THE THOMIST
A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW
OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY

EDITORS: THE DoMINICANFATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH
Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017
VoL.

XXXIX

APRIL, 1975

No.2

ST. IRENAEUS AS MYSTICAL THEOLOGIAN

T

HE AIM of this article is to suggest that Irenaeus of
Lyons is the first really apophatic theologian to write
in the West. His work is perhaps the greatest monument in the Patristic Period of Greek theology developed in
a Latin setting.
Few now would doubt the importance of negative theology
for the development of Christian spirituality. Significantly, it
was during the 4th century, the first great age of monasticism,
when St. Basil was composing the fundamental legislation for
Eastern monks, that his brother, St. Gregory of Nyssa, was
drawing on his profound initiation into the Greek philosophical
tradition to provide the intellectual undergirding for the
growing ascetical movement. This Cappadocian theologian was
essentially apophatic. Since the God of faith transcends every
concept or image we may form of him, we can only know him
by a supra-rational mode of cognition, a way of unknowing.

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This is true theoria (Oewpia) or contemplation, and such is the
inexhaustible goal of the spiritual life.
The importance of Irenaeus's doctrine of transcendence is
that this is the work of a Biblical theologian, not at all given
to Platonic speculations, with no time for any kind of Christian
intellectual elitism. For him, God's progressive self-manifestation is realized in the spiritual advance of man, called to grow
in the deifying vision of God by participation in the divine
life. But we intend to show that this hope of glory is grounded
in a truly Biblical grasp of the transcendence of God and in
a profoundly religious sense of man's dependence on him. This
is why piety demands a proper agnosticism beyond the sphere
of revelation; and why our knowledge of God can never be a
mere rationalism presupposed by the innate powers of the human mind. That the Invisible should become visible and the
Unknowable known is always a miracle of grace, and if this
is so, then we must be dealing here with a genuine connaissance
mystique.
Studies in the past, e. g., the work of Lawson and of Wingren,
have rightly elaborated the Biblicism of Irenaeus and the robust Paulinism of his soteriology. I£ then we can establish the
centrality of the doctrine of transcendence for the spirituality
of a great teacher, little moved to look to philosophy for the
content of his theology, then it may well be that a grasp of the
unknowability of God might be basic to any truly Christian
account of man's religious quest. Apophaticism, with its implication that all religious knowledge is limited and given is not
just a basic position of Christian Platonism. It may be
claimed-and here lies Irenaeus's importance-that the Via
Negativa is implied as much by Isaiah's sense of the sovereign
otherness of Yahweh as by the Platonic axiom of the simplicity
of the One. Philosophy merely provided the Fathers with a
set of concepts with which to defend and expound a sense of
Transcendence inherent in the Tradition from the beginning,
and reinforced by the data of contemplative experience.

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The setting of Irenaeus's Mystical Theology.

Our contention is reinforced in the case of Irenaeus, if we
consider the nature of his detachment from Greek Paideia. The
polemical pressures have changed from the need to challenge
fairly straightforward polytheism to an attack on a worldnegating religious outlook often highly sophisticated-sometimes absurdly so-in its philosophical complexities. The
gnosticism of men like V alentinus was a danger-sign as to
where unbridled Hellenistic speculation might lead the Church.
The Gnostics too preached an Unknowable God, but this implied for them not a democracy of grace but an intellectual
elite, alone fitted by nature to attain to knowledge of God.
Hence, we should not be surprised to detect a change of key in
comparing Irenaeus to the Apologists: he is more cautious in
his attitude to Hellenism, less inclined to laud the natural
capacities of man, or even the Logos-inspired achievements of
the great philoosphers of old. He is concerned not so much
with an Absolute, impassibly beyond being, as with a unique,
universal, and inexhaustible Creator; and again, the Glory of
Man consists not primarily in his intellectual powers but in
his creation in the Image of God, called to grow in God-likeness
by cooperation with the indwelling Spirit. Where Justin is
positive and conciliatory to Hellenism, Irenaeus must first
repudiate those heretical versions of the Faith in which nonBiblical elements have gone too far. As Chadwick says, in him
the conflict with Gnosticism became the historic occasion of a
more balanced catholic theology.
The nature of his achievement may be indicated by his profound Johannine insight into the integrity of knowledge and
life. It is not enough to grasp alleged truths about God, however esoteric, with the mind. The vision of God is in fact not
an intellectual illumination but participation by grace in the
life of God. Thus, while not immune to contemporary culture,
Irenaeus radically corrects Hellenism to expound a rich Christian humanism. Man fully alive, in the fullness of all his Godgiven power-intellectual, spiritual, and physical-is the Gloria

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Dei of our title. Far from offering a reductionist and illiberal
doctrine of man, Irenaeus attacks the t/Jev86wp.os yvwcns precisely because it despairs of man in his integrity and denies the
dignity of creation by (and in the image of) the One Supreme
God. But if Gnostic metaphysical transcendentalism had the
effect of banishing God to a remote Pleroma, with Irenaeus,
it was quite a different case. For him, it is the sovereign otherness of God that guarantees his freedom in creation and redemption, whereby he freely comes into saving relationship
with those he has created in his image.
2)

The Hidden God.

In repudiating Gnostic distortions Irenaeus is quite capable
of using the conceptual tools at hand and bringing a full gamut
of negative abstracts into play to counteract gratuitous speculations. We must not underrate his loyalty to the tradition of
the Apologists, confessors, and martyrs of a previous generation. Nevertheless his use of negative theology is not just a
bow to his predecessors. Rather, he is turning the weapons of
the heretics against themselves in such a way as to make a
doctrine of Divine Transcendence (in the spirit of Job) the
basis of his essentially Biblical soteriology. Although we can
never adequately express the majesty of the Creator, we can
at last fittingly say what he is not. If the otherness of the Living
God can best be safeguarded by negative terms, such concepts
may be used. The language is often Platonic but, basically,
the thought merely reiterates the warning of Isaiah, that God
is not as men, and his ways are not our ways.
Thus, Irenaeus can assert God is simple, uncreated, and unchangeable. (II. xiii. 3) His simplicity stands over against the
shifting, disunified imperfection of all created natures. Will,
thought, and actuation are co-terminus with him (I. xxi. 2)
for " none is of greater knowledge than the God of the Universe." We cannot imagine what Creation can be like in the
case of God; he has only to conceive the idea for it to be. Again
he is ineffable (I. xx. 2) : hence the folly of the Gnostic notion

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that the aeon should name the Unnameable. (I. xv. 5) Even
Christ refused to name the power by which he wrought his
miracles.
As Creator, God must be self-contained (II. i. I, Dem. 4),
and self-sufficient (II. 34. 2) -"Being moved by curiosity . . . would cease to be what God is." We cannot say he
n.eeds our love (IV. xvi. 4), or obedience (II. xiv. 1-2); he is
in no way dependent on us, though the whole cosmos is entirely
sustained by his creative hand. (II. iii. 2)
The intellectualist ring is clear in II. iii. 2 (the Universe a
thought in the Divine Mind) as also in II. xiii. 3/4: God is all
vov<;, 7TV€Vf.La, and cpw<;, one entire
rf}<; aya06r7JTO<;. God is
simple, uncompounded Being, yet (para. 4) beyond all this,
indescribable. Just as his Understanding, which comprehends
all, is in no way like the understanding of men, so " in all
other particulars, the Father of All is in no way similar to
human weakness. We use these terms [i.e., good, wise, etc.]
from the love we bear him; but in point of greatness, our
thoughts regarding him transcend these expressions." This
shows a sophisticated grasp of that fundamental of negative
theology, that the transcendence of God implies the approximate and analogous nature of all theological language. Humanly speaking, we may properly talk of the God of Abraham,
(Dem. 8) but the sublimity and greatness of this God is ineffable. In II. xxviii. 4 Irenaeus repeats the same two correlated
truths: God exists ever one and the same, and hence defies all
definition and analysis. The Gnostic chains of aeons-Ennoia,
Logos, Christos and so on-are ruled out as " not fitting to
God." " Our carnal tongue cannot minister adequately even
to the rapidity of the human mind-how much less can it express God?" It must be admitted there are difficulties relating
to our use of the word "apophatic" in relation to Irenaeus's
doctrine of God. It is not always clear whether he is speaking
of what is unknowable in se, above all, the divine essence, and
what is knowable in principle but opaque to us because of our
human weakness. Or, to put it another way, he does not clearly

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distinguish between what is unrevealable, and what we could
in principle grasp but do not know because God has not seen
fit to reveal.
By thus reverently setting a fence around the Deity Irenaeus
reminds us of our human limitations; of ourselves, we cannot
plumb the divine mysteries and can only receive God's selfrevelation as pure gift. God's inscrutability and omnipotence
are axiomatic for our author; and this is the basis of his freedom
and actuality as Creator and Redeemer. His purpose is not
conditioned by our response, even though he is by no means
indifferent to our welfare. Indeed, God's transcendent freedom
is part and ground of his grace towards us. The fact that he
remains Deus Absconditus, impenetrable in essence, implies
a permanent distinction between God and man, and a definite
limit to our knowledge of God-even within the Churchunless specially enabled by God himself. However close the
Creator may draw to us in love, God is always sovereign, man
always his creature, albeit made in the Divine Image.
3)

The Word from Silence.

Irenaeus's first positive task was to underline the Old Testament proclamation of God in action, without sacrificing a
sense of the infinite greatness of the One Creator-God. He has
no doubt of the partial knowability of God KaT' otKovo,.dav in
both Creation (IV. 30. 3, V. Q8. 4) and revelation. (IV. xx. 6)
The Divine Hands denote the approachability and nearness of
One who while " unknowable in greatness," yet out of pure
love," leads us to himself by his Word." (IV. xx. 6) Only those
without (sc., experiential) knowledge could speak of God
needing tools to create: he himself " in indescribable, inconceivable fashion . . . formed all in harmony through the unwearying Word." (II. ii. 4) Negative theology and economic
trinitarianism are here complementary: since God is ineffable,
so too must be his mode of operation. We need have no qualms
about the Father of the
"
his
" with
<;reation,

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What is being asserted in strong, personalized language is
that it is the Supreme God we know by his mighty acts, as
never-failing source of life even though we may have only the
faintest notion of his nature secundum magnitudinem. Irenaeus's doctrine of the Creator-God bypasses at once comfortable polytheism and the bare Monad of philosophy. What
it implies in Biblical terminology concerning our knowledge
of God is not so far from the later, preciser, more
doctrine of energies and essence. We know the transcendent
God only insofar as he deigns to impinge upon the world he
made. To know him is to participate in the life he brings, not
to speculate upon the generation of the Son.
The heretics despise the God of the Bible (III. xxiv.
because out of love he has come within reach of human fellowship, but none has ever measured his greatness and essence.
(cf. II. xiii. 3) Without apophatic controls the wonder of
revelation and restoration is necessarily eroded. In this passage
(III. xxiv.
Irenaeus clearly contrasts our certain knowledge that God has made and sustained all by his Word and
Wisdom, with our ignorance of God secundum ... essentiam-not that we can even understand God completely Kar' olKovofttav.
"Who understands his hand, which comprehends all things?"
(IV. xix. 1) The Gnostic elite fondly pretend to "knowledge
of the unspeakable greatness," itself constituting perfect redemption. Irenaeus however appeals to Scripture; the prophets
foretold that God should be seen by men, but " not in respect
of greatness of glory, since the Father is incomprehensible, but
in respect of his love, kindness, and infinite powers." Transcendent grace, not human noetic prowess, is the ground of the
Christian hope.
Irenaeus proclaims that the Father is knowable only through
the Son/Word. The Word realizing that the Father is invisible
and infinite as far as we are concerned, " and that none other
could declare him (IV. vi. 1-7) .... declares him to us by his
manifestation."
The Incarnation of the Word, unique mensura Patris, (IV.

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iii. 2) is in fact the point of coalescence of negative and positive
in the theology of Irenaeus. Christ is set forth as sole revealer
of the Father, "the Incomprehensible [made known] by the
comprehensible, the Invisible by the visible, since there is none
beyond him who exists in the bosom of the Father." (cf. III.
xii. 6) The Son is the unique way to knowledge of God, for
" since it is impossible without God to know God, he teaches us
through his Word to know God." (IV. v. 1) The whole process
of revelation is grounded in the gracious will of the Father:
we can only know what he deigns to teach us by his Word,
" since the Father is invisible and unapproachable to created
things." (Dem. 47) Citations could easily be multiplied to
illustrate the paradox that, although God is ineffable regarding
his nature and greatness, (IV. xx. 5) yet he is by no means
unknown. He freely reveals himself in the Incarnation, and
this truth is implanted in our hearts by the Spirit, (V. i. 1)
" who sets forth in our hearts the dispensation of the Father
and the Son." The philosophical conundrum raised by the
Gnostics-and later the Arians-is left unresolved by the religious teaching of Irenaeus: if the Divine Father remains
incomprehensible in se, how can the Son reveal him to us, if
he is God in exactly the same sense as the Father is God?
Irenaeus is concerned simply to assert that with God, immeasurable in power and greatness, what is inconceivable to
men becomes possible, that" those who draw near to God have
access to the Father through the Son." (Dem. 47) Moreover,
this revelation is a vivifying vision since, as we shall see, to
know God is to share in his life. "For if the manifestation of
God in creation gives life to all on earth, how much more does
the revelation of the Father through the Word give life to
those who see God." (ibid.)
The paradox remains: God is indeed invisible and ineffable,
yet men, renewed by him, do see and know him. What to the
metaphysical speculator becomes a stumbling block can be simply accepted by the man of faith at the hands of the Transcendent God.

ST. IRENAEUS

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The limitations of Theology.

Irenaeus is clear that an awareness of our inability to know
God in se should result in an increased sense of our dependence
on him in matters of revelation. Hence his reaction against
the arrogance of Gnostic cognoscenti claiming natural knowledge of the high matters of theology.
Irenaeus is unashamedly un-Greek in his neglect of abstract
speculation for its own sake. God is for him a datum, not a
problem, and his revelation in Christ a free gift for all alike.
Hence his opposition to the " vain imaginings " of the Gnostics
whose myths are a stumbling-block to the simple and obstruct
the shining of the light of the Gospel. We cannot hope to improve on the doctrine of the Apostles who, far from disclosing
"unspeakable mysteries" to an elite, "openly taught the salvation revealed to all." (III. v. I) They were endowed with
all perfect [i.e., necessary] knowledge at Pentecost. (III. i. 1)
This is why the Catholic Church is sole repository of truth.
(III. iv. 1)
But this problem goes beyond the ecclesiological. The
esoteric pretensions of the heretics spring from a lack of piety,
proper reserve in religious matters, a failure to understand the
gratuitousness of revelation. " Let us not be embarrassed because God has reserved for himself things that are beyond us."
(III. xiii, 2-3) Man is as inferior to God in knowledge as the
creature is to its Creator. (II. xxv. 3) This is not surprising,
for we are quite ignorant even of many things of sense. Gnostic
heresy comes (as Dr. Chadwick has pointed out) from the itch
to speculate where Scripture has given no clear guidance. We
must be content not to know where the Word of God is not
explicit and accept the finally irreducible nature of its teachings. Indeed if we knew God comprehensibly, we would no
longer be creatures, for to know God fully would be to be
divine.
The Gnostic claim to exceed orthodox Scriptural limits in
matters beyond creaturely capacity to grasp [and/or unrevealed by God] implies a fundamental lack of trust and love.

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(II. xxvi) We must not seek to rise above God and find one
above the Creator: such reflections are opposed to our natures;
and insolent attempts to fathom God lead only to madness. (c.
f., II. xxv. 3) Rather, it is better to be among the simple who
attain nearness to God by love. (II. xxvi. 1) To see the root
of false gnosis not so much in intellectual error as in failure of
love is typical of Irenaeus. The heretics are devoid of that fundamental sense of dependence which springs from any real
awareness of transcendence and dream of an unknown other
above God. (III. xxiv. 2) They impudently try to " change
God himself " and refuse to learn of the Father from the Son
(IV. ii. 5): they consider human speculations more reliable.
The Gnostics despise a God who out of love has come within
reach of human knowledge. But we know that "as regards
greatness and essence ... this none has handled or measured."
We are not called to speculate about the Divine Nature but to
believe that it is the Only True God who has vivified us by his
Word and Wisdom. (cf. IV. xx. 1-4) Such despisers rob themselves of the gifts of life. (II. xix. 1) In their insatiable desires
they " attempt to be god before becoming (true) men " and to
destroy the distance between God and creation (IV. 28. 4)a salutary reminder of the place of patience, humble waiting
upon God, in the Christian life. We see the results of this refusal to accept the limits of Scripture in the fluctuating, random, and often bizarre nature of Gnostic teaching, all " handed
down according to inclination." (I. xxi. 1-4)
We can surely infer from these passages the basic principle
that we are dependent on God for any knowledge we possess
of him: where God has not revealed the mystery of his person,
man is utterly ignorant. Irenaeus is clear that Scripture only
tells us what we need to know, that we may have faith and
obedience (c£. IV. v. 1: "By God alone can God be known").
Where blanks in our knowledge of God exist, it is not for us
to try to amplify our circumscribed knowledge by our own
speculations. Scripture shrouds, as well as reveals, the mystery.
This points to a fundamental hiddenness in divine matters

ST. IRENAEUS

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19f)

which no Gnostic theologie savante can hope to plumb. Why,
for instance, rack one's mind concerning the generation of the
Word? (cf. II. 18. 5) Since the generation of the Word is
ineffable, how can the Gnostics dare discuss it " as if they had
assisted at his birth?"
This refusal to " act as midwife to the Word " might, in a
wider context, be thought to have an obscurantist ring. It
is the Charisma of the Bishop to expound the great central truths of Christianity enshrined in Scripture and transmitted in the Apostolic Church. The difference between this
explication and Gnostic elaborations is that the former limits
itself to finding in Scripture solution of problems which Scripture intends to solve, not what God has not seen fit to reveal.
Biblical texts are not so many counters to be manipulated according to individual preferences or virtuosity. Intellectual
gifts must not be suppressed but used to clarify (not pervert)
Apostolic teaching. We must exercise ourselves in the "mystery and administration of the Living God, and increase in
love of him who has done such great things for us." (II. xxviii.
1) But the revelation of the mysteries can only be left to God,
" that God should forever teach, and man forever learn . . .
that ever truly loving him, we may hope to receive from him
boundless riches in inexhaustible instruction." (ibid., 88) In
both these two passages loving dependence on God is clearly seen as sine qua non of any real advance in knowledge
of God. But we note also the human requirement of " exercise,"
and also the ultra-positive content of this true ')'VWtrt<;. There
is explicitly said to be no limits to the depths which such a disciple may find in the mysteries God reveals. (cf., doctrine of
epectasis in Gregory of Nyssa)
Irenaeus rejects the double standard of the alleged Apostolic
preaching of the Demiurge to the .simple, but the " declaration
of the unspeakable mystery to those capable of comprehending
the unnameable Father " (III. v. 1) through " parables and
enigmas." The Apostles, like Christ himself, are no respecters of persons.

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All believers are capable of receiving the gifts of the Spirit,
(I. iv) though all do not progress equally in knowledge. There
are degrees of advance within the Church, as God gradually
grants "fuller illumination of the mind." (IV. 29. 1) Weak
eyes cannot bear the full light all at once. The achievement of
the more advanced does not depend on a discovery of a " higher
god " but on greater efforts to penetrate and assimilate (I. x.
3) the truth of Scripture as a whole (TJ {J1ro0ecrt<; r.ry., murew<;) •
Divine study should by no means dissipate the mystery but
should lead one to increasing and adoring contemplation of it.
Significantly, where (IV. iv) Irenaeus lists the great "mysteries " of Scripture set forth for our instruction, he ends with
the ecstatic cry of Paul, " 0 the depths of the riches of the
knowledge of God! " (Rom xi. 33)
All this is slowly opened up to the spiritual man (according
to his advance in yvwcrt<>), and he comes to see how Christ is
the key to the whole history of salvation, a great mystery of
creative and redemptive agape. For the" dise-ipulus spiritualis
vere ree-ipiens spiritum Dei ... omnia ei constant." Thus we
may say that Irenaeus (as well as Clement) has an ideal of
the the " true Gnostic " ; but it is a hope of perfection democratized. Knowledge of God is open to all (III. v. 1) who
strive to progress in love in the power of the Spirit and who are
fully incorporated into the living tradition of the Church. (cf.,
IV. liii.) As Bouyer observes, "True yvwcrt<; is indistinguishable from the Apostolic didae-he fully realised." This then provides the inexhaustible content of Theology for Irenaeus.
The otherness of God should inform our attitude to the
Incarnation. The surpassing majesty of God is the measure
of his condescension and love in becoming man. We do not
possess God in his greatness by the Incarnation, but we
can know him in his goodness and love. The heretics blasphemously despise (III. xxiv. 2) a God who out of love has
come within reach of human knowledge. They cannot accept-because devoid of a proper sense of awe and dependence-that Christ gives us the power we do not have by

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nature: not only to come to know God but to become his sons.
This reconciliation and adoption is beyond our capacities both
to conceive and achieve; and unless we recognize the transcendence of the Giver, we will not have the humbleness to accept
Christ as pure gift. Conversely, we are not dealing with the
Otherness of a static Essence; and unless we allow the agape
revealed in Christ to be determinative of our concept of God,
the Incarnation will remain what it is for the Gnostics, a metaphysical absurdity.
We are not to think of God and man as an antithesis o£ two
incompatible substances but as a communion of persons, which
presupposes distinction as much as it does mutual devotion.
We are involved in a relationship (not an opposition), in which
God freely gives and man receives. The life God bestows is
not something alien to our nature but that by which we grow
and become more truly ourselves. In so advancing, we also
become more like God, thus realizing the purpose of our Creation, fellowship with God. But man is never transmogrified
into God. The doctrine o£ transcendence means God alone is
Creator and Life-giver. The Glory of man is always to accept
re-creation at the hands of God, thus allowing his original creation in imagine Dei to become complete.
NICHOLAS GENDLE,

Blackfriars
Oxford, England

0. P.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS: AQUINAS ON THE
HOLINESS OF THE EPISCOPAL STATE

( ( PERHAPS IN SOME more adequate Church we
could ask for more, but at the present time in
England they (the bishops) provide merely an administrative context within which the really vital and immediately relevant institutions can exist. . . . It would be quite
unrealistic to expect them to be sources of enthusiasm and
original thought." 1 If the negative experience of episcopate
that finds expression in the above lines were ever to become
the experience of Christian people as such, it would be difficult
to imagine a more radical departure from what the episcopate
should mean in the life of the Church. That what is most
vital in the Church should have to find its normal expression
outside the context of an ecclesial life centered on the bishop
would mean an ecclesial situation that would run directly counter to a tradition that stretches right back to earliest Christian
times. For Ignatius of Antioch, in whose writings we find the
first clear references to the monarchical episcopate, " the bishop is, in a certain sense, the incarnation of the Church over
which he presides, in such a way that to receive him is to receive his Church, to contemplate him is to contemplate his
Church," 2 and in the middle of the third century St. Cyprian
of Carthage could write " the bishop is in the Church and
the Church in the bishop." 3
If the relationship between Church and bishop is so intimate,
then the distinctive marks of the Church should manifest themselves in a special way in the bishop. That the apostolicity of
H. McCabe, "Comment," in New Blackfriars 48 (1967), p. !l88.
"G. Bardy, La Thiologie de l'Eglise de saint ClCment de Rome d saint [renee
8 Ep. 66, par. 8 (ed. Hartel, CSEL, t. 3.!l, p. 733).

1

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HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

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the Church is verified in a special way through the line of
episcopal succession is a constant of Christian tradition. 4 While
individual bishops are the principle and foundation of unity
in their local churches, they manifest as a college the unity
and catholicity of the universal Church (cf. Lumen Gentium,
22, 23) . So too with regard to the holiness of the Church. A
most ancient and constant liturgical and patristic tradtion expects the bishop's primacy to be a real primacy in the Spirit,
constituting him in his Church the incarnation of that holiness to which his flock is called.
There is no question in this article of justifying this last
assertion in detail. Our task is to show how this tradition was
taken over and developed by St. Thomas. It finds its systematic expression in his doctrine, so juridical and odd-sounding at
first sight, on the episcopate as a state of perfection. Its ecclesiological significance lies in the fact that it is the classical
medieval expression of the doctrine that the often neglected
mark of the Church, her sanctity, should shine forth in her
bishops above all others. It has also, perhaps, a more immediate relevance today. At a time when people are experiencing
a renewed thirst for the things of the spirit, when they look
for gurus in the paths of prayer and Christian experience rathei
than administrators, it confronts us with an episcopal ideal
that has ben largely lost sight of, with a contemplative and
charismatic episcopate whose primacy is a real primacy in
Christ. It also indicates in the process the broad lines of a
priestly spirituality rooted in the Church's tradition.
I. The Bishop and His Sanctity in St. Thomas.

A. The Bishop in the Church.
As a preface to a consideration of episcopal perfection it will
be useful to situate our subject by saying a few words on what
we might call St. Thomas's mystique of the bishop. It will en• Cf. A. M. Javierre, "Le theme de la succession des ap(\tres dans la litterature
chretienne primitive," in L'Episcopat et L'Eglise Universelle (Paris,
p.

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able us to see the significance of the episcopacy in the eyes of
St. Thomas and bring home to us the fact that he sees more
in him than a mere superior functionary in the Church.
The bishops are the successors of the Apostles. 5 This is a
commonplace enough statement, but it had not exactly the
same sense for a medieval theologian as it has for us. " We
think of an historical succession of individuals possessing by
transmission, and exercising, the same function, and this idea
is exact. The ancients, however, thought more in terms of the
permanence of a certain type . ... " 6 The bishop, therefore, has
a sign-value in the Church insofar as he represents for the
Christian community what the Apostles represented for the
primitive Church.
But it is not only the Apostles that the bishop represents
in the Church. Where the ruling of the Church is concerned
he is also the vicar of God. 7 St. Thomas sees him acting in
the place of God in a special way when he confers mission on
others to preach the word of God. 8
But above all, the bishop " takes the place of Christ in the
Church." 9 Every Christian priest, it is true, acts " in persona
Christi," 10 but the bishop represents Christ in a more perfect
way:
The priest, indeed, represents Christ insofar as he himself fulfilled a certain ministry; but the bishop represents him in this that
he instituted other ministers and founded the Church.U
In summary
5 Cf., e. g., II ad Cor., c. 1, lect. 1 (ed. Marietti,
par. 4); Summa Theologiae,
III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3.
6 Y. Congar, "Aspects ecclesiologiques de Ia querelle entre mendiants et seculiers
dans Ia seconde moitie du XIIIe siecle et le debut du XIVe," in Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age, t. 28 (1961), p. 62.
7 Summa Theol., III, q. 64, a. 2, ad 3.
8 In loannem,
c. I, lect. 4 (ed. Marietti abbreviation:
Mar., par. 112); In
Romanos, c. 10, lect. 2 (Mar.; par. 838).
9 Summa Theol., III, q. 72, a. 3, ad 3.
10 Ibid., q. 22, a. 4.
11 IV Sent., d. 24, q. 3, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

201

insofar as he [the bishop] is a public person he possesses in the
Church the image and place, not of himself, but of Christ. 12
As a result of his special place in the Church which makes
of him the image of Christ,
the bishop, in a special way, is called the spouse of the Church, as
is Christ. 13
This relationship to the Church is symbolised by the bishop's ring, for the Church has been espoused to Christ through
the sacraments of faith, and the bishop is the spouse of the
Church in the place of Christ. 14
As spouse of his Church in the place of Christ the bishop
has now responsibilities to fill in her regard. He must devote
himself totally and for life to her well-being. In fact, the essential notes of the episcopal office are in function of the mystical Body of Christ, for, as being in the image of Christ, the
bishop fills the role of Christ in her regard. He is the image
of Christ the King and as such he enjoys over the Church "a
princely and quasi-royal charge." 15 He is the image of Christ
the Priest, and as such is the "divine high priest" of his local
Church; u "the Pontiff is bound ex officio to administer spiritual goods to his neighor, established, as it were, as a mediator
between God and man, acting in the place of him who is mediator between God and man, Jesus Christ. . . . And hence he
offers prayers and petitions to God as the representative of the
people (in persona populi) . . . And again he takes the place
12 Quodl., VIII, a. 7: " gerit typum et locum non sui-ipsius, sed alterius, scilicet
Christi, in Ecclesia."
13 IV Sent., d. fl4, q. 3, a. fl, sol. 1, ad 3.
" Ibid., q. 3, a. 3. On the importance in the Middle Ages of this idea of the
bishop as the spouse of the Church cf. Cougar, art. cit., pp, 105-106.
15 De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis (abbreviation:
De Perf. V. Sp.) c. fl4 (Mar.,
par. 715); cf. also Quodl. III, a. 17, ad 5; Summa Theol., III, q. 65, a. 3, ad fl.
" One must give a strong sense to the expressions that he [St. Thomas] employs
to speak of the episcopal charge: cura principalis et quasi regalis: an office of
prince "-Y. Cougar, "St. Thomas et les archidiacres," in Revue Thomiste, 57
(1957), p. 666.
16 Contra Impugnantes Dei cultum et religionem, c. 4 (Mar., par. 90).

NOEL MOLLOY

of God (personam Dei gerit) with regard to the people, ministering to them .... " 17 But above all, he is the image of Christ
the Prophet, for the office of teaching has absolute precedence
(principalissimum) over the other functions of the bishop. 18
Successor of the Apostles, vicar of God, image of Christ as
Prophet, Priest and King, and spouse of the Church-this high
conception which St. Thomas has of the episcopate gives us
already an indication of the sanctity he will require of the bishop.

B. Designation to the Episcopate and Acceptance.
Given the centrality of the bishop's position in the diocese
and the fact that he was normally designated through election
by the diocesan chapter, it was natural that the medieval theologians should turn their attention to the duties of electors in
this matter. 19 One was obviously not justified in voting for a
candidate purely on the basis of relationship or personal benefit.
What exactly were one's obligations?
St. Thomas, who treats of this question in a number of places,
requires that one elect as bishop the better (melior) candidate.
However, he always specifies what he means by "better."
Commenting on Our Lord's question to Peter: "Simon, son of
John, do you love me more than these?", a question which
preceded the confiding of the Church to Peter's care, St.
Thomas asks whether one is obliged to elect (as bishop, as
is clear from the context) the one who is the better simpliciter.
He replies that one is obliged in conscience to do so:
But, nevertheless, someone may be better simpliciter-one is thus
called better who is holier, for it is holiness which renders one
good-but may not be better with regard to the Church. In this
De Perf. V. Sp., c. 16 (Mar., par. 655); cf. ibid., c. 18 (Mar., par 664).
Summa Theol., III, q. 67, a.
ad 1. We just mention the teaching function
of the bishop in passing, for we shall be giving it special consideration later.
19 On the bishop's position in the medieval diocese, the method of choosing him,
his powers, etc., cf. G. Le Bras, Institutions ecclesiastiquesde la Chretiente medievale,
Part 1, Books
(Fliche, Martin, Histoire de l'Eglise, vol.
Paris, 1964,
pp. 865-876.
17

18

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

latter respect, one is better who is more learned, more competent,
and more discreet and who is elected with more concord. But if,
those things being eqnal which regard the utility of the Church
and greater suitability in this respect, one chooses the one who is
less good simpliciter, then one sins .... 20
This is the constant position of St. Thomas. In the other
texts in which he treats of this point he expresses in various
ways the qualities which render one better for Church government. The elect should be the one more suited for instructing,
defending, and peacefully governing the Church, 21 the one more
endowed with" industry, knowledge, capacity (potentia), and
other such qualities." 22
Where qualities of personal holiness are concerned, St.
Thomas asks for no more than the minimum:
. . . One should elect to the prelacy or to ecclesiastical office one
who is good simpliciter; because by a mortal sin one is rendered
unworthy of performing anything of a spiritual nature. . . . It is
not however necessary that one always elect the one who is the
better simpliciter. 23
Given his doctrine on episcopal perfection, this minimalism
of St. Thomas is at first sight astonishing. But St. Thomas is
in no way departing from his doctrine on the high sanctity required of the bishop. What suffices to render one apt for election will no longer suffice once one has been consecrated as
bishop. If one has not reached perfection before this, then
after consecration
One must strive to he pre-eminent over others in knowledge and
sanctity ... However, it is not to be imputed to one if, before
undertaking the prelacy, one was not more excellent than others. 24
However, we must conclude that on this point of the
choosing of a bishop St. Thomas shows himself less exigent
In Joan., c. 21, lect. 8 (Mar., par. 2620).
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 185, a. 3.
22 Quodl. VIII, a. 6; cf. also ibid., ad 2.
23 Ibid., corp.
2 ' Summa Theol., loc. cit., ad 2
20
21

NOEL MOLLOY

where spiritual qualities are concerned than many of the patristic and liturgical witnesses that we have considered.
Corresponding to the duties of the electors we find an elaborate doctrine on the attitude that one should adopt with regard to the acceptance of the episcopate. Here two points were
of particular interest to the medieval moralist. Could one
legitimately aspire to the episcopate? And if one were appointed or elected to this office, what should one's attitude be?
On the first point, the doctrine of St. Thomas is quite clear.
In principle, to desire the episcopate is " vicious." His most
elaborate treatment of this point is found in the Summa Theologiae (II-II, q. 185, a. 1). Here he distinguishes three aspects
of the episcopate: the episcopal activity, by which the bishop
dedicates himself to his flock; the high rank of the bishop; and
the various benefits which flow from the episcopate, such as
honor and material security. The desire of the episcopate for
either of the last two reasons is clearly vicious. But surely it
is virtuous to desire to be of service to one's neighbor? St.
Thomas concedes that such a desire is, in itself, praiseworthy
and virtuous but, nevertheless, because of the sublimity of
rank attendant on the episcopal state he judges that the desire
to occupy a position of superiority over others, even though
it be to benefit them, is a desire not free from the vice of presumption.
St. Thomas specifies in another place in what this presumption consists: one judges oneself superior to others " because
greater honor and power belong only to those who are better." 25 But this is not the only sort of presumption involved.
Later on in the same chapter he asserts that, since the bishop's
task is to lead his flock to perfection, he himself should be perfect. Thus, to desire the episcopate, even for the most worthy
of motives, is to assert by implication that one considers oneself
perfect,. which is presumptuous. 26 The last text is a key one
25
26

De Perf. V. Sp., c. 19 (Mar., par. 673).
Ibid., (Mar., par. 674). The same doctrine is found in Summa Theol., II-II,

q. 185, a. 1, ad fl.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

205

for St. Thomas's doctrine on the perfection of the bishop; we
shall return to it later to analyse it in more detail.
But what of the case where one is elected or appointed to
the episcopate? Must one always refuse if one is to avoid the
sin of presumption? St. Thomas touches on this point in a
number of different places, and there seems to be a certain
development in his thought. 27 His final position is that expressed
in the Quodlibetum V, a. 22, which dates from 1271. I£ one is
elected to the episcopate, then it is praiseworthy to accept
out of fraternal charity, so that one may help in the salvation
of one's neighbors. On the other hand, the one who refuses out
of humility is also worthy of praise, for the greatest suitability
is required for the episcopate. St. Thomas's preference goes
to the man who adopts the second line of conduct, for, since it
is extremely difficult to know if one is sufficiently purified for
the undertaking of this high office, it is safer to decline it. 28
What concerns us more directly is to know why St. Thomas
advises refusal. In Quodlibetum V, a. 22, it is because one is
never sure whether one is sufficiently purified (purgatus). In
this same corpus St. Thomas refers to the " maxima idoneitas "
required for the episcopate. What is this idoneitas? He tells
us in another place: " a man becomes suitable for the pontifical
throne in virtue of a pre-eminent charity (per caritatem excellen.tem) ." 29 In a text in which he is most negative on the question of acceptance of the episcopate he states his motive clearly:
Such a one can rightly desire the episcopate who is sufficiently
equipped for the episcopate. But for this no one is suitable, because
a prelate, in virtue of his rank and because of a certain fittingness
(secundum gradum et convenientiam), should be pre-eminent over
all others in behavior and contemplation, so that in comparison
27 For a table of the various positions of St. Thomas
cf. Summa Theologica
(Deutsch-Iateinische Ausgabe), Band 24: Staude und Standespflichten, HeidelbergGraz, 1952), p. 375.
28 However, it is the constant
teaching of St. Thomas that one may not obstinately refuse if the divine will is clearly manifested, as would be the case when
a formal command by one's superiors is involved---d. De Perf. V. Sp. c. 19 (Mar.,
par. 675); Quodl. V, a. 22; Summa Theol., II-II, q. 185, a. 2.
29 Quodl. III, a. 9.

206

NOEL MOLLOY

with him the rest are as a flock. It is the greatest pride to presume
that one has this suitability. . . . And hence the episcopate is not
to he accepted unless it is imposed.30
To conclude this consideration of St. Thomas's attitude toward desiring and accepting the episcopate we could say that
his position is in general negative, and the reasons he invokes
have their roots above all in the sanctity that is expected in
the episcopal state.

C. Sanctity and Holy Orders.
For St. Thomas " the hierarchy is something that is properly
social: it is based, not on interior, personal sanctity, but on
a power that is of a public nature; the hierarchic situation does
not necessarily coincide with the level of grace or of sanctity,
of intelligence or of natural gifts." 31
This power is conferred by the sacrament of Orders: " For
whenever anything spiritual is conferred by means of a bodily
sign, one has a sacrament. It is clear therefore that in the conferring of a spiritual power there is question of a sacrament,
which is called the sacrament of Orders." 32 By this sacrament
one receives "a certain excellence of power in matters that
pertain to the divine ministry." 83 In this the sacrament of Orders differs from Baptism for, while the principal effect of the
latter is the interior purification worked by the infusion of
grace, the infusion of grace is not of the essence of the sacrament of Orders; it is the communication of a spiritual power
that is primary. 34 Conversely, one's rank in the hierarchy is
not determined by one's level of personal sanctity but by the
sacrament that one has received. 35
In this clear distinction which he makes between the power
of Orders and personal sanctity St. Thomas dissociates himself
I ad Tim., c. 8, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 9).
Congar, art. cit., in note (6), pp.
•• IV Contra Gentiles, c. 74.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 84, a. 4.
•• IV Sent., d.
q. 1, a. 1 sol.
ad 1 ad
35 Ibid., q. 1, a. 8, sol. 8.
80

81

HIERARCHY AND HO:J;.INESS

207

from the doctrine of the Pseudo-Denis. As is well-known, St.
Thomas gives, wherever possible, a benign interpretation to
statements of the great figures of antiquity with whose doctrine
he is not in agreement. Such is the case on this point. Thus,
citing the text of Denis in his letter to Demophilus in which
the Areopagite clearly teaches that a sinful priest is no priest,
St. Thomas interprets it to mean that a priest who falls into
grave sin is unworthy (indignus) of any spiritual ministry.%
But such reverent treatment cannot conceal the radical difference between the two doctors. St. Thomas parts company
with Denis
above all in separating the personally possessed quality of illumination and hierarchical function. For Denis, hierarchical quality is
a quality of existence, it corresponds to an ontological degree of
participation in the divine light. For Thomas, it is a question of
potestas . ... For Denis, as is known, one can illuminate only if one
is oneself illuminated; the efficacy of an excommunication or of an
absolution depends on the spiritual dispositions of the minister.
St. Thomas knows these texts of Denis and rejects the doctrine
contained in them . . . The whole of the answer of St. Thomas is
based on a true notion of the hierarchic structure of the Church,
which rests on sacramental and juridical realities that are, of themselves, of a public order. Likewise, to the extent that this expression
belong to his vocabulary, Thomas Aquinas understands by " hierarchical acts " not a superior activity in the line of personal
qualities but sacramental acts proceeding from the potestas that
is constitutive of the sacrament of Orders . . . The hierarchical
priesthood is likewise constituted not by a virtue that allows one
to act well with regard to a personal end but by a power, ordering
a man to the placing of the hierarchical acts of which we have
spoken. 37
But to assert that for St. Thomas the essential element in
performing hierarchical acts is the power conferred on the
minister by the sacrament of Orders and not personal sanctity
is not to say that he considers the holiness of the minister as
being of no importance.
86

87

Quodl. VIII a. 6.
Congar, art. cit., in note (6), pp. 123-125.

208

NOEL MOLLOY

On the negative side, St. Thomas asserts that one who is in
the state of mortal sin is unworthy of any spiritual office as
and that in performing a sacred function in such a state one
sins mortally. 1m The reason is that ministers should be conformed to the Lord whom they serve; to act in God's name while
they themselves are offensive to him through their sin is to be
guilty both of irreverence towards God and, insofar as in them
lies, of contamination of sacred things. 40
But freedom from sin is only the minimum requirement.
While the sacraments would be valid even if the minister were
in sin-a minister does not communicate his own grace but that
of Christ-nevertheless it is fitting that the minister should
have a higher sanctity than those to whom he minister. 41 For
this fitting exercise of the ministry, nothing less than an "amplissima gratia" is required. 42
St. Thomas is quite precise on this sanctity required for the
exercise of Orders:
Eor the suitable exercise of Orders no ordinary goodness suffices,
but a pre-eminent goodness is required: so that just as they who
receive Orders are placed in rank above the people, so they may
be superior to them in merit of sanctity. 48
Though ministers may not be in an ecclesial state of perfection,
nevertheless an inner perfection is required of them for the
worthy exercise of sacred action; 44 in fact a greater sanctity is
required of them than is required even of those who are in the
state of perfection of religious. 45
St. Thomas gives various motives for this requirement of
sanctity in those constituted in holy Orders. Before one preQuodl. VIII, a. 6.
IV Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 5.
•• Summa Theol., III, q. 64, a. 6.
41 IV Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3, ad 2; cf. also Summa Theol., loc. cit., a. 5
38

89

ad 3 and a. 6 ad 1.
'"IV Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad I.
•• Ibid., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 3.
"Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 6.

'" Ibid., a. 8.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

209

sumes to lead others to God, one should oneself be most like
to God (Deo simillimus); 46 one called to be a mediator should
shine before men by a good conscience. 47 The sanctity required
of a minister of the Eucharist is singled out for special mention,
because
by holy Orders one is deputed for most elevated functions, by which
one ministers to Christ himself in the sacrament of the Altar, for
which a greater inner sanctity is required than is demanded in the
religious state. 48
Finally, while the holiness of the minister does not affect the
efficacy of the sacraments themselves, nevertheless the efficacy
of the annexed prayers can be increased by the devotio minis-

tri.4a
It is precisely the sacrament of Orders which gives to the
minister the grace to live up to the demands of sanctity that
his office imposes on him. The fact that St. Thomas insists so
much on the aspect of the communication of a spiritual power
does not mean that he loses sight of the aspect of the communication of a grace of sanctity. In one text, in fact, this aspect is
the only one mentioned:
the efi.ect of this sacrament [i.e., Orders] is an increase of grace, so
that one may be a suitable minister of Christ. 50
In each Order the septijormis gratia of the Spirit is given. 51
Just as no ordinary goodness but a bonitas excellens is required
of a minister, so:
there is required as a pre-requisite [to ordination] a grace which
renders one a worthy member of Christ's people; but in the reception of Orders itself there is conferred a further gift of grace, by
which those ordained are rendered worthy of greater offices.52
IV Sent., d.
q. 1, a. 8, sol. 1.
'" Ibid., ad
48 Summa Theol., loc. cit.
•• Ibid., III, q. 64, a. 1, ad
50 De Articulis Fidei et Sacramentis Ecclesiae. Earlier
in the same opusculum,
46

however, he does mention the impression of a character.
"'IV Sent., d.
q.
a. 1, sol. 2.
•• Ibid., q. 1, a. 2, sol. 1, ad 8.

NOEL MOLLOY

From what has been said it is clear that there is a definite
teaching in St. Thomas on the inner sanctity required of those
in Holy Orders. It will have been noted that so far we have
made no explicit mention of the bishop. In fact, however,and without prejudice to the question of whether or not the
episcopate was regarded by the older Thomas as a sacramental
order-what has been said of the sanctity required of. other
ministers applies a fortiori to the bishop.
For the whole plenitude of this sacrament is in one Order, namely,
in the priesthood; but in others there is a certain participation of
orders; and this is signified by what the Lord said to Moses . . .
" I will take of your spirit and give it to these so that they may
share the burden of the people."58
Now in the line of the priesthood the bishop holds the first
place:
For just as we see that the whole hierarchy finds its consummation
in Jesus, so each local one finds its consummation in its own divine
high-priest, that is, the bishop.54
Certain sacred actions-notably the administration of the sacraments of Confirmation and Orders-are reserved to him. 55
Unlike the simple priest, he wears the vestments of the inferior
ministers because
the power of the ministers is in the bishop as in its origin; but it
is not in the priest, since he does not confer these orders.... 56
Ibid., q.
a. 1, sol. 1, ad
Contra Impugnantes ... , c. 4 (Mar., par., par 90).
66 Cf. IV Sent., d.
q. 8, a. 8. The bishop's office as minister of these two
sacraments presupposes a special sanctity in him. " The imposition of hands takes
place in the administration of the Church's sacraments to designate a certain
copious effect of grace, by which those on whom hands are imposed are linked,
as it were, by a sort of similitude to the ministers, in which the abundance of
grace ought to be present. And hence the imposition of hands takes place in
the sacrament of confirmation, in which is conferred the plenitude of the Holy
Spirit; and in the sacrament of Orders, in which there is conferred a certain excellence of power with regard to the divine ministry." Summa Theol. III, q, 84,
a. 4.
•• Ibid., ad 8; "ipsa sace1·dotalis potestas ab episcopali derivatur." IV Cont.
Gent., c. 76.
68

6'

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

Hence we can say that the sanctity demanded for the worthy
exercise of Orders will be demanded above all from one constituted in the episcopacy.

D. The Gratia Episcopalis.
Sanctity is required of the bishop, then, since he is the one
to whom pertains par excellence the exercise of Holy Orders.
But can one be more precise on episcopal sanctity and say that
St. Thomas holds for a specific grace of the episcopate?
It is here that one might discuss the question of St. Thomas's
position on the sacramentality of the episcopate. However, we
do not intend to consider the point here. The reason is not
that we consider the question of episcopal sacramentality to
be of no interest in a discussion of episcopal perfection-quite
the contrary is the case, for the massive testimony of Fathers
and liturgies shows that the most profound source of episcopal
sanctity is to be sought along these lines. But the very fact
that the question is still disputed means that nothing certain
can be deduced with regard to St. Thomas's position on episcopal perfection if one uses his position on episcopal sacramentality as a basis. 57
But there can be no doubt that St. Thomas holds for a
special grace of the episcopate. When, in fact, he asserts that
the episcopate is not an order, 5 8 that it is" magis dignitas quam
ordo," 59 we must understand him exactly. To the objection
that Denis speaks of only three orders, and hence that a sevenfold division is not justified, he replies:
57 On the much discussed question
as to what St. Thomas's position of the
episcopate might have been had he lived to write the tract on Orders for the
Summa, cf. especially L. Lecuyer, "Les etapes de l'enseignement thomiste sur
l'episcopat," in Revue Thomiste 57 (1957), pp.
and J. A. Ramirez, De
Episcopatu ut Sacramento deque Episcoporum Collegia (Salamanca, 1966), pp.
Both authors maintain that S. Thomas held for the sacramentality of
the episcopate at least at the end of his career. The present writer must confess
that he remains unconvinced.
58 IV Sent., d.
q.
a. 1, sol.
59
ArtiC'lfli.'J Fidei et f$acramel(ltis

NOEL MOLLOY

Denis speaks of Orders not insofar as they are sacraments but
insofar as they are ordained to hierarchical acts; and hence, on the
basis of these acts, he distinguishes three orders: the first of whom,
namely the bishop, has all three [acts]; the second, that is, the
priest, has two; but the third, the deacon, has one, namely, to
purify .... But Orders derive their sacramental nature from their
relation to the greatest of sacraments; and it is on this basis that
the number of sacraments should he calculated. 60
Hence Orders can be looked on in two ways, and this twofold consideration lies behind one of the clearest texts that St.
Thomas has left us on the episcopate. To the assertion that the
episcopate is not an order he replies:
The assertion ... that the episcopate is not an order is clearly false,
if this be understood absolutely. For Denis says expressly that
there are three orders in the ecclesiastical hierarchy, namely, those
of bishops, priests, and deacons . . . For the bishop has an order
with regard to the mystical body of Christ, which is the Church;
over which he receives a princely and quasi-royal charge. But with
regard to the true body of Christ, which is contained in the sacrament, he does not have an order over the presbyter. The fact that
he has a certain order and not merely jurisdiction ... is clear from
the fact that the bishop can do many things which he cannot commit to others, such as confirm, ordain, ... consecrate basilicas, etc:
whereas those things which pertain to jurisdiction can be committed
to others. The same is clear from the fact that if a deposed bishop
is re-instated he is not re-consecrated, indicating that the power of
Orders remains, as happens with other Orders ( tamquam potestate
ordinis remanente, sicut et in aliis contingit ordinibus . .. ) "
Hence the power of the bishop is truly a potestas ordinis, 62
and one can truly speak of the ordo episcoporum; 63 and the
ceremony by which one is assumed into this ordo episcoporum
is a true ceremony of ordination. 64
IV Sent., loc. cit., ad I.
De Perf. V. Sp., c.
(Mar. par. 715); cf. also IV Sent.,
q. 3,
d.
q. I, a.
ad
62 Ibid., d.
q. 3, a.
sol.
ad 3.
68 Cf. Contra Pestiferam Doctrinam Retrahentium
Homines a Religionis Ingressu
(abbrev.-Contra Retrahentes, c. 16 (Mar., par. 853).
6 • Cf. Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 184, a. 5 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 16 (Mar., Par. 656).
60

61

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

This last text we have referred to brings us directly to the
question of a special episcopal grace. In this ordination ceremony, in fact, a special grace is conferred. St. Thomas seems
to be quite explicit. Showing how there is both a quasi-profession ceremony and an external solemnity in the conferring of
the episcopate, he writes:
Hence the Apostle says, in Tim. 6:12: "You confessed a good confession before many witnesses," that is, " at your ordination," as
the gloss says. There is found also a certain solemnity of consecration with the above profession: as we read in II Tim. 1:6: "Stir
up the grace of God which is in you through the imposition of my
hands," which the Gloss expounds as being the "gratia episcopalis." 65
However, this text is not as clear as it might appear at first
sight. One may ask whether a grace of sanctity is in question
or merely the conferring of the power of Orders, which is certainly a grace also. In fact, we read in a later text of St.
Thomas:
In conferring the Church's sacraments one imposes hands to indicate a certain copious effect of grace ... And hence the imposition
of hand takes place in the sacrament of Confirmation, in which
the plenitude of the Holy Spirit is conferred; and in the sacrament
of Orders, in which is conferred a certain excellence of power in
what pertains to the divine ministry; hence II Tim. 1: 6 says .... " 66
Commenting on St. Paul's admonition to Timothy not to
neglect the grace given him by the imposition of hands, St.
Thomas understands by this grace " either the episcopal dignity, or the gift of knowledge, of prophecy or of miracles." 67
It is only in commenting on that other admonition of Paul
urging Timothy to stir up the grace that is within him through
the imposition of a grace of sanctity:
And he [Paul] adds "[the grace] which is in you through the imposition of my hands," an imposition performed by him, that is,
Ibid.
Summa Theol., III, q. 84, a. 4.
67 I Tim., c. 4, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 173) .
65

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NOEL MOLLOY

who ordained him a bishop. In which imposition of the hand was
given to him the grace of the Holy Spirit . . . For there is a twofold spirit, that of this world, and that of God. The difference between them is this: spirit signifies love, because the name of
"spirit" implies a certain impulsion, and love impels. Now there
is a double lov.e, namely, love of God, and this is through the Spirit
of God, and love of the world, and this is through the spirit of the
world. 68
A grace of sanctity, then, is conferred on the bishop at his
consecration. That this is a particularly abundant grace IS
signified by the rite of imposition of hands itself because:
By the imposition of hands there is given a plenitude of grace, by
which those ordained [S. Thomas is here considering only priests
and deacons] become suitable for great oflices.69
To conclude this consideration of what can be deduced on
episcopal sanctity from a consideration of the holiness required
of those constituted in Orders, we can summarize by saying that
St. Thomas expects a pre-eminent holiness of those called to
exercise the sacred ministry: what he says of Orders in general
applies a fortiori to the bishop, who alone can perform all the
sacred functions and from whom are derived in a participated
way the powers of the other ministers. As in the case of the
sanctity of other ministers, this sanctity has its source in the
grace of the sacrament of Orders. While it is not certain
whether St. Thomas held for a special sacramental grace of the
episcopate, or whether the sacramental grace of the bishop IS
II Tim., c. 1, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 13-14).
IV Sent., d. 24, q. 2, a. 3. One might ask at this point if the doctrine of St.
Thomas that the imposition of hands at episcopal consecration confers a grace
of sanctity does not make of this rite a sacrament. Fr. Lemonnyer, who posed
the question in these terms, satisfactorily answered it by showing that S. Thomas
likewise held that a number of other rites-such as the consecration of monks and
virgins and the anointing of kings--confer grace, and yet denied at the same time
that they were sacraments (cf., e. g., IV Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, ad 9; d. 38, q. 1,
a. 5, ad 2). Hence one cannot argue with certainty from the fact that grace is
conferred with the episcopate to the sacramentality of the latter. Cf. A. Lemonnyer, "Memoire theologique sur l'episcopat" :part two, in La Vie Spirituelle (April,
l936), :p:p. [40]-[4Il.
.
.
68

69

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

Q15

that which he holds in common with the presbyter, he does
maintain that there is a special episcopal grace which is conferred on the imposition of hands during the ceremony of episcopal consecration.
II. The State of Perfection of the Bishop.
Since perfection already acquired is distinctive of the episcopal state, we should investigate how St. Thomas understood
" state of perfection " and its realization in the bishop as contrasted with the religious.

A. The Notion of State.
At the time when St. Thomas was obliged to express in very
precise terms his doctrine on the states of perfection-during
his second teaching period in Paris (1Q69-1Q7Q)-the expressions ordo (officium) , status and gradus were used indifferently
by the secular theologians of the time. 70 Hence, the first step
in the elaboration of his theology on this point had to be an
exact definition of what he meant by " state," involving a corresponding precision of the notions of office (officium) and
rank (gradus). Thoughout the many texts which date from
this period of his career he never fails " to define status (per70 Y. Cougar, art. cit., in note (6), p. 66. Since frequent reference will be made
in what follows to "prelates," a few words on what this term implied are called for.
In our period the Church prelate was, in general, one who had pastoral jurisdiction
(cf. Cougar, art. cit., p. 66). Hence, having discussed the state of perfection of
bishops and religious, St. Thomas can go on to ask " whether all ecclesiastical
prelates are in a state of perfection," and proceed to discuss the situation of
"presbyters and deacons with the charge of souls" (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184,
a. 6) .... However, speaking more precisely, St. Thomas can say that "the
bishop alone is, properly speaking, a prelate of the Church ... But the priests who
have charge of souls are not prelates simpliciter but, as it were, coadjutors " (IV
Sent., d.
q. 1, a. 4, sol. 1--cf. Cougar, art. cit., p. 95). It is the bishop who
is, strictly speaking, the pastor, succeeding Christ and the Apostles in this office
(cf. In loan., c. 10, lect 3- Mar., par. 1398). In one very important text St.
Thomas speaks of the state of perfection of prelates, and it is clear that he is
referring to bishops (cf. In Matth., c. 19-Mar., par. 1594-1595). We must judge
each text from the context, but in general we will find that when St. Thomas
speaks of prelates he is thinking of the bishops.

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NOEL MOLLOY

fectionis) with a constancy and a force which leads us to suspect that this notion is an essential element of his representation of the Church and of his own condition as a religious. The
whole nub of the position in his confrontation with the Seculars
is found in his very precise notion of 'status.'" 71
In the final, synthetic expression which he gives to his position in I-II, q. 188, a. 1 (written about 1272) we read in the
" sed contra " the text from Roman law that gives us the source
from which St. Thomas derives the sense that he gives to the
word " state.'' " When a summons has been issued in a process
in which life or state is involved, then one must act personally,
and not by means of investigators (exploratores) .'' 72 St.
Thomas adds, correctly, that state in this text is to be taken
in the sense of freedom or slavery.
In the body of the article St. Thomas justifies this use of
the word " state.'' The verb "stare," from which the word
" state " is derived, involves two elements in its meaning. In
the first place, it signifies a situation of the body which is most
in keeping with man's nature. The natural situation for man
is to be in an upright position, head in the air, feet on the
ground. Hence one who sits or lies down is no longer in the
most natural position and can no longer be said to " stand."
In the second place, a certain immobility is required. Thus
a man who is moving around is no longer " standing.''
Going beyond the primary, physical sense of the word, one
can speak in an analogous way of the properly human state or
condition of a man. In this sense, a man's state will be judged
on the basis of something that is intrinsically related to the
human person and not on the basis of something accidental;
and, in the second place, this condition must be of a permanent
nature, must have a certain fixity. Thus St. Thomas requires
Cougar, art. cit., p. 85.
The text is corrupt, and should in fact read " procuratores," not " exploratores." On this text and St. Thomas's use of it, cf. J-A Robilliard, "Sur Ia notion
de condition (status) en S. Thomas," in Revue des sciences philosophiques et
theologiques, 25 (1936), pp. 104-105.
71

72

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

217

for a properly human state " an immobility m what pertains
to the condition of a person" (ad 3).
Now the most basic human distinction between persons
living in a society is not that which depends on their wealth
or on their honorable rank but rather on their condition as
"sui iuris" or "alieni iuris." 73 If the element of permanence
be added to such a condition of the person, then one is constituted in a state. The element of permanence is necessary,
for a man may be " alieni iuris " for a limited period onlythus a minor, though "alieni iuris," does not change his state
on reaching his majority, for the element of permanence was
lacking in his condition as "alieni iuris." Hence the basic human states, as St. Thomas conceived of them, were those of
being permanently " sui iuris " or permanently " alieni iuris,''
i. e., " state refers, properly speaking, to freedom or slavery,
whether it be in the spiritual or civil spheres." 74
Not every one who serves is a slave, nor is every one who
does not serve a free man. A slave is one who is obliged to
serve; a free man is one who is absolved from this obligation.
But, in human society, this obligation, or the absolution from
it, is not sufficient in itself to constitute a man in a civil state
of slavery or freedom. The change of state must be accompanied by a certain solemnity, as is customary among men
when anything involving perpetual binding force is in question.
The contract is thus given greater firmness. 75
78 " It seems that that alone
to the state of a man which has reference
to the obligation of the human person: insofar, namely, as one is "sui iuris" or
" alieni iuris." On this text Cajetan notes: " Our author never says that ' state '
demands an obligation in every state: but he says that each state ' has reference
to an obligating.' There is all the difference in the world between these two. For
the first requires that every state have an obligation to that which is proper to
the state. But for the second it suffices that there be reference to an obligation,
so that under 'obligation' one can distinguish affirmatively and negatively, i.e.,
one may have an obligation or one may not have it. And in this way the state
of a free person is distinguished from that of a slave: because servitude has an
affirmative reference to obligation, while liberty has a negative one" (In 11-II,
q. 183, a. 1. n.
74 Summa Theol., 11-II, q. 183, a. 1.
75 Ibid., q. 184. St. Thomas mentions the civil solemnity which accompanied the
manumission of a slave, cf. De Perf. V. Sp., c.
(Mar., par. 711).

