THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RES SIGNIFICATA
AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI IN AQIDNAS'S
THEOLOGICAL EPISTEMOLOGY
GREGORY

RoccA, O.P.

Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California

S

T. THOMAS AQUINAS often refers to the distinction
between res significata and modus significandi. He asserls that, whie the :absolute and analogical predicates
of positive theology may be pveditcated of God with regard to
their RS,1 they mrust ,be denied of God with regard to their
MS. 2 The distinotion, then, is an imporlant element in his
sake I will refer to res significata, by RS and to modus
1 For brevity's
significand.i by MS; I will also speak of the res/modus distinction. The following abbreviations for Aquinas's works will be used: BDH =Flropositio in
librum Boethii De hebdomadibus (Marietti ed., 1954); DA=the disputed
question De anima (ed. J. H. Robb [Toronto: PIMS, 1968]) ; DDN =Flropositi<>
super librum Dionysii De divinis nominibus (Marietti ed., 1950); DP=De
potentia (Marietti ed., 1949); DSS=De substantiis separatis (Leonine Commission, vol. 40, 1969); DV=De veritate (Leonine Co=ission, vol. 22, 197276); Herm.=Sententia libri Peri hermeneias (Marietti ed., 1955); John=
Leotura super Johannem (Marietti ed., 1952); Meta.=Sententia libri Metaphysioorum (Marietti ed., 1950); Phys.=Sententia libri Physioorum (Marietti ed., 1965) ; Quod. = Quaestiones quodlibetales ( Marietti ed., 1956) ; BOG=
Summa contra gentiles ( Marietti ed., vols. 2-3, 1961) ; SDO =Eropositio super
librum De causis (Marietti ed., 1955) ; SS=Scriptum super libros Sententiarum (Paris: Lethielleuro, 1929, 1933, 1947); ST=Summa theologiae (Alba/
Rome: Editiones Paulinae, 1962). The English translations are my own.
For Thomas's positive theology of the divine names, see Gregory Rocca,
"Analogy as Judgment and Faith in God's Incomprehensibility:
A Study in
the Theological Epistemology of Thomas Aquinas" (Ann Arbor: University
Microfilms International, 1989) 540-615.
text: "In every name predicated by us [of God], im2 A characteristic
perfection is found with respect to the name's mode of signifying [MS],

173

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

theological epistemology and onomatofogy .3
For some, however, the distinction wou1d ultimately lead us
back to the univocist camp of Duns Scotus,4 for they see it as
hiding within itself a latent core of univocity. One writes that
the predication involved in 1anafogy of attribution is both univocal and equivocail: " It is univocal, insofar as it ai1ways denotes the siame proprietas rei; it is equivoca,J since, through a
differrent modus significandi, it •connotes ' a different existentiail mode of the denoted proprieta.'J."5 Another writes, in
simil.ar fashion, that "the :same property is signifi·ed, hut the
way in which the property inheres in the subject is different." a
Another contends tha;t the idis:tinJCtionbetween RS and MS is
a" bogus distinction between what words realily mean and what
they mean to us." 7 If the res/niodus distinction is an im1

which does not belong to God, though the thing signified [RS'] is suitable to
God in some eminent manner " ( SOG l.30.277) ; the same sentiment is found
in many other texts such as SS L35.LL ad2 and ST l.13.3. Thomas often
explains the saying of Pseudo-Dionysius, that negations about God are true
while affirmations are vague, by claiming that affirmations are true as regards their RS but not as regards their MS (SS l.22.l.2. adl; l.4.2.l. ad2;
SOG l.30.277; DP 7.5 ad2; ST l.13.12. adl; SDO 6.161).
a Hampus Lyttkens, however, thinks the distinction plays no essential role
in Thomas's theory of the divine names (" Die Bedeutung der Gottesprltdikate
bei Thomas von Aquin," N eue Zeitschrift fur systematisahe Theologie und
Religionsphilosophie 6 [1964] 277-80). Klaus Muller claims the application
of the res/modus distinction to the divine names " says really nothing at
all" (Thomas van Aquins Theorie und Praxis der Analogie. Der Streit um
das rechte Vorurteil und die Ana,lyse einer aufsohlussreichen Diskrepanz in
der "Summa theologiae ", Regensburger Studien zur Theologie 29 [Frankfurt am Main/Bern/NY: Peter Lang, 1983] 100).
4 See Richard
Swinburne, The Coherence of Theism (Oxford: Clarendon,
HJ77) 78-80.

s Jan Pinborg, Logik und Semantik im Mittelalter: liJin uberblick, Afterword by H. Kohlenberger, Problemata 10 (Stuttgart/Bad Cannstatt: Frommann0Holzboog, 1972) 101; but cf. G. Scheltens, "Die thomistische Analdes Duns Skotus," Fra,nziskanisohe
ogielehre und die Univozitatslehre
Studien 47 ( 1965) 323.
e Jonathan Kvanvig, "Divine Transcendence," Religious Studies 20 ( 1984)
378.
r John Morreall, Analogy and Talking about Goit: A Critique of the
Thomistic Approach (Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1978)

RES SIGNIFICATA

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175

portant component in Aquinas's theology of the divine names
and if it 11ests ultimately on univocity--either because the
names we predicate of creatures and God really have the same
meaning or hecaiusethe reality they refer to is really the samethen Thomas's contention that the 1abso1ute names of positive
rtiheology1a11e predicated anafogiically of God cannot be upheld,
and therefore God's transcendence will be sJighted by all divine predication. This investigation of what Thomas means
by the distinction between res significata and modus significandi begins by looking at ;the actual historieal genesis of the
terminology.

I. Historical Background
Thanks to rthe combined efforts of several scholars, today
we have a fairly good picture of the W e:stern ancestry of the
term modus significandi, which began its ual'eer in grammar
but was later incorporated into logic and epistemology and
whlch in its later ioontexts was distinguished from the res
significata.8
114. For Morreall, the RS is what the word really means, but we do not
know what that is; the RS is a "core meaning" that has picked up limited
connotations by being applied to creatures for so long; supposedly, after
stripping away the " encrustations of the MS, we are left with the "pure"
meaning or RS. But at this point no one can describe that pure meaning,
and so in the end it is no meaning at all.
s See Charles Thurot, Emtraits de divers manuscrits latins pour servir a
l'histoire des doctrilnes grammaticales au moyen age (Frankfurt: Minerva,
1964; repr. from Notices et emtraits des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Imperiale, vol. 22/2 [Paris, 1868]), especially pp. 148-60; Ueberweg-Geyer, Die
patristische und soholastische Philosophie, vol. 2 in Grundriss der Geschiohte
der Philosophie, 11th ed. (Berlin: Mittler, 1928), section 37, especially pp.
Geistesleben, 3 vols. (Munich:
455-60; Martin Grabmann, Mittelalterliches
M. Hueber, 1926; 1936; 1956), especially vol. 1, chap. 4, and vol. 3, chaps. 3
and 12; M.-D. Chenu, "Grammaire et theologie aux XIIe et XIIIe siecles,"
Archwes d'histoire dootrinale et litteraire du moyen ,age 10 ( 1936) 5-28;
idem, La theologie au douzieme sieole, Preface lly E. Gilson, :Etudes de philosophie medievale 45 (Paris: Vrin, 1957) ; Franz Manthey, Die Sprachphilosophie des hl. Thomas von Aquin und ihre Anwendung auf Probleme der
Theowgie (Paderborn: SchOningh, 1937); Brendan O'Mahoney, "A Medieval
Semantic: The Scholastic Tractatus de modis signiffoandi," Laurentian-um 5

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

The remote foun:dations of the term are to be found :in
Aristotle, Boethius (
, and the Latin grammarian
Prisoian, a contemporary of Boethius. Chapters two .and thl"'ee
of Aristoble's On Interpreta.tion teach that rthe noun and verb
"signify" (semainein) something, and that the verb" signifies
time in addition" (prossemainein chronon): e.g., health is a
noun and is healthy a verb, the fatter s1ignifying in aiddition
(to whait the noun signifies) ithat cthe health is now presently
existing. In his commenta.ry on Aristotle's On Interpretation,
Boethius understands the Philosopher to mea:n that while the
noun may signify (signifioare) ·time in one sense (in words
Hk!e today or tomorrow) , only the veTb neoessarily and as pairt
of its very naturre consignifies (consigniffoare) time according
to its" proper mode'' (proprius modus) .9 Boet:hius's consignificare is very olose in meaning to Aristotle's prossemainein, and
the Boetihian ve11b consigni:fies time aocol'ding to a modus .10
Finally, in his Institutiones grammaticae
Priscian refers
to the "semantic properties'' (proprietates significationum) of
the v;arious parts of discourse, wh1oh by the middJe of the
twelfth century will be disicussed under the term modi significandi.
In the ea:rly middle ages, from the eighth to the beginning
(1964) 448-86; idem, "The Medieval Treatise on Modes of Meaning," Philo·
sophioal Studies 14 ( 1965) 117-38; Geoffrey Bu:rsill-Hall,
Speculative
Grammars of the Middle Ages, Approaches to Semiotics ll (The Hague/
Paris: Mouton, 1971) ; Jan Pinborg, Die Entwicklung der Spraohtheorie im
Mittelalter, Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42/2 (Munster: Aschendorff, 1967) : idem, Logik und Semantik im
Mittelalter: Ein Uberblick (Stuttgart/Bad
Canstatt: Frommann-Holzboog,
1972); idem, "Speculative Grammar," in The Cambridge History of Later
Medieval Philosophy, ed. A. Kenny, N. Kretzmann, J. Pinborg (Cambridge:
Cambridge University, 1982) 254-69; for the old logic of the Middle Ages,
see The Cambridge History 101-57, and for the logic of the high Middle
Ages, see section four of the same work; other relevant literature may be
found in E. J. Ashworth, The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative
Grammar from Anselm to the End of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards (Toronto: PIMS, 1978).
9 In librum Aristotelis
De interpretatimie, 2nd ed., "De nomine" ( PL
64:421D-422B); cf. idem, De divisione (PL 64:888D-889A).
io Cf. Pinbo:rg, Die Entwicklung 30-45.

RES SIGNIFICATA

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of the twelfth century, grammar-in conjunction with dialectic
and rhetoric, the other two parts of the trivium-was taught
in the cloister and cathedral siohools, mainly as a commentary
on Priscian and Donatus. In its middle third, however, the
twelfth century experienced a logicizing of grammar, under the
influence of the translations of Aristotle's logical organon,
especiaMy as it was interpreted by the commentaries and logical treatises of Boethius and by other Arabic commentaries. 11
This logicizing took p1ace especially at the hands of Peter Abela11d (d. ll4Q) 12 and Peter Helias, a professor ait Paris around
1140 who is actually the founder of the medieval logic of language, exp1aining Priscian',s I nstitutiones grammatiaae through
Aristotle's Categories and On Interpretation. 13 He teaches that
the parts of speech ail'e distinguished from one another by their
modi sigriificandi, which is his understanding of Priscian's
proprietates significationum. A part of speech is a sound indicating the mind's conoept, i.e., it is a way (modus) of signifying or consignifying something. Thus, the noun is that
which signifies "srnhstance with quaility." He a.rgues for seven
parts of speech-noun, verb, participle, pronoun, adverb,
preposition, and conjunction---,on the grounds that there are
only seven modes of signification and rejects the interjection
since it does not have a per se mode of significakion. The "essentirul modes" are what pertain always and univcersa11lyto the
parts of speech as 'Such, and the " 'aicc1dental modes " are
either species of the essentiaJ parts of speech (a noun may he
eiither appellative or proper) or something seicondary to the
11 For Boethius's influence on medieval logic, see Ohenu, La theologie, chap.
6. The early period of medieval logic, which runs from the beginning of the
twelfth century to about 1230, is sometimes called logiaa antiqua and further subdivided into logica vetus and logiaa nova: the former is founded on
Porphyry's lsagoge, .Aristotle's Categories and On Interpretation,
and
Boethius's logic treatises; the latter is founded on the remaining treatises of
.Aristotle's logical organon.
12 Note that .Abelard distinguishes
the nomen from the verbum by the way
(modus) each signifies time (see Thurot 150) .
1a For the very early logic before .Abelard and Peter Helias, see Grabmann,
3:94-113.

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

essential mode as such (e.g.• the Single or plrural number of a
noun) .u
The thirteenth century deepened the logical advance with
treatises dealing with sentence and enunciation, the properties
of terms (like supposition and distribution) , and the syncategorematicals, which are various connective, modaJ, or numeral
·terms (like omnis, totus, non, et, an, necessario, etc.). The
most famous treatise of this period is Peter of Spain's Summulae logicales (ca. 1240-45) ,15
FinaHy, from 1270-1350 a new genre flowe11ed, known as
grammatica speculativa, whose works were commonly called
Tractatus de modis significandi or Summae modorum significandi,16 and whose authors were named Modistae. Relying on
Aristotle's logicail corpus (as interpreted by Boethius), Priscian, Donatus, and Peter Helias, the M odistae treatises merged
grammar with logic ·and even metaphysics, aittempting to construct a philosophy of language that could describe a universal
linguistics and grammar that are isomorphic with and dependent upon common reality. The Modistae take for granted a
realistic epistemofogy, especiai1ly in the celebrated triad of
modus essendi, modus intelligendi, and modus significandi, the
first of which grounds :the res, which is represented by the conceptus (grounded in the second) , which is signified by the
dictio (grounded in ·the third). A physical noise (vox) becomes a woro (dictio) and part of speech (pars orationis) by
hamg a determinate modus significandi within the language,
ibut this latter is directly conditioned by the wiay in which intell.ecilU'rul knowl,edge gra:sps reality intentionally (modus intelligendi) , which is itself repI1esentative of it:he various categories and kinds of reailiity (modus essendi) .11
u See Thurot 153-55, 170.
11 The

treatise is divided into seven smaller ones: enunciation, universals,
predicamentals, syllogism, topics, fallacies, and properties of terms.
16 Cf. Grabmann, 1: 115-46. The M odistae tra.ctates diminished with the
rise of nominalism, which could not abide their realism of universals.
11 See Boethius of Dacia, Opera,: Modi 8ignifica1114i si-ve quaestionetJ Bupe1'
PriBoianum Ma.iorem (written ca. 1270), ed. J. Pinborg, H. Roos, S.S. Jensen,

RES SIGNIFICATA

AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI

1.79

The modus Signifir;andi gmdua.hly be1came ]identified with a
8 which
oonsignifir;atio,1
couM mean two things:
the syintactic meaning of a dir;tio, i.e., how a word needs to be
il'e1atedto others in a statement in o'l.1derto signify syntactica.Hy;
or the secondary, connotative meaning in addition to the
primary, denofative one (e.g., the v;erb consignifies tense, one
of its1 aiccidentrul modes) .19 The MS, then, which is a r;onsignifiootio and which establishes the paoc:ts of speech, can be different even when the reality (res) referred to l'emains the same
because the modus intelligendi on which the MS is based is also
different. The usual example is rbhat of pain: dolor and doleo
signify the same res, some sort of pain, but the former does so
per modum permanentis and the latter per modum fiuxus vel
fieri.20 Jan Pinborg offers a concise summary of the grammatical ana1lysiisof the M odistae:
1

According to modistic analysis words consist of a phonological element (vox) and two levels of semantic components, one concerned
with specific or lexical meanings (significata specialia), the other
with more general meanings, called modi significandi, on which in
turn the syntactical component depends .... By a first imposition
the expression is connected with a referent, insofar as a name is
instituted to refer to a definite object or attribute of an object.
How this happens is almost never discussed in any detail. The relation holding between the expression and the object referred to is
called the ratio significandi. It is often described as the 'form '
which turns a mere sound into a lexeme ( dictio) .... In a secondary imposition the lexeme receives a number of modi significandi
which determine the grammatical categories of the word .... A
given lexeme can be associated with different modi, so that the
same lexeme may be realised as different parts of speech and as
vol. 4/1-2 of Corpus Philosophorum Danicorum Medii Aevi (Hauniae: Gad,
1969) 4.15ff, 7.42ff, 27.36, 64.77ff, 81.25, 83.51, 262.83. Michael de Marhais
(late 13th century) writes: "Unde ratio intelligendi sumitur ab ipsa re;
quam rationem intelligendi presupponit ratio significandi existens in dictione"
(Thurot 156).
1s For the details of this process, see Pinborg, Die Entwioklung 30-45.
19 Bursill-Hall 54-55; Thurot 155-56.
20 O'Mahoney,
"A Medieval Semantic " 466-86; idem, "The Medieval
Treatise " 124·28.

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

different grammatical forms.... Obviously then, the modi are a
kind of semantical modifiers, further determining the lexical meaning of the dictio, thus preparing it for various syntactical functions.21

Aquinais certainly recognizes the traiditional triad of modus
essendi, modus intelligendi, and modus signifioondi (Berm.
1.8.90) , and he also knows how to empfoy the purely grammatical distinctions of the Modistae and other medieval logicians and grammarians, especially in his Trinitarian thoology. 22
Nevertheless, he probably did not know ,any of the M odistae
texts properly 1speaking, for he does not use the modal definition for the parts of speech, and the first real texts of the
M odistae genre only appear about four years before his death,
in 1270, with Martin and Boethius of Dacia. 23 Still, some of
the ideas and concepts of the grammafica speculativa were
probably known and discussed some time before they began
to be formally published in 1270.
Three points conclude this section. Fil"st, the res/modus distinction has its historical roots in the discipline of grammar,
from Beter Helias to the M odistae. Aquinas, however, incorand
porates the distinction into his theological
21" Speculative Grammar" 257-58. For the plethora of mocU significandi
used by the Modistae in order fully to define each part of speech, see
O'Mahoney, "The Medieval Treatise" 128-38; Bursill-Hall 345-91.
James Egan shows how Thomas uses the
22 ST 1.39.3, for one example.
grammatical distinction between the concrete and abstract modes of naming
in his teaching on the Trinity (" Naming in St. Thomas' Theology of the
Trinity," in From an Abundant Spring, ed. by Thomist staff [NY: P. J.
Kenedy, 1952] 152-71). For a commentary on ST 1.39 from a semantic perspective, see Michael-Thomas Liske, "Die sprachliche Richtigkeit bei Thomas
von Aquin," Freiburger Zeitschrift fur Philosophie und Theologie 32 (1985)
373-90. Cf. Fernando Inciarte, " La importancia de la uni6n predicado-sujeto
en la doctrina trinitaria de Tomas de Aquino," Scrip ta Theologica 12 ( 1980)
871-84; idem, "Zur Rolle der Pradikation in der Theologie des Thomas von
Aquin: Am Beispiel der Trinitatslehre," in Miscellanea Mediaevalia 13/1,
Sprache und Erkenntnis im Mittelalter (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1981) 256-69.
2a Pinborg agrees with Manthey and O'Mahoney on this point (Die Elntwicklung 69, n. 19). For some background to the "modes of discourse" in
Aquinas, see Mark Jordan, "Modes of Discourse in Aquinas' Metaphysics,
New Scholcwtici1m 54 (1980) 401-16.

RES SIGNIFICATA

AND MODUS SlGNIFICANDI

1$1

justifies it, as we shall see, by recourse to theological truth. 24
Second, while some of the modi are essential. to the various
parts of speech, they are accidental to the specific, lexical
meanings of individual words. 25 This opens up the possibility,
then, of e:xdsing the modi in oroer to penetrate to the pure
lexiool meaning of divine names. But Thomas will not allow
this in his understanding of the modi, for the ratio nominis of
.any divine name is always a creaturely meaning such that we
can never cut away a creaturely mode in order to come up with
a ratio nominis that applies purely ·and properly to God. 26
Thmd, the grammatical employment of the res/ modus distinction has a propensity to Slllpport univocity to the degree that
it refers to an inner-worldly reality that remains the same in
itself even though the ways of understanding and signifying
it may vary (e.g., pain is the same in itself even though the
ways of understanding and signifying it as a noun or verb are
different). Aquinas's use of modus intelligendi and modus significandi is more mysterious and diffioolt to grasp: the res of
the tmnscendent God and the finite creature is not the same,
and yet in true theologicwl judgments the same creaturely
ratio nominis, with its attendant creatureily modi of !Understanding and signification, somehow rewches: past the creature to
24 Pinborg sees Thomas's use of the MS as grounded in real existential differences, whereas the Modistae relied more on Avicenna's "existence-indifferent conception of being" (Die Entwiaklung 38-39, 44-45, and n. 68). Keith
Buersmeyer shows how Thomas knows that the polysemy of the word est
depends on first knowing the truth about reality and how he is more flexible
than the Modistae of his time and later in not attempting to make grammar
adjudicate for metaphysics ("The Verb and Existence," New Soholastioism
60 [1986] 145-62). D. Salman writes that the theory of the modi signifioand.1:,
"classic in grammar since Peter Heliae, had undergone at the hands of St.
Thomas a daring epistemol-Ogical transposition, based on a very deliberate
psychology of knowledge and on a new conception of the metaphysical structure of the object" (Bulletin thomiste 5 [1937] 184) .
:25 We note in passing
that Thomas holds, contrary to those known as
the Nominales and to some of the Modistae, that the verb's consignification
of time is not accidental but essential to its very meaning (DV 1.5; Quod.
4.9.2) ; cf. Chenu, " Grammaire et theologie " 9-22.
211 On this point, see Rocca 540-54.

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

posit ,a, res in the infinite God. This wilJl 'become dearer in the
next section.

II. Res Significata and Modus Significandi 'in Aquinas
Every proper and positive divine name can be <CionsideTed
f,rom tJhvee perspectiv;es: that of the res significata, the ultimate
rerulity which divine prediica:tion signifies ito exisit pr:opedy and
with priority in God; that of the ratio nominis, the conceptual
and
meaning or proper signiliorutionwh:iich is ahvays
is only said properly of the cveabme; that of the modus significandi, which is a consequence of our conceptual mode of
understanding and which ailso is only said properly of the
creature. 21 But what does Thomas mean by the phrase modus
significandi? By denying the MS of God, he usruaJily intends to
reject anything composite in God, since our mode of signification always entails composition, but rejecting composition also
involves refusing anything accidental or anything merely abstract or concl'ete in God. Moreover, his denial of the MS :rests
upon the ontolog1cal truth that God lacks any finite mode and
upon the epistemologioal truth of the oreatme's conna.tural
mode of understanding.
1

A. God's Modelessness and the Creature's Mode

Thomas identifies God with the pure perfection of infinite
and moddess heing. 28 "Nothing is said of God by participation, for whatever is prurticiprutedis determined to the mode of
that which is participated and so is possessed in a partial way
and not wccording to every mode of perfection" (SCG
1.32.288). God's rnodelessness is the divine infinity and vice
versa. As esse purum, God " is not limited to some mode of the
peirfeotion of being but possesses the tota.lity of being in himself." ·29 Thus:, God "does: not exist by any mode, i.e.$ aiccord1

21 See DV 2.1 adll;

BOG 1.34.298; BT l.13.3; l.13.6.
and discussion, see Rocca 481-93.
29 DP 2.L "Every act inhering in something else receives its termination
from that in which it is, because whatever is in another is in tha-t thing
:2s For texts

RES SIGNIFICATA

AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI

183

ing to :some finite and limited mode, but he has. universally and
infinitely encompassed (aooipere) in himself the totaility of
being" (DDN 5.1.629); thait is, God's not existing by any
mode means t:hat he has the totality of heing "simply and
without limitation (incircumscriptive)" (SCG 1.28.267). When
Thomas, then, speaks of God as having a mode, 30 or of having
perfections wcco:Ning to the noblest moide,31 we must understand him to he speaking loosely :Since he alrea.dy knows that
the divine infinity precludes God from possessing any strict
mode whatsoever. Other indications also show that he has nQ
intention of claiming a strict mode in God: God's " noblest
mode " of possessing being turns out to be tantamount to the
identity of being and essence in God, which is Thomas's principail reason for claiming God to be infinite; 32 certain phrases
containing modus as predicated of God 1are oxymoronic; 33
finally, if God's mode is the divine essence,34 and if God's esseI11ce is the divine being, and if God's being is infinite and
without determinate mode, then to speak of God's mode is
really to signify the divine modclessness.
Correlatively, therefore, the crea.ture's mode is first of all
the ·limited, determinate, and finite level or grade of being the
creature enjoys; 85 " The different grades of beings are constithrough the mode of the recipient. The act that exists in no other thing,
therefore, is terminated in no other thing ... and God is the act that in no
way exists in another" (SOG- 1.43.360). Cf. SS 1.43.1.l; 1.43.1.2. ad4; DV
29.3.
so SS 1.43.1.2. adl; BDH 3.51; DV 5.8. ad3; BOG- 1.29.270; 1.31.281;
1.34.298; DP 3.15.adl9.
Sl SS 1.2.1.2; 1.23.1.2.
32 Cf. SS 1.8.4.1, sea contra 3. Modus may be used of God in the context of
an article that rests upon acknowledging God as infinite in being (ST
1.13.11).
BS In distinction
from all creatures which have a determinate, particular
mode of existing, God is said to have "a universal mode of being" (DDS
8.199-218, 253-61), though God's "mode " must be indeterminate, infinite,
and thus modeless. For similar reasons, God's "mode of supereminence"
(SOG- 1.30.276, 278) would also seem to be an oxymoron.
H ".Any mode of God is the divine essence"
(John- 1.11.213); cf. DV
2.11.103-18; 8.2.ad2; SOG- 1.32.285.
85 BB 1.19.2.l.ad3; SOG 1.31.280; Quod. 4.1.l; BT 1.44.2.

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

tuted from the different modes of being (essendi) ." 36 The
mode proper to the creature is its own species (SCG 1.30.276) .
Since every mode entails a thing's determination, 87 the mode
of every created thing is finite. 88 All things are given their
mode (modificantur) by God (SS l.3.2.3.ad3), insofar as no
creature receives being according to its total power but has it
contracted to its own speciaJ. mode of excellence (SCG
1.28.260).
The truth that God is mode1essly infinite is perhaps the
primary contention of Aquinas's qualitrutive negative theology 39
and is the result of knowing God as ipsum esse subsi,stens,
which is itself the consequence of faith's view that God is the
absolutely transcendent and totalJy free creator .4-0 The primary
truth of qualitiativie negative theology denies of God that
which is at the root of the creabure's imperfection qua
creature-limifation, determination, finitude, mode-and announces that God has no mode distinct from the divine nature
itself; but this means that qualitative negative ·theology lies
behind the eoncerns of modaJ. negative theology to excise from
God even the imperfect connotations of the perfection-denoting
terms we predicate of God. It also means, moreover, that we
can never pretend to conreive some pure, "unmoded" perfection in God by distilling out its "divine mode." Since God
has no mode, surch a pmcedure would leave us, pariadoxically,
either with a quidditative knowledge of God's perfect nature,
36 SOG 1.50.424;

same idea in 1.93.790; cf. 1.50.426; 1.69.579; SS 2.18.2.2.
propositi-Owibus modalibus (Leonine Commission, vol. 43 [1976]) lines
3-7. The work, if authentic, is one of Thomas's very earliest.
as SS 1.8.1.2, sed contra 2.
89 Qualitative
negative theology denies of God imperfect creaturely qualities like corporeality or emotion. To deny mode and finitude of God is to
deny in principle every other possible creaturely imperfection, since creaturely
imperfection as such is most fundamentally the creature's status as limited,
partial, "moded." For the distinction in Aquinas between qualitative negative theology and modal negative theology, see Rocca 149-58. Modal negative theology denies of God the imperfect creaturely " modes " (in being and
understanding) of even pure perfections like wisdom and goodness.
4o On this point, see Rocca 423-28, 457-80, 493-509.
37 De

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since perfection and mode do not differ in God, or with no
knowledge of God at aiN, smce to separate the divine mode from
a perfection woulid be to separate God from the perfection.
Negative theology's separation from God of creaturely imperfections and of the imperfect manner in which creatures
possess perfections is the basis for Thomas's rejection of the
modus significandi of God, by whioh he :u.suaililyintends to deny
composition or aiccidents in God. But sometimes by denying
the MS he ·simply wanrts to note that, whil.e our names signily
finite and de.finite forms distinct from one another, in God the
perfections signified are infinite, indefinite, ,and not really distinct fTom one another. 41 Of course, the fact that creaturely
perfections are definite and finite imp1ies that one will be distinct from the obhe:r whenever more than one are found in the
same creature.
Aquinas reoognizes a proportion between modes of being,
modes of understanding, and modes of signifying, the first coosing the second, and the seoond the third. Since creatures receive perfections from God in an imperfect manner, and since
the signillcaition of a;ny name used by us is grounded in our
knowledge, which is based on the ilnpemect manner in which
creiatures participate in God, any name can he denied of God
with respect to its manner of signification (SS 1.22.1.2). Even
in the cas'e of terms that denote absolute perfections there is
ailway;s a creaturely connotation (consignificatio) insofar as
our manner of understanding the perfection is necessarily based
on sensible reality (ibid., ad.2) . Ail three modes, in their proper
011der of influence, can he denied of God: " Ahl the things affirmed of God ean ailso be denied of him since they are not
fitting to him in the way they are found in created things and
as they 1are understood and signified by us" (DDN 5.3.673) .
1

B. The Human Mode of Unde:rstanding
In generaJ, " e'Very knower has knowledge of the thing
known not through the mode of the known thing but through
41 DP 7.5ad2;

DDN 1.3.101.

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

the mode of the one knowing" (SS VU.l). Our intellect is
"informed iby created things" (SS 1.4.2.1.ard.2), and more
particufa11ly, takes its proper mode of understanding (mod!us
mtelligendi) from sensible things. 42 Hut God transcends
whatever we can know or say of the divine being on the basis
of material and created: rieality, for God transcends that rea,lity
and the modus intelligendi founded on it. 43 DP 7.2ad7 signruls
in a striking fashion our intell:ect's ability to transcend its own
mode of understanding. 44 The inte>llect naturally understands
being (esse) in the way rit is found in the things from which
the inteHect receives its knowl!edge, and being is in these things
not as suhs1isting simply but as inhering concreteJy in some
substance.
1

1

Reason discovers, however,. that there is some subsistent being;

and so, although the word being signifies in a concrete fashion, 45
when the intellect attributes being to God it transcends its own
mode of signifying, attributing to God that which is signified but
not the mode of signifying.
Thomas is trying to prove herie that God's being and essence
are identical, that God is subsistent being (esse). The objection Thomas responds to claims we should not attribute being
to God since God is simple i3.J1d subsis1tent whereas being is
always attributed to something as if it were a concrete, inhering aiccidrent.. But if we ha,ve discov,ered a subsistent being,
Thomas reasons, then the truth that " God is subsistent being "
must be upheld, even though the mind rerulizes in the assertion
itself that its concepts and way of understanding cannot do
jusrrace to the truth it affirms of God. Tvuth outstrips the very
42 SS l.22.l.2ad2;

cf. ET l.13.3.ad3.
(cf. DDN l.3.77), where Thomas constructs an elaborate
schema to show how we come to affirm things of God and harmonizes it with
other schemas he has found in the Liber De causis and Pseudo-Dionysius's
On the Divine Names. All three schemas begin at the most basic level of
sensation.
44 Cf. DP 7.4.adl.
45 Per modum conoreationis must be a typographical mistake for per modum
43 See SDO 6.170-71

ooncretionis.

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187

manner in which we understand as humans. Indeed, unless: we
a:lready knew that God is ,subsistent being, we wouM never he
able to assert that our way of understanding this very truth
itself falls short of God, since we only know it falls short of
God hecruuse, whereas it connotes God's being as something
concrete and composed, we know that God's being is reaUy
simple and subsistent.
We may generalize, then, and state that the modus intelligendi ,oan be denied of God only beeause some already known
divine truth contradicts: what the modus intelligendi, left to
woruld connote or imply about God. Thomas's exampJes of
denying the modus intelligendi always follow this pattern.
sea 2.12 demonstrates that God cannot be reaUy related to
creation, since this would imply that God :is dependent on
something created; and sea 2.13.919-20 proceeds to argue
that, since sU!ch relations are not rerully in God and yet are still
predicated of him, they must be attributed to him
on
oocount of our way of unders1tanding, " for when our intellect
understands one thing as referred to a second it also understands at the same time (cointelligere) 1a !'elation of the second to the first e¥en though the second is sometimes not really
related to the first.'' 46 If suich relations are predicated of God
and yet we know that they cannot acturully be in God, then by
a process of elimination we know that their predication and
signilication are the result of our naturail way of understanding. Again, ailthough creation is not really a process of change,
it seems to be so aJCcording to our mode of understanding since
we imagine and understand the same thing 1a,s existing both before and after its creation; and since the MS foMows the modus
intelligendi, we also signify creation as if it were a change. 41
46 The mind cannot escape its way of understanding
and yet also knows
that it cannot escape and so judges its predications about God accordingly.
Temporal relations are predicated of God insofar as they result from our way
of understanding, not that the intellect discovers any real relation of God
to the world, "but more from a certain necessity that is consequent upon
the mode of understanding" (DP 7.11).
47 SCG 2.18.953; S'l' l.45.2ad2.
SCG 2.10.903 states that power is attrib-

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

For Aquinas, composition is the mos:t salient feature of the
human way of understanding that must always be denied in
divine predication. Our intellect knows the simpae in the mode
of the .composite, apprehending the simple form as a subject
and .attributing something to it (ST 1.13.U.ad2), for the in:teJJ.ect forms
areo11ding to the mode of composite
thlngs, from which it natumhly takes its knowledge (SS 1.4.2.1).
Nevierthe1ess, the intellect rises above its natura1 way of knowmg and does not rattrihute the 'composition to God, UII!derstandmg that whwt corresponds to ail·l its different concepts is one
and simple: " For the intehlect does not attribute to the things
it understands the mode by which it understands .them, as it
does not attribute immateriality to the stone though it knows
the &one immrutecirully" (SCG 1.36.302). The mind is not
false when it understands the simple God :in a composite fashion, for there is ·a double meaning to the proposition " the intellect is false thrut understands ra thing otherwise than it is":
1

The adverb otherwise can determine the verb understand in relation to the thing understood or to the one understanding. If the
former, then the proposition is true, and the meaning is: any intellect is false that understands a thing to be otherwise than it actually is; but this is not the case here, for when our intellect forms
a proposition about God it does not say that he is composite but
that he is simple. If the latter, then the proposition is false. For
the intellect's mode of understanding is different from the thing's
mode of being, and it is clear that our intellect understands in an
immaterial fashion those material things that exist on a level below itself, not that it understands them to be immaterial but that
it possesses an immaterial mode of understanding. Similarly, when
it understands simple things above itself,. it understands them according to its own mode, i.e., in a composite fashion, but not that
it understands them to be composite (ST 1.18.12.ad8).

C. The Ruman Mode of Signification
Based on rllaith in God as the transcendent and free creator,

on the truth that God is the pure positivity of lpsum esse subuated to God with respect to immanent actions only according to the modus
iinteUigendi and "not according to the truth of the matter."

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AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI

1.89

sistens, on qualitative negative theology's rejection of all
mode, finitude, imperfection, and composition in God, on modal
negative theology's rejection of anything imperfoot in God's
possession of perfections, and on Qlllr characteristic modus intelligendi, Thomas's rejection of the modus significandi of any
divine predication primarily intoods to bolster and uphold
God's simplicity and substi.stence and thus to separate from
God the inevitable connotations of composition, abstraction,
and concretion that arise whenever our mind forms and signifies ·any predication, as well as the related eonnotation that
would imply anything aiccidental in God. Because he already
knows thait nothing composite, concrete, abstract, or accidental
rea1ly exists in God, he can reject what the MS would seem indirectly to posit in God, and he can impute such connotations
to the characteristic fashion in which our mind understands
and signifies what it knows rather than to any reality in God.
He explains the different modus essendi or modus subsistendi
of various substances by ref erenee to their level of simplicity
or complexity. Materiail substances have a different mode of
esse from that of separate substances, and separate substances
from that of God, for God is the divine esse and nature, separate S1Ubstances are not their own nature, and material
S1Ubstancesal'e neither their own esse nor their own nature but
only S1Ubsist as individruals."'8 But even though we know these
di:ffierent modes of being exist, the mode of signification of
" God is good " and " that woman is good " is the same in both
4'BDA 17.adlO. DA 17 argues that the essence of the separated soul belongs
to the genus of separate intellectual substances and has the same modus
subsistendi, since both kinds of entity are subsistent forms. Material things,
however, do not belong to the same genus as separate quiddities and have a
different modus essendi (DA 16). Cf. DP 7.7 on the different modus ea:istendi of the house in material reality and in the builder's mind. Thomas can
also refer to the ten Aristotelian predicaments or categories as diverse grades
of material entity that give rise to diverse modes of being (DV 1.1.114-61).
Ens is divided into the ten categories according to a different modus essendi,
and since the modes of being are proportional to the modes of predication,
the ten highest genera are called the ten predicaments. (Phy£:. 3.5.322; cf.
SS 1.8.4.3; l.22.l.3ad2).

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

cases; in fact, rit is only because he realizes God's mode of existence :is not the same as the mode implied 1and connoted when
we say " God is good " that Thoma1s teHs us we mrust deny the
MS when we predicrute goodness of God. 49 A ,similar situation
obtains m the oase of concrete and a.bstmrct names.
In all the reality that exists below the first cause, certain things
are found that are complete and exist perfectly, while others are
imperfect and incomplete (diminutus). The perfect things are
those that are per se subsistent in nature, which we signify through
concrete names (human, wise, etc.); the imperfect things are those
that are not per se subsistent, like forms, which we signify by abstract names (humanity, wisdom, etc.) .... Every name we use
either signifies a sharing in something complete,. as concrete names
do, or signifies something as an incomplete formal part, as abstract
names do. Hence no name we use is worthy of the divine excellence.50

The MS is directly dependent on the l'eai composition of s111bsis1tent, concrete things with nonsuhsistent, ahsitraiet qualities
and forms; it !'enders every name unworthy of God since we
know that God is neither ,concrete in a composite fashion nor
abstract in an incomplete or imperfect fashion.
SCG 1.30.277 teJ.ls us more exaotly why the MS renderis eve:ry
name we use unworthy of God's transcendent e:imeNence.
49 It is not universally
true, then, to say that for Thomas " a difference
of modus essendi of a referent corresponds to a difference of modus signifioandi of a predicate" (James Ross, Portraying Analogy [Cambridge Cambridge University, 1981] 165), though it is true in the case of the ten Aristotelian categories, which are the ultimate modi praedioandi corresponding to
the ten most fundamental modi essendi among material realities (Phys.
3.5.322). It is precisely because the creaturely and material objective mode
connoted by a predicate's mode of signification does not correspond to God's
objective mode as the predicate's referent that Thomas feels constrained to
deny our human mode of signification in all divine predication.
50 sna 22.378; 383. While humanity and human both refer to the whole
human e,ssence, the former does so per modum partis and the latter per
modum totius (SB l.23.l.l) ; homo signifies the human as a concrete whole
and humanitas signifies that formal element by which a human is a human
(Meta. 7.5.1379-80). Since Deus signifies divinity in the concrete while
Deitas does so in the abstract, the latter, on account of its modus signifioandi, cannot be used in place of one of the personal names of the Trinity
whereas the former can (John 1.l.44).

RES SIGNIFICATA

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1.91

With a name we express reality in the way that our intellect conceives it. Having the origin of its knowledge in the senses, our intellect does not transcend the mode found in sensible things, in
which, on account of the composition of form and matter, the
form and that which possesses the form are different. A simple
form is indeed found in sensible things, but it is imperfect since it
does not subsist; a subsistent thing that possesses the form is also
found, but it is composite ( concretio) rather than simple. Whatever our intellect signifies as subsistent,. therefore, it signifies as a
composite being, and whatever it signifies as simple it signifies not
as toot which is but as that by which something is. And so,. as regards the mode of signifying, every name we predicate has imperfection, which does not belong to God, though the reality signified
is suitable to God in some eminent way. This is clearly the case in
the names goodness and good: they signify something, respectively,
as nonsubsistent and as concrete; in this respect no name is appropriately applied to God but only with respect to the reality
that the name is used to signify.

