ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIBVAL CULTURE

'TI

HIS YEAR marks the seven hundredth anniversary
f the death of St. Albert the Great. He died on Novemer 15, IQ80, at the age of "eighty and more." His life
thus spans the first eighty years of the thirteenth century, aperiod of great vitality, development, and achievement. Throughout the world this year, and particularly in Germany, there are
numerous celebrations going on to commemorate the life and
works of this remarkable German Dominican, who was known
as "the Great" even in his own lifetime.
When we think of Alexander the Great, St. Gregory the
Great, Charles the Great (Charlemagne), or even Catherine the
Great of Russia, we all think immediately of the person in question and we have some idea, however vague, of why they are
called "the Great ". Unfortunately this is not the case with
St. Albert the Gre,at. Outside of Germany, he is known only as
the teacher of St. Thomas Aquinas, if at all. In Germany
legends of Albert abound, usually those that lack all substance
or verisimilitude. The German philosopher Hegel could speak
in his history of philosophy of Albertus Magnus as " the most
celebrated German schoolman, of the noble race of Bollstadt." 1
And he could recount the legend of Albert's learning as a special
gift of the Blessed Virgin Mary to a very dull and stupid youth
who changed quickly from an ass into a philosopher. The Virgin
]\fary is supposed to have promised him that he would enlighten
the Church, and, in spite of his science, would still die in the
faith. Hegel commented that " five years before his death Albert
forgot his philosophy as quickly as he learned it, and then actually died in the dulness (sic) and orthodoxy of his earlier
years." 2 Hegel the philosopher could also say that Albert's
1 Hegel's Lectures on the History of Philo1;ophy, trans. by E. S. Haldane and
F. H. Simson (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1955), 3: 75.
2 Ibid. p. 76.

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

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learning was generally understood to consist largely of magic.
For," he says, " although natural objects have nothing to do
with scholasticism proper, which was really perfectly blind to
nature, he occupied himself much therewith; and amongst other
devices he manufactured a talking machine which alarmed his
pupil Thomas of Aquino, who even aimed a blow at it, thinking
he saw therein a work of the devil." 3 Without understanding
either Albert or the culture of his time, Hegel could select outlandish interpretations and anecdotes concerning Albert to give
us, as he says, a picture of the conditions of culture in these
times. Hegel was not a medievalist and he could not be expected
to be sympathetic to medieval Christian culture, and his selection of quaint examples can hardly be called an accurate picture
of the condition of culture in the Middle Ages .
.The " eighty and more" years of St. Albert's life are intertwined with three major movements that characterize the High
Middle Ages: (1) urbanization of European society, especially
in Germany and Eastern Europe; (2) reevangelization of Christian Europe, mainly through the mendicant orders founded by
St. Dominic de Guzman in 1215 and St. Francis of Assisi in
1223; and (3) intensive growth and formulation of" scholastic"
philosophy and theology in the university centers of Christendom, especially at the University of Paris and its spin-offs, such
as Oxford, Cologne, Cambridge, Toulouse, and Montpellier.
Although the urbanization of France, Italy, and parts of England had begun vigorously early in the twelfth century, Germany, apart from the Rhine Valley, was a backward country
in 1200 even by medieval standards. "The thirteenth century,"
as John B. Freed has amply shown," was the high point in the
urbanization of medieval Germany," 4 and the history of Germany in that century is in large part the history of the Dominican and Franciscan Orders beyond the Rhine, the Elbe, the
Oder, and even the Vistula. The same can be said of Bohemia,
Poland, and Hungary.
•Ibid.
•John B. Freed, The Friars and German Society in the Thirteenth Century (Cambridge, Mass.: Mediaeval Academy of America, 1977), p. ii4.

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When Albert joined the Dominican Order as a young man of
there was no German Dominican
twenty-four at Padua in
Province, and only two small priories had been established in
the territory. But when he died in 1280, there were sixty-two
flourishing priories in the Dominican Province of T eutonia,
which stretched from Vienna, Austria, to Bern, Switzerland, in
the south, and from Stralsund on the Baltic to Utrecht, Holland,
in the north. The German Dominicans even established a missionary house in Riga, Latvia, in 1234, which was incorporated
into the Province of Teutonia in 1244, well before Albert himself became Prior Provincial of this vast territory. Finally, Friar
Albert was the first German Dominican to become a master in
theology (1245) from the University of Paris; and he himself
established the first center of higher studies (a studium generate) in Germany at Cologne in 1248. This studium generale
was the predecessor of the University of Cologne, which was not
organized until 1388.5 By this late date the Franciscans, Carmelites, and Augustinians also had general studia in Cologne.
Although Albert was already a mature lector of theology in his
home province of Germany and weH-trained in the" scholastic
method " before he went to Paris and encountered the seductive
" new learning " that inundated Paris from Greek and Arabic
sources translated in the south, he eventually "rewrote" the
whole of Aristotelian philosophy in the Latin language, restating, expounding, correcting, expanding, and even adding
whole new areas of scientific thought, as we shall see. His
younger contemporary Roger Bacon enviously complained in
1267 /68 that philosophy was now considered by the bulk of
students (a vulgo studentium) and some men of repute (sapientes) "to be already transmitted to the Latins, and completed, and composed in the Latin language " (quod phi"losophia
iam data sit Latinis, et completa,. et composita in lingua Latina).
Bacon goes on to complain that all of this was done during his
own days (in tempore meo) at Paris, roughly between 1237 and
• Willehad
Eckert, Kleine Geschichte. der Universitiit Koln (Cologne: Universitiit .zu. Koln, 1961)..

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

1257, and that the author of this philosophy is considered an

authority (an auctoritas) in the schools on the same level as
Aristotle, Avicenna, and Averroes, even though this author is
still alive-an unheard of precedent. 6 Albert's reputation as
"the Great", even while he was still living, 7 became not only
legendary, but was grossly exaggerated, so much so that in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries it was utterly fantastic.
The task of the modern historian is to separate and eliminate
the myth from the real man of learning, who sought only the
discovery of truth in nature and the vision of the Triune Creator
in the whole range of Christian culture. This is no easy task,
even in our own age of sophisticated historical methods and
techniques. Despite the admirable scholarship of recent French
and German historians concentrating on Albert's life and works,
there remain many uncertainties and contradictions. Certainly
there is nothing written in English that can serve as a reliable
guide.

Albert's Youth and Entry into the Dominican Order
Albert, a Swabian by birth, was commonly known to his
European contemporaries as Friar Albert the German (Frater
Albertus Tentonicus) or Albert of Cologne (Frater Albertus de
Colonia). But to his countrymen and confreres in the German
Province, he was more properly and accurately known as Friar
Albert of Lauingen, as is indicated on the signet ring ( sigillum)
he received on becoming a master in theology at the University
of Paris in 1245. Lauingen is a sma11 town in Schwabia situated
on the Danube between Ulm a few miles above and Dillingen
a few miles below, in the diocese of Augsburg. At that time
Schwabia, the home of the Hohenstauffen dynasty, was part of
Bavaria, and Austria was " lower Bavaria."
It is certain that Albert came from a military family (ex militaribus) of lesser nobility (knights) in the service of the counts
6 Rogeri Bacon, Opus tertium, c.9, ed J. S. Brewer, Opera quaedam hactenus
inedita (London: RS 15, 1859), p. 30.
• Annales Basileenses, anno 1277, "Albertus Magnus, lector Coloniae," Monumenta Germaniae llistorica, Scriptores, 17: 202, 10-11

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of Bollstadt, whose castle, now in ruins, was less than 19 miles
from Lauingen. But it would seem that the whole of Albert's
family, including his younger brother Friar Henry of Lauingen,
was in no way related to those who eventually took Bollestat
or some variant as a family name. Albert's knightly family, like
all German soldiers, had long been in the service of Frederick
Barbarosa of Schwabia, who had been king of Germany since
1152 and Holy Roman Emperor from 1155 until his death in
1190. It is uncertain how many brothers and sisters Albert had;
but it seems likely, considering the opposition to his becoming
a Dominican, that a military career had been expected of him.
Notwithstanding the contradictory dates always given for
Albert's birth, all that can really be said is that he was born
around moo or a year before. Certainly the date 1206/07
insisted on by Mandonnet, Glorieux, Van Steenberghen, and
all modern historians is too late. Mandonnet's disputable evidence is based on the statement of Henry of Herford's Chronica
(ca. 1355) that Albert was "a boy of sixteen years" 8 when he
entered the Order in 1223. This age of sixteen is below the
eighteen year minimum insisted upon since the time of St.
Dominic himself and contrary to the invariable practice of the
Dominican Order at that time. Sixteen was the minimum age
for the Premonstratensians, which Dominic deliberately altered
in the original rule. At the same time, the date 1193 given by
Irranz Pelster, H. C. Scheeben, and most older authors is much
too early; it is based on the statement of Luis of Valladolid
(Paris, 1414) that Albert died in 1280 "having completed about
(Girciter) 87 years of his life." 9 Surprisingly, one of the first
authors to give both dates without apparently seeing their
impossibility was Peter of Prussia, Albert's first really critical
8 Henrici de Herford, Chronica seu Liber de i·ebus memorabilibus, ed. A. Potthash
(Gottingen, 1859), p. 201. See Mandonnet, "La date de naissance d'Albert le
Grand," Revue Thomiste 36 (1931), 233-56.
•Luis of Valladolid, Brevis historia de vita et doctrina Alberti Magni, c. 1, ed. in
CataloJUB Codicum llagiographicorum Bibl. Regiae Bruxellensis (Bruxellis, 1889),
£: 96; for the history of this work and a better text of the catalogue of writings,
see H. C. Seheeben, "Die Tabulae Ludwigs von Valladolid im Chor der Praedigerbriider von St. Jakob in Paris," Archivum FFr. Praed. 1 (1930), 223-63.

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

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biographer, writing in 1486-87 with a view to Albert's canonization.10 Peter rightly eliminated many of the myths accumulated by his predecessors, especially by Thomas of Cantimpre
and Luis of Valladolid, preserved in the Legenda Coloniensis.
But somehow he failed to see that Albert could not have been
" a boy of sixteen years " in rn2s and a man "having completed
about 87 years of his life " in rn8o, as maintained by Luis of
Valladolid and his successors.
The only contemporary evidence of Albert's age when he died
on 15 November rn80 is that of Tolomeo of Lucca, who says
Albert was "more than eighty" in one passage and "eighty and
more" in another. 11 Tolomeo was a retired bishop and an octogenarian himself when he inserted the brief lives of Albert and
Thomas into his monumental Historia ecdesiastica sometime
after he had completed it in September 1817. His contemporary Bernard Gui merely copied Tolomeo's phrase in his
chronicle: "Hie obiit in conventu Coloniensi anno Domini
MCCLXXX, octogenarius et amplius." 12 Whatever may be said
about the meaning of et amplius is sheer guesswork. The only
reasonable birthdate consistent with the rest of Albert's chronology is moo or one year before.
Albert showed early in life his interest in nature. As a boy he
was taught to train falcons and ha.wks in his home town of
Lauingen. In later writings he showed considerable knowledge
of many species of falcons and hawks, their instincts, and their
training. As a young man, Albert was sent to Padua under the
care of his uncle to study the liberal arts at the incipient university. Many years later, he himself described "Pata via, which
is now called Padua, in which a studium litterarum flourished
for many years," 13 and he recalled two memorable natural
10 Petrus de Prussia, Legenda Alberti Magni (Coloniae: Johannes Guldenschaifl',
after 11 Jan. 1483, ca. 1487).
11 Ptolomaei Lucensis, HisttYlia Ecclesiastica, xxii, c. 19, and xxiii, c. 36, ed in
L. A. Mura tori, Rerum ltalicarum Scriptores (Milan, 1724), 11: 1151 and 1184.
12 Bernard Gui, additions to Stephen of Salanhac's De Quatuor in Quibus Deus
Praedicatorum Ordinem lnsignivit, ed. T. Kaeppeli, MOPH
(Rome: S. Sabina,
1949), p. rn5.
13 Alberti Magni, De natura locorum, tr. 3, c.
(ed. Borgnet 9: 570b-71a).
I

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

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phenomena he had witnessed when he was a youth in Padua
and in Venice.14 Albert's interests at that time were certainly
in natural phenomena, and it is likely that he was exposed to
some of Aristotle's philosophy, translated by James of Venice
ca. 1150-70, still forbidden at Paris. But it is unlikely that he
absorbed much of Aristotle at that date. That was to come
later.
Early in the summer of H!23, Jordan of Saxony, the immediate successor to St. Dominic (d.rn21) as master general of the
Order of Preachers, came to Padua in the hope of bringing
young students and masters into the order by his preaching.
There seems to have been a house of Dominicans already in
the city, and Jordan was on his way to Bologna for the annual
General Chapter of the order opening on Pentecost. At first
he found " the students of Padua extremely cold, " but ten of
them soon sought admission, " among them two sons of two
great German lords; one was a provost-marshal, loaded with
many honors and possessed of great riches; the other has resigned rich benefices: and is truly noble in mind and body.'' 15
The latter of these two has always been identified as Albert of
Lauingen; the other may very well have been John of Wildeshausen, later General of the Order. In the Vitae fratrum, compiled by Gerard of Frachet between H!54 and rn58 from stories
sent to him by brethren throughout the order, the story of
Albert's "conversion" to the order by Jordan while he was a
student at Padua is narrated at some length, supposedly in
Albert's own words. In it Albert tells of his uncertainty about
entering and his great fear of not persevering in the order
once having entered. Jordan is supposed to have assured him
of persevering once he had made up his mind. 16 It is a simple
story, but Mandonnet completely misunderstood the story of
"Alberti Magni, Metheor. III, tr. 2, c.12 (ed. Borgn.et 4: 629a); De mineral. II,
tr. 3, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet 5: 4Sb-49a).
15 Beati Jordani de Saxonia Epistulae, Ep. 20, ed. A. Walz, MOPH 23 (Rome:
S. Sabina, 1951), p. 24.
16 Vitae Fratrum Ord. Praed. P. IV, c. 13, § 9, ed. B. Reichert, MOPH 1 (Louvain, 1896), p. 188.

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

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Albert's conversion to bolster his thesis that Albert was sixteen
years old when he entered the Dominican Order in H223. In
fact, Albert was about twenty-four when he entered, a youth
for those early days of a mendicant preaching order.
Albert was certainly a "young man" (iuvencmus or adolescens) when he entered the Order, but he was not a "boy" (puer)
in the canonical sense, nor even a "youth" (iuvenis) in the strict
sense of being under twenty-one. Relatively speaking, Albert at
the age of sixty could refer to his "youth" at Padua; and Roger
Bacon, who joined the Franciscans when he was around forty,
could speak with an air of disdain of Albert and Thomas as
pucri when they entered their order. In any case, it is certain
that Albert joined the Dominican Order when he was a student
at Padua, receiving the habit from Jordan of Saxony around
Easter of 1223, despite many personal and domestic difficulties
as narrated with embellishments in the l'itae fratrum.

Young Friar Albert in Germany (1223-ca. 1242)
Albert would have been received into the order for some
specific province. But when he joined in 1223 there was no
Province of Germany (Teutonia). There were only two priories:
Friesach (1219) in Austria, which was in a critical state, and
Cologne (ca. 1220) on the lower Rhine, where Friar Henry,
Jordan's classmate and companion at Paris, was then prior.
It is most probable that Albert was sent to Cologne to make
his novitiate and study theology under the local lector. Cologne,
then, would henceforth be considered his native priory, even
though he could be sent by his superiors anywhere in the known
world.
At Cologne, in the Dominican Priory of Heilige Kreuz on
the Stolkgasse, Albert would not only have completed his oneyear novitiate, but would also have attended all the theological
lectures of the official leetor of that priory. No Dominican
priory could be established by the General Chapter unless
there were twelve friars, a prior, and a lector of theology. The
task of the lector, whose importance in the house was second

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL CULTURE

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only to that of the prior, was to give theological lectures on
some book of the Bible to the entire community, including the
prior. According to the primitive constitutions of 1228, no one
could be appointed lector unless he had studied theology at
least four years. By
Albert himself had become a lector.
According to Henry of Herford, Albert " was first lector in
Hildesheim [in Saxony, founded in 1233], then Freiberg [in Saxony, founded in 1236], then Regensburg [in Bavaria] for two
years, then Strassburg [in Alsace], then he went to Paris. " 11
Albert certainly was in Saxony when he and many others observed the comet of 1240 passing near, as it were, the north
pole of the ecliptic 18 ; and he travelled great distances to examine various metals in mining districts (loca metallica), among
which he mentions as particularly important Freiberg and
Gosslar in the Harz :!\fountains in Lower Saxony. 111 Albert's description of melting iron suggests that high temperature blast
furnaces existed earlier than previously known. 20 He also described surface mining of gold, which he observed in the Elbe
and Rhine rivers. 21
In his earliest known treatise, De natura boni, a primarily
devotional work written in Germany before he went to Paris,
he cites explicitly ten works of Aristotle, including six of the
libri naturales in their older versions, still proscribed in Paris.
But in Germany he was completely out of touch with the novelties, excitement, vibrant problems, and stimulus of the " new
learning" that made Paris the foremost intellectual center of
Christendom. The point is that, although Albert knew much
Henrici de Herford, Chronica, ed. cit., p. 201.
Alberti Magni, Metheor. I, tr. 8, c. 5: "Ego autem cum multis aliis ab incarnatione Domini MCCXL in Saxonia vidi cometem quMi iuxta polum septentrionalem,
et proiecit radios suos inter Orientem et Meridiem, magis dirigendo eos ad Orientem;
et constat quod ibi non fuit via alicuius planetae" (ed. Borguet 4: 504a).
19 See D. Wyckoff, "Albertus
Magnus on Ore Deposits,"
49 (1958), 109-122.
20 See N. F. George, "Albertus
Magnus and Chemical Technology in a Time of
Transition," Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, ed. J.A. Weisheipl (Toronto:
PIMS, 1980), pp. 236-240.
21 Alberti Magni, Mineral. ill, tr. 1, c. l and c. 10 (ed. Borgnet 5:
and
72a-b).
17

18

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

about Aristotle and Aristotelian science before he went to Paris,
he still had a great deal to learn about the forefront of Christian thought when he got to Paris. Outstanding in his own
province, he was the first German Dominican selected by the
fourth master general of the order, John "Teutonicus" of
Wildeshausen, when John became general in 1241. The idea of
sending Albert to Paris most certainly orginated with John of
Wildeshausen, but it would have been with the support of Hugh
of Saint-Cher, who himself was Dominican Regent Master in
Theology at Paris, Provincial of France, and later cardinal.
Although John of Wildeshausen was himself a German, he
spent most of his Dominican life outside Germany and was
fluent in French, Italian, and Latin, as well as his native
German. At that time the master general of the order alone
had the authority to send individuals to the only studium
generale in the order where Dominicans held two chairs of
theology, the University of Paris, one for members of the Province of France, the other for all foreigners. Consequently when
Albert was in his early forties, he was sent to the center of
Christian culture to absorb the " new learning " and eventually
to rewrite it.

Albert at Paris (ca. 1242-1248)
Albert was sent to Paris to lecture on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard and to prepare himself for the mastership in the chair
for foreigners as its third Dominican master, succeeding Gueric
of Saint-Quentin. The difference between Germany and Paris
was like the difference between night and day. While teaching
the Sentences for about three years, he was busily absorbing the
" new learning '', even after he became a master in 1245. As
Regent Master, Albert had clearly defined duties to perform:
to lecture as master on some approved text (legere), to preside
at public disputations and to resolve questions he himself had
posed { disputare), and to preach to the academic community
on certain days (praedicare). But Albert's main efforts, it would
·seem, were devoted to writing two massive theological works,

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL CULTURE

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namely a Swrnma Parisiensis in six parts, of which the wellknown Summa de creaturis constitutes only two parts, and a
seven-volume commentary (in the Borgnet edition) on the
four Books of Sentences, completed after he returned to Cologne. These were written while he was lecturing on all the
books of pseudo-Dionysius, and 3Jbsorbingthe" new learning".
It was when Albert was a new master in his mid-forties at
Paris that he first met Thomas Aquinas, a young man of
twenty, who had just arrived in Paris in the company of John
of Wildeshausen to complete his novitiate. Thomas had been
received into the Dominican Order at Naples the preceding
year and was on his way to Bologna when he was abducted by
his soldier brother and companions north of Rome and was
taken to the family castle of Montesangiovanni for the night. It
was there that the soldiers tried to get a prostitute to seduce
Thomas, but without avail. The next day the company of
soldiers took Thomas to his mother, the formidable Donna
Theodora, waiting at the family estate of Roccasicca in the
territory of Emperor Frederick II. The Aquino family was
convinced that their security required Thomas to be abbot of
Monte Cassino. The real problem was that the future of the
family lay with the Emperor Frederick II, who was then at
odds with the pope. But when Frederick was excommunicated
and deposed by the Council of Lyons in 1245, the Aquino
family switched allegiance and temporarily gave up trying to
make young Thomas abbot of Monte Cassino. After about a
year's confinement at the family estate, Thomas was allowed
to return to his Dominican confreres and his earlier plans,
which now involved going to Paris for his novitiate and studies.
It was at Paris that Thomas first heard Master Albert lecture
to the university students.
William of Tocco, Thomas's first biographer, reports that
Thomas " had no sooner heard [Master Albert] expound every
science with such wondrous depth of wisdom, that he rejoiced
.exceedingly at having so quickly found that which he had
come to. seek, one who offered him so unsparingly the fulfiH-

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

ment of his heart's desire." 22 Tocco goes on to say that in
order to profit from this exceptional opportunity, Thomas "began to be more than ever silent, more than ever assiduous in
study and devout in prayer." After three years at Paris,
Thomas accompanied Albert to Cologne for another four years
of study.

Albert at Cologne (1248-1254)
In the summer of 1248, Albert, accompanied by Friar Thomas
d' Aquino and other Dominican friars, travelled on foot to
Cologne to establish the first studium generale in Germany. The
Dominican Order was anxious to increase its centers of learning. For three years the general legislative body of the order
planned to open four more studia outside of Paris, namely at
Montpellier, Bologna, Cologne, and Oxford. Since the proposed
establishment of the four new houses of study had successfully
passed the two preceding chapters, preparations had been
underway in all four places for the expected decision of 1248.
Around the time of Albert's arrival in Cologne, the cornerstone
of the new cathedral was laid, and Albert characteristically
took a keen interest in the excavations involved in laying the
foundations of the new edi:fice.23 The Dominican priory on
the Stolkgasse (where the main postoffice now stands) extended as far as An den Dominikanern. By 1250, the Palatial
residence of Duke Walram IV of Limburg adjoining the Dominican property on the Stolkgasse was purchased by the
Dominicans for the comparatively low price of 150 marks. The
total complex was quite ample for the new studium open to
all Dominicans of the world and to the local clergy.
At Cologne Albert was free of Parisian regulations and could
conduct the studium as he thought best. He not only continued
his lectures on pseudo-Dionysius, completing the entire corpus
including the Letters, but he had the audacity to lecture on the
22 Gulielmo di Tocco, Hystoria beati Thomae de Aquino, c. 12, Vitae Fontes
Praecipuae, ed. A. Ferrua (Alba: Ed. Domenicane, 1968), n. IS, p. 44; see Bernardi
Gui, Legenda, c. 9, ibid. n. 80, p. 139.
••Alberti Magni, De prop. element. I, tr. 2, c. 8 (ed. Borgnet 9: 605a-b).

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

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Ethics of Aristotle with questions on the text. This is a most
remarkable series of lectures by a most remarkable man, and
Rene Antoine Gauthier rightly waxes eloquent when comparing
them to Thomas's own inferior commentary. All that had been
known of Aristotle's Ethics previously were Books II-III
(Ethica vetus) and Book I with fragments of the others (Ethica
nova). But around 1246/47, Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln (1235-53), translated for the first time all ten books of the
Ethics from the Greek. The temptation to lecture on this
treasure was too much for Albert, and he did so at Cologne
around 1250-52, despite the fact that he was a master theologian charged with directing a theological studium open to
all clerics. Although this commentary-with-questions was taken
down by Thomas in his own unintelligible hand, Thomas's copy
is no longer extant; but nine other manuscripts of this text
still exist, and the first part of this work is now published for
the first time. 24 Albert's audacity in lecturing on Aristotle's philosophy in a theological studium is another example not only
of his independence but also of his conviction that philosophy
and science are indispensable for theological studies . It was
this same conviction and audacity that prompted Albert to
"rewrite" the whole of Peripatetic philosophy. This conviction he would also embody in the first ratio studiorum for the
Dominicans in 1259 together with Thomas and three other
inasters. 25
It was at this time that Albert must have begun his huge paraphrase of all the Aristotelian and pseudo-Aristotelian books,
beginning with the Physics. In the Physics, Albert explains that
his Dominican confreres had implored him for a good number
of years to compose a work on physical science in such a way
that they could attain the whole of natural knowledge and
thereby understand the works of Aristotle. 26 This plea of
24

S1iper Ethica: Commentum et quaestiones (ed. Colon. 14/1, 1968). See ibid.

Proleg. § 1.
25
26

Chartularium Univ. Paris. ed. H. Denifle (Paris, 1899), 1: 885-86, n. 335.
Alberti Magni, Physica I, tr. 1, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet 3: la).

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JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

the brethren was made in Hl48 when he returned to Cologne, if not long before that. Finally, by the end of 1249, he
acceded to their wishes, but his plan was far more ambitious
than his brethren could have imagined. Not only would he
explain the fundamentals of natural science with all the aids
at his disposal, but he hoped to explain systematically the
whole range of human learning embracing all the natural
sciences (inanimate and animate), logic, rhetoric, mathematics,
astronomy, ethics, economics, politics, and metaphysics, including the Liber de causis. "Our intention," he said, "is to
make all the aforesaid parts of knowledge intelligible to the
Latins (Latinis intelligibiles) ." 21 That the plan was deliberate,
systematic, and consecutive with the Aristotelian corpus can
be seen from the extant autograph copy in Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. misc. Latin. 273, which contains the last five lines of the Physics on folio 72v and continues
from the same folio to De caelo, De natura locorum, and De
causis proprietatum elementorum. The chronological order of
the rest of the Albertinian corpus of philosophy seems to be
the following: De generatione et corruptione, M eteora, De mineralibus et lapidibus, De vegetabilibus, De anima, Parva naturalia (eleven distinct works), De animalibus, Metaphysica,
Ethica, Politica, and Liber de causis. Albert completed all of
these paraphrases (occupying 20 of the 40 volumes of complete
works) certainly by April, 1271, more likely by 1269, when
Thomas was just begining his Aristotelian commentaries . Thus
it took Albert twenty years of a busy life to rewrite the whole
of peripatetic philosophy. No one can say, as some have said,
that Albert did not take these works seriously or that they do
not express his own mind.
In his Aristotelian paraphrases he made frequent digressions, clarified difficulties, supplemented what was lacking, and
at times added whole books of new sciences that Aristotle had
not discussed. To Aristotle's De mineralibus, Albert added a
whole medieval lapidary; to pseudo-Aristotle's De plantis, he
27

Ibid. (ed. Borgnet 3:

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

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495

added a verified herbal, and to the large De animalibus, he
added a five-book bestiary. The doctrine Albert presented was
systematically and deliberately " Peripatetic," that is, Aristotelian, although he never failed to correct Aristotle when he
was in error regarding facts of experience or the teaching of
faith. To those integralists who insisted on agreeing with
Aristotle on the eternity of the world, he said, " Whoever believes that Aristotle was a man, then doubtless he was liable
to error, just as we are. " 28 On countless occasions, Albert
rejected a supposed observation of the Stagirite, saying that it
is contrary to his own observations, as when he said that
ostriches do not eat iron, because he tried to feed them iron
and they would not eat. In practice as well as in theory,
Albert recognized that " the aim of natural science is not simply
to accept the statements of others, but to investigate the
causes that are at work in nature. " 29
In March, 1252, Albert had his first experience of a role that
he would be called upon to play throughout his long career:
the role of arbiter and peacemaker. This first experience involved a dispute between Conrad von Hochstaden, archbishop
of Cologne, and the burgers of the city. On 25 March, Cardinal Hugh of Saint-Cher, legate of the Holy See, and Friar Albert,
lector of the Dominikanerkloster in Cologne, were called upon
to arbitrate the litigation; they gave their decision in April, and
it was confirmed by Pope Innocent IV in December. The list of
Albert's arbitrations is long and varied, lasting up to fifteen
months before his death. The last document is dated 18 August
1279.

Albert as Provincial of Teutonia (1254-1257)
At the Provincial Chapter held at Worms in June, 1254, Friar
Albert was elected prior provincial of the Province of Teutonia.
By 1254 the Province of T eutonia numbered thirty-six priories
for men and more than twenty cloisters of nuns. It was a vast
28
29

Alberti Magni, Physica VIII, tr. 1, c. 14 (ed. Borgnet 8: 558b).
Alberti Magni, De mineral. IT, tr. 2, c. 1 (ed. Borgnet 5: SOa).

496

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

area and the priories were increasing. During his three full
years as provincial, Albert made formal visitations on foot for
all the houses 0£ his Province, including the mission house in
Riga. It was on his long journeys by foot that he collected
material for his scientific works. He also established three new
priories in the north and at least two cloisters of nuns, the
more famous being the Paradisus near Soest in Westfalia. As
provincial he participated in the General Chapters of Milan,
Paris, and Ii'lorence, always walking to them on foot. He strictly
forbad the brethren to travel by horseback or carriage, except
under the gravest necessity.
It was Albert's custom while traveling-always on footfirst to visit the chapel of the religious house where he intended
to stay the night, to thank God for the safe journey, then immediately to visit the library to see whether there were any
books there that he had not yet seen. Often his candle burned
late into the night as he copied long passages of interest to him
that could be used later. Hence, Albert frequently cites titles
of books and gives direct quotations from works now lost.
The most significant event of Albert's provincialate was his
summons to the papal curia at Anagni, where he represented
the Dominican Order with Humbert of Romans, the master
general, in its struggle against the attacks of William of SaintAmour and his colleagues from Paris. St. Bonaventure, minister general of the Franciscans, played a most decisive role in
this issue both in his writings and in his public debates, and
the bitter controversy was temporarily resolved in favor of
the mendicants with the condemnation of William's De periculis novissimorum ternporum on 5 October 1256. Albert himself states that at the papal curia he publicly debated against
the Averroist doctrine of one intellect for all men; the material
for this debate was later (1263) turned into a little book called
De unitate intellectus contra Averroistas. Albert, it would
seem, was the first to attack the Averroist doctrine that was
later to grip the academic community at Paris. During his
years as provincial Albert was working on his paraphrase of
Aristotle's De aninw, a paraphrase he himself considered im1

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

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497

portant, and eleven works of the Parva naturalia, including
works on nutrition, dreams, aging, and death.
After the chapter of }i'lorence in June 1257, Albert was allowed to resign as provincial and return to his home priory of
Cologne, where he held disputed questions on Aristotle's De
animalibus. He was continually called upon to arbitrate difficult cases and to serve as peacemaker between rival family
claims.

Bishop of Regensburg and Preacher of the Crusades (1260-64)
Then, out of a clear blue sky, in January, 1260, Albert received
Pope Alexander IV's letter, appointing him bishop of Regensburg in the ecclesiastical province of Salzburg, which happened
to be in a deplorable state financially and spiritually. At the
same time, Alexander IV also wrote to the dean and chapter of
Regensburg to receive Albert as their bishop and to obey him
in all things. Humbert of Romans immediately penned a most
fervent plea to Albert, begging him not to accept the dignity,
for it would set a lamentable precedent in the Order, and would
be a dishonor to his well-known nobility of mind and religious
fervor. But apparently Albert had no choice. He was consecrated in the cathedral at Cologne during March and was
invested as a secular prince by a delegate of the Holy Roman
Emperor. It is said that he entered Regensburg unobtrusively
after sunset on
March and stayed with the Dominican friars
at St. Blasius, where as a younger man he had been lector. On
the following morning, Tuesday of Holy Week, he entered the
unfinished cathedral for his enthronement and Solemn Mass,
during which all the clergy present promised obedience. It is
also said that he found the cupboards of the adjoining episcopal
castle bare of all food, the wine cellars completely empty, and
the diocese bankrupt. Albert, known to the local Bavarians as
" Boots the Bishop " because of his walking shoes, devoted a
full year to covering the whole of his large diocese on foot, reforming everywhere. Many of his reforms were reenforced by
synodal decrees from Salzburg.

498

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

During his episcopate, Albert was undoubtedly writing his
commentary on De animalibus. The phrase "in my villa above
the Danube " in Book VII can refer only to the episcopal
castle of Donaustauff, about three miles from the city, on the
Danube. The entire work must have been completed not much
after 1261,30 after he left Regensburg.
Already by the end of 1260, Albert was ready to seek release
from his unwanted burden. By the end of December, Albert,
having set the diocese in order, left Regensburg for Viterbo to
submit his resignation to Alexander IV. He placed the diocese
in charge of Henry as vicar, Leo Torndorf as dean of the chapter, and Ulrich as pastor of the cathedral church. He arrived
at the papal curia at Viterbo in July, 1261, only to find that
Alexander had died at the end of the preceding May. A new
pope was elected in August and consecrated at Viterbo on September 4, taking the name of Urban IV. Albert's resignation
was finally accepted around November; elections were ordered
at Regensburg, and Leo Torndorf, dean of the chapter, was
elected. But it was not until May of 126£ that Leo's election as
successor to Albert was confirmed by Urban. All during this
time, Urban kept Albert in the illustrious circle gathered around
him at Viterbo and Orvieto.
The poet Master Heinrich of Wiirzburg wrote an encomium
of the papal curia at Orvieto at that time, entitled De statu
curiae Romanae. In a few lines he describes the illustrious
court and the presence of a great philosopher of considerable
eloquence who had become the wonder of the scholarly world:
Whoever comes will find whatever he thirsts for;
That house is equipped with all the arts.
There is someone there,. 0 Philosophy, who, if the
House burned to the ground, would design a new one.
The new builder would erect it in finer fashion and;
By his art, would prove superior to men of old. 31
See Alberti, Metaphysica, Proleg. § I (ed. Colon. 16/1, 1960), p. viii. 19 ff.
De statu curiae Romanae, vv. 877-82, ed. H. von Grauert, Abh. d. Bay. Akad.
d. Wiss., philos-philolog. u. hist. Klasse, 27/1-2 (Munich, 1912),
80

31

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

CULTURE

499

The editor of the poem, Hermann von Grauert, considered this
philosopher to be Thomas Aquinas, who was also in Orvieto,
lecturing at the Dominican priory. However, as Martin Grabmann soon pointed out, the philosopher alluded to can be none
other than Heinrich's countryman, Albert the Great. 82 Citing
numerous contemporary sources, mainly German, that referred
to Albert as " a great philosopher " and " the wonder of the
world, " Grabmann showed that Albert was best known to his
countrymen as a philosopher, rather than a theologian, even
though he was a master in theology of Paris and bishop of
Regensburg. In fact, he was far more famous than Thomas
ever was during his short lifetime. Urban kept Albert at the
curia for a year and a half with the scholars, diplomats, bishops,
and missionaries from all Christendom who had passed through
his court. Although Urban was engaged in a losing war with
Manfred, son of Frederick II, he " was a great friend and promoter of philosophical studies, " 33 and he was deeply concerned
with reconciling the schismatic Greek Churches with Rome. It
was in this atmosphere that Albert finished his monumental De
animalibus, his paraphrase of Ethics, the Posterior Analytics,
and possibly the unusual commentary on the Politics.
In February, 1263, however, Pope Urban IV ordered Bishop
Albert to preach the crusade in Germany, Bohemia, and all
lands that spoke the German language, and he conferred extraordinary powers on him for the successful prosecution of his
new mission. Albert's movements between March of 1!263 and
the death of Urban IV in October of 1!264 can be traced easily
as he traveled on foot throughout German-speaking countries,
preaching a new crusade to the Holy Land.

Last Years of Albert (1264-1280)
With Urban's death, Albert's commission to preach the crusade came to an end. For the next three years he lived in the
82 M. Grabmann,
" Ist das ' philosophische Universalgenie ' bei Magister Heinrich dem Poeten Thomas von Aquin?" Historisches Jahrbuch 88 (1917), 815-00.
83 M. Grabmann,
Guglielmo di Moerbeke, O.P., il traduttore delle opere di Aristotele (Rome: Gregorianum, 1946), p. 48.

500

JAMES A. WEISHEIPL,

O.P.

Dominican Kloster in Wilrzburg with his brother Henry, writing the Metaphysios, 34 arbitrating difficult cases, and performing numerous para-episcopal duties, such as consecrating
churches, altars, choir stalls, and nunneries, and presiding at
ecclesiastical functions. He complained that such duties kept
him from his primary desires of study and prayer.
Finally, around 1269, John of Vercelli, then master of the
order (1264-83) , asked Albert to reside in Cologne as leotor
emeritus. For the next eleven years until his death he resided
in Cologne with frequent journeys out of the city to arbitrate
litigations, consecrate churches, and preside at functions. For
example, on 12 September, 1276, four years before his death,
he consecrated the Dominican church of St. Paulus in Antwerp,
which he had caused to be built in 1265 when he was provincial.
News of Thomas d'Aquino's unexpected death in 1274 caused
profound grief and frequent tears in Albert's later years. Albert
was not at the Council of Lyons, but news reached him very
quickly and moved him to such torrents of tears that the
brethren thought they stemmed " from a weakness of mind."
We have only one moving account that details his sad but
heroic journey to Paris in 1277 to defend the writings of
Thomas, then being attacked in the city of philosophers. 35 But
his efforts came to naught, and Tempier's condemnation of 219
scattered propositions came out on 7 March, 1277.
Up to fifteen months before his death, Albert was clearly
competent to negotiate various delicate transactions, including
intricate arbitrations, as is evident from six documents dating
from 26 September, 1277 to 18 August, 1279. When Albert made
out his last will and testament in January, 1279, making his
brother Friar Henry of Lauingen, prior of Wilrzburg, executor
of the will, he stated that he was of sound mind and body
(sanus et inoolumis). 3fl
••See Alberti, Metaphysica, Proleg. § 1 (ed. Colon. 16/1, 1960), pp. vii-viii.
••Bartholomew of Capua's testimony in Proc. Canoniz. S. Thomae, n. 82 in
Thomae Aquinatis Vitae Fontes Praecipuae, ed. cit., pp. 824-25.
•• H. C. Scheeben, Albert der Grosse: Zur Chronologie seines Lebens, Quellen und
Forschungen zur Geschichte des Dominikanerordens in Deutschland (Vechta:
Albertus-Magnus-Verlag, 1981), pp. 128-27.

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MEDIEVAL

CULTURE

501

That Albert was getting senile toward the end of 1279, at the
age of eighty, can hardly be gainsaid. It is quite possible, considering his age and the incredible energy he had put into
everything he did, that Albert's memory did begin to fail and
that at times he might have been completely befuddled. Henry
of Herford gives three explicit indications of Albert's growing
senility, all of which seem to have taken place during the last
fifteen months of his life. For example, once a certain Archbishop Sigfried wanted to visit the aging bishop, but when he
was announced, Albert replied, " Albert is now here. " 37 All
that can be said is that neither Albert nor his confreres were
unprepared when death came for the saintly bishop on Friday,
the feast of St. Geltrud, 15 November 1280. He was then octogenarius et ampliiis. No one knows how much amplius, but he
could not have been more than eighty-one when he died.
In his own day he was with good reason known as Doctor
universalis and Doctor expertus, for his knowledge was truly
" universal " and he knew much from personal " experience ".
Late in his own lifetime he was even known as Lord and Friar
Albert " the Great. " In the words of Ulrich of Strasburg, a
Cologne disciple and intimate friend, Albert was " a man so
superior in every science, that he can fittingly be called the
wonder and miracle of our time. " 38 Today he is not only a
saint and Doctor of the Church, but also the heavenly patron
of those who cultivate the natural sciences. He is seen as the
much-needed intercessor in our new age of atomic power and
its consequent uncertainties. May his wisdom guide us now
in our scientific and moral dilemmas.
JAMES

A. WEISHEIPL, O.P.

Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Ontario
Canada

Henrici de Herford, Chronica, ed. cit., p. !W2.
••Summa de bona IV, tr. 3, c. 9. See J. Daguillon, Ulrich de Strasbourg, La
"Summa de bono." Livre I (Paris: Vrin, 1930), p. 189.
87

THE KINGDOM OF GOD IN ALBERT THE GREAT
AND THOMAS AQUINAS

HE CALL TO REPENTANCE and conversion on
ccount of the imminent corning of the kingdom of God
the central theme of the proclamation of Jesus. 1 It
seems moreover that Jesus was the only teacher of Judaism or
early Christianity to make the kingdom the center of his message. Not that the formula was original to him. The idea that
God is king is present in early strata of the Old Testament as
well as in the religions of Israel's neighbors. 2 The formula
' kingdom of God ' derives from the thoughtworld of Jewish
apocalyptic and of the Aramaic targummim that were read in
the synagogues of Palestine in Jesus's day. 3 The kingdom is
never precisely defined in the gospels and this is not the place
to defend a reconstruction of its meaning. It must suffice here
to summarize a view which is common in modern biblical scholarship and which is presupposed in what follows.

Interpretations of the Kingdom
The kingdom then is a future reign of God upon earth which
brings with it peace, justice, joy. It occurs in time, in history;
it embraces the political, social, and personalistic dimensions of
life and is intended to include all human beings and the entire
cosmos.4 Thus from the viewpoint of the Synoptic Gospels the
1

J. Weiss, Jesus' Proclamation of the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Fortress,

1971; Germ. orig., 189Q); R. Schnackenburg, God's Rule and Kingdom (New York:
Herder & Herder, 1963; Germ. orig. 1959).