9ll8

NOEL MOLLOY

Furthermore, a totality of commitment is necessary to constitute one in a state. A person, in fact, may oblige himself to
serve another in a particular task only. In such a case he cannot properly be said to surrender his freedom, and hence his
state does not change. "If, however, he puts himself totally
in the power of another, in such a way that he retains no freedom of action for himself, then he changes his condition simpliciter, becoming simpliciter a slave." 76
Finally, to distinguish clearly between state, office, and rank,
St. Thomas defines office in terms of relationship to an activity
to be exercised, and rank (gradus) in terms of any superiority
or inferiority. 77

B. The Notion of State of Perfection.
These precisions of St. Thomas were meant to serve as no
more than an introduction to his consideration of what is involved in a state of perfection. Hence, from the physical sense
of the word " state," and then the properly human sense, St.
Thomas goes on to discuss what" state" involves when applied
to the realm of the spirituallife. 78
Just as the basic human states are those represented by
liberty and servitude, so the basic spiritual states are those
which are seen in function of one's spiritual servitude or freedom. Here St. Thomas can invoke St. Paul in his support.
The Apostle, contrasting the situation of Christians before
their conversion with their present one, speaks in terms of a
" servitude with regard to sin, liberty with regard to righteousness " which has been replaced by " liberty with regard to sin,
servitude with regard to God" (cf. Rom. 6: 9l0-9l9l).
Glossing this text St. Thomas explains that: " there is servitude to sin or righteousness when a person is inclined either to
evil from a habit of sin, or is inclined to good from a habit
of righteousness." As the inclination to evil grows there is a
Ibid., c. 15 (Mar., par. 651).
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 183, a. 1, ad 3.
78 Ibid., a. 4.
76

77

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

219

corresponding freedom from the inclination to good; as the inclination to good grows there is a corresponding freedom from
the inclination to evil. Since habits are the resultant of human
acts, one is personally responsible for the state in which one
finds oneself. Human effort is particularly required when it is
a question of freeing oneself from sin to subject oneself to
righteousness. The subjection to righteousness will normally
be attained only progressively, so that one speaks in this context of the states of beginners, proficients, and perfect.
St. Thomas treats of these three states when discussing the
different grades in the growth of charity .79 The charity of beginners is characterized by the struggle to acquire liberty from
the state of servitude to sin, that of proficients by the effort
to adhere more and more to the good. When this habit inclining towards righteousness has become a second nature, so
that one is now constrained, as it were, by a profound inner
urge to a total commitment to the good, charity is perfected.
Corresponding to these three grades of charity are the states
of beginners, proficients, and perfect.
But a state, as we have seen, involves the element of a
total commitment. A person who serves another while reserving a certain liberty to himself is not properly in a state of
servitude. Thus the states of beginners and proficients are
states only in an imperfect sense; they have an inner tension
towards that state which, constrained by an interior law, is
a total yielding of oneself to God. 80 It is only this last state,
that of the perfect, which is a state in the full sense. 81
It is at this point that a closer analysis of the nature of
Christian perfection is called for. Christian perfection is the
•• Ibid., q. £4, a. 9. It is hardly necessary to insist on the fact that, for St.
Thomas, Christian perfection is a perfection of charity. He treats of this in a
number of places: cf. esp. De Perf. V. Sp., cc. 1-2 (Mar., par 559-563), and
Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 1.
8 ° Cf. Quodl. I, a. 14, ad £.
81 Thus, in the prologue to q. 184 St. Thomas speaks of "the state of perfection,
to which the other states are ordained " ; cf. the useful remarks of Cajetan on
this point fo11nd in his CO!J.lmentary on q. 183, a. 1 (n. 3).

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NOEL MOLLOY

perfection of charity. But the precept of charity as found in
the Gospel is two-fold: one must love God with one's whole
heart, and one must love one's neighbor as oneself. Hence perfection consists primarily in the love of God, secondarily in the
love of one's neighbor. 82
With. regard to the love of God there is a triple perfection.
God can be loved to the extent that he is lovable; such a perfection of the love of God would require an infinite power of
loving, and hence is found in God alone. In the second place,
God can be loved with such a totality that the lover is ever
totally and actually borne towards him in love; such a perfection of charity can be found only among those who enjoy the
Beatific Vision. Finally, God can be loved with the totality
that is consonant with the condition of wayfarer, i. e., the
lover excludes, as far as in him lies, everything that would absorb his attention and tie him to the things of earth "so that
the mind may more freely tend towards God, contemplating
him, loving him, and doing his will." 83
The call to th:ls perfection of the love of God is not reserved
to a chosen few but is given to all, and the command has no
limit. 84 Every Christian is called to the full perfection of charity. We have already remarked that there are many factors
necessarily involved in man's pilgrim condition which prevent
a totality of concentration on God comparable to that open to
the blessed. These are limit-situations from which man cannot escape. However, these limiting conditions can be reduced
to a minimum by the exclusion of certain human concerns
which, while not inconsistent with the perfection of charity,
nevertheless render its attainment more difficult. It is precisely
towards the elimination of these non-essential absorbing factors
that accompany the human condition that the counsels of
De Perf. V. Sp., c.
(Mar., par. 562-568).
Ibid., cc. 8-6 (Mar., par. 564-569). St. Thomas also speaks here of that
minimum perfection of God's love without which charity cannot be preserved
(c. 5), but this aspect does not concern us here.
8 • Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 8-III Sent, d.
a. 8, sol.
St. Thomas
specifies: to actually be perfect is not of precept, but to tend to perfection.
82
88

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

221

poverty, chasity, and obedience are geared. 85 St. Thomas is
careful to emphasize, however, that perfection is not found in
following the counsels but in obedience to the precept of the
total love of God and neighbor. The counsels are no more than
instruments for the more effective acquisition of this love by
the removal of those things, non-essential for the individual,
which are impediments to the act of the love of .God.86
Perfection consists secondarily in the love of neighbor, and in
this regard also there are varying degrees of the perfection of
love. As in the case of the love of God, there is a perfection
of the love of neighbor which is not possible in this life-one
cannot actually love every human person in his individuality. 87
At the other end of the scale there is that minimum perfection
of love of neighbor without which fraternal charity cannot be
preserved. This requires a love of neighbor that is true, ordered, holy, and efficacious, excluding everything that is contrary to this love.88 Between both of these, there is a perfection of love of neighbor to which everyone is called, but which
is not a matter of precept, and without which charity can be
preserved. Such a love can attain perfection in three directions: with regard to extension, intensity, and efficacy.89
85 In De Perf. V. Sp. St. Thomas devotes a long section (cc. 7-10, Mar., par.
570-608) to a consideration of the value of each of these " ways to perfection " in

turn.
86 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 8. St. Thomas treats in a number of places
of this question of the relationship between precepts and counsels-d. esp., Ccmtra
Retrahentes, c. 6 (Mar., par. 757-767), and, above all, Quodl. IV, qq.
At the
time when he wrote these last questions, towards the end of his second Paris
period, St. Thomas had come to realize the importance of stating with absolute
precision the relation between precepts and counsels, for he saw that many of the
theses of the Seculars in the quarrels about the states of perfection were based on
fundamental misconceptions on this point; cf. P. Glorieux, "Contra Geraldinos ... ",
in Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 7 (1985), pp.
87 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. i'l, ad 8.
88 The minimum requirements for a real fraternal charity are developed at length
in De Perf. V. Sp., c. 13 (Mar., par. 6£6-685).
89 St. Thomas analyzes in detail each of these dimensions under which ·fraternal
charity can reach its highest perfection here below in De Perf. V. Sp., c. 14, (Mar.,
par. 686-649). What follows is a summary of the doctrine in this key text. The
same matter is treated much more briefly in Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 2 ad 8.

NOEL MOLLOY

With regard to extension, purely natural love embraces those
bound in friendship in any way and may even extend in a
general way to complete strangers providing there is nothing
in them that makes them obnoxious in any way. But that one
should love one's enemy is a grade of love that is properly
Christian. But even this love of enemies admits of degrees. It
may not go beyond the minimum necessary to fulfil the precept: in such a case one does not exclude one's enemy from
the general love that one must bear for all men, and one must
be ready to show him love and assist him as an individual
should a case of necessity arise. But that one should seek out
one's enemies to show them special love and to benefit them
even when there is no question of necessity is a perfection
of love which, while all are called to it, is nevertheless not a
matter of precept and without which charity can be preserved.
St. Thomas remarks that such a love can only come from an
abundance of the love of God. When love of God is
then the loveableness of one's neighbor as an image of God
more than counter-balances the aversion that one feels towards
him on the purely human level. This precision will be of importance when it comes to showing how the episcopal state,
seen in terms of the love of neighbor, is superior to the religious
state, defined in terms of the love of God.
In the second place, there are grades of intensity of the love
of one's neighbor. The intensity of one's love can be gauged
from what one is willing to sacrifice to benefit the person loved.
In the first place, there is a willingness to surrender one's possessions; in the second place, there is a willingness to spend oneself totally by a lifetime of bodily toil in the neighbor's interest.
But beyond this sacrifice of external goods and goods of the
body, there can be a willingness to sacrifice life itself to benefit
one's neighbor. This is the sign of the greatest possible love,
as the Lord himself testifies. In a case of necessity one is
obliged to sacrifice one's bodily life for the salvation of the
neighbor's soul. But, outside such a situation, freely to expose
oneself to the danger of death for the spiritual good of one's
neighbor pertains to the perfection of fraternal charity.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

Finally, the perfection of fraternal love can be judged from
the effect that it produces. In this respect St. Thomas judges
that a greater love is shown in devoting oneself to the spiritual
good of one's neighbor on the human plane-by teaching, advising, etc.,-than by devoting oneself to his purely material
well-being. But the greatest love of all is shown by devoting
oneself to the properly supernatural well-being of others by
communicating to them spiritual goods, "namely, doctrine on
divine things, direction on the path to God, and the spiritual
communication of the sacraments." 90 An additional perfection
is added to this last degree if these goods are communicated
not only to one or two but to a whole group. 91
In his precise theology of the states of perfection St. Thomas
thus restricts the use of the phrase " state of perfection " to
designate a clearly defined reality in the life of the Church,
and hence he habitually distinguishes between being perfect
and being in a state of perfection.

C. The Ecclesial State of Perfection.
St. Thomas has defined a spiritual state in terms of spiritual
liberty or servitude. Now such a spiritual condition may be of
two sorts: it may have reference to the purely interior life
of a man-in which case " state of perfection " is identified
with the state of being perfect-or it may be something which
pertains to the external forum and is of a public nature. God
90 The critical edition of the De Pm-f. V. Sp. reads " the communication
of the
spiritual sacraments," which make more sense (ed. Leonina, c. 17, lines 23-24).
91 In fact, in his prologue to q. 184, St. Thomas
does use the phrase "status
perfectorum," but the context indicates that he is referring to the states of bishop
and religious. By an analogy of attribution St. Thomas can call " perfect " all
those constituted in an ecclesial state of perfection. One might object that the
element of solemnitas is lacking to this purely interior state of perfection. This
is so if we limit solemnitas to something that involves an external manifestation.
If, on the other hand, we see the essence of a spiritual solemnitas in a spiritual
consecration (c£., Summa Theol., II-II, q. 88, a. 7), then this is not lacking, for a
choice divine blessing accompanies, and causes, entry into the perfect state
of divine union. For a purely inner state of perfection no external manifestation
is required. God solemnizes this state without the intervention of an ecclesial
minister.

NOEL MOLLOY

alone can judge whether or not a man is in a state of perfection
in the first sense. But in the second sense " state of perfection " is something which belongs to the visible structure of
the Church, and it is. this sense alone that St. Thomas intends
·when he speaks from now on of the "states of perfection."
To constitute an ecclesial state of perfection St. Thomas
will require that the conditions laid down for the constitution
of a state in general be realized. The conditions are, as we have
seen: that one be obliged to serve or be absolved from this
obligation; that this situation be of a permanent nature; that
there be a totality in either service or liberty; and that the
assumption of the state be accompanied by a certain solemnity.
Each of these conditions must be verified in the ecclesial
state of perfection. Hence, in the first place,
... properly speaking, those are said to be in a state of perfection
who submit themselves to a servitude with a view to fulfilling
works of perfection. Now, it is clear that servitude is opposed to
liberty. One's liberty to do something is taken away by a vow ...
Hence, he who binds himself by vow to something, insofar as he
submits himself to a necessity, makes of himself a slave, depriving
himself of liberty .92
The first condition, then, for a state of perfection is that one
binds oneself by vow to perform works of perfection.
In the second place, this obligation must be perpetual. If
the obligation is only for a limited period, then one is not constituted. in a state of perfection. 93
Thirdly, there must be a certain totality about this obligation.
Should a person, therefore, bind himself by vow to perform any
particular good work, he makes of himself, in a certain way, a
slave-not simpliciter, however, but secundum quid, namely, in
respect of that to which he obliges himself. If, however, by vow
he should give his whole life to God simpliciter, for the performance
Quodl. m, a. 17.
•• De Perf. V. Sp., c.

90

(Mar., par. 679).

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

of the works of perfection for God's sake, he makes of himself a
slave simpliciter, and is thus placed in a state of perfection .... 94

Finally, it is required that this obligation be undertaken
with a certain solemnity. 95 By " solemn " St. Thomas means
something of a public nature, connoting the intervention of
ecclesiastical authority .96 The most profound reality of the
states of perfection is the inner sanctity which animates them,
but the states are essentially ecclesial and as such are incorporated into the external structure of the Church as a sign to
the world of her inner sanctity. 97 It is precisely by the solemnity that accompanies the assumption of the state that this
ecclesial status is conferred. Hence, though the external solemnity is not the cause of one's being in a state of perfection-for
the cause is the perpetual obligation to perform the works of
perfection-nevertheless it is the indispensable sign.98
However, the solemnity which accompanies the introduction
into a spiritual state involves more than an intervention of ecclesiastical authority. The solemnity which accompanies the
assumption of any state is proportioned to that state, hence the
solemnity which accompanies a marriage differs from that
which accompanies the conferring of a knighthood. Now the
assumption of a state of perfection-whether episcopal or religious-involves a vow made to God (cf. II-II, q. 19, a. 7).
Hence the solemnity:
consists in something of a spiritual nature, which pertains to God:
that is, it consists in a certain spiritual blessing or consecration
(ibid., q. 88, a. 7),
•• Quodl. III, a. 17; cf. also De Perf. V. Sp., c. 15 (Mar., par. 651).
95 Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 184, a. 4; De Perf. V. Sp., c. 20 (Mar., par. 681).
•• Cougar, art. cit., p. 86, n. 146. This solemnity in the case of ecclesial states
of perfection involves a solemn consecration or benedictio (coming from God
through his ministers), which accompanies the assumption of the state-d. L.-B.
Gillon, "L'Episcopat, etat de perfection," in L'Eveque dans l'eglise du Christ,
(DDB) (1968), pp. 284-285.
97 Summa Theol., 11-11, q. 184, a. 4, first paragraph-to
be read in conjunction
with q. 188, aa. 2-8.
98 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 24 (Mar., par. 711).

NOEL MOLLOY

a blessing " of which God is the author, although man may
be the minister" (ibid., ad I) .
St. Thomas many times insists on the difference between
being perfect and being in a state of perfection.
But it is to be noted that it is one thing to be perfect and quite
another to be in a state of perfection. For there are those who are
in a state of perfection who are not yet perfect, and who may even
be sinners, while there are others who are perfect but are not in
a state of perfection.99
But does not this mean that a person who has entered a state
of perfection, and yet is not perfect, is a hypocrite? No, because " men enter a state of perfection not as if claiming that
they are perfect, but professing to tend to perfection." 100
In summary, then, St. Thomas requires for an ecclesial state
of perfection that one oblige oneself in a permanent and total
way to the performance of the works of perfection and that
this obligation be accompanied by an ecclesiastical solemnity,
involving a divine consecration.

D. The State of Perfection of the Bishop.
The elaboration of the doctrine of the episcopal state of perfection represents an original contribution of St. Thomas to
theology, although many of the elements which he employed
in his own synthesis were already to be found in earlier theologians.101
For an ecclesial state of perfection St. Thomas requires a
permanent and total obligation to the performance of the
works of perfection, with an ecclesiastical solemnity accompanying the undertaking of this obligation. Now we have seen
that the works of perfection are of two sorts. With regard to
the perfection of the love of God the observance of poverty,
chastity, and obedience are choice instruments for attaining
to as total a dedication to God as is possible here below. Hence
99 Quodl. III, a. 17; cf. also Summa Theol, II-II, q. 184, a. 4; De Perf. V. Sp.,
cc. 15, 20 (Mar., par. 651, 679).
100 Summa: Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 5, ad 2.
101 Cf. Gillon, art. cit., pp. 221-225.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

they are works of perfection, insofar as they are means to perfection. Should one bind oneself by vow to the observance of
all three counsels (necessary for the element of totality) by
a profession recognized as public by the Church, then one is
constituted in a state of perfection-the state of perfection of
religious. 102
With regard to the love of neighbor we have seen that there
can be a perfection of this love with regard to extension, intensity, and efficacy. Should one permanently and solemnly
bind oneself to a service of neighbor that is perfect in each of
these three dimensions (necessary for the element of totality),
then one is likewise constituted in a state of perfection. This
is the state of perfection of bishops. 103
The most complete treatment of this episcopal state of perfection is that found in De Perfectione Vitae Spiritualis, c.
16.104

The perfection of charity with regard to extension is shown
when one seeks out one's enemies to show them a special love
Cf. De Perf. V. Sp., c. 16 (Mar., par. 652); Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 5.
There seems to have been a clarification of St. Thomas's thought on this
point during the course of the controversies of 1269. Quodl. I, a. 14, ad 2
(March, 1269) sees both states of perfection in terms of the love of God. Both
states are linked with the perfection of this love: that of religious-characterized
by the three vows-is preparatory to this perfection; that of bishops-characterized by dedication to one's neighbor-is the effect of this perfection. Hence
both states are called states of perfection in reference to the love of God. In the
De Perf. V. Sp., on the other hand, which dates from the end of 1269, the state
of perfection of the bishop is seen formally in terms of the perfect love of neighbor:
a love perfect with regard to extent, intensity, and efficacy. There is no mention
of this perfection of fraternal love in Quodl. I, a. 12, ad 2. The position of the
De Perf. is that found in Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 5 (dates from
It is quite true that the perfection of fraternal charity can flow only from a perfect
love of God; it is quite another thing to define the state of perfection of the bishop
formally in terms of this love of God.
104 Mar., par. 653-656. The question is also treated
in Summa Theol., II-II, q.
184, a. 5, but here St. Thomas contents himself with mentioning only one aspect
of the perfection of fraternal charity: the bishop's obligation of laying down his
life for his flock. Since the bishop is obliged to this in virtue of the assumption
of the pastoral office, he is constituted in a state of perfection. Note the contrast in this same text between the two states of perfection: the religious are
the "abstinentes," the bishops are the "assumentes."
102
103

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NOEL MOLLOY

and to help them, even outside a case of necessity. But the
bishop is bound to such a love in virtue of his office:
Since they [bishops] have undertaken the universal care of the
Church, 105 in which are often found those who hate, persecute, and
blaspheme them, they must show love and help to their enemies
and persecutors. An example of this appears in the Apostles, whose
successors the bishops are: for, living among their persecutors, they
procured their salvation. 106
That one should be ready to lay down one's life for the spiritual benefit of one's neighbor, even outside a case of absolute
necessity, shows that one has a perfect fraternal charity with
regard to intensity.
Bishops are likewise obliged to lay down their lives for the salvation
of their subjects. For the Lord says, in John 1011: "I am the Good
Shepherd. The Good Shepherd lays down his life for his sheep "
... From which words it is clear that it is necessarily linked with
the pastoral office that, for the salvation of one's flock, one should
not shrink even from mortal danger. [The pastor] therefore is
obliged, in virtue of the very office committed to him, to that
perfection of love which consists in laying down one's life for the
brethren. 107
The perfection of fraternal love with regard to efficacy consists in conferring on others properly supernatural benefits, ordained to their eternal salvation.
Likewise, in virtue of his office, the pontiff is obliged to administer
spiritual goods to his neighbour, being constituted, as it were, a
sort of mediator between God and man, acting in the place of him
who is the mediator between God and men: Jesus Christ ....
And hence he offers prayers and supplications to God in the person
of the people . . . Again, he takes the place of God with regard to
the people, in administering to the people, as it were by the power
of God/ 08 judgments, doctrine, example, and sacraments. 100
105 The Leonine text, has the much more significant reading " the care of the
universal Church" (c. 19, line 25).
106 Mar., par. 658.
107 Mar., par. 654.
>M "quasi virtute Domini"; the Leonine text has "quasi vice Dei" (c. 19,
line 90).
109 Mar., par. 655.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

In itself, however, this obligation to the perfection of fraternal charity is not sufficient to constitute a state. The element of permanence must be added. However, this element too is involved in the assumption of the pastoral office.
St. Thomas sees the bishop, in virtue of his consecration, as
being bound " by a perpetual and solemn vow to the retaining
of the charge of souls." 110 To maintain that the fact that the
bishop cannot surrender his charge without the permission of
the Pope " is in virtue of a Church ordinance, is clearly false;
[the necessity of a Papal dispensation] arises from the very
obligation by which bishops oblige themselves to retain perpetually the charge of souls. 111
To this perfection of fraternal charity-perfect with regard
to extent, intensity, and efficacy-the bishop obliges himself
" in his ordination or consecration ... Hence bishops are placed
in a state of perfection, just as are religious. 112 This same or110 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 189, a. 7. It is because this element of permanence
is lacking that priests and archdeacons with the charge of souls are not in a state
of perfection, though they may well " perform the works of perfection and be perpar. 680). "An evident sign of
fect in charity " (De Perf. V. Sp., c.
this [that they are not in a state of perfection] is that when one is perpetually
deputed or obliged to something, the assumption of this obligation is accompanied
by certain ecclesiastical solemnity . . . It is clear that no such thing accompanies
the commission of an archdeacon or a parish priest, but such are simply invested
with their charge .... " (ibid.,-Mar., par 681). Ordination does not suffice for
this perpetual obligation, for, after ordination, they can always leave the care of
souls and enter the religious state without consulting the bishop; or, with the
bishop's permission, they can resign their charge and live on a prebend or in retirement (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 6). " One can abstract from all idea of the
care of souls when one defines the presbyterate, because, in theory, there is nothing
to forbid the idea of all priests deprived of jurisdiction; while, when speaking
of the episcopate, one must keep in mind that by the very institution of Christ,
the bishops are destined for the government of Churches." A. Martimort, De
l'eveque (Paris, 1946), p. 19.
111 De Perf. V. Sp., c.
(Mar., par.
cf. J. Gaudemet, "Recherches sur
l'episcopat medieval en France", in Proceedings of the Second International Congress of Medieval Canon Law (Vatican, 1965), p. 149: "Once designated, the
bishop is bound to his see by a sort of mystic marriage, in principle perpetual.
One of the most striking features of the episcopate of the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries is, without doubt, its great stability."
112 De Perf. V. Sp.,
16 (Mar., par. 656).

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NOEL MOLLOY

dination serves to provide the final element required for a state
of perfection-the solemn benediction or consecration, which
is the external solemnity required for a spiritual state. 113 " [In
the case of the bishop] the consecratio, the benedictio are
evident. But one might still ask what is the connection which
exists betwen the conferring of the power of Orders and the
promise of a total giving of oneself to the works of fraternal
charity, a giving which is essential to the state of perfection.
Is it a question of a formal and essential connection? St.
Thomas is in no doubt. It is truly in the consecration itself
that mancipatio and promise intervene, the solemn consecration, however, being only a sign and not the cause of the state
of perfection .... " 114
The episcopal state of perfection, then, is seen in terms of
the perfection of fraternal charity. For St. Thomas the episcopate is a true Order, to be seen in relation to the Mystical
Body. 115 In virtue of this ordination, or episcopal consecration,
the bishops are constituted servi of the people:
Should anyone desire to have a primacy in the Church, let him
know that this is not to possess a position of domination but of
service. It is the duty of a slave to dedicate himself totally to the
service of his lord: thus the prelates of the Church owe everything
which they have, everything which they are, to their subjects. 116

He may never desert his charge as long as he can be of use
to his subjects, so that even such an excellent vocation as the
religious life may not be embraced by him. 117 If he is needed,
he must stay with his flock in times of danger, even at the risk
of his own life.118
In normal circumstances this service of his flock will consist in the administration of "judgments, teaching, example,
118

Ibid.

u Gillon, art. cit., p.
cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184, a. 5.
115 De Perf. V. Sp., c.
(Mar. par. 715).
116 In Matthaeum,
c.
(Mar., par. 1669); cf. also Quodl. III, a. 17; De Perf.
V. Sp., c. 17 (Mar., par. 660).
117 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 185, a. 4.
118 Cf. ibid., a. 5; In loan., c. 10, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 1406).
1

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

231

and the sacraments," 119 the feeding of it " with word, example,
and temporal aid." 120
However, of all the functions of the bishop in relation to his
flock, one holds pride of place, the office of preaching, the
"officium . .. principalissimum" of the bishop. 121 So important
is this office, and so closely connected is it with episcopal perfection, that we shall devote special consideration to it in Section III.

* * * *

*

The sublimity of the episcopal state of perfection may be
seen in a clearer light if it is compared with the state of perfection of religious.
We have already seen what is involved in the religious state:
one obliges oneself by vow to the observance of the three
counsels, which are instruments for the attainment of perfection. Hence St. Thomas can define the religious state as
" school of perfection." 122 It is related to the perfection of
charity as a preamble or preparation. 123
The episcopal state, on the other hand, is related to the perfection of charity as an effect.124 It is only because divine love
has reached perfection in the heart of the bishop that he
dedicates himself totally to his flock:
For the perfection of fraternal love, as has already been said, derives from the perfection of divine love, which love has taken
possession of the hearts of some to such an extent that they desire
not only to enjoy God and serve him but also serve their neighbours
for his sake ... It is dear that it is a sign of greater love that, for
the sake of his friend, a man should serve another, than if he wished
to serve his friend alone. 125
De Perf. V. Sp., c. 16 (Mar., par. 655).
Ibid., c. 17 (Mar., par. 660).
121 Summa Theol., III, q. 67, a.
ad 1.
122 Quodl. IV, a.
ad 7.
128 Ibid., I, a. 14, ad
12 ' Ibid.
125 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 18 (Mar., par. 668); cf. also Summa Theol., II-II, q. 184,
a. 7, ad
St. Thomas is well aware of the objection that might be urged against
this position, namely, that de facto those engaged in the active apostolate have
119

120

NOEL MOLLOY

Hence one may not argue to the inferiority of the episcopal
state on the grounds that it is seen in terms of the love of
neighbor, while the religious state is seen in terms of the love
of God.
The relation between the two states is clarified by the answer
to the question of whether a religious who is raised to the
episcopate is bound to the regular observances of his Order.
The religious state pertains to perfection as a way of tending to it,
while the episcopal state pertains to it as a certain magisterium of
perfection. Hence the religious state is related to the episcopal state
as a discipleship to a professorship (disciplina ad magisterium) and
a disposition to its perfection. Now the disposition is not taken
away when the perfection comes ... but is rather confirmed,-just
as it behoves a disciple when he obtains a professorship ... to read
and meditate even more than before. 126
As a result of this relationship
than any religious state:

the episcopal state

IS

higher

It is clear that a greater perfection is required so that one may
confer perfection on others than that required in order that one
may be perfect in oneself; just as it is greater to be able to make
others of such a kind than merely to be of such a kind; and every
cause is superior to its effect. Hence one must conclude that the
episcopal state is of a greater perfection than any religious state
whatever. 127

And hence the famous distinction
matter:

of St. Thomas on this

often not attained the perfection of the love of God: "However, such a perfection
of charity is not found in many who are devoting themselves to the good of their
neighbors, in whom it is more a weariness of the contemplative life that has
led to external activity than such a desire of it which would make it pertain to
the perfection of love that they should lay it aside, as something beloved, for a
time. But the defects of some cannot prejudice a state or office: that one
undertake the care of others is to be considered an act of perfection, since it belongs to the perfect love of God and neighbor." De Perf. V. Sp., c. 23 (Mar., par.
698).
126 Summa Theol., II-II q. 185, a. 8.
127 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 17 (Mar., par. 658); cf. also Summa Theol., loc. cit., q.
184, a. 7.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

fl33

The state of perfection is two-fold: that of prelates and that of
religious; but the word "state" is used analogically (aequivoce),
because the state of religious is for the acquisition of perfection;
hence it is said: " If you wish to be perfect," and if you wish to
come to a state of perfection. The state of prelacy, however, is not
for acquiring [perfection] for oneself but for communicating that
which one has: hence the Lord said to Peter: " Peter, if you love
me, feed my sheep " ; and he did not say: "If you wish to be
perfect," etc. 128
This brings us to the question of the relationship between
the episcopal state of perfection and the actual perfection of
the bishop. From what we have already seen there can be
little doubt as to the nature of this relationship.
The episcopal state and the religious state are related to perfection
in different ways, for the state of bishops presupposes perfection ...
but the state of religious is a way [to perfection] and hence an already acquired perfection is not required but only that one tend
to it should one not have it. 129
The state of perfection of the bishop presupposes that he
be actually perfect. While the link is not intrinsic-a bishop
living in serious sin does not fall from the episcopal state of
perfection 130 -nevertheless the very nature of the one demands
that the other be present. This should already be clear from
our comparison of the state of perfection of the bishop with
that of the religious. However, let us consider here a few texts
of St. Thomas which bear directly on this point:
Perfection of life is demanded as a pre-requisite [praeexigitur] to the
episcopal state .... because, according to Denis, perfection belongs
actively to the bishop, as to the perfector ... It is required that one
be perfect if one is to be able to lead others to perfection .... 131
He expresses the same idea even more strongly in another text:
128 In Matt., c. 19 (Mar., par. 1594). It is clear from what follows shortly
afterwards (Mar., par. 1596) that St. Thomas means "bishop" here when he
speaks of prelate. On the date of this text, cf. Gillon, art. cit., p. 228, note 8.
129 I Tim., c. 8, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 90).
130 Cf. De Perf. V. Sp., c. 23 (Mar., par.
701).
131 Summa Theol., II-II, q. 185, a. 1, ad 2.

234

NOEL MOLLOY

The religious state does not presuppose perfection, but leads to it;
the pontifical dignity, however, presupposes perfection, for he who
undertakes the honor of the pontificate assumes a spiritual magisterium ... Now it is ridiculous that one should become a master
of perfection who does not know by experience what perfection is
[qui perfectionem per experimentum non novit] ... When indeed
the Lord committed the office of prelacy to Peter, he asked him:
"Simon, son of John, do you love me more than these?" and when
he answered: "You know that I love you," he added: "feed my
sheep." By this we are clearly given to understand that the assumption of the prelacy demands as a pre-requisite the perfection of
charity. 132
This is the clear doctrine of St. Thomas: the religious state
is ordained to the acquisition of perfection, while the episcopal
state presupposes it. However, one text poses a certain difficulty when an objector to his doctrine on the states of perfection maintains that this position would mean that all prelates
and religious who are not actually perfect are guilty of a mortal
sin of deception, in that by their state they profess to be what
they are not. St. Thomas's reply makes no distinction between
the states of perfection of the religious and of the bishop:
Men enter on a state of perfection, not as if professing that they
are perfect but as if professing that they tend to perfection. Hence
the Apostle says ... "Not that I have already attained it, or am
perfect: I follow after it, however, that I may by some means
attain it." And later he adds: "Those of us therefore who are perfect, let us feel in this way." Hence one who undertakes a state
of perfection is not guilty of lying or deceit if he is not perfect;
but only if he renounces his intention of tending to perfection. 133
Given the clear teaching of St. Thomas in other places on
the perfection presupposed to the episcopal state, we cannot,
on the basis of this alone, make of the episcopal state merely
a higher form of the religious state, a superior way of tending
139 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 19 (Mar., par. 674); cf. also Summa Theol., Il-ll, q. 186,
a. 3 ad 5: " The episcopal state is not ordained to the acquisition of perfection,
but rather that one may direct others by means of the perfection that one already
has ... "
133 Ibid., q. 184, a. 5, ad

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

to perfection. The bishop does not profess to tend to perfection; he professes to perform works of fraternal charity that
presuppose perfection. It seems, then, that we must find the
key to the interpretation of this text in a later passage of
St. Thomas.
An objector, trying to show that only the candidate who is
the most saintly should be chosen for the episcopate, quotes
a text found in Gratian, in which it is stated that he who is
constituted in a position of honor " is to be regarded as most
wretched unless he is pre-eminent in wisdom and sanctity." 1 q 4
St. Thomas replies:
This auctoritas is to be understood in reference to the preoccupation
of one who is constituted in a position of honor; he should strive
to present in himself one who precedes others in wisdom and sanctity ... However, it is not to be imputed to him as something
blameworthy if before the assumption of the prelacy he was not
more excellent .... 135
St. Thomas's position, then, would seem to be this. Both
the bishop and the religious are obliged to tend to perfection
because of their state. However, the titles under which they
are so obliged are different. The religious is bound to tend
to perfection, because this is what is directly intended by his
profession of the three vows; in his case, perfection is never
presupposed but intended. In the case of the bishop, on the
other hand, the acquisition of perfect charity is not what
finalizes his state, as happens in the cast of the religious; in
virtue of his state, the bishop is obliged to the performance of
works which rather presuppose this perfection of charity.
Hence, if he is to satisfy the obligation of his state, he must
set about the immediate acquisition of perfection if he had
not already attained it before his consecration. It is important,
though, to realize that this tending to perfection is not what
is directly envisioned by his state, as it is directly envisioned
in the case of the religious. The bishop tends to perfection be18 '
135

Ibid., q. 185, a. 3, obj. !'l.
Ibid., ad 2.

236

NOEL MOLLOY

cause he should already have had it. He is striving to become
what he should already be.

E. A Traditicmal Compariscm.
Before concluding this consideration of the perfection presupposed to the episcopal state, mention should be made of
a traditional expression given by St. Thomas to this doctrine
on the superior sanctity required of a bishop. He makes his
own a comparison found in Gregory the Great, and likewise
in Gregory of Nazianzus and John Chrysostom-the bishop
should stand in the same relation of superiority to his people
as does the shepherd to his flock.
Thus, showing that it is presumptuous to aspire to the episcopate, he remarks that " the prelate, in virtue of his rank
and by a certain fittingnes, ought to precede all others in behavior and contemplation, so that, in comparison with him,
the rest are as a flock." 136 He gives fullest expression to this
idea in his commentary on Jesus' question to Peter as to
whether he loved him more than the others:
And he Jesus adds: "More than these," because, as the Philosopher also teaches in his Politics, he who presides and governs in the
natural order ought to be more excellent ... So ought the prelate
to be with regard to his subjects. Hence, according to Gregory, the
life of the pastor ought to be such that in comparison with him the
subjects may be as flock with regard to their shepherd. And hence
[Jesus] says: "J\fore than these," for to the extent that one loves
more, by so much is one the greater. 137

III. The Doctoral Function of the Bishop.

A. The Bishop as Teacher.
Considering the forms which service of his flock should take,
the bishop is obliged in virtue of his state to administer to the
people, in God's name, " judgments, doctrine, example, and
sacraments." 138 Among these episcopal functions, however, one
holds pride of place, the teaching office of the bishop.
I ad Tim., c. 3 lect. 1 (Mar., par. 89).
In loan., c. 21, lect. 3 (Mar., par. 2619); cf. also Quodl. VIII, a. 6, ad 2.
188 De Pen'/. V. Sp., c. 16 (Mar., par. 655).
186
137

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

287

For St. Thomas "prelates ... alone are the teachers of the
Churches " ; 189 he can speak in the same breath, thus indicating the inseparable connection, of " the rank of prelacy and
the office of teaching." 140 To the objection that "preaching
the Gospel does not pertain to religious but above all to the
prelates, who are the pastors and doctors," St. Thomas replies
by acknowledging that preaching pertains to prelates ex officio,
but he maintains that religious can also undertake the office
if they receive a mission from those competent to give it. 141
As we have already remarked when discussing the state of
perfection of the bishop, the term "prelate" in St. Thomas's
time designated in general one who had pastoral jurisdiction,
but St. Thomas himself sees in the bishop alone one who is
properly speaking a " prelate," since he alone has immediate
jurisdiction in his diocese. 142 All the lower clergy are in total
dependence on the bishop, since:
the power of the priest by its very nature and by divine law is
subject to the power of the bishop, since it is something incomplete
[imperfecta] with regard to it ... The priest, however, who is subject to the bishop by divine law, is subject to him in all things.148
Hence the right of the local pastor to preach to his flock is a
right ultimately derived from the bishop, and since it is a derived power, he himself cannot in turn confer canonical mission
on others to exercise the apostolate, above all that of preaching.144
The bishop, then, being the only prelate in the strict sense,
is the one on whom the preaching office primarily devolves.
Among the offices of the bishop this one, and not the adminisContra lmpugnantes, c. 2 (Mar., par. 45).
Summa Theol., III, q. 39, a. 3 ad 2.
141 Ibid., II-II, q. 187, a. 4 ad 2.
142 Cf. supra, c. 13, note
(138).
148 Contra lmpugnantes,
c. 4 (Mar., par. 157). "For St. Thomas, for the
Franciscan doctors, there existed by divine law a structure of hierarchical dependence, in virtue of which all simple priests, be they parish clergy or religious, have
to receive their powers from the bishops "-Y. Congar, art. cit., in note (6), p. 77.
144 Cf. Congar, art. cit., p. 69.
189

140

NOEL MOLLOY

tration of the sacraments, is the one that is absolutely primary
[prin.cipalissimum ]; 145 it is so characteristic of his state that
if another should preach he is spoken of as exercizing an office
that is properly episcopal. 146 In virtue of this the bishop is
constituted the prophet, as it were, of his local Church. Having
remarked that Scripture uses indifferently the words " pseudoprophet," and " pseudo-apostle," St. Thomas goes on:
Now the office of the prophet and apostle is to be mediator between
God and men, announcing God's words to men .... True prelates
are true apostles. 147
However, there is something particularly characteristic about
the bishop's preaching, which distinguishes it from that of
lower ministers, be they priests or deacons.
Instruction may be of many sorts. One is that which converts to
the faith, which Denis attributes to the bishop ... and which can
pertain to any preacher, and even to any lay person. Another is
that instruction by which one is informed about the rudiments of
the faith and about how one should prepare oneself to receive the
sacraments. This pertains in a secondary way to ministers [= deacons], but primarily to priests. The third instruction is that which
concerns Christian behavior, and this pertains to god-parents. The
fourth instruction is that which treats of the profound mysteries
of faith and the perfection of the Christian life, and pertains ex
officio to bishops. 148
This teaching o£ the bishop will take on the form of an exposition o£ the deep sense o£ the Gospel, for such is the proper sense
of " teaching " [docere] when applied to the bishops:
To teach, that is, to expound the Gospel, is the proper office of
the bishop, whose task it is to perfect, according to Denis . . . ;
now to perfect is the same as to teach. 149
Summa Theol., III, q. 67, a. 2 ad 1.
Contra Impugnantes, c. 5 (Mar., par. 167).
147 Ibid., c. 22 (Mar., par. 519, 521).
On the link that St. Thomas establishes
between preaching and prophecy cf. A. Rock, Unless They be Sent (London,
1955), pp. 21-22.
148 Summa Theol., III, q. 71, a. 4, ad 3.
149 Ibid., q. 67, a. 1, ad 1.
145

146

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

B. Christ: PTimus et PTincipalis DoctoT Fidei.
The bishop's teaching office is concerned with the exposition
of the profound mysteries of faith. In this he is continuing the
work of Christ. Christ, in fact, is "the first and principal
teacher of spiritual doctrine and of faith," 150 who carried out
his redemptive mission insofar as " he showed us in himself the
way of truth." 151
Now " every action of Christ serves as instruction for us." 152
This dictum is verified in a special way when it is a question
of preaching, that distinctive activity of Christ, for those who
undertake the office of preaching, teaching, and the care of souls
are the imitators of Christ paT excellence. 153 Hence the sort
of life lived by Christ during the years of his public ministry
should be the ideal of the bishop, his successor in the ministry
of preaching.
Only two of those aspects which characterized the public
ministry of Christ need detain us here because of their particularly close connection with the office of preaching. In the
first place, St. Thomas sees in Christ the charismatic paT excellence:
The gratiae gratis datae are ordained to the manifestation of the
faith and of spiritual doctrine ... Hence it is clear that all the
gratiae gratis datae were present to a superlative degree in Christ,
the first and principal doctor of the faith. 154
In the second place, the form of life adopted by Christ was
of a very characteristic type--a type required of one called to
be a teacher of the deep things of God. His active life of
preaching was one which had its source in a life of profound
contemplation. In Christ is found realized the ideal of the
Christian teacher: contemplata aliis tmdeTe:
Ibid., q. 7, a. 7.
Summa Theol., III, proloque.
152 Ibid., q. 40, a. 1, ad 3.
158 In Matt., c. 19 (Mar., par. 1598).
154 Summa Theol., Ill, q. 7, a. 7.
150

151

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NOEL MOLLOY

That active life in which one gives to others, by preaching and
teaching, those things which one has contemplated is more perfect
than a life which consists in contemplation alone, because it presupposes an abundance of contemplation. And hence Christ chose such
a life.155

Needless to say, the contemplative life of Christ was of
a depth beyond the reach of any other " via tor." Because of
the nobility of his soul he attained to a most profound intimacy
[propinqui88ime] with God in knowledge and love/ 56 enjoying
the beatific vision from the first instant of his conception. 157
He had the plenitude of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, with a
consequent perfection of the contemplatio viae, as well as of
the contemplatio patriae. 158 Yet, though the mode be unattainable, the form of life constitutes the ideal for the one who, in
virtue of his office, succeeds Christ as the doctor of the faiththe bishop.
It seems that we can establish a parallel between the life of
Christ as the Doctor Fidei, with its charismatic and contemplative characteristics, and that of the bishop.

C. The Bi8hop a8 a Chari8matic.
St. Thomas defines a charism, or a " gratia grati8 data," as
a gift of God which is not ordained to personal sanctification
but which enables one to perform acts which exceed the power
of human nature in itself, acts by which one cooperates in the
salvation of one's neighbor. 159
Thus defined, there is one sense in which the bishop's proceeding office quite definitely does not belong to the realm of
the charismatic. Unlike the case of the Apostles, the saving
truth which the bishop communicates in virtue of his office is
a truth not acquired by inspiration but by hard study. Excusing modern preachers from the necessity of manual labor,
St. Thomas writes:
Ibid., q. 40,. a. I ad 2; cf. also a. Q ad 3.
Ibid., q. 7, a. I.
157 Ibid., q. 34, a. 4.
158 Ibid., q. 7, a. 5, corpus and ad 3.
159 Ibid., I-II, q. 111, a. 1.
155

156

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

Modern preachers would be more easily impeded from preaching
by manual labor than were the Apostles, who had by inspiration
the knowledge of what they were to preach; since preachers of
modern times must prepare themselves by continual study for
preaching. . . .160
On the other hand, during the actual exercise o£ the preaching office the charisms still play their part, and, without overstraining St. Thomas's texts, we can see how they are linked
in a special way with the episcopal office, precisely because the
bishop alone is the preacher ex officio.
Commenting on the list o£ charisms given by St. Paul in I
Cor.
St. Thomas links the first three charisms- those o£
faith, the word o£ wisdom, and the word o£ knowledge-with
the office o£ the teacher o£ the faith. By means o£ them:
a man is endowed with a plenitude of knowledge of divine things, so
that he may be enabled [possit] to instruct others.161
To the objection that faith is not a charism but a virtue which
pertains to personal sanctification St. Thomas replies that faith
as a charism is not a theological virtue but rather:
it implies a certain pre-eminent certitude of faith, by which a man
is rendered suitable [idoneus] for instructing others about what
pertains to the faith. 162
We have italicized" be enabled" and" suitable" because such
words would seem to imply that these charisms should be found
o£ necessity in the one who is the doctor fidei in virtue o£ his
office. We find a confirmation o£ this, in £act, in an article £rom
another part o£ the Summa.
St. Thomas, when treating o£ the gift o£ "wisdom" [sapien.tia],
asks whether it is found in all who are in the state o£ grace. In
his reply 163 he distinguishes two degrees o£ this wisdom, a gift
which assures a rightness o£ judgment both in the contempla16 ° Contra Impugnantes, c. 5 (Mar., par. 196); cf. also Quodl. VII, a. 18, ad 7;
Summa Theol., IT-II, q. 188, a. 5 (Where there is a direct reference to the bishop).
161 Summa
Theol., I-II, q. 3, a. 4.
162 Ibid., ad
168 Ibid., IT-II, q. 45, a. 5.

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NOEL MOLLOY

tion of divine things and in the using of them as a rule for
human activity [divina et conspicienda et consulenda]. In the
first degree of wisdom a sufficiency of the gift is conferred to
enable one to work out one's own salvation, and all in the state
of grace possess this degree of wisdom. St. Thomas goes on:
Some, however, receive the gift of wisdom to a higher degree, both
with regard to the contemplation of divine things insofar as they
grasp and can manifest to others certain deeper mysteries; and
with regard to the direction of human affairs according to divine
rules, insofar as they can regulate not only themselves but also
others in terms of them. And this degree of wisdom is not common
to all in the state of sanctifying grace, but belongs rather to the
realm of charisms ....
This ability to grasp and to manifest to others " certain deeper
mysteries" [altiora quaedam mysteria] recalls the teaching
office of the bishop, whose precise function is, as we have seen,
the " instructio de profundis mysteriis fidei." 164 St. Thomas
himself, in fact, links this second, charismatic, degree of the
gift of wisdom with the office of prelacy in the answer to the
second objection.
It seems, then, that one would not be guilty of unfaithfulness
to the thought of St. Thomas to maintain that he establishes, at
least by implication, a link between the charisms corrected with
the teaching of the faith and the bishop considered as the doc-

tor fidei.

D. Contemplata aliis tradere.
Because of his function as doctor of the faith, a distinctive
type of life characterizes the episcopal state-the life of Christ
the preacher, i.e., an active life flowing from a plenitude of
contemplation.
The problem about whether teaching and preaching pertain
to the active or to the contemplative life is one to which St.
Thomas returns on a number of occasions. 165 In the Sentences
Ibid., III, q. 71, a. 4 ad 8.
Cf. Ill Sent., d. 85, q. 1, a. 8, sol. 1, ad 8;De Verit. q. 11, a. 4; Summa
Theol. II-II, q. 181, a. 8. For St. Thomas there are two sorts of teaching: that
104

105

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

St. Thomas offers two solutions. His first is that if teaching
[doctrina]is ordained purely to a knowledge of the truth-even
though there is question of communicating this knowledge to
it pertains to the contemplative life; if, on the
other hand, teaching is ordained to the urging of others to the
practice of virtue-in which case teaching is identified with
preaching-then it pertains to the active life. His alternative
solution is that if teaching is seen as something that is for the
the benefit of the teacher-insofar as it provides him with intellectual exercise and can lead to his own growth in knowledge-then it pertains to the contemplative life; but if it is
exercized with a view to its effect on others, then it pertains
to the active life.
It is this second solution which St. Thomas finally adopts in
the Summa. Doctrine has a double object: the intellectual concept, and the person who is listening. With regard to the first
object, doctrine may be seen as pertaining either to the active
or to the contemplative life, depending on the intention of the
teacher. But doctrine only becomes doctrine when it is given
verbal expression and ordained towards the hearer. As such
it belongs to the active life. Hence one could say that, simply
speaking, teaching belongs to the active life. Thus St. Thomas
can say later that the works of the active life are of two sorts,
one being that which " is derived from a plenitude of contemplation: as are doctrine and preaching." 166 The life of prelates,
then, is the life of Martha, traditional symbol of the active
life.161
But one has not characterized with sufficient precision the
life of the bishop by speaking solely in terms of the active life:
the bishop's life is an active life of a very distinctive type. To
the objection that the active life must be superior to the conwhich pertains to prelates and which is identified with preaching; and that which
is proper to masters of theology. However, he sees the difference between them
as more one based on one's title to teach than on the matter that one teaches
(docere sacram Scriptnram contingit dnpliciter ... em officio praelationis ... ex
officio magisterii.-IV Sent., d. 19, q. 2, a. 2, sol. 2, ad 4).
168 Snmma Theol., II-II, q. 188, a. 6.
167 ln loan., c. 12, lect. 1 (Mar., par. 1595),

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NOEL MOLLOY

templative life insofar as it is the life of the " maiores " in the
Church, namely, the prelates, 168 St. Thomas replies:
The life which pertains to prelates is not the active life alone, but
they should also excel in the contemplative life.169
The active life of teaching of the bishop, in fact, is a life " derived from a plenitude of contemplation." 170
The reason why this sort of life is required of the bishop is,
as St. Thomas repeats on a number of occasions, because of
the bishops' function as mediator between God and his flock.
For since the bishop is constituted as a mediator between God and
men, he ought to excel in action, insofar as he is constituted a minister of men, and he should be pr,eeminent in contemplation, so that
he may draw [hauriat] from God what he gives to men.171
In this, the bishop shows himself a successor of the Apostles:
The Apostles are mediators between God and the people ... It was
necessary therefore that they should draw from God what they
poured forth to the people. Hence it was necessary that sometimes
they should raise themselves to God by contemplation, so that they
might grasp divine things [ad percipiendum caelestia], and sometimes that they should conform themselves to the people to pass
on those things which they had received from God .... 172
This last text allows us to see why contemplation is so important for the bishop: by means of it he can grasp, penetrate
to the extent granted him by God, those " profunda mysteria
fidei," the instruction about which constitutes, according to St.
Thomas, the distinctive preaching function of the bishop. 173
168 The third objection
to this article (Summa Theol., II-II, q. 182, a. 1) as
well as the quotation from Augustine in our objection (obj. 1) make it clear that
by prelate here St. Thomas is thinking above all, if not exclusively, of the bishop.
169 Ibid., ad 1.
170 Ibid., q. 188, a. 6.
171 De Perf. V. Sp., c. 18 (Mar., par. 664); cf. III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3:
"medii sunt inter Deum et plebem, a Deo recipientes per contemplationem et
et populo tradentes per actionem."
172 II Cor. c. 5, lect. 3 (Mar., par 179).
178 Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 71, a. 4, ad 3.
Obviously we cannot treat here
of St. Thomas's doctrine on the active and contemplative lives in themselves, for
it would take us too far afield. His main treatment of this subject is found in

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

245

But this contemplation presupposes perfection in the bishop,
for one can attain to it only after the long exercise of good
works/ 74
The active life serves as a disposition for the contemplative life ...
And hence, as long as a man has not reached perfection in the active life, the contemplative life cannot be pr.esent, except imperfectly and in an incipient way: for them the acts of the moral virtues
cause one difficulty and one must give all one's attention to them,
so that one is drawn away from the exercise of contemplation. But
when the active life is already perfect, then the acts of the moral
virtues come easily, so that one can freely give oneself to contemplation without being impeded by them .... And since it pertains to prelates to be perfect in both lives, insofar as they are
mediators between God and the people, receiving from God by
contemplation .and passing on to the people by action, they ought
to be perfect in the moral virtues, as should also be preachers .... 175
This way of life that characterizes the bishop insofar as he
is the doctor fidei is normally designated as the " mixed life,"
to distinguish it from both the active and contemplative lives.
There is no question here, however, of a third form of life that
can take its place on an equal footing with the active and contemplative lives. For St. Thomas the division of human lives
into the active and the contemplative is the most fundamental
one, and it is adequate. 176 What he refers to as " the middle
kind of life" is not a totally distinct form of life but is virtualII-II, qq. 179-18fl. It will suffice for our purpose here to describe contemplation as
a simple intuition of the truth of faith (cf. II-II, q. 180, a. 3), illuminated by the
gifts of wisdom, knowledge, and understanding (cf. III, q. 7, a. 5, obj. 3), having
its motive force in the love of God and neighbor (cf. II-II, q. 180, a. fl, ad I). By
action, as opposed to contemplation, is meant the exercising of the moral virtues,
whether those concerned with the acquisition of personal holiness or with one's
relations with others (cf. ibid., q. 181, a. 1); however, the active life is seen
as having to do principally with one's relations with others (cf. ibid., ... ad 1):
and, in a Christian context, implies above all the exercise of the corporal and
spiritual works of mercy-hence the definition of St. Gregory the Great, frequently
quoted by St. Thomas: " The active life is to give food to the hungry and to
teach the ignorant the word of wisdom." (cf. ibid., a. 3, sed contra).
1 "' Quodl. IV, q. fl3, ad 16.
175 III Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 3.
176 Cf. Summa Theol., II-II, q. 180, a. fl.

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NOEL MOLLOY

ly contained under the active and contemplative lives, just as
any medium is composed of extremes, and in such a life there
will always. be a predominance of either the contemplative or
the active aspect. 171 Such a threefold division into active, contemplative, and mixed is not so much " ex parte vitarum " as
" ex parte viventium." St. Thomas elaborates on this point
in the Sentences:
That third member [the composite life] is put forward by Augustine
not as constituting a diversity with regard to forms of life but
rather as constituting a diversity with regard to those who live
them [ad diversitatem viventium]. For there are some who concentrate mainly on the works of the active life, although they also
engage in the acts of contemplation from time to time. There
are others, on the contrary, who, laying aside the cares of the active life occupy themselves mainly with contemplation. Others
again occupy themselves with both. There are, however, certain
activities which require both such as preaching and teaching which,
begun in contemplation, terminate in action, going as it were from
cause to effect; and such a middle [way of life] is included in the extr.emes.178

As is clear from this last text, a simple juxtaposition of action and contemplation-the third of the four possibilities mentioned by St. Thomas-is not sufficient to constitute a " mixed
life." Thus a Cistercian who divides his time between contemplation and teaching non-religious subjects in a school is
not leading a " mixed life," as St. Thomas would conceive of
it. For such a life there must be an intrinsic link between the
contemplation and the activity; one communicates in activity
what one has penetrated in contemplation. 179 Such is the life
Cf. ibid., ad fl.
III Sent., d. 85, q. 1, a. 1, ad 5.
179 "Ordo contemplationis
ad praedicationem et doctrinam non est in hac vita
apostolica ordo medii ad finem-tunc namque haberemus vitam activam-verum ordo
formae ad materiam, non quidem formae extrinsecae-prout contemplatio inspirare
potest et alere redemptionem captivorum omnino pariter ac peregrinorum susceptionem-sed formae intrinsecae: non enim praedicatores hi vel doctores tradunt
quidvis ex contemplatione, sed tradunt contemplata-sic intellectus speculativus
fit extensione practicus et amor Dei se extendit usque ad proximum, quin praxis
sit finis speculationis, vel proximus sit finis amoris Dei." P. Lumbreras, De Sta#bu$
lfominum Variis (Madrid, 1957), p. fl4£,
.
177

178

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

of the bishops, " to whom it pertains to contemplate not only
for their own benefit but that they may instruct others." 180
Such a sublime life presupposes, obviously, a great sanctity
in the bishop, so that, in addition to the other titles in virtue
of which sanctity is linked with the episcopal state, titles which
we have already discussed, perfection is required of the bishop
in virtue of his office as the doctor fidei. So St. Thomas can say,
when discussing the most perfect form of religious life:
The work of the active life is two-fold. One, indeed, which is derived from the plenitude of contemplation: such as teaching and
preaching ... And such is preferable to simple contemplation. Just
as it is a greater thing to illuminate than merely to shine, so it is a
greater thing to give to others those things which one has contemplated [contemplata aliis tradere] than merely to contemplate. . . . Hence, among religious orders, the highest rank is occupied by those which ar.e ordained to teaching and preaching.
Such Orders, indeed, approach most closely to the perfection of
bishops . ... 181
An interesting consequence of this intimate link which St.
Thomas sees between perfection and the doctrinal function of
the bishop is that he finds in it the basic reason why we read
that, while Christ and Paul did not administer the sacraments
themselves but delegated others, they exercised the ministry of
preaching in person.
The Lord enjoined on the Apostles, whose place the bishops now
take, both offices, namely, that of teaching and that of baptizing,
but in different ways. For Christ committed the office of teaching
to them so that they should exercise it in person, as being the most
preeminent [principalissimum] [of their offices].... But the office of
baptizing he committed to the Apostles so that they should exercise
it by means of others ... The reason is that in baptism the merit
and wisdom of the minister is of no importance, [while it is] in
teaching ... A sign of this is the fact that the Lord himself did
not baptize .... 182
Summa Theol., II-II q. 184, a. 7, ad S.
Ibid., q. 188, a. 6.
182 Ibid., III, q. 67, a. 2, ad I; cf. also I ad Cor., c. I, lect. 2 (Mar., par. 39).

180
181

Q48

NOEL MOLLOY

IV. CONCLUSION
There is a mystery of the episcopate just as there is a mystery of the Church, or rather, the episcopate is a mystery precisely because the Church is.183 The Church lives in the bishop;
in a special way he is meant to be the embodiment of what is
deepest in her, her sanctity. His position as head of the local
Church requires that he hold, like Christ himself, the primacy
in the Christian community, not only in terms of governmental
and sacramental powers but also in terms of charismatic and
spiritual quality. The community leaders of the New Testament period were not seen as mere functionaries; in the mind
of St. Paul, " it is impossible to establish a distinction between
the charismatic and the non-charismatic ministries. Even those
that belong rather to the realm of function are charismatic in
his eyes." 184
But unfortunately " the subsequent development of the life
of the Church took place along the lines of a perhaps excessive
separation between these two orders that one could designate
as the ex spiritu and the ex offioio, personal gifts and gifts of
function." 185 Certain points of doctrine which were clarified as
a result of the Donatist controversy may well have been largely
responsible for this. In fact, it is arguable that St. Augustine
marks a turning point in the history of the Christian conception of the bishop. Before his time men like Ireneus, Origen,
and Cyprian laid great emphasis on episcopal holiness-in fact
many of the earlier Fathers expressed themselves in terms open
to a Donatist interpretation. To be sure, Augustine too demands sanctity if one is to be a " true " bishop. 186 But in his
controversies with the Donatists he is led to insist strongly that
Cf. J. Lecuyer, "La grace de la consecration episcopale," Rev. Sc. Phil. Th.
p. 389.
18 • H. Schiirmann, "Les charismes spirituels," in L'Eglise de Vatican II (Paris,
1966)' t.
p. 551.
185 Y. Cougar, "La hierarchie comme service ... " in L'Episcopat et L'Eglise
p. 87.
Universelle (Paris,
186 Cf., e. g., Contra Litteras Petiliani, Bk.
c. 30 (ed. Petschenig, CSEL, t.
p. 58).
183

36

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

249

the valid exercise of the episcopate does not demand personal
holiness in the bishop himself. He was defending a profound
truth, in that he emphasized the active presence of Christ at
work in the liturgical life of the Church. But as a result the
bishop now· comes to be seen as an instrument of liturgical action who can remain detached and uncommitted with regard
to the sacred acts which he performs. The precisions of Augustine, because of their very clarity, prepare the way for a conception of the bishop that is more and more that of an administrator and liturgical functionary. But the weighty testimony
of patristic and liturgical tradition makes it clear that Augustine has not said the last word on the subject of episcopal sanctity. It is this older and broader tradition that is consecrated
by the Second Vatican Council: its teaching on the sacramentality of the episcopate and its strong insistence that ecclesiastical office has a character of service serve to direct our
attention once more towards " the essential link that exists between office, interior conformation to Jesus Christ, and his
imitation." 187 It is likewise this tradition that is enshrined in
St. Thomas's firm teaching on the sublime holiness of the episcopal state.
Called on to re-incarnate, as it were, in his own diocese the
person of Christ the Prophet, Priest, and King, the bishop is
placed in a sublime state. It presupposes perfection, and hence
to aspire to the episcopate is presumptuous. If designated to
this office, it is, all things considered, better to refuse it if possible.
A great inner sanctity is required of all ministers for the
worthy exercise of Orders. This is above all necessary in the
minister of the Eucharist, for the exercise of this function demands a greater holiness than is demanded even in the religious state. Since all the other ministries in the Church are
derived from the bishop, in whom the powers of all the lower
Orders are found as in their origin, this inner perfection will be
187

M. Li:ihrer, "La hierarchie au service du peuple chretien," in L'Eglise de

Vatican II (Paris, 1966), t. 3, p. 735.