Theologicail truth tells us that our names cannot do justice
to God, whose
is perfeetly subsistent rather than
imperfectly abstract, and whose subsistence is totaHy simple
rather than concretely composite. 51
Every name fails to signify the divine being since no name signifies at the same time something perfect and simple, for abstract
names do not signify a being subsisting through itself and concrete names signify a composite being; ... rejecting whatever is
imperfect, we use both kinds of name in divine predication, abstract names on account of their simplicity and concrete names because of their perfection. 52

An inidividuaJ. suhstanioe existing with categorical accidents
51 Cf. SOG 1.26.248. In SS l.4.2.lad2,
Thomas justifies the Dionysian modal
negation "God is not wise" by saying that God is not wise as other things
are wise in such a. way that in God wisdom should differ from the one who
is wise.
s2 SS l.4.1.2;
same idea in ST 1.3.3.adl; cf. SS l.8.l.1.ad3; DP 8.2.ad7;
ST l.13.Lad2. Chenu explains how in certain early medieval thinkers the
theology of God's absolute simplicity prevents Priscian's definition of the
noun ("that which signifies substance with quality") from enjoying a universal extension, since we name with nouns the God in whom there is no composition of substance and quality (La tMologie 100-107).

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

always entails ,a certain degree of composition, at least of the
substance or subject and its accidents. 53 For this reason alone
we woU!1d have to deny 1any 1aocidentsin God, but we also must
do so because an accident implies dependence (SS 1.8.4.3) and
because, since God is his own being and nature and therefore
identified with .simple and pure actuality, no further perfection can -accrue to him by way of run accident. 54 Because of the
theological negation of accidents in God, Thomas holds that, although we predicate of God certain perfection terms (like
wisdom) which signify .areidents in creatures, we must not
suppose they signify ruccidents in God (ST 1.3.6.rudl) and must
therefo!"e deny their modus significandi.55 Once again, his reason for rejecting the MS is its connotation of something in God
that he rulready knows to be untrue. Since no divine name can
be taken as implying run accident in God, a name that among
crea;tu:veswouM have as its highest genus one of :the nine categorical accidents (such as quality) is said to be predicated according to its proper specific meaning but not according to its
generic meaning (e.g., wisdom denotes the perfection of knowledge in God but nothing 'accidental), since that generic meaning a;lway.s l"efers to a categorical wooident.56
In coDJclusion,Aquinas acknowledges the traditional triad of
modus essendi (objective mode), modus intelligendi, and modus
significandi (subjective modes), with eruch member grounding
the one (s) after it. 57 As ·such, the denial of the MS is a short1

1

53 Meta. 7.11.1533-36 and SS 1.8.4.3; cf. Meta. 7.5.1379-80.
54DP 7.4 and SOG-1.23.
55 SS 1.9.1.2, and ad4.
56SS 1.8.4.3 and DP 7.4.ad2; cf. SS 1.4.1.1; l.22.l.3.ad2; l.35.l.l.ad2;
l.35.l.4.ad7. Strictly speaking, a predicate falling under the category of
relation could even be said of God according to its generic meaning, for relation denotes only esse ad and not esse in (SS 1.8.4.3). Only the generic categories of substance (De Deo uno) and relation (De Deo trino) are applicable
to God (SS 1.8.4.3; cf. SS 1.8.4.2.adl; l.22.l.3.ad2).
51 See W. Norris Clarke,
".Analogy and the Meaningfulness of Language about God: A Reply to Kai Nielsen," Th-Omist 40 (1976) 75-80;
Giinther Poltner, "Die Reprasentation als Grundlage analogen Sprechens von
Gott im Denken des Thomas von Aquin," Salzburger Jahrbuoh ffir Philosophie
21-22 (1976-77) 26-37.

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193

hand way of pointing out how every proper predication placing
a res significata in God inevitably faHs short of God. The denial
of the MS pmifies our assertions about God by separating from
God all composition, abstra:ction, concreteness, and accidents. 58
A few texts e¥en seem to use the MS stratagem in order to
deny of God the finite and determinate mode of creaturely perfections. The rejection of the MS only makes sense in the context of previously known theofog]cai1 truths, for only such
truths justify and make possible the denia1 of the imperf ecrtions implied and connoted by our human ways of understanding and expression. The MS stmtagem is negative theology in
brief compass, purifying the expressions of positive theofogy
by recourse to theological truth.

III. The Res/Modus Distinction and the Analogical
Nature of. Divine Predication
Does
use of the res/ modus distinction secretly
rea:dmit univocity into divine predication after he has seemingly hrunished it? Does his use of it veil a hidden univocity
so that he and Duns Scotus are saying the same thing after
aill? Three reasons suggest an 1ans:wer in the negative. 59
First, Aquinas's 1ana1ysis disco¥ers three essential elements
to 1aH divine
the res significata, the modus significandi, and the ratio nominis. The denial of the MS does not
leave us with a pure oolllcept exaetly fitted to God's transcendent perfection, for our concept of any perfection (the ratio
nominis) is always and ineluctably hound to and primarily
58 See Ralph Mcinerny,
The Logic of Analogy: An Interpretation of St.
Thomas (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1961) 59-60, 157-61.
59 David Burrell distinguishes
Scotus's use of the distinction, which leads
to univocity, from Thomas's (Analogy and Philosophical Language [New
Haven: Yale, 1973] 117, 178-80). Thomas uses it but does not rely on it,
since of itself it tends to direct meaning to univocity; indeed, his practice
"contradicts" the distinction (ibid. 136-39). John Wippel absolves Aquinas
of any "veiled univocity" in his use of the distinction (Metaphysical Themes
m Thomas Aquinas, Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 10
[Washington, D.C.: CUA, 1984] 238).

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

predicated of creatures. The mind uses the ratio nominis :to
signify the RS in God, .alil the while denying the MS of the
ratio nominis, but it never sees or conceives anything more in
the concept thc:tn the creature's perfection which the concept
nat.iuraJly signirfies. There is no univocal core to the concept
th.rut has been !albs"Wacled from its finite and: infinite modes;
rather, anallogy comes to pa:ss when the mind :predicates the
ratw nominis of God in an oot of judgment that clwims a truth
about the holy darkness of God ·which transcends anything
the concept can quidditaitively gvasp on its own, hound as it is
to creatures. 0 ° Confusion ensues ii we do not preserve the ratio
nominis as part of Aquin:ais's analysis. :Bor him, the ratio
nomiriis, qua concept, is always referred to the creature as the
prime analogue; it does not become analogiml by being reconceived in ra deeper fashion with reference now to a purer divine
meaning hut rather by being used in a true judgment th.alt
posits some reality in God. The truth of the judgment makes
us realize that the concept, as '/.l,Sed hut not as conceived, has
been extended beyond the creaturely reailm. We never rea:lly
know in a clear con:ceptual fashion what a divine name might
mean for God, and whatever we do know about such a name
is a;lways a consequence of the judgments we have already
made about God. The source of unity, moreover, for every
analogical extension within divine predication is always the
oreaturely conceptuail meaning of the ratio nomims.61
60 See Edward Schillebeeckx, Revelation and 7'heology, trans. N. D. Smith,
2 vols. (NY: Sheed and Ward, 1968) 2:170-78, 204; "The act of 8ign-ifymg
goes further than the ratio nominis ... " (ibid. 171).
61 The ratio nominis is the source of unity in divine predication.
Both
Kvanvig and Morreau (see our opening paragraph above and nn. 6-7) seem
to identify the ratio nominis with the RS, which lands them in trouble: the
former thinks Thomas identifies the RS in God and creatures, when actually
Thomas speaks of the ratio nominis as being analogically-which does not
mean conceptually-one in God and creatures; in the latter's opinion, since
for Thomas the RS is what the name really means and since we never actually
know what that meaning is, there is ultimately no meaning at all in divine
predication-but while Thomas does admit that we have no concept of the
RB in God we do have a conceptual knowledge of the ratio mnmnit as it

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Second, the Tes/modus distinction is really a microcosm or
encapsuiwtion of the whole combined expanse of Thomas's positive and l1!egative theology. Faith (supported by reason) in
the free and transcendent Creator-God as ipsum esse subsistens grounds the whole of his positive theology. This view
of God is the basis for the most fundamental proposition of his
qualitative negative theology, the truth that expresses God's
infinite modelessness and consequent incomprehensibility and
thus allows the supereminent modelessness o.f God to remain
-indeed demands that it remain-in impenetrable and transcendent darkness. Positive and qualitative negative theology
exercise their influence upon modaJ negative theology, which
denies anything imperfect even in the perfections of God.62
The res/modus distinction first posits a reality (RS) in God
(positive theology) and then, on the basis of a qualitative
negative theology that denies any modus in God at the same
time as it refiuses any conceptual knowledge of God's res or
modus, rejects the connotations of divine predication (the
deniwl of the MS) that would place anything composite, abstract, concrete, or a:ccidentaJ in God (moda:l negative theofogy) . Because of the judgments of
and qualitative
negative theology, Thomas can deny the MS in divine predication even though he never pretends to know God's res, ratio,
or modus; indeed, we must have recourse to negative names or
names of ,supereminence in order to express the divine mode,
whose quiddity escapes us (SCG 1.80.278). In other words,
Thoma.s's theologircwl epistemology teaches us that while the
RS can be sa.id of God in true affirmations and the MS of those
same affirmations can be simu!l.taneoruslydenied, we still neve,r
know, para.doxically, what that res or its infinite mode amounts
to in God and this means that one can never use the res/modus
applies to creatures, which is then a source of unity for the meanings of
divine predication.
62 Burrell reinterprets
the res/modus distinction as an integral part of
Thomas's negative theology, which continually denies that any concept can
represent God (Analogy 162-64).

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GREGORY ROCCA, O.P.

distinction to distill a univocrul core of meaning out of a compound solution of finite and infinite modes.63 It is ,true that the
distinction is used by Thomas in regions remote from its original appHcation in grammar, where it cou1d easily cohabit with
.a univocal view of reality, and it is true that a too wooden or
mwterial interpretation of it quickly 1eaids baick to univooity. 0'
It is also true that of itself it adds nothing new to his theological epistemology. Nevertheless, 'I\homas does employ the distinction as a kind of partial compendium of that epistemology,
1and thus its proper interpretation should evoke the compJexus
of judgments that comprise his positive and negative theology.
FinaNy, ·since the analogical nature of divine predication and
the use of the res/modus distinction are, in Aquinas, matters
of judgment insterud of concept, 65 the danger of the " common
core of univocity " is avoided. His transcendental analogy depends not on a more profound concepturulizfog hut on recognizing the truth about God. One author has written that
Thomas uses the distinction to remind us we have to consider
ibwo things' any time we employ a peclection-expression for
God: " the immediate
in which it applies, and the intention or scope latent within the term." 66 This " intention "
within the term, however, is not a new level of concept but
riather the fact that the term can be used to express true judgments about God. When Thomas speaks of a statement's intentio signifioare, the phrase first of ruR refers to the statement's
objective design or tendency to
the truth. 67 In Aquinas's
6s Cf. Bernard Montagnes, La doctrine de i'anawgie de
dlapres saiint
Thomas a'Aquin, Philosophes Medievaux 6 (Louvain/Paris:
Publications
Universitaires/Beatrice-Nauwelaerts,
1963) 99-103; William Hill, Knowing
the Unknown God (NY: Philosophical Library, 1971) 141-42. For Burrell,
the res/modus distinction "does not yield any privileged access to the res
•.. " (Aquinas: God and Action [Notre Dame: UND Press, 1979] 10).
64 Cf. Burrell, Aquinas 10; Henri de Lubac, The Disco'IJery of God, trans.
A. Dru from 3rd French ed. (Chicago: Regnery, 1967) 200-201.
65 On this point, see Rocca 288-315, 339-63.
66 Burrell, Aquinas 10.
61 .Andre Hayen describes how Thomas uses intentio/intendere
at the level
of intelligence to mean intensity, voluntary intention, voluntary attention, or

RES SIGNIFICATA

AND MODUS SIGNIFICANDI

197

theological epistemofogy and onomatology, the res/modus distinction serves to underline the
cenrtra.il position he
gives to the truth sta.tus of our theological judgments about
God.

the mind's knowledge of the thing-an mtentio intellecta (L'intentionnd sefon
saint Thomas, 2nd ed., Preface by J. Marechal, Museum Lessianum (section
philosophique) 25 [Brussels/Paris:
Desclee, 1954] 47-51, 161-201). See also
H. D. Simonin, "La notion d'intentio dans !'oeuvre de S. Thomas d'Aquin,"
Revue des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 19 ( 1930) 445-63. Intentio
signifioare, therefore, could refer to voluntary intention (what the proposition
"means " or " wants " to say) or to the know ledge itself (" God is good "
intends of itself to posit goodness in God), but the former is reduced to the
latter since what the proposition "wants " to say is always at least partially
and sometimes totally a function of what it does say. In DDN 4.9.412, for
example, the intentio significare is the intelligible meaning or sense of a word
or set of words as opposed to the mere physical sound or sight of syllables,
words or sentences; in John 1.1.25, the one using the name lapis is said to
intend to signify the actual stone.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS
MICHAEL TAVUZZI,

O.P.

Angeliaum University
Rome

F

OR AQUINAS a sequence of thoughts, even if interconnected in some manner, does not DJutomatically constitute a scientific discipline. To justify a daim to scientific status such a sequence will have ito he characterized by
those properties which raise mere thinking to the level of reasoning: it wiH have to proceed rationabiliter,. in all senses of
the term. The sequence wiM havie to he concerned with a 1corresponding obiectum speculabile, with a universal concept or
ratio.1 It wi11 have to be endowed with a direct object of in1" Et ideo oportet
scientias speculativas dividi per differentias speculabilium, in quantum speculabilia sunt." In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. l;
" ... scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo et principaliter, et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus ... " In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad
4um. The term ratio in Aquinas has a remarkable multiplicity of senses.
L. Schutz, ThomM-Lexikon (reprinted N.Y., 1957), pp. 679-690, enumerates
eighteen principal significations.
Without going into detail, I would like to
point out that I am employing the term ratio in the sense of a universal concept (Schlitz's 'i '). This is not the universal concept taken as a particular
psychological fact or mental event, with the ontological status of an accident
inhering in the rational soul as in its subject, but rather the universal concept in the sense of its notional content, taken as a particular psychological
fact. The term ratio, therefore, denotes the notional content which: ( l) represents the intellect's understanding of the nature or essence which is instantiated in a multiplicity of particulars (the nature or essence is itself
denoted by the term ratio according to another of its senses, Schlitz's sense
'k '); (2) is endowed with the intentio universalitatis whereby the multiplicity of particulars in which the corresponding nature or essence is instantiated falls under the concept as its genus or species; ( 3) is verbally
expressed by a definition. This sense of the term ratio is, of course, not to
be confused with that wholly different sense (also of great importance for an
understanding of metaphysical resolution) whereby it denotes tbe intellect's

199

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

vestigation, with ·a proportionate subiectum scientiae, which is
at foast formally distinct from that of any other scientific
discipline.
Aquinais affirms thrut this is indeed the case with the sequence
of interconnected reasonings which consititutes the science of
metaphysics. In the Prooemium to the oommentary on the
Metaphysics of
he states that metaphysics is concerned, in the first place, with being as sUJCh-with being as
being and the properties which are immediately consequent
upon it. 2 The diroot subject matter of metaphysics, its
obiectum spooulabile as such, is the ratio which is the content
of the concept of being in general (ens commune) and which
is instantiated in everything which falls under this quasigeneric concept. But just how does the mind have access to
this obiectum speculabile? How does the intellect form the
concept of being in geneml and sei:z;e its content? After aH, the
1content of this concept which
the " nature " of being
as such, the ratio entis, is neither readily nor immediately
gmsped by ,the intellect. If it were, there wouM indeed be no
need for the discipline of metaphysics. Just how then does the
intellect attain it? This question represents the crucial probfom of the very possibility of the science of metaphysics as envisaged by Aquinas. Aquinas is ce:vtainly aware of this and in
the same Prooemium does not neglect to answer it. The content of the concept of being in general, the obiectum speculabile
of metaphysics, is attained by means of a process of resolut:io.8
In this paper I shall examine this process of metaphysical
resolution. I shall first trace Aquina;s's gradual clarification of
the nature of resolutive reasoning by commencing with its
most primitiv<e,albeit paraidigmatic, instantiation. I shall then
activity of discursive reasoning ( Schiitz's sense 'g ') ; Aquinas contrasts this
latter ratio with the intellect's .activity of intuitive insight or intellectus.
2 " •••

non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiootum, sed ipsum solum

ens commune . . . M etaphysica, in quantum considerat ens et ea quae con·
sequuntur ipsum." In Meta., Prooemium.
a "Haec enim transphysica inveniuntur in via resolutionis, sicut magis
communia post minus communia." In Meta.; Prooemium.

AQUINAS

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201

consider the peculiarities of the process of resolution as it is
operative in metaphysical reasoning up to the point of mind's
seizure of the ratio entis. Finally, in the light of the interpretation proposed, I shall reconsider an especially controversial
issue which affects current discussions of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology.

I
Resolution is a type of reasoning (ratiocinatio) .4 Aquinas
affirms that to say of the inte1lect that it proceeds in a rational
manner (rationabiliter) involves a multiplicity of significations.5 Initially it means simply that its aotivities are performed in accmidarnce with a specifically human (as opposed
to an angelic or divine) manner of acquiring knowledge. A
manner which is properly human finds its point of departure
in the operation of those sensitive faculties with which the rational soul is so richly endowed. But for" thinking" to attain
the status of " reasoning " much more than this is required.
The intellect wi11 also have to occupy itself with that multiplicity of generic and specific concepts which are the characteristic
products of reason, of the mind's manifold grasp of rationes.
Furthermore it will have fo move
to those characteristics which are peculiar to a process of discursive reasoning. The intellect will move gradually, step by step as it were,
from the knowledge of things already grasped to the discovery
and intellectual appropriation of things previously unknown.
But for the intellect to be successful at disoursive reasoning it
cannot proceed in an arbitrary, fanciful, or opinionated manner. It will have to fulfil the requirements pmper ito logical
thinking. Logiica,l thinking is fundamentally discursive rea;soning which in both its form and its matter is regulated and
nourished by an intimate contact with first principles. With
respect to its form, the structures of its argumentations, the
1

4 " ••• ratiocinatio
humana ... in via iudicii, resolvendo, redit ad prima.
principia. ••. " Summa Theol., I, q. 79, a. 8.
See In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, Responsio.

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

modalities of possible and aroeptable combinations of the
propositions which enter these as their premises, will have to
be regulated rby the laws of syllogistic inference, laws which
are ultimately reducible to the first principles of the understanding, that is, the first principles of demonstration, the
dignitates or maximae propositiones.6 With respect to its matter, the propositions which enter the intellect's argumentations
as premises will also have to be ultimately reducible to first
principles, that is, to propositions which, if they do not have
the status of dignitates, must at least have that of positiones
or (in the case of subordinated sciences) of suppositiones. 1
When both of these conditions, formal and material, are met,
thinking wiltl. proceed rationabiliter, in a particularly pregnant
sense. It will possess the status of being not merely discursive
but indeed demonstrative reasoning. It will be reasoning which
is capable of yielding indisputably scientific knowledge, with
conclusions grounded in the discernment of causes and expressed by ceritain, universal, and necessary propositions (as
opposed to merely probable, particular, and contingent proposay nothing of mere opinions, surmisals, or gratuitous rhetoric) .
Within this context of the intelleces need to be grounded ultimately in first principles, Aquinas sees an initial and fundamental instantiation of "resolution." By " resolution "
Aquinas means, in the first place, a process of reasoning whereby the status " der.aonstra.tive " can be shown to pertain to a
sequence of discursive reaooning. I shall cafil ,this first type of
resolutive reasoning " logical resolution." The task of logical
,resolution is programatically delineated by Aquinas in the
Prooemium to the commentary on the Posterior Analytics of
Aristotle, 8 Logioal resolution seeks to display the uJ.timate
e See In Post. Anal., Prooemium, #6.
1 See In Post. Anal., I, Leet. 4, 5.
s "Pars autem Logicae, quae primo deservit processui, pars Iudicativa dicitur, eo quod iudicium est cum certitudine scientiae. Et quia iudicium certum
de elfectibus haberi non potest nisi resolvendo in prima principia, ideo pars

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IN METAPHYSICS

203

rooting in the first principles of both the formail and the material aspects of a piece of reasoning; its formal structure is
shown to be ultimately a particularized appli:cation of the first
principles of demonstration, rand its material aspect (the propositions which are its content) is shown to be ultimately deriv;ed from propositions which are, in one way or another,
primary propositions. By means of this two-fold "reduction"
or " analysis," the judgments which are the conc1usions of the
piece of reasoning in question ril be seen to possess the epistemological status of "certitude." 9 This will be displayed by
the judgments which terminate the process of resolution itself; in virtue of their own contact with first principles, the
judgments possess the status of certitude themselves.
Which are the salient charaicteristics of logical resolution
which make it paradigmatic for further instances of
reasoning? Which are the fundamental elements of logical
l.1esofotionwhich justify the wider and analogical extension of
the term " resolution " to designrnte other processes of reasoning which have such elements in common with it? I suggest
there are four. (1) Insofar as it is itself an instance of ratiocinatio, logical l.1eso1ution involves a dynamic interpfay between ;the two fundamental acts of the mind-simple apprehension and judgment. 10 (2) Logical resolution terminates in
intellectus-it is a discursive movement of the mind which
finds its climax and terminus in the intellectuail seizure of first
principles. 11 (3) Logical resolution is designated by Aquinas
haec Analytica vocatur, idest resolutoria. Certitudo autem iudicii, quae per
resolutionem habetur, est, vel ex ipsa forma syllogismi tantum ... vel etiam
cum hoc ex materia, quia sumuntur propositiones per se et necessariae .•• "
In Post. Anal., Prooemium, #6.
9 " ••• in cognitionem veritatis ratio inquirendo pervenit, quam intellectus
simplici intuitu videt; unde ratio ad intellectum terminatur; unde etiam in
demonstrationibus certitudo est per resolutionem ad prima principia, quorum
est intellectus ... " In Bent., II, d. 9, q. I, a. 8, ad. I.
10 See In Post. Anal., Prooemium, #4; In Boethii de Trm., q. 5, a. 3.
11" Intelligere
enim est simpliciter veritatem intelligibilem apprehendere.
Ratiocinari autem est procedere de uno intellecto ad aliud, ad veritatem intelligibilem cognoscendam ... inde est quod ratiocinatio humana, secundum

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI,

O.P.

as the "via iudicii " because its culminaiting insight into first
principles enables the intellect to ascertain the status of certitude which pertains to judgments, ,both the conclusions of
demonstrative reasonings and its own conclusions. 12 (4) Logical resolution is grounded in the discernment of causes.
The fourth element warrants some remarks-. The causes
whose discernment grounds the process of logicrul resolution
are the " form " iand " matter " of the pieces of l"easoning which
are anrulyzedby it. We have seen that these correspond to: (I)
The str:uctu:veof such a piece of reasoning as an instantiation
of the laws of syllogistic inference, which are ultimately reducible to the first principles of demonstmtion; (2) The logical status of being primary which pertains to the propositions
to which the content of such a piece of reasoning is ultimately
reducible. It must he noticed that logical resolution has no
direct interest in the particular subject matter of the propositions which are the content of such a piece of reasoning nor
has it ,any direct interest in the partiouilar subject matter of
the primary propositions to which they are
reducible. Logical resolution is directly concerned only with the
logical status of these primary propositions, with whether they
·are (as they must be if we are to have ian instance of demonstrative reasoning) digmtates or positiones or at ,the very least
suppositiones. Now, the "form" and "matter" of pieces of
reasoning, taken in this sense, are the logical causes of the
1

1

viam inquisitionis vel inventionis, prooedit a quibusdam simpliciter intellectis, quae sunt prima principia; et rursus in via iudicii, resolvendo redit
ad prima principia, ad quae inventa examinat." Summa Theol., I, q. 79,
a. 8.
12 ". • • non posset mens humana ex uno in aliud discurrere,
nisi eius discursus ab aliqua simplici acceptione veritatis inciperet, quae quidem acceptio
est intellectus principiorum. Similiter nee rationis discursus ad aliquid certum perveniret, nisi fieret examinatio eius quod per discursum invenitur, ad
principia prima, in quae ratio resolvit. Ut sic intellectus inveniatur rationis
principium quantum ad viam inveniendi, terminus vero quantum ad viam
iudicandi." De Ver., q. 15, a. I. " ... certitudo scientiae tota oritur ex
certitudine principiorum: tune enim conclusiones per certitudinem sciuntur,
quando resolvuntur in principia." De Ver., q. 11, a. I, a.d 13.

AQUINAS

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IN METAPHYSICS

205

status of certitude which pertains to the judgments which are
the conclusions of such reasonings. As "form" and "matter''
they are designaited by Aquinas as being "intrinsic causes."
Accordingly, i1ogka1 reso1ution is to be understood as a process
of reasoning which is carried out exdusively securtdum rationem. As sutch it is a process of reasoning which does not
'concern itself directly with extra-mental realities but rather
focuses upon certain chamoteri:stics of the constituents of the
conceptual order. It is a process of reasoning which concerns
itself with the entia rationi11 or intentiones 11ecundae which are
the subject mat.ter of ,logic.
II
Logical resolution can be performed with respect to any
sequence of rea,soning which lays olaim to demonstrative
status, regardless of the particular scientific discipline within
which that sequence of reasoning is carried out. But Aquinas
indicates further particula,r instances of resolutive reasoning
operative within and peculiar to ea:ch of the three theoretical
sciences, phys1cs, mathematics, and metaphysics. Resolutive
reasoning in the three theoretical sciences needs to be clearly
distinguished from logiica.l :resolution despite its notional continuity with it. I shall caU resolutive reasoning insofar as it is
operative in the theoretical sciences in general " scientific
resolution;" this is to distinguish it not only from logrcaI resolution but also from resolution in the specific sciences. Scientific
resolution adapts itself to the particular subject matter, and
thus scientific resolution in general has to he distinguished into
the three subordinate and specific types whereby it is instantiated in each of the three theoretical sciences: resolution in
physics, mathematical resolution, and
resoJution.
But at this point I should like to ,indioate the characteristics
of scientific resolution in general which differentiate it from
logical resolution.
Scientific reso1ution is in notional continuity with logical
l'esolution in thait it has in common with it the four elements

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

mentioned above: it is an instance of ratiocinatio and is thus
constituted by the interplay between simple apprehension and
judgment; it terminates in intellectus,. in the seizure of first
principles; it is designated as the "via iudicii ";it is grounded
in the discernment of causes. But what are the characteristics
of scientific resolution which differentiate it from logical resolution? There are four of these: (1) The first principles which
are seized as a resiult of scientific resolution (and which are its
terminus) are not at all those principles which are the concern of logical resolution. They are neither the first principles
of the understanding precisely insofar as they are the first
principles of demonstration, which ground the logico-formaJ.
aspect of demonstrative reasoning, nor are they the primary
propositions precisely insofar as they are considered from the
point of view of their logical status and quite independently of
their particular subj,ect matter which, as such, groUil!d the
iJ.ogico-materialaspect of demonstrative reasoning. Rather, scientific resolution is concerned with the first principles of the
theoretical sciences precisely insofar as they do yield a particular subject matter and .are thus determinative with respect to
a field of investigation. Thus, in the first place, scientific resolution is concerned with the first principle of a theoretical science, with its proper sdibile or obiectum speoulabile from
which, as its direct subject matter, the entire content of that
science may be said to flow.18 (fl) Because the first principle
1s "In qualibet enim scientia sunt quaedam principia subiecti, de quibus est
prima consideratio ... cum rationem unitatis scientiae acceperit ex unitate
generis subiecti, rationem diversitatis scientiarum non accipit ex diversitate
subiecti, sed ex diversitate principiorum. . . . Cum ergo scibile sit proprium
obiectum scientiae, non diversificabuntur
scientiae secundum diversitatem
materialem scibilium, sed secundum diversitatem eorum formalium ...• Et
ideo quantumcunque sint aliqua diversa scibilia secundum suam naturam,
dummodo per eadem principia sciantur, pertinent ad unam scientiam .•.•
Nee tamen intelligendum est quod sufficiat ad unitatem scientiae unitas
principiorum primorum simpliciter, sed unitas principiorum primorum in
aliquo genere scibili ... scientiae sint alterae secundum principia, cum perveniatur resolvendo ad principia prima quae sunt indemonstrabilia, quae
oportet esse eiusdem generis cum his quae demonstrantur." In Post A.nai., I,
Leet. 41, #364- #368.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION

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207

which is the terminus of scientific resolution is the obiectum
S]Jeculab'ilewhich is the subject matter of the particular theoretical science within which the process of resolution is operative, the essential element (the element which effects it) of scientific resolution is the particular mental operation whereby
the intellect can have aiooess to an obiectum s-peculabile. This
is the mental operation which is designated generically by
Aquinas as distinctio or abstractio, ood its three specific
types, proper to physics, mathematics, and metaphysics respectively, are total abstraction, formal abs•trruction,and separation.14 (8) Scientific resolution in general may proceed both
secundum rem and secundum rationem, with the exception of
mathematics where it operaites solely secundum rationem.
That is, scientific resolution can be grounded not only in the
discernment of intrinsic causes, materiwl and formal, but ailso
in the discernment of extrinsic causes, efficient and final.1-'
(4) The obiectum s-peculabileof a theoretical science is always
a ratio and, •even though in reality it is installltiated in parentities:, as an obie()twm s-peculabileexists in thought as
the content of a concept (and is thus charrucrterized by universwlity, necessity, ;i.mmaterialiity,and immutability). Thereu" Sic ergo in operatione intellectus triplex distinctio invenitur. Una
secundum operationem intellectus componentis et dividentis, quae separatio
dicitur proprie; et haec competit scientiae divinae sive metaphysicae. Alia
secundum operationem, qua formantur quiditates rerum, quae est abstractio
formae a materia sensibili; et haec competit mathematicae. Tertia secundum
eandem operationem [quae est abstractio] universalis a particulari; et haec
competit etiam physicae ... " In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 3.
u " ... quia cum rationis sit de uno in aliud discurrere, hoc maxime in
scientia natur.ali observatur, ubi ex cognitione unius rei in cognitionem alterius devenitur, sicut ex cognitione effectus in cognitionem causae. Et non
solum proceditur ab uno in aliud secundum rationem, quod non est aliud
secundum rem, sicut si ab animali procedatur ad hominem. In scientiis enim
mathematicis proceditur per ea tantum, quae sunt de essentia rei, cum
demonstrent solum per causam formalem; et ideo non demonstratur in eis
aliquid de una re per aliam rem, sed per propriam diffinitionem illius rei •
• • . Sed in scienti& naturali, in qua fit demonstratio per causas extrinsicas,
probatur aliquid de una re per aliam rem omnino extrinsecam." In. Boethii
de Tm., q. 6, a. I, ad lam q.

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MICHAEL

TAVUZZI, O.I'.

fore, it is in s1cientific resolution secundum rationem, rather
than in scientific resolution secundum rem, that the operation
of distinction which is specific to a particular theoretical science is operative and that science's direct subject matter is
grasped.
A1t this point it is necessary to clarify the distinction drawn
by Aquinas between reasoning secundum rem and reasoning
secundum rationem. (One should note that it is not a distinction which is pecuHar to resoJutive reasoning but is also apto the rational process of compositio) . Aquinas tells
us that reasoning secundum rem is reasoning which is grounded
in the discernment of extrinsic causes, efficient and final, while
reasoning secundum rationem is reasoning whi:ch is grounded
in the discernment of intrinsic causes, material and formaL16
But just what do these affirmations imply with respect to the
character of the two types of reasoning in question? I would
suggest that Aquinas is saying that reasonings secundum rem
are reasonings which are directly about realities; they are reasonings which find both their point of depa,rture and their conclusions in existentia,l propositions. On the other hand, reasonings secundum rationem are reasonings which need not be
,about realities iat alil-and, if they acre, 1they are so only in a
reflexive way. 17 They are rather reasonings which find both
their point of departure and their conclusions in propositions
which concern the conceptual order. They are reasonings
which are concerned with the determination of the necessary
constituents of the contents of concepts; they are concerned,
at least in the first place and directly, with rationes as such. 18
1a "Ratio enim ... quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem, ut quando
est demonstratio per causas vel effectus extrinsecos. . . . Quandoque vero
procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando est processus secundum causas intrinsecas ... " In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, 1, ad 3am q.
17 As in the case, for example, of mathematical
reasonings which are solely
secundum rationem, insofar as mathematics deals with mathematical "entities " which are no more than rationes but which when applied in the
" scientiae mediae" deal with realities.
1.8 This is why I have avoided the customary
practice of translating the

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS

209

The considerations just presented enable us to appreciate
why Aquinas characterizes scientific resolution in ways which,
while not wholly discontinuous with the four characterizations
of logical resolution mentioned aboVie, do l'epresent a significant reelabomtion of the concept of resolution. (1) It is a
movement of the intellect from composites to simples.19 (2)
It is a movement of the intellect from wholes to their parts. 20
(3) It is a movement of the intellect from what is known confusedly to something which is known distinctly. 21 (4) It is a
movement of the intellect from a multiplicity to a unity. 22 (5)
In the case of scientific resolution secundum rem, it is a movement of the intellect from effects to their cause. 28 (6) In the
case of scientific resolution secundum rationem, it is a movement of the inteUect from less universal concepts to a more
universal
Latin term "resolutio " by the English term "analysis." The term "analysis," with its connotation of conceptual analysis, might be employed to
translate the expression "resolutio secundum rationem" but certainly not
the term " resolutio" without further qualification.
·10" Est autem duplex via procedendi ad cognitionem veritatis. Una quidem
per modum resolutionis, secundum quam procedimus a compositis ad simplicia, et a toto ad partem, sicut dicitur in primo Physicorum, quod confusa
sit prius nobis nota. Et in hac via perficitur cognitio veritatis, quando pervenitur ad singulas partes distincte cognoscendas . .Alia est via compositionis,
per quam procedimus a simplicibus ad composita, qua perficitur cognitio
veritatis cum pervenitur ad totum." In Meta, II, Leet. 1, #278.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22" Est enim rationis proprium circa multa diffundi et ex eis unam simplicem cognitionem colligere .... Intellectus autem e converso per prius unam
et simplicem veritatem considerat et in illa totius multitudinis cognitionem
capit .... Sic ergo patet quod rationalis consideratio ad intellectualem
terminatur secundum viam resolutionis, in quantum ratio ex multis colligit
unam et simplicem veritatem. Et rursum intellectualis consideratio est principium rationalis secundum viam compositionis vel inventionis, in quantum
intellectus in uno multitudinem comprehendit." In Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a.
I, ad 3am q.
:2s "Ratio enim . . . procedit quandoque de uno in aliud secundum rem,
ut quando est demonstratio per causas vel efl'ectus extrinsecos; componendo
quidem, cum proceditur a causis ad efl'ectus; quasi resolvendo, cum proceditur
ab efl'ectibus ad causas ... " In Boethii de Trin., q .6, a. I, ad 3am q.
Quandoque vero procedit de uno in aliud secundum rationem, ut quando

2' "

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

m
In this paper I shaill not consider the details of resolutive
reasoning as it is operative in either physics or mathematics;
within these sciences it is effected by the mental operations of
totail abstraclion and formaJ. abstraJCtionrespectively. Rather,
at this point, I shall turn directly to resoi1utivereasoning as it
is operative in metaphysics. I shwhl consider in turn: (1) metaphysical resofotion secundum rem, and, in the next section,
metaphysical resolution secundum rationem.
The first moment of metaphysical resolution aecundum rem
invol¥es the presentation of one or more arguments which find
their point of departure in the factual existence of sensible
realities. These sensible rem1ities are most certainly grasped by
tihe mind as instances of being (ens) .25 But this original grasp
of being has as its content no more than a vague and confused
notion of being. It is an imprecise and unclarified notion of
bemg which is merely preliminary and not yet expliditly metaphysiool.26 :Lt is nonetheless a notion of being from which the
mind can derive that knowledge of the first principles of understanding, with which it must be endowed if it is to be able to
perform any process of reasoning whatsoever. The arguments
which constitute metaphysical resolution secundwm rem commence with the factmal existence of sensible realities and focus
upon their peculiar characteristics of particularity and multiplicity, of materiality, mutability, and .contingency, of being
affected by potentiality. In these arguments the mind considers precisely those characteristics of sensible realities which
:identify them as constituents of the Aristotelian realm of
est processus secundum causas intrinsecas: componendo quidem, quando a
formis maxime universalibus in magis particularia proceditur; resolvendo
autem quando e converso, eo quod 'universalius est simplicius." In Boethii,
ae Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad 3am q.
nostri, secundum praesentem sta.:25 " ••• nee primum obiectum intellectus
tum, est quodlibet ens et verum; sed ens et verum consideratum in rebus
materialibus ... " Summa Theol., I, q. 87, a. 3.
26 See my "Aquinas on the Preliminary
Grasp of Being," The Thomi8t 51
(1987): 555-574.

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flll

" physis " and which determine their inclusion within the reflexive subject matter of natural sdenoe. 27 The mind's consideration of these characteristics enables it to evaluate these
sensible realities as effects. For the puzzling factual existence
of realities endowed with suich characteristics demands, if the
intellect is to attain a satisfactory terminus at aH, the affirmation of the necessary existence of an ultimate and grounding
reality as their principle or caiuse, a supersensible reality whose
nature must be whoUy "lacking" these peculiar characteristics.
The one or more arguments which constitute metaphysical
resolrution secundum rem have thus the logical status of demonstrations quia. They are arguments which are grounded in the
discernment of extrinsic caiuses and involve a rational movement from the grasp of the existence of a multiplicity to the
affirmation of the existence of a grounding unity. As such,
these arguments are no mere processes of the analysis of concepts but precisely instances of resolution secundum rem.
Now one of these arguments might weU correspond to that
argument in the eighth book of the Physics whereby Aristotle
seeks to prove the ,existence of a Prime Unmoved Mover,
though I wou1d suggest that any other valid a posteriori argument for the existence of God would be equally aioceptable to
Aquinas. Nonetheless, no matter which argument :might he employed, wha,t is necessary is that it terminate in the intellectual
seizure of the " nature" of the first principle or caiuse whose
existence has been demonstrated, a caiuse whose " nature " is
gmsped to he, to use Aquinas's own words, lpsum Esse Subsistens. What I wish to stress is that it wouM not he sufficient
for metaphysical resolution secundum rem to terminate :me11ely
in the affirmation of the existence of some other immateriail or
separated substance, for
it would not be sufficient for
it to terminate in the affirmation of the eristence of the rational
soul .and of its immaterirulity. (The reasons for my insistence
wilil be evident below.)
ar I believe this to be the meaning of Aquinas's affirmation that " ... scientia naturalis a.liquid tradit scientiae divinae ... " In Boethii de Trin.,
q. 5, a. 1, ad 9.

MICHAEL

TAVUZZI, O.P.

