PROFESSING THE CREED AMONG
THE WORLD'S RELIGIONS
For Hans-Georg Gadamer
FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK,

8.J.

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

The Creed, the Created Order, and the Religions

T:

HE CHRISTIAN CREED is a particular profession of
aith, yet it is not Hie creed of a sect; it is essentially
niversalist. Both are dear not only from the Creed's
oontent but aJ,so fr.om. the act by which it is professed.
By means of the Creed, one particular, identifiable (" visible ") eommunity----the Christian Church-profosses, both to
its own membership and to eviery pa,rt1cu1ar person or community 1that wants to listen, its faith :in God in the name of
Jesus Christ. The part]cular profession is offered with a universa1ist intent, in the context of a communa:l missionary commitment to the whole world and, beyond that, in the perspectivie of the supernwbural, all- encompassing, escha:tologrcal
"life of the world to come." It is not surprising,
thait
even those primitive trinitarian creeds that lack every trace of
christoJogica.l narrative (and rthus also every ireferenoe rto
Christ's coming to do justice to the living and the dead) still
include a profession of at least a few eschatolog1erwl artides of
belief at the end. The most nota.b1e among these features are
il:he univiersaJ chm,ch (which represents and anticipates the
finaJ gathering of the saints), rthe (definitive) forgivieness of
sins, the resurrection of the flesh, ,and rbhe life that fasts forever.1
But the Creed harbors another universraJism as well. It is
1

1 Cf. DS 1-6.

539

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

natural, fuilldamentail, p:mtoilogiical. In !the text of the Creed,
this univiersalism surfaces in the professwn of God ,as Creato!l'
of aJil ,thait is, whether seen or unseen, and of Jesus Christ a:s
God's 1agent in creation. In .addressing itself to humanity at
the Creed relies on this. It 'appeals to humanity's native
eras-its native .attunement .to God am!d 1to the whole worLd, its
limitless caipacity for ;authentic understanding, and its unquenchable thirsit for ioommunion.
In the rhetoric of the Christian profiession of £aith, :the
fO!l'IDer univiersalism enjoys pride of plare. The Creed's primary
profession is positive: thematiicailly, the Creed is designed to
formuilate the Christian £aiith in its mnc11ete, historic partioofarity, :in :i:ts commitment to the Christian mission to the whole
worLd, and in its anticipation of :the eschaton. But if it is rtrue
that the Creed primariily ·addresses itself to :ail:l of humanity
with the es1chato1ogiterulmessage thrut is the horizon of the Christi,an faith, this positivie profoss,ion is undergirded by a commitment to humanity allld the wol'lld in their
integrity,
by means of ra "suhsidiairy universwlism." If, in the actualiity
the Coorch ·aiddresses itself to all of
of its hisrboric
humanity :and the wor1d with its partrowlar message of sru1vati.on, it is only by virtue of .a fundam.entail, natural universalism
thrut it can so aiddress them. And it is on the strength of this
1aitber univiersailism that the Christian community it·self, itoo,
acknowledges an whl-iillclusive natura.l order which it shares
with all. of humanity.
" All of humanity " is no:t an 1abs:tmntion; it comes in the
form of ithe greiat variety of "rull nations" (Mt
19), along
with their great religions. The theologircail.'bask of interpreting
the Creed in light of ilts .commitment to £UDJdamentail universalism, therefo11e, must .somehow raise the issue of Christianiity';s relationship with the world's great religions.
ln taking on this issrue, we must remind oursel v;es of an
important ooail:ity-one heavy with consequence, as will be1come ·dear in the oomse of this essay. This 11eality was not
unknown to the first Christian apologists: the Consrtantinian
1

541

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

and Theodosian settlements of the fourth century slowly but
surely, and ever more fo11cefolly, eased it
abeyance.
But it began to
with a vengeance in the early eighteenth century, when the Enlightenment, iinereasingJy fascinated by the variety of religions and cultures in the wor1d,
began to irrt1erpreit them all in a
perspective as shapes
and manifestations of one and the siame natural human l'eHgiosity. This amounted to a demand, issued to the Christian
West, to tafoe its place among the woiild !l)eligions as one of
them and to reshaJpe :iJts self-consciousness in light of that demand. Moiie than 1two oenturies bter, this rea:lity is 1stiil>l very
much wi:th us, only in much sharper relief. In the globa.l vilJ,age
of the twentieth century, it has not only become impossible to
over1ook lthe world's great religious traditions; they are also a
presence whose complexity is only just beginning to dawn
on us.
In view of :aM this, it is wise to r:emind ouuselves right a:t the
outset of a fundamenta1l fact about the wor1d religions and to
do :so, at 1least initiaHy, simply for the
of ,reaJlism and fairness, that is, without immediately entering into much busy
tiheoreitical argument or jumping to
of
historic importance. The £act is this: the great world religions do
not rcontent themselves with purely foca1l or :regional relevance;
they ofFer an encompassing interpretation of human me in the
world and of the wor1d
is, of course, what makes
them so transplantable 1to other areas in the wo11ld nowadays.
In other words, Christianity (along with Judaism, to wh:iich it
owes the faith in the One True God that remains ]ts root commitment) 2 is not alone in !'elating a particular profession of
2 Gerd Theissen has made a point of stressing the relevance of the spedfically Jewish tradition of monotheism to modern Christianity:
"It is to
Judaism that we owe the faith in the One and Only God. J< or a long time
this faith was self-evident. Today it is a minority opinion. Since it is, historically and objectively, the most important presupposition of Jesus' preaching, it must be made accessible anew today" (Der ffchatten des GaliUiers,
5th impr. [l\fiinchen: Chr. Kaiser, 1988], p. 55; English: The Shadow of the
Galilea1i: The Quest of the Historical Jesus in Narrative Form [Philadelphia:
0

542

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

faith to a nwbural wor1d-oroer universally accessible to humanity. Nor is Christianity alone in pro.fessing that ithere preViails,
by transcendent design, .a deep co-ordination between, on ;the
one hand, that aihl-inciLusive world order and, on the other
ha.I1Jd, the
pro£ession of rliaith shared among its members. Consequenltlly,rthe ·Christian mission to the 'WO['ld must
1acknowledgesome basic structural parallels between itself and
orther giieat religions. They .are the fol:lowing. The (Judaeo-)
Christian. tmdition i:s not ialone (I) in distinguishing between
the particular ortler created by the " revelation " (or :its functionrul equiv.alent) that is the oontent o:f its own 1specia1 profess.ion of f.aith and a universal o'l'<ler of "nature," 8 (2) in
having conceptions about the integrity of the natural o'l'<ler and
its relativity, (3) in recognizing, on the basis of :this order, a
natural comparability between itself and other great religions,
and hence, (4) in thinking that theve is a natural basis for encounter and debate among the great religions.
These ;an:alogies,but especiall.y the last two, may be disronoerting, but at least they ·serve to emphasize the Christian
conviction that the Greed is not :the creed of ·a ·sect. They also
suggest a ba;sic eonolrusion: the Creed itself implicitly invites
and mandates a Christian dialogue with humanity's great religions. Why?

Fundamental Christok>gical Warrants for Encounter

If an acknowiledgment of the uniV1e['sal order of nature undergivds the Christian pmfession of the order of grace, then
Fortress Press, 1987], p. 36). While commending the encounter with all of
the world's great religions, Vatican II's Declaration on the Relationship
of the Church to Non-Christian Religions Nostra LEtate (n. 4) gives Judaism
pride of place. In the present context, however, it must suffice to note the
theological primacy of the Jewish-Christian dialogue. The Jewish theologian
David Novak has also affirmed this important issue, in his Jewish-Ohristian
Dialogue: A Jewish Justification (New York and Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1989), esp. pp. 26-41.
s Cf. Ninian Smart, The Philosophy of Religion, new ed. (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1979), pp. 99-137.

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

543

this acknowledgment must naturally emend to the ways in
which thait nruturail order has been 1acknowledged and interpreted, nortably in the grieat ,religions. Consequently, attentive
encounter with world religions, precisely inasmuch as they
make their particular claims in a universalist perspective, must
undergird the Christian mission. Since it is important rto understand this ,thesis wetoul'lrutely,let us clarify it in :some detail.
What has heen asiserbedis that it is the Creed that mandates
an attentive e11J00unter. Our thesis, in other words, is presented
as .a theological proposition predicated on positively Christian
warrants. It is not pmposed in deference to- any 'al:leged1y
superior general principle to which all the world's religious
traditions would supposedly owe obedience on grounds rthat
naturaJJly command universal ooceprtance. In acco1.1d with this,
the Catholic Chu:reh at Vatican II :aclrn.owledged positively
Christian grounds for professing itself as respectfully and even
vitaJly l'lelated rto the great l'leligions.4
The background of rthls profession :Us the whole complex of
christological doctrines, no matter how often they have been
misinteT'preteld. The two interrelated christologicail affirmations that ,anchor our rthesis are: £rst, that God is not seit
ag,ainst C11eaJtion, and :secondJy, that, in being united with the
divine Logos, human nature (1and the whole natural order
along with it) is not climinished but enhanced iand dignified.5
In other wol'lds, Jesus Christ is professed as ,the Son of God
and ,ag the Savior of .all. of humanity iand of the whole world
because he embodies and incrudes and welcomes all ways and
aM !Souls, ,aJSsays and chastens them, and perfects rthem by putting them in :an ultimate perspective. 6 He is not so professed
because he (or faith in mm) displaces other ways to God,
1

1

II, Nostra llJJtate, n. 3; cf. Gaudium et Spes, n. 92.
Constantinople III (681 A.D.): Christ's human will is not taken
away, but rather enhanced by being deified: DS 556.
6 On this " rhetoric " of "inclusion,"
"obedience," and "hope," cf. F. J.
van Beeck, Ohrist Proclaimed. (New York, Ramsey, NJ, and Toronto: Paulist
Press, 1979), esp. pp. 145-262. Cf. also "Ten Questions on Soteriology and
Christology," Ohicago Studies 25 ( 1986) : 269-278, esp. pp. 277-78.
4 Vatican

5 Cf.

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

a1long with the great souls that have found, liv;ed, and taught
them. Very importantly, Christ incorporates the natuml oroer
by virtue of sov-ereignty, not by dint of supenority.7 It is mistherefore, to cha.r:ructe:cizethe classical Christian profes·sion of Christ's sole Saviiorship as "exclusivist."
Consequently, I am convinced that Paul F. Knitter's proposal 8 to mak!e some kind of distinction in the Chrisrtian faith
between a universalist theological focu:s and a particularist
chmtological profession of faith is premature; it creates more
than it solves. From the point of view of the Creed,
it .oomes close to compromising :the inextricaMe and mutual
·bond between Jesus Christ and the Hving God, both in the
oroer of grace and in the created order. If that bond is loosened,
Jesus Christ ends up being entirely defined by the particularity
of his humanity, 1and .any claims made on his behalf involving
a speciM universalism booome :an offensive e:xiercisein Western
superiority 1and prejudioe. In Knitter's proposal, therefore,
both Ohrist's uniqueness and his inclusiv;eness are jeopardized.
However, if tthe present treatment makes no OOillCeSsionsin
the area of Christ's uniqueness in regard iboth ro God and to
humanity and the world, it does wish to .state that, to the extent rthat Chrisibianity has presented itself .a;s e:xclusivist, it has
miSU11Jderstoodiboth Jesus Christ and its own normative profession of faiith and, heme, rbhe significance of the great religions
as welt Now as a matter of historicaJ. fact, the proposition that
the Creed mandates an aitbentive encounter with woirild religions has been heeded at least •as much in the breach as in ,the
mmphlance, and affhming it ras integtt"alto Chnistianity calls for
a firm mea culpa, on the part of both the Christian Church and
the Chrisitian thooloigiain. But :the problem has roots in a misvictory over sin
guided christoilogy. In interpreting
rand .death in !triumphalist rterms, and in uncriticall.y aligning itthe Uniqueness of Christ," Ohicago
1 Cf. F. J. van Beeck, "Professing
Studies 24(1985): 17-35.
s No Other Na,me? A Oritica,l Survey of Christian Attitudes Towa,rd the
World Religions (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1985).

545

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

s e1f with poEtieail pnwer, the Church has often professed the
C11eed: (and, hence, Chrises universrul Lordship) in exclusivist,
intolerant rterms, totaHy unw:armnted by either the example of
the histor:]cal Jesus or the rt.rue sense of the conciliar definitions. This error came to he compounded by dubious developments in the 1cruJrtural shape of Western Christianity .. Undue
deferenoe on the part of the simple faithfol to eeolesiast:Ucalpolitiowl esta;blishments became the norm; an increasing preoocuprution with salvation from sin 1as the cenhal theme of the
Christian faith contributed to the dev:elopment of an ever more
starkly adversary relationship between Chris:tendom and nonChristian eultiures. 9 In time, these developments provided
spurious theofogical warrant1s for the" conversion" of the nonChristian wodd; missionary campaigns cou1d be 1as intolerant
and aggressiv<e as the inquisitorial 'and aidrninistr:a:tiv<e"de£ense " of rthe Christian faith at home.
One very serious blot on the his:tory of the CathoJic Church
in rthe Western hemispheve deserves specific mention, if only
bemuse it shaped the
Chmch in Latin Ameriea to
such :a 1arge extent.
the s1lave traders, who made only
the feeblest of attempts a:t offering a 11eligious justification for
their crimes against humaniity, the 1eadership of the Spanish
Conquista explicitly interpreted Christ's victory ov:er the
demons ars a rationale for brutal treatment of the native
Americans 1ai1J1d the desh1uction of rtheir cultu11e; the protests of
aiuthentic Christian pr:opherts Iikie Bartofome de },as Casa;s
(1474-1566) 10 were disrega;rded. The pl'oh1em 1coulrd come to
the forie so vil'ui1ently because it was really as widespcread as
Chris:tendom itself. The ecclesiastica1l triumpha1l:ism estab1

1

1

1

the Torah More than God? Towards a
9 Cf. F. J. van Beeck, Loving
Catholic Appreaiation of Judaism (Chicago: Loyola University Press, 1989),
pp. 69-77.
io See especially his A Brief Account of the Destruction of the Indies.
Breuissima relaoion de la, destruycion de las Indias, in Coleccion de documentos ineditos para la historia de Espana, 71 (Madrid: Imprenta de Miguel
Ginesta, 1879), pp. 1-199. English: Tears of the Indians and The Life of
Las Casas, by Sir Arthur Helps (Williamstown, Mass.: .J. Lilburne, [1970]).

546

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

lished in Emope
rthe rise of Christian and postChristian Deism. Arnd while it is unfair rbo e:mggerate the links
between co:lonialist imperialism and :the Christian missionary
and twentieth centuries, it is unwise to
endeavor in
deny them ,a;ltogether. The efforts of contemporary 1S1chofars
like Wil£red Cantwell Smith, John lliok, ,and even Paul
Knitter :to reinterpvet the Christian faith a.nd its 11e1ationship
to other J'leligions in " inc1usivist " or " plumlist ,, terms may
welil. have to, be j1udged thoologicaJily unsrutisfactocy in the end;
what cannot be denied is that the scandals of the Christian
past ccy out for the kind of remedial theologicail reflection ithey
offer. With this cautiona;cy :bale in mind, then, let us reburn to
the main theme.
1

Interreligious Dialogue and the Positive Elements
It must be carefuUy noted that the affirmation that the
Creed mandates a respootfutl dialogue has a limited t3Jl'get area.
The thesis states that rthe wcknowledgment o[ the natural
order-an ;rucknowiledgmel1itthat Christianity sha:res with the
great religions-furnishes the i;nrterreligious:diafogue with its
foundation; it does not state that it furnishes it with its all of
its content. In fam, when it comes to rbhe content of the inter.religious 'dialogue, rthis essay is oommitted to a much
hoo8ider (thait is, much more caitholic) proposition, namely,
that the religions' particular, potntive elements shouwd be the
principail.ool1itent of :the interreligious «li:alogue. This must be
furrther
First of ail[, positive elements, as (of ,a;Jl people) Schleierm31cher reminds us, are integral ito iaCtu81l reiligions.12 That
11 For much of the remainder of this essay I am deeply indebted to conversation with and suggestions from Charles Hallisey and Francis X. Clooney,
S.J., capable scholars in this history of religions, loyal friends, and reliable
and constructive critics.
·12 Ober die Religion: Reden an die GebUdeten unter ihren Veroohturn, 6th
ed., ed. by Rudolph Otto (Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1967), pp.
186-187. English: On Religion: Speeches ta its Oultured Despisers, trans. by
John Oman (New York, Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 234-235.

THE! CREED AND 'l'H:ffi RELIGIONS

547

means, any 1.1eal dialogue between or among actual religions
must take into aocount their positivie elements. It is a rationalis:t mistake to think tha;t religiosity can exist in its " natural "
form, separately; in fact, only an
understanding
and interpretation of a l1eligion's positiv;e elements: is capable
of laying hal1'e, in an indi11ect fashion, its true nature as a religion.13 Secondly, it is good Christian theology to in:terp1'et the
positi¥e eJements in Christianity (and, arguably, in other religions as we11) 14 as the concrete shape of the human l'esponse
to God's self-revealing graciousness, that is, as the concrete
shape of gr:we and, consequently, as superior to natural religion.15 lit would, therefol'!e, be a theoiogica.l mistafoe of the first
magnitude to exdude the great l"eligions' positive e1ements
from the agenda of the dialogue, no matter how intractah1e
they may seem. For, thirdly, e¥en from a humanistic, purely
anthropoJogicail. point of v,i<ew, it is a mistake to want to subdue the concrete particulars of a different religion by fitting
them into some large, ovem1,ching framework thait claims to
explain everything. A far mol"e 11di:ah1e test of the sieriousness
of any encounter is a genuine, unprejudiced interest in the conc11ete particulars of other people's convictions and practices, no
matter how particular and paritiail they may be. For it is a
sign not of respect but of prejudice and ,a false sense of superiority to belittle and disregard the specific meanings, pract:i!oes,
and intentionalities of others and, hence, of any positive religion not one's own. This warning applies no 1ess whenever it
is proposed, however polit,ely, that we oan a;ocount for these
specifics by .regaJ.'dingthem as conventional difFerentiations of
one aHegedly univ:ersal (i.e., natural) religion.
1

1s Cf. F. J. van Beeck, God Encountered:
A
Systematia
Theology, vol. I, Understanding the Christian Faith (San Francisco: Harper
& Row, 1989), §26, 3; §25, 3; cf. §24, 2, a.
14 Cf., Heinz Robert Schlette,
Die Religionen als 'Phema der Theologie:
Uberlegungen zu einer «Theologie der Religionen>» Quaestiones Disputatae,
22 ( Freiburg, Basel, and 'Wien: Herder, 1963), pp. 43-65. English: Towards
a Theology of Religions, Quaestiones Disputatae, 14 (Freiburg: Herder;
London: Burns & Oates, 1966), pp. 41-6L
15 Cf. God Encountered, §26, 2; §31.

548

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK,. S.J.

Let us sum up. Our thesis affirms ;that the great religions
have an awa11eness of :a universail order of nature in common
1and that this awareness p:rovides the inber11eligiousd.:iaJogiue
with a common pofot of depa11tul'e. Our thesis disputes the
pl'opositi:on that the diaiLogue requires that each religion he
exhauSitiviely interp11eted within the f:mmewo11k of one, aHeged1ly aJl-inc1usiV'e,naturaily acoesrsiMe order. This l'equwes1 some
oar1eful undergirding, by means of a reflection of a rather more
phi1osophicail nrutwe amounting to 1a full-B1oale excursus. Cumbersome though this p11ocedure may he, it will at the very
least 1serv:e to bring home the delicrucy of the task in hand.
1

1

1

1

Participative Knowledge
Let us begin by going back to the basic quesrtion. The
Christian arcknowledgment ·Of rthe all-encompassing order of
nature, it wias 1sltated, must extend .to the ways in which other
religions have acknowledged that universal naturaJ ol'lder. Why
exarotly is this so?
The answer to rthis question is as pl'ofound as :i:t is obvious.
No human group or individual can daim to have 1an objective,
comprehensive gmsp of the aill-encompassing ol'dier of natul'e,
for the ;simple il."earson that they al'e all pa:rit of it. Human persons can no more gmsp or comprehend or he objective about
humanity and the wor1d in their totrulity than fish can 1about
the wa:ter that sustains rthem or, for that maU1er, individual
persons can 1about the V'ery persons they al'e. Just 1as we are
unable :to rudopt a point of view outside ourseilves in order rto
grasp ourselves in our totrulity as whole persons (which is why
a:ll self-knowledge remains ever so precarious and provisiona1l),
so we •are unah1e fo aidopt a point of view outside our personail
reh:utionships w:ith others and, even move, outside humanity and
the world in such a way .a,s to get them in e1ear focus in their
totality.
To reailize this may he at
disconcerting. The idea of
the woir1d and humanity :as cons1t:iibutinga giVien, 1aH-indusive
order of reality "out 1therie" comes so naturrully rto the think1

1

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THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

ing mind, and it is such an indispenrsa.ble ingmdient in all the
great cultural and religious t:mditions in the world as we know
it, that we natJuraHy assume that " we know what we are talking about" when we say "humanity and the wodd" or, for
that matter, when we say " I " or " me " or " you " or evien
"us." ¥et critical re:flreotion, as Immanuel Kant has so conclusively shown in his Critique of Pure Reason, ioompels us to
aocept the fact that our cognitivie grasp of eertain realities is
subject to serious limits. These l'ea.lities include our own selves
and other persons, humanity and the world in their totality
(and then the11e is the transcendent rerulity of God). Whatever it may he that oorresponds "out there in the real wodd"
to the ideas we have of ourselves and of other persons, of
humanity ,and the wo111d, we sm1ely do no:t know them as
(judging from the definite way we talk about them) we appear .to know them, that is, we do not know them simply as
objects of knowledge. 16
Does this mean that our knowledge of oursdves, other persons, ailJid humanity and the wodd is a complete illusion? That
it amounts to nothing? Of course not.
First of aH, it makes littile sense to say that we hav;e an iidea
but no 11eal knowledge of reaJities about vvhich we can, in fact,
know so much objectively. After aH, in our quest for understanding, we approach humanity an:d the world in a great
variety of distinctive (if partia,l) ways, altl of which are in some
way mtionaJ. By means of these approa:ches, we do suoeeed
in grasping a thousand pa;rticular, ohjectiv;e things, about ours:elvies, about others, about humanity and the world. All the
while, of course, we 11eaiizethat not even the Ja1rgest accumulation of such pa11tioular items of knowJedge about ourseJ,ves,
others, and humanity and the world wiM ev;er add up to ex1

16 Kritik der reinen Vernunft,
in Werlce
seehs Banden, Ed. by Wilhelm
Weischedel, ([Wiesbaden]: Insel-Verlag, 1956-64), vol. 2, pp. 327-39. English: Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, trans. by Norman Kemp
Smith (London, Melbourne, and Toronto: St. Martin's Press, 1968), pp. 31526.

550

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK,. S.J.

haustive comprehension. Yet we will insist, diespit:e this essentiail pl'ovisionality and incompJeteness of our knowledge about
ourselves, others, and humanity and the world, that we somehow realily know them. Is this insistence me11ely naive, or does
it stand up fo critfoal examinwtion? This questfon lea.ids to a
second, more important point.
In understanding ourselvces, others, and humanity and the
world, we reJy not only on detailed, objective, rationrul (!and
sometimes even purely mtional) knowledge hut also on knowledge a diffei'ent sort. A l'lealist lik:e Thomas Aquinas, for all
his es1teem of knowledge of the precise and mtional kind, is
futl1ly awa11e of this second type of knowledge. The most sruccinct fornmlaition of his understa,nding of this issue occurs in
the context of an
·disoussion .in the Summa theologica;
but the concept itself occurs throughout his matme work,
whel.'1e it has a va:dety of applications. He explains:
Right judgment can come about in two ways. The first way follows the path of the accomplished use of :reason [perfectum usum
rationis]. The second way is based on a certain natural affinity
[connaturalitatem] with the things about which, as it happens, we
have to form judgments. 17

In other words, knowfodge-especiaHy .the knowledge rthat
is a reliable guide ito the liV'ed life and in that sense "practiCiwl "-is not limited to the rationail kind. When rthe occasion
arises, knowJeidge is also available on the basis of familiarity
or participation. Saints know about God. from :their experience
of lov:e (caritas) in pmyer and pmctice; people
to
·their ma.rciage vcows know about chastity f11om the experience
of :the pains: and joys of loya1ty; and 1cobbler1s1 know about
leather from the experience of working with it every day. AU
of this is so tme that saying that they are the ones: that really
know is not jus:t 1an unp1eas:ant att,ernpt wt edilioation or morwlizing or an instanoe of the mmantic idealization of oM-f.ash17 S. Th. II-II, q. 45, a. 2, in c.: "Rectitudo autem iudicii potest contingere
dupliciter, uno modo, secundum perfectum usum rationis; alio modo, propter
connaturalitatem quandam ad ea de quibus iam est iudicandum."

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

551

ioned CI'laftsmanship. They obviously know. Only prigs and
rationrulists wihl maintain that saint'S: and chaste folks and
cobblers "don't really know" just bemuse they have not
studied either faith or eithlcs, or the physiology of the animal
skin and the chemistry of the tanning process, or just because
they do not sucooed in explaining in articulate, objective terms
what they do know.
It is true, of course, that many people who know by familiarity are conserv;ative; they often resist the findings of rational
investigaition. But on the other hand, even without being prigs
or rationalists, intellectuals (and other smart people out to
win an ·airgument) rtend to be so impressed by dertai1ed, objectivie knowledge ("the facts" or "the state of :the art") that
they end up, in pmctice, <eonsideringit the only " real " knowledge. Even more importantly, they tend to be unaware of the
extent to which detailed, objective, airtioulate, rationrul ("objectifying ") knowledge of every kind is and remains dependent on participative knowledge, the sound understanding implicit in the relationship of familiarity with the (for lack of a
better word) " object " of knowledge.
This last proposition, which will. ,be crucial to our argument,
can be further •explored and clarified.

Perspective, C onvergen()e, Interpretation
The pu.rsuirt of panticufar pieces of detailed, objective, rational knowledge is never entirely self-justifying, not evien in
stricibly academic endeavors. Establishing, say, whether there
is ammonia on the planet Jupiter assumes:, ,at the very lea:st,
that rthe researcher cares. Theroe is no pursuit of academic
knowledge without some type of interest. That interest and
the grounds [orr it may very well not be entireily amenable to
articulation, yet they iare not, for that reason ,alone, altogether
irrational. Educated interest of some sort motivates eviery
particul1ar ,scholiarlyinqruiry ,and givies it a provisional sense of
direction; if evrerything goes welJ, that sense of direction improves ais ithe :inquiry moves ailOilg and ·a:s the druta confirm or

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

modify it. Thrus there results 1a dynamic process. On the one
hand, ,as rthe detailed data aJecumulate, they contribute to the
researehers' bro,rud, participative familiarity with the problem
and make it more assured; on the other hand, the pursuit of
dettail1ed, objectifying knowledge is guided more and more by
the perspective furnished by this brorud, initially unthematic,
bwt in'Ol'leasinglyinformed, participative knowiedge. Only to
the e:xitentthat researehers devielop sounder participative judgment will their particular theoretical pursuits make more
sense; without such judgment, rthe objectifying l'esearch will
"frall 'apart" .and disinitegrate, or simpJy become insignificant.
We conclude that objectifying knowledge needs the perspective
offered by participative knowledge if it is to makle ·sense, and
that participa.tiv 1e know.ledge gains in assurance as it is informed and artieufated by objectifying knowledge.
Participa;tive knowledge ,also ·oocounts for something else;
the sense that what I know is (lohel'ent. Researeh will reward
and confirm the researcher's initiail interest oooording as the
particular dafa begin to arrange ithemselves into patterns; here
if ·anywhere the whofo ,again and again pmV1es to be mo11e than
the SIUIIl of its parts. A good analogue of this is found in the
everyday experience of conversation. In ordinary, everyday
oommunication situations, the experienre of the dynamics of
live speech (the" rhetoric") makes intelUgent listeners of us.
We understand the dri:fit of the ronversation better as we be(lOme better partUdpants in it, and we are better participants if
we do not bore each other ,to tears by insisting on complete
explicitness 1ab01Ut every last detail. Understailiding a oonversrution is indeed dependent on knowiledge of rthe objective
meaning of words and the precise subject-matter of the conversation, but our ability :bo "rerud" whrut peopiLe ,are saying
to each other in the situation is far more important. Fo'l" the
understanding ,aclrieved in live speech is not dependent on the
pamcipants' aWial'eness of each and every one of the discrete
linguistic elements that make up the sipeeich-situ;a;tion,even
though the precise meaning of all those (phonetioa.J, gram-

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

553

matical, syntarctic, 1erica.l, idiomatic, etc.) elements can be
analytically esibablishecL UndeTstanding depends on the lived
experience of relevance. Relevance is dependent, among other
things, on the experience of convergenoe of aH (or rut last most)
of the elements in a speech-siturution; ,and that experience is
primarily ·a matter not of attention to details but of participation in the process as a who1e. If the speech-situation comes
off, all (or ·at least most) of rthe objectifiab1e e1ements of speech
1conspil'e to function as " pointers," and from the way they
point we wilJ sipontaneousily infer what the story is. The opposite happens when the speech-situation fails to come off. To
the eXJtent that we don't get the story, discrete e11ements in the
conversation wi11l become prominent in a haphazarid way, only
to distract and confuse and
us, and further explanation or accumulation of detail (especially of the "helpful"
kind) may only serve to make matters worse. Not until " :the
penny ·d'I'ops " (ofiten at the drop of the " right word ") 18 will
we get reconnected and catch up and thus begin to understand again, understand both the broad meaning (i.e., :the
"point") of the conversation in the first place and, in that
context, most of the details, itoo.
constitutes interpretation. The two
All of this,
kinds of know1edge mentioned by Aquinas a:re indeed distinguishable hut are not doomed to l'emain forever sepamte;
normaHy, they function in interplay. Let us takJe a literacy example. "Genuine poetry," T. S. Elfot wrote in his great essay
on Dante, "can communioa:te before it is understood." 19 The
broad, intuithlie, participative understanding which the first encounte!r with a poem awakJens in me remains inarticulate at
first, hut that understanding, no matter how unthematic, does
furnish me with a :first perspeotive by which to guide my critidetailed knowledge
cal investigartion. Then as the
1s Cf. Ian Ramsey, Religious
1967), esp. pp. 11-48.

Language,

2nd ed. (London:

19 Selected Essays 1917-1932 (New York: Harcourt,
1932)' p. 200.

SCM Press,

Brace and Company,

554

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

thrut I 'Wcqufoe about the poem £a1Js into a convergent pattern,
I wi11 proceed, thanks to my " illative Siert]'se,'' inm1easingly to
interpret the poem as a whole in the light of its details and the
details in the light of the poem as a whole. Thus in the process
of interpretation the poem (and my own spiritual world aiong
with it) get both mor:e complex and more unified. DelightfuJly, my inner wmilid gets both furnished and organized; it develops in:to a hroader, more coherent ,1ands1oape,with more patterned, cherished detail. In the process, my horizon is expanded and my peirspeotive is enlarged to make room for even
mo,re 1reality. Thus I grow and find both enrichment and en:lightenment, in virtue both of what I come to know in rthe way
of obj,ectivity ,and of what I come to undersfand ,by participation.
Let us sum up this analysis :and come to a
siert of conclusions. The fact that things and persons resist
comprehension by means of objectifying knowledge does not
previent us from truJy knowing ;them, for we ean also understand them in a more integral (if iless m1ticrulai1Je) way, by parHcipativ;e knowledge. Far from being irmtional, such participative knowiledgieservies to inspire and guide and lend perspective to ohj1ectifying knowledge, while obje1ctifying knowledge in
its turn serves :to istmcture 1and artioularte participative knowledge.
In being known in this twofo1d way, alil reality reveals its
structure. There is ihoth unity and multipJ.:iicityrto every thing,
to persons, ,and ito humanity and the world in their totality.
The multiplicity in them ailJows us to approach aud appreciate
them hy means of detailed, objectifying
yiert we
realize that they are morie than a conglomerate of objecrti:fiable
elements; for a filller undeirs:ta,nding of their integrity (ithat is,
their unity) we iremain dependent on participative knowledge.
The pmsuit of knowledge of every kind thus invariably
1turns out ito he :an exiercise in interpretation; put dillerently,
it is mterp11eta:tion that media1tes between reality and ourselvies. On the one hand, things and our own selves and other
1

1

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

555

persons and humanity and the wor!1d can indeed he known in
their integrity but only interpretatively, that is, acco11ding as
our participative unders:tanding of them increasingly makes
sense of, accommodates, and integrates objectifiable elements
arranged in significant structures. And on the other hand, aU
the details we objective1ly kn:ow about thlngs and ourselves
and other persons and humanity and the world are indeed a
matter of time knowledge, but they acquire meaning only to
the extent that they, .too, are known interpretatively, that is,
in their re1evance :to the whoJe.
Our anailysis has shown that
totally objective, definitive knowledge of humanity and the wodd as such
is and remains inaccessible to us. We know the order of nature in its all-encompassing integri:ty only by way of familiar-·
ity and pa:rticipation. That is, we kno·w it interpretatively, a:s
we let ourselves be guided hy the patterns of convergence that
strike us and the perspeotiv1e we construe.
This ha:s consequences. The task of interpretation faces
human understm1:ding with redoubtable standar:ds of
ence. Indeed the standards wiH recede forever; .interpretation,
like tmdition, is never done. If no individual person and no
human community oan know humanity and the world con·olusively iand definitivdy, then no individual, no group can
ever claim exemption from interpretation; none can claim
knowledge that is neither perspectival nor ba,sed on convergence.
1

Interpretation 'in an Eschatological Perspective
This is the moment to return to our principal thesis: the
Christian respect for the universal order of nature must
nruturalJ,y extend to the ways in which other reHgions have
rucknowledged and interpreted that naturail order. The lengthy
analysis just conduoted leads to a conclusion: in today's world
community no individuail, no community, a.nd not ev;en the
Christian Chmch (with its divinely aiuthorized, univers:alist
missionary commitment) can propose one understanding of

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

the natul'laJ.order of humanity and the wor1d as definitive and,
in thait 'Sense, exdusivre; none can affol'ld rto dismiss alternative
interprretation:s of the world ·and humanity as definitively ir;vei1evant,dated, or unworthy of oonsiderrution.20
This can he put differently. We, non-Christians and
Christians
profess positive faiths that aJ.so imply a fundiamentrul understanding of the natural order of the world and
humanity. Not surprisingly, our positiV1e statements of faith
differ a gireat deal, hut then, it is in the nature of positive J:1eligious tmditions to be very different. Our understandings of
the world and humanity are different, too, but it is clearly the
same worM and the same humanity we iare referring to, even
though we do nort comprehend just how they are rthe s1ame,
thrut is, we agree they a.re the same even rthough we interpret
them differently.
Where do we get the idea that it is the :same world and the
same hrumanity we are •referring to? What makes us rthink we
can get pa:st our inte11pretations of them? The answer must be:
the implications of the act of interpretation itself.
Lert us start with a parallel. We know from experiell!Cethat
hearing someone speak a different language conveys, in
and of itself, the present situation's potential, both for
tinued :incomprehension (with the 1likelihood of hostility) and
for mutual understanding (with the possibility of peace). This
is so becaiuse it is obvious to us that we both speak languages,
and we know that languages, no matter how foreign-soU]]lding
they may 1be, .a.ire (must he) interpretable, at Jeast to an aippreciab1e extenrt. Thrus the speech-situation in and of itself
lays bare the faot that we cannot not communicate: we are
meant to communicate even if we do not understand each
other's language. But this
of 1oommunioation below the 1eveil of langiuage faces us with a choice: we can either
decide not to pm1srue the process, or we can decide to learn
how to cross the Jingui:stie boundary and to communicate with
1

20 For the way in which this applies to Judaism, cf. Loving the Torah More
than God?, pp. 3-4, 66-82.

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

557

eruch other by particular linguistic means, thrut is, by linguistic
interpretrution. Thel'e is 1something else that speech-situation
conveys as well.,
lea:st unthematicruUy: neither commumcation nor interpretation has anything to gain from the assertion, on the pa.rt of either party, rthat its particular language is
superior :to the other's.
Positive faith-professions, ,a,,g George Lindbeck has rightily
iargued, have basic chamcteristics in common with languages;
chief ·among these is that languages are ·cultur:al in nature;
rthey must and can be learned.21 Just as we must both resolve
to communicaite ac:mss linguistic divides 1and develop ,the interpretative skills to do it, so it takes willingness rrus well as interpretativ;e sikiJJ to communicate aicross the divides mrude visible by the encounter between the great reJigions. Both the will.ingness .and rthe :skills ,to deail with the pa1ticulars are a matter
of foaming. To those open to learning, the simple encounter
with a different world-view, like the simple encounter with a
speaker of a foreign language, invohnes the reaJiz.aition th•at the
stated convictions we ho.th live by are interpretations, our particular interpretations of humanity and the wol'lld. It also
makes us realize that these interpl"etations harbor, in and of
themselves, the potetntial for muturul understanding and enrichment, simply because they are interpretable to others, at
least to a large eXitent (that is, others can foam about them).
This :recognition hrus implications. Most of rull, in our very
attempts :ait interpreting our va:riorus interpretations of the
naitm:al order to eruch other, there is implicit .a twofo1d fundamental .affirmation on which we find oursel¥es in pmotioal
agreement: the wor1d and humanity are basiicailly intelligibfo,
iand we humans .are one at least in ·the sense that we recognize
eruch other as essenitia1ly equipped for 1the kind of iu-belligent, interpretative communication rthat can foad w growth in shared,
participaitive understanding of truth.
This final affirmation, which is 'implicit in the persistent
1

21 Cf. The Nature of Doctrine: Reli,qion and Theology in a Postliberal
(Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984), esp. pp. 32-41, 73-84.

Age

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

practice of interpretative communication, must guide the
diialogue among the gl'eat l'eligions, rather than any explicit
profossfon of a single, common, overa,l'lching, systematic philosophical or religious faith. It is only by pal'lticipation, that is,
by ,interpretation,
1aU of us know humanity and the world
in their natural integrity. Does it not .stand to :reason, then,
tha1t it is by the patient <.sharing of our several persperetival
understandings of humanity and the world
we are likely
to come to a better (if never definitive) understanding of the
wor1d and the humanity we shaTe? Such a persistent practice
of hermeneutics wilil also help reveal two fundamental implicit
truths about the natural order we appear to have in common: the essentfal inteJ!igibility of humanity and the world,
and the fiundamenta,l unity of humanity in virtue of its capacity to find and app11eciate truth, that is, our native resemblance
to the transoendent One. We will also convey that as believers
we profess faith-commitments that we find
enlightening allld which we expect wiH guide us to the end. As believers
we arie not living by the affirmation and imposition of totalitarian ideologies that brook no questioning. And thus the interp11etative dialogue could :reveaJ, by implication, that our
faith-commitments do indeed aspire beyond the fur:thest imaginable horizon to the One that many of us-Jews, Christians,
and Mus1ims--<worshipfully oaU God.
Despite some appearances to the contrary, the proposal just
advanced is not an attempt to 1trade in the mistafoen Christian
triumphaJism of the past for •an equally mistaken relativist
pluralism. There a11e several reasons why this is not so.
Eirst of all, the proposal, which is fundamentally indebted
to Hans-Georg Gadamer's work, understands traidition as a
process of ongoing interpretation, which keeps alive a continuous ,adjustment of perspectiv;es (in Gadamer's term, a " fusion of horizons") across times and places. 22 In interpreting
22 CL Wahrheit
und Method.e, 2nd ed. (TU.bingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul
Siebeck], 1965), pp. 289-90, 356-57, 375; English: Truth and Method,
(London: Sheed & Ward, 1975), pp. 273-74, 337-38, 358).

