FEEDING THE COMATOSE AND THE COMMON
GOOD IN THE CATHOLIC TRADITION
ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

University of Illinois
Ohampaign-Urbana, IlUnoi8

A

A RECENT convention :sponsored by the Catholic
Health Associaition in Boston, Laurence J. O'Connell,
vice-president for ethics and theology, ma.de the following comments:

I am concerned that some of those who are legitimately alarmed
by the potential abuses associated with the public policy that
authorizes the withholding and withdrawing of mechanical means
of nutrition and hydration are sometimes publicly misrepresenting
the Catholic moral tradition. In other words, in their well-intentioned and perfectly legitimate efforts to avoid the slippery-slope-that is, the wrongful withholding or withdrawing of nutrition or
hydration from vulnerable dasses of patients-those advocates are
placing the Roman Catholic moral tradition itself on the slippery slope.
It is mistaken to say it is the church's teaching that we may never
withhold or withdraw artificial nutrition and hydration. It is
mistaken to uncritically refer to the removal of medically engineered nutrition in all cases as starvation-that is, the willful
withholding of nutrition as morally obligatory. It is mistaken to
say that the ethical standards of a single Catholic hospital are
necessarily coextensive with the ethical standards of the Catholic
Church. Just because an individual Catholic facility, for whatever
reason, uniformly refuses to allow the withholding or withdrawing
of technological feeding, does not mean that the Church itself
disallows such withholdings or withdrawals. 1

It is not clear how the Catholic moral tradition can be put
on the " slippery slope " by opposing certain forms of with1 "Church and State Overlap in Ethical Debate", American Medicai News.
February 27, 1987. p. I.

1

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

drawal of feeding from specific classes of patients. Dr. O'Connell has misrepresented the thought of most of those who oppose the recent American Medical Association's new opinion
which holds that artificially administered nutrition and fluids
can be removed from terminally ill patients, even when they
are not imminently dying. 2 There are no Catholic moralists
who claim that it is always and everywhere morally wrong to
withhold or withdraw feeding from patients. However, there
are a number of moralists as well as bishops who now hold it
to be wrong to withhold or withdraw feeding in those cases
where the withholding or withdrawal becomes the fundamental
and underlying cause of death.
O'Connell is p11obably correct in saying that the policies of
one hospital do not necessarily deteJ1IDine the moral doctrines
of the universal Church, but neither does one national organization such as the Catholic Health Association with only a
loose affiliation with the magisterial hierarchy of the Church
necessarily do this either. The debate over the provision of
,aissistedfeeding is a debate over whether iit is morally legitimate
ito withdraw feeding so 1tihat .t:he primary and fundamental reason why the person dies is that withdrawal. It is a debate over
whether those with a certain " quality of life " can be permitted
to be killed by omission. It is a debate over whether feeding
provided by routine nursing measures that can significantly
sustain the life is a medical treatment that should he governed
by the criteria governing other treatments, or whether it is an
2 "Withholding
or Withdrawing Life Prolonging :Medical Treatment"
adopted by the Council on Ethical and Judicial .Affairs of the .Amercian Medical .Association on March 15, 1987, In its pertinent parts, it stated:
The social commitment of the physician is to sustain life and relieve
suffering. Where the performance of one duty conflicts with the other,
the choice of the patient, or his family or legal representative if the
·patient to act in his own behalf, should prevail.
Life prolonging medical treatment includes medication and artificially or
technologically supplied respiration, nutrition or hydration. In treating a
terminally ill or irreversibly comatose patient, the physician should determine whether the benefits of treatment outweigh its burdens. .At all
times, the dignity of the patient should be maintained .•.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

8

aspect of normal care, like protection from exposure or hygienic
care, that is to be accorded to all patients.
In this piece, I wish to review the thoughts of some of the
classical Catholic moralists and show their reluctance to authorize withdrawal of life-sustaining nutrition and fluids. I
also wish to show that, where they did permit food and water
to be removed, their arguments were either flawed or open to
severe criticism. And I will also show tha.t assisted feeding can
be required of patients because of the demands of the common
good. The overall purpose of this effort is to show that requiring assisted feeding when its rejection or removal would
be the fundamental cause of death is not foreign to the classical Catholic medical-ethical tradition.

I. Thomas Aquinas
Aquinas did not write any treatise devoted specifically to
providing food and fluids, but he did note in his Super Epistolas S. Pauli that:
A man has the obligation to sustain his body; otherwise he would
be a killer of himself . . . by precept, therefore, he is bound to
nurish his body and likewise we are bound to all the other items
without which the body cannot live.8

In this passage Aquinas affirms an obligation to take food
and fluids because of a general obligation to sustain life, and he
,asserts that £aii1ing to take them could be momlly equiVtalentto
self-killing in some cases. He 1aipparently would not say thrus
about medical treatments, for he would hold it licit to reject
medical treatments in some cases without being a self-killer.4
The passage implies that there are more circumstances in
s St. Thomas Aquinas, Super Flpistolos 8.PauU (Taurin-Romae: Marietti,
1953), II Thess., Lee. II, n. 77. Translation in Cronin, Daniel, The Moral
Law in Regard, to the Ord,inary and, Flrotraordinary Means of Conserving Life
(Dissertatio ad Lauream in Facultate Theologica Pontificiae Universitatis
Gregorianae, Romae, 1958), p. 48.
4 Medical treatments
that could be rejected without being a self-killer
would be those which are rejected out of a due love for life and for the
spiritual goods.

4

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

which one could licitly reject medical treatments than there are
where one could reject food and water. Aquinas vaguely asserts a distinction between nutrition and fluids and medical
treatments, and he imposes a stronger obligation to receive
food and water than to receive medical treatments. The reason
for this stronger obligation seems to be that food and water are
·seen as a means of sustaining life whether the person is sick or
not, while medical treatments are therapeutic measures only
to be used for those with clinical conditions.
Elsewhere, he says in a statement in the Secunda Secundae
that should be balanced against the previous one that:
[l]t is inbred for a man to love his own life and those things
which contribute to it, but in due measure (tamen debito proprio)
which means those things which permit attainment of the final
goal. Thus, those things which permit attainment of the final end
of man are to be loved, but only in due measure. 5

In the previous statement, Aquinas warned against self-killing and a lack of respect for life, but in this one he warns
against anxious concern for life and undue love for life-preserving measures. This statement imposes an obligation to have
due respect for life and to have a moderate love for those
things which sustain life. There is a duty to protect one's life
by moderate means and he denounces an exaggerated fear of
death which can cause an undue clinging to life. Aquinas has
not defined what means of sustaining life are undue, and one
must wait for later writers to deal with this issue.
What precisely " due love of the things that sustain life "
would be is not clear from this passage. It would seem that
Aquinas is objecting to demands for radically expensive treatments that would not hold out much prospect of prolonging
life. If this is true, then it would be hard to see how he could
object to tube feeding for a medically stable patient given by
routine nursing procedures. This would not seem to be an uncommon or exotic means of preserving life.
B Summa Theologica, Blackfriars
Translation,
P. G. Wa.lsh. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1966),

Anthony Rosa, O.P., and
q. 126, a. 1.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

5

What he might mean by medical treatments that can permit
the attainment of the final end of many is not clear. He may
have been referring to those treatments which enaible a person
to act rationally and interpersonally. However, that interpretation is unlikely because it would imply that there was no
duty to give even palliative care to those who suffered emotional or mental disabilities. What Aquinas probably meant
was that treatments which could sustain either biological life
itself or human life in all its dimensions had to be given because both of these permit attainment of the final end of man.
If he did not mean thait, it would be hard to see how he could
have objected that refusal of feeding in some cases was selfIn relation to our contemporary controversy on assisted
feeding, his principle would affirm a duty to receive and provide readily available forms of assisted feeding when their
denial or refusal would be the fundamental cause of death of a
medically stable patient. It should be recalled that what is
"common" is relative to a society, and in our society assisted
feeding administered by routine nursing measures is simply a
common mode of providing nutrition, and it should be provided when its withdrawal would cause death.
2. Francisco Vitoria

Francisco Vitoria requires patients to take ordinary measures to preserve life, and explicitly holds that a patient would
have at least to use foods commonly employed by persons to
conserve their life.6 Vitoria affirms an obligation to receive
food and water when they can be readily provided by a given
society. Only the use of ordinary foods, and mot exotic dishes,
1

Releotiones Theologioae, (Lugduni, 1587), Relectio IX, de
6 F. Vitoria,
Temp n. 1, (Trans. in Cronin, op. oit., pp. 48-49). .Atkinson notes that the
obligation to take drugs is less grave than the obligation to take food because
food is per se ordered to the preservation of life. See his "Theological History
on the Catholic Teaching on Prolonging Life" in Moral Responsibility m
Prolonging Life Deoisions, edited by Donald McCarthy and .Albert Moraczew·
ski, O.P. (St. Louis: Pope John Center, 1981). p. 98.

6

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

would be mo:mlly required, even if this would shorten the life
of the patient. In his own way, he affirms an obligation to give
and receive only what are customarily and commonly available forms of care and feeding in a society.
He claims that it is one thing to destroy life ·and .another to
cease to protect or prolong it. 7 One must never do the former,
but he holds that it is not always necessary to do the latter.
This formulation, however, is too vague and general to be useful, for failing to protect life in some instances is morally
equivalent to destroying it. For example, permitting another
to die by withholding protection from exposure is morally
equivalent to destroying that person's life. Similarly, failing
to sustain another's life by withholding life-sustaining food and
water that can be provided by routine and customary means
is morally equivalent to failing to protect.
Nowhere does Vitoria affirm that " common " feeding could
'be rejected, because this would be killing by omission. Unfortunately, he does not explain what constitutes "common"
feeding. What makes feeding " common " would seem to be
relative to one's culture and technology, but Vitoria offers no
opinion on ithi:s. But he does teach that talring food is not obligatory if great effort is required, and he probably means
great effort on the palt of the patient. 8 Taking food when
great effort would be demanded of the patient would require
a radical exercise of the virtue of fortitude, ·and Vitoria would
not impose such a demand as a matter of justice. The term
" common " is purely formal, but it must be assumed to mean
what is routinely provided to a patient in a given condition;
this criterion is highly relative to the means available of provmding food and wiater. And there is no hint in Vitoria's thought
that " ordinary " medical cusfoms could be violated.
He discusses the issue of food and water under the aspect of
the virtues, and affirms that failing to receive commonly avail7 See Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging
Life," p. 98.

BlbU.

FEEDING THE COlVIATOSE

7

ruble life-sustaning food and water would be against the virtue
of fortitude, and :failing to provide it would seem to be against
the virtue of justice. 9 Like Aquinas, he imposes a stronger
duty to provide food than to provide medical treatments, for
he holds that the obligation to take drugs is less seriqus than
is the obliga;tion to take food. In order for medical treatments
to be morally 'required in some circumstances, it would only
be necessary for there to be some hope of returning to normal
functioning or some form of recovery. But "common" food
and water, or that by which regularly 'a man can live (satis
est, quod det operam, per quam horno regulariter potest
vivere), have to be given even if recovery is not possible, but
if there is some hope of life.10 And he makes no explicit distinctions between biological, psychological, and spiritual life,
and this implies that food and water must be given if there is
some hope of continuing biological or physical life. If there is
moral certitude that food and water could hold out " some
hope of life " being continued, then it would seem that he
would hold it obligatory to provide nutrition and hydration.
There is no obligation to use the most expensive and costly
treatments or foods to sustain life, but this should not be interpreted to mean that a person could be morally required to
suffer destitution to pay for common feeding or ordinary medical care.11 For Vitoria it is not necessary to use every means
available to sustain life, hut only to use those means which are
9 Ibid., p. 97. Vitoria
discusses the taking of food under the aspect of
temperance, but it would seem that denial of life-sustaining food and drink
to an individual would not be against temperance as much as it would be
against justice, while the refusal of life-sustaining food and water would be
against the virtue of fortitude.
10 Ibid., pp. 98-9. The failure to preserve one's life could be rejection of
those things "by which regularly a man can live". This would seem to consist in food and fluids taken orally or what modern authors call "ordinary"
surgeries and medical treatments. The modern criterion seems to be that of
requiring not just food and fluids but ordinary surgeries as well.
11 Ibid., p. 99. He affirms that expensive or exotic foods would not be required, and he does not hold that one would have to live in the most healthful
climates either. See his Oommentaria a la Secunda Seoundae de Santo Thomas,
(Salamanca, ed. de Hereda, O.P., 1952) in II-II, q. 147, a (transl. as in
Cronin, p. 59 ) .

8

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

of themselves intended for that purpose and which are congruent with that end.12 And if there is a "kind of impossibility" in receiving food and water, Vitoria would not require
their provision or acceptance. Thus, if there was profound
revulsion to food, or a medical reason for rejecting it, he would
not morally require it. It is not clear what he means by this,
for food and water, hygiene and medicine all naturally aim at
preserving life. On this point, Vitoria is ambivalent, for while
he admits that food, water and medical treatments are naturally ordered toward life, he affirms a more stringent obligation
to provide food and water than to provide medical treatments,
implying that they 1are different in nature. 13
This ambivalence in Vitoria's thought is important, for Fr.
Edward Bayer, a contemporary moral theologian, contends
that there is an obligation to provide food and water orally
or" connatul'lally '',but that this obligation ceases when a person needs assisted feeding.14 For Bayer, the natural aspect of
oral feeding imposes the obligation, but it is by no means clear
that such a distinction was made by Vitoria.15 It is not clear
that Vitoria sees the mode of provision ,as being as crucial as
the commonness of the mode of feeding. What is clear about
Vitoria's thought, however, is that he believes that the provision of commonly avail3Jble, life-sustaining food and water is
ethically obligatory.
Relative to the contemporary debate on feeding medically
stable comatose patients, Vitoria's teachings would imply that
food and fluids, provided as an aspect of basic patient maintenance, could not be withheld from comatose patients because
they are now an aspect of" common" feeding. He would not
require their provision if it was medically impossible to provide
it, or if the person was unable to receive it for clear medical
reasons. And he does not demand that r1JJdical or extreme ex12 Relectiones, Relecti

X, de Homicidio, n. 35. (transl. as in Cronin, p. 50).
See Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teaching on Prolonging
Life", p. 99.
13

H[bid.
u "Foregoing

Life-Sustaining Food and Water:
Thought". Unpublished :Manuscript, pp. 1-2.

1900 Years of Catholic

FEEDING THE COl\.fATOSE

9

pense be experienced to provide it. But if receiving or providing food or water is " common " in a given culture, he would
hold it to be morally required. He considered food and water
to be different in nature from medical treatments, and he
established difierent criteria for their provision and acceptance.
He admits that there are elective forms of feeding, but those
that are common modes of feeding ·are morally mandatory. By
asserting that there is a stronger obligation to take food than
there is to take medical treatments, he is affirming the principle
that if assisted feeding and fluids provided as an aspect of basic
patient maintenance could meet the nutritional and hydrational needs of the patient, they should be given.
8. Juan Cardinal de Lugo

In the century after Vitoria, there was a widespread support
among moral theologians for his teachings. Juan Cardinal de
Lugo is important because he supported Vitoria's teachings,
but he was also important because he drew clearer distinctions
between morally permissible letting-die •and immoral killing
based on the type of means being refused or withheld. He is
noteworthy for being exceptionally liberal among his contemporaries for his view of what constituted an extraordinary
means.16 Because of this, Atkinson notes that he was so liberal
in his views that he accepted virtually any reason whatsoever
for removing a medical treatment. For instance, he .held that
drinking wine or abstaining from it could be an extraordinary
form of care in some cases.
With regard to the administration of extraordin·ary treatments, De Lugo claims that a person caught in a burning building would not have to use water to extinguish part of the fire,
thus only delaying momentarily the time of death, because
partially extinguishing the fire would be ·a futile attempt to
preserve life.17 This
is strictly applicable to a patient
16 Atkinson, "Theological History
of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging
Life", pp. 101-2.
17 De Lugo, Juan.
Disputationes SckoZasticae et Morales, (ed. nova,

10

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

who is truly dying and for whom assisted feeding would not
substantially sustain life. In such a case, the removal of food
and fluids would not be the underlying and fundamental cause
of death as would be the fire, and it would therefore be permissible to remove them.
But whether these sorts of patients would have to be fed
is not the issue today. The pertinent issue is whether the removal of .feeding should be morally permitted when its removal would be the fundamental cause of dearth. He holds
that the only condition necessary for providing food and water
is that there be " some hope of sustaining life" .18 The term
" some" does not mean that it be ,a,hsolutely certain that life
will be sustained, but only that there be some prospect of it
being continued by the provision of food and water. This requirement that feeding be given when there is some hope of
1ife being preserved would seem to require its rprov:isionin thait
case.
He is one of the few classical moralists to give high priority
to the judgment of a physician, and if a physician determines
that a treatment is necessary he would require the patient to
consent to the treatment. 19 De Lugo was primarily concerned
with the morality of mutilations, and he held that they were
obligatory if they could cure and if they did not involve great
pain. If 'a mutilating therapy would be necessary for the
health or well-being of the patient, but the patient rejected it,
De Lugo would compel its acceptance. 20 De Lugo states that
a patient:
must permit [a] cure when the doctors judge it necessary, and when
it can happen without intense pain; not, if it is accompanied by
Parisiis, Vives, 1868-69), Vol. VI, De Justitio et Jure, Disp. X, Sec. l, n. 21
(transl. as in Cronin, p. 59).
1s Atkinson,
"Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging
Life'', p. 102.
19 De Lugo, foe. cit.
20 It is likely that De Lugo held this to prevent patients from committing
suicide by rejecting medically indicated, beneficial and nonburdensome treatments from being provided.

FEEDING THE CO:MATOSE

11

very bitter pain; because a man is not bound to employ extraordinary and difficult means to conserve lif e.21According to De Lugo, the failure to employ reasonably
aV1aii1able mea:ns of preserving Life could he equivalelllt to taking one's life, but he does not identify the conditions under
which this might occur .22 This principle applies when the
means are not difficult to use and when death from the lethal
cause could be easily .avoided. This would imply that assisted
feeding would he required i£ it was rerudily ;a-v;aiLable and if !Lts
provision could prevent death by starvation or dehydration.
Thus, De Lugo was deeply concerned about the morality of
removing food and water from patients, and he clearly believed
that some withdmwals were immoral.
4. Fr. Gerald Kelly, SJ.

A. The Usefulness of Assisted Feeding

Fr. Gerald Kelly is important in the history of contemporary
Catholic medical ethics because of his development of the doctrine of ordinary and extraordinary means. He developed his
views on the requirements to receive medical treatments, and
in his later writings he established a clearer normative position
on the duties to receive care and treatment. Kelly claims that
families and medical professionals should be brought into
treatment decisions because they have moral duties demanding respect. 28 In holding this, he laid a foundation for the contemporary " covenantal " theory of medical decisionmaking
espoused by Paul Ramsey .24
21J. De Lugo, Disputation.es Sohloasticae et Morales, Vol. VI, De Justitia
et Jure, Disp. X, Sec. 1, n. 21.
22 Atkinson,
"Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging
Life", p. 102.
Ulbid., p. 107. Kelly mentions this, it •seems, to affirm that families and
health care providers have duties to provide care and that authoriza.tion of
withdrawal of ca.re by either of these can constitute culpable killing.
2' See Paul Ramsey, The Patient as Person (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979) and Basia Ohristian liJthics (Chica.go: University of Chicago Press, 1950), pp. 367·388.

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

In his advanced views Kelly provides us with the what has
come to be 'accepted as the " classical " definition of ordinary
and extraordinary means:
Ordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations which
offer a reasonable hope of benefit and which can be obtained and
used without excessive expense, pain or other inconvenience.
Extraordinary means are all medicines, treatments and operations
which cannot be obtained and used without excessive expense,
pain or other inconvenience, or which if used, would not offer a
reasonable hope of benefit.25

After making this distinction, he proceeds to ask if there
could he a " useless ordinary " means of preserving life and if
such a means could be morally required. Initially, Kelly
argues that all ordinary means are obligatory, but this changes
in his later works in which he replies that no one can be required to employ a means that is useless. He therefore declared some ordinary means to be elective because they were
"useless ". 26 He writes:

1

[N]o remedy is obligatory unless it offers a reasonable hope of
checking or curing the disease. I would not call this a common
opinion because many authors do not refer to it, but I know of no
one who opposes it, and it seems to have intrinsic merit as an application of the axiom, nemo ad inutile tenetur [i.e., No one can
obliged to do what is useless]. Moreover, it squares with the rule
commonly applied to the analogous case of helping one's neighbor:
one is not obliged to offer help unless there is a reasonable assurance that it will be efficacious.21
Kelly argues correctly that a treatment is useless if it does
not offer a reasonable hope of checking or curing a disease.
In light of this definition, it would seem that provision of food
and fluids by assisted means would be useful when it could
prevent the person from succumbing to starv,ation or dehydra1

25 G. Kelly, "The Duty to Preserve Life", Theological Studies, XII ( 1951),
p. 550.
Means of Preserving Life"
2'6 G. Kelly, "The Duty of Using Artificial
Tkeologioal Studies, XI ( 1950), pp. 218-9.
21 Ibid., pp. 207 -8.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

18

tion. For in that circumstance, it could " check ,, the " disease " of starvation.
Oddly, Kelly argues that there would be no obligation to
provide fluids and feeding to a patient by assisted means if
the patient was unconscious and was expected to die within a
few weeks.28 In this situation food and water should be provided because they could achieve their end of preventing death
from dehydration or starvation and thus would not be useless
because they could " check the disease ,,. Kelly does not hold
that life-sustaining measures would have to" check disease for
a certain period of time'', but only that they have this power.
It is thus peculiar that Kelly considers assisted feeding useless
simply because its power is temporally limited.
Further application of his principle would imply that feeding which could only sustain life for short period of time is
" useless,, would also seem to allow spoon-feeding to be withdrawn or withheld from a conscious termina1ly ill patient with
even more time to live, because spoon-feeding is moil'e burdensome to others than is tube feeding. It could permit withholding insulin from a diabetic who was expected to live for a
couple of weeks, even though its withdrawal would cause
death, and it might even permit withdrawal of hygienic care
or protection from exposure. Kelly's understanding of utility
is correct, but it seems that he did not apply it properly in
practice, for he did not see that feeding could fend off death
for a limited period of time and was therefore useful. He is correct in saying that useless treatments need not be given, but
he fails to see that some forms of assisted feeding were not useless when they could prevent death from dehydration or starvation even for a limited period of time by their mere provision.
Kelly's belief that there should be no obligation to continue
feeding a patient expected ·to die within two weeks if the patient is unconscious is quite remarkable. He asserts that a conscious patient should be permitted to decide whether or not to
1

:IS Ibid.,

P· 220.

14

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

receive feeding, but he holds there is no duty to give food and
water to one in a similar state but unconscious.29 This view
would radically limit the obligations of health care providers
to the unconscious terminal patient, and it implies the moral
;permissibility of abandoning provision of all treatment for
them. It is also quite discriminatory because it implies that
capacity for psychological relating is the ground for the possession of moral rights. KeHy would undoubtedly object to
reeently enacted Baby Doe Regulations of :the Child Abuse
Aot which prohibited the removal of food and water from
comatose infants, despite the fact that strong approval was
given these regulations by the disaibled community. 30
Kelly's argument in favor of removing feeding from unconscious terminally ill patients is pertinent to the contemporary
issue of providing feeding for the medically stllible comatose.
F-0r, under some definitions of euthanasia, withdrawing food
and wiruter from them would be mercy kiilling because the withdrawal would be done for the purpose of causing death to prevent a patient from experiencing severe pain. 81 Kelly correctly ·argued that the removal of some medical treatments in such
cases was permissible, but feeding should not be withdrawn,
since withdrawal of food and water would cause death as surely as would a lethal injection.
The withdrawal of food and water, provided as an aspect of
routine patient maintenance and of normal nursing care, is not
29 Ibid., p. 219.
ao Non discrimination on the Basis of H andioap; ProceiVures and Guidelines
Relating to Health Oare for Handicapped. Infants; Final Rule, 49 Fed. Reg.
1622, 1623 (January 1983). HHS reported that after a period of comment,
16,739 comments were received, 96.5% of which were favorable. See: "The
Emergence of Institutional Ethics Committees" by Ronald E. Cranford and
A. Edward Doudera, in their Institutional Ethics Oommittees and Health
Oare Decision Making (Ann Arbor: Health Administration Press, 1984), p. 5.
a1 Webster's Dictionary defines it as an "act or method of causing doo,th
painlessly, so as to end suffering". Webster's New World Dictionary (Second
College Edition, ed. David B. Guralnik. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall,
1970), p. 889.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

15

merely the " occasion" of the patient's death, but is its cause.32
When one removes or refrains from throwing a life ring to a
man who would drown without it, the remov;al or withholding
is not the "occasion " of the man's death but is the cause.
Similarly, the removal or withholding of these readily providable forms of feeding are the causes of the death of a patient
who would be medically stable with their provision. He allows
this withdrawal even though it would imply that death could
be physically caused by removing a routinely available means
of preserving life. Kelly ignores the issue of causation of death,
and he seems to .feel that :there would be nothing wrong with
causing death if death was expected in only a matter of days.
Kelly's endorsement of withdrawing feeding from a comatose patient who was expected to die shortly did not go uncontested, however, for Fr. Joseph Donovan argued that IV
feeding was an ordinary medical treatment and that there was
no impossibility in feeding the comatose.33 He claimed that removing feeding in the instance where Kelly permitted it was
morally equivalent to causing death, and he essentially charged
Kelly with permitting mercy killing by omission when death
was imminent. 34
Kelly agreed that .assisted feeding was an ordinary medical
treatment and he justified this position by making assertions
that many would question today. He claimed that this form
of feeding was an ordinary medical treatment in the speeulative order but that it was an extraordinary treatment in the
practical order because it was clinically useless.85 By admitting
that a;ssisted feeding was speculatively obligafory but practi32 The claim that withdrawal
of life-sustaining nutrition a.nd fluids that
are readily providable does not kill the patient, but is merely the occasion
on which the patient succumbs. See The Medica.Z-MoraZ New8Zetter, Vol. 24,
No. 4, .April, 1987, p. 3.
3S Fr. Donovian's article appeared in Homiletic and PMtoraZ Review, XLIX,
(August, 1949), p. 72.
HKelly, "The Duty of Using .Artificial :Means of Preserving Life", p. 210.
so .Atkinson, "Theological History of Catholic Teachings on Prolonging
Life", p. 109.

16

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

cally elective, Kelly implicitly affirmed that there was something about assisted feeding that distinguished it from other
forms of therapeutic, palliative or remedial medical treatment.
But he was unable to ·see this difference precisely, and he did
not impose obligations correlative to this difference. Kelly
would have had no trouble teaching that a therapeutic procedure such as an ·appendectomy for a dying person was useless
because the person would die from the other cause before he or
she died from the appendicitis, and he seemed to think that
assisted feeding could become extraordinary in exactly the
same sense. What he did not see was that withdrawal of feeding creates a lethal condition, irrespective of the clinical picture of the patient.
The inconsistency of
thought compromises his claims
about the optional chal'lacter of assisted feeding for various
classes of patients. Kelly's view that care and treatment can
be speculatively ordinary hut pl'iacticallyelective is not tenable
today, and his authority in the issue can be rightfully challenged. His distinction between the speculative and practical
has never been widely accepted by medical ethicists, and it is
of uncertain utility. It is interesting that Kelly's argument for
withdrawing food ·and fluids was never accepted into the mainstream of Catholic ethical teaching, even though his conclusion
was. And conversely, Donovan's arguments were logically
sound and implanted in the tradition, hut they have been rejected in recent decades.
Kelly also did not f.ace the issue of causality squarely, for the
withdrawal of feeding from such a person was not the mere
occasion of death but was in fact the cause of death. It seems
that Donovan was correct and that Kelly did in fact permit
those near death to be killed by dehydration and starvation.
Some contemporary right-to-die ,activists have charged that
the Catholic trllldition has .allowed mercy killing by omission
because of Kelly's views, and there seems to be support for
this charge.86
ao See Gerald LaRue, l!Juth111fU1,8i!J, and .Religion. (Los Anglees: Hemlock
Press, 1981). Kelly himself feared that his views might be interpreted as

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

17

Kelly was apparently unaware of ·a diHerence between ordinary medical treatments and what ·some ethicists are now calling normal care or minimal care. 87 This category consists of
hygienic care, protection from
psychological support,
feeding, and the maintenance of such devices as urinary
catheters. Some now believe that to withhold these forms of
care would be morally equivalent to killing by omission, but
Kelly mentions none of this and it is not evident that he had
a clear idea of what constituted killing by omission.
B. Assisted Feeding and the Common Good
More positively, Kelly is alniost the only moralist in the
recent Catholic tradition to state explicitly that patients could
be required to use extraordinary and per se elective measures
if this was required by the common good or a higher value. 38
This is a superb insight, and it should be applied to protecting
society from the emergence of socially and legally endorsed
mercy killing. The common good can require a person to accept assisted feeding in order to prevent the social and legal
endorsement of euthanasia by omission which would pose a
clear threat to the handicapped, immature, unstable and medically vulnerable from mercy killing. Kelly holds that a civil
leader can be required to receive medical treatments, •and that
a father of a family could be morally required to receive them
to protect his family. 39 If saving one's life is necessary for the
weHare of
family or the security of a nation, one must
do so.40 A common good exists where there is a common goal,
1

being "Catholic euthanasia". See "The Duty of Using Artificial :Means of
Preserving Life", p. 219.
s1 See Smith, William, B. "Judeo-Christian Teaching on Euthanasia: Definitions, Distinctions and Decisions". The Linaore Quarter"liu, vol. 54, n. 1 (February, 1987), p. 29. Also see Barry, Robert "The Ethics of Providing LifeSustaining Nutrition and Fluids to Incompetent Patients", The Journal of
Family and Culture. Vol. I, No. 2 (Summer 1985) p. 27.
as Kelly, The Duty of Using Artificial Means of Preseroing Life, p. 206;
p. 106.
a9 Ibid., p. 216.
40 See Welty, Eberhard, Handbook of Christian Social Bthios (New York:
Herde & Herder, 1963), p. 312.

is

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

and in the case of society, that goal is the well-being of all, and
not just the maximization of individual liberties or rights. 41
The good of the community is prior :to private interest, and the
individual is duty bound to strive for the common good.
The common good can place demands on individuals, but
there are filmirts to whait lit oan reqmre. Fir.st, nowhere is an
individual released from the duty to do what is morally good,
and appeals to the common good cannot release from this obligation. 42 Second, the order of values must be preserved which
means that higher values must be protected at the expense of
lower ones.43 Thus, morality can be promoted at the expense
of •art or economic interest, for example. Third, in times of
great crisis, higher values can be set aside for the attainment
of lower ones.44 For example, educational activities can be
suspended in time of war for the welfare of the entire community. Extraordinary measures can be commanded by the
common good, so that a person can be required to make personal sacrifices to save another's life if that can be done without putting one's self or family in the same danger. Thus, one
can be required to forego certain material advantages to protect the lives of others.
Acting in behalf of the common good is required by justice,
and is commanded by the virtue of universal justice which
seeks to protect the well being of all by directing all actions
toward the common good.45 The virtue of universal justice de41 St. Thomas says that "[T]he community has necessarily the sa.me goal
as the individual." "The good of the individual is not a final end but is sub·
ordinated to the common good." "Individual well-being cannot exist without
the welfare of the community . . . therefore it is judging correctly in the
light of the common good that man must recognize what is good for him."
See ·Welty, op. cit, p. 94. This principle is in harmony with what some
moralists call "universal justice" for such demands to be made. Universal
justice is the most important of the. natural virtues, according to Thoma.a.
Summa Theologica, II-II 58, 6-7.
42 Welty, Handbook of Christian Social Ethics, p. 112.
4s Ibid., pp. 112-3.
41 Ibid., p. 113.
45 Ibid., pp. 312-3.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

19

termines what demands can be imposed on a community by
the common good. Virtues can be required by universal justice
so ,that coura;ge could be required. in war, just as temperance
could be commanded in times of famine. 46 That extraordinary
forms of care or treatment should be obligatory for the common good is in accord with the principles of universal justice
because it is an act of courage for the benefit of the entire community. They can be set aside in specific circumstances so
that the individual can pursue the common good.
Assisted feeding could be mandated for certain classes because allowing them to reject it or be denied it would place
entire classes of handicapped, despairing, terminal and chronically sick patients at risk. Because there is so much imprecision in medical diagnosis and prognosis, feeding should be required. for all where it is medically possible so that those who
should be justly given feeding are not denied it.
By way of summary, one must be careful about invoking
Kelly uncritically on the issue of ·assisted feeding, for there
were evident inadequacies in his thought. To his credit, he
admits that his principles were inherently imprecise, and he
argues that, if one is to err in ambiguous situations, it should
be on the side of life. He gave us many of the fundamental
concepts by which we understand medical ethics today, but
some of his analyses were not ·adequately consistent or insightful. He apparently did not believe that it was possible to kill
terminally ill patients by denial of assisted feeding, and he gave
no evidence of medically stable but comatose patients or persons with disabilities wishing to end their lives by starvation
or dehydration, and thus he is in some respects not the sure.sit
of guides for today's problems. Some of his contemporaries,
such as Fr. Donovan, saw this and were critical of his insights,
but Donovan's thought has not been given the prominent place
that was given to Kelly's in Catholic medical-ethical tradition.
This rebuts claims that the moral doctrines of the Church
<16 Jbid.,

pp. 32-3.

20

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

should not be conditioned by public policy considerations, for
Kelly explicitly asserts that the moral teachings of the Church
do take into consideration issue of public policy.

5. Daniel Cronin
Daniel Cronin :teaches that ordinary means hold out a hope
of beneficial results, are commonly used, are p:voportionate to
one's social position, and ·are not difficult to employ. Even
though he does not say when it would actually become so, he
agrees that feeding could become extraordinary if it was
useless.47 It could ·also be rejected if it was impossible to provide, required great effor.t to receive, caused great pain, was
radically expensive, or caused intense revulsion. 48 For Cronin,
the patient possesses the dominant right to decide what treatments are ordinary or extraordinary, and if the patient is incompetent the physician should provide only ordinary treatments. 49 Cronin demands that the physician not only avoid
practicing euthanasia, but also avoid even giving the impression of practicing it.
Commenting on Vitoria's views on feeding patients, Cronin
says the following:
Food is primarily intended by nature for the basic sustenance of
animal life. Food for man is basically and fundamentally necessary from the very beginning of his temporal existence. It is
basically required by this human life and nature intends food for
this purpose. That is why man has the right to grow food and
kill animals. Furthermore, because it is a law of nature that man
sustain himself by food, it is a duty for man to nourish himself
by food. In the case of drugs and medicines, the same is not true.
Drugs and medicines are intended per se by nature to help man
conserve his life. However, this is not by way of exception. Drugs
and medicines are not the basic way by which man is to nourish
his life. They are intended by nature to aid man in the conserva47 Atkinson,
"Theological
Life'', pp. llO·lll.

4B[bi/l,
49 Ibid.,

pp. 112-113.

History

of Catholic

Teaching

on Prolonging

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

tion of his life when he is sick or in pain or unable to sustain
himself by natural means. These artificial means are not natural
means but they are intended by nature to help man protect,
sustain and conserve his life. If man were never to be sick, he
would never need medicines. If he is sick, however, it is quite
natural for him to make use of artificial means of conserving
life.5o

It is hard to ·S'ee how rthese conditions, woo.Id make asssllited
feeding optional for the comatose patient because these patients apparently do not experience pain, and tube feeding is
apparently less burdensome for others than is spoon feeding.
Thus, it would seem permissible to conclude that Cronin would
not permit assisted feeding and fluids to be withdrawn from a
patient if so doing would be the fundamental cause of death.
6. Joseph Sullivan

Joseph Sulliv;an acknowledges cbhait there is a difference between feeding and medical treatments. 51 He argues that ordinary means of preserving life are required of all patients, hut
he does affirm that there are two kinds of ordinary treatments.
On the one hand, there are artificial ordinary treatments, such
as surgeries, X-rays, transfusions and IV feedings.52 On the
other hand, he suggests that there are natural ordinary means
of preserving life such as feeding, protection from exposure,
50 Ibid., pp. 113-114.

n J0<ieph V. Sullivan, Oatholio Teaohing on the Morality of l.llutharw,aio,
(Washington: Catholic University of America Press, 1949), p. 65.
52 Sullivan asserts:
As artificial means, we may understand such means as major and minor
operations, x-ray treatments, blood transfusions, intravenous feeding,
radium treatments, psychotherapy, oxygen tents, iron lungs, all germicides and antiseptics and even the taking of prepared medicines. Ibid.,
p. 65.
One would wonder if Sullivan would allow withdrawal of antiseptics if it
was judged they were too burdensome or useless for the patient. This is
asked because many would consider such forms of care as antiseptics as
simply normal care, like intravenous feeding, and not artificial medical
treatments.

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

exercise and ;regular diet. 58 He iargues that ,a natu;ral means
of prolonging life is per se ordinary and yet it could become
per accidens extraordinary. 64
Sullivan argues that a cancer patient in extreme pain with
a toleration for painkillers could have food ·and water removed,
even if the patient could live a good while because of a strong
heart:
1. A cancer patient is in extreme pain and his systems has gradually established what physician call a "toleration" of any drug,
so that increased doses give only brief respite from the everrecurring pain. The attending physician knows that the disease
is incurable and that the person is slowly dying, but because of a
good heart, it is possible that the agony will continue for several
weeks. The physician then remembers that there is one thing that
he can do to end the suffering. He can cut off intravenous feeding
and the patient will surely die. He does this and before the next
day the patient is dead.
!!. The case involves the principle that an ordinary means of prolonging life and an extraordinary means are relative to the patient's physical condition. Intravenous feeding is an artificial
means of prolonging life and therefore one may be more liberal in
application of principle. Since this cancer patient is beyond all
hope of recovery and suffering extreme pain, intravenous feeding
should be considered an extraordinary means of prolonging life.
The physician was justified in stopping the intravenous feeding.55

These views can be challenged because it is clear that the
intention of withholding the food and water is to effect death
to end suffering. We should recall that euthanasia is "an act
58 Sullivan holds that the following are natural ordinary means of preserving life:
Among the natural means of preserving
would be included such
means as proper clothing, housing, physical recreation, good food, regularity at meals, etc. Ibid., p. 65.
54 He writes that:
A natural mea-ns of prolonging Zife is, per se, a-n. ordinary means of
prolonging life, yet per acoidens may be erotraordinary. .•• An artificial means of prolonging life may be a-n. Mdinary mea-ns or an erotraordinary means reZatwe to the physical condition of the patient. Ibid.,
p. 65.
55 Ibid., p. 73.

life

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

or method of causing death painlessly so as to end suffering ",
iand the explicit purpose of removing feeding is not to remove a
treatment ,which itself causes great pam oo the patient, but to
cause death 'so rthat ,suffering from the disease will cease.56 If
the means of delivering the feeding were the cause of the patient's pain, it might be justified to withdraw it. It is not
clear how what he endorses is distinguished from mercy killing by omission.
It is interesting that Sullivan mentions nothing of Kelly's
claim that even extraordinary means can be forced on a patient for the common good. And he does not discuss Vitoria's
or de Lugo's claim that feeding should be given when there is
"some hope of life". They saw not only a difference between
feeding and other forms of medical treatment, but they also
affirmed that different sorts of criteria governed their provision. Sullivan saw none of this, and simply affirmed that the
same criteria governed the provision of food ·and water in all
circumstances. He did not discuss the issue of causality with
respect to feeding, and he did not say why the failure to provide or receive naturally or artificially ordinary means was
immoral. Had he done this, he might have been more willing
to establish a stricter criterion for the provision of natural and
assisted feeding.
7. Charles McFadden

Charles McFadden believes that the temporary use of medical treatments, including food and water, is ordinary while
their long-term use would be extraordinary. 57 This view is
56 How one can withdraw
readily providable assisted feeding from a
medically stable patient without intending death is not clear. Death is as
certain as if it were caused by a. lethal injection, a.nd death is not a. side
effect of a.n act eliminating suffering, but the means by which the suffering
was eliminated.
57 McFadden writes:
Routine medical practice today utilizes intravenous feeding in a. countless variety of cases. Certainly the physician regards this procedure a.s
an ordinary means of conserving life. It is obviously able to be carried

24

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

questionable because it would seem to imply that the longterm use of insulin by a diabetic or spoon feeding of the senile
would also be an extraordinary treatment as well. The difficulty is that it is no more burdensome to give assisted feeding
than to give spoon feeding, and declaring assisted feeding useless would strongly imply that the long-term use of more
burdensome forms of care or treatment such as wheelchairs, or
even visual ·aids for the visually impaired, would be extraordinary. McFadden was apparently seeking to be compassionate to the terminal by articulating this principle, but in so
doing he created a principle that could place many medically
vulnerable persons in jeopardy.

Conclusicn
In light of these findings, it does not seem possible to hold
that the Catholic medical ethical tradition would be subverted
by ·asserting that feeding be provided when it is an aspect of
·basic patient manitenance. It cannot simply be said that without qualification the " tradition " permitted assisted feeding
and fluids to be removed. It does not appear true that the
Catholic tradition simply allowed feeding to be withdrawn
from patients, for the majority of these writers prohibited the
out, under normal hospital conditions, without any notable inconvenience. For this reason, we must regard recourse to intravenous feeding,
in the case of typical hospitalized patients, as an ordinary and morally
compulsory procedure.
The above conclusion applies, as stated, to routine hospital cases where
the procedure is envisioned as a temporary means of carrying a patient
through a critcial period. Surely any effort to sustain life permanently
in this fashion would constitute a grave hardship and not be normally
compulsory.
Charles J. McFadden, The Dignity of Life (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday
Visitor Press, 1976), p. 152. One must question this judgment. Intravenous
feeding is less burdensome than giving some .Alzheimer's patients spoon
feeding. Does that mean that feeding those patients permanently would also
be elective and not obligatory? Would the permanent use of colostomies also
be elective if they were required for long term use? Many individuals now live
with the aid of portable respirators. .Are those too elective, despite the fact
that people can lead largely normal lives with them?