NOEL MOLLOY

required a fortiori of him. But it is also demanded of him by
a special title. He is the ordinary minister of those sacraments
which confer a special plenitude of grace-Confirmation and
Orders; these sacraments are conferred by the imposition of
hands, which signifies that the " copious effect of grace " is,
as it were, a sharing in the abundance of grace already possessed by the minister. 188
Apart from the bishop's properly sacramental activity, he is
the pastor of his flock and must lead to perfection the Christians confided to his care. Now it is "ridiculous" that one
should be a master of perfection who does not himself know perfection " per experimentum." Hence the episcopate presupposes perfection. 189
This sanctity demanded by the bishop's pastoral functionsacramental or otherwise-has its source in the grace of the
sacrament of Orders. Not only does he benefit from a special
plenitude of sacerdotal grace, a grace which he shares with the
presbyter, but there is also a special "gratia episcopalis "whether St. Thomas conceived of it as being a sacramental
grace is still an open question. This episcopal grace is conferred
by an imposition of hands, a gesture which symbolizes the communication of an " amplissima gratia."
The bishop's life is one of total dedication to his flock. At
his consecration he obliges himself in a solemn and perpetual
way to a service of those Christians committed to his care, a
service that is so all-embracing that it implies the perfection
of fraternal charity on the three dimensions of extent, intensity,
and efficacy. He is thus constituted in a state of perfection,
which differs from that of religious in that it presupposes perfection already acquired.
Among the services which the bishop must render to his
flock, one holds pride of place-his office as doctor fidei. Treading in the footsteps of Christ, the " primus et principalis doctor
fidei," the bishop too is a special beneficiary of the charisms
188
189

Cf. Summa Theol., III, q. 84, a. 4.
De Perf. V. Spir., c. 19-Mar., par. 674.

HIERARCHY AND HOLINESS

251

of the Spirit which are ordained to the effective communication of the Christian message. His teaching office is set apart
from that of other preachers of the Christian faith in that to
him pertains in a special way the exposition of the " profunda
mysteria fidei." Before he can communicate these truths, however, he must have penetrated them himself, sounded the
depths of their riches, so that he can pass them on to others,
inspiring his flock by his own communicative enthusiasm and
combining a radical fidelity to the content of the message with
a truly Christian daring in unhesitatingly enlisting in his service new and more adapted modes of expression that will assure a more efficacious transmission of his good news. All this
is only possible if he himself has first penetrated and assimilated, and been in turn inflamed by, the deep things of God.
Hence the bishop's life, like Christ's, stands under the sign of
the "contemplata aliis tradere." To have attained such an
abundance of contemplation presupposes, obviously, a high
personal sanctity. In both contemplation and action, then, the
bishop will be as superior to his people as the shepherd is to his
flock.
The stress which St. Thomas lays on the functionality of
episcopal sanctity should not allow us to lose sight of its more
profound significance. It is true that episcopal sanctity is demanded for the worthy exercise of Orders, for the fulfilling of
the service due to the flock, for the penetration of the mysteries
of the faith. But there is more to it than this. Episcopal sanctity has an ecclesial significance in itself. The re-incarnation of
Christ, as it were, in his local Church, the bishop must render
present to his community in a preeminent way the sanctity of
Christ. This is the real significance of the doctrine of St.
Thomas on the episcopate as a state of perfection. Asking
whether there should be a diversity of states and offices in the
Church St. Thomas 190 distinguishes three aspects of the life of
the Church: her inner perfection, her activity, and her exterior
beauty. The distinction between states has reference to the
100

II-II, q. 183, &.

NOEL MOLLOY

first of these aspects, namely, the perfection of the Church.191
With regard to this aspect St. Thomas remarks:
Just as in the order of natural things that perfection which is found
in God in a simple and unified way could be found in the universality of creatures only in a diverse and multiform way, so also
the plenitude of grace which is united in Christ as in the head,
overflows in different ways to his members, so that the body of
the Church may be perfect. And this is what the Apostle says in
Eph. 4:11-12: "And he indeed gave some to be apostles, some however to be prophets, others to be evangelists, others pastors and
doctors, for the consummation of the saints." 192
The state of perfection of the bishop, then, the highest state
in the Church, superior to that of religious, is the state in
which the plenitude of Christ's grace is participated to the
highest degree. Episcopal sanctity has a sign-value in the
Church insofar as it represents the high-point of the ecclesial
incarnation of the grace of Christ.
We can conclude this examination of the testimony of St.
Thomas to episcopal perfection with the words of Y. Congar:
" In his conflict with the secular Masters St. Thomas constructed a theology of the episcopate which makes of the bishop
a successor of the Apostles, not only from the point of view of
dignity and powers but also from the point of view of a spiritual upbuilding of the Church by charisms and sanctity. He
united, in his idea of the bishop, as in that which he had of the
Apostles, juridical structure and grace, the grandeurs of hierarchy and the grandeurs of sanctity." 193
NoEL MoLLOY,

St. Charles' Seminary
Nagpur, India

Ibid., a. 8.
Ibid., a. il.
193 Art. cit., in note (6), p. 128.
191

192

O.P.

REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT

((DIS

COURSE " IS THE English word which, perhaps, better than any other, designates the center
of gravity or principal focus, as it were, of contemporary philosophical thought. For, from the standpoint of
the sociology of knowledge, linguistic analysis and phenomenology are the two dominant movements or schools of contemporary philosophy, and "Wiscourse," signifying, as it does,
thought and language equally, is a rubric that covers-as well
as any rubric can-the central concern of both of these characteristically different philosophical movements. As its name
plainly tells, linguistic analysis is a philosophy concerned with
the analysis of language, whether simply to get clear about
common usage, and so obviate needless philosophical perplexities consequent upon careless speech (" ordinary language
analysis ") , or to supply for the deficiencies of common speech
by substiuting for it, at least in scientific and philosophical
contexts, a technically exact, formalized mode of discourse
(" logical analysis ") .
Phenomenology, in contrast to both forms of analysis, is
more "mentalistic" or" thought" oriented, inasmuch as it seeks
not so much to clarify the patterns of speech as to explicateby a careful attention to and description of immediate experience in all its variety-the forms and laws according to which
thought constitutes the objects given in and by experience.
In general terms, then, still speaking from the external standpoint of sociology of knowledge, philosophy today is centered
on discourse.
Shifting now to an internal standpoint, we can say that one
of the problems for any philosophy so centered is the problem
of non-being, insofar as the question of non-being arises, more
253

.JOHN N. DEELY

or less ineluctably, out of the fact that discourse appears to refer
to things regardless of whether or not they exist in fact. In
the philosophy of St. Thomas, for example, the celestial spheres
are repeatedly referred to as explanatory factors decisively involved in the phenomena of life and death, the specific constancy of biological forms, the genesis of cognition from
.sensation, and many other philosophically significant occurrences.1 Yet few today believe in the reality of the celestial
spheres. Nor is such a profound confusion of non-being with
being by any means limited to medieval times. The history
of science and ethnology is jam packed with references to what
does not exist-or at least is not regarded as existing by contemporary lights; and no doubt our own culture harbors its
fair share of non-beings parading in the guise of beings.
Indeed, what would become of literature generally if human
discourse did not have, or at least appear to have, the capacity
to refer to what does not exist as if it did exist? It 1:-tight almost be said that non-being, which plays no positive role
in the physical world, finds a comfortable home indeed in the
world of human discourse. It hardly seems too much to say
that the relativity of discourse to objects, and its indifference
to the being and non-being of those objects, are the two properties that define discourse and reveal its essential character.

I. The Impasse over Non-Being
I£ we look at the ways in which the analytic and phenomenological traditions have construed the apparent capacity of
discourse to refer to what does not exist, we find that they
have come to terms with this. phenomenon in ways that not
only are characteristically different but also lead to a kind
of fundamental impasse in the area of methodological assumptions. For, whereas the phenomenologists descended from
Husserl regard this apparent indifference of discourse to the
physical world as real and a fundamental given, the analysts
1 See Thomas Litt, Les corps celestes
(Paris:
1963),

l'univers de saint Thomas d'Aquin

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

'255

descended from Russell regard it as a mere appearance, to be
explained away with the help of the techniques of mathematical
logic.
But while the programmatic statement and detailed working
out of these two opposed programs is owing, respectively, to
Husserl's theory of intentionality and Russell's theory of descriptions, the basic inspiration for both programs came from
somewhat earlier background figures-Franz Brentano (18381917) and Gottlob Frege (1848-19'25) .
The terms of the later phenomenologists' attitude toward
the possible non-being of the objects of discourse were set, as
it turned out, in the original text wherein Brentano introduced
the notion of intentionality into contemporary discussion:
Every mental phenomenon is characterized by what the scholastics
of the Middle Ages called the intentional (and also mental) inexistence (Inexistenz) of an object (Gegenstand), and what we
could call, although in not entirely unambiguous terms, the reference to a content, a direction upon an object (by which we are
not to understand a reality in this case) or an immanent objectivity.2
Thoughts or mental acts, thus, are allegedly distinguished by
virtue of placing the one who has or makes them into a relation
with objects, regardless of the factual status-the "reality"of those objects. This alleged characteristic of the mental,
subsequently known as the property of intentionality, became
for Edmund Husserl-as Spiegelberg puts it-" the central insight in his phenomenological analysis of consciousness."
" From now on," i. e., after Husserl, " the expressions ' intentional ' and ' intentionality ' stood for the relational property of
having an intention, or being aimed at by it." 3
There we have the guiding view from which phenomenology
comes to terms with the apparent capacity of discourse to refer
2 Franz Brentano,
"The Distinction between Mental and Physical Phenomena,"
trans. by D. B. Terrell, in Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, ed.
by Roderick Chisholm (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1960), p. 50.
3 Herbert
Spiegelberg, The Phenomenological Movement (2nd ed., rev.; The
Hagne: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), Vol. I, p. 107.

Q56

JOHN N. DEELY

to what does not exist in fact. Thought itself, by virtue of its
essential intentionality, constitutes the relation to its objects
in the same way whether or not those objects have a further existence in fact. Since language is but the expression of thought,
it is not to be wondered at that we can refer in speaking to
what does not exist: the indifference of thought to being and
non-being, which language merely records outwardly, and which
constitutes the capacity of discourse to refer to what does not
exist, is an immediately evident feature of common experience,
a primary datum, a fundamentum inconcussum that is to phenomenology what the Cogito was to Cartesianism. That we
can refer in discourse to what does not exist in fact, in short,
is not something problematic for phenomenology-something
that, over and above being noticed and named as of the essence
of thought, calls for an explanation of its possibility. It is rather
what determines the problematic of phenomenology and fixes
the horizon within which phenomenological philosophy moves.
The description and analysis of consciousness and experience
generally begins from this very fact: discourse is not bounded
by the world of physical realities.
Brentano himself did not accept the consistent and purified
development of his doctrine of intentionality in the hands of
Husserl and the phenomenologists. Indeed, in first introducing
the notion, he had had his reservations. From the outset he
looked with suspicion on the proposition that objects of discourse need not be real, and consequently, even on the proposition that discourse is genuinely relative to objects. In the case
of discourse, seeing that " the term of the so-called relation need
not be given at all in reality," he wrote, " one might doubt
that we are here really dealing with something relative, and
not rather with .something only apparently relative, which one
might accordingly call a relation-like thing." 4
It was the doubt voiced here that finally won out in Brentano's mind over the more straightforward doctrine of inten• Franz Brentano, Psychologie vom empirischen Standpunkt
and 1959), Vol II, p. 184.

(Hamburg:

1955

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

257

tionality. "All mental references refer to things,'' 5 he finally
concluded, and the things referred to are really existing things,
concrete individuals. The apparent capacity of discourse to
refer to what does not exist, he held finally, is merely apparent-fictitious, not real. Pieces of discourse ostensibly referring to non-existent objects are but shorthand or abbreviations that would, on a fuller and more careful statement, be
found to consist of a complicated discourse " whose terms refer," as Chisholm puts it, "only to 'genuine objects '-to individual concrete things." 6 All mental references, appearances
to the contrary notwithstanding, refer to things.
This is not to deny that in many cases the fiction that we have,
as an object, something other than a real entity-for example, that
that which lacks being as such, as well as that which has it, may
be an object-proves itself harmless in logical operations; indeed,
by means of this fiction these operations can be facilitated, because
they are simplified in expression and even in thought itself.
It is similar to the way mathematicians are accustomed to use
with advantage the fictions of numbers less than zero, and many
others. By this method a presentation and judgment, complicated
in various ways, permit themselves to be handled as if they were
simple, and one is spared the trouble (which is useless in some
cases) of clarifying more exactly a confusedly grasped mental
event ....
The fact that such fictions are useful in logic has led many to believe that logic has non-things as well as things as its object and,
accordingly, that the concept of its object is more general than that
of the real. This is, however, thoroughly incorrect; indeed, according to what has been said, it is downright impossible, for there
cannot be anything at all other than real objects, and the same
homogeneous concept of the real, as the most general concept of
all, comprehends everything which is truly an object. Also, the
terms of ordinary language are most often not psychologically, but
only grammatically, names. They do not name things, but it remains none the less true that the discourse in which they are involved is concerned with nothing other than things. 7
5 Brentano,
"Genuine and Fictitious Ohjects," trans. hy D. B. Terrell, in
Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, p. 71.
6 Editor's Introduction
to Realism and the Background of Phenomenology, p. 5.
• Brentano, " Genuine and Fictitious Ohjects," loc, cit., p. 75,

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JOHN N. DEELY

Thus the Brentano who inspired Husserl is someone quite
different from the Brentano who philosophized in his own right.
The original statement of the doctrine of intentionality, purified
of ambiguities and rendered consistent by Husserl and others,
affirmed that discourse really does just what it appears to
do-make reference to objects regardless of whether those objects exist in fact as concrete individual things. Brentano, however, finally and firmly denied the reality of discourse's apparent capacity to refer to the non-existent. Sentences appearing to refer to non-existent objects, he held, are translatable
with the loss only of convenience and confusion into other
sentences that refer exclusively to objects existing in fact.
This later view of Brentano, little known in comparison with
his earlier doctrine of intentionality, is substantially the same
as the view that early came to the fore in the analytic tradition's dealings with the apparent capacity of discourse to refer
to the non-existent. The analysts, however, unlike the phenomenologists, do not owe to Brentano the psychologist their
initial inspiration for how to come to terms with the nonexistent. The analysts found their clue rather in the writings
of Frege the logician, who had maintained from the first that
" it is a defect of languages that expressions are possible within
them, which, in their grammatical form, seemingly determined
to designate an object, nevertheless do not fulfill this condition
in special cases; because this depends on the truth of the sentence." 8
There are two aspects to Frege's position on this matter.
First, and most important for the subsequent developments in
analysis, is Frege's firm identification of the apparent capacity
of discourse to refer to what does not exist as a " defect,"
"fault," or " imperfection," together with his programmatic
statement-which we will come to in a moment-of how this
defect might be remedied, this imperfection eliminated. Second,
8 Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Nominatum,
"trans. by Herbert Feigl, in Contemporary Readings in Logical Theory, ed. by I. M. Copi and J. A. Gould (New
York: Macmillan, 1967), p. 85. Cf. Max Black's trans. of this same proposition
in The Philosophical Review, LVII (May, 1948), p.

REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT

259

and of equal interest from the standpoint of logical thory, but
of lesser interest from the standpoint of a philosophy of discourse, is the non-programmatic, ad hoc means chosen by Frege
in his own work to compensate for this alleged " defect " or
"imperfection of language of which, by the way, even the symbolic language of analysis is not entirely free.'' 9
With regard to the first point, Frege not only leaves no
doubt that, so far as he is concerned, reference to what does
not exist is a " defect of languages," an " imperfection," and
" a major source of fallacies," but he also implies that it could
and should be eliminated from discourse-at least from discourse that has been logically perfected-for once and all:
It is to be demanded that in a logically perfect language (logical

symbolism) every expression constructed as a proper name in
a grammatically correct manner out of already introduced symbols,
in fact designate an object; and that no symbol be introduced as
a proper name without assurance that it have a nominatum. It is
customary in logic texts to warn against the ambiguity of expressions as a source of fallacies. I deem it at least as appropriate to
issue a warning against apparent proper names that have no
nominata. The history of mathematics has many a tale to tell
of errors which originated from this source. The demagogic misuse
is as close (perhaps closer) at hand as is the case of ambiguous expressions. ' The will of the people' may serve as an example in
this regard; for it is easily established that there is no generally
accepted nominatum of that expression. Thus it is obviously not
without importance to obstruct once for all the source of these
errors, at least as regards their occurrence in science. Then such
objections as the one discussed above will become impossible, for
then it will be seen that whether a proper name has a nominatum
can never depend upon the truth of a proposition. 10
But, having seen and said this much, Frege fails to take the
further step of actually finding the means " to obstruct once
and for all the source of these errors " that creep in to our theoretical and practical affairs through the door of non-being.
Instead, Frege adopts an ad hoc solution to the problem based
• Ibid.
10 lbid., p. 86.

260

.lbli:N :N. DEELY

only on reasons of convenience. "Whenever something is asserted," he says, whether by means of ordinary discourse or of
the symbolic language of analysis, " then the presupposition
taken for granted is that the employed proper names, simple or
compound "-i.e., the linguistic means employed, be it a word
or a sentence-" have nominata," i.e., refer to objects existing
in fact. 11 This being the case, even though " we may be in
error as regards that assumption, and such errors have occurred
on occasion," Frege considers that " it will suffice for the moment to refer to our intention in speaking and thinking in
order to justify our reference to the nominatum of a sign, even
if we have to make the proviso: if there is such a nominatum." 12 Frege then proceeds to circumvent the demand that a
logically perfected language designate only objects existing in
fact by adopting a convention that allows him to postulate
what an object referred to shall be in a given case.
It is the privileged position of Bertrand Russell in the
analytic tradition to have faced the recognized demand squarely and to have refused to be .satisfied with anything less than
a logical device that would in principle allow for the elimination from discourse of any reference to what does not exist,
and so would remove from discourse the deceptive appearance
of being able to deal indifferently with being and non-being.
The measure of any philosopher is to see clearly the requirements of an issue, to choose among the alternatives according
to the end in view, and to work out in principle the requirements of the chosen alternative to the point where the proportion between means and end comes unmistakably into view. By
this criterion, it is easy to see why Russell is in fact the most
important single figure in the tradition of analytic philosophy,
and why it is from him, rather than from Frege, that the
analytic tradition derives its distinctive heritage, even as the
phenomenological tradition stems from Husser! rather than
Brentano. Brentano and Frege planted seed in stony ground.
11

12

Ibid., p. 85. See also p. 77.
Ibid., p. 79.

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

Husser! and Russell transplanted the seeds, germinated them,
and made them blossom.
Given the apparent indifference of discourse to being and
non-being, and given the assumption that this appearance is
merely an appearance and not the reality of the matter, Russell
saw clearly both the required alternative to Frege's treatment of the alleged logical imperfection of language and (what
is partly the same) the radical inappropriateness of Frege's
means to the desired end. Consider the cases in which the denotation of denoting phrases used in propositions appears to be
absent.
Now it is plain that propositions do not become nonsense merely
because their hypotheses are false. The King in " The Tempest "
might say, "If Ferdinand is not drowned, Ferdinand is my only
son." Now "my only son" is a denoting phrase, which, on the
face of it, has a denotation when, and only when, I have exactly
one son. But the above statement would nevertheless have remained true if Ferdinand had been in fact drowned. Thus we must
either provide a denotation in cases in which it is at first sight
absent, or we must abandon the view that the denotation is what
is concerned in propositions which contain denoting phrases. The
latter is the course that I advocate. The ·former course .... is
adopted by Frege, who provides by definition some purely conventional denotation for the cases in which otherwise there would
be none. Thus " the King of France," is to denote the null-class;
"the only son of Mr. So-and-so" (who has a fine family of ten),
is to denote the class of all his sons; and so on. But this procedure,
though it may not lead to actual logical error, is plainly artificial,
and does not give an exact analysis of the matter. 18
" Taking the latter course," i. e., finding a way to analyze
propositions without having to allow-whether by convention
(Frege) or by confusion (the later Brentano) -for anything
unreal among the objects referred to, is the genius of Russell's
celebrated theory of descriptions and the reason why it is justly
described, in F. P. Ramsey's words, as" a paradigm of philosophy."
13 Bertrand
Russell, " On Denoting," in Logic and Knowledge, ed. by R. C.
Marsh, pp. 46-47.

JOHN N. DEELY

Russell's theory of descriptions first appeared in Mind of
1905 in the form of an article titled "On Denoting." The
most technical and logically simple exposition of the theory is
found, as one might suspect, in the Principia M athematica,
specifically, in the third introductory chapter, "Incomplete
Symbols." The most philosophically important exposition of
the theory, however, at least insofar as philosophy is more
concerned with underlying assumptions and principles than
with the resolution of problems formed into definite conclusions, is to be found in chapters 15-17 of his Introduction to
Mathematical Philosophy. For, from the point of view of the
assumption that discourse is only apparently and owing to confusion on the part of its users indifferent to the being and nonbeing of its objects (rather than really and essentially thus indifferent), we may grant to Russell not only that" language is
misleading, as well as .... diffuse and inexact," but also that
"logical symbolism is absolutely necessary to any exact or
thorough treatment" of the objects of discourse, "in particular
as regards existence and descriptions." 14 But if we wish to
understand the motives for adopting this particular assumption, we must do so apart from the particular conception of
the so-called " symbolic " or " mathematical logic " that depends for its philosophical applicability on one's having already
assented to the view that a reference to what does not exist is
only apparent and not real or " true." The exposition of the
theory of descriptions in the Principia presupposes the truth of
this assumption; but the less technical exposition in the Introduction to Mathematioal Philosophy, precisely because it is not
" only available to those who have mastered logical symbolism,"
is required to make explicit just what is involved in making the
crucial assumption upon which is based, as Russell puts it,
"the method by which mathematical logic can be made helpful
in investigating the traditional problems of philosophy." 15
14 Bertrand
Russell, Introduction
Humanities, 1919), p. 205.
15 Ibid., p. xii.

to Mathematical

Philosophy

(New York:

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

263

What one finds is that an uncompromising passion for reality
and truth lies behind Russell's formulation of his theory of
descriptions:
In obedience to the feeling of reality, we shall insist that, in the
analysis of propositions, nothing " unreal " is to be admitted. But,
after all, if there i8 nothing unreal, how, it may be asked, could we
admit anything unreal? The reply is that, in dealing with propositions, we are dealing in the first instance with symbols, and if we
attribute significance to groups of symbols which have no significance, we shall fall into the error of admitting unrealities, in the
only sense in which this is possible, namely, as objects described. 16
Thus Russell clearly recongizes that non-being enters into
history only through discourse and does so in the form of objects. Wars have been fought, lives have been lost, and endless
miseries have been inflicted upon men because of non-being
parading itself-thanks to discourse-in the guise of being.
Might it not be, then, that a correct analysis of discourse would
put an end to the tyranny of non-being over human affairs
and "obstruct once for all," as Frege proposed, "the source of
these errors, at least as regards their occurrence in science " ?
Such a goal goes beyond the narrow concerns of logic and is
surely worthy of the philosopher. It is the way to this goal
that Russell set himself to find. " My theory of descriptions
was never intended as an analysis of the state of mind of those
who utter sentences containing descriptions," Russell testifies;
" I was concerned to find a more accurate and analysed thought
to replace the somewhat confused thoughts which most people
at most times have in their heads." 17
Consider again the apparent indifference of discourse to
being and non-being in its relativity to objects:
The question of "unreality," which confronts us at this point,
is a very important one. Misled by grammar, the great majority
of those logicians who have dealt with this question have dealt
with it on mistaken lines. They have regarded grammatical form
16
17

Ibid., p. 170.
Bertrand Russell, "Mr. Strawson on Referring," Mind, LXVI (July, 1957),

p. 888.

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JOHN N. DEELY

as a surer guide in analysis than, in fact, it is. And they have not
known what differences in grammatical form are important. " I
met Jones" and "I met a man" would count traditionally as
propositions of the same form, but in actual fact they are of quite
different forms: the first names an actual person, Jones; while
the second involves a propositional .function, and becomes, when
made explicit: "The function 'I met x and xis human' is sometimes true." . . . This proposition is obviously not of the form
" I met x," which accounts for the existence of the proposition " I
met a unicorn " in spite of the fact that there is no such thing
as "a unicorn." 1 s
Thus, by the simple expedient of distinguishing between
propositions and propositional functions, Russell has, in principle, a means for eliminating from discourse all reference to
what does not exist. Whenever a statement appears to refer
to a non-existent object and to assert something about it, that
statement must not be taken, as traditional or "Aristotelian"
logic would take it, as expressing a simple proposition; it must
be taken, rather, as the symbolic or "mathematical " logic would
take it, as expressing a complex combining a proposition and
a propositional function together into what, grammatically considered, appears to be a simple proposition but really is not.
Thus all parts of discourse, seemingly constituted by propositions about unreal objects, are really compounds of propositional functions and false propositions about the real world,
and this is what the analysis of such propositions by the techniques of symbolic logic reveals, though it is what analysis by
the techniques of traditional logic conceals and glosses over.
" For want of the apparatus of propositional functions," Russell concludes, "many logicians have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects." 19 This conclusion-or
confusion-can henceforward, in principle at least, be avoided,
now that the propositional function has been discovered (or
perhaps we should say: invented) . " For clear thinking, in
many very diverse directions, the habit of keeping proposi18
19

Russell, Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, pp. 168-169.
Ibid., p. 169.

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

tiona! functions sharply separated from propositions is of the
utmost importance, and the failure to do so in the past has
been a disgrace to philosophy." 20 It is with an eye to the absence of this distinction in traditional logic that Russell claims
of the modern truth-value logic that "the description of the
subject as symbolical logic is an inadequate one. I should like
to describe it simply as logic, on the ground that nothing else
really is logic." 21
Let us grant the ingenuity of Russell's device whereby, as
Harman remarks of Quine's developments of it, "talk about
ideal objects is reduced to loose talk about real objects." 22 Let
us grant, too (at least for purposes of the present discussion),
Russell's claim that it is through the habit of distinguishing
propositions from propositional functions that the modern,
symbolic, or mathematical logic achieves its decisive superiority over the traditional or Aristotelian logic.
It remains that the theory of descriptions does not exclude
non-beings from among the objects of discourse but merely enables us to eliminate in a technical manner all references to
objects which we believe, for reasons of our own, to be unreal.
Of course, our belief in point of any given object or class of
objects might be mistaken (heaven forbid). But there is
nothing within the system of modern logic-or of traditional
logic, for that matter-that enables us to know that the beliefs
about reality, upon which our regimentation or formalization
of some theory is based, are correct. H they are not, though
our formalization will eliminate from discourse all apparent
reference to objects other than those we assert to be real, the
discourse will yet contain reference to unreal objects. Even
if our beliefs happened to be completely correct, apart from the
fact that we would have no way of knowing this, it would remain the case that our formalized discourse would still appear
and be taken to refer to unreal objects by anyone not sharing
Ibid., p. 166.
Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism," in Logic and Knowledge, p.
22 Gilbert Harman,
" Quine on Meaning and Existence, II," The Rwiew of
Metaphysics, XXI (December, 1967), p. 361.
20
21

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JOHN N. DEELY

our beliefs. How one will formalize or " regiment " (express
in the quantificational terms of modern logic) any given
philosophical theory, therefore, will depend: (1) on what one
understands that theory to assert to be real; (Q) on what one
believes concerning those assertions.
Suppose, for example, two modern logicians, one who believes
exactly like Paul VI and one who believes like Jean-Paul Sartre,
set out to formalize the Summa of St. Thomas. First, let us
suppose that they would each formalize it in terms of the various
entities they took Thomas to assert to be real. And then they
would each formalize it a second time, but now according to
what they themselves take to be real. In the first case, the
quality and worth of the formalizations would exactly match
the quality and worth of their respective understanding of the
doctrine of St. Thomas and would differ accordingly. In the
second case, the manner of binding the variables-referring to
objects-would differ wildly between the two men, not according to their different understanding of St. Thomas now but
according to their radically opposed conceptions of what there
is to reality. In both cases the techniques of formal logic serve
no more than to express differences in understanding; they provide no means whatever for adjudicating or eliminating those
differences. The extent to which mathematical logic "appears,"
as Russell thought," to invalidate much traditional philosophy,
and even a good deal of what is current in the present day," 23
is a deceptive appearance indeed. For it has its whole being
from the extent to which a given user of symbolic logic disagrees-for whatever reasons, and rightly or wrongly-with
the traditional or current views, and in terms of which disagreement he gives symbolic expression to these views in order to
" invalidate " them.
Subjectivity, in the form of the beliefs of the user, is built
in to the very foundations of the logistic method. 24 All the
Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. xii.
•• This point is well remarked by Guido Kling, Ontology and the Logistic
Analysis of Language (rev. ed.; New York: Humanities, 1967), pp. 8-9: "Be28

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

properly philosophical differences over what there is precede
any use that can be made of the method. Far from providing
a tool for the adjudication of philosophical disputes, philosophical discussion ceases to be possible as soon as and as long as
one has recourse to the logistic method, for that method cannot be employed at all except to the extent that one has decided-rightly or wrongly-what a given theory-to-be-formalized asserts to be real.
Carnap's distinction between questions internal and external to
a framework or language-system is useful here. Prior to or independent of the selection of a language-system L with a domain D of
objects as its fundamental domain, the quantifiers are without
meaning. They are given meaning only with the formulation of L,
i.e., by the explicit listing of the syntactical and semantical rules
determinative of L. 25
For purposes of expressing philosophical differences over the
fundamental units of being, modern logic achieves, at least
initially, unparalleled clarity. For purposes of coming to understand the reasons behind those differences, however (which
is, after all, the most proper concern of the philosopher) , modern logic serves no essential use at all, for the reason finely
stated by Alston: "Just as no sentence is necessarily misleading, so none is guaranteed, by its form, to be used without
confusion. The supposition to the contrary is one of the unfortunate effects of philosophic preoccupation with artificial
languages." 26
cause they are artificially made to conform to a logical ideal and because of the
precision of their rules, logistic languages present a completely different case than
do the natural languages. We still find a wide range of possible syntactical systems or 'grammars' ... but these consciously contrived logistic languages are
all alike in the fact that they are determined explicitly by the definite logical
and ontological views of their inventors.
"The translation from a natural into a logistic language, i.e., the logistic
analysis of language, involves an ontological commitment for every sentence
translated."
25 R. M. Martin,
"Existential Quantification and the 'Regimentation' of Ordinary Language," Mind, LXXI (October, 1962), pp. 528-529.
26 William P. Alston, "Ontological
Commitments," in Philosophy of Mathematics, ed. by P. Benacerraf and H. Putnam (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall,
1964), p. 257. Reprinted from Philosophical Studies, 9 (1958), pp. 8-17.

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JOHN N. DEELY

The apparatus of symbolic logic, as incorporating Russell's
theory of descriptions, therefore, does not solve the problem
of non-being in discourse any more than does the phenomenological method based on Husserl's theory of intentionality.
The phenomenologists' doctrine offers no explanation of the
appearance of non-being in discourse. But the analysts' doctrine, while it does show the possibility in principle of eliminating non-beings from among the objects of discourse, also
signally fails to show how in fact this elimination could be successfuly carried through, for, to borrow again Alston's words:
In any context where questions of existence arise the problem
is whether or not we shall assert that so-and-so exists, not whether
we shall choose some particular way of making this assertion. This
means that assertion of existence, commitment to existence, etc.,
does not consist in the inflexible preference for one verbal formulation over any other, however gratifying such preferences may
be to logicians.27
Yet this is short of saying that the whole enterprise of
mathematical logic has been, after all, without substantive
philosophical point. When the delusions of grandeur generated
by its practitioners have been seen for what they are, it can
also be seen that " the point of the translation " of any given
piece of discourse into symbolic form, is, in Alston's phrase/ 8
"essentially a strategic one," specifically, it enables us to neutralize, " wherever they arise," confusions as to what we are
affirming to be real, insofar as such confusions might arise from
the ambiguities of common language; for, by translating the
problematic statements into canonical notation, we can identify the precise locus in language of the ontological commitment we wish to make. 29 At the same time, this strategy
27
28

Ibid., p. 254.
Ibid., p. 257.

29 In addition to this "advantage,"
Ki.ing, in Ontology a;nd the Logistic Anmysis
of Language, pp. 185-186, adds two others equally thin and dubious-the making
possible of " a new kind of pragmatical evaluation " of ontological standpoints
(an advantage which even Ki.ing does " not wish to claim" as " of primary importance"), and a sharpening and increase of our ontological knowledge (which
does not seem to me a defensible claim, for the reasons already given) .

ltEFERENCEl '1'0 TH11l NON-EXISTENT

enables us to escape from the triviality, well-remarked by
Quine, 30 of the ordinary language wing of analytic philosophy
with its tacit claim that the ontological commitments apparent
in common usage are the ontological commitments philosophy
is bound to accept as its own. For what Russell achieved was
a logical system based on the philosophical truth that, for a
sufficiently informed observer-more exactly, for an omniscient
one-it would be possible to .so correct human discourse as to
eliminate all mistaken references resulting from the confusions
of non-being with being. 31
Thus the impasse: where phenomenology sees the inexplicability of the self-evident, analysis sees confusion and something to be explained away. But the' self-evident' phenomenon
to which phenomenology appeals- the relational character or
" intentionality" of thought whereby it relates thinkers to objects thought of indifferent to the reality or unreality of those
objects-is at least as puzzling as it is evident: for how can
there be a relation between being and non-being, between a
thought, which exists in a thinking subject (be it only as a brain
state), and an object, which exists nowhere? How can there be
a relation connecting what exists with something that does not
exist, a relation whose term is not given at all in reality?
This is hardly a question about discourse which phenomenology is entitled to ignore. It will not do, without a word
of explanation, to accept such a bizarre phenomenon as patently the case. A word of explanation is in order; yet phenomenology gives us only descriptive analyses which presuppose
the validity of what is here up for question.
On the other hand, analysis, in seeking to explain away the
problem of discursive reference to the non-existent, fails to
provide a resolution any more satisfactory. For in denying
80 W. V. 0. Quine, "Philosophical
Progress in Language Theory," Metaphilosophy, 1 (January, 1970), p. 18.
81 This truth,
argued in a slightly altered formula, is one of the " theses " of
classical Thomism: see John of St. Thomas (ne Jean Poinsot), Cursus Philosophicus, ed. by Reiser (Turin: Mariett, 1930), Vol. I, Ars Logica, Part II, Q. II,
Art. V, "Utrum Deus Formet Entia Rationis."

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JOHN N. DEELY

that anything but confused discourse can appear to refer to
what does not exist, the analysts fail to provide any standard
for what clear discourse would be other than discourse which
makes reference only to real objects. The elaborate program
for such logically perfect discourse, called for by Frege, worked
out in its fundamentals by Russell (with his theory of descriptions) and finally by Quine (with the elimination from Russell's
theory of the last vestige of uncontrolled reference, the singular
term 32 ) , is little more than an elaborate circularity and proves
in the end unworkable: for the program depends for its successful implementation on the prior judgments made by those
who implement it concerning the reality of any given object
of discourse, and yet it is just these prior judgments concerning
the line between being and non-being that is the very point
at issue between any two scientific or philosophical theories.
Since the original problem of non-being for a philosophy centered on discourse concerns the capacity of discourse to deceive
us in point of the reality of objects, the elaborate program of
the logicians, so far as it holds any properly philosophical prospect or interest, proves to be a program that would only be
realized after there was no longer a need for it. For if the
problem is to decide why there is a problem as to which (and
in what way) objects of discourse are real, the predicate calculus of modem logic provides no help whatever. All that it
can do is to enable us to eliminate the references to the unreal
objects once it has been decided what the real objects are. But
how it is that unrealities appeared or seemed to appear among
the objects of discourse in the first place remains as much in
the dark as ever. The ex post facto account o£ non-being by the
analysts, I conclude, is in its own way as unsatisfying as the
silent appeal to self-evidence by the phenomenologists.
82 W. V. 0. Quine, "Descriptions,"
and "Elimination of Singular Terms," in
Methods of Logic (rev. ed.; New York: Holt, Rinehart, & Winston, 1959), pp.
215-219, and 220-224. See also Quine, "Notes on the Theory of Reference," in
From a Logical Point of View (2nd ed., rev.; New York: Harper, 1961), pp.
130-138; and "Variables Explained Away," in Selected Logic Papers (New York:
Random House, 1966), pp. 227-235.

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

Surely there must be yet a third way of coming to terms with
the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not
exist, which will bridge the gap between these dominant contemporary approaches.

II. To Overcome or to Acquiesce in the Impasse?
We have found in the non-beingofcertainobjectsofdiscourse
a problem common to any philosophy of discourse, and we have
found further that the way of handling this problem in the currently dominant species of such philosophy has resulted in a
kind of stand-off that leaves us as much in the dark as ever
as to how it is that discourse has the appearance of indifference
to the reality of its objects.
But perhaps it is our guiding question that leads us inevitably into blind alleys. Perhaps it is simply a mistake to
seek for an explanation of the apparent indifference of discourse to the reality of its objects, a mistake based on a misunderstanding of the way language functions-the purpose it fulfills in human life. Within the analytic tradition a view just
such as this was developed by Wittgenstein in reaction to the
logical excesses in the analysis of language inspired by Russell's
theory of descriptions'-" as if," Wittgenstein remarked scornfully, "it took the logician to show people at last what a correct
sentence looked like." 88
It was the very requirement for a logically perfect language
laid down, as we have seen, by Frege, that Wittgenstein held
suspect. " The more narrowly we examine actual language,"
he noted, " the sharper becomes the conflict between it and
our requirement." 84 Actual language is simply not tied down
to any one concept of " reality " in the expressions of common
life. Attention to this fact, thought Wittgenstein, should lead
us to abandon " the preconceived idea of crystalline purity "
88 Ludwig
Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, trans. by G. E. M. Anscombe (3rd rev. ed.; New York Macmillan, 1958), no. 81, p. 38 (reading "correct" for "richtiger," instead of Anscombe's "proper").
•• Ibid., no. 107, p. 46.

JOHN N. DEELY

as logically required for authentic discourse, " by turning our
whole examination around." 85 What is called for is neither
an explanation showing how reference to what does not exist
is possible, nor an explanation showing that reference to what
does not exist is but a confused reference to what does exist.
What is called for, rather, is the abandonment of the very
aim of philosophy to explain discourse at all.
We must do away with all explanation, and description alone
must take its place. And this description gets its light, that is to
say its purpose, from the philosophical problems. These are, of
course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking
into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to
make us realize these workings: in despite of an urge to misunderstand them. The problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known. Philosophy
is a battle against the bewitchment of our intelligence by means
of language. 36
This view of Wittgenstein has been widely adopted, and
has resulted in a split of the analytic tradition into two factions or schools-the logical analysts, who look to mathematical logic for the tools of philosophical work; and the ordinary
language analysts, who look to the actual workings of common
speach as the proper object of philosophical consideration.
Where the logical analysts think up " protocols " for translating
this or that sort of discourse into logistic systems, Wittgenstein
counsels the ordinary language philosophers to seek a different
route: " don't think, but look! " 37 And where logical analysts
look for real objects in terms of which to implement their
translation procedures, Wittgenstein counsels the ordinary language philosophers to subordinate such concern to a more fundamental goal-the elucidation of usage. " Philosophy simply
puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces
anything." 88 It "may in no way interfere with the actual use
Ibid., no. 108, p. 46.
•• Ibid., no. 109, p. 47.
37 Ibid., no. 66, p. 31.
38 Ibid., no. 126, p. 50.

35

REFERENCE

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278

of language; it can in the end only describe it. For it cannot
give language any foundation either." 39
Wittgenstein's counsels here have prima facie plausibility,
an intuitive soundness about them, as it were, in the face of
the changes wrought in common speech by use of the theory
of descriptions (changes that even Russell allowed to be
" somewhat incredible " 40 ) , and even in the face of the sometimes bizarre formulations of the phenomenologists. The earlier analysts and the phenomenologists latched onto the referential aspect of discourse as though this were the whole-the
former, by making reference the key for logical translation;
the latter, by making reference the key to consciousness itself as
something irreducibly " mental " or " intentional." But the ordinary language philosophers make it clear from the start that
referential use of words is only one feature of discourse; nonreferential use, however, is another feature of discourse that
must not be neglected. Why then subordinate the latter to
the former? Why not rather simply regard them as equal
partners, each instancing in different ways the primary feature
of language-service in public life? The use of words to refer
to what does not exist, then, is neither something to be explained, nor is it something to be explained away. It is simply
a matter to be clarified through attention to the actual
workings of language, according to the perfectly general formula, " the meaning of a word is its use in a language." There
are words, and there are the uses to which they are put in discourse-that is all the philosopher of discourse knows or needs
to know. When he knows this, he knows all there is for philosophy to know about language, save for details.
What goes on " inside the heads " of the users of language
may be safely left to the psychologist and neurologist, just as
" what there is " outside of language may be safely left to the
other sciences. When the philosopher has mapped the usages
of language, he has done all that he can or can be expected
to do.
89
' 0

Ibid., no. 124, p. 49.
Russell, " On Denoting," loc. cit., p. 44.

JOHN N. DEELY

On this view, the shift in interest from being to discourse
that has taken place in modem times signals more than just
a new perspective on ancient problems. It heralds a radically
new age, a clean break with what has traditionally been known
as philosophy. As Richard Rorty puts it, "analytic philosophers have in common the view that the pursuit of wisdom
cannot be served by continuing the inquiries traditionally
grouped together as ' philosophy'." 41 Russell and the logical
analysts thought they had discredited traditional philosophies
of being by the simple application of their new logical method
to the old problems. But this opinion, we now see, was without
foundation, inasmuch as the application of the new method
to such an outcome is possible at all only to the extent that
the outcome is presupposed in the very application. The ordinary language philosophers avoid this vicious circle by the
simple expedient of eschewing all explanation. "Philosophy"
becomes, as Wittgenstein put it, "what is possible before all
new discoveries and inventions." 42
From the point of view of our question, however, there is
little to choose between (1) the logistic translations made by
the logical analysts to conjure reference away from discourse,
the elucidations of usage made by the ordinary language
analysts in precision from all questions concerning the reality
or unreality of objects, and (3) the descriptions of consciousness or experience essayed by the phenomenologists on the
postulate of intentionality: all three shed no light at all on how
it can be that discourse seems to put us in a relation to what
does not exist with as much facility as it brings us into relation
with what does exist.
The position of ordinary language analysis alone confronts and
does not conceal the question, even though it does so only to
deny the legitimacy of the inquiry. This denial may seem arbitrary from the point of view of a traditional philosophy of
41 Richard
Rorty, "Do Analysts and Metaphysicians Disagree?",
ceeedings, XLI (1967), pp. 89-53.
42 Wittgenstein,
Philosophical Investigations, no.
p. 50.

ACPA Pro-

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275

being. And it must be admitted that it is by no means clear
either how empirical research of the sort that characterizes thf"
sciences could ever provide the answer to our question, or how
the question itself is based on a misunderstanding of the
workings of language-particularly in view of the fact that it
is the workings of ordinary speech itself that give rise to our
question. Is it not the case that discourse does proceed with
an apparent indifference to the reality of its objects? And if
the possibility of so proceeding is not explained by any avenues
of empirical inquiry, is it not arbitrary, or at least indecently
hasty, to assert baldly that no explanation-no answer to our
question-is possible or desirable? 43
Still, the stand of the later Wittgenstein and his school on
the question of meaning does serve to make clear a key requirement any answer to our question must meet: it must
establish a nexus between being and discourse, a point of contact or " perspectival overlap " between a philosophy of being
transparent to itself and a philosophy of discourse aware of the
capacity of speech to convey and designate reality.
If Wittgenstein is right, if the clarification of ordinary language in a manner that neither explains nor infers anything
is all that philosophy could ever be, then there is no way out
of the impasse reached over the issue of non-being by the phenomenologists and the analysts. And the reason why there
is no exit is clear: to overcome the impasse, an explanation of
how language really refers to objects would be necessary, and
no explanation is possible within philosophy.
On the other hand, if an explanation of how language really
refers to objects is possible, and if such explanation does not
•• " Indecently hasty " is about as charitable a description as justice authorizes
regarding Wittgenstein's pronouncements on the nature and history of philosophy.
For in fact, Wittgenstein's knowledge of ancient philosophy consists almost solely
in an acquaintance with Plato's Dialogues, while his knowledge of medieval thought
consisted principally in a quite limited familiarity with St. Augustine. Read against
the immediate background of Russell's work and his own Tractatus, Wittgenstein's
Investigations have an authentic ring. Read as an adequate assessment of the
philosophical enterprise, however, they have rather the ring of gratuitousl;r

fl76

JOHN N. DEELY

depend on the laboratory studies, field researches, or mathematical hypotheses of science, then a way out of the impasse
is possible, the ordinary language analysts are mistaken in excluding all explanation from the domain of philosophy, and the
opposition between the traditional philosophy of being and the
modem philosophy of discourse will-in principle at leasthave been overcome. For whatever will really explain the capacity of discourse to refer equally to being and non-being, will
by that very achievement establish a nexus or point of contact
between the universe of being and the universe of discourse.

III. Overcoming the Impasse.
To the best of my knowledge, no ex professo account of the
apparent indifference of discourse to the reality or unreality
of its objects has ever been given by any philosopher.
Of course, there may be such a treatise of which I am simply
not aware; but what is certain is that, after four years of investigating the literature on language and philosophy-in the
course of which this question only gradually took on clarity
and central importance-! came across no full account of the
relativity of discourse to objects and its indifference to being
and non-being. The closest thing I found to the required treatment, curiously enough, is a 17th century Treatise on Signs,
essayed in Latin by a singularly obscure Iberian philosopher,
Jean Poinsot. The problem of explaining the referential capacity of discourse, according to Poinsot, is dependent upon a careful understanding of the nature of relation, more specifically,
upon an understanding of the fact that relation is the only
category or kind of being that need not be instantiated physically in order to really occur. Poinsot, for his part, gained this
understanding of the peculiarity of relation from St. Thomas
Aquinas. By taking Poinsot's application of St. Thomas's
theory of relation to the theory of language, and by developing
certain features of that application beyond Poinsot's own exposition, I find it is possible to arrive at an account of the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does not exist in

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277

a way that meets, so far as I am aware of them, all the difficulties that led the later Brentano and both camps of analysts
to eschew the relational or " intentional " view of discourse. In
doing this, the account I am about to give overcomes the impasse reached by the phenomenologists and the analysts in
their manner of coming to terms with non-being, by explaining
precisely what the phenomenologists presuppose, namely, how
it is possible for there to be a relation whose term is not given
in reality apart from discourse. And finally, by providing such
an explanation, my account establishes a nexus betwen the
being-centered philosophies of the past and the discoursecentered philosophies of modern times, thereby restoring unity
to the philosophical tradition and dignity to the philosophical
enterprise as an avenue to understanding the world more and
more clearly than is possible through the heritage of natural
languages, even when this heritage is supplemented (as in the
view of ordinary language analysis) or supplanted (as the logical analysts would have it) by knowledge acquired through the
methods of experimental and mathematical science.
Let me develop my account of the referential capacity of discourse from a point that can be agreed to by all philosophers
interested in discourse, be they analysts, phenomenologists, or
whatever; then, in a separate section, I will show how my account owes its chief inspiration to the theory of the sign Poinsot
developed on the basis of St. Thomas's insight into the peculiar
nature of relation as a kind of being. The point of common
agreement, which I take as providing a starting point for a
new attack on the problem of non-being generated by ordinary
discourse, has been satisfactorily formulated by A. J. Ayer.
" Certainly there is a difference," he writes, " between understanding what another person says and merely hearing the
noises that he makes." 44
No more than this need be admitted in order to get onto the
way out of the impasse. Let us re-state Ayer's observation in
•• A. J. Ayer, Thinking and Meaning (London: H. K. Lewis, 1947), p. !'ll.
I am indebted to Mortimer Adler for the suggestion of this as a starting point.

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JOHN N. DEELY

the form of a question: In the case of a mark, sound, or movement-be it a word or a sentence, and be it verbally or graphrically manifested-actually used to refer to an object, what
is it that transforms the in itself physical mark, sound, or move.ment into a linguistic occurrence? My thesis is that in any case
where discourse concerns an object, that is, in any case where
heard or seen noises are understood linguistically, it is the
difference between the mark, sound, or movement as such and
as conveying the linguistic reference that is the key to understanding the nature and function of discourse, and that is,
therefore, de jure, the fundamental datum explanandum for
any philosophy of discourse that wishes to be grounded in principle. The apparent capacity of discourse to refer to what does
not exist will be adequately judged as merely apparent or as
real only to the extent that such a judgment is based on an
understanding of this difference. To overcome the impasse over
non-being, therefore, and to solve the problem of the difference
between the physical. as such and as making a linguistic reference, are one and the same.
Let us state the factors involved in this problem in neutral
terms, i. e., terms that should be acceptable to any philosopher
who accepts as a descriptive definition of meaning the difit may be-between a given mark, sound, or
movement as such and as sign of something other than itself,
and accepts also (even if only tentatively) our proposal to
make the explanation of meaning so· defined the touchstone for
deciding whether the apparent capacity of discourse to refer to
what does not exist is real or merely apparent.
Whenever a mark, sound, or movement is employed successfully as a linguistic sign (i.e., to make a linguistic reference),
whether that sign be a word or a sentence (i. e., whatever it is
that one takes the unit of linguistic reference to
or
phrase, subject of a sentence, whole sentence: whatever), it
seems clear that its status as a piece of discourse involves three
factors. First, there is the linguistic expression itself, which occurs outside the organism; let us call this the extraorganisrn.ic

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

factor X. Second, there is the object that X is a sign of, the significate of X, what X refers to or is about: let us call this the
objective or signified factor 0. Third,. there is the factor within
the organism using or apprehending X as a sign of 0, the organism's "understanding," on the basis of which factor precisely X is, over and above a mere mark, sound, or movement
occurring extraorganismically, a linguistic mark, sound or movement signifying or referring to 0: let us call this the intraorganismic factor C, inasmuch as it is the cause, here and now,
of X's actual functioning .status as sign of the object 0. For,
if C does not occur in connection with the perception of X,
clearly, X will not be perceived by the organism in relation to
0 as a sign thereof. It is thus C, the intraorganismic factor,
that holds, in final analysis, the key to the
of meaning.
I say, "in the final analysis," for it is clear that there are
many ancillary considerations that may be pursued in connection with C-for example, the analysis of the conventions of
use surrounding the occurrence of X as evocative of C (the
province of ordinary language analysis) or the analysis of the
behavior of the organism consequent upon the occurrence of C
(the province of psycholinguistics and behavioral psychology).
But just as clearly, such pursuits are ancillary, and the heart
of the problem lies in C itself. X functions as a sign of 0 on
the basis of C, the intraorganismic factor whereby the language
user apprehends 0 as object signified by X.
Notice here that the being of 0 as an object for the user of
X is dependent upon the factor C. Even supposing that 0 exists
in the world independently of C, it exists here and now as something actually signified by X dependently upon C. As an object of discourse, therefore, as something signified by X, 0 has
its being dependently upon C. In the analytic tradition, the
tendency has been to give physical objects pride of place precisely because here, at least, we tend to have confidence in the
reality of that about which we discourse. But, from the standpoint of C, this tendency suppresses a fundamental insight.
Whenever an object exists as an object of discourse, it is not its

QSO

JOHN N. DEELY

supposed physical reality that is decisive, for the physically real
object as physically real is thought to be such on the grounds
that it seems to have being independently of discourse. But
an object of discourse as such has its being dependently upon
discourse, regardless of whether it also has an independent or
physical being.
The dependence of 0 on C for its being an object of discourse
raises immediately a problem whose importance cannot, I
think, be exaggerated. Given that the factor C, regardless of
whether it be called an " idea" or a brain state or a muscular disposition of some sort, is-as intraorganismic-a subjective or
"private" factor; and given that c is the raison d' etre of 0 so far
as 0 actually enters into discourse, it must be asked at once:
how is it that 0 does not participate entirely in the subjectivity
of C? How is it that two language users of X, each of which
has his own C, can have or seem to have in common the object 0? They do not have the same C. They have or seem to
have the same 0. But 0 exists in discourse as an effect of C.
Therefore it would seem that there are as many 0 s as there
are C s, and that each 0 is private in just the way that each
Cis.
Yet such a conclusion flies in the face of common experience.
We live in a public world, not a merely private one. Language
is an instrument for sharing the world. Here all the arguments
of Wittgenstein against the possibility of a private language are
appropriate. We may take it as a touchstone for any sound
account of discourse that it give an account of meaning as public and common, not as private and subjective. The existence
of C and its necessity for actual discourse here and now, I
think, cannot be gainsaid. But some account must be given
which reconciles the privacy of C with the publicy of 0, and of
X as sign of 0. Otherwise, our theory falls prey to all the
standard and valid objections that have led analysts-both
" ordinary " and " logistic " ones-to eschew any role for psychology and mental entities in the philosophy of discourse.
How are we to reconcile the dependence of 0 (for its being

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281

as object) and of X (for its being as sign of 0) upon C, with
the fact that 0 and X function publicly, while C functions
privately? 45
To get clear about what is at stake here, let us proceed for
the moment on the assumption that the object 0 is a really
existing thing factually given in the physical world quite apart
from discourse. The advantage gained by making this assumption is simply that in the stipulated case-the case where 0
exists in fact independently of discourse-it is clear that not
only C and X are really distinct as well as really related(really related, that is, inasmuch as it is by virtue of C that the
organism is aware of 0), but also that distinction between
0 as something existing in the physical world--0 as thing,
let us say-and 0 as something apprehended by a given
organism-0 as object, let us say-is precisely the difference, for purposes of discourse, between 0 as related in its
existence to a given organism and 0 as unrelated to that
organism, a difference made by the presence or absence in the
organism of C. When C exists, 0 exists as apprehended as well
as in fact; when C does not exist, 0 exists in fact but not as
apprehended. C, therefore, is the basis of the cognitive relation
R between an organism A and an object 0. Here we have a
preliminary answer to the problem posed by the privacy of C
•• The denunciation of " psychologism " has been a rallying cry for both the
analytic and the phenomenological traditions from their very beginnings. Yet
neither tradition offers any clear account reconciling what I am here calling the
privacy of C versus the publicy of 0. The phenomenologists, to their credit, have
from the first recognized that 0 necessarily depends upon C, whatever the difficulties in explaining this fact. The analysts, to their discredit, have proceeded
as though the mere eschewing of any consideration of the intraorganismic factor
C were by itself sufficient to avoid all difficulties in the explanation of objective
discourse. This ploy is most explicit, perhaps, in Quine's distinction between the
theory of reference and the theory of meaning, drawn in the spirit of what we
have seen in the first part of this article is the mistaken belief, inherited from
Russell, to the effect that, as Quine puts it: " There are no ultimate philosophical
problems concerning terms and their references, but only concerning variables and
their values; and there are no ultimate philosophical problems concerning existence
except insofar as existence is expressed by the quantifier '(:;Ix) '." (The Methods
of Logic, p. 224) .

JOHN N. DEELY

vis-a-vis the publicy of 0: just as one and the same thing can
serve as the term of several different relations, so one and the
same object can be the term of relations founded on the C's existing in diverse individuals. One and the same object 0 can
stand at the term of several different relations R founded on
the different C's existing in different individuals. Thus the
publicy of 0 is reconciled with the privacy of C by the diversity
of status between 0 and C: 0 exists as the term of the relation R, whereas C exists as the fundament or basis of that
same relation R. C and 0 differ as fundament and term of a
relation differ. The fact that C and 0 are located in physically
disparate subjects, and that several subjects can be related to
one and the same term, provides a preliminary resolution of
our problem, though we shall soon have occasion to add some
essential refinements.
Let us now reintroduce into the picture the linguistic factorword or sentence or whole treatise-X, which, in conjunction
with C, refers to 0. Our preliminary assumption about
0 as a thing need not be altered, for X, obviously, insofar as it is a mark, sound, or movement (or a series
of marks, sounds and movements), is also a thing existing in
fact independently of any C here and now. This is an important point, whose significance has generally not been appreicated by philosophers of language.
Up to now, we have spoken of C and X as co-occurrent, the
former intraorganismically and the latter extraorganismically,
whenever X actually refers, here and now, to 0. From this
point of view it seems sufficient to say that X is able to be referred to 0 owing to the fact that 0 is apprehended by the user
of X thanks to C. But this appearance of sufficiency is an illusion, for it glosses over the fact that X is every bit as much
an object-a term of a C-hased relation-as 0 itself is. C and
X, as the thought and the word, do not belong on one side of
discourse, and 0, object and thing, on the other side. On the
contrary, C belongs on one side and X and 0 belong on the
other, for X and 0 have in common the character of being
objects, while C is known to exist only analytically, as the

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TO THE NON-EXISTENT

basis that must be posited for the difference between one and
the same thing now existing only in fact, now existing also in
apprehension. Here we arrive at a conclusion whose consequences are definitive: the difference between X as physical
and X as significant or linguistic, is the same as the difference
between 0 as thing and 0 as object of discourse.
The importance of the point demands that we spell it out in
detail. Whenever a given individual, A, let us say, uses X,
the X too is something that he is aware of, and so is an object
A is aware of:_in its own right,
of apprehension-something
as well as and as a necessary condition for X's being a sign
of 0. Both X and 0 must be apprehended as objects in order
for either to function as a sign of the other. This means that,
since C is posited precisely and only as the intraorganismic
factor making the difference between A's actually being aware
or not being aware of a given object here and now, before
(logically, not always temporally) X is used to refer to 0,
there are not one but two C's involved, one whereby X exists
as apprehended and one whereby 0 exists as apprehended.
Strictly speaking, then, the sign character of X relative to 0 is
due to the establishment of an association not between C and
X but rather between X as one object and 0 as another object,
which association in turn results in the formation of a third
C, which is the " idea " or " concept " neither of X nor of 0
disjunctively but of X and 0 conjunctively. It is this C,
properly speaking, that X evokes when it functions linguistically as a sign of 0.
The situation can be clarified, perhaps, by a sequence of diagrams:
of. Ct. the idea of 0,
Diagram 1: A is aware of 0. by
prescinding from the question of how cl was formed.

284

JOHN N. DEELY

Diagram II: A is aware of X by virtue of C 2 , the idea whereby
X exists as something A is aware of.

@--<x
A

Diagram III: A is aware of X and 0 together, making possible
an idea of the two as a unity-a unity of thought.
the formation

(C:\----<

0

A
Diagram IV: A is aware of X and 0 not only together, but also
as connected, by a.· connection consequent upon the idea, C 3 ,
whereby X and 0 exist as something A is aware of conjunctively.