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

559

the judgments of ,the past, we try to recollSltrnct the historic
oonoerns that prompted, inspired, and thus prejudiced rthe
judgments :in srucli a way that they were appropriate (or rut
least runderslbandable)
to those concerns. But what
happens Lin rthis prooess of interpretation is that the past puts
us on the line. Under :the impacl of our own questioning,
judgments made in ;the past turn oUJt to be able to challenge
us; the judgments of the pa;st fay bare the conoerns that
prompt, inspire, and thus prejudice the judgments we live by.
Thus the ex.amined rand interpreted past reveals us to ourselves.
Implicit in Gadamer's hermeneutioal theoil'y is the affinnation of 1rubso!liute:truth :as a living reality, ultimately itr:anscendent, yet endilessly :fruscinatingin the present. Those truly dev:oted to tihe process of inb&pretrution will. find themselves continuaHy chastened as: well ·as delighted by the discovery :that
knowledge of this uLtimate reaility is av:ailiable only by participation, in. perspectivail fashion, even asymptotically, and
not in a form that ·will. ever be exhaustive or definitive.
SoooncNy, it is true that rthe Christian Church professes its
faith in an overaiiching divine design, namely, that it is in
Jesus Chrisit risen that God has definitiviely welcomed humanity and the worM into the <la.vine life. Still, the fuil:fihlment of
:this divine .oommitment remains a matter of hope, that is, of
a profession of faith that remains true only to the extent that
it is interpreted perspectiV'ally.28 Presioot faith does not give the
Christian Churich any present grasp of the shape of the esohatofogical £uHilllmentof humanity :and the world. The Church
makes eschatological :afiirmations, which shows ,that it claims
some iaccess to the fulfillment; but ·this access rests entirely on
discernment, that is, it opemtes on interpretation.
To maintain rthis mnsistently eschatologicaJ perspective, it
would seem to he of the utmost importaJ11Ceto recall. thirut the
1

1

:23 Cf. Christ Proalwimed, pp. 308-09, 331-42. Cf. also God lihwountered, §40,
1; §42, 1.

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

central theme of the Christian faiith is the glory of God and
God's commitment to shaire the divine natlll:re with humanity
and the world;
not the question" Who is saved?" (cf. Lk
24
13: 23-24) . Thus I cannot .agree with Paul F. Knitter's decision to seek .for a firmer f oothoM .for pluralism in " sorteriocentrism." 25 If the s:aJ.v,ationissue is allowed to become if:heir
dominant p11eoooupation (as it has in many ways 1Since
the sixteenth century), Christiams are likely, by an exercise
known to psyichologists as projrection, to interpret other religions as narrowly as Christianity itself. This undiscerning
approach iturns other 11eligions into competing systems of salvatwn (and eventuaUy, under the influence of rationalist toJ.emnre, into .alternative ones,.--even though a liberalized version of Christianity usually oontill!Ues to be presented as a
superior salvation system) . In the long mn,
gveat, original figiu:ves like Gaiutama Buddha .then get ignorantly 1umped together under the rubric "Savior figures" or even
"Christ figures"; whether this .alien charnctecization is imposed on them in 1adtrniirationor in disquiaJification is irrelevant.
The great Tmdition of the undivided Chmch has been less
deeper discernment, the
prejudiood. It hais viewed, with
gverut souls in ,the histo1-y of 11efilgions as revelations of the
eternal Logos in creation and the religions themselves as exp11essions of humanity's natural desire foir God and thus as
worthy of ca;refrwl, :appreciative (if critirntl) undm"standing.26
It has also been prepa11ed to distrust parts of them as potentially misleruding manifositations of human depravity, which
makes them worthy of careful, criticaJ. (if compassionate)
derstanding. And when it comes to the question who is saved,
1smely a pilgrim Church that can commit some of its own sinful members to God's judgment by excommunicating them
with a view to their saJv:atiion (1 Cor 5: 4-5) can entrust to
essential theme, cf. God Encountered, §20, 2.
of Ohristian Uniqueness, p. 187.
26 Cf. Nostro, 2FJtate, nn. 2-3.
·24 On this

25 The Myth

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561

God's merciful judgment those who, a's a matter of simpJe
fact, seek God with an upright heart along other pilgrim paths?
There is ,a further point. The catholic trwdition holds that
the nrutuml order is £uHy revcealed on[y in the act of being divinely e:xcoeeded. This has a c:onsequence for our present argument: in not claiming to grasp the ;shape of the fulfillment of
humanity and the world to come, the Christian faith impHes
that it has no definitiv;e understanding of !them in their natural,
integrity either. For aLl the es:chatologicial assurance inherent
in 1the Christian profession of faith, it is in the nature of Christianity (.and heme of ]ts universalism) to be transitional. Consequently, the Christian Church need not (and indeed must
not) think it incumbent upon itself, simply by virtue of its
total commitment to the profession of Christ's sovereignty
and uniqueness, to sit in judgment on other religions or to
assign de:finitivce places to them, either in God's kingdom to
come or in God's worM as we know it alreaidy. Just how
Christ is Lord, 'already in the present moment, of all the dead
and all the living (cf. Rom 14: 9)
a mystery of es:chatologicrul faith and hope, not a matter of present comprehension.
This mystery, in other words, is inaccessibJe to Christians except by way of perspective, the kind of perspectiv;e that is designed to foster in the Chmch the attitude of the pilgrim, not
the arbiter.
What, then, are we to
of Karl Rahner's proposal to
ca11 the countless peopJe who live well and nobly
the
Christian community, by the light available to them, "anonymous Christians " ? The expl'ession, unfortunately, has elicited
as least as much misundel'standing as genuine Christian openness. It is dear that it must not be understood :as an expansionist gestu11e by which countless admirable non-Christians,
unbeknownst to themselves, are captured by a totalitarian
church that brooks no goodness in the world outside itself. It
is dear, too, that it is one way to express the Christian marvel
a,t the free revelation of God and the Logos in the worM; hence,
it ailso conveys the Christian commitment ,to respectful missionary effort.

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FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

Unforbunately, however, it must also he said that Rahner's
insight has encouraged a whole generation of systematic theologians to content themselves with a generous waVie of the
hand in the direction of the great non-Christian religions and
to think of themselve:s .as dispensed from all attempts at a detailed understanding. This amounts to turning the phrase
" anonymous Christians " into pure theory. To be credible,
marvel at the mani£estation of the Logos at work in the world
must inspire encounter at close qurarter:s. For :that reason, too,
this essay has argued that the intm-religious dialogue must oonoern itself with the religions' positive .elements.
FinaJ:ly, the mention of close quarters calJ.s to mind :the figure of the historical Jesrus. The imitation of Christ would
seem to commend to the pilgrim Chmch truly Christ-like ·approaches to other 11eligions,not to mention Judaism. Time and
again, Jesius made J!srael's universa:list
his own (cf.,
for example, Is 66: 18-21!); he found and admired true faith
01Utsiide Is:r:ael and glorified the Father for it. The Gospel of
Luke goes so far 1as to have Jesus address the Christian community with an eschatofogical rthreat based on that same
Jewish univ:e:rsalism (Lk 13: 24-29) .
The memory of that :threat, it is true, does not come naturally :to a triumphalist Christianity stiiLl residually acoustomed Ito
the attractive (and ofren quite con:structive) privileges of the
Constantinian establishment and its aftermath. But now that
rthe Christian faith no longer defines the preva.ilent ooltural
climate, it is easier to see ithat those privileges had ·a dark side
to them, too. They caJUsed the Chureh :to fose its pre-Constantinian ability to giv;e an :aoooruntof its £aith from a position of
equrulity ,and even :subordination, amidst a variety of n.onChristian religions: and philosophies ,allJd often before the
tribunal of rthe powers that he. The second ...oentury apologists
and Origien had sitiLJ. been ready to do that. In aooepting establishment, il::he Chureh losrt touch with some of the patience and
neighbol'llrinessthat the early ·communities, in imitation of the
historical Jesus, had shown vis-a-vis 01Uts:iders. In the process,

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THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

it also lost, in all Jikel:ihood, some of ]ts original sense of Jesus'
God, as Gero Theissen pointed[y (if somewhat testily) reminds us:
Christian faith in God has often been fundamentally compromised
by its entanglement with power and domination. A persecuted
minority for centuries, Jews have more credibly testified that the
God of the Bible is not on the side of the powerful and the dominating. 37

Some Reflections on Today's Discussion
Recent years hav;e seen a vigorous disoos:sion of fresh proposa1s---.aimed at understanding a11 the great religions, 1as a
matter of stated principle, in a p1ur:alist perspectiV'e. But some
of these proposals are strongly reminisicent of questionable
eighteenth-ieentury precedents, 28 becaiuse they rthoroughly relativize partiooJar religions by "placing" .them in an all-encompassing framework. In this setting, aill the religions' allegedly runiversalist intentions tend to be viewed as equally
right, .and 1aM their allegedly parlioularist claims as equally
mistaken. 29 While allegedly promoting dialogue among .the
religions, this approaich in reality favors " a new monologue
containing them instead." so
The more general .theologicail writings of the learned islamici·st Wilfred Cantwell Smith, no matter how inspiring and attractive, are a good example of this unsatisfactory approach.
The problem is that Smith offers, under cover of a visionary
exhortation to dialogue, what is in reality a hier:archical classification of all. positive religions. As long as he simply discerns
1

21 Gerd Theissen, Der Schatten des GaZiTJi,ers, p. 55; The Shadow of the
Galilean, p. 36.
2s For a competent discussion of no less than 14 recent books related to
this issue, cf. the twin review essays by Francis X. Clooney (" Christianity
and World Religions: Religion, Reason, and Pluralism")
and Paul F.
Knitter (" Making Sense of the Many") in Religious Studies Review 15

(1989): 197-204; 204-07.
29 Cf. God Encountered, §28, 4, a, [d].
Bo David Novak, J ewish-Ohristian Dialogue, p. 80; italics added.

564

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

a " vision of world brotherhood " as a dev;elopment that " we
bel-ieve to be a step towards God's vision," there is still a welcome note of provisionality and perspective, ev;en though
Smith's reference to God's vision ,as the point of perspective
raises doubt.si The doubt is reinfo11cedby the very title of the
essiay from which this quote was taken: "Mankind's ReligioU&ly Divided History Approaiches Self-Consciousness." Are we
to understand that human self-ioonsciousness the essence of
religion, and is the God whose vision Smith wishes to approximate simply human self-consciousness writ large? s2 There is
even more reason to enter firm reservations when Smith proposes that it is the task of theology " to formulate rwt a view
of others seen through Christian eyes, but rather a view, in
global perspective, of humankind, ... a God's-eye view, one
might almost wish to say, of all the human family." Are eyes
other than Christian ones avairlab1eto us? Fin.ally, reservation
should turn into firm rejection when the " almost " is dropped
and the ruling is handed down in a1l its. undisguised immodesty: ". . . in God's ey:es there is genuine pluralism." ss Elsewhere, Smith can write, with an .astonishing lack of awareness
of the relativity of his own position: " I iain ready to argue
with a Christian theologian, on Christian premises, ,th·at the
modern comparative religionist's vision of the religious history
of mankind provides a truer vision of that total history-that
is, a vision closer to God's way of seeing it, a more authentic
H eilsgeschichte-than is any interpretation of this wide-ranging matter formulated within the Church before the present
information, or indeed any serious historical information, was
1

s1 "Mankind's Religiously Divided History Approaches. Self-Consciousness,"
in Religious Diversity: Essays by Wilfred Oantweii Smith, ed. by Willard
G. Oxtoby (New York and London: Harper & Row, 1976), p. 111; italics
added.
s2 Cf. God Enoountered, §25, 4, d; §35, 2-3.
ss "The World Church and the World History of Religion: The Theological
Issue," in The Oatholio Theological Booiety of America: Prooeedings of the
Thirty-Ninth Annual Convention 39 ( 1984) : 52-68; quotations pp. 54, 63
(italics added for emphasis).

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

565

available. Lt is significant to add this: that I would argue :the
corresponding point with Muslim theologians, on Islamic
premises. I write that sentence not glibly, but in full seriousness, rea.lizing that the radically new visWn that it implies
would have to be defended before and ultimately assimilable
by Muslims themselves . ... [T]his religious. rooonceptualization is not simply my wish hut is: necessitated by the advance
of modern knowledge." 34 Helle both Kant and Christian doctrine--bien etonnes de se trouver ensemble-must rise in protest, for this is iHegitimate theological language. It cries out
:for the realization that when it comes to the knowledge of ourselves, other persons, and humanity and the world (not to
mention God) , there .are, in the final analysis, no judges and
arbiters, only participators, discerners, and interpreters.
While I must strongly disagree with Professor Smith, I do
l'ooognize that his .approach to religious pluralism bears: the
marks of his lifelong ,struggle to understand a different religion. in all its: particularity, Islam. This spells the difference
between Professor Smith and an 1author like John Hick, who
has also treated the issue of rdigious pluralism with great frequerncy but ,alw;ays in very general terms and very frequently
in reliance on 1s1econdarymaterials only. Pmfessor Hick's o£trepeated rejection of the ahso1uteness of Chrisrt:ianity would
seem to he the prirncipal source of the energy with which he
has committd himself to very firm judgments about other religions. Brut the proh1em with those judgments is th,at they appear to have too easily absolved the .author, in adv:anee, from
the (lonscientious, detaied study of these !l'ieligionsthemselves.
The 'C!uriousiLy high-handed, even authoritarian overtones of
this new, enlightened orthodoxy :are due to the faict that its advocacy of tolerance comes mainly from ,above. Those who profess it tend to claiim, whether .implicitly or expilicitiy, that they
oooupy il:he higher ground, that theirs is the viewpoint from
which all religions, not to mention humanity and the world as
1

34 Religious

Dwersity, p. 112; italics added for emphasis.

566

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK,. S.J.

:a whole, can be placed, that is, judged. The principwl problem
with such a princip[ed plur:alism is tihat it fails to reailize that
its understanding of the wm1d and humanity, too, is participative, not compr:ehensive. What is unacceptable, therefore, iis
the de:finiti-\i;enessof its oLaim or, in other words, its defic.ient
awareness of the reln;timity of its own perspec.tive.
Curiously, but not rea1ly SIU'l'prisingly,blindness to the l'le1ativity of .aJJ unde:rstanding is pl'ecisely what this new .approach
wou1d seem to have inherited from the very orthodoxies it J.'legards (often with reason) as dated because they .are out of step
with the temper of the present, aJJ.egecfily unbiased age. Under
cover of the fine--sounding, t.ole:rant S1logan of " p1urali:sm,"
therefol"e, this approach invites an rnfilgions to submit to the
new univers1alismiby giving up whateV'er is incompatible with
it, just as the o1d orthodoxies (supposedly) had demanded
that all other faiths give up whatever was iI11Compatiblewith
themsel¥es. But why would .anyone wish to tmde in an oild,
sburdy (if theoor:atic) orthodoxy for an almost entirely theoretiica;l,pan-humanitari.oo ideoJogy 1that looks so blatantly like :a
benign form of post-Christian, rationa:list, Western imperalism?
Very sensibly, therefore, in a world torn .apart by patently
unjustifiabJe differences and inequalities that beggar description, this brave, suspiciously painless type of liberal universailism of Western origin hais been aiocused of "view[ing] the
whole wor1d as like unto itself, .and [of keeping] its disrtance,
even if it be a sympathetic distance, f:vom the wretched of the
earth." 35
Envoy

This can also be put in the str:aightforward, unlC:Ompromising
Language of Christian doctrine. The original unity of .a11 of
1

35 Cf. Tom F. Driver's "The Case for Pluralism,"
the final essay in The
Myth of Christian Uniqueness (pp. 203-18; quotation p. 206), discussing a
highly critical resp<mse by Kenneth Surin to the essays in that collection.
Cf. also Michael Barnes, " Beyond Inclusivism," The H eythrop Journal 30
(1989): 325-27.

THE CREED AND THE RELIGIONS

567

humanity, afong W!ith the whole world, is protologicail: it is of
God's fashioning, and it is in the nature of a first insta1lment
on a magnificent promise. The ultimate unity of a11 humanity,
along with the whole world, is eschato1ogicrul: again, it is of
God's malcing-howev:er and whenever God may fulfill creation's native potentiaJ, beyond anyone's wiildest dreams.
For the here and the now, however, we will have to ho1d on
to a pamdoxical proposition. We uphold the finality of the
Creed we profess, but we invoke that very finality to argue
that our Christian commitment must be to the in-between,
that is, to rthe present pursuit of justice and truth. This win
oonsisrt partly in the ,respectful cherishing of alil that truly distinguishes a1l of us •and partly in the painstaking overcoming
of aill that estranges us. This coll!oeption of truth and justice
wiH show a11 the signs of the here and the now; it will have to
submit to the dynamics of provisionaility inherent in the great
Tl'aidition. In short, it wi11 have to combine modesty with
hope. The modesty wiJl consisrt in reckoning with the possibility that at any time and in ,any situation, even in our best
moments, .any of us may be thoroughly misguided in what we
think or do. The hope will consist in :the trust that humanity
an:d the world will truil.y come into their own by a design not
coooci.V!erlhy human reason nor mrude by human hand, an incomprehensible, hidden design that is as holy as it is loving,
and that comes to do justice .to us from beyond us. In view
of the accomplishment of that hoped-for desri.gn, neither truth
nor justice is aooomplished by claiming that it is in .the nature
of Christianity (or, for that matter, of any other faith or
phifosophy) to give us a commanding bi:vd's-eye overview of
humaD!ity and the worild, a view claimed to be a " God's eyeview." Only the Lamb who was slain, ·the Lion who has conquered, is worthy to open the scroll that has the mysteries of
the
sealed up in it (Rev 5: 1-5, 12). Final justice
and finaJ. truth are ours to anticipate, not grasp.
And in any oose, we know from the Gospel just how God
means to direct our gaze as we view humanity and rthe world.

568

FRANS JOZEF VAN BEECK, S.J.

We are il:o view them not foom any height hut, so to speak,
"f:r:om below," that is, from the tra1vieling Samaritan's patient,
neighbourly
For the pilgrim, servant Chureh to try
to define, in the name of God, the finatl unity of humanity and
tihe wor1d while it stiM finds people lying by the
with
no one to understand or serve them is the equivalent of walking to the hea¥enly Jerusalem with blinders on. O:r, to change
the metaphor, to dveam up a common language this side of the
Halleluyah ,amounts to compounding the already existing confusion of tongues with yet another vociferorns
ideoilogical jargon; in that sense, it woiuld only help shore up
the tower of BaibeL36

36 The last phrase suggested by rcmarkc< in Tom F. Driver's "The Case for
Pluralism," p. 205.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

ROBERT WARNER

St. Joseph's University
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania

I. Introduction
Y ANY MEASURE, Karl Rahner was one of the principal architects of the renascence of trinitarian theology that has marked the last half of this century.
Rahner found that in their pract:icail lives Christians were "a1most mere' monotheists'" 1 while :in speculative endeavors the
treatise on the Trinity stood " isofoted in the structriwe of dogmatic theology as a whoile," 2 and so he devoted himself toand the theoretical
ov;ereoming both the priadicaJ
isolation of the doctrine. He p:mposeid as a methodologicaJ
Grunda:dom the dictum that " the '
Trinity is the
'immanent ' Trinity and the 'immanent ' Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity," 3 in 011der to preclude any sharp disjunction
between how God is in se and how God is ad extra, between
contheofogy and the ,economy. He al:so developed a
cept of self-communication, inscribed it within the heart of his
trinitarian theology, amd materiaily recast the traditional account of the Trinity to
with that notion.
H1s account of the 1dentity and roil.e of God the Father is a
striking, although littiie noted, feature of Rahner's thought.
His trinitarian theofogy trumpets the primacy of God the
Father: this is evident in his oft-stated resolve to begin the
1Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), p. 10. Hereafter cited as Trinity.
2" Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise
'De Trinitate '," in Karl Rahner,
Theological Investigations IV, trans. Kevin Smyth (New York: The Seabury
Press, 1974), p. 78. Hereafter cited as "Remarks."
a Trinity, p. 22.

569

570

ROBERT WARNER

;theological entel'prise, in consort with Scripture and the
Greeks, with God
Father, rather than the one divine es,senoe shared by Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. 4 And that
primacy, in tum, is secured by an extra.ordinary emphasis on
the urnoriginatedness trruditionaUy ,ascribed to the Father.
'What unoriginatedness involves and how unoriginatedness and
fatherhood bear on the identity of the Father become cmci.ail
questions within Rahner's trinitarian theology.
This is no bit of trinitarian arteana, no subtlety of interest
only to a scholastic mindset, but an issue whose consequenee 1s
Two e:mmples will
reverberate throughout Rahner's
suffice. Insofar as Rahner
on the notion of self-communicatfon, he
identifies the F1ather as the origin of
the self-communication. Divinity is communicated rbo the Son
1:the HoJy Spi:cit. Issues regacvding the id.entity of the
Father impinge, therefore, on questions
the seH-communication p11eioise[y because
upon the identity of
the self that is communicated. In 1addition, Rahner works out
the identification of
being of God and the triune being of
God in the person of
Father. Thel'eby the question arbout
ifhe :identity
the Father becomes important in sett1ing the
ontological status of
immanent
the sense in which
God is 1anteoedently trinity
se.
This essay
examine Rahner's rich and compfox a1C1count
of the identity of
Father. It
be necessary, firis:t of all,
to situate that teaching, to clarify
Rahner means by un.origina.tedness, and to determine how he understands unorigifatherhood to be interr 1elat1ed constituting the
identity of the
the essay will argue that
Rahner's account
not, fo fact, succeed and
,this
his
theology. Rahne'l.''s position
can thus: be seen a,s an attempt to identify a philosophically
colJJceiv;ed,abyss
the Father
trinitarian doctrine by reworking the unoriginatedness tr:aditionaHy ascribed to the
Father.
4 Trinity,

p. Hl.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

571

II. 'O 8e6c; and the Father

In an essay that appears early on in the Theological Investigations, "Theos in the New Testament", Rahner outlines the
content of the New Testament conception of God under seveml heaidings.5 He notes, first of 1all, the New Testament's
imperious claim that its God is the one true God, o 8e6c;.
Rahner describes this as the New Testament"s doctrine of
God',s uniqueness. Under a second rubric, God as person,
Rmmer ranges several topics. Aocording to Rahner, as personal, God is (1) an agent who .wets (2) freely in (3) historioaJ. dia,1ogue with human beings and (4) in so doing discloses
his attit;udes or dispositions, in contradistinction to his metaphysioohly necessary .attributes, toward human beings. Third,
that unique God, a free and living God, is a God of love and
is so definitively and irrevocahly because God " has hound
himself." 6 God's last wo:rxl :and last deed is love. Fourth and
finally, Rabner asserts that within the New Testament the
unique God, o 8e6c;, is identified with the one whom Jesus calls
Father; the one true God is the :Father of Jesus Christ.
So far, so good. Rahner's argument is largely exegetica.l and
gives new force to the deliverances of New Testament scholars.
Nevertheless, systematic considerations do obtrude. Granted
that rin the New
o 8e6c; is the Father, Rahner argues
that o 8e6c; signifies the Father and does not merely stand for
the Father. 7 Prescinding from comp1exities in the theory of
meaning, one can ·discern only silightly mu:ffied echoes of a bat:tle with scholastiicism over the con1oept of God and over the
internal organization of the !treatise on God (the De Deo
Uno-De Deo Trina sequence) . Negatively, Rahner .denies that
1

5 Karl Rahner, Theological Investigations
I, trans. Cornelius Ernst, O.P.
(New York: The Seabury Press, 1974), pp. 79-148. Hereafter cited as
"Theos."
6 "Theos," p. 117.
remarks about this claim in his note in " Theos,"
1 See Cornelius Ernst's
pp. 127-8.

579l

ROBERT WARNER

o 8e6<; signifies either the divine nature or "the Trinity in general (and hence indistinctly)." 8 Were that the case, o 8e6r;
wou1d meriely stand for rather thain signify the Father. Positii¥ely, if " God " signiifies the Father, then the one who acts
freely in histo];ical diafogue with human beings and thel'eby
discloses his dispositions (mther ,than attributes) is the Father
of Jesus Christ. In effect, the fongthy descript:ivie phrase
uniquely piieks out God the Father. So, according to Rahner,
when the New Testament thinks of God, it is the concrete, individual, uninterchangeable Person who comes into its mind, who is
in fact the Father and is called o(JE6,; so that inversely, when o(}E6,
is being spoken of, it is not the single divine nature that is seen,.
subsisting in three hypostases, but the concrete Person who possesses the divine nature unoriginately, and communicates: it by
eternal generation to a Son too, and by spiration to the Spirit. 9

Rabner 1tllusbs that his thesis about the Father will foster a
reco¥ereid ,awareness of the trinitarian rhythm of the Christian
life. Prayer and graice p1'ov]de his stock examples. If God
signifies the Father, the Christian at praye:r will be mol'e
ly ;awa,re ,that she prays in the Spirit through Jesus Christ to
the Father. 10 By the same token, if, a:s chiMren of God, we
ave childl'en of the Father, then the mediatorial
of Christ
in our being chi:1dren of God will be underscored. }\lforeover,
Rahner 1sees .a connection with the question of whether or not
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit possess proper non-appropriated
'll1etlationshipsto the justified person in grace. As Rahner sees
it, the justified person's refatfon to the Son and the Spirit
cannot be interpreted ,a,s sonship without making "God"
stanid for the T11inityin its entirety. Consequen1t;ly,the Trinity
is our " Fa;ther '' in grace only by appropriation. If, on the
other hand, the Father in the Trinity is also om Father
through grace, ,then our relation cannot be interpreted as sonship, :and it may need to be asserted that "each of the three
persons ha:s its own p11oper relationship to the justified man." 11
1

s "Theos," p. 130.
s" Theos," p. 146.

pp. 129-30, 148.
n" Theos," p. 147.

10 "Theos,"

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

573

Whether or not the daim ,that " God " signifies the Father
leads to a recovered siense of the trinitarian rhythm of the
Christian li£e, its ramifications within Rahner's theology are
notew;orthy. For one thing, it is an example of Rahner's characteristic rdusaJ to develop a separate or independent doctrine
of God. He pi1locies the scholastics for developing, despite
their best intentions, a treatise more a:ccuratdy termed De
Divinitate Una rather than De Deo Uno.12 Instead, one ought
to treat the "essence" of God only in conjunction with the
being of the Father ,and 1themby only as " the Godhead of this
Father." 13 It is preforah1e to handle "the geneml doctrjne of
God a,s the doctrine of God the Father, the sourceless origin in
the Godhead," mther ,than "as the doctrine of the na,ture of
God which is common to all the :Bersons." 14
Methodologioailly, Rahner recommends beginning the systematic enterprise with the
of the Fa:ther. In
Rahner's eyes this has ,the further merit of making the sequence
of trhe "treatises" reflect :the histodcal unfolding of revelation
itself. 15 The systemwtic yiei1d is: not a better version of the
trruditionaJ De Deo Uno-De Deo Trina sequence but a 1.'ev:amped sequence :that moves from "the Godhead of this
Father " to treatments of Christology and then Pneumatology .16
12 "Remarks,"

p. 102.
p. 83.
14" Observations on the Doctrine of God in Catholic Dogmatics" in Thw·
logical Investigations IX, trans. Graham Harrison (New York: The Seabury
Press, 1973), p. 131.
15 "We might say at least with equal right that the history of revelation
first reveals God as unoriginate person in his relation to the world, and next
proceeds to the revelation of this person as the origin of intra-divine, personalizing vital process." Trmity, p. 20, note 15.
16 See the remarks about this at the very end of The Trinity.
I plan in
another essay to address the status of the concept of " trinity " in Rahner.
That concept belongs to a different level of discourse and involves a set of
considerations that go beyond a merely linear treatment of the Godhead of
the Father, Christology, and Pneumatology.
Where "trinity" ought to be
treated and what logical shape that treatment must possess on Rahner's
13 "Remarks,''

574

ROBERT WARNER

F:ina:Uy, insofar as "God" signifies the Father, the divinity
of the Son and Spirit will be " conceptuaHy a consequence of
the fact that the Fa1ther communicates his whoile nat111re.''11
The doctrine of the Trinity's compatibility with monotheism
is rooted in the Father's role as fons trinitatis. If the Father
is the one true God, then if the Son .and Holy Spirit are themselves divine, they are so thanks to their origination from the
Father mther than to their possess1ionof a common natu11e.

III. The Father as Unoriginate Origin
The equation of o Br:.6<:: and the Father engenders a dilemma
that Rahner mus1t confront the minute the question of natural
theology arises; he seems to ha vie no way out of an unpafat1able
rdisjunctfon. On the basis of this daim about the Father, he
'CJouM simply deny the v:ery pos1sibil1ityof a naturaJ knowledge
of God: God is 1either apprehended by faith through gmoe as
the Father of Jesus Christ or God is simply not graisped rat ail.I.
From Rahner's perspective, that would be tantamount to
fideism a:nd would entail the sicrapping of the V'ery foundational theology he labored to construct. Conversely, Rahner could
boMly affirm that God is known in natural theology precisely
because the God so grasped is the :Fiather. li, however, the
term of naitural theology iis the Father, there seems ;to be no
way to 1deny the inference rl::hat the entire Trinity fa knowable
by reason from the ereated order. If, that is to say, the a ot of
self-communication constitutes the Father, then the Father
1simply cannot be known in isolation from the Son and the
Spirit. Faith, then, is rendered superfluous and supplanted by
ran extr:aordinanhly virulent gnosticism.
Rahne:r',s response is to
a paradoxical assertion. " It is
obvious," he says, " tha1t the Father ,is not known as Father in
natumJl theology, i.e., not as He who communicates his natul"e
1

terms are questions worth pursuing, For one attempt to discern, inter a,Zia,
various levels of trinitarian discourse, see Robert Jenson, The Triune Identity (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1982),
'l 7 " Theos," p, 146.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE FATHER

[//fj

to the Son by an eternal generat1on, and it is obviously true
that the necessary uniqueness of the divine nature is discerned
by na:turaJ theology." 18 In short, Rahner's position is that
natural theology grasps the Father but not the Father as such,
i.e., a:s Father. This 'seems, on the face of it, a contm1dietory
assertion, for how can naturrul theology both know and not
know the Fathm·?
In part to f!eso1v;e this problem, Rahner introduces at this
porint the concept of unoTiginatedness. Natrural theology, he
daims
ascends not just to a divinity but to a God; it knows, that is, that
this divine nature necessarily subsists, and subsists, what is more
(or at least also), in an absolute and unqualified unorigination
(Ursprungslosigkeit). Natural theology is quite capable of affirming the necessity of a pure and absolute unorigination in God, free
from any conceivable restriction, even if its statement of this remains wholly formal.1 9

So what natu:riail. theology knows :is the "absolutely Unoriginate.'' 20 Inasmuch as Rahner medits natural theology with
the ability to discern "the necessary uniqueness of the divine
narbure," 21 it is reasona:hle to infer that Rahner identifies that
uniqueness with unoriginatedness.
Postitiv'ely, Rahner affirms that phifosophy grasps" this conc11ete, abso1utely unoriginate Origin of a1l reality." 22 Moreover, the Unoriginate is seen "not just ras set over against an
origination by cfleation, but as opposed to every conceivaMe
l'eal and hypothetical origination." 23 But "every conce[vabJe
real and hypothetical originrution" wou1d include the begetting
of the Son and the breathing of the Spirit, that is, it woruld
range over origination by ·self-communication. Consequently,
the absolutely Unoriginate is affirmed ito be the origin of all
reaility ad extra as well as all reaJity ad intra. lt is origin by
creation ex nihilo as well as fans trinitatis.
p. 132-3.
p. 133.
20 "Theos," p. 134.

18" Theos,"
19 Theos,"

p. 132.
p. 132.
23 "Theos," p. 132.
21 "Theos,"

22 "Theos,"

576

ROBERT WARNER

Negatively, Rahner denies that phifosophy discerns that the
concrete, absofa1tely Unoriginate is "Origin also by oommunicrution o.f the divine nature and not merely by cl"eation ex
nihilo." 24 Tihus :the divine .self-communication, :a.rooming to
Rahner, remains "utterly concealed" from natural itheofogy.25
lts affirmation of the absruutely Unoriginate [s said to :vemain
" who1ly formail," to bear on its object only " forma1ly and a
priori." 26 Rahner's point .seems to be that the knowledge of
an ,absolutely unoriginate origin of all possible reality does not
entail the ability to deduce everything that has in fact ·sprung
from that soul"ce. A gap, a logical hfatus, must he marked between the formal or a priori domain and the material or a
posteriori domain. The fact of divine self-communicative ructivity can remain " utterly concealed,'' buried within the Unoriginate, became phllosophy endorses the Unoriginate oruy ·as
the SOUl'ce of whatever can he. From that ·absolute reservoir of
possibilities, however, philosophy cannot deduce the actuality
27
of divine se1f-communillcation.
Nevertheless, Rahner continues to insist that " when natural
theology acquires knowiLedge o.f a single and ,absoiliutely first
Principle of aN reality (not ju.st creaturely reality) , wha;t is so
24 "Theos,"

p. 132.
"Theos," p. 132.
·2s "Theos," p. 132.
21 By the same token, the philosophical account of the created world can
only be formal in Rahner's scheme. Philosophy can discern the a priori struc·
tures that any possible world, any possible creation, must take, but it cannot deduce either (a) the existence of the world, the actuality of creation
or (b) the determinate content of the actual world. Rahner's doctrine of
creation, in short, is conceptually tied to his account of the being of the
Father and, in particular, can be tied to the twists and turns in the relation between unorginatedness and fatherhood in comprising the identity of
the Father. The distinction between creation as the condition of possibility
of the self-communication and creation as a consequence of the self-communication (as brought about by the self-communication in order to realize itself)
mirrors the distinction between unorginatedness
and fatherhood within
Rahner's account of the Father. To the extent that Rahner succeeds in identifying the Unoriginate and the Father, he will succeed in identifying creation as both condition and consequence of the self-communication.
:25

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

577

known is the Father." 28 The central feature, therefore, in
Rahnercs ruccoun:t of 'the Father is the identification of the absolutely Unomginate with the Father. Thereby, to be sure, a
wrinkle has been added to the original question of what o (Je6c;,
" God," signifies. Its signification now covers both absolute
unoriginatedness and fatherhood. So Rahner is elaiming that
1

(1) "God" signifies the Father precisely as the absolutely un-

originate Father;
The absolutely unoriginate Father is gmsped by philosophy;
(3) Philosophy grasps the concretely subsisting God qua the absolute Unoriginate but not qua Father.
This move plays an important role in RahneT's constructive
theological endeav:oT. Grant Rahner his concept of the absolutely unoriginate Father and the trinitarian form of his entire project hercomes o1ear. At no step need one ever move
outside the trinitarian orbit; everything 'can be brought within
its purview. Rahner can plausibJy daim, for example, that on
his ,terms either God [s known as Father or Son or Holy Spirit
or else God is simply not known at all. 29 This is because even
phHosophy's grasp of the Unoriginarte is not ,a move outside
the
This may surprise reaiders of Rahner inclined to stl'ess the
oomp1ete independence of the philosophiml propadeut:Uc. But
grant him the identity of rthe Unor:iginate w:ith the Father and
even philosophy may be brought within ,the trinitarian form as
an inner moment of theo:logy. Within the Fafoer, in fact,
Rahner is ;ab1e to identify the phifosophica:l or speculative first
Ultimately both
principle with Christian faith's fus1t
spring from the same :mot, and both share an identical obdect,
so that the di:fforences between philosophy and theology are
absorbed into a deeper and primordiarl unity. From this per1

28 "Theos,"

p. 133.
says that "we can never conceive of a divinity which does not
exist either as that of the Father or of the Son or of the Spirit." Trinity, p.
84, note 6.
29 Rahner

578

ROBERT WARNER

speative, the thesis .about the F,ather may evien provide the
v;ehlcle for bringing together Spirit in the World and the Theological Invest'igations under 1a .single oonooptua;l and trinitarian
umbrella! In any evient, the identity of the Unoriginate and
the Fatiher anchors the uJtimate compatibility of a rioh series
of terms whose mutuail coh.e11enoois 11equired for the viahiility
of Rahner's project. Natural and revealed knowJiedge of God,
na'btme and grace, creation and predestination, providence aind
predestination, to name but a few, presuppose that identity for
their ultimate reconciliation in Rahner's scheme.

IV. Unoriginatedness and Fatherhood
Introducing the concept of unoriginatedness, as we have
seen, has only comp!licated the claim that o Oeo<; signifies the
Father. In oflder fo secu:re that o Oeo<;, "God," refers to a unitary thing, Rahner needs to provide some account of the relationship between unoriginatedness and fatherhood in constituting the Father. At :stake, in other words, is the unitary
identity of the Father. Mmieover, the decision :to rejoot an independent doctrine of Gord allld to treat the Godhead of God
only within the aicoount of the being of the Father puts the
identity of God with the F\ather (and, thereby, the Trinity)
at issue as well. In particmiLa:r, Rahner must dispel any concern that the epistemo1ogicail distinction between grasping x
as unoriginate origin ,and gl'lasping x as Father opens orut into
an ontoJogical distinction that so bifurcates unoriginate origin
and Father as to p11eclude their reaMy being the :same x.30
Commitment rto the identity of being and kno,wing rules out
Rahner's a;hility to separate sharply how the Father 1appeairsin
1

so Once you operate within the parameters of Rahner's distinction, it becomes very difficult to refer to the entity under discussion in a way that
clarifies the issue. Rahner himself has difficulties: when he needs a circumlocution to identify what it is that is unoriginate and what it is that is
Father (without simply defining one in terms of the other), he sometimes
speaks of the first hy,postasis or the first person of the Trinity. My use of x:
as a placemarker for the underlying issue is not done merely out of my own
sense of rigor.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

579

relation to us, for our knowledge, and how God is in se, independently of our knowledge. Much is a,t stake.
It wouM be a mistake to take Ralmer's concept of unoriginatedness at face value. It looks lifoe the traditional ascription of innascihility or unbegottenness to the Father, and there
is oertairuly nothing Christianly inappropl'.iate about that. Yet
we shou1d not prejudge the case by fi1ling in Rahner' s concept
with the traditional content; I think there are several good
l'easons for not doing so.
If we al'e ever to be in a position to assess Rahner's proposal
about the Father, we first need more clarity about what he
means by unoriginatedness and how he sees this 11elated to
fatherhood. To do that, we need to e:immine his talk of" total
unoriginatedness " and " concrete unoriginatedness " in relation to three terms: uncreatedness (or aseity), unbegottenness
(or innascib1lity), and fatherhood. First, "total unoriginatedness '' must be situated in relation to uncreatedness and unbegottenness. Second, what is distinctive about Rahner's concept of " concrete unoriginatedness " is to be identified by
ranging it alongside Aquinas's account of trinitarian characteristics.
Total Unoriginatedness. One ,legacy of the ancient trinitarian debates is the hal'ld won distinction between uncreartedness (or, positively expressed, aseity) and unbegottenness (or,
as the Latins came to say, innascibil:ity). Tremendous consimilar spdling in Greek (agenetos
fusion, in part due to
and agennetos), 11esultedfrom a failure to distinguish the two. 31
Unoriginatedness, in other words, might be used in the sense
of unereatedness or in the sense of unbegottenness. Insofar as
aseity or uncreatedness was at issue, the decisive point w.as
that Father and Son and Holy Spirit were uncreated or a se
ipso. Being unoriginate in the sense of unc1,eated, therefo11e,
was not a property that uniquely singled out one member of
31 See the account of G. L. Prestige,
S.P.G.K., 1952), pp. 37-52.

