THE CONCEPT OF EXISTENCE AND THE STRUCTURE OF JUDGMENT: A THOMISTIC PARADOX 1J HE PRECISE ROLE of existence as related to judgment has increasingly engaged the attention of Thomisc metaphysicians in recent years. 1 The plethora of articles and books whose attention has been bent to the elucidation of the issue might lead us to suspect that little more can be said on the subject. A warning signal that this suspicion is not well founded is the appearance of several studies that have challenged the thesis that the metaphysics of St. Thomas advances towards its fruition thanks to a disengagement of exigencies discovered in the famous "judgment of separation." 2 Even though the thesis has been argued that the interpretations given the Thomistic being (esse) by Jacques Maritain and Etienne Gilson are by no means equivalent doctrines, the names of these two illustrious philosophers are frequently linked by the opponents of what might well be called a "metaphysics of separation " and what has in fact been referred to as "existential Thomism." 3 The expected reaction against the Existentialism of the post-World War II era has resonated within Thomistic circles as well. The present essay is by no means a contribution to the literature of Thomistic revisionism, pro or con, but is written in the spirit of a man who, in fact a nonrevisionist, is convinced that all has not yet been said about 1 E.g., R. Henle," Existentialism and the Judgment," in Proc. Amer. Cath. Phil. Ass. (1947), pp. 40-53; H. Renard, " The Metaphysics of the Existential Judgment," New Scholasticism, (1949), pp. 887-394; S. Mansion, "Philosophical Explanation," Dominican Studies 3 (1950), pp. Joseph Owens, "Judgment and Truth in Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies, (1970); Ambrose McNicholl, " On Judging," THE THOMIST, 88 (1974), pp. 2 E.g. G. Lindbeck, "Participation and Existence," Franciscan Studies XVII (1958), pp. 107-125. Literature relevant to the issue is marshalled by Lindbeck. s E.g., ibid., passim. 817 318 FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN the role of existence and judgment, that the role of the judgment of separation, of a properly negative dimension to all metaphysical propositions and conclusions, is sufficiently dense and rich that we can assume confidently, unless proven otherwise, that there is more to the doctrine than meets the eye. St. Thomas's teaching that human understanding bifurcates into two terminal operations, expressed by distinct verba of the mind, is so well known that it suffices here merely to restate the doctrine. Two acts grasp two aspects of being which, thanks to subsequent reasoning, are known to be non-identical or "really distinct." The synthesizing, composing, or "togethering" function of the act of existing, an activity which forms no part of any synthesis but which is the catalyst in which the principles of nature are annealed into unity, is reiterated cognitively and hence intentionally by the intellect in the act of judgment. 4 Judgment thus is a re-play of the principles of the real. So far as existence is concerned, judgments exercise in a spiritual way the very existential composing which is going on in the real at any one moment of time. The verb " to be " consignifies in the mind the active composing •In I Sent., d. 38, q. l, a. 3, Sol.: "Cum in re duo sint, quidditas rei, et esse eius, his duobus respondet duplex operatio intellectus. Unde quae dicitur a philosophis formatio, qua apprehendit quidditates rerum, quae etiam a Philosopho, in III De Anima, dicitur indivisibilium intelligentia. Alia autem conpreh.endit esse rei, componendo affirmationem, quia etiam esse rei ex materia et forma compositae, a qua cognitionem accipit, consistit in quadam compositione formae ad materiam, vel accidentis ad subjectum. In I Sent., d. 29, q. 1, a. 1, Sol.: ''. .. omnis causa habet ordinem principii ad esse sui causati quod per ipsam constituitur; " In I Semt., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3: " ... quod cum esse creaturae imperfecte repraesentet divinum esse, et hoc nomen ' qui est ' imperfecte significat ipsum, quia significat per modum cujusdam concretionis et compositionis": In I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2: " Sed intellectus noster, cujus cognitio a rebus oritur, quae esse compositum habent, non apprehendit illud esse nisi componendo et dividendo; " In Librum Boethii de Tri:n., q. 5, a. 3, Resp.: " ex congregatione principiorum rei in compositis, vel ipsam simplicem naturam rei concomitatur, ut in substantiis simplicibus." (Although the angelic essence is composed with the angelic existence, angelic esse does not play the role of composing act, of synthesizing act, due to the simplicity of the angelic nature.); cf. as well: In X Meta., lect. 11, n. 1093; In I Periherm., lect, 5, n. 22. EXISTENCE AND JUDGMENT 319 in which being (esse) consists in the real, and it consignifies that composing in the very temporality in which it is discovered to be.5 This cognition of the composite as composite is counterpointed by the cognition of the composite as simple, meaning thereby the composite as though it were simple: e.g., "walking man" abstracting from whether or not the man is here and now, in this moment of time, actually walking. Therefore the act of .simple understanding cognizes synthesized essences, whereas the act of judging cognizes their here and now being synthesized in existence. Thomistic esse thus plays the double role of positing things in being as their absolute act-no other act can be said to be the act that it is unless it be; and, language here is necessarily awkwardbeing-their-very-being as well as composing all of the essential principles constituting" thinghood" into