• K. L. Schmidt, s.v. basileus, etc., in Kittel, Theological Dictionary of the Ne:w
Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 573-595; Kleinknecht,
Quell, Stauffer, Kuhn, s.v. theos, ibid., vol. 3, pp. 65-123.
8 Schnackenburg, God's Rule, pp. 41-75.
•Matt. 6: 33; Rom. 14: 17; P. Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University
of Chicago, 1963), vol. 3, pp. Q97-4Q3, esp. the four defining characteristics, p. 358;

502

THE KINGDOM IN ALBERT AND AQUINAS

503

believer has two hopes: the individual expectation of death,
resurrection, judgment, heaven, and the enjoyment of the blissmaking vision of God on the one hand, and an expectation of
a future intervention of God through the Son of Man come to
earth, in a word, the kingdom of God, on the other hand.
This double expectation of the synoptics, that is, of Jesus,
quickly began to break up after his death. The kingdom is less
central in Paul, and in the gospel according to John it has
nearly disappeared (five times only, in 3: 3,5; 18: 36, as contrasted with 121 times in the Synoptics) , to be largely displaced hy the promise of ' eternal life ' begun here on earth and
completed in the resurrection. 5 As Christianity moved ever
further into the Hellenistic world and left behind its Jewish
Palestinian roots the apocalyptic kingdom hope faded further
and further into the background.
This becomes clear from a brief survey of patristic views.6 As
a representative of Alexandrian neo-Platonic philosophical
Christianity, Origen held that the kingdom was identical with
Jesus himself. To express this he coined the term autobasileia,
self-kingdom, by which he meant that Jesus was himself the
kingdom. Origen went on to interpret the kingdom pietistically
as the soul of the believer divinized or transformed by grace.
Thus the kingdom came to mean for him the immortality of
the soul, eternal life, heaven itself, the goal of the soul.
For Eusebius of Caesarea, who had become a kind of court
chaplain to Constantine, the first ruler of the Christian empire,
the kingdom was obviously the Christian empire itself. Thereby
he expressed the hitherto persecuted Christians' astonishment
J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope (New York: Harper, 1967); W. Pannenberg,
Theology and the Kingdom of God (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969).
5 J. Blank, Krisis (Freiburg:
Lambertus, 1964); P. Ricca, Die Esckatologie des
vierten Evangeliums (Zurich: Gotthelf, 1966); M.-E. Boismard, "L'evolution du
theme eschatologique dans les traditions johanniques," Revue Biblique 68 (1961):
507-24.
6 R. Frick, Die Geschichte des Reich-Gottes-Gedankens in der alten Kirche bit
zu Origenes und Augustin (Giessen: Tiipelmann, 1928); G. W. H. Lampe, "Some
notes on the significance of basileia tou theou, basileia christou, in the Greek
Fathers," Journal of Theological Studies 49 (1948): 58-73.

504

BENEDICT T. VIVIANO,

O.P.

at their sudden reversal of fortune. It was only natural that in
the first flush of their enthusiasm for the new arrangement the
fourth-century Christians like Eusebius overestimated its significance and future potential theologically. It did not take
them long to be disillusioned.
In the thought of Augustine a few generations later such a
nai:ve identification of kingdom and empire has been tempered
by experience. Augustine, in his great work The City of God
(Book 20,9) , moves in a different direction. He comes close to
identifying the kingdom with the church, as he says: " The
Church even now is the kingdom of Christ, and the kingdom of
heaven," although he realizes that it is not so perfectly or as it
will be in the future. For his refined thought it is really the
elect who are the kingdom, but, as his view became the common
one in the Western Church for a long time, some of the fine
points were gradually lost. In medieval Augustinianism there
were occasional temptations to identify the kingdom with the
Holy Roman Empire but these tendencies were resisted by
Pope Gregory VII (Hildebrand) and his successors. For them
the church was the kingdom on earth.
Even Dante, who fiercely fought for the view that the authority of the Roman Empire came directly from God and not
from the church, did not go so far as to assert that the Empire
was the Kingdom of God on earth, although he does argue that
it is typified by " the earthly Paradise " and he goes on to say
that the emperor is responsible for guiding mankind to whatever temporal happiness there is.7 One could argue that Dante
comes very close to making the identification between Kingdom
of God and Empire for all practical purposes. But in fact there
is a gap between the New Testament view and his, because the
New Testament expects a new divine intervention in history
and Dante does not.
7 Dante,
On World-Government 01' De Monarchia (New York: Liberal Arts,
1957; 1310-.13 or 1317), especially III, 16. For views on the Christian Empire
through the ages, see Alois Dempf, Sacrum lmperium (Munich-Berlin: R. Oldenbourg, 199l9 repr. 1978).

THE KINGDOM IN ALBERT AND AQUINAS

505

Summarizing then we may say that the Middle Ages on the
whole did not well understand the this-worldly future dimension
of the kingdom because of three factors: a widespread ignorance
of the apocalyptic Jewish background of this expectation, together with an acute Platonic longing for the eternal, for a
place outside of time and history. This is the first factor. To it
we must add the Augustinian transformation of the kingdom
into the church militant and triumphant, and lastly the imperial ideology of the Christian empire as the kingdom of God
on earth.
Joachim of Fiore and Eschatology
This unclarity about a this-worldly future divine kingdom
characterizes three of the giants of high scholasticism: Bonaventure, Thomas and Albert. But before turning to their
thought we should notice the one striking exception to this
general state of affairs, the prophetic movement associated with
the name of the Calabrian abbot, Joachim of Fiore (c. 1135rno2). Although Joachim, so far as I can tell, did not directly
reflect on the kingdom theme of the gospels, he did renew a
this-worldly hope of a new period of salvation history, which
he called a third status of the world, in which the works of the
Holy Spirit would be brought to perfection and in which
there would be no need for clergy since all the people
would be living as pure contemplatives. It seems that Joachim
himself presumed a continuity between the church of the second stat.us and that of the third status, a continuity which
would be firmly maintained by a perduring Petrine papal office.8
This simple threefold scheme of history sufficed to fire the
8 On Joachim and his influence see M. Reeves, The Influence of PTophecy in the
Later Middle Ages (Oxford: Clarendon, 1969); idem, Joachim of Fiore and the
Prophetic Future (New York: Harper, 1976); B. McGinn, Apocalyptic Spirituality
(New York: Paulist, 1979), pp. 97-181; idem, Visions of the End (New York:
Columbia, 1979), pp. rn6-141, 158-167; H. deLubac, Exegeae Medievale, vol. s
(Paris: Aubier, 1961), pp. 437-558; ibid., vol. 4 (Paris: Aubier, 1964), pp. 825-344;
E. Staehelin, Die Verkilndigung du Reiches. Gottes in der Kirche Juu Christi,
vol. 3 (Basel: Reinhardt, 1955), pp. 119-171, 251-269.

506

BENEDICT T. TIVIANO, O.P.

imaginations and to raise the hopes of many for a better future
in this world. As such it had revolutionary and socially disruptive potential.
While we cannot pursue all the tangled trails of Joachimism
through the Middle Ages, we must mention briefly the scandal
created by the eternal gospel promulgated by the Franciscan
Gerard of Borgo San Donnino (the modern Fidenza) in 1254.
In that year Gerard circulated a collection of three of Joachim's
main works together with an introduction in which he drew the
most damaging conclusions. Seven errors extracted from that
libellus introductorius were condemned by Pope Alexander IV
on 23 October 1255. These errors are: (I) that the eternal
gospel which is identical with Joachim's teachings surpasses the
teaching of Christ and thus the whole Old and New Testaments;
(2) that the gospel of Christ is not the gospel of the kingdom
and therefore does not build up the church; (3) that the New
Testament must be as invalid as the Old Testament; (4) that
the New Testament will only remain in force for the next six
years that is, until the year A.D. 1260; (5) that those who live
beyond this time are no longer held to accept the New Testament; (6) that to the gospel of Christ another gospel follows,
and another priesthood in place of the priesthood of Christ;
(7) that no one is able in himself to instruct people about
spiritual and eternal matters except he go about barefoot. 9 At
the University of Paris this affair was blown up to huge proportions by the animosity of the secular masters, and particularly
William of St. Amour, against the Mendicants. Gerard had
made matters worse by identifying the three angels of the fourteenth chapter of the Apocalypse with Joachim, Dominic and
Francis and explaining them as heralds of the third status. At
the provincial Council of Arles in 1263 the whole " pernicious
doctrine" of the three status, as preached by the Joachites, was
condemned, together with the writings of Joachim which were
9 Original Latin
in H. Denifle and E. Chatelain, Ohartularium Universitatia
Parisiensis, vol. 1 (Paris, 1889), p. 272. Cf. E. Benz, " Die exzerptsiitze der Pariser
Professoren aus dem Evangelium Aetemum," Zeitschrift fur Kirchengeschichte 51
(1932) : 415ff.

THE KINGDOl\f IN ALBERT AND AQUINAS

507

its foundation. In spite of these condemnations and of the failure of Gerard's hopes to materialize in 1260, his doctrine spread
like wildfire among many friars, affecting even the generals of
the two major new orders. This situation provided a real threat
to the leadership of the church and a challenge to the greatest
theologians of the Franciscans and Dominicans, Bonaventure
and Thomas Aquinas respectively. This crisis also helps to
explain the relative blindness of these great men to the centrality of the gospel theme of the kingdom of God. To be sure
it is only a partial explanation, but it did leave its mark.
The response of the two doctors varied as vary it must given
the different situation of the two orders. Bonaventure had to
try to meet the Joachites within his order halfway, to attempt
a compromise, because the number of extremists was larger
among the Franciscans and the danger of their going into
schism was greater, and because the eschatological evaluation of
their founder Francis was nearly universal among them and was
shared by Bonaventure himself. This solution Bonaventure attempted in his great Collationes in Hexaemeron which he gave
at the University of Paris in the summer of 1273 and which had
to be left incomplete and unrevised because of his elevation to
the cardinalate. In this work Bonaventure undertakes a fundamental treatment of the theology of history. It is the only work
in which a leading scholastic theologian attempts a synthesis of
historical symbolic thought (such as characterized Joachim's
interpretation of biblical prophecy) with the conceptual-abstract thought of Scholasticism. 10
Abbreviating Bonaventure's careful and complicated schemes
drastically we can say that he did attempt to discern a pattern
of salvation history, including an expectation of an ultimate
flowering of the Church within history. He follows Joachim
exactly in the expression of this hope by placing the seventh
age between the destruction of Antichrist and the Last Judg10 Bonaventure,
Opera omnia, 10 vol. (Quaracchi, 1882-1902), vol. 5, pp. 829449. Reeves, Prophecy, pp. 179-181. The fundamental analysis is by J. Ratzinger,
The Theology of History in St. Bonaventure (Germ. orig. 1959; Chicago: Franciscan Herald, 1971).

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BENEDICT T. VIVIANO, O.P.

ment and by distinguishing it from the eighth age.11 He also
lists Francis as a member of the ultimate order, the ordo contemplantium, the ordo seraphicus, and gives him eschatological
status as Sixth Angel of the Apocalypse (Rev. 7: 2) and as
Elijah in his second coming. But he does not hold that the concrete, historical Franciscan order is this ultimate, seraphic order.
It is only cherubicus and not seraphicus. This means that the
present Order of Franciscans is not yet the true Order of Francis. Thus Bonaventure makes a distinction between Francis
and Franciscanism. 12 By means of these distinctions Bonaventure tried to link events of his own day with an imminent eschatological future while at the same time preserving continuity
with the existing church. He inherits from Joachim a thisworldly hope but firmly connects it with the return of the Son
and the abiding validity of the New Testament. In this he was
perhaps being faithful to the true meaning of Joachim himself
but not to his radical successors.18

Thoma.s Aquinas and the Kingdom of God
The attitude of Thomas Aquinas to the radical expectations
of a third age of the church aroused by the Joachite movement
is more abruptly negative. But before we look at Thomas's
relation to Joachimism we should first consider his position in
regard to our central theme of the kingdom of God, in order to
see why the Joachite conflict is relevant. If one consults the
standard index to the two Summae of Thomas 14 under the
Collationes, Delorme ed., p. 185.
Ratzinger, Theology of History, pp. 31-51.
13 Reeves, Prophecy, p. 180f.
14 Indices . . . in Summa theologiae et in Summa contra Gentiles . . . , ed.
C. S. Suermondt (Rome: Leonine, 1948); the older index to the complete works
of Thomas, called the Tabula aurea, of Peter Bergamo (Rome: Paulinae, 1960),
p. 822, adds a few minor ref.erences whnich do not substantially alter the picture:
In Sent. 4, d. 49, q. 1, art. 2, q. 5, c.; 1-2, q. 108, a. 1, ad 1 um; In Sent. 4, d.
15, q. 3, a.I, q. 4, ad 1 um; In Rom. 10, lect. l; 11, lect. 1; 14, lect. !?. The
picture which emerges from the new massive Index Thomisticus, ed. R. Busa
(Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1975), Sectio II, vol. 19, entry no. 69107-a,
-b, pp. 290-293, is certainly much vaster and more complex, but not significantly
different from that already drawn.
11

12

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509

word regnum one will find almost nothing. While this disconcerting result is not entirely justified, as we shall see, it contains
an important lesson. The fact is that Thomas Aquinas does not
devote any significant portion of his principal theological enterprise to the kingdom of God, the central theme of the preaching
of Jesus. This may be considered a serious weakness in the
greatest doctor of the medieval Church. Our task is not to
praise or to blame but to understand. Of course Thomas has a
vast moral construction built around the theme of justice in his
great Summa theologiae. And as a matter of fact Thomas does
treat of the kingdom in his commentary on Matthew as well as
in his Summa theologiae, in his commentary on the Sentences,
in the Quctestiones quodlibetales as well as in the theological
opusculum, Expositio super secundam decretalem ad Archidiaconum Tudertinum. But in all of these instances except for the
first it is in a context of polemical interaction with the theology
of history of Joachim of Fiore. Thus in his day the subject was
a theological live-wire which Thomas handled with reserve.
We will now consider some of the kingdom texts from Thomas
and then suggest some reasons why he remained so cool toward
the theme and toward Joachimism.
In his commentary on Matthew where he cannot bypass this
theme we get the impression of a certain amount of confusion.
This confusion may of course be due to his secretary since this
commentary is a reportatio, that is, unrevised lecture notes
taken down by a student secretary, as opposed to a dictatus.
His view (on Matthew 8: 2) runs:
The Kingdom of Heaven in the scripture may be understood in
four ways. For sometimes it means Christ himself dwelling in us
through grace;
The Kingdom of God is within you.
Here the Kingdom of Heaven is spoken of because by means of
the indwelling grace the way of the heavenly kingdom is begun in
us. -Secondly the Kingdom can mean Sacred Scripture itself;
thus Matthew
says: The Kingdom of God will be taken
away from you, that is, Sacred Scripture. It is called a Kingdom
because its law leads to the kingdom. -Third, it refers to the
present Church militant; Matthew 13:47: The Kingdom of Heaven
is like a net cast into the sea and gathering all manner of fish, etc.

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Here it is called a Kingdom because it is founded and set up in
the manner of the heavenly Church. -Fourth, the Kingdom of
Heaven can mean the heavenly court: Matthew 8: 11: They shall
come from the east and from the west, and they shall recline with
Abraham and Isaac and Jacob in the Kingdom of Heaven. 15
Of these four senses the first is the familiar false start based
on Luke 17: 21, which becomes the basis for an individualist,
private interior definition. The third and fourth, the kingdom
is the church on earth and heaven after death, follow the usual
Augustinian line. The second, which defines the kingdom as
Scripture itself, can only be characterized as a rather remote,
arbitrary equivocation.
A second, more familiar passage on the kingdom comes in the
Summa theologiae, in one of its finest patches of biblical theology, the tractate on biblical law (I-II, qq. 98-108). In the
subsection on the New Law of the gospel (qq. 106-108), in q.
106, article 4, is found the question whether the new law will
last till the end of the world. Here the objections are all derived from Joachite or radical Joachite teaching and the fourth
explicitly mentions the kingdom (of God) . In the body of the
article Thomas makes a distinction in terms of the status
mundi, Joachite terminology:
The state of the world may change in two ways. In one way, according to a change of law, and thus no other state will succeed this
state of the New Law. For the state of the New Law succeeded
the state of the Old Law, as a more perfect law a less perfect one.
Now no state of the present life can be more perfect than the state
of the New Law .... In another way,. the state of mankind may
change according as man stands in relation to one and the same
law more or less perfectly .... Thus, too, the state of the New Law
is subject to change with regard to various places, times and persons, according as the grace of the Holy Spirit dwells in man more
or less perfectly. Nevertheless, we are not to look forward to a
state wherein man is to possess the grace of the Holy Spirit more
perfectly than he has possessed it hitherto ....
15 Thomas Aquinas, Super EvangeUum S. Matthaei
lectura, ed. R. Cai (Turin:
Mar.ietti, 1951), on ch. 3, verse !'.!, par. 250. Cf. Maximino Arias Reyero, Thomas
von Aquin als Exeget (Einsiedeln: Johannes, 1971).

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With respect to a promised age of the Holy Spirit advanced in
the third objection, he scores an effective point:
The Old Law corresponded not only to the Father, but also to the
Son, because Christ was foreshadowed in the Old Law .... In like
manner, the New Law corresponds not only to Christ, but also to
the Holy Spirit, according to Romans 8: 2: The law of the Spirit
of life in Christ JesWJ, etc. Hence we are not to look forward to
another law corresponding to the Holy Spirit.

In other words, the whole Trinity is always present to its creation, is always active in history. To the mission of the Son
succeeded that of the Spirit, but that occurred already at Pentecost. Whatever is to come in the future will involve the Son
as well.
With respect to the kingdom he simply says in the reply to
the fourth objection: " Since Christ said at the very outset of
the preaching of the Gospel: The kingdom of heaven is at hand
(Matt. 4: 17) , it is most absurd to say that the Gospel of Christ
is not the Gospel of the kingdom.
And so with harsh words like vanitas and stultissimum he
rejects the Eternal Gospel of Gerard's distorted Joachimism, as
well as Joachim's Trinitarian scheme of history.
In a Quodlibetal Question (q. 13, a. 1) on the possibility of
a massive defection in the church from the ideal of Gospel
poverty, a difficulty is raised that nowadays the church has
armies (castra) at her disposal. In his reply, based on Augustine, he does admit different temporal states of the church but
not a fundamental discontinuity.
Augustine replies in a letter Against the Donatists, based on Psalm
2: I: "Why do the nations rage?" He distinguishes different times
of the Church. There was a time when kings resisted Christ, and
at that time they did not give support to the faithful but killed
them. But now is another time when kings understand and the
learned serve the Lord Jesus Christ in fear, etc., and so in this
time kings are vassals of the Church. And so there is another state
of the Church then and now, but there is not another Church. 16
16 Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones Quodlibetales., ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin:
Marietti,
1956), pp. 23lf., no. 244 (19).

BENEDICT

T. VIVIANO,

O.P.

This is an indication of considerable social optimism, as well
as a high evaluation of the Christian empire, but makes the
empire still subordinate to the church.
Finally, dealing with speculation on the millenium, Thomas
expresses scepticism about foretelling the future by the concords of the Old and New Testaments:
I do not think that these persecutions were prophetically signified
by those deeds done in Egypt, although, by those who think this,
individual events from both periods exquisitely and ingeniously
seem to be compared: This is done not by a prophetic spirit but by
the conjecture of the human mind which sometimes arrives at the
truth and sometimes fails. And the same should be said about the
sayings of the Abbot Joachim who by such conjectures sometimes
predicted truly about future events and in some matters was
deceived.

Thomas's critique of Joachim's method of finding harmonies
between the Testaments is trenchant and reasonable, but there
is an alternative danger of spiritualizing, ahistorical exegesis of
a kind dependent on the Pseudo-Denis. Thomas himself is not
always immune from this danger, and Albert, as we will see, is
even more prey to it. The value of Joachim's method is as a
corrective counterweight which takes the events of history with
full religious seriousness.17
Before turning to Albert, let us summarize some of the factors which inhibited Thomas in his appreciation of a theology
of history which is implied in a this-worldly coming of the kingdom and which was represented in his own day in a somewhat
deformed way by Joachite speculations and expectations. First
of all he probably realized the socially disruptive potential of
this theology and, since he had family connections with the
Hohenstaufen emperors, was on friendly terms with the saintly
French king Louis IX, and from time to time served as a theologian at the papal court, he wanted to help them to maintain
17 Cf. DeLubac's balanced judgment,
Exegese Medievale, vol. 8, p. 556f. Joachim's own contrast of allegoria and concordia, both of which he accepts, may be
found in McGinn, Apocalyptic, pp. 12!'l-124, from Concordia, Book 2, Part 1,
Chapters 8 and 4.

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the fragile social fabric as it then was. Secondly, the antimendicant controversy and the excesses of Gerard of Borgo San
Donnino threatened the very existence of the friars. Under
these circumstances it would have been unwise to encourage
apocalyptic expectations. Third, Thomas's chief claim to social
boldness and apostolic heroism was his effort to meet the intellectual and spiritual needs of the new class of urban lay intellectuals and merchants by the integration of Aristotelian
science and Christian faith. To do this he had to emphasize
sober theological restraint and timeless necessary truths, rather
than the caprice of historical change. 18 Fourth, Thomas's secular learning is predominantly philosophical rather than historical and his approach to Scripture and theology is predominantly
sapiential rather than polemical or prophetic or historical. 10 He
also had a strong conviction about the absolute finality and
sole sufficiency of Jesus Christ as well as about the present
work of the Holy Spirit and those were at least compromised
by Joachimism. The great works of Greek, Roman and Jewish
historiography were simply not available to him, nor were the
pseudoepigraphical works of Jewish apocalyptic. 2° Finally, we
may note that he did not complete his great Summa, so that we
do not have his last word on eschatology, but if we judge from
the sketch at the end of the Summa contra Gentiles this would
not have altered the picture significantly.

Albert the Great and the Kingdom of God
With Albert (1206-1280) we are in a different world. Although he has much to say about the kingdom, he nowhere, so
far as I can see, discusses it in terms of Joachim's theology of
18 Cf. B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages, 2nd rev. ed.
(Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), p. 292.
19 But his great tract on prophecy
in the Summa theol., II-II, qq. 171-174,
contained enough power to ignite a Savonarola. See McGinn, Apocalyptic, p. 804,
n. 10.
2 ° For a fuller and more balanced presentation
of Thomas's relation to history,
see Max Seckler, Das Heil in der Geschichte. Ges.chichtstheologischesDenken bei
Thomas van Aquin (Munich: Kosel, 1964).

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BENEDICT T. VIVIANO, O.P.

history. We are back in the world of Plato, the Pseudo-Denis,
and Augustine, but with the addition of Aristotle. We can treat
him last because he lived longer than Thomas and Bonaventure, and because his great commentaries on the four canonical
gospels 21 were given their final form toward the end of his life,
between 1270 and 1276.22 These commentaries are the only certainly authentic works among the various commentaries on
New Testament books attributed to him. 23 They have not yet
been critically edited, unfortunately. They are masterpieces of
medieval university exegesis, always striving for the literal
truth, the veritas litterae. Perhaps Spicq does not exaggerate
when he says that " a ce titre, ... il est le createur de l'exegese
scientifique." 24 For our purposeS' we have checked every reference to the kingdom of God in his commentary on the synoptics
and found the richest material in his commentary on Matthew,
to which he refers back in the rest of his references.
Albert gives a preliminary definition of the kingdom of God
at its first occurrence, in Matthew 3: 2. His fullest treatment
is found when he comes to the Lord's Prayer, at 6: 10. This runs
to eight quarto pages. All the other comments are comparatively brief. Our procedure then will be first to present a translation and analysis of the first definition, then to summarize his
shorter, scattered remarks, and then thirdly to concentrate on
his full dress treatment. We will conclude with an overall evaluation in light of contemporary theology and exegesis.
The kingdom of the heavens is threefold: (I) one, which is within
" The Kingdom of God is within you." And this
us, Luke 17:
21 These
four commentaries are found in the Borgnet edition (Paris: Vives
1898), in volumes 20-!M.
22 Cf.
J. M. Voste, "Sanctus Albertus Magnus Evangeliorum interpres,"
Angelicum 9 (1932): 242-246. Also published in book form, S. Albertus. Magnus
sacrae paginae magister (Rome: Angelico, 1982), vol. 1, pp. 3-62.
23 C. Spicq, Esquisse d'une historie de l'exegese latine au moyen age
(Paris:
Vrin, 1944), p. 296.
24 Spicq, Esquisse, p. 298. Other treatments
of Albert's exegesis may be found
in Smalley, Study, pp. 298-302 and passim, and H. de Lubac, Exegese medievale,
vol. 4. pp. 302-307. See also the brief noticeR in G. G. Meerseman, Introductio
in opera omnia B. Alberti Magni 0. P. (Brugge: Beyaert, 1981), pp. 93-96.

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is that concerning which it is said in Romans 14:17: "The Kingdom of God is not eating and drinking, but righteousness, and
peace and joy in the Holy Spirit." And through this Kingdom
God reigns in us. For this is, as Dionysius says,. " distribution of
laws, and precepts, and offices, and classes (gradus) and goods
which pertain to the civilization (civilitas) of the saints." And this
is the kingdom of God through which God reigns in us. And as
the first kingdom is the soul of the true (or: first) king, whose insights (illuminationes) and orders and laws and acts as they take
effect among the people themselves constitute the kingdom, so this
kingdom is first of all in the mind of God, and then, when it is
promulgated among the saints, makes up the kingdom of the
heavens. And that which in heaven is external to ourselves (extra
nos) is like to this; but it is even more like the kingdom/reign of
the mind of God, which is third, and exemplar,. and object, and
cause of the two other kingdoms. And it consists in three things:
(a) in the enlightening of those who belong to the kingdom, and
(b) in the powers of the kingdom, and (c) in the duties actually
(ad actum) exercised. (2) The second kingdom is the kingdom of
the heavens outside of ourselves, which is the place and the honor
and the joy (jucunditas) of those reigning in heaven. And this is
acquired by the first kingdom (the one within us). (3) The third
kingdom is the one which is the object and cause of these: and this
is God descending into both the kingdom within us and the kingdom in heaven. Wisdom 3: 8: "They will rule over peoples, and the
Lord will reign over them for ever." Isaiah 33: 22: "The Lord is
our king." 25

Albert's understanding of the Kingdom of God may be summarized as follows: the kingdom consists of three realities, the
life of virtues within the soul of the believer, the life of the
saints in heaven, and thirdly God himself. But as Albert understands the third aspect there is really an underlying unity which
binds all three aspects together and that is the divine reality
present to itself, to the soul and to the blessed. In a word, for
Albert the kingdom of God is God himself. This is a relatively
original concept in the history of interpretation of this biblical
theme. Before Albert the kingdom had been interpreted either
as virtue or the resurrection or as the Christian empire or as
••Albert

Magnus, Enarrationes in Evangelium

(Paris: Vives, 1893), vol. 20, p. 94.

Matthaei,

3:2, Borgnet ed.

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BENEDICT T. VIVIANO, 0.P.

the church, either the present church or the future church of
the Spirit, even as Christ but not, in any major witness, as God.
Let us take a closer look at the text to see what might have led
Albert to his peculiar view.
His starting point is unpromising enough, because he begins
with the least representative text in the Gospels, Luke 17: 21:
" the kingdom of God is within you." This much abused text
has usually misled readers to the conclusion that the kingdom
is an inner spiritual reality in the soul of the believer without
any future social reference except resurrection to eternal life
with the saints in heaven. But if translated as "the kingdom
of God is among you, i.e., in your midst," and read in context,
viz., as addressed to unbelieving Pharisees, as following upon
a healing miracle (Luke 17: 11-19) and as introducing an entire discourse on future eschatology (Luke: 17: 22-18: 8), then
the verse yields a view which fits better with the predominantly
future sense of the kingdom present throughout Luke and the
entire synoptic tradition. The verse would then mean that,
while the fullness of the kingdom is yet to come, it is already
sufficiently discernible in the healing deeds of Jesus to lead eyewitnesses to a decision of faith in Jesus as the divinely accredited agent of the kingdom. It has nothing to do with a kind of
private, individualistic pietism. 25 But all of this was not apparent to Albert, who depended upon the Vulgate's intra vos.
After this false start, Albert unwittingly veers toward the
best and truest definition of the kingdom to be found in the
New Testament: Romans 14: 17: "the kingdom of God is not
in food and drink but justice and peace and joy in the Holy
Spirit." Had he understood these values as a promise for an
earthly future and as social goods he would have been quite on
Augustin Goorges, Etudes sur l'oeuvre de Luc (Paris: Gabalda, 1978), pp.
When Albert himself comes to comment on this verse, he will recognize
this. After discussing other meanings, he then concludes: " Nevertheless according to the letter here [Jesus] means that a material kingdom is already present
among the Pharisees: because the king of the righteous, and the first ordering of
powers, and of the princes of the Apostles and disciples was in their midst, and
they did not recogni11e him. '
26

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517

target. But his understanding of these realities is dominated by
his privatized view of the kingdom which he derived from Luke
17: 21, so he takes them to be purely inner magnitudes, and
thereby strips them of their innate social, transformative power.
For Albert God reigns in our hearts but not directly in the
world. (Perhaps such a low view of God's power to influence
and to direct the turn of historical events may be attributed to
Albert's depressing episcopal experiences at close range with the
workings of the Christian church and empire, and especially to
his bitter experiences at having preached the crusade (ca.
1263) which went down to defeat at the Horns of Hattin
(1287) and finally lost even the miserable little toehold of St.
Jean d'Acre (1291). With the fall of Acre went an archbishopric and a Dominican province.)
Perhaps this line of interpretation which we have been pursuing is misdirected. Perhaps Albert is not so unsocial after all.
A judgment in this matter depends in part on our interpretations of the next sentences in which Albert is drawing upon a
phrase of the Pseudo-Denis: " [The kingdom of God is] the
distribution of laws, and precepts, and offices, and classes
(gradus) and goods which pertain to the civilization of the
saints." 27
From his comments on this passage it appears that Albert is
not an unpolitical theologian. Rather he works out of the Platonic mode of political theory which is psychologizing and
idealistic. For Plato the ideal ruler is a philosopher, and his
principal means of directing his citizens is educational and
rhetorical, winning their hearts and minds through persuasion.
The Christian neo-Platonism of the Pseudo-Denis which Albert
follows transports this model of political theory into the mind
of God. It too is concerned with laws, offices, social classes and
civilization in general. For Albert the divine mind works
through persuasion, order, and actions. Thus there is an unmistakably social dimension to this thought. Albert thinks of
27 So far as I can tell, this is a loose quotation from Dionysius the
treatise On the Divine Names, ch. U (P. G. S, 969 A; Dionysiaca, 1, p.
translation into Latin is that of John Sarracenus).

the

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the kingdom as the divine rule, not in specifically territorial
terms. This is possible for him because the Latin term in question, regnum, can mean both kingdom, in the sense of a territory under royal government, and the actual governing activity, rule (Herrschaft) . This interpretation is supported by
much contemporary biblical scholarship which prefers to translate basileia toit theoit as rule or reign of God. This translation
however fails to catch the earthly, territorial reference of the
biblical concept, so that many exegetes, the present writer included, still prefer the translation" kingdom ". 28 But there can
be no doubt that Albert is catching an aspect of the biblical
meaning. And as Plato's Republic can be interpreted both psychologically and politically, so for Albert God's rule of hearts
is also a rule of the state and sovereignty called the kingdom
of God.
Concluding our analysis of this key passage we note simply
that for Albert the second phase of the kingdom is the heaven
of the saints, and that the third, which holds the other two
together, is God himself. What is most striking in all of this is
Albert's Platonic way of grasping and failing to grasp the social
dimension of the biblical concept.
Turning now to the second part of our study of Albert, we
will simply present without comment some of his more striking
and original remarks on the kingdom. On Matthew 6: 33,
noting that Chrysostom says that the kingdom of God is here
eternal retribution, Albert comments: " This is true with respect
to the ultimate goal intended. But the kingdom which we are
here enjoined to seek is that by which God reigns among men.
The meaning is ' First,' by struggling, preaching, working well
(militando, praedicando, bene operando), constantly' seek the
kingdom of God,' i.e., that he reign by a strengthened kingdom-rule over men. 'And its righteousness,' i.e., the justice
by which this reign is strengthened, and which leads to an everlasting reign. "
28 S. Aalen, "Reign
and House in the Kingdom of God in the Gospels," New
Testament Studies 8 (1961-2), 215-240.

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On Matthew 13: 31 he observes: "The kingdom of heaven
is not like the kingdoms of other powers. For these rule by
coercive force (virtute ooactiva) . But the heavenly kingdoms
attract us by the force of love (virtute ... amativa) ." Commenting on Matthew 25: 1, the parable of the wise and foolish
virgins, he says: "The kingdom of heaven is here understood
as the pursuit of beauty which is set before man according to
the laws which lead to heaven." On Luke 17: 2la he teaches the
universality of the kingdom which he contrasts with the provincialism of the Donatists in Africa and of the Arians elsewhere: "regnum enim gratiae Dei, in potestate saeculari non
erit: neque in una parte mundi, sed in toto mundo, quia totum
orbem obtinebit."
Finally we come to Albert's fullest treatment of the theme,
his commentary on the phrase of the Lord's Prayer, Adveniat
Regnum Tuum, Thy Kingdom Come. 29 His extensive observations fall into three parts. (1) What is a kingdom, and what is
this kingdom? (2) In what way is this kingdom the kingdom
of God the Father? (3) Why do we pray that it come? Thus
each of the terms Regnum Tuum Adveniat is analyzed separately. Of these three sections the longest, giving the definition
of the kingdom, is the first. It contains a remarkable compendium of political philosophy, drawing upon Plato, Democratica (?), Timaeus, Aristotle, Ethics, Politics, and De Regimine Dominorum (?), Cicero, Rhetorica prima, Ambrose, Augustine, and the Pseudo- Denis. In this section Albert first
attempts a definition and characterization of a kingdom or
state in general and then (pp. 269-271) applies this data to the
religious concept of the kingdom of God. At a high point in the
discussion of the second section, Albert spontaneously bursts
into a prayer which will provide our own last words here (p.
272). The third, brief section represents a sound and balanced
theology of grace in which God's initiative is primary, but includes and invites our human, free response.
Leaning on Plato, Albert defines a kingdom as: nothing other
than complete power and dominion in a single person, animate

••In Evang. Matthaei, Borgnet ed., 20, pp. 265-272.

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BENEDICT

T. VIVIANO,

O.P.

justice, ordered by laws, concretized by urban communities as its
parts, strengthened by the force of arms, governing according to
the best principles of civilization, superabounding in external goods
and supplied with sufficient organic resources.... And if this power
were not in a single person, but were a divided power, then division
and schism could arise, and thence desolation. . .. A body with
many heads is a monstrous thing.
Albert then proceeds further to define each element in this
definition and his definitions are amplified and supported both
by classical and patristic authors and by frequent quotations
from the Bible, particularly from the historical books of the
Old Testament, as well as from the prophets and wisdom literature. This section is characterized by practical common sense,
as well as by some bizarre military ideas derived from the
Timaeus, but the whole discussion is conducted in terms of
classical antiquity with no reference to specifically contemporary events or conditions, although, when Albert reports a class
of unmarried soldiers in Plato's ideal scheme, he might be
thinking of the military religious orders of his own day. His
definition of justice is the standard Aristotelian suum cuique
tribuere, rather than the more Christian definition of Peter
Lombard: iustitia est in subveniendis miseris.
Albert then turns his attention to how all this applies to the
kingdom of God. His approach is highly spiritual and moral.
Taking all these matters into our spiritual lives (in spiritualibus),
then the divine processions [of the Trinity] create the dominion of
the kingdom in us, elevating, enriching and strengthening us. These
processions are rays of divine grace, which lift the heart up from
anything which would depress it into servitude, so that now we
should disdain to look at such things, but be powerfully lifted beyond them, and crush them, and be filled with beautiful and good
things as by a fountain (fontaliter). By this means we are sublimated above the vile (vilia) and never fall into them.
Albert then takes most of the elements of the Platonic definition and interprets them in terms of the spiritual life of the
believer. Thus "justice must be our everlasting life." "The
divine laws are engraved on our hearts to be kept inviolably."
I

THE KINGDOM IN ALBERT AND AQUINAS

521

Urban structures are interpreted as the duties of the virtues.
The seven women who embrace one man in Isaiah 4: 1 become
the seven virtues (theological and cardinal) . The weapons in
this kingdom are " studies, alertness and Scripture, by which
the enemy devil is kept out." We also share in the legions of
the angelic hosts, grouped in the nine choirs of the PseudoDenis. And so on.
Thus God the Father confirms his kingdom in us, by giving us a
share in his lordship through grace, by which he raises us up and
assimilates us to his Son the king, who sits at his right hand.
Colossians 3: If.
In the second section Albert explains why this kingdom belongs to the Father. "In it he reigns, he gives it to the Son,
through the Son he leads believers to adoptive sonship, and at
the end of time the kingdom will be turned over to him by the
Son with all who are in it and it in them." Each of these four
aspects is then supported by Scripture quotations. The most
dynamically eschatological among these four aspects is the last,
which looks forward to a definitive divine resolution of history,
based on I Corinthians 15: 24. This verse presupposes a Jewish
apocalyptic world view for its full understanding, but Albert
did not have such a world view at his disposal and the implications of the verse remain undeveloped in his commentary.
When Albert turns to the third and final term in the clause
Thy Kingdom come, (Adveniat) , his commentary becomes a
little treatise on the theology of grace, in which the accent falls
on the primacy of the divine initiative and yet we are called to
a response. Thus he stands in the same line as Augustine and
Thomas.
It does not say that we should come to the kingdom [but that the

kingdom come to us]. This is because we do not of ourselves have
the power to do so. But if it should first come to us, then we can
finally by its force come to it .... Since the kingdom of God is the
power of perfect righteousness, the kingdom comes to us when it
goes ahead of us (nos praeveniens) and lays claim to us [and liberates us, vindicat sibi], and then associates us in a common work,
that we might cooperate with it toward the establishment of the

BENEDICT

T. VIVIANO,

O.P.

kingdom .... No one arrives at the honor of the kingdom, until the
kingdom has first come to him through the keeping of the laws and
virtues and righteousness and power in the aforesaid manner. (p.
272)

It is time for a concluding evaluation of Albert's teaching on
the kingdom. This may be quickly accomplished by two observations, one laudatory, one deprecatory. Albert passes the test
of Tillich's four-point definition of the kingdom: it is political,
social, personalistic and universal. But for Albert the kingdom
of God is only political in the Platonic psychologico-political
sense. In general we may speak of an emphatic spiritualizing
tendency in Albert's thought on this point, which makes his
doctrine unsuitable as a theological basis for radical social doctrines today. This is confirmed by our second observation.
Albert fails the test of comprehending the Jewish this-worldly
inner-historical eschatological divine intervention which was
the specific content of Jesus's own preaching.
Let us nevertheless conclude with Albert's prayer:
Igitur, 0 Pater, est hoc hoc regnum decoris: in tuo diademate fulget tota pulchritudo coelestis per circuitum
orbis: in cuius manu sceptrum est rectitudinis, eaque omnis
rectitudo est, certius verbis et sententiis: in cuius conscientia sacramenta consiliorum sunt abscondita: in cuius
conversatione fulgens et regalis praefulget conversatio virtutis. Hoc igitur regnum tuum adveniat!
BENEDICT

Aquinas Institute of Theology
Dubuque, Iowa

T. VIVIANO, O.P.

ALBERT THE GREAT AND THOMAS AQUINAS
ON THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

B

OTH PRE-CHALCEDONIAN and post-Chalcedonian
Christology focused on the relationship between humanity and divinity in the Christ, Jesus of Nazareth. Roman Catholic Christology has always devoted attention to the
" person " of Christ, to his ontological " make-up " which is
the ultimate source of his activity. If we look at the development of Christology in the Middle Ages, it becomes clear that
intense study was given to this issue.1 One of the significant
contributions of Thomas Aquinas to Christology touches on this
same topic. 2
There is, however, another issue which was important for
medieval Christology: not the nature of the Incarnation or the
mode of union, but the purpose or motive of the Incarnation.
This question may not have been the primary Christological
concern of the Middle Ages, but it was a question which medieval theologians pondered 3 and which was significant both in
1 A valuable study in this regard is Walter Principe's
four volumes on the
theology of the hypo&tatic union in the early thirteenth century: William of
Auxerre?s Theology of the Hypostatic Union (1963); Alexander of Halea's Theology
of the Hypoatatie Union (1967); Hugh of Saint-Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic Union (1970); Philip the Chancellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union
(1975) ; all published by the Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto.
2 ST, III, qq. lil-6, written toward the end of Thomas's second Parisian regency,
and especially q. 17, written after De unione V erbi lnearnati, constitute Thomas's
contribution to and discussion of the mode of the Incarnation, See James
Weisheipl, Friar Thomas d' Aquino (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974), pp. 307-815.
8 For further discussion of the history of this question, see Rudolf Haubst,
(' Das
hoch-und- spiitmittelalterliche 'Cur Deus homo?'" Miinchener Theologische
Zeitschrift (1955), 302-303. Also Robert North, Teilhard and the Creation of the
Soul (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967), pp. 139-161.
Whether there would have been an Incarnation if man had not sinned is a
question primarily discussed within Latin theology during the high and late

524

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

late medieval thought and in the Christology of the Reformation and Counter-Reformation. The issue was expressed as follows: would God have become incarnate if man had not sinned?
Would there be any ' reason ' for the Incarnation if there had
been no need of redemption? Was the intention of God in becoming man to redeem humankind from sin, so that there would
have been no Incarnation if there had not been sin? But, if
there is ' more ' to the Incarnation than the goal of redemption,
in what does this 'more' consist?
Of course, in one sense, there is no way to answer such a question. Any response can easily become a faulty, speculative
tendency to ' read the mind of God.' Can we know what God
had in mind in becoming incarnate? Man can know that God
became incarnate and that the Incarnation was redemptive, but
can we know anything more than that? As Thomas Aquinas
rightly points out, we can only know through what God has
chosen to reveal to us. Does his revelation then tell us anything
concerning this question? In the end, it is a question of what
the Scriptures say, and it is in the interpretation of Scripture
that different opinions emerge.
Middle Ages. An exception seems to have been Isaac of Nineveh, 700 A.D. As
North points out, Rupert of Deutz, c. 1100, raises the question, and Alexander of
Hales, c. moo, does so as well. Albert the Great gives his opinion in the early
thirteenth century. Robert Grosseteste agrees with Albert. Bonaventure, however,
takes the opinion contrary to that of Albert, as does Thomas Aquinas. Alexander,
Albert, Robert Grosseteste, generally represent the opinion later attributed to
Duns Scotus. Bonaventure and Thomas maintain the opinion associated with
Thomas.
Theologians of the half century after Thomas accepted the opinion of Albert,
e.g., Matthew of Aquasparta, Raymond Lull, Peter of Auvergne, William of Ware,
Duns Scotus. John of St. Thomas and Cajetan later defended the view of
Thomas. But Ambrose Catharinus and Giacomo Nacchianti, both Dominicans,
did not follow Thomas on this issue.
For a discussion of the view of Duns Scotus, see: Johannes Bissen, " De Motivo
lncarnationis," Antonianum 7 (1932), 314-336; Robert North, Teilhard and the
Creation of the Soul (Milwaukee: Bruce, 1967), 139-161; Edwin Rabbitte, "The
'Motive' of the Incarnation: Was Scotus a Scotist?" Irish Ecclesiastical Record
65 (1945), 117-125; Dominic Unger, "Franciscan Christology: Absolute and Universal Primacy of Christ, " Franciscan Studies 2 (1942), 428-475; Dominic Unger,
"Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln (1235-1253) on the Reasons for the
Incarnation, " Franciscan Studies 16 (1956), 1-86.