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

withdrawal of feeding when it was an a.spect of basic patient
maintenance.
This does not appear to be true for three reasons. First,
many in the tra.dition asserted principles that would not allow
remov,al of life-sustaining food ,and water from patients, and
many in the tradition who argued for its removal failed to provide adequate reasons for that judgment. Second, a number
of recent official teachings on this issue have affirmed obligations to feed. And third, there is an emerging consensus within
the Church that this sort of feeding is morally necessary. The
Catholic social justice tradition affirms duties of justice to give
food and drink to those in need.
Thus, Aquinas would not permit self-killing, and he required
that commonly available feeding be provided and accepted by
all persons. Vitoria demanded that feeding be given as long as
there was "some hope of life". De Lugo, despite his laxity on
many issues, affirmed that feeding be given and received as
long as there was "some hope of life", and he held that the
refusal of reasonably available means to sustain life would be
morally equivalent to suicide.
Gerald Kelly demanded that extraordinary treatments be
giv,en when required by rthe common good, and this would certainly include assisted feeding in some cases. When he did allow life-sustaining, re,adily available assisted feeding to be
withdrawn, he defended that judgment poorly by arguing that
feeding was speculatively ordinary but pmctically extraordinary. Kelly's critics were more consistent in their logic than
he was, but they were not given the place in the " tra.dition "
accorded to Kelly. Daniel Cronin admitted a difference between nutrition and fluids and medical treatments, but he did
not draw out the implications of this difference. As a result of
this he did not see that there should be different criteria governing the provision of food and water from the those governing the administration of medical treatments.
Joseph Sullivan admitted that there was a difference between feeding and other forms of ordinary care, but he per-

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

mitted feeding to be removed from a cancer patient who was
in great pain but who would live a long while because of a
strong heart. But, because the intention of the action was to
end the life of 1a person in extreme suffering, his view is questionable inasmuch as it seems to be endorsing euthanasia by
omission. He elided natural feeding into the category of ordinary medical treatment by requiring its provision according
·to the same standards as those governing ordinary medical
care. Previous authors asserted stricter obligations to provide
ordinary feeding, but Sulliv;an would not accept this. He recognized that there was a difference between natural and
assisted feeding, but he did not see that a different type of
obligation should flow from that difference. And Charles McF.adden allowed permanent assisted feeding to be removed because it was a burden, but he did not say how this was a
burden to the comatose patent, the first individual to be considered in making these estimates.
Second, in the past decade, a number of important official
statements have been issued on the provision of food and
water to patients, and these have supported the view that
quality of life judgments are not to be allowed determine if
feeding is to be given. The Declaration on Euthanasia held
that it was legitimate to refrain from using remedies when
existence was precarious and painful, but it held that ordinary
means had to be provided. 58 In The Matter of Nancy Ellen
Jobes, the New Jersey Catholic Conference filed an amicus
curiae brief arguing that this severely brain-damaged but
medically stable young woman be fed.59 The bishops argued
that removing feeding would be morally equivalent to intentional killing and ·said the following:
... nutrition and hydration, being basic to human life, are aspects
of normal care, which are not excessivelyburdensome, that should
58 Declaration on llluthanasia of the Sacre<}, Oongregation for the Doctrine
of the Faith, May 5, 1980.
0 0 Brief, Amicus Curiae, and appendix, In the matter of Nancy Iilllen Jobes,
on Behalf of the New Jersey Catholic Conference, #26, 041, p. 5.

FEEDING THE COMATOSE

27

always be provided to a patient. Nutrition and hydration are directed at sustaining life. Medical treatment is therapeutic; nutrition and hydration are not, because they will not cure any disease.
For that fundamental reason we insist that nutrition and hydration must always be maintained. As the Pontifical Academy for
Sciences noted in this respect in its report on "The Artificial Prolongation of Life and Its Exact Determination of the Moment of
Death": If the patient is in a permanent coma, irreversible as
far as it is possible to predict, treatment is not required, but care,
including feeding must be provided.e0

Immediately after the Judicial Council of the American
Medical Association issued its opinion that considered removal
of food and wa;ter from comatose patients who were not imminently dying, Archbishop Philip Hannan condemned the
Judicial Council's opinion. 61 And after an .appellate court in
California ordered caregivers and a hospital to remove a feeding tube which they gave Elizabeth Bouvia because ,they
thought she was trying to starve herself to death, Archbishop
Roger Mahony called the decision irrational. 82 Most recently,
in the lead editorial in the Jesuit theological journal La Civita
Cattolica, which is often ,a mouthpiece for the Vatican's thinking on issues, withholding " ordinary means " such as food,
blood transfusions and injections" was rejected as immoml. 63
flO[bid.
61 In a

letter on March 16, 1086, Archbishop Hannan wrote the following:
The Catholic Church has always held that families are not obligated to
use extraordinary means-such as artificial life support systems-to
sustain the life of a patient in a hopelessly irreversible coma. However,
food and water are ordinary means of sustaining life. Therefore, the
Catholic Church opposes the .American Medical Association position
because it approves denying a person the normal nourishment that he
or she needs to sustain life.
62 "Mahony Critical of Logic in Bouvia Case", Swn Fernando Valley Daily
News, April 24, 1986, p. 1. In addition, Cardinals Law and Bernardin also
criticized decisions to allow food and water to be removed from patients.
See "Law Take Side in Coma Case'', The Boston Herald, June 8, 1985, and
"Cardinal Warns of Eutha.nasia'', Ohioago OathoUo, April 16, 1986.
es La Oivita OattoZioa, February 21, 1987. The editorial cited the report
of the Vatican Commission "Oor Unum" which stated:
There remains the strict obligation to apply under all circumstances

i8

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

These statements clearly show that a consensus is emerging
in the official teachings of the Church on the moral obligation
to provide assisted feeding when it is an aspect of basic patient maintenance. It is clear that through these official statements the magisterium is correcting deficiencies in the moral
theological tradition of recent years ·and is teaching that withfeeding is killing by omission.
holding
Third, giving food and drink to those in need is in clear harmony with classical .Catholic social justice principles. There is
an emerging consensus that those who have the :financialmeans
and technological capability to feed the needy must put their
means to that use. This percei¥ed moral obligation motivated
recent efforts by Western nations to feed the starving in Africa
through Live Aid, and major economic, scientific and agricultural efforts to promote the development of argiculture in the
third world. This obligation has been repeatedly affirmed in
recent Papal Encyclicals which have called on the rich nations
to care for those nations which cannot feed themselves, and it
is imposed on the rich nations as a matter of justice. The
Encyclical Populorum Progressi,o e:x;pressed concern for the
growing problem of hunger in the world and it saw despondency as a cons·equence of this hunger. 64
This issue of providing feeding to patients is part and parcel
of this problem. Lack of food was viewed as posing hazards
greater than were immediately apparent, and it considered
lack of food ·and water an ancient scourge. The Holy Father
simply asserted "No more hunger, hunger never again!" 65
those therapeutic measures which are called 'minimal': that is, those
which are normally and customarily used for the maintenance of life
(food, blood transfusions, injections, etc.) .
The editorial also criticized efforts to withhold "ordinary means" of treatment
such as food, blood transfusions or injections. See "Euthanasia Spreading,
Jesuit Journal Warns" The Boston Pilot, March 6, 1987.
MPopulorum Progressio, Para. 45. See Joseph Gremillion, The Gospel of
Peace and Justice (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1979), p. 401.
65 "Address of His Holiness Pope Paul VI to the Participants of the World
Food Conference," Rome (Nov. 9, 1974), para. 2. In Gremillion, op cit., pp.
599·606.

FEEDING THE COJ\IA.TOSE

29

He did not just say this about the hunger of the poor, but
about hunger in general. The Holy Father said that the lack
of prudent economic planning was one reason why some suffered hunger. 66 This point should be taken seriously with re,spect to ·assisted feeding, for many have sought to justify its
removal precisely for economic reasons. The Holy Father asserted that the right to satisfy one's hunger must finally be
recognized for everyone, according to the specific requirements
of his age and activity, and he called for vigilance and courage
to feed the hungry. 67
The obligation to feed the hungry seems to be based on the
Gospel story of the Good Samaritan. The failure to give food
and drink to the nameless victim is denounced as not just a
failure of charity, but a loathsome failure of justice. The
Samaritan does not stop to investigate the medical condition
of the victim of brigands, but simply ·gives food and drink.
Those who fail to do this are not depicted as merely being
lacking in charity, but as being hateful and maliciously selfish
and egocentric. The Good Samaritan is really a " minimally
decent" Samaritan who simply does what common decency
demand. He does not ask if the man will survive a long period
of time, fully recover his capability for human action, or be
able to act for human spiritual and affective ends. He does not
ask if his actions will increase his sufferings, and he certainly
does not " put the man out of his misery " by giving him a
" quick and painless death "!
This general obligation to give food and drink does not cease
when nursing techniques 'a.re needed rto pwvide them, for it is
probably easier to give IV or NG feeding to a hospital patient in the United States than it is a starving person in the
African or South American countryside, for instance. Thus,
social policy of permitting food and water to be withheld from
those who can live if these are provided could undermine this
developing moral consensus that food must be given to all
people by those with the capability.
oo Ibid., pa.re.. 2, 3, pp. 602-606.

Ibid.

30

ROBERT BARRY, O.P.

Food and water, irrespective of their mode of provision, are
basic resources of the body and are not therapeutic measures.
They are used by every cell, organ and system in the body to
sustain its natural functions, and their natural :finality or teleological orientation is not therapeutic. Unlike medical treatments, all people require them whether they are well or ill. To
remove them when .their mere provision is by routine techniques of patient maintenance is to kill the patient by omission
through their denial. Removing them does not allow an underlying pathological condition to be set free, but sets the process
of dying immediately into motion.
In affirming that life-sustaining assisted feeding provided by
routine nursing measures is an .aspect of normal care and basic
patient maintenance, classical doctrines that were obscure and
not fully understood are made clearer. It is now clearer to
many in the Church that withholding or removing these constitutes killing by omission. The Church is not getting on to
a slippery slope by affirming this, but is making more articulate and clear an insight that has been present, though vague
and ambiguous, for generations.

IMMEDIACY AND MEDIATION IN AQUINAS:
"IN I SENT.," Q. 1, A. 5
DOUGLAS

c. HALI,

Louvain Universtiy
Belgium

Introduction

HE PURPOSE of the present essay is to provide an
]] nalysis of the dialectically related notions of " immediacy" and "med:ia1tion" in Question I,
5 of
Aquinas' Commentary on the Sentences. "Immediacy" here
refers to the non-mediated " light of inspiration " which
Aquinas proposes as a principle for theology; while " mediation " refers to the problem of interpretation via ,sensible signs
in an historical community. It is proposed that there are
dialectical tensions unresolved by Aquinas, and usually overlooked by commentators and interpreters.1
analysis published to date of the theological meth1 The most extensive
odology of Aquinas in this Commentary is by M. Corbin, Le chemin de la
theologie chez Thomas d' Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne, 1974). For his analysis
of the text in question see pp. 273-290. The present essay seeks precisely to
be even more "hegelian" and more "barthian" than Corbin, and to provide
some documentation for the validity of ,such an interpretation of Aquinas. For
a further methodological discussion, see my "Participated Trinitarian Relations: Dialectics of Method, Understanding, and Mystery in the Theology of
Thomas Aquinas" (Leuven: S.T.D. dissertation, the Faculty of Theology,
1987). For basic points in the literature see P. Mandonnet, "Chronologie
sommaire de la vie et des ecrits de saint Thomas," Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 9 (1920), 142·152; G. Rossi, "L'autografo di S.
Tommaso del Commento al III libro delle Sentenze," Divus Thomas Oommentarium de philosophia et theologia 35 ( 1932), 532-585; A. Hayen, "S. Thomas
a-t-il edite deux fois son Commentaire sure le livre des Sentences," Recherches
de theologie ancienne et medievale 9 ( 1937), 219-236. See also the review of
this by A. Donclaine, in Bulletin thomiste 6 (1940), 100-108. P. Vanier,
"Theologie trinitaire chez S. Thomas d'Aquin. Evolution du concept d'action
notionelle," Publications de l'Institut d'etudes medievales 13 ( 1953), p. 124.

31

DOUGLAS C. BALL

The "Prologue" to the Commentary

The " Prologue " of Aquinas' Commentary consists of two
parts, as did that of Albert the Great, and as was the custom
of the time. The first part takes its point of departure from a
biblical text, which is then interpreted in accord with the na>bure of theology and the project of commentary on the four
hooks of the Sentences. The theme of Aquinas' biblical meditation is not scientia hut sapientia. The second part of
Aquinas' "Pmlogue " consists, as did Albert's, of a question on
the status and method of theology. This Question 1 is of particular importance in that it clearly states that sacred doctrine
is not principally to he considered soientia.
After the biblical reflection-mediation, Aquinas presents an
introductory question on the status and method of sacra doctrina in a more "scholastic" manner, specifying five articles
that will be addressed: 1) its necessity; 9l) supposing that it
exists, whether it is one or many; 3) if it is one, whether it is
practical or speculative, and if it is speculative, whether it is
wisdom, science, or understanding; 4) its subject; 5) its mode. 2
For a critique of this position see the review of Vanier by J. Hamer in
Bulletin thomiste 9 ( 1954-1956), 596-601. See also E. Gilson, The Christian
Philosophy of St. Thomas .Aquinas (New York, 1956); M. D. Chenu, Toward
Understanding St. Thomas (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1964); J.
Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," The Thomist 38 (1974), 64-67;
B. Mondin, St. Thomas .Aquinas' Philosophy in the Oommentary to the Sentences (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975). Good arguments on the dating
and circumstances of the work are to be found in J. Weishepil, Friar Thomas
d'.A.quino: His Life, Thought, and Work (Garden City: Doubleday, 1974).
2Aquinas, Soriptum Super Libros Sententiarum, vol. 1, ed. Mandonnet
(Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), q. 1 ( p. 6). [It should be noted that there is as
yet no critical edition of this work. All references here will be to this edition, which at least provides a basic text, which is fundamentally a reprint
of the Vives edition, and thus differs at times from the Parma edition. The
Vives edition, prepared at the end of the 19th century by Abbe Frette, consulted some MSS in the Parisian libraries, but according to current scholarship these MSS reflected a revised text in the MSS tradition. Current
scholarship holds that Bruxelles 873-885 (Bx3) and Madrid 516 (Md) reflect
the primitive MSS tradition. For the decisive analysis, see E. Booth, "The
Three Pecia Systems of St. Thomas Aquinas's Commentary 'In I Sententie.r-

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In this Commentary Aquinas already proposes three types
of questions concerning aacra doctrina: an sit (Article 1); quid
sit (Articles 2, 8, 4); and de modo (Article 5). Yet there are
some logica1 problems with this early schema.3 The question
as to whether sama doctrina is one or many is proposed before
a" what," a genus, such as" science," is established. Similarly,
the question as to whether it is speculative or practical presupposes the untreated question as to what sort of thing it is.
Aquinas will revise this early logical 'structure in his later
Question 1. of the Summa Theologiae.
Article 5: The Mode of Theology

In his later Summa theologiae Aquinais will separate the concerns of this Article 5 into distinct articles on the senses and
images of Sacred Scripture and the "argumentative status "
(reasonableness) of sacred doctrine. But here these topic areas
are combined in one Ar.tide. This Article does indeed appear
to he either a very rough initial attempt that lacks Aquinas'
customary logical organization and clarity, or the existing editions simply have included what were only partial and unfinished revisions. This final Article 5 of the " Prologue " is of
particular interest because of the multiple dialectical relationships it has with the previous four a:r.ticles.
The four objections in Article 5 question whether divine science: 1) is artificialis, 2) has one mode, 8) uses poetics and
metaphor, and 4) is argumentativus (reasonable). The complex corpus of the Article addresses the necessity of sensible
um," (late 1987) in La production du Zivre universitaire au moyen b,ge. }j]11JempZar et peoia. The critical edition by the Leonine Commission is still several
years from completion. However, for all quotations of the Latin text in the
present article, the Leonine Commission Editor for Book I of the Commentary,
Prof. Louis Bataillon, has graciously checked the MSS collation sheet which
has thusfar been completed, and it has been found that there .are only three
variations in the Mandonnet text from current MSS evidence, as far as the
presently cited texts are concerned. These variations will be noted. There is
no published English translation of this Commentary.]
s See discussion in J. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of 'Sacra Doctrina'," The
Thomist 38 ( 1974), 64-67.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

images, the narration of signs, the senses of Sacred Scripture,
the ends of theology, and the "argumentative" (reasonable)
status of sacred doctrine. One may expect that in a brief discussion of these complex themes, Aquinas will not be able to
do them justice, and he may have felt" pressured" to attempt
to do too much in his final methodological Article tin the
" Prologue."
There are two terms in this Article that present particular
and important problems for interpretation: argumentativus
and artificia.lis.
In the response of this Article, Aquinas will state that the
mode of sacred science is " argumentativus." The same term is
later used in Question 1, Article 8 of the Summa Theologiae.
In both works the shades of meaning and intended meaning of
Aquinas have fong presented problems of interpretation for
translators and commentators, ,and more strict Aristotelian
" scientists " were often quick to miss the more subtle and
complex significations. It is the case that " argumenta,tivus "
does, at times for Aquinas, mean " proving the truth of something by a syllogism," demonstrating, " possible of being
proven by a, syllogism," or iargumentative. 4 A " probatio argumentativa" is an apodictic demonstration. But an "argumentatio" has more subtle shades of meaning simply rus " a
procedure of testimony," or "the presentation of evidence," 5
or
" .a process of reasoning or being reasonable." 6 This
is a point of great importance for an accurate understanding
of the status and method of theology for Aquinas. When
Aquinas describes sacred science •as " argumentative " the use
of the term is analogical ,and is itself ex convenientia. In the
response to the fourth objection in the present Article, Aquinas
1

4 See R. Deferrari and Iv.I. Barry, A Lericon of St. Thomas A.quiina8 (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1948), vol. I, p. 82.
5 Ibid.
6 Jt is the judgment of the present author that the best translation here is
simply "reasonable," "being engaged in a proce.ss which involves reasoning."
While acknowledging that, for Aquinas, sacred dootrine is "beyond" the range
of reason, Aquinas also proposes that is has "reasonable" aspects.

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himself will state, "argumenta tolluntur ad probationem articulorum fidei." Since these " first principles " of theology differ
in status and mode of being known from the first principles of
philosophical sciences, it is simply erroneous to think that
Aquinas predicates " argumentative " of rational sciences and
sacred science in the same manner, or that sacred science can
literally be "argumentative" in the strict sense of the term.
The term "a.rtificialis" used in the initial objection has also
long presented complications for translators and commentators. However, the term is present in all known manuscripts,
and thus Aquinas obviously intended something by this term.
The problem is that the use of this term in this text is unique
in the entire corpus of Aquinas. It is also complicated by some
strange historical events. It seems that the expression "artificialis" for a mode of theology came from a mistake in John
Scotus Eriugena's Latin translation of the Celestial Hierarchy
II, fl of Ps. Dionysius. 7 Ps. Dionysius actually uses the term
atechnos 8 when speaking of theologia. In the mystical negativity of Ps. DionySli.1Us,he would s:tress rthe blinding br:illiiance
of divine revelation, as overpowering finite intellect, and there
could be no question of an artistic construction in theology.
By the term atechnos, Ps. Dionysius clearly meant "artlessly,"
"in an unsophisticated manner," " without craft or skill."
However, John Scotus Eriugena translated this term as artificialiter. And thus one hais .a very clear instance where the
meaning of P:s. Dionysius was reconstructed precisely into its
opposite, with resulting contortions in theological ,aerobics in
attempting to explain how it could be that theology has a
mode which is artificialis. In aiddition fo being influenced by
this :translation of P,s. Dionysius, Aquinas was also likely influenced hy ,a 18th century Franciscan theologian, Eudes
Rigaud (Odo Rigaldi), whose Quaestio de scientia theologiae,
pars II had as its Question 1: "Utrum modus procedendi in
1 See R. Roques, Libres sentiers vers l'·erige'7llism (Rome: Ed. dell'Ateneo,
1975), Chapter 2, esp. pp. 46-50.
s Oelestial Hierarchy II, 2. PL 122, 1040A.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

theologia mt artificialis vel non." 9 The approach of Odo
Rigaldi was to distinguish two modes by which something
could be artificialis. One according to human reason, and the
other according to divine wisdom, especially as pertaining to
salvation. The first mode is found in all sciences, but the second is found in theology, as it is concerned with salvation,
piety, and human affect. Thus, for Odo Rigaldi, it was appropriate that theology be artificialis.
Now, regardless of the mistranslation of Ps. Dionysius, all
the MSS evidence indicates that Aquinas did use the term
"artificialis" in his own Article 5. And the question then becomes not what Ps. Dionysius meant by atechnos, but what
Aquinas meant.
In the initial sitaitement of Aquinas' Artide, the quesrt[on
posed with regard to the mode of the science of theology is
that it seems to be "artificialissimus." This is not accurately
understood as meaning " most artificial." 10 Here the context
of the term is "modus artificialis" which refers to the way or
manner of a scientific mode. This is made clear in the response
to this first objection in Article 5: "modus artificialis dicitur
qui competit materiae; unde modus qui est artificialis in
geometria, non est artificialis in ethica; et secundum hoc modus
hujus scientiae maxime artificialis est, quia maxime conveniens
materiae." In the context of "modus artificialis/' it is best to
understand " artificialis " as meaning a skillful ordering, as in
scientific argument, in the sense of the term " artificiose " (in
an orderly manner), or "artificiosus" (skillfull, accomplished
in a.rt), or "artificium" (skill, knowledge, ingenuity). And at
the same time the term does mean a skillful ordering of artistic
11 For the text see L. Sileo, Peoria della 8cienza teologica: Quaestio de
8cientia theologiae di Odo Rigaldi e altri testi inediti (1230-1250). 2 vols.
Facultas Theologica-Sectio Dogmatica, Thesis ad doctorarum n. 277 (Rome:
Pontificium Athenaeum Antonianum, 1984). The text for this Question is
found in vol. 2, pp. 54-59.
10 "Artificialis, e" does mean "artistic" or "artificial" at times for Aquinas.
See R. Deferrari and M .Barry, A. Leroicon of St. Thoma8 Aquina8, vol. 1,
p. 88.

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images or similitudes, and it is here related to the term "artifex" (master of an art, artist, craftsman) .11
In Article 5 the first objection is also complicated by variant
texts between the Parma and the Mandonnet editions:
Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1) [Parma ed. "Videtur quod modus
procedendi non sit artificialis."] Nobilissimae scientiae debet esse
nobilissimus modus. Sed quanto modus est magis artificalis, tanto
nobilior est. 12 Ergo, cum haec scientia sit nobilissima, modus ejus
debet esse artificialissimus.18

Now, in context, the initial statement of the Parma edition
actually makes more sense. But the fact is that the MSS
evidence at present favors the Mandonnet version. The Parma
variant is found also in the 16th Piana edition, but nowhere
else.14 Obviously, one cannot combine the Parma and Mandonnet editions here, for to do so would make no logical sense,
especially in light of the response to this objection, as will be
seen. It does not make sense to combine these editions so that
the objection would read: "It seems that the mode of proceeding [for this science] is not artificialis. . . . Therefore, since
this science is the most noble, its mode should be artificialissi11 Because of the interplays
of these meanings impossible to concisely
render into English, in the translations which follow the term will simply
be presented in Latin.
12 Here the Mandonnet
edition does read "tanto nobilior est," but L.
Bataillon has informed the present author (Letter, June 25, 1987) that the
majority of the MSS actually have "quanto modus es magis artificialis,
nobilior est," without "tanto" :and this elimination does make for a smoother
reading.
13 Q. 1, a. ·5, ob 1 ( p. 16). [Parma ed. "It seems that the mode of procedure for this science is not 'artificiaUs.' "] For the most noble science should
be of the most noble mode. But insofar as a mode is more 'artifioialis' it is
also more noble. Therefore, since this science is the most noble its mode
'
should be 'artifioialis' to the greatest extent.
14 For L. Bataillon,
the Parma variant "seems to be an unhappy tentative to unify the presentation of the articles by inserting th.is 'Videtur quod
modus prooedendi non sit artificialis.' So the text is surely the Mandonnet
one and there is no correction to be made to it" (Letter, June 25, 1987).
But the question remains as to why, in these printed editions, the need was
sensed to insert the phrase.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

mus." The point here is that if one combines the Parma and
Mandonnet editions, one has statements that the mode " is
not artifioiaUs," and that it "should ·be artifioialissimus."
Now, since the Parma addition is not reflected in the MSS evidence it can be eliminated. But then what one has is an
objection stating the thesis which is argued in the corpus of
the Article, .and which is also basically argued in the particular
response to the first objection. This would not be the normal,
logical procedure for Aquinas. Normally, the thrust of the objection is reversed in the corpus and in the response to the objootion. In order to get some sense of what the logical structure of the first objection iat least should be, it is helpful to look
at the response to the first objection:
Ad primum ergo dicendum, quod modus artificial,is dictur qui
competit materiae; unde modus qui est artificialis in geometria,
non est artificialis in ethica: et secundum hoc modus hujus scientiae maxime artificial,isest, quia maxime conveniens materiae.15

Thus, if the response to the objection is holding that sacred
doctrine is maximally artifioialis1 then the logical objection
must be that sacred doctrine is not "arlifioialis." In this regard, at least the Parma edition begins in a logically correct
manner. But both the Parma and Madonnet editions then also
state in the First Objection, "Ergo, oum haeo soientia sit
nobilissima, modus ejus debet esse artifioialissimus."
The hypothesis of the present •author is that the first objection should actually read,
Ad quintum sic proceditur. 1) Nobilissimae scientiae debet esse
nobilissimus modus. 16 Sed quanto modus est magis artificialis,
1s Q. I, a. 5, ad I (p. 18). To the first objection it is to be said that the
mode 'artificialis' is said to pertain [to sciences] according to their subject
matter, hence the mode which is 'artificialis' in geometry is not 'artificialis'
in ethics, and according to this the mode of this science [sacred doctrine] is
maximally 'artificialis,' because this mode is maximally in harmony with
["conveniens", fitting] its subject matter.
1s Again, from the MSS evidence, the later Parma ed. addition of "Videtur
quod modus prooedendi. non sit artificialis" should not be in the text.

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non 17 nobilior est. Ergo, cum haec scientia sit nobilissima, modus
ejus non 18 debet esse artificialissimus.19

What is clearly the case is that in Aquinas' response he
argues that sacred doctrine is " artificialis," and whether or
not one accepts the above hypothesis for how the first objection should rea,d, the question remains as to how one can understand Aquinas' meaning in the response of the Article.
The following interpretation may be suggested. Sacred doctrine is maximally "artificialis" because its ultimate "subject
matter " is impossible to conceptualize or adequately represent
in .any finite medium. What is implied here in Aquinas is the
importance of the constructive imagination of the theologian,
in attempting to find at least moderately satisfactory similitudes. The tension in such a view of the theological process is
that it is not completely clear how what the theologian treats
is the inexpressable reality " behind " the similitudes, rather
than the similitudes themselves, as products of the constructive imagination. It is because of the inexpressability of the
ultimate " subject matter " of sacred doctrine that it is ex
convenientia for the "treated '' subject matter to be " artificialissimus." But it is, of course, the manner of this transition from that which cannot be conceived to that which is
" artificialissmus " which is particularly difficult, or impossible,
to explicate. Aquinas gives some indications of the problems
in his response:
Responsio. Dicendum, 20 quod m.odus cujusque scientiae debet in17 The hypothesis of the present author is thus that what came to be transscribed as "tanto" in many MSS should have been "non."
1s Here again, the hypothesis is that this "non" was somehow eliminated
in the MSS traditions, but there is not one known MSS where either this
"non" or another word is present.
10 [A. 5, ob l.] The most noble science should be of the most noble mode.
But insofar as a mode is more artificialis, it is not more noble. Therefore,
since this science is the most noble, its mode should not be artificialis to the
greatest extent [emphasis added].
20 The Mandonnet edition does have "Respondeo dicendum," but all the
MSS read "Responsi-0. Dicendum . . ." And this is more in keeping with other
critical editions, and the forthcoming Leonine Edition of this Commentary
will certainly have the latter reading.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

quzn secundum considerationem materiae . . . Principia autem
hujus scientiae sunt per revelationem accepta; et ideo modus
accipiendi ipsa principia debet esse revelativus ex parte infundentis, ut in visionibus [Parma ed. "revelationibus"] prophetarum,
et orativus ex parte recipientis, ut patet in Psalmis.21

What Aquinas was trying to express in this text is not fully
clear. It seems that he is trying to indicate that the orientation
of one concerned with divine truth should be an orientation
which searches for, intends, and is open to that which is beyond the merely "natural" realm of the created order. He
seems to be dealing with the idea that the mode of reception
of divine principles is itself a divine mode. It is not only the
principles themselves which have ,a divine status. It is also
notable that his example here of such a mode of reception is
not that of a calm, Aristotelian science, hut the " visions of
the prophets." There is clearly something in Aquinas' intention here that is far removed from merely professional, academic theology.
It should be recalled that Aquinas' point of focus in this final
Article 5 is the " mode " of theology, and that the mode of any
inquiry has to be in accord with its subject matter, which was
the topic of Article 4. The problematic in Aquinas' view of
the subject matter o:f theology is that it has been said to be
" ens divinum cognoscibile per inspiration.em." 22 The dialectic
here is that ens divinum is not directly knowable by finite
consciousness and yet, for many reasons, Aquinas wants to in21 Q. 1, a, 5, resp. (p. 17). The mode of any sort of science should be investigated according to a consideration of its subject matter ..• The principles of this science are, however, accepted by means of divine revelation,
a.nd for the same reason the mode of accepting these principles themselves
should be as revealed by God, from whom revelation flows, as in the visions
of the prophets, and the mode of receiving these principles should be in an
attitude of prayer, as is clear in the Psalms.
[Here the MSS evidence favors the Mandonnet reading of "visionibus'' rather
than the Parma reading of "revelationibus," but the Parma reading may be
taken as an indication of the difficulty of understanding the present text,
with a possible meaning of the revelation given to the prophets being received
prayerfully.]
22 Q. 1, a. 4, resp. (p. 16).

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sist on some knowability of God for finite consciousness. In
the present response, Aquinas appeals to divine action, even
using the dmmatic example of the visions of the prophets to
express what it is like to receive the principles of this sacred
science. The difficulty, of course, is how this divine light of
inspiration, which ultimately is a revelation of the first truth,
so high above human reason that it cannot be conceptualized
or adequately represented, is yet communicated, partially, in
the finite. There can be no complete, demonstrative apologetics for this, yet Aquinas attempts to trace a path.
For Aquinas, the divine light of inspiration gives a habit of
faith to the believer, and it is this habit of faith, as a participation in God's own Self-Understanding, that enables a metaphysical, participatory link between the believer and the First
Truth, and also enables the believer to interpret the articles
of faith and the preaching of the Church in order to reach
through the sensible expressions to the First Truth. 23 What is
sensed " through " language is something beyond language.
Aquinas attempts to trace a link between the "original revelation " of the divine light itself and the expression of revelation
in the finite symbols of Sacred Scripture:
modus istius scientiae sit narrativus signorum, quae ad confirmationem fidei fa,ciunt: et quia etiam ista principia non sunt proportionata humanae rationi secundum statum viae, quae ex sensibilibus consuevit accipere, ideo oportet ut eorum cognitionem per
sensibilium similitudines manuducatur: unde oportet modum istius
scientiae esse metaphoricum, sive symbolicum, vel parabolicum. 24

There are two problems in phrasing for interpretation and
translation here. Aquinas initially states simply "modus
23 Cf. a. 5, resp.

( p. 17).

24Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (pp. 17-18). The mode of this science is the narration

of signs, which are given for the confirmation of faith, and because the
principles of the faith are not proportionate to human reason in its state
in this life, since human reason is accustomed to sensible things, it follows
that our knowledge of these principles of faith will be led by sensible similitules, and hence it follows that the mode of this science is metaphorical, or
symbolical, or parabolical.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

istius soientiae," and the final phrase is also simply " modum
istius soientiae." Both of these could be understood as either
" the mode of this science," or " a mode of this science." The
distinction is impor:ant, even ias what may he the intentional
ambiguity on the part of Aquinas here is important. But if
Aquinas meant the phrase to mean " a mode," or " one mode,"
it would be his custom to indicate this with "unus, a, um,"
which is not done here. This would indicate that he means
"the mode." For the present interpreter-translator, either
" a " or " the" is actually a correct interpretation of the tert,
as long as one understands these in a proper context. In the
present section of the Article, Aquinas is talking about the
" spiritual ·senses" of Sacred Scripture, and the mode of theology is here by means of metaphor, symbol, and parable. But
in Aquinas' view there is another mode of theology, which is
•according to the " literal sense," and it is only in this mode
that theology can be " .argumentative." It is the case that " a
mode " of this science is through the sensible order by means
of metaphor, 1symbol, and parable, and that the access to " content" for theology is at least principally in this manner. It is
1also the case that " a mode " for the reception of the principles
of this ·science is the divine light of inspiration. But such
"light" has no content. 25 Thus, "the mode" for receiving
"content " is via the •sensible order. And this sensible order
can be according to the " literal sense " or the " spiritual
senses," but the latter cannot provide a basis for " argumentative" theology. Of comise, m twentieth century terms, ithere
is far more of the " symbolic order " in the Sacred Scriptures
than could possibly have been recognized by Aquinas in the
thirteenth century.
But aside foom this problem of the possibility of a " literal
sense," a major tension must be noted here. Previously in this
very Question 1, Aquinas has insisted on the" immediate" na25 For further
discussion see our "Participated Trinitarian Relations,"
especially on the transformation of Dionysian mysticism by Albert the Great
a.nd Aquinas.

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ture of divine inspiration, which, as " immediate " would seem
to circumvent the sensible order, with a direct infusion of divine light. However, here in the final Article 5, Aquinas is
clearly talking about a mediated mode through the sensible
order, where the constructive powers of human imagination
have .a siigruificantrole. In 'such an 1approach, the process of interpretation is one at least proximally directed to the products
of human, constructive imagination which, at least in the eyes
of faith, have been guided in their construction by divine inspiration. While the ultimately hoped-for "object" may be
the First Truth, beyond all adequate mediation, the interpretative process here is definitely medi,ated.
One faces here a profound, fundamental, and dialectical tension in Aquinas' formulations. There is a sense in which divine inspiration is immediate, ,and •a sense in which the truth
will .always be mediated in its parti,al expressions by means
of constructive imagination in a particular historical community. And this mode of construction will then directly influence
the reception of the truth.
In Article 5, Aquinas is trying to address how the "principles" of theology are received. His main concern in the final
Article 5 is not with the productive processes of theological
reflection, but the starting points. However, a circle becomes
.apparent, for the starting points for one generation's theology
can be the products of the constructive imagination of previous
generations of theological reflection. What is important in
Aquinas' final Article 5 is his shift to a more " down-toeart:h " view of the theological process, rather than one which
has at times ,seemed to be modeled on the intellectual processes
of separate substances. His qualification .is clear: "ista prinoipia, non sunt proportiona.ta humanae rationi seoundum
statum viae." But if there is a lack of such proportion (or
proportionality), :the problem remains as to how such principles can possibly be received. The appeal to the mediation
of the First Tl'Uth through the articles of faith, which can be
articulated, does not" solve" the problem, for if ,these articles

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

point beyond themselves, one still has the problem of how the
human subject can sense the further meaning, behind the
mediation. An appeal to the " literal sense " of Sacred Scrip-ture also does not " ·solve " the problem, for the " literal sense "
is still in finite language which cannot contain the First Truth.
The dialectical tension should be clear: there is an insistence
on immediacy, and the rather ·independent, a priori status of
theology, at least in the reception of its principles, and with
this status comes the assertion that theology should direct the
other sciences as inferior sciences, as if theology were self-constituted without recourse to the natural order. But here in the
final Article 5 there is a return to the natural order, not merely
for the convenience of " utilizing" it, but for access to the
meanings, or " principles " of theological reflection. In this return to the natural order, it is not the case that theological
reflection has a prior constitution; rather, it enters into the
processes of constructive imagination and interpretation in
order to start to be constituted at all. In this approach, the
"content " and " subject matter " of theological reflection is in
the natural order, but-mysteriously-what
is dialectically
intended by theological consciousness is something which cannot be contained "in" language, or in any aspect of the natural, created order, no matter how artistically and imaginatively
constructed.
The nert point in Aquinas' rather involved response in this
Article, also presents some difficulties. Aquinas has recognized
that :there is ·a reception of biblical truth via metaphor, symbol, and parable, but this will not suffice for the production of
"argumentative"
theology. In an important transition,
Aquinas then presents his own understanding of the three
" theological tasks " presented by Sacred Scripture:
Ex istis autem principiis ad tria proceditur in saCll'a Scriptura:
scilicet ad destructionem errorum, quod sine argumentis fieri non
potest; et ideo oportet modum hujus scientiae esse cuandoque
argumentativum, tum pe'T' auctoritates, tum etiam per rationes et
similitudines naturales. Proceditur etiam ad instructionem morum:
unde quantum ad hoc modus ejus debet esse praeceptivus, sicut in

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lege; comminatorius et promissivus, ut in prophetis; et narrativus
exernplorum, ut in historialibus. Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae; et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum ... 26

The first point of interest here is that Aquinas does not now
base the " argumentative " status of theology 1simply on the
" literal " sense, but on the appeal to " authorities " and in the
use of "similitudes" (or analogies). The second point of interest is that Aquinas lists the "contemplation of the truth"
last, and one may therefore consider it as being stressed as the
most important function. Of additional interest is the fact that
Aquinas describes this goal as " contemplationem veritatis in
quaestionibus sacrrae Scripture " (emphasis added) . Qua.estwnibus is used here as a technical term of mid-18th century
theology. lt does not mean .a " reading " or a " commentary "
on Sacred Scripture, but a process of mtional investigation and
exploration. This "questionibus sacrae Scripturae"
(emphasis ,added) , differs £rom ;the "immediate" corutemplaition
of God presented in Article 1. Here in Article 5, this albeit
brief phrase presents a much more" realistic" and "down-toearth " mode of contemplation, although it may be a less perfect mode in that it is more (not completely) an "acquired"
mode of contemp1rutionthrough study. It is not completely an
acquired mode of contemplation through study because this
" quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae" begins with the act of faith
which is an " infused virtue " inaugumted by divine action, but
it is also an acquired mode of contemplation in that it involves
26 Q. 1, a. 5, resp. ( p. 18). From these principles there proceed three
things in Sacred Scripture, namely, the destruction of errors, which cannot
be accomplished without reasonableness, and for this reason it follows that
this science is in some way argumentative, by appeal to the authorities or
even by means of reasons and nautral similitudes. Secondly there is the instruction of morals, and insofar as this doctrine has this mode it should be
prescriptive, as in law, threatening punishment and extending promises, as
the prophets, and providing exemplars in narrative, as the historians. Thirdly
.there is the contemplation of truth in the questioning [quaestionibus,
"investigation," "rational examination"] of Sacred Scripture, and for these
reasons it follows that the mode of this science is reasonable.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

the very human process of " questioning,'' inqmnng into,
analyzing in order to understand, and making dialectical clarifications in order to
in part the meaning of Sacred Scripture as divine revelation.
It may he recalled that in Article 1 of this " Prologue,''
Aquinas has stated that the end of human life is the contemplation of God, and that the contemplation of God is of two
types: the rational contemp1ation possible in philosophy and a
contemplation in which God " videtur immediate per suam
essentiam," and that this perfect contemplation of God constitutes the vi,sion of God in heaven. 27 Compared to this " immediate " contemplation of God, Aquinas then tries to state
in Article 1 how the theological contemplation of God in this
life is imperfect compared with the vision of God in heaven,
and yet the imperfect contemplation possible in this life is led
rto the more perfect contemp1ation by means of the divine
light of inspiration. It may be recalled that what Aquinas
stated in Article 1 was:
1

1

Unde oportet ut ea quae sunt ad finem proportionentur, fini,
quantenus homo manuducatur ad illam contemplationem in statu
viae per cognitionem non a creaturis sumptam sed immediate e:x;
divino lumi,ne inspiratam; et haec est doctrina theologiae [emphasis
added]. 28

This is problematic, limit-discource, for many reasons. First, it
is not conceivable how any being except God can attain the
perfect contemplation of God to which Aquinas refers, a contemplation per, i.e., "in,'' or "through,'' God's own Essence.
Secondly, it is not clear how there can be an " immediate"
knowledge of God by means of the light of divine inspiration.
How this " light " can ·actuate " knowledge " is not specified.
·21Q.1, a. 1, resp. (pp. 7-8).
2s Ibid., ( p. 8). Hence it follows that even as those things which are directed to an end are proportioned to that end, in order for the human subject
to be led to that [perfect] contemplation [of God] in this life [it is necessary
that] there not only be a knowledge [of God] through the created order but
also an immediate [knowledge of God] by means of the divine light of inspiration, and this is the doctrine of theology [emphasis added].

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All that Aquinas says is that philosophy offers an imperfect
contemplation of God, while the divine light of inspiration, in
this life, offers a more perfect contemplation of God, and it is
this more perfect contemplation which is "dootrina theologiae," 29 the purpose of which is to lead one to perfect contemplation. If this " divine light " can have no " content " for
human intellect, it can only function as an intentional principle for the interpretation of sensible content in human experience.
Within Aquinas' more mature systematic thought further
qualifications could be added. What Aquinas attempts in this
early tert is a treatment of how the human subject can be
proportioned to ,an end (the immediate contemplation of God)
which is beyond the naturail possibilities for finite human nature to acoomplish. This is the theme with which Aquinas' introduces his treatment in Article 1: "ut ea quae sunt ad finem
proportionentur fini." It is then the divine J,ight of inspiration
which proportions the human subject to this end. It should be
noted that if the function of .this " light " is to " proportion "
the human subject, then its function is not properly one of
providing "content," but of enabling the subject to reach
"content," through the created order, because of the changed
horizon, intentionality, or "proportionality to meaning,'' that
the "light" of inspiration p11ovides. This· divine " light" of inspiration " proportions " the human subject. by providing a
higher participation in God's own Immediate Self-Knowledge,
which is beyond "content" and which i'S Pure Intentionality.
The higher participation a:ffio11ded by the divine "light'' of inspiration does not in 1and of [rtsel:f y[eld formal " content." Here
the doctrina theologiae which is the " divine light of in
spimtion " can, in ,a fully consllistent manner, only mean that
such inspihl.-.a;bionis the principle of thoolog.iml.mtentionially in
the processes of tinteripretrution;not thrut thtis "iimmediaite divine light of inspimtion "
the content for theological
29 This very strong statement is in all of the MSS which L. Bataillon has
collated to date for the Leonine Commission edition.

