas de Vaux-Cemay to his Quodlibet (c. 1824) in
S. Axters, "Le maitre cistercien Nicholas de Vaux-Cemay et son Quodlibet," in
New Scholasticism 12 (1988), 242-258 at pp. 244-245: "Haec quaestiones
propoBitae fuerunt die lunae tertiae septimanae adventus domini coram magistro
Nicholao in scholls sancti Bernardi Parisius, qua die dictus magister de quolibet
diaputavit. Et dictas quaestiones prout in isto libello recitentur determinavit die

aabbati maequenti."

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

285

response at all) on the day of the General Disputation. Since
Quodlibets were held only twice a year, and the Determination
followed hard on the General Disputation, it seems reasonable
to suppose that the audience of the first session made it a point
to be present at the second session in order to hear the
magisterial replies to the questions posed at the first. That this
indeed was the case seems clear from a 14th-century story
about Albert the Great. As the story has it, at a " generalis
disputatio de quolibet " in the presence of a " maxima comitiva
magistrorum et scolarium " Albert was at such a loss for a
ready and convincing reply to three questions about angels
put to him by the devil in the guise of a scholar that he spent
the whole night awake trying to find an answer (which he
did eventually, but by divine inspiration) before the Determination on the next day. What is important is that the story
states that it was the same audience that turned up next day
for the Determination: " omnes eras revertuntur ... Et totum
in crastino coram omnibus refert et dicit in scolis." 9
Most of our unpublished or published Quodlibets record the
proceedings of the Determination, not those of the first stage
of the Quodlibet. Hence the Quodlibets as we know them do
not really represent the heat of the debate that followed on
the questions thrown at the bachelors by the audience but
rather the considered reply of the master after he had had
time to sort the questions out, to consult some sources, and
to marshal his arguments. However, what we find in the
Quodlibets of St. Thomas and others is not exactly the Determination as such but a version which was reworked andrefined for publication. After the " Disputatio generalis" and
the " Determinatio " there came the " Ordinatio," as may be
seen in Quodl. III, q. 5, a. 4 of St. Thomas, where there is the
cross-reference, " sicut supra dictum est," to the first article of
the same quaestio.
9 James of Aqui, Chronic01'! imaginis mundi, cited by P. Mandonnet, "Thomas
d'Aquin, Createur de Ia dispute quodlibetique," in Revue des aciences philoaophiques
et theologiques 16
9 n. 1. (= RSPT henceforward).

236

LEONARD E. BOYLE

Some Quodlibets, of course, survive in an unpolished state.
A good case is that of Quodlibet III of the Dominican Bernard
of Trilia, who died in 1292. According to Bernard Gui some
twenty or thirty years later, this Quodlibet was in such a
jumbled state on Bernard's death that his executors were quite
confused: "Sed quia illa [quodlibet] nondum quando obiit
ordinaverat ad votum suum ad plenum, et quaedam quaestiones
particulares et sexterni dispersi manebant, illi qui nimis praeoccupaverunt pro magna parte confuderunt et truncaverunt." 10
Quodlibet XII of St. Thomas, too, has an unfinished look about
it when compared with his other Quodlibets and clearly had
not had the benefit of "Ordinatio" before his death in 1274.
Some questions (e. g., 4, 6, 8-11, 21-24) entirely lack objections
and replies, containing only the corpus (" Respondeo dicendum "); others (e. g., 2) carry nothing more than drafts of
replies to objections. Perhaps the truth is that what we now
possess of Quodlibet XII of St. Thomas is not, as has been
suggested, a student's "Reportatio" of, or St. Thomas's own
notes towards, the Determination, 11 but rather, for the most
part, the text of the Determination precisely as it was held in
1270 or 1272 and before he had had time to prepare more than
a few questions for eventual publication. If this is so, then
it may also be true that a Determination did not consist in
much more than the master's main reply (" Respondeo dicendum ") to the questions raised at the General Disputation and
that the replies to the objections were not drawn up until the
" Ordinatio " stage of the Quodlibet.

*

*

*

*

*

The Quodlibets of St. Thomas, of course, present some special
problems of their own. Until Denifle discovered the dates of
10 J. Quetif and J. Echard, Scriptores ordinis praedicatorum, I
(Paris, 1719),
p. 482.
11 See J. Destrez.
"Les disputes quodlibetiques de saint Thomas d'apres la
tradition manuscrite," in Melanges Thomistes (Kain, 1928) 61-66; P. Pelster,
"Wann ist das Zwolfte Quodlibet des hi. Thomas von Aquin entstanden?," in
Gregorianum 5 (1924), 278-286; P. Glorieux, "Le Quodlibetum Xll de saint
Thomas," in RSPT 14 (1925), 20-46.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

237

two of the Quodlibets (III, V) in 1907,12 there was very little
interest in the Quodlibets as literary productions or as part of
the Thomistic corpus. Denifle' s discovery enabled Mandonnet
in 1910 to establish for the first time ever a chronology of
Quodlibets I-VI (1269-1272) .13 Mandonnet, however, on the
authority of the 14th-century English Dominican, Nicholas
Trivet, continued to assign Quodlibets VII-XI to the" Italian
period " of the teaching career of St. Thomas, dating them
vaguely between 1264 and 1268.14 In this he was followed by
Destrez (1923) in his catalogue of the manuscripts of the
Quodlibets and by Synave (1924) and Glorieux (1925).
It was not until 1926 that Mandonnet turned his full attention to Quodlibets VII-XI, proving beyond all doubt (and to
the confusion of Synave and Glorieux, who had just published
an elaborate 'Italian' chronology) that they belonged to the
first teaching period of St. Thomas at Paris (1256-1259) .15
Since then his conclusions about certain individual Quodlibets
within this group have been challenged or refined by scholars
such as Synave, Glorieux, and Isaac. For what it is worth, the
following schema attempts to summarize the twists and turns
of chronological research on the Quodlibets of St. Thomas from
1910, when Mandonnet published the revised edition of his
Siger de Brabant, to the present day, here represented by
Marc's introduction to an edition of the Summa contra Gentiles
(1967) and by the most recent biography of St. Thomas, that
of Weisheipl (1974). The schema (in which C stands for
12 H.-S. Denifle, "Die Statuten
der Juristen-Universitat Bologna, 1," in Archiv
fur Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mittelalters 8 (1907), 196-847, at p. 820.
18 P. Mandonnet,
Siger de Brabant et l'averrdisme latin au 13e siecle, second
ed., I (Paris, 1911), pp. 85-87.
"P. Mandonnet, Les ecrits authentiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin, second ed.
(Fribourg, 1910), p, xvi; P. Mandonnet and J. Destrez, Bibliographie Thomiste
(Paris, 1921), p. xvi.
16 P. Mandonnet,
"Thomas d'Aquin, createur de la dispute quodlibetique," in
RSPT 15 (1926), 477-506, 16 (1927), 5-38. The conclusions about the new
chronology of Quodlibets VII-XI in this article had been stated briefly the previous
year, but without any documentation, in his introduction to the "Lethielleux"
edition of the Quodlibets: S. Thomae Aquinatis Quaestiones Quodlibetales (Paris,
1925), pp. v-viii.

238

LEONARD E. BOYLE

Christmas and E for Easter) is not exhaustive/ 6 but it does
suggest where the chronology proposed by Mandonnet for individual Quodlibets in the two series has not met with universal
acceptance. 17
16 Some studies of individual Quodlibets are not included, e. g., P. Glorieux,
"Le plus beau Quodlibet de S. Thomas (IX) est-il de lui?", in Melanges de
science religieuse 3 (1946), 235-268, answered in the affirmative by Pelster (1946see next note) and by J. Isaac, "Le Quodlibet 9 est bien de S. Thomas," in
Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age 16 (1947-1948), 145-186.
Nor is there any mention of P. Castagnoli, "Le dispute Quodlibetali VII-XI di
S. Tommaso," in Divus Thomas (Piacenza) 31 (1928), 276-296, who held that
these Quodlibets belonged to the " Italian " period and could be dated as a
block between 1259 and 1268. There are good summaries of the conclusions of
chronological research on the Quodlibets in the appendix by I. T. Eschmann, "A
Catalogue of St. Thomas's Works," in E. Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of
St. Thomas Aquinas (New York, 1956), pp. 381-439, at p. 392.
17 The following abbreviations are used in this table:
Mandonnet I = P. Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant, sec. ed. I (Paris, 1911),
85-87.
Mandonnet 2 = P. Mandonnet, " Chronologie sommaire de la vie et des
ecrits de Saint Thomas," in RSPT 9 (1920), 142-152, at p. 148.
Destrez = J. Destrez, "Les disputes quodlibetiques de saint Thomas d'apres
!a tradition manuscrite," in Melanges Thomistes (Kain, 1923), 49-108,
at p. 51.
Synave 1 = P. Synave, review of Destrez in Bulletin Thomiste I (1924)
[32]-[50].
Glorieux 1 = P. Glorieux, La litterature quodlibetique I (Kain, 1925), pp.
276-290.
Mandonnet 3 = P. Mandonnet, "S. Thomas d'Aquin, createur de la dispute
quodlibetique," in RSPT 15 (1926), 477-506, 16 (1927), 5-38.
Synave 2 = P. Synave, "L'ordre des Quodlibets VII a XI de S. Thomas
d'Aquin," in Revue Thomiste, n. s., 9 (1926), 43-47.
Pelster I = F. Pelster, "Beitriige zur Chronologie der Quodlibeta des ID.
Thomas von Aquin," in Gregorianum 8 (1927), 508-538; 10 (1929), 52-71,
387-403, on which see Synave, Bull. Thomiste 2 (1930) [114].
Glorieux 2 = P. Glorieux, La litterature, II (Paris, 1935), p. 272.
Van Steenberghen = F. Van Steenberghen, Siger de Brabant dans l'histoire
de l'Aristotelisme, II (Louvain, 1942), p. 541.
Glorieux 3 = P. Glorieux, "Les Quodlibets Vll-XI de S. Thomas d'Aquin.
Etude critique," in Recherches de theologie anciemne et medievale 13 (1946),
282-303.
Pelster 2 = F. Pelster, " Literarische Probleme der Quodlibeta des hl. Thomas
von Aquin," in Gregorianum 28 (1947), 78-100; 29 (1948), 62-87.
Isaac = J. Isaac, review of Pelster 2 in Bull. Thomiste 8 (1947-1958), 169-172.

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240

LEONARD E. BOYLE

In spite of some uncertainties of chronology these Quodlibets
of St. Thomas have a fascination all their own in comparison
with his other works. This fascination is not peculiar to the
Quodlibets of St. Thomas but is rather something that flows
from the nature of a Quodlibet. For even in its final, polished
state at some distance removed from the excitement of the original General Disputation, a Quodlibet reflects the interests of
the audience that attended the General Disputation and not
those of the master. The question that then came from the floor
are the questions that the master answers, the pragmatic
(" Utrum melius sit facere phlebotomiam in novilunio quam in
plenilunio ") with the deeply theological (" Utrum emanatio
Filii sit ratio emanationis creaturarum ") .18
The type of question asked at the General Disputation seems
to have depended very much on the reputation or speciality of
the master. The Quodlibets of the Augustinian Giles of Rome
(1286-1291) are quite "speculative" from start to finish
whereas the Quodlibet (5 March 1282) of Berthaud of Saint
Denis, canon of Paris, is severely practical: "Utrum clerici
teneantur solvere pedagia vel tributa. . . . Utrum molere
dominicis diebus sit peccatum mortale." 19 By and large, however, the extant Quodlibets from Paris and Oxford are a mixed
bag of speculative and practical questions, ranging from the
heavily practical Quodlibets (1262-1272) of Gerard of Abbeville to the long and rather contorted Quodlibets attributed
to Peter John Olivi from the end of the 13th century. 20 The
audience, clearly, was a mixed one, too. A master with a reputation for practicality would attract a different audience from
that of a master known for a speculative approach. All the
same, the presence of a number of practical questions in most
Marc = P. Marc, C. Pera, F. Caramello, S. Thomae Aquinatis Summa contra
Gentiles, I (Turin, 1947), p. 4U.
Weisheipl = J. A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d'Aquino (New York, 1974), p. 367.
18 Henry of Liibeck, Qdl I. 33 (13fl3) in Glorieux, Litterature II, p. 136; Giles
of Rome, Qdl. 1.3 (1fl86), ibid., I, p. 141.
19 See the list of Giles' quodlibetal questions in Glorieux, Litterature, I, pp.
141-147, and that of those of Berthaud, ibid., pp. 105-106.
•• For Gerard's see ibid., I, pp. llfl-117; for those of Olivi, ibid., II, pp. fl05-!Ul.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

of the Quodlibets suggests that there really was no hard and
fast rule about what questions might be asked.
An air of immediacy is rarely absent. A Quodlibet gave the
students a chance to take the floor for a change, and they made
the most of the moment. Some questions are somewhat pointed,
like that in the Quodlibet of an anonymous (English?) Franciscan about 1300 ("Utrum frater minor peccat mortaliter
portando pecuniam alicuius ") ,21 or that in an Oxford Quodlibet
of Thomas Wylton about 1312: "Utrum sit magis licitum
magistro in theologia tenere plura beneficia quam alteri." 22
Others have all the openended quality of a High School debate
of " The Pen is Mightier than the Sword " type: " Utrum
melius sit regi ab optimo viro quam ab optimis legibus." 28 And
if there are questions which sound a tired, perfunctory note,
being repeated from Quodlibet to Quodlibet, there are others
which bear upon burning issues or events of the day. The question of where to bury the body of Philip III of France, who
died on 5 October 1285, was the subject of a question in a
Quodlibet of Geoffrey of Fontaines the following Christmas.u
The resignation of Celestine V in December
came up in a
Quodlibet of Peter of Auvergne some two years later: "Utrum
summus pontifex possit cedere vel renuntiare officio suo in
aliquo casu." 25 The implications of Boniface Vill's Clericis
laicos, issued in February
were considered at a Quodlibet
of Eustace of Grandecourt at Paris the following Christmas
or Spring. 26 A prevailing conviction that the end of the world
was at hand in 1300 is present in a Quodlibet of Peter of
Auvergne in that same year. 27
From time to time the students were moved to question
the teaching methods. Some clearly felt that the Universities
•• Listed ibid., II, p. 217.
•• Ibid., II, p. 279.
•• Ibid., II, p. 147.
•• Qdl. I. 11, ed. M. de Wulf and A. Pelzer, Lea quatre premiers Quodlibets
de Godefroid de Fontainea (Louvain, 1904), pp. 27-81.
•• Qdl. 1.15, listed in Glorieux, Litterature, I, p. 259.
•• Qdl. II. 5, ibid., II, p. 82.
" 7 Qdl. V. 15, ibid., I, p. !!62.

242

LEONARD E. BOYLE

and the teachers should be doing more for the ordinary clergy
and for their education (" Utrum ignorantia sacerdotum doctoribus imputetur in peccatum ") ; 28 others that too much
emphasis was being placed on advancement and on academic
honors and not enough on the pastoral care (" Utrum melius
est manere in studio seu scholis, spe plus proficiendi, quam ire
ad animas, intentione salutem eis procurandi ") .29 Although
Henry of Ghent, in another context, furnished a classic answer.
to the latter question ("Audientiam intelligo non tam praesentium quam etiam illorum ad quos per audientes doctrina illa
poterit pervenire ") ,30 there were many students who were less
than enchanted with the teaching. If one may judge from a
question that occurs in at least three different Quodlibets, there
were masters who were reluctant to answer any and every
question at a Quodlibet: " Utrum magister in theologia disputans de quolibet, qui renuit accipere quaestionem sibi propositam quia tangit aliquos quos timet o:ffendere, peccat in hoc
mortaliter." 31 There were others, too, who were more adept
at parrying questions than facing up to them squarely: "Utrum
doctor sive magister determinans quaestiones sive exponens
scripturas publice, peccet mortaliter non explicando veritatem
quam novit." 32 Still others devoted too much time to exotic
questions at the expense of those of greater import: " Utrum
magistri tractantes quaestiones curiosas, dimittentes utiles ad
salutem, peccent mortaliter." 33

*

*

*

*

*

"Utiles ad salutem": most strikingly of all, the Quodlibets
reflect an abiding interest among the students in the cura
William de Falegar, Qdl. I. 15 (1:280-1:281), ibid., II, p. 1:26.
Henry of Ghent, Qdl. 1.35, (IQ76C) in Henrici Gandavensis Quaestione.•
Quodlibetales (Paris, 1518), f. Q3 v.
80 Henry of Ghent, Qdl. X. 16 (1:286 C), ed. cit., f. 437.
81 Q. 55 of Quodlibet of Gervase of Mont Saint-Eloi
(1:28:2-1:291) in Glorieux,
Litterature, I, p. 137. See also Qdl. ill. :23 (1:287) of Richard of Middleton
(ibid., I. p. :270), and Qdl. XII. 6 (1:295) of Geoffrey of Fontaines (ibid., I, p. 270).
82 Henry of Ghent, Qdl. X. 16 (1286 C), ed. cit., f. 437.
•• Qdl. II. 16 (1308) of Herve Nedellec, in Glorieux, Litterature, I. !!02.
28

29

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

243

animarum. This is only natural. For' a large proportion of the
students in the theological faculties of Paris, Oxford, and elsewhere, was engaged in or destined for pastoral care at one level
or another. What the proportion exactly was is not ascertainable, but until the constitution Licet canon of the second
council of Lyons disrupted the practice, many of the clergy
were able to take leave from their curae animarum for a few
year's study at Universities. Certainly after 1298, when Boniface VIII's educational constitution, Cum ex eo, was issued,
the number of parochial clergy attending the Universities must
have been appreciable. 84
The preoccupations of these students are reflected in questions about residence and study, benefices and beneficial obligations, the sacraments and pastoral responsibilities. The
imposition on rectors of personal residence in their livings at
the second council of Lyons naturally occasioned a number of
questions, for example, concerning the obligation of becoming
a priest within a year of taking possession of a rectory. 35 And
when the constitution Cum ex eo of Boniface had relaxed the
Lyons legislation in 1298, allowing rectors to be supported
from the revenues of their parishes while studying at a University, there were rectors who were not too scrupulous about
observing the conditions of their licences to study, as may be
gathered from a question in a Quodlibet of James of Ascoli in
1311-131'il: "Utrum clericus beneficiatus qui habet licentiam
standi in studio, si stet in studio sine spe proficiendi ita quod
studio non vacet sed potius ludat, discurrat et sit vagabundus,
utrum teneatur ad restitutionem fructuum perceptorum tempore intermedio pro quo debuit vacare studio." 86
34 See L. E. Boyle, " The Constitution
Cum ex eo of Pope Boniface VITI," in
M ediaev,al Studies
35 Thus
Qdl. III. 18 of the Franciscan Roger Marston at Oxford in
" Utrum aliquis legitime institutus in beneficio habente curam animarum si non
fuerit ordinatus infra annum possit illud beneficium licite retinere post concilium
Lugdunense," ed. G. F. Etzkorn and I. C. Brady, Fr. Rogerus Marston: Quodlibeta
Quatuor (Quaracchi, 1968), p. 346.
36 Bibliotheca
Apostolica Vaticana, MS. Vat. lat.
f. 68r-v (Qdl. I. 16);
Glorieux, La litterature, II, p.

244

LEONARD E. BOYLE

If a certain distaste for the way of life of the Parisian clergy
may be detected in a question about the size of the stipends
demanded by the " rich curates " of Paris,S7 a distinct pride in
the quality of the parochial clergy vis-a-vis the privileged friars
is to be noticed in a question put to Henry of Ghent in 1287
about preaching: " Si sacerdos curatus in parochia sua paratus
sit et velit praedicare, et similiter frater habens privilegium ut
possit praedicare, nullo eum impediente, uter eorum potior sit
in iure, et utri cedere debeat alter?" 38 The friars and their
privileges, particularly those of hearing confessions and preaching, were, of course, very sore points, and provoked a number
of queries, as in this question in a Quodlibet of Geoffrey of
Fontaines four or five years after Martin IV had endowed
the friars: with some unpopular privileges: "Utrum confessus
ab aliquo habente potestatem audiendi confessiones et absolvendi confitentes virtute privilegii Martini VI, teneatur
eadem peccata proprio sacerdoti iterum confiteri." 39
On the whole, the practical questions, such as one from a
Quodlibet of John of Naples at the beginning of the 14th
87 See q. 8 of Quodlibet (1282-1291) of Gervase of Mont Saint-Eloi in Glorieux,
La litthature, I, p. 134: " Utrum divites curati peccent in accipiendo quando administrant sacramenta, ut in ista villa, scilicet Parisius, quando accipiunt duodecim
denarios in administratione sacramenti extremae unctionis, duos solidos vel tres
in desponsatione coniugum."
88 Qdl. VII. 21, ed. Paris, 1518, f. 272.
89 Qdl. III.
7. ed. de Wulf and Pelzer, Les quatre p1·emiers Qoodlibets de
Godefroid de Fontaines (Louvain, 1904), p. 214. A similar question was put in
1283 to Roger Marston at Oxford (Qdl III. 25): "Si ex privilegio nobis concesso
possumus audire confessiones si praelati prohibeant" (ed. Etzkoru and Brady, Fr.
Rogerus Marston: Quodlibeta Quatuor, pp. 359-388). In one form or another the
question crops up time and again over the next centuries, e. g., in the late 14th
century when the Irish Cistercian Henry Crump was arraigned at London on
seven charges involving confessional jurisdiction, one of which was that he held
that those were " damned for eternity " who did not confess to their own parish
priest after confessing to a friar. Obviously it was possible to approach the question
from all sorts of angles, as in this version in Quodlibet IV. 24 (c. 1286) of the
English Dominican Thomas Sutton at Oxford: "Posito quod sacerdos parochialis
sit sufficiens in scientia et moribus ad curam animarum, quaeritur utrum debeat
licentiare subditum si petat ut possit confiteri sacerdoti alieno, nisi exprimat
causam rationabilem et evidentem suae petitionis.": Thomas von Sutton
Quodlibeta, ed. M. Schmaus and M. GonzliJez-Haba (Munich, 1969), pp. 655-658.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL

CARE

century, are as vital and pertinent as those with which the
pastoral clergy in any age is faced: " Utrum medicus debeat
dare medicinam mulieri praegnanti ex qua sequeretur mors
filii, et si non claret earn, sequeretur mors utriusque." 40 At
times, indeed, the questions in some Quodlibets have more
the look of casus in moral theology than that of classic quaestiones.

*

*

*

*

*

The casus-type question appears in Quodlibets as early as
those of Guerric of Saint-Quentin
.41 It was, of
course, a very common method of teaching in the law schools
century, from which, in fact, the schools of
of the late
theology borrowed the technique of both the Disputed Question
and the Quodlibet. Here in the theological Quodlibets from
Paris and Oxford in the second hal£ of the 13th century the
presence of these casus is quite striking. Though there is little
evidence of practical " moral " theology in the works of the
main scholastic writers of the
13th, and 14th centuries,
there is plenty of evidence in these Quodlibets that a discussion
of practical casus was not left entirely to authors of Summae de
casibus like Raymund of Pefiafort
or to writers of
Summae confessorum such as John of Freiburg
Indeed,
as will be suggested later, it was precisely because of these
casus and practical moral conclusions that the Quodlibets of
some of the greater scholastics of the 13th century were almost
as well-known to the manualists and summists as the Summa
of St. Thomas or the Repertorium of Durandus.
A typical casus is to be found in Qdl. III, 49
of the
Franciscan John Pecham: "Posito quod Titius promisit locare
seu ad firmam dare concedere Gaio fundum usque ad quinquennium pro decem aureis, sed non fecit quod promisit, pro
quo Gaius dicit se Iuera plurima perdidisse, quaeritur an Titius
teneatur aliquid dare pro damno ipsi Gaio." 42 Variants on this
Qdl. X.
in Glorieux, Litterature, II, p. 170.
Qdl. IV. 18, ibid., p. 109.
•• Ibid., p. 179.
40

u

246

LEONARD E. BOYLE

" Posito quod " statements of a casus are to be found in many
Quodlibets, for example, in those of John de Pouilly. 43 On
many occasions, however, the casus is presented with all the
terseness of a "problem" in mathematics (to which, in any
case, legal and theological casus and quaestiones reach back
in origin) , thus: " Ponatur: Aliquis commisit decem peccata.
Confitetur novem non recolendo de decimo. Sufficienter est
contritus et bene confiteretur decimum si recoleret. Absolvitur
a sacerdote. Post aliquod tempus recordatur. Utrum teneatur
confiteri? " 44 ; or again, "Item, ponitur talis casus: Iste scholasticus habet conferre scholas grammaticales. Quidam clericus
dat ei argentum hac intentione ut possit eas obtinere. Obtinet.
Utrum sit simonia? ". 45

*

*

*

*

*

Although there are none of these casus-quaestiones in the
Quodlibets of St. Thomas, there is the usual quota of practical
questions. In fact, there is scarcely one of his Quodlibets that
does not carry a question or two bearing directly on the cura
animarum. As is common in quodlibetal literature, the practical questions generally come at the end of each Quodlibet,
where they were placed when the questions from the General
Disputation were being sorted out for the Determination. After
the questions " De Deo " and De angelis," to take the simplest
division of a Thomistic Quodlibet, there are those "De homine."
The very first Quodlibet of St. Thomas (VII) is devoid of
practical questions, apart from two very long questions on
manual work (VII. 7 and 8) which appear to be Disputed
Questions and to have been tacked on to this Quodlibet when
the first Parisian group of Quodlibets were put in circulation
long after the death of St. Thomas. 46
•• Qdl. III. 12 (1309): "Ponamus quod aliquis sit excommunicatus pluribus
excommunicationibus et quod absolvatur ab una illarum .... " : Glorieux, Littb-ature, I, p. fl27.
"Qdl. I. 4 (1287-1288) of John de Weerde: ibid., II, p. 188.
•• Qdl. II. 8 (1300-1301) of Renier of Clairmarais: ibid., II, 255.
•• SeeP. Glorieux, "Les Quodlibets VII-XI de 8. Thomas d'Aquin," in Recherches
de theologie wncitmne et medievale 13 (1946), 286-fl89; C. Molari, " I luoghi

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL

CARE

247

From the next Quodlibet (VIII) onwards, however, matters
of practical morals become more prominent, e. g., "Utrum ille
qui vadit ad ecclesiam propter distributiones, alias non iturus,
peccet." (VIII.1,1) There is also a brief reply to a question
about pluralism (VIII.6,3) where there is a discussion of the
difficulty pluralists encounter in forming their consciences because of the varying opinions of masters. The same point about
a pluralist's conscience is made at much greater length in the
next Quodlibet (IX.7, 2: "Utrum habere plures praebendas
sine cura animarum absque dispensatione sit peccatum mortale ") .
Prebends, according to some authorities, are so many apples
to be plucked at will; according to others, a plurality of prebends offends against the natural law, and a dispensation is
impossible. So far as St. Thomas is concerned, it is an extremely
dangerous thing to give a straightforward decision about mortal
sin in a question such as this where the truth of the matter is
not clear and unambiguous and where jurist contradicts jurist
and theologian is at odds with theologian: "inveniuntur enim
theologi theologis et juristae juristis contrarie sentire." The
controversy over whether the ancient laws prohibiting pluralism
have been abrogated or not is, he feels, something that" should
be left to the jurists." If the laws still hold, then, customs
to the contrary notwithstanding, it is his view as a theologian
that several benefices cannot be held without a dispensation.
But if, on the other hand, it is certain that these laws have
been abrogated by custom, then there is no question of having
to seek a dispensation.

*

*

*

*

*

On the whole, however, practical questions are not as thick
on the ground in these Quodlibets (VII-XI) from St. Thomas's
first Parisian period of teaching (1256-1259) as they are in
those (I-VI, and possibly XII) from his second (1269-1272).
paralleli nelle opere di S. Tommaso e la loro cronologia (un esempio di analisi:
il lavoro manuale dei religiosi) ," in Euntes Docete II (1958), 871-891.

248

LEONARD E. BOYLE

The audience, perhaps, was a little more varied then than in
the first period; and the presence of influential " practical "'
theologians such as Gerard of Abbeville has also to be taken
into account. When St. Thomas arrived in Paris in 1269,
Gerard had been teaching for some seven or eight years and
had a wide following.47 His nineteen Quodlibets (1262-1272)
are probably the most pastoral of the Quodlibets of the 18th
century and include a splendid example of a casus-quaestio:
" Quoddam cimiterium a praelato loci fuit benedictum. Per
multa vehicula illi terrae benedictae addita et adiecta et superposita fuit terra non benedicta usque ad altitudinem unius
stagii vel duorum, in qua terra non benedicta sepeliuntur funera
quae in parte tangit terram prius benedictam. Utrum ilia
corpora sunt sepulta in cimiterio benedicta, vel utrum tale
cimiterium iterum sit benedicendum? ". 48
None of the questions in the Quodlibets I-VI of St. Thomas
are quite as " casuistic" as this, but there are a few which
are not as innocent as they seem. If, in answer to a straight
question, there is a reply (later repeated ad litteram in his
Summa: 11-11, q. 10, a. 12) that calmly and firmly establishes
that Jewish children should not be baptized behind their parents' backs (11.4, 2) , there is a long and over-emphatic defence
(with answers to twenty-three objections) of the admission of
"callow youths" to religious orders (IV.12, 1). St. Thomas
clearly regarded the question and the objections as mischievous,
since he begins his reply rather testily: " Respondeo dicendum
quod hoc quod pro quaestione hie inducitur, dubitationem non
habet, nisi quod quidam contentioni studentes veritatem obnubilare conantur." 49 This is almost the only occasion on which
47 Gerard headed a group of very vocal anti-mendicant masters at Paris.
Some
of the questions in the Quodlibets of St. Thomas (especially Qdl. I. 14; ill.
17; IV.
were inspired by or aimed at the "Geraldine" circle: see P.
Glorieux, "Les polemiques 'contra Geraldinos '," in Reherches de theologie
ancienne et mediivale 6 (1934), 5-41.
48 Qdl. IV.
listed in Glorieux, Littirature, I, p. ll5.
•• Probably he had some of the " Geraldines " in mind, since this question in
Qdl. IV and that following (IV. U,
are noted in MS. Vat. lat. 799 in the
Vatican Library as follows: "Isti duo articuli fuerunt disputati a fratre Thoma
contra Geroldum in principio quadragesimae [12711" : GlQrieux, art. cit., pp. 34-86.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

he drops his guard a little, though a question in Quodlibet I
(9, 4) on whether monks who eat meat sin mortally, moves
him to make comparisons between the rules of various religious
orders and to blow a trumpet for the admirably balanced
legislation of his own Dominican Order: " in ordine fratrum
praedicatorum est cautissima et securissima forma profitendi
qua non promittit [frater] servare regulam sed obedientiam
secundum regulam." 50
At events, this second Parisian group of Quodlibets is full
of good, practical, everyday questions covering many aspects
of the pastoral care: almsgiving (11!.6, 1; V1.7; VI.8, 1), baptism (1!.4,
benefices and beneficial practice (1.7, 1; IV.8,
4;
1; V.ll, 3; V1.5, 3), bigamy (IV.8,
buying and
selling (1!.5,
conscience
crusades and indulgences (1!.8,
IV.7,
V.7,
death (III.9,
the
Eucharist (V.6,
excommunication (IV.8, 3), fasting (V.9,
hell (1!1.10,
ignorance (1.9, 3), lies (Vl.9, 3), loans
and restitution (V.9, 1), martyrdom (1V.10,
matrimony
(11!.7; 1V.8,
V.8,
penance and confessional practice
(1.5; 1.6, 1-3; 1!1.13,
IV.7, 1; V.7, 1), perjury (1.9,
precepts (V.10,
priests and their obligations (1.7, 1; III.
13, V.14; V1.5,
purgatory (1!.8,
study and teaching
(1.7, III.4,
tithes (1!.4, 3; V1.5, 4), usury (1II.7,
vows (1Il.5, 1-3), wills and executors' responsibilities (Vl.8,
Generally these questions are answered with courtesy and
learning and out of a conviction (echoed later by Henry of
Ghent) that teachers of theology have no mean place in the
salvation of souls: 51 " Theologiae doctores sunt quasi principales artifices [aedificii spiritualis] qui inquirent et docent
50 The edition of the Quodlibets used here is " Marietti " edition:
S. Tlwmae
Aquinatis Quaestiones Quodlibetales, cd. R. Spiazzi (Marietti: Rome-Turin, 1956),
where parallel passages in other works of St. Thomas are clearly indicated and
where the alternative methods of citing the Quodlibets (by question and article
within the question, as in the present essay, or by the consecutive number of the
article in the Quodlibet) are used side by side, most conveniently.
51 See J. Leclercq, "L'ideal
du theologien au moyen age," in Recherches de
(1947),
science religieuse

250

LEONARD E. BOYLE

qualiter alii debeant salutem animarum procurare" (I.7, 2).
Teaching was so important, in fact, that, given a proper
position on the part of the teacher, it was a higher and better
occupation than pastoral care: " Ipsa enim ratio demonstrat
quod melius est erudire de pertinentibus ad salutem eos qui et
in se et in aliis proficere possunt quam simplices qui in se
tantum proficere possunt" (ibid.). And to those who were of
the opinion that study was a waste of time and should take
second place to the cura animarum, he answered drily, " nullam
iacturam temporis patitur qui quid est melius operatur docendo
vel qui ad hoc per studium se disponit" (ibid.). St. Thomas
took his teaching very seriously indeed. Certainly he had no
time for those who in a " Disputatio magistralis " (presumably
he is speaking here of the Determination stage of the Quodlibet)
answer questions with a battery of authorities and leave the
hearers dazed and no wiser than they were before. The duty
of a teacher is to instruct and not to send his students away
empty, as he says in this interesting passage in Quodlibet IV
(9, 3):
Quaedam vero disputatio est magistralis in scholis, non ad removendum errorem sed ad instruendum auditores ut inducantur
ad intellectum veritatis quam intendit: et tunc oportet rationibus
inniti investigantibus veritatis radicem et facientibus scire quomodo
sit verum quod dicitur; alioquin si nudis auctoritatibus magister
quaestionem determinet, certificabitur quidem auditor quod ita
est, sed nichil scientiae vel intellectus acquiret et vacuus abscedet.
True to the conviction expressed in Quodlibet IV, St. Thomas
never answers questions, however simplistic, with anything approaching glibness, from " Utrum sufficiat confiteri scripto "
(I.6, 1) to "Utrum habens duas ecclesias teneatur utriusque
officium dicere" (I.7) . And he rarely lets slip an opportunity
to instruct, as in the question, " Utrum sacerdos parochialis
teneatur credere suo subdito dicenti se alteri esse confessum"
(I.6, 3), where he nicely sets the confessional off from civil
courts and combats a tendency in confessional practice to turn
confessionals into tribunals: " In foro iudiciali creditur homini

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL CARE

contra se sed non pro se. In foro autem poenitentiae creditur
homini pro se et contra se." In some of the replies there is a
down-to-earth realism that allows that matins may be anticipated " propter necessitatem et licitarum honestarum occupationum, puta si clericus vel magister debet videre lectiones suas
de nocte" (V.14), and that it is not a sin for a preacher "to
have an eye on earthly things," provided he is simply looking
to the necessities of life, " sicut ad stipendia pro necessitate
sustentationis vitae" (II.6 . On the question of the support
of the clergy, indeed, he is uncompromising, arguing that to
support the clergy is of divine and natural law (II.4, 3) and
that the question of tithes has nothing to do with whether a
priest is poor or rich (VI.5, 4) .
But for all his humanity and his sympathetic understanding
of the problems of pastoral care, St. Thomas made no attempt
to court the favor of the parochial clergy in his audience. He
was totally convinced of the relative superiority of the teaching
office over the pastoral, and he said so more than once. In his
opinion the pastoral clergy are simply the " manual workers "
in the spiritual edifice, where the doctors of theology are the
" skilled workers " showing how things should be done: " In
aedificio autem spirituali sunt quasi manuales operarii qui particulariter insistunt curae animarum .... Sed quasi principales
artifices sunt et episcopi .... Et similiter theologiae doctores
sunt quasi principales artifices, qui inquirunt et docent qualiter
alii debeant salutem animarum procurare." (I.7,
He was
no less adamant on the point that the parochial clergy belonged
to a lower grade of perfection than religious (I.7,
III.6, 3).
Which is why, he explains rather finely, religious and not parish
priests become bishops (I.7,

*

*

*

*

*

50 Qdl. m. 6, 3 is explicitly devoted to this question of relative perfection:
" Utrum presbiteri parochiales et archidiaconi sint maioris perfectionis quam
religiosi." The Quodlibet was held towards Easter of
some four or five
months after a similar question (" Utrum sacerdotes curati sint in statu perfection
quam religiosi " : Glorieux, Litterature, I, p.
had been answered rather
differently by Gerard of Abbeville. Some of the objections put to St. Thomas echo
Gerard's position.

LEONARD E. BOYLE

At least 127 manuscripts of the Quodlibets of St. Thomas
are extant from the Middle Ages, and they mostly come from
college libraries, monasteries, and Dominican houses. 53 What
possible impact, then, could these Quodlibets have had on
pastoral care at large from which so many of the questions were
drawn and to which the replies were of some interest? Oddly,
an appreciable impact, albeit indirectly. For, although there
is nothing to indicate that the first Parisian Quodlibets (VIIXI) or Quodlibet XII were ever known outside a small, narrowly professional circle, it is otherwise with the second Parisian
block, Quodlibets I-VI. The pastoral teaching in these Quodlibets of 1269-1272 was known and quoted all over Europe from
about 1300, finding its way into all sorts of small pastoral
manuals, from the Oculus sacerdotis of William of Pagula in
England about 1320 54 to the M anipulus curatorum of Guido de
Monte Rocherii in Spain about the same time/ 5 and into more
authoritative works such as the Confessionale of Antoninus of
Florence in the middle of the 15th century 56 and the Summa
of Sylvester Prierias at the beginning of the 15th. 57
This, as it happens, was not because these Quodlibets I-VI
of St. Thomas were widely known as such, but because of the
industry if not the perceptiveness of a German Dominican
called John of Freiburg or John the Lector. 58 A pupil at one
•• J. Destrez, "Les disputes quodlibetiques de saint Thomas d'apres Ia tradition
manuscrite," in Melanges Thomistes (Kain,
pp. 49-108, who lists 96 MSS.
Another 81 are listed by S. Axters, "Oil en est l'etat des manuscrits des questions
quodlibt\tiques de saint Thomas d'Aquin?," in Revue Thomiste 41 (1986), 505580.
f. 76r, etc.
•• New College, Oxford, MS.
55 Manipulus curatorum, ed. Louvain,
e. g., f.
"Sanctus Thomas in
quadam quaestione de quolibet ponit casus in quibus tenetur existens in peccato
mortali confiteri."
56 Confessionale, ed. Paris, 1516, f.
"Item secundum Thomam in quolibet
et Innocentium contritus debet magis diligere Deum quam seipsum."
67 Summa summarum quae Sylvestrina dicitur, ed. Cologne, 1518, ff. 85v, 165v,
etc.
•• For a more specific discussion of John of Freiburg, his Summa confessorum
and the place of St. Thomas in popular theology, see L. E. Boyle, " The Summa
confessorum of John of Freiburg and the popularization of the moral teaching

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL

CARE

253

time of Ulrich Engelbrecht of Strasbourg, John of Freiburg
accompanied Albert the Great to Mecklenberg in 1269 and
may, indeed, have attended some of the Quodlibets of St.
Thomas at Paris in 1279-1272, when Albert went there to assist
St. Thomas. After his appointment as Lector in the Dominican
house at Freiburg-im-Breisgau about 1280, John decided to
bring his textbook of practical theology, the Summa de casibus
of Raymund of Pefiafort, up to date and supplemented it with
excerpts from the Secunda secundae, Quodlibets I-VI, and other
works of St. Thomas, and from other theological and canonical
sources that had appeared in the interval of some fifty years
since the Summa de casibus was published in its final edition
(1234). In a Summa confessorum of his own which he published in 1298 59 John incorporated most of the material from
St. Thomas and others which he had collected in this way,
including the corpus of at least 22 quaestiones from Quodlibets
I-VI. If Quodlibets VII-XI and Quodlibet XII seem to be unknown to him (thus, incidentally, confirming the view of many
scholars that these Quodlibets were not put into circulation
until sometime after 1300), John was thoroughly familiar with
all of Quodlibets I-VI and had searched them thoroughly (together with another Quodlibet which he thought was by
Thomas but which really was by John Pecham) 60 for moral
teaching. 61 Hardly one of the "pastoral" questions in these
of St. Thomas and some of his contemporaries," in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1!174-1974:
Commemorative Studies, ed. A. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1974) II, pp. !'l45-!'l68.
59 There are various editions of the work, e. g., that at Nuremberg, 1517. Incunabula of the Summa are in L. Hain, Repertorium bibliographicum (StuttgartParis, 1826-1888), nn. 7865 (1476) and 7866 (1498).
60 Pecham's Quodlibet occurs in at least 2 MSS. of the Quodlibets of St. Thomas
but is attributed to St. Thomas in only one of these MSS: see Destrez, art. cit.
in 58 above, pp. 59-81. It is interesting to note that the 14th-century English
Dominican Robert Holcot, when quoting one of these Pecham questions attributed
to St. Thomas by the Summa confessorum, suspected that there was something
wrong: ". . . sicut dicitur in Summa confessorum et imponitur sancto Thomae
in quodam quaestione de quolibet. Sed puto quod non est suum. . . ." : In IV
libros Sententiarum, ed. Lyons, 1518, I D. 7, casus XVI.
61 John of Freiburg
also uses Quodlibets of Peter of Tarentaise (Summa confessorum 8.88, 8 and 8.84, 254) and Ulrich of Strasbourg (ibid., 8. 84, 272) . He

LEONARD E. BOYLE

Quodlibets has been missed, and no one quotation is repeated
twice, as may be seen from the following summary table of
borrowings (which does not claim to be exhaustive):
Quodlibet Summa C.
Utrum contritus debeat magis velle esse in
inferno quam peccare
6 2 3.34.69
Utrum confessio differri possit usque ad
quadragesimam
Utrum sacerdos parochialis teneatur credere
6 3 3.34.48
suo subdito dicenti se alteri esse confessum
7 1 1. 7.19
Utrum habens duas ecclesias teneatur utriusque officium dicere
Utrum vacans saluti animarum peccet, s1
7 2 3. 5. 4
circa studium tempus occupat
Utrum periurium sit gravius peccatum quam
9 2 1. 9.23
homicidium
Utrum pueri Iudaeorum sint baptizandi in4 2 1. 4. 4
II
vitis parentibus
III 4 1 3. 5. 5 Utrum liceat alicui petere licentiam pro se
docendi in theologia
4 2 3.32.18
Utrum discipuli sequentes diversas opiniones
magistrorum excusentur a peccato erroris
6 2 3.34.249 Utrum religiosus possit egredi claustram
absque licentia sui praelati ut patri subveniat
in necessitate existenti
Utrum liceat requirere ab aliquo moriente ut
9 2 1.11.23
statum suum post mortem revelet
13 1 3.34.110 Utrum satisfactio universaliter iniuncta a
sacerdote sit sacramentalis
IV 7 2 1. 8.62 Utrum vir possit accipere crucem uxore
nolente, si de eius incontinentia timeatur
8 3 3.33.194 Utrum debeant vitari illi excommunicati
circa quorum excommunicationem est apud
peritos diversa sententia
v 7 2 3.34.192 Utrum melius moriatur crucesignatus qui
moritur in via eundi ultra mare quam qui
moritur redeundo
I

5

3.34.26

was not the only one of the manualists to comb the Quodlibets for practical
doctrine. The Franciscan Summa astesana (1317) uses Quodlibets of Henry of
Ghent: Summa astesana, ed. Regensburg, 1480, f. 20 r, etc. Guido de Monte
Rocherrii used Quodlibets of Geoffrey of Fontaines: Manipulus curatorum, ed.
Louvain, 1522, f. 142 v, etc.