God in Patristic Thought

(London:

580

ROBERT WARNER

the Trinity as opposed to another. It bore instead on the divine nature.
On the other hand, unlme aseity or uncreatedness, unbegottenness was a property peculiar to the Father, one
sive of the primacy aicco!'dedto the Father within the Trinity.
Logically, it :represented the denial of being begotten and, by
extension, the denial of having Ml origin. Armed with the distinction between being uncreated and being unbegotten, it
was possible to deny that whatever was uncreated (unoriginate
in this sense) was by that V'ery foot unbegotten (unoriginate
in that 'sense) 1and, conversely, to deny that whrutewr was begotten was eo ipso created. To be unbegotten, therefore, could
not be what made God God. If so, the very possibility of divin:iity's·being communicated woU1ld be precluded.
Arooroing to Rahner, "before the revelation of the Trinity,
the total unoriginatedness cannot yet be differentiated into
aseity 1and innascibility." 82 If we follow revelation in its
temporal unfolding, the sequeooe commences with an unoriginate origin subsequently shown to be the F:ather of Jesus
Chl'ist. Onily at that point is total unoriginatedness divisible
into aseity and innascibil.ity. Nevertheless, one can think of
philosophy as logim1ly, rather than temporally, prior to :the
revela;tion of the unociginate Origin as the Father of Jesus
Christ and then philosophy's object is total unociginatedness·.
Total unoriginatedness, in turn, must ultimately be
with the Father.
The earlier t.r:adition needed to distinguish uncreatedness
and unhegottenness without proposing any more comprehensive concept .capaMe of systematically unifying or bridging rthe
two. The novelty of Rahner',s concept of rtotal unoriginatedness is that irt purpoiits to .accomplish juS1t that. Uncreatedness
.and unbegottenness are themselves moments or dimensions of
a total unorigiinatedness which includes both within itself.
Therein they merge into :an linpenetrable unity and are only
s2 Trinity, p. 59, note 8.

RAHNER

ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

581

to he distinguished from one another subsequently, i.e., from
the vaintage point of Christian faith. Aseity hears on being
the principle of all reaJlity ad extra; innascihility on being the
principle of all :rewlity ad intra. Rahner's eonoept of total unoriginaibedness spans both and points towards some more encompassing reaJity in whid1 they find their root.
Concrete Unoriginatedness. Precisely how are unoriginatedness and fatherhood interrelated in Rahner',s thought? :Before
turning directly to that question, we need to haV'e some sense
of what might be at srtake in a theologian's decision about how
to oonceptuaJize the relation between the two. Aqui11as wilJ
provide a usef:uJ example.
In question thirty-two of the Summa theologiae, having
denied tha,t the Trinity of persons may be known by natural
reason, Aquinas deve1ops a theory of notiones or cha1racteristics
to explain how the divine persons are known. 33 Characteristics
are "concepts whereby the persons are known." 34 Aquinas
posits five: innascibility, fatherhood, sonship, common spiration, and procession. Obviously some persons will be markied
by move than one characteristic. Within Aquinas's theory of
(e.g., God) in
lmowiledge, human beings know what js
a mmp1ex way, so the multiplicity of charaeteristics belonging
to a particular person as known need introduce no diV'ersity
into the person in se.
Nevertheless, the characteristics are not aH on a par for
Thomas. Indeed only three are said to be personal chara:eteristics, inasmuch as they rconsrtitute persons; they are fatherhood, sonship, and procession. It is, in fact, preoisely because
no philosopher qua philosopher knows " the mystery of the
divine persons through the personal properties of fatherhood,
sonship and pTOcession" 35 that Aquinas denies that the Trinity can be known by nat1ural reason. J\1fos1t .intriguing for our
purposes is Aquinas's denial that innaseibi<lity !i.s a character1

as Summa theologiae, Blackfriars edition, 60 volumes (New York/London:
McGraw-Hill/Eyre and Spottiswoode, 1964-1981).
34 S.T. Ia, 32, 3.
35 S.T. Ia, 32, I ad 1.

ROBERT WARNER

istic that constitutes a person, The person of the Father, in
Aquinas's way of speaking, is constituted by fatherhood, Innascibility is, indeed, a characteristic of 1the Father and only
of the Father
for aH that, it does not comprise the identity
of the Father, It does not serve to distinguish the :first hypoof the Son and
Holy Spirit, Insofar as the
stasis from
Father is unbegot'oen or unoriginate, the Father oannot be
as being from another. For Aquinas, one might say,
innascib:iJ.,ityonly works to point out one previousJy identified
by other means (specificaHy, by fatherhood),
this oontention are insrtritmtive, First,
persons are
l'elations of origin and
these rehtions are, in turn,
upon processions. Innascihility, according to
is itself a relation only indirectly.
In
first
it is the negation or denial of a relation,
the
of being begotten or, more broadly, having an
origin. It s1upposes a prior affirmation of the act of begetting.
Moreover, no proeession, no act
innascibiEty. Therefo11e
lacks ·those features: that are person-p11oducing for Aquinas. Innasoibility cannot constitute a trinitarian
hypo.stasis:.
In a question devoted specifieally to the Father, Aquinas
enter!'cains a suggestion that unbegottenness be taken both
negatively
positiv;ely. 36 On this supposition, unbegottenboth (1) that
Father
ness
comes from no one
the :Rather is the som:1ce or
principle
others. Aquinas eonc1udes that unbegottenness
must be taken negatively,
is, as exduding generation in
a passive •sense. If
positively, he says, there woulid be
no way to distinguish it from either fatherhood or spirartion.
So the meanings of mnascibility
fatherhood must be heild
to be diverse.
FinaUy, Aquinas inquires in another context whether 1a hypostias:is in the Trinity
11emains when by thought we isola,te
the :ve!lationsfrom the personso37 Specifica.Hy, he asks whetheir,
1

36 S.'I'. Ia,

33, 4.

s1 S.T. Ia, 40, 3.

HAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

583

if one shoruLd set aside fatherhood iin thought, ibhe unbegotten
hypostasis of the Father woru1d remain ni:wertheless. Appeailing to the distinction between personal and non-personal
cha:r:acteristics. Aquinas answers that if one thought 1away ·a
non-personal property lllie innascibility, the person or hypostasis of the Farther would Sitill remain. If, conversely, fatherhood were swbtracbed, the hypostasis would he subt:mcted as
well. Without that property, the11e
no longer remain 'a
hypostasis distinct horn the Son 1and the Holy Spirit. By
:fatherhood, " the Father
not only Father, but
'
one,' i.e., a hypo-stasis." 38 .A!ll by itself, innascibility is " a negative, affirming nothing." 39
Rahner handles :the reiLation between unoriginatedness and
f.rutherhood in his 1ooncept of "concrete unoriginatedness." He
claims that" God's unoriginatedness, :as manifested in his selfoommunication, possesses a positive character: the fact that
the divine unoriginate mmmunicates himseU in no way
threatens or impairs his absolute integrity." 40 The implied
contrast between a negiative and a po.sitivieuno:ciginatedness is
wnrth noting. Negative unomginatedness, we may fairly presume, is identical with that "total" unoriginatednass that
philosophy gmsps. Positive unoriginatedness, on the other
hand, is ranged rulongs1iide of the divine self-communication, a
fact outside philosophy's pmview. Within .the self-communication of God, " .the esse:nieeof unoriginatedness shows itself in
its conc11eteness: divinity (aseity) which ean communicate itself with011t thereby losing itself, yet without merely keeping
to itself, for rt.his would do aw:ay with the eharrucrteil."of a selfoommumcrution." 41 The logic of Rahner's claim is that, if a
self-oommunillcation occurs, then unoriginatedness is conc11ete
in its very essence and so the Father. 42 Thereby, in :the terms
1

Ia, 40, 3 ad I.
4o Trilnity, 'P· 84.
Ia, 40, 3 ad 3.
41 Trilnity, .p. 84, note 6.
42 The status of the self-communication is left open at this point. Whether
its contingent givenness can be surmounted in Rahner's thought is a question
that will be addressed later.
38 S.T.

39 S.T.

584

ROBERT WARNER

of the self-other dirulooti.chovering in the background, God is
not tmpped within the opposed alternatives of rolitruriness o:r
self-foss. Concrete !Unociginatedness spehl.s God's (i ..e., the
Father's) ability Ibo communicate himself without risk of losing himself.
So the Eather is " not only ' fatherhood ' (helllOe ' notiona1ity ') , but the concrete God in the unity of essentirul aiseity
and notionrul fatherhood, conCl'ete unoriginatedness:." 43 Care
needs :to he taken, however, in specifying that unity or connection. Some specifications can certainly he ru.Jied out. For one
thing, it would be mislerudillgto think of concrete unoriginatednes:s as the S1Um, .so to speak, of aseity 1and .fathe!1.1hood. Putting
it that way conjm1es up the £alse picture of aseity and fatherhood as log,iicaHy prior and independently aiocessib1e eilements
which are then subsequentily combined to yield concrete unoriginatedness. Even were that ruoouriate, innascibility would
not be the resrULt, for nothing woillid thereby be settled about
the Father'1s originlessness. Besides, Rahner invoked " tOlbal "
unoriginatedness preci19ely in order to merge aseity and innascibili.ty info a unity tha:t was eonoeptrurullyimpenetrable for
phllosophy. The ;twin moments of aseity and ii.nnascibilitywere
distinguishable only giy;en the resources of specificaJily Christian revelation, that is, the ·self-communication of God.
F1urthermore, Rabner is not making the Thomistic claii.m
tha:t innascibility is predicated of :the Father wh:iile the Faither
is constii.tuted by fatherhood. On •tihat supposition, innascibilllity presupposes :that the person of the F·a.ther has afoeaidy been
identified hy other means. By itse1f, ii.t does, not
a
hypostasis. But " concirete unoriginatedneiss " does not work
that way.
Rahner is :saying that concrete unoriginatedness and fatherhood 1are identical. He says, for eXiample, that " the Fatherhood and ilie unoriginatedness of :bhe F1ather may be distinguished, with01Ut over:looikingthe fact that the Fatherr's unorginatedness is his fatherhood and shouild not be conceived as
48

Trinity, p. 84, note 6.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

585

previous to it, as constituting a peJJson." 44 In other passages,
he exp1,essly identii..!Jces unoriginatedness as that which constitutes a hypostasis in contmdistinction to those of Son and
Spirit. Rruhner contends that "insofar as he is unoriginate ...
the Father himself has a manner of being given and of existing
which distinguishes him from Son and Spirit, hut which yet
does not propel'ly precede his refation to either of them." 45
Finally, Rahner corunts among the " person-constituting " reiations of onigin, "the unoriginrutedness (innascibility, unbegottenness, Pater ingenitus) of the Father as the origin of the
Son (Fatherhood) ." 46
Rahner's identifiicat1on of concrete unorriginatedness and
fatherhood seems more nea,rly akin ito the proposal, rejected by
Aquinas, thrut
involves both orig:inlessness and
being the somce or
of others. Ce1t.ainly there is a
simifarity. Rahner's deployment of "total" and "concrete"
unodgina:bedness, related as negative .and posa.tive, coV1ers some
of the same conceptual territory. But the differenoes run
deeper. The proposal Aquinas spurned operated only on the
level of trinitarian charaeteristics; it still presupposed something like the iclassica,l De Deo Uno-De Deo Trino sequence.
F rom the outset, however, Rahner has refused to treat the being
of God prior to and independent of the being of the Father.
Aseity itself is only a moment within tota1l unoriginatedness.
Thereby the dialectic of unoriginatedness and fatherhood is a
diai1e!Ctic within the very being of God, the Godhead of God, a.s
well. The transition from negative ,and total unoriginatedness
to positive and concrete unoriginatedness operates both on :tihe
level of the Trinity and on the level of the div:ine essence.
The identifioation of concrete unoriginatedness and fatherhood is the pivotal claim. If 'they cannot be ident!ified, .a rift
1

1

44 Trinity,

pp. 78-9. Emphasis added.
p. 74. Here, as in a few other passages, Rabner talks (curiously)
of the Father's having a manner of being given. Is this manner of being
given ,something other than his self-gift in Son and Spirit? ·what could it
45 Trinity,

be?
46 Trinity,

p. 78.

586

ROBERT WARNER

opens within the viery being of God between the U nol'liginate
and rt.he Father of Jesus Christ. At the decisive point of :transition from negative ·and totrul to positivie and concrete unoriginatedness stands Rahner' s apperul to the concept and the foot
of a divine self-communication. As a consequence, the status
of the !identity o.f the Unoriginate and the F!ather ris finally inseparruble from the status of the ,oot of self-communication.

V. Critique
There are several compeHing reasons to think that the required identity of :the Unoriginate a;nd rt.he Father cannot be
carried through 1sucicessfuilJ.yon Ralmer's terms. Indeed, his
scheme simultaneously requires :and precludes that identification. At worst, the two features simply exclude one another.
At best, they exhibit a mere conjunction, a juxtaposition, a
yielding insteaid a
simultaneity that faHs 1shor:t o.f
hybrid. The identity of Unoriginate and Father becomes, at
best, a' necessary 'aJocident'; so too the ·oot of self-communication. The upshot is :a pervasivie ambiguity about whether the
ultimate origin of ,all rerulity its indeed the Father o.f Jes1Us
Christ or whether there is somethlng behind or prior to the
Father. ffitimately, it seems tJhat what Rabner tis rtrying to do
is to rrdentify .a philosophi!Calilyposited ,a;byss with the Father
of Christian faith by reinterpretating the ,t:ra;ditionailnotion of
innaooibility.
Absolute and Relative Urwrigination. Because the diwne
self-commrunicattion 11emains "urtterily ·concealed" from it,
natural theology misrses an important fact about the absolutely
Unoriginate. It has no idea ,that "this 'absolutely Unorigiina;te
possesses the diViine nature and its1 own absoliute unoriginatiion
simply in being <!'elatedto its Son." 47 This, of course, is slinply
ithe claim tlhat natural iheofogy does not know the F1ather as
Father. The i£1eason, preS1Umrubly,is that the F1ather is who he
is only in relation to the Son. Substitute the claim that un1

41" Theos," p. 134.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

587

FATHER

originateness and fatherhood are identical, however, and you
generate a eontrrudiotion. The contradicbion resides ri.n Rahner's
claiming about the same x (vaguely put, the first trinitarian
hypostas:is) that it is both absolutely and re:1atively unorigiinate. If the Unoriginate as grasped by natural theology is
absolutely unoriginate, " free from ·any conceivable l'esrtriction," 48 it cannot possess its unorigination only in l"elation to
the Son. Were that the case, its unorigination itseJ.£ would be
constituted by a relation and thus not be absolute. Its being
absoJuooly unoriginate means its being is constituted independently from any relation, including its relation to the Son. That
relation must be ,adventitious rto its being .as the absolutely unoriginate. What cannot be saffid is that a thing has its unrelatednes.s in relatedness. At this point, the absolutely Unoriginate and the Father, total and ooncrete unoriginatedness,
move in opposiite directions.
Unoriginate and Self-Communfoation. The notion of selfcommunication is central to Rruhner's trinitarian theology. To
grirusp the measure of the magnitude of the divine act, a,ooording to Rahner, one must invoke the category of selfhood rather
than esseil!ce or nature. What God communicates is no less
than God's very ;ooJ.f. The incarnation of the Son 'and the descent of the Spirit al"e the'Veforedesc:cibed as "the inner, mutually related moments of the one seH-communication, through
which God (the Father) communicateS' himself unto ,the worild
in absolute proximity." 49 It is
characteris,tic of
Rahner's scheme that the commurncator is the Father and so,
sinJC1e the communication is a :self-communication, the seM in
question is' that of the Bather. The
is that
"by which the Faither communicates himself." 50
If, however, unoriginatedness and fatherhood are identical, a
The reason
becomes logically
is ;straight£orwa:vd: unorriginatedness is, by definition, incommunicable. It repl"esents that in God which cannot he tJ'!ans48 "Theos,"

p. 134.

49 Trinity,

p. 85.

50 Trinity,

p. 102.

588

ROBERT WARNER

mitted and the permanent Iogicail bar to the v:ery possibility
of a complete 1self-communioation. Moreovier, to the extent
tiiat unorigina.tedness and self-communica;tion pull apart, the
Unorigina:te looks more and more like something pre-personal,
something fo which the category of :selfhood does not obviously apply. It is more like a pre-pers:ona,l source of trinitarian
personality.
Indeed, Rahner ,appears to link God's transcendence with
unoriginatedness and God's immanence with seH-communication. Distance a;nd .inaccessibility al'e assooiate:d with unoriginatedness while nearness or o1oseness a11e p11edica:tes of the
self-communication. 51 As a consequence, the reconciliation of
divine tmnscendenice 1and divine
is worked out with
his ruccount of the being of the Father. The struggle is evident
in Rahner's insistence on preserving God's "ahsoi!ute integrity" even within the self-communication. That
that
divine transcendence, is preservied by claiming that even in the
self-commuillca;tion the Father remains "the unodginate, who
keeps to himseH, who remains the incomprehensible " 52 or, a
hit more pointedly, "stiays the one who is free, incomprehen53 Insofar
a word,
as unoriginatednes:s
I'epcresents a log1cal bar to
divine transcendence and divine immanence end up being pJayed off one
another;
transcendence competes with God's caparcity
for £eHow1ship.
Status of the Self-Communicationo Rahner argues that,
51 Rahner, for example, regularly
contrasts God as " the distant, incomprehensible and asymptotic term of our transcendence" and God as "present
in the mode of closeness" in the self-communication.
See Foundations of
Christian Faith, trans. 'William V. Dych (New York: Crossroad, 1978), p.
119. Hereafter cited as Foundations.
52 Trinity, po 640
53 Trinity, p. 84. See also the analogy between self-communication
and the
experience of transcendence in Foundations (pp. 121-2). Rahner argues
about the term of transcendence and, by extension, Goel in the· self-communication that "while it is what is innermost in this movement, it also remains
absolutely beyond ancl absolutely untouched by this transcendental movement."

RABNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

589

given 1a se1f-communication, the U noriginate is disclosed to be
the Father. The transition from total unoriginatedness, philosophy's obdoot, to ronorete unoriginatedne&S is e:ffiooted hy apperul to <the act of self...Joommunircation.Even though it grasps
the Unociginate, philooophy does not perceive therem ·that the
Unoriginate is in fact the Father. Why not? Pres1Umably because, .as Rahner emphaticahly insists, the Unoriginate is both
incomprehensible and free. No mel'ely a priori construction
can deduce ·any f.ree act. A fortiori, the wet of self...Joomm1Unication cannot he deduced f.rom :the concept of the Unoriginate.
No logicrul entailment can span .the transition from rtotal to
concrete unoriginatedness or fatherhood. Thereby tihe " absolrute freedom" and the "irreduicible facmcity" of the selfcommunicaition is preserved.H It is only "experienced a,g an
event in plllre f.ructicrity, it cannot be deduced from another
point, and as such again it J.'lemains a mystery." 55
Since it eannot be deduced, one mrust look to history to determine whether or not a 1se1£-communicationhas indeed :taken
This is what Ohristianity does. It .affirms that God has
been operative historicrully in Jesus Christ and in the bestowal
of the Spirit upon believers. The incarnation and the descent
of the Spirit, horwevier, are facts gleaned from history ia:nd, inso.£ar as ,they are historicrul facts, represents contingent states
of affairis. It could a1ways have been otherwise. If the selfoommunication ms a purely contingent state of affairs, the act
of :self-communication cannot q1Ualify or determine it.he vexy
being of God in se. So Rruhner insists tha;t
Between a priori deduction and merely a posteriori gathering of
random facts, there exists a middle way: the recognition of what
is experienced .aposteriorily as transcendentally necessary, because
it has to be, because it cannot be mere facticity, whatever the reasons from which this necessity may be inferred.56
54 Trinity,
55 Trinity,

p. 88, note 10.
p. 88, note 10. Note the close connection between freedom and

mystery.
56 Trinity, p. 100, note 18.

590

ROBERT WARNER

OnJy if the self-oommuniication stamps God essentiaMy in se
is there an immanent trinity. And, to the extent •t:hat "Goo"
signifies the unoriginate origin in the first place, oruy i£ the
·se1f-commmrioation intrinsically and necessarily de1termines
the Unoriginate is rthat Uno:riginate essentially or nroessarily.
the Father.
The status of the 1se1f-oommunication,therefore, bears on the
nature of the identity of the Unoriginate and the Father. If
Raimer insists, as he does, on rthe freedom of the self-communicative acl, he is forced to admit that the Unoriginate is
free to be Father or not, free .to be concrete or not, and, by
extension, free to be a trinity or not. I£ Rahner insists, as he
also does, on the necessity of the ,seH-uommrunication, he is
foroed w ,ooncede its ded:ucibiilrityfrom the concept of the Unoriginate rendering it thereby rationailly (i.e.,
comprehensible. That iis, if the self-communication essentially
or necesoorily characterizes the Unoriginate, philosophy could
not grasp that Unoriginate without graisping it precisely as
Father.. What Rahner wants to affirm is the identity of unoriginatedness and btherhood as well as the non-deducihility
of the self-communication. But that puts him iin the bind of
saying that one and the same .act is both necessary and free.
To be sure, in
thought the principal stress falls on
the freedom and sovereignty of the unoiciginate God. This emphasis, together with rthe simultaneous assertion of the .ad's
freedom and necessity, means that the self-communicative act
has the status of a 'neces:sary aocident' in God; so too, the
identity of the Unoriginate and the Father is a ' nooesisary
aocident.' 57
Rahner does ·claim that the Unociginate God and the seilfcommunication do not " simply coincide . . . in ili£e1ess identity." 58 The appeal ro the category of life at just this juncture
57 The complete argument for this claim exceeds the scope of this essay.
Suffice it to say, it would involve careful attention to Rahner's account of
freedom, especially the relation between freedom and eternity, as well as to
his account of the being of the Holy Spirit and its role within the Trinity.
58 Trinity, p. 84.

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

591

is tantalizing. Nevertheiless, Rahner settles for the negative
form, the denial of :a fileless identity, r:ather than provide a
positive ,account of what the divine life itself consists in. Not
surprisingly, he avoids the obvious positive move, viz. the
simple equation of that life with the act of seH-communication so ;that it comprises God's very be[ng. In ·a ·Slightly different 'context, ·when attempting to :veconcile God's distance
(or transceil!dence) and God's nearness (or immanence as
se1f-communicating), Rather says that the two" coincide in a
way which subsumes both-term and object-and their difforenre into a more original and ultimate unity which can no
longer be distinguished eonceptually ." 59 Agiain there is an appeal <to a coinciding and a species of identity. This time the
coincidence titseH is described as: conceptually impenetr:able.
Presumably rthe s:ame holds ;bme for the coincidence of necessity and freedom. In the absence of a positive rucoount of
their compatibiility, the coincidence is indistinguishable conceptuaJJy from a ' nooessary accident '.
An Abyss. I would like to mnc1ude this discussion by making a further interpretive p1.1oposal,even though I 'Ciannot fully
argue its aptness within rthe parameters of this essay. Rahne[''s
dtist:inctiveclaim about the identity of the unorigiinate Father,
coupled with the seve:ml aporias rrurgued to he attendant upon
that claim, gienerates the hypothesis of an abyss lying behind
the Faither. Consider the evidence.
Rahner's position relies on a dialectical interplay between
tortaJ and ·eonCl'e:te unoriginatedneiss, between the Unoriginate
and the Bather. They ,are rto he both distinguished and identified. A sharp fogical break irS marked between them. That
hiatus cannot he 1spanned conceptuaJJy. Thought cannot
bridgie it, for moomprehensibility is a predicate of :the Unorignate. Only a ,completely free act which, ·as foee, is non-deduc ..
iible can surmount thre fog]cal hiatus1 and effect the tmnsition.
Christianity, proclaiming that a divine self-communication has
59 Foundations, p. 119.

592

ROBERT WARNER

taken place, confesses the Unoriginate to be the Father of
Jesus Christ.
In effect, philosophy mounts to :an ·abyss, to what it recognizes reflection cannot encompass but only endlessly approach
in 1an iasymptotic fashion. That abyss is .subsequently identified, from the standpoint of Christian faith, with the unocignatedne:ss cl.assicailly.taken to be distinctive of the Father withtrinitari:an theology. Total unoriginatedness, .insofar as it
points to the underlying 'll.llity of uncreatedness and unbegort:flenness, ·ailready mocves in the direction of 1an abyss, ·an ontologically formless prius. This move, baptizing the :abyss by
identifying it with trinitarian unoriginatedness,
underwrites Rahner' s .reconciliation of faith and reason, theological :and philosophical first principles.
Conversely, however, the •reinterpretation of the traditional
notion of innascibility th11ough the category of the abyss
creates p1.1oblems within Christian theology. An abyss is incomprehensible noetiicaHy. lts actions, if and insofar as it acts,
'are non-deducible: its wiLl is insorutahle and unpredictable.
F1orm1es1sonrtologtlcally,the abyss can never be completely identified with any state of affairs grounded in it or, to ruse a d:ifie11ent metaphor, with :any aotion springing from it. When,
thel'efore, Rahner tries to identify the phifosophical abyss with
the Father of Christian faith through a reinterpreted notion
of mnascibility, he runs up 1against the .abyss's imperviousness
to any concrete determimut:ion like fatherhood. In Rahner's
fangiuage, the diaJecticaJ .transition from "total" rto "concrete " unoriginatedness cannot finaLly be made. 60 Thereby

m

60 The hypothesis of an abyss shows where Rahner seeks to distance himself from Hegel without reverting to a pre-critical metaphysic. It is not the
destiny of the abyss to become subject, as is the case for 'substance' with
Hegel. Schelling's version of romantic idealism comes closest to providing
Rahner with a philosophical vehicle. (An essay well worth pondering in this
connection is Emil Fackenheim's " Schelling's Conception of Positive Philosophy," The Review of Metaphysics 7 [1953-54]: 563-82.) The trinitarian price
to be paid, however, is no leE>s heavy than what comes with electing the
Hegelian option. The upshot of coupling an abyss with a self-communicative
act is a trinitarian theogony, and that is no advance over Absolute Spirit,

RAHNER ON THE UNORIGINATE

FATHER

593

the foee wet of .sieH-oommunicaition,suspended over the abyss,
seems 1at best ra necessary ·accident and, a:long with it, the
fatherhood of God. The abyss, not the Father, is the ultimate
somce of the entire Trinity (immanent as weU asi economic)
and of the c11eated order. It becomes the condition of possibility of the immanent trinity. Solitariness rather than fellowship threatens to be the fina:l woJ.'d about God.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY'S PROBLEMATIC
INTERPRETATIONS OF LEO XIII AND THE
AMERICAN FOUNDERS
MICHAEL

J. SCHUCK

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

"Useful falsehoods are dangerous things,
often costing something down the road."
Garry Wills

I

N THE PROLOGUE to his provocative study of ithe
Declaration of Independence, Garry Wills claims Abraham Lincoh1 distorted Thomas Je:fferson's document for
purposes. Amid the tumult of civil war, L,incoln encouraged Amer1cans to "dedicate" themsely;es to the "proposition that all men are created equal," because on this basis
their "fathe11s" had originalJy "conceiV'ed" the nation "four
scoil.'e and seven years" earlier.
In fact, says Wins, the signers employed the word '
'
not to denote ,an a:titribute of indiviJdual persons but rather ito
descnibe the severed colonies' political standing vis-a-vis the
motiheT country. Nor did the Dedar:ation 1conceive a nation:
"if anything, July 4, 1776, produced twieily;e new nations." 1
Lincoln's 1oreatiy;euse of the Dedaration of Independence at
Gettysburg bore both benefits and costs. It emboldened
Union cresolvedur:ing the war and inspired a new nation in the
1aftermath. Yet it aJ.so, thinks W,i<lls, promoted the false notion
that the Dechration contains a coherent political " doctrine,"
a doctrine one must adopt " in order to be an American." In
addition, it transformed the Puritan ideaJ of a " eity set on a
1 Garry Wills, Inventing
America: Jefferson's Declaration of Independence
(New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1978), pp. xiii-xvi.

595

596

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

hilltop " Ito .a theory of American manifest destiny-" ,a belief
in our extr:ao11dinacybirth" as a "nation ·apart," with an obEgation to "sav;e the world." 2
This paper argues that an anaJogorus situation exists in the
way the Roman Crutholic theofogian John Oorurtney Munay
used the encyclical teachings of Leo XIII and the founding
documents of the American republic From 1945 to 1967,
Murray presented powerful a:nrd yet flawed inteTpretations of
these texts to advance two momentous projects: doctrinal
rucknowledgment of religious freedom by the Roman Catholic
Church and social :vooognitionof a link between Catholic and
American political thought. It is important to identify rthese
flruws becruuse, Eke Lincofo's reading of the Declaration, Mrnrray's inibwpretations have not only enhanced but also handicapped contemporary Roman Catholic sociaJ ethics.
The argument will proceed in three ,steps. First, Murmy's
case for Catholic approval of religforus freedom and American
political :thought will be outlined. As the shifts and increasing
complexity of Murray's thinking on these matters have been
ably demonstrated by others, only a distillation of his thought
be ofiiered here. 3 Second, an argrument for Murriay's misinterpreta;tion of both Leo XIII's encyclical teruchings and
American political :thought wiU be presented. The purpose will
not be rbo invalidate
outstanding a;chievements in
American Caitholic :sociail ethics hut to estabHsh the grounds
for chaiUengingit in step three. This final step wil[ focus in on
two persistently influential yet problematic dimensions o.f his
work: ,the organic theory o.f doctrinal development and the
Cartho1icincorporation of American liberalism.
1

2 Ibid.,

pp. xix-xxii.

a See J. Leon Hooper, The l!lthics of Discourse: The Social Philosophy of

John Oourtney Murray (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
1986) ; Thomas T. Love, John Oourtney Murray: Oontemporary Ohurch-State
Theory (New York: Doubleday, 1965): Robert W. McElroy, The Search for
an American Public Theology: The Oontribution of John Oourtney Murray
(New York: Paulist Press, 1989); Donald E. Pelotte, John Oourtney Murray: Theologian in Ooofoict (New York: Paulist Press, 1975).

JOHN

COUHTNEY

MURRAY,

LEO XIII,

AND AMERICA

597

The Two Projects
Murray's work in ethics and public affairs mveQ'ed a wide
range of topics, resulting in a prodigious output of over 130
magazine and journal articles in thirty-five years. His two
projects, I'eligious freedom and Catholic compatibility wjth
Ameriican pohtical thought, constitute over a third of this corpus. The following offers an encapsulated version of each
argument.
Reiligious F11eedom
In thirteen Theological Studies articles from 1945 to 1966,
John Courtney Murray turned mains;tream Roman Catholic
teaJChing a,bout religious freedom on its head. He claimed that
the puhl.iic expression of an individual's religious faith was
momHy a,ceeptabJe on grounds internal to Catholicism itseH.
But what of Pope Leo XIII's nineteenth century support for
Catholic confos:siona'l states and for the banning of an individual's pubrlic expression of non-Catholic religion? Murray
1said that this was "consequent upon social fact and social
necessities of the hisitori:cal, not theoTetical, oridier," a position
tafoen to protect church freedom a,gainst attacks by Europe's
newJy constituted, anti-derieal nation-states. 4
Murray foca.ted the non-contingent core of Catholic thought
on 11eHgioius freedom in three interrelated ideas: the distinction
between state and socrety, the freedom of the churrch, and the
dignity of the person. Each idea orystalized ait difforent times
in his thought, reaching mutual reinforcement during and
after the religious freedom debates at ¥atican II.
By 1951, J\./[urray folt a critioal element in understanding
4 John Courtney
Murray, "Leo XIII: Two Concepts of Government,"
Theological Studies 14 (December 1953) : 556. Theological Studies is hereafter cited TS and article authors and titles will be given only in the first
citation. Sec also his "The Church and Totalitarian Democracy," TS· 13
(December 1952) : 551; "Leo XIII on Church and State: The General Structure of the Controversy," TS 14 (March 1953) : 13; and "Leo XIII: Two
Concepts of Government, II Government and the Order of Culture," TS 15
(March 1954) : 15.

598

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

reiligiorus :freedom was the d:istiTI!ction between state and society. The :sta:tie neither embodies society as a whole nor assumes responsihllity for .all of its needs. Instead, it is but one
social institution among many and has one principa;l task: :to
preserV'epublic order by wdministering essenrtia1leveis of peace,
moraility, iand justice. Oare for the totail common good of so"includes all the sooiaJ. goods, spiritual and mo11a1
as well as material, which man pursues here on earth in acoord with :the demands of his personal and sociaJ. nature" -is
the province not of the state 1rulone, but of aH the social institutions (family, church,
business firm, voluntary aissociation, ista:te) functioning freeJy, cooperativieily, and appropriately in their distinct arieas of ioompetence.5
In his iseareih for an example of this distinction in papal
encyclicals, Murray 1adnrittredthat "up fo [Leo XIII's] Rerum
novarum, rthe trruditional distirnction between ,society and state
is obscured." 6 But in tihis encyclical the distinction surfaces
when the pope describes :the powe[" of the :state in the economic
order as "strictly limited" rto grav;e :social emergencies to
which no other social unit can adequately l"espond. Murray
used tthe foliliowing qruotations from the encyclical: " The law
ought not to undertake more, nor ought it go farther, than the
remedy of evils or the removatl of danger requires," and " Let
the state protect these lawfully russociated bodies of citizens.;
but let it not intrude into their internal .affairs ·and order of
li£e." Leo XIII'is use of a more " paternal " and less " properuy political '' notion of the state [n otiher letters was a function not of his prIDcipJes but of " the hisbo:rical conditions
which this particular pope confronted." 7
With the help of this distinction between stwte and society,
Mrurray 1argrued that direct care £or the spiritual good of 1socierty
s John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom," TB 25
(December 1964): 528. See also his "The Problem of State Religion," TS
12 (June 1951) : 158, n. 6.
6 John Courtney Murray,
" The Issue of Church and State at Vatican
Council II," TB 27 (December 1966): 586.
1 TS 14 (December 1953) : 551-54.

JOHN COURTNEY

MURRAY,

LEO X!Il, AND AMERICA

599

depends not on the ,state but on iieligious in:dividua1s and instiitutions. "The Chu11ch and the chm:1ches, and various voluntary associations for l1eligious purposes " shoukl be neither impeded nor dir,eol'ly aided by the state. 8 While the state shou1d
show ooncern for the religious condition of society, its cura
religionis must go no farther than preserving jurid.icwl conditions "
to 1the free p11ofessionand praictice of religion"
by the people (the cura libertatis religionis) and their reJigious
institutions (inc1lurding Roman Catholic concern for the cura
libertatis Ecclesiae) .9
Murmy founrd arguments against state coer1cion of religious
instirbutions in " 60 or more documents of Leo XIII '' and saw
an argument against rdircct state aid for religion in the pope's
Sapientiae christianae statement that " the goveranice of souls
(regimen animorum) is committed to the chunch ,alone, in such
wise ithat the politicarl power has no part in it at all." From
this, Murray concluded that
When the pope says 'no part at all,' it is to be presumed that he
means 'no part at all.' Not even therefore an instrumental part.
Consequently, when one finds in history the civil power playing a
part in the goverance of souls, one can be sure that other factors
were at work beyond the exigencies of principle; they were factors
inherent in special historical circumstances.1°

F11om the beginning of his deliberations on l1eiigious freedom,
Murray considered the basic issue" the freedom of the human
person to rrewch God." 11 But not until he established the idenand refative :autonomies of starte :and chu11ch did he
s TS 25 (December 1964): 528. See also TS 27 (December 1966): 598.
27 (December 1966): 598. See also John Courtney Murray, "Con·
temporary Orientations of Catholic Thought on Church and State in the
Light of History," TS 10 (June 1949): 189; TS 12 (June 1951): 173, n.
17; TS 25 (December 1964): 528.
10 On state coercion, see TS 12 (June 1951) : 156; and TS 27 (December
1966): 593. On state aid, see TS 14 (June 1953): 204; and TS 27 (Decem·
ber 1966): 606.
11 J olm Courtney Murray, "Freedom of Religion:
I. The Ethical Problem,"
1'S 6 (June Hl45): 236.
9 TS

600

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

amplify this dimension of the problem. This process helped
him undersfand how the dignity of the person (rooted in
humanity'iS God-given Tationality and freedom) requires that
individuals be allowed the freedom to negotiate the claims of
citizenship and ;ve1igiosity :in their own consciences and not
have these claims: negotiated for them in enactments between
states and churches. Thius, the state is not to promote religiaus truth for indiviidrual,shut to protecrt the indiividiual's right
to pursue S1Uch truth; the church may facilitate this pursuit
tlmough its cruU to " teach, ru1e, and sanctify," hut it may not
enlist the state in these :rotivities, lest individual consciences
be coel"ced. " No argument can be made today," said Murray,
" that would vaJidate the legal institution of religious intolerance." 12
Murray identified " the ttmth of the dignity of the human
person " as " part of the Catholic position from the beginning,"
though it did not" emerge as determinant of social and political doctrine " until Leo XIII's Rerum novarum. 18 Another
important step was Leo XIII's Immort<ile Dei refel"enceto the
pel'lsoin as both " citizen and also Christian." " Leo XIII was
implicitly saying," wrote Murray, "that the human person by
his action as Christian and citizen ought to be the instrument
and agent of establishing this harmony in actual fact." 14
Mur11ay heM that these three
ideas undergirding 11eligious rneedom were iillcipient in Loo XIII, further
elucidated in the writings of Pius: XI, Pius XII, and John
XXIII, and folly maniifested
Vatican's II's Dignitatis
humanae. Few is1sues, thought Murray, gave greaiter evidence
for the development of doctrine in the Roman Catholic Church
thoo. religious freedom.
12 On the role of the church, see TS 12 (June 1951) : 156. On intolerance,
see TS 25 (December 1964): 570.
1a Edward Gaffney, "Religious Liberty and Development of Doctrine: An
Interview with John C. Murray," Oatholio World, February 1967, p. 278. See
also TS 27 (December 1966): 586.
14 TS 10 (June 1949): 189, 220-22. See also TS 14 (June 1953): 209-11
and TS 27 (December 1966): 587.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY, LEO XIII, AND AMERICA

601

American Political Thought
In the intmdwction and first two chapters of We Hold These
Truths, John Courtney Murray argued thait Roman Catholic
ithought
the best intellectual bra.ce for the" American
Proposition" contained in the Declaration of Irndependerrce,
the Constibut1ion, and the Bi11 of Rights. This a1ssertion was
and the
based on four links he pe11ceiV'ed between
founding documents of the American republic.
First, he tmced sruch American principles as the rule of law,
the imp0Tt1wnoeof consent of the governed, and the distinction
between state and society baick to the Christian political
theory of mec:lieV'al Europe. In the thirteenth century, for examp1e, Heney of Bradon understood that the king was "under
God and under the law" because ",the faw makes' the king."
Similarly, "the princip1e of consent wrus inherent in the medieval idea of kingship"; as an instance, Henry VI's Chief Justice insisted that the king "may set upon theim [the people]
non imposicions without their consent [sic]." Finailly, the distinction between state and society was apparent in the medievail d.iftierenti:ation between studium and imperium. 15
Second, Murray felt that the Deolamtion, like Roman Catholic thought, asisumes a " realist epistemology." Here, " the
'l.'eal " is the " measure of kno<wledge" 1and human intelligence
can reach " the real, i.e., the nature of things." This epistemology was "made c1ear by the Declaration of Independence in
the famous phrase: ' We hold these truths ito be ,self-evident.' "
In these words, the American founders presumed the Catholic
notion of "objeetiv;e truth, uniV'ersal in its import" and "accessihle to the reason of man." 16
Murray also thought the Declarrution shares with Catholicism a commitment to the moral theory of natural law. Both
the Declaration and the Bill of Rights were " tributary to the
15 John Courtney Murray, We Hold These Truths: Oatholio Refieotions on
the American Proposition (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1960), pp. 32-35.
16 Ibid., pp. viii-ix and 327.

