THE THOMIST A SPECULATIVE QUARTERLY REVIEW OF THEOLOGY AND PHILOSOPHY EmToRs: Tm,: DoMINICAN FATHERS OF THE PROVINCE OF ST. JosEPH Publishers: The Thomist Press, Washington, D. C. 20017 VoL. XL JULY, 1976 No. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK T HE THEORY OF abstraction is one of those epistemological theories which, historically as well as in a contemporary context, have served to polarize philosophical positions. The dividing line of this division falls along two theses, bo:th of which are considered essential to the integrity of the theory itself: the doctrine of mental faculties as distinct functions of the human intellect and soul; and the theory of metaphysical realism. Traditional as well as contemporary critique of the theory of abstraction has been to the effect that quite apart from all else, these very presuppositions of the theory are suspect, if not downright mistaken; and that therefore the theory itself need not be examined for conceptual consistency and philosophical insight-to say nothing of correctness. I do not here wish to debate the various pros and cons of this critique. To be quite candid, I am convinced that as generally understood these presuppositions of the theory are unacceptable, and therefore cannot lend support to the theory itself. At the same time, I am also convinced that the theory need not 337 388 E.-H. W, KLUGE be understood in this manner; and what is more important, that the critical conclusion suggested by the preceding train of reasoning is mistaken. I am convinced that there is a way of interpreting the theory of abstraction which not only renders it immune from criticisms which have thus been directed against it, but also shows that the theory is in fact correct. This, then, is the task which I have set myself in the present paper: to show why and how the theory of abstraction should be considered seriously from a modern point of view. But as the proverb has it, one cannot make an omelette without breaking eggs. Thus, what will emerge after I have done will be an account of abstraction which, although in essence constructed along historical lines, differs considerably from those accounts proffered by historical figures. In fact, it will be extremely doubtful, not to say unlikely, that any historical figure would recognize right off the theory as clothed in such modern garb as I intend to furnish it. Still, I am convinced that once explained to them, these individuals would accept my version of the theory of abstraction as merely a modern re-working of their own. Nor do I make this last claim in the spirit of a pious hope. I am confident that what I see as the central thrust of the theory of abstraction is already to be found in the writings of that greatest medieval expositor of it: St. Thomas Aquinas. In the present paper, I propose to put this confidence to the test. That is to say, I shall present my analysis of the theory of abstraction as a reinterpretation and exposition of the account proffered by St. Thomas. As an aside, I find this approach doubly fitting: Not only is the account given by Aquinas the touchstone of any attempted reinterpretation; if successful, my endeavour will also have the merit of showing the perennial nature of the Saint's conceptual endeavour. I However, I shall not begin in medias res. Instead, I shall soften the harshness of my unaccustomed interpretation by beginning with Aristotle, the precursor of Aquinas. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 339 That is to say, the roots of Aquinas's theory of abstraction are manifold. Ultimately, however, they reduce to one-a taproot, to continue the metaphor: the theory of perception advanced by Aristotle. The latter probably finds its most familiar expression in Book Three of the de Anima. There, Aristotle tells us that we must distinguish between a sense on the one hand, and a sense organ on the other. The latter, so he tells us, is merely a material, physiological entity which functions as the substratum of the sense itself, where the sense is defined as " the equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ." 1 He then does go on to say: This explains why plants cannot perceive, in spite of their having a portion of soul in them and obviously being affected by tangible objects themselves; for undoubtedly their temperament cannot be lowered or raised. The explanation is, that they have no mean of contrary qualities, and so no principle in them capable of taking on the forms of sensible objects without their matter. 2 From this account, two things emerge: One, that sensation is a matter of " taking on the forms of sensible objects without their matter." TheJ other, that this taking on of the forms of objects-of the stimulus-objects-depends on the presence of contrary qualities in the sense-organs which, until the moment of their stimulation, are held in " equipoise." Both of these points are important. The first finds its development in expressions like " actual knowledge is identical with its object," 3 and the claim that the mind " becomes each set of its possible objects " 4-in short, in the thesis that " in every case, the mind which is actively thinking is the object which it thinks." 