unity. The very unity of any essence, for St. Thomas, is its being.6 Essences, abstracting from existence in either the real or in the mind, are neither one nor many. 7 Esse is the being of things and their being-composed: the esse of composite creatures is existential synthesizing activity ,8 But every one of the propositions forming the above para•In I Periherm., lect. 5, n. " ... hoc verbum EST consignificat compositionem, quia non earn principaliter significat, sed ex consequenti; significat enim primo illud quod cadit in intellectu per modum actualitatis absolute: nam EST, simpliciter dictum, significat in actu esse; et ideo significat per modum verbi . • . vel simpliciter vel secundum quid: simpliciter quidem secundum praesens tempus; secundum quid autem secundum alia tempora. Et ideo ex consequenti hoc verbum EST significat compositionem." •De Ente et Essentia, c. 8, (ed. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, Paris, 1948), pp. !M-25: " Unde si queratur utrum ista natura sic considerata possit dici una vel plures neutrum concedendum est, quia utrumque est extra intellectum humanitatis, et utrumque potest sibi accidere. . . . Similiter si unitas esset de ratione eius, tune esset una et eadem Socratis et Platonis et non posset in pluribus plnrificari: " cf., l; De Ver., q. 1, a. l; De Pot. q. 8, a. 16, ad 8; Quodl. Summa Theol., I. X, q. 1, a. 1. Unity in St. Thomas, being the indivision of an ens from its esse, is a negative way of considering being. Essences are one in being composed and esse is that active composing (cf. footnote 4), T De Ente et Essentia (ed. cit.), c. 8, pp. 28-25. 8 Cf. footnote 4. FREDERICK D, WILHELMSEN graph is a conclusion of an act of metaphysical reasoning. Not one of those propositions is understood in some kind of privileged intuition. In this case, a number of truths are known but the content of these truths is not cognized properly in any act of simple understanding, in any " vision." The verbal copula "is " has been distended into playing the role of subject as well as predicate in a series of judgments which are results produced by syllogistic reasoning on exigencies initially grasped immediately in experience.9 As so distended into operating as a subject of predication or as a predicate affirmed or denied of some other subject, being-in the sense of existence-has shifted radically from the initial role that it plays in all human knowing. In the cognition of things as being, grasped intellectually in and through sensation, existence is never affirmed or denied as though it were some object known, some " meaning " or intelligibility thrown up before "the screen of the consciousness." " Screen," of course, is a metaphor weighted with our idealist inheritance. What is known directly, according to Thomistic epistemology, is the thing sensed and it is not known as sensed but as it is. Nowhere in non-scientific judgments is existence known as subject or predicate but everything else that is known is known as either existent or non-existent, or as existent or non-existent in this or that way. This scandal for a mind bent on conceptualizing everything when confronted with non-conceptualizable existence is no scandal at all for the non-philosopher in any waking moment of his life: he is constantly affirming and denying and these affirmations and negations all bear on existence, the " factor " cognized in judgment. The author has argued that the " fact" of existence is in no way distinct from the Thomistic esse.10 When I know that "It is raining" or "My friend's hair is turning grey,'' I am knowing esse, subsequently understood by the metaphysician 9 On experience and man's knowledge of existence, cf. E. Gilson, Being and Some Phifasophers (Mediaeval Studies of Toronto, second print., 1961), pp. 190-215. 1 ° F. Wilhelmsen, "Existence and Esse," The New Scholasticism, 50 (1976), pp. 20-45. EXISTENCE AND JUDGMENT 321 as absolute act (in the first case) and as synthesizing as well as absolute act (in the second case). In both instances I can switch the words I use and easily speak of " the fact of raining " and "the fact of my friend's greying hair." But the shift from knowing being as fact and knowing existence in the series of propositions that cluster around a philosophy of ens commune or esse commune 11 is the entire shift from non-metaphysics to metaphysics. To subject existence to some predicate or to make existence the predicate of some subject, using all the while the verb " to be," is to wrench the verb "to be "out of its normal usage. The obvious danger here consists in making the subject " existence " exist as a subject of being or in making the predicate " existence " exist as an inhering and determining form. The avoidance of this temptation is the heart of the present study. After all, both are declared, thanks to the copula, "to be." The judgment, "John is a man" entails that the subject," John," exists; but the judgment "Existence is an act "-a commonplace in Thomistic metaphysics-does not mean or intend to mean that the subject, " existence," exists in its own right as an act-at least not in the way in which John exists as a man. A comparable case can be found in judgments proper to the Aristotelian philosophy of nature: e.g., "Substantial form is the act of first matter" is not intended to affirm the subsistence of substantial form, its actual being as a thing in itself. But the metaphysical statement about existence is far more radical. Form is not declared not to be form but is declared not to exist, in philosophy of nature; but in Thomistic metaphysics, it is precisely existence 11 E.g., In Meta. prooemium: "Ex hoc apparet, quod quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria [primae