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

reflection. But ·the problems in Aquinas' formulaition, and
genena.tions of interpretation, iis that it.his "iimmeclirute divine
light " cou1d itself be seen 1as providing " content " rather ,than
merely making it possible for the theologian to interpret the
sensible order in a way that then provides " limit-content."
If this inspiration itself is thought to provide " content,"
then one must observe that there is a profound tension between
Arl:icle 1 1and the concluding .Article 5. ANicle 1 can at least
give the impression that theology is constituted on an independent, a pri,ori basis, simply because of the divine light of
inspiration, and rbhen :it is because of this <tha.t it is aible to· direct the other sciences, without, seemingly, even having Ito
eniter into rthe empiriical study of the other sciences. But if
theology were completely an infused, " immediate" knowledge
of God, then there would, of course, be no need for dialectical
disputations such ·as Lombard's Sentences and Aquinas' own
Commentary. One could expect, then, that Aquinas would attempt to link ms discussion of the " immedia.te " knowledge of
God and ithe necessity of dialectical theology, and this is
exactly whra.t he does as he describes the ithi1rd fonobion of
theology:
Proceditur tertio ad contemplationem veritatis in quaestionibus
sacrae Scripturae; et ad hoc oportet modum etiam esse argumentativum, quod praecipue servatur in originalibus sanctorum et in isto
libro qui quasi ex ipsis conflatur.80

The " questioning " of Sacred Scripture, then, occurs in an historical community in which some interpretations (e.g., of the
Fathers [and teaching mothers!]) have a certain primacy, and
even in this one can encounter dialectical differences of interpretation. Here the mode of theology as contemplation is
realistically Linked wi:i.rth the hisitocicalcondition of the one seekao Q. I, a. 5, resp. (p. 18). [Sacred science] proceeds, thirdly, to the contemplation of truth in the 'questioning' of Sacred Scripture and from this
[these three ends] it follows that the mode of this science is 'argumentative,'
which mode is particularly served by the collection of the works of the saints
[Fathers] which are provided in this Book [of the Sentences] which- has, to
a.n extent, arranged them.

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ing contemplation of the truth in a community of interpretation and misinterpretation.
In a very interesting manner, the next complex theme addressed by Aquinas in the response of this Article is the relationship of the senses of Sacred Sccipture to the tasks of sacred
science:
Et secundum hoc etiam potest accipi quadrupliciter modus exponendi sacram Scripturam: quia secundmn quod accipitur ipsa
veritas fidei, est sensus historicus: secundum aute quod ex eis proceditur ad instructionem morum, est sensus moralis; secundum
autem quod proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis eorum quae
sunt viae, est sensus allegoricus [Parma ed. "et secundum quod
proceditur ad contemplationem veritatis"]; eorum quae sunt
patriae, est sensus anagogicus. Ad destructionem autem errorum
non proceditur nisi per sensum litteralem, eo quod alii sensus sunt
per similitudines accepti et ex similitudinariis locutionbius non
potest sumi argumentatio; ende et Dionysius dicit in Epistult ad
Titum [col. 1103, t. I], quod symbolica theologia non est argumentativa.81
s1 Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (p. 18) . .And according to this one is able to accept four
modes for the exposition of Sacred Scripture, for that which is received as
the very truth of the faith is the historical sense, and that which is for the
instruction of mroals is the moral sense, and that which is for the contemplation of the truth [of God] 'on the way' [in an earthly manner, for human
beings in this life] is the allegorical sense, and that which pertains to [the
fulfillment of contemplation] in heaven is the anagogical sense. The refutation of errors, however, does not proceed by any sense except the literal, in
that the other senses are received according to similitudes, and it is not
possible to engage in argumentative discourse based on similtudes of speech;
and hence Dionysius says in the Epistula ad Titum [PG, col. 1101, t. I], that
symbolic theology is not argumentative.
[Here the Parma addition has not been included in the translation since
it is not supported in the MSS evidence. .Also, here "argumentatio" and
"argumentativa" have been translated as "argumentative" in that the meaning of .Aquinas here is stronger than "reasonable" and yet one should bear
in mind the previously mentioned cautions when understanding and translating .Aquinas' use of .this term. Also here, .Aquinas' phrase "contemplationem
veritatis .•. viae .•. patriae'' is being interpreted in accord with .Aquinas'
later use of "contemplatio viae," meaning "earthly contemplation," "contemplation in this life," or "contemplation on the way;" and "contemplatio
patriae," meaning "heavenly contemplation," "the contemplation of God in
heaven," or "beatific contemplation," as expressed in the Summa Theologiae,
II-II, q. 5, a. 1, ad 1; q. 180, a. 7; and q. 189, a. 7.)

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

Of course, in the present context Aquinas does not mean that
the anagogical sense of Sacred Scripture and the " .anagogical
mode of questioning 1and e:xipoundingSacred Scripture " enable
the interpreter to attain .beatific contemplation in this life.
What Aquinas means is .siimply ·that the anagogioal sense has
a symbolic, eschatological referential value which enables the
interpreter in this life to anticipate oontemplatW patriae.
The meaning of Aquinas here with regard to the modes of
contemplation merits .further consideration. Earlier in this
response Aquinas has stated the three ends of theology ·as being the refutation of errors, instruction of morals, and the contemplation of truth. In the present section he links two senses
of Sacred Scripture to the contemplation of truth: there is an
allegorical and an anagogical mode of contemplation. Both of
these modes of oonrtemp1ation are in the " quesrtioning" of·
Sacred Scripture, as has been earlier clarified in the response:
"contempla,tionem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae." The contemplation which investigates and "questions " the meaning of Sacred Scripture is, in part, an acquired
mode of contemplation. It is only partially acquired in that it
presupposes the infused light of
which is received ias a
result of divine, initiating action, and yet this results in the
dialectical and symbolic process of interpretation, leading to
contemplation, in an historical community of meaning. When
Aquinas states in this response that symbolic theology is not
"argumentative," he means "argumentative" not in the
weaker sense of merely " reasonable," but in the stronger sense
of being probative, as is clear in his response to the fourth objection:
1

argumenta tolluntur ad probationem articulorum fidei; set ad de-

fensionem fidei et inventionem veritatis in quaestionibus ex principiis fidei, oportet argumentis uti . . .32
s2Q. 1, a. 5, ad 4 (p. 19). Arguments are in no way used to prove the
articles of the faith, but for the defense of the faith and for the discovery
of the truth in the investigative process of questioning based on the principles
of the faith, and hence it follows that 'arguments' are utilized [in this
science] ...

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IN AQUINAS

Conclusion
There is a certain dialectical rtension thus reflected here in
the "Prologue" on the status and method of theology. The
tension is not completely articulated as such, but is more below the surface, as one compares Aquinas' various other statements with his notion of " contemplatwnem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripture," in Article 5. Again, in Article 1,
Aquinas has made the hold proclamation that there is a type
of,
Contemplationem .. . in statu viae per cognitionem non a creaturis
sumptam, sed immediate ex divino lumine inspiratam; et haec est
doctrina theologiae.38

This appears rto differ from the mode of contemplation discussed ;in Article 5 which is a " quaestwnibus sacrae Scripturae." They are not, however, completely different, in that
they both require the fundamental, initiating action of the light
of faith, which is 1an infused virtue. At the same time it must
be ,acknowledge that there is at least a dialectical tension in
Aquinas' manner of expression, when he strongly insists, in the
first place, on a " contempla,twnem in statu viae ... immediate
ex divino lumine" and then later speaks of a "contemplatronem veritatis in quaestionibus sacrae Scripture." In order
to stress that there is real, understandable content in divine
revelation and that faith attains to God himself, Aquinais must
stress its immediate nature. But if this were the full extent of
the theological process then there would be no need of dialectics in interpretation, which is precisely the t ask of the
Sentences upon which Aquinas is engaged in commentary.
This dialectical tension in Aquinas' own view of the status
and method of theology is reflected in other contrasting texts
in the five articles of the " Prologue," which may here be
noted:
1

sa Q. I, a. I, resp. ( p. 8). Contemplation ..• in this life by means of a
knowledge [of God] which is not based on the created order [for its starting
point] but on an immediate knowledge [of God] by means of the divine light
of inspiration; and this contemplation is the doctrine of theology.

52

DOUGLAS C. HALL

[I] divinum lumen, ex cujus certitudine procedit haec scientia ... 34
[2] virtus quam
considerat, non est ab opere nostro;
immo eam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur. 35
[3] ista scientia ... magis dicenda
quam metaphysica,
quia causas altissimas considerat . . . per inspirationem a Deo immediate acceptam .. .s6
[4] theologia articulos fidei quae infallibiliter sunt probati in scientia Dei supponit, et eis credit, et per istud procedit ad probandum
ulterius illa quae ex articulis sequuntur .. .37
[5] ista doctrina habet pro principiis primis articulos fidei, qui per
lumen fidei infusum per se noti sunt habenti fidem, sicut et principit naturaliter nobis insista per fomen intellectus agentis. 38

In these examples the stress is on the certitude and scientific
status of theology, the immediacy of divine revelation, and the
scientific ability of theology to engage in the demonstration of
some truths (though not the truth of the articles of faith themselves. The stress is on theology an immediate, infused, and
certain contemplation of God. In the final example above, the
statement is a strong one, not sufficiently qualified to make it
clear that Aquinas is using an analogical and ex convenientia
argumentation. The literal statement here is that the articles
of faith " are " per se nota principles known by the light of
faith " sicut " (" as," " even as," " in a way like ") natural
selves). The stress is on theology an immediate, infused, and
principles .are known by the light of reason. The " sicut " ex34 Q. 1, a. 2, ad 1. (p. 10). Divine light, from whose certitude proceeds
this science ...
85 Q. 1, a. 2, ad 3, (pp. 10-11). The virtue that the theologian considers
is not a result of our work, but is [the result of] an [initiating movement]
of God in us without our own operation.
36 Q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1 (p. 12). This science ... is more to be called wisdom
than metaphysics, because it considers the highest causes . . . by means of
inspiration which accepted immediately from God ...
37 Q. 1, a. 3, sol. 2 (pp. 13-14). Theology presupposes and believes in the
articles of faith which are infallibly proven in the science of God's own
knowledge of himself, and theology proceeds by means of these to the demonstration of other things that follow from the articles of faith ...
as Ibid., ( p. 14). This doctrine has for its first principles the articles of
faith, which are infused by the light of faith as per se nota principles in
those having faith, even as the [first] principles [of reason] are naturally
instilled in us by means of the light of the agent intellect.

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press the analogical qualificaJtion, but in the previous pl:mase,
the language is " flat ", "per lumen fidei infusum per se noti
sunt habenti fidem."
Aquinas is here using a complex series of analogies·. To speak
of the "light" of the ,agent intellect is already an analogy, a
metaphor, in the natural order. To speak of the "light" of
faith or of divine revelation is an extension of that analogy.
When one then speaks of the light of faith being ,similar to,
"sicut", the light of the agent intellect, one is using a double
analogy ex convenientia. The statement may seem at first to
have a great deal of content, but its logical structure is far
more symbolic and poetic. More attention to this aspect of
Aquinas' structure is needed. For the moment it •suffices to observe that in the five ·articles of the "Prologue " Aquinas repeatedly makes very bold .and confident proclamations, which
can give the nnpression that theology flows effortlessly, and
without the tensions of historical dialectics, into ·an immediate
contemplation of God.
In contrast to the themes of the above examples, in the concluding Article 5, Aquinas professes a mode of theology that is
"quaestionibus sacrae Scripturae ": a mode of contemplation
and interpretation in an historical community concerned with
very human processes of reasoning and inquiry. It would
seem that the underlying structures of Aquinas' " Prologue "
here i·s his own struggle with the mysterious " fact " that
aspects of theology that are more properly called infused contemplation and aspects thae are more properly called acquired
contemplation are inevitably in a constant, dialectical process.
This structure is brought more to the surface in the concluding Article 5 of the "Prologue." Aquinas has repeatedly stated
already that the ultimate end of theology is contempl·ation. In
his discussion of the senses of Sacred Scripture and the tasks of
theology he has linked the " historical " and " literal " sense
with the theological task of the refutation of errors, for it is
this " literal sense " that contains the ipsa veritas fidei.39
so Q. 1, a. 5, resp. (p. 18).

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DOUGLAS C. HALL

In the moce a,cquired contemplative mode of interpreting
Sacred Scripture, the allegorcial and anagogical senses have
primary importance. But these senses of Sacred Scripture,
" aunt per similitudines accepti et ex similitudinariis locutionibus non potest sumi argumenta.tio . . ." 40 The importance of
this " non-argumentative" and more contempl,ative sense of
theology emerges in dialectioal tens1ion with other themaitics
in the "P.rologue" in the response to the third objection in
Article 5, which concerns poetics and metaphor. In the third
objection it was stated:
scientiarum m.axime differentium non debet esse unus modus. Sed
poetica, quae minimum continet veritatis, maxime differt ab ista
scientia, quae est verissima. Ergo, cum illa procedat per metaphoricas locutiones, modus hujus scientiae non debet esse talis.41

The 11esponseto this objection may he somewhat surprising:
Ad tertium dicendum, quod poetica scientia est de his quae propter
defectum veritatis non possunt a ratione capi; unde oportet quod
quasi quibusdam similitudinibus ratio seducator: theologia autem
est de his quae sunt supra rationem; et ideo modus symbolicus
uttrique communis est, cum neutra rationi proportionetur.42

Even though Aquina:s is directly addressing the "spiritual
senses " of Sacred Scripture here, his statements are broad
enough to impact on the status of the entire theological
40 Ibid.: are by means of similitudes which are based on similitudes of
speech which cannot be used for argumentation ...
41 Q. 1, a. 5, ob 3 ( p. 17). The sciences which are maximally differentiated
should not have the same mode. But poetics, which minimally contains the
truth, is maximally differentiated from this science, which is the most
truthful. Therefore, since poetics proceeds by means of metaphors of language, the mode of this [divine] science should not be the same.
42 Q. 1, a. 5, ad 3 (p. 17): To the third objection it is to be stated that
poetic science is of this mode [of metaphor] on account of a defect [in the
human mind] because of which the human mind is not able to attain the
truth by reasoning as such; and hence it follows that poetics in a way
alluringly leads reason by means of certain similitudes. But theology is concerned with those things which are beyond the range of res.son, and thus the
symbolic mode is common to both poetics and theology, since neither of them
is proportioned to reason.

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prise. In the previous articles of the " Prologue," Aquinas has
claiimed that the articles of faith are infused, per se nota
principles !instilled by the Itight of fia.ith, even ·as :bhe naturally
known first principles are instilled by ithe light of the agent
intellect. But now, the additional qualification is that the
mode of ·existence of the recipient is 'significantly limiting the
divine revelation that is creceived. Here, rather than an "immediate " revelation of God, revelation procedes through the
mediation of .symbols. This may not he the only mode of !revelation for Aquinas, but from the content and tone of this response one would judge that it is at least an important one.
In dialectical tension with the position that the principles of
faith " are " per se nota propositions, Aquinas is here stating that the weakness of reason makes it incapable of grasping
the truth, and hence reason must ·be alluringly led, " seducatur," by the similitudes and symbolics of poetics. Ultimately, since contemplation supra rationem is the highest task
of theology, and since e"\"ell with divine revelation reason remains unable to attain the fullness of truth, the theologian is
here pictured .a;s patiently waiting for the alluring invitation of
the symbolically mediated God. The further implication is
that even theological self-consciousness in contemplation will
be symbolically mediated.
These dialectical themes, and their implications, are certainly not brought to the surface and articulated as such by
Aquinas in this "Prologue," but an analysis of the structural
relationships of the articles cannot help but come to these critical conclusions. With the interpreted •stress of the "Prologue"
as being in the final Article, particularly in the final response
concerning poetics, Aquinas dialectically qualifies his previous
statements with a view of theo1ogical methodology that is most
properly considered .as ·at least open to some problems of historical consciousness in a community of dialectical misinterpretation, open to the constructive role of imagination, and
open to a view of revelation as providing an intentional principle for the dialectical interpretation of sensible content, but
not the content as such.
1

THE QUEST FOR AN ADEQUATE
PROPORTIONALIST THEORY OF VALUE
RoNALD H. McKINNEY,

S.J.

U'IWversity of Scranton
Scranton, Pennsylvania

E

DWARD VACEK shrewdly observes that proportionalism attempts to synthesize the crucial insights of
both the teleologist and the deontologist. 1 Indeed,
Vacek provides a fine summary of this achievement. However,
he reflects that the most underdeveloped feature of proportionalism is its value theory by which we are enabled to know how
to resolve conflict situations. 2 Richard McCormick, among
others, has attempted to meet this deficiency by ·adopting John
Finnis' notion of associated basic goods. In this essay, I will
show how such an ·approach fails to remain true to the basic
aims of proportionalism. Nor should this come as a surprise,
since Finnis is himself indebted to one of McCormick's archopponents, Germain Grisez. Moreover, I will attempt to outline the elements involved in a non-hierarchfoal theory of value
which I will argue to be the only adequate alternative to McCormick's attempted solution.
Deontologists argue that certain acts are right or wrong regardless of the ·consequences. Proportionalists, however, are
opposed to such notions as an " intrinsically evil " act or an
"absolute" duty, since they recognize the existence of moral
dilemmas. A moral dilemma arises whenever there is a situation in which pre-moral values •are in conflcit, i.e., whatever
choice one makes will result in the omission or harm of one
or other of the values at stake. According to the proportionl Edward Vacek, "Proportionalism:
Studies 46/2 (June, 1985), 289.
2 Va.eek, 302.

One View of the Debate," Theological

56

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

57

alist reformulation of the principle of double effect, the permission or oausrution of ontic evil is not necessarily a moral evil as
long as there is a proportionate reason justifying ,such an action, e.g., when a father shoots an !intruder threatening to harm
his family.
McCormick's initial description of the requirements of proportionate reason [s ias follows: "a) a v1alue at least equal to
that sacrificed is at stake; b) there is no less harmful way of
protecting ithe value here and now; c) the manner of its protection here and now will not undermine it in the long run." 8
McCormick argues that it simply will not do to claim that the
ontic evil permitted or caused in a conflict situation is always
only indirectly intended. 4 For, in many instances, this simply
is not true. Moreover, he would argue that to intend an end
is not necess1arilyto desire it as deontologists suppose. What
justifies the ontic evil resulting from such actions, then, is
solely the proportionate reason for which it is allowed or
caused.
There are some obvious criticisms that have been hurled
at this proportionalist proposal for resolving conflict situations:
I) that it leaves itself open to the practical, if not theoretical,
difficulty of weighing different values; !2) that it results in
the possibility of many resolutions that could go counter to
our normal moral intuitions; 8) that there exists an inherent
fallibility in the calcul,ation of long-range consequences; and 4)
that this uncertainty might easliy promote an undesirable attitude of skeptical relativism.
It is perhaps the onslaught of these and other criticisms
which prompted McCormick to adopt Finnis' theory of associated basic goods. Lisa Cahill ,argues that this new theory
constitutes an "abandonment" of McCormick's prior proposal.5 To understand how this new theory leads to inevitable
1

s Richard McCormick, ".Ambiguity in Moral Choice," Doing Evil To Achieve
Good: Moral Choice in Oonfiict Situations, eds. R. McCormick and P. Ramsey
(Chicago: Loyola U. Press, 1978), 45.
4 McCormick, 35-38.
5 Lisa Cahill, "Theology, Utilitarianism,
and Christian Ethics," Theologica,I
Studies 42/4 (Dec., 1981), 618-24.

58

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

inconsistency for McCormick, we must first examine Finnis'
position itself.
Finnis' Theory of Basic Goods

By "value," Finnis refers to any " general form of good that
oan be participated iin or realized in indefinitely many ways on
indefinitely many occasions." 6 Basic values, moreover, refer
to ·intrinsic goods that are desired for their own sake (NL, 62,
65) . They are good not because they are desired, but they are
desired because they are good (NL, 70). Indeed, according to
Finnis, that such goods are v·alues is self-evident (NL, 64-69) .
Basic values constitute the fundamental aspects of human
flourishing. According to Finnis, a careful survey of human
culture will reveal, not sheer relativism, but the evidence for
asserting the existence of seven basic values: li.fe, knowledge,
play, aesthetic experience, friendship, practical reasonableness,
imd religion (NL, 81-92). He argues ·thait we will find such a
list to be not only exhaustive but irreducible if we make sure
to attend to the differences between general values and particular goals as well as between ends ·and means. Moreover,
he 1aptly pomts out the infiIJJitediviersity of ways in which we
can ·actualize these values as well as the diversity that exists
in the extent to which individuals can respond to such values.
Finnis prefers to say that we " participate in " instead of
" pursue " or " realize " basic values (NL, 96) . This is because
a v;alue is never fully realized nor is it the mere end result of
some act. Furthermore, pleasure is not considered by him to
be itself .a basic or supreme value, smce it iis that which accompanies our participation in all of these values (NL, 96) .
Finnis admits that we inevitably weigh the consequences of
alternative decisiions (NL, 11-18).
eXiample, he contends
thait we must always pref er basic goods to merely instrumental
ones. Thus a co\Sit-;benefitanaJlysiis [s desiirable in many prace John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1980), 61. Hereafter, all references to this work will be cited within the
text itself, e.g., (NL, 61).

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

59

tioaJ operations. However, he draws the line at a consequen6alist ethics because of his claim that basic values are " incommensurable," that there exists no objective hierarchy
among them (NL, 92-95) . Not only would the weighing of
such values be impractical, but it would al,so undermine the
very dignity of human nature. A calculative mentality that
uses basic goods as commodities to be compared makes the
human person ,itself 1a mere tool 1to he used (NL, 120-28) . To
weigh incommensurable values is thus to destroy them. It
follows that a fundamental principle for Finnis is that " every
basic value he at least respected in each and every action "
(NL, 120) . It 1is permissible and inevitable that we "indirectly impoverish, inhibit, or interfere " with the realization of
some values when we pursue some course of action and thereby
omit others. What is not permissible is " directly and immediately dama;ging a baisic good " as in certain conflict situations, e.g., when killing an innocent person to save the lives of
hostages. This is because such a killing damages the very
value of life we are trying to promote.

McCormick's Use of Finnis' Theory
McCormick's list of basic human tendencies is extremely
similar to that developed by Finnis. 7 As does Finnis, he argue:s
that when merely instrumental and basic goods are in conflict
we must compare and weigh their relative v:alue.8 He a:dds,
however, that this is not pos,sible for ·oonfiicts between basic
goods. As in Finnis' logic, McCormick is contending that, since
such goods are "associated," rto hurt one undermines all the
others including the v;alue to be promoted.
One might wonder if this is simply a different way of expressing the fact that certain actions have long-term consequences detrimental to the original value one attempts to p1107 McCormick,
"Bioethics and Method," Theological Digest 29/4 (Winter,
1981)' 305.
s McCormick, "Notes on Moral Theology 1977 ," Theological Studies 39 /l
( 1978)' 112.

60

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

mote. Cahill, however, suggests that this is not the ca:se in
McCormick's (and Knauer's) claim that certain actions are
of themselves "disproportionate ,, or "counterproductive." 9
She notes that Knauer compares such •self-defeating actions to
the class of deeds outlawed by Kant's universalizability criterion. If this is the case, then an empirical survey of probable future oonsequences is not what is called for .to show an
.action to be " disproportionate.'' Rather an a priori (deontological) analysis of the nature of such acts should be sufficient
to reveal their "couniterproductivity." It siimply is not clear
if this is what McCormick has in mind. However, if this does
reflect the direction of his thought, then Cahill would be right
that McCormick's proportionalism appears to have been modified by his adoption of Finnis' notion of associated basic
goods.1 ° For the net result is the placing of a certain class of
values -in a speci.al protected category and thus guaranteeing
proportionalism more objectiviity in its resolution of moral
conflicts.
Even Cahill, however, realizes that McCormick does nort
really intend to enter the deontological camp. For she adds
to her discussion no,ted a;bove thiat McCormick is opposed to
suppressing basic values " except in cases where necessity requires it.'' McCormick himself argues elsewhere that he is in
agreement with deontologists that we must never choose
against a basic good: " What is to count as ' turning against
a basic good ' is, of course, the crucial moral question. Certainly it does not mean that there are never situations of conflicted
values where it is necess.a.ryto cause harm as we go about doing
good.'' 11 If this is McCormick's position all along, then he
seems to have gained nothing by adopting Finnis' theory of
basic goods. For such a theory was intended by its deontologioal proponent to eliminate the very possibility of conflict situas Cahill, 618-20.
lo Cahill, 624.
11 :McCormick, "Does Religious Faith Add to Ethical Perception?" ed. John
Haughey, PersonaJ Values iin Public PoZioy (NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 165.

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

61

tions involving basic vialues. Thus Vacek is correct when he
argues that McCormick's theory of basic goods faces the same
difficulties encountered .by all other deontological maneuvers
to protect basic values.12 It remains for us to consider what
these difficulties are and why proportionalism should abandon
·altogether any notion of a hiem11chy of basic ·goods.

Criticism8
There are many prOlblems which confronit Finnis' theory of
basic goods. The first one is simply a conceptual difficulty:
how i·s one to distinguish basic v;alues from all others? Mc·Cormick sometimes speaks as if that which constitutes a value
as basic is that it is not rut .all instrumental, i.e., a means. 18
Finnis is more precise in his acknowledgement that, since basic
values are themselves interdependent, they can be used as instruments in the pursuit of other basic values (NL, 92) . But
.they are not merely instrumental since they also possess intrinsic worth themselves. Moreover, Finnis adds that a basic
value must be incommensurable wiith the others, must constitute a fundamental .aspect of human flourishing, not be ultimately self-defeating (NL, 91) or reducible to an aspect of
any of ,the others (NL, 92), and be distinguished from the
means by which it is to be achieved as well as from the ways
:in which it is to be participated (NL, 90-91). The former
category refers to those activities, e.g., £arming and procreation, which collectively help achieve a basic v·alue, e.g., life.
The latter category ref·e:vs to the moral virtues such )a.is cour.age, generosirty, moderation, and gentleness. Thus it follows
that a basic value, as conceived by Finnis, is .a concrete universal (.a whole) resulting from :instrument·al activities and
virtues (the parts). Basic values, in turn, are the parts that
make up the ultimate whole of human flourishing.
As nuanced as it is, Finnis' definition of a basic value leaves
more questions than it answers. First, there is the ·ambiguity
12 Vacek, 309.

1s "Notes on Moral Theology 1977," 112.

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

as to whether a non-fundamental value is necess·arily thereby
an instrumental one :for the realization of the seven basic
values. That would seem to be Finnis' intended interpretation. However, itlris may be true 1as a criterion for the adeqUJacy
of Finnis' theory. Yet it does not guarantee a priori that we
shall never encounter a v:alue which is neither one of the seven
baac goods nor one that is instrumental to their realization .
.Another ambiguity to be noted is that Finnis' basic values
do not distinguish between their individual and communitarian
dimensions. For example, the basic value of 1ife includes both
the
own life and that of all others as well. The basic
value of friendship can refer to those relationships valued by
the person himself or to the v•alue of friendship in general
within society ws a whole. Thus this ambiguity contains the
seeds for possible oonflicit between rbhe needs of the individual
and society which Finnis seems ·intent to ignore.
His requirement that basic values not be reducible to ea.ch
other also deserves some consideration. For it is not perfectly
obvious, for example, why we are to oonsider " play " and
" aesthetic experience " as categories tha;t are ·somehow lJld
generis. Gadamer's classic analysis of aesthetic experience as
play is sufficient reason to question Finnis' claim that they are
irreducible to each other. 14 Moreover, it is also not totally obvious why Finnis distinguishes " knowledge " from " practical
reasonableness" or" religion" from" friendship." His contention that he is not absolutely wedded to his own list (NL, 92)
does not dispel the argument that any list whatsoever will be
hardpressed to keep its categories irreducible, so inte:rrtwined
are all features of human experience and language. For example, Finnis indicates that one of rthe requirements for realizing the basic value of pmctical reasonableness is " community "
(NL, 127) . How one is to distinguish this requirement from
the basic value of friendship is problematic. Thus this is one
more reason for questioning the feasibility of maintaining the
uHans-Georg Gadamer, Truth and Method (NY: The Seabury Press, 1975),
91-119.

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

68

criterion of irreducibility. Moreover, the fact that Fmnis
claims that practical reasonableness is the one basic good which
can never be excluded, even tempomrily (NL, 100), a1so
makes problematic his criterion of the incommemsurability of
basic V!alues. For it would seem that, for him, p11actical reasonableness has priority over the others in so· :Ear as it is the
virtue by which one shapes one's participation in the other
basic goods.
The final problems with Finnis' definition of a basic value
result from his desire to distinguish it from the means and
ways by which it is to be realized. Proportionalists have genemlly argued that moml virtues ought not to be considered
somehow sui generis as mFinnis' analysis. Rather, they ought
to he included within ,a complete list of pre-moral goods to be
weighed in a conflict situation instead of distinguished from
basic goods and their instrumental means for realization.
Finnis undercuts his own position, in fact, by including a
moral Viirtue, p11actical reasonableness (the skill by which one
integrates all the other basic V'alues), in his catalogue of basic
goods. Indeed, the requirements (instrumental means) for its
realization are themselves moral virtues. Moreover, there also
seems no reason to deny the intrinsic worth of instrumental
means as Finnis intends as a way of distinguishing hasic and
instrumental goods. For the experience of a meal, for example,
can he savoured for its own sake as well as for the fact of its
contribution ;to the pursuit of friendship and life. And even
money can be valued for its own sake if you happen to he a
coin colloobor.
Besides ,the conceptual problems involved in his definition
of necessary and sufficient criteria for " basic values," there
are other difficulties with his theory as well. A major one concerns his epistemological justification for ,asserting the " exhaustive " nature of his list of seven basic values. He admits
that his list is the result of an empirical survey of many human
cultures and one to which he is not necessarily wedded (NL,
81-92). One would have expected from him, on the contrary,

64

RONALD B. MCKINNEY.

S.J.

an a priori deontological analysis of human flourishing. Without 1such ·an ·analysis. moreover, there is no way he can avoid
the fallibility of his conclusions. Other lists of basic values are
possible because of the existence of different frameworks of
initer:p:retrution. There 1are many rnfferent ways to categorize
the saime experience •as well as many different cultural
ences to consider. Even if v;alue theorists can achieve agreement on the essential elements for human flourishing today,
tomorrow might reveal ·ever new facets of human .authenticity.
Moreover, with his own admission that there is potentially
an infinite number of instrumental means with which to realize
basic values, it follows that the majority of our moral decisions
will involve the cost-benefit weighing of such instrumental
values. Indeed, such decisions are, by his own admission, more
ambiguous than those involving the conflict between basic and
instrumential values. Thus Finnis is hardpressed to maintain
the kind of objectivity in his ana:lysis required by deontologists
to avoid the relativism they ascribe to proportionalists.
The fundamental flaw in his theory, however, lies in his requirement that basic values are never to be used as the means
to attain some lower instrumental end. He would permit one
to choose the opportunty to make money over the chance :to
·gain knowledge if one is in extreme ']XYVerty. But this is only
because the basic value of life requires .a certain degree of
wealth, thus permitting the omission of the complementary
basic value of knowledge. However, if it is true, as we haive
maintained already, that instrumental values have intrinsic
worth in their own right, then there seems no reason to mainta;in an ·aibsolutehierarchy of values. After all, the dialectic of
whole and part :implies, not only the iinterdependence of parts,
but the mutual neces•sityfor both part and whole as well. Thus
the part is an instrument :for the flourishing of the whole. But
the reverse is true as well: the whole is the means for the
flourishing of the part. Indeed, the very distinction between
means and ends is problematic. For is ia making of ·a meal a
or is a. friendship a means
means to the fostering of
1

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

65

to the making of ia delicious meal? This fund!amenbalinterde-

pendence of values is not at all demeaning to what Finnis considers the higher value, friendship. For to love food is not to
love friendship less. R:ather both are necessary elements rto
human fl.ourishing. In some circumstances one will be more
important than the other. But it simply is not true to ·say that
one is always more important than the other which is what
Finnis wishes to contend.
It is for this reason that Peter Coming argues that to invert
Maslow's hierarchy of needs, as he does, is not to demean our
view of human nature. 15 Corning is :simply acknowledging by
this reversal the polarity which exists between the physical ·and
spiritual :factors in our make-up, neither set of factors being
more fundamental than the other. Indeed, it follows thait we
shou1d rega11d Finni s' value hierarchy as rather a network of
values, each of which is of intrinsic worth and able to serve as
the instrumental means for the attainment of other values as
well. After all, this is the way Finnis understands the network
of hasic valrues itself. Each of the seven basic goods is of intrinsic value yet able to serve as the means for our participation in the others as well. I have simply suggested doing away
with any notion of one value being more " basic " than any
other by acknowledging the irutrinsic worth of Finnis' instrumental means as well as the fact that his brusic goods can be
actually the means for realizing instrumental goods. This revision, moreover, is of great value, since it will allow us to
affirm, for example, that the individual in a friendship is of as
much value as the friendship as a whole.
Indeed, this admis sion implies that we need to consider not
only ·the conflict between rival means for realizing v;alues but
the conflict between means and ends as well. For, as we have
seen, the end of friendship can serve as the means for making
a meal which, in turn, can also be the instrument for cementing
a friendship. Thus just ais oomplementa;ry means can each be
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

11 Peter

Coming, The Syn&rgism Hypothesis:

l!J'Volution (NY:

McGraw-Hill, 1983), 198.

A Theory of Progress-We

66

RONALD B. MCKINNEY,

S.J,

in conflict as part to part (e.g., having to decide whether to
feed myself or my child first to enhance the well-being of my
family as a whole), so too can a whole and part be in conflict
as rival values (e.g., having to decide whether to participate
in the Neighborhood Watch Patrol this evening for the good
of the community or just watch television for the sake of
needed personal relaxation). Finn.is' theory is defective, however, in its way of handling such conflict situations.
He admits that even among his " incommensurruble" basic
values one cannot help but omit one while participating in another. But, as noted earlier, he conrtends that we may not directly harm or sac:rii:fice one basic good to realize another.
Proportionalists, however, argue that, ais finite creatures, we
cannot avoid either omitting or harming one value for the sake
of ·another in tr:agic conflict situaitions. Some proportionalists
imagine such moral dilemmas to be quite rare in the ethical
enterprise. Indeed, they take great pains w reassure the
deontologist that our acceptance of the evil effects that accompany the ,attainment of greater good is only a regrettable
necessity. They rargue thait it is simply because we do not live
in an " ideal " world that ithe tragic necessity of confliict situa-tions must be tolerated.
Unfontunately, such well meaning reassurance goes too far.
It seems to presume that the existence of moral dilemmas is
but the result of original rsin. On the contmry, Louis Janssens
.argues thrut, though the majority of ontic evil in the world may
be due to human sinfulness, still our creaturly finitude alone
necessitates that all our actions not only indirectly but directly cMise ontic ev:il.16 Janssens claims that because of our
"temporality " every act includes an omission and, hence the
indirecrt causation of ontic evil. His originality lies in his additional claim that it is because of our " spatiality," i.e., our
materiality, thait we necessarily directly create ontic evil in
l!8 Louis Janssens, "Ontic Evil and Moral Evil," Reaaings in MMal Theology No. 1: Moral Norms and the OathoUo Tradition, eds. C. Curran and R.
McCormick (NY: Paulist Press, 1979), 40-93,

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

67

our actions •ais well. And this is because that, while our body
enables us to communicate with others and to act upon things
of this world, it is at the same time subject to the laws which
govern matter. Our body is consequently also an impediment
to ·action in so far as it is subject to the wear and tear, fatigue
and sickness of ordinary living. Therefore, simply because the
performance of any moral act requires an expenditure of physical and psychic energy ais the price for its possi1bili:ty,ontic evil
is created. Moreover, Janssens also ·adds that because we are
:finite our knowledge of this material world always remains
limited. Consequently, our moral deeds which transform our
enviwnment can result in unforseen and undesired side-effects
in the long run.
Therefore, :though it is only proper for proportionalists to
" regret " the ontic evil caused in our actions, it is quite another thing to regret having to make such decisions at all.
Rather, I would •suggest we learn to accept ontic evil as a
species of entropy itself. We need to realize :that there can be
no evolving order in the un1i:v:erse without the creation of some
diso11der as .the price to he paid and the stimulus for further
growth. If deontologists are suspicious of the implications of
proportionalism, I would ·suggest that this is one of the key
points of controversy.
Finally, even if Finnis were able to maintain his notion of
•a hieriarchy of basic goods as a way of fending off the dangers
of relrutivism, there is one final weakness in his theory which
undercuts this very quest for objectivity. He has continually
maintained the incommensurability of basic v:alues and our
need .to respect each ·and every one of them in all our actions.
However, he admits that each of us inevitably has our own
subjective order of priority in the way we live out our life in
different w;ays. But he would contend that this is merely due
to our own personalities, upbringing, talents, and opportunities rather than to a difference in the intrinsic worth of the
seven haisic goods. If a dedicated scholar, for example, requires
" a degree of concentra.tiion . . . at the expense, temporarily or

68

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

permanently, of other forms of good," this is just a feature of
our finitude, according to Finnis (NL, 105). He argues that it
would be unreasonable for the scholar seeking knowledge to
deny in his plan for life that other basic vulues are just as intrinsically good as knowledge.
These admissions on the part of Finnis, however, are devastating for his position. First, a scholar may not simply omit
other basic values in his plan for life. He may also directly
harm them as we have argued aibove to be inevitwble. For
e:x;ample,if the only way the scholar can keep himself warm is
by burning a painting or a book, he cannot avoid either harming the basic value of knowledge or aesthetic experience. Second, it is true that a dedicated scholar need not himself be an
artist or appreciate art ,and yet can still affirm the value of art
for other people. But should he not choose to do so, by what
right can Finnis call him unreaisonable? Indeed, should some
culture refus e to ·appreciate the value of religion, by what right
can Finnii.s call it lacking in the proper elements for human
flourishing? For Finnis himself claims to have derived his list
of basic values for human flourishing from an empirical survey
of cultures. If some culture lacks one of his seven basic values,
it thereby e1iminates such a value from being considered as
basic according to Finnis' own methodology itself. Thus
Finnis' theory, to be consistent, would seem to require that no
one can choose not to participate in all seven of his basic goods.
This is because, for him, the .alternative would he the sheer
relativism deontologists 'attribute to proportionalism.
1

aonclusions
I have examined the inconsistencies and weakness in Finnis'
hierarchical theocy of value which highlights the importance
of basic goods. Moreover, implicit in this discussion has been a
rival non-hierarchical ,theory of vafoe. It remains for me to
make more explicit the key elements of such a theory and defend it from ithe inevitable charge of relativism.
I have argued 1above that ·all values ,are of intrinsic worth

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

69

as well as capable of serving ,as the means for the participation
in all other values. It follows that. I am committed to the view
that human flourishing requires the proper balancing of existing
values. To dtiscover what value to prefer in a particular conflict ,situation involves, not .the ,appeal to some absolute hierarchy, but the determination of which conflicting value has
been unduly neglected thus far. The ideal of proportionality is
.therefore the quest for balance among the competing goods in
our values network. Such a network, moreover, is necessarily
open-ended. The more experience we gain ,ag individuals and
as 1a society, the more aware are we of newer facets of genuine
human flourishing. HoweV'er, there ·are obvious objections to
this aibove 1sketchthat need to 1be considered.
Some will object that what has been propo1Sedis impractical.
How do we manage to halance a potentially infinite array of
values? How could we ever pin..point accurately the value or
v.a1ues being neglected in •a particular situation? How could .we
even begin to .analyze our open-ended network of values if we
are not permitted :to assert a manageable number of basic
goods? My reply is simply :thait, just •as common sense allows
us ·to choose the proper course of action out of an infinite set
of possibilities when confronted with the daily tasks of survival, •SO too, our practical wisdom (phronesis) can enable us
to perform the necessary balancing 1act proper to the moral
enterprise. This does not imply that we are utterly dependent
upon moral intuition ialone. On the contmry, the rational
•analysis of moral dilemmas needs to complement and be critical of our currently developed practical wisdom. But such
analysis is itself falliible since it cannot help but abstract from
the real complexity of our values network those goods which
are considered to be most relevant in a particular situation.
Reason can come up with rules of thumb to guide our moral
intuitions :but it cannot replace them.
Another objection might be the clruim that proportionali1Sm
is just as vulnerable •as Finnis' theory when it comes to justifying its judgments that certain values are being unduly

70

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

neglected in certain ,situations. In reply, 1a proportionalist
would first appl aud Finnll.s' observation that not everyone can
be expected to participate in every possible value. People and
cultures 1a;s a whole do indeed differ in terms of their genetic
endowments of personality, interest, and talent as well as in
:terms of their experiential backgrounds. In so far as the
human community is functionally interdependent, people and
1SOcieties can be expected to complement each other in terms
of their contributions. Not everyone needs to be a writer or
an artist or ,a plumber nor does every 'society have to p11oduce
the same goods as every other society in order to flourish.
Nevertheless, there do exist certain values which each person ,and culture as 'a whole must not neglect but maintain in
the proper bailance !if it wishes cbo flourish in its humanity as
such. Finnis ]ails to distinguish between the gifts and cbalents
that people will not all have equally 1and those values that all
must equally participate iin to be authentic human beings.
Any proposed list of such values will of course be open-ended
and subject fo ongoing criticism. But it will not be based solely on some empirical 'survey of' human cultures. For such
a descriptivist 1approach confuses the realms of " is " and
"
1... "
p roporuona.w'Si;s
. l! . .!-. mten
•
d w prescniue
•;i..
. own proibh ffir
oug"'t.
posals :lior human authenticity 1and allow the test of time to
be the ultimate judge. Thus, though even proportionalists
cannot :require that a dedicated scholar become ,an artist as
well, they can have grounds for arguing that this ,scholar needs
to address his defective affectivity (perhaps even tfilough art
therapy) i£ he is to flourish as a human beiing.
The critics of thi s proportionalist theory of vailue will argue,
however, that we have not thereby avoided the problem of
relativism. It is true that we can offer no a priori validation
of any proposed list of necessary values. Indeed, we cannot
even guarantee that the list we abstract for analysis from the
infinite set of values which exists in principle will be at all
relevant for resolving our moral dilemma;s. We cannot even
outlaw the possibility that two responsible proportionalists
1

1

1

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

71

will achieve a proper balance in different ways when confronted
with the same conflict situation. In fact, our analysis has
opened up a crucial loophole by distinguishing between those
values proper to all 1authentic human beings and those values
(based on talents) which differ from person .to person since
they are the result of the functional interdependence of the
human community. For it is pos,sible that a person, when
asked to participate in a protest march against racism, might
selfishly respond that his talents 1are for writing against racism
and not for active protest.
Our acceptance of a healthy pluralism, however, need not
imply the inevitability of relativism. The fact that there is no
guaranteed method by which proportionalists can all arrive at
the same assessment of ,a moral dilemma does not mean that
just any resolution of a conflict situation is thus valid. For any
proposed solution must demonstraite that some value (or
Via1ues) has been disipropomion:atelyneglected to the ongoing
satisfaction of the moral community. Moreover, the fact that
even people isharing similar va1ues can resolve conflict situations differently is only a testimonial to the flexibility of the
human species; there is always more ,than one way to achieve
the same end ii.n the long run. Nor is the fact that my theory
alloWIS for the possi!bility of people ignoring their obligations
by arguing these duties belong ito others in the wider community 1a devastating indictment. For we should expect such
differences and value them if our quest for consensus is not to
turn into a stagnant reaffirmation of the status quo.
However, I have saved to the last the most serious criticism
oi a non-hierarchical va1ue theory. Such a theory will be
claimed to be self-referentially inconsistent. For authenrtic
human flourishing requires the proportional balancing of all
values according to this theory. If so, then it should follow
that "authenticity" itself j,s no "basic " value but rather complementary to a;ll others. Consequently, there should be circumstances in which it is permissible to omit or harm this
value. Thus, critics argue, ·a non-hierarchical theory of value,
1

1

1

RONALD H. MCKINNEY,

S.J.

if it is to be consiistent, must admit that the proportional balancing of all values is not always necessary. In fact, inauthenticity must sometimes be permitted in order to be faithful to
the value of ·authenticity. And this is a contradiction according to the critics of this value theory. Indeed, it is the same
dilemma that Finnis faces in his claim that practical reasonableness can never be omitted or harmed.
One possible solution might be to distinguish between the
contrariety of opposing lower-level values and the contradictory nature of the ultimate values of good and evil. But this
would be to admit that there are some values which are
" basic " which must never be violated. And the deontologists
would have their victory after all. Most proportionalists would
probably concede that it is fooHsh to try to go " beyond " the
basic categories of good and evil. After all, what harm is there
in acknowledging that there is one fundamental law that cannot be "ha1anced off" against any other: do good and avoid
evil..
The harm, however, lies precisely in our failure to ·acknowledge the open-ended nature of the moral enterprise. We constantly want to give in to the temptation of the deontologist
that we possess the ultimate framework for understanding
human flourishing, tha.t our current wisdom of what does and
does not constitute the proper balance [s necessarily correct.
On the contJJary, I would contend that a non-hieJJarchical
theory of value is not self-referentially inconsiis:tent siince it
anticiprutes the ongoing re-evaluation of our basic categories of
good ·and evH, of authenticity and inauthenticity. It anticipates that our current " art " of balancing values must itself
always be changed if we are to maintain our moral balance.
This does not imply that rbomorrow we must champion the
holocaust of the Jews. It ·siimpJ.y implies that we must be ever
critical of our way of making decisiions since they will inevitably betray a pattern of hieJJarchioal values that must continually be reversed in order to maintain a proportional balance.