A

Viewed in this way, there is no chance of committing the blunder of thinking that thoughts and words are two separate
processes, each of which would be just what it is if one or the
other were to be removed. On the contrary, discourse-the
whole of thought, language, and object-is profoundly one, so
unified that the intraorganismic thoughts and the extraorganismic words and objects are what they are precisely and only
to the extent that each is simultaneously. For, while the object
of cognition exists dependently on the thought from the standpoint of being, object and thought co-exist in perfect proportion
to one another from a temporal standpoint. The object cannot
be as apprehended save when and as an idea of it exists, and
an idea as idea cannot be save as giving an existence of presence
to an object. In a certain sense, therefore, only upon the formation of c3 in our sequence of diagrams do we have the existence
of discourse properly speaking.
This reveals a profound import to the contemporary expression, "universe of discourse." For, from the standpoint of the

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

concept or idea, words are not opposed to objects as words are to
things. On the contrary, words and things known are equally
objects, but objects differing in status primarily as regards their
manageability. Thus, words and sentences call things to mind
and order our thoughts about things, but, equally, things suggest words and patterns of words. For both words and things
exist, in discourse, in an objective unity derived from the concepts or ideas which give them their being-which " constitute
them," the phenomenologists say-as cognized or known.
A linguistic remark .can fail to be understood-Q, on hearing
X, may think of N rather than 0. Or a perceived object may
suggest no words to the perceiver but present itsel£, as it were,
mutely. But in any case, whenever anything enters our consciousness, it does so by virtue of an intraorganismic occurrence

c.
These remarks bring out the utter peculiarity of the intraorganismic factor C, the con.cept or idea: unlike objects, including words, that are also signs, ideas cannot fail to give
presence to something besides themselves. Inasmuch as a sign
is anything that makes present in awareness something besides
itsel£, ideas are pure signs: they do nothing but signify, i.e.,
make present the objects of awareness-be they words or
things or whatnot-that the ideas themselves are not. Unlike
the objects which are also signs, ideas cannot fail to signify.
They alone, among all the furniture of the world, signify by
necessity. For them, to be and to signify are simply one. The
object of which we are directly aware, be it word or thing apprehended disjunctively or .conjunctively, is, in every case, just
what C qua C is not. If we were or could be directly aware of
C, it would not be C, but something else, for C is just that
factor that makes us aware of something that it itself is not.
No matter how the matter is approached, careful attention to
the function of C in relation to X and 0 reveals that, while C
can be known to exist by a reflexive analysis of discourse, it can
under no conditions be directly observed or apprehended. This
is a point of some importance that was well understood by the

Q86

JOHN N. DEELY

older scholastics and by a few recent philosophers-notably
Jacques Maritain and F. H. Bradley-but that seems never to
have been adverted to in a systematic way by anyone in the
analytic or phenomenological traditions excepting Heidegger.
Substituting the word " physical " for " psychical," the following text can be cited from Bradley's Logic with even
more timeliness, in many respects, than when Bradley wrote:
An idea, within my head, and as a state of my mind, is as stubborn
a fact as any outward object .... but, intent on this, we have as
good as forgotten the way in which logic uses ideas. We have not
seen that in judgment no fact ever is just that which it means, or
can mean what it is; and we have not learnt that, wherever we have
truth or falsehood, it is the signification we use, and not the existence. We never assert the fact in our heads, but something else
which that fact stands for. And if an idea were treated as a physical reality, then it would not represent either truth or falsehood.
When we use it in judgment, it must be referred away from itself.
If it is not the idea of some existence, then, despite its emphatic
actuality, . . . it is a something which, in relation to the reality
we mean, is nothing at all.46
Or again, substituting

" discourse " for " judge " :

Not only are we unable to discourse before we use ideas, but,
strictly speaking, we can not discourse till we use them as ideas.
We must have become aware that they are not realities, that they
are mere ideas, signs of an existence other than themselves. Ideas
are not ideas until they are symbols, and, before we use symbols,
we ·can not discourse.H
So far, then, we have given a preliminary explanation of how
the privacy of C reconciles with the publicy of X and 0. C,
as subjective or private, is not something experienced or known
but the basis or fundament of all experience and knowledge.
What are experienced and known are words and things, O's
and X's insofar as they enter into relations R with us on the
•• F. H. Bradley, The Principles of Logic (2nd ed., rev.; London:
versity Press, 1922), Vol. I, p. 2.

* Ibid.
7

Oxford Uni-

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

basis of C's. And O's and X's have a common or public character, precisely because they exist at the term of the diverse
relation R's founded on the several C's.
But so far we have also been proceeding on the assumption
that the O's in question exist in fact as well as in discourse.
How does the foregoing analysis clarify or apply to the case
where 0 does not exist in fact and where, accordingly, Quine,
Russell, and the logisticians generally assert-not without
plausibility-that the apparent reference of the discourse is
merely apparent or at least thoroughly confused?
It is in the systematic clarification of the privileged sign
status of the intraorganismic factor C that the answer to this
question, and the explanation of the apparent indifference of
discourse to being and non-being, is found. Clearly, in calling
ideas " intentional," and in assigning them the property of intentionality, Brentano and the phenomenologists after him
were getting at the fact that ideas cannot be save as giving the
being of presence in cognition to objects. Brentano, in later
rejecting the doctrine of intentionality as a truly. relational
property on the grounds that the object terminating an intentional relation is often unreal, seems to be getting at the fact
that the notion of a relation without a term is unintelligible.
But what he failed to see, and what Husserl glimpses in his
doctrine of ideas as constituting their objects, and even in his
perverse doctrine of the epoche, is the fact that the term of a
relation, as it is a term, has its being from the relation; and
hence there can be a true relation between idea and object
even when the object has no further being than that of a term.
Consider again the unique status of C, the idea or concept. In
its function as C, it is neither experienced nor experienceable but
has its whole being in provenating-" dimanating," as Poinsot
would say-the relation R terminating in 0. If C were to
exist without engendering this relation R, it would not be as
C that it existed, for as C it is precisely the fundament of R.
C as C gives rise to R by necessity. This is what constitutes
its uniqueness among the furnishings of the world. This is also

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JOHN N. DEELY

what endows discourse with its indifference to the being and
non-being of its objects, for the following reason: the term of
any relation, inasmuch as it is a term, owes its being to the relation it terminates.
To see how this is so, consider the case of a non-cognitive
relation, say, the relation of "larger than." A, for example, is
something larger than B, only so long as both A and B exist.
A's .size as a natural thing provides a basis for its being related
to B, but only on condition that B actually exist. Given' the
existence of B in itself, then B will also have an existence as
term of A's relation to it based on A's size, and vice-versa.
Thus the existence of B relative to A as something smaller than
A is owing to or based upon A's .size, just as the existence of
A relative to B as something larger than B is owing to or based
upon B's size. The point this proves is perfectly general: even
when the term of a given relation is something existing in fact,
it owes its being as term to the relation that it terminates.
A term, insofar as it is a term formally, is the term of something;
for nothing terminates except another. The term of a relation,
therefore, is something of the relation; if the relation is real, its
term is a term purely, that is, it does not have other than to terminate or be opposed to the relation and to be something of the relation itself as of the respecting. In this it differs from the fundament, because it is necessary for the fundament to give existence
to the relation according to inherence, in which existence the relation coincides with an absolute determination of the subject of the
relation. The term, however, does not give existence to the relation, but the opposition of termination. Therefore the formality
of the term is not something absolute. 48
Applying this perfectly general point to the case of C, we
see that the dependence of 0 as object upon C is but a special
case of the dependence of any term as such upon the relation
of which it is the term. The case of CRO differs from the case
of A> B only in this, that where A functions as fundament
contingently upon the existence of B in fact, C functions as a
•• Jean Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus, ed. B. Reiser (Turin:
Vol. I, p. 596a46-b 15.

Marietti, 1930),

REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT

fundament by virtue of what C in itself is, that is, C functions
as a fundament necessarily. Hence A will generate B's status as
term only if B also eiists in fact. But C will generate O's existence as term regardless of whether 0 also exists in fact. This
explains the capacity of discourse to refer to what is not. All
objects of discourse, as such, exist as terms of the relation R
generated by C. Since C cannot be without generating R, and
0 exists qua object as term of R, 0 will exist as an object whenever C exists as a fundament, regardless of whether 0 also exists as a thing in fact. Hence the objects of discourse need not
be independently of discourse in order to be really referred to.
Here we must refine our preliminary solution to the publicy
of objects. If every term of a relation qua term has its being
from the relation, and if every object of discourse exists as
such in the capacity of term, will there not be as many
terms as there are relations founded on C's? And if there are
as many terms as there are C's, is not the common or public
status of the object destroyed after all? Does it not merely
become the extraorganismic correlative of the intraorganismic
C, as private in its own way as the C founding the relation R
that gives 0 its being as term?
The answer to this difficulty involves some unavoidable
subtlety but continues to be a firm No. In every case of an
actual relation the three factors-fundament,
relation, and
term-are existentially inseparable but really distinct. For
example, the A that is larger than B differs from the A that continues to exist when B exists no longer, only by a difference in
mode. It is one and the same A existing in both cases but
once with an added dimension or mode-fundament of the
relation " larger than." Similarly with the term of any relation. Apart from the relation it does not exist as term; yet if,
besides existing as term, it also exists in its own right, those two
existences differ in mode only.
Suppose then two persons, A and B, each having his own
concept-C1 and C2, respectively-of an object 0 which happens to exist in fact. The object 0, existing in relation to C1

290

.JOHN N. DEELY

and C2, differs from the thing 0, existing in fact, only modallyjust as a point qua terminus of a line has a mode of being superordinate to the being of the point as such. HencetheobjectOis
identical with the thing 0 but adds to it the mode of being as
term-something 0 has, not from itself but from c. cl and c2
generate R1 and R2 both terminating at the thing 0 in its mode
as object. But just as 0 as object is also 0 as thing, so also 0
as term of R1 is also 0 as term of R2. All three-0 as thing,
0 as term of R1, 0 as term of Rz-coincide in being, though
they are also modally distinct. Similarly, one and the same
point can terminate two different lines, even though that point,
considered as terminating, exists dependently on each of the
lines it terminates and as modally distinct from each of them.
More concretely, two individuals, each perceiving the same
cloud, give the very cloud floating in the world a new mode
of being as object perceived. Each perceiver has his own intraorganismic factor C founding the relation terminating at the
cloud as perceived. Each, therefore, gives a modally distinct
objectivity to the cloud: yet it is one and the same cloud that
is objectified in the two cases. cl and c2, located in spatially
diverse subjects, terminate in the numerically same space with
a difference only in the mode of the termination.
This unavoidable subtletly, actually, saves the public character of discourse in a manner that is more genuinely satisfying
than the more facile formulation of our preliminary solution
could provide. For the modal distinctness of one and the same
object as cognized by two or more individuals (or by one and
the same individual at two separate times), together with the
modal distinctness between things as such and things become
object, fits very well with our experience of the "slipperiness
of things " and of the great difficulty with which any deep
agreement is reached in human discourse; for it is precisely
through these modal distinctions that differences in experience
slip in between man and man, and through them too that history insinuates itself between man and the physical world.
We have seen now how it is that the objects of discourse

REFERENCE TO THE NON-EXISTENT

291

can also be things of the world, and why they need not be;
and we have also seen how it is that discourse has a public
character, even though it is based on an intraorganismic or
"private" factor C, which I have repeatedly referred to as an
" idea " or " concept."
This choice of terms bears closer scrutiny, for according to a
celebrated theory widely held in current scientific and philosophical circles-the so-called " identity hypothesis "-the intraorganismic factor C is in fact a state of the brain of the organism A which uses X to discourse about 0. What I have
called an" idea" or" concept," according to this view, is more
properly called an event or state of the central nervous system-an identification that must he made because, if the postu-lation of such intraorganismic factors " is going to prove fruitful," as Charles Osgood remarks, " and serve as anything more
than a label for ignorance, properties must be attributed to
them." 49
We can agree with Osgood on the importance of assigning
properties for C, but to ascribe to C the properties of a nervous
event or state is possible only to the extent that the abovedescribed manner in which C functions relative to X and 0 has
been systematically misunderstood. If what I have said is the
function of C in discourse be admitted, then the view that
" mental states are brain states " must be false- A brain state
is something that is observable in principle. Therefore C as
such is not a brain state but must be other than and superordinate to any state of the central nervous system; for, as we
have seen, since an idea (C as C) cannot be save as giving an
existence of presence to something which it itself is not, an idea
as idea is intrinsically unobservable. It can be objectified only
by inference, never by observation. 50 To repeat an earlier re•• Chares E. Osgood, Method and Theory in Experimental Psychology (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 410. Cf. p. 681: "We must postulate
material events for meaning and then investigate the theoretical consequences of
this postulation." (Osgood's emphasis)
•• Cf. Poinsot, OurBUS Philosophicus, III, 185a33-M5.

JOHN N. DEE"LY

mark: " careful attention to the function of C in relation to X
and 0 reveals that, while C can be known to exist by a reflexive
analysis of discourse, it can under no conditions be directly observed or apprehended."
Physical marks, sounds or movements, when functioning in
discourse, undergo-thanks to C-a singular and mysterious
"elevation" (as Cajetan puts it 51 ), during which they exist
in a higher way than is proper to them as observable, physical
occurrences; and they do so inasmuch as they are the objective
effects of the intraorganismic factor C-the concept or ideawithin the speaker and hearer of language, a factor which, as
it functions in discourse, is itself no more directly inspectable
than the significance it causes. This is the point o£ view proper
to a would-be philosophy of language; it is on this point that
an account of meaning can properly turn. Here we may apply
another of Cajetan's remarks:
From this it will appear how crude is the thinking of those who
treat of sense and the sensible, of understanding and the understandable, as also of the processes of sensation and understanding,
according to the canons of judgment applicable to material events.
Et disces elevare ingeniu1n, aliu1nque reru1n ordine1n ingredi--you

must learn to raise up your mind, and enter into quite a different
order of occurences.52
The point is not to deny that brain states are somehow correlative with and indeed necessary conditions for the existence
of ideas. It is simply to point out the error of reductively
identifying C, as that which is conditioned, with a brain state,
as that which doubtless conditions C. 53 Whatever difficulties
one may have with the terminology of ideas and concepts, they
are as nothing compared to the difficulties consequent upon the
failure to grasp this principle: the conditioned as such is always other than its necessary and even sufficient conditions.
51 Cajetan, Commentaria in summam theologicam S. Thomae, I, q. 14, art. 2, nn.
4 and 7; q. 79, art. 2, n. 14.
52 Ibid., I, q. 14, art. 1, n. 7.
63 Cf. Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus, III, 185b26-186b40, esp. 186b3-16.

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

298

IV. A Thomistic; Perspective on Discourse (The Classical Doctrine of Intentionality).
Brentano, in introducing the concept of intentionality into
modern discussion, contented himself with a vague reference to
the origins of the notion among " the scholastics of the Middle
Ages." 54 To judge from the manner in which he formulates
the doctrine, and from the reasons that led him finally to evacuate the doctrine of its relational content, it seems fair to say
that Brentano was rather poorly informed as to what the classical scholastic doctrine of intentionality actually contained. 55
The notion of an intentional mode of existence, or at least
the invention of the terminology, seems to have come from
Averroes, and in particular, from his remarks in commentary
on Aristotle's discussion in the de Anima of the character of
the stimulus engendering the sense impressions that form the
basis of our perceptions of the physical world. 56 In St. Thomas
himself, this notion of an intentional determination of being,
or "species," as distinct from the natural or entitative determinations of being-the "formae naturales "-became the
organizing concept for the account of the genesis o£ concepts, beginning from the " species impressae sensuum externorum "the intentional stimuli of sensation-proceeding
up through
the workings of the internal senses to the culmination finally
in the " species express a intellectus possibilis "-the concept or
intentional form made by the understanding itself as the medium in which the world exists as understood.
It was the privilege of Cajetan to clarify, principally in his
Commentary on Aristotle's de Anima, the exact basis of the
distinction between the formae and the species as two typically
54 Brentano, " The Distinction Between Mental and Physical Phenomena," Zoe.
cit., p. 50.
55 I have given some detailed evidence for this judgment in " The Ontological
Status of Intentionality," The New Scholasticism, XLVI (Spring, 1972), pp. 220233.
56 Averroes, Commentarium
Magnum in Aristotelis de Anima Libras, ed. by
F. S. Crawford (Cambridge, Mass.: The Mediaeval Academy of America, 1953),
II, sec. 60, pp. 219-!i!21.

294

JOHN N. DEELY

diverse ontological realities, the one (the formae) by which
the affected subject is primarily altered or changed, the other
(the species) by which the affected subject is primarily identified with something that it itself is not. 57
However, the nature o£ this intentional union and the mechanism, so to speak, that underlies its possibility, was not systematically clarified until the 17th century, when Jean Poinsot,
called by Yves Simon the last Commentator of genius on the
work of St. Thomas, took up the doctrine of the species in
order to develop a comprehensive theory of the sign and of
cognition. 58
In Poinsot's theory, unlike most other versions o£ the
nature o£ discourse essayed in recent times along Thomistic
lines, the doctrine of the intentional form is not deployed in
an opaque fashion as a fundamental datum not susceptible of
further elucidation. On the contrary, the capacity and function
of the intentional form is shown to be possible as a direct consequence of the peculiar status of relation among all the possible
modes of being. This peculiarity, which Poinsot exhibits as
constituting the prior possibility of signs in general and of human discourse in particular, Poinsot learned from St. Thomas:
Relation is said to be in a way different than any other kind of
being. For in the case of other kinds of being, each one is said
to be in two ways, both as regards its existence, and as regards
the character of its essence. . . . But relation is something according to the existence it has in a subject, while according to its
essential character it has not to be something, but only to be referred to another; whence according to its essential character it
does not posit anything in a subject. . . . Thence also is it that
something is found to be related in which there is only a mind57 Cajetan,
Commentaria in de anima Arif!totdis, ed. by P. I. Coquelle (Rome:
Angelicum, 1939), Vol. II, sees. 264-267, pp. 251-255.
58 Poinsot's
theory of the sign is in the Cursus Philosophicus, Vol. I, Part II,
Qq. XXI-XXIII, pp. 646al4-749b47, but draws also on other parts of the work.
This entire matter is discussed at length in my article, "The Two Approaches to
Language," The Thomist, XXXVIII (October, 1974), pp. 856-907.
Poinsot's treatment of cognition runs throughout in Vol. III of the Cursus
P hilosophicus.

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

295

dependent or mental relation, and the relation is not posited there
according to physical being, as when the knowable is referred to
knowledge.5 9
Following out this clue, Poinsot was able to elucidate the
nature of signs and the function of concepts or ideas in discourse with an unrivalled profundity. From the standpoint of
their role in discourse Poinsot divided the sign into two classes,
which he called formal and instrumental. Formal signs are all
signs that correspond to what we identified above as the intraorganismic factor C, that is, they are the signs whose whole being
is exhausted in the function of signifying or presenting to mind
objects other than themselves. These signs, since they are
never objects directly apprehended (this is precluded by their
mode of being, as we have seen), are known only reflexively
and by inference, 60 from the fact that, if there were no such
signs, the interpretation of words would involve us in an infinite
regress, as would the awareness of any object. 61
Instrumental signs, by contrast, are all signs, including,
therefore (and principally), words and sentences, that are perceived directly as objects, and whose functioning as signs depends on their being objectively perceptible.
The class of formal signs, thus, includes the whole of what
traditional philosophers have variously called ideas, concepts,
images, imaginations, etc. They exist as such only in the cognitive act 62 and only as presenting objects that they themselves are
not-which objects, in turn, often (indeed, normally) , by the
associative processes so familiar to modem psychology, become signs in their own right (instrumental signs) as well as
objects. Since the class of instrumental signs is comprised of
59 I Semt., dist. 20, q. I, art. I. St. Thomas makes this point in numerous other
passages as well-e. g., Quodlib. I, a. 2; Quodlib. IX, a. 4; de Verit., q. I, a. 5 ad
I6; Summa Theol., I, q. 28, aa. I and 2; et alibi. I have cited the text from the
Semtences only for reasons of convenience in the present context.
60 See Poinsot, Oursus Philosophicus, III, 185 a 33-b 10.
61 See John A. Oesterle, "Another
Approach to the Problem of Meaning," The
Thomist, VII (April, 1944), pp. 258-260; and John N. Deely, "The Ontological
Status of Intentionality" (cited in fn. 55 above), pp. 229-230.
62 Poinsot, Cursus Philosophicus, I, 303b29-38; III, 185b26-186al5.

296

JOHN N. DEELY

signs that are apprehensible objects besides, and since objects
as apprehended depend upon formal signs, if there were no
formal signs, there would be no signs of any kind. " The formal
sign," as Poinsot put it, " is a sign simply and absolutely" ; 63
the instrumental sign is a sign only in a certain respect. Or
as Bradley put it, " in the end, there are no signs save ideas." 64
Formal signs were also called by Poiusot (here following
Cajetan, Aquinas, and Averroes) intentional forms, in order
to contrast them with the natural forms or determinations of
things. The point of the contrast lies in the fact that an intentional form functions to generate a relation necessarily, by
virtue of what it is. Natural forms, by contrast, though they
may indeed serve as the basis or fundament generating a relation, do not do so necessarily, but only contingently-contingent, that is, upon there being in fact an entity to which the
mode of being as term can be added. The further point, that
every term qua term owes its being to the relation it terminates-" is something of the relation," as Poinsot says 65 -even
when that term (as is normally the case outside of relations
of cognition) is also something existing in reality outside of the
relation, becomes, as we have seen, the key to interpreting the
apparent indifference of discourse to the real being or non-being
of its objects. Poinsot himself does not make this point an
explicit element in his treatise on the sign; but he does devote
an entire article to it in his earlier treatise on relation, 66 of
which treatise he says the theory of the sign is but an extension and particular application. 67
With the addition of this explicit element to Poinsot's theory,
then, it becomes perfectly clear why the objects of discourse
need not be independently of discourse in order to be truly and
really referred to. Given the nature of relation with its necesPoinsot, Cursus Philosophicus, I, 694 b !'l3-69.
Bradley, The Principles of Logic, Vol. I, p. 5.
65 Cursus Philosophicus, I, 596 b !'l-3.
66 Cursus Philosophicus, I, Part II, Q. XVII, Art. V, "Utrum relatio formaliter
terminetur ad absolutum vel ad relativum."
67 Cursus Philosophicus, I, 64!'l a !'l5-37.
63

64

REFERENCE

TO THE NON-EXISTENT

sary elements of fundament, connection, and term, the indifference of discourse to being and non-being becomes the direct
consequence of the difference between intentional and natural
forms-between, if you like, the " mental " and the " physical."
Both an intentional and a natural form can function as fundament of a relation, but only the intentional form does so by necessity. Hence, any form (any determination of being), insofar
as it is the fundament of a relation, is mediately the cause of the
existence of the term regarded formally as term of the relation
in question. But a natural form gives being to the term of the
relations it generates contingently-contingent,
that is, upon
the real existence of something which, besides existing in relation to another as term, also exists in itself as more than a
mere term; while an intentional form, an idea, gives being to
the term of the relation it generates necessarily-necessarily,
that is, regardless of whether or not there is a real existent
which, besides being a term in relation to the idea, has a being
in fact independently of discourse. When my uncle dies, he
continues to exist as an object of discour:se, for this existence
he has as term of the cognitive relations my ideas engender.
The crucial point to be noted here is that, while every object of discourse as such exists necessarily as term of the relation generated when, as, and while an idea exists, not every
object of discourse need exist only as such, i. e., only as term
of cognition. In other words, it can perfectly well happen, as
common experience suggests does often happen, that the very
object existing in discourse as an object also exists as a thing in
the world independently of discourse here and now. Objects existing only as objects Poinsot, following an ancient tradition,
calls "beings of the mind" (entia rationis). Objects also existing
as things or "in fact," Poinsot calls "real beings" (entia realia).
Real beings and beings of the mind, as objects of discourse, have
in common the existence as terms of cognitive relations. For this
existence as " objective beings," both alike depend upon being
known, " since indeed it is from the actual termination of a relation that it results that a given thing is said to be the term of that

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JOHN N. DEELY

relation." 68 But real beings, in addition to their being knowni. e., in addition to their being as terms of relations founded on
ideas-also have being independently of being known, and in
this consists their reality in point of fact. Beings of the mind,
by contrast, have no being in addition to being known-i.e.,
have no being in addition to their being as terms of relations
founded on ideas-and in this consists their unreality in point
of fact. Beings of the mind are precisely non-beings relative to
the beings of nature-the physical or " real " beings. "A being
is properly said to be of the mind," writes Poinsot, " because it
has no being independent of the understanding, but is said to
exist in the understanding only objectively, and so is opposed
to real being." 69
Being and non-being, thus considered, belong to objects in
point of fact according as they are or are not something more
than pure terms of idea-based relations. The objects of discourse, however, as such, are nothing more than pu1·e terms
of idea-based relations. These relations have the ontological
character of relations both when the objects at which they
terminate are and when those objects are not also things in
the world. But the objects are considered by " common sense"
to be realities only to the extent they are or are believed to be
things in the world besides being objects; to the extent the objects are or are believed to be only objects (cognized terms)
and nothing more, they are considered unrealities. The crucial
point for a philosophy of discourse, however, is that in point of
the existence they receive from ideas, objects, real and unreal,
are on an equal footing and are equally public. Once this is
understood, it is perfectly understandable also why discourse
should really be as it appears to be-endowed with a certain
internal indifference to the being and non-being of its objects,
not, indeed, insofar as they are objects but insofar as they are
things in addition to being objects.
It is this last point-that nothing prevents some objects of
68
69

Ibid., 596 a 86-89.
Ibid., 285a89-48.

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discourse, existing as such as terms of relations founded on
formal signs, from also existing in themselves as things of
nature independently of discourse-that Husser! and the practitioners of his epoche (suspension of belief in the factuality of
any objects) systematically neglect, but that seems to be
allowed for in the development of later trends known as " existential phenomenology."
In any event, this application by Poinsot of the theory of
relation found in St. Thomas to the explanation of the sign does
seem to provide a way out of the impasse reached by the phenomenologists and the analysts over the apparent indifference
of discourse to being and non-being. This indifference is a consequence of the very nature of discourse as relational, for, as
Cajetan put it, since what is essential to relation as such is a
being toward, and not a being mental or physical, " the consequence is that the toward as such is neither physical nor mental by necessity, but either permissively," 70 depending on the
conditions concerning the nature of the fundament (is it a
natural or an intentional form?) and-primarily-of the term
(is it a pure term and nothing more, or is it a thing of nature
besides being a term?) . When the term of a cognitive relation
is a pure term and nothing more-when it is an object only, let
us say, and not also a thing existing in fact as well as and while
it is apprehended-it lacks a positive character possessed in its
own right. But when the cognitive relation is merely cognitive
and nothing more, that is, when the cognitive relation is between an idea in the knower's mind and an object having no
other existence than the being of term given by the relation and
its fundament (the idea); when, thus, the cognitive relation
obtains between a physical reality or being in fact-the
knower-and a physical unreality or non-being in fact-the object as mere term and nothing more-it is still a true and genuine relation possessing the positive or ontological character
of relation in its own right. In the case of relation alone, therefore, as Cajetan puts it, " to be in the mind is not a diminishing
7

° Cajetan, in summam theologicam, I, q. 28, a. 1.

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JOHN N. DEELY

condition, as in the case of all other modes of being that admit
of physical instantiation. For a rose existing only in the mind
is not a genuine rose, any more than the Homer existing in belief is genuinely Homer. But a relation in the mind is a genuine relation." 71
The doubts of Brentano and the analysts concerning the relational character of discourse, and the silence of the phenomenologists when asked to explain how it is possible for discourse to really refer to what does not exist, alike stem, it would
seem, from the failure to articulate the peculiar status of relation as a mode of being-the failure to understand that, as
Poinsot learned from Aquinas, relation alone among the ontological categories retains its positive content whether its existence is physical or merely mental, because
only relation has to be a being and toward a being, and from
the side whence it has a being toward it exists positively, and yet
it does not have thence the character of being real. But the real
being of a relation originates from one place, namely, from the
fundament; the positive character of [the relation as a] being toward from another place, namely, from the term, whence the relation does not have to be a being, but toward being .... That
therefore something could be considered ontologically, or positively,
even if not really in an entitative or physical way, is something
peculiar to relation. 72
Ibid.
Poinsot, Cursus Philosopicus, I, 581 b 1-13. One caveat must be entered before
concluding this discussion of the " classical doctrine." Throughout this and the
preceding Section, I have spoken about objects of discourse being, as such, terms
of idea-based relations. In speaking thus, I have been viewing objects under a
restricted and, to tell the truth, " improper " formality-to wit, solely and wholly
from the standpoint of the here and now cognized. It would be a mistake if the
reader took from this the impression that such a notion of object is a fully adequate
one, in need essentially of no further analysis. Since such further analysis lies outside the scope of the present argument, however, suffice it to note here that the
notion of object adequately considered reduces to that of a " cause " in the order
of extrinsic formal specification, and applies not only to cognition. These points
are expressly made by Poinsot in his theory of signs (which intentional forms are
in the line of), and the interested reader is well advised to have a close look at
Poinsot's adequate and formal consideration of objects in the Cursus Philosophicus,
I, 670all-679b5, esp. 673b50-674a4, 677b5-ll, and 678a7-32, where it is asserted
and explained why the consideration of objects as here and now cognized, i. e., as
71
72

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301

V. Conclusion.
The analytic tradition in philosophy began when Bertrand
Russell turned to mathematical logic as the instrument for
vindicating the standpoint of pluralistic realism that G. E.
Moore had adopted around the turn of the century in order to
escape from the pseudo- Hegelian idealism of Bradley and
Bosanquet then dominating British and American thought. The
standpoint of pluralistic realism, the standpoint that lies at the
base of analysis, lies also at the base of Thomistic philosophy.
But what about Russell's appeal, followed, morever, by that
of the Wittgenstein of the Tractatus and the so-called " logical
analysts" generally, to mathematical logic as the means of
justifying this standpoint?
Russell turned to mathematical logic because he found in the
theory of polyadic functions, developed by mathematicians
since the middle of the 19th century, a pure logic of relations
that could express relational structure without reducing the
relative element to a mere attribute of a subject conceived in
a certain way by the mind. In other words, Russell turned
to mathematical logic because, unlike the traditional logic with
which he was acquainted, mathematical logic allowed for the
reality of relations as something external to the related subjects
and so something existing over and above those subjects and
their respective attributes.
Two things must be said about this appeal from the standpoint of Thomistic philosophy. First, Russell, in the eyes of
St. Thomas, is unequivocally correct in rejecting the idealistic
view that relations are not real, either in the sense that all relations are reducible to inherent attributes of subjects (esse
in), or in the sense that all relations are products of the requirement that certain aspects of subjects, which in themselves
are not relations, nonetheless must be conceived by the mind
through a comparison with elements other than themselves
(relativa secundum dici-things relative according to the terms
terms of idea-based relations, is not the formality most proper to objects as such
simply.

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JOHN N. DEELY

in which the understanding must give expression to them). This
view that the being of relations as relations is something unique
(esse ad), reducible neither to the inherent attributes of a substance (esse in), nor to the activity of the mind (secundum
dici ,78 is fundamental to Thomism and a direct consequence, for
Thomas as for Russell, of the pluralistic character of the world.
Second, there is little room for doubt that the modern logic
allows for a purer and more straightforward expression of relational facts than does any developed technique of traditional
logic and has the added advantage of making explicit, in the
quantification of predicates, the fact that our knowledge of the
world is a highly constructional, historical achievement. These
advantages, however, are not sufficient to support the hopes
Russell entertained for the new logic-hopes that continue to
be vainly sustained in a large part of the analytic community.
For it is simply not true that the whole of logical development prior to modem times was based on a system of thought
committed to denial of the extramental reality of external relations. Nor is it true that the analysis of relational facts admittedly real is impossible to achieve according to protocols
compatible with the general framework of a logic of the Aristotelian type. The relational analysis of the sign essayed by
Poinsot, for example, is embedded completely in one of the
purest and most complete treatments of the pre-modem logical
tradition, a massive volume titled simply the Ars Logica.
No man knows the whole of any tradition, however, and
when a learned man such as Russell is actively engaged in the
creative solution of distinctive problems, he may be excused
for lapses of historical knowledge. A man is justified in not
relying overmuch on the thoughts of men long dead to the
extent that their systematization was not achieved with an
eye to encompassing the novelties and difficulties consequent
•• Not that a relation secundum dici is an activity or result of the mind exactly,
but that the activity of the mind, in expressing the absolute ontological structures
of finite being, must express them as intrinsically dependent on another (circa
oliud: relative in .this sense) in the order of existing and acting. See Poinsot,
and
esp. 67Ib6-9.
Cursus Philosophicus, I,

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303

upon fundamental shifts in the patterns of philosophical interest and cultural belief. Were this not so, reading and
thinking, information and understanding, would be one and the
same-which they are not.
But Russell did seem to confuse the singularly powerful expression of the view of pluralistic realism made possible by the
new logic, with the quite different matter of justifying philosophically the viewpoint so expressed. To silence an opponent
is not to prove him wrong; yet the new logic, as we have seen,
is intrinsically limited to the elimination of alternative claims
in the giving of expression to the existential commitments presumed or preferred by its user. In short, the new logic becomes
applicable only when and to the extent that philosophical debate has already ended, and then only to systematize and
codify, as it were, the conclusions reached-or, more often in
fact, the conclusions preached. As A. J. Ayer neatly comments
in his recent book on the analytic tradition, the " analysis of
existential statements " allowed for by the logistic system
"gives an illuminating and correct account of one way, perhaps
the most common way, in which they are employed," but "it
does not cover their use in philosophical ontology." 74
The dependence of the new logic upon presupposing as
settled what, philosophically considered, is always the point at
issue-our beliefs concerning the structure and content of what
there is-is, therefore, the Achilles' Heel of logical analysis, and
it is there that Wittgenstein, himself once a promoter of Russell's confusion, directed the shaft of his Philosophical Investigations. Ordinary language-common speech, if you likesuccumbs to the power of modern logic only to the extent that
that logic conceals a preconceived idea of the world, a preconception, moreover, that invariably proves to be much poorer
and more restricted than the rich and varied world on which
the evolution and continued survival of even homo logicusinsofar as he is a sub-species of homo sapiens-patently de74 A. J. Ayer, Russell and Moore: The Analytical Heritage (Cambridge, Mass.:
Harvard, 1971), p. 35.

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JOHN N. DEELY

pends. The trouble with the philosophical application of modern logic, Witgenstein warns, is that it cuts the world down
to the size of the mind of the one applying the symbols, and
then insists that the world so trimmed and the world created
by the hand of God are one and the same. Hubris, the ancient
sin of reason, thus proves to be in a special way the temptation
proper to the tradition of logical analysis, for that tradition
owes its allegiance to a system that reduces all opposition to
silence in the assertion of what there is, a system that claims to
perfect and logically remedy the referential confusions and
deficiencies of ordinary language in a way that would be possible only for an omniscient observer.
The rebellion led by Wittgenstein, thus, was certainly correct in redirecting the attention of philosophers to the incompatibility of ordinary language with any one philosophical
theory of reality. For in truth, all the philosophical controversies over how to draw the line between being and non-being,
between reality and unreality, are latent in the common speech
of men. But the further claim that philosophy can do no more
than take note of this diversity, which is the heart of Wittgenstein's claim in the Investigations and of the so-called "ordinary language analysts " after him, is at least as arbitrary and
philosophically stultifying as the most arrogant applications
of logical techniques in the service of views closed by their very
formularly to the type of discussions proper to philosophy.
Far more promising is the work in progress by the descendants of Husserl, with their rich descriptions of the varieties
of experience and their uncovering of typically verified structures within this variety.
Yet, on examination, the theory on which these phenomenological " discoveries " depend for their justification-the Husserlian doctrine of the intentionality of consciousness-proves as
unsatisfying in its own way as the arbitrariness of the analysts
either in their application of logical symbols or in their confinement to common usage. For intentionality, it turns out,
is taken by phenomenologists for the essential fact about con-

REFERENCE

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305

sciousness, without any explanation that justifies the attachment to it o£ this essential importance. Phenomenology as a
method, being itself the result o£ a name given where an explanation is called for, thus proves incapable o£ developing reasons for the facts it uncovers. 75
Thomism, inevitably in a kind of competition with theserival
traditions from a sociological point o£ view, has been at a distinct disadvantage, for it is straightforwardly a philosophy
centered on being, whereas analysis and phenomenology alike
find their center-the center o£ modem interests-in discourse.
For this reason, the sociological opposition between Thomistic
thought and the dominant modem trends has long been taken
by many to be itself but the symptom o£ a deeper and ineradicable opposition in the very perspective o£ philosophy itself.
It is my conviction that this transposition o£ hostility from
the sociological perspective into the perspective of philosophy
proper has been the result o£ a mistaken belie£ that the difference between discourse-centered and being-centered philosophizing admits of no common ground, a belie£ based on the proposition that there is no path starting from the mind-with its
ideas or its words considered as its own-that can lead back
to being as it is independent of the mind.
It was the genius o£ Russell, in effect, to seek in the reality
o£ relation a way through the mind-dependent structures o£
discourse to the mind-independent reality o£ things. It was
the genius o£ St. Thomas, after all these years, to have given
rise to a tradition that has within its resources the wherewithall
to uncover the very path whose existence Russell suspected
75 See my book, The Tradition Via Heidegger (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff,
1971), Chs. IX and X, pp. 134-170, for detailed amplification of this point, which
amounts to a vindication of Heidegger's claim that his philosophical differences with
Husser! stem from " a more faithful adherence to the principle of phenomenology,"
as witnessed by the fact that " the historicity of thought remained completely
foreign to [Husserl's] position" while it became increasingly central to Heidegger's.
(See Heidegger's "Vorwort" to Richardson, Heidegger: Through Phenomenology
to Thought [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963], p. XV.)

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JOHN N. DEELY

but failed to uncover. This discovery within Thomism is not
something to crow over. Only one man-Jean Poinsot-in
the long tradition of Thomistic thought, seems ever to have
suspected, as Russell did, that the path was there. It took all
the work of the analysts to make the possibility of such a path
socially credible, and all the work of the phenomenologists to
make clear the importance of finding it.
For if I have accurately sketched the impasse reached by
the modern philosophies of discourse-the heirs of Locke,
Berkeley, and Hume, and of Descartes, Kant, and Hegel-and
if the way out of the impasse that I have argued for is sound,
then it may be that the opposition between the philosophers
of Ideas and Words, on the one hand, and the philosophers
of Being, on the other hand, is not as irreconcilable as it has
long and generally been taken to be by thinkers on both sides.
For what is now disclosed is a veritable common ground in the
category of relation, a meeting point or nexus wherein, for all
their independent variability, the universe of discourse and the
the universe of being partially coincide. Here indeed, in the
coincidence of objects with things, being and non-being are
reconciled, ontology and historicity become mutually intelligible, the philosophy of being finds its way into the world of
modern concerns:
It is true that the character of a knowable thing and of an object
can be univocal between a real being and a being of the mind; for
the divisions of being in the physical world are one thing, but
those in the order of discourse quite another .... And so the character of the knowable is not the character of being formally, but
presuppositively only is the character of the knowable being and
modelled upon being; for the true is a property of being, and so
is not being formally, but modelled on being and presuppositively
being; but the true is one with the knowable. Whence it can well
be that some being incapable of existence is capable of truth, not
as a subject, but as an object, inasmuch as it does not have in
itself an entitative character, which as subject founds truth and
knowability, but has this, that as object it can be known on the
pattern of real being and so can exist in the understanding as true.
Whence although entitatively considered real being and being of

REFERENCE

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307

the mind are only analogous, yet objectively, since the one is
represented on the pattern of the other, even things which are not
univocal entitatively, can coincide in a univocal character or pattern-as, for example, God and a creature, substance and accident,
come together in the character of a metaphysical knowable, or of
something understandable. Moreover, the character of the sign,
since it consists, not in the character of an object absolutely but
in the ·character of substitution for another which is supposed to
be the object or significate as represented to the mind, does not
pertain to the order of the knowable absolutely, but relatively and
ministerially; and for this function it takes on something of the
entitative order-specifically, as it is a relation and as it assimilates the category of the knowable to the category of the relative. 76
Whether these long neglected insights of Thomism will be
taken up and developed, of course, I cannot say. But it does
seem clear to me that they open the way to a new and heretofore unsuspected dimension of the tradition-the uncovering
of the intelligible structure or ground of historical experience
and of the ground out of which the diversity of cultures and
epochs springs. Along this path, I suspect, lies the understanding of how and why man, the rational animal, is also the
historical animal, the-as Heidegger puts it-Seinsgeschicht-

liches W esen.
For the capacity of human discourse to mistake what is not
for what is, is after all a defect or imperfection essentially only
relative to the standpoint of an omniscient observer. From a
properly human standpoint it is an imperfection only accidentally; essentially, it is a perfection, a perfection whereby a being,
otherwise limited to the immediately given here and now, becomes alive to the prospect of realities both other and more than
what is perceived at any given time. The indifference of discourse
to being and non-being, after all, is not without the remedy of
intuition and judgment. And if it often leads us into error and
habitually shrouds us in a cloud of unknowing, it also enables
us to share in a common and public life superior to the divisions
of the materiaL world. 77 And because we are aware of the ever
76

77

Poinsot, CU1·sus Philosophicus, I,
Cf. Ibid., III, 405 <>

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JOHN N. DEELY

present tendency of discourse to present what is not as though
it were, we can by reflection live with the possibility of discovering truths and realities beyond the immediately given
semblances of being that contour common life. The capacity
for being deceived, after all, turns out to be the price finite
beings must pay for the capacity to create literature, art,
science, and philosophy.
JOHN

St. Mary's CoUege
Notre Dame, Indiana

N. DEELY

PAUL TILLICH'S ARGUMENTS FOR GOD'S REALITY

I

T IS INTERESTING to notice that, although he vehemently denies that the question of God's existence is a
legitimate question, Paul Tillich does have arguments for
God's "reality." Tillich, of course, does not use the term
"reality" here, but there must be some term to denote God's
ontological status in Tillich's system. When Tillich speaks of
something that " exists," he means something which is finite,
is limited by the "categories of finitude" (time, space, substance, etc.) . God, Tillich says, is most assuredly not this.
God, he says, is being-itself.
The purpose of this article is to show that such a ploy does
not succeed for Tillich. Indeed, one can raise the question of
the reality of being-itself. In fact, Tillich himself raises this
question and gives at least two arguments to prove the reality
of his God. The notion of non-being plays a central role for
Tillich here. Hence, in this essay I shall explicate Tillich's notion of non-being as an ontological power/ and examine his
arguments for God's reality. In so doing I hope to show two
things: (1) that Tillich does offer arguments for God's reality;
that those arguments are not sound.
The notion of non-being, says Tillich, has a long history in
philosophy, beginning with Parrnenides and continuing to
Sartre and Heidegger." There have, however, been two basic
ways to try to avoid this notion.
1 Though Tillich mentions non-being in many places, the major sources for his
views on it are as follows: Systematic Theology, I (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1951), pp. 186-189; The Courage to Be (New Haven: Yale University
Press, 1952), pp. 32-63; Love, Power, and Justice (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1954), pp. 35-53.
2 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 33. Here Tillich lists the major philosophical
figures who have made use of the concept of non-being and states briefly the way
he thinks the notion functioned in their thought.

309

310

HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

(1) Some philosophers, says Tillich, try to discard nonbeing as an ontological notion by saying that negativity is only
a quality of negative judgments. 8 Tillich's argument against
this view 4 is that negative judgments themselves presuppose
a being (man) who can transcend the present moment by expectations and then be disappointed when the events which
would fulfill those expectations do not occur. The judgment
made by that being, then, was mistaken. The important thing
to see, though, says Tillich, is that expectation itself would not
be possible unless being were structured in such a way as to
allow man to have expectations and fall into error. For this
to be possible, man himself " must be separated from his being
in a way which enables him to look at it as something strange
and questionable." 5 Further, this separation is itself possible
only because man participates in the ontological ground of
negativity, non-being. Thus, Tillich concludes, negative judgments themselves presuppose non-being.
The second way to attempt to avoid non-being is by
placing it in absolute contrast with being. 6 If non-being is
in no way related to being then non-being is not. This was
Parmenides ' move. The answer to this, says Tillich, is to speak
of non-being as "dialectical," as related to being. 7
Tillich distinguishes betwen two types of non-being by referring to the Greek distinction between meon and ouk on.8
M eon is dialectical non-being. In Platonism mean was " that
which does not yet have being but can become being if it is
united with essences or ideas." 9 It is the meontic "Matter"
from which the demiurgos formed the world in Plato's Timaeus.
Ouk on, on the other hand, is the " nothing which has no relation to being." 10
8

Tillich, Systematic Theolo,gy, I, p. 187. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be,

p. ss.

• Ibid. Cf. also Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 34.
• Ibid.
• Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, p. 254.
• Ibid., pp. 254-255.
• Ibid., p. 188.
• Ibid., p. 187
10

lllid.

PAUL TILLICH'S

ARGUMENTS

FOR GOD's REALITY

311

It is never exactly clear just what Tillich means by " nonbeing " when he uses it in his system. He definitely does want
to speak of it as having ontological status, thus rejecting ouk
on. However, he does not want it to be an independent reality
over against God, thus rejecting meon. He states that the
Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo is to be taken as creation
out of ouk on.11 What Tillich seems to do is to combine some
qualities of both concepts. He retains ouk on insofar as things
are said to be threatened with the total loss of their being.
But he retains meon in that his non-being is related to being.
In fact, it is said to be "within" being.
For Tillich, the notion of non-being is part of a discussion
of being, though such a discussion is of necessity symbolic.
Actually the notion of " power " is the closest Tillich comes
to saying anything literal about being-itself. Although it is
symbolic or metaphorical to speak of being-itself as the " power
of being " (the power by virtue of which things are rather than
are not), this symbol seems to be Tillich's favorite: "Being is
the power of being." 12
However, if being is spoken of as the power of being, something over which the power is proved is presupposed, says
Tillich. 13 The problem is that everything participates in being
(and, thus, in the power of being) . So what is left to resist
it? " What can be that which tries to negate being but is negated by it?" 14 The answer is non-being. As I said, such talk
is symbolic. It touches, says Tillich, " the basic mystery of existence." Hence, any attempt to explain non-being will include
terms which " bear in themselves the scars of non-being." 15
That is, they will be paradoxical.
11Ibid.
12 Tillich, Love, Power, and Justice, p. 37. Cf. also Systematic
Theology, I, p.
189. There Tillich says: "The concept of being as being, of being-itself, points
to the power inherent in everything, the power of resisting non-being. Therefore,
instead of saying God is first of all being-itself, it is possible to say that he is
the power of being in everything. The infinite power of being."
18 Ibid.
"Ibid.
15

Ibid., p. 38.

HOUSTON CRAIGHEAD

The reason non-being is able to resist being is that it is part
of being. "Being' embraces' itself and non-being." 16 As part
of being, non-being is eternally present and cannot be dispelled.
It is, in fact, a necessary part of being. Without it being would
be .static and dead. However, if non-being is within being, how
is it that it does not overcome being? Tillich's answer is that
being "logically precedes non-being." 17 If non-being did overcome being then it would also overcome itself-it would have
nothing to negate and, thus, would not be.18 Thus, being and
non-being require one another and cannot be separated. God is
the power of being constantly overcoming non-being, which
is part of being!
Certainly one can describe being in terms of non-being; one can
justify such a description by pointing to the astonishing prerational
fact that there is something and not nothing. One could say that
"being is the negation of the primordial night of nothingness." But
in so doing one must realize that such an aboriginal nothing would
be neither nothing nor something, that it becomes nothing only
in ·contrast to something, in other words, that the ontological status
of non-being is dependent on being. 19

Now such remarks make for very rough sledding indeed!
However, it would seem that Tillich is .saying something like
this: Non-being is not absolutely nothing at all. It is an
ontological power, the power of negating what-is and of driving
what-is on beyond itself or destroying it. As such, Tillich's
non-being is really not absolute nothingness; it is something.
It has ontological status and, as such, is included within being.
Were it not included within being it would not be at all. As
included within being, non-being•is manifest in all the things
that are, that have being. Hence, the tendency of things to
change and to die. Hence the anxiety of man, which we experience in terms of the categories of being and knowing. 20
Tillich, The Courage to Be., p. 34.
Tillich, Love, Porwer, and Ju,stice, p. 39.
18 Tillich, The Courage to Be., p. 40.
19 Ibid.
20 Tillich, Systematic
Theology, I, pp. 191 ff.
16

17

PAUL TILLICH'S

ARGUMENTS

FOR GOD'S REALITY

818

In other words, Tillich is basically an ontological realist. He
not only maintains the reality of essences as " powers of
being," 21 but, beyond them, the reality of an ontological ground
for the existence of beings and for the transitoriness and
passing-awayness of beings. Not only are there essences as
powers to make things what they are, there is also the Supreme
Power of Being-Itself to provide things (as well as essences)
their thatness. As such, this power includes within itself its
own negation and overcomes it continually, thus giving a
ground even to negation!
This is still not sufficiently clear. However, I think it can
best be made clear if we see it now in light of Tillich's own
arguments for God's reality. In his article "The Two Types
of Philosophy of Religion," 22 Tillich examines the ontological
and the cosmological approaches to God. Here he is not referring to these as arguments, but as approaches. The ontological approach, he says, is Augustinian. It is the way of overcoming estrangement. The cosmological approach is Thomist,
and is the way of meeting a stranger.
On the ontological approach, which Tillich accepts, man is
immediately aware of the unconditioned and its reality cannot
be inferred. 23 Tillich agrees with the Augustinian assertion that
in doubt and the quest for truth, verum ipsum is presupposed.
It is the norm of all approximations to truth. 24 Tillich also
agrees with a point he claims Kant makes in his moral argument for God-that good acts presuppose bonum ipsum. This
is the norm for all approximations to goodness. 25 Further, both
verum ipsum and bonum ipsum are manifestations o£ esse
ipsum, being-itself, " the ground and abyss of everything that
is." 26
21 Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 179. See also a reply by Tillich in Philmophical
Interrogations, eds., Sidney and Beatrice Rome (New York: Holt, Rinehart, and
Winston, 1964), p. 45.
22 Tillich, The Theology of Culture (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1959),
pp. 10-29. Cf. also Systematic Theology, I, pp. 204 ff.
28 Ibid., p. 28.
2 • Ibid., pp. 12-18.
25 Tillich, Systematic
Theology, I, p. 207.
26 Ibid.

314

HOUSTON

CRAIGHEAD

If, as Tillich says, " V eritas is God," 27-or presupposes
God-then God must be real. This is so, Tillich claims, because
truth can be denied only in the name of truth; if there is no
truth, then it is true that there is no truth, but that is itself a
truth. Hence, it is impossible to deny truth-hence it is impossible to deny God. 28
Putting this another way, Tillich says that thought presupposes a unity of subject and object, else thought would have no
content. This fundamental unity or ground of all thought,
Tillich says, is God. In God, being and knowing are identical.
Such a God " is a necessary thought because it is the ground
of all thought." 29
In short, Tillich maintains that man has a fundamental
awareness of the Unconditioned, God, which involves his whole
being. All of man's thought and activity presupposes this fundamental element. " Man is immediately aware of something
unconditional which is the prius of the separation and interraction of subject and object, theoretically as well as practically." 30
Tillich attempts to explicate what he means here by " awareness." He says it is the "most neutral term," it avoids the
connotations of "intuition," "experience," and "knowledge." 81
It is not "intuition" because intuition (in the Kantian
sense) has the character of a Ge8talt. But the Unconditioned
appears as" an element, a power, as demand." 32 It is not" experience" because that connotes" the observed presence of one
reality to another reality.'' 33 The Unconditioned is not an object of observation. It is not " knowledge " because in knowledge the separation of subject and object is presupposed, and
a theoretical act is implied. This is "just the opposite of awareTillich, The Theology of Culture, p. 12.
Ibid., p. 13.
29 Ibid., p. 15.
ao Ibid., p. 22.
81 Ibid., p. 23.
27
28

82
83

Ibid.
Ibid.

PAUL TILLICH'S

ARGUMENTS

FOR GOD's REALITY

31.1)

ness of the Unconditioned." 34 This awareness is immediate, not
inferred. " It is present whenever conscious atention is focused
on it, in terms of an unconditional certainty." 35
This power of being is the prius of everything that has being. It
precedes all special contents logically and ontologically. It precedes every separation and makes every interaction possible, because it is the point of identity without which neither separation
nor interaction can be thought. This refers basically to the separation and interaction of subject and object, in knowing as well as
in acting. The prius of subject and object cannot become an object
to which man as a subject is theoretically and practically related.
God is no object for us as subjects. He is always that which precedes this division.36
In other words, Tillich seems to be saying that, if God is
conceived as being-itself, rather than as a being, then the subjective reality of God entails his objective reality-objective
as ontological ground as opposed to objective as a being or subjective only (i.e., being real only in thought) . If thought and
truth both presuppose this foundamental ground then, as
Tillich says, " God is the presupposition of the question of
God." 37 Hence, since the question of God is clearly real, 38
God too is real.
Tillich's second argument for God's reality as being-itself is
actually more implicit than explicit. Nevertheless, it is working
as a kind of " hidden assurance " behind all of Tillich' s claims
that God does not exist but is the ground of being. The" argument" appears in Tillich's discussion of the question "Why
is there something rather than nothing?" 39
This question, says Tillich, is " meaningless," because no matter what answer is given to it, the same question can be asked
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid.
•• Ibid., p. 25.
•• Ibid., p. 13.
38 See Systematic Theology, I, pp. 204 fl'. Tillich's main point here is that though
none of the traditional arguments are valid in the sense of proving God's existence
they do show that the question of God is inevitable.
•• Tillich, Systematic Theology, I, pp. 163-164.

316

HOUSTON

CRAIGHEAD

again. Hence, one is caught in an infinite regress. 40 The question does serve the function though, of expressing the " metaphysical shock " which one has when he realizes that there is
something but no good reason why there should be-that there
could just as well have been nothing, and that this possibility
or " power " of nothingness is present in all existing being.
Tillich says, "If one asks why there is not nothing, one attributes being even to nothing." 41 In other words, thought can
imagine the negation of everything that is, but one must realize
that, even if there were not anything, then there would be
nothing. This, however, is contradictory, for nothing cannot
" be." If nothing cannot be then some fundamental ground or
power must necessarily exist or, better, be real. Hence, beingitself as ultimate ground of everything is necessarily real!
These two arguments are obviously inter-related and, I think
obviously spurious. To take the second one first, I should think
Tillich would see that if everything ceased to exist that would
not mean that, suddenly, nothing, as a kind of ontological
"thing," had "come into being." The term "non-being" is
merely a linguistic sign which stands for the fact that it is
possible for things to cease to be. We need not say that, if all
things ceased to be, then there would " be " nothing, and so,
nothing would have ontological status, and, so, would not
really be nothing but something-thus requiring being-itself
as even more fundamental. On the contrary, if all things ceased
to be then there would be a return to what Tillich calls the
"primordial night of nothingness." 42 Further, as Tillich says,
such a nothing would not " be " anything at all. It would not
" be " something and it would not " be " nothing, if such language entails that an ontological power (being-itself) would
have to be presuposed even for there to "be" nothing. Such
a state would be gained simply by the absence of all that is.
And, if one replies that then the absence of all things would
•• Ibid., p. 163. Cf. also Philosophical Interrogations, p. 408 .
•, Ibid.
'"Tillich, The Courage to Be, p. 40.

PAUL TILLICH'S

ARGUMENTS

FOR GOD's REALITY

817

have "being," and, thus, presuppose being-itself, I can only
say that he is bewitched by language. To say that there are
no unicorns does not entail that the non-being of unicorns has
some kind of ontological status. It just means that unicorns
as objective realities are not available to any experience whatever.
It is easy to see now, in light of this argument, why Tillich
wishes to make a case for non-being as dialectical, " within"
being. He wishes to do away with non-being as pure nothingness because that kind of non-being does not require being-itself to give it "being."
The reply to Tillich's first argument is two-fold: (1) even
if there is some ontological ground which provides the unity
of subject and object, which is the prius of all thought and
being, this prius is not clearly God. 43 It may well be that any
legitimate concept of God would have to say that he is the
ground of thought and being. But that does not mean that such
a ground is God.
(2) One can easily say that truth is only a quality of the
propositions which correctly describe the world. Clearly Tillich
does not want to say God is a quality of propositions. In light
of his previous remarks concerning negativity as a property of
judgments, it is reasonable to think that Tillich would reply
to this criticism by saying that in order for propositions ever
to correctly describe the world there must first be a " ground "
for this correctness, just as there must be a "ground " for
negativity. But, as was pointed out in connection with negativity, there is no need for such a "ground." One can simply
deny Tillich's ontological realism. He nowhere argues for it
but only asumes it. One certainly cannot establish anything
about God (or anything else, for that matter) by simply assuming a particular brand of metaphysics which leads inevitably to what one desires. Hence, Tillich's arguments fail.
To sum up then: Paul Tillich offers at least two arguments
•• John Smith, Reason and God (New Haven:
169.

Yale University Press, 1961), p.

318

HOUSTON

CRAIGHEAD

to prove the reality of his God. One argument claims that if
anything at all exists, then there must be an ontological ground
by virtue of which whatever exists does so. This is being-itself,
the power of being. The second argument claims that even if
nothing at all exists there would still have to be being-itself to
give the "nothing" its being. I have tried to counter these
arguments by showing that, in the first case, Tillich is simply
appealing to an ontological realism which he only assumes,
and, in the second case, that Tillich is either bewitched by
language or (more likely) has developed a special notion of
"non-being" which presupposes being-itself.
HousToN CRAIGHEAD

Winthrop College
Rock Hill, South Carolina

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY, AND THE
ONTOLOGICAL ARGUMENT

A

S AN EXTRAORDINARILY resilient source of philosophical fascination, Anselm's ontological argument has
generated a plenitude of criticism 1 as well as eloquent
and dogged support from a variety of thinkers culminating in
such contemporary proponents as Hartshorne and Malcolm. In
this article I want to focus upon what is assuredly among the
most influential (and putatively" decisive") of these criticisms,
namely, that real or denotational existence 2 can never be contained in, or be part of,. any concept whatsoever. One has only
to consult the critical literature on the ontological argument
to appreciate the way in which this objection makes its appearance by way of "conclusion." Terence Penelhum, for example, has argued:
1 Cf., for example,
Part II of The Ontological A1·gument, edited by Alvin
Plantinga (New York, 1965). Also, for a very novel sort of criticism, cf. William E.
Mann's excellent article, "The Ontological Presuppositions of the Ontological Argument," Review of Metaphysics (December 197£), pp. 260-277. One of Mann's
rather central contentions is that the argument ought not be interpreted in a
manner congenial to the principles of modern modal logic. While I think he is on
solid ground in that regard insofar as the argument of Proslogion II is concerned,
one must account for the undeniably modal character of Proslogion III. Particulary
in view of Hartshorne's eloquent argumentation in Anselm's Discovery concerning
the validity and significance of the modal argument of Proslogion III, I find it
unfortunate that Mann makes no mention of the latter argument. In this article
my use of the expression "Anselm's ontological argument" or simply "ontological
argument" should be taken to refer essentially to the modal argument, though this
is not necessarily to imply a belief in the logical separability of the modal argument-as argued by Hartshorne and Malcolm-from the argument of Proslogion
II.
2 In "Existence,
Predication, and the Ontological Argument," Mind (1972),
pp. 307-325, Jerome Shaffer maintains that the ontological argument establishes
only the " intensional existence " of God. Shaffer's argument will be discussed
somewhat briefly in the final section of this article.

