The Thomist 63 (1999): 343-401

THE NATURE AND GRACE OF SACRA DOCTRINA IN
ST. THOMAS'S SUPER BOETIUM DE TRINITATE
l.AWRENCEJ. DONOHOO, 0.P.
Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D.C.

I

NQUIRIES INTO THE meaning and function of sacra doctrina in
St. Thomas's thought have long centered on the pregnant yet
cryptic opening question of the Summa Theologiae. Relatively
little attention has been devoted to its treatment in his exposition
of Boethius's De Sancta Trinitate. 1 Yet this early text, devoted to
questions of theological and philosophical method, explores with
unusual sophistication the various dimensions and tasks of sacra
doctrina: a knowledge dependent on revelation and reason; the
relationship between faith and reason; the work of reason within
and apart from faith; justifications for belief; and the psychological, epistemological, and theological grounds for the complementarity between faith and reason.
This study will explore these various facets of sacra doctrina in
the De Trinitate in order to establish how Thomas, toward the
beginning of his career, laid down an intermeshing foundation for
philosophy and theology in a work all the more valuable for
1 All references to St. Thomas's opusculum on the De Sancta Trinitate (hereafter De
Trinitate or In Boet. de Trin.) depend on the critical edition of the Leonine Commission,
SuperBoetium deTrinitate (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1992). Translations and paraphrases
of the first four questions are taken from or based on Armand Maurer, St. Thomas Aquinas:
Faith, Reason, and Theology: Questions I-W of His Commentary on the De Trinitate of
Boethius, Medieval Sources in Translation (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1987). Translations and paraphrases of the last two questions rely on Armand Maurer, St.
Thomas Aquinas: The Division and Methods of the Sciences. Questions V-VI of His
Commentary on the De Trinitate of Boethius (3d ed.; Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1963). The first page reference following citations refers to the Leonine
critical edition; the second, to the respective translation of Maurer.

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being the sole thirteenth-century commentary on Boethius's text. 2
What emerges in this daring exposition, which supported the
edifice of his thought to the end, is the construction of an overarching science-a wisdom-that embraces a "meta-philosophy"
and a "meta-theology," in which neither component, while
retaining its own identity and its own acts, can be understood
without the other. A study of this text also reveals that much of
the teaching on sacra doctrina in the Summa Theologiae is simply
a borrowing or rearrangement of ideas already advanced in this
early opusculum. 3
In question 1, Thomas examines theology's contribution to
philosophy. 4 How does a thinking steeped in faith know the
2 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1: The Person and His Work, trans.
Robert Royal {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 67-68;
345. For other brief treatments of the setting, history, importance, and bibliography of
Thomas's commentary, see the Leonine Commission's Super Boetium de Trinitate,
"Introduction," 5-9; James A. Weisheipl, Friar Thomas D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and
Works (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974), 134-38, 381-82; and M.-D. Chenu, Toward
Understanding Saint Thomas, trans. A.-M. Landry and D. Hughes (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Company, 1964), 276-78. The most painstaking textual analysis is that of Michel Corbin, Le
chemin de la theologie chez Thomas cfAquin, Bibliotheque des archives de philosophie,
nouvelle serie (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 291-474. The historical background to Thomas's
text and to the medieval efforts to develop a theology of the Trinity are ably treated in Leo
Elders, Faith and Science: An Introduction to St. Thomas' Expositio in Boethii de Trinitate
(Rome: Herder, 1974), esp. 7-24. Ralph Mcinerny provides a helpful assessment of the
influence of Boethius on Thomas in Boethius and Aquinas {Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1990), 1-29. Douglas C. Hall's The Trinity: An Analysis of St.
Thomas Aquinas' Expositio of the De Trinitate of Boethius, Studien und Texte zur
Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ed. Albert Zimmermann, no. 33 (Leiden, New York, Koln:
E. J. Brill, 1992), is especially helpful for studying the relationship of the De Trinitate to the
Commentary on the Sentences (39-40; 48-49, 55-58). For an extensive list of texts in the
Thomistic corpus treating the question of theological method, see Yves Congar,A History of
Theology, trans. Hunter Guthrie (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday, 1968), 91-92.
3 For an alternative approach that detects a gradual development in Thomas's concept of
sacradoctrina from the Sentences through De Trinitate and the Summa contra Gentiles to the
Summa Theologiae, see Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie, 64-107. A textual-systematic
approach is in any case recommended in the presence of the quaestio which, shaped by
discrete arguments and responses, lends itself to the interpreter's toil of reworking its parts
into a systematic whole.
4 The structure of the Super Boetium de Trinitate is simple and meticulous, if incomplete.
Following Boethius's text (preface and two chapters), Thomas's opusculum is comprised of
an introduction (pro/ogus), three brief commentaries (expositio prohemii, expositio capituli
primi, and expositio capituli secund1), and six questions marked off in three groups of two
questions which follow each expositio. The literal commentaries closely follow Boethius's