PROPORTIONALIST

THEORY OF VALUE

78

In this essay I have .attempted to examine the recent debate
over the role of basic goods in resolving conflict situations. I
explored the inadequacies of Finnis' theory and proposed a
non-hierarchical theory of value as an alternative. I have admitted, moreover, that such a proportionalist theory of value
will not eliminate the pluralism inherent in moral discourse
.today. Rather, I am in agreement with Richard Bernstein that
we need to get "beyond" the categories of "objectivism and
relativism." 17 For underlying both schools of thought seems to
be a ·shared commitment to ·a free and open dialogue through
which it is hoped we can create ·an authentic human community.

11 Richard
Bernstein, Beyond Objeotivism and Relativism: Science, Her·
meneutios, and Prawis (Philadelphia: U. of Pennsylvania Press, 1983).

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER?

p AUL O'REILLY

A

St. Anseim Ooiiege
M arwhester, New Hampshire

ER ST. THOMAS' commentary on Boethius' De
Trinita.te, another discussion on the nature of intel-

ligible matter might ·seem unnecessary. In question
five, article three of that work he argues that mathematics is
the study of quantity and since no accident can be understood
apart from substance, one must understand mathematics to
have some substrate. This he calls intelligible matter.
But what is intelligible matter? St. Thomas, along with
Aristotle, recognises only two kiinds of substance: natuml
composites ·and pure forms. Neither of these could be identified
with intelligible matter.
One could also ask what does the term " intelligible matter "
mean. In a couple of plaices St. Thoma.s appears to call the
substrate of mruthematica1ls intelligible matter because it is
substance and substance can only he grasped by the intellect. 1
Yet, m another text he explains that it is because mathematioals are held in the imagination, and rthe ·imagination is sometimes: referred to as intellect, that the matter of mathematicals
is called intelligible. 2
And then there are the te:x;ts in which both Aristortle and St.
Thomas refer to this same subjecrt ais the continuum; iis the
continuum the same thing as substance? We should further
note thart several modern Arisrtotelian commentators describe
1 Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Ewpositio Super Librum Boethii de Trinitate,
Q.5, a.3, pg. 184, n.16-18. (Bruno Decker) E. J. Brill, 1959, a.nd also
Summa Theoloqiae, Prima Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2. (Texts of St. Thomas
are taken from the Marietti editions unless otherwise indicated.)
2 Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaphysicorum, L.VII, l.X, n. 1495.

74

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER(

75

intelligible matter as the continuous, or as space or extension;
are all these positions consistent? These, then, are some of the
problems ·associated with the doctrine of intelligible matter.
It tis important to determine what intelligible mrutter is for
a few reasons. If one undel"stands it as the substance that is
found in :the natural o;rder then mathematics will become a
branch of physics, a consequence that is untenable for a
Thomist. Whereas iit is ridiculous to think that the substance
that is separa..te from ,sensible mrutter, viz. pure ,furms like
angels, is the subject of mathematicals. Furthermore, there are
other A:cistotelian-Thomist doctrines that could be implicated
if one were to dismiss the traditional posiition on intelligible
matter. For example, both these great thinkers recognise that
every accident ·is dependent on substance for its being and its
definition, but iif intelligible matter iis not substance, ais might
seem to he the case if there ·are only the two kinds of substances mentioned before, then this assertion is not universal.
A synthesis of St. Thomrus' position will, therefore, be valuable.
The mathematician (at least the classical mathematician, if
not all his modern counterparts) may consider this question
irrelev;ant.
all, the mathemartician does not stop to
wonder about the kind of matter that composes mathematical
figures. More than that, he could maintain that the notion of
matter in mathematics is repugnant. For the marthematician,
as Aristotle himself says,3 studies rthe figures of quantity and
their properties and does not treat of that which is quantified.
(The modern mathemartician does not even appear to grant
this supposition, for him the mathematical object is relation
not quantity.) The investigation into the nature of the subject of mathematical beings is not in the mathematician's domain. No science questions its own principles since to do so
would require these very same principles. A more universal
discipline will seek the answers to the questions we have raised;
that discipline is metaphysics.
a .Aristotle, Metaphysics, Bk. I.3, 106la29-36.

76

PAUL O'REILLY

Although the notion of matter seems at first to have no
place in mathematics, reflection reveals that some 'SON of matter is required in O['der to fully explain mathematical entities.
For instance, how does one account for the many individuals
of the same species that one finds in mathematics?
Seveml triangles do not differ from each other because of
what they are, ,all are equally called triangle, but they are in
fact distinct individuals. It is because this triangle is made
from these lines 1and that triangle from other lines that one
differs from another. Even if two triangles are coincident they
are nonetheless distinct, for the mind can conceive of each
.triangle, composed as it is of its own particular lines tha.t the
mind alone has designated, a;s a distinct individual although
these triiangles do not differ in posiition. This is ,also the ca1Se
in arithmetic, though it is not as evident. For when one conceives of two numbers of the 'Same numerical value, as for ex,ample in the equation 2 2 = 4, it is evident that the first two
cannot he disrtinguished from the next as regards its formboth are esserutially two-yet they must be different individuals otherwise the equation would make no sense. It is because
the mind can designate that this number two is composed of
these uni.ts and the nert of these other units that the first number is different from the second. In short, irt is necessary tha.rt
one account for the individuality of mathematical beings. This
cannot be done by :appealing to the form of :these things since
that is what unites the members of the species. Individuality
is explained in terms of matter, a matter that is appropriate ;to
mathema;tical things: the continuum in the case of geometry
and the unit in arithmetic. 4 The fact of mathematical inditherefore, indica.tes that some notion of matter is
appropriate to mathematical entities.

+

4 The application
of the doctrine of intelligible matter to arithmetic is
more difficult than its application to geometry. Consequently we shall consider its nature and role in geometry in this paper and not deal with
arithmetic explicity. However, it is our contention that this doctrine applies
equally to arithmetic and geometry.

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE MATTER?

77

An analysis of St. Thomas' doctrine on intelligible matter
must begin with his teacmng on abstraction. This is because
it is the act of abstraction that gives mathematicals their
proper character. And since we 1are ·approaching this issue
metaphys:ically, it is necessary to justify the act of abstraction
in general and mathematical abstraction in particular. Obviously :it not up 'to the mruthematician to defend the aJbstraction proper to his science. It suffices for him that such an
act is possible. That is, that the mind can consider quantity
apart irom sensible matter. But the metaphysician must show
what abstracbion is, how it is. possible and that it involves no
falsity, thereby defending the mathematician's a.bstraction.
Abstrootion, ·as the name suggests, is the driawing away of
one thing from another. More particularly it is the understanding of one thing without the other things that belong to
iit :in reality. Hence, abstraction belongs to the first act of the
intellect; not the second act which inV10lves predicating an ruttribute of 'a suhject and, therefore, truth and f1alsity. Abstraction can only occur if one thing does not depend on another to
be understood. For in.stance, one can abstract the nature of
man from Socr:ates because to be the individual Socrrutes is not
essential to whrut iit :is to be a man. But one cannot aihstract
Socrates ,from his humanity since to he Socrates is to be essentia1ly a man; that is, it is impossible oo think of Socrates without seeing that he is a man. Moreover, ithe act of abstraction
can only take place when things 1are joined acco11dingto !l.'eality.
One would not say that to consider animal without conceiving
of a stone would 1be to abstract the notion of animal from stone
since 1a srbone 1and .a.n animal ·are not joined secundum rem. Con.sequently, it is only when things :are joined in nature, and when
ithe understanding of one does
!involve that of the other,
5
that 1abstraictioncan take place.
There are two kinds of abstraction according to the two
ways in which things are joined.
5 Cf. S. Thomas,

In Physicorum, 1.2,3, n. 161.

78

PAUL o'RElILI,Y

Since there cannot be abstraction, properly speaking, except of
things joined in being (in esse), then according to the two ways
of conjunction . . ., namely as part and whole are united or as
form and matter, there is a twofold abstraction: one in which form
is abstracted from matter, the other in which the whole is abstracted from its parts. 6

The abstraction of a whole from its parts corresponds to the
abstraction of a universal from particulars. This kind of abstraction is presupposed to all science since science is of the
general not the singular. But the abstraction of form from
matter, later to be made more precise as the abstraction of an
accidental form from sensible ma.tter, is proper to mathematics.
Not every :llorm can he abstraicted from its matter, but only
,that form which does not depend on its matter for its definition. As St. Thomas puts it, " form can be abstracted from
some matter when the ratio of !its essence does not depend on
that matter." 7 Furthermore, all accidents are to substance as
foNU :to maitter. And no accident can be abstracted from subsitance since an accident ,is necessal'lily conceived of as a determination of something: that something being substance. However, quantity can be considered apart .from particular kinds
of sensiible subjects. One ,oan, for exampJ.e, conceive of a circle without it being 'a wooden or bmnze circle. To unaerstand quantity apart from its va11ious natural subjects is rto
abstract it from sensible matter. This is the a.1bstractionproper
to mathematics and is that which is ,.signifiedby " the abstraction of form from matter."
A difficulty immediately surfaces with this formulation of
mathematical abstraction. The reason quantity oan be abstracted from sensible maUer, St. Thomas explains, is that
1

6 Unde oum abstraotio non possit esse, proprie foquendo, nisi coniunctorum
in esse, secundum duos modos coniunotionis praedictos, scilicet qua pars et
totum uniuntur vei forma et materia, duplex est abstraotio, una, qua forma
abstrahitur a materia, alia, qua totum abstrahitur a partibus. Super Librum
Boethii de Trinitate, p. 184, n. 2-6. (All translations of St. Thomas are my
own.)
T Forma autem illa potest a materfrt, a!iqua abstrahi, ciiius ratio essentiae
non dependet a tali materia. (Ibid, n. 6-7)

WHAT IS INTELLIGIDLE

MATTER?

79

quantity is in •some way prio'l" to quality. 8 Colour, for example,
is necessarily understood as an ·accident of an extended body
whereas length or number do not depend on colour, or any
other quality, to be known. (It may be true that quantity as
a common sensible depends on quality to be perceived; yet
once known quantity is freed from any dependence on quality
for the understanding of what it is.) Granted then that quantity is logically prior to quality, how does it follow that quantity can be conceived of apart from sensible matter? As we
saw earlier, abstraction can only occur when the ratio of one
thing does not depend on another. Therefore, St. Thomas'
argument seems to conclude that quantity can be thought of
without quality, not without sensible matter. Yet geometry,
to take a concrete example, is not about taible tops or the like
considered apart from their colour and texture, which would
be the case if quantity was said to ·be abstracted from quality
and not from .sensible maitter. Thus, in oroer to understand
mathematical abstraction .we must 1see how the priority of
quantity over quality allows us to abstract quantity from
sensible matter.
The solution to this difficulty wiill be made ea:s[er by a brief
explanartion of what " sensible matter " meains. Both Aristotle
and St. Thomas recognise that things are sensible in two ways:
either per se or per accidens. Per se sensibles are divided into
proper or common. A proper, per se sensible such as colour
or sound affects the senses in virtue of itself and it affects
a particular sense. It is called per se because it is sensible due
to itself and ibo· no other. And it is called proper because it is
the object of a pamcular sense £aculrty, as sound is the proper
object of hearing, and colour of sight. A common, per se sen1sible is not the proper oibject of ·a particular sense £acuity. Lt
can be attadned by more than one sense power. Shape and motion are examples of common, per se sensibles. Shape can be
gmsped by sight and touch, while motion can be recognized
through sight, sound and touch. Common sensibles are per se
1

s Cf. ibid, n. 12-16.

80

PAUL O'REILLY

sensibles because they affect the senses in virtue of themselves;
a bigger shape affects the senses differently than a smaller one,
for example.
A thing can also be sensible per cwcidens. A per aooidens
sensible is ,that which is an incidental object of the senses.
One such per acciden.s sensible is the incidenta.Ily sensed subject of per se sensibles. Socrates, for example, is sensed per
accidens. For when one senses a certain shade of colour, various sounds of voice, a certain size and so on, one recognises
that this [s Socrates. However, Socrates is not sensed iais ii.s his
colour, nor as are his shape and size. He affects the senses in
virtue of another, that is, in virtue of hls colour, shape, and
the like.9
Charles De Koninck describes the way in which the per
aooidens sensible is grasped in this way:
Knowledge of an incidentally sensible object ... must accompany
every sensation, since all per se sensibles are at once perceived as
belonging to something that is not per se sensed; . . .10

St. Thomas calls this incidentally sensible subject of the per
ae sensibles sensible matter: " corporeal matter according as it
underlies sensible qualities iis called sensible matter." 11 "Matter " genevally signifies that of whii.ch a ithing is composed, or
the underlying suhstl"ate of things. Sensible matter, therefore,
will be the incidentally sensible substvate of sensible qualities;
and is, in fact, a cause of these per se sensibles.
Now that ,we have seen whait "sensible matter" means, let
us return to the difficulty that arose earlier. That difficulty is
agaii.n: how does quantity's priority over quality justify the
9 Cf. Aristotle, De An.ima, Bk. II.6, and St. Thomas, In De Atlinw,, 1.2,13.
Note also that there is another sense of per accidens sensible: that which is
the proper object of one sense, but per acciden-8 object of another-this distinction is not important for our present purposes.
10 Charles De Koninck, "Abstraction
from Matter, I", p. 172, Laval
PMologique et Pkil08ophique, Vol. XIII, t.2, 1957.
11 M ateria
en4m 88'11-8ibiU8 dicitur materia. corporali8 8ecun.dum quod
subiacet quaUta.tibu8 8en&ibiUbus, ... St. Thomas, Summa Theoloqiae, Prima
Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2.

WHAT IS INTELLIGmLE

MATTER?

81

mathematical abstraction of quantity from sensible matter?
Clearly the ratw of quantiity is not dependent on quality, as
quantity can be undel'IStood apart from quality. But quality,
ais we have just seen, makes known sensible matter. That is
to say, without quality the ratio of sensible matter is unattainable. How could one conceive of bronze or of Socrates without
their colour, size, and so on? The very definition of sensible
matter is in terms of per se sensibles. If quantity can be understood apart from quality it can ipso facto be understood
apart from sensible matrber :which is knowable rtihrough qualiHes. lt is in this way that quantity's priority over quality can
be seen ·as ·a justification of mathematical abstraction.
We can now state more precisely what mathematical abstraction is. It is the conceiving of quantity apar:t from sensible matter, the incidentally sensible subject of per se sensibles. The subject of mathematics, therefore, is a pure, simple
·and immobile quantity, freed from the mutability of natural
things. Mruthematics is not about bronze circles, or wooden
triangles; its subject is abstracted £rom all such matter.
Having clarified tihe notion of abstmction it is necessary to
treat of the nature of the definitions of substance ·and accidents. This must be done because it
yet apparent why
the ·ahstmction of quantity from sensible matter requires that
it be underatood as the quantity of some substance. lndeed
this conclusion seems strange, :since the study of maithematios
does not deal with any kind of substance, but concerns itself
with the figures of quantity. Is it really essential, therefore,
to identify intelligible matter with substance?
Aristotle devotes part of his Metaphysics to the question of
the definitions of both srnbstance and ·accident. And St.
Thomas comments on this discussion as follows:
1

Substance ... which has an absolute quiddity, does not depend
on another for its quiddity. An accident, however, depends on a
subject, although the subject is not of the essence of an accident;
. . . so that it is necessary that an exterior essence is put in its
definition. But accidents do not have being except insofar as they

82

PAUL O'REILLY

are in a subject; and therefore the quiddity of these accidents is
dependent on a subject, on account of this it is necessary that a
subject is put in the definition of an accident; ... 12

Since substance exists per se and in ipse it can be defined
absolutely. An ·accident does not have this same mode of being
nor, consequently, this same mode of definition. The being of
an accident
upon the being of substance. Even if an
accident is other than substance, havmg a nature proper to itself, it is nonetheless 1a determination of substance and musit
be understood ;as such. Yet ·all accidents are not the same, a
point that St. Thomas developes in his oommentacy on the
Metaphysics .
1

. . . certain accidents are simple, and others are coupled (copulata).
Accidents that do not have a determinate subject are called simple, [this subject] is put into the definition of them, as for example
curve and concave and other mathematics. However those ail.'e
called coupled that have a determinate subject, without which
they cannot be defined.18

To use Aristotle's example, "snubness" is a shape found in
a determinate suhjoot-.a nose. This is a " coupled " accident,
for snubness signifies not only ·a certain shape, but a shape
found in a definite subject. On the other hand, if one were
12 Substantia ... quae habet quidditatem absolutam, non dependet iin sua
quidditate elD alio. Accidens autem dependet a subieoto, lioet subieotum non
sit de essentia aooidentis; ... ita quod oporteat wteriorem essentiam in
eius definitione poni. Aooidentia vero non habent esse nisi per ho·o quod insunt
subieoto: et ideo eorum quidditas est dependens a subieoto: et propter hoc
oportet quod subieotum in aooidentis definitione ponatur, •.. In Metaphysioorum, 1.7,4, n. 1352. St. Thomas uses the word "subject'' here
not to distinguish that which enters into the definition of an accident from
substance. "Subject" is the prope·r term for that which underlies accidents,
hence substance can be called a subject. Cf. St. Thomas' De Priincipiis Naturae,
Opuscula Omnia, Vol. I, p. 8. (Mandonnet edition, 1927) In this text St.
Thomas also points out that the subject that underlies accidental :forms can
be called "matter".
13 • • • quaedam accidentia sunt simplicia, et quaedam copulata. Simplicia
diountur, quae non habent subiectum deterrninatum, quod in eorum definitione ponatur, sicut curvum et ooncavum et alia mathematica. Oopulata
autem diountur, quae habent determinatum subiectum, siine quo definiri non
possunt. In Metaphysioorum, 1.7,4, n. 1343.

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER?

to .ask what specific subject underlies mathematical forms,Do table tops underlie planes? Or is the sun the subject of the
circle?-it would be impossible to name a determinate subject.
Clearly tha.t is what St. Thomas means by simple accidents
since he gives mathematica1s ·as examples.
We have seen that mathematical abswaction is the separation of quantity from sensible matter and that quantity cannot be abstracted from substance since aU accidents depend
on substance. Mathematical quantity, therefore, does not depend on sensible matter to he understood, yet it does have to
be. understood as the quantity of •some indeterminate substance. " Quantity can be undersitood without the mrutter that
is subjeot oo motion and s·ensible qua1ities, but not without
substance." 14
In light of these two principles St. Thomas proceeds rto draw
the conclusion that, despite their .a;bstract chamcler, mathematical forms •are understood as .the determinations of some
kind of •substance. This sulbstance he calls " intelLigible matter." "And thus according to the notion of its substance quantity does Illot depend on sensible matter, but only on intelligible
matter." 16 But what kind of substance is intelligible ma.tter
since it is neither ·a natu11al composite nor a pure from?
In the Summa Theologiae, St. Thomas gives his most precise
statement as to the nature of intelLigiblematter. He says that
" intelligible matter is truly called substance according .as it is
subject to quantity." 16 This short formula holds the key to
the clifficultiesraised at the outset.
14 Pot est igitur intelligi quantitas sine materia subiecta motui et qualitatibus sensibilibus, non tamen absque substantia. In Pkysicorum, 1.2,3,
n. I61.
15 Et sic secundum ra.tionem suae substantiae non depend.et quantitas a
materia sensibiZi, sed solum a materia intelligibU. Super Librum Boetkii de
Trinitate, Q.5, a.3, corpus, p. 184, n. 16I8.
16 M ateria 11ero inteUigibiUs dicitur substantia secundum quad subiacet
quantitati. Summa Tkeoloqiae, Prima Pars, Q.85, a.I, ad 2. Cf. also In
Pkysicorum, 1.2,3, n. I6I; Scriptum Super Sententiarum IV, I2, Q.I, a.I,
n. 44-45; Summa Tkeoloqiae, Tertia Pars, Q.77, a.2, ad 4.

84

PAUL O'RFllLLY

The definitions of mathematicals do not require a determinate 1subject or substance. Rather the substance of the
mathematical figures has simply the notion of that which underlies these figures and that upon which they depend. Intelligible matter, then, is not ,a kind of substance as is bronze
or wood. Not even the notion of substantial form iis proper to
this substance. The ratio of intelligible matter is much like the
description of suhstance that is given in the Categories: substance is that which is neither said of another nor exists in another .17 In the Categories Aristotle is giving ,a common, not a
developed, explanation of what "substance" means. The notion of substance that is proper to intelligible matter is very
much like this confused notion of substance. Intemgible matter is not a particular kind of substance having a nature apart
from abstract figures. That is why St. Thomas defines it as
substance ·according 1as it is subject .to quantity. Consequently
intelligible matter is neither substance tin the sense of a natural
composite (though the notion of substance is gathered from
natural things) , nor in the 1sense of pure form.
Intelligible matter is also called the continuum. 18 Rather
than posing a problem this name further illuminates what intelligible matter is. There is no ·difference between substance
according as it is subject to quantity and the continuum.
" Continuum " signifies that which iis .able to be divided without end and thait the parts of which have a common boundary.
Therefore the word " continuum" designates 1a subject having
quantity, which subject is conceived of only in that regard,
namely, as underlying quantity. The continuum in one dimension is line, in two dimensions surface, and in three dimensions
·,solid. Because it signifies:an indeterminate subject that stands
under quantity and i.is a.ble to become the different mathematicals intelligible matter can reasonably be called the "continuum". Some modern commentators have described intelli1

1

Categories, ch.5, 2all-13.
St. Thomas, In Physioorum, 1.1,41, n. 360; In De Anima, 1.3,7,
n. 714; In Metaphysicorom, 1.7,10, n. 1460; De Veritate, Q.2, a.6, ad 1.
11 Cf. Aristotle,
18 Cf.

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER?

85

gible matter in other ways too. Hippocrates Apostle, for example, says that the matter of mathematicals " is the continuous." 19 While W. D. Ross and Thomas Heath refer to
the intelligiiblemalbter as" space ". 20 Do these niames ·shed any
further light on the nature of intelligible matter?
One ought not confuse the continuous with the continuum.
The continuum signifies quantity with a suhjeot, but the continuous is a kind of quantity-it is an accident. As an accident
"continuous " may imply that there is a subject underlying it
yet it does not designate a 1subject. " Continuous:" is akin to
"red", both imply a subject, neither expresses it directly.
This is not the case with "continuum"; it refers directly to a
substrate, hawng no other character than that of an underlying recipient of quantitative forms, but ·a subject nevertheless.
Thus it would seem that " continuous " is not an appropriate
name for the mwtter that is subject to mathematicals, and it is
not at all synonomous with" continuum".
Neither is " space " a particularly good name for intelligible
matter. (In fad, " space " could ev•en be a very misleadiing
term if one thought that it signified physical extension. Intelligible matter is ·in no way a physical thing.) What Ross
and Heath mean by " space" is ·a substrate that is devoid of
sensible attributes, free from all things properly physical.
Heath, in fact, equates: "1space" with "pure extension ", 21
which is 1a sign that "sp111ce" means the subject that remains
after the abstraction of sensible matter. However, " space" is
still not a fortunate expres1sionin that it suffers from the same
deficiency as does " continuous ". " Space " does not represent
the ·SU!bject that undeTlies mathematical figures •and so it is not
of help in coming to understand what intelligible matter is.
Finally we must consider the signification of the name "in19 Cf. Hippocrates
Apostle, Aristotle's Philosophy of Mathematics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952), p.17.
20 Cf. W. D. Ross, Aristotle's
Metaphysics (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1924), pp. 203£; Thomas Heath, Mathematics iin Aristotle (Oxford: Cla.rendon Press, 1949) , p. 224.
21 Cf. Heatl1, Ibid.

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PAUL O'REILLY

telligible matter ". This appears to be the most perplexing
problem since St. Thomas gives two quite different reasons
for the use of this expression. In the commentary on Boethius'
De Trinitate, his most elaborate work on intelligible matter,
St. Thomas says that quantity does not depend on sensible
matter for the notion of its substance but on intelligible matter. And then .to explain the name "intelligible matter" he
adds: " for substance, when the accidents have been removed,
remains intelligible only to the intellect in that the sensitive
powel1S do not attain a comprehension of substance." 22 However in •another place St. Thomas s.tates that " intelligible "
when referring to mathematicals signifies that these things are
grasped by the imagination. "[The imagination] is called intelligence here, because it conS1iders things without the senses
as does the intellect." 23 If that is so why do we not call
the matter of mathematicals imaginaible matter (which is •akin
to the name St. Albert uses: quantitas imaginabilis24 ) ? It
seems that the name " intelligiible" is used as a concession to
Aristotle who called the imagination the corruptible passive
intellect. 25 Whait then is the proper signification of the name
"intelligible matter"? Does it refer us 1to the intellect which
alone seizes substance, or to the imagination which properly
grasps mathematiools?
· A solution to this difficulty will best be found by returning
to Aristotle who was the first ito speak about the subject of
mathematioal:s ·and then to reflect on the te:ds of St. Thomas
that seem problematic.
Aristotle uses the expression VATJ VOTJnl to designate that
22 Substantia enim remoti8 aooidentibus non manet nisi intellectu comprehensibili8, eo quod sensitwae potentiae non pertingunt usque ad substtJJn.tiae
oomprehensionem. St. Thomas, Super Librum BoethU de Trinitate, Q.5, a.3,
p. 184, n. 18-20.
2s [lmaginatio] quae hie intelUgentia dicitur, q'Uia res oonsiderat sine sensu,
siout inteileotus. In Metap1vysioorom,1.7,10, n. 1495.
24 Cf. St. Albert, Physicomm, 1 ( Parisiis:
Vives, Bibliopola.m Editorem,

1890),p.2.
2s Cf. St. Thomas, In Metaphysicorum, 1.7,10, n. 1494.

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER?

87

which we have been calling intelligible matter. 26 Now v>.:11,
which first :signified ,a forest, ·and then lumber, later came to
designate ,thart of which .anything is composed. And vo'1Jri1 describes 1somethinginsofa!l' as it is gr.asped by an interior knowing faculty of the soul. The adjective vo'1Jri1 and the noun
vovs comes from the verb voloo which designates the act of perceiviing,of thinking and of conceiving. Both the adjective and
the noun
a wide range of knowing powers, either diTectly or indirectly, though ·all ,these powers are interior mental
faculties. A good translation of vovs would be " mind " since
" mind " can be .applied to <imagination,intellect, and even the
emotions, among other thing.s. Hence vo"1ri1 could best ·be
translated as "minded". Consequell'tly VA'1J vo'1Jri1, especially
when contrasted with 1sensible matter, ·refers to that matter
that is .attained by some iinterior power.
Charles De Koninck confirms this understanding of the name
"intelligible matter".
. . . we call the matter of these mathematical individuals 'intelligible', in the sense that it can be reached only by mind, and is
not the individual matter of external sense experience.27

Now that Aristotle' s original phrase has been clarified we
must return to the texts of the Angelic Doctor that seem to
give distinctly different explanations of what " intelligible matter" signifies. In the commentary on Boethius' De Trinitate,
St. Thomrus claims that intelligible matter is .so called because
it is substance ·and substance is only knowable through the intellect. This <interpretation would appear to aooord with the
use of the phrase VA'1J
by Aristotle because vo'1Jri1 can
signiify the intellectual. And since 1in this particular context St.
Thomas wants to show that quantity is abstracted from sensible matter but not from substance simpliciter, it is plausible
that St. Thomas gives this justification of the name "intelligible matter " to stress the very £act that it is substance.
1

2t1Cf. Aristotle, Metapky&ic&, Bk. VII.IO, 1036a9-12; Bk.VII.11, 1037a4-5;
Bk.VIII.6, 1045a34-36.
21 Charles De Koninck, "Abstraction from Matter, II" (Emphasis added),
Laval TMoZogique et Pkilo&opkique, VI, t.l (1960), p. 64.

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PAUL o'REILLY

But this explanation is problematic, as was seen by Frere
Augustin-Gabriel. He notes that ,sensible matter can ·also be
identified with substance, and therefore
would merit the
name " ·intelligible matter " 28 It would seem, then, that the
argument propo1sedby St. Thomas to clarify the name " intelligible " as said of the matter of mathematicals can be applied
equally to the matter of natural things. Accordingly, St.
Thomas would be giving ·an .argument that does not
why the subject of mathematfoals deserves to be called intelligible ·any more than any other .subject. However, ·after raising the difficulty Frere Augustin-Gabriel offers a solution .
. . . intelligible matter is prior to sensible matter. This latter, in
fact, implies the presence of sensible qualities. Consequently, quantity is situated at a higher level of intelligibility than corporeal
matter; thus it is closer to that which can only be the proper
object of the intellect, that is substance. For these reasons, one
appropriates the name of intelligible matter to the subject of quantity rather than to sensible
Although sensible matter ms only ·sensible per accidens and
although it can be identified with substance insofar ·as it is the
subject of sensible accidents, nevertheless it implri.es sensible
attributes. Initel1igihle matter, on rbhe other hand, iJs the suJbject rbhat underlies mathemartical figures and so is free from
•ainy referrenoe to sensible qualities. Therefore the notion of
intelligible matter is prior to that of sensible matter. Even if
both can be considered as subs:tance, .intelligible matter might
-appropriate the name " intelligible" becaiuse of this priority,
while the matter that implies sensible attributes is rightly
called sensible.
2s Cf. Frere Augustin-Gabriel, "Matiere Intelligible et Mathematique, III",
Laval Theologi,que et Philosophique, XVIII, t.2 ( 1962), p. 194.
29 ••• La matiere intelligible est anterieure a la matiere sensible. Oelle-ci
impUque, en effet, la presence des qualites sensibles. La quantite se situe, en
consequence, a un niveau d'intelligibilite plus eleve que la matiere corporelle;
ainsi, elle se rapproche davantage de ce qui ne peut etre objet propre que de
l'intelligence, c'est-ii-diire de la substance. Pour ces raisons, on approprie le
nom de matiere intelligible au sujet de la quantite plut()t qu'a la matiere
sen.8'ible. Frere Augustin-Gabriel, Ibid. (Translation is my own.)

WHAT IS INTELLIGIBLE

MATTER?

89

However, when St. Thomas argues in his commentary on
the Metaphysics that "1intelligib1e" designates the imagination, .his claim is not in con:ili.ct with his interpretation of " intelligible matter " in the commentary on Boethius. For vo'Y/rli
can also refer to 1thait which is grasped by ithe imaigination.
Since it is clear that mwthematical bcings .are iseized by the
imagination it is indeed corcrect to call the matter that underlies them intelligible matter i:f one clearly understands by this
the matter that is subject to entities held in the imagination.
Now the term" imaginruble matter" might be better to signify
this aspect of intelligible matter, but "imruginable " would not
refer us to anotheir .aspect of intelligible matter-its substance.
So, too, the description that St. Alber:t gives is co:rrect up to a
point. Nevertheless " quantitas imaginabilis " likewise suffers
mom the deficiency of not 1signifying intelligible matter as
substance.
The £act that mathematicals are gra;sped by the imagination-which can be called inteUect-seems to be the fundamentail reason w:hy the subject of mathematicaLs is called intelligible matter. In £act, one can see here a proportion between
the name sensible matter and the name intelligible matter. For
just as the subject of physical things is cailled
because
the sense's seize these physical things, so too the subject of
mathematical things should be named from the faculty tha,.t
gnasps them. To 1some
it may be true that " intelligible
matter " is .an unfortunate name because the English word
" intellect " is so attached to the faculty of reason that its application to the iimaiginarl:fon seems forced. To that extent
" mind " matter or " mental mrutter " could be more faithful
phrase. " Mind " can desigtranslations of Aristotle's
nate the imagination readily while leaving itself open to the
further signification of mtelligible mrutter as substance since
" mind " can also refer to the intellect.
In short, the two accounts of the meaning of " intelligible "
that St. Thomas offers .are not contradictory, rather they are
complementary. They signify two different facets of intelligible

90

PAUL O'REILLY

matter. It is the substance of mathematical quantity and the
matter that under1ies beings grasped properly by the imagination.
This brief analysis serves not rbo answer all the questions
about the doctrine of intelligible matter, but to illustrate that
it is a profound doctrine involving many difficulties. The solution of these difficulties lies in a careful study of ,the texts of
the Aristotle amd St. Thomas.

EOONOMICS, WISDOM AND THE TEACHING OF
THE BISHOPS IN THE THEOLOGY
OF THOMAS AQUINAS*
KEVIN A. McMAHON

St. Anselm OoZZege
Manchester, New Hampshire

W

HEN IN 1985 the American bishops came out with
the first drait of thcir pastoiral letter on the economy,
and ithen a year Later when they
the final text,1
they drew fire from groups both within and outside the
Church. Much of the criticism, on the popular front at least,
seemed to concern the impropriety of religious leaders involving themselves in seoular .affairs (1and technical affairs at that).
But while ithe bishorps were quick to admit their Lack of technical expertise, they claimed for rthemselves a special authority
to teach regarding the principles tha.t underlie a just economic
life. Far from sitepping outside their proper sphere, it is their
obligation, they sruid, to speak on these issues, and to a.ddress
not only membel'IS of the Ca.tholic Church in America, 1but the
nation as a whole. It is a requirement of their ofHce that ithey
be concerned with the weHare and security of all individuals,
,and they effectively promorte this end iby setting forth the word
of God recorded in Scriipture and handed on by the Church's
tramtion. 2
There ,are two points in prurticu1ar that are implied by this
statement. F1irst, knowledge of revelation is an aid to estab" The substance of this article was first presented as a paper at the College
Theology Society convention, held in Newport, Rhode Island, in May 1985.
i "Economic Justice for All: Catholic Social Teaching and the U.S. Economy," Origins, vol. 16, no. 24 (November 27, 1986), 412-455..
2 Pastoral
Message to accompany the letter, sections 4-9, 12-19, 29;
Pastoral Letter, sections 5, 22-27.

91

KEVIN A. MCMAHON

lishing peace and justice in the community at large because
of the iin.sight into 1the good for man that the Gospel offers.
Second, reason alone will not suffi,ce the community ·as a guide
in interpel'lsonal activity, even in the area of economics, so it
makes great sense for the citizen to ·attend to rthe bishop, who
in his teaching expresses the Church's foilith. The bishops' letter on economics does not fully draw out either of these points.
And Aquinas nowhere expressly deaLs with the authority of the
bishop in economic matteiis. But he does have something to
say about rthe nature and soul'lce of episcopal authority, and of
the need in the community for moral teachers.
Priv.ate property, commercial trading, the use of moneyfor Thoma.s ,aJl o[ these institutions or practices were devised
by communities for the sake of individual and general wellbeing. They conform to right reason, they are products of
right reason, and they are governed by the virtue of justice.
It would seem that practical rea:son, ,all by itself, is sufficient in
their regaOO.. Take priViate propecl;y a:s an
Thomas
offers three arguments in irts defens·e in his Summa theologiae.
First, people work more diligently when they own the product
of their lrubor. Second, if people work in the first instance for
their own sake, roncentrarting on their own needs, there .WJill be
less confusion than if everyone has responsibility for the group.
Thiird, to quote Thomais, "quarrels arise more frequently
where there is no division of the things possessed." 3
Note that Thomais is not .arguing for the rubsolute necessity
of private property. He defends private property as a social
institution without prejudicing eiither :the right of specific individuals to hold property in common, or the good of their doing
so. After all, Thomas himself belonged to a religious order
whose members take a vow of poverty. All he iis claiming is
that the institution of private property makes sense.4 If pri1

1

a 2-2, q. 66, a. 2, c.
"Odon Lottin writes that Thomas was unusual in regarding human nature, even after the Fall, as indifferent to the institution of private property;
the natural la.w neither commands nor prohibits it. Rather, men cross-cul-

BISHOPS'

TEACHING ROLE IN ECONOMICS

93

vate ownership is so common, Aquinas might say, it is because
it
all things considered, a reasonable way to provide for
human well-being. And to whatever extent the institution does
not promote the welfare of ,the indiwdual ·and the community,
reason will dictate that it be limited. Thus, Thomas distinguishes between the prhnate ownel'IShip of properly and the
proper manner of its use, namely for the good of all.
Now Thomas has based this discussion on what reason
shows to be the good for man. In foot, much of what Thomas
says, including ms distinction between the possession of property and its use, may he found in Book two of Aristotle's
PolitiCJJ. There Aristotle writes: "It is clearly better that
property should be priViate,but the use of it common." Notice,
·however, what Aristotle then adds, "and the special business
of the legislwtor is rto create an men this benevolent disposition." 5 What this amounts to, he explains, is that men be
led to broaden the affection of friendship to mclude 1all their
fellow citizens. Certainly such general benevolence is reasonaible 1since the pofot of the ,state is to be a true community of
individuals. Al'lsitotle's statement that the citizens must be
brought to this conclusion by the community's leaders will be
taken up by Aquina:s. The principles of morality, he contends,
even if they 1all pmceed from reason, are not equally grasped
by all. There is need in the community for moral teachers,
individuals whom Thomas in the Summa theo'logiae calls
"sapientes," the wise men.
It was common among medie¥al writers ro propose an analogy between speculative reason ,and practical reason. Thomas
hmiself makes a comparison, although the parallel he draws is
turally simply have found private ownership to be a beneficial social arrange·
ment. See Dom Odon Lottin, Le Droit Naturei ohez Saitnt Thomas d' Aqmn
et 8e8 pred.eoes8Wr8, 2nd ed. (Bruges: Charles Beyaert, 1931), p. 89 and n. 4.
There are, however, those authors who believe that Thomas considered private
property to be a consequence of sin. See Josef Fuchs, S.J., "The 'Sin of the
World' and Normative Morality," GregoriwMJ,m 61 (1980), 51-75, in particu·
lar p. 54 and n. 4.
5 PoUtio8 2. 1263a38·40.

