CATHOLIC SOCIAL AND SEXUAL ETHICS:
INCONSISTENT OR ORGANIC?
} OHN

S. GRABOWSKI

MICHAEL

Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

J. NAUGHTON

University of St. Thomas
St. Paul, Minnesota

HIS ARTICLE evaluates Charles Curran's proposal that
here is an unjustifiable methodological split between recent
fficial Catholic social and sexual teaching. 1 Specifically,
this study will argue that the dichotomy between recent Catholic
social and sexual teaching is not so sharp as Curran and others
suppose, and that the real differences which do exist between
these two strands are neither arbitrary nor unjustifiable in light
of a Thomistic view of the human good. This study will proceed
by first providing an overview of Curran's thesis concerning the
divergent methodologies employed in Catholic social and sexual
teaching as he and other moral theologians have presented it. It
1 We know of no writing that explicitly challenges this thesis. When this
idea is mentioned it is only supported. Among the studies which mention or
develop this idea see: Kenneth R. Overberg, An Inconsistent Ethic? Teachings
of the American Catholic Bishops (Lanham: University Press of America,
1980); Richard Gula, What Are They Saying aboiit Moral Norms? (New
York: Paulist, 1982), pp. 34-48; Reason Informed by Faith (New York:
Paulist, 1989), pp. 34-35 and chap. 16; Christopher Mooney, Public Virtue
(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), pp. 146-50; Richard
McCormick, " The Consistent Life Ethic: Is There An Historical Soft Underbelly?", delivered for the Symposium "A Consistent Ethic of Life" at Loyola
University of Chicago, November 7, 1987, pp. 10-13; and idem, "Human
Sexuality: Toward a Consistent Ethical Method," in One Hundred Years of
Catholic Social Teachings, ed. John A. Coleman, S.J. (Maryknoll: Orbis
Books, 1991), pp. 189-97; Russell B. Connors, "Justice and Sex: Differing
Ethical Methodologies," Chicago Studies 27 (1988) : 181-190; Thomas F.
Schindler, Ethics: The Social Dimension (Wilmington: Michael Glazier,
1989), pp. 70-75; Patrick T. McCormick, C.M., " Abortion: Retooling for a
New Frontier," New Theology Review 5 (1992): 48-61.

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will then offer a critique of this position by considering the unjustifiable dichotomies it creates between reason and nature, the
physical and the personal, and historical consciousness and classicism. We conclude that while tensions exist between these two
kinds of teaching, the social and sexual teachings of the church
are held together organically rather than juxtaposed incon-

I. CURRAN'S POSITION ON THE CHURCH'S
MORAL METHODOLOGY

Two Interpretations of Natural Law
Throughout much of his work, Curran calls attention to two
divergent understandings of natural law articulated in the history
of Western thought and adopted by the Church. 2 Similar observations have been made by other moral theologians. 8 According
to this view, Cicero ( 43 B.C.) exemplifies one strand of the
natural law tradition when he speaks of " true law which is right
reason in accord with nature." 4 The focus of this "order of reason " approach to natural law is on the rationality and prudential
judgment of the agent in his or her own concrete situation. 5
Ulpian (228 A.D.), who describes natural law as " that which
2 See, for example, Charles Curran, "Absolute Norms in Moral Theology,"
in A New Look at Christian Morality (Notre Dame: Fides, 1968), pp. 74-89;
"Dialogue with Social Ethics: Roman Catholic Social Ethics-Past, Present,
and Future,'' in Catholic Moral Theology in Dialogue (Notre Dame: Fides,
1972), pp. 116-35; " Natural Law," in Directions in Fundamental Moral Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1985), pp. 119-72; "The
Changing Anthropological Bases of Catholic Social Ethics," in Moral Theology: A Continuing Journey (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame, 1982),
pp. 173-208.
s See, for example, Timothy O'Connell, Principles for a Catholic Morality,
2nd edition (San Francisco: Harper, 1990), pp. 149-60; John Mahoney, The
Making of Moral Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987), p. 110; Gula,
What Are They Saying, pp. 34-35 and Reason Informed, pp. 222-223.
4 De Republica, lib. iii, c. xxii: "Est quidem vera les recta ratio, naturae
congriiens." The citation is from M. Tullii, ed. (Rome, 1852), pp. 405-406.
5 See T. O'Connell, Principles, pp. 150-51, and Gula, What Are They Saying,
p. 35.

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nature has taught all animals," exemplifies a very different approach. 6 This strand of natural law, the "order of nature" approach, inclines toward physicalism because of its emphasis on
conformity to biological properties or finalities and because it
focuses on the commonality between humans and animals. 7
For Curran and other moral theologians these differing strands
of natural law have led, especially in recent thought, to markedly
different worldviews, anthropologies, and moral methodologies.
The focus on the " order of reason " has proved to be more in
harmony with modern understandings of the world, with their
awareness of growth, process, and historical consciousness. 8 It
likewise has proven receptive to an inductive and experiential
approach to moral reasoning, and thereby emphasizes the particular and contextual character of moral choice over deductively
derived absolute norms. 9 The result is a greater emphasis
on the open-ended character of the moral enterprise. As one's
apprehension of reality changes, so should one's understanding
of moral norms and reasoning. Echoing Curran in this regard,
Gula points out that "insofar as reason's grasp of reality is always partial and limited, moral norms are necessarily tentative." 10 These developments also encourage a greater focus on
the person as moral agent. According to Curran, this type of
" personalism " is characterized by a relationality-responsibility
s Imperatoris Iustiniani Institutiomtm, lib. 1, t. 2. pr: "!us naturale est, quad
natura omnia a11iinilia dornit." The citation is from the edition by J. B. Moule
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1923), p. 100. Ulpian makes this remark with reference
to human procreation, but goes on to add that human beings obey this law
through the use of reason and out of a sense of duty.
7 Curran, "Natural
Law," pp. 127-32, and Gula, What Are They Saying,
p. 35. For background, see Michael Crowe, "St. Thomas and Ulpian's Natural
Law,'' in St. Thomas Aquinas 1274-1974: Commemorative Studies, vol. 1, ed.
Armand A. Maurer (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1974), pp. 261-82.
s Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 137-40; Gula, What Are They Saying, pp.
18-22, and Reason Informed, pp. 30-36.
9 Curran, "Natural
Law,'' pp. 140-41; Gula, What Are They Saying, pp.
22-25.
10 Gula, What Are They Saying, p. 42.

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model that understands "the human person in terms of one's
multiple relationships with God, neighbor, world, and self and the
call to live responsibly in the midst of these relationships." 11
In contrast, the " order of nature " strand of natural law sees
reality as composed of static and immutable essences, from which
one can deduce absolute moral norms. Insofar as it sees the
physical qualities of actions or the natural finalities of biological
processes as morally determinative, this strand is characterized by
a kind of "physicalism." 12 Physicalism, as opposed to "personalism," refers to the tendency in moral discourse to focus on
the biological dimensions of the person or of human action in the
process of moral judgment.

Application to Church Teaching
Curran and other moral theologians maintain that elements of
both the " order of reason " and the " order of nature " approaches can be found in the thought of Aquinas which has
proved influential in the formulation of magisterial moral teaching.13 The "order of nature" with its inherently physicalist pre11 Curran, "Official Social and Sexual Teaching," in Tensions in Moral
Theology (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), p. 96. See
also his " Methodological Overview of Fundamental Moral Theology," in Directions, pp. 3-27. According to Gula, this brand of "personalism " is " characterized by placing emphasis on dimensions of the human person and human
actions which extend beyond the physical and biological to include the social,
spiritual, and psychological dimensions as well." See Gula, What Are They
Saying, p. 35. For a more extended consideration of this personalism, see Louis
J anssens, " Personalism in Moral Theology," in Moral Theology: Challenges
for the Future, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 1990), pp. 94107.
12 Curran, "Natural
Law," p. 127. Cf. Gula, What Are They Saying,
pp. 35-36. For a brief historical survey of this emphasis on the physical nature
of acts in moral theology, see B. V. Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism," Studia Moralia 30 (1992): 76-78.
13 See Curran, "Absolute
Norms," pp. 77-84; "Natural Law," pp. 127-31;
Gula, pp. 35-37; Timothy O'Connell, pp. 153-55. Lisa Sowle Cahill also describes Aquinas's understanding of natural law as having physicalist tendencies
without citing the influence of Ulpian; see her Between the Sexes: Foundations for a Christian Ethics of Sexuality (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), pp.
108-9.

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occupation with biological finality continues to inform the
Church's prohibitions in the matters of sexual ethics, particularly in the encyclicals Casti Conn>ubii (1930) and Humanae Vitae
( 1968) .14 This understanding of the " order of nature " with its
ahistorical and deductive orientation has also informed social
encyclicals such as Rerum N ovarum ( 1891), Quadragesimo
Anno ( 1931), and to a lesser extent Laborem E.xercens
( 1981) .15 The church's social teaching after 1960, however,
demonstrates an increasing dependence upon the " order of reason" approach to natural law.16 The decisive moment of this
process is said to have been reached in Vatican II's Pastoral Constitution on the Church Gaudium et S pes which repudiated the
classicist world view in favor of experience, personalism, induc14 Cf. Gula, What Are They Saying, pp. 36-9. For a more extended critique
of the teaching of Humana.e Vitae, see Curran "Natural Law," pp. 119-72.
For a similar critique of the more recent document of the Sacred Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, Declaratio de quibusdam questionibus ad
sesualem ethicam spectantibus (1976), see Curran, "Sexual Ethics: A Critique," in Issues in Sesual and Medical Ethics (Notre Dame: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1978), pp. 30-52.
15 For Curran's critique of pre-conciliar Catholic social thought as well as
his critique of the teaching of Pope John Paul II, see " Changing Anthropological Bases" and "Dialogue with Social Ethics," in Contemporary Moral
Theology in Dialogue (Notre Dame: Fides Publishers, 1972), pp. 132ff. See
also Peter J. Henriot, et al., Catholic Social Teaching (New York: Orbis
Books, 1988), pp. 18-19; J. W. O'Malley, "Reform, Historical Consciousness,
Aggiornamento," Theological Studies 32 (1971) : 573-601; Susan L. Secker,
"Human Experience and Women's Experience," The An:nual of the Society
of Christian Ethics (1991), p. 135; Leslie Griffin, "The Integration of Spiritual and Temporal : Contemporary Roman Catholic Church-State Theory,"
Theological Studies 48 (1987) : 250ff.; and eadem, "Moral Criticism as Moral
Teaching: Pope John Paul !I's Sollicitudo Rei Socialis;' delivered at the
Symposium on Recent Catholic Social Teachings at Notre Dame University,
April 24-26, 1989.
16 Curran is dependent here on M. D. Chenu, "The Church's Social Doctrine," Concilium 140 (1980): 71-75. Curran himself is somewhat more critical of the earlier social tradition and the discontinuity between it and more
recent developments. See Curran, "Changing Anthropological Bases," pp. 173208; " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," pp. 88-100. In this
latter work Curran describes the recent social teaching as not only more personalist and historically conscious, but also as adopting a " relational responsibility" approach to ethics. See also Gula, What Are They Saying, pp. 42-45.

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tion, process, and historical consciousness-a shift evidenced in
its appeals to read the "signs of the times!' 11 This new approach has been carried forward in most subsequent social teaching. However, this shift in the social teachings from the " order
of nature " to the " order of reason " has not been paralleled in
the church's teaching in sexual matters.
Curran recognizes some development in recent official church
teaching on sexuality. He points to the replacement of the language about the procreative end of intercourse as primary and the
unitive end as secondary by an affirmation of their equal importance in Gaudium et Spes. 18 Even though Humanae Vitae reaffirmed this position, Curran and many moral theologians uniformly reject its teaching that spouses must preserve the inseparable unity of these ends in each conjugal act. 19 In its continued
focus on particular acts, and in its understanding that the conjugal act has a natural finality toward procreation, the encyclical
reflects the physicalism of the older " order of nature" strand of
natural law. 2° Curran and others argue that the logic of personalism would allow the subordination of the physical end of procreation to the more personal demands of love and relationship. 21
The procreative dimension of a couple's sexual relationship need
not be realized in particular acts, but can be spread over the duration of their lives together. 22 Sexuality, and particularly fertility,
17 See Curran, "Natural
Law," pp. 141-43; "Dialogue with Social Ethics,"
pp. 125-30; and " Changing Anthropological Bases," pp. 183-6.
18 Gandium et Spes, no. 50. Cf. Curran, "Natural Law," pp. 131-32.
19 Paul VI, Hnmanae Vitae, nos. 11-12. Cf. Curran, "Sexuality and Sin: A
Current Appraisal" in Contemporary Problems in Moral Theology (Notre
Dame: Fides, 1970), p. 174.
2 ° Cf. Curran, "Natural
Law," pp. 156-57; Gula, What Are They Saying,
pp. 38-9; and Richard McCormick S.J ., N ates on Moral Theology 1965-1980
(Lanham: University Press of America, 1981), pp. 218-21.
21 Cf. Curran, "Sexuality
and Sin," pp. 173-74. This is also a repeated
theme in a recent study by Lisa Sowle Cahill, " Catholic Sexual Ethics and
the Dignity of the Person: A Double Message," Theological Stitdies 50
(1989) : 120-50.
22 See Curran, "Sexuality
and Sin," p. 174; "The Development of Sexual
Ethics in Contemporary Roman Catholicism," in Tensions in Moral Theology,
p. 76; and McCormick, N ates 1965-1980, pp. 218-21.

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while important, are neither exhaustive nor determinative of the
person. 23 As a result these realities can be subordinated to other
goods at stake in relationships. 24 While commending the use of
personalist language in recent church teaching, most notably in
the thought of Pope John Paul II, some accuse the present pope
of inconsistencies in his utilization of personalist ideas. In this
view John Paul's advocacy of marital experience and personalism
is at odds with a continued focus on particular acts, and hence his
emphasis on the " dignity of the person " is in conflict with other
aspects of his teaching. 25
Unlike the sexual teachings, Curran maintains that the church's
social teaching has gone through a significant development from
the order of nature ( 1891-19 58) to the order of reason ( 1961present) with John Paul II vacillating between the two orders. 26
23 McCormick, N ates 1965-1980, pp. 219-20; Cahill, "Catholic Sexual Ethics,"
pp. 139-43.
24 Thus Curran, contrasting his own view with the older and more physicalist
approach which saw an inherent teleology in the sexual faculty, states: "A
more relational approach sees the sexual faculty related to the human person,
and the human person related to others, especially to the marriage partner.
For the good of the marriage relationship contraception or sterilization can be
justified." See "A Methodological Overview," p. 14.
25 Cahill in particular objects to John Paul's affirmations of the importance
of the vocation of motherhood as a form of gender role stereotyping which
results in women bearing the brunt of the procreative end of marital sexuality
and also what she sees as the romanticization of sexual commitment in his
descriptions of love as a form of self-giving. See "Catholic Sexual Ethics,"
pp. 145-6. Similar criticisms are made even more sharply by Christine Gudorf,
" Encountering the Other: the Modern Papacy on Women," Social Compass
36 (1989) : 298-302. Yet other theologians question whether John Paul II's
emphasis on the " dignity of the person " is at all relevant to determining the
morality of concrete actions. See Bruno Schuller, "Die Personwiirde des
Menschen als Beweisgrund in der normativen Ethik,'' Theologie und Glaube
53 (1978) : 538-55 and Richard McCormick, N ates 1965-1980, pp. 801-7.
2s For Curran, John Paul's social teaching is tainted by a return to aspects
of a classicist worldview. See "Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings,"
pp. 92-3. For support of Curran's view, see Joseph A. Selling, "The Theological Presuppositions of Centesimus Annus," Louvain Studies 17 (1992) : 3547, and James O'Connell, " Is There a Catholic Social Doctrine? The Problem of Content and the Ambivalence of History, Analysis <ind Authority,"
Heythrop Journal 32 (1991): 511-538.

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For Curran, this development can be seen by contrasting Pius
XI's Quadragesimo Anno ( 1931) and Paul VI's apostolic letter
Octogesima Adveniens ( 1971). Pius's plan for social reconstruction was a particular plan proposed for all peoples and all times.
Curran sees such a plan as flawed from the start since it was
Euro-centric and failed to consider its own historical situation.
In essence, according to Curran, Pius's corporatist plan was deductive and classicist. This approach, according to Curran, began
to be abandoned in Catholic social thought with John XXIII. It
was completely dismissed with Paul VI who demonstrated a historically conscious and inductive approach in his social teachings.27
Thus in Octogesima Adveniens, he writes:
In the face of such widely varying situations, it is difficult for us to
utter a unified message and to put forward a solution which has
universal validity. Such is not our ambition nor is it our mission. It
is up to the Christian communities to analyze with objectivity the
situation which is proper to their own country, to shed on it the light
of the gospel's unalterable word, and to draw principles of reflection,
norms of judgment, and directives from the social teaching of the
church. 28

Curran goes on to explain that John Paul II fails to continue the
sensitivity to the historical particularities of social problems, returning to a more static and classicist approach, by proposing
offiical Catholic social "doctrine" for the whole church. 29
In summary, the thesis advanced by Curran and echoed by
others is that there are basic methodological differences between
Catholic magisterial teaching on sexual and social morality:
" Whereas the official social teaching has evolved so that it now
employs historical consciousness, personalism, and a relationalityresponsihility ethical model, the sexual teaching still emphasizes
classicism, human nature, and faculties, and a law model of
Curran, " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p. 92.
Curran, " Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings,"
p. 91.
29 Ibid.; see also Charles Curran, "A Century of Catholic Social Teaching,"
Theology Today 48 (1991/92) : 161, 167-169.
27

28 No. 4, as cited in

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ethics." 30 Additionally, attention is also sometimes drawn to the
apparent inconsistency between the highly specific nature of the
church's sexual teaching which condemns particular acts and the
more general principles and analysis contained in the social tradition. 31
Are the charges of an unwarranted dichotomy between the
church's recent social and sexual teachings accurate? While
Curran and others considered thus far are undoubtedly correct in
noting a divergence in tone and method between the two forms
of teaching, it remains to be seen whether this divergence is as
great and as unjustified as they suppose.
IL CRITIQUE OF CURRAN'S ARGUMENT
Our response to Curran is limited to two basic observations :
first, the divergence between the social and sexual teachings of
the church is not as great as Curran might suppose; and second,
Curran overlooks significant differences between sexual and social
issues that account for the differences in method which do ·exist.
Curran's position arises from three dichotomies that underlie his
arguments : reason versus nature, the person versus the physical,
and historical consciousness versus classicism. In each, Curran
exaggerates the differences and advocates one over the other.
Considering those three in turn, we propose instead that an organic unity and interconnectedness exist for each of these pairs,
while at the same time we recognize reasons for their difference
and utilize them accordingly.

Reason/Nature:

An Intrinsic Connection

Curran's separation of human reason from human nature rests
upon a misunderstanding of Thomas Aquinas's analysis of human
3o Curran, "Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p. 107. Cf. Gula,
What Are They Saying, pp. 37-45.
31 Cf. Richard McCormick, Notes on Moral Theology 1981 through 1984
(Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1984), p. 74; and Curran,
"Official Catholic Social and Sexual Teachings," p, 106. For an application
of the same objection to the teaching of the American bishops see Overberg,
An Inconsistent Ethic?

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inclinations within the framework of natural law. Curran attempts to separate " physical " from " rational" inclinations in
Aquinas's analysis, assigning the former to the influence of Ulpian
and the latter to the influence of Cicero. 32 Such a separation
overlooks the fundamental unity and integration of these inclinations already worked out by Aquinas. In his discussion of natural
law Aquinas considers how there can be several precepts of
natural law and several kinds of human inclinations all of which
are known and unified through the exercise of reason. 33 Human
beings share with all created things an inclination to self-preservation. With the animals, human beings share an inclination to
reproduce and to raise and educate offspring. Finally, insofar as
people are rational, they have a peculiarly human inclination to
live together in society and to know the truth about God. As
expressions of various facets of human nature, these inclinations
are designated by Aquinas as " good," and are all unified in the
exercise of human reason. 34 As Jean Porter points out, these inclinations are an outline of what a " human life should properly
look like, what goods it will incorporate, and what relation those
goods should have to one another." 35 An understanding of this
properly ordered life requires an understanding of the hierarchical
3 2 Curran, "Natural
Law," pp. 127-31. See also Gula's interpretation of
Aquinas's theory of inclination in Reason Informed, p. 225. Influenced by Curran, Gula polarizes Thomas's understanding of the inclinations by maintaining
that the inclination to procreate and educate offspring stems from Ulpian's
" order of nature " or physicalist approach, while the inclination to know and
do the good derives from Cicero's "order of reason" or personalist approach.
See also O'Connell, Principles, pp. 154-5, for a similar interpretation, although
his discussion of Richard Westley's understanding of Aquinas presents an alternative and somewhat more unified view of the interaction of body and spirit in
the individual.
33 Cf. Summa Theologiae (ST) I-II, q. 94, a. 2.
34 ST 1-11, q. 94. a. 2, ad 2: "Ad secundum dicendum quod omnes hujusmodi
inclinationes quarumcumque partium naturae humanae, puta concupiscibilis et
irascibilis, secundum quod regulantur ratione, pertinent ad legem naturalem, et
reducuntur ad unum primum praeceptum, ut dictum est, et secundum hoc sunt
multa praecepta legis naturae in seipsis, quae tamen communicant in una
radice." The citation is from the Blackfriars edition, vol. 28 (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966), p. 82.
35 Jean Porter, Recovery of Virtue (Louisville: Westminster, 1990), p. 90.

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order of the inclinations. Porter points out that this hierarchy
works in both an ascending order of excellence and a descending
order of fundamentality. In the order of excellence, the inclinations are pursued in a way in which the lower inclinations are
subordinated to the pursuit of the higher inclinations ; namely,
the pursuit of self-preservation and procreation is subordinated
to the more excellent pursuit of society and God. But at the same
time there is an order of fundamentality that prevents the lower
inclinations from being destroyed by the higher inclinations, since
it is on the basis of the lower inclinations that the higher inclinations are built. Hence, as the goods involved with the inclinations
move from first to third in an order of increasing excellence, they
also move in the same direction in an order of decreasing fundamentality. The lower levels are the necessary preconditions for
the higher levels.86
Thus in Aquinas's understanding of human nature, various inclinations (toward being, reproduction, society, and God) are integrated rather than opposed. In this light, the attempt to depict
Aquinas as a " physicalist " is based on a fundamental misreading. 87 Both reason and bodiliness (including sexuality) are integral components of human nature. Thus the order of nature
and the order of reason are not two conflicting orders as Curran
presents them, but two sides of the same coin. In other words,
Curran only views the hierarchy of inclinations in one way, namely, in the direction of excellence, and fails to consider adequately
36 Ibid., pp. 89-90.
37 William E. May has argued that Curran and O'Connell exaggerate the
influence of Ulpian on Aquinas's discussions of natural law. While it is true
that human beings share certain inclinations with the animals, they are regulative for human beings only as they are grasped as goods in the light of practical reason. See May, " The Natural Law and Objective Morality: A Thomistic Perspective," in Principles of Catholic Moral Life (Chicago: Franciscan
Herald Press, 1980), pp. 160-5. Cf. D. O'Donoghue, "The Thomist Concept
of Natural Law," Irish Theological Quarterly 22 (1955) : 91. For a further
critique of Curran's claim of physicalism in Aquinas and recent official Catholic
sexual teachings see William E. May, "The Moral Methodology of Vatican
Council II and the Teaching of Humanae Vitae and Persona Humana;' Anthropotes 511 (1989) : 30-45.

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the direction of fundamentality which reason also recognizes.
This false dichotomy of nature and reason in turn underlies the
dichotomies of personalism/physicalism and historical consciousness/ classicism according to which Curran evaluates Catholic social and sexual teachings. While the reading proposed here does
not preclude a certain fruitful tension between the various inclinations, it does reject Curran's depiction of them as polar opposites.

Personalism/ Physicalisrn: Unifying the Physical
and the Relational
In considering whether the official church's teaching concerning sexuality can rightly be accused of physicalism, a number of
observations are in order. To a degree Curran's claim is correct,
insofar as the church takes seriously the physical nature of the
human body. Sexuality necessarily involves the human body.
But like Aquinas the church does not base its teachings merely
upon the animal nature of the body. It is noteworthy that the
term which church teaching employs in describing marital intercourse is "the conjugal act" or " marital act" which means the
marital love that informs sexual intercourse between husband
and wife. 38 It is not merely a sex act-that would be physicali11m. The conjugal act is a human act. Animals cannot engage
in conjugal acts (which carry out reasoned choices). 39 They are
incapable of human love and reason. But should the love and reason expressed in the conjugal act subvert its procreative dimenGaudiuin et Spes, no. 49; Hivmanae Vitae, nos. 11-13.
sexual characteristics of man and the human faculty of reproduction
wonderfully exceed the dispositions of the lower forms of life. Hence the acts
themselves which are proper to conjugal love and which are exercised in accord with genuine human dignity must be honored with great reverence."
Gaudium et S pes, no. 51. The citation is from The Documents of Vatican II,
Walter Abbott, ed. (Piscataway, NJ: New Century, 1966), p. 256. Cf. Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism," p. 73; see n. 6 on the same page
where Johnstone states that " in official documents, such as Pius XI' s Casti
Connubii (1930), that marriage, as a contract by which reason and free will
determine the expression of human sexuality cannot be put on the same level as
the union of animals."
38 Cf.

39 " The

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sion? Can one view the person as free from the constraints of
human nature, including its embodied (and hence biological)
aspects? Or is not human nature a condition of possibility for all
that we do?
While Curran accuses official church teachings of physicalism,
his separation of body and spirit forces him to advocate a kind
of spiritualism. Curran tends to an ethic for human sexuality
which does not account for its concrete embodiedness-in short,
its physical character. Can we violate the physical laws of our
bodies and still achieve authentic human development? The
church's teaching of the inseparability of the unitive and procreative ends of human sexuality recognizes both the dynamic role of
sexuality in human relationships and the creative and physical
dimension of procreation.
Influenced by modern phenomenology in the 1920s and 30s,
Catholic moral theologians such as Herbert Doms and Dietrich
von Hildebrand began to develop a sexual ethic from the philosophy of personalism. 40 They criticized the exclusive treatment of
marriage in terms of ends, specifically the over-emphasis on the
procreative end. 41 These theologians maintained that an exclusive
40 Good discussions of this development can be found in John C. Ford and
Gerald Kelly, Contemporary Moral Theology, vol. 2: Marriage Questions
(Westminster, MD: Newman, 1964), pp. 18-35; William Shannon, The Lively
Debate: Response to Huma:nae Vitae (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1970),
pp. 12-23; and Theodore Mackin, What is Marriage? (New York: Paulist,
1982)' pp. 225-35.
41 Here Curran and others are correct in their assertion that the tradition
has had elements of physicalism. See Johnstone, "From Physicalism to Personalism " on the origins of physicalism. On the legacy of Augustine in the
development of the Church's view of sexuality, see the generally excellent historical study of John T. Noonan, Contraception: A History of Its Treatment
by Catholic Theologians and Canonists, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Harvard
University, 1986). Even though there was an over-emphasis on the procreative good, theologians also demonstrated a growing attention to what came to
be designated as the unitive good. Hence Augustine will speak of the relationship of husband and wife in terms of friendship (see De Bono Conjugate,
1). Aquinas understands marriage as the greatest form of human friendship
to which sexual intercourse is not unrelated, even while it does not express its
totality (see Summa Contra Gentiles III, c. 123, 125; cf. ST II-II, q. 26, a.
11). Bonaventure speaks of intercourse as an expression of the unique love
which exists betwen husband and wife (see In IV Sententiarum, 33, 1).

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focus on the " ends " of marital intercourse failed to do justice
to the profundity of human relationships. They affirmed the centrality of the couple's love in marriage without denying the integral value of procreation in conjugal love.42 The work of these
theologians prepared for the affirmation of the equal importance
of the unitive and procreative dimensions of intercourse at the
Second Vatican Council.43
When Curran and some other moralists speak of personalism,
however, they see the " personal values " of love, freedom, and
reason as central to human life and "biological values " such as
procreation as secondary and subordinate. In other words the
logic of personalism, in this perspective, demands not the elimination of the older language of primary and secondary ends of
conjugal love, but its inversion and a corresponding lessening of
interest in particular acts.
Such a view is problematic on two counts. First, the argument that personalism necessarily entails a focus on relationships
rather than specific acts neglects the existential or reflexive character of human acts. That is, in making particular decisions or
choices one shapes one's own character as a moral agent. 44 Even
though the person does not summarize or express himself or her42 On the precise relationship of this love to the procreative dimension of
marital sexuality, there were important differences between them. While both
defended the church's prohibition of artificial contraception, for Doms it was
the couple's shared life of "two-in-oneship" that gave marriage its primary
meaning. It was this same two-in-oneship that Doms saw as " the one immediate purpose " of intercourse rather than procreation, although this was not
excluded since a child constituted the "natural fruit" of a couple's love. See
Herbert Doms, The Meaning of Marriage (New York: Sheed and Ward,
1939), pp. 77-78, 84-85, 94-95. Hence his ideas provide something of an anticipation of the personalism presently advocated by Curran and others.
43 Doms in particular urged the abandonment of the language of " primary "
and "secondary" ends, arguing that "it would be better if we just spoke of
the procreative and personal purposes immanent in marriage and distinguished
them from its meaning" (ibid., p. 88).
44 Curran is aware of this reflective and self-constituting character of human
acts but draws this puzzling conclusion: "Individual acts are not the most
fundamental ethical category because they are both expressive of the moral
subject and constitutive of the moral being of the subject." See "A Methodological Overview," p. 15.

CATHOLIC

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self completely in particular actions, particular acts are nonetheless integral in shaping one's disposition and character. That one
ought not be deeply concerned about whether particular acts express the procreative dimension of human sexuality but only
whether this value is expressed over the course of a relationship
begs an important question. Does not the failure to respect the
value of procreation in particular acts of contraceptive intercourse
lessen one's ability to respect this value and live it out in general?
If contraceptive intercourse is a bad act, does it not create a disposition toward other bad acts in those who engage in it? 45
A second problem with this particular version of personalism
can be found in its presuppositions concerning human sexuality,
nature, and personhood. Central to this account of the person is
an interpretation of rationality, freedom, and various relationships that leaves the place of sexuality in this anthropology undeveloped or minimized. 46 The implication is therefore that sex45 A parallel case might be worth considering.
Would Curran and others
agree that the relation of the unitive dimension of human sexuality to specific
sexual acts is equally unimportant? If a particular conjugal act for whatever
reason was devoid of love or other personal values, it would not be a good
act, but rather an act of sexual manipulation, coercion, or violence. Cf. Cahill,
Between the Sexes, p. 149. If this is the case, then why should the procreative
dimension of human sexuality not also be respected in particular acts?
46 Hence, when discussing the person as moral agent, Curran will describe
the importance of certain dispositions or virtues and also one's fundamental
relationships with God, neighbor, world, and self. Little is said about the place
of sexuality in such an anthropology except to urge that it be subordinated to
the overall context of one's relationships. See, for example, "A Methodological
Overview," pp. 14-18. ·when discussing sexuality itself, Curran describes it as
a means of personal relationship, but leaves unclear its relation to the person
as embodied-except to reject what he believes to be the physicalist preoccupation with procreation characteristic of past Catholic theology and teaching. See
" Sexuality and Sin," pp. 168-70. Others will affirm the corporeality of the
person as subject, but do not explicitly develop the implications of this with
regard to sexuality. See Louis J anssens, "Artificial Insemination: Ethical
Considerations," Louvain Stitdies 8 ( 1980) : 2-29. Still others, such as Cahill,
want to affirm the sexual as an " important but not all-encompassing" dimension of human experience, but do not specify how this ought to be understood
(see " Catholic Sexual Ethics," p. 143). On the Church's view of the difficulties inherent in the opposition of freedom to human nature and embodiment,
see John Paul II, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor, nos. 46-50.

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NAUGHTON

uality is to be equated with " the physical " or with " nature "
and both ought to be viewed as extrinsic to the core of the person. Such an approach is beset by problems. This account of
personalism reintroduces the false opposition between reason
(here equated with the person) and nature (here equated with
the body) criticized above. It also creates a further dichotomy
between human nature and personhood. Such a dichotomy is unnecesary if nature is understood as a set of organically united
inclinations that are possessed by individual persons as the very
ground of their humanity. 47 Finally, this account of personalism
restricts sexuality to a physical or biological phenomenon. This
ignores the growing awareness of the interpenetration of soul and
body within the person and the resulting conclusion that sexuality
is not merely a biological reality but also one that affects all areas
of human personality and relationship. 48 Hence the version of
personalism advocated by Curran and others is rooted in an anthropology which appears unworkable.
Curran maintains that, whereas the church's sexual teaching is
plagued with the problem of physicalism, the church's social teaching is far more personalistic, escaping this problem. While he
41 For a good exposition of the meaning of "person" and "nature" in both
classical and contemporary thought, see Ambrose McNicholl, " Person, Sex,
Marriage and Actual Trends of Thought," in Human Sexuality and Personhood, Proceedings of the Workshop for the Hierarchies of the United States
and Canada, February 2-6, 1981 (St. Louis: Pope John XXIH Medical Moral
Center, 1981), PP. 138-65. It should be noted that the attempt to oppose the
categories of person and nature renders unintelligible the Church's classic
Christological confession of Christ as one Person in two natures as well as
the anthropology of Vatican II with its emphasis on Christ's assumption and
revelation of human nature. See Gaudium et Spes, nos. 20, 29; Li1men Gentium,
no. 13.
48 On this point one can find surprising agreement between moralists who
hold otherwise sharply different views. Hence Philip Keane, S.S. states: "the
gift of sexuality is a gift that touches persons on all levels of their existence
. . . thus becoming a basic ontological determinant of human existence or
personality." See Sexual Morality: A Catholic Perspective (New York:
Paulist, 1977), p. 4. Ronald Lawler, O.F.M. Cap., Joseph Boyle, and William
May will assert in a similar vein that " sexuality is a modality which affects
our entire being as persons." See Catholic Sexual Ethics: A Summary Explanation and Defense (Huntington, IN; Our Sunday Visitor, 1985), p. 129.

CATHOLIC

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argues that this personalism is achieved through an emphasis on
freedom, equality and participation, he does not examine the relationship of the physical nature of the person in the social teachings. This absence points to a failure to understand the importance of the physical in the socio-economic area of morality and
thereby appreciate the organic role of the physical in the moral
teachings of the church.
There is little disagreement that sexuality is necessarily more
physical and bodily than economic concerns. However, economic
concerns cannot be understood outside physical and bodily
boundaries. In the church's social teachings on wage justice, for
example, the popes have emphasized the " necessary " or physical
characteristic of wages. Wages are means to one's physical survival, that is, wages have a necessary and physical characteristic.
Because work is necessary for the preservation of one's life and
the procreation and education of offspring, any wage theory must
envisage a wage commensurate with the necessary or physical
character of human work. The proper object of justice is not the
strict economic exchange of what is "due," but the person. One's
due in reference to wages must be a living wage. The wage contract is not merely two parties bargaining for the best price, each
attempting to maximize his or her self-interest. The wage contract is a means to further the perfection of the human person,
which Leo XIII always sees in terms of providing the necessities
of human existence to sustain workers and their families in a relatively comfortable life that includes adequate shelter, medical
care, food, pension, etc.
This necessary or physical characteristic of remuneration demands that justice guide the relationship between the worker
and the firm as well as the state. 49 Precisely because wages are
necessary, they cannot be calculated by economics alone. Since
people are physical beings, the physical dimensions of all their
activities need to be taken into consideration. All physical or material goods have a "universal destination." The very "nature
of creation " is directed toward the common use of all people.
49

See Leo XIII, Rerum Novamm (1891), no. 62.

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People do not have absolute control over their property, by the
very fact that it is created by God. As John Paul II has pointed
out, property has a "social mortgage" and people have the duty
of stewardship to see that it is distributed to meet the needs of
all people. 50 In other words, wages are an important factor in
fulfilling the inclinations toward self-preservation, procreation,
and education of offspring.
It should be pointed out that, just as Catholic sexual teaching
has undergone development in changing its description of conjugal goods from primary and secondary to an affirmation of their
mutual importance, so has Catholic social teaching altered its
emphasis on wages and ownership from emphasizing the necessary, physical, or need aspect to a more personalistic criterion.
This is particularly evident in John Paul's writings concerning
worker ownership, although it is also found in John XXIII's
Mater et M agistra. While worker ownership serves as a good
means by which to distribute the goods of the earth for the needs
of people, it serves other ends as well. Worker ownership also
has a personal rationale which John Paul II refers to as the "personalist argument." The rule of ownership ought to be at the
service of " personalistic values." Workers are not only concerned with what they receive from their labor (extrinsic benefits) ; they also want to work for themselves (intrinsic benefits).
For John Paul II, it is difficult for workers to have a personal
connection to
is not their own. He maintains that worker
ownership contributes to the personal development of the individual worker-that is, to the formative dimension of work. Another aspect of this personalist component of worker ownership
is that it creates stronger social relationships between employees
and employers. 51 Worker ownership is advocated by John Paul
50 See John Paul's talk to the Indians at Oaxaca, Mexico entitled " Importance and Dignity of Farm Workers," The Pope Speaks 24 (Fall 1979):

207.
51 John Paul II, Laborem Exercens,
nos. 14-15. The "personalist argument " is set in the larger context of private property and more specifically
in the ownership of the means of production, although it is also applied to the
participation of workers in the production process. See Lothar Roos, " On a
Theology and Ethics of "\Vork," Coimmmio 17 (1984): 117.

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II not only because it distributes wealth and fulfills human needs,
but because it serves well as a means to personalization by affecting positively the formative dimension of the person and creating
stronger social relationships between worker and employer. 52 In
other words, the church has come to a fuller expression of the
meaning of remuneration by stressing both the order of fundaThus in developments of both the sexual and social teachings of
the church, the emphasis has been on uniting and integrating the
personal or relational and the physical, not on polarizing them.
In the case of John Paul II, this continuity between his teachings
in the sexual and social spheres is particularly evident since he
employs the language of "the dignity of the person" (drawn
from Gaudium et S pes) in each. Both contraception and unfair
remuneration obscure the dignity of the person because both regard the person as a means rather than as an end in himself or
herself. In the case of contraception, the spouses falsify the language of total self-giving which conjugal love is meant to express by withholding an essential aspect of themselves, namely
their fertility, from one another. Therefore the person is neither
given nor received in the totality which love demands. 53 In the
case of unfair remuneration, the person created in God's image
52 Some may want to accuse Leo and Pius of not developing a more personalistic view of remuneration. One clear reason why Leo XIII did not explicate this area is that if societies were not meeting their basic physical
needs, it is hardly possible to speak of meeting more personalistic functions.
This reality is similar to Maslow's hierarchy of needs. If a person does not
have nutrition and shelter, it is useless to speak of one's self-esteem. See also
Porter's chapter on justice where she briefly discusses the relationship between
the inclinations. She states " The more basic such an inclination is, the more
stringent the claims that it generates, over against both the community as a
whole and other members of that community, presumably because one who is
frustrated in pursuing one of the more basic inclinations will have much less,
or no, opportunity to pursue the more distinctively human inclinations" (p.
136).
53 See Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. "Willets (New
York: Farrar, Strauss, and Giroux, 1981), p. 234. The same understanding is
reflected in John Paul II's papal teaching. See his Apostolic Exhortation,
F amiliaris Consortio, no. 32, and the partial collection of his general audiences
on his "theology of the body" published in book form as Reflections on
Humanae Vitae (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1984), pp. 33-34.

