THE MUNUS OF TRANSMITTING HUMAN LIFE:
A NEW APPROACH TO I-IUMANAE VITAE
JANET

E. SMITH

University of Dallas
Irving, Texas

'TI

RE ONLY ACQUAINTANCE 1bhat most rea;ders have
with the Latin of Humanae Vitae is the tit1le. It is likey that fow laymen and perhaps eV'en fow schofars make
ire:ferenoeto the Latin text; indeed, it is ireported that I-Iumanae
Vitae was originally composed in ltalian, and it seems that aH
available translations of the text al'e based primarily on the
Italian V'ersion. But since the official text of Humanae Vitae
is in Latin and since translations are necessa11ilydeficient, we
shouild not be surprised that the ava:ilahle translations fail to
convey a:M the nuances of the official text. (Latin, of course,
is tihe langua:ge in which all official documents of the Church
are written.) This study seeks to show that attenti¥eness to
certain words fa the Latin text, most particularly the word
munus, uncovers important eonnections between Humanae
Vitae and pe['spect[ves of the Church, perspectives particularly highlighted in the documents of Vatican II. It also seeks
to show that the La.tin provides greater philosophical precision
for certain key teaohings of the text, most particularly section
11: "each and every maritail act must remain open to proc11eation."
It is ii.mportant to note that some of the crucial Latin words
of the document cal'ry connotations tihat cannot possibly be
captured ihy 1any one English word. Indeed, some of the words
convey concepts and attitudes that are quite foreign to
speak:iers of modern English; to convey the meaning of some
terms requires a. fairly lengthy expl,ication of notions not immed:iate1ly and directly graspaible hy ail readers. Even to the
reade[' of Latin, the text does not 'easily
its secrets. The

385

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JANET E. SMITH

Latin of the document has no identifiahle souTee of reliabJe
deoipherment; it is a kind of " modern " 0 r " Church " Latin,
of elassical Latin and the lanwhich is an odd
g1uage the Ohurch ha:s deve1oped oveil.' the centuries. The method of translation employed here has invo lved consultation of
classical and medieval dictionaries, reference to arguably rep!l1esentativeclassical and medieval authors, tracing of the word
'being ioonsidered through t1he documents of Vatican II, con'sideration of 1appearance of the word in other Church documents, cross-reference to other uses of the word within
Huma,nae Vitae itself, and reference to the Italian" original." 1
1

1

1

1

for this article reference was made to six English transl In preparation
lations: (a) the translation done by the NC News Service, made widely available by the Daughters of Saint Paul, Of Human Life (Boston, Mass.:
Daughters of St. Paul, 1968), hereafter referred to as the "usual translation"
and designated by HY; (b) the translation by the Catholic Truth Society
printed in John Horgan, Humanae Vitae and the Bishops (Shannon, Ireland:
Irish University Press, 1972), 33-53; this translation was modified and reprinted in (c) The Pope Speaks 13 (1969): 329-346, and in (d) the Vatican
Press Office translation, " Encyclical Letter on the Regulation of Births " in
Vatican II: More Post-Conciliar Doauments, ed. Austin Flannery, O.P.
(Northport, N. Y.: Costello Publishing Company, 1982), 397-416; ( e) the
translation by Rev. Marc Calegari, S.J., Humanae Vitae (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1978), which has undergone a further, as of yet unpublished,
revision. 'There is one translation (f) that was made entirely from the Latin,
by Rev. A. J. Durand, Humanae Vitae: A New Translation (Bethlehem, Pa.:
Catechetical Communications;
no date given); it is, though, not widely
available.
Rev. Calegari, in private communication with this author, noted that the
document was originally written in Italian, though the Latin text is the
official text. He also stated that the modern language versions were made
from the Italian text. My comparisons of the translations of Humanae Vitae
with the Italian and the Latin versions indicate that Rev. Calegari is correct in saying that most modern versions are based on the Italian, though
a few, most notably that by the Catholic Truth Society, have clearly made
reference to the Latin. The Latin in several places does not completely correspond with the Italian; the differences are not of tremendous significance
but nonetheless in nuanced ways shift the tone or focus. When the Latin
diverges from the Italian, it seems proper to give preference to the Latin text,
since it is the official text. It is, however, also true that some of the Latin
phrases are extremely difficult to translate and that recourse to the Italian
is most helpful for determining what the Latin is meant to say.

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387

A more accurate translation iand £uHer understanding of a
rfew key words should lead to a better understanding 0£ the
teruchings of the document. The word munus in parliculiar will
receive detailed consideration; a few other anomalies will also
ibe noted. Indeed, iif the views offered here a:borut translation
are ·OOTTecl, lit wouM 1suggest that many inteirpreters of the
document hav:e not fuLly realized the ioomplete framework of
the document, which concerns not just the question 0£ " birth
regulation" and natural ilaw hut ·also the very natrure of the
Christian ,calling of marriage :and the place of " transmitting
Jiifo " within that rcaJling. Interpreters have perhaps placed the
emphaisis of the do,cument on natural laiw to the detriment of
a srpecificaLlyChristian concern: commitment to a free .and responsiible participation in Christ'·s mission and a recognition
ithrut the invita:tion to partiicipate in that mission is a gift that
enta:ils ennobling !l'esponsiihilities.
The second portion of this study will show how more precise
translrutions and understandings of some key terms in bhe text
can provide ]urther justification ifor some of the more controversial teachings of the document. Of :particular interest will
:be the claim that each ,and every act of marita;l intercourse
mrust (l.1emain " orpen " to procreation and the claim that the
unitive and procreativ;e meanings of marital intercourse are
inseparable.
A third and final section of this paper will explore what may
·be caHed the" interiority" of munus. There the daim will be
made that fulfi1lingthe munus of transmitting human life or of
having children is essential to the uJ.tima.te puirpose of mar:ria;ge: the sanctification of the spouses and their children and
their transformation into the 1loving, generous, and self-sacrificing individuals all Christians are meant to !be.

The Meaning of "M unus ,,
The very fi:vst line of Humanae Vitae-Humana,e vitae tra.dendae munus gravissimum-1presents difficulties for the translator; !bhis line is usuwlly rendered "The most serious duty of

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JANET E. SMITH

transmitting human lirfe .... " ':Dhe translation "duty" [s not
incorrect but 1it is inaidequate, as is any
to capture all the
iimportant connotations orf munus. And it i:s important that we
get this rword ri!ght, foc it appears at several crucial juncture's
in the document. Indeed, its appearance in the first line carries no small weight. The chief prorblem with the translation
".duty" for munus is that for many modern E!ll!glish-,speaking
people the word " duty" ihas a negative connota,tion. A duty
iis often thought of a;s something that one ought to do, all.though
SOIJllethingthat one often is reluctant to do; those wiho are re:sponsiJble will perform their duties and may enjoy so doing,
hut they are thougiht to tmnscenid what is negative ahout them.
The word munus, though, truly seems to be without negative
oonnotations; in rfad a munus is something that one is honored
and, in a sense, privileged to have. " Duty " is more properly
the English translation of officiwm, one of the possible synonyms of munus. 2 It seems fair to say that a munus often entruils officna, that is, when one receives 1a munus one is also then
committed Ito certain duties. What, then, is 1a munus?
(Throughout most of the fo:llowing anrulysis munus--plru.ral
munera-wii.11 he used, rather than ,any single English word or
a multipllicity orf wo11ds; for the references to the documents of
Vatican H the translation used in the .Abbott text will 1be given
inparentheses).
The English deriviatives of munus are revealing of some
meanings of the WO'.l'd that 1are not oom-.;eyed by the word
"duty." For instance, "municipaJl," "rpatr.imony," perhaps
"matrimony," and" munificent" are 1all derivatives of munus.
" Municipal" comes from the Latin municeps which refers to a
hoMer o[ pulblic office who has significant responsiJbilities.
1

z.4_ Latin Dictionary by Charlton T. Lewis and Charles Short (Oxford:
Clarendon Press, 1975 impression) gives "officium," "mVwisterium," and
" honos" as synonyms for "munus " but it also notes that it is a munus
which confers or entails officia (" munus significat offecium, cum dicitur quis
munere fungi. Item donum quod officii causa datur ") . Cicero uses the
phrase "munus officm," which clearly signals a difference between the two
words.

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A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

" Patrimony " refers to the inheritance or munus rbhat one receh,,es from one's father (pafJer) or family; it too entails certain [1espons.i:bilities,for maintaining the family name. "Matrimony" is somewhat more difficult rto decipher; " muwia,'' which
mme strictly means " duty " than " munus '' seems to he the
etymofogical root of "matrimony.'' It means, then, the "duty
of being a mother," which apparently is what marriage oon£ers.3 FinaHy, one who is munificent, is one wiho gives (facere
munera-or gifts. Indeed a classicist encountering this rword
would ,a;s readily translate it as ",gift," "wealth and riches,"
"ihonor," 1or "!responsibility" as weH as "duty." Other Eng1lish translations commonly rused are " role," " task," "m]s,sion,"
"office," and "functions." Indeed alil of these are on occasion
Jegitimate translations, <and on a few occasiions the word embraces all of these connotations. It is the judgment of this
author that munus in the first line of Humanae Vitae p11ov.ides
such an occasion.
One common classica,l Latin use of the word wouild be in
reference to bhe :bestowwlof a rpublic office or responsibility on
a citizen. Be:ing selected for such an offioe or responsiihility
rwou1d he considered an honor; the selection woutld entail certain duties, hut ones that the recipient willingly embraces. The
word
,also often used synonymously for " gift " or " reward: " 4 it is ;something ireeily given by the g,iver and often, hut
not ru1ways, with the iconnotation that the recipient has merited
the gift in some sense; it is given ;as 'a means of honoring the
recipient. In Virgil's Aeneid, munera are often the prizes won
1
)

1

1

s St. Thomas (Summa theologiae, III, q. 44, a. 2) asks the question,
"Whether matrimony is fittingly named?" He gives a multiform answer;
he notes that Augustine thought "a woman ought to marry for no other reason, except to be a mother " (Thomas cites Contra Faus tum XIX, xxvi).
Thomas also notes that the upbringing of children is more often the duty
( munia) of the mother. Then again, the source could be "matrem muniens,"
which would refer to the husband's duty to protect the wife. He gives other
possibilities but these have no connection with " munus" or "munia."
4 Roy J. Deferrari,
A Latin-English Dictionary of St. Thomas Aquinas
(Boston, Mass.: St. Paul Editions, 1960), lists only "gift" as a suitable
translation for "munus."

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JANET E. SMITH

at rgames (see Book V, 282 and 532). Men give munera to the
gods (Aeneid Book IV, 217) .and gods give munera to men;
r£or instance, Cice:J.10 ha:s the gods bestowing rthe munus of
rpilrilosorphyon man (Fam. 15. 4. 16) .
In. scriptu::re (the Vulgate), munus rulmost railways has the
sense of " gift." Men offer gifts rto other men to win favors
rfrom them (Gn 3: 15); they are 1rudvised to give the gift of
"first fruits" to God (Lv 2: 15); 5 and the Mrugi ibl'ling gifts to
the Christ child (Mt 2: 11) .
Di<!tionaries ifor St. Thomas recommend tihe translation of
"gift" [or munus. For Thomas, munera ·a:re both gifts that
men 1girve to God, 1rus 1a ;part of their oblations and sacrifices, and
gifts that God gives to man, such as an :integral nature, and
gra:oe, and the >aihilityto prophesy. It ris in Aquinas's commentaries on the Epistle to the Ephesians 1and on the Second Epistle
to Timothy that he int:mduces the use of munus that is frequent m Vatican II. In 1both works he uses munera to refer
:to the different gifts with which men alI"e endowed to serve the
ChUireh and God; in the Epistle to the Ephesians the reference
!i:s to diversi status et munera (diverse positions and gifts), such
as rbeing an 1apostle,prophet, or teacher. In his commentary on
rthe Sercond Epistle to Timothy he is commenting on Paul's
claim that the duty of admonition belongs to the priest; he
states that this comes from a condition of divinorum munerum,
or divine gifts, and is a munus that obliges one to serve God.
On another v;ery :di:lforent, but perhaps irelated, ieveil ii:s the
reference to the Holy Sp[rit as munus; in the Summa Theologica, I, q.39, a.8, Thomas appmrpriates fmm Hilary that
God the F1a1ther is eternity, God the Son is :image, rand God the
Holy Ghost is gift, donum or munus. ThiS' associaition was continued in Chur.ch teaching. For instance Leo XJII's encyclical
on the Holy Spirit was entitled Divinum Illud Munus (That
Divine Gift/Office). "Munus" here refers fo the munus 0£
bringing men to ·salvation, w:hich Christ :received !from His
5 In the Old Testament,
Dt 10: 17.

gifts are at times understood to be bribes, e.g.

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

891

Father and
He transmitted for completion to the Holy
Spi11it. Leo XIII speaks of the Holy Spirit in these terms: " Fo'l."
He not only :brings to us His divine gifts [dona], hut is the
Author of rthem and is Himself the :supreme Gift [munuS'], who,
proceeding from the mutua1l love of the Father and the Son, is
justly 1believed to be and
called" Gift [Donum] of God most
High." 6 He also mentions that the Holy Spirit is .invoked in
the liturgy as the Giver of Gifts (Dator Munerum) .7 The sense
of
then, is deeply em!hedded in the Church's use of the
wo11d munus, which a1lso carries some sense of giftedness hy the
Spirit. This sense becomes even clear:er in the documents of
Vatican II.
1

" M unus " in the Documents of Va.tic.anII
The documents of Vatican II makce liheml use of the wmd
munus;
appearances are Hsted in the index. 8 The usage of
"munus" in the documents is true to its classical and Christian :l:mrifage. A review of the pa:rticular employment of this
word •in the document indicates the 1lofty, if comp1icated, sense
that the word has.
The words " vocation " (vocatio) , " mission" (missio) ,
"ministry" (ministerium)-wihich seems often to be a :synonym for" apostolate" (apostola:tus)-" munus," and "duty"
(ofjicium) are often linked and occasionaHy interchang1eable.
The order of the list just given suggests a possibfo ranking of
these words as far as comprehensiveness is concerned; i.e. all
Christians havie the mission of bringing Cfilist to the world;
they do so through different ministries or a:postolates that ins A translation of Leo XIII's Divinum Illud Munus is available in The
Papal Enayalicals 1878-1903, ed. by Claudia Carlen, I.H.M. (Raleigh: MacGrath Publishing Co., 1981), 409-417. This passage is found on page 413.
1 Ibid., 416.
s It appears 48 times in Lumen Gentium, 44 times in Gaudium et Spes, 40
times in Ohristus Dominus (on bishops), 21 times in Presbytei·ionim Ordinis
(on priests), 12 times in Apostoliaam Aotuositatem (on the laity), 19 times
in Ad Gentes (on missionary activity), and 11 times in Gravissimum Educationis (on Christian education), and elsewhere as well.

JANET E. SMITH

various munera and carry certain duties. The second
section of Apostolic:am Aotuosiwtem (on the !laity) weaves
these terms together; t:he foUoiwingpassage i1lustr:ates one vari·aJtion of the interconnection of these terms:
The Church was established for this purpose, that by spreading the
kingdom of God everywhere for the glory of God, she might make
all men participants in Christ's saving redemption, and that
through them the whole world might truly be ordered to God. All
apostolic [ apostolatus] activity of the Mystical Body of Christ is
directed to this end, which the Church achieves through all of its
members, in various ways; for the Christian vocation [ vocatio] by
its very nature is a vocation [vocatio] to an apostolate [aposiolatus]. Just as in the make-up of a living body, no member is able
to be altogether passive, but must share in the operation of the
body along with the life of this body, so too, in the body of Christ,
which is the Church, the whole body must work towards the increase of the body," according to the function and measure of e.ach
member of the body" (Eph 4: 16). Indeed in this body the connection and union of the members is so great (cf. Eph 4: 16) that
the member which does not contribute to the increase of the body
according to its own measure is said to benefit neither itself nor
the Church.
There is in the Church a diversity of ministries [ministerii] but a
unity of mission [missionis]. The munus of teaching, sanctifying,
and governing in the name and with power of Christ has been conferred by Christ on the Apostles and their successors. But the
laity, having been made participants in the priestly, prophetic,
and kingly rrvunus, are to discharge their own share in this mission
of the whole people of God, in the Church and in the world (AA
.9

As this passage swesses, in 0:11der for the Christian mission to
succeed, eaich member of the mystical !body of Christ must :fulfili his or her apostola.te. Both " missrion" and " apostolate "
rare closely linked with " vocation." As stated in the passage
aibove, " The Ohristian votcation, lby its very nature, is also a
caH to .an apoiStofate" (AA
. The words "vocation" and
1

9 The abbreviations for the texts of Vatican II are standard.
The translation given here is my own, as are all the translations in this essay, unless explicitly indicated otherwise.

A NEW LOOK AT HDMANAE VITAE

398

" mission " .apply to two different aspects of the same reality;
God calls us to be Christians and because of that caJl, we have
a mission, ·a general assignment, qua Christian to transform
the worild; 1the pairtic:ular way in which we are ca!llied to do this
. our aposto 1ate or nnmstry.
. .
(Both " m1ssmn
. . " an d " aposto1s
la.te" have as their t:oot meaning " to he sent .." The difference
between an arpostolate and ia ministry is not dear, though perhaps a ministry usually involves a closer oonnection with ibhe
sacramenta:l '1ife and the institutionaJ Ch1.rnc!h,wherea:s an apostolate may •refer mo!l'e generally to any commitment to good
•works. Along with the ministries •and/or apostolates that the
Ch11istian mission spaiwns, there oome gifts [dona and charismata] that enable the l'ecipient to fulfill his or her duties
[officia] (AA 8) .10
.11he genera:! meaning of "munus,'' then,. is close to other
words that carry the general meaning of something that the
Christian is called to do·. "M unus," while close in meaning to
mission •and a.postolate;11 seems both broader and more specific
in its meaning; in certain passages " munus '' seems to ref er fo
those gifts or ·charisms thrut enable one to carry out one's ministries or apostolatJe; in other passages " munus " seems to be a
ibroader term than ministry or apostolate (one's munus would
determine which ministries or apostola.tes one would engage
in). "Munus" is oocasionally trianslated simply as "task,"
10 A

passage from Familiaris Oonsortio connects gifts, charisms, and
"This [evangelical] discernment happens through the sense of the
faith, which is a gift [donum] imparted to all the faithful by the Spirit, and
is therefore a work of the whole Church according to the variety of the
multiple gifts [donorum] and charisms [oharismatum], together with the
munere [responsibility]
and the duty [officio] of each and in accord with
these, all working together towards a greater understanding and accomplishment of the word of God." ( FO, 5)
11 "LG 20 speaks of the munus· (office) of those appointed to the episcopate
being chief among the ministries entrusted to the early Church. LG 24
asserts that the duty [munus] of being witnesses to Christ which the Lord
co=itted to the shepherds of his people is a true service [verum ••. serviti·um] and in sacred literature is significantly called dialconia. or ministry
[ministerium] • .At LG 33 we find "The laity are called [vooantur] by God
so that by exercising their proper function [suum proprium munus] ... "
munera;

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JANET E. SMITH

ibut ro1Utinely the tasks referred to have rthe natu11e of a solemn
"a:ssignment." "Munus" quite regularly refers to a special
assignment that is .entrusted to one, the completion of which
is vital for the srtwcessful institution of the kingdom of God.
It
mnferred as ·an honor, often ·empo.wers one, and entaHs
serious responsibilities and obligations. DraJWting shrurp distinctions between these words is not possihle, but the above discussion. should serve to indicate art least loosely the association of
these words.
Lumen Gentium lays out the munera of many of the participants in the Christian mission. This document, by no means
uniquely, has as a theme the distribution of characteristic participation of different members of the Church in the triple
and King (LG 31).
munera of Christ, i.e., Priest,
Christians, in their various callings, participate in these
munera; they do so ihy fulfilling other munera, specifically entrusted to them. For instance, Mrury's munus (role) is being
the Mother of God (LG 53 and 56), which 1also confe11s on her
a materna,l mrunus (duty) towa11ds all men (LG 60). Christ
gave Peter several mune1'a: for instance Peter was given the
munus (power) of ibinding and loosening and the grande
munus (special duty) of spreading the Christian name:whioh wrus also :giranted to the apost1es. The apostles were assigned the munera. (great duties) of "giving witness to the
gospel, to the ministration of the Holy and of Justice for God's
gilory" (LG 9ll). To help them fulrfill these munera, they were
granted a speciad outpouring of the Holy Spirit (LG 9ll) . By
virtilJle of his munus (office), the Roman Pontiff ha;s "£ull, supreme, and universal :power " in the Church (LG 9l2) and also,
·by virtue 0£ rhis munus (office), he is endowed with rinf.a.llibility
(LG 43). Bishorps, by virtue of thei!r episcopal 1consecration,
have the munus (office) of preaching and teaching (LG 21).
The la;ity, too,
.in the priestly, prophetic, and kingly
munus of Christ, have their own mission [missio]; they are pa;rrticulaJ.1lycalled [vocantur] to the munus (proper function) of
"working, Jik!e Jeaven, for tihe iSanclilication of the world from
1

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

895

within, and espeoiailly:so by the 1w.itnessof their ilives. By shining :forth with faith, hope, and charity, they Mle to mani:fest
Christ to others" (LG 81). Munera afle coru£erred by one
superior in po wer UipOn another. 1t is :important to note that
Christ is routinely aclmowledged as the source of the munera.
£or ,eruch of the above-mentioned 1groups.12 Munera are not
man-made :but God..rgiv:en. It is also true, thorugh, that some
apostolates can share their munera with others, for instance the
!bishops sharre their munera (duties) with priests (LG 28).
Commentaries on the documents of Vatican II occasionally
draw attention to "munus " ; it has heen oibserved that from
the schema to the final dra:ft, ithere rwas 1a grrudual siubstitution
of the word munus for potesiJas (po1wer) .13 A comment on one
schema notes that "munus " il'e:fers to the sruocessionof ministries from Peter to the pope mrd hishoips; 14 an explanatory note
on the Lumen Gentium 21 remairks that "munus" carries the
suggestion of an onto1ogicrulparticipation in a divine office imparted :through Christ (as indicated iby liturgical language),
whereas "poiJestas" (po1wer) J:ms mme direct il'eference to
power related to action, a porwer juridicalily or canonically con.feirred.15 One commentator concludes: " ... the choice of the
word munus rather than potestas rplaces the emphasis on the
runctionaJ view of ministry with the proviso that the function
must rest on ooclesial command." 16 Although the word munus
1

12 Christ is said to share his munus or munera with the .Apostles (e.g. LG
21, 19) with the bishops (LG 24, 13), with priests (LG 21, 8), and with
the laity (LG 34, 7).
13 Einar Sigurbjornsson, Milnistry within the People of God (Lund:
Gleerup, 1974), 121.
120, fn. 202.
.14 Cited in Sigurbjornsson,
15 The note reads, "In consecratione datur ontologic.a participatio sacrorum
munerum ut indubie constat ex Traditione, etiam liturgica. Consulto adhibetur vocabulum munerum, non vero potestatum, quia haec ultima vox de
potestate ad actum expedita intelligi posset. Ut vero talis expedita potestas
habeatur, accedere debet canonica seu iuridica determinatio per auctoritatem
hierarchicam." (Nota expUcatioo n. 2; cf. LG n. 21) cited in Sigurbjornsson,
121, fn. 203.
16 .Sigurbjornsson,
121. The differences between "potestas" and " munus "
are also explored by Jean B. Beyer, S.J., "De natura protestatis regimiinis

396

JANET E. SMITH

can !l'eifer to any assigned task, it serons right to say that
tmough the documents it becomes more fl"equently associated
:with rta.sk entrusted to an agent hy God.
Specific documents have been issued by the Council to
d.arify further :what is the natrnve of the munera of these difgroups. For ii.nstance, Chrisf:Ju.9 Dominus ha:s as :i.ts subtitle " Decree on the Pastorwl M unus (Office) of the Bishops
in rthe Chul'ldh;" this. document explicitly designates the
munera of :bishops; neru:dy half the sections iin this decree have
rforms of the word mun.us in the first few lines. This pattern
continues in many postconciHa!l'documents, for instance, the
subtitle of Familiaris Cooaorrtio i:s "de Familiae Christianae
muneribus in mundo huius temporis " (" Concerning the
M unera of the Ohrastian Family in the World of Our Time") .
In his preface to the new code orf Canon law, Pope John Paul
JI
specific reference to the intention of the Code to implement the commitment of Vatican II to the Chr:ist:ianlife a:s
a faithf.wlness to the rthreefoM munera of Christ, a:s Priest,
1\':ophet, and Ruler, and rto defining how difl'erent membel'!s of
the Church are to exercise these munera; this commitment of
the oode of Canon Law tro tJhe munerra ris reflected in two of the
subtitles; Hook III is entitled De EccleiMe M unere DoCJendi
(The 1leachin!gOffice of the Church) and Book IV, De Ecdesiiae MunerB SancmfWandi (The Sanctifying Office of the
Olmrch).
The worvd munus a;ppears, of collJ.l'se, in Church documents
prior to Vatican H ·and Humana,e Vitae. rt appeaired fairily
1

1

seu iurisaictiowis recte in cocUce rmwvato ervuntianaa," PeriocUca ae re
morali, canonica, liturgica 71 ( 1982) : 93-145. He concludes there: "munera
non sunt potestates; potestas restricte auditur, munera latius intelliguntur.
Munera docendi et regendi natura sua communione hierarchica sunt exercenda. Communio illa hierarchica, missione canonica legitime recepta, in communione apostolica episcopos constituit, proprium eorum officium definiendo
et ad hoc officium potestatem exercendam, per missionem canonicam concedendo. Quae ultima connotatio, si probabilis videtur, neque stricte in mente
Concilii exprimitur, neque a doctrina Concilii recusatur, sed ob totam et immutatam Ecclesiae traditionem melius perspectam, est tenenda.

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A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

frequently in the earlier code of Canon Law. One commentator
noted that it refers to an elevated duty in the Cl:umch which
,either directly or indweotly was exercised for ·spirituailpurposes,
and that it had iboth a wide sense in referring to Church offices
and more nwrrow sense in referring to ·specificduties. 17 Of special interest to us here a.ire the eight appearances of " wunus "
in Casti Connubii. It shows the typical mnge oif meanings
there; it refers to the " Tole " or " noble office " of women
(AAS 549, HV 15 and AAS 567, HV 38) and to the sacred
office of the priesthood (AAS 555, HV 23, and AAS 560, HV
. Its most frequent reference is to rthe duties of husband
1and wife within marriage (Ai.AS 554, HV [twice], oand AAS 561,
HV 31); munus in w1l these passages is more than offic.ium. For
instance, one pa:sswge reads: "Nor must we omit to remark,
in fine, that since the duty [munus] entrusted to pairents for the
good of their children .is of S1Uch high dignity and of such great
importance, every use of the faculty giv;en by God :for the procreation oif new life is the
and privilege of the married
state alone, .and musrt be contained within the sacred limits of
the family " (AAS 546, HV 12) . Here, again, " duty " does not
seem the p:voper translation of " munus,"
heve " munus"
seems to share .in the e:x;alted status of a divineJ.y .appointed
mission rwe haive seen in Vatican II. This meaning is carried
over to Humanae Vitae.
Tihe frequency and placement of the tel"lllmunus rthe documents of Vatican II •show it to he 1a very significant term; the
documents speak about munera of Christians and rubout Christians fulfilling certain roles both in a general way and rulso more
·specificaUy.The use of this word, t!hen, while not unusual in
pr:eooncilirurdocuments, seems to hav:e assumed a new importance 1with Vatican II and, in a sense, can 1he said to ibe indicative of the ecCilesiologyand the understanding of the Christian
mission that is ·a;dvancedthere.
1

m

1

17 See Richard A. Strigl, Grundfragen der kirchUchen Amterorganisation
(Miinchen: Max Hueber Verlag, 1960), 61.

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JANET E. SMITH

" M unus" in H umanae Vitae
The appearance of "munus,, in the first line of Humaxna:e
Vitae helps link this ency!Clicalwith the documents of Vatican
U. Indeed, the encyclical has such close alliances with Gaudium et Spes 47-51 that it seems hut a continuation of it. This
should not he surprising, since Vatican II explicitly left the
question of the pl'Oper methods for regwlating birth to the Holy
Father, wiho, it is welil known, had set up a special commission
to advise him on this matter (see footnote 14 to Gaudium et
Spes). Hurnanae Vitae is the document that he issued to address this question. The most significant and suhst,antial link
of Humanae Vitae with Ga:udium et Spes is sections 7-10,
which follow closely sections 49 and 50 of Gaudium et Spes in
the discussion of the meaning of conjugrul fove 1and of !responsible parenthood. Forms of " munus" appear ten times in the
:five sections of Gaudium et Spes th.at speak about the role of
married !peoplein the Church. There we 1leam that spouses and
parents have a praecellenti ... munere (lofty calHing) (GS
47) ; that conjugal fo¥e leads spouses to God and ,aids and
strengthens them 1in their sublimi munere (sublime office) of
being a mother and rfather (GS 48); that the sacrament of marriage helps them fulfiJll their conjugal and familial munera (oh; that 1spouses a:re blessed with the dignity and rnunus
(office) of fatherhood and motherhood, which helps them
achieve their duty [officium] of educating their ohildren (GS
48); that young people should ihe properly and in good time
instructed about the dignity, muniis (duty) , and expression
[opere] of ,conjugal Lovie (GS 49). The next occurrence appears in a paragraph that hrings together several of the terms
of concern here:
1

In the duty [officium] of transmitting and educating human life,
which is the special mission [missio] of spouses, they understand
themselves to be in cooperation with the love of God the
Creator and, as it were, interpreters of this love;. Therefore,. with
human and Christian responsibility, they will fulfill their munus
(task) .... " (GS 22)

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

399

Later in the same section, there ,is mention of " the munus
(duty) of procreating; '' "those who fu1fiU this God-given
munus (task, commissio a Deo) by gene1rously having a large
family are particrulady to be admfred " (GS 50) . We are told
that "It ought to he clear to aill that human life and the munus
(task) of transmitting it are not [realities] restricted only to
this world ... but that they always look to the eternal destiny
of man" (GS 51).
Humanae Vitae so closely follo,ws Gaudium e,t Spes in its
focrus on the munus of spouses that it would have been rperfect[y consistent to have subtitled ithe ency;elical "De munere coniugium " (Concerning the M unus of Spouses) . F:orms of the
word munus appear twenty-one times in Humanae Vitae.
Reference is made to the munera of women (2.15), of the
Church (5.1), of al1l men (7.6), of hiologica,l processes (10.7),
of the medical profession (27.2 and 9), of priests (28.2), and of
bishops (80.10) . It <is used four times in reference to the munus
of transmitting human life, three times to the munus of responsible parenthood, and once to the apostolic munus that
spouses have to other married couples.
It 1seems rfair to say that the munus of " tmnsrriitting human
life" and the munus of "responsible parenthood " ,are one and
the same munus; the second phrase simply specifies and clarifies the first. Indeed, the Church has always linked together
the begetting of lifo with the obligation to educate and guide
the life begotten. For instance, St. '.Dhomas straightforwardly
links the two when he asserts that " offspring signifies not only
the begetting of children, but also their education, to which as
its 1end is directed the entire communion of worb that exists
between man and :wife as united in marriage, since parents
naturally' Jay up for their children' (2 Cor. xii. 14)" (Summa
Theologica, Supplementum, q.49, a.2, ad 1). And Casti Connubii also explicitly connects the begetting of children with the
obligation to educate the children-not just for prosperity in
this life, but with a view >to their eternal destiny: " ... Christian parents
understand that they are destined not only
1

400

JANET E. Sl\ITTH

to propagate and conserve the human race, nor even to educate
just any worshippers of the true God, but to bring forth offspring for the Church of Christ, to procreate fellow citizens for
the Saints and servants of God, so that the worshippers devoted to our God and Savior might daily increase" (MS 454) .
Gaudium et Spes adopts the 1oustomary linking of procreation
and education ,when it states that "Marriage and conjugal love
aire by their nature ordained to the prncreating and educating
of offspring" (GS 50). The document Humanae Vita:e, then,
has as its purpose clarifying for spouses the Christian munus
that is theirs, the munus of bringing forth children and of being responsible parents to them, with a view to guiding them to
he worthy of eterna.I union with God.
The Christian caHing of marriage is one of the 1ways in which
men and women may Jive out their Christian commitment. An
essential part of this crulling is raising children. This is one of
the most important ways in which men and women can serve
God, can fulfil.I the call to sanctifying, prophesying, and governing. Raising children is a munus; it is an honor conferred
upon spouses that brings with it certain obligations; it is the
assignment that God gi¥es to spouses so that his kingdom of
love might begin to prevail in this wo11ld. God created the
world in orde1r to share His goodness with those He created.
life that
Spouses work with God ,in creating-pmcreating-the
God seeks to bring into eternity. Theirs is a munus that is
essential to God':s intention for His Creation.
W,ith this understanding of munus ,and of Christian marriage,
'1et us attempt a translation of the fiTst line of Humanae Vitae:
"Humanae vitae tradendae munus gravissimum." As we ha:ve
seen, munus has so many connotations that it permits of severail Vialid translations; "duty," "gift," " task" aJ:le all legitima:te translations.18 Perhaps a faithful translation of the first
1

1s As footnote 2 above suggested, it would have been natural to translate
the Italian "dovere" by the Latin "officium" (and this was done later in
the document, see section HV 10). In section 10 of Humanae Vitae, "munus"
is used three times where the Italian uses "missione" (mission), "ewer·
oizio" (exercise) and " compito " (task) . The selection of "mun-us" seems

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

401

line of Hunianae Vitae would be" the gift/duty of transmitting
human life "-but since English does not have the freedom of
German in concocting synthetic neologisms, it would be best to
strive for one English word. We must also take into account
that munus is ,a,ilso close in meaning to " vocation " a.nd
"ministry" and " mission." A freer but mO!re faithful translation might be "God entrusted to spouses the extremely important mission of transmitting human life ... " The next line
reads "ex quo coniiiges liberam et consciam Deo Creatori
tribuunt operam," whicth 1is customarily trans1arted " for which
[munus] ma11ried persons are the free and responsible coUrubomtors of God the Creatm .... " The transfation "collaborators " is based more on the Italian (collaboratori) than on the
La.tin. " Tribuunt operam " rendered JiteraHy would be " offer
oa- pay back a service." "Operam" .is the accusative for the
:feminine noun opera, which means service; it is not a form of
the wo'l."d opus, which means work. 19 " Collabor1afo'l."S" may
conjure up an image of God and the spouses working side by
side on tihe assembly Ene; it is certainly true that we are to understand God and the ,spouses working together here, but the
sense of these lines seems to be thrut God gives the spouses a
munus ,and thJ10ugh this, and in some sense in return for this,
tihe spouses give a 'service to God. The word consciam, usually
translated in this ,second line as "deliberate," aippears elsewhere in 'the document linked with "paternitatem," translated
" responsible parenthood." Perhaps the use of " consciam "
here is meant to anticipate its linkage with "piatemitatem"
later; this line, then, would be translated " by which spouses
freely and responsibly ,render a service to God." 20
designed to suggest a close connection with GS 49 and 50, upon which this
section of Humanae Vitae draws. Thus, the choice of "munus" in the first
line of Humanae Vitae seems to be accurate in the context of the whole.
19 Lewis and Short (see note 2 above) translates
opera as "service, pains,
execution, work, labor" and states that "opus is used mostly of the mechani·
cal activity of work, as that of animals, slaves, and soldiers; opera supposes
a free will and desire to serve."
2-0 There are other significant
problematic translations of the text.
Hiimanae Vitae has a tone of grappling with a question that is of press-

402

JANET E. SMITH

T:hese first lines, then, would mean that God :confers upon
spouses the honor, the gift, of rtransmitting human life. They,
in turn, freely aocept this extremely important assignment that
ing concern to modern couples. It is forthright about acknowledging the
conditions in modern society which seem to make the Church's promotion of
child-bearing problematic.
Nonetheless it remains resolutely committed to
recognizing parenthood as an elevated calling and is optimistic about the
ability of spouses to understand and live by the Church's teaching. The
translations are more successful at conveying the "worrying" tone of the
document than at conveying its optimism. In certain instances the translations of some words seem to put the teaching of the document in an unnecessarily negative light. For instance, the second paragraph of the document
speaks of the mission of transmitting life as "posing grave problema " to
the conscience of married persons, but the phrase translated here is "arduas
quaestiones." The word quaestiones appears frequently in the document and
elsewhere is translated, properly, by its English cognate "questions; " here,
then, the phrase should be translated; "raises some difficult questions"which, it seems, is free from the negative connotations of "problems." .Again,
the reliance of the translations on the Italian explain the translation, for the
Italian use the word problemi and English translators would readily use the
cognate "problems." Yet even from Italian the word more properly is translated as " questions." In English " question " means a query and is much
more neutral than "problem," which connotes some difficulty.
The usual translation of the subtitle is true to the Italian, but somewhat
different in Latin. The Italian reads " Kulla regolazione della natalita" and
is usually translate.cl "On the Regulation of Birth." Some have spoken of
the document as the encyclical " on birth regulation" or "on birth control,"
which is a possible rendering of the Italian subtitle. The Latin subtitle
reads "de propagatione hurnanae prolis reate ordinanda," which, translated
literally, means "on how bringing forth human offspring ought to be rightly
ordered." This is indeed an awkward English rendering but would better
suit those who argue that the focus of Humanae Vitae is on responsible
parenthood as much as it is on "birth control."
It is not only the subtitle that puts undue emphasis on "birth regulation"
as opposed to "responsible parenthood." Several times phrases are translated
as "birth regulation" which, in the Latin, refer only to "bringing forth
children." .At the end of section three, the question is raised whether it is
time for man to entrust to his reason and will (rather than to the rhythms
of his body) "the task of regulating birth," but the Latin is "tradendae
vitae" (the mission of transmitting human life) ; no mention is made of
"regulating."
The first sentence of section 7 starts with " De propaganda
prole quaestio;" the usual translation renders this as "the problem of birth,"
when really it .should read "the question of having children; " even more
preferable, perhaps, is the translation that reads "the question of human
procreation."

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

403

brings with it certain responsibilities and duties, and they
thereby offer a service to God. '.Dhis use of r!ihe word munus
may have impHcations for one of the more controversial teachings of the document, the teaching that "each and every
ma·rital act must be open to procreation" and that all contraceptive sex is intr:insicaJilyimmoral.

Per se destinatus
Another cont:mversiwl and proiblema.tic phrase in Huma.nae
Vitae appeaEs in the fast line of section 11. Indeed, it is perhaps the most controversial sentence in Humanae Vitae. It
deserives ou'l' close :attenrtion. A note ·aJborut
is needed
first, so that we might understand precisely what the text is
saying. The Itwlian !'leads "ohe qualsiasi atto matrimoniale
deve rimanere aperto. alla trasmissione della vita." The Latin
suhstitutes the words " per se destinatus " (.in itseH destined)
:for the Itailian "aperto" (open) wlthough the Latin" apertus"
would easiJy have :worked he11e. (It is, in fa.ct, the
used
in one of the pmpositions of the Sarcred Synod on the Family
where reference is made by John P,ruuJ H to this text in Humanae Vitae, in Familiaris Cons01'tio 29). Tihe phrase" per se
destinatus," though, is phi1osorphicrullymore precise, and more
!i.n keeping with the 1context. One tJransla.tion renders this portion rather freely but faithfully: ". . . in any u:se whatever of
marriage there must be no impairment of its natural oarpaoity
to procreate human life." Another appearing in Horgan's text
reads: "[it is] abso.Jutely required that any use whatever of
mamage must retain its natural potential to procreate human
me" (my emrphas!i.sin both translations) .21
The common trans:lation of this line that is based on the
Italian and rspeaks of "each and every act [11emaining]... open
to procreation" giv;es rise to some misunderstandings. Some
mistakenly wgue that this fine means that when engaging in
21 The first trans la ti on given here is by the Vatican Press Office; the second by the Catholic Truth Society.

404

JANET E. SMITH

sexual intercourse, the spouses must be desiring to have a
child. They
this line to rule out sexual intercourse
during the infertile periods ,and claim that the dooument is inconsistent in permitting sexual intemourse during these times.
Is there an inconsistency in permitting sexua1 intercom.·se
durmg a woman's infertile period and ai1so insisting that" each
and every marital act must remain open to procreation? " Arre
not coupfos who confine their acts of se:imaJ intercourse to the
:infertile periods "closed " to pmcreation? To ibe sure, they
may ibe as determined not to have children at a given time as
are couples who are oontracepting; thus, it must he granted
that in the -subjective sense, they may be no more " open " to
having children. But it is important to understand that the
document is not speaking of the subjective " openness " o£ the
spoul!les; it is -speaking of their objective acts oif sexual intercourse. One source of misunderstanding is that the woil'd
"open" in English tends to have an ·association with a subjecti¥e state of mind rather than with objective reality; again,
to some it suggests that the spouses must be actively desiring
or ·at Jea;st quite receptive to ,a pregnancy. Some daim that the
document is te!liching that the spouses must intend to beget a
child with each ·and every act of conjugllllintercourse. But such
has never 1been t:he teaching of the
Humanae Vitae
here is not ref&ring to the sUJbjective desires of the spouses;
the Latin " per se destinatus " is directed towards the maxitaJl
acts of the spouses. It is these acts that must remain" open"
or per se dest:inatus. The spouses may do nothing to deprive
the act of its ordination or destination to procreation. They
may do nothing to "close off" the possibility of the act lllchievmg its naturail ordination. And here is the point. At certain
times, procrea,tion is simpJy not available to spouses for reasons heynnd their ioontrol. Although their marital acts wi11 he
no Jess infertile than those of a couple practicing contraception,
their acts have not by their own will been deprived of theiil'
pmper oruination. As RV 11 :states, " marital acts do not
cease being riegitimate if they are foreseen to .be infertile be-

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

405

cause of reasons independent of the spooses . . " (my emphaisis).
Still, in spite of this important distinction ibetween surbjective desire and otbjective act, perha;ps all is not yet oleair. Another question must be raised. What can it mean to say the
aots of sexurul intercourse during the infertile periods are
"open to " or "per se destinatus" to procreation (which rthey
must be if they are to 1be mor.al) ? And if these "naturally "
infertile acts !are ,still. oroered to procreation, why is this not
ailso true of acts deliberiately made infertile, that is, contracepted aicts? The distinctions to be maide here are at times
surbtile but they arie nonetheless rerul and important.
First, it must be understood that the ·sexurul <>'l'gans are natuil'aHy ordered to procreation and notihing can render them not
ordered to procreation. This ordination or potential is inherent
in them whether capruble of tbeing actualized or not. This is
equivalent to saying that eyes that are being used to see, eyes
that are closed, and blind eyes are still ordered to seeing; eyes
tblind at birth and eyes blinded by some deliberate act are still
ordered to 1sooing. "Being ordered to seeing" means that the
eye has a natUJI'aJ function and 1specificwork, even an eye that
oaillllot perform its function. Onily eyes can 1be "given" or
restored to the power of seeing because only eyes do that kind
of worik; ears and noses do not. The siam.e is tr.ue of sexual
organs; •sexual organs whether fertile or infertile,
temporarily or permanently, by the choice of the individuail or not,
are ordered to priocreation. They are o!l'gans of the procreative
kind; i. e., reproductive organs.
Still, ·wlthough 011gans ·ailways in some :sense retain their
na,tumal ordina;tion, is the:r:e not ·a difference between the situation where an organ cannot perform its function because of
some defect and a situation where some agent deliberrutely deprives the o:rigan of its ab:iJity to perform its £unction? Does
not being ,blind through a birth defect differ grea;tJy from being
blind througih a delibemte wet of
oi\Vll will? There is no
shame in having an organ that cannot iachieve its £unctions,
1

1

406

JANET E. SMITH

but there may he shame and wrong invn1ved if one deliberately deprives an organ of the abil!i.ty to perform its proper functioning. To be hlind "independently of one's will" is not to
have done something wrong. But to blind oneself deliberately
wou:ld he to strike a Mow at the proper ordination of the reye.
A deliberately blinded eye remains an eye. It is still the organ
of s[ght and thus still ovde!l'ed to seeing, but the .act of deliberately depriving it of this a:bility is an act against its natural
ordination. One has not a·11owed the eye to retain its ability of
achieving its per Be destinatiion.
The description of acts that follow £:mm the function of organs proceeds in the same fashion. It is tme to say that an
act shares the ordination of the organ from which it pmceedsrugain, whether or not the act is capahle of achieving its
oridaiined end. Acts performed by the eye are acts ordained to
seeing. If an ,individuail is in a dark room, or if some obstruction is put ovrer an eye, the aots of the eye are stiH ordained
to seeing even if they are not able to achieve their end. Acts
performed hy the se:imal organs are acts 011dained to procreation, whether or not they al'e able to achieve their ordination.
The acts, as do the organs, retain their ordination, whether or
not capable of achieving the end towards which they are ordained. But it is possiible tha,t ructs can he tampel'ed with and
in a
sense " lose '' their
It is possible
ito thwart the per se ordination of action to its destined end.
It is possible to prohiibit actions .from achieving their naiturailly
ordained end. And this is pl'ecisely what Humanae Vitae disalfows: it disrullows p:rohibiting marital acts from aohieving
their natumlly ordained end.
Let us use an analogy to clarify this point. The act of eating
is hy natme ordered to nutrition. Take a woman whose digestive system is working well. This woman eats and achieves the
end of supplying her system with nutritious vitamins, etc.
Twfue another woman whose system is not working well. She
ailso ·eats nutritious food, hut, because orf a defeot in her system,
she is not nourished by this food. T he systems of both of them
1

1

1

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

407

are equally digestivcesystems, both systems are equally orderred
to the specific work of digestion; both of their 1acts are equally
ordered to supplying nutrition for the hody. But one woman
is able to achieve this and the other is not. Now suppose the
healthy woman deliberately tampers with her digestive system
so rthat she might enjoy the the sensation of eating without
achieving the end of nutrition. She thwarts the orrlination of
her action; she attempts to prevent it from achieving the end
toiwrur:ds whioh it is ordained. Her ,action does not retain its
·wbility to achieve its per se destination. Her ·system does not
change in kind; it
·a digestive sy;stem, naturally ordained to a specific work: digestion. Nor reruHy does her act
change .in kind. But she does not aHow her action to retain its
ability to ,achieve its per se destination. Again, she acts in such
a way as to depriv,e her act of its per se destination; her wet
cannot do the work it is natmally ordained to do.
The parallel with se:xual intereou:rse is clear; the sexual organs of both the fertile and infertile are ordained to procreation, and thus in a sense, rbheir acts are too. In the case of
those who rur:e :infertile, the inability to achieve the ordered end
is independent of the wiH of rthe spouses; in the case of the
fertile, the spouses can deJiberately tamper with their action
and not allow it to remain orupaJble of ,achieving the end to
which it is ordained.
Let us probe this analogy evcen further. The digestive organs
are ordained to providing nutrition for the ibody. Acts of eating are ordained to nutrition. There .we occasions where the
digestive organs may not be working correctly and thus one's
act of eating wiM not achievce its end of nourishing :the body.
So, too, if one is infertile, one's acts of sexual intercourse will
not aehieve its procreativce end. In neither of these cases has
one thwarted the natural ordination of the act; both organ and
act retain their per se ol'dination. But one may eat a completely non-nutritious substance and thus, although one is performing an act of eating, one is not performing 'an ·aict that can
·achieve its mdination to nutrition. One ihas not alrlowed or as1

408

JANET E. SMITH

sisted one's a.cl to achieve its o:vdained end. Homosex;ual acts
of semal intercourse can 1be seen in the same !light. The reproductive orgian.sare ordained to procreation and 1actsof sexual intercourse aire o!'ldained rto proCTeation. Yet, although homo'Sexuails peJ.'lfomn acts of sexual interoorurse, these are not acts
that can achieve their ordained end of procreation. The same
is true of contr:arept.ed acts 0£ intercourse; acts of sexual intercouTse .are perifomned!but they ihave ;been kept :from achieving
the end of procreation to which they are ordained.
The above .analysis should help us understand what Hu'11U1.nae Vitae means iby stating that every marital aot must :remain per se destinatus to procreation. It means that couples
must not tamper with the natural ordination of their maritwl
·acts. It does not me1an that couples must be desiicin.1g children
w:ith each and every act of interoourse. Nor does it rule out
sexual intercourse during a woman's infertile period, for acts
of sexual in·ter:courseduring rbhese periods, as we have seen, do
meet the criteria of iheing oruained tn pll'ocreation.22
:A caveat must be stated here. The intent of this discussion
has not been to assess the morality of tampell'ing w:ith the natural ordination of organs or acts; the intent has been to clarify
when it is true to say that the per se ordinaition of an orig.an or
action has been thwarted. Indeed, althougJi much of the above
:ana:lysis camed the clear implication that tampering with the
natur:al ordination of organs or acts
,be wrong .and perhaps
is wrong for the most part, it is also certainiy true that not alJ
tampering is wrong. For instance, there is little controve!l'sy
about the moral permissi!bi1ity00: medical procedures necesS'ary
22 For an excellent discussion of the difference between contraceptive
acts
of intercourse and ;acts of intercourse during infertile periods, see Brian J.
Shanley, O.P., "The Moral Difference between Natural Family Planning and
Contraception," Linacre Quarterly 54 (Feb. 1987) : 48-60. He uses the terminology of G. E. M . .Anscombe, "You. Can Have .Sex Without Children:
Christianity and the New Offer," in Vol. III of her collected papers: Ethics,
Religion, and Politics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1981),
82-96. Shanley makes good use of .Anscombe's distinction between the intentionality of the immediate act and the accompanying further intentions.