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limits and limitations of philosophy in a way hidden from
philosophy itself? Furthermore, how does theology clarify the
nature of philosophical thinking by situating human knowing in
a larger field of knowers? Theology, reaching over to interpret
philosophy from a revelatory perspective, finds that its own
self-understanding is broadened in the process. In question 2,
Thomas examines philosophy's contribution to theology. How
does knowledge that arises solely from reason and that is placed
before, within, and alongside the knowledge that proceeds from
faith contribute to building up a body of knowledge whose
content represents a human assimilation of divine truth? Moreover, how can this knowledge assist theology even as it retains its
own nature and methods? 5 In its task of converting belief into
sacra doctrina, philosophy both becomes something else and
remains itself as theology's companion, counterpart, and competitor. Question 3 plumbs yet deeper to uncover the principles and
nature of sacra doctrina embedded in faith, along with offering a
"theology" of philosophy that places both sacred science and
secular knowledge within the ambit of the natural desire for God.
Finally, question 5, within the context of sorting out the various
sciences of natural reason, articulates the basis of faith, itself the
basis of sacra doctrina, in God's revelation.
The major issues introduced in the prologue are largely raised
and resolved in these four interrelated questions. We cannot do
better than to trace Thomas's argument textually, for he arranged
his work to unfold in accordance with the nature of the subject
matter as well as with Boethius's text. 6 However, while Boethius
employed a recondite style in order to exclude unworthy readers,
text, while the six questions probe more fully issues raised in the expositiones, as the
introductory remarks to questions 1, 3, and 5 indicate.
5 Unless otherwise indicated, "theology," "divine science," and "sacred doctrine" are used
interchangeably in this study in both their Latin and English forms to refer to the discipline
which, following upon revelation and presupposing faith, investigates God and his creation
as it is related to him. "Theology" is to be distinguished particularly from theology as a
branch or dimension of metaphysics, and "divine science" is to be contrasted with God's own
science or knowledge.
6 The coincidence of systematic and textual order is helped by Thomas's recognition that
Boethius proceeds theologically, that is, he begins with the absolute starting point of the
Trinity, which only faith reveals (In Boet. de Trin., prol. [75; 3-4]).

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Thomas's work, by its very nature as exposition and commentary,
seeks to illuminate and develop Boethius's teachings even to the
point of clarifying the character of his veiled and obscure style.7
The result is an exposition, concise yet comprehensive, that
skillfully images its prototype because a master is commenting on
a master. 8
I. THE PROLOGUE: A QUEST FOR THEOLOGICAL METHOD

First statements are usually important in works that treat of
first things, and De Trinitate is no exception: "The natural gaze
of the human mind, burdened by the weight of a perishable body,
cannot fix itself in the first light of truth, by which everything can
be easily known." 9 Presuming Thomas's Aristotelian psychology
of powers and nature, his relatively optimistic assessment of
human nature, and above all his fleshly anthropology, one might
well be startled by the spiritualist cast of this statement and its
propensity to judge human nature by angelic or divine standards.
Since an interpretation that finds Thomas succumbing to
angelicism or so-called Platonism must be excluded by the most
rudimentary familiarity with his epistemology and anthropology,
we must look for other explanations.
Textually, the opening statement anticipates Boethius's preface, which expresses disquiet in the face of the awesome mystery
being approached. It provides a counterpoise to the optimism,
absent in Boethius, which is expressed in the epigraph quoting
Wisdom 6:22: "I will seek her out from the beginning of her
7 In Boet. de Trin. (69; 7); pro!. (75-76; 3-6); exp. proh. (79; 11). For Thomas's
discussion of the prudent use of obscure speech in theological writing, see In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 2, a. 4 (100-102; 51-55).
8 Thomas's work as exposition and commentary is itself an image of Boethius's text, which
Thomas understands as purporting to image God's own knowledge. For he interprets
Boethius's opening statement as identifying the efficient cause of the text as principally God's
divine light and secondarily the author's mind (In Boet. de Trin., exp. proh. [77; 8]). Thus the
De Trinitate as text images what it teaches, namely, a sacred teaching rooted in God's
revelation and transmitted in a tradition.
9 "Naturalis mentis humane intuitus, pondere corruptibilis corporis aggrauatus, in prime
ueritatis luce, ex qua omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest" (In Boet. de Trin.,
pro!. [75; 3]; see also ibid., q. 1, a. 1, ad 4).