causae, principia maxime universalia, et id quod est a materia immunis] consideret, non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum ens commune." Ibid.: "Quia secundum esse et rationem separari dicuntur, non solum illa quae nunquam in materia esse posssunt, sicut Deus et intellectuales substantiae, sed etiam ilia quae possunt sine materia esse, sicut ens commune; " cf.,: M. Glutz, "The Formal Subject of Metaphysics," THOMIST, 19 (1956), pp. 59-74 and "Being and Metaphysics," The Modern Schoolman, 35 (1958), p. 272, n. 2. FREDERICK D. WILHELMSEN which is declared not to exist. Quite evidently there is a distinction between denying that principles in general exist and denying that the principle through which all other principles are in being is itself being or exists. The prior but accidental characteristics of the Thomistic esse, stressed so frequently by Father Joseph Owens, heighten a unique paradox which has no analogue in the order of nature. 12 Creatures are, through an esse which is a quo and not a quod. 13 Since esse is not a quod, esse is not a subject of anything at all. The issue touches the very question of the possibility of metaphysics and of man's capacity to make significant and true propositions about being. A metaphysics of being as existing must, among other things, square itself with Kant's insistence that metaphysics lacks any object discovered in experience, that metaphysics is a perennial temptation to convert laws into quasi-realities. 14 As interesting as it would be to approach the question in the light of Kant's rejection of metaphysics, this essay r:estricts itself to the problem as encountered in the thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Within this metaphysics, it shall be argued, the temptation to turn existence into a privileged object in a world of objects is avoided thanks to the techniques proper to the judgment of .separation which, in this case, emerges as an instance of the " way of negation," the via negationis.15 The incipient metaphysician puzzling over the mystery of being seems at the outset of his investigation to be gored on the horns o:f a dilemma: either he tries to conceptualize the 12 J. Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1962), pp. 68-79; An Interpretation of Existence (Milwaukee, Bruce, 1968), pp. 57-59, 74-78; "The Accidental and Essential Character of Being in the Doctrine of St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval, Studies, 20, pp. 1-40. 13 Summa Contra Gent., II, c. 52; In Boethii de Heb., lect. 2. "I. Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, tr. by F. Max Muller (2nd. ed., rev., Macmillan, N. Y., 1927), Second Division. Transcendental Dialectic, pp. 288-251. 15 For typical texts, cf. In Boeth. de Trin., I, I; Summa Theol., I, 8, 4; De Pot., 7, 2-5; In I Sent., 8, 1, I; 22, I, S: Summa Contra Gent., I, 14; I, 28; Comp. Theol., 2. EXISTENCE AND JUDGMENT verbal copula or he tries to convert the copula into the substantive, " being." It would seem initially that he has no other way to talk about being. Being thus is going to function variably as subject and predicate if the novice philosopher is to be released from the pre-philosophical awe at the dizzying truth that things are, an awe whose only response is the hortatory "Is-Is-Is" which overwhelmed Parmenides. But Parmenides subsequently worked himself free of the grip of his experience in order to reason about its meaning. The experiment consisting in disengaging the copula from its normal function in predication and expanding it into a conceptual object forces the mind to reduce "Is " to nothing at all. No-thing is "Is." Conceptualized "Is," hence, is equivalently nothing. The very vacuity and indetermination of "Is," thus conceived, coupled with the realization that experience has never yielded an " Is " that talked, walked or ate, ineluctably necessitates the judgment, " Is is not." In a word: " Is," as thought conceptually as an object, simply blanks itself out because "Is" is no subject (in the scholastic sense of the term) at all, and certainly not a subject of itself. As St. Thomas puts it in his In Boethii clion, although it is clear enough that he has become dissatisfied with the fact that Husserl's philosophy, and the ever-growing research and inlt'rpretation which surrounds that philosophy, appears to have so little direct relevance for the pressing problems of human existence. Might this book be a sign that Sokolowski is beginning to work his way out of the scholarly exegesis of Husserl as an end in itself? Has he begun to conclude that the genuine task of phenomenology (as philosophy) is to help make mankind aware of the need to question the structure of our world, in order to show how to change it in light of the discovery of higher possibilities? For the primary aim of this book is not the careful and illuminating analyses of difficult themes in Husserl's phenomenology; these analyses serve as a means to the major task of posing such questions as: What docs it mean to be human and truthful? What is omitted from the scientific interpretation of man, if not precisely his capacity to be truthful, thus human? What relation d.oes phenomenology have to traditional philosopical concerns, and to the social, political, and economic affairs of contemporary human existence? This book is a kind of summons which bids the phenomenologist to take his work in a new way. Sokolowski warns the phenomenologist not to lose himself so completely in the obscure reaches of Husserl's thought that he forgets that the task of philosophy is a public one. Part of the task of the philosopher is to show to the rest of thoughtful mankind that much of what passes for" wisdom" is sophistry. And although one truthful