602

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

rtriadirti.onof na;turaJ. law, to the idea that man has cerlain original responsibilities pr:ecisely as man, antecedent to his status
as citizen." Here again, Catholicism and the Declaration draw
on the ,sh:wed epistemology " that man is intelligent; that
reality is intelligible; and that reality, as gra;sped by intelligeDJee, imposes on the will the obligation that it be obeyed in
its demands for action m abstention." 17
The fourth link Murray !'ecognized was mutual recognition
of God. The Declaration, he wrote, " looks to the sovereignty
of God 1as to rthe firsrt principle of its organization." Like
Catholicism, the American foundel.ls understood God as the
"Creator of nature .and the Mas.ter of his.tory." 18
On ,the stl'ength of these four links, Murray concluded that
if a rtime came when either indifference or dissent eroded the
principles of the Declaration,
The Catholic community would still be speaking in the ethical and
political idiom familiar to them as it was familiar to their fathers,
both the Fathers of the Church and the Fathers of the American
Republic. The guardianship of the original American consensus,
based on the Western heritage, would have passed to the Catholic
community,. within which the heritage was elaborated long before
America was.19

Problematic Interpretations
But in arguing for Catholic rrooognition of the importaJ11Ceof
re:ligious freedom and of rthe vaLue of Ameriioan political
thought, MuNay presented flawed rinterpretations both of the
encyclicaJ. teachings of Leo XIII and of the founding documenrbsof tihe Republic.
The Encyclical Teachings of Leo Xill

Close .analysis of the papal encyclicrul literature does not
support the argument that Leo XIII reoo·gnized-implicitly
or explicitly-the three non-contingent eilements Murray conu Ibid., pp. 37 and 109.

18 Ibid.,

pp. 28 and 37.

10 Ibid.,

pp. 42-43.

JOHN COURTNEY

MURRAY,

LEO XIII, AND AMERICA

603

sidered essential to Catholic thought of religious freedom.
Both a micro- and a macroscopic study of these letters rebuts
Murray's olaim.
When viewed [n detail, the critioal texts that Murray used
do not sus1tain his argument. This is true, first of all, concerning Murray's distinction between state and society. When Leo
XIII wrote " that the faw ought not to undertake more . . .
:than the ,remedy of evils," he was addressing the state's response to specific social emergencies such as labor strikes, Sun·day labor, or work-force oppression. In such eases, the state
must offer asS'istance without assuming the l'esponsibilities of
the business firm itself; the latter would be an intrusion into
1an 1association's "internal affairs and order of life." In saying
this, the pope was not-as Murray suggested-establishing
a
princip1e for the state's approach toward society under normal
conditions. Leo XIII was olear on this matrter: since the state's
purpose is " to serve the common good," it must monitor social life in all its dimensions. The power of the state, he said
in Rerum novarum, " should he exercised as the power of God
is e:x;e13cised-with the fatherly solicitude which not only guides
the whole, but :t'eaiches also individuals." 20
Murray's second element concerned church freedom. When
Leo XIII declared in Sapientiae christianae that the political
power has" no part at all" in governing souls, he was referring
to taisks specific to the church: the p11ead1ing of the Gospel;
the practice of s1ac11ed rites; !the distribution and discipJine of
ecclesiast:Ucal offices; the enaJCtment and aid.ministration of
of creligious congregations, ascanon la:w; and the
sociations, and institiutions. Leo XIII was not saying-as
Murray maintained-thait the state 1should not assist the
chm1ch in these tasks; he was
stating that these are not
the 1state's prerogatives. Two paragraphs far 1ther along in the
same letter, the pope noted: "in the public 011der itself of
1

20 Leo XIII, Rerum novat·um, 35. All encyclical references are taken from
Claudia Carlen, ed., The Papal Encyclicals, 5 vols. ([Wilmington, N.C.]:
McGrath Publishing Co., 1981), vol. 2.

604

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

states-which cannot be severed from the laws influencing
mora1s and from religious duties---'it is 1alw:ays urgent, and indeed the main preoccupation, to tail{!e thought how best to con.sult 1the interests of Catholicism." 21
Finally, as to MUICTay's identification of the concept of
human dignity as a "determinant of sociaJ. and political doctrine " in Leo XIII, the pope nowhere employieid: this 001J1cept
as a philosophioal or theologiicrul ground for understanding
human conscience. In Rerwm novarum, Leo XIII did refer to
human dignity three rtimes, hut in eacli cruse it is without
elaboration, and in eruch case he associaited iit, not (like Murray) with human natrl.J.'l'le, but with "Christian character."
Similarly, in Immortale Dei, when Leo XIII described the
human person as both " icitizen and also 00.ristian," he did not
mean to sugge:srt that the truth claims of state and church
should be adj1udicated solely in individituail:conscience. Quite
the opposite. Leo xm used this idea to indicate how importanit it 1was for 1state and church to coopemte "inasmurch as
each of these two powers has authority o-ver rthe same sub-

iects."

22

On a
level, the tota;l thrust of Leo XIII's communications ·across 86 encyiclica;lletters runs counter to Murmy' s claims. As can be 1seen from the perBpective of his entire
roorpus, Loo XIII held thait .a11 state authority comes from God
for :the "welfare of those whom it govierns." This requires care
of people's "external well-heing" and "the welfare of men's
soruils," respectiviely called the "proximate " and " remote"
ends of government. Chul'loo and state have joint jmisdiction
o-ver 11emote ends iSUJCh 1as marriage, rudoilesoentediucation, and
public censorship. But because rthe church possesses primary
the soul, state reguilation in
authority over matters
these wreas m11.LSt follow churoh teruching. Thus., the ·state
sh0'1.l.1d
'the Catholic Church silllCle " the profession of one
n Leo XIII, Sapientiae ahristia-nae, 29.
22 On human dignity,
see Leo XIII, Rerum n-0vwrum, 20. On the two
powers, see Immortale Dei, 13.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY,

LEO XIII, AND AMERICA

605

religion is neeesisary in <the state" and the religion pruhlidy professed must be that " which alone is true." 23
Underling this teaching was Leo XIII' s firm commitment to
Thomas Aquinas's architectomc vision of all things emanating
from God, .sustained by God, 'and returning to God through
Jesus Christ. This v:ision indluded a model of the world as a
hiemrchy of creaited entities moving through spruce and time
by virtue of orde:red causes. This mov;ement is not random,
hut l'eflects'--however obliquely-God's embedded purposes
for the world. From this perspective, Leo XIII believed" the
principJe of civil ml'd l'elig.ious power is one and the same,
namely, God. Thel'\efove, the:re can be no discol'd between
the:m ... for God cannot rbe at variance with Himself." 24
But Leo XIII also recognized two facts. First, the
of institutional priodty being granted the Roman Catholic
Churrch in traditionally non-Catholic states wa·s remote. Second, church insistence that Cartholic citizens press for such institutionrul status in
states cou1d caruse more
harm than good. As a vesuilt, out of considerations of expedience, he did aocept situations of less than optimaJ church
status. In Libertas, 33, he
, .. while not conceding any right to anything save what is true
and honest, she [the Church] does not forbid public authority to
tolerate what is at variance with truth and justice, for the sake of
avoiding some greater evil, or of obtaining or preserving some
greater good.
From both a m.i:cr:o- and a macroscopic perspective, John
Cou'lltney Mm.ray pa.-esented a flawed interpretation of the
papal texts and pr:oposed an argument for relig.i:ousfreedom in
28 Leo XIII, Libertas, 21; and Sapientiae christianae; 25 and 29. See also
Licet multa, 3; Nobilissima gaUorum gens, 2; lmmortale Dei, 4, 6-7, 10.
24 Leo XIII, Officio sanctissimo, 13. See also Quod apostolioi muneris, 10;
Arcanum, 36; Immortaie Dei, 32; Sapientiae christianae, 5-6, 11. On creation and causality, see Officio sanctissimo, 8; Libertas, 15; Rerum novarum,
6 and 22; Divinum Ulud munus, 3. On purposiveness, see Arcanum, 25; Immortale Dei, 4; Au milieu des sollioitudes, 6.

606

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

direct opposition to the teaclllngs of Leo XIII. Leo XIII's support for rbhe Catholic confessional state and for banning an indiviidiuail'spublic expression of non-Catholic religion cannot be
explained away 1by appeals to historical eontingency; ;these were
his principles.
Oatholicism .and the " American Proposition "
When Murray proposed his argument for the compatibility
rthorught, disagreement surof Catholic and American
faced not oruy from ;scholars acoostomed to be wary of the
Catholic presel1!ce in the United States brut wlso from some
academics otherwise sympathetic to Catholicism. An ex:ample
of the latter is Edrwar:d
ess1ay " John Courtney Murray: Historicism as an Antidote," published in his Peter and
Caesar: The Catholic Church and Politwal Authority (New
York: Herder and Herdea."", 1965). Although the entirety of
his argument will not be discussed hoce, one of his points is
particularly apropos.
Contemporary rscholarship on the inteiL1ectualand historical
context of the founding doC1UIDents aJso calls several of Murmy';s claims into question. We will ha¥e reootU.rse, once again,
to Garry Wi1ls's Inventing America.
If Goerner and Wills M"e oorrect, Murray's forur links between Catholic thought and the founding documents of the
American republic cannot hoM. As to Murmy's first claim that
American politicail thought
rooted in the Christian po·litical
theory of medievrul Europe, Goerner insisted that the remote
origin of ea.rly American political thought was not the medieval period hut Greek and Roman civilization. The 1alternative, wrote Goerner, is a "noble, Platonic tale that Murray
tells with a view to taming the e:x:cessesof both Catholics and
non-Catholics so that they can li¥e rtogether." 25 For the
proximate inte1lectuail origin of rthe American republic, Wills
1

1

1

25 E . .A. Goerner, Peter and Caesar: The OathoUa Ohurah and Political Authority (New York: Herder and Herder, 1965), p. 182.

JOHN COURTNEY MURRAY,

LEO

xrn, AND AMERICA

607

cites the founde11s' "speciiaJ affinity" with the English revolutionaries of the l
who celebra;ted ·the fact that they
"ousted a CwtJ:rolicincumbent" from the throne. 26
Contrary to Murray'1s second olaim that Catholicism and the
American founders share a realist epistemology, Wills notes
that Jefferson-like the buJk of his contemporaries-was a
Lockean empiricist. For Jefferson, reason discerns not the ends
and purposes of human action (as in Thomistic realism) but
the means necessary to ends proposed by human desire; reason is not a "principle of aietion" but a "stiilJ ·arnd receptive"
faculty 1assigned the tasks either of "simply registering reality" or of making pmotical chnices. 27
But wha:t of Jefferson's "self-evident truths" which Murray
identified with Catholic natural law moraJ theory? From Jef:ferson's perspective, these were not laws discovered within
natural reason but affoctiV'e sentiments of benevolence issued
from :the human heart. On this basis, the Dec1aration is far
firom a natural law document; fostead, it reflects the moral
sense theory of the Scottish EnJ.ightenment. In this theory,
moraility is a matter of a:esthetics, not dialectics. Thus, Wills
asserts that Jefferson's ethical theory (following Francis
Hutcheson) was not linked to lllatura:l law but to "the moral
sense as :a separate fia1c1ulty.''28
Finrully, :the deistic beliefs of Jefferson and many of his politiioail contemporaries were a far cry from Roman CathoJic
theism. AHhough Jeffe:rson',s deism-unlike Toland's-incorporated a "religion of the heal't," his appeal to God in the
Declaration wouM sca:11cely support Murray's belief in a mutual recognition of God hetween Catholicism and the American founders. Jefferson, writes Wills, "left no room for divine
revelation " and " identified Europe with superstition because
of the Catholic church.'' 29
Murray's argument that Roman Catholic thought undergirded the founding poJitical documents of America cannot be
1

1

26 Wills,

21 Ibid.,

Inventing America, p. 99.
p. 194.

2s Ibid.,
29 Ibid.,

p. 199.
pp. 160, 182, 283.

608

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

sustained. He misread the iouncling doooments iin ithat he
:si:buaitedthem a.t .too great a distance from their- classical and
Enlightenment origins. Throughout his life, Murray agonized
over the prospect of America departing from its " doctrine,"
but, like Lincoln, he missed the extent to which this doctrine
w.as of his own making.

Handicaps
John Courtney Murray endowed Roman Cathoilic social
ethlcs with a rich, 1sruhsbantia.llegacy. But over the years, general aooeptance of ibis interpvetations of Leo XIII and ilihe
American forundevs has served to endorse two elements of this
legacy tlmt need fo he challenged. These are his m-gam.ic
theory of doiotrinal development and the Catholic incorrporation of American Hberailism.
Development of Doctrine

In his commentary on Vatican Ils' Declaration on Religious
Frieedom, Pietm Pavan says the Council would have rejected
Dignitatis humanae had Murray not " put in evidence " its
continru:irty with ",the teaching of the Catholic Chfil'ch." 30
But .this essay shows that Murray's concept of religious freedom ·was not in continuity with the teac:hings of Leo XIII.
The problem, however, is not
discontinuity but the
way he ·argues for continuity.
Munay',s intel'est in the impact of historical context and
change on church teaching made for a more sophisticated approooh toward doctrinal development than that held by many
of his contemporaries. Beyond simple elucidation through
gradrual initellecbual clarification, doctrines rulso develop dialect:icailly," by a ressourcement, a creative return to the sources
so Pietro Pavan, "Ecumenism and Vatican II's Declaration on Religious
Freedom," in Religious Freedom: 1965 and 1975: A Symposiwm on a Historic
Document, ed. Walter J. Burghardt, Woodstock Studies 1 (New York: Paulist
Press, 1977), p. 14.

JOHN COURTNEY

MURRAY,

LEO XIII, AND AMERICA

609

of the tradition, .a review of traditional doctrine within a new
perspectiV'e rcreat,edby history." 31
Yiet, the heart of Murray's theory-like rthat of Bernard
Lonergan, foom whom he borl'owed-retains
what Joseph
Stephen O'Leary caHs the " total aoceptance of the Aristotielean my,th of 1a necessary progression from mythos to
logos." 32 Even with his sensitiviity to history, Murr:ay remains
committed to the o'l:"ganic dictum that " living things grow
without surrendering their identities." 33 Or, as P:avan describes
it:
Between repetition and contradiction ' datur tertium,' there is a
third possibility: unfolding from within. What our Lord said of
the kingdom of heaven can be said analogically of Christian sociopolitical doctrine: it is a seed which becomes a tree. 34

The organic theory of doctrinal development handicaps
Roman Catholic social ethics in two ways. It masks the
"discontinuities, the flaws, the tentativ;e 1and makeshift quality, the wedu1cible pluralism" of chu11ch discourse on social
ethics. 35 Thus, Murray's suoces1s at Va,tican II has rullowed
CathoHcs to ov;erlook the 11eality of substantive conflict and
contradiction in chmch teaiching. What Ca:tholics need to do
is rto devefop the theological ·capacity to concede eeclresia.lerror.
The organic 1therory also requil'es that new ·ethical insights be
justified hy showing connections with ea11Her chm1ch utterrances. Making su:ch connections a requirement draws scholars
perilously dose to what O'Leary calils a " hermeneutics of
s1 TS 25 (December 1964): 534. See also John Courtney Murray, "Vers
une intelligence du developpement de la doctrine de l'Eglise sur la liberte
religieuse," in Vatican II: La Liberte Religieuse, ed. J. Hamer and Y. Cougar
(Paris: Les Editions du Cerf, 1967), p. 114.
-02 Joseph Stephen O'Leary, "The Hermeneutics
of Dogmatism," Irish The·
ological Quarterly, 41 ( 1980) : 108.
33 William E. Reiser, What wre They Saying A.bout Dogma?
(New York:
Paulist Press, 1978), p. 34.
34 Pavan, "Ecumenism and Vatican II," p. 14.
as O'Leary, " Dogmatism," p. 112.

610

MICHAEL J. SCHUCK

transparent ciroularity ." 86 Even Murray entered this cioole
on occasion: "The ·answer [to the question of religious freedom]
must be new," he wrote, "hecaiuse the question is new. The
answer must a1so be traiditional, because it is the answer of the
Ohiul1Clh."37
American Liberalism
Though
case for the compatibility of Oatholicism
and Ameriican poiliticail thought is £Lawed, ibis argument persists, buoyed by the siz·abJe pM"ticipaitionof Cmtholics in political ilife and the tremendoos material success of the American
clm:rich. The sanguine alignment in most Catholics' minds be:IJWieen American libe11alism1and Roman Oathoilicism is, in part,
a problemrutic legacy of Murray's work.
American Jiheralism is .a form of cla.ssicaJ Enlightenment
liberaJlism nuanced by America's unique social experiences of
westwa:vd expansion and unpoooodented economic growth.
Despite differences, bo:th forms of liberalism share a core undel"standing of the ·self a.ind society. Accoroing to S. I. Benn,
" the model of the natural person p!l."esrupposed:by liberalism is
that of a self-governing chooser"; or, paraphriasing J. S. Mill,
rthe person is "sieil.:f,.determining,self-developing, and aiutonomous." 38 The 1iberaJ idea of society is a body of individuals
"not for iitsel.f, or for anyrthing intrinsic :to the
1ooJJaiborative .ructivity, but only £or what each beilieves he
wouM get out of :it." In this model, the inidividuaJ's commitment to the grlQlup will "ialwayis be conditional, and derive
from his own standards"; complete commitment to :a community would constitute "
abdication of autonomous
judgement." 39 Drawing from this core understanding of sel£
a6 Ibid., p. 98.

(December, 1964): 523.
S. I. Benn, "Individuality, Autonomy, and Community," in Oommumty
as a Sooial Ideal, ed. Eugene Kamenka (New York: St. Martin's Press,
1982), p. 44 and 46.
37 TS 25

38

39 Jl,iid., J?l?· 44, 49, 57.

JOHN COURTNEY MUltRAY, LEO XiI1, AND AMERICA

611

and society, America's unique experiences with westward expansion and economic growth have only tended to ampJify this
emphasis on individuail self-reli:anice1and sociaJ. pragmatism.
The understandings of self and society offered in the encyclical social teaichings of the Roman Catholic Church do not
conform to these liberal models. Beginning with Benedict
XIV (1740-1758), through Leo Xlll, and up to John Paul II,
the popes hav;e understood the self as embedded in the community. &om this perspective, the person is defined, in p.ar:t,
by "the totality of its relations with other beings and, particularily, with other selves." 40 Given these relations, the
Catholic :self-unlike the "raidicaJly unencumbered " liberal
self--possesses what Allen Buchanan calls" special non-voluntary obligations." Admittedly, the popes hav;e not always expLained .the origin of these obJigations in the same way. While
God's will is .aJways identified as the ultimate origin of moral
obligation., this will is sometimes mediated through territorial
oostoms (the ·eighteenth-century position) , sometimes through
cosmological nature (Leo XIII's position), and sometimes
through an affective sense of soli!darity (the predominant position since Vaitican II) .41
Unlike
largely procedural or functionalist understanding of society, the popes: have argued for ·a 'diakonic'
model wherein social roles and powers are hierarehically ordered for the purpose of mutual aid. Like their explanation of
the self, the popes' model of society has haid severail interpretations: some rooted in appeals ,to custom, others to nature, still
others to affection.
In short, Murray's: association of Catholic and American
politicaJ. thought involved itw:o serious misunderstandings.
First, his w:ork blurred the .degree to which central features of
American liberalism are at cross purposes with the communi1

1

40 Roberto Mangabeira
Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The
Free Press, 1975), p. 216.
41 Allen E. Buchanan, "Assessing the Communitarian
Critique of Liberalism," Ethics 99 (July 1989): 872.

612

MICHAEL

J. SCHUCK

tarian tmdition of Catholic social ethics reflected in the encycliical tea:chings of the church. Second, his assumption that
Roman Catholicism not only ' can ' brut ' must ' bolster the
"American Proposition" forecfosed the question as to whether
or not it should. lt may be that a Roman Catholic communitada:n social ethic makes for an inherently bad dvil religion
by the standards of American liberalism. It may likewise be
that Catholicism pmvides not a "v:apid image of the communrul past " as in Robert Hellah's H ab'its of the Heart but a
.substantive challenge to the polifilcialpresuppositions of American society. 42
Conclusion
One can argue that Abraham Lincoln distorted the Declaration of Independence. This paper has argued that, in a similar
fashion, John Comitney Murray presented powerful and yet
flawed [nterpretations of the
teachings of Leo XIII
and the founding documents of the American Republic. His
,aim was to advanoe the doctrinal acknowledgment of reiligfous
freedom by the Roman Catho1liic Church and public 11emgnition of 'a link between Catholic and American political thought,
But his
interpretations of these itexts ihave also
meant tihe persistence of a theory of doctrinal development
blfod to error and an insufficiently criticail appropriation of
liherrulism in modern C:atholic sociail thought.
1

42 Criticism of Bellah is in Paul G. King, Kent Maynard,
and David 0.
Woodyard, eds., Risking Liberation: Middle Giass Powerlessness· and f:fooial
Heroism, Foreword by Donald W. Shriver, Jr. (Atlanta: John Knox Press,
1988), p. 20.

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER
HUGO MEYNELL

University of Calgary
Calgary, Alberta

I

N THE FOLLOWING essay I w;ant to examine some of
rthe ba1Sic
of Heidegger from SIOmethingof a " transcendiental Thomist " pevspective, as represented by Bernard Lonergian's " generalized empirical method." I believe
that there are a nlllmber of important insights :to be gained
from Heidegger's work but that it contains a fow very perilous
oversights as well. To my mind, Heidegger shows with more
conviction and power than any other thinker how our anxieties
and our trivi al everyday concerns are apt to shut us out from
1apprehending the deep my;stery of things, and how great art
:and poetry, together with a ,sustained thinking-through of the
nmbure of consciousness :and of the woJ.'11d wihich it reveals, have
the power of opening up this mystery to us again.. I ailso agree
with Heidegger when he says that the technicaiL fanguages of
the scieDJoes and of traditional metaphysics as weH al'le, to a
consi<leEableeJclJent, mea;ns for the domination and control of
things by ihuman beings, and, in consequence, they are a standing pretext for self-deception aborut the real nature of the
world :and of ourselves with.in it.
But I will. :argiue that Heidegger overlooks rthe fact that the
specia1iz,ed langiuages of 1science and traditional metaphysics
have ot:her
runid other possib:iil.ities. They may be an exwonder; they may even
pl'lession .and resuffit of
convey a grasp of a :veail inteLligible world made known to us
hy inquiry into the everyday world available to common sense
and described by o!l'ldinary language. What appears rto be
view of s1C1ientifirc and metaphysical language (almost <always a means to control ·and domination) p.vesents us
1

1

1

1

1

1

1

1

613

614

HUGO MEYNELL

in ·effect with a terrible dilemma: we must either abandon the
scientific worM-view along with the enormous benefits which
it has roo·nferred on humankind, or we must resign ourselves
to existence in a wodd conceived in a way which is utteril.y
hostile to the file of the human spirit. I believe that this dilemma does not exhaust the possihiLities, that .science and
traditional metaphysics, on the one hand, rand the life of the
rspirit, on the other, may greatly renhan.ce one another when
both are properly related to their basis in human consciousness.
I
In this section, I shalil outline what I take to be Heidegger's
views on human beings and their consciousness, the nature of
trurth, the world of " things" which is givien to consciousness,
and the role of great 1art in restoring our vision of how
" things " reailily rare when this has been obfuscated or corrupted.
It is specifically human nature, as concerned with the world
and capable of raising questions about it, which Heidegger refers to as Dasein. " In which being j,g, the meaning of Being to
be found; from which being is rthe disclosure of Being to get its
start?" 1 The 1answer to the question can only be, "this being which we ourselves in each case are rand which includes inquiry among the possibilities of its Being." 2 What must be
most strenuously is any atrtempt to deal with Dasein
in terms used to interpret other parts or aspects of the wodd,
e.g., material objects 1and prooosses.3 AM metaphysical questions must be approoohed explicitly on the basis of Dasein
whirch is the ·subject of questioning, which questions. 4 Fmm
1 Martin Heidegger, Bei!ng and Time. Citation from the edition by David
F. Krell: Martin Heidegger, Basic Writings (New York: Harper and Row,

1977),47.
2 Heidegger, op. cit.; Krell, 48. Cf. Heidegger, Bei!ng and Time (London:
SOM Press, 1962; BT in subsequent references), 36-40.
s Cf. Krell, "Introduction," 19.
4 Heidegger, "What is Metaphysics?";
Krell, 95-6.

615

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

this point of V>iew, one has to dismantle the conceptual appa:vaitus which we take for granted, an appara;bus wherein the answers are given or presuppos,ed, but the questions al'e never
e1q>erienced any more-least of all those aborut orur own nature, desbiny, and state in the wol'l1d. In asking these questions, we must be constantly ·aware of the limitations which
aiccrue mom our particular historical sitruation.5 These were not
sufficiently taken account of in the dassicaJ. phenomenology of
Husserl, with its "transcendental subjectivity " based on an
allegedly "d!isintel'ested observer." For all. its determination
to 11eturn :to" the things themselves," this
did
not attend sufficiently to the manner in which its own aims
:and IJ[>ocedures we:ve determined historicaUy.6 Husserl, as he
himself aJC1knowledged,was very much in the tradition of Descartes, who was trying to find an uns:hakabJe basis for the
practice of phll.osophy. But it is just this basis which Heidegger seeks to prut into qruestion.7 We have to a.sk what is the
decisiY.e matter for ,thinking: "Is it consciousness and its objectivity or is it the Being of beings in its unconcealedness and
concealment ? " 8 Access to the things themselves is best
thought of in true Greek fashion as " aletheia, the unoonceaJ.edness of what is present, iits being revealed, its showing itself." 9
(A,s he quite often does, Heidegger is here making capital out
of ·an etymological point; " aletheia," the Greek word for
1
"""
.t-1. ,, iI.S
• eqwv:a1ent
•
. "
cealm
,..,ruuu,
to " a-i-th
e ei,a,
· ent).
So what is basic to truth, irt must be inferred, is not the 00['rectness of assertions, or their cor11espondencewith states of
a:fiaim, or the :agreement of subjoot and object express ed by
them; it is the self-showing which is necessary for things if
1

5 Cf. Krell,

"Introduction," 21.
13.
(London: Routledge and Kegan
7 Cf. Walter Biemel, Martin Heidegger
Paul, 1977), 8-9; Krell, 31. On the alleged errors of Descartes, see BT 123-33.
sHeidegger, On Tflrne and Bemg (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 79;
Krell, 14.
o Heidegger, loc. cit., Krell, 13.
6 Ibid.,

616

HUGO MEYNELL

they 1arie to become objects of assertions .at all.10 The £.act is
that .rulil (lO!l'respondence," rudequation "11 or whatev<er,between
judgment run.cl state of affairs preSJUrpposes a discovery or revealing of bein:gis such as aililows them to be seen.12 The urual
'3Jooount of truth, as :rucool'dancebetween :a ;statement or proposition on rtb.e one hand and a thing or state of affairs on the
other, is not wt bottom inreliligibJ.e. Suppose I say of a firvemark com tha:t it is rorund. How are statement and tlllng supposed to be in 1aooord!anoe? Whrut are ialleged to be related to
one another ·are so diverse in their .appeairalllCeand const:itutiorn: rthe five-mark piece is round •and metallic, whereas the
s:tatement is neither iSprutial noc materi®l.13 What relation
thel'e is depends on a certain bearing or comportment on the
part of the one who makes rlihe statement, which is" invested
with its oorrectTI!essby the openness of comportment; for only
through the latter can what is opened up reru1ly become the
standMid for the rpresentative correspondence." 14 (What this
amounts to, I think, is that the correspondence of statements
with things :in which truth is .SiUpposed to reside depends ineluicta:bly on the openness of 1consciorus subjectivity towards
things; :it .is that in which truth fun:damenta1ly consists.) So
the wad:itionrul assumption ithat truth. belongs at bottom to
statements or pmrpositions rums orut to be fa.Urucious.15 The
openness of compo:r:tment which is essential to truth is in rlirurn
grotmded in .freedom; freetdom being a matter of " the reso1ute,}y open :bearing that does not closeup in iiitsel£" 16 ;and th.Ills a
matter of letting things be.17 80 it was at the iheginning of :the
Western :trad:ition, in G:r:eek thought. " If we :translate " aletheia " .as " unconcealment " rather than " truth," this trans10 Krell, 18; cf. Heidegger, " On the Essence of Truth," Krell ll 7ff.; and
"The Origin of the Work of Art," Krell 173ff. See also BT 257-73.
11 Cf. the scholastic tag to the effect that truth is "adequatio
rei et intellectus," or " adequation of thing and intellect."
12 Heidegger," On the Essence of Truth"; Krell, 115.
lS Ibid., 122.
14 Ibid., 124.
1s Ibid., 133.
15 Ibid., 125.
11 Ibid., 127.

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

617

fation i:is not merely more literal; it contains the diriective to rethink the orrlinary icoooept of t:mth (in the sense of .the co1rreictness of statements) :and rto 1think it back to that still un·OOIDprehendeddisc1osedness and disclosuve of being." 18
Unfortunately, we are too prone to trrude :this friee openness
for :the seC1Urityof agreeing with " them," (that is, the thoughtless majority of people), with .aJCICepting without question
whatev<er " they " say is true. 19 There are besides iSO many
things to seduce and distract rus from •attending to the presiuppositions of •aJil this secure "know1ledgie," whether it takes the
guise of science or of l'leligiousfaith; whait are called "eternal
truths " are •apt to be nothing more than rthe most deeply in.prejiudi!ces.20 The rbemptation becomes an the greater
when science has made such a wide mnge of things apparently familiar and well-kno.wn and when technical domination of
the wo!I.'1d may well ·appear virtually lillnit1ess. More authentic
ways of knowing things tend ultimately to be no longer even
a matrter of iDJdifiererJJCe;they are simply forgotten. Everything
beoomes 1subj·ected .to " the leveNing and planning of this
omniscience, this mere knowing." 21 We distract ourselves further by proposing and pla:nning on the basis of our latest needs
·a:nd aims, 22 thus fleeing from the basic mystery of things to
what is readily available, "onward from one current tlllng to
the next." 23 Evenburully a who1e system of intel'llocking errors,
with a long history of dev<elopment, is built urp; 24 and any
thoughtfuil questioning of the system is dismissed •as " an aittack on, an unfortunrute irritation of, 1oommon sense." 25
Obsession with manipulwtion 1and controi is at the very bottom of O'Ul' modern conJCeptionof what a " thing " is. Things
are envisaged in modern Western thought as su.bjoots of accidents or predicates, as mentaihly grasped unities of sense-im1s Ibid., 127-8.
19 Ibid.,

115. On the" they", cf. BT 163-8.
loc. cit.
2a Ibid., 135.
21 Ibid., 131.
24 Ibid., 136.
22 Ibid., 134.
25 Ibid., 138.
20 Krell,

618

HUGO MEYNELL

pression:s, or as paricels of matter iuvested with form; all these
oonceptions reflect their origin in a specirul kind of human acrtivity, the use of tools or equipment. 26 The original Greek experience of things was expressed (notably by Aristotle) in
terms whose meanings were subtly but definitely affected in
their translation by medieval scholars into Latin; this transiLation is by no means as innocent '3iS it is usrually taken to be. 21
"Roman thorught rtakes over the Greek wo11ds withorut a corresponding, equally original 'experience of what they .say."
Such is the origin of the rootlessness of thought in the modern
West. 28 It seems rash irudeed to quesbion the relation which is
now ,so rtaiken for granted between statements and things and
between the structilll'e of strutements ·and the structure of
tlllngs. y;et we hruve to a;sk whether the subject-predicate
statement is realily the mirror-image of the structure of the
thing (.as sllJlbstanoe chariaicterized by iaiccidents), or mther
whether the stmctu:ve of the thing is not merely ·a projeotion of
the stru!ctrul"e of the subjecit-predicate statement (as opposed
to something existing in reality) .29 And T'eftecitionon the matter does indeed indicate thrut the usuail concept of the thing
"does not l ay hold of the ·thing as it is in its own being, but
makes an asswuit upon it."
It is true that people are occasionailly stI"lllCk by the •suspicion
that rthorught has done v:iolenre to things, but they react to
this :rarther by disavowing ,thought than ·by being more
thoughtful. Yet this ream.ion in :favor of £eeling or mood may
in the last analysis be more reasonable, in the important sense
of move intelili.gentilyperoeptive 1andi open to things:, than the
insensitive and domineering " rrutionality " 31gainsrt which it is
a reaction. 80 Arooor<l:ing to one influential oonoeption of the
thing, what we peroeiive in the fust instance is a mass of sen1

1

145; cf. Being and Time, sections 15-18.
"The Origin of the Work of Art"; Krell, 153. For a sketch
of the development and alleged distortion of Greek ontology through the history of European thought, see BT 43-4.
28 Krell, 154.
211 Loe. cit.
so Ibid., 155.
26 Krell,

21 Heidegger,

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

619

sations, on which we impose a unity--iI':ather than something
like a storm in a chimney, an rairp1ane with three motors, or a
Meroedes •as opposed to a Volkswagen .. But the fact is that the
things themse1ves are closer to us, more immediately reiated
to ()IUr consciousness, than the sensations:; to get •rut mere
" we have to listen
sounds, at aural impressiorus, for
away from things, divert orur eair from them, i.e., listen abstractly." 81 The ma.tter-form ,struobure on which this colllception of a thing is based is: in its turn ultim·ately grounded in
assumptions aib()IUt usefumess, where the "matter " is imposed
on the "form" for a specific purpose. "A being thrut falls
under usefolness is alway s the product of a process of making.
It is maide as a piece of equipment for someithing." 82 Our oorl'ent and ,a;llegedly seilf-evident assumptions :rubout ".things"
are based on rthis ·form-matter structure deriving from the
medieval period, with the essentia;hly pragmatic presuppositions which underlie it; to these assumptions, Kantian and
tr.anscendentru quMifioaitions have made no fund•amental difference.83
How can we 'avoid such distorting p!l.'leconceptions?Only by
delibera.tely distancing oul'selves from them and leaving ea;ch
thing " to rest in its own seili." Or we may aspire simply " to
describe some equipment without any philosophical theory "
in 011der to see whrut it is to envisage it precisely as equipment;34 In this a.ttempt, great works of art wiR he of the utmost assistance to us. An excellent example of how they may
be is rto 'be found in Van
well-known pruinting of a
peasant's paiil" of shoes. This painting bcings before us the
peasant's wea;ry tread, ov;er furro·ws and through a biting wind,
as she worries uncomplainingly abollllt food for the future and
1

ai Ibid., 156. One may compare the aspersions of "linguistic philosophers,"
notably J. L. Austin, on the "sense-data" postulated as direct objects of
sensation ©y representatives of an earlier stage of analytical philosophy. Cf.
Austin, Sense and Sensibilia (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1962).
32 Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art"; Krell, 158.
33 Ibid., 159-60.
34 Ibid., 161.

620

HUGO MEYNELL

trembles ,at the imminent a:nid deadly da:ngeT of hearing a child.
So the " eqiuipme:nJtalquality'' of this pair of shoes is, brought
home to us, not by actual ohserviation of t:he thing itseH or of
its manufacture or use, hut hy looking at Van Gogh's masterpiece. The painting does not merely evoke an emotion about
or attitude to its subject; it " is the disclosure of what the
equipment, the pair of peasant shoes, is in truth." We may
the point by saymg that the essell!ce of arit [s " the
truth of things setting itself to work." 35 What shouM concern, us " is a fust opening of our viiBion to the fact thrut what
is workly in the work, equipmentaJ in equipment, and thingly
in the thing comes closer ito us oll!ly when we thfilk the Heing
of ,beings." 86
The same principles apply to art that is non-(l)epreserutation:al, a Greek temple for example. This " fits together ood
at the same time gathers around itself the unity of those paths
and relaitions in which birth and death, disaster and blessing,
victory and disgrace, endurance and decline i3JCquire ·the shape
of destiny for human being." The temple stands against the
violence of the storm and by doing 1so manifests that violence;
its repose and steadfastness: bring out by contrast the srurging
of the surf and the tumult of the sea. Again, " t:he luster and
gleam of the stone . . . first brings ;to radiance the light of the
day, the meaidth. of the sky, the darkness of the night." 21 In
fact, " to be a work means to set up a world." 38 This insight
into things (and the place of human beings among them)
which is afforded by the temple remains open so long as the
god of the tempLe has not le:lit it. 39 A 1similar conception of
divine presellJClemay he ·applied to Greek .sooiptUT'eand Greek
tragedy. The sculpture of a god is not a device for showing
people how the god is ;supposed to look;" lit is a woirk that lets
the god himself be present iand thus is the god himself." In
the performance of a trngedy, the battle of new gods against
old is not merely being i'epresented but ructuaJly fought.4-0
1

1

35 Ibid.,

36 Ibid.,

165.
166.

s1 Ibid.,
s8 Ibid.,

169.
170.

39 Ibid.,

40 Ibid.,

169.
170.

A WAY OF LOOKING

6U

AT HEIDEGGER

II
Thus far Heidegger. Blllt what tis one to make of what he
has to ,gay? Aooo:riding to Richa11d Ro11ty, there is an epi:stemologioail tradition which mistakenly abbempts. to find sooure
foundations for knowledge; this txadition has been central to
phiJ.osophy since Desca,rtes, and Husserl (like Bertrand RusseH)
· is .among the last of its distinguished represent,atives. Burt
Rorty say;s that this itrrudition has rightly 1been repudiated by
Heidegger (together with Dewey and Wittgenst,ein), who has
seen that such grounding is unnecessary and in 1any case impossiMe.41 I believe that Rorty hriJ.iliantly sets out the fundiamentrul: isSll'e in contempomry philosophy and correctly aligns
itwentieth-century philosophers in relation to it; but I am convinced that he himself has chosen the wrong side on it. I haive
no space here to show this at length, but I must sketch the
most impo.rtamt of my reasons. Short of some foundations for
knowledge, which are not simply opted for or 1a matter of sociaJ. consensus, there is no mo:rie foundation for the statement
that water is a chemicail compound or that Margaret Thatcher
is Pllime Minister of Great Britain in 1989 than for the statement that the moon is made of green cheese or that J. R. R.
'.Dolkien has published a tex:tbook on thermodynamics. And
the notion that the11e 'are no follil.dations of knowledge other
than convention or socirul consensus appears to be incoherent
as wieM 1as having paraidorica.il
one is to
.aicknowledge that it is merely convention or sociaJ. consensus
that the forundations of knowledge are merely convention or
social consensrus. It seems that one is £aioed with intolerable
consequences if one denies that knowledge has foundaitions
(other than convention or social coll!oensus); it was such
foundrutions that Hus;serl was concemed to find.
I also believe that Hrusseril's,attempt to found knowledge in
1oonsciousnesswas right in principle. For Husse11l, as Heidegger
41 Richard Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature
Princeton University Press, 1979), 4-6.