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birth, and will bring the knowledge of her to light." 1 Further, it
responds to Sacred Scripture by paraphrasing the anthropology
of Wisdom 9: 15: "For the corruptible body is a load upon the
soul, and the earthly habitation presseth down the mind that
museth upon many things. " 11 In this way Boethius's apprehension
is both acknowledged and balanced by two scriptural texts
respectively concerned with the light of human wisdom and the
weight of our corporeal nature. This juxtaposition is reinforced
rhetorically through a series of contrasts: aggrauatus and luce,
facile and non po test, naturalis intuitus and corruptibilis
corporis.12 Systematically, the contrast presents the two poles that
govern all six questions of the De Trinitate: the lowly human
mind and the human nature it illumines, and the transcendence
of the Trinity as ultimate object and end of the graced human
intellect's desire. The brilliance of Thomas's opening remark
appears more clearly when understood as not simply confirming
a source of revelation, but also as interpreting the opening statement of Aristotle'sMetaphysics-the text on first principles which
likely represented for Thomas the finest achievement of human
reason. As a commentary on Aristotle's bold assertion that all
human beings desire to know, the opening statement of the De
Trinitate, without denying the doctrine of desire, inscribes the
believer's experience of epistemological disappointment in the
capacity of the human intellect to know the highest truths by its
own power.
This initial declaration, then, not only balances the epigraph
by tempering Scripture with Scripture, it also mediates between
Jerusalem and Athens by moderating the optimism of human
thinking with a sobriety that leans on divine wisdom. We know
from faith that we do not know from nature the first truths
except as through a mirror darkly. In an imbrication of the
Socratic mood, God's word gives us knowledge of our ignorance
10 "Ab initio natiuitatis inuestigabo et ponam in lucem scientiam illius" (In Boet. de Trin.,
pro!. [75; 3]).
11 Douay Rheims version. "[C]orpus enim quod corrumpitur adgravat animam et deprimit
terrena inhabitatio sensum multa cogitantem" (Biblia Sacra: Iuxta Vulgatam Versionem, vol.
2 [Stuttgart: Wiirttembergische Bibelanstalt, 1969]).
12 See Thomas's discussion of the necessity of veiling theological discourse as evidence of
his rhetorical sensitivities (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 4 [100-102; 51-55]).

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in a way and to a depth unknown to philosophy. Hence the De
Trinitate, as a query into our ignorance, attempts to bridge the
gap between the infinite and finite in the realm of knowledge and
to set this knowledge against the enlightening matrices of divine
and angelic knowledge, human participation in this knowledge,
and other kinds of human knowing. In this pursuit of somehow
knowing what it cannot know and in ways it cannot know, the
human mind is directed both into itself in the reflective analysis
that ponders its own act and above itself to the highest Knower
for whom we are partly suited in our nature and our knowledge,
both by nature and by grace, already now and forever in glory. 13
The opening statement of the prologue introduces an argument that points to the natural limitations of the human mind
ascending to a knowledge of God through knowledge of creatures. God compensates for the human incapacity to know him
adequately by providing "another, safe way of knowing ...
through faith. " 14 Although this passage does not conclusively
establish that per {idem means "through the mediation of faith"
rather than "through faith itself," a subsequent statement clarifies
that this knowledge is based on faith but not identical to it. 15 A
basic distinction between philosophical and theological knowing
follows: philosophers consider creatures before the Creator, presumably in their ascent to him, while theologians first consider
the Creator by virtue of God's revelation. This distinction
punctuates the De Trinitate's major theme of the limits and
possibilities of knowledge variously addressed in the following six
13 "From the Vlth century text [of Boethius], we pass to the XIIIth century commentary
[of Thomas] in which the questions dealt with reveal perhaps the topmost point reached by
XIII th century's critical reflexion upon itself" (Chenu, Toward UnderstandingSaintThomas,
278).
14 "Et ideo Deus humano generi aliam tutam uiam cognitionis prouidit, suam notitiam
mentibus hominum per fidem infundens" (In Boet. ck Trin., pro!. [75; 3]). For a similar
argument, see ibid., q. 3, a. 1 (107-8; 65-67). The use of via, when compared with its pivotal
use in the arguments for God's existence (STh I, q. 2, a. 3), suggests that Creator and
creatures share a common task in bridging the chasm that separates them.
15 "[C]ognitionis desuper date principium est prime ueritatis notitia per fidem infusa" (In
Boet. ck Trin., pro!. [75; 3]). Like the opening article of the Summa Theologiae,the prologus
thus distinguishes, if not sharply, between truths of faith and theological reflection following
upon them. However, the emphasis here, in contrast to the Summa, is on knowledge of God
rather than salvation.