5 The .second has rather important implications with respect to the notion of form: as to how we understand it. Let me consider these in turn. What the first comes down to is this: The mind, like the 1 4Q4a81. 4Q4a8Q-4Q4M. 4QOaQO; 48lal; etc. •4Q9b5. G 48lb17 ff. 2 3 340 E.-H. W. KLUGE senses, acquires the form of its object. It becomes " informed " by the latter, as it were. In thus becoming informed, the mind becomes qualitatively identical with its object. If that object happens to be a pure form, then of course the thinking mind will be its own object. The Prime Mover is here a case in point. If the object is not a pure form but has matter, then the mind will differ from its object. But only numerically; i.e., with respect to the matter. Otherwise, what the mind thinks and the mind itself are one and the same. Nor does this state of affairs hold only with respect to thinking as we nowadays understand the term. It also applies to thinking as understood in the traditional sense. More particularly, it also applies to perception. Here the form is supplied directly by the relevant sense (s) and is identical with the form of the object which acts as a stimulus. But even in these cases-or especially herethe mind is what it perceives, i. e., thinks. If the mind were a material entity, this would occasion difficulties. Not the least of these would be that perception would have to involve a spatio-temporal modification of the mind itself.6 However, as Aristotle reminds us, the mind is not material. To be precise, he says that it is a " form of forms." 7 Consequently, this sort of difficulty does not obtain. Others, however, do. The most important of these can be summed up in the following questions: how is it that the mind can become that which it thinks and yet remain essentially as well as numerically distinct from it; and how is it that the senses can take on the form (but not the matter) of their stimulusobjects and not turn into the objects themselves? These questions, in turn, focus on still another issue: How to interpret the Aristotelian concept of form, particularly in view of the claims made about the natures of mind and senses respectively. At this juncture, I want to leave traditional interpretations of Aristotle's dicta and start anew. To begin with, I propose to take seriously the claim which Aristotle makes in diverse places: • The phrase, "store-room of the imagination " obtrudes itself in this context. • 482al-2. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 341 that a form is not a metaphysical entity in the Platonic sense, but a principle of organization. 8 The way in which I propose to understand this is, that a form is a structural relation; or, as one might also put it, that it is a pattern of structural complexion which, insofar as its nature concerned, is independent of and distinct from the substrata in which it might be realized, but which for all that cannot exist (cannot be realized) independently of such substrata. · With this in mind, let us make a brief excursion into the realm of contemporary logical theory. The latter recognizes a distinction between the different orders or levels of generality of distinct systems. Thus, there are first-order systems, whose formulae, axioms and theorems deal only with states of affairs, objects, etc., in the world; second-order systems, whose formulae, axioms and theorems deal only with statements about the world; third-order systems, whose formulae, axioms and theorems deal only with statements about statements about the world; and so on. It is the relationship between fir.st- and second-order systems that is of interest here. For, a secondorder system can be viewed as a schema; as a generalization with respect to various :first-order possibilities, where the diverse first-order systems which it permits are distinct and mutually exclusive realizations of these possibilities. Another, logically equivalent way of putting this would be to say that an individual :first-order system is a particularization of a certain second-order system where the latter also admits of various other; mutually exclusive particularizations. 9 Let us return for the moment to the Aristotelian definition of a form as a principle of organization. 1-0 I suggested that this means that a form must be understood as a principle of struchire; and that it follows from this that a form must be construed as a relational entity which can be realized in many ways, de8 Cf. I041M6 ff.; 1014b36· ff.; 1033bl9f.; 103Ib3lff.; etc. • A good example of the sort of relationship involved here would be that outlined by David Hilbert in his epochal On The Foundations of Geometry as holding between Euclidean, Riemannian and various other geometries on the one hand, and the second-order geometry of which they are particularizations on the other. 1 °Cf. 8 above. 342 E.-H. W. KLUGE pending on the nature of the substratum in which it is instantiated, but which, as such, is logically independent of the particular substratum in question. 11 This crucial point can be illustrated with the aid of contemporary physics; more .specifically, by considering the nature of a hologramme. 