94

KEVIN A. MCMAHON

iactually two-fold. Just 1as the first principles of speculative
reason .aJI'e the ·starting poirut in rany scientific demonstration,
he writes, the precepts of p11aicticalreason---iand here Thoma;s is
speaking of .the precepts that all people arrive at when they
consider the !SO!l'lt of actions that will ;protect the ends of the
person----iare:the ·stwting point for mor:al thinking. 6 Before I
can decide whether OT not I 1should perform a particular act,
I must :fust be aware of these p11actical dictates. Making the
decision :i:s a matter of applying rthe principles of morality to
specific cases, and ithus ra matter of prudence. What makes deciding difficult, .and prudence so important, is that the principles do not .aJ.ways hold. The stock example Thomas gives
is the unreasonableness of following the general rule that one
return entrusted prope!l.'lty to its owner in a case where you
know he might use it against your country. 7 Really, most
mortal questioDJS iin.volv:e decisions of this 'SON. Judgmenits of
temperance, for example, rall require tha;t one have uppermost
in one's mind rthe peculiaiities of one's own personality and
cireumstances. And to return to the issue of economics, it is
one thing ,to call for a jusit 1schedule of prices in the marketplace, but how does one determine what price is just? There
a;re f·ar too many variaibles rto allow for a unive11sally bindillg
rule. Tms is why Thomas grants such ra 1arge role in morality
,to people of genuine prudence. Their experience and acuity,
in public matte11s such as economic justice am.d personal matte11s such as temperance, are indispensable to the community.
Yet ithese cannot be the guides that Thomas refers to as
the wise men. Prudence, Thomas writes, is concerned with
putting moral principles into 1action. Wisdom is concerned
with the fi11st causes of all things, rbhe principles of all the sciences.8 So if one is gomg fo ·speak of wise men in the moral
life, their role will have to concern the principles of mor:ality.
Now there is a place in morality for ·Such a function, as we can
1

1

s 1-2, q. 94, a. 2, c.
7Q.94,a.4,c.
.
S2-2, q. 47, a.2, ad I; aa. 5 and 7, c.; cf. 1-2, q. 57, a. 2, !c.;' a. 4, c;

BISHOPS'

TEACHING ROLE IN. ECONOMICS

95

see if we look at the second ·analogy 1that Thomas makes between specu1rutiveand practical rea;son. Just as in specu1rutive
reasoning there is a move from first principles to specific conclusions, ·So in pl'lactical reasoilling we move from first, most
general, principles to more determinate principles that are
arrived •at -like conclusions, and which we then apply to our
given situation. One can take as an
the command
"Do not steal," or mare precisely, "Do not take another's
property without the owner's permission." It follows from the
principle that one should do no harm to another. 9
Apart, then, from rthe mrutter of applying a rule to a concrete
case, which ·belongs to the virtue of prudence, there is the
problem of going firom rthe basic principle to its derivative, or
from primary to secondary precepts as Thoma:s calls them. 1<>
The first, most general, precepts seem ito form a rather narrow
category of principles that :are iimmediately known by all people a;s soon as ,they begin fo reason about practical affairs.
Like 11ationalityitself, they are never entively absent, ·although
their operation may be anesthetized by the force of passion.11
The secondary precepts comprise ·a much broader category,
from principles that even the untutored can axrive at
with just a Httle reflection (the prohibition of stealing, for example), .to rules thrut require the teaching of the wise men
(such as the :admonition to respect the elderly). It seems to
be a matter of just how clearly one gl'asps the goods on which
s The prohibition of stealing offers an example of how a determinate principle concerning a relative good, such as private property, may not hold in
every instance. As Thomas points out, it is not immoral in a situation of
grave necessity to take in secret another's property and use it; because
material things exist for everyone's sake, and the personal possession of
property remains a good only so long as it works to relieve the needs of both
yourself and your neighbor ( 2-2, q. 66, a. 7).
1'01-2, q. 94, aa. 5-6. Note that this is how Thomas speaks of primary and
secondary precepts in the Summa theologiae. See R. A. Armstrong, Primary
and Secondary Precepts in Thomistic Natural Law Teaching (The Hague:
Martinus Nijhoff, 1966) for a discussion of how Thomas' use of these terms
changes from his early to his later work.
111.2, q. 94, a. 2, c.; a. 4, c.; a. 6, c.

96

KEVIN A. MCMAHON

the moral precepts are based. The primary precepts simply
point out these goods, .such a.s human life, to which we are inclined by nature. The secondary precepts, however, refer to
these goods iin. greater detail, indicating more and more specifically the sort of :actions rthat will promote, 1and the sort that
will injure, ·a prurlicular good. For the individual who fully
understands the nature of these goods, hoth the primary and
the •secondary precepts :are iSelf-evidenitlytrue. 12 But for those
who cannot, do not, or simply refuse to reflect long enough Ito
see the greater detruil of these goods, these secondary rules
might very well appear false.
Wirth rbhis in mind, the role of :the wise men becomes pretty
clear. They have the job of educating those who are less in1sightful about the nature of human goods. And what is even
more important, they can stem ·the development of evil haibits
into community-wide evil customs, dispelling by ·their teaiehing
the clouds tha;t egoism can crusrt over the citizens' practical reason. There is only one problem: Thomas writes that the
aicquired virtue of wisdom is strictly a 1speculaitive v•irtue; !it
is not concerned with moral action. 13 So what is one to make
of the repeated references to the wise men? Irt is possible that
Thomas is using the title " wise " in the broad sense of anyone
who has the responsibility of ordering and governing others,
after rthe mainner of Aristotle's good legislator. The idea of
wisdom as ordering principle was an important one to
Thomas. 14 Yet Arisrtortledoes not use wisdom (sophia) in this
way, reserving for the legislator's virtue the name phronesis. 15
And even though one can find evidence for the view that
Thomas himself was not ·so scrupulous, this answer still does
not su:ffice.16
12 1-2, q. 100, a. 1, c; q. 94, a. 2, c.
13 2-2, q. 45, a. 3, obj. and ad I.

14 See Lawrence Boadt, C.S.P., "St. Thomas .Aquinas and the Biblical Wisdom Tradition," The Th-Omist 49 (1985) 575-611, especially pp. 592-96, 603.
15 Nicomachean Flthics 6, 114la20, 114lb23.
L6 Boadt, in the article cited above, shows how Thomas parallels the biblical wisdom tradition in regarding wisdom in the highest sense as both

BISHOPS'

TEACHING ROLE IN ECONOMICS

97

Thomas is rtoo insistent that prudence or practical wi:sdom,
even mthe unconditioned ;sense of in-aotical wO.sdom,
the
human good mgeneral, is not ·about moml principles. What is
more, in spealcing of :a divinely revealed morial 1aw, and thereby
opening up the possibilirty of ia much larger role fm one who
would teach morial principles that are not self-evident to all,
it is very difficult for Thomas ito get away with characterizing
this teacher 1as having the virtue of the legislator, whose chief
business is applying the means of .good Laws to the end of a
virtuous community. And it is precisely in conjunction. with
the divine law that Thomas speaks mosrt orfiten of the wise men.
Despite all this, 1a less than precise use of the term " wise "
might in bet be what is at work here. But there is another
possibility. It could be that Thomas is referring ito that form
of wisdom that is both speculative and active, namely the
wisdom that is a ,gift of the Holy Spirit.
1

speculative and active. Thus, one commonly finds in Thomas the idea that
wisdom (and the wise man) orders all things. Yet Boadt goes on to argue
that Thomas derived this notion in part from .Aristotle; and this is a point
that must be qualified. If Thomas in fact believes that .Aristotle considered
the activity of ordering to be proper to the wise man, it might be because his
Latin translation will sometimes render phronesis as sapientia (e.g., 2-2,
q. 47, a. 5, obj. I). More likely, however, is that Thomas was so imbued
with the biblical tradition (both Old and New Testament) that he read into
Aristotle a connection between wisdom and action that the Philosopher did
not have. A prime example of this is the statement "It belongs to the wise
man to order." It occurs, among other places, in the opening of his commentary on the M etaphysios, and Boadt writes that it is taken from the
first book of .Aristotle's PoUtios (I. 5). Yet .Aristotle does not speak there
of wise men at all, but of natural rulers and natural slaves. It is Thomas
who in commenting on the passage shifts from Rpeaking o.f rulers (prinoipantes) to wise men ( sapientes), and this because of a passage from the
book of Proverbs: "the foolish man will serve the wise" (In Pol. I. 3. 68).
Revealing, too, is a passage in 2-2, q. 45, a. 6, c. where Thomas cites Aristotle
(Metaphysics I. 982al8-19) to the effect that the wise man establishes order.
Actually, though, what .Aristotle says is that it is commonly held of the
wise man that he gives rather than receives orders, and Thomas seems to be
aware in his commentary that .Aristotle is regarding this as only an opinion
(In Met. 1. 2. 41-42). Note that when it is a matter of establishing prudence
as a distinct virtue, concerned with action, Thomas will quote Aristotle
against the wisdom tradition, as in 2-2, q. 47, a. 2, obj. and ad 1.

98

KEVIN A. MCMAHON

Of this wisdom Thomas writes, " it considers them (divine
types) in so for as it contemplates divine things in themselves,
and it consults them in so far as it judges of human acts by
divine things, and direots human acts according to dvine
rules." 17 The understanding wisdom has of divine things is
due, not to the effort of reason, but to a " connaturality " with
them that is an effect of cha;rity; beoause charity, Thomas
notes, "unites us with God-a1s it is said in 1 Cor. 6: 17, 'He
who is joined to the Lord is one spirit.' " 18 Why would
Thomas, who follows Aristotle so closely in his discussions of
wisdom, breaks with the Philosopher in speaking of the highest
wisdom as both contemplative and active? The answer appears
at the very beginning of the Summa contra gentiles. Since the
end of the entire univierse i,s truth, it is with truth that the
wise man must primarily be concerned. And so, he continues,
divine Wisdom testifies that, in order to make truth manifest, he
assumed flesh and came into the world, saying 'For this I was
born, and for this I came into the world, in order that I might
give testimony to the truth' (Jn. 18: 37) .19

Wisdom for Thomas is not merely some humanly acquired
habit thait enables one to contempl,ate a divine and transcendent cause. The highest wisdom in this life comes of a personal
union with >the divine Wisdom, who is also the divine Truth
17 Thomas is commenting on Augustine's
statement that wisdom "indendit
'rationibus supernis,' scilioet divinis, 'et conspiciendis et oonsulendis ;' oonspiciendis quidem, seoundum quod divina in seipsis oontemplatur; oonsulendis
autem, seoundum quod per divina iudioat de humanis aotibiis per divinas
regulas dirigens aotus humanos" (2-2, q. 45, a. 3, c.). The Latin text of the
Summa theologiae quoted here and following is the Ottawa edition, 19411945.
18 Huiusmodi autem oompassio sive oon1iaturaUtas ad res divinas fit per
oa1·itatem, quae quidem unit nos Deo, secundum illud 1 ad Oor. 6 :17, 'Qui
adhaeret Deo unus spiritus est' (2-2, q. 45, a.2, c.).
19 Et ideo ad veritatis
manifestationem divina Sapientia oarne induta se
venisse in mundum testatur, dioens, .Jn. 18 :37, 'Ego in hoc natus sum, et
ad hoc veni in mundum, ut testimonium perhibeam veritati' ( 1. l. 4). Summa
contra gentiles, 2 vols., ed. by Pera, Marc and Caramello (Turin and Rome:
Marietti, 1961), vol. 2, p. 2.

BISHOPS'

TEACHING ROLE IN ECONOMICS

99

(Jn. 14: 6). And this divine Wisdom., who deliberately made
man, bound himself to m.an by taking hum.an flesh, in order
that m.an might bind himself to him. The gift of wisdom must
be active, because God is ootive, working to draw man into
the divine life.
Since man is essentially ·an ragent, and a cooperative agent,
moving as a member of a community toward union with God,
it makes sense for Thomas to speak of the wise man as an
orderer. Since man moves toward his end by fostering the
goods of his nature, and since his end consists in the union of
his own nature with thart of God, one can see where there would
be need for a teacher of secondary or derivative moral principles concerning these goods, just because the deepest significance of these goods :is that they image the unseen God
(though Thoonas is none too explicit rubout 1this particular
need) . And who better to :fi]l this role of teacher than the man
gifted with wisdom, who by virtue of his connaturality with
divine things ·oon best unde11standthe goods of our nature, and
the sort of actions that promote or injure them.
But now another difficulty 1arisers. The gift of wisdom belongs in some degree to ·aill who have .grace, and it may be received in ·a special degree by any individual, since it is one of
the " gratuitous grares which ,the Holy Spriit dispenses as he
wills." 2 As such, rthe wise men would consist of those individuals who are reoognzied in the community for their holy
perspioocity. But rus Thomas 1Speak!s of :the wise men, they occupy 1a form.al, public position, rand have their authority by
their office. Thus, in one of the plaices where he most clearly
describes the function of the wise men, Thomas refers to the
role Moses and Aaron had in Israel, .acting as teachel'!S by
virtue of their divine commission to give God's law to the
peopfo.21
Q

2·0 Quidam autem altiori gradu perficitunt sapientiae donum. • • • Jj]t iste
gradus sapientiae non est communis omnibus habentitbus gratiam gratum
facientem, sed magi& pertinet ad gratias gratis datas, quas Spiritus Sanctus
'distribuit prout vult,' secundum illud 1 ad Oor. JS:B, 'Alii datur per Spiritum
sermo sapientiae,' etc. (2-2, q. 45, a. 5, c).
211-2, q. 100, a. 11, c.

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KEVIN A. MCMAHON

The need for divinely revealed law-the Law of Moses and
the Law of grace-stems from man's vocation. It teaches of
God's nature and guides human .action. It is, in fact, the
neces·sary precondition for the possibility of the gift of wisdom.
Wisdom in the perfected sense is an effect of the outpouring
of the Spirit that constitutes the New Law. It presupposes
faith in Christ, and acceptance of whatever precepts are associated with the reception and right use of. grace.22 Wisdom
as it existed in Israel presupposed membership in the holy
people formed by God. It seems, then, that whether one is
speaking of wisdom in Israel or in the Church, a distinction
must he made between the quality as it is possessed as a personal gift, and ais it is held in virtue of one's office of proclaiming the law that is the fundamental bond between the community and God.
If it is co-rrect to say that the wise men spoken of in connection with the Old Law were the successors to Moses and
AaJron, namely, the Levitioal priests, the elders, and to some
extent the prophets, then their counterparts under the New
Law would be those who succeed to Christ, the High Priest in
whom all these roles have their fulfillment. These, of course,
are the bishops. Thomas considers the bishops to be the
premier teachers of faith and morals in the Church. Teaching
is their special duty, he writes in his commentary on Ephesians.28 It is, in fact, their most important duty, he states in
the Summa theologiae;24 mosrt impo·rtant because knowledge
22 1-2, q. 108, a. 2, c.
2a Writing

on Ephesians 4:11 (which in Thomas' text reads, ".And indeed
he gave some to be apostles, and some to be prophets, other evangelists,
and others pastors and teachers, . • ."), Thomas interprets "pastors and
teachers" as referring to the successors of the apostles, who in having the
responsibility of watching over the Lord's flock also have the responsibility
of teaching it. He states: "Quantum vero ad curam Eoolesia,e subdit: 'A.lios

autem pa,stores,' oumm soilioet dominioi gregis habentes: et sub eodem addit,
'lilt dcotores,' ad ostendendum quod proprium oflioium pastoris Jiloolesiae, est
dooere ea, qua,e pertinent a,d fidem et bonos mores" (In. Flph. 4, 4) St. Thomas
Aquinas, Opera Omnia,, 24 vols. (Parma: Ficcadori, 1852-1873; reprint ed.,
New York: Musurgia Publishers,
24 Dicendum

1948-1950), vol. 13, p. 479.

quod utrumque offi,cium, sciUcet docendi et baptiza,ndi, Dominus

BISHOPS'

TEACHING

ROLEJ IN ECONOMICS

101

of the truth and the practical expression of it in right conduct
are the beginning of one's par:ticipation in the life of God,
which is perfected through the sacmments. This duty belongs
to .the bishops by vil1tue of their aipostolic succession, :in which
they share the apostles' representiation of Christ, for Christ
initiated the full offer of gmce by his teaching and in his
sacrifice.25 Thus, Thoma,s says of Christ:
First, he taught the truth by inviting and by calling to faith; and
in this he completed the will of the Father .... Second, he brought
the truth itself to completion by opening up in us through his
passion the door to life, and by giving the power to persevere to
the perfected truth. 26

That the bishop succeeds to Chrsit's role as teacher and
1sanctifieris also shown when Thomas writes of Pentecost:
The Holy Spirit descended upon the apostles, first in the form of
a wind, in order to indicate the propagation of grace which is accomplished in the sacraments, of which the apostles were the
ministers, and for this reason, Christ has said: Whose sins you
shall forgive, they are forgiven them .... A second time, the Spirit
was communicated to them in tongues of fire, in order to signify
the propagation of grace which is accomplished through teaching,
and for this reason, in chapter two of the Book of Acts, we read
that, having been filled with the Holy Spirit, they began to speak. 21

Especially in his commentaries on the letters of St. Paul,
Thomas emphasizes that Christ, the Son through whom we
have received the Spirit, is the source of all grace. And as the
Apostolis iniunmit, quorum vioem gerunt episcopi, aliter tamen et aliter.
Nam offeoium dooendi oommisit eia Ghristus, ut ipsi per se illud emoeroerent,
tanquam principalissimum; unde et ipsi Apostoli dixerunt, Acts 6 :2, 'Non est
aequum nos relinquere verbum Dei et ministrare men.sis' (3, q. 67, a. 2, ad 1).
25 l-2, q. 99, a. 2, c.; Summa contra gentiles 4. 74. 2; 76. 1.
26 Primo doouit veritatem, invitando,
et vocando ad fidem: et in hoc complevit voluntatem Patris. . . . Secundo consummavit ipsam veritatem,
aperiendo per passionem suam in nobis januam vitae, dando potestatem
perveniendi ad oonsummatam veritatem .•. (In Jo., 641). Latin text quoted
by M. J. Le Guillou, Ghrist and Ohuroh, trans. Charles E. Schaldenbrand
(New York: Desclee Company, 1966), p. 283, n. 59.
2r In Jo., 2739. Quoted by Le Guillou, ibid., p. 287.

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KEVIN A. MCMAHON

head, he gives of his fullness to his entire body. If, then, the
bishops have a special authority to teach, it is because in
representing the hea;d :they make present the guidance that the
Spirit offers ito ·all the Church. 28 In preaching the word and
celebrating the sacraments, which together constitute their
teaching, the bishops express the
faith that cannot
fail.
We conclude that Thomas' !reference to wise men in the
moral life is ultimately :a reference to individua;1s who possess
the gift of wisdom conferred by the Holy Spirit, indeed a special £orm of this gift, one that under the Old Law proceeded
from one's role in conducting the divine worship, and under
.the New Law proceeds .fl'lom o:ne',s full sacramental conformity
.00 Christ, the one, true :sacrifice of which the Levitical offerings were but ·a type. This rorm. of wisdom is foundational,
originative, but not entirely pel'lsonal. One can .and must distinguish betwieen those who are specially blessed with this gift
iand those who :fill the role that malres this gift possible, recognizing that the two groups will seldom overlap.
Such a distinction would be absurd if applied to wisdom in
any other sense. The one considered best able to pass on wisdom would be the one who had ·acquired the most. But the
giift of wisdom is nort :a;cquired. It comes to the Chureh as one
body joined to Christ, and Christ remains with his Church
through those consecrated as his successors. As individuals
they may not be the most wise. But they are the most certainly wise, because so long as they intend to carry out the
apostolic ministry, ·they represent infallibly the wisdom of
Christ. And they are :the most importantly wise, because by
1

28 Si vero consideretur divina providentia, quae .Ecclesiam suam Spiritu
sanoto dirigit ut non erret, sicut ipse promisit (Jn. 10 :26) quod Spiritus
ad'Veniens doceret omnem veritatem, de neoessariis scilicet ad salutem; certum
est quod iudicium .Ecolesiae universalis errare in his quae ad fidem pertinent,
impossible est ( Quodl. 9, q. 8, a. 1). Quaestiones Quodlibetales, 9th ed.,
edited by Raymnod Spiazzi, O.P. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1956), p. 194.
See also Quodl. 3, q. 4, a. 2; S.T. I, q. I, a. 8, ad 2; 2-2, q. 5, a. 3, c; q. IO,
a. 12, c.

BISHOPS'

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108

their entry into Chrsit's ministry they continue Christ's offer
of participation in his life. And to enter his life, Thomas states,
is to enter that of Wiisdom begotten. 29
The vibrancy of the Church's life depends upon those who
have been specially gifted by the Spirit. Yet at the center of
this life will be the bishops. Which is not to say that the bishop is without any personal wisdom. Since wisdom is pal't of
all sacramental grace, there can never be a complete break between peirisonal wisdom and that of his office while a bishop
remains fully a part of the Church. Still, Thomas was careful
to encoura-ge among bishops the nurturing of infused wisdom
through a life of prayer, as well as acquired wisdom through
the discipline of study. 30
The light of wisdom comes through prayer, and irt comes
through study, but both prayer and study must center on that
which summarizes the truth of revel.ation: the Incarnation,
recorded in Scripture and handed on in the Church's tradition. The understanding of the faith and of human morals in
light of faith is a corporate activity that draws upon the contributions of saints and scholars. But it is the bishops, in
union with the pope, who establish the context for this quest. 31
And as the search for understanding broadens in the realm of
morality to include all men of goodwill, it is still the epis1

a. 6, c.
so In his commentary on Titus, Thomas writes that the bishops must adhere to the "sermo fi-deli.s," "ut custodiant contra haereticos, et ideo dicit;
'et eos qui contradicunt arguere,' id est c01Wincere, et hoc per studium
sacrae Scriptu.re." In epistoiam ad Titum 1. 3, Barma ed., vol. 13, p. 648. In
the next line Thomas notes that such refutation pertailli! "ad opus sapientis,"
though he clearly means "wise" in the sense of learned. Le Guillou, referring
to a passage from In 1 Oor., 222, writes that it is the duty of a prelate to
assist his people "in developing their Christian life under the influence of the
Spirit, through a living communion in the Eucharist, and through a life of
service to their brothers. For this reason, the prelate must live a life of
contemplation, and must grow in the knowledge of the Wisdom of God, in
order that he might be an authentic mediator after the heart of God (Jer.
3: 15) ... " (op. cit., p. 289).
n Summa ocmtra ·gentiles, 4. 76; In Symbolum Apostolorum scilicet "Credo
in Deum" eropositio, a. 9; Ocmtra errores Graeoorum, pars altera, cc. 32-33. ·
20 2-2, q. 45,

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KEVIN A. MCMAHON

copacy that, in its teaching of the divine law which contains
the natural Law,32 provides the definiiitiveguidance.
Although it is possible to cite specific examples in Thomas
of moral principles, secondary precepts, :that can be clearly arrived at only in the light of revelation (one would be the indissolubility of marriruge), nothing like that is involved in the
American bishops' prustora1. The principles underlying their
letter-the responsibility of a community for its poor, for example-do not strike the typical American reader as surprising, though perhaps uncongenial. Aristotle says very much the
same thing, with regard to citizens anyway, in the passage
from the Politics we noted before. What the bishops are responsible for doing, and what in fact they do, is initiate and
guide debate on central economic issues among those who have
the prudence necess,ary to correctly apply the letter's principles
to the American situation.
However there is something more to the bishops' role.
Thomas was simply commenting on Aristotle when he wrote,
" ... man is naturally part of some group through which he receives help in living well." 83 But it was his Christianity which
added in the De Regno:
men form a group for the purpose of living well together . . . and
a good life is one lived according to virtue. . .. Yet by living according to virtue man is ordained to a higher end, namely, the end
of delight in God.... Consequently, since society must have the
same end as the individual man, it is not the ultimate end of an
assembled multitude to live according to virtue, but through a
virtuous life to attain to the enjoyment of God.H
s2 Thomas writes that all those things which belong to the natural law
are fully handed down ("plenarie traduntur") in the Law and the Gospel
1-2, q. 94, a. 4, ad 1.
sa In Ethic., I. I. Quoted by Robert J. Giguere, The Social Value of Public
Worship According to Thomistic Principles, The Catholic University of
American Philosophical Studies, vol. llO (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1950), p. 50, n. 12.
84 Ad hoc enim homines congregantur, ut simul 'bene vivant ... 'bona autem
'Vita est secundum virtutem . ••• Sed quia homo vivendo secundum virtutem
ad ulteriorem finem ordinatur, qui consistit in fruitione divina, supra iam

BISHOPS'

TEACHING ROLE IN ECONOMICS

105

More recently Rans Urs von Haltha;sar made the same point
when he wrote, " Human beings were created not rto he satisfied with themselves but that, deaid to self, they might, in
Christ's possesism, possess all things m him." 35
What the hi.shops add ,to the principles gained by reason in
their preaching of our creation in Christ ,and for Christ is an
,awareness of rthe depth of the community we are all called to
form; it is, in £act, to add everything, and it is why their vocation extends to the civil realm. For even if the concern of the
State is iOO provide for rthe material well-being of its people, this
can never be done unless they realire how deeply they are tied
to one ,another. What the bishops ,add by their sacramental
role is the ,actual strength to bring about that communion that
reason and faith perceive. In his Commentary on Colossians, Thomas indulged in a long but helpful metaphor. He
remarked:
Upon Christ depends the entire good of the body, that is, of the
Church. For there are two goods in the body: the cohesion of its
members, and its growth. And these things the Church receives
from Christ .... In the body, there is a twofold cohesion of the
members; in the first place, that which arises from contact, as the
hand is joined to the shoulder, the shoulder to the chest, and so
on. A second conjunction is that of the nerves, and for this reason,
Paul says: 'the joints and ligaments.' And so it is that the Church
draws its cohesion from faith and knowledge: 'one Spirit, one
faith, one baptism' (Eph. 4:5). But this is not sufficient unless
there is also the cohesion of charity and of the sacraments, and for
this reason, he adds: organized by the nerves, because through
charity each provides for the wants of others. 86
dia:imus, oportet eumdem finem esse multitudinis humanae, qui est hominis
unius. Non est ergo ultimus finis multitudinis congregatae vivere secundum
virtutem, sed per virtuosam vitam pervenire ad fruitionem divinam (De
Regno 2. 3). The Latin text is taken from Aquinas, Selected Political Writings, ed. A. P. D'Entreves, ed., trans. J. G. Dawson (Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1948), p. 74. It is actually the text of De regimine principum 1. 14.
85 Das Weizenkorn, p. 25. Quoted in The Von Balthasar Reader, ed. Medard
Kehl and Werner Loeser, trans. Robert J. Daly and Fred Lawrence (New
York: Crossroad, 1982), p. 57.
86 [n Ool., 129. Quoted by Le Guillou, op. cit., p. 279.

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KEVIN A. MCMAHON

What Thomas 1says: here of the Church is equa,lly true of the
State; which [s why it.he papaJCy since Leo XIII has taught repeaitedly that in the drive for social justice, justice itself is nort
enough; thait chaciity drawn rrom Christ will. alone ,succeed.81

ST Thus, Pius XI in Qua&regesimo Anno (n. 137) stated: "For justice alone,
even though most faithfully observed, can remove indeed the cause of social
strife, but can never bring about a union of hearts and minds. • . . Then
only will it be possible to unite all in harmonious striving for the common
good, when all sections of society have the intimate conviction that they are
members of a single family and children of the same Heavenly Father, and
further, that they are 'one body in Christ, and everyone members one of
another' (Rom. 12: 5), so that 'if one member suffer anything, all members
suffer with it' (1 Cor. 12:26)." Cf. John XXIII, Pacem in Terris, nn. 37-8.

CATHOLICISM, PUBLIC THEOLOGY, AND
POSTMODERNITY: ON RICHARD JOHN NEUHAUS'S
" CATHOLIC MOMENT"
DAVID L. SCHINDLER
University of Notre Dame

HAT CATHOLICS should assume .their rightful place
m the task of forming a culture, and indeed shaping a
public philosophy in and for a pluralistic, dernocrwtic
society, is ia suggestion which has not often been heard in the
history of American culture, and certainly not from. nonCatholics. It is a suggestion thrut Richard John Neuhaus, a
Lutheran pastor, nonetheless makes with eloquence and wit
in The Catholic Moment. 1 The book makes for enjoyable and
even exciting reading. It is difficult for a Catholic, even of a
non-itriumphalistic sort, nort rto be moved by his suggestion: not
to be stimulated into rserious
upon the meaning of
Catholic identity, particularly now in the pT"esent cultural
situation in America and indeed the West, which seems-note
the subtitle of Neuhaus's book-aptly described in terms of a
modernity giving way to posrtmodernity, a modernility searching for genuinely postmodern patterns of thought. Neuhaus is
insistent-and the insistence is refresb.ing-,that this reflection
be carried through with integri,ty (cf., e.g., p. 150) : the Catholicism. for which our-a postmodern-culture [.g ripe is and
must be ·a Caitholicisrn which is fiaithful to the Gospel and to
tits own tradition. This double intention of Neuhaus to speak
on behalf of a Catholicism which is in and for a postmodern
world sets .the context for .the questions I wish to pose in the
present inquiry.
The meaning of Neuhaus' s Catholic moment is twofold:
1 The Catholic Moment: The Parado11J of the Church in the Postmodern
World, by Richard John Neuhaus (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1987).
All references in the text are to this book.

107

108

DAVID L. SCHINDLER

[It] is the moment in which the Roman Catholic Church in the
world can and should be the lead church in proclaiming and exemplifying the Gospel. This can and should also be the moment in
which the Roman Catholic Church in the United States assumes
its rightful role in the culture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed public philosophy for the American experiment
in ordered liberty (p. 282) .

In .the light of this
and indeed of the overarching
context md[ca;ted by the suhbitle of his book, I wish to direct
attention in whait follows to three issues: what Neuhaus takes
to be an authentic Catholic Christianity ·and Catholic Christian rtheology (tha;t is, a Christianity which iis f.aithful in" proc1aiming and exemplifyiing the Gospel ") ; what he takes to be
the proper sense (the sense required by Ca.tholic Christianity)
of the itask of forming ·a culture and " constructing a religiously
informed public philosophy" in and for a plumlistic, democrrutic society such as that of America; and finally what he
takes to be the ·appropriate sense of this fask in a world
which he distinguishes as postmodern. Now Neuhaus develops
his response to these issues in terms of wha;t he calls a paradoxical relation between the Church and the world. My purpose in what follows, therefore, will be to e:x;amine the meaning he accords " Catholic, " public," ·and "postmodern," m
terms of this central notion of " paradox."

I.
In his discussion of the relation betwen rthe Church and the
world, Neuhaus provides a sketch of the five types proposed
by H. Richard Niebuhr (pp. 16ff.). These are: the Church
against the world, the Church of the world, the Church above
the world, the Church and the world in paradox, and the
Church as the transformer of the wor1cl. The first, "the
Church against the world," iis what is often identified as a
sectarian model, evident for ex;ample in monasticism and in
such communities ·as the Hutterites and Mennonites. The second type, " The Church of the world," can be exemplified in
nmeitrenth century l.iberial theology 00:d its promotion of a

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

109

" cultural Protesitantism," wherein " rel[gion W18iS to be placed
at the service of the besrt in the evolution of society" (p. 19).
The model which views: the- Chur'Ch ia;s a transformer of the
world "smacks of triumphalism" (p. 20), formerly of the
Right, now in the post-V,aJtioanII era more commonly of the
Left: the goal of the Church, perhaps even its exhaustive purpose, "is the estab1ishment of a Just Social Order" (p. 20).
The fourth type, that of " the Church above the world," is
exemplified in a theologian Hke Thomas Aquinas, who " aimed
at ' synthesizing ' Christ and culture, Church and world, faith
and reason, grace 1and nature" (p. 21) .
Neuhaus's reasons for rejecting-even as he sees import.ant
values in-the first three types can be put simply. While it is
the case that Christians must always in some sli_gnificantsense
be agai111St the world, they must also and at once be " for " the
world: the relationship is always one of sic et non. Again,
while the " Churich of the world" model legitimately emphasizes " the cosmic dimension of redemption " (p. 19) , the
problem is that
model all too easily removes any disson·ance between the Chmch and the world, and slides off into
" talk about ' the secular city ' in which ' man come of age '
would <lireot religion to do its duty by going out of business "
(p. 19). And the model of the Chmch '8JS transformer of the
world or culture seems finally not to be thait different from the
" Church of the world " model. Furthermore, the triansfonnational model (discussed rut length by Neuhaus in ,terms of the
project of
theology) seems "·to iassure that there is
a known direotion in which culture, or the world, should be
moving" (p. 21) .
Neuhaus is more qualified in his aissessment of the " Church
above culture " model, even as he is ,briefest in the ch&'acleriiJation of its meaning. This is because he thinks that
what he suggests is a Thomi1Stic-model, at leaist !in its stereotype, is often perceived to be antithetical to the paradoxical
model of Church-world relation which he wishes to defend.
Neuhaus .thinks that in point of fact this is not the case: that,

110

DAVID L. scmNDLER

on the contrary, the two models may be comprumble. (Indeed,
although Neuhaus never returns to the issue in the thematic
way which seems required by his argument, the entire weight
of that argument as subsequently developed implies that
there are no significantly pertinent differences between the
[Thomistic] "Church above culture" model and Neuhaus's
paradoxical model. This is a point to which I will have occasion to ·return.)
Now it should be made clear that Neuhaus recognizes that
these types are " ideal," which ·is to say that they ·are often
intermixed in the concrete historical order. It is nonetheless
legitimate to say that a given church or tradition is, on balance, " more like this type than like another type " (p. 17) .
Having offered the four above types, then, Neuhaus turns to
a description of the model he favors: the paradoxical-what
Niebuhr calls .the dualistic-model of Church-wo:rld relation.
Since the term " paradox " is in fact the linchpin term in the
argument of the book, we need to be clear about its meaning.
In the section where Neuhaus firist indicates the role that
the term " paradox " is to play in his argument, he begins. wli.th
·an appeal to Thomas Aquinrus and the work of John Courtney
Murray on behalf of a " ' public theology ' that takes the world
up on its task to he, above 1all else, reasonable " (p. 7) •
Against the romanticisms of the Right, which are on behalf of
a church aga,inst the world, and the romanticisms of the Left,
which are on behalf o[ •a church of the world, Neuhaus proposes his alternative: " we will examine a Catholicism of reason that is for the world" (p. 8). But of course "a measure
of ' againstness' and ' ofness,' so to speak, is necessary in being effectively for the world " (rp. 8) . And thus emerges a kind
of riddle that gives way not to neat resolution but to pariadox.
Now "pal'ladox" in its conventional meaning refers to " statements that violrute received opinion, or an apparent contl'laidiction that contains :an important
" (ip. 8) . In saying that
the Church's manner of being in the world is paradoxical, Neuhaus intends these meanings, but he also intends something
else.

1

1

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

111

I mean that paradox is closely related to promise. The existence
of the Church, and indeed of the world, is premised upon a promise,
and that promise has not yet been fulfilled in historical fact. The
Church is a community ahead of tmie. It is saying these things
about itself and about the world that are paradoxical because it
is speaking in present time from a point beyond present time
(p. Sf.).

The key to what Neuhaus means by paradox, then, lies in the
Church's esohatological h0irizon. The Church is a community
premised upon a pl'Omise, and s;pe,aks to and a,bout the world
" in present time from a point beyond present time." Now of
course the Church must be understood eschatologically: from
a point beyond the wOTld and its history. But what Neuhaus's
intention nonetheless commits him to-his intention, that is,
to defend " a Catholioism of reaison rthat is for the world "-is
some sense of a Church which is also in the world: which
speaks also from within the world. But it is just this sense of
a Church speaking truly from within the wodd that Neuhaus's
appeal to eschatology does not yet suffice to give us.
The difficulty to which I wish to direct attention here can
be seen by following Neuhaus further in his development of
the meaning of pwadox. Thus he ·says that, in the pa,l'ladoxica.l
model of Christian existence, " the Chris:tian lives, ias it were,
in different worlds, different realities. Nature, reason, law,
culture-all these mean one thing in relation to one reality,
and qmte .a.norther in relation to another " (p. 22) . Such a
statement seems to express a dualism which on the :liace of it
would 1ruppear to run directly counter to Neuhaus's intention.
In a book whose pmipose is to show us a Catholicism which is
both reasonable and for the world, iand which is thus able to
give us a theoJogy which can speak in and for the public order,
his paradox emphasizes the dif]eterwe between the worlds in
whfoh the Christian lives. Now to be sure any authentic
Christianity would seem to have to defend such a difference.
But the point nonetheless is that an aippeaJ. to difference aloo.e
leaves us with a dualism of worlds-of g11ace and nature and
is inadequate: that ri!s, for a Chrcisof faith and
1

112

DAVID L. SCIDNDLER

tiooity which would (also) be for the world. Apparently
recognizing such a difficulty, Neuhaus is quick to point out
1that, ·although paradox is inescapa;ble for the Christian, that
paradox should not be underistood simply in terms of a conflict between the worlds in which he or she lives:
The paradox that is inescapable is not the product of conflicts between nature and grace or between revelation and reason. Paradox
is not irrational. Paradox, rather, is the product of careful and
relentless reason; we arrive at the paradoxical situation when we
discover that the things that we think we know do not :fit together. Truths that, as rational beings, we are convinced are true
do not jibe. Between them are tensions and apparent contradictions. We cannot in intellectual conscience, we cannot in good
faith, trim the truths in order to produce a cognitive consonance
that denies the dissonance between pieces of what we think we
know.
Put differently, escapable paradox is the product of faulty reasoning. Inescapable paradox is the result of the incompleteness of
the world in which we reason. That is why it is said that paradox
is directed toward promise. It is one of the greatest obligations of
the Church to remind the world that it is incomplete, that reality
is still awaiting something (p. fl3).
On the one hand, then, Neuhaus is clear in his intention that
paradox not be understood in terms of a simple conflict of
worlds, of a simple dualism of gr.ace and nature, faith and reason: in terms of an understanding of grace and naJture as simply outside of each othea-, extrinsic to each other. On the other
hand-and this iis the critical claim I wish to introduce-if
we press Neuhaus's statements for some a.ccount of how such
a dualism is to be ·avoided, we find language which stresses
only that grace (the Church) is outside of or beyond nature
(the world) : "The Churrch is a community ahead of time";
it speaks" in presenit time from a poiint beyond present :time";
" pariadox is directed. .towarid promise " and "is the result of
the incompleteness of the world iin which we ;reason "; and so
on. My claim is not that these statements do not say something essentially true of the Church and the supernatural
order. The claim :raither iis that the statements ·suffice to give

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us only a sense in which grace (the Church) is beyond nature
(the world), is thus just so far outside of and not in nature.
To be sure, Neuhaus wa:ubs to insist that grace is in nature,
hut precisely paradoxically 1so. But that is just the problem:
his ,account of pwadox proceeds simply by way of pointing us
to the eschruton,which is to say, by way of pointing us precisely beyond nature (this world) .
The difficulty to which I ,am drawing attention here can be
shwrpened further in relation to the following statement:
The classical Christian view is that the order of creation has its
own God-given worth quite apart from the order of redemption.
Or, as Thomas Aquinas would say, while grace fulfills and transforms nature, it does not deny to nature its integrity apart from
grace (p. 57) .

I take Neuhaus to mean what he says here: namely, that the
created ,and/or natuml order ms its integrity and worth apart
from the redemptive and/or gr.aced order. Neuhaus, in other
words, conceives the relation between the two orders as extrinsic: the .two orders are understood (however tacitly) as
first constituted and complete outsti.de of each other, such that
they then relate .to each other after the manner of what comes
simply from without. But what comes simply from without
is and can only be related by way of (simple) addition, or by
way of (dialectical) opposition and reversal. My suggestion is
that it iis just these features of addition and opposition which
are primary in Neuhaus's understanding of the grace-nature
relation-however much they are left unthema.tized in his
argument. Indeed, it is these features alone which make sense
of, ,and justify, Neuhaus's notion of paradox. But the question, of coul'!se, is how this view of the grace-nature relation
might be seen to differ from that of the Oaitholic tradition.
That difference I take to 1ie in a nuance which at first glance
may seem to be trivial but is in fact of crucial importance:
namely, that on ·an ·authentically Catholic understanding, the
distinotion between the order of redemption and the order of
creation, between girace and nature, is never a separation.

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There is-de facto, not de jure--one in<liv1isible cosmic order
even as narture is
wherein grace and nature are really
ordered f1mn the beginning, and hence oriented radically from
within, to God as revealed in Jesus Christ through his Chureh
in the Holy Spirit. Indeed, I take this to be the very point of
the Tetrieval undertaken in this century by Catholic theologians such 1as Henri de Luibac, Hans Urs v10n Balrthasar and
others: to overcome the eXJtrinsicismchamcteristic of much of
modern (e.g., post-Tridentine) Catholic theology, and to do so
in terms of a recove1ry of the more orgianic perspective of the
prutristic (or indeed pre-modern) period. Their insistence has
been Hmt this organic pe11speotive,1wherein the order of creattion 1and the o.l'der of redemption, and nature and grace, are
seen in a unity which is simultaneous with their distinctness,
is in fact the deepest and truest interpretation of classical
Christianity and of Thomism. 2
To he sure there is much tha,t needs to be 1argued here. What
I nonetheless wish to insist upon in the present essay-it is the
fundamental presupposition of my c11irticism of Neuhaus'-is
that this orgianic perspeotivce is nort simply a ma.tter of one
"school" of Caitholic theology over another. On the cont.Dary,
it is-I .take it to be-rather an integral parl of the received
tlJ.'aiditionof Oaithnlic Chris.tianity. 3
1

2 Cf. inter alia: Henri de Lubac, The Mystery of the ffopernatural
(New
York: Herder and Herder, 1967); idem, Augustinianism and Modern Theology (New York: Herder and Herder, 1969); idem, A Brief Oaechesis on
Nature and Gt·aae (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1984); Hans Urs von
Balthasar, "The Concept of Nature in Catholic Theology," in The Theology
of Karl Barth (New York: Doubleday/ Anchor Books), pp. 202-227; idem,
"The Achievement of Henri de Lubac," Thought, vol. 51 (March, 1976), esp.
pp. 24-29.
a Cf. inter aUa the references in my "Catholicity and the State of Contemporary Thoology," in Oommunio, vol. 14 (Winter, 1987), 432, n. 7; the
discussion by de Lubac of various contemporary Catholic theologians in
A Brief Oateohesis, pp. 33-53; and the statements by Pope John Paul II
referred to inn. 26 below.
It is of course the Christocentric character of the created world and of
man which sets the context in which the problem of grace must be considered.