way of being " present " in the world is to be able to be " absent" from it at times by means of reflective criticism, the phenomenologist must remember that the point of this " absencing " is to be able to act within the human world on the basis of what has been learned about it through such criticism. Sokolowski wants the phenomenologist to recognize that genuine autonomy is not merely the power of the rationn1 ego to make independent judgments, but is also the power of the whole self to exist as a genuine human agent within the historical, public world. l\IICHAEL Tulane University New Orleans, Louisiana E. ZIMMERMAN BOOK REVIEWS 447 Theology for a Nomad Church. By Huao AssMANN. Trans. Paul Bums. Maryknoll: 1976. Assmann begins by calling the reader to a deeper understanding of the political dimensions of the Christian faith and to the task of developing a political theology. The call for a political theology, however, is subject to all sorts of misunderstandings. It could be interpreted as a call to return to the theocratic society of the middle ages-a society of a Constantinian or Byzantine sort. It could also be interpreted as a call to develop a 'leftwing Constantinianism," as Assmann calls it (p. 100). According to such a political philosophy, the Church would simply switch its loyalties from right to left, but would once again exert the same sort of heteronomous authority which she exercised in the middle ages. Assmann is not interested in this type of political theology or in the restoration of " Christendom," to which it leads. In that respect, in spite of his severe criticism of the theology of the secular (p. 57) , he nevertheless affirms the attempt of the theologians of the secular to redefine the relationship between the Church and the world. In an attempt to clarify his understanding of political theology, Assmann refers to the " new European political theology " of Metz and Moltmann. He is in essential agreement with several of the main theses of this new theology, particularly Metz's attempt to break free of the privatized understanding of Christian faith, his quest to recover the "dangerous memory, the subversive contents ... in the Christian message" (p. 81), and his understanding of the Church as an institution of social criticism. Assmann also utilizes Moltmann in later sections as he continues to develop his understanding of political theology. He is particularly appreciative of Moltmann's distinction between religions of promise, with their focus on the future, and epiphany religions, which are essentially the pagan religions so severely attacked in the Biblical writings and which function to legitimate the status quo. Assmann begins the development of his own political theology where Moltmann and Metz end theirs. Although he sees their work as a positive contribution which moves theology away from identification with the status quo, he is critical of both theologians at several points. He accuses Metz of retrenchment in the face of the attacks by reactionary theologians. Metz's distinction between political theology (theory) and political ethics (practice) comes in for particularly heavy criticism by Assmann who sees it as a retrenchment with regard to his position on the relationship of theory and practice. He also criticizes European political theology for its failure to relate itself to any systematic social analysis and for its fear of any and all ideological commitments. Although he himself is aware of the excesses to which an ideological approach can lead, Assmann believes 448 BOOK REVIEWS that ideological insights, properly used, can serve a positive function (p. 93) . He is of the opinion that the Europeans' avoidance of sociological analyses and their excessive fear of ideology have resulted in sociological vagueness on the one hand and an inability to name the agents of oppression on the other. This vagueness and this inability in turn have done much to weaken the revolutionary impact of their writings and thus to diminish their practical relevance. Expanding on the efforts of Moltmann and Metz, Assmann continues his own attempt to develop a Latin American political theology. He first addresses himself to the problem of a redefinition of the terms " politics " and " political." These words, according to Assmann, must be understood in such a way as to enclose within their meaning both those acts which are ordinarily thought of as private and those which are understood as public or political in the strict sense. Assmann is concerned to point out that in this new and broader definition of politics, the intention is not to repress or deny the importance of intimacy or of personal and interpersonal relalations in human existence or even to lessen the intensity with which this dimension of life is experienced. Rather the intention is to call attention to the fact that all so-called personal relationships also have a political side. As an example (Assmann does not give any), one might point to the sexual behavior of a couple. Certainly a couple's love-making practices are or ought to be the ultimate in intimacy. Nevertheless, these very practices assume a " political " dimension as soon as the couple becomes concerned about the problem of population growth in the late twentieth century. An awareness of the way in which one's sexual behavior is related to this public problem has in fact influenced the sexual behavior of many couples. The question of the role of each sex in marriage might serve as another example. The interaction patterns between husband and wife, ordinarily thought of as a part of the " private " sphere, assume a political dimension as soon as the partners become aware and concerned with the problem of human liberation