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and called to transform the world through work is subordinated
to things or denied basic needs, 54
While Curran does not deny the physical dimensions of moral
teachings outright, his polarization of the physical and the personal prevents an integration that Aquinas's theory of inclinations
demands, Curran's approach stands in marked contrast with the
effort to integrate the physical and the personal evident in both
the sexual and social teachings of the church,

Historical Consciousness/Classicism»
Different Structures, Saine Person
Although Curran will remark in passing that there are differences between personal and social ethics, he nonetheless assumes
that sexual and social ethics should use the same methodology, 55
The focus of both social and sexual ethics in Catholic teaching
concerns two fundamental elements-the structures and the person, Regarding its sexual teachings, the church's primary structural focus is the family with sacramental marriage at its center,
The church has regarded sexual activity as limited to marriage
between a man and a woman through whose union in the conjugal act a family begins, The church understands the family as
a foundational unit of society, with the sacrament of marriage
uniting the family as a set institution throughout time,
On the side of Catholic social ethics, the church's primary
structural focus has been the state, the market, associations,
unions, and productive organizations, Since the Industrial Revolution and Leo XIII's Rerum N ovarum, the church has focused
upon social structures and the ·effects they have on people, Unlike the familial structure, the church has never ordained one
particular social structure as the right one for all times, At times
the church has come close to baptizing one economic structure
over another (corporatism over capitalism or free market over
See Laborem E:rercens, nos, 9 and 12,
Curran, "A Century of Catholic Social Teaching," Theology Today (July
1991) : 169,
54

55

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socialism) , but never as the last word on the issue. The emphasis
of the church in the social sphere has been on the principles on
which structures of different ideologies can rest. 56
The structural concerns of Catholic social and sexual ethics
are different in many ways. The familial structure of the church's
sexual teaching is foundational and consequently unchanging.
Imitating the love of Christ and His church, a man and a woman
unite in the sacrament of God's love. For this reason the church
contends that the family was " from the beginning " and is still
today God's original plan for humanity. 57 In contrast, particular
social structures are not specified in the church's social teaching;
rather, the church condemns or condones socio-economic and political structures from the principles developed in its social tradition. The moral evaluation of social structures is contingent upon
such principles and is provisional. Although there are developments in the understanding of the family in church teachings, they
are minor in nature (reflecting social shifts such as that from
extended to nuclear families) in comparison to developments or
shifts in socio-economic structures (agricultural to industrial to
informational).
With this said, Curran is correct that the
church's social teachings are more historically conscious than its
sexual teachings. However, to have it any other way, the church
would either have to relativize the family or baptize a particular
social structure or system.
The point here is not to separate the family from the socioeconomic concerns of society. On the contrary, the family serves
as the fundamental structure of any society. But it is precisely in
this fundamental role that the family has a more permanent posi56 While Curran is not unaware of these ideas, he draws different conclusions. See his discussion of John C. Murray and the Church/State question
in American Catholic Social Ethics (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame,
1982)' pp. 225-32.
5 1 Thus John Paul II writes that, " polygamy . . . in fact, directly negates
the plan of God which was revealed from the beginning, because it is contrary
to the equal personal dignity of men and women who in matrimony give themselves with a love that is total and therefore unique and exclusive" (Familiaris
Consortia, no. 19. The citation is from The Pope Speaks 27 (1982): 15-16.

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tion than other institutions in society. In other words, the social
area has a flexibility that the sexual area cannot provide, because
to procreate and educate offspring is more fundamental than the
social (although not more excellent), and issues concerning life
and death are even more fundamental and therefore provide even
more permanence. This is not to say that the only role of the
family is to procreate and educate offspring. This was treated
above in discussing the importance of the unitive end of conjugal
love. But to procreate and educate offspring is certainly a fundamental purpose for the family which demands more permanency
in any given situation than social institutions such as the state,
productive organizations, and other intermediary groups.
On the personal level, one can also notice reasons for the different approaches in these two forms of teachings. In the realm
of social ethics, the church
focused on general issues such as
whether the person could participate within the structure and
whether his or her dignity is respected. Thus, while recognizing
a moral dimension to the problem of underdevelopment, for example, the church does not attempt to off er technical solutions to
it. 58 As Pius XI noted, the church's moral authority does not
reside " in technical matters, for which she has neither the equipment nor the mission, but in all those [matters] that have a bearing on moral conduct." 59 While the social teachings of the popes
are ultimately aimed at people, they are also aimed at structures.
An organization is subject to political, economic, social, and technological changes which needs room for development. Because
of the complexity of these variables, the popes have been reluctant
to recommend specific programs, unlike the more determinate nature of sexual and familial teachings. What the church attempts,
as a part of its mission of evangelization, is to exercise a prophetic
role by speaking out on behalf of the person in defense of human
rights and condemning evils and injustices embedded within sos Cf. John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, nos. 34 and 41.
Pius XI, Quadragesimo Anno (1931), no. 41. The citation is from the
N.CW.C. translation (Boston; Dau!:l"hters of St, Paul, n.d.).
5

59

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cial structures as well as facilitating particular projects that promote the dignity of peoples. 60
In regard to the personal component of sexual ethics, the
church is much more specific in proscribing certain acts as morally evil. The primary reason for this difference in tone and specificity has already been alluded to above. That is, the church
sees a fundamental integration of the person with his or her concrete sexual specificity and human nature. Because the church
holds that this nature and its meaning have been revealed by
Christ, the individual person and his or her sexuality also stand
illumined. 61 As the one to whom this revelation is entrusted, the
Church regards herself as an " expert in humanity " and is qualified to speak accordingly. 62
This is not to imply that the social nature of the person is secondary or peripheral to what it means to be a person. Indeed,
John Paul II frequently quotes the teaching of Gaudium et S pes
in this regard: " man, who is the only creature on earth which
God willed for itself, cannot fully find himself except through a
60 See John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socia/is, no. 41. The popes, however,
do not stay away from particular programs altogether. As John XXIII writes:
" It is not enough merely to formulate a social doctrine. It must be translated
into reality" (see John XXIII, Mater et Magistra (1961), no. 224; the citation
is from The Pope Spea.ks 7 (1961): 337). Otherwise, the social doctrine becomes meaningless, and the role of faith is restricted to the realm of one's
private life. This is why, for example, Pius XI, Pius XII, John XXIII and
John Paul II have encouraged proposals such as worker ownership, profit sharing, and worker participation, which they see as logical, although not necessary in all cases, outcomes of the church's social principies. See John Paul II,
Laborem E.rercens, no. 14. For a critique of John Paul's specificity, see James
O'Connell, 527. Many people including Curran have been critical of Pius's
proposal on vocational groups. See Curran, " Changing Anthropological
Bases," pp. 187-88. For a different interpretation of the importance of these
groups, see John Cort, "If Not Communism or Capitalism, What?," New
Oxford Review (September 1990), pp. 18-25 and Jonathan Boswell, Community and the Economy: A Theory of Public Co-operation (New York:
Routledge, 1990) .
61 Cf. Gaudium et Spes, nos. 22 and 29; Ltmien Gentiitm, no. 18; John Paul
II, Redemptor Hominis, no. 8. Perhaps the clearest effort to understand the
person and sexuality in the light of revelation can be found in Pope John
Paul II's " theology of the body" alluded to above which derives especially
from his analysis of the first three chapters of Genesis.
62 Cf. John Paul II, Sollicitudo Rei Socialis, no. 41.

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sincere gift of himself." 63 We are only fulfilled in communion
and community with others. However, as noted above, with the
exception of the sexual community of man and woman in the
family, this social dimension of human nature does not demand
one specific form and the church has seen no reason to impose
one. 64

III. CONCLUSION
This study has sought to examine critically the proposal of
Charles Curran and others that the Catholic church has arbitrarily
applied two differing moral methodologies in its recent sexual
and social teachings. While the point concerning the differing approaches is well taken and undoubtedly correct in certain respects,
the idea that this difference is unjustifiable or arbitrary is open
to question. We have argued that the differences between the
two forms of church teaching are not as great as these thinkers
suppose and that the attempt to portray them as such betrays
questionable presuppos1t10ns concerning moral methodology,
natural law, and personalism. We have also argued that there
are reasons for the difference in tone and specificity between these
two forms of teaching which have not been adequately considered
by those offering this critique. For these reasons, this proposal
is in need of further examination and perhaps revision.

63 Gaudium et Spes, no. 24, Abbott, ed., p. 223. Cf. John Paul II, Apostolic
Letter, Mulieris Dignitatem, no. 7.
64 Another point of critique that can be explored is the observation that the
supposedly radically different worldviews which the historically conscious and
the classicist approaches embody in fact share a number of the same presuppositions in their individualistic and reason-centered orientation toward facts and
information. The markedly " left-brain " approach betrayed by both worldviews shows a definite inability to integrate more holistic, participatory, and
communal forms of knowing yielded by story, symbol, and grace. See the discussion of these matters in David Bohr, Catholic Moral Tradition: In Christ,
a New Creation (Huntington, IN: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1990), pp. 6774. See also Joseph Pieper's distinction between ratio and intellectus in Leisure
as the Basis of C1!fl11re (New York: New American Library, 1952), pp. 26ff.

HOMO FABER RECONSIDERED:
TWO THOMISTIC REFLECTIONS ON WORK
KEITH

A

A. BRECLA w

Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

THOUGH WE APPEAR to be poised at the beginning
of yet another chapter in the accelerating drama of the
industrial revolution-or as some would have it, a postindustrial climax to that revolution-it is far from evident that
homo faber and his distinctive activity have found for themselves
either a philosophy or a philosopher. The work activity may have
become respectable as a philosophical subject only in the nineteenth century, but it has hardly been the object of extended or
systematic inquiry, then or now.
That is well illustrated by Marx and the Marxian legacy.
Marx is arguably to be considered· the preeminent philosopher of
work, having elevated work and the worker to the center of his
activist program. Yet that same orientation to instigating action
leads Marx intentionally to neglect elaborating the philosophical
foundations of his thought. To be counted among the consequences of that neglect is a treatment of the work activity which
appears to be inconsistent, or at best, incomplete.1 One measure
of the inadequacy of Marx's treatment of the subject is to be
found in a significant tendency among some twentieth-century
Marxists or Marxist-inspired thinkers to abandon the centrality
1 On the unresolved tensions in Marx's concept of work, see, for example:
G. A. Cohen, "Marx's Dialectic of Labor," Philosophy and Public Affairs 3
(Spring 1974): 260-261; Peter Fuss, "Theory and Practice in Hegel and
Marx: An Unfinished Dialogue," in Terence Ball, ed., Political Theory and
Praxis: New Perspectives (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press,
1977), pp. 113-114; and R. N. Berki, "On the Nature and Origins of Marx's
Concept of Labor," Political Theory 7 (February 1979) : 35-37.

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of work and the worker altogether. Andre Gorz bids a dramatic
and final " farewell to the working class." Work has become so
de-skilled and fragmented that the Marxian working class has
been decisively replaced by a " non-class of non-workers." Work,
now thoroughly absorbed and shaped by technocratic industry, is
beyond hope of humanization. The radical program he recommends for the " non-class" is to maximize leisure which is already a realizable possibility within the technocratic economy.
With that pronouncement, whatever dignity homo faber may
have possessed is lost as he vanishes into the depths of a selfreproducing technocratic order. 2
In this paper I wish to examine an alternative to Marxism for
approaching work as a subject worthy of philosophical attention.
\Vhile classical and scholastic thought may not appear at first to
be promising grounds on which to consider the topic, the work of
two contemporary Thomists- Jacques Maritain and Joseph
Pieper-offers a significant and unique contribution in this area.
However, I hesitate to say that either of these thinkers has accomplished the construction of a full-scale philosophy of work. 3
In all fairness, that is not the intent of either one of them. At
the same time, what they have accomplished in their reflections
on work in some respects is more extensive and systematic than
the results of speculation by Marxist thinkers. 4
2 Andre Gorz, Farewell to the Working
Class (Boston: South End Press,
1982) . Gorz' s program for labor is built largely on conclusions about the
evolution of capitalism since Marx associated with the thinkers of the Frankfurt School and their contemporary disciples. The notable claim is that the
contribution of technology has come to dwarf labor as a factor of production
to such an extent that Marx's labor theory of value is no longer operative.
This dominant role for technology is also at the root of the deradicalization of
the workers' movement. See Jurgen Habermas, "Technology and Science as
'Ideology',"
in his Toward a Rational Society, trans. Jeremy Shapiro
(Boston: Beacon Press, 1970).
3 M. D. Chenu, in his Theology of W or lo (Chicago: Regenery, 1963), judges
that presently we lack not only a theology, but a philosophy, psychology or
sociology of work as well (p. 5). There is little reason to conclude that the
situation has been altered since Chem1 rendered that judgment.
4 Having said that, I by no means wish to diminish Marx's
own signal
contribution to the subject. Marx is rightfully considered to be the pioneer in

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By no means do Maritain and Pieper speak with one voice.
Indeed, in examining their respective approaches to work, it will
become evident that they have produced, within the boundaries
of a shared tradition, distinctive and even conflicting assessments
of the concept of work and the problems surrounding it. At least
provisionally, I shall argue, it is useful to understand them as
presenting two different models of the work activity. After having presented those models, however, I shall take a closer look
at the nature of the differences between them and make some assessment of the extent to which they may also complement one
another. But at least as important as that examination are the
insights yielded about the nature of the enterprise of philosophizing about work.
1. Work and Leisure
Pieper's assessment of work in the modern age rests upon one
critical assumption: both practically and philosophically, work
has escaped its legitimate boundaries of action and effect. The
nature of those boundaries was clearly perceived by Aristotle and
Aquinas although they could not possibly have foreseen the expansiveness of work in the modern era. Living in this age,
Pieper's self-appointed task is to bring to our attention how far
work has, in fact, penetrated human thought and action, and he
does so by mobilizing standards of judgment which he believes
to inhere in the classical and scholastic traditions. That, however, involves a creative application of those standards in light of
the radically altered circumstances of the modern era. I believe
that as a consequence Pieper also substantially extends the discussion of work and leisure to be found in the classical tradition
and uncovers implications which had long remained latent.
In Aristotle, both work and economic activity generally remained submerged within the precincts of the household. That is
this field, and, as often the case with pioneers, he traverses an enormous territory without always pausing to survey it in detail. For a remarkable appreciation of Marx as a philosopher of labor, and from a thinker hostile to Marxism,
see Eric Voegelin, From Enlightenment to Revolution (Duke University Press,
1975), p. 300.

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to say several things. First of all, economic enterprise had yet
to emerge as an autonomous activity, understood to operate according to its own laws and independently of conventional moral
standards. Secondly, economic autonomy in such terms was virtually inconceivable for Aristotle; given the ends of the household, economics would remain subordinate to those ends and remain, literally, the " art of household management." 5 This is to
underscore the fact that for Aristotle the household is not first an
economic unit but a moral community. Such productive activity
as takes place within it is a matter of necessity, at best a precondition for the moral life. 6
Even the status of the slave as producer is problematic for
Aristotle. The natural slave is one who of necessity requires a
master to complete his own nature; his deficiencies are compensated for by the master who acts as his fiduciary. The moral
community established between them is to their mutual benefit,
being also an occasion for the exercise of justice by both master
and slave. 7 So, although the slave may also be a productive agent
within the household, that function is seen as an incidental one.
Aristotle, somewhat confusingly, amplifies that point when he observes that the one conceivable condition under which the household could dispense with slaves would be " if the shuttle should
weave for itself, and a plectrum should do its own harp-playing." 8
Immediately, however, he qualifies this claim, for as it stands, it
would suggest that the slave is exclusively an instrument of production. In fact, the slave is not primarily a producer at all but
a "servant in the sphere of action," and "[L]ife," as Aristotle
insists, " is action and not production." 9 He is undoubtedly emphasizing here the personal character of that service and the intimacy it engenders between master and servant. And that in5 On the emergence of economics from the household, see Karl Polanyi,
" Aristotle Discovers the Economy " in Karl Polanyi et al., ed., Trade and
Mark et in the Early Empire (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free Press, 1957).
s Aristotle, Politics, 1323b.
7 Aristotle, Politics, 1255b; Ethics, ch. VIII.
8 Aristotle, Politics, 1253b.
9 Aristotle, Politics, 1254a.

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timacy is characteristic of a moral community, not a productive
enterprise.
Limitation and subordination appear to be the key concepts
which apply to work in the Aristotelian household. There is no
intrinsic merit to productive toil, not even for slaves, who happen
to be best suited to it physically and mentally. The substantive
content of work is the provision of use values for the household
and work comprises a concrete set of skills and knowledge directed toward these ends. The art of household management embraces the practical knowledge of horticulture and husbandry,
crafts and tool-making required to direct those activities. Aristotle distinguishes clearly between this art and the art of acquiring property, the chrematistic. 10 The latter is not concerned with
use and disposition of property and wealth for the needs of the
household, but simply with the act of acquiring them. It is true
that the household must make limited use of that art to the extent
that it is not self-sufficient,11 but the requirement of self-sufficiency also defines the legitimate limits of exercising the chrematistic.12
However, when practiced in isolation from the needs of the
household, the art of acquisition knows no natural limitations.
It is precisely in this state that it becomes a perversion.13 Usury
exemplifies the barren nature of unnatural acquisition generally,
with money, having no inherent use value, generating more
money. But trade itself is perverse as its sole aim is to generate
money wealth rather than use values for the household, which
comprise in any event the true content of wealth. 14
Aristotle, Politics, 1256a.
Aristotle, Politics, 1257a.
12 Aristotle, Politics, 1256a. From the manner in which Aristotle presents
his argument, it would be just as plausible, and perhaps less confusing, to include this form of acquisition along with the production of use values. Acquiring those goods calls for a specialist's knowledge of them, as in trading for a
horse. Here the expertise lies not in trading skills per se, but in knowledge of
the excellence which pertains to the object in question. Such knowledge is
only incidental to the trader-for-profit.
1s Aristotle, Politics, 1256b-1257a.
14 Aristotle, Politics, 1257b-1258b.
10

11

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Both work and trade for Aristotle have this much in common:
occupation with them excludes leisure, and leisure embraces the
exercise of the distinctively human activities of politics and
philosophy.15 Leisure is activity at its fullest while even play, in
contrast, is only the necessary period of rest and recreation embedded in the cycle of work rather than a genuine leisure activity.16 The message is clear: to occupy oneself willingly with unleisurely pursuits where the demands of subsistence are satisfied
already is a perversion indeed.
But Aristotle's critique of work and money-making are also to
be distinguished from one another. Part of the perverse character of trade is that it distorts the natural ends toward which
the arts and crafts are directed, subordinating those ends to the
one purpose of money-making. 11 Also, implicit in the attack on
usury and the profits of trade is the' claim that such activities are
not productive of use-values as is work. Unlike trade, then, work
cannot be dismissed as intrinsically harmful to leisure. It, at
least, is a preconditionJfor leisure when properly subordinated to
the needs of the household.
In practice, the problem of work, as distinct from trade, would
appear to have been solved for Aristotle. Work in a slave society was largely confined to the household, freeing those who
were capable of leisurely pursuits. And yet, even in this setting,
Aristotle intimates that work itself can take a perverse form.
Specifically, Aristotle observes that the liberal arts are sometimes
practiced in an unfitting manner that, in effect, brings them within the ambit of work. One can strive with too much concentration and effort in those arts to attain perfection, robbing them of
their liberal character. It is the toilsome and mechanical application of energy that renders such activity work-like. 18 In the serPolitics, 1324b34-1325a23.
Politics, 1337a39-1335b.
17 Aristotle, Politics, 1258a.
18 Aristotle, Politics, 1337b. See, also, Ernest Barker's comments at this
place in his edition of the Politics (New York: Oxford University Press,
1958)' pp. 334-35fn.
15 Aristotle,
16 Aristotle,

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vile arts-which are directed to producing use-values-such effort
is appropriate, but not in the leisure activities. Clearly work cannot be condemned when operating within its proper boundaries;
only when it invades the realm of leisure is it subject to disapproval.
Interestingly, Pieper does not offer the conventional condemnation of materialism and its preoccupation with material consumption. He does not, of course, approve, but I am convinced
that he understands hedonistic materialism to be more a symptom
than a cause. Such a critique could easily follow the lines laid
down in Aristotle's reflections on the chrematistic. Instead,
Pieper appears to me to pick up the critique of work which is
only slightly developed in Aristotle himself. No doubt, Aristotle
could not have imagined that work could have escaped its boundaries on such a massive scale and produced the effects which
Pieper must confront. But, in the process of examining these
effects, Pieper is also led to reflect on the very nature of work
in a way which Aristotle is not.
Pieper would accept that work entails effort and toil and that
it is directed toward the production of utilities or use-values.
Yet, as I read Pieper, that does not get to the essence of work as
it has exposed itself in the modern age. Far more significant is
that work embodies a particular standing to creation, a particular
way of knowing or mode of cognition. Work is_ knowing that
can never be content with itself, but is always broadly instrumental. That includes, prominently, the utilitarian ends of the
work activity but is not confined to them. Man as maker does
seek to know the world's physical properties and laws in order
to alter it, to make it amenable to his needs and desires. The
mode of knowing and reasoning appropriate to those ends is that
of ratio, the scholastic label for the exercise of the discursive or
analytical reason. 19 It is reason linked to understanding causation, to breaking down reality into its constituent parts to render
it transparent to manipulation and artifice. This kind of reason1 9 Josef Pieper, Leisure, the Basis of Culture (New York: New American
Library, 1963), pp. 26-27.

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ing calls for great effort in order to penetrate nature and to make
it less mysterious as well as to reconstitute the new understanding of nature into a comprehensible system of knowledge. Even
where such knowledge stops short of generating world-transformative projects, it is already an instrument of the human mind
which transforms our view of nature. At the very least, nature
becomes an object of mental manipulation.
I would suggest that the very ·essence of work for Pieper is this
mode of perception and all that it entails. Neither physical effort
and effect nor utilitarian motives are enough to explain the
penetrative power of work into areas beyond the production of
use values. This conclusion is buttressed by Pieper's account of
the condition of modern philosophy. For although philosophy is
not strictly utilitarian, and certainly does not call for physical
effort, Pieper is convinced that the work-like mode of activity
has captured even philosophy in the modern era. On this reading, Kant is the philosopher par ezcellence of work, for he understands philosophy itself to be a work-like activity. 2 ° Kant insists
that all knowledge is discursive and can only be won by great
effort. Philosophy itself is held to be genuine only when engaged
in as "'herculean labor.' " 21 The end of that labor is not the
creation of use-values but it is nonetheless a reduction of reality
to categories which make it amenable (or appear to make it so)
to mental manipulation and control.
Proletarianism is the term which for Pieper describes a society dominated by work. Yet, as Pieper insists, it is not the mere
existence of the industrial working class that defines this condition and it cannot be resolved by transforming everyone into a
proletarian. " What then is proletarianism? If the numerous
sociological definitions are reduced to a common denominator, the
result might be expressed in the following terms : the proletarian
is the man who is fettered to the process of work." 22 In this case,
Peiper says that that process "means useful work in the sense
Leisure, pp. 25-27.
Leisure, p. 29.
22 Pieper, Leisure, pp. 49-50.
20 Pieper,
21 Pieper,

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already defined, of contributing to the general need, to the bonum
utile." 28 More accurately, the peculiar process of work that utility calls into play is production guided by the discursive mode of
reasoning. As already indicated, that cognitive process need not
be tied directly to the production of use values in order to be
characterized as work. It is precisely the ability of discursive reason to penetrate activities beyond producing utilities and transform them into work-like activities. The case of the " intellectual
worker "-the scientist, the administrator-is
not in question
here. They, too, are part of the system of production even if
their contribution is not so direct as that of the worker. More
to the point, the paradigmatic case of the process of work escaping
the production of use values is, as we have already seen, the
modern philosopher.
I believe that identifying ratio as work's defining characteristic
apart from the ends to which it is directed-utilitarian or nonutilitarian-is of significance, for it yields in Pieper's work a
two-fold critique of the modern work culture. There are actually
two such cultures or at least two variations of that culture. One
is the overtly totalitarian work society, exemplified by the regimes
of Hitler and Stalin. They do indeed subordinate all activity to
the demands of social utility, turning each member of society into
a functional unit. This social order, however, is almost a caricature of the work culture, and it is obviously dangerous. But
the total work culture can take another more insidious form that
is not accompanied by the impositions of the totalitarian state.
The industrial democracies are themselves ruled by the demands
of work without fully recognizing how totally work and its characteristic mode of cognition monopolizes thought and action in all
occupations and at all social levels, even those beyond the narrowly utilitarian. In these circumstances, Pieper reflects, " it
might be asked whether we are not all of us proletarians and all
of us, consequently, ripe and ready to fall into the hands of some
collective labor State and be at its disposal as functionaries-even
28 Pieper,

Leisure, p. 50.

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A. BRECLA W

though explicitly of the contrary political opinion." 24
Lost to the total work culture is a distinctive way of knowing,
intellectus as opposed to ratio. Intellectus is the kind of knowledge by way of intuition which Kant refused to recognize as
knowledge at all. For Pieper, however, it constitutes knowing
in its purest sense, knowing that is content with itself. Such
knowledge is the product of contemplation. To acknowledge
creation on its own terms-without the desire to alter it or adapt
it to human needs-and to sense its divine provenance brings
one out of mundane reality into the realm of the transcendent
and infinite. From such extra-mundane experiences do human
beings maintain contact with the ground of existence and their
nature as spiritual beings.
Of course, human contemplation can only imperfectly comprehend being. The promise of the afterlife is that the soul will be
able to gaze upon the divine source of creation even as the angels
do. 25 What remains significant in the contemplative act is the
purity of the desire to experience creation simply as it is, and to
do so means putting aside the distractions and busyness of dayto-day existence. Further, Pieper insists that the insight into
the being of creation which is the fruit of contemplation arrives
effortlessly, without the toil which produces mundane accomplishments. The contemplative insight comes unexpectedly and
almost as a gift; like the gift of grace it is incapable of being
produced by the recipient of the gift, and the gift itself is incommensurate with any effort expended by the recipient toward securing it. 26
In one sense, contemplation is simply receptivity or openness
to experience. 21 Yet Pieper also makes clear that it must be more
than that. This introduces a paradox which Pieper does not appear to have resolved. He insists that leisure ought not to be
construed as either passivity or laziness. In fact, such an interLeisure, p. 51.
Leisure, p. 27.
26 Pieper, Leisure, p. 52.
21 Pieper, Leisure, pp. 40-42.

24 Pieper,
25 Pieper,

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589

pretation of leisure is a false understanding imposed by the work
culture itself. From the standpoint of work, leisure can only be
inactivity as rest from work, or idleness. Pieper insists, on the
contrary, that leisure is not to be defined in terms of the cycle
of work. Following Aquinas, Pieper understands leisure, as the
opportunity for contemplation, to be itself an activity :
The provision of an external opportunity for leisure is not enough;
it can only be fruitful if the man himself is capable of leisure and can,
as we say, " occupy his leisure "; or (as the Greeks still more clearly say) skolen agein, " work his leisure " (this usage brings out very
clearly the by no means " leisurely " character of leisure). 28
Perhaps Pieper misses the irony of the Greek phrase; he certainly does not pause to consider its implications for his own position. Elsewhere, and more consistently, he seeks to expunge any
hint of work or effort from the characteristic leisure activities.
Yet Pieper' s efforts in this direction can themselves appear to be
somewhat labored:
the highest form of knowledge comes to man like a gift-the sudden
illumination, a stroke of genius, true 1contemplation; it comes effortlessly and without trouble .... The highest forms of knowledge, on
the other hand, may well be preceded by a great effort of thought,
and perhaps this must be so . . ., but in any case the effort is not
the cause; it is the condition. It is equally true that the effects so
effortlessly produced by love presuppose no doubt an heroic moral
struggle of the will. But the decisive thing is that virtue means the
realization of the good; it may imply a previous moral effort, but it
cannot be equated with moral effort. 29
That effort in the absence of genius or moral greatness cannot
produce inspired results is true enough. But there are plenty of
instances, too, of talent that goes unrealized for lack of effort
and discipline. To say that effort is a mere condition for inspiration is to avoid the real issues : how do effort and inspiration interact and what kind of effort is involved. Since all effort falls
into the undifferentiated category of work for Pieper, it is in2s Pieper, Leisure, pp. 54-55.
29 Pieper,

Leisure, pp. 31-32.

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conceivable to him that it could make any contribution to the activities of leisure. Still, there is the disquieting evidence, which
Pieper cannot entirely ignore, that the great accomplishments in
art and philosophy and moral life do not come without effort.
Ivforeover Pieper himself recognizes that such accomplishments
can in turn inspire contemplation; 30 surely this is evidence that
contemplation is neither entirely self-sufficient nor spontaneous.
This is a problem I will return to later. I introduce it here only
to illustrate the lengths to which Pieper will go, under the inspiration of the classical tradition, in segregating work from
leisure.
2. Another Model: Work and Creation
In her essay, " Why Work?," Dorothy Sayers refuses to accept that work must, of necessity, be drudgery in order to serve
the divine purpose. On the contrary, she draws a nexus between
human work and the act of divine creation: " [work] should be
looked upon ... as a way of life in which the nature of man finds
its proper exercise and delight and so fulfils itself to the glory of
God. That it should, in fact, be thought of as a creative activity
undertaken for the love of the work itself; and that man, made
in God's image, should make things, as God makes them, for the
sake of doing well a thing that is well worth doing." 31 Not only
does Sayers elevate man to the status of creator, but his work is
portrayed in some manner as participation in the original creation
by virtue of that status. As creative activity, work acquires a
new dignity that makes it a proper subject of inquiry in its own
right. Therein lies the distinctiveness of Sayer's position: work
is an autonomoits activity. Human formative capabilities have a
divine provenance but the appropriate standards for judging good
work lie within the nature of the work itself and the demands
which it imposes upon the maker. "No piety in the worker will
compensate for work that is not true to itself; for any work that
Josef Pieper, The Philosophical Act, cited in Pieper, LeisHre, p. 73 .
Dorothy Sayers, "\Nhy Work?," in Creed or Chaos? (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1949), p. 46.
30

.31

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is untrue to its own technique is a living lie." 82 In the matter of
work, attending first to the demands of work is the guarantee
that divine ends will also be served and served well.
Sayer's reflections on work are animated mainly by a concern
with the actual status of work in the industrial world and the
mass consumption society it has spawned. Work in the industrial
society has largely lost its autonomy, being regarded as little more
than a means to make money. The products of the industrial
workplace are ill-designed and shoddily produced precisely because that is the guiding principle. In establishing the linkage of
work and creation, Sayers provides a standard by which the
prevalent modes of work may be judged and judged deficient.
This is at least the basis for establishing a hierarchy of work activities that renders work something other than a homogeneous
category.
These brief reflections hardly amount to a full-scale philosophy
of work but they do expose the two elements that appear to be
essential to the alternative Thomistic work philosophy: the
autonomy of work and the differentiation and valuation of the
various formative activities. Each of those elements is given
more extended treatment by Jacques Maritain and along explicitly
Thomistic lines. And while he does not provide the critique of
industrial work that Sayers does, he develops a philosophical
framework in which such a critique naturally emerges and which
Sayers herself understands to form the basis for her own reflections. 33 Strictly speaking, it is not Maritain's intent to offer a
philosophy of work at all. His philosophical reflections on work
are contained in a philosophy of art and artistic creation. But, as
he also notes, "[t]he sphere of Making is the sphere of Art in
the most universal sense of this word." 34 Artistic making is the
model of work at its fullest.
a2 Sayers,"

Why Work?," p. 57.
herself understands her reflections to be guided by Maritain's
framework; "Why Work?," pp. 61-62.
a4 Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism (South Bend: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1974), p. 12.
33 Sayers

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Consistent with the assertion of the autonomy of making, good
art is not necessarily sacred art for Maritain. The proper ends of
art may be perverted when artistic making is too consciously directed toward glorifying God; in the course of attempting to
off er divine praise, artistic activity may fail as both art and worship. However, by probing the depths of the human creative act,
Maritain looks to discover the sources of its autonomy and the
standards that are appropriate to judging creative activity and
human making generally. By virtue of that exploration, what begins as a philosophy of art becomes, by extension, a sketch for a
philosophy of work.
Maritain draws upon the broad Aristotelian categories to distinguish the kinds of human activity. Art-like morality and
politics-belongs to the practical order of doing and making
rather than the speculative order. In both realms, intelligence is
brought to bear but with a different set of ends in view. Speculative knowledge is knowledge content with itself, knowledge without effect in the material world. 35 In contrast, practical knowledge produces effects in this world; doing consists in the exercise
of freedom and will while making produces a tangible product.
Doing falls into the sphere of morality and is directed toward
the perfection of the will. Making, however, lies outside of the
moral sphere. The rules of making are not those of man-of
moral doing-but those which belong to the object to be made.
Work as an end dictates its own standards which in their turn
guide making. It is, then, intellectual, rather than moral, virtues
which direct the activity of making. Virtues attend to the perfecting of an activity, and because making lies outside the moral
sphere, its attendant virtues are also of a non-moral nature. At
the same time, art does not escape human character. The intellectual virtues are necessary to artistic production : " as a man is,
so are his works." 36 But moral character need not have any diScholasticism, pp. 5, 7.
Scholasticism, p. 12. For an alternative treatment of the relationship between work and the intellectual virtues, see Yves R. Simon, Work,
Society, and Culture, ed. Vukan Kuic (New York: Fordham University
Press, 1971), pp. 167-182.
35 Maritian,
36 Maritain,

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rect effect on artistic virtuosity except where vices such as laziness or indiscipline detract from realizing talent. 37
Maritain does more than establish the autonomy of making.
What moves his speculation closer to a genuine philosophy of
work are the refinements he recognizes within the category of
making itself. While Maritain will recover the distinction between craft and art, the useful arts and the fine arts, 38 the more
fundamental distinction is between creative activity and activity
which represents a perversion or falling short of the creative. In
fact, when artistic making is spoken of as an autonomous activity,
it is meant precisely that it is being performed in the creative
mode. Creativity is the touchstone of making at its fullest and
most complete, at its most god-like. 39
As Maritain has it, to create is first to know the world in a
special way. Maritain begins just here, with the act of cognition,
although perception itself does not fully encompass the activity
of creation. Creative knowing is summarized as an act of creative or poetic intuition. Such intuition, however, is not outside
of the intellect, but constitutes a distinctive form of knowing. It
is knowing-the action of the senses-guided by the intellect and
infused with emotion. All of the human capacities participate in
this act articulated by the illuminating intelligence. 40 Maritain
acknowledges that such connatural knowledge or knowledge by
inclination is unfamiliar to the modern mind. Yet that penetrating intelligence that senses the essence of Being lies at the
core of both practical moral knowledge and mystical experience.
And it may penetrate the realm of making through artistic creation: " Poetic knowledge, as I see it, is a specific kind of knowledge through inclination or connaturality ... which essentially
relates to the creativity of the spirit and tends to express itself
in a work." 41
3 1 Jacques Maritain, Creative Intuition in Art and Poetry (Princeton University Press, 1953), pp. 48-49.
3 8 Maritain, Intuition, pp. 53-64.
39 Maritain, Intuition, pp. 65, 112, 137-138.
40 Maritain, Intuition, pp. 96-97, 118.
4 1 Maritain, Intuition, p. 118. Cf. p. 55.

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Why should the external world become a focus of such intense knowing? It is worth knowing, on Maritain's account, because it is potentially full of meaning for human beings. However, this amounts to more than a claim about the complexity of
man and the world. The merely complex is properly the subject
of analysis, of dissolution into constituent parts, of simplification
or reduction. That much is accomplished by the discursive intellect. Poetic intuition aims at unreconstructed complexity, at
grasping not simply the whole and its parts, but unveiling the
meaning it contains which is beyond analysis. Indeed, such meaning is forever beyond complete grasp. Man and nature possess
for man as observer an amplitude of meaning, meaning that can
never be exhausted. 42 Rather than simplifying reality, poetic intuition is instrumental in uncovering yet deeper layers of meaning
and complexity. 43
Moreover, poetic intuition necessarily brings an encounter in
the realm of practical knowledge; the irttellect makes itself consonant with the object of knowledge. The problem arises when
the object itself has yet to come into existence. Under that condition, knowledge can only be consonant with the appetite which
sparks the creative endeavor; truth amounts to conformity of
knowledge with that appetite. 44 The creative act, then, must come
back to the creator and his nature. That is no less true for the
divine creator himself. Maritain portrays God the creator as the
first poet, the model for the human creator. He cannot work on
matter as a craftsman because matter does not yet exist. He
must turn to his own essence to provide the material of the creative act. But the aim for the divine, as for the human, creator is
not to know himself, but, knowing himself, to create. The poetic
act, then, is intellective but also creative. Such an act can only
express the being of its author. It follows that the works of art
that come closest to the poetic source reveal most clearly the subjectivity of the author. The act of creative intuition fuses self
Maritain, Intuition, pp. 126-127; Scholasticism, p. 44.
Intitition, pp. 140-141.
44 Maritain, Intuition, pp. 46-47.
43 Maritain,

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and object in an unique fashion; the perceiver-creator is wedded
to the object in a way which ceases to be external. Poetic intuition becomes an experience that is at once cognitive and emotional. 45
Why does the natural world have such meaning? Maritain's
answer, in effect, is that it is a reflex of the infinite. 46 Proceeding
from its divine origins what else could it be? The pathos of
human life lies in the fact that it represents the finite striving toward the infinite, and in the finite forms of material reality that
goal must always escape human grasp. Yet within the finite
forms the infinite can be detected although it requires the extraordinary effort of creative perception. The tension induced by
the enormity of the object of perception and the resources which
can be mobilized to perceive it is an unavoidable accompaniment
of creative intuition. All of this may seem far removed from the
concerns of the sphere of making, but Maritain comes to see
poetic intuition and artistic production as indissolubly linked.
Maritain's use of "poetic" and "creative" synonymously with
respect to intuition calls for clarification. Poetic intuition is effectively poetry without words. The poetic impulse is to capture all
of the reality of an object within the perceptive act. Poetry
proper-in word or song-may or may not come as a later result
of that perception. Yet this account can also be misleading insofar as it suggests that poetic intuition can stop short of poetry.
That certainly may at times happen, but on Maritain's account,
the very fullness and amplitude of Being experienced by way of
creative intuition typically spills over the boundaries of individual
consciousness. 47 It positively demands communication to others,
translation into tangible and communicable form. In entering the
realm of expression, however, one is immediately thrust also into
the realm of making, whether so slight as crafting words on
paper or so earthy as molding clay.
Intuition, pp. 121-122.
Intuition, pp. 126-127.
47 Maritain, Intuition, pp. 113-114, i28.
'· 0 Maritain,

46 Maritain,

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The relationship between creative intuition and making also
calls for further explanation" Certainly not all making is creative,
Le., under the inspiration and guidance of creative intuition" But
it would be mistaken to assume that making-even when led by
creative intuition-is just an imperfect attempt to express the
creative insight. That explains why contemplation and creative
in:tuition are to be distinguished from one anotheL 48 The contemplative possesses connatural or intuitive knowledge as experience of the divine and is, moreover, content with that experience.
It is sufficient in itself and does not spark the desire to communicate that experience to others. That desire is not excluded as a
possibility, but does not arise as an essential part of the experience" In the case of creative intuition, though, the relationship
between intuition and expression is of a different charactero
Maritain appears to say that creative intuition-by its naturedemands tangible expression. 49 Because of the fullness of reality
contained in the intuitive experience, it is impossible to contain
that experience within the boundaries of the perceptive act. It
demands a worldly notation, and the experience is not complete
until it attains it. That calls into play a second order of creationbeyond the creative perception-which is the construction of that
notation. And it embraces the problematic we have already encountered: how to suggest within the limitations of materials the
non-material meanings that flow from creative intuition. Note
that much more than a matter of technique is involved here. Indeed, material technique is only a minimal concern at this point.
Even crude technique can serve the expression of poetic intuition,
but no amount of technique, however sophisticated, can substitute
for creative intuition" 50 Great artists can be distinguished from
lesser ones because they unite highly developed technique with
creative insighL
Technique itself, after creative perception and formative effort,
could be thought of as a third order of making and the one which
Int11ition, pp" 113-114"
Intuition, pp. 113-114, 124.
50 Maritain, Scholastidsm,
p. 49.
48 Maritain,

4 9 :Maritain 0

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is purely instrumental. But even technique receives a definitive
inflection from creative intuition. For if the artist begins only
with technique he may never move beyond it. 51 Maritain is entirely consistent in praising the modern age because it has freed
the artist from slavish acceptance of prevailing techniques, although that freedom has sometimes been abused and degenerated
into a fascination with mere novelty in technique. 52 When, however, technique is hitched to poetic intuition, it becomes something that the artist is also discovering or remaking : there are
rules of making, but the rules themselves are subject to creative
construction. 53 When art permeates making, man as poet and
man as maker are both present, and the line between them becomes artificial :
Art must never forget its origins. Man is homo faber and homo
poeta together. But in the historical evolution of mankind the homo
faber carries on his shoulders the homo poeta. Thus I shall point,
first of all, to the art of the craftsman; and, secondarily, compare the
universe of the art of those for whom . . . we reserve the name of
artists. 5 "'
Making is a highly differentiated activity and .one whose complexity Maritain makes some effort to examine. His exploration
reveals a hierarchical ordering of activities under the category
of making which finally can generate an evaluation of work and
working. Art is the highest form of making and the model of all
making. Artistic making has as its object the representation of
beauty and the meaning that lies within it. That is the realm of
the fine arts: making for the sake of beauty. In contrast, the
crafts or useful arts make in beauty as well, but the beauty is secondary to the concern of utility. 55 At the margin, however, it
may be difficult to distinguish the two ; much of human artifice
Scholasticism, p. 49.
Intuition, p. 131.
53 Maritain, Scholasticism, pp. 38-39; Intuition, pp. 56, 64. Maritain claims
that it can even be true of craft and technique in Intuition, pp. 53-54.
54 Maritain, Intuition, p. 45.
s 5 Maritain,
pp. 59-60.
51 Maritain,

52 Maritain,

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may be of great beauty even apart from the intention of its
creators. 56
On reflection, however, Maritain goes even further, concluding eventually that the traditional distinction between the fine
arts and the crafts itself requires significant revision. A more
meaningful distinction, says Maritain, is to be drawn between
what he terms the free or self-sufficient arts and the subservient
arts, a distinction which transcends that based upon distinguishing producing for utility from producing for beauty. Beauty can
be engendered in architecture as in poetry. What makes an art
self-sufficient is the degree of freedom it has in pursuing beauty,
whether or not there are also utilitarian ends involved. Architecture can approach the freedom of poetry in this respect when
it is free to produce work for the good of the work itself. " I
would say that the good of the work, which is the aim of every
art, depends more, in certain arts, on its relations to the needs
of human life, and on the fact of the work being good for something else; and that, in certain arts, the good of the work succeeds more in being a good in itself and for itself. . . . When
the good of the work reaches such self-interiority, the art involved is not subservient but free, as is the case with architecture
and still more with painting and sculpture, ... and still more in
music and poetry." 57
3. The Two Problems of Work

I am convinced that how to conceive of work as a philosophical
problem has long been obscured by the entanglement of that
Maritain, Scholasticism, n. 40; Intuition, pp. 61-62.
Intuition, p. 175. For different reasons, Hannah Arendt transcends the distinction between art and craft in her concept of work Work,
on her definition, is the activity which produces the durable world of cultural
artifacts which provides the setting for, and sustains, human action; d. The
Human Condition (University of Chicago Press, 1958), pp. 168-174. Labor,
in contrast, produces the narrowly utilitarian goods and consumables which
are drawn into the metabolic cycle and the labor activity itself reflects this
cycle in its toilsome repetitiveness (pp. 93-96). However, this distinction allows her to recognize, as does Maritain, the complexity and diversity of the
making activities.
56

5 7 Maritain,

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problem with the social problem of work or labor. Historically,
the conflation of the two is not difficult to account for; that work
could even be of philosophical interest hardly occurred until the
condition of the working class or classes became a matter of public attention. The social problem resolved itself early on into that
of the proletariat and its future. That is the case not only for
Marxism but for Catholic social philosophy as well. 58 The philosophical task facing Pieper and Maritain is to separate out the
two issues, but, after having done so, to show nonetheless how
they are related to one another. Maritain, I shall argue, goes
furthest in treating work independently, and this apart from the
claim of autonomy. Yet Pieper sees clearly as well that a philosophical treatment of work has to establish its independence from
the condition of workers or the working class. That is most
evident in Pieper's evolving analysis of the proletariat's situation.
In an early formulation, Pieper finds the antidote to the condition of the proletariat to lie in " deproletarianization." Drawing
upon the encyclical Quadragesimo Anno, he favors a corporatist
reconstruction of society that would allow workers to escape the
dependence and degradation associated with wage
Small
property ownership is a foundation for both the security and
dignity of the worker. That independence would also put an end
to the class conflict that revolves around the content of the wage
contract. By the time of Leisure, however, Pieper's understanding of the proletariat has been transformed. In fact, it is no
longer, properly speaking, the problem of the proletariat with
which he is occupied. Or, to put it another way, the problem of
proletarianization is now seen by Pieper to encompass more than
the social class called the proletariat. As we have already seen,
it is the content of the work activity itself, and its penetration to
58 For the most extensive treatment of the social problem of labor within
Catholic social thought, see Goetz A. Briefs, The Proletariat (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1937).
59 Josef Pieper, Thesen Zur Sozialen Politilc (Frankfurt/Main,
1947). This
work first appeared in Germany in 1933, and as Pieper notes in his introduction, was quickly banned.