But it mu.st be noticed that the inteillectuaJl sec1.zure which
terminates
resolution secundum rem l'epresents
an insight me!rely into God's " nature " rather than into God's
nature, that is, the seizuLl.'e of God as lpsum Esse Subsistens is
the produiot of an entire sequence of negative judgments, of
remotiones. 28 The distinctively metaphysicwl mental operation
of separatio is already operativce within the various arguments
which constitute metaphysical resolution secundum rem. 29 In
.first moment of metaphysicail resolution, negative
tion is cleady concerned with reaHties rather than with rationes
and might aocordingly he designated as "negative separation
secundum rem." This sequence of negative judgments of sepamtion secundum rem can be succinctly expressed by the following proposition: "not aH
involve potentiality and
are material and mutable . . . there must a:lso be a Being who
does not involve potentiality, materiality and mutability ... " 30
Metaphysical resolution secundum rem is therefore effected by
negative separation secundum rem. NeviertheJess, there is more
to
resolution secundum rem than just the procedure of negative separation which effects it. This " more "
is expressed by the positive judgment that "God is lpsum

1

.2s "Cognito de aliquid an sit, inquirendum restat quomodo sit, ut sciatur
de eo quid sit. Sed quia de Deo scire non possumus quid sit, sed quid non
sit, non possumus considerare de Deo quomodo sit, sed potius quomodo non
sit .... Potest autem ostendi de Deo quomodo non sit, :removendo ab eo ea
quae ei non conveniunt, utpote compositionem, motum et alia huiusmodi."
Summa Theol., I, q. 3., introd.
29 For Aquinas's identification
of the notions of "remotio" and "separatio
( secundum rem)": " Quaedam vero sunt quae excedunt et id quod cadit sub
sensu et id quod cadit sub imaginatione .... Sed tamen ex his, quae sensu
vel imaginatione apprehenduntur, in horum cognitionem devenimus per viam
causalitatis ... per remotionem, quando omnia, quae sensus vel imaginatione
apprehendit, a rebus huiusmodi separamus." bi Boethii de Trin., q. 6, a. 2.
so" ... est quaedam scientia superior naturali: ipsa enim natura, idest
res naturalis habens in se principium motus, in se ipsa est unum aliquod
genus entis universalis.
Non enim omne ens est huiusmodi: cum probatum
sit in octavo Physicorum, esse aliquod ens immobile. Hoc autem ens im·
mobile superius est et nobilius ente mobili, de quo considerat naturalis." ln
Meta., 4, Leet. 5, #593.

AQUINAS

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!l1$

Esse Subsistens." A positive judgment which as such, even
while it does not do justice to God's nature, is a sruitable terminus for a process of reasoning which wants to instantiate
Aquinas's: conception of resolution. furthermore it is 'a positive
judgment which substantiates Aquinas's characterization of
11esolutive reasoning as the " via iudicii," as it is a judgment
which has certitude, heing the 'result of one or more demonstrations quia.
Now it is clear that for Aquinas this metaphysical resolution secundum rem does not yield to the mind that ratio, that
ob'iectum S'peculabile, which is the direct subject matter of
metaphysics. For Aquinas, God, whose existence is affirmed
and whose "nature" is seized as being that of lpsum Esse
Subsistens, is the direct srubject matter not of metaphysics but
of sacra doctrina. 31 As we shall see, God only enters within the
ambit of metaphysioaJ. research insofar as He is the principium
essendi of the reflexive subject matter of metaphysics, of all
beings which, in one way or another, instantiate the ratio entis
and therefore fall under the concept of being in general (ens
oommune) , ·as if it were a generic concept. Nevertheless, it
might be argued, and I sha11 in fact argue, that the positive
and certain judgment, the intellectual insight, which is the
terminus of metaphysical resolution secundum rem, into the
"nature" of God as lpsum Esse Subsistens, is indispensable to
metaphysical reasoning's eventual seizure of the obiectum
S'peculabileof metaphysics in a manner adequate to the grounding of Aquinas's metaphysics as a science.
1

IV
The second moment of metaphysical resolution, secundum
rationem, is not directly concerned with realities, but, insofar
as it is grounded in the discernment of intrinsic causes, with
the formation of more universal concepts and the determination of the necessary constituents of their contents. It is an
a·1 See In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a.. 4.

Ql4

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

authentic instance of .resolutive reasoning not only because by
it the mind moves from the grasp of a multiplicity to that of
a unity hut also because it is a process of reasoning which
finds !its terminus in the inteHectual seizure of the very " nature" of that unity. This second moment of metaphysical
resolution is also effected by the e:xce.rcise of the distinctively
metaphysical mental operation of negative separation. But this
further type of negative separation must not he confused with
that negative separation secundum rem which had effected
metaphysical
secundum rem. Metaphysical resolution secundum rationem is effected iby wha,t might accordingly
be designated as " negative separation secundum rationem."
Whether metaphysoocrul:resolution secundum rationem is necessarily dependent for the very possibility of its achievement
upon a prior execution of metaphysical resolution secundum
rem is an extl'emely controversial issue, and it is also an issue
which has been formulated in variious different w;ays. Basically
it corresponds to the problem of whether the very possibility
of Aquinas's science of metaphysics is necessarily dependent
upon a prior demonstration of God's existence and the seizure
of God's "nature" as lpsum Esse Subsistens. What is not
controversial though is that metaphysical :resolution S'ecund!um
rationem
be founded upon metaphysicai resolrution secundum rem. I believe that this would be a;ooeptable even to
those interpreters of Aquina,s's metaphy;sicrul methodology who
wouJid argue that it need not be. lit is my contention though,
as I have ailreaidy intimated !in the preceding section, that in
fact it must he and I sha:H take this for granted in the remainder of this .section. So as ,to avoid irksome interruptions of
its continuity I shaiLl argue only my case here and consider
alternative foberpretations in the next and conc1u:ding section
of this paper.
As I have said, metaphysical reso1ution secundum rationem
moves from the grasp of a multiplicity to that of a unity, and,
precisely becaiuse it is a :resolution secundum rationem, both of
these concern. the conceptual order" The initial multiplicity is

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS

that of diverse concepts of being. These are not yet explicitly
metaphysical conoopts of being, as they do not presuppose any
kind of grasp of the ratio entis but only that vague and confused notion of being which is the content of that original apprehension of being (to which I referred in the preceding section) . They are concepts such as: " material and mutable being ·affected by potentiality," " immaterial but mutable being
affected by potentiality," " immaterial and immutable, purely
ructuail being." In metaphysical resolution secundurn rationem,
the mental operation of negative separation concerns: itself precisely with such concepts. Negative separation secundum rationem progressively denies that the peculiar contents of these
various concepts of being are necessary constituents of the
ratio entis, which is to be ·seized eventuaUy. It denies that they
iare necessary constituents of .the content of the concept of being in general, which is thereby gradually elaborated. The reasoning which justifies these progressive negations is obvious.
If, for example, either the notion of materiality or that of immateriality were nooessary constituents of the ratio entis, then
the actual existence of either immaterial beings or material beings, resrpectiv;ely, would be ·contradictory and hence impossible. But as a matter of fact (and as was recognized through
metaphysical resolution secundum rem), not only material beings but also immaterial beings exist. Therefore both the notion of materiality and that of immateriality must be negated
of the ratio entis. 82 Now the great va.Iue of this procedure is
that it enables the mind to move grruduaill.ytowarrls the seizure
of the ratio entis, by negating of it (in the manner indicated)
what cannot possibly pertain to it as a necessary constituent,
without at the same time presupposing a prior grasp of the
ratio entis (which would involve circular reaisoning).
a2 "· •• ens et substantia dicuntur separata a materia et motu non per hoc
quod de ratione ipsorum sit esse sine materia et motu, sicut de ratione asini
est sine ratione esse, sed per hoc quod de ratione eorum non est esse in
materia et motu, quamvis quandoque sint in materia et motu, sicut animal
abstrahit a ratione, quamvis aliquod animal sit rationale." In Boethii de
Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 5.

MICHAEL

TAVUZZI,

O.P.

At this point one must be carefuJ not to interpret the role
of negative separation incorrectly. Negative separation does
not imply the positive exclusion from the concept of being in
general of, say, the notion of materiality or that of immateriality. If this were the case
would be tantamount to asserting
than neither material beings nor immaterial beings could faH
under the " generic " iconcept of being in genern,l whiJCh is heing
formed. If this were the nature of the role of negative separa;tion, the result would be 'an entirely vacuous concept of being
in genemL Furthermore insofar as it would place both outside of being in general, it would transform the notions of
materiality and immateriality into difjerentiae and the concept
of being in genera,} into a generic concept. Rather, negative
separation goes not further than the denial that the notions
of materiaJity and immateriality are necessary constituents of
rthe ratio entis. Thus the ratio entis, even though it has not as
yet been grasped, is aicknow,ledged as being oapabJe of instanin both material and immaterial be[ngs. Both material
being and immaterial beings can therefore he "subsumed"
under the concept of being in general. By this" s1uhsumption"
I mean simpJy that both material beings and rimmasterial beings, insofar as they both instantiate the ratio entis and therelol'e fall under the quasi-generic concept of being in general, can
be considered from the point of view of being as being (ens inquantum ens) and as mch enter within the scope of metaphysical research. In other words, being as being, the concept
of being in general which is being progressiV'ely elaborated, does
not posritively exclude either materiarl beings or immaterial beings, and both can be considered under the forma.lity of being
as heing, bemuse the possible instantia:tion of the ratio entis
is not limited either to the one or fo the other. Neither the notion of material,ity nor tha1t of immateriality is a necessary constituent of the ratio entis, and it is precisely this that is shown
through negative separation s'ecundum rationem.
This sequence of negative judgments of separation secundum
rationem can be succinctly expressed rby the
proposi-

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS

fl! 7

tion: To the ratio entis does not necessarily pertain either the
notion of being materirul or of being .immaterial, of being mutaihle or of being immutable. Thus, as the result of this progressive negative separation, metaphysical
aecundum
rationem invoives the movement of :the mind from all our
multiple and preliminary coDJCepts of being to the formaition of
1the concept of being in general (ens commune). Insofar as the
ratio entis which is the necessary constituent of rthe content of
this COillCeptcontains no necessary reference to either materiality or immateriality, the concept of being in general is situated
on the level of the third degree of separation from matter. 88
Yet, insofar ·as the ratio entis can be instantiated in both material and immaiteriaJ beings, both can fall under the concept of
being in general, which therefore has been appropriately charaderized by interpreters 1as only " neutrally immaterial." 34
I should like to stress that metaphyfficaJ resolution secundum
raticmem involvies more than the negative separation secundum
rationem which effects it. It is not to be confused with negative separation, let alone identified with it. The climax, the
terminus which is necessary to it as a process of resolution,
cannot simply be the formation of a concept of being in generrul but must rather be the inteillecturulmsight into, the poffitive seizure of, the ratio enfis. Remember that the gradual
elaboration of the concept of being in general through negative separation did not at all presuppose a seizure of the ratio
entis; this was rather the constant goal of the process of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem. Just how is this
achieved and just " what" is rthe ratio entis? I would suggest
that as the result of negative separation, the mind discerns that
there is at least one " conceptual " .content which, insofar as
it is necessarily common to 1all the mwltiple and preliminary
ss See Summa Theoi., I, q. 85, a. 1, ad 2.
F. Wippel, "Metaphysics and Separatio According to Thomas
Aquinas," The Review of Metaphysics 31 (197&): 431-470. I shall cite from
this article as republished in M etaphysioai
in- .Thomas Aquinas
(Washington, 1984), pp. 69-104. See p. 72.
34 John

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

concepts of being on which negati¥e separation has been exercised, positively resists negative separation and is seized by
the intellect as the ratio entis. This irreducible conceptual content may not be negated of the concept of being in general
without either faHing into contmdiction or ",annihilating " it.
This conceptual content is the sharing in a common existential
actuality, of participating in a common esse ut actus
The ratio entis, the one necessary constituent of the content
of the concept of being in general is the condition of participating in what Aquinas 'refers to as "esse commune ". 36
The problem which immerdiately arises is that of the nature
of this act of fotellectual seizure of the ratio entis, which :represents the terminus of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem. What is the nature of this wot, and what are its ultimate conditions of possibility, if it is to be able to ground
Aquinas's metaphysics as a science? I will not deal with this
issue at this point, but I shall return to it in the concluding
section, because I believe that the answer given to this question affects a11 the controversial issues in current interpretations of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology.
Now the ratio entis is the one necessary constituent of the
concept of being in general which is the obiectum speculabile,
the direct subject matter, of Aquinas's metaphysics. The reflexive subject matter of metaphysics, on the other hand, is all
those entities, whatever their individual, specific, and generic
peouHarities, in which the ratio entis is found and which therefore fall under the concept of being in general as a quasi-generic
concept. This is ana:logous to the way in which sensible par35 " ••• ratio autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur ... " De Ver., q. l, a.
1, ad 3.; " ... ens dicitur quasi esse habens ... " In Meta., 12, Leet., l,
#2419.; " ... ens dicat aliquid proprie esse in actu ... " Summa, Theol., I,
q. 5, a. 1.
-06 Esse commune is our conceptualization
of esse ut actus entis insofar as
we consider it as participated in by all entia, "Quod est commune multis,
non est aliquid praeter multa nisi sola ratione .... Multo igitur minus et
ipsum esse commune est aliquid praeter omnes res existentes nisi in intellectu solum." Summa Contra, Gent., I, Cap. 26, #241.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION

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219

ticu1ars are only the reflexive subject matter of a natural science. The direct subject matter, the obiectum speculabile, is
the ratio found in these particulars as their natures or essences;
it is the necessary content of that universal, specific, or generic,
concept which, in the resolutive moment of that natural scieooe, has been formed by the mental operation of total abstraction. 37 We should also note that for Aquinas all the entities in which the ratio entis is instantiated enter into the reflexive subject matter of metaphysics only insofar as they do
instantiate the ratio entis and not as they are instantiations
of different natural kinds. 38 Furthermore, in the light of the
mind's grasp of the ratio entis at the climax of metaphysical
resolution secundum rationem, it is dear why God is not the
obiectum speculabile of metaphysics and does not even enter
within its reflective subject matter: because God as Ipsum
Esse Subiistens is grasped by the mind at the dimax of metaphysical reso1ution secundum rem, He does not exemplify the
condition of participating in esse commune, is not to be numbered among the entities which instantiate the ratio entis, and
falls outside of the extension of the concept of ens commune.
As I intimated at the conclusion of the preceding section, God
enters the ambit of metaphysical researeh only as the principium essendi of :the constituents of the reflexive subject matter of metaphysics.

a1 " ••• scientia est de aliquo dupliciter. Uno modo primo et principaliter,
et sic scientia est de rationibus universalibus, supra quas fundatur. Alio
modo est de aliquibus secundario et quasi per reflexionem quandam, et sic de
illis rebus, quarum sunt illae rationes, in quantum illas rationes applicat
ad res etiam particulares, quarum sunt, adminiculo inferiorum virium. Ratione enim universali utitur sciens et ut re scita et ut medio sciendi. Per
universalem enim hominis rationem possum iudicare de hoc vel de illo."
In Boethii de Trin., q. 5, a. 2, ad. 4.
:is" .... metaphysicus considerat etiam de singularibus entibus non secundum proprias rationes, per quas sunt tale vel tale ens, sed secundum
quod participant communem rationem entis ... " In Boethii de Trin., q. 5,
a. 4, ad 6.

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MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

v
In light of this interpretation of metaphysical resolution in
Aquinas, I would now like to consider a partiiculal"ly controversial issue which has received a great deaJ of attention in the
contempora:ry discussion of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology.89 This issue has usuahly ,been expressed in the form of
the question: Do we first need to prove the existell!Ceof God if
the science of metaphysics envis aged by Aquinas is to be possible rut all? Interpreters of Aquinas's metaphysical methodology have given an extremely wide variety of answers to this
question, but I believe they can he grouped into four basic
positions.. (1) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does not presuppose a prior demonstration of the existence of God because
the intellect is capable of forming a concept of being in general, the subject matter of this science, by means of a distinctio
other than negative separation, for example, by means of some
kind of total or formal abstraction. (2) Aquinas's science of
metaphysics does not presuppose a prior demonstration of the
existence of God because the inteHect is capable of forming a
concept of being in general by means of a process of negative
separation, and this process need not be grounded in the
demonstl'ation of the existence of any immaterial reality, let
alone of God. (3) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does not
presuppose a prior demonstration of the ·existence of God because the intdJect is capable of forming a concept of being in
geneml by negative separation and, though this process needs
to be grounded in the affirmation of the existence of some immaterial reality, for example, the rational soul, this need not
be God. (4) Aquinas's science of metaphysics does presuppose
a prior demonstration of the existence of God because the intellect is only capable of forming a concept of being in gen1

1

1

so For an invaluable guide see John F. Wippel, op. cit., and the discussion
of this article in Rassegna di Letteratura Tomistica 14 ( 1981) : 127-128.
See also A. Moreno, O.P., " The .Subject, Abstraction and Methodology of
Aquinas' Metaphysics," AngeZioum 61 (1984): 580-601.

AQUINAS

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221

eral, by means of a process of negative separation, and this
process can only be grounded in the affi.rmation of the existem:ie of the immaterial reality who <is God.
It is my contention that all four of these positions are unsatisfactory because they a11 fail to do justice to the problem
as I think it should be reformulated. In light of the interpreta,tion given above, I would ask: Does the intellect fust need to
perform that metaphysicail resolution secundum rem which has
as !its terminus the seizure of God as lpsum Esse SubSistens if
it is to be capable of performing that metaphysrca1l reso1ution
secundum rationem whereby it can obtain that obiectum
speculabile, the ratio entis, which is the direct subject maitter
of metaphysics? And can it do so in a manner which will
ground Aquinas's metaphysics as a science?
In Eght of this reformulation of the problem, I see little
point to entering into a detailed discussion of the four positions. I consider them all to share some common failings: (1)
They faiil to see that the obiectum speculabile which must be
seized if the science of metaphysics envisaged by Aquinas is
fo be possible at aU is not just some indeterminate concept of
being in general hut precisely the ratio entis. (2) They fail to
see that that negativie separation which effects metaphysical
resolution secundum rem must be clearly distinguished from
that negative separation which effects metaphysical resolution
secundum rationem. (3) They fail to see that in neither case
of metaphysical resoilrution (secundum rem and secundum rationem) should the negative sepamtion which effercts it,
(secundum rem and secundum rationem respectiviely) be confused, let alone identified, with the resolution that it effects;
the reso•lution effected invoJves more than just the negative
separation which effects it. (4) They fail to appreciate the implications of Aquinas's conception of resolution in general, and
a fortiori of metaphysical resolution, ,and thereby fail to render
an adequate account of the scientific status that Aquinas attributes to his metaphysics.
As we have seen, one of the essential elements of a process

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

of resolution as such is ,that it is a process of ratio which necessarily terminates in intellectus; [t is a process of discursive
reasoning which has ·as its terminus always and necessarily
the seizme of first principil.es.This is especially and pamdigmaticaJ:ly tme of resolution in its initial instantiaition as logical
resolution, hut it is ,aJ.so true of scientific resolution as it is
performed within and specified by each of the three theoretical
sciences. Logical resolution culminates in the seizure of the first
principles of both the formal 1and the material aspects of reasonings as such. Similarly, scientifiic
culminates in
the seizure of rthe first principle proper to a science from which
the entire content of that science flows, its ob'ieotum speculabile, which as such is 1always a ratio. Now metaphysical resolution, if it !is to be an iauthentic process of resolution at all,
must culminate in the inteJiectool .seiZ1Ure of the first principle
of metaphysics, of its obiecitum speoUlabile, the ratio entis,
wh!ich is the necessary oonstitiuent of the concept of being in
general. The point that needs to be stressed is that the terminus of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem cannot be
just the formation of some imprecise or indeterminate concept
of being in general which wou1d still leave the mind quite unenlightened as to the ratio entis. Such a " terminus " would not
be 1an .arlequate terminus at all, and the process of " resolution " that attained it wou1d not be an authentic instance of
resolution. After all, we already have some kind of vague and
confused notion of being on the basis of the original, merely
preliminary and pre-metaphysical grasp of being which is
common to 1aJl men. Indeed, if one oould found the science of
metaphysics envisaged rby Aquinas on some merely indeterminate concept of being in general and without an explicit
seizure of the ratio entis, then surely this original apprehension
of being would be quite sufficient, and there wou1d he no need
whatsoever for either metaphysical resolution or the negative
separations which effect it. But, as I have argued, for Aquinas
it is the seizure of the ratio entis which represents the only
satisfactory terminus of metaphysical resolution seoondum
rationem.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION

IN METAPHYSICS

flfl8

At this point we need to return to the ea11lier question about
the precise nature of this intellectual seizure whereby the mind
attains the ratio entis as the terminus of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem. We have seen that this seizure is
.rendered possible by that succession of negative judgments of
separation secundum rationem which effect metaphysical resolution secundum rationem. Since it must have the characler of
a positive seizure, this ·attainment itself cannot be a negative
judgment of separation. The situation is exactly parallel to
that of metaphysical resolution secundum rem, which is effected by a S1Uccession of negative separations secundum rem
hut which has .a:s its terminus the positive judgment that " God
is lpsum Esse Subsistens," and while this judgment does not
do justice rto God's nature, it is nonethefoss no mere negation.
Simil.arly, I would suggest, the seizure of the ratio entis which is
ithe terminus of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem is
no mere negation but a positive judgment: "the ratio entis is
the condition of participating in esse commune."
Now it is my contention that this positive judgment seizing
the ratio entis must presuppose the positive judgment seizing
God as lpsum Esse Subsistens if it is adequately to ground
Aquinas's metaphysics as a science and if the process of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem of which it is the terminus is to be an a;uthentic instantiation of Aquinas's conception of resolution. Aquinas characterizes the process of resolution as the "via iudicii." An authentic process of resofotion
must have as its terminus not just rany positive judgment
but must always oulminate in a positive judgment which pos·sesses the epistemological status of being certain. A positive
judgment which seized the ratio entis but which lacked certitude would not only be inadequate to the grounding of metaphysics as a science; it would not even represent a satisfactory
terminus for a process of metaphysical resolution secundum rationem which claimed to be authentic.
W·e have seen that the positive judgmental seizing God as
lpsum Esse Subsistens, which is the terminus of metaphysi1

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

ool resolution secundum rem, does possess certitude. This is
becaiuse metaphysical resolution secundum rem, even though
it is effeoted by a sequence of negative separations, is constituted by one or more arguments which have the logical
status of demonstrations qu'ia. But what is the epistemological
status of rthe positive judgment seizing the ratio entis if we
consider it exclusively in terms of metaphysical resolution
secundum rati..onem? This process of metaphysical resolution
is a11so effected iby a sequence of negative sepamtions, but, unmetaphysical resolution secundum rem, it is in no way
constituted by one or more arguments which could possibly
pretend to the status of being demonstrations quia, let alone
demonstrations propter quid. Metaphysical l'esolution secundum rationem
neither reasoning from realities grasped
as effoots to the affirmation of the existence of their cause nor
purely deductive reasoning, which would have as its point of
departure the grasp of some quod quid est of being, expressed
by a definition. Of course this is entirely appropriate: it
would hardly do for the initial seizure of the obiectum speculabile of metaphysics to be the result of demonstrative reasoning if metaphysics is to be first philosophy.
Furthermore, in contrast with logical resolution, metaphysical resolution secundum rationem is not a case of an analysis
or reduction to first principles which are principia per se nota
quoad ommnes (propositions whose truth is grasped and assented to by a1l who understand :the meanings of the terms
which appear in them) . Such principles are known to begin
with; they must be if the logical resolution of the piece of reasoning being examined is to be possible at all. The proposition
which expresses the seiz:ure of the ratio entis, " the ratio entis
is the condition of participating in esse commune," while it
might in se be an analytic proposition, is most certainly not
analytic quoad om,nes. If it were presupposed, we would
have a petitio principii. Rather, it is arrived ak by the application of a finite series of negative separations secundum rationem to a finite series of diverse preliminary concepts of be-

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION

IN METAPHYSICS

225

ing. As I said in the preceding section, it represents the seizure
of an irreducible collJceptual content which cannot be negated
of the concept of being in general without either falling into
contradiction or " annihilating " that concept. But it must be
kept in mind that this concept of being in general has itself
been formed on the basic of a necessarily finite series of diverse
concepts of being. As a matter of principle the seizure of the
ratio entis which culminates metaphys:UcaJ.resolution secundum
rationem represents no more than a highly sophisticated conjecture. There is no certitude whatsoever that it represents a
be. Viewed
seizure of the ratio entis as it must
solely in the light of the metaphysical resolution secundum rationem which it culminates, the seizure of the ratio entis seems
to be irremediably deficient with respect to the epistemological
status that it must have if metaphysics is to be a science and
not mereJy a
discipfine, dealing at best with probabilities.
It should now he dear why I believe that the very possibility
of Aquinas's science of metaphysics presupposes a prior demonstration of the existence of God and the intellectual seizure of
God as Ipsum Esse Subsistens as ithe terminus of metaphysicail
resolution secundum rem. It is only by being seen in the light
of this eertain judgment that the seizure of the ratio entis
which eulminaities
resolution secundum rationem
can itself acquire the epistemological status of certitude. Insofar as it does so, it becomes an aoceptahle terminus for the
prooess of resolution which it culminates, a process of resolution which Aquinas would call the " via iudicii." Insofar as it
does so, it can also serve as a suitable point of departure for
a scientific metaphysics which finds in the ratio entis its
obiectum speculabile or direct subject matter. Aquinas makes
this point repeatedly, albeit implicitly, throughout his works.
It is because God is lpsum Esse Subsistens thait we can be certain that the condition of participating in esse commune is the
ratio entis, which is instantiated in e¥erything whi:ch faJ1ls under

MICHAEL TAVUZZI, O.P.

the concept of being in geneml 'as if it were a generic concept. 40
By being seen in the light of rthe certain
of God as Ipsum
Esse Subsistens, the proposition which expresses rthe seizure of
the ratio entis is grounded epistemoJogicall.yand is revealed to
be an analytic proposition, a propoSitio immediata. Though not
immediata quoad omnes, it is no mere nugatio or trivial tautology. It is a suitable point of departure for metaphysics, that
is, for the judgments with respect to necessities which constitute the reflexive subj·ect matter of metaphysics. u
Furthermore, I would suggest that my interpretation now
makes it possible to give 1a definitive account of why God must
be e:mliuded from the 1-e:flexive subject matter of metaphysics.
Otherwise one sees the direct S1Ubject matter of metaphysics
as being, either some indeterminate concept of being in general,
as in the case of the four representative positions enumerated
above, o;r a ratio entis as the condition of participating in esse
commune, grasped in a judgmental seizure which culminates
metaphysical resolution secundum rem but which is not epistemologically grounded in the seizure of God as lpsum Esse
Subsistens. In either case, it then becomes impossible to exclude God definitively from the extension of the concept of being in general (ens commune) . And with regard to this issue
Aquinas. himself never manifests the slightest doubt. 42
40 " ••• Deus est ipsum esse per se subsistens. . . . Relinquitur
ergo quod
omnia alia a Deo non sint suum esse, sed participant esse." Summa Theol,
I, q. 44, a. 1; " ... sicut hie homo participat humanam naturam, ita quodcumque ens creatum participat •.. naturam essendi: quia solum Deus est
suum esse ... " Summa Theol., I, q. 45, a. 5 ,ad 1.
41 " ••• et circa naturas inferiores quas respicit ratio inferior, possunt
accipi necessariae considerationes, quae ad scientificum pertinent:
alias
Physica et Metaphysica non essent scientiae ... " De Ver., q. 15, a. 2, ad 3.
42 " ••• illud enim quo primo acquiritur
ab intellectu est ens et id in
quo non invenitur ratio entis non est capibile ab intellectu • . . secundum
rei veritatem, Causa prima est supra ens, inquantum est ipsum esse infinitum.
Ens autem dicitur id quod finite participat esse et hoc est proportionatum
intellectui nostro. . . . Unde illud solum est capibile ab intellectu nostro
quod habet quidditatem participantem esse; sed Dei quidditas est ipsum esse,
unde est supra intellectum." Sup. De Oausis, Prop. 6, lect. 6, #174-175.

AQUINAS ON RESOLUTION IN METAPHYSICS

227

In conclusion I should Jike to make a final suggestion. The
intellect's positive and certafa seizures of God as lpsum Esse
Subsi,stens and of the ratio entis as the condition of participating in esse commune, which terminate metaphysical resolution
secundum rem 1and metaphysicail resolution secundum rationem, are the pofots of departure for the two subsequent
moments of metaphysical reasoning envisaged by Aquinas.
They are the starting points for the two processes of metaphysical composition Becundum rem and metaphysical com.position secundum rationem respectively. But this raises the
wider issue of the preeise nature and :role of compositio in
Aquinas's metaphysfoal methodo1ogy. The argument that I
have presented in this paper is quite l'elevant to this issue.
After all I have contended that :the very possibility of Aquinas's
science of metaphysics is dependent upon a prior seizure of
of this
God as lp8Um Esse Subsistens and only in the
seizure can the proposition which expresses the seizure of the
ratio entis acquire the logical status of a positio. Thus, my
argument has implied a definite commitment to the demonstrative character of at least one dimension of Aquinas's subsequent metaphysical reasoning. But this issue of Aquinas's
understanding of compositive metaphysical reasoning deserves a whole artiole in its own right.

PLATO'S PARMENIDES AND ST. THOMAS'S
ANALYSIS OF GOD AS ONE AND TRINITY
SHERWIN

KLEIN

Fairleigh Dickinson University
Hackensack, New Jersey

I

N HIS CRITICISM of the Neopfatonic interpretation of
the Parmenides, Cornford says, "The fanguage throughout is as dry and prosaic as a textbook on algebra; there
is little here to suggest that the One has any religious significance as there is in the other case to suggest that x, y, and z
are a trinity of unknown gods." 1 I agree with Cornfo11d that
the N eopl atoniJc interpreta.tion is very speculative and seriously flawed. Nonethe1ess, the "negative theology" these interpreters attribute to Plato is instruic1tive. More than this, it
can be shown that opinions like Cornford' s are, to say the
least, unimaginative.
I intend to est ablish, in the first and main part of this artide,
the logical agreement between the PJatonic and Thomistic analyses of an absoJuteiy simple unity. The argument at Parmenides 137b-142a, Blato's analysis of the absoluteJy one, prov]des a basis for determining what God, as an absolutdy simple unity, is not. By applying this 'argument in the Parmenides
to St. Thomas's discussion of God as one, I shaill show that
what appears to be " as dry and prosai:c as a textbook on
algebra " has, contrary to Cornfo11d, " religious significance."
In the second part of this article, I shall use the arguments
at Parmenides 157b-159b and 159b-160b to determine what can
1

1

1 Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides'
Way of Truth and Plato's Parmenides,
trans. with introduction and commentary by Francis MacDonald Cornford
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 131.

229

230

SHERWIN KLEIN

be predicated of God, if St. Thomas's analysis of the Trinity
is to aoco:rd with the articles of faith (God as an abso1utely
simple unity as weU as a Trinity). Once again, we shall see
the ":religious significance" of Plato's analysis and the irony
of Cornfo11d's suggestion about the meaninglessness of applying
Plato's analysis to " a trinity of unknown gods."

I
We should first he clear about how St. Thomas uses the term
"one" as applied to God. In Q. n, A. 1 of the Prima Pars
(The Unity of God) ,2 he distinguishes between one as "the
negation of division" and one as "the principle of number."
The first sense, which he calls the transcendental sense, applies
to God; in this sense the one is opposed to the many as the
undivided is :to the divided. Human beings cannot know what
God is, but we can determine what God is not, e.g., not-many,
the transcendental sense of being absolutely simple. (The
human intdlect can only know the composite or tha,t which
pertains to the composite; it cannot know that which is absample or undivided.)
St. Thomas says, "He is
supremely undivided inasmuch as He is divided neither actually nor potentially by any mode of division; since He is altogether simple." 3
If we :compare the analysis of God as absolutely one or simple with the first hypothesis of the one in the
i.e.,
if the one is one, what can be predicated of it, then we shall
notice an important similarity. If the one is simply one, none
of the categories which can determine the nature of the one
are predicable of it. Similarly, God as absolutely one or simple cannot be understood in ,a positive manner (His nature is
incomprehensible) . However, He can be understood negatively. And what we can say negatively about God parallels
2 References are to the Summa Theologica in Basic Writings
of Saint
Thomas Aqu-Ynas, ed. Anton C. Pegis, vol. I (New York: Random House,

1945).

a ST, I, q. 11, a. 4, c.; Pegis, p. 90.

PLATO AND AQUINAS

231

Plato's determination of what is not predicable of the one as
simple.
To show what God is not, we must negate what does not apply to Him; this reveals the simplicity of God. If the one is
one (in St. Thomas's transcendenta.l sense of "one " as simple), says Plato, it cannot be many and, therefor:e, cannot have
parts and cannot be a whole, for a whole is composed of parts.
In his discussion of " The Existence of God in Things," St.
Thomas says, " A whole is so called with reference to its parts.
Now a part is twofold: viz., a part of the essence, as the form
and the matter are called parts of the composite, while genus
and diHerence are calrled parts of species. There is also a pavt
of quantity, into which any quantity is divided." 4 I shall use
this analysis of part and whole in order to determine the simplicity of God. God cannot be a body, for He is pure actuality,
and 'any body possesses potentia.lity for change or motion.
Thus, God cannot be a pant of a quantity, for He does not
partake of that which is materia.l. Nor is God a composite
being in the sense that form and matter are par:ts of a composite whole. Since God is pure actuality, He cannot he composed of matter and form. But forms can either be received
into matter and individuated by matter (composite beings)
or they cannot be received into matter (self-subsistent beings).
In the latter case, the form is individuated in a negative sense,
beca.use it cannot be received into matter. God is said to be
surch 'a form.
St. Thomas is aware of the folilowing problem that Plato
mises: If the one is simply one, how can we predicate anything of it, for :then it would be many and not one? St. Thomas
says that since we speak of simple things only as! if they were
composite, for we may predicate names of the simpJe thing, we
may predicate Godhead' or life of God, but this does not mean
that God is composite. " We indicate the composite way in
which our intellect understands, hut not that there is any composition in God." 5
4 ST, I, q. 8, a. 2, ad 3;

Pegis, p. 65.

5 ST,

I, q. 3, a. 3, ad 1; Pegis, p. 29.

SHERWIN

KLEIN

No:r is God a composrite entity because He is composed of
genus and difference. A thing may he in a genus in two ways:
either properly, as a species is contained in a genus, or as a
point, for example, is reduced to 1the genus of quantity. God
is not in a genus as in the former case, for species is composed
of genus and idifforence. Genus is to difference as potentiality
is to actuality. But in God, there is no potentiality. God is not
reducible to any genus, for any principle, e.g., a point, does
not extend beyond the genus to which it belongs, hut God is
the principle of a'11. being.
In God there are no accidents, and, therefore, He cannot be
composite in this way because a subject is to its a1ocidents as
potentiality is to actuality, but there is no potentiality in God.
Since God does not partake of the compos ite in any way, He
must he absolutely simple.
Returning to the argument in the Parmenides, Plato says
that an absolutely simple unity cannot have a beginning, middle, and end, for it has no parts. The Trinity is, in some sense,
a beginning, middle, a.nd end, but not in the sense of having
pa.rts. Having no beginning, middle, or end, the one is apeiron
(unlimited), without end or infinite.
The infinite, a;ocording to St. Thomas, can be considered
with respect to form or matter. God is not infinite qua matter,
for He is absolutely simple and pure form. Thus, He is said
to be infinite in His essence raithe:r than in magnitude. Conoe:rning form, composite beings are relatively infinite, for their
forms are in potentiality to an indefinite number of acd dental
forms. God alone is absolutely infinite with respect to form,
for He is pure wotuality and, thus, an absolutely simple unity.
Therefore, He is in potentiwlity to no accidents; He possesses
an infinite number of perfections by His essenJCe alone.
Pilato says that the one, being nonmaterial, is shapeless, and
sinoe it is formless (in this sense) it cannot be in ph1;ce. If it
were in place, it wou1d be either in itself or in anothe r. If it
were ii.TI itseilf, it wou1d be both container and contained, and,
therefore, two rather than one. Nor could it be in another, for
1

1

1

1

1

PLATO AND AQUINAS

it would be bounded by another and touched in many p1ruces.
But this is impossible if the one, being one and indivisible, is
without shape and parts.
St. Thomas considers, as does Plato, the connection between
infinity and plruce, although in a different way. "God is said
to be everywhel'e, and in aH things, inasmuch as He is boundless and infinite." 6 Plato argues that the one cannot be in
plruce. We notice, however, that the one is considered as a material ·entity. If the one is indivisible, in this sense, it cannot
be located in the world or be in place. St. Thomas says, " God
is in ruil things, not, indeed, as part of their essence, nor as an
wocident, but as an agent is present to that upon which it
aots." 7 God is said to fill every place but not in the way a
rnateriaJ body does. " He fills every plwce by the very fact that
He gives being to the things that fill all plaices." s
Plato proceeds to show that the one as indivisible cannot
he in motion. If it were in motion, it would either change or
move in plruce. But if the one changes, it will no longer be itself (one) . If it moves in place, the motion is either circular
or rectilinear locomotion. The former lcind of motion, however, implies parts (the center must he differentiated from the
other parrt,s) ; the latter kind of motion implies coming to he
in a place, which entails parts.
After considering God's omnipresence and existence, St.
I, q. 7, in trod.; Pegis, p. 56.
I, q. 8, a. l, c.; Pegis, p. 63.
a ST, I, q. 8, a. 2, c.; Pegis, p. 65. The term " indivisible" pertains either
to the continuous, e.g., a point or a moment, or to that which is outside the
genus of the continuous. In the first case the indivisible cannot be in many
places, but in the latter case it can. " Such a kind of indivisible does not
belong to the continuous as a part of it, but as touching it by its power
(Ibid., ad 2) God is said to be in all things by His essence, presence, and
power. He is also in all things as an object of desire and knowledge. How·
ever, since God's essence cannot be known by natural reason, He is primarily
in man, in this latter sense, as an object of desire. Thus, God is in all things
primarily in two ways: as an efficient cause and as a final cause. We may
note that St. Thomas would deny that contact between God as a cause and
His effects implies parts in God. Creation is a product of God's essence which
is an absolutely simple unity.
6 ST,

1 ST,

fl84

SHERWIN KLEIN

Thomas discusses His !immutability. God cannot change, for
change implies potentiality and He is pure actuality. Again,
God does not move in p1ace, for He ilacks any potentiality.
Since motion implies parts--for 'Something in motion "remains
in part ·as it was, and in part passes 1away "-God is immutable, for He is simple rather than a composite being and,
!therefore, lacks parts. 9
Plato says that since the one as one cannot partake of the
same or the other-for it cannot be in itself nor can it he in
another-the one cannot be in the same plaiee and, !therefore,
ca;nnot be at rest. We can only attribute rest or motion to an
obj·ect when both 1are attribUJtable to rthe object, for ·an object
that is capabJe of motion must ailso be capable of rest and vice
versa. Therefore, since God is not in motion, rest cannot be
predicated of Him. St. Thomas says that resit is not predicable
of God, but immutability is.
I shall now apply the 1logicaltranscendenrals same and other
to the conrcept of God ·as absolutely simple, as Plato does to
ithe one as simple. God as a simple unity cannot be other than
Himself, for then He would not be a simple unity. Nor can He
be the same with another being, for then He would be that
being, but there is only one God. One with reference to its
oneness is not other than other things, but only in virtue of
otherness 1as a relation can the one be other than others.
Knowledge of the relation of otherness between God and
beings, according to St. Thomas, is deriv;ed from our knowledge of God as the cause of all beings. Since we cannot know
the essence of God by natural reason (we know Him by ex9 St. Thomas says, "Thus, in every creature
there is a potentiality to
change: either as regards substantial being as in the case of corruptible
things; or as regards being in place only, as in the case of celestial bodies;
or as regards the order to their end, and the application of their powers to
divers objects, as in the case with the angels; and universally all creatures
generally are mutable by the power of the Creator, in Whose power is their
being and non-being. Hence, since God is mutable in none of these ways, it
belongs to Him alone to be altogether immutable." ST, I, q. 9, a. 2, c.; Pegis
p. 73.