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

409

may result in blindness
for the health of an
or sterility. The intent of such ·examples .as the" eating of nonnutritious food " was not to suggest that this action is morally
wrong 0 r that homosexua1lintercourse and contraceptive intercourse are on the same moml plane as "eating non-nutritious
food" or on the same plane with each otherr. The point of the
·aibove discussion, again, was to clarify, by use of anailogy, what
it means to say that an organ or an act has a per se destination
and wh1llt it means to say that that destination has been
thwarted. The moral evaluation of this tampering is a separate
issue. Traditionally the principle of tota1ity and the principle
of double effect have been employed to distinguish when tampering is justified and when it is not. Here let us go another
!l'loute, and let us consider how the analysis of the mearning of
the word munus may help us underntand the necessity of respecting the OI'dination of marital intercourse.
1

" M unus" and "Each and Ev·ery Act "
Again, a niunus is special assignment that honors the one
who receives it, that brings with it duties and responsibilities
ordered to bringing about some good both for the one who
makes the assi1gnment and for the one who receives it. Let us
first use a rather mundane example to explain how the use of
contraception would be a :veneging on one's munus of transexplain why " each and ev·ery act
mitting :human life, to
of marital intercourse must remain o·rdered to procreation."
Then an example with s:arcramental dimensions will be used to
he1p clarify hoiw it ican he said that" the unitive and procreative meanings of marit1a1l intercourse a!'e inseparaible."
The first analogy reqruires that we imagine a good and generous king of a eountry who .asked one of his worthy
to help him huild his kingdom. The king needs a responsible
individuail to peclorm this munus since it is important, indeed,
essential, to the kingdom to keep contact with a distance
horough. He 1ohooses to honor his subject George with this
munus of keerping contact with one of the outlying borougihs.

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JANET E. SMITH

In 011der for George to perform this service, the king gives
George the use of a fine horse and buggy that will enable him
to travel to the distant borough. The king needs someone to
sprellJd goodwill 1and cheer in this community and 1wants George
to undertake this munus. He makes it clear that George should
ney;er go to the borough unless he attends to the Icing's business
when he is there. The king has another motive for providing
George with the horse and buggy, for he also wishes George to
prosper. The horse and buggy will ena:ble Gemge to attend to
his own business when he traveJs to the distant borough. The
king makes it clear that those who ilive in the borough and
George himself Will fare better if George uses the horse and
buggy as designated, for the king knows that it is quite imfor either to prosper without the other. So George
achieves two ends ,by the use of the horse and buggy; he advances his own prosperity and that of the kingdom. The Icing
also tells George that business is dosed in the outlying borough
one week of every month and during that week George may
oontinue freely to use the horse and buggy for his own purposes. Mocreover, since the horse and buggy are handsome and
efficient, it ,is pleasurable for George to employ them, but
pleasure is an added benefit to the use of tihe horse and buggy,
not the purpose of the horse and buggy. The king more or less
leaves it up to George how often and when he visits the
borough; he asks George to be generous hut to use his own
good judgment. Now, if George were to accept this munus and
the horse and buggy that go with it hut refuse to drive to
the outlying borough, then he would be reneging on the munus
that he accepted. And if he were to go to the bovough but refose to attend to the king's business while there, he would
again be failing to 1live up to t:he demands of his munus.
There are parallels here with the miinus of transmitting
human life. God has given this munus to spouses because He
wishes to shmre the goods of His kingdom with more souls and
He has chosen to call upon spouses to share with Him the work
of bringing new life into the wodd. This
is an honor and
1

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

411

entrusted only to those willing to embrace the responsibilities
of mlllrriage. Those who perform the responsibilities of marrilllgein accord with God's will benefit 1both themselves and the
!l'est of society. The spouses achieve the good of strengthening
their l"elationship through sexual intercourse, i.e., the good of
i.e., the
union, and they achieve the good of having
good of procreation. Both goods also benefit God's kingdom,
for He wishes love between spouses to flourish and He desires
more souls with whom to share the goods of his kingdom.
'f.hus, seJrua:l
is a part of the munus of transmitting
human life, a munus that is intimately bound with other goods.
Those who accept this munus need to respect the other goods
that accompany it.
Still, in the same w:ay that the good king allowed George to
use the horse and buggy even when 'business was not in session
in the outlying borough, God has so designed human
and human sexuality that humans are sometimes fertile and
sometimes not. It is permissible for spouses to enjoy marital
,intercourse at any time, whether they ave infertile or fertile.
God seems to have designed the human system this way to
£oster union and happiness between spouses. But He has asked
them to :be ll'eceptive to new life, generously but in accovd with
their best judgment, and not to misuse the munus that He has
given them. To choose never fo have children is like refusing
ever to go to the outlying district. It is to renege on the
munus that comes with mll!mage. To have contmooptive sex
is like driving to the outlying borough ·llilld ignoring the king's
!business. The oontrooepting corupJe is :vepudiating the munera
of their own fertility and altering the :functioning of the body.
They ll!re pursuing pleasme while emphatically rejecting the
good of rprocreaition. They may not feel that they are engaging
in :an act of emphatic rejection 0£ the good of procreation, hut
in terms of their munus that is exaictly 'Wha:t they are doing. (It
is also true .that the good they achieve, plea:sure, is not the good
of union, which can he achieved only if the p11ocreativegood is
also vespected. More will be said aibout this below.) But the
1

1

1

1

1

JANET E. SMITH

good king ·allowed George to use the hoirse and huggy ·when
business was not in session, and that is exactly what the couple
is doing who are having sexuaJ inte11courseduring the infertile
period. '.Dhey are pursuing one good, the good of union when
another is not avail,a;ble. Again, the oontrruoopting couple is
'l'epudiating .a munus tha.t they have accepted; the noncontracepting corupJe is cooperating with the complexity of the mwnus
that God has entrusted to them.
The above analysis may help to clarify why each and every
act of marital intercourse must remain ordered to procreation.
Let rus raise another problem and offer another example that
may shed further light on this norm. Many hav;e argued that
as long a:s the wihole marriage is open to
then it is not
necessary that each and every marital a.ct of interoour:se be
open. This .arrgument usuaJly employs what is ca11ed in Humana,e Vitae the" principle of totality," which maintains that
for a proportionate ·good it is permissible to sacrifice the good
oif .a rpart :for the whole. This principle is used, for instance, to
justify the amputation of diseased limbs for the sake of the
'Whole :body. Humanae Vitae rejects the use of this principle
to justify sacrificing the ordination of conjugal acts for the sake
of the good of the marriage. In doing so it makes ref.erence to
a speech by Pope Pius XII on oornea1l transplants. 23 In brief
he airgiues that the principle applies onJy to organic wholes.
Marriwge is not an ovganic whoJe of which conjugal acts are
organic parts, not even by analogy.
marriage is an ontological :reality, that is, a relationship, a bond between spouses,
not a whole with many rpiarts (conjugal acts) subservient to
the :whofo. Without a clear definition of what constitutes a
'Whole and what parts are subservient to the whole, the application of the principle of .totaJity is rather :whimsical at best.
Consider someone ·who had been told that it was his duty/
2s Hwma1n.ae Vitae makes references to the "principle of totality" in sections 3 and 17. Footnote 21 makes reference to two of Pius XII's speeches
where he discusses this principle; "Address to the .Association of Urology,"
A.AS 45 (1953): 674-675 and "Address to Leaders and Members of the
Italian .Association of Cornea Donors and Italian Association for the Blind,"
AAS 48 (1956): 461-462.

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

418

responsibility /gut (mun1US) as 1a go¥e!l"Il.lllentemployer to fight
racial discrimination. But .suppose he refused to keep each and
every joib opportunity open to minorities by claiming that
'Overall it was his intention to fight racial discrimination, but
he didn't see why he had to .apply this
to each and
every joib opening. Suppose he further arg1Ued tha:t it was for
:the good of the whole that minorities be eX'elru:ded from some
for the other workers would be less unhappy if this were
the ca;se. Would the" principle of tJotaJity" justify his action?
Not if the understanding of rnunus is oo:rroot here, for this
would mean that in acoeptirrg the munlUS, a position of trust
that brings with it certain obligations, he mu.st .fulfill that
munus completely and not partially. (Again, if, of course, there
were no minorities
for a position, he wouilid not be
wrong in not hiring a minority person-in the same way that
having intercolEse when the 1procreative power is not availwble
is morai1ly permissible!)
Although it is hoped that the ;aibove analog.ies .assist in
clarifying how the munus of transmitting life fits into marriage,
marriage differs significantly from receiving .an appointment
from a king and from being responsible
doing some deed
•for the sake of the community. Marriage is a sacrament. So,
perhrups an .example based upon the workings of a sacrament
may .also help to clwrify the teaching of Humanae Vitae and
partioolarly the claim that the " unitive and procreative meanings of marriage are inseparable, that oontraooptive sex is al•ways mtrinsically immoral."
Many have objected to the teaching of Humanae Vitae because it seems to put too much stress on .biological processes,
on the lams of nature, and not to -appreciate sufficiently the
value of conjugal interoourse for fostering oonjugrul love; it
seems a return to the assessment of p!l'ocreation as being the
purpose of marriage. Many theologians were :velievedthat Humanae Vitae, following Gaudium et Spes, spoke no longer of
primary ·and secondary ends of marriage, for they felt thait this
language w:as .antiqua:ted and did not sufficiently convey the
1

414

JANET E. SMITH

mo11e recently appreciated "personalist" v:a1ues of marriage.
It is not the place of this essay to enter into the debate of the
appropriateness of the language of primary and secondary ends,
or of the :relative newness of personalist v:alues.24 Again, it is
not the purpose of this essay to evaluate the force of these objections to Humanae Vitae. Rather, this essay seeks to show
the ii.mpo:rtanoe of the 'language of munus, which appears
a11ongside of arguments derived from the scholastic tradition
and associated more with naturail law.
It has ;been ,a istrength of the Church that it teruches not
only in the <languageof one discipline (or
hut intermi:XJes and layers teI"minoJogy from several disciplines (and
traditions); teachings do not :rest on one incontrovertible argument ihut aJ'e 1supported 1by oomplex and various principles
and values, hoth those philosophically g11ounded and those
theologicaJly grounded. Apparent tensions may sometimes
exist between modes of argumentation, hut if they are in suppo1't of the same truths, ultimately they must be complement1ary. Let us oons1der an analogy of v:arious munera which may
1

24 I believe it is fair to say that discussion of the "primary and secondary
ends " of acts has generally become virtually extinct. In reference to marriage, the attempt to order the ends of marriage seems to offend many. The
avoidance of this type of analysis does not, of course, suggest rejection of it.
Still, properly understanding it requires such extensive orientation into a
whole way of thinking that it is perhaps best to avoid it in a pastoral document. It is false to say that Gaudium et Spes repudiated this language, for
it clearly states that God established the ends of marriage and then footnotes the very texts in Augustine and Thomas where they speak of the three
ends (offspring, fidelity, and sacrament) of marriage (GS 48, note l). Fur·
thermore, when one hundred ninety o:f the Fathers at the Council requested
that the traditional ordering of the ends of marriage be included in the text,
the response (c) was that "in a pastoral text intended to initiate dialogue
with the wor Id such legal language ( elementa illa iuridica) is not required."
Cross-reference is made to another portion of the response (f), which notes
that the hierarchy of goods of marriage are able to be considered according
to different aspects (Acta SynodaUa Sacroscanoti Gonoilii Vatioani. II, vol.
4, Part VII [Romae: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1978] 477-479). For an
analysis of the ends of marriage in accord with the position of Vatican II,
see Germain Grisez, "Marriage: Reflections Based on St. Thomas and Vatican Council II," Catholic Mind 64 (June 1966): 4-19.

415

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

assist us in understanding the insepruraibilityof the two meanings of maritrul interoourse.
H umanae Vitae porbrays " having children " or " transmitting life " less ais the primrury end or rpurpose of marriage than
as an essential munus of maxriage. Again, it is an " assignment"
entrusted to spouses 1and a service that they may perform for
God. Wihat is needed he!l"e, ii:t seems, iis a better u1I1derstanding
of the maritaJ vocaition 1which includes this munus. And what
needs to he ,grasped is that vocations have a ,certain reality
and make certain demands upon those embracing their vocation. Humanae Vitae 10 speaiks to this point:
1

The :responsible parenthood of which we speak here has another
dimension of utmost importance; it is rooted in the objective moral
order established by God-and only an upright conscience can be
a true interpreter of this order. For which reason, the mission
[munus] of responsible parenthood depends upon the spouses
recognizing their duties towards God, towards themselves, towards
the family, towards human society, as they maintain the right
hierarchy of goods.
For this reason, in regard to the mission [munus] of transmitting
human life, it is not right for spouses to act in accord with private
judgment, as if it were permissible for them to define subjectively
and willfully what is right for them to do. On the contrary, they
must accommodate their behavior to the plan of God the Creator,
a plan made manifest both by the very nature of marriage and its
acts and also by the constant teaching of the Church.

By frreely and deliberately aocepting the caHing of marriage,
they also freely and
accept the munera tha;t go
along with that calling, in the saime way tha.t a priest in re1Sponding to the caJling of the priesthood also aicoepts the
munera of that " assignment." To he married hut not to accept the munus of trmnsmibti.nglife is ilike taking on an aiss:i:gnment but not taking on the fulJ responsibilities of that assignllllent-and not realizing the full goods of that assignment both
for one's self and for others. For instance, a man may wish to
he a priest but not wish to perform some of the saicraments;
that would be a •repudiation of his cailling and the munera of his
crulling. The following elabora;tion of this parallel with the

416

JANET E. SMITH

priesthood cannot he made exactly coordinate at all points,
lbut if it is a correct parallel at some key po·ints< it should illuminate •why it is wrong to attempt to separate the good integrally united with a given act.
Participation in the Eucharist is parallel to the marital act
in so far as it too conveys several goods, the good of sacramental grace, for instance, and the good of united community
activity. lt is possible that .a priest may wish to pursue the
good of united community activity :without pursuing the good
of sacramental grace. He may lbe facing a community that includes both Catholics and non-Catholics and not wish to exclude any .from receiving the Eucharist. Knowing that he
should not distriibute the Eucharist to non-Catholics, he may
do something to invalidate the consecration--'he may not say
the proper formula or may use invalid matter for the euchairistic ibread and ma.y ·then distribute it to all ipresent. (Admittedly it makes the exampJ.e somewhat preposterous to
speculate th.at a priest who would have qualms about serving
the Eucharist to non-Catholics would choqse to invrulidate the
sacrament, but ieit us suspend our disbeilief for the sake of the
analogy!) Thus he wou1d gatheil' the community together but
not violate the norms for distribution of the Eucharist. But
it should be clear that it amounits to a sort of deception or even
sa,.c:rilege to pretend that one is distributing the Eucharist
while having deliberately depriv;ed the act oi one of its essential--1and sacred--'tlimensions. The intention of the priest may
be good, hut he could achieve the end of unifying the COiillmunity ihy some other 1ceremony; he need not violate the meaning
of the Euchrurist to do so. Or, he could distr.ibute the Eucharist
only to the Catholics present and tolerate the " imperfection "
of a not fuilly united 1oommunity. But he ought not to seek
the good of .a united community at the expense of the good of
the sacrament. The ultimate irony, Oif course, is that he is not
truly a:chieving the good of union if he eX'c1udes the good of
sruC!l'amenta:l1grace, for it is precisely the sharing in saicrrumental
grace which effects the truly meaningful union of the assembly;
any other sort of union is superficial in comparison.

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

417

Spouses, too, may be tempted to pursue one good of eonjugal
union and not another. Yet they are faced with the same reality as was the priest; to pursue one good without the other is
to fail to achieve either. As noted, the priest who distributes a
non-consecrated " eucha1rist " achieves at best only a superficial
uniting of the community, for he <fails to effect the sacramental
igrace that is ,the source of true unity achieved through the reception of the Eucharist. Simila,rly, couples achieve only a.
superficial union through contracepted interoourse; they do
not achieve the union appropriate to spouses. As H umanae
Vitae ,states, the goods of union and procreartion are inseparaible. It is curious that whereas other periods may have had
some itroub1e articulating the unitive significance of the seA'llal
act, our age seems peouliarly resistant to appreciating the procreaitive meaning of the sexual act. Mention was made earlier of
the persistent debate over the proper ordering of the goods of
marriage .. Again, Humane Vitae short-circuits this debate by
asserting that the unitive and procreative significances of the
sexual act are knit rtogether in an indissoluble nexus. This
means not just that spouses should not seek one without the
other, hut that indeed, they cannot achieve one without the
other. Indeed, to seek one without the other is to violate the
very meaning of the act. Thus, for a conjugal act to be unitive
it must in some sense by procreative as weU (that is, at least
per se destinatus to procreation), and for it truly to be procrertaive it must ·also be unitive (hence one of the major ohjeotions of the Church to artificial insemination even for
spouses).
Certainly couples may believe that they are achieving the
good of union through contracepted sexua1l intercourse,. but
their ructions do not co,rrespond to their intentions. The fact
is that contracepted
intercourse yields neither the good
of procreation nor the good of spousal union. To be sme,
some sort of union takes place, for shared activity nearly always produces some sense of union among the pa.rHciparnts.
For instance, strangers viewing a sporrting event together ex-

418

JANET E. SMITH

perie1me a sense of union with eaich other, hut such is a fleeting
and inswbstantiail union. Sexuail interoourse, being by its nature a very intimate activiity, undoubted!l.y creates bonds even
when engaiged in with strangers, hut these are not the bonds
appropriate to the spousal relationship. (Indeed, se:rual intercornrse engaged in with strangers Oil' with non..;spouses is not
only a source of union [alibeit superficial union] huit it is rulso a
source of alienation, fior the seruaJ partners know that they do
not intend the depth of union inherently promised by the act
of sexual intercourse. Tlhere£ore, rulthough they have achieved
some ilcind of bond, it is not an authenitic, trustworthy, or
spousal bond.),
Nor does sexual inter:cowrse robbed of its procreative meaning create the ibond that is p:voper to spousal intercourse, for
spousal union requires that the spouses give fiuLly of themselves
to one another. Theirs is to he a tortrul
Burt by using
contraception they are withholding their fertility and all that
being open to child-bearing entails. Being open to child-bearing is an essential feature .to spousal intercourse. And "being
open to child-hearing" does not mean that the couple must intend to have a child in ea;ch and every act of sexual intercourse.
Rather, it means that the oouple has done nothing to deprive
'an act o.f se:imal intercourse of its bruby-maiking possibilities.
Thus, those 1who are in.fertile whether through age or physicail
abnorrmrulityor through the periodic infertility all iWomen experience by nature have not negated the pil'Ocreativemeaning
of sexual interoorurse. If engaging in se:rual inte11oourse in a
spous1aJ way, they are still ,express,ingthe desire for a union
appropriate for spouses, a union that would accommodate children if children were a possibility. The meaning may ibe present in sexua;l intercourse only symbolica;lly hut it is ithere nonetheless.
The irndissolub1e nexus ,between union and procreation is
rooted deeply in human intentionality. This point may he
clarified by considering that conjuga;l loVoe, the love of spouses,
is tha,t which intends a faithful, lifetime commitment, the type

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

419

of commitment that is uniquely suited to the raising of children. It is rare (surrogate motherhood notwithstanding) forr
one to wish to have children by a person for whom one does
noit have the intensity of love that is prope11ly spousal; that is,
.a sign that one lov;es another a;s a ispouse is one's winingness
to have and raise children with this individual, the wilJingness
to interlock one's life together with another in the way that is
·ruppropriate rfor raising faithful Christians. 'llheTefo11e, WTitten
into the desire .for union charaderistic of the spousal love of
Oh:dstianrsis an ordination to having children.
Let us oonsider somewhat fu11ther the claim that being open
to hruby-making, at least symholicrully, is essential to spousal
intercourse. Consider the common description of contmcepted
sew:a:l intercourse -a:s "rrecreational sex." It is sewal intercourse that is engaged in for play. Now such sexual intel'course
obviously could be engaged in with 1a large number of individuals. That is, most individuals could easily find others
with whom ·they would enjoy" a romp in the hay." But when
we strurt thinking of the baby-making possibilities of sexurul intercourse and start thinking of those with whom we are willing
to share the responsibilities of child-ll'earinrg,the list of potentiail .partners for such sexual aiotiv:ity becomes quite short. And
this is became we kno1w .what kind of bond is appropriate for
ibeing spouses, what sort of conditions we must have to perfol'!1Il. the prurental munus pil'ope:rly. It is, in ·fact, the bond
characteristic of spouses, i.e., one that is faithful and exclusive
>and committed to a lifetime of union with another. Thus, thorse
responsibly engaging in noncontracepted sexual intercourse
with another are engaging in an activity which expresses the
kind of commitment or love that spouses should have for one
-another. Indeed, a sign that one loves ainother as a spouse is
one's willingness to interfock one's life together with another in
the way that is
]or raising faitihful Christians.
'llherefore, WTitten into the desire for union characteristic of
the spousal love of Christians is an ordination to havin 1g chHdren. On the other hand, those who rob their sexual intercourrse

JANET E. SMITH

of its pmcreative meaning aire also severely diminishing its unitive meaning; indeed it no longerr expresses the kind of union
that spouses are meant to have with one another. Truly,
spouses using ioontraception are desiring p1easme more than
union, for they have deliberately diminished the unitive meaning of theh- aat.
And finally, just as a priest can pursue community union
effectively through means other than an invalid Eucharist (and
truly more effectively when sacrilege is not present), so, too,
there are many way;s that spouses ma.y expreiss their ilove and
foster ;union rupart from intercourse. W!hat is rwirong is deliberately to deprive a
act of the essential good of fertility,
aill in the name of pleasure. To do so is to use one's munus improperly; it is to be selective about the way that one wi.rll serve
God through the gifts and 'Vesponsibili.tieswhich He has entrusted to one. The wrongness of the use of contraception, then,
can 1be seen not only ias ;a violation of natural laiw hut also ais
a repudiation of a munus which one has freely embraced with
a view to accepting a:ll the responsibilities entailed by the
munus. Spouses have no obligation to en:gruge in ·sexual intercourse at any givien time, but when they do they
not interfere with the divine mission entrusted to them.
In the fi.rst de£nition of conjugal love offered by Humanae
Vitae1 the ennobling il'esiponsihifityof parenthood is highlighted.
Section 8 reaids:
1

1

1

Truly, conjugal love most clearly manifests to us its true nature
and nobility when we recognize that it has its origin in the highest
source, as it were, in God, Who is Love and Who is the Father,
from whom all parenthood [paternitas] in heaven and earth receives its name.
It is false, then, that marriage results from chance or from the
blind course of natural forces; God the Creator wisely and providently established marriage with the intent that He might
achieve His own designs of love through men. Therefore, through
the mutual gift of self, which is proper and exclusive to them, the
spouses seek a communion of persons, by which, in turn, they perfect themselves so that in the procreation and education of new
lives 1 they might share a service with God.

A NEW LOOI\. AT '.HUMANAE VITAE

Moreover, for the baptized, matrimony is endowed with such
dignity thrut it is a sa;cramental sign of grace representing tihe
union of Christ and his Church.
The notion that the spouses make a mutual gift of themselves through procreation and that they achieve their perfection through parenthood deserves greater a.na;lysis ithan it has
received. It needs to ibe mo11e folly app'l'eciated that children
represent the most incarnational and eternal union of the love
of spouses. '.Dhe child, heing the creation of the very genetic
mixing of the spouses, is 1literailly one flesh come from two.
The
has an immortal soul and thus r:erpresentsas weill an
eternal continuation of the love bet:ween spouses. In understanding, expl'essing, and ,being faithful to this love ordained to
procreation and therefore 011dainedto eternal union, the spouses
undergo what H umana,e Vitae calls the mutual peirfection of
themselves as they attempt to he responsible parents to their
offspring. Spouses regular1ly find themselves developing and
S'eeking to develop certain virtues (e.g. generosity, pa,tience,
tenderness, rigor) because they need them to be good pa.rents;
they also Labor to help their spouses acquire these virtues and
ultimately, of course, their children. The word munus also
points to tihis phenomenon of married life.
1

The Interiority of "Munus,,
To this po,int the discussion of munus has focused largely
upon the external dimensions of munus, upon its status as a
task bestowed as an honor on man by God. What is needed
now is a consideration of the kind of intetrnal benefits gwined
by one who eagerly embraces and seeks to £ulfiilil his or her vocation, mission, or munus. What we need to do is focus on
the interior changes in the indiviidual who lives his or her married commitment faithfully. And we wish to place particular
emphasis on the role of children in fostering these interior
changes. When Humanae Vitae asserts that one of the defining
characteristics of marri a,ge is its fruitfulness, it states:
1

1

JANET E. SMITH

[Conjugal] love is fruitful since the whole of the love is not contained in the communion of the spouses, but it also looks beyond
itself and seeks to raise up new lives.

Humanae Vitae cites further fmm Gaudium et Spes:
Marriage and conjugal love are ordained by their very nature to
the procreating and educating of children. Offspring are clearly
supreme gift of marriage, a gift which contributes immensely to
the good of the parents themselves.
This final portion of 1tb.e paper will, very briefly, elaJborate on
this iclaim of Gaudium et Spes and Humanae Vitae that children contribute immensely to the good of the parents. The
fundamental point is that having children and raising children
is a source of great good for the parents, that having to meet
the responsibilities entailed in the munus of transmitting
human ,life woi'ks to transform individuals into more virtuous
individuals-it works an attitudinal change that enables them
to be better Christians.
He:ve we wiH be ,drawing upon the wo:vk of Pope John PauJ
II, in particular £roim. passages in his book Sources of Renewal,
which he wrote (as Kaml Woy;ty1a) ,a;s a commentary on Vatican II, and foom Familiaris Consortia, itself a marvelous commentary on Hwmanae Vitae. In these works, the Pope puts a.
1gfleat deal of emphasis on man's intern:wl life, on his need for
.transformation in Omist. The '.focus on interiority is characteristic of P:ope John Paul II; it flows foom his emphasis on per'SonaJist vru1ues, from his inte:vest in the kind of self-transformation one wo:vks upon one's self through one's morrul choices.
Porpe John P1aul II has labored hard to dra;w the attention of
moralists to personwl]st values, the values of self-mastery and
generosity, for instance, that are fostered by moral choices. He
repeatedly depiots life as a continuous process of transformation. For instance, in Familiaris Consortio he states,
What is needed is a continuous, permanent conversion which, while
requiring an interior detachment from every evil and an adherence
to good in its fullness, is brought about concretely in steps which

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

423

lead us ever forward. Thus a dynamic process develops, one which
advances gradually with the pI'ogressive integration of the gifts of
God and the demands of His definitive and absolute love in the
entire personal and social life of man." (FC 9) 25

The task o[ life, then, is to become ever more like Christ
through fidelity to the demands of one's oaHing in life.
In
book Sources of Renewal, Karol Woytyfa pfaces great
stress on the " atti.tude od: participation " Tequi1red from Christians in Christ's mission,. which he calls the " central theme of
the Conciliar doctrine concerning the People of God." 26
There he makes reference to Christ's threefold power of munus
as priest, p'I'ophet, and king in which Christians must participate. He maintains that sha1ring in this power of munus is not
simply 1a matter of sharing in certain tasks; rather it is more
fundamenta1lly a participation in certain attitudes. He tells us
that man has the power of"' task' or' office' [muniis in tria
munera Christi] together with the ability to perform it." He
goes on to observe,
In speaking of participation in the threefold power of Christ, the
Council teaches that the whole People of God and its individual
members share in the priestly, prophetic and kingly offices that
Christ took upon himself and fulfilled and in the power which enabled him to do so .... The Council teaching allows us to think of
participation in Christ's threefold office not only in the ontological
sense but also in the attitude of testimony and give it a dimension
of its own, as it we.re an interior form derived from Christ himselfthe form of his mission and his power.27

The claim that participating in a munus involves not just the
power to act, nor s,imp:J.y the responsibility to complete an external act, hut ailso requires an internal atUitudinal change on
the part of Christians adds another dimension to the complex25 Translations
for Familiaris Consortio are from The Role of the Christian
Family in the Modern World (Boston, Mass.: St. Paul Editions, no date
given).
26 Karol Wojtyla, Sources of Renewal, trans. P. S. Falla (San Francisco:
Harper and Row, 1980), 219.
21 Ibid., 220.

JANET E. SMITH

ity orf this wo!l'ld. In Sources of Renewal, Karol Woytyla outlines the different attitudinal changes !Vequired to be faithful
munus. He identifies a cerparticipants in Olmst's
tain aitirude associated ,with each of the three mun.eraof priest,
prophet, or king.
tt is possible to crystalize these attitudes in the following
w:ay. In conjunction with the munus of priesthood shared by
the faity, the attitude needed is ·a sacrificial one, whereby " one
commits himself and the wodd to God." To explain this attitude, he cites from a. key passage in Gaudium et Spes:
It follows, then,. that if man is the only creature on earth that God
has wanted for its own sake;, man can fully discover his true self
only in a sincere giving of himself (GS 24) .28

Shwring in the prophetic munus of Christ requires that spouses
work to bring the truth of Christ to the wol'lld through evangelization. And the kingly munus •is best exercised by man not
in rule over the world but in rule o¥er himself. Thus, fo he a
priest one must be ,self-sirorificing,to be a prophet one must
evangelize, and to ,be a king one must govern--.and govern
one's self above rull.
It is in Fa.miliaris Consortia that we find more detailed instruction aibout ihow spouses are to participate in the thl'eefold
munera of Christ, how they are to be priests, prophets, and
kings, or how they are to be self-sacrificing, evangelical, and
self-mastering. Familiaris Consortia speaks specifically about
the
part in the threefold munus of Christ; it states:
The Christian family also builds up the Kingdom of God in history through the everyday realities that concern and distinguish
its state of life. It is thus in the love between husband and wife
and between the members of the family-a love lived out in all its
extraordinary richness of values and demands: totality, oneness,
fidelity, and fruitfulness-that the Christian family's participation
in the prophetic, priestly, and kingly mission of Jesus Christ and
of his Church finds expression and realization. Thc::reforelove and
life constitute the nucleus of the saving mission of the Christian
family in the Church and for the Church. (FC 50)
2s Ibid., 223.

A NEW LOOK A'l' '.ECU'.MANAE VITAE

In the remainder orf Familiaris Consortia, he explains how the
family folfi.Ms its. participation in Chmst"s threefold munus.
He identifies the praphetic office with the obligation of the
family to evangelize, especially evangeli:z;e its own members.
The Pope reheaxses the obligation of pairents to be educators
of their children, especially in matters of the faith. Familiaris
Consortio refers to the evangelization of children ias an original
and irreplruooableministry (FC 58). It states:
The family must educate the children for life in such a way that
each one may fully perform his or her role [munus] according to
the vocation received from God.

For the family, the priestly office is fulfilled by engaging "in
a dialogue with God through the sacraments, through the offering of one's life, and through praye'I.'" (FC 55). And the
kingly office 'is fiulfilled when the family offers service to the
larger community, especially to the needy. Note this powerful
passage:
While building up the Church in love, the Christian family places
itself at the service of the human person and the world, really
bringing about the " human advancement" whose substance was
given in summary form in the Synod's Message to families: " Another task for the family is to form persons in love and also to
practice love in all its relationships, so that it does not live closed
in on itself, but remains open to the community,. moved by a sense
of justice and concern for others, as well as by a consciousness of
its responsibility towards: the whole of society." (FC 64)

fl'he family participates in the thveefold munus of Ghrist by
being true to its own munus. In the previous sections of Familiarris C onsortio which laid the foundation for the discussion of
the family's participation in the tffieefold munus of Christ, the
Pope sketched out the interior changes to be gained when the
family is true to its munus. What Pope John Paul II hopes for
that ·it wi11 result in the formation of a new
from marriage
heart within the .spouses, the children, and ultima.tely within
all of society. This heart wiH he one that is lovmg, generous,
and self-giving (FC
The family serves to build up the

1

JANET E. SMITH

kingdom of God insofar as 1it is a school of fove; as the Pope
rputs it, "the essence and role of the munus of the family ll!re
ii.n. the fu1al analysis specified :by lov;e" (FC 17) . He goes on:
" Hence the family has the mission to guard, reveal and communicate love." Fa.miliaris Consorti,o states that:
The relationships between the members of the family community
are inspired and guided by the law of "free-giving". By respecting and fostering personal dignity in each and every one as the
only basis for value, this true giving takes the form of heartfelt
acceptance, encounter, dialogue, disinterested availability, generous service and deep solidarity. (FC 48)

'l1he text also states:
All members of the family, each according to his or her own gift
of munus, have the grace and responsibility of building, day by

day, the communion of persons, making the family " a school of
deeper humanity"; this happens where there is care and love for
the little ones, the sick, the aged; where there is mutual service
every day; when there is a sharing of goods, of joys and of sorrows.
(FC

A key phr1ase for orur purposes is the next 1line: " A fundamental opportunity tfor tbuiilding such a communion is constituted hy the education exchanged 1betiween pruvents and children, in which each gives and receives ... " 1and "Family communion oain only be preserved and perfected through a great
spirit of sacrifice. It requires, in fact, a ready iand generous
openness of each and ru11 to understanding, to fo!l1bearance,to
pardon, to reconciliation." These passa.ges suggest the kinds
of virtues needed for aind cultivated hy good family life. Success[ully adapting to family life rosters love and
the
rubility to forgive, and a whole host of related virtues. Both
the parents and the cihildren and ultimately the whoJe of society stand to· g110W in ,these virtues as the famiily attempts to
he true to its nature.
J:he munus of transmitting life, of 1educating children, of
being pairents, then, yield multiple goods. Creating a family
where self-giving and a11 the virtues might ibegin to flourish is
1

A NEW LOOK AT HUMANAE VITAE

an activity that has
purposes. Certainly, it works
towards achieving God's end of producing mo11e :souls to sh.are
with Him eternaJ bliss. Hia:ving children also heilps parents
mature and acquire many of the virtues they need to be .fully
human and fully Christian. Furthermore, building families is
to rthe good of the whole of society, for generosity :and fove
should flow irom the family to ;the lrurger community, especially
to the poor and needy.
What is key here for an understanding of Humanae Vitae
is to recognize that to reject tihe p:mcreative ipo:wer of sexuiaJ1
tinteroomse is not 1s:imply to reject some ibiologioal power; it is
to reject ;a God-given munus and aill that entails. The resistance to the procreative rpower of sexual intercourse that accompainies the desfoe to use contraception predictably involves an
underestimation of the value of the family-to God, to the
spou:ses, and to the larger society. Ultimately spouses must
come to reruliz.e that to reject the munus of transmitting life,
to limit the number of
bhey havce, is to !limit the
,ber of gifts and blessings that God gives :to them, it is to limit
,t111"','' the gifts that they return to God, and it is to fonit their op,, ,,, porrtunities and abi,Jity to grow as Christians.
1

1

1

A FAOT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

A. CHADWICK RAY
Oentrai OoUege
Peila, Iowa

P

HILIPPA FOOT remarks in Virtues and Vices that

"with the nota;ble exception of Peter Gea;ch hardly
100.yone sees ·any difficulty in the thought that virtues
may sometimes be di·splayed in bald ructions."1 That a man
may use his courage to deplorable ends; that 'a tea.ah.er ma.y
show charity in igiving a miudent undeserved credit-these seem
to ibe hardly problema.tic possibilities. Yet Aquinas upholds
•a definition of morrul virtue as " a good quality o[ the mind, by
which we live rightly, of whioh no one cain make bad use, ... " 2
And Aristotle's conception of the man Ol:f p:riactica:l reason as
the standard of moral virtue likewise seems to p!'lec1ude a virtue's being misused. 3 Times change, and rupparently eV'en virtue
is not what it used to be. Nevertheless I mean here to survey
the resour.ces of moral psyichology in the tradition of .Airistotle
to see what sort of grounding can be found for the no-bad-use
thesis.
Presumably Geach stamds wlmost afone today on this question, because the more traditional view would seem defensible
only if it is taken as analytic. We could stipulate that an action wilil be called virtuous only if on balance it is the wisest
alternative aivaifaible to the agent, but the utility of such a
1

l Philippa
Foot, Virtues and Vices (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1978), 15. In After Virtue (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1981), 216, Macintyre finds Hume, Kant, Mill, and Rawls taking virtues as dispositions to conform to certain rules. To the extent that rules are
unreliable, the virtues will be too.
2 Aquinas, Summa theoiogiae, I-II, q.55, a.4.
a Aristotle, Nioomaohean Flthios 1106b36-7a2, 1113a30-31.

430

A. CHADWICK RAY

concept would be doubtfrnl, and 'virtue' would seem to name
no real thing. The'1'e are, after aH, appwrently anomalous cases,
as wihen a teacher is moved to indulgence by an undeserving
student's plea and seems to show kindness to a fault. The deifense oif the no-bad-use thesis requires us to deny that real
kindness is shown here. But if no better justification for the
can be offered than that the action is wrong and so cannot be virtuous, the thesis wil:l express only an a11bitrary decision about how to use 'virtue ' and related terms.
But if such deni1als can he justified by appeal to facts about
human nature, then the no.:brud-use thesis itself may perhaps
be taken a;s descriptive of certain realities constitutive of
human life. After considel'ing some of the conditions of vir:tuous action and the possibility of degrees of virtue (section III),
I shaill argue (IV and V) that the opening sentence of Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics affords a bctua:l ba;sis for sustaining the no-had-use thesis as descriptive of virtues as we find
them; that if "every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at
some good " is perhaps an overstatement, still the humanness
and intelligibility of an action would seem to depend on its
aiming at some good; and that it is largely by trying to consider actions independently of the goods they aim a;t that we
imagine virtues able to se1we unworthy ends. Payffig fuH rega11d to the purposiveness of human action and the desires expressed in it will also make it possible (VI) to avnid oonoluding with Aristotle that the virtues are inseparable from eaich
other. I conclude (VII) with some brief refteetion on the meaning of my departures from Aristotle. Before offering my own
interpretation of the Aristotelian resources, though, I briefly
contend for the reality of moral virtues (as tiraditiona1ly understood) against conventioIJJa1ist interpretations ('section I) and
then (H) consider an ailtemative account (roughly Geach's)
of the nature of the virtues that would sa¥e the no-bad-use
thesis.

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

431

I. Virtues as Teleological Di8}Jositions
Why indeed speak of vi1rtues at a1l? Behavior would seem to
be describahle and e:x:p1a.inahle--inthe sense of being suhsumaible under "patterns" -without recourse to morailly evaluative language. Rather than describe one's behavior or character as " courageous ,,. or "temper.ate," for instance, with the
suggestion that such ihehavior is always admimb1e, ·We might
either substitute morailly neutral terms like "·fea1rless" or
(perhaps) "frugal," or agree to use the old words in a noneva1uative way, as we already implicitly <lo in supposing that
courage can he good or had depending on the circumstances.
Alternative, non-prescriptive vocahula.ries a:re avaiilable, and
it needs to be shown that there is any place in descriptions
rfor evaluative terms naming virtues and vices as traditionally
understood. At least these terms would seem to be eliminaJbfo
in favor of non-prescriptive ones.
Briefly, the argument for the place of the virtues in the
moral scheme of things rests on the claim ,that they are realities without reference to which action is inexplicable. Trwditionai1ly, virtues are said to have a rational, teleological aspect,
being ordered to the happiness of the swbject, as the morally
neutraJl qualities are not, and to the extent that hehavfor is indeed teleologicrul we may expect teleologiml conoepts to de1scribe and explain it better than
ones. Consider, for instance, a:lte1mativ;e explanations of a man's leaping
into a raging river to save a drowning child. To attribute the
action, in a morally neutral ·way, to a :fearless delight in danger
is at least (roughly) to suggest that where dangerous e:x1Citement is to be had, he tends to pursue it. To attribute it to the
virtue of courage is to suggest (roughly) that where danger or
pain (of some sorts, at least) must ibe faced to achieve a greait
good, he will face it willingly. ConceivaNy, corresponding sorts
orf peopfo exist, .the thril1l-seeking and ,the courageous, but they
are not the same people, and to explain their behavior our
vncabulary should reflect the difference hetween them. The
1

A. CHADWICK RAY

foarless thrill-seeker might just as readily have risked his life
on a oasuail dare, whereas the icoura,geous man, who faces
danger or pain only for the sake of an o'Verriding good, would
eonsider that sort of risk pointless and refuse it. He does not
faoe dainger:orusexcitement for its own sake, 'and ihis saving the
ohi1d is explained badly if it is implied tihat he would.
Courage in this example counts as a virtue beca;use it is
"ordered towa1d " a good life, resting as it does on reasonable
or even generous concern for others a:s well as for oneself; indifference to the plight of others, or to one's 01wn plight so far
as it goes, suggests a mean, sterile ,life, or a passive one. A
predHection for risk or danger for its own saike, on the other
hand, wiH be useful or not, depending on the circumstances.
And so, to the extent that people a:re genuinely virtuous and
aim to ward a good life, there wi11 be a poor fit between a nonteleologioa:l vocabula.ry and human characte1r and action.
Indeed, a good l'eason to prefer tihe teleological vocabufa.ry
of the virtues to a descriptive but nonevaluative vocabulary
will be that the latter vocahulary does not describe anybody.
T wo paragraphs befotre this one, I conceded that oonceivrubly
someone might simply seek thrills; oonceivruhly too one might
he assertive tou,t court. Such cha.racters a;re perhaps (barely)
oonoeivaible, though it is ha11d to ima1gine anyone's always disregarding considerations of prudence entirely. Indeed, if in
fact Aristotle is right, and all action aims towa:rd some good,
even imprudently adventurous or assertive action is at least a
failed attempt at virtuous or sensihle living. A degree of
judgmerrt, howe¥e1r, inadequate, is therefore essential to any
discernibly adventmous or assertive behavior at all, ail.ld to
describe it in a nonevaJuative vocaibulruryis to treat it a:s beyond rational cont.ml, like a sneeze. Such a descriptive style
may ha,ve its p1ace, as perhaps in the treatment of pathologies,
but that will 1be not because it is generally more clinical or
precise but because in such special :contexts practical reasonaib1eness is supposed to hav;e been short-circuited. For understanding ol'dinairy human character, rteJeo1ogica.l concepts of
virtues would seem to be indispensable.
1

1

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

433

Understanding .of the moral virtues here has rested on the
logically prior concept of a good life, OT happiness. For the
purposes o[ this paper that concept will have to ibe taken for
granted and left unanalyzed.

II. A No-Bad-Use Thesis
It will not do to stipulate that actions are virtuous if and
only if, a.11 things consideil'ed, they al'e prudent and wise, beoaiuse the stipulative account, making the thesis analytic, forfeits the explanatory power of reforence to virtues. If teleological concepts 1rure to be explanatory, a virtuous action
shou1d be intelligible in light of the
character and circumstances, and unless the action is thoug1ht to express that
character, e.g. hy displaying a particular vill'tue, it cannot be
fitted .into any sort of
pattern and be to that extent understood. '.Dhe stipulrutive acoount wowd make the concept of a virtuous a0tion fundamental, inteUig.iiblein itself; on
such an account an action is virtuous 1becaiuse it is the right
thing to do, and the charader of the agent is irrelevant. But
philosophical literature is full of characters whose behavior is
" correct" yet lacking virtue, beginning with the conventionailly just man described by Gfauoon in the Republfo, 4 and the
citizen-soldier orf Aristotle's example, who stands his ground
against the enemy from £erur of Jegal or sooiwl ipenalties.5 We
are to understand that the oorrect behavior of these characters
does not express the intelligent dispositions in question and
1does not fit into an aH-round good 1life. Right actions, then,
cannot be judged in themselves to be virtuous, rus .the " stipuJative" account requires.
Peter Geach understands virtuous actions as expressions of
chruracter and so is in a good position to deny that virt.ues can
ibe
in had :actions. A had ,a;ction, after all, !however
:admimhle it may be mom some abstract ;point of view, is sure
4 Plato,

Republic 359b-360d.