319

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ROBERT OAKES

From an examination of the concept of deity we could never discover that God exists; we could do this only if His existence were
part of the concept of deity, and indeed Anselm and Descartes talk
as if it were--but it cannot be part of any concept. 8

Likewise, Wallace Matson has assured us:
If . . . denotation can, as a matter of logic, never be contained in
a concept, then nothing-not even God-can have existence
guaranteed it. There is not, then, nor can there be, anything the
existence of which is inconceivable or involves a contradiction. 4

Finally, John Hospers has found that the ontological argument
fails for the very same reason, i. e.,
... if existence is no part of the concept, we cannot use the ontological argument ... 5

I
To begin with a moderate disclaimer, it needs to be made
clear that I shall not be concerned in this essay with an explicit
attempt at positive support for the ontological argument.
Rather, my sole purpose shall consist in the effort to show that
the very influential and widely-held objection embodied in the
quotations delineated above probably constitutes one of the
reddest of the red herrings ever to be directed against that
argument. Hence, I find it rather surprising that-at least insofar as I have been able to determine from the wealth of
8 Terence Penelhum, Religion and Rationality
(New York, 1971), p. 17 (my
emphasis on " part of "). The criticism in question is, I take it, somewhat related
to, and perhaps a versicm of, the classical " existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection.
In any case, Penelhum seems to virtually identify the latter with the " containment " objection. However, I think it would be best for purposes of clarity to
divorce the two objections, particularly in view of the rather opaque nature of the
" existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection. In the event that the "containment "
obi.ection is a version of-or identical to--the " existence-is-not-a-predicate " objection, then, 'insofar as the arguments to follow are cogent, so much the worse for
the latter objection.
• Wallace Matson, The Existence of God (Ithaca, 1965), p. 55 (my emphasis
on "contained in").
• John Hospers, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis (Englewood Cliffs,
1958), p. 825 (my emphasis on "no part of").

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

321

relevant literature-that no explicit attempt has been made to
establish what I hope to show is the logical irrelevance of such
an objection to the success or unsuccess of the ontological argument. On the contrary, proponents of the argument have continually responded to the objection in question in a way which
reveals an acceptance of what that objection presupposes, i.e.,
that the validity of the argument is dependent upon whether
real existence can be part of the concept of God. Consequently,
they have directed their best efforts toward a refutation of
the claim that real existence cannot be contained in the concept
of God. As I hope to show, however, that has been an unfortunate misdirection of effort.
The popularity of that line of defense, however, would
largely to be due to what has come to be the equation of the
claim that no concept can contain real existence with the
standing injunction-having, of course, deep-seated epistemological roots in Hume and Kant-that no affirmative existential
proposition can be logically necessary. Concerning this latter
admonishment, proponents of the ontological argument have
responded (correctly, I believe) that it cannot be established
that no affirmative existential proposition is logically necessary
independently of its being established that the logical modality
of " God exists " is that of contingency rather than necessity.
That is," God exists" must be shown to be logically contingent
rather than begged to he so on the basis of an a priori dogma 6
that necessarily true propositions are always de dicto as opposed to de re. Now while I believe it is clear that to argue
against the ontological argument on the basis that no affirmative existential proposition can be logically necessary does beg
the question of the logical modality of " God exists," I want
to maintain that the claim that real existence cannot be part
of, or contained in, any concept is perfectly compatible with
the suggestion that " God exists " is a logically necessary, i. e.,
analytic, truth. Hence, both the critics and an unfortunately
6 As pointed
out so well by Norman Malcolm in "Anselm's Ontological Argu·
ments," The Philosophical Review (1960), p. 55.

ROBERT OAKES

large number of proponents of the ontological argument have
been seriously mistaken in believing that " God exists " can
be analytic only if real existence is contained in the concept
of God.
Presupposing, then, that the concept of that-than-whichnothing-greater-can-be-conceived is internally consistent (and
there would .seem little reason for believing otherwise when one
considers the notorious unsuccess of " ontological disproofs ") ,
all that the proponent of the ontological argument needs to
insist upon is the analyticity of " God exists " and, as I hope
to show, that is not necessarily to claim that real existence is
contained in the concept of God. Rather, while conceptual
containment is obviously a logically sufficient condition for
analyticity, it seems reasonably clear that such containment
is not a logically necessary condition for the latter. Consequently, what I hope to establish is that whether or not " God
exists" is analytic (and thereby that "God does not exist"
constitutes a contradiction) is logically independent of whethe-r
or not the concept of God " contains" real existence. However,
assuming this to be correct, while the proponent of the ontological argument thereby need not maintain that real existence is
" contained " in the concept of God, I shall conclude this article
by arguing that there seems to be no good reason why he should
not maintain exactly that once the proper status of that-thanwhich-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is clarified.

II
According to the critics who have maintained that the ontological argument fails because real existence cannot be contained in the concept of God, it is clear that " discoveries "
based solely on conceptual analysis are necessarily limited to
what the relevant concept contains. However, this is the case
only if analyticity is reducible to conceptual containment. Further, while Penelhurn is correct in noting that Descartes 7
" talked " as if real existence is "included " in the concept of
• In Part IV of the Discourse on Method as well as the Fifth Meditation.

CONTAINMENT,

ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

deity, I do not find that Anselm talked that way at all. Rather,
as will be discussed, there seems to be adequate reason for interpreting Anselm in such a way that the analyticity of " God
exists " is not to be understood in terms of the containment of
real existence in the concept of God. However, it is somewhat
irrelevant to our central purpose here to suggest that certain
proponents of the argument-notably Descartes-have talked
as though the validity of the argument depended upon the containment of real existence in the concept of God. Rather, the
point to be driven is that they need not have talked that way.
Granted that conceptual containment clearly constitutes a
logically sufficient condition for analyticity, is it not equally
clear that it does not constitute a logically necessary condition
for analyticity? To begin with, while "Lincoln was assassinated or Lincoln was not assassinated" is analytically true,
it is obvious that nothing in that proposition is contained in
anything else. It might, however, reasonably be objected here
that such a proposition exemplifies a formal tautology (Pv-P)
the truth of which is logically independent of the meaning
postulates governing linguistic convention. Let us, then, consider the following implications:
(1) If John is my father, John is a male.
If something is blue, it has spatial location.
(3) If this object is a cup, it is not a speck of radioactive cloud
dust.

Now what I want to maintain right off-in contradistinction
to" rationalists" such as Blanshard and Ewing (their thought
in this regard to be explored below) -is that all of the above
implications-not just (1) -are analytically true, i.e., true
solely by virtue of the meaning of their constitutent expressions
(and can thereby of course be known to be true a priori). If
one knows the intensions of " blue" and " located in space,"
that is suffioient for knowing the truth o£ (2). Similarly, if one
knows the intensions of " cup " and " speck of radioactive cloud
dust," that is sufficient for knowing the truth of (3) . HenGe,
and (3) -as well as (1) -are analytic truths. However,

324

ROBERT OAKES

while (1) clearly constitutes a case of conceptual containment
insofar as the intension of " father " contains the intension of
" male," is there any good reason for believing that being located in space is contained in the intension of " blue," or that
not being a speck of radioactive cloud dust is contained in the
intension of "cup" ? Rather, (2) and (3) constitute paradigms of the sort of meaning-entailment that clearly does not
reduce to meaning-containment. In this regard consider that
" Einstein was a great scientist" entails " If Einstein had white
hair, then .some great scientists had white hair" ; however,
since the former proposition in no way includes the notion of
white hair, it in no way contains the latter proposition. Such
is the case with implications (2) and (3) . Could it seriously
be maintained that the enormous number of items entailed
by calling something a cup (or blue) are thereby all constitutive of what is meant by " cup " (or " blue ") ? Surely not.
Rather, (2) is analytic simply because being blue entails being
located in .space, and (3) is analytic because being a cup entails not being a speck of radioactive cloud dust. As Blanshard
puts it in his strictures against the positivist dogma that all
a priori propositions are assertions of conceptual containment:
Silly as it is to say that part of what I mean by calling anything
red is that is is not green or the south pole, it is only good sense
to say these things are entailed by what I mean.8
However-and unfortunately, I believe-thinkers such as
Blanshard and Ewing, while correct in their recognition that
not all conceptual entailment is reducible to conceptual containment, conclude from this that Kant and company were
correct in their insistence that there are propositions (e. g., if
something is blue, it has spatial location) which must necessarily be construed as synthetic a priori 9 in character. On the
contrary, I would maintain that the proper conclusion to be
drawn in this regard is precisely the opposite. That is, while
8 Brand Blanshard,
Reason and Analysis (La Salle, Illinois; 1972), p. 290.
• Blanshard, ibid., pp. 291-292 fl'. and A. C. Ewing, "Criticisms of the Linguistic
Theory of the A Priori," in Fundamental Questions of Philosophy (London, 1951).

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

it seems clear that there are meaning-entailments which do not
reduce to meaning-containments, why must this lead to the
conclusion that there are synthetic a priori truths? On the
contrary, what I am suggesting is that it is far more reasonable
to conclude that not all analytic truths (other than formal
tautologies such as Pv-P) are analytic truths because of conceptual containment. The reason why it is difficult to deny
that such propositions are analytic-and thereby why it is
more reasonable to conclude that they are analytic rather than
synthetic-is that their truth is guaranteed solely by the
meaning of their constitutent expressions. If one knows the
meanings of " cup " and " speck of radioactive cloud dust,"
that is all that is needed to know that nothing could be both
the former and the latter; and, if one knows the meanings of
"blue" and "located in space," that is all that is needed to
know that nothing could be blue which did not have spatial
location. Such is the case with regard to all propositions which
are true as a consequence of meaning-entailment, and, since
synthetic propositions are defined as those the truth of which
cannot be known strictly on the basis of meaning analysis, it
would seem clear that such propositions cannot correctly be
construed as synthetic.
Hence, assuming that what has been argued thus far is correct, it is of very clear significance for our central concern
insofar as it collapses into irrelevance the long-standing criticism against the ontological argument that, since real existence
can never be contained in the concept of God, " God exists "
cannot possibly be an analytic truth. Rather, all that the
proponent of the ontological argument need maintain in order
to support the claim that "God exists" is an analytic truth
is that God's real existence is entailed by the concept of God.
Since entailment constitutes a sufficient condition for analyticity but not for conceptual containment, the question concerning the analyticity of " God exists " is logically independent
of whether or not real existence is (or can be) contained in the
concept of God. (One might raise an objection here thatstrictly speaking-concepts as such cannot entail anything, but

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ROBERT OAKES

rather that only propositions have entailments, and that it is
thereby a " category mistake " to suggest even the possibility
of God's real existence being entailed by the concept of God.
This, however, is easily responded to insofar as it is clear that
" conceptual entailment " must necessarily be defined in propositional terms, i.e., the claim that the concept of God entails
(without containing) God's real existence is intensionally
equivalent to the claim that it is logically impossible for the
proposition " God exists " to be false and the proposition " God
is that than which nothing greater can be conceived" to be
true) .
As a point of historical as well as polemical interest, however, we might turn to a consideration of the relevant chapters
of Anselm's Prosologion. While we find there considerable
emphasis upon "conceivability" and the view that God's real
existence is entailed or necessitated by the very concept of
that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived,
there is very
little to suggest Anselm's support for any claim that the real
existence of God is contained 10 in that concept. In Chapter
III, Anselm states:
... if that, than which nothing greater can be conceived, can be
conceived not to exist, it is not that, than which nothing greater
can be conceived. But this is an irreconcilable contradiction.
To begin with, it is clear that on the basis of his claim that an
" irreconcilable contradiction " is generated by the denial of
God's existence that "God exists" is, for Anselm, an analytic
truth. However, it seems that Anselm nowhere suggests that
the real existence of God is thereby contained in the concept
of God. Rather, he goes on to state in Chapter IV:
For no one who understands what fire and water are can conceive
fire to be water ... So, then, no one who understands what God
is can conceive that God does not exist although he says these
10 All quotes are from Anselm's Proslogion, translated
by S. N. Deane (Open
Court, 1903). Also, it seems clear that there is nothing in Anslem's "Reply to
Gaunilo " to suggest any hint of support for the notion that real existence is
contained in the concept of God; cf. Plantinga, op. cit., p. 13-27.

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

327

words in his heart, either without any, or with some foreign signification.
Now this analogy drawn by Anselm between fire and water/
God and existence is a most telling one insofar as the point at
issue is concerned. That is, Anselm can consistently and
plausibly be read here as maintaining that the analyticity of
" God exists " is a consequence of the sort of meaning-entailment that does not reduce to meaning-containment. Surely,
there is no implication whatsoever in Anselm's reasoning here
that existence is to be understood as any more included in the
meaning of " God " than not being fire is included in the
meaning of "water," and, while it is clear that not being fire
is entailed by what we mean by " water," it seems equally clear
that there is little basis on which to suggest that it is included
in what is meant by " water." Consequently, "if x is fire, x
is not water " is an analytic truth. To know the meaning of
" fire" and the meaning of " water " is epistemically sufficient
for recognizing the "irreconcilable contradiction" inherent in
the suggestion that something is both fire and water. Hence,
Anselm's analysis appears to lend considerable support to our
thesis that the analyticity of " God exists " is logically irrelevant to whether or not real existence can be contained in the
concept of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.
Consequently, it is now clear that the proponent of the ontological argument can with consistency maintain the following:
a) " God exists " is an analytic truth.
b) The concept of God does not contain God's real existence.
Clearly, the logically central question on which the analyticity
of " God exists " and thereby the possible validity of the ontological argument depends is: Assuming the truth of b) above,
does the concept of God entail God's real existence, i.e., does
the proposition " God is that than which nothing greater can
be conceived " entail the proposition " God exists" ? Since,
as emphasized previously, I am not concerned here with explicit support for the ontological argument, no attempt will be

328

:ROBERT OAKES

made to justify an answer of Yes to that question. Rather, my
essential concern has been one of locating (what seems to me
to be) the fatal deficiency of the widely-held "containment"
objection. Hence, it is hoped that what has been argued up
to now might serve as somewhat of a prolegomenon to future
discussion of the ontological argument. In short, insofar as
entailment provides a strict guarantee of analyticity without
constituting a logically sufficient condition for conceptual containment (though such containment is undoubtedly one important form of entailment), the proponent of the ontological
argument is not (logically) oonstrained to insist that real existence is part of the very concept of that-than-which-nothinggreater-can-be-conceived.

III
Let us, however, change course somewhat abruptly. Assuming that what has been argued thus far is correct, i. e., that
the proponent of the ontological argument need not insist that
God's real existence is included in the concept of God in order
to support the analyticity of " God exists," is there any good
reason why he should not insist upon it? I want to argue here
that there is not, and that much of the confusion in this regard
has resulted largely from the failure of critics to get clear about
the precise ontological status of the concept of that-than-whichnothing-greater-can- be-conceived.
For example, in admonishing proponents of the ontological
argument for their " illegitimate attempt to deduce actual existence from the mere definition of a word ... ," 11 Flew states:
Say, if you like, that by the word God we are to mean " a Perfect
Being;" and then go on ... Manoeuvre how you wish and for
as long as you like with the definition. Still you will not have
taken one single step towards establishing that there actually is
any being such that the word so defined can there correctly be
applied. 12
11

12

Antony Flew, God and Philosophy (London, 1966), p. 79.
Idem. (my emphasis) .

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

329

Also, early in his influential critique of the ontological argument Jerome Shaffer states: "Let the expression, ' God,' mean
an almighty being who exists and is eternal," 13 and then goes
on to show the failure of such a definition to establish anything
further than a recognition that nothing could be God which
did not really exist. It in no way establishes that the concept
of God has application. Hence, the sort of " existence" thereby
established as indigenous to God would be purely intensional,
having no extensional force whatsoever. As neatly put by
Shaffer, then, " ... the statement ' God necessarily exists, but
there is no God,' is not self-contradictory." 14
Now while Shaffer and Flew are undoubtedly correct in
pointing out that real or denotational existence can never be
a logical consequence of conventional connotation or definition,
exactly what does that have to do with the import of "that
than which nothing greater can be conceived " for the proponent of the argument? Surely very little indeed. For, to use
Flew's expression, there is simply no "maneuvering" possible
at all with a real definition, i. e., no sincere proponent of the
argument-regardless of how he might feel about a Platonistic
ontology in general-would dare to suggest that what is meant
by the expression" God" (though not, of course, the expression
itself) is subject to the vagaries of linguistic maneuverability.
Rather, is it not clear that the proponent of the argument must
necessarily regard the "concept" of that-than-which-nothinggreater-can-be-conceived as logically independent of human
convention? 15 Of course we cannot argue God into real existence by virtue of conventional intension, and who would ever
suggest that we could? Now maybe there are no such things
Shaffer, op. cit., p. 307.
"Ibid., p. 319. Cf. Hartshorne's rejoinder to Shaffer 'in Anselm's Discovery (La

13

Salle, lllinois 1965) pp. 267-278. Hartshorne argues rather persuasively that Shaffer
has missed the significant "modal" structure of Anselm's argument.
15 Cf., for example, Anton Pegis, "Four Medieval Ways to God," The Monist
(July 1970), pp. 322-328 for an excellent treatment of Anselm's commitment to
Platonism, which, it seems to me, any proponent of the ontological argumentsimply to the extent that he does support the
share.

830

ROBERT OAKES

as " real essences," not even one of God, but the point to
be driven is that that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived is (and must be) construed as a real essence by the argument's proponents. Hence, while it is no doubt true, it is simply
irrelevant to the ontological argument to point out that real
existence can never be deduced from a "mere definition." Insofar as the proponent of the argument is concerned, while one
might try his best to maneuver with God, one had better not
suggest maneuvering with what is meant by" God."
However, exactly how does all of this bear upon the question
at hand? Assuming-as I believe we clearly must-that " that
than which nothing greater can be conceived " is, for the
Anselmian, expressive of nothing less than a real essence, of
what consequence is this for the question of whether God's real
existence can be contained in the "concept" (i.e., essence)
of God? The answer, it would seem, is simply as follows: While
it is clear that real existence cannot possibly be contained in
any "conventional concept " of God insofar as it would be
absurd to suggest that real existence could ever be incorporated
into a linguistic convention, this has no logical bearing whatsoever upon the question concerning the valdity of the suggestion
that real existence can be (and is) contained in a real essence
of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived.
Consequently, to show that the containment thesis fails, one of the
following must be shown to be the case:
1) No real essence can contain its own instantiation, or
2) That-than-which-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived does not

constitute a real essence.
But exactly how could either of these claims be shown to be
true? Once again, since it is not my purpose here to defend
the validity of the ontological argument, I am not suggesting
that the concept of that than which nothing greater can be conceived is a real essence; nor should I be undersood as even suggesting that if it is a real essence, it would thereby contain real
existence. Rather, the only implication of what has been
argued above is that it will take a lot more work than has

CONTAINMENT, ANALYTICITY,

AND ONTOLOGY

331

normally been supposed to refute the claim that the real existence of God is guaranteed by the very concept of that-thanwhich-nothing-greater-can-be-conceived, since, while it is clear
that real existence could never possibly be contained in a
linguistic or nominal essence, this in no way comes close to refuting the presupposition of the ontological argument that such
existence can be (and is)· contained in a real essence. Finally,
however, we have seen that the proponent of the ontological
argument is free to abandon the containment thesis entirely
insofar as the analyticity of " God exists " would be guaranteed
by the sort of logical entailment which does not reduce to conceptual containment. Hence, all that he needs to maintain is
that the" concept" of that-than-which-nothing-greater-can-beconceived entails God's real existence. Perhaps it does not, but
then that is what the critics must show in order to refute the
ontological argument. 16
RoBERT OAKES

University of Missouri-Rolla
Rolla, Missouri

10 I am grateful for all of the clear thinking provided me by Carol Ann Smith
during the writing of this article.

ARISTOTLE, DE CAELO 279 a 18-85 (or 279 b 8),
A "FRAGMENT " OF THE LOST ARISTOTELIAN ON PHILOSOPHY

I

N DE CAELO 277 a 27- 279 b 8 (Book I, chaps. 8-9)
Aristotle maintains, among other matters, that " the cosmos (heaven) [the physical universe] is one," that "more
than one cosmos is impossible," that " the cosmos is eternal,"
that "nothing corporeal [physical] can exist outside the cosmos," and that " all corporeal things (or everything corporeal
or physical) are ' congregated ' within the cosmos." From all
this it must be inferred, Aristotle continues (ibid., 279 a 11-18),
that " no place or void or time can exist outside the heaven,"
because place or void or time are dependent " on the presence
(or existence) of a physical body." "It is clear, then," Aristotle concludes (ibid.), "that there is neither place nor void
nor time outside the cosmos."
After having stated all this (ibid., 279 a 11-18), one would
surmise that in keeping with what he had said ibid., 277 b 2729, to wit, in accordance with his statement that " we must
show not only that the cosmos is one, but also that more than
one cosmos is simply impossible . . . as well as that . . . the
cosmos is eternal," beginning with 279 a 18 Aristotle would
set out to dicuss the eternity, ungeneratedness, and indestructibility of the cosmos. As a matter of fact, Aristotle touches
on the eternity of the cosmos in 279 b 4 ff. But between 279
a 18 and 279 b 4, we find what seems to be an " insertion "
which, owing to its particular style and specific content, definitely appears to be somewhat out of place.
This "out-of-place insertion" (ibid., 279 a 18-85, or 279 b 8
reads as follows:
Hence, whatever is there [to wit, outside the cosmos or heaven],
is of such a nature as not to occupy any place, nor does time age

ARISTOTLE,

" DE CAELO "

333

it, nor is there any change in any of the things which lie beyond
the outermost motion. These " things " continue through their
entire duration unalterably and without modification, having the
best and most self-sufficient existence. As a matter of fact, the term
" duration " did possess a divine meaning for the ancients, because
the fulfilment, which includes the period of life of any creature
outside of which no natural development can fall, has been called
its duration. On the same principle the fulfilment of the whole
heaven, the fulfilment of which includes all of time as well as infinity, is "duration "-a term based upon the fact that it is
always (aiwv)-that is, duration immortal and divine. From it
derive being and life which other things, some more or less articulately but others feebly, enjoy. So too, in its discussions concering
the divine and addressed to a general public ( €yKvKAw
the view is propounded that whatever is divine, that is, whatever
is primary and supreme is completely unchangeable. This fact
also confirms what we have said. For there is nothing stronger
than it to move it, because this would imply a greater degree of
divinity. It also has no defect and does not lack any of the excellences proper to it. [Its unceasing movement, then, is also reasonable. Because everything ceases to move when it comes to its
proper place. But the body whose path is the circle has one and the
same place for starting-point and goal]."

In brief, De Caelo 279 a 18-22, or the :first part of the "insertion " begins with the assertion that the " beyond " or " outside " (raKeZ) / which is " outside " the outermost sphere of
the heaven, has" no place
nor void nor time." Neither
is it subject to change, but throughout all of eternity remains
unchanged and, hence, enjoys" the best and most self-sufficient
of all existences." At this point we ought to clarify the exact
meaning of the term raKet-" outside" or "beyond "-in the
Aristotelian passage. Alexander of Aphrodisias, according to
the testimony of Simplicius: is of the opinion that this term
refers to the outer sphere of the fixed stars. In the words of
Simplicius, Alexander of Aphrodisias 3 seems to have arrived at
1 The meaning of the term " rcit<eZ " is discussed in some detail by M. Tintersteiner, Aristotele: Della Filosofia (Rome, 1963), pp. 286-287.
2 Simplicius, In Arist. De Caelo Comment., CIAG, vol. VII
(ed. J. L. Heiberg,
Berlin, 1894), 287, 19 fl'.
• Ibid., 291, 22 fl'.

334

ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

this conclusion because of Aristotle, De Caelo 279 b 1-3, where
the Stagirite speaks of the unceasing movement of the heaven
or " npwrov rrwp,a." This being so, Alexander of Aphrodisias concludes, though erroneously, that throughout De Caelo 279 a
18 - 279 b 3 Aristotle speaks of the outer sphere of the fixed
stars and of nothing else.
Simplicius, on the other hand, by relying on several authorities whom he fails to mention by name, insists that by the term
Aristotle refers to some unnamed (nameless), incorporeal and " transcendent entities " which are the original or
prime movers. 4 Arguing his thesis in great detail and with
much vigor, Simplicius maintains, among other matters, that
this
in fact refers to something which is wholly outside,
and completely independent, of the outer sphere of the fixed
stars, because the latter-and this is Simplicius' main argument
against the thesis propounded by Alexander of Aphrodisias 5is subject to change or, to be more exact, is in motion which
implies spatial change. Admittedly, Simplicius is fully aware
of the fact that his particular interpretation of Aristotle, De
Caelo 279 a 18-35, in a certain way seems to be refuted by ibid.,
279 b 1-3.6 This impasse may be resolved in the following
manner: Aristotle, De Caelo 279 a 18-35, constitutes an obvious" insertion." This being so, ibid., 279 b 1-3, is in fact not
related to 279 a 18-35 but actually refers to what had been
said prior to 279 a 18.7 This would also lend some support to
Simplicius' insistence that the term "
" definitely contains
an allusion to something " transcendent" as well as divine 8• Ibid.,
1 ff.
5 See note
supra.
6 Simplicius, op. cit.,
ff.
7 This is the view advanced,
for instance, by H. Cherniss, Aristotle's Criticism
of Plato and the Academy (Baltimore, 1944), p. 588. Cherniss' view was rejected
by F. Solmsen, among others. See F. Solmsen, Aristotle's System of the Physical
World (Ithaca, 1960), p. 308, note
8 See supra, note 4.
In modern times Simplicius' views were accepted, among
others, by W. Jaeger, Aristotdes: Grundlegung einer Geschichte seiner Philosophie
(Berlin, 1955), p. 317 W. Theiler, "Ein vergessenes Aristoteleszeugnis," Journal
of Hellenic Studies, vol. 77 (1957), p.
I. During, Aristoteles: Darstdlung
und Interpretation seines Denkens (Heidelberg, 1966), pp. 360 ff.

ARISTOTLE,

" DE CAELO "

335

to a transcendent and incorporeal reality which constitutes the
most perfect as well as absolutely autonomous form of life
devoid of all change and motion, 9 in brief, to an " unmoved
mover " (or to several " unmoved movers ") . It cannot be
fully determined, however, whether the expression" TaKe'i:" refers to a single (supreme) "being" or to a plurality of such
" beings " ; and whether in the latter case it relates to several
"movers" of the different spheres. 10
Apparently in order to give additional support to his thesis
that there exists a transcendent, incorporeal, unchanging, eternal, and divine reality, in De Caelo
a
ff. Aristotle makes
reference to his eyKvK)ua cptAo(J"oqn}p,am:
As a matter of fact, as has been stated in several passages of the
iyKvKiua
which deal with things divine, the view is
frequently propounded and discussed that the first and supreme
divinity must of necessity be completely unchangeable. This proposition confirms the very essence of what has just been said. In
fact, there does not exist any power greater than this [first and
supreme] divinity to move [the heaven], for this would mean something even more divine. And this [first and supreme] divinity has
no defect nor does it lack in any of the excellences appropriate to
the supreme divinity. 11

E. Bignone, among several scholars, maintains that the expression eyKVKAta cptAO(J"ocpiJp,amrefers to some " introductory
"·we maintain,
• Compare, for instance, Aristotle, Metaphysics
b
therefore, that God is a living being, eternal and most good; and that life and
duration continuous and eternal belong to God. For this is God." See also
ibid., 1073 a 11 fl'.; 1091 b 16 fl'.
10 Some scholars, perhaps due to the influence of Alexander
of Aphrodisias (see
note !2, supra, and the corresponding text), are of the opinion that the early
Aristotle did not advocate the doctrine of an "unmoved mover." For a contrary
view, see, for instance, H. Cherniss, op. cit. supra, note 7, pp. 581 fl'.; M. Untersteiner, op. cit. supra, note 1, p. !29!2.
11 According
to Philo of Alexandria, De Aeternitate Mundi VIII. 39-43 (frag.
!21, Rose"; frag. 19c, Walzer; frag. 19c, Ross; frag. 17, Untersteiner), Cicero,
Lucullus XXVIII. 119, Plasberg (frag. 18, Rose 2 ; frag. !22, Rose"; frag. !20, Walzer;
frag. 20, Ross; frag. 22, Untersteiner), and Lactantius, lnstitutiones Divinae II.
10. !24-all these passages have been identified as fragments of Aristotle's On
Philosophy-the first and supreme divinity must be absolutely unchangeable.

336

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

writings for the study of philosophy," 12 that is, to " writings
addressed to a larger public or audience," 13 or to what is frequently called Aristotle's " exoteric writings." 14 As a matter
of fact, Simplicius already had insisted that the reference to
Aristotle's f.yKvKAta <fnA.oU"o<f>-ryfLamis definitely an illusion to Aristotle's On.Philosophy. 15 This observation has induced a number
of modern scholars to include Aristotle, De Caelo 279 a 18 - 35
(or 279 b 3), among the authentic fragments of the lost Aristotelian On Philosophy. 16 Moreover, Simplicius' lengthy and
detailed report as regards the manner in which Aristotle had
argued the existence of a transcendent, incorporeal, unchanging,
and divine reality in his On Philosophy should make it amply
clear that in De Caelo 279 a 18 ff., and especially in 279 a
33-35, Aristotle in fact summarizes what he had said previously
and in greater detail in the On Philosophy. 11
12 E. Bignone, L'Aristotele
Perduto e la Formazione Filosofica di Epicuro, vol.
I (Florence, 1936), p.
18 Ibid., vol. I, pp. 135ft.
14 Ibid., vol. II, p. 360, note 1. See also I. A. Bonitz, Index A ristotelicus (Berlin,
1870) 105 a
ff. In his De Anima 407 b
Aristotle refers to rois
KO!Pcp
'Y•"'fvop.lvo•s M'Yo•s, an expression which likewise alludes to the " exoteric discus'sions.'' See further P. Moraux, Les Listes Anciennes des Ouvrages d'Aristote
(Lou vain, 1951), pp.
B. Meister, " Die Entstehung der hOheren AllgemeinM. Untersteiner,
bildung in der Antike," Wiener Studien, vol. 69 (1956), p.
op. cit. supra, note 1, pp. 197-198, and ibid., p.
15 Simplicius, op. cit. supra, note
ff. See also frag. 15, Rose 2 ; frag. 16,
Rose•; frag. 16, Walzer; frag 16, Ross; frag.
Untersteiner.
16 W. Jaeger,
op. cit. supra, note 8, pp. 316 ff.; F. Blass, "Aristotelisches,"
Rheinisches Museum fur Philologie, vol. 30 (1875), pp. 481 ff. R. Walzer (in 1934)
and M. Untersteiner (in 1963), in their respective collections of Aristotelian fragments included this passage (frag.
Walzer; frag. 38, Uutersteiner). In recent
times a number of scholars, though by no means all of them, have accepted, at
times with certain modifications, the views held by Walzer and Untersteiner.
17 H. Cherniss, op. cit. supra, note 7, p. 119, note 77, remarks that Simplicius
probably did not have direct access to Aristotle's On Philosophy. The same
Cherniss, however, concedes (ibid., p. 587) that Simplicius might have known of
this passage from the On Philosophy through some intermediary source or sources.
According to P. Wilpert, " Reste verlorener Aristoteles-Schriften bei Alexander
von Aphrodisias," Hermes, vol. 75 (1940), pp. 368 ff., especially p. 387, Simplicius
derived his information about the On Philosophy primarily from Alexander of
Aphrodisias who was acquainted with, and liberally cited from, tlle early but

ARISTOTLE,

" DE CAELO "

837

The unchanging nature of the ultimate divinity or divine
reality, in all likelihood, was argued by Aristotle in the On
Philosophy along the following general lines: A change in the
ultimate divine reality might be caused (I) by something else,
or (II) by this divine reality itself. If the divine is changed
by something else, this " something else," which causes a change
in the divine, must (A) either be mightier than the divine, or
(B) must be better than the divine. Conversely, (II) if the
divine is changed by itself, then it must do so (A) either "in
the direction" of something better, or (B) "in the direction''
of something more beautiful or more desirable. 18 The possibility cited under IA is rejected with the remark that there
cannot possibly exist anything that might be better than the
now lost writings of Aristotle. See also the detailed comments on this issue in M.
Untersteiner, op. cit. supra, note I, pp. 198-200, and ibid., pp. 218 ff.; p. 285 ff.;
B. Effe, Studien zur Kosmologie und Theologie der aristotelischen Schrift " Uber
die Philosophie;' Zetemata, Heft 50 (Munich, 1970), p. 105.
18 It will be noted that Philo of Alexandria, De Aeternitate
Mundi VIII. 39-4!!,
which is considered a fragment of the Aristotelian On Philosophy (frag. 21, Rose";
frag. 19c, Walzer; frag. 19c, Ross; frag. 17, Untersteiner), argues this issue in
almost the same manner:
They asked, why should God destroy the universe? Either in order to save Himself from the trouble of continuing in His creationist activities, or in order to
make another universe. The former of these two purposes is alien to God. For
what befits Him is to turn disorder into order, not order into disorder. Moreover,
He would thereby be admitting to Himself repentance, which is an effection or
disease of the soul. For He should either not have created a universe at all, or
else, if He judged the work becoming to Him, He should have rejoiced in the
product. The second alternative deserves full examination. For if in the plare
of the present universe He is to make another universe, this new universe He
makes will be in any case either worse or better than the present universe, or
just like the present universe. Each of these three possibilities is open to objection.
(I) If it is worse, its artificer will be worse. But the works of God are faultless,
exempt from criticism, above criticism, incapable of improvement, fashioned, as
they are, by the most perfect art and knowlegde. For, as the popular saying goes,
"not even a woman is so lacking in good judgment as to prefer the worse when
the better is available." And it is proper for God to give form to the formless,
and to deck the ugliest things with marvellous beauties. (II) If the new universe
is like the old one, its artificer will have labored in vain, differing in no ways from
mere children, who often, when they make sand-castles on the shore, build them
up and then pull them down. It would be far better, instead of making a new
universe just like the old one, neither to take away nor to add anything, nor
to change anything for better or for worse, but to leave the old universe in its
place. (III) If He is to make a better universe, the artificer himself must become
better, so that when he made the former universe he must have been more imperfect
both in art and in wisdom-which even to suspect is not permissible. For God
is always equal and like to Himself, admitting neither slackening towards the
worse nor intensification towards the better.

338

ANTON- HERMANN

CHROUST

divine, unless it would also be "more divine "-a statement
which can also be found in De Caelo 279 a 33-34. The mere
thought that the better may be affected or " conquered " by
the worse is simply unlawful and, hence, not permissible, as
it is not permissible to surmise that God might ever consider
the creation of a better universe. For in the first case the better
would have to accept something worse (or some deficiency) -a
thought wholly repugnant to the notion of a perfect God who,
in the words of De Caelo 279 a 35, cannot possibly have a defect. The possibility mentioned under IIA-B, namely, that the
divine might change itself " in the direction " of something
better or " in the direction " of something more beautful or
more divine or more desirable is rejected on the grounds that
the divine is without defect and, hence, cannot possibly aspire
to something better or more desirable-a thought which is also
alluded to in De Caelo 279 a 34-35. And finally, the very thought
that God or the divine may change into something worse-a
thought which also implies that God or the divine or the perfect or the absolute good is capable of acquiring something imperfect or deficient-is rejected (by Simplicius) with the remark that even imperfect man " does not willingly make
himself worse," an argument to which De Caelo 279 a 34-35
also seems to allude. 19
In order better to understand the preceding paragraph, it
might be helpful not only to study Philo of Alexandria, De
Aeternitate Mundi VIII. 39-43, cited in note 18, supra, but also
to read Simplicius, op. oit. supra, note 2, 289, 1-15/ 0 who makes
the following observations:
Aristotle speaks of this [scil., of some of the problems discussed
in the preceding paragraph] in a work entitled On Philosophy. In
general, where there is a better, there is a best. Since, then, among
existing things one is better than another, there is also something
19

See also P. Wilpert, "Die aristotelische

Schrift

'Uber

die Philosophie',"

Autour d'Aristote (Louvain, 1955), pp. 110 ff.
2 ° Frag. 15, Rose•; frag. 16, Rose 8 ; frag. 16, Walzer; frag. 16, Ross; frag. 25,
Untersteiner. See also the interesting comments on this fragment by M. Tintersteiner, op. cit. supra, note I, pp. 197-205.

ARISTOTLE,

" DE CAELO "

339

that is best, which is the divine. Now that which changes is
changed by something else or by itself. And if it is changed by
something else, it is so either to something worse or through the
desire for something better. But the divine has nothing better than
itself by which it might be changed (for that " other" would then
have been more divine), nor on the other hand is it lawful for the better to be affected by the worse. Moreover, if the better were to be
changed by something worse, it would have admitted into itself
some evil. But nothing in the divine is deficient. On the other
hand, the divine does not change itself through a desire for something better, because it lacks none of its own excellencies. Nor
again does it change itself for the worse, since even a man does
not willingly make himself worse. Nor has it anything evil such
as it would have acquired from a change to the worse.21
A comparison of Philo of Alexandria, De Aetern.itate Mundi
VIII. 39-43, Simplicius, In Arist. De Caelo Comment.
115-both of which have been called fragments of Aristotle's
On Philosophy by numerous scholars-and Aristotle, De Caelo
a 18-35 (or
b 3), should make it abundantly clear that
De Caelo
a 18 ff. in a most compressed form restates what
the Stagirite had discussed in greater detail (and in a more
systematic manner) in his On Philosophy. In this sense Aristotle, De Caelo
a 18-35 (or
b 3), too, may be called a
fragment of the On Philosophy. something which, although in
vastly different ways, has been asserted by R. Walzer (frag.
and M. Untersteiner, as well as suspected by other scholars.
In the light of what has been said in this essay it is certainly
reasonable and justifiable to consider Aristotle, De Caelo
a 18-35 (or
b 3) , a significant fragment of Aristotle's On
Philosophy. Obviously, we will have to rely on, and make judicious use of, Philo of Alexandria, De Aeternitate Mundi VIII.
39-43, and Simplicius, In Arist. De Caelo Comment.
1-15,
in order to reconstruct and fully understand the overly com21 Simplicius concludes his remarks by pointing out that "this last proof, too,
Aristotle took over from the second book of Plato's Republic," that is, Plato, Republic SSOD- 381E. B. Efl'e, op. cit. supra, note 17, p. 107, note 150, insists that
Aristotle cited Plato, Republic 380D fl'., that is, Plato's doctrine of the unchangeability of God, in order to disprove Plato's doctrine of the creation of the universe
advanced in the Platonic Timaeus.

840

ANTON-HERMANN

CHROUST

pressed report found in De Caelo
a 18 ff., a "compression"
or" abridgement" which makes this passage from the De Caelo
almost incomprehensible as regards its ultimate meaning.
There remains a final, though relatively unimportant, question: since the Aristotelian On Philosophy consisted of three
books, to which of these three books did this fragment originally belong? There are, in brief, two possibilities, namely, either
to Book I or Book III. In Book I, it is commonly held, Aristotle,
among other matters, discussed the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the universe, thus rejecting the creationist thesis
advanced in Plato's Timaeus. This being so, it is quite possible
that in Book I the Stagirite also touched upon issues outlined
in this article, thereby adding some further arguments to his
thesis about the uncreatedness and indestructibility of the universe. In Book III, on the other hand, the Stagirite expounded
his " theological " views, that is, questions such as, for instance,
the existence, perfection, eternity, activity, and knowability of
God. In the light of his particular understanding of Aristotle's
On Philosophy, the present auther is inclined to assign this
fragment, to wit, De Caelo
a 18-35 (or
b 3), to Book
III rather than to Book I.
ANTON -HERMANN CHROUST

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

THE ARISTOTELIAN CONCEPTION OF EPISTEME

T

HE AIM OF THIS communication is to provide a
succinct account of the Aristotelian conception of
(This term shall be rendered by variations
on " science," " scientific knowledge," or " scientific understanding.") Aristotle articulates its inner structuration primarily in the Posterior Analytics. Hence the exposition will
concentrate on this treatise.
The antecedent task of interpretation is to locate the concept in its milieu and in the corpus as a whole. Against Sophistic skepticism of it, Plato urges the essential possibility of an
organized field of knowledge that justifies, according to principles, every new apprehension. To an arbitrary conglomeration
of impressions he contrasts a realm of consistent and founded
cognitions. Such a realm comprises one or another domain of
meaning, i. e., it is relatively universal; and it counters a naive
miscellany of data, i.e., it is necessary. Plato raises the question of its inner logic, but Aristotle presents the first extensive
articulation of that structure. In him, the term
becomes technical and especially names this realm of consistent
and founded cognitions. 1 Among the sciences that make up
his corpus is that " science which inquires into demonstration
1 The original sense of the term e7run1u.<7J is knowledge with a practical orientation, know-how (e. g., Homer, Il. 5, 60; 14, 92; 15, 282; also Thucydides, I 49,
3; I 121, 4; II 87, 4; VII 63, 3) . This earlier sense still resounds in some passages
of Plato (e. g., Ion 536 C; Gor. 511 C). But it gradually comes to mean assurance
about something, and then understanding in general. Eventually, Plato uses the
term to name the special knowledge of the philosopher (e. g., Rep. V 477 B).
From this sense the technical Aristotelian meaning develops. It is cognition
delimited by two oppositions: first, e7rLCTrf}p,7J opposes the grasp (atcriJ'l)CTLS) of an
individual as only individual, i.e., it is universal (e. g., An. Post. I 31); and
second, it opposes the grasp
of a phenomenon insofar as the latter could
be otherwise, i.e., it is necessary (e. g., An. Post. I 33). Located at first through
oppositions, emcrrfJp,'lJ is to be defined in detail.

841

342

DANIEL GUERRIERE

and science." 2 His systematic explorations in the science of
science are collected into the Organon. Since all science, as
discourse, is composed of terms and propositions, an inquiry
into science must clarify these; and Aristotle does so in the
Categories and On Interpretation. Next, the interrelation of
propositions constitutes the specific field of universal and necessary knowledge; and the Prior Analytics studies this formal interrelation-mainly syllogism. But knowledge in general and
hence scientific knowledge may founder, and the Sophistical
Refutations especially studies this; while the Topics,. originally
a part of the same treatise as the former, especially studies the
process of delimiting a realm of meaning before it is scientized.
Finally, the Posterior Analytics contains the full theory of
knowing in a scientific way.
What is the inner logic of a universal and necessary knowledge, of a realm of consistent and founded cognitions? To let
Aristotle answer this question is the burden of the following
exposition.
"We consider that we have scientific knowledge of anything," Aristotle begins in the Posterior Analytics, "(as contrasted with the accidental knowledge of the Sophists) when
we believe that we know (i) that the ground [alrtav] from
which the fact [1rpii:yfLa] results is indeed responsible [al7ia] for
that fact, and (ii) that the fact cannot be otherwise." 3 This
kind of knowledge comprises syllogism 4 and is obtained only
if the premises are "true, primary, immediate, better known
than, prior to, and responsible [al7twv] for the conclusion." 5
Evidently, in order to construct scientific knowledge, one must
(aside from logical rules) already know (1) the premises (7a
1Tpw-ra) or first principles (al apxai), and (2) the fact-to-be-proved
(70 SetK'VVfLEVOV, 70 on) .6 On the one hand, the first principles
• Met. K 1, 1059 b 18.
"An. Post.
71 b
cf. II 11, 94 a
E. N. VI 3, 1139 b 18-33. All Bekker
numbers unless otherwise specified refer to the Posterior Analytics.
71 b 16-19; E. N. VI 3, 1139 b 31.
•I
"I
71 b
6 For ra 1rpwra, I
a 6 and passim. For a! apxal, I
a 7 and passim,
For ro O«KvvfJ-evov, I
71 b
And for ro 5n, I 1-2 passim.

THE ARISTOTELIAN

CONCEPT

OF " EPISTEME "

343

state the existence and the definition of the phenomena that
concern the science.• On the other hand, the fact, though not
known as entailed by the premises, is nevertheless known
antecedently: " Before the process of relation is completed or
the conclusion drawn, we should presumably say that in one
sense the fact is understood scientifically, and in another sense
it is not." 8 Thus the process of science is to systematize what
is already known-the apxat and the on-so that " the observed fact follows from these premises as a conclusion." 9 The
syllogism which explicitates the relation of known principles to
known fact constitutes precisely scientific knowledge. 10
The fact-to-be-proved, already in a way known, can be a fact,
however, only within a definite context or framework: there
are no isolated, horizonless facts. In Aristotle the framework
is the " about which " (1rep'i o) of the science, in other words,
the genus (yivo<>) ·11 That is the issue now to be exhibited.
"A single science is one whose domain is a single genus." 12
" Hence it is not possible to prove a fact by passing from one
genus to another." 13 Indeed, the fact-to-be-proved is precisely
an internal possibility (vmipxov) of a specific genus, and it is
reached somewhere along a (logical) series of internal possibilities (middles or reasons[aiTta]). 14 Now the subject-genus
(To yivo<; To V1ToKEtfLEVov)15 forms a universal (To Ka86A.ov) .IR
But " it is clear that the fact is not scientized in any unqualified
fashion but is rather scientized as pertaining to a universal." 17
7 I 2, 72 a 19-23; I 10, 76 b 3-7, 35-38. An. Pr. I 30, 46 a 17-22.
E. N. VI 3,
1139 b 26-30, and VI 6.
8 I 1, 71 a 24-26 cf. b 6-8.
• John Herman Randall, Jr., Aristotle (New York: Columbia University Press,
1960)' p. 40.
1 ° For this whole paragraph,
see in general I 2, 4, 6, 10, and II 3.
11 For the identification
of ro
ll and ro "'ivas, cf. I 7, 75 b 7; I 10, 76
b 12-23; and I 11, 77 a 25.
12 I 28, 87 a 37.
18 I 7, 75 a 38.
14 I 6, 75 a 28-37; I 7, 75 a 37-b 2; I 10, 76 a 81-34; II 14, 98 a 1-13.
15 I 7, 75 b 1.
16 II 19, 100 a 15-b 3. Cf. I 18; I 24, 85 h 24-28; I1 13, 76 b 2-6, 15-25; IT
14; IT 16, 98 b 32-33; Top. I 5, 102 a 32-b 5.
17 I 1, 71 a 28-29; cf. 16-23.

844

DANIEL GUERRI:ERE

Thus any fact is to be known scientifically only as subsumed
under a universal. " Objects so far as they are an indeterminate
manifold are not understandable scientifically, so far as they
are determinate, understandable: they are therefore knowable
scientifically insofar as they are universal rather than insofar
as they are particular." 18 It is manifest that" by or in a universal we see the particulars." 19 One would never recognize
which facts belong to a specific science did he not already know
them "in" that (framework) which underlies a science (i.e.,
TO v1roKe£p,evov), the genus. If the facts are knowable scienfically, or intelligible, insofar as universal, then the universal will
be the intelligibility of the facts, " the one beside the many
which is the single identity within them all." 20
If science presupposes knowledge of the fact-to-be-proved,
and this comes to pass only within a universal (genus), then
science assumes knowledge of that genus. And Aristotle is explicit. The first step in science is " to posit the genus which is
common to all the particulars." 21 Now the genus and that
which belongs (v7r(£pxet) to it 22 are precisely the first principles
(apxa£) that science assumes and that constitute the premises
from which the fact (-to-be-proved), i.e., another peculiar possibility, will be concluded: " First principles are of two kinds:
the premises by means of which demonstration proceeds [sc.,
the logical rules], and the genus with which the demonstration
is concerned. The former are common, while the latter are
peculiar." 28 As first principles, the genus and what immediately belongs to it comprise nothing other than the subject of
the science.24 A science begins by delimiting them. " The
definition of immediate terms consists in an indemonstrable asI 14, 86 a 5-7.
An. Pr. II
67 a
(rii p,ev ovv tca.86Xov 8ewpovp.ev rO. ev p,epe• ••• ) ; cf.
b 1-8. Cf. also An. Post. I 1, 71 a 17-19,
II 19, 100 a 16-b
•• II 19, 100 a 6-7. Cf. I 11, 77 a 5-9; II 8, 98 a
21 II 14, 98 a 8.
•• II 14, 98 a 8-5.
•• I
88 b
Cf. I 10, 76 b 10; I
88 a 86-b 8.
85-88.
•• I 10, 76 a 81-87, b 8-7, and esp. b
18
10

THE ARISTOTELIAN

CONCEPT

OF " EPISTEME "

345

sumption of the essence [Tt €a-rtv] . Thus in one sense definition is an indemonstrable account of the essence." 25 This type
of definition " is a first principle of demonstration." 26 " In all
demonstration a definition of the essence is required as first
principle." 27 The inner possibilities or attributes (ra 1nn£pxovra)
of a genus are explicitated into definitory premises by means
of division, generalization, 28 and especially dialectic. 29 From
these premises another definition is eventually concluded, sc.,
of what belongs
to the genus, or the fact-to-beproved.30
Science, then, will be the systematization of prior knowledge:
on the one hand, of the principles (ai apxat), the premises (ra
1rpwra), the "about which" (ro 'li"Ept o) the genus (ro "fEVoc;),
the subject (ro V'li"OKEtfJ-EVov), the universals (ra Ka06J...ov), the
one (o ev), or the internal possibilities (ra v7rapxovra); and
on the other hand, of the fact (ro 1rpuy11-a), the "that" (ro
on), the "self-display"
(ro i)HKVVfJ-EVOV), the "in-turn" Or
"successive shares" or particulars (ra Kara 11-f.poc;),or the many
(ra 7roAA.r£, ro a1rav). This twofold prior knowledge Aristotle
already intimated at the opening of the Posterior Analytics:
"All teaching and all learning that involves thought proceeds
from pre-existent knowledge [yvwa-ewc;]." 31 Even though twofold at the beginning of scientific construction, this knowledge
is at its origin the simple act of knowing (yvwpt,ew)
the universal, since it is only " by or in the universal that we
observe the particular." 32 Thus it may be said: "Science depends upon knowledge of the universal" (Tj
r0
II 10, 94 a 9-11. Cf. II 9, 93 b fl1-fl4.
I 8, 75 b 3fl.
27 De An. I 1, 40fl b fl5-fl6.
28 II 8, 13, 14.
29 An. Pr. I fl7, 30. Top. I 2, 101 a 37-b 4; I 12-17 VII 4-5, Vill.
80 I 30, 75 b 31-33 II 10, 94 a 13-24.
For the main
of the whole
scientific process, see I 2-4, 6, 8, esp. 9; II 1-3, 10, 13, 19; An. Pr. I 27, 43 b 1-38;
I 30; Top. I 14; and E. N. VI 3,6.
81 I 1, 71 a 1-fl. Cf. E. N. VI 3, 1139 b fl6.
82 An. Pr. II fl1, 67 a fl7.
25

26

346

DANIEL GUERRIERE

Ka06A.ov yvwpt,ELV E(rrtv) .33 What more does Aristotle disclose
about this knowledge
Knowledge
of the universal Aristotle calls
usually rendered " intuition " or " abstraction." 84 It is the immediate grasp of the intelligibility of the fact or phenomenon;
it is the grasp of the framework in which a fact may arise; it is
prior knowledge (but not in time) of the intelligible structure of
the factual object. As such, it may well be called the " precomprehension." Let us render
as precomprehension.
Now the intelligible structure of an object is its "objectivity." Hence science begins with a precomprehension of this
or that objectivity (universal) and step by step explicates it
until the internal possibility of the phenomenon comes to light.
It :first formulates what-is-precomprehended as a definition, and
then proceeds. These objectivities (intelligible structures,
genera) of the facts-to-be-proved are, especially by dialectic,
explicitated into the definitions that form the first principles or
premises of science. "Now precomprehension
is the
foundation [for knowledge] of the universal as well [as the particular], while syllogism proceeds from universals. Consequently, there are :first principles from which syllogism proceeds and
which are not reached by syllogism. They are, therefore, precomprehended." 85 " Clearly it must be by precomprehension
that we accomplish knowledge of the primary preinises." 36
Thereby it is the condition for knowledge of particulars: "For
in no case do we find that we have previous knowledge of particular facts, but we do :find that by or in the process-ofprecomprehension [rii E1Taywyfi] we at once [ap.a] secure knowledge of particulars just as if we were remembering them." 37 Of
course, this process-of-precomprehension differs essentially from
logical induction (also called
; the latter comes to pass
through numerous instances, while precomprehension (as imI 31, 87 b 38.
II 19.
35 E. N. VI 3, 1139 b !'l8-31.
••n 19, 100 b 3; cf. esp. b 5-17.
31 An. Pr. II !'l1, 67 a !'l!'l-!'l5.
33

3'

THE ARISTOTELIAN

CONCEPT

OF " EPISTEME "

347

mediate) need not: "As soon as one of numerous indiscriminables has made a stand, the earlier universal is present in the
soul (for even though it is the particular that is perceived, perception is within the universal) ." 38 The soul is so constituted
that it "comes unto the origin or essence" of particulars (E1Tt
.ryx.eev) •39 Finally, the comprehension
of that
which is (7t EcTTi) in the sense of the essence (7o 7t .ryv eivat) is
always true; this comprehension is not the assertion of something, of the belonging of P to S (7t Kan£
.40 The comprehension of the essence, or intelligible structure, or objectivity, of a phenomenon is non-mediate; it is prior to any
mediation through syllogism or even through proposition.
This precomphehension (
is the operation of
Thus may Aristotle say: " It remains that
accounts for
the origins or first principles " of science (A.ei7e7at vovv eivaL
7WV apxwv) .41 Clearly, then,
will be the origin for scien'' EL'YJ
'' '
'
' ') .42 N
" f oun d s "
t 1.fic kn owled ge " (
av
apx'YJ
science (syllogism) inasmuch as
knows the premises (the
universals:, the genus, the " about which," the essence, the intelligible structure, the objectivity) . And the universals, in tum,
"found" the many particular facts. Hence Aristotle concludes
the Posterior Analytics: "And
will be the origin of the
origin [i. e., of universals], while the whole of this has the same
relation [of foundation] to the whole of fact " (
i} p,ev
EL'Y} av, i} 8€ 1TUU"U

EXEL

70 1TUV 1Tpuyp,a) .43

The procedure of the sciences may be summarized. Beforehand, they" circumscribe some particular way-to-be [ ov] or genus as an object of special concern," 44 i. e., they focus on a parII 19, 100 a 15-17. Cf. esp. Rhet. II 23, 1398 a 32-b 18. See Sir David Ross,
Barnes and Noble, 1964 5 ), pp. 38-41.
89 II 19, 100 a 10-14.
•• De An. III 6, 430 b 27-28.
41 E. N. VI 6, 1141 a 8-9. Cf. An. Post. I 3, 72 b 24-25; I 33, 88 b 35-89 a I;
II 19, 100 b 12-13.
•• II 19, 100 b 15.
•• II 19, 100 b 15-17. This sentence is persistently mistranslated, due to a
miscomprehension of the phUosophical sense,
•• Met. E I, 1()25 b S-9.
88

Aristotle (New York:

348

DANIEL GUERRIERE

ticular realm of meaning; and then they work out definitions of
the genus or realm and its internal possibilities or attributes to
serve as premises. This is the discipline of dialectic, generalization, and division. Then science proper begins. It orders the
premises into syllogisms and draws the conclusions, that is to
say, constructs other definitions of what belongs to the genus
(an internal possibility). This process continues through middles or possibilities until the fact-to-be-proved is reached and
so defined; and to do this is to state what is necessarily responsible for it. Thus it is that syllogism answers the two questions
that motivate inquiry, namely, the fact {-rooT£) and the reason
(TO SL6T£) •45
DANIEL GuERRIERE

California State University
Long Beach, California

•• ll 1, 89 b !M; ll
8, and in 8 esp. 93 a 45. Cf. Hugh Tredennick's Introduction in his Loeb Classical Library edition of the Posteriorr Analytics (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1960), pp.
and Ross, op. cit., pp.

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

Introduction

S

T. THOMAS'S FIRST Way admits of fruitful study
from many perspectives on its differently distinguishable stages. But it is only finitely divisible, even in
intellectu, at least to any good purpose. However cheering
one may find the light of reinterpretative reason, some
perspectives and some such stages may remain most crucial of
all for evaluating the lasting importance of the argument. Saint
Thomas himself at Summa contra Gentiles I, 13, assures us
that the crucial stages of his argument in the Summa Theologiae are two in number. These are, (I) the stage of showing
whether every" change" 1 (kinesis, motus), in our experience
of natural bodies is caused by something other than that which
is " changed " ; (II) the stage of arguing that one cannot allow
the chain of concurrent causes of " changes " to go on to infinity or else one can give no real explanation of any " change "
at all.
It does not seem unreasonable to concede a Comon Sense
analogue of (I) . It is less momentous, but not very audacious,
to say that no " change " in anything which we abserve seems
causally quite independent of any sets of concurrent events.
The " leap " from p1 to p2 of what is said to be an " essentially
unpredictable " nuclear particle at t3 seems pretty plausibly to
depend at least in good part on the position and velocity of a
great many microscopic and macroscopic co-existent things
in the universe and their concurrent behavior. This particle
within the nucleus of that atom in my right hand might not
1 For a valuable discussion of "motus"
and its technical meaning as "change"
see Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways, (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul,
1969), pp. 7-9.

349

350

JOHN KING-FARLOW

be taking its particular leap now if an atomic war had just
begun with an irradiating bang, or if the sun had just started
radically disappointing Hume's expectations of solar consistency.
The sceptic who cheerfully grants this to be eminently plausible may well suggest yet again that the very existence of
Nature viewed as a complete, self-subsistent, law-governed
physical system of " changes " would he quite as good a First
Cause as any. In nearly two decades of scientifically erudite
championship for Saint Thomas, Dr. William Wallace, 0. P.,
has argued that such a sceptical move betrays an ignorance
of science and its history. 2 Father Wallace protests that such
talk of a "self-subsistent, law-governed, etc., physical system"
abstracts away too many important characteristics of natural
bodies. But his protest, I shall argue, may tum out to be,
(scarcely less than the sceptic's move), an irrelevant response
to a religious person who poses the question "Why?" as a
religious question and to a Christian theist's attempt to reply
as a theist. For the religious type of" Why?" questioning may
tum out to engulf the sceptic with expressions of fresh wonderlike "Why is there then a complete, self-subsistent physical
system in which this ' change ' occurs? " And it may tum out
to engulf Wallace and his historical Newton with utterances
of new bafflement like: " Why then is there a universe with
this kind of ' change ' in it, and also with a higher intelligence
maintaining its gravitational laws, and also with other scientifically describable regularities? " " How could this happen
if the universe were controlled by an intelligent being? "
This sort of question about the first stage will be taken up in
a brief Part II, The First Way in Moral Space, which will bring
this essay to a close. It may turn out that not only Newton's
2 See W. A. Wallace, 0. P.,
(i) "Newtonian Antinomies and the Prima Via,"
(ii) "Saint Thomas, Galileo, and EinThe Thomist XIX, 2, (1956), pp.
stein," The Thomist XXIV, 1, (1961), pp. 1-22; (iii) "The Cosmological Argument," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association XLVI,
(1972), p. 43-57; (iv) Causality and Scientific Explanation, Volume I: Medieval and Early Classical Science, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press,

THE FffiST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

351

but even Aristotle's physics sometimes seems to result in too
much abstracting away of fundamental" OUGHT "-properties
or value-laden features in Nature, although these are the very
properties which should most concern aN at ural Theologian who
is considering "change."
Non-Thomists in the English-speaking world are most likely
nowadays to look to a noted teacher of the Gregorian University and to a noted alumnus for the clearest possible exposition and logical appreciation of the First Way: Frederick
Copleston, S. J., 3 and Anthony Kenny. 4 Both in Aquinas and
in his History of Philosophy Father Copleston gives the impression that he tries to steer us away from an idea which
might " turn off " modern readers, the idea that Aquinas in the
First Way is taking any particularly controversial stand on the
concept of Infinity. He would have us conclude that, since
Aquinas accepts the intelligibility of talk about an infinite series
of successive stages in time, nothing particularly daring is being
held about Infinity. This approach, I shall try to show, tends
to mask what is most exciting both about Aquinas's First Way
and about much of the Aristotelian reasoning cited by him in
its favor at I Cont. Gent., c. 13. Kenny's attempts to be blistering about the second stage o£ First Way also reveal at times
an extraordinary reluctance to look at how boldly Aquinas and
Aristotle have made their stand on Infinity. (Kenny, still
more than Copleston, seems anxious about losing the interest
of modern Science Fiction readers in the First Way much too
3 F. C. Copleston, S. J., Aquinas
(London: Penguin Editions, 1955); A History
of Philosophy, Vol. II, Part 2: Albert the Great to Duns Scotus, (New York:
Doubleday Image Books Edition, 1962), Chapter 34. In the latter Copleston
writes: "the so-called mathematical infinite series has nothing to do with the
Thomist proofs. It is not the possibility of an infinite series as such which he
denies but the possibility of an infinite series in the ontological order of dependence. [There must be] ultimate and adequate ontological ·explanation." (p. 61)
But Aquinas is denying much more than an event without an explanation. He
is denying the possibility that God could be the First Caus·e of an infinitely
extended world in space, or even of infinitely many actual beings in a finite space.
Aquinas, I shall argue, is less bland, thank heaven, than Father Copleston construes him to be.
• Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways.