PLATO AND AQUINAS

235

cellence and remotion) , we cannot determine the relation of
otherness between God and beings as we wou1d between two
known entities. As St. Thomas says at
beginning of question three, we must remove from God all a,ttributes which do
not befit Him, and, thus, He is seen to be a simple unity. As
a simple unity, we may determine 'vvhat He is not. Perfection,
infinity, unity, and immutability do not determine the essence
of God; they, rather, determine wha;t He is not and, therefore,
His excellence and remotion.
Unity is not identical to sameness or identity. If the one is
to partake of sameness-be the same with itself-it must be
in virtue of something other than its unity, i.e.,
virtue of
identical to samesameness. Although unity is not
ness, if we determine God to be a
unity, we must say
that the predicates applied to Him do not differentiate His
essence hut are in ,some sense the same. God's will, for example, does not differ from_ His understanding or His power.
Sinoe man, by his natuml powers, cannot know God's simple
essence, we must proceed to attribute these properties to God
aoco11dingto the mode
our understanding, thait is, 1a.s if God's
essence were many and not one.
Since likeness is a species of sameness and unity was seen
not to be identical 1to sameness, one cannot he like itseH or
another in virtue of unity ailone. The same reasoning holds
with respect :to unlil.0eness, otherness, m1d unity.
Since God is not contained in any genus, the effects of God
as first cause do not bear any specific or generic likeness but
only an ianalogica:l likeness to Him, "In this way
created
things, so far as they al'e beings, are like God as the first and
principfo of all being." 10
may delay further discussion of likeness and equality, for these terms are predicated
of God as a Trinity.
Neither sameness nor diffe11enoe in age can be predicated of
the one, for the one does not partake of equality and likeness,
nor of inequality and unlikeness, hut sameness of age implies
10 ST,

I, q. 4, a. 3, c.; Pegis, p. 41.

SHERWIN KLEIN

equality or likeness of time 'and difference in age implies mequality or unlikeness
time. Since the one can neither be
older no:r younger nor the same age with itseilf nor with another, it cannot be in time at all.
We saw that God is an immutable being because He is simple, and this was based upon the fact that motion implies parts
or a composite being. In Q.
A. 2, St. Thomas says, "The
notion of eternity
immutability, as the notion of time
!oUows movement .... Hence, as God supremely immutable,
it supremely belongs to Him to be et·ernal. Nor is He eternal
only, but He is His own eternity." 11 God's eternity, then, follows from His simplicity. Eternity is said to be known from
two facts. Eternity has no beginning or end, and it has no succession (it is simultaneously whole). Time is 1de:fined as "the
number of movcement according to before .and after." An entity which is absolutely simple lacks motion and, therefore,
does not parta:kie of befor e and after, is not in time. Thus,
that entity which does not participate in succession and is,
therefore, outside of time partakes of the nature of the eternal
(in its essential aspect of being that which is simultaneously
end in time). Since,
whole as well as having no beginning
according to St. Thomas, knowledge of simple things is based
upon knowledge of composite things, he says that knowledge
of eternity is derived from om knowledge of time. We can
attain a knowledge of simple things, in this way, by negation.
Thus, eternity is defined as having no end or beginning and,
essentially, as not partaking
succession (eternity is simultaneously whole).
Plato concludes his argument by maintaining that the predicables used in attempting to discove:r the nature of the one
as one are aU the possible modes of partaking of being. Therefore, neither is the one, one, nor does the one exist. " Then it
is neither named, nor ,expressed, nor opined, nor known, nor
does anything that is pe11oeive it." 12
1

11 BT, I,

q. 10, a. 2, c.; Pegis, p. 76.
142a.

12 Parmenides

PLATO AND AQUINAS

237

Plato's conclusion appears to conflict with St. Thomas's belief that God is an absolutely simple unity. But St. Thomas
agI1ees with Plato's analysis of the one as one and accepts the
consequences. He agrees that God's essence cannot be known
by natural reason alone and does not partake of the physical in
any way. Since St. Thomas is aware of the implications of the
ana,lysis, how can he argue that God is a perfect being?
God and creatures have only analogical, rather than specific
or generic, likeness. Aiccording to Aristotle, we understand
what a thing is by the ten categories. But if we attempt to
predicate them of the one as simple, as Plato does, we see that
they are not appl:i!cable. Thus, the predicaments or categories
are directly applicable to creatures, but not to God (as a simple being). Howevier, if God's being is not determined as the
being of creatures and things is determined, how does one know
that God partakes of being in any sense? Being may refer to
ithe existence of something or to the properties of a thing.
Since one cannot determine the existence of an entity as absolutely simp1e by the predicaments, St. Thomas first attempts
to pl'ovie the existence of God and, then, proceeds to the question of the manner of His existence. 13
The connection between Plato's and St. Thomas's arguments
is, then, clear. For Plato, the one as one does not exist, because
we cannot determine it as a physical or intelligible entity. St.
Thomas, howevier, begins by proving the existence of God, and
he agrees with Plato's anailysis showing that none of the possible predicabies apply to the one as one. God, as an absolute13 The first cause as prime mover is pure actuality.
In this way, St. Thomas
can show that being and perfection belong to God. In Q. 4, A. 1, ad 3, he
describes the nature of being. " Being itself is the most perfect of all things,
for it is compared to all things as that which is act; for nothing has actuality except so far as it is. Hence being is the actuality of all things,
even of forms themselves " ( Pegis, p. 38). God as the first cause of things
is pure actuality, and, thus, must be the most perfect of beings. God is
being itself in the sense that the perfections of all things are in God. "All
the perfections of all things are in God. Hence He is spoken of as universally
perfect, because He lacks not ... any excellence which may be found in any
genus." BT, I, q. 4, a. 2, c.; Pegis, pp. 38-39.

288

SHERWIN KLEIN

ly simple unity, cannot be known in this life, as either ·an intelligible or a physical entity. Therefore, God's essence cannot he kno wn by the predicables by which we know the nature
and attributes of creatures and things. Howervier, the Platonic
analysis of the absolutely simple one can provide ia basis for
determining what God is not. By this analysis, the
tion of Gard's perfection rev·eals the sup]['eme eJreeilienceof the
being of God, a;lthough not in the sense that His essence can
be known by human (natural) reason. Thus, St. Thomas begins with the con1ception of God as first cause :and shows that
the predicables which would determine God as composite are
not applicable to Him; therefo.ve, He must be a simple unity.
From this, he proceeds to show, as Plato does: with the one as
one, that God must he immutable, infinite, ml!d eternwl.
1

1

1

1

II
In Q. 82, A. 1, St. Thomas discusses the difference between
the inquiries about God a's one and as a Trinity. One cannot
gain knowledge of the Trinity by natural reason, although, as
we saw in the first part of the paper, one can determine what
belongs to Goc;las the first cause of all things. " By natural reason," says St. Thomas, " we can know what belongs to the
unity of the essence, hut not what belongs to rthe distinction
of the persons." 14
We may reason about .a subject in two basic ways: sufficient
proof can be £urnished of some principle, as in .the n:a.tural sciences, or one can show
how the remaining effects are in harmony with an already posited
principle .... In the first way we can prove that God is one and
the like. In the second way, arguments may be said to manifest
the Trinity; that is to say, given the doctrine of the Trinity, we
find arguments in harmony with it. We must not, however, think
that the trinity of persons is adequately proved by such reasons-15
14 ST,
15 ST,

I, q. 32, a. 1, c.; Pegis, p. 316.
I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2; Pegis, p. 318.

PLATO AND AQUINAS

239

The "posited principle,'' here, is an article of faith. 16
We cannot use :the Parmenides to discover what belongs tQ
Goo as a Trinity or even to determine God as a Trinity. However, we may use arguments in the Parmenides to show what
must be affirmed or denied of God qua many in order to make
the
of the Trinity ruooord with the articles of faiththat God is :an absoJ.utely simple unity and a Trinity.
I shailJ .begin :with the second part of the foUowing hypo,thes·isin the Parmenides: If ;the one is, what can we say of the
others? (Parmenides 159b-160b) An unbridgeable gap results
from positing 1an absolute separation between the one and the
others. As we have s:aid, if the one is an absolute, simple unity,
it is not a whole composed of parts; .therefore, the others cannot partake of the one, since t:he one is wholJy separate from
the others and contains no parts. The following absurd consequence results :from the above considerwti.on: Since the others
do not participate in the one, they can have no unity; nor can
they he many, for as many, each part would be part of a whole.
But the others do not partake of .the one. Therefore, they cannot partake of whole or part.
If we say that unity belongs to God's essence but not to
God as a Trinity, then neither ean the Trinity partake of
God's unity •and, therefore, of what belongs to God as an absolutely simple being-which is against faith-nor cou1d the
Trinity exist at aH, :for without unity they could not be many.
Indivisible unity pertains to both God as one and .to the Persons of :the Trinity. "So when we say, the essence is one, the
term one signifies the essence undivided; ·and when we say the
person is one, it signifies the person undivided; and when we
say the persons are many, ·we signify those persons and their in·dividual undividedness." 17 Thus, indivisibility is the formal
16 In Q. 32, A. 4, something is said to be of faith in two ways: "Directly,
and such are truths that come to us principally as divinely taught, as the
trinity and unity of God; . . . and concerning these truths a false opinion
of itself involves a heresy. . .. A thing is of faith indirectly, if the denial
of it involves as a consequence something against faith ( Pegis, p. 323) ."
11 ST, I, q. 30, a. 3, c.; Pegis, p. 304.

240

SHERWIN KLEIN

property of unity as it pertains to both God's essence and the
Persons.
In order to ·examine this problem further, I shall consider the
first attempt in the Parmenides to solve the problem: l£ the
one is, what can we say of the others? (Parmenides I57b-I59b)
In this section, Plato assumes that the one and the others are
not wholly separate from one another, but the one and the
others are other than one another. The others, being other
than the one, are not the one but, in a sense, participate in the
one. Being other than the one implies having parts, £or i£ they
did not have parts they would be a simple unity. Parts have
a relation to a whoile which is one in the sense of having a
unity of which the parts ave parts. Thus, i£ the others have
parts, they will partake of the whole and, in this sense, of the
one. But the parts themselves must, in themselves, partake
of the one, £or i£ a part
a part, it must he separate from
other parts. " Both the whole and the part must participate
in the one; for the whoile wiH be one whole, of which the parts
will be parts; and each part will be part of the whole which is
the whole of the part." 18
The others (other than the one) will be many, for if they
are neither one nor more than one, they wouM not be. In the
sense that the others, as many, partake of the one but are not
the one, they are infinite. " And, yet, when each several part
becomes a P'art, then the parts have a limit in
to the
whole and to each other, and the whole in relation to the
parts." 19
If God is one and yet a Trinity, in some way the Persons
must be distinguished from one another, and yet the essence
must remain the same. Alth()!Ughthe Persons are distinguished
from one another, they must participate perfectly in the unity
of God's essence. The conJCeptionof God as one and a Trinity
becomes more difficult if we say: the Trinity is other than God
as an absolutely simple unity, for if it wer:e not, it would be
1

1s Parmenides 15Sb-c.

19 Parmenides

15Sc-d.

241

PLATO AND AQUINAS

that unity. Being other than God's essence, ·as a unity, would
then <imply having pams. St. Thomas wants to apply the transcendenba;l sense of one to both the Persons and God's essence
so that the Trinity is not distinguished from God's essence as
the others aire from the one. Both God's essence and the Persons qua one
indivisible. However, there must be some
distinction between God's essence as an absolutely simple unity
and the indivisiibility of the Persons taken as a trinity. Although the term " indivisibility " is common to God's essence
'and ,the Trinity, if God as one and a Trinity are one qua indivisible, then there would be no distinction between God's
essence rand the three Persons; nor wouM there be any distinctions ·among the Persons themselves. The indivisibility of
God's essence must differ from the indivisibiJity of the Persons,
not in terms of the transcendental sense of one, hut in virtue
of the fact that rthe Persons are distinguished from one another
whereas God is also said to be an absolutely simple unity.
In Q. 31, A. Q, St. Thomas discusses the delicaite balance
that must be maintained in eX'amining God's unity and the
trinity of Persons. The terms "diversity " and " difference "
do not apply to God, for His essence is a unity. There is,
howe¥er, a distinction among the relations. The term " other,"
when applied rto God, can only mean a distinction of suppositum, for the essence of the Persons is identical to the
essence of God. Thus, the term " other " cannot be used to
distinguish God and the P•ersons but only the Persons themselves. But ii God is absolutdy one, and the Persons are not
other than God but distinguished among themselves, how is
God •absolutely one and, yet, many?
In Q. 39, A. 1 and Q, St. Thomas raises this question and
offers the following solution. In God, relations are the divine
essence and, since the Persons are relations " subsisting in the
divine nature," 20 the Persons are not distinct from God's
1

1

20 St. Thomas says, "It is ... better to say that the persons or hypostases are distinguished rather by relations than by origin. For, although
they are distinguished in both ways, nevertheless in our mode of understand-

SHERWIN KLEIN

essence, hut they a!'le "reailily distinguished from each other."
"The supl'lemeunity and simplicity of God exclude every kind
of pJ1Urrulitytaken absolutely, but not the p1ur:a.Jityof relations;
for relations are predicated relatively, and thus they do not imply composition in that of which they are predicated." 21 But
how oan there he a 11eal 1distinction among the Persons? Are the
terms " ,absolute " and " relative " meaningful when attributed
to an absolutely simple ·being?
Given the above facls, it would seem that, since God is His
essence ailJd He is: also an absolute unity, if one says that there
are real distinctions in God (St. Thomas insists th.at the relations or Persons are real rather than .logical), there would necessarily hav;e to be some distinction 1between God as essence,
which is also an ,absolute unity, and the Persons. But oocoroing to faith, this is inadmissible. If we say that the distinction
between God and the Persons is simply "in our way of thinking," ,this is to admit that human beings cannot understand
the mystery of how God can he simple and a Trinity. We must
11emember,however, that St. Thomas says that the Trinity cannot he established a:dequately by reason but requires divine
revelation. The best that one can do is to expound the doctrine of God as one and ,a Trinity in the most consistent way
possible. The theory that there are real relations in God which
are not distinguished from His essooce may well be the best
way to handle the problem, hut it does not remove the mystery;
nor does St. Thomas think it does.
Returning to the Parmenides, we l"eteall that parts are parts
of a whole conceived as ·a unity. Moreover, the parts as parts
must partake of the one. Howe¥er, as we have seen, in God
the relations are not parts of the whole, for the l'leal l'lelations
which ,distinguish the Persons are the same as God's essence;
if they were, this would mean that ,the part is :identical to the
1

ing they are distinguished

chiefly and primarily by relations."

a. 2, c.; Pegis, p. 385.
21 ST, I, q. 30, a. I, ad 3; Pegis,

p. 300.

ST, I, q. 40,

PLATO AND AQUINAS

243

whole. (Then the part would no longer be a part; it would be
the whole.)
We recall that Plato shows that in one sense the others are
indefinite, whereas in another sense they, as parts, are limited
by the whole and by their relations to one another. This is
somewhat analogous to God as a Trinity, for there must be
;<iome factor which delimits ithe number of persons as real relations.
If we say that the Persons are somewhat analogous to parts
in a whole in the above sense, St. Thomas must find some limiting factor (s) that, by analogy, applies to God (as: a whole)
and thus determines their number. Since the Persons are said
to proceed from God, the determina,tion of their number, aceo11dingto St. Thomas, should. be based upon what is analogous
to the highest creatures, i.e., that which pertains to the mind.
Smee mental acts proceed. from two sou11ces, the intellect and
the will, these are the delimiting factors that determine the
number of Persons.
As in the case of God's essenoe, the divine Persons can be
ana1yzed negatively by considering part and whole as applied
to the Persons. Parts relate to a whole in two possible ways:
as matter and form are parts of a composite and as genus and
difference are parts of a species. A divine person cannot be
anafogous to a human person, for He is not a composite of
form and matter. Furthermore, we define man by dille1,entiating the genus animal 1and thus determine the species, man.
Individual men participate in the form of man. But this cannot be done with divine Persons. Divine Person iis not a species in which the three Persons participate; the term " divine
person " signifies a subsisting reality as relation in the divine
nature.
I shaU conc1ude this paper by discussing the divine Persons
with reference to the Platonic predicables, motion, time, likeness, and equality.
Although God cannot he in motion, since there is no potentiality in Him, St. Thomas makes the folilowing st,atement:

SHERWIN KLEIN

" The other ol"der of origin in God regal"ds the procession of
person from person." 22 Could this not be construed as entailing motion? Not necessarily, for although order seems to
imply a before and after, before and after do not necessarily
imply motion or time; there is a before and after in number.
St. Thomas suggests that there is an order according to origin
but without priority. Since, for example, the Son is said to be
from the Father, we say that there is an order among the
Persons, but not in the sense that one Person is really prior
,to another.
Since likeness is a weaker term than equality, it is more correct to say that the Persons are co-equal than to say that they
are like one another. Two things may be like one another by
participating in the same form, but they are co-equal only if
there is a perfect participation or a perfect likeness. Since God
is the same, qua essence, as the three Persons, the Persons
must he co-equal. Nonetheless, St. Thomas does make use of
the notion of lilmness. Since there is a specific likeness between
father and son, image is said ito be properly attributed to the
Son as a name. Moreover, eternity is said to have a likeness to
the Father, species to the Son, and use to the Spirit. However,
the diffioolty of applying special names to the Persons becomes
manifest when we consider the divine simplicity. Although
eternity and equality, for example, are predicable of aJll tlie
Persons in the same degree, eternity is said to have a likeness
to the Father and equality to the Son. It is difficult to under·stand how the Persons can partake of eternity and equality in
equail degrees and yet not in equal degrees unless " eternity "
and "equality " !al"e used equivoicwMy with reference to the
specific persons and their essence.

22 ST, I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 1; Pegis,

p. 391.

METHOD DIVORCED FROM CONTENT IN
THEOLOGY? AN ASSESSMENT OF LONERGAN'S
METHOD IN THEOLOGY
TERRENCE REYNOLDS
Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island

I

N IDS INTRODUCTION to Method in Theology, Ber-

nard Lonergan flatly maintains that he intends to· write
not theology but only method in theology. 1 He therefore
proposes .to concern himself solely with the operations theologians perform and to suspend consideration of the objects
they seek to expound. He is looking for "a normative pattern
of recurrent and related operations yielding cumulative and
progressive results." 2 To arrive at his method, Lonergan relies
upon the cognitional theory which he ha,d outlined with great
sophistication in Insight. He argues that the dynamism of the
human mind and the principles of its operations as revealed by
introspective psycihology lead to a model of the nature of scientific method in general and, by extension, to method in theology. It is through the transcendental method that Lonergan
discovers in the procedures of the human mind the basic pattern of operations by which wl1l cognitiona1 activity takes plaice.
This pattern, he maintains, yields cumulative results in thelogical inquiry as well as in any fie1d of investigation. He therefore intends to demonstrate that theology can be studied in
the same manner as any other discipline.
Critics have respectfully suggested that, while Lonergan's
system is an imposing one, he has introduced unworkable and
1 Bernard

Lonergan, Method 4ln Theology (New York, 1979), p. XII.
Method, p. 5.

2 Lonergan,

245

246

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

misleading distinctions into his work; in particular, he has
to explicate his thoologiicaJ.p11emises and thereby leaves
uTIJc!lear the presuppositions upon which his Method rests.
Method, they argue, cannot be divorced from theology, and
the p11ecise writing of the form.er cannot be carried out without attention to the latter. Avery Dulles, Mauri!Oe Wiles, and
Anthony Ke1ly have all leveled the charge that Method suffers
from this detaichment of method from content. The purpose
of this essay wiH he to discuss Lonergan's achievement in
Method in Theology but then to consider the extent to which
his critics may be right.
Um:Lerstanding Lonergan's methodologiical enterprise requires a familiarity with his cognitionrul theory as delineated
in Jnsi,ght, for his complex theory of knowing establishes the
anthropology upon whiJCh he grounds his Method. Basically,
he pr:obes .for ·the answers to thl"ee questions: 1) What happens
when we a11e knowing? 2) Why do we
that knowing? and
3) What is known when that is happening? The ans1wer to the
first question yie1ds his cognitionrul theory, the second his
epistemology, .and the thi11d his met:aphysics.3 Since •all knowing is a quest .for explanaition, founded upon the ass111mptionof
the intelligibility of the universe, the on-going search for explanation in the finite sphere implies a finail e:q>i1anationand
this is be[ng itseH. In apprehending the processes of cognition,
one can begin to recognize the means by which the search for
·this reality is universally conducted:
Thoroughly understand what it is to understand, and not only will
you understand the broad lines of all that there is to be understood, but you will possess a fixed base, an invariant pattern, opening upon all further developments of understanding. 4
a Lonergan, Met hod, p. 25.
4 Bernard Lonergan,
Insight (New York, 1957), p. XVIII. Lonergan's
cognitional theory draws from the work of Thomas and Kant but moves
creatively beyond them in his emphasis upon the dynamism of the human
mind and the nature of the reality it perceives and comes to know. For Kant,
to whom Lonergan's work is often compared, the mind imposes a conceptual
framework and an intelligible order upon that which it seeks to understand

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

Lonergan's use of introspective psychology reveals four
levds in human consciousness, the empir1ca1, the intellectual,
the rationa1l, and the moml. The empirical
concentrates
upon experience itself and involves the hasic questioning and
intel"est in one's surroundings which all subsequent self-transcende1J1ce presupposes. It is " experiencing one's experiencing,
understanding, judging and deciding." 5 Intellectual consciousness considers the elements passed on to it as " unknown " by
the empirica1l consciousness,
it is the level at which fresh
tmderstanding of such matters is reached. Prob1ems posed by
experience receive an initial, tentative so1ution through the
colllceptua1l insights of
intelJectua1l consciousness. In mtiona:l cons1ciousness, which leads
knower to the point of
judgment, the hypotheses of the intellectual consciousness a:re
tested, reflected upon, revised if necessary, and ult.h'Ilately assessed to he essentia.Irly a1ccurabe or inaocurate. This is: a crucial step, for at this juncture self-transcendence enabJes the
subject to make a truth rcla.im, a claim to describe reality as it
ructua1ly is. The judgment represents the "mind's: assurance
that the conditions for asserting existence have been met." 6
in the very process of understanding. As a result, what is known lacks any
actual reality outside of the "reality" imposed by the knower himself. Whatever order or objectivity appears to exist only does so because the mind has
given to the data an intelligible structure. Apart from the order provided
by the processes of the human mind, things as they are in themselves cannot be known. For Lonergan, as we shall see, both what the knower experiences and the intelligible pattern within which it is known to exist are
aspects of a real, objective world order. This order of things confronts the
knower but would still objectively exist in such a pattern even if the
knower never sought to understand it.
Lonergan moves beyond Kant at another level as well. Where Kant had
posited a static, organizational structure within the human mind, Lonergan
finds a dynamic movement toward broader understanding and more expansive horizons. Built into the mind is a kind of nagging dissatisfaction with
the present understanding, which drives the knower always beyond himself.
5 Lonergan, Method, p. 14, 15.
s Denise Carmody, "Lonergan's Religious Person," Religior• m Life 44
( 1975) : 225. This expTession is used by Carmody but is an accurate representation of Lonergan's perspective on the matter of judgment.

fl48

TERRENCE

REYNOLDS

Finally, the moral ·oonseiousness makes a demand upon the
subject that he act in accol'd. wi:th his own assessment of the
>truth. This entails a call to responsibility and moral courage
in the confrontation with the reality he has come to understand. The agent thereby ads out of love, driV'en to uphold
the good, the :real, and the honorable, with a commitment to
the preservation and expansion of what he thinks ought to be.
Thus Lone:rgan's person is one who mov;es: towards a devotion
to reality in love, the highest level of self-transcendence.
From these four 1levels of cons1cious intentionrulity proceed,
l'espectiV'ely, the acts of experiencing, understanding, judging,
and decision-making; by these acts the subject dmws nearer to
a full comprehension and appDeciation of reality and to authentic self-trans1cendenee:
... intelligence takes us beyond experiencing to ask what and
why and how and what for. Reasonableness takes us beyond the
answers of intelligence to ask whether the answers are true and
whether what they mean really is so. Responsibility goes beyond
fact and desire and possibility to discern between what truly is
good and what only apparently is good. 7

This anaJlysis of the phenomenon of human knowing reveals
that a:ll knowing is based on the a priori transcendental notions of being, truth, goodness, and vailue; these create for the
subject a perpetual tension which driv;es him to seek beyond
his present limitations of consciousness. Man is urged from
within towa11ds fuUer knowledge of his universe and towards
an affirmation of vrulues. As the agent comes to know the
world around him, he attends first to the data at hand, proceeds to formulate theories concerning the stmctul"e of the
data, and then arrivies at judgments regarding the correctness
of the theories. Thereafter, one ordinarily aiets in accord with
what one has judged to he the case, for to act otherwise would
be
inconsistent. In short, the subject spontaneously
makes judgments and decisions in the course of living and
7 Lonergan,

JJllethod, p. 11.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

249

knowing and thereby supports Lonergan's claim that being,
truth, goodness, and value are a priori notions which give
shape to the horizon of the knower. They are the notions
which dynamica1ly form the way we seek out knowledge and
ultimately appropriate it. As William Reiser expresses it:
... a study of the structure of knowing reveals its intrinsic orientation towards being; the structure of judgment, an intrinsic orientation towards objectivity; the structure of choosing an intrinsic
orientation towards goodness and value. 8

Arising from these a priori determinants are the transcendental
he reasonable, and be
precepts " Be attentiv;e, be
l1esponsible,"
Lonergan insists are fundamental to intellectual growth and integrity.
It should be aJdded that al-1 men do not proeeed unerringly
to the fullness of self-transcendence. These a priori factors do
not propel all subjects inexorably into authenticity. Personal
experiences, the influence of egoism, mistaken judgments, and
the like contribute to the infinite variety of individual consciousness. But al-1 men do possess a basic dynamism towards
fulier comprehension of life: " ... we all share some capacity,
some desire and intimation, for mature human consciousness.
If our progress is dialectica:l, forward and bruck, yet it continues,
so fong as we try to grow, to become more 11ealistic and more
wise." 9
There are four decisive steps which should he taken for one
to achieV1e a maitul'e and :vuthentic consciousness; Lonergan
ca1ls them "conversions." In eaich conversion, a major change
occurs in the subject's horizon, 10 so that he carries out the pros William E. Reiser, "Lonergan's Notion of the Religious A Priori," The
Thornist 35 (1971) : 247.
9 Carmody, p. 226.
10 When Lonergan uses the term "horizon," he refers to the total scope of
one's vision from a particular viewpoint. T'nis inclucles both the "relative"
horizon, which describes one's range of vision relative to one's development
in psychological, cultural, and sociological terms, and the "basic " horizon,
which describes the subject relative to the four transcendental conversions,
intellectual, moral, religious, and Christian. For an extended analysis of

fl50

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

cedures of knowing with a radically revised perception of reality. Intellectual conversion consists of the subject's .appropriation of a raitional view of experience ov;er and against his previous common sense perception. It is from this: inteHectual
stance that one learns to equate the real with the ¥erified and
acquiesces to the demand from within to require cogent evidence before ,arriving at conclusions. Having undergone this
conversion, one would ,ruooept as real only that which conformed
rto the critiical demands of reason. The morail conv;ersion is
noted by its art.traction to what is right or good and consists
in .sustaining a congruence between one's judgments and one's
actions. It is a 1oommitment to .the real in wovd and deed, based
upon a love for the truth.
For Lonergan, the dynamism of the knowing process and
the logic of the transcendental notions lead to the question of
God and the affirmation of his: existence, the religious conversion. 1t is .a fact of rull knowing that it seeks out explanations
in order to apprehend the rewl. This is certailli.y the ease in all
scientific inquiry, ,as newer theories revise an:d replace the oM,
·ailid knowledge progresses ever nearer to an ruccurate understanding of being. The on-going differentiation in scientific
knowledge demonstrates that man hopes to draw closer somehow to ultimate truth at the end of his quest. If being or reality itself were not the objective of human knowing, ·the search
wouM cease or become meaningless. Implicit in aill inquiry is
the underlying as.sumption that the universe is intelligible and
that aill phenomena do, indeed, possess explanations. If being
is intelligilie, says Lonergan, and if facts hav;e explanations,
then existence its:elf must have an explanation, an unrestricted
act of understanding, which we call God. The gnawing desire
to know in foll, therefor·e, is dynamically directed towards the
ultima;te ground and sou11ce of ali1. that exists.
So for the knowing subject, the grasp of a limited reality and
even the love for a finite truth leave a persistent sense of dis1

the concept of horizon, see David Tracy, The Achie'IJement of Bernard Lonergan (pp. 1-21) and Karl Rahner's use of the term in HeM'ers of the Word.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

251

satisfaction. From the depths of consciousness comes a call
for completeness, a crull for the f,tlli:fil.lmentof the person in the
Jove of the unlimited, of that which ts found at the end of the
chain of ca;usality. A religious conversion oocurs, then, when
one comes to grips with the urging from within and opts to
fo.V1e unconditionally, making love for all. of reality the absoJute
ground out of which one consciously proceeds. This decision
to love unconditionally in a
finite wor1d is a l'le!ligious
one, for it mows man beyond the constricted reality of his experieillce into the mystery of God, who presides over alt The
uncl'leated reality outside the eJq>erience of man becomes the
center of his being and man's exis:tenee ,becomes filly authentic
in his conversion to •a;hsoiutelove. Unrestricted love becomes
the principle of his aJctions and re-creates his consciousness.11
This .conv;ersionto :reil.igionmay remain implicit, a touch of
the divine imbedided in the very core of the subject out of
which proceeds his ability to transcend critical rationaJrity and
to arrirvie at a stance of love and compassion. But interiority
veaches its fu!Lfillmentin this
and the dynamism of
human cons:ciousness drives the subject to :ruchieve fuH personhood. Man at his best is man who e:l!Jl>eriences,understands,
judges, and decides in the light of the mystery of being which
permeates his consciousness:
Conversion, as lived, affects all of a man's conscious intentional
operations. It directs his gaze, pervades his imagination, releases
the symbols that penetrate to the depths of his psyche. It enriches his understanding, guides his judgments, reenforces his decisions.12
On the specific conversion to Christianity, Lonergan does
not hav;e a gl'eat deal further to add. 18 He states that it repre11 This reflects the notion of the "fundamental
option", a tradition which
goes back to Blondel and is given fuller expression by Karl Rahner in his
discussions of man's decision to love unrestrictedly in a limited world.
12 Lonergan, Method, p. 131.
is Lonergan has said more on the subject elsewhere, however. Writing in
the New Oatholio Erwyolopedia, he claims that conversion is not "a change

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

sents the attachment to a particular historicwl tradition expressing the reHgious consciousness, and that one undergoing a
Christian conversion joins his implicit religiosity with an outward community and thereby makes his stance explicit. The
conv;ersion "conjoins the inner gift of God's love with its outer
manifostation in Christ Jesus and in those who fol!low him." 14
The explicit word of the Gospel has three distinct purposes:
The message announces what Christians are to believe, what they
are to become, what they are to do. Its meaning, then, is at once
cognitive, constitutive, affective. It is cognitive inasmuch as the
message tells what is to be believed. It is constitutive inasmuch
as it crystallizes the hidden inner gift of love into overt Christian
fellowship. It is affective inasmuch as it directs Christian service
to human society to bring about the kingdom of God.15

Having outlined his cognitional theory Lonergan attempts
to establish ,a means of understanding and appmpriating theological materials which corresponds to rthe manner in which
alil. knowledge is apprehended. Thus in Method he devotes
the first half of the work to .a review of the dynamism of
conscious intentionality and then shows how the four levels
of conscious operations (experiencing, understanding, judging,
and deiciJding) can be seen to be present and contributing to
the on-going inquiry of theology. The recognition and integrrutionof the four leve!lsof oonsciorusnessinto the methodological structures of theology serve to bring it into congruence
with :the pattern of inquiry inherent in all enterprises of knowledge. Thus, theology is to be carried out at a variety of levels.
'.Uhere is a dynamic continuum of understanding in theology,
and work may be conducted ,at any point 1at which one wishes
to makes his contribution to the field.
or even a development, rather it is a radical transformation which follows on
all levels of living, an interlocked series of changes and developments." Yet,
as Charles Curran has pointed out in questioning Lonergan on the issue, he
has later spoken of conversion as integration, development, and enlargement.
This possible ambiguity in the matter of conversion will be discussed later.
14 Lonergan, JJlethod, p. 360.
15 Lonergan, Method, p. 362.

METHOD AND CONTENT

IN THEOLOGY

Q53

Lonergan first draws a distinction between two phases of
theology which he calls mediating and mediated. In the first
phase, the documents and materials of a religion are studied
and understood as thoroughly as possible, while in the second
phase the knowledge gained is mediated to others. 16 In a sense,
the second phase takes the inquiry beyond the level 0£ history
of religions into a theology of affirmation. 17 Comprising these
two phases al'e eight functional specialties which reflect the
movcement foom the compiling of data to the making of decisions concerning the data. These functional speciailties are: 1)
research, 2) interpretation, 3) history, 4) dialectic, 5) foundations, 6) doctrines, 7) systematics, and 8) communications.
The first four comprise mediating theology, and the final four
are the work of mediated theology, yet aH are integrally related as components in the dynam:iics of human inquiry.
Sin:ce the Christian mes1sagie comes to us through •rhe documents of believing communities, the first task facing Christian
inquiry is to, discern the actu:aJ content of the materials
passed on. The second step is to determine what the authors
aJCtually intended to convey in writing as they did, while the
thfod step is to place the authors and their writings into a
contextual framework out of wh1ch they lived and wrote. In
short, this progressive penetr:ation into the materials of Christianity is nothing other than the first three functional specialties of researich, interpretation, and history. Further, these
three specialties para:Hel the first three operations of cognition
namely, experiencing, understanding, and judging. Dialectics
is the final speicia1ltyin the phase of mediating theology; here
the knower questions the extent to which the authors were
right or wrong in their histor:Ucailly-conditioned assessments. By
engaging in dialectics, the knower takes positions vis-a-vis the
materials at hand; this paraUels decision-making, the fourth
operation of human knowing.
16 For

our purposes, the example of Christianity will be used from here on.
Winquist, Review of Method, Anglican Theofogical Review 56
( 1974): 101.
11 Charles

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TERRENCE REYNOLDS

In the mov;ement to mediated theology, the order of the
levels of consdousness is l'eversed. Now the dynamism is from
decision-making towards the mediating of one's knowledge, or
from the adoption of positions to the making of the data accessible to the experience of others. The fifth specialty, foundations, delineates conversion in the intehlecitual, rationa,l, and
moral spheres and 'attempts to determine which of these conversions were evident in the writers of the documents. The next
specialty, doctrines', sets out the facts and values which are
regarded as most essential in the tradition studied. Foundations engages in decision-making, whilie dorctrines is essentially
a function of judgment. The finaJ two specialties, systematics
the cycle rbad{: to the second
m1d communications,
and first 1e¥els of consciousness. Systematic:s attempts to form
a pattern of how
doctrines of a given traidition are coherent1ly interl'elated, thereby exercising bhe skiHs of interpretation;
communications seeks to bring the systematized body of truth
to hear upon the experienee
others.
Lonergan's point is that
initial progression towards decision-ma.king in the mediated phase leads one onwa11d to commun:iicate the knowledge to the experienJce
others, thereby
bringing to full circle the unity of knowing and its conveyance
to others in the perpetual devefopment of human knowledge.
By tying theolog1oail method into the structure of the operations of aM human knowing, Lonergan also wants to make theology 1as subject to historicail development as any form of
human knowing and just ,as
with ou:r modern sense of
distance from the pa.st, which constitutes the he:rmeneutical
prob1em. In so doing, he reiterates his rejection of "olass1cist
notions: '' of culture,
rconcretize periods of history as supposedly uniquely expressive of the truth, and affirms: his approval of "empiriicist notions " of culture, which acknowledge
the progressive flow of knowl'edge, evoJ,vin_g through cultures
and time.
As Lonergan describes his transcendental method, he maintains that it is "the concrete and
unfolding of

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

255

human attentiveness, inte1ligen1oe,reasonableness and respon1sibility,"18 and is therefore as appropriate to theology as to
a;1l other fields of inquiry. The method offers the "key to 1a
unified sicienoe," and outside of its field of application " there
is nothing at all." 19 Man progresses towards authentic selftr:ansoendence; his end is a life of faith, hope, and love, the
means by which he will ultimatdy fulfill the transeendental
precepts to fo 11e intelligently, reasonrubily, and responsibly. In
defining the grasp of truth as the fruit of authentic subjectivity and in positing this subjectivity as a universal end which
all seek and are capa1citated to :attiain, Lonergan leaves open
the question of the specific value of the Christian faith and the
particular impact that it may have upon his proposed method.
Critics have argued that Lonergan's programmatic division
of the labor of theology from that of method is unsatisfactory. 20
A very DuUes in a review of Method in Theology provides a
concise summary of this perceived difficulty in Lonergan's
approa,ch:
A third unfortunate separation pervading Lonergan's book is that
of method from theology. He repeatedly avers that he writes not
as a theologian but as a methodologist. On this ground he abstains from discussing the nature of revelation, the authority of
Scripture, the Fathers, doctors, popes,. councils, bishops, etc. While
he evidently accepts conciliar pronouncements and staunchly adheres to the teaching of Vatican I, he provides no theory of the
nature and limits of authority in theology. Granted that one's
view of authority will necessarily depend upon one's theory of
revelation, Christology, and Church, I am convinced that method
in theology cannot be adequately treated without some attention
to these questions. In theology as in other sciences, method and
content are dialectically interdependent. 21
is Lonergan, JJ! et hod, p. 24.

19 Lonergan, Method, p. 23, 24.
20 Other issues raised by Lonergan's
critics which cannot be given proper
attention in this essay include his division of theology into his proposed eight
functional specialties and his confidence in the scope and capacity of human
reason.
21 Avery Dulles, Review of Met hod, Theological Studies 33 ( 1972) : 555.

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TERRENCE REYNOLDS

From this critique arise further questions riegariclingLonergan's
notion of love, his understanding of the l'elationship of Christianity to other religions, and his anthropology.
Beforie analyzing the charges directed at Lonergan's Method,
a few clarifying remarks are in order. As Dulles correctly
avers, the majority of critics ,do not 1rucicuse Lonergan of harboring non-Christian or, more specificaUy, non-Catholic premises; the charges tend to focus on his al,leged failure to make
explicit the manner in which his Christian understanding influences the construction of his method. 22 Others have suggested that Lonergan's approa:ch domesticates the Gospel, removing its "No" to man's religiosity. Some argue that
Method deprives theology of its uniqueness by advocating that
it be studied as scientifically as any other discipline. Thomas
TorranJoe, for example, has referred to Lonergan as the " Catholic Sdtleiermacher " and has claimed that Method makes man
the source for theology, thereby unde11cutting the free, revelatory act of God. It will not he the purpose of this essay to
answer these cha;rges. Suffice it to say that there are models in
which the relationship of nature and graoe is so delineated as
to permit a fruitful degree of theofog1cia1l insight based upon
a descriptive analysis of the human person. This essay will
look at the question of whether or not Lonergan has successfully incorporated such a model of nature and grace into his
wo:rk, and whether it enables him to answer the conoerns of
the majority of his critics.
Anthony Kelly has pursued the concerns mised by Dulles
and '\!Viles23 and has fooused specifical.J.y upon Lone.rgan's
treatment of ·three interrelaited matters: man's seilf-transcendenoe in the direction of the divine, :religiosity and Christianity,
22 Lonergan's
reputation, based upon previous exegetical and doctrinal
studies, is virtually unblemished. His critics have been unsettled by the lack
of clarity in his recent undertaking.
23 This is not to suggest that Kelly's concerns are completely representative of what Dulles and Wiles "might " have said, had they expanded their
critiques. My point is only that Kelly's objections do arise from the concern
expressed by both reviewers over Lonergan's division of content and method.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

257

and the uniqueness and value of Christ for authentic subjectivity.
Lonergan asserts that the grasp of truth is a product of
wuthenticity and that one achieves such authenticity as a :resul,t of a progression to the fovel of self-transcending love.
This love is to be discovered in a variety of trnditions, promoted in a variety of oultures, and represents a human possibility not bound to a particular society or creed. Faith, hope,
1and love, as trans-cultural phenomena, are 'the means by which
men everywhere are able to fulfiH the demands of the transcendentail precepts (to live intelligently, reasonably, and responsibly). With this schema, Lonergan provides a basis for
understanding and collaboration in cognition which Kelly applauds: "By taking his stand on what is fundamental to an
cultures, the self-transcending drive towards authentic values,
he o:ffers the promise of a theoretical and practical coherence
for the totaJ human enterprise." 24
Yet EeHy remains uncomfortable with Method bemuse he
11egards Lonergan's treatment of the person and work of Jesus
Christ as fundamentally ambiguous: " ... and here precisely
is my question: how does this theological method take faith in
Christ into its inner vitality? How is Lonergan's Method a1ive
to the unique, the original, the absolute element in Christian
faith?" 25 Pressing the point, he qru:estions the significance of
faith for the ,theological enterprise 1as Lonergan sees it. Does
one's commitment to Christ and the Church impinge upon
one's approach to the methodological task? EelJy argues that
Lonergan is disconcertingly unclear on such matters, and he
focuses his line of inquiry even more sharply as he continues:
... there is the possibility of forestalling this whole question by
the rather devastating' Why should Christ make any difference to
theological method? ' This type of question is quite illuminating.
It suggests presuppositions about what is absolute and original in
24 Anthony Kelly, " Is Lonergan's Met hod Adequate to Christian Mystery,"
The Thomist 39 (1975) : 439.
25 Kelly, p. 440.