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questions.16 More immediately, it elucidates Boethius's theological
method whose point of departure is "the supreme source of
things, namely the Trinity of the one God," and so establishes this
knowledge as a pursuit of divine knowledge dependent on faith,
rather than the knowledge of faith itself.17 Finally, this architectonic distinction between theology and philosophy introduces
a "meta-theology" or wisdom that overarches both knowledge
based in faith and natural knowledge by defining each in opposition to the other, but in such a way that their mutual assistance is
implied in their passing trajectories between God and creation. 18
Such in fact appears at once in reflection on the loftiest and
most abstruse mystery of the faith. Thomas follows Boethius's
example of comparing and contrasting the divine processions
with created ones. Is this analogy a divine teaching or a human
one? It appears to be both: certain scriptural texts are cited to
indicate its revelatory lineage,19 yet these analogies also serve as
concepts for ordering human thinking that Thomas finds at the
core of Boethius's own theological vision. In a prefiguration of
the Summa Theologiae'sown structure, Boethius's consideration
of uncreated and created processions is seen by his commentator
as the key for opening up his entire theological scheme of
procession and restoration. 20 The rapid path from reflection on
the highest to reflection on the whole in order to understand the
highest suggests that both thinkers understand that speech about
16 Even a question as metaphysically abstruse as whether two bodies can exist in the same
place is the locus of a teaching on the limits of reason (In Boet. de Trin., q. 4, a. 3, ad 1
[129-30; 105-6]).
17 "Hunc ergo ordinem sequtus Boetius, ea que sunt fidei tractare intendens, in ipsa
summa rerum origine principium sue considerationis instituit, scilicet trinitate uni us simplicis
Dei" (In Boet. de Trin., pro!. [75; 4]).
18 Thomas may have been prompted here by Aristotle's deployment of a meta-wisdom in
the philosophical domain that, by defining the subject matter of first philosophy, is situated
both within and beyond it. See Aristotle, Post. Anal. 1.9-12; and Aquinas, I Post. Anal., lect.
17-21; Aristotle, Metaphys. 1.2; 6.1; and Aquinas, In Metaphys., prooemium.
19 Thomas cites Ephesians 3:15; Colossians 1:15; and Proverbs 8:22.
20 In Boet. de Trin., pro!. (76; 5). As presented in the De Trinitate, Boethius's tripartite
scheme is the Trinitarian God, the procession of good creatures from the good God, and the
renewal of creatures through Christ. The Summa Theologiaecombines Boethius's first two
parts in the Prima Pars, and then divides his last part into the "renewal of creatures" (Secunda
Pars) and "through Christ" (Tertia Pars). All of this is prefaced by a preliminary treatment of
sacra doctrina (STh I, q. 1, a. 1) that parallels Boethius's preface.

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the Creator presupposes speech about the created. For this
reason, the statement that God is treated first in theology must be
interpreted with a certain elasticity.
Turning to the question of method, Thomas leans on the
unimpeachable authority of St. Augustine to introduce the distinction between leaning on authorities and following reason.
Boethius's preference is reason: "The aim of the present treatise
is to clarify the mysteries of faith, as far as this is possible in the
present life." 21 Thomas emphasizes that this rational quest for
understanding the highest things presupposes faith by fortifying
Augustine's authority with Scripture: the way of reason is
reserved to the wise individual who investigates knowledge of the
Trinity "which men of former times accepted on authority
alone." 22 Depending on a kind of thinking of which only the few
are capable, the method of reason embodies a special kind of
knowing conversant with the created order that transposes its
insights into understanding of divine matters. 23 The argument
clearly implies that those who take the truths of faith further
along the path of understanding are to be praised above those
who simply believe on the basis of authority.
This suggests that divine revelation not only allows for but
actively reveals the truth that the deepening of one's knowledge
of revealed truths by enlisting human reason is to be encouraged.
Such a conclusion is reinforced by the prologue's closing image of
the wise man, borrowed from Job, that makes for a fitting
inclusion with the epigraph: "He has searched the depths of
rivers, and hidden things he has brought forth to light." 24 It is
also braced on the level of human reason by a shrewd observation
on Boethius's writing for the understanding few. The difficulties
21 "Finis uero huius operis est ut occulta fidei manifestentur quantum in uia possibile est"
(In Boet. de Trin., pro!. [76; 6]).
22 "quam antiqui sola actoritate asseruerunt" (In Boet. de Trin., pro!. [76; 6]).
Ecdesiasticus 39: 1 is cited.
23 The following brief commentary on the preface to De Sancta Trinitate provides
evidence of this by employing the doctrine of fourfold causality, unfolding various forms of
argumentation, and acknowledging the limitations of its own human reasoning (In Boet. de
Trin., exp. proh. [77-79; 8-12]).
24 "Profunda fluuiorum scrutatus est et abscondita produxit in lucem" (In Boet. de Trin.,
pro!. [76; 6]). Job 28:11 is cited.

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set before the reader are the locks that either bar him from
reading the text, or the occasion for summoning ingenuity and
patience so as to release them. 25 In fact, Thomas has made the
reader's task less arduous by sounding all the major themes of his
text in his sparse introductory remarks. Both in his brevity and in
his clarity he continues along the path Boethius marked out in the
human quest for understanding the deep 'things of God and his
creation. Already Thomas has given the major outlines of what he
will soon call sacra doctrina: a faith-based inquiry into the highest
cause, and the implications of this cause for everything else.
II. QUESTION 1: HUMAN KNOWLEDGE AND ITS LIMITS