G NFJ 1116a16-20.

434

A. CHADWICK RAY

to manifest a deficient character, which a virtuous action presuma1bly could not do. 'Yet Geach too :finally seems merely to
stipulate what will count 1as a virtuous deed. He writes that
" endurance or defiance of danger in pursuance of a 1w11ong end
is not virtuous 1and in my hook is not cou11ageous either." 6
There is he111e an implicit psychology: Virtues are dispositions
engaged by circumstances that reveal ,the agent's chara:eter.
But what w11l enable him to deny that a ceictain action really
is vi rtuous win be an unsupported stipulation about " pursuance of a wrong end." In that case an apparently virtuous
agent's unvirtuous ads (if the is allowed any a,t all) seem to
demand an explanatfon, especially if virtues are thought of as
unfailingly effectiive. One explanation, favored for the most
part hy Geach, is to 1argue that such an agent's past virtue was
unreal; Aristotle's explanation, tihat such virtue is not "eomplete" hut only" natural," 1w1H be considered in section IV.
In Geach's example, drawn :firom the novel Ashes and Diamonds, 1 1a Polish judge has heen a model citizen and a pillar of
justice. But ,when he finds himself in ;a Nazi concentration
camp, he tortures fellow prisoners to save his O"l'lll skin. On
Geach'!s interripretation the judge's past virtue is thereby shown
to have 1been only provisional, "and therefore was not virtue
at all." 8 Furthermore, Geach concludes that " any 1ascription
of virtue other than couraige may he defeated if 1a faek of cornrage is established." 9 The conclusion that provisional v,irtue is
not real virtue at all apparently rests on the thesis that no action can he tmly virtuous unless it springs from dispositions
neither too weak nor too strong; they must he 'SO perfectly
measured tha:t they could under no circumstances lead their
possessor astray. Such a position may 1be ca1led a Measured
Disposition Theory. It has the charm of preserving the purity
1

1

1

1

1

1

s Peter Geach, The Virtues, (New York: Cambridge
1977)' 160.
1 Geach gives no further information on this source.
s Geach, 161.
9 Ibid.

University

Press,

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

485

of truly virtuous dispositions, for 1any disposition that ever
proves to he either eX!cessive or deficient turns out fo be no
virtue. But it :seems excessively hrursh in tihat it implies that
noibody can be recognized to be virtuous at aill until he has
endu11ed the utmost testing. Virtue is either unconditional or
nothing at aill and so would seem ·to he a praotica;lly unrealizable ideal. The advantage of tying the •assessment of action to
the
cha.racter is that Geach can now argue, with Aristotle, that an ascription o[ virtue to an action may he defeated
if under some circumstances the •agent would fail to show the
virtue in question. But the implicit scepticism in his conception of the
can say what past virtue has not been
merely provisional?-is a high price to pay for that aidv:antage.
The rull-or-nonecharacter of such virtues, reminiscent as it is
of Stoicism, is symptomatic of the neglect of the relationship
1betwieen action and ipurpo·se. Admittedly, the Measured Disposition Theory has in some .ways followed Aristotle. But al·though !both theories allow ascriptions of virtue to actions to
be defeated in light of other ·aictions, Geach claims more than
Aristotle. The courage of Aristotle's citizen-soldier can be
out, a:s can the justice of Geach'.s Polish judge, and so
of rboth men it might be •said that their doing the right thing
was priovis.ionail: the •Soldier needs the threat of penalties; the
judge needs the assurance of physical ·comfort. But we axe to
suppose that the citizen-so1dier •stands his ground only to avoid
penalties, while the truly courageoUJsone does 1so ".for a noble
end." 10 (I suggest ,below that this 1will have something to do
with loving his city as he ought.) The citizen-soldier might,
for 1a1l .Aristotle says, not care a fig for eouraige or for his city,
and 1so his doing the right thing is no indication of virtuous character. Tihe Polish judge, on the other hand, hrud presumably
·served conscientiously, eager to 1see justice done, at least until
the personwl cost got too high. Prresumably some of his actions-turning down a "safe" hribe, for instance--could be
1-0 NFJ 1115hl0-13, 20-24; 1116al0-13;
1117b5-9. Aristotle's own unhelpful
account of 'the noble' is found in Rhet. 1364b27-28, 1366a33-7b20.

436

A. CHADWICK RAY

only with reference to his love for justice. Unlike
the citizen-soldier, then,. the judge did the right thing for the
right reason, in the right spirit. To suppose that fove of justice
never motivated ihim (because under severe conditions that
fov:e [ailed) is Jike supposing that a man who stopped eating
flounder when the p1.1ice r:eached ten dollars a pound must
never have ·liked it at ·all. In short, Aristotle is ready to recon:sider ascriptions of virtue where the presumed motive turns
out not to have heen operatiV'e; a Measured Disposition Theory
withdraws the ascription wihere e¥en the best moti¥e is found
to have 1been imperfectly cruliiooated.

III. Some Conditions of Virtuous Action
The ascription of an al·l-o·r-nonecharacter to the virtues can
be a¥oided in a fairly natural way, I think, even if virlues are
thought of as qualities "of which no one can make had use."
For it does not follow from the thesis that a v·irtue cannot be
put to haid use that one who has it can never faiJ with respect
to it. The possibility of failure and of degrees of virtue can be
made intelligible in light of Augustine's idea of virtue as " the
ordel'lingof lmre." 11 Roughly, to 1he virtuous would be to love
goods to tihe rproper degree and in the right way, where action
is of course integrrul to the lo¥e. In Aristotle's •argument, following Plato, since virtues are concerned with p1easuTes and
pains, they require us " to enjoy and he pained by the things
we should" (1104h12-18). Now notorious1lywe can love persons and things without always treating them as we ought or
:would wish. We may then say that we do not love as we ought
OT that our love is imperfect, hut ·we do not necessarily oon1c1ude that the love is a :siham. In spite of seeing some failings,
an observer may grant that we love someone, for instance, if
OUT treatment of that person o¥er time makes 1best sense on
the supposition that rwe do love him or her. As for virtues, I
have been 'Supposing that to act virtuously is not merely fo do
1

u .Augustine, On the Morals of the Catholic Ohurch, I, 15.

437

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

a good thing, nor even to do it 1because:it i:s rt.he right thing to
do, hut also to a;ct out of appropriate loves, concerns, and inclinations. (These will include a conoern to, "do the right
thing.") Hut it does not follow that one must he utterly incorruptible, with loves in per.feet ooder, to have a virtue and
act virtuously, any more than
love of a person must he
perlect .and unfaiiling to ibe love. Indeed, almost everyone has
the virtues to 'Some degree. As Geach himself argues, for instance, one needs some courage even to learn to ride a bicycle;
an excessive fear of taking a fa11 couM deter one f.rom evffi'
heginning. 12 Ev,en the Polish jrudge,.then, must be Cl"editedwith
some coumge, ·and similar arguments will_ apply to other virtues. Admittedly it is by considering actions in trying cixcumstances that we distinguish between particularly virtuous persons and moml medioorities, hut still one may aict virrtuous!y ii:
moved hy appropriate 1concerns and dispositions even if under
more trying crncumstances he would have failed. And again,
as in ascribing one's actions to love, it ·seems reasonruble to ascribe behavior to virtuous dispositions if it cannot be reasonahly e:x;plained away by less flattering interpretations or he
understood as simply tJhe erusiest thing to do under the ciroomstrunces.
In keeping, then, ·with the rejection of the Measured Disposition Theory and for pvesent pUll'poses,I suggest that for an
action to qualify as virtuous the following conditions are especially relevant:
1

1) The action must spring from concerns (a) most appropriate
to the circumstances, (b) characteristic of the agent, and (c)
valued by the agent, who must be committed to maintaining
them.
2) The degree of virtue exhibited in an action seems to vary with
the amount of "moral work " done, or the level of difficulty of the
moral task. A worthy action shows the more courage, for instance,
the more frightful it is to a reasonable person.
3) The action must not display these concerns inordinately. However, the motivating concerns need not be ordinate in themselves.
12 Geach, 152.

438

A. CHADWICK RAY

in order. As I use the
Some preliminary amplification
term, a concern is inordinate in itself, e:reessiv:e or deficient,
if in some ciroomstances it would he exhibited inaippropriately
(and so be
Oil" fail where it is needed ('and so prove
deficient) .
Condition I (a) is meant to disquailify characters like Aristotle's citizen-soldier from the claim to true virtue. For a
soldier to stand his ground for fear of punishment may not be
in itself a bll!d motive, but to qualify as virtuous the action
must 1be cwried out, ais Aristotle says: (NE 11151b22-4, etc.),
" for :a noble end," which in this case would seem to mean in
part out of love for one's city. This is perhaps a most ruppropriate concern in that it is the sort of disposition ,which enriches life, and it seems to he just this life-enriching quality
that makes the concern " noble." Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle
:all seem to find a, [uJ.ly human life inconceivable without such
loyalties. Moreover this concern, unlike the desire to save one's
skin, is a significant mor:al achievement, and it can be counted
on to motivate courageous behavior even where the threat of
punishment is rubsent. Aristotle's requirement that virtuous
actions must be intended i.for their own sake (1105a33-4) would
not seem to require that actions be intended without regard for
their intended results, as if, e.g., holding one's ground against
a;ttaJckerswere intrinsically worthwhile, hut only that one's act,
conceived with its purpose so as to he recognizrubly virtuous,
e.g., as deifending one's city against attack, be intended for its
own saike and not out of some less praiseworthy concern.
The point of condition I (h) is that one's good deed, however we11 motivated, blls short of v:irtue if it does not spring
from a firm disposition. A failed
one disciplined act of
does not spring from a settled disposition---0ne
would hardly appeal to the dieterr's temperance as a factor in
explaining the action-and so the virtue is not in evidence.
Condition I (c) requires that besides actually acting in accordance with a virtue one must value the dispositions in play
to be acting virtuously. If he £nds tha:t his dispositions and

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

439

.concerns are becoming less admiraible, he must he the sort of
person who resolves to discipline ihimself. A man who simply
his whims in eating and would slide into gluttony if
his appetites so Jed him shows no evidence of temperance, however wholesome his diet may be. Being uncritica1l of his desiTes, he is only a somewhat anaesthetized sensualist.
Condition 3 disqualifies well-motivated actions fu-om the
claim to a virtue wihere under the circumstances they offend
against other virtues and should not be undertaken. A teacher
who raises an undeserving student's grwde out of commendable
regard for the student's tender foelings may he committing an
injustice against others. In that case the concern for the student's feellings presuma;bly should not lead him to raise his
girade, ,and if it does, the action £ails to meet condition 3 and
does not sho·w kindness.
The rider on condition 3 allows that a correct and properly
motivated action may be virtuous ev;en if, ilike the Polish
judge's justice, the concern and "love" motivating his deeds
prove unequal to later tests.
A.rt uh.is po,int condition 3 can only be taken as a stipulation
conv:enient to save the no-bad-use thesis, for it denies the virtuous chwraJcter of any action which on balance is unwise,
where we are orften tempted to see a generally admfil.aibletendency in ·excess and conclude that virtues can be misused. The
Aristotelian's different ·Way of tailking can be shown to be preferable and to refer to morail reailities only (if iat aH) hy the
explanatory power of the concepts it underwxites. But if condition 3 can he shown to exprress a view of virtues uniquely
ahle to illuminate action and our judgments about it, perhaps
little more can be asked 0£ it.
I now try to show how condition 3 can he supported hy Arisdictum on action's aiming at some good.

IV. No Virtues in Excess
At least it must be admitted that generally rudmimble tenderwies can be displayed in deploraible actions. Consider GeraJl'!d,

440

A. CHADWICK RAY

who daringly mces his car to a conference. He may be thought
to show courage, even if he is speeding just for fun, needlessly
endangering life and property. We might deny the virtue of
this speeding merely by defining ' courage ' a:s applying on:y to
mmmendable action. But can we disco¥er a better basis on
which to do so? Conditiorn 3 for ,an 'act1on's heing virtuous
seems p:mpitious. But at first glance it reads like an ad hoc
stipulation to save the no-had-use thesis. To upihold this condition we wiH argue first for the intevdependence of practical
reason (phronesis) and the moral virtues in one's character
in general, then (section V) for bhe incompatibility of morail
virtue and uncr'easonableness in particular actions. I assume
that ructions displaying concerns inordinately are practically
unreasonable.
H Aristotle is right in saying that " evcery action and pursuit, is thought to 1a1m at some good," then even Gerard must
do what he does for the sake of some good, be it to reach his
conference on time, amuse himself, impress his companions, or
whatever. The action may :be foolish, being unwarranted by
any sufficiently extenuat,ing circumstances, hut there must be
some good and some co1rresponding love for it, which impels
him to such action; and there must he a. corresponding relative
indifference, we may suppose, to ioonsiderations of safety and
legality or a lack o.f awareness of the risks involved. In fact,
severa1l possible explanations of Gerard's speeding come to
mind, each of which could ,be trrue to a. degree:
1) Gerard is unaware of the risks involved in his speeding.
Gerard is aware of the risks but finds them exhilarating and
speeds for the thrill of it.
3) Gerard is aware of the risks but considers them outweighed by
the urgency of his appointment or by some other good to be
realized.

To the extent that (1) is true, there is no courage involved
in the speeding, for though the action may spring from an appropriate concern (to reach tihe conference), it sho1ws no wiH-

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

441

ingness to face risks appropriately or otherwise for a worthy
;purpose and so is not virtuous. Condition 2 required that to
he exerciised a virtue must do " work" against some resistance
(e.g. fear of danger), and here there is no ;resistance to overicome since Gerard does not see his speeding as dangerous.
To the exterrt that (9?) is true, Gerard may sound merely
skydiving
pathological. Perhaps he is, hut many activities
and hu1lfighting are attractive to people who find the dangerr
exhilamting, and 'We often speak of their feats as courageous.
Of course Gerard's daring is less a;dmirable in that his speeding directly endangers othe;rs, as skydiving does not; hut we
may ialso hesitate to think of such thrill-seeking as courageous
fo;r a more significant 1reason: to the extent that Gera:rd acts
merely for the pleasure of eX!hilaration, he does not act out of
any no:ble concern, such as to save a Jife or preserve a city.
(N ohody contends that such exhilaration is tbasic to a good
Hie, wihe11eas some have argued that pa!rticipation in the political 1life of the polis is) . And if Gera:rd is daring only for the
eX!citement he can enjoy, there is no reason to think he will
perform well, or even try to perform well, where courage is required in ciircumsta1J.1ces that do not excite him. Indeed,
Gera1rd's daring is unpromising precisely because he is not acting for " :a noble end ": his speeding is not the expression of
any concern remotely necessary for a, good Efe, neither as exercising an
va:lua;ble disposition nor as expressing a
fove .for any good to be achieved.
To the extent that ,explanation (3) is true, Gerard speeds
where a morre discerning person would not because of a false
impJicit assessment of conflicting considerations. 'Do deny that
courage is shown here because there is poor judgment will
sound Jike :scholastic artificiality and apriorism; but for Aristotle, the contention that virtue "in the main sense" (as opposed to natura1l simulacm found in children ,and animals)
"cannot come into iheing without phr'Onesis" (EN 1144hl 718) ocr that" :without phronesis virtues cannot erist" (ib21-22)
is no stipulation hut the conclusion of an argument. He con1

A. CHADWICK RAY

tends that a sho1w of unintelligent daring, for instance, is evidence o,£ only a capacity .for courageous hehavior, a "natural
virtue " 1which must he educated to grow into virtue " in the
main sense": "]for all men think that each part of one's character exists in him hy nature in some sense, since from the
moment of birth we are in some sense just and temperate and
1brave and the like" (1144ib4-7). The full virtues are apparently folfillments of the natural virtues, those fulfi11ments being
achieved hy one's acquiring prwctica1reason.
But it is difficult to sray how practical reason and the natural
dispositions are related without understanding the former
merely to govern the latter, a:s judging when to he daring, when
to be tempemte, etc. And this inter:pretation lea¥es the essential nature of the dispositions unaffected, still mere executive
rapacities which can be misused. Nor :are Aristotle's imruges too
help£ul here, for he compares the person of merely natural virtue to 'a strong body stumbling a;bout for lack of vision
(1144bl0-13) . As vision would seem to ,guide strength without
essentially changing it, so pra:clica:l Teason wou1d seem on.J.y
to direct the natural dispositions without otherwise altering
or educating them. ln that case it can be only !by a sort of convention that we refer to these dispositions as virtues only when
they ·are exercised reasonably, :for they wouM seem to be the
same capacities however they are used. And it is undeair why
virlues could not exist without phrone:M, as ,strength can exist
without vision.
There is a point to :be gained, of course, 1by packing moral
vision into the concept of the different moral virtues. To anticipate: :IT moral vision and the virtues can he shown to constitute
naturail unities mther than arbitrarily associated quailities, then
there need he nothing stipulative in the claim that moral :virtues cannot he misused. A fai1uire of moral vision to see what
i:s good, temMe, etc., will he a !failure of the virtue (the ,lpves,
concerns, etc.) to become engaged where it Sihould.
Aristotle's own comparison o,£ natural and full virtue to blind
and sighted st:vengtih seems to ovevlook the prurposi\"eness orf

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

443

action. E ven " natura1l couraige," for instance, must show some
de1gree of judgment :about aippropriate circumstances for facing danger and pain. Clutching red-hot coals for no reason, forr
instance, would not show any sort of courage at all, hut only
idiocy, and would ihe uninteHigihle. To per£omn an ad a:t aH
is to ha.vce an end which at some level one intends to achieve in
acting as one does. Of course one's intentions are not always
self-evident, and they wiH typically have more ultimate purposes fading off into the future. Still, the hasrc concept is not
mysberi10us: a .soldier's intention in standing his ground, for
instance, might he the avoidance of punishment O'r tihe defense
orf his city. Now generaJly ends are propedy choisen, Augustine
might say, by those whose loves ave in order, who ha,ve the
requisite moral virtues. (A soldier could love Athens and be
a coward, perhaps, but his lov;e would certainly he impeirfect.)
Thus " that which makes the intention rright is virtue"
(1144a21); virtues direct us to noble ends. It is only virtues
"in the main sense" that do so consistently, hut even the exercise of natural virtue is purposrvce. Natural virtues, then, are
not comparaihle to blind strength.
Certainly Aristotle is clear thrut practical rewson and the
moral virtues are irrterdepell!dent (1144a36-37, h31-33), and
ihe wants to 1show how practical reason can enable us to per.form noble and just actions. But vision and strength are not
obviously interdependent as practical reason and the moral
virtues are supposed to be, and without desire no amount of
strength and vision wiH rresult in action. It may therefore be
helpful rather to think of virtue as a sort of purpose-giving
"lovce,'' which has an element of desire pa.eked into it. Having
direction and an object, it wilJ at least be less blind than physica;l strength. This conception of moral virtue will also suggest
how moral vision may he essential to it, for we can fove propel'ly only what we in some rneaisure understand. Natural virtue
can lead one to do occaJsionally as one ought, hut it is not reliable beca1use it lacks practical reason. Now 'practical reason' embraces a great deal in the Nicoma:ahean Ethios, but one
1

444

A. CHADWICK

RAY

of its more important aspects is an understanding of the place
in life of diffe11ent goods, this unde11standing coming only with
experience. A practically reasonable maa.1, Aristot1e observes,
is thought to deliberate well about "the kinds of things which
a11e g1ood and e:xipedient for liiving 1we1l [in general]." 13 This
aibility distinguishes the person of virtue " in the main sense "
from the possessor of merely natura1l virtue. Natural courage,
for instance, may he seen in an inexperienced person's facing
a danger weM, hut ihe does not have courage in the full sense
until he faces danger and pain wisely and out of appropriate
"foive." Tihus Aristotle thinks that the truly courageous soldier
in battle shows sound judgment aibout what circumstances
warrant such risk-taking; I would add that the soldier also displays a depth of commitment to noble ends (the defense of
his city, the maintenance of his integrity) that makes his action 11easona:hle in a way that 1a child's could not be, eV'en if
the chi1d were induced to imitate the soldier. Lacking experience, a cihild cannot reasonably assess ends like the soldier's.
Recognizing through Me •experience the place of such things
as one's city and one's integ,rity is part of what pmctical reason is. As we come to recognize their place, we can come to love
them as we ought.
On this view phronesis and the moral virtues will be interdependent, .as Aristotle requires. While ocular vision does
not enhance physicail. strength, the vision that phronesis gives
shows the place and worth of goods and so enables us to order
our loves and deepen our commitments reaisonaibly. The directedness of moral virtues and their role in discerning loves,
concerns, and oommitments explain their dependence on practical reason as no comparison of them to physical strength can.
Conversely, practical reason would he unattainable without
ethical virtue. Had we no love for the things dimly seen to he
·13 NE 1140a27-28. Phronesis is also said to deliberate about means to ends
( 1144a8-9), but these assertions do not preclude its discerning means to the
final end, eudairnonia, and that will require discerning what goods are to be
pursued at all and what place these should have in one's life.

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

445

good for us, we woillid take no interest in coming to discern
those goods more dearly. An untutored, natural love for goods
such as the natural virtues expvess is therefore fundamental.
Notoriously, one who is reluctant to swcrifice his immediate
comforts for any good :purpose is unlikely to find much occasion to do so. Without some initial interest in goods worth
acting for, it is hard to see the point of any morrul discernment
at1all.
Practical reason and the mo1ral virtues are more obviously
interdependent, then, than a comparison of them to vision and
strength respectively 'would suggest. And A:rist.:oble'sconcluding dictum that " without phronems virtues cannot exist "
(1144h21-22) can be made the conclusion of an argument from
humrun nature and not simply a stipulation. A summary of the
argument might go as follows:
AH human ruction ams ·at some good ('as productive of it or
as itself constituti ve of lit), howeve1r untuto1red the virtues involved may rbe. But good .aim, directed towar:d and constitutive
of a good life, requires at lea;st two things: (1) a clear vision
of the worth of things and their place in a good life (part of
practical reason); and (2) an apprropriate love for these things
(:part of moral vi1rtue) . Now a person who has appropriate
foves for different goods may generally live well, but he cannot
fo¥e things and e:x;ert himself as he ought if he does not clearly
see their appropriate plaice in a good life; certainly he 1will not
choose wen consistently. He cannot, that is, have moml virtues
" in the main sense" without practicrul reason.
The distinction ,between practical reason a;nd the moral virtues in the ahove a:vgument a;dmittedly rests on a debata.ble
understanding of the r:elationship 1between goods and desire for
them. Lf .we suppose that
being good for us just
is OIUI' des.iring it, then we wilil not allow that "practical reason " has any meaning except as an ability to discern means
e:x;peidiient for achieving whatev.er ends we may choose. Noc
will we allow that " a11 human action aims at some good,"
makes a facturul claim 01r is ·anything ibut a taiutology; for as
1

1

446

A. CHADWICK

RAY

a factua1 olaim it means that we essentially aim .for and desire
things that are in some sense seen as good, even though conceivably our desires and actions could be indifferent to our
judgments of v;a:lue. '.Dhis thesris is reasonable in light of our
aibility to assess and criticize our desires (we can reasonably
ask, for instance, whether a vacation plan that sounds appealing really would be satisfying), though I do not oo:-gue the
point here. 14 The argument rests, then, on taking Aristotle's
opening sentence in a realist sense: goods are aimed 1at becnruse
they are good (though they are not necessarily the best ends
to pursue in any particlliaT circumstances) . Taking the thesis
that iway, we can see ihow praioticail reason in one's character
fu1fil1s natural virtues and is indispensable to moml virtues "in
the main sense."

V. Unreasonable Actions
Even if moral v;irtues cannot be attained without practical
reason, it might still he objected that reasonable people can
1suffer lapses of practical 1reason and yet exhibit moral virtues
in sueh lapses. If so, then morll!l virtues can be misused. Hut
if morial virtues depend on practical reason and have the directive function assigned to them here, then 'a fai1ure of judgment lilice Gerard's in speeding cannot he interpreted simply as
:a failure of practical reason without 1impli:cationsfor one's hold
on the moral virtues. Though Gerard's speeding, fo:r instance,
shows that in certain circumstances he is wining to face and
impose greiat dangers, it does not manifest a generic willingness
to do so, where such a disposition might he identified with courage. The daring action is insepwraible in Ger:al'd's character
from the concerns, loves, and indifference that make it intelliand these may he dep1ora;ble. Similarly, ads of for:bear1ance and of gmtifying others are not irn themselves manifestations of temperance and kindness in the ahstrad. These are
14N. J. H. Dent argues the case in The Moral Psychology
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 1984), esp. 96-120.

of the Virtues

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

447

not ·a:ll-purposeexecutive qualities at the 1service of whatever
rprojects one may choose. Rather, the acts express partioolair
purposes-workings and £ailmes of :practical reason-and cannot ibe understood ,apart from them.
Macintyre challenges this view in After Virtue.15 We can see
that even serious1ly misguided people can haV'e mora;l virtues,
he says, 1by considering what woruild be inV'olV'ed in the moral
re-educiation of a Nazi. Though humility and charity might he
new to a foomer Nazi, temper:ance aind courage presumably
would not. Indeed, it is because of tihis common ground between him and his reformers that reform would be possible at
a;ll.
This argument too seems to overlook the purposiveness of
action. Consider a Nazi wiho ,wa;s a "good so1dier" precisely
because he believed in an exa.Ited thousand-year destiny for the
Third Reich. (He must aim at some good in his soldiering) .
His visio!Il of it may be the o'Illly thing that ever inspired in him
the least self-sacrifice. He may ha.ve eagel'lly srucrificed everything for this one cause onily because he rsruw little worth in anything else. His de-Nazification, then, in enlightening him about
his past illusions, might restore him to his former indifference,
foaving him with no puriposes at all, and consequently no virrtues. In general, actions that one manages to perform only from
neglect Olf or indifference to mora1Jy relevant considerations do
not exhiibit the virtues we seem to find there, since such oversight alterrs the very ciroumstainces which would normally make
the deeds praiseworthy. Thus a soldier who is ruble to foave
his xamily and risk his life 1because these mean nothing to him
may be doing the right thing, hut hrs action does not show
true corura.ge because it does not spring from appropriate loves
.and concerns and because "moral work " is not being done.16
15 Macintyre,

167.
recognizes the inferiority of such courage compared to that of
the soldier "for whom life is most worth living" ( lll 7bll) : "But it is
quite possible that the best soldiers may be men not of this sort but those who
are less hr.ave but have no other good; for these are ready to face danger,
and they sell their life for trifling gains." (1117bl7-19)
1a .Aristotle

448

A. CHADWICK RAY

A keen regard fo!r Ollle's own life and love for one's family,
country, and comrades would be appropriate concerns :that
must order if he is to rhe virtuous, for these are
such a
the sorrts of concerns th 1at make ,a good life possible and which
Aristotle might qualify ais " nohle." Similarly, the teacher
who raises the undeserving .student's grade, thereby cheating
the others, has not shown kindness " in the main sense," fo!r his
relative indifference to ·the claims
justice makes the "kindness " so easy that it is meaningless as .an indication of virtue.
VI. L<wking OJ Virtue

To •say that an action displaying neglect of or indifference to
!relevant morrul consider:ations does not ex;hibit the mora:l virtues
"in the main sense" is not to say that the agent lacks those
virtues entirely. The indulgent teacher, .fo!r instance, may still
ibe kind even ii his imprudent ·and unfair a:ctions do not show
it. Even lacking a due rega11d for justice, he may on occasion
act sacrificially for othel'ls simply became he is actively concerned to !l.'elieve suffering. His kindness will not be apparent
on those occasions where, as we might be tempted to say, his
kindness gets him into rt.rouble, hut it will still be there, ready
to shine through in r£avmahle cimumstances. Where he goes
wrong, the problem is not that he is too kind, hut that he is insensitive to the demands oo jrustice.
Anistotle holds that wrtues " in the main sense " are insepara:ble from each other, that you cannot have one without having
them all, since practical reason is iboth nece•ssary amJd sufficient
for having any of them (1144b85-38) . This thesis seems rto
have devastating implielations fo!r anyone who lacks even one
virtue or even fails one test, :for it seems to say that in such a
person practical reason must be lrucking a:nd, there.fore, that
any apparent virtue must be only " natural." Nonetheless, revolting as it is, this conclusion seems to he neatly inescapable
ior philosophe!rswho think of virtues as dispositions to act well,
e.g. according to rules, without payijn.g sufficient regwd to the
loves and ·concerns that motivate the ·acts. Thus Cicero's posi1

1

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

449

tion is not surprising: "If you a:drnit to not having one partioular virtue, you will necessarily not ha,ve any at all." 17
Aristotle's 'rupiparent sponsorshi:p of this position, however,
and Aquinas's qua1ified endorsement of it, 18 would seem to he
avuidahle given the pr;ominent plaoe of desire in their thinking. To common sense there would seem to he a number of
ways in which a practically reasonable per1son might fail in
certain circumstances. An obvious example would he Geach's
Polish judge, whose exemplary early life may be inexplicahle
on any supposition except that the man has a real love of
justice. That his love proves to be inadequate in his most
sevel'e test is no reason to deny that it was genuine and in.formed by pcractica1lreason, and so a1so his virtue. Recognition
of the loves and concerns underlying both purposes and virtues
enables us .to see how virtues can be imperfect hut still genuine
and l'easonwble as f.ar as they go.

VII. Degrees of Reasonableness
I have emphasized the orientation of the moral vktues toward things loved and cared aibout. 'Dhese virtues enabJe us to
act well, 1and as NE II.2 contends, this depends on our being
ddighted and pained as we ought. Ha,ving the proper educ:a,tion sentinientale, we should choose our actions well. But action i's dependent for its character and inteJ ligiihility on its end.
Pighting an armed opponent, for instance, can be vicious or
virtuous depending on whether it is a robbery or the defense
of one's city. Aquinas here is more explicit than Aristotle:
" Human acts ... receive their species from the end." 19 Arisinsistence, then, that a virtuous aot must be done "for
its own s>ake '' (1105a33) does not exdu:de purpose foorn virtuous acts nor !'educe virtues to pointless tendencies to behave
in a certain way; fighting, for instance, is not valued for its
1

1

11 Cicero, Tusoulan

Disputations II, 14.
quotes Cicero with approval, ST, I-II, q.65, a.I. His only qualification is to specify that it is true only of " perfect" virtues, not natural
ones.
19 ST, I-II, q.l, a.3.
1s Aquinas

450

A. CHADWICK RAY

own 'sake hut as, say, the defense of one's city. The moral vir'tues, then, :rest at least in part on loves for goods beyond themselves.
I ha:ve al:'gued furthermore that these loves can he effective
only fo the e:irtent that one knows the 01bjectsof these loves 1and
recognizes their p1aee in a good life; thi,s recognition I have
seen as a function of practical reason. This conception of practicwl reason and of the morail virtues has a number of haprpy
consequences. First, it makes their interdependence inte1ligi!hle;
" Without phronesis virtues cannot exist." Then the dependence of virtues on 1ov'e's allows us to recognize gradations of
virtue just as we recognize gradations of love. Consequently,
the compatibility of real moral virtue with moml frailty and
vice also becomes intelligible. Finally, consideration of the
place of loves and concerns in virtuous actions has suggested
that imprudent deeds do nnt exhlbit the virtues they seem to.
Part of what makes ,deeds virtuous is that they are carried out
in ci:wumstarrces that make them difficult. If one is unaware
of these ci,roumstances or does not appreciate their weight,
then one's actions do not show the concern that otherwise
might inform them, and they do not exhibit the V!irtues they
seem to.
It may be objected that I have sa,ved virtues" in the main
sense " only by viirtually reducing them to natural virtues, for
the difference !between these is that the foll virtues are informed by practical reason as natu ral vi rtues a11e not, and I
have imrplied that one may have virtues "in the ma.in sense"
without per£ect practiml reason. Some reasona1bileness,I have
argued, informs acts of even the most untutored human virtue,
and perfect practica1l reason being in short supply, it is ireasonable to see ,between natural and foll virtue a di:fference in degree rather than kind.
Indeed, the a,wkardness of Aristotle's support for the claim
tha,t "without phronesis the virtues cannot exist," as well as
his thesis of the insepara:bility of the virtues,, follows from an
:implicit dichotomy between the (practically) 11easonable and
unreasona:hle, the virtuous and
person. Seeb:ions
1

1

1

1

451

A FACT ABOUT THE VIRTUES

III and IV construed mora1l virtues as ihaibits 1based on loves
and concerns, practical reason heing (iamong other things)
our recognition of the pfaoe of different goods in a good life.
That .a:coount, I hope, showed the dependence of the moral
virtues on practical reruson ,in a natuiral way, it being difficult to
love goods pl'operly when their place in life is unclear. Through
experience we come to recognize life's goods and their respectiv;e places in life, and we come to love them mol.1e or 1ess 011dinately. Practical reason and moral viirtues are found, then, in
varying degrees.
Why does Aristotle not argue this way? Why does he compare natural virtue to (<blind) strength and pmctical reason to
vision? The eompm1ison, after aH, is ,£acr from persuasive, since
beside1s failing to illuminate the 1interderpendence of practioal
reason and moral virtue, it faiils to account for action at all.
Strength and cognition a1re insufficient to mnve us without desire, which "loves and ooncems '' covers for nicely. (This is
1true even if the cognition is of the goodness of things. To perceive the goodness of something is not to desire it.)
I suggest tha1t to think here of naituml virtues as baised on
concerns and loves rather than as 1being like blind strength
might be unacceptable to Aristotle precisely because coniceirns
and
are found in va,ry1ing degrees in all human action and
operate in way;s tha;t indicate v1arying degrees of practical reasonahlene1ss. But for Aristotle pmctical reason is, to put it
harshly, the exdusive property of a single class of people:
"Phronesis only is chartiJoterisiticof the ruler " (Pol. 1277h25) .
Aristotle offers 1some more nuanced pronouncements on the
suibject of the distribution of practical reason, 20 a:nd there a.re
vrurieties :and levels of rule. But we can think of actions and
agents of nrutur:aJ virtue aiB lacking practical reason altogether
only hy accepting something like his comparison of natural
virtue to strength and phronesis to sight.
1

1

1

1

20" For the slave has no deliberative
faculty at all; the woman has, hut
it is without authority, and the child has, hut it is immature." (Pol. 1260al214) For a milder statement on slavery see 1254b20-22.

POMPONAZZI'SCRITIQUE OF AQUCNAS'S
ARGUMENTS FOR THE :IMMORTALITY
OF THE SOUL
JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

I

I. lntJroWi.wtion

N 'JiHE COURSE of hls discussion on the immortality of
the soul, Pietro Pomponazzi systematically critiques the
Pfatonic, Avel'IJ'IOist, and Thomistic positions concerning
this perennial problem iin the philosophy of human nature.
Pomponiazzi's Tractatrus de irnrmortalitate animae 1 is inteirestin!g from three methodological standpoints: (1) the criteria
Pomponazzi uses to ev:aluate the various positions, (2) Pomponazzi's attempt to redefine the probtlem of immortality in
fo:gica;l terms, and (8) his analysis of previous positions. In
this Renaissance treatise one finds an excellent example of the
infliuenceof method on the dev:elopment of an idea. This article
wiihl eX'amine and ev:aluate Pomponazzi's analy,s:i.s of Thomas
A:quiinas's aJ.'gument for the immortality of the soul showing
how Pomponazzi''S irefo:rnnula;bionputs the Thomistic argument
in a context completely differoort fmm whait Thomas himself
intended. Although this ipaper treats a historical pr01blem, its
mai:i.n oibject is to show how the fo:tmulation of phifosophical
critema and ,questions influences how one handles a topic and
1

1 The standard Latin text of the Tractatus is:
Petrus Pomponatus, Tractatus de immortalitate animae, ed. Gianfranco
Morra (Bologna: Nanni and Fiammeghi, 1954). The English translations
used in this article are from Ernst Cassirer et al., eds. The Renaissance
Philosophy of Man (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1948). A complete
translation of the Tractatus by William Henry Hay II, revised by John Herman Randall, Jr., and annotated by Paul Oskar Kristeller, appears on pp.
280-381.

458

454

JOHN L. TRELOAR,

S.J,

what one says about prewous solutions to a problem. This
article, then, studies a rphi1osophica1lmethodology as much as
it arppraises Pomrponazzi and Aquinas. 2
Eady in the Tractatus de immortalitate animae Pomponazzi
'es'tia;bJishes the dual cr1iter:ia for judging the adequacy of au
p!i.'evious arguments ]or the
of the ,soul. First,
"Leaving aside revefaition and miracles, and remaining entirely within natmal limits," 3 what can be said concerrning the
immortality of the soul? Second, "what ... was Aristotle's
on the same question " ? 4 These criteria function as
the limiting conditions that determine the adequacy of any
argument :for immortality; Pomponazzi employs these criteria
to test whether previious a1rguments are adeqU'ate.
Pomponazzi's attempt to l'edefine immo:rtality in strictly
1ogicailterms also influences his critique of pl'evious authoi's :and
his own generail condusions. He picks u:p Fieino'.s notion that
the human being is of an ambiguous nature, that is, part spirit
1and pa:rt oorpore1al.5 This, of course, is new neither with Ficino
nor with Pomponazzi, for the concept of a twofold nature goes
hack at least as ia1· as Plwto. Plomponazzi',s use of 1this concept
of a twofold nature, however, is unique. He casts the whole
2 In his book Renaissance Thought and Its Sources (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1979), Paul Oskar Kristeller says, "Among the many problems and concepts that have occupied the thinkers of the past, and especially
those of the Renaissance, the doctrine of immortality seems especially remote
from the discussions and concerns of our time" ( p. 181). He argues in this
essay that, "The problem is still with us, and we may hope that it may yet
lead to new answers that are more in accordance with our knowledge and
our sensibilities than those transmitted to us by the thinkers of the past,
especially those of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries" ( p. 196).
s "Prim um scilicet, quid, revela tionibus et miraculis semotis, persistendoque pure infra limites naturales, hac in re sentis." Immortalitate, p. 36
(p. 281). All references to the Traatatus de immortalitate animae will appear in this form. The first page reference is to the Latin text and the page
number in parentheses is to the English translation cited above.
4 "Alterum
vero, quamnam sententiam Aristotelis in eadem materiam
fuisse censes." Imrnortalitate, p. 36 (p. 281).
5 See Marsilius
Ficino, " Five Questions Concerning the Mind," in Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 201-12.

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

455

pmblem in logical terms. A genuinely twofuid nature is an impossibility because ibody and spirit function logically as contraidictories.6 This means thait Pomponazzi must devise a wa.y
in which the relationship of body and soul ca;n be explained
without violating the principle 0£ contrrudiction.
He systematically outlines the rulternatives used to exp1ruin
the union of body and soul. There axe two major subdivisions
with three options unde'l' each. Schematically, ·all the possibilities can be enumerated as follows:
1

Presupposition: It is impossible for the same nature to be unqualifiedly mortal and immortal.

I. One nature rwhich is at once mortal and immortrul.
A. The nature will he unqualifiedly immortail and relatively
morta;l.
B'. The nature wiill be relatively immortrul and unqualifiedly
morta.I.
C. The nature wil.1 1be relatively immorlail and relatively
mortal.

II. Two natures one of which is mortal and the
other immortal.

A. CC'he number of morta;l and immortal natures will he according tJo the number of men.
B. In .aill men the'l'e will be assumed but one immortail nature, while the moctal ones will he distributed and multiiplied
in each man.
C. In .all men the
will be multiplied, hut the mortal
7
be .common to ai1l.
Pomponazm eliminates two of these six options immediately
ibecaiuse no one has ever he1d the position. No one has rudvoa Caput Secundum, " in quo ponuntur modi quibus dicta multiplicitas
humani naturae intelligi potest," sets forth the logic of Pomponazzi's discussion. ImmortaUtate, p. 42 (p. 283-84).
7 Immortaiitate, p. 42, (p. 283-84).

456

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

ca.ted that the immortal is mrnltip1ied while the mortal is common to all (II, C). In addition, no one says that a thing is
!l'elattively mortal and immortal at the same time (I, C) .
Pomponazzi's hasic 1aJrgumentationproceeds hy a disjunction.
He shows in the foHowing chapters that none of the four remaining possibilities e:xplaiin the immortality of the souL He
concludes, that since none of the options work, one cannot
ip11ove the [mmortality 1of the 1soul 1by merely natural means.
That is, only faith reveals immortality. Section IV of this
article will examine whether this methodology p11ovides an adequate means of solving a metaphysical problem such as immortality.
Although Pomponazzi expends much ene11gy on the positions
of both Av;e11roes (II, B) and St. Thomas Aqruinas (I, A), we
will examine
the section on Aquinas. With respect to
Averroes, Pomponazz:i is mainly concerned to show that the
Aver1.101istposition is not in acco11.id with the texts of Aristotle.
In Aquinas's argument, however, Pomponazzi sees a complex
interplay of the problea:n of !1eason alone and the question of
comp.Liancewith Aristotle. Jn Section JI we will eXJa:mine Pomponazzi's cmtique of Thomas and show ho,w he employs the two
criteria to iillustrate that Thomas's position cannot be known
iby reason a;lone and that Thomas is not in accord with Aristotle. Bemuse Pomponazzi provides such an ex;tended argument against ThomaJs, we must ailso ask what caJn be said in
defense of Thomas and whetheT the Thomistic arguments withs1tanJd the attack (Section III) .
1

1

H. Pomponazzi's Rejevtion of ThornxJJs Aquinas
:Romponazzi's relationship to the thought of Tihoma;s and
Aver110es is compfox and inftuenoes wihrut he sa;y'S rubout both
men. Some fee'l that Pomponazzii was at one time a Thomist
himself but mov;ed more and more to a. position of purre A:ristotelianism as his thought matured. This shift is due fargely to
increasing availaibility of better Aristotelian texts which were
not dependent upon either the Averro[st or the Thomistic in1

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

457

terpretation. In any event, by the time he composed the
Traotatus de immortalitate animae he had rejected Thomas's
posibion on the nature of the soul. 8 The critique of Thomas is
far reaching in that it opens up the whole Thomistic position
on the soul an:d not merely the protblem oif lifo rufiter death. As
we have iseen in the introduct10ry section, immortality is really
rooted in the way one wants to ve1ate body and soul (one immortal principle and one mortal priinciiple).
Pomponazzi summa.rizes the Thomistic position in the following five propositions:
l. The intellective and the sensitive in man are the samE: in existence; (Cf. ST, I, q.76, a.3 and 4) .9
Q. This soul is truly and unqualifiedly immortal, while relatively
mortal.

3. Such a soul is truly the form of man and not only, as it were,
the mover (Cf. ST, q.76, a.I).
4. This same soul corresponds in number to the number of indi-

viduals (Cf. ST, q.76, a.2).
5. A soul of this kind begins its existence with the body (Cf. ST,
I, q.90, a.4); it comes from without and its produced by God alone,
not indeed by generation, but by creation (a.Q and 3); however,
it doe,s not cease to be with the body, but is perpetual from that
time on (Cf. a.l-4).

A quick rlook at the reforences included with these five propositions shows that they can, indeed, he identified with various
1articles in the Summa theologiae. The one e:ll!ceptionis Proposition Two. Although Thomas does not use the language of
qualifiedly and unqualifiedly mortal and immortal, Pomponazzi
s See Paul Oskar Kristeller, Renaissanoe Thought and Its Souroes, ed.
Michael Mooney (New York: Columbia University Press, 1979). Chapter 9,
"The Dignity of Man," and Chapter 10, "The Immortality of the Soul," (pp.
169-196) give summary discussions of Pomponazzi's intellectual development.
summary of Thomas's position we have attempted
9 In this Pomponazzian
after each of the five statements to provide a representative text from the
Summa theofogiae in which Thomas actually does hold the position attributed
to him by Pomponazzi. These Thomistic texts will become crucial in the
next section where we attempt to provide a defense of Thomas.

458

JOHN L. TRELOAR,

S.J.

feels that he is ieatching the spirit of Thomas'.s posiition without
having a direct textual rerference for the proposition. In addition to the general Thomistic srpirit, this proposition aJ.so fits
wiitih Pomponazzi's logic of mortality anid immOTtality: it is one
rtational exof the four alternatives considered as a
planation for immortality. Not only do we l1ack a direct textual
xe:ferencefrom Thomas for .this proposition but e:xiaminationof
Chapter Eight of the Traotatus de immortalitate animae a'1so
show:s that this second iproposition aibsoribs most of Pomiponazzi's effort in refurtaition of Thomas Aquinas. If he can
·sho.w thrut it is impossible for the soul to he unqualifiedly immortal hut 1£'elatively mortal, he feels that he has defeated
Thomas, for the remaining propositions collapse under the
critique of this second one.
Pomponazzi ha·s no difficulties .with the fust proposition. He,
•as a matter of £wet, depends on it to make some of his la.ter
arigumentation wo'l"k. Basically, it states that the higher intellectual .bering of humanity includes a:ll the opell'rutionsof the
lower, sensitive heing of the beast. There is a htieraoohica•lrein .which the higher being aut:Jomaticahlyincludes aM
attributes of the lower ibeings.10
When one turns to the second proposition, one finds Pomgreat energy to prove that the soul cannot
ponazzi
possibly be unqualifiedly immortal and rela.tiV'elymortaJl (ihis
iinteivpretation orf the Telationship o£ ,body and soul :according
to Aquinas). Now the problem is that Thomas ·simply cannot
say that the soul is truly anid unquwlifiedly immol'ltwl. This
would mean either thiat rthe •sou[ has no relationship whatsoever
with the ibody or that, rut rbest, tJhe soul is the mover of the
loody. The !basicpresupposition is that the soul must he Telated
rto the rbody: that is the groundwork of the whole disoussion on
iimmo!l'tality. In othe r words, to say that the soul is unqualifiedly :immortail·and yet
to ,a morla[ hody would woJate

1

1

io In primo igitur eius dicto non ambigo, scilicet quod re in homine idem
sit sensitivum et intellectivum. Sed caetera quatuor sunt mihi valde ambigua.
I mmortalitate, p. 82 ( p. 303).