600

KEITH

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all kinds of work regardless of social class, that defines the problem of work for Pieper. His continued employment of the term
"proletarianization"
may, therefore, be somewhat misleading.
While wage labor may characterize the work at many levels in
society, intellectual workers and managers, as he notes, may be
well-paid and otherwise removed from the exigencies facing the
industrial proletariat. It is the manner in which they work, rather
than any common material condition associated with the way they
work, which allows for this classification.
Pieper could only arrive at this conclusion by pursuing the
essence of the work activity apart from the social condition of
workers. Granting work an independent treatment does not,
however, amount to support for the claim of autonomy of work
as Maritain or Sayers conceives it. As in the classical treatment
of work, Pieper remains no less convinced that work must remain
subordinate to ends outside of it-the production of subsistence
goods-but that does not prevent him from examining the intrinsic content of work apart from its ends. By having a grasp
of that content, Pieper can assess the consequences of the work
activity escaping the boundaries set by its legitimate ends. Indeed, as I have shown, only on accepting a particular content of
work is it possible for Pieper to account for the penetration of
work-like activity into philosophy and art. Granting work independent treatment, then, by no means need be identical with
acknowledging the claim of autonomy.
What Pieper has accomplished is to show how the philosophical
problem might produce social consequences which are profound
in their effect but far from obvious. The traditional social problem remains, but is now presented as being a reflection of a more
fundamental philosophical ailment. In the event, it itself would
appear to be a consequence of the total domination of work; perhaps in a society where work approaches duty (or, as in the
totalitarian states, where it has become a legal duty), it is more
difficult to focus attention on what must appear as mere sideefiects of the work activity, seen itself as a form of necessity.
And the situation is compounded by the vulnerable dependency of
wage labor.

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I am not accusing Pieper of bad faith or somehow abandoning
the industrial worker. His concern with their basic physical
needs as well as spiritual well-being is manifest. However, it becomes apparent that the philosophical analysis goes some way
towards disarming practical efforts regardless of Pieper's intent.
As I hope to make clear, that is not a defect that follows from
focusing on the philosophical problem of work, but rather the
specific content of Pieper's analysis. Pieper can conceive of work
as no more than utilitarian in purpose and, consequently, seeks to
narrow the sphere of utility and contract the work activity to
match it. But that poses a dilemma for those who work (no matter how work is socially distributed), for however much actual
work time is reduced, work itself always remains tied to the
utilitarian. Moreover, the discursive mode of reason which accompanies work always threatens to penetrate beyond it. Pieper
is himself aware of the consequence and expands upon them at
some length. The reduction of work time within the work culture does not provide a spiritual opening at all. Instead, it generates a false leisure which mirrors the work activity itself. 60
The alternative, for Pieper, is to restore the ground for true
leisure. At the mass level that means a spiritually based festivity
that is genuine punctuation to the rhythm of work, offering a
period of escape from the mundane. 61 At the personal level, the
experiences of love and intimacy may provide the " existential
shock" that disrupts the day-to-day pattern of existence. 62 And
to those who are so gifted, artistic creativity and contemplation
feed on the insight and inspiration that arrive, as it were, effortlessly.
Given Pieper's measure of the work culture, it is not likely
that such occasions will present themselves frequently or spontaneously. That lends an air of pessimism to Leisure which may
be at odds with Pieper's deep conviction that humans are spiritual
60

Pieper, Leisure, pp. 38-41.

61

I osef Pieper, In Tune With The World (New York: Franciscan Herald

Press, 1973), chs. I-IV.
62 Pieper, Philosophical Act, p. 73.

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beings to their core. In short, his hopefulness is difficult to sustain in the face of his analysis of the situation. In earlier reflections, when he yet construed the problem of the proletariat in
narrow social terms, Pieper could be both more dearsighted and
optimistic about a solution and its prospects for implementation.
The program he derived from Quadragesimo Anno was simple
and direct, and could be summarized in two mutually supporting
principles : the deproletarianization ( Entproletarisierung) of the
proletariat and the establishment of an occupational-corporatist
order ( berufstandische Ordnung). The former was the first step
in a two stage process ; the :first order of business was to free the
workers from the insecurity and dependency that accompany
wage-labor by appropriate social legislation. Yet the condition of
the proletariat could not be fully resolved until its position as an
antagonist in a class struggle was eliminated. The corporatist
order was to be the completion of the process of deproletarianization. Workers and employers were to be united in interest and
welfare through economic organizations defined by their economic
function, a function which cut across dass lines. 63
By the time of Leisure, Pieper concludes that a political solution-as he labels his earlier approach-was not wholly adequate,
and that he, like others of his generation, " expected too much in
general from unadulterated politics." 64 One can only conclude
that this observation is made in light of the philosophical analysis
of labor and its detachment from the social problem. He does not,
however, wholly abandon faith in the earlier solution, although
it will have to be adjusted to take account of the expanded problem of proletarianism, now no longer confined to the industrial
working class but present there, nonetheless, in its most acute
and manifest form. Now there may clearly be multiple manifestations, or proximate causes, acting alone or in concert, of this condition: " lack of property, State compulsion, or inner impoverishment." Absent, apparently, is hope that a corporatist reconstruction can be effected. In the event, in these altered circumstances,
e3

Pieper, Thesen, passim.
Leisure, p. 67, n. 5.

64 Pieper,

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603

' deproletarianization ' would mean " enlarging the scope of life
beyond the confines of merely useful servile work, and widening
the sphere of servile work to the advantage of the liberal arts;
and this process, once again, can only be carried out by combining three things : by giving the wage-earner the opportunity to
save and acquire property, by limiting the power of the state, and
by overcoming the inner impoverishment of the individual." 65
The component of the revised program which appears to be
utterly novel is " widening the sphere of servile work to the advantage of the liberal arts." Not only is it novel; there is no
precedent for it in anything Pieper has said thus far. Indeed his
meaning is only clarified in another of his works : " The counterpart [of servile work] is not inactivity or nonwork, but free activity, ars liberalis: work that does not have a purpose outside of
itself, that is meaningful in itself, and for that very reason is
neither useful in the strict sense, nor servile or serviceable." 66
There are a number of problems that suggest themselves. In
Leisure, too, Pieper notes the classical Greek formulation that
leisure is not simply respite but itself must be " worked." Yet
Pieper's conception of work-tied as it is to a particular mode
of cognition-is also portrayed as
inimical to the liberal
arts. As we have seen, it is not the presence or absence of utilitarian ends which alone distinguishes the liberal from the servile
arts, although Pieper sometimes confusingly reverts to that
formulation. It is, rather, the mode in which they are conducted;
the very homogeneity of work renders it harmful to the liberal
arts. It is inconceivable, then, that the sphere of the liberal arts
could overlap to any extent with the sphere of work.
The point is underlined by Pieper's treatment of creative activity. We know that he goes out of his way to segregate effort
and the exercise of analytical reason from the fruits of creative
insight; that insight is not produced by any amount of effort,
but arrives when the artist or philosopher or mystic has freed
himself from toil and become receptive to experience. Although
0 5 Pieper, Leisure, p. 51.
ss Pieper, In Tune, p. 7.

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he must admit that artistry and philosophy entail practical activity, he does all that he can to minimize the contribution of
practical effort to the artistic process or philosophical act.
Certainly a work of art has no utilitarian end, and certainly it is not
a means to accomplish something else. But may we not ascribe its
power to the fact that the process which takes place in the artist takes
place also in his audience-who in seeing, hearing, absorbing the
work are kindled to contemplation of Creation? 67
This is, mistakenly I believe, to conflate the experience of the
artist with that of the audience. No doubt, the artist can step
back and observe his own work as an audience of one. But he is
also the creator of that work, and the process of creation is inaccessible to those who simply behold the finished product, or
even to an audience who were to watch the artist paint. The
artist does not only " see " ; he attempts to distill some of that
vision into communicable form. And to whom do we bestow
the greatest honors-to museum-goers and connoisseurs or to
creators? In short, Pieper could not possibly hope to move servile
work toward the practice of the liberal arts, given his own understanding of work. For on that understanding, work excludes
contemplation, and the essence of the liberal arts is contemplation.
And his portrayal of any creative activity consistently excludes
work and effort.
Why then does Pieper even suggest expanding the scope of the
servile arts? Surely it betrays an uneasiness with his understanding of work and the work culture. If they cannot be transformed
because of their intrinsic nature, it is also the case that work can
never be eliminated. Even if it is contained, then, to proportions
which satisfy Pieper, that does not discount the possibility-perhaps strong probability-that the imperatives of the work culture
will reassert themselves. After all, they are always there, latent,
in the very nature of the work activity. Pieper himself claims to
be living in an age when just that has happened in both the
totalitarian and democratic states. By defining work as he does,
67

Josef Pieper, Happiness and Contemplation

p. 96.

(N cw York: Pantheon, 1958),

TWO THOMISTIC

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605

Pieper leaves no prospect for resolving the condition which has
become endemic. At best, he can hope for a slight remission but
no cure.
Beyond that, there is the positive danger that by denigrating
work it loses all prospect of carrying spiritual significance.
Pieper, recall, grants a narrow dignity to work; it serves contemplation by freeing time for it but it bears no intrinsic value,
and no one who is without need to support himself is obligated
to work. If work is irredeemable there is no prospect for transforming the work culture from within or hoping that it will
evolve naturally in a more promising direction.
Maritain supplies at least the prospect of escaping these
dangers. He does so by constructing the scaffolding upon which
Pieper's proposed expansion of the servile arts could more
plausibly rest. The main support of that structure is Maritain's
conception of making. As we know, it is far from the homogeneous activity which Pieper makes work out to be. Making
casts a wider net for Maritain, containing within it making activities of a qualitatively different character which range from the
toilsome and degrading to the creative. Pieper simply will not
admit that such differences exist. Maritain is able to discern
those differences because he is also willing to treat contemplation
itself as divided into two types. 68 As a consequence, Maritain
does not perceive the deep and unbridgeable gulf which Pieper
sees between work and contemplation.
Artistic making and kinds of work or crafting interpenetrate
with contemplation of the natural world. On Maritain's account,
poetic insight demands material expression and, moreover, participates actively in various orders of creation which accompany
the formative activity. And all involves considerable effort. As
Maritain insists, the true artist, operating under the guidance of
poetic insight, discovers that sustaining creativity calls for ever
greater effort. Whatever the satisfactions that accompany crea68 Pieper momentarily admits the distinction, only to find that it does not
hold up under examination. See Happiness, pp. 76-82.

606

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tive work, they must be won by taking on an ever greater burden.
But such effort is also of a different character from toil which is
merely mechanical and wearying. That, however, Pieper seems
unwilling to admit. It is evident in his summary of philosophy
in the "philosophical act "-the moment of insight-rather than
the exploration and elaboration of that initial germ. That making and contemplation are moments of the same process is something Pieper is unwilling to grant, but it is the basis of the
dignity and stature which Maritain accords to human making.
Yet if Pieper desires to enhance the status of servile work-work
serving utilitarian ends-it can only be by moving closer to
Maritain's position in this respect. But that also entails abandoning the conventional distinction between the servile and liberal
arts, a distinction which Maritain has already superseded.
Note that establishing the dignity of work in principle does not
amount to the claim that all human making actually has this
status. Rather, Maritain has set up a standard for judging the
multiplicity of formative, productive activities. In doing so, he
can be-and is-no less critical of work in industrial society than
Pieper himself :
Artistic work is ... the properly 'human work, in contradistinction to
the work of a beast or the work of a machine. . . . When work becomes inhuman or subhuman, because its artistic charaicter is effaced
and matter gains the upper hand over man, it is natural that civilization tend toward communism and to a productivism forgetful of the
true ends of the human being (and which in the end will therefore
jeopardize production itself) .69
On this account, it is not work that is a corrupting cultural influence, but work itself which has been corrupted. When work is
not all that it could be, severe social consequences follow. The
questions Maritain leaves unanswered concern the extent to
which work in the industrial setting must follow this pattern and
whether it is amenable to change. There is no evidence that he
favors a return to craft production or that he would consider it
possible. In passing, he observes that something of poetic in69

Maritain, Scholastirism, p. 15411.

TWO THOMISTIC

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607

tuition may be involved in occupations as varied as those of the
businessman, scientist, and general, but provides no elaboration. 70

4. Conclusions
Pieper, in his brief essay, manages to sketch the outline of a
work philosophy. It is admirable in its attempt to link what is,
in effect, an ontology of work, an assessment of work and its
culture, and a program of reform. But it amounts to no more
than a sketch, and its defects are all too apparent. It is a project
that is flawed from the outset; the analysis of the nature of work
on which that project rests does justice to the complexity and
variety neither of the productive activity nor of creative endeavor. It is just here that Maritain is most convincing because he takes work seriously as a philosophical subject. Yet his
treatment of work does not extend much beyond exploring its
ontology, rooted in the creative act. What he accomplishes in
that respect is, I believe, considerable and suggestive. But because he stopped short, aside from the few intimations we have
noted, of bringing this impressive beginning to bear upon the
actual condition of work and the social problem, he cannot be
said to have fulfilled the project of a philosophy of work as
Pieper outlines it. Had he attempted to do so, it might well have
led him to consider further the status of the autonomy of work
in the industrial world, the psychology of the worker, and the
effect of work on human development. As it is, there is the implication that work, while formally outside the sphere of doingof moral activity-nonetheless carries a certain moral weight
and spiritual significance beyond the narrow utilitarian dignity
which Pieper grants to it. In that light, the question of how far
work may satisfy the standards of autonomy in practice becomes
imperative.

70 Maritain, Intuition, p. 237.
See also, Jacques Maritain, "Concerning
Poetic Knowledge," in Morris Philipson, ed., Aesthetics Today (New York:
World Publishing Company, 1961), p. 249.

ULTIMATE END AND COMMON GOOD
GREGORY

I

FROELICH

University of Alaska
Anchorage, Alaska

N HUMAN ACTION what is last in execution is first in
intention. For just this reason Thomas Aquinas begins the
secunda jmrs of the Summa Theologiae with a consideration
of man's ultimate end. It is the end and the end alone that renders
intelligible all those choices and activities that human life comprises. " Finis enim <lat speciem in moralibus " (ST 2-2, 43.3;
see 1-2, 1.3, 18.6). Both the intellect in its practical activity and
the will in its inclination share the same starting point. " The
point of departure," Thomas says, "in the activity of rational
appetite is the ultimate end" (ST 1-2, 1.5). And: "The first
principle in human deeds-the subject matter of practical reason
-is the ultimate end" (ST 1-2, 90.2); accordingly, "what first
falls into the apprehension of practical reason is the good" (ST
1-2, 94.2). Clarity on this point must be had at the outset of
moral discourse (whether philosophical or theological) to ensure success and avoid disastrous confusion. Hence Thomas devotes the first questions of the secunda pars to a consideration of
the ultimate end. Only then does he proceed to consider human
actions in themselves and their intrinsic and extrinsic principles.
In this paper I wish to consider a specific feature of Thomas's
discussion of extrinsic principles. For beginning with question
90 of the prima secundae, the first question in the so-called
Treatise on Law, an explicit consideration of the ultimate end
arises once again but with a precision that is, I think, sometimes
misunderstood within the Thomistic tradition.
Thomas's discussion of the definition of law in ST 1-2, 90
takes its cue from the familiar sense of the term, that is, human

609

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GREGORY

l'ROELICH

positive law. This is perhaps most obvious in the second article
where Thomas argues that aU law (eternal, divine, natural, and
human) is ordered to the common good. As the rational rule
and measure of all human action, so the argument goes, law must
first take into consideration the ultimate end; but since human
perfection at every level is achieved only in society (human and
divine), the ultimate end is in fact nothing other than the common good. In an effort to confirm this Thomas refers to the fifth
book of the Nicomachean Ethics where Aristotle speaks of legal
justice as procuring and preserving the happiness of a political
community. He then reminds us that in the Politics Aristotle calls
the perfect community the city ( civitas). Strange references for
a theologian, unless we realize that Thomas is not restricting his
discussion here to divine law and in fact is focussing on its better
known secular counterpart in order to shed light on divine and
other forms of law. When Thomas identifies the ultimate end
with the common good, therefore, he has chiefly in mind the
human ultimate end attainable in this life and the political common good, that is, political community.
This identification is precisely what a Thomist such as Henry
Veatch denies. 1 As he sees it, the common good or political community is considered good just so far as it is an expedient means
to the welfare and happiness of each and every individual citizen.
It is not a good worth choosing for its own sake, let alone an
ultimate end.
[T]he common good of any social whole is never an ultimate end or
end in itself; instead, any such common good needs to be conceived
as a social system or social organization or social order designed and
disposed so as to make various of the goods of life available to the
individuals who make up the community.2
Rather than an ultimate end, the common good, rightly conceived,
can be only an intermediate end, or a means to the perfection or wellbeing of each and all members of the community.3
i Henry Veatch, Human Rights: Fact or Fancy? (Baton Rouge, 1985), pp.
124-134.
2 Ibid., p. 127.
3 Ibid., p. 129.

ULTIMATE

END AND COMMON

GOOD

611

Veatch's own description of the common good resembles the bona
communia that Thomas refers to in his discussion of distributive
justice (ST 2-2, 61.1) which treats such goods as money, honors,
water, land (natural resources in general) and " anything else
in the class of exterior goods ". The sum of these, according to
Veatch, together with the roles, offices, responsibilities, and " institutional arrangements " 4 that ensure their maintenance and
usefulness, is the common good.
For Thomas, this is indeed a common and indispensable good,
but nevertheless a common good on the level of utility and not
choiceworthy in itself. For it falls within an order toward an
even more indispensable common good-a good that is in the class
of bonum honestum, as Jacques Maritain argued repeatedly 5a good that is noble, choiceworthy for its own sake, and perfective
of the human agent. Thomas identifies this more perfect common
good as the life of political community itself, for as a member of
this communion of persons, just as within a friendship, the individual finds an essential element of his or her flourishing. In
other words, for Thomas (and Aristotle), political community is
a basic human good (ST 1-2, 94.2). In fact, insofar as it is perfect, the life of the community contains all other natural human
goods and for this reason can be considered an ultimate end
(though, of course, not the absolute ultimate end).
It is of interest to note that while Veatch denies that the political common good could possibly have the character of an ultimate end, he nonetheless argues that " the love and association of
others" 6 is an integral part of an individual's flourishing. But
is not political community a form of love and association, of
philia, amicitia, or friendship? Aristotle, Thomas, and Maritain
thought so and for that reason considered the city to be an intrinsic good and an ultimate end. Veatch not only neglects this
4 Ibid., p. 122.
"Jacques Maritain, The Person and the Common Good (Notre Dame, 1966),
p. 53; The Range of Reason (New York, 1952), p. 142; Man and the State
(Chicago, 1963) , p. 149.
6 Veatch, Human Ri'.ghts, p. 129.

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FROELICH

constant and evident teaching of the tradition he claims his own,
but he also (perhaps unwittingly) contradicts it. His confusion
on this point, I suggest, stems both from his attempt to reconcile
two fundamentally disparate political schools (Aristotle's and
Locke's) and from his failure to distinguish objective beatitude
(finis cuius) and formal beatitude (finis quo, see ST 1-2, 1.8).
Without this distinction, all common goods (e.g., truth, offspring, friendship, creation, God) are quickly reduced to " intermediate ends " or means ordered to the individual's incommunicable state of well-being. With this distinction in hand, however, one can avoid such a dilemma and adopt the scholastic tag,
" Amo deum mihi, sed non propter me." I love God (and other
intrinsically choiceworthy common goods) for myself, but not for
my sake.
John Finnis's interpretation of the common good in Natural
Law and Natural Rights 1 surpasses Veatch's in clarity and fidelity to the tradition but, it seems to me, is not completely immune
from criticism. In fact, his working definition of the common
good seems strikingly similar to that of Veatch :
A set of conditions which enables the members of a community to
attain for themselves reasonable objectives, or to realize reasonably
for themselves the value(s), for the sake of which they have reason
to collaborate with each other (positively and/ or negatively) in a
community.8
The resemblance lies in the claim that the common good is 1 )
extrinsic to the " values " of individuals, and 2) a means, as
conditions are means, to those "values". I say " seems similar,"
however, because of other remarks Finnis makes in Natural Law
and Natural Rights that run counter to such an interpretation.
For example, he also calls the common good a " value" and " objective", the" flourishing of all members of the community" and
the "object of all justice." 9 In this last sense, the common good
7 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights
(Oxford, 1984), pp.
160.
s Ibid., p. 155.
9 Ibid., pp. 154, 174, 168, 194; cf. pp. 303, 372.

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END AND COMMON

GOOD

613

" is not to be confused with the common stock, or the common
enterprises, that are among the means of realizing the common
good." 1 ° Finnis advances a threefold division of the common
good:
1) the seven basic values (life, knowledge, play, aesthetic experience,
friendship, religion, and freedom in practical reasonableness) taken
together;
2) each basic value taken separately; and
3) a set of conditions, which is the definition "commonly [but, note
well, by no means exclusively] intended throughout this book." 11
Although Finnis does not state explicitly whether an order exists
within this division, his argument suggests that the third is
ordered to bringing about the first and second. 12
Thomas himself admits that "common good" is used in a
variety of ways, but never exactly in the ways Finnis mentions. 13
Among Finnis's seven basic values or goods, Thomas would
admit only one that is truly common in the way a good is properly common, that is, as a common end or goal (" communitate
causae finalis," ST 1-2, 90.2, ad 2). That good is friendship. 14
Life, knowledge, and the others, since realized (or instantiated)
in the individual as such, are common only in definition ("communitate generis vel speciei "). Although we both may be knowing one and the same truth, my act of knowing is not yours.
Knowledge in general, as something predicably common, enjoys
logical existence only. But a common end or goal must exist as
some one particular and real thing, for since actions toward an
1 0 Ibid., p. 168.
11 Ibid., p. 155. See aiso Germain Grisez, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago, 1983), pp. 272-273.
1 2 Finnis, Natural Law and N ativral Rights, p. 156.
13 See G. Froelich, "The Equivocal Status of bommi commune," The New
S cholasticism (Winter 1989), pp. 38-57.
1 4 So far as play can be considered a good common in the way of a final cause,
it is a type of friendship. Religion might also be considered a good common
in causality, if by "religion" we mean to signify the object of religion (finis
rnius), in which case " religion " does not mean an interior state of the soul
but the union of man to God, and therefore is also reduced to the good of
friendship.

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GREGORY FROELICH

end belong to the realm of individual reality, so too must the end.
We have here two types of being-in-common that are opposed
with respect to existence. Hence knowledge taken as predicably
common cannot serve as a common goal. It is helpful to recall
that Aristotle in J?ook 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics reluctantly
takes Plato to task precisely on this point.
Friendship, on the other hand, is in its very particularity as
common to the friends as the room they may be sharing. By
friendship here I do not simply mean benevolence, for that is an
interior and therefore incommunicable state of the soul ; benevolence can be common only in predication. Rather I am referring to the fulfillment of mutual benevolence in cooperative
action and a common life, which Aristotle argues is the most
distinctive mark of friendship (Nicomachean Ethics, 1157b6-24,
1171b33). Each of the typical actions that friends do together
(e.g., eating, drinking, working, playing, exercising, conversing)
is so united in any one friendship as to be a single though complex action and not just a single kind of action. Even sworn
enemies can be said to act together by merely existing and going
about their work in the same place. But the kind of unity in the
actions of friends must be greater than a unity of predication
only. A philosophical discussion among friends, for example, involves two or more interlocutors engaged by a particular topic.
If it is a true discussion then there is a true unity, and not a
mere passage of words, as when two or more simply ventilate
their thoughts. This is like a pile, having no real unity. But a
discussion involves an order: give-and-take, response, objection,
comment-a coordination of speech in a common pursuit of a
particular question. Therefore, like any other order, a discussion
is something really one (realis unio, ST 1-2, 28.1) and yet common to all the participants. The same holds true for the other
activities in which friends typically share. Each is a complex
activity whereby one friend coordinates his actions with those
of the other.
Now when Aristotle and Thomas argue that shared activity is
the proper act of a habit of mutual benevolence, they are saying

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END AND COMMON

GOOD

615

not only that this kind of collaboration must arise from a settled
state of the soul, but more importantly that it is the perfection
and fulfillment of that state. The act of a habit is much more the
cause of the habit than the habit is a cause of it. For the act, or
more precisely, the good execution of the act, is a cause in the
sense of that for the sake of which. It is the ultimate reason why
the habit exists in the first place. In the case of friendship, leading a good and pleasant life in common is the final cause of the
mutual benevolence between friends. Thus Thomas describes
convivere as the most choiceworthy part of friendship: " eligibilissimum in amicitia" (In IX Ethicorum, lect. 14). At least
then in the case of friendship, living together, that is, community,
is an ultimate reason for action.
But since friendship is based upon a variety of goods, in fact
upon the entire range of goods, can it be the ultimate goal of the
pursuit of those goods? Obviously, in friendships based upon
utility, like business partnerships, the common action is sought
only as a means. But in friendships based upon pleasure or upon
excellence (areten, Eudemian Ethics 1236a32) or "the good"
(agathon, Nicomachean Ethics 1155b20), which is equivalent I
think to "basic human good," the common action is sought as the
perfect mode of participating in the good. It therefore has the
character of an ultimate reason for action.
Take, for example, the good of human life. Marriage is a community of human action in which that good is more perfectly
realized by and for each member precisely as a part of the community. Indeed, marriage receives its particular character as
friendship from its ordination to the propagation and, more importantly, to the education (moral and intellectual) of individual
human lives. But as members of this community, the married
couple not only prolong their own lives through the perpetuity
(in principle) of the line of their descendants but, moreover, they
enrich the good in themselves by causing the form of the species
in others. For whatever good one has from nature is held, as it
were, in lease, and thus should, and indeed, could, find no determination in oneself. "Nature's bequest gives nothing, but doth

616

GREGORY FROELICH

lend; /And, being frank, she lends to those are free " (Shakespeare, Sonnet 4). The good of human existence is no doubt
one such good that Dante's Virgil had in mind when he says
" For the more there are who say ' ours,' /so much the more
good does each possess, /and the more love burns in that cloister"
(Purgatorio, Canto 15, 11.55-57). By the inclination set in the
human person, nature directs the couple to propagate the species
and so participate in a good greater than any natural good that
belongs exclusively to either of them.15 The natural apprehension of this good is in fact one of the first laws of nature, a form
of obligation that St. Thomas calls the duty of nature ( officium
naturae, Summa Contra Gen:.tiles IV.78). Such is the duty to
increase and multiply, which the Author of nature has implanted
in every living thing, but principally in humans, wishing them
not merely to continue the species but, even more, to fill up the
number of the elect (ST 1, 98.1). Thus the community of marriage is one mode of fulfilling the good of human life.
In general, I am arguing that the full realization of the basic
human goods, those self-evident goods, for example, that Thomas
lists in ST 1-2, 94.2 (life, the union of male and female, children,
truth, etc.), depends upon their incorporation in communities of
action. All law, including natural law, directs action to the common good, which according to Thomas primarily means friendship.
One of these goods, however, seems to pose an insurmountable difficulty to my interpretation, namely, the good of truth.
How does friendship fulfill one's pursuit and possession of truth?
Does the common good of friendship rank first even among contemplatives (taking this term broadly) ? At first blush it seems
not, for, as Thomas himself says, progress in the contemplation
15 See Finnis's
argument in "Natural Law and Unnatural Acts", The
Heythrop Journal 11/4 (1970), pp. 365-387, that the couple are "to find
their mutually fulfilling communion and friendship not in an inexplicably exclusive cultivation of each other, but in a common pursuit, the pursuit of a
good that de facto cannot be adequately realized otherwise than by a singleminded devotion to that good, by the only two people who can be the mother
and the father of that child" (p. 383).

ULTIMATE

END AND COMMON GOOD

617

of wisdom depends largely on how much one is cut off from
others (In De Hebdomadibus, prologue). And ·even though it
seems highly unlikely that there can be progress without teachers
and a tradition, nevertheless such a community of action is merely useful. In the end, truth and its personal acquisition by the
contemplative constitute the ultimate reason for action. Is not a
sign of this radical separation of the contemplative from society
found in the longstanding custom among most people to disparage
those devoted to the philosophical life? Even the great Socrates
did not escape this rather common scourge. Aristophanes depicts him in The Clouds as a social misfit who contemplates such
things as the sun and how far a flea can hop. On the other hand,
there have been those who, while extolling the life devoted to
wisdom, claim that a fundamental disproportion and even an inevitable hostility exist between philosophy and the city.16
In striking contrast to this, Thomas insists that the contemplative adds to the beauty and health of the community. 17 Indeed, during the Middle Ages, Christian, Jewish, Moslem, and
Oriental cultures not only tolerated contemplatives but even respected and supported them. They were seen as embodying the
peak of human excellence and not as mere accretions that were
generally useless for the community. It could in fact be said that
their value to the community consisted precisely in their uselessness. For the flourishing of human nature consists primarily (although not exclusively) in the perfection of what is best in human
nature, namely, intellect. And the perfection of intellect consists
primarily in knowledge of things better than human nature,
which man cannot change or shape to his own purposes and hence
are essentially useless. This quest for perfection, moreover, is not
the domain of a chosen few. The contemplative and the ordinary
person immersed in the business of the world both share the same
desire of knowledge for its own sake and the same sort of de16 A notable and recent example is Leo Strauss in, for example, " On a
Forgotten Kind of Writing," in What is Political Philosophy? (Chicago,
1988).
17 ST 2-2, 152.2, adl; IV Sent., d.26, q.1, a.2; Contra Gentiles III, 131-136;
In X Ethic., lect. 11.

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GREGORY

FROELICH

light in learning. Humans are curious by nature. Even the simple desire to go and gaze upon the Sequoias because they are the
largest living things on earth discloses this natural bent of the
mind. The great delight universally taken in skillfully crafted
peripeteia is also, as Aristotle argues in the Poetics, a sign that
to learn something is a pleasure in itself In sum, contemplation
is nothing other than the resolute attempt to do well that which
we can scarcely help doing at all if we are human.
No matter how solitary, therefore, a contemplative' s life remains an essential and integral part of human society. 18 While
contemplation is the pinnacle of human excellence, it is not its
totality. Indeed, since a single individual could never fulfill every
human potential (physical, moral, artistic, and intellectual), nor
even a small portion of one human potential (Mozart, for example, did not even begin to exhaust the possibilities of the
sonata), the contemplative necessarily finds himself or herself
united in the human endeavor to overcome the limitations inherent in the individual. That endeavor is human community.
"Human communities are the highest attainments of nature, for
they are virtually unlimited with regard to diversity of perfection, and virtually immortal." 19 They are unlimited with regard
to diversity because they are the union of many variously talented
men and women. They are virtually immortal because they are
continuously open to all who can participate in the manifold
human activities they comprise. Thus, even in the solitary activity
18 The same holds true on the supernatural
level. See Instruction on the
contemplative life and on the enclosure of nuns ( V mite seorsuni), from the
Sacred Congregation for Religious, 15 August 1969, section 3: "From Scripture, moreover, it is evident that it was in the desert or in a mountain solitude
that God revealed hidden truths to man .... There in fact are places in which
heaven and earth seem to merge, where the world, in virtue of Christ's presence, rises from its condition of arid earth and becomes paradise anew .... How
then can contemplatives be considered alien to mankind, if in them mankind
achieves its fulfillment? This, in a word, is the prayer which is like an apex
toward which converges the universal activity of the Church. In this way
contemplative religious, bearing witness to the intimate life of the Church, are
indispensable to the fullness of its presence."
1 9 Yves Simon, A General Theory of Authority
(Notre Dame, 1962), p. 29.

ULTIMATE

END AND COMMON

GOOD

619

of the contemplative, the common good of friendship ranks first,
so much so that if its existence is threatened the contemplative is
obligated to come to its defense. For much more compelling than
the debt owed to the community for the opportunity for leisure
is the goodness of the community itself.
In conclusion, if friendship as a common good best fits the description of an ultimate reason for human action, then it is precisely what law respects above all. And so it should not come
as a surprise to find Aristotle insisting that the principal intent
of human law is to produce friendship among the people (Nicomachean Ethics, 1155a25). Thomas adds that even divine law has
friendship chiefly in view-the friendship, of course, between man
and God (ST 1-2, 99.2).
Yves Simon once warned that "an inquiry into the common
good must involve constant awareness that its object may, at any
time, be displaced by deadly counterfeit". 2 ° For it is a highly
equivocal term. But equivocity does not always preclude one of
the many senses from ranking first. I have tried to indicate the
status of the common good in an authentic Thomistic moral
theory: the common good is ultimate end. In this view, an individual citizen chooses to participate in the common good of his
community as an integral component of his flourishing and not
as a mere means. Fortunately, this is not a uniquely Thomistic
view. The authors, for example, of Habits of the Heart (New
York, 1985; see also The Good Society, New York, 1991) seem
to accept it, and in fact have argued that everybody seems in one
way or another to assent to it, even though the prevailing language at the moment is that of individualism. For, as I noted,
even natural law, the set of first and immediate principles of
practical reason present to everyone, has as its principal object
the common good.

20

Ibid., p. 27.

AQUINAS AS A COMMENTATOR
DE ANIMA 3.5
JAMES

D

ON

T. H. MARTIN

St. John's University
Jamaica, New York

OES ST. THOMAS AQUINAS in his commentary
on De Anima 3.5 provide an acceptable gloss on Aristotle's cryptic remarks about active mind? That is, can
one accept .that what Aquinas says about active mind is what
Aristotle meant but for some reason did not say? Many modern
commentators, among them Franz Brentano, Marcel de Corte,
Paul Siwek, and Francisco Peccorino, appear to think so and
present an interpretation of active mind which agrees substantially with what Aquinas says in his Sententia Libri De Anima
(Sent.). 1
P.M. edita
i Senteiitia Libri De Anima, opera omnia iussu Leonis XIII
(Paris: Vrin, for the Leonine Commission, 1984). While he does criticize St.
Thomas Aquinas for some statements which " seem to betray a certain lack of
clarity concerning the nature of active intellect,'' Franz Brentano awards the
first place among earlier commentators on Aristotle's doctrine of active mind
to Aquinas : " Indeed, I am not sure whether I should not say that he correctly grasped Aristotle's entire doctrine" (The Psychology of Aristotle: In
Particular His Doctrine of Active Intellect, ed. and trans. Rolf George
[Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977], p. 155). De Corte holds that
the originality of his study consists entirely in combining " all the technical
means refined by modern criticism and which the thirteenth century did not
have at its disposition " with the " Thomist interpretation of the Aristotelian
theory of intelligence," an interpretation with which de Corte agrees, and which
he presents as a necessary correction of the errors of modern commentators,
who are "more or less instilled with an unconscious Averroism which radically
vitiates their power of understanding" (La doctrine de l'intelligence chez Aristote [Paris: Vrin, 1934], p. 2). Siwek notes that "many of St. Thomas's
explanations of Aristotelian psychology are altogether consonant with our own
explanations,'' and warns his readers against undervaluing Aquinas's views
(Aristotelis Tractatus de Anima Graece et Latine, editit, versione latina auxit,
commentario illustravit [Rome: Desclee & C.i, 1965], p. 30). Peccorini com-

621

622

JAMES

T. H. MARTIN

Aristotle's text is concerned with two minds, "a mind which is
such as matter by becoming all things, and another which is such
as an active principle by making all things" ( 430a14-15). What
are these minds, and what do they do? The central elements of
Aquinas's exegesis of De Anima 3.5 consist in his answers to
these questions. He holds that these two minds are " parts or
potencies of the soul " (Sent. 3.4. 126). The role of passive mind,
the "mind which is such as matter," is to apprehend the intelligible object (Sent. 3.4. 101-2), while that of active mind, the
mind " which is such as an active principle by making all things,"
is to abstract the intelligibles (Sent. 3.4. 103-4), a role which
he explains in this way:
Active mind makes those things intelligible in act which previously
were intelligible in potency. It does this by abstracting them from
matter, for in this way they are intelligible in act, as has been said.
Aristotle was led to posit an active mind to exclude the opinion of
Plato, who held that the natures of sensible things are separated from
matter and actually intelligible. Thus for Plato it was not necessary
to posit an active mind. But because Aristotle holds that the natures
of sensible things are in matter and not actually intelligible, it was
necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter and so make them actually intelligible. (Sent. 3.4 50-63)
Active mind on Aquinas's reading makes the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually intelligible, and in this
way these sensible things become objects of thought. If one accepts this role for active mind, one is forced to accept as well, I
think, that active mind is part of the soul rather than something
separate from the knowing human subject. Aquinas argues this
point at length in his commentary on De Anima 3.5. If thinking, the action of the passive mind, is in fact an operation perments on De Anima 3.5 by glossing it with excerpts from Aquinas's commentary and expresses the greatest confidence in the Angelic Doctor's interpretation: "Aquinas's understanding, of course, can be relied upon" ("Aristotle's Agent Intellect: Myth or Literal Account,'' The Thomist 40 [October
1976] : 505-34). All of these modern commentators agree with Thomas Aquinas
that the active mind is something in the human soul, and the above remarks
show that this agreement is hardly accidental; each is aware of his agreement
with Aquinas and has been influenced by him to an important extent.