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115

It bears emphaisis: affirmation of 1a unified cosmic order does
nort entail a denial of the distinctness between gI'ace and nature; irt simply entails 1a di.fferent w.ay of conceiving such mstinctness. Which is to say further that this affirmation does
not entail a denial of the utterly l'ladical transcendence of the
order of grace ;to naiture-again, even '8.iS. it forces a different
way of undeES!t.anding.that :trian:scendence. Indeed, this is juSlt
the problem with Neuhaus's argument. In his (rightful) concern ;to defend the :transcendence of ·the order of grace (and
hence the distinction between grace ·and nature), he seems to
essume :that there is only one way finally to conceive such
rtr:anscendence (and distinction); .and that way is the way of
a kind of Reformation or indeed dialectical or " crisis theology" (cf. especially m this connection his :references to Krurl
Booth •and Emil Brunner and, to a lesser e:xtent, Reinhold
Nwbuhr [p. 189]; or again, to· Kierkegiaiard ·and Bo:nhoeffer
[p. 106]).
In this connection, see St. John 1:1-2, 12-32; 17:21-23; and St. Pa.ul: I Cor.
8:6; Eph.1:9-10, 21-23; Col.1:15-20; 3:4.
Finally, see the summary statement in the Encyclopedia of Theology: The
Concise Sacramentum Mundi, edited by Karl Rahner (New York: Seabury
Press, 1975) :
The nature of man cannot be given a definitive end and goal except in
the vision of God. But it is not itself ordained towards that vision. It
is only grace which begins the divinization of man and ordains him
effectively to immediate union with God. Thus all dualism between
nature and grace is eliminated. Man does not exist except as intrinsically
ordained by grace to the vision of God as his end, which is the only
absolutely final end of that very nature. There are not and cannot be
in man two definitive finalties merely juxtaposed to one another. The
notion of the nature of man as capable of attaining its definitive fulfilment by its proper dynamism is radically excluded. On the other hand,
the transcendence of grace remains intact. The created spirituality of
man does not necessarily imply ordination to the vision of God, since
of itself it cannot give itself an absolute end ( p. 1035, col. 2).
If I may put the matter in summary form, what the Catholic tradition
(despite the differences among its "schools of theology": cf. the work of
Hans Urs von Balthasar on the one hand and of Karl Rahner on the other)
sees it as necessary to avoid is at once (a) a collapse of nature into grace,
which would result in pantheism; and (b) a dualism of grace and nature,
which would result in a secularization of nature-secularization
in its most
profound sense.

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Irt is just this assumption that seems to me to warmDJt challenge-precisely in the DJame of Catholic Christiianity. On this
latter understanding of Chmstianity, the ol'der of grace is never
col1apsed into the order of naiture, even as the Te1ation beitween
these ol'ders is
(de faoto) diirect (grace establishes
from the beginning an ontologioal orienta.tion in nature), that
is, rather than extrinsic or dialectical Oil' inverse in the way
indicated in " crisis theology " and in N euhaus's undersrbanding of pamdox. 4 By diroot here I do not mean intrinsic in the
1sense involved .ID a de jure re1rution, which would imply that
God wrus not absolutely free in his decision to share his nruture
with all of creation in and through Jesus Christ and his
Church. I mean l'lruther that, having decided freely so to share
his nature, that nature truly penetrates, becomes immanent
within or interior to, creation, truly ol'del'S creation from
within.
Again, these claims require much more development and
argument than can be given here. It will have to suffice simply to oa11 attention to .their significance re1ative to N euhaus's
pariadoxical model of the Church-world relation. That significance can be seen by returning to the statement quoted
above, wherein Neuhaus (rightly) says that Aquinas's view
is that "grace fulfills and transforms nature" (p. 57). What
we should now be able to see, however, in the light of the sug4 It should be pointed out that the term "paradox" has a long history in
Catholicism, and thus should not be associafod only with "crisis theology."
It is in fact a prominent term in the works of de Lubac. What a study of the
term in Catholic works-for example in the work of de Lubac-would reveal
is nonetheless a rather different sense of paradox from that of "crisis theology." In the Catholic tradition represented by de Lubac, paradox is founded
first on a direct rather than "additive" and/or inverse relation between the
distinct terms of relation. Thus, for example, the transcendence and immanence of God are directly and not inversely related: God is not the more
transcendent of nature the less he is immanent in nature; God is not
transcendent of nature by way of dialectical opposition to nature. On the
contrary, God's unspeakably great transcendence of nature is exactly coincident with God's utterly profound immanence in nature. (As the saints constantly remind us, God is more interior to me than I
to myself.)

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117

gestion I have introduced, is the ambiguity carried in the
term " fulfills." This term can mean a completion which is
by way of simple addition: that is, after the manner of what
comes simply from without and which remains external; or
which is-more " paradoxically "-by way of (dialectical)
reversal, which itself presupposes the externality (and thus
closure) which makes possible the opposition signified by reversal. But this (external) meaning-either of simple addition or of opposition-is ruled out when and insofar as one
truly recognizes the link between "fulfill" and "transform":
what this latter term requires is that what is distinct truly
penetrate the other (that into which it enters into rel'ation) by
ordering that other from within. This ordering from within
does not do violence to, but, on the contrary, exactly brings
nruture to its perfection (perfacio: brings all the way through) .
In a word, grace does not reverse or destroy or merely add to
nature: on the contrary grace precisely trians-forms nature-again, even as it always and essentially transcends naiture.5
In this connection, then, my suggestion is simply this: that
Neuhaus's paradoxical model of the Church-world relrution
entails exactly the understanding of grace as either extrinsic
to or reverser of nature--or indeed of .grace as both extrinsic
to and reverser of (dialectically opposed to) nature-which
is ruled out by the understanding of grace as properly transformative of nruture. Or rather: did Neuhaus not so understand the grace-nature relation (however unconsciously) in
this extrinsicist and/or dialectical manner, he would have to
be open in principle to the Church of the world and Church as
transformer of the world models. And he would have to be
open to the Church above the world model, now interpreted
'as requiring transformation and thus-in this sense--rus more
5 That is, the supernatural
truly assimilates and transforms na.ture, even
as the supernatural does not merely prolong the momentum of nature: the
infinite does not merely prolong the finite. On this, cf. de Lubac, A Brief
Oateohesis, pp. 48 fl:'. and 81 fl:'. The centrality of the term "transformation"
in the Catholic understanding of the relation of the superna.tural to na.ture
is discussed at length by de Lubac on pp. 81-99.

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

like the cosmic and transfocmational models rthan like his
paradoxical model.
In sum, then: on the more
understanding
of the grace-nature relation 1suggesrted here, Catholic Christianity has an intrinsically cosmic dimension. Grace establishes
an ontological odentation in the cosmos: orders every entity
from within to God in Christ. 1t follows that Catholic Christianity haJS an intrinsic mission truly to enter into, to penetmte, all of human being and activity and hence all of cul.ture: to help carry through this ordering of all of being to God
in Christ. The Catholic Churrch, as a matter of its own inner
essence, must in this way be of the world and a transformer
of the world, that is, even (precisely) as it is-and must remain-above (transcendent of) the world.
Two additional comments will illuminaite fur.ther the direction of my criticism of Neuhaus here. First, in his description
of the models of the Church of the world and transformer of
the world, Neuhaus acknowledges something to ·be true of
each model: to w.it, the cosmic dimension of Chri.stianity, and
the need for Christianity :to form 1a cu1ture. But note how he
nonetheless argues with respect to the models: bevause a
Christianity which takes its cosmic dimension seriously van
s1ide off into K ulturprotestantismus or some version of the
"secular city" (and hrus ofrten done so), and bevause a tm.nsfo!raillationalChriSltianilitycan become (and has often done so)
1a triumphalism (formerly of the Right, now more commonly
of the Left) which identifies the Ohuroh too closely with a
culture or specific cultu11aJ projects .and institutions, we should
therefore set the "of-1the-world" and tl'lansformational models
of Chl'listianity aside, in favor of a. pamdoxical model. This
•sort of argument is .at once question-begging and indeed a kind
of (political-culturrial) " oorusequentialism." The fact that a
cosmic Christianity can be-and often has been-interpreted
to justify the " secuJ.ar city " does not mean that Christianity
fOO' all that does not still carry an intrinsically cosmic dimension. The fact that a rt11aooformationa1isrtChristianity has

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

119

·sometimes identified Christ's purpose too closely with this prur·ticu1ar culture or cultural project does not mean that Christ
is not truly and in a fundamental ·sense the finaliity or end of
ia11 human-cu1tur.aJ1activities.
What I wish to lSuggest here, then, is that anyone who, like
Neuhaus, would set ·wside .the cosmic and tr.ansformarbionial
model·s of Christianity, must .give a properly theological account of the issues raised dn and by .those models: must give
an account of the cosmic dimension of Christianity, of the
finality of Cfil-ist, in terms of wh3Jt these imply intrinsically,
the Christian's relaas a matter of theological principle,
tion to the world. That such models have m fact been aissociated :with £alse notions of secularity and libeTlationdoes no.t
mean that the models do not
CaJ111'Y an essentiia;land indeed
crucial theological truth. It may in £act well be the oase---and
indeed .thds is what I mean to suggest--that, when that essential .theological truth is properly gmsped, these models themselves will be seen to entail a challenge of certain prevalent
versions of the " isoou1rur c:iity " and of liberation theology.
But be that ·as it may, .the point in any ca:se is ·that Neuhaus'1s (political-cultural) oonsequentia1ist argument for rejecting the cosmic and tr.ansformationialist models of Christianity does not yet suffice for a. properly thelogical argument-that is, of the •sort required by his own intention to defend Catholic theology in its .integrity, as faithful to the Gospel
and to its own tradition. Indeed, it is only slightly too cynical
to say that the warr.ants for Neuhaus's argument in its present
a noo-conserviative politiform rest in a fundamental way
cal-cultural agenda: the pamdoxioal model is embroced (and
the cosmic and trans£ormartional models ·are rejected) ·because
the par:adoxical model serves better to justify the neo-conservative reading of the particular political-cultural project
called the American experiment. I do not say that Neuhaus
finally intends this priority of political-cultural warrants. I
do say that his argument fiai1s to show in properly theological
terms that the Church's :trlanscendenceof the world, which he

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

rightly sees 1a;s essential to Christianity 1and which to be sure iis
affirmed in his pariadorical model, might not and for all that
be affirmed also, and indeed in ·a more Catholic-and cathin the cosmic 1and traD!sformational models.
Secondly, and more briefly, then: as we have seen, Neuhaus
offers John Courtney Murray as a representative of "a tradition of ' public theology ' that takes the world up on its claim
to be, above all else, reasonable " (p. 8) , of a tradition which
takes the mission of Roman Catholicism " not to be a refuge
from the world nor a crusade against the world, but a wisdom
for the world " (Ibid.) . And he does this in the context of appealing to Mul"l.'lay's work thmughout his book as a kind of
paradigm of his own vtision. But then, curiously, in the final
pages of his book, Neuhaus :refers approvingly to Murray's
" ' transformationalist ' vision of .an authentic Roman Catholicism" (p. 280). The sense in which this reference is curious
seems to me evident in filght of the foregoing: if Murray's
vision is in fact accurately described as " transformaitionalist "
-and I think at least in some significant sense it is-there
tis just so far r:aised, now from within Neuhaus's own argument, the question of whether that vision, which Neuhaus
identifies as that of the Church above the world model, might
not involve essential elements of the cosmic and t:mnsformational models of Christianity: might just so far be more 1ike
these latter than it is like Neuhaus's paradoxical model.
Which is to say, there is raised once again the properly theological question of the grace-nature relation, now relative at
once fo Murray's work and to the cosmic and transformational
models of Christiantity. This question nonetheless gets left unengaged--iin 1an explicit and thematic way-by Neuhaus.
1

II.
Analogous to the difficulty described here in terms of the
content of theology as understood by Neuhaus is a difficulty
with the form of theology as he proposes it, that is, as appropriiate foir Catholicism in a postmodern age. This form Neu-

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haus calls "positliberal," as distinct from the "preHberal"
and " liberal " forms or models of theology. Largely following
George Lindbeck's The Nature of Doctrine, 6 Neuhaus char·aoterizes these three models respectively ws "cultural-linguistic," "cognitive-propositional," and "experiential-expressive," and describes them briefly rus follows:
Preliberals assume that doctrines are propositions that express
revealed and therefore unchanging truths. Liberals assume that
doctrines are symbolic expressions of universal and unchanging
religious experiences. Postliberals incline to the view that doctrines
are essentially "rules" reflecting the "grammar" of specific religious
traditions (p. 151).
Postliberalism, then, adopts a " rule-theory " approach to
doctrine: doctrines are unders.tood as church tooching, and
their purpose in this context" is .to set the range within which
theology goes about its busines1s of propositional statements
and symbolizing activities" (p. 151). What Neuhaus means
is that doctrinal statements have their propeT meaning and
truth within ·a given oommunal grammar, within the limits set
by the" rules" of a given linguistic community. In the interpretation of these doctrines, then, "the regulating accountability i1s to the community and its tradition " (p. 153) . In sum,
the emphasis in Neuhaus's postliberal approach to theology is
upon the "verbum externum ": theology begins from within
.the "externals" of a language, .a community, an authority, a
rtmadition which is 1alw:ays the anterior presuppo·sition of our
inner experience .and internal word. Above all, in agreement
with " one of it.he great mtellectual shifts of our time " (p.
153) , po•stliberal theology reoogn[zes " that significant diiscourse is shaped by community and tl'ladition" (p. 154).
Perhaps what is most imporla:nt .about a post1iiberal aipproach to theology, then, is its emphasis upon the " parrticu1ar":
e The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a PoatUberal ..!ge
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).

DAVID L. SCHINDLER

Talk about theology as a cultural-linguistic enterprise accents
limitation. It reminds us that this Christian way of speaking and
thinking and acting is one way among others. Gone are the heady
universalizing :flights in which we thought the Church encompassed
everything and encompassed it now (p. 158) .

The postlibe:r:alapproach recognizes " that the seM"Ch for the
' universal ' p1ace to -stand---0.n Archimedean point to which
particu1arisms can be brought to judgment-is elus1ive and
finally illusionary" (p. 154).
Now an obvious question which emerges in connection with
this postliberal emphaisis upon the
rehabilitation of community and triaclition :as essential for the integrity
of Christian (Catholic) theology-is whether it does not force
a collapse into relativism and fideism. Raving denied that
there ,j,g ,any " Archimedean point " to which " parlicularisms
can be brought .to judgment," the question then is whether
there remains any ,significant sense in which we can nonetheless still judge normatively between pail'lticulartmditions. Are
the doctrinal truths 1affinned in a given-e.g., Catholic Christian-.religiious tradition exhamstively a function of its peculiair
communal giiammar, such that these truths make no claim
upon those who operate from wi1thin a different grammar, a
different linguistic community? Is there no 1sense in which
there is, as it were, a " trans-communal " grammar: no sense
for e:x:ample in which Crutholic Chri:srbian speech is or can be
catholic, can make a claim to truth which is universal in its
reach?
It is impoTitanitrto norte tbhrut Neuhaus is aware of these questions and is explicit in his intention to avoid what I have
called relativism and fideism. Thus he says approvingly:
1

With Karl Barth, among others, Joseph Ratzinger insists that the
Christian Gospel is not one symbolic ·expression among others of
the universal phenomenon of religion, but is the controlling statement of truth by which all reality, including the phenomenon of
religion, is rightly understood (p. 158) .

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THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

Again, Neuhaus insists that postliberal " particularism " does
not mean " that we have license to assert any truth claims
whatsoever, no matter how ·arbitrary, in complete :freedom
foom reasolliWblediscourse" (p. 154). The question, then, is
not whether Neuhaus intends to
relativism and fl.deism,
but mther whether his appeal to paradox ias a way of meeting
this irutention is successful-that is, re1'ative to his concern to
offer us a form of theology which is authentically Catholic.
A good summary indication of how Neuhaus undeTstands
pal"adox to establish the form o;f Cluistian theology a.s normative can, I believe, be found in the following:
The Christian vision is now challenged and contested by other
visions. These other visions are not, as traditionalists [preliberals]
would have it, simply false. Nor are they, as liberals would have,
simply different versions of the same vision. They ail'e different
ways of knowing, short of that time in which we will know even
as we are known. We have decided for the Christian way of knowing, because we believe that 'God has made a decision.' Children
of the City of God, we are "alien citizens" of the City of Man (p.
158).
Our specifically Christian way of knowing and being in the world
stands in a relationship of paradox to other ways of knowing and
being in the world in which we also participate (ibid.).

The key features of this statement rare its emphasis on
eschrutoLogy (" that time in wbicih we will know even as we
are known"), decision, and belief. Neuhaus's point, in other
words, is not that the Chrisman vision is not true-and ibhus
oormrutive--reLatiive to other visions. His point !"ather is that
that truth-and normativity-is paradoxical, and this means
that .it can be seen and aidequartelystated only by pointing to
the eschaton; by emb:vacing the vision ·as ia matter of beLief
and decision; by believing thrut "'God hias made a decision',''
whose truth will properly be known 1amd comprehended by us
only in the End Time.
Now of ooul'se ithe Christian vision is a matter of decision
and belief, and iis essentially ordered to the escha.ton in terms
1

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

of the fulness of its truth. But saying this leaves precisely unanswered the sense in which that vision is also a matter of
knowledge and intelligence, here and now, in and for this
cosmos: that is, relartive to competing-non-Christian-visions.
To say that the Christian vision is true, but th111t its truth is
a function of belief, decision, and eschatology, is precisely not
yet to show how that " itruth " is other than of a :6.deistic or
voluntaristic sort: not yet to sihow how ·that vision iis not simply ra function of, and in this sense simply relative to, one's
historically situated linguistic community and triarlition.
The difficulty to which I wish to draw attention here, then,
is analogous to that sketched earlier, to wit: just as Neuhaus's
paradoxioa.l understanding of the grace-nature distinction entailed an " ertrinsicist " understanding of grace in relation to
nature, so now can his pariadoxical Oil' postliberal understanding of the faith-reason distinction be seen to involve an "extrinsici:st" understanding of rthe relation of faith to reason.
Or, to put it another way, just as the content of Neuhaus's
understanding of
theology entailed a "supernaturalistic"
grace (the transcendence of the wder of grace is a trianscendence first .by way of exterrnality •and hence of simple addition
and reversal), so now can the form of Neuhaus's theology be
seen to involve a :6.deistic,hence just so far relativistic, understanding of faith. Of oou11se the meaning of these assertions
must be clarified in reLaitionto the Catholic :tradition, and here
once agaiin I musrt be oonitent with trying to record a central
principle of that tradition.
That principle has already been :indica.ted. On the more
organic un<leristanding of rthe grace-nature relation (which I
take to be) affirmed in the Catholic tradition, grace can be
said, as it were, to " contain " nature: thrut is, in the sense
th3it griace truly penewaites naiture (because nature is " inside "
grace) even as the order of g11ace utterly tmnscends the order
of nature. 1 What thls means is that nature-and hence rea1 Cf. the constant teaching of the tradition according to which God is said
to "contain" the world: for example, Athanasius, De Incamati<me, nos. 8

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

IU

son-has only one end or :finality, and that end or :finality is
God. Not some v1ague, geneMl, or deistic notion of God, but
precisely the God revealed in Jesus Chriist through his Church
in the Holy Spirit: the God of griace.
The point in the present conte:rt, then, is rthat the order of
grace and of faith, even ias it transcends the order of nwture
and reason, oarri.es within it 'a meaning for nature and reason
which is diroot: that is, and not a meaning ·which is first by
way of simple 1addition or indeed reversal. Another way of
putting the ma;tter is tha;t the order of faith intends precisely
an onto-logic: claims to carry from \Wthin itself the final meaning and truth of all of being. Indeed, it ·is just this ontological
which provides the deepest warrant for the
intention of
traditional Catholic concern for what is called " propositional
truth." However badly rthis concern is formulated in what
Neuhaus calls the "cognitive-propo·sitionalism" of preliberal
theology, .that concern seems nonetheless to he one which the
Catholic cannot relinquish. The Catholic claim to speak-directly-.the truth ·about being, rubout the being of man and of
the cosmos, is inextrioobly linked with the Catholic understand of the grace-nature relaton.
The Catholic position I wish to defend here can be further
illuminated by the following statements by Joseph Rwtzinger
and John Courtney Murray, theologians whose woirk plays a
large role in Neuhaus's
The doctrine of the Trinity "passes over into a statement about
existence." 8
The dominant line in St. John's Gospel can properly be termed a
"theology of being as relation and of relation as a mode of unity." 9
Theology concerns "the truth of our very being itself." 10
and 17; Augustine, Confessions, Bk I, chs. 2-3; Thomas Aquinas, 8.T. I,
8, 1 ad 2. Cf. also in this connection the statement by Hans Urs von Baltha.sar
cited in n. 23 below.
s Joseph Ratzinger, Introduction to Christianity (New York: Seabury
Press, 1969), p. 135.
s Ibid.
10 Ratzinger, "The Church and the Theologian," Origms, 15 :47 (May 8,
1986), p. 765.

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

Paul and John were "interested in the fundamental truth of our
being." 11
"Faith does not eliminate the law of analogy." 12
The Nicene definition (i.e., the homoousion) "formally established
the statute of the ontological mentality within the Church." 18

To he sure in today's theological climate, and indeed against
the backdrop of the postlibe:ml approach to theology as outlined by Neuhruus (following Lindbeck) , the meaning and in14 What
ternbion of such statements !is hrurdly U1100ntrnversial.
I nonetheless venture ;to suggest, while recognizing the need
for further argument which cannot be met here, that, however one interprets the statements, interpretation must include
recognition of the following: that, for the Catholic tradition,
as reflected here in R.atzinger and Murray, Christian faith
carries within it a meaning and reference which is intrinsically
and fundamentally ontological. What Christian doctrines are,
u Ibid., p. 766.
12 Ibid. For further
references to and discussion of Ratzinger's thought
pertinent to the present context, see my "Is .America Bourgeois?," Oomm'Wnlio,
vol. 14 (Fall, 1987), 267-271; and "Once .Again: George Weigel, Catholicism,
and .American Culture," Oommunio, vol. 15 (8pring, 1988), 111-118, esp.
116-118.
13 John Courtney Murray, The Problem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), p. 51, (and cf. further the whole of ch. 2). In connection
with Murray, cf. also my "Once .Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and
.American Culture," p. 119.
14 The theological climate to which I refer is that set, more generally and
radically, by "decon.structionism";
and, more i=ediately, by the "antifoundationalism" in theology represented, for example, by George Lindbeck
and (on the Caitholic side) David Burrell. On "deconstructionism," cf. Reiner
Shiirmann, Heidegger on Being and Aoting: From Principles to Anarchy
(Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987) ; Deconstruction in Oonte1JJt,
ed. by Mark C. Taylor (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1986); and
After Philosophy: End or Transformation?, ed. by K. Baynes, J. Bohman,
and T. McCarthy (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1987); Richard Rorty, Philosophy
and the Mirror of Nature (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1979).
For Lindbeck, see The Nature of Doctrine. For Burrell, see his "Religious
Belief and Rationality," in Rationality and Religious Belief, ed. by C. F.
Delaney (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979), pp.
84-115, and his interpretation of .Aquinas in Aquinas: God and Action (Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

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127

in and of their essence, is precisely articulations or unfoldings
of the onto-logic of faith. They intended to reveal, directly,
something true about being, first and above all about the being
of God, and then in turn, and in the light of God as revealed
in Christ and his Church by the Holy Spirit, about the being
of man and the entire cosmos.
Ii, then, we return to Neuhau_s's (rightful) c1ruim that
Ratzinger sees thrut " the Christian Gospel ... the oontriol1ing
statemenrt by which all reality . . . is rightly unde.l'stood" (p.
158) , we should now be ;aJble to see the difference between
Raitzinger',s understanding of that claim and Neuhaus's. For
Ratzinger, the Christian Gospel carries the meaning of all
reality directly, that is, rather than fir.st merely e:xitrinsically
and/or by way of rever;sal, ;as is indicated in Neuhaus's understanding of paradox. To he sure 1the gmsping of that meaning
entails belief and decision. To be sure that meaning comes to
us through a " paooicular " 15 linguistic community (,indeed
thart iis ra.lready!implied in ;an understanding of ia God who has
become incairnate in the " parrbicular " person Jesus Christ) .
To be sure, that meaning is transcendent, in the sense that it
essenmally requires an eschatotogical horizon £or its fullness
and final oomprehension. But the point is that, for the Cath15 The conventional sense today of the term "particular" seems to me problematic: the sense, that is, wherein "particular" is understood in (what I
take to be) a nominalistic fashion as excluding relation to the universal, or
making that relation merely extrinsic. It is just such a nominalistic understanding of "particular" that leads Neuhaus (however unwittingly) always
to slide the meaning of "particular" off into "particularistic":
that is,
such that any universal claim made (or mediated) by such a "particular"
(person, community) can only be made paradoxically (in Neuhaus's sense)
and not directly.
In connection with the various theloogical-ontological issues raised here,
cf. the following: Kenneth L. Schmitz, "Neither With Nor Without Foundations," Review of Metaphysics, vol. 42 (September, 1988) 3-25; idem, "Community: The Elusive Unity," Review of Metaphysics, vol, 37 (December,
1983), pp. 243-265; my "David Bohm on Contemporary Physics and the
Overcoming of Fragmentation," International Philosophical Quarterly, vol.
22 (December, 1982), pp. 315-327; and my "Catholicity and the State of
Contemporary Theology."

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DAVID L. SCH.INDLER

of Rrutzinger, the reolic :tradition, .as reflected in the
lation indicated hexe between belief and decision and reason,
between the "particular " lingwistic community and the universal meaning, between a tr.ansoendent meaning (a meaning
which goes beyond .the cosmos) and .an immanent meaning (a
meaning which is in and for the cosmos) , is direct, and lit is
this directness of rel1rution which !is given expression in, and
iindeed &ally justifies, the intrinsically ontological meaning
and reference of ,faith as undersrboodin the Catholic tradition;
even as it is an extrinsic 1and/or dialootical rel.ation which is
ill, and indeed .alone finally justifies, the
given
denial o[ ian intrinsically ontological meaning and reference of
faith as understood 1m N
postliberiaJ. aipproach to
theology.

III.
Having considered Neuhaus's par.adoxical-postliberal theology on its own terms, then, we turn now to what happens when
that theology, as it were, goes public.
As we have seen, Neuhaus's fundamental concern is that the
Roman Caitholic Church 1should now assume its rightful role
"in rtihe culiture-forming task of constructing a religiously informed pub1ic philosophy" (p. 283). As we approach the
meaning of this strutement, we recall that Neuhaus (rightly)
insisrts upon 1a Ch:riis1tianitywmch is trianscendent: so that it
can ·always stand in judgment of a given society and its structures (" we have not here a liasting city ") . But he is fearful
of 1tmnsformation, of ;a Ohristiianity which seeks to transform
society 1Mlid its ·struCJtures: beoauise such ·a
·always
threatens to hecome " immanentfaed," 1rubsorbed into an earthly society, and thereby ibo lose its power to judge (rund indeed
to :Liberate in the deepest sense) . And :thus he is led to hls
understanding of 1a Christianity rus pa:riadoxicallyrelated to rociety. Our task here will be to consider how Neuihaus's paradox shapes the meaning of the ierucial terms which describe
the task to which Neuhaus :takes Oatholiies to be called in a
special way today: to wit, that of formirng a culture, by way
1

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

H9

of constructing a religiiously informed puhliic philosophy. Specifically, my concern is wmth N euhaius's paradoxical meaning of
" forming " .and " religiously informed," ill rterms of the consequences of that meaning for how we ;are to understand
"public."
Drawing on what we have already said, we can be brief. Put
simply, on Neuhaus' s unde11sit;andingof paradox, " fo!l'mi.ng"
and " informing " can only be indirect, external, or by way of
dialectical reversal: which is to say, can never be direct, interna1, or by wiay of ordering or bringing to fulfillment from
within. Agiaiin, the issue is thrut O!f rthe grace-nature relation:
on Neuhaus's paradoxical unders;baniding, grace is (however
tacitly) understood "supematumliisrtically " :and faith is consequently underrstood ":fideis.tioally." Or, iagain, f1allith is understood "particu1arisrticially." The result, pertinent rbo the present context, is rbhrut the meaning of failith is thereby precisely
privatized.
Bwt note then what this iimplies: if Christian faith is, ias it
were, to go public, it must do so now :precisely in the name of
a reason from which Christian faith has already and just so
far been removied. And indeed this is exactly what I .take to
be the meaning entailed (however unwiittingly) when Neuhaus insisrbs on a " duai1istic" relation of the Christian to society .16 When the Chcis:tian speaks in 1and for the public order,
is Cf., for example, The <Jatholic Moment, pp. 193-195, 253, 255. In opting
for dualism, Neuhaus insists nonetheless that the relation of religion and
politics is one of distinction and not of separation ( p. 254). The question I
am pressing therefore once again is one which bears, not on Neuhaus's
intention, but on his execution. Neuhaus sees monism and dualism as exhaustive alternatives (p. 254), and construes these alternatives in terms of a
relation between the "now" (this world) and the "not yet" (the eschaton)
(pp. 193£.). Monism (of Right or Left) collapses (in different directions) the "not yet" into the "now," while the dualist lives in and with
the tension between the "now" and the "not yet": lives as an "alien citizen"
in this world. Now I agree that any authentic Christianity must insist that
we live this tension. The problem is that Neuhaus thinks that the only way
truly to aecept the tension is in terms of his paradox-it is the only alternative he offers us. But the difficulty with paradox as Neuhaus understands it-if what I have argued above is accurate-is that it gives us exactly no sense

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

he or she mwsrt do so in the name of a reason to which faith iis
extrinsic, a reaison which is thus "outside" of fraith and which
is thereby common to, like that of, those persons who do not
share one's faith. To put the matter in iibs most radfr:ial terms,
Neuhruus's pariadoxical understanding (of grace-nature and
fa.ith-reaison) entails 'a priv,rutizingof :liaith which is s[mulrtaneous with a "
" of naiture 1and a " rationalizing " of
reason. Tha;t is, Christmanity ,can_ go public, can speak in and
for rthe public orider, but only in the name of ,a nature just
so far unpene:tmted by grace 1and a reruson just so far unaffocted (internally) by fraiibh.11
of being really in the "now," that is, in a way which is truly simultaneous
with being open to the "not yet." The worlds of grace ,and nature have only
an external relation, even if the dialectical character of that relation suggests that it is a dynamic one. If and insofar as this is true, Neuhaus's
paradox in fact gives us, not genuine tension-which would require a unity
,simultaneous with distinction-but only and exactly fragmentation: a faith
which is fl.deistic (simply of ,the world beyond) joined to a politics which is
secularized (simply of this world). Eor a contrasting view of the relation
of faith :and culture, see Henri de Lubac, A Brief Oateckesis, pp. 92-3.
11 Cf. in this connection Neuhaus's
essay, "From Providence to Privacy:
Religion and the Redefinition of America," where he makes the statement
that the Catholic tradition "has . . . consistently asserted that there is no
truth pertinent to human gorvernance that is not accessible to human reason.
That is among the reasons why I believe that this should be ..• 'the Catholic
moment' in the history of culture-forming religion in America" (in Unsecular
America, ed. by Richard John Neuhaus [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans
Publishing Co., 1986], p. 65). There is to be sure much truth in this statement; but it nonetheless harbors an ambiguity which is crucial relative to
his proposal and in the face of the Catholic tradition as understood in the
present essay. It should be evident from what we have already said that, on
Neuhaus's notion of paradox-of a paradoxical relation between grace and
nature-this statement can only mean that there is a separation of truths:
those proper (simply) to faith on the one hand and those proper (simply) to
reason on the other, the relation between such truths thereby being external
(by way of simple addition or dialectical reversal). But the question raised
by the present argument, in its insistence-in the name of Catholicism-on
a direct and internal relation of grace to nature, is precisely that of whether
the truths of reason can be so separated or detached from the truths of
faith. To be sure Catholicism (as I have defended it) affirms a distinction
between the two orders. But the point is that "disinction" (which presupposes a unity which is anterior) and "separation" (which does not) just so

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131

The upshot 0£ which, then, is that the Christian can never
speak in and for the public order qua Christian. To be sure,
Neuhaus would counter that the Christian can indeed speak
qua Christian, but only in a way .that is paradoxical. But
that is just the
the paradoxical way is eXjactly the way
which pcrecludes the rsort of direct relation 0£ the Christian to
society 1that the terms " form " rand " rinform " properly suggest. Or better, the paradoXjica.l way of a Christian's being in
society exactly rules out the direct or transformational way 0£
being in society which indeed is carried in the term " in " ·as
understood in the Oa.tholic tr:adition-<that is, in terms of how
it sees grace ras in nature. In sum, what there is not, and can
never he, on Neuhaus's pamdoxical understanding, is a Catholicism whi!ch can rea.lly and truly form a culture and inform
(directly enter into) a philosophy which would be publirc.18
far give rise to diffNent senses of the "autonomy" of the natural-rational
order.
Developing the nature and implications of this difference is of course a
profoundly difficult task, well beyond our purview here. My concern is only
to point out once again that the meaning of statements such as that by
Ne1ihaus recorded above is inextricably linked with an understanding of
the grace-nature relation. And indeed Neuhaus himself links his understanding of the autonomy of the political order, his appeal to natural law, with
his understanding of the grace-nature relation: see, for example, The Catholic
Moment, p. 216, where he links that appeal to the claim that "grace does
not destroy but crowns nature." But the point is that he seems unaware of
the crucial ambiguity in the term "crowns," an ambiguity which is just that
discussed above relative to the term "fulfills."
18 In an earlier work in connection with the use of the term "public,"with the idea of thevlogy as a "public" enterprise-Neuhaus
acknowledges
an indebtedness to the work of David Tracy and Wolfhart Pannenberg (cf.
Neuhaus's The Naked Publia Square [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1984], p. 265, n. 6). In the present work Neuhaus then goes on
to defend the public character of theology in terms of "paradox," and in
the course of so doing, he appeals for support to an array of theologians
including Luther, Barth, Brunner, Lindbeck, Aquinas, Murray, Pope John
Paul II, and Cardinal Ratzinger (among others) : that is, in the context of
suggesting that all of these theologians support the essential thrust of his
argument that the nature of theology is best conceived in paradoxical terms.
It is not the number of theologians noted here to whom Neuhaus appeals in
the course of his hvo studies that I find troubling. It is rather the manner

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

IV.
But we musrt press further. The view we have put forwaro
as rt.he Catholic view entails ,a trans£ormational presence of the
Christian in society. But this gives rise to an apparent
dilemma, that
in terms of N euhaus's ,argument on behalf
of a Catholicism well-suited to provide a public philosophy for
American. ·socierty, which i,s .to say a society which i:s pluralistic
and democratic. The difficulty
this: on the one hand, Neul11aus's paradoxical view, which entails .a "rationalist" appeal
to :veason, an appeal rto what is reasonable in a kind of neutral
or " pure " sense of reasonable-that is, insofar as the Christian intends to be spe,aking in aind for the public order-would
seem for 1all of its theological difficulties fo be nonetheless
priactica1ly necesSJary: that is, given the pluralism of modern
society. On the other hand, what I have called the Catholic
view, which entails a "faithful" 'appeal to reason, an appeal
to reason ias "finalized" from the beginning in faith and hence
.as requiring ongoing transiformaition in the light of faithagain, precisely as the Christian intends .to be speaking in and
for the public order-would seem for all of its intrinsic theological correctness nonetheless to .give rise to insuperable practical difficulties: :again, given the plumlism of modern society.
of that appeal. The differences among these theologians, this is, relative to
the notion of "paradoro" understood in a way consistent with "crisis theology," are, prima facie, so significant and manifest that surely some prolonged
and systematic attention to such differences is warranted. (It is just not,
prima facie, clear to me that, say, David Tracy, Karl Barth, Thomas Aquinas,
and Cardinal Ratzinger could be said to be in agreement regarding the sense
of the relation of faith and reason in theology, except in the thinnest of
senses and on the barest of surfaces.) Nonetheless, Neuhaus does not see
fit to give us any systematic account of these prima faoie differences. Indeed, he gives no indication of an awareness that such an account may be
necessary.
I bring this matter up simply because I think it points to a kind of
eclectic character in Neuh.aus's work which is seriously problematic. Neuhaus
would likely respond by claiming (something like) that he follows (say)
Barth when speaking as a Christian (to and for Christians) and (say) Tracy
when speaking publicly. But that illustrates just what I mean by eclecticism.

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138

In short, if Neuhaus's proposal is theologically inaidequ:ate, is
it not for ·all tha.t politically necessary? And if the Catholic
proposal as I have 1sketched it !is theologically correct, is it not
for all that seriously problematic in its political implications?
I l'!aise this question for the purpo.se of drawing attention to
Tha.t difficulty cona final difficulty in Neuhaus's
cerns the term which sets the ovemrehing context for his proposal and is indicated in the subtitle of his book," The Paradox
of the Church in the Postmodern World" (emphasis added).
The context of Neuhiaus'.s proposal, in other words, is understood to be that of a worrld which is, or is becoming, postmodern. My final question, .then, hears on whether Neuhaus's
undersrt.anding of what is to count as public in and for a
pluralistic, democratic society like that of America has in fact
been ·sufficiently penetl'lated by genuinely postmodern, as distinct from modern, patterns of thought. In a word, does Neuhaus' s view gert us beyond a modern and into a postmodern
understanding of politics: in terms of what counts as a public
use of l'!eason by a Christian in and for a pluralistic society?
Now I follow Neuhaus here in linking what oan be called
modern patterns of thought with those patterns identified as
Cartesian and of the En1ightenment. And it must he noted
immediately th.at Neuhaus means to •l'leject these. Characleristic of an" Enlightened" :appeal to reason is the daim on behalf of a kind of neutr:a1ity: as though one could avoid speakring out of a particular tradition, or ·rugain, could speak in a
manner which, as
were, is context-free. As we have seen,
Neuhaus makes expliiciit an intended rejection of this view of
!Veason: indeed, such rejection iis a major intention of the book.
Simi1arly, in his discussiion of the preliberral, liberal, and
posUiiberal models of theo1ogy, Neuhaus says: "The point cannot he maide too of.ten that what !is descr!ibed as prelllibeml!ism
is really 1a relatively modern, pos:t-Cartesian, undersrbanding of
truth" (p. 156). It is just this modern, post-Cartesian understanding of .truth, rin other
which must be gotten beyond and replaced by
My concern then is not

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

rto cal,l into question Neuhaus's intention of getting us beyond
Enlightened and Carrtes:iianpatterns of thought; it is rather to
ques,tion whether his notion of paradox really succeeds in
doing so.
By Oarlesianism, for the present context rand indeed in its
fundamental meaning, I mean a pattern of thought which understands distinction iafter the manner oif S'erp.airation: that is,
in the ·sense that, where x and y are taken to be distinct, they
1a,re jUJst so fiar undoosr!Jood1as first simply
of ea,ch other,
such thait any (subsequeillt) relation or :influence of one upon
the other comes .after the manner of what is simply external.
Thia.it is, re1aition alwiayis .aind properly extirinsic, something
made by way of addition or indeed opposition. In shor:t, a
Oair:tes[ian understanding of ws:binotion enfails a dualistic unde11srtandingof relation (the terms of relation).
Thus a Oartes[ain understanding of distinction, when it informs
understanding of the faith-11ea:sonrelatioo, forces a
dualistic unde11standiingo;f that relation: £aith rand realS'On ·are
understood a1s simply outside of ea.ch other, and .their (consequent) relation in tum is understood as either extrinsic (by
w1ay of simple ,addition) or opposing (e.g., dialectical) . And it
is just this dualistic under:standing of the faiith-rea,sonrel.aition
which ia1one and in turn makes possible the Enlightenmffilit
claim on behalf of a neutral reason: a "pure " reason, a reason,
that is ;to 1say, from which all influences (e.g., "bithful" influences, presuppositions of ,a given "particular" tradition)
have been removed. On the "Enlightened " view of reruson,
such influences can he seen only as extrinsic matters which eo
ipso ;threaten the integrity of rooson.
lt should of oourise already be evident that this dualistic
undersrbanding of the faiith-rea,son refo,tion informs Neuhaus's
nolbion of pamdox: that notion embodies exactly the extrinsicist undeirsibandingof .the faith-reason relation which undergiirds his sense of :an appeal, when :Speakingin and for the public order in a pluralistic society, ito a
or reasonaJbililitywhich is commonly 1accessible,thait is, accessible in prin-

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185

ciple to all knowens insofar a.JS they remain uninfluenced (i.e.,
not directly or internally informed) by any " particular" religious faith orr traidition. My concern is merely now to make
explicit the fact that Neuhaus's understand.ing of what thus
counts ais public in a plumlis:tic society does not challenge the
patterns of thought which chamcterize modernity. On the contrary, his understanding offers us ·a pamdigm of rt.hose patterns. In the name of paradox, Neuhaus offers us yet one more
instance of the dualism of modernity: the Christian can enter
the public/political orderr, but only inso.far as he or she permits faith to have only an external (because merely paradoxical) influence on his or her thought and praictice.
To be sure there 1should be no illusion regarding the ma;gni1fmde of the task involved in working out 1an 1alternative to
N euhaus's modern ·view of po1imcs 1MJ.d pluralism. But even
here it 1should at lea;st be noted how the 1alternatives which
Neuhaus sees 1a;s exhaustive in .this context themselves both express modern patterns of thought. Thus, Neuhaus opposes
what would be a itransformatiolJllalview of f·a;ith in relation to
reason. Such a tr:ans.formatiollJ3Jlview entails for Neuhaus a reduction :simultaneously in two di.reotions: on the one hand,
faith tends to be absoobed iinto reruson, and there thus results
a secularizing of frailith and the (eventual) emergence of a
" seculiar city "; on the other hand, reas001 tends to be absol'lbed into fmith, ·ood tbhere thus results the loss altogether of
the secular character of reason and the tendency simply to
collapse the" eal'lthly city" in-00 the" heavenly city." In shoN.,
on
understanding, a trians.formatioDJalview of faith
in relation to rea:son entails some form of monism (a kind of
"integraMsm," in the name either of reaison--e.g., secula-rismor of faith--e,g., Iillbemtionrtheology); and to thiis monism he
opposes his paradoxical hmnd of " dualism," because he sees
this rus the only 1avaiLable alterna!bive. (p.
"The alternative to ibeing dualis:tic is to be monistic.")
Whait I wish to suggesrt is that the a;ssumption ithat the ailternatives available to us here are exhausted in monism and
1

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DAVID L. SCHINDLER

dualism is itselif 1an exact expression of
in the
sense outlined above. A mutual internal relation between x
and y (e.g, faith and reason) entails an absorption of x into
y (or vice-versa), or a confusion of the distinctness of x and/
or y, only insofar ·as one h81s conceived x and y as first separate
from or closed to each other, as complete each unto itself and
apart from the other. Monism and dualism, in other words, are
merely the opposite sides of the same Cartesian coin. On the
Catholic understanding of the faith-reason relation defended in
this article there is a third alternative. And that third alternative begins by challenging Cartesianrsm (and hence the paradigmatically modern pattern of thought) in its very roots. That
is, Catholicsilli understands the disrtinciness of faith ruid reason from the beginning from within their de facto unity: in
terms of their de facto one finality. That distinctness, in other
wocds, is understood from the beginning ri.n terms of (their)
relation. It follows that the disrtincrtnessof faith and re31son is
not of a dualistic sort; and that the (de facto) unity which is
given wiirth, ais alllte:cior to, thrut disrtincrtnessiis not and cannot
be of a monisrtic sort. 19
In sum, then, my intention here has been to suggest that
Neuhaus's understanding of what is necess•ary to qualify as a
public use of reason by a Christi.an in a pluralistic, democraitic
society, fails to challenge the modern-Ca:ritesian, Enlightenment-understanding of public and thereby of pluralism (of
what suffices, because :it is public, 1as legiitmiately plura1isrtic).
Or rather my intention has been to .show that Neuhaus faces
a dilemma: on the one hand, if he continues to defend what
counts as public-iin-a-pluralistic-society in terms of his present,
pariado:ici:calunderstanding, he musrt ·accept that he i:s offering
us a world which is still-and indeed pa;radigmrutically19 On the specifically political implications
of this third-Catholic-alternative suggested here, that is, in terms of the question of religious liberty
and a confessional state and in the light of Dignitatis Humanae, cf. my
"Once Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and American Culture," esp. pp.
105-109.