THE QUODLIBETS

OF ST. THOMAS AND PASTORAL

CARE

f/.55

Utrum praelatus qui dat beneficium alicui
suo consanguineo ut exaltetur, simoniam committat
14
1.
Utrum liceat clerico qui tenetur ad horas
canonicas dicere matutinas sequentis diei de
sero
1.
Utrum clericus beneficiatus teneatur in
VI 5
scholis existens dicere officium mortuorum
5 3
Utrum episcopus peccet dans beneficium
bono si praetermittet meliorem
8 1
5.113 Utrum mortuus aliquod detrimentum sentiat
ex hoc quod eleemosynas quas mandavit dari
retardantur
8
5.114 Utrum executor debeat tardare distributiones
eleemoysynarum ad hoc quod res defuncti
melius vendantur
9 3 1.10. 5
Utrum maius peccatum sit cum aliquis
mentitur facto quam cum aliquis mentitur
verbo
11 3

Armed with the corpus of these quaestions, each introduced
by the phrase, " secundum Thomam in quadam quaestione de
quolibet," the Summa confessorum spread all over Europe and
was the dominant summa for confessors over the next two
centuries. It was copied, abbreviated, arranged in alphabetical
order, translated into German and (partly) into French. And
it became a prime source for the moral teaching of St. Thomas
(especially as found in the Secunda secundae and these Quodlibets) in scholastic as well as in unprofessional circles-so
much so, indeed, that, if one finds in a scholastic writer or
confessor's manual a quotation from St. Thomas, "in quadam
quaestione de quolibet," the source almost invariably proves
to be John of Freiburg's Summa confessorum or a derivative
and not the Quodlibets of St. Thomas themselves. Thus when
Ranulph Higden, monk of Chester and author of the wellknown Polychronicon, states in his Speculum curatorum
(1348), "Sanctus Thomas in quadam quaestione de quolibet
dicit quod in foro contentioso creditur homini pro se et contra
se et sine probationibus," the source, if a little garbled in this
particular manuscript of the Speculum, is not St. Thomas but

!256

LEONARD E. BOYLE

John of Freiburg (Summa 3.34.48) .62 The same is true when
the English canonist and parish priest, William of Pagula,
writes in his Summa summarum in about 1320, "An clericus
praebendatus in scholis existens tenetur dicere officium mortuorum? .... Sciendum . . . secundum Thomam in quadam
quaestione de quolibet." 68
These and a host of other manuals of the 14th and 15th
centuries were written for and generally circulated among those
engaged in the cura animarum. It is surely not inappropriate
that the replies furnished so carefully by St. Thomas in Determinations at Paris in 1269-1!27!2 to chance questions from
pastoral care should have reached, however indirectly, over the
next two centuries and more, that very milieu from which
these practical questions had come in the first instance.
LEONARD

E. BoYLE, O.P.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Canada

•• Cambridge University Library, MS. Mm. i.
f. 188 v.
•• Oxford, Bodleian Library, MS. Bodley
f. 140 v, from Summa confessOTUm
I. 7.19.

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

-" Now of all human pursuits, that of
wisdom is the most perfect the most
sublime, the most p1·ojitable, the most
delightful." 1
-" No one can live without some sensible and bodily pleasure." 2
-" The abundance of pleasure in a wellordered sex-act is not inimical to right
reason." 3

T

HE MODERN WORLD is sometimes censoriously said
to be a pleasure-seeking world. Against such a judgment and its implications many reply just as vehemently with the question: why should it not seek pleasure?
has it not a fundamental right to pleasure? is not in fact
pleasure the only thing that makes life worth living, and precisely in a world of stress and strain is it not pleasure that
gives hope and courage and ultimately brings peace to people
and nations? Now, the simple fact is that pleasure and the
seeking after it do play a most important role in present-day
Western civilization, in Europe and America and all the cultures dependent upon them or influenced by their way of life
and living. It is at times maintained that the ancients and
the medievals, and in a special way the thinkers, the philosophers, and theologians of ancient and medieval times, had very
little notion of man's fundamental right to pleasure. Either
they never even examined the nature of such a human right,
it is asserted, or they flatly denied its existence. In any event,
it is further contended, they certainly looked askance at
1 I Ccmt. Gent., c. 2, no. 8.
• Summa Theol., I-II, q. S4, a. 1.
8 Ibid., 11-11, q. 15S, a. 2 ad 2.

257

258

CORNELIUS

WILLIAMS

pleasure and pleasure-seeking in every form and were at no
pains to assign it an honorable place in human life and living.
In view of such global assertions it would appear useful to
examine the place pleasure took in the teaching (and life) of
those who were responsible for the making of Western culturethe ancient Greeks-and in a special way in the moral theological synthesis of Aquinas. It will then be seen that, far
from neglecting or even ignoring the phenomenon of pleasure
in human life, they offer us a finely nuanced analysis of its
structure and, while not holding for a man's right to pleasure,
they insist most categorically on its pre-eminent importance
in the serious business of human living. It is in that very sense
that the Greeks held the ideal man to be the 'aner spoudogeloios- a term that is well-nigh untranslatable but might be
rendered by: the lighthearted-earnest man-or the eutrapelos,
the man for all seasons and situations, who struck a happy
mean between the bomolochos, the jester or buffoon, and the
agroikos, the boor devoid of all wit and humor. In a word, the
ideal and full human being was he who could relax from his
toils (as statesman, as scholar or as peasant) and, whilst taking
legitimate satisfaction in his achievement, 4 could devote himself to distractions and amusements with his fellows 5 in order
the better to be able to contiuue the task begun with re-created
'This idea, as we shall see in the course of the present study, is fundamental
to the authentic notion and reality of pleasure. The less it is thought about or
consciously sought after the purer and deeper it is. Jean Lacroix puts this very
well when he writes: " En quelque sorte il faut gouter au plaisir, sans l'avoir
voulu, parce qu'on le trouve sur sa route et sans s'y arreter. La conscience meme
qu'on en prend ne va pas sans un gout d'amertume. Le plaisir n'est pur qu'inconscient. Aussi la poursuite consciente du plaisir engendre-t-elle la pire tristesse "
(Les sentiments et la vie morale [Paris: PUF, 195fl], p. 42). Or, as A. C. Ewing
puts it, " in order to get pleasure we must be interested in other things besides
pleasure for their own sake" (Ethics [London, 196fl], p. fl7).
5 This is the authentic
Latin notion of "play"-" ludus" in all its forms as
a remedy for the fatigue of the mind. The notion was taken up later most
felicitously by St. Thomas and its human value duly emphasized in Summa Theol.,
II-II, q. 168. In a. fl he has this to say: "oportet remedium contra fatigationem
animalem adhibere per aliquam delectationem, intermissa intentione ad insistendum
studio rationis."
See Hugo Rahner's valuable little book: Man at Play (London, 1965).

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energy. This will all become much clearer if we examine briefly
their philosophical analysis of the pleasure-phenomenon.
Both the Greeks and the Latins had a very keen sense of
language, and in a very much more pronounced degree than
modern writers, on philosophical and theological matters; they
cultivated a very refined understanding of and attention to the
precise meaning of words. This they did in the conviction that
words are meant to be the expression of concepts, and through
words and concepts we are brought into contact with truth
and reality. Pleasure is anything but a simple reality. It is
highly complex both in its psychological and physiological or
somatic structure. Now, the Greeks were fully aware of this
complexity, and they were also, it must be added, especially
attentive to the moral or ethical values involved in the many
distinct forms of pleasure and pleasure-seeking. They had one
term-hedone--that could apply to all types of pleasure and
pleasure-seeking. 6 It was a kind of common denominator. But
they also had a whole series of expressions to express almost
every possible shade of hedonic experience, from the acherontic
movements of the psychically informed soma to the heights
of the delights of the spirit. 7 Thus they had precise terms referring to the experience of coition and its attendant turbulent
pleasure on the part of the human male (lagneia) and another
separate word to express the vehement lustful and sexual comportment and experience of the human female (machlosyne).
Then there were terms to express the reality of sense experience
• It is of interest to note that the English terms " hedonism " and "hedonist "
were first used towards the middle of the last century (1856 = earliest known
occurrence). And then they were used or at least generally understood in a
negative and pejorative sense. The OED quotes a word of G. G. Finlay:
" Hedonism, or the pleasure theory of life. . . . is the greatest heresy in morals.
Hedonism is usually taken to mean the same thing as Utilitarianism. On the
contrary the adjective 'hedonic' and the substantive 'hedonics' were used already
in the 17th century and had not a pejorative meaning. 'Hedonics ' meant quite
simply that part of ethics that treats of pleasure."
7 Freud prefaced his treatise
on the interpretation of dreams (Traumdeutung)
with the well-known word of Vergil, Aen. VII,
" Flectere si nequeo superos, acheronta movebo."

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of all kinds up to the level of man's sense of the beautiful, in
which there is obviously a reflection of the spirit (tryphe, chlide,
aselgeia, akrasia-and many others) . And lastly there were
Greek terms to express characteristic experiences of the human
psyche going from simple merriment and cheerfulness up to
the delights found only in the higher spheres of the spirit
(euthymia, euphrosyne, thymedia, right up to terpis and
chara).
The Latins, too, for their part, were vividly aware of immense variety of delectable experience in human life and, while
perhaps not with the same semantic ingenuity of the Hellenes,
they sought to bring this awareness out in their speech. Almost
all their expressions have passed, in one form or another, into
the romance languages and through them into English usage.
Like the Greeks, they also had one general term that could
refer to pleasure on every level, the term delectatio. Then they
had a large number of terms to express the different shades of
the delectation-phenomenon, beginning with the effervescence
of passionate (sensual or sexual) pleasure and desire (libido,
voluptas) and attaining to the heights of the profound and
suave pleasures of the human spirit (gaudium, fruitio, laetitia) .8
Semasiologically, then, it would be completely wrong to speak
of man's right to pleasure without first of all explaining the
precise meaning of the pleasure-phenomenon and at the same
time making quite clear the type and quality of pleasure referred to. 9 It would, then obviously be fatal and most mislead8 A somewhat similar variety of expression and meaning is to be found in all
European languages: joie, agrement, delice, delectation, jouissance, plaisir, volupte;
Freude, Wonne, Vergniigen, Gluck, Beseligung, Entziicken, Lust, Wollust; joy,
gladness, delight, bliss, cheer, enjoyment, transport, pleasure, sensuality, voluptuousness.-All these terms (and there are many others) refer to quite distinct physical,
psychological, and moral realities.
• The publishing firm, Herder of Vienna-Freiburg-Basel, brought out (1970)
a collection of essays devoted to the general theme of man's right to pleasure.
It carries the significant title: Recht auf Lust (ed. by Anton Grabner-Haider).
True, the German expression Lust does not at all mean the same thing as the
English " lust." But neither is it in any way the same thing as, for instance,
Freude, W onne, GlUck. The contributors to the volume are a varied group:
clerics, psychologists, lawyers, sexologists. The central theme of the book is in fact

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

261

ing to limit a discussion or theory or practice of hedone or
delectatio to the sphere of voluptuousness or even libidinous
activity. 10
The problem of pleasure has, it can be safely maintained,
occupied the minds of men since men began reflecting on the
structure and meaning of human existence. The pre-Socratic
philosophers devoted their attention to the question and have
left us in a fragmentary fashion the fruit of their ruminations.
Democritus of Abdera taught that
The chief necessity, if one is to achieve well-being, is to do nothing
to excess. To overstep due measure makes the most pleasant things
unpleasant, while moderation multiplies pleasures and magnifies
pleasure. The animals are wiser than Man in this regard as in
others: they know how much they need, and their self-control is
instinctive. Man's bodily needs are available to all without trouble;
things acquired with trouble are desired not by the body but by
the ill-regulated mind. Enjoyment derived from (excessive) eating,
drinking, and love-making is brief, and the painful consequences
are many; moreover the desire is no sooner satisfied than it recurs.
In attaining such pleasures, men sacrifice health, and then pray
to the gods to restore it, not knowing that the attainment of health
professedly sexual, even orgastic pleasure and man's right to it! The book is
neither enlightened nor enlightening It is, in the full sense of the term, a sad
book. A puerile effort in the aristotelian and thomistic sense of the word (see:
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 142, a. 2).
10 One thinks here of Sigmund Freud's rather one-sided emphasis and his somewhat limited approach to the question of pleasure. That was due to his discovery
of the eminent importance of the subconscious, of the subconscious acheronta of
man. And there he located the libido (in the narrow sexual sense of the term,
which is the impression given in all his writings) and its repression. His mission
in life was to set it free and thus permit the full man to breathe freely again,
uninhibited in his deep vital urges and unrepressed. The libido is, by all means,
eminently important in the life of all men, non-celibate and celibate. But it is
not of prime or supreme importance in human life, unless, indeed, one wishes
to extend its meaning to include the deepest urges of the whole man, body and
spirit, towards the fulness of its proper body-in-spirit being. And this is an aspect
of human reality that another eminent psychologist, Victor E. Frankl, accentuates
in many of his works. He has pointed out, as a corrective to the freudian approach,
that the repression of the spirit of man, that is, of religion or openness for the
eternal and the divine, may well be more fatal and destructive of human personality than the repression of the libido. The libido can be sublimated into the
spirit; the spirit can only be suffocated by the libido let loose.

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depends on themselves. Moderate enjoyment is necessary to
happiness: the life without festivity is a long road without an inn,
and expenditure at the right time has its virtue, as well as fasting
and thrift; but the secret of happiness lies in judging the right
time.U
The teaching on pleasure occupied no more than a small part
of the teaching of Democritus as handed down to us in the fragments. Somewhat later, two philosophers became known to
posterity principally, if not indeed exclusively, for their teaching on pleasure and its place in human life: Aristippus of
Cyrene (founder of the Cyrenaic School of philosophy) and
Eudoxus. Aristippus was a student of Socrates and a friend of
Plato. Eudoxus, somewhat younger, was a follower and friend
of Plato. Both these thinkers held that pleasure and the seeking
after it is the chief good in life, the Good katexochen. It was
in reaction to this teaching that Plato and Aristotle both go
into the problem so thoroughly. 12 Now, while not in agreement
on all points of their teaching on the nature of pleasure in itself
and in its relation to desire and love and other cognate affections of the soul, both however insist unambiguously that, in
spite of its importance in human life and motivation (a point
which they concede without hesitation) , pleasure can never
be considered the supreme or chief good in human life, and
11 This is a resume of the teaching of Democritus by Kathleen Freeman in
her Companion to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers (Oxford, 1966), pp. 816-817.
Democritus lived between 460 and 860 B.C. and was in his prime about
when Plato was a child and almost 40 years before Aristotle was born. In spite
of his atomic materialism in the matter of physics and metaphysics (the foundation
of his atheism), his ethical insights are of permanent value. He has much more
to say about the theme of pleasure than in the resume quoted. True human
wisdom speaks through his words. They must be kept in mind for a true understanding of the teaching of the later Greek thinkers, of the Academicians, of the
Peripatetics, and of the Cyrenaics.
12 For a good expose of the mind of Plato on the problem of pleasure see the
following: Jussi Tenkku, The Evaluation of Pleasure in Plato's Ethics (Helsinki,
1956); R. Hackforth, Plato's examination of Pleasure. A translation of the Philebus
with introduction and commentary (Cambridge, 1945). For Aristotle's teaching on
the problem see: M. Wittmann, Die Ethik des Aristoteles (Regensburg, 1920),
pp.
See also A.-J. Festugiere, O.P., Le Plaisir (Eth. Nic. VII, 11-14, X,
1-5), (Paris, 1986).

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

may never in consequnce be identified with the Human Good
itself.
In the dialogue on pleasure by way of setting up the problem
for discussion Plato formulates the two opposed positions in
this fashion:
Philebus says that to all living beings enjoyment and pleasure and
gaiety and whatever accords with that sort of thing are a good;
whereas our contention is that not these, but wisdom and thought
and memory and their kindred, right opinion and true reasonings,
are better and more excellent than pleasure for all who are capable
of taking part in them, and that for all those now existing or to
come who can partake of them they are the most advantageous of
all thingsY
In the course of the discussion Plato makes it clear that he
does not condemn pleasure off-hand. It is a human good but
only an adjunct to life and achievement, a concomitant of
fulfilment. And in that sense he is willing to concede that
wisdom and nous alone are the supreme good of man but a
mixture of many elements including ultimately pleasure and
satisfaction as ordered by truth and reason. Left to itself,
pleasure leads headlong to destruction, as he says,
for pleasure is the greatest of impostors, and the story goes that in
the pleasures of love, which are said to be the greatest, perjury
is even pardoned by the gods, as if the pleasures were like children,
utterly devoid of all sense.14
_And contrasting the two goods, namely, of the mind and of
pleasure, he asserts pointedly that
no one, either asleep or awake, ever saw or knew wisdom or mind
to be or to become unseemly at any time or in any way whatsoever,
now or in the future, but pleasures, and the greatest pleasur.es at
that, when we see any one enjoying them and observe the ridiculous
or utterly disgraceful dement which accompanies them, fill us with
18 Plato, Philebus, 11 B-C. The translation of H. N. Fowler in the Loeb Classical
Library edition is being used. One should perhaps take special note of the implicit
restriction that amounts almost to an important concession: " for all who are
capable of taking part in them " ! !
u Philebus, 65 C. See again St. Thomas, Summa; Theol., II-II, q.
a.

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a sense of shame; we put them out of sight and hide them, so far
as possible; we confine everything of that sort to the night time, as
unfit for the sight of the day" 15

Setting up a hierarchy of human goods he lists five in order
of dignity and value. Pleasure is by no means the first of possessions. The first is " measure, moderation, fitness, and all which
is to be considered similar to these; second comes proportion,
beauty, perfection, sufficiency, and all that belongs to that
class." And if one count " mind and wisdom as the third," he
will not wander far from the truth. In the fourth place he
puts those properties which belong especially to the soulsciences, arts, and true opinions. In the fifth and last place he
situates " those pleasures which we separated and classed as
painless, which we called pure pleasures of the soul itself, those
which accompany knowledge and sometimes perceptions." 16
In the finale Plato triumphantly proclaims the supremacy of
mind (nous) and reason over instinct and pleasure as being a
far better and more excellent thing for human life. This is by
no means a purely intellectualist approach to human existence;
most realistically it incorporates into the texture of true human
life the life of pleasure provided that it be informed and thus
humanized by the guiding light of reason that alone is capable
of leading man to the fullness of specifically human life. Without doing violence to either the text or thought of Plato it
may be maintained that it is completely in line with the teaching of Democritus.
Plato's immediate successor as head of the Academy,
Speusippus, no longer wished to concede-as Plato had-that
pleasure (hedone) is a good (agathon) of any sort. For him
it would then obviously be utterly unthinkable to regard
pleasure as the chief good, as the summum bonum of human
life. Eudoxus, however, as already indicated, had done precisely
Philebus, 65 E---66 A.
•• Philebus, 66 A-C. It should be noted carefully that Plato does not include
pleasure tout court in the structure of human existence and human blessedness
or perfection but only pure pleasures of the soul itself.
10

THE HEDONISM OF AQffiNAS

that. And it is in the context of attempting to steer a middle
course between these two opinions that Aristotle's teaching on
pleasure must be studied and understood. 17 On the question of
the structure of pleasure there is a notable difference between
the teaching of Aristotle and the position of Plato. For Aristotle, pleasure is not a process of tending towards something.
In other words, Aristotle always refused to confound pleasure
with desire, as Plato would seem to have done. But-and this
he insisted upon repeatedly-it is an intense and active resting
in an end achieved. For him, then, it is a movement, an intense
movement even, of the soul, a movement and activity rooted
in and caused by the full actualization of vital potentialities.
Notwithstanding this rather fundamental difference of opinion
on the structure of pleasure, there was complete agreement between Plato and Aristotle with regard to the place of pleasure in
the hierarchy of human goods and in the business of constructing
the specifically human good in its fulness. And in this context
Aristotle distinguished more carefully and more precisely the
various kinds of pleasure that may occur in human experience.
Plato, as was seen, also was aware of the importance of this
phenomenon. It was for Aristotle to supply the logical explanation. The quality of pleasure is immediately constituted and
conditioned by the quality of life and action on which it is
founded, by which it is caused.
Aristotle devoted his attention to an examination of pleasure
on three distinct occasions-twice in the Nichomachean Ethics
(VII, 11-14
and )(, 1-5 [1172a15-17 In the position of Speusippus, of whose work only fragments remain, see
M. T. Cicero, Diffp. Tusc. V, 10, 80.
As to Eudoxus it must be noted (as later also of Epicurus) that he was by no
means a profligate or an advocate of profligacy. Rather he was a true ascetic
striving for the proper balance between pleasure and pain, between order and
disorder in life, after the mind of Democritus. But he did in fact teach that
pleasure is the chief motivation of human action and its attainment the Supreme
Good in life. When Aristotle first stayed at the Academy he made the acquaintance
of Eudoxus and, whilst opposing his teaching, he esteemed the teacher highly,
remarking that " his arguments were credited more because of the excellence of
his character than for their own sake." See Eth. Nick. X, 2 (1172 b 15-18).

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1176a29) ] and then a third and last time in the Rhetoric (1,
11 [1869b88-1872a8]). In the Rhetoric Aristotle is not interested in a strict analysis of pleasure. His business there is
to expound the rules and techniques of oratory of all kinds, the
essential aim of which is to sway the hearers. He also knows
that pleasure in a very powerful motive in human activity and
is indeed the end sought after by perhaps the majority of mankind. In a word, he treats of pleasure in this context because
he is intent upon showing how most efficaciously to move an
audience by appealing to their feelings. The two treatises in
the Ethics complement one another felicitously and where even
a certain contradiction may here and there be detected that is
due to normal doctrinal development and greater scientific
maturity. 18 It is in the second treatise that he distinguishes so
carefully between pleasure and activity. Pleasure, the accompaniment of achievement, the companion of fully lived life and
a perfection of it both antecedently, through glowing attentive
anticipation, and subsequently, through the legitimate satisfaction in the accomplishment. 19 It is. in this sense that he says
all men seek to obtain pleasure, because all men desire life. Life
is a form of activity, and each man exercises his activity upon
those objects and with those faculties which he likes most. 20 Men
have good reason therefore to pursue pleasure, since it perfects
for each his life, which is a desirable thing. The question whether
we desire life for the sake of pleasure or pleasure for the sake of
life, need not be raised for the present. In any case they seem to
18 See W. D. Ross, Aristotle (London, 1956), pp.
In the first treatise
Aristotle reacts against the position of Speusippus and is at pains to show that
pleasure may well be enumerated amongst human goods. In the second, on the
contrary, he is at pains to refute the position of Eudoxus, and insists that pleasure
can never be the summum bonum, but does pertain to and accompany it.
10 Eth. Nich. X, 4-5. Thus he teaches that "the pleasure perfects the activity,
not as the fixed disposition does, by being already present in the agent, but as
a supervening perfection, like the bloom of health in the young and vigorous "
and further that " an activity is augmented by the pleasure that
belongs to it; since those who work with pleasure always work with more discernment and with greater accuracy."
The translation is that of H.
Rackham in the Loeb Classical Library edition.
so Ibid., 4, 1175a10-18.
.

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

be inseparably united; for there is no pleasure without activity,
and also no perfect activity without its pleasure. 21
Only indirectly and implicitly does Aristotle a little further
down give an answer to this question of precedence when he
points out that not pleasure as such is desirable hut only those
pleasures that follow on and accompany the good life as determined by the man of virtue and of practical wisdom. 22 For
Aristotle, then, there is no question whatever of equiparating
pleasure with the Good. It ever remains a subordinate and
an adjunct, even though the masses may think otherwise.
Right at the beginning of his Ethics he makes the astute
observation that " the generality of men and the most vulgar
identify the good with pleasure and accordingly are content
with the life of enjoyment." %a
One might well be tempted to say now: causa finita est/
One must, however, add with Augustine: utinam aliquando
finiatur error! (Sermon 181, 10, PL 88, 784). Plato was already about seven years in his grave and Aristotle was tutor
to the crown prince at the Macedonian court when Epicurus
was born on the island of Samos in January or February 841.
His interest in philosophy was awakened at a very early age
through reading the writings of Democritus and through the
influence o£ the democritan philosopher, N ausiphanes. At the
21 Ibid., 1175al6-21.
Aristotle, it will be noted, does not decide the question
of precedence-between life in its bloom and fulness and pleasure. He is content
with insisting on their inseparability. He did not return to the question again.
St. Thomas in his commentary on the Nichomachean Ethics adverted to Aristotle's
hesitation and completed the teaching of Aristotle decisively. See In X Eth., lect
6, no. 2037-2038.
•• Ibid., 5, 1176a4-29. In seeking this authentic human pleasure and fulfilment,
observes Aristotle, man is bringing to fruition a seed implanted in him by God.
(Eth. Nich. VII, 13, 1153b32) And at the end of the same book, with reference
to the divine character of pure act, he points out that " God enjoys a single simple
pleasure perpetually. For he i3 not only an activity of motion, but also an activity of immobility, and there is essentially a truer pleasure in rest than in
motion." (c. 9, 1154125-26)
•• Ibid., 1095b. This teaching of Aristotle must be borne in mind when attempting to evaluate the teaching of theologians on the morality of an action done for
pleasure's sake alone-propter solam delectationem.

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age of about 32 he begins teaching philosophy in Mytilene
and Lampsakos. Already at the age of 18 he had come for
the first time to Athens to absolve his obligatory military service. "\\1len he was free to devote himself to his philosophical
studies again and frequent the Academy it would seem that
Aristotle had just died and he became the pupil of Xenokrates.
In 306 he returned for good to Athens and founded his School
of Philosophy, the School of the "Garden Philosophers" (hoi
apo ton keton, as they were called) .24 Now, Epicurus, as
Aristippus and Eudoxus before him, and certainly in reaction
against the strict virtue and apatheia teaching of the Stoics,
insisted, with special nuances of his own, on the supreme importance of pleasure in human life and taught formally that
pleasure and pleasure-seeking is the chief good, the summum
bonum, in life This hedonic doctrine, wrongly understood, appealed to the popular mind and caught the imagination of the
masses. It spread like wildfire not only through Greece and
Italy but also, as we are told by Cicero, to the barbarian peoples
outside the Greco-Roman cultural field.25 Unfortunately, how•• On Epicurus and his teaching see: A. J. Festugiere, Epicure et ses Dieux
(Paris, 1946); E. Bignone, L'Aristotele perduta e la fvrmazicme filosofica di Epicuro,
2 vol. (Florence, 1986); H. De Witt, Epicurus and his Philosophy (Minneapolis,
1951); Benjamin Farrington, The Faith of Epicurus (London, 1967). In a letter
to a young man troubled by violent carnal desires Epicurus, while telling him to
satisfy them, at the same time assigns the precise conditions in which he may
do that and concludes with the warning: " Cependant il est impossible de ne
pas etre arrete par l'une au moins de ces barrieres: les plaisirs de l'amour n'ont
jamais profite a personne, c'est beaucoup quand ils ne nuisent pas" A.-J. Festugiere,
op. cit., pp. 40-41).
25 See M. T. Cicero, De finibus bonMUm et malorum, II, 15. It will be useful
to note the whole pertinent text of Cicero on account of its teaching on the nature
of morality and because of its insistence on the notion of hcmestum, which is
independent of the views of the masses. " Philosophus nobilis, a quo non solum
Graecia et Italia sed etiam omnis barbaria commota est, honestum quid sit, si id
non sit in voluptate, negat se intellegere, nisi illud quod multitudiuis rumore
laudetur. Ego autem hoc etiam turpe esse saepe iudico et, si quando turpe non
sit, tum esse non turpe cum id a multitudine laudctur quod sit ipsum per se
rectum atque laudabile; tamen non ob earn causam illud dici esse honestum quia
laudetur a multis, sed quia tale sit ut, vel si ignorarent id homines vel si
obmutissent, sua tamen pulchritudine esset speieque laudabile." It is interesting
to note here the reverence of Cicero for the person of Epicurus and his rejection

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269

ever, the pure doctrine of the noble Epicurus was, in the process
of dissemination and vulgarization, travestied into Epicureanism, which was then taken to imply the pursuit of pleasure
in every shape and form as the prime source of human happiness and well-being. Nothing could have been further from the
mind of Epicurus. For him the problem of well-being, of pain
and suffering, was a vital one, one of personal and existential
urgency. He was throughout his life sickly, and he endured
excruciating suffering during his last years. For him it was
a vital question of the delicate balance between pleasure (above
all spiritual pleasure or joy of the mind) and pain or suffering.
He realized that the attainment of that balance, that atarxy
(as distinct from the apathy of the Stoics), that imperturbable
peace of soul, could be guaranteed only by constant self-control
and the wise sizing-up and evaluation of all incidental pleasures. The result is a joy and delight of the spirit that can
be attained and retained in the midst of most intense suffering
and has nothing in common with the fleeting pleasures of the
senses. His teaching was truly sublime, an ascetic program and
not at all, as has been said of Epicureanism, an ethic whose
motive is "prudent selfishness and enlightened self-interest." 26 This is borne out most impressively by a letter Epicurus
wrote the day he died to his friend Idomeneus. Feeling his
vital powers rapidly ebbing away and in the certain knowledge
that death was imminent he summoned up sufficient strength
to pen these words of farewell:
It is on a day of deep joy for me that I write these words to you,
the day I am to die. My illness and suffering continue relentlessly
of Epicureanism. Cicero had the same contempt for the opinion and custom of
the masses in moral matters as later Kierkegaard. Many of the notions touched
on here (honestum, turpe, pulchritudo) are found later in the moral theological
synthesis of Aquinas. That of the base and the vile and the ugly in human life is
found also in the New Testament (see Eph. 5: 4, 1ft = aischron). When one
recalls the modern vilification of sex a word of Aquinas, that re-echos that of Cicero
above, comes to mind: " Consuetudo peccandi diminuit turpitudinem et infamiam
peccati secundum opinionem hominum: non autem secundum naturam ipsorum
vitiorum" (Summa Theol., II-IT, 142, a. 4 ad 2).
•• William Barclay in A Dictionary of Christian Ethics (ed. John Macquarrie),
p. 108.

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without the slightest assuagement of their intensity. However, I
seek relief from all these sufferings of mine in the joy that fills my
soul when I recall the talks and discussions we used to have, 27

Epicurus was a great scholar and a profound thinker. His
life bears all the signs of nobility, authentic virtue and, one
is even tempted to say, of real sanctity. But his teaching on
the summum bonum, on the chief good and true blessedness or
happiness of man was ill-advised, and in this sense eminently
dangerous in that it left itself so open to being fatally misunderstood not so much by scholars, theologians or philosophers, but
by the unthinking masses, Cicero saw this danger clearly, and
in spite of his obvious reverence for the person of Epicurus he
pilloried scathingly the ravages wrought by popular Epicureanism. This danger was detected and pointed up by thinkers
down the ages, by both Christian and non-Christian men of wisdom. At the beginning of the fifth century the Roman philosopher and statesman, Anicius Manlius Torquatus Severinus
Boethius 28 emphasized the fallacy and danger of the popular
27 See R.-A. Gauthier, Magnanimite
(Paris, 1951), p. 120, note 2. These words
of the dying Epicurus recall the teaching of Aquinas on the remedies for sadness,
depression, and suffering (Summa Theol., I-II, q. 38). St. Thomas would certainly
have gone a long way in seeking a solution to the problem of suffering and death
in the recollection of past joy experienced and in the expectation of joy promised
for the future. See Luke 24:26. The promise and hope of a glorious and joyous
resurrection is the Christian answer to the Cross. These divergent opinions could
perhaps all be reconciled were one to apply the ingenious distinction of Aquinas
concerning the morality of acting for sake of pleasure alone: formalitll1', yes;
finaliter, no: to put the reply most briefly (see ibid., q. 70, a. 1 ad 2 et passim)
The judgment of St. Thomas on the teaching of the Stoics is interesting and important. With reference to the difference between the Stoic and Peripatetic teaching on the moral value of the emotions or passions he writes: " Quae quidem
differentia, licet magna videatur secundum vocem, tamen secundum rem vel nulla
est, vel parva, si quis utrorumque intentiones consideret" (ibid., q. 24, a. 2 et
passim) . He would surely have said the same of the authentic teaching of the
noble Epicurus
28 Boethius was born in Rome about 480 A.D.
He was brutally put to death
on a worked-up charge of high-treason against his master, Theodoric the Great,
and against the Western Empire. He died in the state prison of Pavia in the
year 524. It used to be questioned whether he was a Christian. However the
recognition of the authenticity of the short theological treatises-among them
De Sancta Trinitate.-ascribed to him, settled the matter.

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pleasure-principle pointing out, among other things, that, were
it true, there would be no reason why the beasts of the field
should not also be able to attain to blessedness.fll The self-same
truth was intuited with poetic vision by that great judge of
human nature and character, William Shakespeare, when he
warned against the danger of confounding love with lust:
Call it not love, for Love to heaven is fled,
Since sweating Lust on earth usurpt his name;
Under whose simple semblance he hath fed
Upon fresh beauty, blotting it with blaime;
Which the hot tyrant stains and soon bereaves,
As caterpillars do the tender leaves.
Love comforteth like sunshine after rain,
But Lust's effect is tempest after sun;
Love's gentle spring doth always fresh remain,
Lust's winter comes ere summer half be done;
Love surfeits not, Lust like a glutton dies;
Love is all truth, Lust full of forged lies.30
•• This word of Boethius is quoted by St. Thomas in his tract on Beatitude
(Summa Theol. I-II, q. 2, a. 6 arg. sed contra) and is taken from the treatise
of Boethius, De Consolatione Philosophiae, composed by him while awaiting
condemnation and execution in prison. Bearing this in mind the full text of
Boethius takes on a new urgency and interest. It is worth quoting in full, having
immediate bearing on the topic of the present essay: " Quid autem de corporis
voluptatibus loquar, quarum appetentia quidem plena est anxietatis, satietas vero
poenitentiae? Quantos illae morbos, quam intolerabiles dolores quasi quendam
fructum nequitiae fruentium solent referre corporibus! Quarum motus quid habeat
iucunditatis, ignoro. Tristes vero esse voluptatum exitus, quisquis reminisci
libidinum suarum volet, intelleget. Quae si beatos explicare possunt, nihil causae
est quin pecudes quoque beatae esse dicantur quarum omnis ad explendam
corporalem lacunam festinat intentio. Honestissima quidem coniugis foret liberorumque iucunditas, sed nimis e natura dictum est nescio quem filios invenisse tortorem;
quorum quam sit mordax quaecumque condicio, neque alias expertum te neque nunc
anxium necesse est admonere. In quo Euripidis mei sententiam probo, qui carentem
liberis infortunio dixit esse felicem."
The relevance of this text to the modern problem of birth-control need scarcely
by pointed out And then there is contained the conviction that blessedness is
the prerogative of spirit, which may be defined as radical openness for the eternal
and the divine.
80 Shakespeare, Venus and Adonis.
Perhaps more brutally still the Bard of
Stratford puts into the mouth of Emilia in Othello the following bitter assessment
of the male's use of woman:
'Tis not a year or two shows us a man:

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In more recent times thinkers,-philosophers,
theologians
and psychologists-all keenly aware of the body-spirit unity
and polarity in man, have insistently pointed to the same truth.
This has been done perhaps more penetratingly and profoundly
than all others by Kierkegaard in two memorable passages. In
The Concept of Dread we find the following passage:
We will leave speculators out of account and simply assume the
presence of sexual differentiation before the Fall, with the observation however that it did not strictly exist, because it does not exist
in ignorance. In this respect we have support in the Scripture. In
his innocence man was, insofar as he was spirit, a dreaming spirit.
The synthesis therefore is not actual; for the combining factor is
precisely spirit, and this is not yet posited as spirit. In the animal
sexual diversity can be developed instinctively; but in this way
man cannot have it, pEecisely because he is a synthesis. The instant spirit posits itself it posits synthesis, but to posit the synthesis
it must first permeate it differentially, and the extremest expression of the sensuous is precisely the sexual. This extreme man can
attain only at the instant when the spirit becomes actual. Before
that time he is not an animal, but neither is he properly a man.
The instant he becomes a man he becomes such only by being at
the same time an animal. Sinfulness then is not sensuousness, not
by any means; but without it there is no sexuality, and without
sexuality no history. A perfect spirit has neither the one nor the
other, hence also the sexual difference is annulled in the resurrection, and hence too no angel has history. . . . The synthesis is
first posited in the sexual as a contradiction, but at the same time,
like every contradiction, as a task, the history of which begins that
very instant. This is the actuality which is preceded by the possibility of freedom. But the possibility of freedom does not consist
in being able to choose the good or the evil. Such thoughtlessness
has as little support in the Scripture as in philosophy. Possibility
means I can. In a logical system it is convenient enough to say
that possibility passes over into actuality. In reality it is not so
They are all but stomachs, and we are all but food:
They eat us hungerly, and when they are full,
They belch us.
Othello m, iv.
One is reminded of the modem German expression: ein Miidchen vemaschen!
Quite different is Schiller's Ode to Joy put to such immortal music in Beethoven's
Ninth.

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easy, and an intermediate determinant is necessary. This intermediate determinant is dread, which no more explains the qualitative leap than it justifies it ethically. Dread is not a determinant
of necessity, but neither is it of freedom; it is a trammeled freedom,
where freedom is not free in itself but trammeled, not by necessity
but in itself. If sin has come into the world by necessity (which is
a self-contradiction), then there is no dread. If sin has come into
the world by an act of abstract liberum arbitrium (which no
more existed at the beginning than it does at a later period of
the world, for it is a non-sense to thought), neither in this case is
there dread. To want to explain logically the entrance of sin into
the world is a stupidity which could only occur to people who are
comically anxious to get an explanation. 31

When one comes to realize that spirit is in fact the openness or
ouverture of the created for the uncreated and the divine only
then does one fully realize the full import of this teaching of
Kierkegaard on the polarity of matter and mind, of body and
spirit, as the original cause of the entry of sin into the world
and ultimately the root cause of its abiding presence. 32 • Matter
together with body and sensuality that is not shot through
with (or, as the Schoolmen would have said, not informed by)
spirit is radically closed to the eternal and divine, radically
excluded from immortality which is nothing more than the conscious sharing of the spirit of man in the eternity of God.
In the kierkegaardian synthesis the concepts of dread and
despair are inseparably connected, and both are used most
81 89lren Aaby Kierkegaard, The Concept of Dread, translated with introduction
and notes by Walter Lowrie (Princeton, 1957), pp 4.4-45.
32 This insight of Kierkegaard is very akin to that of Aquinas, put just as forcibly
and impressively, namely, that man is situated on the horizon between time and
eternity (II Cont. Gent., c. 81, no. 16!'l5'f; c. 68, no. 1453) or as the horizon
or " confinium " of spiritual and bodily reality (III Sent. prol.; Summa Theol., I,
q. 77, a. !'l in fine corp.; II Cont. Gent., c., 68, no. 1453 b); and that man is, as
a consequence, constituted " in summo rerum vertice" : II Cont. Gent., c. 46, no.
1!'l!'l9).
Kierkegaard returns frequently to the same theme, as in his Discourse on 1 Pet.
IV: 7-1!'l (Love covereth a multitude of sins), where he condenms "der schandliche
und entsetzliche Betrug der Lust," the shameful and terrifying deception of lust
and passion (The German translation of Theodor Haecker is being used: ReligiOae
Reden [Munich, 1950], pp. 30-81).