In continuity with the theme of the prologue, the first article
of the De Trinitate shows that the human mind's resources are
sufficient for it to know the truth without a new divine
illumination. The nature of the human mind is elucidated as the
power that is principally engaged with the acts of believing,
thinking, and theologizing. In the first part of the responsio,
reason and revelation, represented by Aristotle and Scripture (Ps
4:7), respectively, join together to establish against Avicenna that
the agent intellect is a power of the soul. 26 The conclusion that
the active and passive powers working together are adequate for
the intellect to perceive the truth leads to the second
subargument, which demonstrates that the intellect's power
extends to certain intelligible truths that fall within its proper
domain. This judgment about natural truths is apparently made
by reason. But the companion claim that other truths-among
them the truths of faith-lie beyond the capacity of reason and
are only known by a divine illumination "supplementing the
natural light," obviously depends on premises that arise from
25 "ut ea que in hoc libro scribuntur tantum sapientibus colloquantur, qui hec intelligere
poterunt, sicut est auctor ipse et ille ad quern liber conscribitur, alii uero, qui capere intellectu
non possunt, a lectione excludantur: non enim libenter leguntur que non intelliguntur" (In
Boet. de Trin., exp. proh. [79; 11)). The argument of ibid., q. 2, a. 4 (100-102; 51-55) is also
pertinent to this discussion.
26 Thomas's awareness of Aristotle's ambiguity on this question, which occasioned
Avicenna's position in the first place, is captured in his careful formulation: "uerba Philosophi
... magis uidentur sonare" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 1 [82; 16)).

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faith. 27 Finally, a concluding subargument, also relying on
revealed principles, shows that divine Providence offers ordinary
guidance to all created natures by directing their powers to their
respective acts, and that the human mind therefore requires this
divine activity for its natural functions as well. 28 To varying
degrees, then, the various subarguments enlist both revelation and
reason to defend the human intellect's capacity to know truth on
the strength of its own nature, albeit a nature dependent on God's
creative and providential causality.
Clearly, a special divine illumination is assumed here for
demonstrating the naturalness of human knowing inasmuch as the
argument depends in large part on principles that derive from
faith. Revelation offers reason its resources to help it to understand its own nature as well as its limitations as a self-possessed
power. For only in a theology of creation that points back to the
intentions of the Creator who makes, shapes, and guides it in its
acts does human reason find its ultimate articulation. To this end,
Thomas intricately weaves an inductive argument of reason,
working backward from activities to the nature and functions of
the human intellect, with deductive arguments rooted in doctrines
concerning the truths of faith and secondary causality. At first
glance the argument's dependence on theological premises suggests that reason is inadequate to the task of accounting for itself.
To be sure, Thomas joins revelatory principles to principles taken
from natural psychology, anthropology, and epistemology in part
because of the difficulty of the subject matter, 29 but his intention
is also to advance a "theological psychology" that offers far more
than reason can provide on its own. No contradiction is involved
in the implication that the human mind needs a supernatural
illumination to know adequately that it does not need a new
illumination to know truth, for a more comprehensive theological
approach to the argument does not negate its strictly philosophi27 "superaddito

lumini naturali" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 1 [82; 17]).

28 For a discussion of the agent intellect as an immediate participation in God's own light,

see Jan H. Walgrave, "Die Erkenntnislehre des hi. Thomas von Aquin," in Aktua/itiit der
Scholastik?, ed. Joseph Ratzinger (Regensburg: Friedrich Pustet, 1975), 30.
29 "multa inquisitione indigeat ad cognoscendum quid est intellectus" (In Boet. de Trin.,
1,
q. a. 3 [87; 27]).

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cal conclusions. Unable to account thoroughly for its own capacities and limitations, reason transcends itself by merging with
faith in order to learn more about its nature than it can gain on
its own. Hence the question of whether the human mind is adequate for its own act can be clarified more satisfactorily with the
aid of faith, even if reason is taken beyond its own horizon. Paradoxically, reason comes to understand more adequately that it is
self-standing by way of a meta-theology which, without calling
attention to itself, sheds light on the human intellect by pointing
to the radical conditions of its exercise and the limitations of its
power. In other words, faith helps reason to see to what extent
reason does not need faith-and to what extent it does.
Asking whether the human mind can arrive at a knowledge of
God, article 2 addresses the issue of human knowledge of divine
matters. It follows the example of the preceding article both
methodologically, by engaging faith and reason, and substantively, by clarifying the natural limits of human knowing in its
pursuit of the ultimate cause of all things. This clarification is
achieved by contrasting the human intellect to the divine intellect
and angelic intellects with respect to the way one knows oneself
and other beings. The argument centers around knowledge as
possession of the form known. Something can be known either
through its own form or through the form of something similar
to itself. Further, there are two ways that something is known
through its own form: either through the form which is the being
itself (as God knows himself through his essence) or through a
form derived from the reality (as the human intellect knows the
stone through its abstracted form). Neither of these ways,
however, applies to the human intellect's knowledge of God in
our present state. For knowing God through the form that is his
essence, which constitutes the beatific vision, is unavailable to an
intellect that for now can only know anything by abstracting its
form from the senses. As for knowing something through a form
that is derived from it, any likeness imprinted by God in the
intellect would be created and hence inadequate for reflecting his
infinite essence. Finally, knowing God through purely intelligible
forms is also ruled out because the human intellect in this world
is naturally related to images. Hence God can only be known