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

525

Setting aside the question of whether Scotus himself was a
"scotist" on this particular question, what we have come to
label the "scotist-thomist" controversy had little to do originally with the views of Thomas and Duns Scotus themselves,
for the so-called " scotist " or Franciscan position had already
been the opinion of the famous teacher of Thomas Aquinas, one
of the greatest Dominican intellectuals of the Middle Ages,
namely Albert. 4 On the other hand, Bonaventure,5 the great
Franciscan, and Thomas both held the same opinion.
The issue becomes something more than various theological
opinions, however, with the Protestant Reform. For now" creation-centered" theology and " salvation-centered" theology
are opposed to each other. For Luther, the Incarnation takes
place for justification. The centrality of Scripture, of Paul, of
justification, was emphasized and became a norm for Protestantism. Yet, to the Catholics, the Protestant Reform seemed to be
a reaction which cut off rich theological traditions. To Catholic
eyes, it appeared as if it were Luther alone who interpreted
justification, and justification alone which was the norm for
interpreting Paul; and, finally, Paul alone the norm for understanding Scripture.
The issue of the relationship between creation, Incarnation,
and redemption is not simply academic; it has ecumenical implications. In the days of Albert and Thomas we find both
opinions peacefully held, more compatibly entertained than in
the late medieval or post-Reformation theology. Other issues
have complicated and intensified this one. It is too great a
simplification to say that Greek theology and Franciscan theo4 Alexander of Hales, a Franciscan, prior to Albert, is also generally considered
to have held this 'scotist' view. See Alexander of Hales, Summa theologica, III,
pars 1, tractatus 1, quaestio 2, titulus 2 (Quaracchi edition, 1948, vol. 4, text, pp.
41-42) (Cologne edition, 1622, III, q. 2, m. 13). Haubst, p. 304, however, concludes it is difficult to know the precise opini-on of Alexander of Hales.
5 Bonaventure,
Commentaria in libros sententiarum, III, distinctio 1, articulus
2, quaestio 2 (Quaracchi edition, 1887, vol. 3, pp. 21-28). Also see Alexander
Schaefer, "The Position and Function of Man in the Created World According
t-o St. Bonaventure," Franciscan Studies, 20 (1960), 261-316, and 21 (1961),
233-382.

526

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

logy tend to be creation-centered and cosmic, and that Latin
theology and Thomas Aquinas tend to be salvation-centered.
Thomas, arguing from Scripture, holds that salvation from sin
is the motive of the Incarnation, but he also suggests that another motive is possible. It is also too simple to say that Catholicism is creation-centered and Protestantism salvation-centered.
This question is also important because it has pastoral implications for morality, spirituality, politics and liturgy as well as
ecumenism. Most contemporary Catholic christologies, such as
that of Karl Rahner, are 'scotist.' 'Scotism' is found in contemporary Protestantism as well, as we see in the theology of
Herbert Richardson and Wolfhart Pannenberg. The philosopher, Charles Sanders Peirce, was influenced by Scotus.
Let us turn, then, to Albert and Thomas to see what we can
learn from their theologies composed when the issue was less
polemical.

Albert on the Motive of the Incarnation 6
Three central ideas form the core of Albert's opinion and can
be found in his solutio to the question. First, Albert manifests
an awareness of the tenuous character of any opinion on this
question. In the end, we simply do not know whether God
would have become man if man had not sinned. The' motive'
for the Incarnation involves the freedom of God and hence the
incomprehensibility of that decisive choice. Thus Albert is modest about offering an opinion. His own view is not to be asserted
strongly (nihil de hoc asserendo dico) ; it is uncertain (in hac
6 The chronology of Albert's life poses many difficulties.
Sometime after 1!?40
he came to Paris, where he lectured on the Sentences of Peter Lombard for at
least two years, c. H!43-1245, and possibly for four years, 1241-H!45. During
the summer of 1248 Albert went to Cologne to organize the first Dominican
studium generale in Germany. The final revision of Book IV of the
was
completed in Cologne in 1249. He was elected provincial of the German
province in 1254. He died in 1280, about 80 years old. See Weisheipl, Friar
Thomas, pp. 32-51; also Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great,"
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences-Commemorative Essays 1980, edited by James
Weisheipl, Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto, 1980).

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

527

quaestione solutio incerta est) ; and it is expressed reservedlyinsofar as an opinion can he formed (quantum possum opinari) .7
Second, Albert's opinion is that" the son of God would have
become man even if there had never been sin." Albert's opinion is not the same as that of Thomas; nor, however, is it as far
removed from Thomas's as it first appears to be.
Third, Albert offers his opinion hesitantly but still sees it as
more probable (probabilius) because, as he says, it is more in
accord with the piety of faith (credo hoo quad dixi, magis concordare pietati fidei) . His reason, given the uncertainty of either
opinion, for being inclined more to one side of the question than
to the other is based on what seems to him to agree with the
life of the faithful. 8
Let us look at Albert's discussion a little more closely. If man
had not sinned, he asks, would the Son of God have become
incarnate?
Albert first gives four reasons why God would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned, and to each of these he
subsequently replies. Then Albert presents the other side and
states six reasons why God would have become incarnate even
if man had not sinned. These " sed contra " arguments cannot
be identified with Albert's opinion itself, for he also replies to all
six of these and disagrees with all six. In accord with the style
of the Schools, Albert is giving the arguments for both sides, but
he does not then simply accept one side. None of the arguments
on either side stands; hence both opinions are uncertain. This
uncertainty is Albert's most fundamental assertion. The basis
7 Albert's discussion and direct quotations
from him are from his commentary
on the Sentences of Peter Lombard, Book III, distinction 20, article 4. For secondary sources, see Haubst, p. 305, and North, p. 141. See V. M. Pollet, "Le
Christ d'apres saint Albert le Grand," La Vie spirituelle, 34-35 (1933), 78-108.
8 I have translated
"pietas fidei" as " the piety of faith. " It is not immediately clear how Albert understands the expression. Pietas can mean piety, devoutness, the devotional life, the practice of the faith. Fides refers to the faith, the
life of faith. Perhaps pietas fidei can be seen as the life of the faithful, the practice of the faith. I use " the piety of faith " as a translation in order to avoid
interpretation, but " the life of faith " or simply " the Christian life " might
render it better.

528

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

on which he then expresses a preference is his understanding of
the piety of faith. Let us look briefly at some of these pros and
cons.
He offers the following arguments in favor of the opinion that
God would not have become incarnate if man had not sinned.
The first two arguments are the liturgical use of the Exultet
sequence of Easter, and its felix culpa theology. With this approach, however, Albert disagrees. He writes, "Such ways of
speaking as calling a fault ' blessed ' or ' happy ' are most improper, for it is not called blessed or happy in itself but from
what follows upon it. . .. The Incarnation of Christ is not a
consequence of the fault; nevertheless, the great works of redemption ... did come after the fault." Hence the poetic felix
culpa argument does not prove that, if there had been no sin,
there would have been no Incarnation. Properly speaking the
fault is not " blessed " in itself, but only incidentally, since the
works of redemption do follow it and are grace.
The third argument is based on Romans 8: 28, that all things
work unto good for those who love God. A gloss includes, "even
sins." So good can come even from original sin and this good is
the incarnate Christ; if there had been no sin, there would have
been no need for Incarnation. The fault in this argument is the
gloss. For Albert, sin does not work unto good except incidentally, e.g., by making someone more vigilant. Hence one cannot
link the Incarnation only to original sin. Redemption does follow upon sin, but one does not know whether there would have
been an Incarnation or not if there had been no sin. To assume
that the Incarnation is tied only to redemption would be begging the question.
The fourth argument is that without sin there would be no
need for liberation or redemption. 1£ man had not sinned, God
would not have manifested so great a love as he did after sin
had been committed. To this Albert replies that Christ might
still have become incarnate to demonstrate his infinite love and
to prepare multiple delights for us since he regards us as
brothers and sisters.

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

Albert therefore does not accept the above arguments; in one
form or other they all beg the question. Incarnation and redemption are in fact related, but would they have to be so in
such a way that there could not be one without the need for
the other? Albert is unconvinced that they are 'necessarily'
tied together. God could have become incarnate in any case.
Whether he would have is another question, and Albert's response is-we do not know.
Does Albert accept the other opinion: that God would have
become incarnate even if man had not sinned? This position is
also flawed. The first opinion is false because it states that God
would not have become incarnate apart from sin; the second is
false because it states that God would have become incarnate
apart from sin. Albert's opinion is that God could have (hence
the first opinion is false) , but that we do not know whether he
would have (hence the second opinion is false). Albert's own
opinion is that probably God would have become incarnate but
we cannot conclude that with certainty. The freedom of God
underlies Albert's opinion. The first opinion is false because it
denies the freedom of God to become incarnate and the second
because it denies God's freedom not to. These stated opinions
do not sufficiently esteem the freedom of God.
Albert offers six reasons as to why God would have become
incarnate even if man had not sinned, all six of which he also
rejects.
The first one is the axiom, Goodness is diffusive of itself. God
cannot better diffuse himself than by becoming incarnate. Albert replies: Goodness diffuses itself according to the capacity
of those who receive it. The union of the divine and human is
not something merited by human nature itself. Hence it was
not necessary for God to share Himself in this way. Again
Albert presumes God's freedom.
The next is similar to the first. " The greatest love shares
itself in the greatest way. But there can be no greater love than
when someone joins himself to another. Therefore since God's
love for man was so great, he would unite himself to him. There-

530

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

fore it seems that God would unite himself to man even if man
had not sinned." Albert replies, " The manifestation of his love
in glorification was enough, for it was not necessary that God
manifest every manner of love," Again Albert appeals to God's
freedom.
There is no need to look at all of the six statements along
with Albert's objections to them. One further example is sufficient, the third argument: " An angel is not capable of being
united to the divine nature, but man is capable of being united.
Since no aptitude is created by God in vain, therefore it was
necessary that God become incarnate." But, for Albert, "this
aptitude is not from nature but from the grace of election ....
It is not necessary that God do anything whatsoever in the best
way in which he could have done it if he had so willed, but it is
enough that he does things as he wills, as long as he does not
deny to them anything concerning their nature."
Albert, then, is hesitant and uncertain about any opinion
which involves the divine will and freedom; hence his position
is that we do not know whether God would have become incarnate or not if man had not sinned. But the opinion that God
would have become incarnate is probable for Albert simply because it is congruent with the piety of faith. It certainly would
be fitting for God to do so.

The Early Thomas: The Commentary on the Sentences
In his commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard,
Thomas's view appears closer to his master and teacher, Albert,
than the thomist opinion might lead one to believe.9 He is
9 Thomas studied under Albert shortly after Albert was preparing his own lectures
on the Sentences. It is not certain whether he had already studied under Albert
in Paris. If he did, he would have been with him from l!M5-1252. Nevertheless,
he studied under him in Cologne from 1248-1252. In 1252, Thomas went back to
Paris and lectured on the Sentences from l!M2-Hl56, at the age of 27. Undoubtedly
at this time Albert's influence on Thomas is strong. Thomas's Summa comes later.
He worked on the first questions of the tertia pars, the christological section, in
1272. He stopped writing toward the end of 1273, and he died in 1274. Albert
was still alive. (Cf. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas, pp. 67-80, 289-320),

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

531

aware of the soundness of both positions with respect to this
question and also the tenuousness of each. The arguments for
neither side are necessary. In fact, in the commentary, Thomas
does not adhere strongly to either opinion.
Thomas gives seven reasons in favor of the opinion that God
would have become incarnate even if man had not sinned. 10 He
then gives four reasons for the contrary opinion. His own response is that either view can be sustained. He is aware of the
"probable" character of both views, and maintains that both
views can be held-held as probable. He expresses no direct
preference for either.
Thomas begins his response with a theological and methodological principle. Only he who willed the Incarnation could
know its motive. That which depends on the will of God alone
cannot be known by us, or rather can be known only insofar as
it has been revealed, hence insofar as it is in the Scriptures and
the holy exposition of Scripture. In Scripture, however, the
only cause assigned to the Incarnation is the redemption of man
from the slavery of sin. Hence some say that" probably" the
Son of God would not have become man if man had not sinned.
As a support for this opinion, Thomas quotes Pope Leo and St.
Augustine. It is interesting-given the principles, and given
Thomas's apparent conviction that this is the 'reason' most
consistent with Scripture-that he still speaks only of the probability of the opinion, not its conclusiveness. The major support
for this opinion, however, is its basis in revelation itself.
Thomas then considers the opinion of others who would maintain that, in fact, the Incarnation accomplished not only a liberation from sin but also the exaltation of human nature and
the consummation of the whole universe. Hence, even if there
were no sin, these other causes would have motivated an Incarnation. And Thomas writes of this opinion: " This can also
probably be upheld."
Thomas recognizes that those who uphold the first opinion
speak of it as probable, and those who maintain the other opin1 ° For this discussion and the references, see Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super
libros. Sententiarum, III, distinction 1, question 1, article 3.

l:>ONALf> GOERGEN, 6.P.

ion can also sustain their view as probable. It appears as if
Thomas does not hold to either opinion himself, and is, then, not
so far from the stance of Albert.
All seven arguments in favor of the proposition that God
would have become incarnate even apart from the need for redemption are quite speculative. To each of these, Thomas replies that the argument is not conclusive.
For example, the fourth argument favors the opinion that
God would have become incarnate even apart from sin because
human nature is not expanded or enhanced as a result of sin.
Yet human nature was found in the Incarnation to be capable
of assumption into union with a divine person. Therefore it
must have been capable of being so assumed even prior to or
without sin. Moreover, God does not deny to the creature any
good which it is capable of receiving, and so he would have
assumed human nature even if man had not sinned. To this
Thomas replies by distinguishing the capabilities of a creature
as natural potencies from those which belong to our fundamental nature, to our obediential potencies which are not part
of our nature but which point to what God can still choose or
will. The capacity of human nature to he assumed into unity
with a divine person is not a natural but an obediential potency.
God does not deny any good which is in the order of a natural
potency, but the fulfillment of an obediential potency is different. God is not bound to fulfill obediential potencies, simply
because he is not bound to do everything that he can in fact do.
One notes here the emphasis on divine freedom so central to
Albert's theology.
Aquinas's four statements, however, which express the view
that God would not have become man apart from the need for
redemption are either biblical or patristic. The arguments rest
on Luke 19: 10, 1Tim.1: 15; and upon a union of Hebrews 2: 14
and Romans 5: 12; comments of Augustine as well as Gregory
the Great are used. 11 In the article's conclusion, Aquinas responds to these four statements, to all who maintain that there
11 Thomas's text in the Sentences links the Augustine's gloss to Matthew 18: 11,
but Luke 19: 10 (so identified in the Summa theol.) is meant.
'

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

588

would have been no Incarnation if there had been no sin; he
briefly states that these maintain that Christ came for ransom
or redemption (ad redimendum) and not simply, i.e., without
qualification (non simpliciter) .
We are led to conclude that Thomas has some sympathy for
the opinion that God became man £or the sake of redemption.
He does not express at this point an explicit preference for one
opinion or the other, and he is aware that either opinion can be
sustained as probable. Like Albert, he shows an awareness of
the tenuousness of the discussion. He is sensitive to theological
method, to the limits within which a theologian can speak, to
the theologian's dependency on Scripture in this issue. He is not
quick to eliminate a contrary opinion as simply unacceptable,
even when there are some biblical or patristic grounds for doing
so.
Yet Thomas is inclined in the direction of saying that, if there
had been no sin, there would have been no need for redemption,
and thus no Incarnation: (I) the very basis of his own responsio is that we can only speak on this question from what
has been revealed in Scripture; (2) the supports for this particular opinion are scriptural, whereas the supports for the other
opinion are speculative; (8) this opinion forms the bulk of his
response and comes first, whereas the other opinion is listed
second and described as also or likewise (etiam) probable; and
(4) he makes no effort to contradict this opinion, whereas he
replies to each of the seven arguments in favor of the opinion
that there still would have been an Incarnation.
Yet, although Thomas preferred one opinion, he acknowledges
the limits of either opinion, refrains from taking sides explicitly,
and allows the other to stand with almost equal probability.
Thomas was certainly aware that the direction his own inclination takes would lead to an opinion different from that of
Albert.

The Late Thomas: The Summa Theologiae
As we move from Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences to
his Summa theologiae, the opinion of Thomas becomes explicit

534

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

but no less careful. 12 The tertia pars of the Summa contains
Thomas's theology of the person of Christ. The very first ques'"
tion inquires 'de conV'enientia incarnationis.' Thomas recognizes, at least, a pedagogical importance attached to the question
of the " suitability " or " appropriateness " of the Incarnation.
This question is a prologue to the tertia pars, an introductory
preface before Thomas discusses the nature of the union itself.
Of the six articles in the first question, only the third article
concerns us, asking whether, if the human race had not sinned,
there would have been nonetheless an Incarnation.
Thomas begins his response by acknowledging that " there is
a difference of opinion on this matter." "Some say that even if
man had not sinned, the Son of God would have become incarnate. Others assert the contrary; and agreement with them
seems preferable." Here Thomas makes his preference explicit;
it is a preference, however, not a conclusive argument. His language does not reject the probable character of his earlier discussion. That the Son would not have become incarnate apart
from sin seems more likely, more probable. But why? That
which comes forth from the divine will is a mystery the reasons
for which cannot be known in and of themselves; they can only
be known if God chooses to reveal them, if they are contained
in Scripture.
It is Thomas's opinion (and was already so in his commentary on the Sentences) that in Scripture the sin of the first man
is given as the reason for the Incarnation. Thus " it is preferable
(convenientius dicitur) to hold that the work of the Incarnation is ordered by God as a remedy for sin, in such a way that, if
there had been no sin, there would have been no Incarnation."
Aquinas adds the qualification: " Divine power, of course, is not
limited to this, for God could have become incarnate even if
there had been no sin."
Again, as with Albert, it is important to distinguish what God
could have done, would have done, and what in fact he did do.
For Thomas, God in fact did become incarnate in order to save
us from the effects of sin. He could have, however, become in12

See ST, III, q. 1, a. 8.

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

535

carnate even if there had been no sin. The question then is
whether God would have become incarnate apart from sin. Here
Thomas maintains that we can only inquire into this question
on the basis of what Scripture says since there is no other way
of knowing.
Disagreement with Thomas would have to be on the basis of
Thomas's interpretation of Scripture or on his methodological
presuppositions (e.g., the divine will cannot be known unless
revealed; revelation is contained in Scripture). One might disagree with Thomas by arguing either (1) that Scripture itself
in other texts does not limit the effects of the Incarnation to
redemption, the removal of the effects of sin, or
that Scripture is speaking only about what God in fact did choose to do,
and not about what he might have chosen or would have done
if there had been no sin. Scripture would not in fact seem to
address the specific question of what God would have done.
Given the existential, historical, non-speculative character of
the Scriptures, one might well argue in this vein and conclude
with the early Aquinas that the other opinion is also probable
and fitting. Thomas Aquinas, however, understood Scripture to
say that God became man for salvation. In the Summa he does
not cite all the biblical references that he used in the Sentences.
The sed contra includes approvingly a comment of Augustine on
Luke 19: 10 and the Gloss on I Tim. I: 15. The Scriptures, Augustine, and the Gloss 18 help make his final opinion " more
probable." The weight Thomas grants Augustine and the Gloss
cannot be underestimated.
There are two other places where Thomas makes his preferred
opinion clear: in his Commentary on the First Epistle to Timothy and in his disputation, On Truth. 14
13 The Gloss is the
Glossa ordinaria of Anselm of Laon and his assistants,
working about 1100-1130, the standard medieval commentary on the Bible. B.
Smalley identifies Anselm himself as responsible for the Gloss on Paul, Gilbert
de Ia Porree, Anselm's pupil, and Peter Lombard were responsible for Anselm's
glosses becoming the standard, the Gloss; The Study of the Bible in the Middle
Ages (Notre Dame: University Press, pp. 46-66, pp. 60-66).
14 The writings on the
date from rn52-rn56. The first questions of
the tertia pars of the Summa are from 1272. The commentary on 1 Timothy

536

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

1 Timothy 1: 15 states, "The saying is sure and worthy of
full acceptance, that Christ Jesus came into the world to save
sinners." Thomas writes in his commentary on this epistle:
But if there had been no sinner, would he have become incarnate?
It seems not, because he came to save sinners. Therefore the Incarnation was not necessary. Thus the Gloss: take away the illness
and there will be no need of medicine.
I respond. From the words of the saints, this is clear enough.
But this question is not of great authority because God ordained
that things come about according as they are to come about. And
we do not know what he would have ordained if he had not had
foreknowledge of sin. Nevertheless authorities seem to say explicitly that he would not have become incarnate if man had not
sinned, toward which opinion I am more inclined. 15

As in the Summa, Thomas also makes his opinion explicit but
points out that this opinion is not authoritative. Thomas also
writes in the De V'eritate, "Christ's humanity is related differently to angels than to men ... with respect to the end of the
Incarnation, which was carried out principally for the sake of
man's liberation from sin; and so Christ's humanity is ordained
to the influence which he exercises upon men as the end intended, whereas his influence upon the angels is not the end of
the Incarnation but a consequence of the Incarnation." 16

A Final Perspective
Both Albert and Thomas are aware of the uncertain character
of both opinions. Both are aware of the theological and methodological issues involved. Their "opinions" are less far apart
than they seem to be when taken out of the context of discussion and theological method. Each would acknowledge his own
dates from the second Parisian regency,, 1269-1272. De veritate, question 29,
is dated during the third year of the first Parisian regency, 1258-1259. Thus
Thomas's opinion becomes explicit between 1256 and 1258. For the above datings,
see Weisheipl, Friar Thomas.
16 In Epistolam 1 ad Timotheum, lectio 4.
16 De veritate, q. 2:1, a. 4, ad 5.

THE MOTIVE OF THE INCARNATION

537

opinion as being more of a preference than a certain conclusion;
each would be open to the other opinion as probable.
In Albert's approach three points stand out. First, God could
have become incarnate even if there were no need for redemption from sin; supporting this is a theology of the freedom and
power of God. Second, we do not know whether God would
have become incarnate or not. Any opinion on this question
will be uncertain, for God's freedom is central to Albert's
Christology. Third, his own opinion on the second point above
is that the Son of God probably would have become incarnate
if there had been no sin, even though we cannot be certain of
this. Here he refers to the piety of faith.
Thomas represents an equally careful approach to the issue.
In his Commentary on the Sentences Thomas would agree with
the possibility apart from sin. With respect to the third point,
he does not make explicit an opinion one way or the other. He
is developing the methodological issues which lie underneath Albert's second point mentioned above. As Thomas insists that
either opinion can be maintained (and both are only probable)
he draws out the implication of Albert's emphasis on the freedom of God. That which depends on the will of God cannot be
known by us as to whether it would have taken place or not,
except through what has been revealed through Scripture.
Thomas implies that the reason for the Incarnation as found in
Scripture is that of redemption.
The Summa theologiae does not develop any new directions;
Thomas makes his implicit preference explicit. The
still uncertain, but now expressed as more probable because of
Scripture-is sin as the reason for the Incarnation. There could
have been an Incarnation, but, more probably, there would not
have been as far as we can judge from Scripture.
Does Aquinas go too far in the Summa? Do the Sentences
represent a view more consistent with his method? We can
recall that Scripture only gives the primary reason why God
did become incarnate and does not discuss other motives apart

538

DONALD GOERGEN,

O.P.

from sin. His method leaves us between divine freedom and
historical fact. The difference between Thomas and Albert is
that Thomas tends to see Scripture as more congruent with the
opinion that, if there had been no sin, there would not have been
an Incarnation. Albert sees the piety of faith as a support for
a creation-centered theology of the Incarnation, a view of incarnation in humanity and history with or without sin.
DONALD GOERGEN,

Aquinas Institute of Theology
Dubuque, Iowa

O.P.

ALBERT THE GREAT AND MARTIN LUTHER
ON JUSTIFICATION

O

NE RESULT of the ecumenical revolution which occurred in that remarkable decade, the 1960s, was the
appearance of a number of studies comparing Thomas
Aquinas and Martin Luther. Stephen Pfiirtner uncovered similarities between Luther's understanding of faith and Aquinas's
theology of hope. Harry McSorley displayed in Augustine,
Aquinas and Luther a triad of interpretations of free will, sinful
bondage and grace. H. Vorster's book on freedom in Aquinas
and Luther represented a Protestant contribution to this conversation between two of the great Western theologians. The
final position of consummate achievement belongs to Otto
Pesch's one thousand page study of justification in Aquinas and
Luther. 1
Some German reviewers of these books, sensitive to history
and historicity, pointed out the cultural and intellectual distance between Aquinas and Luther. As if in support of this gap,
McSorley and Pesch had shown that Luther had little if any
direct knowledge of Aquinas's writings. 2 Nonetheless, cultural
history and the question of comparing one thinker and his
1 S. Pfiirtner, Luther and Thomas on Sol,vation (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1965); H. McSorley, Luther, Right or Wrong (New York: Paulist, 1969); H. Vorster, Das Freheitsverstiindnis bei Thomas von Aquin und Martin Luther (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1965); O. Pesch, Die Theologie der Rechtfertigung bei Martin Luther und Thomas. von Aquin (Mainz: Griinewald, 1967);
C. Hennig, Cajetan und Luther (Stuttgart: Calwer, 1966). This enterprise began
with Y. Congar, "Luther," Vraie et fausse reforme dans l'eglise (Paris: Cerf,
1950), pp. 377ff. On the changing view of Luther in Catholic scholarship in general, cf. R. Stauffer, Luther as Seen by Cavholics (Richmond: John Knox, 1967).
2 Cf. McSorley, pp. 139f., and Pesch, "Existential
and Sapiential Theology. The
Theological Confrontation between Luther and Thomas Aquinas," Catholic Scholars
Diol,ogue with Luther (Chicago: Loyola, 1970), pp. 6lfl'.

539

540

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

Zeit.geist with another cannot be quickly dismissed. To select
thinkers from different ages and to claim that they easily or
clearly agree, or that they participate in some single, eternal,
transcendental truth is to deserve the critique of scholars and
the burial ·Of history itself. Weltgeschichte will be the Weltgericht of such an enterprise. If, however, we wish to understand why two thinkers from admittedly different cultural
worlds (such as the Parisian thirteenth and the German sixteenth centuries) do disagree, then our enterprise is legitimate.
For to compare two thinkers adequately and fairly is at the
same time to compare their cultural worlds and to see both the
similarities and differences therein. The following essay does
indeed abstract from the thought-forms of Luther and Albert,
which are quite different. We will look at the issue of justification, especially of justification within or apart from the activity
of the human personality of the one justified. Although truth
is not easily timeless, it is possible to examine how an Albert
and a Luther, an Augustine and a Biel maneuver within the
dialectic of the grace of an omnipotent God and the fallen freedom of a creature.
In counterposing Aquinas and Luther, scholars in the 1960s
were doing more than comparing two of the great figures in
Western Christian theology. They were doing more than composing the counterpoint of an ecumenical fugue. For Aquinas
and Luther are not only individuals: they formed the collective
consciousness of parts of Christianity. And this primal role belongs also to Aquinas's teacher, for not only is he a medieval
thinker of import but before Aquinas he gave the momentum
to the great thirteenth century.
The Roman Catholic has until recently thought almost exclusively out of an Aristotelian-Thomist framework; the catechisms of Catholicism since Trent are, in the main, simplified
scholasticism. The Lutheran family of the Reformation, however, thinks out of the framework of Paul and Augustine which
Luther vivified anew. For instance, for the Roman Catholic,
sin is a free, disoriented action contrary to the natural and

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

541

eschatological plan of God; for the Lutheran, sin is the human
condition, the prior and present ecology of our world before
God's wrath and word. Despite the recent decades of a theology of grace which is more biblical and more personal, the
Roman Catholic tends to imagine grace to be an intermediary,
dynamic entity with which God moves my will to do good; for
the Lutheran, grace is God's attitude towards me, merciful,
forgiving, just but loving. So, to compare Luther with Aquinas
was and remains worthwhile, for it has been the contrast not
only of men, but of churches, of theologies, of world-views. U.
Kuhn begins his comparison of Aquinas and Luther on law by
suggesting that not only is Aquinas typical of the Roman Catholic mentality, but that Baroque scholasticism must be passed
through so that in the real contributions and limits of medieval
theologians Lutherans as well as Catholics can find teachers. 3
This anniversary year of Albertus MUo<JTIUS offers the opportunity to build upon the studies of Aquinas and Luther; to go
a step further and see how Aquinas's mentor and confrere, Albert of Swabian Lauingen, addressed some of the theological
concerns and polemics of Luther in the area of justification.
Perhaps some further facets of the origin of the Reformation,
some further insights into the theology of grace and personality
will emerge as well as questions about the theological distance
between Lutherans and Roman Catholics today.
Justification is not simply one, interesting, ecumenical topic.
Luther said it was central to Christianity and Reformation. In
Aquinas and Albert, it is not given such importance in as far as
the content of their work is concerned. When Aquinas, however,
leaves the traditional model presented by Peter Lombard's Sentences and creates his own format for the Summa theologiae, a
dynamic series of processions and returns, one could argue that
grace is the vein of the entire structure; for both as the life of
the Trinity and as the life of the angels and human persons,
grace begun in justification is the rhythm of the entire system.
8 U. Kuhn, Via Caritatis. Theologie des Gesetzes bei Thomas von Aquin (Gottingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1965), p. 13; Pesch, "Existential .. .," p. 6fl.

542

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

Justification and grace remain important in Christian confession and life, for they concretize in a particularly sharp way the
mentalities of Lutherans and Catholics. The bilateral conversations between the two Christian families have resolved many
traditional differences. One could claim that only one theological topic remains to separate Lutherans and Catholics, remains
because it expresses the thought-form of these ecclesial families
and their theological tradition: that topic would be grace.
Albert the Great was the teacher of Thomas of Aquino. No
one in the thirteenth century was more responsible for the theological revolution of that age and for the church's eminently
successful dialogue with the new culture entering Europe at the
end of the twelfth century. Albert had taken as his professed
goal, on behalf of this new consciousness of the Gothic and
Christian West, to make" Aristotle intelligible to the Latins." 4
Not only Aristotle, but Neoplatonist theology, not only patristic
texts but botanical and geological samples interested Albert;
even more than Aquinas, he met and directed the polychrome
dynamics of the thirteenth century. As scholars have learned
more about the currents of Neoplatonism in the universities of
Paris, Oxford and Bologna, they have come to see that Thomas
Aquinas represents the crystallization of one of the currents
which Albert influenced; but there were others such as the Neoplatonism Albert found in Pseudo-Denys and passed on to his
student, Meister Eckhart. 5
4 In Physica, I, tr. 1, c. 1, Borgnet ed., vol. 8, p. 2.
•We are comparing Albert as a scholastic theologian, as an Aristotelian systematician, with Luther, the reforming theologian who wished to go back beyond
medieval systems to Augustine and Paul. There is, however, another theologian
who links Albert and Luther. Towards the end of his long life, Albert may have
taught a young Dominican from the Erfurt region, Eckhart of Hochheim. Although
this theologian of genius came to understand the new Aristotelianism of his times,
his sympathy lay with Neoplatonic streams. Like Aquinas, he was inspired by
Albert's commenting on Pseudo-Denys. Eckhart eventually occupied Aquinas's
chair in Paris shortly after 1800. His thought-a metaphysics of the spiritual
life--found its greatest expression not in the enormous summa of scriptural commentaries, scholastic questions and sermons which Eckhart planned, but in the brief
sermons preached in German. While Luther was against medieval scholastic
theology, he wrote enthusiastically about the books he knew which contained

ALBERT AND LUTlIER ON JUSTIFICATION

543

A study of Albert's theology of justification vis-a-vis Luther's
questioning of the medieval tradition will be of value not only
because it continues the comparison of Aquinas to Luther but
because it examines the theology of justification in another,
important, medieval thinker whose own synthesis of the currents of the thirteenth century was not quite the same as that
of Thomas Aquinas.

Luther's Critique
By 1517, Martin Luther, from his intense spiritual experience
and his theological studies, had come to the conclusion that
scholasticism as he knew it, the dominant school theology and
philosophy ·Of the authorities of his academic world, was injurious. Not only was it an obstacle to understanding the Bible,
especially Paul, but it falsified Augustine. Luther composed
ninety-seven theses for the disputation of one of his students.
The disputation was a requirement for attaining a bachelor's
degree in Scripture; on September 4, 1517, as dean of the faculty
of theology at Wittenberg, Luther presided over this disputation; the theses were printed in a collection of Luther's writings
as early as
This is, indeed, a series of " theses against scholasticism," for
at times the views of " all scholastics " are set aside. Particular
thinkers such as Scotus, Biel and Ockham are firmly rejected
while Augustine is liberated from their misinterpretations of
him. Moreover, a number of these theses are aimed at the very
Rhenish mystical writings whose pages, often anonymously, transmitted Eckhart.
" In Tauler, I have found more true theology than in all the university doctors
lumped together" (WA I, 557,!29). On Eckhart and Albert, cf. J. Koch, "Kritische
Studien zum Lehen Meister Eckharts," Archivum FFr. Praedicatorum !29 (1959),
lff.; on Eckhart and Luther, cf. H. Bornkamm, Eckhart und Luther (Stuttgart:
Kohlhammer, 1936).
6 H. Grimm's edition and translation
of this Disputation in Luther's Works 31
(Philadelphia: Muhlenburg, 1957), pp. 6ff. The wock Will be referred to in the
text by the number of the thesis. Cf. C. Stange, "Die iiltesten ethischen Disputationen Luthers," Quellenschriften zur Ges.chichte des Pratestantismus 1 (1904),
35ff.; On Luther's opposition to scholasticism, cf. R. Schwarz, Fides, spes und
caritas beim jungen Luther . . . mittelalterlichen Tradition (Berlin: de Gruyter,
1962); P. Vignaux, Luther, Oommentateur des Sentences (Paris: Vrin, 1935).

544

THOMAS F. o'MEARA,

O.P.

use of Aristotle; at the entire scholastic system founded upon his
logic, physics, ethics and metaphysics.
For our analysis of Albert we will keep in mind three aspects
of the theology of justification, markers on the battlefield where
previously Augustine and Pelagius had struggled. They are:
(1) the contribution of the fallen, human will to grace prior to
God's justification in Christ; (2) the issue of a contribution to
individual justification as summed up in the theological axiom,
facienti quod in se est, Deus non denegat gratiam, " to the one
who does what he can, God does not deny gTace "; (3) the
nature and existence of an active, human relationship to God's
justification and grace as expressed in the topic of merit. These
three areas are mentioned in the theses of Luther's disputation
against scholasticism.
(1) Luther begins this group of theses with a strong affirmation of the bondage of the human will, of its sole and necessary production of evil works. He does not distinguish between
the objective nature of this or that enterprise as neutral and
good, and the context and motivation of the fallen agent. Perhaps it was precisely this kind of scholastic distinction which
annoyed Luther who was struggling to recapture the radical
purity of God's justification. And so in the very first thesis he
denounces those who defend their theology by stating that
"Augustine exaggerates."
After a dozen theses, he moves to the dimension of religion
and salvation, and criticizes Scotus and Biel for saying that a
fallen person can love God " above all things." In good, I,utheran, existential manner, he asserts: "Man is by nature unable to want God to be God. Indeed, he himself wants to be
God." (#17) Whatever love of or friendship to God we have is
not by nature but according to " prevenient grace." (Biel, Luther adds, teaches the opposite.) "We do not become righteous
by doing righteous deeds, but having been made righteous we
do righteous deeds. This is in opposition to the philosophers."
(#40) Here Luther attacks directly the semi-pelagianism he
saw rampant in his time, a bargaining about grace and justification, a refinement of human activity which might induce merit

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

545

of grace. Luther's religious experience was such that any middle
ground between God's grace and glory, and fallen nature is
impossible and blasphemous. " The grace of God is never present in such a way that it is inactive, but it is a living, active and
operative spirit; nor can it happen through the absolute power
of God that an act of friendship may be present without the
presence of the grace of God." (#55) We can see that Luther
is attacking a theological nominalism which allows words such
as "merit," "disposition," "friendship" to have a reality and
meaning apart from first grace. He concludes (#68): "Therefore it is impossible to fulfill the law in any way without the
grace of God."
Our interest is not sanctification but justification, not the
entire life of Christians but their first contact with God's order
in Christ, the mysterious plan of salvation-history. Therefore
we can pass over the new theology which Luther offers for the
subsequent relationship of law and grace in the human psyche.
There is no other place where the distinction between Luther'.s
existential theology and the harmonious theology of the High
Middle Ages is more keenly obvious. That, however, is a question of Christian life after justification.
(2) Luther alludes to the axiom, facienti quad in se est,7 in
thesis twenty-six and joins it to another theological phrase " act
of friendship"; both can stand for a semi-pelagian accomplishment. Luther rejects both as positive actions, rejects them as
means for obtaining God's grace, or for "turning toward and
approaching God." Turning to the idea of removing obstacles
to grace, Luther rejects the belief that "doing all that one can
do is able to remove the obstacles to grace." (#33) There is no
preparation in us for grace; the sole and best preparation is
7 Gabriel Biel had written,
"Haec facienti deus gratiam suam tribuit necessario." (McSorley., p. ££7) . Luther complained that he did not want a "justificatiop.

which had been domesticated." Luther did not hesitate to refer to his opponents
as " Pelagians." " Although there are now no Pelagians by profession and title,
yet there are many people who in truth and thinking, albeit ignorantly, are Pelagians." Commentary on Romans (1516) Luther's Works, £5 (St. Louis: Concordia,
197£), p. 496.

546

THOMAS F. o'MEARA, O.P.

"the predestination of God." (#29); "On the part of man
nothing precedes grace except . . . rebellion against grace."
( #30) Not only has Luther rejected an active, semi-pelagian
approach towards God's justifying grace, he has replaced
that view, so congenial to every religious spirit, with his own
theology of conflict and paradox.
(3) In this collection of theses by the early Luther, the
Reformer does not discuss merit at length. 8 He does, however,
deny that any human action could merit first grace, could precede justification. "For an act to be meritorious, either the
presence of grace is sufficient, or its presence means nothing."
(#54) Luther is attacking the claim that justification or first
grace could be merited; if such were merited, grace shows itself
to be an empty word. Without grace, the will does not seek
grace but only self. ( #78) So, in 1517 Luther's psychological
theology of the moment when a person is radically accepted by
God challenges any middle, developmental, neutral view of religious law, of human effort. To do what the law commands,
regardless of what good thing it might command, is still to be
outside grace; one is blessed not because of a good work, but
because of God's grace which may produce good works and
must confront the law. (#79, 80)
Qur goal is not an exposition of Luther's early theology of
law, sin, justification and grace. These three points, raised in
a disputation aimed at the theological world regnant since the
time of Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, are mentioned
by every theology of justification. They are part of the controversies over grace which have flared up from Augustine to
Banez and Jansen. They are the domain of the semi-pelagianism which did flourish in university and shrine at the end of the
fifteenth century. Ultimately, this theology of Luther points to
the true (but not, humanly speaking, congenial) , Christian belief that entrance into the grace of God, which is the horizon of
a history of salvation rooted in Christ, comes without any positive merit or action on our part. Grace is grace; justifying grace
is grace before which there has been no grace.
8

In a subsequent disputation at Heidelberg, 1518, Luther rejects all merits.

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

547

Albertus Magnus' s Summa theologiae and Justifi()a,tion
We have chosen to look at the Summa theologiae to find
Albert's thought on justification. To peruse the entire Opera
of Albert would be an enterprise too vast, and, because of the
lack of critical texts, premature. No commentary on Romans
(a work which would suggest itself in any comparison with
Luther) survives. The Commentary on the Senten()es does not
offer a unified discussion of the topics which interest us, although we will note that in general it agrees with the somewhat
surprising theology of the Summa. The Summa follows the order of Peter Lombard's Sentenees. 9 Experts hold that this
summa was written after 1268 and they date the second part
after 1274. This means that the sections on justification which
interest us were written after Aquinas's Summa theologiae; indeed, perhaps after the younger Dominican's death. We are
aware of the recent questioning of this work. 10 If this system
is not by Albert, we have, nonetheless, a further comparison of
thirteenth-century scholasticism from Cologne and Paris with
Luther's theology.
H. Doms, in a rare monograph on this topic, concluded that
Albert's teaching on grace is essentially an interpretation of
Aristotelian philosophy in a Neoplatonic framework. A nature
seeks a finality and perfection for itself. Grace is the motive
principle within human nature which allows the movement of
the human person to a supernatural destiny. Grace is an efficient causality in the will as well as a formal causality and an
"ultima oompletio" 11 of nature. For Albert, justification is
a movement away from the rigid state of sin (whether original
9 " Prolegomena,"
Alherti Magni, Summa theologiae . . . Pars I (Miinster:
(Aschendorf, 1978), p. xvii; cf. 0. Lottin, "Commentaire des sentences et somme
theologique d' Albert le Grand," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 8
(1936)' 14011'.
10 Defending the authenticity is the introduction to the first volume of the critical
text; Ibid., pp. vff.
11 H. Doms, Die Gnademlehre des s. Albertus Magnus (Breslau: Miiller, 1929);
cf. F. Pangerl, "Die Reuelehre Alberts des Grossen " Zeitschrift fur katholische
Theologie 46 (1922), 8811'.