AQU!NAS

AS A COMMENTATOR

623

formed by the human knower, the human knower must have what
is necessary for him to perform that operation, or, as Aquinas
puts it, there must be" in man himself the principles by which he
can execute his operation, which is the act of understanding,
which, indeed, he could not accomplish except through the passive
mind and the active mind. Thus the perfection of human nature
requires that both of them be something in man" (Sent. 3.4. 95100). Given the role that Aquinas assigns to active mind, to
make the active mind something outside the human knower
would imply that man did not have what he needed in order to
perform an activity that is natural to him; accordingly, he would
be naturally imperfect (Sent. 3.4. 93-94). The falsity of this
conclusion indicates that active mind, like passive mind, must be
" something in man."
The focus of our attention, accordingly, should be the correctness of Aquinas's position that active mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form. One cannot justify this interpretation by pointing to Aristotle's text. There is in Aristotle's text
the simile of light to describe active mind: " There is a mind
which is ... such as an active principle by making all things, like
a kind of disposition, as light is; for in a way light makes potential colors, colors in actuality" (de An. 3.5. 430a14-17). Aquinas
interprets this simile as referring to an activity of abstraction performed by active mind; as light makes potential colors actual
colors, so active mind makes " those things intelligible in act
which previously were intelligible in potency by abstracting them
from matter" (Sent. 3.4. 51-52). But Aristotle says nothing
about an act of abstraction being required for all human intellectual cognition, either in the De Anima or anywhere else.

An Aristotelian-Sounding

Argument

Aquinas, however, has more than the simile of light to justify
his interpretation. In his explanation of abstraction quoted above,
he provides an argument whose necessary conclusion is that there
must be something that separates the forms of sensible things
from matter so that human thinking can take place; such is the

624

JAMES T. H. MARTIN

role which Aquinas assigns to the active mind ( intellectus agens).
And, as has been shown, if there is an active mind in this sense,
it must be a part of the human soul.
Aquinas's argument for an active mind which performs the
work of abstraction is the following:
1. Intelligibility requires separation from matter ("for in this
way they are intelligible in act").
2. The forms of sensible things are not themselves separate from
matter, but rather are " in matter and not actually intelligible."
Therefore,
3. The cognition of sensible things requires that there be something that makes the forms of sensible things actually intelligible,
i.e., fit to specify an act of intellectual cognition ("it was necessary that he posit a certain intellect to abstract them from matter
and so make them actually intelligible ").
The conclusion of this argument is certainly not found in Aristotle. Nevertheless, those who accept Aquinas's interpretation as
correct take the conclusion to indicate what Aristotle meant but
did not say. One reason for this is that the premises of the argument that Aquinas presents for active mind sound Aristotelian.
Are both these premises not only Aristotelian-sounding but
actually found in Aristotle? If they are, there is at least a probable argument in support of the conclusion that active mind is for
Aristotle a faculty of the human soul that abstracts the intelligible
from the sensible form.
That intelligibility requires separation from matter is clearly
indicated by Aristotle's answer in De Anima 3.4 to the following
aporia about the intelligibility of mind:
Is the mind not itself an object of thought? For either everything
else will have mind in it, if it is not in virtue of something else that
mind is intelligible and if what is intelligible is one in form, or mind
will have something mixed with it which makes it, as well as other
things, intelligible. ( 42%26-29)
If being an object of thought means the same thing in the case
of mind and other things (" if what is intelligible is one in

AQUINAS

AS A COMMENTATOR

625

form "), mind, as intelligible, should possess whatever it is that
makes other things objects of thought. Either mind will possess
nothing outside itself and be intelligible in virtue of itself, in
which case " everything else will have mind in it "; or mind will
possess something other than itself-" something mixed with it"
-and this will be what makes both it and other things intelligible.
The first possibility is absurd, for if everything is intelligible
through the actual possession of mind, even stones will possess
mind by the fact that they are intelligible. And the second possibility-that there is something mixed with mind-is incompatible with the simplicity which Aristotle attributes to mind in
De Anima 3.4: " It must, then, since it thinks all things, be unmixed, as Anaxagoras says, in order that it may rule, that is, in
order that it may know" (429al8-20).
Since mind is "unmixed" (amige) (429a18), there is nothing "mixed with it"
( memigmenon) ( 492b28).
Here is Aristotle's answer to this aporia:
And it is itself an object of thought, just as its objects are. For, in
the case of those things which have no matter, that which thinks and
that which is thought are the same; for speculative knowledge and
that which is known in that way are the same. The reason why
thinking is not always taking place we must consider. In those things
which have matter each of the objects of thought is present potentially. Hence, they will not have mind in them (for mind is a potentiality for being such things without the matter), while it will have
what can be thought in it. ( 430a2-9)
To be known is to be separated from matter ("mind is a potentiality for being such things without the matter "). Whatever
is an object of mind is separated from matter in the mind of the
knower. Thus, it is not the stone that is in the mind of the
knower, but its form (de An. 3.8. 431b29-432al). 2 Here, then,
2 Immateriality
is a requirement even of sensible cognition. Thus, in the tradition of the Greek commentators, Aristotle's statement that "sense is receptive of the forms of sensible things without the matter" (de An. 2.12. 424a1719) came to be understood to mean that sense receives the forms of sensible
things immaterially, i.e., in a way that, in so far as sensation is an awareness,
is not constituted by a physical change (although it might involve a physical

626

JAMES

T. H. MARTIN

Aristotle argues that intelligibility requires separation from matter. The first premise of Aquinas's argument for an active mind
that performs the work of abstraction is, accordingly, in Aristotle's De Aninia in the lines immediately preceding 3.5.
Aquinas explicitly attributes his second premise to Aristotle:
" Aristotle holds that the natures of sensible things are in matter
and not actually intelligible." The reference Aquinas makes to
Aristotle's differences with Plato in this same passage might suggest that the Aristotelian text Thomas has in mind is Metaphysics
Alpha where the Stagirite criticizes the doctrine of the Forms,
arguing that the form which gives a thing its intelligibility and
existence as a definite kind of thing cannot be something outside
the thing itself (Metaph. 1.9. 991a8-b9). Metaphysics Alpha,
however, does not hold that forms which are in matter are thereby
" not actually intelligible," nor does Aquinas in his commentary
on Metaphysics Alpha find this point in Aristotle. One could defend it as genuinely Aristotelian by arguing that, if intelligibility
requires separation from matter and the forms of sensible things
are not separate from matter, there must be something that separates them. But let us examine this argument for this second
premise, which presents it as the conclusion of the first premise
and the position of Metaphysics Alpha that the forms of sensible
things are not separate from matter:

1. Intelligibility requires separation from matter.
4. The forms of sensible things are not separate from matter.
Therefore,
2. The forms of sensible things are not themselves separate from
matter, but rather are " in matter and not actually intelligible."
The flaw in this argument is that the sense of "separation
from matter " in ( 1) does not agree with the sense of " separate
change) or a physical being. See Joseph Owens, " Aristotelian Soul As Cognitive of Sensibles, Intelligibles and Self," in Aristotle: The Collected Papers
of Joseph Owens, ed. John R. Catan (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New
York Press, 1981), pp. 81-98.

AQUINAS

AS A COMMENTATOR

627

from matter " in the phrase " not separate from matter " in ( 4) .
The requirement of cognition in ( 1) is not that the forms of
sensible things must be encountered outside those things. This
absurd interpretation of ( 1) is required, however, if the notion
of separation in ( 1) is the same as that in ( 4), since ( 4), if its
sense is determined by what Aristotle says in Metaphysics Alpha,
means that the form that gives sensible things their existence and
intelligibility is not anything apart from the sensible things (i.e.,
the form in question cannot be a Platonic Form, which is separate). Reading this sense of separation into ( 1) makes this first
premise hold that something separate, such as a Platonic Form, is
necessary for intelligibility. Clearly, then, different notions of
separation are implied in ( 1) and ( 4), and this equivocation in
the sense of separation makes the argument invalid. Therefore,
since the second premise is neither in Aristotle nor defensible by
an argument that would read the text from Metaphysics Alpha
in the light of the first premise, Thomas's Aristotelian-sounding
argument is not a plausible basis for accepting his interpretation
of De Anima 3.5 as correct.

0 ther Difficulties
Other reasons to question the correctness of Aquinas's interpretation of De Anima 3.5 are provided by the fact that important
elements in Aquinas's interpretation are simply not found in Aristotle, while others strain the sense of De Ani11ia 3.5. As already
mentioned, for example, there is in Aristotle no doctrine of abstraction such as Aquinas attributes to him in holding that the
Stagirite's active mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible
form. The philosopher uses aphairesis (" abstraction ") only to
refer to the operation of the mind in which, in considering mathematical objects, it disregards everything but the quantity of these
objects. Accordingly, abstraction is limited to the mathematicals
and there seems to be no textual basis for holding that it is necessary for thinking generally. 3
3 On the sense of "abstraction"
( aphairesis) in Aristotle, see Joseph Owens,
The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 3d ed. (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1978), pp. 381-85.

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JAMES T. H. MARTIN

Secondly, there is in the De Anima no distinction between
sensible and intelligible forms. Aquinas's position that the active
mind abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form implies that
there is a form which is fit to specify an act of sensation (the
sensible and intelligible forms. Aquinas's position that the active
lection (the intelligible form). If Aquinas's interpretation of De
Anima 3.5 is correct, one might expect Aristotle to talk about
these two forms in the De Anima. In De Anima 2.12 Aristotle
says that sense is "what has the power of r:eceiving into itself
the sensible forms of things [ton aistheton eidon] without the matter" (424a17-19; trans. Smith [the old Oxford]), and in De
3.8 he says that" the objects of thought are in the sensible
forms " (en tois eidesi tois aisthetois) ( 432a4-5; trans. Smith).
The sensible forms that Aristotle considers in these texts are
sensible because they are the forms of things apprehended, at
least originally, through sensation. As the second text suggests,
these forms remain sensible in this sense even when we think the
things of which they are the forms. Neither text indicates that
for Aristotle a sensible form must be made intelligible before
thinking can occur, and in the De Anima Aristotle does not call
a form intelligible.
Thirdly, if Aquinas is correct, twice in De Anima 3.5 Aristotle uses " mind " of what does not think. First, Aristotle calls
the " active principle " of human thinking a mind, although it
does not think but only prepares the way for human thinking.
If, however, Aristotle's "active principle" is not a mind, why
does he call it a mind? Brentano, who agrees with Aquinas on
this point, tries to defend this use of the term "mind." He argues
that it is the " deficiency of language " that makes Aristotle refer
to the principle of thinking as nous, even though it does no actual thinking. 4 Similarly, he maintains, Aristotle sometimes uses
nous to refer to the faculty of desire. Since desire follows on
thinking, this use of nous, in which the word refers to the consequence of thought, is not very different from the use of nous
to refer to the principle of thought. 5
4 Franz

Brentano, The Ps3•chology of Aristotle, p. 114.

5 Ibid.,

p. 113.

AQUINAS

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While it is certainly true that Aristotle often finds it useful to
exploit the equivocity of key philosophical terms, Brentano's case
is not convincing, since all he does is point to a possible equivocal
use of nous. The possibility, moreover, seems remote when we
consider that Aristotle can apply nous to the faculty of desire not
only because desire is an effect of mind, but, more importantly,
because the faculty of desire is materially identical to mind (de
An. 3.9. 432b3-7). In calling what desires 'nous,' therefore,
Aristotle is applying the term to mind itself. Brentano, accordingly, fails to find an instance in which nous is applied to something which does not think.
The second instance, according to Thomas, where Aristotle
uses "mind" of what does not think occurs at 430a24-25 where
Aristotle says that "passive mind is destructible." Not wanting
to hold that the thinking part of the soul is destructible, Thomas
holds that "passive mind" refers to the part of the soul which is
the subject of "passions ... such as love, hate, and remembering,
and of such things as take place together with some bodily affection" (Sent. 3.4. 233-35). But here, too, the interpretation requires that one accept that Aristotle is using " mind " to refer to
something which does not think. Thomas says, "This part of the
soul is called mind just as it is called rational in the first book of
the Ethics in so far as to a certain extent it participates reason,
obeying it and following its motion" (Sent. 3.4. 239-42). Nevertheless, while one can accept calling rational what is not mind
but does have some relation to it,_ one cannot easily accept calling
a mind what is not essentially a mind but only has some relation
to it.
Fourthly, Aquinas's view that at 430a19 Aristotle stops discussing active mind and takes up the consideration of what he
calls " the intellect in act " is open to question. In the second
part of De Anima 3.5, Aristotle says, " It is not the case that it
sometimes thinks and sometimes does not" ( 430a22). Most
commentators hold that the subject of "thinks " and " does not"
is active mind. The trouble for Aquinas is that, if these words
are understood of active mind, they imply that it is engaged in
an eternal act of thinking. But such an eternal act of thinking

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T. H. MARTIN

is incompatible with Aquinas's position that active mind is a
faculty of the human soul, a faculty which itself does not think
and whose only connection with thinking is that it facilitates
human thinking, which of course is intermittent. 6 Aquinas meets
this objection by arguing that Aristotle is not talking about active mind here but rather about "the intellect in act, which consists in the very act of understanding " (qui consistit in ipso intelligere) (Sent. 3.4. 196-97). The act of understanding, of
courne, is as such always actual. The difficulty with Aquinas's
interpretation of these words is that there is no indication that
Aristotle has stopped discussing active mind and has taken up a
new topic. 7
Aristotle's Essentially Actual Min:d
The most serious objection to Aquinas's position, however, is
based on Aristotle's description of active mind:
And mind in this sense is separate, unaffected, and unmixed, being
essentially an actuality. For the active principle is always more
honorable than the passive, and the principle than the matter (De
An. 3. 5. 430a17-19).
6 Strictly speaking, the human active mind does have for Aquinas a connection with an eternal act of thinking, since it is a participation in a separate
agent intellect (S.T. I, q. 79, a. 4 c.), but this participation does not endow the
human active mind with any thinking, far less with any eternal act of thinking.
7 Siwek provides interesting
evidence of the appropriateness of taking the
words in question of active mind. Although he agrees with Aquinas that active mind is a faculty of the human soul, he does not avoid the problem as
Aquinas does by taking these words as applying to something other than active mind; rather he follows a manuscript reading which omits the ovx in the
phrase aAA' ovx or€ µ,€v vo<i or€ o' ov voei. This gives " it is the case that it
sometimes thinks and sometimes does not," instead of " it is not the case that
it sometimes thinks and sometimes does not." In Siwek's altered version the
human knower can be taken as the referent for the pronoun subject of "thinks"
and "does not," as Siwek's interpretation requires. In omitting the otlx, however, he seems to be influenced by his assumption that active mind is part of
the human soul. At least, his argument that the omission of ovx produces a
more coherent text seems not to have any force unless one accepts this assumption. Not accepting it, one would retain °'ix, following the reading of 48 of
the 65 codices used by Siwek in his edition of the De Anima and that of the
commentators Alexander of Aphrodisias (Peri nou, in De Anima Liber Cum
Mantissa, ed. Ivo Bruns [Berlin: Reimer, 1887], pp. 109, 27-28) and Themistius
(fo Libras De Anima Paraphrasis, ed. Ricardus Heinze [Berlin: Reimer
1899]' pp. 99, 34-36).

AQUINAS

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The most important element in the description of active mind
is its " being essentially an actuality" ( Tfj ova-ii/: wv evf.pyaa)
(430al8). 8 The mind considered in De Anima 3.4 is not essentially an actuality. It is in actuality when it has received the form
of the object of thought, but in itself this mind is " in actuality
no existing thing before it thinks " ( 429a24). In itself this mind
is a potentiality.
The above passage asserts that active mind is separate, unaffected, and unmixed, qualities which were attributed to passive
mind in De Anima 3.4. The participial phrase "being essentially
an actuality " gives the reason that active mind possesses these
qualities, and indicates that it possesses them in a way that is
superior to the way in which passive mind possesses them: " For
the active principle is always more honorable than the passive,
and the principle than the matter."
If we consider what " separate, unaffected, and unmixed "
must mean in the case of active mind, we must be guided by indications in the Metaphysics, which considers both the question of
actuality and the case of the unmoved mover of Metaphysics
Lambda, which is also described as essentially an actuality
(Metaph. 12.6. 1071b19-20). The guiding principle and justification of the application of Metaphysics Lambda to De Anima 3.5
is that, since the unmoved mover of the Metaphysics and the active mind of the De Anima are both essentially actualities, the
meaning of " separate, unaffected, and unmixed " as applied to active mind must agree with what these terms mean when predicated of the unmoved mover. The unmoved mover, in fact, is
described as separate ( M etaph. 12.7. 1073a3-5) and unaffected
(1073a11-12), and, although it is not described as unmixed, in
De Anima 3.4 'simple' is used as a synonym for unmixed, and
8 Siwek notes that ivlP"feUJ, is the reading in only 12 of the 65 manuscripts
he consulted; nevertheless, he prefers it on the grounds that, according to Priscian, Theophrastus read €vop"feia ( Tractatus, n. 670 [p. 332]). The reading
found in the majority of the manuscripts, &veP"felq,, would give "being essentially
in actuality " instead of " being essentially an actuality." Since what is essentially in actuality must be essentially an actuality, there does not seem to be
any important doctrinal difference here.

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JAMES T. H. MARTIN

the unmoved mover is described as simple ( M etaph. 1072a3034). 9 Reading De Anima 3.5, then, in the light of the Metaphysics, one must conclude that, as essentially an actuality, active mind is separate in the sense of not depending on matter for
its existence in the way that the form of an enmattered thing depends on matter; unaffected in the sense of not needing anything
outside itself for its operation in the way that the human mind
depends on its object; and unmixed in the sense of being a pure
form which exists without any admixture of potency.
A reader of Thomas's Sententia may suspect that this interpretation of Aristotle's text is precisely the one which he criticizes
most vigorously in his commentary. Thomas holds that if active
mind is a separate substance different from passive mind (substantiam separatam et quod diff ert secundum substantiam ab intellectu possibili) (Sent. 3.4. 90-92), the human knower is not
properly equipped for knowing, since he would lack something
necessary for knowing. But, as noted in the consideration of this
argument above, it assumes that the role of active mind is to
make the potentially intelligible forms of sensible things actually
intelligible. If this is the role of active mind, a knower who did
not possess an active mind would not be able to abstract intelligibles. Although he considers the point at length elsewhere, in
the Sententia Thomas either takes it for granted that it is the
knower that abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form or
alludes to a proof of this proposition based on the perfection of
human nature. 10 But in any case, since for Thomas we abstract
9 The first aporia about mind in De Anima 3.4 implies that the mind has
already been shown to be "simple and unaffected," and to have "nothing in
common with anything else " ( 42%23-24), but what we find in his investigation of the attributes of mind is that Aristotle proved it to be " unmixed "
(3.4. 429a18), "unaffected" (429a15) and to "have no nature other than this,
that it is potential" ( 429a21-22). These two lists of attributes correspond if
one identifies simple and unmixed, on the one hand, and having nothing in
common with anything else and being a pure potentiality, on the other.
10 In the Sententia Thomas says simply that "the perfection of human nature requires that both of these [active and passive mind] be something in
man " ( 98-100). A possible argument for this point in the Quaestiones Disputatae De Anima is that besides the universal active causes of human thinking that are " the divine power and the powers of other secondary substances,

AQUINAS

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the intelligible from the sensible form, the active mind which does
the abstraction must be part of us (Sent. 3.4. 105-6). Obviously
however, if the active mind of De Anima 3.5 is not something
which abstracts an intelligible from a sensible form, but rather a
divine mind which is an ultimate source of the actuality of human
thinking just as the unmoved mover of Metaphysics Lambda is
the ultimate source of actuality in the universe generally,
Aquinas's argument certainly does not establish that the perfection of human nature requires that active mind in this sense be
part of the soul of the human knower.
The interpretation of active mind presented here is not arbitrary. Rather, it is the reading required by the fact that Aristotle
says that active mind is essentially an actuality, and, as pointed
out above, attributes to it an act of uninterrupted thinking, which
would be impossible for anything that depended on matter for
its existence or activity. And, if this reading of active mind is
correct, Aquinas's reading cannot be right. For Aquinas active
mind is a power of the human soul (Sent. 3.4. 122-27), which
is the form of the body (Sent. 2.1. 216-223). Thus, as part of
the soul, active mind for Aquinas has a necessary connection with
matter that is incompatible with its being essentially an actuality.
if they have any influence on us," there must be particular active causes, i.e.,
something in particular !mowers that brings about the intelligible form. In
the case of certain imperfect animals, such as those that come about through
putrifaction, one does find instances of production that owe nothing to particular active causes ; it is the celestial bodies that are the sole active causes
of what comes about in such a way. " But for the generation of perfect animals
there is also needed, besides the celestial power, the particular power which
is in the semen. Therefore, since what is most perfect among inferior corporeal
things is the intellectual operation, besides the universal active causes which
are the power of God's illumination or the illumination of any other separate
substance, there must be a proper active principle in us through which we make
the intelligibles in act, and this is active mind" ( q. 5, resp.; see also, De
Spiritualibus Creaturis, art. 10, resp.). Perhaps, however, Thomas does not
intend this as a proof, since in the same place he says, " But we experience
(ezperimur) both of these operations [that of the passive mind and that of
the active mind] in ourselves, for we receive intelligibles and abstract them."
If Thomas thinks that the operation of the active mind is experienced as an
activity of the knower, there is clearly no need to prove that it is an activity
of the knower.

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JAMES T. H. MARTIN

Furthermore, it can hardly be unaffected in Aristotle's sense if it
has to receive a sensible form before it can perform its proper operation of turning sensible forms into intelligible forms.
What does Aquinas make of Aristotle's calling active mind
essentially an actuality, the element in the text of De Antima 3.5
which provides grounds for the most serious objection to his interpretation? In his commentary Aquinas says that active mind
is " in act according to its substance " (in actu secundum suam
substantiam) (Sent. 3.4. 71) and explains this sense of being in
act by saying that active mind "is compared to an act in respect
to the intelligibles in so far as it is a certain immaterial active
power able to make other things like unto itself, viz., immaterial.
... An active power of this sort is a certain participation of the
intellectual light from the separate substances" (Sent. 3.4. 15558, 162-64). These remarks do not indicate that Aquinas appreciates the full import of " being essentially an actuality." In
the Summa Theologiae, on the other hand, Thomas seems to be
fully aware of the meaning of " being essentially an actuality,"
and explicitly denies that active mind can be essentially an actuality in Aristotle's sense.11
In considering whether the angel's act of understanding can
be the substance of the angel, Thomas raises the following objection:
It would seem that the angel's act of understanding is his substance.
For the angel is both higher and simpler than the active intellect
[intellectus agens] of a soul. But the substance of the agent intellect
[inte.Uectus agentis] is its own action, as is evident from Aristotle
and from his Commentator. Therefore much more is the angel's substance his action, that is, his act of understanding. (S.T. I, q. 54,
a.l, obj. 1; trans. Pegis) 12
11 The justification for clarifying what Thomas says in the Sententia in the
light of what he says in the Summa Theologiae is that the Sententia was composed simultaneously with at least part of the Summa Theologiae, according to
Rene-A. Gauthier in his introduction to the Leonine text of the Sententia
used in this study (p. 288).
12 Pegis's translation of the prima pars of the Summa, a revision of the English Dominican Translation, appears in his Basic Writings of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, vol. 2, edited and annotated, with an introduction (New York:
Random House, 1945).

AQUINAS

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Aquinas's answer to this objection is very instructive:
When the agent intellect is said to be its own action, such predication is not essential, but concomitant, because, since its very nature
consists in act [cum sit in actu eius siibstantia], instantly, so far as
lies in itself, action accompanies it; which cannot be said of the possible intellect, for this has no actions until after it has been reduced
to act (S.T. I, q. 54, a.1, ad 1; trans. Pegis).
Here, in the words cum sit in actu eius substantia, Thomas
clearly alludes to the Aristotelian formula "being essentially an
actuality." 13 The objection indicates that Thomas is aware of
the sense in which these words can be taken: they can he taken
to mean that active mind is what it does. In the body of the article, Thomas makes clear that this identity of substance and act,
the thing and what it does, is found only in God: " It is impossible for anything which is not a pure act, but which has some
admixture of potentiality, to be its own actuality, because actuality is opposed to potentiality. But God alone is pure act. Hence
only in God is His substance the same as His being and His
action " (trans. Pegis). Accordingly, Thomas denies that " being essentially an actuality " means that active mind has no admixture of potency, and proposes another sense for these words.
He suggests that they mean that active mind does not need to be
brought into actuality before it can do what it does. Thus,
whereas the possible intellect needs to be brought into actuality
by the reception of an intelligible form before it can think, active mind is by its very nature immaterial and always ready to
make a sensible form immaterial.
On the basis of our investigation of the sense of what "being
essentially an actuality" means in the context of Aristotle's
philosophy, Aquinas's interpretation of these words appears incorrect. To accept it as what Aristotle really meant but for some
reason did not say is unreasonable when we see De Anima 3.5
in the context of Aristotle's understanding of the kind of sepa13 The laconic rendering of Aristotle's
phrase found in the Leonine text of
the S ententia is siibstantia actit ens, which is verbally quite close to sit in actit
eius substantia.

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JAMES T. H. MARTIN

rateness that characterizes pure actuality. The sense that must
be given to these words is precisely that sense which Aquinas
denies to them.
C onclusionJ
For a long time the generally accepted view of active mind
coincided rather well with what Aquinas says about active mind
in the Sententia Libri De Anima. The majority of commentators
held that active mind was a part of the human soul and the view
that Aristotle's active mind is a divine mind was "almost universally rejected." 14 Recent studies, however, have begun to rehabilitate the view that active mind is in fact a divine mind. 15
If, as I have argued in this study, this new view, which, of course,
is in large part a reappreciation of an ancient interpretation, is
the correct interpretation of De Anima 3.5, then Thomas's commentary on this chapter cannot be accepted as a faithful exegesis
of Aristotle's text.
In Thomas's defense, however, one must consider that his interest in writing the Sententia was perhaps not to reveal the
sense that the text of the De Anima had for Aristotle. If
Thomas's intention in the Sententia is the same as his intention
14 W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, vol. 2, Aristotle: An
Encounter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 322.
i 5 Ibid., pp. 322-26; Victor Kai, On Intuition and Discursive Reasoning in
Aristotle, Philosophia Antiqua, no. 46 (Leiden: Brill, 1988), pp. 84-113; and
Jonathan Lear, Aristotle: The Desire to Understand (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1988), pp. 135-41. My Active Mind in Aristotle's Psychology (New York: Peter Lang, forthcoming) argues that active mind must be
a separate divine mind which exercises final rather than efficient causality,
since for Aristotle efficient causality cannot be exercised by an agent which
is essentially an actuality. See also L. A. Kosman, "What Does the Maker
Mind Make?" in Essays on Aristotle's" De Anima," ed. Amelie Rorty and
Martha Nussbaum (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992): "In a sense, Chapter
5 may be thought of as turning to that function of mind, mind as the principle
of cosmic ordering and apprehending, that is, of intelligibility and intelligizing
en hapasei tei physei, to redirect the words Aristotle uses at the beginning of
the chapter. In this sense, nous poietikos is, as the intrepid half of the tradition has always understood, divine, a fact to which we should be alerted by its
description, with clear echoes of Metaphysics [Lambda], as a being 'whose
ousia is energeia '" (p. 355).

AQUINAS

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in the commentary on the Metaphysics, his purpose is certainly
not to do a commentary on the De Anima of the sort one would
expect from an historian of philosophy today. Let us consider
briefly some indications of Thomas's intention in commenting on
the Metaphysics.
Aristotle holds that " God is thought by all to be one of the
causes and a principle" (NI etaph. 1.2. 983a8-9; trans. Apostle).
Thomas, on the other hand, while he acknowledges that metaphysics treats of God, denies that anything other than common
being (ens commune) is the subject matter of metaphysics. 16
Thus, in commenting on Aristotle's Metaphysics, Thomas accommodates the words of Aristotle to the truth of Christian revelation: for him it is unacceptable that God should be the subject
matter of metaphysics, since " sacred theology has already appropriated God as its specifying subject." 17 Similarly, Thomas's
use of " separate," when he says that the subject of metaphysics
is what is " in the highest degree separate from matter "
( ma:i:ime a materia separata) (In M etaj;h., Proem), is not Aristotelian, since for Aristotle no common notion such as common
being could be described as separate from matter secundum esse
et rationiem (In M etaph., Proem). For Aristotle, what is separate
in being is a substance, but " nothing common or universal can
be a substance in the setting of the Metaphysics (Z 13, 1038b835) ." 18 Again, Thomas uses the infinitive " to be " in the expression separata a materia secundum esse et rationem to mean existence, whereas Aristotle uses the corresponding Greek word einai
to refer to the formal aspect of a thing (e.g., de An. 3.2. 426a1516 " Quamvis ista scientia praedicta tria consideret [ ( 1) God and intellectual
substances, (2) being and what follows on it, and (3) the first causes of
things], non tamen considerat quodlibet eorum ut subiectum, sed ipsum solum
ens commune" (In M etaph., Proem; ed. Marietti).
17 Joseph Owens, "Aquinas as Aristotelian
Commentator," in St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, ed. John
R. Catan (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), p. 5. "If God
as he exists in himself is allowed to function as the subject of metaphysics, no
room will be left for a further science about God arising from divine revelation" (ibid., p. 7).
18 Ibid., p. 6.

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JAMES

T. H. MARTIN

17). 19 Such differences of philosophical position and reworking
of philosophical vocabulary indicate that Thomas's commentary
on the Metaphysics of Aristotle is something other than a work
of historical scholarship.
On this and other such evidence, Joseph Owens concludes that
" the kind of philosophical truth being propounded in the commentary on the Metaphysics should be the truth developed and expressed in the metaphysical thinking of Aquinas himself, to the
extent that the text of the Metaphysics gives occasion to do so." 20
Furthermore, Thomas does not hesitate to make the words of
Aristotle express what Thomas sees as the truth even when he
knows that this is not what the Stagirite had in mind. But, in
doing this, Aquinas can consider that he is faithful to Aristotle
and that he is not doing violence to his thought. Just as Aristotle
could justify his interpretation of Anaxagoras as uncovering that
truth " towards which his intellect tended, although he was unable to express it" (bv I Metaph., lect. 12, no. 196), Thomas
could defend his interpretation of Aristotle as faithful because it
presents the truth which the Stagirite had intended to discover. 21
Thomas's appropriation of Aristotle in the commentary on the
Metaphysics would suggest, then, that in commenting on the De
Anima Thomas is expounding his own philosophy rather than
presenting the sort of exegesis that one would expect from a
modem commentator. 22 And indeed, this is what we find in the
case of the treatment of active mind in the Sententia: although its
position that there must be a power of the soul to abstract an intelligible from a sensible form may be accepted on the philosophical merits of Thomas's arguments, there are important reasons
19 Ibid., p.

'l.

20 Ibid., p. 9.

Ibid., p. 10.
Owens's study bears on Thomas's Aristotelian commentaries general!yincluding the commentary on the De Anima, which he considers briefly-in aU
of which " Aquinas continues his dedication to theological wisdom " (p. 17).
This dedication prompts him both to seek " philosophical guidance from Aristotle for his own theological work" (p. 19) and to correct Aristotle in those
cases in which his philosophy is in conflict with revealed tiruth.
21

22

AQUINAS

AS A COMMENTATOR

639

for refusing to accept this commentary on De Anima 3.5 as
articulating what Aristotle meant but did not say.
On the other hand, even if one accepts that Thomas is not writing the sort of exegesis that one would expect from a modern
commentator, one may nevertheless ask why Thomas could not
in commenting on De Anima 3.5 have agreed with Aristotle that
active mind is something separate from the human knower.
The most generally known aspect of Thomas's teaching on active mind is his position that it is a part of the soul which abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form. But this is not all
that Thomas says about active mind. In the Sententia, as we
have seen, Thomas calls active mind "a certain participation of
the intellectual light of separate substances" ( 163-64), and in
De Spiritualibus Creaturis he argues for the existence of an intellect "above the human soul ... on which the human soul's act
of understanding depends ( suum intelligere)" (art. 10, resp.; ed.
Keeler). This mind is a pure intellect ( intellectus secundum
to tam suam naturam), and is without discursive movement or
potency. This mind, accordingly, is always in act ( intellectum
semper in actu e.:ristentem). And, after recognizing its existence,
Thomas identifies it as God (De Spirit. Creat., art. 10). Why,
then, did Thomas not interpret De Anima 3.5 as referring to a
totally actual mind on which minds that are not totally actual
must depend? It is curious that, being in philosophical agreement
with Aristotle on this point, he nevertheless interprets in another sense the text in which Aristotle argues for the existence of
such a divine mind as a cause of human thinking.
The explanation, I think, is that Thomas approached De
Anima 3.5 in a context established by other commentators who
had sought in Aristotle's text an answer to a question that the
Stagirite was not asking. The question for Aquinas, as is clear
from the above consideration of the S ententia, is ' How does a
sensible form become an intelligible form?' In the light of this
question it is reasonable to hold that there must be something
which abstracts the intelligible from the sensible form and to attribute this role to an active mind which is part of the human
knower. Aristotle, on the other hand, is not trying to explain
how a sensible form becomes an intelligible form but rather to

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JAMES T. H. MARTIN

account for the activity of human thinking by identifying an
essentially actual mind on which it depends. Thomas's different
perspective is quite understandable when one considers that so
authoritative a commentator as Themistius speaks of active mind
as making enmattered forms intelligible " by abstracting them
from matter." 23 It is thus no accident that Aquinas read Aristotle's text with the wrong question in mind; his question was
given to him by other commentators.
In another sense, however, Aquinas's question was not wrong;
it was the right question, because it raised the philosophical problems he needed to address. Earlier commentators had interpreted
De
3.5 in the light of this question and their position that
active mind was separate had what Thomas considered unfortunate implications for the integrity of the human knower.
Accordingly, in his desire to defend the integrity of the human
knower by insisting that what does the abstracting must be part
of this knower, Thomas quite appropriately chose to do this in
commenting on De Anima 3S

2s Jn

Libros De Anima Paraphrasis, p. 98, 1-2,

THE VIRTUES OF MAN THE ANIMAL SOCIALE:
AFFABILITAS AND VERITAS IN AQUINAS 1
KEVIN WHITE

X

Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

STOTLE'S definition of man as the 'qlov '1ToAmKov2 the city-dwelling animal-undergoes an interesting transformation in the scholastic Latin of St. Thomas Aquinas :
while the epithet of the definition occasionally appears in
Aquinas's writings as transliterated, in animal politicum, or as
thoroughly domesticated, in William of Moerbeke's translation
animal civile, his preferred version of the Aristotelian formula
is animal sociale, though he sometimes says politicum et sociale,
politicum vel sociale and sociale et politicum. 8 For these uses of
the term sociale, Aquinas is indebted not only to earlier writers
of Latin but also to the genius of the language itself, whose words
sociale and societas seem to have no equivalent in Aristotle's
Greek. Less formal and explicit than the polis or civitas, what is
meant by societas is rather the pervasive and mostly unacknowledged element within which cities are founded and continue, and
which consists in the specifically human way of being together or,
as Heidegger says, Mitsein. It is easy to discern in Aquinas's
opposition between politicum and sociale the ancestor of our own
commonplace and sharp contrast between " politics " and " so-

1 This paper was read in Buenos Aires on September 14, 1991, as a contribution to the sixteenth annual Semana Tomista of the Sociedad Tomista
Argentina.
2 Politics I, 1, 1153a2-3.
a For a survey of texts, see Edgar Scully, "The Place of the State in
Society According to St. Thomas Aquinas," The Thomist 45 (1981): 407-429.
The present discussion may be regarded as a gloss on the theme of this article
that the social is prior to the political.

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ciety," though we should be careful not to identify our way of
speaking with his: whereas we view " society " as a historical
product, and so distinguish among different societies, societas
for him, as for the ancient Romans, primarily connotes the universally human activity of coming together in association or alliance: it names that essential feature of human combination which
is prior to institutions and to recognitions of special friendship,
but which, just because it is a good of our nature, prevents
human togetherness from being reduced to a bare co-presence.
An illustration of the way in which Aristotle's reflections on
human nature are both complicated and enriched, in Aquinas's
appropriation of them, by the Roman notion of societas may be
seen by comparing the differing treatments which the latter gives
of the " social " virtues of truthfulness and friendliness in his
commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and in the Summa Theologiae. In both texts, to be sure, these virtues pale in significance
beside such impressive qualities as courage and moderation;
nevertheless, a notable increase in their importance seems to occur between the commentary, where, in keeping with the order of
Aristotle's text, they appear as members of a series of virtues related to merely secondary matters, and the Summa, where they
are elevated to a status among the " potential parts " of the virtue of justice and are distinguished by their relevance to the needs
of man the animal sociale. Let us consider this difference in
presentation, bearing in mind that the two texts were composed
approximately simultaneously and fairly late in Aquinas's career,
that is, during his second Parisian sojourn in 1269-72."
I
The commentary on the Ethics introduces the fourth book of
the work as a sequel to the third : after discussing courage and
moderation, which concern those things by which the very life of
man is preserved, Aquinas says, here, in Book IV, the Philos4 For the chronology, see James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Friar Thomas d'Aquino:
His Life, Thought and -YVorks, with Corrigenda and Addenda (Washington,
pp. 361, 380.

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opher treats of other "intermedaries," namely seven virtues and
the feeling of shame, which are related to " certain secondary
goods or evils." 5 Among the seven virtues, the first four have to
do with external things, whether the external goods of wealth and
honor or the external evils which provoke anger. 6 The other
three virtues, however, concern human actions themselves, which
in serious matters requires the virtues of aff abilitas and veritas
and in playful ones are perfected by the virtue of eutrapeleia or
"wit." 1 Aquinas assigns affabilitas and veritas to the "serious"
part of human action in order to distinguish these virtues from
eutrapeleia; Aristotle himself, while agreeing that the area of influence of affabilitas roughly coincides with that of veritas, describes this area more particularly as " conversations, living together and the sharing of words and things." 8
Aquinas divides the chapters on aff abilitas and veritas with his
usual minute care, making clear Aristotle's intention to demonstrate that these virtues, in conformity with the definition of
virtue set forth in Book II, are each intermediary states between two extremes: friendliness is a mid-point between fawning
and quarrelsomeness, as truthfulness is between boastfulness and
5 Postquam Philosophus determinavit de fortitudine
et temperantia, quae
respiciunt ea quibus conservantur ipsa hominis vita, hie incipit agere de aliis
medietatibus, quae respiciunt quaedam secundaria bona vel mala. Et primo determinat de medietatibus laudabilibus quae sunt virtutes; secundo de his quae
non sunt virtutes, sed passiones, ibi: De verecundia autem etc. Sententia libri
Ethicorum (Rome, 1969), 4.1.1-9. Both the Moerbeke translation of the Ethics
and Aquinas's commentary on it will be quoted from the Leonine edition of the
commentary, in which the standard division into ten books is observed, but the
chapter divisions of both the Aristotelian and the Thomistic texts follow the
divisions of Aquinas; references to the Moerbeke translation will include the
usual indications of the Bekker edition, and references to the commentary will
follow the lineation of the Leonine text.
a Ibid., 9-22; 4.13.1-5.
1 Postquam Philosophus determinavit de virtutibus quae respiciunt res exteriores, hie determinat de virtutibus quae respiciunt actus humanos. Et primo
in seriis; secundo in ludicris . . . (ibid., 14.1-5).
8 In colloquiis autem et convivere et sermonibus et rebus communicare . . .
(ibid., 14.1126bll-12) ; Circa eadem autem fere est et iactantiae medietas ...
(ibid., 15.1127a13).