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

459

the :principle of eontmdiction. In ST I, q.76, :a.l, Thomas specifically ,shows that tbhe 'sou1I cannot 1be a Plrutonic mover of the
1body.11
So, !bhe issue rests in how we describe the il'elatiionshirpof the
soul to the ibody. Pomiponazzi expresses the Thomistic position 'as unqualii.fiedly iimmorrtal iand relatively moTta1. Pomponazzi proviides fi¥e ,arguments against this proposition, and
1as ;a matter of fact this arrgumentation takes uip most of
Chapter Eight of the Traotatus de immortalifufte ammae. In
,an ·arlicle of this length one cannot amaJyze eaoh of the arguinto
ments, and it will not 1be 1reallynecessary 1becausethey
ce:vtain patterns. The mrguments can he 'SIUmmariized in the
following manner: 1. 1by using the same reasons ,employed hy
Thomias one can p'I"oveex;actly the opposite (i.e., Thomas wants
to :prove immoribality; one can use his Teasons to p:mve mortality); Q. iby enumerating qualities which are immorlal and those
which ,are morlal one ean prove the 1soul is TeaMy mortal as
against '.Dhomas,'spnsition of immortrulity.
Poil1llpona,zziinit:Ua;llysmnma;rizes Thomas's amgumentfor immorla;lity iby showing thrut with respect to the human soul
there arre certain facts that must 1be ooknow"rledged.. An essence
such as the human 1soul receives a1l material forms ,and rwhat is
irecei¥ed in it lies known :actually; in this knowledge it does not
u:se a.ny ibodily organ. Ailso, the soul ,strives £or ·eternity and
things. From these facts Tihomas concludes that the
1

1

11 Although Aquinas is directly refuting William of Auvergne at this point,
his complaint is with all Platonic approaches to the relationship of body and
soul as mover and moved. He gives four reasons why this cannot be the relationship of body and soul: 1. The intellect does not move the body except
through the appetite, whose movement presupposes the operation of the intellect. 2. Since Socrates is an individual in a nature of one essence composed of matter and form, if the intellect is not the form, it follows that the
intellect must be outside the essence. 3. The action of a mover is never attributed to a thing moved, except as to an instrument. 4. Although the action of a part can be attributed to the whole, it is never attributed to another part. All references to Thomas Aquinas as used in this paper can be
found in the Basic Writings of Saint Thomas Aquinas, ed. Anton C. Pegis
(New York: Random House, 1945), vol. 1.

460

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

soul is immortal.1 2 But, says Pomponazzi, these same facts can
be used to
that the soul ris mortial ra:ther than immortal. "Vhenevier the soul operates materrially, 1as the vegetative soul, it does not receive :all forms. Whenever it operates
as a sensitive soul tit uses a 1bodily ol'gan. It is common experience that the soul often strives d'.or tempora l and perisha:ble
things. From these facts, claims Pomponiazz,i, one can conclude
that the soul is morta:l. What Pompon:azzi 1is doiing here is a:ctually taking the opposite of the fact s proposed by Thomas to
prove that the soul is mortal, not the identica1l facts used by
Thomas. At this point at simply seems to he a standoff between
the two thinkers. Depending on which set of facts one Wiants
to cons1der, 1one will think od: the soul 1as either immortal or
mortaL Prn:nponazzii does 1aHow that insofar as the soul knows,
it will be relativiely immorta11. 'l1he general condusion is that
" the argument for one conclusion seems to he no s'tronger than
£01r the other." 13
The second type of al"gument proposed ihy Pomponazzi to
defeat Thoma.s's position enumerates qua,Iities that are mortal
aI1Jd immortal. If the preponderance of qu1alities are mortal,
then the soul is actually mortwl 1rather than immortal. (The
opposite would also ho:ld.) In order to a,void the 1accusation
of deciding a philosophical issue :by counting, one must also
Jook at each of the qualities and decj,de its reLative importance.
What Pomponazzi
trying to show is that the more preva,Ient
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

12 One must look at Chapter VII of the Traotatus in this context also. In
a .preliminary exposition of the meaning of the second Thomistic proposition,
Pomponazzi uses the standard Aristotelian argument as found in De Anima
III, 4, 429a, 15ff. This is an argument he will criticize in Chapter VIII.
13 "Sed pariter, cum ipsa materialiter
operetur, ut vegetativa, non omnes
formas recipit, ut sensitiva, eadem organo corporali utitur, temporalia et
caduca affectat, probabitur quod ipsa veraciter et simpliciter sit mortalis.
Verum ex ea parte qua intelligit secundum quid immortalis erit, tum quia
intellectus, non coniunctus materiae, est incorruptihilis, sed materiae coniunctus est corruptibilis; tum quia in tali opere non fungitur instrumento corporali. Sicut etiam ipse elicit quod taliter est per accidens et secundum quid
materialis. Non enim maior ratio de uno quam de altero esse videtur." Immortalitate, pp. 82-84 ( p. 303) .

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

461

qualities will he found to 1be mortal rather than
Pompoll!azzi cites three instances where supposedly immortal
powers ave outclassed by the mortal ones. 1. There a1re only
two powers which 1a:ttest to immortaility, intellect and will;
the!I"e a:re innumerable powers of the ,sensitive and vegetative
If one e:icamines 1the ha:bita:b1e regions, many more
souL14
people resemble beasts than :rational heings__.indeed, rational
ibeings are most rrure.15 3. An e:xJaminalion of knowing itseli
leads one to tihe conolusion that it is so weak that it should be
ca:lled a twofold ignorance of negation and disposition rather
than knowing. 16 Pomponazzi's general conclusion to this
enumerative style of :argument 1is that by nature human " existence is mo11e 1sensuous than intellective, more mortal than immortal." 17 All of this, claims Pomponazzi, seems to come closer
to the truth than the position of St. Thomas. 18
There is one final aipproach Pomponazzii. uses to validate his
iairgiument 1a:ga1inst Thomas: the rposition of Aquinas is not in
:ruccord with the teaching of Aristotle .. He shows this by compruring and contrasting Aristotelian 1and Thomistic texts. Since
one of the two criteria he set up at the very heginrning of the
Tractatus de immorta.litate animaer was to test wihether a positfon is in accol'd with Aristotle, this is a 1legi:timateprocedure
for him. Thomas, of course, comes up deficient in this :respect.
The following argument giiv;es an
showing that
Thomas's notions on imrnorta,1ity 'a,re not in ,accord with Aris1

1

14"Nam si in homine numerum potentiarum consideremus, duas tantum invenimus, quae attestantur super immortalitatem, scilicet intellectum et voluntatem; innumeras vero, tum sensitivae tum vegetativae, quae omnes attes·
tantur super mortalitatem." lmmortalitate, p. 84 (p. 304).
15 "Inter quoque rationales
si considerabimus, hi simpliciter irrationales
nuncupari possunt, verum appellati sunt rationales in comparatione ad alios
maxime bestiales ... "ImmortaUtate, p. 84 (p. 304).
16 "Verius utraque ignorantia,
scilicet negationis et dispositionis, nuncupancla sit quam cognitio." Immortalitate, p. 84 (p. 304).
11 "Causa, inquam, est quia natura homo plus sensualis quam intellectivus,
plus mortalis quam immortalis existit." lmmortalitate pp. 85-86 (p. 304).
1s" Si, inquam, haec consiclerabis, magis opposita pars viclebitur vero consona quam illa Divi Thomae." Immortalitate p. 86 (p. 304).

462

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S ..J.

totle. Thomas uses as one orf his main proofs for immortality
the fact that the soul, ,since it can know universals, is not alw:ays dependent on a bodily o>rgan.19 Pomponazzri, following
Aristotle stricUy, takes the opposite position. If the human
soul depends in :a11 its operations on some organ, it is material.
But in all its operat,ions, it is dependent. Therefore, it is mate:ria'1. To suihstan tiate this ihe uses a kind of p!roof text from
Aristotle's De anima. "If knowing is imagination or is not W"ithout imagination, it [s impossible for it [the soul] 'to he sepamted."20 This ,divemity of opinions devdops :firom Aristotle's
universal definition of soul: ". . . the ad of a physical and organic hody." 21 The point here is that Thomas's position does
not agree with the stated positions of Aristotle ]n the De anima,
and consequentrly Thoma,s to :be discounted on this !basis.
Thus far we ha.vce looked at Pomponazzi's critique of Propositions One and Two. Tihe ,remaining three Thomistic propositions are quickly dispatched hy Pomponazzi by showing that
they can be hei1d, as 1in the case of P:mposition Three, if one
holds that the soul iis mate;rial. Proposition Fourr and Five
contradict the stated position of Aristotle 1and are to be
discounted on that hasis. 22
1

III. In Defense

or Aquinas

The final result of Pomponazzi' s extended argument against
Aquinas's position on immortai1ity aprpewrs to conclude that
Aquinas can neither prove immortality on the hasis of reason
1wlone nor remain in accord with Aristotle. In other words,
Thomas viiola.tes hoth of the standards set forth at the very
19 See

ST, I, q.84, a.6, and q.85, a.I and 2.

20" Maior patet primo De Anima, dicente Aristotle:

si intelligere est phantasia, aut non sine phantasia, non conf'ingit ipsam separari. Immortalitate,
pp. 86-88 (p. 305). The Aristotelian reference is fa De Anima III, 7, 43lal7.
21 • , • ex diffinitione universali animae, scilicet est aotus corporis physioi
organioi. Immortalitate p. 88 (p. 305). The Aristotelian reference is to De
Anima, II 1, 412al9ff.
22 Cf. lmmortalitate,
pp. 96-100 (pp. 310-313).

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

468

OF AQUINAS

outset of the Traotatus de immmtalitate animae. Can anything
he said 1in defense of Thomas at this point?
The extended discussion of Proposition Two hy Pomponazzi
bolds the key to a possible Thomistic response. Pomponazzi
summarfaes Thomas's doctrine on the relationship of body and
soul by stating that ". . . this soul is truly .and unqualifiedly
immortal while ,relatively mortaL" 23 One of the easiest things
to say 1rubout P])oposition Two is that Thoma's simply does not
use the terms Pomponazzi attributes to him. Pomponazzi's
structure he has imposed
comes out of the
in Chapter Two of the Tractatus. In order to include Aquinas's
teaching on immortality in the ;generail discussion, Pomponazzi
had to impose this Proposition on the Tihomistic doctrine of
Summa theologia,eI, qq. 75 and 76. Granted that Thomas does
not use the language of " truly .and unqualified !immortal " 'and
"relatively mortal," is even the spirit of Thomas in these
phrases? I think not.
Thomas is 'ooncemed with the relationship of body and sorul,
and he certainly sees the problems surmunding the olaim thiat
the soul is immortal and yet is related to a rhody. He does not
want to accept the Pilatonic :answer that the soul is merely the
mover of the hody. 24 He proceeds eX!perientialJy. He 'asks :first
about the aictivities distinctive of the human being. On the
ibasis of these activities, can one infer something 1about the natme of the soul? Thomas does indeed point to the activitie:s
that figure in Pomponazzii's critiicism. Since humans have the
oapacity to know nJll :materia1l forms, they have a soul that is
essentially immaterial. Using the fiamous analogy with sight
and color-sight itself cannot he co1med or dse we woruld not
see a:11 cofors-Thomas says that since the intellectual soul
know:s all 1bodies it cannot itself be 1a ibody. Hence, this soul
must he immaterfa,1, and immateriality has a;s part of [ts implication the notion of immortaHty. 25
1

1

1

23 " Secundum quod tale vere et simpliciter
est immortale, secundum quid
vero mortale." Immortalitate, p. 7 4 ( p. 300).
24 Cf. ST, I, q.76, a.l.
25 Cf. ST, I, q.75, a.2, ad 3, and a.6.

464

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

But there is still a problem here. This argument of Thomas
seems to fall prey to P;omponazzi's first objection rtihat the soul
and the body cannot ibe opposites. Thomais handles this difficu.Jty ;by showing that the intellecturail soul is united to the
ibody as a. form is relruted to matter. Basring his argument on a
set of metarphyiSicalprinciples-that whereby ,anything acts is
the form of the thing to which act is attri:buted, and the first
thing by which 1a hotly Jives. is the soul-Thomas concludes
that life arprpeara in di:ffieirent degrees th11ough the vairious operations of ·Living things. That which ·allowsihumans to perform
these ·vita;l aJCtions is the souJ. The sow ris the primary principle of nourishment, ,sensation, focal movement, and understanding. Thi.s principle is the form of the body. And Thomas
ends up hy stating thrut this is the demonstration used by
Acistotle. 26
Without using the :schema of Pomrponazzi, then, Thomas
·feels that he has proven that the soul ris an immaterial and,
hence, immortal p!rinciple ha1viing the .status of the form of the
ibody. The argument starts tWom the experience of human activities and is, acoo11ding to Thomas, in agTeement with the
doctrine of Ariistotle. H one were to ask Thomas whether he
had iobserved the two criteria set down hy Pomponazzi, his
answer would certainly ibe affi.!l"mative. Section Il of this rurticle noted that one of the chief arguments Pomponazzi uses
against Thomas Aquinas is that the Thomistic position does
not follow the docrnine of Aristotle. Thomas is certainly using
Aristorble inso£ar as he is aib1e. He is nm, however, repeating
Aristotle slavishly. He does
from the tea0hing of Aristotle on the question of ereiation and •specificallyon the
tion of the creation of the hUIIllan sout Pomponazzi would say
that this only goes to pl'Olve that the immoil."talityof the souI
cannot lbe demonstrated iby ireason rulone, srince the doctrine of
1

26 Cf. ST, I, q.76, a.I.
Thomas has changed the notion of "form of the
body" with respect to the human being, however. This is to make up for a
lack of an account by .Aristotle for the uniqueness of the human soul and to
clear up the ambiguities in the .Aristotelian text.

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

465

creation iis a strictly reveailed matter. Aristotle certainly does
not have 1a theory of creation iin his wri:ting.21 If there is no
doctrine of creation in geneml, then therre certainly cannot be
1a doctrine of the creation of the indivridual human souil either.
Thomas, a;s is weH-known, appeals to a theological truth for
the doctrine of genera1l creation of the runiverse.28 Is he also
forced to .a1ppeal to the 1same truth for the creation of the individua,l soul? I do not think so. Once one has 1admitted the possibility of creation as opposed to geneiratiion, one can look
rnround at tihe 1beings of the wo11ld and ask whether there are
some ibeings who manifest hy their aJCtivities the necess,j_ty for
creatiion a;s opposed to generation. Because of the status of
human knowledge and the kind of being Thomas has discovered the soul to be, rits presence in the wior1d happens only :as
a direct resu1t of creation by God. Thomas, knowing that he
departs from Aristotle on this point, feels that AI'1istotlesimply
did not ·reason the matter out sufficiently.
Wihat can he said to defend Thomas regarding the three
argument types presented hy Pomponazzi in the exposition of
Proposition Two? Initially, when PompOil'mzzicla:ims that the
same facts can he used to prove both the mortalaty of the soul
and the :immortality of the soul, he actmailly uses facts opposite
from those employed hy 'Thomas. Although Thomas would
have no p1'1obiem with this (hecaiuse he never denies that there
is a material element to the human ,being) , he would oibject to
Pomponazzi's daiim that this a1rgument is sufficient to show
that the human soul is mortal. The enumerative style of argumentation can also be dismissed rather easily if one goes to
Thoma.s's notion of the relationship of the viarious 1levefo of
reality. Eaoh level has its own distinctive chamcteristics, and
each superior level manifests an aprpropriate use of the capacities of the lower levels. In his hierarchical view of reality, 29
1

1

1

21 ST,

I, q.90, a.2 and 3.
ST, I, q.46, a.l, for Thomas's reasoning concerning the necessity for
general creation.
29 See especially Thomas's discussion
of the relationship of the vegetative,
sensitive, and intellectual in the human being in S'T, I, q.78-82.
28 See

466

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

Pomponazzi would introduce a major rupture into the levels
of reality, loosening the relationship among 1levels significantly.
Finally, ,the ,ola.im that the Thomistic position is not in accoro
wii.th Aristotle must :be looked at each .time tit :appears. There
aire times ,when Thoma;s follows Aristotle, times when he deJiiberately avoids A!l'istotle, and tiimes ·when he modifies the
Aristotelian :approach.
The final :result of an investiga,tion of the Thomistic texts is
to rewliize that Thomas is orpemtmg on an entirely different
methodologica.l pfane from Pomponazzi. Thomas seeks to validate experience and to rea;son on the :ba;sis of thiat experience
to the various :attributes. of the soul. H Aristotle is a help in
this process, then he to 1be used and followed. If A'ristotle is
ambiguous or ii.f his :conclusions do not come from expel'lience,
then he must he adjusted or ignored. This procedure gives a
condusio!U quite different from Pomponazzi's: the soul can be
pmven to Jbe immortal from reason alone.

IV. Matters of Criteria and Methodology
We have ,been investigating a <Single pihilosopibica;lproblem,
the immortality of the soul; we have seen that Thomas and
Pomponazzii. come to quite different (lonclusions concerning
this matter. What ruooounts.for this radical difference? In this
section we wiH look at Pomponazzii's method iand his criteria
as a solution to our question. The11e
three items that must
be investigated: first, the two criteria themselves; second, the
logic of Pomponazzi's rprocedme; third, the matter of outside
influences on the philosophical enterprise.
For every ;rurgumentPomiponazzi investigates concerning the
immo["ta;lity of t;he soul, he estrublishes "bWo ,criteria: Can the
matter be known by reason alone? and Is the matter in accord
with the philosophy of Aristotle? Whether a matter can be
known ,by reason 1alone is :a trwdiitiona.lphi1osophica.lcriterion
distinguishing philosophy from theo1ogy.30 Pomponazzi's criao Cf. Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New
York: Charles Scribners Sons, 1938). Gilson has pointed out the motivation

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

467

terion, taken in itself, is not unusual. What makes his approach interesting is tihe ri.gOir with whlch he aiprplies the principle to questions orf immortality. Since he :f·eels that knowledge of iimmortality has mme .from scripturraJ sorurces and
church tradition, these roots immediately make it suspect as a
legitimate philosophical topic. If one adds to this the additiona:l criterion that Aristotle does not ,speak of immortality except
in the most 'ambiguous way, the topic ibeoomes even more
douibtful 1as a legitimate philosophical problem. 31 Any argument, then, that pul'lports to reason to the immortrulity of the
1soul must meet the two criteria. As we ha:ve seen, Pomponazzi feels that the Thomistic arguments rliruil in this regard.
But we can question the adequacy of the criteria. The fust
critel'lion is a reasona:bJe philosophical rule. Indeed, without it
the whole enterprise of philosophy would disintegrate. There
may be ,a possibility, however, that the truths oif philosophy
1and theology can ,coincide in some instances with one discipline
helping the other. Thomas certainly thorught iin terms of a coordination of theologica:l truth and philosorphica:ltruth rather
than ·a confrontation orf the :two .truths. 82 The second criterion
for this distinction between reason and revelation and has provided an excellent survey of answers to the problem.
s1 Because of these two criteria, there are some who would accuse Pomponazzi of being an atheist. Paul Oskar Kristeller in Eight Philosophers of
the Italian Renaissance (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1964),
shows that this is incorrect by claiming that "The statement made by many
theological contemporaries of Pomponazzi, and by some modern historians,
that he simply denied the immortality of the soul is obviously false. He merely says that the immortality of the soul cannot be demonstrated on purely
natural grounds, or in accordance with Aristotle, but must be accepted as
an article of faith" (p. 84).
a2 One could surmise that Pomponazzi is advocating a kind of double truth
theory in his approach to the question of immortality. This is also inaccurate.
By labeling the problem as neutral (i.e. equivalent to the problem of the
eternity of the world), Pomponazzi simply says that this information is
known to us by faith alone rather that through reason. There is no claim
that there is one truth in theology and one in philosophy and that they
might appear to conflict. Rather there is a truth available to us from
theology which is not available to us from reason alone. Cf. Immortalitate,
Ch. XV, pp. 232-239 (pp. 377-81).

468

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

is more suspect, for the &act that Aristotle says something does
not necessarily make it true. The confl:ids !between the Ita1ian
humanists ;and the Aristote1ians 1are well known a.ind need not
1be rehearsed ·at this point. 38 The .fact remains, though, that at
the time Pomponazzi was writing, Aristotle w:as still the
ackno-wledged authority in secular learning, and it w:as customary to ask 1whether Aristo-tle lhiad •anything to say on a matter and to put forth his conclusions as a reaisonruhle position.
Even in philosophy one ·oonsuiltsthe best aJUthoritieson a subject, and so P:omrponazzii's.application of these two criteria has
a certain legitimacy rubout it. One can fiault him, however, for
heing too ready to· accept a position simply because Aristotle
holds it.
We must now look at Pomponazzi's Jogical method. The six
aJtemative formulations of the problem of immort:ality of the
soul can ibe exipressed in .a ktind of ·extended disjunction. Pomponiazzi systematiciaJ.ly eliminates aH of the options. He first
discaIDds ttro versions because no one had ever held the positions, and then he shows that each of the other four are faulty.
Now any first year logic student knows that at least one sentence of a disjunction must :be true in 011der for the disjunction
to ,be true. Since ,a,11 possiibilities .rure false, Pomponazzii concludes that .the immortality of the soul cannot be proven hy
reason ailone.
The method 1wo;riks as long as Pomponazzi has eliminated a11
of the options. If we look at the ·w:ay the :a:rgiumentis fornmJated, ·we see that he has iindeed ico·vered•all cases. The humain
being is either of one nature or of two niatlli'es, and eiach option
here ihas th'l'ee possiibi1ities:34 None of these iis accep:t;a;hleas a
purely rational a.rgiumentrfor the immort:rulityof the souL
Pomiponazzi ihas: for:mufated the problem of immortality in a
manner and reaches a conclusion on this basis.
strictly
1

aa An exemplary case critiquing Aristotelian authority is found in Francesco Petrarca's " On His Own Ignorance and That of Many Others." Cf
Ernst Cassirer et al., Renaissance Philosophy of Man, pp. 47-133.
34 Cf. Section I. Introduction for the complete schematic outline.

POMPONAZZI'S

CRITIQUE

OF AQUINAS

469

What can be said about this? In the first place, a careful reading of the text shows that Pomponazz[ does not deny the immortality of the 'soul as such; ihe only rejects proof on the basis
of reason alone. Since immortality does not yield to rationial
explanation, in Cha:pter XV of the Traotatus de immortalitate
he moves the discussion onto a whole different plane.
He says that this is a neutra;l pr:mblem like the eternity of the
world. 35 Since theology tells us that the souJ is ti.mmortial (and
that the wodd is created), we must assent to it; hut there is
no demonstration of these truths from reason.

V. Conclusion
The manner in which Pomponazzi iconstmcts ihis aiiguments
aigainst ,a rationa!l p11oof for immortality and hris tmnsmutation
of the Thomistic arguments to fit his own methodology is an
instructive episode in the development of ian idea. Pomponazzi,
using a purely iogieal method, comes to the 'conclusion that the
soul cannot 'he found to, be immortal simply on the basis of
il'eason alone. Thomas, stwrtirrg from a metaphysical standpoint
1based on experience, comes to the conclusfon that the soul is
immortwl aind that this can he known from reasoning aibout the
1activitiesof the human 1souL
It is a philosophical truism that the way a question is formulated and the method one uses to answer the question will a:ffect
the response to the question. In the case of Thomas and Pomponazz1i,this 1is certainly 1apparent. Both thinkers are discussing
the same problem and one would hope that if both 1are :ration.ail
they will m:irive at the same solution. Pomponazzi's reformula35 Pomponazzi might even have conceived of this solution to the problem
of immortality on the basis of what Thomas has to say in the Summa theologiae, I, q.46, a.I and 2. First, Thomas points out that Aristotle's argu·
ments for the eternity of the world are demonstrative not absolutely but
only relatively, that is, against some of the ancient philosophers.
Then
Thomas says that the truth that the world did not always exist is held by
faith alone; the newness of the world cannot be demonstrated from the world
alone. Pomponazzi would like to extend this type of solution to the immortality of the soul also.

470

JOHN L. TRELOAR, S.J.

tion of the Thomistic concepts of the relationship of body and
soul into a discussion of 1relative and absolute mortality and
immortality necessiitates his conclusion, contmiry to Thomas',s
he does not have the synthetic metaphysics of
position.
Thomas as a background, he must rely only on that of Aristotile, and this proves to he deficient for handling the problem
ihe is addressing. The strictness with which he arppHes the second of his two criteria forces him to conclude to the neutrality
of the problem. This may ibe as far as one can get with some
phrilosophical prorhlems, hut this is certainly never a satisfying
for the philosophioa1 mind.
A historica,l exercise, such as the one we have just completed,
can be most helpful 1in our own pursuit of truth. When we
come upon a problem that does not seem to y1ield itself to an
adequate so1ution, it is important to ask whether the criteiria
we are using :and the 'way in :which we have constructed the
loigic of the p:mblem 1wiU ever aJlow us to arrive at an adequate
answer. We can avoid much comusion in our reasoning hy a
wi1Engnessto look at the method we have used to solve 1a difficult issue. E¥en though the issue of immortaility is on the back
burner, so to speak, in today's ph:i1osophical disoossioiJ.1, the
con£mntation between Pomponazzi and Thomas, Aquinas on
this matter points to issues that a.re of major concern to us aU:
what oriteria, are v1alid £orr judging an issue and what methods
ail'e logical for reasoning a1bout a

RICOEUR, WNERGAN, AND
THE 1INTELLIGIBILITY OF COSM.lC TIME
JAMES

R. PAMBRUN

Bt. Paul University
Ottawa, Oanada

I ntroduot:Wn
HE QUESTION OF TIME ihas entered into the work
f ·every major philosopher s1ince Aristotle. As Heidegger
(who is 1fond oif il'eco·vering these forgotten questions)
has shown, time is not merely an ar.bitrary WJay of reckoning or
calculating the fleeting moments of day-to-day life; rather, it
is an exipressrionof our very mode of heing.1
One of the major philosophers who !has taken up this question rin our own day and has pfaced it at the center of his
·continuing work in rpib.ilosophicalanthropology is Pia.JUI Ricoeur.
He has ·shown how the ·symbols, metaphors, and narratives of
time offer orientations to reflection: they not only point to the
existential romplexities of human iftfe in its personal, social,
and cosmic dimensions ibut also to its fundamental intentionrulities to.ward meaning that undergird these objectifications of
time.
Beyond this, Ricoeur himself has set up the question of time
on new foundations. In his own elaho!I'ation of this question,
he ib.as identified two distinct objectifications of time: cosmic
1 "Have we not, as Heidegger says, gained access, thanks to time, to the
'original phenomenological knowledge of the inner and unified structure of
transcendence'?"
Paul Ricoeur, Fallible Man (Chicago: Henry Regnery,
1967), p. 66. Besides Heidegger's classic Being and Time, see also his Basic
Problems in Phenomenology (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University
Press, 1982): "Dasein's basic constitution is grounded in Temporality" (p.
228). Also, The History of the Concept of Time (Bloomington, Indiana:
Indiana University Press, 1985), especially pp. 140-141.

471

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

time ;and the time of the human spirit. When taken together
these obj.ecbificationscreate ia paradox or pairadoxes (he names
them "aporias ") for the general :intelligibility of time. They
occur when ·oosmic time oonfronts existential time. Co.smic
time, wihich :identifies the relationship between a;ny two arbitrarily chosen moments in ovder to measure a specific magnitude of time, is indifferent to eristentiail time, which is based
on existentially, therefo!l.'e, meaningfully-detemiined categories
of past, present, 1and foture. 2
Fail' from parrulyziinghis thinking, howevier, these apori.:as invite Ricoeur not only to probe mo!l.'e deeply the
he is seeking to understand ibut also to seek &om different disciplmes a Jight which may he shed on resolving these aporias. 3
In this article, I do not wish to address tihe question of the
intelligibility of time '3.t the more general ihermeneuticaJ level
that Ricoeur has identified for his own work. I wish ·rather to
engage RicoeUT's:analysii.so[ one s1ide of this question, namely,
the meaning and mtel:l.igibility of cosmic ti.me. And f& this
purpose the general :ftmmeworkthat Ricoeur has set urp in his
discussion on the phenomenology of time in the thivd volume
of ihis most rrecent work, Time and Narrative, is ru:t a;pproprri.ate
starting point for our o.wn study.
Cerf, 198·5), pp. 30 & 31.
2 Paul Ricoeur, Temps et reoit, Tome 3 (Paris:
The other volumes in this trilogy are Temps et reoit, Tome 1 (Paris: Seuil,
1983) [Eng. Time and Narrative, Vol. 1 [trans. by Kathleen McLaughlin and
David Pellauer] (Chicago .and London: University of Chicago Press, 1984)];
Temps et reoit, Tome 2, La configuaration dans le 1'ecit de fiction (Paris:
Seuil, 1984) [Eng. Time and Narrative, Vol. 2 (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press, 1985)]; the English translation of the third volume
appeared from the same publisher in 1988. For a good outline of Ricoeur's
program in these three volumes see John Van den Hengel's review of Volume
2 in Eglise et TMologie 18 ( 1987) : 401-405.
a Note, for example, the three disciplines Ricoeur engages in dialogue in his
recent three-volume work Temps et recit: literary works on narrative, historiography, and phenomenology. Earlier he wrote, "Finally, by carrying
the debate to the level of language, I have the feeling of encountering other
currently viable philosophies on a common terrain." "Existence and Hermeneutics," in Oonfiict of Interpretations (Evanston: Northwestern University
Press, 1974), p.15.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

478

-I,'J'.he specific contours of Riooeur's discussion of time :are
shaped hy traditions of thought whose origins may he identified
1with Augustine and .AristoUe. Ricoeur will hmng the insights
of 1both these traditions into his own rrefleictiionon time and will
,J'efashionthe major p:roiblematic of time: How can I on the one
hand have a reflection on time whose lba;sic point of reference is
my immediate present, a present f1rom which I can refer intelligibly to the meaning of the past aJJid the future, while on
the other hand develop 'a reflection on time, cosmic time, which
is completely indifferent to such terms as present, past, and
future :and which refers, in quite neutra:l
to autonomous, successive instances?
It would seem at first sight tihat .AUJgustine has taken us
most deeply into the mysterious complexities of our understanding of time. Most studies whlch take urp the question of
time ibegin 1with his now famous expression of frustmtion:
"What, then, is time? H no one asks me, I know; if I want to
explMn it to someone ,who does ask me, I do not know" (Confessions1 Ch. 14, Bk. 11). Just as weH-kno,wn are his subsequent refined and detailed a,ccotmts of the human spirit's prresence to itself tin its own activities. An elaboration of the structure of these activities, in the mind's attention to its act o[ attending, to memory, and to anticipation, in short in the activity
of intending (intentio) , W"iill ibecome the hasis upon which he is
a:ble to account for a reference to the :rerulitiesof the present, the
past, and the future. These :references will become distentions of
the intentiona,l activity of the human spirit. And so Augustine
will place at the center of his exposition of time the reference to
the distentio animi.
I shall not describe once more bhe well-knnwn structure of
Augiustine's refiectfon 4 nor Ricoeur's magnificent interpretation of the operations and dialectics that lea;d Augustine from
1

1

1

4 See Ricoeur,

Time rma Narrative.

Vol. 1, pp. 5-30.

474

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

one level fo the next. However, I would like to mention one
important oihserv:a:tionmaide by Ricoeur. He finds a failure in
.A!ugustine's reflection where the latter acknowledges a common opinion which identifies time with movement. Augustine
dismisses this equation hut at ,the same time decidedly turns
arw:ay from a consideration of more subtle interpretations of
and insights into the nature of cosmic time.
For this reason Ricoem reoognized from the beginning that
he would have to account for this dimension in developing his
own study, hut he reserved discussion of it until he was preto undertake it within a far more extensive presentation
of a genera:l phenomenology of t:ime in Volume 3.
When Riicoeur does pick up this issue, he argues that there
is indeed an 0rbjective reaEty of time, linked to the reality of
movement, :which resists being accounted for pu't1ely in terms
of the "time of the human spirit." Jn Ricoeur's assessment,
cosmic time, lbeing an expression of objective reality, is present
before the activity of !human ,spi,rit, and thus human sipirrit
cannot consider itself to :be at the origin of our understanding
of time.
In order to :counterbalaince Augustine's approach, Ricoeur
goes hack to A'ristotle. He sees !in Aristotle's "explanation " of
cosmic time an intelligibility and objectification of the reality
of time, an appropriation of cosmic truth, that cannot he taken
up rpurely and simply within Aiugustine's 'reading of the tiime
of the human spirit.
However, if it is one of the gains of Ricoeur's study to have
caHed for a sohering
to the reality of cosmic time, I
think his treflections on the 1inte1Hgibi1ityof 1oosmic time can be
pushed a hit furitiher and a more precise meaning of the oibjectivity of eosmic time developed. Jn view of this I shall be
pursuing the ro1e that "ordering intelligence" plays in our apipreoiation of the meaning of objectiivity when referring to the
order of the visible universe. In my view, implications of this
role can he decisive for the relationship between cosmic time
and the time of human spirrit, which privileges the v;alidity of
!human action.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

475

That Riooeur's account of the ohjectivity o:f cosmic time
needs to he :fUTtherdeveloped can :be clarified :by Jooking at his
reading of Heidegger.

-IIHaving gone through the ilong history of rrefl.eotions and deibates ooncerrnillgtime and having :focused, i:in ;particuJar, on the
works of Arugustine, Aristotle, Kant, and Husserl, Ricoeur
turns to
Being arvd Time, which, he argues,
out
a new foundation on which to carry for1w:aird our inteTpretation
of time. If Augustine and Husserrl have wo:rked £rom a descripti:ion of our innerr
of time, and Aristotle and Kant
lliuve worked :from a description 1of the "objectivity" o:f time,
Heidegger 'Superseded these two starting points with 1a reflection ihased on his :reading of Da,sein. Heidegger emphasizes our
wkeady heing-the11e, our 1already having found ourselves as
heing-in-the-wor,Jd and thrown .towa:vds death. The term
which encapsulates this onto.logical existentiel experience of
being-in-the-'world, thrown tow:ard death, iis Care.
:Altholll>gh Heidegger had su;perseded the polemic of cosmic
and psychologica,l t:i!Ille, Riooeur still has misgivings about
Heideggerr"s appropriation of the intelligihility o:f cosmic time
within hiis new rperspectivieof understanding. For in Heidegger
the popular
oi time which corresponds, to om heingin-the wor1d ,as cosmos is treated under the heading o:f withintimeness (Innierzeitliohkeit) . However, :for Heidegger, thiis is
seen as an experience and expression oi:f time which is too superficirul; it (JOr,resipondsto tihe time of what is 1at !hrund, the thingness of the wor1d, and its artiifacts which mre manipulruble.
Heidegger, who is a pioneer in the philosophy of 1anguage,
could not yet draw out the full :implications of finguistic clues
;to our deeperr and more .complex
of cosmic participation. So much is this the case that Ricoeur ends up placing
Heidegger'•s treatment, ibeginning as it does rwith Care, within
the trrudition o[ AJugustine's more psychologica:l 1reading of time
and Husserrs perspectives on time.
1

1

476

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

But in so doing, rand this is where Riooernr reveals his own
ranticipations, he still credits Heidegger with drawing our attention to the already-there of our 1being-in-the-world and with
indirectly demonstnatinrg that
time, the time :of the
world, precedes in its objectivity the time of the human spirit,
OT precedes the
of time for iwhiich the human spirit
is responsible in its mode of being attentive to itself. In fact, I
would suspect that, because he learned this from Heidegger, he
wa;s awrare from the beginning of the need to read Aristotle' s
insights into time along with Augustine's and to 1anticipate the
corrective which a notion of eosnric time wou1d bring to our
hermeneutics of time as an expression of self-underst:anding. 5
However, in my view, this relationship to the already-there
of our being-in-the-world, as evidence of the objectivity of
cosmic time, does not yet take into account the fall truth of
the meaning of the o:bjectivrity of cosmic time. :Ror it is one
thing to say that realities such as movement make 1an impact
on my senses and confirm the world's ibeing-there objectively
hefore I hegin to think about it; it is quite another thing to
identify these incontl'overtible impressions made on my senses
by the visib1e world with the intelligibility of the world's full
objectivity. There is the difference here :between (1) the sense
of the oibjectiViederived from an experience of the" giivenness"
of material reality and (2) the objectivity of the wodd, a
knowledge which is the fruit of the research, for example, in
natural sciences. The one is a question of appeia•rance, the
other of an act of understa:ncHng.
Ricoeur is fully ruware of the significance of the intelligibilities which are the :result of our knowledge in the natural sciences. His work offers insightful inroads into a general theory
of objectivity and
the importance rof empirica1l resea,rch
as an explanatory pole in a generail theory of hermeneutics. 6
1

5 See Ricoeur, '.l'ime and Narrative.
Vol. 1, pp. 60-64; Temps et reoit. Tome
3, pp. 90-144.
6 Drawing on such studies as The Discove1·y of Time, by June Goodfield
and Stephen Toulmin (Chicago and London: University of Chicago Press,

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

477

But wha.t Ricoeur does not yet seem to hawe accounted for in
the distinction between sentient experience of movement and
the objective intelligibility of cosmic time is the
role
of human intelligence, especriaillyas this concerns the different
f:rames of reference involved in 1identifying ooncrete time. A's a
result, it appears that in his discussion of cosmic time he tends
to place the emphasis on the ailready-there of movement hefore
the engagement of the activity of the mind. He does this in
order not to ,Jet the cosmic theory fall under the governance of
psy;ohofogical theory of time.
This is evident when he himself continues to resist allowing
human intelligence a. primary role in understanding the objective rewlity of eosmic time. He knows, as his rreading from
Aristotle indicates, that intelligence is requirred to understand
how we measure and number ("re1dmn," if you wi1l) our dayto-day cosmic time. But he maintains that even before there
is this act of measuring time there is the 01bjective l.'eality of
what is measuraible. This 'objectivie order,' therefore, precedes
and stands as 1a coTl'ective to the ad of human intenigence 1and
understanding. 7
I would not deny this, hut I do come hack to an eadier
1963), Ricoeur demonstrates the complex and stratified levels that are present
in any account of our understanding of cosmic time. He refers to these in
order to offer resistance to the all-too-quickly incorporatecl (and dismissed)
notions of popular time taken up by Heidegger.
I refer the reader to the extremely important pages in Ricoeur's work
Fallible Man, pp. 57-71, where he deals with the question of objectivity. He
writes, " To know being is not merely to let it appear but is also to determine it intellectually, to order it, to express it" (p. 67). I am asking how
the meaning of this statement is nuanced when we consider cognitional operations as well as the determination of language and speech in reaching the
real.
7 Our judgment on Ricoeur's
approach finds even more support when he
explains where he can anticipate the cosmological response to the aporias
of the "time of the human spirit." He believes that they will be found at
the level of a poetics, a narrative configuration of time (Temps et recit, 3,
p. 31). In our view, this indicates that we still must address precisely how
the ordering intelligence does lead us to an affirmation of the objectivity of
time.

478

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

point: the objectivity of reality that comes from an impression
made on my senses, that is, empiricrul,e:xiperienceand its images,
is not the objectivity of an intelligibiliity like the notion of
time itself. This latter is ia result of knowing, rand is, therefore,
the oibjective as grasped and known. In this case, a, fuller
elaJboration of the irole of human sp[rit in its acts of understanding is cmcia;l.
Furthermorrie, there is no direct experience of time even at
the cosmic level of time. We must recall that the question of
time ,was just as pil'ohlematic £or Aristotle as it wias for Augustine. Both began their respective keatises hy asking ho1w we
can sipeak of something that logic telis us does not exist.
As far as the truth of cosmic :time is concerned, this pi!'oblem
cannot be superseded unless we understand that the objectivity
of cosmic time is 1reached only within a comprehension of how
understanding ,gives us access to this intelligibility. It can only
he understood in its inteHigihility as an act of judgment and
only hecomes knowledge as something that is krwwn. This is
achieved :by hringing into :focus rand to its end the entire dyna:mITc ,structure of mgnitiional operations in an act of judgment. This does not make knowJedge subjective; it simply
recognizes that what is known to 1be true amd 01bjectiveis only
known as such by a knower who knows this. 8
This is why in the next section of this article we must retUII'n
for a moment to Aristotle and re-Teaid his account of time.
But in the course of our re-reaiding, we shall rbe drawing on the
insights of thinkers who work within 1a philosophical tradition
which places at the center of its approach an atitention to the
sSee Bernard Lonergan, Method in Theology (N.Y.: Herder, 1972). "Reflection and judgment reach an absolute: through them we acknowledge what
really is so, what is independent of us and our thinking" ( p. 35). .Again:
"What is true is of itself not .private but public, not something to be confined to the mind that grasps it, but something independent of that mind
and so in a sense detachable and communicable" (pp. 44-45). Note also the
article by Lonergan entitled: " The Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific
Thought," in OoUeotion, ed Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), pp. 142151, especially p. 149.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

479

OF COSMIC TIME

act of understand:inig and the operaitions of reason itseH. We
shall see that it is the differentiated understanding orf this attention which sheds new 1i.ght on the meaning rand objectivity
of rcosmictime.
The tradition of 1which we are thrinlcingis that orf St. Thomas
Aquina;s. When speaking of time, he referred to Aristotle, yet
when it came to grasping the structure of the visible universe,
he was principally concerned with our acts of understanding.
He thus orpened up a trrudition which W10uld eventuaUy set up
·the premises from which a more elaiborate account o.f time
muld he developed. 9 In our judgment, this challenge w&s taken
up most recently hy Bernard Lonergan.
study on time in Chapter 5 of Insight together
with other reflections on time which ihave developed within the
Thomistic tr&dition will he particufarly helpful as we pursue
the question of the intelligibility of time.
I cannot promise to
the .aporias which set Ricoeur's
own reflection in motion, for there is truth to his ohser vations.
The very olanguaige of time itself ·will always serv;e to give rise
to further thougiht. But the Teflections in the next section may
shed mnsiderruble light on how to ohjectify and understand
cosmic time.
1

1

of this tradition, especially in the many
9 Note the recent historiography
articles of G. McCool (most recently in his "Neo-Thomism and the Tradition of St. Thomas," Thought 62 (June 1987): 131-146). I would identify
in particular the following: " De Tempore" (a short monograph on the
question of time, once wrongly attributed to St. Thomas but which can be
found as Opuscule XLIII in Opuscules de saint Thomas d' Aquin, trans. M.
Vedrine, M. Bandel, and M. Fournet (Paris: L. Vives, 1856-1858-Texte la tin
sur deux colonnes au bas des pages) ; Friedrich Beemelmans, Zeit und
lflwigkeit nach Thomas von Aquino (Miinster: .Aschendorffsche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1914); Desire Nys, La, notion de temps (Paris: Felix .A.lean,
1925) ; De Tonquedec, La, Philosophie de la, nature: La, nature en general
(Premiere partie, troisieme fascicule) Principes de la philosophie thomiste,
II (Paris: Lethielleux, 1959), pp. 66-90; Bernard Lonergan, Insight: A
Study of Huma,n Understanding (New York: Philosophical Library, 1957),
especially Chapter 5.

480

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

Time and Ordering Intelligence
-IOur ideas in this section rely on Lonergan's insights. He
maintains that, even if a i!Wtion of cosmic time emerges only in
app11ehension of concrete focal motion, there cannot be an
adve11tenceto time as the foll set of concrete durations without
the " inter¥ention of ordering intelligence." Moreover there
cannot he an invariant
of time which persists aa:nong all
instances of particular measures of time without attending to
the " level of intelligence."
This affirmation goes st:might to the heart of Ricoeur's discussion on the relationship between Augustine's and Aristotle's
viiews on time. Ricoeur, as mentioned rubove, has stated the
importance of holding both theories together 1and yet argued
that hoth cannot he held within one theory of time. 10
Augustine's " psychO'log1ca:l" account of time does represent
a definitive adv1ance over that of Aristotle, hut Riicoern· judges
that Aristotle's ,theory resists hetter the imperia,l rule of the
subject in an interpretation of the full intelligi!bility of cosmic
time. It was Aristotle, mo11e than Augustine, who prroibed iin
subtle fashion the complex features of cosmic time.
In his anwlysis of Arristotle's theory, Ricoeur 1dentifies three
iphases: first, Aristotle's eJDp1anation that tia:ne is found in
mov;ement but not identified with movement. (Here we must
under:line that it is conc1'ete, local motion that is considered.)
Apart from the apprehension of change there is no foundation
cfor the genesis of the idea of time.
Secondly, regarding the movement of any object through a
given space, time concerns the ,relationship of ' before ' 1and
' afteOC' ', namely the identifia:hle beginning and end points of
motion. There is no apprehension of time without an identification of these two points and their relationship to one another
aJJJd in relation to the siame body moving through space.