352

JOHN KING-FARLOW

soon if he should take that stand seriously. But such anxiety
can lead one to make oneself as well as others miss a most
crucial point!)
In Part I of this essay, The First Way in Physical Space,
an attempt will be made to clarify the view that Kenny's recent
criticisms may be a good deal more anachronistic than Aquinas's
second stage-and thus to clarify the perennial importance and
excitement of that stage for lovers of fundamental problems
in philosophy. Some recent words from G. E. R. Lloyd's Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought 5 may help
to set the scene:
The antithesis between form and matter may be connected in
turn with that between limit and the unlimited, and this takes us
to a further set of related doctrines, including the ethical and
aesthetic doctrine of the mean .... Aristotle's preference for the
limited rather than the unlimited comes out in a different context
in his discussions of infinity, especially in Physics III, Chapters 4-8.
He allows that the idea of the infinite has some valid uses; thus
magnitudes are infinitely divisible, and both time and number are
infinite by addition, although only potentially so-the infinity of
motion consists in a process of coming-to-be and is never actual.
But it is striking that Aristotle holds that mathematics does not
require an infinite line, only a finite line as long as one wishes,
(Physics,
ff). And he argues at length that an infinite
body cannot exist and that the universe is finite. The infinite, he
34 ff., is a cause in the sense of matter,
concludes at Physics
and its essence is privation.
The following passage from Copleston himself, written when
he is not troubled about making the Five Ways interesting
to modern readers, usefully points to the general closeness of
fit between Aquinas and Aristotle on Infinity:
One of the reasons adduced by St. Bonaventure to show that the
world must have been created in time and could not have been
created ·from eternity was that, if it had been created from eternity,
there would be in existence now an infinite number of immortal
human souls and that an infinite actual multitude is an impossibility .... St. Thomas followed Aristotle in rejecting the pos• G. E. R. Lloyd, Aristotle: The Growth and Structure of his Thought (Cambridge University Press, 1968. Citation from pp. 290-291.

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

353

sibility of an infinite quantity. In the De Veritate (2, 10) the
Saint remarks that the only valid reason for saying that God could
not create an actual infinite multitude would be an essential repugnance or contradiction in the notion of such an infinity, but he
defers any decision on the matter. In the Summa Theologica he
affirms categorically that there cannot be an actual infinite multitude, since every ·Created multitude must be of a certain number,
whereas an infinite multitude would not be of a certain number
(Ia, 7, 4; 1, 46; ad 8.)
(In the remainder of this paragraph Father Copleston suggests
that, if in the occasional passages St. Thomas may appear
reluctant to lay down the law about Infinity, "it would seem
rash to conclude to more than a possible hesitancy on St.
Thomas's part as to the impossibility of an infinite multitude in
act.") 6
If Lloyd and Copleston are right here, and if on the score
of Infinity Aquinas and Aristotle are both agreed and internally
consistent, then the core of the First Way is highly controversial about Infinity. It probably follows that, whatever supplementary reasons the Angelic Doctor's commentators may
misrepresent as primary reasons for rejecting an infinite series
of actual coexistents in any of the Ways, St. Thomas in giving
supplementary reasons like " then there would be no first
mover" will already have a primary reason for dismissing as
absurd any objector's appeal to the idea of an infinite series
of actual, concurrent " changes." The supplementary reason
is basically meant to show the objector various epi-absurdities
of his basically absurd position. The epi-absurdities and the
basic absurdity are meant to illuminate each other. A nos

moutons!
Part I: The First Way in Physical Space
Let us return now virtually to Square One and relate Aristotle's views on Infinity to a few simple modem notions about
sets and semantics.
For Aristotle, assertions of the finite extent of physical space
• F. C. Copleston, S. J., A History of Philosophy, Vol. II, Part 2, p. 87.

354

JOHN KING-FARLOW

and of the numerical finitude of physical objects actually existing at any one time in space were closely related necessary
truths of reason. Aristotle, to repeat the repeated, had no
prejudice against the idea of an infinite series: as such. He believed tke world to be eternal and so believed that infinitely
many successive changes of some sorts could and would occur
in space in the course of eternity. Even if history were
" cyclical," and even if the untidy sublunary world of " for
the most part things " (by clumsily following the realm of aei
energounta) exhibited series after series of eternal recurrence,
there would still be infinitely many changes of such sorts. For
Atlantis's rising from the waves 10,000 years ago and sinking
back under 5,000 years ago would not (in an important sense
of "same") be the same changes as Atlantis's rising 300,000
years ago and sinking 295,000 years ago. Again, Aristotle had
no quarrel with certain abstract thoughts about the infinite
one
repeatability of the dividing operation in mathematics:
can think of a particular log's being halved into A and B, with
B's next being halved into C and D, with D's next being halved
into, etc., etc. What of the further fact that a human mind
can grasp the generating relation of the series "{a log-part
three feet in circumference and ninety-six feet long; a log-part
three feet in circumference and forty-eight feet long ... a logpart three feet in circumference and fn feet long etc., etc., ad
infinitum}"? Even this fact about our capacity to grasp the
generating relation would not, in Aristotle's (or Aquinas's)
view, entail that a human mind could understand as a coherent
truth-candidate the sentence SI:
SI: "Infinitely many distinct but quite contiguous pieces of
wood three feet in circumference actually exist at the same time
in space-a piece ninety-six feet long, a piece forty-eight feet
1
. fimtum.
.
"
.
long . .. a pwce
2 n feet long, etc., etc., a d tn
Still less does our mathematical understanding of the generating relation behind "{2 X 1; 2 X (2 X 1); 2 X (2 X (2 X 1));
... ad infinitum}" entail that we can understand as a coherent
truth-candidate the sentence SII;

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

355

SII: "Infinitely many distinct pieces of wood three feet
in circumference actually exist in physical space at the same
four feet
time, the first being two feet long, the second
long,. the third being eight feet long, and so on ad in;finitum."
Note that SI, even if intelligible, would not entail S III, if
also intelligible.
Sill:

"Physical space is infinite."

For the pieces said to exist in SI might perhaps be so all but
perfectly contiguous as to never exceed one hundred and ninety
two- (or, for generosity's sake instead of perfection's, one hundred and ninety three) -feet in length. On the other hand,
should both SII and Sill be intelligible, then SII would entail
Sill, that physical space is in;finite. Next consider SIV.
SIV: "There actually is a log (L) three feet in circumference and infinitely long." If SIV were intelligible as well as
Sill, then SIV would also entail Sill. But Aristotle, as we see
from Physics E, 204a34- 206a7, would reject SIV as an intelligible truth-candidate. For, he would say, the use of the term
"long" in SIV implies that L is a particular body, bounded
by a definite surface on all sides, but SIV's use of "infinite"
immediately excludes this. Again, if the log were said to be
n many feet long and three feet in circumference then " It
many" could not have "infinitely many" as a value. Any
actual number of feet of loggish spread could be numbered,
whereas a so-called" infinite number" could not be numbered.
In so distinguishing the conditional entailment relations first
between SI and Sill and next between SII and Sill, and in
trying to draw morals about Aquinas's First Way, one needs
to show caution and bring matters into better perspective.
Father W. A. Wallace has very helpfully argued in Causality
and Scientific Explanation, Volume I, (see footnote 2) , that one
must see Albert the Great and Aquinas as committed to at least
two distinct positions on Aristotle:
(a) Aristotle, far from
being divinely infallible on matters of physics, does sometimes
go astray on important claims- (about astronomy in Libri

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JOliN KING-FARLOW

M eteororum, for example) -by relying more on hearsay than
on experiment and demonstration; (b) contrary to the amici
Platords at thirteenth-century Oxford, "neither Albert nor
Aquinas saw mathematical form as ·existing in physical things
antecedently to sensible quality and individuality; unlike
Kilwardby they understood it as form abstracted from an existing physical entity by a mental process that leaves aside all
irregularities and individual characteristics resulting from matter and motion." (p. 80) The business of the natural scientist,
Wallace reasons from a plethora of crucial texts, is largely the
same for Aristotle, Albert, and Aquinas. It is business taken
to be different from that of those who afford primacy to mathematical abstractions in science. In Albert's words, that business is to study " what may happen in natural things on the
grounds of causes inherent in nature,"or, more concretely still,
"to look for the causes in natural things." (p. 70) Let us turn
now from Wallace's recent book to a related passage in an
earlier essay where Wallace writes of Aquinas as a neo-Aristotelian (and as a foe of the hyper-mathematical thinker) on
Space:
This conclusion [that the earth is spinning on its axis] ... does
not commit the theorist to the Newtonian conception of a subsistent absolute space . . . in which such spinning motion is executed. The notion of absolute space is again an extreme of mathematical realism ... Space for St. Thomas, does not exist apart
from bodies that are extended and in motion; itself based on the
relation of distance between bodies, it is rather a relative thing,
not an absolute. More properly it abstracts from matter and
motion, and as such is conceived statically by us. 7

These passages from Wallace throw valuable light on what
the conditional entailment relationship between SI and Sill
and what the lack of such a relationship would amount to in
Aristotle and Aquinas:
(A) SI, "Infinitely many distinct but quite contiguous pieces
of wood exist at the same time in space-a piece ninety-six feet
• "Saint Thomas, Galileo, and Einstein," p. 17. (Cf. Footnote 2)

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

357

long, a piece forty-eight feet long . . . a piece 1.... feet long, a
n

piece l

feet long, etc., etc. ad infinitum,"

(IF SI MAKES

SENSE), DOES NOT ENTAIL Sill "Space is infinite"(EVEN IF SI and Sill BOTH MAKE SENSE) !
(B) IF Sil MAKES SENSE, " Infinitely many distinct
pieces of wood actually exist in physical space at the same
time-a piece 1 foot long and 1 foot in circumference, a piece
feet long and feet in circumference, a next piece twice the
previous piece's size, etc., etc., ad infinitum," THEN Sil DOES
ENTAIL Sill "Space is infinite," (IF BOTH SII AND Sill
MAKE SENSE) .
I£ SI and Sill make sense and SI is true, then space need
not be infinite because the actual particular bodies are tightly
contiguous and have sizes that would prevent their infinite sum
feet in length,
from stretching more (or slightly more) than
while their circumference would, of course, be of the same finite
size throughout. The idea that infinite absolute 8pace would
still be real because a vacuum that is conceivable by intellectual
abstraction would be capable of " absorbing " each of the infinitely many pieces so that each might lie at a distance of at
least 100 yards from any other piece would strike Aristotle,
Albert, and Aquinas as a boringly " mathematical " hypostatisation of the " nothing " in the disguisedly nonsensical sentence " there is nothing to prevent each piece of the infinite
series from being situated simultaneously at a distance of at
least 100 yards from any other piece." Unless infinitely many
actual concrete particulars (perimpossibile) simultaneously lay
at such definite distance from each other (while undergoing
particular moiJUs) , there might be little temptation for a
physicist to talk of infinite space. But if Sil and Sill make
sense, then we can intelligibly speak of SII's entailing Sill
because space would not now be conceived, 8 in Wallace's just
8 For areas of disagreement
between Aristotle and Aquinas on the concept of a
vacuum or void, cf. Father Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation, pp.
178 and

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JOHN KING-FARLOW

cited words, to " exist apart from bodies that are extended and
in motion " and would not now be conceived not to be " based
on the relation between bodies."
It might be retorted that, from what one hopes to be an
Einsteinian point of view, talk1 of the simultaneous existence
of all the spatially separate members of the infinite series envisioned by an affirmer of SII would make no sense. And (it
would seem to follow) talkz of the simultaneous existence of
one infinitely long log's different areas would be just as nonsensical. Why? Because verifying the tenets of talk1 and talkz
that all the pieces of areas simultaneously co-exist across infinite space would require something physically impossibletravel faster than the maximum possible speed, the finite speed
of light. But perhaps this objection involves a confusion between knowledge of a proposition's Fregeau Sinn (meaning)
and knowledge of its Fregeau Bedeutung (truth-value) .9 The
objection may be a sort of Positivist petitio. Who can yet be
sure? The more radical objection of Aristotle and, surely,
of Aquinas to talk1 would go:
I can make no sense of talk 1 about the actual infinite of co-existent
material bodies situated next to one another or lying at particular
distance apart from one another. I know how to conceive a mathematical generating relation and say "For any number n of actual things (including the counter) that I or a Superman might
count at t as co-existent at t, there are always n plus I things
coexisting at t." "I can understand that if it means that there
are finitely many things, but more actual things at any time
than any human counter could actually succeed in counting at a
time or than any finite human numberer could succeed in intelligibly expressing the finite number of at a time. But I can't understand it if it means that infinitely many things actually exist at
once. Nor can I understand talk 2 about an infinitely long log's
infinitely numerous areas since no principle of individuation can
be given for its being a log or a log."
9 Cf. John
King- Farlow and William Niels Christensen, Faith and the Life of
Reason, (Dordrecht:
Reidel Publishers, 1972) pp. 78, 130. This point about
Sense-Reference confusions is developed further in John King- Farlow "Immortality, Analogy and the Phenomenology of Death," Proceedings of the American
Catholic Philosophical Association, Vol. XLVII, (1973), pp. 191-200.

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

359

Again, suppose that it were suggested to Aristotle:
The members of the set X of {mere vegetative things coexisting
now in the universe} could be placed in one-to-one correspondence
with the members of the set Y of {animal-vegetants and mere
vegetative things} coexisting now in the universe. For this would
be essentially no more problematical than setting the infinite series
of prime numbers in one-to-one correspondence with the infinite
series of primes and square numbers.

Let Aristotle now be told that this Cantorian device would
enable him to understand what it is for two series of actual
physical co-existents to be infinite series-hence what talks of
infinite physical space might mean. Aristotle would surely reply that, unless one already had both an intuitively clear and a
clearly consistent notion of what it is for two or even just one
series of actual physical co-existents to be infinite, he would
rule out the intelligibility of such talks about any such" placing
in one-to-one correspondence" the individuals of what are
intuitively grasped to be smaller or larger sets.
Whether Aristotle would be right to make such replies is one
of the profoundest questions in philosophy-a question on
which I am far too much in doubt to pronounce any judgment
in this essay. This involves a cluster of issues on which mathmatical logicians, like " Platonists," " Formalists," and " Intuitionists " of distinction, may well find themselves divided
despite their technical skills. (The issues are hardly to be resolved by citing any physicists' dogmas). It is enough for
present purposes merely to distinguish five very probably Aristotelian assumptions which were very likely shared by Saint
Thomas:
(1) If (as is the case) there are finitely many distinct co-

existent things set at finite distances from each other, dist-ances
which do not differ greatly in the case of the interestingly large
entities, then space (a relationship between concrete particulars) is finite.
(2) The idea of space as largely an infinite vacuum stretching beyond the finite realm of actual co-existents-a vacuum

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JOHN KING-FARLOW

into which these co-existents might indefinitely expand-is an
idle hypostatisation of certain mathematicians' abstract thinkmg.
(3) The "ideas" of infinitely many (actual and separate)
things co-existing in finite space and of infinitely many (actual
and separate) things co-existing in infinite space are both unintelligible.
(4) The "idea" of an infinite distance between two coexisting actual things is the " idea " of two co-existents between which an infinity of finite actual things could co-existhence this " idea " too is unintelligible.
Each member of these asumptions has something to do with
Aristotle's and Aquinas's belief that space is finite. So presumably does (5) :
(5) If we are inclined to think that there can be a single
continuous physical body of infinite length in space, then we
must admit that we could lay an actual infinity of co-existent
and suitably finite bodies along that body's length-and thus
we see that no such thing can exist.
At this stage it may be objected that Aristotle and Aquinas
frequently do talk seriously about infinite sets of actual coexistents or about a thing of infinite magnitude in order to
demonstrate the existence of a Prime Mover. Consider the following passage on the First Way's second stage from Chapter
II (" The First Way") of Anthony Kenny's earlier mentioned
and scathing book The Five Ways.
The argument continues as follows. I£ whenever you have a
series of moved movers, the motion of the moving body is the
same with the motion of the moved body, then if you have an
infinite series of moved movers, you have an infinite number of
bodies in motion whenever one of the series is in motion. " Omnia
ista infinita simul moventur dum unum eorum movetur. Sed
unum ,eorum, cum sit finitum, movetur tempore finito. Ergo
omnia ilia infinita moventur tempore finito. Hoc autem est impossible." (I Cont. Gent., c. 13, Quarum prima.)
What is wrong, we might ask, with an infinite number of bodies
being in motion for a finite time? "An infinite motion in a finite
time " sounds shocking; but only because there seems something

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

361

odd in a body's travelling an infinite distance in a finite time. But
why should not an infinite number of bodies travel a finite distance
in a finite time?
Well, says Aristotle (Physics VII,
45 ff.), add together
all the finite distances travelled by the infinite number of bodies
and you will get an infinite distance which cannot be traversed in
a finite time. But, we might retort, there is no single thing which
travels an infinite distance, only many things travelling a finite
distance. Not so, he retorts
59 ff); one body can move
another only if it is in contact with it; so all these contiguous bodies
make up one large body (which need not be infinite). And this
body will have to travel an infinite distance in a finite time; which
is impossible.
This argument, which is partially reproduced by St. Thomas,
seems to fail partly because it is not the case that if a body has
parts each of which travels a certain distance then the body as
a whole travels the sum of those distances. Moreover, if, as Aristotle argues, an infinite number of bodies together make a merely
finite body, why should not an infinite number of journeys added
together make a merely finite journey? 10
Of course, Aristotle does give quite a few teasing arguments
in the Physics for the existence of an Unmoved Mover. And
Aquinas's clarification of the Summa Theologiae's condensed
First Way in the Contra Gentiles refers specifically to parts
of the Physics where such arguments occur. These arguments
seemingly tend to warrant the supposition that there can, after
all, be infinitely many actual and co-existing bodies, that an
infinitely large body can exist, that an infinitely long spatial
journey can actually be made. But if Aristotle and Aquinas
held to all or most of the five doctrines which we just gave about
(A) finite space and (B) the finite number of co-existent
bodies, then something is badly wrong with Kenny's line of exposition and criticism just quoted. Consider the famous passage in Aristotle himself which infuriates Kenny and which the
Contra Gentiles relates to the First Way.
But since the immediate and direct ·cause of a physical movement
in space must (as we see in all cases) be either in contact or
10

Anthony Kenny, The Five Ways, pp. 24-25.

36Q

JOHN KING-FARLOW

continuous with the thing it moves, our series of movers and moved
must be either continuous or in contact with one another so as to
form one thing composed of them all. For our present purpose [not,
of course, Aristotle's italics] it makes no difference whether this
one thing is limited or unlimited; for in any case, since they are
unlimited in number, the whole movement will be unlimited, if
we assume as actual what is theoretically possible, that each movement is either equal to or greater than the movement prior to it.
If then A, B, C, D, etc. make up an unlimited magnitude which
accomplishes its motion E F G H in the limited time K this involves the conclusion that an unlimited movement is gone through
in a finite time by something which is either limited or unlimited;
and whichever it is the conclusion is an impossibility. (Physics,
242b 21-35) .

Why cannot an infinite amount of change or movement
(kinesis) be undergone in a finite time? What Kenny does not
realise is that Aristotle's reasoning here must, in a way, be
either virtuously or viciously circular and ironic. The standard
Aristotelian assumptions about Infinity- (1) to (5) -are still
all assumed by Aristotle! Aristotle wants to grant his opponents as great a number of what may be called" IF, (PER
IMPOSSIBILE)," suppositions as may be needed to lure them
into argument. But at a certain stage, he still supposes, the
opponents can be directly or indirectly called back to plain
Good Sense or to what some would call " basic intuitions."
Aristotle invites us somewhat ironically to suppose, per impossibile, that each of an infinite number of co-existent things are
simultaneously moving and being moved. Then, per impossibile, we would get infinitely many changes or an infinitely
great change in a finite time. But this would require, as Kenny
fails to see, something yet more absurd for Aristotle, something
incompatible for Aristotle with the finitude of physical spaee
and with the numerical (as well as the spatial) finitude of
simultaneously actualisable bodies. All this infinite amount of
" change," which, per impossibile, would require infinite space
to occur in at one time, would be taking place in a finite space
at a finite
further shows the absurdity (hidden
to Aristotle's opponents) of supposing that infinitely many

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

363

co-existent contiguous things may be needed to explain an
everyday occurrence. The circle is virtuous here, as elsewhere
in the Physics, if all or most of the assumptions (1) - (5) are
philosophically sound and kept clearly before Aristotle's ironical mind. The circle may be vicious if it is not so virtuous.
But at least the kind of reasoning needs to be discerned and
relevantly discussed.
Perhaps this account is unduly charitable, however, to Aristotle or Aquinas or both. Perhaps Aristotle is not as consistent
about the finite and the infinite as he should have been-perhaps what is taken here to be his generosity with" IF, (PER
IMPOSSIBILE) ," concessions to draw what seem to him to
be counter-intuitively operating opponents into argument results in radical inconsistencies. Or perhaps Aristotle's views on
infinity, actuality, and space simply evolved and changed in
ways that Aquinas should have noticed and bewared of combining for consistency's sake. Or perhaps Aquinas did not fully
realize how radically dependent the First Way and Second Way
were on certain Aristotelian assumptions about infinity, actuality, and space. Unfortunately Father Wallace, in a recent
attack on Kenny 11 entitled " The Cosmological Argument,"
confines himself to Aquinas's "first stage" and breaks off his
criticisms before reaching the passage in Kenny that we cited.
Possibly the explanations offered here will induce Wallace to
extend his studies to analyse the second stage of the First Way
in depth so as to complete his reply to Kenny. In his very
challenging paper of 1956, "Newtonian Antinomies against the
Prima Via," 12 Father Wallace had already sought to defend
the First Way against numerous misunderstandings. Thus I
leave him and other admirers of that way with two questions
still inadequately answered. To what extent is the First Way
dependent on the sorts of assumptions we have suggested? To
what extent are these still really sound assumptions, however
11 W. A. Wallace, 0. P., "The Cosmological Argument:
A Reappraisal," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, XLVI, (1972), pp.
48-55.
12 The Thomist, XIX, 2, (1956), pp. 151-192.

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JOHN KING-FARLOW

boldly some modern mathematicians and mathematical physicists may talk about infinite space, infinity and orders of infinity?
The second part of this essay will take up in a new way
some of Wall ace's complaints in his paper on Aquinas and Newton of 1956, complaints resurfacing in Causality and Scientific
Explanation about the undue reliance on abstractions from concrete particulars that is found in Aquinas's critics and competitors. But before one turns to this, it may be usefully
germane to venture a few more comments on Kenny's treatment of the First Way as it continues in his third chapter " The
Second Way."
Kenny writes:
The Five Ways have a formal structure in common which is
applied in turn to each of the Four Causes and the different types
of causality provide different contents for this formal structure ....
Basically each of the Five Ways takes a two-place relational predicate " R " and shows the relation in question to be irreflexive
(nothing has R to itself) and transitive (if a stands in relation R
to b and b stands in relation R to c then a also has R to c). It
concludes from this that either there is an endless series of things
standing in relation R to each other, or else there is something to
which others may have R which does not itself stand in relation
R to anything. In the First Way, "aRb" is to be interpreted as
"a is being moved by b." This basic formal structure is a sound
one. For the following formula is not satisfiable in a finite domain:
(x) - Rxx & (x) (y) (z) (Rxy &

& (x) (Ey)Rxy

For a given interpretation of " R," this formula says in effect that
the relation R is irreflexive and transitive and that everything
stands in the relation R to something or other. If, therefore, we
have a relation which we know to be irreflexive and transitive, and
we know that the domain of the relation is finite, [not Kenny's
italics], we can conclude that not everything stands in that relation
to something. In symbols:
-(x) (Ey)Rxy
and from that we conclude:
(Ex) - (Ey) Rxy

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

865

which, if we interpret " R " as " .... as caused by " says
There is an uncaused thing. 13
Two pages later Kenny suggests another formula to be valid
for every finite domain, a formula which he takes to be crucial
for understanding the argumentative strategies of Aristotle and
Aquinas. This complex formula runs (Ex) (Ey)Rxy & - Rxx
& (x) (y) (z) (Rxy &
& (Ez (w) - Rzw. Of the
forgoing formula Kenny writes:
This indeed is valid for every finite domain. It is unwise, therefore, for a critic of the Five Ways to attack their formal structure.
To refute one of them one must rather show either that the relation in question does not hold of anything, or that it does not have
the properties of transitivity and irreflexivity, or that there is no
reason to restrict it to a finite domain. 14

If what we originally wrote about Aristotelian and related
Thomist assumptions concerning infinity, actuality, and space
in connection with the First Way seemed unduly bold, here
perhaps one has a measure of serious confirmation from a
scholar who attacks Aquinas violently, but only after formerly
having made a sympathetic and profound study of many
Thomist texts. For here, where Kenny is giving sympathetic
exposition instead of rather contemptuous criticism, Kenny
himself stresses (at least by hearty implication) the importance for understanding the Ways of realizing that St. Thomas
wishes Nature to be understood as a finite domain. Now
Kenny has already admitted in The Five Ways (pp. 12-18)
that Aquinas (like Aristotle) was not opposed on philosophical
grounds to the idea of Nature as exhibiting " an endless series
of temporally ordered causes." Presumably the finitude of N ature as a domain for Aristotle and Aquinas is thus indirectly
implied by Kenny to be (at least partly) spatial finitude. But
Kenny seems unable to profit by this implication in his chapter
on "The First Way." Kenny thus evades what should be
13

14

Kenny, The Five Ways, pp. 36-37
Ibid., p. 39

366

JOHN KING-FARLOW

central to any book devoted today to the Five Ways: the
problem of actual infinities, especially actual infinities of physical co-existents.
Quite how much reliance should be placed on Kenny's use
of logic in assessing Aquinas is by no means clear. Consider
the relation R in the formula which he says is " not satisfiable
in any finite domain " :
(x) - Rxx & (x) (y) (z) (Rxy &

& (x) (Ey) Rxy

(p. 37).

Since according to Kenny, the essential thing is that this relation is meant to be transitive but not reflexive, one is tempted
to rewrite this as
(x) - Rxx & (x) (y) (z) ( (x#y & y#z & x#z)
& (x) (Ey) (a;#y & Rxy)

&

Let the domain be a seven numbered circle of beads which
can be seen or loked at from any angle. Let " R " express
the relation "can be seen as situated to the left of." We
then get: For any one bead x that bead cannot be seen as
situated to the left of itself. For any three distinct beads x,
y, and z,. IF x can be seen as situated to the left of y and y
can be seen as situated to the left of z then x can be seen as
situated to the left of z. For any particular bead x there is always a distinct bead y such that x can be seen as situated to
the left of y. Here, all seems to go well for a finite domainor at least for a finite domain of more than two but very few,
or of many, or of very many members. If, however, Kenny
insists rigidly on his original formulas being spared the addition
of the distinctness clauses above, then one is driven to work
up possible counter-examples with accounts of more curious
sorts of relation which respect our flexible natural intuitions
about relating and relatedness, but eschew the unnaturally
rigid intuition of "formal logicians" that relations be accountable in terms of Straight-Forward ORDERED N-TUPLES.
Consider one odd candidate. Let the formation rules of the
relevant calculus dictate, say, that Kenny's formula be written

'l'HE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

367

out clearly with square brackets for the conjuncts after the
quantifiers thus:
(x) [-Rxx] & (x) (y) (z) [ (Rxy & Rzy)

& (x) (Ey)

[Rxy]

Following our odd interpretation of " R " for the same even
membered circle of beads we read:
For all x it is not the case that [x being mentioned only once as
x in the appropriate square brackets lies in the same circle as x
being mentioned only once as x in the appropriate square brackets].
AND for all x, y, z,[IF x being mentioned only once as x in
the appropriate square brackets lies in the same circle as y being
mentioned only once as yin the appropriate square brackets, AND
if y being, etc., lies in the same circle as z being, etc., THEN x
being mentioned only once as x in the appropriate square bracket
lies in the same circle as z being mentioned only once as z in the
appropriate square bracket]. 15
AND for any x there is a y such that[x being mentioned only
once as x in the appropriate square bracket lies in the same circle
as y being mentioned only once as y in the appropriate square
bracket].

Here again the formula seems to be satisfied in a finite domain. One may leave to the reader's imagination the task
of assessing Kenny's claim that the other formula is satisfied
by every finite domain. Of course, when " Rxy " becomes " x
is greater in physical size as a material object than y" the domain D 1 must be infinite in actual members and infinite in
spatial extension-whatever the sense or nonsense of being said
to be such a domain. Now suppose a domain D2 to be like the
one mentioned earlier of the log-piece three feet in circumference and ninety-six feet long, followed in all but perfect contiguity by one of the same circumference but forty-eight feet
long, and so on by halves ad infinitum. Suppose our relation
to be " is spatially smaller than." Although there are infinitely
many contiguous log-pieces, they can extend no further in
space than one hundred and ninety-two or one hundred and
15 Such a conditional
with a necessarily false ant·ecedent
repeated) is necessarily true.

(as the variables are

368

JOHN KING-FARLOW

ninety-three feet. Thus one needs not only the Aristotelian assumption about the senselessness of talk about " infinite space "
to exclude D 1 but one needs his further assumption about the
craziness of belief in infinitely many actual co-existents if one
is to exclude D2. Kenny's loose talk about "finite domains
obscures a distinction that is germane to understanding where
Aristotle and Aquinas really stood on Nature as a finite domain. Notice next that D2 involved a single-sided infinite
series somewhat like the domain of positive integers in its contrast with the domain of all negative and non-negative integers
gushing out from Zero at its "centre." Here we might construct a corporeal domain D3 bilaterally infinite in members
but still finite in physical extension. The ninety-six foot logpiece is "in the middle " with smaller and smaller log-pieces
stretching contiguously out on either side up to form a three
hundred and eighty-eight (or eighty-nine) foot line. Either
" stands to the left of " or " stands to the right of " would each
be admirable readings for " R " to many a mathematical logician untroubled about the metaphysical problems of possible
semantics. For Aristotle and Aquinas this attempt at a description of the bilateral infinite series of actual pieces would,
I take it, be bilateral Nonsense. And perhaps they would indeed be right. I can only repeat that problems about Infinity,
actuality, and space remain among the profoundest in philosophy; that Wallace's fascinating and extremely sympthetic discussions of the First Way, like Kenny's ambivalent and sometimes bitter sounding commentary, have failed to bring these
problems into sharp enough focus. Since Father Copleston's
still more influential writings have also succeeded in obscuring
the relation between these problems and the Prima Via, I hope
that authors of future history books or of future editions of
present history books will do something to make Aquinas's and
Aristotle's real lines of reasoning stand out much more clearly.
Part II:

The First Way in Moral Space

For so many ancient Greek thinkers physis (" Nature ")
was not the value-free domain of Newtonian physics-at least

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

369

as Hume and Kant envisaged the latter. Physis had a logos,
a saving and precious rationale fit to be the goal of sophia:
even for the classical atomists Leucippus and Democritus
everything in physis happened " ek logou kai hyp' anangkes."
Understanding of this logos made the universe seem far from
" absurd" to such devout materialists. To some ancient Greeks
there seemed to be intuitively necessary connections between
sophia and logos and peras (limit) and one or more words
of the eidos (form) family. (For peras brings eidos). With
no few Sophists their ethical relativism and their interest in
rhetoric as an instrument for manipulating men's opinions and
feelings tended to go with an abandoment of the philosophical
quest for sophia through grasping the logos of physis. To put
matters a bit colorfully, natural things for many a Sophist
had no intrinsic value but were given different values as instruments or impediments by different goals. Each man was the
measure of everything. According to a traditional seeker for
the logos of physis like Plato, one could only think about
natural things in this crudely pragmatic way of the Sophists
if one had turned a largely blind eye to the most crucial properties of those things to focus on others considered immediately
attractive in relation to fulfilling one's present confused intentions.
In" Newtonian Antinomies against the Prima Via" Father
Wallace offered some very striking suggestions about the implicit procedures of those who argue against the Prima Via
of Aquinas (or against some of Aristotle's earlier related arguments). Father Wallace's favored words here and also in his
discussion of Aquinas's opposition as a neo-Aristotelian to
thirteenth-century Oxford "Platonists" in Causality and Scientific Explanation are " abstract " and " abstraction." Consider
the following passages from " Newtonian Antinomies against
the Prima Via " :
(A) Now the peculiar thing about an equation is this: if it does
not express a tautology, then the only way it can equal two things
that are not identical is by abstracting from certain features that

370

JOHN KING-FARLOW

are not common to both. In fact abstraction must be made from
everything that would either disturb the equality or does not enter
into it essentially. (p. 163)
(B) But this does not necessarily derogate from the utility of
the principle of inertia as a physico-mathematical principle. What
it does indicate is that this principle does not have the broad applicability of a generalized physical principle that would be universally verified in all real motions. Rather it gives an idealized
account of local motion and abstracts from extrinsic factors
present in the real world and affecting such motion. And since it
abstracts from extrinsic factors acting on real bodies moving in
a physical enviroment, it should not be surprising that it also abstracts .from efficient causality influencing the body in motion.
(p. 180)

(C) But while this [the action-reaction principle] is a valid
principle of mathematical physics, it is not true when the total
reality is considered. The reason is simple enough. If there is a
strict equality between agent and receptor, there can be no motion.
Nothing dynamical can proceed from strict equality . . . A rope,
of and by itself, cannot pull a horse, but a horse can pull not only
the rope but also something tied to it. If abstraction is to be made
from this fact for the purposes of noting physico-mathematical
equalities, all well and good. But the physical reality contains
much more than the physico-mathematical equality ... Newton's
third law of motion, like his other two, has its only solid foundation and ultimate justification in the physical movers which lead
their discoverer inexorably to the existence of God. (pp. 190-191)

Kenny suggests that a sound critic might well seek to show
that what is demonstrated to be a " Prime Mover " by an
argument like the Prima Via, were it cogent, "would not necessarily be a candidate for being called God." (The Five Ways,
p. 39) And indeed there is the danger that a seemingly cogent
formulation of the First Way might come up with the existence
of something which theists would consider an idolatrous thing
to worship as divine. We might come up, for example, with a
unique, self-sufficient being whose mere POWER accounts for
all the motion in observed Nature. Such a being might appeal
to extreme Voluntarists whose equation of Goodness and of
the Logos or Reason that makes sense of it all with Complete

THE FIRST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

371

POWER strikes them as making such a First Mover the ideal
answer to religion's demand for a Justifying Explanation. A
Justifying Explanation, as I have characterised it elsewhere/ 6
offers us an ultimate causal explanation of anything and everything which exists or happens. But it offers this in terms of a
causal agent whose existence and agency makes " sense of anything and everything"; makes it cause for joy that things exist
and exhibit the " changes " of the First Way; makes the " sense
of everything " a consolation to rational persons who grasp it
for every disappointment, however tragic, and an addition to
any joy. That is what Christian theism offers. The Christian
God for whose existence Aquinas was arguing was not Aristotle's Prime Mover wrapped up forever in self-contemplation
but a Biblical God whose Sel£-Comtemplation is one with his
love and concern for all other (created) persons' history,
happiness, and opportunity to share in his ultimate triumph
of Good over Evil. Aristotle in depicting his Prime Mover as
a Perfect Person or God abstraGted too many essential properties of perfection as a Person away from what could answer
many men's cry for a Justifying Explanation of "changes"
familiar to them. A Perfect Person would necessarily care
about other persons, all of them, however imperfect. (An Unmoved Mover might seem logos enough for Athens and Stagira,
but it could hardly be so for many who turned for fulfillment
to Jerusalem or Benares, to Mary's grave in London, or to the
New Communism (cum-Sinophilia) of Peking.)
What is it that is to be explained when one is asked to explain why kinesis or motus, or "changes" occur as they do?
Aquinas, it seems, abstracts too carelessly from the ordinary
16 See John King-Farlow, Reason and Religion, (London:
Darton, Longman and
Todd, 1969), Chapters 6 and 7; John King- Farlow and William Niels Christensen, Faith and the Life of Reason, Chapters 1 and 2. Cf. Robert C., Coburn
"A Neglected Use of Religious Language," in Dallas M. High, (ed.), New Essays
in Religious Language, (Oxford U. P., Oxford and New York, 1969), pp. 215-235;
John King- Farlow and W. N. Christensen, "Faith and Faith in Hypotheses,"
Religious Studies VII, 2, (1971), pp. 113-124; John King- Farlow and W. N.
Christensen, "Two Sides to a Theist's Coin," Philosophical Studies of Eire, XIX,
(1970)' pp. 172-180.

JOHN KING-FARLOW

fact to be explained when he argues in the First Way for a
Prime Mover. What is to be explained is "change" in a universe where persons able to pose a host of evaluative questions,
(including moral and aesthetic questions), find themselves
given a history. The physicist (qua physicist of a certain type)
may want us to focus on what he considers to be the Hard
Facts for physicists of his type when at work. Even Aristotle
at times when he is devoted to " efficient causes " or " material
causes" may want us to focus on a somewhat de-valued set of
Hard Data: the nameless spinners who deliberately move their
average hands that move some sticks that move some bits of
wool; the moving spheres beyond the Sublunary Region which
move with complete regularity, while on our changing Earth
we have epistemological or perhaps even ontological surds
among the motions of " for the most part things " ; the potentially hot wood placed on the fire and caused to burn by the
actually hot fire. Aristotle's reader can become too far abstracted away from the " formal causes " or characteristic excellences that make things' explanation important. Kenny may
be right to hold that the First Way is directed like the Second
to efficient causality but to a different aspect of efficient
causality .. (The Five Ways, p. 36) Or Father Wallace may be
right to hold that it is more faithful both to related Aristotelian
and Thomist texts and to Aquinas's lasting importance for
philosophy of science to emphasize material rather than
efficient causality-or to do so at least during the first crucial
stage in the Prima Via. (See " The Cosmological Argument,"
pp. 44, 55, etc.). But if" changing" Nature, which is a domain
that includes persons aware of values, is to be given a Justifying
Explanation by natural theology, and if "changing" Nature
cannot be adequately described by persons in a more or less
value-neutral way, 17 then no very satisfying religious argument
for theism can be given in abstractedly value-neutral terms
of what " changes " because of chains of " efficient causality "
and "material causality" culminating in an Unchanged Change.
17

Cf. John King-Farlow, "Value

XXI, I (1958), pp. 162-170.

and 'Essentialist

Fallacies," The Thomist,

THE FffiST WAY IN PHYSICAL AND MORAL SPACE

373

It is tempting to say that the First Way is possibly like the
start of a satisfying theist argument, because Aquinas follows
it soon after with the Fifth Way and its talk of Final Causes.
But a good many teleological explanations, at least those in
terms of intelligent agents' intentions and goals which count
among Final Causes, may be pursued by cultural relativists in
a value-neutral manner: What is sought may be a Verstehen
of what an individual conventionally intends and desires as a
member of a particular community; no ultimate value judgment about the wisdom or foolishness, etc., of the agents' intentions or the community's system of values need be allowed.
Of course, Aristotle and Aquinas do have a wider variety of
Final Causes in mind than would interest exponents of pure
V erstehen. But the Fourth Way, which most directly stresses
belief in absolute values familiar to men's experience, brings
out far more clearly, if still more controversially, why the Fifth
Way's Final Causes go beyond the interests of cultural relativists.
It is a curious conclusion, yet I think it fairest to St. Thomas,
to say that in his far more Platonistic Fourth Way he is much
more directly bent on capturing the evaluative dimensions of
"The Hard Facts " at their hardest for persons-dimensions
like the moral and the aesthetic. Here Aquinas is least prone
to abstract away reality's most challenging features in order
to explain very partially what we experience in reality. The
Fourth Way has its violently controversial logical problems.
But at least it points to logically better dividends for religious
theism. Before he comments with special harshness on the
Fourth Way, Kenny writes:
Admirers of Aquinas are divided in their attitude to the Fourth
Way. Some, such as Geach, suspect it of being indefensible; others,
such as Gilson, say that " the Fourth Way can be said to be the
deepest one from the point of view of metaphysical knowledge."
(Elements of Christian Philosophy, Doubleday; New York, 1960,
p. 76) All agree that it is the Way in which, for better or for worse,
St. Thomas comes closest to Platonism. 18
18

Kenny, The Five Ways, p. 71.

874

JOHN KING-FARLOW

But why not say rather that Aquinas's Fourth Way is the
closest to our religious needs and to our ordinary understanding
of the world in its most crucial dimensions for personal
agents? Why not say that the Fourth Way is in many respects
closest to plain Common Sense at least in that it focusses on
predicates like "good" and "noble" instead of all but abstracting such properties away from what is to be metaphysically explained? Or why not say that the First Way would
benefit from a reconstruction in which these normative properties are stressed as much as those physical properties taken
by Aristotle in a relatively value-neutral way when the First
Way's " changes " are to be explained? Reconstruction or serious reformulation would be in order because the First Way is
a Ch1istian thinker's argument-for religious conclusionswhich proceeds from the data of our Lebenswelt. The First
Way belongs in moral space. It deserves to be set much more
clearly in moral space, and this is where admirers of Saint
Thomas ought much more clearly to set it.
JoHN KING-FARLOW

University of Alberta
Edmonton, Alberta
Canada

THE FIRST WAY: A REJOINDER

I

N THE PRECEDING article Pro£essorJohnKing-Farlow
has raised a number o£ intriguing questions relating to
the prima via o£ St. Thomas Aquinas'---questions, indeed,
that cannot be answered with any measure o£ completeness in
a brief reply. The queries he raises, however, do present the
opportunity to offer some further observations on the traditional understanding o£ the proof and on its validity in the
light o£ modern science, and these will be the focus o£ this rejoinder.
The prima via, it would seem, is a clear instance o£ a cosmological argument £or the existence o£ God. It starts from an observable aspect o£ the cosmos, i. e., the motion or movement
or change that is sensibly observable in it, reasons a posteriori
£rom this to an ultimate cause, and so concludes to the existence o£ a First Unmoved Mover who is incorporeal, immaterial, infinite in power, etc., and who in the sequel can be
identified with the God o£ Revelation. Although in its later
stages the proof makes use o£ metaphysical reasoning, its beginnings actually pertain to natural philosophy. (Indeed, as
most Thomists hold, i£ the natural philosopher could not prove
the existence o£ some type o£ being that really exists and is
neither material nor in motion, there would be no need £or
metaphysics as a discipline, since its subject matter would be
essentially the same as that o£ natural philosophy.) The natural philosopher, moreover, abstracts from certain features o£
the physical world in elaborating his discipline; this abstractive
process is found in all sciences, although some abstract in ways
different £rom others, and their manner o£ abstracting can unfortunately have a restrictive influence on the types o£ arguments and proofs they are able to elaborate. 1
1

For a succinct account of Thomistic teaching on abstraction and its relation

375

376

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

On this understanding the prima via is only one of several
possible cosmological arguments, all of which, precisely as cosmological, operate at the same " degree " of abstraction. Thus
the secunda via, the tertia via, and the quinta via may
be viewed as different proofs, 2 complementary in some respects,
following the same basic logic or methodology, each of equal
abstractness, and yet each capable of independent formulation
and justification. 3 Moreover, insofar as these proofs focus attention successively on particular aspects of the cosmos, it is
admittedly quite legitimate to say that each one " abstracts
from " other aspects of the same cosmos. Such a use of the
notion of "abstraction," however, is different from the way
in which the abstractive process may be said to differentiate
the sciences. King-Farlow calls attention to my frequent use
of the terms " abstract " and " abstraction " and makes a play
on these expressions in urging his own interpretation of the
prima via-one essentially at variance with that given it in
the Thomistic tradition. The difference between his use of " abstraction " and mine is that he gives the term the rather broad,
precisive meaning just illustrated, whereas I use it in the
technical Aristotelian- Thomistic way employed to differentiate
the various sciences. 4
to the classification of the sciences, see the articles by E. D. Simmons entitled "Abstraction" and "Sciences, Classification of" in the N(}W Catholic Encyclopedia,
16 vols. (New York: McGraw-Hill and Publishers Guild, Inc., 1967, 1974), Vol. 1,
pp. 56-59, and Vol.
pp.
2 Here the quarta via is consciously omitted as being more metaphysical in character than the other four ways.
8 My affirmation of the partly complementary
character of the proofs is shared
by King-Farlow in his books Reason and Religion and Faith and the Life of Reason. He would stress, however, that the proofs are only collectively valid, whereas
I am further claiming their individual validity. See notes 4 and 13, infra.
• Correspondence with King-Farlow shows that we agree to disagr.ee on this
matter of " abstractness " thus. A description D1 is a more abstract description
of the world W than is description D2, when D1 covers fewer sets of predicates
required for indicating the most important features of W. It is Aquinas's claim
and mine that the existence of a physical universe to which predicates of the
natural sciences, N 1 , N 2 • •• •Nn, are truly applied offers sufficient reason to affirm
the existence of a Being to whom related predicates can be assigned and who
is identifiable with the God of Revelation. It is King-Farlow's view that some

THE FIRST:

A REJOINDER

377

To be more specific, the over-riding concern in my articles
cited by King-Farlow has been with mathematical reasoning
and the mathematical physics this generates, which Thomists
commonly think of as operating (at least partially) at the
"second degree" of abstraction, i.e., an abstraction that leaves
aside sensible matter and motion and concentrates exclusively
on the quantifiable aspects of natural phenomena, which aspects are refractory to analysis in terms of efficient and final
causality. The natural philosopher, as opposed to this, operates
at the "first degree" of abstraction, i.e., one that leaves aside
only the individual aspects of natural phenomena so as to consider them universally, but still as involving sensible matter
and motion in their definition, and for this reason open to the
discovery of agents and ends. All cosmological arguments, to
the extent that they are cosmological and in this sense pertain
in some way to natural philosophy, may be seen as functioning
(at least in their initial stages) at this first degree of abstraction. It is preferable, on this account, not to speak of the ways
in which the various cosmological proofs differ among themselves as differences of " abstraction" or of " abstractness."
Here the Thomistic tradition appears to be at odds with KingFarlow, who in the foregoing article speaks first of the prima
via " in physical space " and then of the same proof " in moral
space." Seemingly he regards the latter consideration as less
" abstract" than the former and as more appealing, on that
account, to the Christian theist because of its openness to moral
and personal values. In the traditional view neither of these
considerations is more "abstract" than the other; what is important is that they are precisive of different aspects of the
world of nature and thus may provide the basis for different
cosmological proofs. So, when King-Farlow speaks of " the
prima via in physical space," most of what he says is unexceptional, for he is talking about the prima via as Thomists have
ethical predicates, E 1 , etc., as well as N 1 , etc., must be applicable if sufficient
reason is to be given. This accents, in a different way, our basic difference over
the merely collective validity as opposed to the individual and collective validity
of the proofs.

378

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

generally understood it; when he speaks of the same proof " in
moral space," on the other hand, it is somewhat difficult to
follow his argument. In this second manner of speaking he may
well be on the track of a valid proof for God's existence, but
if so, one would not wish to call this new proof the prima via.
Perhaps what he is proposing there is a nuanced version of
the quinta via, or alternatively, he may be working out a
sexta via, or a septima via, etc. In my published writings, as
opposed to this, I have dealt exclusively with the prima via
in its traditional understanding and resist being drawn into
a related area of discourse, however enlightening this might be
to the Christian theist, particularly when much yet remains
to be done in the domain of" physical space "-as King-Farlow
himself has effectively shown.
To concentrate, then, on the first part of the foregoing
article, the question of the finitude of physical space or
of physical movers and things moved) is certainly integral
to both Aristotle's and Aquinas's arguments for the existence of a First Unmoved Mover. The difference between
the arguments lies in the fact, as is well known, that Aristotle
was convinced of the infinite duration of the universe whereas
Aquinas believed in its creation in time and thus in its temporal
finitude; for purposes of argument, however, Aquinas was
willing to admit the theoretical possibility of an infinite temporal regress, and so his argument does not develop in a way
essentially different from Aristotle's. 5 Both thinkers, moreover,
thought of the hierarchy of movers and moveds in the context
of what is now referred to as a Ptolemaic universe, i. e., a closed
world of finite dimensions and composed of a finite number of
concentric spheres. In such a universe no physical body can be
actually infinite, although, as King-Farlow rightly discerns,
physical bodies can be thought of as made up of a potentially
infinite number of parts, when they are either divided into, or
5 A fuller exposition of Aquinas's view on the temporal finitude of the universe
is given in my article, " Aquinas on Creation: Science, Theology, and Matters
of Fact," The Thomist, 38 (1974), pp.

THE FIRST:

A REJOINDER

379

addition is made to them by means of, proportional parts-the
type of geometrical progression favored by peripatetics and
illustrated so well in King-Farlow's article. 6 For the cosmologist of the present day, of course, the context is quite
different and so the problematic must also be stated differently.
It is precisely his awareness of this situation that has led
Anthony Kenny to reject the Five Ways as hopelessly imbedded in a medieval cosmology. 7 One need not agree with
Kenny's pessimistic evaluation, 8 however, and in fact one can
be quite sympathetic to King-Farlow's analysis above, for the
concept of potential infinity may well prove adequate to handle
objections arising from modem mathematical theories of the
universe. This adequacy cannot be assumed, however, and
requires more detailed argument and substantiation than could
possibly be given in this rejoinder.
Apart from the problem of the finitude of the physical universe, there are other special difficulties associated with the
prima via that arise in the context of modem physics and that
perforce could not have been considered by either Aquinas or
Aristotle. The thorniest problem would seem to be that posed
by inertial motion and the way in which this threatens the
general applicability of the Aristotelian- Thomistic thesis on
the simultaneity of cause and effect (or of mover and thing
moved) to the elimination of the infinite regress possibility.
Some aspects of this problem have been examined in the article
on Newtonian antinomies cited by King-Farlow, but one of
my more recent publications also takes note of a number of
texts where Aquinas admits the possibility of antecedent (i. e.,
6 Some aspects of King-Farlow's
exposition, it may be noted, are adumbrated
in late medieval and scholastic discussions of infinity see especially Domingo de
Soto, Super octo libros physicorum Aristotelis questiones, 2d ed. (Salamanca:
Andrea a Portonariis, 1555), fols. 52r-58r.
• The Five Ways (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1969), p. 3.
8 See my review of this in The Thomist, 36 (1972), pp. 721-724, as well as the
article cited by King-Farlow, "The Cosmological Argument:
A Reappraisal,"
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association, 46 (1972), pp.
43-57.

880

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

non-simultaneous) causality in physical processes.Q To my
knowledge Aquinas nowhere resolves the enigmas that such an
admission creates for the prima via, although a resolution appears generally possible and needs only to be worked out in
detail for types of causal regress that interest the modern
physicist. In fairness to Kenny, moreover, it should be admitted that contemporary Thomists have not adequately answered the questions he raises relating to the motor-causality
principle and the infinite regress as applicable to cases that
have arisen in recent science. This failure would seem to be
traceable in no small part to the proclivity of Thomistic metaphysicians to answer every objection to theistic proofs in terms
of being and the act of existing, and to their failure, as a consequence, to take a close look at the world of nature. If they
pretend to offer cosmological arguments at all, unfortunately
they do so in terms of what the late R. J. Nogar referred to
as a " cosmology without a cosmos," 10 one that is clearly at
variance with both the spirit and the letter of Aquinas himself.
On this account it is refreshing to see King-Farlow addressing
himself to these concrete cosmological problems-for it is only
by solving them that one can promote acceptance of the prima
via by the modern mind. 11
With regard to the apparently abrupt dismissal of the second
part of King-Farlow's article, the following clarification may
now be in order. The introduction of a moral dimension into
discussions of the prima via is particularly distasteful to me
because it inadvertently concedes too much to the two philosophers who have made the prima via unappealing to our
contemporaries, namely, David Hume and Immanuel Kant. As
0 "Aquinas and the Temporal Relation Between Cause and Effect," The Review
of Metaphysics, 'll7 (1974), pp. 569-584.
10 See his essay of that title .in From an Abundant
Spring. The Walter Farrell
Memorial Volume of The Thomist (New York: P. J. Kenedy, 1952), pp. 363-391.
11 I also endorse King- Farlow's view that, if modern commentators
like Copleston
and Kenny present Aquinas over-sympathetically in failing to stress Aristotle's
pertinent view on the finitude of space, then they offend fewer modern physicists,
but they seriously misrepresent St. Thomas's own reasoning. Now is a good time
for us both to stress this.

THE FIRST:

A REJOINDER

381

argued in my second volume on Causality and Scientific Explanation/2 neither Hume nor Kant was consistent in his
understanding of causality, and each effectively adopted a
subjectivist approach to knowledge reached through causal
analysis. For Hume causality became nothing more than a
psychological projection into reality, a matter of " feeling " or
of human anticipation, whereas for Kant it became an a priori
category of the understanding that would serve to organize
phenomena but could yield no knowledge of any reality behind the appearances. For both, therefore, a posteriori demonstration became an impossibility, as did any science of nature
in the epistemic (as opposed to the empiriological) sense, and
cosmological proofs for God's existence could lead at best to
transcendental illusion. Thus for them the way to God through
the intellect and its understanding of the universe was effectively blocked, and if one wished to assent to God's existence
he would have to do so on moral or affective grounds. (This
is not to deny, of course, the validity of theistic proofs based
on such ethical and valuational grounds, but it does oppose
reducing all proofs to this kind, and particularly the prima
via.ls)
As noted in the recently published supplement to the New
Catholic Encyclopedia/ 4 both Hume and Kant tried to elab(Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 1974), pp. 38-51, 60-75.
The fundamental difference between myself and King-Farlow on this point
has been well put by him in our correspondence, as follows: "You take the Five
Ways to be complementary and individually adequate; I take them to be complementary and collectively imposing. You think of deductively sound demonstrations; I think in terms of 'Good Reasons' arguments which wise people can come
to find overwhelming. Burne and Kant may have sometimes thought that reasoning with normative premises is the soft underbelly of philosophical theology as
they understood it. But the enthyrnernatic premise that some arguments are good
and some are bad, some wise, some foolish, etc., then becomes the soft underbelly of aU intelligent reasoning, including Burne's and Kant's. As I argne in
Faith and the Life of Reason, the ' positivist ' attack on the ethical dimension
of what we seem to experience generalizes itself into an attack on all normative
dimensions. But this could only be sound if it is unsound-that is, if we know
some reasoning to be good, bad, worthy of attention, dishonest, etc."
H In my article entitled "Cosmological
Argument," Vol. 16, pp. 105-108.
12

13

38fl

WILLIAM A. WALLACE

orate philosophies of science, but they did so only in a context
provided by classical mechanics, and their efforts have proved
singularly sterile for evaluating realist claims arising from highenergy physics. The discovery of vast numbers of so-called
"elementary particles," with non-classical properties that render them unobservable even in principle, suggests that scientists are now (contra Hume and Kant) de facto employing
causal reasoning to transcend sense experience and to arrive
at deeper ontological explanations of the physical universe.
Such scientists, rather than recent philosophers of empiricist
and analytical bent, are the thinkers who are developing canons
of demonstrative inference that can be used to establish the existence and attributes of entities unlike those falling under
sense observation. In this they have much in common with
Aquinas and with the type of reasoning he employed to elaborate the quinque viae. The obvious task awaiting those of
us who are interested in defending cosmological proofs for
God's existence is to refine and complement their methodology
and show how it can sustain a plausible inference to such a
transcendent cause. And, as has been suggested in the same
supplement/ 5 such an enterprise must be directed, not to the
" religious " person who regards his commitment to God as
an affair of his heart or will and not of his intellect but rather
to the hard-headed thinker who uses his mind to study the
world of nature in objective fashion and so to penetrate to its
underlying causes.
This is not to say, of course, that King-Farlow would be unsympathetic to such a program. But he will probably agree
that it would have to avoid pursuing some of the leads he suggests in the second part of his article so as to devote full time
to clearing up the difficulties he raises in the first.
WILLIAM

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. (J.

15

Ibid., pp. 107-108.