12 Whatever the manner of its generation, a hologramme is really nothing other than a complex wave pattern. As such, it is susceptible of exact mathematical analysis; if not in actual practice, then at least in principle. Let us suppose that a particular hologramme has been analyzed in such a way. Then the equations representing it would be uniquely descriptive of its structural form. However, these mathematical formulae would not apply to the hologramme alone. They would also describe the stimulus-object giving rise to the hologramme insofar as it is a causal antecedent of the latter. In that sense, therefore, these formulae would be a mathematical expression of one and the same principle of structure or form as it is realized in distinct material substrata. In that sense, too, the form can be seen to be independent of the particular .substratum in which it happens to be instantiated. If we now tum to the concept of a nervous system, we can effect a synthesis of the disparate logical and physical points that have just been made in order to shed some light on our 11 Where there is here no suggestion whatever as to existential independence. Indeed, the interpretation I am suggesting would make nonsense of such a claim. 12 A hologramme is an interference pattern produced by the interaction of a reference wave with waves of the same type issuing from or reflected by the object to be recorded. Coherent radiation-usually laser light-is generally employed to produce such a pattern. The latter does not look like the object, but like the sort of ring-formed wave-pattern produced by simultaneously throwing several rocks into a still pool. Hologra=es provide a striking example of the principles that forms qua forms are independent of substrata and that forms are in the receiver after the nature of the receiver. For, hologrammes and target objects share the same form: when illuminated by laser light of the original type, a 3-D image structurally identical to the target object (in the causally relevant sense) is produced which can be viewed from different angles as the observer changes position just as can the target object. Since the structure of the image is constituted by the hologramme, and not the coherent light, the former must contain the form without for all that being the object. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 343 problem. For, in a very real sense, a nervous system can be viewed as a second-order system capable of first-order particularizations. That is to say, it can be viewed as a neural net which as such is a physical analogue of a second-order system. Its specific states-the specific electro-chemical activities which obtain in the various senses at any given moment in timewould then be determinations or particularizations of the system to one of the many sets of possibilities inherent in the net as a whole qua second-order system. If we consider what I said a moment ago about the identity of form between stimulusobject and hologramme, this will now become germane in the following way: upon stimulation by a particular object, the nervous system, considered as a second-order system, is particularized in its states to a series of first-order states--electrochemical discharges-the logical nature of which is isomorphic to the form of the stimulus-object insofar as the latter is causally active in that particular modality in which the system is receptive. 13 Therefore, those very equations which describe the hologramme and the stimulus-object would also describe this first-order electro-chemical particularization of the nervous system on this specific occasion. And in this sense, clearly, stimulus-object and nervous system-,stimulus-object and sensecould meaningfully be said to have one and the same form. Let me now return to my point of departure: Aristotle's claim that (1) the sense is an equipoise of contrary qualities, distinct from the sense-organ itself; that sensation is a disruption of this equipoise-a disturbance of the mean of the temperament-which forms the material basis of the sense; that (3) in sensation, the sense takes on or is informed by the form of the object, but without its matter; and that (4) the mind which is perceptually aware " is the object which it thinks." In line with the preceding discussion, all of this can now be restated in more modem terminology, as follows: 13 I am here postulating an ideal case, barring sensory malfunctioning, etc. Strictly speaking, this account applies to the particular senses, not the nervous system as a whole. However, the same analysis, mutatia mutandis, holds for the latter as well. 344 E.