(Princeton,

N.J.:

HUGO MEYNELL

puts it, "ithe t:ransioendentaJ reduction fo absolute subjectivity
gives mid 1sectwes the possibility of grounding the objectivity
of ,all obj ects (the Being of these beings) in their valid stmctilire and consistency, thrut is, in their constitution in and
through subje1ctivity." 42 In other words, only by being dear
about the natul'e of conscious subjects and the way in which
they can come to know objects can we pr:operly grou11d our
knowledge of objeots, of things as they really are prior to and
independently of the mental projections which we may impose upon them. Heidegger raises the question of whether we
should be fundamentally concerned with cons1ciousness ,and its
objectivity or with the Being of beings in its unconcealment. 43
But I believe thwt this is a false ,d_]Iemma,due primarily to the
fact that ,a misleaJding ambiguity 1urks in the eoncerpts of "object" and "objeict1ivity." It is one thing to impose orur purposes on our environment in such a way as to envisage things
as" geia'r" or" tools"; it is anorthe:r to set ourselves
to find out how things really are. It is to do the latter, not
merely the former, as Heidegger seems to a,ssume, that one
must hav:e a clear doctrine of how the oonsdous subject is, or
at least may become, suffieiently "transcendent" of its particular situation to attain such knowledge.
However firmly each of us is embedded in her own historical
situation and conditioned by ,the needs
aims stemming
from herr past
driving her towards her future, we do have
a certain degree of "cognitive traJweendence," as it may be
caUed, of this situation. This is to be asserted not hecaiuse it
is convenient or reassuring but because denial of it leads quickly to ,absurdity. W:hen we come to know that two p1us two
eq;ua1ls four, thwt
the Conqueror fought and won the
Battle of Has:t,ings in 1066, or thwt there is a giant planet in
our sol a:r system which is outside the orbit of Uranus, we
know what is so ahsoluteJy, not just
is so for persons in
1

1

1

1

42 Heidegger,

" The End of Phliosophy

382.
43 Of. note

8 above.

and the Task of 'Thinking "; Krell,

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

623

our particular hist:oricrulmilieu. Even to say that each human
being is too 1embedded in her own historicrul situation to state
what is so aboolutely presupposes some degree of cognitive
transioendence by ith.e speaker of her historical .situation. What
is being said is about human being;s .in general and supposed
to he 1true of them; it is not a.bout them .as they are me.rely
for the speaker oir from her particular point of view. Any
statement of cognitive a:-efativism,supposed to derive from the
embeddedness of eaJch knower within her own hisrtoricwl ·situation, in fact presuppo.ses .the falsity of such 11elativism. Now
Heidegger seems rto assume that this concern of Husserl's is
either based on a mistake or a matter of indifference. Does
this imply that Heidegger's ibhought iis •thereby so :foitally&wed
that nothing useful is to be learned from it? I do. not see why
this shouM be so. Assertion of the cognitive transcendenre of
human .S1Ubject to kno.w ·whait is real,ly so (and not merely so
from •a pavtioolar historical perspective, whatever this would
amount to) can perfectly .weM be combined fruitfoiMy with
Heidegger's concern to make consciousness more sensitive,
pliable, TeceptiVre,rand refieotive. Yet only when one takes •the
cognitiV1elyself-1tvanscendingsubject as the arehimedean point
ean one p:mooed to dismantle those aspects of the
tradition that ought to be ·dismantled and to rehabilitate those
thait ought to be lflehabilitated.
The " generalized ,empiricrul method '' described by Bernaro
Lonergan 44 provides the (broadly transcendental Thomist)
point of view from which I will ;assess those aspects of Heidegger's philosophy which I have summarized. Without
·spending a great deal of time describing or justifying the
merthod, I do wish to set out ,those of its: principles which will
be relevrunt to •the dis1cussion.
I. One tends to get at the truth rubout things, by means of
11easonahle judgments that are based on the possibilities that
understanding can envfaa:ge<to •ruooount for .a s1Ufficientlybroad
1

44 Bernard Lonergan, Insight: .A. Study of Human Understandmg
Longmans, Green and Co., 1957), 72, 243, 423-30.

(London:

HUGO MEYNELL

of evidence in experience. It is self-stultifying to deny
this. Suppose someone does deny it. Then she is advancing
her denfaJ as a truth. Does she then advance this1 supposed
truth as the judgment that, among the mnge of possibilities
that might be envisaged, best accounts for the relevant evidence in e:xipecience? H she does not, there seems no point in
attending to wha:t she says, since no defonice of it, as more
liruble to be tme than its mntradicto:ry, is to be offel'ed. But if
she does, she is impliciUy presupposing the v;ery conditions of
stating the tmth that she is explicitly denying.
2. It is equaUy self-stultifying to deny that one is a cons1cious subject -capable of making true judgments and judgments on the basis just ,s].rntched. The
that one can
make true jil.l!dgmentsis itself a judgment advanced as being
true. To make we11-founded judgments which are liable to he
tme, I must be a srubject of (a) experience, (b) understanding
such 'as is able to envisage possib:il,iitiesand concoct hypotheses
which might ,a;ccorn.mt for such experience, and (c) judgment
which is -capable of fixing on the possibility or hypothesis in
eaich case whlch does appa:venttly best account for the experieme.45 (The merthod of this kind of philosophy is "generalized
1 " I
• •
. base d on awa11eness (" exper:ience
.
" in
. a m"d'e
emp1rl!cai.1:.
t is
sense) of one's exevcise of all these basic conscious capa1cities,
including "ex:pe11ience" in 1a narrow 1sense--just as "empiricism " in the usuail sense is based on " experience " in tha.t nairl'OW sense) .
3. The actual world, i.e., reality, is nothing other than what
true judgments a:re about and whait prope11ly-justified judgments (those based on the widest Tange of experience and 0£
envisaged possihilities) rtend 1fo be about. Any inteUigihle contrast :between reaJity and a;prpearanJCe, or between ,the aicbuail
world and ithe wo111d merely for or of a particuJar individual or
group, p:vesupposes a contrast between the !N'101eess of proper
1

1

,45 There is a fourth basic kind of conscious act, that of decision, by which
one moves from judgment to action; but this is not directly relevant to the
present discussion.

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

justiificaition taken just so iar and the ,same process: purSJUed
indefinitely.
From points (1) a.nd (3) it will be seen that one important
consequence of the generail:iz,ed:empirical method is tha.t the
trarlitional view of truth (that it is primarily ,a mrubter of
judgments or propositions) is .to be reaffirmed, in spite of
Heidegger's a.uthority. Heidegger is perfectly right, I believe,
that attention ,to conscious subjects ,and to ithe way in which
they may be relatively "open " or " closed " .to the world is
necessary if one is to understand much about ithe nature of
truth. But it does not foll.ow f,rom this that truth is not, after
all, primarily a matter of the rie1ation bebween judgments or
propositions and rStates of affairs. Still, while truth is rto be
found primarily in jrudgments, such jrudgments are an achievement of conscious subjects, who have rto eX'erl themseives to
secure and maintain :a certain openness towru.rls the wor1d in
order to reach iit. And Heidegger's work is extmordinarily instructive ,as to the natu:r:e of this openness.
Arttention to point (3), I think, brings out the solution to
Heidegger's puzzile :about how there can be " agreement " or
" correspondellloe" between entities .so heterogeneous ,as propositions or judgments on the one hand and material objects on
the other. If the real wor1d, including rull the materiail: objects
which it may contain, is northing othe!r <tihan what judgments
would he rubout, if ·all the relevant evidence in experience were
attended to and all :the relevant possibilities envisaged, then
the problem of how statements can :agree with things disappears.
Heidegger stresses rthe manner in which whait is called
" knowledge," especially in an em which particlliarly prides
itself on its .technology, may represent
an ass1JJult on
things than 'an a1lowing of them to be as they illlre. Here, I
believe, he is aihluding to· a distinction whiich is of the utmost
importance; hut the manner in which he makes it is unfortunate and :seems to obscure some vital issues. What is rthe
proper role of mental ",aJctivity " ruJJd "passivity" in 01Ur com1

626

HUGO MEYNELL

mg rto know things? It seems to be true and very important
to note thrut there are two .aims in science, that of contemplating the worM as it reaHy is and that of controHiing it for our
uses, and, however worthy the second a:im., something deadly
happens to the human spirit if :the seoond :aim :rultogether
usurps rthe place of rthe first. In foot, from aistronomers to
zoologists, first-rate natu!l"rul scientists appear from their writings to be :activrubedmore by ,a love for :and wonder at the obj.ect of their study than by a desire to control it. 46 It seems to
me that the " disenchantment " with nature which so many
haiv;e compiLainedrbhat scienoe has broru:ght on is rerully due to
the assumption rthrut scienre is about control :r:ather than :contemplativ;e wonder. But in order to know things ·as they really
wre, even when one tis motivated hy love and wonder rather
:than ithe urge to control, the use of ·ructive powers of rthe mind
is nooessrury. These are clearly and distinctily described by the
generalized empiriicrulmethod, in a way that does not seem to
he possible in terms of Heidegger's thought. In order to come
rto know white dwarf stars or peregrine falcons for what they
are, I hav;e rto be sufficiently passive to attend to observations
which go against the asSJUmptionswhich I bring to the subject.
But I must also actively propound hypotheses and envisage
possibilities .and must actively employ my faculty of judgment
to determine which of these possibilities is best S1Upported by
the obsel"Vlationswhich I ihav;e mrude. It is in fact failure to be
mentally :active in these ways which is TesponsiMe for our imposing rulien caitegomes on things, ratheT tha;n getting to· know
them as :they :veally are. As Heidegger rightily ins1ists, things
do not reveal themselves :to me unless I open myself to them;
but he is suggesth,,e 11ather than precise and in some ways positively misleaiding abourt the nature of rthis openness. The
genel'alized empimerul method pl'ecisely airticulates the three
1

1

1

1

46 For the physicists and cosmologists, one might refer to the writings collected in K. Wilber'.s Quantum Questions (Boulder and London: Shambala,
1984); and for the zoologists, to K. Lorenz's Studies in Animal and Humwn.
Behwvior (London: Methuen, 1971).

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

basic types of mental operation iin which tihis openness consists.
What is to be avoided is by no means the ructively wttending,
hypothesizing, and judging mind but rather the mind which is
·SO obsessed with its pet theories that it is blind ito other possibilities and brushes aside any conflicting evidence.
On this aocOJUnt of the basic mental oper:rut:ionsinvolved in
ooming to know, it is unfair to attribute the medievaJ. account
of "substance" 1as "matter " and "form" exdusively (as
does Heidegger) to 1the hruman tendency rto dominate things
rather than ·ru1lowing them to be as :bhey are. For .the diff e11ent
realms of e:risbenoe do in fact seem to form a hierarchy, m
which "matter" is p11ogressively "informed": chemical siub1Stanr0esinvolve the imposition of sets of" forms" or structures
on fundamental particles, organic life imposes 1another such
set of "forms" on chemical substances, sensitive animal life
on organic life, ·and human existence in turn on sensitive anima;l life. Eruch such "form" is !to be grasped by hypothesis
and verified in the data of experience; so the structure of wha.t
is :to be known, which is nothing other than the veal work!, is
analogous to the structure of knowing. Eruch levcl of existence
has its own 1srpecial set of inte1lig;ib1e properlies, its " forms "
in the Aristot1e1ian .and mediev:aJ. metaphysical sense, which
distinguish it from the levels below it, while sha1fag the properties of a1l these levels. (A human being is to some extent
characterized by the special human propevties of intclfigence
and reason, but she is 1also ·subject to the organ:ic laws of
gmwth 1and decay and to all the ilaws of chemistry and physics.) Thus the resuJt of applying the generalized empirical
method is to hring out the correctness of this basic ArisrtOibelian
and medievial insight into the natwe of things :and to show
that the1re is no need to attribute it
or even priimarily to the human obsession with making and controlling. I
believe that Heidegger is pi!.1ofoundilycorrect that Kantian and
qualificwtions in 1the long run make no essen.tirul difference to the metaphysical analysis of the "thing"
wihich we have inherited from the mediev.a.ls. But he infers
1

628

HUGO MEYNELL

from this that both are to he !'ejected, whereas ,the considerations which I hav;e a1dduced seem Ito lead rather to the contrary, transcendental Thomist view that both shol!lild be accepted.
Hut evien if it is w1'ong to envisage Scholastic eategor,ies too
exduSliV'elyas means to use and oorrtrol, there is no doubt rt:hat
the urge eXJcessively to use and cont11ol does exist and that it
may poison and deaden our apprehension of the beauty and
terror of the worM. Heidegger is .sureJy right thait it is one of
rthe main functions of great art to 11ea:waken us to this. We
become 1SO used to the uses of ·an old pair of shoes that we no
longer see it for what it is. What was originally the mpbure
of scientific disoov;ery becomes part of the ,stale and taken-iforgranted furniture of the mind; a
viewpoint adopted
with a specific purpose is t aken as universrul and unquestionable, long after the specific purpose has been fost sight ot
Heidegger <assoda:bes the tmditionail "form-matter'' schema
with the belief 1that we mentally
things out of data,
mtiher than direictly apprehending things as s1uch. This association seems to me to be correct, hut, in the l"eJevant sense,
so does the belief. Jit is trrue that, in the usuaJ senses of " see "
and" hear," we ,see and hea1r
mar1ching by :and obois1ts
playing their ins1tm1ments. BUit this is no more than to say
that, when using the terms " see " and "hear " in these senses,
we assume not only that we havce visual and aural impressions
as though of soldiers ma11ching by and oboists playing hut that
the:ve are actuarlily soLdiers marching and oboists playing wheire
there appear to he. In normal ,cases we leap spontaneously
from a .set of sensations to judgment, from a series of experiences as though of our most garrulous colleague waJ.king towa11ds us down the passage to 1bhe judgment that he is doing
so. Alternaitive possibilities do not ooour to us, 1et alone commend :themselv;es -as likely. It is only sped.al circumstances,
like deception or psycho1og,1ml experiment, which i:ndruee us to
draw out the distinction between the types of mental act involvied. In a psychology l,aboratory, I may wen consider the
1

1

1

1

1

A WAY OF LOOKING AT HEIDEGGER

possibility that things have ,been set up in such a way that
the11e will 'appear to be a music-stand ten reet before my eyes
when no S1Uch thing is there, and I may judge with good reason
tha,t this is the corl'lect explanation of my experience. But the
fact that I do not attend to the distinction between the various
mental acts involvied hy no means proves that no such distinction exists. I may engage in a number of types of mental
31Ctivity without attending to the f3icl that I am doing so. It
seems dear thait it is one thing to enjoy a paittern of sensation,
1another to judge
1the state of .affairs which would noTmaMy
explain that pattern ·acbuaJly obtains.
I have tried in this 'airticle to show, on the basis of the kind
of transioendenta.1Thomism exemplified hy the work of Bernal1d
Lonergan, how one may derive greaJt ,eniJ.ightenmentfrom the
writings of Heidegger, without accepting at face vaiLue his
raspersions on traditional metaphysics as a whole.

UNREAL REAL,JSM
RAYMOND DENNEHY

University of San Francisco
San Francisco,, California

Contextual Realism, a Meta-Physical Framework for Modern Science. By RICHARD H. SCHLAGEL. New York: :Raragon House,
1986. Pp. xxiv
808. $22.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-913729-20-5.

+

The Many Faces of Realism. By HILARY PuTNAM. LaSalle, Ill.:
Open Court, 1987. Pp. 98. $8.95 (paper). ISBN 0-81269043-5.
Varieties of Realism: A Rationale fo!f' the Natural Sciences. By
RoM HARR.E. Oxford and New York: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Pp. vii
375. $34.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-631-12592-2.

+

REN PASSMORE wrote his assessment of British
moral philosophy, he lamented that the fifty years
which :had elapsed since 1900 had produced nothing
beitter than so many variations on utilitarianism. Equally, a
lament seems in order over the ourrent state of epistemology.
After so many years of grappling with the problem of v,aJidating
!l'eailism-consider, for example, the
American scene during the first severail decades of this century:
Roy Wood Sellars et al. announcing the "new realism '' and
George Santayana et al. announcing ,the "critical realism " one might have hoped for an oiutcome more reassuring than Hie
current £deistic realism.
But if the fideism disappoints, its rationalizations fascinate.
Take, for examp1e, the trio o.f books discussed herein. They
undertake a common project: to forge a raitionaJ justification
for realism. They shave other features, not so 1audatory,
especiaUy :a merely fideis:tic ioommitment to what might best
be deseribed as generic realism, which finally evaporaites into
1

631

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

idealism. The mo,sit thait the authors can muster on behalf of
realism amounts: to no more than this: " Something (what, we
don't know) must e.rist outside our minds heearuse we aict on
that premise with considemhle success, not only in daily life
hut in scientific prructice, aillld
the theories used to explruin it
aDJd its successes form a logieally coherent whoJe." In other
wo11ds, whait these "defenses'' of rerulism offer is a pragmatic
representationalism, organized and ultimaitiely vindi!caited by
the ideaJist criterion of coherence and der,iving overai11 inspiration from a blind faith in
reality.
The tip-off ,fa ,in the books' titles: Contextual Real-ism, The
Many Fa(')es of Realism, and Varieties of Realism. How can
you taJk about the "contexts," " v;arieties,'' and "many faces "
of realism if__,espreiciaJJy by your own admiss:ion-you cannot
identify 11eaJ,ity itself? The answer is found in fideism: you
want to affirm extramentaJ reality, even though y;ou find it
impossible to justify 1that affirmation ,rationaHy. So, in a flush.
of ega,1itarian fervur, you aooept au plausible claimants to the
title of " reality "; and being unabJ:e to say that any one
ant is more or
11eal than any other, you hope to bring matters to a happy conclusion by apperuling to "varieties," "con:te:xJts,"and "many faces" of rea1ity.
Hut the imperatives of life and thought maroe ,a harmoniza,tion of ail1l these " realities'' inevitable if anything resembling
tl'IUe and false assertions is to he sav;ed. If, for example, common sense tells us that the11e 1a11e ,ice cubes and scienee teHs us
that the11e are only indeterminate mass particles, we will want
to know how these asse11tions can both be true. Clearly, the
V'enerahle correspondence criterion of truth won't do here, is:ince
we are fruoed with two oompeting objects of correspondence.
It thus becomes necessary to enlist :the aid of the pragmatic
theory of tmth to deoide which of the " realities " wil,l be designated " xeal '' in a
set of circumstances. Anticipating PiUtnam's
we ma.y then say that ice
and pink ones aJt that__,are real when we wish to mix drinks
and that iDJdeterminate mass particles
reail when we wish
1

UNREAL REALISM

633

to produce a scientific ruoom.mt of the phenomenon caHed " ice
cubes." Still, .antil(Jipating Schlagel, not even pragmatism carries us far enough because it depends on knowing which resuJtis are felicitous. We thus turn fo the cohe11ence theory of
tmth as our final court of appeal. It furnishes the rational
context for designating the fol:ircitous results, in addition to
ha.rmonizing assertions about varied realities.
The irony of this whole process is that our " :malists " end
up with the idealist standard of truth and reaJity; the known
and the real merge together.
what can you expect? If
things are not the measure of mind, if they do not proclaim
their reality by their ¥ery being, then how do we establish a
representat1on a.s real? Surely not by appealing to "conte:xts,"
"varieties," and "many faces"! If " 0 x 0 = O," ·so does " 5 x
0 = O." Only the coherence of likely accounts remains, and
within this coherence lurks the .identification of the known
and the real. In other words, the eardina,l principJe of reaJism,
" Things are the measure of mind " is reversed to read " Mind
is the measu11e of things." ·what is aidvanced as 11eaHsm turns
out to be
in the cases of Seh1agel and Putnam, perhaps in rthe case of Harre. The fo!l'mer two authors
clearly appeal to the coherence theory of truth as the ultimate
criterion of rational justification. Schlagel exp:licitly enshrines
it; Putnam implies it in his resort to fornmd mles of discourse,
while Harre's use of Gibsonian psychology, neo-Kantian concepts, and the 1concept of a " theory-family" may ye.t prove to
be cryptic versions of 1it.
Thus what fascinates in these" defenses" of realism are the
echoes of Hegel's principle, " The real is the ra.tionaJ and the
rrutional is the real."

Schlagel: " A Meta-Physical Framework for Modern Science "
It was said ahove that Schlagel belongs fo that group of
thinfuers whose readism is in crisis: within his heal'it he is a
!l'ealist, but wi·thin his mind he cannot ma,nage to pin down
exactly wha,t aspects of experience count as reality. He settles

634

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

for the position that science, as weH as everyday experience,
testifies rto rthe :reality of the e:x't:ramental worM, hut a;dds that
rthe meanings we attribute to the things which compose ,the
wodd depend ultimately on the coherenoe of our assertions
about them within the multileveled
historical, cu1turail, and linguistic-of human e:xJperience. This
anticlimactic " defonse " belies ,iJhe puflery on the dustj acket
which announces that Contextual Realism is a "landmark"
hook. For all its preoision and scholarship, it remains no more
than a variation of that fusion of pragmatism with neo-Kantfanism and Hegelianism which has been peculiar to American
philosophy since
fast century
ha,s been exemplified
chiefly in
wriitings of John Dewey
C. I. Lewis.
Although Schlagel's commitment to
1eads him to disavow rany
rdiSitinction between phenomena and noumena, his commitment to the sensationalist theor:ry of knowledge leads him to embraee neo-Kantianis:m and finaJJy idealism. His realism, being more fideistic than mtional, lacks the
inte11eebual wherewithal to jus1tify an objective, veridical
know1edg,e of rthe
wodd. He is thus confronted with
very distinction he wouM l'eject: between things as they
a1re in themselves and things as ·bhey a[l)e known (i.e., contex'tually conditioned) by us.
Consider the preeminence and origin of his coherence
theory of truth: the " ... final justification of truth must depend upon the most coherent integra.tion of knowledge "
Although emphasizing the importance for truth of
"Observable ,data, p:redfotab1e consequences, 1and experimental
results or discoveries," he neve:rithe1ess adds, "but insofar as
their meaning and significance depend on how they are interpreted, the coherence of the inte!1p:retation becomes the predominant fa;ctor fo the assessment, even though 1the other criteria continue to play some
(247-48) .
Hence the transformation of realism into idealism. Charaiote:ristic of the coherence theory, mill!d, not things, is the
somce of inrbe!lil.,igibility:" .. , heoause the world as directly ex-

UNREAL

REALISM

635

perienced and described in everyday language does not reveal
its own raison d'etre, we !have had to create theories to represent the jnternal structures and extensive background conditions on which the foreground of experience depends.
these theories consisted of analogical models oopied from the
operations of the world amund us so
the process cou1d he
imagined, but now that our theories have become so dependent
upon exceedingly esoteric experimental da:ta and highly abstra:ct mathema:tical formailisms, the test of
consists of
the experimental
internal consistency and congruence
evidence,
coherence"
In the book's inti:ioduction, Schlagel tells his readers that he
seeks to develop, besides 'a theory of knowJedge, " a conception of Teality consistent
the remarkable developments of
twentieth century science." He says that t11ese developments
portray physical reality as composed
a series of levels, each
of which consists of entities whose distinctive properties anticipate ,the st11uctures
,interactions found on the successively
deeper 1eV'els of reality. Yet the journey to each 1suoceeding
levd requires a spec1ulative leap, insofar as the transitions are
incomplete. Aided by increasingly sophisticated scientific instruments, we attain ,a progressively deeper penetmtion into
physical l'eality, revealing a reduction from the diversity and
complexity of the entities most accessible to our perceptions
to an ever .increasing unity and
on the levels furthest
remoV'ed.
Despite the fact that these discontinuities leave us unable
fo
fully why the entities on the deeper levels have the
distinctive properties they seem to possess, Schlagel assures
us we still have aocess to enough data to suppose that, conimairy to the Kantian rd1chotomy between phenomena and Il'OUmena, physical reality is continuous, albeit multi-leveled. His
claim that "the meta-physical pictillre of contextual realism"
is "more consistent with the achievements of contemporary
science if:han Kant's notion" (294) understates matters; more
than being consistent with the achievements of contemporary
science, his book from start to finish enshrines science as the
best available knowledge of reality.

636

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

Unfortunateily, Sehl.agers a.rmamentariurm of truth cdteTfa
cannot penetrate the ourita:in separ:ating mind from the physioail. wori1d for the simple reason that all cfaims about reality,
including his vaunted experimenfal evidence, a;re contextuaHy
conditioned, making it impossible to know the meaning of
anything <aipairt from the ultimate context, coherence. But not
only does the cohe11enceof a syst:em of thought have nothing in
principle to do with the latter's correspondence with extramentiail reaUty, Schlagel himself emphasizes the merely provisional status of the most coherent conceptiual system, even a
system highly rega;r1ded at present.
Schlagel'·s sensationalism leads to his inadvertent
embraice of neo-Kantianism. Anytime intelligibility is severed
fC!:1om its basis in extramental being, it must be imporbed and
imposed upon :things. When aill data from the physicial world
are reduced to sensations, our knowledge o[ things becomes both
subjective and unreliable. If the deliveralllces of our perceptions 'are fo be inteUigihle and oridered, then intelligibility and
011der must be imposed upon them ab extra. Thus Schlagel's
conceptual systems tell us not so much ,about the obj,ects we
experienoe in the
world a:s about what they must be
for us to know them. How similar this a1M is 'bo the distinction
Kant dmws in the Prolegomena between (orur srubjeetive)
"judgments of pel'ception" and (our objective) "judgments
of expe:cience "!
Fai1ing to grasp the significance of the ontoJogica;l basis of
kno1w1edge. Schlagel has no alternative brut sensationalism: all
claims about the physical world mus:t be reducible fo empiriologicail knowledge. This bia,s first 1aipperurs in the book's introduction whei'e Schlagel 1eava;lie11ly commingles Pfato's and
Ari:s:to.Ue's philosophical explanations with their scientific explanations; while these thinkers" provided :a guamntee of objective knowledge hut a weak explanation of natrnral phenomena, the Atomists prnv,1ded a mol'e adequarte general
framework (ais attested to by later developments in science)
na.tu:r:al phenomena, brut rr:aised intractable quesfor
1

UNREAL REALISM

637

tions :for a geneml theory of knowledge that have challenged
modern philosophy" (xix).
The po!int of depa.rbmie he cites is the dubiety of our sense
periceptions, noted both by tihe Atomists and Galitleo, to wllit,
the v:ariations of tastes, odors, and oolors, etc., which seem to
originate not in the objeot pemeived hut in the inte:riaction with
the pe11ceiver's sense organs. These variations, aiccordiing to
Schlagel, constitute one of the primary features of the modern
world as opposed to the "realistic
oonoeption of the
,and ,essen:tirulist:iicconceptions of Plato and Aristotle" (xx) .
Whi1e the radica:l shift in phi1osopillea.l preo1ccupation which
Schlagel describes did in fruct ocour, he shows little app11eci:ation for the fact that Plato and Aristotle were prima:rily concerned with an ontological aoooiunt of our knowledge of things,
a level on which perceptual vaciations have 1little relevance.
Our knowledge of the being, substances, and esse:rmes of things,
aJ.ong with their essentfa,},lyrelated causes, p11esupposes an intellectual rather than a mel'ely sensible knowledge. The book's
expressed concern with our knowledge of physical rea;lity and
1aim to provide "A Meta-Phys.iicaJ Framework for Modern Science" mig;ht 'Save Schlagel from the charge of being a sensahimse:lf were it not for his failure to display 1any inclination to give rn'edence to an ontological rarther than a merely empiriological arocount. He repeatedly treiats the oorrent
state of scientific knowledge as if it furnished the primary examples of our knowledge of external reaJity.
The unvei1ing of contextual realism occurs in successive
chapters on the correspondence, pragmatrc, and coherence
theories of ttiuth. That Schlagel should end up as a contextua1ist comes as no srurprise; his sensationalist epistemology
leads him to find: inadequaioies in the correspondence criterion.
His blindness to the ontological levei of knowledge results in
his totally misunderstanding Aristotle. Aristotle's definition of
truth is " sayiing of what is that it is." The most obvious interp11etation of this defifil,tion, says Schlagel, collides with too
many important instances where what we ha.Vie taken to be ob-

638

RAYMOND DENNEHY

jectiv;e features of the world were" actually a function of our
experience (such as geocentrism :and
motion) or interpretation (as Aristotle's convictiion that nruture abhors a
belief in a,bsolute srpace and time)" (180).
vaourum or
Hut not to worry. Schlagel sees a way to save tihe co;rrespondence crite:nion. Suppose " we ignore the 11ealistic assumptions of the !'est of Aristotle's philosophy ... " and suppose also
that being aware of ,the dubiety of our know:ledge, !he eschewed
a naive or direct rerulism in fiavor of a contextual realism in
which ail knowledge is" framework dependent." Here we have
a version of :the correspondence theory that Schlagel. can live
with: " .... whatever we can mean by something ' being what
it is ' depends ultimately on our conceptual-linguistic framework (aMhough whether a particular assertion within that
framework is true or false will depend upon how the world
happens to be a1t hat [sic] moment), as Popper, Quine, Sellers,
and Feyembenid maintain" (181).
The unreJiia:bility which Schlagel detects in the correspondence criterion of truth means that even scientific knowledge
must uJtimrutely be context-dependent in ol'deir to be defensible.
His sens1ationalist assumptions have scotched any hope of aiccepting a direct oorrespondence between the assertions of science and the entities to which they p;u:rport to refor. (:Bor him
the correspondence 1criteirion ha,s its greatest reJiability in the
realm of ordinary experience, but even then its meaning is contextually rela:tive.) Thus he invokies the pragmatic theory of
truth--as expressed in terms of hypothesis and prediction-to
scientific assertions. Of course, not even this resort
proves sufficient, for pmgmatism presupposes an established
frameworrk within which conJs:equenoos can he determined rto be
felicitous o:r not.
In the end, the highest {3omt of appeal is the coherence
theory of truth. The itest of truth "depends upon the assimila<mon of new evidence, disco¥eries, or experimental resulrbs wtithin :an oMer framework that may have to be either :revised orr
rejected to accommodat,e tihe newly acquired or :reinterpreted
1

UNREAL REALISM

639

darta, ... [thus] rthe totail e;oherence of the interpretation becomes the primary frucitor in assessing its truth." (247-248) .
But, if the coherenee theory is the ultimate standal'd for assessing truth-v:a1rue, it suffers from the very lirnitaitions that
a:ffiict all our means of knowiing. Since aihl assertions, Schlagel
eonfesses, :aJ.ie falsifiable, our state of knowledge of anything
remains open to
the highest, most coherent conoeptual system can be nothing more than provisional (294-95) .

Putnam's "Internal Realism"
Putnam, 1ike SchJiagel, faces the rdrchotorny between thought
and l'eaJity, but his ,attempt at erasure amounts to no more
than. ignoring it by an appeal to a rnuseul,ar pragmatism. As
his argument unfolds, however, it beconies dear that he falls
victim to the very neo-Kantianism he would use for his own
purposes. In the end, he must resort to thought (i.e., varfous
forma,l rules of discourse) to determine what is real.
Putnam pmposes a " non-alii:enated view of truth and a nonalienated view of human :flom:ishing" (1). As in his earlier
work, Reason, Truth and History, he seeks to further specify
hris project of "breaking the Sitranglehold" exerted by the
dichotomy between 'objective' and '1subjective' views of
truth." The " alienwted views " are those which " cause one to
hse one or another part of one's seH and the world '' (17) .
Such views are metaphysical realism, which holds that the
mind simply copies a wodd which 1alfows description by only
one true :theory, and ,relativism, which ho1ds that the mind constructs the wor1d. PIU'tnam's non-alienated view is this, tha;t
"the mind and the wodd jointly
up the mind and the
world."
He calls this view "Internal Rea1ism" ("Pragmatic Realism,") : " Internal realism is, at bottom, just the insistence
that realism is not incompatible with conceptuaJ. Teiativity.
One can he both ,a :vea1ist and a conceptual relativist."
Putnam begins his project by addres1sing the tension between scientific 11ealism and commonsense realism. Scientific

640

RAYMOND

DENNE'HY

!retailism l'esits on mathematical

physics'1s way of conceivfog external objects, apparently introduced by GaJieo':s distinction
between p!l'imary and secondary qualities. The forme1r are regam:1ed rus real because they 1are desccihabde in terms of mathema;tical formU1las; the Latter are not so regartded because they
are not described in that way. This viiew led to the notion of
a 8'en8'e datum. Thus secondary qualities:, viiz.,
tastes,
etc., ai11e not in the thing but are instead in the sense data, the
product of the pel'ceiv:ing subject, mused hy 1the int1ericaictionbetween the thing's prdmary qualities and orur perceptual appar.atills. Pu1tnam notes the disastrous effect of t:his view. Its
diualistic 11epresentaitionof the physical world anrd its primary
qurulities, on the one hand, and the mind and it1s sense data, on
the other, led to 1the "post-scientific commonsense" picture of
the phySiical wor1d which colliides with the realism of everyday
ex:peri:ence,a realism which affirms the exisitence of tables and
1chairs: the consistent application of the primary /seoondairy
quality distinotion means that ev;en solidity !Suffers the same
:fate as color and taste. Despiite the absence of decisive evidence in favor of the sense-data theory, its in:fluem:ie has perfrom the .seventeenth century down to the rtwentieth.
But the prob1em with the " ' Objectivist' picture of the
wodd" goes ·deeper, observes PIU!tnam, than 1sense data, which
are only its symptoms. The :mot of the problem is the idea of
an " ' intrinsic ' property, a pl'operty something has ' in itself ',
apart from any contribution made by language or the mind"
(8) . CorreJmbiV'e with the notion of an intrinsiic property is
the notion of properties thait acre merely ' .appearances ' or
something we merely ' projeot ' onto the object.
The distinction between intrinsic properties 1a.nid appearances
engienderis the notion of disposition, which, according to Putnam, .is rthe weaik point of the whole d1istinction. Not only color
and solidity, etc., but so-caUed intrinsic priopertiies of 'extern·al things such as solubility rburn out n:ot to he intrinsiJc p['operties of aJUy external thing. Sugar does not a1wayis dissolve in
wabeT, hu:t only under normal condii.tions. Thus "If the 'in1

1

UNREAL REALISM

641

trinsic ' properties of 'external ' things are the ones that we
can represent by formulas in the Language of fundamental
phy.sics, by ' siu.itab1efunctions of the dynamic v:acia.bles', then
solubility is also not an ' intrms]c ' propenty of any external
thing. And, simil:arly, neither is any' otherr things being equal'
disposition" (11). A shaxp distinction must oocordingly be
dr:aiwn between dispositions and so-ca.ii.ledintrinsic properties.
Lest one he Jed to 1suppose thait dispositions ("or ·at least
' other things being equal ' disposition:s, such as solubility '')
are also not in the things themseilrveshut are mther something
we project onto those things, PU!tnam challenges the notion of
proj.ection. Projection implies a dichotomy between mind and
matter. Hut despite Descartes's distinetion between two flllndamentaJ. .substances mind and matter, Putnam 1expressesconfidence thlalt ·contemporary philosophy no Longer thinks of mind
rus a separate substance at a11.
Othel1Wise the result is " metaphysicail realism," which, in
Putnam's viiew, ironically resembles idealism more than realism. Fl.1om the standpoint of the common .sense wor1d, the
efforts of metaphy;sicaJ. realism to supply the rationale for
philosophical realism comes down to a denial of objective reality and the reduction of everything to thought alone. This
is why P.urtnam 1elects to cast his fot with the " philosophers
iin the Neo-Kaintian tmdition-James, Husserl, Wittgensteinwho claim that commonsense tables and cihairis and sensations
and eleet:vons are equally relit, and not the metaphysical reailiists " (12) . (As stated a;bovie, we shaJ:l ·see that P.utnam himseilf ends in the mire of idealism.)
At the v;ery heart of the problem of vindicating philosophical
realism is the increasing tendency, :moor:dingrto Putnam., to regard rth01Ughtitselrfias a prodeetiion. And rthis is because, despite
its widespread! support, it remains to be shown that the view
that " th01Ughst is j1Ust ia primitive property of a mysterious
'ruhsrtanre ', mind, [has] any content" (13) .
The esoope route fmm projection is neo-Kantianism. His
warrant for this preforence seems to be ·an interpretaltion of

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

Kant's first critique as meaning that the extmmental existence
of noumena ha,s not been established and that we do not (and
never will) know what mind is. Putnam insists that the a:lte!l."native is to aissu:me, as the Objeotivists do, that "mental
phenomena must be highly deriv<ed physical phenomena in
some way .. ,'' (13) .
That is to say, therre a11e two Objectivist assumptions. (1)
" ... there is a dear distillation to be dmwn between the puroperties things havce 'in themselvces' and the properties which
are' projected by us' and (2) that the fondamentarl
in the siingu1ar,,since only physics ha1s that status today-tells
us what properties things have ' in themselves ' '' (13) .
This, aocording to Putnam, has reduced modem Objectivism
t:o materirulism. The latter's chief proMem is to aocount for the
emergence of mind f:tiom matter. But the outlook for success
in thi1s endeavor wi11 he no rosifil" than that of redru.cing color
or solidity or solubility to fundamental phy sics--'which hias
pmv;ed impossible. The functions of mind Desist reduction to
brain functions for the simple reason that the 'intentional
'cannot be reidueed to the 'computational leviel ' anymore
than it can he to the ' physical level '.
This lea,vies the Objectivist with onJy one conclusion, namely, that intentionality as wen must he a mere "projection."
But this is indefensible, for the very idea of proj ec:tion presupposes intentionality. Thus 1thought cannot he 'a mere
tion. Intentiona,1ity is thought, i.e., consideration of the
" aboutness " of thingis.
All of which clears the gmund for Putnam :to introduce his
·defense of 11ealism. Seventeeruth-1century philosophy has led to
a dead ecnd in the twentieth century, hut the alternrutive Iis
neither extreme r:elativism nor the denial of commonsense
1

1

1

reailism. To be sure, ,,sevenrteenbh-centrnry conoeptions of the
'eX!ternal ;world', 'sense impressions', 'intrinsic pvoperties ',
and 'projections', etc., have fai1ed to resoue commonsense
Putnam nevertheles1s reassures us: " There are tables

1and chairs and ioe cubes. There ar;e 'also elect11.1ons and space-

643

UNREAL REALISM

time regions .and prime numbers and people who ·are a menace
to wocld peruoe and moments of beaiuty and transcendenre and
mainy other things" (16-17) . His only caveat here is that
11eailism with a capitail. R won'1t waish; in fiad it is the bane of
·OOmmon.seruse realism. The defense of commonsense reaJ,ism
requi11es reali:i.sm with a smaill r.
Enter Internal (Pmgmatic) realism, which " ... is, at bottom, just the msi:srtence that realism is not incompatible with
conceptual l'elaitivity. One can 1be both a I"ealist and a conceptuaJ relativist " (17) . Putnaim's claim that conceptual reLatirvity differs from triuth-11eLativismdemands ain explanation.
What is the difllerence?
In anrswer, Putnam invites us to consider the foLlow:ing examples taken from the respective logics of Carnap and the
Polish school. In 1a world of three individuaJs, the answer to
the question " How many objeots are there in this world? "
depends on your rules of formal discorunse. It might be supposed that, having posited a world of individuals, there must
be three objects. After :all, how can there be non-abstmct entities which .aiie not ' indiwdru.aJs' ? One possible answer is
" There cannot be," if, for ·example, we :identify ' individual',
'ob;iect ', 'particrufar ', etc., and do not rega11d as absurd a
world with only three objects which enjoy indepoodence and
unrelatedness to each other (as ' logicail atoms ') .
Hut a different logicaJ doctrine cain jlll'stifysaying that these
three mdividiuals amount to more than three objects. If, for
ex:rumple, we aissume the premise of some Polish logicians rbhat
' for every two particulars there is an object which is their
sum," then (ignoring the so-ca1led 'nun obj ect ') it turns out
that "the WOI'lld of ' three mdivffiduails' . . . actualJy contains
seven objects ... " (18) .
Now here comes the ticklish part o1 Putnam's claim thait his
OOiliCeprturulI"elativity diffor:s from truth-relativism. The ·answer
to the question, "How many objects are .there?," is "three"
or "seven" depending on how we use the wo:tid " object " O(l'
exist." The answer, a.ccoitling to him, cannot be reduced to
1

1

"

1

644

RAYMOND DENNEHY

a matter of comnention and cannot validly he illlte:ripretedas
being equivalent to oc implying "radical oultural relativism":
"Om concepts may be ou.ltura1ly l'eiative, but it does not follow that the truth or failsity of everything we say using these
coDJceptsis simply ' decided ' by the oult'l.llre. But the idea that
there is 1an AI'lchMriedeanpO!int, a use of ' erist ' inherent in the
w:orJd itseiM, £rom w:hich ithe question ' How many objects
really exist? ' mak!es :sense, is an illirusion" (20) .
beThis neo-Eantianism, then, is Putnam's
tween commonsense realism and scientific ,realism. Depending on our formal rules of disoourse, "it may be possihle [!]
to show how the ' same ' world can be described as composed
of tables and chairs, with these objects described as colored
an!d poosessing dispositional properties, etc., on rthe one hand,
,and composed of ·spaice-time regions, pruilides and fields, ertc.,
on the other hand. But '3Jl1though these two versioll!S of the
worJ.d ave " deeply related," tihey cannot be reduced to ·a single
vierstion; for the question " ' Whiah. are the real objects? ' "
makes no sense apart from our choice of concepts (20-21).
It w::ouLd be diffioolt ito imagine a "realism" more barren
and more confll'Sed than this. .Ais with Schlagel, PutDJam.'s
wol'ds betray more than a mere flirtation with idealism:
" Wihat is strange about the fear that only the Metaphysical
Realist ·can .save fair common sense from Demon Re1ativism
is that even Metaphysi.ral Realists recognize that the writ of
.rationality runs farther than 1what they are pleased to call
' I'leaJlist truth • " (30) .
Olearly, the realm of ,thoiught embraces moce than the
realm of exii:stence,for more things can be thought than exisit.
Brnt so what? Unless Putnam. thinks he can show that the criteria for being a thought and being an existent are the same,
it does nort foJ:low from the greater extension of thought over
things that the former are more decisive in establishing what
is i.ieal. Putnam seems perfectly innocent of the criterion of
c1assffical reaJism, " Things are the meaS1Ure of mind, not mind
the measu11eof things."