548

THOMAS F. o'MEARA,

O.P.

sin or habitual mortal sin) to the state of friendship, adoption
by God, a glorious and saving future destiny. If the poles of
this process are sin and God's active person, the dialectic also
takes place between created grace and limited free will. Consequently, in the moments of this movement of the personality
through rejection of sin to salvation by faith and infusion of
grace, we have the framework for investigating what comes
from God, and what is more uncertain, what comes from the
human personality.
Question I 04 of the Summa theologiae treats " justitia " in a
discursive description which moves from the etymology of a
civil virtue to that " general justice " which can only come from
God and which touches the entire personality in its being and
its actions (265) .12 Here and in the following question on
Pelagianism the author treats the theological issues surrounding
justification. Following the questions suggested by Luther, we
will look at three issues: the most basic one is the activity of
the human personality amid the presence and dynamic of what
faith and theology call justification; the second is the possibility
of human, preparatory action to
quod in se est;
the third is the question of merit, not of some grace but of the
first graced contact in justification.
(1) Albert states unequivocally that justification comes not
from us, " nor from any movement which is ours, but from God
alone who is the cause of virtue and grace in us" (269A). In
the world of grace there is nothing in us that is not from God
(9W6A) . The work of justification is compared to creation:
both can have only God as a cause, for they need a power infinite and divine (266B) . Not only is the activity of justification above us, but the being of pleasing God at all is above us.
Both realities, both esse,. are from God (272B) . Our free will
is not a cause of justification, not a formal or an efficient one;
but, " the motion of our free will unto God and in abhorrence
of sin is not demanded except as not placing an obstacle to the
Holy Spirit" (269B) .
12 Summa theologiae, II Pars, tract 16, pp. 104, 105, vol. SO (Paris: Vives, 1895).
References will remain in the teirt, noting column as well as page.

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

549

What is the justification of which Albert is speaking? Who
is the subject of God's justification? Albert lived in a society
which was not only completely Christian but where almost
everyone was baptized in infancy. Albert is describing a process
effected by baptism in an infant. Because the child lacks the
psychological maturity to respond fully to the sacrament, the
medieval process of justification is a theological and ontological
process which in dawning consciousness becomes a psychological
emergence of the life given by baptismal justification. Albert's
examples, however, show that often he is not thinking of the
grace given in baptism, but of the escape of an adult from the
bondage of mortal sin where the grace of justification and baptism has been freely rejected by serious, habitual evil actions.
There the drama of justification gains color and movement, and
the discussion of merit, disposition, passivity and God's action
becomes alive. 0£ course, this theology of justification is related to Albert's understanding of the action of sacraments, not
only baptism but penance.
(2) A mention of our will not placing an obstacle leads us
into more delicate areas. Albert, commenting on the issue of
the ordinary person avoiding sin, says: For a person can avoid
sin once he has accepted grace, which a person is always able
to have, if he does what is in him. It is not clear that Albert
is speaking of a disposition of facienti quod in se est, a formal,
naturally good, action, prior to justification. For the issue is
ordinary freedom from sin, and Albert has just said that this
comes from " accepta gratia." So, the theological issue in the
text may well be that God will grant further grace to the faithful Christian who needs it-a Pauline doctrine.
While touching on human activity prior to justification, we
should observe that Albert says that God has prepared "this
grace" for all and he cites James 1: 5. He goes on to use our
key phrase. " For he who does what is in him, by showing himself to God, immediately receives grace from God." (272A) But
again, the issue here is keeping commandments to merit eternal
life, not first grace. Shortly before, Albert had argued that a
person by his own powers cannot live virtuously without op-

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THOMAS F. o'MEARA,

O.P.

erating and cooperating grace, and that only God is a formal or
efficient cause of grace. So this display of a person in the state
of sin to God would not be a cause of grace, and Albert
perhaps excludes passive disposition from being true causality.
(3) Generally in this work, merit is discussed not as connected with justification or grace but with keeping the commandments during the life of a Christian. This is, perhaps, a
warning that Albert's theology of merit is developed in the
context of a person after justification, not before. "Pelagius,
himself deceived, has erred, placing the perfection of holiness
and justification in the human person, something which is in
God alone as its cause, as we have said; although in the human
person there might be something by which he is disposed to
justification ex congruo, non ex condigno" (270B) . The mention of perfection of holiness and the absence of the word merit
are significant, but the mention of justification linked to a disposition ex congruo is clear. This text along with others struggles with the issue of a disposition prior to justification. As we
saw, Albert had wrestled with such a disposition, such a moment in the process of conversion towards grace, in the passive
lack of adhering to any "obstaculum" (269B) to grace.
The various threads of semi-pelagianism err by placing in the
human personality prior to justification an unqualifiedly positive motion towards or merit of grace. The mention in the
above text of ex congruo and a disposition places Albert in the
midst of what later historians called the "neo-semi-pelagianism" of the thirteenth century. A. Harnack concluded, as did
another Protestant historian of dogma, F. Loofs, that Albert
agreed with the thinking of the Franciscans, Alexander of Hales
and Bonaventure, and that all held for some kind of self-movement ex congruo prior to justification. 13 Later we will see that
Aquinas avoided the ambiguity we find in Albert's passages by
eliminating without qualification any mention of merit prior to
justification. Did Albert hold that prior to justification there
13 Harnack
is discussed at length in Doms, pp.
F. Loofs, Leitfaden zum
Studium der Dogmengeschichte (1889) (Tiibingen: Niemeyer, 1948), p. 451.

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

551

can be in the human personality a positive movement towards
first grace? As we will see from later texts, it seems that Albert's discussion of the absence of an obstacle, this something
prior to justification, is not intended to initiate justification,
and that for Albert a disposition ex congruo is not merit. Albert
writes that justification finds its completion in "opera meritoria" (269A) . Even though a certain balance exists in the
powers of the human personality, these" do not have the power
of meriting or justifying ... , and so justification and merit are
more attributed to faith and charity than to other virtues."
(269B) Albert concludes his treatment of justification with
lines from Augustine.
It is true (that the being by which we work good is from God)
that the same rule is operative for both (willing and doing). Both
are his, for he prepares the will, and both are ours, for nothing happens unless we will it." (£78B) 14

Even more significantly, earlier in this summa Albert had written: " Catholic faith holds that no merit precedes grace, for
otherwise grace would not be grace." 15
Although we have chosen to limit ourselves to Albert's Summa theologiae, it would not be amiss to select a few of the texts
scattered throughout the certainly authentic commentary on
Lombard to note their general correspondence to the directions
present in the later work. They represent the same dialectic
between sovereign grace and human disposition but the tension
is articulated somewhat more clearly.
Albert follows Peter Lombard in describing the disposition
of someone in the state of sin towards not placing an obstacle
to grace; it could be called merit improperly speaking.
Someone is said to merit by good deeds done in the state of mortal
sin. He cannot merit as something due him, but still the Masters
say that he merits grace de congruo. It would seem more correct to
say that he merits grace de minus incongruo inasmuch as he dis14 The quotation from Augustine is from the Retractationes I, ch.
in parentheses are not found in the critical text.
15 I. Pars, tr. 16, q. 68, a. 1, p. 648

The words

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THOMAS F. O'MEARA,

O.P.

poses himself to grace through the works he does more than another
who lacks such works.16
Albert goes on to mention merit of a proper kind. There are
different perspectives of looking at grace, love and " the alien
merits of Christ " as they are active in a particular life. The
master of scholasticism goes on to distinguish five different ways
o.f looking at the Christian life, at merit and the graced sources
of merit.
Doms's study on Albert's theology of grace located its foundation not in justification or meritorious Christian life but in
predestination, and he may well be correct in his analysis. When
we turn to Albert's discussion of predestination in the Sentences
we find both a forcefulness on the side of God's sovereign activiity, and a kind of solution to the relationship of prior human
activity to first grace.
In the solutio Albert states:
Predestination does not fall under merit, neither as its proper effect
nor in se. For its proper effect is grace given in praesenti finalis,
and before first grace there is no grace by which anyone could merit
anything. The increase of grace can be merited-but this is not the
essential effect of predestination.
Then, a few paragraphs later, Albert writes:
Although a person can work something towards having grace, he
cannot be the cause of grace. A human work is only like a disposing cause in the subject, which disposition is not sufficient of itself
to take away the contrary act, although it might habilitate (habilitet) towards good through good acts; so it is not the cause, but
God alone.17

In these lines we reach the greatest clarity in Albert's solution
of the relationship of incipient human turning to what is of God
and the sovereign activity of God which is grace, and we find
this clarity in the Commentary on the Sentences. These texts
seem to express clearly the underlying problem for Albert's
theology of justification, the ambiguity and dialectic we felt in
1•

17

In III Sent., d. 18, a. I.
In I Sent., d. 41, a. ad

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

558

the columns of the Summa theologiae. The Dominican theologian has no desire to counter the Augustinian theology of the
bondage wrought by original sin, and the gratuitous supranature of grace. As a realist, an empiricist, however, Albert
must take into account the actions of the human personality.
Following a kind of theological common sense, he wishes simply
to defend the preferability, even prior to justification, of contrition, of a movement away from habitual sin, of new faith.
Nevertheless, even as he names these a disposition, he refuses
to let them merit, strictly speaking, first grace, or to lead directly to actions which only the Holy Spirit can perform.

The Summa theologiae of Thomas Aquinas
While Albert lived over eighty years, his brilliant student,
Thomas, lived to be only forty-nine. Albert lived decades before Aquinas and some years after him. As a young professor,
Aquinas commented upon the Sentences of Lombard. Scholars
have seen a suggestion of semi-pelagianism in some passages.
"To have grace a person can prepare himself by free will alone;
by doing what is in himself grace is reached." 18 H. Rouillard
concluded that Aquinas in his early writings was ignorant of
the existence of semi-pelagianism, and of the church documents
resulting from that post-Augustinian controversy. This was
true of Lombard, the Franciscans and Albert; the last records of
the knowledge among theological writings of semi-pelagianism
come from the ninth century.
Albert, Thomas in his youth ... neo-semi-pelagian? This seems to
be too severe. There is no orthodox theologian in the middle ages
who did not hold the necessity of grace and its primacy in the world
of salvation. Ignorant without exception of semi-pelagianism, they
did not always express themselves on the subject of the preparation
of grace with exactitude and precision ... Theology is bound to the
times, to history, both to its risks and to its progress. 19

J. A. Weisheipl dates the part of the Summa theologiae in which
Aquinas treats grace as coming from 1269. Prior to that, at the
18
19

In II Sent., d. !?8, a. 1, a. 4.
H. Bouillard, Conversion et grace (Paris: Aubier, 1941), pp. 223, 95, 63.

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THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

papal court Aquinas had apparently come across historical records of semi-pelagianism. 20 In the questions of the final Summa
on grace we have a clear, thoroughly Augustinian theology or
justification, and not only is the advent and causality of God's
grace analyzed, but the secondary theology of merit and the
slogan, f acienti quod in se est, are treated.
(1) Thomas Aquinas frequently and deftly deals with the
nature of finite beings and he tends to isolate them from history
and individuality. Even in his theology of the Judaeo-Christian
tradition, he will at times, for the sake of clarity, abstract from
sin and salvation-history. Knowing that he is discussing an
abstraction, he will speak of " human nature," or of " intact
nature," humanity before primal sin. To emphasize the need
for grace, he begins his treatise on it in the Summa with the
forceful assertion that in any state the human person needs
God's grace to live in the realm set up by God, namely that of
a vocation and destiny above nature. Aquinas always places
grace in the analogical framework of life; and, for an Aristotelian, life is a principle which displays itself in acts. The activities
of God's plan for us, whether those of faith and mercy, or the
joy of the next life, are above the psychological equipment of a
created human being. They particularly exceed the potentiality
of a fallen creature; they exceed the humanity of that happy
pair in Eden. Aquinas concludes that not only does the human
person need God's grace as the principle of all activity in the
order of salvation, but, because of sin, God's grace is necessary
for a full, natural life. In light of this need by sinful humanity
for grace to live out human life integrally, there can be, of
course, no question of the endless necessity of grace for justification.
For Aquinas, justification is a process, a movement from a
state of sin to a new life tending to eternal glory; the principle
of that human movement must be of the same order as its goal,
God.
20 Edward Schillebeeckx, Revelation and Theology, Vol. II, transl. N. D. Smith
(N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1968), p. 85.

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

555

God moves all things according to the mode proper to each.... And
so, the motion from God towards justice does not take place without a movement of free choice in someone who can exercise free
choice; but he infuses the gift of justifying grace in such a way that
at the same time he also moves the free choice to accept the gift
of grace (113,3) .2 1
(2) Aquinas concludes, because o:f his model o:f proportion
between potency and its act, between a life and its :fulfillment,
that any preparation for grace is itself a grace. "To prepare
oneself for grace is a kind o:f turning to God ... , and so it is
clear that one cannot prepare himself to receive the light of
grace except by the gratuitous assistance of God moving within
him." (109, 6) An objection to this conclusion introduces the
theological adage, "faciendo quad in se est." Aquinas responds:
" The human being can do nothing unless moved by God, as
John says: 'Without me you can do nothing' (15: 5). And so,
when someone is said to do what lies within him, this is said to
lie within the power of a person as moved by God." (109,
6ad2) . There is in Aquinas no middle area, no place where free
will melds into grace, nor is there the trap of a movement backwards through a quasi-infinite string of acts preparing for justification. Because of the distinction between natural and supernatural orders, because of the motif of Aristotelian psychology,
Aquinas's lucid logic terminates the discussion quickly. Whatever we may detect as a preparation for grace, that is grace.
If we speak of grace in the sense of the assistance of God moving

one towards the good, no preparation, as it were anticipating the
divine assistance, is required on our part; rather, whatever preparation there might be in one derives from the assistance of God moving the soul towards good. In this sense, the good movement of
free choice itself, by which a person prepares to receive the gift of
grace, is the action of a free will moved by God
.
Later on Aquinas devoted an article to the axiom, " f acienti
quad in se est." Discouraging any semi-pelagian interpretation,
he recalls the image from Jeremiah that man is clay in the hand
o:f the potter. Whatever preparation there is for justification
01

Translations from the Latin text are mine; all references are to the I-II.

556

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

comes from God, and whatever movement within free will is
from free choice as moved by God. Aquinas offers some radical
conclusions which are reminiscent of Luther's link of justification to predestination.
If it is by the intention of God as mover that the person whose

heart he moves should obtain grace, that person obtains it infallibly;
as John says,' Everyone who has heard and learned from the Father
comes to me.' " (112,3)

Aquinas repeats the principle which he applies to every preparation for grace: if there is an action preparing for grace, that
action is also grace. In an observation important for our study
of the Albertine Summa, he looks at gra.ce from the perspective
of the Aristotelian causes. The formal and efficient cause of
grace is God; as to the material cause, Aquinas writes: " In the
physical world the disposition of matter does not necessarily
achieve the form except by the power of the agent." (112,3,3)
So Aquinas too at least alludes to the disposition of the personality not turned against justification.
(3) Aquinas discusses merit in terms of God crowning his
own work of justification and grace. Directly-and more than
once-Aquinas rejects <any merit of first grace or of justification. "No one in the state of sin can merit eternal life without
first being reconciled to God . . ., and this takes place through
grace .... No one can merit first grace for himself" (114, 2&5).
There is no question in the mature Aquinas of any merit of
first grace.
What is discussed is the logic and nature of merit in the ongoing life of the Christian. M entum is not a creation of medieval theology; for the thirteenth century, it was a widely accepted theological by-product of the traditional and broad
discussions of grace and human will. " Our merit," Aquinas
observes dryly," is a secondary cause of re·aching eternal life-a causa subsequens." (114,3,2) There are passages in the New
Testament which suggest a religious framework of merit within
the order of grace; Augustine accepted merit with qualification.
The terminology of one of the branches of the medieval cate-

ALBERT AND LU'.l.'HER ON JUSTIFICATION

557

gorization of merit comes from the Vulgate text of Romans,
8: 18: "Non sunt condignae ... The sufferings of this present
time are not worthy .... "
Having rejected every claim of an active freedom beyond
sin and within salvation as well as having firmly dismissed any
merit of justification and any interpretation of faoienti quod
in se est outside of grace, Aquinas asks whether a person constituted in the life of grace can merit eternal life. His answer
is interesting not because he would accept merit de congruoas a fitting, graced completion of what grace has begun-but
because he allows from one perspective condign merit, a merit
claiming some real proportion between act and reward. Aquinas
returns to his principle that there must be a correspondence
between a principle of activity and its actions, between a source
of life and the kind of life which flows from it. Looking at the
life of grace from the point of view of the human psyche, there
is no equality between even the life of grace and the glory to
come. But, from the perspective of the presence of the Spirit,
who justifies, sustains and completes salvation in an individual,
there is a kind of proportion between these different moments
in a man's or woman's story of salvation. Aquinas cites Ephesians and recalls that the Spirit coming in baptism is a " pledge
of our inheritance" (1: 14) to come. As Otto Pesch concludes:
" There is human merit with God only on the basis of a divine
attempt that what the human being in his activity, born by
God's power, attains, should have the character of a reward ....
' Merit ' is the word for a particular way of reaching the goal
of activity. " 22

Conclusions
(1) The Lutheran Critique: Semi-Pelagianism. The brevity
and lucidity of the Angelic Dotor may have distracted us from
22 0. Pesch, Die Theologie .. ., pp. 775f. "Out of fidelity to himself, God gives
to the human being a reward to his action without any claim upon it." Ibid., p. 782.
On the theology of merit, cf. J. Riviere, "Mfrite.," Dwtionnaire de theologie catholique 10: 1 (Paris: Letouzey et Ane, 1928), 574-785; "Quelques antececedents
patristiques de la formule, Facienti quod in se est," Revue des sciences rdigieuses 7
(1927) 98ff.

558

THOMAS F. O'MEARA, O.P.

our purpose, the examination of justification in a summa of
theology attributed to Albertus Magnus and a study of justification in a medieval theology from the point of view of the
concerns of Martin Luther in 1517. The issues of the role of
the human and the divine in justification, of merit, led us to
the remarkable struggle of Albert to be both Augustinian and
Aristotelian, to the ambiguity of his language in terms of first
grace and merit de congruo.
Since Albert and others did not know of the semi-pelagian
controversies, their terminology in the area of human personality vis-a-vis justification is ambiguous and dialectical. A
sympathetic reading of the full context of Albert's theology of
grace would lead to a different evaluation than the extraction
of one or two passages which might, arguably, imply a merit
de congruo of justification, something his pupil, Aquinas, rejects. But in the affirmation of the unique causal role of God
in grace, and in the conscious downplaying of human contribution, Albert can hardly be given a label of which he knew little
and tried to avoid.
Thirteenth-Century Theologies of Grace. The question
of the attribution of this work to Albert belongs to the patient
work of textual critics. The above discussion may lead to a
questioning of the authenticity of the Summa,. since it presents
a theology of justification which, in comparison to Aquinas, is
diffuse and unresolved. We recall that this work is dated after
Aquinas's death. There is an imprecision, a lack of resolution
in the treatment of grace and the human personality, an uncritical acceptance of approaches from Peter Lombard and
Alexander of Hales. This might mean that this work, in terms
of its theology of grace, belongs to the earlier world of giants
such as Bonaventure who also did not reach the historical
knowledge and strong precision of Aquinas on justification and
merit. Precisely these characteristics, however, of a world prior
to Thomas Aquinas might argue for its Albertine authorship.
If the work is by Albert, then it raises problems of Albert's
care in and proximity to its composition; and it suggests some

ALBERT AND LUTHER ON JUSTIFICATION

559

distance between Albert and the final works of Aquinas. As

J. Riviere suggested fifty years ago, it is paradoxical that the
Franciscans, famed for their attention to Augustine, struggled
to express the role of the fallen psyche even in justification,
while Thomas Aquinas, the theologian of Aristotelian psychology, did not hesitate to sweep away any real human contribution to first grace. 23
Nevertheless, there can be no question of Albertus Magnus
belonging to the various pelagianisms of the late medieval
period. Albert's theology was hampered by a lack of knowledge
of the past; he was unaware of the further nuances in the subsequent history of the theology of grace after Augustine and
Pelagius. As a thinker of the High Middle Ages he represented
the same dialectic between the sovereign dynamic presence of
the Trinity and the active structure of the human psyche which
his pupil, Aquinas, developed so beautifully. While Scotus led
towards the late medieval theology which Luther abhorred and
rejected as typical of all theology after Bernard of Clairvaux,
Albert the Great led to Thomas Aquinas, who carefully and
forcefully excised all pelagianism from his final summa. As
Pesch and others have shown so well, the difference between
Luther and Aquinas in the theology of justification is not over
principles but over the form of their thinking. Finally, ecumenical agreement on the issue of justification points to theological
difference not there but in the conceptual framework of how
grace interacts with the human personality throughout the
Christian's life.
THOMAS

F. O'MEARA,

O.P.

Washington, D. C.

23 "

641.

S. Thomas et le merite de congruo," Revue des sciences religieuses 7 (19i7)

THE SIGNIFICANCE OF ALBERT THE GREAT'S VIEW
OF SACRAMENT WITHIN MEDIEVAL
SACRAMENTAL THEOLOGY

'TI

HE SEVENTH CENTENARY of the death of Alert the Great offers us the opportunity to recognize
new his outstanding achievements as a natural scientist, philosopher and theologian. This article focuses precisely
upon Albert as theologian, as a theologian of the sacramental
life of the Church. We will look at his vision of the sacraments,
and at its place and significance within the history of sacramental theology. To understand Albert's contribution we will
first survey sacramental understanding previous to him and
contemporary with him, and then we will look at Albert's
theology as contained in his Summa de Sacramentis.

St. Augustine's Sacramental Theology
The common term used by the Greek-speaking Christians
of the early Church to designate their sacred rites and ceremonies, especially those associated with baptism and the eucharist was mysterion. 1 Latin-speaking Christians beginning with
Tertullian used the term sacramentum to express the same
reality and continued as well to employ mysterium as the
Latin equivafont of the Greek mysterion. Among the Latin
Fathers of third and fourth centuries the terms sacramentum
and mysterium were used interchangeably although each had
his preferred expression for the sacraments of the Church.
The reality of the sacramentum or mysterium is twofold,
the visible and sensible part of the rite which constitutes the
symbol and the invisible and spiritual effect which is indicated
1 II. M. Feret, " 'Sacramentum,
res ' dans la langue theologique de S. Augustin,"
Revue des sciences philosophiques et theofogiques, 29 (1940), 219.

560

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

561

by the symbol. One of Augustine's lasting contributions to
sacramental theology was to distinguish these two elements of
the ordinances of the Church: " Today we receive visible food,
but the sacrament (sacramentum) is one reality, the virtue
of the sacrament (virtus sacramenti) another reality. " 2
Augustine's writings present two meanings for the worci
"sacrament": the first is general and applies to any kind of
sign that signifies spiritual reality; the second is specific and
pertains to the religious rites of the Old and the New Testament.3 With regard to the first usage, since he operated within
a Platonic world view where all phenomena reflect the noumena, Augustine believed that any object or event could be
sacramental, that is, a sign of an inner reality. 4
Augustine defines sacrament in the specific sense: " But
there is a sacrament in any celebration when the commemoration of the event is so accomplished that it is understood to
signify what must be received worthily." 5 In continuity with
the tradition of the Latin Fathers, Augustine uses the term
sacramentum and mysterium interchangeably. 6 In the Augustinian view of sacramental reality, it is Christ who binds together both the general and the specific notions of sacrament
whether the term mysterium or the term sacramentum is employed.
What is the relationship between the sacramentum, the visible sign, and the virtus sacramenti,. the spiritual effect? How
does the sign become a life-giving reality wherein Christ is
operative? In Augustine's theology the material elements, such
as water in bavtism, become a sacrament when the sanctifying
words of consecration are pronounced:
•In Evange!lium Joannis tractatiis. 26, II. PL 85: 1611. Franciscus Moriones,
Enchiridion Theologicum Sancti Augustini (Madrid: La Editorial Cat6lica, 1961),
n. 1911. Hereafter cited as Moriones.
3 P. Pourrat,
Theology of the Sacraments, trans. from the Third French Edition
(St. Louis: Herder, 1941), pp. 22-28.
4 M. D. Chenu, Nature, Man and Society in the Twelfth
Century, trans. by
Jerome Taylor and Lester K. Little (Chicago: University of Chicago, 1968), p. 120.
5 Ep. 55, I, 2. PL 88: 205; Moriones, n. 1921.
• C. Couturier, "' Sacramentum' et 'Mysterium' dans I' oeuvre de Saint Augustin," Etudes Augustmiennes (Paris: Montaigne, 1958), p. 267.

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

What is the baptism of Christ? A washing with water in the word.
Take away the water, there is no baptism. Take away the word,
there is no baptism. 7
Take away the word, and what is the water but only water. When
the word comes to the element, it becomes a sacrament,, a visible
word.8

The sacraments as the union of material elements and consecratory words are the work of Christ: " The Lord himself
and apostolic tradition have transmitted a few observances,
instead of many, and these are very easy to fulfill, very venerable in their meaning and most sublime in practice. Examples
of these are the sacrament of baptism and the celebration of
the Body and Blood of the Lord. " 9 The Lord chose elements
such as water, bread and wine whose natural properties and
effects upon human beings such as cleansing and nourishment
would indicate the kind of effect (virtus) that the sacrament
worthily received would produce within the individual person:
"If sacraments did not have a resemblance to the things of
which they are sacraments, they would not be sacraments
at all." 10 Hence when the ministers of the Church pronounce
the words of blessing over the natural elements of water, bread
and wine, they become sacramental realities signifying the
actualized presence of the life-giving Lord: " The sacraments
take their names from the mysteries which they represent. " 11
We should note carefully that the bishop of Hippo distinguishes between the res sacramenti and the virtus sacramenti:
the res is the reality symbolized by the sacrament while the
virtus is the effect produced by the presence of the symbolized
reality. 12 By the res Augustine means the presence of Christ
vivifying believers through one of the mysteries of salvation. 13
In lo. Ev. tr. 15, 4. PL 85: 1512 Moriones, n. 1984.
In Io. Ev. tr. 80, 8. PL 85: 1840. Moriones, n. 1915.
•De doctrina Christiana III, 18, The Fathers of the Church, Vol.
Fathers of the Church, Inc., 1947) , p. ms.
10 Ep. 98, 9. PL 88:.864. Moriones, n. 1912.
11 lbid.
12 Feret, "Sacramentum,"
p.
1 " lbid., pp.
and fl40. Cf. PL 85:1612 and PL 88:874.
7

8

(New York:

ALBERT'S VIEW OF SACRAMENT

563

Hence the sacrament (sacramentum) does not directly signify
grace (virtus) but some mystery of the life of Christ (res)
such as his baptism or his death and resurrection which is the
source of a particular grace such as the regeneration of baptism or the spiritual growth of eucharist. 14 In receiving a sacrament the properly disposed person receives the grace flowing
from the mystery signified by the sacrament.
Augustine believed that the graces given in the sacraments
were spiritual remedies for healing the wounds inflicted upon
human nature by original and actual sin. 15 Hence the virtus
of each sacrament brings believers the healing power of Christ.
N. M. Haring has re-emphasized the importance of the Augustinian notion of the sacrament as a lasting consecration in the
recipient because it helps us to understand the dynamic aspect
of the great doctor's concept of the sacramental character. 16

M ajar Developments in Sacramental Theology from St.
Augustine to the Twelfth Century
In this section we shall consider briefly the major developments in sacramental theology after Augustine represented by
pseudo-Denis, St. Isidore of Seville, and the eucharistic controversy of the eleventh century as they influenced the outlook
of Hugh of St. Victor and his contemporaries. Sacraments
within the Augustinian perspective are the remedies for a
fallen world, and if men and women had not chosen to sin,
there would have been no need for the healing reality of the
sacraments. However, because of the darkness which sin has
brought to human understanding, men and women need signs
(signa or sacramenta) which will manifest their true nature
and the spiritual world.
14 James Cunningham, "The Sacramental Theology of Hugh of St. Victor" (unpublished S. T. D. dissertation, Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1963),
p. 263.
15 Bernard Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology (Westminster:
Newman,

1955)' p. 103.
1 • N. M. Haring, "The Augustinian Axiom: 'Nulli Sacramento Injuria Facienda
Est,'" Medieval Studies, 16 (1954), 93.

564

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

In contrast to the Augustinian view of the sacraments as
signs given to fallen mankind of God's healing love in Christ
and calling for human cooperation through faith in the celebration of the sacred rites of the New Testament, stands the
pseudo-Dionysian understanding of the nature of sacramental
reality. Pseudo-Denis does not use the word signum for the
sacraments but the term symbolon. 11 The difference in terminology reflects a profound difference in spiritual outlook. For
pseudo-Denis the need for symbolic action does not result from
the fallen condition of human understanding but constitutes
the normal way in which human beings participate in knowledge within a cosmos which reaches upward in hierarchical
stages. Creation itself is necessarily sacramental since it is the
phenomenal theophany or symbolon of the noumenal world.
The sacraments were seen as symbols which " brought about
the purification, the illumination, and the perfection of man
and so consummated the divine existence in man.
The next major development within sacramental theology
was the work of Isidore of Seville. We have seen the importance
which Augustine attached to the symbolic aspect of the liturgical rites emphasizing that the sacraments are signs of spiritual
reality which offer grace to the individual. The bishop of
Hippo clearly distinguished the sacramentum, the res and the
virtus. In the sacramental theology of Isidore of Seville these
important distinctions are overlooked. In his Etymologiae he
writes as follows of the sacraments:
But there is a sacrament in any celebration when the commemoration of the event (res gesta) is so accomplished that it is understood
to signify what must be received worthily. Baptism, chrism and
the body and blood of the Lord are sacraments.
And they are called sacraments because beneath the covering of
bodily things the divine power (virtus) secretly produces the salvation contained within these sacraments, whence they are names
because of their secret or sacred powers (virtutibus).
17
18

Chenu, Nature, Man and Society, p.
Ibid., p. rn4.

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

565

They became fruitful when received within the Church, because
the Holy Spirit abiding in her produces the effects of the sacraments
in a hidden manner.19
Damien van den Eynde, reflecting on the difference between
Augustine's and Isidore's outlook, offers the following observations:
For both the eucharist consists without doubt in the consecrated
bread and wine. But while St. Augustine contrasts these elements
to· the body of Christ as the sign to the thing signified, St. Isidore
identifies them with the body and blood of the Lord. For Augustine
the body of Christ is the res sacramenti; for Isidore it is the sacramentum itse1f.2 0
Isidore's explanation of the sacrament wherein the body and
blood of Christ are not only the res but the sacramentum is
clear in the paragraphs from the Etymologiae.
He cites the Augustinian definition of the sacraments which
we have noted above. However, for the bishop of Hippo the res
is signified by the sacramentum while for the bishop of Seville
the res is equated with the sacramentum. This interpretation
of the text is possible within Isidore's sacramentology because
the elements of bread and wine are not signs but coverings
which conceal the res. The Holy Spirit uses this hidden res
to produce spiritual effects (virtus) . The sign dimension so
important for Augustine has been completely obscured. Instead
of signifying and conveying the spiritual presence of the mysteries of Christ's life and the healing power which flows from
them, the sacraments are seen as the mysteries themselves
hidden under the veil of the elements and possessing secret
powers.
Berengar of Tours (999-1088) stands with Lanfranc and
Anselm at the beginning of that creative period in Western
thought which began in the eleventh century with the rediscovery of the significance of dialectics in theological endeavor.
This is Berengar's theological definition of the sacraments:
PL 82: 255.
Damien van den Eynde, "Les definitions des sacrements pendant la premiere
periode de la theologie scholastique (1050-lil35) ," Antonianum, 24 (1949), 186.
19

20

566

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

Berengarius's idea of sacrament is totally oriented towards Augustine. In his response to Adelmann, Berengarius gives us no fewer
than six definitions of a sacrament according to Augustine:
1) From the De civit. Dei V, 5: a sacrament is a sacred sign
(sacrum signum) .
2) In a certain letter: a sacrament is the visible form (visibilis
forma) of invisible grace (invisibilis gratiae).
3) In the book De catchiz. rudib.: a sacrament is the visible sign
(signaculum visibile) of an invisible divine reality (invisibilis
divinae rei) .
4) In the book De paenitentia: a sacrament is a sign (signaculum)
of a divine mystery.
5) In the book Contra Faustum: corporeal sacraments are holy and
visible words.
6) In the book De civit. Dei: visible sacrifices are signs (signa) of
invisible realities as words are signs of things. 21

Among these six definitions, Berengar chose to utilize the second in his argumentation. The inexactness of the reference
" in a certain letter " as contrasted with the specific citations
of the other definitions is significant. Although the spirit of
the definition is certainly Augustinian, the formulation as given
comes from Berengar and not Augustine. 22
Berengar explained that forma meant " visible appearance "
or" that which falls under the senses." 23 Claiming Augustinian
authority for the definition, the teacher of Tours applied it to
the eucharist and maintained that the consecrated bread and
wine are not physically the body and blood of Christ but only
symbols of the invisible body and blood of Christ. In contrast
to Isidore of Seville who saw the sacraments as veils concealing
the res, Berengar believed that the sacraments do not contain
the res but only signify the presence of the res to the believer. 24
21 Josef Geiselmann, Die Eucharistielehre der Vorscholas.tik (Paderborn: Schoningh,
1926)' pp. 298-294.
22 J. de Ghellinck, " Un chapitre dans l'histoire
de la definition des sacrements
au XIIe siecle," Melanges Mandonnet (Paris: Vrin, 1980) 2, p. 87.
••Ronald F. King, " The Origin and Evolution of a Sacramental Formula: Sacramentum Tantum, Res et Sacramentum, Res Tantum," The Thomist, 81 (1967),
p. 22.
•• Ibid., p. 28.

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

567

As proof that his understanding of the eucharist was correct, Berengar cited the Augustinian axiom " the word comes
to the element and it becomes a sacrament. " Just as the baptismal water remains water after the consecration by the words
of blessing and is thus a sacramentum, so the bread and wine
must remain bread and wine after the consecration to be truly
a sacramentum. 25 In trying to restore the bishop of Hippo's
distinction between sacramentum and res, as opposed to the
Isidorian equation of sacramentum and res, Berengar missed
the distinction which Augustine had made between res and
virtus and applied the term sacramentum univocally to baptism and the eucharist. Without the concept of Christ's presence differentiated in the sacraments according to the mystery
signified, the res as the link between the sign (sacramentum)
and the effect (virtus) has been destroyed and the sacraments
can be treated univocally.
The opponents of Berengar, such as Lanfranc, refused to
concede that his interpretation of Augustine's definition corresponded to the tradition of the Church. However, since most
of Augustine's anti-Donatist treatises were unknown to them,
they lacked the possibility of opposing Berengar by reasserting· the threefold Augustinian distinction. 26 Instead they
countered the assertions of the teacher of Tours by saying
that he had restricted the concept of sacrament too narrowly
in applying it only to the elements of bread and wine. Lanfranc
maintained that the term " sacramentum " could be applied simultaneously to the bre·ad and wine and to the sacramental
body and blood of Christ. 27
At the end of the eleventh century Ivo of Chartres borrowed
freely from both Berengar and Lanfranc without realizing that
" ... logically speaking, one cannot accept Berengar's definition of sacramentum and at the same time perpetuate Lanfranc's usage of calling the invisible Body of Christ a sacraIbid.
•• N. M. Haring, "Berengar's Definitions of Sacramentum and Their Influence
on Medieval Sacramentology," Medieval Studies., 10 (1948), p. 12!'l.
27 Ibid., p. 145.
25

568

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

0.P.

mentum ". 28 Only the introduction in the twelfth century 0£ new
terminology such as sacramentu1n tantum, sacramentU?n et res
and res tantum to describe the relationship between the elements, the body and blood 0£ Christ and the grace 0£ eucharist could resolve the problem raised by Berengar in his attempt
to return to an authentic Augustinian concept 0£ sacramentum
and res.
The Sacramental Theology of Hugh of St. Victor and his
Contemporaries

At the beginning 0£ the twelfth century, the term sacramentum still retained a broad meaning. 29 However, as the
century progressed theologians sought to precise the meaning
0£ the sacramental dimension 0£ the Christian life along with
the other areas 0£ the faith. 30
The Berengarian controversy 0£ the mid-eleventh century
had provided a number 0£ Augustinian definitions 0£ the sacraments. The one most frequently utilized as a starting point
by twelfth-century theologians was that of sacrament as "a
sacred sign" (sacrum signum) but modified under the form
"a sacrament is a sign of a sacred thing." 31
Abelard made use of Berengar's definition but substituted
the word signum for the word forma: " a sacrament truly is this
visible sign of the invisible grace of God. 32 By employing this
formulation Abelard sought to divorce himself from the Berengarian interpretation of the definition and return to a more
authentic Augustinian terminology. 83
While dialecticians such as Abelard took the Augustinian
28
2•

Ibid.
Ibid., p. 115.

••William Courtenay, "Sacrament, Symbol and Causality in Bernard of Clairvaux," Bernard of Clairvaux (Washington: Consortium Press, 1973), p. 112.
31 Eynde, "Definitions,"
p. 200: sacramentum est sacrae rei signum."
32 PL 178: 984b; cf. Richard Weingart, "Peter Abailard's
Contribution to Medieval Sacramentology," Rech1Yrches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 34 (1967),
167: "sacramentum vero est visibile signum invisibilis gratiae Dei."
••Weingart, "Abailard's Contribution," pp. 165-166.

ALBERT'S YIEW OF SACRAMENT

569

definitions given by Berengar and modified them by substituting what they believed was more truly Augustinian terminology, the approach of Hugh of St. Victor was to add new
clarifying elements. 84
Hugh's vision embraces both the general sacramental nature of created reality and the special sacramental ordinances
of the Church such as baptism and eucharist. 85 The great
Victorine uses saeramentum, as a term synonymous with mysterium to speak generally of anything symbolic or hidden. 86
He also calls the mysteries of the faith "sacraments," e.g.
the sacrament of the Trinity (saeramentum Trinitatis) .37
These general Hugonian usages can be contrasted with the
more specific understanding of the term saeramentum as a
sacred sign of God's activity within the process of restoration.88
We first encounter Hugh's definition of the sacraments as
symbols of God's saving activity in the De saeramentis legis
naturalis et seriptae dialogus (c. 1125):
Eynde, "Definitions," p. 199.
Norman Pittenberg, " 1The Incarnational Philosophy of Hugh of St. Victor,"
Theology, 31 (1935), 277.
86 Cf. PL l 76-195d; 176-336; l 77-285b.
87 Cf. PL l 76-803b-d.
38 A summary of Hugh's use of the term sacramentum can be found in Baron,
Science et sagesse, p. 220. The most comprehensive wiorks on Hugh's sacramental
theology are Heinrich Weisweiler, Die Wirksamkeit der Sakramente nach Hugo von
St. Viktor (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1932) and James Cunningham, "The
Sacramental Theology of Hugh of St. Victor" (unpublished S. T. D. dissertation,
Rome: Pontificia Universitas Gregoriana, 1963). Heinrich Weisweiler has also
published an important article on the influence of Pseudo-Dionysius within
Hugonian sacramental theology: "Sakrament als Symbol und Teilhabe," Scholastik,
27 (1952), 321-343. Since the theology of Anselm of Laon played a significant
role in Victorine theology through William of Champeaux, Weisweiler sought in his
article: "L'ecole d'Anselme de Laon et de Guillaume de Champeaux, nouveaux
documents," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale, 4 (1932), 237-269
and 371-392 which was concluded by D. 0. Lottin, "Nouveaux fragments theologiques de l'ccole d'Anselm.e de Loon, conclusions et tables," Recherches de theologie
ancienne et medievale, 14 (1947), 157-185, to indicate basic source materials and
lines of influence. This goal of outlining the sources of Hugh's sacramental theology
was furthered once more by W,eisweiler's article, " Die Arbeitsmethode Hugos von
St. Viktor, Ein Beitrag zum Entstehen seines Hauptwerkes De sacramentis;'
Scholastik, 24 (1949), 59-87 and 232-267.
34

85

570
D.
M.
D.
M.

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

What is a sacrament?
A sign (signum) of a sacred thing (sacrae rei).
Why is a sacrament said to be the sign of a sacred thing?
Because an outward, exterior reality signifies another interior,
invisible reality .39

A decade later in writing the De sacranientis, the great Victorine begins with the same Augustinian definition but then
goes on to provide an expanded definition of what fully and
perfectly constitutes a sacrament in his understanding:
The doctors have designated with a brief description what a sacrament is: 'A sacrament is the sign of a sacred thing.' For just as
in man there are two things, body and soul, and in one Scripture
likewise two things, letter and sense, so also in every sacrament
there is one thing which is treated visibly without and is seen, and
there is another which is believed invisibly within and is received.
What is visible without and material is a sacrament (sacramentum),
what is invisible within and spiritual is the thing or virtue of the
sacrament (res sive virtus-sacramenti); the sacrament, however,
which is treated and sanctified without is a sign of spiritual grace
and this is the thing of the sacrament and is received invisibly ...
Now if anyone wishes to define more fully and more perfectly what
a sacrament is, he can say: ' A sacrament is a corporeal or material
element set before the senses without, representing by similitude
and signifying by institution and containing by sanctification some
invisible and spiritual grace. ' 40
Before passing on to Hugh's explanation of his definition
we should note that the Canon of St. Victor, in contrast to
Augustine, equates res and virtus. We shall say more about
this later, but for the present let us continue with Hugh's
commentary:
This definition is recognized as so fitting and perfect that it is
found to befit every sacrament and a sacrament alone. For every••PL 176: 34a-b.
De sacrametntis christwnae fidei I, IX, !i?. PL 176: 317d, "sacramentum est
corporale vel materiale elementum foris sensibiliter propositum ex similitudine
representans, et ex institutione significat continens aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem
gratiam." English translation by Roy J. Deferrari. Hugh of St. Victor: On the
Sacraments of the Ohristwn Faith (Cambridge: Medieval Academy of America,
1951), pp. 154-155. Hereafter cited as DS.
40

ALBERT'S VIEW OF SACRAMENT

571

thing that has these three is a ·sacrament, and everything that
lacks these three cannot he properly called a sacrament. For every
sacrament ought to have a kind of similitude to the thing itself
(res) of which it is the sacrament, according to which it is capable
of representing the same thing; every sacrament ought to have
also institution through which it is ordered to signify this thing
and finally sanctification through which it contains that thing and
is efficacious for conferring the same on those to he sanctified. Now
it is looked upon as important, that every sacrament indeed has a
similitude from first instruction, institution from superadded dispensation, sanctification from the applied benediction of word or
sign.41

Hugh uses baptism to exemplify his definition, but he says
that the three elements of the definition apply equally to all
those realities which can most properly be termed sacraments.
First, the material element must be naturally capable of signifying a particular spiritual effect. This similitude comes from
creation and is the work of the Father, the Creator. Thus
water as a cleansing agent is an apt symbol for the spiritual
cleaning of the soul. Secondly, there must be a divine institution
which actually incorporates this natural symbol into the symbol
system which constitutes the sacramental process of restoration. This institution comes from the carrying out of the
divine plan of salvation and is the work of Christ, the Savior.
Thus Christ actually commanded the apostles to baptize his
followers with water for the forgiveness of their sins. Finally,
the natural element which has been given a new symbolic
meaning by Christ must here and now be sanctified so that it
actually contains the grace which it signifies. This sanctification comes from the blessing of the priest and is the work of
the Holy Spirit, the Dispenser. Thus the baptismal water
actually contains the spiritual grace which washes away the
sins of the person being baptized.
The first part of Hugh's definition, "representing by similitude, " has Augustinian roots and was often quoted by Berengar .42 The second part of the definition "signifying by institu•1
42

DS I, ix, 2. PL 176: 317-318. Def., p. 155.
Haring, "Berengar's Definitions," p. 126.