1

1

1

10 Ricoeur,

Temps ct recit, Tome 3, pp. 29-30; 35-36.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

481

.FinaUy, there is the measure of the interval, its length orr
quantity between the beginning and end points. In this instance, human intelligence makes use of a convenient numbering system and determines (thy way of numbering) the quantity of this interval.
Given these phases 0£ Aristotle's commentary on time, we
understand why time is defined as " the number of motion in
respect of' hefore '1and' after.' " 11
Augustine's failure in trying to substitute a psychological
theory for a cosmological one is asserted hy Ricoeur through
·every major phase of his analysis oif ATistotle's theory. He will
show that at every point where, from Augustine' s piresentation,
the human spirit attempts to affirm its priority Aristotle's
theory will resist this advance. In this way he attempts to
bring to the surfrace the truth of our participation in the
cosmos, which tends .to .be hidden, if not suppressed, in Augustine's formulation of time. I shall briefly describe Riooeur's
position by referring to each phase 0£ Aristotle's theory and hy
adding some remarks of my own.
First, Ricoeur underlines the fact that we aT'e " already circumscri.Jbed and enveloped " in time, for through mo'Viement
1and its successive moments we apprehend the already-there of
the visible universe 1before we attest to our own presence on
the scene. We experience the wol'11d and find "succession in
things " before •We re-construct the world. I would add that
while it !remains true that mov;ement makes 1an impact on our
senses, this does not yet give rise to a notion of time; time is
not ·an immediate and explicit experience. 12
Secondly, for Ricoeur, in the relationship of 'hefore ' and
' after' we anticipate an intelligibility to the order orf the universe. Our whole discussion of time in the AristoteHan tmdition " proceeds by analogy from a relation of order which is in
1

11 Aristotle,

Physics 219a34-35.
II est dificile de savior ce que c'est que le temps " ("difficile est cognoscere quid sit tempus ") . "De Tempore " in Opuscules de Bwilnt Thomas
d' Aquin, p. 31.
12 "

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

the world hefore being in the mind." 13 But I wou1d add that
the meaning of "before" as used here must ,be submitted to
,some criticwl analysis. For, ii it is true that the order of the
universe does not derpend on the human srpirit, it is nonetheless
true that order is an intelligibility, not an immediate dakum of
experience. Furthermore, any order which is discovered to
exist independent of the human
is a.in order only known
as such hy the opemtions of knowing of the human sipiriit. This
will he at the center of our discussion be1ow.
Finally, time ultimately relies for the purposes orf measure on
a constant, ahsoilutely rregular movement. Even if the standa11d
for this cannot be immediately identified, it nonetheless is attested to hy R1icoeur, "that the sea11ch for an a1bsolutelyregular
movement l'emains the governing idea of every measure of
time.'' 14 But I see further implications in this with regard to
the prohlem o.f time. For implicit here is an assumption concerning simultaneity. If simultaneity is anticipated as the diirecting goal with regard to the universal measure of time,
there results the confusion of identifying :a wncrete particular
with an abstract principle. This is one of the fundamental
'sources of e11ror O'r at least blockages in our comprehension o.f
time.
Nonetheless, these points ha.ving ibeing made, Riooeur recognizes in each of these stages the imperious weight of bhe presence of human intelligence. He TeaEzes that whether with rega11d to perceiving motion, or with regavd to identifying any
point or instant which sets the 1boundarriesof :a specific motion
so that it may he measured as a unit of time, or with regard to
the possibility of applying a measure of time itself, one has to
acknowledge the perceptive, discriminating, and comparative
activities of thought.
However, for R:icoeur, this aetivity of the spirit never overrides the principal empha:sis of Aristotle's theorry. "Movement
1° Ricoeur. Temps et reoit, Tome 3, p. 25.
14 Ricoeur, Temps et reoit, Tome 8, p. 20.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

483

.remains the ·aooentua:ted term .... " 15 And in order to re-affirm
this, he maintains that the objectivity of the cosmological experience of time cannot he directly reached hy the human
spiTit,16 meaning, that it is not by an analy:sis or pihenomeno1ogy of human consciousness of
that we can comprehend
without 'limits the meaning orf cosmoiloigicaltime.
Ricoeur would maintain that, even if in each phase of the
cosmological theory there is 'allusion to the operations of the
human spirit, there remains in this theory no explicit reference
to the human spirit. 17 However, I would maintain that, despite
the ifact that it may ibe true that there is !110 explicit reference
to the operations O'f the human spirit in this theory, this should
not lead us to de-emphasize the role understanding plays in our
affirmation of the objectivity of time. It is the inattention to
the role of understanding in the formulation of the objectivity
of time that has led to some of foe major ·confusions in understanding cosmic t,ime itselrf.18
We shai11 see that hy attending to the operations of understanding rwe need not he '1ed surreptitiously ha,ck into Augustine's psychological theory; far from it, we can .be led more
proioundly into the implications of the intelligibility and objectivity of ieosmic
itself, quite distinct from psychological time. At tihis Jevel I am in complete agreement mth
Ricoeur: we cannot comprehend within one theory both
theories of time. Neveritheless, I iheliev;e that it is still possible
to disengage, within the theory of cosmological time, other
formative elements in our understanding of this notion.
Temps et recit, Tome 3, p. 23.
Temps et r6oit, Tome 3, p. 21.
·11 Ricoeur, Temps et r6cit, Tome 3, p. 26. Beyond attempting to account
for the intelligibility of time itself, Ricoeur also emphasizes another agenda
that is at the heart of this section of his work, namely, "restituer toute sa
profondeur a la phusis, ... " (p. 26) His appeal to objectivity is also a way
of declaring that nature is the principle and cause of movement which "preserve la dimension plus qu'humaine du temps" (p. 26) . It is worthwhile
comparing this emphasis with those of Pat Byrne in his address delivered
at the Lonergan workshop meeting in Boston, June 1987, entitled "Insight
and the Retrieval of Nature."
18 See Lonergan, Insight, pp. 158, 160, 16·6, 170.
15 Ricoeur,
16 Ricoeur,

484

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

-IIIn order to develop these insights, it is important to come
hack to tih.e assumption that there is no explicit account of the
operations of the human spirit in Aristotle's theory of time.
H the text of The Physi(;S itself does not give an account of
these orpemtions, it seems nonetheless that subsequent tradition 19 has done so and has benefited greatly thereby. It has
come to understand the full objectivity and meaning of Arisrtotle',s definition hy
appealing to the role of understanding in the .formulation of a definition of time and by
identifying the stages or :phases in the conception of time that
led to the definition itself.
Here is a case where we must 1aidvert to more than what is
stated in the theory itself. This 'more ' is the way
human beings understand the visible univ;e.rse itself. For me,
this is one of the most important reasons for pursuing this
question within the .Aristotelian tradition. This tradition has
heen continued and enriched hy Aquinas and by modern commentators on Aquinas rwho have taken seriously his own call
to understand understanding. We shall highiight in particular
a hook written iby Desire Nys entitled La notion du temps,
In this
first published in 1898 with a third edition in
brilliant study, Nys demonstrates why it is so important not
only to dloHow ,an arglllment of a texit but also to attend to how
understanding, the activity orf reason, is operating in formulating the aiigiument of the ,text.20 I sha11 the :referring frequently
to this text 1by N ys.
F1ollowingthis line of iinterpretation concerning the questions
of cosmic time, ,we recognize that our knowledge of time is not
just 1a question of the objectivity of the visible world over
·against the ructivity of the hruma.n spirit. It is also, as an affirto
matiion of intelligibility of order, one of the hest
watch the processes of abstraction at work and to identify
19 See above n.9.

2-0 See, for example, Nys, La notion

du temps, pp. 7, 11, 12.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

485

the foundations of human understanding. 21 It is a unique instance of 1appropriating the objective and subjecthne complex
iat work in judging the truth of order in the visible universe.
We must ruppropriate not only how the human miind in its
operations is indirectly implicated hut also how it is impossible
to comprehend pmperly the objective intelligibility of time
-without ian attention to the operations of reason itself. The
.Aristotelian theory goes bey;ond asserting that nature is there
before human spirit is iat worrk; it shows !how both our participiation iin the visible unh,,erse 1and our understanding of this
1are subtly and simuJtaneously implicated. 22
Let us druborate this 'by referring in more detail to these
three phases identified hy Riooeur's ['eading of .Aristotle's
theory of time. I shrull indicate at ,every stage how an underrstanding of the operations of intelligence is essential to an
elabovation of the notion of time itseLf. In eruch phase I will
a:lso accentuate the importance of maintaining the distinction
1between what is pemeiv;ed to he objective and real ait the Jevel
of first appearances, and what is known to be ohjecrtive and intelligible as a result of the activity of reflexive consciousness
!itself.
1. Nys has written that the key to the entire understanding
of the Thomistic aind Aristotelian notion of time is the identity
of the 0 1bjectivity of motion (focal motion) and the objectivity
of persistence. Those familiar with Aristotle's theory recognize
the important, if not essential, relationship between these two
realities, i.e. time :and mo,vement. Without movement there
:is no :genesis of the ,idea of time. So closely are these two notions interrelated that it is understood to be
to develop 1a notion of time without an e:x1perienceof change. 23
Insight, p. 140.
this reason we would not agree with Beemelmans' expression: "Die
Zeit hat einen halb subjektiven, halb objektiven Charakter" (Zeit 1tnd
lflwigkeit, p. 21) • Objectivity is reached through knowing; it is not a component of knowledge independent of a consideration of the knowing subject.
See, however, n.8 above.
23 See Nys, La notion d.u temps, p. 23, 27. See also Friedrich Beemelmans.
Zeit un<l lflwigkeit, pp. 13-14.
21 Lonergan,

22 For

486

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

However, even with this identification there comes a swbtle
distinction. Movement a.nd time are not .equated; time is found
tin movement but is not movement itself. Thus, time is not
perceived immediately by our senses, as is the appea!l"ance or
apprehension of movement itself. So much is this the case thait,
like .Augustine, Aristotle and Aquinas 'begin their reflections
on time by affirming the rprohlematic charader of knowing
what (it iseems) cannot logically "rbe." 24
r.Dhe initial perception of time requires an ract of intelligence
or !!'ea.son. Nys points out, for example, that the affirmation of
time in movement 1and the distinction of time itself from movement require that we h11ing together both the fact that something is and thait this something persists in its existence
tl:u:1oughsuccessive motion in a fixed frame of space. Movement
implies " the persistence of the same act oif existence." 25
But persistence is not the same as existence. To affirm that
something is, and to affirm that it persists in mo'Viementin its
a;ct of existence, these two .affirmations rely, first, on the fact
that intelligence has formulated the idea of persistence and,
secondly, that it has distinguished it fvom an ract of existence
which is perceived in sll!ccessiv:estates of change.
Bven in this very :basic phase of the theory we have to be
oare£uil. not to lump into one perception two distinct realities,
one 1which can he described, namely, movement, the other
which is an inte1ligibi:1ity,namely, persistence of some thing in
its a;ct of existence. In relating time to movement, then, the
distinction between the obdectivity of description and the objectivity of !intelligibility is introduced.
Before moving on to the second phase, naimely, the idea of
the relationship of ':before' and 'after,' we should note that
the identification of the act of e:xistenGe,which is distinct from
persistence yet only apprehended in persistence, helps us to
24 Aristotle, Physics, in The BMic Works of Aristotle, ed. Richard McKeon
(New York: Random House, 1941). Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on Aristotle's Physics (London: Routledge & K. Paul, 1963).
25 See Nys, La notion du temps, pp. 12-13, 17.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

487

understand something of the nature of time. That is, time is
not the resuJt of a sum of successive moments in change; it is
not the sum of separruble parts.
Thus we can srpeak of an infinite series of divisible magnitudes of time (an infinite series) without compromising our
understanding of time. Were time, as a notion, pure1y material
magnitude, then it would be an infinitely divis1rble magnitude,
the full measure of which wou1d be aniv;ed at by adding these
magnitudes.. But the notion of time, even if it applies only to
concrete durations, is an abstract inte1ligibility and not identified with any specific magnitude. We shall have an opportunity to come hack to this point later when we speak of measure.
But here, we simply wish to say that any
is
ly divis1ble, given our .aihiEty to identify any points for potentiwl measurement and subsequently to divide the magnitude at
these points.
Q. The second phase of the themy concerns the relatfonship
of 'before,. and 'after.' Even if the magnitude iidentified with
the points of before and after objectifies an 011der inherent in
the st111ucture of mo vemen:t and nature, nonetheless it is only
the power of reason which makes possible the identification of
this specific point as a boundary of what magnitude is to he
measured by time.
Ricoeur himself admowledges the role of the human spirit
in identifying the ihoundary point which identO.fies the limit of
any particula;r movcement to he measured, yet :this activity of
the spirit is still not emphasized. However, Nys has shown
that without this act of reason there is no not:ion of time; there
is oruy movement.
if one of the major elements in the
notion of time is the relationship of before and after, there
exists, until this ' after ' ipoint is identified, 1only potential time
in the material base of movement. Without this identification
there is only successive movement and no reference to measure.
In other wo.rids, the eme11gence of the notion of cosmic tiime requires the act of intelligence which suspends motion in motion and enables the interval :between these 'two points to be
measured.
1

488

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

One ma.y counter the argument hy saying that there a:re,
independent of an 1act of human intelligence, many identifiahle
movements in nature, e.,g. tihe hea;rt beat. These may suggest
ohjectively identifiaible beginning and end points OJ' even reguJa;r ;rhythms whose sequences permit the applicrution of a measure of time. Yet the cosmic theory elaborated hy Aristotle, and
then by Aquinas and such :eommentatovs as Nys, recalls that
it is not just 'a question of identifying these points; it is a1so
a question of I1ecognizing the relationship hetween the beginning and end points. Theve is nothing in nature itself as visible
reality which can ho1d in relationship two independent points
for the rpurposes of applying a measure; this remains an act
of intemgence. 26
Without the act of reason, time remains only potential, in
movement. If this remains difficult .for our imagination to
grasp, it is only because we ha,ve not yet 1rudverted to how om.·
intenigenoe works in expressing the languaige of time itselI,
We do not ,wish to say that inteHigence creates the st:mcture or
011der which time measures; we simply wish to highlight that
a judgment :rubout that structure or order can he true only because this O'l'der is a rea:lity which can he reached by the operations o,f human cognition. We are not falling hack into a theocy
of time based merely on the psychology of the inner experience
of time.
The importance of recognizing the mle of re ason in constituting the intelligihlity of cosmic time becomes more evident if
we also comprehend the fact that these two points, the before
and after, the structure of whose relationship is essential to the
definition of time, are not iinoluded in the magnitude that is
measured as time. They set the limits from which and to
which a magnitude is measul'ed. Wel'e they included in the
measure, this would imply two other points as the limit of the
measure. When this insight is applied not only to local movements and their time ihut also to the wol'1d in its totality as
1

2a See Nys1 La notion au temps, p. 33.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

489

movement, we understand the futility of attempting to measure either the foll tiime of the world or to identify its chronoilogicalorigin.
Because of the Tefationship between the operations of reason and the measuring of time, it is impossible iby virtue of
some other time to identify the end of the wo'l"ld. This is why
Aquinas could entertain, at least in p1rinciple, the idea of the
eternity of the world, 27 even if it is in £act finite. There is not
only an in:finite number of divisions applicable to any magnirude by virtue orf its divisibility; there is also an infinite num1ber of concrete extensions to any 1ocal movement.
Moreo·ver, since any measure requires as its limit a point
that is not included in the measure itself, it is
to
identify an origin without implicating another pcior moment
as limit. Once more, difficmlties and confusions .arise if we do
not distinguish the objectivity proper to the intelligibility of
time and the intelligibility proper to describing observed
motion .
.Aigain, then, in this second phase, the structure of objective
nature expressed in the notion of cosmic time can only be
grasped and known by the operative and ordering intelligence.
3. The most complex aspect of time is the third pha.se of
Ricoeur's analysis of a cosmic theocy of time. What is often
not attended to here is that measure not onJy involves using
a conventional " yardstick " .for determining magnitude but
also implies 'all !intelligibility of what it means to measure. Forgetting this gives rise to a number of difficult aporias. For ex27 Nys, La notion du temps, p. 157. See also A. D. Sertillanges,
L'idee de
creation et ses retentissements en philosophie (Paris: Aubier Montaigne,
1945), pp. 25-63. Also Beemelmans, Zeit und Ewigkeit, pp. 50-51. Beemelmans, Nys, and De Tonquedec refer in this context to the term "aevum"
that was used ·by Aquinas. It is not " aeternitas "; nonetheless, as Beemelmans points out, "Es bedeutet eine Teilnahme an der Ewigkeit seitens des
Geschi:ipfes" ( p. 50) . .Sertillanges uses the phrase " ab aeterno " on p. 25 of
his text. Aevum was also a notion that the medieval thinkers used to differentiate the "eternity" of non-corporeal created beings (pure spirits) from
God's eternal existence ( aeternitas).

490

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

.ample, a common but mistaken assumption is that, smce there
is a unity to time, there is .ultimately a common standard,
whether it he knowable or not (Kant), which can be the measure of an and total time or, if you will, the full magnitude of
motion.
More concretely this is evidenced in the assumption that, independent of the positions observers occupy, all motion is
simultaneous. It is the theory of relativity which forces us
beyond this common sense notion with regard to measurement,
even if this theory cannot itself olwrify what it has to offer towards understanding time. 28
I cannot possiibly en.for into a description of this theory, let
a;lone pretend that I fully gra1sp either its mathematica;l or its
physicaJ aspects. But with regard ito our present dis cussion I
wish to sibow ho1w it has furthered our understanding of the
notion of time.
E1ven Nys, in his
edition of his hook La noti.on du
temps, knew he was up a;gainst a new phenomenon. Though he
was mo:re awa;re than others of the role of reason and its developed distinctions in dea:ling with time, Nys felt that Telativ:ity theory, by affirming d[fierent apparently contradictory
measurements of similar points and their relationships, 29 was
·still comprehensible ·within an idea of infinite magnitudes of
mea,surement and, furthermore, thait it did not touch the in.telligibility of time itself.
But haiving said this, he knew that :somehow there :was more
to it-here we see how perceptive he was in his day-even
1

1

1

.28 One way this is evidenced is by the search for the foundations
of relativity theory. See Patrick Byrne, " Lonergan on the Foundations of the
Theories of Relativity," in Creativity and Method: Essays in Honor of
Bernard Lonergan, ed. Matthew L. Lamb (Milwaukee, Wis:. Marquette University Press, 1981), pp. 477-494.
29 The standard example for posing the problem is the explosion of firecrackers on a station platform as a train is rapidly passing through the station. If you are on the platform and trigger the explosion of the firecrackers,
they all go off, for you, at the same time. However, if you are a passenger on
the train moving through the station, it looks as if they go off one after the
other.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

491

though he could not articulate what this was nor grasp what
this imp;iied :for our £uture understanding of the visible universe. The reason for his blind spot on this point can be found
i!l.1 his own text. He iassumed that, since there was a universal
and aJbso1ute intelligibility to time, there was an rubsolute magnitude too. In other words, he did not arpply to the notion of
measure the same analysis regarding reason tha;t he applied
to the notion of time.
A ·Similar oversight can he found in a text like de Tonquedec's,30 which is in many ways a fine commentary on time
in the Thomistic tradition. He too has avoided many of the
common sense difficulties hy attending to the operations of
reason. But when it comes to measurement, there is no similar
attention to the oper:ations of understanding. So he says that,
when two events occur simultaneously for one person but not
for another, we should resolve this by considering the relationship between or among these events themselves, independent of
the observel's. This solution assumes that there is a higher
over:aH perspective from which we see things happening. But
any motion that is accounted for from tib.is perspective leads us
ha.ck to the prolblems of what is seen from one particulaT point
of ohservation and how space is defined within thait perspective.81 And we are back to the same prioblem relatiiv1itytheory
faoed, with its attempts to devise invariant laiws that held true
across different, concrete, spatio-'temrporrulframes of :reference.
'.Do my knowledge the first creative solution to this perplexity
is found in Lonerigan's chapter on " Space ,and Time " in
Chapter Five of Insight. He !I"ecaJls something wihiich everyone
since Aristotle has maintaiined about time, that is, that time
1

1

so De Tonquedec, La philosophie de la nature, p. 87.
in the once used example of God sitting high up on
top of a hill watching two persons or vehicles below moving toward one another at high speeds around a bend. The two vehicles, it was argued, are
moving but God is at rest and so does not undergo the same experience of
time as the two moving persons or vehicles. This is hardly a way of solving
the problem, since all it does is place God within a specific, concrete, spatiotemporal frame of reference.
s1 This is the oversight

492

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

deals with co!l1crete local motion. But where we speak of concrete local motion in concrete space, things are perceived
relation to a point of origin which is that of the observer.
Thus, measurement takes into cons1deration, at least implicitly,
the frame of reference within which points in time and space
a.re said to relate to one another. The measure of these 'l'e1ationships is called a. geometry.
But here is where the problem .begins. For we still almost
spontaneously don Newtonian hats, that is, we think of the
universe or creation in terms of one geometry. But Lonergan
has shown that there are di:fferent ways of measuring the same
points in their temporal and spatial relationships and, thecrefore, different possible geometries, even an infinite set thereof.
Consequently, there is not just one concrete standard of measurement. Given the intellig1bility of correlations within any
specific way of measuring, we can anticipate an infinite num1ber of possible concrete ways of measuring. 32 ".AJhsolutes,"
writes Lonergan, "do not lie in the field of .sensible rparticulars .... " 33
He reinforces this insight hy saying that simultaneity, which
presupposes being able to bring two movements together witihin the same measureable quantity, really applies only at the
concrete level. It speaks of a " now " in relation to a specific
observcer. As such, then, this is not an intel1ig1hiEty either of
time or of measure.
When we forget this, we apply what is true at a concrete
level to an abstract inteHigibility of time, and therefore apply
the truth of a particula·r situation as the standard for all. It
is like saying one particular measure of time (e.g., an hour) is
the standard of absolute time. But time is an aibstract notion,
not a particular measure. Even N ys l'ecognized this last point.
1

s2 See Lonergan's remarks on Riemannian geometry in Insight, especially
p. 147. See also his remarks on the meaning of geometry as a concrete stand"
ard of measurement in "A Note on Geometric Possibility," in Collection, ed.
Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), p. 112.
33 Lonergan, Insight, p. 170.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

493

This tmth a.bout measure and the roJe of our intelligence in
measuring
eluded us as long as we did not J:iaive to deaJ
with the p!l.'ohlem of measuring particles moving at very high
speeds. But the data now force us in another direction. If we
resist, it is not because we do not need the theory. Riather, it
is heca,use we live fmm day to day with velocities of motion
which do not 11equir:e it. We feel secure in our classical world
view, even if there is mounting evidence for a statistical wodd
view, which does not view the world in its totality in the same
way thwt the classical does.
Lonergan admits that Aquinas thought within olassioal assumptions. But Aquinas did provide the principles for superseding them. By directing us to attend to how our understa:nding orper,a:tes when it understands the visrble univcerse, we
were ahle to go !beyond the classical theory when new data for
our understanding 1bemme available in the natuml sciences.
This 1is the 1genius of Lonergan: he ihas attended to the new
data available for "understanding understanding " that came
with the new insights and methods in the natural sciences, and
he !has been able to devcelop a world view that incorporates
iboth the classical and statisticrul intelligirbilitiies. He has ca:lled
this world view "emergent prorhability."
Within this view he has been able to focus in more precise
way1s on what we understand when we understand cosmic time,
and he has developed a definition which tak:es into consideration both the classical and the sitatistical inte1ligibilitiresof the
laws of the visible univcerse. He has defined the concrete intelligibility of time 1as " that [which] grounds the possibility of
SU'ooesssivel'ealiza.Hons in accord with prolbaibilities."34
Furthermore, he has maide us awrure that world views are
not just totaliziing images of what is 1already-out-there-now.
He saw that wirth relativity theory we had in :fact gone beyond
imagination in our ·efforts to understand and exp1ain the visible
universe: "But relativity has eliminated the D:naginaihilityof
·ScientificaUy conceived space 1and time; and quantum me34 Lonergan,

Insight, p. 172.

494

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

chanics has elimina,ted tihe imaginahility of ibas]c processes.
Whether he Ekes it or not, the scientist has transcended
imagination." 35
A world view, therefore, wiH have to have a methodological
reference; it will become a heuristic, anticipating specific kinds
of
and correfations. Lonergan calls this "emergent probaihility," a world view 1which is a heuristic according
to which one is able to anticipate " the inteiligi:bHity immanent
in world process." 36
Once this is understood, the question with crega11d to time
and me:asurement can he aiddressed on the rbasis of different
premises. Lonergan is aible to free us from the assumption of
,simultaneity in the notion of measurement. The unity of time
is not one of ma.gnitude and there is no absolute particular
standard of time. The same distinction between the particular
and the intelligilble, even if the two notions cannot he separated,
:applies to measurement. There is an intelligi:bility to measurement which is neither defined nor determined 37 at a purely
" concrete " or descriptive level.

Conclusion
My purpose in this article was not to pcresent or discuss a
new definition of time. Tlhe concern has been rather to focus
more sharply on the role of "ordering inteHigence" in an understanding of the intelligibility of time. The activity of reflection (questioning, understanding, and judgment) is not a
secondary element in our comprehension of a theory of cosmic
time hut something essential to :recog-nizing why time is not
only intellig1ble and universal but a1so objective.
These reflections do not pretend to eEmirrmte what Ricoeur
has referred to as the a:porias of time. In our view there still
35 Lonergan, " Isomorphism
of Thomist and Scientific Thought," in Collection, ed. Fred Crowe (Montreal: Palm, 1967), pp. 142-151.
36 Lonergan, Insight, p. 171.
37 Some of Beemelmans
remarks on measurement had, at least implicitly,
suggested this. See his Zeit und Ewiglceit, p. 22.

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

495

are aporias which spur on our thinking aibout oosmic time, but
they are not the same as the ones identified by Ricoeur.
For example, Riooeur spoke of the pamdox that a period of
time is a unity e¥en though this period is made up of independent successive moments. A distinction between levels of
objectivity can help resolve the tension between continuous
time and discontinuous moments of ·succession in time. In the
same way this kind of dist,inction can help clarify .the paradoxical use of the term " now" orr " instant." If any " instant "
can be" now," what then does "now" mean? We have seen
that one side of tJhe para:dox refers to the descripti¥e level while
the other .refers to the intelligibility of time, the level of objctive intelligiilbilityof 011der.88
This helps us to understand, too, a basic distinction regarding the origin and fundamenrtal measure of movement that was
&tandard to both Aristo,tle and Aquinas, that is, the distinction.
between primum mobile and Unmoved Mover. Both thinkers,
Lonel"gan teHs us, sought a cosmic sta:nda11dfor the measure of
.all time. This standard was the fixed sphere; it met the qualities of regularity, ,simplicity, uniformity, and maximum speed. 89
1

as Nys examines this problem by making a distinction between any moments identified as " before " and " after " (these are infinite in number)
and the idea of the temporal present, which refers to the fact that creation
"is", that is, it is always in its act of existence as creation and so is
"now." See our remarks below on the distinction between the Unmoved
Mover and the primum mobile and the significance of these terms for an
understanding of time. Also, note that the medieval thinkers employed a distinction here which Ricoeur has not identified. For them, the term " instant"
did not refer simply to any arbitrarily identified moment; it also referred
to an experience which was timeless. (An example of such a timeless experience is an "instantaneous" act of understanding.)
89 See Antonio Moreno, "Time and Relativity:
Some Philosophical Considerations," The Thomist 45 ( 1981) : 62-79, especially p. 78, where he refers
to the qualities of time we have just identified. This article tries to argue
that the speed of light as relativity theory has described it is "the ontological
unity of time." Today, Moreno argues, the speed of light corresponds to what
Aquinas speaks of in his. works as the primum mobile. Moreno's analogy
might be right, but, if so, his theory suffers from the same weakness Lonergan
identified in Aquinas, namely, the failure to distinguish between the abstract

496

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

But this standard does not y;et give us the ontological inteHigirbility of time. It remains a fixed measure in its own right, one
which perhaps offers the outermost limit for any measuraJble
magnitude of time hut nonetheless a limited one. Furthermore,
this standard cannot solve the other prohlem of how there can
he an ,infinite series of measurable magnitudes of time, while
time, linked as it is to movement and crea;Uon, is finite.
Just as Augustine at the limit of his reflections turned to
address the Eternal Orea:tor to identify the :finitude of time, so
too in their own dist[nct ways did Aristotle a1nd Aquinas turn
to an affirmation of the Unmoved Mover and of Being itself.
as the tramcendental reference to the self-understanding of
finite time. This is no Kantian a priori. 1t .is an understanding of the relationship :between our open and umestricted desire
to know tbeingand Being itself .40
It is an insight into the intelligibility of Being itself, or, for
Aristotle, nature itself, which is the object of my desire to
know. But the notion of tihe Unmoved Mover, as the origin
of all movement without being in movement, also p11ovides an
insight into the finitiude of creation and of time. Only when
time and creation rrecognize their re1a;tiionship to a higher
origin do they Tecognize the truth of their own finitude. 41
intelligibility of time and its concrete frame of reference. I do not see how
the speed of light can in any way be the " ontological" unity of time. It
requires an intelligibility of time to measure it as a concrete standard. This
is why neither Aristotle nor Aquinas would include any sort of speed in their
definition of time. For Lonergan's critique of Aquinas's reference to time,
see Insight, p. 160. Regarding the primum mobile, Aquinas remained confined
within an Aristotelian world view, in Lonergan's judgment.
40 Patrick
Byrne's essays and articles are excellent elaborations of the
significance of this point. See "Foundation of Special Relativity Theory"
in Oreativity and Method and "Insight and the Retrieval of Nature," an
address given at the Lonergan Workshop annual meeting (June, 1987) in
Boston.
41 For this reason I think it extremely important to pay attention to the
literary genre of creation stories. Most often they are either myths, narratives, or liturgical hymns. Ricoeur's later works on language and imagination shed considerable light on this. See, for example, his The Rule of Metaphor: Miiltidi1;oiplinwry Studie1; of the Oreation of Meaning im Language

THE INTELLIGIBILITY

OF COSMIC TIME

497

We must also mention in this context how Gilson saw St.
Thomas's view of the Unmoved Mover as a qualitative advance
over the
of Aristotle. I believce this advance was quite
significant in the history of our inte1'pretation of cosmic time.
Aquinas, unlike Aristotle, asserted the primacy of the act of
existence (to exist) over essence. 42 In affi11ming the primacy
of act, Aquinas was able to argue to the presence of Pure Act,
i.e. the presence of God as Creator to every moving being immediately and not only a;s a remote cause, as in Aristotle's view
0£ the relationship between U nmovced Mover and moving beings. This set the stage for breaking with the notion of a fixed
absolute maignitude of time, even if Aquinas himself was unable to realize this development in any exiplicit wa.y.43 This is
crucia,l in anticipatiing what later would he implied in the developments of relativity theory. St. Thomas's own breakth11ough at the level of understanding implied (400 years before
Newton) that Newton's fixed magnitude (or space within
(Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977), especially Study 7, pp. 216-256.
Regarding the relationship between mythic genre and the reference to beginnings see especially the works of Eric Voegelin: Plato and Aristotle (Baton
Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), pp. 192-204; The Ecumenical Age (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana State University Press, 1974), pp.
7-11; and most recently In Search of Order (Baton Rouge, La.: Louisiana
State University Press 1987), pp. 13-47.
42 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy
of St. Thomas Aquinas (New
York: Random House, 1965), especially pp. 64-65; 78-79.
43 Lonergan does give Aquinas credit in spite of the fact that Aquinas's own
solutions remained limited by his reference to the primum mobile. Compare
Insight, p. 160, where Lonergan refers to the limits of Aquinas, and "Isomorphism of Thomist and Scientific Thought," p. 149, where Lonergan refers to
how Aquinas has provided us with the insight to advance beyond these limited
solutions. In addition to our reference to Gilson in n.42 above, for more information on the specific historical stages which led to the significant nuances
in Aquinas's interpretation of Aristotle's theory of time, see Augustin Moncion, "La theorie aristotelicienne du temps chez Ies peripateticiens medievaux: Averroes-Albert le Grand-Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Neosoholastique
de la Philosophie 36 (1934): 275-307. This article shows how the stage was
set for resolving the problem of the unity of time by breaking with an assumption about magnitude.
(Note: in 1940 Revue Neoscholastique de la
Philosophie became Revue Philosophique de Louvain.)

498

JAMES R. PAMBRUN

which time was measura:ble) was not rubsofotely needed to explain either its intelligibility or its objectivity. 44
However, even when someone li}(,e Lonergan takes up this
understanding ,and aipplies it to our que>Stion of time, it does
not resolve the ,aporias; rather it intensifies them. 45 For in my
1experience of dealfog with this question of the intelEgibility of
cosmic time, relativity theory is one of the most puzzling things
for the human mind to come to terms with. Quite simply put,
it is the discovery that we have an inteHigibi1ity about the
order of the world without any hope of devdoping a corresponding image. An .appro,aich which works with the complementarity (not dialectics) of classical and statistical ,intelligibilities of reality has left us with one of the most peculiar
aporias: the constant urge to think of totality and its intelligihility, yet without having the possihility of forming an image
of this.
At this point we must bring in the insights of Ricoeur on
the use of Language itself to accentuate a peculiarity of this new
aporia. For in speaking of this move beyond imagination,
Lonergan has called it a world view, namely, "emer1gent probahility." In spite of the turn to methodology, there is still a
testimony to the image-making capacities of langua1ge as a resomce kom which to dra:w augmentation of meaning and its
intellig1bilities. In this terminological anomaly, which implies
a " view" with no co'l'resrponding " image," we express the
,aporia of time at a new level, one whicih calls us to further
thinking.
1

,44 From reading Lonergan one is able to see how the idea of simultaneity
remains a stumbling block to higher viewpoints on time. It is a common
sense image rooted in the particularity of a concrete spatio-temporal frame
of reference. The abstract intelligibility of time can never be found at this
level.
45 For Ricoeur, this is not a sign of the weakness of reflection but rather
a motivation which intensifies the search for understanding.
This can be
traced also through Ricoeur's well-known reflections on "split reference"
and "metaphorical twist"; Rule of Metaphor, pp. 216-256, and throughout
his volumes on Time and Narrative.

AMERICAN OATHOLlC THEOLOGY AT
CENTURY'S END:
POS'I100NCIL!IAR, POSTMODERN, POST ...THOMISTIC *

J. A. D1No1A, O.P.
Domiinican House of Studies
Washiington, D.O.

I

N CENTURY'S END-.a iascinaiting recent hook describing the decades at the turn of the centuries from the 990s
throiUgh the 1990s-cultural historian Hillel Schwartz
writes: "The millennial year
has gravitamona1l tides of
maximal reach. Its entire precedirng hundred years, our century, has come to he felt as a final epoch, a time of grotesque
·extremity. . . ." 1 Along with other modern intellectual inquiries, American Catholic theology has felt the pull of the app:voaching miHenium. Any interpretation of its current stateas well as of the 'l:"ole that the ·thought of St. Thomas Aquinas
may continue to play in it--'ll.eeds to take account of long range
intellectual and theological trends.
Clearly, the main currents in fate 20th century American
Catholic theology result at least in part from the play of large
tides reaching over the past hundred years and hey;ond.
Among the most significant of these is Ohrist]anity's continuing
endeavor to meet the pl'leS'sing surge of modernity. This endeavor engaged the energies of Catholics and Protestants for
nearly two centuries, :before reaching 1someth:ingorf a climax in
the Second Vatican C01Uncil. Assimilating the 1Work of several
*A version of this paper was presented on May 4, 1990 in Rome at an
Angelicum University symposium on the role of St. Thomas in contemporary
thought.
1.Hillel .Schwartz, Oentury's End: A Oultural History of the Fiin de Siecle
from the 990s through the 1990s (New York: Doubleday, 1990), p. 239.

499

500

J. A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

generrutions of ,bishops and theologians, the Council oombined a
reaffirmation of the Catholic Christian identity of the Church
with a positive, a:lbeit critical, approach to modernity. Now,
just when disagreements about the conciliar stance to modernity preoccupy and divide eurrent American Catholic theologians, the advent of " :postmodernity " is being hailed in
a1,chitecbure, literary oriticism, science, philosophy, and other
fields. No wonder the decades ushering in the 21st century
have seemed to many "a final epoch, a time of grotesque extremity " in theology an:d in Church life. The condition of late
20th century American theology is intelligible, I shall af'gue
here, only when viewed in the perspective of the complex responses of Catholic and Protestant Christianity to the once
swelling and now receding tides of modernity.
The fortunes of the study of Aquinas ha,V'e shifted in tandem
with these :fluctuations. In both Aquinas's late 19th century
11evival and, at least in American CathoJic circles, his late 20th
century eclipse, alternative Christian assessments of the challenge of moderniity figured prominently. But the situation is
again in flux. There is a recovery of Aquinas underway, in connection with theological developments that encompass at least
a measure of the refreshing postmodern agenda. It is here, I
shall suggest, that we can identify some of the most creative
currents at work in present-day American theology.
I

Although united in their appeal to the authority of Vatican
II, rival American Catholic theological positions are divided by
two opposed readings of the nature of the conciliar response to
modernity and its implioataions for the theo1ogica:l a:genida. Acco1•ding to one reading, the Coundl is understood to commend
,a strong reaffirmation o.f Catho·lic Christian identity, taking
the broadest view of its historic traditions, yet open to the
cultural and religious pluralism characteristic of our times.
But in the eyes of a numerous and influential group of American theologians, such a reading reverses the true priorities of

AMERICAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

501

the Council. It was not resfomtion, ibut modernization, dialogue, a.nd social oommitment that V:atican IT chiefly sought to
culti¥ate in the contemporary Church. To a. large extent, the
state of theology in the U.S. (and perhaps elsewhere as well)
refLects the predominance of the second interpreta.tion of the
Council.
Ressourcement or aggiornamento? As the conciliar documents reveal, both of these progmms were ruddressed and embraced by Viatican II. But which of them has priority? The
documents themselrves do not provide an explicit ans,wer to
this question. A perceptive Lutheran observer of the Catholic
scene, PI-ofessor
A. Lindbeck of Y:ale University, has
suggested that if one gives priority to ressourcement, then one
will read the conciliar documents in the light of the Constitutions on Divine Revelation and the Church (Dei Verbum and
Lumen Gentium). But if aggiornamento has p:riority, then the
Constitution on the Church in the Modern World (Gaudium
et Spes) is seen as p110 viding the inte11pretrutivekey for the rest
of the doooments.2 In .an effort aimed at reaccentramento, the
Extram:dinary Synod of 1985, under the leadeMhip of Pope
John Pwul II and Oa.rdina1 Ratzinger, sought to resolve this
question iby bwlancing trwdition--mindedness with modernization.3 But it is a sign of the :ascendancy of aggiornamento in
the American Catholic reception of the Council that such recentering efforts are routinely decried by theofogians as retrogressive ·and anti-conciliar. 4
This disagreement ·about the naiture of the Council's response
to modernity needs to :be set within the oontext of broad trends
in 20th century theology. Throughout most o[ the centucy,
Catholic theologians saw the program of modernization ('later
1

2 George A. Lindbeck, "Ecumenical
Theology," The Modern Theologians,
ed. David F. Ford (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989), vol. II, pp. 255-273.
s See Aidan Nichols, O.P., "Walter Kasper and His Theological Program,"
New Biaakfriars 67 ( 1986) : 16.
4 See, for example, the essays in Hans Kiing and Leonard Swidler, eds.,
The Ohuroh m Anguish: Has the Vatiaan Betrayed Vatfoan II'! (San Fran·
cisco: Harper & Row, 1988).

502

J. A. DI NOIA; O.P.

to be termed aggiornamento) as possessing an important but
subordinate value in comparison with that of the program of
ressoiircement.
It is well known that ressourcement furnished a power£u:l
impetus for theological work in hoth Catholi!c and Protestant
circles throughout the first half of this century, and even more
so in the period between World War II and the opening of
Vatican Il. The impulse arose not from historical or antiqua.rian interests hut from a determination to reaffirm Catholic
Christian identity hy appeal to and creative reapproipriation of
its principal formative sources. In part, a1nd especi1ally in its
late 19th century pha,se, ressource:ment involved the recovery
of medieval and ·scholastic sources. But gmdually and more
bl'oadly, a1ttention shifted to Scripture, liturgy, and the Fathers
of the Church.
It became increasingly clear as the century wore on that
moderniz1ation would be an important byproduct of ressourcement. The earlier l'eoovery of medieval and scholastic sources
had heen so success£ul as to havie restored and reinforced a
£undamentally post-Tridentine theological edifice, with at least
deference to-if not actual adoption and promotion of-the
positions of Aquinas as its cornerstone. This neoscholiastic and
neo-Thomistic reviva1l supplied the means to refute the error's
of modernity rather than to engage its challenge. But study
of the :biblicail, liturgical, and patristic sources afforded theologians access to the 1immeasurahly more pluralistic pre-schoIlastic period. In a strategic deployment of ressourcement, the
greater tra;dition was recovered in order to
the
nar:mwer post-Tridentine tradition enshrined by neoscholastic
a:nd neo-Thomistic theology. For neoscholasitic theo1ogians, ressourcement had
access to an arsenal; for biblically and
patristicarlly oriented theo1ogians, it unlocked a. treasure. Thus,
it transpired that the fater phase of the 20th century resourcement haid a powerfully modernizing edge. It cut into the neoscholastic hegemony through the fundamentally pJuraEzing introduction of hiblioaily and pa.tristica;lly ishwped theological

AMERICAN

503

CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

positions in dia1logue with modern culture and philosophy. The
passion at the core of the ressouraement progriam stemmed,
nonetheless, from a tl.·adition-minded reaffirmation of Catholic
Christian identity. Ressourcement theologians shared the confidence that the ·richness of the Christian tradition, once displayed in all its wonderful diversity and breadth, could not fail
to win a favomble hearing in the modern world.
While 1this conception of the halance of ressourcement and
aggiornamento rremained in plaice throughout the Council, it
has not fared :we11 in the postconciliar period. In the popular
American 1reception of the Tesults of the Council, it never even
had a chance. Almost from the start, the program of aggiornamento was seen hy the rp1uiblic and the media as providing the
key to the conciliar deliberations and actions. Vatican II came
rather qu[ckly to be viewed :as representing a sharp break with
the previous centuries and as charting a new course for the
Church as it entered the
century. In part, ·this reception
was fostered hy the early implementation of the Constitution
on the Sacred Liturgy. This document, in addition to recommending the 11eform of the liturgy, was also understood to
siginal a vast overhaul of Oatholic life. More crucia:lly for our
purposes, veform and renewal were widely viewed as equivalent
with modernization rather than with the reaffirmation of
Christian identity implicit in the ressourcement. Modernization came to entail in practice a vigorous enga1gement in diafogue and in sociaJ.lyrbransformaitive action.
I rehearse these familiar developments here in order to underscore the fact that the pm.gram of aggiornamento prevailed
in American Oatholic reception of the Cornncil from the outset. This eventuality had an enormous impact on rpostconciliar
Catho1ic theology in the U ;S.
In theology, the priority 0£ aggiornamento over ressourcement has entailed more than simply the updating of foilllls of
and expression. It has often meant a readiness to appropcia:te the 1agenda oi modernity, especially in oorrelationist and
reviisionist modes of rtheo1ogical reffection. In oo!t'Telationist
1

1

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J, A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

conceptions of the relation of .faith and modern culture, culture asks the questions to which ,faith rpro"\nides the responses.
In revisionist conceptions, faith tailors its claims with an eye
to rpl1evailing canons of reasonaibility and appliorubility. Both
theofo,gical styles in v,acying degrees embody ·an accommodationiist appropriation of the modern agenda that has not ibeen
favomble to the a:ffirmation of traditional Christirun claims
rubout revelation, the st3Jtus of Scripture, the person of Jesus
Christ, and meaning of human Hfe.5 But even :where correlationism .and revisionism are not operative ·as explicit methodological oommitments, the priority of a.ggiornamento fosters a
iclimate in which modem criteria of rationality are perceived to
he in competition with fidelity to the Christian doctrinal
traidition.
American Catholic theology iincreasingly displays a itypicrully
modern profile. The characteristic concerns of modern theology, singly or in 1oombination, have gained prominence in
theology over the fast two decades: the primacy of the category of .experience-'Whether religio:us or common human experience; the su!bjective turn, with its emphasis on the structures of human existence 1as affording the chief context fo.r
theological affirmation; the centrality of theological anthropofo,gy; universalism in the doctrine of revelation; p1ma1ism in
the attitude fo other religions; insistence on the historically
mniditioned nature of [ormulations of the faith; the ascendancy
of historicrul-critical approaches to the study of Scripture; antipathy ito doctrinal norms; the centrality orf critique ·and dissent with reference to the trruditio!Il·and magisterium; a preference :for procedural over thematic eoumenism; [n ethics, the
centmlity of obligation and the :autonomous .a,gent. In addition
1

s On accommodationism, see Peter Berger, "A Sociological View of the
Secularization of Christianity,'' Journal for the ffoientific Study of Religion
6 (1967): 3-16 . .See also William J. Abraham, "Oh God, Poor God: The
State of Contemporary Theology,'' The .American Scholar 58 (1989): 557563. For a helpful discussion of revisionist and correlationist theological
positions, see James J. Buckley, "Revisionists and Liberals,'' The Modern
Theologia'YIS,vol. II, pp. 89-102.

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to these familiar characteristics of modem theology, some cur-

rent American Catholic theology draws from
theology an emphasis on rpoliticail activism and the notion that
certain experiences, especially those of the oppressed, ,afford a
privileged access to the meaning orf revelation.
This profile emibits istriking affinities to 19th century Protestant strategies for 1appropri.ating modernity. As many Protestant observers have noted, the postrconciliar Catholic experience in effect rrepresents a compressed and accelerated recapitulation of the 19th 1and 20th century Protestant experience.6
Not smprisingly, the Protestant experience may rpmve to be
iinstructive for understanding developments in Catholic theology and in Catholic ,Life 1generally in the aftermath of the
Council.
For one thing, it is significant that the polarization that divided the Protestant churches into conservative and Eiberrul
ibranches ,at the turn of the century is emerging rus a factor in
the postconcili.ar Catholic
In both the Protestant and
Catholic situations, issues turn on how to understand and deal
with the chaJlenge of modernity. In an important recent hook,
The Restructuring of American Religion, sociologist Robert
Wuthno,w has shown thiat in hoth Catholic and Protestant
circles in the U.S., the 1conservative/1:i:be:mlsplit is ibecoming
more significant than denominational differences. Thus, progressive Catholics allld
Protestants find themselves allied
against
Catholics and evangelical Protestants. 7
More to the point lis the £act that evangelical Protestantism
is .growing rapidly, in comprurison with a long range decline in
1.iiberalProtestantism.. 8 This trend tends to confirnn the predic1

6 For example, Richard John Neuhaus, The Oatholio Moment: The Parado111
of the (Jhuroh in the Postmodern World (San Francisco: Harper & Row,
1987).
7 Robert Wuthnow, The Restruoturing
of American Religion: Booiety and
Faith sinoe World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1988).
s George Gallup, Jr., and Jim Castelli, The People's Religion: Amerioan
Faith in the 90's (New York: Macmillan, 1989).

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J. A. DI NOIA,. O.P.

tion that Christian communities with a cleru- sense of their
distinctive identity vis-a-vis the wider culture possess a competitive advanta,ge over those whose aocommodationist strategies have 1b1urred their distinctively Christian profile.9 In
combiniation with wider ourltura1 .and intellectual trends, these
developments have produced a faV"or:ahle environment within
Protestant theo1ogy for the emergence of vigorous pockets of
ipostliberal and postmodern theology. 10
There is reason to hope that American Catholic theology will
drruw a, lesson from the Protestant experience. The waning of
the modernizing accommodamonist strategies typical of modern
Protestant theolo1gy (iand 1with them, the ·forms of institutional
:adjustment they inspired) ·suggests that, over the Jong hauJ,
aggiornamento cannot sustain a fully Catholic Christian theology and a vita.I ·Church life. The a genda of modernization by
itself turns out to he ·an inadequate program for the prractice
of Christian theology. Preva;iling trends within tihe history of
Christian thought suggest that ressouroement supplies a more
lastingly potent principle of theological energy. In fact, within
American Catholic theology, there is a gmwing movement seeking to 1reassert the priority of ressourcement over aggiornamento in the appropriation of vatican n .and in the theological
1enterprise genemlly. There is no question of reversing the
tremendous gains-fa flexiJbi1ity, in collegiality, in Teligious
freedom, in sociail and political awareness, in commitments to
dialogue with other Christians, other religious people, and
non-believers, in respect for diversity within the
Church,
and so on-achieved in the name :of aggiornamento. Rather,
there is a recovery of the astute insight that fueled the work
of the original ressourcement theofogi,ans: an uncompromising,
unapologetiic hut open reaffirmation of the follness :and rich1

1

9 See Berger, art. oit., and George Lindbeck, " The Sectarian
Future of
the Church,'' The God Hxperienoe, ed. Joseph Whelan (New York: Newman, 1971), pp. 226-243.
10 William Placher, "Postliberal
Theology," The Mod.ern Theologi<Jlns, vol.
II, pp. 115-128.