258

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

Christian experience, and more basically, an implicit approach to
theological knowing. The extremes are clear. Either make theological method into a function of faith,. or see faith as any faith, a
mere range of data that theology will dispassionately survey in
the light of a method designed to ensure such detachment and disinterestedness. At this juncture, because of the irrationality of allowing theology to become either the ideology of a sect or a stance
of concerned religious skepticism, all we can demand of a method
is that it not be so generalized as to suppress some data for fear
of disconcerting its anticipations. 25

The danger of generaliza,tion is thought to exist because
Lonergan proposes a re,ligiously neutra,l methodological model
and recommends it to Roman Catholic theologians 21 yet demurs .from providing an explicit Christology. For Kelly this is
ineXiCUsabJe, since Christian faith demands that !a Christology
be included within any methodological study. In its: plwce,
Method speaks of the " data " of the human mind. 1and of the
universailily discemibfo drivie for self-transcenden!ce. KeiUy asks
whether theo<1ogyor the theologian can be correctly understood
in terms of such
or whetiher alJ theology mus t begin with
the " data " of God's gift of Himself, which discloses to man
his human possibilities and the nature of his genuine authenticity:
1

1

1

The divine self-transcendence precedes and provokes the human.
Is not the self-gift of God the foundation of theology rather than
man's self-transcendence in the direction of the divine? Which is
more fundamental to theological thinking? Here we have a question that I regard .as basic for a critical reading of Method. 28
Lonergan's aecount of self-transcendence, :in which he treats
1the questions just rnised, is unsatisfactory, as far as Kelly is
ieonce:rned. The highest form of self-transcendence in Lonergan' s s1chema is attained through religious conviersion, the
dynamic stiarbe of being in love with God. 29 (This is said to attune the theologian especially for his task.) 30 The root cause
2s Kelly,

p. 441, 442.
Method, p. XU.
2s Kelly, p. 442.

21 Lonergan,

29

Lonergan, Method, p. 104 ff.
Method, p. 271.

so Lonergan,

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

of this conversion is said to be a form of sanctifying grace, attributed to the working of the Holy Spirit. But this rais,es a
further problem for Kelly:
This would indicate the methodological presupposition that the
Holy Spirit is flooding the hearts of all authentically human beings with his love. I have some hesitation at this point. Is this
general reality of religious love ... to be immediately interpreted
as the Christian reality of love communicated to us by the Spirit
of Christ? 31

To support his position on the significance of love, Lonergan
extensivcly cites the love texits of the New Tesrbament both in
Method 'and, in response to inquiries, in Philosophy of God
and Theology. Yet he exo1udes any mention of the person of
Christ from his discussion a:n:d allows the impression to be
given that the r!Jexts refer to a kind of transcendental piety
rather than a specilicrully Christian experience and expression.
The res1.Ult,Kel1ly believes, is tihe .suggestion that rthe Holy Spirit
s1 Kelly, p. 445. Lonergan's position on the nature of such love is spelled
out in Phil<>Bophy of G-od and Theofogy; ·see especially p. 9 and following. He
also responds tellingly to a series of questions on pages 17-20. In effect, he
relies heavily upon I Timothy 2: 4 which says it is the will of God that all
men be saved. From this he discusses the great varieties of human religious
experience and the transforming effect of such experiences upon the lives of
people everwhere. A particularly interesting exchange follows:
Question: "But Paul says in other places that unless the gospel is
preached and unless the gospel is believed, all men will not be saved. So
God is not providing the salvation of all men in any other way than to send
his Son to whom the salvation of the world is owed."
Lonergan: "Well, that's another view isn't it? But what Paul has to say
about charity, that there isn't salvation without it-and there's lots of
evidence of people leading extremely good lives without being Christians."
Question (cont.). "But Paul never says charity is enough for salvation;
for Paul it is faith in Jesus. Charity is the most important virtue, the most
important response."
Lonergan: "Well, perhaps according to 'Paul.' It's an exegetical question. I was suggesting a line of thought. I am not doing detailed exegesis ... "
This exchange (and what ·precedes it) demonstrates that Lonergan is confronting the issue of religious pluralism which engaged Rahner as well.
Their responses do not appear dissimilar.

260

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

is the basis of aJH self-trianscendence, an!d that the love which
the Christian observes phenomenologica.Myin others is essentially identical to his own Christian religious
Both
appear to be dynamic states orf being in loV'e with God. Despite
,the fact that Lonergan uses the expression " being in love " to
serve different purposes in his hook, the fi11st (in the "Background ") to denote data submitted for interpretation •and the
second (in the " Foreground ") to indicaite rthe theofogian's
own conversion or principle of interpretation, Kelly cites a
lingering ambiguity:
... a confusion begins and persists when both are named " being
in love" in this religious sense. . . . What might have been intended as a flexible methodological description seems to be already
implicitly Christian, so that the specifically Christian is read into
the general phenomenon. It could be that the general phenomenon
embraces the specifically Christian, which not only raises a theoretical issue hut makes one ask what the New Testament texts are
doing here. I doubt that either is completely the case, but since
Lonergan is at pains to build up a framework of creative collaboration, this kind of latent confusion needs to be clarified.... We invite confusion, if not regression, by identifying the general impulse towards self-transcendence with the activity of the Spirit of
Christ, especially when this is a basic, though admittedly implicit,
methodological position. 32

Lonergan's description of the distinctiveness of Christian
conversion ailm fails to satisfy Kelly:
Further, religious conversion, if it is Christian, is not just a state
of mind and heart. Essential to it is an intersubjective, interpersonal component. Besides the gift of the Spirit within, there is the
outward encounter with the Christian witness. That witness testifies that of old in many ways God has spoken to us through the
prophets but in the latest age through his Son.33

Ke1ly continues ·to probe for a recognition of the uniqueness of
Christian conversion in Lonergan hut fails to find it. Lonergan
speaks of the " prior wol1d " of gmce, which enables man to
transcend to a state of loving God, and of the " outward word "
a2 Kelly, p. 447.

sa Lonergan, Method, p. 327.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

9261

of religious expression, which is historicaHy conditioned but
which nevertheless complements the prior or inner wo11d. He
asserts that the Gospel serves as a particular objeotification of
the implicit reiigiosity of those converted to a love of God.
Kelly questions this complementary function of the Gospel:
What is the relationship of the Incarnate Word of revelation with
the outward word of religious expression? Is it like any other " outward word," the declaration of an inner state? Does the incarnate
event of God's love and self-giving not enter more deeply into the
understanding of religious love? At this point, at least, Lonergan
seems to make no demand that it should, for "the religious leader,
the prophet, the Christ, the apostle, the priest, the preacher announces in signs and symbols what is congruent with the gift of
love that God works within us." 34

It thus appears that Chris1t, like the prophet and the priest,
merely explicitates that which is already experienced inwardly
'by the convert to religion.
The impl'essfon is given, says Kelly, that there are two
"zones of religiousness," the one prior, inwa.11d, and commonly
experienced cross-culturally, and the other outward, historica,l1ly-bound, and serving to express through specific signs and
symbols the wctivity already occurring within. But Lonergan
nullifies such an interpretation when he speaks rather dramatically of the additional value to be attached to the outwa11d,
historierul wo11d of God as it comes to his peopfo:
1

Then not only the inner word that is God's gift of his love but
also the outer word of religious trandition comes from God. God's
gift of his love is matched by his command to love unrestrictedly .
. . . The narrative of religious origins is the narrative of God's encounter with his people .... Finally, the word of religious expression is not just the objectification of the gift of God's love; in a
privileged area, it is also a specific meaning, the word of God
himself. 35
Here, then, theological inquiry appears to confront unique information. A dis1tinJCt encounter with God himself has taken
34 Kelly,

p. 449.

35 Lonergan,

Method, p. 119.

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

expects that Lonergan will adjust his method
p1are, and
to a1low for the impact of SIUlch data, perhaps
the
receipt of a form of reV'elation. But Kelly is disappointed once
more, for Lonergan at this point reiterates his methodolog]cial
pai:ameters, " ... here we come to questions th:at are not methodologiicrulbut
questions concerning revielation ,and
inspiration, scripture and tradition. . . . To rthe theologians we
must leave them." 86 Ke1ly
no attempt to veil his distaste for this distinction:
Indeed. The methodologist does not feel constrained to leave to
the theologians the rather momentous questions concerning the
nature of grace, the universality of its occurrence, the significance
of world religions; yet he hands back to theologians the specifics of
Christian experience as outside the concerns of method .... I think
theologians could be pardoned for indulging a little disappointment
when they have such " methodological" matters handed hack to
them. I think we could have hoped for an understanding of method in theology more responsive to the "subject matter." But the
fact remains we have an obscurity where we are most in need of
clarification. 87

Ke1ly' s remarks are useful on a variety of leV'els, for they
offer several lines of possible inquiry into Lonergan's Method.
But the Barthian element in Kelly's critique wiM be left unconsidered, and rthis for two reasons: first, Kelly's article and
the co111cerns expressed by DuHes and Wiles are not principally addressed to that 1aspect of Lonergan's Method on that
basis, and
the normative question of how theological
inquiry ought to be conducted is not central to the purpose of
this essiay. What is at issue here is the question of how weU
Lonergan fulfills his own objectives .
.The :f.undamenrbaldilemma in Lonergan is that he seeks to
establish a method of investigation in theofogy which is
tematicaMy divm1ced from the content of theology. He constmcts his Method so tha,t it might serve what David Tracy
has cruled the " revisionist model " for contemporary theologi36

Lonergan, Method, p. 119.

sr Kelly, p. 451.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

263

phifosophical reflection upon
cal inquiry. This modei
the signmcance of human experience and the meanings present
m the Christian fact. 38 Lonergan's merthodological schema
seems designed to satisfy the first four of the five theses which
Tracy includes as ·components of the model. The first four
theses are essentially methodological in chM"acter while the
filth describes: the H1eo1ogical task itself:
The first thesis defends the proposition that there are two sources
for theology, common human experience and language, and Christian texts. The second thesis argues for the necessity of correlating
the results of the investigations of these two sources. The third
and fourth theses attempt to specify the most helpful methods of
investigation employed for studying these two sources. The fifth
and final thesis further specifies the final mode of critical correlation of these investigations as an explicitly metaphysical or transcendental one. Upon reaching the final thesis, one should be able
to provide a summary of the meaning and truth value of the present model proposed for theology, viz., the philosophical reflection
upon common human experience and language, and upon Christian texts. 89

Lonergan appropriately takes great ewe to fulfill the first four
of these requirements, while leaving the :bask implied in the
fifth thesis to the theologians:.
As can be seen in Lonergan's own works on Christian texts
and later in his extraordinary efforts towwds a philosophical
psychology in Insight, Lonergan appears committed to the
satisfaction of Tl'rucy's initial thesis. Neither the texts of the
faith nor common human experience can be understood apart
from one another, and both must be studied with scientific
neutmlirty and rigor. His phenomenological inquiry and criticwl appraisal 0£ the doouments 0£ the Church demonstrate a
faithful a.dherenrceto Tracy's theses two through four as well.
At this point, one can £nd Jrittle quarrel with Lonergan's methodology, but he ohooses to press onwal'd, launching his investigation into the muddier waters of the telos of human in88 David
89 Tracy,

Tracy, Blessed Rage for Order (New York, 1979), p. 43.
p. 43.

264

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

tentionality. At the ultimate horizon of consciousness, he posits
a religious dimension, echoing Tracy, Langdon Gilkey, and
others who haV'e similarly directed their attention ito the consideration of such " limit " questions and their answers:. Here
he raises the legitimate :religious quesitions which appear at the
outer edge of human capacities and understanding. God is
phi<losophicaHy postulafod as the reality which fills the apparent emptiness at the end of the dynamics of human knowing. Having examined the charnoter of the human mind and
demonstrated its movement towa11d being itself with philosophical iola.rity, Lonergan now maintains that this inclination
of self-transcendelllce toward religious awal"eness (and, ultimately, towaJ'd a loV1e for the God at the end of the chain of
causality) is propelled by a form of grace. It is this divine
catalyst which fundamentally drives mankind toward a common authenticity and understanding.
This is the assertion from which Lonergan's difficulties proceed, for by speaking
grace he introduces a theologica;l category which must be unpacked in a manner consistent with the
scientific premises of his methodology. It now becomes entirely 1legitimate to ask Lonergan what he means by "grruce,"
what its: natme is, how it is an agent of faith and love, and
how it inf!Juences the methodologist who seeks to carry out
his work in theology with the same scientific rigor as in any
other quest for knowledge. Lonergan's introdll!ction of the
category of grace draws him to the point of intersection between method and theology and clouds the distinction he has
tried to make between the two enterprises. Lonergan's dilemma is
On the one hand, grace c1annot be described as
offering insights into the data of theofogy wh1ch are unavailahle to the "ungraeed," for this would jeopardize the commonality of human experience upon which the entire program
is founded. And if this commonality were forfeited, the universwlity of the method would immediately coHapse, as theology would then he in a realm all its own. On the other hand,
an account of grace which apparently disl"ega11ds the peculiar

METHOD AND CONTENT

IN THEOLOGY

265

nature of Christian apprehension will do an injustice to the
notion of graiCe as it has traditionally been understood within
the Church. 40 Any refornrnlation of gmce designed to universalize its effect must certainly be formulated so as to be
dear and aciceptahle to systematic theology, particularly if
one claims to propose a method for use by Roman Catholics.
Standing at this intersection of method and theofogy, Lonergan 'attempts to harmonize these seemingly disparate options
in a manner which preservies the philosophical integrity of his
system and at the same time presents a treatment of grace suitable to his Roman
audience. It is evident, however,
that his account has not
the concerns of many of his
readers.
The
directed at Lonergan focus upon his notion
of grace, specifioa:Hyits effect upon faith and faith's subsequent
effect upon method. Can one truly inviestigate matters of faith
in a neutral fashion? Can a scientific objectivity properly
"understand" the data of the resur1,ection? Frurther, if all
undergoing a " conversion "
have equal access to the
content of theology then how is the method to be of particular
value to Roman Cathol:iJcs? KeHy's essay homes rn on these
foatmes in Lonergan's thought and exposes a Iwck of clarity,
if not a fundamental flaw in his approach. Griace is, indeed,
ambiguously defined and Lonergan gives the impression that
he wou1d prefer not to expand his treatment of theological
conoepts, even when they are integrally rehted to his method.
StiU, it seems that Kelly's objections should be taken a step
further; as they stand, ,they suggest a mere clumsiness in
Lonergan's presentation and. this fails to highlight the core of
the issue. Vve can assume with some confidence that Lonergan
knows precisely what he is doing when he writes of gr:JJce in
40 Lonergan is not under attack here for a failure to provide a "traditional" formulation of grace. The concern is that his use of the term as a fundamental category within his understanding of the authentic human person
obligates him to clarify its meaning. Further, if the method is to assist
Roman Catholics in particular, the clarification should be appropriate to
their theoiogfoal conceptualization.

266

TERRENCE REYNOLDS

such .a limited manner and when he refrains from exp[icitating
his theological positions. The 1.1eaJ. issue passed over by Kelly
is why Lonergan has chosen to withhold a thorough explanation oi these matters.
Lonergan certainly possesses the theological acumen to have
pl"esented a model of nature and grace which would have answered Kelly's diffiou[rbies41 and laid to rest any suoo concern
ovier his separation of method from theologicial content. In
fact, it appears that such 'a theoilogiJca1l model is implicit in
Lonergan's Method. Without going inrto detail, I believe the
model is not unlike that outlined by Karl Rahner in Hearers
of the Word and various essays in Theological Investigations.
Like Rahner, Lonergan could have explicitly and creatively
affirmed a nature/grace wo:rild-view founded upon an all-embracing Christology. This wouM have enabled him to affirm a
form of "1anonymous Christianity '', ·so di.srtinclive of Rahner,
and point to the gracious element underlying man's authentic
decision to love absolutely in a finite wor1d and limited wol"1d.
It would .also have permitted him, as it does Rahner, to speak
.straightf orwal"dly about ,the pattern of grace as it moves across
clfiltures and systems of belief. Had Lonergan made such
programmatic choices ·and developed them with originality, he
would have answered KeiHy's cl"it]cisms, to be sure, but he
wouLd also ha¥e opened up a who[e new range of perplexing
questions.
Lonergan ohose to write the way he did for sound programmatic reasons. As Tracy writes of the five models relevant to
theological discourse he includes the work of Karl Riahner under the heading of Neo-Orthodoxy. He thereby indicates that
41 In fairness to Kelly, I suspect that his difficulties would not have been
so easily alleviated as this suggests. Kelly makes it clear that he is not attracted to Rahner's unfolding of God's universal gracious intentions and,
therefore, is not pleased by what he thinks might be elements of Rahner in
Lonergan's presentation. However, had Lonergan explicitly offered a Rahnerian schema, Kelly could object directly to a systematic theologian. As it
stands, Kelly appears frustrated over his inability to discern precisely what
Lonergan means to say about grace.

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

267

Rahner's ·emp!iasis upon the object-referent of the "Radically Mysterious God "
him in rthe network of conceptualization " proper to a systematic reartiouJation of the major
dogmatic and theologioal moments of the Cathoilic tradition." 42
Rahner, then, and others participating in similar theological
tasks are essentially engaged in the enterprise of dogmatic
1theology. If Lonergan were to graft his methodology onto a
constructive approach SU!ch as that, he would be enmeshed in
·a rather hopeless: contradiction of intentions. After promoting
a neutral method based upon philosophical inquiry, if Lonergan were to lapse into thoological formul<ations of a neo-orthodox character, he wou1d thoroughly erode his claims to obj·ectivity and 1.3.y waste his methodological program.
The point, then, is that Lonergan l'efuses to remove the
theological ambiguity that concerns Kelly not because his
thought is unclear but rather because his thought is olear and
he appreciates. the category distinotions necessary to preserve
the
of his Method. For Roman Catholics, The
Rahner-like model within Lonergan' s Method makes it possible
for them to work within its framework. For others, the general theofogiral remarks need not he of interest ·and need. not
have a negativ;e impact upon their appraisal of Lonergan's
work. Method, therefore, may have the general appeal intended by its author. When Lonergan's purposes are clarifiedu
it oould be argued that Kelly's criticisms are somewhat misdirected. Insofar as he attacks Lonergan for failing to lay out
his theological premises in a manner pleasing fo a confessional
Christian audience, he is correct yet somewhrut off the mark.
Certainly, it can be claimed that systematic theologians will
find Lonergan vague, but this is to he expected since he has
not ·attempted to formulate a complete theology. By demanding precise answers from Lonergan to specific theological questions, KeMy exhibits a certain insensitivity to his program.
Nev;ertheless, despite his failure to penetrate fully into the
'2 Tracy, p. 27, 28.

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TERRENCE REYNOLDS

of Lonergan's Method, :Kjelly has discerned a basic
difficulty in the approaJCh. Whi:le it is appropriate to lend a
sympathetic ear to Lonergan's objectivies, the l'esults of his
effort cannot be so easily embraced. If one makes no
irntl assumptions concerning re¥efation :and authority, what is to
prevent a neutral method from !'ejecting the dogmas of the
Cihurohwhiich it is meant to serve? Oentml tenets of the Christian faith, such as the virgin birth, the mcarnaition, and the
resurrection 1are hardly self-evident to the objecti¥e observer,
even to the observer touched by Lonergan's religious converto a1l having unsion. H such « facts " were readily
dergone suich a conversion, one would expect to see their incorporation into the thought forms of al1l faiths, a phenomenon
which has yet to orour. Since this is dearly not the case, one
mus1t ask Lonergan about the starbus of such claims. What,
:for 1example, is to ,be said of claims regarding the person and
work of
Christ? What wi11 be the force of such claims
if theoJogy is pursued without attention to the authority upon
which they rest? If Scriptme and tmdition are sources of
truth which the methodologisrt eitheT brackets or contextualizes
historicru1ly, how can he he expected to :arrive at theological
conclusions meaningful to Roman Catholics? It would seem
that the theologiJcal enrterprise within Catholicism has proceeded, by definition, upon the insights of written revelation
1and the Churich, insiights not universwHy available to reason,
be it converted or unconverted. Lonergan has constructed his
Method without expHcit reference to these authorities and yet
offel'ed his work pallticulm.1ly for Roman Catholiic use. Without
a definiti¥e resoJution of these apparent difficulties, Lonergan's
work does reflect the confusion wh:iich Kelly has cited.
Lonergan may have escaped the Sicy1la of Rahner's "neoorthodoxy " but has fa.Hen prey to the Charybdis of an implicit Christian theology devoid of its ,central mystery. Method
in theology presupposes theological conceptuwlization, for as
Dulles has stated, the two are "dialecticalil.y interdependent,"
and Loneirgan's attempt to divorce the two is ill.-conceiived.
1

1

1

METHOD AND CONTENT IN THEOLOGY

269

His philosophical psychofogy is impeecably done, and lnsight
is col"I'eotly regarded as a major intellectual achievement.
Method is
a formidahle work insofar as it pursues his
philosophical observations and offers an analysis of the functional specia1lties germane to theology. But his programmatic
effort to sepamte method and theology is not convincing.
What he has done instead is to enter the realm of theology in
part, o:fFering obliique and somewha;t piecemeal theological rema.rks, saying just enough to spur critics like Kelly to demand
a more systematic devdopment of his theology or a greater attention to the demands of his own method. lJ1ethod, therefore,
provides more than a method and less than a thorough retheology. It stands as a hybrid, to be completed when
and if some folfower of Lonergan writes a theology for Roman
based upon this philosophicaJ fou:nidrution. :K!eHy's
critique, then, as summed up ·by Dulles and echoed by Wiles,
is ess:entiailly we1l founded.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND THE
INTERPRE.TATION OF POLITICAL VIOLENCE
FREDERICK SONTAG
Pomona OoUego

Olaremont, Oalifornia

" It is impossible to remain loyal to Marxism, to the Revolution,
without treating insurrection as an art."
Lenin, paraphrasing Karl Marx

W

HENEVER Liberation Theology ·and its contributions to theologicail discussion al'e ·concerned, no
aspect has been more controversirul than its association with violence. There is no question that Marxism/Leninism depends on the use of violence. But all liberation theories
must take violence into consideration. On the one hand, the
ties that hold humans in bondage may be so strong that only
violent means ca.n be effective to release us. On the other hand,
it is well known that violenre often breeds its own do·wnfall
and results in ten·or more often than peace.
Since the beginning of time, probably every prrogram seeking to release human beings to their furhl. potential has had to
consider the use of violence to achieve its ends, even while
awal'e of its potential dangers. Yet this issue takes on a new
urgency in our time because of two s[gnificant changes in our
situation: (I) Most communist proposals which have resulted
in
change have militantly asserted the necessity to
use force if we are to be set free; (2) In recent times Liberati.on Theofogy has been espoused by some Christian theologians even while the adoption of pacifism or the abhorrence
of violence by most Christian groups is well known. The question of religion's intrusion into the politicaiJ. reailm is problem
271

FREDERICK

SONTAG

enough, but add to this the question of the use of violence and
the discussion becomes very heated indeed.
Although many traditions have well-developed positions regarding violence and non-violence, Christianity will be our
frame of reference in discussing these issues, since Liberation
Theology has, in fact, developed in a Christian context. First
of all we havie to ask whether the use of violence to ruchieve
politicaJ ends is a;lways ruled out or whether some circumstances might justify it as an ruooeptabletool for Christian use.
Where Christianity is concerned, it is always instructive to begin by looking at the life and work of Jesus. Trruditionally,
Jesus is seen as rejecting the use of violence and as having suffered vioilence himself. Can anything so change this image as
to make violence acceptable on Christian grounds?
In ·considering this, we first have to note that Jesus himself
lived under po1itiool oppression. We must
the Jewish
expectations for the ' Messiah ' and how this role came to be
projecbed onto Jesus; their hope for release from Roman oppressors was what plruced mroh high political expectations on
Jesus. Christians recognized Jesus as a' Messiah', even though
he obvious1ly did not fulfill the role of a political liberato·r.
Afiter his death and for centuries fater, Jewish political fortunes went from bad to worse. The people's expectations of
gaining release by the hand of Jesus did not result in a change
in their political fortunes. Christians diid enter into politics
and governments in !Later years, and some welcome changes
can be attributed to Christian influence. But still, none of
these improvements can be directly attributed to Jesus' efforts
in his own file<time.
This leads us to one of the many pomts of conflict that
Christians have had with Communist programs. Following the
optimism of the modern scientific age, Marxism/Leninism
clruims that the age of science offers us the possibility for utopia
now. Christianity, on the other hanid, seems to offer release
only later, delayed until some eventual heaven. Thus, the
Chmstian must face the faunt that Communism offers an

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL

VIOLENCE

273

achievable ideal state now, one within our reach because of scientific advances, whereas Christianity ho1ds out little hope for
us in this wor1d. Oe:rtainly Liberation Theology arises at least
partly as a 01ristfa.n answer to the Marxist
As is
weill known, rin order to ,answer it, it does borrow some doctrines from Marxism/Leninism. But how compatible is Christianity with Marxist/Leninist doctrine and its philosophical
assumptions? Can Christian liberation
accept
parts of Communist doctrine without compromising the core
of their own heHef?
If Christians cannot prollli.se us immediate release, as Marxists ean, then certainly they are at a disaidvantage competing
in a world dominated by revoJutionary
Marxists have
achieved the ovierthrow of oppressive politica:l regimes. What
can Cfilistian offer to :compete with this, other than a distant
heaven? Christians do claim that we human beings can be
rborn :anew, achieving an internal l'enewal, but how can this
mild and largely unseen change compete with revolutionary
and the establishment of a new political order? (Of
course, if you are not a fan of Marxist regimes as they have
emerged historically, you might begin by questioning whether
violent :revu1utions have in foct achieved the £uH rel.ease they
promised to the citizens affected.) It cannot be denied that
revo1utiorrary violence has yielded political change in some
societies and without the use of fo11ce these societies might weU
have simply remained stagnant and unchanging. What can
Christians hope to aichieve in the way of overt change and
what means can they legitimately and cons[stently employ?
Before exploring some of these basic issues further or exploring what Christian beginnings and history would seem to
aillow as possible ilet me state the thesis I will offer. This might
seem to be reaching the condusion before the analysis of the
issue but stating a thesis at this point may in fact clarify the
issues. Anyone who deals with Christian texts and traditions
has no choice except to pick some focal point as a reference.
Once one makes this selection other notions fall into place

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FREDERICK

SONTAG

around it, but I believe there is no neutrail focal point. Some
selections can be easily brushed aside as minor and unuS1Ual,
but what I propose has often been selected as crucial for Christian interpretation. It may be a bit enigmatic, its interpretation may he disrputed, but the central sayings in Christianity
often are.
Recall that, when JeS1Us was asked if it was proper to pay
ta:x;es to Caesar, he asked for a coin. Showing the image of
Caesar on it, he is quoted as saying: " Render therefore unto
Caesar the things which are Caesar's and unto God the things
which are God's." 1 Commentators have pointed out that, although this seems •an astute reply, it is not so easy to interpret
in detail as it might at first seem. I would not dispute that
conclusion. After all, I think all abstract principles are difficult
to apply in detail and in concrete, and their S1Upposed precision
often becomes murky when practical decisions ·are required. I
take this as no special fauilt of Jesus' utteraDJCes but as a fact
of our moral life, that is, that no principle can be applied easily
and universally without difliooJt decisions on our part. This
does not render generail ruJes and principles useless, but it does
mean that the enunciation of general principles is only the beginning of the human decision-making process.
In ,this case in particu1ar, how does Jesus' neat ·division, the
affairs of Caesar /the affairs of God, he1p UIS with the question
of whebher •a resort to vio[ence to aichieve ichange is legitimaite
for a Chris1tian or whether it is to ;be ruled out? Quite often
this saying of Jesus is appealed to in order to .argue for a rigid
separation. Christianity becomes purely a thing of the spirit,
to be conducted in isolwtion from mundane matters, and Christians 1are sometimes even ·advised :to have nothing to do with
these. Religion betcomes•an mterior, spiritual a:fFair, leaving the
affairs of state overtly unaffected. In contrast, I want to argue
the contr:ary: that in fact this important saying sho1UM be interpreted 1as leaviing Christians free the pr:aciticrulwor1d. This
1

1 Matt.

22 :21 (King James Version).

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL

VIOLENCE

275

can he done with one cruoia.l provision: Christians should not
1appeal to Jesus or to religious principles to justify their politicrul/publ:iic activity. Eruch person must accept responsibility
and justify his (or her) actions on his own.
Although to say this may seem to compartmentalize religion,
it only means to authorize any raotivity the individual may see
fit to undertake, provided that he (or she) takes upon himself
the
for what is done. It does not ,claim tha.t religion, pavtiraularly Christianity, is purely :an internal, spiritual
affair with no eX"bernarl applications. It simply te11ls us that, if
you feel that some principle, such a·s compassion for those who
are poor or suffering, requil'es wction on your part, you must
undertake what you deem necessary, without putting off rersponsibirlity for the decision onto others, pm·t:Ucu1arly onto
Jesus. Jesus deady
not use violence and seems to have
preruched against its use. If you think that violenJCe now is
needed to release human betings from their bonds of suffering,
fine. But the means you adopt are your choice and the consequences are on your shoulldern. Of course, most liberation
theologians want to analyze Christian 'texfa and traditions so
that they justify their partircu1liar actions, even violence. But
instead, I believe, God places all responibility on our shoulders.
Any argument which seems to
that all Christians must
or shouM support some one program of action cannot he justified in the fong run. No argument within Christianity has received (or can it receive) unanimous approval as expressing
what all Christians must beJieve or do. This does not mean
that all arguments claiming Christian support are equally
valird. But it does mean that it is dangerous to try to fix one
" Christian position " ,as binding on all. Our differences have
not ceased to exist, and the only way in which we might reach
universrul agreement is by agreeing not to try to force all of
Christianity into some s:i.ng1e form or program. Diversity may
be of Chrisrtianity's •essence. If we could accept this as fact,
it might keep us out of internally destructive arguments, ones
which make us :appear headed toward unity hut in fact promote division.

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FREDERICK SONTAG

One can live in South Africa and claim justification for one's
racial views, but they will always be subject to dispute since
(on this thesis) neither God nor Jesus enjoins any one program.
However, the stress on love and the love of enemies is so central
tha.t one does need to reconcile any particular outlook with
that theme of Christianity. Those who once ,asserted the divine right of kings are as much at fault as the revolutionary
who argues that Jesus' offer of liberation authorizes the use of
violence, if this proves necessary to break " the ties that bind "
us in debilitating life styles. Surely Jesus not only did not resort to violence himself but in fact seems to have opposed it.
Yet I believe even that fact does not prevent the dedicated
Christian from arguing for the necessity of violence as a means,
if he or she is convinced that it is the only way an oppressive
structure will release us.
One 'central proh1em with this interpretation wiH he spotted
quickly both by dedicated revolutionaries and Christians who
want Liberation Theology to result in social change. That is,
effective liberation and revolutionary movements need unified
support. To he effective, dedication is required, and the group
cannot simply sink into an " e'ach do as one pleases: " ,attitude.
We know that effective revolutionary action is necessarily intolerant towarids 'any opposition to the new programs it envisions. The classical liberal tolerianJCe for ,diversity in viewpoints is not a virtue that breeds success for revo;Jutionary or
liberation movements. We rull know that such actions have
not only often been intolerant of opposting views but have in
fact felt that the destruction of the opposition >is a prime :requfoement for success. We 'are aware of the Marxist/Leninist
insistency on toeing the line on dogma, for conformity to doctrine.
But can the Christian ,aiccept the uniformity of interpretation which effective acbion seems to require? If the Christian
liberation theofogian argues that aU Christians cannot be required to aiocept some one program of wction, he or she is
limited by the division that plurality brings. On the other

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL

VIOL]j]NCE

'277

hand, the Christian revotutionary activist should not be told
that his program is " unchristian " as judged by some singular,
authoritative standard. Of course, the chief complication in
saying this lies with a hieI"archical church which includes authorities to formulate doctrine. The Christian who wants to
act differently from what the srbructure of such a chureh allows
will either: (1) have to find a way to act independently and
still stay within that community; or (2) convince the hierarchy of the rightness of the position, mwhich case the church's
officiail position becomes his own; or (3) leave the churoh for
another less doctrinaJJy rigid Christian community.

Does Liberation Necessitate the Use of Violence?
Up until this: point we have just :assumed that any effective
To
liberation of human beings requires the use of
deal with this 1assumption, we must first distinguish the inner
and the outer human natUl'e. As is known, Christianity often
makes this distinction 1and often clrui:ms to offer a new inner
freedom. lt talks of being "born again" in the sense of one's
inner nature, not the physical human being. Of course, external change is sometimes offered rtoo, but usually it is to be
at a later time, not now.
It is clear from Jesus' statements, that, no matter what later
ohureh interpretations may conc1ude, Jesus' foNowers were enjoined to help the poor, heal the sick, and relieve suffering.
No specific instructions are given ,as to how this i:s to be done
(which is the basis for ,a Marxist complaint about the lack of
action-program) , but still the intent is clear. I argue that any
implementation program is the 11esponsibilityof the individual
and that no spooifics are enjoined; Christian doctrine says only
that some action should be undertaken. This provokes the
Christian indiviidua.il crisis: I must do something for human
relief, but the burden is mine as to how I choose to do this; no
group plan has been laid out.
Furthermore, two problems plague Christianity with regard
to Marxism/Leninism: (1) The Marxist doctrine of "mate-

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FREDERICK SONTAG

rialism" and (2) the stress on the use of revolutionary violence. The Christian appraisal does not deny that there
are material causes of unhappiness and ·enslavement, but still
it tends to stress (as Hegel does in opposition to Marx) the
spiritual or internal causes; these must he addressed first, and
they may not necessarily have been materially determined
(they may he of some other). How, then, one attacks the
material/economic/political situation is not specified. It may
be to work as Mother Teresa works, simply caring for the suffering individually. But it might also involve a political/material program. But whatever may be proposed it should not
be required of all hy reason of their Christian belief.
The universalism and uniformity of doctrine generally demanded by Marxism/Leninism as a condition for success
should not be demanded in Christian terms. Some church
groups have attempted to impose uniformity of doctrine, but
while this may he demanded of the members of a particular
group, no interpretation can be required of all Christians.
Uniformity of action on a" Christian" basis is e:xduded from
the beginning. All this does not bode well for a " Christian "
revolution and certainly it makes the use of violence to aichieve
liberation a matter of great debate.

Cornell West
With some of these issues and proposals in Inind, let us look
at some recent proponents of Liberation Theology in a Christian setting and use these as a testing ground for our thesis. We
begin with a recent (and Inild) statement, Cornell West's,
Prophesy Deliverance: An Afro-American Revolutionary Christianity. 2 West profeS1Ses to " an abiding allegiance to progressive Marxist social analysis ·and political praxis." 3 But it is
hard to understand how his Christianity meshes with Marxism,
since .the latter involves an allegiance to material/economic

1

2 Cornell West, Prophesy
Deliverance: an A.fro-American Revolutionary
Christianity (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1982).
a Ibid., p. 10.

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY .AND POLITIC.AL

VIOLENCE

279

determinism and a commitment to political revolution, using
violence as necessary. Marx stresses inevitable class strife and
the necessity to use force to break these bonds.
West describes "the Christian people" as "the self-realization of individuality within the community." 4 That this involves in principle a" this-worldly" liberation as well as otherwor1dly salvation is hard to deny. But the issue is: what does
" this-wor1dly " liberation mean and what sort of force is to
be used to achieve it? Are the f orees that bind us such that
only violence and political revolution can break them? West
notes that Marxism and Christianity " share a similar moral
impulse." 5 This is quite true, and it often pits them against
each other as rivals . But the issue is the analysis of which
" binding structures " must be attacked and which means
must be used. Otherwise platitudes unite us all.
West then goes on to say that the two basic challenges confronting Afro-Americans are "self-image and self-determination." 6 Again, it is hard to argue with this, but what if violence and revolution are necessary to achieve self-determination? He urges a" dialogical encounter" between Afro-American Christian thought and progressive Marxist social analysis. 1
Again, dialogue is harmless enough, but what if the good Marxist argues for the necessity of violence, revolution, and the extermination of opponents who block the revolution? West
proceeds to an histo:vcial aiccount of the Afro-American experience, but this still skirts the issue of " what is to be done "
and how.
Even if as West says "the alliance of prophetic Christianity and progressive Marxism provides a fast human hope for
mankind," 8 the issue at stake still remains: the role of violence
in its reaJiziation, a question he does not address. Fiurthermore,
rther:e surely is no one agreed definition of " prophetic Christianity" which aJl Christians can support. It is hard to see
4lbid., p. 16.
5 Ibid.

1 Ibid.,

e Ibid., p. 80.

8 Ibid.,

p. 83.
p. 95.

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SONTAG

how 1a "lasit human hope" can rest on such a divided and
splintered foundation;
Marxist knows this to be a formul a
for political-social inaction. We get involved in arguing about
whait program a Christian ought to foHow rather than uniting
What is the evidence that " all.
ito ruchieve transformation.
Christians " have or ever can be unit ed on one
One of West's principles that seems 1ocucial to his theology
is: "God sides 'wth the oppressed and 1aots on their behalt" 9
Christian Hterature iClertainly is fuH of concern for the " oppressed," but we must he careful to determine what an author
means by " oppressed" and what he says the cimses of the
oppression are. It cannot be argued that alil. Christians use (or
ought to use) "oppressed" as a Marxist would. But more importantly, among both Jews 1and Christians God has been said
to "act." Tl'ue, brut do the actions God has en:dorsed include
revolution and violence? That would be hard to establish, particufa11ly since God's incarnation in Jesus lef1t the Roman
pire untouched: Jesus was crucified, and the Jews were left
,subjugated.
West asknowledges that " one is hard put fo find a sketch
of what liberation would aotualJy mean in the everydray lives
of Mack people." :i.o But even if there are any concerns that can
he shared with Marxism, even these wilil fade
insignificance unless a poHticalfsocfal 1action program can he agreed
upon an:d particulady unless the use of or the rejection of
viio1ence mn be 1agreed upon. West suggests that " human liberation occurs only when people participate substantively in
the decision-making proeess in the major institutions which
libemte their lives." 11 But this still leaves untouched the
major and decisive issue of how this is ;to be achieved and
whether any Christian program can become :identical with a
Mar:xiistfo:rmu1a.
West claims that Marxism l'eoognizes "the posiitive liberating aspects of popular (luiliture and religion." i 2 But there is a
1

1a

1

1

9 Ibid.,
10 Ibid.,

p. 106.
p. 11 l.