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irony. 9 For the most part the commentary stays quite close to
the letter of the Moerbeke translation, briefly clarifying the significance of each point in sequence, though occasionally Aquinas
pauses to explain the meaning of a Graecism or to add a supplementary consideration to what the text says.
One such consideration is introduced when the commentary
reaches Aristotle's remark that the friendly person's effort to
give pleasure and avoid giving pain is directed to what is good
and useful because this virtue concerns the pleasures and pains
which occur in conversations. Aquinas takes this occasion to add
that human living together ( convictus) principally and properly consists in conversations : for being together in conversation is
a property-a proprium-of human beings among the animals
which share ( sibi communicant) in food and other such things. 10
9 Fawning may be done for its own sake, by the placidus, or for the sake
of gain, by the blanditor sive adulator; the quarrelsome person is called litigiosus et discolus (ibid., 14.142-154). The boaster or iactator is opposed to the
ironic man or eyron (ibid., 15.52-60).
10 Referens autem ad bonum et conferens, coniciet non contristare vel condelectare; videtur quidem enim circa delectationes et tristitias esse in colloquiis factas (ibid., 14.1126b29-31). Et <licit quod tendit ad hoc quod sine
tristitias vel etiam cum delectatione aliis convivat, et hoc refert ad bonum
honestum et ad conferens, id est utile, quia est circa delectationes et tristitias
quae fiunt in colloquiis, in quibus principaliter et proprie consistit convictus
humanus ; hoc enim est proprium hominum respectu aliorum animalium quae
sibi in cibis vel in aliis huiusmodi communicant (ibid., 14.99-107). Cf. ibid.,
17-21: ... colloquia humana per quae maxime homines ad invicem convivunt
secundum proprietatem suae naturae et universaliter circa totum convictum
hominum qui fit per hoc quod homines sibi invicem communicant in sermonibus
et in rebus .... Elsewhere [Sententia libri Politicorum (Rome, 1971), 1.1/
b.112-126] Aquinas argues that the use of speech (locutio) among men constitutes a proprium which, like the need which men have of one another for
survival, is a sign of man's social and political nature. The use of the term
propriitm in these texts is, of course, technical. It names the fourth of the
"predicables" or "universals" distinguished by Porphyry (genus, differentia,
species, propriitm, accidens), a feature which is intermediary between substance and accident : a proprium does not belong to the essence of a thing, but
is caused by the essential principles of a species (cf. Summa Theologiae (ST)
I, Q.77, a.l, ad 1). If speech is a Propriitm of human nature, it is also, in
Aquinas's view, both a consequence and a purpose of the human body, whose
distinctive upright posture permits man not only to gather knowledge by looking around and upwards, to use a more perfect brain, and to develop the nimble

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A rather obvious fact, perhaps; nevertheless, this comment, by its
use of the logical term proprium, momentarily develops a passing
observation on the aim of the virtue of friendliness into a reflection on human nature, thereby disclosing an important dimension
of the virtue itself which Aristotle at most leaves implicit. In the
question on friendliness in the Summa Theologiae, where Aquinas
is freed from the constraint of expounding a text, this root connection between affabilitas and human nature becomes much
more pronounced.
Towards the end of the chapter on friendliness, the commentary
makes another kind of contribution to the discussion by providing a name for the intermediary between the fawning and the
quarrelsome dispositions, an intermediary for which Aristotle's
Greek has no term, but which "among us," Aquinas says, can be
called affabilitas.11 Earlier, in the second book of the commentary,
where Aristotle had called the virtue <fn"Aia, Aquinas proposed the
corresponding Latin term amicitia, which he there took to be synonymous with affabilitas.12 Clearly, however, the definite "friendship " specified by cfn"Aia and amicitia fits the virtue in question
less exactly than does the more diffuse " friendliness " or " approachability " which aff abilitas suggests. Like the word societas, then, the choice Latin term aff abilitas, which appears to
have reached Aquinas both from a verse of the Vulgate Bible
and through a tradition of discussions of duties (de officiis) composed by Cicero, Ambrose and Cassian, 18 is an instance of the
human hand, but also to free the mouth to become an instrument of speech
( locutio) which is a "work of reason;" cf. ST I, Q.91, a.3, ad 3. Both the
Ethics and Aquinas's commentary suggest that the proprium of speech is especially evident at meal-times. Human eating-together seems to be emblematic of
domestic life (cf. Politics I, 2, 1252bl3-14). Accordingly, the "other such
things " which involve speech and thus call for aff abilitas might include sexual
union, the care of children and perhaps manual labor. The theme of the table
as the site of aff abilitas recalls the titles of Plato's Symposium and Dante's
Convivio. Cf. the root meaning of convictus.
11 Ibid., 2.91108a28 and 135-136.
12 Ibid., 2.9.1108a28 and 135-136.
13 Ibid., 2.9.135-136, adnotationes. The scriptural verse is Ecclesiasticus 4.7,
which the Leonine editor R.-A. Gauthier mentions with a reference to ST
II-II, Q.114, a.1, sed contra. It is remarkable that the Summa refers to

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superior range and precision of Aquinas's resources for describing moral phenomena in comparison with those of Aristotle,
Proceeding to the subsequent and rather longer chapter on
truthfulness, we find the commentary still closely hugging the
letter and the intentio of Aristotle's texL Here again, however,
Aquinas at one point momentarily enlarges the scope of the discussion with a few supplementary remarks, About a third of the
way through the chapter, Aristotle, summing up a preliminary
distinction between the virtue of truthfulness and the opposing
vices of boastfulness and irony, states that falsity is of itself
" base" and " to be avoided," while truth is " good" and
" praiseworthy,'' 14 Aquinas begins his explanation of this remark
with the observation that " signs have been instituted in order
that they might represent things according as they are!' 15 This
brief sketch of a theory of signs, with its opposition between res
and signa and its technical notion of " representation," is drawn
from Augustine's De doctrina christiana, which thus furnishes
a most unaristotelian and indeed ungreek vocabulary for the purpose of expanding Aristotle's consideration of certain human
qualities to include a more fundamental reflection on the process
of signification which grounds the activities of both the truthteller and the liar, Aquinas adds that one who represents things
as other than they are by lying acts in a disordered way (inordinate) and viciously, while one who speaks the truth acts in
an orderly way (ordinate) and virtuously,1 6 the " ordering"
in question being that of signs to things, However briefly, he
thus expands the limits of Aristotle's discussion in two ways:
Ecclesiasticus no fewer than five times in this article of the Summa, and three
times again in the following article, thus suggesting that it is the book of the
Bible which is eminently concerned with the sphere of aff abilitas,
14 Per se autem mendacium pravum et fugiendum, verum autem et bonum et
laudabile (Sententia libri Ethicorum, 4J5Jl27a28-30),
15 Ad hoc enim signa sunt instituta quod repraesentent res secundum quod
sunt , , , (ibid,, 85-86), The Leonine editor refers to Augustine, De doctrina
christiana, I, II, 2,
18 • , , et ideo, si aliquis repraesentat
rem aliter quam sit mentiendo, inordinate agit et vitiose, qui autem verum <licit, ordinate agit et virtuose (ibid,, 8689),

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as already suggested, he gives Aristotle's character sketches a
more theoretical cast by reducing the remarks on truth-telling
and lying to a basic consideration of the origin and purpose of
signs; by the same token, he extends Aristotle's relatively narrow concern with questions of truthfulness and falsehood about
oneself to a more general consideration of truth and lies as such.
These enlargements of Aristotelian themes, which are merely
hinted at in the commentary, are more fully developed by the account of truthfulness in the Summa.
In commenting on Aristotle's presentation of friendliness and
truthfulness, then, Aquinas supplies the text with a more emphatically theoretical perspective both by bringing a more explicit
organization to the ordering of these virtues and by occasionally
deepening the discussion through the introduction of fundamental
principles. A comparison of these chapters of the commentary
with the questions on truthfulness and friendliness in the Summa,
however, shows what Thomas the commentator is not able to do.
One important difference between the texts is that the words sociale and societas, which do not occur at all in the two chapters of
the commentary, become, in the corresponding section of the
Summa, basic terms for clarifying the nature of these " social"
virtues as potential parts of justice.
II

Turning to QQ. 109-116 of the secunda secundae, we note
first of all that the virtue of truthfulness acquires a preeminence
over friendliness which it did not have in the commentary both by
being placed before the latter in the order of topics and by being
treated at much greater length. 17 We also remark that the Aristotelian definition of virtue as an intermediary not only is
acknowledged in these questions, but is their basic ordering prin17 Between the question on veritas (Q.109) and the questions on the opposing
vices mentioned by Aristotle (Q.112 on iactantia and Q.113 on ironia), Aquinas
inserts two questions which go beyond Aristotle's concerns: Q.111, Aquinas's
classical treatment of lying (in which Augustine's De mendacio is the chief
authority), and Q.112, on the biblical theme of hypocrisy.

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ciple, since Aquinas in each case begins with a question on the
virtue and then goes on to consider the corresponding vices. 18
Finally, we observe that the discussions of friendliness and truthfulness in the Ethics are frequently quoted or referred to in this
part of the Summa. 19 Mixed with these Aristotelian components,
however, are two quite unaristotelian ones which are more important. The first, of course, is a theological interest, which appears not only in the many scriptural and patristic quotations,
but also in the regular series of articles which treat the particular
vices as sins, thereby reminding us that we are reading a summary of theology composed in a tradition of manuals for confessors.20 The other unaristotelian element is the presentation of
truthfulness and friendliness as "potential parts " of justice and
as taking their place accordingly within the great organizing
scheme of this part of the Summa, a scheme which Aquinas owes
to Roman developments of the Platonic-Stoic doctrine of four
cardinal virtues.
Before the way in which truthfulness and friendliness are
parts of justice is explained, there is, according to Aquinas, another point to be clarified in the case of each, namely the fact
that recognition of them as " special " virtues depends on the
Augustinian principle that the good consists in order. We have
seen how the commentary briefly refers to the " orderly " and
" disorderly " actions of truth-telling and lying; in the Summa
this concern with order becomes systematic in the consideration
of what is distinctive of both virtues. The argument with respect
to both is that since the good does consist in order, wherever
is See the preceding note on veritas. The treatment of affabilitas remains
closer to the Aristotelian pattern, with a question on the virtue (Q.114), and
then one question each on the opposing vices of aditlatio (Q.115) and litigium
(Q.116).
19 In the case of each of the two virtues, approximately
one quarter of the
corresponding chapter in the Ethics is quoted or closely paraphrased in the corresponding section of the Summa.
20 ST II-II, Q.110, aa.3-4; Q.111, a.4; Q.112, a.2; Q.113, aa.1-2; Q.115,
aa.1-2; Q.116, a.2. Cf. Leonard E. Boyle, "The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas,'' The Etienne Gilson Series 5 (Toronto, 1982).

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there is in human action a special aspect (ratio) of order, there
must correspondingly be a special good, and so a special virtue.
One such order is established according as man's external words
or deeds are duly ordered to something as signs to what is signified; and to this end he is perfected by the virtue of truthfulness. 21 Another order in human actions is required in that each
man ought himself to be appropriately ordered, through his words
and deeds, to other men in his being together and with them, so as
to comport himself towards them in a becoming way: and thus
there must be a special virtue which preserves what befits this
order, namely, friendliness or affability. 22 The theme of order,
more particularly that of the ordering of words and deeds, which
Aquinas uses to distinguish the matter of truthfulness and friendliness here is evidently more precise than the rather vague class
of " serious matters " by which he somewhat mechanically sets
these virtues apart in the commentary on the Ethics.
We come now to the most striking novelty of the Summa's
treatment of these virtues, namely the identification of them as
"potential" or "adjunct" parts of justice. 23 Let us first note
that Aquinas's authorities for this identification are both Roman:
21 Dicendum quod ad rationem virtutis humanae pertinet quod opus hominis
bonum reddat. Unde ubi in actu hominis invenitur specialis ratio bonitatis,
necesse est quod ad hoc disponatur homo per specialem virtutem. Cum autem
bonum, secundum Augustinum in libro De natura boni, consistat in ordine,
necesse est specialem rationem boni considerari ex determinato ordine. Est
autem quidam specialis ordo secundum quod exteriora nostra vel verba vel
facta debite ordinantur ad aliquid sicut ad signatum. Et ad hoc perficitur homo
per virtutem veritatis. Unde manifestum est quod veritas est specialis virtus
(ST II-II, Q.109, a.2, c).
22 Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, cum virtus ordinetur ad bonum, ubi occurrit specialis ratio boni, ibi oportet esse specialem rationem virtutis. Bonum
autem in ordine consistit, sicut supra dictum est. Oportet autem hominem convenienter ad alios homines ordinari in communi conversatione, tam in factis
quam in dictis, ut scilicet ad unumquemque se habeat secundum quod decet. Et
ideo oportet esse quandam specialem virtutem quae hanc convenientiam ordinis
observet. Et haec vocatur amicitia sive affabilitas (ibid., Q. 114, a.I, c.).
2s Cf. ST II-II, Q.48, a.I, c.: Partes autem potentiales alicuius virtutis dicuntur virtutes adiunctae quae ordinantur ad aliquos secundarios actus vel
materias, quasi non habentes totam potentiam principalis virtutis.

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Cicero in the case of truthfulness and Macrobius in that of friendliness. 24 His own understanding of the subordination of these
virtues to justice is best approached
way of objections which
arise at the beginnings of the two respective articles on this point,
arguing that neither truth-telling, on the one hand, nor friendliness, on the other, seems to involve the payment of a debt, so
that each virtue appears to faJl outside the definition of justice. 25
In both instances,
reply at once transforms the discussion of a rather small virtue into a reflection on human nature by
stating the definition of man as the animal sociale. The article
on truthfulness argues as follows: because man is the social
animal, one man naturally owes to another that without which
human society could not be preserved; but men could not live
together if they were not able to believe one another, which depends upon each making manifest the truth to the other; therefore,
the virtue of truthfulness does include the aspect of paying a
debt. 26 The argument concerning friendliness not only follows
the syllogistic pattern of this demonstration, but builds upon it:
as has already been said, Aquinas begins, because man is by nature the social animal, he owes, from a certain decency, that manifestation of the truth to others without which the society of men
could not endure; but just as man cannot live in society without
truth, so neither can he do so without pleasure, for, as Aristotle
says, no one can spend all the day with one who is sad or una certain natural debt of
pleasant; and therefore man is bound
ST II-II, Q.109, a.3, sed contra and Q.114, a.2, sed contra.
enim proprium esse videtur quod reddat alteri debitum. Sed ex
hoc quod aliquis <licit verurn, non videtur alteri debitum reddere, sicut fit in
omnibus praemissis iustitiae partibus. Ergo veritas non est pars iustitiae (ST
II-II, Q.109, a.3, obj. 1). Ad iustitiam pertinet reddere debitum alteri. Sed
hoc 11011 pertinet ad hanc virtutem (sc. amicitiam), sed solum delectabiliter
aliis convivere. Ergo huiusmodi virtus non est pars iustitiae (ST II-II, Q.114,
a.2, obj. 1) .
2 G Dice11dum quod quia homo est animal sociale, naturaliter
unus homo debet
altcri id sine quo societas humana serviri non posset. Non autem possent
homines ad invicem convivere nisi sibi invicem crederent, tanquam sibi invicem
veritatem manifestantibus.
Et ideo virtus veritatis aliquo rnodo attendit rationem debiti (ST II-II, Q.109, a.3, ad 1).
24

25 Iustitiae

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decency to live with others in a way which is pleasant, except,
occasionally, when it is necessary to sadden others for some useful purpose. 27 These articles do concede that truthfulness and
friendliness, while resembling justice in their orientation "to another," do not fulfill the definition of justice completely, because
the debts which they pay are not "legal" but rather " moral "
ones, contracted from a sense of decency. 28 That these virtues
thus lie beyond the scope of law appears to diminish their significance, relegating them to the sphere of the private and of a
kind of moral good taste which cannot be legislated, but only
taught by exhortation and example. Their vital connection with
our nature, however, which cannot satisfy its need to be with
others without the trust and the pleasure provided by these virtues, suggests that they are conditions of, and in this respect
more important than, the legal and political situation within
which justice properly so-called becomes a requirement. The intriguing contrast between the secondary and the necessary in
these virtues seems to reflect the distinction between the political
and social aspects of human nature. To man as the animal
sociale, at any rate, it would seem that no perfections are
more important than the modest habits of truth-telling and
21 Dicendum quad, sicut supra dictum est, quia homo naturaliter est animal
sociale, debet ex quadam honestate veritatis manifestationem aliis hominibus,
sine qua societas hominum durare non posset. Sicut autem non posset homo
vivere in societate sine veritate, ita nee sine delectatione, quia sicut Philosophus <licit in VIII Eth., "nullus potest per diem morari cum tristi, nee cum
non delectabili." Et idea homo tenetur ex quodam naturali debito honestatis
ut aliis delectabiliter convivat, nisi propter aliquam causam necesse sit aliquando
alias utiliter contristare (ST II-II, Q.114, a.2, ad 1).
28 Deficit autem (sc. veritas) a propria ratione iustitiae quantum ad rationem
debiti. Non enim haec virtus attendit debitum legale, quad attendit iustitia: sed
potius debitum morale, inquantum scilicet ex honestate unus homo alteri debet
veritatis manifestationem. Unde veritas est pars iustitiae, inquantum annectitur
ei sicut virtus secundaria principali (ST II-II, Q.109, a.3, c.). Deficit autem
(sc. amicitia) a ratione iustitiae, quia non habet plenam debiti rationem, prout
aliquis alteri ob!igatur vel debito legali, ad cuius solutionem lex cogit, vel etiam
aliquo debito proveniente ex aliquo beneficio suscepto : sed solum attendit
quoddam debitum honestatis, quad magis est ex parte alterius, ut scilicet faciat
alteri quad decet eum facere (ST II-II, Q.114, a.2, c.).

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affability, since without these, as Aquinas points out, the very
being of men as social animals cannot last. Such virtues, one
may say, are compatible with very great vices, while lack of
friendliness, at least, does not preclude the possession of more
heroic other virtues. Nevertheless, although the question of their
presence or absence is not the final test of human goodness, it is
the first such test : first in the raising of children, first in the
meeting of strangers, first, too, in the society of acquaintances,
which in a sense is always beginning anew.

III
I close with a few observations provoked by the foregoing remarks. First of all, it is clear that the necessity of truthfulness
and friendliness is obvious, so much so that their inculcation is
nearly universally a central feature in the education of the young.
Certainly, the importance attached to these virtues varies according to circumstance, and modern urban life in particular has
greatly obscured their direct reference to human nature; on the
other hand, the immediacy and intimacy of electronic communication dramatically remind us of their perennial indispensability.
A second observation concerns the regular conjunction of the two
virtues which we find in human life, and which is no doubt
owing to their common subservience to the needs of our social
nature: despite the fact that truthfulness seems a degree more
necessary than friendliness, and despite the grain of truth in the
cynical view that the two virtues are incompatible, they nevertheless call out for and complete one another, so that there is something incongruous, as well as corrosive of society, in malicious
honesty or deceitful affability. Perhaps the two virtues unite
most closely in the attractive quality we call frankness. A further noteworthy point is that the goods secured by these virtues
are found again in the highest human activity, the pursuit of
wisdom, which provides not only knowledge of truth, but also,
as Aquinas, echoing the Book of Wisdom, affirms, a companionship--a conversatio or convictits-which contains no bitterness

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or weariness, but only joy. 29 It would appear to be a measure of
the consistency of human nature that its most pressing needs
should thus anticipate its deepest satisfactions. Finally, it seems
relevant to consider that Aquinas opens his question on Christ's
way of life with an article in which he argues that it was fitting
for Christ to live among men, rather than as a solitary, because
He came into the world in order to manifest the truth (ad manifestandum veritatem), to free men from sin and to give men, by
living in familiarity with them-familiariter cum hominibus conversando-the confidence to approach God. 30 Although Aquinas
does not in this argument mention the virtues we have been discussing, his descriptions of the first and last of the three purposes
of the Incarnation are reminiscent of his accounts of truthfulness
and friendliness respectively. Might not the full worth of these
virtues have derived, in his view, from their exemplification by
the truthful and affable Redeemer of the world?

20 See Summa Contra Gentiles I, c.2: Inter omnia vero hominum studia
sapientiae studium est perfectius, sublimius, utilius et iucundius. . . . Iucundius
autem est quia " non habet amaritudinem conversatio illius nee taedium convictus illius, sed laetitiam et gau<iium (Sap. VII, 16).
ao ST III, Q.40, a.l, c.

THE IMMANENT AND THE ECONOMIC TRINITY
THOMAS

WEINANDY

Greyfriars Hall
Oxford, England

I

N HER MAJOR study on the Trinity, God For Us: The
Trinity and Christian Life, Catherine Mowry LaCugna contends that theology should abandon the distinction between
the immanent and the economic Trinity as it has been understood
within contemporary theology. She believes that such a distinction segregates " God in himself " from " God for us " and thereby
fixes an unbridgeable gap between them. This divorce renders
the Trinitarian God irrelevant to the Christian life. In contrast,
LaCugna proposes-and this is the theme of her entire bookthat the whole trinitarian enterprise must be executed within a
soteriological context. 1
Since the Council of Nicea, however, the history of the development of the doctrine of the Trinity has focused, both in the
East and in the West, on the immanent Trinity and the intradivine relationships between the persons. This is especially true
of Latin trinitarian theology where Augustine and Aquinas
founded their trinitarian conception on substance and articulated
a trinity of persons who are enclosed upon one another. 2 The
more theology developed the doctrine of the immanent Trinity,
1 Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God For Us: The Trinity and Christian Life
(San Francisco: HarperCollins, 1991). See pp. 15, 211.
2 With reference to the Western conception of the Trinity in contrast to the
East, LaCugna comments: " However, the economy of salvation a Patre ad
Patrem becomes all the harder to see once the consubstantiality of persons is
situated in the intradivine domain, or beyond, in a permanently unknowable
and imparticipable divine essence" (ibid., p. 73). For comments on how Augustine's trinitarian thought brought about a rupture between God in himself and
God for us see pp. 80, 91, 97, 101-02, 104. For a similar criticism of Aquinas
see pp. 157, 167-68.

655

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the more the doctrine of the Trinity became irrelevant. LaCugna
completes her lengthy, and often insightful, study of the historical development of the doctrine of the Trinity by concluding:
" The history of doctrine and theology tells the story of the emergence and defeat of the doctrine of the Trinity." 3
Even if one argues, as Rahner and many others do, that the
immanent Trinity is the economic Trinity, the very distinction
still places a gulf between God as he exists in himself and the
God who exists for us. 4 There remains, according to LaCugna,
a separation between theologia, that is, knowledge and speculation about God qua God, and oikonomia, that is, knowledge and
speculation about God-for-us. For LaCugna, if theologia is to be
relevant it must be inherently and thoroughly soteriological.
Hence it follows that theologia can only be theologia of the
oikonomia, that is, a theology of God's action within the world.
A theologia of the Trinity must then be a theologia of the trinitarian pattern of God's self-revelation within the economy. Her
governing principle is : " theologia is fully revealed and bestowed
in oikonomia, and oikonomia truly expresses the ineffable mystery
of theologia." 5
[The economy is not] a mirror dimly reflecting a hidden realm of
intradivine relations; the economy is God's concrete existence in
Christ and as Spirit. The economy is the 'distribution' of God's life
lived with and for the creature. Economy and theology are two
aspects of one reality: the mystery of divine-human communion.6
Thus the Trinity that is revealed is not a Trinity apart or distinct from the economy, but a Trinity of the economy. " The
referent for the immanent Trinity is not 'God in se,' or 'God's
essence as it is in itself.' Theories about what God is apart from
a Ibid., p. 198. Also, pp. 209-10, 392.
4 LaCugna gives a clear exposition of Rahner's position on the distinction
and relationship between the immanent and economic Trinity (cf. ibid., pp.
211-21). She concludes: "Finally, according to Rahner at least, distinctions in
the economy originate in and are grounded in distinctions ' in ' God. It is on
the last point that we part ways with Rahner" (p. 221).
5 Ibid., p. 221.
a Ibid., p. 222.

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God's self-communication in salvation history remain unverifiable
and ultimately untheological, since theologia is given only through

oikonomia." 1
LaCugna therefore argues :
There is neither an economic nor an immanent Trinity; there is only
the oikonomia that is the concrete realization of the mystery of
theologia in time, space, history, and personality. In this framework,
the doctrine of the Trinity encompasses much more than the immanent Trinity, envisioned in static ahistorical and transeconomic
terms; the subject matter of the Christian theology of God is the one
dynamic movement of God, a Patre ad Patrem . ... The existence of
such an intradivine realm is precisely what cannot be established on
the basis of the economy, despite the fact that it has functioned within speculative theology ever since the late fourth century.
This vision of the basic trinitarian framework obviates the need to
adhere to the language of economic and immanent Trinity. These
terms are bound inextricably to the framework that operates with a
gap between oikonomia and theologia. The revision-more accurately, the return to the biblical and pre-Nicene pattern of thought-suggests not only that we abandon the misleading terms, economic and
immanent Trinity, but that we also clarify the meaning of oikonomia
and theologia. Oikonomia is not the Trinity ad eztra but the com7 Ibid., p. 231. Cf. pp. 224-28. For LaCugna theology fell to the temptation
to seek to articulate the inner life of God: " to find reasons for the coequality
of persons in an independent metaphysics rather than in the record of the economy, and, to confuse the immanent structure of salvation history with the
'inner life' of God. As we have seen, the notion of God's 'inner life' simply
cannot stand up to scrutiny " (p. 229). LaCugna is in basic agreement with
Schoonenberg that we are incapable of moving from the Trinity revealed in
the economy to speculation about the Trinity as it may exist in itself. We do
not know whether God actually exists as a Trinity apart from God's trinitarian
expression in the economy. All we know is the economic expression. " This is
the import of Schoonenberg's point that the question of whether God would
be trinitarian apart from salvation history is purely speculative and cannot be
answered on the basis of revelation" (p. 227; also pp. 217-20, and p. 236,
n. 21). For Schoonenberg's own article see "Trinity-the Consummated
Covenant. Theses on the Doctrine of the Trinitarian God," Studies in Religion
5 (1975-1976): 111-16. Commenting on Schoonenberg's position that to say
the immanent Trinity is dissolved in the economic Trinity, as though the eternal
Trinity first came into existence in and through history, Kasper states: " In
eternity the distinctions between the three persons would then at best be modal,

and would become real only in history" (Thi? God of I l?SUS Christ, p. 276).

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prehensive plan of God reaching from creation to consummation, in
which God and all creatures are destined to exist together in the
mystery of love and communion. Similarly, theologia is not the
Trinity in se, but, much more modestly and simply, the mystery of
God. 8

Within the economy of salvation, then, God manifests himself
within a trinitarian pattern. God expresses himself in the form
of a descending and ascending parabola through Christ in the
Spirit and so sweeps us up into himself though Christ in Spirit.
" This chiastic model of emanation and return, ezitus and reditus,
expresses the one ecstatic movement of God outward by which
all things originate from God through Christ in the power of the
Holy Spirit, and all things are brought into union with God and
return to God." 9
The heart of LaCugna's trinitarian theology is the notion that
"to be" is "to be relational." The whole history of trinitarian
thought is founded upon this principle.10 However, the Trinity
does not exist as an intradivine set of persons who subsist in relation to one another. That would once more divide theologia and
oikonomia. 11 Rather God, within the economy, is inherently relational in that through Christ and in the Spirit he relates to us
and so unites us to himself in communion.12 For God to be is
s Ibid., p. 223.
9 Ibid., p. 223.
io Ibid., pp. 288-92. LaCugna wishes, following Zizioulas, to lay claim to the
Cappadocian insight that personhood is constitutive of substance and not vice
versa (cf. ibid., pp. 244-50, 260-66).
11 LaCugna writes : " The goal of theology is not knowledge of God ' as God
is in Godself' disjoined from God's manifestations in the economy; the goal of
theologia is knowledge of God, which is inseparable from who God is in God's
concrete existence in Christ and the Spirit" (ibid., p. 233, cf. 334).
12 LaCugna does not see the perichoresis as designating the intercommunion
between intradivine persons. " The starting point in the economy of redemption,
in contrast to the intradivine starting point, locates perichoresis not in God's
inner life but in the mystery of the one communion of all persons, divine as
well as human. From this standpoint ' the divine dance ' is indeed an apt image
of persons in communion : not from an intradivine communion but for divine
life as all creatures partake and literally exist in it " (ibid., p. 274; see pp. 27078).

IMMANENT

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659

for God to be relational.1 3 Unlike the limited relatedness of human
beings, " to God belongs the sphere of infinite relatedness, infinite
capacity for relationship, infinite actuality of relationship, both to
past, present, and future reality." 14
Quoting again at length, LaCugna writes:
The relational ontology in which all of reality is referred to its origin
in personhood-if it were carried forward through the whole of dogmatic theology-would avert the separation of theologia and oikonomia. The trinitarian oikonomia is the personal self-expressing and
concrete existence of God. The ontology proper to this understands
being as being-in-relation, not being-in-itself. The economy is
'proof' that God is not being-by-itself but being-with-us. The
sphere of God's being-in-relation is the economy of creation and redemption in which the totality of God's life is given. We have no
direct or immediate access to God's being in-itself or by-itself ....
The heart of theologia, as also of oikonomia, is therefore relationship, personhood, communion. The mysteries of human personhood
and communion have their origin and destiny in God's personal
existence. The histories of divine and human personhood intersect
in the economy that proceeds a Patre ad Patrem, through Christ in
the unity of the Holy Spirit.15
LaCugna maintains then that " In God alone is there a full
correspondence between personhood and being, between hypostasis and ousia. God for us is who God is as God." 16 Ultimately then it does not matter whether one uses the term "person"
for God in the singular or plural, for " we are not giving a description of the essence of God as it is in itself, but using a term
that points beyond itself to the ineffability of God."
[This is so because J the proper focus of theology is the concrete
manifestation of God's personal reality revealed in the face of Jesus
Christ and the activity of the Holy Spirit. It does not so much matter whether we say God is one person in three modalities, or one
nature in three persons, since these two assertions can be understood
13 For LaCugna, "This relational ontology follows from the fundamental
unity of oikonomia and theologia: God's To-Be is To-Be-in-relationship, and
God's being-in-relationship-to-us is what God is" (ibid., p. 250).
14 Ibid., p. 292.
15 Ibid., p. 246.
1e Ibid., p. 305.

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in approximately the same way. What matters is that we hold on to
the assertion that God is personal, and that therefore the proper subject matter of the doctrine of the Trinity is the encounter between
divine and human persons in the economy of redemption.17
The reason I have outlined LaCugna's position at some length,
predominately using her own words, is that, as a Christian view
of God and his relation to us, it is, I believe, fatally and disastrously flawed.
LaCugna is absolutely correct in saying that the God who is
must be God-for-us. There is no other. There is then no ontological difference between what God is in himself and what God
is for us. However, in order for there to be a God-for-us there
must be " a " God. 18 In order for there to be a Trinity-for-us
there must be a Trinity. While there is no ontological distinction
between the immanent and the economic Trinity-the Trinity
which expresses itself in the economy must be one and the same
Trinity that exists in itself-yet there is an ontological distinction
between God and all else that exists. The oikonomia is the realm
where God, in all his wholly otherness as God in ontological distinction from the oikonomia, is present and acts, and in the Incarnation actually abides, in the fullness of his wholly divine
otherness, as man. For LaCugna, God, in his wholly ontologically distinct otherness as God, is actually never present to nor active within the oikonomia. Rather, God is reduced to the oikonomia itself so that we no longer live with God in his wholly otherness, but only experience a God who has receded into and subsides wholly within the ontological level of the oikonomia itself. 19
305 ; cf. pp. 300-304.
speaking of " a " God I do not want to imply that God is one of many
beings, but precisely the opposite. God must exist ontologically distinct from
all that is not God. As Aquinas states : God is not contained in any genus
(Summa Theol. I, q.3, a.6).
19 LaCugna does speak of the ineffable mystery of God, but this apophatic
knowledge of God is an apophasis of the aikonomia-those aspects of God
which remain mysterious to us within the economy. " There is no hidden God
(deus absconditus) behind the God of revelation history, no possibility that God
is in God's eternal mystery other than what God reveals Godsclf to be ...
It must be emphasized that divine immanence is not equivalent to the 'eco17 Ibid., p.
18 By

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661

LaCugna, while wanting to eliminate the gap between God and
us, has actually constructed a chasm between God and us that is
now unbreachable. We only come to experience and know the
phenomenal God of the oikonomia and never the noumenal God
who actually exists in his wholly ontological distinct otherness as
God.20
Thus LaCugna so collapses, fuses, and merges the Trinity into
the economy that the economy is no longer the realm in which
the Trinity acts, but the only realm in which the " Trinity " is. The
oikonomia is no longer the realm in which the trinity of persons
as they exist, in all their otherness, act, and so relate to us in all
their otherness as distinct divine subjects, but the only realm in
which the Trinity of " persons " actually exist. The Trinity does
not exist ontologically distinct from the economy. " The Trinity" ontologically is the economy. Thus the Trinity is not the
persons of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit acting in
time and relating to us in history as they are in themselves, but
merely an impersonal theological principle grounding, sustaining
and articulating our relation to "God" and with one another.
God is no longer a trinity of persons or subjects. The term "trinity " now merely expresses the trinitarian pattern or mode of
God's revelation as manifested through Christ and in the Spirit
by which human persons (including Christ) are related to God.
Equally, one can question, although I do not believe she wants
to hold this position, whether God, for LaCugna, is ultimately
nomic' Trinity, nor is divine transcendence equivalent to the ' immanent '
Trinity. God's transcendence is not God out of relationship to us. God is transcendent because God's nearness to us in history does not exhaust the ineffable
mystery of God. Both immanence and transcendence must be predicated not
just of theologia but also of oikonomia: God's mystery is grasped as transcendent precisely in the economy of salvation. Vice versa, the economic selfrevelation of God in Christ is grasped, albeit obliquely, as the mystery of theologia itself. If we adhere to the principle that economy and theology belong
together as two aspects of one mystery, then the economy of salvation is as
ineffable as is the eternal mystery of God (theologia)" (p. 322; cf. pp. 322-35).
20 If God is not ontologically distinct and other than the oikonomia, one ends
up with either a finite God or a " Christian " expression of atheism, both of
which, in the end, may be the same.

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nothing more than the philosophical principle, inherent within
reality, which gives rise to human relations and expresses "the
more" contained within them. 21 God does not exist " outside "
the economy. He is the economy.
While LaCugna consistently speaks in personal and relational
terms and wishes to found her trinitarian theology upon them,
in Part Two of her book, where she presents her own theology
of the Trinity, she assiduously avoids using the terms " Father,"
" Son," and " Holy Spirit." Instead she speaks of "God,"
" Christ," and " Spirit." 22 She does this, I believe, for two interconnected reasons. First, the terms " God," " Christ," and
" Spirit " are more compatible with her reductionist view of the
Trinity as existing only in the economy. God (as relational, and
not necessarily as Father) expresses himself through Jesus as the
Christ in the Spirit. Secondly, I believe that she avoids the term
"Father" not only because she believes that God could be equally well called "Mother," but more, in light of the above, because
the term "Father" (or "Mother" for that matter) implies a
" Son." 23 She wants to avoid the term " Son" because that immediately presupposes a subject, and one that might be construed
as ontologically divine apart from the economy. She normally
drops " Holy " from Spirit because that traditionally implies a
subject as well. By speaking of " God," " Christ," and "Spirit,"
LaCugna can speak of the relationality of God without speaking
of divine subjects. Christ and the Spirit are not divine subjects,
homoousios with the Father; rather they embody and so express
how God relates to and acts within the world. Human beings
are the only real persons or subjects within LaCugna's relational
ontology. The human subject of Jesus supremely embodies God's
relatedness to us in the Spirit and so is the Christ. The Spirit
21 In this case LaCugna's
notion of God would be similar to Hegel's
"Spirit," or Heidegger's and Tillich's "Ground of Being," or Process Theology's " Di-polar" God.
2 2 See, for example, pp. 320, 356, 365, 378.
23 For LaCugna's view that God could equally well be called "Mother,"
see
ibid., pp. 267-70, 280, 303.

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specifies the manner in which God acts in Christ and m each of
us, and so is called Spirit. 24
Thus, while LaCugna maintains the dynamism and even beauty
of relational language, the notion of personhood, at least the personhood and subjectivity of the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit, is abandoned. They are not divine subjects and therefore
all that LaCugna says about our unity and communion with
" them " is vacuous. 25
This becomes exceedingly evident when LaCugna states that
all speech about God as personal or relational is mere metaphor.
" The systematic theologian needs to keep in mind that every
concept, whether it be 'substance' or 'relation,' is fundamentally metaphorical, not a literal description of what is." 26 Such a
view substantiates the previous criticism that the use of trinitarian
language merely expresses an impersonal theological or philosophical principle which governs and underlies reality.
Moreover, while LaCugna wishes her trinitarian theology to
be thoroughly soteriological, Jesus as the Christ does not relate
to God in a different kind of way than we do, but only in degree. 27
Therefore, Christ exemplifies and embodies, and so reveals, how
all of us relate to God in the Spirit. The actions of Christ and
the Spirit do not change our relationship with God in kind but
24 Ibid.,

pp. 296-98.
LaCugna's Cqapter 9, "Trinity, Theology, and Doxology," is spiritually
and aesthetically moving. However, because the Father, the Son, and the Holy
Spirit are no longer divine subjects in themselves, the praises that we sing are
devoid of theological content and meaning. We end up singing our own praises
as persons rather than glorying in the majesty and splendor of the triune God.
26 Ibid., p. 359; cf. p. 354. LaCugna refers the reader to her other articles
at this point: C. M. LaCugna and K. McDonnell, " Returning from 'The Far
Country': Theses For a Contemporary Trinitarian Theology," The Scottish
Journal of Theology 41 (1988) : 191-215, esp. 204-5, and C. LaCugna, "ReConceiving the Trinity as the Mystery of Salvation," The Scottish Journal of
Theology 38(1985): 1-23.
27 LaCugna denies both that the Sonship of Jesus differs in kind from our
own sonship and that Jesus the Son is an eternal divine person (ibid., pp. 309,
n. 67 and 317, n. 143).
25

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only in degree through the manifestation of the trinitarian pattern
of divine and human existence to consciousness.28
LaCugna believes that her understanding of the Trinity is
biblical and follows the pre-Nicene pattern, that is, that the Son
and the Holy Spirit are conceived primarily as the manner in
which God acts within the economy.29 The Son and Spirit
emanate from God only in relation to the economy of salvationthe orders of creation and redemption. As the above shows, she
believes such a notion sustains her premise that theologia and
oikonomia are one and the same.
Now the pre-Nicene Fathers, as witnessed primarily in the
Apologists, did stress the economic expression of the Trinity.
The Son and the Spirit became distinct subjects emanating from
the Father only at creation and in redemption. This conception
was due to their heavy reliance on Middle Platonic thought.
However, the whole trajectory of the pre-Nicene development
was directed away from such a conception in light of the biblical
data and the Christian faith that grew out of it. We see this development already in Irenaeus, who pushed the economic expression of the Trinity well into the immanent nature of God. More
and more, as witnessed in such theologians as Tertullian in the
West and especially Origen in the East, the question of concern
was how to conceive of God in such a manner as to uphold the
oneness of God and yet allow that the Son and the Holy Spirit
are eternal subjects within that oneness. The subordinationism
and the emanationism contained in the early Fathers were neither
expressions of their disbelief in the eternal divinity of the Son
and the Spirit, nor of their conviction that the Son and Spirit
were only "God" within the economy; rather, these were conceptual struggles and attempts to articulate the belief that the Son
2 8 On how Jesus, through his death and resurrection, changes our relationship with God not only in degree but in kind, see T. Weinandy, In the Likeness
of Sinful Flesh: An Essay on the Humanity of Christ (Edinburgh: T & T
Clark, 1993).
29 God For Us, pp. 221-23.