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THEOLOGY

ness of the ,Christian tradition is in itself a porwerlul " motive
of credibility." In addition, as some contemporary P:rotestant
theologians hruve discove'.red and as I shall point out fater, the
postmodern intellectuial dimate is £avorruble to just such an
approach to theological affirmation.
1

II
How has the study of St. Thoma;S Aquinas fared in recent
decades? Recently, a rprofessor of philosophy at the University
of Seattle cremarked to me: " There :was a time when anyone
who knew anything ,rubout St. Thomas had to be a Catholic.
These days, anyone who knows anything about St. Thomas
just can't he a Catholic!" His jest is not far from the mark as
a description of the current situation. One is more likely to
find the texts of Aquinas pored over in graduate theologi:ca1
claises at Yale University than in 1those iat many a catholic
illlliversity. The renewed Protestant interest in Aquinas is a
sign of the move torwa11d postmodern and postliher:a1 theology
in some Prortestant the0r1ogioolcircles. But the question hefore
us norw is: why was Aquinas eclipsed in postconciliar Catholic
theology in America?
In the a:ftermath of the Council, under the impact of pressures generated iby iboth the ressourcement and aggiornamento
programs, the noo-Thomistic and neoscholastic synthesis was
all hut swept a;side in the U.S. ·as a framework for pursuing
theological study. This development represented 1a widespre:a;d
CathoHc cultura,l phenomenon ais well, since Thomism in some
£onm had 'served not only as a framework for theology and for
theological education in semina:cies ihut ,a;lso for philosophy and
indeed for :American Catholic higher education itself .11 In
postconciliar Catholic tiheologica,l circles, interest :in Aquinas
surrvived in the various versions of personrulist, ·existentialist,
phenomenological, and transcendenta;l Thomisms that poured
into the theological and philosophical 'Vaouum crea;ted iby the
1

11 Philip Gleason, Keeping the Faith
Dame Press, 1987), chapters 1, 7, and 8.

(Notre Dame: University of Notre

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J. A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

collapse of more classicail forms of neo-Thomi:sm.12 Most influential 1were the modernized versions of Aquinas advanced in
the worrks of Karl Rahner rund Bernard Lonergan. These were
viewed iby many as the only readings of Aquinas that could
mntinue to he viruble in tihe postoonciliar period. 13 It was widely believed that in tmnsoendental Thomism, typically modern
philosophical 1and theological concerns were accorded the systematic prominence ithey deserved and in this way provided
the ha.sis for a theology suited to the needs of the Church in
the modern world. 14
I can only hegin to sketch the complex cruuses of these developments in American Thomism.
For many Americ8i!Il theologians, Aquinrus came to 1be a:ssociated, rightly or 'Wrongly, with the forces of reaction at the
Council. The conciliar figures who opposed the agendas of both
ressourcement and aggiomamento were identified in the minds
of many with classicrul forms of neo-Thomism. It iwas neoTihomism that seemed to supply the thought-forms that legitimated and supported .all that 1was seen to he in need of change
and modernization mthe Church. In the earlier
century,
it had :been neo-Thomistic construals of Aquinas's thought that
had provided the arsenal with which rto demolish modernism
and thus to delay the inevitruble creative engagement of Catholic Christianity with the modern era. More recently, neoThomistic criticism had been the source of the persecution of
the very ressourcement theofogians who were exereising
ship at the Council and whose previous work was daily vindicated in the course of Council's deliberations. Many Ameri1

12 See Helen James John, The Thomist Spectrum
(New York: Fordham
University Press, 1966).
13 See Gerald A. McCool, S.J., OathoUa Theology in the Nineteenth Oentury:
The Quest for a Unitary Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), and
From Unity to PluraUsm: The Internal Evolution of Thomism (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1989).
14 See Karl Rahner, "Theology and Anthropology,"
Theological Investigations, vol. 9, pp. 28-49; J. A. DiNoia, O.P., "Karl Rahner," The Modern
Theologians, vol. I, pp. 183-204.

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can theologians drew the conclusion that neo-Thomism was incorrigibly anti-modern and obscurantist, and that it had so far
crippled the Chmch in its encounter with modernity. Indeed,
a vigorous progriam of aggiornamento would require the abandonment or ma;rginailizrutionof neo-.Thomistic styles and conceptions. In plaice of these, the virtua1ities of newer styles of
philosophioail reflection-existent:iiailist, phenomeno.fogical, and
the like--iwould have to ibe exploited in order to generate explications of the Christian faith that .would he accessible to
modern understanding.
Moreover, ressourcement theologians were understood to
have rundermined once and for all the neo-T.homist and neo1schofastic !hegemony in Catholic theology by exposing its
neglect of the •scriptural, liturgica:l, 1and patristic sources of
Christian tradition and affirmation. The arlleged .dogmatism,
irrteHectualism, ,and propositionarlism of neo-Thomism seemed
opposed to the pastoral, diiaJogical,and personalist emphases of
pre...ischoliastictheology. And, ironically, it was precise1ly these
more .ancient emphases that seemed to capture the interest
and attention of modern Christians 1and thus rto supply the
foundation for a renewed theology.
These difficultiieswere reompou:ndediby neo-Thomistic interpretations of Aquinas's theology thait ex:a1ggeratedthe role of
its metaphysical component. It had ibeen part o:f the longsbanding legacy of 16th century Jesuit interpreters of Aquinas
to 1give priority to metaphysics and epistemology to the neglect
of natural philosophy and rational psychology in the sequence
of pihilosophical stud[es. This line of interpretation was reinforced throughorut the next two centuries, both ibecause
.Aquinais'snatural pihirlosophyseemed hopelessly entwined with
orutidated Aristotelian science and 1because of the prevailing
epistemologioa,l and metaphysical interests of rationalist phifosorphy. Thiis mtionailistioally conceived Thomism :became the
basis :for the 19th century revival of Aquinas and ·aahieved
early prominence in neo-Thomistic construals of the theological works of Aquinas.. There was little understainding of the

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J. A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

Scriptural and patristic !bases of his theology. The
ti!aEzed reading of Aquinas, p:rnmoted by Maritain and Gilson
·and their army of followers, reinforced a fundamentally metaphysical account of his theo'1ogy. This was especia1ly the case
in Gilson's oonflation of theology with philosophy in his interpretation of the " Christian philosophy " of the great theological Summas. The cumulative impact of these met1aphysrcally
and
oriented readings of Aquinas's theology
was to intensify neo-Thomism's I'eputa:tion for aihstrarction and
excessiv;e systematization. In partioular, it confirmed the judgment of ressourcement theologians that in Aquinas the historical concreteness of Christian revelation had been subordinated
to a philosophical system.
On more systematic grounds a.s well, neo-Thomism was perceived as inadequate. Fragmented into its various topical
treatises rand ove11burdened rhy the detritus of centuries of interna1ly generated dirulectics, textbook theology seemed unable
to foster a truly integrated, synthetic vision of the faith. It
was felt that such theology could not transmit the kind of
christocentrically and soteriofogically shaped conception of
Christian revelation necessary in the modern day.
It 1is beyond the scope of my paper to assess the accuracy of
these judgments of neo-Thomistic theology. The history of
20th century Catholic theology still offers a rich field for research. Until this is done, it wi11 he hand to set tthe record
straight. The fact remains that these widespread perceptions
of neo-Thomism are now so deeply entrenched as to constitute
a so:rt of oommon wisdom among legions of American Catholic
theologians. This development has not been favorable to the
creiative use of Aquinas in theology. Although Thomism remained a permanent fixture in Catholic philosophy and medieval studies, the postconciliar collapse of neo-Thomism :regrettarhly and unnecessarily involved the eclipse, at least in
Catholic theologica1 circles, of Aquinas himself.
Can there be a Thomas 1rufter Thomism? Is there a postThomistic, or at lea.st a post-neo-Thomistic Aquinas? I shall

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THEOLOGY

Aquinas, an Aquinas unenargue that there is a
cumbe:ved by the enormous weight of oommentary, debate, and
systematization that has made his thought seem inaccessible
to modern theologians and unusahle for the theological work,
an Aquinais who spea;ks with pristine clarity to a host of urgently postmodern tlheo1ogieailquestions. In :fact, a growing number of Protestant theologians, Chr:istian philosophers, and
rphi:losophical ethicists me beginning to reaid Aquinas in just
this way. The early results are exciting and promising.
If my analysis in the first section of this pruper is correct,
then the Amemcan Catholic theological scene will he the setting
for a vigorous reassertion of the ressoutcement agendar-and
tihe ,subordination, though hy no means the abandonment, of
that of aggiornamento-in the years to oon1'e. There are signs
that this process is already underway .. One such sign is the
popularity of new editions of the writings of older generation
ressourcement theologians like De Lubac and Congar, and of
translations of the works of von Balthas1ar, Ka,sper, and
Ratzinger. I shall mention other signs in the next section of
this paper. There is every reason to believe that Aquinas will
ihavce a significant and continuing role in these developments,
particularly as ressourcement comes to terms with the advent
of postmodernity.
1

1

1

III
" At century's t1urn," remarks Professor Schwartz, " there is
always space, [t seems, for 1another New Age." 15 Wi11 the passage from modernity to postmodernity mean the dawning of a
new age in theology? " There is a growing awa1renesstoday that
the modern era, ushered [n hy Desca,rtes and the Enlightenment, is passing," write theologians Nancy Murphy 1and James
·McClendon. " That it is passing (or ha,s passed) in science,
philosophy and theology 1seems clear enough; the contours of
postmodern thought are iless dear." 16 Identify[ng certain de15 Schwartz,

p. 253.
Murphy and James Wm. McClendon, Jr., "Distinguishing
Modern and Postmodern Theologies," ll:fodern Theology 5 ( 1989) : 191.
16 Nancey

J. A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

vdopments in 20th century science and philosophy as important sources of the 1shift, James Miller rremarks that" the postmodern era may he far from midday, ihut it is weM past dawn."
Acco11ding to Miller, fundamenta:l to the shift towards postmodernity are the scientific themes of evolution, relativity, indeterminacy and participation.
Ma.tching these scientific
themes are contextual accounts of language and ho listic accounts of knowledge in recent rp!hilosorphy.17
Some of the most creative in:itiatives on the American theofogieal scene a:ve those that seek to transcend the agenda posed
,for Christianity hy modernity. Acknowledging their affinities
with developments in art, architecture, literary criticism, science, philosophy and other fields, some theologians are prepared
to label the new theological initiatives as postmodern. Others
are reluctant to rally under the postmodernist hanner, particularly since deconstrucbionists have co-opted the term
.for their own ultramodern and disitunbingly nihilistic uses.
Whether or not one adopts the ilaibel, however, it is clear that a
series of converging developments is pushing the frontier of
theologica,l reflection beyond engagement with th:e chamcteristic agenda of modernity. What ris most interesting for our
rpurposes is the irole that the Wl'itings of St. Thoma's are al11eady
playing in shaping and promoting these developments. Since
these developments are pvoceeding on a variety of fronts, it
will be necessary to ,be selective allld suggestive, rather than
emaustive, in my account of them here.
At 'the forefront of these developments is a loosely allied network of Catholics and Protes;tants, both British and American:
the so-cailled " Yale School " of theology (George Lindbeck,
the late Hans Frei, David Kelsey, Breva11d Childs, William
Pfacher, Ronald Thiemann); evangelical theologians (Thomas
Oden, Donald Bloesch, Wil;liam J. Abraham, Colin Gunton,
David Fm•d) ; the Amerioan Communio group (David Schind1

1

17 James
B. Miller, "The Emerging Postmodern World," Postmodern
Theology: Christian Faith in a Pluralist World, ed. Frederick B. Burnham
(San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1989), pp. 8-12.

AMERICAN

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513

ler, Kenneth Schmitz, Glenn Olsen, Michael Waldstein) ; Christian philosophers (William Christian, Thomais Morri,s, William
.Alston, Eleanor Stump, Rohert .Adaims, Nicholas Wolterstorff, Alvin Pfantinga, Peter Geruch, Basil Mitchell); and
moral philosophers and theologians (.Alasdair Macintyre, Afan
'Don.agan, Stanley Hauerwas, John Finnis). Despite great dif,ferences among them, these groups orf thinkers, and others who
,share their perceptions, believe that the rpassing of the modern
era entails new opportunities for Christian affirnnation as it is
freed from the .strictures imposed hy characteristically modern
presupposimons. In varying degrees, these thinkers turn to
pvemodern and classicail ,souTces of philosophy rand theologynot in ol"der to repristinate t:he past as if the modern era had
nevier occurred, hut in order to make these sources speak anew
in the 'ITreversiblypluralized post-modem era.
Among 'severa] thrut could be cited, three elements impart a
distinctively postmodern fla:\cOT to these new theological initiatives. In the first place, in the :service of a broader conception
o[ tratiolllality, postmodern thinkevs reject the modern (Cartesian) quest for a foundation £or all knowledge, modeled on
mathematical or scientific paradigms of rationality. .As a
'I\homist might say, reasonaibility !and certainty are anrulogous
concepts, applicarble to diverse domains of knowledge Lin ways
that are dependent on the principles operative from one context to another. Scientific claims are truth-bearing in ways that
1are distinctive from claims in other fields like philosophy,
ethics, relrigion.,history, literary criticism, and ,so on. In assessing elaims to rationality and truth, it ris :axiomatic for postmodern thinkers to :attend to the ,context in which these claims
are embedded. Truth and r-ationality are far ibroa<ler notions
than modern thinkers rwere genemlly prepared to acknowledge.
In this connection :and in :sharp contrast to modernity, postmodern thinkers insist on the centrality of tradition and authority in legitimating and supporting truth and mtionality,
not only in the religious hut in the scientific and philosophical
fields as well.

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J. A. DI NOIA 1 O.P.

T wo other characteristic elements in pos1tmodern thinking are
its discovery of the role of texts and narratives in shaping
thought and ·cultme, and its 1stress on the importance of relationships and community in fostering personal identity. These
empha:ses challenge rntionalism and positivism in modern
philosophy of language and epistemology, and individualism in
modern moral and po1itica:lphilosophy. In part the postmodern
insistence on the cu1ture- and identity-shaping Toles of language is the outcome of the so-called " linguistic turn ":__a
series of developments in continental and Anglo-American
philosophy stemming from the thought of Heidegger and Wittgenstein respectively. Postmodern thinlmrs seek to secure the
oibjectivity and ·realism of knowledge 'with reference, not to the
inner workings of consciousness (as in rationalism) or to their
correspondence to objective fiacts (as in positivism), hut to a
shared world of meaning and truth embodied in the ilinguistic
practices of a community.. In addition, postmodern thought
views personal identity, not :as an individualistically oultivated
sense and performanoe of moral duty, hut in a communally
and 1refationally shaped life of virtue.
Theologians whose thought 1is shaped by their reading of
Aquinas will welcome the postmodern determination to overof modernity's turn to the subject in epistecome the
mology and ethics. The modern
!between consciousness and the true self i.s displaced by the postmodern insistence on 1bodiliness'--'and hence on 1immersion in a natural
oosmic order and on pa.tterns of activity in 1a community of
social and persocnal relations-as a constitutive element of persona,} identity. In postmodern thought, bodiliness, agency, and
community 11eplacesubjectivity, consciousness, and the autonomous self as fundamental anthropological oategories. Read
straight£or1wardly-rather than in bhe modernizing construal
given him by tmnscendental Thomism-Aquinas supports precisely thi.s displacement of the Cartesian separations of mind
and ma1tter, of spirit and body, of subject rand
and of
moral seH and mora:l agent.
1

1

AMERICAN

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515

More generailly, there are three areas in which we may briefJy note how chamcteristic elements of postmodern thinking
have coalesced to produce an intellectual climate generally
favoriable to the exigencies of theological affil"lilation. In eacli
of these airea;s, post-Thomistic rerudings of Aquinas can and do
pla.y ·a ·significant role.
Biblical ihernneneutios is one of the first .areas in which the
impact of postmodern thought has :been felt, particularly its
insistence on the interplay 1between the eommruna:l reading of
rand their community-shaping power. Partly under the
influence of Hans Frei's enormously important ibook, The
Eclipse of Biblical Narrative, theologians have begun to question the hegemony of historical-critical methodofogies for
mediating the meaning of the Scriptures for theofogical, doctrina;l, a:nd other chmchly uses. 18 F\vei was criticaJ. of the modem
theory and practice of hiiblical hermeneutics and persuasively
underscored the va;lidity of pre-critical narmtional and typological hermeneutics, ·which had ii.lead the Scriptu11esas a ullified
aooount of revelation and salvation with Jesus Christ •at the
center. It is in the ·context of this doctrinrully and liturgicaHy
structured rea.ding of the Scriptures that its explicit churchly
uses come into play. Although historical-critioa.l approaches
have much to contribute to Christian understanding of the
Biible, these rupproac:b.es1are 1suhordmate to the :doctrinaHy and
fiturgicailly •shaped reading of the Bible precisely as Scripture. 19
Aquinas's understanding of the appropriation of the rresults of
other disciplines hy sacra dootrina in terms of the ,suJbalterna.tion of sciences can 1be helpfol in 1sortingout the complex logic
of the relation of historical and Htemry e:x;egesis to theology.
Directly releviant to a :vea.dingof Aquinas on tihese issues is the
fact that the movement ]rom lectio to quaestio in his own theoiogical 'Wlork represented the cresting of one of the most potent
is Hans W. Frei, The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1974).
10 George A. Lindbeck, " Scripture, Consensus and Community," The C'ri8i8
of Biblical Authority, ed. Richard J. Neuhaus (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans,
1989), pp. 74-101.

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J. A. DI NOIAJ O.P.

movements of ressourcement ,in the history of Christian
thought.
Another area in 1which the impact of postmodern thinking has
heen
is in pb.Hosoipihicaltheology. ]if in modem theology the
basic question was, how can a modem person !believe this doctrine? then in postmodern theology the ibasic questii.onhas beoome, how can the deep intelligibility of this doctrine be exhibited? From the outset, postmodern appivoaches to philo1sophical theology 1avoid posing skeptical questions wbout the
Christian scheme. The assumption is not that rreligious claims
inevitahly challenge and ibend .accepted canons of rationality.
Rather, canons of rrationality in the religious realm have their
own integrity and scope, 1and, 1ailthoughthey do not isolate the
religious domain foom other domains, they nonetheless involve
a distinctive logical 1structure. Philosophical theology in the
postmodern ''"ein hegins 1hy trying to discern and .exihibit this
structure. The initial .a;ssumption is that a doctrinal scheme
and the religious pattern of life it commends maike good sense
rin theory and in practice. The task of Christian philosophical
theology is to explicate the inherent intelligibility of a particular doctrine within the ,whole hotly of Christian doctrines.
Again, Aquinas's vision of the fundamental :and integral intelligibility of the mysteries of the ·Christian faith hears directly on non-foundationalist postmodern 1appvoachesto the
oation of doctrine. In his employment of metaphysical and
other conceptions in the service of this explication, he w:as careful to a¥oid forcing the Christian scheme onto :a philosophical
grid.
Finally, in postmodern theologica1 approaches and in marked
oontraist to those of modernity, Ohri:stianity's particularistic
claim to universality ,constitutes not an embarirassment but a
necessary feature of its commitment to :and proclamation of the
truth .aihout God's dealings with us in Christ. The postmodern
emphasis on the narrational an:d communal sources and em!hodiment of a community'1s claim to truth irenders the Christian insistence ion the uniqueness of Christ
and, in-

AMERICAN CATHOLIC THEOLOGY

517

cidenta11y, oomparruble fo· the partimlaristic claims of other
!I'eligiouscommunities. Universal meaning is embedded in the
partiioularistioally depicted and narrated ·story of the passion,
death, resurriection, and glory of Jesus of Nazareth, delivered to
us as Ghrist and Lord. The motto of von Balthasar's theology
is pertinent here: " the ·greatest possible radianioe in the world
in virtue o[ the closest possiible £o11owingof Christ." The replication of the pattern of Christ, in the imitatio Christi, is not
only the vehicle thmugh which Christian personal and communal identity is sihaped. It is .a;lso the particularistic medium
in rwhich the umversailly applicable, though not universally actruth of Christ is made known to the whole wol'1d !beyond the visible •ambit of the Christian oo:rmnunity. The
scandal of particularity is no scandal for theology practiced in
the postmodern vein. Despite much well-intentioned defense
of the interplay of history rand metaphy.sics in Aquinas, particuLarity is no ·scandal for his theology either. At the center
of his theology is a doctrine of salvation, embedded !ill a christo.Jogica1ly shaiped narrative. The objective of theological
explication is to provide as complete as possible an account of
the principal characters upon whose agency the movement and
action depicted in the nar:r:ative depends: God, angels:, humans,
and Christ. The narrative is not universalized by the introduction of metaphysical concepts. Rather, ii.ts particularistic claim
to universal relevance is secured hy -a web of exeget:iJCal,theological, philosophical, .and other pattems of argumentartion.20
The contributions of postmodern theology in these three
wilJ ser:ve to suggest something of the virtualities of theology practiced in this vein. 21 The affinities between post1

1

1

1

20 For a reading of the particularistic
universalism of Aquinas's Christology in the context of a comparative analysis of the christological positions
of Rahner and Barth, see Bruce Marshall, Ohristology in Oonfiiat: The I den·
tity of a Saviour in Rahner and Barth (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987),
especially chapter 5.
21 For a more complete picture of characteristically
postmodern theological
concerns, see William C. Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Ohristian Voice
in a Pluralistic Oonversation (Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster/John Knox
Press, 1989).

518

J. A. DI NOIA1 O.P.

modern emphases and the ressourcement agenda are striking.
farvors traditionLike ressouroement, postmodern.
mindedness over traditiona;lism, on the one hand, 1and revisionism .and correlation, on the other. In mntrast to the program o[
aggiornamento, postmodern ibheolO'gy sees systematic impm:t:ance in the reaffirmatiion of ChTistian identity .as a means of
promoting Christian fidelity and Clmistian procliamation.
When acicorded primacy over ressouroement, aggiornamento
·looks to postmodern eyes as if always on the verge of running
out of breath. Conceived simply as the updating of theofogy,
aggiornamento is never :fini·shed catching 111:p; conceived more
gmndly as modernizrution, it is aJready :f.ar iheihind.
Ressourcement has a ilot to learn mom Aquinas, however, if
!it is to ·avoid the pitfalls of traditionaJ.ism. Often ressourcement has shown itself unable or unwilling to confront the conceptual problems-the quaestiones---which the sources themselves ,bequeathed to sUJbsequenttheology. Aquinas p:mvides a
•set of strategies tfor the disciplined :appropriation of the results of non-theofogical intellectuail inquiries--J.ike philosopihy,
philosophical iethics, !history, and psychofogy-in 011der to advance the 1analysis and ·resolution of such pilloblems. For
Aquinas, the results of such inquiries aire the theologian's
friends. If •a theologian cannot deploy such reflective strategies,
the results o[ alien inquiries will often find their way into his
proposals in forms that he neither cont.vols :nor shapes to his
purposes. The vastly pluralized postmodern contexts in which
theology is practiced today .accentuates the challenge. Whatever its other weaknesses, scholastic theology cultivated a
ihealthy l:'espect for rigo:mus pmlosophicail analysis and sound
patterns oif argumentation. These are intellectual skills that are
much needed in postmodern theology. 22

.22 For a discussion of the importance
of Thomism for contemporary theology, see Avery Dulles, "Vatican II and Scholasticism," New 011Jford Re·
view 57 (May 1990) : 5-11.

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS SERIOUSLY: SOME
IRONIES IN THE CURRENT DEBATE ON A
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY OF RELIGJ:ONS *

GAvIN D'CosTA

1

West London Institute of Higher E'ducation
Isleworth, Middlese111

HE QUESTION oi Christian attitudes to the world
eligions is becoming increasingly important. An lnterpretatwn of Religion is emblematic of a growing trend,
which runs across 1denominational lines, that attempts fo take
other ,religions seriously. John Hick .argues that for most of
its ihistory Christianity has hrud a rpolitioaUyand theologicrully
imperialist attitude towards the ireligions of the world. Superiority :and uninformed arrogance have generally prev:ailed
with the accompanying attitude that the religions of the world
1aire generally sinful and incapable of being salvific. The time
has come foT a change of a;ttitude: the wol"ld reHgions must be
taken seriously :and this means ·affil"ming them as alternative
paths to salvation, possibly neither worse nor better than
·Christianity. This Hick cru1ls a "pluralistic" outlook. The
agenda is irrudical and Hick's Vioice is not solitary.
Hick' s hook !is a ma;gisteri:al 4rn paiges and is ibrused on his
Giffol'ldLectmes of 1986-87. It contains cons!i.derrubleindological, philosophicail and theological material, hut in what follows
I shall ,be dea1ing with one aspect oll!ly, his argument for
p1uiialism. Hick is acknowledged :as a leading irepresentative
of this pluralistic approach. Initially he began as a conservative ,and exclusivist Christian ,and has over the years enoompassed a wide !l.'ange of thoofogica1 positions now ,culminating
1

1

1

1

*John Hick, An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the
Transcendent (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989).

519

520

GAVIN D' COSTA

in this p11esent rbook.1 In :this review discussion I propose that
many o[ the most mdical strategies in the theology of re1ligions
in 'Spite 0£ their wish to take other rreligions seriously have an
il'!Onic tendency to do just the opposite! In attempting to be
genuinely accommodating to the 11eligions 0£ the world, Hick,
I will argue, unwittingly ends up in danger of accommodating
none, including Christianity. This tendency, which iI believe
to 1be clearly illustrated in Hick's rrecent rbook, is shared in various degrees hy numerous theologians pursuing a, pluralist
p111ojectsimilar to that of Hick's. 2 It would he foolish to assume
they are " all the 'Saime," hut they certainly share common
theological and philosophical tendencies which I wish to isolate
and comment on. I should 1state dearly that iby such a critique
I do not intend to discount the possibility that a:ll religions
ma,y lead fo God, but that the stmtegies often employed to
a111g111e .for this are deepJy problematic.
put Hiok"s new rbook into :perspective it will he helpful to
wace its genesis 1briefly.In 1973, using an astronomical analogy,
Hick suggested a Copernican revolution in the Christian theoology of rreligions whereby Christians should "shift from the
1

1 He began, in his own words, as a "strongly evangelical and indeed fundamentalist " Christian: see God Has Many Names (London: Macmillan,
1980), p. 2. See also my analysis of his entire pilgrimage in John Hick's
Theology of Religions (London/New York: University Press of America,
1987).
2 For some of those on Hick's trajectory,
see A. Race, Olllristians and Religious Pluralism (London: SCM, 1983); Paul Knitter, No Other Name'!
(New York: Orbis, 1985); Wilfred Cantwell Smith, The Meaning and End
of Religion (New York: Harper & Row, 1978); R. Ruether, Pluralism and
Ohristology; the latter three and other influential co-contributors (including
Hick) are to be found in The Myth of Christian Uniqueness: Towards a
Pluralistio Theology of Religions, ed. J. Hick and P. Knitter (New York:
Orbis, 1987). More recently, we can see the extremely thin line between
pluralists and essentialist "inclusivists" in E. Hillman, Many Paths·: A
Oatholic Approach to Religious Pluralism (New York: Orbis, 1989), who
marries K. Rahner and W. C. Smith, divorces faith from history and tradition, and thereby provides an essentialist analysis. See the pertinent comments of K. Surin on Smith's essentialist project in "An Examination of
the Discourse of John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell Smith", in Religious
Pluralism and Unbelief, ed. I. Hamnett (London, Routledge, 1990).

TAKING OTHER RELIG10NS

SERIOUSLY

dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the reiaHzation that
it is God who is at centre, and that an ;religions ... including
our own, ,serve and revolv;e a110und him.'' 3 The earlier "Ptolemaic " dogmas plwced the Church and Christ as the source of
and means to sa1vation. A<coording to Hick, these dogmas became increasingly implausible in the light of the truth and
hoEness evident in other religions, rand they ev;en seemed to
contradict the Christian belief in a. God who loves aill people.
Hence the Copernican ·revolution marked a shift from ecclesiooentricism and Christocentricism to one of theocentricism,
analogous to the monumental pamdigm shift in astronomy
precipitated hy Copernicus. God, not Christ or the Church,
shou1d rbe center stage. H1ck suggested that this paradigmatic
shift wou1d facilitate a new understanding of religions whereby
olaims to superiority and exclusivity would dissolve. 4 A new
era of inter-l'eligious ecumenism would. da1wn.
To facilitate this theooentric move Hick had to de-center
the incarnation. Basically, Hick's acrgument ha.s been that Jesus
should not be seen as God incarnate, but rather the divinity of
Christ shou1d rbe wewed mythologica1ly. Hick',s definition of
myth is important and plays a major m1e in his later thinking.
He has defined myth as" a story which is told but which is not
literally tme, or an idea ocr :image which is applied to something or someone hut which does not literally arpply, hut which
invites a particular attitude in its hearers. Thus the truth of
a myth is a kind of practicail truth consisting in the appropriateness of the attitude which it evokes." 5 Hence, Jesus' divinity
is 1a mythological construct that expresses the literal truth that
" God has: been encountered through Jesus," which is " not an
aJ. Hick, God and the Unfoerse of Faiths (London: Fount, 1977), p. 131.
4 Many of the theologians
cited in note 2, such as Race, Smith, and Hillman stop at theocentricism.
5 Hick, God and the Universe of Faiths, pp. 166-67. See C. Gillis's interesting critique of Hick's use of myth in A Question of .Pinal Belief: John Hick's
Pluralistic Theory of Salvation (London: Macmillan, 1989), chap. 5-6, and
G. Loughlin's penetrating remarks in "Myths, Signs and Significations",
Theology 89 (1986): 268-75.

GAVIN D' COSTA

1assertion of unique 1savirng effectiveness in human life, hut a
particular Tedemption-myth attached to one great historicrul
way of sah,ation." 6 Hick seems to employ a purely instrumentaiist view of re1igious diseourse, one in which language is
seen as 1an eXipression of intentions, attitudes, or particular
progr:am hut not eorncerned with making cognitive claims about
any ontological
analogically or otherwise. 7 Hick seems
untmuhled by the "1iteral" statements that he uses, such as
" God has ,been encountered thl'ough Jesus!' What is
cant at this sfage is Hick's maintaining the reality of God at
the oenter of 'salvation-,a1though whose God or whose understanding of God this is remains unresolvied.
Hick's latest ,writings siigna:l a radical :shift away £rom theocentricism to what he calls Reality centeredness. (A'11 subsequent rpage 'references are to An Interpretation of Religion).
He argues tihat all 'religions are salvific rpaths to the one Divine
" Rea:l," none being lhetter or worse :and none with a privileged
or exclusive revelation, despite what some o:f their adherents
ma.y claim. The wo11d "Real " or "Reality " ibetter expresses
the fact that the Di v[ne oannot rbe ultimately l'ega11ded:as personal (theistic) or impersonal (non-theisitic) . This move occurred as a rresult of dealing with the objection that Hick w:as
a covert theist, for his Copernican revolution did not a{lcommodate non-theistic 1religions. How could it, if he contended
that all religions :represented different paths to the one aillfoving God?
'fo overcome this difficulty Hick proposes a Kantian type
distinction ,between t:he noumenal, which exists independently
and outside of human perception, and the phenomenal wvrld,
which [s that world ais iit aippears to our human consciousness
(pp. Q46ff) .8 The varying phenomenal responses within the dif1

1

1

1

6lbid., pp. 172, 177.
'TI1is point has also been made by others such as P. Griffiths & D. Lewis,
"On Grading Religions, Seeking Truth, and Being Nice fa People," Religious
Studies 19 (1983) : 75-80.
epistemological foundations undergirding many pluralistic
8 The Kantian
theologies are exposed and criticized by L. Newbigin, The Gospel in a Pluralist Society (London: SPCK, 1989).
1

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS

SERIOUSLY

528

ferent religious traditions, hoth theistic and non-theistic, are fo
he viewed as authentic hut difforent responses to the noumenal
Real. Hence, 1we cannot say that the " Real an sick [in itself] has
the characteristics displayed hy its manifestations, such as (in
the case of the heavenly Father) love and justice or (in the
case of Brahman) consciousness and 1blis.s" (p. 247). So just
what does this talk a:bout 1a hea.venly Father amount to? Once
again, the notion of myth is utilized to deal with the problem,
1but now it is applied not only to the incarnation but to the
very idea of God and is further extended to the ultimate real[ties designated by the various religions, such '3JS the Hindu
Brahman, or Allah in Islam, Yahweh in Judaism, and so on
(pip. 343-61) . Therefore in Hick's view, speech about our
" heavenly Father " is " mythological speech about the ReaL
I define a myth as a story or statement 1which is not 1literaHy
true but which tends to evoke an appropriate dispositional attitude to its subject matter. Thus t:he truth of a myth is a
pract:iica:ltruthfulness: a tme myth is one which rightly relates
us to a reality about which we cannot speak in non-mythofogical terms " (p. 248) . With his Kantian distinction Hick severs
any ontological ;connection 1between our human language and
the divine reality :and iniwoduces 1an entirely instrumental use
of religious language. Accmding to Hick all the world religions
encourage us to turn away .from the SeH towards the Divine
Reality, engendering :love and compassion towards all people.
The common ,soteriologicwl 1goal is there:by matched by a common ethical goal, which therefore eonfirms the pluralistic
thesis.
Wha1t I now wish to show is tihe way in which Hick's pluralism actually, if unwittingly, undermines taking other rnligions
serriously. Primarily a:nid ironically he fails to take the sheer
plurwlity of their conflicting claims seriously. His proposa.ls
:raise epi:stemoilogical, ontologica,l, ethical, and he11meneutical
problems which concea1, ratheT than illuminate, some of the
difficulties facing a Christian theofogy oif religions. Many of
his stTategies are shared 1by other pluralists.
1

524

GAVIN

n' COSTA

Hiok advances an entire exiplanatory system into which aill
the rworld religions are slotted. Any such over-arching grand
system shou1d give us caiuse £or concern, not only in its Olympian pretensions but a:lso because of its easy assimilation and
homogenization of tihe religions. But what of the unique and
particular nature of the various religions and their histories?
Herein lies a central irony of Hick's plm1alism: one form of
imperialism (so-cwlled traditional attitudes) is replaced hy another (tihe system of homogenization) , which possibly does
equa.I disservice to the world religions. The religions are fitted
into this schema in a fashion that is often contrary to their
own self-understianding. For example, they are interpreted and
and ruppmpriated witihin a structure which denies them the
possibility of any definitive truth claims. That the religions
make some such claims is manifest. 9 To render impotent the
definitive claims made by many of the religions is certainly an
odd way in which to take them seriously .. The method iby
which Hick relativiz·es truth claims is tihrough his mythologizing hermeneutic.
This mythofogizinig hermeneutic bears the mrurks of what
Roland Barthes has called the " rrhetorical forms" of " bourgeois myth." 10 Underlying tihis myth, accolJ'dingto Barthes, is
the attempt to turn history into " Essences," a restless drive
which will not cease until it has " fixated this world into an oibject which can he for ever possessed, catailogued its riches, emhrulmed it, and injected into reality some purifying essence
which win stop its triansformation" (p. 155) . This tendency
towards
in the theology of religions ironically
9 See the instructive
work by W. Christian, Oppositions of Religious Dootrme (London: Macmillan, 1972); and his Dootrines of Religious Communities: A Philosophioal Study (London & New Haven: Yale University Press,
1987).
10 See R. Barthes, Mythologies
(London: Paladin, 1983), p. 154 (subsequent page references in main text). I am indebted to Gerard Loughlin for
drawing my attention to the possible use of Barthes in this way. See his own
use in "Prefacing Pluralism: John Hick and the Mastery of Religion",
Modern Theology, forthcoming.

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS

SERIOUSLY

525

hastens the closme of dialogue Tather than offering a illew
1begillln:ing.
system has ailreaidy ibegurr the process of
caJtaloging history and making the religions conform to the
schema of plu:mlism ,so that they can he possessed iby the
mytholo,gizer. Hut 1let me pursue Hick's use of myth (and
Ha:rthes's analysis of it) to su1bstantiate my thesis.
The notion of myth is first applied to tihe incarnation to
decenter it and facilitate Hick's mo¥e to theocentricism. But
now Hick hais to de-center theocentrici:sm (God) in order to
facilitate his move to 'the Real.' AH theisbic trruditions must
undergo his mythofogizing hermeneutic, :as well .a,s the norrrtheis1tic tmditions, for they too cannot claim ainy priviileged
access to reality, exoopt on the terms stipulated iby the pluralist framework. ]jf the adherents of the world religions aire not
aHowed to make fundaimental ontological claims with their
fuH force and implications, then harmony is 1arrivedat through
the destruction and neutralizing of the "Other.'' Barthes
writes that one rheto'rica1 form of :bourgeois mythology is that
[t iis "unable to imagine the Other." If the p1ura1ist mythographer comes .face to bee with him, "he blinds himself,
ignores and denies him, or 1else transforms him into himself ...
,rull
oif confrontation are reverberating, any otherness is reduced to sameness" (p. 151). This is indeed the effect
of Hick's mythologizing hermeneutic: it seems to ignore or
deny the !l"erully diffioult, mnflicting tmth cla;ims hy in effect
Teducing them to 1sameness: i.e. that they 'are all mythologicail
assertions. All religious people should view their reHgions as
does the mythographer. ]jf they do not, then they cannot he
,accounted for in this schema and arre 1seen 1as holding false views
a1bout the :n.atruve of their doctvines and truth daims. 11 Underlying this rol'IIllof plurailism is an impJicit epistemology (;an in1strumentalist mythification) which T'efuses to take seriously
the genuine rplumlity of epistemologies in the world religions.12
11 See further the comments by J. DiNoia, "Pluralist
Theology of Religions: Pluralistic or Non-Pluralistic?",
in Ohristian Uniqueness Reconsidered, ed. G. D'Costa (New York: Orbis, 1990).
12 See, for example, the differences in epistemology within just one tradi·

526

GAVIN n'coSTA

Barthes ·also notes that this type of myth" consists of 1stating tw10 opposites and halancing the one hy the other so as to
reject them hath" (p. 153) . Here a.gain the analogue is clear.
One oan see the way in which theism (as if this were one
"thing" in Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) and non-theism
(simila:rly so for Buddhism, Humanism, and forms of Hinduism) are !balanced in Hick's schema only by, in fact, rejecting them lboth. The "balance" in Hick's schema amounts to
something quite different from theism or non-theism; it
amounts to agnosticism. Hick is led into 1agnosticism when he
presses the distinction and severs the link between the Rewl
in itself and its various phenomenal manifestations in relation
to humankind. He writes: "It follows f11om this distinction
between the Real as it is iin itself and as it is thought and experienced through our ·religious concepts that we crunnot apply
to the Reia1l an sich [in itself] the characteristics encountered in
its" vairi.ous manifestations (p.
The outcome leaves
Hick with no real access to " the Real." The ways of analogy
and metaphor, ,for example, are rendered impotent. This ina1hrlity to speak of the Real or even ailow "it" the
of self-utterance leads to the Real's redundancy. Ironically,
any detailed and serious interest in the religions of the wo111d
i s suhv;erted as they are unable to furnish clues a1bout the Real.
The color, diversity, difference, and detail are hlead1ed of their
meaning, for the Real apparently resists all description and is
inoapa:b1eof self-utterance. This outcome has a close analogue
with Barthes's description of yet another rhetorical form of
mythology. It is that "the accidental failure of language is
maigicaily identified with what one decides is a natuml ·resistance of the object" (p. 151). This maneuv;er, which Barthes
calls tautology, "creates a dead, ·a motionless wodd." Hick's
system does this precisely :becwuse it has decided all things in
advance; every :form of 11eligion is cataloged and encoded into
1

1

tion (Hinduism): E. Lott, Vedantfo Approaches to God (London: Macmillan,
1980); D. M. Datta, The Six Ways of Knowing (London: Allen & Unwin,
1932).

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS

SERIOUSLY

5:il7

the structure. The history .anrd particularities of the various
traditions are just icing on the cake, :already tasted, known,
and digested. Many intractruble partieul1arities with their
unique !histories aire drained of their power.
It is precisely this absolute incomprehensibility regarding
the na;ture of Reality that threatens Hick's whole
project, a project mystifying rather than illuminating the nature of the Real through his Kantian development. Kant also
had to face the question of how he >Ciould claim to know that
rtili.ere is a oorrespondence rbetween :phenomena and things in
themselv;es and that the latter act upon our consciousness.
Agnosticism is the inevitl!Jble outcome of the trajectory of
Hick's flight from parlicularity: first from the particularity of
the incarnation, then from the rparticularity of a theistic God,
and then from the rparrticula:rityof any !religious claim, he it
Christian OT non-Christian. The outoome of the escape from
particularity can only be to nothing-in ...particular, or, in
Harthes's words, " history eviapourates " under the power of the
myth (p. 151) . Underilying this form of rp1umlismis an implicit
ontology (agnosticism) which refuses to· take seriously the
genrnine plm.·ailityof onto·logical cla.ims in the wo['lld religions.
It would seem, then, that the Real'..sinvulnerrubility -lea;ds ailso
to its redundancy. Only the human .activity of turnmg a.way
from self is Jeft, .although 1with less and less theoretical foundation or revelatory grounding, or with any specificity of what
this "turning -a1way from self" involves. Here, finally, we
arrive at the ethical counteripart to this ontological essentialism.13 In the same way that aiil Teligionsare seen .as ultimately
related to one 1and the same" Rea;l" despite their oonsidera1ble
differences and intractruble particularities, 1so too is there an
ethical oounterpart to this claim. We aire toM tlhat despite all
the differences injunctions to act .and follow specific ·ways of
life enjoined 1by each particular tradition, the Teligions·are ulti13 Such an ontological essentialism undergirds theocentric solutions that
specify "God" to be the center of all religions, as is the case with the earlier
Hick, W. 0. Smith, and E.
to name a few. See also Surin, op. cit.

528

GAVIN D' COSTA

mately united ID putting fOI'IWlaird the same ethical principles
tha.t ,will provide the ibasis to unite them in a new harmony.
Hick :finds thaJt 1all the 1great traditions teach "Lo'Ve, compassion, 'self-sacrificing, concern for the good of others, generous
kindness and forgiv·eness:" (p. 825) . It is perhaps not surprising tha.t Hick ha;s to ·sever these values from their revelatory
grounding (surely quite
for many forms of
Judaism, Islam, and Christianity) m1d writes that the above
ideal " is not an ,aJ.ien ideal imposed hy 1supernatural authocity
ibut one arising orut of our human na;bure" (p. 825) and which
happens to concur with the " modern liberal morail outlook "
(p. 880). The rbasic criterion of judgffi,g sailvific 1religions is
therefore a commonly accepted set of va:1ues which are rooted
in " human nature " 1and not in the ,supernatural aiuthority of
any or a;ll religions.
, There are two points that should be maide •aJboiut this ethical
turn in Hick's wo11k, 1a tum which is increasingly shared ,by
rpluralists :under the aHeged influence of Ji!beration
The first is that the system, in Barthes's :wo:rds, "continuously
transforms the products of history into essentia:l types " 1and
when it has done this, deems them to he " Nature" (p. 155) •
One then p11oceeds to rcaH in Nature to adjudicate mattel'IS of
controversy (e.1g., •as to which are salvific rreligions), and impamality is apparently achieved at the same time. This
maneuver ,continues the iprocess of essentiaJ.ism,first noticed ID
ontology mid now found in ethics, which seeks to divest the
particularities of history and the uniqueness of religious traditions of their differences, intractaJbilities, and sometimes mdicai1ly exclrusivist rclaims. What of those religions, for example,
which view ethics a;s inbrinsicaillyrelated to the me of the community in response to a particular revelation and which, therefo11e, place a significant emphas[s on the precise intentionality
and modality of ethics, an emphasis not easily ireducible to descriptive ethical outcomes? They ,a;re marginalized by Hick's
14 See for example the essays by R. Ruether, M. Suchocki, P. Knitter and
T. Driver in the third section of The Mytn of Ohristia-n Uniqueneas.

TAKING OTHER RELIGIONS

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59l9

method. 15 Unde11lyinghis form of pluralism is an implicit view
of ethics which rrefruses to take seriously the genuine di:fferences
1betweenthe understanding of ethics within the world Te1igio!Ils,
let alone within a single tradition.
Furthemiore, the specificity of the ethical agenda and its
political and social hruggage go unnoticed, for it is believed that
these values are followed universrully and if not, all people
would wish to follow them. This ronoeruls the very real ethical
problems involved in making sense of such generali21ed ethical
injunctions .. And when harnessed to the modern liberal mo,ral
outlook, do- not such. values put forwacr.-d a merely 1bourgeois
program.? Indeed, some recent critics of plur:alism ihave
aillgued that this is precisely the case, and in using Barthes I
ha¥e tried to indica:te that it is not hy chance that Hick's
mythologizing program shares the chamcteristics what Barthes
calls ":bourgeois myth." 16 I do not hiwe tihe space to develop
this point but simply wish to 'raise it in a tentative £ashio-n.
Without wishing to· far all plurialists with the same hrush,
the a11gmm.ent of this essay has .been to show that, imnically,
radical p1ura;liststrategies such as Hiick'.s end up by not taking
other religions seriously on epistemological, ontO'logical, and
ethical 'grounds. It has not ·been my purpose to argue that there
is no -oommonality between religions in these three areas or that
Christians ought not to stri¥e to create inter-religious harniony.
I have only wanted to show why the pluralist approach is in
danger of sUJbverting its intended goal by failing to take real
religious pluriality seriously.