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through the form of something similar to himself, namely through
the form of his effect. Some effects are equal to the power of their
causes, and provide knowledge of the cause's essence; other
effects are unequal, and can only provide knowledge of the existence of the cause. Since all effects fall short of God, the human
intellect is only able to conclude that God exists. However,
Thomas turns from Aristotle to Dionysius to widen access to
knowledge of God through the three ways of causality, supereminence, and negation.
As with the first article, principles arising from faith are
indispensable for this argument's attemptto investigate the power
and limits of reason. Even in the terms in which it is framed, the
primary question of whether the human mind can know God
presupposes knowledge of him not available to human reason.
Reason contributes epistemological and psychological principles
borrowed from Aristotle;30 faith provides doctrines which support
an intellectual penetration of mysteries concerning the beatific
vision and the nature of God and of angels. By situating the
human intellect within a larger field of suprahuman and human
knowers enjoying the vision of God's essence, Thomas presents
a theological epistemology of the human mind that provides
knowledge of ways of knowing that do not or do not yet apply to
us. The net effect is a complex interpenetration of philosophy,
faith, and theology that establishes limits for the operations of
reason in this world. 31
But can the truths of faith provide the human intellect with a
knowledge that transcends the capacities of reason? For knowing
the limits that are naturally set for human reason is already in
some sense to have transcended these limits in order to know
them as such. Thomas addresses this question toward the end of
the responsio in the affirmative, but in a way that accents the via

negativa:
directs our attention, among other references, to De Anima 3.7; Post. Anal.
2. 7-10. Here, as throughout the work, he provides an extensive list of sources (Faith, Reason,
and Theology, 21-22).
31 This argument is not complete, for Thomas will later show that revelation, in the act
of revealing the need for it, instructs natural reason in the limits of its intellectual powers (In
Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [106-9; 63-70]). See also SI'h I, q. 1, a. 1, and ScG I, c. 5.
30 Maurer

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The human mind receives its greatest help in this advance of knowledge when
its natural light is strengthened by a new illumination, like the light of faith and
the gifts of wisdom and understanding, through which the mind is said to be
raised above itself in contemplation, inasmuch as it knows that God is above
everything it naturally comprehends. But because it is not competent to
penetrate to a vision of his essence, it is said in a way to be turned back upon
itself by a superior light. 32

As splendid and far-reaching as the teachings derived from faith
may be, even they cannot circumvent the human intellect's
present inability to attain to a knowledge of God through the
divine form or through purely intelligible forms that bear a
likeness to him. By means of the illumination of faith, however,
the believing mind transcends itself by learning that God in
himself remains unknowable to it in via. Reason, when elevated
by the light of faith, "is raised above itself'' insofar as it breaks out
of its own boundaries to learn that its natural boundaries are not
exceeded by this new illumination. Whereas the first argument
presented a theology based in faith showing reason its own limits,
here a comparison of various knowers enables theology to know
what limits even a supernaturally illumined human intellect
encounters-and to know them precisely as limits.
Article 3, investigating whether the intellect knows God before
everything else, continues the exercise of applying insights rooted
in both reason and faith to understand the nature and limits of
the mind. Human unhappiness and disagreement about the nature
of God provide initial evidence for a negative answer. The
hypothesis that proposes that the human intellect first knows the
divine light implanted within it is rejected, but this response
requires a more extended analysis of what in fact the intellect first
grasps by rneans of an inquiry into the mind's own act of
knowing. In contrast to the first two articles, which borrow
heavily from insights that depend on faith, article 3 relies largely
on premises available to reason to bring the intellect to a
32 "In hoc autem profectu cognitionis maxime iuuatur mens humana cum lumen eius
naturale noua illustratione confortatur, sicut est lumen fidei et doni sapientie et intellectus,
per quod mens in contemplatione supra se eleuari dicitur, in quantum cognoscit Deum esse
supra omne id quod naturaliter compreendit. Set quia ad eius essentiam uidendam penetrare
non sufficit, dicitur in se ipsam quodarnmodo ab excellenti lumine reflecti" (In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 1, a. 2 [85; 22-23]).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