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and Spirit are God both within the being of God and within the
economy of salvation. In a way, the pre-Nicene Fathers did not
really want to say what they said, but they could not come up
with any better way to say it. LaCugna, on the contrary, does
want to say what they said because she believes this is the best
way to say it.
Actually, LaCugna's pre-Nicene version of the Trinity is not
pre-Nicene at all. The pre-Nicene Fathers, including the Apologists, conceived the Son and the Spirit to be distinct divine subjects in themselves, at least within the economy, whereas LaCugna deprives them of their divine subjectivity even within the
economy. The Son and Spirit are only impersonal expressions of
God's relatedness which becomes personified in human persons,
including Christ. Thus, LaCugna's trinitarian theology is
thoroughly Platonic and emanationist in character.
LaCugna believes that trinitarian theology took the wrong turn
at the Council of Nicea. Nicea created " the gap between oikonomia and theologia." 30 By proclaiming the Son to be homoousios with the Father, Nicea compelled theology to speculate
about the intradivine trinity of persons separate from the economy, rather than grasp that "the Trinity" is entirely God's expression of himself within the economy. While she recognizes
that Nicea is a stumbling block to her trinitarian thought, LaCugna does not perceive its radical significance. It is Nicea that
guarantees that the God we have come to know is truly the God
who is for us. 31 Nicea forges the unbreakable ontological link
between the economic and the immanent Trinity and it does so
by declaring that the one who is wholly within the economy is
the same one who is wholly other than the economy. The Son,
who is homoousios with the Father, and thus wholly God as the
so Ibid., p. 35; cf. pp. 209, 231.
31 The

title of LaCugna's book is not without significance. While the book
is on the Trinity, it is entitled God For Us. The reason is that the Father, the
Son, and the Holy Spirit do not truly exist as divine subjects, only God exists,
and thus it is he who is for us. He is "for us " by expressing himself in a
trinitarian pattern,

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Father is God in all his wholly ontologically distinct otherness,
is the same Son who became man, suffered under Pontius Pilate,
was crucified, died, and was buried. LaCugna's venture ultimately runs aground on the rock of homoousios. 32

3 2 Kasper is entirely correct when he states : " There is at least one case in
which this identity of economic and immanent Trinity is a defined truth of
faith: the incarnation of the Logos, or hypostatic union. . . . In the case of
the incarnation, then, the temporal sending of the Logos into the world and
his eternal procession from the Father cannot be completely distinguished;
here immanent Trinity an cl economic Trinity form a unity" (The God of Jesus
Christ, pp. 274-75).

HERMENEUTIC OF AQUINAS'S TEXTS:
NOTES ON THE INDEX THOMISTICUS
PAOLO GurnTTI

Universita Cattolica Augustinianum
Milan, Italy

U

I. Introduction: First Impressions of the
Index Thomisticus

PON ENTERING an excellent library of philosophy,
one cannot help but notice the 56 volumes of the I nde:c
Thomisticus. 1 Anyone with a scholarly interest in Saint

1 Index Thomisticus: Sancti Thomae Aquinatis Operum omnium Indices et
concordantiae . .. (Stuttgart: Frommann-Holzboog, 1974-1980). Reference to
this work in notes takes the form: IT [section]-[ vol.], [p.]. References to
Aquinas's works will follow the conventions established by Busa in the Index
Thomisticus (e.g., STl=Summa theologiae, prima pars) and unless otherwise indicated are from the same texts processed in the Index Thomisticus.
References to Roberto Busa's works will have the following abbreviations:
Clavis Indicis Thomistici: Clavis Indicis Thomistici (Stuttgart: FrommannHoltzboog, 1979). Fond. informatica linguistica: Fondamenti di informatica
linguistica (Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1987), (contains a bibliography of Busa's
works through 1987). Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ': "Per San
Tommaso 'ratio seminalis' significa 'codice genetico '. Problemi e metodi di
lessicologia e lessicografia tomistiche," in Atti dell'VIII congresso tomistico
internazionale (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1981), vol. 1. L'Index Thomisticus: "L'Index Thomisticus," in Stitdi medievali, III serie, XXI,
I, 1980. Informatica e filologia: " Informatica e nuova filologia," in G. Savoca
ed., Lessicologia, filologia e critica (Florence: Olschki, 1986), pp. 17-25.
L' originalite linguistique: "L'originalite linguistique de S. Thomas d' Aquin,"
in Archivum Latinitatis Medii Aevi (Bulletin du Cange), Tome XLIV-XLV,
fascicule double, 1985, pp. 65-90. ORDO dans les ouevres: "ORDO dans les
ouevres de St. Thomas d'Aquin," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., ORDO
II Colloquia internazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Rome: Edizioni
dell'Ateneo e Bizzarri, 1979), pp. 59-184. Voces REALIS-REALITER:
"Voces REALIS-REALITER in S. Thoma Aq. Cum appendice de voce 'resrei," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi eds., RES. III Colloquia internazionale del
Lessico intellettuale Europe a (Rome: Edizioni dell' Ateneo, 1982), pp. 104-

667

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PAOLO GUIETTI

Thomas Aquinas will be drawn to employ the Index Thomisticus
as a powerful concordance. But any reasonable scholar can recognize the disproportion between a desirable concordance and
this hyperbolic system of about 70,000 pages. The Index Thomisticus is the second largest written work of this century, surpassed
only by the Enrcyclopedia Britannica. The Index Thomisticus is a
mountain of pages that classifies with a precision never before
realized everything that came from Aquinas's pen in twenty-five
years. 2 Is it not awkwardly disproportionate and too pedantically
analytical for scholarly research?
Moreover, what would Aquinas think if, in a return to this
life, he could see the electronic digestion of his work? A neoscholastic Jesuit who devoted thirty-four years of his life to
chopping and classifying even the most insignificant things, like
" et " and " est," could seem to St. Thomas a modern computernut, i.e., a person who has lost his good sense in front of a screen. 3
Everyone understands the usefulness of a concordance; even St.
Thomas wanted and used concordances. 4 But the Index Thomis136. De voce SPIRITUS: "De voce SPIRITUS in operibus S. Thomae
Aquinatis," in M. Fattori and M. Bianchi, eds., SPIRITUS. IV Colloquia
lnternazionale del Lessico Intellettuale Europeo (Rome: Edizioni dell'Ateneo,
1983), pp. 191-222. Thomistische H ermeneutik: " Das Problem der thomistischen Hermeneutik nach der Veroeffentlichung des Index Thomisticus," in
A. Zimmermann, ed.,
Medievalia, Bd 19: Thomas von Aquin
(Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), pp. 359-364. L'Indez Thomisticus per la filosofia: " L' Index Thomisticus per la filosofia e la teologia," in
Teologia 5, 1980, pp. 258-265. Il logos Principia di dialogo: "Il logos principio di ogni dialogo tra persone secondo San Tommaso,'' in Portare Cristo
all'Uomo. Congresso del Ventennio dal Concilio Vaticano II (Vatican City:
Urbaniana University Press, 1985), pp. 577-584.
2 I. e., 8,767,854 words.
The lnde:i: Thomisticus classifies everything St.
Thomas has probably written, everything St. Thomas erased (Autographi
deleta: Inde:i: Thomisticus: 006 ADL) and even works of other chosen authors
for comparison with St. Thomas.
a Roberto Busa, S.J., was born in Vicenza, Italy in 1913. He began to
"play" with the computer in 1949. His major work in neoscholasticism is:
La terminologia tomistica dell'interiorita. Saggi di metodo per un'interpretazione della metafisica della presenza (Milan: Bocca, 1949).
4 See St. Thomas, Tabula libri Ethicorum in " Opera Omnia, Iussu Leonis
XIII edita" (Leonine edition), tomus 48 (Rome, Ad. Sanctae Sabinae 1971),
pp. B 63-B 158.

NOTES ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

669

ticus is excessive. What is the purpose of this expenditure of
human energy and time? Is it only for the satisfaction of completeness, of perfection? The Inde% Thomisticus is an unicum
and a monstrum (in both the senses of a wonder and something
deformed). We may not lament the unicum. But what would a
library become if every author had an Indn such as Aquinas
has now?
The question " for what? " is a disoriented yet common and
understandable reaction to this new instrument on which Roberto
Busa has spent half of his life. Moreover, there are other
characteristics which strike the common approacher of this monstritm. The IndeJC Thomisticus looks both extremely advanced
and primitive. The formal symbolization is so new that every-·
one is disoriented by it. But in spite of this aspect of novelty,
the language used in the Inde% Thomisticus is a dead language,
Latin, which once was the language of culture, but today is the
language of nostalgia. As a result of these two characteristics, the
IndeJC Thomisticus seems to come from other periods than the
present: the future, the time in which the computer will make
available every text with this kind of mathematical and electronic
precision, and the past, the time in which scholars were able to
communicate in Latin.
Furthermore, the Index Thomisticus is the most pedantic work
ever written. The Inde% Thomisticus surpasses in precision and
erudition any classification of human speech attempted before. It
can spot every "et" or "ad" of St. Thomas. Busa avoided asking the question whether or not a word was relevant before
classifying it. 5 In fact, Busa purposely did not ask the question
" what is important? " 6 The original structure of every human
5 The most common words like " et " are not excluded simply because they
are judged unimportant. See the tabulae 33 and 34 in IT I-9, pp. 1205-1206 for
a view of the frequency of these words in St. Thomas's work.
6 "Ho giudicato che fosse importante
rilevare e sistematizzare tutto quello
che c'e, cosi com'e. In scienza pura tutto e per principio importante: si
tratta di conoscere fatti e cose per quel che sono e per quel che contengono di
categorie. All'opposto, un giudizio d'importanza non puo non essere relativo
a finalita specificate.[ ... ] E la prima volta che un indice o concordanza
documenta tutti gli et, i non, i quam, gli est, di un corpus di queste dimensioni"
(L'lndex Thomisticiis, pp. 414-415).

670

PAOLO GUIETTI

language is present in the most common words. To choose to
overlook these words is to choose to overlook the simplest yet
deepest categories of thought and language. Busa explains why
the outcome of this complete analysis is so complex: "The Index
Thomisticus is a complex research documentation, which may
prove at the outset to be laborious to use. There are two reasons
for this. The first is the enormous quantity of data to be documented: 179 writings, 1,500,000 lines and 10,600,000 words.
The second reason for the complexity of the Index Thomisticus
is the complexity inherent in speech and language. In all verbal
expressions there emerges a multitude of distinct, diverse, opposite, and complementary structures. Speech can be viewed as
the merging of body and soul, where matter and spirit come together. In fact, reality consists of more than only tangible objects. Physical objects react only to present stimuli. Measurements of these interactions can be formulated in mathematical
terms. On the contrary, human words show that : a) human
thought also deals with non-present stimuli : unseen, possible, universal, formal objects ... ; b) the human mind also has instantaneous flashes and intuitions which are a simple mental operation, by which it masters a multitude of different objects in a
system which derives its unity from its goal ... ; c) the mind has
the power of creative freedom to select among the many beautiful
and appealing possibilities which it is able to imagine." 7
After these remarks, we can consider the position of someone
who for whatever reason wants to read Aquinas. This reader
could ignore the Index Thomisticus altogether. Since the dimensions are so enormous, he could avoid it with the justification
that it is important for linguistics and research in medieval language, but not for understanding Aquinas. He could use it at
most as an oversized concordance. However, the general opinion
would be that to understand St. Thomas one must read St.
Thomas directly, not an electronic pulverization of what he has
written, just as to understand a man you must look at the whole,
and not at his atomic composition: 65 % Oxygen, 20% Hydrogen, 12% Carbon, etc.
7

Clavis Indicis ThomistiC'i, p. 7.

NOTES

ON THE INDEX

THOJllIISTICUS

671

Nevertheless, if one's curiosity is provoked by this huge expenditure of energy, one should try to understand whether the
electronic precision of Busa can have any use in the hermeneutics
of Aquinas. The Index Thomisticus is a linguistic instrument.
Really to understand any instrument one must be able to use it,
and in order to be able to use the instrument, one must use it.
Ab esse ad posse datur illatio. The best way to understand the
Index Thomisticus is to examine carefully its hermeneutical use,
looking at someone who has used it (besides reading the instructions, of course). 8 It is not hard to imagine that in the next
decades instruments like the Index Thoniisticus will be made
available for many philosophers. An interest in the Index Thomisticus, therefore, goes beyond an interest in St. Thomas. It is an
interest in what will succeed the birth and childhood of the computer in the humanities: a jump in the techniques of the academy.

II. An Overview of the Structitre of the
Index Thomisticus
A synthetic view of the Index Thomisticus is the first thing required. The Index Thomisticus consists of 56 volumes of more
than 1000 pages each. 9 Properly, the Index Thomisticus comprises 49 volumes, with 7 supplemental volumes which reproduce
the electronic texts used in the Index Thomisticus. 10 The Index
Thomisticus is divided into three sections:
SECTIO PRIMA ( 10 vols.) :
Indices
Prospectus distributionis 11
Singillata distributio 12
Systemata lexici 13
8 Clavis Indicis Thomistici.
A volume of introduction is forthcoming. For
the moment, Clavis Indicis Thomistici may be considered an introduction to
the Index Thomistiws.
9 The Index Thomisticus is available on 300 magnetic tapes (density 800
bpi). Soon it will be available on optic disk.
1 0 See below.
12 Published in 1976.
11 Published in 1976.
1 s Published in 1980.

672

PAOLO GUIETTI

SECTIO SECUNDA (23

+ 8 vols.):

Concordantiae operum thomisticorum:
Concordantia prima 14
Concordantia altera 15
SECTIO TERTIA (6

+ 2 vols.):

Concordantiae operum aliarum auctorum 16
Concordantia prima
Concordantia altera
The first section is the strangest and apparently most useless
section of the Index Thomisticus. It consists of tables of symbols
and numbers not immediately decipherable. This is a work of
pure linguistics, and one must understand its usefulness within
this horizon. A cardinal distinction for understanding the system of the Indices (and the concordances, too) is the linguistic
distinction between lemma and form. Everyone makes use of this
linguistic distinction in speaking and writing, yet few can say
what it is. Busa explains it in this way: " We call a lemma a
lexical unit, i.e., the words which in a dictionary represent au
their possible flections and signify that basic meaning which is
common to all. For instance, ' am, are, was, being' are forms of
the verb ' to be.' " 17 The four largest Indices, tables of distribution, are organized upon two distinctions : a) lemma-form and
b) general prospectus and one-by-one view .18 The first eight
14 Published

in 1974-75.
in 1980.
1s Published in 1980.
17 R. Busa, CAEL
Newsletter, Dec. 1988 (trans. M. Dunne). Also:
" Lemma: titulus paradigmatis, exprimens unitatem lexical em vocabuli quod
flexiones habet; v.g. sum est lemma cuis formae sunt sum ... est ... fui ...
fuisti ... ens ... , etc. Forma: typus vocabuli prout scriptum iacet ... " (IT
II-1, p. IX. Microglossarium). "The difference and distinction between lemma
and form belongs to those structures of our speaking ability which everyone
exercises, i.e. knows in actu exercito, but to which only a few people give conscious and deliberate attention in actu signato," Clwr;is Indicfr Thomistici, p.
19. See also Informatica e filologia, p. 19,
1s The
15 Published

NOTES ON THE INDEX THOMISTICUS

673

volumes of the Index Thomisticus contain tables arising from this
fourfold distinction. The tables of the last two volumes of the
first section are based upon other concepts and oriented towards
different problems. For instance, there are tables of graphical
variations, of homography,1° of the forms printed in alphabetical
order of the inverted word, and of quantity. 20 This appears to be
the most maniacal part of the Index Thomisticus. Busa's fantasy
and the computer seem to be out of control. The question " what
for? ", however, is misplaced: the usefulness of these tables becomes apparent in working with the Index Thomisticus. Asking
" what for? " beforehand is like judging all the Chinese material
in a library to be useless simply because one is not able to read it.
The second section consists of 31 volumes. This is the best
known and most used section of the Index Thomisticus (at least
the 23 volumes of C oncordantia prima). They were the first to
be published, and they can be used as a simple concordance of all
St. Thomas's works. This is the best system of concordance ever
produced. A rapid glance shows its logical completeness and
pleasing aesthetic presentation. The difference between Concordantia prima and Concordantia altera lies in the way in which the
words are presented. In the former, every word is given in its
whole context, while in the latter, every entry consists of only
three words. All except 1654 of St. Thomas's words are present
in Concordantia prima.21 The remaining words are to be found
in the concordantia altera.22
The third section consists of only 8 volumes. This section is
a classification of 61 texts of other medieval Latin works. The primary purpose of this section is to make possible a comparison
19 " I call the forms which are spelled identically but belong to different
lemmas, homographs." Clavis Indicis Thomistici, p. 23.
20 A panoramic structure of these ten volumes is given in the insert to
volumes 9 and 10 : I ndes I ndicum.
21 IT II-1, p. X.
22 The reason for this is either the excessive frequency of certain words or
their presence in quotations or citations. The table of Indices shows where the
word is to be found .. For a complete and detailed explanation of the distribution in Concordantia altera (2nd to 5th concordances), see IT II-1, p. IX.

674

PAOLO GUIETTI

with St. Thomas's language. Section III is structured exactly
like section II. Many of the indexed works are works which
St. Thomas left incomplete and which were finished by other
"Thomists." However, other words indexed also include texts
by Albert the Great, Giles of Rome, Cajetan, Thomas Sutton,
etc. 23
The supplement consists of 7 volumes with all the texts
processed in the Index Thomisticus. They are the most rapid way
to check a reference in St. Thomas's text. 24 This edition of St.
Thomas's Opera Omnia is the most compact available: all works
are compressed in to 4500 pages. St. Thomas's text is offered in a
form which is not very easy to read but is extremely useful for
reference. Lastly, the texts used are from the most recent (and,
when available, the critical) edition of St. Thomas's works. 25
The list of them can be found at the beginning of any of the 49
volumes of the Index Thomisticus.
The Index Thomisticus is primarily a work in computational
linguistics. 26 It is the most daring use of the computer in the Humanities to date, if for no other reason than the amount of paper
consumed by the work. The Index Thomisticus is a tool for
studying not only the language of St. Thomas, but also-in levels
of ascending generality-scholastic
Latin and medieval Latin. 27
This linguistic instrument is useful in philosophy for two reasons.
First, because the texts processed have philosophical-theological
value, the material analyzed so minutely becomes available for
dealing with many problems in St. Thomas. It is a powerful lens
which allows one to discover things too small to be seen in an
23 For the complete list see IT I-1, p. XV-XVI.
See also L'Index Thomisticus.. pp. 412-414.
24 The last volume is for Alii Auctores.
2 5 Considering how hard it is to obtain certain editions of St. Thomas's
works, these 6
1 volumes of supplement render another great service.
2 6 " L'Index Thomisticus per i suoi risultati, finaliti e materiali e anzitutto
un'opera di linguistica generale" (L'Index Thomisticus, p. 418).
27 For the distinction of these three different levels and an introduction to
each of them see M. D. Chenu, Introduction a l'etude de saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1950), pp. 84-105.

+

NOTES

ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

675

ordinary reading or too numerous to be considered systematically. Thus, it offers the raw material to deal with hermeneutical
problems in reading St. Thomas. Secondly, the Index Thomisticus provides a large amount of material for elaborating a philosophy of language, i.e., for understanding language as such. 28
III. The Novelty of the Index Thomisticus
In the Inde% Thoniisticus texts are treated in a novel analytical
way. Roberto Busa is not the first to discover that language is
a compound of atoms which can he examined with electronic machines. Neither is he the first to analyze the laws of composition
of these atomic-words. But he is the first and, until now, the
only one who has taken a system, a product of human thought,
and has produced a disintegration of such scientific precision.
Just as a chemist gives the formula of a compound, elements
in percentage, and the spectrographic analysis, so the Inde%
Thomisticus gives elements and percentages of that peculiar
compound of ink or bits which is St. Thomas's Opera Omnia.
Busa, who is aware of his position as a pioneer, writes: " This
manual is the outcome of 40 years of computational linguistics,
like the geographical map of a new region which an explorer has
measured first." 29 The most striking aspect of this work is the
fact that Busa discovered a new method. This method is not confined to an analysis of St. Thomas. Soon we may hope to have
similar instruments for Aristotle, Plato, Augustine, Kant, etc.
without having to multiply space in libraries. These indexes can
use a different " support": not heavy and cumbersome paper,
but optic disks.
Continuing the analogy with physics and chemistry, the
28 Many drafts of such a philosophy of language are offered passim by Busa:
"Je point de depart de la philosophie est !'analyse reflexive du language Commun a tout l'homme, au fond duquel on trnuve la logique de l'etre" (L'originalite linguistique, p. 78) ; Cf. L' Index Thomisticus Per la filosofia. pp. 258265.
29 Fond. informatica linguistica, p. 13 (my translation).

676

PAOLO GUIETTI

strange-looking first volumes of the Index Thomisticus can be
compared to Mendeleev's table of elements. Computational linguistics is to language what the atomic theory is to physics. The
lemmas and the forms are the analogues of atoms in the field of
linguistic expression. Lemmas and forms are the smallest parts
of speech with meaning. Mendeleev's table of elements is not
comparable to the alphabet because letters are not per se parts
with meanings. For the written text of St. Thomas, the
Singillata distributio lemmatum, the distribution of the lemmas
one by one, constitutes the analogous reduction. The Index
Thomisticus is the ana-tomization of St. Thomas's text just as
atomic Physics is the ana-tomization of nature.
The language in the first part of the Index Thomisticus is reduced to its elementary morphology just as physics renders the
elementary morphology of experienced reality. so To reduce St.
Thomas's text to the Index Thomisticus is to understand nothing,
just as to reduce nature to atoms is to understand nothing.
Things arise from the infinite numbers of possibilities of combinations of elements, but they are not reducible to the elements.
Moreover, what really exists are the compounds, while the elements are a scientific abstraction depending on existing reality.
If the compound is not reducible to the elements, neither is the
composition. The composition-including the law of composition,
the architectonic, and the relationships among the elements-is
irreducible to the elements of the sentence.81
In the introduction to the lexicological system in Index Thomso The isotopes and the ionized form of atoms are the analogues of the form
in Index Thomisticus, while the basic form of atoms corresponds to the
lemmas.
si "As regards that which is compounded out of something so that the whole
is one-not like a heap, however, but like a syllable is not its elements, ba is
not the same as b and a, nor is flesh fire and earth ; for when they are dissolved the wholes, i.e. the flesh and the syllable, no longer exist, but the elements of the syllable exist, and so do fire and earth. The syllable, then is something-not only its elements (the vowel and the consonant) but also something else." Aristotle, Met., VII, 17, 1041 b, in The Complete Works of Aristotle, ed. by J. Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), vol.
2, p. 1644. See Informatica e Filologia, p. 20.

NOTES ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

677

isticus, Busa writes: " Our system is integral, exhaustive, and
complete, meaning that it offers all words without any exception,
numbered as far as the last units and classified in such a way that
no index or concordance has ever done before. However, one
who would affirm that nothing is to be systematically defined
would be mistaken : I think that researches on human speech are
more inexhaustible, so to speak, than physical or biological researches." 32 The complexity and the simplicity of language
(even the small fragment of all spoken and written words that is
the entire Thomistic corpus) is the complexity and simplicity of
reality. Millions of words can be classified by a computer, but
their order is beyond the complexity of any software: it exhibits
the simplicity of intelligence. What exists is not words or elements, but simple units, sentences and subsentences, which are yet
extremely complicated when anatomized.
IV. Working on Aquinas with the Index Thomisticus
There are many possible ways to exploit this linguistic instrument. Before sketching the hermeneutical use of the Index
Thomisticus as elaborated by Busa, some examples of different
possible uses are noted. All these uses exploit primarily the fact
that the Index Thomisticus is a complete concordance of St.
Thomas's corpus. Inos Biffi uses the Index Thomisticus to locate
and examine all the occurrences of the lemma metaphysicus. 83
William Wallace ·examines the lemma suppositio and particularly
the syntagma ex suppositione, proving a linguistic and a conceptual continuity between medieval science, represented by St.
Thomas's use of this language and concept, and empirical-modern
science, represented by Galileo's use of the same language and
s2 IT I-9, p. XIV,

n.2 (my translation).
a3 I. Biffo, "Il lemma metaphysicus in san Tommaso d'Aquino," in Teologia,
pp. 85-107 (English summary p. 107). In another article-" Per un'analisi
semantica dei lemmi ' theologia,' 'theologus,' ' theologizo ' in san Tommaso:
un saggio metodologico nell'uso del "Index Thomisticus," in Teologia, 3, 1978,
pp. 148-163-Biffi follows the pattern of a hermeneutical research to a greater
degree.

678

PAOLO GUIETTI

concept.34 Laura Landen, recensing all the occurrences of terms
like complexio and elementum, sheds new light-from St.
Thomas's biological language-on the well known Thomistic
thesis of the unicity of the substantial form. 35 Enzo Portalupi
documents the influence of Gregory the Great on the young St.
Thomas, collecting all the quotations of Gregory the Great in the
Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate. 36 With a more lexicographical intention and method, Riccardo Quinto 37 analyzes the
words timor and timiditas, exemplifying also the lexicographic
process invented by Busa. 38
Before sketching the moments of a hermeneutical analysis with
the Index it is necessary to counteract the widespread idea that
the use of a computer shortens the time involved in developing an
interpretation. The computer, rather, makes this process longer,
but much more precise and complete. The Index Thomisticus
creates the need for a greater amount of time for hermeneutical
research. The time necessary for research is " by its nature and
without possible remedies the true remarkable defect of the Index
Thomisticus (defect ... by ·excess!) : The Index Thomisticus is
neither a lexicon nor a florilegium ready to hand for rapid consultation, but a document for systematic researches." 39
34 Unpublished paper presented at the XIX International
Congress on
Medieval Studies, Kalamazoo, MI, 1984. See W. Wallace, "Galileo and Reasoning Ex Suppositione: The Methodology of The Two New Sciences " in
Proceedings of the 1974 Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association, ed. by R. S. Cohen et al. (Dordrecht and Boston: D. Reidel, 1976),
pp. 79-104.
35 Idem. See L. Landen, " Thomas Aquinas and the Dynamism of Natural
Substances" (Dissertation, Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
America, 1985).
36 E. Portalupi, " Gregorio Magno nelle Quaestiones Disputates De Veritate
di Tommaso d'Aquino, in Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 78, 1985, pp. 556598.
37 R. Quinto, " ' Timer ' e ' Timiditas.'
Note di lessicografia tomista," in
Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 78, 1985, pp. 387-410.
38 For more examples of use of Index Thomisticus see Thomistische Hermeneutik, p. 364.
so Per S. Toinmaso 'ratio seminalis' p. 448. "When someone has an immediate need to know what St. Thomas wrote about a specific point of doctrine and does not have the time to research scientifically into which words are

NOTES

ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

679

The first moment of the analysis is the le.xicological analysis.
Once the lemma corresponding to the concept to be studied
has been determined, i.e., the key-word, the "family" of the
lemma has to be measured and classified. The family of a lemma
is composed of all those lemmas which share the same radical
stem, or which are lexicologically related. In this way one can
begin to identify the notional area of the key-word. The notional area or semantic field does not necessarily have the same
verbal root. This notional field, however, has to be measured in
lexicological terms: classified by numbers, occurrences, etc.,
either in proper texts or in quotations. Before the second step,
one must notice that the problem of a Thomistic lexicology in
general can be stated in this way: " How many and what sort of
words did St. Thomas use? How does one describe the system,
both by typology and by quantity? " 40
The second moment consists in the proximate preparation to
lexicographic analysis. All the contexts selected are read one by
one. 41 It goes without saying that certain contexts are extremely
prominent: those, for instance, where the key-word is not just
used but also defined. 42 This lexicographic moment of the analysis, however, still deals with the word itself in its use, with the
word in actu exercito. The most elaborate part of the hermeneutical work consists in this analysis. First, it is very important to
identify the other words with which the key-word is associated: as
used by St. Thomas in expressing it, he is advised not to apply to the Index
Thomisticus but to an inde.r realis, i.e., subject index of St. Thomas, like the
Tabula Aurea of Petrus of Bergamo, the Indices Leonini vol. XVI and L.
Schuetz's Thomas Lexi/con" (Clavis Indicis Thomistici, p. 10).
40 Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ', p. 445. L. Bataillon, in a short paper
with the title " The Index Thomisticus and Leonine Editions " for the XIX
International Congress on Medieval Studies (Kalamazoo, Mich., 1984) gives
examples of the lexicological usefulness of the Inde.r Thomist,irns, limited to
the ongoing production of critical editions of St. Thomas.
41 Criteria
of selection, of limitation, differ according to the goal and the
available time for research. One can restrict a search to the context of the
key-word, avoiding the contexts of words of the lexicological family and of the
notional field. Other possible restrictions : only to certain works, only uses
outside of quotations, etc. See for this Clai1is Indicis Thomistici, pp. 16-18.
42 See the example for metaphora, in Clavis Indicis Thomistici, p. 18.

680

PAOLO GUIETTI

synonyms, antonyms, comparisons, etc. Then, exammmg the
grammatical correlations, one determines which words are associated with it as adjectives (predicative or attributive), which
words are associated as specifications (genitive), or which words
the key-word specifies, etc. Finally, one determines for which
verbs the word is the subject or the object of action. This process
is the very anatomy of the key-word. It shows a myriad of different links and connections. It is like the examination of a cell
under a microscope. 43
" Writing the lexicographic voice is the last step. It is a spiritual work of intuitive and synthetical interpretation. It would be
science fiction thinking that a computer would be able to accomplish it." 44 All the analytical work here finds its synthesis.
In this process thought and word, in-tuition and ex-pression, find
their identity again. To write the lexicographic voice is to reach
the mens auctoris and its Aus-legung, ex-position. For example, one sees that when St. Thomas wrote ratio ordinis, he
was not thinking of what we think when we say " the reason of
order," but of something closer to what we think in saying " rational plan, program." 45 Likewise with ratio boni: not (only)
"the reason of good," but "value."
The lexicographic analysis has as its final goal the compilation
of a new Thomistic lexicon. 46 This lexicon will make possible the
passage between signs belonging to two different systems. The
lexicon will be a bridge, moreover, not just for signs, but for
thoughts. This hermeneutical project is very ambitious and requires the sacrifice of confidence in an acquired jargon, or better,
requires that the jargon, in this case the medievalist jargon, be
presented as such, which may not be related essentially to what
43 Examples of this patient analysis are presented in the quoted articles :
ORDO dans les oeuvres, De voce SPIRITUS, and Voces REALIS- Realiter.
44 Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ', p. 450.
45 Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ', p. 447.
46 "This was mainly the reason why I wanted to prepare the Inde.x Thomisticus. I maintained that St. Thomas's vocabulary should be translated prior
to his texts. In fact, linguistic evolution progresses at a far greater speed than
the evolution of species " ( Clm:is Jndicis Thornistici, p. 14).

NOTES ON THE INDEX THOMISTICUS

681

is said and often proves misleading. Thought cannot be mummified in words: because it is act, thought is dynamic and living.
The project of a new Thomistic lexicon is not just an invitation
to a linguistic party. It is an invitation to thinking: an invitation
to discover philosophy and not just history in the history of
philosophy. It is an invitation to depart from the safe ghetto of
two kinds of repetitions : that of the historicist and that of the
paleo-scholastic. For the former, time is everything, while for the
latter, time is nothing. For Busa's hermeneutical project, time
is something. 47 Therefore, the Inde:c Thomisticus is a philosophical project of the "consciousness of the work of time." 48
V. Anti-Historicism 'Without Forgetting Time and History:
The E:cample of Ratio Seminalis

In reading St. Thomas, like reading anyone else, there is a
communication between two intelligences, remote in time, space,
environment, and language. This communication is made possible
by signs, written words, and sentences which convey a meaning
It is practically impossible that the same signs could have the
same meanings after seven centuries of human speech and of
human history. This is the hermeneutical problem: the reader's
mind and the writer's mind are not reading the same thing, al47 There is another hermeneutical process altogether different from the patient analysis of the Index Thomisticus. This method is a synthetic one (see
Thomistische Hermeneutik, p. 360). In order to understand only one word,
one has to read the entire corpus. This synthetical approach is certainly more
fundamental. But even if the method looks to the whole, it does not mean that
studying the fragment is worthless. To inquire into the fragments as if the
whole were just the mere sum of the fragments is to have lost sense of reality.
Inquiry into the fragments qua fragments manifests again the primacy of the
whole. As anatomy can be extremely useful to physiology, so the anatomy of
the text in its words can be useful for understanding the text.
48 So J. Grondin proposes to translate
Gadamer's syntagm "Wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein" (Wahrheit und Methode, II, II, 3). See J.
Grondin, " La conscience du travail de l'histoire et le probleme de la verite
en hermeneutique," in Archives de Philosophie 44, 1981, pp. 435-453. In any
case, the finest merit of historiographical hermeneutic is the disclosure of
time, i.e., the time which separates reader and writer. It is an ex-position
and thereby discloses consciousness of the work of history.

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PAOLO GUIETTI

though the sign is the same sign. The same sign, for instance,
ratio seminalis, does not have the same meaning in the two
minds. 49
The first, but still rudimentary, solution of this hermeneutical
problem regarding St. Thomas is the literal translation. The text
is simply given in a modern language. Ratio seminalis is thus
translated by ' seminal reason ' or ' seminal virtue.'
Et ideo convenienter Augustinus
omnes virtutes activas et passivas
quae sunt principia generationum
et motuum naturalium seminales
rationes vocat.50

Thus Augustine aptly termed
seminal virtues all those active
and passive powers that are the
originative sources of the coming into being of natural things
and of their changings.51

" Seminal virtues " (reasons) has practically no meaning for
any modern mind. This reflects a weakness of the translator, but
neither the text by itself nor such a translation of it can overcome
this difference. 52 Another way to make the differ·ence less puzzling is an historiographical approach. In this way, ratio semin'alis
is understood in its historical settings, as a Stoic concept inherited by St. Thomas through the influence of St. Augustine,
and so on: quotations and citations of Marcus Aurelius, Plutarch,
Philo, and Plotinus, as origins of the concept for St. Augustine
and St. Thomas, can be multiplied. While bringing the historical
meaning of the concept closer, this approach makes the philosophical meaning more remote.
The Index Thomisticus makes available the horizon of the same
word every time it has been used, i.e., written. The effort of
Per San Tommaso 'ratio seminalis', p. 448.
ST 1, q. 115, a. 2 c.
51 Ibid.
Quoted in Blackfriars edition. One should consult the essay on
'Seminal Reason' by W. A. Wallace, in Vol. 10, appendix 6, pp. 197-198 of
the Blackfriars edition of the Summa Theologiae as well.
52 " On perdra par la, heureusement, la facilite macaronique de traduire les
discours de St. Thomas, tout simplement en manipulant les desinences, la
graphie et parfois l'ordre de ses mots. Traduire un texte d'autrui implique de
remonter de son discours a ses concepts et de reexprimer ces memes concepts
avec nos mots d'aujourd'hui, meme s'ils son differents: en effet dans un auteur
ancien, plusieurs mots peuvent avoir des contenus semantique que nous ne
leur attribuons plus aujourd'hui" in L'originalite linguistique, p. 88.
49

50

NOTES

ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

683

comprehension is to try to understand in one's own conceptual
system a different conceptual system, and to do so through a
verbal system that is not coincident with the way its expression
appears to us. The common system of signs, the written words,
is neither common nor immediately communicative. The hermeneutical process can be represented with a triangle. 53

St. Thomas's verbal
system

St. Thomas's conceptual
system

!'

verbal and conceptual
system of St. Thomas's reader

This triangle avoids the possible reduction of concepts to words
(verbal system to conceptual system), and expresses the necessity
of a passage through the reader's conceptual and verbal system
in order to understand a simple text.
A word like ratio seminalis, therefore, has two different meanings, one in St. Thomas's mind and one in the reader's mind.
Translating ratio seminalis by ' seminal virtue' or 'reason' gives
the text an oldness and an inadequacy which originally it did not
have. To read ratio seminalis by giving the word a historical
meaning, i.e., furnishing it with a set of historical sources and
influences, is to meta-interpret the text. Furthermore, when the
historical apparatus obstructs the comprehension, this leads the
reader to mis-interpret the text.
5 3 Thomistische Hermeneutik, pp. 359-360; Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ', p. 444; L'lndex Thomisticus, p. 414.

684

PAOLO GUIETTI

A rigorous lexicographic analysis 54 of the word shows that
St. Thomas uses the word ratio seminalis to mean something
similar to what we mean by ' genetic code,' or the original set
of information. The word ratio has the meaning of program,
plan, or organized set of information. The word seminalis, the
adjectival form of semen, has to be understood as 'genetic.' Rationes seminales should be understood as those programmed codes
which are at work in the ordered development of a living being.
The repetition of these programs, from living being to living being, is reproduction. According to St. Thomas, there are four
different modes in which these biological routines or genetic programs work: first, in the beginning phases of every living being;
second, in the mature living being insofar as it is able to reproduce this information; third, in the beginning of all processes
of reproduction, genesis, as a condition of possibility of an order;
fourth, but fundamentally, in the mind of the programmer of life.55
This does not mean that St. Thomas had our notion of genetic
code or that he is the father of genetics, but that in using this
expression to explain the living world he means something similar
to what we mean when speaking of genetic codes.
One may criticize this approach by saying that it lacks historical sense. ' Genetic code ' is not ratio seminalis, one might
argue, for there are seven centuries of history of scientific effort
in between. This goes without saying. The problem is instead:
how can we judge the past from a point of time that is itself going
to be the past in a few years? Why should the truth be ' genetic
code ' and not ratio seminalis if in one hundred years another
expression, ' x ', will replace ' genetic code ' as inadequate? In
reading an author of the past we have to remember that we ourselves are going to be what he is : past. With the measure by
which we measure, we are to be measured. What is more, we are
already measuring ourselves and the value of our opinions. If
scientific-philosophical paradigms were without any continuity,
5 4 Analysis of seminalis made by I. Sztrilich.
See Per S. Tommaso 'ratio
seminalis ', p. 442.
55 ST 1, q. 115, a. 2; Per S. Tommaso 'ratio seminalis ', p. 442-443.

NOTES

ON THE INDEX

THOMISTICUS

685

then any paradigm would have as justification only the fact of
being the most recent.
Another objection rises from certain fields of specialization in
medieval philosophy. The effort to overcome the difficulties in
the comprehension of a text (cultural settings, chronologies,
styles, influences) leads to forgetfulness of the value of the text
itself. One can spend a lifetime on these texts and be incapable
of remembering why they are still so interesting. This fear of
thinking is a mortal disease in philosophy. It is comparable to
the fear of Cremonini, who used to say " De Aristotele dicimus,
non de re ipsa." 56 The "archeological" effort to disclose certain
texts, an effort worthy of a great reconnaissance, must remember
that those texts and words coming from centuries past have meanings. And the worth of archeological efforts depends upon this :
the more current these texts are the more valuable it is to " discover " them. This is assuming, of course, that someone from the
past can say something that we do not know, i.e., that it is not
true that the last to speak is the one who is right.
Busa remarks that he has not yet found a word in St. Thomas
which has not undergone a process of modification in its meaning. Indeed, history docs nothing in vain. The meaning of the
word ordo, for instance, a word used very often by St. Thomas,
has been specified by many other words, and simply translating
ordo by ' order ' loses the semanticity of the word in St. Thomas.
Therefore, ordo can mean in St. Thomas (according to the different contexts in which it is used) what we mean by ' organization ', ' system ', ' classification ', ' hierarchy ', ' taxonomy ', etc. 57
Likewise, the word virtus has a notional value much more extensive than the word 'virtue'. Moreover, in English the word
' virtue ' has almost completely lost its dynamical connotation.
For St. Thomas, virtus means force, energy, power, dynamism,
capacity, ability, efficacy, etc. An expression like virtus fidei, for
instance, would be better translated " power of faith." 58
5 6 As quoted by F. Olgiati,
L'anima dell'umanesimo e del Rinascimento
(Milan: Vita e Pensiero, 1924), p. 576.
57 ORDO dans /es oeuvres, p. 60.
58 L'originalite linguistique, p. 75. See also Voces REALIS-REALITER;
De voce SPIRITUS.

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PAOLO GUIETTI

This effort to go beyond a thoughtless reading to understand
signs truly is the hermeneutical attitude. And this hermeneutical
attitude is what philosophy and theology are all about: " One of
my teachers, Father Carlo Giacon, S.J., attributed to St. Thomas
the originality of having made the distinction between theology
and philosophy. I want to add to this a paradox: while for St.
Thomas theology is the hermeneutic of the human and historical
discourses by which God disclosed the mystery of salvation,
philosophy is the hermeneutic of that exclusive language of God
of which things are the words ( solus Deus po test creare), i.e.,
philosophy is the hermeneutic of being and of the beings. St.
Thomas realized that, for all of us, all discourse is but a fragment of a hermeneutic of being." 59

5 0" Un des mes maitres, le R. P. Carlo Giacon, S.J. attribuait a St. Thomas
l'originalite d'avoir distingue philosophie et theologie. Moi j'y ajoute un
paradoxe : la theologie etant l'hermeneutique des discours humains et historiques
avec lesquels Dieu a revele !es mysteres du salut, pour St. Thomas la philosophie est l'hermeneutique de cette langue exclusive de Dieu, dont !es mots sont
!es choses (so lits Deus po test ere are), c'est-a-dire l'hermeneutique de l'etre et
des etres. St. Thomas s'est rendu compte que, pour nous tous, tout discours
n'est qu'un fragment d'une hermeneutique de l'etre" [L'orighialite linguistique,
p. 78 (my translation) ] .