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

137

modern, r:ather than helping us to move into a genuinely poSJt..
modern world. On the other hand, if he does really wish to
realize the intention, carried in the subtitle of his book, of
offering us a new, precisely postmodern, .approach to the world,
paradorical undersitanding of what counts
he must 11ev:ise
as public-in-a-pluralistic-society. In short, the dilemma which
Neuhaus must face O.s thris: if a pwadoxtical understanding of
the reLation of Chmstiamty and politics, then an understanding thrut is modern; if 1a genuinely postmodern understanding
of the rela.tion of Christianity .to politics, then not a pamdo'Xlical understando.ng. .Agiain, in msisting on the importance of facing up to this dilemma, I have no illusii.ons a:s to the difficulty
in developing an a1ternrutive-genuinely Ca:tholic-oonception
of that re1a.tion which wouLd cut through the dilemma. 20 But
the dilemma for all thrut must be faced.

ms

v.
The argument presented here tlms challenges Neuhaus on
each of his central concerns, and it does so in terms of his conception of pariadox. (I) In the name of ·a Catholic understanding of the Gospel, N euha.us offers us a pa.mdoxical view of the
grace-nature iaind faith-reason relations. But if what I have
argued above is correct, tihis pamdoXiical understanding is
proper to something much mme like the " crisis theology " of
Protestant Neo-Orthodoxy. (2) In rthe name of a Christianity
which would form and indeed inform culture, he gives us a
Christianity which forms or informs only ·extrinsii.oallyor indirectly: that is, by way of a paradorical as dist.inertfrom the direct and transformational relation which the terms " form "
and " inform " more properly intend, and which is indicated
in the Catholic understanding of the grace-nature relation. (3)
Finally, in the name of postmodemity, Neuhaus gives us a
dualistic conception of faith and reia,son which expresses emclly the Cartesian pattern of thought which makes possible and
20 Cf. the discussion

referred to in n. 19.

138

DAVID L. SCfilNDLER

indeed alone justifies the neubral or "pure" rationality proper
to the Enlightenment. But it is e:x;ruotly this dualism and this
neutral sort of rationality which underpins the modern undersitanding o.f what counts as" publ.ic" and thereby as legit.imate
in and for ,a democratic society.
In sum, then, whrut Neuh1JJus offel'ls us is neither a truly
Catholic moment, nor a truly public philosophy (that is, qua
directly Chris1tian), nor a truly pos tmodern world. On the
contvary, what he gives us is a new version of an old Protestant
moment, a philosophy which is at once fideist/private (qua
Christian) and rationalist (qua public), a philosophy therefore which meets the requirements 0£ "public" and " p1u:rialistic" in 1a wor1d which is understood precisely in a modern
w:ay.
ln saying 1this, m chal lengiing Neuhaus in till:s fundamental
way, I wish to stress that I do not thereby deny the v:alue and
impoil'ltanceof his book. The book iis bci.mmmg with insightful
pe11ceptiollisinfo the s1bate of contemporary theology and culture. W bJrut the
rubove all serves to do, it seems .to me, is
.to focus attention in the right diirection: Neuhaus is fundamentally correct, I think, in insisting that the time has come
for Catholics to appropriate their tradition and bring its resourees to bear on the task of forming and informing the public life and thought and culture of America.. And he is funda,.
mentally correct, I think, in urging us to move forward, in our
patterns of thought and behavior, into what can be called a
"post-modern" 21 world. But the problem of course is that we
must get clear about the meaning of Catholicism and post1

1

1

1

1

21Perhaps it should be noted: by "postmodern" I mean (.a) "non-modern,"
but in a way (b) which is not (simply) restorative, that is, of a pre-modern
period. To put it another way, I take postmodernity to entail retrieval of
pre-modern (what Neuhaus calls pre-preliberal) patterns of thought: for
example, those developed in the patristic period (interpreted in a classical
rather than in N euhaus's paradoxical sense). But this retrieval must be
conceived in terms which are analogous: in terms that is, which take account
of and indeed truly integrate the difference(s) introduced in and by the
intervening history.

THE CATHOLIC

MOMENT

139

modernity. If I might conclude with a summary suggestion in
this connection, that is, at once relative to the meaning of
Catholicism and postmodernity, and in the light of Neuhaus's
proposal, it would be that the fundamental issue which needs
adjudication is thrut of the gmce-nruture relation: 1an issue
which is at once ia maitter of gr.ace rand nature and of re1a.tion
(irut once of theology and ontology, or, more eJrootly, of a
theology understood in the classical sense a:s always already
carrying within it ,run ontology) .
Regarding postmodernity and ;reLaition, then: if what I have
•argued1aihoveis coITOOt, it follows thrut modernity can accurrutely be oharaoterized by 1a prubtern of thought which cannot
affirm a simultaneity of unity-and-distinctness. As we have
seen, this is the essence of Cartesianism, wherein x and y,
inso£ar 1as ithey are unde,l'!stoodto be distinct, 1are conceived ias
external to one another, which is to say, a:s simple identiities
constituted first in ithemselve.s, 1apant from each other (" separate") . Any relation between x and y, then, either remains
external and by way of ,simple ,addirtion, such th.rut there is no
,real re1a.tion at 'all; or, if .that ,relaition becomes, real, which is
to say, if x and y really penetrate each other, then there just
1so £ar results' confusion, and thus the 1oss of the (distincl)
integrity of x and y. In short, given a Cartesian pattern of
,thought, unity ialways1 collapses into some form of monism or
reductionism, and distinction inito some form of dualism. In
eiitherrcase whirut is lost is precisely the reality of relation, which
presupposes the 1simu1taneity of unity and distincmess----and
thereby affirms both reail unity 1and real 1disrtinctness, even as
it ooan:ges the chara.cter of bo1th. Jn a word, seeing monism
and dualism as exhaustive 1a1tematives exactly preempts the
thrut relation (s) may be real, and indeed primary.
If Hlli.s characterization of the modern pattern of thought is
acouriate, then rthe task of po,srtmodernity must be that of dev:eloping ·a w:ay of seeing relation (s) as real and indeed
prnmary.

Secondly, then, regiarcLing Cablro1icismand the gmce-nwture

140

DAVID L. SCHINDLER

relation: the sense of thait relia.tioncan perhrups: best be seen m
tihe Nicene frn."Illulationof rthe Creed, that is, in :the homoouquirte vighrt in pomting to AthlammsrilliS
sion. Neuhaus I ;think
and Nicaea .ais examples of the sort of " p;re-pre1ibe:tial" pattern
orf thought w:hich is needed dior .a Oarbholicismtin a poSltmodern
WOTlld (cf. pp.
156) . But rwhalt must be
on: once
ragain, contrary to Neuhaus, is thart the Crutholi.c underSitlanding of Nfoaea (rthe homoousi,on) !involves first ian onrtologrical
rather than "rule-rtheiory" undel'ISrtanding of Christruan doctrine: 22 that is, affirms: a ·c:lirrect and real raJther than paracLorioal (in N euhaus''S sense) relation of God .and man in the being
of Jesus. The unity of Jesus's person is simulibaneolliSmth the
disrt:tiniatnerssof d.rivii.ne and human. Which is to say, tha.t-divine--unirty is such that irt tiruly penetrates: •and thus trans£orms Jesus's humanity: Jesus iis div·ine in his very humanity,
ev;en ·as the distinction ·heitweendiwne ·and hum.an is not thereby ·el:iminaltedor coin.fused.
Now of courise t:here only one homoousion: one hypositaitic
union. At the same time, however, and rthis is a point seen
much more dearly ·in the patristruc peciod rthan in the modern
peciod, the direot and real relation of divine ·and human in
Jesus is med.riaited by Jesus (in and through his Church by
means of the Holy Spiiriit) :to 1a11 of created being-.to all of the
human and naturial being of rthe cosmos---,fromthe beginn.ringof
created being's exiisitence.23 Thws what Jesus Christ is by natuve all else run the cosmos in some signmcant sense both is
1

22 Here I again
follow Ratzinger (Introduction to Christianity)
and
Murray (The Problem of God) rather than Lindbeck (The Nature of
Doctrine).
2s See n. 3 above. Cf. also in this connection the summary statement by
Hans U rs von Balthasar:
If the cosmos as a whole has been created in the image of God that
appears-in the First-Born of creation, through him and for him-and
if this First-Born indwells the world as its Head through the Church,
then in the last analysis the world is a 'body' of God, who represents
and expresses himself in this body, on the basis of the principle not of
pantheistic but of hypostatic union (The GW1';1J of the Lord, Vol 1, Seeing
the Form [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1982], p. 679).

THE CATHOLIC MOME'NT

141

and iis to become by rudoption and pamci.paition. 24 '.Dhe poiint,
then, :is that neirther Jesus nor, ias a result of Jesus, anything
else iin the oosmos, can be properly understood except, and
£rom the beginiliing, in ,terms of relation. Jesus'·s beiing, that is,
a:s Son 1and rus W&d, iis' essentially relalbion to, God ithe F.ather. 25
The beiing of all else in t:he oosmoB becomes ij,tsel[ in turn, th.lat
is, in and through the mediation oif Jesus as ithe Incarnaite
Word, iwteimialJyreLated to God: is ordered to God from within
its v:ery diistincrlness ;aJs human 1and natumL 26 In shorit, if tih.e
ontologoal interpretation indroaited by the itierm homo<>USi.on
of the rela1tiionof God 1and man rin Jesus Christ, and in ,turn of
the relation of God and rbhe enrtire cosmos as mediated by
Christ (ilhilough the Church in the Holy Sp[rit) , is rtrne, tihen
:Lt follows rthat no enitirty or aspect of any enrbity of the OOSIIDOS
is simply closed. No entity or iaspoot oif any entity ha:s iits
proper idrotiity e:xiCept rel,rutively, iand hence as open from
within: :a re1wbivity iand an openness, ith:rut is, which can only
:be understood properly and finally in terms of the God of
Jesus Ohriist ·and hence rthe tr.inibaa.iianGod of Christianity. 27
Tthe summairy questions which I wouJd piurt before Neuhaus,
then, wiiith respect to the meaning of Catholicism and postmodernity, are the following: how is one to understand the
graice-nruture relation in the light of the Nicene homoousion?
Cain one undersrband thrut re1artion properly wirthourt understandmg it in terms of the onto1ogiieal intention suggested by
1

.24 See my "Catholicity
and the State of Contemporary Theology," pp. 430434. It is crucial that the "already-not yet" character of the relation of God
and the cosmos, established by God in Christ, be maintained, a.s well as the
central role of human being in helping to realize this relation (on this, see
especially the references given in nos. 6 and 7 of this article) .
25 See the beautiful and profound development of this theme in Ratzinger's
Introduotion to Ohristianity, especially pp. 127-82.
26 In connection with my outline here of the meaning of the homoo'U8'ion,
cf. the recent statements of Pope John Paul II: "The Christological definitions of the Councils and the Church's f.aith today," L'Osservatore Romooo,
Eng. ed. (April 18, 1988), esp. p. 11; and the encyclical Dominum et Vivifi.oantem, esp. n. 50.
21 Cf. Walter Kasper, The God of JesiM Ghrist (New York: Crossroad,
1984).

DAVID L. SCHINDLER

the term homo<>usWn (" one iin being ") , and rindeed ias interpreted in the classical tradition? Does this term not indicaite a
real simultaneity of unity and distinctness in Jesus: which is
to say a 1'eal-'-direct, internal-relation of divine and human
in Jesus? And if so, what then does ,it mean in turn to affirm
that all of creation is created in and through (Jesus as)
the Word, has its being in :the Woird? Does this ·affirmrution
not mean that the real re1aJtion of God and man which !is
Jesus's essentiially or by nature !is tin £11Jci mediillllted by JeS1Us
(through hls Chureh in the Holy Spirit) to aU of creation,
,and rthait all of creation thereby shaxes in thrut real relation
parrticipaitively or by ·adoprtion? That all of creation thereby
mum be understood in ter:ms of this relation-and thus in
terms of reLat!i.on? Whait then does this imply further in terms
of rthe cosmic or :Wani.siformaitional:sense of Chr!i.sti1an!i.ty: in
terms of the need borth to recognize and to help bring about
this oivdering of ,all of be!i.ng to God (m Christ through his
Church)? What does this need suggest for the Christi.an as he
or she takes up the task of .fol'Illiing.and informing the culrturial
.and polit!i.oallife of society?
,Jt bears empihrusiziingone final time thrut one can be under no
il1usions .as to the diifficulty of .worlcinig through adequate ans;weirs to these queis:bioos: there is: of course an essential trut:h
to Neuhaius's ins!i.stence thait a fully comprehensive vision will
be ours only iin the End Time. And there should be no musiions
as if:o the rirudieal nature of the questions. But in an important
,sense ithrut ii:s the rpotill.lt of cris!i.s: properly undeTstood, it sends
us, or sihou1d send us, <back in search of the roo:ts of a problem. It seems to me that Neuhaus is quite right in seeing that
America (rthe modem West) is 'in 1a strute of oris!i.s: :ait a turning point which requiires deliberative assessment and judgment. And irt seems to me further th.wt he is quite right in
seeing the Catholic trrladfutionas hearing wiithin it the resources
for meet!i.ngtlmt crisis. But I fea:r that ithe proposal he makes
will in £act serve merely to ertood ithe crisis. We do nort need
yet another version of modernity.

THE CATHOLIC MOMENT

148

Neuhaus rightly-in my judgment-challenges the various
monisms (of the Right :and peThaps more commonly of the
Le£t) which a.re often put forward todray. But in response we
do not need another dualism, indeed oo.e which precisely continues the secul.arized paibterns of thought which have characrterized modernity: which gives us exiaotly no sense of a need
for an ontological penetration of nature ·and cosmos and culwhich
ture by gl'laice.28 We do not need the sort. of
Neuhaus calls parrudox, whim makes it iimpossible ito under·stand the !!.'elationof grace .and na.ture (Church •and world) in
ally•thing other than .an indirect, e:xiternial, and dialectical
manner. Wb.rut we need riather is •a sern:se of nature and the
cosmos as penetl"ated, .and .as needing ongoing penetration, iby
groce (by the life M:d love of God ,as medi!aitedby JesUtS Chcist
through his Chmch iin the Holy Spil"it); 1a sense therefore of a
re1aition between grace lfill!d niabure which is di'l'eat :and internal
and real. It is jusit this sense of nature :and of the grace-nature
relation
iB affirmed in and ·by Orutholicism.When this is
undel'ISltood-burt only then-can we agree with Neuhaus that
ithe present cu1tu11al situirution provides us with whrut is, or
oou1d he, .a truly
moment.
1

2s It is interel!ting in this connection to note Neuhaus's repeated assertion
that contemporary American society is not secularized (cf. for example, The
<Jatholic Moment, p. 82; or indeed the title of the recent book edited by him:
Uns.eoular America). N euhaus's point is that recent empirical evidence shows
that a persistently-and increasingly-large number of Americans believe in
God, go to Church, and the like. The implication of the argument developed
in the present essay is that such-precisely wternaZ--evidence suffices to
demonstrate religiosity in America only if and insofar as one fails to under·
stand religiosity as requiring ontological penetration, and just so far genuine
interiority and incarnation. When this deeper, Catholic, requirement for true
religiosity is taken into account, and indeed when the corresponding need is
met for evidence which is distinct from the quantitative and hence external
sort proper to public opinion surveys, I believe American culture is shown,
contrary to Neuhaus's judgment, to be significantly and indeed pervasively
secularized. On this question of the religiosity of American culture, and the
nature of the evidence therefor, cf. roy articles, "Is America Bourgeois?," and
"Once Again: George Weigel, Catholicism, and American Culture."

BOOK REVIEWS
At the Origins of Modern Atheism. By MICHAEL J. BucKLEY, S.J. New
Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1987. Pp. viii+ 445.
Writing ostensibly a history of the philosophical origins of 18th
century atheism in 17th century theism, Michael Buckley, S.J., has
contributed a learned, subtle, and provocative hook whose length is
significantly increased and whose focus is considerably enlarged by a
running commentary about the metatheory (Richard McKeon's philosophical semantics) that structures his reading of the chosen theists
and atheists. Buckley provides the best summary of his own historical
conclusion: " ... theology generated apologetic philosophy and philosophy generated Universal Mechanics, and these in turn co-opted theology to become the foundations of theistic assertions . . . [But] when
the contradictions between Cartesian and Newtonian mechanics were
further negated ... god became a deus otiosus" [pp. 358-359]. This
conclusion rests on a philosophical principle whose elements are taken
from Plato's Seventh Epistle: " The name, the definition, and the instance for the atheistic negations are all set by the current theism "
[p. 15]. In turn, this principle is justified by a cluster of meta-theses
that are not easily summarized, although one stands above the rest:
" Much more may he involved in such a process of ideas [from 17th
century theism to 18th century atheism] than their· own internal necessity, hut internal necessity remains and governs inherently " [p. 334].
The latter meta-thesis asserts that there is a dialectic of ideas and
it is from this point of view that Buckley reads the conceptual history
of modern atheism. Dialectical necessity is a bugbear for many contemporary philosophers, hut Buckley argues, convincingly I think, that
some kind of conceptual necessity links theism and atheism. Atheism
is, essentially, the negation of a particular form of theism. In Hegelian
terms, atheism is a determinate negation which draws all of its conceptual content from what it negates. Buckley, however, puts an even
greater Hegelian spin on the same point. If the theism carries within
itself a contradiction, it negates itself and, thereby, dialectically generates its contradiction-atheism [cf. p. 17]. " Modern atheism took
not only its meaning hut its existence from the self-alienation of religion" [p. 359].
A theism that believes in the existence of an intelligent, personal
God, Who creates and orders the universe, but that attempts a rational

144

BOOK REVIEWS

145

justification of this belief apart from the religious experience that
alone can embody such a faith contains exactly the kind of inner contradiction that generates the negation of itself. Buckley focuses on the
poignant contradiction of a Christian theology abandoning " the
religious figure of Jesus as the principal evidence for the reality of
God" [p. 41] in favor of some philosophy (whether that of Descartes,
Malebranche, or Newton) which provides a different and allegedly
more certain kind of evidence for God's existence. This theology, or
more precisely the theistic philosophies it spawned, are the sources of
modern atheism because, if Descartes and Newton are consistently
combined, philosophy can do quite well without God. Laplace's famous
reply to Napoleon, although it was not originally an atheistic slogan,
captures what Diderot and d'Holbach thought: God is an unnecessary
hypothesis in a truly universal mechanics which needs to presuppose
only matter and motion.
The historical story, of course, is more complicated than this skeleton
dialectic can suggest. Buckley richly details the story but I shall rehearse only its opening chapter. Buckley begins with the Jesuit theologian, Leonard Lays ( 1554-1623), usually known under his Latin
name, Lessius, whose De providentia numinis et anima immortalitate
(1613) set the pattern for subsequent Catholic theology. Lessius, who
was convinced that atheism by eliminating the eternal judge destroys
morals and sound politics, revived Stoic arguments, numerous variations on a theme, which show that the universe is everywhere imprinted with a divine design. Lessius's intent, although he referred
only to ancient philosophers, was not to replay the classical battle between the Stoics and the Epicureans but to combat the atheism, silent
and disguised in contemporary Europe, that Lessius thought to be the
inevitable outcome of the wars of religion and theological fights.
Lessius, however, paid scant attention to his own insight into the
religious and cultural origins of atheism. Lessius recognized that the
dissolution of a common religious authority was the matrix for modern
atheism, but his fatal mistake, according to Buckley, was to treat
atheism as a philosophical question to be solved by philosophical
answers. A second theologian, the Franciscan Marin Mersenne ( 15881648), took the same tack but with one notable difference. Mersenne
battled contemporary enemies (mainly the renaissance philosophers
Charron, Cardano, and Bruno) who embraced, so he thought, versions
of ancient scepticism and naturalism.
Why did Lessius and Mersenne follow this course and abandon, in
practice at least, theology for philosophy in order to defend belief in
the existence of God? Buckley provides two interesting explanations:
to avoid legitimating the Pyrrhonian scepticism of a Montaigne who

146

BOOK REVIEWS

"pushed revelation at the cost of the soundness of reason" [p. 66]
and to follow, albeit in misguided fashion, Aquinas who proved the
existence of God through philosophy. I shall return to this latter issue
at the end of my review. But, first, I want to note a certain exclusivity
in Buckley's argument.
Buckley adverts to the plethora of non-philosophical factors from
which atheism arose, hut he insists that one should not turn atheism
into an "epiphenomenon "-a by-product of social, psychological, or
political events, forces, or milieus. Instead, Buckley continually
stresses the conceptual dialectic that generated atheism " whose existence is accounted for in terms of the ideas which preceded it " [p.
16]. By his own standards, however, this is an overstatement that is
difficult to reconcile with what Buckley also quite clearly acknowledges.
Just as faith is rooted in religious experience, so too must atheism
reflect the absence or negation of religious experience. But who would
argue for any religious experience-or lack of-that does not reflect
even as it transcends its psychological, social, and cultural milieu?
There is no way of talking about faith and, consequently, atheism
without talking about culture. If that is the case, can the existence of
atheism really he explained essentially in terms of " its own argument
in the history of ideas" [p. 31]? Buckley has chosen, and perhaps
he should have explained this more fully, to narrow the field.
Of course, ideas have consequences and to reconstruct philosophical
theism and philosophical atheism is to display the philosophical interconnection and consequences of those ideas, whether or not one uses
dialectical negation to make the connection. Buckley has effected the
latter procedure with eclat. Yet, Hegel's warning remains apropos,
lest we readers fall into a play of concepts, a bloodless dialectic that
explains only the philosophy of atheism hut not atheism: philosophy
is the owl of Minerva that flies only at dusk. Put in less metaphorical
language, Hegel knew that philosophers reflect and conceptualize only
what has already occurred in pre-philosophical life.
In fact, Buckley seems to he grappling, although it is not made explicit, with a profoundly Hegelian problem throughout this hook. What
is the relationship of pre-philosophical life (history in the largest sense
of the word) and the philosophical reconstruction of that history?
Hegel thought that history both led to the categories of his Logic (pro·
viding what he called the ladder to the absolute standpoint) and that
the Logic alone gave sense or allowed one to order what would otherwise he an ultimately senseless history.
The importance of the problem has not escaped Buckley; it is what
motivates him to rely on the categories of McKeon's philosophical
semantics to make sense of a particular stretch of philosophical history.

BOOK REVIEWS

147

Buckley writes la grande not la petite histoire. But is there one sense
or many senses to history? McKeon's categories, so Buckley claims,
avoid both Hegelian and relativistic traps; they do not reduce " every
philosophy to a single true philosophy " or regard " all positions as of
equal worth" [p. 21]. On this score, though, McKeon himself is
hardly so reassuring: " There is no pre-established priority of being,
cause, or rule among things, thoughts, actions, and statements; each
in turn may he made fundamental in deliberation or judgment or
demonstration" ["Discourse, Demonstration, Verification, and Justification, " in Demonstration, Verification, Justification: Entretiens de
l'Institut International de Philosophie (Editions Nauwelaerts: Louvain,
1968), p. 45]. McKeon's meta-theory about the history of philosophy,
to put it benignly, is resolutely pluralist.
As he presents them, Buckley's conclusions about the dialectical
origin of modern atheism are fundamental; nonetheless, the metatheory which directs his approach to that history can reasonably he
taken to provide the basic plot of the book. Buckley himself notes
[cf. p. 21] that his inquiry into atheism amounts to a progressive clarification of his (i.e., McKeon's) philosophical semantics. This promise,
I think, is not quite fulfilled; especially for someone not versed in
McKeon's own writings, the theory remains recondite. Buckley makes
a conscientious effort to sketch McKeon's four coordinates of intelligible discourse: " selection " (what is selected to he the suhjectmatter), " interpretation " (how anything can he said about the subject
matter selected), "method" (how one proceds in making discoveries)
and "principle" (the ultimate source of the unity, truth, or value of
the discourse). Yet, he does not explore the logical status of this
theory itself. Of course, Buckley would have had to write two hooksone historical, the other methodological-if he had attempted to answer
all of these meta-theoretical question. Still, Thomists might well wonder whether a meta-theory that first focuses on discourse is really a
neutral instrument through which to examine other theories that start
elsewhere. In any case, it should be noted that the arguments needed
to sustain the meta-theory are quite different and need careful delineation from the arguments that are needed to support the dialectical
method that Buckley uses to generate modern atheism from modern
theism.
In fact, the dialectical method is hut one of several, irreducible
methods: other universal methods, each of which has been proposed
as the " pattern appropriate to all serious discourse " [p. 23], include
the logistic, problematic, and operational methods. One could anticipate, then, that the choice of any of these other methods would generate
a different kind of history of atheism. So there is a kind of partiality,

148

BOOK REVIEWS

if one is consistently following McKeon, about approaching atheism
from the standpoint solely of the dialectical method. To quote McKeon
again: "There is no reason a priori why any starting-point should
provide better principles than any other or why any method adapted
to the scope and intricacies of a universal subject should he preferable
to any other" ["Philosophy and Method," The Journal of Philosophy,
48 (1951), p. 672]. There, however, are meta-issues, and I do not
want to tax Buckley with every objection that can be raised against or
from within McKeon's theory. Any history that is not a mere sequence
of philosophical propositions (if such is even possible) incorporates
some hermeneutic; it is a merit that Buckley has been so explicit about
his own skillful use of McKeon.
In a book so expansive, it is to be expected that readers, here and
there, will contest details. Especially in this journal, I should like to
quibble about Buckley's remarks about Aquinas and Gilson. The quibbles open upon a large issue that is central to Buckley's argument.
Aquinas's philosophical demonstration of the existence of God occurs
-as Buckley states-within the context of Thomistic theology. But,
contrary to what he suggests [cf. p. 55], these demonstrations are-at
least, for Aquinas-" intrinsically theological ": the existence of God,
which Aquinas attempts to demonstrate rationally, is still considered
in the Summa Theologiae " sub ratio Dei," i.e., as revelabile. As
Aquinas puts the matter in De Trinitate, Q. 2, a. 3, ad 5, the theologian
who uses philosophy changes the water of philosophy into wine of
theology; he does not simply mix the two. No one among recent interpreters has understood this better or emphasized it more than Gilson
who, at the same time, drew attention to the originality of Aquinas's
philosophical principles. To attribute to Gilson, as Buckley does, the
idea that " religious experience or Christianity as such posseses nothing
with which to engage this issue of the existence of God" [p. 342]
is vastly wide of the mark. Gilson said exactly the contrary: " The
God Whose existence we demonstrate is but a part of the God Whose
existence we hold to be true on the strength of our faith in His words
... the God of rational knowledge is, so to speak, included within the
God of Faith " [Elements of Christian Philosophy (Doubleday & Company: Garden City, N.Y., 1960), p. 54]. In fact, Gilson held to a line
that I would suppose to he parallel to Buckley's views. In his essay,
" Historical Research and the Future of Scholasticism, " Gilson strongly
advocated that "scholastic philosophy must return to theology." Only
in a theological context will philosophy, presumably, he sufficiently
respectful of and able to elucidate the Christian faith that, in all of
its experiential aspects, supports and structures belief in a personal,
provident God.

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What role Athens has in Jerusalem raises questions, especially about
the role of philosophy within the theology of Aquinas, that go far
beyond and, indeed, may contradict the historical examples of Lessius
and Mersenne. Anton Pegis asked: "If St. Thomas incorporated his
philosophy within his theology and intended it to he a part of that
theology, how do we read it as he meant it unless we read it as
theology? And if we read it as theology, what are the conditions under
which we then venture to think of it as philosophy? " [St. Thomas and
Philosophy (Marquette University Press: Milwaukee, 1964), p. 34].
These are questions that lead Gilson and Pegis to a quite different
reading of Aquinas than Buckley offers. But on the general theme, how
philosophy should function in relation to theology, I look forward to
further reflections from Father Buckley.
DENIS J.M. BRADLEY
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour in Rahner and Bath,
By BRUCE MARSHALL. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987. Pp. ix
210. $45.00.

+

This is an extraordinary hook, perhaps the best book on the con·
flicting shape of christology in the academy in recent years. It makes
a major contribution to the logic of christology as well as to the con·
versation between Barth and Rahner-and Aquinas. In brief, Marshall
argues that Barth's christology (honed by Aquinas' logic of reduplica·
tion) is more adequate than Rahner's to the shared assumption that
the particular individual Jesus Christ is of universal significance.
But this might make the book sound too scholastic-as if it were
another in a long line of revised dissertations convincing us that we
will be better off siding with one theologian rather than another. Jn.
stead, Barth and Rahner and Aquinas become test-cases for a problem
that has a particular " historical shape " ( c. 1). In the Middle Ages,
says Marshall, " it seems to have been taken quite for granted, in popu·
lar as well as learned or ' high ' culture, that the function of that which
is ultimately ' significant ' or ' most important ' in human life belonged
uniquely and solely to Jesus Christ, the particular person whose story
is told in the Bible" (p. 1). This presumption was undercut in modern·
ity when " the inextricable tie of all that is ultimately meaningful to
Jesus Christ as a particular person ceased to be completely obvious in
Western culture" (p. 2). Some persisted in dogmatically asserting the

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particularity of Jesus Christ; others abandoned this particularity in
favor of seeking what ought be ultimately meaningful for us all. Still
others attempted to mediate between these alternatives. Marshall here
uses " mediate " in a technical sense: we mediate when some immediacy
has been lost by finding another putative immediacy as a sort of
launching pad for the first. Thus, the mediator's christological strategy
is 1) to discover or construct "logically general criteria" of meaning·
fulness and 2) explicate (not prove) how these criteria can be predicated of the particular figure Jesus Christ.
I think it would help Marshall's story to point out that the insistence of the Enlightenment and Romanticism on universality was
not merely an outsider's challenge to the particularity of Jesus Christ
but a challenge to Christians to do justice to the universality of this
particular One. It is important to remember that, although classic
Christians rightly agreed on the " ultimate significance" of this particular figure, they were frequently wrong on Christ's universal sig·
nificance. We need only think of Barth's criticisms of his tradition on
double predestination and Rahner's criticisms of the eschatology of
his tradition. On some issues, perhaps the world (against its wishes)
continues to understand Jesus Christ better than some Christians. The
story of our treatment of the particularity of Jesus Christ would perhaps provide the instance of those respects in which the turning of
the world from the Church is the condition of the turning of the Church
to the world (Church Dogmatics IV /3,1 :21) .
In any case, Rahner is one kind of mediating theologian focused on
developing logically general criteria of a specific sort (i.e., transcen·
dental). But (Marshall argues) Rahner fails to explicate how these
criteria identify the particular individual Jesus Christ. For example,
Rahner contends that how Jesus Christ is significant for salvation
(heilsbedeutsam) depends on how anything can be so; but, even if we
grant Rahner's theology of the latter, how does this help us describe
the former? Indeed, Rahner's strategy seems to make it logically im·
possible for Jesus Christ to be of ultimate significance in his particu·
larity. Marshall offers a careful analysis of "particularity," trading
on a contrast between "positive individuality" and "particular individuality" (or, in Aquinas' lexicon, "vague individuality" and " indi·
viduality determinatum distinguens ") (p. 45). Note :that Marshall does
not challenge Rahner's " transcendental theology " as a whole, only
its application to the issue of the particularity of Jesus Christ. Chapter
2 makes this case; Chapter 3 responds to a number of objections to
criticisms of the " logical indispensability " and " material decisiveness" of Jesus Christ in Rabner. The upshot is that, since Rahner
intends to come to terms with both general criteria of meaningfulness

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and Jesus Christ's particularity ("I" and "2" above), Rahner's
christology is inadequate on its own terms.
The main accomplishment of this book is the way it clearly, thor·
oughly, and non-polemically devastates this essential phase of Rahner's
christology. Of course, Rahner's christology has been criticized previ·
ously by traditions like Thomism, movements like liberation theology,
and individuals like Balthasar. But the criticisms have never been carried out on Rahner's own terms by such a close reading of the texts.
I ought to mention that Marshall's criticism are carefully qualified. He
does not argue that this provides the clue that unlocks all keys in
Rahner; he does not deny that on other issues Barth and Rahner may
be more (or even less) comparable. It would not be inconsistent with
Marshall's claims to agree with his criticisms of Rahner, while counterarguing that transcendental christology plays only a minor role in
Rahner's theology as a whole. But I think that Marshall's execution of
his criticisms will make a counter-argument difficult to sustain on the
issue Marshall explores. Certainly much of Rahner's pastoral advice,
his analyses of doctrines, and even his insistence that we embrace as
much of the transcendental self as the Gospel permits and requirescertainly this and more will abide. But, unless mediating christologies
can mount clear, thorough, and non-polemical responses to Marshall on
his terms, Rahner's position on the issue of Jesus Christ's particularity
will continually qualify his position on other issues.
Barth, says Marshall, proposes an alternative in which logically general claims about redemption and redeemers " are themselves finally
meaningful, intelligible, and existentially accessible because and in so
far as they are appropriately applied to Jesus Christ as a particular
person" (p. 118). The name Jesus Christ is inseparable from a par·
ticular history, and Barth's many descriptions of this One are descriptions of this One's "narrated pa11ticularity" (p. 129). However, Barth
runs into problems because his " ontological descriptions " of how
Jesus' history is God's own (especially his account of the anhypostasis
and enhypostasis) become " an increasingly technical descriptive account " which " seems dwarfed by the amount of explanation the description itself needs" (pp. 175-76).
It is at this point that Thomas Aquinas' " logico-sernantic explication of ' This man is God' " becomes helpful. Marshall's analysis at
this point seems to suggest-I am not entirely clear on this point-that
Aquinas takes account of three sorts of ways of speaking of Jesus
Christ: the modus loquendi of Scripture, of the church and its councils, and ontological descriptions. The last have " a derivative place "
(pp. 179, 182). Indeed, in the sui generis case of the hypostatic union
ontological descriptions are " ill-suited "; modest "logico-grammatical

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analysis" of claims such as " This man is God " are preferable (pp. 181,
183). By book's end, there is a suggestion that the key issues have
less to do with issues such as how Jesus is " incarnation of God "
(recall the debates in England over" the myth of God incarnate") than
with the grammatical rules embedded in teaching that this particular
one is God incarnate.
These criticisms of Barth are less devastating than the criticisms
of Rahner. This is perhaps because Marshall has felicitously circumscribed his problem so as to distinguish Barth's stand on Christ's
particularity from other stands Barth takes-for example, on election
(pp. 122-23), the "subjective appropriation" of reconciliation (pp. 14849), or the Extra Calvinisticum (where Barth exhibits "a virtually constitutional unwillingness to disagree with the Reformed theologians of
the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries when they disagreed with the
Lutherans" [p. 191, note 9]). But it is also because it is puzzling to
have a book on the logic of belief in an incarnate God worry a great
deal about "technicality." To this reader, the criticism of Barth seems to
amount to a charge that Barth's christology often does not adequately
distinguish christological "doctrine" and "theology." This, I think,
is true. Certainly Barth rarely makes a systematic distinction between
dogma and theology, as does Rabner. (This, by the way, makes Marshall's criticism of Rahner all the more cutting. Certainly Rabner would
agree that mediating christology is not dognatically required of Catholics; here Rahner consistently outdoes many Rahnerians. But Marshall's argument implies that it cannot even be theologically permittedperhaps in the name of christological pluralism-without undercutting
essential christological doctrine.) The sociological reason for this difference between Barth and Rahner may have to do with the different
role of the theologian in Reformed and Roman Catholic communities.
But the logic of the difference may have less to do with terminology
such as anhypostasis than with the options Barth considered (or was
handed) for ontological description. For example, let us grant that
Barth's ontology aims to describe " what reality must be like given the
belief in question" (p. 170). But the problem here may not be primarily
the technicalities of some of these descriptions. The problem may be
the monistic illusion that there is a single thing called " reality " which
"must" be; and this problem may be tied to Barth's reading of Anselm
and Hegel-a considerably different tradition of " logic " than Marshall
(rightly, I think) presumes.
In sum, I can only recommend Marshall's argument-and hope that
Marshall goes on to apply his remarkable logical acumen to issues of
God's triune identity and theological anthropology. " Particularity "
(Marshall would insist) is not a key to unlock all christological doors.

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158

But his analysis shows how it can distinguish as well as relate opposed
positions, and so shows how theology contributes to our hope for a
common community in and with vigorous dissent from each other.
JAMES J. BUCKLEY

Loyola College of Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland

Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican
"Instruction on Respect for Human Life in its Origin and on the
Dignity of Human Reproduction." By THOMAS A. SHANNON and
LISA SowLE CAHILL. New York: Crossroad, 1988. $17.95 (cloth).
This volume supplies a great deal of useful information on this in·
struction which it prints in full in an appendix. Chapter 1 supplies an
up-to-date survey of available reproductive technologies. Chapter 2
summarizes the Catholic tradition on sexual morality. Chapter 3 an·
alyzes the Instructions, and 4 compares this to the regulations of the
American Department of Health, Education, and Welfare ( 1979) , the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists (1983), the
American Fertility Society (1986), the British Medical Resarch
Council (1982), the British Medical Association (1982) the Warmock Report (1984), the Australian National Health and Medical
Research Council (1982) and the Victoria Government Committee
(1982, 1983, 1984). Chapter 5 reports American reactions including
those of Cardinal Bernadin and Archbishop Daniel E. Pilarczyk,
theologians Richard A. McCormick, S.J. and James T. Burtchaell,
C.S.C., and the columnist Charles Krauthammer.
In Chapter 6 the authors draw their own conclusion. They think the
Instruction has performed a service in calling attention to the need
to set reasonable limits on the use of reproductive technologies, but
they believe " The Vatican's call for legal prohibition of all reproduction technologies that eliminate sexual intercourse extends further than
is morally necessary" (p. 138). They show, correctly, Humanae Vitae's
principle of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative meaning
of the marital act is the guiding principle by which the Instruction
limits technological reproduction, but they reject this principle and
propose in its stead that it is " the committed love relationship of the
couple in its totality that gives the moral texture both to their sexuality
and to their subsequent role as parents ", since " it is from the wholeness of the relationship that their specific physical acts of sex and

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conception take their moral purpose. " Hence they would only exclude
technologies that use gametes from donors other than the married
couple. They omit discussion of another important principle proposed
by the Instruction, namely the right of the child to be born of legitimate
parents in a normal manner.
They themselves seem to admit that the principle they propose to
limit permissable techniques is not very helpful since after excluding
donor methods they add, " although the authors recognize that further
discussion may be necessary to clarify this point" (p. 138). In fact,
couples consenting to insemination of the woman with a donor's sperm
or contracting with a surrogate mother can easily justify their action
as contributing to the wholeness of their loving relationship. Theologians who use this principle without further specification are logically
forced to accept homosexual marriages and the artificial production of
children for such marriages. This book simply ignores such obvious
objections to their proposal.
Indeed it does not seriously address in any detail the problem which
the Instruction faces frankly and honestly, namely, what kind of reproductive acts are consistent with the totality of a committed loving
relationship. Certainly, as the authors admit, some kinds of acts are
not consistent with such a relationship, but they do not show critically
how the principle they want to substitute for that of the Instruction can
determine which reproductive technologies are not morally acceptable.
The Instruction, on the contrary, took the necessary responsibility of
proposing such a specification, by defining the structure of the marital
act which is essential to this relationship. This does not mean that it
defines it merely in its physical character, but in its specifying moral
intention (its moral object) as an act which keps intact the intrinsic
relation between the expression of love and the transmission of life.
Since the authors never explain why this principle, so deeply rooted
in the Catholic tradition, is false, nor refute the many arguments in its
favor put forth since Humanae Vitae, their exposition of the Catholic
tradition and the Instruction is largely beside the point.
The authors also state that:
At stake here is the claim, dear to the current magisterium, that it is in
fact possible to formulate absolute moral nol'llls about specific physical
actions, so that these can be decided in advance to be morally excluded,
no matter what unforeseeable circumstances may come about.
A ·contrasting viewpoint, argued by many theologians working within
the broadly Catholic tradition, hut called " dissenters " by the official
teachers, is that acts, especially sexual acts have to be evaluated in light
of human relationships and the circumstances within which those relationships have their actual texture. This contrasting approach does not
represent a cohesive " school of thought, " but is rather represented by
many thinkers who raise questions about the best contemporary interpre-

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155

tation of the Catholic natural-law tradition of moral theology! . . . They
,are called-usually by detractors---" proportionalists." (p.109, 110)

At the expense of being thought a "detractor," I must point out
that it is not just the " current magisterium" but the consistent teaching of the magisterium from St. Paul and St. Augustine on that their
are concrete exceptionless ("absolute") moral norms and that the
"dissenters", although they have tried, have not been able to put up a
good historical case to the contrary. But, these absolute norms are
not about " physical actions " as such, hut about the moral evil of the
intention to perform actions which have specific physical results. While
it is true that those who deny such exceptionless norms and maintain
that the decisive moral principle is simply "proportionate reason", i.e.
the balance of positive and negative premoral values, do not form a
" cohesive school ", this only evidences the fact that while agreeing on
a common methodology they have not found any single defense of it
which has been able to withstand critical analysis. The present work is
another example to prove that this approach with its talk of " the texture of human relationships " and " proportionate reasons " becomes
hopelessly vague and arbitrary when faced with the real problems of
our day, since it supplies no workable criteria hy which to decide
among the new technologies, and thus leaves society open to the uncontrolled employment of them which these authors rightly deplore.
BENEDICT M. ASHLEY, O.P.