heightened self-awareness of what it need not know in order to
know. 33 Knowledge begins with the object known; only then does
the mind reflect on its act, and by means of the act reflect on its
nature. Since reflexive knowledge presupposes simple knowledge
of objects, the natural intelligible light which bestows the power
of understanding need not itself be first understood. 34 A rather
involved epistemology justifies this claim, which not only illuminates human knowledge of God but helps to preserve human
knowledge from needless complexity. 35
Explicitly returning to Boethius's Trinitarian theology, article
4 argues for the impotence of reason in coming to a knowledge
of the Trinity. Arguments from divine causality lead back only to
the one God, who faith alone knows is the three Persons who
mutually share in the work of creation. 36 This conclusion appears
as the consummation of the entire question insofar as it directs all
of its epistemological efforts toward the most sublime mystery of
faith. Though the emphasis is on reason being taught its absolute
boundary with respect to knowledge of God's intimate nature, we
should observe what is doing the teaching: the faith-infused
intellect which alone possesses knowledge of the Trinity. Hence
article 4 points in two directions. On the one hand, by showing
that natural reason is ignorant of God's innermost nature, it
confirms the teaching of article 2 that inquiry based in faith
deepens one's knowledge of God's utter transcendence as well as
the human incapacity to penetrate to the vision of his essence or
even grasp the conditions of its exercise. On the other hand, the
intellect infused with faith, informing the natural intellect of what
it alone knows of the Trinity, shows to what extent truths of faith
33 To be sure, theological reasoning also comes into play in accounting for the general
knowledge of and desire for God present in everyone from the start, but this is secondary:
"non ... oportet quod [Deus] sit primus in cognitione mentis humane, que ordinatur in
finem, sed in cognitione ordinantis; sicut et in aliis que naturali appetitu tendunt in finem
suum. Cognoscitur tamen a principio, et intenditur in quadam generalitate, prout mens
appetit se bene esse et bene uiuere; quod tune solum est ei cum Deum habet" (In Boet. de
Trin., q. 1, a. 3, ad 4 [88; 29]).
34 In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 3, ad 1 (88; 28).
35 See Walgrave's excellent treatment of theology's contribution to epistemology in
"Erkenntnislehre," 23-30.
36 In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 4 (89-90; 31-32).

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offer the believer an intimate and exclusive knowledge of God's
nature. 37
Natural reason, however, is not simply on the receiving end.
Alongside the double-edged growth in knowledge of God and
knowledge of natural and faith-based ignorance of God is the
contribution that reason makes to theology. For inquiry based in
faith must know what reason can know by itself in order to
distinguish such knowledge from what reason can know only
through faith as well as what reason cannot know even with it.
To begin with, natural knowledge of God varies from person to
person relative to the capacity to apprehend adequately the
relationship of causes to effects.38 Since this knowledge pertains
to metaphysics, which in turn presupposes familiarity with the
other theoretical disciplines, knowledge of God and of the
character and limits of human knowledge presumes facility in the
human sciences.39 While these disciplines do not pertain to
theology per se, the kind of fundamental theological inquiry
undertaken in these articles presupposes considerable knowledge
of material logic, anthropology, psychology, physics, and
metaphysics insofar as these disciplines help to identify the
capacities and limits of the human intellect, especially concerning
the highest truths. 40 In this way all human disciplines can assist
natural reason in presenting the breadth of its capacities to faith.
37 For a discussion of the historical context of the question of the function and limits of
reason and revelation in the debate over whether and to what degree human reason can aspire
to natural knowledge of the Trinity, see Jarislav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History
of the Development of Doctrine, vol. 3, The Growth of Medieval Theology (600-1300)
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 284-88.
38 "Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est, alio perfectius cognoscit: quia causa tanto ex
effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanta per effectum magis appreenditur habitudo cause ad
effectum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 2 [84; 22]).
39 "Human sciences" refers to disciplines dependent on natural reasoning in contrast to
sacred science based on faith.
40 In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 will later confirm this. There the third among five reasons
for the necessity of faith is to make certain truths available to all: "propter multa preambula
que exiguntur ad habendam cognitionem de Deo secundum uiam rationis: requiritur enim
ad hoc fere omnium scientiarum cognitio, cum omnium finis sit cognitio diuinorum, que
quidem preambula paucissimi consequntur; unde, ne multitudo hominum a diuina cognitione
uacua remaneret, prouisa est ei diuinitus uia fidei" (108; 67). See also ibid., q. 6, a. 1, ad 2
(third part) (163; 65); and ScG II, cc. 2-4.

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

In sum, question 1 offers a balanced assessment of the power
and limits of human reason in general and especially in its
investigation of first principles. Rejecting from the start the need
for a special divine illumination for the functioning of natural
reason, Thomas enlists conclusions of both faith and reason to set
reason on its own two feet by defending its capacity-in one sense
a tautology that supports his case-to accomplish what it has been
empowered to do. But the following articles put a halt to a
natural power that would aspire to an adequate knowledge of
God, whether through his own essence (art. 2), or as the first
truth known (art. 3 ), or in the form of a rational deduction of the
Trinity (art. 4). At the same time, knowledge that is infused by
faith helps the intellect to come to a deeper self-understanding of
what it can naturally know and what it cannot, what its
limitations are within the larger arena of divine and angelic
knowing, the genesis of its own act of knowing, and its radical
circumscription by faith's exclusive access to God's revelation.
Theology's analytical forays into philosophical psychology, while
remaining eminently theological, serve to clarify both the supernatural and the natural. Grounded in principles derived from
God's revelation, the reflecting mind, infused by faith, is able to
know what reason cannot know without the benefit of faith, and
even to "know" something of what transcends reason illumined
by faith. By reflection, illumined by revelation, the believer is able
to look at his intellect, as it were, from the outside.
III. QUESTION 2: MANIFESTING THE DMNE KNOWLEDGE
The following sources of knowledge have been introduced in
the first question: natural reason, particularly as it is exercised by
the learned; the light of faith; the gifts of wisdom and understanding; and reason illumined by faith. These principles, which
have explored the nature and limits of human reason, are directed
in question 2 to examining the divine science rooted in revelation
and pursued by the reflective human intellect insofar as it is
illumined by faith and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The thematic
sequence from reason to divine science follows the logic that
reason's nature and limitations must be probed before its