as it related to the male and female roles. Although these examples are not related to issues which stand at the top of Assmann's priority list, they do serve to illustrate his point that the separation which we seek to make between private and public life is untenable and that " politics " and " political " are terms which require a much broader definition than we ordinarily attribute to them. Undoubtedly most people will find this awareness of the political dimensions of their most intimate acts an awareness which they would prefer to do without. Nevertheless, Assmann makes his point very convincingly. The awareness, once awakened, can scarcely by repressed. One might justifiably argue, however, that Assmann, in spite of the logic of his argument, is introducing a linguistic confusion here. To be sure, most if not all so-called private acts include a political (social) dimension of which most people BOOK REVIEWS 449 are not aware and of which they need to become aware. Does this mean, however, that these acts are "political" in the same sense as a mass demonstration or a traditional political campaign? Is not the use of the same word to describe two acts which are similar in some respects but dissimilar in others somewhat questionable? The point could perhaps be made with more linguistic sophistication. At the end of this effort to redefine politics, Assmann summarizes his point by saying that all other dimensions of human activity (technology, science, and even individuality) require a broader why-or meaning. Politics, as newly defined, provides that broader context within which this why or meaning can be discovered (p. 33) . A second theme to which Assmann now turns has to do with the relationship between politics as redefined and faith. In order correctly to articulate this relationship Assmann believes it is necessary to move beyond the concept of " applying " insights derived from the faith to particular political situations. Rather, he suggests that the meaning of Christian faith must be understood in such a way as to do justice to the political dimension of faith itself. This political dimension of faith, without which it is not Biblical faith, derives from the fact that the Christian faith is an historical reality meant not merely to be intellectually affirmed but to be lived. As an historical entity, however, it can be lived only within and in relation to a particular historical context. This means that any act of faith is at the same time, though not exclusively, a political act. It is not necessary to derive insights from the faith and apply them to politics. Merely to live the faith in relation to a particular historical situation is to assume certain political positions and to be committed to certain political goals. For the liberation theologians, of course, the chief of these goals is the liberation of the members of the human community. Assmann appeals, in so arguing, to a number of Biblical traditions. He lays the greatest stress on the Exodus and the prophetic traditions. In the Exodus, Yahweh calls upon his people to live out their faith by their commitment to the liberation struggle led by Moses. But this act of faith is also and obviously a political act. Israel's act of faith in Yahweh involves her in a political struggle with the greatest political power of the age, Pharoah and all that he represents. Indeed, the Exodus is portrayed as a political struggle between Yahweh and Pharaoh for control of history and the future. The plagues are a part of the divine strategy and Moses is the "outside agitator" or "organizer." (These terms are the reviewer's.) Israel is assigned, on the basis of faith, an important role in this struggle. The prophetic call to Israel to return to the true faith likewise includes an important political dimension. Even the prophets' vigorous attack on idolatry contains important political implications since the importing of foreign religious practices was a part of the political policy of detente with 450 BOOK REVIEWS Assyria and other foreign powers pursued above all by Manassah but also by other Israelite kings. This means that Israel's renunciation of Assyria's gods was interpreted as renunciation of Assyrian suzerainty. More obvious examples of the prophets' call for political expressions of the Yahwist faith could be mentioned, however, such as their exhortations to Israel's leaders to renounce foreign treaties or Jeremiah's call to surrender to the Babylonian forces beseiging Jerusalem. Unfortunately Assmann does not offer any of these examples but contents himself with generalizations such as the statement on page 35 that political theology "in biblical exegesis ... lays stress once again on the meaning of the Exodus as the original principle on which the whole biblical concept of God and faith is based; on the historical and political nature of prophecy; on the prohibition of institutions trying to ' capture ' God in images . . ." Although Assmann admits the need for the theology of liberation to discover and expound on such subversive and dangerous Biblical memories as those mentioned above, he contributes little to this discovery or exposition. One is grateful for the extensive discussion of such themes as dependence and development and would not wish to have these discussions shortened; nevertheless, one also comes away from a reading of the book with the wish that those sections which might be called theological in the strictest sense of the word had been equally developed. These references to the prophetic and Exodus traditions lead logically to Assmann's next point. Once again he affirms Metz's and Moltmann's effort to develop a political theology but asserts that the Latin American version of political