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poignantly to describe the origin and the state of sin, and
ultimately the true meaning, the terrifying meaning, of the
state of the damned. Sin can be found only in the realm of the
spirit. It is found precisely there where the created spirit, in
spite of being by definition an openness to or for the eternal
and the divine, shuts itself off from conscious contact with
the divine, a contact made in humble reverence, in faith or in
vision. And therein consists the act and the state of despair.
Aquinas had the selfsame insight when he repeatedly pointed
out that, in all this visible world of ours, only man, only the
rational creature, only the spirit ultimately, is capax Dei. 83
Where this capacity for God is not actualized in faith and
obedience that both call for their culmination in vision, there
is sin and damnation. In this sense Kierkegaard speaks of the
despairing Unconsciousness of having a Self and an eternal
Self 34 and goes on to point out the self-destructive character
of the seeking after sensual pleasure and its utter folly. In
the case of the majority of men, he observes,
their sensuous nature is generally predominant over their intellectuality. So when a man is supposed to be happy, he imagines he is happy (whereas viewed in the light of the truth
he is unhappy), and in this case he is generally very far from
wishing to be torn away from that delusion. On the contrary, he
becomes furious, he regards the man who does this as his most
spiteful enemy, he considers it an insult, something near to murder,
in the sense that one speaks of killing joy. What is the reason for
this? The reason is that the sensuous nature and the psychosensuous completely dominate him; the reason is that he lives in
•• See de Verit., q.
a.
ad 5 et passim. A good study of this teaching of
Aquinas is that of M. Mattijs O.P.: "Quomodo anima humana sit 'naturaliter
capax gratiae' secundum doctrinam S. Thomae." Angelimum 14 (1937), 175-193.
Also Gilles Langevin S.J. "Capax Dei". La creature intellectuelle et l'intimite
de Dieu (Bruges-Paris, 1966).
•• It is incomprehensible how some modern writers can deny categorically the
distinction between mind and matter, between sensual and spiritual love--of God
or of one's fellows. See the gratuituous assertions of Julius Miko in the work
mentioned above in note 9 (Recht auf Lust), p. 184. This would be finally to
reduce man to the state of the spiritless beast-and that is not said disparagingly
of the beast, rather deprecatingly of man. See Summa Theol., IT-IT, q. ISO, a. I.

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the sensuous categories agreeable/ disagreeable, and says goodbye
to truth etc.; the reason is that he is too sensuous to have the
courage to be spirit or to endure it. However vain and conceited
men may be, they have nevertheless for the most part a very
lowly conception of themselves, that is to say, they have no conception of being spirit, the absolute of all that a man can be-but
vain and conceited they are ... by way of comparison. In case
to think of a house, consisting of cellar, ground-floor and
one
premier etage, so tenanted, or rather so arranged, that it was
planned for a distinction of rank between the dwellers on the several
floors; and in case one w,ere to make a comparison between such a
house and what it is to be a man-unfortunately this is the sorry
and ludicrous condition of the majority of men, that in their own
house they prefer to live in the cellar. The soulish-bodily synthesis
in every man is planned with a view to being spirit, such is the
building; but the man prefers to dwell in the cellar, that is, in the
determinants of sensuousness. And not only does he prefer to dwell
in the cellar; no, he loves that to such a degree that he becomes
furious if anyone would propose to him to occupy the bel etage
which stands empty at his disposition-for in fact he is dwelling in
his own house. 35
The disastrous consequences of a neglect of, of an ignoring ofnot to speak of a denial of-the matter-mind polarity in the
business of daily living could scarcely be more trenchantly
bared.
Since the time of Kierkegaard thinkers of every stamp have
devoted much attention to the problem of pleasure in life. In
a memorable dicourse on the occasion of the celebrations for
the 80th birthday of Sigmund Salomon Freud in Vienna
35 S. A. Kierkegaard,
The Sickness unto Death (A Doubleday Anchor Book,
bound together with Fear and Trembling) [New York, 1954], p. 176.
No one could maintain that Kierkegaard was in any real way influenced by
Augustine or Aquinas. His acquaintance with the Fathers and the Medievals was
through a very second-rate protestant historian: Georg Friedrich Bohringer in
his Die Kirche Christi und ihre Zeugen oder die Ki1·chengeschichte in Biographien
(Zurich, 1842-1848). It is all the more amazing, then, to find that Aquinas
insisted repeatedly on precisely this aspect of human experience: plures sequuntur
inclinationes naturae sensitivae quam ordinem rationis (Summa Theol., I-II, q.
71, a. 2 ad 8). Some twenty times Aquinas repeats the same convictions. See
Hilarion Pitman, 0. Carm., The Behaviour of the Multitude (unpublished diss.
Angelicum, Rome 1959).

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Thomas Mann touched on the problem and in the context
of freudian terminology he showed the mind-matter polarity to
be nothing more than the l-It tension and relationship. Most
impressively .he showed that, in the mind of the master (Freud),
it is the business of the I to penetrate and inform the It and,
in direct reference to the problem of this essay, he shows that
the pleasure-principle of the It must be corrected by the realityprinciple of the V 6 Paul Tillich, a very original thinker, but
also much influenced by the thought of Kierkegaard, maintains,
in line with the whole of authentic Christian ethical thinking,
that libido or desire that is centered on the pleasure derived
from and attaching to the object encountered or to the function
performed is existentially distorted. 81 Dietrich Bonhoeffer,
another profound original thinker, influenced too by the
kierkegaardian synthesis, a man of enlightened and committed
Christian faith, speaks in the same sense about the" disordered
desire for pleasure," 88 and then he goes on to insist with deep
insight into the hard reality of the Christian way of life that
"every act of self-control of the Christian is also a service of
the fellowship." 89 The renowned Viennese psychologist and
"" Thomas Mann, Freud und die Zukunft. This is a discourse given by Mann in
Vienna on the occasion of Freud's 80th birthday. It is printed as epilogue to
Freud's Abriss der Psychoanalyse (Fischer Pocket-book edition, Frankfurt-am-Main,
1972), p. 139. In order to understand Freud's teaching correctly and be fair
to his vital pre-occupation one must remember that for the last 16 years of his
life he suffered excruciating pain. He suffered from palatal cancer and between
1923 and his death in 1939 in London he underwent 33 operations. He was an
exemplary husband and father. It has been pointed out that Freud, while
devoting so much space and time to an analysis of the pleasure-phenomenon,
devotes none whatever to an examination of a much more important phenomenon,
of the joy-[Freude] phenonmenon.
87 Paul Tillich, Morality and Beyond (London, 1964), p. 60. In the same sense
he speaks of pleasure in his: The Courage to Be (London-Glasgow: The Fontana
Library, 1967), p. 23. In complete agreement with Aquinas he thereby formally
rejects the pleasure-principle and points up its intrinsic fallacy.
•• Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together (London, 1963), p. 22.
•• Ibid., p. 79. See his Letters and Papers from Prison under the date 28th
of July, 1944. There he points out that in the question of chastity (vowed and
lived) the essential thing is not a renouncing of pleasure but rather a new radical
orientation of one's life towards an end, towards completion in human being.

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psychiatre, Victor Frankl, has touched on the problem of pleasure in many of his works. As a corrective to freudian teaching
and emphasis he insists most realistically on the mind-matter
polarity of human existence and points out that there is in
man not only a subconscious libido but also a subconscious
spirituality or religiosity. And he insists that the effects of
the repression of this second essential dimension of human
existence can be and normally are much more disastrous than
the repression of the libido. In that sense, too, he makes a plea
for the cultivation not only of a so-called depth-psychology
but also and indeed more urgently of a height-psychology! It
was for that precise reason that he worked out, in contradiction to and in completion of the art and science of psychotherapy his own logotherapy. 40 In his work on medical and
priestly care for souls (cura animarum! in the true and full
sense of the term) he examines explicitly the famous pleasureprinciple. He rejects it categorically, above all its false freudian
interpretation and application in psychology. 41 The pleasureprinciple is, he asserts, a psychological artefact, an ill-founded
invention of psychologists. Pleasure, he continues, can never
constitute the end of all our strivings; it can only be the accompaniment and consequence of their fulfilment. 42
This immense tradition of human thought-from Aristippus
to Frankl-on an eminently important dimension of human
existence, on the place and meaning of pleasure in life, has
Where such an orientation is lacking, he says, chastity becomes ludicrous.
Kierkegaard had already called virginity the religion of the spirit in his Journal
for 1854 (XI' A 150).
•• Frankl works out these idea principally in his classical work: Der unbewmate
Gott (Vienna, 1949), and again in his very valuable: Der Mensch auf der Buche
nach Sinn (Freiburg-Basel-Vienna,
"In the context of the present study there is no need to distinguish between
psychological and moral hedonism. In the reality of human life they amount to
the same thing.
•• Victor Frankl, Aerztliche Seelsorge (Vienna, 1966), pp. 48-55; and in his:
Der Mensch auf der Buche nach Sinn, passim. This same point has been made
most forcibly by the Director of the Max-Planck-Institute
for BehaviorPsychology, Seewiesen-Munich, Prof. Dr. Konrad Lorenz, in his recent Die acht
Todsiinden der ziviliaierten Mensckkeit (Munich, 1973), pp. 89-50.

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perhaps never been so pithily, so profoundly, and so beautifully epitomized as by Henri Bergson. Pointing out that philosophers in all ages have reflected on the meaning of life and on
the destiny of man he observes that, frequently enough, they
did not take the trouble to advert to the simple and obvious
fact that nature itself has supplied the answer to man's questionings. Nature itself, he says, gives us an infallible sign when
our destiny has been reached, when life has realized its exostential hopes. 43 And that sign is joy, the joy of life, the joy of
achievement and fulfillment, which is an intense activity of the
whole human being (through his affective powers, by all means,
which are the source of his capacity for delighting in the accomplishment of good) welling up from the depths of a spirit-inmatter signalling the gaining of victory, thevictoryofmind over
matter. Bergson goes on to insist that he does not mean pleasure; for pleasure, he remarks pertinently, is no more than an
artifice of nature to ensure that the living care for their life and
preserve it. It does not betoken the intrinsic orientation of
human life, of the spirit in matter. Joy, on the contrary, is the
glowing reflection of achievement. Joy, it might be said, is the
antic proclamation (manifesting itself, needless to add, in the
affective human psyche) that human being itself-even in the
presence of death-has achieved on tic success, has gained ground
in the process of being-or becoming-complete, that it has in
fact gained victory over the powers of darkness and death. 44
•• Bergson, be it noted, speaks of the destination as reached here and now: Elle
nous avertit par un signe precis que notre destination est atteinte." Obviously it
is here a question of attaining the authentic human good, of what Aquinas might
call the beatitudo imperfecta huius vitae, of the bonum et splendOT rationi8 in the
fashioning of daily life and suffering. And through it, as Frankl so apposite puts
it, man can turn suffering into an achievement (Der Mensch auf der Suchenach
Sinn, p. 121).
u It was in this sense that Prof. Kurt Huber wrote a letter to his wife and
children a few hours before his execution in Munich, July 13, 1954: "Do not weep
for me. I have a sense of deep happiness and security. The alpine roses, your last
loving greeting to me from my beloved mountains, are there withered on the table.
In two hours time I climb the true mountain of freedom, for which I fought
all my life" (See Du hast mich heimgesucht bei Nacht, ed. Helmut Gollwitzer,
Kathe Kuhn, Reinhold Schneider [Munich-Hamburg, 1969], p. 112).

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Wherever there is joy, says Bergson with the intuition of a
poet-philosopher, there is creation and the fuller and richer
the creation and achievement of the spirit, the deeper is the
joy.4G
By way of capitulation of this survey of the place pleasure
occupied in human thought down the ages it should be carefully
noted that no thinker-either philosopher or theologian-ever
propounded the theory that unbridled pleasure and pleasure
seeking (either psychologically or morally) is the supreme motive in human life or man's summum bonum. Lead astray perhaps by a disastrous misunderstanding of the teaching of philosophers, the masses may well have thought in that fashion and
lived accordingly. But the elite, the thinkers, the wise men,
keenly aware of the true meaning of human life, thought and
taught otherwise. Ever for Aristippus and Eudoxus, even for
Epicurus, it was ordered pleasure which in their eyes constituted the chief good of man, and that as a counter-balance to
suffering and pain. They too fully realized the priority and
superiority of the pleasures of the spirit, of internal joy, of the
joy of achievement. It was reserved for writers of today to
propound explicitly and formally as a theory the superiority
of the pleasures of the flesh in the business of human living 46
and to proclaim that those who either voluntarily (vowed
celibacy) or involuntarily renounce them remain ever immature, unbalanced, and distorted human beings. 47 They even
•• See Henri Bergson, L'e:nergie spirituelle (Paris, 1967), p. fl8. The ideas
expressed here by Bergson appeared originally in English as the Huxley Lecture
given at the University of Birmingham, England, May 29, 1911, In putting the
lecture into French the author developed them somewhat and they appeared in
the quoted volume 1919. The 182nd edition of the PUF is the one used.
•• See Friedrich Heer (professor for the History of Culture at the University
of Vienna) in the work: Recht auf Lust, p. 20 (see note 9 above). According
to this cultural professor sexual pleasure or quite simply, in colloquial English,
lust, is the supreme pleasure, the human pleasure: "die grosse Lust, die Urkraft
aller Weltfreude und Weltverantwortung und Weltbejahung."
47 F. Heer, ibid. p. 80. His definition of sanctity or, better, description of those
officially recognized by the Church as saints, is a classic of utter cultural blindness:
"Der kirchlich approbierte Voll-Christ est ein Verkriimmter, ein seiner Freiheit
Beraubter, ein entmannter Mensch." Rendered into English that might sound

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go so far as to reject out of hand the real distinction between
sensual and spiritual love, that is, ultimately, they are willing
to reject and scoff at the distinction between the spirit and the
flesh, between mind and matter. 48 As a consequence of this
approach to things they vociferously set themselves up as the
defenders of man's right to pleasure. And by that they mean
quite unambiguously orgastic pleasure or quite simply, in the
English sense of the term, lust. 49 They seem to forget completely that all man's rights are rooted in duty. And the fundamental duty of man is to achieve fulness of human being,
fulness, that is, of being-mind-in-matter, a process that reaches
its apogee in the vision of God. Therein can be perceived the
gyves of authentic freedom and spirit. The reward for achievement (and it is not sexual prowess that is meant) is pleasure
(hedone, delectatio) , joy that inundates the spirit in the
realization of accomplishment. Man's fundamental right, then,
is the right to fulness in being and life; then and only then
may one legitimately speak of man's right to pleasure, which
is so intimately and inseparably linked to achievement (and
fulfilment) that both together constitute no more than one
complete object of man's vital strivings. Where pleasure and
pleasure-seeking are divorced from the striving towards fulfilment there is distortion and disorder, and finally deepest unhappiness.50 Again the gyves of human freedom! What should
be inseparably bound together man can, unfortunately and
tragically, tear asunder.

* * *
like this: the (celibate) canonized saint is a distorted human-being, robbed of its
freedom, an emasculated man.
•• Julius Miko, Recht auf Lust, p. 184: " Wir sehen, dass allen Ausfiihrungen
iiber die Lust eine akute Schwache zu eigen ist, jene verhangnisvolle Scheidung
zwischen sinnlicher und geistiger Liebe. . . ."
•• As indicated already above, that is the central thesis of that tristful tome:
Recht auf Lust.
•• This has been brought out admirably by Franciscus Sylvester of Ferrara, who
insists as well that pleasure in this truly humanistic sense is intense activity of the
mind, in his commentary on the Summa contra Gentiles of Aquinas (in I Cont.
Gent., c. 90; in Ill Cont. Gent., c.
See St. Thomas IV Sent., dist. 49, q. 8,
a. 4, qla 8.

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There is to-day a veritable chorus of protest against and
criticism of the Church's official teaching on the place of pleasure in human life and a kind of concerted rejection of the
traditional teaching of the Church's theologians in the matter. 51
In the forefront and on a very vital point of doctrine would
seem to be Noonan's bulky volume on contraception. 52 In his
study Noonan devoted much space and thought to the question of pleasure. According to his way of seeing things it is
a misunderstanding of its true natu,re and an incapacity to
perceive its immense human value that has caused the Church's
negative stand on the still more urgent problem of contraception or birth control. He sees in this attitude a kind of puritanical and stoic influence that, he would have us believe, has little
to do with the spirit of Christianity and is alien to true humanity. In a special way Augustine and Aquinas come in for
criticism. The influence of the Penitentials-very many compiled under stark Celtic influence-is severely condemned. It
is also somewhat insinuated that a celibate Church and a
celibate clergy could not possibly have a sound judgment of
what they never experience (d) .53 They have as a result, he
would like us to think, an inborn suspicion of pleasure of all
kinds and all that savours of it, and from that, he insists, stems
their concerted rejection of contraception. Against this presentation of the double problem of pleasure and contraception
it must be said that the matter is not at all as simple as Noonan
would have us think. He displays in his study an impressive
erudition but manifests at the same time a sorry lack of
61 See Dennis Doherty, The Sexual Doctrine of Cardinal Cajetan (Regensburg,
1966) (plus present author's review of the work in Theologischl!lRevue 64 [1966],
846-349); S. H. Pfiirtner, Kirche und Sexualitiit (Hamburg, 197!'l); Joachim Kahl,
Das Elend des Christentums (Hamburg, 1968)-and a host of other booklets,
pamphlets and articles.
•• John T. Noonan, Contraception. A History of Its Treatment by the Catholic
Theologian and Canonists; this work was first published in 1965 by the Harvard
University Press. The paper-back edition (Mentor-Omega Books, 1967), is being
used here. It must be borne in mind when perusing this time that the author is
neither an historian nor a moral theologian.
58 Loc. cit., p. 579.

CORNELIUS

WILLIAMS

(moral-) theological (and philosophical) understanding. One
is even compelled to maintain that he has missed the point
altogether, despite the remarkable number of authors and legal
sources consulted and quoted. Leaving his treatment of Augustine's teaching out of account, 54 the last section of this essay
will be devoted to a brief examination of the authentic thought
of Aquinas.
Noonan maintains that Aquinas, under the influence of Aristotle, clearly saw the positive value of pleasure and in many
places insisted on its intrinsic goodness. And for all that a
strange inconsistency, it is said, insinuated itself into his mature
teaching: for it would seem that St. Thomas taught at the
end of his life that sexual pleasure in marriage is evil.55 This
was due, the author tells us, to the fact that Aquinas incorporated into his teaching the viewpoint of Augustine. In order
to bring out more impressively this alleged inconsistency and
to emphasize more strongly his own new insight that pleasure
may well be a purpose or motive in human activity and above
all in marital sexual life the author puts and repeats the question: " If pleasure was good, if sexual pleasure in particular
was good, why was it not lawful to seek such pleasure" ?56 This
is utterly misleading and gives the reader a completely false
impression of Aquinas's mind on the value of sexual pleasure.
However, it is not the scope of this essay to examine that
matter in particular but rather the mind of Aquinas on the
positive value of pleasure in general. Nonetheless, in the interest of bringing out the true teaching of Aquinas, a few brief
remarks must be made. The implication is that St. Thomas
•• See John J. Hugo's fine study: St. Augustine on Nature, Sex and Marriage
(Chicago-London-Dublin, 1969)
55 Noonan, Zoe. cit., p. 354.
No reference is given. The footnote brings in an
unsubstantiated comment of Joseph Fuchs, S.J. It might be noted here in passing
that to assert that for Aristotle " was not itself an act, and consequently was not
the immediate object of moral judgment" (p. 353) shows a very strange misunderstanding of Aristotle's teaching on the one hand, and on the other, of the
true structure of pleasure. As a necessary result the interpretation of the mind
of Aquinas also misses the essential point. (pp. 353-356)
56 Loc. cit., p. 354. Again p. 355.

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

!283

taught that married people may never seek the pleasure attaching to sexual intercourse, that they may never desire bodily
union because it pleases them, because they delight in it.
Now, it must be clearly stated that such a teaching is to be
found nowhere in his writings, neither in the early nor in the
later and more mature works. He never said that pleasure may
not be sought in the coital activity of the married. On the
contrary, he constantly insisted on the important place and
value of pleasure, of sexual pleasure, in married life, and, anticipating the moderns, even pointed to the close connection
between the seeking of that pleasure and indulgence in it and
the expression and fostering of married love. Sexual pleasure
of the married is for him something holy 57 and meritorious of
eternal life 58 and is increased in intensity by the love of those
who seek it and indulge in it. 39 St. Thomas, then, affirmed
over and over again the positive human and moral value of
pleasure in the life of both the married and the unmarried. But
he also insisted just as strongly that the pleasure and the seeking for it must be in order, ordered by right reason according
to the needs of life and of one's station in life.60 In other words,
in line with the whole tradition of human thought from Aristippus to Frankl, he ever adamantly rejected the pleasureprinciple; he always refused to admit that the summum bonum
is pleasure-whether spiritual or sensual-or the seeking after
it. And in that precise sense he also consistently taught that
it can never be in order for the married to indulge in coital
activity for the sake of pleasure alone-propter solam delectationem,61 realizing certainly the intrinsic disorder of such a
07 Suppl., q. 49, a. 4.
•• IV Sent., d. 26, q. 1, a. 4.
•• III Cont. Gent., c. 125, no. 2981. See the very good recent study of Ferruccio
Galeotti, "Amore ed amicizia coniugali secondo S. Tommaso d'Aquino," in Doctor
Communis 25 (1972), 89-59; 129-168.
60 See Summa Theol., II-II, q. 141, a. 6 ad 2.
61 See IV Sent., d. 81, q. 2, or Suppl. q. 49, a. 6 with parallel places listed there.
St. Thomas examined the question of the sola delectatio on many occasions and
quite objectively, in the context of his general hedonics. His teaching will be
indicated briefly below.

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manner of acting and conscious perhaps as well of the imminent
danger of addiction, which can exclude all human value. 62 He
also always kept in mind the important distinction between
the finis operis and the finis operantis, and he always refused
to admit that it is in order for the operans to rob the opus of
its intrinsic finality in order to achieve his own subjective
end. 68 As to the use of contraceptive methods, the exercise of
coital activity together with the hindering of conception, he
saw with absolute lucidity that in such a case there is no question of true marital or conjugal intercourse, of true coitus, but
rather a question of mutually desired and mutually caused
self-abuse, which would then have to be judged accordingly. 64
That was absolutely clear to Aquinas.

* * *
In the course of the present investigation occasion has been
had to indicate in passing the mind of Aquinas on the problem
of pleasure and to put it in its proper doctrinal context and perspective. Aquinas, however, did not just touch on the problem
of pleasure in passing. It was for him a much too important
a matter to be glossed over briefly; it demanded thorough philosophical and theological analysis. And for that reason he
went to the trouble of working out a veritable hedonic, so that
one is justified in speaking of the theological (and philosophical,
needless to say) hedonics of Aquinas. 65 In the concluding pages
of this essay it has been thought fit to present this theological
hedonics in broad outline and at the same time to indicate the
62 See III Cont. Gent., 186, no. 8118 a. This is also admitted by modem psychologists in certain circumstances. See Th. Spoerri, Kompendium der Psychiatrie
(Basel I New York, 1966), p. 86.
•• See Summa Theol., I-II, q. 1, a. 6 ad 8.
•• See III Cont. Gent., c. 1ft2, no. ft955. For St. Thomas sexual activity is
primarily in the service of life, and not first and foremost a source of pleasure.
For that reason he can say that, after the sin of murder, contraceptive practice
comes next in the order of malice.
•• See, for instance, with regard to the theological importance of the question
for Aquinas: Summa Theol., I-II, q. 2, a. 6; q. 4, aa. 1-2; q. 11; II-II, q. 27 (where
the whole biblical theology of joy is incorporated into the theological synthesis);
Quodl. VIII, q. 9, a. 1.

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285

two essential doctrinal pillars on which this thomasic hedonic
rests, that is, the structure and division of bonum, on the one
hand, and on the other, the true ontic relation between motion
and rest, between achievement or accomplishment and the contentment flowing therefrom. 66 When that is done it will be
apparent that, if properly understood, one may truly speak of
the hedonism of Aquinas.
The most extensive tract in the whole Summa Theologiae is
the tract on the passions, that is, the affections or sentiments,
of the soul. It comprises twenty-seven questions divided into
one hundred and thirty-two articles. 67 The extent alone of the
treatment is enough to show the importance Aquinas attached
to passion or sentiment in human life. Thus, he is able to affirm
categorically that it pertains to the perfection of moral or human goodness that one strive for the realization of the good
in life not with the will alone but also with one's whole sense
nature, with the added impetus, that is, of sense affectivity .M
And of all the passions or emotions that exercise such an influence in the business of ordering human life and comportment
the most important of all, and the one that exercises the
greatest, the most lasting and most profound influence in the
life of a man is pleasure. 69 To a thorough theological analysis
of the pleasure phenomenon-which obviously must include a
full psychological and moral consideration of the reality-he
devotes four questions divided into twenty-four articles. 70 A
66 The hedonics of Aquinas was the object of a full study by C. Reutemann:
The Thomistic Concept of Pleasure as compared with hedonistic and rigoristic
philosophies (Washington, 1953). This work was unfortunately not available in
Munich libraries.
67 Summa
Theol., I-ll, qq. 22-48.
68 See ibid., I-II, q. 24, a. 3. Also de Malo q. 12, a. 1 where the following is
amongst many other things to be read: "Dum huius vita infirmitatem gerimus,
si passiones nullas habeamus, non recte vivimus." And that recalls the well-known
saying of Blaise Pascal: " L'homme n'est ni ange ni bete, et le malheur veut que
qui veut faire l'ange fait la bete" (Pensees, edit. Bibliotheque de la P!eiade,
[Paris, 1954} Oeuvres Compl/CJtes), p. 1170, no. 329.
69 See Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 25, together with !I-ll, q. 123, a. 10 ad 3.
70 See ibid., I-II, qq. 31-34. There is a corresponding analysis of sadness, depression and pain (qq. 35-39) which includes an added question on the remedies

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careful study of these questions shows beyond doubt the saneness and balance of Aquinas in his approach to the question of
the value of pleasure in human life. His approach is totally
human and, one would like to think, shot through with the spirit
of the joy and gladness of the Gospel-message. For the theologian
Thomas was surely convinced that the eternal Exemplar of all
created things and in a special way of all human beings that
are its image came out of the depths of creation and became
visible as man in order to renew the totality of human reality
and direct it anew to its true fulfilment, which is to be found
only in a return to the uncreated source of its being. And it
is precisely this return that is the cause or foundation of what
might be called ontic delight of which every pleasure on this
journey towards completion is but a faint shadow and at the
same time its true organic anticipation in the process of growing into fulness of human life. The three texts of Aquinas set
at the beginning of this essay show most clearly two things:
first of all, an undeniable positive approach to pleasure in life
and a full awareness of and acceptance of its real value and
indeed necessity in life; then secondly, a keen awareness of the
different degrees of pleasure corresponding, it is safe to say,
to the different degrees of human being and life. For Thomas,
the quality of pleasure and the degree of its value-psychological and moral-and desirability in life depend entirely on
its place in the hierarchy of human being and perfection. Just
as the Greeks and Latins before him, he too had a keen sense
of the meaning of words and their correspondence to varied
realities. 71 Not only, then, does St. Thomas tolerate pleasure
in life and grudgingly, as it were, concede its acceptance to
the less perfect, he rather proclaims unambiguously its necessity
on every level of living. Thus he can assert that no one can
live for any length of time without some kind of pleasure, so
that if the pleasures of the higher order of the spirit be denied
to sadness and depression, one of the most important being, in the mind of Aquinas,
authentic pleasure obtained at times through the simple means of taking a warm
bath! (q. 38, a. 5).
71 See ibid., I-II, q. 31, a. 3 corp. and adS; q. 35, a. !l; de Verit., q. 25, a. 4o ad 5.

THE HEDONISM OF AQUINAS

him he will inevitably seek those of the senses and of the body. 72
In fact, the natural order of things demands, that is, imposes
the obligation, of seeking and of accepting and of indulging in
all those pleasures that one's well-being, that is, one's happiness
and contentment and health, require. 73 Were one to abstain
rigidly and stoically, iu the name of a false spirituality and of
a false humanity, from all occupations that delight the heart
and the body of man, then authentic human goodness would
not be attained. That would be both unreasonable and uncharitable.74 The very fact of living together demands that we
share in the pleasures of our fellows and see to it that we
be not a burden to them. 75 He even goes so far as to maintain
that were anyone to abstain from wine in such wise as to do
notable harm to his health he would not be free from fault, he
would commit thereby a sin. 76 Pleasure that includes delight
and contentment with oneself and one's fellowmen is truly the
spice of life that helps each one to attend more diligently and
perfectly to the serious business of living, so that all may contribute towards that graciousness and beauty of living that is
a god-willed element in the truth of life, the veritas vitae, culminating in the vision of God. And this vision of God brings
the whole human being-the totus homo-mind and matter,
body and soul, spirit and sense, to fulness in human being that
is the only true source of the everlasting delight and peace
of the blessed.r7 From all this it is clear that pleasure may
See Summa Theol., II-II, q. 35, a. 4 ad 2; q. 119, a. 1 ad 3.
See ibid., q. 142, a. 1; also q. 153, a. 8 where he points out that venereal
or sexual activity is of immense importance for man. In this doctrinal context
St. Thomas would assuredly maintain that it is a strict duty of married people
to foster and cultivate sexual love.
10 See ibid., q. 142, a. 1 ad 2.
75 See ibid., q. 114, a. 2 ad 2; q. 168, a. 4 where he has the following to say:
" Est autem contra rationem ut aliquis se aliis onerosum exhibeat: puta dum
nihil delectabile exhibet, et etiam delectationes aliorum impedit."
76 See ibid., q. 150, a. 1 ad 1.
17 See ibid., 168, a. 4 where pleasure is said to be like a condiment to life after
the fashion of salt in food. In a. 1 of the same question he quotes the gracious
word of St. Ambrose: " Hoc est pulchritudinem vitae tenere, convenientiae cuique
sexui et personae reddere." See note 19 above. Also I-II, q. 4, a. 1 ad 3; q. 33, a. 4;
Ill Cont. Gent., c. 26.
72

18

288

CORNELIUS

WILLIAMS

never be set up as an absolute in life. It ever remains an adjunct of right living and is always conditioned and relativized
by the needs of life. And for that reason there is ever present
the danger of superfluity and disorder in its pursuit. A little
suffices, is the dry comment of Aquinas, just as a little salt in
food is enough. Too much would make the food unpalatable.
Superfluous and disordered pleasure and pleasure-seeking must
at all costs be banished from life.78 Now, when that has been
said the question arises: when does a pleasure become superfluous? what is the criterion of order, or of superfluity and disorder in hedonic activity? A brief answer to this important
question will bring this study to a close.
St. Thomas's very balanced and very human approach to the
question of pleasure in human life is firmly based on the metaphysical structure of the Good, on the one hand, and on the
other, as a consequence of this first analysis, on the causal relationship between the honestum and the delectabile. As to
the structure of the Good St. Thomas saw clearly that the Good
is a facet of Being and convertible with it. It too is an analogical reality and an analogical concept. Just as Being is divided
analogically into substance and accident, so is the Good divided
into the honestum and the utile. The honestum is the intrinsic
term of the subject's progress or growth into the fulness of being
and life, the culminating point that terminates or finalizes all
its strivings and efforts. It is the final end that ultimately completely satisfies the deep desires of the will and brings it to
rest. 79 And from this point of view the honestum takes on
•• See Summa Theol., II-II, q. 168, a. 4 ad 3; de Malo, q. 14, a. 14, a. 4; II Sent.,
d. 31, q. 1, a. 1 ad 3. It is precisely this disorder in the matter of pleasure-seeking
that causes in a special way ugliness and vileness (" turpitudo ") in human deportment. See note
above.
•• See Summa Theol., I-II, q. 31, a. 1 ad
"Licet enim delectatio sit quies
quaedam appetitus, considerata praesentia boni delectabilis, quod appetitui satisfacit,
tamen adhuc remanet immutatio appetitus ab appetibili, ratione cuius delectatio
motus quidam est." In this connection it is well to recall that for St. Thomas the
supreme good that is present finally is the beatitudo obiectiva intrinseca, which
is nothing else than the perfectissima operatio, uniting the human subject in a
beatifying union with the beatitudo obiectiva extrinseca. All that is the obiectum

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289

secondarily the character of the delectabile. The delectabile,
then, appears as an eflluence of the honestum. It is the proper
effect of the end achieved and inseparable from it, whereas
once the end has been attained the utile is discarded. 80 The
delectabile is thus taken up into the confines of the final end,
of the honestum. On the level of action through which the
perfection of being is caused and attained it can be said that
the perfect or perfecting achievement is the source of the profoundest pleasure, and that pleasure is the necessary outflow
from and reward for the achievement in relation to the conscious striving of the subject. Pleasure is the rest that follows
on toil and its necessary recompense.
Based on this metaphysical analysis of human good is the
teaching of Aquinas on the relation between activity and pleasure, and in a special way on the right of man to act and live
for pleasure's sake but always in subordination to the achievement of the honestum, in subordination to the achievement of
authentic human perfection. From this it follows that St.
Thomas would admit that man may and perhaps even must
act for pleasure's sake on every level of human life, but he may
never act for pleasure alone. The reason for this teaching is
not some concealed celibate hostility to pleasure; it is the
metaphysical structure of the human good. 81 Or to be absolutely precise, it may be said that it is quite in order to have
pleasure as the sole motive of action (that is,
or
in genere causae formalis motivae) , but pleasure may never be
made into the final end of man's striving, it may never become
convenientissimum of the appetite, of the will, which is the appetitus totius suppositi. See Quodl. VIII, q. 9, a. 1. One must also be very careful not to render
the Latin honestum with the colloquial English honest. They have strictly speaking
nothing whatever in common. Quite a satisfying English rendering of honestum
would be moral worth, as given by H. Rackham in his translation of Cicero's
It is a question of being, not a matter of having.
De Finibus. See note
80 See Summa Theol., I, q. 5, a. 6; II-II, q. 145, a. 3.
81 See ibid., I-II, q.
a. 6 ad 1 together with q. 4, a.
ad
with Cajetan's
penetrating commentary on q. 4. On the whole question of the sola delectatio
see the very fine study of J. B. Becker, "Die moralische Beurtheilung des Handelns
448-465; 673-700.
aus Lust," in Zeitschrift fur katholische Theologie

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the summum bonum. That is, one may never act for pleasure
alone finaliter. In resume one might say that Aquinas admitted
the delectatio-principle but always rejected the principle of the
sola delectatio. 82
In this teaching of Aquinas one may dare to see his great
humanity and urbanity. He was surely of all the canonized
saints one of the most human and kindly. 83 And understanding
hedO'Jl.Cin the sense of chara one may also speak of the hedonism
of Aquinas-or perhaps better of his charism, in the sense that
his moral theology is a veritable charismastic (chara) theology
that shows men how to form their lives in the joy of the Lord,
and thereby grow into its fulness in
TT]v xapav
'TOV KVptoV. 84

CoRNELIUS WILLIAMS,

O.P.

Theatinerkirche
Munich, Germany

•• This teaching of Aquinas contrasts quite forcibly with the kantian doctrine
of doing one's duty for duty's sake.
•• See the warm appreciation of the humanity of the saint by Martin Grabmann,
Das Seelenleben des heiligen Thomas von Aquin (Freiburg I Schweiz, 1949).
•• Math.

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

I

N THIS ESSAY I discuss the concepts of prudence and
conscience and I am particularly concerned to show that
they are not the same. That is, " prudence " and " conscience " are not synonyms. Such a claim must, of course, be
made within the context of established usage, and my appeal
throughout is to the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas where we
find consolidated and clarified two quite disparate historical
streams.
There is little need to remind ourselves of the important role
which appeals to conscience play in our moral discourse. Freedom of conscience, the obligation to follow the dictates of one's
conscience, the duty we have to form a correct consciencethese are commonplaces and, like so many other commonplaces, they embody uncommonly weighty truths. The term
" prudence," on the other hand, has fallen on bad days. We
are not likely to praise prudent men, because we associate the
prudential with calculative self-interest or, worse, with insurance. And even if we are willing to distinguish the vice of
gambling from the virtue of insurance, prudence is not likely
to seem a virtue to us. However, in order to catch the flavor
that prudentia had for the Latins and phron.esis had for the
Greeks, we need only invoke the image of the wise man, the
man who humanely and sensitively makes those choices constitutive of a character we can regard as paradigmatic. To act
well and wisely out of an abiding state of character, on the one
hand, to follow one's conscience, on the other-surely few
would find such topics unimportant for moral philosophy.
As for Aquinas's treatment of them, we must, of course, be
prepared for historical complications. Thomas wrote at a point
of confluence of a number of traditions and his thought is,
sometimes deceptively, expressed in available categories which
291

RALPH MCINERNY

do not on the face of it go easily together. On the matter of
prudence, it is comparatively easy to drive his teaching back
to its sources in Aristotle, but what he has to say on conscience
is said under another influence. It is undeniable, moreover,
that there are obvious similarities between his remarks on
prudence and on conscience, similarities which can suggest
that the terms were effectively synonymous and that his employment of both has historical rather than doctrinal importance. So perceptive a student of Aquinas as Josef Pieper,
for example, takes prudence and conscience to be the same for
St. Thomas.
The living unity, incidentally, of synderesis and prudence is nothing
less than the thing we commonly call " conscience." Prudence,
or rather perfected practical reason which has developed into prudence, is distinct from synderesis in that it applies to specific
situations. We may, if we will, call it the "situation conscience."
Just as the understanding of principles is necessary to specific
knowledge, so natural conscience is the prerequisite and the soil
for the concrete decisions of the " situation conscience," and in
these decisions natural conscience first comes to a definite realization. It is well, therefore, to remember, as we consider the foregoing
and the following comments, that the word " conscience " is intimately related to and well-nigh interchangeable with the word
" prudence." 1
This passage introduces a number of points to which we shall
be turning, but perhaps by saying a thing or two now of synderesis we can grasp the nature of the well-nigh interchangeability that Pieper is proposing. Synderesis is the habit of the
first principles of practical reason; that is, its content is what
Aquinas calls natural law. We could say, therefore, that synderesis and natural law are well-nigh interchangeable with
one another and, indeed, that the two are interchangeable with
what Thomas has to say of man's ultimate end. Nonetheless,
though both prudence and conscience presuppose synderesis
and natural law, though both apply it to concrete situations,
they are far from being interchangeable. They are, however,
in many ways intimately related.
1

Josef Pieper, Prudence, (New York:

Pantheon Books, 1959), pp. 26-7.

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

293

The plan of my remarks is this. I shall begin with a treatment of prudence or practical wisdom, and I shall get at it in
what might seem to be an excessively oblique fashion. There
is a controversy among Aristotelian scholars as to the relation
between the account of deliberation Aristotle gives in Nicomachean Ethics III and the accounts of practical syllogism he
gives in Nicomachean Ethics VI-VII. The fact that St. Thomas
appeals to the practical syllogism in discussing both prudence
and conscience commends this difficulty to our attention, but,
as we shall see, there are other and less remote reasons for our
interest in the problem. Once we see St. Thomas's resolution
of the difficulty-which I consider to be Aristoteles ex Aristotele-we will be led on into a discussion of the similarities and
dissimilarities of his accounts of prudence and conscience.
Finally, I shall indicate very briefly why I take the points
discussed to be a good deal more than exegetical niceties.
I
In Chapter 3 of the Third Book of his Nwomachean Ethics
Aristotle gives an account of deliberation and its relation to
choice. We deliberate about things which are in our power
and can be done by us; moreover, deliberation bears on ways
and means of achieving an end in view.
We deliberate not .about ends but about means. For a doctor does
not deliberate whether he shall heal, nor an orator whether he shall
persuade, nor a statesman whether he shall produce law and order,
nor does anyone else deliberate about his end. They .assume the
end and consider how and by what means it is to be attained; and
if it seems to be produced by several means they consider by which
it is most easily and best produced . . . till they come to the first
cause, which in the order of discovery is last. 2

The model of inquiry and deliberation is an end / means one.
We start from the desired end and work back toward the last
link in a chain which, in the order of execution, is first. Any
utilitarian would find this model acceptable, I suppose, and it
2

lll!thHl-20.

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RALPH MCINERNY

carries along with it a number of other difficulties. What is
it that commends any means in the chain linking the presently
possible deed to the desired consequence? That it is possible,
certainly, but, as means, the fact that it will effect the end in
view. It is the end that justifies the means whose goodness is
derivative from the assumed goodness of the end it will bring
about. Had Aristotle left the matter here, we might accept his
account as an account of human decision, perhaps, but not
as an account of good decision or choice. So it is important
to see that Aristotle did not leave the matter here in Nicomachean Ethivs III. In his discussion of the voluntary and involuntary he invokes two ways of assessing an action: that it
leads to some end and that it is base or noble.8 These two
assessments cannot be equated because sometimes a deed which
would effect a desired end must be avoided because it is ignoble.
D. J. Allan, in his article on the practical syllogism,4 has
suggested that the account of decision given in NE III is corrected by the later introduction of the practical syllogism account, when the end/means schema gives way to the universal/
particular schema. In NE VI-VIII the goodness of an action
derives from the fact that it is a particular instantiation of a
rule and not because, as a means, it is conducive to some end or
consequence beyond itself. Allan views this as a significant and laudable development in Aristotle's moral theory.
Gauthier-Jolif 5 make a philological retort to this, arguing that,
chronologically, there is evidence that NEVI-VII were written
before, not after, NE III, so that what Allan sees as progress
would have to be regarded as retrogression. Gauthier-Jolif
do not leave the matter there, of course, since the question
of the relation between the two accounts, of their relative
merits, would remain untouched. As it happens, Allan finds in
a passage in the De motu animalium (70la25) an effort to put
• D. J. Allan, "The Practical Syllogism," in Autour d'Aristote (Louvain: 1955),
pp. 825-840.