UNREAL REALISM

645

Putnam's words, as do Schla.geJ's, ring witih the same
iderulist imperative heard in Hegel's dictum, " The :tieal is tihe
mtiona.l .and the rational is the 11ea:l." For he leaves no doubt
that the forma.l ruJes of diisoourse determine what we rationally
say the things in the world are like. Becaiuse, however, his
"I"erulism" is fideistic, he cannot aoceprt the idealistic implications of his Internal Realism but insterud ferventily (perhaps
desper.ately) embrruces pragmatism. He follows Quine and
others who urge us to reject the spectator point of view in
metaphysics :and epistemology. (So much £or specufative
knowledge!) We a,re to aiccept the "reality" of abstract entities because they are indispensable in mathematics, mic:roparticles and space-time points becaiuse they are indispensable
in physi!Cs, 1and tables and chairs because they are indispensable in daily living.
This leap .away from idealism in favor of pragmatic realism
can he traiced to
acceptance of science as the standaJ.'d of knowledge. Despite his exho1r:t:ationsto abandon ce11tain
outlooks of seventeenth-"century philosophy, he seems nevertheless to cling firmly to Locke's view that the philosopher's
vocation is to serve as an "undersweeper" for science. He
goes so far in his a1dulation of science as to preach resignation
,to the prospect of having to live and phi1osophize without
foundwtiorrs. Why? Becaruse" Science is wonder::fulat destroying metaphysical answers, but is incapa;hle of
sub,stitute ones. Science takes away foundations without prowding ll'eplaicement" (32) .
Adverting to the undermining influence whii!ch the dichofomies between common sense and knowledge have on common
sense realism, Putnam seeks to show how his Internal Realism
erases tihese dichotomies without lapsing into "sheer linguistic
idealism." He insiists that on the strength of Internal Realis1n
we ean stiH ,show that there is " ' externality '," " ' something '
out there independent of l1anguage and mind."
But his defense against " 1sheer linguistic idealism " lays hare
an epistemological agnosticism, itestifying to the way modern

646

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

philosophy has
know1edge by separating the object of
knowledge from the thing. It looks as though Putnam-despite his diso1'aimers on
internal realism regarding the
dichotomy between subject (mind) and object (thing)-ha1s
whole the Ca11tesian dichotomy. He
tha;t
the11e are "'
facts'"
that we can describe them.
Hut
" we cannot say-because it makes no sense-is
what the facts are
of a11
choices " (
3) . We can answer the ques1tion, recaU, "'How many object's
are 1the1,e?'" by appealing either to the logical system of Carnap--in whrich case we answer " Three "-or to the ,system of
the
case we answer "Seven." Either
answer
correot
on our "conceptual
choices,"
is
many objects there are.
The reason Putnam
the indefonsibiJity of " objects existing ' independently '
conceptual schemes is that
there are no
for the use of even the logical notions
from conceptuaJ
is impossible therefore to
assign an
to
category of Object or
Substance.
he
we must reject the position that
" ... its aH
" Some facts "are the!l'e rto he disby us ";
we cannot embark on
covered and not
such discoveries before we
" ... adopted a way of speaking, a language, a ' co11'ceptua1scheme '." " ' F act1s '," " ' ,exist ',"
"'object'" are not words
us1a.ge is determined by
"Reali1ty Itself" (35-6) .
would Putnam ha,V'e us suppose that his internal realdefends realism without acknowledging the 'thing in itself'. The latter engendem
such a.s those between
intrinsic and non-intrinsic properties, the former being the
prope11ties possessed
things in 1thems1eilves;as we haV'e seen,
accuses
dichotomies
undermining common
sense knowledge.
Having dismissed the dichotomies, Putnam assures us that
we ael'e no longer constrained to divide rernlity into a " ' sci1

UNREAL REALISM

647

entific ilnage ' aJJid a ' manifest image ' " : " T·ables and chairs
(and yes, pink ice cubes) exist j111st as much as quarks 1and
gravitrutionailfields.... The idea thait most of illlllndane reality
is illusion ... is given up once and for all. But mundane rerulity [now] looks different, in that we are forced to acknowledge
thait many of our familiar descriptions reflect our interests and
choices" (37).

Barre's "Modest Soientifi() Realism"
Because Harre contents: llimself with working toiward a rationaJ. justification onily for soientifio realism, he keeps the
ph:ifosopbical underpinnings of this project under wraps.
NevertheJess, his appi11oach raises a question or two about
these underpinnings and hence about the ultimate significance
of his defense of scientific l'eailism.
Harre proposes a modest scientific realism, a " referential
which he also caHs " policy I"ealism." In gener:al
iterms, what he means by soientifio realism is ". . . the doctrine that science descriibes somewhat imperfectly and certainly incompiLetely, the world as it e:irists independently of the
cognitive aJJid maiteriail praetices of mankind ... " (237). He
quickly aidds that this reailism cannot be established by a
"global rurgiument"; it is impoissib1eto ·oonstmct an argument
that would justify a realist il'e3Jding of all scientific theories.
He bases this disclruimer on the premise that there are three
importantly different lci.nd!s of scientific object, each inhabiting ii.ts own realm and requiring its own criteria of verification.
Rerulm 1 contains only objects of actual experience; Realm 2
,contains objiecbs of possible experience; Realm 3 contains objects " which, if they we'l."e real, womd be beyond 'all possible
experience ... " (237) .
Harre undersicores two features of this scheme: the first is
that most sciences make rnfel'ence to '3J1l three realms; the second is that the lines of demarcation between the realms are
poorly defined. Where the boundaries a[l)e dmwn depends on
historical and technical considerations (e.g., the inviention of

648

RAYMOND DENNEHY

the microscope). NevertheiLes1s,no difficu1ty e:rists iin finding
representative objects for each realm.
Citing " hivalence '' and " essentia1ism " as ithe chief 1sou:rces
of scepticism toward scientific realism, he appeals to the principle of " material practices." The principle of bivaJ.ence, which
holds that " ' The theoil'letic:alstatements of science are true or
£w1se 1by virtue of the way the wo:v1d is'," p:vesupposes a truthrealism tihat the " best explanation " cannot defend. Essentialism, which is to proceed kom theory to pronouncemelllts
aihouit what science is, misses the mark. The derense of science
reqruires the appeal to material pra!C!bioos,i.e., to what scientists
·actuaJJy do when they do scieil!ce (3-4) .
Harre' s oonstruail of these mateciwl practices leads him to attribute a moral, rwther than an epistemological basis to science.
The moral sensibility of ithe scientific oommunity-<which he
rega:OO:s as 1aJdrn.irahle---iis needed, partiouilooly to stave off.
ireJiativism, booaiuse there are no clewr-out procedrures fo.r determining common objects of peroeption and common objects of
undeJJstanding. Thus a triadiition of trllJls:t must pe:vvade the
scientific oonununity. Scientisrbs must have confidence in the
integrity of their oo11eagues, rendering belief in the discove·ries
and procedures of others reasonable. Moreo¥er, the everyday
sense of truth and frusity does not emend to the unobservruble
or the general, i.e., to theories and lwws. Tmth and £al,sity are,
in Harre's estimate, jrusti:fied when used for confumation and
disconfirmation of the trust-worthiness of expressed belief or
opinion. Theiir use rorms pant of " the social netwook through
which an epistemic moral, order is S1Ustainec1" (93) .
But despite the imtial emphasis Harre places on this mol'laJ.
basis, he a11ow:s it to slip immediarteiLy from sight so th.rut it
plays no furrther :vole in his defense of scientific realism. At aill
events, iit iis haitl to understand ihow mor:ality oouild he defended .as rthe basii.s of a discipline or a family of diisciplines
whose goail is undeTstanding. Also, the dffierentiation of disciplines depends on the specificity of their resrpootive objects
of foous; how, then, couhl science w1timwtely be differentiaited

UNREAL REALISM

649

f11om commerce? Surely trust among rthe members of the business community is equally rnmrcial. Perhaps the impossibility
of observing the putative denizens of Realm 3 science makes
Ham?s emphasis on the importance of moral sensibility among
scientists mo re undersitandah1e.
He argues t:hat realism assumes a different form in each of
the three realms and aecordingly needs different defonses.
Thus the project for the phifo.sophy of soience is clearly set
tortih: "The pursuit of the philosophy of science becomes the
effort to develop an adequate theo:i.·y of science for each realm,
a theory which expJains how kno 1w1edge conceirning the beings
of each !'ealm is possible, and defines the extent to which the
method!ologies of soience can auhieve it" (237) . Although
deficient, these defenses are hieramhica1ly velated: the defense
of the " transcendental reaJ.ism" of Re1a;lm 3 depends on the
" policy rea11ism'' of Rea1lm 2 which, in turn, depends on a
successful defense of the "pevceptual realist wccorunt" of
Realm I.
modest 11ealist comtrurul of Realm 1 science 1appeaJ.s
to Gihsonian ps;yochology.He argues that Gibson'>s anaJysis of
pemeption
speciific la
constants in oiur pereep··
tiuail judgments; ecvien erroneous j111dgment.s,e.g., that there are
canals on Ma.vs, can he shown rto be based on these constants
(237-38) .
He defonds the realism of Realm 2 science, policy realism, by
an inductive argument. He begins with the procedu11e of looking for so far unobserved entities whose e:icistence
has been rendered plausible by the theoriz,ing of Realm 2 science. Past suooes:sesin this way of proceeding justify the practice. Ha.rre turns to the method of "]oon1c theorizing" to defond the procedure"s rationaiLity. Iconic theorizing preserves
the generic natural kiinds of ReaJm 1 science, whose observability has ailverudy been established, and then proceeds to the formation of conceptions of unobserved objects by analogously
e:iciending the features of observed nabural kinds into Realm 2.
For eXjamp1e, Prasteur's ea11ly yea,vs in micmbio1ogy spent in1

650

RAYMOND DENNEHY

vestiigaiting the influence of yeasts in f e:rmentation
him with the " anailytical analogue " to explain the suppuration of vvuunds. 'iVerie the "
ceHs " in £act bodily cells set
loose by the disease, a.s Lord Lister thought? By thinking of
suppu:ratfon as analogous to fermentation, Pasteur was
to
entertain the conception of the
cells as analogous to yeast
and thus to conceiVie of them as an infection: "In inducing a
cloisu:re the analytical
had opened up a :research project, which cmlminated in the disco¥ery of the so-oal1ed '·attenuation of vhiuses' '' (174) .
Such analogical conceptuaJiza.tion enables the formation of
a "theory-family." The fatter is "1a kind of cognitive object
characteroi.sticof theories that pertain to ... [Realm 2]" (193).
PoJicy l'ea1ism itl]jus rconsists tin the formation of theory-families
anticipate the manner in which new kinds of
which not
beings may be conceiV'ed but also suggest methods of constriuoting strategies for discovering
of such beings.
Huit this way of proceeding oannot he extended to Realm 3
because the denizens of ithat realm e1ude aU possible ex-perielllce. Although aclmowledging some shifts in the boundary
separating Realms
and 3, as when technical a,dviances made
viruses pos1s1ib1e objects of visual observation with the electron
mrcroscope, Harre neveritheless sees the division between these
riealms as formidable: " A being which belongs to Realm 3 may
or may not be of a familiar met,aphysica.l category and of one
of the common natura,l kinds. At least some of the beings are
not of familiar natural kinds." Harre has in mind here esotertic
beings s1Uch as "the
vector bosons of quantum
field theory" (238-39) .
Clearly Rea1lm 3 entities create massiV'e problems for any
defense of scientific realism. If rt.he putative objects of scientific
discorrnrsel'emaiin fugitiv;e to
possible experience, what is the
wa;rrant for the ola1im that they are real?
defense uses
the
concepts of covariance, invariance, and symmetry to justify the crucial putrutive link between the entities
of Reail.m and 3. The Kantian concept of suhstance can be

UNREAL REALISM

651

analogically extended to the unobservabJ.,e entities of Realm
3, and an individual member therein is ,construed as a "conserved quantity." The proposed anrulogy then presents itself
as that between substances as permanent entity and energy as
permanent quantity.
Thus, depending on the Lorentz transformation, the " revision of rthe ieonoopt of mass leads directly to the popularly
famous Einsrtiniain relation E = Mc 2 • This relation can be interpreted as introduoing a new conserved quantity, 'energy.'
... Or, to put the matter another way, the existence of this
relation within ithe theory 1sh.ow:s that the laws which are
covariant under the Lorentz transformation can be interpreted
as being ab01Ut :a ' substance ' of unknown constitution but
known dispositions: energy. A realist interpretaroion then cans
for the postulation of H .being, ' energy ', to be the heart of a
common ontology for physical theories. Whatever it is, the
energy concept behaves like a substance concept" (250-51).
" Real " as applied to Realm 3 entities derives its meaning
": "Whatever persists unfrom the "Robustness
changed through chang.e is rea-1 ... " (277) . This use of " real "
is clearly cruciail to Harre'is adaptation of the covariance principle to validate the reality of Realm 3 entities. He ooaracterthe Robustness Principle as" eX!ceeding poweclul," iinsof.ar
a:s it allows direct inferences from designated kinds of observable changes displayed by Realm 1 phenomena to phenomena
iin Realms 2 or 3.
Harre does nort lose sight of the £act that, despite all the
above strategies, the entities of Rerulm 3 remain unobserved.
The properties which the <theoriesof Realm 3 science attribute
to them do not reveal themselves to us. Rather it is the
" affioodanoe·s'' oi:f ibhese beings that such theonies describe.
" A:ffordance " refers to the cwtegory in which Reailm 3 entities are expressed. An affo1dance is "a special kind of tendency, one for which the typioaJ. manifestation must be re1'ated
to something specifiea1ly human" (283). Despite grounding
in the objective properties of things, "there can never he a

RAYMOND DENNEHY

wholly theory-wee reaili.ng of the natures of things from the
oibservwbledisplays. of tendencies" (283). In other worlds, the
w,ay the entities o[ Realm 3 science appear to observation is
shaped by the specifications and caprucities for display in the
particular appaIDatusused: " A water dropilet can he seen by a
phyisicist, but the ioniz·wtion of which it is a manifestation is
!itself a manifesbation of the charge on a subatomic particle"
(307).
AJlrtih.ough not importantly m-iginaJ, Harre offers a sober,
thorough defense of scientific realism. His book abounds in
incisive analyses .and bruJ.fa:nt critiques. His dismantJ.mg of
anti-realist claims, s1U1ch as Cartwright's and Fraasen's, are cases
in point. Unlike Schlagel, he is not content to acknowl1edge
pomts of discontinuity between observ:able and unobservable
entities and let matters stand at that; instead he appea1s ;to
anrulogiues and "theory-families" to vindicaite claims of ove!l"all continuity in the scientific wo!l"1d view.
If there is .any point whei'e his 1approach raises a question,
Ii.it is the absence of any aidvertence to a philosophicaJ under1structu:re. Viewed exclusively in terms of providing " A
Rationale for the Natural Sciences " (the book's subtitle) , his
accomplishment, as impressive as it is, gives no clear rerudii.ng
of just what " V'ariety " of realism he has S1Uoceeded in defending. Is it the fideistic variety which, like thwt espoused by
Schilagel a:nJdi Putnam, ends in a pragmatic rep!l"esentationaJism? Is it finally a cryrpto-iderulism? Harre's book unfortunately provides no ·answers to these kinds of questions.
We cannot infer much about his philosophical ;l'eaJism from
his claim that ReaJm 2 science (upon which Realm 3 science
depends) depends on Realm 1 scie111ce, the obj,ects of which
are observca.ble by ordinary experience. His defense of the
veracity of ourr sense peroeptions, recalJ, resits on an :appeal to
Gihsonian psychology, speci:fiooJJ.yto the lwtteir's structuralism,
accoirling to wmch our pereeptual judgments rely on a set of
l1aw...1ike oonstanrbs. As it stands, this can be interpreted in a
neo-Ka:nJbiansense and thrus fits snugly with Harre's qualified
neo-Kantian notion of srubstance and his concept of ,a theory-

UNREAL REALISM

653

family, whlch may also have a hard time escaping the neoKantian label. Insofar as a themy-family is a oognitivie object
representative of theories that pertain to Reailm 2 and validated: by the consensus of the scientific community for the
purpose of allowing the anticipation oi new kinds of beings, it
sounds very much like Kant's set of 1a priori principles, "AnaJ.ogiesof Experience."
Of course, these things in themselves do not allow us to infer that Harre is a neo-Kantian. But if his defense of scientific
realism does not spring from an authentic phi"losaphicalrealism-by the latter I mean a philos01phywhich ·starrts with the
knowing
immediate and certain knowledge of extramentaJ. being-then wll Han-e will have aooomplisihed is to
articulate the mtionally coherent manner in which science investigates real entities, if real entities exist. And I think !it is
clear that he wishes to do more than that.

Concluding Remarks
How does realism become idealism? The proximate answer,
I think, Lies in nominalism. Schlagel and Putnam deny the
intellect the power to know what things are in themselves.
The reptresentationialist theory of knowledge engendered by
nomina1ism evisce['ates any iattempt to defend our ability to
know exrtramenta1 realiity. For we know that things are at the
same time thwt we know what they are. Abstractions suoh as
" rewlii.ty" and " being " can mislewd, but when we say that
we perieeive reality, we mean .thwt we perceive things. Things
have dii.stinctive characteristics, and the less: we know these
chwaJCteristics, the less we know that there are things. No
one's introduction to rthe world of ertramentail reality consists
of peroeptions o:f things as such. There are generic labels (as
opposed to brand names) for products but not generic products. (Try to imagine a generic corn flake.) The world is
popuiated by specific entities, and the specificity of ewch is intimately bound to distinctive characteristics.
1!f ,aJI we know are our representations of things, then what
we know dil'ectily and in the first instance are the representa-

654

RAYMOND

DENNEHY

tions, not the things they pufatively represent. The cause of
realism is confronted here with something mo·re serious than
knowing what the representations are while not knowing what
the tliings they represent are. 1t is a matter of knowing what
the represientations are and that they exist (in us, at least)
while not knowing what and that anything beyond them exists.
If we follow Sdalagel and Putnam in saying that we cannot
know the p:roperl.iiesand characteristiies things possess in themsdves hut can only know instead our •representations of them,
then like these writers we can defend realism only by
ing to the pragmatic and ultimately to the coherence theories
of truth,
But realism is pooDly served by pragmatism. The repeated
confuma1tion of assumptions through successful action, although rendering increasingly pfausihle the dai:m that the
world is as we represent it, does not eradicate the de jure posa dream.
sibility that the " external wor11d " is no more
For aill that in principle
the premises of pragmatism is that the proposition "Action x fulfii!Js the expectations
of my assuming y" is coherent wibh
other .assumptions
by which I Jive.
Small wonder, then, that the coherence theory venerated by
idealists should be brought forth as the ultimate criterion of
,truth! But by realists?
How i110n.ic that philosophers professing to he rea.lists should,
in the end, embmce a
I pointed to nominaJism
as the "p:mximate '' cause. But how account for the nomiinalism? Judging from the texts of Scihlagel and Putnam, the di.rect cause of their nominaJism (and the penultimate cause of
their idealism) is the materialization of the mind, Both writers
discard ontoJogical knowledge in favor of sense knowledge. A!s
the writings of
and, preeminenbly, of Hume eloquently
testify, the mere associartion of sensible properties bespeaks no
intelligible str1ucitures, no formal cause, intrinsic to things. If
the mind grasps only sensible prope:rt1ies,it has no experiential
evidence for justifying the claim that essences are rea1l; for the
wha-tness of ithings is not materia,l: matter itself cannot ex-

UNREAL REALISM

655

plain 0trganizrution. The knowledge that my stereo is rectangular in shape pil."esupposesmy apprehension of its rectangularity; to know that the indiwdual approaching my office is the
.te1erphone repairman preS11.1pposes my a;pprehens:ion of his essence, man. Brut the logic of materialization carries us farrther
.than this. As Hume correctly saw, it leaves no evidential basis
for saying even that •there are things; the evidence provided by
seruse data or ampression:s justifies no more than asserting the
presence of mere phenomena, i.e., bundles of impressions.
If the proximate cruuse of the prevrulent crypto-iderulism is
nominalism and its penuitimate cruuse the materialization of
the mind, the ultimrute cruuse, it seems to me, is the asisumption
that common sense knowledge and philosophical knowledge
1are dichotomized. This curious feature of modem philosophy
bedeviiJs any attempt to defend realism. Our primary, experientirul knorw1edige tells us that things, not mere sensrhle
erties, populate 1bhe womd. And the identillcation of an object
of
as a thing requires a knowledge of its whatness,
essence, anid its thatness (existence, either possible or ructuail) .
Such spontaneous jUJdgmentsof common sense are the stuff of
pmlosorphicruland scientific knowledge; they immediately proclaim their trruth to the mrnd. It is evident and certain thrut
things exist outside the mind becruuse things are ways of being,
booruuse rull things are reducible to being (.a;s indeed all concepts are reducible to the concept of beti.ng) ; thus being is the
basis orf all intelligibility.
Once one foresakes the higher reaches of metaphy:sica1 abstraction in favor of the "clear and dtistinct," then the mruterializrution of the mind w:ith its attendant nominalism follows.
As Blato observed in the Sophist, those who reject the doctmne of the For!Ins in f.aV10r of sensible things becaiuse the latter
can be grasped by ,the senses sihou1d uJ1timately take boulders
to he the :most real of things, for they can be hugged!
Hut the writings of Schla.gel and Putnam unmask the irony
in all this: when houLdel'ls are taken as the most real of things,
they somehow transmute into the mere idea of bouillders.

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUMES 51 to 55 (1987-1991)

*

*

*

*

*

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

A p·lus sign after the name indic:ates joint authorship.
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. Constructing and Reconstructing the Human
51 (1987) 501-520
Body .....•..........................•...•
--Scriptural Grounds for Concrete Moral Norms .. 52 (1988)
1- 22
Barad, Judith. Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment and
Activity ...........................•........
55 (1991) 397-413
Barry, Robert L., O.P. + Can Deterrence Be Moral? A Review
Discussion. [Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] .......... 52 (1988) 719-736
--Feeding the Comatose and the Common Good in the Catholic
Tradition ..................................
53 (1989) 1- 30
+ Pharaoh's Magicians: The Ethics and Efficacy of Human Fetal
Tissue Transplants .•........................
54 (1990) 575-607
Beards, Andrew. Creator and Causality : A Critique of Pre-Critical
Objections
................................
53 (1989) 573-586
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas's Fourth Way and the Approximating
Relation •....•................•..•.........
51 (1987) 17- 36
Boyle, Joseph, et al. "Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New
Life": Toward a Clearer Understanding ....... 52 (1988) 365-426
Buckley, James J. Minding Our Own Business.
52 (1988) 307-319
[Christian, Wm.] •........................•.
A Return to the Subject: The Theological Significance of Charles
Taylor's Sources of the Self .......•.........•
55 (1991) 497-509
Casey, Gerard. An Explication of the De Hebdomadi"bus of Boethius in
the Light of St. Thomas's Commentary . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 419-434
Cataldo, Peter J. Husserl on Galileo's
Intentionality
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 680-698
Centore, F. F. A Note on W. J. Hill's "The Doctrine of God after
Vatican II" ................................
54 (1990) 531-540

657

658

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Cessario, Romanus, O.P. The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian Moral
Life: Its Significance for Human Life Issues ... 53 (1989) 173-196
--Theology at Fribourg . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 325-366
Clayton, Philip. Being and One Theologian.
52 (1988) 645-671
[P.annenberg] ..............................
Connery, John R., S.J. The Non-Infallible Moral Teaching of the
Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987)
1- 16
Cortest, Luis. Was St. Thomas Aquinas a Platonist? 52 (1988) 209-219
Craig, William Lane. Aquinas on God's Knowledge of Future
Contingents ................................
54 (1990) 33- 79
D'Costa, Gavin. Taking Other Religions Seriously: Some Ironies in the
Current Debate on a Christian Theology of Religions
[Hick] ....................................
54 (1990) 519-529
Dennehy, Raymond. Unreal Realism. [Schlagel; Putnam;
Harre]
....................................
55 (1991) 631-655
DiNoia, J. A., O.P. American Catholic Theology at Century's End:
Postconciliar, Postmodern, Post-Thomistic ...... 54 (1990) 499-518
--Authority, Public Dissent and the Nature of Theological
Thinking ..................................
52 (1988) 185-207
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious. Truth: A Comparison of
Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan 53 (1989) 461-480
Duncan, Roger. Lublin Thomism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 307-324
Dupre, Louis. Note on the Idea of Religious Truth in the Christian
Tradition ..................................
52 (1988) 499-512
Echeverria, Edward J. The Fate of Theism
Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 (1987) 632-657
Fay, Thomas A. Maritain on Rights and
Natural Law ................................
55 (1991) 439-448
Finnis, John. Object and Intention in Moral Judgments According to
Aquinas ...................................
55 (1991)
1- 27
Finnis, John, et al. " Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New
Life": Toward a Clearer Understanding ...... 52 (1988) 365-426
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J. A Critical Note on Thomas Morris's
The Logic of God Incarnate ..........•..••.•.
54 (1990) 141-149
Foster, David Ruel. Aquinas on the Immateriality of the
Intellect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 (1991) 415-438
Galvin, John P. The Marvelous Exchange: Raymund Schwager's
Interpretation of the History of Soteriology ... 53 (1989) 675-691
Griffiths, Paul J. Religious Diversity.
[Christian, Wm.] ...........................
52 (1988) 319-327
Grisez, Germain. History as Argument for Revision in Moral Theology:
55 (1991) 103-116
A Review Discussion. [Mahoney] .............
--The Structures of Practical Reason: Some Comments and
Clarifications. [Response to Johnstone] ........ 52 (1988) 269-291

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES

659

Gris.ez, Germain, et al. " Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New
Life": Toward a Clearer Understanding.
[Humanae Vitae] ...........................
52 (1988) 365-426
Guagliardo, Vincent, 0.P. Aquinas and Heidegger: The Question of
Philosophical Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 (1989) 407-442
Guarino, Thomas. Betti and the Hermeneutics of
Dogma ....................................
53 (1989) 635-654
Hall, Douglas C. Immediaey and Mediation in Aquinas:
In I Sent., Q. 1, A. 5 ........................
53 (1989) 31- 55
Hanink, James G. A Theory of Basic Goods: Structure and
Hierarchy
.......... , ......................
52 (1988) 221-245
Heiser, John H. Plotinus and the Apeiron of Plato's
Parmenides
................................
55 (1991) 53- 81
Hibbs, Thomas S. A Rhetoric of Motives: Thomas on Obligation as
Rational Persuasion .........................
54 (1990) 293-309
Hilkert, Mary Catherine, 0.P. Hermeneutics of History: The
Theological Method of Edward Schillebeeckx .. 51 (1987) 97-145
Hill, William J., O.P. The Doctrine of God after
Vatican II ..... ., . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 395-418
--On Knowing the Unknowable God: A Review Discussion.
..................................
51 (1987) 699-709
[Burxell]
Hubbard, J.M. Albertus Magnus and the Notion of the Syllogistic
Middle Term ...............................
54 (1990) 115-122
Hughson, Thomas, S.J. Dulles and Aquinas on
52 (1988) 445-471
Revelation .................................
Hurd, Bob. Being is Being-Present-to-Self: Rahner's Key to
Aquinas's Metaphysics .......................
52 (1988) 63- 78
Irwin, Kevin W. Recent Sacramental Theology
[II]
......................................
52 (1988) 124-147
--Recent Sacramental Theology III .............
53 (1989) 281-313
--Sacramental Theology : A Methodological
Proposal
..................................
54 (1990) 311-342
Jackson, Timothy P. The Theory and Practice of Discomfort:
51 (1987) 270-298
Richard Rorty and Pragmatism ...............
Jacobs, Jonathan. + The Unity of the Vices ...... 54 (1990) 641-653
Jaki, Stanley L. Thomas and the Universe ......... 53 (1989) 545-572
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. Toward a Thomistic Perspective on Abortion and
55 (1991) 343-396
the Law in Contemporary America ............
Kelley, Francis E. Robert Orford's Attack on Giles of
Rome .....................................
51 (1987) 70- 96
Kendall, George A. Space-Time and the Community of Beings:
51 (1987) 480-500
Some Cosmological Speculations ..............
Kesler, Darrel. + Pharaoh's Magicians: The Ethics and Efficacy of
Human Fetal Tissue Transplants .............
54 (1990) 575-607

660

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

King-Farlow, John. The Actual Infinite in
Aristotle
..................................
52 (1988) 427-444
Klein, Sherwin. Plato's Parmenides and St. Thomas's Analysis of God
55 (1991) 229-244
as One and Trinity ..........................
Knasas, John F. X. Aquinas and the Liberationist Critique of Maritain's
52 (1988) 247-267
New Christendom ...........................
--Esse as the Target of Judgment in Rahner and
Aquinas ....................................
51 (1987) 222-245
--Transcendental Thomism and the Thomistic Texts.
[Marechal]
................................
54 (1990) 81- 95
Krasevac, Edward L., O.P. 'Christology from Above' and
' Christology from Below' . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 299-306
Lauder, Robert E. On Being or Not Being a Thomist.
[McCool] ..................................
55 (1991) 301-319
Lee, Patrick. Existential Propositions in the Thought of St. Thomas
Aquinas ...................................
52 (1988) 605-626
Lehrberger, J,ames, O.Cist. Intelligo ut Credam: St. Augustine's
Confessions
...............................
52 (1988) 23- 39
Lindbeck, George. Response to Bruce Marshall. [Aquinas as Postliberal
...............................
53 (1989) 403-406
Theologian]
Lo, Ping-Cheung. Are There Economic
.... 52 (1988) 703-717
Macierowski, E. M. Does God Have a Quiddity According to
.................................
52 (1988) 79- 87
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. Quasi-Formal Causality and" Change in the
Other " : A Note on Kar 1 Rahn er' s Christology . . 52 (1988) 293-306
Marshall, Bruce D. Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian.
[Lindbeck]
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 (1989) 353-402
Martin, Francis. Literary Theory, Philosophy of History and
Exegesis
..................................
52 (1988) 575-604
Matteo, Anthony M. Grounding the Human Conversation.
[Grayling; Marechal] .......................
53 (1989) 235-258
May, William E., et al. " Every Marital Act Ought to Be Open to New
Life": Toward a Clearer Understanding ....... 52 (1988) 365-426
Mayes, G. Randolph. Ross and Scotus on the Existence of God: Two
Proofs from Possibility ......................
54 (1990) 97-114
McKinney, Ronald H., S.J. The Quest for an Adequate Proportionalist
Theory of Value ............................
53 (1989) 56- 73
McMahon, Kevin A. Economics, Wisdom, and the Teaching of the Bishops
in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas ........... 53 (1989) 91-106
Meynell, Hugo. From Epistemology to Metaphysics . . 51 (1987) 205-221
--A Way of Looking at Heidegger ..............
55 (1991) 613-629
Michalson, Gordon E. The Inscrutability of Moral Evil in
Kant
........ ., ...........................
51 (1987) 246-269

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES

661

Mitcham, Carl. Towards a Religious Ethics of Technology: A Review
Discussion
................................
51 (1987) 146-168
Molnar, Paul D. Can Theology Be Contemporary and
A Review Discussion. [Ratzinger] ............
52 (1988) 513-537
--Is God Essentially Different from His
Rahner's
Explanation from Revelation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 575-631
--Some Dogmatic Consequences of Paul F. Knitter's Unitarian
Theocentrism
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 (1991) 449-495
Moreno, Antonio, O.P. Finality and Intelligibility in Biological
Evolution
.................................
54 (1990)
1- 31
Muller, Richard A. The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen
A Response to T. F. Torrance ...... 54 (1990) 673-704
A Review
Murphy, Matthew M. + Can Deterrence Be
Discussion. [Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] ........... 52 (1988) 719-736
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics: A Critique Based
on St. Thomas's Understanding of Prudence .... 51 (1987) 461-479
Nichols, Aidan, 0.P. A British Commonwealth
Dogmatics .................................
52 (1988) 96-123
O'Callaghan, Paul. The Holiness of the Church in Lumen
Gentium ...................................
52 (1988) 673-701
O'Reilly, Paul. What is Intelligible Matter? ....... 53 (1989) 74- 90
Pambrun, James R. Ricoeur, Lonergan, and the Intelligibility of
Cosmic Time ...............................
54 (1990) 471-498
Peterson, John. On the Bearer of 'True' .......... 53 (1989) 481-488
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes, and the
Good: Recent Moral Theology. [ Caffara; May;
Schockenhoff] ..............................
55 (1991) 117-140
Poirier, Maben Walter. A Comment on Polanyi and
Kuhn
.....................................
53 (1989) 259-279
Porter, Jean. De Ordine Caritatis: Charity, Friendship, and Justice in
Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae .......... 53 (1989) 197-213
Power, William L. Literal and Metaphorical Uses of Discourse in the
Representation of God .......................
52 (1988) 627-644
Ray, A. Chadwick. A Fact about the Virtues ...... 54 (1990) 429-451
Reynolds, Terrence. Method Divorced from Content in Theology? An
Assessment of Lonergan's Method in Theology .. 55 (1991) 245-269
Rocca, Gregory, 0.P. The Distinction between Res Significata
and Modus Significandi in Aquinas's Theological
Epistemology
..............................
55 (1991) 173-197
Root, Michael. Alister McGrath on Cross and
Justification
...............................
54 (1990) 705-725
Roy, Louis, O.P. Wainwright, Maritain, and Aquinas on Transcendent
Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 655-672

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES

Rudebusch, George. Aristotelian Predication, Augustine, and the
Trinity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 53 (1989) 587-597
Schepers, Maurice, O.P. Conversion and Convergence: Personal
Transformation and the Growing Accord of Theology and
Relig·ious Studies ...........................
51 (1987) 658-679
Schindler, David L. Catholicism, Public Theology, and
Postmodernity: On Richard John N euhaus's Catholic
Moment ....................................
53 (1989) 107-143
Schner, George, S.J. Hume's Dialogues and the Redefinition of the
Philosophy of Religion ......................
55 (1991) 83-101
Schuck, Michael J. John Courtney Murray's Problematic Interpretations
of Leo XIII and the American Founders ....... 55 (1991) 595-612
Schultz, Janice L. Thomistic Metaethics and a Present Controversy.
[Finnis; Grisez J . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . 52 (19SS) 40- 62
Seidl, Horst. The Concept of Person in St. Thomas
Aquinas ....................................
51 (1987) 435-460
Simon, Yves R. Knowledge of the Soul ............
54 (1990) 269-291
Simpson, Peter. Saint Thomas on the Naturalistic
Fallacy . .. .. . . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 51- 69
Smart, Ninian. William Christian and Community
52 (19S8) 327-335
Doetrines ...................................
Smith, Janet E. The Muniis of Transmitting Human Life:
A New Approach to Hiimanae Vitae .......... 54 (1990) 385-427
Smith, Philip, O.P. Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life:
A Thomistic Exploration .....................
54 (1990) 191-227
Sontag, Frederick. Liberation Theology and the Interpretation of
Political Violence ...........................
55 (1991) 271-292
Staley, Kevin M. Happiness; The Natural End of
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. 53 (1989) 215-234
Steiss, Albert J. Philosophy of Art: A Postscript .. 53 (19S9) 315-31S
Stubbe.us, Neil A. Naming God: Moses Maimonides and Thomas
Aquinas ....................................
54 (1990) 229-267
Burin, Kenneth. Towards a ' Materialist' Critique of 'Religious
Pluralism' ... John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell
Smith . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . 53 (1989) 655-673
Swindler, J. K. Maclntyre's Republic ............. . 54 (1990) 343-354
T,avuzzi, Michael, O.P. Aquinas on Resolution in
Metaphysics ...............................
. 55 (1991) 199-227
--Aquinas on the Preliminary Grasp of Being ... . 51 (1987) 555-574
Tekippe, Terry J. A Response to Donald Keefe on
Lonergan ..................................
. 52 (19S8) SS- 95
Theron, Stephen. The Divine Attributes in Aquinas .. 51 (19S7) 37- 50
--Meaning in a Realist Perspective ............ . 55 (1991) 29- 51