A. WALLACE, O.P.

BOOK REVIEWS
Les Sacr,ements d'initiation et les ministeres sacres. Edited by STANISAS
DocKx, 0. P. Paris: Fayard, 1974. Pp. 272.
This attractively printed paperback should prove ecumenically helpful.
It will enable a much wider public to have access to the proceedings of a
significant dialogue held under the auspices of the International Academy
of Religious Sciences. During the colloquium in question sacramentality
was the unifying theme. Major papers were read by authors representing
various Christian traditions: J. C. de Stage (Anglican), Edward Schweizer
(Lutheran) , Max Thurian (Reform), Paul L'Huiller (Orthodox) , and a
pair of Roman Catholics-Pieter Smulders and the editor. Four of these
speakers concerned themselves with Baptism in one context or another.
They centered in respectively on its relation to: 1) faith; 2) personal
salvation; 3) the Lord's supper in Johannine Literature; and 4) the Holy
Spirit. The remaining two dealt with the Church's ordained ministry:
1) in its relation to the universal priesthood of the baptized (Max Thurian)
and 2) from the perspective of the different powers vested in priest and
bishop (Paul L'Huillier). An appendix presents Edmund Schlink's reflections on problems connected with infant Baptism in societies where large
numbers of parents are Christian in name only.
After each paper a discussion took place. At this point others besides
the colloquium-speakers had an active part in the proceedings. Included
in this category were: Ernst Kiisemann, Hans Kiing, Wolfhart Pannenberg,
Joseph Ratzinger, Harald Riesenfeld, J. J. von Almen, B. D. Dupuy, M. J.
Le Guillou, J. Hajjar, K. Schelkle, Rudolf Schnackenburg, Edmund Schlink,
and A. de Vooght. Their interventions have been preserved in the form
of brief resumes. Sometimes this entailed translating into French observations made in another language. The results show that the effort this involved was well worthwhile. Indeed without this record of what must at
times have been a rather lively exchange, the book would lack much of
its value. A pertinent example may help to illustrate the point.
The New Testament does describe the three distinct ministries of bishop,
priest, and deacon in the way they appear in the teaching of certain
churches of the present day. For example, between the bishop who figures
in the Pastoral Epistles and the one who is prominent in the documents
of Vatican II there is a definite family relationship but a considerable
difference as well. Similarly one should not pretend to discover in the
New Testament the presbyterian-synodal polity of certain Protestant
churches or to assert that their Elders correspond exactly to the presbyters

383

384

BOOK REVIEWS

in the Acts of the Apostles or Pastoral Epistles. So argued Max Thurian
in his presentation entitled: "Le ministere au sein du sacerdoce universe!."
He also posed the logical question at this point. Given the non-conclusive
character of the biblical precedents for church order, how does one find
an ecclesiology that is both ecumenical and true? He gives as well at
least the beginning of an answer.
Such a theology of the church will have to strike a balance between
the importance of recognizing charisms and diverse ministries on the one
hand and due acknowledgement of institution, continuity, and ordination
on the other. (p. 196) A church especially concerned with effecting and
preserving order among the ministries in the Body of Christ easily shuts
itself off from prophetic renewal, while another that is more sensitive to
the distribution of charisms by the Spirit readily blocks the organization
of those charisms in the ordained ministries. The organization of Christ's
body and the freedom of his Spirit should not contradict each other. To
be specific, the universal priesthood of the faithful exists primarily to render
service pointed ad extra-beyond the confines of the church, while the ordained ministry is called first and foremost to serve the church itself.
Such a position leads to a consideration of ordination. He states that on
the basis of the Pastoral Epistles an episcopal ministry as a function providing for government of the church, protection of the deposit of faith,
and regulation of the church's stance in relation to the world seems essential
to the church's life. To be sure, this episcopal function is one situated
in the context of presbyteral collegiality and one assisted by the diaconate.
(p.
Still the Body of Christ must recognize that certain of its members
have been entrusted with the role of expressing the will of Christ its head.
(p.
Indeed God himself wills that in the church there will always
be a ministry that is to continue the work of the Apostles, who were sent
by the Son in the power of the Spirit. (p.
In this perspective ordination is: 1) a prayer to the Holy Spirit for the gifts necessary for ministry;
the actual reception of the charism sought from the Spirit; 3) the transmission of the power of the Spirit from generation to generation; 4) the
consecration of an individual to Christ in the Spirit of power, love, and
prudence; and 5) a recognition by the Church that God has actually given
it a new messenger of his word, presence, and authority. (p.
To all of this Ernst Kasemann quite predictably reacted. He noted that
there are two ways of understanding Christ's Lordship in the present age.
One looks at that Lordship as something perpetuated and imaged in the
church's ordained ministry; the other sees it as a function exercised directly
by Christ himself. The latter is the view of the New Testament; the former
is Ignatian. The threefold ministry of bishop, priest, and deacon is an
"emanation" or a "fully legitimate development" from the New Testament but not for that fact necessary for all times. If one looks at the matter

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in terms of recent history in Germany, Protestant bishops-says Kiisemann-failed more than did their communities in remaining steadfact in
the service of Christ. Existentially speaking, he can no longer, he says, accept the proposition that an ordained minister possesses power and
authority for the mere fact of having been ordained. (pp.
To this Max Thurian replied that he was not sure communities were
more exempt from infidelity than their ordained ministers. Calvin was
right in the Institutes. Bishops are bishops only if they preach the word
of God. Bishops who do so, however, provide as such an intermediate
position between accepting the idea of a ministry that as ordained always
reflects Christ's Lordship and a conception of the one Lord who shows
himself here and there without ordained ministers. (p.
Joseph Ratzinger argued that the Lordship of Christ is precisely and
paradoxically safeguarded in holding fast to one conviction of the primitive
church; namely, that even when the ordained minister does not respond
properly to calls for evangelical service, we cannot for that fact declare
his power dissolved. Only because Christ alone confers and continues to
confer the Sacraments-even if the minister is Judas-is his Lordship
safeguarded and the ministry withdrawn from human whim and caprice.
(p.
At this point Hans Kiing is reported as trying to locate some common
ground shared by the positions of Kiisemann and Ratzinger. (p.
Wolfhart Pannenberg says he is astonished and overjoyed to learn that
Kasemann concedes at least the possibility that from an evangelical perspective what existed from the beginning does not comprise the sum total
of what is legitimate; that change as such can be legitimate (even change
to the monarchical episcopate}. In his own opinion, the ascendancy of
the monarchical episcopate was legitimate because it was the only way
at the time to secure authentic tradition by way of recourse to Christ
as the source of all Christian proclamation. But determination of the canon
of Scripture was necessary as well and during the same period. In other
words, the rise of the monarchical episcopate was perhaps inevitable at
a time when the certitude of Christian tradition was not guaranteed save
through the principle of authority. Thus for his own day Augustine was
right. But when it became possible (to use Max Thurian's words) to say
that bishops are not always bishops even though they are in office, then
the force of conviction became the criterion for judging authority. This
shift occurred at the time of the development of methodical study of the
Bible. Today such study allows church authority itself to be judged as
successful or wanting. That Christ works through and in unworthy ministers is not so much an assertion of his Primacy (and that of christology)
as a christological assumption in a particular type of
··
assumption that must itself be assessed. (pp.

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Ratzinger rejoins that the uncertainty of historical research today leaves
us about where Christians were in Augustine's day without it. (p.
Kasemann, not to be silenced, returns to the fray to register " fundamental opposition on one point." The independence, autonomy, and nonabsorption of Christ into the Christian community cannot be realized
through the ordained ministry but through the word. (p.
The present reviewer would have to side with Ratzinger. But the exchange that occurred confirms him in one conviction he has had for some
time and conveyed to churchmen and theologians alike (e. g., in his paper
at the September meeting in 1974 of the Lutheran-Roman Catholic Bilateral Ecumenical Consultation in the USA and in his address to the
United States Catholic Conference in November of the same year). That
conviction comes to this. In consensus statements that deal with the
church but not with what the authors think of the Lordship exercised by
Jesus Christ today, agreement may be more apparent than real. Is it right
to assume without further ado so broad a consensus on christology? He
thinks not and has recommended that attention be paid by ecumenists to
christological concerns both for the sake of the churches involved and for
a far wider audience. The reader will not be surprised to find out that
the reviewer finds his conviction not only not challenged but actually
confirmed by the discussion recorded in the present volume.
CARL J. PETER
The Catholic University of America
Waahington, D. C.

St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae. Vol. 49 (a. 7-15) The Grace
of Christ. By LIAM G. WALSH, 0. P. New York: McGraw-Hill, 1974.
Pp. 259. $12.50.
Liam Walsh does honor to Dominican scholarship by his careful, lucid
English translation and commentary on questions seven to fifteen of the
"Tertia Pars " of St. Thomas's Summa Theologiae. The volume is entitled, The Grace of Christ, since this question is developed most fully. It
might also have been subtitled, " The Human Condition of the Incarnate
Word," a title which St. Thomas himself used to introduce this section
of his summa. Four main divisions are found in the work: Christ's grace;
Christ's knowledge; Christ's power; Christ's physical disabilities.
What is particularly attractive and helpful in this volume is the Introduction {pp. XVII-XXVII) in which the author situates the question
treated in this part, explains St. Thomas's method, his use of Scripture,

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his anthropological principles, and his theology. The author is not defensive, nor apologetic. He succeds in making a case for a current appreciation
of the thought o£ St. Thomas, while at the same time he freely admits that
there are limitations to the Thomistic synthesis especially in the area
of Christ's knowledge. One does not come away with the impression that
one has been sold a bill of goods. Rather, one finds an honest appraisal
of the advances made in Christology with the aid of more contemporary
philosophies. One cannot help but be impressed.
In addition to the footnotes proper to the Summa there are many (yet,
not too many) excellent explanations of the meaning o£ the text, particularly in relation to developments which have occurred in modern
Christological studies. Again, one finds no attempt to defend but only an
attempt to clarify the context of the particular question and an openness
to other approaches more in line with modern thought and more apt to
coincide with biblical thought-patterns. In his brief, concise commentary
there is evidence of a real familiarity with the documents of tradition, as
well as with recent scriptural syntheses, something which would please the
Master Theologian himself.
The area of St. Thomas's Christological synthesis which is most often
criticized by biblical scholars and modern theologians is that which is
concerned with the knowledge of Christ. This is handled very well in the
commentary: there is a good exposition of Thomas's reasoning and an
appreciation of new insights.
The volume concludes with a glossary of important technical terms. It
is to be hoped that the remaining volumes of this series will be o£ the
same quality as this one.
GEoRGE F. KmwiN,

0. M. I

Oblate Corlege
Washington, D. C.

Theology Today. 17 The Theology of Grace. By CoRNELIUS ERNST, O.P.
Pp. 96. 23 The Theology of Secularity. By GERALD O'CoLLINS, S. J.
Pp. 94. Notre Dame: Fides, 1974. $1.25 each.
When theologians of our time have provided the Church with a wellrounded theology of grace they will have performed perhaps their greatest
service. The Theology of Grace is a notable contribution in that direction. In the opening section on "The Language of Grace" we read:
"It is not as though we were to itemise God's gifts and call one of
them ' grace '; it is rather that ' grace ' qualifies the whole of God's
self-communication as a gift beyond all telling." (p. 29) The second of

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the book's three chapters gives a brief but incisive history of the doctrine
of grace where the factors shaping our recent and somewhat improverished
treatment of ' grace ' are outlined. Among these is the divorce of the gift
of grace from the Giver and the philosophy of the real which was used
to express this theology. These two enlightening chapters prepare the way
for the last in which the author gives his " Perspective for a Theology
of Grace." Because grace is not " one item among the many gifts God
bestowed on man," the author believes that there is no such thing as a
theology of "grace" which would parallel a theology of Christ, say, or the
sacraments. Rather he tries to "elicit some kind of centre in experience . . . from which . . . we might refresh our awareness of the whole
of human existence under God as gift . ... " (p. 93) Toward this end
he presses into service the notion of "meaning" which he feels is more
relevant in our times. "Grace" brings new meaning into man's life,
a transformation, because it implies a totally new destiny, a new communion between God and man, made possible by Christ's death and resurrection. The relationship of grace to nature, freedom, sin, sacraments,
Holy Spirit is dealt with from this fresh point of view; a pity it has to
be so brief. The profundity and originality of this volume is such that
a bigger book would be needed to do it justice. Those who study this
work, and study is needed, will be richly rewarded for their efforts.
Secularization is one of the more important elements in the theologian's
milieu in our time. If many find themselves ill-at-ease believing, it may be
because they have not yet come to terms with the role the secular world
should play in their interests and commitments.
(the "non-religious")
In his search for the ultimate basis of a theology of secularity the author
of The Theology of Secularity regards the doctrine of creation (which he
deals with only in its Old Testament context) together with God's intervention in saving-history as providing only provisional lines. The Incarnation and the ministry of Jesus too are considered inadequate for this role,
and the conclusion is that " only the death and Resurrection of Christ
provide the adaequate backing for a theology of secularity." (p. 49)
Christ "died a degrading, radically secular death," but this was the occasion "when the divine initiative commenced the process of effecting the
new creation." By the Resurrection the most secular becomes most radically transformed. This means that there now is the promise that the tension
between the "secular" and the "religious" will be resolved, partially here,
and totally hereafter. This Christian hope is the source of man's responsible
service to the world, where he holds the delicate balance of respecting its
good without idolizing it. This doctrine is applied to the Church in its
worship, its relation to the world, and as an institution, where a plea is
made for greater democracy in elections, shorter periods of rule for bishops,
and for ordained women, this last in the name of St. Paul and of the

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popular press! The style is racy, readable, and light, and in parts the
content has no " weight problem " either. Overall, the book is fresh,
original, and stimulating, and a worthwhile contribution to an area in
theology needing profundity and integration.
PETER KIRKE, 0. P.
St. Charles' Seminary,
Nagpur, India

Authority. Edited by FREDERICK J. ADELMANN. The Hague, Netherlands:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1974. ll8. Guilders 27.50.
In his Foreword editor Frederick J. Adelmann says of these collected
essays: " It is up to the reader to try to discern the truth enunciated partially at least in each of these essays, keeping in mind, of course, that any of
us in our human philosophical speculations is also limited." (p. 5) In
general, the limitations are more pronounced than one would hope; more
significantly, the collection as a whole suffers from the weaknesses of each
essay, which weaknesses are highlighted by the lack of any truly integrating
thread which might collect the parts into one. There are moments of
promise, but the brevity of each essay prohibits the internal development
of such promises; externally, the promises of one essay tend not to complement the hope raised in some other essay.
In spite of such criticism one welcomes a volume on" authority." What
structured group of people in the contemporary Western world does not
ache for a sane experience of saving authority? The words "my countryright or wrong " are too hauntingly familiar; hearing them reminds us of
those who could not obey an authority they judged to be without moral
undergirding. "Law and order" sounds like a call for strongly-exercised
authority; those who recoguize the underlying code anticipate selective
repression, not true authority. The Roman Catholic Church writhes in
the agony of having no well-understood authority. Episcopal collegiality
is seen by some as a challenge to papal authority; one often surmises,
righty or wrongly, that episcopal proponents of collegiality are less enthusiastic when such a doctrine would appear to diffuse episcopal authority,
extending the responsibility for decision-making to sub-episcopal realms.
And yet most everyone dreams of the emergence of truly authoritative
voices; the same tongue which acidly eats at recent expressions of " authority " cries longingly for leadership.
Karl Rahner's "Theology and the Church's Teaching Authority after
the Council" engagingly raises the issue, while typically (for Raimer) not
pretending to resolve it definitively; one can discern an appreciation for

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the " will " element of authority while also being reminded of the significance of the " intellect," the content of what is stated with authority.
Indeed, the most profitable theme which recurs spurtingly and with uneven clarity in this little volume is that " authority " very much involves
the communication of some value from one to another (which is most
usually a grouping of others). (Joseph M. Bochenski's spirited foray into
the formal logic of authority, albeit unfulfilling for those on a rather more
metaphysical journey, even reminds us that authority is a triadic relation.)
Probing what it means to call Einstein an "authority" in physics serves
to open up new possibilities for re-understanding ecclesial "authority";
as soon as one recalls that disputes about ecclesial " authority " are
most often about "teaching authority," one is reminded that Einstein is a
more felicitous analogate than is Hitler. Richard T. DeGeorge incisively
sorts out four types of authority in morality and uses this distinction to
clarify some existing painful misunderstandings; it is good for him to
remind us that when " authorities " disagree among themselves, the " authority " of each is diminished, and it is likewise good to be convinced
that the parent/child relationship is not an appropriate paradigm for most
instances of moral authority.
The volume is dedicated to John Wild whose death punctuated the
months between the completion of his essay "Authority" and the publication of the collection Authority; such a dedication would have been merited
solely by the clarity and wisdom of his essay which enjoys first position in
the collection. Having shown the triadic nature of "authority," he speculates on the errors which can arise when the one who is an authority shifts
his stance too near to (a) the value being communicated or (b) the one (s)
who depend upon him as an authority. When religion is the arena, the
former alternative leads to an " authority " who seems to identify himself
with God himself (rather than serve merely as a reputable authority within
the God/man matrix); the second alternative forecloses any appreciation
of the transcendent by identifying the " authority " with those purported
to be subject to authority. While Wild draws the distinction between Roman
Catholicism and the communities of the Reformation, one can fruitfully
illustrate intramural Roman Catholic debates today by borrowing from
Wild on this point.
If Wild shifts the emphasis to the content, the value, the intellectual
component (in distinction from a heavily voluntaristic theory of authority), William H. Davis reminds us of the "will" component in "authority "; a true experience of authority always involves the subjection of
oneself to another to some degree. For Davis the authority of interest is
God himself; just as the scientist enters upon new knowledge only by
submitting himself to the limitations of the matter being studied, structuring his investigations according to the laws (a word laden with overtones

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of " authority ") , so will the religious creature only truly know his Creator
to the extent that he is subject to him.
One should report the inclusion of a very few pages by Bernard Lonergan.
One unfamiliar with Lonergan can only fail to grasp his words on " authority " because they are cast totally in Lonerganian categories. One who has
already exposed his mind to Lonergan will recognize here a sketetal summary of the introductory chapters of Method in Theology, which were
themselves a matured distillation of Insight; hence, one is offered a potentially-helpful unnuanced overview of the basic Lonergan, but the joy of
that insight tends to give way to displeasure with the murkiness of " authenticity," a concept integral to Lonergan's understanding of "authority."
WILLIAM J. FINAN, 0. P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

Lions and Foxes: Men and Ideas of the Italian Renaissance. By SIDNEY
ALEXANDER. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1974. Pp. 386. $12.95.
Two periods in the history of western culture have exercised and continue to exercise unabated fascination: the "golden age" of Pericles in
ancient Athens and the Renaissance in Italy. The differences between these
periods are deep and significant; but their basic similarity, from which
that common fascination stems, is even more profound and replete with
meaning for modern man. The differences can best, perhaps, be rendered
visual by a contrast between an artistic masterpiece of the one period and
of the other: the Milonian Venus, for example, and the Pieta of Michaelangelo (by preference, not the early Vatican version but the profoundly
moving version of his old age). The cool, remote, and chiseled perfection
of the first, in which all movement has been arrested in a moment of perfect equilibrium, all commotions of the heart stilled to a dreamlike calm;
the sinuous and even agonizing expressivity of the marble of the second
brought to pulsating life by the inner turmoil of emotion: these define the
differences more clearly than any words might do. But the similarity between the two ages, as signalized in those same masterpieces, is even
greater. Each is a monument to the creative movement by which the human spirit lives in every age: for man in every age is what he creates. In
every period of his history his great emprise is to release the creative power
within him and, in doing so, bring into being, not something other than
himself but his own profoundest reality. For this reason every age in which
this creative power has found compelling expression fascinates men of all
other ages, for in that age men see mirrored their own highest possibilities.

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A profound narcissism, one will say; this cannot be denied but, it must
be added, a fruitful narcissism as the spirit's history proves.
The stated purpose of Alexander's book is to hold up the mirror of the
creative life of the Italian Renaissance to contemporary men; even more,
to transmit to him, not the mere outer image and appearance of that age
but something of the creative principle from which those marvelous manifestations spring, whence, whether in word or ikon or emprise, they draw
their life and power. This is a purpose which cannot be praised too highly.
It may, perhaps, draw upon itself some measure of disdain from the scholarly who have in memory as paradigms the great and exacting works of
Wittkower, of Panofsky, of Garin, and their peers; the word "popularization " may even rise to their lips. There is, without question, a strong
element of popularization (" divulgazione" is the term Alexander, with
his love of all things Italian, might prefer) in the present pages. The disdain,
on the whole, however, is unwarranted. Popularization is in itself one of
the chief functions of culture and, in its own way, a creative process. That
disdain would be especially unwarranted in the present case, moreover,
because at every point in the popularizing process Alexander gives ample
evidence of his more than adequate control and mastery of the sources.
He does not, to be sure, parade those sources or his mastery of them in
classical academic fashion; but when he needs them he can call upon them
with complete assurance that they will answer and sustain him. His power
of exemplification and illustration is pointed, his quotations almost unfailingly apt and authoritative. The reader feels at once that he is in
the presence not, perhaps, of a great and original scholar but of a versatile,
sensitive, and articulate cognoscente-a reassuring feeling which makes it
possible for the reader to surrender himself to the narrative without reserve.
Alexander's purpose is to project for the contemporary reader the creative power and tone of the period. To do so he selects, as his title announces, two channels: men and ideas. Between these he does not, in
these pages, establish a meticulous balance. The men predominate, easily.
The term "idea," moreover, is understood in a large and liberal sense as
including, not rigidly formulated scientific and philosophical concepts alone
but rather the whole range of guiding and inciting insights by which the
imagination and the will, as well as the intellect, of man can be stirred.
Granted the purpose and the cultural framework of this book, this is an
entirely defensible employment of the term. Science and philosophy form
but two dimensions, though very basic dimensions, of culture while the
creative principle draws its inspiration from many other sources as well.
Following the author's lead, then, we may profitably review, first, some
of the figures, the men and women to whom he calls attention and then,
in turn, some salient ideas.
How rich the pageant of illustrious personages that traverses these pages!

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393

It is as though the pages of Vespasiano da Bisticci had opened wide or
the thronged panels of Montegna's murals in the Sala dei Sposi in Mantua
had quickened into life. Popes, cardinals, princes, warriors, artists, scholars,
philosophers, prophets follow one upon another, not in orderly array but
pressing close in eager clusters, crying out to history, like the souls of
Dante's nether regions, not to be forgotten, hungering for that shadowy
immortality which may be theirs in the fickle memories of men. To attend
to all their voices would be the merest justice-for all are so vital, so hauntingly human. We can only hearken to a very few, however, choosing those
who reflect, in their personalities, so diverse and yet so similar, the diverse
aspects of the age.
It is clear at once that Alexander possesses a special predilection and
affinity for Michaelangelo. Indeed, it could be argued that he interprets
the age as a whole essentially on the model of that volcanic genius. There
are many who would argue that the essential Renaissance man is Leonardo,
not Michaelangelo. In this case, the quality of the life of the age, interpreted in function of that unquestioned genius, would be very different
indeed. But before Leonardo Alexander displays a certain diffidence the
source of which is difficult to fix. It may be that what most attracts those
who would lift Leonardo to that pinnacle-the element mystery which envelops him, the haunting and not entirely benign aura of the magus which
cloaks him (and which Merezhkovsky projects so powerfully) does not
awaken sympathy in Alexander's essentially robust spirit. It is very clear,
however, that the volcanic energy of Michaelangelo does. How Alexander
savors the appellation " titanic" which he unstintingly invokes in Michaelangelo's regard. The sweep of the imagination, the will and power which
release those forms by direct "levatura "-hard steel on resistent marble
under the relentless pressure of the human hand-thrill him. But the
attraction of this aspect of the complex soul of Michaelangelo does not
blind him to its other nuances. He senses as well the suffering inward spirit,
struggling to release itself from the heavy armature of time and matter like
the inward, hidden form struggling to emerge from the heavy burden of
stone-but with no hand to wield the liberating chisel and mallet. Alexander is especially impressive in his sensitive response to the poetry of
Michaelangelo--a sculptor's poetry. It is perhaps the kind of poetry he
would write himself (the sentiments, ideas, images are hewn from the resistent language-Michaelangelo
is perhaps the only tongue-tied Italian to
appear in history) like the David from the stone, with muscle and sweat.
Impressive too is Alexander's sensitivity to the gradual inward transformation of Michaelangelo's spirit, the steady taming of the titanic energy with
the passing years and growing knowledge of life, until it reaches that lyric
melancholy-expressed in the second Pieta which defies words to convey
and draws tears to behold.

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The principle which draws Alexander to Michaelangelo also draws him
to Savonarola: concentrated and condensed power, hard compressed,
packed down and straining to burst forth. Savonarola is the sculptor of the
soul, his own and that of the people among whom his life was cast. Out
of the resistent flinty matter of Florentine materialism and worldliness he
tried, by the sheer " levatura " of his prophetic soul and his fiery wordhis growth as a preacher is one of Alexander's more felicitous insights-to
hew a monument of spiritual and civic virtue. Savonarola had Michaelangelo's power; what he lacked was his inward perceptivity, that perceptivity which finally surfaced and transformed Michaelangelo's genius,
rendering it more human in its melancholy humility that it was in its
power and pride. Perhaps time was not given Savonarola to undergo a
like . transformation; no one can say. What time does not grant nothing
can repair. But Alexander does bring out the strongest features of this
enigmatic, tragic, and yet withal attractive man-attractive in those very
features which, abstractly, should render him abhorrent; for every man
does feel the attractive power of absolute sincerity, and no one who has
contemplated that fiery consummation of his life endured with superhuman fortitude-even accepted-has ever imagined Savonrola devoid of
sincerity.
The Renaissance was not, viewed candidly, a philosophic age. Its
energies flowed too abundantly in other channels, and it had to go too much
to school to the ancients before it could deploy its own capacities in this
elusive field. It does abound, however, in philosophic sensitivity, and this
sensitivity finds exquisite expression in Marsilio Ficino. Alexander senses
the importance of Ficino in the integral pcture of the Renaissance; he
mentions him often, but confronts him never. Perhaps this is not too
difficult to explain. A man with so strong an affinity with Michaelangelo
would hardly be expected to respond with equal warmth to the introspective genius of Ficino. This lack, though comprehensible, nevertheless
constitutes a serious flaw in the exposition and for two reasons. The first
has already been suggested: Ficino is integral to the Renaissance though
ancillary to the history of philosophy in its major movement; any neglect
of him, consequently, does slight the movement as a whole. The second
is even more serious: Ficino was a true, though not a strong and original,
philosophical mind. The doctrine of the Theologia Platonica de immortalitate animorum reveals the innermost soul and longing of the Renaissancethe longing to rise to God on the Pegasus of the Platonic idea. The commentary on the Symposium of Plato is one of the greatest documents of
the synthesis of the Greek and Christian insights of love-eros and
charitas-that we possess. Not to know and appreciate Ficino fully is not
to know the Renaissance or to appreciate it in one of its richest themes.
More than by any other figures of the Renaissance, Alexander is in-

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trigued by the popes of the period. Bewildered, perhaps, were an even
apter term to convey his stance in their regard-belwildered, yet fascinated. He does parade them before us: Alexander, Julius, Leo, but it
is apparent that his vision of them is impeded by the stereotype which
hovers before his eyes. Alexander does not see the papacy for what it
is: a promise of Christ that his spirit will be present with the Church always. Consequently he cannot make the distinction between the office and
the man who transitively occupies it which is absolutely necessary for historical and spiritual comprehension. He is, consequently, forever making
an invalid illision from the character of the one to that of the other.
Alexander is always somewhat scandalized by his namesake, for example,
whereas a true grasp of the functional relation between the abiding and
the transient-the papacy and the pope-would have endowed him with
some perception and compassion-and even a little humor (of which, incidentally, he displays appallingly little throughout the book), such as surely
would be awakened in a believer by the sight of a Pope wearing armor
beneath his papal robes. Factually, his account of these figures, absolutely
integral to any treatment of the period, cannot be faulted; but in insight
it must be accounted amazingly impoverished.
Where a true measure of praise must be rendered to Alexander is in
his treatment of Guicciardini. This truly great historian and critic-the
Thucydides of his time is not, perhaps, too high an accolade-has for
the most part been completely overshadowed by Machiavelli. Croce, with
his exquisite sense of historical balance (and justice), tried, without prejudice to Machiavelli, to place Guicciardini in a truer light, and de
Caprariis, in Croce's footeteps, tried to advance this purpose. Alexander,
sketchily in the relevant chapter of this present work and more substantially in his translation and introduction of Guicciardini's History of Italy,
follows them with great profit. Of Guicciardini it may be said that he
fulfilled even more than Machiavelli the latter's avowed purpose "videre
come stanno le cose." Realistic insight into men and affairs, a judgment
exquisitely balanced, neither moralistic nor amoral but moral in the most
human and humanistic sense of the term and a high standard of critical
(for the time and the subject) scholarship, plus a vivid, inexhaustibly
fertile style mark his writings-and Alexander appreciates every aspect
of his talent.
It is through ideas also, however, that Alexander would project for us
the creative power of the Renaissance. Here, unfortunately, his touch
is much less sure and his success, consequently, less than might have been
hoped for. First of all, there seems to be lacking in his presentation the
presence-or at least the adequate presence--of an entire dimension of the
culture of the Renaissance, namely, the emergence of the modem scientific
consciousness which is surely to be traced here in this vibrant age. However
one may evaluate this dimension of modem culture-positively or negative-

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ly, to slight it, as Alexander does (for one would not care, in the light of
his sweeping mastery of the period, to suggest that it has eluded him)
would seem unjust simply from an historical point of view and leaves a
serious lacuna in an otherwise rich and detailed depiction. The citation
of the testimony of a single witness, authoritative as Marie Boas surely
is, repairs the fault to some extent, but not nearly enough. Randall's work
on the school of Padua (Abano), for example, is utilized not at all.
This lack in the order of ideas is not as arresting or as disturbing as
another, namely, Alexander's whole manner of treating ideas. He treats
them wholly in function, it seems to the present reviewer, of men. Now
it is true that ideas come into the world, like human offspring, wholly
through the agency of men (bracketing, but by no means questioning the
doctrine of the immediate creation of the individual soul) ; it is equally
true, nevertheless, that, again like the human being, ideas, once delivered,
also have lives of their own; more accurately, have a life principle, immanent to themselves and not reducible to that of their progenitors. This
is a fact which the historian of ideas holds to be elementary and which
becomes a cardinal principle of his methodology: he treats the ideas and
does not reduce them to dimensions of the consciousness of their originators.
He seeks, in other words, to respect their autonomy.
The historical fact is that the Renaissance did see the birth of ideas
in this sense, i. e., as having an autonomous life principle of their own. Indeed, it was an age drunk with the heady wine of ideas which it did not
see as mere extrapolations of the life-consciousness or life styles of their
progenitors. Here again the witness of a Ficino, a Pomponazzi, a Pico della
Mirandola may be invoked with confidence. And as further witness one
need but cite such historians as Koyre, Cassirer, Duhem, Carin, Kristeller
and others of this same order. The transition from the closed to the infinite universe, as Koyre correctly records and analyzes it, traceable to the
genius of Bruno, is a transcendental transaction and in no way a mere
function of the consciousness of Bruno; and so of other key ideas of the
period in the treatment of these other authorities. But frankly one would
never suspect from Alexander's book that this exciting and historically important dimension of the life of the Renaissance possessed an irreducible life
of its own. On this point it does not seem possible to exculpate him.
Nevertheless, all in all, his is a hearty book, to be quafted, like a hearty
ale, with gusto and relish. It has little of what is new in it, but what
it has is hearty fare, nourishing and served up with attractive style. The
neophyte will find much to learn from it, while even the seasoned scholar
will find that it gives him occasion to pour over again with renewed pleasure
and satisfaction familiar persons places and images-surely not the least
of joys to be garnered from a good book.

A. RoBERT CAPONIGRI
Unive:rsity of Not:re Dame
Not:re Dame, Indiana

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397

Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of God. By BERNARD TYRRELL, S. J. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1974. Pp. 216. $12.95.
This book is a revised version of the author's doctoral dissertation,
written under the same title and successfully defended at Fordham University. The first section deals with "the new context" which distinguishes
Lonergan's philosophy of God both from "more classical approaches" and
from " diverse contemporary efforts " as well. The second studies in detail
the internal development of that same philosophy over the years and comes
to the conclusion that despite important shifts of emphasis on his part,
Lonergan still regards as valid the proof for the existence of God that is
found in chapter 19 of Insight.
There is an epilogue by Dr. Philip McShane, who says he wishes to
associate himself with the stance taken by the author in the text. Lonergan
himself has a brief Foreward in which he asserts that, despite appearances
to the contrary, the cognitional theory given in Insight involved not a
faculty psychology but rather intentionality analysis. The latter, however,
has implications he did not advert to in the work in question. In retrospect
the way he expressed his position at that time may now appear incongruous
and reminiscent of the older Aristotelian-Thomist approach to the question
of God. As to the issues this raises, Dr. Tyrrell has given them full and
professional treatment; so Lonergan on the present volume.
With this judgment the reviewer agrees. A former student of Lonergan,
to whom he owes more than he is probably aware of, he found Tyrrell's
presentation clear, fair, and to the point. There were, however, two aspects
of Lonergan's philosophy of God that he hoped would be treated in a more
developed fashion.
The first has to do with the world-relatedness of God. For Lonergan it
would be a contradiction in terms for God as the formally unconditioned,
unrestricted act of understanding, to be in any sense in intellectual dependence on anything else. (p. 158) Schubert Ogden errs in thinking that
the result is an existentially repugnant divine indifference. (p. 175) On
the contrary, God is not indifferent to man's choices and actions. Transcendence is the way to account for the divine plan's effectiveness and man's
contingent choices. (ibid.)
Lonergan wants to say just this and does actually do so. But does it
do justice to what he also writes regarding contingent predications about
God? The latter require for their truth the existence of a finite term. So
Lonergan; and so Tyrrell reports accurately. For the reviewer there are
unanswered questions at this point. That finite term, distinct from and
caused by the divine being, is a condition for the truth that God is,
for example, Creator. The creature may be simply the subsequent condition for the truth of God's being Creator. Or it may be as well the

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hypothetically necessary, subsequent, and real condition for God's being
Creator? It seems God is somehow conditioned in either case-and this
may have implications not adverted to by Lonergan. To be sure efficient
causality does not involve a change in God as agent. But does it not
make for Actus
differently constituted from what Actus Purus would
have been eternally .had God with equally free self-determination and
without modification in his perfection willed not to create; not to be a
Creator God? The reviewer has answered affirmatively in this journal (Vol.
83, pp. 150-61). Perhaps he is mistaken; he did however hope that this
issue would be treated more in detail than it was. Greater elaboration of
the implications involved in positing creatures as a subsequent condition
for the truth of God's being Creator might well meet Ogden's concern more
effectively than is the case when the matter is settled by recourse to divine
transcendence. Nor would, the reviewer maintains, this have to imply
change in Actus Purus.
The second matter has to do with the genesis of Lonergan's cognitional
theory. The reviewer has already asked, again in this journal (Vol. 87,
pp. 60Q-10), whether acceptance of Vatican I's doctrine about doctrine may
not have influenced Lonergan's theory of judgment as involving a virtually
unconditioned. Pannenberg seems to have his own serious reservations
about the virtually unconditioned character of judgments. In other words,
it is still possible to attempt to appropriate one's own consciousness and
come up with a different description of judgment. Surely Lonergan thinks
his own view of the matter is independent on a doctrinal position regarding
doctrine. The reviewer thinks that may be true but is not so sure as to dismiss the question. Efforts at some sort of an answer would have significant
bearings on one's assessment of Lonergan's philosophy of God. To that
degree the matter would have been pertinent in the present work.
Clearly the reviewer has expressed his scruples and tried to explain why.
Still he thinks Dr. Tyrrell deserves credit not merely for his intention of
investigating Lonergan's development but also for the professional skills
manifested in bringing the task off. In short, the reviewer is happy to
recommend this book, especially to the philosophers and theologians who
wrongly in his view seem to have formed premature judgments regarding
Lonergan's significance.
CARL

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

J. PETER

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399

Cla.'Ssical Approaches to the Study of Religion. Aims, Methods and
Theories of Research. Vol. 1. Introduction and Anthology. By JACQUES
WAARDENBURG. The Hague & Paris: Mouton, 1973. Pp. 742. $21.75.
This is the most significant work in an impressive series on method and
theory in religion study now being published by Mouton under the general
editorship of Jacques Waardenburg. Waardenburg's own contribution to
the series is a two-volume resource book. The first volume consists of
a full historical introduction to scholarly research and an anthology of those
scholars who have contributed most to the methodological framework in
the study of religion.
Reflection on the history of religion study is compounded by the multiplicity of disciplines, methodologies, and subjects that scholars employ.
Clarification of method and discipline in religion study began with the
first university chairs in religion in the 1870's and continues with greater
refinement today. Resources in the history of religions'Wissenschaft have
been somewhat scattered and thus limited to a few scholars, but the book
under consideration both gathers together resources and encourages reflection on the history of religion study.
From its inception in the last century to the present, religion study
reflected both the history of the emergence of new disciplines such as
anthropology, sociology, and psychology, and new methodologies such as
historical, comparative, and phenomenological approaches to religious understanding. Waardenburg, beginning in the introduction with the new rationalism of the 18th century, traces the interests of 19th-century scholars
who forged the new disciplines and methodologies and finally grounds the
search for intelligibility in religion study in the 20th century. A supplemental text which offers greater comprehensiveness at this point is The
Study of Religion by Jan de Vries (New York: 1967), who begins his
historical survey with the Greek philosophers to the moderns. W aardenburg, nonetheless, is especially good within the limits set to show the
changing subject matter in religion study as it advances from myth to
origin questions, and from the broad range of religious phenomena to phenomenological structures. The contributions of the early anthropologists,
sociologists, and psychologists in their methodological framework and their
religious questions set the stage for contemporary religion study. A fivefold framework is employed in both the introduction and the anthology
itself, namely, the study of religion established as an autonomous discipline,
connections with other disciplines, religion as a special subject of research,
contributions from other disciplines, and finally perspectives of a phenomenological study of religion. A genetic understanding of the history
of the field and the development of method is set forth. Other works
which have attempted to do what Waardenburg does are usually thematic.

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In Walter H. Capps' Ways of Understanding Religion (New York: 1972),
for example, an excellent thematic anthology and methodological study is
presented which offers a more readable text for teacher and student but
remains inferior as a resource tool.
The anthology is limited to forty-one scholars. The perimeters are set
by Max Muller, the so-called father of religionswissenschaft, from the
middle of the last century to the middle of this century, thus excluding
any living scholar. An anthology obviously needs perimeters, but by
eliminating living scholars a whole moment has been lost. W aardenburg is
specifically concerned with the birth and development of the phenomenological method in religion study, but by excluding important contributions from Mircea Eliade, C. J. Bleeker, and Ninian Smart, all living
scholars, the anthology becomes significantly dated. Moreover, the work
of Wilfred Cantwell Smith in the history of religions, Claude Levi-Strauss
and Georges Dumezil in structural understanding have advanced religion
study so greatly that to exclude them immediately dates the field prior
to the 1950's. In fact, the anthology should more properly be titled religion study from 1870 to 1950. These comments are not meant to reduce
the value of this book but to indicate that with limited supplemental works,
a complete overview of the field may be grasped.
The selection of texts is generally excellent, showing constructive editorial
skill. In order to delineate Frazer's method in the Golden Bough, for example, excerpts from the three different prefaces of the three editions of
the study trace the author's self-understanding. One norm adopted by
W aardenburg in the selection of texts is to use only material which has
been translated into English. It is difficult to understand why such an
arbitrary norm is followed, but it has not in general lessened the value of
the work. In one case, in the opinion of this reviewer, a substantial text
on method in religion study is absent, namely, material from Joachim
Wach's untranslated Verstehen. What runs through the anthology is
Waardenburg's concern for phenomenology, and some rarely considered
texts are included here which enhance considerably the understanding of
the phenomenological method. Max Scheler's distinctive essay on the
difference between descriptive and essentialistic phenomenology, and his
effort to show the dialectic and difference between psychology and phenomenology, is usually not included in the history of phenomenology but is
wisely included here.
The only criticism one could have with Waardenburg's editorial work
is that he has not highlighted enough the classic contributions. Not all
forty-one authors are of equal importance in religion study. From the
point of view of religionswissenschaft the work of Otto, Van der Leeuw,
and W ach must be seen as classical both in terms of religion as an area of
study and as setting a methodological framework. An anthology should

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401

not eliminate the necessity to return to the classical writers and their work
in their entirety. This is clear today in psychology of religion with Freud
and Jung and in socio-anthropology of religion with Weber and Durkheim.
No anthology in method can be a substitute to return consistently to the
classics of Otto, Vander Leeuw, Wach, and Eliade, for no discipline cancels
its classics without fundamentally altering itself.
Mention should be made of the three indices in this volume: an index
of personal names; an index of scholarly concepts; and an index of concrete subjects. The second, the index of scholarly concepts, contains terms
which are both theoretical and methodological in the study of particular
materials. A historical development is found in this index itself. Rarely
is an index so useful in research. This indicates the perduring value of
the book as a research tool. The second volume, which is now in print, is
an extensive bibliography of the forty-one scholars in this anthology and
over 170 scholars treated in Waardenburg's introduction. The outcome
is a basic research tool rarely found in publishing today.
WILLIAM CENKNER, 0. P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington. D. C.

The Reluctant Vision: An Essay in the Philosophy of Religion. By T.
PATRICK BURKE. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974. Pp. 136. $3.00.
One of the curiosities of recent philosophy of religion in English-speaking
countries has been its narrow focus. The point of departure has been almost invariably a set of problems associated with· the crisis of modern
Western theism-the existence of God, the immortality of the soul, and
the ethics of belief. The authors and editors evince little awareness that
these issues have no such prominence in non-Western cultures and that
they consume less than the total attention of Judaism and Christianity.
Consequently it does not dawn on them that the " philosophy of religion "
might start with larger concerns likely to embrace the wide range of
religious experiences and traditions.
T. Patrick Burke's slender but eloquent The Reluctant Vision provides
a fine antidote to this narrowness. Burke attempts a functional analysis
which would illuminate religion in its diverse as well as in its common
features. What he sees as common is a structured interpretation of life
which involves a problem of over-riding importance, a proposed solution
and a corresponding path towards the solution. The difference of problems,
solutions, and paths appears, in this scheme, to distinguish one religion from
another. Thus, Chinese religions (Taoism and Confucianism) have a char-

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BOOK REVIEWS

acteristic preoccupation with the relation of man to nature, Indian religions
(Hinduism, Buddhism, Jainism) dwell more on the problem of suffering,
and the semitic religions (Judaism, Christianity, Islam) on the relationships of men with each other. The nuances of problem, solution or path
make for the more precise distinctions within these broad cultural groupings.
It is, then, interest rather than sheer curiosity which is at the heart of religion and the diversity of interests which makes for the diversity of religions. The Buddhist stands apart from the Christian, to take one instance of diversity, more because of the centrality of pain in his interpretation of life than because of any directly theoretical disagreement about
Gautama or Jesus.
The problem-solution-path analysis is reminiscent of the familiar presentation of the Four Noble Truths of Buddhism: there is pain; desire is the
cause of pain; the elimination of desire eliminates pain; and the Eightfold
Noble Pathway is the road to the elimination of desire. Applied to other
religions in The Reluctant Vision, the method proves fruitful in abundant
insight. Yet the same fecund method can be a procrustean bed when
applied as single-mindedly as in this book. Burke would make the questions he calls factitive or metaphysical (questions about the nature of
Brahman or Nirvana or God) secondary, albeit important matters for
religions. The Christian churches have, nonetheless, generally given these
same questions a priority and have claimed to draw the interpretation of
life from authoritative answers. This author prefers to let the strength
of his method justify itself by a method of disclosure, but he needs some
argument for bypassing the self-understanding of some of the religions he
studies.
The Reluctant Vision draws much of its strength from its valuable reflections on apparently simple concepts such as " interest," "purpose," " community," "recognition" and their application in an account of the religious
life. One is reminded, both by its style and by its approach, of Alfred
North Whitehead's The Modes of Thought to which Burke pays explicit
homage. But even here one looks for a more extended treatment, and
the brevity of remarks on a concept like " metaphor " ill befits the stress
placed upon it in the discussion of change and continuity in religious communities. In his concern for brevity and simplicity the author runs the
risk of becoming cryptic.
Burke tried his analysis of religion as an interpretation of life previously
in a long esay entitled "Theology as Part of the Study of the Phenomenon
of Religion" and published in Franklin Littell's Searching in the Syntax
of Things. He has more recently been pursuing the question in an American Academy of Religion seminar on the study of religion as a phenomenon.
Perhaps a still more satisfying presentation of the method of The Reluctant
Vision will come from this continuing investigation. It will need to be

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408

longer and more cautious, but the quality of these first two efforts warrants
hopeful anticipation of future work.
MICHAEL J. KERLIN
LaSalle College
Philadelphia, Pa.

The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle. In the
Latin T1·anslation of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (t 1253).
Critical edition with an introductory study by H. PAUL F. MERCKEN.
Vol. I. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1973. Pp. XII+ 135* + 371. Guilders
108.
This is the first volume of a three-volume edition of the Latin version
by Robert Grosseteste of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics (NE) plus several
partial commentaries. Paul Mercken (Sarah Lawrence) has worked a long
time on this important collection of ethical treatises. His excellent training
and patient research at Louvain and Oxford are guarantees of the quality
of scholarship evident in this book. The second and third volumes (Corpus
Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum) will be edited with
the assistance of J. P. Reilly, Jr. (Yale) and will contain the last six books,
plus scholia and indexes. Mercken published in 1964 (Brussels) a preliminary edition of the first two books of this collection, under the Flemish
title, Aristoteles over de menselijke Volkomenheid (my review appeared
in The Modern Schoolman XLIII, 1966, 198). The present volume adds
two more books.
Bishop Grosseteste perfected his knowledge of Greek in his mature years
and seems also to have used the services of several Greek scholars in
England to produce a number of Latin versions (many were revisions of
earlier imperfect translations) of Greek works of science, philosophy, and
theology. It is difficult to determine how much Grosseteste contributed
personally to these translations and how much was done by assistants such
as Robertus Graecus, Nicholas Graecus, John of Basingstoke, and possibly
Adam Marsh. However, D. A. Callus, 0. P., who probably knew this
field better than anyone, considered Grosseteste a very good Greek
scholar-and Mercken agrees.
At some point Grosseteste had procured a Greek codex of the NE, to
which had been added several sets of annotations which formed a Greek
commentary on all ten books. This collection is still extant in two Greek
MSS at Oxford, where Mercken spent three years of research. Besides the
text of Aristotle, the collection included a remarkable gloss on Books I
and VI written by the Byzantine theologian, E\lstratius, who died in the

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early twelfth century. Although he was learned in Aristotelian philosophy,
especially logic, Eustratius' comments show him to have been a Christian
Platonist in his personal convictions. The compiler of the collection filled
the commentary gap with older Greek scholia on Books II, III, IV and
V, probably dating from the end of the second Christian century. These
anonymous glosses are inferior in quality to the work of Eustratius but
historically of interest. So, this first volume prints a Latin version of NE,
plus Eustratius on Book I, plus anonymous scholia on the next three
books.
Subsequent volumes will contain the main text and the anonymous
scholia on Book V, commentaries by Michael of Ephesus (11th c.) on
Books V, IX and X, another anonymous commentary on Book VII (possibly by a Greek physician (12th-early 13th c.) and finally a commentary
on Book VIII by the Greek master, Aspasius, who taught in Athens at
the start of the second century A. D. The whole compilation is important
for the history of ethics, from classical, through Byzantine and Latin medieval scholarship. Grosseteste's translation of this gathering of moral
treatises provided the only complete Latin text of NE, translated directly
from the Greek, for thirteenth-century students at the universities and
monastic houses of study. Aristotle's Ethics was eagerly studied all through
this century. From the work of R. A. Gauthier, 0. P., and others, it now
seems quite clear that there was never a version of NE made by William
of Moerbeke, 0. P. Furthermore, the Bishop of Lincoln added his own
notes (notulae) to these commentaries: they are printed within parentheses right in the text of Mercken's edition. Many of Grosseteste's comments are philological (after all, he was adapting Latin to a new terminology), but some notes are longer and of doctrinal importance. In the
second chapter of Book III, for instance, the Greek commentator remarks,
in typical utilitarian and situationist style, that lying and adultery at times
may not be immoral, if the consequences (such as the overthrow of a
tyrant) are important and good. To this Grosseteste appends the following
note:
Now the Christian religion professes and holds that one must not sin for the
sake of any advantage of consequences (utilitatis consequendae), or to avoid
something unsuitable. Hence, since to lie or to have intercourse with another's
wife are both sins, neither is to be done under any conditions (aliquo modo).
So the above doctrine is not doctrine but error in the alleged examples. For the
evils of sin must not be done in order to bring about good results, although the
evils of punishment (mala poenae), even when they are truly bad (turpia) but
not sins, are to be accomplished and endured so that good results will occur.
(Mercken text: p. 239, lines 75-82.)

Several points are noteworthy in this typical Grosseteste coment. First
of all, he was convinced that there are some kinds of sin that are in-

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405

trinsically immoral: lying and adultery, for instance. In the second place,
his use of the phrase " utilitas consequendae " is very significant for
students of the history of utilitarianism. There are some who claim that
the term " utility " was first used in ethics by French writers of the
eighteenth century. Finally, the phrase that I have translated as "under
any conditions" (aliquo modo) is quite typical of Grosseteste's frequent
use of modus for a wide variety of meanings.
Both Mercken {whose long Introduction is a mine of historical information) and Father Gauthier (the editor of Aquinas's commentary on NE
in the Leonine edition) agree that Albert the Great used Grosseteste's version of NE, and the Greek commentaries, and Grosseteste's Notulae, when
in
he gave the Cologne lectures that were recorded by Thomas
Aquinas. However, when Aquinas years later made his own commentary
on NE, he showed little acquaintance with Grosseteste's annotations and
used only some of the explanations of Eustratius and possibly Aspasius.
It is my conviction that this is but one indication that St. Thomas commented on the NE in Italy, during the
decade, where he did not have
the library facilities that were available at the University of Paris. In
any case, the Robert Grosseteste version of Aristotle's Ethics provided the
base for dozens of other Latin commentaries from the thirteenth century
down to the Renaissance.
As to the quality of the critical texts in this volume, it is impossible
for a reviewer who has not done the work on the MSS that Mercken
has to make a judgment of accuracy. However, the editorial job gives
every appearance of first-class scholarship. Compared with the Marietti
printings of the versio antiqua of NE, which accompanies St. Thomas's
commentary, this Grosseteste version is obviously the same basic text. The
versio recens in volume XXI of the Parma edition of St. Thomas (reprinted from the Firmin Didot Opera Omnia Aristotelis) is, on the other
hand, quite different throughout and of no value for the study of medieval
commentaries.
Mercken has studied all twenty-one extant Latin MSS in which the
Grosseteste version of this compilation occurs. Not all are useful for a
critical edition. The second part of Mercken's Introduction gives details
on his reduction of the MS evidence to four codices whose readings are
represented in the text and whose variants are given in the apparatus.
Throughout, the editor provides references to the Berlin Academy editions
of the corresponding Greek texts. Mercken uses three critical apparatuses
at the bottom of each page: 1) provides complete variants from the four
base MSS;
notes divergencies of the Latin text from the Greek editions;
and 3) identifies references to names, works, and places mentioned in the
NE text and commentaries.
In a collection of such complexity indexing is an absolute necessity.

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It is to be hoped that the third volume will soon appear and provide access
to the details of the text. A table listing all the Grosseteste Notulae, for
instance, is much needed. There is in volume I, pp. 181 *-184*, a Table
of Proper Names in the Introduction; this is a great help. When complete, this edition will constitute an extremely valuable source of primary
information for historians, theologians, ethicists, and philologists.
VERN ON

J. BouRKE

St. Louis University
St. Louis, Missouri

Aristotle and His School. By FELIX GRAYEFF. New York:
Noble,
Pp.
$11.50.

Barnes and

This book is about the authorship and arrangement of the treatises of
Aristotle. Its central thesis is that Andronicus's edition of the Corpus
Aristotelicum contained treatises which were neither exclusively nor even
mostly written by Aristotle himself. Instead, according to Grayeff, these
treatises were in part written and arranged by various members of the
Peripatetic School over a considerable period of time after Aristotle's death.
To substantiate his thesis, Grayeff first draws evidence from Aristotle's
life, the history of The Peripatos after Aristotle's death, and the history
of the school library. Then, in the main section of the book, he analyzes
several books of the Metaphysics, especially Book Zeta, with a view to
showing that not only external factors in the history of the Peripatetic
School and the library but also, and most important, the internal structure
of the texts themselves goes to establish that the Corpus was actually the
work of many hands.
As regards Aristotle's life, Grayeff concedes that, while nothing we know
about it could show irrefutably that the Corpus was not the work of Aristotle himself, still, the fact that his life was an unsettled one would make
it unlikely that Aristotle could have had the time or the opportunity to
have authored the entire Corpus.
But in addition to this, Grayeff points out that Strabo's account of what
happened to Aristotle's books conflicts with what we know from other
sources. First, points in Aristotle's philosophy were debated during the
very period when, according to Strabo, the Aristotelian manuscripts were
buried. Second, the text of the Corpus, Grayeff points out, is " a very
good text and by no means bears out the story (of Strabo) of the motheaten manuscripts with their many gaps." (p. 75) Further, Grayeff
presents ample evidence to show that, so far from being buried in a hole

BOOK REVIEWS

407

by the heirs of Neleus, Aristotle's books were housed in the celebrated
library of Pergamum. Moreover, Theophastus himself admits in a ·letter
preserved by Diogenes Laertius that the Peripatetic philosophers had to
revise and amend their lectures over and again, a procedure which was
doubtless caused by the emergence of the new philosophical challenges
of Stoicism, Epicureanism, and Scepticism. The upshot of all this is that
quite apart from internal evidence based on a detailed examination of the
Corpus itself, there is external evidence to support the thesis that the
Corpus was the work of many members of the Peripatetic School.
Turning to the internal evidence for Grayeff's thesis, let us consider
his examination of Metaphysics Zeta. Grayeff's holds that the discussion at
several places in Zeta only makes sense if it is viewed as a response to
Sceptical and Stoical inquiries. At Zeta X, for example, two problems of
definition are discussed. (I) How are the parts of a definition related to
the parts of the thing defined? and (2) Is the whole prior to the parts
or vice versa? Grayefl' observes that it was the Stoics who " methodically
set out the parts of the proposition " and " the Sceptics who questioned
both the possibility of definition and of distinguishing a whole and its
parts. Further, there is a close connection between Zeta XII and Sceptic
Sextus Empiricus' discussion of definition," Grayeff argues. Sextus Empiricus had argued that, since genus is either identical with its different species
or is none of them, it does not exist. There appears to be a reference to
this at Zeta XII (36a6). But the Peripatetic writer answers this objection
in Zeta XII by holding that species exist and contain the genus (rather
than vice versa). Grayeff thinks that this connection between Zeta XII
and the Sceptical arguments is so close as to warrant the conclusion that
the Peripatetic writer was actually answering Sceptical objections and
hence that he (the writer) could not have been Aristotle himself but a
later peripatetic philosopher.
Another indication of this conclusion according to the author is found in
Z XIII (39a3). According to Grayeff, in that section the argument presupposes that some philosophers had used the concepts of actuality and
potentiality in defending separately existing universals. But since these
concepts are not as such found in Plato, Grayeff argues that the argument
in this section is directed not against Platonists but against fellow Peripatetics with a Platonic tendency. But this evidence of intra-school debate in the Corpus supports the hypothesis that the Corpus was in part
at least written by various members of the Peripatetic School over a period
of time.
Still another piece of textual exidence Grayeff cites in support of his
thesis occurs in Z XV. Grayeff contends that it is obvious that the writer
here has seriously considered Sceptical arguments. This is indicated, he
thinks, by the repeated use of the Sceptical expression ouk endechetai
('maybe not'). There are also several points of similarity in this chapter

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to Stoic thought and terminology: the distinction between knowledge and
opinion, the use of the term logos and the emphasis on epistemology.
Finally, two clear-cut indications that Zeta is a multi-authored book are
(1) the doctrinal discrepancies it contains and (!il) the presence of gaps
or omissions in the text. As regards the first point, Grayeff points out
that there are in Zeta several and conflicting views on the concept of
substance. For example, being is said to be substance in Zeta I but is
rejected as substance in Zeta XII. Further, substrate is rejected as substance in Zeta III but is considered as substance in Zeta VI. And as
regards the second point, Grayeff observes that there are two examples
in Zeta where the author announces that a topic is about to be considered
but fails to consider it. For instance, Zeta II begins a doxographic-critical
course but the discussion is cut short, leaving a gap in the text. This
critical discussion foreshadowed in Zeta II is actually contained in Metaphysics M and N, as well as in Metaphysics A and in Physics A and
B. From this Grayeff concludes that when the volume which included
this discussion was compiled, the doxographic-critical course in Zeta was
shortened and mostly transferred to separate volumes.
By way of criticizing Grayeff's thesis, it seems that neither the supposed
doctrinal discrepancies in Zeta to which Grayeff refers nor the supposed
influence of Stoic and Sceptical thought on Zeta, nor even the fact (if it
is a fact) that there are parts missing in Zeta but preserved elsewhere in
the Metaphysics-it seems that none of these points establishes the multauthored character of Book Zeta.
With respect to the first point, even if there is a doctrinal discrepancy
in Zeta as regards substance, it by no means follows from this that Zeta
was written by more than one person. Instead, the discrepancies may only
indicate that Aristotle had several opinions on this difficult matter and
was unsure himself as to which one of them was correct. Second, there
is no evidence that there was in fact any influence of Post-Aristotelian
thought on Zeta. The fact that we find Sceptical and Stoical terminology
and themes in Zeta says nothing as to the direction of the influence. Since
it could just as easily been the case that the Stoics and the Sceptics borrowed both terminology and thought-content from the Aristotelian treatises
rather than the other way around, Grayeff's assumption that it was the
Aristotelian treatises which were influenced by Sceptic and Stoic thought
is unwarranted. Finally, the gaps or missing parts in the text of Zeta and
their reappearence in other contexts shows, at most, that the arrangement
of the original texts was changed either by Aristotle himself or by one
or more of his followers. But this is far from saying that Zeta was written
by more than one person which is what Grayeff contends.
JoHN

University of Rhode Island
Kingston, R. I.

F. PETERSON

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409

Berkeley: The Philosophy of Immaterialism. By I. C. TIPTON. London:
Methuen and Co. Ltd., 1974.
This book was very difficult to review, partly because Professor Tipton
seems at times to be writing for the professional Berkeley scholar, and
at others for the intermediate Berkeley student. He sometimes states the
theses he is going to examine in misleading ways. For example:
. . . (Berkeley) committed himself to the negative thesis that there is no material
reality . . . (and) the positive thesis that sensible objects are just mind-dependent
sensations.

We all know that Berkeley never denied the existence of material reality,
only material substance, and that if one seriously considers what he says
about God, as Tipton belatedly tries to do in his eighth chapter, it is
at best misleading to say that Berkeley thought objects to be " just minddependent sensations" (my italics), since for Berkeley God has no sensations. He spends inordinate amounts of time examining theses which,
from a philosophical point of view, seem to me to be either uninteresting,
or unimportant, or both. For example, he takes many pages (all of one
chapter and parts of others) to examine the question of whether Berkeley
is justified in characterizing his view as " common sense," which Tipton
takes to mean "in accordance with the common man's views," whatever
they are. Berkeley students will recognize of course that Berkeley's claim
to "speak with the vulgar" is just that; and that further, he pretends
to speak with the vulgar about only a narrow range of subjects, and not
in philosophical depth. He does not pretend that philosophy is either obvious or simple-minded. He does not pretend to speak or to think with the
vulgar about God, (aside from his "necessary" proof for His existence),
or about scientific explanations, the refutation of material substance,
causality, motion, notions, (including relations), mathematics, vision, and
a plethora of other things. Nor does Berkeley depend, in any place I can
find, upon agreement with received vulgar opinion alone to support a
philosophical point. It is of passing interest, I suppose, that he thought
the contemporary ordinary man would find the doctrines of material substance and abstract general ideas foolish; but this is not why Berkeley
rejects either theory, and for the philosopher the philosophical is the issue.
Tipton has a tendency from time to time to accept unusual or controversial positions too easily. One example which comes to mind is his
acceptance of the claim that Locke took material substance rather lightly.
He characterizes Locke's position as his" ... case against taking substance
too seriously." But surely it is one thing, Yolton and Warnock notwithstanding, to claim as Locke does that we can know nothing much about
material substance except to say that it exists and must exist, and quite

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another to say that we should not take it too seriously. Indeed, given
that Locke thinks it essential for explaining reality, given that continuity
is explained in terms of it, that the causal origin of our ideas is too, that
we supposedly have an abstract general idea of it, and that it plays an
essential part in the theory of material powers, one would think the thesis
centrally important to Locke's metaphysics, if not to his epistemology.
This carelessness is reflected in other misleading statements purporting
to represent Berkeley's position. He implies that Berkeley " ... dispensed
with material things altogether," (page
which he did not, and in
another place (page
he takes Berkeley's claim that
... it (is) a manifest contradiction, that any sensible object should be immediately
perceived by sight or touch, and at the same time have no existence in Nature,
since the very existence of an unthinking being consists in being perceived

to be used by Berkeley as support for the claim that" ... when I perceive
something (though not necessarily by sense) I can be sure that is exists
(though not necessarily in nature)." But surely even a superficial examination of the passage and the context in which it occurs (Principles
provides no evidence of this whatsoever.
Sometimes it is difficult to know whether the misleading nature of some
of Tipton's assertions is due to simple ill choice of language or whether it
rests on some basic misunderstanding. For example, " ... For the plain
man the real knife can cause us pain, but for Berkeley (strictly) no idea
can do anything." (page 83) One is tempted to say-ah, yes, but he
means that there is no efficient causality in the natural world, even though
he would agree that the perceptions of the knife at certain consecutive
spatial and temporal points relative to a body would be followed by pain;
but then one would be confused by Tipton's apparent failure to appreciate
Berkeley's theory of signs, and Berkeley's analysis of natural causation
in terms of that theory. Further grounds for suspicion along these lines
is provided by Tipton's seeming misunderstanding of what real causes are
for Berkeley. He notes (page 307), that in his opinion, Berkeley did not
believe ("in the spirit of entry 107" of the Commentaries) that om
"volitions" are efficient causes. Well, they are certainly causes, or at
least, willings are, and if they are not efficient, then the proper conclusion
is that "efficient" in the Aristotelean sense may not fit Berkeley's use-our willings are certainly not formal, material or without God," the obvious
context being the necessity for God's concurrence in order that our willings
be effective.
In his analysis of what Berkeley means by "physical object " Tipton
seems to ignore the fact that, for Berkeley, objects are composed not just
of ideas, but of relations of which we have notions.* He has little to say
*Desiree Park, Complementary Notions: A Critical Study of Berkeley's Theory
of Concepts (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1972).