theology must take a specific form, namely that of a theology of liberation. This theology must be related specifically to the Latin American historical context in which it finds itself. This context results above all from the failure of the decade of development in Latin America and from the insights discovered by Latin American social scientists, especially economists, as a result of this failure. First of all, the failure of development revealed to the economists the inadequacy of the neo-capitalistic theories upon which the development approach was based. The social scientists now substituted a new theoretical understanding of the Latin American social and economic reality. The key concept in this new understanding is the concept of dependence. Latin American societies are seen as dependent on the developed societies of the northern hemisphere, particularly the United States. The base of this dependence is economic, but on this economic base is built up a political, military, and cultural dependence. This dependent relationship is maintained with the help of internal structures in Latin American society-the latifundia and the oligarchies with whom foreign interests align themselves and with whom they share the spoils of their economic exploitation. In this way, the foreign-based multinational Corporations are able to tie their own interests BOOK REVIEWS 451 to those of the ruling groups within in Latin American societies. Should a revolutionary government assume power in a Latin American society and threaten American economic interests, the multinationals in collusion with the displaced oligarchy, the American State Department, or the CIA work to destabilize the situation and restore a government favorable to American (economic) interests. Because development theories and strategies do not challenge but reinforce and strengthen both these social and economic structures within Latin America and the dependency relationship between Latin America and the developed countries, they do not alleviate but exacerbate the social problems of Latin American society. Development enriches the already rich countries of the north, as studies on the flow of the capital have revealed. It further enriches the already rich oligarchies and latifundia of Latin America, while it further impoverishes and enslaves the Latin American masses. Indeed, according to these economic theorists, it is only because the rich nations of the north, with the help of internal collaborators, were able to reduce the Latin American nations to the state of dependence that the metropolitan countries of the north were able to develop themselves. The price of their development was the underdevelopment of the colonial and neo-colonial societies of Latin America and the rest of the third world. From this perspective underdevelopment is seen not as a mere failure on the part of third world societies to develop but as the shadow cast by the development of the first world. Development and underdevelopment are organically related. The one is possible only in its particular relationship to the other. Nations of the third world are not underdeveloped. They have been underdeveloped. From this point of view, it is obviously nonsense to call for more development as the cure for the problems of Latin America since it is precisely the dynamics of development which have caused the immense social problems of the continent in the first place. What the new theories demand is the liberation of Latin American societies from their dependence on the developed countries of the north. This is the prerequisite for any kind of social progress. This goal cannot be attained by reform, as it requires radical changes in the power structures of Latin America. It is naive to think that those in power will voluntarily agree to reforms which will significantly weaken their control. What is required is a revolution. The precise form which the revolution should take in Latin America is the subject of some disagreement among and within various revolutionary groups within Latin America, though there appears to be increasing willingness to embrace the methods of violent revolution. When Assman and the other representatives of the liberation school speak of the theology of liberation, they speak within the theoretical framework described above. This theoretical framework is accepted by them as the most adequate analysis of present Latin American social reality. They 452 BOOK REVIEWS accept it more or less in toto, including the call to join the revolutionary struggle for liberation. This latter call Assmann and the other liberation theologians seek to relate to the gospel call to obedience and faith. Indeed, they understand faith as the act of participation in the struggle for liberation. It is at this point that Assmann and liberation theology depart most drastically from European political theology. European political theology is unwilling to adopt so rigorous an ideological framework or to call so unequivocally for concrete political action. Such a call, for Metz, would be the prerogative not of political theology but of political ethics. This reluctance of European political theology to commit itself to concrete practical political action is its most serious shortcoming in the eyes of the liberation theologians. It is related to the Europeans' understanding of the relationship between theory and practice. In spite of their desire to make theology more relevant, the Europeans remain committed to an idealistic epistemology according to which truth is discerned speculatively and articulated theoretically. Such "truth" may then provide guidelines for action or may be applied to action. Liberation theology on the other hand not only understands the