• Etkique a Nicomaque, R. A. Gauthier, 0. P. and J. Y. Jolif, 0. P.. (Paris:
1959), Tome II, part. 1, pp. 209 ff.

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

the two accounts together by reducing the end I means schema
to that of the practical syllogism, the universal I particular
schema. There, observing that action is the conclusion of a
reasoning process, Aristotle adds, " but the premisses which
lead to the doing of something are of two kinds, through the
good and through the possible." We might take these kinds to
be premisses of one thought process, but Allan suggests that
they point to different kinds of major premiss and thus to two
kinds of operative syllogism. " ... a premiss ' of the possible '
starts from the desirability of some End, and leads to the
performance of an action as a means, whereas a premiss ' of
the good ' starts from the notion of a good rule to be realized in
a series of actions, which are severally good, not as means, but
as constituents." 6 Minor premisses would be, respectively,
"this is a means to the end," and " this is an example of the
rule." But might we not say that every rule of action is the
statement of an end? Yes. But, Allan argues, one could hardly
reverse this and argue that whenever several steps conduce
to an end, the end is a universal of which they are particular
instances.
Pierre Aubenque has suggested 7 that Aristotle's originality
lies not in the practical syllogism, which has its parentage in
Plato, but in his intuition of the possible dissonance between
end and means. That is why he requires deliberation followed by
a choice, which is not a reasoning whose result is a conclusion.
That is, the great difficulty of the practical syllogism is the
establishment of the minor premiss, and this is the work of
deliberation.
The difficult thing is not to know that one ought to be brave nor
to decide that what has been recognized as the brave thing to do
ought to be done, but rather what bravery is hie et nunc. Does it
lie in bravado or sang-froid, in daring or abstention, in hopeless
struggle or a :flight which will enable us to do battle another day? e
• Loc. cit., p. SSI.
7

Pierre Aubenque, La Prudtmee Chez Aristote, (Paris:

" Op. cit., p. 141.

1968).

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RALPH MC INERNY

The end j means schema is notoriously ambiguous in moral
theory. It is all too easy to think of the end as a consequence
of action and, when we do, to have the kind of misgivings about
Aristotle's account of deliberation which underlie Allan's article. It is as if Aristotle were being pulled now in a teleologicalutilitarian direction, now in a Kantian-deontological one. But
can anyone think of Aristotle's conception of end, telos, good,
as open to this kind of interpretation? At the very beginning
of the Nicomachean Ethics he distinguished between end-asaction and end-as-a-product-beyond-action, and it is perfectly
clear that it is the former and not the latter which interests
him. The end is the good aimed at in acting, it is the perfection
of the action, its eu or well-being. Well-performed human
actions, virtuous actions, are constituents of eudaimonia or
human perfection. If we would speak of actions as means, this
should be understood in the sense of means-of-realizing-theideal; actions, that is, constitute the realized ideal rather than
effect it as a consequence. Surely Kant was correct in suggesting that good human actions are not means of effecting
some end or consequence which is not itself moral. The moral
good is good action; virtue is its own reward.
I am not thereby suggesting that there is no problem at all
in putting together the account of deliberation and the account
of the practical syllogism. But Aubenque is on the right trail.
Given courage as a cardinal constituent of the ideal of human
perfection, the ways and means of realizing the ideal of courage
here and now is not always an easy matter to decide. One of
the great merits of Aquinas as commentator on Aristotle is that
he has underlined Aristotle's insistence on deliberation as an
element in the practically wise man's judgment as to how in
fleeting circumstances the moral ideal can be realized. One
cannot read NE VI without being struck by the constant linking of deliberation and practical wisdom or prudence. " The
man who is capable of deliberating has practical wisdom." 9
Furthermore, the discussions of Chapters 9-11, with their men9 1140a31.

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

297

tion of eubulia, synesis, and gnome, provide St. Thomas with
virtues necessarily associated with prudence-and eubulia, of
course, has to do with excellence of deliberation.
Let me recall in a rough sketch the domain of practical reason
in its concern with the good or perfection of the human agent
as human. Aristotle's and Aquinas's conception of ultimate end
is in effect the statement of a criterion for the perfection of
the human act as human. The mark of the human agent as
human is reason, and the eu or excellence of rational activity
is, therefore, the perfection of man. Of course, " rational activity" means a number of things; it has an ordered set of
meanings: the perfection of theoretical reason, of practical
reason, and of activities other than reason insofar as they are
amenable to the direction or sway of practical reason. These
perfections or virtues are the constituents of eudaimonia or
beatitudo. They are a sketch of the ideal, of the end we should
aim at if we desire the perfection of the kind of agent we are,
a desire implicit in anything we do. To aim at the ideal is to
attempt to realize it in the concrete actions we perform. This
application of the ideal to circumstances assessed in its light
is the work of practical reason and, in its perfection, of prudence.
It is easy to see why the notion of practical discourse or
syllogism should have been introduced by Aristotle here. On
the assumption that we can get hold of general principles which
embody the ideal of human conduct, the problem is to apply
those principles. The moral task is to see particular circumstances in the light of the ideal, to deliberate and judge the
means of realizing that ideal here and now. In this regard, it
is difficult to see the contrast Allan urges upon us when .he
speaks of two kinds of practical syllogism, one of which would
have a general rule as its major premiss, while the other would
have the statement of the end as major premiss. It is as if he
would have us contrast:
contrast:

(1)

One ought to perfect his mind, Going to
the university will perfect my mind, Ergo,
etc.

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RALPH MCINERNY

and
(2)

The perfection of the mind is an end,
to achieve it I might go to the university, buy
the Gr.eat Books, talk more with my Uncle
George, take up Yoga, eat more yogurt, give
up crossword puzzles, sell my weightlifting
equipment,
but I do not have enough money for tuition
or the Great Books (even on the installment plan), Yoga and yogurt are irrelevant,
crossword puzzle solving runs in the family,
and I still owe sixteen payments on my
barbells,
I had better talk more with Uncle George.

Once we attempt this sort of contrast, it seems to fade away
and we see that deliberation, as Aubenque suggested, is the way
to arrive at the minor premise. Moreover, we can see why
St. Thomas took a lead from Aristotle to develop the seemingly
over-complicated theory of virtues connected with prudence,
namely, eubulia, synesis, and gnome? 0 An ability to deliberate
well is going to be involved in applying moral principles to
particular acts; furthermore, an ability to terminate such
deliberation with a judgment is also requisite. Is prudence just
an umbrella-term covering such deliberation and judgment?
There is left, Aquinas feels, the command or precept proper:
this ought to be done. That is the proper act of prudence to
which deliberating well and judging well are ordered.
Now, the surprising thing is that, when we turn to what St.
Thomas has to say about conscience, we seem to get the same
general picture. 11· "Conscience" is taken to have three meanings which must be distinguished before the activity which
interests us is analysed. The Latin does not distinguish, as
Summa Tkeol., II-II, q. 51.
See Eric D'Arcy, Conscience and its RigkfJ to Freedom, (New York: 1961)
and Reginald Doherty, 0. P., The Judgments af Con.science and Prudence, (River
Forest, Til.: 1961).
10

11

PRUDENCE

AND CONSCIENCE

English does, between " conscious " and " conscience," so the
first meaning of conscientia is that awareness of what we are
doing which goes into the notion of " conscious action or behavior." As for conscience in the moral sense, it is divided to
accommodate two activities ascribed to it. On the one hand,
conscience is a judgment before we act which prompts, directs,
guides; on the other hand, conscience assesses what we have
already done and prompts remorse or satisfaction. In either
case, conscience is an assessment of a particular action in the
light of general principles. Thomas is somewhat stingy with
examples, but here is one he gives: Adultery is wrong; Susie is
married and not to me; Sexual intercourse with Susie would
now be wrong for me. Conscience is said to be an act, not
a habit; a fortiori it is not a virtue. But if it is an act, it must
be the act of some faculty and, Thomas feels, of some habit
of that faculty. The faculty is mind and the habits are several:
synderesis, wisdom, and knowledge. As we have already observed, synderesis is the term Aquinas uses to speak of the
habitual knowledge of first principles of the moral order, that
is, the habit of natural law. Conscience is taken to be preeminently the application of natural law principles to particular
actions. Moreover, this application is said to be deliberative
and judiciaJ.12 What I am getting at, of course, is that the
account of how conscience operates, particularly antecedent
conscience, looks to be indistinguishable from the account given
of the activity of practical wisdom or prudence. It is not
surprising, then that Pieper and others have concluded that
prudence and conscience are simply two names for the same
process. Indeed, it has been suggested that, when we consider the writings of Aquinas chronologically, we find that
in his early writings he assigned a large place to discussions of conscience, whereas in the later writings conscience
all but disappears from view. Might we not conclude that,
as his thought developed, particularly in such independent
works as the Summa Theologiae, recognizing the redundancy of
the notions, he let conscience go and emphasized prudence?
11

De Verit., q. 17, a. 1.

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RALPH MCINERNY

It is my view that prudence and conscience are not the same
thing for Aquinas; their difference cannot be reduced to the
level of mere terminology, as if they were synonyms. In orde1·
to see why this is so, we must take another look at the procedure of prudence since our earlier sketch stressed the superficial similarities of prudence and conscience (both involve the
application of general principles to a particular act; both can
be elucidated by appeal to the practical syllogism; both involve
deliberation) at the expense of what is crucial and definitive
of practical wisdom or prudence.

IT
In the Quaestio Disputata de Veritate 13 we find an extended
(and chronologically early) discussion of conscience. In the
course of it a number of similarities are developed between
the procedure of conscience and what is called free choice or
free will (liberum arbitrium). Both are concerned with a particular act; both presuppose general truths about how we ought
to behave. Both, that is, presuppose synderesis or natural law.
How do they differ? The judgment of conscience, Thomas
says, is purely cognitive whereas the judgment of free choice
consists in the application of knowledge to affections or appetite. The judgment of conscience is purely cognitive, that
of free choice is not. I take this to mean that the judgment of
choice reveals our moral character in a way that the judgment
of conscience does not. My choices reveal my character, the
condition of my appetite, whereas the judgment of conscience
reveals my cognitive ability to see that a given act is forbidden,
commanded or permitted.
That is why the judgment of free will is sometimes perverted whereas that of conscience is not; for example, when someone examines
what is imminently to be done and judges (as it were still speculating with reference to principles) that this is evil, for instance, to
have sexual relations with this woman, yet, when he sets out to act
in the light of this, other factors from a variety of sources come
18

Ibid., ad 4.

PRUDENCE

AND CONSCIENCE

301

into play, like the promised delight of sexual activity, from desire
of which reason is blinded and its assessment set aside. Thus one
errs in choice and not in conscience, though he acts contrary to
conscience and is said to act with a bad conscience insofar as his
deed does not conform with his knowledge.14
This passage puts us in mind of what is crucial to moral knowledge and particularly to practical wisdom or prudence. The
person described in the passage quoted is defective: he knows
what he ought to do, and he does not do it. This deficiency
is not merely appetitive, though it is certainly at least that. If
we say that there is a cognitive deficiency here, no doubt we
should want to locate it in the decision which is embodied in
the deed done and that decision is: carpe diem, seize the day
or, in this case, the lady. What we are not likely to think is
that such a man is in need of the fifty drachma course in moral
philosophy; if he has a cognitive deficiency, it is not at that
level. Or is it?
Consider the procedure that both Aristotle and Aquinas
follow in doing moral philosophy. They begin with the assumption that we act for some purpose, with an end in view.
They hold that the good has rightly been described as that
for the sake of which we act; that is, end and good are effectively identified. The aim of an action may only be to perform
that action well; it need not have an end beyond the performance of the action. We are led on to a description of the
"good for man" in a way with which we are all familiar. What
I want to draw attention to here is both obvious and important:
we can relate cognitively to the human good, that is, we can
arrive at knowledge of what it is and, if we are successful, our
" Ibid. " Et ideo contingit quandoque quod indicium liberi arbitrii pervertitur,
non autem conscientiae; sicut cum aliquis examinat aliquid quod imminet faciendum,
et iudicat, quasi adhuc speculando per principia, hoc esse malum, utpote fornicare
cum hac muliere; sed quando incipit applicare ad agendum, occurunt undique multae
circumstantiae ad ipsum actum, utpote fornicationis delectatio, ex cuius concupiscentia ligatur ratio, ne eius dictamen in eius reiectionem prorumpat. Et sic
aliquis errat in eligendo, et non in conscientia; sed contra conscientiam facit:
et dicitur hoc mala conscientia facere, in quantum factum iudicio scientiae non
concordat."

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RALPH MC INERNY

knowledge is, o£ course, true. But notice that what we are
speaking of is the good, and to speak of the good, to relate
to it cognitively, to know it under the guise of truth, is not
yet to relate to the good as good. The good is the object of
appetite; it is what we seek, pursue, aspire to. Even at the
level of very general principles, if the goods which are enunciated are not my goods, if I am not effectively ordered to them
as to the objects of my appetite, then these principles are not
in the full sense moral principles.
I take the cardinal virtues to be explications of, constituents
of, the human good, the final end, eudaimonia, beatitudo. The
moral ideal, if it is only known, cannot function as a moral
ideal. I need those acquired dispositions of appetite which are
called temperance, courage, and justice in order to be
to the moral ideal, the human good, as good, as moral. And,
in order to acquire such dispositions of appetite or moral virtues, I need the intellectual virtue of prudence or practical
wisdom. As we know, there is a virtuous circle in Aristotle at
this point: the moral virtues presuppose prudence, prudence
presupposes the moral virtues. At the least, this means that
they are acquired simultaneously. As to their interaction, the
following picture is urged upon us. The moral virtues insure
a proper ordination to the human good as good, as end; practical wisdom assesses how the moral ideal can be realized here
and now; that is, it deliberates, judges, and commands as to
the means of realizing the end. It is against this background
that the otherwise odd concept of practical truth makes its
appearance. The judgment of prudence, as to the means of
realizing the end, is said to be true, not by conformity with
the way things are but by conformity with rectified appetite,
that is, by conformity with the presupposed moral virtues'
ordination to the end. Only if my knowledge that courage is
the good for man is complemented by an appetitive ordination
to that good as good, can my deliberation, judgment, and command as to how that constituent of the end is here and now to
be realized be effective. It is on the assumption of this appetitive ordination to the good as good that Aristotle can say

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

303

that the minds judgment, prudence's judgment, as to how that
good can here and now be realized will be executed euthus,
straightaway.
Many of the difficulties which have been urged against the
practical syllogism as it figures in the process of prudence seem
to me to disappear when one sees the force of the phrase the
good as good. If the major premiss is considered to be merely
cognitive, of course action is not going to be the conclusion
of such a reasoning process. But when the good expressed in
the major premiss is my good, there is already present the
disposition which, when the means of realizing that good are
recognized, immediately chooses those means.
If we look back now on the way in which St. Thomas contrasted the judgment of conscience and the judgment of choice,
two observations spring immediately to mind. Conscience was
said to be purely cognitive, which means that, for it to function,
for the judgment of conscience to be made, all that is required
is a cognitive ordination to the good. Furthermore, in his
illustration of how the judgment of choice can be perverted
while that of conscience is not, Aquinas is portraying the type
of man Aristotle calls incontinent, that is, the morally weak
man. He knows what he ought to do, his conscience is all
right, but his knowledge of the good is not complemented by
an effective appetitive disposition to the good as good. That
is why, in the crunch, in choosing (which is a meld of mind
and appetite), he goes wrong.

III
It can now be seen why it is necessary to keep the judgment
of conscience and the prudential judgment distinct. To have
cognitive knowledge of what I ought to do here and now is not
a function of, is not dependent upon, being related to the good
known as good. A bad man can have a correct conscience. The
correctness of conscience does not of itself guarantee that action and choice will be in accord with it. Moreover, if the
judgment of conscience is erroneous, discussion, knowledge,

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RALPH MCINERNY

maybe even the fifty drachma course, can be efficacious in
correcting it. In the case of our appetitive dispositions and the
reasoning which is embedded in choice, it is otherwise. One
does not become good by philosophizing. Furthermore, although the judgment of conscience is not as such efficacious for
action, it does oblige us, we should act in accordance with it.
One who erroneously believes that contraception or abortion
are the only available means of realizing the ideal that we
should act responsibly, rationally, humanly, in reproducing
ourselves, is obliged to act in the somber light of that assessment. We must not entertain that witty possibility Aristotle
sketches whereby a combination of erroneous knowledge and
weakness of will would add up to right action. Nonetheless,
although the appeal to conscience is in this sense a stopper,
since I can only see what I see and cannot be forced to act as
if I saw otherwise, there is as well a sense in which conscience
cannot be invoked to stop moral discourse. One who has concluded that the geometrical growth of population can only be
checked by abortion or, a more modest proposal, cannibalism,
must be prepared to discuss the conclusion to which he has
come, to examine whether or not it embodies a vision of the
human ideal which can withstand the force of criticism. Is it
not the case that appeals to conscience often sound like a claim
to some private vision which need not and cannot be subjected
to public and rational inquiry? We may not be able to make
one another see, but we can certainly offer reasons for seeing
in one way as opposed to another. When such reasons are ruled
out in principle, the appeal to conscience as a stopper becomes
suspect. If I read Aquinas correctly, the judgment of conscience is the continuation into the concrete of the cognitive
endeavor which is moral philosophy, and that means it involves
appeal to a whole network of principles and rules which, like
their applications, are open to rational inquiry.
It is such considerations that prevent me from suggesting
that, at least in the case of the virtuous man, conscience and
prudence effectively coalesce because there would no longer

PRUDENCE AND CONSCIENCE

305

be any need to speak of a purely cognitive assessment of how
principles apply in the concrete. The prudent man should in
principle be able to give reasons other than autobiographical
ones for acting in the way he does. To say otherwise would
have the disheartening consequence that only the good can
understand good reasons for acting in a given way in such-andsuch circumstances. Nor am I tempted by the opposite ploy,
namely, explaining an erroneous conscience as due to malice or
vice. Our choices reveal, at least to ourselves and to God, the
kind of man we are; our judgments of conscience reveal only
the principles we accept as true and the factors we take into
account in applying them to a particular deed. Discussion may
not change our character, but it can lead to a rejection of the
principles we hold or to our seeing that a particular application
of them cannot be rationally justified.
The picture we are left with, after looking into Aquinas on
conscience and prudence, would seem to be this. Conscience
brackets the rational process which issues in those choices
revelatory of our moral character. Antecedent conscience, when
action is imminent, is a purely cognitive assessment of what
we ought to do. Prudence, or its opposite, is the cognitive
component of our present choices. Consequent conscience is
that retrospective and cognitive appraisal of what we have
done, the assessment of past deeds in the light of general principles. Conscience is no more a function of our moral character
than is moral philosophy or ethics. No doubt the kind of men
we are influences what we maintain in moral theory, but the
context of that theory demands that we be able to give reasons
other than our dispositions, good or bad, for maintaining what
we do.
RALPH MciNERNY

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

THE LAW OF INERTIA AND THE PRINCIPLE

QUIDQUID MOVETUR AB ALIO MOVETUR

H

ISTORY OF SCIENCE teaches us how difficult it is
to discover the general laws of nature and the fictitious
character of these laws. The fictitious character of the
fundamental principles of physics is evident from the fact that
we can point to two essentially different principles, each of
which corresponds with experience to a large extent. Einstein
calls philosophical prejudices the belief in the direct intuition
of laws from nature through observation.
The prejudice consists in the faith that facts by themselves can
and should yield scientific knowledge without free conceptual constructions ... One does not easily become aware of the free choice
of such concepts, which, through verification and language, appear
to be immediately connected with the empirical materiaJ.l
On the other hand, physicists should be aware of the importance played by philosophical ideas in the discovery of
physical laws and physical theories. Every important physical
theory presupposes a cluster of philosophical concepts regarding
space, time, motion, causality, and so forth, which are a consequence of the philosophical world view of the pioneers of physics. All great physicists without exception were philosophers.
One supposes Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg and Dirac to be different
kinds of thinkers from Galileo, Kepler and Newton. But this is
wrong. These are all physicists: that is, natural philosophers seeking explanations of phenomena in ways more similar than the
dichotomy "classical-modern" has led philosophers of science to
imagine.2
1 A. Einstein, Essays in Science, (New York, 1934), p. 69. Cf. Albert Einstein:
Philosopher-Scientist, ed. by Paul Schilpp (New York, 1951), p. 49.
• N. R. Hanson, Patterns of Discovery (Cambridge, 1958), p. !l.

306

THE LAW OF INERTIA

307

The conceptual basis of De Broglie's doctoral thesis on matter
seemed " philosophical " to his examiners. The dispute between
Einstein, Bohr, Bohm, and De Broglie is regarded as merely
philosophical by most physicists. Physicists, however, are
philosophers of nature looking for the explanation of phenomena, as were Aristotle, Galileo, or Newton. A physicist is
a philosopher of nature, and a philosopher of nature must know
physics. It is the vision of the universe which counts, not the
symbolism of its mathematical formulation.

I. The Law of Inertia in Galileo and Newton
A typical example of the fictitious character of physical laws
and their philosophical implications is the Law of Inertia, called
by Whitehead the first article of the creed of science, which
reads: "Every body continues in its state of rest or of uniform
motion in a straight line, unless it is compelled to change that
state by forces inpressed upon it." 8 This law is not axiomatic
in the sense of self-evident. It seemed plausible, however, to
Galileo, Newton, and the majority of classical physicists. To
prove this law, Galileo argued that a sphere rolling down a
plane on one side of the room would roll across the floor and up
an inclined plane on the opposite side. Moreover, ignoring
friction, the sphere will ascend the second plane to just the
height above the floor from which it had been released on
first inclined plane. Hence, a sphere in motion on an ideal frictionless floor would move along a straight line to infinity. "We
may remark," Galileo says, " that any velocity once imparted
to a moving body will be rightly maintained as long as the
external causes of acceleration or retardation are removed, a
condition which is found only on horizontal planes ... " 4 That
3 I. Newton,
Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (London, 1687),
Law I. cf. A. N. Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy (London, 1948),
p. 171.
• Galileo, Two New Sciences, IIIrd day, pp. 215-fH6, Cf. ibid., "Any velocity
once received by a body is perpetually maintained as long as the external causes
of acceleration or retardation are removed, a condition which is found only in
horizontal planes."

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ANTONIO MORENO

this motion will be uniform ad infinitum is assumed to follow
from Galileo's "thought experiment" by simply passing to the
limit. Theoretically speaking, the Law of Inertia can be considered as a particular case of the Second Law of Motion, namely, force is equal to the product of mass and acceleration. F =
d2s
__,
d 2s
dt 2 ; when F = 0 it follows that de must be zero. Hence, a body
in motion without imparted forces necessarily assumes uniform
motion ad infinitum.
The Law of Inertia, as a limiting case, may perhaps be formulated as an hypothetical law: "If there were a body free of
forces, then it would either remain at rest, or would manifest
uniform rectilinear motion." But as Hanson proves conclusively:
No body whose motion could meaningfully be described as uniform
and rectilinear could possibly be force-free. Any alternative interpretation would crush the gravitational cornerstone of mechanics,
something few physicists would he prepared to countenance just
to avoid the necessarily counter-factual character of the Law of
Inertia ... The law is thus revealed as referring to entities which
are not such that although never observed they remain observable,
i.e., that we know what it would be like to encounter such entities.
No, rather, the Law refers to entities which are unobservable as
a matter of physical meaning, or it conflicts with other Laws of
Mechanics. Either way, it is difficult to understand. 5

There is not in nature any system perfectly isolated, perfectly
abstracted from all external action, although there are systems
which are nearly isolated. So in this case we postulate a small
force which is equal to the product of the mass and acceleration.
But again the Law of Force is a law which cannot be checked
by experiment. Hence, it is not only that no body with uniform
and rectilinear motion could possibly be force-free. In addition,
the weakness of the Law of Inertia is that it involves an argument in a circle: a mass moves without acceleration if it is
• N. R. Hanson, "The Law of Inertia:
phy of Science 80 (1968), ll!t.

A Philosopher's Touchstone." in Philolo-

THE LAW OF INERTIA

309

sufficiently far from other bodies; we know that it is sufficiently
far from other bodies only by the fact that it moves without
acceleration. The vicious circle formulation of the Law of
Inertia is emphasized by Eddington in the case of the free fall
of projectiles:
Unfortunately in that case its motion is not uniform and rectilinear;
the stone describes a parabola. If you raised that objection you
would be told that the projectile was compelled to change its state
of uniform motion by an invisible force called gravitation. How
do we know that this invisible force exists? Why! Because if the
force did not exist the projectile would move uniformly in a straight
line. The teacher is not playing fair. He is determined to have
his uniform motion in a straight line, and if we point out to him
bodies which do not follow his rule he blandly invents a new force
to account for the deviation. We can improve on his enunciation
of the First Law of Motion. What he really meant was-" Every
body continues in its state of rest or uniform motion in a straight
line, except insofar as it doesn't" ... The suggestion that the body
really wanted to go straight but some mysterious agent made it go
crooked is picturesque but unscientific. 6

There is a group of concepts semantically linked: " uniform,"
"rectilinear," "motion ad infinitum," "force-free," which are
interdependent conceptions within classical mechanics. Furthermore, the concept of force depends upon the concept of
mass and acceleration. And, as Einstein points out, the connection of force and acceleration was made possible only by
the introduction of the new concept of mass, which was supported by an illusory definition, i.e., the concept of mass had
to be invented. Thus the fundamental concepts of classical
mechanics are linked in a circular way; if any of them is false,
classical ·mechanics collapses.7
6 A. Eddington, The Nature of The Physical World (Cambridge, 1958), pp.
128-124. Cf. A. Einstein, The Meaning of Relativity (Princeton, 1955), p. 58.
• A. Einstein, Essays in Science, p. 81; H. Poincare, Science and Hypothesis
(New York: Dover, 1952), pp. 97-98: "What is mass? Newton replies: The
product of the volume and the density." "It were better to say," answer Thomson
and Tait, " that density is the quotient of the mass by the volume." What is
force? " It is," replies Lagrange, " the product of the mass and the acceleration.
Then why not to say that mass is the quotient of the force by the acceleration?
These difficulties are insurmountable."

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ANTONIO MORENO

Physics approaches reality by steps. Hence, we should not
be surprised if we find other conceptual difficulties regarding
the Law of Inertia. In physics, the body to which events are
spatially referred is called a co-ordinate system. The laws of
mechanics of Galileo and Newton can be formulated only with
the aid of a co-ordinate system. But it is very remarkable
that these laws are valid only with respect to co-ordinate systems called " inertial systems," free from rotation, and any
other co-ordinate system that moves uniformly and in a
straight line relatively to an inertial system. Hence, as Einstein
notes, "physically speaking, the inertial system seemed to occupy a privileged position, which made the use of a co-ordinate
system moving in other ways appear artificial." 8 Therefore,
inertial systems are a weak point of the Galilean-Newtonian
mechanics, for there is presupposed a mysterious property of
physical space conditioning the kind of co-ordinate system
for which the Law of Inertia holds good. So, physics and pure
geometry are different, for in abstract geometry all the rigid
co-ordinate systems are logically equivalent. The equations of
mechanics, however-and this is true of the Law of Inertiaclaim validity only when they are referred to a specific class
of such systems, i.e., the " inertial systems."
Furthermore, in order for the laws of mechanics to be valid,
the inertial co-ordinate systems to which they are referred have
to be" force-free" and have no rotation. That is, the physical
interpretation of the spatial co-ordinates presupposes a fixed
body of reference, which has to be free from imparted forces. 9
Therefore, the Law of Inertia presupposes that either the inertial
co-ordinate is not accelerated, and consequently, free from impressed forces, or the Law must assume the existence of Absolute Space, which fulfills these conditions. Since in nature
there exists no body free from impressed forces, then, if the
8 A. Einstein, Essays in Science, pp. 78-79. Cf. ibid., p. 55: "Mach had already
asked this question: How does it come about that inertial systems are distinguished
above other co-ordinate systems? Newton's theory offers no answer." Ibid.,
Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, pp. 6S and 27.
• A. Einstein, Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist, p. 55.

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311

Law of Inertia must make sense, we must take pure geometrical
space, i.e., Absolute Space, as the" free-force" framework within which particles and processes reside. Without this assumption the Law of Inertia is incomplete, and Newton was well
aware of this inconsistency when he assumed the existence of
Absolute Space. Einstein, Russell, Euler, Hanson, and many
other theoretical physicists claimed the need of Absolute Space
for the classical laws of mechanics to be valid. As Einstein
put it:
In order to able to regard the rotation of a system at least formally
as something real, Newton regarded space as objective. Since he
regards his Absolute Space as a real thing, rotation with respect
to an absolute space is also something real to him. Newton could
equally well have called his Absolute Space " the ether" ; the only
thing that matters is that in addition to observable objects another
imperceptible entity has to be regarded as real, in order for it to be
possible to regard acceleration or rotation as something real.1°
Is the Newtonian space absolutely necessary? Mach did indeed
try to avoid the necessity of postulating an imperceptible real
entity by substituting for the acceleration with respect to Absolute Space, a mean velocity with respect to the totality of
masses in the world. He argued that inertial frames were just
those frames which were unaccelerated relative to the fixed
stars. The inertia of bodies is not considered with respect to
Absolute Space but with respect to the totality of other ponderable bodies. It appears conceivable that what inertial re10 A. Einstein, Essays in Science, p. 107. Cf. N. R. Hanson, art. cit., p. 117
fn.: " It is interesting to note that Euler defended the necessity of Absolute Space
by pointing out that, since all material references frames are accelerated, inertial
motion could exist only relatively to a non-material reference frame, i. e. absolute
K[Jace. This constitutes a preservation of the Euclidean geometrical meaning of
' rectilinearity ' at the complete sacrifice of its physical meaning." Bertrand
Russell expresses the need of absolute space in this way: " The laws of motion
require to be stated by reference to what have been called kinetic axes: these are
in reality axes having no absolute acceleration and no absolute rotation ... Hence
any dynamical motion, if it is to obey the laws of motion, must be referred to
axes which are not subject to any force. No material axes will satisfy this condition. Hence we shall have spatial axes, and motions relative to these axes are
of course absolute motions." The Principles of Mathematics (London, 1956), p. 490.

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ANTONIO MORENO

sistence counteracts is acceleration with respect to the masses
of the other bodies existing in the universe. Einstein found
this idea fascinating, although he rejected Mach's view, because
"inertial resistance with respect to the relative acceleration of
distant masses presupposes direct action at a distance. Since
the modern physicist does not consider himself entitled to assume that, this view brings him back to the ether, which has
to act as the medium of inertial action." 11
Mach's ideas on motion are of great significance, for he introduced a new concept of inertia unknown to Galileo and
Newton. In Newton's view, inertia is an intrinsic property of
matter independent of the existence of other bodies. In Mach's
view, however, any matter in the universe will make a small
contribution to the total inertia of a body, since a body has
inertia only because it interacts with all the matter existing
in the universe.
The anthropomorphism entailed in the Newtonian laws of
motion is obvious and implicates the whole field of physics.
This is especially true of the concept of force, which is considered the cause of motion and of universal gravitation. The
idea of force is primitive, irreducible, indefinable; of it we have
simply direct intuition which arises from the idea of effort,
which is familiar from childhood. But as Poincare points out,
this intuition is an insufficient basis for mechanics, for the notion of effort or pressure does not teach us the nature of force.
The experience of effort is reduced to a recollection of muscular
sensations, and " no one will maintain that the sun experiences
. a muscular sensation when it attracts the earth." 12 Anthropomorphism plays an important role in mechanics, but it
cannot be the foundation of a really scientific and philosophical
concept in physics. It would probably be difficult to discover
the idea of force without the intuition of effort and pressure,
but we should be aware of the natural tendency of projecting
A. Einstein, Essays in Science, p. 107, Cf. ibid., pp. 51, 79. B. Russell rejects
See op. cit., p.
19 H. Poincare, op. cit., p. 106.

11

Mach's argument.

THE LAW OF INERTIA

SIS

human experiences as the explanation of phenomena. In Einstein's universe forces are abolished and motion is explained by
recourse to geometry.
As a summary we must say that the Law of Inertia is far from
being self-evident, not only because it can never in principle
be verified experimentally but because it poses physical conceptual difficulties, some of them not unknown to Newton.
Mach's critical analysis of Newton's laws of motion opened
the eyes of physicists and awoke them from a dogmatic slumber which had slowed down the development of mechanics.
The outcome of this criticism is the theory of relativity. From
the physical viewpoint, Einstein summarizes the conceptual
difficulties of Newton's laws thus:
I) In spite of the fact that Newton's ambition to represent this
system as necessarily conditioned by experiment he set up the concept of absolute space and absolute time, for which he has often
been criticized in recent years. But on this point Newton is particularly consistent. He had realized that observable geometrical
magnitudes and their course in time does not completely characterize motion in its physical aspects . . . Therefore, in addition to
masses and temporal distances, there must be something else that
determines motion. That " something " he takes to be relation to
"absolute space."
2) The introduction of forces acting directly and instantaneously
at a distance into the representation of the effects of gravity is not
in keeping with the character of most of the processes familiar to
us from everyday life. . . .
3) Newton's teaching provided no explanation for the highly remarkable fact that weight and inertia of a body are determined
by the same quantity (its mass) ... The remarkableness of this
fact struck Newton himself.18

II. Einstein and the Law of Inertia
Contemporary physics has profoundly changed the worldview of the universe. This view has modified the concept of
inertia and its laws. In 1904 Poincare formulated the Principle
of Relativity, which states that all the laws of nature have the
18

A. Einstein, Essays in Science, pp. 84-85.

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ANTONIO MORENO

same form in the co-ordinates belonging to one inertial system
as in the co-ordinates belonging to any other inertial system.
This means that every law of nature which is valid in relation
to a co-ordinate system C must also be valid in relation to any
co-ordinate system C, which is in uniform translatory motion
relative to C'. We are yet in the classical world of physics and
the formulation of this principle did not completely satisfy the
genius of Einstein, who asked:
Should the independence of physical laws of the state of motion
of the co-ordinate system be restricted to the uniform translatory
motion of co-ordinate systems in respect to each other? What has
nature to do with our co-ordinate systems and their state of motion?
If it is necessary for the purpose of describing nature to make use
of a co-ordinate system arbitrarily introduced by us, then the choice
of its state of motion ought to be subject to no restriction; the laws
ought to be entirely independent of this device (general principle
of relativity.) u

If we elevate the equivalence of all co-ordinate systems for
the formulation of natural laws into a principle, we arrive at
the general theory of relativity. 15 A preferential reference system does not exist. From the standpoint of the physical world
one frame of reference is just as acceptable as the other.
The general principle of relativity has implications in respect
to the concept of inertia, for relativity owes its existence to the
empirical fact of the numerical equality of the inertial and
gravitational mass of bodies, which permits extending the
principle of relativity to co-ordinate systems accelerated relatively to one another. In classical mechanics inertia and gravitation work independently. But not in Einstein's theory, which
means that the inertia of a body has to be considered in connection with gravity. 16
Ibid., p. 57. Cf. ibid., pp. 55-56.
Ibid., p.
Cf. C. Lanczos, Albert Einstein and The Cosmic World Order
(New York, 1965), pp. 39-40.
16 A. Einstein, Essays in Science, p. 80: " In the theory I advanced the acceleration of a falling body was not independent of the horizontal velocity or the
internal energy of a system." Ibid., Albert Einstein:Philosopher-Scientist, p. 81:
" I would like to point to the fact that the division of energy into two essentially
different parts, kinetic and potential energy, must be felt as unnatural."
H

15

THE LAW OF INERTIA

815

Hertz, in his very late work, attempted to free mechanics
from the concept of potential energy, i.e., from the concept
of force. But it was Einstein who abolished the concept of
force, so important for the Law of Inertia. "The concepts of
force, lose their basis, because these concepts rest upon the
idea of absolute instantaneousness. The field takes the place
of force." 17 In relativity theory the action of bodies upon other
bodies is not a direct and instantaneous action but takes place
by means of space, through the field. Fields are physical conditions of space produced by the matter of the universe. The
geometry of physical space is a function of the distribution of
masses, an idea entirely new in the history of geometry. The
properties of space depend on the material bodies and the
energy present. So where Newton postulates forces, and Absolute Space and Time, Einstein postulates the modification
of the curvature of the space and a space-time continuum dependent upon energy and matter.
In Newton's theory the space affected masses, but nothing
affected it; the space remained simply the passive container of
all events, playing no part itself in physical happenings. In
relativity theory the space conditions the behavior of inert
masses, but it is also conditioned as regard its state by them.
And since the structure of the space depends on physical influences, the space is neither homogenous nor isotropic; the
metric of the space-time continuum is conditioned by matter
existing outside the region in question. 18
Therefore the conditions required for the existence of the
17 A. Einstein, Out of my Later Years (New York, 1950), p. 78; C. Lanczos,
op. cit., p. 99: " The fact that the force of gravity did not exist in our original
reference system but came into existence solely through its motion suggests
that perhaps the force of gravity is not real force at all but an " apparent force ''
of the same kind as the centrifugal force on earth which comes into existence
solely because the earth rotates around its axis. All apparent forces are strictly
proportional to the inertial mass of the moving body. . . . In the reference system
of the astronaut the force of gravity is not existent. This force comes into
existence only if we describe the motion of the astronaut from a reference system
located on earth."
18 A. Einstein, Essays in Science, pp. 66, 68, 107, 108.

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ANTONIO MORENO

Law of Inertia cannot be met in relativity theory, since this law
can be valid only in Euclidean space, absolutely homogenous
and isotropic. The geometry of the universe, however, is
Riemannian, and the geodesic takes the place of the straight
line of the Euclidean geometry. Bodies always naturally follow
this path: "The geodesics of our curved space-time supply the
natural tracks which particles pursue if they are undisturbed." 19
In regard to the Law of Inertia, the most important concept
discovered by relativity theory is that inertia is a function of
the energy of the body, not of its mass. Poincare in 1900 was the
first to adumbrate the principle that all energy has the property
of inertia, and the theory of relativity showed that the inertia
of a system necessarily depends on its energy, namely, m =
Therefore mass is not an independent concept, and the
concept of mass, formerly a basic concept of physics and a measure for the quantity of matter, is demoted to a secondary role.
The Law of Inertia should be considered as a function of energy,
not of mass. 20
III. The Principle of Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur
The Law of Inertia is important in philosophy because this
law seems to deny the validity of a principle which is basic
19 A. Eddington,
op. cit., p. 125. Cf. E. Whittaker, From Euclid to Eddington
(New York, 1958), p. 113: "Gravity is due to a change in the curvature of
the space-time continuum produced by the presence of matter. Gravitational properties are essentially of the same nature as inertial properties."
20 Max von Laue, " Inertia and Energy " in Albert Einstein: Philosopher-Scientist,
pp. 528-530. On pp. 529-530 he says: " One type of energy, however, the new
physics must eliminate from its list, and this is kinetic energy. For the energy
E of a body possessing the velocity q, relativistic dynamics furnishes the equation

Eo

In which Eo is the energy in the state of rest. Each type of energy therefore
increases in the same manner as a result of motion. And in fact, if we consider
all inertia as an attribute of energy, then we cannot base a particular type of
energy in tum on the inertia. That is how fundamental changes are which the
law of inertia and energy causes in our whole picture of the physical universe."

THE LAW OF INERTIA

317

in the Greek concept of motion and in the proof of the existence of God through motion. The principle is formulated as
Omne quod movetur ab alio movetur, whatever is moved is
moved by another. St. Thomas explains this principle thus:
It is certain to the intellect and obvious to the senses that something is moved in this world. But whatever is moved is moved
by another; for nothing is moved except insofar as it is capable of
possessing the term to which it is moved, while a thing moves
another inasmuch as it is actually effective. To move means to
draw a thing from potentiality to actuality, and nothing can be
drawn from potentiality to actuality except by something active;
just as an actually hot body, like fire, makes wood, which is
potentially hot, to be actually hot, thereby moving and changing
it. It is not possible that a thing be both actual and potential
possessor of the same term, but only of different terms; for what
is actually hot cannot at the same time be potentially hot, although
it can be potentially cold. Therefore it is impossible that anything
be at the same time and in the same respect both mover and moved,
or that it move itself. Thus whatever is moved is moved by something else.21

As seen above, St. Thomas demonstrates the principle by recourse to the principle of contradiction; that is, the principle
is an immediate consequence of the definition of motion. Motion is not conceived here as modem physics conceives it now,
as a quantitative description of a mobile following a path; it
is conceived as the property of a being which is continuously
passing from potency into act. That which is moved acquires
continuously a new act to which it was previously in potency.
Hence, " to be moved" is a passive capacity for something
else's action. "To move" on the other hand designates an
agent's activity on a recipient. Since the mobile as mobile is
as such in potency, it must be moved by a motor in act, for
21 St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 3. Cf. I Cont. Gcmt., c. 13, (9):
"The
same thing cannot be at once in act and in potency with respect to the same thing.
But everything that is moved is, as such, in potency. For motion is the act of
something that is in potency inasmuch as it is in potency. That which moves,
however, is as such in act, for nothing acts except according as it is in act.
Therefore, with respect to the same motion, nothing is both mover and moved.
Thus, nothing moves itself."