-H. W. KLUGE (1) The sense itself is a second-order system: a structural organization or inter-relationship among material entities (neurons, etc.) which, although not identical with the sense itself, nevertheless function as its material basis. (2) Sensation is a determination of this second-order system to one of the first-order possibilities inherent in it, where the first-order states which result form an analogue of the stimulusobject as it is causally active on the sense-organ. (3) The first-order determination of the sense is not merely an analogue of the stimulus-object, but in fact is an isomorph in the sense explained.a The sense thus" takes on the form" of the object. A mathematically describable relation of structural identity obtains between the first-order particularization of the sense and the stimulus-object. (4) The mind is a" form of forms"; i.e., a third-order structural organization of the material, neurological basis which, as such, includes as its particular determinations the various second-order systems which are the senses. Being a higherorder system, it can contain these mutually conflicting secondorder systems simultaneously, and thus is capable of particularization to distinct first-order states at one and the same time as a result of the stimulation of the senses. In this way, the mind, like the senses, acquires the forms of the various stimulusobjects-" receives " their forms, but not their matter-in the form of neural impulses which together constitute the neurological isomorph of the stimulus-object's structure. The mind thus becomes "the object which it thinks "; that is to say, in this way it comes to share the latter's form. 15 Of course, given its nature 14 If need be, this isomorphism-this identity of form-could be substantiated by an analysis of the wave-pattern and the electro-chemical state of the responding system. I realize full well that the production of the relevant equations is something which is not possible for us at the present time. In that sense, what I have just said is more in. the nature of a pious hope than a description of an actual st>tte of affairs. •• I am fully aware that I have here made Aristotle out to be a materialist with respect to minds. Although unusual, this is nevertheless perfectly in i;woord with ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 345 as a third-order system, this becoming-the-object-which-itthinks does not entail a spatio-temporal assimilation of it to the stimulus-object, any more than this was the case with sensation proper as discussed previously. 16 The interpretation of ' form,' ' sense ' and ' mind ' which I have just suggested explicates, and indeed lends credibility to, the Aristotelian account of perceptual awareness. What would otherwise be outlandish metaphysical nonsense now appears as comprehensible, credible, and possibly even correct. This, I submit, is a point in favour of my interpretation, its unusual character notwithstanding. But it also has another advantageif such it may be called: it brings out a fundamental shortcoming of the Aristotelian account, a shortcoming which is best captured by Aristotle's own phrase: The mind qua form of forms " becomes the object which it thinks." This .shortcoming does not reside in the postulate of formal isomorphism between mind and object. On the contrary, that is a point in its favour: any theory of perceptual awareness which accepts the hypothesis of a non-phenomenal reality which is the causal antecedent of and is represented by the world of phenomenal experiences, must provide a point of contact between the two realms. In fact, the requirement is much stronger: it must provide for a point of identity between the two. Otherwise, to borrow a phrase from the tradition, the perceiver will be locked in the circle of his own ideas. As I have interpreted it, the Aristotelian schema provides a solution everything that Aristotle says on the subject-with the possible exception of what he says about the active intellect. The latter, however, presents a puzzle even on traditional interpretations. However, a little later I shall try to show that on my interpretation even the active intellect can be understood in a consistent and coherent manner. 18 Another way of putting this would be to say that this higher-order structure instantiates a. first-order neurological state which, considered from a purely logicomathematical point of view, can be put into a direct one-one correspondence with those features of the stimulus-object which are causally active in the relevant sense. (I here ignore threshold effects and similar neurological phenomena. A discussion of these would complicate the issue unnecessarily for the present context.) 346 E.-H. W. KLUGE to this transcendental bridging problem: by means of the postulate of the identity of form in percept and perceived. The shortcoming which I mentioned lies in another direction: in the properly perceptual aspects of the theory. More precisely, it lies in the complete absence of interpretative, conceptual and categorical machinery from the schema; a lack which ultimately leads to a disappearance of the distinction between being and perceiving by collapsing the latter into the former. 17 But let me put this .somewhat differently and in somewhat greater detail. There are two major problems that are faced by any would-be theory of perception. One of these I have already characterized as the transcendental bridging problemhow to get from the phenomenal to the non-phenomenal. The other problem is, how to account for the cognitive significance of the phenomenal itself. Struck by the importance of the transcendental bridging problem, Aristotle solved it in the manner just indicated: by the postulate of the metaphysical identity of form. The mind acquires the form of its perceptual object and becomes that which it perceives. 