AUTHORS

OF ARTICLES

668

--A Necessary Condition for the Truth of Moral and Other
Judgments .................................
55 (1991) 293-300
Thiemann, Ronald F. In Praise of Pluralism.
[Stout] ....................................
53 (1989) 489-503
Treloar, John L., S.J. Pomponazzi's Critique of Aquinas's Arguments
for the Immortality of the Soul ..............
54 (1990) 453-470
Van Beeck, Frans Jozef, S.J. Professing the Creed among the World's
Religions ...................................
55 (1991) 539-568
Warner, Robert. Rahner on the Unoriginate Father .. 55 (1991) 569-593
Wilson, William M. A Different Method, a Different Case:
The Theological Program of Julian Hartt and Austin
Farrer .....................................
53 (1989) 599-633
Woods, Martin T. The Reduction of Essence in the Thought of
Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl ........ 53 (1989) 443-460
Woods, Richard, 0.P. Meister Eckhart and the Neoplatonic Heritage:
The Thinker's Way to God ...................
54 (1990) 609-639
Young, Robin Darling. Recent Interpretations of Early Christian
Asceticism. [Brown et al.] ...................
54 (1990) 123-140
54 (1990) 641-653
Zeis, John.
The Unity of the Vices .............
Zeitz, James V., S.J. Przywara and von Balthasar on
Analogy ....................................
52 (1988) 473-498

+

TERMS IN TITLES
ABORTION
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. Toward a Thomistic Perspective on Abortion
and the Law in Contemporary America ........ 55 (1991) 343-396
Zeitz, James V., S.J. Przywara and von Balthasar on
Analogy ...................................
52 (1988) 473-498
ART
Steiss, Albert J. Philosophy of Art:
A Postscript ................................
53 (1989) 315-318
ATTRIBUTES
Theron, Stephen. The Divine Attributes in
Aquinas ....................................
51 (1987) 37- 50
AUTHORITY
DiNoia, J. A., O.P. Authority, Public Dissent and the Nature
of Theological Thinking ......................
52 (1988) 185-207
BEING
Clayton, Philip. Being and One Theologian.
[Pannenberg] ...............................
52 (1988) 645-671
Hurd, Bob. Being is Being-Present-to-Self: Rahner's Key to
Aquinas's Metaphysics .......................
52 (1988) 63- 78
Kendall, George A. Space-Time and the Community of Beings:
Some Cosmological Speculations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 480-500
Tavuzzi, Michael, 0 .P. Aquinas. on the Preliminary Grasp of
Being ......................................
51 (1987) 555-574

BODY
Ashley, Benedict M., 0.P. Constructing and Reconstructing the
Human Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 501-520
CAUSALITY
Beards, Andrew. Creator and Causality: A Critique of Pre-Critical
Objections .................................
53 (1989) 573-586
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. Quasi-Formal Causality and u Chang.e in the
Other": A Note on Karl Rahner's Christology .. 52 (1988) 293-306
CHARITY
Porter, Jean. De Ordine Caritatis: Charity, Friendship, and Justice
in Thomas Aquinas' Summa Theologiae ........ 53 (1989) 197-213
CHRISTOLOGY
See JESUS CHRIST in index of ''Proper Names in Titles"
CHURCH
Connery, John R., S.J. The Non-Infallible Moral Teaching
of the Church . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987)
1- 16

664

TERMS IN TITLES

665

O'Callaghan, Paul. The Holiness of the Church in
52 (1988) 673-701
Lumen Gentium .............................
COMATOSE
Barry, Robert L., O.P. Feeding the Comatose and the Common Good
in the Catholic Tradition ..•..•......••...•...
53 (1989)
1- 30
CREATOR/CREATURE
Beards, Andrew. Creator and Causality : A Critique of Pre-Critical
Objections • • • .. . . . . . • • . • . . • • • . . . . .. • • . . . . • . 53 (1989) 573-586
Molnar, Paul D. Is God Essentially Different from His Creatures Y
Rahner's Explanation from Revelation . • . . • • . . 51 (1987) 575-631
DETERRENCE
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Matthew M. Murphy.
Can Deterrence Be Moral Y A Review Discussion.
52 (1988) 719-736
[Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] .............•.•.....
DISSENT
DiNoia, J. A., O.P. Authority, Public Dissent and the Nature of
Theological Thinking . . . • . • .. . .. . . . . . • • .. . . . • 52 (1988) 185-207
DOCTRINE
Centore, F. F. A Note on W. J. Hill's" The Doctrine of God
after Vatican II" ...........................
54 (1990) 531-540
Hill, William J., O.P. The Doctrine of God after
Vatican II • • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . • .. . • . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 395-418
Smar.t, Ninian. William Christian and Community
Doctrines ..................................
52 (1988) 327-335
DOGMA
Guarino, Thomas. Betti and the Hermeneutics of
Dogma •............•...•......•..•..•...••
53 (1989) 635-654
Molnar, Paul D. Some Dogmatic Consequences of Paul F. Knitter's
Unitarian Theooontrism . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . 55 (1991) 449-495
Nichols, Aidan, O.P. A British Commonwealth
Dogmatics .................................
52 (1988) 96-123
ECONOMICS
Lo, Ping-Cheung. Are There Economic RightsY .. 52 (1988) 703-717
McMahon, Kevin A. Economics, Wisdom, and the Teaching of the
Bishops in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas .•.. 53 (1989) 91-106
EMOTION
Barad, Judith. Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in Moral Judgment
55 (1991) 397-413
and Activity ................................
EPISTEMOLOGY
Meynell, Hugo. From Epistemology to
Metaphysics . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . .. . . . • . . . • • . . • 51 (1987) 205-221
Rocca, Gregory, O.P. The Distinction between Res Significata
and Modus Significamdi in Aquinas's Theological
Epistemology ...............................
55 (1991) 173-197

666

TERMS IN TITLES

ESSE
Knasas, John F. X. Esse as the Target of Judgment in
:Rahner and .Aquinas .........................
51 (1987) 222-245
ESSENCE
Woods, Martin T. The :Reduction of Essence in the Thought of
Thomas .Aquinas and Edmund Husserl ........ 53 (1989) 443-460
ETHICS
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Darrell Kesler.
Pharaoh's Magicians: The Ethics and Efficacy
of Human Fetal Tissue Transplants .......... 54 (1990) 575-607
Mitcham, Carl. Towards a Religious Ethics of Technology:
51 (1987) 146-168
A Review Discussion ........................
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics:
A Critique Based on St. Thomas's Understanding
51 (1987) 461-479
of Prudence ................................
See also MET.AETHICS and MOR.AL
EVOLUTION
Moreno, .Antonio, 0.P. Finality and Intelligibility in
Biological Evolution .........................
54 (1990)
1- 31
EXEGESIS
Martin, Francis. Literary Theory, Philosophy of History
and Excegesis ................................
52 (1988) 575-604
EXISTENCE
Lee, Patrick. Existential Propositions in the Thought of
St. Thomas .Aquinas .........................
52 (1988) 605-626
Mayes, G. Randolph. Ross and Scotus on the Existence of God:
54 (1990) 97-114
Two Proofs from Possibility .................
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics:
.A Critique Based on St. Thomas's Understanding
of Prudence ................................
51 (1987) 461-479
FETAL TISSUE
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Darrel Kesler.
Pharaoh's Magicians: The Ethics and Efficacy
of Human Fetal Tissue Transplants ........... 54 (1990) 575-607
FIN.ALITY
Moreno, .Antonio, 0.P. Finality and Intelligibility in
Biological Evolution .........................
54 (1990)
1- 31

GOD
Centore, F. F . .A Note on W. J. Hill's" The Doctrine
of God .after Vatican II" .....................
54 (1990) 531-540
Craig, William Lane . .Aquinas on God's Knowledge
of Future Contingents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 33- 79

TERMS IN TITLES

667

Flannery, Kevin L., S.J. A Critical Note on Thomas Morris's
The Logic of God Incarnate ..................
54 (1990) 141-149
Hill, William J., O.P. The Doctrine of God after
Vatican II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 395-418
Hill, William J., O.P. On Knowing the Unknowable God:
A Review Discussion. [Burrell] ...............
51 (1987) 699-709
Klein, Sherwin. Plato's Parmenides and St. Thomas's Analysis
of God as One and Trinity ...................
55 (1991) 229-244
Macierowski, E. M. Does God Have a Quiddity
According to
......................
52 (1988) 79- 87
Mayes, G. Randolph. Ross and Scotus on the Existence
of God: Two Proofs from Possibility .......... 54 (1990} 97-114
Molnar, Paul D. Is God Essentially Different
from His Creatures? Rahner's Explanation from
Revelation ..................................
51 (1987) 575-631
Power, William L. Literal and Metaphorical Uses of
Discourse in the Representation of God ........ 52 (1988) 627-644
Stubbens, Neil A. Naming God: Moses Maimonides and
Thomas Aquinas .............................
54 (1990) 229-267
Woods, Richard, 0.P. Meister Eckhart and the Neoplatonic
Heritage: The Thinker's Way to God . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 609-639
See also ATTRIBUTES and WAY
GOOD
Barry, Robert L., O.P. Feeding the Comatose and the Common
Good in the Catholic Tradition ................
53 (1989)
1- 30
Hanink, James G. A Theory of Basic Goods :
Structure and Hierarchy .....................
52 (1988) 221-245
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes,
and the Good: Recent Moral Theology. [ Caffara;
May; Schockenhoff] .........................
55 (1991) 117-140
HAPPINESS
Staley, Kevin M. Happiness: The Natural
End of Man? ...............................
53 (1989} 215-234
HERMENEUTICS
Guarino, Thomas. Betti and the Hermeneutics of
Dogma .....................................
53 (1989) 635-654
Hilkert, Mary Catherine, O.P. Hermeneutics
of History: The Theological Method of Edward
Schillebeeckx ................................
51 (1987) 97-145
HUMA..."l\f
Ashley, Benedict M., 0.P. Constructing and
Reconstructing the Human Body ..............
51 (1987) 501-520
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Darrell Kesler.

668

TERMS IN TITLES

Pharaoh's Magicians: The Ethics and Efficacy of
Human Fetal Tissue Tmnsplants .............
54 (1990) 575-607
C.essario, Roman us, 0 .P. The Meaning of Virtue
in the Christian Moral Life: Its Significance
For Human Life Issues ......................
53 (1989) 173-196
Grisez, Germain, et al. " Every Marital Act Ought
to Be Open to New Life": Toward a Clearer
52 (1988) 365-426
Understanding. [Humanae Vitae] .............
Smith, Janet E. The Munus of Transmitting
Human Life: A New .Approach to
54 (1990) 385-427
Humanae Vitae .............................
Smith, Philip, O.P. Transient Natures at the Edges of
Human Life: A Thomistic Exploration ........ 54 (1990) 191-227
IMMEDIACY
Hall, Douglas C. Immediacy and Mediation in
Aquinas: In I Sent., Q. 1, .A. 5 ...............
53 (1989) 31- 55
IMMORTALITY
T11eloar, John L., S.J. Pomponazzi's Critique of .Aquinas's
.Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul . . . . 54 (1990) 453-470
INFINITE
King-Farlow, John. The Actual Infinite in
.Aristotle ....................................
52 (1988) 427-444
INTELLECT/INTELLIGIBILITY
Foster, David Ruel. .Aquinas on the Immateriality
of the Intellect ..............................
55 (1991) 415-438
Lehrberger, James, O.Cist. Intelligo ut Credam:
St . .Augustine's Confessions ..•.•..............
52 (1988) 23- 39
Moreno, Antonio, O.P. Finality and Intelligibility
in Biological Evolution .......................
54 (1990)
1- 31
O'Reilly, Paul. What Is Intelligible Matted .... 53 (1989) 74- 90
Pambrun, James R. Ricoeur, Lonergan, and the
54 (1990) 471-498
Intelligibility of Cosmic Time .................
JUSTICE
Jean. De Ordine Oaritatis: Charity,
Friendship, and Justice in Thomas .Aquinas'
Summa Theologiae ................ ,. ......... 53 (1989) 197-213
JUSTIFICATION
Root, Michael. Alister McGmth on Cross and
Justification .................................
54 (1990) 705-725
KNOWLEDGE
Craig, William Lane. .Aquinas on God's Knowledge
of Future Contingents .......................
54 (1990) 33- 79
Hill, William J., O.P. On Knowing the Unknowable God:
51 (1987) 699-709
A Review Discussion. [Burrell] ..............

TERMS IN TITLES

669

Simon, Yves R. Knowledge of the Soul .....•.... 54 (1990) 269-291
LAW
Fay, Thomas A. Maritain on Rights and
Natural Law •.••.•.•....••.•••.....•...••..•
55 (1991) 439-448
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. Toward a Thomistic
Perspective on Abortion and the Law in
Contemporary America • • . . • . • • . • . • . . . . • • . • . . . 55 (1991) 343-396
LIBERATION
Knasas, John F. X. Aquinas and the Liberationist
Critique of Maritain's New Christendom ..•..... 52 (1988) 247-267
Sontag, Frederick. Libemtion Theology and the
Interpretation of Political Violence ..••....•..• 55 (1991) 271-292
MEANING
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. The Meaning of
Virtue in the Christian Moral Life:
Its Significance for Human Life Issues ........ 53 (1989) 173-196
Theron, Stephen. Meaning in a Realist
55 (1991) 29- 51
Perspective .....•••••....•.•.......•..•.....
METAETHICS
Schultz, Janice L. Thomistic Metaethics and a
Present Controversy. [Finnis; Grisez] •••...•• 52 (1988) 40- 62
See also ETHICS and MORAL
METAPHYSICS
Hurd, Bob. Being is Being-Present-to-Self:
Rahner's Key to Aquinas's Metaphysics ........ 52 (1988) 63- 78
Meynell, Hugo. From Epistemology to
Metaphysics . . . . . • . • • . . . . . • • . . . . . • . • . . . . . . • . 51 (1987) 205-221
Tavuzzi, Michael, O.P. Aquinas on Resolution
in Metaphysics ..•.•......•.•.......•........
55 (1991) 199-227
METHOD
Hilkert, Mary Catherine, O.P. Hermeneutics of
History: The Theological Method of Edward
Schillebeeckx: .....•..•.....•..•••..........•.
51 (1987) 97-145
Irwin, Kevin W. Sacramental Theology:
54 (1990) 311-342
A Methodological Proposal .............•.....
Reynolds, Terrence. Method Divorced from
Content in TheologyT An Assessment of
Lonergan's Method in Theology .••...........•
55 (1991) 245-269
Wilson, William M. A Different Method, a Different Case:
The Theological Program of Julian Hartt and Austin
Farrer •..••...•••......•........•......•...
53 (1989) 599-633
MORAL
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. Scriptural Grounds for
Concrete Moral Norms .•••.••....•.....•..•••
52 (1988) 1- 22

670

TERMS IN TITLES

Barad, Judith. Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in
Moral Judgment and Activity ................
55 (1991) 397-413
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Matthew M. Murphy.
Can Deterrence Be Moral'! A Review Discussion.
52 (1988) 719-736
[Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] ............•........
Cessario, Romanus, 0.P. The Meaning of
Virtue in the Christian Moral Life : Its Significance
for IIuman Life Issues .......................
53 (1989) 173-196
Connery, John R., S.J. The Non-Infallible Moral
Teaching of the Church . .. .. .. .. .. .. . .. .. . . .. 51 (1987) 1- 16
Finnis, John. Object and Intention in Moral Judgments
According to Aquinas .......................
55 (1991) 1- 27
Grisez, Germain. IIistory as Argument for
Revision in Moral Theology: A Review Discussion.
[Mahoney] ..................................
55 (1991) 103-116
Michalson, Gordon E. The Inscrutability of
Moral Evil in Kant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 246-269
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes,
and the Good: Recent Moral Theology.
55 (1991) 117-140
[Ca:ffara; May; Schockenhoff] ................
Theron, Stephen. A Necessary Condition for the
Truth of Moral and Other Judgments .......... 55 (1991) 293-300
See also ETIIICS and METAETIIICS
MOTIVE
IIibbs, Thomas S. A Rhetoric of Motives: Thomas on
Obligation as Rational Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 293-309
NATURALISTIC FALLACY
Simpson, Peter. Saint Thomas on the Naturalistic
Fallacy .. .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. .. .. .. .. .. . . . 51 (1987) 51- 69
NATURE/NATURAL
Smith, Philip, O.P. Transient Natures at the Edges of
IIuman Life: A Thomistic Exploration .....•.. 54 (1990) 191-227
Staley, Kevin M. IIappiness: The Natural End
of Man'! ....................................
53 (1989) 215-234
Fay, Thomas A. Maritain on Rights and
Natural Law ................................
55 (1991) 439-448
OBJECT
Finnis, John. Object and Intention in Moral Judgments
According to Aquinas .......................
55 (1991)
1- 27
OBLIGATION
IIibbs, Thomas S. A Rhetoric of Motives: Thomas on
Obligation as Rational Persuasion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 293-309
PERSON/PERSONAL
Schepers, Maurice, O.P. Conversion and Convergence:

T:fllRMS IN TI'rLES

6'71

Personal Transformation and the Growing Accord of
Theology and Religious Studies ...............
51 (1987) 658-679
Seidl, Horst. The Concept of Person in
St. Thomas Aquinas ..•.....•........•.•.....
51 (1987) 435-460
PLURALISM
Surin, Kenneth. Towards a 'Materialist' Critique
of ' Religious Pluralism ' : John Hick and
Wilfred Cantwell Smith ..•...................
53 (1989) 655-673
PRAGMATISM
Jackson, Timothy P. The Theory and Practice of
Discomfort: Richard Rorty and Pragmatism . . . 51 (1987) 270-298
PROPORTIONALISM
McKinney, Ronald H., S.J. The Quest for an Adequate Proportionalist
Theory of Value ............................
53 (1989) 56 -73
PRUDENCE
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics:
A Critique Based on St. Thomas's Understanding of
Prudence . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • 51 (1987) 461-479
REASON
Grisez, Germain. The Structures of Practical
Reason: Some Comments and Clarifications.
52 (1988) 269-291
[Response to Johnstone] .....................
RELIGION
D'Costa, Gavin. Taking Other Religions Seriously:
Some Ironies in the Current Debate on a Christian
54 (1990) 519-529
Theology of Religions. [Hick] ...............•
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious Truth:
A Comparison of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and
Bernard Lonergan ...........................
53 (1989) 461-480
Dupre, Louis. Note on the Idea of Religious Truth in
the Christian Tradition .....•...............•
52 (1988) 499-512
Griffiths, Paul J. Religious Diversity.
[Christian, Wm.] ...........................
52 (1988) 319-327
Schner, George, S.J. Hume's Dialogues and the Redefinition
of the Philosophy of Religion ...........•....
55 (1991) 83-101
Surin, Kenneth. Towards a ' Materialist' Critique of
' Religious Pluralism ' : John Hick and
Wilfred Cantwell Smith . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 (1989) 655-673
Van Beeck, Frans Jozef, S.J. Professing the Creed
among the World's Religions ..............•..
55 (1991) 539-568
REVELATION
Hughson, Thomas, S.J. Dulles and Aquinas
on Revelation ........•......................
52 (1988) 445-471

TERMS IN TITLES

Molnar, Paul D. Is God Essentially Different from
His Creatures 'l Rahner's Exp1anation from
Revelation ............... ,. . . . .. . . . .. .. . . . .. 51 (1987) 575-631
RIGHTS
Fay, Thomas A. Maritain on Rights and
. 55 (1991) 439-448
Natural Law ...............................
Lo, Ping-Cheung. Are Ther.e Economic Rights 'l
52 (1988) 703-717
SACRAMENT
Irwin, Kevin W. Recent Sacramental Theology
[II] ...................................
., .. 52 (1988) 124-147
Irwin, Kevin W. Recent Sacramental Theology
III .........................................
53 (1989) 281-313
Irwin, Kevin W. Sacramental Theology:
54 (1990) 311-342
A Methodological Proposal ...................
SCRIPTURE
Ashley, Benedict M., 0.P. Scriptural Grounds for
Concrete Moral Norms ... " ..................
52 (1988) 1- 22
SOTERIOLOGY
Galvin, John P. The Marvelous Exchange:
Raymund Schwager's Interpretation of the History
of Soteriology ..............................
53 (1989) 675-691
SUBJECT
Buckley, James J. A Return to the Subject:
The Theological Significance of Charles Taylor's
55 (1991) 497-509
Sources of the Self .........................
SYLLOGISM
Hubbard, J.M. Albertus Magnus and the Notion
of the Syllogistic Middle Term ................
54 (1990) 115-122
TECHNOLOGY
Mitcham, Carl. Towards a Religious Ethics of Technology:
A Review Discussion ........................
51 (1987) 146-168
TIME
Kendall, George A. Space-Time and the Community
of Beings: Some Cosmological Speculations . . . . 51 (1987) 480-500
P,ambrun, James R. Ricoeur, Lonergan, and the
Intelligibility of Cosmic Time .................
54 (1990) 471-498
TRINITY
Klein, Sherwin. Plato's Parmenides and St. Thomas's
Analysis of God as One and Trinity ........... 55 (1991) 229-244
Rudebusch, George. Aristotelian Predication, Augustine,
53 (1989) 587-597
and the Trinity .............................

TERMS IN TITLES

678

TRUTH
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious Truth:
A Comparison of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and
53 (1989) 461-480
Bernard Lonergan ...•••..••.•......••••.....
Dupre, Louis. Note on the Idea of Religious Truth in
the Christian Tradition ....••............•..•
52 (1988) 499-512
:Molnar,Paul D. Can Theology Be Contemporary and TrueT
A Review Discussion. [Ratzinger] ....•..•.•.• 52 (1988) 513-537
Peterson, John. On the Bearer of ' True' . . . • . . . . 53 (1989) 481-488
Theron, Stephen. AN ecessary Condition for the Truth
of Moral and Other Judgments ..........•..••
55 (1991) 293-300
UNIVERSE
Jaki, Stanley L. Thomas and the Universe ...•••• 53 (1989) 545-572
VICE
Jacobs, Jonathan, and John Zeis.
The Unity of the Vices . . . . . • . . . • • • • • • . . . . . • . • 54 (1990) 641-653
VIRTUE
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. The Meaning of Virtue
in the Christian Moral Life: Its Significance
For Human Life Issues ••••.•.•..•.....•..•.•
53 (1989) 173-196
Ray, A. Chadwick. A Fact about the Virtues • . . . • 54 (1990) 429-451
WAY
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas's Fourth Way and the
Approximating Relation ....•...•.......••...
51 (1987) 17- 36

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES
ALBERT THE GREAT, ST.
Hubbard, J.M. Albertus Magnus and the Notion of the
54 (1990) 115-122
Syllogistic Middle Term ......................
AMERICA
DL."l\foia, J. A., 0.P. American Catholic Theology at Century's End:
Postconciliar, Postmodern, Post-Thomistic ..... 54 (1990) 499-518
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. Toward a Thomistic Perspective on Abortion
and the Law in Contemporary America ........ 55 (1991) 343-396
Schuck, Michael J. John Courtney Murray's Problematic
Interpretations of Leo XIII and the American
..................................
55 (1991) 595-612
Founders
AQUINAS
see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.
ARISTOTLE
King-Farlow, John. The Actual Infinite in
Aristotle ....................................
52 (1988) 427-444
Rudebusch, George. Aristotelian Predication,
53 (1989) 587-597
Augustine, and the Trinity ...................
AUGUSTINE, ST.
Lehrberger, James, O.Cist. Intelligo ut Credam:
52 (1988) 23- 39
St. Augustine's Confessions ..•..•......••...•
Rudebusch, George. Aristotelian Predication,
53 (1989) 587-597
Augustine, and the Trinity ...............•...
AVICENNA
Macierowski, E. M. Does God Have a Quiddity
According to
.....................
52 (1988) 79- 87
BALTHASAR
Zeitz, James V., S.J. Przywara and von Baithasar
52 (1988) 473-498
on Analogy .. "° .............................
BARTH
Muller, Richard A. The Barth Legacy:
New Athanasius or Origen Redivivus A Response
54 (1990) 673-704
to T. F. Torrance ...........................
BETTI
Guarino, Thomas. Betti and the He,rmeneutics of
Dogma ...........................
,. ........ 53 (1989) 635-654
BOETHIUS
Casey, Gerard. An Explication of the De Hebdomadibus of Boethius
in the Light of St. Thomas's Commentary . . . . . . 51 (1987) 419-434

674

PROPER NAMES IN TI'.rLES

675

BOYLE
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Matthew M. Murphy. Can Deterrence
Be Moral'! A Review Discussion. [Boyle; Finnis;
Grisez] ..............................•..•...
52 (1988) 719-736
BRITISH COMMONWEALTH
Nichols, Aidan, O.P. A British Commonwealth
Dogmatics ..................................
52 (1988) 96-123
BROWN
Young, Robin Darling. Recent Interpretations of Early
Christian Asceticism. [Brown et al.] .......... 54 (1990) 123-140
BURRELL
Hill, William J., O.P. On Knowing the Unknowable God:
A Review Discussion. [Burrell] ..............•
51 (1987) 699-709
CAFFARA
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes, and the Good:
Recent Moral Theology. [Caffara; May;
55 (1991) 117-140
Schockenho:ff] ...............................
CHRIST
see JESUS CHRIST
CHRISTIAN
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. The Meaning of Virtue in the Christian
Moral Life: Its Significance for Human Life
53 (1989) 173-196
Issues ......................................
Young, Robin Darling. Recent Interpretations of Early Christian
Asceticism. [Brown et al.] ............•......
54 (1990) 123-140
CHRISTIAN, WILLIAM A.
Buckley, James J. Minding Our Own Business.
[Christian, Wm.] .........................•..
52 (1988) 307-319
Griffiths, Paul J. Religious Diversity.
52 (1988) 319-327
[Christian, Wm.] ............................
Smart, Ninian. William Christian and
Community Doctrines ........•..••••...•..•••
52 (1988) 327-335
DULLES
Hughson, Thomas, S.J. Dulles and Aquinas on
Revelation ..................................
52 (1988) 445-471
DUNS SCOTUS
Mayes, G. Randolph. Ross and Scotus on the Existence of God:
Two Proofs from Possibility ..................
54 (1990) 97-114
ECKHART
Woods, Richard, O.P. Meister Eckhart and the Neoplatonic
Heritage: The Thinker's Way to God ......... 54 (1990) 609-639
FARRER
Wilson, William M. A Different Method, a Different Case:

676

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

The Theological Progvam of Julian Hartt and
Austin Farrer ...••.•....•..•..•.••.•..••••••
53 (1989) 599-633
FINNIS
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Matthew M. Murphy.
Can Deterrence Be Moral 'I A Review Discussion.
[Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] ..•.............•...•.
52 (1988) 719-736
Schultz, Janice L. Thomistic Metaethics and a Present
Controversy. [Finnis; Grisez] .••......••..•.•
52 (1988) 40- 62
FRIBOURG
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. Theology at Fribourg .•. 51 (1987) 325-366
GALILEO
Cataldo, Peter J. Husserl on Galileo's
Intentionality ......•........................
51 (1987) 680-698
GILES OF ROME
Kelley, Francis E. Robert Orford's Attack on
Giles of Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 70- 96
GRAYLING
Matteo, Anthony M. Grounding the Human Conversation.
53 (1989) 235-258
[Grayling; Marechal] ..............•.........
GRISEZ
Barry, Robert L., O.P., and Matthew M. Murphy.
Can Deterrence Be Moral TA Review Discussion.
[Boyle; Finnis; Grisez] ........•.•..........•
52 (1988) 719-736
Schultz, J aniee L. Thomistic Metaethics and a Present
Controversy. [Finnis; Grisez] ....•...•.•.•••.
52 (1988) 40- 62
HARRE
Dennehy, Raymond. Unreal Realism. [Schlagel;
Putnam; Harxe] .......•.....•.•••......•...
55 (1991) 631-655
HARTT
Wilson, William M. A Different Method, a Different Cru>e:
The Theological Program of Julian Hartt and Austin
Farrer . . . • • . . . • . . • • • • . . . . . • • . . • • • • • . . • • • • . • 53 (1989) 599-633
HEIDEGGER
Guagliardo, Vincent, 0.P. Aquinas and Heidegger: The Question
of Philosophical Theology ..•..•..•...••••..•
53 (1989) 407-442
:Meynell, Hugo. A Way of Looking at Heidegger .. 55 (1991) 613-629
HICK
D'Costa, Gavin. Taking Other Religions Seriously: Some Ironies
in the Current Debate on a Christian Theology of
Religions. [Hick] .............•..••.........
54 (1990) 519-529
Burin, Kenneth. Towards a 'Materialist' Critique of
' Religious Pluralism': John Hick and Wilfred
Cantwell Smith •••••••••••••••••.••••••.•••••
53 (1989) 655-673

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

677

HILL
Centore, F. F. A Note on W. J. Hill's " The Doctrine of
God after Vatican II" ...•.......•...•......
54 (1990) 531-540
HUME
Schner, George, S.J. Hume's Diriloguesand the Redefinition
of the Philosophy of Religion ................•
55 (1991) 83-101
HUSSERL
Cataldo, Peter J. Husserl on Galileo's
Intentionality • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 680-698
Woods, Martin T. The Reduction of Essence in the Thought of
Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl .......•. 53 (1989) 443-460
JESUS CHRIST
Krasevac, Edward L., O.P. ' Christology from Above' and
' Christology from Below' . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 299-306
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. Quasi-Formal Causality and" Change in the
Other": A Note on Karl Rabner's Christology .. 52 (1988) 293-306
Pinckaers, Servais, 0.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes,
and the Good: Recent Moral Theology. [Ca:ffara;
May; Schockenhoff] .........................
55 (1991) 117-140
JOHNSTONE
Grisez, Germain. The Structures of Practical Reason:
Some Comments and Clarifications. [Response to
52 (1988) 269-291
Johnstone] ...•..•..•.•......................
KANT
Michalson, Gordon E. The Inscrutability of Moral Evil
in Kant . . . . • • . . . . . • . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 246-269
KEEFE
Tekippe, Terry J. A Response to Donald Keefe on
Lonergan . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 (1988) 88- 95
KNITTER
Molnar, Paul D. Some Dogmatic Consequences of
Paul F. Knitter's Unitarian Theocentrism ...... 55 (1991) 449-495
KUHN
Poirier, Maben Walter. A Comment on Polanyi and
Kuhn •......••..•.....•........•....•......
53 (1989) 259-279
LEO XIII
Schuck, Michael J. John Courtney Murray's Problematic
Interpretations of Leo XIII and the American
Founders •..•.•.••••.......••........•...••
55 (1991) 595-612
LINDBECK
Marshall, Bruce D. Aquinas as Postliberal Theologian.
53 (1989) 353-402
[Lindbeck] ...••........•.....•........•..•..
LONERGAN
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious Truth:

678

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

A Comparison of Wilfred Cantwell Smith and
Bernard Lonergan .......... ,, ...............
53 (1989) 461-480
Pambrun, James R. Ricoeur, Lonergan, and the Intelligibility
of Cosmic Time ....................
., ....... 54 (1990) 471-498
Reynolds, Terrence. Method Divorced from Content
in Theology7 An Assessment of Lonergan's
Method in Theology .........................
55 (1991) 245-269
Tekippe, Terry J. A Response to Donald Keefe on
Lonergan ...................................
52 (1988) 88- 95
LUBLIN
Duncan, Roger. Lublin Thomism ................
51 (1987) 307-324
MACINTYRE
Swindler, J. K. Macintyre's Republic ........... 54 (1990) 343-354
MAHONEY
Grisez, Germain. History as Argument for Revision
in Moral Theology : A Review Discussion.
55 (1991) 103-116
[Mahoney] .................................
MAIMONIDES
Stubbens, Neil A. Naming God: Moses Maimonides
and Thomas Aquinas ........ '" ..............
54 (1990) 229-267
MARECHAL
Knasas, John F. X. Transcendental Thomism and
the Thomistic Texts. [Marechal] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 81- 95
Matteo, Anthony M. Grounding the Human Conversation.
[Grayling; Marechal] .......................
53 (1989) 235-258
MARITAIN
Fay, Thomas A. Maritain on Rights and Natural
Law ........................................
55 (1991) 439-448
Knasas, John F. X. Aquinas and the Libemtionist Critique
of Maritain's New Christendom ...............
52 (1988) 247-267
Roy, Louis, O.P. Wainwright, Maritain, and Aquinas on
Transcendent Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 655-672
MAY
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral Absolutes,
and the Good: Recent Moral Theology. [ Caff.ara;
:M:ay; Schockenhoff] .........................
55 (1991) 117-140
MCCOOL
Lauder, Robert E. On Being or Not Being a Thomist.
[McCool] ...................................
55 (1991) 301-319
MCGRATH
Root, Michael. Alister McGrath on Cross and
Justification ................................
54 (1990) 705-725
MORRIS
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J. A Critical Note on Thomas Morris's
The Logic of God Incarnate ..................
54 (1990) 141-149

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

679

MURRAY
Schuck, Michael J. John Courtney Murray's Problematic
Interpretations of Leo XIII and the American
Founders ...............................•..
55 (1991) 595-612
NEOPLATONIC
see PLOTINUS
NEUHAUS
Schindler, David L. Catholicism, Public Theology,
and Postmodernity: On Richard John Neuhaus's
53 (1989) 107-143
Catholic Moment ....•.......................
ORFORD
Kelley, Francis E. Robert Orford's Attack on
Giles of Rome . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 70- 96
PANNENBERG
Clayton, Philip. Being and One Theologian.
52 (1988) 645-671
[Pannenberg] ...............................
PLATO
Cortest, Luis. Was St. Thomas Aquinas a
PlatonistY ...................................
52 (1988) 209-219
Heiser, John H. Plotinus and the Apeiron of Plato's
Parmenides .......•.........................
55 (1991) 53- 81
Klein, Sherwin. Plato's Parmenides and St. Thomas's Analysis
of God as One and Trinity ..•................
55 (1991) 229-244
PLOTINUS
Heiser, John H. Plotinus and the Apeiron of Plato's
Parmenides . . . . . . . . . . • • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . 55 (1991) 53- 81
Woods, Richard, O.P. Meister Eckhart and the Neoplatonfo
Heritage: The Thinker's Way to God .......... 54 (1990) 609-639
POLANYI
Poirier, Maben Walter. A Comment on Polanyi and
Kuhn .......................•......•.......
53 (1989) 259-279
POMPONAZZI
Ti;eloar, John L., S.J. Pomponazzi's Critique of Aquinas's
Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul ..... 54 (1990) 453-470
PRZYWARA
Zeitz, James V., S.J. Przywara and von Balthasar on
52 (1988) 473-498
Analogy ..•.................................
PUTNAM
Dennehy, Raymond. Unreal Realism. [Schlagel; Putnam;
Harre] .........•.......•.........•........
55 (1991) 631-655
RAHNER
Hurd, Bob. Being is Being-Present-to-Self: Rahner's Key to
52 (1988) 63- 78
Aquinas's Metaphysics ....•...•........••....

680

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

Knasas, John F. X. Esse as the Target of Judgment in
Rabner and .Aquinas .•...........•.••........
51 (1987) 222-245
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. Quasi-Formal Causality and " Change in the
Other": .A. Note on Karl Rahner's Christology • • 52 (1988) 293-306
Molnar, Paul D. Is God Essentially Different from His Creatures?
Rahner's Explanation from Revelation . . . . . • • . • 51 (1987) 575-631
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics:
.A. Critique Based on St. Thomas's Understanding of
Prudence ...................................
51 (1987) 461-479
Warner, Robert. R.ahner on the Unoriginate
Father •.•.•..•••..••....••••••.•••.•••...•
55 (1991) 569-593
R.A.TZINGER
Molnar, Paul D. Can Theology Be Contemporary and True7
.A. Review Discussion [R.atzinger] ........••..• 52 (1988) 513-537
RICO EUR
Pambrun, James R. Ricoeur, Lonergan, and the
Intelligibility of Cosmic Time •.....•.•.......
54 (1990) 471-498
ROBERT OF ORFORD
see ORFORD
RORTY
Jackson, Timothy
The Theory and Practice of Discomfort:
Richard Rorty and Pragmatism . • . . . . . . . • . . . • • 51 (1987) 270-298
ROSS
Mayes, G. Randolph. Ross and Scotus on the Existence of God:
Two Proofs from Possibility ...••........•••••
54 (1990) 97-114
SCHILLEBEECKX
Hilkert, Mary Catherine, O.P. Hermeneutics
of History: The Theological Method of
Edward Schillebeeckx ..•••.••••••...•...••••.
51 (1987) 97-145
SCHLAGEL
Dennehy, Raymond. Unreal Realism. [Schlagel; Putnam;
Harre] ....................................
55 (1991) 631-655
SCHOCKENHOFF
Pinckaers; Servais, O.P. Christ, Moral .Absolutes,and the
Good: Recent Moral Theology. [Ca:ffara; May;
Schockenho:ff] ...•.......••...•••••...•.•••.•
55 (1991) 117-140
SCHWA.GER
Galvin, John P. The Marvelous Exchange: Raymund Schwager's
Interpretation of the History of Soteriology •.•• 53 (1989) 675-691
SMITH
Doyle, Dennis M. Objectivity and Religious Truth: .A. Comparison of
Wilfred Cantwell Smith and Bernard Lonergan •. 53 (1989) 461-48()
Surin, Kenneth. Towards a ' Materialist ' Critique of ' Religious

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

681

Pluralism': John Hick and Wilfred Cantwell
Smith ......................................
53 (1989) 655-673
STOUT
Thiemann, Ronald F. In Praise of Pluralism.
[Stout] .....................................
53 (1989) 489-503
TAYLOR
Buckley, James J. A Return .to the Subject: The Theological
Significance of Charles Taylor's Sources of the
Self . . . . • . . • . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . • • • • . . . . . . • • . . . . . 55 (1991) 497-509
THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.
Barad, Judith. Aquinas on the Role of Emotion in
Moral Judgment and Activity ......•....•....
55 (1991) 397-413
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas's Fourth Way ·and the
51 (1987) 17- 36
Approximating Relation .............•.......
Casey, Gerard. An Explication of the De Hebdomadi'bus of Boethius
in the Light of St. Thomas's Commentary • . . • • • 51 (1987) 419-434
Cortest, Luis. Was St. Thomas Aquinas a
Platonist'V • • • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . • . • . . . . . • . • . . • . . . . 52 (1988) 209-219
Craig, William Lane. Aquinas on God's Knowledge of
Future Contingents ..........................
54 (1990) 33- 79
Finnis, John. Object and Intention in Moral Judgments
According to Aquinas ........••....•.•...•...
55 (1991) 1- 27
Foster, David Ruel. Aquinas on the Immateriality of the
55 (1991) 415-438
Intellect ....•.........•.....•..•....•....•.•
Guagliardo, Vincent, O.P. Aquinas and Heidegger:
The Question of Philosophicml Theology ........ 53 (1989) 407-442
Hall, Douglas C. Immediacy and Mediation in Aquinas:
In I Sent., Q. 1, A. 5 . . . . . . . . • . • . . • . . • . . • • • • . 55 (1989) 31- 55
Hibbs, Thomas S. A Rhetoric of Motives: Thomas on Obligation
54 (1990) 293-309
as Rational Persuasion ..•..•..•.....•..•.•.•.
Hughson, Thomas, S.J. Dulles and Aquinas on
Revelation ..................................
52 (1988) 445-471
Hurd, Bob. Being is Being-Present-to-Self: Rahner's Key to
Aquinas's Metaphysics .....•....•....•....•.
52 (1988) 63- 78
Jaki, Stanley L. Thomas and the Universe ......• 53 (1989) 545-572
Klein, Sherwin. Plato's Parmenides and St. Thomas's Analysis of
God as One and Trinity ......................
55 (1991) 229-244
Knasas, John F. X. Aquinas and the Liberationist Critique
of Maritain's New Christendom ............•.•
52 (1988) 247-267
Knasas, John F. X. Esse as the Target of Judgment in
Rahner and Aquinas .. .. .. .. • .. .. • .. .. .. .. .. 51 (1987) 222-245
Lee, Patrick. Existential Propositions in the Thought of
St. Thomas Aquinas .........................
52 (1988) 605-626

682

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

Marshall, Bruce D. Aquinas as Postliheral Theologian.
[Lindbeck] .................................
53 (1989) 353-402
McMahon, Kevin A. Economics, Wisdom, and the Teaching of the
Bishops in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas .... 53 (1989) 91-106
Nelson, Daniel M. Karl Rahner's Existential Ethics:
A Critique Based on St. Thomas's Understanding of
Prudence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 461-479
Porter, J,ean. De Ordine Caritatis: Charity, Friendship, and Justice
in Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae ....... 53 (1989) 197-213
Rocca, Gregory, O.P. The Distinction between Res Significata
and Modus Significandi in Aquinas's Theological
Epistemology ......... ., ....................
55 (1991) 173-197
Roy, Louis, 0.P. Wainwright, Maritain, and Aquinas on
Transcendent Experiences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 655-672
Seidl, Horst. The Concept of Person in St. Thomas
Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 435-460
Simpson, Peter. Saint Thomas on the Naturalistic
Fallacy .. .. . . .. . .. .. . .. . . . . . .. .. . . . . . . . . . .. . 51 (1987) 51- 69
Stubbens, Neil A. Naming God: Moses Maimonides and
Thomas Aquinas .............................
54 (1990) 229-267
Tavuzzi, Michael, 0.P. Aquinas on Resolution in
Metaphysics .................................
55 (1991) 199-227
Tavuzzi, Michael, O.P. Aquinas on the Preliminary
Grasp of Being .............. ,, .............
51 (1987) 555-574
Theron, Stephen. The Divine Attributes in
Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 37- 50
Treloar, John L., S.J. Pomponazzi's Critique of Aquinas's
Arguments for the Immortality of the Soul .... 54 (1990) 453-470
Woods, Martin T. The Reduction of Essence in the Thought of
Thomas Aquinas and Edmund Husserl . . . . . . . . . 53 (1989) 443-460
THOMISM/THOMIST
DiN oia, J. A., O.P. American Catholic Theology at Century's End:
Postconciliar, Postmodern, Post-Thomistic ...... 54 (1990) 499-518
51 (1987) 307-324
Duncan, Roger. Lublin Thomism ...............
Kaveny, M. Cathleen. Toward a Thomistic Perspective on Abo:ciion
and the Law in Contemporary America ........ 55 (1991) 343-396
Knasas, John F. X. Transcendental Thomism and the Thomistic
Texts. [Marechal] ...........................
54 (1990) 81- 95
Lauder, Robert E. On Being or Not Being a Thomist.
55 (1991) 301-319
[McCool] ...................................
Schultz, Janice L. Thomistic Metaethies and a Present
52 (1988) 40- 62
Controversy. [Finnis; Grisez] ................
Smith, Philip, O.P. Transient Natures at the Edges of Human Life:
A Thomistic Exploration .....................
54 (1990) 191-227

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

683

TORRANCE
Muller, Richard A. The Barth Legacy: New Athanasius or Origen
Redivivus'l A Response to T. F. Torrance ...... 54 (1990) 673-704
VATICAN II
Centore, F. F. A Note on W. J .. Hill's" The Doctrine of God
54 (1990) 531-540
.after Vatican II" ....................•......
Hill, William J., O.P. The Doctrine of God after
Vatican II . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 (1987) 395-418
VON BALTHASAR
see BALTHASAR
WAINWRIGHT
Roy, Louis, O.P. Wainwright, Maritain, and Aquinas on
Transcendent Experiences . • . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . 54 (1990) 655-672

AUTHORS AND EDITORS OF BOOKS REVIEWED
Pfoase note that The Thomist often treats an extended review as a "
view article." To locate a review article, see the index of "Proper Names
in Titles/' which begins on page 674.
A. plus sign indicates joint authorship or editorship.