572

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE, O.P.

tion," although it corresponds to Augustine's basic sacramental outlook, gives more emphasis to the role of Christ
as the one who actually instituted the sacraments than had
the bishop of Hippo. 43 The third and final part of the definition, " containing grace by sanctification, " combines Augustine's notion of the sacraments as healillg remedies with the
Isidorian concept of the sacramental elements as veiling the
res.44 Thus for Hugh the sacraments become vessels which
contain God's healing power. This view certainly goes far
beyond the Augustinian concept of the sacraments. Although
Hugh formulated this definition to counteract the inadequacies
of the Berengarian position, his own explanation contains its
own problems.
Since the Augustinian. concept of the res as the mystery of
Christ's life made present in and through the sacrament which
brings a particular spiritual virtus had been lost, and res and
virtus were not equated as sacramental grace, twelfth-century
theology was faced with a dilemma in view of the Berengarian
distinction between the sacramentum and the res. How do the
sacraments as signs truly convey God's healing power? Bernard
of Clairvaux taught that " the sacraments are legitimate and
efficacious claims or titles to grace, given on the occasion of
the proper reception of the sacraments. " 45 To Hugh this was
not a sufficient explanation. Hence he took the Isidorian concept of the res as hidden under the material element and described the sacraments themselves as vessels of grace. Since
material elements had participated in mankind's fall, then
material elements should play an integral part in mankind's
restoration. In the view of the great Victorine, we are not
meant to seek salvation from the sacraments but in the sacraments from God.
In the twelfth century, the terms materia and forma did not
bear the hylomorphic connotations that they would carry m
43 Pourrat, Theology of the Sacraments, p. 89.
•• Eynde, " Definitions," p. ii!l6.
••Courtenay, "Sacrament, Symbol and Causality," p. 114.

ALBERT'S VIEW OF SACRAMENT

573

thirteenth-century theology; materia, in general, meant physical
element while forma meant simply rite or fol'mula. 46 Thus
Hugh having asked about the materia of the sacraments can
respond:
All divine sacraments are accomplished in threefold matter (materia), namely, either in things (rebus) or in deeds (factis) or in
words (verbis) ... H
The matter of the sacraments-things, deeds and words-corresponds to the areas of human life that require God's healing
power. His examples, such as water, oil, bread and wine in the
category of things, the sign of the cross in the category of
deeds and the invocation of the Trinity in the category of
words, show he is not speaking of these categories of sacraments
in terms of his own strict sacramental definition as he himself
points out:
Moreover, we must realize that with these three modes (modis),
sacraments are accomplished. Yet those are more properly and
principally called sacraments in which virtue (virtus) is through
sanctification and the effect of salvation through operation. 48
Although Hugh had tried to darify the difference between
his general notion of sacrament as applicable to diverse realities within the process of restoration and its most specific application to the sacramental ordinances of the Church, the difficulties persisted. Since Hugh chose to use the phrase: "corporeal or material element set before the senses " in his: definition
and likened the sacraments to vessels containing medicine, the
problem remained. For in the final analysis, considering as well
the other two parts of the definition, institution and sanctification, Hugh's definition can be accurately applied only to
baptism, confirmation, eucharist and anointing of the sick.
Hugh attempted to salvage orders, matrimony, penance, the
consecration of a church and other rites of worship regarded by
•• Damien van den Eynde, " The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments
in Early Scholasticism," Franciscan Studies, 11 (1951), p. 20.
41 DS I, ix, 6. PL 176: 326c. Def., pp. 163-164.
•• DS I, ix, 6. PL 176: 326d. Def., p. 164.

574

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

the twelfth-century men and women as sacramental by speaking of sacraments for exercise and sacraments for preparation in
addition to the sacraments for salvation. Since these other rites
lack an identifiable material or corporeal element, they do not
correspond to Hugh's own definition by his own words; all
cannot be considered sacraments in the full sense of the word:
" This definition is recognized as so fitting and perfect that it
is found to befit every sacrament and a sacrament alone." 49 In
trying to salvage the Augustinian definition of a sacrament
from the Berengarian interpretation by using the Isidorian understanding, Hugh had created a definition of the sacraments
so closely bound up with the material element that it proved
unacceptable to his contemporaries and to later theologians.
The first major revision of the Canon of St. Victor's definition came from within the Hugonion school itself, the Summa
sententiarum (1140-1146) .50 In the tract on the sacraments,
the author of the Summa bypasses Hugh's definition in the De
sacramentis and returns to the latter's explication of the Augustinian definition of sacrament as "a sign of a sacred thing"
in the Dialogus. The author of the Summa places his emphasis
upon the sacrament as an efficacious sign rather than as a
material element and indicates that this sign not only signifies
but confers grace.
This concept of the sacrament as an efficacious sign of grace
was taken up by Peter Lombard who defined a sacrament as
follows: "A sacrament is precisely defined as such a sign of
God's grace and such .a form of invisible grace, as to bear its
likeness and to exist as its cause. " 51 The great master of medieval theology then applied this definition to seven ecclesiastical ordinances of the New Law. He thereby initiated the
septenary enumeration of the sacraments that became standard
in subsequent medieval theology: "Now let us come to the
sacraments of the New Law, which are baptism, confirmation,
•• DS I, ix, 2. PL 176:317-318. Def., p. 155.
50

Haring, "Berengar's Definition,"

51

Lib. IV, d. 1, cap. 4.

p. 127.

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

575

the bread of blessing, that is, the eucharist, penance, extreme
unction, orders, and marriage. 52

The Sacramental Theology of Albert's Contemporaries
The author of the Summa sententiarum and Peter Lombard
in Sentences expressed dissatisfaction with Hugh of St. Victor's
definition of a sacrament because it had tied sacramental reality too closely to a material element and hence they proceeded
to define a sacrament as a grace-producing sign. If, however,
one moves away from the Hugonian definition wherein the
material element is the vessel of grace, one must then explain
how the sacramentum as sign causes the res, sacramental grace,
in the recipient. The Augustinian vision of sacramental reality
as constituted by the sacramentum, the res, and the virtus
needed to find new expression.
Since the problem of the relationship between a sacrament
and the grace received by the recipient had first risen in the
Berengarian controversy of the eleventh century, the eucharist
would naturally be the place for the restoration of the concept
of a three-fold sacramental reality. Hugh of St. Victor had
already delineated this threefold reality of the eucharist in
his De sacrarnentis,53 but the author of the Summa sententiarurn gave it verbal form when he distinguished sacramentum
tantum, sacramentum et res, and res tantum. 54 Although this
formulation was useful in explaining causality in the eucharist,
the septenary enumeration of the sacraments by Peter Lombard opened the century-long attempt to try to apply the
eucharistic insight on the nature of sacramental reality to the
other six sacraments ..
The situation was further complicated by two factors: 1)
the terminology sacramentum tantum, sacramentum et res, and
res tantum was not universally used, and many continued to
refer to the body of Christ in the eucharist as the sacramentum
52
63

Lib. IV, d. 2, cap. 1.
DS II, viii, 7. PL 176: 466. Def., p. 308 .

.. Haring, "Berengar's

Definition," p. 145.

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THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

and 2) in the last quarter of the twelfth century, reflection on
baptism resulted in the application of the term sacramentum
to the lasting spiritual effect, the baptismal character, which
later theology came to denote as the sacramentum et res.55
Nearly a century of searching for clarity in regard to the
threefold nature of sacramental reality came to expression in
the work of the Dominican Hugh of St. Cher who in his Summa
about 1233-34 applied the threefold terminology to baptism,
confirmation and holy orders as well as the eucharist. 56 We
shall see, subsequently, what Albert the Great himself had to
say on this topic.
Besides the discussion of the threefold nature of sacramental
reality, the second area of concern in sacramental theology
for Albert and his contemporaries was the question of the
composition of the sacramental sign. The author of the Summa
sententiarum, drawing upon and modifying the work of Hugh
of St. Victor, spoke of the three kinds of components in every
sacrament as things (res), deeds (facta) an<l words (dicta) .57
Peter Lombard in the Sentences had maintained a bipartite
composition of the sa-eraments specified as verba and res; 58 he
also used the Augustinian terminology of elementum and verbum. 59 During the last half of the twelfth century the terms
forma and materia also come to have a significant place in
sacramental theology. At that point, however, the two words
had nothing to do with the hylomorphic theory of Aristotle;
forma simply meant rite or formula and materia meant physical element. 60 Peter Lombard is a pivotal figure, influencing
the discussion prior to Albert and establishing its context even
into the thirteenth century. From Peter Lombard (+1160)
to William of Auxerre (+1231) , the question of the composition of the sacraments continued to manifest confusion in
•• Ibid., p. 184.
••Leeming, Principles of Sacramental Theology, p.
07 Eynde,
" Theory of Composition," p. 9.
58 Sent., IV, d. I, c. 5.
(ed. Quaracchi, 748).
••Sent., IV, d. 3, c. 1. (ed. Quaracchi, 745-755).
60 Eynde,
" Theory of Composition," p.

ALBERT'S VIEW OF SACRAMENT

577

terminology and doctrine without any resolution between a
tripartite and a bipartite understanding of the sacraments.
However, during that period of time we can also discern the
development of a growing tendency to replace the terms res
and verbum with the terms materia and forma 61 , although
the terms materia and forma were certainly not always seen
as necessarily co-determining. 62
By 1230 the Sentences of Lombard had become, outside of
the Bible itself, the starting point of all theological teaching.
With the almost universal acceptance of the authority of Lombard, the theory of the bipartite composition of the sacraments became standard teaching. Some Parisian masters such
as the Franciscan Alexander of Hales (+1245) accepted the
bipartite theory only in a broad sense which allowed of exceptions, while other masters such as the Dominican Hugh of
St. Cher (+1263) gave it a universal sense and assimilated it
to the hylomorphic outlook of Aristotle. 68
The second Dominican master at the University of Paris,
Hugh of St. Cher, in his Commentary on the Sentences (around
1230) and in his Questions (before 1236) not only identified
two sensible constituents in each sacrament, namely res or
materia and verba or forma verborum, but he taught that their
relationship to each other was that of matter and form in an
Aristotelian understanding. 64 In contrast to his fellow master
at Paris, Alexander of Hales, Hugh of St. Cher maintained the
bipartite and hylomorphic constitution of each of the seven
sacraments without exception. We shall discuss subsequently
the position of St. Albert the Great on this question.
The third area of investigation for Albert and his contemporaries was the question of sacramental causality. This question is intimately linked to the question of the threefold nature
of sacramental reality and to the question of the composition
61 lbUJ., p. 128.
'"Ibid., p. 187.
•• Damien van den Eynde, " The Theory of the Composition of the Sacraments
in Early Scholasticism," Franciscan Studies, 12 (1952), p. 1.
••Ibid., p. 12.

578

· THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

of the sacramental sign. Since any investigation of the problem of causality is closely dependent upon a clear understanding of the two previous questions, it did not emerge into
prominence until the third decade of the thirteenth century. 65
As one might expect, it was Hugh of St. Cher, the great
advocate of the concept of the threefold sacramental reality
and a bipartite understanding of the composition of the sacraments as matter and form, who approached the problem of
sacramental causality in a significant way. Utilizing the insights of his predecessor Stephen Langton ( 1228) , yet moving beyond Langton's hesitation regarding the possibility of
creaturely participation in causality within the order of grace,
Hugh in his Questio de sacramentis in commune taught that
the vis of the sacrament is the efficient cause of spiritual healing and sanctification. 66 God is the primary efficient cause who
works through the sacraments as secondary efficient causes.
The sacrament, then, is a medium by which God sanctifies the
soul.
Having briefly surveyed the history of sacramental theology
previous to Albert with special emphasis on the three problems
which occupied the attention of his predecessors and contemporaries, we can now turn to a consideration of Albert's own
sacramental theology.

+

Albert the Great: The Theology of Sacraments
This article will discuss Albert's theology of sacraments by
presenting the teaching on sacraments in general from the
Summa de Sacramentis. Authorities date this Summa to the
period between Albert's arrival in Paris in 1243 or 1244 (if not
earlier) as he prepared to incept as a master in 1245, and his
commentary on Book II of the Sentences done in 1246.67 Albert
65 Damien van den Eynde,
" Stephen Langton and Hugh of St. Cher on the
Causality of the Sacraments," Franciscan Studies, 11 (1951), p. 141.
66 Ibid, p. 153.
67 James A. Weisheipl, O.P;, "The Life and Works of St. Albert
the Great,"
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays, 1980 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1980), pp.

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

579

later completed his Commentary on the Sentences at Cologne
after March 25th, 1249.68
St. Albert the Great incepted as Master of Theology in the
Dominican chair for foreigners in 1245 succeeding Gueric of
St.-Quentin and held that second Dominican chair of Regent
Master at the Priory of St. Jacques until 1248.69 Albert, who
was around 42 years old, had been sent to Paris by the German
Master General of the Dominican order, John of Wildeshausen,
with the support of his Dominican brother, Hugh of St. Cher,
who had been Regent Master at Paris from 1230-1235 and was
at that time Provincial of France. 70
St. Albert in his Summa De Sac;ramentisbegins his discussion of the question " Quid sacramentum sit " 71 by discussing
four classical definitions of the sacraments, namely those of
Augustine, 72 Peter Lombard, 73 Hugh of St. Victor 74 and Isidore
of Seville.75 Both the complexity and the significance of Albert's sacramental theology result from his attempt to hold
these four classic definitions together in dynamic tension with
the new insights and developments of thirteenth century
theology.
In the solutio to questio fl of Tractatus I, Albert says that
three things concur in any sacrament: 1) institutio significandi,
2) quod significet non tantum rem sacram sed etiam sacran88 Ibid., p. 22.
•• Ibid., p. 28.
• 0 Ibid., p. 21.

•i. St. Albert the Great, 'Summa De Sacramentis,' tr. I, q. 2, ed. Colon., Opl!IT'a
Omnia, XXVI, p. 2, I. 62. Citations from the ' Summa De Sacramentis ' will be
abbreviated as SDS; the page and line numbers in the Cologne edition will also
be indicated.
h SDS, tr. I, q. 2. Col., p. 2, I. 64: "sacramentum est sacrae rei signum."
'"SDS, tr. I, q. 2. Col., p. 2, 11. 66-67: "sacramentum est invisibilis gratiae
visibilis forma, cuius similitudinem gerat et causa existat."
"SDS, tr. I, q. 2. Col., p. 2, 11. 69-78: "sacramentum est corporale vel materiale elementum oculis extrinsecus suppositum, ex similitudine repraesentans, ex
_institutione significans, ex sanctificatione aliquam invisibilem et spiritalem gratiam
continens."
'"SDS, tr. I, q. 2. Col., p. 2, II. 74-75: "sacramentum est, in quo sub tegumento
visibilium rerum divina virtus secretius operatur
.

580

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

tem, sfoe contineat illam sive non, and 8) quod illa res sacrans
sanet infirrnitatem peccati vel quae est ex peccato." 76 How
does this statement of the threefold nature of sacramental reality relate to the current thirteenth-century terminology sacramentum tantum, sacramentum et res and res tantum which
Albert himself uses to describe sacramental reality in Tractatus
VII, questio 8 of the De Sacramentis? 77 I believe that the threefold enumeration of questio 2 of Tractatus I is St. Albert's explication of what he means in the concrete by sacramentum tantum, sacramentum et res and res tan tum in light of the four definitions with which he has introduced the question.
Let us turn first to a discussion of the words institutio significandi. Albert says that three things are necessary for a
sacrament: "I) proprietas signi:ficans; 2) res cuius est proprietas illa and 8) sanctificatio causans ex forma sacramenti." 78
In my opinion, for Albert the first two factors established the
matter of a sacrament and the third the form, so that together
they constitute the sacramentum tantum or institutio significandi of any sacrament. By using this terminology, Albert is
trying to show continuity between the classical definitions of
a sacrament and the terminology then current among the
scholastics of his own time.
We have already seen that Hugh of St. Victor's definition
of a sacrament as corporale vel materiale elementum by tying
every sacrament to a material element produced great problems, especially after Peter Lombard's septenary enumeration
of the sacraments. Albert the Great tries to deal with this
problem by viewing the matter of the sacrament not only as a
material element but as something (res), whether a material
element as in baptism and eucharist or an action such as the
sensible expression of consent in marriage 79 and the manifestaSDS, tr. I, q. 2. Solutia. Col., p. 3, 11. 74-79.
SDS, tr. VII, q. 3. Col., p. 132, 11. 12-14: "Praeterea, in quolibet sacramento
tria sunt, scilicet sacramentum tantum et res tantum et medium, quod est sacramentum et res."
78 SDS, tr. I, q. 2, ad 13. Col., p. 5, 11. 24-26.
1 • SDS, tr. IX, q. 1, art. 2. Col., p. 156, I. 49.
1•

77

ALBERT'S

VIEW OF SACRAMENT

581

tion of sorrow in penance 80 , which by reason of its manifest
properties becomes capable of serving as a ratio significandi.
Thus by utilizing the concept of a property of this res which
consists in its signification, Albert takes Hugh of St. Victor's
notion of a sacrament as " ex similitudine representans" and
uses it as a way of saving the Victorine's definition while at
the same time opening it to a new understanding. To move,
however, from a res and its properties, which together constitute the matter of a sacrament, to an actual institutio significandi requires the second aspect of sacramental composition,
the form.
St. Albert teaches that the form of the sacrament is a signum
significans by reason of its divine institution. 81 This is in accord with the phrase "ex institutione significans" from Hugh
of St. Victor's definition. The sacramental form specifies the
matter of the sacrament and is the principle of causality,
whether that form is an invocation or set of words as in baptism and eucharist or whether it is an interior disposition as
in penance. Together matter as the ratio significandi and form
as the ratio causandi constitute the " esse sacramenti " which
is the institutio mgnificandi or sacramentum tantum. 82
The constitution of the sacramentum tantum through the
coming together of matter and form leads to the second aspect
of sacramental reality, the sacramentum et res. For St. Albert
the causality of the sacraments flows from the sacramentum
et res as established by the form specifying the matter and
setting up the ratio causandi. Thus the form of the sacrament
is the link between the human and divine aspects of sacramental causality.
St. Albert teaches that the uncreated Word is the efficient
cause of the sacraments, and the created word is the dispositive
cause of the sacraments. 83 The created word or its equivalent,
SDS, tr. VI, pars. 1, q. 2, art. 2. Col., p. 78, 11. 39-40.
SDS. tr. I, q. 2, ad 3. Col., p. 4, 11. 11-12.
82 SDS, tr. I, q. 2, ad. 10. Col., p. 5, 11. 1-4.
83 SDS, tr. V, pars. 1, q. 3, art. 2. Col., p. 60, 11. 43-45.

80
81

THOMAS D. MCGONIGLE,

O.P.

as the form of the sacrament, functions as a dispositive cause
because it is joined to the uncreated Word as efficient cause.
Through the here-and-now human constitution of the sacramental sign which he instituted, Jesus Christ, the uncreated
"VVord and Redeemer, as efficient cause establishes a state or
condition of sacramental reality, sacramentum et res, which
opens the possibility for the recipient through faith to receive
the grace of a particular sacrament (res tantum).
This sac,ramentum et res takes difierent forms, for example,
as a sacramental character in baptism, 84 as the body and blood
of Christ in eucharist 85 or as an interior disposition in penance.86 Ifowever, in each sacrament, the sac,ramentum et res
involves the presence of Christ the Redeemer and healer who
invites the recipient and disposes him or her to enter into the
specific grace of each sacrament (res) .87
While complex and perhaps at times ambiguous, the
sacramental theology of St. Albert is significant, because it
represents an attempt to reconcile the sacramental theology of
the fathers and early scholastics, varied and at times conflicting in outlook as their opinions were, with the new insights and
desire for systematization of the dawning golden age of scholasticism.
In his discussion of the four definitions of the sacraments
given by St. Augustine, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St. Victor
5 • SDS, tr. III, q. 1, art. 5, ad. 10. Col., p. 34, 11. 33-35. Cf. B. T. d'Argenlieu,
"La Doctrine d'Albert le Grand sur le caractere sacremental," Revue Thomfste 33
(1928), pp. 295ff., pp. 479ff.
85 SDS, tr. V, pars. 2, q. 2. Col., p. 66, 11. 19-35.
86 SDS, tr. VJ, pars. 1, q. 2, art. 2. Col., p. 78, 11. 42-43.
87 SDS, tr. 5, q. 6 ad. 4. Col., pp. 14-15, 11. 91-92; 1-16: "Unde sicut septem
fuerant in redemptor.e, in quibus operatus est salutem nostram, ita septula est
gratfa sacramentalis. . . . Gratia ergo baptismalis configurat nos Christo morienti .
. . . Gratia confirmationis configurat nos Christo pugnanti fortiter; paenitentia satisfacienti in sustinendo poenam; eucharistia Christo, secundum quod est sacerdos;
matrimonium eidem, secundum quod est sponsus ecdesiae. Extrema vero unctio configurat nos ei, secur1dum quod surrexit oleo plenae gloria delibutus." Cf. Franz-Josef
Nocke. Sakrament und Personater Vollzug bei Albertus Magnus, Beitrage zur
Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters. 41: 4 (Miinster: Aschendorfl', 1967) .

ALBERT'S VIEW OF SACRAMENT

583

and St. Isidore of Seville, Albert tried to draw the positive
elements from each while truthfully recognizing their limitations. He preferred Hugh of St. Victor's definition of the sacraments over the other three which he treated; but, as we have
seen, he interpreted it in the framework common to his thirteenth century contemporaries: threefold sacramental reality,
a bipartite composition of the sacraments and dispositive causality of the sacraments.
True to his own reconciling stance, St. Albert adopted a
mediating position between the view of his fellow Parisian
masters, Alexander of Hales and Hugh of St. Cher. Albert
followed Hugh rather than Alexander in maintaining that each
sacrament was composed of matter and form.ss However, he
chose like Alexander to give matter and form broad meanings
and did not limit his vision to Hugh of St. Cher's understanding that matter and form must always be sensible.s9
The lasting significance of St. Albert the Great in the history
of theology, as exemplified in the Summa De Sacramentis, lies
in his theological vision which sought continuity and catholicity
by reconciling the best of traditional theology with the new
insights of his own time. Constantly weighing all opinions in
the light of faith and reason, Albert, the theologian, tried to
render the gospel meaningful to his contemporaries.
THOMAS

D. McGoNIGLE, O.P.

Aquinas Institute of Theology
Dubuque, Iowa

88 Campion Murray, O.F.M., "The Composition of the Sacraments
according to
the 'Summa De Sacramentis' and the 'Commentarium in IV Sententiarum' of
St. Albert the Great," Franciscan Studies, 16/17 (1956/1957), p. 200.
•• Ibid., p. 199.

ALBERT THE GREAT'S CRITIQUE OF LOTHAR OF
SEGNI (INNOCENT III) IN THE DE SACRIFICIO
MISSAE

These and other [interpretations] of this kind we consider to be the absurdities of unlettered men who profess
to be doctors by reasons of their ex;cesses and nonsense,
and who make theology detestable by their doctrines.
De sacrificio missae III.IO: 118b 1

W

ITH THESE WORDS Albert the Great hurls his
strongest attack against those medieval authors
who employed rememorative allegory in their explanations of the Mass. Expressions of Albert's frustrations
with the method of these authors punctuate the sober commentary of his explanation of the Mass, the De sacrificio
missae, but usually without such vehemence. 2 Who were these
' homines illitterati ' that provoked Albert to write such harsh
words in a work that is otherwise quite free of such emotion?
It is the purpose of this article to show that one writer who
provoked Albert's special ire was Lothar of Segni, the Cardinal
Deacon who was later to become Pope Innocent III, that
Lothar's explanation of the Mass, the De missarum mysteriis,3
is a primary target for Albert's attack.
1 The
text used in this article is found in vol. 88 of edition of Auguste
Borgnet, B. Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, 88 quarto vols. (Paris: Vives, 1890-99).
References to this work are made in the following manner: III.IO: 118b, i.e.,
tractatus III, caput 10, page 118, column b.
• For example: I.2: 16ab; Il.2: 42b-48a; UI.2: sob; III.28: 168a.
•The most available text of Lothar's work is found in Migne: PL 217: 774-916,
where it appears under the incorrect title of De sacra altaris 'ffll!JSterio. However,
I have used my own text of Lothar's expositio missae: David F. Wright, 0.P.,
"A Medieval Commentary on the Mass: Particulae 2-8 and 5-6 of the De
missarum mysteriis (ca. 1195) of Cardinal Lothar of Segni (Pope Innocent III) "
(Ph.D. dissertation, University of Notre Dame, 1977), pp. 91-276. References to

584

ALBERT'S

CRITIQUE

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

585

The expositio missae genre of medieval literature originates
in the Carolingian reform of the late eighth and early ninth
centuries. As part of a broader program to raise and maintain a certain level of competence and understanding in the
priestly ministry, the expositiones missae provided the clergy
with useful explanations of the Mass. These explanations
sought to explain and comment upon the prayers and ceremonial of the Mass, thereby revealing the meaning which
each contained. Not all would agree on the definition of this
genre of literature,4 but for practical purposes the expositio
missae may be considered that genre of medieval literature
which explains and comments upon what is said and/or done
at Mass.
Several developments in Church life had served to create a
setting in which the expositi-0 literature flourished: (1) by the
eighth century the Latin language of the Mass had become
a clerical preserve and, as Jungmann notes, had created a
new disciplina arcani which served to conceal holy things, not
from the pagans, but from the faithful; 6 (2) the Church's
reaction to Arianism had fostered a view of Christ which
accentuated his divinity at the expense of his humanity and
which now required a special group of people who could mediate
between him and his people, namely, the clergy; and (3) the
concept of the Eucharist as the act of an entire Christian
community had given way to the concept of the Eucharist as
the bona gratia, the great gift of God coming down to mankind. Such developments coupled with the fact of an increasing separation of the role of the clergy from that of the
faithful in the Mass provided a field ripe for allegorization.
this text are made in the following manner: DMM ID.U.490, i.e., Particula ID,
caput 12, line 490. For convenience I have placed the reference to the PL text
in parentheses following the reference to my text.
• In the article " Expositio missae " in DACL 5.1: 1014 Dom Andre Wilmart
restricts the term to certain kinds of works of the ninth and tenth centuries. His
definition seems too narrow.
•Josef A. Jungmann, S.J., The Mass of the Roman Rite, vol. I (New York:
Benziger, 1951), p. 81.

586

DAVID F. WRIGHT,

O.P.

What could be more natural than to see in the celebration
of Mass " hidden mysteries" revealed in every object used, in
every action performed, and in every minister involved.
The matrix for the allegorical interpretation of the Mass
could already be found in the medieval approach to scriptural
exegesis. In his ninth Homily on Ezechiel St. Gregory the
Great (+ 604) outlined the four senses of scripture: the
literal sense which uncovered the res gesta, i.e., divine revelation as a past event recorded in the text of scripture; and the
spiritual sense which depended upon the literal sense and was
to penetrate and. lay open the deepest meaning of the res gesta.
The spiritual sense itself had three dimensions: allegorical,
tropological or moral, and anagogical or eschatological. 6 Medieval theologians differed on the terminology used to describe
these senses of scripture and their relationship to one another.7
While medieval liturgists do not usually make explicit reference to these four senses in their expositiones, they nevertheless employ them. In commenting upon the ways in which
the famous ninth-century liturgist, Amalarius of Metz, uses
allegory, Jungmann notes four kinds: (1) moral allegory, i.e.,
ethical admonitions; (2) typological allegory, i.e., fulfillments
of the Old Testament; (3) · rememorative allegory, i.e., events
in the economy of salvation; and (4) anagogic or eschatological allegory, i.e., allusions to the consummation at the end
of time. 8 While all are present in the works of Amalarius, the
rememorative predominates.
The expositio missae literature developed along two paths:
the allegorical and, for lack of a better term, the non-allegorical.9 This does not imply a sic et non division, for the meHomiliae in Ezechielem 9, no. 8. (PL 76: 1047B).
For a summary of this development
Beryl Smalley, The Study of the
Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Blackwell & Mott, 195!1?). S. Thomas Aquinas
will sum up the classical medieval approach to scripture in his Summa theologiae
I, q. I, a. IO.
· • Jungmann I, p; 89.
•See: Pierre-Marie Gy, O.P., "Expositiones Missae," Bulletin du Comite des
Etudes [de la] Compagnie de St. Sulpice no. !!!! (1958): !!28-!!82; ,Edouard de
6
7

ALBERT'S

CRITIQUE

587

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

dieval writer who could avoid allegory is rare indeed. Rather
it implies the way in which the author viewed the Mass itself,
and under this general rubric we may speak of two schools,
the allegorical school and the non-allegorical school, provided
that we understand that no necessary connection is implied
between any two writers.
The non-allegorical writers generally concern themselves with
the concrete, their intent being to serve the clergy by making
what is done and what is said intelligible to them. Normally
they comment upon the various elements which comprise the
order of Mass, make some attempt to give the historical origin
of these elements, and at times describe the ceremonial of the
Mass. Their commentary upon texts such as the Canon and
the Lord's Prayer is usually an exegesis of the text which often
amounts to a catena of scripture quotes and patristic texts. 10
While the writers of the allegorical school follow the same
procedure, their delight in symbolism leads: them beyond
what is apparent to the eye and the ear. As symbolists they
believe that underneath the materiality of the world about
them there is something that is more real, something which
lies hidden, something which can be revealed to those who
have eyes to see and understand. Thus, in the order of Mass
it is easy for the allegorist to see the seven officia of Christ,
each prefigured by an act of Moses,11 or the order of Mass can
become the presentation of a number of tableaux from the
life of Christ. 12
Moreau, S.J., "Les explications allegoriques des eeremonies de Ia sainte messe au
moyea age, " Nouvelle reinte theologique 48 (1921): 123-143; idem, "L'explication
realiste des ceremonies de la sainte messe," Nouvelle revue theologique 48 (1921):
400-419.
10 Several notable
examples of this school: Bemo of Reichenau (
1048)Libellus de quibusdam rebus ad missae offecium pe1·tinentibus (PL 142: 1055-1080);
Bernold of Constance (
1100), Micrologus de ecclesiastics observationibus (PL
151: 979-995); John Beleth (
1182), Summa de ecclesiasticis offeciis (CCCM
vol. 41A).
11 See Honorius of Regensburg (
ca. 1156) , Gemma animae (PL 172: 541-738) .
12 See Rupert
of Deutz (
1129/113-0), De divinis offeciis (CCCM vol. 7).
Sicardus of Cremona (
1215). Mitrale seu de offeciis ecclesiasticis s:umma. (PL
213: 13-436) is another notable example.

+

+

+

+

+

+

588

DAVID F. WRIGHT, O.P.

Examples of both approaches can be found throughout the
ninth and tenth centuries. Certainly Amalarius of Metz (+
may be called the
of the allegorical interca.
pretation of the Mass in the western Church. While not the
first to use the allegorical method of interpreting the liturgy,
he is the first of the medieval writers to apply systematically
this approach to the Mass. 13 The primary fault of Amalarius
seems to be exaggeration. While he was motivated by pastoral
concern for the clergy and laity of his time, his application of
the allegorical method did not allow a mode of explanation to
develop naturally from the words and the rites themselves.
Rather he imposed his imaginary schema upon the Eucharistic
liturgy in such a way that his symbolism hid the words and
rites and made one forget them. The triumph of his method
was the defeat of his purpose. Here we have the weakness in
the allegorical method which so upset Albert the Great. The
multiple layers of interpretation often led to the "excesses
and nonsense " which he so deplored.
The work of Amalarius was strongly opposed by his contemporary, Florus, deacon of Lyons (+ 860) , who wrote his
De actione missarum 14 as a rebuttal, and who eventually obtained the condemnation of the work of Amalarius at the Council of Quiercy (838) for motives as much political as they were
theological. However, the work and method of Amalarius
were not to be overcome so easily, for both Amalarius and
Florus were to have many followers. During the eleventh
century the expositio missae writers are generally of the nonallegorical school, but with the rise of the schools of theology
in the twelfth century, the allegorical approach returns once
again in full vigor. It is against this background that we must
13 Amalarius first treats the Mass in two short and early works: the Missae
expositionis geminus codex and the Canonis missae interpretatio; his principal
work on the Mass is found in the third libellus of his later work, the Liber offecialis. See: Amalwrii episcopi opera liturgicaJ omnia, edited by J. M. Hanssens
S.J. 8 vols. (Vatican City: Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 1948-1950).
"PL 117: 15-7!!.

ALBERT'S

CRITIQUE

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

589

place the De missarum mysteriis of Lothar and the De sacrificio missae of Albert, the. former representing the allegorical
school, the latter the non-allegorical school.
The De missarum mysteriis-Lothar

of Segni

The De missarum mysteriis (ca. 1195) was a labor of love
of the young Cardinal Lothar of Segni, whose interest in
theology prompted him to write a number of short theological
treatises while busily engaged in the activities of the Curia. In
his prologue Lothar states that all the elements which now
comprise the Mass were so ordered that they recount all the
deeds which were done through and in Jesus Christ from the
moment that he descended from heaven until his return to the
Father at the Ascension. The order of Mass, moreover, represents the deeds of Jesus by means of words and signs. Four
kinds of elements may be distinguished in the order of Mass:
persons, actions, words and material things. All of these are
full of divine mysteries and it is Lothar's intent to comment
and elaborate upon them as best he can. In doing this he
states that he will not concern himself with what was done in
former times, but will follow that present custom which is
observed by the Apostolic See.
The work is divided into six particulae, only four of which
are directly concerned with the order of Mass. Particula I
deals with the vestments which the various ministers wear at
Mass. Particula II begins the treatment of the order of Mass
proper and concludes with his commentary on the Preface.
Particula III begins his commentary on the text of the Canon
up to the Qui pridie. Particula IV interrupts this commentary by using the Qui pridie and the Simili modo as
springboards to a systematic treatment of various questions related to the theology of the Eucharist which were of
15

16 De sa<fl'o altaris mysterio,
the name given to this work in Migne, appears
for the first time in a printed edition of 1534 and is neither the original nor the
correct title. The work was written between April, 1195, and early 1197. See
Wright, pp. 58-56.

590

DAVID F. WRIGHT, O.P.

concern to the theologians of his time. Particu"la V returns to
the method of Particulae II-III and comments on the remainder
of the Canon from the Unde et memores to the end, as well as
the Pater noster with its embolism and the silence which follows the Pater noster. Particula VI complete Lothar's commentary upon the Mass. Each of these particulae represents a
certain portion of the events of the life of Christ.
Lothar stands as a bridge between the twelfth and thirteenth
centuries. Well-versed in the theology of the Parisian schools
of the late twelfth century and the canon law of Bologna, he
sums up in the De missarum mysteriis much of the theology of
the twelfth century, and serves as an often-quoted source for
the theologians of the thirteenth and succeeding centuries. In
terms of the expositio missae genre of literature Lothar clearly
stands with the allegorical tradition. Yet he is not simply a
compiler. His is a synthetic work and he uses his sources to
his own purposes. In his use of allegory Lothar avoids multiple
layers of allegorical interpretation as a general rule, and his
approach is more highly scriptural and theological and less
concerned with rubrical details than most of his predecessors.
The De sacriffoio missae-Albert

the Great

The De sacrificio m'issae and the De sacramento eucharistiae,
a work generally associated with the De sacrijicio missae, are
considered to be rather late works and the authenticity of both
has been questioned. 16 At one time Albert Fries attributed
them to Ambrose Sansedoni of Siena, O.P. (rn20-rn86/87) who
with Thomas Aquinas was: a student of Albert at Paris and at
Cologne.17 Recently Heinz-Jiirgen Vogels reconsidered the
16 On the works of Albert the Great see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., "The Life
and Works of St. Albert the Great" in Albertus Magnus. and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies,
1980), pp. IS-51.
17 Albert Fries, C.SS.R., (' Messerklarung und Kommuniontraktat
keine Werke
Alberts des Grossen? " Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie
(1955):
Four biographies of Ambrose written by contemporaries fail to
mention any writings whatsoever. See Jacques Quetif and Jacques Echard,

ALBERT'S

CRITIQUE

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

591

arguments of Fries and concluded in favor of authenticity. 18
Even if they were the works of Ambrose, they could at least
be. considered to reflect the thought of his teacher. For the
purposes of this study the De sacrificio missae will be considered an authentic work.
Albert begins the prologue of the De sacrificio missae with a
text from Isaiah: " For thus says the Lord: Lo, I will spread
prosperity over her like a river, and the wealth of the nations
like an overflowing torrent" (66: 12-NAB). In this he perceives the promise of two things: (1) the reception (perceptio
of God's goodness according to the perfection of grace, and (2)
the taste of the sweetness of this goodness according to the
foretaste of glory. These two things which are found in the
Mass and the mystery (mysteria missae) carried out there provide the basis for the division of the Mass into three parts: (1)
the Introitus in which we show our yearning for this good; (2)
the Instructio in which we find perfect illumination concerning this good; and (3) the Oblatio in which we literally seize
this good and distribute it and communicate it. This threefold division provides the rationale for the division of the work
into three tracts (tractatus). Tractatus I includes all prayers
and ceremonies from the beginning of Mass through the Gloria
in excelsis; Tractatus II continues with the Dominus vobiscum
and collect and concludes with a commentary on the two
Creeds; and Tractatus III begins with the Dominus vobiscum
before the Offertorium and comments upon the remainder of
the Mass. Each tract is divided and subdivided several times
over in good scholastic fashion.
In his commentary Albert delights in discovering the hidden
meanings of the prayers and ceremonies of the Mass as much
as any other medieval writer, but he prefers the moral, ascetical
and mystical explanations and rejects the rememorative allegory of many of his predecessors. His treatment of the numScriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum, vol. I (Paris: J.B.C. Ballard and N. Sima.rt,
1719), cols. 40la-403b.
18 Heinz-JUrgen Vogels, "Zur Echtheit der eucharistischen Schriften Alberts des
Grossen," Theologie und Glaube 53 (1978): 102-119.

592

DAVID F. WRIGHT, O.P.

her of collects to be said at Mass is a good example of the way
in which his allegorical interpretation differs from that of the
authors whom he attacks. 19 He notes what some writers have
said: one collect signifies the unity of the divine substance;
three collects the Trinity; five collects the wounds of Christ;
and seven collects the seven gifts of the Holy Spirit. Albert
finds such reasoning useless (inutiles), null (nullae), and laughable (derisibiles). He then goes on to give his own interpretation based upon his view of prayer: the intention of prayer
is one, i.e., to obtain the eternal good; the object of prayer is
threefold, namely to be delivered from evil, to obtain grace,
and to attain glory; and because of the manner of our prayer
there are either five or seven collects. For in the Lord's
Prayer there are seven explicit petitions, but these seven could
be considered five petitions, for there are two instances in which
one petition is contained within another. 20
We may say then that Albert rejects interpretations which
have no basis in the prayers or ceremonies themselves, i.e.,
he rejects rememorative allegory which attempts to make these
prayers and ceremonies correspond to the events of the life
and death of Christ. Albert tends toward spiritual interpretations and is concerned with piety. However, his mosaic of
scripture texts, the multiple divisions so dear to the scholastic,
and the sometimes forced character of some of his reasoning
makes the work difficult to read. One wonders, for instance,
whether it is any more honorable for Albert arbitrarily to use
Isaiah 66: 12 as the basis for his division of the Mass than it is
for Honorius of Regensburg arbitrarily to base his division on
the seven officia of Christ. 21
Among the passages in the De sacrificio missae which deal
with Albert's 'homines illitterati,' some are simply brief remarks made in passing, 22 while others are more lengthy. In
1•

2

Cf. II.2: 42b-43a.

° Cf. Il.2: 43a.

Gemma animae chs. 3, 13, 19, 26, 44, 60, 61 (PL 172: 543B-544A ff.).
For example: I.2: 16ab--the reason why there is a ninefold Kyrie and
Christe; II.2: 42b-43a-the nnmber of collects to be said at Mass; and ill.28: 16Sathe reason why the Oommunio is sung.
21
2•

ALBERT'S

CRITIQUE

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

598

this latter group three passages stand out, the first two occurring in the same chapter in which he treats the Secreta and
the third occurring in the chapter in which he comments upon
the Quam oblationem section of the Canon.
In the first instance when explaining why the Secreta is said
silently, Albert quotes Dionysius as giving the true reason for
the use of silence at the Secreta and at other times during the
Mass. Essentially it is to prevent the laity from ridiculing what
is said and done at Mass, for they might be led to think that
the proclamation of ordinary words and the use of ordinary
material could not attain our salvation. 23 Albert goes on to say:
However, some say that before the passion, when the Jews sought
to kill Jes us, he " withdrew to a town called Ephraim in the region
near the desert, where he stayed with his disciples" Jn 11:54NAB). And because Jesus did not preach publicly, they then say
that here the priest represents this silence [of Jesus] by his own
first silence. It seems curious that that [silence] should correspond
to some [event] of which there is no mention in the [rite] itself. In
the concealing silence of the [Secreta] there is no mention whatsoever of this silence or likeness; for the priest when leaving the altar
does not hide or conceal himself. And therefore as far as I am concerned, such adaptations are worth nothing. 24

Albert is rather gentle in his criticism of this interpretation,
calling it "curious" (mirabile) .
The parallel passage in the De missarum mysteriis fits exactly what Albert describes, 25 and Lothar sums up his interpretation by saying: " Therefore, the silence of the priest signifies a hiding place of Christ." However, here Lothar is quoting Rupert of Deutz (+ 1129/1180) almost verbatim, 26 although he includes more of the scripture quotation from the
gospel of John (11: 54, 47-50, 53). Sicardus of Cremona (+
23 So also John Beleth, Summa de ecclesiasticis offeciis c.44a (CCCM vol. 41A),
pp. 78-79.
.. III.2: sob.
25 DMM II.48
(PL 217: 881B), Lothar's text: ' Silentium ergo sacerdotis latibulum Christi significat. "
••De divinis offeciis II.4 (CCCM vol. 7), pp. S5-S6: 148-159.