18 But this very solution introduces the second major problem in full force. For, perceptual awareness, if it is to be an awareness, cannot allow perceiver and perceived to coalesce into one. That is to say, the perceptual object must be experienced as a percept. An element of distinction-of distance, as it were-must obtain between the percept and the perceiver. Otherwise, the perceiver would quite literally be his own (phenomenal) world. This distinction, however, can obtain if and only if the percept has cognitive significance; more precisely, if it is apprehended under some categorial structure. 19 It is on precisely this point that the Aristotelian analysis fails. To be sure, Aristotle does appear to take some small steps in the direction of a solution. In particular, his concept of the 17 That is why there is a certain irony in Aristotle's own phrase, the mind " becomes the object which it thinks." 18 To paraphrase Berkeley, percipere becomes ease. 1 • Kant saw this point nicely. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 347 active intellect with an illuminating function seems to go some way towards filling the categorical need. 20 However, these steps are so tentative and superficial-as witness the medieval interpretations on this score-that they scarcely even amount to a recognition of the problem, let alone a proper solution. It is at this point that the medieval advances over the basic Aristotelian schema manifest themselves; in particular those which we encounter in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. Here we seem to find a clear recognition of the necessity of categorical interpretation of phenomenal data in order for the latter to attain cognitive significance and thus become percepts, rather than remaining merely aspects of the phenomenal totality which otherwise would be the perceiver. To this end, the Aristotelian distinction between active and passive intellect is amplified, developed and employed to full advantage. The result is an analysis of perception which not merely solves the transcendental bridging problem, but the problem of percept-perceiver distinction as well. In the remainder of this paper, I shall show how this is the case. I shall do so by considering first the traditional interpretation of Aquinas on this topic, and shall criticize it as failing to appreciate the Saint's philosophical contributions on this issue. I shall then sketch what I take to be the correct interpretation. I shall conclude by taking a brief look at the Franciscan tradition critical of Aquinas's account. Here I shall attempt a brief reply, showing that this critique is misdirected since based on a faulty understanding of the thomistic notion of abstraction and the Aristotelian concept of form. II Traditional accounts of Aquinas's theory of perception generally begin by stating several rather fundamental points: that for Aquinas the human soul is the form of the (human) body; that at birth the human mind is a tabula rasa, devoid of any 20 I am not stating that Aristotle consciously intended the latter for this purpose or introduced it for this reason. 348 E.-H. W. KLUGE and all concepts; and that the thomistic analysis of perceptual awareness locates the sources of such awareness-as indeed of awareness in general-in the senses, which provide the raw materials for cognition. These theses are then interwoven in something like the following manner: in sensation, the senseorgan is affected by an external object, resulting in a senseimpression. This sense-impression, in turn, is nothing other than an " immutation" of the sense by the form of the stimulusobject: a reception of the form of the object into the sense, but without the matter. Sense-impressions from the various senses are then combined by an agency known as the common sense into a complex image; that is to say, the sensible species of the various senses are then combined into a phantasm. Possession of the phantasm, however-so the account continuesdoes not yet constitute perceptual awareness. That would require that the phantasm be actually understood. 21 The phantasm, however, is a creature of the senses; a form instantiated in the material substratum of the senses. Matter, however, is not only the principle of individuation; it is also, and indeed thereby, the principle of the unintelligibility of forms instantiated in a material substratum. Consequently the phantasmthe form of the stimulus-object as instantiated in the material substratum of the senses-is unintelligible as it stands. In order to become intelligible, it must be dissociated from its material context. Furthermore-so the account continues- perceptual awareness is a mode of knowledge: of the external world, to be sure, but knowledge nevertheless. As such, it must be propositional in nature; which is but another way of saying that it must involve judgment: judgment to the effect that the phantasm in question is of a certain sort. 22 This, in turn, requires concepts: universals under which the phantasm can be subsumed. The radical empiricism of the thomistic theory implies that nihil est in intellectu quad non prius fuit in sensu; 21 Strictly speaking, more would be required. But see below. •• Once more, strictly speaking this is incorrect. It should read, that the object as apprehended through the phantasm is of a certain sort. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 349 more specifically for the present context, that the generic concepts required for such judgments must somehow be supplied by the senses. The only things the senses supply are sensible species. These, in virtue of their materiality, are particular. Consequently, as one commentator has it, "It is necessary to postulate an activity on the mind's part, in order to explain how the universal concept is formed from the material provided by sense-experience." 23 It is here that abstraction enters in a dual capacity. In abstracting the form of the stimulus-object from its associated substratum of the senses, it not merely makes the form potentially intelligible, but also abstracts it from its individuating condition and thus results in the form qua universal. This is then given to the passive intellect. The latter, now in possession of a generic concept, performs a" conversion to the phantasm "-sees the latter as it were sub specie universalis-and in thus seeing it, perceives through it the stimulus-object as an entity of a particular kind. 24 In short, it now actually perceives. 25 As I said, the preceding is pretty much the course of a standard analysis of Aquinas on perception. Yet, although fairly standard, it is unacceptable as a whole. While its analysis of the judgmental characteristic of perceptual awareness cannot be faulted, its characterization of abstraction is superficial and confused, obscuring precisely those points of the doctrine which constitute its strength. In so doing, the account obfuscates and falsifies the whole analysis, leaving it an easy prey to negative critique. Therefore, in order to get clear on what Aquinas actually does say, and to show how his account is not only a substantial improvement over that of Aristotle but also evades traditional critique, I shall now retrace and analyse the various steps of the Saint's theory as we find them in his works. Let me begin by stating that Aquinas had a very clear-cut understanding of the transcendental bridging problem and that •• Copleston, F. C., Aquinas (Penguin Books, London, 1955), p. 175. •• Cf. notes and above. ••Cf. Copleston, passim; see also F. C. Copleston, History of Western Philosophy, Vol. II, Part Chapter 38, to mention but one rather well-known commentator. 350 E.-H. W. KLUGE he accepted the Aristotelian solution in terms of identity of form. That is to say, he tells us that ... whatev.er operates must in some sense be united to the object in relation to which it operates.26 and that this union of what operates and what is operated on is effected by means of the form which is shared by both-at any rate, in perception. As he put it, ... in sensible things it is to be observed that the form is otherwise in one sensible than another .... In the same way, the sensible form is in one way in the thing which is external to the sense, and in another in the senses which receive the form of the sensible things without receiving their matter. 27 21 Ibid., q. 84, a. 1. As I have tried to show in the first part of this paper, the possibility of veridical perception-indeed, of perception tout court-hinges on two factors: the possibility of contact between the perceiver and the object of perception, and on maintaining a distinction between perceiver and percept on the phenomenological level-on maintaining what I have called psychic distance. In accepting the Aristotelian solution to the transcendental bridging problem, Aquinas solved the first of these problems facing any theory of perception. So far, then, substantial agreement between Aquinas and Aristotle obtains; and so far, the standard account is acceptable. It is with respect to the second problem that Aquinas and Aristotle begin to part company; and it is at this point that the traditional account becomes faulty. For, it is at this point that Aquinas introduces the theory of abstraction. As we saw, the traditional account has it that the reason for abstraction is to make the sensible species and phantasm actually intelligible-i. e., to restore an intelligibility to the form which it has lost due to its association with matter-and by that very move to provide a concept. It is on the first of these that I want to concentrate. What seems to be implied by it is, among other things, that so long 2• Summa Theol., I, q. 78, a. 8. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 851 as the form is instantiated in a material substratum, it will be particularized and individuated by the latter, and therefore will be unintelligible in principle. In fact, the traditional account takes this to be one of the most fundamental thomistic tenets. Unquestionably, texts can be cited which, when viewed in a certain way, support this interpretation. The following would be cases in point: " The materiality of the knower and of the species whereby he knows . . . impede knowledge of the universal; " 28 wherefore we must postulate in the human mind " some power to make things actually intelligible by abstracting from the material conditions." 