Christian faith as ACT and emphasizes in an almost absolutist way the preeminence of act over idea, of praxis over theory. It even assigns epistemological priority to practice. According to its epistemological theory, truth is discovered only in the doing, not through contemplation or speculation. To European political theologians, this onesided emphasis on praxis is unacceptable. It flies too much in the face not only of western theological but of the entire western intellectual tradition. Here again, one is faced with what seems to this reviewer to be a false alternative. Both the idealistic epistemology of the Europeans and the pragmatic one of the Latin Americans seem incomplete. The actual relationship between theory and praxis appears to be far more dialectical then either approach would indicate. The exhortation to revolutionary action presents a further difficulty. It is not that the call to express one's faith by participation in the revolutionary struggle for the liberation of the Latin American masses is in any sense incompatible with Christian faith. One would, however, before joining the fray as a Christian, like to know a bit more about both the revolutionary means and the revolutionary ends. Assmann does include several paragraphs in his book which somewhat set our minds at ease with regard to the ends. Although consistently emphasizing that " liberation " must not be assigned so broad and " spiritual " a meaning that its basic economic and political dimensions become obscured, he nevertheless clearly states that his understanding of liberation includes more than economic and political elements. Thus, on pages 140-141, Assmann writes, " Man does not appear as a spontaneous product of structures, even though BOOK REVIEWS 453 these are the necessary conditioning material of his ' birth ' as a new man. If the formative context of material structures is not joined by the loving process of call and response, the result is a simple product of the environment and not the new man." On the question of revolutionary means, Assmann is more equivocal. He does affirm the inevitability of conflict both within the church and in society at large if commitment to the liberation struggle is taken seriously; in fact, he is critical of those post-conciliar reformers who are so naive as to think that significant change can be brought about without notable conflict. Most of them are concerned exclusively with ecclesiastical reform, says Assmann, and it is questionable if even that can be attained without significant conflict. Nevertheless, in spite of the positive role it assigns to conflict as a necessary means of change, Assmann's book is far removed from the spirit of violence which characterizes some revolutionary literature. Conflict is clearly kept in its place as a means to an end and is never portrayed in the apocalyptic colors which it receives in some writings. It is also obviously a broader concept for Assmann which could include both violent and non-violent manifestation. As regards the violence-non-violence question itself, Assmann is non-committal. The general tenor of the book indicates that Assmann would prefer the least violent means of achieving liberation but would not rule out on principle the violent revolution. One might wish that he had considered more adequately the potential of non-violent revolution of the Gandhian style. This subject, however, is not really discussed in detail in the book although there are several sections which might logically have included some discussion of it-for example the section on strategies and tactics (p. 119-125) and the last chapter on " The Christian contribution to liberation in Latin America " (p. 129-45) . There is no mention in the book of any of the extensive writings on the subject of non-violent revolution or of the work of Dom Helder Camara in Brazil which is deliberately patterned after the campaigns of Gandhi and King. This later is all the more remarkable as Dom Helder has analyzed the problem of Latin America in much the same terms as Assmann, but is attempting to apply the methods of non-violence to bring about the structural changes for which Assmann and other theologians of liberation call. Assmann's heavy emphasis on sociological analysis and political action, along with his failure to deal at greater length with the concerns of traditional theology, even when he mentions areas of traditional theology which need much more intensive work and which relate to his basic concern for liberation, has led to the accusation that he has reduced the gospel to a social and political program. He could have taken some of the power out of this criticism had he devoted more attention to the question of the compatibility of revolutionary violence with the Christian 454 BOOK REVIEWS faith. He chose not to do so, however, probably fearing to alienate many of the revolutionary groups with whom he so strongly, and from the reviewer's point of view, rightly, identifies. In spite of these weaknesses and the vulnerability of Assmann's work to this criticism, a careful reading of certain crucial paragraphs will show that this accusation is not entirely justified. To be sure, these paragraphs are fewer and more ambiguous in Assmann than in either Gutierez or Segundo, who themselves have had the same accusation directed at them. Nevertheless, they are present in all three theologians. In a section in which Assmann speaks of theology as "critical reflection on human history" (p. 56-65), he is concerned to distinguish the theological mode of such reflection from other, non-theological modes. In attempting to make this distinction he emphasizes that, "for critical reflection on human history to become theology, it must have