11 Ibid.,

12 Ibid.,

p. 112.
p. ll 7.

LIBERATION THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

281

difference between Christianity and Marxism here that is
ci311. The Marxist sees most religion ·as haviing a subjugating
e:ffoot, and his notion of what is needed to overeome human
alienation inv:olV'es more force. Given this difference, little can
be held in common when it comes to practical implementa<bion. West is strong in supporting what one might uaU a cultural and intellectual revoJution in outlook, but he skirts the
complex question of whether such " ailtered perspectives " are
suffiicient to •achieve liberation, something the Marxist would
be quick to deny.
The "revolutionary aictivity" 13 which West seems; to endorse is something quite different from M arxist revolution and
vio1'ell1Ce. 1£ so, one must ask West what such a " revolution "
can hope to <ochiev;e by way of mdical reform. West seems to
freel he has found a "miiddJe pathway," 14 but it is hard to get
a very dear picture of how this dew1s with revo1ution and
violence. The book ends on an extremcly vague note, and
leaves the reader puzzled as to: (1) what specifically is proposed; (2) whether revofotion 1and violence are authorized; and
(3) whether West really believes ,thaJt all black theologians
are likreily to. •agree with what he has proposed.
1

James Cone
Now let us examine an earlier work which is a mo11e clearcut proposal cro111Cerningthe use of vti.olence: James Cone's A
Blaok Theology of Liberation.15 I do not propose to assess all
the writings and changes in positions that Cone or other American liberation theologians have gone rbhrough since 1970, hut
this provides us with an early example of raising the ii.ssue of
rthe valid use of violent means. Cone srtates that Christianity
" is esisentiaMya oofilgion of liberation," 16 which is difficult to
13 Ibid.,

p. 131.
p. 143.
1s James Cone, A Black Theology of Liberation
pincott Co., 1970) •
.10 Ibid., p. 11.
14 Ibid.,

(Philadelphia:

J. B. Lip-

FREDERICK

SONTAG

argue with. But the question still :remains: liberation from
what allJd by what means? Similal'lly, when Cone says tha:t the
Christian mes:s:ageis addressed to "the poor," what is the meaning of "poor," e.g., economic or spiritual?
Cone argues that the gospel bestow;s on .the poo!r "the necessary power to break the chains of oppression." 17 But again,
what limits ave set, if any, on the use of power? Lime West,
Cone asserrts that hla;ck liberation " is the work of God himself." 18 But is this " work" by God 1sruch that it is physically
evident now; and partim:ilady, does: iit extend to violent
tion? If it does not, it may not su!Oceed, in which case it would
be a 'strange " work " of God indeed. Cone claims that a11 acts
which destroy white rrucism ar-e "Christian." 19 But again, does
tha;t put God on rbhe side of violence? Cone also ha,s God" takring sides in the struggle," 20 but this is a bit hard to visualize.
How does God in foot do this? Why is this: not evriident to us,
to 1a1l?
Cone ,aidvocates "a ra.dica1l revolutionary confrontation"
with white power :21 But once :again: can this indude the use
of violence 'and human destruction, if the power structures that
interfer-e can be ovie11come in no other way? Racism probably
is " inicompat:iihle with the gospel of Christ," 22 but that is easy
to say; it :rea.Ily means nothing until the issue of
is
faced. 'Cone does argue that we cannot fak!e Jesus' actions as
a guide and that we must be free " to make decisions without
an ethical guide from Jesus." 23 But that srimpJy postpones the
issue of what criteria Christians can use to justify an action
1as being within the Emits of Christianity. Anyone may ca1l
any ruction, violent or otherwise, "Christian"; names are free.
But how many who :identify themsdv:es as Christian wou1d
agree to use these s1ame names?
The meaning of " rev:o1ution " is also part of this question.
1

u Ibid., p. 23.
1s Ibid.,

21 Ibid.,

19

22 Ibid.,

p. 26.
Ibid., p. 33.
20 Ibid., p. 36.

p. 41.
p. 40.

2a Ibid., p. 68.

LIBERATION

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283

Cone asserts that ":the black revo1ution in America is the
rev;olution of God," 24 and he identifies the black revo11ution
with
Power. However, we know from history that it is
diffic:u!Lt to establish that changes reahly are revolutions,
though they are often asserted to he such. And, more importantly, what wou1d "revo1ution" mean in the context of what
has transpired in America in recent years? To say that" every
:blow for liberation is the work of God " 25 leaves Gord open to
'.llesponsibilityfor mass murder. Cone dearly states that" they
should havie kiMed him (the oppressor) insteaid of 'loving'
him "-this is ce11tainily a mdicrul reversal of traditional Christian teruchings.26
Perhaps his most clear-cut expression of these ideas is this
sentence: "What we need is the divine love ·as expressed in
Blaick Power whlch is the power of blruck people to destroy
their oppressors here and now, by any means •at their disposa1." 27 Vio1enoe and destruction are thus maide "holy." We
know that the history of Christianity (as we11 as of other religions) is full of kiJlings in "holy" w:ars. But the question remains: Do we want ,to retreat rt:o such destruction? Also, " holy
wars" can be waged by social 1a:nd politicrul conservatives as
well as by rrudicwls. One cannot argiue that " Christianity " is
or has been on one political side only.
Cone claims that " love " means that " God meets our
needs," 28 :hurt the history of Christianity offers countless ex•amples of religious testing which seems f.ar from" God's meeting one's needs." That God has oonsistentily met our needs is
hard to see in l'eiligioushistory. Cone wilil not •rullow human suffering to have "divine •approval," 29 hrut that is di:ffioult if not
nnpossible to claim if one aucepts God :as the world's creator
as well 1as its liberator. If God created our wocr1d, then the
divinity seems Ito be responsible for much of the suffering our
wor1d contains.
24 Ibid.,
25 Ibid.,

26 Ibid.

p. 90.
p. 101.

27 Ibid.,

p. 130.

p. 138.
2s Ibid., p. 149.
28 Ibid.,

FREDERICK SONTAG

The vagueness of Cone's early writing soon brought forth
many objections. I do not want to give a his:tory of ensuing
debate but just to pofu.t out the strange way in which Christianity is used to support violence and how " love " is made
compatible with killirig.
In his later hook God of the Oppressed,30 James Cone attempts to build Liberation Theofogy out of the Black church
experience. The result is more mild in tone than A Black
Theology of Liberati-On. Yet he srtates: " God came and is
present now, in order to destroy the oppressor's power to hoLd
people in captivity." 31 But if this is true, this surely cannot
be " power " in a poilitica;l sense, eince oppressors still wield
political po·wer. If that was the" power" God sought to break,
God seems to have been ineffective. God's intervention cannot be as immediate as Cone claims. Cone asserts that " Jesus
has not left us alone hut is with us in the struggile for freedom." 32 Thwt may very wehl be hue, but it says nothing about
how Jesus is linked with the question of using violent means in
the struggle.. Jesus is the Expected One, " coming to liberate
the oppressed from silaviery." 33 Yes, but when? And what is
his present action? Cone does not tell us. Cone calls Black
worship " a liberruting experience " 34 and it may weN be, but
S'UI"ely .such " liberation " is far from political or violent and
may have 11ittle economic effect. But ithen Cone returns to his
theme that " liberation '' mean " revolutionary action against
injustice, slavery and oppression." 35 He speaks of "joining
God in the fight against injustice," 36 but Cone remains vague
iand ambivalent as to what means we may use.

Gustavo Gutierrez
,As is well known, Gustavo Gutierrez first brought Libe:r:ation
Theoliogy to wide aititention with his book A Theology of Lib30 James

Cone, God of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1975).
p. 99.
34 Ibid., p. 144.
32 Ibid., p. 122.
35 Ibid., p. 152.
38 Ibid., p. 129.
36 Ibid., p. 233.
a1 Ibid.,

LIBERATION

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285

eration.81 Just as the situation of black people in America is
unique, so it is clear that the Roman Catholic chureh in Latin
America is different from what it is in most parts of the world.
And just as Cone and West speak of a unified " Black" perspective, so Gutierrez speaks almost entirely in terms of "the
church," as ;a unified whole, in a way no Protestant really can.
Without going into detail about the Church's socio-historical
context, we are concerned .about how Liberation TheoJogy relates to the use of violence. Gutierrez begins by equating
" liberation " with "salvation," 88 and this is cruciail. Most
Christians are familiar with the idea of "salvation," but they
may not he oocustomed to link it with the notion of " liberation."
Gutierrez argues that the notion of theology changes: over
the years, and that ,a notion of theology " as a critical reflection on praxis " (or action) has only recently become recognized. From a Protestant perspective one could argue that theologians have long argued Christianity's mmmitment to
change, but, of course, Gutierrez is speaking from a Roman
Catholic-Latin perspectiv:e. Marxism is even more committed
to transform the world, 40 but the ques:bi.onis: By what means?
" Liberation," Gutierrez recognizes, implies radical change.
" SaJlvation " does too, hut it is not at first glance socially and
politicaiiily oriented. Gutierrez sees the historical process as
" the gradual liberation of man," 41 hut tills: implies a progressh11e, evolutionary
which may be hard to justify
by the foots of history. To present Christ "as the one who
hvings liberations," 42 is to :ruocept the shift from " salvation "
to the slightly broader notion of " liberation." But then there
iis the question of what liberation really involves. Gutierrez
recognizes these diffioulties but he argues that now, on the
1

B1 Gustavo

Gutierrez, A Theolon of Liberation. (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis

Books, 1973).
SB Ibid., p. 2.
se Ibid., p. 6.
•o Ibid., p. 9.

.n Ibid., p. 29.
42 Ibid., p. 37.

286

FREDERICK

SONTAG

basis of evolrution, " human reason has hooome political reason." 4-3 (But this may be difficult to accept without also accepting the assumption thiait there is "social evolution.")
Gutierrez .asks the rhetorical question: Shorui1d the chureh
:aictiually lend support "to a dictatorial and oppressive government" by remaining friendly or silent?" H (This again
assumes a Catholic sense of " the church.") He leaves unspecified what aiction the .church or any individUJal religious person should engage in. As for faiitin America, he does foel that
the revolutionary process " ought to embra.ce the whol.e continent," 45 but he does not provide any specifics about how this
is to be done or how far it shou1d go. He ·ailso seems to assume
a certain purity of intelllt on the part of those who oppose current dictatorial government. On .the other hand,
Niebuhr might be right: there may be no one right side in
these situations but only a choice of :lesser evils.
As Gutierrez says, " the ·coming of the Kingdom implies the
building of a just so1ciety."46 To be sure, hut stilil the issue is:
how, when, and by what means? No Christian needs to refrain from social action, hut there is a question of whether our
own actions can claim to bring about the just society (.as the
Marxist plans to bring about the classless society) or whether
its fiulil 8Jchievement is resel"V'edfor God's final 8JCtion at the end
of time. Gutierrez urges the church to "prophetic denunciations " of soci1rul injustice. There is an 'alllCienttrrudition for this
both in Judaism and in Christianity, but the question is
whether one ·Can moV'e beyond this tradirtion to violent revolution on a religious basis.
Speaking for Latin America, Gutierrez wants the church to
" place itseM s:quarely within the process of remlrution, amid
rbhe violence which iis present in diffovent ways." 47 Of course,
Christians cannot escape violence; those involved in any
struggle must still: be ministered to, and their human needs
1

1

1

4a Ibid.,

p. 47.

p. 65.
'5 Ibid., p. 89.

44 Ibid.,

46 Ibid.,
47 Ibid.,

p. llO.
p. 138.

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY

AND POLITICAL

VIOLENCE

287

may he even greater than in times of tranquility. But can the
church, or any per,son claiming the support of Christianity,
aictivcelypromote the process and engage in violence too? The
ichuflch might put its weight behind social changes, hut shouLd
it endorse any particular program or plan or action? Gutierrez
treats "saJvation " 1as something "other-worldly," 48 hut one
does not have to do so. He wants a new chosen people and a
Messiah who will obviousily be more of a poJitical liberator
than Jesus was in fact.
Gutierrez paints a moving picture of Christian commitment
to aHeviate su:fforing and of the new wodd it works towards,
but on the
unlike Cone, he skirts the issue of the necessity of violence. Perhaps he comes closest to the issue when
he states: "To love one's enemies presupposes recognizing
and aiccepting thrut one has olass enemies and that it is necessary to combat them." 49 Yes, but by what means? And does
this include the elimination of opposing parties by violence if
neoessary? Orthodox Marxism assumes that it often must be
necessary. Gutierrez wants us to participate in the class strnggle, hut does he want us to seek the elimination of certain
existing classes?
He argues for a " solidarity with the poor and a protest
against poverty." 50 But is this protest to 11emain mainly
verbal? Marxism wou1d scoff at such ineffective "action." In
a11 his analysis, Gutierrez has not faced the Marxist challenge
that the boilids that suppress us are materiail and that therefofle radical ,aJction, l'evolutionary violence is needed to break,
eliminate, and eradicate the social/political structures of our
present world. The Marxist analysis could be tme. Gutierrez
has only argued for action in general terms, without specifying
the Jimits of action ailfowed, hut this is the issue at the heart
of 1the matter, the origin of the surrounding controversy.
p. 151.
p. 276.
50 Ibid., p. 301.
48 Ibid.,

<!9 Ibid.,

288

FREDERICK

SONTAG

Oscar Cullman
To assess these athors let us briefly conside:r a book by Oscar
CuUman, Jesus and the Revolutionaries? Cullman argues that
Jesus could havie joined the revolutionary movements of his
time, but that he did not. In fact, he " cannot be simply viewed
as belonging to any of the principal movcements prevailing in
his time." 5·2 This is something all the aidvocates of revolution
cons1dered here, 'West, Cone, and Gutierrez, would find hard to
,accept. They want to enlist Christian backing for specific
causes. But it seems cl,ear thait Jesus joined no specific causes
in his time and because of this very fact remained an enigma
ro his disciples. Cone has argued that Jesus should not be the
:role model for Christian ruction, but, if we accept that statement, we will be hard p11essed to identify any ;action as " Christian!'
In JeS1Us' time the Zeailots were the group advocating a political program, just as Cone, West, and Gutierrez do; yet
Jesus did not join them. The Romans convicted Jesus of the
ic:rime of trying to establish a political kingdom. Yet we know
the irony of his cmcifixion is that he prewched the coming of
the kingdom from within. Jesus and the .Zealots both procl1aimed tha;t the kingdom of God was iat hand, and Jesus was
condemned as a Zealot agitator. Yet we know he advocated
nonviolence and viewed Zealotry as a diabolic temptation to be
shunned. Jesus' expe1ctation of a coming kingdom is undeniable, but it is to come from God, not f:rom us.
Most importantly, Jesus did not hate his enemies, a tendency
we see in M1rurxism and in some Liberation Theologies.. In fact,
his attitude towarid the Samaritans 1and Gentiiles probably
shocked the Zealots, " whose hate for the Gentiles was the most
extreme." 53 Can violent revolution be advocated without a
61 Oscar Cullman, Jesus and the Revolutionaries
Row, 1976).
02 Ibid., p. vii.
oa Ibid., p. 23.

(New York: Harper and

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

basis in hatred? If not, it will be repugnant to most Christians. The forgiving of enemies is difficult for a revolutionary
program, and it certainly eliminates violence as an acceptable
path. Jesus turns to the poor and to the rich; he shows no
class disrbinctions,and this is a rood block for all Marxism.
E-V'en his disciples could not understand the conception of
the kingdom of God which Jesus preached, so different was
it from the current political options. He was a strange
" Messiah." Jesus dismissed as a satanic temptation the
Zealot's political concept of the Messiah, a concept which is
olose to that of Cone, West, and Gutierrez. It is not easy to
understand the kind of "kingdom" Jesus wanted to inaugurate, but certainly it was not a political-economic one. The
Zealots considered 11efusalto pay taxes ®s a test of f,aithfulness..
But Jesus had his own idea of political/religious allegiance as
we noted earlier. He did not join the Zealots when the Jewish
Wax broke out but fled to .the other side of the Joroan. IronicalliY Jesus was condemned as a Zealot, and yet he was no Zealotand that is a problem for West, Cone, and Gutierrez.

The Special Problems in South and Central America
For someone living in the United States, it may be easy
enough to pursue a non-violent revolution. Miartin Luther
King, Jr., couiLd be a Cmistian pacifist, foHow Jesus and
Gandhi, and still achieve a revolution in race relations. Gandhi
inspi11ed King because he aJChieved the independence of India
while preachmg non-violence, even if violence did follow as a result of his work. Gandhi was dealing with aiuthorities ultimately SJUbjoot to a cultivated British democracy, and King had
United States coll!Stitutional ll:lippeals open to him. Although
situations vaey, it is ihavd to point ;to a singile situation in
South/Cenwrul America where military fonce is not the rule and
where civil liberties are genuinely sacred.
When you bee miilitary power thait is: openly ruthless and
political rule that is so autocratic that any protest might muse
you to disappear from society, it can easily seem that nothing

FREDERICK SONTAG

hut force can ruocomplish change. Those who hold power regafldless of constitutions or open democratic elections recognize that ultimately oruy represision can keep them in power.
Such rulers have everything to fear from protest and revolution and little .to lose from ruthless oppression, pa;rticulaflly if
it is astutely and cleverly
In such situations, to talk
of " liberation " without a willingness ;to resort to force and
violence may he .to doom the speaker to either frustration or
insignillcaooe. "The church " often has both wealth and political influence. Why shouM this not be used to achieve a
change otherwise doomed to fairlrure?
In a situation of this sort, the difficulty I have pointed out
in reconciling Christianity with any appeal to violence· wouLd
seem to doom religion to ineffectiveness. How to change or
revise Christianity's tr:aditional postme is one problem. But
what puzzles me is how pofrbical interests, no matter how just
their cause, could have thought of turning .to Christianity, to
.any of its churches, in support of a change <that aJmost demands violence if the project is to succeed. Why not argue for
change (and for any means necessary to achieve it) on a
.secular basis, just as Marx does? Of course, a monolithic church
in Latin America can be 1a powerful instrument, whereas
churches in the U.S. split their power by their sheer variety.
In North America one can appeal to organiz;ed religion for
spiritual or moral srupport and often raise powerful forces. But
any hint of violence would at best divide support and at worst
doom the movement to failure. In Latin America, violence may
be necessary for success, and the Roman Chureh stands out as
one of the few institutions explicitly committed to the good of
the people, whate¥er its past recol'd of accommodation to
political repression may be. One may be forced to consider
:the church as an ally if one wants any organized support at all.
Violence has been used by Christianity in the past, often as a
means to :vepress dissent from within. But it still seems odd
that violence might be used as an alternative to potential revo1lutionary failure. What we must ask, however, is whether as-

LIBERATION

THEOLOGY AND POLITICAL VIOLENCE

fl91

sociation with violence might not in fact tear Christianity
1apart, rather than secure an otherwise unobtainable political
change.
Listening to the rhetoric of recent liberation theologians, one
detects two trends that have been dangerous in the past to
Christianity and may be potentially divisive again, especially
when unity of action is desperately needed. These are: (A) a
tendency to pit one group against another rather than to bring
peare among factions; and (B) a stress on preaching the realization of the Kingdom of God now.
(A) Insofar as Latin American Liberation Theology incites
hate against North American economic" oppressors" (or even
simply against local political oppressors), it draws its strength
from the stormy emotions of hate and retruliation, whereas
Christianity has preached the love of enemies. Can any movement be accredited as " Christian '' which in any way capitaliz;es on hate for 1an enemy and not lov;e? Furthermore, it often
happens whenev;er hatred of any group or class is pI"eached that
sUJCh :appeaJ. will divide Christians rather than unite them, even
if some may rally to the call.
(B) Wher:e Christian tradition is concerned, how to understand the " Kingidom of God " poses the most difficult problem.
Jesus' followers expected success in their time, and Jesus was
crucified amid disappointed hopes. The traditional expootation
of the Second Coming seems to say ·that no reaJization of the
Christian hope can come in any
or exact sense until that
time. If this is the case, wha;tever Christians may do in the
interim to redress wrongs, even if they are enjoined to do it,
the final resolution still a.waits God's aiciion.
to
achieve goals now appears to be even more difficult .to justify.
Vioilence, if it is to be :appealed to, can hardily be enjoined by
virtue of Christian doctrine but must he undert:aken as an individual decision.

FREDERICK SONTAG

Summary
If an individual, Christian or otherwise, choos1es to resort to
violence and destruction, he or she shoruld be willing to take
the responsibiility for it on his own shoulders. The Marxist/
Leninist can undoubtedly find a c1ear doctcinail support for
using violence to break those
class
structures which prevent liberation. A ·Christian, on the other
hand, may offer 'an individual reading of "Christianity"
whlch 1aiuthorizesthe use of violence, but neither in the life and
work or Jeisrus, nor in the New Testament, nor in most major
theologicwl inter:pretations oan one find justification for the use
of violent means or even for advocating destruction.
Certainly you wiill D!ev:er get a11 Christians 1Jo agree to accept
the use of violence, so ·antitheticaJ is it .to most Christian traditions. Y:et we IDIUSt aJso firuce the Marxist/Leninist challenge:
there may he times when the structures which bin:d us can
only ·be broken by the use of vi01l1ent means. Nevertheless,
whatever any Christian may feel authorized to do, the transformation of the
hasic stru\Cture depends .at least in
part on God's intervening power. And furthermore, even if it
can he said that the divinity inte:deres partiailly and subtly
now, the day of foll ,and finail release is not yet here, and we
1simply oannot be srure that the use of vioJence and terror will
hasten its ooming.
1

A NECESSARY CONDITION FOR THE TRUTH
OF MORAL AND OTHER JUDGMENTS
STEPHEN THERON

Na,tional University of Lesotho
Lesotho, Africa,

S

IMPSON'S RECENT review of Morals as Founded on
Natural Law 1 so misrepresents its main point, one so
vital to civilization's continuance, that I feel obliged
to try to restate that point. It was of course disconcerting that
he misunderstood the main point of the hook (whetlrer he
agrees with it or not), thoogh it may ,weN. be, as he says, that
the book oouM have been mOire readably written.
He summarizes the book's aim as being" to establish morality on an external authoritative law "-a summary which does
indeed seem close, even :identicaJ.,to what is said in the book's
first paragraph. However, there is ra potential equivocation in
the w;ay he uses " externail.'' One should ask, external to what?
What .the book speaks of in this opening paragraph is of justifying morality on ra principle " external to states of mind." I
use "external" in the sense of that principle's being "independent of them," 'i.e., of meuba1l srtates. So :llar, this is a very
open statement.
Brut how do I go on to amplify it? Not the way Simpson
does. He takes me as equating this principle with " the authoritative law of God," in the sense of "a divine legislative aiuthority " which, he reports me as arguing, " is just somehow an inemdicwblegiven."
This " somehow " not only refoses to consider the meta1 Stephen Theron, Mora,ls M Founded on Na,tural Lww, European University Studies (New York: Peter Lang, 1987; 2nd ed. 1988). Reviewed by
Peter Simpson in The ThomiBt 53 (1989): 341-342.

294

STEPHEN THERON

physical reasoning at the heart of the book's position but even
seems to suggest that such reasoning was not evien offered.
In fact it is precisely at this point that Simpson goes right off
the raiJs as far as representing my view is concerned.
claims that this foundation upon divine authority would make
morals "dependent on ·divine 1a.w, not, as his title dedares, on
natural law."
However, my use of " naturrul law " is rthe Thomistic use,
which is sufficiently wen known in the debate so as not to be
misleading. In the view of St. Thomas (and a whole established school of thought), natural law is indeed, in Simpson's
words, "deriviative and secondary," or, in St. Thomas's words,
"a reflected divine light.'' 2 Brut in the famous Artiicle 2 of
Question 94 of the Prima secundae of the Summa theologica,
so exh81ustively discussed in .the rooent literaturie, natural law
is declared to be derived from the eternal law and not from
divine law in the "external " or positivist •sense clearly intended by Simpson. (A different distinction is used in the
Contra gentiles, but throughout my book the above text was
referred to, often explicitly) .
"Divine law," the fourth type of law (eternal law and
natural law being the first two types), does indeed refer, in
this text, to some kind of positiv;e legisfation on the part of
God in the 01d and New Testaments. (But evien here St.
Thomas is oarefoil to point out that the law of the New Testament is only analogous to positive law, since it is not written
on stone but poured into men's hearts by the Holy Spirit.) If
I had been referring to this divine law (in such phrases as " reaISOn is divine and .therefore law ") and not thait eternal law
which is one with the divine being, Simpson might have been
able to brooket me with those nominalist theologians for whom
.2" quasi lumen r.ationis naturalis . . . nihil aliud sit quam impressio
luminis divini in nobis. Unde patet quod lex naturalis nihil aliud est quam
participatio legis aeternae in rationali creatura."
St. Thomas Aquinas,
Summa theologica I-II, 91. 2.

THE TRUTH OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

295

God might hav:e decreed an opposite morality if he so chose.
(Though this, too, would be contrary to St. Thomas's view of
such positive divine law, ev;en for the Old Testament; indeed
for him even 011dinary "human" positivie law loses the sense
of law if it contradict natural law.)
In any case, the eterna,l law which natural hw reflects differs
from this. As the divine wisdom 011dering creation, it is conceived as identical in re with the ,divine being. This is the key
concept of my book, and Simpson has either missed it or forgotten it. It is only because
law, as expounded by St.
Thomas, is a reflection of the divine wisdom that it is law at
1ai11 3 and enables human beings to legislate valid (in the sense
of obligatory) laws for their civil soc1etie8.
Now it is true, as Simpson recognizes, that in my book I
equated natural law vvith "the law of our natural reason."
What I said is that this law of :rea,son (and all the particular
judgments commonly resulting from it) has the fo11oe which
we call obligation only because of this re1lation of reflection.
Our human nature, of which reason is the specific difference,
reflects or images the eterna'l la,w, i.e., the divine nature.
We oannot question divine authority without falling into a
regress. But I certainly do not mal;;,e this the rational ground
for accepting that authority. Instead I offer a metaphysical
grounding for this authority in the divine nature, in wha;t it
is to be God. 4 The reference to the !'egress is made in Chapter
Two as part of 1a discussion of the role of tmdition; it is not at
all linked up with God. Rather, the point is made that, if there
acl'e no self-evident moral p11emises, then they must at some
stage he tiaken fmm outside the seJf (p. 6fl) . This, mutatis
mutandis, is Hume's famous point. Unlike him, however, I
do attempt to legitimize an ultimate epistemic or rational ruu1

1

s Ibid. 93, 3: "omnes leges in quantum participant de ratione recta, in
tantum derivantur a lege aeterna."
4 Especially
Chapter Six, Section Two, pp. 153-157. "God as the truth
of all things must als.o be the truth as to what is right."

296

STEPHEN THERON

thority or criterion for mol'al principles as being true, though
at this point I simply claim that if such a criterion is found
anywhe11e it oan only be embedded in the human tradition.
This is why I l'eferred to children; in the case of children we
have .an wctUJal example of people (ourselves included) taking
moral principles from a soul"Ce outside the mdividuail self.5 According to both Aristotle and Aquinas, the customs of tradition
do ,illdood form the first principles: of ebhiool science.
But rin ,the book I hwd not yet tackled the question of just
how 'such a tl13Jdition might
·be an ,authority imposing an
obligiation.6 Indood, a large part of the subsequent argument
is devoted to showing tlmt custom cannot hav:e obligatory
force e:xrept on the supposition of its reiftecting the divine nature, taJcing customs as being ;the distillation of human experience.
For reason either jilllstifies:itseH or requires £ur:ther justifioation.7 It is true, as Simpson says, that it is only by l'eason that
we can recognize I'eason's validity. But this is a matter of
reoogniizing the necessary condition for reruson's being valid;
it is not to say that we " only admit the vailidity of our own
reason after we have l'ecognized the divine and reason's dependence upon it." 8 Hence Simpson's aittempt to show that I
am myself " caught in 1an infinite regress " seems to rest upon
an ignoratio elenchi. For we are not here invited to suspend
confidelllcetin reruson ;through some kind of Cartesian H1oughtexperiment. We ask rather what are ibhe rationally necessary
p:ve-iconditionsfor that confidence in reaison we naturally have,
to which all our J.ianguageand behavior witnesses. Irrespective
On Being so Placed", New Blackfria,rs, September 1980.
p. 63 where, after saying " there has been such a tradition because
such is human nature," I expressly add, " The question why human nature
is a criterion of what is right I leave for later," i.e., to the extended discussion of Chapters Five and Six (pp:lll-157).
7 This question is not really opened up until V, ii ( p. 117) • On this topic,
see also my" Morality as Right Reason", McmMit 1983.
s I tali cs original.
5 Cf. Theron,"
6 See

THE TRUTH OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

297

of whether or not one aocepted the particular answer proposed,
one could disallow this question, .as Simpson tries to do, only if
one equated a naturaJl conviction with a scientific certainty. 9
Hence it is quite false to say ,that "reason is seilf-va1lidating
or nothing at all is valid." Morever, one can quite easily point
out that the grounds for the validity of reason might be left
igno11ed or unacknowi1ed:ged (hence reason would not be "selfva:lidating ") without at all suggesting that reason might not
be vali!d.10 By Simpson's own principle, I don't dispose of the
truth of a hypothesis when I dismiss a had argument for it.
My intention, accordingly, was not to dissuade secularists
·from being morrul but to point to the sole ground upon which
convictions as to moral obligations and human dignity 11 can
important for humanity
be rationally justified. It is
that they should be rationally justifiable. For no one need pretend tha;t, if w:e routinely deny the ground upon which our
human essence is based, our foeedom, our conformity to that
essence- as natuve, is guaranteed. Reason can he 1and often is
rejected.
Freedom, of cour•se, should not be confused with arhi.tmriness. One can ,show that there is a necessary connection between fr;eedom ,and posises.sion of an int:el1ectual naiture. Only
possesision of such a nature giv;es one the power of judgment,
and this power precisely is the power to be free from the determinism that being iconfined to a limited cognitional environment ,entails. As does Joseph Pieper, I have argued 1·2 that this
s Or perhaps if one were impressed by Hilary Putnam's theory of "internal
realism".
'lO A classical discussion of this matter was G. E. M. Anscombe's "A Reply
to Mr. C. S. Lewis's Argument that 'Naturalism' is Self-Refuting", Socratic
Digest, Oxford, 1947 (in her Collected Papers, Vol. 3). See also my "Does
Realism Make a Difference to
", Monist, April 1986; Augustine
Shutte, "The Refutation of
", Philosophy 1984.
llCf. VI, ix, pp. 170-172; also my "Duty and the Divine," Neue Zeitschrift
fur system(J,tisohe Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 31 ( 1989) : 308-326.
i2 On pp. 121-124.

298

STEPHEN THERON

capacity for apprehending truth (ul.tima,teJy a conionnity to
the divine mind but presupposed to judgment) is the point at
which 11eason can he seen to he a refieotion of the divine mind
or nous. By reason I mean both theoretical reason and pmict:iioal reason, induding natural law. The divine knowledge ipso
facto sets things in order, and these things then inform our
minds.
Now these darifications make it impossible to present the
book as a " reduction," a reduction " of everything, in philosophy as well as in morals, to a 1egaHstic theism." Simpson has
simply reacted to my interp:reting moral principles as laws
without itaking a1ocount of the tho:mugrhly non-vo1untarist view
of law argued for from Chapter Three onwards. That laws
proceed from intellect or wisdom (the lex aeterna) rather than
from will does not of course makie these rlaws non-obligatorythat would be a contradiction. However, it does remove the
conflict our vohmtarist oultme often feels between obligation
1and rationality or freedom. Such ,fa,ws are now an expression
of rrutionaility and hence of freedom precisely because, I claim,
they express the divine or wbsol1UJte mind. For it is conneotion
with this mind which alone gives reason, as cause of our free
w:i.J.J, fl'eedom from naburaJ detell'IIlinisms 13 and renders it, in
bheo11eticwllydiscerning truth, prwcti!cailly obHging.
F1ina.Uy,this a.cicount helps to removie the impression that oh1ligation is an extraneous category imposed upon an otherwise
freely mnging theoretical reason, which is bounded only by a
reaility it only wishes to apprehend, not evade. We should 11ecahl, first of alJ, thait practical !'eason is not a faculty separate
from theoretical 11ea:son.14 This
,alone can lead us to wish
to get behind a brute idea of obligation and achieve a unified
view of wisdom a.s a whole.
We have claimed that, errors apart, what we judge to be so
1

:rn Reason is not determinatum ad unum, like other natures, but able to
form diverse conceptions of anything at all. Cf. S.T. I-II, 17, l ad 2.
H Ibid. I, 79, 11.

THE TRUTH OF MORAL JUDGMENTS

299

reaiMy is so, and that this also applies to judgments a.bout whait
is to he done, how we are to behave. We know oursdves just
as we know other things. Although the fact of our freedom
determines tha,t ructions fall under a gerundive mode, judging
is an .aict of identifying things as they are,. whetheil' the judgment is theoret:iJoail or practical. The sign of the judgment's
truth is fo say A is B, despite Fregean opinion apparently to
the cont:ra:ry. A t.rue judgment, bearing upon something
wh:iich it is in our power to do, is as reaJ, true, and sderrtffic
as any other. Its content, if univ:ersal, we can a law of human
nature.
Now in saying tha1t such laws a.re obligations, we do not so
much ,3Jdd to their strictness as bring out what is implicit in
their being a law. Just as it is a law and hence true (as a universa1l judgment) that hot air rises, so it is a law and henice
rtme that debts are fo be paid. To say that it is oMigato:ry
that debts a,11e to be
says no more than tha,t this is true.
Obligation is ,the mode of truth in prae-ticis; the gemndive is
the mode of pmcticail reality. In saying this we should not forget that what al'e primari11y obligatory are ha,bits, viz., the
virtues, aH of them. The acts whi!cl.1 the vir bues elicit, whether
of necessity or with pmhability, ut in pluribus, are seoonda.rily
obligatory, the obligation to unremitting exercise of the virtue
remaining. In any case, the difference between the two types
of law is not mel'ely " forma.l " but a difference on the part of
t:he object
We come to know
:realities
as heing (still) in our power of performance. These are in fact
tiheoretrca1 judgments about practice, like the pwt]cular judgments of
It is truth that obliges.
This, then, is the foundation of morals upon naturail law,
viz., 'that the normal
judgments made and principles
enuncfated by men and societies are true, anid that the hahits
needed for pe:rfoct fulfilment truly are virtues, i.e., objective
1

1

15 Cf.

Leo Elders, "St. Thomas .Aquinas' Doctrine of Conscience",

et Libertas, ed. L. Elders & K. Hedwig (Rome, 1987).

in Lew

800

STEPHEN THERON

eX!cellenciesof human nature (or of ,something Slllperior to natwe) . lt further belongs to this foundation th.rut the possibility
of such true ju1dgment depends upon human reason, the specific
difforenoe of our nature, insofar as is a reflection of the divine ireason, that which oriders a11 things (lex aeterna) to be
what they are. To complete rthe picture I ,should have dis-

cussed how this divine order is not only reflected in the order
.veason ,setg up hut ,ailso declares itself directly in our generic
natru:re.16 Hwt when I wrote the hook, I had not yet come to see
the lln.portanice of this.

:i.a Here should belong discussion of the peccata contra naturam, as in my
"Natural Law in Humanae Vitae," in "Humanae Vitae": 20 Anni dopo,
.Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Teologia Morale (Rome, 1988), pp. 487494.

ON BEING OR NOT BEING A THOMIST
ROBERT

E. LAti'DER

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism: The Search for a Unitary
Method. Gerald A. McCool, S.J. New York: Fordham University Press, 1989. 301 pages (paper).
From Unity to Pluralism: The Internal Evolution of Thomism.
Gerald A. McCool, S.J. New York: Fordham University
Press, 1989. 9248 pages (hardcover).