Adams, James L., et al., eds. The Thought of Paul Tillich.
(Jelly, F. M., O.P.) .........................
52 (1988) 568-573
Adams, Robert Merrihew. The Virtue of Faith and Other Essays in
Philosophical Theology. (Meynell, Hugo) ...... 52 (1988) 755-756
Albert the Great, St. Albert and Thomas:
Selected Writings. Ed. and trans. by S. Tugwell, O.P.
54 (1990) 541-545
(Woods, Richard, O.P.) ......................
Ansaldo, Aurelio. El primer principio del obrar moral y las
normas especificas en el pensamiento de G. Grisez y J. Finnis.
55 (1991) 332-337
(May, William E.) ..........................
Ashley, Benedict, 0.P. Theologies of the Body: Humanist and
Christian. (May, William E.) .................
54 (1990) 168-172
Austin, S. Parmenides: Being, Bounds; and Logic.
51 (1987) 377-380
(Benitez, E. E.) ............................
Azar, Larry. Twentieth Century in Crisis: Foundations of
Totalitarianism. (Ingardia, Richard) ........... 55 (1991) 168-172
Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Glory of the Lord: A. Theological
Aesthetics. II, Studies in Theological Style: Clerical Styles.
51 (1987) 178-186
(Keefe, Donald J., S.J.) .....................
Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Glory of the Lord: A Theologicai
Aesthetics, III, Studies in Theological Style: Lay Styles.
51 (1987) 710-714
(Keefe, Donald J., S.J.) .....................
Bell, Richard H., ed. The Gramma,r of the Heart:
New Essays in Moral Philosophy and Theology.
(Ferreira, M. Jamie) ........................
54 (1990) 560-564
Bormann, Karl, ed. + Nicolai de Gusa Opera Omnia.
X/2h, Opuscula II, Fasciculus 2b, and XI/I, De Beryllo.
(Biechler, James E.) ........................
53 (1989) 725-727
Braaten, Carl, ed. Christian Dogmatics.
(Root, Michael, and James Buckley) .......... 52 (1988) 152-158
Bracken, Joseph A., S.J. The Triiine God: Persons, Process, and
Community. (Hill, William J., O.P.) .......... 51 (1987) 172-176
Buckingham, Thomas. De contingentia f uturoritm et
arbitrii libertate. Ed. by B. R. DelaTorre, 0.P.
(Kelley, Francis E.) .........................
53 (1989) 164-166

684

BOOKS REVIEWED

685

Buckley, Michael J., S.J . .At the Origins of Modern .Atheism.
53 (1989) 144-149
(Bradley, Denis J. M.) ......................
Cahill, Lisa Sowle.+ Religion and .Artificial Reproduction:
An Inquiry into the Vatican" Instruction on Respect for Human
Life in its Origin and on the Dignity of Human Reproduction."
(Ashley, Benedict M., O.P.) .....•...........
53 (1989) 153-155
Caputo, John D. Radical Hermeneutics Repetition,
Deconstruction, and the Hermeneutic Project.
(Lauder, Roberi E.) .........................
53 (1989) 722-725
Carpenter, James A. Nature and Grace·: Toward an Integral
Perspective, (Galvin, John P.) ................
54 (1990) 173-176
Carroll, Noel. Philosophical Problems of Classical Film Theory.
(Lauder, Robert E.) .........................
55 (1991) 535-538
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. Christian Satisfaction in .Aquinas:
Towards a Personalist Understwnding.
51 (1987) 524-526
(Buckley, James J.) ........................
Chadwick, Henry . .Augustine. (Berthold, George C.) .. 52 (1988) 347-350
Childress, James F., ed.+ The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics. (Johnstone, Brian, C.SS.R.) ........... 51 (1987) 375-376
Childs, Brevard S. Old Testament Theology in a Canonical Context.
51 (1987) 714-716
(Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P.) ...................
Ciba Foundation. Human Embryo Research: Yes or No'!
(Barry, Robert, O.P.) ....................•..
52 {1988) 551-556
Connell, R. J. Substance and Modern Science.
(Centore, F. F.) ............................
53 (1989) 331-337
Cooper, John W. Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting:
Biblicai .Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate.
55 (1991) 522-526
{Blosser, Philip) ............................
Curran, Charles E. Toward an .American Catholic Moral Theology.
(Krasevac, Edward, O.P.) ...................
52 (1988) 757-760
Davidson, Herbert A. Proofs for Ete·rnity, Creation, and the
Existence of God in Medieval Islamic and Jewish Philosophy.
(Redpath, Peter A.) ........................
53 (1989) 528-531
DeGeorge, Richard T. The Nature and Limits of .Authority.
(Lee, Patrick) .. .. .. . .. . . . .. .. .. .. • .. .. • .. . .. 52 (1988) 172-173
DeLaTorre, Bartholomew R., O.P. Thomas Buckingham and the
Contingency of Futures-the Possibility of Human Free·dom.
53 (1989) 164-166
(Kelley, Francis E.) .........................
Desan, Wilfred. Let the Future· Come
54 (1990) 564-570
(Davis, John B., O.P.) .......................
Despland, Michel. The Education of Desire: Plato and the Philosophy
of Religion. (Yaffe, Martin D.) .•...........•.
52 (1988) 343-347
Deutsch, KennethL., ed. The Crisis of Liberal Democracy:
A Straussian Perspective. (Asselin, D. T.) ..... 55 (1991) 526-535
1

:

686

BOOKS REVIEWED

Donagan, Alan. Choice: The Essential Elernent in Human Action.
(Schultz, Janice L.) .........................
55 (1991) 160-165
Dulles, Avery. The Reshaping of Catholicism:
Current ChaUenges in the Theofogy of Church.
55 (1991) 156-160
(Hughson, Thomas, KJ.) ....................
Dupre, Louis. Marx's Social Critique of Culture.
(Samples, John) ............................
53 (1989) 346-348
Durant, John, ed. Darwinism and Divinity: Essays on Evolution
and Religious Belief. (Centore, F. F.) ......... 52 (1988) 357-362
Eco, Umberto. Art and Beauty in the Middle Ages.
(Morris, Michael, 0.P.) ......................
52 (1988) 181-183
Elders, Leo. J., ed.+ Lex et Libertas: Freedom
and Law According to St. Thomas Aquinas.
52 (1988) 539-542
(Ow.ens, Joseph) ............................
Elders, Leo J. Die Metaphysik des Thomas
von Aquin in historischer Perspektive. 2. Teil.
(Owens, Joseph, C.Ss.R.) ....................
53 (1989) 337-339
Farley, Wendy. Tragic Vision and Divine Compassion:
A Contemporary Theodicy. (Phan, Peter C.) ... 55 (1991) 327-329
Farthing, John L. Thomas Aquinas and Gabriel Biel: Interpretations
of St. Thomas Aquinas in German NominaUsm on the Eve of the
Reformation. (Wawrykow, Joseph) ........... 55 (1991) 149-156
Ferreira, M. Jamie. Skepticism and Reasonable Doubt: The British
Naturalist Tradition in Wilkins, Hume, Reid, and Newman'.
53 (1989) 531-533
(Turner, Frank M.) .........................
Fogarty, Gerald P., S.J. American Catholic Biblical Scholarship:
A History f1·om the Early Republic to Vatican IL
(Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P.) ...................
54 (1990) 355-357
Forrester, Duncan B. Theology and Politics.
(Schuck, Michael J.) ........................
54 (1990) 558-560
Freddoso, .Alfred J., trans. On Divine Knowledge
(Part IV of the Concordia). By Luis de Molina.
(Doyle, John P.) ............... ., ........... 54 (1990) 369-371
Frede, Michael. Essays in Ancient Philosophy.
(Benitez, E. E.) ............................
53 (1989) 522-527
Ful'ey, Pat, ed. + The Vatican and Homosexuality:
Rea.ctions to the" Letter to the Bishops of the
Catholic Church on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons."
(Williams, Bruce, 0.P.) ......................
54 (1990) 160-164
Geffre, Claude. The Risk of Interpretation: On Being Faithful
to the Christian Tradition in a Non-Christian Age.
53 (1989) 156-160
(Dodds, Michael J., O.P.) ....................
Gersh, Stephen. Middle Platonism and N eoplatonism: The Latin
Tradition. (Buss,anich, John) .................
52 (1988) 740-745

BOOKS REVIEWED

687

Gillett, Grant, ed.+ Persons and Personal Identity: A Contemporary
54 (1990) 746-750
Inquiry. (Griffiths, Paul J.) ......•...........
Gramick, Jeannine, ed. + The Vatiaan and Homosexuality: Reactions
to the" Letter to the Bishops of the Catholic Church
on the Pastoral Care of Homosexual Persons."
54 (1990) 160-164
(Williams, Bruce, O.P.) .....................
Grant, Robert M. Gods and the One God.
(Placher, William) ..........................
51 (1987) 542-545
Hallett, Garth. Reason and Right.
(Schultz, Janice) ............................
51 (1987) 530-535
Hart, James G., ed.+ Essays in Phenomenological Theology.
51 (1987) 727-732
(Allik, Tiina) ...............................
Hedwig, K., ed. + Lex et Libertas: Freedom and Law According to
St. Thomas Aquinas. (Owens, Joseph) ........ 52 (1988) 539-542
Heft, James, S.M. John XXII and Papal Teaching Authority.
(Portier, William L.) ........................
52 (1988} 763-768
Hill, Edmund, O.P. Ministry and Authority in the Catholia Church.
54 (1990) 738-741
(Granfield, Patrick) .........................
Hillman, Eugene. Many Paths: A Catholic Approach to Religious
Pluralism. (D'Costa, Gavin) .....•...........
54 (1990} 741-744
Hilmy, S. Stephen. The Later Wittgenstein: The Emergence of a New·
Philosophical Method. (Churchill, John} ....... 53 (1989) 533-538
Hintikka, Jaakko, ed.+ The Logia of Being: Historical Studies.
52 (1988) 544-547
(Bussanich, John) ..........................
Rittinger, Russell, A Critique of the New Natural Law Theory.
(Califano, Joseph J.) .......................
53 (1989) 343-345
Hodgson, Peter G. God in History: Shapes of Freedom
54 (1990) 361-365
(Dodds, Michael J., O.P.) ..•..•.......••...•
Howard, Dick. From Marx to Kant.
(Henry, Michael} .•..........................
52 (1988) 350-355
Hudson, Deal W., ed.+ Understanding Maritain: Philosopher and
53 (1989) 727-731
Friend. (Aeschliman, M. D.) .................
Hughes, Gerald J., S.J., ed. The Philosophical Assessment of
Theology: Essays in Honour of Frederick C. Copleston.
53 (1989} 339-341
(Ingham, Nicho1as, O.P.) ....................
Hunnings, Gordon. The World and Language in Wittgenstein's
Philosophy. (Churchill, John) ................
54 (1990} 554-558
Janz, Denis R. Luther on Thomas Aquinas:
The Angelic Doctor in the Thought of the Reformer.
55 (1991) 145-148
(Tune, Anders S.) ..........................
Jelly, Frederick M., O.P. Madonna: Mary in the Catholic Tradition.
(Kirwin, George, O.M.I.) ....................
53 (1989) 155-156
Jodock, Darrell. The Church's Bi'ble: Its Contemporary Authority.
54 (1990) 730-735
(Raposa, Michael L.) ••.•••..••.•............

688

BOOKS REVIEWED

Johnson, Elizabeth A. Consider JeS'US:
Waves of Renewal in Christology.
(Weinandy, Thomas, 0.F.M.Cap.) ............ 55 (1991) 511-517
J onsen, .Albert R. + The .Abuse of Casuistry: A History of Moral
Reasoning. (Cessario, Rom.anus, O.P.) .•...•... 54 (1990) 151-154
Jordan, Mark D., trans. On Faith:
Summa Theolagiae 2-2, qq. 1-16 of St. Thomas .Aquinas.
(Cessario, Romanus, 0.P.) ....•.............•
55 (1991) 141-144
Jordan, Mark D. Ordering Wisdom:
The Hierarchy of Philosophical Discourse in .Aquinas.
52 (1988) 745-749
(Moreno, Antonio, O.P.) .......•....•..•.....
Josol, Abdon Ma. C., C.SS.R. Property and Natural Law in Rerum
Nooorum and the Summa Theologiae 2-2, Q, 66, AA, 1, 2, 7.
(Habiger, Matthew, O.S.B.) .•................
51 (1987) 539-542
Kai, Victor. On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in .Aristotle.
(Martin, James T. H.) .......................
54 (1990) 181-184
Kennedy, Leonard A., C.S.B., oomp. A Catalogue of Thomists,
1270-1900. (Carlen, Claudia, I.H.M.) •.......• 53 (1989) 166-169
Kennedy, Leonard A., C.S.B., ed. Thomistic Papers IV.
(Reichenbach, Bruce R.) .....................
54 (1990) 371-376
Kenny, Anthony. The Logic of Deterrence. (Barry, Robert, O.P.,
and Matthew M. Murphy) ....................
52 (1988) 174-181
Kenny, Anthony. Reason and Religion: Essays in Philosophical
53 (1989) 709-713
Theology. (Quinn, Philip L.) ...........•.....
Ker, Ian. The .Achievement of John Henry Newman.
(Miller, Edward Jeremy) ..•..•.........•...•
55 (1991) 337-342
Ker, Ian. John Henry Newman: A Biography.
55 (1991) 337-342
(Miller, Edward Jeremy) ....................
Kerr, Fergus. Theology after Wittgenstein.
{Churchill, John) ...........................
52 (1988) 337-342
Kirkpatrick, Frank G. Community: A Trinity of Models.
(Nelson, Paul) ..............................
51 {1987) 372-374
Knuuttila, Simo, ed. + The Logic of Being: Historical Studies.
(Bussanich, John) ..........................
52 (1988) 544-547
Kopp, Clemens, ed.+ Thomas von Aquin: Werk und Wirkung im Licht
neuerer Forschung. (Schenk, Richard, O.P.) .• 54 (1990) 376-379
Kress, Robert. The Church: Communion, Sacrannent, Communication.
(MeConville, William, O.F.M.) ......••.......
51 (1987) 176-177
Kiing, Hans. The Incarnation of God: An Intro<l!uctionto Hegel's
Theological Thought as Prolegomena to· a Future Christology.
(Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap.) ...••....•.. 53 (1989) 693-700
Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J. Patience and Power: Grace for the First
World. (Galvin, John P.) .•......•.....•..•..
54 (1990) 365-368

BOOKS REVIEWED

689

Lash, Nicholas. Easter in Ordinary:
Reflections on Human Experience and the Knowledge of God.
(Proudfoot, Wayne) .........................
53 (1989) 505-508
Lawler, Michael G. Symbol and Sacrament: A Contemporary
Sacramental Theology. (Irwin, Kevin M.) .... 53 (1989) 732-734
Laycock, Steven W., ed.+ Essays in Phenomenological Theology.
(Allik, Tiina) ...............................
51 (1987) 727-732
Lee, Philip J. .Against the Protestant Gnostics.
52 (1988) 355-357
(Maddox, Randy L.) ........................
Libera, .Alain de, ed. De Summo Bono. Liber II, Tractatus 1-4.
By Ulrich of Strasbourg, O.P.
54 (1990) 546-552
(Schenk, Richard, O.P.) ..............•......
Lindberg, David C., ed. + God and Nature: Historical Essays
on the Encounter between Christianity and Science.
(Austin, William H.) ........................
52 (1988) 562-568
Macintyre, .Alasdair. Whose Justice'! Which Rationality'!
(Kerlin, Michael J.) ........................
53 (1989) 512-515
Mackey, James P. Modern Theology: A Sense of Direction.
52 (1988) 737-739
(Buckley, James J.) ........................
Macquarrie, John, ed. + The Westminster Dictionary of Christian
Ethics. (Johnstone, Brian, C.SS.R.) .......... 51 (1987) 375-376
Mancini, Matthew J., ed. + Understanding Maritain: Philosopher ani/,
Friend. (Aeschliman, M. D.) •......•......•..
53 (1989) 727-731
Marenbon, John. Later Medie'IJalPhilosophy (1150-1350):
An Introduction. (Macierowski, E. M.) •....... 54 (1990) 187-189
Marshall, Bruce. Christology in Conflict: The· Identity of a Saviour in
Rahner and Barth. (Buckley, James J.) ....... 53 (1989) 149-153
Marx, Werner. Is There a Measure on EartM Foundations for a
Nonmetaphysical Ethics. (Gallagher, Shaun) ... 53 (1989) 539-544
McDermott, Timothy, O.P., ed. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation.
By St. Thomas Aquinas. (Froelich, Gregory) •• 54 (1990) 727-730
McDonough, Richard M. The .Argument of the Tractatus.
(Churchill, John) ...........................
52 (1988) 165-172
--[Reply to Churchill's review in The Thomist, vol. 52, no. l]
(McDonough, Richard M.) ...................
53 (1989) 319-325
--[Response to McDonough's Reply]
53 (1989) 327-329
(Churchill, John) ...........................
McMullin, Ernan, ed. Evolution and Creation.
(Dennehy, Raymond) ...........•...........•
52 (1988) 556-562
Meissner, W.W., S.J. Life and Faith: Psychological Perspectives on
Religious Experience. (Stock, Michael, O.P.) .• 53 (1989) 160-162
Miles, Margaret R. Praaticing Christianity: Critical Perspectives for
oo Embodied Spiritua,lity. (Maas, Robin) ..... 54 (1990) 155-159

690

BOOKS REVIEWED

Miller, Edward J. John Henry Newman on the Idea of Church.
52 (1988) 760-763
(Heath, Thomas, 0.P.) ......................
Molina, Luis de. On Divine Knowledge (Part IV of the Concordia).
Tra.ns..by A. J. Freddoso. (Doyle, John P.) ... 54 (1990) 369-371
Morris, Thomas V. The Logic of God Incarnate.
(Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap.) •........... 51 (1987) 367-372
Moss, Jean Dietz, ed. Rhetoric and Praxis:
The Contribution of Classical Rhetoric to Practical
Reasoning. (Morris, John R., O.P.) ........... 53 (1989) 162-163
Nagel, Thomas. The View from Nowhere.
51 (1987) 189-193
(Lauder, Robert E.) ..........................
Newman, Jay. The Merntal Philosophy of John Henry Newman.
(Jost, Walter) ..............................
51 (1987) 732-737
Newman, John Henry. The Letters and Diaries of
John Henry Newman. Vol. VI. Ed. by Gerard Tracey.
(Ferreira, M. Jamie) •......................
51 (1987) 199-204
Newman, John Henry. A Packet of Letters: A Selection from the
Correspondence of J. H. Newman. Ed. by Joyce Sugg.
51 (1987) 199-204
(Ferreira, M. Jamie) ........................
Nicholas of Cusa. Nicolai de Ousa Opera Omnia. X/2b, Opuscula II,
Fasciculus 2b. Ed. by Karl Bormann and Heide Dorothea Riemann.
XI/1, De Beryllo. Ed. by Hans Gerhard Seng.er and Karl Bormann.
53 (1989) 725-727
(Biechler, James E.) ........................
Nieli, Russell. Wittgenstein: From Mysticism to Ordinary Language:
A Study of Viennese Positivism and the Thought of Ludwig
53 (1989) 349-351
Wittgenstein. (Riska, Augustin) ..............
Nielsen, Kai. Philosophy and .Atheism: In Defense of .Atheism.
(Churchill, John) ............................
51 (1987) 384-388
Noonan, John T. The Believer and the Powers That .Are: Oases1
History, and Other Data Bearing on the Relation of Religion
and Government. (Whitt, D. R., O.P.) ........ 53 (1989) 704-708
Novak, Michael. Will It Liberate'! Questions about Liberation
52 (1988) 362-364
Theology. (Kerlin, Michael J.) ...............
Numbers, Ronald L., ed.+ God and Nature: Historical Essays
.on the Encounter between Ohristiamty and Science.
52 (1988) 562-568
(Austin, William H.) .......................•
Oben, Freda Mary. Edith Stein: Scholar, Feminist, Saint.
(Brady, Maria.n, S.P.) .......................
54 (1990) 379-383
Oddie, William. What WiU Happen to God'! Feminism and, the
Reconstruction of Christian Belief.
53 (1989) 515-518
(Soule, Warren J. A.) .......................
Ogden, Schubert M. On Theology.
51 (1987) 521-524
(Jenson, Robert) ............................

BOOKS REVIEWED

691

Orsy, Ladislas, S.J. The Church: Learning and Teaching.
(Wo-0d, Susan K.) ..........................
53 (1989) 519-521
Pagels, Elaine . .Adam, Eve, and the Serpent.
(Cavaclini, John C.) .........................
53 (1989) 509-512
Palmour, Jody. On Moral Ch(JJracter:.A Practical Guide to .Aristotle's
Virtues and Vioes. (Kruschwitz, Robert B.) .... 52 (1988) 548-550
Peacocke, Arthur. Intimations of Reality: Critieal Realism in Science
and Religion. (.Austin, William H.) ........... 51 (1987) 194-199
Peacocke, Arthur, ed. + Persons and Personal Identity:
.A Contemporary Inquiry. (Griffiths, Paul J.) ... 54 (1990) 746-750
Phillips, Derek L. Toward a Just Social Order.
(Davis, John B., O.P.) ......................
54 (1990) 564-570
Porter, Jean. The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of .Aquinas for
Christian Ethics. (Cessario, Romanus, O.P.) •.. 55 (1991) 141-144
Proudfoot, Wayne. Religious Experience.
51 (1987) 193-194
(Meynell, Hugo) ............................
Rachels, James. The End of Life.
(Moxeland, J. P.) ...........................
53 (1989) 714-722
Raedts, Peter. Richard Rufus of Cornwall and the Tradition of Oxford
Theology. (Schenk, Richard, O.P.) ........... 52 (1988) 542-544
Rabner, Karl. Theologfoal Investigations. Vol. 21, Science· and Christian
53 (1989) 701-704
Faith. (Phan, Peter C.) .....................
Rausch, Thomas P., S.J . .Authority and LeadershiP' in the Church:
Past Directions and Future· Poss.ibilities.
55 (1991) 165-168
(Wood, Susan K.) ..........................
Riemann, Heide D-0rothea, ed.+ Nicolai de Gusa Opera Omnia.
X/2b, Opuscula II, Fasciculus 2b.
53 (1989) 725-727
(Biechler, James E.) ........................
Rudavsky, Tamar, ed. Divine Omniscience and Omnipotence in
Med·ieval Philosophy: Islamic, Jewish and Christian Perspectives.
51 (1987) 716-718
(Redpath, Peter .A.) .........................
Santurri, Edmund N. Perplexity in the Moral Life:
Philosophical and Theological Considerations.
54 (1990) 164-168
(Turner, Philip) ............................
Schillebeeckx, Edward. The Churoh with a Human Face.
(Little, Joyce) ..............................
52 (1988) 158-165
Schlesinger, George N. New Perspectives on 0 ld-Time Religion.
54 (1990) 358-361
(Morris, Thomas V.) ........................
Schnaubelt, Joseph, O.S ..A., ed. .Anselm Studies: .An Occasional
Journal. Vol. 2. (Fidler, W. Larch) .......... 54 (1990) 184-186
Senger, Hans Gerhard, ed. Nicolai de Gusa Opera Omnia. XI/1.
De Beryllo. (Biechler, James E.) .............
53 (1989) 725-727
Sha:l'to, Michael, ed. How We Know.
51 (1987) 526-529
(Lauder, Robert) ............................

BOOKS REVIEWED

Shannon, Thomas A.+ Religion and Artificial Reproduction: An
Inquiry into the Vatican" Instruction on Respect for Human
Life in its Origin anil on the Dignity of Human Reproduction."
53 {1989) 153-155
{Ashley, Benedict M., 0.P.) •.......•.........
Sheehan, Thomas. Karl Rahner: The Philosophical Foundations.

54 {1990) 552-554
(Phan, Peter C.) ...........................•
Sherover, Charles M. Time, Freedom, and the Common Gooa.
{Hibbs, Thomas S.) ...............•.........
55 {1991) 329-331
Soffer, Walter, ed. The Crisis· of Liberal Democracy: A Straussioo
55 {1991) 526-535
Perspective. {Asselin, D. T.) ......•.....•....
Sokolowski, Robert. Moral Action: A Phenomenological Study.
{Bildstein, Walter) ..........................
51 (1987) 725-727
Soskice, Janet Martin. Metaphor ana Religious Language.
51 {1987) 719-725
{Ferreira, M. Jamie) ..•......•.......•......
Spangler, Mary Michael, O.P. Logic: An Aristotelian .Approach.
{Smith, Raymond, O.P.) .....................
51 {1987) 188-189
Steidl-Meier, Paul, S.J. Social Justice Ministry: Founaations ana
Concerns. (Bildstein, Walter) .............•••
51 {1987) 392-394
Stein, Edith. Essays on Woman. Trans. by F. M. Oben.
{Brady, Marian, S.P.) .......................
54 {1990) 379-383
Sugg, Joyce, ed. A Packet of Letters: A Selection
from the Correspondence of John Henry Newman.
51 (1987) 199-204
(Ferreira, M. Jamie) .............••........•
Tanner, Kathryn. God and Creation in Christian Theology: Tyranny
or Empowerment'! (Marshall, Bruce D.) .....•. 55 (1991) 321-326
Theron, S.tephen. Morals as· Founded on Natural Law·.

(Simpson, Peter) .............•............•.
53 (1989) 341-342
Thiemann, Ronald F'. Re'IJelation and Theology: The Gospel a8
Narrated Promise. (Dulles, Avery, S.J.) ....... 51 (1987) 169-172
Thomas Aquinas, St. Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings.
Ed. and Trans. by S. Tugwell, O.P.
54 {1990) 541-545
(Woods, Richard, O.P.) .....................
Thomas Aquinas, St. On Faith: Summa Theologiae 2-2, qq. 1-16.
Trans. by Mark D. Jordan.
(Cessario, Romanus, O.P.) ...•.•..•.........••
55 {1991) 141-144
Thomas Aquinas, St. Summa Theologiae: A Concise Translation.
Edited by TimorthyMcDermott, O.P.
54 {1990) 727-730
(Froelich, Gregory) ......•......•..•....•.•..
Tobin, Frank. Eckhwrt: Thought anil Language.
(Woods, Richard, O.P.) .•....................
52 (1988) 750-755
Toulmin, Stephen. + The Abuse of Casuistry: A History <>f Moral
Reasoning. (Cessario, Romanus, O.P.) .....••.. 54 {1990) 151-154
Tracey, Gerard, ed. The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman.
Vol. VI. (Ferreira, M. J.amie) . . • . • . • • • • • . • . • 51 (1987) 199-204

BOOKS REVIEWED

693

Trembath, Kern Robert. Evangelical Theories of Biblical Inspiration:
A Review a,nd Proposal.
53 (1989) 734-739
(Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P.) ...................
Trevor-Roper, Hugh. Catholics, Anglicans, and Puritans:
Seventeenth-Century Essays.
(Soule, Warren J. A., 0.P.) .................
54 (1990) 570-573
Tugwell, Simon, 0.P., ed. & tr. Albert and Thomas: Selected Writings.
(Woods, Richard, O.P.) ......................
54 (1990) 541-545
Ulrich of Strasbourg, O.P. De Summo Bono. Liber II, Tractatus 1-4.
Ed. by A. de Libera. (Schenk, Richard, O.P.) .. 54 (1990) 546-552
Veatch, Henry. Human Rights: Fact or Fancy?
(Crossin, John, O.S.F.S.) ....................
51 (1987) 535-539
Viladesau, Richard. Answering for Faith: Ghrist and the Human Search
for Salvation. (Allik, Tiina) .................
54 (1990) 176-180
Vos, Arvin. Aquinas, Galvin and Contemporary Protestant Thought.
(O'Brien, Thomas C.) ........................
52 (1988) 148-152
Vroom, Hendrik M. Religions and the Truth: Philosophical Reflections
and Perspectives. (Kerlin, Michael J.) ........ 54 (1990) 744-746
Walsh, Katherine, ed. + The Bible in the Medieval World:
Essays in Memory of Beryl Smalley.
(Matter, E. Ann) ...........................
51 (1987) 186-188
Walsh, Liam G., O.P. The Sacraments of Initiation.
(Irwin, Kevin W.) ..........................
54 (1990) 735-737
W eisheipl, James A. Nature and Motion in the Middle Ages.
(Kelley, Francis E.) ............. ; ........... 51 (1987) 381-383
Westphal, Merold. God, Guilt and Death: An Existential Phenomenology
of Religion. (Crowell, Steven Galt) ............ 51 (1987) 545-553
Wiebe, Paul. The Architecture of Religion: A Theoretieal Essay.
(Whittaker, John) ...........................
51 (1987) 388-391
Wolter, Allan B., O.F.M. The Philosophical Theology of John Duns
Scotus. (Incandela., Joseph M.) ...............
55 (1991) 517-522
Wood, Diana, ed.+ The Bible in the Medieval World: Essays in Memory
of Beryl Smalley. (Matter, E. Ann) ........... 51 (1987) 186-188
Zimmerman, Albert, ed.+ Thomas von Aquin: Werk und Wirlcung im
Licht neuerer Forschung.
(Schenk, Richard, 0.P.) .....................
54 (1990) 376-379

REVIEWERS
Aeschliman, M. D. 53 (1989) 727
Allik, Tiina. 51 (1987) 727; 54 (1990) 176
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. 53 (1989) 153
Asselin, D. T. 55 (1991) 526
Austin, William H. 51 (1987) 194; 52 (1988) 562
Barry, Robert, O.P. 52 (1988) 174; 52 (1988) 551
Benitez, E. E. 51 (1987) 377; 53 (1989) 522
Berthold, George C. 52 (1988) 347
Biechler, James E. 53 (1989) 725
Bildstein, Walter. 51 (1987) 392; 51 (1987) 725
Blosser, Philip. 55 (1991) 522
Boadt, Lawrence, C.S.P. 51 (1987) 714; 53 (1989) 734; 54 (1990) 355
Bradley, Denis J.M. 53 (1989) 144
Brady, Marian, S.P. 54 (1990) 379
Buckley, James. 51 (1987) 524; 52 (1988) 152; 52 (1988) 737;
53 (1989) 149
Bussanich, John. 52 (1988) 544; 52 (1988) 740
Califano, Joseph J. 53 (1989) 343
Carlen, Claudia, I.H.M. 53 (1989) 166
Cavadini, John C. 53 (1989) 509
Centore, F. F. 52 (1988) 357; 53 (1989) 331
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. 54 (1990) 151; 55 (1991) 141
Churchill, John. 51 (1987) 384; 52 (1988) 165; 52 (1988) 337;
53 (1989) 327; 53 (1989) 533; 54 (1990) 554
Crossin, John, O.S.F.S. 51 (1987) 535
Crowell, Steven Galt. 51 (1987) 545
D'Costa, Gavin. 54 (1990) 741
Davis, John B., O.P. 54 (1990) 564
Dennehy, Raymond. 52 (1988) 556
Dodds, Michael J., O.P. 53 (1989) 156; 54 (1990) 361
Doyle, John P. 54 (1990) 369
Dulles, Avery, S.J. 51 (1987) 169
Ferreira, M. Jamie. 51 (1987) 199; 51 (1987) 719; 54 (1990) 560
Fidler, W. Larch. 54 (1990) 184
Froelich, Gregory. 54 (1990) 727

694

REVIEWERS

695

Gallagher, Shaun. 53 (1989) 539
Galvin, John P. 54 (1990) 173; 54 (1990) 365
Granfield, Patrick. 54 (1990) 738
Griffiths, Paul J. 54 (1990) 746
Habiger, Matthew, O.S.B. 51 (1987) 539
Heath, Thomas, O.P. 52 (1988) 760
Henry, Michael. 52 (1988) 350
Hibbs, Thomas S. 55 (1991) 329
Hill, William J., 0.P. 51 (1987) 172
Hughson, Thomas, S.J. 55 (1991) 156
Incandela, Joseph M. 55 (1991) 517
Ingardia, Richard. 55 (1991) 168
Ingham, Nicholas, O.P. 53 (1989) 339
Irwin, Kevin W. 53 (1989) 732; 54 (1990) 735
Jelly, F. M., O.P. 52 (1988) 568
Jenson, Robert. 51 (1987) 521
Johnstone, Brian, G.SS.R. 51 (1987) 375
Jost, Walter. 51 (1987) 732
Keefe, Donald J., S.J. 51 (1987) 178; 51 (1987) 710
Kelley, Francis E. 51 (1987) 381; 53 (1989) 164
Kerlin, Michael J. 52 (1988) 362; 53 (1989) 512; 54 (1990) 744
Kirwin, George, 0.M.I. 53 (1989) 155
Krasevac, Edward, 0.P. 52 (1988) 757
Kruschwitz, Robert B. 52 (1988) 548
Lauder, Robert E. 51 (1987) 189; 51 (1987) 526; 53 (1989) 722;
55 (1991) 535
Lee, Patrick. 52 (1988) 172
Little, Joyce. 52 (1988) 158
Maas, Robin. 54 (1990) 155
Maciernwski, E. M. 54 (1990) 187
Maddox, Randy L. 52 (1988) 355
Marshall, Bruce D. 55 (1991) 321
Martin, James T. H. 54 (1990) 181
Matter, E. Ann. 51 (1987) 186
May, William E. 54 (1990) 168; 55 (1991) 332
McConville, William, O.F.M. 51 (1987) 176
McDonough, Richard M. 53 (1989) 319

696

REVIEWERS

Meynell, Hugo. 51 (1987) 193; 52 (1988) 755
Miller, Edward Jeremy. 55 (1991) 337
Moreland, J.P. 53 (1989) 714
Moreno, Antonio, O.P. 52 (1988) 745
Morris, John R., O.P. 53 (1989) 162
Morris, Michael, O.P. 52 (1988) 181
Morris, Thomas V. 54 (1990) 358
Murphy, Matthew. 52 (1988) 174
Nelson, Paul. 51 (1987) 372
O'Brien, Thomas C. 52 (1988) 148
Owens, Joseph, C.SS.R. 52 (1988) 539; 53 (1989) 337
Phan, Peter C. 53 (1989) 701; 54 (1990) 552; 55 (1991) 327
Placher, William. 51 (1987) 542
Portier, William L. 52 (1988) 763
Proudfoot, Wayne. 53 (1989) 505
Quinn, Philip L. 53 (1989) 709
Raposa, Michael L. 54 (1990) 730
Redpath, Peter A. 51 (1987) ; 716; 53 (1989) 528
Reichenbach, Bruce R. 54 (1990) 371
Riska., Augustin. 53 (1989) 349
Root, Michael. 52 (1988) 152
Samples, John. 53 (1989) 346
Schenk, Richard, O.P. 52 (1988) 542; 54 (1990) 376; 54 (1990) 546
Schuck, Michael J. 54 (1990) 558
Schultz, Janice. 51 (1987) 530; 55 (1991) 160
Simpson, Peter. 53 {1989) 341
Smith, Raymond, O.P. 51 (1987) 188
Soule, Warren J. A., O.P. 53 (1989) 515; 54 (1990) 570
Stock, Michael, O.P. 53 (1989) 160
Tune, Anders S. 55(1991) 145
Turner, Frank M. 53 (1989) 531
Turner, Philip. 54 (1990) 164
Wawrykow, Joseph. 55 (1991) 149

REVIEWERS

Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap. 51 (1987) 367; 53 (1989) 693;
55 (1991) 511
Whitt, D.R., O.P. 53 (1989) 704
Whittaker, John. 51 (1987) 388
Williams, Bruce, O.P. 54 (1990) 160
Wood, Susan K. 53 (1989) 519; 55 (1991) 165
Woods, Richard, O.P. 52 (1988) 750; 54 (1990) 541
Yaffe, Martin D. 52 (1988) 343

697