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ANTONIO MORENO

nothing can give itself what it has not. There are not two motions, however, but a single reality which belongs to both agent
and patient, although in a different way. The same motion is
the motion by which the hand pushes an object and the object
is pushed. "And the actuality of that which has the power of
causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable,
for it must be fulfillment in both." 22 There is a single actuality
but two different formalities which require different parts.
Therefore, by careful analysis of the terms of the definition of
motion, the principle "whatever is moved is moved by another"
appears as a sequel of that definition. However, the concrete
application of this principle to different kinds of motions, especially the concrete application of this principle to local motion, is far from easy. This difficulty has been proved with
regard to Aristotle's concept of gravitation and by the Law of
Inertia, each of which seems to deny the validity of the principle. Therefore, let us investigate how this principle was
interpreted in its application to local motion.
Modem historians interpret Omne quod movetur ab olio
movetur to mean that everything which is in motion must be
moved by something here and now conjoined to the body in
motion. Thus Ross says, interpreting Aristotle, " One body
can be in movement as a result of the influence of another only
so long as the other body is continuing to act on it, and is in
fact still in contact with it." 28 Crombie complements this idea
in such a way that, when the cause ceases to operate, so does
motion, for the mover necessarily accompanies the body it
moves. 24 Other historians hold similar opinions. 25 Duhem, how22 Aristotle, Physics, III, 3, 202 a 14-17.
•• W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Physics (Oxford, 1936), p. 722.
2 ' A. C. Crombie, Augustine to Galileo (London, 1952), p. 82.
25 E. J. Dijksterhuis,
The Mechanization of the World Picture (Oxford, 1961),
p. 24: "Aristotelian physics is based on the axiom that every motion presupposes
a mover: omne quod movetur ab alio movetur. This motor must either be present
in the moving body or be in direct contact with it; action at a distance is excluded as inconceivable: a motor must always be a motor conjunctus." See J.
Weisheipl 0. P. "The principle omne quod movetur ab alio movetur in medieval
physics " in Isis, 56 (1965), No. 183.

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319

ever, explains the principle in terms of natural place enticing
bodies not yet in it, a kind of extrinsic form desired by bodies
which must move towards it. 26 Thus he conceives the principle
merely in terms of the final cause of motion, but not in terms
of the efficient cause of motion, which is the problem here.
For others, like Maier, the resistance of the medium is also
an essential element for motion: " every movement requires a
particular mover bound to it and generating it directly, and
every normal, successive motion taking place requires a resistence which opposes the moving force and which is overcome
by that force, since without resistance there could be no motus,
but mutatio, i. e., an instantaneous change of place." 27
The common factor of agreement among all these historians
is this: the continuation of motion requires a motor pushing
the mobile continuously or the motion ceases. So they interpret
the principle as: " Whatever is in motion has to be moved by
something else continuously." This pleases our common sense,
but this common sense is denied by the Law of Inertia, and,
besides, it does not represent Aristotle's and Aquinas's ideas
on the principle.
In the Middle Ages Avicenna explained gravitation in terms
of the natural inclination of the body towards a natural place
moved by its substantial form. " It is absolutely impossible for
an essence of a thing to cause its own motion unless it be a
mover through its own form and a moved through its own subject." 28 The final cause of motion is its natural place, the form
is the motor, and the mobile is the subject.
In Averroes's interpretation the form moves indirectly by
moving the medium, which in turn moves directly the entire
body. The medium is an essential part of motion:
The original cause of natural gravitation is the generator of the
heavy body, who in generating the form inevitably confers natural
P. Duhem, Le systeme du monde (Paris, 1918), I, p.
Anneliese Maier, "Ergebnisse der spatscholastichen Naturphilosophie." Scholastik (1960), 85: 170.
•• Avicenna, Opera philosophica (ed. Venice, 1508), Sufficientia, lib. II, cap. 1,
fol.
ra.
26
27

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ANTONIO MORENO

motion and all other natural accidents consequent upon that form.
Thus the generans is the motor extrinsecus of natural movement
by means of the form given. But A verroes goes on to assume that
some intrinsic mover (motor intrinsecus) must continue to produce
motion after the natural body has been separated from its extrinsic
progenitor. Since this natural motion arises from the form, Averroes
thinks that this intrinsic form is the immediate mover in natural
motions. . . . The natural form is a self mover per accidens. True
self-movement requires a real distinction between mover and part
moved; this is the case of animals, which move their arms and legs
per se. The natural form, however, is not distinct from matter in
this way. Hence the natural form must move the medium, which
in turn moves the entire body. 29

It appears that the position attributed by modem historians
to Aristotle is not that of Aristotle but Averroes's interpretation of Aristotle.
St. Thomas's interpretation of the principle Omn.e quod
movetur ab alio movetur is based on Aristotle's concept of
nature, which is the cornerstone of the dynamics of Greek
physics. Aristotle defines nature as " the principle of movement
and rest in those things to which it belongs properly (per se)
and not as concomitant attribute (per accidens) ." 30 So if we
want to understand natural phenomena, we must admit an internal spontaneity within concrete bodies for their characteristic behavior. This spontaneity is the result of an intrinsic
principle of movement which Aristotle calls nature. The pattern of nature is manifested in the regularity of the phenomena,
which makes them intelligible, as opposed to phenomena arising
from art or chance which are neither regular nor predictable.
For the Greeks, if the motion of a body was opposite to its
natural motion, then the motion was violent motion, which
was defined as " that whose moving principle is outside, the
things compelled contributing nothing." 31 Hence violent moJ. A. Weisheipl, art. cit., p. 86.
Aristotle, Physics, II, 1, 192 b 21-28.
81 Aristotle, Eth. Nic., III, 1, 1110 b 15. Cf. St. Thomas, VII Metaphys., lect.

29

80

S,n. 1442c: " ... because violence exists when the thing undergomg the change is
moved by an extrinsic principle and does not itself contribute anything to the
change."

THE LAW OF INERTIA

tion must be the result of an external agent which imparts
to the body a motion against its internal natural inclination.
The distinction of motion as natural and violent is invalid in
modern physics; it is crucial, however, to the understanding of
the dynamics of Greek motion.
The spontaneity of natural motions can be twofold. Nature
secundum materiam signifies all passivity of bodies which requires a natural agent to actualize it: " There is a difference
between the matter of natural things and that of things made
by art, because in the matter of natural things there is a natural
aptitude for form, and this can be brought to actuality by a
natural agent; but this does not occur in the matter of things
made by art." 32 The body is endowed with a natural aptitude
to receive forms which perfect the whole, so the goal of this
passivity is the good of the whole.
On the other hand, nature secundum principium formalc
signifies an active principle of spontaneous behavior, which
ultimately is ascribed to the substantial form, since "the inclination of natural beings is the result of the natural form.
This inclination cannot be abolished or changed as long as that
form remains; wherefore, the operation of the natural being
is always in the same unique fashion. Through gravity, for
example, the stone is inclined to motion downwards." aa In
natural beings the agent gives the form of the being, and consequently the inclination and movement towards its end which
results from this form.
It is of crucial importance, however, to emphasize that the
active principle of nature must not be taken as the efficient cause
of motion, as the motor. In Aristotelian terminology the
efficient cause is frequently called active power, not active principle. A formal or active principle is therefore the spontaneous
source of all characteristic attributes and activities which follow
that form, but the principle is not the efficient cause of these
attributes. The generator of the form is the agent, because,
•• St. Thomas, VII Metapkys., lect. 8, n. 144flf.
•• St. Thomas, De Virtutibus in communi, a. 9.

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as St. Thomas says, " qui dat formam, dat consequentia ad
formam," namely, that which imparts the form, imparts also
the properties following that form. This idea is the cornerstone for the understanding of " Omne quod movetur ab alio

movetur.",
In the case of gravitation, the natural fall of bodies, Aquinas's
interpretation of the axiom can be summarized in these two
quotations:
In heavy bodies there is a formal principle of their motion, because
just as other accidents flow from substantial form, so too place,
and consequently movement towards place, not how.ever that the
natural form is the motor, rather the motor is the generans which
gave a form from which motion follows.84
The second quotation is from De Caelo:
Both arguments stem from the same error. Averroes thought that
the form of heavy and light bodies in an active principle of motion
after the manner of a mover needing some resistance contrary to
the tendency of form, and that motion is not immediately due to
the agent who conferred the form. But this is absolutely false.
The form of heavy and light bodies is not a principle of motion
as a generator of motion, but as a means by which the mover
moves, just as color, a principle of sight, is a means by which something is seen ... Thus movement of heavy and light bodies does
not come from the generator by the intervention of another moving
power. Nor even is there any need to look for resistance here
other than that which exists between generator and generated. Thus
it follows that air is not required for natural motion of necessity, as
in the case of violent motion, since that which moves naturally has
a power (virtutem) imparted to it which is a source of motion.
Consequently there is no need for a body to be moved by any other
power impelling it, as though it were a case of violent motion,
having implanted force from which motion springs. 35
In the case of the natural fall of bodies, the motor which generates the motion is the generator of the form, because by generating the form it also generates the attributes which necessarily
follow that form, one of which is its natural place. Accordingly,
•• St. Thomas, II Physic., lect. I, n. 4.
•• St. Thomas, Ill De Carlo et Mundo, lect. 7, n. 9. Cf. De Pot., q. 8, a. 9.

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323

the generator is also the cause of the movement towards that
place, for according to Aristotle, natural place is a property of
the body. Hence the body tends towards its natural place
whenever it is outside that place. Thus, the generator is what
" moves," and the body is that which " is moved."
Now we come to the crux of the argument; the form is not the
pusher, nor does the body need a continuous pusher, a motor
conjunctus to the body, moving it continuously towards its
natural place. The need of a continuous pusher is precisely what
St. Thomas, against Averroes, says is absolutely false. Averroes
thought that the form was the mover and that the motion
was not immediately due to the generator which conferred
the form. In St. Thomas's explanation, however, once the mobile is in motion, the form is a means by which the mover
moves, i.e., the form is an instrument but not the motor. Thus,
in natural motions, Quidquid movetur ab alio movetur shoulJ
not be interpreted as " everything which is in motion must be
moved continuously by something." The interpretation of the
principle by the Arab philosophers and the modern historians
is totally different from St. Thomas's interpretation. Thus, the
Law of Inertia in the sense of absence of forces is similar to
Aristotle's concept of natural gravitation, which is very remarkable.
In the case of celestial bodies St. Thomas again uses Aristotle's concept of nature, although not in its active but in its
passive sense. Nature as an active intrinsic principle always
tends towards a specific and concrete goal. Hence, St. Thomas
says:
It is impossible for a nature to tend towards motion for the sake
of motion. Therefore, it tends through motion towards rest . . . If

then, the motion of the heavens wer.e simply from a nature, it would
be ordained to some condition of rest. But the contrary of this
is apparent, for celestial motion is continuous. Therefore, the
motion of the heavens does not arise from a nature as its active
principle, but rather from an intelligent substance.36
•• St. Thomas, Ill Cont. Gent., C. !'l8, (6). Cf. De Pot., 3, 9.

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ANTONIO MORENO

St. Thomas's explanation assumes that nature as active must
achieve a concrete goal, and the perpetual motion of celestial
bodies does not fulfill this condition. And it does not fulfill this
condition because local motion entails a potentiality which is
never totally actualized except when the body rests in its
natural place. Motion cannot exist for the sake of motion but
for the sake of rest.
And yet, the motion of celestial bodies is natural on account
of its passive intrinsic principle which is matter, for in matter
there exists a natural aptitude for such a motion. There are
no natural places for celestial bodies, but they have a natural
aptitude to be moved continuously. 37
In Greek physics there exists another kind of local motion
which is called violent motion. Violent motion can be understood only within the context of natural motion. For example,
since the natural motion of a stone is downward to its natural
place, the stone cannot move upward spontaneously, for this
is contrary to its " nature." The source of violent motion, therefore, cannot be intrinsic and natural but rather extrinsic and
non-natural. "For if the mobile object contributes nothing to
the motion produced by an external agent, the motion is violent; because violence exists when the thing undergoing the
change, is moved by an extrinsic principle and does not itself
contribute anything to the change, as is stated in Book ill of
the Ethics." 38 According to Aristotle, the mover gives not
only motion but the power of moving the air, or the water, or
something else of the kind which is naturally adapted for imparting or undergoing motion. Movement is thus retarded
when the motive force imparted decreases, until finally " one
part of the medium no longer causes the next to be a movent
but only causes it to be in motion." 39
37 St. Thomas, ibid., Ill, 23 (8).
Cf. ibid., (II): II Physic., lect. 1, n. 4; VII
Metaphys., lect. 8, n. 1442 f.
88 St. Thomas VII Metaphys., lect. 8, n. 1442c. Cf. Aristotle defines violent
motion as: " That whose moving principle is outside, the thing compelled contributing nothing." De Caelo, III, 2, 301 b 18-19.
89 Aristotle, Physics, 267 a 9-10. Cf. Ibid., 267 a 4-5.

THE LAW OF INERTIA

St. Thomas accepts Aristotle's explanation of violent motions.
But in addition he also speaks of a power (virtus) imparted to
the body by the principal agent. The violent motion lasts as
this power remains.
An instrument is understood to be moved by the principal agent
so long as it retains the power (virtus ) communicated to it by
the principal agent; thus the arrow is moved by the archer as long
as it retains the power wherewith it was shot by him ... And the
mover and the thing moved must be together at the commencement of but not throughout the whole movement, as is evident in
the case of projectiles.40
This power, however, should not be considered as an active
intrinsic principle, as is the case of natural motion. The distinction between natural and violent motions prevented St.
Thomas from developing a modern theory of inertia.
Thus, in the case of violent motions the interpretation of
Quidquid movetur ab alia movetur is this: the " mover "is
the external agent which operates through the medium and
through a power (virtus) communicated to the body. That
which "is moved " is the body undergoing violent motion.
We must emphasize that the three different kinds of local
motions considered by the Greeks, namely, natural, celestial,
and violent, necessarily require three different kinds of interpretations of the principle Quidquid movetur ab alia movetur.
It has to be so, because the concrete interpretation of this
principle depends upon the physical theory which accounts for
the specific kind of local motion. In all these cases, however,
the principle is considered always valid.

IV. Philosophical Speculations on Inertia and the Principle
Quidquid Movetur ab Alio Movetur
St. Thomas's interpretation of Quidquid movetur ab alia
movetur is different from the interpretation offered by the Arab
philosophers and modern historians. From the philosophical
•• St. Thomas, De Pot., q. 8, a. 11, ad 5. Cf. Ill de Caelo et Mund., Iect.,
7, n. 6.

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ANTONIO MORENO

viewpoint the main difficulty with Aquinas's interpretation lies
in the causality of the generator once the generator is separated
from the moving body, as in the case of gravitation. How can
the form be a means by which the mover moves if the mover
is separated from the body? This is possible only if a "separated instrument" can exercise its causality in local motion.
This is also the case with the Law of Inertia, since the initial
impulse imparted by the mover to the body remains in the
body until friction makes it disappear. Common sense assures
us that the baseball player is the cause of the whole flight of
the ball, and the parents the cause of the generation of their
children, although their action is reduced to the initial conception. For " an instrument is understood to be moved by
the principal agent so long as it retains the power (virtus)
communicated to it by the principal agent, thus the arrow is
moved by the archer as long as it retains the power wherewith
it was shot by him." 41 The principal agent imparts to the
instrument a power by which it operates. This power is not
equivalent to a force: this is not its philosophical meaning.
In philosophy virtus signifies a quality which retains the power
for action of the principal agent. In gravitation it is the form
which retains the power of the mover:
The term passion denotes the effect produced in a thing when it is
acted upon by some agent. Now where natural agencies are in
question, the effect is twofold: first a form is produced, then the
movement arising from that form. For instance, that which brings
a body into existence gives it both weight and the movement that
results from weight. Since the weight is the cause of the body's
moving towards its natural place it may be called a "natural
love." 42
In heavy things that which is generated is moved by the generator as long as it retains the form transmitted thereby. In othe1·
instances, as in the motion of projectiles (violent motion),
the power imparted is not something permanent and essential
" St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 2. Cf. De Pot., loc. cit.
•• St. Thomas, Summa Theol., I-II, q. 26, 2. Cf. De Pot., loc. cit.

THE LAW OF INERTIA

like the substantial form; it is rather a transitory quality which
finally disappears through friction. The mover operates by
means of this power.
This power, however, should not be identified with force.
An anthropomorphic approach to mechanics ascribes to forces
the cause of motion: As we are the cause of the motion of
an object by pushing it, by exercising a force, so any local motion needs a force as its causal explanation. In modern physics
the concept coming closer to power (virtus) is the concept of
energy. Sometimes energy is considered as a permanent quality
of the body, like the energy which corresponds to inert mass.
At other times energy is considered as a transitory quality of
the body in motion, like kinetic energy. But even in physics
the nature of energy as such is almost unknown, although
energy is well known and measured in quantitative terms. The
principle of conservation of energy is the cornerstone of physics.
The modern concept of force as the change of momentum,
the change in flux of energy, comes closer to reality than the
anthropomorphic concept of muscular effort. But again we
know the quantitative measure of force only as a vector, not
its intrinsic nature. There exists, however, a quantitative relation between energy, momentum, and force which is very
valuable in physics.
In the theory of relativity forces have been abolished; Einstein replaces Newton's instantaneous attractive force with the
field. The field is produced by masses which also account for
the curvature of the space. There are in space no natural places,
a necessary concept in Greek physics; but neither is space
homogenous and isotropic nor is it merely receptive and passive, as Newton thought it to be. There are no natural places
in space, but there are natural paths in the space-time continuum that bodies follow in their motion without recourse to
forces. The natural motion of the Aristotelian world is similar
to the natural motion of the world of Einstein. In both, motion of bodies is spontaneous and natural, and in both it is
a consequence of properties of space, which influence the mo-

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ANTONIO MORENO

tion of bodies. The geodesic is the natural path that bodies
spontaneously follow in their motion. The space is active, and
motion is free. As Hegel put it: " The stars are not pulled this
way and that by mechanical forces; theirs is a free motion.
They go on this way, as the ancients said, like the blessed
gods." 43
According to Whitehead, the Greek classification of motions
into violent and natural is a hasty one based on trivialities.u
In the eyes of following generations the classification of masses
into inertial and gravitational, and energies into kinetic and
potential, now totally unified by Einstein, will probably seem
trivial and hasty. In the historical context of Greek dynamics,
however, the classification of motions into violent and natural
is logical. Natural places are conceived as intrinsic properties
of bodies which spontaneously tend towards them in order to
acquire rest. Accordingly, a motion opposite to natural motion must be violent, and it must be explained by recourse to
an extrinsic mover, for nothing intrinsic can be ascribed to the
body itself as the cause of that motion. This conception is now,
of course, outmoded, because natural places are not thought
to exist.
In spite of this, however, the theory of "impetus," historically speaking, is an Aristotelian development. It was developed by scholastics through their discussion of instrumentai
causality in the sacraments and reproduction, as Maier has
shown.45 In 1320 Francis Rossi, a Franciscan, showed that
the projectile has within it a certain residing power (mrtus)
by which motion is produced. The projectile motion cannot
be explained by the air but must be explained by a virtus imparted to the body by the motor. This virtus is conceived
simply as an instrumental power separated from the true cause
which conferred the virtus.
In Buridan's case the "impetus" is also conceived as ex•• Hegel, Werke
ed.), Bd. 7, Abt 1, p. 97.
u A. Whitehead, op. cit., pp. 174-175.
•• A. Maier, Zwei Grundprobleme, pp.

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329

trinsic to the nature of the body and destined to be extinguished by the natural forces of the body. It is simply a
vehicle by which the mover achieves his goal. Finally Domingo
de Soto, a Spanish Dominican, conceived the impetus not as a
mover but rather as an instrument of the agent, which is the
only motor. The development of the concept of " impetus "
goes from the medium as the initial cause of the continuation
of motion, to the concept of power (virtus) which is conceived
as a certain quality received transitorily by the body, as the
instrument by which the mover continues the motion. Thus
" impetus," a quality which necessarily diminishes due to the
opposing natural forces, is a borrowed quality which acts without being a mover. 46
In physics the energy which corresponds to the " impetus "
is called kinetic energy (i mv2 ) • But we should bear in mind·
that the kinetic energy as such, i. e., isolated from other physical
factors, does not furnish full justification of local motion, because the inertia of the body depends upon other bodies and
the total energy of the universe. In Einstein's world, space,
time, and matter became united into one single and inseparable
structure which includes the entire physical world.
The Aristotelian concept of natural motion, regardless of how
outmoded it may appear to modern mentalities, is in itself
sufficient to show the genius of the Greek philosopher. From
the philosophical viewpoint it is easier to conceive an anthropomorphic concept of mechanics based on forces than a
non-anthropomorphic concept based on natural places. Aristotle teaches us the danger of physical hypothesis based exculsively on pure mechanical models. Einstein's world is not
conceived as a mechanical model, and Quantum Theory even
less. Einstein conceives inertia not as an intrinsic property
but as a property dependent on the space-time continuum,
which in its turn depends on matter and energy. This concept
of inertia is much more valuable than the Newtonian concept.
•• See J. A. Weisheipl, Nature and Gravitation (River Forest, Dlinois, 1955),
p. 88-44.

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ANTONIO MORENO

In the last analysis, however, we are yet ignorant of the ultimate causes of local motion. Newton himself was aware of
this when he wrote to Bentley: " You sometimes speak of
gravity as essential and inherent to matter. Pray do not ascribe
that notion to me; for the cause of gravity is what I do not
pretend to know, and therefore would take more time to
sider it." 47 On another occasion he says: " Gravity must be
caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws;
but whether this agent be material or immaterial, I have left
to the consideration of my readers." 48
In conclusion we may say that we do not know what inertia
is or the causes of local motion. The fact of motion is clearly
manifested to us by the testimony of the senses. The explanation and justification of this mysterious phenomenon, however,
is one of the greatest mysteries of nature and a challenge to
philosophers and physicists. The most basic concepts of philosophy of nature are yet unknown; inertia is one of them. For
centuries the influence of Newtonian physics was so great
that everyone believed in the absolute certitude of his laws.
Now, however, philosophers and physicists are well aware of
how difficult it is to discover the fundamental laws of physics
and of the dialectical approach of modern physics, based on
free hypothesis. As Max von Laue says: " Here we feel with
particular intensity that physics is never completed, but that
it approaches truth step by step, changing for ever." 49
Futhermore, the discovery of new concepts and laws to replace the old ones is the exclusive prerogative of a few geniuses.
The discovery of new workable theories is usually a slow
ess which takes centuries. The progress of physics is slow; the
results tentative and incomplete. As Hanson put it:
Every law within physics is a cornucopia of philosophical
plexities and conceptual excitement . . . The fundamental laws
•• Letter to Bentley, 169:t, In Edleston, Corre$fJondence of Sir Isaac Newtcn and
Professor Cotes (London, 1850), p. 159.

•• Ibid.,
•• ;u!lx vqn J,aue1 art,

pp. 58S-S4,

THE LAW OF INERTIA

881

of statics and kinematics, ,of optics and dynamics, of celestial bodies
and microphysical interactions, these contain the most profound
challenges to the human understanding to be confronted in our time.
And the Law of Inertia, sometimes characterized as the simplest
of them all, turns out to embody challenges as profound as any of
them. 50

These philosophical and physical considerations should be
taken into consideration in evaluating the validity of the Law
of Inertia. And these considerations should also be taken into
account in order to evaluate the validity of Quidquid movetur
ab alio movetur. The principle appears as an immediate consequence of the definition of motion. But since in the case
of local motion the true causes of it are unknown, the specific
interpretation of the principle is also unknown, because this
interpretation depends upon these unknown causes.
ANTONIO MoRENO,

Graduate Theological Union
Berkeley, California

60

N. R. Hanson, art. cit., p. 121.

O.P.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT
ESSE: A COMPARISON

I. THE Goo-PROBLEM

I

N AN AGE characterized by intellectual restlessness it
is perhaps not so strange that man should show an uncommon concern for the problems of God and religious
language. Experiencing the harrowing symptoms of cultural
shock the man of the latter part of the twentieth century
impatiently casts about for the meaning of human existence,
and, regardless of the ultimate direction of this thought, almost compulsively engages in an analysis and reexamination of
the problem of God. In his alienation and technological loneliness contemporary man craves a transcendental companionship which will reassure him of the importance of his limited
life span, and will somehow free him from the fearful judgment
that human existence is absurd. He rebels against the concept
of an all-perfect and unchanging God, for he cannot see how
such a God could be relevant to his own life and contemporary
society. 1 Yet, after attempting to refashion God according to
his own image, and having reduced the transcendental aspect
of God to that of mere immanentism, or shadowy presence,
his agony of estrangement begins anew, for he recognizes that
a God made in his own image cannot free him from the torments
1 Schubett M. Ogden, e. g. sums up the current God-crisis this way:
" Man today
finds this [traditional] form of faith so objectionable because it directly contradicts his profound secularity, his deep conviction of the reality and significance
of this world of time and change and of his own life within it. . . . We now
realize that whatever is real and important must somehow include the present
world of becoming which we must certainly know and affirm, and this means
that we find the classical form of Christian theism simply incredible." " Toward
a New Theism," as found in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Delwin
Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., Gene Reeves, Editors (New York: The BohbsMerrill Co., 1971), pp. 180-181.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

333

of his own doubts about the meaning of history and the great
"human experiment."
Thus it is not surprising that the philosopher's concern for
ultimate meaning should inevitably lead him back to a reevaluation of the problem of God. How man responds to that
problem will just as inevitably shape his vision of himself, of
his world, and of all mankind. Even though for some God may
be dead, the problem of God is very much alive. The resurgence
of religious philosophy and philosophical theology in the academic circles of our own day gives evidence of the centrality of
this concern with God and the transcendental in human consciOusness.
How the philosopher formulates the God-problem and his
success in dealing with it depends quite obviously on his own
vision of reality, for from this vision are fashioned the instruments he will employ in conducting his analysis. Living as he
does in a post-nineteenth-century
world it is wholly understandable that contemporary man should be almost instinctively aware of his own dizzying pace of cultural and technological
development. Time has become for him an essential ingredient
of the progress formula, and he has come to view life itseli
as an evolution toward a higher and higher synthesis. The
basic paradigm of much of contemporary theological philosophy
has become process, and the Greek world is now commonly
looked upon as representative of naive, atavistic thinking, incapable of containing the new heady wines of thought pressed
from the rich, insightful grapes of a maturing and expanding
world.
In view of these developments it appears opportune that
the voice of one who spoke of the God-problem with profound
human conviction and insight be allowed to re-enter the dialogue. It has been 700 years since the death of St. Thomas
Aquinas, but the passing of seven centuries has not stilled his
voice nor has it obscured the lucid musings of his mind. It
is regrettable that many who speak of his thought with thinlydisguised disdain or patronizing condescension present uncon-

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

vincing evidence of having read him carefully. Aquinas's
thoughts on philosophical theology and on the God-problem
cannot be gleaned from the ubiquitously quoted Question II
of the First Part of the Summa Theologiae alone, where he
presents his famous five ways. As a workman and skilled
artisan who displayed uncommon respect for his subject matter, Aquinas exercised the greatest care in selecting and fashioning the intellectual tools he would employ in his confrontation
with man's profoundest problem, the problem of God.
With his exquisite sensitivity to the earthly dimension of
human existence Aquinas evades the alluring temptation of
attempting to speak of God without first concerning himself
with man. He realized the need of an adequate method, and
of trustworthy tools, all of which he fashioned from an authentic
continuing reflexion on his own human experience.
It is commonplace to say that Aquinas's theory of being
is the key to his metaphysics and to the manner in which he
formulates the question of God. Accordingly, this essay will
seek to expose the basic anatomy of his thinking on the God
problem by concentrating on the similarities and differences
in his teaching between what he terms the act of being, common
being, and subsistent being, God.
For all his angelic clarity Aquinas knew well enough that
a philosopher is not an angel and that a metaphysics which
does not arise out of the mesh of human experience and does
not evolve from a continuing dialectic between matter and
spirit was condemned from the start to dissipate itself eventually into the unreality of subjective whim and caprice. To
reach God the humane philosopher cannot begin with him.
Aquinas's philosophic world is, perhaps more than that of any
other philosopher's, a world of being. For him, being is the
axle around which the entire wheel of human experience turns.
It is the atmosphere which man breathes and within which he
lives, thinks, and decides. It is ever present, inescapable, and all
life is but a variant form of being. Being is the ultimate invariant within a world of variance. For Aquinas, being is at once

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

335

primordial and derived, concrete and abstract, essential and
transcendental, real and logical, finite and infinite, present and
absent. The manner in which it is all these without losing its
own identity is that which constitutes it as as a profound enigma.
It was Aquinas's concern as a philosopher to demythologize
this enigma without destroying its truth. He sought for a unity
between the human experience and the human condition which
honestly respected the many-sidedness of that experience while
unerringly focusing on its penetrating patterns of interrelatedness.

II. EssE AND METAPHYSics
Aquinas begins his reflection on being by informing us that
it can be understood in two ways. It can, he says, either refer
to the being we give expression to in the ten categories, or it
can refer to the truth of propositions. The latter can refer not
only to things that are but also to " things" that are not, viz.,
privations. Consequently, being as expressed in propositions
cannot be the primary meaning of being. Thus propositional
being only concerns the philosopher to the extent that it bears
some relation to being as it is found in things. The being we
recognize according to the ten categories, however, pertains to
being as it authentically is and not as merely imagined or
thought of. It is here, then, that it is authentically expressed,
and it is with this meaning of being that the philosopher is
truly concerned. 2
Yet the enigma of being remains, because it is found in all
ten categories. In which of these is being principally found
and why? Though these appear to be the questions Aristotle
asked, it is not precisely the question Aquinas raises, for it is
clear to him that the ultimate meaning of being, if it is found
in the ten categories, cannot be derived from any one of the
categories but must in some sense be transcategorical. Consequently, for Aquinas, being does not take its name from the
essential structure that beings have, nor from the accidental
• cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 1.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

categories attributable to them, in short, any categorical structure, but rather from what he calls the act of being, esse, by
which the categorial structures are. For Aquinas, the distinction between the essence of a thing and the actuality of essence
is crucial to his metaphysical theory. For him, something is
called a being because it is and not because of its particular
essential determination or accidental characteristics. To be a
being is to share in an actuality immanent to but not encompassed by essence. It is this unique characteristic of this actuality that it ·is that by which something is denominated
" a being " which will presently concern us.
The polivalent and flexible manner in which " being " is
encountered in experience leads Aquinas to conclude outright
that being cannot be anything at all by which something
is in a particular way. 3 Thus he concludes that" ... things are
not distinguished one from another in that they are, because
in this respect they are similar." 4 Thus Aquinas gives to that
actuality by which whatever is, is, the name esse. Esse is not
a thing, yet it is found in things. It does not subsist; rather
it inheres in that which does subsist. 5 Esse as esse cannot be
diverse. 6 Consequently, any diversification of esse must come
from something other than esse.
Because the act of being, esse, is common to whatever is,
Aquinas calls it common being or common esse (esse commune,
ens commune) .7 Although common being exists as a notion in
8 "Esse autem secundum quod dicitur res esse in actu invenitur ad diversas
naturas vel quidditates diversimode se habent." II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 1. Sol.
• I Cont. Gent., c. 26.
" "Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res
existentes nisi in intellectu solum." Ibid. " ... Esse significat aliquid completum
et simplex. Sed non subsistens .... " De Pot., q. 1, a. 1.
• II Cont. Gent., c. 52.
• " Unde et huiusmodi res divinae non tractantur a philosophis nisi prout sunt
rerum omnium principia, et ideo pertractantur in ilia doctrina, in qua ponuntur
ea quae sunt communia omnibus entibus, quae habet subiectum ens inquantum
ens, et haec scientia apud eos scientia divina dicitur." In Boet. De Trin., L. II,
q. 1., a. 4. "Ex quo apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret,
non tamen consideret quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed solum ens commune."
In Meta., Prooem. "Ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

887

the intellect, common being for Aquinas is not merely a mental
word. Rather, the intellectual notion itself derives from the
beings experienced, for as he indicates, " Our intellect understands esse in the same manner as it is found in the material
thing from which it obtains its knowledge." 8 Esse, while it
will not be found save as determined and individuated, will
be discovered to have received individuation and specification
from another, viz., signate matter and essence. Of itself esse
contains no limitation and no specification. Thus its "nature "
is such that it can be shared, and it is this " sharability" which
underlies its commonality. Its ability to be shared, however, is
only known through an experience of its actually being shared,
as we have attempted to indicate elsewhere. 9
It is precisely here that Aquinas's teaching on being differs
from that of all other scholastics and from contemporary
philosophers as well. Because esse is not identified with the
essential determination of beings, and only because it is not,
can it be viewed as common. If esse and essence were identified,
the only meaning the expression," common being," could have
would be being as understood in the intellect, for clearly there
is no essence which could be considered common to all things,
unless one were to adopt a strict monist position.
This unique aspect of Aquinas's metaphysics of being allows
him to avoid the very conclusions later reached by Kant, by
which metaphysics becomes identified with logic, thus rendering
metaphysical inquiry equivalently superfluous. It also permits
non est ut ei additio fieri non possit; sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio
et de eius ratione est ut ei additio fieri non possit; unde divinum esse non est
esse commune." De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 6. ". . . esse divinum quod est eius
substantia, non est esse commune, sed est esse distinctum a quolibet alio esse."
De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 4.
• Ibid., ad 7.
• The issue here is crucial to safeguarding the moderate realism of AquinM's
epistemological-metaphysical position. Any attempt to declare "esse" common
through a " transcendental reflexion " on the knowning subject alone is, in our
opinion, fated to lead to a univocal notion of being and ultimately to nominalism.
Cf. our article, " The Transcendental Method and the Psychogenesis of Being,"
The Thomist XXXII (Oct. 1968), 449-508, for a more lengthy discussion of this
problem.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

Aquinas to escape the trenchant metaphysical critique of
Heidegger for whom esse (Sein) always remains an ambivalent
horizon of the knowing subject (Dasein) mysteriously welling
up from the hidden depths of consciousness, and just as mysteriously slipping back into those depths as Dasein turns away
from thinking (Denken) and returns to the" ontic" world of
" everydayness." 10
Significantly, then, the subject of metaphysics for Aquinas
is not the notion of being as it resides in the human intellect,
for this pertains to the domain of logic, but rather the being
of things as it is found in things. 11 Just as important for a clear
recognition of Aquinas's authentic position is the awareness
that, for him, being does not signify the "mere fact of existence,"
or the mere stimulation of consciousness by an unknown presence, but an actuality immanent to things, yet distinct from
their essence, by which they themselves are. 12 The mental aspect of the notion of being has indeed its vital and essential
role to play in the philosophy of Aquinas, but it is a subsidiary
and derived role and does not constitute the subject itself of
the science of metaphysics. That subject is ens commune or
esse which, although it is found in material being, is nevertheless found to be intrinsically independent of matter. 13 Thus,
1 ° Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, John
MacQuarrie & Ed. Robinson, esp.
Division II, Ch. 3, pp. 349-382.
11 We have
discussed the relation between Metaphysics and Logic at some
length in a previous article. Cf. "Logic and the Method of Metaphysics," The
Thomist XXIX (Oct. 1965), 341-395.
10 This point
has been effectively underscored by Cornelio Fabro, who feels
that it is terminologically unfortunate that some contemporary Thomists have
exchanged the term, esse, for " existence." Fabro protests against what he feels
is: " ... 'the over-simplified attitude' of dragging the Thomistic esse into the
existentialistic 'nouvelle vague ' which is, instead, the ultimate result of the
existentia of formalistic scholasticism, as Heidegger himself made clear." Cf.
"Platonism, Neo-Platonism and Thomism," The New Scholasticism XLIV (Winter,
1970), p. 90.
18 Aquinas makes this point with great precision in the introduction
to his
Cummentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle, where he says: "Quamvis autem
subiectum huius scientiae sit ens commune, dicitur tamen tota de his quae sunt
separata a materia secundum esse et rationem. Quia secundum esse et rationem
separari, dicuntur, non solum ilia quae numquam in materia esse possunt, sicut Deus

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

339

only by focusing one's attention on the objective dimension
of Aquinas's metaphysics do his profoundest comments on the
nature of common being avoid being consigned to Kant's metaphysical limbo of " transcendental illusion." 14
III.

EssE As IMMANENT

These preliminary considerations behind us, we may now
attend to Aquinas's more detailed examination of that esse
which constitutes the subject of metaphysics. Then we may
profitably contrast his teaching on the " nature " of common
and subsistent being, indicating at once how they differ, how
they resemble one another.
Perhaps nowhere is the realist dimension of Aquinas's philosophy more accentuated than in those passages where he is
concerned with indicating the close relation esse has to the
material, subsisting thing in which it inheres. Thus, Aquinas
states plainly that " among all the principles pertaining to
things, esse is the one which is more directly and more intimately related to them." 15 And, in discussing the question of
God's relation to created being and the latter's dependence
on the divine action he concludes that God intimately works
in all things precisely because he is the cause of each thing's
"universal esse" (causa ipsius esse universalis) which in tum
is the principle most intimately related to each existing thing. 13
Elsewhere in discussing a similar point he adds the adverb,
"profundius," stating that esse is not only that which is the
et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam ilia quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens
commune. Hoc tamen non contingeret, si a materia secundum esse dependerent."
Aquinas rules out the possibility of placing mathematics on the same level as
metaphysics or first philosophy, since the subject of mathematics is distinct from
matter only according to reason and not secundum esse. " Et non solum secundum
rationem, sicut mathematica, sed etiam secundum esse, sicut Deus et intelligentiae "
(ibid.).
"Cf. Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, I, 2, Transcendental Dialectic.
15 Quaest. Un. De Anima, a. 9, resp.
16 "Et quia forma rei est intra rem, et tanto magis quanto consideratur ut
prior et universalior; et ipse Deus est proprie causa ipsius esse universalis in
rebus omnibus, quod inter omnia est magis intimum rebus; sequitur quod Deus
in omnibus intime operetur." Summa Theol., I, q. 105, a. 5. resp.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

most intimately related to each thing but that it is also that
which is most deeply rooted in them, since it is " formale "
with respect to everything else found within beings. 17 Further,
not only is esse the most intimate and profound principle
to be found in things, it is also the first and most common
effect in them/ 8 and it is not communicated to any two things
in exactly the same way .19
From the fact that Aquinas characterizes ipsum esse as the
most common of all things and the most communicable, it
might seemingly be concluded that it is also the most imperfect. Indeed Aquinas himself raises this objection against his
own position. 20 His response is that "Esse is the most perfect
[principle] of all." 21 The reason he alleges is that esse is related
to all things as act, for it is the actuality of all things and even
of the very forms (substantial) themselves. 22
There is, however, one characteristic which Aquinas attributes to esse which requires some explanation, since it appears to
be in contradiction to his frequent claim that esse is distinct
from all forms and is indeed their actuality. The statement
occurs in the Summa Theologiae, and hence its meaning cannot be construed to have been superseded by later teaching.
In discussing the manner in which esse is related to other
principles within the individual being Aquinas states that esse
is not compared to them as the receiver to the received but
rather as the received to the receiver. "For when I speak,"
he says, " of the esse of a man or of a horse or of any other
17 " Esse autem est illud quod est magis intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius
omnibus inest; cum sit formale respectu omnium quae in re sunt. . .. " Loc. cit.,
q. 8, a. I, resp. Cf. also II Sent., d. I, q. I, a. 4, sol.
18 " lpsum
esse est communissimus et effectus primus, intimior omnibus aliis
efl'ectibus." De Pot., q. S, a. 7, resp.
10 ". • • licet esse sit formalissium inter omnia, tamen est etiam maxime communicabile, Iicet non eodem modo inferioribus et superioribus communicetur ."
Quest. Un. De Anima, a. I, ad I7.
•• Summa Theol., I, q. 4, a. I, obj. S.
21 Ibid., ad S.
"" lpsum esse est perfectissium omnium: comparatur enim ad omnia ut actus.
Nihil enim habet actualitatem, nisi inquantum est: unde ipsum esse est actualitas omnium rerum, et etiam ipsarum formarum." Ibid.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

341

thing whatsoever, ipsum esse is considered as that which is
formal (formale) and received; not however as that to which
esse belongs." 23 In describing esse as that which is " the most
formal " of all things Aquinas might seem to be equating esse
with a determinate form of some kind, even though an extremely perfect one. Since such an interpretation would involve him
in a flagrant contradiction, it cannot be seriously entertained.
Yet neither can the remark be summarily dismissed, since it
is not an isolated instance. He reaffirms the same point only
a few questions later. In speaking of the infinity of God
he states: "That, however, which is the most formal of all
things is ipsum esse as is clear from what has preceded."
Again in at least two other instances an equivalent expression
occurs. In his Treatise on the Soul Aquinas refers to ipsum esse
as the most formal of all principles. 25 Though the expression
used here differs verbally from that found in the seventh question of the Summa Theologiae, the meaning is identical. Here
he has called ipsum esse " formalissium inter omnia " while in
the Summa he refers to it as " maxime formale omnium." And
in his Commentary on the Sentences he simply calls esse the
first formal principle (primum forrnale) .26
Puzzling as these expressions at first appear, they can, nonetheless, be seen to be consistent with Aquinas's position that
esse is the act of all forms, if the meaning of " form " is carefully understood. Although for Aquinas form is certainly not
ipsum esse, yet it is a perfection which is ordered to esse, and
hence the more perfect the form, the more intimate its relation
to its own act of being.27 The application of this principle to
the human soul is what leads Aquinas to conclude that the
latter is immortal, since the human soul, being more perfect
than those forms dependent upon matter, is intrinsically in•• Iibid.
•• Ibid., q. 7, a. I, resp.
""" ... formalissimum inter omnia," Quest. Unica De Anima, a. I, ad I7.
•• II Sent., d.I, q. I, a. I, sol.
•• " •.. unumquodque enim habet esse secundum propriam formam •••• " Quest.
Un. De Anima, a. I4, resp.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

dependent of matter for its being.28 Indeed, in the instance of
the most perfect form, form itself coalesces with the act of
being. Thus, in God essence and the act of being are one. Consequently, when Aquinas describes ipsum esse as the most
" formal " of all things, he has no intention of denying the
distinction between essence and the act of being in created
things. He merely wishes to emphasize that there is no perfection which is foreign to esse, since esse is " the actuality of
all acts." 29 Because esse is that actuality, and since it is the
most perfect of all perfections,S0 it is also the most formal of
all principles. Indeed, since form itself merely signifies a perfection o£ a determined kind which is ordered to a further perfection which o£ itself is not limited, form is dependent upon
that perfection for its supreme actuality.
The final characteristic of esse which remains to be considered
is the manner in which it can be contracted or determined.
It is this aspect of esse or common being which is perhaps
the most complex and elusive of all. Because esse is the actuality of all acts, there is nothing that is related to it as act
is related to potency. 31 Consequently, in all its determinations
esse is limited by principles which are related to it as potential.
Thus, nothing can be added to esse which is wholly extraneous
to it, since nothing can " actualize " it. Yet esse is related to
potential principles and can be determined by them, so that
determinations of being can be added to it. 82 This Aquinas
expresses when he describes common being as that ". . . to
which no addition is made, but whose ratio does not preclude
the possibility of an addition." as
By way of illustration of his point Aquinas draws an analogy
•• Cf. loc. cit.; also Summa Theol., I, q. 75, a. 3.
•• Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
•• Ibid.
81 " Nee intelligendu!ll est quod ei quod dico esse, aliquid addatur quod sit eo
fonnalius, ipsum determinans, sicut actus potentiam." De Pot., q. 7, a. 2.
80 Ibid.
88 " ••• ens commune est cui non fit additio, de cuius tamen ratione non est ut
ei additio fieri non possit ... " Ibid., ad 6.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

343

between esse and its determinations on the one hand, and a
"genus" and its determinations on the other. Just as, he
argues, " rational " does not add to the ratio of " animal," since,
if genus " animal " did not somehow contain its difference,
no " animal " could be " rational," so similarly esse indeterminately contains what it actualizes, since no addition or determination can be made to it which is not itself a determination
of esse/ 14 The basic point to be emphasized here is that for
Aquinas no perfection can be added to common being (esse)
in the way that it can to any determinate form, because in
the unique case of esse the " only thing " that could be extraneous to it would be " nothing," absolutely speaking, 1. e.,
non-being.sn
IV.