B

EFORE I READ Gerald A. McCool's two volumes examining nineteenth and twentieth centrury scholast:i:cism and Thomism, if someone had asked my philosophica;l o:rientation, I would have replied "I am a Thomist."
Having rerud McCool's two books, I still and with a strong
sense of gratitude articulate my philosophical self-des,ignation
as Thomisit, but what I mean by Thomist has become considerably more nuanced. Not only those who identify themselvies with the thought of St. Thomas but a, wider philosophical and theologiea1l community shou1d be grateful to Father
McCool for- his eXiceHent scholarly contribution to the understanding of sicholasticism and Thomism. His two volumes show
many of us who call ourselves Thomists where we have been
an:d wheve we rare and, by illuminating our past ,and present,
clarify for us our options for the future.
Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism was first published under
,the title Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century by The
Seabury Press in 1977, but it has been re-issued hy Fordham
University to ruocompany the appearance of his second volume.
In this earlier work McCool ohal'ts in detail the growth and

301

ROBERT E. LAUDER

d.wection of scholasticism, especially in relation to two influential Chmich documents: the Apostolic Consititu.tion on Faith
Dei Filius, solemnly app:rovced in 1870 by the fathers of the
First Vatican Council, and Leo XIII's 1879 encyclical Aeterni
Patris. The ,earlier ,document defined and darified the Church's
teaching on the supernatural and free charac1te:r of faith and
on the relation between supe:matural faith and natural reason;
the encydical was a disciplinary document concerning the
method of philosophicaJ instruction for priests. McCool
\Stresses that the linking of the two documents in the minds of
Roman authorities and theologians gave the documents enormous weight and influence during the nineteenth and well into
the twentieth century, but now, more than a hundred years
and r'easses:sed. Though
fater, their influence is being
the present situation in Catholic philosophical and theological
circles is not a case
history reversing itself, it is an extra011dina:ry example of history leruding to the l'eopening of questions ithat ,seemed definitivdy dosed. McCool suggests that
there are at
two factors affecting contemporary Catholic
theology which indicate that ·current historical research
into nineteenth-century
Catholic theology may point to a
genuine option between a deveJoped Thomism and a restored
pre-Thomistic nineteenth century system:
The first of these is the freedom given to Catholic theologians by
the Second Vatican Council to experiment with non-Thomistic
theological systems. Aetelf'ni Patris no longer enjoys the status of
an irrevocable theological option, based on immutable dogmatic
and metaphysical principles. Its theological signification has been
relativized. Aeterni Patris must now be considered an historical
moment in the dialectical progress of theological development. The
second distinctive characteristic of contemporary theology is the
current ferment over theological method. This means that the
nineteenth-century debate, which the official option of Aetelf'ni
Patris seemed to have closed definitively, has been reopened. The
disciples of SL Thomas and the partisans of the ' new ' theologies
are free once more to submit their diverse theological methods to
the judgment of their fellow theologians. (p. 6)

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

303

McCool views Joseph Kleutgen as the outstanding representativ;e of the noo-Thomisit.ic movement in the nineteenth
century. Kleutgen was trying to strike a balance between the
extremes of fideisim and rationalism. He felt strongly thrut if
one says positive and speculative theology are nort intrinsically
difforent in their intellootua;} questions from a philosophy of
·l'leve!Imtion then either natural veason's proper autonomy has
to be compromised by a tmditional :fideism or the distinctiveness and gra.tuity of supernatuml knowledge has to be blurred
by a 1Semirationrulistexaggeration of natuml reason's ability to
grasp the intelligibiility of the Christian mysteries. McCool
srtresses rthe intrinsic ru11d influential role that Aristotle's
phillosophy played in K1eutgen's struct:uring of his theology.
W,ov;en ovier an Aristotelian mosaic, Kleutgen's theology of
grace and natrure dicbaited his theology of faith and 11e.ason, hut
both of these required an Aristotelian metaphysics of substance aTIJd accident, £ruc:mlty, habit and act. As a grounding for
metaphysics, an Aris1torbeliantheo·ry of knowledge was needed,
which in turn 1ed to an Aristotelian theory of metaphysics as
a •science. These theories (and his Thomistic metaphysics of
grruce and natul'e) led Kleutgen ,to conJOeive of theology as an
Aristotelian 1S1cience, with philosophy subordinate to it as another Aristotelian sdence. Apologetics in its nrutuml int•eillectual
operations was for fileutgen a scientific propadeutic to theand both posirti:v;e and spemlative theo1ogy were subsequent to and depell!dent on faith for their 'Supernatural oper:ations and the •supernatrura1necessity of their evidence. The
logic and neatness of
schema had a gveat deal going
and iJt wo:u1d be diffiou1t to overempha;size its infliuence
for
on ninetoonbh-1century Thomism. !Geutgen dmfted the final
version of Dei Filius and is frequently credited as the principa;l (i£ not the sole) author of Aeterni Patria. But
Sltresses that, in spite of its sitrong points, KJteutgen's:Thomism
had no
at all for hisrtory or for the
but non1ogica1 devefopment of thought, ·e.g., through changing con1

1

804

ROBERT E. LAUDER

ceptual frameworks of succeeding historical and culit:ura.lworldviews. ParadoxicaJly Kleutgen's Thomism, which was not
open to history, led to the Thomism of the la.st quarter of the
twentieth century, as represented by Karl Rahner and Bernard
Lonergan, a Thomism that is open to history, evolutionary in
its thought, and sensitive to the plurality of diverse cultural
,and conoepturul frameworks. McCool notes the connection:
The Thomistic theory of knowledge demanded a substantial union
of soul and body in man. The Thomistic intellect was always an
abstractive intellect. Its concepts could only deal with the Holy
Mystery who is the subject of Christian revelation through the
indirect and analogous concepts of a judging intellect which, as
St. Thomas said so well, knew what God was not rather than what
God was. Abstraction and analogy rather than direct and :intuitive knowledge of God distinguished the scholastic approach to
God from the approach of post-Cartesian philosophy and despite
its rapprochement with modern thought in the twentieth century,
abstraction and analogy are still the cognitional characteristics of
Thomistic metaphysics and theologyo

McCool cleatly desiccibes the modem theoJogies that Kleutgen wanted his Thomism to replace. These theologies had an
epis1temology, anthropology, and metaphysics that was rooted
in post-Kantian German ideal!ism, especiaHy that of ScheHing.
The post-Kantian :ideaJi:st1sidivided the inteHect into discursive
reason (Ver stand) , which wa,s limited to the worM of objectiv;e phenomena, and intuitive 11eason (Vernunft), which was
icapahle of inte:Llectual intuition of norumem:vl or metaphysical
reality. A twofo1d proeess made up this intuitive· grasp: the
firs1t stage was intuitive reason's passive aeceptance of reality,
and the second stage was int:uitive I'eason's s1cienti:fic:reflection
upon intuited reaility (Wissen).
then,
this postKantiian metaphysical view was taken to he a science (Wissenschaft) of faith ocr ascience of revefation. The Absolute manifes1ted itself through its finite self-manifestation in the dynamic
universe of spirit and nature. Eaich human community had its
own specific (lOmmunail idea, which achieved :the perfection of
1

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

305

its :rerulizationthrough the free 1actiwty of individual members.
Of course, the aiuthentic development of the communal idea
could be frustrated through wrong free chofoes of membecrs of
:the community, bUJt even this frustmtion wais temporary. Evil
and mistaken choices wou1d, eventually and ineviitably be ex'OlUJded by the members of the community. Because the history of the community rudvarmed through the free chol!ces of
persons, it wrus genuine history, hut :it had an intrinsic diai1eoticail inte1ligibi.1ity because it was the communal
history of the enfoMing of a formativce :i!dea, whiioh reached its
perfection th11ough the conscious exclusion of its opposites.
N oumenal reality re¥ealed itself through an act of intuitive
faith to members of an organic community. Philosophical reason cou1d then p.vovide a scientific reconstruction which would
make exp1icit the ideal system of essences which constituted
the inteiLligibJestmctme of reaHty.
In the firs1t half of the nineteenth century this post-Kantian
model of fiaith and reason greatly affected the re1ations between theology of revelation, apologetics, positive theology,
and. specuiliative theology. The Catholic tmdiitionalist systems
opposed themselves to both Kantian rationalism and Hegelian
pantheism. Built upon this model were French tradition.alism, the ·theology of the Caitholic TU.bingen School, the metaphysical dualism of Anton Gunther, and the ontologism of
Rosmin[ and Gilberti. The advanta.ge of this type of nonscholasitic theology •was that it was S'ensitive to the meaning
of history, tmdition, and community in ways that the Aristotelian non-Thomis:t.s were not. Another contrast between the
two approaches was that, while there was an appreciation
among post-Kantian Catholic theologians of an apologetics of
immanence rooted in the demands of the human spirit, the
Aris1totelian neo-Thomists based. their apologetics on the "obiective signs " of miracle and prophecy and were suspicious of
any apofogetics of im:r;nanen0e. But the victory of the neoThomists, as evidenced in.Dei Filius and Aeterni Patris, left a

306

ROBERT E. LAUDER

tension between neo-Tihomistic theofogy and s1ubjective historical modem thought and e¥enturully led to the modernis:t crisis.
McCool stcresses thrut the tension became obvious again a decade or two hefo:re the opening of foe Second Vatic1an Council.

In his meti!cu1ou:scharting of the coru:rse of nineteenth-century schola:sticism, McCool provi des detiai1ed treatment of
F11encli trwditionailism, Anton Gunther's: dualism, 1and the phllosopihica,l <synthesis of Matteo Liberatore. Liberrutore's neoThomism became influential rth11ough a bri:Uiant series of artrncles in Civilta Cattolica in whi:ch he argued thait Thomism
shou1d he :re1srtol'edin
thought as a unitary system of
thought. McCool notes that by the beginning of the twentieith century the scho1lastic revival was wen under way, because the :religious oriders and the Church hiera:richy had. responded favorably and strongly 'to Leo XIII's Aeterni Patria.
Theological 1and philosophical faculties in Rome (at both the
Gregorian Univ;ersity and the Angelioum) , Louvain, and Innsbruck, as wel1l as in France and Switz:e:rfand,1embraiced 1sohofastiicism enthusias1t1ca1ly. The same spirit can he seen in the
philosophical and theofogical journwls published in Italy,
France, Germany, Belgium, and Switzerliand. However, McCool argues, deficient historical awal'eness was a cruuse of confusion in the seholas1tics' own speculative !thought. Seventy:five years a,go scholastic theologians we11e in no position to
comprehend the 1specific starting point and intrinsic consist,ency of any of the greaJt thirteenth ee!JJlturyscholastic systems.
MoCool insists thrut they cou1d not dirstingiuish between
own theology and the theologies of his baroque commentart0:rs; they s1aw Thomism ·as simply another name for the
rtheoilogy of Cajetan or John of St. Thomas or fo:r a generic
scholasticism of Sua;vezian or Scotistic hue. In addition, historical ignorance caused turn-of-the-century scholastic authors
to give mis1leading a1cicounts of Sit. Thomas's thought in their
manuals. Because his distinctive metaphysics of existence was
largely iignored, the unique character of Thomas's philosophy
1

1

1

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

307

of man and God was ovel'llooked. Neither the role that a.bstmction and judgment play in Thomas's epistemology nor
the significant distinction between ratio and intellectus in
Thomas's
of lmo,wle:dge (and hence in his theology
of the Trinity, Inmrna:tion, and graice) was emphasized. The
connection between Thoma,s's, metaphysiios of God and his personml religious ex.peidence was not even noti1oe:d. Consequently,
Thomism cou1d give the impressions of being a highJy rationalistic system. lt was presented as an Aristoiteilian science that
moved deductively from first p.r;inciples to conclusions. Within
it there seemed to be little room for the role of personaJ experience or nonconrcepbua1 intuition in religious knowledge of God.
Although Aeterni Patris led to turn-of-the-roentury schofasticism, with al1l its weaknesses, the encyolica1 arlso eventually
led to the oon:temporary Thomism of Rahner and Lonergan
and its openness to pluralism. Though the drafters of Aeterni
Patris did not fol"esee the ev:o,lutrion of Thomism, that evolution is, a1ccording :to McCool, an outgrowth of the work that
the encyclical ina.ugurateid. He writes
Historical rediscovery of St. Thomas's thought and the systematic
development of the latent potentialities through a Thomistic
dialogue with the modern world was the work which Aetemi Patris
invited Catholic philosophers and theologians to undertake. The
drafters of Aeterni Patris did not anticipate that the work which
they invited their colleagues to undertake would inevitably result
in the evolution and radical revision of their own Thomistic syntheses because they did not think historically. For them a radical
change in St. Thomas' Aristotelian method or the sanctioning of a
post-Cartesian starting point in Thomistic epistemology and metaphysics would have been inconceivable. Neither of these 'modern'
approaches would have been compatible with their own conception of Thomism as an Aristotelian Philosophie der Vorzei-t. Yet,
despite the limitations and inaccuracies of their understanding of
St. Thomas' thought, the sturdy confidence which the neo-Thomist
pioneers placed in the soundness and the fruitfulness of the Angelic
Doctor's epistemology and metaphysics turned out to be amply
justified. (p. 9l85)

308

ROBERT E. LAUDER

In the last thirty pages of Nineteenth-Century Scholasticism, McCool sketches the course, that turn-of-the-century
scholasticism would take through the influence of the nonThomist Maurice Blonde! and the work of Pierre Rousselot,
Jacques Maritain, and Etienne Gilson. This eventually opened
up into the pluralism of thought welcomed and fostered by the
work of Rahner and Lonergan. The dosing pages of this volume are an extraordinarily clear but brief treatment of the
mo¥ement within Thomism from its reliance on the commentators Cajetan and John of St. Thomas and the strong influence of hard-line Dominican Thomists such as GarrigouLagrange to the transcendental Thomism of Rahner and
Lonergan. A more detailed and in-depth treatment of Thomism's e¥olution appears in From Unity to Pluralism. In this
.seoond votume McCool devotes one chapter· to Joseph Marechal and two chapters each to Rousselot, Maritain, and Gilson. McCool correctly cirtes these four thinkers as the key to
Thomism's movement towards a greater openness to othe,r
thorught patterns.
The theology presented by Aeterni Patris was modeled on
Aristotelian 1science, whiich moves rto conc1usions from first
principles in a timeless fashion. It leaves no room for historica;l development, hermeneutics, or diverse coneeptuaJl frameworks. In effect, the encyclic11;l cast doubt on the possibility
of structruring a Orutholic theology with one of the modern
pmlosophies or using their methods to serve 1the demands: of
the Catholic faith. But there were Thomists whose research
Jed beyond the Thomism of Aeterni Pa:bTis. Two of them were
Pierre Rousselot, whose philosophical and theological career
was abruptly terminated .during the Second World War, and
Joseph Maroohall.
Rejecting Suarezian Thomism and Sootistic votuntarism,
Rousselot insisted that St. Thomas was an inteillectuaJist. In
The Intellectualism of St. Thomas, Roiusselot .argued that in
violruntacisitmetaphysics the highest act of the spiritruaJ. crea-

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

309

tme, indeed the act which defines the very nature of the spiritual being, is an act of voluntary tending toward the good, but
that in intellectualist metaphysics the nature of the spriritual
creature is defined by ·an act of cognitive repose. In the Beatific
Vision rthe spiritual creature has an exhaustive vision of its
own essence as we11,rus of God's own being. Rousselot argued
that in the vo1untarist scheme charity shou:Ld not be described
as reasonaMe becruuse it is an impulse to abandon one.seH completely to God. Charity certainly is not conformed to nature.
Ontological duality between lover and beloved, rather 1than a
prior ontological unity be1tween them, iiS a metaphysicial presupposition of voluntarism. This constitutes a kind of violence
to nature raither than its fmfillment. But this is not the case,
claimed Rousseil.ot,with mtelJecturulism's ontological order. Acco:vding to the intellectualist, the aict of charity is consequent
to the vision of God in which the essence of happiness is
Ileached. The creature's ultimate 1enid is :veachedthrough an act
of the inte1lect, a contemplative intuition, and this contemplative intuition demands, ais its ontological condition, that the
in:te1leotbe orde11ed. by naibure to grasp the fru11 range of being.
Now in St. Thomas'.s intei1lectualism, every finite intellect is
oiidered by its nature to a real g'J.1asp of the full range of being.
Rousselot ,insisted that Thomrus's mtelJectualist theology of
beatitude requires as its condition of possibility a metaphysical
realism g11ounded upon the dynamism of the inteMect. The
unity, coherence, and distinctiveness of St. Thomas's metaphysics of
man, aIJ1d being can be 1seen m his theology of the Beaitific Vision. Roussefot believed that St.
Thomas's inbellectualism and the metaphysics of knowledge
a.nd participation which 1S1Usrtains it can aooounrt for the creature's love of God as its highest good.
Having read BJondel and Bergson, Rousiselot agreed that the
vaiLue pl,aced on conceptual knowledge by rationalists and even
by some of his fellow scholastics should be rei1a.tivized. He
thought that Thomism had to a.bsorb many of the contribu1

310

ROBERT E. LAUDER

tions that .idealism h3Jd ma1de to philosophy if it weil'e to bethat
come an effective contempor:a.ry theology. He
modern philosophers had confused St. Thomas'•s intelJectualism with raitionailism hut that !if St. Thomas's thought were recovered and developed in the 1ight of the otriginail texts and
contemporary philosophy, it could make benefiJcia1lcontact with
modern thought; it could deaJ fmitfiuilly wiith the pmhlems of
faith, its fr.eedom and dogmatic formulation, its history and its
l'ela:tion to life and religious experience---.indeed. the very problems which hrud p11ovokedthe Modernisrt crisis. Using Thomas's
metaphysics of God and the •angels, Rousselot proposed tha,t to
know another is to 1ive the life of another liiving being. For
Rousseilot, Thomas's inte1MectuaJ1ism could be summed up in
the formula: the intelligernce is essentialily the •sense of the reaJ,
but it is the 1sense of the veal only because it is the sense of the
divine. The mol'e unified the immanent act of knowfodge, according to St. Thomas, the gveater in range and depth is its
transcendence. God's creative knowledge, identical with His
lovie, is the measure of ;alil finite intelligibility. In
Rousselot's position, McCool writes:
Thomas therefore was fundamentally opposed to the rationalist
position that intellection is a univocal perfection and that 'ideas
are equal in every mind.' His metaphysics of participation and
existence, and the analogy of knowledge which it demands, made
it clear to him that concentration on intelligence in its lowest and
least developed form, discursive reason, must limit our understanding of its nature and distort our conception of its proper
formation. Accurate and comprehensive understanding of intelligence as an analogous perfection can come only from a reflection
on its higher and more developed forms. For that reason a careful study of St. Thomas' angelology is required for the proper understanding of his intellectualism. (p. 50)

The norrm of perfection of St. Thomas's metaphys[cs of the
intielleot is concentiiation of ideas mther than muHiplidty of
,ideas. St. Thomas claimed that rubso1utie unity wrus posstiNe in
a finite intuition in the Beaitific Vision. Rousselot points out

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

311

that 1the intehlect, the faiaulty of the real, is: "evecything in its
wiay " because it is " God in its way." In his metaphysics of
the immanence and transcendence of knowledge and of the living God of revelation rus the goal of man's: spirituail dynamism,
St. Thomas is closer to Blondel than ,some of his critics believe.
Thomas's intell.eotualism, though it guararutees that the human
inte11eotis the faculty of the reail, relativize:s the vaJlidity of its
oonJceptual knowiled:ge, ,a,ccording to Roiusselot. Ill!tuitive intellectus is higher than disoorsive ratio. The latter is: close to
those ,SO'Ul'ICes in man which he shares with the brutes, the
former he shares with angels. Ratio is a dri.vie toward intellec:tus. As an intieihlectiualist,Thomas held discursive knowledge
in fow esteem ,and ·viewed COillCeptsas no more ithan approximations of the reail existing form, :subdeci to constant revision and
devielopment. St.. Thomas's intei!Jecturulism is a Christian
wisdom, with none of the pr01ud independeDJce rthat marks
man's rationalist phiJosophy. The meaning of human aiction
is revealed to the philosopher who a.ssen:tsfree[y in faith to the
supernatural goal of its spiritual dynamiSlfil. McCool is correct
in noting tha:t Thomas's inteUecturulism does bear some re!Semblaooe to B1ondel's:philosophy of .action.
In its objectiV'e affirmation of exisrbell!ce, the mind goes bey:oll!d the form represented in its abstrad concept to the act of
existence couched in the judgment; this makes the mind's
judgment of existeme the dynamic subs1titution for the intuition thait it seeks. Rousseilot not·es that connatura:l knowledge
is not confined to the moraJ sphere; God's conna:tural knowledge is identica:l with His infinite esse, 'a:rud so the highest fo.rm
of intellectus is infinite life and action, identical with love.
Man, a form ,received in ma:tter, ha:s no intuition of his essence;
he is not immediately awa11e of his connatura:lity with other
beings nor of his sympa.thy toward them. The imperfection of
man's self-awareness ruooounts for his deficient way of knowing other beings. For Roussefot the species
is an "enlightening sympruthization of the mind."

ROBERT E. LAUDER

According to Rousselot, if a spiritual creature lorves his own
good truJy, he must love God more than he loves himself. If
conrtempfation is the goal of the soul's
through
action in Thomas' s metaphysics, then knowledge and fove of
itself and God are the goal of the spiritual love tha;t defines an
intelligent nature. Rousselot suggested that to concteive being
is to dream of God. Rousselot' s assigning intellectus a higher
role than ratio opened contemporary schofasticism to the contributions that contemporary Bergsonian philosophy could
make fo it. Believing that the process of £aith was not a
,cursive process of ratio brut rather a movement of the intellectus, the higher power of insight, Rousselot ,claimed that the
intel1oot's highest certitude is a free -certitude. This theok>gy
of the act of faith seems closer to the actuality of lived human
experienoe than rationalist approa.ches.
:Bor Rousseilot. neither .the concept nor the impressed 'Species
couM oocount for the objectivity of knowledge. Rather, the
mind'!s connatum[ love for God, its attitude of connatural sympathy for :the Fi:Iist Truth, is required for the mind to make
obj ootive judgments. For Rousselot the inte1leot was the facu\Lty of the real because it was the £aou1ty of the divine.
For Marechal it was the dynamism of the mind rather than
the representative content of the concepts which grounds the
concepts in reality. In every jrudgment the mind aidways signifies more than :ist can represent in its ioolllOepts. God is known
1through the mteHigibility of objects affirmed in judgments, but
significant intelligibility can oniy he represented in analogous form through inadequate con-0epts. For MarOOhalthe key
Jt.o the analogy of being was metaphysica[ affirmation, and
saw that no objoot could be .affirmed if the Infinite Being, the
term of the mind's dynamism, is denied.
The wrudition epitomiZled by Rousselot and Marechal was
carried on by their Jesuit cohleagues. The relativization of roncep'buail knowledge, suspicion of an Aristotelian science of history, ,emphasis on the ract of insight ,and upon Marechal's anail1

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

313

ysis of the judgment ito ground the truths of theology and
metaphysics-alil these made Transcendental Thomism a truly
new approach toward history and p1urrulism in both theology
and philosophy.
While this was happening, Jacques Maritain under the inspimtion of Thomas's commentators Cajeta.n and John of St.
'llhomas was working out his hril.Jiant synthesis and applying
St. 'llhomas's principles to science, al't, morals, oulture, and
politics. But because Maritain's Thomism was based on an
Aristotelian philosophy and theology, and Rousselot had rejected the possibility of an Aristotelian s1cience mediating the
Chmoh's historiical revelation, 'lliiansicendental Thomism and
Marifain's Thomism wel"e incompatible.
In McCool's judgment Mairitain's writings represent neoThomism's most successful a.ttempt to achieve the goal of
Aeterni Patris and to integrate contempomry culture through
the wisdom of 'I\homas. Grounding his metaphysics on an
eiidetiic intilltion of being, Maritain thought that the transcendell!ta.I method was arbitrary and doomed to error. In his
philosophy of person Maribain's opposition to Cartesianism is
very pronounced. This philosophy of person was fed by his
own inner expecience and sympathetic knowledge of contemporary .art, literature, and euLture; in turn it became the foundation on which his aesthetics and political philosophy rest.
(McCool thinks that Maritain's most lasting contribution is
in his phiilosophizing about a,rt.) Marit ain's Integral Humanism
is clear evidence that traditional Thomism could respond to
contemporary culture.
McCool's chief criticism of Maritain concerns the tension between
experience 1and the
framework he.
took ovell.· from Caj:eitan. For Maritain the valid1ty of metaphysics and the possibility of a metaphysicai interpretation of
ihuman knowledge rests uJtimateJy on the concept. For an his
openness :to ou1ture and his deep sensitivity ,to cultural diversity and historiic1a1ldeviefopment, Maritain opted for a very different approach from Roussefort and Marechal.
1

314

ROBERT E. LAUDER

Gi1son came to see that medieva.l philosophy was contained
in medieval theology. It was the kuitful contact between
Greek metaphysics and Christian revelation in the theology of
the medieva1 Doctors which reaUy pmduced the uniqueness,
originality, and powm" of
philosophy. For Gilson,
Christian philosophy is !a speciail way of doing philosophy. McCooJ. underlines the significance of this:
This means,. of course, that Gilson's interpcretation of St. Thomas'
Christian philosophy was in open opposition to the Thomistic
philosophy which had come into being in the seventeenth-century
Catholic schools and whose influence could still be felt in contemporary Thomism. The seventeenth-century Thomists had extracted their 'theses ' from both St. Thomas' theological works
and his commentaries on Aristotle, Gilson maintained, because
they had, for all practical purposes, equated the philosophy of St.
Thomas with the philosophy of Aristotle. Then they compounded
their error when they arranged these Aristotelian-Thomistic
' theses' in the ascending philosophical order which St. Thomas
himself had never used. By doing that, Gilson complained, they
had treated the Christian philosophy of St. Thomas as though it
were simply one more ' separated ' philosophy on the model of the
modern rationalist systems. Such an unwarranted transposition of
St. Thomas' philosophy to the order of a ' pure' philosophywhich was content simply to avoid contradicting the theology it
systematically ignored-did violence to the essential nature of the
Angelic Doctor's thought. (pp. 169-170)

Gilson sihowed rthat there was no rcommon 1sys1tem of Scholastic thought in the MiddJe Ages; there was rather a radical
phHosophical pluralism. Augustine, Duns Scotus, Bonaventure,
and Thomas had different philosophies. Though Augustine
lea;rneid more from rthe " I am Who am " of Exodus than he did
from Plotinus, the gl'ewt Churrch Father was sWl sufficiently influenced by Plotinus not to think of being in tieorms of existence.
Thooe were seveml deficiencies in Augustine's Plotinian philosophy whieh were not present in Thomas's metaphysics: it
diid not preserve the essential unity of rthe human composite,
it did not gmn:t the human body proper dignity, !it deprived

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

315

finite a.gents of the independence they deserve as true secondary causes, and its theory of illumination seems an invitation
:to skepticism. Thomas took the same divine statement from
Exodus hut went fmther than Augustine. Echoing Gilson,
McCool writes that having read the passage from Exodus,
Thomas
learned the ' sublime truth ' it contains. The name of God who
made the world is 'I am Who am'. Aquinas, however, did not conclude that to be meant to be an essence. On the contrary, Thomas
concluded that if God's name is ' I am Who am,' God must be the
pure act of existence. That the highest form of being is pure act
he already knew from Aristotle, for the pure act of self-thinking
thought, the prime mover, is Aristotle's supreme divinity. But that
the pure act of being must be a pure unlimited act of existence
was his own discovery. After Thomas had made it under the inspiration of Exodus, to be no longer meant to be an essence or a
form. To be meant to exist. (p. 182)

B-eoause of his insight into the act of existence, Thoma.s's
metaphysics was radically different from Augusitine's metaphysics and even more raidicaUy di:ffeTent from Aris:totle's, with
its emphasis on substance. Gilson stressed that Aristotle's selfthinking thought could not be concehned as an wet which, instead of making a thing to be wha.t it is, rnafues a thing to exist.
As McCool insists, Thomism is neither Platonic essen,tialism
nor Aristotelian substantia1ism and cannot he reduced to any
other metaphysics. When the human knower affirms " it is "
of any being given in sense experience, he grasps an intelligibility thait is not the same as the intenigibility of :form or essence.
Gilson' s stu1dy reveaJed thrut cailling iattention to the inte1lligibiility of existence is Thomas's unique contribution to the history of philosophy.
G:Hson's research revealed :bhat Thomistic commentators,
such as Cajetan, did not really understand. Thomrus's aet of
existence. Furthermol'e, neither the Thomas of Roussefot nor
of Marechal nor of Maritain was the aJuthentic Thomas, acco:vding to Gi,lson. Rousselot and Marechal were making the
1

316

ROBERT E. LAUDER

Cartesian mistake of going from thought to being, and Maritain, relying on Cajetan and John of SL Thomas, did not present Thomas's metaphy,sics authentiic1alJy, even in his master
work, The Degrees of Knowing. McCool demonstrates what
Gilson had done, even if unwittingly, to Aeterni Patris:
In reality, therefore, Gilson could not accept the validity of the
program for Neo-Scholasticism's development set forth in Aeterni
Patris. He always referred to the encyclical in tones of agreement
and high praise. Yet, according to his own criteria, none of the
forms of Thomism which the encyclical inspired, whether they
took their inspiration from Suarez or the great Dominican commentators, can be called authentic Thomism. Gilson was able to
agree with Aeterni Patris because he understood the encyclical to
be saying what in fact it never says: that to be a Thomist is to
adhere with absolute fidelity to the way of philosophizing St.
Thomas employed in his theological works. (p. 196)

In the world of theology in the 1940s a p1urailism was
developing, and works by two French theofogians also contributed ito the undermining of neo-Thomism. Henri Bouillard
and Henri De Lubac mad e clear that St. Thomas had no doctrine of man existing in a state of pure nature. Bouillard
showed that manuails gav;e the impression that theology was
changeless, eolllcerned with timeless problems, whereas the troth
is that theology lives iin history; tiheologica1l meaning changes
with the passage of time. In explaining Bouilla11d and De
Luhaic's contribution to the dismantling of neo-'I1homism's
mosaic, McCool summarizes a number of important points
they made. The
affirmations of faith can never be
separ1ruted from the cont:ingent and time-condit:ioned notions
needed to e:k"Press them, hut this does not mean that truth is
affirmations of the
faith are
:relative. The
ruhsolute in spite of the relativity of the notions in which they
are exp11essed. The two F11ench theologians made it clear that
the scholastic theology of gmcie 1aind natme whiJCh Aeterni
Patris defends is not the theology of either the Fathers or the
medieval Doctol's. In effect ti.hey underout some of the strong1

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

317

est arguments that the Neo-Scholastics ha<l mustered in support of their case for the revival of Thomism. McCool writes
If the history of theology which Aeterni Patris presents corresponds
to the facts, St. Thomas 'gathered together' the wisdom of the
Fathers, gave it clear scientific form, and transmitted it to modern
scholastics through their Thomistic and Suarezian predecessors.
Yet, if as Bouillard shows,. the medieval Doctors overlooked very
important elements in the Patristic tradition, how could St.
Thomas have ' gathered together ' the wisdom of the Fathers
without notable loss? If later scholastics abandoned some of St.
Thomas' own theological positions and altered others, as both
Bouillard and De Lubac show, what happens to the Neo-Scholastics' claim that their Aristotelian science of theology can guarantee the full and faithful transmission of their medieval heritage?
If contingent notions constantly change their meaning, often imperceptibly, when they are used in diverse contexts, how can it be
possible that an Aristotelian science that prescinds from history
can provide an adequate method for theology? If theologians can
forget their past, and medieval theologians had actually done so,
how can one claim that a medieval system, even the system of St.
Thomas, can function as the unique and all-inclusive system of
Catholic theology? (pp. 207-208)

Bouillarid believed not only that concepts and systems can
evolve but that they cannot fa.ill to evolv;e. If they did not
pb.ilosophy and theology cou1d not preserve the changefoss truth of their affirmations as human thought passes
through the various contexts of its historical evoiution. Plural,.
ism in theology is demanded. by the historical nature of human
thought. Bouilla11d went far beyond Gilson. While Gilson
recognized ·that thought did in fact evolve in the middiLe ages,
he could not hoM that it must evo1ve and still insist on the
unique and normative position of Thomas' s Christian philosophy. On Bou:illard's principles no theology, including thrut of
St. Thomas, cou1d be the normative, all-embracing, uniquely
true philosophy that Aeterni Patris had wished to promote.
Some Thomists tried to counterruttack, and they did hold back
the tide of pluralism for ia while, hut with the Second Vwtican
Council and the :inftuentiailphilosophicail and theOJlogicalopen-

818

ROBERT E. LAUDER

ness of Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan, rucceptance of
pliurrulismis now predominant in Catholic rthought.
Those of us who love St. Thomas and believe that his contribution to the hisrtocy of philosophy and theology is unique
are greatly indebted to McCool for his magnificent accomplishment. His study and scholarship have paid off handsomely.
The one minor oriticism I offer is in a way of a backhanded
icompliment. I for one would haV!e we1comed a detailed discrussion of the presence of St. Thomas',s insights in the thought of
Rahner and Lonergan, simifar to the exposition McCool gave
for the thought of Rousselot, Marechal, Maritain, and Gilson.
The clarity and thoroughness which maa<ked McCool's treaJtment of these four would hav;e been most welcome in adding
to the literature on Rahner and Lonergan, the two most infllllentirul Catholic thinkers of rthe Latter haJlf of the twentieth
century.
Where does McCool's historiJCal researeh Jeave us? Does: the
fabeil. " Thomist '' have a Jegitima.te meaning? Concerning the
first question, I am convinced McCooil's erudite and painstaking presentation of the neo-Thomism fostered by Dei Filius
and Aeterni Patris brilliantly il1ustrates how the hisrtorian can
provide the historical context of two non-infaJJih1e Church
documents and 1also rev"eal the hisrtoricity of all thought systems. This sirde of heaven, human thought is conditioned by
time. This does not mean it is alwiays erroneous, hut it does
mean that human beings never know as God knows. With faith
we see through a glass darkily, and even our best philosophy
and theology 1are aJwayis a chiaroscuro, light 1and darkness.
ConJCerning the second question, I find myself agreeing with
Gilson's insisiteI11Cethat Thomas's: philosophical insights are in
h:is theology and furthermore that neo-Thomism's retlianoe on
the
Doctor's commeJJ!tators rather than St. Thomas
1eventually led to its demise. Gilson I ibhink wrus correct in his
insistence that a Cartesian starting point within the mind is
doomed to failure, as it is logicruhly and inevitably directed to-

GERALD MC COOL AND THOMISM

819

1WMd solipsism. But the starlling point of Maroohal, Raihner,
and Lonergan is not a Cartesian olosed consciousness but
mther consciousness open to being. It is the Thanscendental
Thomists' emphasis on the .act of existing, on analogy, and on
the mind's dynamillc orientation towiard God that I find most
attractivie ;and most faithful to Thomrus. Parado:ricalJ.y it is
their very openness to other thought cu:rirents that made
Rahner and Lonergan most faithiuJ. to tihe thought of St.
Thomas .and to his willingness to aooept truth wherever it is
p:r:esent. That faithfulness deserves the appelwtion " Thomist."

BOOK REVIEWS
God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny or Empowerment?
By KATHRYN TANNER. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell,
196. $39.95 (hardbound).
1988. Pp. viii

+

In describing the role of the human will in salvation, Thomas Aquinas
remarks that justification indeed requires an act of human free choice,
namely one which takes place when God "infuses the gift of justifying
grace in such a way that he simultaneously moves the free will (liberum
arbitrium) to accept the gift of grace" (Summa theologiae I-II, 113,
3, c) . When they encounter this sort of remark in Aquinas-and parallel remarks can he found across the whole ecumenical tradition of
Christian theology-contemporary theologians may well be puzzled by
two
.. One is Aquinas's evident conviction that an utterly robust
view of God's power and sovereignty (such that whatever God wills to
happen, happens) is fully compatible with the ascription of genuine and
ineradicable freedom to human beings. But perhaps even more striking
is the fact that Aquinas apparently takes this compatibility, so problematic for much of modern theology, to be obvious: it occasions no visible
perplexity, appeal to mystery, or lengthy explanation, but is simply invoked in passing to help deal with the theological issue under discussion.
In this powerfully argued and provocative book, Kathryn Tanner
undertakes to clear up both of these perplexities. She develops an original and richly textured account of how Christian thinkers could and
can maintain uncompromising accounts of both divine sovereignty and
creaturely independence and freedom without falling into incoherence,
and she also explains how what was once obvious now so easily seems
bafHing.
Tanner begins by arguing that the coherence of Christian claims
about God and creatures can best be displayed by an explicitly secondorder analysis which aims to lay bare the rules governing well-formed
Christian discourse, rather than by constructing a first-order ontological
and metaphysical account of the relationship between God and the
world. The book explicitly concentrates, " not on what theologians are
talking about, but on .the way they are saying it " (p. 11). Tanner
undertakes this " semantic ascent," which. she articulates with considerable nuance, partly in order to proceed in a way congruent with powerful recent developments in philosophy (European as well as Anglo-

BOOK REVIEWS

American) and theology, but more basically because she thinks the
issue itself demands this kind of treatment. However available in their
own right, accounts of the relations between God and creatures cast in
first-order metaphysical language are, theologians of quite different
conviction have often maintained, veiled in a certain inevitable obscurity which limits their explanatory value; one cannot " reconcile
God's agency with the creature's active powers through any material
explanation of the actual mechanism found in some ' causal joint ' between the two" (p. 26; Thomas's way of putting this point, as Tanner
is aware, is to say that we have no modus significandi for descriptions
in divinis [see p. 12]). By contrast, the rules for coherent Christian
discourse about God and creatures, if we can find any, can be stated with
comparative clarity and precision: they will be straightforward directives to speak in certain ways and not in others. Moreover, the problems in speaking coherently about divine power and the contingent independence of creatures are not confined to a particular scheme of firstorder theological concepts and judgments but recur across a wide range
of differing schemes; correlatively, if we can isolate second-order rules
for Christian discourse about God and creatures those rules " may
structure very different theological schemes, schemes distinguished by
their first-order claims by vocabulary, philosophical frames of reference etc." (p. 29). Tanner's project, then, is a certain kind of transcendental argument: she wants to show "how it is possible for Christians to affirm certain statements while holding on to others that seem
to conflict with them" (p. 20). If rules which govern apparently conflicting statements about God and creatures in Christian discourse can
in fact be isolated, and it can be shown how they are followed by Christian theologians, then, Tanner argues, the project will have succeeded;
the coherence of Christian discourse about God and creatures will have
been displayed.
Tanner isolates basic rules for Christian speech about God and creatures by analyzing the difference between Christian convictions about
God's transcendence and creative activity and those which dominated
the Hellenistic religious and philosophical environment in which Christianity arose. In a Hellenistic context, God is either closely associated
with the world by nature or defined by maximal opposition and contrast
to it; "Hellenistic views of divinity in relation to the world seem to
oscillate" between these two poles (p. 39). In this environment, the
Christian claim that God is both utterly transcendent to the world and
directly involved in the world as the creative ground upon whom everything depends for its existence will simply appear incoherent; it does
not follow the established rules. But, Tanner argues, while the early
Christians freely used Hellenistic language to talk about God and crea-

BOOK REVIEWS

tures, they were clearly following different rules. Christian discourse
exhibits a rule for speech about God as transcendent which Tanner
formulates as follows: "Avoid both a simple univocal attribution of
predicates to God and world and a simple contrast of divine and nondivine predicates" (p. 47). This is precisely "a rule for talk of God's
transcendence beyond both identity and opposition Wlth the non-divine "
(p. 47). With it Tanner correlates a second basic rule, mutually implicative (see p. 82£.) with the first: "Avoid in talk about God's creative agency all suggestions of limitation in scope or manner. The second rule prescribes talk of God's creative agency as immediate and
universally extensive" (p. 47).
The articulation of these rules for Christian discourse is the logical
heart of Tanner's argument, but the meaning and import of the rules
can be displayed only by showing how they function to structure diverse theological positions which seek to deal coherently with a wide
array of issues. Tanner is extraordinarily deft at this. She shows how
very different conceptualities can be shaped in conformity with these
rules to generate coherent discourse about God's nature, transcendence,
and creative action: Platonic language about forms, an Aristotelian
metaphysics of causes (examples in these two cases ranging from
Irenaeus to Thomas Aquinas) , Kantian and idealist language of transcendental structures of consciousness (different versions of which are
employed by Schleiermacher and Rahner) , and personalist language of
intentional agency (one sort used by Thomas Aquinas and a different
one by Karl Barth, with his stress on God as self-determining agent).
Against the background of these rules, otherwise puzzling Christian
claims, such as (to cite one of Tanner's examples) those which conjoin the ascription of necessary efficacy to God's will with the ascription of contingency to the world, can be articulated in a coherent waybut no one conceptuality is uniquely suited to doing this (see pp. 7376).
Tanner goes on to develop and extend considerably her account of
rules for Christian discourse in a chapter devoted specifically to the
relationship between a transcendent and creating God and " creatures
with their own powers and efficacy "-especially creatures endowed with
will and choice. Here the coherence of divine power and human freedom is displayed principally by extending the rule of transcendence to
exclude any limitation on the types of effects God's power can produce, and by extending the rule of universal and immediate divine
creative agency to require both a) that "everything non-divine must
be talked about as existing in a relation of total and immediate dependence upon God" (p. 84), and b) "a direct rather than inverse
proportion between what the creature has, on the one hand, and the
extent and influence of God's agency, on the other" (p. 85).