15 In Christianity, for example, see the work of S. Hauerwas, The Peaceable
Kingdom (London: SOM, 1984); and A. Macintyre,
Virtue: A Study
in Moral Theory (London: Duckworth, 1981) and Whose Justice? Whioh Rationality? (London: Duckworth, 1988).
16 See J. Milbank, " The End of Dialogue,"
and K. Surin, " A Certain
Politics of Speech: Towards an Understanding of the Relationships Between
the Religions in the Age of the McDonald's Hamburger," in Christian Uniqueness .Reconsidered.

iA NOTE ON W. J. HILL'S "THE DOCTRINE OF
GOD AFTER VATICAN II"

F. F. CENTORE
St. Jerome's Oollege, University of Waterloo
Waterloo, Ontario

G

OD MAY NOT :be dead, hut certamly 1any strictly
philosophical, scientific, rational approach to God
'WIOuld seem to ibe derud today. Modern thought, even
rumong deeply religious people, seems to J:nwe despaired of ever
being ruble to pwve rbhe existence oi God to anyone, even to
someone who not 'SO willfully prejudiced against
that
he simply rrefuses to view the evidence in 1an open-minded,
calm, am.d rreflective iway. However, this does :not mean that
our ,apip:voachto God must be strictly emotional and ir.rational.
It may >still 1be reasonable rto believe in God, even though we
cannot rprove his existence in 'Some strictly r:ationrul way.
Rather ,than beginning with our ordinary human experience
of the real exbramenrtailworld and ,working our way up to a
knowledge o:f the bet that God exists·, we might take a more
inner.,directed, psychofogicail, humanistic, phenomenological,
historical app 1voach to such knowledge. Such an aiprproach
might even 1be more effective and more convincing rto un1believers.
Reoent writers on the modern God-question ha1v;e
the notion that rational wgruments :for the existence (and natuire) of God may :be :a:ll 1weH and :good hut only for ia oomputer
or a rolbot. What modern man needs is not so much 1a krrmwledge of God as ;a persona1 relrutionshlp to God. And perhaps the
hesit 1w:ay to achieve this is not to throw out completely the
role of reason in providing a .scientific support for God' s existence ibut to rev;errse the pmcess. We must first come to a personrul ruwaireneiss of God and then proceed to v;alida;te rthfus
1

1

1

531

F. F. CENTORE

awareuess via scientific confirmation. After all, how can anyone ever hope even to 1begin the search for God unless he already hais some ·awareness of God's e:ristence?
According to John Hick, fo.r inst:mce, this is especially true
in the Juda.eo-Christian tradition and, hy extension, in those
other religious traiditions 1which derive f["om it, such as Islam.
H " to kno·w " means " to be a1ble to prove hy syllogistic reasoning," then the Jews of the Old 'I1esbament did not know
God. Instead of attempting to prove the existence of God they
took his existence £or granted. " They thought of God as an
experienced reality rather than as an inferred entity." i The
ancient £aithful were as sure of the existence of their God as
they we:ve of the material wo:rld which surrounded them. There
was. no need to :become rationalistic rubout it.
In iaddition, even if they had turned ra:tiona1listicit would
hav;e been of no use whatsoever to them. F11om the point of
view of faith, all of the theistic proofs (none of which is v;ery
oompelling or cogent an;}'iway) are completely ir:velevant. They
can actually do nothing to move anyone to :feel and act in a
religious way. AH such proofs are only for pedants who are
content to 1live an empty ,and ·sterile rubstract life within their
own minds rather than wailking in the living p:vesence of the
divine.
Although there may well. he a place for the rational development of our intuitive sense of the living presence of God as
expressed in revelation, once we are in full possession of such a
revelation, it must always hold a place secondary to the experienced fact of £aith. Thus, even though modern religious
thinkers reject natuira:l theology, "This modern theofogioal rejection of natural theology is not necessarily motiva:ted ·by an
ir:vationaJi.stdistrust of reason." 2 There is a :vole :for reason, hut
only so long as it comes: after we already know thrut God exists.
Since reason ialone can never pirove the existence 0£ God, ·reve1 J. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 3rd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: PrenticeHall, 1983), pp. 59-60.
2 Ibid., p. 74.

A NOTE ON W. J. HILL

533

lation and ·faith are the only means we have to find out rubout
God.
A similar .attitude can ibe found in William Atbraiham. This
aiuthor distinguishes among fideism, so.ft rationalism, and hard
riationailism. Fideism ne5:bherseeks after nor needs any scientific
or pihilosophioal rea:sons for what is maintained in its doctrine.
Although not neeessa,rily irrational, it is ait lea!St non-rational.
Soft rationalism differs from fideism in that it does seek after
some sort of proof for the existence of God and the main doctrines of il'eligion. The arguments, however, need not he aibso1utely conclusive iand overpowering. The cruse for religion can
1be iba,sed upon a cumulative arrangement of evidence drawn
mom any .and .all souroes which ·axe deemed pertinent by the
thinker involved. In the end, the £na.il decision is hased 111rpon
an ll<:veducibleappeal to intuitive and persona,} judgments concerning the truth orr falsity orf tihe rreligious ;propos·itions:involved.
Hard rationalism is devoted to the cainons of formal logic
and rigorous thinking. This is a "
" form of rrationalism. Abraham sees this app:voacli as 1being in the traiditioo. of classicail natural theology. Y:et it is not classical natural
theology. li\.coording to .Aibr1aiham, the most that ha:rid ra.tiona;lism can ·achieve is a :rational ;appreciation of the [,act that
the existence of God is mme p11.1ohable than ms nonexistence.
Using Richa11.1d Swill:burne as his model, Abraham points out
how all tihe olassical aiprpToachesrto God, none of which is a real
proof :when ta;ken mdividua;lly, do 1in fact add up to a very
good :rational argument .for the existence of God when vie1wed
ooHectively.8
As it turns out, ihowever, hard :rationailism is not much ibetter than soft Tationalism 1when it 1oomes to proving itihe exiistence of God. Even granted that cumulative ia:riguments are
1better than unidimensional
the cum1J.1lative apipmach still fails. Sooner OT
ha11d rationalism is called
1

1

1

a See W. J. Abraham, .An Introduction to the Philo8ophy of Religion
{Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1985), pp. 114-117.

534

F. F. CENTORE

hack rto soft rationalism and e¥en to ficleiism in 011der to make
its oase. The11e are no t:mly objective, universal, and cogent
arguments to prove the existence of God. TheTe is, of course,
a:ll sorts of evidence pointing in God's direction. But there is
a1so evidence, such as the fact of evil, pointing away from God.
This ibrings us hack 'to our i·diosyncratic selves all over ·again.
" In the end we are all left 'to weigh tihe a.vailarb1e evidence for
ourselves." 4
This attitude is quite widespread today 1and can evcen be
found within the Roman Ca:tholic Church, and in the highest
places. In its Pastoral Constiitution on the Church in the
Modern World (Gaudium et Spes), Article 21, "The Attitude
of the Cihurch Towarids Atheism,'' Vatican Comrcil II :does not
in any 'Way emphasize the rational or scientific path to a knowledge of God's existence. At the beginning of the :section we
read that the Church must strong·ly criticize harmful teaching
and ways of acting which are opposed to reason and common
human experience. The chief error is atiheism, which must
sooner or later lead people into desrpair.
When it oomes to answering atheism, howev:er, the main appeal is not to 'reason and science hut to human feelings, emotions, and hopes, 1as well as to the good example of ideal human
beha,vciorwhich •should ihe set by the Churcih. The modern ruppeal is not to the head hut to the " most secret des1res of the
human heart." Apart foom the fulfiHment of the higher destiny
of each ihuman ibeing, which is to he with God forever, "nothing is .ruble to satisfy the heart of man." As St . .Augustine says
at the very 1beginning of his Confessions," Thou hast made us
it rest in
for thyself, 0 Lord, and our heart is rrestless
5
thee."
In his rpost-Viatioan II commentary on this text, Joseph
Ratzinger, 1who was made a Crul'dinal in 1977, and who became
Prefect of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the
1

1

1

1

4 Ibid.,

p. 129.
Flannery, ed., The Documents of Vatican II (Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Eerdmans, 1975), pp. 920-922.
5 A. P.

A NOTE ON W. J, IDLL

535

Faith in 1981,
it dear that he creads it 1as .a move away
rfrom the position. or Vatican Council I (1869-1870) on the
demonstrrubility of God's existence, even though Vatican II
does not cootr:aidict Vatican I. Instead of an emphll!sis upon
what can or cannot ibe done in ·science 1and philosophy in a positive way, the •emphasis is plaood upon the history of religion.
Insterud of repeating V1atican I on the demonstrahility of God's
existence :by
.alone, the £act that .atheists cannot disprovce God's existence is emphasized.
Ca11dinrulRatzinger's own view is that the whole question of
God's existence or non-existence .stainds outside the realm of
" demonst!'lative thought." In ol'lder to " appease " some of the
fathers, however, who wanted to l'letain the main point of Vatican I on the demonst:ra;bility of God, the temi "rationa:l" was
arlded <to the text. Acool'lding to Ratzinger, the term "rationaJ " was meant only to recru11 the position of Vatican I,
while the rest of the phrase, that ieoncerned 1wi:th " common
human 1experience," was meant to de-emphasize the " neoscholastic rationalism " of Vatican I with ats static !llotion of
":natural reason" and the non-historical syllogistic mind-set of
the perennial philosophy.
The background which the text thus adds to Vatican I is not so
much the history of philosophy as the history of religion. In order
to find confirmation for the thesis of Vatican I, one must not ask
whether there were philosophers before the time of Christ who
worked out an incontestable monotheistic conception of God, but
rather whether mankind knew about God or not. It knew about
him even when God encountered mankind obscured by the form
of the gods.6

Ovcem11, Ratzinger is ihappy ·with the Councirs demand fo:r
an open discussion with atheists on the e:ristence 1and nature of
God .and Christ, "which here appears for the first time .in an
officia1 document oi the magisterium," 1 even though he is not
happy with its mtionalistic ·sounding tone due to the inclusion
ed., Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II (New
6 H. Vorgrimler,
York: Herder and Herder, 1967-1969), vol. 5, Part I, p. 153.
1 Ibid., p. 158.

536

F. F. CENTORE

of the word ratio in the text. Nevertlheless, the essence of the
article should not 1be fost. iits main concern [s with humanistic
atheism, and its main message is that " Faith does not diminish
man hut leads him in the direction in 1which alone the endless
irestlessness 1which impel,s him can find satisfaction. Man's
measure is infinity, everytihing else is tboo little
him. Con8
sequently only God can ibe man's measure."
On the .surface of it, thourgh, it seems to ihe a sorry state of
aff1arirs when we cannot use our rational powers to know the
divine cause of 1all rationality, especirully.in an ,age when science has given us so much knowledge. If God reailly does exist
as the creator of all things, he must rbe rthe creator of our minds
ais rwell. Why, then, can we not use our minds to krmw God? If
the great glories of science rure open to us, including rthe pagians,
atheists, Ml!d aignostics ·among us, why should not the even
greater glory of God be ours to possess? It seems like a, very
strange and unnaturra:l rthiing to ,say that we can know great
aind distant gialaxies hut not the 1great Lord of 1aill. Can this be
what the Council meant?
More recently, Fr. Hill has said mrnch the same thing as
Cardinal Ratzinger. He thirnks that the march of spontaneously dialooticail histo:ry has ov;ertilivowndassica;l n:atural theology,
that is, "of that understanding in which God is the Supreme
Befog ,expJa:iningthe existence of ev;erything else-a preunderstanding 'that precedes Tle¥e1ation and makes the latter credible." 9 Yet 1we cannot 1rubandon metaphysics alto.getber. Our
language must have 1a meaning. "'\iVe must :be ,aible to relate our
words and propositions, even faith rpmrpositions,to the real extr:amental :world. " T:he sole alternative to ola,ssical metaphysics need not be either linguistic anrulysi-sor ibiiblica1£undameutalism, nor may 1it mean roUrupse into uncriticail ,belief or
into, action." 10
s Ibid., p. 159.
9 W. J. Hill, O.P., "The Doctrine of God after Vatican II," The Thomist
51 ( 1987) : 396.
1-0 Ibid., p. 399.

A NOTE ON W. J. HILL

537

What we must do, though, is give up our prejudice wgainst
prej:urdiice. Thel'e is nothing philosophioa1ly wrong with being
prejudiced in £avor of Jesus Christ. In effect, 1we must return
to the idea of faith seeking understanding whioh, of course,
pil"esupposes 1belief,:faith, .and religious assent to that which we
are attempting to explicate. And tihe hest way to do this is to
see the Christian reLigion a;s essentially ·an historicrul process of
human-divine invo:lvement and ia faith enoounter rwith providential growth rund development.
This does not mean ,going whole hog for the !heretical position of process theology or for the ev;olutionary myth of necessary and continual progress in the world, even in human
a:ffiairs. It means seeing God-in-the-Wor1d and M.an-in-God
within an ever-aotive context of ,a personal love relationship
which incorpoTates into itself all of the vicissitudes, ibacktrackin:gs, disappointments, :glories, and sufferings of :a Jove relationship. God the Father is :a " Daddy " who must put up with
all of the stresses .and strains of his demanding toddlers, obnoxious teenagers, 1and cynical adult children. Nevertheless,
God remains unchanged within his very nature, and ibis demand
foT
oo.d obedience continues to glow Ted-hot rus he incessantly interacts :with his ereation on its way to ii.ts divinely appointed culmination.
All this is weH-taken, as is the .emphasis on faith 1and :belief
preceding scientific Teasoning as expressed iby the other authors
mentioned rubove. What I must question, however, is Fr. Hill's
statement that " The quinque viae then of Aquinas remain
valid, not in the sense of proving God's existence from a sta:te
of pure ;a.gnosticism, ibut hy way o[ clarifying the question,
pointing in the direction of its resolution, and giving 1ogiorul
formulations to the answe:r:s ,surmized." u I don't think that
thi s is the !basic meaning of V:atican Council H on the ibest approach to God when dealing with die-ha:r:d,humanistic atheists.
At no time does the Council ,contrrudict Vatica.n ·Council I, and
1

1

1

1

11 Ibid.,

p. 417.

1

538

F. F. CENTORE

indeed,
Ratzinger's ,attempt to make it sound so, the
Council 'seems to be making a ,specia1l effort not to rule out a
scientific argument :for God's existence which would be convincing to the honest and open-minded 1atheist or agnnstic. In
fact, I don't see how a proof which does not ;proceed from a
state of pure agnosticism with respect to the specific issue under investigation can he called a valid pvoof in a completely
rational sense. If it does not start foom premises better lmnwn
than the conclusion, it must then he circuilaJ.' and hence not a
vialid prroof,a,t all.
How then can we !reconcile the Council's emphasis on both
St. Augustine, trecommended as 1a;n antidote to modern existerrtia1l-1phenomenologicalatheism, which more feels than thinks
its way th:vough life, and St. Thoma's Aquina,s, recommended as
a wor1d-1wi:demodel to all Christian intellectuals :because of his
1rubilityto harmonize science, phi1osophy, and theology? I think
this ean be done hy affirming that, yes, in pri:ndple at least
one proof from 'S'cratch for the existence of God is certainly
possible to unaided human reason, but that in practice, given
our 011d[nary rubilities, inte!'ests, and day-to-day human problems in the wo111d, this is not the wa,y to go rin modern 'apologetics. It could even ihe affirmed, quite truthfully and accurately, that Aquinas himself did not fake that rroute in his own
:rerul-lifesituation. He was, after all, not a philosophus, a pagan
philosopher, hut a Christian who philosophized. Nonetheless,
when he did philosophize he did it very well, and one of the
things he may 1well have ,achieved was at 1least one proof for
the exis1tenceof God which would he cogent and convincing to
the honest, open-minded 1Vgnostic.12
Vatican Council II recognized itself as a continuation of
Vatican Council I, which was out off prematurely by the
Fmnco-Prussian War. But ,wihat was the main ooncern of the
earlier conclave? Acoording to the ew11ly 20th century commentary of Vincent McNabb, O.P., it was nothing else than
12 Further to this, see my "Logic, Aquinas, and Utrum Deus Bit," Angelicum 63 ( 1986): 213-226.

539

A NOTE ON W. J. HILL

the everlasting problem of £aith. Its results were four basi1c
proclamations: " That over men there is the Maker of me!ll;
thaJt we have reason enabling us ito discover Him; faith ernabling us to ibelieve Him; :and an
mouthpiece of revelation to. decla:ve Him." 13 However, .a;lthough k:now:ableiby reason 1alone, we should not •eJq>ect too much <from this roa.d to
God. " Moreover, Christian philosophy has the sanction of
the Vatican Council :for ·suggesting thait, ais men .and methods
•stand, these p:voofs :are not Likely to ibring conviction to the
masis of men or even to the general :run of thinking men." 14 To
my ear, this rpolSlt-V1aticanI comment sounds vecy much like
some po•st-VatricanII comments.
a 11iving conviction which really grruhs us we require
something more than mere syUogisms-much more. This can
only he hriougJ:rtrubout hy a personal :response rto ·a personail appea:l, 'by a fo.¥e which embmoes the whole person. " Yet how
real ibecomes this conviction when we 1believe in the supreme
love
intel1igence of Creation 1a;nd Providence, and the
and :self-sacrificeof Redemption. The C'I1oss indeed is not only
the power of God, lbut His wisdom and .IE:s fov;e-overrooming
all difficulties, answering a:ll doubts, realizing a;ll aspirations." 15
Well, as Fr. Hill points out, mayibe not aU problems of an emoand intellectual nature, ibut the 1Perfect Mediator does
at least provide us with a mntext for
and does give us
1
6
hope for s:uooess.
To conclude, I don't see anyhhing in Vatican II that would
contmdiot the main pQints of ¥atican I. Starting with naJtural
1

1

13 Vincent McNabb, O.P., 011Jfor1l Oonferences on Faith (St. Louis: Herder,
1905)' p. 18.
14 Ibid., p. 55.
15 Ibid., p. 58.
16 Indirectly,
Fr. Hill raises ·some interesting questions. If we do away
with the prejudice against prejudice in philosophical methodology, can we also
do away with some other taboos? For instance, should we insist that theo·
logians maintain a personal loyalty to the pope, rather than simply to the
Catholic Tradition, from which they select whatever is, to them, the best?
Also, these days we are allowed to write about passion in philosophy, but we
cannot write philosophy passionately. Should this be changed?

540

F. F. CENTORE

reason alone, exercised hy one hereft of
Tevelation,
it possible in principle to reason one's way to Him Who ls, to
a God who is the Lo'.1.'d of all time, of our past and our future.
Neither Council meant to say that for our belief in God to be
reasonaible it is 'Sufficient that no one can dib1lrove ihis existence. If this were the ca:se, 'rather than the case being something much mol'e positive, we would iindeed 1be in a sad way,
mtiona1ly speaking. I'm afraid 1t\hat it would lay us open to any
critic who wants to say something like: "Since you can't prove
that Jesus's disciples did not take his body from the tomb,
us agree
therefore that is what must have happened.'' No,
instead that a positive pil'oof is possible hut that this objective
fact in :no way guarantees a loving, personal, suhjective response on the part of the unibe1iev;er,eitheT ancient or modern.
1

1

BOOK REVIEWS
Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings. Trans., ed., and intro. By SIMON
TUGWELL, O.P., preface by Leonard E. Boyle, O.P. Classics of
Western Spirituality. New York: Paulist Press, 1988. Pp. xv
650. $17.95 {paper).

+

In scope and size, Albert and Thomas is an unusually large work for
the Classics of Western Spirituality Series-" really two books in one,"
as Leonard Boyle, Prefect of the Vatican Library, observes in his unusually brief but laudatory preface. Perhaps it is three books. Simon
Tugwell not only provides lengthy critical introductions to the life and
writings of both Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas but also translates the whole of Albert's commentary on the Mystical Theology of
Pseudo-Dionysius, as well as providing a new translation of that short
work itself (or rather the Latin version of it by John Sarracenus that
Albert used with an eye to the previous translation by Eriugena) . Tugwell also provides first or new translations of several shorter works of
St. Thomas and excerpts from longer ones: Thomas's Inaugural Lecture at the University of Paris, the Commentary on the Sentences of
Peter Lombard, De Veritate, the Commentary on Boethius, the scriptural
commentaries on Paul, Matthew, John, and Romans and the Contra lmpugnantes, as well as the Summa contra Gentiles and the Summa
Theologiae.
Regent of studies of the English Dominican province, Simon Tugwell
teaches at the House of Studies in Oxford; he is also on the faculty of
theology at the University as well as at the Pontifical University of St.
Thomas (the Angelicum) in Rome. He is a member of the Dominican
Historical Institute and editor of Dominican Sources in English, and
in the Classics of Western Spirituality series he previously edited the
volume Early Dominicans. He brings to the present volume a wealth of
scholarship that can truly be called prodigious, especially if measured
in terms of documentation: the endnotes for the introductions alone
number 1292 !
Despite the encompassing scope of Tugwell's introductions, which
account for more than one-third of the book, the focus of his work and
of the texts he selected is spirituality rather than dogmatic or moral
theology, exegesis, philosophy, or natural science-which is to be ex·
pected in a series of this kind. Of course, for both Albert and Thomas,
" spirituality " can only mean " the theology of the spiritual life," not
" devotional literature " of even a high scholastic tone. Thus a question

541

BOOK REVIEWS

may legitimately he posed regarding the volume's intended audience.
The overall length, the extensive critical apparatus, and the often seemingly remote and abstract topics favored hy Albert, Thomas, and Tugwell are likely to overwhelm the casual or novice reader interested in
the spiritual teaching of these Doctors of the Church. Conversely,
academic theologians and historians might consider a series on spirituality an unlikely site for such a major, probably epoch-marking study
of these giants of scholastic thought and method, especially in so limited
a context. Both readerships would be sadly mistaken. Although not
beyond cavil in some respects, the present volume is likely to be regarded in coming years as the most important study of Albert and
Thomas published in the last several decades. It also contains spiritual
theology of immense richness and profundity for anyone patient enough
to look.
The volume is divided unequally, two-thirds going to Thomas. Both
parts are sharply, even narrowly focused (in respect to Thomas, I feel,
narrowly enough to lead to some imbalance). The section on Albert
centers on the corpus Areopagiticum, specifically on a single work. In
light of Albert's role in generating a Christian Neoplatonic revival in the
thirteenth century and the centrality of the Mystical Theology, this is
appropriate, even necessary. Conversely, the influence of Dionysius on
Thomas is passed over quickly, and instead of a single work, Aquinas
is represented by a selection of chronologically-arranged texts covering
his entire career, dealing with teaching, prayer, the contemplative life,
and an assortment of medieval problems connected with the vows of
obedience, poverty, the role of study, and rivalries between mendicant
orders.
To the casual reader, Tugwell's much briefer treatment of Albert
might seem to serve largely as a preface to that of Albert's student,
Thomas. In fact, his introductory remarks comprise the most complete
and exhaustive account of Albert's life, writings, and doctrine now available in English. Among other merits, it contains a brilliant synopsis of
the central problem of early medieval theology, which is of immense
importance for subsequent spirituality: how we can know God within
human experience. Thus, Tugwell pays significant attention to Albert's
exploration of the ways we know God, in particular the place of rapture
in contemplative experience. Much of the contemporary relevance of
Albert's teaching on spirituality undoubtedly lies in this area. Regrettably, the parallel, hut very different contributions of Thomas in this
regard are again passed over quickly, at least in comparison with other
topics (seep. 551).
Tugwell's introduction to the life and work of Thomas Aquinas is
likely to he more controversial than his work on Albert the Great. It

BOOK REVIEWS

548

is in this regard that the word " ruthless " appears several times, once
in Boyle's preface, who refers to the "pruning, at times ruthless, of
some traditional accounts of [the tangled sources of the life of] .••
Thomas " (p. xv) . Tugwell later applies it to his attempt to eliminate
"fantasies ... hallowed by generations of historians" (p. xiii). He
uses it of Thomas as well (p. 569) , although chiding the Angelic Doctor
for lacking sufficient ruthlessness to prevent misunderstanding. In
Tugwell's case, the historian who receives the brunt of his ruthlessness
is Pierre Mandonnet, whose dogmatic pronouncements " bewitched "
a generation of modern biographers (see pp. 216-17, 221, 310 n. 166,
317 n. 249).
Tugwell departs more gently from James Weisheipl, the most recent
major biographer of Thomas, on a number of historical points (see
pp. 305 n. 130, 310 n. 166, 313 n. 206, and 322 n. 313), including
the date of Thomas's birth and the allegedly mystical experience that
ended his writing career. However, Tugwell is perhaps a hit too quick
to credit Edmund Colledge for his insightful surmise that Thomas suffered a stroke on Dec. 6, 1373, all the while passing silently over (p.
266) Weisheipl's equally cogent suggestion that when Thomas struck
his head against an overhanging tree (branch) en route to the Council
of Lyons in February 1374, he suffered a suhdural hematoma that
ended his life. With regard to the year of Thomas's birth, Tugwell
plumps for 1225/26 against the currently accepted 1224/25 favored by
Weisheipl (though without fervor) . Considering the various accounts,
it seems to me that the cumulative weight of evidence supports Tugwell's side. What is important, historiographically, is his grounds for
preferring William of Tocco and James of Viterho over Bernard Gui
and others and against Mandonnet and Weisheipl (who himself concluded that " It is unlikely that we shall ever know the precise day or
year."). For Tocco notoriously confused dates in other respects, as
Tugwell elsewhere observes with glee (see p. 309 n. 160). All things
considered, however, Tugwell's dating of the events of Thomas's life
and writings will most probably become standard.
The texts Tugwell uses to explore Thomas's spiritual teaching are
restricted to three major areas: prayer, action and contemplation, and
certain problematic issues in religious life. Tugwell does not detail his
reasons for selecting these particular themes or texts, although in both
cases historical importance and depth of treatment obviously played a
dominant role. The translations of all the texts are generally excellent,
despite an occasional tendency to breeziness ("link-up of ideas,"
"much-speaking,") and a certain penchant for English cultural references that could well he opaque to the non-British reader (e.g., " the
Earl of Blanding's brother," London subway stops).

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The selection itself, at least in Thomas's case, poses a problem, how·
ever, in regard to spirituality. Because the issues and interests of the
thirteenth century, especially among mendicant friars and university
masters, are in most respects different from those of twentieth-century
readers, the relevance of much of Thomas's teaching and Tugwell's
masterful exegesis is likely to escape notice amid the welter of repetitious and sometimes tedious discussions of clerical preoccupations.
(Scholars, on the other hand, will delight in Tugwell's mastery of his
sources, even when disagreement occurs.)
A major disappointment concerns Thomas's discussion of active and
contemplative " lives," which, as Tugwell states, is not only " muddled "
(see esp. pp. 283-84) but inconclusive. For if, as Tugwell frequently
notes but too rarely instantiates (see p. 568 n. 13, 584 n. 7), Thomas's
notion of the differences between two " lives " is based on " tempera·
mental bias" (as t<;>day we regard introversion and extraversion),
arguing whether one or the other is better or more enjoyable" in itself"
begs the question. And how does one apply Thomas's principles to the
practical order, where for someone temperamentally biased toward the
active life the repose of contemplation would be excruciating, and vice
versa? Thomas's use of the terms " action " and " contemplation " is
itself ambiguous, since in the received tradition going back to Plato,
the sense of both terms waffied indiscrimately between epistemological/
philosophical and religious/theological meanings. What needs clarification is the meaning of both action and contemplation with respect to
human experience in general and spirituality in particular, the choice
of a personal life-style based on temperamental inclination, and the different character of active vs. contemplative religious orders. Obviously,
this area warrants much more discussion than possible even in so large
a work.
Similarly, while Tugwell does not devote much space to Thomas's
treatment of the moral virtues as predisposing factors for contemplation, he at least recognizes this important connection and in this regard interprets the mind of Aquinas very accurately. The superb note
on p. 575 concerning Thomas's attitude toward "mere austerity," and
other passing observations on false altruism, pleasure, and self-seeking,
open tantalizing windows to a wide and inviting range of Aquinas's
spiritual theology that regrettably remained beyond the scope of the
present work. (As Tugwell suggests, of course, one can-should-con·
sult his earlier work, Ways of Imperfection.)
The long discussion of controversies in medieval religious life which
concludes the selection of Thomas's texts, much of which is taken from
the Summa Theologiae, seems even less relevant except for antiquarian
interests. There is, for example, the dispute between the Franciscans

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and Dominicans regarding absolute poverty or which was the " best "
order. Despite its real merits, the latter argument (from ST, II-II,
q.188, a.6) is more an embarrassment than a curiosity, not least he·
cause of its implicit clericalism. It does, of course, represent the mind
of Thomas on an issue of vital importance to the mendicants of his day,
even if in an unflattering light. Here and elsewhere, however, Tugwell
attempts neither to cover nor to apologize for the Angelic Doctor's weak
points. But how much more valuable today would have been an ex·
position of Thomas's spiritual theology of the active life, especially of
lay persons.
Among lesser matters, Tugwell's use of inclusive language wherever
possible {largely substituting " human being " for the generic " man ")
is welcome and, I feel exemplary. Textually, the whole volume is
remarkably accurate and exhaustively referenced, if, in minor regards,
occasionally incomplete. This has the effect of teasing the reader un·
necessarily and, more unfortunately, deprives us of the point of several
of the author's more interesting and deft" asides" {see pp. 399 n. 560,
340 n. 575, 342 n. 605). Among the few errors of note, the second
" negations " on p. 170 should surely be " affirmations." I also wonder
if "James of Caiazzo" {p. 292 n. 3) should he "John of Caiazzo"
(see pp. 230, 232, 235 and notes).
Leonard Boyle's remark about the number of volumes latent in this
ambitious, richly rewarding, and persuasively argued study may have
unintentionally identified its greatest achievement as well as its prin·
cipal weakness. Tugwell's superb introductions, especially that to
Thomas, are not yet hooks in their own right, hut they well could he.
One can only hope that rounded out and filled in, they soon will he. In
whatever form, of course, studies such as Albert and Thomas cannot
provide the last word on their subjects, as Tugwell himself modestly
avers {p. xiii). But the present volume offers far more than " a small
step forward; " it is an outstanding contribution among the Classics of
Western Spirituality. I am in complete accord with the final comment
by Fr. Boyle: "As an introduction to the lives and spiritual teaching
of two of the greatest Dominican authors of the Middle Ages, Father
Tugwell's work here is easily the most clear-headed and stimulating in
English, or indeed in any language " (p. xv) •
RICHARD

Loyola University of Chicago
Chicago, Illinois

Woons, O.P.

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BOOK REVIEWS

D.e summo bono. Liher II, Tractatus 1-4. By ULRICH OF STRASBOURG,
O.P. Edited by ALAIN DE LIBERA. Corpus Philosophorum Teutoni·
corum Medii Aevi, Vol. I, 2 (1). Hamburg: Felix Meiner Verlag,
1987. Pp. xliii
162.

+

After the publication of works by Theodoric of Freiberg and Berthold
of Moosburg, the Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi has
been continued by the start of an edition of a third representative of
the German Dominican School: Albert the Great's "favorite disciple,"
1277). The success of the series' previous
Ulrich of Strasbourg (
undertakings gives every reason to expect the rapid completion of this
project as well, which had defied earlier attempts at complete edition.
The extent and difficulty of the project made it necessary to distribute
the text to several editors and to allow the volumes to appear in the
chance order of their completion rather than according to the order of
the original work. Simultaneously with de Libera's edition, Sabina
PieperhofI edited Liber IV, Tractatus 1-2, 7 (Vol. I, 4 [l]) ; more recently (1988), the first book of the work has been edited by Burkhard
Mojsisch: (I, 1). As the directors of the entire project, Kurt Flasch and
Loris Sturlese, explain (I, 2 [l], IXs.), this necessary division of labor
demanded that the work on the editions begin without the possibility
of an exhaustive and :final judgment on the entire text tradition. The
reader will certainly understand and accept the necessity of this limitation, agreeing however with the project directors that a final judgment
on the text tradition must be reserved until more volumes have appeared.
De Libera and PieperhofI have given somewhat different interpretations of the text tradition. The general directors, judging both editors
to be correct for their respective segments, are forced to the hypothesis
(by no means impossible in itself) that the manuscript in the library
of the university at Erlangen (Cod. 530/1 = E) witnesses to one hyparchetype in the second book and to another in the fourth book. The
significance of this hypothesis is all the greater for two reasons: the
construction of a second hyparchetype, just as independent and reliable
as the first, is the principal innovation in the new edition's evaluation
of the text tradition; and because this new hyparchetype is constructed
on the basis of only two manuscripts-for Book II, R (Cod. Vat. lat.
1311) and U (Vienna, Dominikanerkloster Cod. 170/204) ; for Book
IV, R and E-Mojsisch has now followed de Libera's interpretation in
its postulating RU as an independent and older hyparchetype. It will
he interesting to see if coming editions can support this new view of
the text tradition or if these first two sections will have to claim exceptional status.

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547

Although de Libera argues his case with conviction, the evidence for
the originality and reliability of the hyparchetype RU must he viewed
as tentative. Often, he has proposed the longer reading of RU as the
more probable, against the principles espoused by the general editors
( (XXXII; cf. XI) in accord with P. Maas, Textkritik {Leipzig, 1960).
Although these general rules were never meant to he followed slavishly,
RU is taken frequently to he the better reading, omitted by all others,
where at least as good a case could he made for viewing the passage as
an addition by RU. For example, " vel audientis" in II 1, 2, 9, interpreted by de Libera as original, is more likely to have been a later
addition (cf. also II 1, 1, 37; 1, 2, 51; 3, 2, 135; 3, 3, 14; 3, 7, 25; 3,
8, 1; 3, 13, 316). In most other cases, a plausible enough argument
could he made for the alternative reading, that the unique text of RU
could he viewed as secondary; cf. II 2, 2, 75; 3, 2, 16; 3, 5, 106; 3, 7,
87. 173; 3, 9, 10; 3, 11, 127; 3, 13, 17. 65. 96. 174. 312. Only rarely
does the unique tradition of RU seem to offer the singularly correct alternative (cf. II 2, 2, 32; 3, 6, 99. 130; 3, 8, 186) . Presumably moved
hy the alternative reading in R (" mutationem "), the editor (II 3, 12,
196) posits for the original text an "immissionem," although the universal reading of all other manuscripts (" imitationem ") is quite
cogent. Especially in light of Pieperhoff's close grouping of R and E
for Book IV, it is interesting to note that, where RU does not offer the
unique alternative for Book II, an affinity (though by no means an
exclusive one) with some member of the subgroup ELM appears frequently. Mistakes common l:o both postulated hyparchetypes (e.g.
"Odivius" II 3, 8, 38 in BDEMRU) must he attributed either to the
original archtetype or to parallel hut independent corruption of the
two traditions; in neither case an easy explanation, although not impossible.
Following de Lihera's interpretation, Mojsisch documents the un·
deniahly close relationship of RU for the first hook as well. It also becomes clear that this relationship extends in lesser intensity to B {Berlin,
Staatshihliothek Preussischer Kulturhesitz, Cod. Theol. Lat. 233) , hut
also to members of the sub-group FDELM. Mojsisch accepts the theory
that RU is an independent and the more reliable hyparchetype. Although criteria such as the lectio difficilior force him to follow occasionally the alternative archetype, Mojsisch prefers RU wherever possible, arguing that because R seems to be the oldest manuscript, RU will
probably represent the original version most faithfully {I, 1, LXII).
The guidelines articulated hy Maas and recommended by the general
editors had warned against such a line of argument. Not the chrono·
logical distance to the original, hut the number and quality of mediating
manuscripts along with the individual quality of the existing copy is

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BOOK REVIEWS

decisive for the question of greater and lesser fidelity. It also remains
to be explained how the manuscripts BDLPU came to include a (com·
mon?) table of contents for the whole work (I, 1, XXXIII). And yet,
even should later editions lead to a revision of the stemmata codicum,
especially as regards the primordiality of RU and RE, the changes in
the text would not be so major as to impair significantly the value of
these volumes.
According to the stemmata proposed by the editors, the frequent cor·
rections, especially of B and N (St. Omer, Stadtbibliothek, Cod. 120),
are neither the result nor the source of textual contamination. Daguillon
had claimed in the preface to his edition of the first book (BT XII, 50*)
that two separate sets of corrections in N can be distinguished from one
another, with the later set of corrections corresponding closely to P.
Had the new edition made the distinction visible for the reader, it would
have been possible to evaluate Daguillon's claim and its consequence
especially for the sub-group NVP.
De Libera reviews critically the earlier partial editions and analyses
of the text tradition by J. Daguillon, F. Collingwood, F. J. Lescoe, B.
Faes de Mottoni, and I. Backes, but he does not discuss in any detail
(cf. XLis.) the edition of II 3, 4 by Martin Grabmann: Des Ulrich
Engelberti von Strassburg 0. Pr. ( 1277) Abhandlung De pulchro:
Untersuchungen und Texte, republished in his Gesammelte Akademie·
abhandlungen (Paderborn, 1979) I, 177-260). In fact, however, Grabmann intended to offer merely a "readable" text (pg. 74), utilizing
only six of 'the nineteen manuscripts known to him. He was skeptical
about the possibility of ever bringing the manuscripts into a helpful
stemma with a defined achetype (pg. 73). A comparison of Grabmann's
text with the new edition reveals that, in those cases of discrepancy
where a consultation of the Munish manuscript (Bayerische Staatsbi·
bliothek, Clm. 6496) could decide the matter, the new edition almost
invariably provides the better reading of this manuscript. At II 3, 4,
219, the Munich manuscript (f.42v) should be added to the tradition in
eluding the preposition "in." "Et" for "id est" /om. at 86 (M f. 4lr)
and "homine" for "hominis " at 128 (M f. 41v) are presumably
singular mistakes. Grabmann adds a few double variants ( GAA, a.a.O.
252f, 253d, 255a, 256ad, 257h), which, even if verified in the manu·
scripts cited, would not demand any changes in the main text.
The decision to exclude singular variants from the apparatus is un·
derstandable, but it obviously makes independent confirmation of the
new edition more difficult. Taking chapter II 3, 7 as an example, it is
clear from M (f. 43v) that "actum" (1. 79) should read "acutum"
(cf. also Dionysiaca II 838, 2; Alb. De cael. hier, c. 7, §4, Ed. Par. t.
14, p. 168b; and Super De div. nom. 4, n. 140, Simon 229, 9), whereas

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549

it is uncertain from M alone (f. 47v) whether its reading of noto for
noti (I. 18 of the new edition) is a singular variant or not. In I, 1,
the negative style of apparatus, listing only the variants to the reconstituted text, makes it difficult for the reader to know when the partially
preserved manuscript from Louvain agrees with the main text or is
simply incomplete.
The date of composition is not explicity discussed in these first volumes, but the" Index auctoritatum" implies a date later than previously was assumed. Grahmann (op. cit., 206) argued, not without a certain plausibility, that Ulrich had written his work after 1262 (Albert's
resignation as bishop of Regensburg, implied at IV 3, 9) and before
the translation of Proclus's Elementatio theologica in 1268, a work so
congenial to Ulrich, that its absence here seems significant. I. Backes,
Die Christologie, Soteriologie and Mariologie des Ulrich von Strassburg: Ein Beitrag zur Geistesgeschichte des 13. Jh., Trierer theologische
Studien, 29 (II, 11) , reasoned similarly with regard to the absence of
all reference to Thomas Aquinas's writings after his commentary on
the Sentences and De veritate 29. Following 0. Lottin, Ludwig Hoedl
has suggested recently a date around 1270 for Ulrich's work, seeing in
it an awareness of the Prima pars of Thomas's Summa: " Die Wuerde
des Menschen in der scholastischen Theologie des spaeten Mittelalters,"
in De dignitate hominis: Festschrift fur C.-J. Pinto de Oliveria, ed A.
Holderegger, et al. (Freiburg i. Ue./Freiburg i. Br., 1987), 127.
In an article for the Freiburger Zeitschrift fuer Philosophie und
Theologie 32 (1985): 105-136 ("Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d'Albert
le Grand "), de Libera attempts to show that Ulrich draws on a greater
number of Albert's writings than earlier thought, including the second
book of the Summa theologiae attributed to Albert (though not without
quaestion: cf. the Prolegomena to the critical edition by D. Siedler,
Opera omnia, Ed. Col. XXXIV, Muenster, 1978, V-XVI).
The second part of this Summa, which at least in its final form refers
to the Second Council of Lyon in 1274, is alleged by the first two edi·
tors of De summo bono as a source of Ulrich's work; Mojsisch sees no
such reference in Ulrich's first book. Although Ulrich's use of the second book of the Summa attributed to Albert would suggest a date of
composition after Thomas's death, the editors-in contrast to Hoedldo not draw any consequences for possible references by Ulrich to
Thomas's middle or later works; indeed, the only alleged references to
Thomas are in Book IV and refer simply to his commentary on the
Sentences. In her article on (and edition of) De summo bono II 3, 13,
B. Faes de Mottoni explored some parallels between Ulrich's tract on
evil and the early and middle works of Thomas (Medioevo I (1975):
29-61; cf. by way of contrast: Studi medievali III (1979): 313-355).

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BOOK REVIEWS

Further parallels to Thomas's early works could he demonstrated
easily. A comparison e.g. between Ulrich's II 3, 12 and Thomas's commentary on the Sentences (I 48, l, 1-4) or especially his De veritate 23,
7-8 would reveal a detailed similarity in the formulation and success of
arguments qualifying the required conformity of divine and human will.
The far-reaching agreement does not exclude differences: E.g. Ulrich's
"Cavendum" (1, 162-168) might well be a partial reaction to De
veritate 23, 8, ad 2 (Ed. Leon. XXII 675, especially 160-170; cf. Bonaventure's commentary on the Sentences I 48, 2, duh. 1, Quaracchi I
860). By contrast, there is no apparent reason to assume that Ulrich's
elaboration of the imago-character of the will (1. 1-12) presupposes a
knowledge of the prologue and first question of ST, I-II. The important
difference of Ulrich's position on the transformation of beatified human
nature into the divine (1. 36-37) does not seem to be directed against
any particular passage from Thomas's works (e.g. ST, II-II q.19, a.11,
ad 3 and parallels) .
The new editors, alleging many borrowings from the first part of the
Summa theologiae attributed to Albert, have demonstrated some impressive parallels (cf. FZPT, op. cit., 120, where the relationship to
Albert's Summa is convincing, despite the unmentioned tie of "anthropospathos" to the passions in Albert's commentary on Isaiah, I 14;
Ed. Col. XIX, 23, 59) . In themselves, such parallels are not yet decisive for questions of priority (and authenticity) . The first part of this
Summa is thought by its editors (Ed. Col. XXXIV, l, XVII) to refer
to both Thomas's ST I (critically) and the translation of Proclus's
Elementatio theologica (positively) , both completed around 1268. As
these references seem to be the latest found in the first part of the
Summa attributed to Albert, a final date of composition around 1269
would be conceivable. If Ulrich's work is dependent on this first part
(and not the other way around), then the years between 1270 and 1272
(when Ulrich becomes provincial, presumably with less time for academics, although Bonaventure's literary production as Minister General
should be a warning not to overrate this argument) would seem a likely date for Ulrich's own De summo bono.
The second part of the "Albert" Summa (final form after 1274) is
alleged as a source in fewer and less convincing parallels. Several
allegations include these references as but one possible source among
many, less problematic citations. The concept of creatio as communicatio boni, on which the allegations at II 3, 7, 185 and 3, 8, 37 are
based, is an idea common to Albert's commentary on Dionysius (Ed.
Col. XXXVII, 1: 9, 51; 75, 22; 114, 52; 117, 10. 17; 164, 74; 169,
32, etc.) and neoplatonism as a whole. In Albert's De bono (Ed. CoL
XXVIII, 12, 31), the good is described by the same paired "diffusivum

BOOK REVIEWS

551

et communicativum " as in Ulrich, II 3, 8, 36s.: " Diffunderet et com·
municaret bonum." Ulrich did not need to wait until after 1274 for his
formulation, as can he shown by citations of this neo-Platonic axiom
in several texts undoubtedly prior to the 1270's: e.g. in Thomas's own
commentary on Dionysius, IV, lect. IX (Marietti, Nr. 409), where sev·
eral elements present in Ulrich's passage are to he found again: the
Dionysian quotation on divine love, the paired concepts " difjundere et
communicare," and the inference of the limitations imposed on divine
generosity by the limited receptivity of the creature. Admittedly, the
source of Ulrich's views on pseudo-Aristotelian texts needs further consideration (IV 1, 8, 57s.). The coming volumes are likely to shed new
light on the questions of date and sources. The later the date, the more
likely the references and reaction to Thomas's works.
The question of the relationship between these two Dominicans is of
interest not only because they possibly studied together at Cologne under Albert {1248-52, although the evidence is weaker for Ulrich), but
because the later German Dominican School from Ulrich onwards developed its reception of Albert in partial opposition to the views of
Thomas. The translation of Proclus's works and the "Averroist" con·
troversies of the 1270s would lead especially in the years after Ulrich's
death to an ever sharper accentuation of the divergent directions of
Dominican theology, although basic differences surely were clear already by the 1260s. For example, Ulrich's thesis that the" notitia Dei"
is "per se nota," naturally inserted into the possible intellect " ... in
habitu lucis intellectus agentis, quae est Dei similitudo" (I 1, 3, 41
[pg. 10]), could he directed against Thomas even before his ST. In
their joint introduction to I, 1 (especially XV-XXII), Mojsisch and
de Libera make no mention of Ulrich's comments on the intellectus
agens, possibly because of their attempt to criticize Ulrich from the
alleged standpoint of Theodoric and Eckhart, whom they interpret
along lines worked out by K. Flasch as propagating a purely rational,
philosophical theology free of all revelation and mysticism. While the
discussion of this interpretation is by no means concluded, it is clear
already that Ulrich did belong to a phase of the Albert School, when
the problematic which was to follow the reception of Proclus and
Averroes was less defined. In contrast to this differentiation among
Albert's disciples, recent studies on the attitude of the Albert School as
a whole toward Thomas have tended occasionally to a certain anti·
thetical simplification, neglecting e.g. the issues of the " Correctoria "
controversies and the reaction of neo-Augustinians to Thomas's writ·
ings; there have yet to be articulated in any detail the differences in
the attitudes of Albert's disciples toward Thomas and toward a theology
more singularly conscious of salvific history. Nonetheless, the fre-

BOOK REVIEWS

quent opposition of the German disciples of Albert to Thomas's thought
is indisputable in itself and helpful in defining the " novum " of
Thomas's theology. This does not rule out certain commonalities in
method, sources, and content, some of which can he seen in the treatment of the theodicy problem in De summo bono II, as is clear e.g.
in Josef Goergen's Des hl. Albert Lehre van der goettlichen Vorsehung
und dem Fatum, unter besonderer Beruecksichtigung der Vorsehungsund Schicksalslehre des Ulrich von Strassburg (Vechta, 1932), 115.
This title would he a helpful addition to the bibliography provided by
de Libera on pg. XLI-XLHI, along with W. Huebener: "Malum auget
decorem in universo. Die kosmologische Integration des Boesen in der
Hochscholastik," in Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Bd. 11, ed. A. Zimmermann (New York/Berlin, 1977), 1-26. Together with the earlier volumes of the Corpus, the edition of De summa bona provides the most
significant contribution of recent years towards understanding the rich
diversity of Dominican theology in the thirteenth and fourteenth
centuries.
RICHARD SCHENK, O.P.
Munich, Germany

Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations. By THOMAS SHEEHAN.
Series in Continental Thought, Vol. 9. Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1987. Pp. xii
320. $24.95.