29 However, there are weighty reasons for contending that such a use of these passages is erroneous; that they-and others like them-must mean something else, and that on pain of incoherence and contradiction of the thomistic system as a whole. In particular, there are two series of considerations which bring this out-the one textual, the other conceptual in nature. I shall begin by sketching the latter. The conceptual considerations center around Aquinas's theory of the (human) soul and its manner of operation. As he repeatedly tells us, the (human) soul is the form of the (human) body. 80 The body, of course, is material. Therefore, whatever else may be the case, the soul of a particular person, while in this life, is a form instantiated in matter. Consequently, if matter is the principle of individuation, it follows that once the material context of the soul is lost, its individuality will be gone with it. In other words, if death is the separation of soul from body (matter), then on this under,standing of the role of matter, death will entail a loss of identity for the soul. Now, Aquinas himself denies such a loss; 31 and and indeed, acceptance of it would go contrary to the very faith that he professes. Also, Aquinas himself gives an account of 28 Ibid., q. 76, a. 2, ad S. ••Ibid., q. 79, a. 3. 3 ° Cf. Ibid., q. 76, passim; Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chap. 68, 70, 71, f. 81 Cf. Summa; Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chap. 81, no. 7, f. to mention but one of many instances. E.-H. W. KLUGE the continued identity of the soul which has nothing to do with matter as an individuating agent. As he puts it, the continued diversity of the soul stems from the diversity of the commensuration of the souls to (their respective) bodies: since this soul is adapted to this and not that body, and that soul to another, and so on for all other cases. And this adaptability remains in the souls even after their bodies have perished. 32 To be sure, he presents this as a special case: It holds only for forms whose" being" does not depend upon matter. But that is really beside the point. The point is, that on pain of assimilating souls to the genus of angels, the commensuration of each soul to its body must be an accidental feature, not a specific one. In which case accidents are here said to be individuating: immaterial accidents, to be sure, but accidents nevertheless. The same reasoning that applies to souls can be applied, mutatis mutandis, to forms that do depend for their "being" on matter. Therefore the upshot of this is that matter cannot be viewed as the principle of individuation; that a different appraisal of passages putatively to that effect must be found. And clearly, such an interpretation will affect our understanding of how a form can be particularized qua instantiated in the senses. However, there is a further, and for the present context, much weightier conceptual difficulty. It concerns human perception, and arises with respect to the operation of the human soul when informing a body. The difficulty is this: The soul, when in a body, is in a material substratum. On the traditional interpretation sketched above this implies that because of its "commensuration" to the body, it will be individuated. That, however, entails that all modifications and states of the soul, when in such a condition, will be particular as well. That is to say, any accidental form adhering to the soul will also be particularized. Now, individual acts of understanding and per82 Ibid., no. 8. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 858 ceptual awareness are states of the human mind-accidents, as it were, advening to the soul.88 Whence it follows that, while in such a state, the human mind cannot have any understanding of universals: for these to be in the mind qua universals would entail a contradiction of the preceding. Therefore it follows that if matter is the principle or occasion of individuation of the soul, and if form and matter are understood in the traditional sense, the soul will be incapable of judgment when in a body. Which, in turn, means that while in an embodied state the soul cannot know anything at all. This conclusion is unacceptable. Not only is it contradicted by actual fact; it also runs counter to everything that Aquinas says about human knowledge in general and abstraction in particular. In fact, it would render the latter complete nonsense. Therefore, whatever the elements giving rise to this conclusion, they must be rejected; or, if they are passages from Aquinas himself, they must be reinterpreted. Either that, or leave the tho:mistic analysis in complete incoherence. Happily, this last alternative can be ruled out without conceptual contortions. There are passages in Aquinas' writings which, even when considered on their own, stand wholly at variance with the traditional interpretation of matter and its role as individuating. And this brings me to my second, textual series of considerations which I mentioned above. However, instead of citing passages on their own in a purely critical effort, I should like to change my approach: I should like to adduce them as considerations leading to and incorporated into what I take to be the correct appraisal. Confining the discussion to the Summa Theologiae, we come across the following statements. Nor are they isolated. For every one of them, a dozen others could be cited to similar effect: (i) ... the things· which belong to the species of a material being (such as a stone or a man, or a horse) can be thought without the 80 Note: I am here not talking about the power but the exercise of it. The powers themselves, of course, are not accidental but essential. 