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about the role of relations in the physical world, which may have something to do with his failure to deal with the theory of signs. In connection
with this it might be noted that, although the concept of the " Language
of the Author of Nature" is really important to Berkeley (he mentions
it nine times in the Principles alone) , Tipton hardly refers to it; once,
if I recall. Tipton seems to share the standard underestimation of the
role of God in Berkeley's philosophy, even though his treatment of this
subject is much more thorough than that of most other commentators
today. Certainly, Tipton is honest enough about why he does not pay
more attention to God in Berkeley, although his comment suggests that,
in a book about Berkeley, much attention to God is needed:
Implicit in the decision not to devote much space to Berkeley's views on God
is of course a judgment as to what is most challenging and important in his
philosophy ... It so happens that Berkeley's main preoccupations are not ours,
and that we regard his views on the nature of the sensible obj.ect as more worth
discussing than his views on the nature and attributes of God. (page !'299) (my
italics)

Since Tipton then goes on to show us how one cannot understand the
nature of the sensible object, nor the answers to such questions as the explanation of continuity without an understanding of God's role, this remark
leaves me somewhat puzzled.
And this brings me to another criticism. Given that Tipton uses material
in his discussion of God and continuity from the Three Dialogues, Siris,
(at least a reference), the Correspondence with Johnson, and with Lady
Percival, not to mention the references to Commentaries, why does he not
bring in this material much earlier on? Most of that material is of philosophical interest in connection with continuity, the problem of resemblance,
the inherence problem in connection with presently unperceived (by humans) objects, and with the structure of Nature as a language through
which we learn God's will. Sttrely it cannot be systematically excluded
in a book about Berkeley's ontology and epistemology. But, at least in
the first three quarters of this book, it is. For motives I cannot fathom,
writers about Berkeley persist in ignoring the absolutely clear fact that
the mind in which objects ultimately inhere, or if you prefer, upon which
they ultimately depend, is the mind called God. Berkeley is not a twentieth-century philosopher, and he understook the philosophical enterprise
to disprove scepticism and to prove theism. To ignore his explicitly stated
purposes and to relegate the capstone of his philosophy, God, to a secondary
place in a discussion of his thought, is to distort his thinking and to do
injustice to the man. I emphasize that this is not a failing unique to
Tipton; most commentators on Berkeley do the same thing.
The bibliography in the book is poor. For example, no item from Colin
Murray Turbayne's considerable literature on the Irish Bishop is included,

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and many of the more important recent articles, such as those by James
Cornman, W. H. Hay, Richard Van Iten, Edwin B. Allaire, and others are
not mentioned. Even such an oft discussed article as Moore's " The Refutation of Idealism " is not noted, and again, one wonders just for whom
this book was written.
The notes, which are copious, are by and large informative and explanatory. But they are often unjustifiably opinionated. I mention only one
personal example. In note 3, on Chapter Five, page 367, Tipton says:
I don't think anyone would want to claim that those doctrines in the Principles
which are related to claims about meaning (and to criticism of Locke's theory)
are such as to reflect Wittgensteinian insights.

Mr. Tipton might consult my article, "Wittgenstein's Refutation of Scepticism,"* for suggestions to the contrary.
Finally, two more remarks in a critical vein. Tipton has a tendency
to set up straw men and then spend much time nibbling them down. He
does this in his discussion of Bennett's arguments about Berkeley's position
on continuity, Graves' on the relation of ideas to God's Ideas, and in his
brief (too brief) mentions of notions. Second, a personal dislike: Tipton
keeps referring to Berkeley's " moves " in reaction to this or that philosophical position. This terminology has always suggested to me that
philosophy is a sort of game, even if titillating. However accurate or inaccurate this feeling, Berkeley did not think that he was playing a game;
he thought he was refuting sceptism and proving theism.
In spite of all these negative remarks, Tipton has written a book about
Berkeley that is worth working through. His summary of Locke's position
is good, as is his discussion of the difficulties raised for Berkeley, and
any Berkeleyan, by the scientific view of objects. At times, he gives illuminating comparisons between Berkeley and other thinkers, for example,
Malebranche, and he understands the importance of historical context to
the understanding of Berkeley, with the exception (common to others) of
the place of God in his thinking. He notices, as many do not, the validity
(if not the soundness) of most of Berkeley's arguments, and although I
believe my comments about his neglecting the place of God are well
founded, this is still one of the best sources of information in English
about the role of Berkeley's God. Had he worked harder on style and
clarity, taken greater care with his technical language, put more effort
into a bibliography, and studied Berkeley more carefully on the issues
of efficient causality and motion, and on God, this could have been a very
important book.
PAUL JAMES 0LSCAMP

Western Wcuhington State College
Bellingham, Washington

* Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, vol. XXVI (Dec. 1965).

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The History of the Concept of Association of Ideas. By DAVID RAPAPORT.
New York: International Universities Press, 1974. pp. 185. $8.50.
This short work is the doctoral dissertation submitted in 1929 at the
University of Budapest, translated by L. Juhasz, and discovered among
Dr. Rapaport's papers after his death by Mrs. Elvira Rapaport, who
edited and checked it for publication. It is interesting as the early work
of a man who became one of the foremost exponents and theorists of the
psychoanalytic movement, bringing perspectives from the philosophy of
science and general philosophy to a largely clinically based enterprise.
As a doctoral dissertation it has expectable limitations in depth and
clarity of conceptions, coherence of thrust towards a clear purpose, and
clarity and suppleness of expression. Nevertheless, within its class it is
a more than representative work-product of a superior student who was
already coming to grips with the philosophical and psychological issues
which were to be the center of his intellectual pursuits. He surveys the
role played by the concept of the association of ideas in the philosophies
of Bacon, Descartes, Hobbes, Spinoza, Locke, Leibniz, Berkeley, Hume,
and Kant. Admittedly, the association of ideas was not a major philosophical theme for these men, not the object of intensive reflection, but insofar
as their interests were methodological and epistemological, the process of
idea association had to be considered and evaluated, and the role in mental
life assigned to the process was contributive to and reflective of deeper
philosophical concerns. And admittedly the intensive consideration of association of ideas post-dated the philosophical period considered and was
the work not so much of philosophers as of psychologists who were more
or less free of philosophical persuasions and uninfluenced by the philosophies
of the past. Nevertheless, the vicissitudes of the development of the concept and its relations with the psychological and genetic aspects of the
philosophies under study-Rapaport's
expressed focus of concern-offer
occasions for fruitful insights.
It is interesting in the light of his later work in psychoanalytic theory
that Dr. Rapaport had already concluded that " the emergence of associations is determined by curiosity, by interest-in a word, by desires " and
that this is " the guiding thread in the history of the concept." That conclusion sems perhaps overdrawn, but that is in itself significant in the
development of the author's thought.
MICHAEL STOCK,

St. Stephen's Priory
Dover, Mass.

o. P.

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Philosophy of Psychology. Ed. by S. C. BROWN. New York:
Noble, 1974. Pp. 362. $16.50.

Barnes &

This book presents the papers and discussions of a "conference on the
Philosophy of Psychology at the University of Kent in 1971 " sponsored
by the Royal Institute of Philosophy. (Preface) The Philosophy of Psychology which is here endorsed as a topic of contemporary interest in the
dialogue between philosophers and psychologists from Britain, Canada,
and the United States consists mainly in a defence of opposing views on
certain aspects of problems discussed in today's so-called philosophy of
mind. The problems assigned as topics for the six symposia of the meeting
are listed as parts of the book.
Part One: "Psychology as the Science of Human Behavior " (3 ff.)
offers first in Sigmund Koch's paper, " Psychology as Science," a psychologist's critical look at the condition of his discipline. Prof. Koch who
is known as an expert analyst of methodological and theoretical problems
of psychological studies intends to extend his earlier critical attitude towards different forms of behaviorism to an investigation of the meaning
of the hundred-year history of psychology as science. As a result of his
evaluation he finds " that psychology cannot be a coherent science, or
indeed a coherent field of scholarship." (21) The application of the
methods of physical sciences to the empirical study of man, that John
Stuart Mill had recommended as a recipe for curing the backward state
of psychology, could obviously yield fruit only in subfields of this science,
such as physiological and biological psychology. In a study of genuinely
psychological problems as, for instance, of perception, cognition, motivation, learning, creativity, development, and conditions of the healthy and
pathological personality the analytic pattern of the physical sciences is
not meaningfully and fruitfully applicable. So it is not surprising that the
occasional germane facts or sparks of insight which "a massive hundredyear effort to erect a discipline" (6) had produced, "the bits and pieces
into which psychology falls," (22) cannot be considered as a science. Psychology is " a discipline of deceit " ; its literature " consisting of an endless
set of advertisements for the emptiest concepts, the most inflated theories,
the most trivial 'findings,' and the most fetishistic yet heuristically selfdefeating methods in scholarly history." (27)
The second paper of this section, Donald Davidson's "Psychology as
Philosophy" (41 ff.), which was supposed to comment on this view of psyas science, seems to confirm Prof. Koch's evaluation of the scientific status
of psychological endeavors. Human actions are essentially intentional.
When described in psychological terms, i.e., " a system of concepts in
part determined by the structure of beliefs and desires of the agent himself," (42) they "resist incorporation into a closed deterministic system."

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415

(42 f.) This "nomological irreducibility of the psychological means, ...
that the social sciences cannot be expected to develop in ways parallel
to the physical sciences nor can we expect even to be able to explain and
predict human behavior with the kind of precision that is possible in principle for physical phenomena." (42) Since Prof. Davidson admits that
his personal experience of the inability to predict and theoretically to explain the results of his psychological experiments led him to give up his
career as an experimental psychologist (48) and to turn philosopher, Richard
Peters in his Chairman's Remarks (53 ff.) is primarily interested in an
answer to his question whether the title of the paper is intended to imply
that " the study of philosophy is the appropriate way of pursuing an interest in the explanation of behavior." (55) In the answer to these Remarks that Prof. Davidson gives during the Discussion (60 ff.), he agrees
with the Chairman about the possibility of modest rather piecemeal types
of psychological inquiry and denies that his paper was intended as an
attack on psychology or its right to be called a science. Only the unique
character of this science was to be emphasized. And since propositional
attitudes, the specific object of psychology, refer to questions that belong also to the traditional concern of philosophy, the title of his paper
seemed to him to be justified.
Various objections are raised against the consistency of Prof. Davidson's
"anomalous monism " during the Discussion. A defence of the irreducibility
of psychological concepts and the denial of strict psycho-physical laws are
maintained to be incompatible with a materialistic monism. In his attempt to meet the objections Prof. Davidson clarifies the position he intended to defend in his paper. His anomalous monism truly is supposed to
be monism, "because it holds that psychological events are physical events."
(43) The fact that these events do not fall under strict laws when described
in psychological terms and that this monism has thus to be described as
anomalous does not render this physicalism inconsistent. For there is only a
dualism of psychological and physical concepts, not a dualism of causal factors or types of causation. (65) However, one probably has reasons to
doubt whether Prof. Davidson truly meets the objections against his position. After all, psychological concepts and descriptions, as a rule, do not
represent arbitary creations of the human mind, and one can certainly think
of sufficient reasons to question the truth and validity of the "first premise"
of his argumentation for physicalism, i.e., that " psychological events such
as perceivings, rememberings, the acquistion and loss of knowledge, and
intentional actions are directly or indirectly caused by . . . physical
events." (43)
Part Two: "Action" (69 ff.) is introducted by William P. Alston, who
in his paper, "Prolegomena to a Psychological Theory of Intentional Action," (71 ff.) proposes to present the outlines of an analysis of intentional
action concepts and then to determine the extent of a possible use of

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these concepts by two main types of psychological behavior theory. Restricting himself to a consideration of concepts of overt intentional action
Prof. Alston finds three conditions essential for the realization of such an
action: overt intentional action involves a bodily movement (Bodily Movement Condition) , which has a state of affairs as its success (Success Condition) , and which did occur because the subject wanted this success (Purpose Condition). (75 ff.) Prof. Alston recognizes that his analysis is
incomplete and will not be universally accepted by representatives of contemporary philosophy, where intentional action is a subject of intense
controversy. However, he is convinced that an adequate analysis must
include the conditions he listed and that more complete philosophical action concepts will offer still greater difficulties to an attempt at integrating
them into scientific theories than the concept he proposes. (82) The investigation of the possible use of his basic intentional action concept in
psychological theory reveals to Prof. Alston that there are " conceptualmethodological barriers to incorporating them bodily into the dependent
variable slots of behavior theories." (100) One type of scientific theories,
which is called "physicalistic," (83) obviously has no use of distinctively
psychological concepts, and thus they are unable to represent the essential
element of an intentional action, the role of " want " in producing a bodily
movement. The other main type of psychological theory, the intentionalistic or cognitive-purposive theories, do utilize traditional psychological concepts; but "they cannot get past an intention to do something" (97)
and "leave it open as to whether that aim is realized." (100) Especially
" by virtue of their success conditions, ordinary action concepts far exceed
the proper limits of any sort of psychology." (90)
To these philosophical proposals about action concepts and their use
in psychology Robert Borger gives a psychologist's response in his "Human Action and Psychological Research." (102 ff.) He is of the opinion
that psychologists are not " missing something essential " when disregarding the criticism of philosophers who demand a scientific concentration
" on the essentially human aspects of human beings," question psychological efforts " inspired by the assumption that people and animals . . . are
physical systems," and expect the psychologist to produce an account
continuous with ordinary talk. (102 ff.) Mr. Borger decidedly prefers
physicalistic to so-called cognitive-purposive theories in psychology and
finds that the use of concepts of everyday language, such as " intention "
or " purpose," within psychological theory will meet difficulties " in providing such theories with an empirical anchorage" (104) or in establishing
links with bodily movements or with anything that is publicly observable.
(128) Because of such publicly observable features of human behavior,
a psychological analysis from a mechanistic standpoint is not only possible
but seems to be demanded by the character of psychology as an empirical
science.

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417

It is most regrettable that the manuscript of the remarks of Prof. Charles
Taylor who presided as chairman of the second symposium was lost. His
paper certainly would have helped to clarify the issues concerning a psychological or mechanistic psychology and concerning physicalism as a
philosophy of mind and of man and as a method in psychological studies.
In Part Three: "Human Learning," (137 ff.) Prof. D. W. Hamlyn offers
under the same title a philosopher's observations about psychological studies
of learning and his ideas about the essential conditions of genuine learning.
Its identification with a simple modification of behavior, as understood by
psychologists, is seen to have its foundation in a preoccupation with animal as opposed to human learning; (140) true learning worthy of the
name "must at least involve the acquisition of knowledge through experience." (141) The knowledge which is presupposed by this understanding of learning as a basis for the acquisition of further knowledge
does not require innate ideas, as maintained in Chomsky's theory of learning
a language, nor does it have to be temporarily prior. " The priority that
is necessary is a logical priority only." (150) The child is not to be conceived as a solitary inquirer set over against a world which he has to
construct on the basis of his sense data. (146) He is in the world and
a part of the world from the beginning and as a social being learns originally by a way of initiation into a common form of life, of common interests,
attitudes, and feelings. (151) "Late learning" will obviously differ from
modes of early learning which is primarily a function of personal relationships betwen the child and other human beings. (154)
John Morton agrees with Hamlyn's rejection of Chomsky's theory of
learning in his "The Use of Natural and Linguistic Concepts in Psychological Explanation."
(158 ff.) However, he is not satisfied with the
philosopher's appraisal of psychological studies of learning nor with his
definition of learning. Modern empirical psychology, which studies animals
in their natural environment, has much richer concepts at his disposal
than Hamlyn allows. Empirical studies stand " in the continual need for
our conceptual framework to expand." It should thus be expected that
" the use of natural language has acute limitations as a tool for discussing
psychological phenomena." (163) The term "knowledge " which Hamlyn
uses in his determination of learning remains undefined " until psychological models of brain functions have been developed well beyond their current state." (164)
In Chairman's Remarks, " Language Learning and Innate Knowledge,"
(175 ff.) Theodore Mischel questions the usefulness of such explanations
of knowledge in terms of brain functions for an understanding of a child's
learning of his first language. In support of Prof. Hamlyn's view he points
to the fact that even competent speakers, unless they are linguists, do not
know Chomsky's "deeper" rules of language either consciously or uncon-

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sciously, "so that there is no need to explain how the child learns them."
(16)
In Part Four: "Perception " (193 ff.) Richard L. Gregory proposes to
interpret Perceptions as Hypotheses. (195 ff.) Starting with a consideration of the duck-rabbit figure which, presenting one and the same stimulus,
may be perceived as either of the two animals, Prof. Gregory rejects the
traditional stimulus-response theory of perception and demands an " informational account," according to which perception is, as Prof. Gregory
explains during the Discussion, " based on but going beyond sensible data,"
(ft33) and one stimulus configuration may be followed by several alternative perceptions or permit various hypotheses as compatible with the
available sensory evidence. The greater part of this paper is dedicated to
an enumeration and explanation of " hypothesis-like characteristics of perception" (30ft) that are supposed to justify the thesis that perceptions are
hypotheses, not mere copies of a physical stimulus situation.
G. E. M. Anscom be questions this justification in her "Comment on
Professor R. L. Gregory's Paper." (ftll ff.) She examines various meanings
of " hypothesis " and the possible application of the term to different conditions of perception and finds difficulties especially with regard to an
understanding of the subject forming such perception-hypotheses and concerning the mode of their confirmation.
Godfrey Vesey continues this attempt at an analysis of the concept
of " hypothesis " and of its possible use for an explanation of perception
phenomena. He concludes his considerations " by inviting Gregory to answer " the question whether in determining perception as an hypothesis he
means more than the fact that in perception as sensory output there is
more given than the mere sensory input. (266)
In his answer Prof. Gregory tries to clarify his interpretation of perception. He wishes, he declares during the Discussion, to regard all perceptions as hypotheses, " based on sensory data much as hypotheses in physics
are based on instrumental data " and, a scientific hypotheses, answerable
to data. (ft33) The "framer" of these perception-hypotheses is to be
sought in " brain mechanisms, accepting current sensory data and storing
past data, mainly as generalizations, generally arriving at a good bet as
to what is before us, in space and time." (234)
Reviewing this clarification Prof. Anscombe still finds "a residual unclarity about the theory." Not only does she consider the assumption concerning the brain functioning as a computer as a " mere fashion " but
she wonders especially about the identity of the subject evaluating these
brain-produced hypotheses. Is it the brain, the supposed computer itself,
or the person that " judges " the perception hypotheses, she asks. Prof.
Anscombe concludes with a complaint. Prof. Gregory had used the opportunity of answering objections against his theory by repeatedly ex-

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419

pressing his conviction about the scientific uselessness and worthlessness of
ordinary language philosophy. Prof. Anscombe gets the impression that
he hopes to criticize her " by having a swipe at ' linguistic analysis ' as a
stance or critical position." She rightly observes that " he has no jusf.)
tification for doing this."
In Part Five: "Computer Models in Psychology"
fl'.) Hubert
Dreyfus and John Haugeland offer a paper intended to show "The Computer as a Mistaken Model of the Mind,"
ff.) while N. S. Sutherland
deals with " Computer Simulation of Brain Function."
fl'.) The
first paper of the symposium seems to be primarily concerned with an
alleged all too optimistic use of computer programming as a method of
psychological explanation. It intends to prevent such an uncritical acceptance of computer models by describing the difficulties of computer
programming of ordinary human behavior and by insisting upon the impossibility of simulating even brain processes on a digital computer. Computer programming of human behavior, for instance, the coordination of
a state of anger as output to the organism's being slapped as input, faces
the problem " that there is not a set of physical conditions which always
amount to a slap."
And since the human nervous system does not
represent a system composed of discrete parts, a simulation of brain
processes by discrete computer programmes is impossible.
Prof. Sutherland disputes the justification of such views about the impossibility of an explanation of behavior in terms of the working of a
physical system such as the nervous system, and he questions the related
opinions concerning the constitution and function of the brain as a system
of discrete units. At any rate, the claims on which " Dreyfus' argument
appears to be based " do not seem to have been established by him.
D. M. Mackay, Prof. of Communication, agrees with this evaluation of
Dreyfus' empirical evidence for his assertions in his Chairman's Remarks.
ff.) He is of the opinion that" in any case Sutherland advances some
good reasons for not granting them in our present state of knowledge."
However, he is also inclined to believe that there are necessary
limits to our ability " to specify mental processes in the terms required
by a rule-following computer."
During the Discussion Mr. Roger Harris argues for " an a priori obstacle " to the use of computer simulation in the explanation of the regularity of specifically human behavior. The logical character essential to
human activity is not reducible to regularities of their physical components
and their interactions with one another and with the environment. The activity, for instance, of inferring can "just in so far as it was logical,"
not be identified " with any finite physical process to which a man, or a
f.)
machine, and some part of his/its environment are subject."
The last symposium had " Determinism " as its theme of discussion.

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Aaron Sloman opened the meeting with his paper, "Physicalism and the
Bogey of Determinism." (283 ff.) Physicalism is defined: "All physical
behavior, (i.e., of human bodies and everything else) conforms to physical
theories." (285) Possible "alarming implications" (290) of this thesis are
easily disposed of. It does not imply any identity or composition of human
actions with or out of physical behavior; for " the physical behavior has
to be interpreted ... as the action," (287) and thus there is a "threetermed relation " between the physical phenomena, the action, and the
mode of interpretation, not a two-termed relation as "being composed of
or being identical with" would be. (289) Nor does physicalism imply a
denial of actual mental states and processes and of their influence on our
behavior. However, the author does not see any conceptual impossibility
in designing and building a purely physical system that would enjoy private
inner experience, and he lists the " conditions sufficient for the applicability
of psychological concepts" (298) to his possible conscious, intelligent, and
morally responsible robot.
George Mandler and William Kessen, "two old experimental psychologists," as they introduce themselves, (324) entitle their contribution:
"The Appearance of Free Will." (305 ff.) They consider it as their first
day to remove or, at least, to point to " one of the fundamental difficulties
of modern philosophical analysis," i. e., " a basic misunderstanding of what
empirical psychology is about." To identify the investigation of the human
mind with an investigation of " psychological terms used by human beings
in their common language, with its rather dubious history " is a philosophical, not a psychological enterprise. The mind studied in psychology is understood as " the theoretical assignments or descriptions to a person of
psychological process and structures . . . useful in explaining, predicting
and ordering his behavior." (306) Refined and translated in psychological
theory, common language statements about mental events are not to be
confused with those scientific statements they thus turn out to be through
this psychological transformation. Ordinary language does not deserve
" the intense attention it has received in the search for mental explanation."
{307 f.) After all, why should contemporary philosophy show this "preference for common language rather than psychological explanations and descriptions of human behavior and mental phenomena " when nobody would
think to recommend or use ordinary language descriptions of non-human
phenomena, for instance, as a scientific method in engineering or astronomy.
{311 f.)
As an empirical science, psychology presupposes the strict determinism
of its subject matter. This determinism is "a metatheoretical convention ... an axiom for theory and research " and has, as such, nothing to do
with reductionism or with physicalism. The psychologist considers human
bodies primarily as psychological, not physical systems; and within psy-

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421

chological theory human actions are assumed to have purely psychological
explanations. (309) But the possibility to explain, predict, or control psychological phenomena within the realm of psychological theory is, in principle, of the same order as the scientific treatment of physical phenomena
within the theory of physics. (3ll) Objections raised against the determinism of psychological phenomena on the basis of the free will argument and doctrine, which merely are "inherited word play," (3ll) can
be easily put aside. The freedom of independence of antecedent conditions, of alternative choice, or of self-determination, which philosophical
definitions ascribe to the human will, is either a useless theologcal remnant or the expression of a psychological determinism. Choice behavior
certainly exists; but it is scientifically established to be dependent on a
number of variables that influence choice deterministically, and is thus
"not beyond the reach of systematic investigation." (314)
The doctrine of the free will, opposed to determinism, is false. Distinct
from the doctrine is the belief in free will, which is a "'good thing' for
personal and social development." (315) This belief "has an important
determining function." It will lead to a delay of choice, and thus more
potential aspects of the alternatives will " come to the fore, to be in turn
weighted by whatever final choice mechanism we wish to invoke." The
process of delay will, then, most likely " increase the quality of the final
choice." (316) In short: "the belief in free will, the desire to choose freely
and well contributes to the ability of the human being to face delay, to
countenance anxiety in order to make the better choice and to lead the
better life." In spite of this overwhelming evidence for human freedom,
listed by our two old psychologists, they still insist in the next line that
they cannot discover any trace of evidence of its reality. Asserting the
need for the belief, they profess to be forced to do so " even in the absence of any evidence for the doctrine." (317)
In the Chairman's Remarks (325 ff.) Alan R. White first feels obliged
to state that both papers failed to discuss the topic of the symposium. As
a contemporary British philosopher he confirms the self-description of the
psychologists' approach to the problem of free will, that refuses all examination of man's " inherited word play " in favor of a Dictionary's
definitions, as truly "simple-minded." (326) In connection with his remarks concerning the relations between a human being and his body, which
he does not find clarified in the papers, Prof. White takes issue with Dr.
Sloman's view that, because of the interpretation required in an action,
the physical movement involved in that action cannot constitute or be
identical with a human action. "A specific item can very well be identical
with an interpreted item." (328) And finally he asks for " a straight answer ... to the question ... whether psychological processes are determined
or not, and whether, if they are, this is compatible only with the appearance of free will or also with its existence." (329)

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In the Discussion Dr. Sloman admits the justification of the Chairman's
critique of his paper. He condemns his argument concerning the difference
of physical behavior and action due to a three-termed relation of human
action as "not only fallacious, but stupid." (331) Professors Mandler and
Kessen give Prof. White the straight answer he desires: "Man is as free
as a falling leaf," they express their conviction about the existence of human freedom. (341) In other words, they do not realize, and not one
of the participating philosophers and psychologists seems to have been
able to help them realize, that they confuse methodological with philosophical determinism, or that their " metatheoretical convention " prescribed by
their scientific approach to a study of human behavior does not demand
the defence of a philosophical determinism or a denial of the freedom of
the human will, as they believe, and, following the dictate of their scientific
conscience, preach.
However, they are certainly right when in their Concluding Remarks
they confess that the Conference has confirmed " an antique truth " :
"Philosophers and psychologists not only play different language games,
they also inhabit different cultures." (340) Mutual misunderstanding of
philosophers and psychologists concerning the meaning and value of their
work is not uncommon and, as this case of dealing with determinism in
psychology shows, most regrettable. The lack of an appreciation of philosophical problems and considerations prevents the psychologist fully from
recognizing what he is actually doing when applying the methods of his
science, and may lead him to overstep the boundaries of his field and
to defend philosophical doctrines which actually he has no right or reason
to defend and practically he even does not maintain.
The reason for this deplorable situation is not only to be sought in " the
psychologist's impatience with looping discussions " of philosophers or with
"autistic philosophy," as psychologists assume. (340) It must partly also
be seen in the methodological approach characteristic of contemporary
Anglo-Saxon philosophy. Not certainly in those tendencies of ordinary language philosophy, which in this Conference were attacked by almost all
the participating psychologists as worthless and useless for a psychological
understanding of human beings. The philosophical insistence upon the
mental aspects of human activity, upon a necessary differentiation of types
of human behavior and of their relations to somatic processes, and upon
a psychological understanding and explanation of human existence is obviously unacceptable to a psychology which consciously or unconsciously
is inspired and directed by a behavioristic ideal of scientific studies or even
by a behavioristic philosophy of man; it is, however, essential to a realistic,
" psychological " psychology. When the contemporary philosophy is not
living up to the demands and needs of a realistic empirical psychology,
it is the result of its intentionally cultivated piecemeal, microscopic ap-

BOOK REVIEWS

proach to philosophical problems. The conceptual analysis of psychological
concepts of ordinary language is not the only service the psychologist may
expect from philosophy. What he primarily needs in order to avoid those
hopeless starts and meaningless theories which Sigmund Koch deplored
as typical shortcomings of psychology in his critical review of the historical
efforts of his science is a realistic philosophy of man that offers basic
information about the philosophical problems concerning the essential constitution of a human being and concerning the differentiation and relationships of the components of his existence. And it is this philosophy
of man which our contemporary philosophy of mind, at least, overtly and
publicly does not dare to risk. It is interesting to observe that the psychologists of the Conference, who were so eager in their condemnation of
ordinary language philosophy, did not have any complaint about this
deficiency of today's philosophy. Considering their work as scientific, they
deny any relationship of psychology to philosophy and are unaware of
the fact that their psychological methods and theories necessarily are expressions of some kind of a philosophy of man.
As a whole, the papers of this Philosophy of Psychology do not bring
many surprises. As was to be expected, they deal with certain aspects of
the contemporary philosophy of mind, generally in an interesting and informative manner. However, a student of this philosophy of mind and
of the meaning of empirical psychology will have to turn to more comprehensive and explicit studies of the problems discussed, both for a better
understanding of the problems and of their present discussions.
MARms ScHNEIDER, 0. F. M.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

La filosofia di Marx. By GIOVANNI GENTILE. A cura di V. A. Bellezza.
Florence: Sansoni, 1974. L. 3,000.

This volume contains not only the fifth edition of Gentile's Filosofia d1
Marx (first published in 1899) but also a long Appendix where the editor
has collected various documents intended to provide some historical context for Gentile's book. La filosofia di Marx is the book that in 1915 was
praised by Lenin as one of the most interesting works on Marx by nonMarxist philosophers. It is also the book whose first edition contained a
dedication to Benedetto Croce expressing Gentile's gratitude for the many
fruitful discussions they had had. Croce was at the time one of the leading
interpreters and critics of Marx, as may be seen from his Historical Mater-

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ialism and the Economics of Karl Marx (first published iu 1900). Thus
in the first section of the Appendix the editor has collected all relevant
correspondence between Gentile and Croce, consisting of 100 letters of
various lengths covering a total of 94 pages. But those were " the good
old days," that is, the times when Gentile and Croce were friends and
collaborators, before the former's support for fascism and the latter's opposition broke their long friendship in the 19QO's. The editorial history
of La filosofia di Marx reflects this, for in its second edition in 1987 the
dedication to Croce of the first edition was taken out of its original place
and appended as a footnote to the author's preface. Be that as it may,
the rest of the Appendix in the present volume contains the following: six
letters between Gentile and Antonio Labriola, a well-known Italian Marxist
of the time; two letters between Gentile and Georges Sorel, a leading
French Marxist whose interpretation of Marx overlaps with Croce's, though
they had worked independently of one another; four book reviews by
Gentile, including one of Kausky's Die Geschichte des Sozialismus in
Einzelderstellungen (Stuttgart, 1895), and one entitled " Croce's Marxism "
dealing with the third Italian edition of Croce's Historical Materialism and
the Economics of Karl Marx of 1918; and a facsimile of one of Labriola's
letters to Gentile.
Gentile's work consists of two parts: the first is an examination of historical materialism, the second of the so-called philosophy of praxis. The
apparent structure of the two essays is similar; in each case the examination is carried out in three steps: an explanation of the doctrine as can
be found in certain texts; a defense of the doctrine from certain current
objections; and a " philosophical " criticism of the doctrine as being selfcontradictory. The texts are, respectively, Marx's summary in the Preface
to A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, and his Theses on
Feuerbach. Gentile argues that Marx was a philosopher insofar as his
historical materialism must be regarded as a philosophy of history and insofar as the philosophy of praxis inherent in the Theses on Feuerbach constitutes a " materialistic monism distinct from any other similar system
by the concept of praxis applied to matter . . . [where] praxis, for Marx,
is synonymons with human sense-activity." (p. 156) This is not to say,
Gentile notes, that there exists an original system of ideas-Marxismwhich is a workable philosophical system, since he thinks that Marx's
philosophy is an eclecticism of contradictory elements, which when taken
in isolation are often insightful, but Hegelian rather than original to Marx.
In fact, I think that deep down what Gentile tries to show is the following:
Marx's philosophy is valid insofar as it is Hegelian and invalid otherwise.
From this point of view the long chapter entitled "Recent Interpretations
of the Philosophy of Praxis," (pp. 1Q5-55) which might seem a digression,
has a definite function, for it argues that Engels' criticism of transcendent,

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425

abstract metaphysics in Anti-Dilhring is right insofar as it is a repetition
of Hegel's own criticism, and wrong insofar as it misunderstands Hegel or
ignores the later's original criticism of abstract, transcendent metaphysics.
Gentile's book is valuable when so interpreted, i.e., as a justification
of the thesis that Marx's philosophy is valid insofar as it is Hegelian and
invalid otherwise. But there are two problems in this interpretation. First,
the concept of philosophy presupposed by this thesis, though common
and supposedly rigorous, is rather implausible since it implies that it is
possible, and often the case, that one is a great thinker but a poor philosopher; and this makes philosophy irrelevant at best, and perhaps even harmful. The way to solve this problem is to call the kind of philosophy that
Gentile is talking about by its proper name: metaphysics. So I reformulate
my interpretation of Gentile's book as follows: a plausible justification
of the thesis that Marx's metaphysics is valid insofar as it is Hegelian
and invalid otherwise, and an implicit and probably unintended justification of the irrelevance of metaphysics in the thought of an individual.
The second problem with my interpretation is that it makes the book
difficult to understand in terms of the historical context in which it was
created. In fact, the Croce correspondence in the Appendix makes clear
something indirectly implied by ·certain passages and footnotes in Gentile's
book, namely, that his first essay is a reaction against Croce's interpretation
of historical materialism as a historiographical canon of revolutionary importance and universal applicability though of limited validity; and Gentile's second essay is a reaction against Croce's belief that the metaphysical
elements of Marx's thought were of no importance. This problem may
be solved as follows. It is true that the substance of the book consists of
two arguments, one discussing the reason why historical materialism should
be regarded as a philosophy of history rather than as a mere historiographical canon, the other discussing the evidence for the pervasiveness of metaphilosophical elements in Marx's thought. However, these arguments are
inconclusive as the counterarguments in Croce's letters (as well as Gentile's
actual accomplishment mentioned above) show. Hence I do not find that
the value of Gentile's work lies in those arguments, though they are there.
Hence, the present volume, of which La filosofia di Marx is only a part,
is itself valuable insofar as it allows us better to understand and evaluate
Gentile's book.
An important and interesting document in the Appendix is Gentile's essay
entitled "Croce's Marxism." Croce's relation to Marx is a problematic
one because the period of his active interest in Marx was rather brief (from
1895 to 1900, in his long life from 1866 to 195Yl) and because he never
regarded himself as a Marxist (not even in a qualified way), never regarded Marx as a philosopher, and never acknowledged Marx's influence
for his own thinking. Gentile explains Croce's interest in Marxism, which

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while it lasted was very intense and productive, as a case of convergence.
As regards specific points of overlap, Gentile accepts (p.
the two
alleged by Croce himself (in the preface to the 1917 edition of Historical
Materialism and the Economics of Karl Marx), namely, (1) historical,
political realism. Gentile adds two others,
concrete philosophizing, and
namely, the principle of the basic independence and primacy of action visa-vis thought, and the idea of the inapplicability of moral judgment to
social facts and historical events.
I am inclined to agree that Croce's thought does have these four
" marxist " elements, but I would caution that in Croce one finds such elements in a form that I would call "spiritualized." To explain this I wish
to mention a fifth Marxist element which I detect in Croce. One of the
most fundamental doctrines in his philosophy is a general value theory
which is succintly stated in one passage as follows: "Activity and value
are the same thing. For us, valuable is only whatever is an effort of the
imagination, of thought, of the will, of our activity in every one of its
forms. Just as Kant said that nothing else in the universe can be called
good but a good will, so we can generalize and say that nothing else in the
universe has value but human activity." 1 In spite of Croce's explicit
reference to Kant, this concept of value looks more like a generalization
and deepening of Marx's labor theory of value. For Kant was contrasting
the good will to other human traits such as wit and intelligence and hence
presumably to what Croce calls thought and the imagination. Whereas
Marx's labor theory of value was attempting to define the specifically
human contribution to prices, profits, and economic value, as Croce himself
must have believed since he explicitly argues that the labor theory of value
must be interpreted not as a descriptive empirical law (in which case it
would be false) but as a valid principle helpful as an element in the sociological explanation of the profit of capital. 2 So it seems that Marx's
" labor " and " economic value " become respectively Croce's " human activity " and " value in general."
In summary, the present volume will be useful not only to those interested in the history of Italian philosophy and to those interested in the
history of Marxism but also to all those interested in exploring Marx's
Hegelianism (in metaphysics) and Croce's Marxism (in philosophy, as
distinct from metaphysics).
MAURICE

A. FINOCCHIARO

University of Nevada at Las Vegas
Las Vegas, Nevada
1 Benedetto
Croce, Materialismo storico ed economia marxistica
economica. Bari: Laterza, 1968), pp. !'l!'l8-!'l24.
• Ibid., pp. 57-74.

(Edizione

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427

Methodological Foundations of Relativistic Mechanics. By MARSHALL
SPECTOR. Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press,
1972. Pp. 192. $10.95.
The Field Concept in Contemporary Science. By MENDEL SAcHs. American Lecture Series, M. Farber, ed. Springfield, Illinois: Charles C.
Thomas, 1973. Pp. 132.
Philosophical Problems of Space and Time. Second, enlarged edition. By
ADOLF GRUNBAUM. Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science, Vol.
XII, R. S. Cohen & M. W. Wartofsky, eds. Dordrecht and Boston:
D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1973. Pp. 907. $17.90.
The three titles listed above are recent works in the philosophy of science,
similar in their addressing scientific topics that are somewhat esoteric for
the ordinary philosopher and yet quite different in their levels of approach
and degrees of sophistication. While none of the three offers a definitive
solution to current problems in the philosophy of science, all are worthy
of notice as providing useful background and for suggesting new insights
that may help decide substantive issues within this discipline. In their
editorial introduction to Griinbaum's work Robert Cohen and Marx
W artofsky agree that this is "one of the few major works in the philosophy
of the natural sciences in this generation " and go on to praise the author
for his admirable exemplification of the "Aristotelian devotion to the intimate and useful dependence of actual science and philosophical understanding." (p. xiii) All three of the works under review show a deep awarenes of such mutual interdependence between science and philosophy, an
awareness that was shared also by Thomas Aquinas when he had reached
the peak of his intellectual career, and for this reason alone merit being
called to the attention of readers of The Thomist.

*

*

*

Spector's analysis of relativistic mechanics is the work of a philosopher
who is concerned with the methodological foundations of the special theory
of relativity, who can and does employ sufficient mathematics to state his
position unambiguously, and who is concerned to go beyond positivist interpretations of Einstein's special theory to suggest a conceptual understanding of that theory more sympathetic to realism. Unlike many popular
expositions of special relativity, which concentrate on its kinematic aspects
and treat such well-worn topics as simultaneity, light cones, world lines,
and the four-dimensional manifold, Spector's work by-passes most of this
material and focuses instead on the dynamical aspects of the special theory,
paying particular attention to the changes induced in the concepts of force,
mass, and energy in the transition from classical to relativistic dynamics.

BOOK REVIEWS

The author is concerned exclusively with the special theory, mentioning
Einstein's general theory only in passing.
Spector's book may be roughly divided into three parts. The first deals
with the methodological foundations of classical mechanics, with primary
emphasis on dynamics and on delineating the paradigm this provides for
mechanical explanation. The second part goes into the foundations of classical electrodynamics, introduces the concepts of frame of reference and
Galilean transformation, and delineates the crisis situation that developed
towards the end of the nineteenth century as proposed mechanical models
of the ether proved unsatisfactory. The third part then explains how
special relativity arose as a response to the crisis situation in classical
mechanics and electrodynamics, and how Einstein's laws of mechanics
differ from those of Newton, tracing the implications of this for understanding various force functions and the famous equation, E
mc 2 • Some
of Spector's distinctive theses include the following: that F = ma represents the essential content of Newton's second law of motion, and that
the first law of motion is actually a consequence of, and not a propadeutic
to, the second law; that mechanical explanations in the classical sense are
causal explanations made through the application of Newton's second law
and particular force laws; that an element of conventionality enters into
classical mechanics through the constraints that are placed on the kinds
of force laws regarded as allowable; that the luminiferous ether was
originally conceived to supply a mechanical explanation of light phenomena; that the failure of the program to reduce electrodynamics to classical mechanics did not automatically entail the rejection of an ether, nor
did it necessitate the identification of an ether with absolute space; that
Einsteinian dynamics essentially rewrites Newton's second law in more
abstract form; and, as a consequence of all of this, that there is no real
meaning-invariance with regard to the terms force, mass, and energy as
these pass from classical to relativistic mechanics, or, to put it another
way, that Newtonian and Einsteinian mechanics are conceptually commensurable. With regard to the last point Spector maintains that the
concepts of force and mass are both primitive to the systems of mechanics
he has been analyzing and that a " deeper explanation " of these concepts
is not possible within either system, although it may be forthcoming from
various interpretations of general relativity or from more " metaphysical "
types of premises.
As may be seen from this overview, Spector's study is unpretentious.
It purports to be not so much concerned with an accurate historical account of the context of discovery from which the special theory emerged
as it is with a philosophical evaluation made in a context of justification
to show what the special theory ultimately means. Inevitably, however,
the attempt to separate the two contexts lays the author open to the charge
that he is offering an idiosyncratic interpretation of relativistic mechanics-

=

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429

one that is at variance with either the historical record or the results of
formalistic analyses or both. It is noteworthy that Spector is indebted
to Thomas Kuhn for some of his terminology, but he actually takes issue
with, and decidedly rejects, Kuhn's stand on the revolutionary character
of Einsteinian (vis-a-vis Newtonian) mechanics. If the book has any
defect, apart from being poorly indexed, this might be the modesty of
its claims, and particularly its failure to move beyond the narrow problem
of meaning-invariance to a broader realist interpretation of mechanics as
this relates to problems of causal analysis and causal explanation generally.

*

*

*

Mendel Sachs's study of the field concept covers some of the same ground
as Spector's work, but it does so from a different perspective and with an
entirely different intention. The author is a physicist who is in the process
of developing a general field theory of matter and who has a subsidiary
interest in the history and philosophy of science. He presents his work
as being " at an elementary level " and unlike Spector eschews all formal
mathematics so as to concentrate on what he regards as " the logical and
historical aspects" of field theories of matter. Sachs begins with the field
concept as it was introduced by Michael Faraday in the mid-nineteenth
century and traces its development into the full-blown classical theory
of electromagnetism. Faraday's contribution, in Sachs's estimation, was
a unified field theory that was essentially different from the " action-ata-distance" theory of Newtonian mechanics (the author actually attributes
action-at-a-distance to Newton himself, apparently being unaware of Newton's express repudiation of that concept in his well-known letter to
Bentley). He then takes up special relativity as arising out of the impasse
to which mechanical theories of the ether had come but is concerned
almost exclusively with showing how Einstein's principle of relativity
relates to the continuous field concept, and so deals more with kinematic
concepts that require continuous functions for their representation than
with the dynamical concepts analyzed by Spector. Sachs further expands
his discussion to include the general theory of relativity, explaining how
Einstein generalized Newton's law of universal gravitation in terms of the
"metrical field" derived from Riemannian geometry. He also describes
Mach's work on inertia and himself proposes what he refers to as " a
generalized version of the Mach principle," namely, "that all of the manifestations of interacting matter are consequences of their mutual coupling,
and not a consequence of the intrinsic properties of bits of matter." (p. 70)
From this Sachs moves on to " the mechanics of atoms and the continuous
field of probability " to sketch recent interpretations of quantum theory
and to point out the difficulties inherent in producing any generalized
theory that truly combines quantum and relativity concepts. The author's
intuition is that " elementary interaction field theory " is more basic to

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a description of matter than is the currently-accepted "elementary particle theory." His own option is for a continuous field of mutual interaction that underlies " a single closed system, without actual parts, as the
fundamental existent of nature." (p. 113)
Because of the tentative and somewhat intuitive character of Sach's
presentation, it is difficult to give a critical evaluation of the work. The
author undoubtedly manifests an interest in the history of science, but
the many vignettes of scientists he intersperses throughout his development, from Galileo all the way to Einstein, can only make an historian
of science uneasy, to say the least. Somewhat like the medieval hagiographer Sachs uses biography for didactic purposes, extolling the putative
virtues of great scientists of the past as they have been canonized in the
minds of present-day scientists, and drawing liberally on legends long discredited by historians. Sachs's philosophy is almost in the same class as
his history, as it shows little awareness of the type of problem discussed by
Spector or of the analytical sophistication necessary even to delineate the
logical and substantive issues at stake. In fairness to Sachs, however, it
should be remarked that he writes as a physicist and that he is attempting to
articulate a thesis of great philosophical import. His work is of less significance for the history and philosophy it contains than for revealing the
extent of his realist and metaphysical commitments, even though it fails
to articulate the precise grounds on which these are based.

*

*

*

The third title listed above is the second, enlarged edition of Adolf
Griinbaum's Philosophical Problems of Space and Time, the first edition
of which was reviewed by the present writer over ten years ago [The
Thomist, 28 (1964) , pp. 524-529]. The work has more than doubled in
size since its first appearance, as the author remedied defects in the early
work and developed his thought under the stimulus of criticism, some
of which is still on-going. The additional materials elucidate Griinbaum's
considerable debt to Riemann for the ontology of physical geometry that
was fundamental to the thesis developed in the first edition, and also
provide a fuller account of space and time as these ftmction in Einstein's
general theory of relativity, which was treated sparsely in the first edition
because of the extensive development accorded there to the special theory.
To spell out in more detail the amplification of contents in the second
edition the reader needs be reminded that the first edition was divided
into three parts, treating respectively philosophical problems associated
with the metric of space and time, the topology of space and time, and
the theory of relativity. In the second edition, three new chapters supplement part one, a single chapter supplements part two, and three chapters supplement part three. At least four of these chapters have already
appeared as articles elsewhere, but it is extremely useful to have them re-

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431

printed here along with the photographic reproduction of the first edition.
Because of the latter method of reprinting the author was unable to make
any textual revisions, but he has remedied this defect by a lengthy appendix in which he corrects errors, explains the changes from the first to the
second edition, and indicates work still in progress that will amplify his
views further.
The resulting volume is so extensive in scope and exhaustive in detail
that it is impossible to give it fair notice in this review. Of particular interest, however, is Griinbaum's continued discussion of Pierre Duhem's
epistemology of physics in terms of his own views on physical geometry,
his appraisal of Eugene Wigner's dictum that "entropy is an anthropomorphic concept," and his revised statement on the bearing of philosophy on
the history of the special theory of relativity. Also noteworthy are his
discussions of current philoosphical issues in the general theory, particularly
the ontology of empty curved space and the bearing of the time-orientability of space-time on an understanding of " time's arrow." Gri.ibaum
articulates his position with reference to his supporters and critics in recent
philosophy-of-science literature, of whom Gerald Massey, Hilary Putnam,
and Gerald Holton are representative. He has much to say also about
falsification and the philosophy of science of Karl Popper, which he
promises to amplify in a volume to be entitled Falsifiability and Rationality,
forthcoming from the University of Pittsburgh Press.
In relation to the other two titles here reviewed, Gri.inbaum covers
roughly the same area as Spector and Sachs, but he does so in the advanced, highly technical way one now expects to find in journals devoted
exclusively to the philosophy of science. Spector's book, on the other hand,
is at a more intermediate level; on this account it would be a useful
propadeutic for reading Griinbaum. Sachs's work, as he himself acknowledges, is elementary; one may fault it for its historical and philosophical
simplicity, but for directness of expression and commitment it commends
itself to anyone who lacks the technical background to comprehend the
other two.
WILLIAM A. WALLACE, O.P.
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D. C.

Man's Responsibility for Nature. By JoHN PASSMORE. New York: Scribner's, 1974. Pp. Ql3.
This is an ambitious and broad-ranging reflective study of man's relationship with nature in terms of Western Christianity and contemporary
problems. The first two chapters study the man-nature relationship as

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found in the tradition of " man as despot " and in the two dependent but
connected traditions of "stewardship" and "cooperation with nature."
The author finds that the tradtion of despotic domination and exploitation
of nature has always been dominant in the Christian West. Little distinction is made between Catholic and Reformation traditions; there is
no reference to the well-known " Protestant ethic " thesis, and the treatment of the first creation narrative is somewhat simplistic. These defects
are continued into the description of the Christian tradition of the stewardship of nature, which the author finds to be not biblical and, although important, clearly minor. The tradition of Christian cooperation with nature
is also held to be minor. Passmore does not seem to realize that this tradition is the main Catholic one since Thomas Aquinas, and in fact labels
it as, from a Roman Catholic point of view, unorthodox. (note, p. 33)
The remaining five chapters are far more successful. Using a more or
less general philosophical method, Passmore takes up the current questions
of environmental pollution, the conservation of natural resources for future
use, the preservation of nature, and the increase and control of human
population. Most of the judgments in these chapters seem well weighed
and moderate. Certainly, to reflect philosophically on these four major
problems and on their interrelations is a large and difficult undertaking.
Given the obstacles as well as the scarcity of precedent, the author has
done a remarkable job of philosophical pioneering. These chapters are
somewhat marred, however, by occasional poor taste (Martin Luther is
called a "spoiled monk," note, p. 144), by some passing tendentious or
temerarious judgments (e. g., " ... the anti-human bias of so many
ecologists," p. 127; " The Roman Catholic Church has never placed much
store on the reduction ... of suffering," note, p. 131), and especially by
a surprising lack of familiarity with the Anglican and Roman Catholic
traditions concerning nature's relation to man. These faults are made
more evident by their contrast with the author's excellent and sprightly
style, one in which there happily flickers a bright if donnish wit.
It would, of course, have been impossible to write a book on these problems which would not be quickly outdistanced by world events and outdated. Unfortunately, the present book appears to have been written before the " limits to growth " debate and before the energy crisis. This
makes it of limited usefulness for most readers. Theologians will find it only
slightly helpful. Philosophers in the area of the philosophy of nature and
its importance for today's macro-problems of environment, resources, and
population, will find Passmore's study interesting and, probably, stimulating.
RoBERT FARICY,

Gregorian University
Rome, Italy

S.J.

BOOK REVIEWS

488

Anatomy of the New Testament. By RoBERT A. SPIVEY and D. MooDY
SMITH, JR. New York: Macmillan Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Pp.
539. $9.95.

The Twelve Apostles. By RoNALD BROWNRIGG. New York:
Publishing Co., Inc., 1974. Pp.

Macmillan

This Hebrew Lord. By JoHN SHELBY SPONG. New York:
Book/The Seabury Press, 1974. Pp. 190. 5.95.

A Crossroad

Although appearing only five years after the first edition, the second
edition of Anatomy of the New Testament is clearly a brand new, up-todate introduction to the New Testament. The present edition has been significantly reorganized for the sake of both simplicity and clarity. Most important, however, are the revisions that take account of the many scholarly
advances during the past five years, e. g., the Son of Man problem and
the value of epistolary evidence for understanding Paul's ministry. In addition, the footnotes and bibliographies have been carefully brought up
to date.
The work as a whole achieves the remarkable goal of providing for the
lay reader a thoroughly adequate treatment of the background, composition, and content of the New Testament. It presupposes nothing more than
an ability to read English and an interest in Scripture. Nevertheless, the
work is an invaluable tool for students, clergy, and scholars for it is both
simple and complete, clear and profound, abounding in charts and illustrations as well as containing a glossary, indices, and comprehensive bibliographies. For anyone desiring to enter into the world of the New Testament and encounter the Word of God this work is strongly recommended.
The Twelve Apostles, richly illustrated with more than one-hundredand-forty photographs, maps, and reproductions of religious art, is a critical
examination of the lives, work, and religious significance of the Twelve and
much more besides. Ronald Brownrigg examines all of the available evidence on the Twelve and their impact on the last two-thousand years
of Christianity: the sketchy information of the New Testament, the
legendary material in the apocryphal writings, the witness of the Fathers,
and the traditions that have enriched the lives of Christian communities
all over the world. The result is a commendable synthesis whose balanced,
critical judgments clearly separate fact from fiction while at the same time
giving to the average reader of today a vivid appreciation of the apostles
in the origin, spread, and present-day life of Christianity.
John Shelby Spong has admittedly run the risk of heresy in his presentation of Jesus in This Hebrew Lord, and some will undoubtedly insist that
he has indeed succumbed. The critical scholar will search in vain for
affirmations of traditional beliefs about Jesus, e. g., the pre-existent Son

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of God, the redemptive incarnation, the sacrifice offered on the cross, the
bodily resurrection. Nevertheless, Spong should not be faulted for not
doing what he never intended to do. His work " is not offered as a definitive Christology but as a personal witness." (p. ix) He has taken seriously
the criticisms of traditional formulations put forward by J. A. Robinson
in Honest to God but has gone far beyond Robinson in his effort to explain his personal faith in Jesus Christ in terms that are meaningful in
today's society.
His method, as indicated in the title, is to return to the Hebrew milieu
into which Jesus was born and in which he lived and worked and died.
He then attempts to uncover the fundamental faith experience to which the
early Church gave witness and then to give expression to this same faith
experience in the context of contemporary society.
His results are to some extent valid but at the same time limited. He
views Jesus in terms of what he came to do, i.e., to "bring love to the
unloved, freedom to the bound, wholeness to the distorted, peace to the
insecure." (p. 170) He is certainly correct as far as he goes, and one might
even argue that he is correct in going no further, i.e., in not raising questions of dogma that are really irrelevant to the faith and life of contemporary Christians. However, he is certainly incorrect in his attempt
to explain how Jesus accomplished his purpose. Spong sees Jesus as uncertain and groping: first he taught, then he acted out his purpose in his
deeds, then he shared his deepest feelings with his disciples and finally,
when all else had failed, he went to the cross. Perhaps Spong is correct
in seeing a progress in Jesus' understanding of his mission, but he fails to
grasp the full meaning of the cross and the transforming effect it has on
those who believe when he sees the result of the cross as nothing more
than what Jesus might have accomplished by his words and deeds.
This reviewer suspects that Spong has either missed the full impact
of the early Church's faith in the cross and resurrection or he has so
re-mythologized that faith in contemporary terms as to render it as inaccessible as he claims it was in the out-dated credal formulations he
seeks to avoid.
In spite of the above criticism, Spong's work has much to recommend
it: his grasp of the Hebrew mentality, his ability to translate that mentality into today's language, his understanding and formulation of the fundamental purpose for which Jesus came into the world. This work represents what one sees far too little of in today's literature: a positive effort,
using the insights of contemporary scholars, to communicate to the educated lay reader the truth in Jesus.
TERENCE

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

J. KEEGAN, 0. P.

BOOK REVIEWS

435

Your People, My People: The Meeting of Jews and Christians. By A. RoY
EcKARDT. New York: New Times Book Company, 1974. Pp. 255.
$8.95.
Roy Eckardt, chairman of the Department of Religious Studies at Lehigh
University, outlines in this volume the present status of Christian-Jewish
relations. Against a background of long years of experience as lecturer,
panelist, activist in the dialogue, he presents a progress report on the main
subject areas: antisemitism in the New Testament, the Holocaust, the
Vatican II declaration on the Jews, the Palestinians and Israel, the Jewishness of Christianity.
His purpose is exhortatory. Deploring Christians' inadequate contrition
for their sins against the Jews, he declares: "The obligation remains of
how to make ourselves aware of the divine judgment and mercy so that ...
our lives may be transformed and the future influenced." In a clear,
punchy style he strives to raise Christian consciousness out of its apathy
over antisemitism. He feels his Christian guilt intensely and affirms it
passionately, but this very intensity becomes at times so overpowering as
to be self-defeating by antagonizing the very reader he aims to influence.
Eckardt contends, for instance, that every display of historic Christian
antisemitism can be traced directly or indirectly to events recorded in
the New Testament. "The foundations of Christian antisemitism and the
Church's contribution to the Nazi holocaust were laid 1900 years
ago: the line from the New Testament through the centuries of
Christian contempt for Jews to the gas ovens and crematoria is unbroken."
(p. 13) This lack of nuance contrasts sharply with the guarded approach
of certain Jewish scholars he praises, such as Hesche} and Buber. In one
sub-chapter, entitled "Enter the Devil," his compulsive indignation leads
him to suggest that our Christian antisemitism is "our own below-conscious
wish " to kill Christ, which has involved us Christians in a primordial
conspiracy with "the demonic powers." (p. 81)
Aware of his own emotional extravagance, Eckardt admits that during
lectures his own emphatic manner of presenting Christian guilt seems to
have prompted listeners "to accuse me of self-flagellation." (p. 3) The
wise reader, however, will not pass up this otherwise valuable book simply
because of its flights of moral indignation.
The author's approach to the antisemitism question is distinctly theological but is this the right approach to a sociological disease in a secular
age? The secularist regards discussion of " deicide " or " the new Israel "
as " rumors of forgotten wars and battles long ago," yet antisemitism is
endemic here and now in our society and might become epidemic at any
moment. I say this not in criticism of Eckardt's book but simply as commentary. The book is a highly colored but stimulating report, full of rich
insights into a deplorable religious tragedy.
JOHN B. SHEERIN, c. s. P.
St. Paul's College
Washington, D. C.

BOOKS RECEIVED
Citta Nuova Editrice: Studi Tomistici. 2 San Tommaso e l'Odierna Problematica Teologica. Saggi. (Pp. 346, L 5.000); 3 San Tommaso e
Il Pensiero Moderno. Saggi. (Pp. 330, L 5.000)
Columbia University Press: Twentieth Century Ethics, by Roger N. Hancock. (Pp. 240, $10.00)
Editorial Moneda y Credito, Realitas. Seminario Xavier Zubiri. I Trabajos
1972-1973. (Pp. 514)
The Free Press: Magic, Faith, and Healing, ed. by Ari Kiev. (Pp. 492,
$2.95)
Instituto Francisco de Vitoria Francisco Suarez, De Legibus III, ed. by
L. Perefia & V. Abril. (Pp. 414, 850 pesetas)
Inter-Varsity Press: The Unraveling of America, by Stephen V. Monsma.
(Pp. 228, $4.95); The Clock Work Image, by Donald M. Mackay.
(Pp. 112, $2.25)
Macmillan Publishing Co.: Historical Atlas of the Religions of the World,
ed. by Ismail Ragi al Farugi & David E. Sopher. (Pp. 364, 12.50);
Atlas of the Arab-Israel Conflict, by Martin Gilbert. (Pp. 101,
$6.95)
Pflaum Publishing Co.: Becoming Human. An Invitation to Christian
Ethics, by William E. May. (Pp. 155, $4.50)
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies: Master Eckhart. Parisian Questions and Prologues, tr. with Introduction & Notes by Armand A.
Maurer, C. S. B. (Pp. 123, $3.50)
Prentice-Hall, Inc.: Readings in Philosophy of Art & Aesthetics. (Pp.
603, $13.50)
Tulane University: Tulane Studies in Philosophy. Vol. XXIII, Studies
in Process Philosophy I, ed. by Robert C. Whittemore. (Pp. 105,
$5.00)
University of Notre Dame, Press: Ockham's Theory of Terms. Part I of
the Summa Logicae, tr. & introduction by Michael J. Loux. (Pp. 234);
Art and Scholasticism, by Jacques Maritain, tr. by Joseph W. Evans.
(Pp. 240, $9.95 cloth, $3.25 paper)
University of Oklahoma Press: Philosophy of Beauty, by Francis J.
Kovach. (Pp. 360, $9.95)
Yale University Press: The Ethics of Fetal Research, by Paul Ramsey.
(Pp. 125, $2.95); The Practice of Death, by Eike-Henner W. Kluge.
(Pp. 259, $10.00)

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