IMMANENT AND SUBsiSTENT

EssE

As suggested earlier, Aquinas's philosophy of being finds its
uniqueness in his theory of esse from which every being derives
its name. We have attempted to delineate St. Thomas's notion
of common being in order to effect as sharp a contrast as possible between it and his view of God as subsistent Esse. There
have, of course, been recent attempts to find new philosophical
structures to support a new philosophical theology. 36 The criticism most contemporaries level against the philosophical theology of Aquinas is that his God is too absolute, too infinite,
too immutable, and too much a " supreme " cause. 87 They often
•• " Sicut et animali communi non fit additio in sua ratione, rationalis differentiae;
non tamen est de ratione eius quod ei additio fieri non possit; hoc enim est de
ratione animalis irrationalis, quae est species animalis." Ibid. For Aquinas's
detailed explanation of the relation between genus, difference, and species cf. his
De Ente Essentia, c. 8.
85 " Nihil autm postest addi ad esse quod sit extraneum
ab ipso, cum ab eo
nihil sit extraneum nisi non-ens, quod non potest esse nee forma nee materia." De
Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.
•• The philosophies of Whitehead, Bergson, Marcel, Bonhoeffer, Hartshorne,
Tillich, Dewart, and others, all attempt in one way or another to find a God who
is seemingly more directly concerned with the development of the world, and
who, in some sense at least, is finite, and thus capable of development.
87 Schubert M. Ogden, e. g., states unequivocally, " So far from being the wholly
absolute and immutable Being of the classical philosophers, God must be conceived

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

call for a " relativization " of God which one prominent contemporary, Charles Hartshorne, defends in the name of the
"principle of dual transcendence." 88 Through the application
of this principle God is somehow absolute, infinite, immutable,
and supreme cause " but in such fashion that he can also be
relative, finite, mutable, and supreme effect." ssa Thus for
Hartshorne, " God comes under both sides of the basic contraries . . . I call this the principle of dual transcendence." ssb
It seems to us that the criticism directed against Aquinas, that
he has unduly absolutized God, is grounded on an improper
understanding of what Aquinas understands by esse and by
esse subsistens.
If anything becomes clear from a thoughtful study of
Aquinas's teaching on man's philosophical knowledge of God
it is that he is adamant in rejecting all modified forms of a priori
knowledge of God. He allows no possibility of a direct experience of God in this life. All philosophical knowledge of God
must be obtained through the mediation of finite, limited beings. Aquinas is equally firm in rejecting Anselm's argument
which is grounded in the idea of a perfect being. Aquinas is
not an immanentist. He disallows all forms of deductive analysis for reaching God which are merely formal and logical,
and which do not involve a causal structure which is not only
formal but also efficient in nature. 89
The God of Aquinas is ipsum esse Subsistens. The name that
most properly refers to God is " Qui est," He Who Is. 40
as the eminently relative one ... " "Toward a New Theism," as in Process
Philosophy and Christian Thought, Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Gene Reeves,
Editors (New York: Bobbs-Merrill), p. 185.
•• Charles Hartshorne, "The God of Religion and the God of Philosophy," as
found in Talk of God, Royal Institute of Philosophy Lectures, Vol. II (New York:
MacMillan, 1969), pp. 162-168.
••• Ibid.
asb Ibid.
89 Summa Theol., I, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; as Cornelio Fabro says of Aquinas, " ... he
has rejected the ontological argument in a most categorical way." Art. cit., p.
84.
•• ". . . unde hoc nomen ' qui est,' quod secundum Damascenum significat

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

345

Aquinas gives three reasons why he considers " Qui est " to be
the name most proper to God. First, because of its indefiniteness, for it does not signify a determinate form but ipsum esse.41
Second, because it is the most universal of all names, for even
those names with which it can be interchanged, such as " one,"
"good," "true," qualify it according to reason. 42 And third,
because it cosignifies the present, which most properly pertains to God who is above time. 43
Yet Aquinas sharply distinguishes the esse of God from common esse, the actuality immanent to each existing thing by
which it is without qualification. 44 The divine esse is subsistent,
i.e., it is not that actuality of a form distinct from it but is,
in this unique instance, also that which is.45 Hence the divine
esse does not inhere in a subject but rather is one with the subject and with the divine essence. Consequently, no limitation
is placed upon it. Because the divine esse subsists, it cannot
be an esse which inheres within things and which formally
renders them in act. 46 For the esse found in things does not
subsist but has the form as its quasi principle (quasi prinsubstantiae pelagus infinitum, convenientissimum nomen dicitur esse, ut patet
Exod, III, 14." De Pot., q. 10, a. 1, ad 9.
u De Pot., q. 7, a. 5, resp.; cf. also: Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 11.
•• Viz., " good " adds to being a relation to appetite, while " true " adds a
relation to intellect.
•• Cf. Summa Theol., I, q. 18, a. 11.
" Despite the clarity and insistence with which Aquinas has distinguished the
esse of God from esse commune, a recent work by K. Kremer which assesses
the Neo-Platonic influence on the philosophy of St. Thomas concludes that Aquinas
really identified the two. As C. Fabro remarks, this is " an identification which
no one .... had until now ever proposed." Fabro, art. ci-e., p. 90. For K. Kremer'!!
views on esse commune cf. his Die neu-platonische Seinsphilosophie und ihre
Wirkung auf Thomas von Aquin, in " Studien zur Problemgeschichte der antiken
und mittelalterlichen Philosophie," I (Leiden, 1966)
•• " Si igitur non sit suum esse, erit ens per participationem, et non per essentiam.
Non ergo erit primum ens: quod absurdum est dicere." Summa Theol., I, q.
8, a. 4, resp. " Cum igitur in Deo nihil sit potentiale, sequitur quod non sit
aliud in eo essentia quam suum esse." Ibid.
•• ". . . quia esse est actualitas omnis formae vel naturae: non enim bonitas
vel humanitas significatur in actu, nisi prout significamus earn esse. Oportet igitur
quod ipsum esse comparetur ad essentiam quae est aliud ab ipso, sicut actus ad
potentiam. . . ." Ibid.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

cipium) ,47 since it is limited and determined by the very form
it actuates. 48
Because the esse of things receives formal determination from
the form into which it is received, it is somehow (quasi) caused.
Wherefore, Aquinas argues that, if the divine esse were one with
the esse of things, the divine being would itself be caused. 49
Further on he remarks that, were the divine esse one with the
esse of things, it could not subsist, since the only " place "
where esse commwne is found apart from things is in the human intellect. 50
Although "He Who Is" is God's rrwst proper name, since,
as seen, it derives from esse, which is the most indeterminate,
universal, and atemporal of names, it does not follow from this
that the subsistent divine esse is dependent upon something
else for its individuation. Rather, the divine esse, precisely
because it is subsistent, is distinct from every other act of being,
for a positive rather than a negative reason. It is unique in
that it subsists and is thus unlimited and undetermined. Every
other act of being, however, is limited by the form which it
actuates. 51
Hence, the divine esse, as it is totally outside the pale of
determination, differs from the esse of created things in that
it is the fullness of being and is pure actuality. 52 Not only i:'l
'""Esse enim rei ... qnasi constituitur per principia essentiae." Cf. I Cont.

Gent., c. 26, # 240. IV Meta., Iect. 2, (558).
•• " Onmis actus alteri inhaerens terminationen recipit ex eo in quod est: quia
quod est in altero, est in eo per modum recipientis ... Deus autem est actus nullo
modo in alio existens: quia nee est forma in materia, ut probatum est, nee esse
suurn inhaeret alicui formae vel naturae, cum ipse sit suum esse." I Cont. Gent.,
c. 43.
•• " Si igitur esse divinum sit esse uniuscuiusque rei sequetur quod Deus, qui
est suum esse, habeat aliquam causam; et sic non sit necesse esse per se." Ibid.,
c. 26.
50 " Multo igitur minus et ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter
ornnes res
existentes nisi in intellectu solum. Si igitur Deus sit esse commune, Deus non
erit aliqua res nisi quae sit in intellectu tantum." Ibid., # 241.
51 " lpsum esse Dei distinguitur
et individuatur a quolibet alio esse, per hoc
ipsum quod est esse per se subsistens, et non adveniens alicui naturae quae sit
aliud ab ipso esse. Ornne autem aliud esse quod non est subsistens, oportet." De
Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 5.
•• Cf. De Ente et Essemtia, c. 4.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

347

it unlimited in and by itself, which is also true of created esse,
but it is not actually limited by another, and is, moreover,
positively incapable of receiving such limitation. 58
V. EssE AND CAUSALITY

Because Aquinas's God is subsistent esse, he cannot be directly experienced either within the consciousness of man or in the
world of created things. Yet he leaves his trace in the esse of
created things which " is the proper effect of the highest cause,
i. e., God." 54 The determination itself which is found in the
esse of created things is that which formally constitutes that
trace. The mere observation of the limitation of created esse
is a common enough occurrence, yet the formality of the trace
does not consist merely in the de facto limitation of the created
esse but in the reflexive awareness that this limitation does
not derive in and through the esse itself. Once this is seen, it
is possible to move to the further realization that there is indeed an esse which is free of all determination and which is the
source of all limited esse.55 It is thus the unique quality of
created esse by which, though undetermined of and in itself,
it is nonetheless determined through another, that discloses the
path for Aquinas to the fountainhead of Being itself. For, if
esse were not undetermined of itself, it could never be uncovered as caused, with the result that the human mind would
have no clue by which it could hermeneutically translate the
existence of this thing into dependency on another whose esse
is not limited. 56 In short, the entire philosophical theology of
Aquinas rests on the discovery that to be caused by another
is not an inherent characteristic of esse 57 and that all humanly
•• " ... sed esse divinum est esse cui non fit additio, et de ratione est ut ei
additio fieri non possit." De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 6; cf. also I Cont. Gent., c. 26.
"'Summa Theol., I-ll, q. 66, a. 5, ad 4.
•• Cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 4.
•• From this is seen how crucial for Aquinas is the distinction between the
esse and essence of material things to the development of his philosophical theology,
Without this starting point he has no feasible way of reaching subsistent esse.
57 " Esse autem ab alio causatum
non competit enti inquantum est ens; alias
omne ens esset ab alio eausatum." II Cont. Gent., c. 52.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

experienced esse is, as a matter of fact, both " participated "
and " caused." 58
Man becomes conscious of the participated dimension of esse
in things by observing the multiplicity of beings themselves.
This awareness in turn is brought home to him through a reflection on the manner in which he speaks about being. For
Aquinas the revelation of being is always through language,
for the being of language " is grounded in the esse of the thing,
which esse is the act of essence." 59 Esse," as Aquinas asserts,
" is spoken about everything to the extent that it is." 60
Consequently, either both, (in the case of two things), or all,
(in the case of many things,) are caused, or one of them is not.
Finally, whatever is the cause of all that is must of necessity
be subsistent esse.61
In saying that from the experience of the determination of
created esse the mind can rise to the existence of subsistent esse,
Aquinas is careful not to overstate his case.62 He takes great
pains to point out the difference between knowing that God
is and knowing Who he is, and never claimed that the human
intellect could, in this life, reach a proper knowledge of " Who
God is." 63
•• " Esse rei est participatum." III Cont. Gent., c. 65.
•• " Tertio modo dicitur esse quod significat veritatem compositionis in propositionibus, secundum quod ' est' dicitur copula: et secundum hoc est in intellectu
componente et dividente quantum ad sui complementum; sed fundatur in esse rei,
quod est actus essentiae." I Sent., d. 88, q. 1, a. 1, ad !urn.
•• II Cont. Gent., c. 15.
01 Ibid.
62 Recurrent criticisms of Aquinas's philosophical theology seem in fact to be
objecting to a position Aquinas himself never really defended.
63 Nowhere perhaps does he more clearly present this distinction than in responding to an objection he raises against his own position that in God essence and
esse are one and the same. If this be true, the objection argnes, then we cannot
know that God is without knowing what he is. In reply Aquinas states that esse
can be understood either as signifying the act of being or the composition of a
proposition, which the intellect forms in uniting a predicate with a subject. He
denies that we can know the esse of God according to the first meaning, just as
we cannot know his essence. Therefore, he says, the esse that we do know when
we say, " God is," is the esse of the proposition which we know to be true from
a prior analysis of limited beings. Cf., Summa Theol., I, q. 8, a. 4, ad

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

849

Although it is perfectly true that Aquinas clearly affirms that
God is subsistent esse, that his essence and existence are one/ 4
and that God is pure act, he is equally insistent that none of
these expressions are to be considered as definitions of God,
for God's essence, his substance and his esse are simply unknown to us. 65
Whence it is that, for Aquinas, man's knowledge of God in
this life constitutes a paradox which is not unlike man's knowledge of the world around him and which indeed rather remarkably parallels that knowledge. For Aquinas the material world
is assimilated by man in an immaterial way. Though the human intellect grasps the material world, it does so in its own
manner, i.e., immaterially. 66

VI. EssE AND THE WoRLD
In man's knowledge of God the knowing paradox assumes
its profoundest level, for God is known after the human manner. Here the inverse of man's knowledge of the material world
is true. There the knower exceeds what he knows in dignity and
excellence, with the result that what he knows exists in his intellect in a more perfect way than it does in the thing known.
His knowledge is limited and controlled by the material status
of the object of his knowledge. In his knowledge of God, however, man's manner of knowing is inferilYf to the object of his
knowledge. He knows God through immaterial likenesses, but
they are likenesses which he has derived through his commerce
with a material world. They are likenesses drawn not directly
from God but from material things whose act of being is
•• Summa Tkeol. I, q. 3, a. 4.
••" Deus definiri non potest. Omne enim quod definitur, in intellectu definientis
comprehenditur; Deus autem est incomprehensibilis ab intellectu; unde cum dicitur
quod 'Deus est actus purus,' haec non est definitio ejus." De Pot., q. 7, a. 3, ad 5.
Cf. also, op. cit. q. 7, a.
ad 1. This point is underscored by William J. Hill,
0. P., in his recent scholarly work, Kn!YWing the Unkn!YWn God (New York:
Philosophical Library,
pp. 6-7 and especially pp. 136-144.
•• " Et similiter intellectus species corporum, quae sunt materiales et mobiles,
recipit immaterialiter et immobiliter, secundum modum suum: nam receptum est
in recipiente per modum recipientis." Summa Theol., I, q. 84, a. 1, resp.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

limited and determined and hence non-subsistent. In a word,
man knows the material world immaterially while he knows
God quasi materially, i. e., through the world.
Since God is subsistent being and since his essence and esse
are one, there is no possibility of man's knowing him properly
through a concept which is distinct from God himself, but all
human knowledge of God must be mediated by the essences of
material things. 67 Thus, when we say that " God is," we know
that the proposition is true from our experience of limited
beings, but through it we can claim no proper knowledge of
God's essence.68
Since, then, our knowledge of God derives from his effects,
it necessarily reflects the plural nature of the experience which
underlies it and inevitably involves the composition and division found in all human truth,S 9 both of which are essentially
foreign to God, who is the fullness of being. The composite
and complex form of human expression with its intertwined
clusters of propositions, although it does betray the human
dimension of our knowledge, does not falsify or demean it, 70
for the human intellect reveals its own awareness of the truth
it expresses when it proclaims that what is materially signified
by the subject and predicate in its affirmation are indeed united
in one being.11
The esse which the human intellect knows is an esse that is
derived from intellect's union with material beings, and consequently it is an inhering and not a subsisting esse, as already
seen.72 Thus, it is only through an analytical reflection upon
Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 11.
Ibid.
69 Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 5.
70 " Et similiter, cum intelligit [intellectus noster] simplicia quae sunt supra se,
intelligit ea secundum modum suum, scilicet composita: non tamen ita quod
intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
compositionem de Deo." Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 12, ad 3.
71 " Sed tamen, quamvis intelligat ipsum sub diversis conceptionibus, cognoscit
tamen quod omnibus sui conceptionibus respondet una et eadem res simpliciter.
Hanc ergo pluralitatem quae est secundum rationem, repraesentat per pluralitatem
praedicati et subjecti; unitatem vcro representat intellectus per compositionsm."
72 Cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 7.
67

68

IMMANENTLY TltANSCENt>ENT AND SUBS:tSTENT ESSE

3.51

common being that human reason discovers the need for a
ground for the being it knows and realizes that nothing short
of subsistent esse can provide it. 73 It is precisely the inadequacy
of universal common being to ground itself which encourages
the intellect to turn elsewhere in search of such a ground. 74
Hence although the human manner of speaking of esse necessarily reflects the inherence of esse in a material subject, for
man's notion of being derives from created beings, nonetheless,
in reaching the awareness of subsistent esse, the intellect
transcends its own human mode of signifying and attributes
to God what is signified but not the manner in which it is
Consequently, the claim that propositional truth is incapable
of expressing the transcendent because it views reality through
"Greek lenses" 76 and hence that the intellect inevitably falsifies our knowledge of God by attributing composition to him
is clearly anticipated and rejected by Aquinas as failing to distinguish between what is signified and the manner by which
it is signified.11
Nonetheless, while Aquinas firmly maintains that the human
mind can come to a knowledge of the reality of God, he is
equally firm in denying that we can know God's nature other
than to say that his essence and his esse are one. Thus God
remains wholly unknown and mysterious to us simply because
78 " Ratio autem invenit quod aliquod esse subsistens sit."
Ibid.
••" Intellectus autem humanus cognoscit ens universale. Desiderat igitur
naturaliter cognoscere causam eius, quae solum Deus est. . . ." 111 Cont. Gent.,
c. 25.
75 " ••• et ideo Iicet hoc quod dicunt esse, significetur per modum concreationis,
tamen intellectus attribuens esse Deo transcendit modum significandi, attribuens
Deo id quod significatur, non autem modum significandi." De Pot., q. 7. a. 2, ad 7.
•• This phrase is used by Leslie Dewart and conveys a distinctly perjorative
connotation. Cf. The Future of Belief (Herder & Herder, 1966), p. 205.
77 "Manifestum
est enim quod intellectus noster res materiales infra se existentes
intelligit immaterialiter; non quod intelligat eas esse immateriales, sed habet modum
immaterialem in intelligendo. Et similiter, cum intelligit simplicia quae sunt supra
se, intelligit ea secundum modum suum, scilicet composite: non tamen ita quod
intelligat ea esse composita. Et sic intellectus noster non est falsus, formans
compositionem de Deo." Summa Theol., I, p. 13, a. 12, ad 3.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

he transcends every form to which the human intellect can
attain. 78 In this respect, therefore, created and uncreated esse
do show a marked similarity, for created esse is wholly indeterminate in itself and thus can never be known in itself but
only in a particularized manifestation which is not revelatory
of its entire self. And while it is true that God is "known to
be" through the manifestation of being, the being through
which he is revealed is not his own being but rather the being
of material things. Thus for Aquinas the paradox of our knowledge of God is simply that in the act of his being unveiled
to us in others he himself continues to remain veiled to us
as he is in himself. Indeed, so "unknown" does God remain
to us in this life, even though we can justly claim to know him
as "He Who Is," that the limited knowledge we have of him
tells us more what he is not than what he actually is.79 Yet,
imperfect and inadequate as our philosophic knowledge of God
is, it is, nevertheless, the most valuable knowledge we possess
through reason alone. 80

VII. EssE AND PREDICATION
A scrutiny of the manner in which esse compares with Esse
thus provides Aquinas with his most profound metaphysical
tool for offering a philosophical explanation for man's experience of God in this life. As an immanent yet form-transcending
actuality esse widens man's vision to the reality of that which
is primordially transcendent and only historically immanent
and enables him to relate this experience in a meaningful, human way. As the very field of human awareness in which,
through which, and against which all experience unfolds and
takes place esse provides man with the possibility of speaking
of God. Because God in himself transcends human experience,
man can only speak of him by employing the special language
of analogy. This view is fundamental to the development of
a philosophical theology in Aquinas.
•• Cf. I Cont. Gent., c. 14.
10

8

Ibid.

° Cf. Aristole, Metaphysic8, Bk. 1, c.

also, I

Gent., c. 4.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

353

The idea of analogy is repugnant to not a few contemporary
philosophers. 81 Often it is looked upon as a mythical attempt
at philosophical explanation where in fact no explanation is
possible. Yet to view analogy and analogical predication in
this way is simply to overlook its true nature and indispensable
function, for without analogical predication no metaphysics,
at least in Aquinas's sense, is possible. In dismissing analogical
predication as pre- or anti-philosophical one is really claiming
that metaphysics is an illusion. Indeed, by pushing the matter
back to its ultimate ground Aquinas simply affirms that the
validity of all predication, univocal included, rests on the foundation of analogical predication, for the simple reason that no
affirmation can be made which does not involve the notion of
being. 82
Since in univocal predication the predicates signify identically limited contents, and the very notion of delimitation upon
which such affirmation rests depends in tum upon the presence
of that which is not de se limited, univocal predication must
in all instances be ultimately reducible to being, which, because
it connotes no determinate content, can itself never be predicated univocally. For Aquinas, therefore, all univocal affirmations are merely a manifestation of being as it is in some
determinate way. Univocal predication can thus never exhaust
being's capacity for manifestation. The very incompleteness
of the manifestation of being in any singular act of predicating
is that which underlies its analogous character and which, then,
necessitates the multiplication of predicative acts in order to
unveil negatively the all-enveloping character of being. 83 That
which underlies everything and compenetrates everything can81 This would especially include process philosophers and logical positivists.
Leslie
Dewart has left little doubt as to his own views regarding the value of analogy in
speaking about God. Cf. The Future of Belief, pp. 178-179, esp. note # 7.
82 " ••• sicut in praedicationibus omnia univoca reducuntur ad unum primum non
univocum, sed analogicum, quod est ens." Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 5, ad 1.
88 " •••
Ex eodem provenit quod intellectus noster intelligit discurrendo, et
componendo et dividendo: Ex hoc scilicet, quod non statim in. prima apprehensione
alicuius primi apprehensi, potest inspicere quidquid in eo virtue continetur."
Ibid., q. 58, a. 4.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

not be revealed in its fullness through " anything," but it can
be negatively uncovered as the condition for the possibility of
every determinate affirmation.
Once the indeterminate underlying condition for every
determinate affirmation has been uncovered by the mind's reflecting on its own act of knowing and judging, that indeterminate ground can itself be thought of, and this is precisely
what Aquinas understands by the act of being, esse.84 The act
of being which is found to "inhere" in all existing things and
is the internal principle by which they formally are is reflected
in every act of predication. Consequently, esse, common being,
is the primordial principle of predicative and metaphysical
unity. It is that through which metaphysical as well as logical
community is explicitly forged, and it is for this reason that
analogical predication grounds all other forms, and instances,
of predication. 85 Esse unifies but is itself not unified by anything else. Thus it is the communal principle par excellence,
•• Crucial to this analysis is an appreciation of the inseparably intimate relationship found between logic and metaphysics; a point to which we drew attention
in a previous article, viz., " Logic and the Method of Metaphysics," The Thomist
(Oct. 1965). A nuanced treatment of this relation is found in William J. Hill's
recent book, Knowing the Unknown God. In discussing the question of analogical
predication and objectivity Hill states: " ... the point is that analogical language
does express whether the perfection be intrinsic or not to those subjects to which
which it is attributed; it does this, however, not insofar as it is analogical naming
but in virtue of the content of the predication. The question of intrinsicality is
set aside only in the purely formal consideration of analogical attribution, one
that looks only to the form of the ' saying ' and not to ' what ' is said. Still, all
language must have some material content, and on this level the existential order
is reflected (or, in the case of falsity, not reflected). But this is to take one
back into the real order, to the relations between things as they exist rather than
as they are in knowledge. Logical concerns are now altered into metaphysical
ones, and on the noetic plane the conceptions of the mind are no longer second
intentions but first intentions." p. 181.
85 The so-called " critical question " is wholly an artificial and 'self-contradictory
one when thought of as the primordial question which helps us to clarify the status
between " real " and "unreal " (logical) being. It can only be a " derived ''
question which necessarily assumes both contact with " being " which exists independently of the knower as well as the implicit criteria whereby it can successfully respond to the complex questions reflexively arising out of minds exploring the
nature of its own act and of its own being.

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355

and all forms of predication necessarily reflect its unifying function in one way or another.

VIII. EssE AND TRANSCENTAL

DiscoURsE

It is then this communalizing principle, esse, which permits
man to speak of God at all, for it, together with its transcendental characteristics of the true, the good, and the one, signifies nothing but perfection, even though indeterminately, and
consequently is " essentially " predicable of God. This is not
to be understood as claiming that through analogical discourse
man knows " who God is," for all predicative naming, including
talk of God, takes its meaning from concepts ultimately derived from material beings. Hence the "being" of God, which
is known through analogy, is replete with all the limitations of
created esse, which, because of its indeterminacy, is not subsistent. As William J. Hill explains: "The meaning of the
term is not common to God and creature as if somehow embracing the specific ratio of both; the essence of God after all cannot be constrained and represented within any concept or
name. It is rather proper to the creature and extended to
God in the intellectual project which is analogical knowing." 86
Whence all knowledge obtained about God through analogical
predication " ... is without any proper conception of God and
at the same time totally by way of a concept." 87
The dual origin of human predication depends upon man's
active assimilation of the world and reflects the ultimate dependence of human language on the creative activity of God
through which the human predicative act was made possible
in the first place. This fact explains the unique situation attending upon all transcendental discourse about God, viz., that
the manner of discourse is human but the ground and order
upon which the discourse itself primordially depends is divine.
Only a recognition of the distinction between the cosmo- and
psycho-genesis of being allows one to escape from the ambiguity
of appearing either to have to speak of an utterly unknown
•• Op. cit., p. 148.

87

Hill, op. cit. p. 144.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

God or of possessing a pre- or trans-philosophical knowledge of
God prior to the event of human discourse about him. In the
causal order of cosmogenesis all being is derived from God and
bears his trace, but in the psychogenetic order the trace must
first be uncovered and authenticated in order that the reality
itself of God can be cognitively affirmed. Thus, even though
man must reach a knowledge of God through those things
which derive from him, the perfections he finds in them are
in themselves more properly predicated of God than of creatures,88 simply because the perfections the words themselves
signify existed in God before they were found in creatures.
Yet, psychogenetically, God's effects are known before he
himself is recognized, and only through a reflection on the determined indeterminacy of the being of existing things is the
inescapable need for a subsisting being in the unqualified sense
unveiled. Hence, in affirming the reality of subsistent esse the
human mind employs the very notion, esse, which it has uncovered as a result of its everyday encounter with limited exising things. 89 This is precisely, why, therefore, all forms of
ontologism are incompatible with Aquinas's philosophical theology,90 for he insists that the human predicative act must be
employed to unveil the presence first of common being, then of
a subsistent being whose esse is its nature. 91
The affirmation, " God is being," has meaning only because
the mind is able to divine an authentic community between
limited beings and a being whose nature it is to be. It is, to be
sure, a community more of obscurity than clarity since being
necessarily signifies according to the human mode in which it
88 " ••• quantum
ad rem significatum per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo
quam de Creaturis, quia a Deo huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant."
Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 6, resp.
89 " Sed
quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius a nobis imponuntur
creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus. Unde et modum significandi habent qui competit
creaturis." Ibid.
90 As Cornelio Fabro
indicates, the ontological argument can only succeed if
common being, esse, and subsistent esse are actually identified. " The ontological
argument derives therefore directly from the concept of God as esse commune
which is identified with the ipsum esse subsistens ... " Fabro, art. cit., p. 83.
91 Cf. Summa 'Theol., I, q.
a. 1, ad

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

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357

is known and does not provide even a minimally direct insight
into the nature of subsistent being itself. Yet meager as the
knowledge is which the analogical affirmation provides, the
cognized community between the being of things and of God
is real; it is not mythical or purely metaphorical or merely
symbolic. It is authentic, human knowledge because it flows
from human experience, which is both indispensable to and
sufficient for Aquinas's development of a philosophical theology.92 The analogy of being is, in the last analysis, made possible by an ontological sharing by many things in a primal
actuality immanent to each of them and deriving from a common source, subsistent being, but as a human acquisition it is
only realized in the uncovering of esse as an actuality immanent
to beings yet which is totally indeterminate in itsel£.93 This
is the crucial dimension to Aquinas's metaphysical analysis
which marks off his metaphysics from that of any other. 94
Aquinas's metaphysics of being makes it possible to say that
God is being (subsistent) without totally falsifying the meaning of being as it is applied to created things. Common being
provides man a link to his primal origin, for through it he can
say not merely that " God is the cause of existing being " 9''
but, what is indispensable to a meaningful metaphysics, that
"God is being essentially," not merely mythically or metaphorically .96
92 For a fuller discussion of this point cf. Hill, Knowing the Unknown God,
pp. 141-144.
93 Cf. I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 4, ad sol.
9 ' One might wonder what philosophers such as Schubert M. Ogden would say
about Aquinas's unique metaphysics of being. Would Ogden, for instance, also
include it in his characterization of pre-Heideggerian metaphysics as embodying
" the traditional concept of fixed, static being" ? Cf. " The Understanding of
Theology in Ott and Bultmann," as found in The Later Heidegger and Theology,
edited by James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb (New York: Harper & Row),
p. 157.
95 " De aliis autem nominibus, quae non metaphorice dicuntur de Deo esset etiam
eadem ratio, si dicerentur de Deo causaliter tantum, ut quidam posuerunt. Sic
enim, cum dicitur Deus est bonus, nihil aliud esset quam Deus est causa bonitatis
creaturae: et sic hoc nomen bonum dictum de Deo, clauderet in suo intellectu
bonitatem creaturae." Summa Theol., I, 13, a. 6.
96 " ••• huiusmodi quidem nomina significant substantiam
divinam, et praedicantur

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

For if indeed there were no names which truly indicated
something to us of the divine nature, however imperfectly,
since they derive from a totally human experience, 97 it would
not be possible for us to speak of God in any but a most ambiguous and near meaningless sense. Aquinas cites three reasons why the views that all divine names are calculated merely
to deny something of God, 98 or to signify a relation God has
to created things,\)9 are unacceptable: I) because neither position provides any reason why one name should be more properly attributed to God than any other. Thus, if God is called
good only because he is the cause of goodness in others, he
could with equal right be thought of as corporeal because he
causes bodies; 100 2) because all names referred to God would
then be addressed to him secondarily and primarily to creatures; and 3) because such a position is simply contrary to
the intent of those who speak of God, for when they say, e.g.,
" God is living," they do not merely mean that he is the cause
of life.101
IX. EssE AND ANALoGous

CoMMUNITY

Thus Aquinas's theory of being provides the crucial and
discriminating catalyst to his philosophical theology, since it
establishes the rationale for a community which is indispensible
to obtaining any knowledge of God in this life, yet which at the
same time does not anthropomorphize God. Aquinas' original
teaching on esse inhaerens, because it contains a trace of
transcendency, unerringly leads him to acknowledge in truth
de Deo substootialiter. sed deficiunt a repraesentatione ipsius. Significant enim
sic nomina Deum secundum quod intellectus noster cognoscit ipsum." Ibid, ad 2.
•• " Uncle quaelibet creatura in tan tum eum repraesentat, et est ei similis,
inquantum perfectionem aliquam habet: non tamen ita quod representat eum
sicut aliquid eiusdem speciei vel generis, sed sicut excellens principium, a cuius
forma effectus deficiunt, cuius tamen aliqualem similitudinem effectus consequuntur ... " Ibid.
•• This was the view of Moses Maimonides. Cf. A Guide for the Perplexed,
II, 58.
•• E. g., that God is good because he is the cause of goodness in things.
100
101

Ibid.
Summa Theol., I, q. 13, a. 2.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

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859

the reality of an esse subsistens. Thus the two, esse commune
and esse subsistens, do constitute a certain community of meaning, and from this community flows forth the analogous predication of being of both things and God. They constitute a
community in that both esse inhaerens and esse subsistens
signify pure actuality. The community is an analogous one because esse inhaerens is always de facto limited by the essence
and form it actualizes, while esse subsistens is one with the
divine essence and hence does not inhere and is not limited
or determined. Yet, if esse inhaerens is always de facto limited
by the essence and form it actualizes, esse subsistens is one
with the divine essence and hence does not inhere and is not
limited or determined. I£ esse inhaerens is determinable, it is
not limited in such a way that its determination is something
that comes to it from without bestowing actuality on it as
act confers reality on potency, and in this respect again esse
inhaerens and subsistens are similar, since neither are either
actualized or actualizable in the restricted sense of the word.
Yet, at the same time, while esse inhaerens is indeterminately
infinite/ 02 since, although always participated, 103 it is in and
of itself simply indeterminate, esse subsistens is positively infinite, for it is unqualifiedly beyond limitation of any kind. Because of its participatedness esse inhaerens is also always individuated/04 while esse subsistens, although it is individual,
because it is beyond limitation is not individuated.
Esse inhaerens is of itself indefinable because of its total indeterminacy. Esse subsistens is indefinable only because it
transcends limited essences and is identified with the divine
essence.105 Since it is not subsistent, esse inhaerens is the most
proper effect of the highest cause, while esse subsistens is its
own reason for being, and is, consequently, uncaused.
Cf. I Cont. Gent., c. 48.
"Esse autem cuiuslibet rei est esse participatum: Cum non sit res aliqua
praeter Deum suum esse." Ill Cont. Gent., c. 65.
104 Strictly speaking this is not true of the esse of intellectual substances, but
actually we haYe in mind here the esse of all material beings.
105 Cf. I Cont. Gent., c.
102
103

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

Thus when "esse " is predicated of God analogously it differs
negatively, positively, and supereminently from the esse predicated of limited, contingent beings. Negatively, inasmuch as
all indeterminancy is denied it; positively, in that it contains
the fullness of actuality; and supereminently, in that it subsists.

X. AQUINAS AND DEWART oN Goo
Of course, it is no secret that the philosophical theology of
Aquinas is under heavy assault from various contemporary
quarters. Among those seeking to articulate an entirely new
approach to God by grounding their philosophical theology
on process rather than on being, perhaps Leslie Dewart has
presented the most sophisticated case against Aquinas and the
scholastics. 106 In his celebrated book, The Future of Belief, he
has criticized the use of the term, being (esse), as applied to
God and has suggested that we substitute in its stead the terms
reality and/ or presence. 107 Dewart has assumed an existentialist stance in inseparably relating being to man because, he
feels, the latter stands out from himself in presence and consciousness and understands himself as being. 108 Consequently
Dewart's notion of being is necessarily limited and created.
Thus he will argue that, since " God cannot be created whether
by another or by himself, he should therefore not be conceived
as being." 109 Dewart has insisted on understanding esse or common being in terms of the contemporary understanding of existence, with the consequence that, since only created things
can be said to exist, the terms, " being," can be applied to
them alone. Consistent with this view, then, God can neither
106 While Dewart's basic position on God appears to resemble in some ways the
views of Maurice Blonde!, Gabriel Marcel, Alfred North Whitehead, and Charles
Hartshorne, he also seems to have gone beyond them in articulating a head-on
confrontation with the scholastic tradition, perhaps because he is much more
familiar with the nuances of scholasticism, especially with the philosophy of
Aquinas.
107 Cf. pp. 174 ff. Hill also calls attention
to this in his book, Knr:nving the Unknr:nvn God, pp. 98 ff.
1os Ibid.
100 Op. cit., p. 175.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

361

be said to exist nor to be being. 110 Dewart indeed goes as far
as to claim that " to attribute existence to God is the most
extreme form of anthropomorphism. " 111
He further allows that Christian philosophy has been reduced
to indulging in this anthropomorphism " only because of the
inability of hellenic metaphysical thinking to discern reality
except in ens, that-which-is." n 2 Because Dewart has thought
of being solely in terms of " to exist," it is understandable that
he has striven to go beyond " being" to find a name for God.
In this he follows in the tradition of Plato and Plotinus for
similar, though somewhat different reasons.
Yet Dewart's critique of being does not, in our opinion, hit
its mark in the person of Aquinas, who does not identify esse
and existence and who does not formally speak of God as " He
who exists " but as " He who is." 113 Aquinas presents three
reasons why " He Who Is " is the most fitting name of God:
(I) it does not signify a determinate form;
all other names
either presume it or at least meaningfully add to it; and (3) it
co-signifies being in the present. 114 Since, therefore, "being ''
does not of and in itself signify a " determinate form," it cannot in and of itself be said " to exist."
Dewart is quite right in emphasizing that, for Aquinas, intelligent people are not overly concerned with how things are
named. 115 Yet nomenclature does have its place, for under110 " The proposition that ' God cannot be said to exist ' can be properly and
literally understood by the Christian believer in God, on the grounds that to
exist (in the literal sense of the term, to arise out of, to emerge), is proper to
a being that is, to that which is created or creates itself and is, therefore, a
thing (res), a that-which-has-essence. If God is not a res and if he has no essence,
then he does not exist." Op. cit., p. 180.

111
112

Ibid.
Ibid.

113 The non-" existentialistic"
overtones of Aquinas's philosophy is underscored
by Cornelio Fabro. " Kremer did well to protest against the ' oversimplified
attitude' of dragging the Thomistic esse into the existentialistic 'nouvelle vague'
which is, instead, the ultimate result of the existentia of formalistic scholasticism,
as Heidegger himself made clear." Art. cit. p. 90.
114 Summa TheJol., I. q. 13, a. 11.

115

The Future of Belief, p. 213. Cf. II Sent., q. 3, a. 1, qcla. 1.