594

DAVID F. WRIGHT,

O.P.

rnI5), a contemporary of Lothar, also uses Rupert as his source
when commenting on this use of silence.27 Thus, we must conclude that in this passage J,othar was not the only object of
Albert's criticism.
A short paragraph later Albert returns to his criticism of
rememorative allegory. He goes on to say that the priest raises
his voice at the Per Dominum nostrum at the end of the
Secreta to indicate to everyone that what we ask for is only
heard in the name of Christ. This raising of the priest's voice
provides the second occasion for his criticism:
The fact that certain ones say that the raising of the voice indicates the resumption of preaching by Christ, when in the week of
of the Pasch between the tenth and fourteenth day after the new
moon he returned to Jerusalem and spoke publicly while teaching
in the temple, in my judgment is of no avail to their purpose. Even
though sometimes holy men say this, these adaptations are assuredly assumed with little suitability. 28

Still, Albert's criticism is muted. Could reverence for the
papacy and respect for the memory of the talented and dedicated Pope Innocent III be a check on the true feelings of
Albert the Great?
The parallel passage in the De mis8arum mysteriis again fits
Albert's description. 29 And once again we find that Lothar is
quoting and building upon Rupert of Deutz. 80 Thus, in this
and the preceding passage we cannot consider Lothar the sole
culprit, for he is merely employing materials from the vast
allegorist storehouse of the Middle Ages. In the third passage,
however, Lothar must face Albert's criticism alone.
When commenting upon the Quam oblationem of the Canon
and the five signings with the cross which accompany it, the
first three over the entire sacrifice, the fourth and fifth over
the host and chalice respectively. Albert's frustration with rememorative allegory elicits his harshest response:
Mitrde III.6 (PL 213: 121C).
••m.2:8ob.
•• DMM II.49: 887-898 and 1!:50: 894-899 (PL 217: 884D-885A).
•• Liber de divinis officiis II.4 (CCCM 7, p. 86; 168-182).

27

ALBERT'S .CRITIQUE

OF LOTHAR OF SEGNI

595

On this point certain [writers] make absurd statements: that
because Christ was sold for thirty pieces of silver, which is three
times ten, the three first signings with the cross are made; and
that because there was then a selling and a buying, two signings
with the cross are made in second place. 81 Others add that because
Christ was sold by three sorts of men, namely, priests, scribes
and Pharisees, the three signings with the cross are made; and
because of the buying and the selling, two signings are made in the
second place. 32
Others say that because the traitor Judas received a morsel of
bread after Satan had entered into him and thus was cursed, by
contrast the offering of the Church is called" blessed" (benedicta);
because he was proscribed by the assembly of the faithful, by contrast this offering is called "wholly acceptable" (adscripta); because his deed was not approved and of no effect, by contrast this
offering is called "valid" (rata); because he lacked all reason,
by contrast the offering is called "reasonable" (rationabilis); and
because the deed of Judas was condemned and so he hanged himself, by contrast [this offering] is called " worthy of acceptance "
(acceptabilis) .33 These and other [interpretations] of this kind
we consider to be absurdities of unlettered men who profess to be
doctors by reason of their excesses and nonsense, and who make
theology detestable by their doctrines. 34

While Albert may speak in charity of " certain writers " and
" others, " the interpretations which he cites as examples are all
found in the De missarum mysteriis. The order is slightly different and in the case of the use of the role of Judas to explicate this text, the applications are differently arranged, but
the substance of the charge remains. In fact Albert has overlooked another possible interpretation which Lothar gives:
the first three signings with the cross recall what Jesus did with
the bread and wine-" he took, blessed and gave;" the fourth
recalls the word of institution pronounced over the bread" This is my body"; and the filth recalls the words pronounced
over the chalice-" This is my blood. " 35 These interpretations
are not to be found in the other major writers of the allegorist
Cf. DMM III.H!.490-512 (PL 217: 850D-851A).
Cf. DMM III.12: 535-541 (PL 217: 851C-852A).
33 Cf. DMM III.12: 515-528 (PL 217: 851B).
3 • III.IO: 118ab.
35 Cf. DMM 111.H!:528-534 (PL 217: 851C).
31
32

596

DAVID F. WRIGHT, O.P.

tradition. Unlike the two preceding passages which show
direct dependence upon previous writers, notably Rupert of
Deutz, it appears that in this passage Lothar was carried away
by his imagination and, although unnamed, must bear Albert's
criticism alone.
Like Florus of Lyons in the ninth century, who attacked
the method and allegorical exaggerations of Amalarius of Metz,
Albert the Great attacked the same method of interpretation
used by the followers of Amalarius. Just as the triumph of
Florus at Quiercy did little to overcome the influence of Amalarius, so the criticisms of Albert did little to stop the influence of Lothar of Segni. The De missarum mysteriis continued
to be copied for four centuries and achieved its lasting triumph in the work of William Duran ti, the Elder ( 1295) ,
whose Rationale divinorum offiaiorum (1285-1291) became the
standard treatise on matters liturgical for the succeeding centuries. In the introduction to Book IV which treats the Mass.,
Duranti acknowledges his dependence upon the work of Pope
Innocent III.8 6 In his conclusion Duranti sums up his method
of procedure in these words:

+

Like a honey bee I have profitably gathered this [work J from the
various Zibelli and commentaries of others as well as from the gifts
which divine grace has bestowed on me. 37

No truer statement could have been made regarding his use of
Lothar's work, for of the 176 chapters which comprise the
De Missarum mysteriis, 152 appear in Duranti's Rationale
verbatim. Worthy though the attack of Albert might have
been, through Duranti the 'homines illitterati ' had won the
day.
DAVID F. WRIGHT,

O.P.

Aquinas lns.titute of Theology
Dubuque, Iowa
••See IV.1.2 (Rationale divinorum officiorum. Venetiis: Apud Gratiosum Perchacinum, 1568), f.58r.
37 VIII.14
(ibid.), f.320r. "Hoc enim tam ex diversis aliorum libellis et commentariis more melliscantis apis, quam ex his quae mihi divina gratia propinavit
fructuose collegi. "

ALBERT THE GREAT: A BIBLIOGRAPHICAL

GUIDE

The goal of this bibliographical essay is to indicate resources
and collections of writings by and on Albertus Magnus. Students of Albert's theology as well as of other areas of his work
still must go to several sources to gain some overview of Albert's
writings or to :find extensive lists of books and articles on him.
Just as there is no complete edition of his writings at the present
moment, so there is no bibliography of writings on his thought
which attempts to be complete.

Editions of the Writings of Albert the Great
A collection of Albert's works was published and edited by
A. Borgnet in the nineteenth century in thirty-eight volumes
(Paris: Vives, 1890-1897). It was based largely on an earlier
edition, B. Alberti Magni, Ratisb. Ep., O.P., Opera (Lyons,
1651),
volumes.
The Albertus Magnus Institute in Cologne began thirty years
ago to publish the critical text, Opera Omnia (Aschendorff,
1951) . Fourteen volumes have appeared. In his bibliography for the Albertus-Festschrift (Cologne, 1980), J. Schopfer
lists ten authentic or pseudonymous Albertine works which
have been published separately.
P.G. Meersemann published an introduction to the oeuvre
of Albert in the 1930s. He discussed the authenticity and provenance, the situation of text and editions as well as the content
of each work. He arranged them under the three headings of
philosophy, theology and scripture: Introductio in Opera
Omnia B. Alberti Magni, 0.P. (Bruges, 1931). A similar,
shorter survey had been published in German: F. Pangerl
" Studien iiber Albert den Grossen," Zeitschrift fiUr katholische
Theologie, 36 (1912), 304-346.

Bibliographies of Writings on Albert the Great
Meersemann's book is a sign of the new flurry of interest
in Albert which occurred at the time of his canonization. In
597

598

THOMAS F. O'MEARA,

O.P.

1931, Yves Congar and M. H. Laurent published a bibliography of 583 works on Albert: " Essai de bibliographie Albertinienne," Revue Thomiste 36 (1931), 198-238. The authors
published some additions in an" Addendum," Bulletin thomiste
3 (1931), 312f., as did T. Kaeppeli in his "Bibliographia albertina," Positio causae S. Rituum Congregationis . , .. (Rome,
1931). Over the next two decades there appeared the specialized bibliography of A. Walz and A. Pelzer in the natural sciences, "Bibliographia S. Alberti Magni indagatoris rerum
naturalium," Angelicum 21 (1944), 13-40, and F. J. Catania,
" A Bibliography of St. Albert the Great," Modern Schoolman,
37 (1959-1960)' 11-28.
The next bibliography is one of considerable importance.
l'tf. Schooyans published as a separate issue of the Brazilian
periodical, Revista da Universidade Catolica de Sao Paulo, 21
(1966) , a "Bibliographie philosophique de Saint Albert le
Grand (1931-1960) ,"continuing the work of Congar and Laurent. Over fifty pages in length, it included a list of bibliographies, general and specialized, on Albert. Its only drawback is
that this collection of close to one thousand entries included
many which are only marginally about Albert, works on medieval thought in general.
The present anniversary year of Albert's death in 1280 is
the occasion of new bibliographies. In the Jubiliiumsschrift on
Albert and natural science edited by James A. Weisheipl, Albertus Magnus a.nd Science (Toronto, 1980) , there is a bibliographical listing of all the works referred to in the essay where
experts treat the broad range of Albert's contribution to science
and to the philosophy of science. In Germany, Gerbert Meyer
has edited a large volume of studies on Albert's philosophy
and theology, Albertus-Magnus·-Festschrift (Cologne, 1980).
For this work J. Schopfer has assembled a bibliography of
articles and books on Albert after 1962. Having collected over
two hundred titles, Schopfer's listing gives a view of the secondary literature after Schooyans and up to 1980.
THOMAS

Washington, D.C.

F. O'MEARA,

O.P.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM IN ALBERT THE GREAT'S
LIBER DE CAUSIS ET PROCESSU UNIVERSITATIS
That Albert the Great (ca. 1200-1280) was interested in the
conception in Liber de Causis, Prop. 4, of esse as primum
creatum 1 is attested to by his commenting upon it in his
earliest down to his latest treatises. 2 For example, in Summa de
Creaturis, composed before 1243, Albert interprets Prop. 4 of
the Liber (" Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante
ipsum creatum aliud ") in such a way that esse pertains to cognition rather than to the actual world: esse or ens is first in
the sense that it is the concept beyond which the resolution of
other concepts cannot go and, accordingly, ens is not entirely
convertible with bonum, verum or unum (Summa de Creaturis,
Pars I, Tr. 1, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; XIX, 7d) .3 When writing the
1 See Otto Bardenhewer
(ed.), Die ps.eudo-aristotelische Schrift Ueber das reine
Gute bekannt unter dem Namen Liber de Cau..-is (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder,
1882), p. 166: "Prima rerum creatarum est esse, et non est ante ipsum creatum
aliud." For Bardenhewer's translation of the Proposition from Arabic, see ibid.,
p. 65: " Das erste der geschaffenen Dinge ist <las Sein; ein anderes Geschaffenes
vor ihm gibt es nicht." The anonymous Liber de Causis. is Neoplatonic in its
philosophy (basically, that of Plotinus and Proclus) but whether its author is
Arabian, Jewish or Christian is still not clear. For a survey re its authorship see
Leo Sweeney, S.J., "The Meaning of Esse in Albert the Great's Texts on Creation
in Summa de Creaturis and Scripta Super Sententias," Southwestern Journal of Philosophy, 11 (1980), note 20.
2 For the chronology of Albert's life and writings, see J. A. Weisheipl, "Albertus
Magnus and the Oxford Platonists," Proceedings of American Catholic Philosophical
Association, 32 (1958), 124 sqq.; idem, "Life and Works of St. Albert the Great,"
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative Essays (Toronto: Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980); the "Prolegomena" to the volumes of the
Cologne critical edition (see below, note 7).
3 Since the Cologne critical edition of this Summa has not yet been published,
my references are to the Jammy edition: Petrus Jammy, Opera B. Alberti Magni
(Lugduni Sumptibus Claudii Prost, 1651), Vol. XIX: Summa de Creaturis Divisa
in Duas Partes. On its date as prior to 1243, see L. Sweeney, "Meaning of Esse,"
n. 24.

599

600

LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

slightly later Scriptum Super I Librum Sententiarum,' Albert
used Prop. 4 of the Liber de Causis to prove the impropriety of
saying that " essence is being or good. " Since esse or essence
is what is created first and no other creature is prior, essence
has nothing to serve as its foundation or subject, of which it
would in turn serve as form; the result is that essence as
essence cannot be unless created from nothing. Everything
other than' essence comes through formation of essence-for
instance, in the order of nature the good presupposes the concept of essence as that in which it is. Therefore, the intelligibility of essence is based upon no subject or substrate
but upon nothingness and thereby is prior to all else (ibid., a.
13, solutio; XIV, 667D-668A) .6
Fifteen years later Albert was still concerned with the
exegesis of Liber de Causis, Prop. 4.7 In chapter two of Metaphysfoa, Liber IV, tr. 1, he first proves that metaphysics is
the science of being qua being and then faces opposing views,
one of which is this: ens is what is caused first and thus there
is nothing caused prior to it; accordingly, it is in no way a
subject (" igitur nulli subicibile esse videtur ") but is predicable of all else (XVI, 163, lines 3-5) . Ens is (Albert replies)
a subject in which all subsequents come about through information (ibid., lines Hl-15)-thus, life, substance, sensibility,
reason and intellect are all added as forms to ens (lines 16-17).
As subject it is that which is presupposed in all subsequents
and stands under them all (lines 20-22). Accordingly, all subsequent existents are shown to be in being in the same way
• On dating the Scriptum ca. 1!!?45 and, thus, as somewhat later than the Summa
de Creaturis, see L. Sweeney, ibid., n. 34. My references will be to the Jammy
edition, Vol. XIV.
5 On esse as substrate, see In I Sent., d. 46, a. 14 [solutio]; XIV, 669B.
6 For other comments on Prop. 4 see ibid., a. 11, ad objectionem de definitione
Augustini; XIV, 665C; In II Sent., d. 1, a. 1. ad objectionem de tertia explicatione; XV, 5A; for interpretation of those texts, see L. Sweeney, "Meaning of
Esse," portion of article corresponding to notes 84 sqq.
7 That
Albert wrote his Metaphysica between 1260 and
see B. Geyer,
Alberti Magni Opera Omnia [hereinafter: Cologne edition] (Monasterium Westfalorum in Aedibus Ashchendorff, 1960), Tomus XVI, Pars I, p. VIII.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

601

that beings which have esse through information are present
in being that has esse solely through creation. Why this? Because being has absolutely nothing prior to it, whereas whatever comes after it presupposes being itself. Such is the meaning of the statement in the Liber de Causis: "esse is what is
created first and no other creature precedes it. " All else (e.g.,
good, etc.) comes about through informing [and determining]
it (ibid., lines 25-34).
As a final instance of Albert's attention to Prop. 4 consider
how he solves one of the problemata given him in 1271 by the
Dominican master general, John of Vercelli,8 as to whether
the angelic movers of the heavenly bodies thereby mediately
help produce whatever arises on earth through natural causes
and, thus, educe them from potency to act (Problemata Determinata, qu. 14; XVII, 45, lines 44-47). Even if angels
should (Albert responds) move the heavenly bodies-a philosophical impossibility, though-, it would not follow that they
would cause whatever comes about on earth through nature
by also educing them from potency to act (ibid., p. 53, lines
69-p. 54, line 5) . This eduction they would do not by their
own power but by that of the first cause within them; hence,
their function will be to make others be apt recipients of the
causality of the first cause (ibid., p. 54, lines 5-8). Otherwise
one would infer that esse is not what is caused first and is not
the proper effect of the first cause-a position most effectively
disproved in the Liber de Causis (lines 9-12) .9
8 On 1271 as the date of composition, see P. Simon's "Prolegomena"
to J. A.
Weisheipl's edition of Problemata Determinata, ibid. (1975), Tomns XVII, Pars I,
pp. XXVII-XIX.
"Also see Summa Theologiae, I, tr. 18, q. 58, m. 1 ad ultimum sed contra;
Jammy edition, XVII, SOSA. A. Hufnagel doubts, however, that this Summa is
rightly attributed to Albert-see " Zur Echtheitsfrage der Summa Theologiae
Alberts des Grossen," Theologische Quartalschrift, 146 (1966), 8-89; but see R.
Kaiser, "Die Benutzung proklischer Schriften durch Albert den Grossen," Archiv
fur Geschichte der Philosophie, 45 (1968), 14, n. 88: Part One of the Summa is
certainly Albert's, Part. Two may have been finished by Gottfried von Duisburg.
Albert also comments on Liber de Causis, Prop. 4, in Super Dionysium De Divinis
Nominibus., c. 11, ad 2; Cologne edition XXXVII, 428, lines 26 sqq.; De Bono, tr.
1, q. 1, a. 6, Praeterea; ibid. XXVII, 10, line 88.

602

LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

Those four passages are sufficient witnesses to the fact that
Albert attended to Prop. 4 of the Liber de Causis from start
to finish of his writing career. 10 They also disclose one of the
major speculative problems which esse primum creatum entailed for him as a professed Aristotelian: how does esse so
conceived fit into Aristotle's theory of act and potency? 11
Although this question is muted in Text A, it is rather blatant
in the other three. According to Texts B and C esse primum
creaturn serves as foundation, subject, substrate for everything
else, which is consequent upon esse and functions as form or
determinant added to it. But in an Aristotelian worldview
subject or substrate is aligned with potency, form with act.
Therefore, is not esse primum creatum on the side of potency
and not of act? But Text D intimates that esse primum causatum is act, as this line of argumentation indicates. The power
which secondary causes such as angels have over esse is their
share of the divine power resident within them and is exercised
by their helping subsequent agents fittingly receive the divine
causality; but God causes not by educing act from potency but
by creation; therefore, His first effect-esse-is an act not
issuing from a potency but resulting from His creative fiat.12
The relationship of esse primum creatum to Aristotle's act/
potency is, then, a genuine problem. Has Albert faced it
squarely in any of his treatises? Yes, in Liber de Causis et
1 ° For greater
convenience we shall refer to the key passage in Summa de
Cnaturis as Text A; In I Sent. as Text B; Metaphys.ica as Text C; Problemata
as Text D.
11 On Albert's claim to be Aristotdian
and on his aim to explain the corpus
aristotelicum to his contemporaries, see R. Kaiser, "Zur Frage der eigenen
Anschauung Alberts d. Gr. in seinen philosophischen Kommentaren," Freiburger
Zeitschrift fiir Philosophie und Theologie, 9 (196fl), 53 sqq.; L. A. Kennedy, "The
Nature of the Human Intellect According to St. Albert the Great," Modern
Schoolman, 37 (1960), lfll-fl3. On the meaning Albert gives to "Peripatetic," see
below, n. fl3, last prgr.
12 The intimation that esse is act arises from Albert's contrasting God's causality
with that of natural causes, which are " de potentia in actum eductores ... [et]
productores " (Problemata Determinata, q. 14; Cologne XVII, p. 45, line 47, and
p. 54, lines 4-5) . Esse, whether created by God or educed from potency by creatures,
is act.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

608

Processu Universitatis, composed before 1272 and after his commenting on other books of Aristotle's M etaphysics. 18

PROBLEM REVISITED
On first reading Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis
one might be tempted to conclude that Albert intensifies rather
than solves the problem since he appears in some places to
equate esse primum c·rea.tum with act, but in others with
potency. 14
13 I say "other
books of Aristotle's Metaphysics" because Albert considered
what we know as the anonymous and Neoplatonic Liber de Causis to be the concluding portion of Aristotle's Metaphysics-see R. Kaiser, "Versuch einer Datierung
der Schrift Alberts des Grossen De Causis et Processu Universitatis," Archiv fiir
Geschichte der Philosophie, 45 (1968), 1Z9.
Kaiser's dating of Albert's De Causis et Processu Universitatis as not earlier
than 1265 and not later than 127Z (this last date is preferable) seems well argued.
See ibid., pp. 125-86, where he lists and evaluates the arguments of those who
posit Albert's De Causis to be written as early as IZ44 (e.g., Mandonnet, Endres,
von Hertling, Feig!) and as late as IZ7Z (e.g., Pelster, Geyer, Bach, Bardenhewer,
Scheeben).
In an article in the same volume of the Archiv and entitled "Die Benutzung
proklischer Schriften durch Albert den Grossen," pp. 1-ZZ, Kaiser refutes the claim
of Ernst Degen in his 190Z Munich dissertation, "Welches sind die Beziehungen
Alberts des Grossen Liber de Causis et Processu Universitatis zur Stoicheiiisis
Theologike des Neuplatonikers Proklos?" that in his commentary on the Liber
Albert uses not only the Liber de Causis itself but also Proclus's Elements of Theology in a Latin version of an Arabic translation (ibid., pp. 1-14). As a result of
Albert's seeming unawareness of William of Moerbeke's translation (finished 1Z68)
of Proclus's Elements, one may conclude that either Albert's commentary on the
Liber was before 1Z68 or, perhaps better, that Moerbeke's translation was not
available to him personally. Albert does refer (although somewhat sporadically
and arbitrarily) to Proclus's Elements in his Summa Theologiae, which is subsequent to his commentary on the Liber (ibid., pp. 14-Zl).
14 The Cologne critical
edition (Alberti Magni Opera Omnia, Tomus XVII,
Pars II) of Albert's Liber has not yet appeared and, hence, we shall use the
Borgnet edition (Vol. X, pp. 861-6Z8) but only after consulting the Jammy
edition (Vol. V, pp. 5Z8-655). The Latin of both editions is occasionally corrected when demanded by the sense of a passage but corrections are always
indicated by being inserted within brackets (I also have often simplified punctuation) . Hereafter I shall abbreviate the title of Albert's commentary as PU. He
divided PU into books, tractates and chapters, which I shall refer to in that
order. Hence, this reference-PU l.Z.Z; X, 390a-means: Liber de Causis et
Processu Universitatis, Book I, Tractate Z, ch. Z; Borgnet Vol. X, p. 390, upper

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LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

Why (Albert asks in an instance of the first sort) does the
First Principle cause life in all living existents? Because esse, as
well as vivere and intelligere, is an actus continuus issuing
from the First Being, First Life and First Intelligence (PU
1.2.2, p. 390a) . Again: the termini of an esse in time are its
potency and act-such an esse starts in potency and :finishes
in act (" in potentia enim esse inchoatur et in actu terminatur ") ; the esse of the First Cause starts neither from without nor from within and, thus, is fully eternal; but the esse
which the First Cause produces and which belongs to intelligence and soul, has a start from without (the First Cause)
but not from within: although produced by God, it is so
comprehended by His light as to be immutable and, accordingly, exists entirely in act and without any potency (" totum
existens in actu, nihil sui habens in potentia "; 2.1.8, pp. 446d447a). On one occasion when speaking of the simplicity characterizing a self-standing substance, Albert even describes esse
primum creatum as "pure act": whereas a substance which
comes about through fieri has an esse which is not pure but
mixed and multiple because of many potencies, a self-standing
and immutable substance possesses an esse which is a simple
and pure act without any mixture of nonbeing (" esse enim
est simplex actus et purus, nihil habens admixtum de non
esse ") and which has :flowed from the First Cause into an id
quod est marked by immobility (2.5.12, pp. 603d-604a) .
In other passages, though, Albert links esse primum creatum
with potency. For example, why is such an esse less simple than
its First Cause? Because it is distant from that Cause; because
according to that-which-it-is it has come from nothing and is,
of itself, in potency. Thus it is concrete through the relationships it has to the nothingness from which it came and to the
power of its First Cause, in which it existed intelligibly before
it came to be (2.1.17, p. 462b) .15 Again: even though simple,
half of first column on that page. Since Albert's Liber does not extend beyond
Vol. X of the Borgnet edition, references will generally omit that volume number.
15 Also see ibid., c. 18, p. 463a.

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

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esse primum creatum entails relationships and powers (potentias) and, thereby, is a composite of finiteness and infiniteness.
Finite due to its origin as form and light from the First Intellect, it is infinite with respect to what follows upon it through
division: potentially it is in and of that infinitude. It also is
infinite in itself because of the goods, powers and other potentiae
which flow out from it to subsequent realties. But these goods
and powers do not make the esse primum creatum a composite:
it remains a simple concept or intelligence, which however involves a diversity because of the relationships and potencies
underlying them. This diversity causes in turn the subsequent
intellects to be diverse: the esse is potentially each subsequent
(" potentia est sequens "), which comes to be when that potency is brought into act by determination replacing the state
of confusion [and of indetermination in which the subsequents
exist in that esse] (2.1.19, pp. 465b-c and 466a; see key-text
"H" below). This connection which Albert puts between esse
primum creatum and potentia no doubt results, we may note,
from his conviction that everything except the Necessary Being
is in potency and, thus, nothing has esse from what-it-is, which
is rather in potency and from nothing (2.1.14, p. 456d) .
The paraphrases so far offered are rather lengthy but they
seem warranted as a restatement of the problem encountered
above in Texts A to D: how is esse primum creatum related to
Aristotle's theory of act/potency? Is it act or potency or
both or neither? Secondly, they illustrate that Albert was very
much aware of that theory and often tried to deal with how
esse could be best situated within it. In order better to understand and evaluate his efforts let us study separately and in
context several key passages. 16
TEXT E: PU 2.1.5 (Borgnet ed., X, pp. 441-42) : "Qualiter
16 These will be lettered
as " E " and so forth (see above, n. 10) for ease in
referring to them. Numbers in brackets will also be added to them for the same
reason.
PD 1.2.8, p. S98c-d, speaks informatively of esse primum creatum but not
explicitly in connection with act/potency; hence PU 2.1.5, pp. 441 sqq., is instead
chosen as Text E.

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causa primaria universalis plus influit in causatum quam secundaria universalis "
In Book One Albert discusses the First Cause (its status of
Necesse Esse; 17 its knowledge, freedom, will and omnipotence;
Tr. One to Three) and fiuxus as the manner of its causing
effects (Tr. Four). At the beginning of Book Two he speaks
of the four primary causes: the First Cause, who is efficient,
formal and final source of all realities; Intelligence, which moves
all subsequents through the desire it instills in them; Soul,
which moves the first heavenly body by the desire it conceives for the Intelligence; Nature, the form and power diffused
through all the heavens as their innate principle of motion and
life (2.1.2, pp. 436-37). Those are the causes with which Albert
concerns himself in Text E on this point: in a situation where
an effect arises from primary and secondary causes, the primary
cause literally " influences " (= flows over into, pours into)
the effect more than does the lower cause. 18 The gist of his
discussion follows.
[l] That a primary cause's flowing over into the effect is
greater than that of a secondary cause is based upon four
reasons. [a] The first cause flows into the effect even when
the second cause does not. [b] This latter cause is set up as '.1
substance (sitbstantificatur) only through the former, which
gives it its power of flowing-into (virtutem infiuendi). [c] Whatever a second cause does, the first cause does more eminently
17 Designating God as Necesse Esse comes from Avicenna, whom Albert took
to be one source of the original Liber de Causis-see PU
pp. 433d and 435a.
On Avicenna, see P. Morewedge, The Metaphys-ics of Avicenna (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1973), pp. 206 sqq., 298-99 and 324; S. M. Afnan,
Avicenna: His Life and W-0rks (London: Allen and Unwin, 1958), pp. 130-35;
M. M. Anawati, Avicenna: La Metaphysique (Paris: J. Vrin, 1978); G. Verbeke,
"Introduction," in S. van Riet (ed.), Avicenna Latinus: La Metaphys.ique (Leiden:
Brill, 1978) . Also see n. 22 below on dator formarum, which likewise is Avicennian
in origin.
18 In his discussion Albert contrasts
the four primary causes not only with
secondary ones but also among themselves, as the chapter shows. The quotation
marks around the words " influence, " " inflow " and " flow " in subsequent pages
indicate that they are to be understood literally.

ESSE PRIMUM

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and more perfectly, but not e converso. [d] A second cause is
in the first virtually, potentially, substantially and (so to
speak) influentially or out-goingly, as some philosophers say,
for it goes out from the first according to its entire reality.
But a primary cause is not present in a secondary cause in any
way. Hence, a first cause pours more into the effect than does
a second cause, which in fact is an effect of the first.
[2] Accordingly, the first cause is said to be in many (in
multis) because its causality extends to all secondary causes
and, secondly and to some extent, to be of many (de multis)
since as a sort of univocal cause it shares form, name and
meaning (rationem) with those secondary causes. 19 In this
sense, then, the first cause is called "universal"
p.
441b-c).
[3] If with Aristotle we take a universal to be a one in and
of many, what is more universal is in and of more ("in pluribus
... et de pluribus ") and, consequently, a first cause is more
universal and more " influential " than a secondary one. Moreover, not every primary cause is the first cause but only that
cause which has neither equal nor contrary. Again, a secondary cause, although it receives " influence " from antecedent
causes, is of itself and substantially a cause; yet it does not
pour more into the effect than the prior causes, even though
its pouring-into combines its own causality with that from
above: all the resources which the " influence " of a secondary
·ause calls upon it has from its prior cause, where they are in
a more potent and strong state (p. 44ld) .
[After settling an objection that a secondary cause has the
greater "influence" because what it pours into an effect
grounds the effect's definition and demonstration (pp. 441d19 The explanation here of in multis and de multis helps clarify PU 2.1.9, p. 465c
(which has been cited above, "Problem Revisited," and below as Text H, #3b):
if "esse oomparatur ... ad id quod post ipsum est ... infinitum est: potentialiter
enim in infinitis et de infinitis est. " On univocal cause see next footnote.
On #Id, second last sentence ("But a primary cause is not present in a secondary cause in any way"), see 2.2.29, p. 522b sq., for an apparently different
doctrine (" Causa agens formaliter est in eo quod agit et constituit ") .

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442a), Albert summarizes what has preceded and sets down
conclusions.]
[4] From what has been said previously it is clear that the
first cause pours more into an effect than its secondary cause,
for it inflows more intensely and extensively (" intensius . . .
et in pluribus ") , more eminently and powerfully and its " influx " adheres more tenaciously to the effect than that from
the secondary cause. [5] True enough, the latter flows into the
effect in a more determinate fashion than does the former, for
that which the secondary cause pours into the effect determines
it as to its form more than does that coming from the primary
cause (p. 442a) .
[6] Accordingly, some attack the position just presented by
saying that the " influx " from the secondary cause when compared with that from the first cause is as act to potency-thus
vivere with respect to esse is act to potency, and likewise sentire
with reference to vivere. Since, then, an act contributes more to
reality (esse) than potency, they conclude that a secondary
cause pours more into the effect than does a primary one.
[7] But that is an error, for no act is a potency except inasmuch as it is also imperfect, but an act is imperfect not of
itself but from the fact that it is an act of what is imperfect.
[8] But with reference to efficient and to formal causes every
act is perfect because it is an act of what is perfect (" Nullus
enim actus potentia est nisi per hoc quod etiam imperfectus est.
Imperfectus autem est non ex se sed ex eo quod est imperfecti.
Comparatus autem ad efficientem et formalem causam, omnis
act us perf ectus est propter quod est act us perf ecti ") . Thus,
motion is a perfect act with reference to the mover from which
it proceeds but is an imperfect act by being in what is moved.
[9] But the going-forth or "flux" from a first cause is a perfect
act insofar as it issues from that cause, and accordingly it is
an imperfect act only inasmuch as it is received in the effect
(" Processus autem sive fluxus a prima causa secundum quod
est ab ipsa actus perfectus est, et accidit illi actum imperfectum
esse secundum quod est receptus in causato "). [10] But truly

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the perfection of the effect is present more simply and eminently in a primary rather than in a secondary cause and, thus,
the objection is invalid. Hence, a universal primary cause
clearly flows more into an effect than does a universal secondary cause (p. 442b).
Comments. Of the many texts in PU which touch on esse
primum creatum this one serves as a good introduction since
2.1.5 is a clear affirmation that esse is not potency with reference to vivere and other subsequents but is, of itself and as
from the First Cause, a perfect act and, secondly, it sets forth
the basis (in part, at least) upon which that affirmation rests:
the crucial notions of infiuere and fiuere. Let us begin with
these last two words.
In order to understand infiuere we must first investigate
fiuere, since the former entails the latter: "Influere ... est
fluxum talem [the sort of fiuere Albert had discussed in the
previous chapter] alicui innectere receptibili" (1.4.2, p. 412d).
What, then, is fiuere? It is not synonymous with causare but is
restricted to analogous causality 20 and is exemplified in the art
(p. 410d) of an architect's building a house or of a doctor's
inducing health, (p. 412b), as well as in a ray of light from the
sun (p. 411c) or in water of a creek from a spring (p. 410d).
What those instances have in common is that one and the
same causative factor is in the source (the architect, doctor, sun,
20 Albert first states that fiuere is similar to (note that he does not say: identical
with) univocal vs.. equivocal causality (p. 410d: "Similiter enim idem est fluere
quod univoce causare "). A bit later (ibid., c. 6) he calls it analogous: the " flow"
from the First to the last existent occurs neither " in genere causae efficientis
aequivocae omnino" nor "inter ea quae omnino univoca sunt." Rather, it occurs
"inter ea quae per analogiam dicuntur, in quibus secundum quasi instrumentale est
ad primum. Et f.orma qua fluit primum magis ac magis coarctatur et determinatur
secundum quod fluit in secundo vel in tertio et sic deinceps .... In omnibus enim
his idem est quod fluit, licet secundum aliud esse sit in primo et secundum aliud in
secundo, et sic deinceps" (pp. 420d and 421a). On causes as univocal, analogous
and ·equivocal see L. Sweeney, S.J., A Metaphysics of Authentic Ex'stentialism
[hereafter: AMAE], (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1965; Ann Arbor,
Michigan: " Books On Demand, " 1977), pp. 232-34.
On esse or "being " as analogous when applied to God and creatures, see below,
Text F, #16-#19; L. Sweeney, AMAE, pp. 142-51 and 182-84.

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spring) and in the effect (house, healthy organism, illumined
surface, creekbed); consequently, that factor (the perfections of
"house," "health," light, water) is said to "flow" from cause
to effect. 21 Thus, only that factor " flows " which is of the same
sort both in cause and in effect: " non enim fluit nisi id quod
unius formae est in fluente et in eo in quo fit fluxus" (p. 410d) .
Accordingly, a "flux" (the translation of fluxus, the noun
formed upon fiuere) is the form emanating from the First
Source, which Plato calls the "Giver of Forms" (p. 411b) .22
"Flux" is not an eduction of act from potency (as Peripatetic
authors describe the process) but the coming of act from act
(" dici potest quod fluat secundum quod est actus ab actu ") 23
by the First Origin's communicating itself without lessening
its own perfection (1.4.2, p. 41lb-c). It is an incessantly on21 The first two examples are truly analogous, since the same factor is in cause
and in effect but differently: the house-as-planned vs. the house-as-built-of-bricks,
health-as-envisioned-by-the-doctor
vs.. health-as-achieved-in-the-patient.
The other
two examples are not analogous but univocal: the same factor is in both cause
and effect and in the same way: the light is physically in both its source (the sun)
and on the surface of the wall, the water is physically in both the spring from
which it flows and in the riverbed. On causes as analogous, see preceding note.
22 The conception of dator formarum is, of course, not Plato's
but Avicenna'ssee E. Gilson, History of Christian Phuosophy in the Middle Ages (New York:
Random House, 1955), pp. 195-96, 204-205, 213-15; A.-M. Goichon, Lexique de la
langue philosophique d'Ibn Sina (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1938), p. 440, #784;
S. M. Afnan, Avicenna, pp. 112 and 130. On the active intelligence as plena
formis, see PU 2.2.21, pp. 510-11, where Albert mentions both Plato and Avicenna.
23 An example of an act coming from act is, Albert adds, that of a house built
to conform with its design in its architect's mind or of a patient's health resulting
from his doctor's awareness of what constitutes health. These instances Albert
next admits finding in Aristotle's Meta., VII, c. 7, 1032bl sqq. On act from act
also see below, Text I, #4; notes 33, 70 and 75.
At times Albert is content (as here) to mention the Peripatetici without naming them-e.g., 1.1.10, p. 482c, where he contrasts them with theologi such as
Dionysius. Elsewhere he also names them--e.g.,1.2.7, p. 397a: antiqui Peripatetici
are Theophrastus, Porphyry and Themistius; posteriores Peripatetici include
Avicenna, Algazel and Alfarabi; 1.3.2, p. 402: Peripatetics who deny a will to the
First Principle are Thoophrastus, Porphyry, Avicenna and Averroes; l.3.5, p. 407c:
posteriores Peripatetici are Avicenna, Alfarabi and Algazel. At times he names only
Aristotle among them (or, at least, lists one of his treatises): e.g., 2.2.1, pp. 477d
and 478b-c; ibid., c. 23, pp. 528d and 529a.

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

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going process (" fluxus semper est in fieri "; p. 4lld) issuing
from the generosity of the First who is always in act (" ipsa
communicabilitas primi cum semper sit in actu ... hanc facit
emanationem "; p. 411c) and Who is the Agent Intellect (literally) illumining and thus constituting whatever He effects
(" intellectus agens, qui lumine quod sibi est de se, sic semper
formas emanat quibus constituit ea quae agit "; p. 411d) . It
is the intelligible and simple emanation from that First Source,
who thereby penetrates everything and is everywhere present
(pp. 411d-4Hla) .
Next, what is infiuere? Before answering, though, let us note
that fiuere is not confined to efficient causes, as one might think
from the chapter just analyzed, but applies also to formal (=
exemplary) and to telic causes (see 2.1.4, pp. 416-17) .24 Now
the First Cause simultaneously exercises all three causalities:
He is the efficient, formal and final source containing everything (2.1.2, p. 436b: "Et causa ... prima est in qua sicut in
fonte effectivo et formali et finali sunt omnia ") . Therefore,
the "flux" from Him is an efficiently produced emanation
exemplarily directed by omniscience and telically aimed at
freely communicating divine riches to creatures. 25 Esse primum
creatum is, if we anticipate what will be documented later, 26
that " flux" in its initial but enduring moment.
If the above paragraphs successfully re-present what Albert
intends by fiuere, we are now ready for infiuere: what is the
force of the preposition " in " in that infinitive? It reminds us
that anything flowing must be flowing into something which
contains, encloses, borders it. Even though a flowing liquid
24 Fluere is, in fact, the causality exercised by each sort of cause: the activity
itself of an agent, the direction given by an exemplar, the attraction issuing
from a goal. Can the grounding, limitation, individuation and multiplication which
matter effects in something be described as a fiuere? Yes, although not strictly and
only per accidens-I.4.4, p. 416b and d; 2.1.3, p. 438b-c (the initial word of the
initial sentence of the prgr. should be materia and not modo).
25 On divine omniscience, will and freedom see Book I, Tractates Two and Three,
pp. 386-409.
26 See 2.1.15, pp. 458d and 459b; Text F, #10 (= 2.1.17, p. 462a); Text H, #6
(= 2.1.19, p. 465c); Text I, #4 and #Sb (= 2.UO, p. 467b and d); 2.3.10, p. 559b.

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of itself is just that-a liquid-, it involves something over
and beyond itself-the bottle, bucket-into which it is poured
and which is its container. The" flux" which is the esse primum
creatum is no exception. It is itself a single and simple emanating form or light 27 and remains so throughout its development
into vivere and intelligere. 28 Nonetheless it connotes compositeness when " part " of a composite: the existents (Intelligence,
Soul, heavenly bodies, bodies on earth) which receive, contain,
curtail it and which are themselves the fonts of the possibility
or potency
p. 413a: " [continentia est] in possibilitate rei
cui fit fluxus, quae possibilitas rei est ex seipsa ") whereby the
light (= esse) flowing from the primal Agent Intellect is
gradually reduced from bright to dim, from spiritual to physical, as it moves from the intellectual to terrestrial levels (pp.
412d-413d) .29
27 Elsewhere Albert designates esse as "simplex conceptus mentis"
(Text F, #4;
2.1.17, p. 46lc); as "intelligentia simplex," which he explains as "forma a lumine
intellectus agentis in esse producta et in simplici ilJo lumine per intentionem
accepta" (Text H, #2; 2.1.19, p. 465b). See below, n. 56.
One should keep in mind that " to be real " for Albert means " to be light "see 1.2.1, p. 388a: "Omnis res ab il!o est in quod resolvitur sicut in suae constitutionis principium. Ex quo ergo omne quod est, sive sit per se sive per
accidens, sive sit per naturam sive per animam, sive corporeum sive sit incorporeum,
resolvitur in tale lumen intellectus agentis, et id ad aliud resolvi non potest; constat
ergo quod primum effidens est sicut intellectus universaliter agens "; 1.4.8, p. 428b:
"Dum ergo primus intelJectus universaliter agens hoc modo intelligit se, lumen
inteiligentiae quod est ab ipso prima forma est et prima substantia habens formam
intelligentis in omnibus." In fact, God is pure light (2.1.25, p. 475d). In and
through that light He pre-possesses the forms of all things and, then, establishes
and distinguishes all of them (1.3.6, p. 409d). Because the divine light extends
everywhere, God is omnipresent (1.2.5, p. 394b).
28 As will be clear from Text F, #6 ( =
2.1.17, p. 46ld), esse primum creatum
is the actus entium, whereas vivere and intelligere are, respectively, esse viventium
and esse intelligentium. The latter two are acts within the act which is esse primu1n
creatum: they are that esse in a more explicated and less perfect state-see below,
Text H, #11 (= 2.1.19, p. 466a); Text I, #3 (= 2.1.20, p. 467b-c); notes 31,
72 and 76.
•• For additional information on the production of the heavens and on terrestrial existents (a topic to which little explicit attention will be given in this
paper), see 1.4.4, p. 416d; 2.1.2, pp. 436d-437a; 2.1.3, pp. 438d sq.; 2,1,21, p, 468d;
U.l, p. 480b-c; 2.2.19, p. 507d; 2.2.\37, pp. 53S-5\l4; 2.4.2, p. 573c; U.12, pp. 585b-

.1S6.