John Paul II Institute on Marriage and the Family
Washington, D.C.

Madonna: Mary in the Catholic Tradition. By FREDERICK M. JELLY,
O.P. Huntington, Indiana: Our Sunday Visitor Publishing Division, 1986. Pp. 210. $7.50 (paper).
Madonna is a hook that is, in this reviewer's opinion, long overdue.
There is an abundance of theological material on the subject of Mary
available to the " theological public " but much of it is found in
scholarly journals and relatively little is in English. Fr. Jelly has done
English-speaking Catholics (and probably many others) a real service
hy producing a solid, fluid, and readable book on the Woman of Faith
who is still attractive to multitudes of people while remaining ohjec·
tively an integral part of Catholic biblical and theological traditions.
Not only can we not avoid discussing Mary when in dialogue with our
non-Catholic brothers and sisters, but also our Catholic understanding

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and appreciation of Mary's place in our faith lives needs to be con·
tinually nourished. This book contributes much to fulfill this need.
In the book the author gives a good historical background to each of
the issues raised: Mary's Motherhood, Virginity, Immaculate Concep·
tion and Assumption. His chapter on Private Devotions and Appari·
tions is a good analysis of the facts and gives some good insights into
a particularly delicate aspect of our Marian heritage.
Throughout the book the author displays a familiarity with the
latest scriptural developments regarding Mary and these are blended
well with theological reflection which help to clarify and deepen our
grasp of the mystery who is Mary. It will serve as an excellent intro·
duction for those who are interested in pursuing further certain Marian
themes. It sets up clearly the " state of the question. " And for anyone
wishing to have a clear and intelligible understanding of the Catholic
position on Mary, this is a book to read.
This book is well structured; one's interest is captured and maintained throughout. The reviewer's hope is that this is but the first of
several works on Mary by Fr. Frederick Jelly.
GEORGE KIRWIN, O.M.I.
Boston, Massachusetts

The Risk of Interpretation: On Being Faithful to the Christian Tradi·
tion in a Non-Christian Age. By CLAUDE GEFFRE. Translated by
David Smith. New York/Mahwah: Paulist Press, 1987. Pp. vi
298. $12.95 {paperback).

+

Several years ago, M.-D. Chenu described himself, in his preface to
Claude Ge:ffre's A New Age in Theology {New York: Paulist, 1972),
as " one who, not without some boldness and certain risks, has reacted
against decay in theology and envisaged opportune breakthroughs in
historical and speculative method. " In the present work, Geffre shows
himself likewise willing to take the risk involved in the work of theology. Since theology is a hermeneutical task "from beginning to end,"
it involves "the risk of distortion and error," but unless theology is
willing to take that risk by presenting a creative interpretation of
Christianity, it runs the no less serious risk of "simply handing on a
dead past" {pp. 1-2).
The present work comprises a collection of fifteen articles and lectures, three of which were previously unpublished, eight of which have
been reworked, and all of which have been organized into a consistent

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presentation. The hook is divided into three parts, concerned respectively with theological methodology, certain "fundamental realities of
Christian revelation, " and Christian praxis in face of the new histori·
cal, social, and cultural conditions of our non-Christian age.
The author begins with a lucid presentation of the shift that has
occurred in the last twenty years from a theology which understood
itself as " constituted knowledge " to a theology of "pluralistic interpretation " (i.e., from " dogmatic theology to hermeneutical theology") (p. 11). Under the influence of such thinkers as Dilthey and
Gadamer, theologians have become aware of the critical importance of
the present situation of the interpreter or speaker in establishing the
meaning of a text or articulating a speculative truth. This new awareness of " a certain kind of dogmatic theology that is offered to us as
the only authentic way of interpreting the christian message" (p. 14).
In Chapter II, Geffre takes up the structuralist critique of hermeneutics. He responds to their contention that the meaning of a text
can he found only in " the structures of the text and the mechanics of
its functioning" by making judicious use of Paul Ricoeur's notion of
the " world of the text, " and thus separates himself both from the
position of the structuralists and from the sort of hermeneutics which
pretends to find the meaning of a text by discovering the intention of
its author. He thus shows how theology may employ much that is valuable in the method 0£ the structuralists without falling victim to their
criticisms.
Geffre contrasts the hermeneutical model for doing theology with
what he calls the " dogmatic model, " characterizing them as " two
paradigms of theological study . . . separated by an epistemological
revolution " (Chapter III) . While the dogmatic model, which was characteristic of theological work from the Council of Trent until Vatican
II, was excessively nominated by the strict formulations of the magisterium, the hermeneutical model is open to constantly new interpretations as it seeks to correlate "the fundamental Christian experience
to which tradition hears witness and contemporary human experience"
(p. 50).
What separates the old dogmatic model most fundamentally from the
new hermeneutical model is an " epistemological revolution " involving
a new understanding of the nature of Christian truth. When truth is
viewed as a matter of judgment (as adaequatio rei et intellectus),
theology tends to become simply a matter 0£ repeating a " dogmatic
knowledge which has been constituted once and for all time " (p. 54).
When truth is seen from the perspective of Heidegger as coming to
us in a language that itself interprets us (p. 54), the historical aspect of
truth is recognized, and theology is seen as serving the truth most

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faithfully not when it simply reproduces "a dead past" (p. 56), but
when it produces something that is always new ·• in response to the
permanent coming of the original truth that was revealed in Jesus
Christ" (p. 62).
In Chapter IV, Geffre considers the freedom of the theologian in the
new hermeneutical model. All theology must begin with a " revealed
datum " or " deposit of faith . . • handed down from apostolic times "
(p. 67) and embodied in texts, each of which is itself an historically
conditioned act of interpretation. In its reformulations of that original
interpretation, theology is kept from being arbitrary or subjective
through its reference to a " rule of faith " which is " not a created
authority, but God himself" (p. 71). God works, however, through created authorities which include the authority of " the believing people
of God, " " the body of bishops in communion with the Bishop of
Rome," and "the community of theologians." The latter enjoy a
freedom informed both by a love of the truth and by a certitude that
" the mystery of Christ transcends all the statements that the Church
can ever make about it " (pp. 71-74) • In his treatment of authority here,
Geffre seems to he retreating from the sort of " non-authoritarian theology" be outlined in his A New Age in Theology (pp. 8, 40-41) as a
response to " the modern rule of reason which will not agree to submit
itself to a truth in the name of an authority-even that of God. "
It is curious that Geffre should here employ the notion of a" deposit
of faith •.. handed down since apostolic times " (p. 67) when a few
pages earlier he asserted that " Christian truth .•. is not an unvarying
datum that is handed on from century to century in the form of a
fixed deposit" (p. 62). Geffre clearly maintains that there is a "permanent content of truth" in any given dogmatic definition (p. 62), hut
the precise nature of that " permanent content " is difficult to pin
down. Although it cannot he identified " with a past period in tradition-not even with the New Testament corpus" (p. 40), still Scripture
remains "the soul and vital principle of all theology" (pp. 167, 51).
Although it cannot he equated with " a dogmatic confession of faith "
(p. 71), and although we have to "demystify" both "the illusion of a
meaning that is believed to he concealed behind every text . • . or even
within the text itself " (p. 3) and " the idea that the content of faith is
an unvarying factor underlying many varying theological translations" (p. 68), still ·there is a "truth of the affirmation of faith that is
[any dogmatic] formulation" (p. 74). Perhaps such ambiguities are
unavoidable in a theology which seeks to discard " the logic of propositions based on the principle of non·contradiction" (pp. 58, 56, 123,
136) and yet maintain that " hermeneutical theology does not cease to
exercise a rigorous logic with regard to the truths of faith" (p. 59).

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Regardless of such ambiguities, one must agree with Geffre that that
truth which is the object of theological knowledge is not so much a
"co:qi.plex of conceptual truths" as "a mystery, the act by which God
mad{! himself known to men " (p. 60) . " The deposit of faith is . • • the
testimony • . • brought about by the event of Jesus Christ, " written
down in Scripture, and inseparable from " the experience of faith of
the early Christian community" (p. 67). We are in contact with that
permanent content in that, by the gift and guarantee of the Spirit,
we are in continuity with that original comm.unity (pp. 16, 18, 75,
166).
In the second part of the hook, Geffre looks at the resurrection of
Christ as interpretative testimony (Chapter V) , the theme of " the Son
of Man " in the atheistic hermeneutics of Ernst Bloch (Chapter VI),
the notions of the "crucified God" and the "Fatherhood of God" in
contemporary theological discourse (Chapters VII and VIII), and the
meaning of the " Lordship of Christ " for the contemporary believer
(Chapter IX).
In his discussion of the crucified God, Geffre reviews the " protest
against the God of metaphysics " and the protest against the " social
function " that is often assigned to God. In both cases, the immutable
God of absolute Being is cast in the role of the villain who either rules
out all possibility of " man's becoming himself " (p. 114) or acts as the
" ideological guarantee of a conservative social order " {p. 117).
Geffre's own failure to "protect against" these facile simplifications of
the theological tradition is disappointing. He does, however, make good
use of the thought of Karl Rabner in suggesting that the transcendence
of God might reconcile " unchangeability and becoming " (p. 123) •
Weaving together elements of Moltmann, Bonhoeffer, and Varillon, he
then shows quite beautifully that this transcendence is a transcendence
of love by which God is in solidarity with his suffering creatures. It is
regrettable, however, that the transcendence which Geffre here envisions is not " transcendent enough " to allow divine love to he united
with absolute Being in the reality of an unchanging God of love: " I
have insisted on God's transcendence, hut only after having made it
clear that that transcendence was one of love and not one of absolute
Being " (p. 124) .
In the final section, Geffre considers the role of Christian praxis in
the contemporary interpretation of Christianity. Here, he reviews such
themes as the pluralism of our age (an age in which Christianity can
still function prophetically [Chapter X]), the phenomenon of secularization (which, he argues convincingly, should not lead us to adopt
a " theology of secularization " along the lines of Bonhoeffer or
Gogarten [Chapter XI]), the dilemma of the primacy of orthodoxy

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or orthopraxis (which is revealed insightfully as a false dilemma [Chapter XII]), and the Church both in its struggle for human rights (Chapter XIII) and in its missionary activity (Chapter XIV).
The translation of the work is quite adequate, though there are some
places where it misses the nuance of Geffre's text, as when it asserts
that "there is no knowledge ... " (p. 14), instead of saying that "it
[discourse] is not a knowledge" (French edition, Paris, 1983; p. 23).
It can also tend to render the text unintelligible, as when it speaks of
"our habit of judging ... the exclusive place of theological truth"
(p.54), instead of "our habit of making judgment ••• the exclusive
place of theological truth " (French edition, p.76·77). Then, there are
moments when it simply says the opposite of what the author intends.
Thus Thomas Aquinas is presented as one of those who tend to replace
the authority of Scripture with the authority of the magisterium (p.48)
instead of being distinguished from them (French edition, p.68), and
scientific exegesis and historical method are credited with helping to
" bridge the gulf " between exegetes and theologians (p.13) , instead
of being criticized for helping to " dig the ditch ( creuser le fosse) "
that separated them (French edition, p.21).
Geffre concludes his book with an epilogue where he comments both
critically and hopefully on the recent history of Catholic theology in
France. In this he is able both to review the major themes of the book
and to establish a challenging program for future work in hermeneutical theology. Despite the reservations I have mentioned concerning
some of his views, I think it can be said that Ge:ffre's careful scholarship and insightful arguments, combined with is penetrating grasp of
the contemporary theological scene which is evident in his copious
notes and references, may represent one of the first flowers of the " new
theological spring " of which he speaks.
MICHAEL J. DODDS, O.P.
Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California

Life and Faith: Psychological Perspectives on Religious Experience, by
W. W. MEISSNER, S.J. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University
Press, 1987. Pp. xviii
302. Bibliography. $24.95.

+

Fr. Meissner is continuing his career-long research into the overlaps
of psychoanalysis and religion, and in this book is broadening his perspectives to embrace several other areas of contemporary developmental psychology, in a wide.arching synthesis of broad generaliza·

BOOK REVIEWS

161

tions. His underlying thesis is that psychoanalysis, especially in its
later ego-psychology and object relationships developments, has insights to contribute to the psychology of religion, and, along with other
psychologies of development, clarifies and concretizes the understanding
of religion-as-lived, counterpointing the contributions of theology.
The book has three sections. In the first section, the author reflects
on a psychology of grace, and sets up a developmental schema of the
steps toward spiritual identity, paralleling Freud's psychosexual stages
and Erikson's psychosocial stages. He conceptualizes the psychospir·
itual stages in terms of the theological virtues, partially subdivided into
Gospel virtues, and two of the cardinal virtues. Thus his eight stages
emerge as faith/hope, contrition, penance/temperance, fortitude, hu·
mility, love of neighbor, service/zeal and charity. Prudence, presum·
ably, would relate more to a Piagetian schema, although prudence
would certainly also be affected by areas of psychological conflict,
while justice would probably be considered a superego derivative.
The second section of the book deals with faith/hope, the first stage
of psychospiritual development. The author uses Kierkegaard's analysis
of faith as his theological standard. Whether this understanding of
faith, in which the formal motivation is absurdity, is preferable to a
faith whose formal motive is "because nothing is impossible for God,"
is debatable. In any event, Kierkgaard's faith would seem to belong
more to a stage of final purification than to any earlier developmental
phases.
In presenting the stages of faith development, Meissner uses Fow·
ler's schema, based on -Piaget's and Kohlberg's studies, (cognizant of
Rothman and Lichter's criticisms in terms of the influence of sociopolitical ideologies, but making no reference to Loevinger's critique
from women's perspectives), along with his own contribution of Stage
0, undifferentiated. Moving into the hope dimension of the first stage,
he draws on contemporary theologies of hope (Moltman, Metz, Block,
etc.) , and, having implicitly traced the stages of hope in the faith
dimension, examines their psychopathology and psychotherapy. The
third section of the book deals with psychology and religious values.
After a broad survey of the concept of values in sociology, anthro·
pology, ethics and psychology, the author relates values and grace and
concludes with comments on the pathology of value conflict, i.e.,
alienation.
In sum, the thrust of this book is toward synthesis rather than
analysis, towards interrelating the conclusions of large perspectives of
research and reflection. It does not present new results of empirical re·
search, but invites and points the directions of future research. It tends
to be repetitive but that is perhaps to be expected in a study in which
concepts are converging rather than expanding.

BOOK REVIEWS

There are fairly frequent typographical errors in the text; most of
them harmless hut one of them reverses the meaning of the sentence" institutionally prescribed means " for " institutionally proscribed
means" (p. 279), and a couple of them are comical-" In a previous
part of this discussion (pp. 000-000) ", (p. 265); see also p. 274.
MICHAEL STOCK, O.P.

St. Stephen Priory
Dover, Massachusetts

Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Prac·
tical Reasoning. Edited by JEAN DIETZ Moss. Washington, D.C.:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1986. Pp. 168. $24.00
(cloth).
The six essays on classical rhetoric which constitute this collection
were first presented at a conference entitled Classical Rhetoric and the
Teaching of Freshman Composition held October 6-8, 1983, at The
Catholic University of America in Washington, D.C. In her excellent
introduction, Jean Dietz Moss, the editor, indicates that the purpose
of this collection of essays is " to retrieve from the classical age of
rhetoric some methods of practical reasoning-methods of stimulating
and ordering thought about matters of common concern-that might
inform our teaching of writing today" (p. 1). This particular theme
runs throughout all of the essays. Professor Moss informs us that the
basis of these studies is the conviction that the act of reason has not
changed since the time of the Sophists, Plato, and Aristotle, even
though its forms have. The reasoning process is the same for us today
as it was for those of the past. Armed with this conviction, the authors
of these essays attempt to recover from classical rhetoric some means
which will assist in the teaching of freshman composition.
In the initial essay, Professor Schoeck gives the background and
history of rhetoric, thus setting the stage for the essays which follow.
These essays take up in turn five classical concepts: topoi, enthymeme,
kairos, aitia and telos. The first two concepts are the more familiar and
are derived from Aristotle's Rhetoric; the other three, while less
familiar, are discovered throughout the writings of other philosophers
and rhetoricians of the classical period. Professor Hairston focuses
even more sharply on the cause of the present problem in writing
among students. Hairston explains that early in the twentieth century
rhetoric as an academic discipline was separated from the English

BOOK REVIEWS

168

departments, and then, within a brief period of time, was dropped from
the curriculum altogether. In the absence of rhetoric, the teaching of
writing was left entirely to literature departments, and according to
Hairston, this was a serious mistake. The romantic view held by most
literature departments at that time led them to deal with writing as a
nonrational activity. The papers in this collection put forward the view
that composing is a cognitive task and training in rhetoric can assist
in its development. Schoeck reflects the attitude of all the contributors
when he proposes that what is needed now is a rhetoric for our times.
" One of our purposes in these essays is to insure that there will be
a renewed presentation that will keep pace with contemporary literary
production" (p. 38).
One must applaud the effort both to improve the writing of com·
positions by students and to recover a part of classical rhetoric for our
day. This particular effort to recover some of the riches of the past
appears to be a part of a growing trend which the reviewer heartily
endorses.
By and large, this collection of essays is very good. However, a
teacher of composition unfamiliar with rhetoric might find its usefulness limited. Although the terminology is defined within the context of
the articles, it is my judgment that the essays would be found difficult
to understand by one who had little or no previous familiarity with
rhetoric. The usefulness of these essays would improve exponentially
for someone who came to them equipped with some knowledge of
classical rhetoric. None of the articles deals directly with the problem
of teaching writing or communication. The participants at the con·
ference at which these essays were originally presented had the advan·
tage of ongoing discussions from which they were able to develop
tactics to be implemented in the classroom. While the papers, of themselves, do not give a completely coherent picture of how they might be
applied to the actual teaching of freshman composition, nevertheless,
they would be found worthwhile by someone interested in this task.
A Select Bibliography for Further Reading is appended to the collection
which should be found useful by both the expert and the not-so-expert
alike.
Joa:N R. MORRIS, O.P.
Dominican School of Theology and Philosophy
Berkeley, CaUfornia

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BOOK REVIEWS

Thomas Buckingham and the Contingency of Futures-The Possibility
of Human Freedom: A Study and Edition of Thomas Buckingham,
De contingentia futurorum et arbitrii libertate. By BARTHOLOMEW
R. DE LA TORRE, O.P. University of Notre Dame, The Medieval
Institute Publications in Medieval Studies, Vol. XXV. Notre
Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1987. Pp. xii
+394.
In this volume, Fr. Batholomew de la Torre offers the text and an
extended study of Thomas Buckingham's De contingentia futurorum et
arbitrii libertate, which is the first of six questions of this scholastic's
Quaestiones theologicae, more properly entitled Ostensio meriti liberae
actionis. The six questions are found in their entirety in two English
manuscripts, namely Oxford New College 134 and Oxford Merton 143.
The New CoUege (late fourteenth century) manuscript is earlier and
superior to Merton (early fifteenth century), and accordingly the editor
adopts it except in cases where the Merton reading makes better sense.
The author, Thomas Buckingham, born in the early days of the
fourteenth century, was an Oxford scholar at Merton, chancellor of
Exeter, and died, very likely a victim of the Black Death, in 1348.
The work edited here probably formed a part of Buckingham's exercise
prescribed by University statute for those incepting as Masters of
Theology. In the editor's view, this inception took place sometime between 1341 and 1346, when Thomas departed Oxford to take up duties
at Exeter.
There is some reason to believe that Buckingham may have been a
student of Thomas Bradwardine (p. 7); irt is certain, however, that the
present work "is a sustained attack on Bradwardine's notion that all
future contingents come about by antecedent necessity relative to the
first cause, God" (p. 103) • Bradwardine presented his view regarding
how we must reconcile God's universal and immutable causality with
human freedom in his magnum opus De causa Dei contra Pelagium.
De la Torre describes Bradwardine's position this way: "For Bradwardine, God is the universal cause of all things, including future
contingents. Future contingents are determined by divine antecedent
necessity, for God's will concerning them is omnipotent and unimpedible. Such futures nevertheless remain contingent because only man
as a secondary cause-and no other secondary cause-is responsible
for his free choice. The theory that, once God has determined what a
future shall be, He can still determine otherwise, is patently untenable

BOOK REVIEWS

165

for Bradwardine because it predicates mutability of God and nullifies
all inspired prophecy, including that of Christ" (p. 101).
Bradwardine's exposition here outlined corresponds in its essentials
with what Thomas Aquinas had taught in the previous century. The
freedom or contingency in man's will act is to he understood in terms
of its relationship to secondary or proximate causes. Unlike those
events which are determined to come about by virtue of necessitating
proximate causes, will acts in this respect remain totally undetermined.
Along with this, says Aquinas, we must allow that God, because of
His eternal knowledge, knows all futures-determined, as well as contingent-as present. His knowing future contingents, however, does not
take away the condition of contingency, since the latter condition rests
solely on their mode of occurrence as they relate to secondary or
proximate causes.
Thomas Buckingham finds this explanation inadequate. In order to
safeguard future contingents or human freedom. Buckingham insists
there must be a sense in which the ultimate cause, God, is casually
contingent with respect to the human will act. Though his exposition
is different in many details, Buckingham's fundamental direction is in
accord with what certain predecessors, especially Scotus and Ockham,
had argued regarding the problem of divine foreknowledge and future
contingents. Indeed, in view of the way Buckingham cites Scotus, the
editor considers it reasonable to suppose that he regarded himself a
disciple of the Subtle Doctor (p. 132). There is at least one instance
where Buckingham exhibits a markedly Scotistic and anti-Ockhamist
analysis. This occurs in connection with the explanation as to how in
one and the same instant, because of the different moments of natural
priority and posteriority, the divine will can both will and not will the
same thing.
The editor points out some significant resemblances between Buckingham and the Dominican, Robert Holcot. On the assumption that God's
knowledge of future contingents is itself contingent, Holcot concludes
that revelation could be false: " (1) Scripture could be false; (2)
Abraham could have merited by means of a false faith, and so can
any believer; ( 3) the soul of Christ could have been deceived; (4)
Christ could have preached something false; . . . The similarity between Holcot and Buckingham is obvious" (pp. 134-35). These paradoxical theological statements are logically required corollaries flowing
from the eternal contingency in God's will respecting all things ad
extra. We must bear in mind, however, that in the so-called "composed
sense", on the assumption God wills A, it is impossible that God not
will A. In the "divided sense", however, it is possible that God wills
A and that God not will A.

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BOOK REVIEWS

The editor also points out how Buckingham may have been influenced hy the Franciscan Adam Wodeham, who was a disciple of
Ockham. Adam proposed the following hold conception: " Since a man
is free to act or not to act despite God's foreknowledge, John Doe
can hy his own free choice make God know from all eternity that
John Doe will do a particular thing and similarly John Doe can make
God know from all eternity that John Doe will not do that thing"
(p. 136).
The student of fourteenth century philosophy and theology owes
de la Torre a debt of gratitude for making available the hitherto un·
edited De contingentw futurorum of Thomas Buckingham. Although,
as he readily admits, this work had only a modest influence on later
scholasticism, Buckingham does serve as a clear witness to the Scotistic
school of thought at Oxford in this important matter.
The edition is well prepared, and the editor deserves special credit
in that he had no more than two manuscripts to serve as a basis for
his text.
FRANCIS E. KELLEY

Franciscan Institute; St. Bonaventure University
St. Bonaventure, New York

A Catalogue of Thomists, 1270-1900. Compiled by LEONARD A. KENNEDY, C.S.B. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1987. Pp.
240, with index.
As a one-time editor of Theological Studies pointed out a number
of years ago, "it is not easy to judge whether bibliography has served
theology well, " since the vastness of the latter and the complexities of
the former have made progress in this field slow and hesitant. This
is particularly true in the area of Thomistic studies where one would
expect to find extensive coverage.
The Mandonnet-Destrez-Chenu Bibliographie thomiste, a restrospec·
tive classified list covering the period from 1800 to 1920, includes some
2,219 entries. Bourke's Thomistic Bibliography (1920-1940) continues
the record in a carefully organized volume with a remarkable number
of 5,666 titles (the numbering begins with serial no. 1001). The
Miethe-Bourke Thomistic Bibliography updates the record from 1940
to 1978 with some 4,079 items, including the many special issues devoted to St. Thomas on the 700th anniversary of his death in 1974.
The Bulletin thomiste supplemented the above from 1924 until 1965
when it was superseded hy Rassegna di letteratura tomistica.

BOOK REVIEWS

167

This Catalogue of Tkomists, compiled by Leonard A. Kennedy,
C.S.B., of the Center for Thomistic Studies at the University of St.
Thomas, has now set for itself the ambitious goal of listing Thomists
from 1270 to 1900.
The Introduction states certain limitations: " A decision was made to
be tolerant of incomplete source material. " Sources .not available " in
an excellent library, and difficult to obtain by interlibrary loan, were
not consulted unless they seemed likely to yield more than minimal new
information. " Only a minimum of information is given for each entry,
hut authors are listed even if some of this " minimal information "
is lacking. The terminal date of 1900 was selected because most of the
later names are available in the above-mentioned bibliographies and
lists. According to the author, these decisions on scope were made because " a full account would require years of research, and result in
a several-volumework. "
In the body of the Catalogue names are arranged chronologically,
but where numbers warrant it entries have been grouped within a
century by religious congregation and by country and subarranged
chronologically up to 1800, after which date an alphabetical arrange·
ment has been followed.
No effort has been made to include all the works of an individual
Thomist. If only one or two titles are given in the sources, they are
recorded, but if many are listed only the most significant are included
here. The actual number given sems to run from one to :five with a
few names having none. Printed works are given preference over manuscripts. These titles, moreover, have been largely abbreviated and give
date and place of first publication only. The source of the informa·
tion, however, is coded in square brackets after the title.
According to the compiler, the most difficult problem was to deter·
mine who was a Thomist. Since " there are no criteria universally
agreed on," the selection was made with fairly liberal guidelines: an
indication in the title of the work, the nature of the work, or a state·
ment of alleged Thomism by an author himself or one of his historians,
unless evidence contradicted this.
The Introduction includes a table listing by century the number of
Dominicans, other religious, .and non-religious included. This categori·
zation reveals that of the total number of 2,034 entries more than half
of the Thomists in each century were Dominicans, except for the
nineteenth century when only eleven percent were members of the
Order. Of the other religious listed, only Jesuits are represented in
large numbers and their peak contribution was reached in the seven·
teenth century.
The table also shows that around A.D. 1400 there was a noticeable

168

BOOK REVIEWS

drop in the numbers of Thomists. After that date, the number increased
until the eighteenth century when another significant decrease occurred.
In the nineteenth century the number again increased dramatically,
though not among Dominicans. Publication of Leo XIII's encyclical
Aeterni Patris, issued in 1879, would not alone account for this he·
cause a large number of publications had already appeared before
that date.
There is great need for a good reference work covering this early
period of Thomistic bibliography hut this Catalogue is not the answer.
The only library listed in the acknowledgments is that of the Pontifical
Institute of Mediaeval Studies (Toronto). Under the heading "Works
Referred To" eighty·one sources are given hut many major general
references are omitted. There is, for example, no indication that
Chevalier was consulted nor is there any reference to the classified list
of theologians in the Enciclopedw Cattolica. Specific titles are also
lacking, as, e.g., Paul Wyser's Der Thomismus.
The four and one-half page Introduction does not give a clear state·
ment of purpose, nor does it give any orientation or historical setting
for the material on Thomism and Thomists. The statistical table is a
good overview hut lacks adequate interpretation.
The arrangement and information given under each entry are in
accordance with the criteria set up by the author, hut it is unfortunate
that more information was not given when it was readily available.
Many of those using this handbook will not have access to most of the
sources used. This means that anyone who is searching for information
will find limited facts since each entry gives only name, dates (if
known) , source, and a selection of abbreviated titles of publications.
In a few cases only the name is given without any qualification.
Any author dealing with the medieval period faces more than theological problems. Medieval names are among the most difficult to
index. The author states that " because of the large size of the index
(24 p.) it has not been possible to have more than one entry per per·
son " and decisions have therefore been made on " an ad hoc basis."
If all persons who lived before 1400 are entered under their anglicized
Christian names, cross-references are essential from the Latin or
vernacular form. Likewise, those who ordinarily had a Latin name in
the Renaissance period need a cross-reference from whichever form is
not used. In a work of such importance as a catalogue of Thomists from
1270 to 1900 a good index is of prime importance.
Is is only asking for trouble, for ·example, to find Robert of Orford
(De Colletorto), whose variations of name include Tortocollo, Here·
ford, Orphordius (c. 1300), listed under Robert of Tortocollo with no
cross-references from the other forms and no reference to the con·

BOOK BEVIEWS

169

fusion that exists with William of Macclesfeld (d.1303). Another case
in point, among many, is the entry of Harvey Nedellec (Hervaeus
Natalis) under " Natalis, Harvey " with no cross-reference from the
other forms. Perhaps scholars can handle this situation but certainly
not aspiring students. A number of names seem to have been omitted
hut one hesitates to say that they are not here because they may be
under some obscure form of their names. It is even difficult to recog·
nize Jacques Benigne Bossuet under "Bossuet, James B."
The popes are another problem. Most popes are not known by their
family names; e.g., to list Pius IX under "Mastai Ferretti, Giovanni
Maria, " without a cross-reference from Pius IX, or to find Leo XIII
listed under "Pecci, Joachim," without a corresponding reference
only confuses the reader. And the farther hack one goes the less
familiar will the family name he, as in the case of "Roger, Peter,"
with no reference from Clement VI (1291-1352). Even "Roger,
Pierre " would have been more helpful. Including the name of the
pope in the body of the work does not solve the problem.
There are also a number of typographical errors in the spelling of
even common names (e.g., Savanrola instead of Savonarola), and
there are many errors in simple filing. This tends to destroy one's
confidence in the work.
The shortcomings in this book are partly due to the relative brevity
of the work, granted the vast range of areas it covers, but even more
basicly because of a lack of awareness of the problems involved in
doing bibliographical work. Readers who consult the Catalogue will
no doubt evaluate it in terms of their particular purposes. Librarians,
however, will find it most confusing for reference and bibliographical
work.
CLAUDIA CARLEN, I.H.M.
St. John's Provinci.al Semmary
Plymouth, Michigan

ERRATA
IN THE GENERAL INDEX, VOLUMES 1 TO 50
Page 1831 line 23 ff., should read:
Anderson, James F. The Bond of Being.
16 (1953) 135-137
(Smith, R., O.P.) ...........................
--The Cause of Being. (Thomist Staff) •••...•••. 16 (1953) 595-596
--Reflections on the Analogy of Being.
(Mcinerny, R.) .............................
32 (1968) 276-277
Anderson, James N. D. Christianity and Comparative Religion.
(Rebeiro, M.) ..............................
35 (1971) 522-524
-Morality, Law, and Grace. (Milmore, A.1 O.P.) •• 37 (1973) 392-393
Page 185, line 81 "Bachelor ••. 11 should read:
Batchelor, Edward, ed. HomoseX'l.laZityand Ethics.
(Barry, R. L.1 O.P.) ........................

45 (1981) 490-493

(entry should appear on page 186)
Page 1901 after line 111 insert the following:
Brandon, S. G. F. The Judgment of the Dead: The Idea of
Life after Death in the Major Religions.
33 (1969) 591-593
(Cenkner, W., O.P.) ........................
Page 196, line 28 ff.1 should read :
Collins, Gary R. Effective Counseling.
37 (1973) 262-263
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) .......••••••.••••••
--Fractured Personalities: The Psychology of Mental Illness.
37 (1973) 790-791
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) •.........•.....•..•
--Man in Transition: The Psychology of Human Development.
37 (1973) 262-263
(Nessel, W. J., O.S.F.S.) ••••••••••••••••••••
Page 198, line 9, "Copelston ••• " should read
Copleston, Frederick C.1 S.J. Aquinas.
(Thomist Staff) .............................
(entry should appear after "Copi")

171

19 (1956)

283

172

ERRATA

Page 204, after line 36, insert the following:
[Dupre, L.] Transcendent Bel/hood: The Loss a·nd Rediscovery of the
43 (1979) 674-675
Inner Life. (Marsh, M.) .•.•.•••.•.•.•...••..
Page 221, line 12, should read :
Hudson, Wayne. The Marxist Philosophy of Ernst Bloch.
(Him.es, K. R., O.F.M.) •.•.••••••.•••••••••.
49 (1985) 660-662
Page 233, after line 31, insert the following:
[Maritain, J.] Dieu et la permission du mal.
(Heath, T. R., O.P.) ........................

28 (1964) 533-534

Page 238, line 35, "Millet •.. " should read :
Milet, Jean. God or Christ'I
(Johnson, E. A., C.S.J.) ••••••••••••.•••••••

47 (1983) 623-625

(entry should appear after "Midgley")
Pog.e 270, line 3, "VandePol •.. "should read:
Pol, W. H. van de. The Christian Dilemma: Catholic ChurchRef-0rmation. (Pater, T.) ........•••..•...•••.
16 (1953) 585-591
(entry should appear on page 249)
Page 290, after line 12, insert the following :
Marsh, M. 43 (1979) 674

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUME 58 (1989)
ARTICLES
PAGE

Barry, Robert, 0. P. Feeding the Comatose and the Common Good
in the Catholic Tradition .
1
Beards, Andrew. Creator and Causality: A Critique of Pre-Critical
573
Objections
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian
173
Moral Life: Its Significance for Human Life Issues .
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious Truth: A Comparison
461
of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan .
Galvin, John P. The Marvelous Exchange: Raymund Schwager's
675
Interpretation of the History of Soteriology .
Guagliardo, Vincent, O.P. Aquinas and Heidegger: The Question of
407
Philosophical Theology
635
Guarino, Thomas. Betti and the Hermeneutics of Dogma .
Hall, Douglas C. Immediacy and Mediation in Aquinas: In I Sent.,
31
Q.1, A. 5
281
Irwin, Kevin W. Recent Sacramental Theology III •
Jaki, Stanley L. Thomas and the Universe .
545
Lindbeck, George. Response to Bruce Marshall [Aquinas as Post403
liberal Theologian] .
Marshall, Bruce D. Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian. [Lindbeck] 353
Matteo, Anthony M. Grounding the Human Conversation .
235
McKinney, Ronald H., S.J. The Quest for an Adequate Proportionalist Theory of Value .
56
McMahon, Kevin A. Economics, Wisdom, and the Teaching of the
Bishops in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas
91
O'Reilly, Paul. What is Intelligible Matter? .
74
481
Peterson, John. On the Bearer of ' True ' •
259
Poirier, Maben Walter. A Comment on Polanyi and Kuhn
Porter, Jean. De Ordine Cwritatis: Charity, Friendship, and Justice
in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae •
197
Rudebusch, George. Aristotelian Predication, Augustine, and the
Trinity
• 587
Schindler, David L. Catholicism, Public Theology, and P.ostmodernity: On Richard John Neuhaus's Catholic Moment
107
Staley, Kevin M. Happiness: The Natural End of Man?
215
• 315
Steiss1 Albert J. Philosophy of Art: A Postscript .

INDE.X OF ARTICLES Continued
PAGE

Surin, Kenneth. Towards a 'Materialist' Critique of ' Religious
Pluralism ': A Polemical Examination of the Discourse of
John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith .
Thiemann, Ronald F. In Praise of Pluralism. [Stout]
Wilson, William M. A Different Method, a Different Case: The Theological Program of Julian Hartt ·and Austin Farrer .
Woods, Martin T. The Reduction of Essence in the Thought of
Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl

655
489
599
443

REVIEWS
Buckley, Michael J., S.J. At the Origins of Modern Atheism.
(Bradley, Denis J. M.)
Caputo, John D. Radical Hermeneutics: Repetition, Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutical Project. (Lauder, Robert E.)
Connell, R. J. Substance and Modern Science. (Centore, F. F.)
Davidson, Herbert A. Proofs for Eeternity, Creation, and the Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy.
(Redpath, Peter A.)
DeLaTorre, Bartholomew R., O.P. Thomas Buckingham and the
Contingency of Futures-the Possibility of Human Freedom. (Kelley, Francis E.)
Dupre, Louis. Marx's Social Critique of Culture. (Samples, John)
Elders, Leo J. Die Metaphysik des Thomas van Aquin in histori. scher Perspektive. 2. Teil. (Owens, Joseph, C.Ss.R.)
Ferreira, M. Jamie. Skepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British
Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman.
(Turner, Frank M.)
Frede, Michael. Essays in Ancient Philosophy. (Benitez, E. E.)
Geffre, Claude. The Risk of Interpretation: On Being Faithful to
the Christian Tradition in a Non-Christian Age. (Dodds,
Michael J., O.P.) .
Hilmy, S. Stephen. The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a
New Philosophical Method. (Churchill, John)
·.
Rittinger, Russell. A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.
(Califano, Joseph J.) .
Hudson, Deal W., and Matthew J. Mancini, eds. Understanding
Maritain: Philosopher and Friend. (Aeschliman, M. D.)
Hughes, Gerald J., S.J., ed. The Philosophical Assessment of Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston. (Ingham,
Nicholas, O.P.) .
Jelly, Frederick M., O.P. Madonna: Mary in the Catholic Tradition.
(Kirwin, George, O.M.I.) .
Kennedy, Leonard A., C.S.B., comp. A Catalogue of Thomists, 12701900. (Carlen, Claudia, I.H.M.) .
Kenny, Anthony. Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical
Theology. (Quinn, Philip L.) .

144
722
331

528

164
346
337

531
522

156
533
343
727

339
155
166
709

INDEX OF REVIEWS Oontinued
PAGE

Kiing, Hans. The Incarnation of God: An Introduction to Hegel's
Theological Thought as Prologomena to a Future Christology. (Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap.) .
Lash, Nicholas. Easter in Ordinary: Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God. (Proudfoot, Wayne)
Lawler, Michael G. Symbol and Sacrament: A Contemporary Sacramental Theology. (Irwin, Kevin W.)
Macintyre, .Alasdair. Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Kerlin,
Michael J.) .
Marshall, Bruce. Christology in Conflict: The Identity of a Saviour
in Rahner and Barth. (Buckley, James J.)
Marx, Werner. Is There a Measure on Earth? Foundations for a
Nonmetaphysical Ethics. (Gallagher, Shaun)
McDonough, Richard M. The Argument of the Tractatus. [Reply
to Churchill's review in The Thomist, 52, no. 1] (McDonough,
Richard M.) .
-[Response to McDonough's Reply] (Churchill, John)
Meissner, W. W., S.J. Life and Faith: Psychological Perspectives
on Religious Experience. (Stock, Michael, O.P.)
Moss, Jean Dietz, ed. Rhetoric and Praxis: The Contribution of
Classical Rhetoric to Practical Reasoning. (Morris, John R.,
O.P.)
Nicholas of Cusa. Nicolai de Gusa Opera Omnia. X/2b, Opuscula
II, Fasc. 2b, and XI/1, De Beryllo. (Biechler, James E.)
Nieli, Russell. Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary
guage: A Study of Viennese Positivism. (Riska, Augustin)
Noonan, John T. The Believer and the Powers That Are: Cases,
History, and Other Data Bearing on the· Relation of Religion and Government. (Whitt, D. R., O.P.)
Oddie, William. What Will Happen to God? Feminism and the Reconstruction of Christian Belief. (Soule, Warren J. A.) .
Orsy, Ladislas, S.J. The Church: Learning and Teaching. (Wood,
Susan K.)
Pagels, Elaine. Adam, Eve, and the Serpent. (Cavadini, John C.)
Rachels, James. The End of Life. (Moreland, J.P.)
Rahner, Karl. Theological Investigations. Vol. 21, Science and
Christian Faith. (Phan, Peter C.)
Shannon, Thomas A., and Lisa Sowle Cahill. Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An Inquiry into the Vatican "Instruction •.. " (Ashley, Benedict M., O.P.)
Theron, Stephen. Morals as Founded on Natural Law. (Simpson,
Peter)
Trembath, Kern Robert. Evangelical Theories of Bi"blical Inspiration: A Review and Proposal. (Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P.)

693
505
732
512
149
539

319
327
160

162
725
349

704
515
519
509
714
701

153
341
734