the distinctive characteristic of reference to faith and the historical embodiments of this faith-the Bible and the history of Christianity." To be sure, this statement, which appears to assign a central role to the Bible and Church history is hard to reconcile with other statements such as the one on page 104 that the " text " of the theology of liberation is " our situation, and our situation is our primary and basic reference point " or the declaration that in contrast to the usual views of exegetes who " work on the sacred text," theologians of liberation " work on the reality of today" (p. 105) . The difficulties are alleviated, however, if one understands that for Assmann the Bible and Church history are important not in and of themselves but as embodiments of Christian faith and if one then remembers that faith has been a central concern of Assmann throughout the book. One may, indeed, disagree with Assmann's interpretation of Christian faith. One may even say that he has distorted it beyond recognition. One should not, however, fail to acknowledge that he is concerned throughout the book to witness to the faith as he understands it and is in no way seeking to eliminate it or to reduce the gospel to a social and political program. He is not even rejecting the traditional methodologies of theology. He is rather seeking to expose the extent to which western ideologies have influenced the results to which these ever so " objective " methodologies have come. That he himself is ideologically influenced he is perfectly willing to admit. This is a part of the point-viz. that the theologian should be aware of his or her own ideological prejudices and of the role they play in his or her theologizing. At this point, one comes face to face with a confrontation of cultures and all the accompanying problems in communication. Before passing judgment on the theology of liberation, a western theologian would do well to remember that the hermeneutical situation in which third world theologians find themselves is fundamentally different from that of the western theologian who lives among the privileged of the privileged. BOOK REVIEWS 455 Frequent reflection on Matthew 25 might serve as a warning to those in the rich nations who are too eager to condemn liberation theology and its sister theological movements as " mere political and social movements." A second theme of explicitly Christian nature introduced by Assmann is that of eschatology. Biblical eschatology, says Assmann, reveals the "provocative" nature of God's call. God's call to faith is a call away from the comfortable, settled, established existence of the present status quo and a call into God's promised future. Faith is faith in this promised future and frees the believer to live in hope for that future. Through faith, the future of God breaks into the present and challenges its structures and powers. It is this faith in the promises of God which provides to the believer a basis for his or her involvement in the struggle for liberation. At the same, however, Biblical eschatology reminds the believer that God's promised future transcends any future which humanity can realize for itself within the limits of history. God's promised future is concrete enough to be a real threat to any status quo, be it the capitalist one of the present or a socialist one which may, and according to the liberation theologians should, displace the present one. From the point of view of liberation theology, socialist society may be a parable of the Kingdom. It is far from being the reality itself, however (p. 68-70) . Biblical eschatology reminds the believer of this fact. The most tantalizing and profound theme of explicitly Christian nature which Assmann introduces in his book is the theme of death and resurrection. In a section in which he wrestles with the difficult question of the rationale for dying for one's brother, Assmann says that this is the "point at which the essence of human activity . . . becomes inaccessible to scientific inquiry-including theological inquiry " (p. 85) . The act of dying for a sister or brother, the ultimate act of love, is ultimately inaccessible to rational analysis; the final, mysterious efficacy of love embodied in history ultimately eludes human understanding. This act, seemingly so futile, is affirmed by faith to be the ultimately efficacious act. The paradigm act in relation to which it receives its meaning is the central Christian mystery of the death and resurrection of Christ, as Assmann clearly states on pages 143-44. The few sentences in which Assmann introduces this theme are among the most interesting in the book. They are, however, extremely vague and poorly articulated. One wonders if he is trying to say something like what Moltmann has said in his latest book, The Crucified God. There are indications, such as his call for a theology of the cross, that he may, indeed, be moving in a similar direction. If so, it is unfortunate that Moltmann's book was not available to him. Assmann's book leaves much to be desired in organization, clarity, the- 456 BOOK REVIEWS ological exposition and systematic presentation. Still, it raises important questions. These may not all be theological in the traditional sense. But some of them are. To these he gives very unsatisfactory answers, as he himself would admit. The incompleteness of the answers, however, ought not to lead to a rejection of the questions. Even the " non-theological " questions which Assmann raises, such as the question of how Latin American economic and political reality ought to be interpreted, are questions which the theologian can ill afford to ignore. GERALD FoLK Augustana College Sioux FaUs, South Dakota Death, Dying, and the Biologic