ESSE PRIMUM

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lnfiuere is, then, to link fiuere with some recipient: " influere
autem est fluxum talem alicui innectere receptibili "; p. 412d) .
This link occurs whenever a cause (efficient, paradeigmatic,
telic) transmits the "flow" (which at its first stage is esse
primum creatum and, then, is vivere and intelligere as esse
evolves further) into the receptacle which contains and limits
it. As the " flow " is transferred, it becomes more determinate
intrinsically (e.g., esse becomes vivere) or is limited or terminated extrinsically by its recipient (e.g., esse becomes hoc esse).
Obviously, the " flow " is more perfect, both intrinsically and
extrinsically, on a higher level in the cascade of causality and,
secondly, the higher the cause, the more powerful and "influential " it is.
The preceding comments are relevant since Text E deals with
the situation in which higher and lower causes are cooperating
in that "influx" and, thereby, in producing the effect. Here
Albert first draws the conclusion that a primary cause's responsibility for the "influx" (with its two dimensions of "flux"
and reception) constituting an effect is greater than that of a
secondary cause, 30 and this for reasons now so manifest (see
#1) as to need no further explanation. He then (#2) discusses how a first cause is universal (in all secondary causes
through its causality and of them because its causality is analogous; see above, n. 19). Next he contrasts it with a secondary
cause: the latter's influence is less than the former's from which
it has received all its resources ( #3) and which accordingly
"inflows" more intensely, widely, eminently and powerfully
into what is caused than does a secondary cause ( #4) ; secondly, the latter's "inflow" forms the effect more determinately (#5). This second contrast gives occasion for the objection that the" flux" (e.g., vivere) from the secondary cause
is act whereas that (e.g., esse) from the first cause is potency
••Although "influx" entails both those dimensions, he stresses now one (as in
Text E), now the other.

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and, thus, a secondary cause inflows more into an effect than
does the first ( #6) ,31
Albert already had the data needed for responding in previous sections of the text: formal determination of esse is due
to the primary cause since whatever a second cause does, it
does more perfectly and transcendently (#le); a secondary
cause is an effect of the first (#Id); all the resources which
the " influence " of a secondary cause uses in formally determining the effect come to it from the prior cause, where they
are present more powerfully and strongly (#3). Eventually,
that is his response (see #10): the perfection of the effect is
present more simply and eminently in its prior rather than in
its secondary cause.
But his first attempt at replying is based on analyzing the
notions of act/potency (see #7-#9), an analysis which the
very wording of the objection ( #6) triggers: the" flow" (e.g.,
vivere) from the secondary cause when compared with that
(esse) from the first cause is as act to potency; but act contributes more to reality than potency; therefore, a secondary
cause "inflows" more than does a primary. Albert handles
its major premise in an elliptical and rather puzzling line of
argumentation (#7-#9):
an act is potency only if it is itself imperfect;
but an act is imperfect not of itself but from the fact that
it is an act of something imperfect;
but with reference to efficient and to formal (=exemplary)
causes an act is perfect because it is an act of what is perfect
[although it may be imperfect if it is in an effect which is imperfect]-e.g., motion is a perfect act with reference to the
mover from which it proceeds but is an imperfect act by being
in what is moved;
but [esse as] the "flux" or going-forth from the first cause,
precisely as from that cause, is a perfect act [and, thus, not
a potency], although it may be an imperfect act [and thereby
a potency] inasmuch as it is received in the effect [and is hoc
esse].
31 In #6 the objector also speaks of sentire compared to vivere as act to potency,
but for our purposes we need report Albert's discussion only on vivere and esse
as act and potency. On est1e, vivere, intelligere, sentire, see notes
and

ESSE PRIMUM

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615

The flaw which makes Albert's argument puzzlingly irrelevant to the objection is clearer if we express its last proposition
in this fashion:
esse as " flux " is act, hoc esse as " influx " is limited by its
recipient, which serves as potency.

But as "influx" esse, though limited and received by potency,
is not itself a potency, which is the recipient rather. Secondly,
esse can be in the state of "influx" (i.e., can be hoc esse)
without the presence of any secondary cause-e.g., the primal
Agent Intellect is solely responsible for the first created Intellect, which consists of esse and id quod est and wherein esse
has become hoc esse.32 But the objection dealt with primary
and secondary causes and, more precisely, made the point that
the latter contribute more to the effect than does the former
because the latter makes: esse be vivere (not: esse be hoc esse)
by changing potency to act.
The thrust of that more precise point Albert seems not to
have met here. I say "here" because what he said earlier on
"flux" in PU 1.4.1, p. 411b, does counteract their position.
As we noted above, the " flowing" of a form (read: esse) from
the First Source is not an eduction of act from potency but
the creative emanating of act from Act (p. 411b: "dici potest
quod [forma] fluat secundum quod est actus ab actu ") by
that Source's communicating itself without lessening its own
perfection. 33 If one may describe the" flowing" of esse primum
32 On God as immediately
causing the first intellectual substance, see 1.2.1, p.
387d; 2.2.19, p. 507b. On the significance of capitalizing "Intellect" or "Intelligence," see n. 56 below.
33 On God's status as Act, see 1.2.3, pp. 39ld-392a:
God knows all creatures, even
though these be potentially infinite, because " sui nulli habet in potentia sed totum
quod in ipso est, actus purus est et simplex "; 1.4.l and 2, pp. 4llc and 413c: the
" flow " or emanation of l'eality from God is accounted for by the fact that He is
always in act (" cum semper sit in actu ") and in no way is in potency (" cum
nuHo modo in potentia sit"); 2.2.4, pp. 484d-485a: as the "intelligentia universaliter activa" God "nihil in potestate habet ... intelligentia est actus purus."
Incidentally, on "intellectus universaliter agens" as the best name for God, see
2.1.24, p. 475a-b; also see n. 27 above.
On "act flowing from Act," see below, Text 1, #3, and "Comments" corresponding ton. 75.

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creaturn from God as the coming of act from Act, may one
not validly describe the development of esse into vivere as the
coming of act (vivere) from act (esse)? The relationship of
esse/ vivere would then not be that of potency/ act but of act/
act and, accordingly, the objection discussed has no foundation
and is thereby invalid.
Conclusions. Although Text E concentrates: on relationships
between primary and secondary causes (efficient, exemplary,
final) and between their " influences," it also furnishes important data on esse prirnurn creaturn. When fitted into an Aristotelian framework, it is act and not potency. It is act flowing
from the Act Who is First Cause and into the subsequent acts
of vivere and of intelligere. Limited by recipients and thereby
linked (but not identified) with potency, it becomes hoc esse,
hoc vivere, hoc intelligere .. .
The next key text will, we hope, illumine dimensions of esse
which still remain obscure.
TEXT F: PU 2.1.17 (X, pp. 46ld-462d) : "Quid sit
primum causatum in rebus et entibus "
Having earlier in this: tractate contrasted primary and secondary causes as to causality (chs. 2-6; see above, Text E, for
ch. 5) and as to the esse which characterizes each (chs. 7-10)
and having discussed the nature and origin of Soul (chs. 1116), Albert next takes: up the crucial question of what God
causes first (chs. 17-20). Let us begin with Ch. 17.
[l] Esse is what God causes first or, more precisely, creates
first since He causes it from nothing: His causality does not
presuppose anything else pre-existing (p. 46lb) .34 [2] Another reason for the priority esse has over other effects is that
no intelligibility is prior to esse. If the composite should be
84 At the beginning of this paragraph
Albert states: "Supponitur autem hie ab
omnibus Antiquis quod esse primum causatum est, propter quod ab Antiquis non
causatum tantum sed creatum esse dicitur." This statement is, of course, inaccurate
if " antiqui" refers to ancient Greek authors.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

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resolved into the simple, or effect into formal cause, or the
posterior into what is prior either in nature or in intelligible
content, or the particular into the universal, that resolution
will always stop at ens. [8] But whatever is last in a resolving process is necessarily first in a composing process. Therefore, esse is the first of all the effects proceeding from the First
Cause, for they go forth from Him by a process of composition
inasmuch as everything is constituted in its reality as a composite (p. 46lc) .
[ 4] Consequently, esse is created and is first, for it is the
simple mental concept ("simplex conceptus mentis ") which
is not formally determined at all and which enables one to
reply yes whenever asked whether some or other thing exists. 35
[ 5] This question of an sit only the First Cause can definitively settle, 36 for only He can create esse, which is a simple
concept and at which ultimately the resolution stops. Why so?
Esse is not educed from anything in which it might have a
formal start, as indeed vivere is educed from esse, sentire from
vivere, and the rational from the sensible (p. 46ld). That is,
whatever is rational is sensible, whatever is sensible is living,
whatever is living is being, but not conversely.
[6] And esse "inflows" its power upon all subsequents and,
accordingly, just as it is the act of beings (" esse actus est
entium "), so vivere is esse for living existents, sentire is esse
for sentient ones, ra.tiocinari is esse for rational ones, as Aristotle says. 37
85 On esse as " simple concept," see the portion of this article corresponding to
n. 27 above and its first prgr.
••On an est Albert refers to "what had been shown in Book One "--see 1.1.8,
p. 377b-c: " Quod autem esse habeat in effectu ex se non est sibi sed potius ex
primo esse, ex quo fiuit omne esse quod est in effectu. Hoc ergo quod est, ah alio
habet esse et illud quod est, et sic esse hoc modo accidit ei, quia ab alio sibi est;
et ideo in ipso quaeri potest an est an non est; et quaestio determinabilis est per
causam ejus quod est esse. In primo autem propter hoc quod esse non habet ab
alio, esse per se est, et quaestio an est locum nullum habet."
87 In referring to Aristotle Albert most likely has in mind On the Soul, II, c. 4,
415bl3, where to zen is identified with to einai. For a discussion of esse and vivere,
see L. B. Geiger, "La vie, acte essentiel de l'ame---l'esse, acte de !'essence d'apres

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[7] This power-that vivere, sentire and ratiocinari should
be the esse in living, sentient and reasoning existents-they
can have only from esse primum ("et hanc virtutem, quod
scilicet quodlibet istorum sit esse quorum est, sequentia non
possunt habere nisi a primo quod est esse "). Why? Because
each of those subsequents' intelligibilities presupposes something preceding and, consequently, is not produced from nothing but from that in which its esse is inchoate; [8] therefore,
none of them can come about through creation, since what is
subsequent is related to what precedes as to that which informs and determines it and, thus, the subsequent is produced
not through creation but through information (pp. 46ld-462a).
[9] The result is that esse is what is created first, that all
other effects are not created, and that no effect can be before
esse. [IO] But esse is not called "being" or "entity," for it
proceeds first from the First Cause as the simple process and
act causing anything which is: to be. 38 Since, then, esse signifies
that process as the act of being, it is better that the primum
creatum be called esse than "being" or "entity" (p. 462a).
[ 11] From its being first one can infer that esse is simpler
than all else: that is most simple which cannot be resolved into
something else; but esse is that at which the resolution of beings
stops, for if esse would be resolved into anything else, this latter
would necessarily be prior to the first and the subsequent to
the last-a situation which is unintelligible.
[12] But esse, even though more simple than all other effects,
is not as simple as the First Cause for the reason that it is
second and, thus, is distant from that Cause. Hence, according to its what-is, it is from nothing and of itself is in potency
and, thus, it is concretized through relationships (p. 462b:
" et hoc [its not being as simple as the First Cause] est propter
Albert-le-Grand," Etudes d'histofre litteraire et doctrinale (Paris: J. Vrin, 1962),
pp. 49-116; for an evaluation of Geiger's article, see L. Sweeney, "The Meaning of
Esse," pages corresponding to notes 15-16.
88 On the Latin here (" processus enim simplex prius a causa prima procedit ut
actus in esse constituens omne quod est"), see 2.1.13, p. 455b-c: " Tale ergo esse et
constitutionem in esse a prima causa accipit anima nobilis."

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

619

hoc quia est secundum [et] distans a causa prima, et secundum
id quod est ex nihilo est, et secundum seipsum in potentia est,
et sic est concretum habitudinibus ") .39 [13] For example, it has
a relationship to the nothingness from which it came and to
the power of the First in which it was intelligibly before it
existed actually: it exists not of itself but by the active power
of the First. [14] Of itself esse is nothing and, accordingly, its
reality is not nothing-but-esse to the extent that the esse of
the First Cause is.
[While next answering the objection that, if esse is the first
process from the Cause, it can be neither first nor created,
Albert furnishes some relevant data.] [15] Esse is "first" by its
not presupposing that anything of itself is pre-existent which
might furnish essential and intrinsic constituents. It does presuppose its Creator, Who however is no part of it or of any
effect. Hence, the resolution of beings into their essential parts
does not go back as far as the First Principle. [16] Accordingly,
the esse predicated of that Principle and the esse predicated of
His effects is not univocal 40 and, secondly, esse predicated of
both God and creatures is neither one genus (since then the
divine esse would be an essential constituent of created beings)
nor is it in one genus (since then something would be prior
and simpler than the First Principle) . [17] Accordingly, whenever the First Principle and an effect are each said to be, " being " is common to them through analogy and belongs to God
directly and properly but to the effects as His images. [18]
Therefore, the esse which is first when existents are being assembled and is last when they are being disassembled is not
that which is absolutely First but that which is created first.
[19] And when" first" is applied to this effect, it is not referred
to subsequents as their genus but as their principle. Why? Be39 Derived from concrescere, the past participle, concretum, means literally " that
which has been congealed or hardened " and, thus, that which is fashioned and
made definite by the relationships it has to the divine power and to nothingness.
• 0 Not univocal, Albert adds, because "univocum
... in omnibus his est essentialiter de quibus praedicatur" (p. 462c) . On fiuere as analogous and not univocal,
see above, n. 20.

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LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

cause every genus is a composite so as to be distinguishable
from another genus; but whatever is first is simple also and becomes the first constituent of a composite-none of which characteristics esse would have were it itself a composite; therefore,
esse is related to subsequents as their principle but not as their
genus. Hence, esse is what is created first (p. 462c-d) and [20]
creation is the First Agent's simple action upon no pre-existing
subject (p. 463a) .
Comments. Albert structures this text into three clear parts,
the first of which (#1-#8) establishes that esse is primum
creatum, the second (#9-#14) draws inferences from that
fact and the third (#15-#20) faces an objection. In them we
shall concentrate upon his remarks on act/potency.
In his initial attempt to establish that esse is primum creatum Albert does not disclose why it is esse rather than something else which is first but rather why esse is not merely
caused but is created: the First Agent's causality presupposes
nothing pre-existing (#1). His second attempt settles on the
former question. Esse it is which is created first because no
other intelligibility precedes it, as witnessed by the fact that
(note the word he now substitutes) ens terminates the resolution of all other intelligibilities. But ens or esse is not entirely
intramental since Albert also makes it the terminus of the reduction of such extramental items as composites, effects and
subsequents in nature ( #2) and, thus, esse as their term would
be something simple, a formal cause, and that which is first.
Granted that shortly after he speaks of esse as " simplex conceptus mentis," the content of which is unformed and undetermined (" ad nihil formatus et determinatus ") and enables
one to reply affirmatively when asked whether anything whatsoever exists ( #3) . But this statement is sandwiched between
his affirming that esse proceeds from God prior to all else ( #2)
and his remark that the esse [which corresponds actually to]
the initial simple concept can only be created by the First
Cause (#5) .41 His proof for this last calls his attention to
esse as act, to which we now turn.
"See above, n. 85.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

621

Why, then, is esse created by the First Cause? Because
it is not educed from anything in which it might have a formal
start and, thus, it is unlike vivere, sentire and ratiocinari. The
argument that these last are educed from something prior in
which they are inchoate is that every rational existent is sentient, every sentient thing is living, every living thing is ens,
but not conversely (#5) .42 This issues from everyday experience and amounts to a resolution of what is composite to
what is simple. To its four grades (rational, sentient, living,
being) there correspond in reverse order the four processes
from the First Cause of esse, vivere, sentire and ratiocinari,
the last three of which are educed from an inchoate state in
its predecessors. Are these three, then, in potency in what
precedes? In Text E (#6-#7) Albert had firmly denied that
vivere is related to esse as act to potency or, again, that sentire and vivere have that relationship. If, then, Text Fis to be
consistent, Albert does not mean that (say) vivere is educed
from esse (# 5) as act from potency but eduction is equivalent
to a development, disclosure, articulation by which act comes
from act (see Text E, portion of "Comments" corresponding
ton. 33).
In fact, he applies "act" to esse three times in immediately
subsequent lines. Esse is the act of beings (" actus est entium ")
and the " inflowing " of its power upon vivere, sentire and
ratiocinari enables them to be esse [and acts] in their respective
recipients (Text F, #6) .43 A bit later when drawing inferences
42 The transition from rational to sensible to living to being appears to leave out
the stage of chemical, which should fit between living and being-unless, of course,
being stands for chemical. This seems doubtful in view of the fact that
or esse
is primum creatum, which could hardly be a composite of chemicals! The same
omission and/or difficulty occurs in Prop. One of the Liber de Causis itself, which
moves from virtus rationalis. to vivum to esse (see Bardenhewer ed., p. 163, lines
13 sqq.).
'" On esse as actus entium, see L. Ducharme, "Esse chez S. Albert le Grand.
Introduction a la metaphysique de ses premiers ecrits," Revue de l'Universite
d'Ottawa, S!7 (1957), 1-44, especially pp. 19-9!3 and 39!-38; G. Wieland, Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Gross.en (Munster:
Aschendorff, 1979!), "Beitrlige zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters," Neue Folge, Band VII, especially pp. 47-ll!i!. For an evaluation of

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from the fact that esse is the primum creatum: esse should not
be called ens (but see #2) or entitas because it is the simple
process flowing from the First Cause as the act causing that
whatever is is (" processus enim simplex ... procedit ut actus
in esse constituens omne quod est"; #10). No, the primum
creatum should (Albert continues) be called esse and not ens
or entitas because esse designates that initial process precisely
as the act 0£ being (" esse illum processum nominat in actum
entis ") .
Those three clear affirmations of esse as act should make
the exegesis of ambiguous texts easier, one of which we encounter in the paragraphs which directly follow #10 and which
set forth inferences drawn from the status of esse as primum
creatum. Although this status indicates that esse is simple, it
is not a,s simple as God because it is distant from Him and,
thereby, its what-is is from nothing and of itself it is in potency
("et secundum seipsum in potentia est") and, thus, it is concretized by relationships (#12) . The italicized words juxtaposed so closely to his previously affirming esse to be act
makes one wonder whether Albert is contradicting himself.
Apparently not, in view of that very juxtaposition and, especially, by reason of the explanation he gives directly after the
puzzling words: esse is related to the nothingness from which
it came and to the divine power in which it was in an intelligible
manner before it was actually-it exists not of itself but by
virtue of the power of the First Cause: " habet enim habitudinem ad potentiam primi in qua fuit antequam esset secundum
intellectum. Non enim secundum seipsum est sed a potentia
et virtute primi " ( #13) . Here esse is not said to be potential
itself but solely with reference to the active power of God as
exemplary cause in which it previously existed and by which it
is now created. In this active and paradeigmatic sense potentia
is applied intrinsically and properly to God and extrinsically
to the esse primum creatum: this is the effect of God's creative
Ducharme and Wieland, see L. Sweeney, "The Meaning of Esse," pages corresponding to notes 13-14 and 17-22.

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

623

potentia and, thus, is dubbed potentia through extrinsic denomination.44 But in itself it properly deserves the title Albert
bestowed on it earlier of actus entium (#6, #10).
Will the subsequent chapter in PU favor this exegesis? Let
us see.
TEXT G : PU 2.1.18 (X, pp. 463d-465a) : "Quod esse simplicius et universalius est omnibus aliis entibus "
[1] From what has preceded one realizes [Albert begins]
that esse is more one 45 and simpler and, thereby, more universal and of greater extension than all subsequent beings. [2]
This realization is based upon the fact that although esse creatum is a simple concept, and, as created, is second after the
First and is essentially distant from Him, nonetheless it is
made concrete by its relationships to the nothingness from
which it came and to the First's power in which it was before it
actually existed (p. 463d) . [3] But those relationships do not
constitute in it an essential composition, for they are not
different constitutive essences but are a single relationship
with different terms, which reside in reason rather than in
nature.
•• This predication of potentia activa to esse primum creatitm through extrinsic
denomination is matched by the status of esse as container of divine, intellectual
and psychic powers, which result in subsequent existents and which are in esse as
active powers and not as complete essences-·see !it.1.15, p. 459a: Soul " divinam
habet operationem eo quod esse suum processus divinus est: ... in processu manet
virtus divinitatis causae primae "; ibid., p. 459b: on the level of Soul esse is one
numerically but causes diverse multiple existents inasmuch as it operates through
the power of God, Intelligence and Soul (" causat ... prout est in potentia virtutis
divinae et virtutis intelligentiwe et virtutis animae "; ibid., p. 459c: why is esse one?
Because in Soul it contains three active potentiae (creative, intellectual, psychic)
but not as complete essences since the powers which ground its causality are its
contents, and content and container are, despite a conceptual distinction, one and
the same. Also see below, n. 79.
• 5 "More one " translates
unicius, which elsewhere might mean " more unique "
but which the context indicates has to do with oneness rather than singularity. Also
see below, #7, which has to do with how God is one: "Primum principium est
.et pure unum .... vere est unum et non unitum ": He is truly one and not merely
united as though from parts.

LEO SWEENEY,

S.J.

[ 4] But the First Principle has the greatest number of relationships, which however come about when the multitude of
His effects are viewed in reference to Him; but these relationships, because based not in Him but in the effects, do not
diminish His simplicity.
[5] On the other hand, the relationships of the esse primum
creatum are based in it; accordingly, although they induce in
it no essential composition, they do diminish its simplicity. [6]
Therefore, esse is simple (though not absolutely so) and, thus,
is more strongly one than all other divine effects. The reason
is that all those other effects are composites and, thus, involve
a number of natures or essences, which are their components
and [which make] some [compositesJ prior, some posterior (p.
464a) ;46 but esse, though rendered concrete through relationships, is not a composite and, hence, it is more one and simpler
than all of them.
[7] But the First Principle is absolutely one (" pure unum ")
and entails (as Boethius says) no number, for it is neither
composed of essences nor concretized by any relationships with
a basis in Him; therefore, He is truly one and not merely united.
[8] But esse primum creatum is more one than all subsequent divine effects by its proximity to God through imitating
His unity but it is not genuinely nothing-but-one. [9] Everything subsequent to it has no unity except through a composition of potency and act, which would not be a genuine unity
but a mere aggregation [exemplified in #10 and #lld below by
substance and accidents] if it were not one and the same existent which is in potency and in act. That is, it is one and the
same existent whose [specific] reality as inchoate is in potency
and as perfect is in act (p. 464d: "Sequentia autem unitatem
non habent nisi compositionis potentiae et actus, quae unitas
non esset sed congregatio, si idem et unum non esset in potentia
et actu. Idem enim et unum est cujus esse secundum inchoationem est in potentia et secundum perfectionem est in actu ") .
••The prior and posterior composites mentioned here are those spoken of below,
#llc-d.

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

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[10] Moreover, whatever is composed of substance and accident
is one in subject and by aggregation and, hence, is not strictly
one at all.
[11] Accordingly, " one " is fourfold: [a] He who is truly
and absolutely one and in whom there is no number; [b] esse
universale [and primum creatum], which is one in such a way as
to involve a number of relationships but not of essences; [c]
a composite of potency and act, which is one by involving a
number of natures, one of which contains the other (" unum
ex potentia et actu compositum, in quo est numerus naturarum,
quarum una continetur in altera ") ; 47 [ d] that which is one as
the subject in which a number of essences reside, no one of
which causes the other except improperly (" nisi per accidens "),
as happens when a subject is said to cause the reality of an
accident (" esse accidentis ") , which however is not other than
the subject's nature or essence.
[12] [Now, an existent on a lower level possesses its unity
from the immediately higher level. Thus] what is one as a composite of potency and act [#llc] derives its ability to be one
from that which is one without composition-namely,
esse
[# 11 b], which contains everything within its power and from
which a genus gets its ability to contain species: these are one
because they are in a unity and are reduced to a unity [i.e., the
genus] (p. 464b-c). [18] That which is one because it is not
a composition of essences [and is the esse primum creatum;
#llb] has its capacity to be one from Him [#lla] who is truly
and purely one (p. 564c). That is, since He is one and since
only unity can immediately flow from unity, that" flow" is one.
[14] That which is one as a subject [#lld] has its ability to be
one from that which is one as potency and act [llc] inasmuch
as such a unified and yet composite subject causes diverse dispositions and properties: act terminates potency diversely
-sometimes perfectly, sometimes imperfectly ("tale enim
47 Also see above, 2.1.15, p. 459a-c: that which is present in another is identical
with that in which it is present (see above, n. 44); 2.2.28, p. 421c (quoted below
inn. 62),

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LEO SWEENEY,

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unmn compositum in subjecto diversas causal dispositiones et
proprietates propter hoc quod actus potentiam diversimode
terminal, aliquando perfecte aliquando imperfecte ") -so that
different dispositions emanate and occasionally occur (" emanant et occasionantur ") and, thus, are accidents inhering in a
single subject.
[15] Finally, from the fact that esse is more stringently one
than all subsequent effects, it is more extensively universal
than any of them. Why? Whatever is composed of a constitutive form or of a restrictive difference is thereby set apart
from others. [This is true even of] the highest genus, which
does not have any external or antecedent constitutive difference but does have something which serves as a difference (as
is clear when one says: " Substance is a being") and which prevents its being predicated of some subjects. Therefore, " being "
as determined by a constitutive difference cannot be predicated
of absolutely everything.
[16] But esse primum creatum is determined by no difference and, consequently, the scope of its predication is in no
way curtailed. Hence, its universality is most extensive, which
nonetheless is not that of a genus, species, specific difference,
property or accident. Rather it is that of a first principle which
enters into the reality of all things and which is analogously
referred to beings (p. 465a: " universalitatis ... principii primi
ingredientis in esse rerum omnium, quod per analogiam refertur
ad entia "). Therefore, esse primum creatum, which is simply
one, is a universal of the widest possible universality. 48
Comments. The present key passage directly deals with why
esse primum creatum is simpler and more universal than all
other creatures: it is more simple because it is not a composite
of essences, as all subsequent beings are ( #6) ; it is more universal because it is the first intrinsic source of the reality of all
••Would not God be an exception, since He would be most universal as the
principle and cause even of esse? See 1.1.10, p. 888d: "Primum quod est necesse esse
fundamentale erit ad omnia, et si ipsum contineat emanationem esse, nihil erit ens
vel esse in tota existentium universitate "; Text F, #15,

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

627

things (#16) . But the text also is informative on esse primum
creatum in itself, as these reflections show.
Why is esse, despite its greater simplicity with respect to
whatever is subsequent, less simple than God? Because it is
made concrete by the relationships it has to nothingness and
"to the First's power in which it was before it actually existed"
(" habitudinibus ... ad potentiam primi in qua fuit antequam
esset "; #2). Note that here potentia is not ascribed to it but
solely to God, who contained esse prior to creation and then
created it as His first effect.49 This corroborates our interpretation of Albert's description of those relationships in Text F
above-namely, that his statement, "et [esse] secundum seipsum est in potentia et sic est concretum habitudinibus" (see
Text F,. #12) should be read in the light of what he immediately adds there: "habet enim ... habitudinem ad potentiam
primi in qua fuit antequam esset secundum intellectum. Non
enim secundum seipsum est sed a potentia et virtute divini "
(# 13) . That is, " [esse] secundum seipsum est in potentia" is
equivalent to "[esse] secundum seipsum est ... a potentia a
virtute primi." Potentia is applied to esse primum creatum itself only in reference to the divine power knowing, containing
and creating it. The fact that in his subsequent discussion of
Text G on why esse is concrete through relationships Albert is
silent on esse's being "secundum seipsum in potentia" and
simply repeats " [esse] concretum est habitudinibus . . . ad
potentiam primi in qua fuit antequam esset " ( #2) is a reassurance of the validity of our previous exegesis in Text F.
Text G illumines other dimensions of esse and of subsequent effects. For example, esse primum crea.tum is concrete
through relationships but it is simple. All other divine effects
are composed of natures or essences ( #6) , which function as
potencies and acts ( #9) . Here, though, one must distinguish
between two sorts of compositions. In the first sort the same
item is in potency inchoately and then in act perfectly; nonetheless, it is genuinely one inasmuch as the natures or essences·
••On God's power see 1.3.3, p. 404b-c; 2.2.17, pp. 508d sq. Also see below, n. 54.

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LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

which it entails are contained one in another. Thus, the generic essence" animal" is, as genus, potentially" rational" but
it also is actually " rational " when determined by someone
defining " man. " 50 Despite the presence in it of the potential
determinations of " rational," "canine, " "equine " and so forth,
" animal " is one because it conta.ins those determinations (Text
G, #9, #llc, #12): that which is contained is one with its
container, that which is in another is one with that other. 51
But in the second sort of composition the same item is not
first in potency and then in act; moreover, it is not a genuine
unity but an aggregation. Thus, substance is potency and remains in potency even when perfected by the accidents it causes
and receives; the accidents themselves are acts. Although these
inhere in and are not really distinct from the substance, still
accidents and substance are not strictly one in being (Text G,
#10, #lld, #14) .62
Esse transcends both types of composition and, by inference,
potency/ act also. Granted it involves relationships, but these
are mental rather than actual and, strictly speaking, are a
single habitudo with several terms (e.g., nothingness, divine
power, as well as all subsequent effects that esse helps set up as
an intrinsic constituent; #3, #5-#6, #llb) ,53
Furthermore, esse transcends all logical categories: the five
predicables (#16) and ens even (#15). And yet it is universal
but its universality is analogous to God's: each is a first source,
but God £unctions extrinsically as efficient, exemplar and final
50 Genus and species are the sole instances Albert gives in
of the unity he
described in #lie (a composite of several natures related to one another as act/
potency, which nonetheless is one because those natures contain one another), but
would Intelligence, Soul and Nature fit into #lie also? The answer apparently is
affirmative since if genus and specific difference are there, a fortiori Intelligence,
p. 459b, for another reference to genus
Soul and Nature would be also. See
and specific difference.
61 See also ibid. and n. 44 re inchoate presence of active powers.
••Are there any other instances of #!Id besides substance/accidents? See n. 50
above.
53 On the relationships between esse and subsequent realities, see below, Text H,
and #6 sqq.

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

629

cause of all existents (2.1.2, p. 436b), esse primum creatum
intrinsically as their essential and radical component ( #16) .54
Thence they derive not only existence but also such specific
perfections as vivere, sentire and intelligere, all of which are
present in esse as acts, 55 whence they emerge as actus ab actu
(1.4.1, p. 41lb; see above, "Comments" to Text E, second
last prgr.) .
Let us look for more data in Chapter 19.
TEXT H: PU 2.1.19 (X, pp. 465b-466c) : " Quod quamvis
esse sit simplex, tamen compositum est ex finito et infinito "

In this chapter immediately following Text G Albert makes
the point that the simplicity of esse primum creatum does not
prevent its being composed of the finite and the infinite.
[1] Despite the fact that esse primum creatum is a simple
intelligence, it is a composite of finiteness and infiniteness by
reason of the relationships and powers it has (p. 465b: " per
habitudines et potentias quas habet "). [2] By affirming that
esse is a " simple intelligence " one does not mean that it is an
intellectual substance such as was considered earlier 56 but that
54 An intrinsic source or cause differs from an extrinsic cause inasmuch as the
former is a constitutive part of the product, the latter is not. See L. Sweeney,
AMAE, p. 223, n. 3.
On God's causality as unfolding from esse whatever perfections it contains (e.g.,
vivere, intelligere) see PU 2.!U4, pp. 499b and 500b; 2.2.17, p. 503b; 2.3.5, pp.
553d sq.; 2.3.6, pp. 555a and .555b; 2.3.10, p. 559a; 2.3.13, especially p. 546a; 2.4.11,
p. 584 sq.
55 On the presence of vivere, etc., in esse as acts and potentiae activae, see above,
n. 44; Text G, #2, and " Comments." On esse accounting for the fact that things
exist, as well as its other significations (e.g., entity, essence, act of essence, intelligibility of ens) , see L. Sweeney, " The Meaning of Esse," especially its sections of
"Summary" and "Conclusions" which correspond to notes 42 sqq.
56 See 2.1.3, p. 438a. On Intelligence as a "causa primaria," see 1.4.7., pp. 426b427d; 1.4.8, pp. 428-31; 2.1.2, p. 436c.
As one can easily gather from Text H, #2, intelligentia can mean the intellectual
substance which is a primary cause (see references given in first prgr. of this note)
and, secondly, the simple procession or "flow " from the First Cause which in its
first stage of development is the esse primum creatum with which #2 deals. For
another clear statement of both meanings see 2.1.21, p. 468d. In this paper I distinguish the two meanings by capitalizing the English word to express the intellec-

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LEO SWEENEY,

S .J.

it is a form caused to be by the light of the Agent Intellect
and received intentionally in that simple light 57-thus, we
call esse the first intelligence, vivere the second, sensibility
the third, and so forth. 58 [3] [Esse as) such an intelligence
is composed of the finite and of the infinite because of the
twofold relationships it has, for [a] when compared to that
whence or by whom it is, esse is finite and is terminated by
the light of the First Intellect; [b] when compared to that
which is after it, esse is infinite: it is potentially in and of the
infinite [multitude of existents) 59 which go forth from it through
its being divided into ens per se and ens in alio-a division
which proceeds into an endless multiplicity because what is infinite can be divided only because it is potentially infinite (p.
465c).
[ 4] But one must realize that [its being infinite with reference to the infinite series of subsequent existents is also
equivalent to] its being infinite in and of itself, since it is
distant from the First in and of itself and this distance brings
about the infinite multitude it entails (p. 465d) .
[5] But it is finite not from itself but from the First Principle, for as being it stands in the light of the Intellect protual substance (thus: Intelligence) and by using lower case to express the simple
"flow" from the Cause (thus: intelligence).
57 The italicized words from p. 465b: " ... intelligentia, hoc est, forma a lumine
intel1ectus agentis in esse producta et in simplici illo lumine per intentionem accepta
.. .," perhaps suggest Avicenna's influence. On "intentio" in the Latin Avicenna,
see E. Gilson., History of Christian Philosophy, pp. 190-91; A.-M. Goichon, Lexique,
p. 253, #469.
58 Here Albert quotes Aristotle, On The Soul, Ill, c. 6, 430a9W sqq.: "lntelligentia
ergo indivisibilium est, in quibus non est verum et falsum. In quibus autem verum
et falsum est jam compooitio quaedam intellectuum est." For the more authentic
import of the quotation (re error and truth in our intellection) in Aristotle's own
thought, see the following commentaries: D. W. Hamlyn, Aristotle's. De Anima
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), pp. 142-44; P. Siwek, Aristotelis Tractatus De
Anima (Roma: Deselee, 1965), pp. 335-36; D. Ross, Aristotle: De Anima (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1961), pp. 299-300.
•• Its being in and of infinitely many existents constitutes one aspect of its universality-see above, Text E, #£, and Text G, #16.
In 2.1.23, p. 471d, esse is contrasted with Intelligence., Soul and sensibles as "ens
secundum se acceptum" with "ens in parte."

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

631

ducing it: unless it were finite in this way, it could neither
be the term of resolution nor the beginning of composition
for all beings.
[6] In this fashion, then, esse is the intelligence which is
not only finite but also infinite by reason of the perfections,
capabilities and other powers which it contains and " inflows "
upon everything subsequent to a degree unsurpassed by any
other power-" unsurpassed " is its power because no other
power is so rich and extensive in " inflowing " 60 (" Est ergo
hoc modo intelligentia complexa ex finito et infinito in bonitatibus et virtutibus et in reliquis potentiis, quas habet influere
super sequentia ultima. Dico autem ultima quia ultra illa
[read: illam] nulla potentia adeo ampla et lata est ad influendum
quemadmodum sua "). [7] Why? Because other intelligible
forms such as vivere, sentire and ratiocinari are more expansive and more strongly universal when present in esse than in
themselves. [8] Granted that in themselves they are intelligences 61 but they are inferior to the intelligence which is esse
and are beneath it in fullness, goodness and power to " inflow".
This inferiority is due to their being less expansive [when
existing formally] as themselves than when they are virtually
present in the intelligence which is esse (p. 465d-466a: "Quia
non sunt ita dilatae in seipsis sicut sunt quando virtute accipiuntur intelligentia quae est esse ") : a restrictive difference
diminishes a thing's power of expansion, as indicated above. 62
[ 9 J The perfections and powers which esse " inflows " into
its subsequents are caused by its relationships and thus do not
make it a composite, although they do render it necessarily
00 A more literal translati-0n of the Latin would be: " ... 'inflows'
upon subsequent things down to their very last, and this it does because no other power .... "
On esse as intelligence, see Q.l .Q3, p. 472d: " esse quod est creatum primum secundum totum sui est intelligentia in lumine intellectus agentis [=God] constituta."
61 But not Intelligences-i.e.,
intellectual substances-; see above, #Q, and notes
Q7 and 56.
62 On restrictive difference,, see Text G, #15.
On the fact that the lower is more
perfect when present in the higher than on its own level, see 1.4.Q, p. 413d; Q.1.1,
p. 434b; Q.Q.QS, p. 5Qla; ibid., p. 5Qlc; Q 'l.37, p. 533d.

LEO SWEENEY,

S.J.

concrete. [ 10] Therefore, the whole which is esse primum creatum is a simple intelligence or concept, which nevertheless entails a diversity of relationships and powers (p. 466a). And this
causes the diversity of the intelligences coming after esse: [11]
its power [allows it to be] the subsequent 63 and, hence, the
reduction of that power to act is at once [the development of]
esse from a state of indetermination to one of determination
and the production of the subsequent. 64 When this last's indetermination is likewise determined as a further act, a still additional effect is produced; when this third's indetermination is
similarly determined still further, the fourth effect is produced,
and so the process goes until one reaches infinity (" Quia enim
potentia est sequens, ideo deducta ad actum in quo confusio
esse determinatur efficitur sequens, cujus confusio si iterum
determinetur ad actum universaliorem [read: ulteriorem], efficitur tertium .... ") .
[rn] This process is akin to what happens in this lower
world. Here form is divided by matter and, thereby, it gives
reality (esse) to a multitude of individuals: its potency can be
divided [into an infinity of individuals] but in such a way
[a] that it is itself present in each one as a whole in quiddity,
activity and power [b] and yet as it exists in one and in another it is distinct.
[13] But esse or first [created] intellect is joined to the next
intellect without undergoing corruption, since "joining" for it
consists in its going from indetermination to determination,
whereas its being apart from a subsequent is not through any
local or essential separation (as is the case in material things)
but through its being indefinite and undetermined (p. 466b) .65
•• Perhaps the Latin (" potentia est subsequens ") should be translated: " by its
power esse is the subsequent," especially in view of the later parallel text-2.1.28,
p. 472a: esse " secundum seipsum est potentia quodlibet sequentium " (Ch. 28 in
its entirety is a helpful summary of preceding pages).
64 This product
would not be vivere but the first intellectual substance since
production goes on indefinitely.
65 In the lines directly following, Albert continues to contrast
esse and other
intelligences ( #13) with physical forms ( #12): the former have esse superius, the

ESSE PRIMUM CREATUM

633

[14] But for a lower form to be joined to matter is to corrupt it, since to generate a material composite is simultaneously
to do away with the [independent reality of] what brought it
about; on the other hand, a material form severed from an individual is entirely apart from it and is present in it in no
manner (p. 466b-c).
[After affirming (p. 466c) that simple forms when taken in
light of the intelligence causing them have a superior reality
(" esse superius ") and are eternal and universal, Albert restates his conclusion that] esse primum creatum is a complex
of the finite and the infinite.
Comments. For our purposes this text is important because
of the data it gives on the potentia which esse entails, as this
survey shows. Esse primum creatum is describable as infinite
with reference to the infinite effects subsequent to it: by its
power it is present in them and is part of them ( #3: " potentialiter enim in infinitis et de infinitis est ") . Why so? Because
esse is their primary intrinsic cause and, as the " principium
primum ingrediens in esse rerum omnium" (see Text G, #16),
its causality permeates theirs and brings them form, name and
meaning analogously the same as its own (see Text E, #2).
Again: what makes esse both finite and infinite is the" bonitates et virtutes et reliquae potentiae " which it pours forth
until they reach the very lowest existents. The causality of
nothing else extends so far since no other power is comparable
in richness and extension (Text H, #6) . In fact, vivere and
other intelligible forms are more expansive and more strongly
universal when they exist in and as esse than formally in and as
themselves (#7) , where their " complementum et bonitas
et virtus influendi " are inferior because more restricted (#8) .
Furthermore: whence arise the " bonitates et virtutes " of
esse? From its relationship (#9) to God's power, where it origlatter esse inferius; the former are eternal and universal, the latter temporal and
particular (ibid., p. 466c).
In #13 proceeding from indetermination (e.g., esse) to determination (e.g.,
vivere or, as the case may be, the first Intelligence) is from the more to the less
perfect. See below, n. 76.

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LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

inally existed and which eventually made it actual (see Text G,
.66 These potentiae of esse are diverse and this diversity
causes diverse intelligences to arise subsequently (p. 466a: "Et
haec diversitas causa est diversitatis sequentium primum creatum "; Text H, #10), for by its potentia it is the subsequent
(see above, n. 63) and to reduce that potentia. to act is to determine esse further and thereby to produce a subsequent existent, and this process continues on down the line (#11) until
the potentiae of esse primum creatum have all been unfolded
and developed. The last level of this explication is, of course,
the visible world, where the potentia of a form is divided by
matter into many individuals but in such a way that the quiddity, operation and virtus of the form is wholly present in each
particular thing (#12) .
The conclusion which reflection upon these statements on
potentia and esse suggests seems obvious. Potentia here has an
active sense: because esse primum creatum contains vivere,
sentire and so on, 67 it can cause them. Its potentiae are those
perfections present within it as acts, which come forth as an
issuance of acts from act and not as an eduction of acts from
potency.
The last key-text will further illumine how acts issue from act.
TEXT I: PU 2.1.20 (X, pp. 467a-468b): "De solutione
quaestionis: [Unde veniat actus determinans esse primum creatum ad intellectum secundum et tertium et sic
deinceps] "
In this chapter immediately subsequent to Text H Albert
explicitly deals with the extrinsic cause of how esse is further
determined, although simultaneously he illuminates also the
intrinsic factors in that determination.
66 This portion of Text G also speaks of the relationship esse has to nothingness.
But this habitudo is irrelevant in our locating the source of the perfections and
powers esse has, but not so in our understanding the source of recipiency and
potentiality in an existent. On its habitudo to nothingness, also see Text F, #12#14; notes 54 and 79.
67 See Text G, #12: esse "potestate
continet omnia "; nn. 28, 44, and 55 above.