BOOK REVIEWS
Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals. By IRIS MURDOCH. Harmondsworth:
Allen Lane; New York: Viking, 1992. $35.00.
Dame Iris Murdoch is familiar to most people as a witty and en·
gaging novelist whose twenty-four hooks of fiction can he read on a
variety of levels. They are wonderful stories, hut the philosophically
acute reader will also enjoy Murdoch's judgments, polemics, and inhouse jokes about philosophers and philosophical views.
Comparatively few people are aware of Murdoch's previous scholarly
studies: Sartre, Romantic Rationalist, The Sovereignty of the Good,
The Fire and the Sun; and Acastos. Even so, those familiar with
these hooks will recognize the profound impact she has had on debates
within moral philosophy. She has been at the forefront of the move·
ment that has rehabilitated the central importance of such notions as
goodness, the Good, virtue, and the moral life as a journey.
So it is not surprising that Murdoch has returned to the genre of
philosophical argument to advance her views on the relationship between metaphysics and morals. But it is surprising that her argument
exhibits neither the clarity of thought characteristic of the analytic
philosophy in which she was trained nor the dramatic narrative of her
novels.
Indeed the hook reads like a collage of lecture notes, complete with
extensive quotations from other people's thoughts with minimal com·
mentary. Further, the chapter titles (e.g., " Fact and Value," " Schopenhauer," " Consciousness and Thought-I," " Derrida and Struc·
turalism," " Consciousness and Thought-II," "Notes on Will and
Duty," " Axioms, Duties, Eros," " Void ") shed little light on the overall structure or argument of the hook. One cannot help hut have the
impression that Murdoch spent less time crafting the argument of this
hook than she does in crafting the story line and characters of her
novels.
This is not to say, of course, that there is not much to he learned
from Murdoch's perspective. She is remarkably erudite, and her discussion of various themes, figures, and issues often yields fascinating
insights. But the whole is considerably less than the sum of its often
interesting parts. I have already suggested that this is partly because
of the structure and style in which the hook is written. But the hook

687

688

BOOK REVIEWS

is also disappointing, and perhaps more determinatively, because of the
overall perspective she seeks to deploy and defend.
Readers of Murdoch's work have heretofore often wondered about
the relationship between her avowed Platonism and her interest in Christianity. Metaphysics as a Guide to Morals has the virtue of clarifying
that relationship, hut the result is unpersuasive.
At the heart of Murdoch's Platonism is her recasting of the allegory
of the cave from The Republic. The moral life is an arduous struggle
to ascend from the cave (represented, as in her earlier works, by " the
fat, relentless ego ") by a dispossession of the self so that we can apprehend a little less imperfectly the perfect form of the Good. As
Murdoch puts it,
Plato assumes the internal relation of value, truth, cogmtion. Virtue
(as compassion, humility, courage) involves a desire for and achievement of truth instead of falsehood, reality instead of appearance. Goodness involves truth.seeking knowledge and ipso facto a discipline of desire. ' Getting things right ', as in meticulous grammar or mathematics,
is truth-seeking as virtue. Learning anything properly demands (virtuous) attention. Here the idea of truth plays a crucial role (as it does
also in Kant) and reality emerges as the object of truthful vision, and
virtuous action as the product of such vision. This is a picture of the
omnipresence of morality and evaluation in human life (p. 39).

Such a depiction ought to resonate quite deeply with Christians, something not lost on Murdoch when she writes a few pages earlier: "There
are innumerable points at which we have to detach ourselves, to change
our orientation, to redirect our desire and refresh and purify our
energy, to keep on looking in the right direction: to attend upon the
grace that comes through faith " (p. 25) .
But Murdoch's "grace" and her "truth-seeking as virtue," among
other themes, involve something quite different from what Christians
have typically meant by such notions. Murdoch does not simply wish
to say that God is Good; she wants to replace talk of God with talk of
the Good. Metaphysics, according to Murdoch, is a gifted thinker's engagement with the Good which, while independent of the self, is also
not transcendent in any sense similar to what Christians say of God.
Talk of this " immanent " Good is indispensable to an adequate account
of morality, but we can and more importantly should dispense with talk
of God.
Moralists, she suggests, can give an adequate and coherent account
of morality by developing metaphysical metaphors about the Good and
ignoring or abandoning references to God. Indeed Murdoch follows
Schopenhauer in being attracted to Buddhism as a tradition that talks
about the Good without reference to a personal God.
In addition, Murdoch thinks we in the West can dispense with talk

BOOK REVIEWS

689

of God because traditional Christianity is fading, and along with it, belief in a " supernatural " God. It is to be replaced by a " demythologized " Christianity which " takes leave of God." Setting aside the
empirical dubiousness of her claim that Christianity is " fading," Murdoch's theological perspective here seems most influenced by a rather
peculiar and provincial British intellectual tradition identified with such
figures as A. J. Ayer and John A. T. Robinson. One has to wonder
about the theological sophistication of a book on " metaphysics and
morals " and on issues of " God " and " Good " which devotes more
space to Don Cupitt than to Thomas Aquinas.
Indeed the omission of any discussion of St. Thomas (he is mentioned twice, and only in passing) is a major lacuna of the book.
One would think that, at the very least, his work represents a worthy
rival whose position is sufficiently similar to require a sustained engagement by Murdoch. But while she provides a thorough discussion
of Anselm's ontological argument (which she thinks provides only the
necessity of Good-not a proof of divine existence) , Murdoch attends
neither to Thomas's critique of the ontological argument nor to
Thomas's complex synthesis of the Platonic-Augustinian and the Aristotelian traditions.
Why this is so is unclear. It would seem that, despite Murdoch's
recurrent desire to bring theology and philosophy together (as well as
her judgment that current intellectual trends are already bringing them
together), -0nly a " demythologized " Christian theology is invited to
the table.
Perhaps Murdoch's philosophical perspective on the relationship between metaphysics and morals would be more persuasive if it was defended more explicitly in relation to rival viewpoints such as St.
Thomas's, or if her own judgments about Christianity's contemporary
significance did not hang by rather tenuous threads, or if she developed
a more powerful argument about why belief in a transcendent-yetimmanent Triune God should be abandoned as morally dangerous. But
in the absence of such accounts, her perspective seems rather arbitrary
-and ultimately unsatisfying.
Perhaps the saddest feature of reading this book is that it now becomes more difficult to read Murdoch's wonderful novels and even to
re-read her engaging The Sovereignty of the Good. Once one has seen
the full development of her philosophical perspective in Metaphysics as
a Guide to Morals, it will not be easy to be enchanted once again by
Murdoch's storytelling power. That is the unfortunate legacy of a
problematic book written by a most provocative author.

L. GREGORY JONES
Loyola College in Maryland
Baltimore, Maryland

690

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Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible. By RICHARD J. BLACKWELL. Notre
Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame, 1991. Pp. 272. $29.95
{cloth).
Although this well-hound, manageable volume, complete with an
artistic seventeenth-century dust jacket, has not received an official
ecclesiastical "imprimatur," nevertheless, it is (according to this Dominican reviewer) both free from doctrinal error and filled with true
and useful historical, philosophical, and theological information. Seemingly no other case in the history of our western intellectual tradition
has generated more controversy, more ill feeling, and more mutual misunderstanding across more lines of intellectual, political, and religious
division than the "Galileo affair." Few people today are equipped historically, scientifically, philosophically, and theologically to discuss accurately the wide range of issues surrounding this unfortunate incident.
A seasoned veteran of the strong historical, philosophical tradition of
the Jesuit-run St. Louis University, and himself an active member of
the Roman Catholic Church, Richard J. Blackwell, historian of philosophy and philosopher of science, has done a marvelous service to the
academic community hy presenting us with this volume.
In this well-researched, well-argued, and very readable manuscript,
Blackwell helps to place Galileo's intellectual and ecclesiastical struggle
within the broader historical, philosophical, religious, and theological
context of rthe late 16th and early 17th centuries. Quoting the words of
Olaf Pedersen, Blackwell considers the Galileo affair " not only as an
episode in the history of science, but also as an important event in the
history of theology" {p. 3). His principal purpose in writing this
book is " to study the Galileo affair from this perspective " and, in
particular, to understand "the role played by the Bible in the Galileo
affair" (p. 3). Without attempting to praise, to blame, or to excuse,
Blackwell sets out to understand precisely how it was that the historical,
religious, and theological factors came to have such a profound effect
on the scientific and philosophical questions of Galileo's time. He
argues convincingly that the Roman insistence on upholding the traditional interpretation of certain key biblical passages can he understood
adequately only within the historical and religious climate of postTridentine theology, Jesuit obedience, and strict adherence to the
Thomistic synthesis of philosophy and theology. Toward this end,
Blackwell brings together for the first time certain important texts, concepts, and historical arguments that help to alleviate some of the
" murkiness " blurring our view of the Galileo affair, and help to make
that incident more intelligible to our modern minds.

BOOK REVIEWS

691

Blackwell argues that the Roman hierarchy was not so much concerned with the content of the new astronomy as it was determined to
reassert itself as the authentic interpreter of Scripture and tradition.
According to Blackwell, the new astronomy challenged not only the
philosophy of Aristotle and the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but, perhaps more importantly, it challenged the ecclesiastical authority of the
Roman hierarchy in its role as interpreter and teacher of the Apostolic
faith. How could the new astronomy be anything but a hypothetical
model, when it so clearly contradicted the words of Scripture as in·
terpreted by the Church Fathers? How could mere mathematicians and
astronomers insist on philosophical propositions that seemed to make
the Bible false? No single individual was invested with the authority
to interpret the Bible for the whole body of believers, as the Church
had so painfully learned from the lessons of the Protestant Reformers.
That authority lay solely with the "Church," that is, with the Roman
hierarchy, the Pope in union with a council, as was clear from the
canons and decrees of the Council of Trent. Moreover, strict obedience
was the order of the day as many Jesuit thinkers so agonizingly came
to realize.
Blackwell divides his own text into seven chapters: (1) Trent and
Beyond; (2) Bellarmine's Views Before the Galileo Affair; (3) Gali·
leo's Detour into Biblical Exegesis; (4) Foscarini's Bombshell; (5)
The Bible at Galileo's Trial (6) The Jesuit Dilemma: Truth or Obedience; and (7) Reflections on Truth in Science and in Religion. In
the first two chapters, he establishes a context for the Galileo affair by
discussing :the theological interpretation and importance of the Council
of Trent, especially as concerns ecclesiastical authority, the interpretation of Scripture, and the tradition of the Church Fathers. He singles
out for discussion the biblical and cosmological views of Robert Bellarmine, a cardinal, a Jesuit, and perhaps the leading theologian and
Churchman of his day. As Blackwell reminds us, Bellarmine was involved in the condemnation of Giordano Bruno, in the controversies
over grace and free-will among the Jesuits and Dominicans, and he
played a signal role in the " first trial " of Galileo. Moreover, had
Bellarmine lived longer, perhaps his personal respect and admiration
for Galileo could have prevented the seemingly inevitable show-down
between Galileo and the Roman authorities. However, Blackwell points
out that it was Bellarmine's own theology, including his strict interpre·
tation of Trent, his emphasis on the importance of authority, and his
understanding of " blind obedience " that helped to shape the forces
that eventually brought down Galileo and temporarily slowed the advance of scientific and philosophical discourse in the Catholic world.
In chapters three, four, and five, Blackwell discusses the writings,

692

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decrees, and events surrounding the condemnation of Copernican
astronomy and the silencing of Galileo in 1616, as well as the disciplining of Galileo in 1633. Blackwell shows that the significant scientific,
philosophical, and theological issues were all decided during the " first
phase" of the trial in 1615-16. In the second phase of the trial, in
1633, the Church merely reasserted " with both force and frequency "
its earlier condemnation of Copernican astronomy and focused its attention instead on " the person of Galileo "-" Was he loyal or was
he disobedient? " {p. 131).
In the final two chapters, Blackwell discusses these ecclesiastical decisions concerning Galileo and the new astronomy within the context
of the Jesuit notion of obedience and an increasing desire within Roman
Catholicism in the 17th century to curtail the divisive effects of the
Protestant Reformation. He shows, too, how this emphasis on authority
and obedience adversely affected the Jesuit thinkers of the day, who
seemed eager to make a place for the new evidence of the senses in the
world of Aristotelian and Thomistic philosophy and theology. Finally,
Blackwell considers some contemporary questions concerning the relationships among science, philosophy, and theology, and draws certain
parallels between the thoughts, actions, and events of the 17th-century
and those of our present age. Indeed, what is the relationship between
authority and truth?
Besides his original discussion concerning the role of the Bible in
the Galileo affair, Blackwell brings together for us in a relatively extensive series of appendices and in English translation {some for the
first time) key documents surrounding the incident. These include a
selection from the Decrees of the Council of Trent, Diego .de Zuniga's
theologically suspect Commentary on Job, a section of Bellarmine's
theological masterpiece, De controversiis de verbo Dei, Galileo's Letter
to Castelli, Galileo's correspondence with Pietro Dini, as well as some
of Galileo's unpublished notes on science and scripture (written in
1615), along with Foscarini's Letter on Copernican astronomy and his
Defense of that letter, together with an anonymous censor's report on
the original letter and Bellarmine's own Letter to Foscarini. These
texts present us with a convenient opportunity to peruse the documents
for ourselves and to see the important role that ecclesiastical authority
and biblical interpretation played in the Galileo affair. Galileo and
Foscarini tried desperately to convince the Roman authorities that they
were making a grave mistake in condemning Copernican astronomy in
order to uphold the traditional interpretation of scripture. "Too had,"
says Blackwell, " that they apparently were unable to see the devastating impact of their actions beyond their Roman world and beyond their
own small place in time" (p. 124). And yet was it not precisely he-

BOOK REVIEWS

693

cause they perceived the importance of this event and the devastating
effects of privatized religion that they in fact insisted on their own
authority? Indeed, they were mistaken in this instance, and they have
paid dearly for it over the ages, hut it was a sincere concern for truth
and for Church unity that guided them on their path. Galileo himself
was committed to the same ideals of theological, philosophical, and scientific truth as were the Jesuits, as were the Roman authorities, as
were most thinkers of the time. It was this concern for truth that led
to this individual conflict, which has had disastrous effects within and
without the Catholic world for the last four centuries.
All in all, I think that Blackwell has made a significant contribution
to the ongoing discussion of the relationships among science, philosophy, and theology. This is a first-rate treatment of an immensely important historical incident that sheds light on the issues of today. However, I should like to raise several questions about the hook and suggest areas that need clarification and further study. First, I think that
Blackwell does not state strongly enough the historical conclusion for
which he has presented convincing evidence. He jumps too quickly at
the end of the hook from the 17th century to the present day. Had he
stayed principally with his understanding of the Galileo case and the
surrounding theological climate of the time he could have made his
point more forcefully and tied together more clearly several lines of
intellectual and historical importance. Secondly, Blackwell's treatment
of some of the methodological issues of the 17th century strikes me as
somewhat anachronistic. He seems at times to take for granted the
contemporary distinctions between science, philosophy, and theology,
distinctions which would not have crossed the minds of even the
greatest thinkers of that time. Though 17th-century thinkers most assuredly distinguished the realm of faith from the realm of reason, they
certainly did not consider the study of nature to he " hypothetical," in
the contemporary sense, as Blackwell sometimes hints that Galileo and
Foscarini did. In fact, it was their commitment to the human mind's
ability to grasp clearly and certainly the secrets of nature that got them
into so much trouble in the first place. Galileo hoped to discover the
true constitution of the physical universe based on sense experience and
necessary reasons or demonstrations. William Wallace's recent work
on Galileo's early physical and logical questions is especially helpful in
supplementing our understanding of Galileo's use of suppositiones, that
is, " suppositions " or "hypotheses," in his scientific writings. Bellarmine, Galileo, and most thinkers of the time shared common Aristotelian principles of methodological procedure, whether in natural philosophy, metaphysics, or Christian theology. Thirdly, a fuller discussion
of the appendices could have helped to make them more useful for the

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reader. Indeed, Blackwell does discuss the context and importance of
the documents within his own text However, I think that a short introduction to each selection, including time and context of its authorship, as well as some of its historical or intellectual connections with
other writings would have proved helpful. Finally, I perceived a few
minor inconsistencies in Blackwell's discussion of the relationship he·
tween tradition and Scripture, and his discussion of the " literal " interpretation of Scripture. He argues that the problem with the new
astronomy is that it contradicts the Scriptures and not the unwritten
Catholic tradition. Yet he spends a considerable time discussing the
Patristic interpretation of Scripture, which he seems to say is part of
the " unwritten " Catholic tradition. Also, at times he seems not to
keep in mind clearly enough the precise meaning of " literal " interpretation of the Bible. Indeed, as Blackwell points out, the literal sense
can be figurative, that is, metaphorical, e.g., " God's wrath " or " God's
right hand." However, when he detects an increasing literalism in the
Church's interpretation of Scripture, Blackwell seems to forget this
point. The more " literal " interpretation of passages dealing with the
motion of the sun seems to me a mistake about the true literal meaning
of the text, rather than an increasing emphasis on the literal sense, as
distinct from the metaphorical or figurative sense. However, these are
only minor points and do not detract from the meaning and importance
of Blackwell's text.
In some ways, we have only recently begun to face the facts of the
Galileo affair in an honest and scientific manner. Much more work
needs to be done on the scientific, methodological, philosophical, and
theological context of this history-shaping event. Blackwell's discussion
of the role of the Bible in the Galileo affair is a significant contribution
towards our further understanding of why this incident happened in
the way that it did-indeed, why it happened at all. This book is accesible to theologians, philosophers, historians, and interested scientists. It could be used in graduate courses, as well as in upper-level
undergraduate courses, dealing with issues of the historical relation·
ships among science, philosophy, and theology. For all who are interested in coming to a true understanding of the Galileo affair within
its 16th- and 17-century context, this hook is a must read.

Emc A. REITAN, O.P.
St. Louis University and the Aquinas Institute of Theology
St. Louis, Missouri

BOOK REVIEWS

695

Salvation Outside the Church? Tracing the History of the Catholic
Response. By FRANCIS A. SULLIVAN. New York/Mahwah: Paulist
Press, 1992. Pp. i

+ 224. $12.95 (paper).

The subtitle of the volume describes well its purpose and content.
The author surveys in chronological order, beginning with the earliest
ecclesiastical writers and ending with John Paul II, the various interpretations of the axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus. What prompted
Sullivan to undertake a historical rather than systematic approach in
his volume is the conviction that without taking into account the historical and cultural factors that conditioned the formulation of this
axiom it is impossible to make sense of the shift from the exclusivism
of the pre-Vatican II Church to the inclusiveness of Vatican II and
post-Vatican II theology with regard to the salvation of those who are
not members of ,the Roman Catholic Church.
The principle that guides Sullivan's attempt to disclose the meaning
embodied in the manifold formulations of the axiom " there is no salvation outside the Church" is Pope John XXHI's distinction between
" the substance of the ancient doctrine of the deposit of faith " and
" the way in which it is presented," and the more recent emphasis of
the Declaration Mysterium Ecclesiae (1973) on the historical condition affecting the expression of divine revelation.
As a historical study, Salvation Outside the Church? is an excellent
continuation of Louis Caperan's two-volume work Le probleme du salut
des infideles, which is still unavailable in English. Obviously an over·
view of almost two thousand years of theological discussion of this
problem has to be highly selective if one is not to miss the forest
for the trees, and Sullivan's choice of authors as well as of historical
periods for discussion is judiciously made. If a complaint is to be made
in this regard, it is that he has focused too much attention on magisterial documents, and Roman documents at that, and not enough
on contemporary theology. True, he devotes a chapter to the theory
of " anonymous Christians," espoused mainly by Karl Rahner (chapter
10), and defends it against criticisms by Henri de Lubac, Hans Urs
von Balthasar, Hans Kiing, and Max Seckler. He is well aware that
Rahner's theory has become the position of mainstream Catholic theology and cites authors who support it in one way or another (p. 181).
However, a book that claims to present " the Catholic response " to
the problem posed by the axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus should,
one would expect, have discussed in greater detail the various positions of contemporary Catholic theologians on this issue. It is to be
fervently hoped that Sullivan will take up this task in his next book.

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Sullivan's basic thesis is that the substance underlying the various
negative formulations of the axiom extra ecclesiam nulla salus is the
positive belief ithat " God has assigned to the church a necessary role
in the accomplishment of his plan for the salvation of humanity " (p.
12). Such a thesis is, of course, neither new nor startling. Hans
Kling had already said that much in his 1967 Die Kirche (English
translation, p. 318).
What is helpful in Sullivan's account is his explanation of both the
intent of those who affirmed this axiom with its apparent exclusiveness
and the limitations that prevented them from perceiving the universality
of God's saving grace. With regard to intent, Sullivan shows con·
vincingly that the patristic usage of the axiom is intended as a warning for those Christians who had separated themselves from the catholica either by schism or by heresy that they must remain within it in
order to be saved, whereas ithe medieval usage is intended to warn
pagans and Jews that they should accept the message of the Gospel
now that it had been announced to them. With regard to limitations,
Sullivan singles out two: the geographical and the psychological. On
the one hand, there was before the discovery of America the conviction
that the world was identical with Christian Europe. This belief led
theologians to postulate that the Gospel had been spread throughout the
world. On the other hand, their ignorance of the dynamics of human
choice caused rthem to impute bad faith and guilt to all those who re·
fused to accept the Gospel.
The shift from the pessimism of the pre-Vatican II Church to the
optimism espoused by Vatican II and post-Vatican II theologians regarding the possibility of salvation for non-Roman Catholics is credited
by Sullivan to two factors: Vatican H's teaching on the hierarchy of
truths (the primacy being granted to God's universal will to save rather
than to the necessity of baptism and the Church as means of salvation)
and the broadening of theological horizons brought about by ecumeni·
cal and interreligious dialogues.
As a historical study, Salvation OutsUle the Church? is a helpful
survey of a vexed issue in ecclesiology and the theology of grace. It
accomplishes what it sets out to do, wiith clarity of exposition, economy
of expression, and fairness of judgment, qualities that grace Sullivan's
other works such as Magisterium and The Church We Believe In. As
has been pointed out above, Sullivan's basic thesis is neither startling
nor new, but theological merit often does not lie in radicality and
novelty. One is grateful to Sullivan for having shown that the nega·
tive-sounding formula " No salvation outside the Church" is " only one
way, and a very imperfect way at that, in which Christians have expressed their belief that God has given to his church a necessary part
to play in his plan to save the world " (p. 204).

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Excellent as Sullivan's book is, it has raised a host of questions
which, though it cannot be fairly expected to discuss them at length,
much less to resolve, are at the heart of ongoing reflections about the
possibility of salvation outside the visible Church. Such questions concern the concrete ways in which God works in the lives of peoples of
different religions, the unique and normative role of Christ in the history of salvation, the function of non-Christian religions as mediations
of salvation, and so on. And the debate on these issues rages on among
Catholic as well as non-Catholic theologians! One wishes that Sullivan
had given a fuller account of this debate which is central in interreligious dialogue.
More directly connected with the method and approach of the book
itself are the questions of dogmatic development and the hermeneutics
of doctrines. To put it more concretely, was Leonard Feeney, with
whose ironic fate the book opens and ends, simply expressing the ancient doctrine of the deposit of the faith concerning salvation in the
Church in a negative and imperfect fashion? Or was he (and more
importantly, popes and official teachers of the faith) wrong in affirming
the exclusiveness implicit in the formula extra ecclesiam nulla salus
(which apparently they did) ? H the latter, then the issues of infallible
magisterium and dogmatic ' development ' raise their ugly heads, and
one has to come to terms with them.
PETER

c. PHAN

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Character. By JOEL KUPPERMAN. Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1991. Pp. vi
193.

+

The two theses of J. Kupperman's Character are "that character is
of central importance to ethics and that ethical philosophy will have to
be restructured once this is understood " (p. 3). The argument has
three stages: the first three chapters explicate the notion of character
and its relationship to the notions of the self and of responsibility; the
next two consider the dominant, rival theories in contemporary ethics;
the last two address the topics of value and the place of character in
ethics. In two appendices, Kupperman applies the substantive conclusions of the work to the issues of moral psychology and the education
of character. A brief review cannot communicate the many nuances
of argument and the precise and lucid style that distinguish the book.
While certain parts of the argument seem problematic, or at least in

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need of further development, the work deserves the attention of professional ethicists and of inquisitive non-professionals.
The opening chapter offers the following definition of character:
"X's character is X's normal pattern of thought and action, especially
with respect to concerns and commitments in matter affecting the hap·
piness of others or of X, and most especially in relation to moral
choices" (p. 17). In the second chapter, Kupperman considers three
views: Enduring Self (ES), No Self (NS), and Constructed Self (CS).
The ES appears to be seH-evidently true. But what exactly is the self
and where is it to he found? It is difficult to fix the abiding " I "
amid or behind the flux of our self-experience. On the other hand, even
Hume's skepticism concerning the self presumes that " we know where
to look " for it. The " I " is simultaneously obvious and elusive, stable
and unstable (p. 40). Thus, both the ES and the NS are problematic,
The third option is the Constructive Self, Kupperman holds that, as
children, we begin with a "protoseH." The full-fledged self is often
the result of orientations, habits, and traits of character developed before one has even begun deliberating about the kind of character one
would like to have. Like the self, character is constructed mostly
through unreflective choices. But this raises questions about responsibility, which is the focus of the third chapter. If we have not willed
to be the sorts of persons we now are, how can we be held responsible
for who we are or what we do? Actions do not " flow from character
like water from a pipe " (p, 59) . Over long periods of time and
through a reorganization of large portions of our life, we can change
our character; short of that, we are capable in particular circumstances
of altering characteristic ways of behaving,
The subsequent two chapters provide criticisms of alternative ethical
theories: Kantian and utilitarian theories, as well as those of Rawls
and virtue ethicists. The former pair share the same weaknesses, Their
decision procedures presume an inherited morality that educates
agents to identify certain features of experience as salient; in spite of
claims to scientific rigor, the procedures yield " indeterminate . . ,
results." The theories also emphasize single decisions to the exclusion
of continuity of commitment. Instead, priority must he given, as it is
in character ethics, to a person's sensitivity, to her or his awareness
that a case is morally problematic and to the " agent's conscientiousness, as reflected in the willingness to reflect seriously on what seems
morally problematic." Rawls's theory is also reductionistic. It fosters
a lowest common denominator view of values and dogmatically excludes " the promotion of character and various virtues-intellectual,
aesthetic, and moral " from the supposedly value free original position. While Rawls's view is clearly antithetical to the concerns of char-

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699

acter ethics, it might seem that virtue ethics would be congenial. Indeed, " character " and " virtue " are often used interchangeably in con·
temporary ethics. Virtue ethics is indeed noteworthy for its " implicit
reference to what agents are like." It provides criteria for the identification and appraisal of certain classes of actions, but it " breaks
down in cases in which a number of factors of different sorts are relevant" (p. 107). In spite of its focus upon agency, virtue ethics tends
towards impersonal universalization, since virtues are identical from
one person to another. Character, on the contrary, underscores the
particularities and distinctiveness of the life of this person, with his or
her specific "concerns and commitments" (p. 9).
Much of contemporary ethics is preoccupied with questions of value.
Kupperman argues that value should be linked to character. The
vacuity of much contemporary discussion of value can be traced to a
reluctance to impose values. The good life is thereby equated with
happiness and happiness with pleasure or subjective satisfaction.
Kupperman counters that happiness is not the same as pleasure and that
the good life includes more than happiness (he notes that Aristotelian
eudaimonia is inadequately translated as happiness) . The possession of
excellences of character, for example, perception, experience, and refined judgment, makes a person a more authoritative judge concerning value. Thus, " strength and goodness of character matter to the
values available to a person " (p. 115) . The flourishing of character
is personal; one should welcome an "antiphony of values" (p. 143).
Character traits such as sensitivity and perceptiveness enable one to
appreciate rival visions of the good life and prepare one to deal with
unanticipated circumstances and "hard cases." Strong character is
needed for confidence in, continuity of, and satisfaction with one's self.
While a social setting may be necessary for the development of char·
acter, " more creative forms of character are more likely to develop in
a pluralistic society than in a tight-knit community" (p. 111).
Although numerous issues in the book invite exploration, the differences between Kupperman's character theory and virtue ethics is
perhaps the most promising. A proponent of virtue ethics could embrace the basic criticisms of neo-Kantian and utilitarian theories. Most
virtue ethicists, for example, Macintyre, and Hauerwas, have overcome
the compartmentalization of the virtues through the narrative unity of
human life. What, then, distinguishes Kupperman's view? Kupper·
man's view seems in some cases too close to virtue ethics and in others
too far from it. The universalist critique of virtue ethics, for instance,
seems equally applicable to character theory. While Kupperman holds
that justice is for the most part an artificial virtue, he also thinks that
a " social order can reasonahly be judged from the outside " and that

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certain violations of justice can be appreciated without " any back·
ground of social conventions" (p. 95). The cases he cites-racial and
gender bias and the failure to return kindness-may he unproblematic
for us, hut is this not because we have been tutored by the institutions
of modern liberalism? A strong case can be made, moreover, that our
general agreement vanishes when it comes to particular cases. This
raises a larger question: can character ethics-with its repudiation of
impersonal decision procedures-provide a basis for even limited universalism? A less impersonal route would be that of Thomistic natural
law, but Kupperman's meager attention to personhood and his emphasis
upon the self as a " metaphysical term of art" makes this an unlikely
route.
Kupperman seems intent on securing limited universalism as a nee·
essary framework for pluralism; the view is central to his thesis that
moral education cannot substitute values clarification for absolutism,
at least not in its initial stage (pp. 174-78). It is not clear, however,
that the primacy of the language of " values " is compatible with an
emphasis on strength of character. Kupperman concedes that an "antiphony of values " may make the achievement of strong character more
difficult. He fails, however, to entertain seriously the possibility that
the pluralism of post-modern liberalism might well generate a society
of Nietzsche's last men, with no more than a " qualified loyalty to anything " (p. 137) . While the argument of Character may not he fully
persuasive, it nonetheless marks an important contribution to recent
Hterature attempting to show that liberalism need not be indifferent to
questions of the good and of human excellence.
THOMAS

s. HIBBS

Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

The Magic of Ritual: Our Need for Liberating Rites that Transform
Our Lives and Our Communities. By TOM F. DRIVER. San Francisco: Harper, 1991. Pp. 270. $19.95.
Tom Driver, former theater critic and author of hooks about theater
and religion, is Paul Tillich Professor of Theology and Culture at
Union Theological Seminary, New York. He is also an active leader in
the Ritual Studies section of the American Academy of Religion. This
engagingly written book reflects all of these vocations and interests.
When he writes compellingly that we suffer from a void of ritual that
could give shape and meaning to human life he critiques the view that

BOOK REVIEWS

701

Christianity is primarily about theology and doctrine as well as the
shape and content of the liturgy as presently celebrated in many Christian churches. On the one hand, this book is an apologia for the role
of ritual in Christian life; on the other, it is a trenchant critique of
what and how liturgical churches ritualize their faith. In the Introduction he states that by design this work is about the " deep human longing for ritual; to interpret it in the light of our physical, social, polemical, sexual, moral, aesthetic, and religious existence; and to urge a reform of our ritual life, especially in religion, so that our longing for
ritual and our longing for freedom may come together " ( 4). He poignantly observes that the book is a response to "ritual boredom" (7)
and that much Christian liturgical practice " has become moribund "
(ll).
The book's fairly evenly distributed three parts concern "ritual
pathways," a cursory survey of animal, human and church ritual behavior (chapters l to 3), " modalities of performance," relating ritual
to theater and reflecting on ritual's relationship to confession and ethics
(chapters 5 and 6), and" ritual's social gifts," reflecting on the results
of ritual: order, community and transformation of participants (chapters 7 to 9). In many ways the book's Conclusion and two Appendices
betray Driver's slant on the state of contemporary Christian liturgy and
ritual studies by offering critiques of the celebration of some Christian
liturgies (Conclusion and Appendix A) and of the work of the ritual
theorist Victor Turner (Appendix B). While there is nothing really
new in this last part of the book, these sections offer a particularly
clear view of where Driver stands, what his prejudices are, and how
current his scholarship really is. Reading these last sections first would
offer theologians not trained in ritual studies a bridge from their disciplines and experience of liturgy to the " purer " treatment of ritual
in general in the book's first nine chapters.
At the same time, these last sections are highly problematic, polemical, and debatable. The concluding chapter " Christian Sacraments as
the Performance of Freedom" exemplifies Driver's concern throughout
the book that rituals are open to ongoing change, that they are less
about communal cohesion than liberation from institutions that are too
tightly knit, and that the poignant critique from the contemporary
women's movement should serve to critique the oppressive structures
of much Christian liturgy. That he relies so fully on Juan Luis
Segundo's dated book The Sacraments Today, written from a Latin
American perspective before the envisioned postconciliar liturgical inculturation even began to take place, raises certain cautions about the
method and sources used in the rest of his research. That he includes
"Fifteen Maxims for the Planning of Christian Rituals" (212) as

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part of this chapter would seem to mitigate the argument of his open·
ing three chapters about the givenness of rituals in human and church
life. The fact that these " maxims " ignore what is foundational to
Christian liturgy and sacramcnts-Christology,
Pneumatology, and
ecclesiology-makes them less compelling as guides for Christian ritual
construction and celebration.
In many ways the book's first three chapters are the most important.
They introduce the problematic of modern religionists' longing for and
search for " liberating rituals " and their not finding them in church
liturgy (chapter l) , they show that both animals and humans use
rituals to structure life (chapter 2), and that part of humanity's "loss
of balance " at the end of the millennium is that it has lost its way in
appreciating and performing rituals (chapter 3). The book begins to
lose cogency from a Christian Hturgical perspective when the contrast
between " priest " and " shaman " (chapter 4) ignores an equally
central discussion about the role of the Christian liturgical community
which has been initiated into and which is gathered for its covenant
renewal through liturgy, whoever leads the service and whatever his
or her primary job description.
A central feature of Driver's book derives from his explicit effort to
connect ritual and the theater. But the flaw here is related to the priest/
shaman discussion as primary ritual actant in the previous chapter.
The parallel between ritual and ,theater is quite inappropriate given
the fact that theater (even in its most participatory contemporary ex·
prcssions) is predicated of " actors " or " performers " and an " audience." This simply cannot be the paradigm for evaluating ritual he·
cause in essence ritual behavior is inclusive of the whole community.
Even those who " watch " the acting oui: of the rites of pmisage Driver
describes are themselves at least committed to them (they do not critique them as in theater) and they largely join in their enactment. Cer·
tainly Christian liturgical ritual is enacted by and with the whole as·
sembly. More particularly, the emphasis in the postconciliar liturgical
reforms in the Catholic church, calling for the " full, conscious and
active participation " of the whole assembly in liturgy requires that the
actor/ spectator dichotomy be overcome in theology and transcended in
practice.
In many ways Driver has done his homework. He has researched
and cites the most commonly acknowledged contemporary ritual theor·
ists (in English) from Arnold van Gennep to Ronald Grimes. Happily,
for Driver's thesis here and for method in liturgy studies today, conversation with ritual theorists has become a constitutive part of liturgical and sacramental studies across denominational lines. What would
have helped Driver's argument here would have been more explicit at-

703

BOOK REVIEWS

tention to the psychological factors that are part and parcel of ritual
celebration and human, as well as Christian, identity. A greater familiarity with foreign language sources, especially on this latter point,
would have made the book more cogent and complete.
The academic theological community is still searching for ever more
adequate methodologies for ritual studies. The fact that the American
Academy of Religion and the North American Academy of Liturgy
have ongoing study groups concerned with this topic is a very encouraging sign. Harper is to be thanked for publishing this book as one at·
tempt to articulate how ritual studies are not for the theorist only.
As Driver repeatedly asserts, the study of ritual is essential for human
survival and Christian vitality.
KEVIN
IRWIN

w.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Mary For AU Christians. By JOHN MACQUARRIE. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
160.
Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1991. Pp. xiii

+

In the preface, John Macquarrie expresses his purpose for writing
this collection of papers very clearly and concisely: " ... the ecumenical spirit of recent years has been encouraging Christians to try to
understand and appreciate one another's traditions better, so this book
is ' for all Christians ' and is written in the hope that they may find in
Mary resources for reconciliation rather than conflict." Fittingly
enough most of the chapters of this book were originally papers given
by Macquarrie to members of the Ecumenical Society of the Blessed
Virgin Mary (ESBVM) to which he has belonged since 1970, only a
few years following its foundation in England. The foreword to this
book by Dom Alberic Stacpoole, one of its contemporary leaders, provides a helpful description of the origin, growth, and ecumenical effectiveness of ESBVM which gives the reader the proper context for the
spirit and doctrinal contents of the book. Part Two, " An Ecumenical
Office of Mary -the Mother of Jesus" and several supplementary appendices for options in reciting this Office, shows that ESBVM is very
much motivated by devotional practices as well as doctrinal dialogues.
"God and the Feminine," the initial essay, was originally a paper
delivered by Macquarrie at ESBVM's Third International Ecumenical
Congress held at Birmingham during Easter Week 1975. It is a masterpiece of theological precision and a balanced interpretation concerning an issue which is all too seldom characterized by either quality.

704

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In the movement toward greater equality of the sexes which would
produce more freedom and dignity for women, it seems that the most
vociferous pro-feminists and anti-feminists rarely hit the happy medium
in this complex and highly emotional issue. Macquarrie, on the other
makes superb use of the Judaeo-Christian Tradition to ace om·
plish just that, looking, for example, to the ethical monotheism of the
cults, to the fact
Old Testament in opposition to the pagan
that there were women among the disciples of Jesus, one of whom was
the first witness to his resurrection, and to St. Paul's teaching that the
differences between male and female do not really count in the new
creation of Christ. Macquarrie points out the indispensable role of
Mary in the New Testament scheme of salvation as most significant for
the authentic liberation of women. It is his thesis that the " ... study
of the Marian tradition can help Chrit>tians reach a fuller and more
balanced understanding of the feminine in their religion, from the
theological question about the significance of sexuality for our understanding of God to practical questions about the roles of women in
the modem Church" (p. 23). According to Macquarrie, it is not
linguistic innovation but only sound teaching that will show the triune
God revealed in Jesus Christ, Son of God and Son of Mary, as communicating divine recreating love to us ,through the feminine as well as
the masculine. This reviewer does feel obliged to raise a question
about 'the author's use of theological terminology when he refers to the
three divine Persons as "three distinct modes of being" (p. 21) which
seems to lend itself to a modalist or Sabellian misinterpretation of the
mystery of the real distinction between the three divine Persons within
the one divine nature. Perhaps it was done out of sympathy with the
Barthian and Rahnerian objections against the use of the notion of
"person" as an analogy, hut their quest for other analogical approaches to the Trinitarian mystery probably created more problems than solutions, one of which is a flirtation with some form of
"modalism."
The second essay, "Mary in the New Testament," is also refreshing to read, mainly because Macquarrie is able to detect a few traces
of the historical Mary as the biblical basis for authentic development of
Marian doctrine and devotion in the Tradition. His carefully drawn
conclusion is that there is a solid scriptural foundation for reflecting
upon Mary's theological significance. Then in the four following essays
of Part One in the hook, Macquarrie proceeds to address the critical
ecumenical question of just how far such development can travel on the
road of post-biblical Tradition.
He begins this difficult journey by reflecting upon the Roman
Catholic dogma of the Immaculate Conception defined in 1854 by Pope

BOOK REVIEWS

705

Pius IX. Macquarrie clearly asserts: " I do not myself see any irresoluble conflict between the doctrine of an Immaculate Conception (at
least as it will be expounded here) and the full humanity and freedom
of Mary as of the same race as Eve" (p. 54). And it does appear that
his explanation of the dogma is in substantial agreement with its definition in 1854. Macquarrie does have a more positive way of expressing this revealed mystery than " Mary was preserved from the stain of
original sin." He prefers putting it, "Mary was preserved in a right
relatedness to God " (p. 71) , meaning that she was ever completely
receptive to her Son's redeeming and recreating grace from the very
first instant of her personal conception. Thus there is no conflict between her receptive and redeemed righteousness and his creative, innovative, and redeeming righteousness.
The fourth essay, " Glorious Assumption," is the only one in this
collection that did not appear originally as a paper for ESBVM, but was
the Assumption Day Lecture delivered at Walsingham Parish Church.
Macquarrie is of the opinion that it is the issue of authority rather
than any deep division over the person of Mary that makes the dogma
of the Assumption ecumenically controversial. Pope Pius XII solemnly
defined it as a truth revealed by God and so to be believed by all members of the Roman Catholic Church during the Holy Year 1950. Of
course there are other ecumenical problems concerning this dogma
such as the lack of any clear and explicit biblical evidence or of early
patristic testimony which must be taken into account. But Macquarrie
does describe with spiritual fervor and theological acumen his own
pilgrimage of faith regarding this dogma, having come to perceive it
as significant for the inseparability between our ascended Lord and
his body the Church upon earth. Mary is the first moment in the
glorious assumption of the whole Church (p. 91).
"Mary Co-redemptrix," the fifth essay, addresses in a special way
two terms that have had profound influence upon Marian doctrine and
devotion, namely, " co-redemptrix" and "mediatrix." The first term
has virtually disappeared from the religious and theological vocabulary
of contemporary Catholicism since Vatican II, which did not use it even
once in its teaching about Mary. The second, while used once in
chapter 8 of the Dogmatic Constitution on the Church, was very carefully nuanced so as to prevent the misinterpretation that Mary's mediation is on the same level as the unique mediatorship of her Son.
Macquarrie proceeds, however, in a very positive manner to show that
such terms, while they have been ahused, admit of a proper meaning
that must be preserved. Both " co-redemptrix " and " mediatrix "
designate our response to the gift of grace which enables us to cooperate in working out our salvation and in serving as channels or in-

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struments of redemption for others. Mary is the primary exemplar of
receiving her Son's redeeming love in freedom and of wholeheartedly
mediating his graces to all he has redeemed.
The final essay, "Mary and Modernity," is most timely for American
Christians and ecumenists. It is a very worthwhile attempt to compare
and contrast the secular triad of virtues, liberty, equality, and fraternity with the Christian triad of theological virtues, faith, hope, and love,
especially as they are exemplified in Mary. Although this approach
perceives Mary more as a " sign of contradiction " to our secularistic
culture, she will help us to avoid the extremes of confusing true freedom with licence, genuine equality with egalitarianism, and authentic
fraternity with collectivism by helping inspire in us the really liberating
values of her Son's Gospel. Everyone can benefit immensely from the
intelligent reading of this book.
FREDERICK

M. JELLY, O.P.

Mt. St. Mary's Seminary
Emmitsburg, Maryland

Dieu et l'etre d'apres Thomas d'Aquin et Hegel. By EMILIO
Paris: Presses Universitaires
francs.

de France, 1991.