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

standing and language are intimately, if obscurely, related, and
what something is called is not unqualifiedly a matter for
epistemological indifference. 116 It can often go a long way toward contributing to a common understanding of what is
meant. By confining the signification of " being " to that which
has essence and which can be directly experienced in some
fashion, Dewart is really engaged in a much more serious game
than mere' name-calling.' He has indeed changed the meaning,
from Aquinas's point of view at least, of the most basic term
in his (Aquinas's) philosophy, with the unsurprising result that
everything, according to that view, has now been tilted out
of focus. Not unexpectedly, therefore, some rather significant
consequences follow, not the least of which is that we no longer
have a meaningful way of referring to God. In addition, man
himself must now supplant God as that which is " most truly
a being, because he is present to himself as an object." 111
Rather than calling God, being, Dewart would refer to him,
(if indeed, he says, we should continue to give him a name
at all), as " ... the presence of that which (though not itself
being) manifests itself in and through being, that-which-is." 118
116 Dewart himself calls attention to this point in his The Foundations of Belief,
pp. H!O fl.
117 The Future of Belief, p. 174.
118 Dewart confirms the view of " presence " as " that reality which transcends
being" in his more recent The Foundaticms of Belief (Herder & Herder, 1969),
p. 442. " What I have proposed is that belief in God is reasonable and wellgrounded in experience if it means not belief in a reality which exists in the
presence of man yet cannot be experienced, but in a reality which is present to
man in his experience of existing being." P. 442, Note # 60. Strangely enough,
it does not seem to appear paradoxical to Dewart that beings in his semse could
reveal in their presentness a presemce beyond themselves, which, unlike themselves,
is not a determinate essence. Yet such a paradox has not escaped Heidegger, as
Heinrich Ott has pointed out: " If one wishes to inquire about the being of God
within the framework of Western thinking about being (and Christian theology
has indeed done just that for centuries), then how could the matter have to
appear in view of Heidegger's understanding of being? It is obvious that Heidegger
himself does not pose this hypothetical question, since he apparently does not
consider Western thinking about being as a suitable horizon for talking about God."
This is found in" Response to the American Discussion," as in The Later Heidegger
and Theology, James M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, Jr., (eds.) (New York:
Harper and Row, 1968), p. 209.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

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In order to avoid viewing God as an object among other
objects, 119 Dewart is moved to employ a name for God that
transcends everything that stands out from itself, that ex-ists.
Yet clearly even the names Dewart employs as substitutes for
"being" are meaningless without the supposition of being. For
even the grammatical form of ex-ist denotes a way of being.
Absolutely speaking, being must precede existing. The name,
" presence," also reveals a similar etymological origin, for the
Latin form from which it derives, praesens, is composed of the
verb "to be" and the preposition, prae," in front of" or" facing
toward." Hence, " presence" merely indicates a state of " being
in front of or before." It expresses a relational modality of
being, and becomes manifestly meaningless when divorced from
the notion of being. Unless God is being, there is no way in
which he can consistently be considered "present to being,"
or " Presence." 120
Despite efforts to dislodge it, Aquinas's notion of being remains firm as the first and most basic of all names attributable
to God. The claim that " ... if God does not come into being
then he is not being," 121 rings true only if " a being" refers
to a determinate, limited actuality, but is simply irrelevant to
Aquinas's understanding of God as being. In his concerted
polemic against what he calls the" Hellenized metaphysics" of
the scholastics, Dewart has given insufficient attention to
Aquinas's teaching on common being or esse, and has apparently
not recognized that the position he opposes is merely a caricature of Aquinas's own philosophy of being. 122 If one opts for the
The Future of Belief, p. 180.
I have suggested, therefore, that God is better conceived as a reality which
is present to being than as a reality which is being, that God's reality should
be conceived in terms of real presence rather than in terms of real being." Dewart,
Foundations of Belief, p.
footnote # 60.
121 Dewart,
The Future of Belief, p. 184.
122 Dewart
has been, it seems, seriously betrayed by his own misreading of
Aquinas's well known passage from Chapter IV of the De Ente et Essentia where
he speaks of the mind's ability to concentrate on the essence or quiddity of things
without expressly averting to their real existence apart from the knowing subject.
By translating "ignorare" as "to be ignorant of" or "not to know" Dewart
119

120 "

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

existentialist definition of being and attempts to construct a
philosophical theology on such a base, one does more than
merely restrict the name of being to existing things. In effect
one draws an opaque curtain between beings and God which
can only be parted by identifying God with a mere inner manifestation of human consciousness and by simultaneously subjecting him to the process of human history. 123
understands Aquinas to say: " I can know what a man or a phoenix is and still
be ignorant whether it exists in reality." (The Foundations of Belief, p. 256).
Relying on this interpretation Dewart allows himself the liberty of exclaiming:
". . . this assertion is nothing short of fantastic: it is precisely the opposite of
what any legally sane, adult citizen can verify for himself by having recourse
to no more sophisticated or authoritative testimony than that of elementary
experience." (Ibid.) Dewart's reaction is, of course, reasonable enough but it is,
alas, contrary to fact! As Ralph J. Masiello has pointed out: " ... another
meaning of ignorare, according to ancient and medieval usage, is to ignore or
not to take into consideration; and it can be established beyond a doubt that
St. Thomas intended the latter meaning of the term." ("A Note on Essence and
Existence," The New Scholasticism, Vol. XLV, 3 [1971], p. 491.) It is truly
unfortunate that Dewart is not alone in his misreading of this passage of Aquinas,
for, as Masiello sagely observes, such an interpretation has Aquinas plainly
contradicting himself. "Had St. Thomas maintained that it would be possible to
have an understanding of the essence of man and yet be ignorant of the existence of man (homo), he would have completely nullified his own argument.
Whereas, he immediately concluded by saying, ' Therefore, it is obvious that existence is other than essence or quiddity." (Masiello, ibid.) Joseph Owens dissents
from Masiello's reading of the text and finds the strict interpretation of" ignorare"
as meaning "not to know" to be preferable. Yet, his overall understanding of
" essence " and esse certainly differs from that of Dewart. Cf. Joseph Owens,
"Ignorare and Existence," The New Scholasticism, Vol. XLVI, 2 [1972], pp.
210-219.)
128 That this is the real inspiration and direction of the "new " Process Theology
seems to be readily admitted by its proponents. Malcolm L. Diamond, e.g., states
that " ... this theology {Charles Hartshorne's] is a startling complement to existentialistic anthropology." He also observes that "Hartshorne's doctrine of
God .... captures the note of personal striving and creative freedom that is central
to existentialistic concerns." (Malcolm L. Diamond, " Metaphysical Target and
Theological Victim," as found in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, p.
168.) Schubert M. Ogden for his part makes no secret of the important role
" history " is to play in the new theism: "The clear implication of the new
theism, on the contrary, is that this world could not conceivably be more real
or significant. Because nature and history are nothing less than the body of God
himself, everything that happens has both a reality and an importance which are
in the strictest sense infinite." " Toward a New Theism," Pr(){)ess Philosophy and
Christian Thought, p. 168. (Italics added.)

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

365

Aquinas agrees of course that God's presence is experienceable in man's encounter with material being and by his participating in the historical flow of existing things, but what his
philosophical theology denies is that such presence is expressive
of God's essence, since, if it were, God would himself be historical and in process. The new theism seems bent on inserting
an "incarnationalist" dimension into the inner life of God,
thereby radically Hegelianizing both God and the world of
contemporary man. This seems to be the direction the "new
theist" will be invited to take once he can be persuaded to
reject, if he has not already done so, the "Hellenized metaphysics " of Thomas Aquinas.

XI. THE FRAGILE STATus oF MAN's KNoWLEDGE oF BEING
Concerned with the elimination of the " degrading " objectification of God that has resulted from " the preoccupation with
God's existence which characterized post-patristic thought," 124
Dewart fails to see that, however valid his complaint may be
in some quarters, it does not correspond to the realities of
Aquinas's metaphysics. God is not a " thing '' for Aquinas in
any ordinary sense of that term, for though he is not without
essence, his essence is beyond definition, simply because his
essence is one with his being (to be). Indeed, precisely because
" Qui est" names " The infinite sea of substance itself," it is
the name most proper to God.125
Nonetheless, it would be incorrect to conclude that for
Aquinas " Qui est " is the most perfect divine name in every
respect, for, although it is the name most apt with regard to
that from which it derives, viz., esse, as well as the manner in
which it co-signifies the divine nature, yet the Hebrew name,
" J aweh," is in one sense more appropriate, since it emphasizes
more adequately than any other name the total incommunicability of the divine nature. 126
'"' Tke Future of Beli6J, p. 185.
Cf. Summa Tkeol., I, q. 18, a. 11.
128 Ibid., ad 1. This is a point which seems to have been commonly overlooked.
Recently, however, Armand Mauer, C. S. B., has called attention to it in an
article entitled, "St. Thomas on the Sacred Name 'Tetragrammaton,'" Medt106

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

It can be recognized, however, that with continued usage
it is inevitable that the name, " Qui est," should become
inordinately "objectified" in the minds of many, so that its
real and original meaning not only fades from view but even becomes falsified. Still, the fault here need not lie with the term
itself, nor with the metaphysics which underlies it, but seems
rather more justly attributable to the " fallen state " of human
language itself. With the passing of time language tends to
lose hold of its primordial meaning, and, as Heidegger has
pointed out, of all names, man is most prone to become " forgetful" of the meaning of being. 127 Indeed, this is a phenomenon to which all metaphysical names, since they inherently
transcend the world of sense objects, seem uniquely susceptible.
Thus the mere fact that the name, " Qui est," has been referred
to God in such a manner as to suggest that he is merely an
object among objects, and that he can be known by man
through proper knowledge, is in itself no sufficient or reasonable
justification for repudiating it as misleading and inadequate. If,
through usage, names lose the freshness of their original and
deeper meaning, this alone does not validate their being discarded or replaced, and above all it does not mean that the
reality they originally signified has become irrelevant and inauthentic to contemporary philosophy. Instead of repudiating
superficially offensive terms, what is called for in our time is
a renewal of the original reflective process by which the meaning behind the name was first uncovered. A kind of metaphysical repechage is in order, and what Heidegger has termed
Wiederholung (repetition) . It is in this spirit that we would
concur with Cornelio Fabro that St. Thomas with his notion of
being is significantly better positioned "
. to carry on a
dialogue with modern thinking than any other Christian
thinker." 128
eval Studies (1972) . Mauer's research reveals that the passage quoted above is
the only one where Aquinas has emphasized the special appropriateness of the
name, " Jaweh."
127 Cf. John MacQuarrie
and Edward Robinson, trans., Being and Time (New
York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 219-224.
128 Art. cit., p. 99.

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

367

Only through renewed and continued effort to understand
what he has already understood can the philosopher retain the
meaning of any metaphysical name, especially that of being.
Precisely because of the dynamism of the human knowing
process and the developmental aspect o£ the human condition
to which the metaphysician is as subject as anyone else, is the
phenomenon of radical metaphysical forgetfulness possible.
There is a radical precariousness of all forms of human knowing that mandates a continuing solicitude if one wishes to know
and to retain what one has learned. This is not to suggest that
the knowledge itself is uncertain or overshadowed with doubt,
but is simply to acknowledge that the manner in which man
knows is temporal and spacial and hence subject to the near
whimsical fashion in which being confronts man and reveals
itself to him in the depths of his lived and ever-varying human
experience. The philosopher has no guarantee that, without
continued effort, he can even retain the convictions of his
former insights, for with the passing of time, he can lose track
of the paths that lead to being, or along which being has come
to him. In short, the philosopher, regardless of the authority
and depth of his insights, cannot permit himself the luxury of
giving up the work of thinking or of philosophizing, for he thus
cuts himself off consciously from the very source of the truth
he possesses, from the meaning of being which alone reveals
the meaning of the beings he encounters and the Being which
lies " beyond " them.

XII. THE EssE OF AQUINAS AND CoNTEMPORARY

PHILOSOPHY

Being is all the more easily forgotten since in and of itself
it is beyond categorization. All the more understandable, then,
that when the name, being, is applied to God, the deep mystery
of his presence and of his nature remains. Moreover, referring
to God as being allows us to avoid the pitfalls of all forms of
anthropomorphism, because esse does not designate a mode of
being but in and of itself expresses a fullness and completeness
which utterly transcends the scope of man's range of knowable
objects. Aquinas's theory of being permits us to realize the

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JAMES B. REICHMANN

very thing Jiirgen Moltmann envisions as necessary if a solution is to be found to the problem of transcendence and history,
for it offers man the possibility of realizing an opening toward
transcendence within the very experiential structure of his own
inner grasping of the being of things. As Moltmann states,
"A meaningful mediation seems to result only if the transcendence which is beyond history is linked with man's act of
transcending within history. . . ." 129
It is precisely this opening that is found in Aquinas's notion
of esse, which, though humanly experienced and deeply imbedded within the world of man's daily encounter, radically
transcends its " empirical " environment, so that it may justly
be referred to as "immanently transcendent." St. Thomas's
notion of God seems incisively characterized by the words
of Dietrich Bonhoeffer: " God is in the midst of our life beyond." 130 When taken within the full context of his metaphysics of being, it may be said that Aquinas has summed up
his own position most adroitly in saying: " ... what I designate
as esse is the actuality of all actualities, and is, consequently,
the perfection of all perfections." 131
It seems then reasonable to suggest that the contemporary
philosopher will find in the metaphysics of Aquinas a flexible
framework within which the phenomena of process and development will find its full meaning as manifestations of an
otherwise " unspeakable " and " unknowable " God. If he permits himself a glimpse at Aquinas's " vision" of God as subsistent esse, the contemporary philosopher need no longer feel
constrained to speak of God merely in terms of history and
temporality in order to satisfy the exigencies of the totality
of his human experience, 132 for in viewing God as the cause
129 Jiirgen Moltmann,
Religion, Revolution, and the Future (New York: Scribners, 1969), p. 198.
130 Quoted by Fabro,
art. cit., p. 100.
131 De Pot. q. 7, a.
182 Dewart's discontent with what he considers to be the traditional views of
God and his relation to the world of beings has led him to advance some rather
appalling conjectures with regard to the theism of the future. "Let me then

IMMANENTLY TRANSCENDENT

AND SUBSISTENT ESSE

369

and well-spring of esse wherever it may be found in participated
form, God will be present granting it being and continually
calling it out of the void of nothingness, and his presence will
be one of extraordinary intimacy, since the being he grants
them is that which is most intimately and integrally a " part "
of the things that are. 138
One is struck by the elegant balance achieved by Aquinas
in articulating a philosophical theology which depicts God as
mysteriously and ineffably transcending the world of beings
and yet as more intimately present to things and their world
than they are even to themselves. Whatever one could hope
to gain by an emphasis on the historical dimension of man and
his world and by relating the fullness of the divine being to
the unfolding of the historical world of man, seems already to
have been wondrously anticipated and secured by the Angel of
the Schools, but in such a way that God is in history but not
dependent upon it, is present to it but transcends even this
transcending presence. Through his own original disclosure of
esse as the act of acts and the prefection of perfections, Aquinas
at one stroke provides meaning to process in the world and to
a world in process, and indicates why a world in process simply
cannot be merely a world of process.
JAMES B. REICHMANN, S.J.

Seattle Unive:rsity
Seattle, Washington
simply advance the suggestion," he states, "that Christian theism may in the
future conceive God as a historical presence, indeed as History, yet a history
that would destroy neither human freedom nor God's reality precisely because
such a God would not be eternal." The Future of Belief, p. 198.
133 " Cum autem Deus sit ipsum esse per suam essentiam, oportet
quod esse
creatum sit proprius effectus eius; sicut ignire est proprius effectus ignis. Hunc
autem effectum causat Deus in rebus, non solum quando primo esse incipiunt,
sed quandiu in esse conservantur; sicut lumen causatur in aere a sole quamdiu
aer illuminatus manet. Quamdiu igitur res habet esse, tamdiu oportet quod Deus
adsit ei, secundum modum quod esse habet. Esse autem est illud quod est magis
intimum cuilibet, et quod profundius omnibus inest: cum sit formale respectu
omnium quae in resunt. . . . Unde oportet quod Deus sit in oumibus rebus et
intimlJ." (Summa Theol., I, q. 8, a. 1. It is thus totally one thing to view God
as present to existing beings and totally another for God to be that Presence itself
and nothing more!)

BOOK REVIEWS
The Mission of the Church. By Edward Schillebeeckx, O.P. New York:
The Seabury Press, 1973. Pp. Q53. $9.75.
In this fourth volume of Theological Soundings Schillebeeckx develops
a theme which he has previously presented in his Christ, the Sacrament
of Enco1mter with God and his article in Concilium (vol. 1), "The Church
and Mankind," the sacramental nature of the Church with particular
reference to the various functions within the Church and their mutually
interrelated services to the world.
Because the sacramental nature of the Church clearly defines the missionary thrust of the Church, there is a definite inward direction of the
Church which calls forth a constant renewal and re-formation as the
Church proceeds in time. This renewal and re-formation is necessary if
the Gospel is to be able to offer answers to the questions which modern
Christian man puts to it. This is the basic message of the :first two chapters
of the work.
In Chapter Three Schillebeeckx lays out the basis from which this inward
and outward direction flow. The Church is the historical manifestation
and completion of God' plan of salvation. It is the visible embodiment of
the salvation which is already at work within the world through the
Paschal Mystery of Christ. Thus, the saving grace which is present outside the Church, where men personally respond to God's saving will, is
visibly present in the community called Church. Moreover, this implies
that the Church is the sacrament of the world, inasmuch as the Church
is called by God to reveal the world to itself-what it is and what it is to
become.
With Chapter Four Schillebeeckx begins his understanding of the outward direction of the Church. Using the sacramental nature of the Church
which is at the basis of the Pastoral Constitution of the Church in the
Modern World, he analyzes the relationship that the Church must have
with the world in light of the coming of age of modern man with all his
hopes and desires.
This then sets the stage for Chapter Five which is concerned with the
vital place of the layman in the Church. Because of his unique position
as a member of the Church and his Christian relationship with the secular
world, the layman shares in the total mission of the Church as sacrament of
the world. Consequently, because of the rather limited theology of the
layman, it becomes one of the imperative tasks of the theologian to define
clearly the layman's function within this sacramental sign.

370

BOOK REVIEWS

371

The remaining chapters of the volume, which are concerned with the
other ecclesial functions of religious and the hierarchy, are attempts to
come to a better understanding of how these can manifest specifically their
manner of being Christian in the world, whether it be as eschatological
signs of the Reign of God or as signs of the true meaning of Christian
authority. Hence, the whole People of God in light of its specific functions
becomes the sacrament of God's saving presence in the world. Through
its mission it becomes the revelation of the mystery of the life of the
world in its fullest dimension.
One of the principal drawbacks of this present volume is that the
English translation has been six years in coming. But in addition to this,
the book is merely a compilation of lectures and articles which were delivered or appeared between the years 1963-68.
Before publication the author should have taken care to reorganize and
clarify some of his material. The two chapters on the layman could have
been reduced to one; as they now stand, they are repetitious. Some of
the author's attempts to show the development in thought in the various
preliminary drafts of the documents of Vatican II are obtuse and verbose,
particularly in reference to the role of the layman and the Pastoral Consitution on the Church in the Modern World. In the chapter on religious
life, which is an excellent treatment of its sign value, one is left with the
question as to what is the relationship that should exist between the layman
and the religious? His treatment of the collegial nature of the official ministries is a good basis for a modern understanding of office, but the documentation of his reinterpretation of the Tridentine understanding of the
sacramental character of Order is meager. The reader would also like to
see the author's further thinking past 1968.
All in all, even though the English translation has been long in coming,
one feels that, as we approach one decade past Vatican II, many of the
themes which Schillebeeckx has treated are far from being realized in
the life of the American Church. It is one's hope t:hat more attention
will be paid to them during the second decade so that the Church can
realize itself as the sacrament of the world.
WILLIAM

Cluster of Independent Theological Schools
Washington D. C.

J. RuHL, O.S.F.S.

372

BOOK REVIEWS

The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman (Volume XXV: The
Vatican Council) . Edited by Charles Stephen Dessain and Thomas
Gornall, S.J. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1973. Pp. 507. £
in a projected 30 volume series of
This current volume is but the
Cardinal Newman's life-long correspondence and private diaries. And it
is probably the most exciting, even though no volume published to date is
wanting in interest and vividness, or in reviewers' praise. The Anglican
years (volumes 1-10) will be published after the Roman Catholic period.
Volume
covers the important months from Jan. 1870 to Dec. 1871,
a span which witnessed the Vatican Council, the Franco-Prussian war, the
loss of the Papal States, and the schism of the Old Catholics. Correspondence to and from Newman makes much of this history come alive for us.
And one finds informative letters about the Grammar of Assent, which
Newman published in March, 1870.
Rumors that the Council would define the Pope's infallibility caused
to Bishop Moriarty of Kerry,
Newman to write, on Jan.
What heresy calls for a decision? What have we done that we can't be let
alone? Hitherto definitions de fide wel'e grave necessities, not devotional outpourings. . . . Have men who entertain such a project any regard at all for the
souls of their brethren? The frogs said to the boys who threw stones at them,
"It is fun to you, but death to us." Where is the Arius or Nestorius, whose
heresy makes it imperative for the Holy Church to speak?

Writing on the same day to his own Ordinary, Ullathorne of Birmingham,
Newman observed that
Rome ought to be a name to lighten the heart at all times, and a Council's
proper office is, when some great heresy or other evil impends, to inspire the
faithful with hope and confidence; but now we have . . . little else than fear and
dismay .... No impending danger is to be averted, but a great difficulty is to
be created. It this the proper work for an Ecumenical Council? . . . . What
have we done to be treated, as the faithful never were treated before? When has
the definition of doctrine de fide been a luxury of devotion, and not a stem painful necessity? Why should an aggressive insolent faction be allowed to " make
the heart of the just to mourn, whom the Lord hath not made sorrowful? "

To the Jesuit Provincial, Robert Whitty, he wrote on

April 1870,

You are going too fast at Rome. . . . Think how slowly and cautiously you
proceeded in the definition of the Immaculate Conception, how many steps were
made, how many centuries passed, before the dogma was ripe;-we are not ripe
yet for the Pope's Infallibility.

Newman himself had believed all along in the Pope's Infallibility, and
a Definition would merely make a dogma of what he held, on personal
conviction, to be true. He could not foresee God committing Revelation

BOOK REVIEWS

878

to a society without giving it the grace to infallibly proclaim it. And Popes
have acted, in times past, in their teaching as if they were infallible. But
to define this doctrine now was inexpedient-" there are truths which are
inexpedient "-and would harm many. Lady Chatterton was but one
of many correspondents to whom Newman wrote, "I have ever held the
infallibility of the Pope myself, since I have been a Catholic-but I have
ever felt also that others had a right, if they pleased, to deny it." The
Definition came on July 18th, although it was not clear to Newman and
many others that it was a truly conciliar act, due to a walk-out of 88
bishops just before the vote and due to the abrupt interference of the
Franco-Prussian war on July 19th. He wrote to Bishop Clifford on 12
August,
Did the Bishops of the minority openly or tacitly yield now, and allow the
doctrine, which has been the subject in dispute to be circulated, proclaimed, and
taken for granted among Catholics, then I should think that the majority represented the whole episcopate, and that the doctrine was really defined. As at present
advised, I should in that case think the definition the voice of the Church, and
to come to us with a claim of infallibility.

Working from his great principle of securus judicat, i.e., "the general
acceptance, judgment of Christendom is the ultimate guarantee of revealed truth," Newman connected conciliar validity with moral unanimity.
To Ambrose De Lisle on 24 July 1870:
But if the fact be so, that the Fathers were not unanimous, is the definition
valid? This depends on the question whether unanimity, at least moral, is or is
not necessary for its validity? As at present advised, I think it is, certainly Pius
IV lays a great stress on the unanimity of the Fathers in the Council of Trent.

Because a body of bishops, " of high character in themselves, and representing large masses of the faithful," walked out in protest, Newman was
not sure; but as the dissidents began to accept and to promulgate the
Definition, its conciliar stature was ensured in Newman's mind.
Newman had no respect for the tactics of the illtramontanes at the
Council nor for their badgering pastoral approach at home.
As little as possible was passed at the Council--'!lothing about the Pope which
I have not myself held-but it is impossible to deny that it was done with an
imperiousness and overbearing wilfulness, which has been a great scandal-and
I cannot think thunder and lightning a mark of approbation (to Mrs. Froude, !l! Jan.
71) .... the very cruelty of certain people, of which I complain, is that they
will not let people have time. They would come round quietly if you give them
time-but, when you hold a pistol to their heads and say, "Believe this doctrine, however new to you, as you believe the Holy Trinity, under pain of danmation,': they can't. Their breath is taken away-they seem to say " Give me time,
give me time-" and their confessors all about the country say, "No, not an hour--

374

BOOK REVIEWS

believe or be damned-we want to sift the Catholic body of all half Catholics "
(to Bishop Moriarty, 1 Nov. 70).

Newman thought Dollinger impatiently pushed by the Archbishop of
Munich.
Newman's pastoral approach to badgered and confused laity was first
to say that the Definition actually trims ultra-montane excesses and in
fact says very little about the Pope. But secondly, he counselled patience.
E. g., to H. Loyson on fl4 Nov. 70:
There is a fable in one of our English poets, of which the moral is given thus:
"Beware of dangerous steps: the darkest day, I Live till to-morrow, will have
passed away." Let us be patient: the tum of things may not take place in our
time; but there will be surely, sooner or later, an energetic and a stern nemesis of
imperious acts, such as now affiict us.

Newman was clear on what he saw coming.
From feeling that we can really do nothing, I come to think that our helplessness, and therefore that our resignation under the mighty hand of God, is
the path of duty .... The Council cannot force things-the voice of the Schola
Theologorum, of the whole Church diffusive, will in time make itself heard, and
Catholic instincts and ideas will assimilate and harmonize into the credenda of
Christendom, and the living tradition of the faithful, what at present many would
impose upon us, and are startled at, as a momentous addition to the faith (to W.
Maskell,
Feb. 71) .

And the following sounds recently familiar!
The definition was taken out of its order-it would have come to us very
differently, if those preliminaries about the Church's power had first been
passed ... ; if the Council proceeds, I trust it will occupy itself in other points
which will have the effect of qualifying and guarding the dogma.

This letter of 31 Jan. 71 to Maskell ends,
Our wisdom is to keep quiet, not to make things worse, but to pray that He,
who before now has completed a first Council by a second, may do so now.
The dogmas relative to the Holy Trinity and the Incarnation were not struck
off all at once piecemeal--one Council did one thing, another a second-and
so the whole dogma was built up.
Let us have faith and patience (to Miss
Holmes, 15 May 17)

Newman had an interesting reason why the "ultras" dominated the
Council.
What we have wanted, ever since Cardinal Wiseman drifted from his first
policy, and took up an ultra line, has been some periodical organ of moderate
views, yet unassailable in point of theology. But we have left the field open
to extreme opinions and their fanatical preachers--or what is worse, we have
mistakes in the opposite direction (to W. Maskell, U Feb. 71).

A year earlier he wrote to James Hope-Scott,

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Things would never have come to their present pass, if we had our Univers and
Tablet [the "ultra" journals]. For myself, if I want at any time to put in a
letter, I have no wither to go, unless I betake myself to some Protestant publication.

Equally interesting was Newman's feeling that the loss of temporal
power balanced the Primacy and Infallibility definitions. " ... nor perhaps
is it possible in the disposition of Providence that the same man should
be both infallible in spirituals and absolute in temporals. The definition
of July involved the dethronement of September" (to W. Monsell,
Dec.
70). Newman thought the loss of temporals would throw the Pope into
greater dependency on the world's episcopate and its opinions.
Newman had been mentally drafting the Grammar of Assent for twenty
some years, but " it was like tunnelling through the Alps." To Aubrey
De Vera he wrote,
I felt I had something to say, yet, whenever I attempted, the sight I saw
vanished, plunged into a thicket, curled itself up like a hedgehog, or changed colours
like a chameleon. I have a succession of commencements, perhaps a dozen, each
different from the other, and in a different year, which came to nothing. At least
four years ago, when I was up at Glion over the Lake of Geneva, a thought
came into my head as the clue, the " Open Sesame," of the whole subject. (Viz.,
that certitude was only one type of assent.)

A number of asides, punctuating the letters, reminds us of Newman's
sense of humor. An inquirer, wondering about the many writers on the
Index, prompted this:
There would not be many good Catholics to be found in the world, if to be
on the Index is to be a bad Catholic. I believe Bellarmine was once on the Index;
Erasmus cannot suffer much in his company.

And he had a sense of humility. "I am neither Bishop, nor theologian.
I am but a convert, a controversialist, a private priest" (to Sir J. Simeon).
And above all he loved the Church.
When Rome spoke on this subject every misgiving vanished; for, if by some
fiction those who love me will have it that I am a teacher of the faithful, I am
above all a disciple of the Church, doctor fidelium discipulus ecclesiae (to Archbishop of Paris, Dec. 1870) .

The editors have supplied background footnotes to the texts, and as
much " interesting action " takes place there as in the letters. The scholarly
reputation of this series has grown along with its size, and libraries which
have not yet subscribed may find it difficult procuring volumes. The
editors, C. S. Dessain and T. Gornall, are by now habituated to reviewers'
accolades. And I add mine. The volumes simply are good.
JEREMY MILLER,

University of Louvain
Belgium

O.P.

376

BOOK REVIEWS

Catholic Charismatics. Are they for Real? By R. Douglas Wead. Carol
Stream, lllinois: Creation House, 1973. Pp. HW. $3.95.
It is no secret to even the most casual observer of the American religious
scene today that Pentecostalism or Charismatic Renewal is making news
as the fastest growing religious phenomenon in our era. The reasons for
the rapid spread of this movement, particularly in the Catholic Church,
have been analyzed by many, but it seems to me that they were best
summed up by Kilian McDonnell, O.S.B., of Saint John's Abbey, Collegeville, in a talk he gave about three years ago to the Charismatic prayer
group that meets at the Gregorian University in Rome. He chose four
major reasons for the success of the Charismatic movement: 1) People
are looking for religious experience and find it in the movement;
People
are searching for community and find it there as well; 3) Just because
people have been exposed to the preaching of the Gospel, it does not
mean that they have consciously accepted the Gospel of Christ and committed themselves to him, but Charismatic renewal offers the means to
this end; 4) Charismatic Renewal could not achieve any success in the
Church unless it had the acceptance or at least the tolerance of the American hierarchy.
These reasons, I think, help to explain the fact that thousands of Catholics
who would have reacted very negatively to the "Pentecostal " experience
before Vatican II as something allied to the " Holy Rollers " are now
deeply committed Charismatics.
This book was written from quite a different perspective by a man who
is an ordained minister in the Pentecostal tradition, the son of a Pentecostal
preacher, and a member of one of those classical Pentecostal churches that
sprang up at the turn of the century when the mainline Protestant
denominations refused to have anything to do with those of their flocks
who had been "baptized in the Spirit " or had undergone the Pentecostal
or Charismatic experience. R. Douglas W ead grew up in an atmosphere
where this experience was taken for granted, where the charismata described
by St. Paul in I Cor.
and 14 (which Catholics have considered to be
extraordinary) were considered an ordinary aspect of the Christian life
and where " speaking in tongues " was thought to be a normal and desirable way of praying. The task he sets himself in this book is to prove
to other classical Pentecostals that Catholics can " receive the Spirit "
too, since his co-religionists have tended to limit the work of the Spirit
to those who shared their doctrinal understanding of this experience. Mr.
W ead does this in a highly popular vein, with many examples and stories,
both moving and informative. He emphasizes the contributions that
Catholics can bring to the movement if they avoid radicalism and other
pitfalls of the Classical Pentecostals themselves. Actually, a Catholic

wanting theological analysis and exploration of the Charismatic Renewal

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would do better to read The Pentecostal Movement in the Catholic Church
by Edward O'Connor, C.S.C. or Did You Receive the Spirit by Simon
Tugwell, O.P. On the other hand, Catholics involved in the Charismatic
Renewal would do well to read this book, as the author sees Catholic
strengths and Pentecostal pitfalls that the Catholic Charismatic may overlook, all the while affirming what the Spirit is saying to the churches today.
GILES DIMOCK,

O.P.

Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

The Other Dimension: A Search for the Meaning of Religious Attitudes.
By Louis Dupre. Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 197fl. Pp.
545. $10.00.

Something of a product of the Enlightenment, philosophy of religion
has tended to pass judgment on religious statements and attitudes by
testing whether they met philosophical standards. Dupre intends to turn
that about, affording religion the pride of place, and employing philosophical
tools to clarify what religious people do. He means to shift the bias only,
holding philosophy itself to be a neutral instrument of critical inquiry.
His intention leads him to a predilection for more dialectical forms of
philosophy, however, since these-notably Hegel-prove more attuned
to the harmonics of religious affirmations. In short, where philosophy's
critical task has often led it to be unsympathetically critical of religious
life and language, Dupre allows his predilection for religion to lead him
to adopt those philosophical styles which prove sympathetic with it.
The result is closer to what has been called religious philosophy than
to philosophy of religion, however that inquiry may be inclined. For
Dupre re-states many a religious position in philosophical terms, and does
so with grace and judiciousness. This approach allows him to recall how
much the language we speak is an inherently symbolic one, and to point
out how many philosophers have relied upon the symbolic dimension of
language. Once again, philosophy is used neither to prove nor to supplant
a religious way but to open us to the myriad traces of the transcendent
in our everday experience.
Dupre is clear on this point: "philosophy alone is unable to reach the
idea of God." (p. Hl7) His concern throughout is to present those
philosophical options which " pretend neither to invent nor to prove the
existence of God, but to remain' open' toward the transcendent." (p. 139)
He wishes to offer philosophical support to an intelligent person who believes in God. In fact, the book itself embodies the odyssey of just such

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a person: Louis Dupre. Therein lies its appeal and its limitations. No
central thesis appears; its unity is more that of a saga than of a system.
The items considered, the thinkers presented, are germane to the intellectual
adventure of a believer seeking understanding and hence enjoy the thematic
unity referred to. Yet for 'that very reason, these same issues are not
subjected to the sort of treatment that presents them in a coherent pattern.
So, for example, the issues brought into focus by process theologians
are presented, as are more classical treatments of God as being. Similarly,
the conceptual conflicts between divine omnipotence and human freedom,
God's goodness and evil, are laid out. In each case, some distinctions are
made and an adjudication is normally offered. Many a sensible judgment
is rendered, but, lacking a central argument, the reader is not exercised
in learning how to make such judgments himself. As a result, I fear this
book may prove exasperating for a philosophical student of religion, while
it may well elude a religious person hoping to learn how better to understand what he is doing. For the specific form of philosophical encouragement which gives heart to Dupre may well be cumbersome rather than enlightening to someone else.
What appears to be at stake here is the manner in which philosophical
reasoning might lend support to a way of life informed by faith. Dupr6
finds it in those philosophical schemes which themselves venture into
transcendent regions and so offer some preliminary soundings for discoursing about divine things. Others could well find such philosophical
forays less credible than the articles of faith themselves and so be left
discouraged by the encouragement offered. Philosophers would serve them
better by offering a kind of intellectual therapy, designed to show how
conceptual entanglements might be unravelled and certain philosophical
conundrums exploded-so that a person is left free to believe.
One can find exercises of that sort in Dupre's work, notably the line of
reflection which allows us to see how "God is neither bound nor free." (p.
390) But for the most part, the reader is offered entrance to a philosophical
world-view, and one which is ample enough to leave room for believing:
its language and its way of living and of worshipping.
DAVID BuRRELL,

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

C.S.C.

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879

Soundings in Srctanism. Assembled by F. J. Sheed. New York: Sheed and
Ward,
Pp.
$6.95.
In 1951 Sheed and Ward published Satan, which was a translation of a
book of the same title in a series of Carmelite studies which first appeared
in French in 1948. The present volume is not so much about Satan as
it is about the cult of Satanism, as well as related matters, such as the
role of Satan as a theme in art. It is, however, made up of eleven articles
from the earlier volume, plus two accounts of witch trials in the seventeenth century; two pieces of fiction; some brief remarks by F. J. Sheed,
and a selection from The Occult Revolution by Richard Woods, O.P.
(1971). There is also an introduction by none other than John Updike,
who expresses some diffidence "at leading such a parade."
One can understand Updike's diffidence, for this is a very uneven collection. The materials from the older volume are not uniformly stimulating.
Two articles dealing with Satan in the Bible appear to have relied heavily
on concordances to demonstrate that Satan plays a far less important role
in the Old Testament than he does in the New. The otherwise useful
1948 article dealing with exorcism informs us that the office of exorcist
is " one of the four minor orders conferred in the Catholic Church on
the future priest." Fr. Woods in " Satanism Today " rightly notes that
the ordination of exorcists is not any longer one of the regular preliminary
steps to the priesthood in contemporary Roman Catholicism; although it
is true that the office itself has been retained. The obvious contradiction
could have been explained easily enough, but these articles appear to have
been assembled without concern for such small matters as continuity.
One also notes that there are several instances of authors who repeat the
cliche that Milton presents Satan in Paradise Lost as an almost Promethean
tragic hero. This error is easy enough to make if one reads no more than
the first two books of Milton's epic, since it does not take account of
Satan's degeneration, which is complete by the end of the poem but
scarcely begun in the early phases of the action.
Fr. Wood's article, written in a popular style, deals with Satanism and
contemporary life. It is preceded by the 1948 article on exorcism and
followed by another 1948 article on Satan in the Old Testament. Whatever
the reason for this curious arrangement, Fr. Woods does suggest why a book
dealing with the phenomenon of Satanism is needed in our time. He lists
such items as: The Church of Satan, founded by Howard Levy-a former
circus performer from Chicago-who became Anton Szandor La Vey,
Exarch of Hell in 1966; the Process Church of the Final Judgment, begun in London and currently spreading in America; the doctrine that the
three gods of the universe are Satan, Lucifer, and Jehovah; the popularity
of The Exorcist and Thomas Tryon's The Other; various ritual murders;
and the film Rosemary's Baby. He notes convincingly that: "Today's

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surprisingly resistant notion of Satan is an important facet of contemporary
religious consciousness, which demands a fuller investigation."
That there is a market, as well as a need, for serious attention to
Satan in print may well justify this resurrection of part of Sheed and
Ward's 1951 translation and the publishing of the older articles along
with Updike's preface, as well as the other materials. Popular thought,
as Fr. Woods says," seems to be as attuned to the devil as ever," but since
Vatican II the theologians have tended to relegate Satan to obscurity. Lay
readers of this volume can obtain information concerning such matters as
pseudo-possession, dream demons, and the realities of exorcism-as well
as the reasons why it must be so guarded and circumscribed by the Church
with the greastest care. The account of a Black Mass in Paris, taken
from J. K. Huysmans' La-Bas, and the very effective short-story "The
Hint of an Explanation " by Graham Greene, are striking, imaginative
experiences, which vividly present the diabolic drive to desecrate what is
most sacred. F. J. Sheed's apologetics may be dated, but it is not easy to
avoid the force of his conclusion that the New Testament takes the power
of Satan most seriously.
John Updike, speaking as an American Protestant, remarks that most
people in his religious tradition nowadays " have trouble enough conceiving of a deity, without dabbling at diabolism." Yet, he says, "The
world always topples. A century of progressivism bears the fruit of
Hitler; our own supertechnology breeds witches and warlocks from the
loins of engineers." Not to give the Devil his due seems, in effect, io
result in having the Devil to pay. If Soundings in Satanism has its flaws,
it is at least a reminder to contemporary theologians that the Devil will
not be demythologized without a struggle.
PAUL VAN K. THOMSON

Providence OoUege
Providence, Rhod6 Island

Faith and the Life of Reason. By John King-Farlow & William N.
Christensen. Dordrecht, Holland:
Pp. 253. 68 florins.

Reidel Publishing Company, 1972.