354 E.-H. W. KLUGE individuating principles which do not belong to the notion of the species. This is what we mean by abstracting the universal from the particular, or the intelligible species from the phantasm. In other words, it is to consider the nature of the species apart from its individuating principles represented by the phantasm. 34 (ii) The intellect, therefore, abstracts the species of a natural thing from the individual sensible matter, but not from the common sensible matter. For instance, it abstracts the species man from this flesh and these bones which (latter) do not belong to the species as such but to the individual and (hence) need not be considered in the species. But the species of man cannot be abstracted from flesh and bones.35 (iii) Now it is manifest that quantity is in a substance before sensible qualities al'.e. Therefore qualities such as number, dimension and figure-which are determinations of quantity-can be considered apart from sensible qualities, and this is to abstract from sensible matter. 36 (iv) ... intellect, which abstracts the species not only from matter but also from the individuating conditions of matter, knows more perfectly than do the senses, which latter receive the form of the thing known; without the matter, to he sure, but subject to material conditions. 37 The important point that is contained in these passages and to which I want to draw attention is this: we must distinguish between the material condition of a form-its individualityand the matter of a form-its unintelligibility. Let me try to show how and why this is the case. Excerpt (i) talks about abstracting the universal from the particular, and equates this with abstracting the intelligible species from the phantasm. This, so the passage continues, is to consider the nature of the species apart from its individuating conditions which are represented by the phantasm. Aquinas's choice of words is here a clue: only formal features can be represented. It lies in the nature of representation that this should be the case. Therefore, the individuating principles of ••Summa Theol., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad l; cf. Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chap. 77, no. 2. 85 lbUl., ad •• IbUl. •1 Ibid., q. 84, a. fl; see also preceding article. ABSTRACTION: A CONTEMPORARY LOOK 355 the instantiated form must themselves be formal in nature. Otherwise they could not be represented by the phantasm. 88 In this context, (iv) is also relevant. Not only does it distinguish explicitly between matter and " the individuating conditions of matter " ; it also .states that the senses receive the form of the thing known but without the matter, subject, however, to these material conditions. Now as it occurs here, this last phrase is something of a logical dangler. It may refer eithe,r to the condition of the form as it is in the thing, or to the material nature of the .senses in which the form now finds itself. It is tempting to opt for the second alternative; all the more so, since the senses are material in nature. However, to do so would entail unacceptable consequences: namely, the thesis that the form of an object enters the sense as a universal, and that it is the material nature of the sense that engenders the particularity of the form as it occurs in the sensible species and the phantasm. This consequence is doubly unwelcome: for the reasons just indicated, it renders Aquinas's talk about the representation of material conditions nonsensical. Furthermore, it contradicts his own explanation of what these "material conditions" are: namely, the "individual properties," 39 "determining qualities " or " sensible qualities " of the object as it occurs in the world. (iii) above goes some way towards clarifying this point. (ii) is also instructive. There, abstraction is represented as the removal of the species or form from the individual sensible matter, where elsewhere Aquinas describes the latter as matter "under determinate dimensions." Again, as such, the latter must be formal in nature-especially given (ii) . Therefore, what Aquinas .says about "material conditions " must be understood in the sense of the particular accidental yet formal conditions under which a form occurs when instantiated in the sensible world. Material conditions, therefore, are conditions of individuality. Conditions which are formal in nature. Given this, we should •• Or by anything else, for that matter. ••Summa Contra Gentiles, Bk. II, chap. 77, no. 356 E.-H. W. KLUGE expect that a form occurring under such conditions-a form thus particularized or individuated-would not on that account be unintelligible. And this is precisely what Aquinas himself says: " Intelligibility is incompatible with the singular not as such but as materi