BRITO.

Pp. 422.

245

Sprung from premature fears of post-modernity or from an ignorant
nostalgia for a monoform Catholicism which never existed, universal
dismissals of " modernity " still appear occasionally in Catholic j ournals. They recall ,the neo-scholastic te:xitbooks prior to Vatican II in
whose pages the " moderni " (among whom were numbered not only
"Kantiani" but "Hegeliani ") were dismissed by authors who, having read a few pages, were incapable of grasping the basic directions
of philosophy from Herder to Heidegger. Emilio Brito, S.J., however,
follows in the line of the French and German Jesuits: through this
century they have sustained a varied dialogue, in philosophy and
theology, between Thomas Aquinas and the important figures of
modern philosophy. His two works on Hegel's Christology, and a third
large study of God and creation in Schelling are now followed by this
comparative work.
The theology of Aquinas and the philosophy of Hegel are like two
galaxies. Do they move past each other at a distance, or do they move
through each other guarding a proper identity with similar forces and
shared motifs? Brito has chosen one theme within these two vast realms
of thought: his topic (and the book's title can mislead) is God; 'being'

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is present as a stimulus to our reflection about God. After an introduction on recent interpretations of Hegel, particularly by Catholics,
pages which should be read by all interested in contemporary theology,
there are three sections: " the knowledge and naming of God," " the
divine substance and the cycle of its attributes," and " the operations
of absolute spirit." The chapters in each of the three areas present
Aquinas's and then Hegel's thought, and sometimes a section of further comparison. At the end of the work Brito offers a conclusion
("God's Goodness") and a postlude ("God's Beauty"). Finally
there is a "Resume." According to Brito, Aquinas's thought is clear
(his Aristotelian logic is readily understandable) , and his emphasis
lies with the divine transcendence. Despite the process-format of the
Summa theologiae and the traces of history in the headship of Christ,
the diversity of sacraments, and the theologies of faith and natural law,
his modest description of movement in God and in God's world of beings stands in contrast to the unleashed and unresolved development
penetrating Hegel's Geist.
The concluding " Resume " of nine pages is particularly valuable as
it brings together the author's synthetic insights into Aquinas and
Hegel (one might hope that at least it would appear in translation) .
The following excerpt displays its balance and clarity.
The God of the Summa tends to stay back from mediation, letting itself
exist in a certain exteriority, while the Hegelian absolute " raises out"
the determinations it posits only by also absorbing them negatively. In
the same vein, the Hegelian parousia of the negative abolishes absolutely
the distance maintained by the inexpressible in language. In an opposite direction, the originating positivity of the God of Thomas grounds
the irreducible presence of a reality represented in discourse. If he is a
stranger to this approach and more respectful of mystery, nonetheless,
Hegel rejoins Thomas in refusing agnosticism and in (accepting) the
speculative vision of absolute truth. Despite the difference in terminology, the Hegelian Idea and the Thomasian Being come together in the
measure that they articulate the Self (subject, substance) as a unity of
moments in theory and praxis (the True, the Good) (p. 381).

Hegel receives more attention, more commentary, and more employment of secondary literature, for modern philosophy is Brito's area of
expertise. The rapid movement from one of Thomas's works to another
can imply that his corpus is angelic in its lack of development. A
theologian might look for more precision and exposition concerning
the relation between theology and philosophy, or grace and nature.
One would not want to restore a neo-Thomist mentality where philosophy and theology were confused, or a " Christian philosophy " where
segments of Aquinas were stripped of references to their polar star,
Christ, and to their ground, grace. Brito's hook is far from that. But

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it can he noted that God must ultimately be understood within
Aquinas's entire thought as the source of Trinitarian missions becoming present to people and not just as a being with a sublime simplicity
and immutability who in the past set forth an array of beings. Revelation and salvation in Hegel are mentioned: but they do not quite escape
the evolving depth of an incomplete God, nor do they adorn and expand a human being whose particularity and limits are more than
tragedy and opposition. From this dialogue admirably advanced by
Brito's book, we understand why Aquinas must always be preserved
from the mechanics (never more exciting than when applied to God)
which neo-scholasticisms compulsively construct, and why Hegel must
be studied for the dynamic of his thought-forms but not for his conclusions without resolution.
THOMA§

F. O'MEARA, O.P.

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

Work in the Spirit. By MmosLAv VoLF. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1991. Pp. xviii+ 252. $32.50 (cloth).
Miroslav V olf initiates his theological inquiry by exammmg the
contemporary situation of work, its transformation from a world of
agricultural and industrial production into a system of information
technologies. He attentively notes that this contemporary technology
brings with it both advantages and disadvantages for workers. He also
examines crises such as unemployment and discrimination which ac·
company employment today. Despite both the ambiguity which accompanies the change in production and the threatening uncertainties
caused by the current crises, he nevertheless emphasizes the duality of
work: people consistently find their work to be both curse and delight.
V oH wishes to emphasize this twin feature so that the theology he
fashions
he realistic and active.
V olf pursues a theology of work which can account for varied developments in quite different economies and for the needs of succeeding generations. Thus V olf describes the activity of work in terms
which are invariant with respect to time and place. By a theology which
is adequate to this global concept of work, he means one " developed
on the basis of a specifically Christian soteriology and eschatology .
(79). While Volf maintains an attention to the Christian traditions in
recalling soteriology, he downplays a creation-based understanding of
work in favor of one which is eschatological. Work is a cooperation
with God in the transforming of the world on the way toward the new

wm

o

."

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creation of the end-time. Volf's laying-out the transformative character of work is insightful. It avoids the recurrent consequences of a
theology of work based solely on creation: effort without limit and
sullen acceptance of the toil.
How does he accomplish this? First, he explores the lodes of dominant theoretical understandings of work by examining the .thought of
A. Smith and K. Marx. Second, he presses for a pneumatological understanding of work. That is, he holds that rthe presence of the Spirit
is key to human activity (133). Volf makes use of the theological tradition of the charisms in order to present more completely how human
effort and divine activity can cooperate in work. Charisms are personal
capacities which achieve development through interaction with the
Spirit (112 and 130). He <introduces the variety and suppleness integral to charisms so as to correct the understanding of work as vocation. In his observation of industrial and information societies, V olf
recognizes that persons often change :their j ohs or may he engaged in
several occupations at one time. He reminds ,theologians that ' vocation,' in contradistinction to its frequent understanding as a single, lifelong assignment to a specific occupation and standing, is a call to a
person in a particular place and time (109). The particular assign·
ment is not the governing element; rather, the person who works receives a call to which his or her talents make an adequate response
feasible.
V olf carefully notes that a charism extends benefits to others even
beyond the circle of co-religionists (Ill). In addition, Volf's position
makes possible an attentiveness to differences among individuals and
changes within persons. It remains uncertain, however, whether his
global concept of work can encompass the heterogeneity which results
from the variation of different structures and systems. For example,
unemployment is not a univocal concept across regional and national
lines. The heritage expressed in the spiritual and corporal works of
mercy could further stimulate both the development of the attention to
diversity, which the charisms themselves welcome, and a movement of
the pneumatological theology of work away from any self-restriction to
believers.
Volf's presentation contributes significantly to the understanding of
work activity by situating it within ecological processes. Not only do
the activities of persons cooperate with the Spirit who moves the entire
world to a new creation, hut also the Spirit imbues and acts within
nature itself. Indeed, the reading of Marx has taught Vol£ the perduring naturalness of the power of persons in their working: " ... When
human beings work on nature, nature, through them, works on itself "
(57). Through these two conceptual moves, Volf avoids the conse-

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quences of the invidious disjunotion between working persons and their
world, namely, ignorant indifference or intentional destruction valued
as an achievement. The restoration from past destruction wreaked upon
nature, the maintaining of a constant protection of it, and the securing
of its future preservation provide both guides and goals for work. In
Volf's careful approach to the faith-informed evaluation of the relation between work and nature, there is promise of fruitful dialogue
with Pope John Paul's interpretation in Laborem Exercens of the book
of Genesis's "subduing of nature."
As a way of evaluating work, Volf sketches a moral anthropology
by laying out true and false needs (152-154). One critical need is
human development. This takes place at the moral level by way of the
"fruit of ithe Spirit," and in the practical and intellectual spheres
through the "gifts of the Spirit." An attention to the medieval heritage-especially in its examination of the fruits and gifts of the Spirit
in relation to the virtues-would offer some power in pressing forward
Volf's salient pneumatological account of personal development which
results from work.
Such an account is important because what human beings are like
becomes problematic when a central element in the theology and ethic
which Volf offers is the "new creation." How are anthropology and
eschatology related in such a way that both activity and critique still
matter? If work profoundly affects workers, it is important to know
which sorts of work will correspond to the new creation.
In raising the issue of freedom, one turns to another important area
of Volf's moral anthropology. Freedom is that element of the new creation which would secure the individual's integrity; yet it is unclear
how freedom is linked to the new creation. The privilege assigned
to freedom requires a clear explication of the connection between the
freedom ingredient to salvation and the manifestations of freedom in
the secular sphere. On the way to this goal, V olf examines bad work,
i.e., work in coerced circumstances. In so doing, V olf dedicates much
attention to alienation. He is notably clear in avoiding an approach
which would analyze the dissatisfaction of the worker as the basis for
this range of phenomena (158 ff.). He underscores the critical point
that alienation is not the sum of the possible negative effects on the
workers' feelings, but rather alienation is what it does to the working
person (162). However, his insistence on an objective character for
alienation requires a more transparent articulation of the dynamics
concerning human freedom.
In examining several aspects of work which center around freedom,
certain terms should be distinguished more sharply. Although it appears intuitively correct that the more work resembles leisure the more

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711

it is humane (134), one can also easily recognize the inhumanity of
enforced leisure or useless work. Freedom's stronger sense certainly
cannot be the ability " to engage in whatever activities one may desire " ( 186) . That is license. While V olf makes use of a Kantian approach which prohibits workers from being treated only as a means
and, interestingly, also condemns work which is simply instrumental,
one must ask whether an analysis in terms of means and ends suffices.
The need for a different basis for critique appears readily, for example,
when the issue of management control must be addressed. Is freedom
necessarily limited by accepting work? If managers direct workers' activities for the sake of security and control, one cannot on that basis
alone censure these purposes. Likewise, the criticism of the situation
where workers must follow the orders of managers is appropriate in
some circumstances only. Security, control, obedience are all multivalent terms. The discrimination of the meanings is a critical contribution of a theological assessment of the structures and processes
which shape the work place. V olf is insightful in distinguishing the
subordinations which devolve from the application of particular forms
of technology and from managerial control (180). Neither form of
subordination, however, necessarily constrains the freedom integral to
the person.
Volf attempts to ground the objective character of good work in
"certain characteristics of human nature" (160). Economic forces
frequently require labor which threaten these features. The abstraction
of physical power renders the worker a skillful animal. Yet Taylorism
produces, in addition, an abstraction of intellect; managers, planners,
and designers are reduced to machine-like analysis and decision. Further, the legal and social environment may generate an abstraction of
will, so that it remains merely as a periodic, formalized activity at the
time of contract negotiation. This abstraction of the will distorts a
significant characteristic of human nature, namely, the incessant desire
for some form of participation in the social process.
Human symbolic activity-the capacity to express and to interpretis a characteristic of human nature in which work can find an objective ground. Persons can then view elements of material creation as a
means, an end, or an expression (p. 96 )-all deriving from their work.
Expressivity is a characteristic of all free activity: productive, practical, or political. Work understood in terms of symbolic activity makes
it possible to understand how freedom is integral to such activity if it
is to meet basic needs, especially personal and social development.
Security, control, and obedience are inadequate values when the
ability to elicit, contribute, and respond to symbolic expression is
blocked. Both in its activity and through its status as an emblem, prop-

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erly constituted authority exercises and fosters symbolic activity. The
force of management is not to he confused with .the question of authority. An investigation of authority within •the corporation and in
the work place calls for a more sharply delineated taxonomy of the interaction of all employees: those involved in production, service, and
management. Developed out of another tradition of theology, the
writings of Oswald von Nell-Breuning provide some of the necessary
tools for the analysis of power, force, authority, and participation.
A more systematic understanding of the cooperation of Spirit and
person in his or her activity of work can establish a theological approach to this large question of freedom. V olf himself suggests as
much when he reflects on the possible ways in which economic alienation and alienation from God influence each other. It is interesting and
important to work out how economic alienation can lead to alienation
from God, hut still too much to say that economic alienation causes
alienation from God (166). When attempting to probe this relation, it
is of limited usefulness to say in response to Marx's work that alienation from God is the basic alienation (163). It is, of course, important
to assist believers in their exercise of Marxian language; however,
Christians must speak of alienation from God in terms which can he
grasped by non-believers. Social sin may he the category-devolving
from articulations within the Christian heritage-that can elicit some
resonant response from those who, although standing outside these
traditions, are attempting to respond to the same issues.
Volf's theology of work is constructive and hopeful, for, in addition
to his examination of alienation, he presents a study of its contrary.
Good work fa directed effort which is humanizing, fosters participation,
remains an actus personae, and maintains personal development ( 175179). In attempting to delineate work which would he humanizing
and non-alienating, Volf valorizes "work for work's sake" and " work
as an end in itself " so that persons do not value their work solely in
terms of what it produces. Yet these terms-Volf's distinction between
production and productivity notwithstanding (198)-remain easily
confounded with the common, extrinsic measures of work. Although
it cannot be analytically identified with the ideal of work, leisure does
provide a clue to the character of work because it secures a prerequisite
for work's twin-play. Much can he learned about good work from
the fascination of people with the game character of their efforts, regardless of its heteronomous purpose or autonomous direction.
Furthermore, a necessary step in delineating the characteristics of
good work is to draw upon the distinction between work and labor.
Marx holds that toil, production, and service within a constrained context constitute labor. This is not the same as work, which unfolds

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within an emancipated framework. Consequently, even work as a
means is not a form of forced labor in all situations (pace p. 59) .
How persorni exercise their unconstrained freedom offers a model
on the basis of which the critique of actual labor within exploitative
and alienating systems and structures can take place. One useful element of eschatology for believers is that it provides a point of vantage
whereby they can differentiate between work and labor-as well as between leisure and constrained ease. Volf's reflection on "autonomous
work " outside the time of employment indicates a perception of this.
Volf describes work as increasingly removed from nature; yet, because there are senses in which this development is by turns commendable, neutral, or damnable, precisely so that a theological attention toward ecological issues is not clouded, the shape and elements of this
process must be delineated. The issue of a removal of work activity
from nature (in the industrial and information societies) may indicate
not simply a change in the way persons work with nature but also a
note of possible change in the major image of the work interaction with
nature. The image has changed from extraction or production to preservation or shaping. Having acknowledged this new conceptual matrix,
one could then articulate what respect for nature (145) and nature's
potential (146) might he.
Volf's key move in articulating a theology of work-his use of
charism-presents some difficulties. That Christians work not out of
duty but out of experience of the Spirit ( 125) requires a restatement
of spiritual experience in terms so broad that it might then approximate duty. Further, the relation between charisms and the gifts and
fruits of the Spirit should he made clearer. Are the charisms equivalent
to the gifts of the Spirit? If so, then what does the charism vocabulary
add? If not, then how are these two deposits of the Spirit's action related? The examination of workers' inventiveness, of the constant
origin of the technology emergent from working persons, is critical
for developing a pneumatological model of charism as accountable
skill for service. V olf' s intriguing study of Genesis 4, as manifesting
God's blessing on human ingenuity provides the start of such an examination.
A theological approach to work in terms of its expressivity may profit
if it were to make use of the work of John of St. Thomas (Poinsot) on
sign and signification, perhaps particularly in conjunction with his The
Gifts of the Spirit. Then, too, the work of Rhineland mysticism might
well prove a rich resource for a theology of work, especially in Ruusbroec's refined attention to the action of the Spirit and the work of
persons. A step still further back in the Christian tradition would have
theologians who probe invention and production, technology and serv·

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ice explore the writings of Maximus ·the Confessor. Indeed, conversa
tion with the Orthodox tradition which has reflected upon Maximus's
insights might contribute to the further development of an ecumenical
theology-well initiated by Miroslav Volf-which is supple and extensive enough to address the global structures and personal experiences
of work today.
0

PHILIP

J. CHMIELEWSKI, SJ.

Loyola University
Chicago, Illinois

Philosophy and Art. Edited by D. 0. DAHLSTROM. Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy Volume 23. Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1991. Pp. xii
266. $44.95 (doth).

+

Daniel Dahlstrom's collection of essays on philosophical aesthetics
is by various writers, from differing theoretical perspectives, on diverse
themes, in contrasting styles. Containing many good things, the en·
semble witnesses nonetheless to the Babel that is contemporary Western
philosophy and the disorientation of much artistic practice today. This
review will attempt to guide the potential reader through this multifarious offering.
The initial group of essays shares a common concern. Thomas
Prufer argues, with Aristotle's help, that in tragedy the meaning of
human action :is focussed through the conferring of form ( eidos) so
that the dramatic artwork transforms while reproducing, enhancing the
elements of intelligibility in the action it portrays. Karsten Harries
finds an adequate aesthetic not in the legend of Narcissus-art m; a
beauty that invites us to " lose ourselves in its self-sufficient presence,"
-hut in that of Pygmalion where the artwork's beauty points beyond
itself to a beatitude which comes from attention to the other. Joseph
Margolis commends a minimum ontology in which artworks (like persons) are " entities ... embodied in physical things " and with their
"properties incarnate in physical properties." The emphasis here is
meant to distinguish Margolis's position from that of physicalism. A
sculpture, for instance, is not a mere physical object hut " a real, culturally complex object produced in a humanly apt world and embodied
in a physical object of some sort": such a conclusion is forced on us,
according to Margolis, by the very demands of reference and predication in aH language about art. We begin to see a common thread
inter-linking the contributions summarized so far, :namely, How does

the artefact come to be an artwork?

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This is also the question with which Francis Kovach's Neo-Thomist
contribution opens, and his answer is that while every artwork, like
every artefact, has its material cause in entitatively accidental being,
the artwork is distinguished by taking beauty as its formal cause, cognitive delight as its final cause, a ' model or preconceived idea ' as its
exemplary cause, and a maker who ' arranges ' an artistic medium as
its efficient cause. In this essay, which combines an austere practice
of the Scholastic " distinguer pour unir " with a flurry of references to
music and painting, Kovach does not hesitate to deny the term ' fine
art ' to much twentieth century experimental art which for him is simply "interestingly novel." For Kenneth Schmitz, with his more pheno·
menological approach, an artefact comes to be an artwork by " gaining
a certain density of form, content and meaning." His essay centers on
the concept of the boundary of the work, which both divides it from
and links it to its audience. Schmitz stresses that such boundaries, in
their role as providers of " juncture and communion," cannot operate
without a circumambient tradition. Question: where would the artwork
be without the mediating assistance of a community of producers, performers, receivers, and interpreters?
Answer: reduced back to the
status of an artefact. Somewhat abruptly appended to this discussion is
the thought that a religiously inspired artwork may bring us to that supreme boundary where the bounded (the creaturely) is both divided
from and linked to the Boundless (the Creator) . A fuller discussion
of this issue would certainly be desirable-not least in a volume on
philosophical aesthetics emanating from a Catholic University press!
A second group of essays moves in the ambit of the late eighteenthand early nineteenth·century German philosophical tradition, which
was still sufficiently imbued with the ideas and the concerns of the
Judaeo-Christian revelation to advance its elucidation. Robert Wood,
in an account of Kant's aesthetics firmly contextualized within an overview of his 'project ' as a whole, explains that, for Kant, art is the
"prime analogate for all other types of purposiveness." Not only does
art serve analogically to draw together all experience, it also provides
the most all-encompassing notion for the world that judgment can
reach: nature as "divine art." Sensitivity to nature gives birth to art
which, in turn, makes us sensitive to the beauties of nature. This point
is related to the moral dimension so pronounced in Kant's work: the
human being acting under moral law is itself an aesthetic form par
excellence. Indeed, the artistic presentation of such acting is the fusing
of the harmonious operation of our faculties in the experience of
beauty of presentation with the experience of the (fortunate) dispro·
portion of our faculties in the discovery of the sublime. Yet this is not,
ultimately, a humanism; for Kant, the divine artist is the source of

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the inspiration of the genius which affects the community's sensibility,
weaning it from the dominance of appetite and aiding it in the l:rnnsi
tion to the moral dimension.
Schiller, so Walter Hinderer explains, ascribed a similar :irole to art
as a means to self-completion. In On the Aesthetic Education of Man,
he asserts that it is philosophical truth, and not merely poetic licence,
to call beauty our " second creator." Only aesthetic experience is able
to " cultivate the totality of our sensuous and intellectual abilities in the
greatest possible harmony." Hinderer brings out Schiller's high anthropology: the suprasemmous in man is the divine in him; man's
realization of the idea of l:otality makes him the "peer of God." Here
a subj acent theological doctrine of man made in the divine image and
likeness threatens to turn itself into an untrammelled Prometheanism.
In his treatment of Hegel's aesthetics, William Desmond raises the
question, left in shadow hy Schiller, as to whether human originality is
not related to a more ultimate power (Sha£teshury had called the artist
"a Just Prometheus under love"). For Hegel, art evinces (along
with religion and philosophy) a dimension of absoluteness. In Desmond's words, the great artwork " serves to tell us something significant
about the deepest sense of being in relation to the meaning of being
as such." In post-Kantian aesthetics the originating role of the Eternal
in its transcendent otherness tends to be replaced by that of the creative self in its inwardness, thereby raising a question concerning what
sort of otherness, if any, remains to stand over against the self in such
a philosophical context. Although Hegel does go beyond Romanticism
in rejecting the notion that the originating spirit is simply the creative
individual (the origin "institutes, mediates, and consolidates itself in
different cultural-historical formations " of the power of being or
Geist), aesthetic origins remain for Hegel a self.mediation, rather than
an original otherness that "resists our mastery." For Desmond, however, echoing Schelling, the great artwork " concretizes that otherness
in a way that resists complete conceptualization." With the affirmation
that thought must think not only itself hut also its other-and not
simply its other in a dialectical sense-Desmond appeals to the philo·
sophy of art to go beyond Hegel rather than around him. Hegel was
too concerned with a wholeness akin to " Greek circularity " to do
justice to the (more Jewish, i.e., biblical) "unmastered infinite."
Between these essays-concerned as they are with the metaphysical
and anthropological implications of art as an expression of the ultimate
origin of the world and a major factor in human flourishing of the
most far-reaching kind-and other contributions which are largely deaf
to these appeals, we can situate the editor's own reflection on the " end
of art/' or, rather, the" end of the idea of art," a concept he takes from
0

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the work of Arthur Danto. Here the stimulus to reflection is those elements in modern art which " make a farce of traditional art and art
theories hy giving us artworks indiscernible from objects found on
grocery shelves or in lavatories." If, as Danto suggests, whatever is to
count as art is simply what an " artworld " decrees, then the distinction between artefact and artwork can disappear completely (except in
terms of somebody's bank balance).
The trouble with the remaining essays in this collection is that their
authors have not appropriated a truth given lapidary expression in
Woods' essay on Kant: "Attention to the works of genius throughout
the ages cultivates the sensus communis and establishes a community
involved in the beautiful." Thus, while Ted Cohen is right to consider
television a possible artistic medium, the objects of televisual appreciation he considers usually witness to a breakdown of a community involved in the beautiful, while the frequently nugatory objects discussed
in John Brough's "Who's Afraid of Marcel Duchamp? " testify to the
disintegration of the sensus communis concerned.
Finally, if Paul Weiss is right in his "Creativity and Beauty" not
only to designate beauty " the excellence pertinent to the creation of a
work of art," but also to house it together with the quartet of truth,
goodness, glory, and justice, then we can get a sense of how wisdom in
both philosophy and artistic practice might he restored: through a re·
discovery of the interdependence of the transcendentals. But perhaps
only the Judaeo-Christian revelation now holds the key to this possibility.
AIDAN NICHOLS, O.P.
Black friars
Cambridge, England

Through the Tempest: Theological Voyages in a Pluralistic Culture.
By LANGDON GILKEY. Ed. Jeff B. Pool. Minneapolis: Fortress
Press, 1991. Pp. xx
252.
Langdon Gilkey: Theologian for a Culture in Decline. By BRIAN J.
WALSH. Lanham, MD: University Press of America/Institute for
Christian Studies, 1991. Pp. xii
324. $47.50 (cloth); $22.50
(paper).

+

+

With the exception of two mid-1970s papers, Through the Tempest
is a collection of some of the addresses and essays written in the 1980s
hy Langdon Gilkey, Shailer Mathews Professor Emeritus at the University of Chicago Divinity School. Title and subtitle are meant to re·

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fleet three elements of Gilkey's temper. First, the tempest corresponds
to his dramatic vision of the twentieth-century world, with its wars, up·
heavals, and destructive forces. Second, the preposition through expresses the sober hope that for all the darkness that surrounds our
century, we are actually moving toward a destination beyond the turmoil. And third, his explorations and assessments of the many facets
of contemporary culture are theological voyages.
In these pages readers will find many of the themes Gilkey has
tackled over the years, such as God, Jesus, Creation, Providence, spirituality, the function of symbols, ethics, suffering and death, Christianity
and other religions, faith and science, church and public policy. Among
the most original pieces are, to my mind, Ch. 10, on the different attitudes to ethics in Christianity and Buddhism, and Ch. 14, which clarifies many aspects of suffering.
The general readership made up of those interested in religion will
probably enjoy these lectures, while specialists in theology or human
studies are likely to find them merely impressionistic and too vague
both in their cultural analyses and in their conceptual discussions.
Further, there is a discrepancy between Gilkey's assessment of the
human predicament and :the theological solutions he puts forward.
On the one hand, the mood and the content of his assessment is neo·
orthodox (inspired by his master Reinhold Niebuhr). For instance,
chapters 11 and 13, on evil and sin, are typical of an acute awareness
of the dark side of human conduct. As he follows this vein, Gilkey
raises pertinent, profound, and difficult questions.
On :the other hand, his prescriptions do not match the depth of his
diagnoses. Despite his efforts at overcoming theological liberalism, he
often remains confined within the limits of the Western Enlightenment.
For example, like most eighteenth-century thinkers, he rejects "a level
of grace beyond nature " (54) . What he repudiates is in all likeliness
the modern separation between nature and supernature, and he is apparently unaware of a significant alternative, namely, the medieval distinction between the natural and the supernatural aspects of Christian
life. Consequently, for him grace merely consists in the restoration of
human nature: "grace in no way transcends nature but rather makes
its realization and fulfillment possible " (61) .
Likewise, Gilkey's treatment of the problem of truth in Christianity
and world religions does not take us beyond modernity. In chapter 2,
his problematics remain very close to the ones set up by Spinoza and
Lessing. Thus Gilkey departs from Calvin's position regarding the
precedence of faith over loving one's neighbor and adopts-without
naming him-Spinoza's stance which asserts the priority of love over
doctrine (22). In this connection, Gilkey fails to offer any precise unraveling of the extrinsicist problem of revelation forcefully voiced by

BOOK REVIEWS

719

eighteenth-century thinkers like Lessing. He states that the issue, as
we face it today, is deeper: "It is not just our response to revelation
that is relative; it is the revelation to which we are responding that is
now roughly equal to the others" (31). Gilkey does not explain in
what sense we can still talk of " revelation " in this case. All he offers
is a "paradox of a relative-absolute " ( 191; see 181-193), that is to
say, an amalgamation of universalism and relativity, in which these two
components stand in tension without being intellectually thought out.
Gilkey's theological style is marked by a determination to proceed
dialectically in the discussion of issues. Since his thinking purports to
he dialeotical, his assertions are generally matched by antithetical assertions. To give hut a few examples: the tension between credibility
and rationality, theology and ontology, or universalism and relativity.
The acknowledgement of " tensions" is rather popular nowadays in
the human sciences and in theology. In a first stage, this recognition
is sound, for it amounts to taking full account of the complexity that
characterizes important human problems. In a second stage, however,
it is not very fruitful, because it gives up the endeavor to fully understand what can and ought to he understood. In other words, the acceptance of "tensions" is a premature submission to the Mystery in
an area where fides quaerens intellectum could gain some true insights.
As a matter of fact, in a short passage Gilkey goes beyond dialectical
thinking, at least to a certain extent. In his reflections on God's transcendence and immanence (91-92), he does not rest content with stating
that God is both transcendent and immanent. He defines and qualifies
several terms in such a way that the reader can advance, beyond a
mere tension, toward an intellectual integration.
Most of the time, unfortunately, Gilkey does not suggest how such
an integration could he achieved. Instead, he remains a prisoner of
his dialectical oppositions, for example regarding the following polarities in God: being and nonheing, independent and related, absolute
and self-limiting, immutable and changing. Like Pannenherg and Moltmann, Gilkey wrestles with the late medieval concept of an arbitrary
divine omnipotence and never manages to exorcise it (96; 109). Therefore, instead of seeing through the inadequacy of this concept, he sim·
ply balances successive versions of it with successive versions of its opposite, thereby projecting various polarities into God. I suggest readers
would find it helpful to contrast Gilkey's position with the one adopted
by Michael J. Dodds, O.P., in his penetrating work The Unchanging
God of Love (Frihourg: Editions Universitaires, 1986), which goes to
the very roots of the problem.
Gilkey has been active in three areas of the theological enterprise:
prolegomenon, constructive theology, and theology of culture. In his

720

BOOK REVIEWS

hook entitled Langdon Gilkey, Walsh presents him as a Theologwn for
a Culture in Decline (this is the subtitle). Walsh thinks Gilkey's lifetime project is best understood when approached from the perspective
of his theology of culture. Accordingly, after outlining Gilkey's theological method as a whole (Part I), Walsh proceeds to focus on his
theology of culture (Part II), in terms of which he then discusses his
prolegomenon (Part III) and his constructive theology (Part IV).
This threefold division is a felicitous organizing principle which
facilitates the presentation and evaluation of Gilkey's theological
corpus. Walsh's hook aims to he both expository and critical, and by
and large it is very successful. I have found Walsh's expose somewhat
unclear at times, hut this defect has much to do with Gilkey's idiosyncratic style, whose option for noetic tensions does not lend itself easily
to conceptual precision.
Walsh's assessment of various aspects of Gilkey's theology is very
helpful. In particular, I would draw attention to the following, quite
illuminating topics: Gilkey's eidetic unfaithfulness to Scriptures (3738, and 260-262); the doubts Walsh raises concerning some aspects of
Gilkey's doctrine of God (242-245, and 258-259); the inconsistency he
spots in the way Gilkey conceives of a Christian critique of the ambiguous religious character of secular culture (158-167) ; the distinction,
introduced by Walsh, between a religious structure and its direction or
misdirection, regarding the problem .of the religious substance of a
culture (214-217); Gilkey's collapsing of the religious "dimension"
into the unifying center of the self (198-200, and 212); the dualism
between religious and scientific language (203-205).
Walsh calls Gilkey "a systematic theologian who has not produced
a systematic theology" (227). As an explanation for this inadequacy,
I have suggested that Gilkey does not manage to integrate the neoorthodox and the liberal strands in his attempt to correlate cultural
issues with Christian doctrine and practice. In his writings there is a
continual oscillation between fideism and rationalism. Despite this lack
of systematic integration, the reading of Through the Tempest, especially if coupled with Walsh's exposition and critique, can trigger much
fresh and profound thinking.

Loms RoY,. O.P.
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUME 57 (1993)
.ARTICLES
PAGE

Ashley, Benedfot, O.P. Gender and the Priesthood of Christ . . . . . .
Bell, Thomas J. The Eucharistic Theologies of Laud(J) Sion and
Thomas Aquinas's Summa Theologiae . . • • . . • • • • • • . . • . . • . • • .
Brady, Bernard V. An Analysis of the Use of Rights Language in
Pre-Modern Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . • . . . .
Breclaw, Keith A. Homo Faber Reconsidered: Two Thomistic Reflections on Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Burns, Peter, S.J. The Status and Function of Divine Simpleness
in Summa Theologiae la 2-13 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corrigan, Kevin. Light and Metaphor in Plotinus and St. Thomas
Aquinas
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . •.
Crosby, John F. The Incommunicability of Human Persons . . . . . .
Crosson, Frederick J. Rejoinder to Bruce Marshall . . . . . . • . . . . . .
Dietrich, Wendell S. Troeltsch's T11eatmentof the Thomist Synthesis
Fastiggi, Robert L. The IncarnaJtion: Muslim Objections and the
Christian Response . . . • . . . . • . . • . • . . . . . . . . . • . . • . . . • . . . . . . . .
F11oolich, Gregory. Ultimate End and Common Good . . • . . . . . . • . • •
George, Marie I. Mind Forming and :Manuductio in Aquinas . . . . • •
Godsey, John D. Recent Barthiana . . . . . • . . . . . . • . . . . . • . . . • . . . . •
Grabowski, John & Michael Naughton. Catholic Social and Sexual
Ethics : Inconsistent or Organic? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . .
Guietti, Paolo. Hermeneutic of Aquinas's Tex,!;s: Notes on the
Index Thomisticus . • • • • • • . . . • • • • • • • • • • • • • • . . • • • • . • • • • • • • •
Hibbs, Thomas S. Macintyre's Postmodern Thomism . . . . . . • • . . . . .
Kennedy, Terence, C.Ss.R. An Italian View of the Debate on
Virtue • . . . . . . . . • • . . • . . • • • . . . . • . . . . • . • . . . . . . . • • . . • . . . . . •
Kondoleon, Theodore J. A Contradiction in St. Thomas's Teaching
on Creation . . . . • . • . . . . • . . . . • . • . • . • . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kries, Douglas. Leo Strauss's Understanding of Aquinas's Natural
Law Theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . .
Martin, James T. H. Aquinas as a Commentator on De Anima 3.5

343
163
97
579
1
187
403
299
381
457
609
201
269
555
667
277
123
51
215
621

INDEX OF ARTICLES

(Continued)
PAGE

Naughton, Michael J. & John Grabowski. Catholic Social and Sexual Ethics: Inconsistent or
........... ... .. .......
Porter, Jean. Basic Goods and the Human Good in Recent Catholic
Moral Theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Rocca, Gregory, O.P. The Trinity and Feminism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schall, James V., S.J. Transcendent Man in the Limited City: The
Political Philosophy of Charles N. R. McCoy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Schmitz, Kenneth L. The God of Love . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Walker, Dll.vid. Trinity and Creation in the Theology of St. Thomas
Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
White, Kevin. The Virtues of Man the .Animal sociaJ,e: .Affabilitas
and V eritas in Aquinas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M. Cap. The Immanent and Economic
Trinity
....... ... ....... ................. ... ....... .. ..
Zimbelman, Joel. Theology, Praxis and Ethics in the Thought of
Juan Luis Segundo, S.J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

555
27
509
63
495
443
641
655
233

REVIEWS
Balthasar, Hans Urs von. The Glory of the Lord, vol. V. (Keefe,
Donald J., S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Blackwell, Richard J. Galileo, Bellarmine and the Bible. (Reitan,
Eric A., O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Brito, Emilio. Dieu et T!etre d'apres Thomas d'.Aquin et Hegel.
(O'Meara, Thomas F., O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Corecco, Eugenio. The Theology of Canon Law. (Gaal, Im.re V.) . .
Dahlstrom, D. 0., ed. Philosophy and .Art. (Nichols, Aidan, O.P.)
DiNoia, J. A. The Diversity of Religions. (D'Costa, Gavin) . . . . . .
Driv:er, Tom F. The Magic of Ritual. (Irwin, Kevin W.) . . . . . . . .
Elders, Leo, ed. La Doctrine de la revelation divine de Saint
Thomas D' .Aquin. (D' Amecourt, Joseph, F. J.) . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fiorenza, Francis S. & John P. Galvin, eds. Systematic Theology:
Roman Catholic Perspectives. (Rocca, Gregory) . . . . . . . . . . . .
Fowl, Stephen E. & L. Gregory Jones. Reading in Communion.
(Raposa, Michael L.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Gale, Richard M. On the Nature and Existence of God. (Dodds,
Michael J., O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Geisler, Norman L. Thomas .Aquinas: .An Evangelical .Appraisal.
(Wawrykow, Joseph) , , , , , . , , •• , • . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . • • . . . . . . .

308
690
706
546
714
524
700
141
305
324
317
529

INDEX OF BOOK REVIEWED

(Continued)
PAGE

Gilkey, Langdon. Through the Tempest: Theological Voyages in a
Pluralistic Culture. (Roy, Louis, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Greer, Rowan A. Broken Lights and Mended Lives. (Berthold,
George) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Hill, William J. Search for the Absent God. (Burrell, David,
C.S.C.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .
Hoitenga, Dewey J., Jr. Faith and Reason from Plato to Plantinga.
(Wolterstorff, Nicholas) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Kupperman, Joel. Character. (Hibbs, Thomas S.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
MacDonald, Scott, ed. Being and Goodness. (Kruschwitz, Robert
.
B.) ...................................................
McGinn, Bernard. The Foundations of Mysticism. (Dupre, Louis)
McMullin, Ernan. The Inferenee that Makes Science. (Wallace,
William A., O.P.) ......................................
.
Macquarrie, John. Mary for all Christians. (Jelly, Frederick M.,
.
O.P.) .................................................
Murdoch, Iris. Metaphysies as a Guide to Morals. (Jones, L.
Gregory)
Pattison, Robert. The Great Dissent. (Ferreira, M. Jamie) ..... .
Rorty, Amelie Oksenberg. Mind in Aetion. (Churchill, John) ... .
Schenk, Richard. Die Gnade vollenileter Endlichkeit. (Alberg,
Jeremiah L., S.J.) ......................................
.
Smith, Janet. Humanae Vitae: A Generation Later. (May, William E.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sullivan, Francis A. Salvation Outside the Church? (Phan, Peter
C.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Tarnas, Richard. The Passion of the Western Mind. (Krasevac,
Edward, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Thompson, William. Christology and Spirituality.
(Krasevac,
Edward L. O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Volf, Miroslav. Work in the Spirit. (Chmielewski, Philip J., S.J.)
Walsh, Brian J. Langdon Gilkey: Theologian for a Culture in
Decline. (Roy, Louis, O.P.) .. . . . . . . .. .. .. . . .. . . . . . . . . .. . . .
Wilhelmsen, Frederick D. Being and Knowing. (Fenton, Norman,
O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
William of Ockham. Quiillibetal Questions. (Noone, Timothy B.)
Wissink, J.B. M., ed. The Eternity of the World in the Thought of
Thomas Aquinas and his Contemporaries. (Baldner, Stephen)

717
328
521
542
697
150

133
131
703
687
331

533
321
155
695

550
136
708
717
153
337
146