+

Thomas Sheehan's work is without doubt the most sophisticated and
detailed analysis in any language to date of Rahner's philosophical
stance as expounded in his Spirit in the World ( = SW) . The author
has also put to good use his exceptional knowledge of Heidegger, whom
Rahner acknowledged as his "master" and "teacher" (see Preface,
p. XI), focusing on Rahner's debts to and arguments against the
thought of the philosopher of Freiburg.
The hooks is neatly divided in two parts. The first part traces the
foundations of SW in the works of Immanuel Kant, Pierre Rousselot,
Joseph Marechal, and Martin Heidegger (Chapters I to III). The second part is a chapter-by-chapter critical commentary of SW's three
parts. Chapter IV, " The Problematic of ' Being' in Rahner," dis·
cusses SW's Part II, l; Chapter V, "Towards Spirit in the World,"
SW's Part I; Chapter VI, Bivalence as Abstraction," SW's Part II,
3 (on abstraction); Chapter VII," Bivalence as Conversion," SW's Part
II, 2 (on sensibility) and Part II, 4 (on conversion) ; and the last
chapter explores the possibility of metaphysics from Rahner's and
Heidegger's standpoints (SW's Part III).

BOOK REVIEWS

553

The heart 0£ the work is located in Chapter VI (on the agent in·
tellect as the power 0£ abstraction) and in Chapter VII (on the possible
intellect as the power 0£ conversion to the phantasm or sensibility as
presence to the world). Central to Rahner's transcendental anthro·
pology, in Sheehan's estimation, is the view that the human person is
a " bivalent " and " kinetic " being, that is, a being intrinsically structured by a self-unifying dual movement, the one 0£ self-transcendence
toward the asymptotically recessive telos, i.e. Absolute Being (Aristotle's energeia or entelecheia) and the other 0£ self-abandonment and
essential openness to the world or matter. In epistemological terms, the
first movement is interpreted as the act of abstraction, that is, 0£
" liberation " 0£ the universality or repeatability of the form in the particular instances, of being-present-to-oneself (self-presence), of anticipating-but-never-grasping the Absolute Being ( V orgriff or excessus).
The second movement is interpreted as the act of returning to the phantasm, of being-absent-from-oneself (self-absence) both in sensibility (or
the " cognitive sense") and in the conversio ad phantasma.
Sheehan underscores repeatedly the unity of these two movements in
Rahner's anthropology. They are not two separate or successive movements; rather, the human person's self-presence intrinsically involves
presence-to-other (self-absence) and vice versa. In Sheehan's words,
£or Rahner humans are" press-ab-sence" (p. 7) (Incidentally, £or the
sake 0£ orthography, is it not better to write " pre-ab-sence "? )
Sheehan speaks for all when he confesses that reading SW gave him
an occasional feeling of riding a bicycle through sand dunes. His book,
though not easy reading itself (the text is replete with Greek, Latin,
German, and other foreign language terms), with its pellucid clarity,
its extensive scholarship, and its elegant style, provides a much-appreciated help to those desiring an in-depth understanding of Rahner's
philosophy. H the sand dunes 0£ Rahner's thought are not leveled, at
least students are furnished with a powerfully motored all-terrain vehicle, and not a bicycle, to climb them.
Of the many virtues of this book I would like to single out the following for special commendation. First, it offers an excellent background to Rahner's philosophical thought, in particular its roots in the
writings of Joseph Marechal and of the lesser known Pierre Rousselot.
Secondly, it provides a detailed, and in my judgment, accurate assess·
ment 0£ Rahner's indebtedness to Heidegger. Sheehan has convincingly shown how Rahner in his 1940 article on Heidegger ("Introduction
au concept de philosophie existentiale chez Heidegger") and in the
1941 edition of Horer des Wortes has misunderstood Heidegger's notions 0£ das Sein and das Nichts. Rahner, Sheehan correctly holds, still
remained in the "ousiological" tradition (see pp. 146-155), even

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though he had carried out a radical interpretation of Thomas Aquinas's
esse in his transcendental turn. Thus, Sheehan has brilliantly shown
both Rahner's indebtedness to Heidegger (especially his notion of the
human person as a bivalent and kinetic being; note the parallels between Rahner's cogitative sense and Heidegger's Temporalitiit, between
Rahner's agent intellect and Heidegger's Existentialitiit, between Rahner's possible intellect and Heidegger's Faktizitiit) and Rahner's profound differences from Heidegger, especially in his understanding of
being (see pp. 110-116; 280-291). Finally, Sheehan has provided the
clearest exposition to date on Rahner's theory of " inner-worldly efficient causality " (pp. 244-255) .
The book would have been much more helpful if an index of topics
and a bibliography had been provided. There are two omissions. On
p. 135, the last line should read: " Chapter VIII concludes the study
by laying out the critical difference between Rahner's effort to re-establish the science of metaphysics on a transcendental base and Heidegger's
attempt to overcome metaphysics." On p. 186, line 19: "In whatever
way we read the content of predicate (Aquinas: quiddities) ." There
are also a number of minor misprints. Strange that this book was published only in 1987, even though the research was apparently completed
before 1982 (see p. 171, note 62). But its many assets will make
Sheehan's work a permanent feature among the best Rahnerian studies.
PETER

c. PHAN

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

The World and Language in Wittgenstein's Philosophy. By GORDON
HUNNINGS. Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press,
1989. Pp. xiv
266. $34.50.

+

This book will not find a place among the distinguished commentaries
on Wittgenstein's work. Aiming to cover the full sweep of that work,
Hunnings devotes three of his eight chapters to the Tractatus, one to
the" Notes on Logical Form" (1929) and Philosophical Grammar, one
to the transitional material of The Blue and Brown Books, one to writings and lectures on the philosophy of mathematics, and just two to
the central themes of the later philosophy. Indeed, of the book's 256
pages of text, 193 are spent before the reader finds himself dealing with
Philosophical Investigations. So there is a problem of balance. For a
book of this size and scope striving to cover the whole of Wittgenstein's

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555

thought on representation and grammar, there is too much exposition
of transitional detail and too little attention to the difficult but fertile
work at the heart of the mature later Wittgenstein.
There are now many fine expository studies of Wittgenstein's work.
This is not to say that all important matters of interpretation are settled.
Indeed, there are significant areas of rival interpretation and there are
varying assessments of the adequacy of Wittgenstein's views. There is
contention over the degree to which his work is assimilable to the philosophical tradition. These facts suggest, not that there is no profit in
further investigation of his work, but that new studies-particularly
ones attempting a comprehensive survey of Wittgenstein's work from
the Notebooks to On Certainty-should situate themselves in a well
cultivated terrain of commentary and interpretation. But Hunning's
work does little to inform prospective readers of the extent to which
scholarly study of Wittgenstein's work has advanced. Eschewing a
bibliography, Hunnings makes it somewhat difficult for the reader to
discern his command of the scholarship. In construing the Tractatus he
relies on Anscombe, Stenius, Griffin, and Black-all standard sources.
But in dealing with the later philosophy and the much-debated transitional period between Wittgenstein's resumption of philosophical work
in the late 1920's and the period of the Investigations, Hunnings simply
does not scratch the surface of the huge body of secondary writing
available to serious students of Wittgenstein's work. It would be pointless to list the important commentators whose works are ignored; suffice
to say that Hunnings's book is apparently unassisted by a full scholarly
command of the available literature. In this regard it suffers by comparison with A. C. Grayling's Wittgenstein in the Oxford University
Press Past Masters series. Grayling's treatment of Wittgenstein's work,
much briefer than Hunnings's, is both clearer and more fully informed
by the relevant scholarship.
Judging by the allocations of attention in his text, one can conclude
that Hunnings finds the early Wittgenstein more philosophically interesting than the later, or perhaps more amenable to expository treatment. His opening chapters on the ontology of the Tractatus, on language, and on the picture theory of meaning, offer a workmanlike but
uninspiring survey of that book. Readers interested in a basic account
of the philosophy of logical atomism in its application to language and
the world will not be seriously misled by Hunnings's account of the
Tractatus. These early chapters may, indeed, be the most useful portion of the hook, employing as they do a fairly substantial scholarly
bibliography and delving relatively deeply into the issues of the
Tractatus.
For example, readers of Hunnings will gain a far clearer vision of

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Wittgenstein's early work than that afforded by a recent publication by
the same university press, Richard McDonough's The Argument of the
Tractatus. In contrast to McDonough's attempt to impose an alien
mentalism on that work, Hunnings rightly states of the pictorial relation between propositions and facts, " that this relation is construed in
spatial rather than, say, mental terms tells us something important
about Wittgenstein's concept of the nature of the relationship, and the
directness of the link, between language and the world" (49). What
that relation tells us is that Wittgenstein from beginning to end saw
that the modern tradition's vocabulary of mentality is profoundly problematic. Hunnings, to his credit, sees this in his work and displays that
insight.
In his treatment of the later Wittgenstein, Hunnings focuses on the
concept of grammatical investigation, listing two pages worth of instances that count as investigating grammar. (There are several such
lists in the book.) His somewhat rambling, discursive account is, in
the main, standard fare. Of the commonplace comparison of Wittgenstein with Kant he writes: " The transmutation of the Kantian attributes
of the human psyche to the grammar of our language is one of Wittgenstein's greatest achievements. On the other hand, a consequence of this
transmutation is that these problems lose their distinctive character of
depth, persistence, and universality which are themselves only grammatical illusions" (202). This passage is typical of Hunnings's text.
It contains an allusion to, but does not work out, a frequently made
comparison of Wittgenstein and Kant. In it Hunnings rightly notes
the importance of Wittgenstein's move and the profound change it
works on the issues mentioned. But by ending his treatment of the
topic with a reference to " grammatical illusions,'' Hunnings creates an
unspecified negative judgment without explaining what might be entailed by this phrase. He goes on to discuss Wittgenstein's inquiry into
rule-following, the use of the" picture analogy," the sense of the famous
" meaning is use " dictum and the problems surrounding sense data,
mental images, and inner states. Readers of Hunnings can glean a
reasonably clear grasp of the range of issues handled by Wittgenstein
and some notion of the manner of the handling. They will not, however, get a precise characterization of those issues or, really, an expert
account of what Wittgenstein does in his discussion of them. Hunnings's
treatment of the philosopher's sometimes intricate handling of pain,
pain-behavior, and the language of pain is more precise and more
sophisticated. He sees clearly that Wittgenstein is not a behaviorist and
gives a good expository account of those topics.
Hunnings's closing chapter, "Grammar and the World," is a loosely
structured scanning of the continuities between the early and later

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557

work. He provides a rather interesting chart of " Features of Wittgenstein's Thought" that attempts a schematic comparison. Unfortunately,
the perspective of this chapter, like much of the book, is distorted by a
misconception of Wittgenstein's aim in practicing philosophy, a mis·
conception epitomized in this remark: " If one had to sum up in a single
sentence the point of Wittgenstein's philosophy it could be expressed as
an investigation of the grammar of representation. Reality as mirrored
in language was an obsessive concern throughout his life" (242). The
author of these sentences has not grasped the significance of the fact
that-as he himself states in this chapter-philosophy in Wittgenstein's
view aims at the dissolution of conceptual confusions, not at the construction of a picture of reality, and representation is only one among
very many uses to which language is put.
In his final chapter Hunnings attempts to hoist Wittgenstein on his
own petard by charging that the concept of grammar in the later work
is an illicit philosophical generality. He calls it "another chapter in
the metaphysics of sense" (24.9) and writes that Wittgenstein's assertion " that (his) philosophy only demolishes houses of cards and in no
way interferes with language but leaves everything as it is, is at best
tendentious and at worst nonsense (250) ." He concludes this criticism
by alluding to Wittgenstein's views as themselves "houses of cards."
Now Hunnings is onto something here. There are unresolved problems
in Wittgenstein's conceptions of (a) the aims of philosophy, (b) the
character of the problems confronted in philosophical work, and ( c)
the nature of philosophical work itself, particularly the standpoint occupied by the philosopher. But the issues are more complex-and in
fact more interesting-than is suggested by Hunnings's attempt at quick
disposal through a charge of over-generality in the concept of grammar.
Finally, this closing chapter also contains a superficial consideration of
the treatment of "to know" from On Certainty. It has, however, no
concluding summary. There is no wrap-up. Just as the hook begins
without introductory material, so it ends abruptly, leaving the reader
puzzled on a fundamental point. If Wittgenstein's work is as fatally
flawed as Hunnings argues, why is it worth our attention? Or, to reverse the presumption, if Wittgenstein's work genuinely is worth our
attention, how can we discover what is worthwhile in it while also recognizing and understanding the problems in it? In this hook Hunnings
has managed to gesture toward some of the problems. But an answer to
the fundamental question requires a more sophisticated treatment of
that work than Hunnings has provided.
The publishers have appended a note to the author's preface indicating that Gordon Hunnings died in April, 1986, before the publication
of this book. I celebrate the dedication to philosophical inquiry that

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completion c;if this work represents. I trust that the best tribute to the
inquiry he so evidently valued is a straightforward assessment of his
text.
JOHN CHURCHILL
Hendrix College
Conway, Arkansas

Theology and Politics. By DUNCAN B. FORRESTER. Signposts in The·
ology Series. New York: Basil Blackwell, 1982. Pp. 182. $39.95
(cloth); $14.95 (paper).
Theology and Politics offers two things: a map of the" perennial possibilities" (p. 20) open to Christian political theology and a sym.·
pathetic introduction to liberation theology. In the first case, the map
obscures as often as it guides; in the second, readers are led down an
already well-trodden path.
In chapters 1-2, Duncan B. Forrester (professor of Christian ethics
and practical theology at New College, University of Edinburgh) de·
scribes a "spectrum " of three Christian political theologies established
in Graeco-Roman times and traces their recurrence down to the present. One political theology is represented by Tertullian, who claimed
" there is nothing more alien " to Christians " than politics " and thus
dissuaded them from taking direct " responsibility for power " (p. 20) •
Instead, they should challenge political society by witnessing to an " alternative way of ordering life" (p. 21). During the Reformation, this
approach resurfaced in the Anabaptist movement.
At the other end of the spectrum is Eusebianism, a political theology
advocating church-state complementarity. Its author, Eusebius of Caesarea, was an " apologist for imperial rule and the propagator of a
Christian civil religion " during the Constantinian era. He saw " the
earthly role of the emperor as a reflection of, and a kind of participation in, the kingly omnipotence of God himself" (p. 23) . This approach
predominated in medieval Christendom and recurred, in varying guises,
during the Reformation. Luther advanced Eusebianism by default in
his emphasis on individual justification by faith and the "two kingdoms" theory, wherein states are viewed as instruments of God's
"left hand." His " depoliticizing" of Christian faith encouraged political passivity and uncritical obedience to state authority (p. 32).
Calvinism advanced Eusebianism from the opposite direction. Its
"theocratic emphases " absorbed the state into the church, blurring the
"degree of autonomy" necessary for the political order (p. 34).

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559

" Somewhere around the centre" is Augustine's political theology.
On one hand, Augustine felt-against Tertullian-that the church had
a "responsibility to defend peace and justice." On the other hand,
he taught-against Eusebius-" that the Roman empire was, and always had been, corrupt." Thus, Augustine " affirms the theological significance of the political order " but " refuses to accord more than a
heavily qualified endorsement to any temporal political order whatever "
(pp. 24-25). This is the view Forrester endorses and under which he
begins his discussion of liberation theology.
Forrester offers a routine treatment of liberation theology in chapters
3-6. In its deliberate " engagement " with the poor, liberation theology
criticizes the comparatively abstract political theology of Metz and Moltmann (p. 60). In its conviction that the poor "have privileged access
to the teaching of the Bible," liberation theology suggests that the social
context of Western biblical scholars skews their scriptural interpreta·
tion (p. 96). By highlighting the radicalism of the historical Jesus,
liberation theology challenges the "Domesticated Christ" of North
American Christianity (p. 120) . By viewing the church as a base community of the "poor, powerless, and oppressed," liberation theology exposes how the institutional church is " deeply implicated in capitalist
society" (p. 136).
In the last chapter, Forrester summarizes the relationship between
theology and politics by linking his three political theologies with those
discussed in the 1985 South African Kairos Document. In this way, the
"state theology" identified by the Kairos theologians (racist ideology
of the South African government) is Eusehianism, "church theology"
(reformist ideology of the mainline churches) is Tertullianism, and
"prophetic theology" (radical ideology of liberation theology) is
Augustinianism.
But two things are wrong here. The reformist struggle of mainline
feeble-is not identical to the
churches against apartheid-however
Tertullian-Anabaptist approach as Forrester earlier defined it. The
former challenges the state through public discourse; the latter witnesses
to the state through a counter-cultural lifestyle. Second, insufficient
evidence is given for the claim that contemporary prophetic theology
reflects the political theology of Augustine.
Both problems stem from Forrester's initial assumptions. Suggesting
medieval Christianity reflected no more than a Eusebian understanding
of political theology misses not only the critical differences between
Eastern and Western church-state relations but also the contribution of
Thomas Aquinas. Indeed, Aquinas's thought (never discussed in the
text) may represent a better "middle position" on the spectrum of
Christian political theologies than Augustine's. If Robert L. Holmes's

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recent discussion of Christian political theology in On War and Morality is correct, 1) Augustine was more Eusebian than we have generally thought, and 2) Luther was possibly his best exegete. Regarding
Forrester's remaining political option, his leapfrogging from Tertullian
to the Anabaptists misses the political theology of Western monasticism,
which produced not only the witnessing cloister but also a brand of
church-state theory (e.g. Gregory VII and Leo IX) quite unlike East·
ern Eusebianism.
In short, Forrester's spectrum obscures more than it clarifies; the
range of qualitatively distinct Christian political theologies is simply
wider than he suggests . And while one appreciates a clear discussion
of liberation theology, new paths to understanding are not opened.
MICHAEL

J. SCHUCK

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

The Grammar of the Heart: New Essays in Moral Philosophy and
Theology. Edited by RICHARD H. BELL. San Francisco: Harper
and Row, 1988. Pg. 259
xxviii. $24.95.

+

Grammar tells us what kind of a thing something is, and this set of
essays addresses what Paul Holmer calls the " grammar of faith." This
grammar has been traditionally seen, however, in two markedly different ways: as one essay puts the contrast, a grammar of ' rational belief '
as opposed to a "grammar appropriate to affairs of the heart" (Hust·
wit, 97). It is the second of these, the character of the grammar of the
'heart,' which these essays as a whole explore, and the sub-title of the
1987 symposium in honor of Holmer from which they are drawn" Thinking with Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein "-indicates the two
main avenues of exploration. Through these, we are told in the introduction, the authors intend to shift the concern of philosophy of religion
and theology from questions of " epistemic credentials " to a construe·
tive re-valuation of our age-an age which, arguably at least, is still
as much " an age without culture " as it was when Wittgenstein first
made the complaint.
The hook consists of two parts, and each part is introduced by an
illustrative selection from Holmer's writings on faith and morality, then
followed by a corresponding set of six original essays. The first set of
essays, the editor tells us, are " more philosophical," analyzing "the
grammar of our modern culture and of religious practices in general,"

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561

while the second six are devoted to analyses of specifically moral and
Christian concepts. Although the separation of the two may initially
seem an artificial one, precisely against the " spirit of both Wittgenstein
and Kierkegaard" which the essays are said to exemplify, it does in
fact often result in the kind of overlap and repetition which are quite
fruitful-for example, as in the mutually illuminating correspondence
between the constructive philosophical suggestions about metaphor in
the first part (Whittaker) and the presentation of the specifically Kierkegaardian understanding of the metaphorical ' language of love ' in the
second part (Walsh).
The collection as a whole is indeed in the spirit of Wittgenstein and
Kierkegaard by virtue of its imaginative diversity of perspective. Although there is the predictable (and admittedly useful) exploration of
the ' grammar of the heart ' in terms of the standardly Kierkegaardian
categories of " risk, passion, paradox, and duty " (95) , there are also
proposals which are both unexpected and exciting. A glance at a few
of these will reveal something of the particular character and value of
this collection.
The centerpiece of the first part is the explicit proposal in two of
the essays of an understanding of the grammar of the 'heart ' in which
the role and relevance of the private (personal, individualistic) is challenged and rethought in light of the public (social interaction and practice) . The ' heart ' at issue is found at the heart of community; the
grammar of the ' heart ' is a grammar of the activities of a life in common, rather than of privatized inwardness or interiority. Glehe-Mcf>ller,
for example, examines the relation between two views of religion in
Wittgenstein's writings-a first-person (Kierkegaardian) type of religion and a sociological view of religion as a shared phenomenon-arguing that, in the end, despite an explicit adherence to the former throughout his writings, Wittgenstein's intellectual commitments (especially his
understanding of rule-governed practice) imply the dependence of the
personal on the shared.
This challenge to traditional public/private dualisms is elegantly
played out in the exciting essay by Rowan Williams in terms of the
tension between the agenda of doubt and decoding (Freud, Ricoeur)
and the agenda of a " suspicion of suspicion " (Wittgenstein and Bon·
hoe:ffer). The question is how to " reconcile the imperative of decoding with a recognition of the profundity of surfaces" (37)-the question, that is, is how to do justice to limits, the concrete, the particular.
Williams imaginatively suggests the challenge of Wittgenstein and Bonhoe:ffer to those who are" obstinately discontented with finitude" (40)
and desperately seek to uncover" what is discreditably secret" (41)" what if the truth is that the interior self is in flight from the ' victory

BOOK REVIEWS

already achieved ' of the visible person? " (43) . The conclusion to be
drawn, however, is not a naive rejection of interpretation (for decep·
tion and self-deception are always possible); the irony goes deep, for
given our fragmentedness, "we must be suspicious equally of the un·
truthfulness of what is offered us and of the untruthfulness of our own
refusal of it (for we have no language or consciousness that has not
been given us) " (46) . The rejection of the quest for an " unsullied
interiority " or " impossible transparency " in favor of a " properly
public life" is not, therefore, the rejection of all interiority, and the
essay concludes with some suggestions toward an understanding of
" inner life " which is neither naive immediacy nor the result of de·
coding.
The analysis by Whittaker of the shared denial by Wittgenstein and
Kierkegaard that Christianity is a " doctrine " could also be seen as
indirectly addressing the public/private issue. His view of beliefs as
" construals " challenges such a dichotomy: they are " recognizably
metaphorical" (72), yet they are claims put forth and held as "true"
because they are capable of being " supported and communicated
through a process of rational persuasion " ( 69) in terms of being
"capacitating enough to be reasonably held" (72). Such a view at
the same time challenges a simplistic understanding of ' heart ' as con·
trasted with ' head ' since it intends to locate the ' grammar of the
heart ' within a cognitivist account of religious clamis.
Such a compatibility of ' heart ' and cognitivist orientation is also
argued for from a very different direction in Sherry's analysis of the
specific concept of 'inspiration' in the second part of the book. Sensi·
tive to Wittgenstein's admonitions against essentialism, one-sided diets
(of examples) , and picture-thinking about ' mental processes,' Sherry
urges a widening of the concept of inspiration, developing the very
suggestive analogy between religious inspiration and ' moral imagina·
tion.' Religious inspiration, delivered from its bondage to narrow
models of Biblical inspiration, is paralleled with imaginative extensions
of moral and emotional range and with the enhancement of capacity ex·
emplified in aesthetic creativity and intellectual insight (177). Sherry's
essay also illustrates the interweaving of themes between essays which
is apparent in retrospect throughout the book-that is, such ' heart '
as Sherry construes as imaginative perception or vision may well be
taken as an elaboration of suggestions in the earlier discussion by Mason
of the status of moral principles in terms of a Wittgensteinian under·
standing of the way we learn empirical judgments and of the role of
rules in our practices.
Still another kind of approach to the ' grammar of the heart ' is exemplified in Walsh's construal of it in terms of a 'grammar of love.'

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563

While it may seem a commonplace that the ' heart ' is a metaphor for
inwardness, passion, and subjectivity, Walsh offers a fruitful unpacking of that metaphor by focusing on Kierkegaard's characterization,
in W arks of Love, of the way in which love not only proceeds from
but also "forms the heart" (234). While it may seem obvious that
' heart ' and love are tied, there has been little, she suggests, in the way
of a theology of love comparable to developments of theologies of hope,
play, etc. In illuminating detail she considers the grammar of love in
terms of selfishness, the other as neighbor, the relevance of special relations, and the tension between love as commanded and love as spontaneous. Acknowledging weaknesses in Kierkegaard's account (especially with respect to ambivalence about reciprocity and special relations) , Walsh nevertheless argues that his account offers resources for
moving beyond a " Sartrean conflict model of human relations " as well
as beyond a " patriarchal framework of relations between the sexes "
(249).
This collection does not entirely escape the problems usually attending symposium-based collections-namely,
unevenness both in quality
and in direct bearing on the development of the theme-but it suffers
from them less than most. It succeeds, moreover, in the more important
respect of forcing a rethinking of the issues addressed, and it does this
in various ways. Sometimes the challenge lies embodied within the
essays, as when some of the essays assume an opposition between a
grammar of ' rationality ' and that of the ' heart ' while others seek to
enrich one or the other side so as to diminish the contrast. Moreover,
in addition to the simply appreciative examinations of Kierkegaard's
thought (either alone or in comparison with Wittgenstein's), and the
explicitly critical (yet constructive) assessments of his thought, some
of the essays can be read as effectively, though not explicitly, offering
a Wittgensteinian corrective to Kierkegaard. A critique of Kierkegaard's emphasis on transparency (both in Judge William and AntiClimacus), for example, seems implied in William's general proposal
and his endorsement of Stanley CaveU's criticism of the requirement of
transparency (42). In this way it can be seen as indirectly offering a
Wittgensteinian corrective, de-privatizing a Kierkegaardian understanding of inwardness. Such an essay, however, serves as an indirect
illustration of how appreciation of Wittgensteinian insights can allow
Judge William's
one to develop the potential in Kierkegaardian insights.
claim, for example, that " He who cannot reveal himself cannot love,"
could be read in line with William's own view of our task (at least in
part) as lessening our " obscurity " to ourselves through skills learned
and nourishment given ( 50), thus offering a non-privatized view of
transparency. Hence it points the way to what could he a fruitful and

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illuminating re-examination of the category of inwardness in Kierkegaard's writings. The majority of the essays in the hook are similarly
suggestive and will prove rewarding and interesting reading-they echo
the aim and gift, share by Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard, of "making
their readers thinkers" (xvi).
M. JAMIE FERREIRA
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, Virginia

Let the Future Come. By WILFRED DESAN. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1987. Pp. 152. $9.95 (paper).
Toward a lust Social Order. By DEREK L. PHILLIPS. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1986. Pp. 434. $12.50.
After several decades of doldrum thinking, social ethics, i.e., personal
and political ethics done on the same canvas, is undergoing a welcome
renewal. Perhaps spurred by the growing awareness of the massive
problems of our tiny planet, thinkers from diverse areas are beginning
to offer what the social sciences call "grand theory." Both Desan and
Phillips make valuable contributions to this project and represent the
best levels of refleotion from the teleological and deontological perspectives respectively. Desan's essay is the final volume of three, hut may
be read independently of the earlier studies, discussed by this reviewer
in 1973 in The Thomist (Vol. 37, pp. 249-255). If Desan has a core
concept for his thinking it is planetary peace and the human individual
as gardener and guardian of this admittedly future state of affairs.
Phillips, critically inheriting the Anglo-American rights tradition,
focuses on the person, not the planet, on the distinctiveness of the part,
not on Desan's projeotion of a whole humanum composed of parts (each
a member of the human community yet only a member) . The metaphysical background here, then, is the whole-of-parts versus parts·of-awhole dialectic. Read together the two works would truly stimulate a
graduate ethics seminar, for we see the renewal of ethical ,thinking
against some classical ontological themes.
For Desan, the person is homo custos, self-aware becoming otheraware; for Phillips, the person is the source and enactor of rights. He
offers heavy criticism of the virtue/community school's orientation towards the common good of society, with subsidiary private rights located within that context. This is the weakest part of his massive survey of recent ethics. Phillips simply cannot see the reality of human
community, which is exactly what Desan is determined to project as

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565

our only possible future. Desan's combination of Thomism and Hegel
stands to the far side of Phillips's Lockean stress on private rights as
the base criterion for any future just public order. We will look first
at Desan's final effort to summarize a notion of " planetary " existence
that will be valid both individually and communally and then turn to
Phillips's detailed, Rawls-like approach.
Desan's argument against the primacy of the individual over the
world community was carefully nuanced in his two earlier volumes; he
has no intention of denigrating the person in order to celebrate the
planet, and he is no partisan of the " deep ecology " effort to elevate
nature above the sub-category human nature. His planet is social and
political, a cosmic existent dependent upon specifically human activitynot individual activity at either the personal or national levels but activity at the level of the total earth population. He is not so much detailing yet another agenda for a New World Order as he is striving to
raise modern individualized consciousness to a height where the reality
of interdependency is rationally undeniable. Desan's appreciative critique of Husserl's individualized consciousness in his first volume, A
Noetic Prelude to a United World, displayed the plight of personalized
consciousness as against planetary awareness. In this final panel of his
triptych, he synthesizes that critique: "Where the individual Observer
is the magister, there are as many worlds as there are magistri." This
privatized existence is not to be denied but rather seen for what it is:
a limit instead of a secure startpoint for either ethical or epistemological
theory.
His second volume stressed that our very awareness of this limitation gives rise, perhaps in a Hegelian dialectic, to potential for participation in global existence. To resist this cooperative consciousness
is to favor isolated determination of one's perspective for oneself. To
open the border of private and sub-group consciousness and the prioritizing based upon these structures, Desan claims in his final volume,
is to foster the new virtue needed for the future, what Nietzsche styled
Fernstenliebe, or love of the distant. This virtue, instead of the classic
justice of the traditional polis, will be the mark of the emerging World
Citizen. Gone will be the autonomy and self-sufficiency at both epistemic and ethical levels that confined Cartesian man. Here now at the
crescendo of his three volumes, Desan offers a profound alternative to
the so-called anti-humanism of Derrida and the post-structuralists, who
demand the West's obsession with the Subject cease. Desan calls for a
self that rises knowingly from its uniqueness, from what he describes
as the "angularity" of human vision in individuals and nation-states,
to a height where the Cartesian self is suspended, or bracketed in a semiHusserlian sense. The vision now is not self-interest, personal rights,

566

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or the accident of enculturation; it is what humanity could he in the
future. This vision is, ultimately, :the classic common good, detached
from personal reduction to the good-for-me or for-us, where the " us "
stands for any group less than the human community. Hence the self
loses a viewpoint as such: there is a view of future humanity hut also
a continual effort to detach this from a set perspective or point of vision.
On this account, otherness defines selfness and we become a people
living to belong, instead of living for belongings, rights, or privileges
over others.
Desan's thinking will strike some as a Hegelian dissolution of human
individuality in favor of a vague, future, planetary polis. His primary
virtue is awareness of self-limitation, a humility to replace the arrogance
of hubris. He cannot profile this new World Citizen for us, hut his
effort over the past quarter-century surely should assist in curtailing the
role of self and national interest in social and political theory. Rather
than assign us to watch out for our own interests or those of the
groups to which we each must belong, Desan calls for homo custos, a
humanity in which each one serves as guard for the others' interest
instead of defender of one's own. It is a profoundly religious vision
rooted in love of neighbor rather than rare recognition of the neigh·
hor's equality with the individual.
Phillips has great difficulty with the notion of human community at
this level because he sees the cultural relativity of every less-than·
global human grouping. What is needed, he claims, is a deontology,
not a custodial democracy. Ethics must begin with concrete situations
demanding principles of reasonability for just resolutions. We see
again the distinction between telos·based moral reflection, whether the
end he personal virtue or common good, on the one hand and rule-based
reflection on the other. It must he granted that Phillips has moved far
from his home base in sociology, which, he points out, hesitates to allow for normative theory "as to right and wrong or the justice or injustice of a particular institutional arrangement." He has also moved
beyond that school of analytic ethics that would only treat of moral
language. With Rawls and Nozick, he has crossed into normative ethics,
and his hook ranges through most of the issues current in the ethical
revival. His goal is a " socialization for a just social order " (p. 7) .
But he does not seem to see the circularity of rt:his goal in the same light
as he sees such circularity of reasoning in Macintyre, e.g., he claims to
catch Macintyre in just such a quandary when the latter writes:
. . . the good life for man is the life spent in seeking for the good life
for man, and the virtues necessary for the seeking are those which will
enable us to understand what more and what else the good life for
man is. (p. 110)

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567

He especially reacts against Maclntyre's project of envunoning new
forms of local community where the moral life can be sustained,
"through the new dark ages which are already upon us," as Macintyre
phrases it. Yet what basically aggravates Phillips is that " while the
natural law theorists claim that there are correct moral principles, they
have never managed to provide a rational justification for a particular
set of such principles." Phillips sees his theory of a just social order
providing " a standard against which we can evaluate particular laws
and institutions from a moral standpoint independent of those laws and
institutions." (p. 327)
Here we see goal-based and rule-based theorists locked in conflict.
For the former, norms can only be projected in terms of the vision of
outcomes; for the latter, including Phillips, the norm must be rationally detachable from the situation or institution at issue, and individual
action or societal policy cannot he evaluated by reference to individual
or common good. This is the present state of affairs, and one benefit of
Phillips's book is his own version of a calculus that attempts to meet
the rule-based camp's demands. This comes, as expected, in terms of
distribution of goods and services to competing holders of right. It
would seem all this is ultimately rooted in a principle he states in passing, without realizing, perhaps, that his whole theory begins from this
interest: entitlement to rights and two conditions for action, well-being
and freedom. His theory begins here rather than with the teleologists'
search for the purpose of well-being and freedom. In the end, Phillips's
context is the Rawlsian one: projected outcomes should determine present proportionality of benefits. In this sense, the new rule-based ethics
may not be as far distant from the goal-based posture as the former's
proponents believe. There must be a vision involved, either of common
good or else peaceable division, either Desan's totum humanum or a
divisum humanum. Ultimately it is with distribution of goods, not collectivity of life, that Phillips is concerned. This is evidenced in his in·
ability to conceive of the common good as specifiable for the human
community. This said, his book must still be considered a major contribution to recent ethical theory because of the range of issues and
thinkers Phillips addresses and his willingness to offer judgments of
his own, in addition to criticism of others' opinions.
In Part One, he critiques four of the dominant theories of social
order: the classical private interest position, then situational analysis,
then the consensus and conflict approaches. Somewhat detailed treatments of the recent work of Jeffrey Alexander and Anthony Giddens
follow, which leads to the more favored deontologies of Rawls, Nozick,
and Gewirth. Although Phillips takes exception to each of these postures, he still can argue for Gewirth's rights notion against Macintyre's

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claim that this is a fairly late, i.e., Enlightenment, development. As a
result, and as indicated briefly above, he concludes:
Contrary to the arguments of Macintyre, Sullivan and Walzer, then,
normative theories cannot rest on the elaboration of social arrangements
as found in the tradition, community or society. Instead, we require the
sorts of deontological theories that aim at rationally justifying those
principles appropriate to justice in any society. ( p. 113)

The alternative, as mentioned above, is to be Gewirth's stress on two
" generic rights," well-being and freedom, and their configuration within social and political institutions. For Phillips these rights are mutually dependent, to be learned early, affirmed, and accepted by every individual. This position-that morality is learned in social interactionleads to extensive discussion of many controverted issues in Part Two,
and his treatment of these is consistently stimulating. Current theories
of moral development, specifically Kohlberg's, the complex topic of
privacy as raised by Ferdinand Schoeman, and a most valuable extended discussion of child and parent rights follows. A highlight of
the whole volume is a fine validation of the notion of moral guilt and
the distinction of this awareness from shame and from Freudian or
neurotic guilt. Phillips argues for the need of "true guilt." In view of
the present reviewer's attitude towards the author's right-based theory,
it must he said that his discussion of guilt as a form of self-disappoint·
ment, not rule violation, is a substantial contribution to the literature
and another death-knell for emotive ethics in the A. J. Ayer tradition.
Part Three <takes up the current debate between legal theories, spe·
cifically the natural law tradition represented by Fuller mainly, legal
realism in its classic Holmesian version and in the newer versions of
Frankfort School derivation, and Kelsen and Hart's legal positivism.
But what really concerns Phillips is Dworkin's so-called " liberal
theory " and its conclusion that, although there is a legally correct solution to any "hard case " situation, that answer may not he morally
right. This autonomy of the legal from the moral order is unacceptable
to Phillips, who seeks to confirm the former by means of the latter and
finds his hoped-for "rational justification" outside or apart from the
versions of this offered by the four current theories. To this end,
Phillips offers his version of Gewirth's Principle of Generic Consistency;
" Act in accord with the generic rights of your recipients as well as of
yourself," which is his foundation for the just social order. This state
of affairs will he one in which " all people's actions are regulated by
recognition and respect for everyone's rights to freedom and well-being
and by the institutions to which those generic rights give rise" (p. 315).
In this order, all citizens will (must?) first recognize and then "identify freely and rationally with its institutional arrangements and collec·

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569

tive aspirations." Here the legal system would at last he "rationally
grounded and will impose on everyone an obligation to comply with
its dictates." In this context, Phillips cites with approval George Herbert Mead's vision of a commonwealth "in which each individual
would carry out in himself the response that he calls out in the community."
Phillips takes Gewirth's " weak " version of a Kantian ethic and
makes it into a " strong " version of the same. We see this at the crucial point when, after citing Gewirth's modified position, Phillips drives
over the qualifications to reach his own goal line. The context, as might
he expected, is the root issue for rule-based ethics, the relationship between morality and lawfulness. First let us hear the Gewirth weak ver·
sion, and then the Phillips strong reconstruction. In his 1978 Reason
and Morality, Gewirth is discussing the traditional bete noir of the
rule-based school, the relation of morality and lawfulness:
The basis of the obligation to obey the law, then, is not simply that it is
the law but rather that the law is instrumentally justified by the PGC.
Hence, indirectly, the obligation to obey the law is a rational obligation,
in that to violate the law is to contradict oneself. (p. 300)

But Phillips's interpretation of this position is plainly much stronger:
In other words, it is a rational obligation to obey the law when it can
be morally justified in terms of protecting everyone's rights to freedom
and well-being. There is, then, no rational obligation to obey the law
when it cannot be morally justified in such a manner. In short, there
is no moral obligation to obey unjust laws. (p. 319)

Here we have what Phillips holds to be a detached rational basis, superior to the norm of either personal virtue or common good, upon
which to justify a social order. While Gewirth's basis for deciding to
obey rather than contradict is clearly Kantian and subjective, Phillips
is reaching for some universal norm of rationality whereby all will
recognize the generic rights of all. In this reviewer's opinion, Phillips
has not found such a norm of reason, nor is there one to be found
apart from natural individual arete projected outwards as the necessary
arete of the human society. As mentioned, sociologist Phillips finds notions of universal human nature and consequent projections of a universal human good faulty because of the diversity of human societies.
Yet in his model, each individual is empowered by reason to determine,
not the ideals of personal and common virtue, but rather generic rights
as actualized or violated in specific situations, and not merely one's
own but those of "everyone."
The problem here is enlarged in Part Four, where Phillips attempts to construct his version, via Gewirth's Principle, of a Rawls-

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like reasonable rule for economic life. This effort is worthy of more
attention than is possible here, but let it be noted that it must inevitably
suffer the same fate as any ethical calculus: someone must decide for
others what is their due and what is not. How much wealth, for example, makes for a concentration [of wealth] that would be " demonstrably detrimental to some people's exercise of their generic rights "?
His is ultimately an entitlement or rights ethic, rather than an aitial
ethic of goal-purposive fulfillment for the individual, projected outwards
for a common good scenario. While his rejection of goal ethics's inability to detail principles for distribution of goods is noteworthy, it
does not appear that a tightened version of generic rights theory will
come closer to either of Phillips's desiderata: a justification of moral
reasoning apart from any theory of nature or a calculus for its application.
Desan and Phillips wish to think against the limits of the human
situation. For Desan, rising above limitation is a moral task and obligation facing us each, if there is to be a common future. His call
is to be World Citizen in a Polis of Nations. Phillips's vision is more
concrete, a distribution of benefits to benefit all with well-being and
freedom. But this mundane task is no less difficult than Desan's transcendent one. Indeed, according to Augustine, even the Divine Mind
must utilize an artifice in dealing with human creation: "He loves each
of us as though there were only one of us." Both ethicists have striven
to show us how we might think this vision for ourselves, i.e., for each
other of us.
]OIIN

B. DAVIS, O.P. '

Detroit, Michigan

Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans: Seventeenth-Century Essays. By
HUGH TREVOR-ROPER.
Chicago: The University of Chicago Press,
317. $27.50 (hardbound).
1988. Pp. xiii

+

Even to list the changes and events which occurred in seventeenth
century England is a difficult task: the century spans the period from
the death of Queen Elizabeth to the Glorious Revolution and beyond,
through the Civil War, the accession and exile (twice) of the Stuarts,
the rise of science, the transformation of the theological and religious
issues of the English Reformation, to name only the most obvious. To
conceive a book, in the form of occasional essays, which not only addresses these changes and events but does so by establishing the connections which were present with European currents at the same time
surely tempts fate, even when it does not tempt reviewers.

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571

But Hugh Trevor-Roper is a master, both of the period under survey
and of the form of the essay. With one exception, each of these essays
began as a lecture or seminar paper, and the pleasantly legible style
in which they are written must bear some trace of that origin. The
occasional flashes of wit, mixed with rthe fairly non-technical style,
make the book a joy to read and a welcome escape from the usually
constipated style of scholarly prose.
In his Introduction, the essayist clearly sets forth his thesis that
English intellectual history does not exist apart from the currents of
European intellectual history (a thesis for which Trevor-Roper has already staked a claim). That leads to what may very well be the major
problem with these essays: its end is in its beginning. The list of
names cited in these essays only partially coincides with the list of
names in the index; the former is much longer than the latter. And
while the style of the essay welcomes the reader to the period, it also
throws up more names and places and events than can be explained or
even annotated adequately. This occurs both on a large and on a small
scale. The first essay, on "Nicholas Hill, the English Atomist" contains such a vast array of names that at times it becomes the prosopo·
graphical equivalent of a telephone book. On a large scale, there is the
problem with a definition of Arminianism. No definition, at least no
formal definition, is attempted-and this is probably wise. But, particularly in the case of the essay on "Laudianism and Political Power,"
when Trevor-Roper returns to the subject about which he wrote over
forty years ago, he seems to side-step the issue of whether Laud and
his party can accurately be called Arminiaµs at all. Quite a lot is presented about the personal connections between the Laudians (and more
particularly their predecessors such as Andrewes) and Arminius himself, and a satisfactory answer to the question can probably be made
from a distillation of these essays as a whole, but respect for TrevorRoper inclines one to wonder what answer he would give in his own
words.
Two themes of major interest run through these essays, however, and
stand in even greater relief because of the comparatively smaller play
they have been given in modern scholarship. The first is the place of
the irenic movement, particularly in the England of James I. It is here
that the combination of European and English intellectual history becomes most valuable. The picture which emerges is of a strong ecumenical period in which the possible reunion of Christendom is contemplated with more than idealistic speculation. The fact that this
movement was torpedoed by the Synod of Dort, on the one hand, and
the intransigence of reactionary Roman Churchmen, on the other,
makes it none the less important. While it has been referred to more

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regularly in recent articles and essays (particularly with regard to some
of the movement's leaders and more colorful figures such as Marcantonio de Dominis, classified as a "reunionist" in these essays), there
is a refreshing exposition of this group (in more than passing references) in a number of these essays. The position of James I is mentioned infrequently, possibly because more attention is given to others,
theologians and political leaders, who have been even more neglected
in this respect. But the position of James I stands out quite boldly in
this international movement and has (by and large) been ignored by
the more "insular" historians of the Stuart period. Trevor-Roper occasionally produces a defense of" what if" historiography, in which he
indulges fairly infrequently, so one would have been glad to have seen
some attention paid to the reasons why the irenic movement failed, be·
yond the obvious reason that it was buried under more numerous and
more pressing events.
The second theme of interest is that of the "No Popery" school of
English intellectual (and, at times, anti-intellectual) writing. This becomes most obvious in the essays on Archbishop Ussher and John
Milton, not surprisingly, but it also is a major issue in the growth of
the Laudian party. There are two areas of interest which these issues
raise, in the theme of the anti-Papal polemic. The first is the relation
between English "No Popery" and the manifestation of contemporary
Gallicanism in France. While both of these are undoubtedly political
forces, as well as religious movements, the linking of intellectual work in
these two countries is fascinating. This runs from the English support
for Richelieu's proposed Gallican patriarchate to the less noticeable but
still significant exchange of hooks (most of which Trevor-Roper men·
tions by title, and then comments that they were not read by the re·
cipients). More than this is the second area of concern, namely, the
relationship between English anti-Papalism and current millenarian
thought. David Brady, in his recent study The Contribution of British
Writers Between 1560 and 1830 to the Interpretation of Revelation
13:16-18 (Tiibingen: Mohr, 1983), has noted the amazing growth in
the seventeenth century of literature on the hook of Revelation, but more
specifically on the identification of figures (such as the Beast and the
Antichrist) in this literature. Trevor-Roper recalls this literature in
some depth and links it not only with the radical Millenarians but even
with the more " moderate " party of Laud. The gradual retreat of
Milton into apocalyptic unreality and his growing ingenuity in his exegesis of Revelation also stand out in Trevor-Roper's final essay,
"Milton in Politics." That essay presents Milton as a whole, rather
than as a writer, or political operator, or intellectual leader (in the
manner of most other works on Milton). One does wonder whether

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Milton was as totally dislikable as Trevor'Roper portrays him, and the
essayist's occasional jibes about Milton's passion for divorce seem to
be gratuitous. But, on the whole, Trevor-Roper presents the identification of the Papacy with the Antichrist in a fascinating way, a narra·
tive which contributes not only to seventeenth century intellectual history hut also to the history of biblical exegesis.
This is certainly not a survey text, but it is a pleasant and occasionally entertaining introduction to the currents of the intellectual and religious movements which lay behind the Civil War and Puritan Revolution in England and Ireland-and by a master of the essay.
WARREN

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.

J. A. SOULE, O.P.