ESSE PRIMUM CREA.TUM

685

[1] To ask whence comes the act determining ease primum
creatum to be the second, third or other subsequent intellects
is to seek the actually existing agent which causes esse to be
living and which thereby must itself be living and possess sensible light and other such qualities. Why so? Because anything
which goes from potency to some or other act does so under
the efficacy of an agent having that act (p. 467a: "Quaeritur
autem ... unde veniat actus determinans ipsum [esse primum
creatum] ad intellectum secundum et tertium et sic deinceps.
Omne enim quod de potentia venit ad actum non potest effici
in actu nisi per id quod est in actu) .68
[2] Answering that question is not difficult if we recall points
previously made. The First Principle is absolutely perfect: all
perfections and excellences are in Him but are completely one
and cause no multiplicity in Him at all, for privations, motions
and compositions are in Him immaterially, nondeficiently, immutably and simply-the manner in which lower existents are
present through their rationes in what is higher. [8] Hence, the
Principle Who as uncreated Esse produces esse also makes esse
be vivere inasmuch as He is life and also causes vivere to be
sentire inasmuch as He is the Light of sensibles (p. 467b-c) .69
[ 4] Accordingly, Aristotle says that act is from act: 70 the act
of that which is caused is from the act of its cause. For example,
the house made of stones and wood is from the house which is in
its builder's soul (p. 467c: "actus est ab actu: actus ejus quod
fit, ab actu ejus quod facit, sicut domus quae est in lapidibus et
lignis, a domo quae est in anima architecti ") and which is the
ratio or species of the house existing in the light of his practical
••Although Albert's Latin is awkward, the thought is clear. Despite the initial
word, quaeritur, of the paragraph, he is expressing the difficulty (see #13: "in hoc
stat solutio dubitationis propositae ") that if esse becomes vivere and sentire, its
extrinsic cause must not only be and be living but also be sentient.
69 On God as cause of esse, vivere and intelligere, see 2.8.5, pp. 558d sq.; 2.8.13,
p. 546a; 2.8.14, p. 564b-c; 12.2, p. 890a; (the entire chapter is informative); also
n. 54 above.
70 See Meta., VII, c. 7, 1082bl sqq.; also note 28 (first prgr.)
above and n. 75
below.

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LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

intellect: this ratio is related to the house of logs and stones as
art is related to the matter of artefacts.
[5] Plato too posited ideal forms in the light of the universally agent Intellect, which are imprinted upon material things
as is a seal upon wax and which subsist and are incorruptible
and more perfect in every way there [than they are in things]
inasmuch as in that light they are present in an esse higher
than their own. [6] These forms are, he says," universals existing prior to things " and serve as source for the forms of all
things, since the light of the First Agent Intellect goes forth to
everything which is and carries them to all things (p. 467d). [7]
But they are not affected when their "parts " [i.e., the things
they cause] are corrupted because their source or principle is
not those " parts " and nothing is destroyed so long as its principles remain intact. Consequently, they too remain intact in
the principles which constitute them and which are the processions of lights and the light of the Agent Intellect, which is the
universal cause of all: since they are the light of that First
Agent Intellect, they are the light and rationes of all things,
with the result that the forms of things are intelligible and that
whatever is intellectually known is known through its form.
[8] But such forms can be taken in a threefold way, [a] the
first of which [consists in our viewing them] in the principle
itself whence they proceed; so considered, they are all one. [b]
Secondly, [one may view them] in the light in which they proceed from the First; so considered, they differ in their rationes.
[c] Thirdly, [we may view them] in the light as it terminates
at [and constitutes] the things themselves; so taken, they are
actually diverse, for the light of the First Cause gives form to
every second cause, which then acts [under the influence] of
the form and power of that First Agent (p. 468a) . (9] Thus
a soul " forms " digestive heat, which thereby acts according
to the form not of fire but of the living organism nourishing
itself: not fire but the soul imprints upon that heat the forms
which make it living and animated. It is in this fashion that
the action of the First stretches from first to last.

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

637

[10] Since Plato looked on the ideal forms within the light
in which they proceed from above [see supra, #Sb] and, thus, as
differing from one another in their rationes as the rays proceeding from a single point in the sun differ from one another, he
also stated that they cannot be compared with material things.
[a] Each of these latter is, in its reality, one solely and stands in
itself lethargic and unproductive, [b] whereas the reality of a
form viewed in the procession of light [from the First Cause] is
because of its power a principle of infinite subsequents by continuously sending forth forms to produce the reality of things
and yet stands in itself immutable and eternal (" esse formae
in processu luminis acceptum virtute principium est infinitorum,
continue emittens formas ad esse rermn, et est stans in seipso
fixum et aeternum ").
[ 11] [Because they are thus the source of an infinitude of
existents] these forms have for Plato a relationship even to the
"smallest perfections "-namely, the forms enmeshed in matter,
which are perfections only as byproducts and images of genuine
perfections (p. 468b). [rn] These latter are, Plato concludes,
separate substances, which differ generically and specifically
among themselves insofar as they are viewed now indeterminately, now determinately within the "flowing" of light from
the First Agent.
[ 13] Let this suffice as a solution to the difficulty proposed
[of how the actually existing agent which causes esse can also
cause it to be vivere, sentire and so on.]
Comments.
This key passage consists of four parts, in the
first of which Albert states the problem (#1), in the second he
sketches a broad outline of his solution (#2-#3) , in the last two
he fills in that sketch by calling upon Aristotle (#4) and, at
greater length, Plato (#5-#12) .
The problem he is here concerned with is at the bull's eye of
our topic. As esse primum creatum moves from an initial and
and relatively indeterminate stage, it becomes vivere, then sentire and so on; but vivere, sentire, etc. are acts with reference to
esse and one must search for their source; but that source must

638

LEO SWEENEY, S. J.

be an agent who possesses those acts i£ he is to cause them in
esse since whatever comes from potency to act achieves act only
by the efficacy 0£ that which is in act; accordingly, one must discover an agent who is a living and a sensitive existent (#1) .71
The way in which the problem is stated even in paraphrase
discloses at least two pitfalls Albert must avoid: that esse is
in potency to vivere and to sentire and, secondly, that the agent
causing esse to be sentire must itself exist with senses and therefore be physical. Hence, in answering he must emphasize that
esse is act and restate that God (and, hence, esse primum creatum too as His first effect) does contain (and, thus, causes)
.sensible and other physical perfections but in a nonphysical
fashion.
Albert presents his reply with broad strokes and, even so,
rather indistinctly (#rz-#3) .
All perfections are in God-e.g., esse,vivere, [intelligere],sentire, as well as those which privation, motion and composition entail; 72
See abov.e, n. 68; 2.2.2, p. 48ld.
I insert intelligere because it is higher than sentire and is its source. lntelligere
is listed with esse and vivere in the following: 1.2.2, p. 390a (see above, n. 69);
2.2.28, p. 520d; ibid., ch. 29, p. 522b-c; 2.3.5, p. 554a (see above, n. 28). In
2.1.17, p. 46ld (=Text F, #6) he inserts sentire as third member in the list
between vivere and rationale or ratiocinari; in 1.4.4, p. 416(\ the list is ens, vivum,
sensul>'., ratio, intellectus; 2.1.4, p. 440a-b: esse, vivere, sentire, intelligere; 2.1.13, p.
455b: esse, vivere, sentire, intelligere; 2.1.19, p. 465d: esse, vivere, sentire, ratiocinari.
See 2.3.5, pp. 553d sq., for an explanation of how esse, vivere and intelligere "complectuntur omnia quae sunt: vivere enim per incrementum et nutrimentum vegetabilibus est esse, vivere autem per sensum sentientibus est esse, et vivere per
in tellectum in telligibilibus est esse."
On the triad of esse, vivere and intelligere in other authors see P. Hadot, "Etre,
vie, pensee chez Plotin et avant Plotin," Les sources de Plotin (Geneve: Fondation
Hardt, 1960), pp. 105-157; A. H. Armstrong, "Eternity, Life and Movement in
P1otinus' Account of Nous," Le Nioplatonisme (Paris: Centre National de la
Recherche Scientifique, 1971), pp. 67-76; R. T. Wallis, Neoplatonism (New York:
Charles Scribn.er's Sons, 1972), pp. 66-67, 124-25, 130, 132-33; Stephen Gersh,
KINESIS AKINETOS: Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus (Leiden:
E. J. Brill, 1973), pp. 20-22 and 78-80; idem, From lamblichus to Eriugena: An
Investigation of the Prehistory and Evolution of the Pseudo-Dionysian Tradition
(Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1978), pp. 47, 87-88, 143 sqq.; E. R. Dodds, Proclus: Elements
71

72

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

639

all those perfections are there in their rationes (since such is
the way in which the lower is present in the higher), and
yet each is completely one with God and with the others,
each is there according to the divine manner of being rather
than its own (thus privations are there nondeficiently, motions immutably, compositions simply, matter immaterially, sensibility nonsensibly);
moreover, all those perfections are there as acts since an agent
must be in act the acts which he causes and God is the
agent causing those acts in subsequent existents;
consequently, because God is uncreated Esse, He causes the
act which is esse primum creatum; because He is Life, He
causes esse to be the act which is vivere; because He is
Light, He causes vivere to be the act which is [intelligere
and its offshoot], sentire.
If our re-presentation of Albert's solution is accurate, he has
cleverly sidestepped the two traps set in #1 insofar as he conceives of esse, vivere and other intelligences as acts and, secondly, of the divine nature as containing the perfections even of
His effects in the visible world but in an invisible and spiritual
way. 73
But he still must account for how God's causality works. This
account he finds partially in Aristotle's dictum that act comes
from act since an effect's act arises from the act of its cause
(#4) . Take the case of an architect's designing and building a
of Theology, pp. 252-54; L. J. Rosan, The Philosophy of Proclus (New York:
Cosmos, 1949), pp. 97-98; Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (Paris: Etudes
Augustiniennes, 1968), Ch. IV: " La triade intelligible: etre, vie et pensee," pp.
213-46; ibid., pp. 260-71; J. Rist, "Mysticism and Transcendence in Later Neoplatoni.sm," Hermes, 92 (1964), 218.
73 On this point Albert differs from such a Neoplatonist
as Plotinus, according to
whom the One causes all precisely because He transcends all and contains nothing:
" How then do all things come from the One, which is simple and has in It no
diverse variety or any sort of doubleness? It is because there is nothing in It that
all things come from It. . . . The One, perfect because It seeks nothing, has nothing
and needs nothing, overflows, as it were, and Its superabundance makes something
other than Itself" (Enneads, V, 2 [ll], 1, lines 3-5 and 7-9). See L. Sweeney,
"Basic Principles in Plotinus' Philosophy," Gregorianum, 42 (1961), 506, n. 4.

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LEO SWEENEY, S. J.

house, which results from its blueprint in his mind directing his
activity of building. The finished product is the perfection or
act of the blueprint of " this house " as concretized and realized
in materials. Its act has come from its agent's act existing in
the light of his intellect (p. 467c). Its act "flows" from him,
its analogous cause (1.4.2, p. 410d; see above, Text E, " Comments," prgrs. 2 and 3) .74
To apply this reflection to esse: the acts which are esse primum
creatum, vivere and so on are caused by the acts of esse, vivere,
etc., existing as paradeigmatic rationes in the light of the divine
intellect. An actual esse is the act of its exemplar but as concretized and realized in an existent. It is an act" flowing" from
the Act who is God, the analogous cause of all things. 75
But Albert still must explain more precisely how He causes
effects in the sensible world. For help he turns to Plato, whom
he finds locating forms in three places: in God, where their
rationes are all united; in the light in which they proceed or
" flow " from their divine source and where they differ ratione;
in the light as it terminates and constitutes existents, where
they differ actually (#S) . But how do these three levels illumine how an immaterial and incorruptible divine cause can
produce even material and corruptible things? What is common
to all three is the fact that each entails forms. Those in material
things (#Sc) are separated from one another and are each
lethargic and unproductive (#lOa) ; those in the flow of light
from the First Cause (#Sb) are endlessly productive and yet
are immutable and eternal (#lOb); those in God (#Sa) are
there in a divine manner: simply, transcendently, eminently,
immaterially (#lOb). Yet transcendent, eminent, simple, immaterial as they are in the divine light which is the First Agent
74 Albert often utilizes an artist and his art in his commentary,
as this partial list
of texts indicates: 1.1.12, p. 387b-c; ibid., p. 388b; 1.2.5, p. 394b; 1.4.1, p. 410d sq.;
1.4.2, p. 413a; 1.4.8, p. 429a; 2.1.1, p. 434c; 2.1.20, p. 467c; 2.2.1, p. 480b; 2.2.2,
p. 481d; 2.2.3, p. 483d; 2.2.9, p. 491b; 2.2.28, p. 521d; 2.2.29, p. 523b; 2.2.37,
p. 533d; 2.3.5, p. 554b.
75 Other texts on "actus ex actu " are 2.2.23, p. 513d; 2.5.15, p. 607b. Also see
2-2.2, p. 48.2a, which speaks of " fluxus formae super formam."

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

641

Intellect (#7, #8) and in the light emanating from Him, those
forms are the means by which God causes all subsequent existents. His light goes forth and carries the forms to whatever isconstituting existents in their reality (#6) , rendering them cognoscible ( #7) , and also giving them causal power (#8) as the
channels through which God's action reaches from on high down
to the bottom 0£ reality in the physical universe (p. 468a:
" lumen enim causae primae omnem causam secundariam format ut agat ad formam virtutis agentis primi .... Et hoc modo
actio primi pertingit a primo usque ultimum "-(#9); also see
n. 54 above).
And in that light issuing from the divine Agent Intellect those
forms are (to revert to Aristotelian terminology) acts which
come from Act. Since they are also present in esse primum
creatum, God's first effect, as the acts and potentiae activae 0£
further effects (see above, Text H, "Comments"), they also
emerge as acts from the act which is esse as this becomes increasingly determined. 76

Conclusions
The key text just commented upon suffices to bring our entire
paper to a close for it is an unambiguous answer to the question
with which we began 0£ how esse primum creatum could be
fitted into Aristotle's theory 0£ act and potency. 77 Despite earlier
statements which were ambiguous (Text F, #13) or elliptical
(Text E, #7-#9), Albert here clearly responds that esse primum
creatum is act. 78 In fact, its contents (vivere, intelligere, sen76 This increasing determination is a transition from the more to the less perfect,
as can be inferred from texts cited above in n. 62 : if the lower is more perfect when
present in what is higher than on its own level and if going from presence on the
higher to its own level is to move from indetermination to determination, that
transition to greater determination reduces it from a more to a less perfect state.
See above, n. 28.
77 See the section above of our paper oorresponding ton. 11.
78 On esse as act also see 1.1.8, p. 378a: " esse est actus ejus quod est "; 1.1.10,
p. 38la: "non autem est causans nisi habeat actum illum qui est esse "; 1.2.2,
p. 390a: "esse, vivere et intelligere actus continui sunt "; 1.4.7, p. 426c: form
"actus et esse eorum est ... [intelligentia] caelo dat actum et esse "; 2.1.8, p. 447a:

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LEO

S. J.

tire) are acts too. These, then, are related to esse as acts to act
and not as acts to potency. Hence, their coming forth from esse
is not an eduction of acts from potency but an unfolding of acts
from act through the threefold extrinsic causality (efficiency, exemplarity, finality) of the Act who is esse increatum and intellectus universaliter ageris. Together with esse primum creatum,
they are simultaneously the potentiae activae within the procession or "outflow" of light by which He causes all creatures to
be and to be what they are in the cascade of reality reaching
from God down to matter (see above, notes 27, 33, 54).
Albert's identifying esse primum creatum and its contents
with lights or forms, which "flow " into, and thereby constitute,
created existents, discloses him to be a Platonist (= Neoplatonist). But his calling them acts also reveals an Aristotelian
strain in his position.
His adherence to Aristotle's theory of act and potency is,
though, less than wholehearted when we realize that potency
for the German Dominican often seems to point not so much
to an intrinsic state of potentiality in an existent as to some
sort of relationship to an outside cause. This realizaion can be
gained from many texts. Passive potency is equivalent to receptivity, which however arises from an existent's distance from
the First Cause (2.1.14, p. 458a) .79 In an earlier passage: what
" esse intelligentiae et animae nobilis ... totum existens in actu, nihil sui habens in
potentia "; 2.1.17, pp. 461c and 462a (=Text F. #6, #IO): "esse actus est entium
... [esse est] processus ... a causa prima ... ut actus in esse constituens omne
quod .est.... Esse processum ilium nominat in actum entis "; 2.2.11, p. 494b:
" intellectuale enim esse ... est ... intelligentiae substantialis ejus actus "; 2.4.12,
p. 585c: "potentia non in esse alicujus est"; 2.5.12, p. 604a: "esse enim est
simplex actus et purus." Also see above, n. 33, re God as Act.
79 According to 2.1.21, p. 469a, Dionysius
is the source of this emphasis on
distance. See 2.3.7, p. 555d, for a comparison of the distance which dissimilarity
causes in immaterial existents with that which diversity of place causes in bodies;
2.4.2, p. 573b-c: the relationships and active powers which a being receives are
p110portioned to its distance from the First Cause.
Although 1.4.2, p. 413a, states that the possibility which enables something to
receive and contain an "inflowing " perfection arises from the thing itself (" possibilitas rei est ex seipsa "), still 2.4.12,, p. 585b-c, portrays God as the producer of a
being's receptive potency: " Causa enim prima non tantum est producens res sed

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

643

is second is in potency to what is first, what is third is in potency
to what is second, and so on down the line. Why? Because the
second is distant from the first, the third from the second, and
so forth (1.4.5, p. 419d sq.) .
A bit later: the difference in grade between the existents
(e.g., Intelligence, Soul, the heavens, things on earth) which
constitutes the natural order of the universe arises in this
manner. Whatever is from another has a threefold comparison:
to the higher existent which is its cause, to itself with respect
to what it is and to the potency it involves inasmuch as it came
from nothingness-before it existed, it was in potency because
whatever is from another is caused by that other and was in a
state of potency before it came to be (1.4.8. p. 428c: " comparationem ... et ad hoc quod in potentia est secundum hoc quod
ex nihilo est: antequam esset, in potentia erat quia omne quod
ab alio est, factum est et in potentia erat antequam fieret ") .
Nearly sixty pages later: an intelligence of lower rank is in
potency both to the First Cause and to an intelligence of higher
rank-to the First Cause because it is His creature and to the
higher intelligence because it is formed and perfected by the
light flowing thence (2.2.5, p. 486d) .
Subsequently: the id quod est of an intelligence entails potency and privation: potency since it is in potency to the cause
producing it; privation inasmuch as it has arisen from nothingness (2.2.14, p. 499c: "Id autem quod est permixtum est potentiae et privationi secundum id quod est. Potentiae dico
quia ipsum est in potentia ad causam constituentem: sic enim
non est necesse esse. Permixtum est etiam privationi in quantum ex nihilo est ") . Its esse, although it is the pure goodness
gradus et ordinem rerum praedeterminat . . . ; et ideo sub actu producti producit
potentiam susceptivam, quae quia sub umbra actus producitur, necesse est quod
imperfecta sit."
On active powers, see
p.459a: distance of Soul from God accounts also for
the efficacy of its intellectual and divine potentiae activae. In ibid., ch. 14, p. 458b,
Albert explains that potentia activa is linked with distance not qua distance but
qua involving a process in and through which the power of higher causes travels to
the effect and is operative there. Also see n. 44 above and the prgrs. which correspond to notes 66 and 67.

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LEO SWEENEY, S. J.

flowing from the First Cause and is without impurity insofar
as it is from and in that Cause, is at a distance from that
Cause and thus an intelligence is neither caused nor produced
except in a state of potency and privation because of its distance from the First.
A final passage: the First Cause and a creature differ in their
manner of acting because they differ in their manner of being.
In God esse and id quod est are identical and, hence, He acts
through that which He is (2.4.1, p. 572a) . But every creature
is in potency and, according to that which each is, is nothing
and from nothing; therefore, it engages in activity not according
to what it is but in accordance with its esse. Not so with God,
whose id quod est is not from nothing or in potency: according
to what He is, He is self-subsistent and has absolutely no
cause in comparison to which He might be in potency (p. 572b:
" secundum id quod est, non ex nihilo est nee in potentia est.
Secundum enim id quod est, in seipso est, nullam penitus
habens causam ad quam comparatum sit in potentia ") .
In the light of those texts potentia in at least one of its
meanings (see above, n. 79) indicates primarily the openness of
an existent to extrinsic causes rather than the intrinsic constituent which receives and limits an intrinsic act and which
is more characteristic of Aristotelianism as traditionally understood.80 And if one adds this non-Aristotelian conception of
80 Aquinas's approach to potency/act in his early treatises is marked by a similar
sort of "extrinsicism "--see L. Sweeney, S.J., "Existence/Essence in Thomas
Aquinas' Early Writings," Proceedings of American Catholic Philosophical Association, 37 (1963), IQ6-28, especially p. IQ7: " One realizes that esse/essence are act/
potency not by what they are in themselves but by the relationship the existent has
to God."
Incidentally, some contemporary Thomists interpret Aquinas's texts on esse in
such a way that in an existent it solely is real and essence is reduced to " pure possibility" or" pure potency of being" or, even, a negation almost (e.g., if esse is the
line drawn on .a blackboard, essence would be the point terminating it) . Thus, esse
contains and is the source of all perfections whatsoever in an existent. See Maurice
Holloway, "Towards the Fullness of Being," Proceedings of Twenty-Fourth Convention of Jesuit Philosophical Association (Woodstock: Woodstock College Press,
1962), p. 22: "The act of existing then is the source of the reality of the individuality [of a being] , .. [and] of its total intelligibility"; ibid., p. 26: "Diverse

ESSE PRIMUM CHEATUM

645

potentia to Albert's identifying esse and its contents (as already noted) with lights and forms "inflowing" into existents
from the divine intellectus universaliter agens and plenitudo
formarum (see above, n. 22), he is much more Platonic than
Aristotelian. 81 This conclusion stands firm, despite the fact
acts of existing are responsible for diverse essences"; ibid., p. Q8: "Our act of
existing ... pre-contains the fullness of being"; ibid., p. 34: " Our act of existing
is all of these at once [namely, material and immaterial, physical and intentional,
substantial and accidental] on the level of human existence, just as God is all existence infinitely "; ibid., p. 37: our act of existence is " the total reality of what we are
and ... the very intrinsic content of all our perfections." Also W. Norris Clarke,
"What Cannot Be Said in St. Thomas' Essence-Existence Doctrine," New Scholasticwm, 38 (1974), 36: "All perfection resides in the act of existence itself.
Existence is now seen ... as the whole inn.er core of all the perfection the being
contains" (see ibid., n. 9, for references to G. Phelan and W. E. Carlo); W. J. Hoye,
Actualitas Omnium Actuum: Man's Beatific Vision as Apprehended by Thomas
Aquinas (Meisenheim am Gian: Anton Hain, 1975), p. 78: "If esse is taken as
intensive act, ... [it contains] all acts and perfections whatsoever"; ibid., p. 79,
where he quotes with approval W. E. Carlo's statement that "as all creatures flow
from God, so all other principles flow from esse in the creative act"; ibid., p. 80:
"There is nothing in an existent which is not existence."
However unfavorably one reacts to those authors' statements as an interpretation
of Aquinas, they would be right on target if directed at Albert's conception of esse
primum creatum as the act which contains all subsequent perfections (e.g., vivere,
intelligere, sentire) precisely as acts and his understanding of passive potency
(=essence) as merely a being's distance from its Cause (see n. 79 above).
On Albert in relationship to Aquinas see the studies listed in the following: M. H.
Laurent and Y. Congar, "Essai de Bibliographie Albertinienne," Revue Thomwte,
36 (1931), 460, nos. 548-555; F. J. Catania, "Bibliography of St. Albert the Great,"
Modern Schoolman, 37 (1959), Q4-Q7; M. Schooyans, "Bibliographic Philosophique
de Saint Albert le Grand-1931-1960,"
Revista da Universidade Cat6lica de
Sao Paulo, QI (1961), 83-84. The following have appeared since 1960: Guy Allard,
"Reactions de trois penseurs du XIII 0 siecle vis-a-vis de l'alchimie (T. d'Aquin,
Albert le Grand, Roger Bacon," Cahiers d'Etudes Medievales, 2 (1974), 97-106;
D. Gonzalez, "El legado intelectual de San Alberto Magno," Studium, 5 (1965),
1Q7-35; P. Montane, "Algunos precedentes Albertinos de! tomismo," Es,i£ritu, Q4
(1975), 5-26; A. Pelzer, "Le cours inedit d'Albert le Grand sur la Morale a
Nicomaque recueilli et redige par St. Thomas d'Aquin," Etudes d'Hwtoire Litteraire
sur la Scolastique Medievale (Paris: Nauwelaerts, 1964), 272-325; F. Ruello,
La notion de verite chez Saint Albert le Grand et Saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1969).
81 On Albert with reference to his predecessors
(e.g., Plato, Aristotle, Greek
Neoplatonists, Arabians, etc.) see the studies listed in the following: Laurent and
Congar, " Essai de Bibliographie," pp. 457 sqq., nos. 514-541; Catania, "Bibli-

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LEO SWEENEY, S. J.

that on almost every possible occasion he speaks of esse primum
creatum as act.
LEO SWEENEY, S.J.

Loyola University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

ography ," pp. 24-27 (in those pages studies referring to Albert's predecessors are
not separately listed from those referring to Aquinas); Schooyans, "Bibliographie,"
pp. 66-69. Since 1960 the following studies have been published: Bernard Burke,
Das neunte Buch (Theta) des. Lateinischen Grossen Metaphysik-Kommentars von
Averroes (Bern: Francke Verlag, 1969), see especially Section III: "Einfluss des
Averroes auf Albert den Grossen und Thomas von Aquinas," pp. 119-52; F. J.
Catania, " Albert the Great, Boethius and Divine Infinity," Recherches de Thiologie Ancienne et Medievale, 28 (1961), 97-114; A. Cortabarria, "Literatura
algazeliana de los escritos de San Alberto Magno," Est. Filos., 11 (1962), 255-76;
J. Dunbabin, "The Two Commentaries of Albertus Magnus on the Nichomachean
Ethics," Recherches de Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, 30 (1963), 232-50;
H. Gatje, "Der Liber de Sensu et Sensato von al-Farabi b.ei Albertus Magnus,"
Oriens Christianus, 48 (1964), 107-116; B. Geyer, "Albertus Magnus und die
Entwicklung der scholastischen Metaphysik," in P. Wilpert (ed.), Die Metaphys.ik
im Mittdalter "Miscellanea Mediaevalia," Band II (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1963),
pp. 3-13; M. Grignaschi, "Les traductions latines des ouvrages de la logique arabe
et l'Alfarabi dans !'oeuvre d'Albert le Grand," Archives rJ:Histoire Doctrinale et
Littbaire du M oyen Age, 39 (1972), 41-107; M. Mignucci, "Albert the Great's
Approach to Aristotelian Modal Syllogistic," Arts Liberaux et Philosophic au
Mayen Age [Acts of Fourth International Congress of Medieval Philosophy] (Paris:
J. Vrin, 1969), pp. 901-911; F. Ruggiero, "Intomo all'influsso di Averroe su S.
Alberto Magno," Laurentianum, 4 (1963), 27-58; J. B. Schneyer, "Alberts des
Grossen Augsburger Prediktzyklus iiber den HI. Augustinus," Recherches de
Theologie Ancienne et Medievale, 36 (1969), 100-147; F. Van Steenberghen, "Albert
le Grand avait-il une philosophie personelle? ", Bulletin de l'Academie R011ale de
Bdgique (Lettres), 52 (1966), 15-30.

BOOK REVIEWS
Albqrtus Magnus and the Sciences, Commemorative Essays, 1980. Edited
by JAMES WEISHEIPL, O.P. Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval
Studies, 1980. Pp. xiv + 658.
Etienne Gilson once remarked that Albert the Great is more famous than
he is well known. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, published on the
seven-hundredth anniversary of the death of the "Universal Doctor" of
the thirteenth century, will help to make Albert far better known than
he is. James Weisheipl has edited an important work for mediaevalists
and historians of science. In twenty-one separate articles scholars describe
and analyze some of Albert's achievements in physics, psychology, biology,
chemistry, astronomy, embryology, botany, ornithology, and mathematics.
Albert the theologian knew that the truths of science and theology are
not contradictory, and further, that our knowledge of nature helps us
to come to know the Creator. And Weisheipl's work adds markedly to our
understanding and appreciation of Albert the natural scientist.
For the most part, the sources relied upon for this book are the paraphrases of Aristotle's works which Albert completed from 1250 to 1270,
in the midst of an extraordinarily active life of mendicant friar, university
professor, provincial prior, and bishop. In his task of making all of
Aristotle " intelligible to the Latins " Albert did not merely explain the
texts of the Stagirite. He re-worked some of them and provided many
additions, corrections, and innovations of his own. These Aristotelian paraphrases, and several independent treatises, provide a rich source of information for the historian of science. The articles in Weisheipl's book are
ample evidence of the treasures that can be found in reading Albert. The
major purpose of this review is to provide the reader with some sense of
what is available in the book. It will not be possible to comment in
detail on the many topics discussed in the various articles. The authors
range from graduate students to established scholars and some of the
essays would be of interest to only a few narrow specialists.
W eisheipl, already famous for his 1974 biography of Thomas Aquinas,
introduces this work with what is sure to be the skeletal outline of a
similar book on Albert. With the meticulous scholarship for which he is
well known, Weisheipl discusses the scholarly controversies concerning
Albert's birth and early life as well as the accounts of his activities as a
major figure in the thirteenth century world. In an appendix to the
volume he provides a chronological account of Albert's works on the

647

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BOOK REVIEWS

natural sciences. Weisheipl's sketch is of the life of an amazingly active,
peripatetic friar who walked across Western Europe and of a man who
was a keen observer of everything from stones, to spiders, to birds, to
mining technology, to men.
Articles by Benedict Ashley and William Wallace offer an excellent
analysis of Albert's general understanding of the natural sciences. Ashley
describes the classification of the sciences as Albert presents it, and
Wallace explains the kind of knowledge Albert thinks possible with the
world of change as its object. If mediaevalists were to read only two
articles in the book, these would be the two to read. Both authors are
at home in discussing the many currents of mediaeval thought and they
are able to place Albert in the wider context of the age in which he lived.
Ashley gives us a useful chart detailing the division of the sciences and
the various works of Albert which fit into each category. Wallace argues
for the importance of Albert's explanation of the kind of necessity which
is possible for the scientist of nature to discover. As Wallace points out,
Albert knew that the study of nature depends upon neither theological
nor mathematical principles, and Albert's understanding of the autonomy
of the natural sciences is confirmed in the various articles dedicated to
particular features of his investigation of nature.
Betsy Price surveys Albert's understanding of physical astronomy and
astrology, citing the sources he had at his disposal, and indicating Albert's
own plans, which he never realized, to write separate treatises on astronomy
and astrology. Her account of the different astronomical systems which
Albert discusses would have been enhanced by further attention to the
place of astronomy in the classification of the sciences.
In one of the outstanding articles of the volume, Ernest McCullough
presents a searching and systematic analysis of Albert's paraphrase of
the first three chapters of Book III of the physics: Aristotle's definition of
motion. Anneliese Maier has argued that Albert is the source of the distinction, so much discussed in the fourteenth century, between motion
considered as forma fiuens and as fiuxus formae. McCullough does not
think that the evidence is so clear. He shows that Albert rejects the
interpretations of both Averroes and Avicenna, and that in the process
Albert fashions a profound understanding of Aristotle's discussion of
motion. McCullough's essay is an excellent account of the many complexities inherent in an intelligible treatment of motion, and is of special
value to the historian of physics.
Albert's interests in alchemy, stones, minerals, and chemical technology
(especially with respect to the production of iron) are examined in articles
by Pearl Kibre, John Riddle and James Mulholland, and Nadine George.
These authors find Albert a keen observer of the world of minerals and
stones, fascinated with the origin, formation, and use of metals.

BOOK REVIEWS

649

Nicholas Steneck and Lawrence Dewan discuss Albert's contributions
to the psychology of sense perception. We discover Albert, the commentator
on Aristotle's De Anima, aware of the Arabic interpretations of the role of
sense experience in the process of knowing as he lays the foundations of
what becomes the scholastic analysis of sense perception. These two
articles offer an excellent account of mediaeval theories of the senses with
special reference to the difficulties in the Aristotelian analysis of the
medium of sense experience and in the incorporeal nature of the sensible
as it exists in the medium. Steneck and Dewan should be read in conjunction with the first part of Katharine Park's essay on Albert's influence
on late mediaeval psychology.
Like Aristotle, Albert was fascinated with all living things. His biological treatises contain impressive accounts of his own observations and
theoretical speculations. Albertus Magnus and the Sciences contains articles by Joan Cadden on Albert's understanding of nutrition as the basis
for a universal physiology; Karen Reeds on Albert's paraphrase of what
was considered to be Aristotle's De Plantis; and Jerry Stannard on Albert's
contributions to mediaeval herbalism. Robin Oggins describes Albert's
elaborate classification of hawks and falcons. Nancy Siraisi uses Albert's
treatises that touch on human anatomy, physiology, and psychology to
discover his conception of medical learning and its relationship to natural
philosophy. Siraisi shows how Albert draws upon the works of Aristotle
as well as those of the medical tradition of his time to forge a unified
system of anatomy and physiology. Luke Demaitre and Anthony Travail
provide a detailed account of Albert's explanation of human embryology.
Theirs is a highly technical article, but is an important one in which we
may see the way in which Albert responds to the differences between
Aristotle and the Galenic tradition.
Albert is often seen as underestimating the potential of mathematics in
the study of nature. Such at least seems to be the view of A.G. Molland
in his account of the role of mathematics in Albert's thought. Molland
thinks that Albert's commitment to the distinctions between physics and
mathematics led him to an inadequate appreciation of the importance of
mathematics in an understanding of nature.
Two articles are devoted to special textual questions. Jeremiah Hackett
argues that the " boy theologian" who is the object of Roger Bacon's
criticism as one not properly trained in philosophy, and yet revered as an
authority in his own time, is Albert. And Paul Tummers contends that,
on the basis of internal evidence, it is likely that Albert is the author
of the commentary on Euclid's Elements which has been traditionally
attributed to him.
The volume of essays concludes with two works on the heritage of
Albert's thought. Katharine Park describes the tripartite controversy at

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BOOK REVIEWS

Paris and in the German universities in the fourteenth and fifteenth
centuries among the nominalists, known as the moderni, and the Thomists
and Albertists, known as the antiqui, on the nature and faculties of the
soul. She traces the rise of an Albertinism in the history of psychology
which came to differ in important respects from the position of Albert,
especially on the question of the possibility of intellection without images.
In the final essay of the book Edward Mahoney investigates Albert's influence amongst Paduan philosophers in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. Mahoney shows the high regard in which Albert was
held at his alma mater; he was frequently considered to be on the same
level as Averroes and Avicenna, and exercised " a more striking and significant influence " at Padua than did Aquinas.
Albertus Magnus and the Sciences is long, but it can, and perhaps ought
to, be read in bits and pieces. It has an excellent bibliography, and the
topical and textual indices are important tools for any systematic use
of the book. It is regrettable that the biographical list of contributors
omits the names of two of them. On the whole, the book is handsomely
published in soft-cover, and the typographical errors in the text are
neither so numerous nor so significant as to present serious problems in
understanding.
Although the book is already quite long, still there are a few omissions
serious enough to deserve mention. Albert's understanding of time, developed primarily in his paraphrase of the Physics, could very well have
been the subject of an article. The relationship between mathematics and
physics in Albert's thought is not adequately discussed in the book. To
what extent does Albert recognize the validity of an intermediate science
between mathematics and physics? Another topic not discussed is Albert's
position in the debate on the eternity of the world. Although three
articles are concerned with Albert's psychology, there is no full treatment
of his understanding of the troublesome question of the active and passive
intellect.
The contributions to this volume confirm the observation of lnrich of
Strasbourg that Albert was "a man so superior in every science, that he
can fittingly be called the wonder and miracle of our time. " As Edward
Synan observes in his delightful introduction to the volume, Albert was
a committed Aristotelian, but he did not consider Aristotle infallible.
With Aristotle, Albert knew that the investigation was a search for
causes. Albert also knew that the principles are only starting-points and
that any investigation of nature required a careful observation of details:
experience, one's own or others', laboriously discovered, holds the key
to a true science of nature. For years to come Weisheipl's book will
serve as a fruitful source of information on the scientific achievements of
Albert the ·Great. No serious student of the thirteenth century, nor of

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BOOK REVIEWS

the history of science, can afford to ignore it. Surely it is not without
justification that the Paduan philo,sopher, Agostino Nifo, calls Albert" the
first of the Latins. "
·
WILLIAM

E. CARROLL

CorneU College

Mount Vernon, Iowa

Albertus Magnus: Doctor UniversaUs. Edited by Gerbert Meyer, O.P. and
Albert Zimmermann. Mainz, West Germany: Matthias-GrunewaldVerlag, 1980. Pp. 586. No price available.
·Celebrations ·of anniversaries of prominent theologians and philosophers
have at least one good result: the Festschriften which often are produced.
The septicentennial of the death of Albert the Great is one such anniversary, since already at least three Festschriften have appeared. Francis
J. iKovach and Robert W. Shahan have excellently edited a volume of
nine papers on Albert's positions in logic, physics and metaphysics, as well
as on Albert in reference to one of his predecessors (Avicebron) and to a
subsequent author (Galileo): Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays
(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980). Another volume of
twenty-two articles on Albert's contributions to such natural sciences as
philosophy of nature, astronomy and astrology, alchemy, mineralogy, chemistry, physiofo>gy, psychology, botany, herbalism, medicine, embryology,
falconry ,and mathematics has been capably edited by James A. Weisheipl,
O.P., under the title of Albertus Magnus and the Sciences: Commemorative
Essays (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1980). A
third set of papers on topics in Albert's theology and metaphysics is published in this current issue of The Thomist.
To this series of Festschriften Gerbert Meyer and Albert Zimmermann
now add the volume they have edited, Albertus Magnus: Doctur Universalis. Besides their "Vonvort "and a helpful bibliography drawn up by
Johannes Schopfer, this consists of twenty articles, fifteen of which are
in German, three in English and two in French. There is something on
topics in almost every academic area except metaphysics. Four articles
are on points in Albert's theology: Albert Fries, " Zur Entstehungszeit der
Bibelkommentare Alberts des Grossen"; Johannes Schneider," Die Bestimmung des Tugendbegriffs in den Schriften Alberts De Natura Boni und
Summa de Bono"; Walter Senner, "Zur Wissenschaftstheorie der Theologie im Sentenzenkommentar Alberts des Grossen"; Edouard Henri Weber,
" L'interpretation par Albert le Grand de la theologie mystique de Denys
le ps.-Areopagite." Another article concerns Albert's ethics: Clemens Van-

BOOK REVIEWS

steenkiste, " Das erste Buch der Nikomachischen Ethik bei Albertus Magnus." Several take up topics in his philosophy of nature: Paul Hossfeld,
" Die Arbeitsweise des Albertus Magnus in seinen naturphilosophischen
Schriften "; Gerbert Meyer," Das Grundproblem der Bewegung bei Albert
dem Grossen und Thomas von Aquin "; Paul Hossfeld, " ' Erste Materie '
und ' Materie im allgemeinen ' in den werken des Albertus Magnus ";
Ingrid Craemer-Guegenberg, " Die Seele als Form in einer hierarchie von
Formen: Beobachtungen zu einem Lehrstiick aus der De-Anima-Paraphrase
Alberts des Grossen"; James A. Weisheipl, "The Axiom 'Opus Naturae
Est Opus Intelligentiae' and Its Origins." Still other chapters in the
volume are devoted to various natural sciences or, more generally, to the
scientific methodology he used: Christian Hiinemorder, "Die medizinische
Denken bei Albertus Magnus"; Jerry Stannard," The Botany of St. Albert
the Great "; and William A. Wallace, " The Scientific Methodology of St.
Albert the Great." A couple of chapters take up Albert's way of research
and· his poetic ability, as evidenced in composing liturgical sequences:
Yves Congar, "'In Dulcedine Societatis Quaerere Veritatem ': Notes sur
le travail en equipe chez S. Albert et chez Jes Precheurs au XIII• siecle "
and Albert Fries, " Albertus Magnus Prosator." A final set of studies
locate him with respect to the Latin Averroists of his time and to his
fifteenth-century followers: Albert Zimmermann, "Albertus Magnus und
der lateinische Averroismus "; Martin Bauer, "' Secundum Modum Albertistarum '-Ein Albertistischer Kommentar zu De Anima (Koln 1482}
im Vergleich mit dem Text des Albertus "; Isnard W. Frank, "Zurn
Albertus-Autograph in der Osterreichischen Nationalbibliothek in Wien
und zum ' Albertinismus ' der Wiener Dominikaner im Spiitmittelalter ";
Rudolf Haubst, "Albert wie Cusanus ihn sah."
All in all, Meyer and Zimmermann have put forth a volume of which
they, as well as Albert himself, can be proud: the articles are well documented and intelligently researched on important topics; they appear to
make fresh contributions to our understanding and appreciation of Albert.
The only drawback which my initial reading discovered is the excessively
small print in which the volume (both body of the chapters and the notes
and bibliography) is set. But that aside, anyone interested in medieval
studies, as well as as in Albert himself, should have this excellent volume.
LEO SWEENEY,

Loyola University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

S.J.

BOOKS RECEIVED
University of Alabama Press: Heraclitus Seminar 1966/67 by Martin
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653

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