The authors are Anglican philosophers speaking in the context of linguistic analytic method and making the case for the reasonableness of a
philosophic theism. They deal with a set of knotty problems in natural
theology: the existence and character of God, the possibility and meaning
t>f miracle, the role of will and intellect in religious commitment, the
problem of evil, and, in a brief concluding chapter, the just war theory

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381

of Thomas Aquinas. In their travels through this muddied field they raise
the relevant philosophic issues: analogy, language about being (s) and
Being, existence as predicate and God's existence as "necessary" (very
neatly done here), time and eternity, the desirability and possibility of
metaphysics (they are for it), and themeaning of probability.
Their arguments are pitched at traditional and contemporary empiricist
anti-theism and involve analysis of the analysts' analyses of the logic of
Christian belief. They are, it seems to me, successful in their efforts. They
will speak perhaps more successfully to later day analysts than to the
hoary elders of the movement who discarded the possibility of even a
descriptive metaphysics. What lurks behind, and occasionally not at all
very far behind, the authors' analytic technique and language is what
I gauge to be a belief in an explanatory metaphysics. But since they are
so intent on providing some room in the analytic tradition for a moderately
traditional theism, they do not bring out the heavy metaphysical guns.
One is led to hope that if their collaboration continues they will issue a
study drawing out the implications of their suggestion that, after all,
being is in need of explanation.
The volume is fast, engaging, stimulating, and very enlightening for
the theologian who is given to wonder at the maze of analytic philosophy
of religion and to despair that it bodes any good for a traditional theology
or philosophy of God. In fact, the book is proof enough that it bodes
plenty of good toward clarifying religious and theological language. There
are parts that will be rough going for one not trained in analysis, but the
text is in major part clearly written and easily followed. It is a solid,
hard-headed contribution to the contemporary debate.
The authors propose a " hypothetical theism," i. e., there are good
reasons allowing a reasonable person to conclude that God exists, and
there are some good reasons for a reasonable person to conclude that he
does not. They reject a scepticism which withholds consent when confronted with the logical and moral problems involved in Christian belief
and, with equal firmness, they reject the dogmatism or fanaticism that
makes reasonable discourse impossible. Their argument for theism [The
Justifying Explanation Argument, p. 89 f.] amounts to putting forth "the
best possible reasons for belief in God "-an effort which they claim, and
rightly so in my opinion, is in continuity with that of Aquinas in a
different context.
Briefly put, the argument includes the following elements: (1) that
experience of such things as prayer, good and evil, an inability to accept
death and pain as surd, dependence (contingency rather than the feeling
of), the restlessness of the "why?" question, suggests that there must be
a justifying explanation for everything;
that giving up the quest for
explanation is, in the final analysis, a refusal to face "Reason's most
important question"; (3) that to admit the need for some justifying

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explanation does not force any (particular?) Deity on the person who
admits the need; (4) that taking account of reasonable propositions regarding ultimate explanation and of attacks on belief, God is still a
plausible kind of justifying explanation; (5) that a personal God seems
"vastly" more probable than other suggested explanations; (6) that to
commit oneself to belief in God seems to bear the most promise of wisdom
and insight in living life; (7) that one is wise to commit oneself (tolerantly)
to a set of metaphysical beliefs which supply by far the most plausible
justifying explanation of history. The conclusion: it is reasonable to accept
certain theistic beliefs with a real but tolerant faith. The theistic belief
favored by the authors is in a " temporally eternal, incorporeal, perfectly
loving and all-justifying personal God of the Biblical tradition." (p. 219)
There is, in my opinion, a difference between arguing that God exists
and arguing that it is reasonable to think that he does. The latter is what
the authors are doing by and large (and hence the tolerance). They are
clearing ground rather than putting up the building, defending rather
than offending (although they do not mince the adjectives in the face
of an opponent's muddleheaded argument) . And we can be grateful for
the expert clearing, especially beautifully done in their analysis of traditional anti-theistic arguments from the existence of evil. (cf. pp. 200214) However, and at the risk of some little fanaticism, this reader
would like to see some unfolding of elements 1 and 2 as grounds for a
(reasonable) affirmation of God's existence. This, of course, would call for
bringing on those metaphysical guns which would undoubtedly evacuate
the field of its analytically inclined occupants before the first shot is
fired. The authors would, in their own language, be " bombinating in a
vacuum." One would like to know the authors' position on why the
" why " demanding explanation is there at all. Or, are the authors claiming
sub rosa that existence is unintelligible without a justifying explanation?
Or, why should what is obviously in at least some serious senses intelligible
demand any further (transcendent) explanation or raise the question of
a transcendent explanation at all? To answer such questions would require a broadening of the philosophic context to include questions and
methods other than those of ordinary language analysis. The authors do
a spendid job of making belief sound reasonable, but they do not tell
us at any length why they think that God exists.
The argument is conducted largely on positivit-analytic turf. My chief
criticism (admittedly possibly unjustified given the chosen limits of the
volume) is that it does not go beyond that turf to raise questions that
underpin its argument. My reservations can be expressed in three ways:
(I) to allow a reasonable affirmation that God exists requires a close
analysis of what leads to a reasonable affirmation, or, to move toward a
justifying explanation calls up the question of what an explanation is
and why we try so devilishly hard to come by them; (2) an exploration

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of the logic of belief and unbelief requires a further inquiry into religious
subjectivity (including its expressions), i.e., is it philosophic argument
that leads one to believe, or something else? And what is that " something
else " ? And, what is it about the reasonable people who do not think
it reasonable to believe in God that makes them think that it is unreasonable to believe in God? Or, what after all is wrong with "fides quaerens
intellectum," (p. 184) and why is it incompatible with the suffering of '.t
person seeking to understand what he does not understand but believes?
(3) Does a tentatively held theism, for all its praiseworthy regard for
tolerance and its disaffection for certainty and dogmatism, really cover
what religious people do and the ways they talk? They often enough sound
dogmatic to me, even when they can be numbered among the tolerant.
Pope John is a good example of this.
We need a logic of religious conversion to ground and complement a
logic of religious expression and belief. A clearly worked out cognitional
theory and explanatory metaphysics is required if one is to erect a
philosophic world in which religious language and expression can be
adequately thematized. I fear that these tasks will not be accomplished
on the analytic turf. The turf needs the kind of plowing so expertly
administered by the authors of this volume. But it needs its fences moved
back as well.
WILLIAM

SHEA

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

The Betrayal Of Wisdom. By R. J. Kreyche. New York:
Pp.
$3.95 (Paper).

Alba House,

One need not be a philosopher to observe that the times seem out of
joint; that Western society is suffering from a deepseated malaise; that
the promises of Enlightenment progress by the application of scientific
method are illusions uglier than sheer academic rubbish, for they have
cheated and maimed the spirit of Western man. But it is the function
of the philosopher, largely ignored or stifled in our day, to diagnose the
philosophical sources of contemporary illness and to discover some remedies
that will restore mental and spiritual balance; so Robert Kreyche movingly
and ardently (but without ever raising his voice) argues in this popularized
call for a rededication to the philosopher's vocation to wisdom. Prof.
Kreyche's style, like the man himself, is invariably gentle and civil, but
his distress at the enormity of our civilization's sickness forces him at
times to resort to strong language to describe the current disorder. The
modern world is experiencing a " sickness unto death," many of the old

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structures lie in ruins; the modern psyche is a:ffiicted with an " existential
neurosis " ; and contemporary society has brought on itself a " mild
neurosis." In this period of stress it is idle to appeal to the usual run of
philosophers for direction and relief. Echoing the sober opinion of Abraham
Kaplan (a recognized philosopher-teacher of our day), Kreyche finds contemporary philosophy plagued with "intellectual bankruptcy." It is overacademicized, imperiously indifferent to (where it has not abdicated :t
sense of) social responsibility, cold to, if not contemptuous of, the pursuit
of wisdom, and topheavily analytical perhaps in the way that the logicchopping of the so-called decadent scholastics supposedly immured them
from the insistent realities of nature and the life of man. The roots of this
depression and decline range through much of modern thinking. Subjectivism, in breaking man's direct noetic bond with nature, led to psychologism and set the stage for Kant's assault on metaphysics. Positivism
reduced objects to mere phenomena and, applied to the social scene,
emptied social relations of absolute moral content. Pragmatism, while
commendable for its concern for human problems, has offered a stone
to a human spirit hungry for metaphysical bread. Linguistic analysis has
swelled into hyperanalysis, a late stage in a narrow methodolatry amounting to an " obsessional neurosis." Into natural realism itself has crept
a sort of rationalism that overtheoreticizes reason, gives short shrift to
appetitive (the line of" higher emotions") and personal components, and
has little or no time for philosophy of society and culture.
As a measure of a healing for ailing modern man Kreyche prescribes what
he calls an integral realism that aims " to unite thought and action into
a synthetic whole." This renewal of realism, a beyond-Dewey reconstruction of philosophy, recommends first a " humility before being "
(Marcel) before capitalizing on the pragmatists' emphasis on making
thought a powerful tool for action. The model stance is that of prudence
or practical wisdom with its real instead of just notional assent (cognitively
disposed for by the philosopher); a wisdom that rejoins together the intellect and will our day has put asunder. Adapting a well-known coinage
from William James, Kreyche also felicitously labels his renovation a
radical empiricism of the spirit. In spite of his originality and his feel
for the concrete, James was yoked to many empiricistic assumptions of
his time, so that his brand of empiricism turned out to be shallow, nearly
devoid of roots in the object, and prejudiced against an enduring ego as
hopelessly "metaphysical."
Instead of dogmatically chopping the given
to the aprioristic bed of Hume and Mill, Kreyche's authentic empiricism
ambitions to embrace all the dimensions of human experience, nothing
human being alien to it: the subconcious, the conceptually conscious (including the scientific), and the suprarational (the province of the truly
religious and mystical). The will-to-meaning that is man finds ultimate
temporal meaning for his existence in coexistence, in caring for and sharing

BOOK REVIEWS

385

with his fellows in the justice and love of the community. Kreyche sketches
a Christian realistic picture of Royce's Beloved Community to save and
purify interpersonal relationships amid the atomization and massive collective forces that brutalize contemporary civilization. To help fashion
a philosophy of culture toward an ideational redeeming of the time philosophers are bid work toward and become part of a " prophetic shock
minority " (Maritain) especially in the United States whose culture, in
many features aped worldwide, has generally overcultivated the quantity
of life through a worship of bulk, bigness, and fast tempo. If we are to
check the drift to the death of man, philosophers must rekindle spiritual
fires fed principally by a contemplation exercised through silence, detachment, and leisure. Thus to respond to the harsh challenge of a sick, decaying society, philosophers must regard themselves, without pretentiousness and without undue irony, as something like secular missionaries of
a rejuvenated Christian humanism to help make straight the way for a
recommitment to a wisdom whose light and life alone can be counted upon
to release contemporary man from a dark night of the mind and spirit.
It would be easy to put this work! down as long on scope, a bit short
on depth, at times rhetorical and somewhat hortatory, here and there
scanty in detailed concentrated analyses, somewhat repetitious- in brief,
a work that falls somewhat short of the most exacting standards of scholarship. But it would be utterly wrongheaded and unfair. Surely the Aristotelian rule concerning the commensuration of method with subject
matter may be· analogously applied to the criteria suitable to the assessment of a work. A scholar who is properly annoyed when his opus is
taxed for not reading as smoothly and slickly as a Time article sometimes
forgets that the converse is equally true: We cannot in justice demand the
strictest technical rigor in a designedly nontechnical work. Qualities like
those mentioned a few lines back that may be registered as debits from
a strict scholarly vantage point are undoubtedly virtues in a volume
geared to a partly unprofessional, middle-brow readership that tends to
shy away from austerely wrought chains of reasoning as unappealing, if not
unintelligible. Nonetheless, we may be permitted to express some reservations about a few minor points of too loose conceptualization and somewhat
inapt phrasing. It seems extravagant to aver that belief in modern myths
"has led to every kind of neurotic disorder." It may be questioned also
whether it is altogether happy to characterize his own outlook on man as
anthropocentric in view of Maritain's now generally accepted dyslogistic
sense in Integral Humanism. It sees incongruous that after properly bemoaning the soft, self-serving, de-absolutized modern morality Kreyche
should express concern over " the Stoicism of modern life." Again; dissatisfaction with the non.social character of Boethius's definition of person
seems to unreasonably require of an ontic formula a performance beyond
its function. Too, Kreyche uncritically iterates the forced opposition be-

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tween living philosophy and rote learning (an Aquinas without enormous
factual knowledge would have probably been something less than a
colossus). The Darwinist survival of the fittest, moreover, is not "profoundly true " ; it comes down to the survival of the survivors-a profundity whose scientific value is zero. Furthermore, while admiring LatinAmerican provision for leisure, some may hesitate to hope to profit from
" a richness of spiritual and religious traditions " in nations whose spiritual
tone does not appear to be impressively high. Finally, in the light of
unabated international tensions it seems pseudo-optimistic to see " mankind
moving in the direction of' one world'," and it seems to savor of Teilhardian
wish-thinking blind to the ineradicable countervaluational tendencies in
human nature (called original sin by less enlightened generations) to
summon philosophers to labor for the evolutionary (inevitably onward and
upward) development of man.
Generally, however, Kreyche's limpid, attractive prose exhibits a conceptual tidiness and precision accommodated to his popular aim. (A
book of this sort, by the way, might be quite serviceable in introductory
and other philosophy courses to sensitize students to the urgency of sound
philosophizing.) In proclaiming to all the critical need of a rationally
articulated life-philosophy, this work links us with the "Know thyself"
of Socrates and one now lost tradition of the early Christian centuries and
medieval period that saw in Philosophy a disciplining of the spirit, an
indispensable means of purifying the soul toward an encounter or union
with God (even speculative truth, Kreyche penetratingly remarks, heals
the whole man). We are indebted to Prof. Kreyche for a vigorous rethinking of the truth that for Augustine, so for modern man, noverim
me (the
of the meaning of man) must precede the noverim
Te (a fulfilling knowledge and love) -but meditation on this latter may
open the door to another book.
JoHN

M. QUINN, O.S.A.

Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

The Indestructible Soul. The Nature of Man and Life after Death in
Indian Thought. By Geoffrey Parrinder. New York: Barnes & Noble,
1973. Pp. 116.
This terse study is a descriptive analysis of the concept of self (atman)
in the Hindu, Buddhist, and Jain traditions. The self is central in Indian
intellectual development as God is in the Semitic traditions; more importantly, the self is the subject for Indian meditation as God is the sub-

BOOK REVIEWS

887

ject for Western meditational experience. In ten brief chapters Professor
Parrinder examines the eternality and indestructibility of the self, its
relationship to the Absolute, to life, death and rebirth, and its final goal.
Much of the analysis is based upon primary sources from the scriptural and
philosophical literature. Within Hinduism, for example, Parrinder draws
amply upon the Upanishads, the Bhagavad Gita, and the six philosophical
systems with emphasis on Samkhya-Yoga.
One of the finest chapters is on the nature of the self in terms of
transmigration and rebirth. The substantial modification in the Hindu,
Buddhist, and Jain views of self differentiate how these three religious traditions conceive of rebirth. The author deftly exemplifies that belief in
rebirth was a stimulus to activity and did not lead inevitably to passivity
as so frequently interpreted by non-believers. Also noteworthy is the
de-emphasis of the no-self (anatta) theory in contemporary Buddhism of
Southeast Asia.
Several factors, however, could have contributed to further clarification
of the concept under study. Parrinder does not employ the category of
consciousness in his analysis of the self, and most scholars today would
consider the use of this category somewhat imperative if intelligibility is
to be found in this Indian concept. The language of consciousness may
well be the sole philosophical modality to clarify the distinctive character
of the Indian self for the Western reader. Likewise, Purusha (spirit)
Prakriti (nature) would have become more intelligible if translated or
at least understood within the context of consciousness. It would have
been helpful, moreover, if an additional chapter clearly differentiating
the Western notion of soul from the Indian notion of self were included. It
is also unfortunate that contemporary Hinduism is so easily overlooked,
for it is in twentieth-century Hindu thought that a high development of
doctrine has occurred in regard to this concept. An examination of Tagore,
Aurobindo, Bhattacharya, and Radhakrishnan would have shown that the
concept of self has been creatively advanced for contemporary Indian man.
These observations do not distract from the value of this book as an
introduction to one of the most subtle and vital concepts of Indian intellectual history. The clarity and briefness of the text contribute to informative reading.
WILLIAM CENKNER, O.P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

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Value Systems: The Moral and Eudaemonic Components.
Guendling. Chicago: Adams Press, 1973. Pp. 151.

By John E.

In this privately published work John Guendling has 1!-ttempted to
integrate conceptions from sociology, economics, and political science into
a review of the two traditionally basic value systems "the right " and
the " good " or in other language " doing things out of duty " in contrast
to "doing things for a pay-off." In the first of his four essays, "Morality
and the Game of Life," he develops problems of moral discourse in the
context of the analogy of life as a game. Many
his sentences illuminate
subtle implications of this age-old and widely employed image. His writing
indicates wide familiarity with current research and documentation in
this area of inquiry as well as in the field of game-theory. In essay II,
"Changing Games: A Theory of Societal Development," the author offers
a metatheory and a theory as a set of steps to be followed in any attempt
to modify a social structure. His third essay, "Casuistry, Explication
and Saving the Appearances," reviews the proposition that might makes
right under the light of diverse rubrics drawn and formulated from
political theory. It is in his fourth essay, "Toward a Socialist Theory of
Morality," that the argument of the book reaches its clearest and most
explicit proposal. By an application of the economic polarity of scarcity
and abundance he advocates creativity as present in a socialistic political
and economic system to beget cooperation among men for the welfare
of the disadvantaged. Whereas monopolistic capitalism maintains structures through the exploitation involved in deprivation, socialism has the
potential of bringing a more equitable distribution of goods by cooperative
contributions by members of the society. The author does not succeed in
convincing the reader because he neglects to provide any detailed suggestions about how the change and redistribution of goods would come
about.
The aim of this monograph which started out as an elucidation of the
distinction between "fair " and " successful " became increasingly confused as the discussion proceeded through the four essays. The style
burdens the reader, demanding much effort for a modicum of light. It is
hard to select what audience he intends to address by his writing. The
verbal creations and the extended sentences of Mr. Guendling do not
help to advance the insights in the discussion toward this necessary and
useful goal of integration of thoughts from the behavioral sciences with
moral theory. Reading numerous pages for the occasional unit of understanding is a higher price than one should be expected to pay for intellectual exercise.
GEoRGE L. CoNcORDIA,

ProvidenctJ College
Providence, Rhode Island

O.P.

BOOK REVIEWS

889

On Reading F. F. Centore's Review of The Problem of Evalution, by
J. N. Deely and R. J. Nogar.
Book reviewers, as is well known, are commonly prone to two serious
faults. One is the failure to read carefully before they write their evaluation.
The other is to criticize the book for failing to be some other book which
the reviewer thinks should have been written. Unprofessional though such
reviews are, it is unlikely that we will ever see an end to them. The
best that one can hope for, perhaps, is that such reviews will be responsibly answered, counteracting the harm and setting the record straight.
A case in point is the recent review in this journal by F. F. Centore 1 of
a work by John N. Deely and the late Raymond J. Nogar, The Problem
of Evolution. 2 It is with respect to this particular review that I would
like to set the record straight.
The Problem of Evolution has a complex structure that cuts across so
many lines of classification that its significance is almost certain to be
missed by the casual reader-a fact which no doubt explains the serious
misrepresentations and misunderstandings evidenced in Professor Centore's
review.
This book, Professor Centore writes, has as its " main point " " to continue the work of Chardin." 3 "As one might suspect," he writes "' traditionalists' like Aquinas are not very well treated." 4 Despite attempts
to "get-with-it and get-modern," 5 Centore asserts, the work has "missed
its opportunity " to tackle "the 1973 problems of specific theories of
evolution." 6 Instead, "it represents a 'mentality' which soars up, beyond, and around the lack or presence of facts of the moment." 7
There we have Professor Centore's assessment of The Problem of
Evolution: it fosters an irrational attitude, it caricatures traditional
philosophy, it deals mainly with outdated problems, and, despite "some
good readings, extensively annotated" (Centore gives no specific mention
of which are the " good " readings) , the work as a whole is essentially
unbalanced and confused. Small wonder that Centore thinks the book
" does not seem to have much of a place in modern North American intellectual life." s
With all due respect to Professor Centore, anyone who actually read

See The Thomist, XXXVII (July, 1978), pp. 611-618.
• New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1978.
8 Loc cit., p. 611. Presumably, Fr. Teilhard de Chardin is meant, in which case
the use of " Chardin " is a mild malapropism.
' Ibid., p. 612.
• Ibid.
e Ibid., p. 618.
7 Ibid., p. 612.
"Ibid., p. 611.
1

390

BOOK REVIEWS

with care the book thus dismissed would be compelled to doubt that
Professor Centore had himself also read the book, properly speaking, before he undertook to write and publish his review. For a reasonably careful look at The Problem of Evolution reveals a work misread and misrepresented by Professor Centore on all major points. I think some criticisms can be made of the book, but they bear little or no relation to the
criticisms Professor Centore advances.
Here I would like simply to review the actual content of the Deely-Nogar
book, for purposes of setting the record straight.
The Problem of Evolution falls into three parts. Part I is an essay by
John Deely in the philosophy of science, entitled " The Impact of Evolution on Scientific Method." Part II is a carefully organized selection of
readings. Part III is a very complete bibliography, keyed, respectively,
to the essay in Part I and to each of the six sections of readings in Part II.
The complex interrelations running through the work as a whole are
rendered manageable, for the sufficiently motivated reader, by an 8-page
table of contents supplemented at the end of the volume by a
double-column index of proper names, subjects, and key terms.
By far the most important part of the book is Part I. Readers conversant with the situation of the philosophy of science in North America
during the 1950's and 1960's know that the main workers in the field
were either of an analytic and positivistic persuasion, taking mathematical
physics as the paradigm and measure of science, or of a scholastic persuasion, the main opposing " schools " of which were represented by
Charles De Koninck of Laval, the Kane-Ashley Lyceum group of River
Forest, and the diffuse movement inspired by Jacques Maritain's analysis
of science in Part I of The Degrees of Knowledge.
Against this historical background Deely's essay in the philosophy of
science, without having to enter at all into the problematic theory of
the "degrees of abstraction," proposes a common ground of the differing
scholastic analyses by means of a distinction between what he calls " the
Aristotelian and the Platonic Explanatory Modes." 9 What this distinction
comes down to, worked out in detail, is the difference between a causal
and a mathematical interpretation of scientific observations. The essay at
the same time circumvents the positivistic concentration on physics by
• This basic distinction is also characterized by Deely in a number of other ways.
The "Aristotelian" explanatory mode is also called the "Causal," "Natural
Physical," and sometimes the "Philosophical" explanatory mode. The "Platonic"
explanatory mode is also called the " Galileian," " Mathematical," and " Postulationally " explanatory mode. Whether all types of explanation can be reduced to
these two, ood whether these two are co-ordinate or subalternate, are issues raised
.and discussed in Deely's essay: see the entry "Explanatory Modes," with the
cross-references there given, in the " Index " of The Problem of Evolution.

BOOK REVIEWS

391

showing how the biological sciences seem to require precisely an approach
to the understanding of nature such as is found in the tradition of Aristotle
and St. Thomas, i.e., a properly causal analysis of natural phenomena.
As Deely remarks in the " Preface " to The Problem of Evolution:
Evolutionary science, by its success, proves the falsity of the view that every
explanation as such must conform to the model or type of modem physics. In
so doing, it does not in any way detract from the power and importance of
mathematical physics, but simply demonstrates the limits of such an approach
to the understanding of nature. Explanation thus proves reducible to two diverse
formal schemes, one in which the rule of explanation is conformability to the
requirements of mathematical formulation, and one in which the rule of explanation is the identification and isolation of proper causes. In the former explanatory
scheme, deduction-and hence prediction-is a primary value; in the latter, deduction is a secondary value. 10

The plausibility and convincing power of this thesis derives largely from
the author's analysis of the difficult notion of " fact." Fundamental to
Deely's analysis is the notion of " observed " or "measurable " facts
(data): the elements of experience for which no logical constructs can be
substituted and upon which all our logical constructions in the explanation
of nature finally rest. These fundamental elements or " data," Deely comments, can be interpreted either causally (giving " reasoned facts ") or
mathematically (giving " mathematized facts ") ; and on the triangle of
facts (observed, reasoned, mathematized) thus arrived at, he suggests,
our world-view in the zone of the logos rests.
But of course, not all data are either reasoned or mathematized perfectly, and the large zone of but tentatively rationalized data opens up
two crucial further dimensions in our understanding of the world. On the
one side, there is the order of what the author calls " facta vialia" or
science-in-the-making: dialectical or hypothetical (" empiriological" facts.
On the other side, there is the order of fact as impregnated with desire
and feeling, the order of " poetic," " ideological," or " mythical factsworld-view in the zone of the mythos.
The Platonic and Aristotelian Explanatory Modes are presented as our
principal means for transforming or " interpreting " data within the horizon
of logos. These explanatory modes also provide the principal structures
within the order of the dialectical and hypothetical facts properly socalled. This analysis brings Deely's work into dialogue (as is pointed out
expressly in certain footnotes to his essay) with the main reactions against
positivism and with the theory-ladenness of observation debate illustrated
in the works of Hanson, Toulmin, Kuhn, Kordig, von Wright, and others.
In view of these connections between Deely's analysis of the impact of
10

P. viii.

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BOOK REVIEWS

evolution on the conception of scientific method and the extensive past
and continuing discussions among the philosophers of science, it seems
indeed that the book has a place in modern North American intellectual
life. Moreover, since it becomes clear at a number of points throughout
the book 11 that the whole work is organized along the lines of what
Deely calls the "Aristotelian Explanatory Mode," it is certainly not organized, as Centore alleges, according to any "postulatory, 'as if,' mythos,
' vision • of evolution." 12 According to Deely's own words, " the interpretation of data within the horizon of mythos" (which is where Deely
situates the work of Teilhard de Chardin by way of contrast to his own
work) belongs to neither of the explanatory modes, but especially not to
the one that is the main theme of this book as a whole.
Professor Centore makes no mention whatever of the Aristotelian I
Platonic Explanatory Mode distinction, and does not so much as refer in
passing to the detailed analysis of the notion of fact which, together with
this distinction, provides the key to the volume as a whole.
Part II of the volume is a kind of anthology of readings, but an
anthology of a refined and unusual structure. The readings are divided
into six sections, each section opening with an over-all " Rationale " explaining the nature of the section and the order of the readings, followed
by the readings themselves, each introduced by a short series of " Contextualizing Comments." In the" Preface,'' Part II is described as follows:
The Second Part of the book, " Contemporary Discussions," attempts to isolate
and develop the main areas relevant for humanistic thought in which the discovery
of evolution has had a critical impact. We have identified six such "zones of
crisis." The first is man's understanding of his own origins and ties with the
animal world. The second is his understanding of the distinctively human environment provided by cultural traditions. The third is the region of man's moral
sensibilities, and the justifiability or unjustifiability of our sense of " right " and
"wrong." The fourth is man's understanding of understanding itself, what it is,
how it develops, and what its limits are. The fifth is the zone of man's religious
sensibilities, and his conception of his relation-or lack of relation-to something
greater than this world. The sixth is man's attempt to put together the various
and disparate pieces of insight and feeling into a coherent and overall picture.'"

Most of the readers of this journal would probably be interested in a
more explicit relation of these six sections to the classical philosophical
tradition, and that might be accomplished by saying that the first set
of readings lies in the area of the philosophy of man, the second set in the
area of philosophy of culture, the third in the area of ethics or moral philosE. g., pp. 190-198, 251-!M4, 295-299, inti!JF alia.
Centore, p. 612.
13 The Problem of Evolution, p. viii.

11
12

898

BOOK REVIEWS

ophy, the fourth in the area both of metaphysics and of natural philosophy
in its more general concerns, and the fifth in the area of the philosophy of
religion. The sixth set of readings is not directly related to any one area of
traditional philosophy but represents more a kind of taking-stock or overview on the part of very divergent orientations toward the establishment of
a properly evolutionary view of man's situation in the world. Suffice it to
say that no one who reads the selections of Part II in the light of their accompanying " rationales " and " contextualizing comments " will be able, in
my judgment, to share Professor Centore's opinion that " ' traditionalists '
like Aquinas are not very well treated " in this book.
Professor Centore concedes that there are here gathered " some good
readings, extensively annotated, on some of the biological, cultural, philosophical, and religious aspects of the non-problem [sic!] of evolution," though
he prefaces this by asserting that the sections " are not given the systematic,
integrated, all-sides, dialectical treatment they deserve." 14 It seemed to
me, however, that the readings of the six sections are all in fact rather
well arranged from a dialectical point of view. Interestingly, the readings
all fall into triads or sets of three, except for the last set, which has a
fourth and most appropriate closing piece by Loren Eiseley, "How Human
Is Man?"
Perhaps the most peculiar feature of Professor Centore's review of
The Problem of Evolution is not its misrepresentations of the nature, objectives, and contents of the volume but rather its charge that the book
is out of date because "Professor Deely and Fr. Nogar ... seem to
neglect the fact that the great divide today is ... between those who
claim evolution is totally undirected chance process and those who say
that God is somehow at the source of all the changes that have and are
[sic] taking place." 15 This "great divide," according to Centore, is the
current "front line of battle," and for failure to situate itself here, "the
work has missed its opportunity" to tackle "the 1973 problems of specific
theories of evolution." 1 6
With all due respect to Professor Centore, this will hardly do. In the
first place, none among the evolutionists contend that evolution is a totally
undirected chance process. Even for atheists such as Huxley and agnostics
such as Simpson, natural selection is precisely an anti-chance and directing
factor (although, as Deely points out in Part I of the book, it clearly
involves chance in the Aristotelian sense).
In the second place, and more importantly, the questions of the existence
of God and of his distinction from and relation to the world are metaphysical questions; they are not problems of specific scientific theories of
evolution-not even 1974 theories, let alone 1973 theories. To call a
philosophical work on evolution " out of date " simply on the grounds
14

Centore, p. 613.

11

Ibid.

10

Ibid.

394

BOOK REVIEWS

that it fails to deal principally or exclusively with such questions is to
evince a lack of philosophical precision. Professor Centore's criticism
of The Problem of Evolution on this score, thus, exemplifies the second
of the two common faults of book reviewers that I mentioned at the beginning, namely, the fault of criticizing a book for not dealing with topics
the reviewer would have preferred to read about.
I hope my remarks have made clear that The Problem of Evolution
deserves a more careful reading than some would have us believe, and
that it should be a book of general interest to the readers of this journal.
MoRTIMER

J. ADLER

Institute for Philosophical Research
Chicago, Illinois

Frontiers for the Church Today. By Robert McAfee Brown. New York:
Oxford University Press, 1973. Pp. 166. $5.95.
Robert McAfee Brown over the last two decades has made significant
contributions to our understanding of twentieth-century Christianity. He
has demonstrated the enviable ability both to perceive problems and to
offer realistic solutions. It is no surprise, therefore, that his latest book
evidences these same qualities. It is not a thorough systematic treatment
of the theology of the Church, but rather a collection of pointed observations on several critical issues facing the Church today. His controlling
image is that of the frontier, because, as he states, "The Church in our day
is called to live out a frontier existence." (p. xiii) To use the term
frontier is to suggest spontaneity, adaptability, mobility, and creativityattitudes that are urgently needed in the present ecclesial community. In
this context he discusses mission, ecumenism, revolution, technology, structures, images of the Church, and the liturgy (" the peoples' work ") . His
thoughts are provocative and challenging.
The basic theological underpinning that Brown espouses is that of
secularization theology. His thesis is that the Church is not an end in
itself but exists for the world. An ecclesia gloriae with its triumphalism
and self-perpetuating institutionalism is clearly rejected. Moving beyond
an earlier generation of secular theologians, Brown insists that we must
affirm the unity of the entire human family and the nonsectarian concern
for mutual help. In other words, the major problems of any one segment
of humanity are the problems of all humanity. Consequently, Christianity,
if it is to faithful to its vocation, must grasp this universalist theme and
act positively on it.
Brown writes with a sense of urgency, but he never resorts to strident

395

BOOK REVIEWS

rhetoric. He is obviously not satisfied with the present state of the Church
and the world, but he refrains from tiresome carping or excessive negativism. His criticism is rather one of loyal opposition, a " healthy iconoclasm," (p. 47) a" lover's quarrel." (p. xii) Brown believes in the Church
and is committed to it, but he wants to see it become more sensitive to
socio-political needs, more a reconciling agent of God's mercy, more a
defender of the rights of the dispossessed. This means, of course, that
the Church has to become less " other world " oriented, less and exclusivist
assembly, and less than simply a haven for affluent believers.
Of special interest in this book are the sections dealing with the
penetential dimension of the Church, the value of Christianity, the nature
of genuine ecumenism, the necessity and expendibility of structure, and
the images of the Church. Brown devotes two chapters to images and
presents some fascinating and refreshing thoughts on the Church as
diaspora, counterculture, servant, movement, and cantus firmus.
Two areas, however, seem to be neglected in Brown's admittedly selective
analysis of the Church. Both would have afforded a needed balance and
perspective. The first is an explicitated eschatology. Contemporary ecclesiology (Protestant as well as Catholic) places a growing emphasis on
the proleptic relationship between the Church and the Kingdom; in so
doing it delineates more precisely the nature of the Church and its mission.
The second is the charismatic aspect of the Church with the affirmation
of the dynamic and creative role of the Holy Spirit. Inclusion of these
two points would have rounded out Brown's discussion of the Church,
giving it, moreover, a fuller theological dimension.
Frontiers for the Church Today is a most readable and useful book for
the laity and the clergy. Brown is a Presbyterian, but there is no hint
of any narrow denominationalism in his writings. He is familiar and
sensitive to Christian tradition in its Protestant and Catholic forms. This
book, then, can be highly recommended because of its positive ecumenical
thrust, its clearly stated positions, and its sober reasoning. The eight page
annotated bibliography is especially valuable for the serious reader.
PATRICK

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

GRANFmLD

396

BOOK REVIEWS

Philosophy and Technology. Readings in the Philosophic Problems of
Technology. Ed. by Carl Mitchum and Robert Mackey. New York:
The Free Press,
Mitchum and Mackey have produced a book accurately described by
its subtitle "Readings in the Philosophic Problems of Technology." But
in doing so, they have also produced a call for action on the part of
philosophers and technologists. Various authors in the readings refer to
a Philosophy of Technology as non-existent, stagnating, hampered, a
Cinderella, an afterthought, etc. It would not have been difficult for the
authors to provide the identical comments from a search of the technical
literature rather than from the philosophic literature.
We live in an era of technology, not an era of science. This is probably
a true statement, but how does one distinguish between science and technology? Skolinowski, in the "Readings," bases his distinction on precise
evaluations of scientific progress (pursuit of knowledge) as contrasted
with technological progress (pursuit of effectiveness, or efficiency). T. Kuhn
(Structure of Scientific Revolutions) makes this different distinction-the
scientist chooses problems that he has good reason to believe he can solve;
the engineer chooses problems which urgently need solution.
Thus, while doing no more than organizing our field, we are enmeshed
in difficulty in our definitions-technology versus science; stagnation versus
progress. But who defines the measure of efficiency; who decides which
problems urgently need solution? Ellul feels that technology contains its
own goals-if something can be done, it will be done. Events of the last
decade have shown that reliance on the political process is indeed a weak
reed. The distortion of biology in the service of Soviet agriculture is a
clear example. It must be clear that the consequence of modern technology
has a humane content. During the 1940's the scale of possible technological
impacts grew by orders of magnitude; simultaneously technological developments in information distribution provided means for widespread distribution of knowledge regarding such impacts. The most lonely Bedouin, at
the most isolated Saharan oasis, can follow the Arab-Israeli clash on
his battery operated transistor radio. Worldwide concern with extensive
environmental damage (whether due to nuclear fallout, weather modification, DDT pollution, etc.) has had direct political consequences, even to
the toppling of governments.
Why, even in the face of the consequences shown above, do we use
such words as non-existent or stagnating to evaluate the state of Philosophy
of Technology? In this brief discussion we have shown interactions with
politics, epistemology, ethics, ontology-to name a few. Perhaps Technology's early association with the craftsman has caused philosophers to
regard it with disdain. If so, this heritage from the Greeks must be discarded. After a long period of satisfaction based on the comtemplation of

BOOK REVIEWS

897

artifacts, and after a briefer period of awe based on some of the extraordinary (and even unexpected) consequences of those artifacts (such as
the automobile), Technology has lost some of its pristine faith in the concept of progress, and now searches desperately for a rudder, or a compass,
or something, to regain its sense of direction and control. The task of
Philosophy is clear-a hierarchy of values must be reestablished; the effort
to accomplish this has potential feedback to the assumed linkages between
technology and the democratic process. Current political regulation of
Technology appears to be a cautious process of successive approximations,
seeking the public consensus on the basis of observed response to experimental social inputs. The Environmental Protection Act, the Consumer
Product Safety Act, and the Gas Pipeline Safety Act are recent examples
of such regulations. The process can be given direction and thrust by
better philosophical understanding.
Mitchum and Mackey's book could be the springboard for action. With
philosophers disdaining the " dirty hands " aspect of technology, and with
most technologists ignorant of philosophy, a foundation, or take off point,
must be found. The authors have done a superb job of selection, and have
written an excellent introductory essay. These same authors produced
the recent bibliography which also appeared (in slightly different form)
in " Technology and Culture " in April, 1973. They have produced a work
of taste and strength comparable to the works of Kranzberg and Pursell
in the field of social history of technology.
Any editor, of course, can be faulted, by someone, for his choices. Perhaps this work should have paid additional attention to the process of
invention, which is the focal point of modern technology, and which deserves more
study by philosophers and psychologists. But this
should be regarded as a minor criticism; the general level of selection has
been excellent.
DoNALD E. MARLoWE

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Hasard, Ordre et Finalite en Biologie. By Michel Delsol. Negation de
la Negation. By Henri-Paul Cunningham. Les Conferences Charles
de Koninck. Quebec: Presses de l'Universite de Laval, 1973.
This volume contains two short books, both written in the wake of
Jacques Monod's best seller, Le Hasard et la Necessite (Chance and
Necessity). Cunningham commends Monod as a scientist who is aware of
the need for an " authentic natural philosophy," and has undertaken the

398

BOOK REVIEWS

formulation and solution of some fundamental philosophical problems.
Cunningham's book is a detailed critique from a nco-scholastic position of
Monod's central notions: the postulate of objectivity required of all true
knowledge; the decisive role of chance in the natural world, particularly
in the evolution of life and man; the rejection of a " finalistic " or
teleological philosophy which assumes nature to be " projective," rather
than " objective." Cunningham successfully shows that Monod falls short
of developing a fully consistent philosophy, but Monod's main theses are
barely affected by his critique. Monod's and Cunningham's lines of thought
are like two airplanes flying around the world in opposite directions, crossing each other time and again without ever meeting. The anecdote comes
to my mind of the Reverend Sydney Smith, a famous wit, walking through
the very narrow streets of old Edinburgh. A furious altercation was going
on between two housewives shouting from windows on different sides of
the street. " They can never agree," said Smith to his companion, " for
they are arguing from different premises."
The lion's share of Delsol's book are his chapters II and ill. In
chapter II he analyzes with considerable insight the notions of chance,
law, and teleology: "three concepts which all scientists should know."
Delsol's notion of chance is basically that of Cournot: a chance event results
from the intersection of two independent causal series. A woman goes
shopping but is killed on her way by a flower-pot accidentally pushed from
a high window by a child playing. This notion presupposes universal
causality and determinism. Delsol recognizes also the possibility of " absolute chance " in the world of subatomic particles as required by Heisenberg's uncertainty principle. Chapter III is a summary of teleological arguments advanced against a mechanistic interpretation of the living world,
followed by answers provided by the modern (" synthetic ") theory of
evolution. According to Delsol, the theory of evolution gives a satisfactory
account of all phenomena described in the arguments of telelogists. Yet,
he argues that as the " scientist transcends science," or " moves from
science to metaphysics," he discovers teleology in the world.
The latter observation follows from Delsol's conviction that scientists
are concerned with answering the question, "how?", while the question,
"why?" belongs in the realm of philosophy. I cannot agree with this
position. Science is concerned with both types of questions {as well as
others, like "what? ", " what for? ", and " how come? ") . The evolutionist
who explores an evolutionary phenomenon tries to find out how the
process occurs (e. g., by changes in the frequencies of certain genes), but
he also attempts to find out why the process takes place (e. g., because
as the environmental changes some genes make their carriers better adapted
to the new conditions).
The biologist as biologist, and not only the philosopher, can discover
teleology (or teleonomy, as some scientists prefer to call it) in the living

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BOOK REVmWS

world. The modern theory of evolution provides an explanation of the
obvious teleological character of organisms, and their features and behaviors. I have discussed this matter in extenso elsewhere (American
Scientist, 56, 207-221, 1968; Philosophy of Science, 37, 1-15, 1970), but
one important distinction may be made here. Scientists often argue
the notion that the natural world is teleological; they have in mind what
may be called external teleology. This is the teleology of a wrench, a
watch, or a thermostat, entities designed and constructed to serve some
specific purpose intended by their creators. There is no evidence that the
process of evolution is guided by any external agent (or internal force)
towards specific kinds of organisms. The teleology, or end-directedness of
organisms and their features is, nevertheless, undeniable; it may be said
to be internal teleology and results from the process of natural selection,
which favors the differential multiplication of genetic variants that are
useful to their carriers. Natural selection is a natural process which has
no goals intended or otherwise, but which nevertheless results in enddirected features when these increase the reproductive efficiency of the
organisms. In this sense, natural selection is a directional, not a random
process. It is an egregious but not uncommon misconception to state that
the process of evolution is guided by pure chance.
FRANCISCO

University of Califomia
Davia, Califomia

J. AYALA

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Aumann, O.P. (Pp. 808, $15.00)
Mercy Teachers' College, Australia: Concepts in Education. Philosophical
Studies, ed. by J. V. D'Cruz & P. J. Sheehan. (Pp. 100, $1.85)
Orbis Book: Faith for Today, by Edmond Barbotin. (Pp. 195, $8.95)

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401

Philosophical Library, Inc.: For a Funda:mental Social Ethic: A Philosophy
of Social Change, by Oliva Blanchette, S.J. (Pp. fl53, $7.50)
Prentice-Hall, Inc.: The Fabric of Existentialism. Philosophical and
Literary Sources, ed. by Richard Gill & Ernest Sherman. (Pp. 651)
Revue d'histoire ecclesiastique: The English Bishops and the First Vatican
Council, by Frederick J. Cwiekowski, S.S. (Pp. 366, 500 Fr belges)
Scarecrow Press: Theodore Parker: American Transcendentalist, by Robert
E. Collins. (Pp. fl77, $7.50)
The Seabury Press: Dictionary of Biblical Theology. New revised edition,
ed. by Xavier Leon-Dufour. (Pp. 743, $17.50); Hunting the Divine
Fox, by Robert Farrar Capon. (Pp. 167, $5.59)
Tulane University: Tulane Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XXII, 1973.
Dewey and his Influence. Essays in Honor of George Estes Barton,
ed. by Robert C. Whittemore. (Pp. 149, $5.00)
University of Michigan Press: Causality and Scientific Explanation. Vol.
II. Classical and Contemporary Science, by William A. Wallace.
(Pp. 433, $14.00)
University of Notre Dame Press: Beyond the New Morality. The Responsibilities of Freedom, by Germain Grisez & Russell Shaw. (Pp. fl40,
$7.95 cloth, $fl.95 paper}; On the Church of Christ: The Person
of the Church and her Personnel, by Jacques Maritain, transl. by
Joseph W. Evans. (Pp. 315, $9.95 cloth, $3.95, paper}