BOOK REVIEWS

Here again Tanner employs a broad range of examples. Specifically
from Aquinas's point of view, a passage from the De malo (16, 7, ad
15) nicely
what she is arguing, although she attends to other
texts in her own analysis of Thomas. Responding as he frequently does
to the worry that, the infallibility of God's providence (always producing exactly
intends) burdens all future events with necessity,
Thomas observes that " the divine will is the cause of being in its entirety ( universaliter) and in their entirety of all things which happen
in a necessary manner and also in a contingent manner. But the divine
will itself is beyond the order of the necessary and the contingent, just
as it is beyond the whole of created being." These are (in reverne
order) essentially statements of Tanner's two primary rules, in what
she calls " a material mode." Thomas goes on to infer from the mate·
rially stated rules much the same point about the coherence of infallible divine volition and genuine human freedom that Tanner wants to
articulate: " Therefore, necessary and contingency in things are distinguished not by relation to the divine will, which is the common
cause of both, hut by relation to created causes, which the divine will
o:rders in a way suited to the effects, so that for necessary effects there
are unchangeable ( intransmutabiles) causes, and for contingent effects
changeable (transmutabiles) causes." Since God is beyond the contrast
of the necessary and the contingent and the limitations that contrast imposes on agents subject to it, saying that an event is due to God's agency
(that it is willed or caused to happen by him) by itself leaves open
the question of whether the event is necessary or contingent: God can
produce effects of both kinds equally well. And he does so precisely in
virtue of a universal and immediate agency which as such is capable
of producing not just a created effect but tli.e manner in which the
e:ffect takes place, that is, the causes and causal relations by which a
given ev:ent is rightly described as necessary or contingent. God is in
this way the total cause of our free acts-save for any element of evil
in them. (Following Aquinas and Barth, Tanner deliberately declines
to structure her account of the normal relationship of divine and human
agency around .the assumption that evil must be IIJ.11de intelligible, and so
brackets the problem of evil for the purposes of this book [see p. 174,
note 12] .. One hopes and expects that she will have more to say about
the problem.)
Tanner's rich and complex discussion includes a detailed account of
the way in which the rules she articulates are a ",resource for theological diversity " (p. 105). Theologies which have a relatively high estimate of human freedom (like Thomas's) and those which talk of human
freedom mainly with marked suspicion (e.g., Luther's and Calvin's)
need not .be regarded in the usual fashion as oppos,ites but can rather
he seen
" functional complements," following the same :rules for dis·

BOOK REVIEWS

325

course about divine power and human freedom in response to quite
different theological and extra-theological pressures. She offers as well
an account of how theologies structured by a nest of distinctively
modern assumptions about human autonomy and about the nature of
inquiry slid into incoherence in their discourse about God and crea·
tures; an analysis of Biel on justification and of the de auxiliis disputes
supports this account. By being bent (often unintentionally) to conform
to this new and ill-suited set of rules, " in modern times the ruled structure of theological discourse is deformed so as to promote persistent
wrangling over traditional Christian affirmations of divine sovereignty
and the creature's power and freedom" (p. 141); claims about God
and the world once obvious to Christian theologians now seem desperately mysterious to them or are revised (not always overtly) to fit the
new rules. The antidote to this deformation is a contextually and rhe·
torically sensitive recognition, akin to that of Christians in the ancient
world and repeatedly exemplified in the history of Christian theology,
"that theological discourse is a fracturing discourse, that theological
rules for discourse are critical principles for reworking those in force
elsewhere " (p. 167).
Tanner's argument has the potential to be intensely controversial: if
she is right, then much modern and contemporary theology and philosophy of religion concerned with these issues is not only mistaken in
specifics but fundamentally misguided; a host of problems it has generated call not for solution, but for dissolution (see p. 6). One line of
resistance to Tanner's argument might go as follows.
1) Tanner's rules :themselves, it might be argued, are incoherent or
are bound to generate inconsistencies when one attempts to follow
them. According to the second rule, for example, even human free acts
must be spoken of as immediately and entirely dependent on God's
agency, and this rule licenses talk of God as the " sufficient cause" of
our free acts (p. 93). But a free act, one might reasonably suppose, is
precisely one for which there are no conditions antecedent to the act
itself which are sufficient to bring the act about; in that sense free acts
may he regarded as uncaused. So Tanner's rule not only permits but
even encourages talk about God as the sufficient cause of that which
has no sufficient cause. Tanner has an obvious reply to this charge of
incoherence: it assumes that "cause" must mean the same thing when
God is called " sufficient cause " and human acts are called " uncaused "
or, more broadly, that divine agency must be assimilated to one or another type of created agency (so that God is either a necessitating
cause, in which case human acts are not free, or human acts are free,
in which case God is only a contingent cause with respect to them).
But, as Tanner's first rule specifies, in Christian discourse God's agency
is neither to be identified with any kind of creaturely agency no:r con·

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strued as its opposite; God's causality transcends the contrast between
necessity and contingency. Since there is no univocity in the uses of
"cause," there is no contradiction in saying that God (in a transcendent
manner unique to him) causes free acts (i.e., those which have no necessitating causes).
2) In reply, the objection might he relocated. Tanner seems to
rescue the coherence of her rules at the cost of vacuity; she is able to
speak consistently of God's agency only by employing a concept of it
which God alone can have. We can conceive, it might be claimed, necessary agents and contingent ones (that is, those whose effects, if they
occur, are respectively necessary and contingent) but not an agent which
is neither necessary or contingent. This, so the objection might go,
argues against adopting Tanner's rules and the obscure notions of divine agency they support. As her first chapter indicates in some detail,
Tanner is willing (and indeed thinks it necessary) to concede a certain
amount on this score. A God who genuinely transcends all the limitations and oppositions of created reality will he one we can speak of only
by " fracturing " our rules and expectations for discourse about created
things; speaking of such a God's agency will require us to bend our
ordinary discourse about created agents, causes, and so forth, so that
it can be applied to a genuinely transcendent agent. Such speech is not
vacuous, since we understand the discourse we are bending and we understand where, how, and why we are bending it, but it will not yield
a conception of God's agency as clear, satisfying, and adequate to its
object as those we have of (e.g.) necessary and contingent causes. It
seems as if this debate might be reduced to a stalement between those
who insist that we have to get our concepts straight and those who insist that we cannot speak of God as though he were subject to creaturely limitations. But at least for those who want to develop an account of
God's agency which is rooted in the scripturally normed discourse of
the Christian community, this stalemate can he avoided by repairing
to the basic patterns of discourse the account attempts to honor. Granted
that such an account should always strive for as much clarity as the
distinctive subject matter allows, the decisive question (as much exege·
tical, historical, and empirical as conceptual) is whether the discourse
constitutive of the Christian community is in fact structured by the rules
Tanner articulates. H it is, then commitment to rthat discourse requires
in all our attempts to conceive of God and God's agency a willingness
to live with a readily located but quite ineluctable obscurity, built into
the very structure of the discourse itself.
BRUCE

St. Olaf College
Northfield, Minnesota

D. MARSHALL

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Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion: A Contemporary Theodicy. By
WENDY FARLEY. Louisville, Kentucky:
Press, 1990. 150 pp.

Westminster/John

Knox

Wendy Farley sets herself an ambitious task in her book. She is dissatisfied with past theodicies, which account for evil and suffering as
punishment for sin, as counterpoints in a larger aesthetic cosmic harmony, as means of purification and formation of character, or something that will be as compensated for by other-worldly vindication and
reward. These four theories may explain some forms of evil and suffering, but in the face of " radical suffering " they are " unable to exorcise the demons that whisper that life is futile, suffering is meaningless,
and the cosmos an empty and evil void " (p. 22) .
By " radical suffering " Farley means that kind of suffering which
debases and destroys the human dignity of the sufferer: " Radical suffering pinches the spirit of the sufferer, numbing it and diminishing its
range. The distinctiveness of radical suffering does not lie in its intensity or its injustice but its power over the sufferer" (p. 54). Radical
suffering drives the person to self-loathing and despair and therefore
destroys her or his capacity to resist it. Despite its massive destructive
power radical suffering is not rare; it occurs in familial, cultural, poli·
tical, and economic relations under the forms of, e.g., child abuse,
sexism, racism, violation of human rights, poverty, and starvation. To
account for radical suffering, Farley proposes that (a) one place suffering rather than sin at the center of the problem of evil; (b) one replace the notion of a primordial fall with that of tragedy; ( c) one
repudiate the idea of divine omnipotence in favor of that of divine compassion (pp. 12-13). The second and third proposals are captured in
the title of the book, " Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion."
Farley's first proposal leads one to expect that she would do away
with the notion of sin altogether, hut this is not the case. Strangely, she
devotes a good deal of attention to sin, describing it as " catastrophic
because it introduces chaos and disharmony into history " (p. 43) . She
sees sin as (self)-deception, callousness, bondage, and guilt (pp. 4451). Whereas traditional theology perceives a causal link between sin
and suffering, the logic of Farley's alternative proposal entails her locating the origin of suffering elsewhere, namely, the tragic character of
human existence: ". . . tragic vision locates the possihilirty of suffering
in the conditions of existence and in the fragility of human freedom "
(p. 29).
A tragic vision of life does not, Farley claims, rationalize (radical)

BOOK REVIEWS

suffering, nor is it atheistic. It recognizes, honestly and bluntly, that
" the conditions of finite existence include conflict and fragility " (p.
31) . Multiplicity ·and' variety enrich creation hut they inevitably lead
to division and .separation; relationships warm the heart hut they must
include some and exclude others; values sometimes conflict, such as
mercy and justice; embodiment allows us to enjoy the pleasures of life
but it leads to decay and death. Even human freedom, Farley points
out, is infected with fragility caused by anxiety and desire: "Freedom
is the tragic flaw of human existence, at once the stamp of its greatness
and its destruction " ·(p. 37).
What should one do in face of inevitable suffering? One must have
compassion. Farley takes compassion to mean an enduring disposition
horn of sympathetic knowledge of another person's suffering leading to
love (which is a liberation from egocentrism that enables one to care
for others) and working for justice (especially removing social in·
justice). In contrast to dominating power, compassion empowers the
sufferers to speak and act in their own defenses. It rejects the tempta·
tion of passivity before evil and the use of violence to overthrow it.
Rather, it empowers sufferers to resist evil.
For Farley, God's power must he understood as compassion or love.
As a noncoercive form of power, divine love (a) creates a tragic world
in which radical suffering is inevitable and (b) because of suffering
redeems it. Hence, divine compassion is both creative and redemptive.
But why does God go through this seemingly redundant exercise? Why
doesn't God create a perfect world instead of a tragic one? With a
caveat that divinity is incomprehensible (what she calls its " unground·
edness "), Farley suggests that divine love is "erotic," that is relational.
It "needs" to express itself in a tragic situation in which suffering is
inevitable. And since God needs to create, " God must share respon·
sibility for suffering. Creative power culminates in a world in which
conflict and evil are not merely possible but inevitable " (p. 107) .
How does God " redeem " this tragic world God has created? By
compassion and mercy, Farley tells us, that is, by resisting the causes
of suffering and by resisting the power of suffering to dominate suf •
ferers (p. 116). And God carries out this resistance by means of alltoo-ambiguous instruments, such as Scripture and Church. Can God
finally and radically vanquish evil? Here is Farley's answer: "If it is
possible to speak of the efficacy of divine compassion at all, it is impossible to do so in ways that would deny the existence of absolute
evil: evil for which there is no atonement or vindication. Nothing in
the past, present, or future will atone for the wanton, cruel destruction
of human beings in death camps and torture chambers or through the
structural evils of poverty, sexism, and racism" (p. 126, emphasis
added).

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I find Farley's theory of tragic existence and divine compassion distressing and depressing. To sufferers, it says: "C'est la vie!" Put
more learnedly, "created perfection is fragile, tragically structured.
. • . And yet, without creation, divine eros remains merely potential,
inarticulate. The fragility of creation and the nonabsolute power of
God culminate in the tragedy and rupture of history" (p. 124). Thank
God, I can now have God ,to blame. Of course, God is trying to repair
the damage, but even God's efforts are ultimately vain since "absolute
evil " will ever play havoc with history and since God himself is responsible for suffering. Furthermore, since the author does not offer
any extensive discussion of the suffering and death of God .on the cross
(she dismisses the idea: "The compassionate God is ... to he distinguished from the benevolent but impotent deity who ' suffers with '
the world" [p. 112]), nor of the resurrection of Jesus as divine vindication of innocent suffering, nor of hope for a life beyond,· her tragic
vision sheds no real light on the problem of suffering nor can it pro.vide impetus for the struggle against evil or hope for victims-especially when demons whisper that life is futile, suffering meaningless, and
the cosmos void.
The book is repetitive (suffering: pp. 23-24, 30-31, 51-59, 115-119;
tragic vision: pp. 31-37, 78-79, 98-99, 106-110, 124-125; compassion:
pp. 37-39, 79-81, 92-94, 110-114, 114-119, 126-128). It is oracular
("theologians have been uncomfortable about directly attributing love
to God " [p. 96], self -contradictory (it speaks of God's " aseity " and
divine " relationship " in the same breath [p. 105]) , and misleading in
its use of sources (e.g. its appeal to Thomas for its peculiar understanding of analogical language about God [pp. 101-103]). Mercifully,
the hook is brief.
PETER

c. PHAN

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Time, Freedom, and the Common Good. By CHARLES M. SHEROVER.
New York: State University of New York Press, 1989. Pp. xiii+
314. $59.50 (cloth) ; $19.95 (paper).
Guided by the insights of traditional political philosophy and contemporary phenomenology and animated by 'the spirit of Tocqueville,
Sherover's book is an attempt " to secure the foundations of a public
philosophy adequate for our time" (p. xii). Like Tqcqueville, Sherover
is preoccupied with the " universal appeal of freedom," with its com-

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plications, its paradoxes, and especially its possibilities. Sherover faults
liberalism for its simplistic conception of freedom and its " superficial
view of the nature of human existence" (p. 8). In an attempt to find
a more adequate account of human experience, Sherover appeals to
three existential categories: sociality, temporality, and freedom. The
project of the book, which moves from the establishment and articulation of these categories to :their practical application, is ambitious. Yet
the argument is lucid and persuasive.
Following Aristotle, Sherover argues for the primacy of the social
in human life. He effectively argues not only that moral norms and
linguistic practices are socially rooted phenomena, but also that " social
membership is prior ... to any notion of differentiating individuality "
(p. 20). Social atomism is but a theoretical abstraction, and individualism is as incoherent as a private language. Sherover points out that the
defense ·of the social nature of human existence has at least one negative result: it undermines political theories that are rooted in a radically
individualistic conception of human nature. Yet the emphasis on sociality does play a positive role in Sherover's essay: it serves as an initial
justification of the relevance of the idea of the common good to political
discourse. The existential category of sociality surfaces, for instance,
in Sherover's cogent account of rights, wherein he argues that particular
rights should not be seen as innate and absolute. The claim that rights
are innate renders unintelligible the prevalent notion of "newly dis·
covered" rights (p. 79). Instead, particular rights are socially recog·
nized, justifiable claims which cannot he isolated from the social and
political context in which they are recognized and exercised. Particular
r.ights come into being over time and in intimate connection with con·
crete, historical realities.
The initial result of Sherover's consideration of the second existen·
tial category, temporality, is also negative. Since human existence is
a" being in history," finitude characterizes all human endeavors. Given
the inherent limits to human knowledge and human power, " fallibilism " can be eradicated neither in theory nor in practice. Thus,
Sherover couples the case for limited government with an argument for
the limits of political philosophy. But, once again, the negative result
has a positive correlate. Sherover's repudiation of the notion that gov·
ernments can and ought to determine policies for public life in a com·
prehensive and peremptory fashion leads him to affirm the importance
of " procedure " and " pragmatics " in public life. " Procedures "
regulate the sequence of political events and allow policies to be deter·
mined and revised over time; " pragmatics " focus on the specific and
various effects that policies will have in actual situations. The perva·
sively temporal character of human life highlights the need for both
(pp. 258-60).

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Sherover's discussion of freedom, the third existential category, contains his most direot and sustained confrontation with liberalism.
Classical liberal thought, in Locke and Mill for instance, saw government as principally negative and rtlrns had little to say about the degradation of the industrial revolution. The defect in liberalism brings to
the fore its failure to distinguish between negative liberty and positive
freedom. The former is indeed a necessary precondition for republican
government, but the stipulation of the existence of rights is without
effect if the citizens lack the wherewithal to exercise their rights.
Sherover does not, however, reject the free market economy; in fact,
he sees a commercial society as a necessary basis for republican government. His book includes a persuasive defense of the tempered freemarket economy which avoids both the stagnation of socialism and the
excesses of laissez-faire capitalism. Classical liberalism, moreover, has
had little to say about " the proper procedures for decisions " or " the
dynamics of political power " or the resolution of conflicts (p. 112) .
For a more adequate understanding of the dynamics of freedom.
Sherover turns to Machiavelli's Discourses, Montesquieu's Spirit of the
Laws, and The Federalist.
This list of texts offers hut a small suggestion of the breadth of
Sherover's scholarship. Yet, if there is a difficulty with his argument,
it lies in his synthetic use of quite varied sources. He deploys, for in·
stance, both Kantian and Aristotelian accounts of practical rationality,
and both Aristotelian and Machiavellian views of constitutional polity.
Sherover does indeed claim that the Kantian and Machiavellian theories
are developments or extensions of positions seminally present in Aristotle. And the assimiliation of such varied sources is at least partially
justified by the project of the hook, which is an attempt to rethink
our political principles, since a convergence of various traditions lies
at the root of the American experiment. Still, the relation between the
various accounts could he more adequately secured. In spite of this
weakness, the integration of political philosophy and political practice
is one of the more successful features of the essay. The hook contains
an implicit argument for the inseparability of theory and practice in
western politics.
THOMAS

Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

s. HIBBS

BOOK REVIEWS

El Primer Principia del Obrar Moral y las Normas Especificas en el
Pensamiento de G. Grisez y !. Finnis. By AURELIO A.NSALDO.
Roma: Pontificia Universita Lateranense, 1990. Pp. xiii+ 255.
This unusually excellent and important doctoral dissertation was
written in Rome at the Istituto Giovanni Paolo II per Studi su Matrimonio e Famiglia, a component of the Lateran University. The author
currently teaches at the Ateneo Romano della Santa Croce in Rome.
The volume is of special importance for three reasons: ( 1) it provides a comprehensive, detailed, and accurate account of the moral
theory developed by Germain Grisez and John Finnis over the past
quarter century (Joseph Boyle has also made important contributions
to this theory, and Ansaldo has noted these); (2) it defends Grisez
and Finnis against many of the criticisms which have been unjustly
leveled against their thought; and ( 3) it raises some critically import·
ant issues by way of constructive criticism. In what follows I will
briefly comment on the first and second features of Ansaldo's work and
discuss more fully the third important component of his scholarly study.
In the first part of his work (pp. 3-100), Ansaldo offers readers a
splendid synthesis of the thought of Grisez and Finnis. He has carefully
studied everything written by these authors from 1964 to 1988. He has
included important material from Finnis that had escaped even my attention, and I have tried to study everything these authors have written.
He has also succeeded in presenting their thought comprehensively and
faithfully. He understands what they think, appreciates it, and presents
it accurately. In short, he does justice to their thought. In this respect
his study is quite superior to another doctoral dissertation, Russell
Hittinger's A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory. Hittinger's
work has been severely criticized, and rightly so, not only by Grisez but
by others (e.g., Robert George and William Marshner) ; it seriously
misrepresents the work of Grisez and Finnis. A criticism of this sort
cannot be levelled against Ansaldo's work; it provides an accurate and
very scholarly account of their thought.
In the second part of his study (pp. 103-229) Ansaldo offers a critical assessment of the work of Grisez and Finnis. Here he first shows
that many of the criticisms leveled against their thought are unjust and
unfounded, particularly those offered by such writers as Veatch, Rittinger, Flicken, Bourke, et al. These writers charge that Grisez and
Finnis fail to show how moral principles are rooted in metaphysics and
anthropology, that they completely separate ethics from metaphysics,
natural law from human nature, etc. Ansaldo, by a patient and thorough

BOOK REVIEWS

888

examination of their thought and the thought of St. Thomas, defends
Grisez and Finnis from these misguided criticisms. He shows, first of all,
,that Grisez and Finnis are correct (and fully in accord with St. Thomas)
in holding that our krwwledge of the primary principles of natural law
is not derived from our knowledge of metaphysics or of human nature.
By referring to appropriate texts of Grisez and Finnis, Ansaldo shows
conclusively that these authors explicitly recognize the intimate rela·
tionship between ethics and metaphysics, between natural law and
human nature. They fully and explicitly recognize that, were our na·
ture other than it is, namely, the nature of human beings, the goods
pedective of us would be other than what they actually are. When these
goods are grasped by practical reason, they serve as starting points or
principles of purposeful human action. Nonetheless, our practical
krwwledge of these goods, is not epistemologically derived from or dependent upon prior knowledge, speculative in character, of human
nature.
In short, in contrast to their critics and in conformity with St.
Thomas, Grisez and Finnis are correct in holding that our practical
understanding of the primary principles of natural law is not dependent
upon our prior understanding of metaphysics or human nature. At the
same time they explicitly acknowledge and defend the truth that onto·
logically ethics is grounded in metaphysics and anthropology. "Our
authors," Ansaldo writes, " have always sought not only to respect but
even more to defend and explain the fact that the basis, the founda·
tion, of an cethics is the reality of things (their nature, what they are)
and, in short, the reality that man is" (p. 106). What they propose
is an epistemology or methodology proper to ethics, " not an ethics
' independent of ' or ' foreign to ' metaphysics or reality; much less do
they prescind from or deny it. In other words, [they propose] an
thait is ontologically grounded in nature, but not deduced from it . • .
an ethics that has its own proper principles, original and not derived,
known immediately and naturally by all, without need for recurring to
prior metaphysical explanations, but an ethics that affirms and demands
the need for metaphysical reflection for a complete and full knowledge
of human nature " (p. 108) . In my opinion, Ansaldo successfully de·
fends Frisez and Finnis from the misguided and unfounded criticism
that some have leveled against them.
But in this part of his study Ansaldo also raises important problems
with their work. He believes that Grisez and Finnis have either in·
adequately treated or left out of consideration entirely some matters
which, if integrated more systematically into their thought, would en·
hance its value. He does not challenge the basic structure of their
thought, which he believes contributes greatly to deepening and clarify·

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ing the understanding of natural law rooted in the thought of St.
Thomas. His intent is to offer constructive criticism. His critique
centers around the following points: (1) the metaphysical-anthropological foundations of ethics (they are affirmed but they need to be set forth
and defended more systematically and explicitly); (2) the relationship
between human goods as " ends " of human existence and personal
union with God as "the end" of human existence; (3) the formulation
of the first principle of morality; and (4) the articulation of the
"modes of responsibility," i.e., of the intermediary principles between
the first principle of morality and specific moral norms.
( 1) Although Grisez and Finnis explicitly affirm and defend the
truth that ethics is rooted in reality, Ansaldo thinks that their defense
lacks the philosophical rigor that is needed if our moral life is to be
properly understood. They need to acknowledge more fully the fact
that speculative inquiry and practical deliberation, while distinct, are
nonetheless compenetrating or interpenetrating; as a result, the truths
of practical reason, although not derived from truths of the specula·
tive order, are inwardly illumined and deepened by truths about reality
itself that are known to us and, in their own way, inscribed in our
hearts. In particular, he thinks that Grisez and Finnis need to affirm
explicitly and show that the dignity of human persons (and the in·
violability of the goods perfective of them) is grounded ultimately in
the truth that human persons are the only material, created beings
whom God has willed for themselves and to whom he has given the
vocation to know and love himself (p. 119). Grisez and Finnis are right
in affirming that the goods perfective of human persons are goods in
themselves (goods propter se). But they need to show that these goods,
along with the persons whom they fulfill, are created goods (not per se
goods) and utterly dependent for their being on God himself, the uncreated and supreme good, the good both propter se and per se.
(2) With Grisez and Finnis, Ansaldo repudiates an overly narrow,
intellectualist understanding of human fulfillment or beatitude. The
ultimate blessedness of human beings is rooted in a personal union
with God that surpasses all understanding (and is made known to us
only through divine revelation). But this not only does not exclude,
it fully includes participation in all the goods perfective of human per·
sons, both as individuals and as social beings, made for life in com·
munion with others (pp. 131-134). Good human actions and participa·
tion in the goods of human existence are not, as Grisez and Finnis
(and St. Thomas) insist, merely extrinsic means toward human fulfill·
ment but rather integral components thereof. Nonetheless, Grisez and
Finnis need to recognize explicitly that union with God through knowl·
edge and love is the end for which human persons have been made.
Such union i!!l not a dominating end in relation to which all others are

BOOK REVIEWS

335

subordinated, in extrinsic fashion, as mere means; it is rather an "inclusive " end, embracing within itself full participation in the " ends "
or " goods " of human existence. Grisez and Finnis accord a priority
to the good of religion in organizing the moral life of human persons,
even though, qua a basic human good, it is not objectively " greater "
than others. But Ansaldo notes that personal union with God far surpasses the realization and full participation in the good of religion, and
he urges Grisez and Finnis to treat this issue more explicitly. He does
not charge them with the error of identifying personal union with God
with participation in the good of religion. His point is rather that Grisez
and Finnis need to consider more fully the relationship between created
human goods as " ends " of human existence and the uncreated Good,
who is God, the end of human existence.
(3) An excellent chapter (pp. 143-195) is devoted to the thought 0£
St. Thomas. By a patient examination of relevant texts from all of the
Common Doctor's writings, Ansaldo shows that the proper way to
formulate the first principle of morality is in terms of the twofold command of love of God and love of neighbor. Grisez and Finnis, like
Ansaldo, maintain that this is indeed the way St. Thomas formulated the
first principle of morality. But they argue that this mode of formulating the first principle is too intimately bound to a specific religious tradition and that this first principle can be translated into philosophical
language by expressing it in terms of openness to integral human fulfillment. Ansaldo argues that the way Grisez and Finnis formulate the
first principle does not, in truth, " express in its fullness the richness
of the content of human morality in all its dimensions." In fact, he
thinks that Grisez and Finnis admit as much, for, in the work on
nuclear deterrence which they co-authored with Joseph Boyle, they
said: "The first principle of morality as we formulate it captures much,
if not all, the moral content of those love commands " (cited, with
emphasis added, on p. 206). Ansaldo contends that their formulation
of the first principle of morality, while quite helpful insofar as it explicitly refers to the basic human goods at stake in human choice and
action, is ultimately insufficient, for it fails to take into account the re·
lationship, of crucial significance for human morality, between participation in created human goods and personal union with God (pp. 206208).
(4) Finally, Ansaldo thinks that Grisez and Finnis have contributed
to an understanding of natural law by showing how principles such as
the Golden Rule (as explicitly recognized by St. Thomas) mediate the
movement of practical reason from the first principle of morality to the
formulation of specific moral norms. Nonetheless, he thinks that the
complex way in which they have formulated their modes of responsi-

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hility should he worked out in a way that more clearly relates these
modes to the traditional moral virtues (pp. 214-221).
In my opinion, the issues raised by Ansaldo are quite important. I
think that to some ex.tent at least, Grisez and Finnis have already sought
to take more explicitly into consideration the first and second issues
raised by Ansaldo. I would point to the very important (hut difficult
and complex) article they co-authored with Joseph Boyle, "Practical
Principles, Moral Truth, and Ultimate Ends," in the American Journal
of Jurisprudence (32 [1987]: 99-151). This article is listed in Ansaldo's bibliography, hut it actually appeared only in 1988 and evident·
ly appeared too late for Ansaldo to give it the kind of extensive consideration it merits. In this article Grisez and Finnis do address to some
extent the first and second points of Ansaldo's critique. Nonetheless, it
seems to me that the questions he poses are by no means fully answered
in this article and that further attention needs to he given to them.
With respect to the third issue Ansaldo raises, namely, the formulation of the first principle of morality, Grisez and Finnis might well defend themselves successfully. After all, even St. Thomas, as Ansaldo
himself notes, frequently expressed the basic moral principle in terms
of love of neighbor without explicitly referring to love of God. The
love of neighbor and love of God are intrinsically interrelated and inclusive. An openness to integral human fulfillment, which requires a
love for all .the goods of human persons and of the persons in whom
these goods are meant to flourish, virtually includes a love for God,
the source of these goods and of human persons. But it may he that
here too Ansaldo's critique needs to he considered more deeply.
The final issue Ansaldo raises, namely, the formulation of the
" modes of· responsibility " and the relationship between these modes
and moral virtues, also merits careful attention, in my opinion.
In summary, this doctoral study is most helpful and makes a real
contribution to contemporary efforts to deepen our understanding of
natural law and the meaning of human moral life. The author both
understands and appreciates what Grisez and Finnis (and Boyle) are
doing, and he sees their work as a development of (and not a contradic·
tion to) the thought of St. Thomas. He offers a splendid synthesis of
their thought, successfully defends them from criticisms that are wide
of the mark, and raises important matters than require careful attention.
Ansaldo notes that in preparing his study he was aided particularly
by Ramon Garcia de Haro, a professor at the Istituto Giovanni Paolo
II in Rome. I want to note here that Garcia de Haro, whose work is
unfortunately not yet available in English, is an exceptionally good
moral theologian, one steeped in the thought of St. Thomas and, indeed,
the entire Catholic tradition. His student has profited from his guidance

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and contributed an important and helpful study. This dissertation is a
model of its kind. One hopes the author will continue his scholarly
efforts.
WILLIAM E. MAY
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

John Henry Newman: A Biography. By IAN KER. New York: Oxford University Press, 1990. Pp. xii + 764. $24.95 (paper).
The Achievement of John Henry Newman. By IAN KER. Notre
Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. x
209.
$24.95 (cloth).

+

Ian Ker has inherited the mantle of the late Charles Stephen Dessain
as the finest textual expositor of the Newman corpus, and Ker's biography should become a standard reference tool in the field. Ker ap·
prenticed under Dessain in the production of the monumental (31volume) Letters and Diaries, and his biography shows his command of
the materials of that as yet unfinished project. Ker's hook joins the
biographies of W. Ward (1912) and M. Trevor (1962) as significant
"lives of Newman" to consider, and it addresses their earlier shortcomings: Ward's inadequate appraisal of the Anglican Newman and
Trevor's unconcern for Newman's theological writings. Of Newman's
intellectual contribution, Ker's treatment is similar to Dessain's John
Henry Newman, an exposition of the major themes and intellectual
moves, and theologically-minded inquirers need read both.
Ker offers the hook as a personal life, a literary appraisal, and an
intellectual study. The personal life and literary analysis are ably carried off; Ker's background in English literature and his editorial work
on the letters have served him well. The intellectual study takes the form
of synopses of Newman's hooks and articles, which are woven into the
chronological narrative of the life. This aspect of Ker's hook is by no
means "the theological achievement of JHN" (cf. Tracy's work on
Lonergan); such a project still awaits Newman studies and someone
of the conceptual breadth of the late Jan Walgrave to achieve it. Ker
provides accurate and readable summaries of Newman's writings, and
if a biography is meant to introduce the sundry aspects of a person,
especially a complex thinker like Newman, then Ker's treatment of the
intellectual aspect offers a fine introduction.
I shall consider these three dimensions of the biography, and first the
personal life. Newman considered that a person's life is best told

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through that person's correspondence. Ker's biography is approached
chronologically, and Newman's published letters guide the tale. Newman's advice is particularly apropos for his own biographer, since Newman's hooks and articles often displayed a "reserve" in which his true
feelings were couched and nuanced. His letters, especially to confidants,
were candid and often hard-hitting, as when he described the Curia in
these words: " And who is Propaganda? one sharp man of business,
who works day and night, and dispatches his work quick off, to the
East and West, a high dignitary, [perhaps an Archbishop], hut after all
little more than a clerk . . . with two or .three clerks under him " (p.
519). (Ker displays some reserve himself, omitting Newman's episcopal aside.)
Ker's use of the letters is most revealing during Newman's Roman
Catholic period when he encountered opposition from Archbishop Manning and W. G. Ward in England, from Archbishop Cullen in Dublin,
and from Cardinal Barnaho in Rome. One senses how the laity rallied
round him. Some of Newman's most pungent thoughts on ·theological
freedom, on the suspicious nature of the clergy toward educated laity,
on the wherewithal to make an institution a genuine university, on the
role of patience and .trust in God when authorities are hearing down,
are to he found in Ker's choice of letters. With so much material to
mine-Newman wrote 20,000 letters-it is understandable that Ker
does not include, save rarely, what Newman's opponents were thinking.
Ker's account of Newman's Anglican period is equally illuminating,
and indeed it is a highlight of the biography. While the Apologia has
provided the main lines of the story, Ker puts flesh and hones to Newman's struggle with his conscience. In coming to Oxford, Newman contended with his early evangelical convictions, and when he divests himself of them for what becomes his settled and life-long immersion in
doctrine and sacrament, he must then struggle with the prevailing ethos
of the Church of England, which becomes less and less a home for him.
Newman fights to hold on, to cling to where God has providently put
him, and his fingers slip off one hy one. Ker's account of the period
from 1838 to 1845, using Newman's letters and his published articles,
is moving and does genuine credit to the ferocious struggle in conscience Newman waged within himself. It is also a credit to Ker's tenacity
to have wrested from the Birmingham Oratory Newman's unpublished
letters from this period, for the lacuna in the projected thirty-one volumes of published letters is precisely here. If anyone thinks that Newman simply read the Fathers and thereby read himself into the Roman
Catholic Church, he or she must read this chapter of the biography.
One must relive the three "great blows" Newman felt: the melting
away of the Via Media, the Bishops' charge against Tract 90, and the
Jerusalem bishopric affair (p. 231-36).

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339

As successful as Ker is with the personal life aspect, there are some
absences of a psychological nature. Newman's relations with his immediate family were, on the whole, problematic. His relationship to
brothers Frank and Charles was awful, and he became forever estranged
from his sister Harriett in 1843. With sister Jemima he maintained
contact, but one wonders how close they were. On the other hand he
grieved his whole life long over his youngest sister Mary, who died
in 1828. Given Newman's sensitive nature, what is one to make 0£
these alienations, and what do they tell us of Newman? The personal
dealings within the Littlemore community are another unknown. With
like-minded colleagues, Newman set up a monastic-like community outside Oxford in April, 1842, and these next three years were crucial, in
a psychological sense, to his odyssey. Apart from W. J. Copeland, Ker
never makes clear who is there with him from the first and, more importantly, how they influence one another. Lockhart, Dalgairns, and
St. John are mentioned later in passing but without analysis. Perhaps
in these two cases the Newman family and the Littlemore family, the
information is simply not available to a biographer. But we are the
less for it, when it comes to trying to fathom the person Newman.
The biography's second aspect, the literary appraisal, is well done,
and one senses Ker to he on home ground. He identifies the disestablishment debate of 1833 as "the beginning of Newman's career as a
controversialist" (p. 66). There Newman's powers of irony and sarcasm are nurtured, leading to " the satirical masterpiece of his Anglican
period," Tamworth Reading Room in 1841, in which the "aphoristic,
the colloquial, and the ironic come together in a dazzling display 0£
imagery" (p. 211). Satire is once again employed in Loss and Gain,
his 1847 novel, this time at the service of the Newmanian real/unreal
distinction and the importance of moral integrity. "A man's moral
life ... lives in the tip of his fingers, and the spring of his insteps "
(p. 335). The analogies with Victorian England are identified in Newman's second novel, Callista (p. 420).
Ker's best analyses are saved for the Present Position of Catholics,
a work Newman considered his best written effort and in which Ker
detects the humor becoming " more and more fantastically grotesque,
in the Dickensian vein " (p. 367), and for the Apologia itself. Ker directs attention to its fifth Chapter, " perhaps the most brilliantly subtle
of all Newman's writings" (p. 550). Many have analyzed the Apologia's literary merits, but Ker introduces a provocative reading in
terms of a thesis/antithesis/synthesis
structure. The paradoxical conjunction of opposites, sustained by conflict with each other, is important to Newman's theological method, as my own hook, JHN on the
Church, argues.
The intellectual aspect of this biography is, as mentioned before, a

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series of excursuses, to use the scholastic term, woven into Ker's yearhy-year story. These synopses of Newman's hooks and significant articles are readable and clear, save for that on Grammar of Assent-which is surely difficult for anyone to summarize. I would like to point
out some key points in which Ker adds to our understanding of Newman's doctrine and to mention a few items to complement Ker's.
The inadequacy of human language to express dogmas, at the heart
of the 1845 hook on doctrinal development, is first broached in Newman's 1832 Arians, where it is argued in relation to the early Church's
principle of 'economy,' permitting Newman to maintain both the necessarily imperfect medium of human vocabulary as well as the need for
words (dogmas) when the inquiring intellect oversteps its hounds (p.
49:ff) . Ker develops nicely the spirituality of the Parochical and Plain
Sermons, reminiscent of L. Bouyer's and Dessain's studies, emphasizing
the indwelling of the Holy Spirit, who works through ordinary channels-conscience, feelings, reason-and " does not come immediately l:o
change us" (p. 91); consistency in doing ordinary duties well is the
clue to Newman's realist spirituality. The Lectures on Justification continue the theme of moral duty hut now couched as a Via Media insight. Faith ruled by love steers a middle course between Luther's sola
fides and Roman Catholicism's justification through obedience. Though
he later changes his appraisal of Catholic spirituality, in 1838 he is
identifying what Catholics recognize as "rote Catholicism." Ker's excursus on the Sermons is a really fine synopsis of them.
Ker rightly situates within the calculus of antecedent probability the
famous seven tests of doctrinal development in Newman's 1845 EssayNewman called them notes in his 1878 revision. Without this context
they are misunderstood in too ruhrical a fashion (pp. 302-15). Ker
underplays, however, Newman's treatment of infallibility, since it is
crucial to the hypothesis of the essay. Newman's letter to Catherine
Ward (LD 12:332) captures the argument. The historical fact that the
Roman Church continues the Primitive Church is so clear that one
should join it, save for certain objections, viz., portions of the teachings
of the present Roman Church are not taught in the Primitive. One does
not prove these teachings to he primitive hut rather damages the
cogency of the objection against them. The theory of development is
this invalidating process. Infallibility affirms a development; otherwise
God would have given a revelation without a means to preserve the
community in the original truth.
Ker makes a genuine contribution to understanding the Idea of a
University by noting the differing perspectives and points of view from
which Newman writes. Recollect that the discourses presently constituting the hook's chapters were either delivered or written on separate oc-

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341

casions. At times liberal education is eulogized and at other times
critiqued. So, too, the book's famous "gentleman," because Newman's
evaluations of this noble product of education constantly shift accord·
ing to the particular aim he is then seeking. The book cannot be read
as an argument which marches straight forward. Newman's Grammar
of Assent, on the other hand, can and ought to be so read. There is
really no way to capsulate the argument and a tough argument it is for
the justification of religious belief. Clearer than Ker's attempt (63850) I believe is Newman's own effort in a letter of 1879 to William
Froude (LD 29:112·20). Froude died before Newman posted the letter
but the letter is an excellent way to enter into the core of Newman's
argument.
Newman's 1877 Preface to a third edition of his 1837 Prophetical
Office contains his sacramental vision of the Church. As the 1845
Essay answered objections to non-primitive doctrines and the 1866 Letter
to Pusey treated objections to Mariology, this lengthy Preface inquired
whether actual Catholic practice violated its official orthodoxy. Ker
rightly notes that Newman corrects his 1837 mistake in attributing corruptions to Catholic theology, noting instead that evils have a "popular
or a political origin " in Church life (p. 703) . But he also could have
noted that Newman prefers to situate evil within the context of theism,
for if evil in the world does not tell against theism, why should ecclesiastical abuses tell against the divinity of the Church; see LD 19:212,
27 :260, 28 :215.
My critical annotations are rather minor, to the great merit of Ker's
biography, and my esteem for his effort must not be lost. I am less
tender toward Oxford UP, for I must take it to he the publisher's spacesaving prescriptions that required the footnoting and index to be the
way they are. The reader would have been immensely helped to know
the dates of the letters and to whom Newman was writing them. It is
sometimes hard to determine in what month and year the action was
happening. The index is alphabetized by personal names, and under
"Newman, John Henry" are subject topics followed by Works. These
are not alphabetized hut rather listed by their first appearance in the
pagination. Searching a topic is unnecessarily difficult.
Ker's Achievement of JHN is a series of five essays on Newman as
educator, philosopher, preacher, theologian, and writer. Through a
judicious selection of quotations and extended texts, Ker allows the
reader to feel the force and gracefulness of Newman's prose. Nonetheless, Ker brings a viewpoint to hear upon the texts in terms of what
is selected and in correcting misreadings.
The latter is clearest in the " educator " chapter. He rightly corrects
the reading given to Idea of a University by M. Svaglic and A. D.

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Culler by arguing that Newman's " philosophy " within a university
education is not a metascience capturing the more specialized disciplines
hut rather the process and mental discipline by which the mind is culti·
vated and enlightened. Such disciplining of mind can he effected by
any of the intellectual disciplines, though Newman preferred the Classics
as the staple; it is how a subject is taught, rather than its content,
which is key.
The other chapters are, in large measure, summaries of Newman's
writings hearing upon the particular topic (e.g., much of "Newman
as philosopher" studies Grammar of Assent and its central themes).
Through these many texts one constantly meets Newman's preoccupa·
tion with the distinction between real and unreal religion as well as
Newman's method of not wishing to dissolve conflicting forces, such as
the conflict between infallibility and private judgment. The sacrament·
alism of Newman's theological view, however, might have been :more
forcibly drawn out. As did Ker's biography, this book displays an ad·
mirable familiarity with the whole corpus of Newman's writings.
EDWARD JEREMY MILLER

College of New Rochelle
New Rochelle, New York