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resources can be applied to matters of faith. There is, to be sure,
the suggestion of circular reasoning in this order of presentation:
question 2 formally investigates, with reason's assistance, the
nature of a theological science that has already served in question
1 as a source for examining human reason. But circularity is
avoided if the arguments of question 1 defining nature and reason
are understood as critical moments in divine science's work of
distinguishing itself from natural reason in its quest for
self-understanding. 41
A) Article 1: The Divine Permission for Human Inquiry into Divine
Matters

The fundamentally different perspective introduced by the
second question can be appreciated by contrasting the issues
raised in question 1, article 2 ("Whether one can attain to a
knowledge of God") and question 2, article 1 ("Whether one
should consider divine things by way of investigation"). 42 The
earlier question, inquiring into the capacities of human reason to
probe the highest cause, bypasses the issue of whether such
questioning is permissible. Instead, it concludes that human
reason requires the assistance of the new illumination of faith to
arrive at an adequate knowledge of God. The second question,
framed within the ambit of faith, asks the more basic "moral"
question of whether revealed truths should be investigated. At the
same time, this argument builds on the conclusions of question 1
insofar as the proposal that the mind should seek knowledge of
God in the manner proper to it presupposes philosophical and
theological insights into the nature and limits of human knowing.
If the earlier question examined the possibilities of human
knowing from the human perspective, the present question
approaches the issue of limitations from God's viewpoint. More
simply, the movement is from what we can know to what we

41 Or to paraphrase the teaching of In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 1, the science by which we
know is not that which we first know.
42 "utrum possit ad Dei notitiam
peruenire" (80; 13) and "utrum diuina liceat
inuestigando tractare" (92; 35) (my translation).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

should know. 43 However, by inquiring into God's will with
respect to the human aspiration to know him, the question
obliquely points to the paradox that its resolution presupposes
sufficient knowledge of God's wishes.
Thomas strategically places the moral question before the
major epistemological concern of the following article: whether
a divine science is possible. 44 This sequence indicates his departure
from Aristotelian methodology, in which the first question to be
asked would be an sit-in this case, whether a science of the
particular matter at hand is possible. 45 However, that question
can be deferred until article 2, because no matter what an inquiry
into the precise nature of divine science yields, the revealed truths
which ground any such knowledge cannot be denied. It is this
prior faith which bids any investigation to reflect an antecedent
reverence for God at the outset. For any inquiry arising from
God's revelation is foremost a personal inquiry into the mode of
response due him, a "person-to-person" encounter that appreciates the possibility of God's desire for privacy and searches
natural wisdom, Christian teachers, and God's word itself for an
answer. 46
43 Hall, The Trinity, 71-72; Elders, Faith, 43. In fact, the answer to the question this
article poses was already adumbrated in In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, a. 2, which favors the human
mind's advance in knowledge by the illuminations of faith, wisdom, and understanding.
However, reason must also be aware of its limits; see, e.g., ibid., q. 4, a. 3, ad 1 (129-30;
105).
44 Only the last of seven objections in In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1 (92; 36) raises an
epistemological objection to inquiring into divine matters.
45 Aristotle, Post. Anal. 1.1; Aquinas, I Post. Anal., lect. 2. For a helpful elucidation of the
application of Aristotle's and Thomas's teaching to the postulation of a science, see William
A. Wallace, The Role of Demonstrationin Moral Theology (Washington, D.C.: The Thomist
Press, 1962), 17-20. Boethius is not cited here in support of Thomas's position, most likely
because he was recognized as one of the tradition's strongest proponents of the use of reason
in theology. His admonition, "si poterit rationemque coniunge," may be taken as the motto
of his thought (Tractate 2, "Utrum Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus," in Theological
Tractates, ed. and trans. H. Stewart, E. Rand, and S. Tester, Loeb Classical Library [Latin],
vol. 74 [Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1973], 36).
46 Johannes Stohr, "Die Theozentrik der theologischen Wissenschaftslehre des HI. Thomas
von Aquin und ihre Diskussion bei neuzeidichen Kornrnentatoren," in Thomas van Aquin:
Werk und Wirkung im Licht neuerer Forschungen,vol. 19 of MiscellaneaMediaevalia, ed.
Albert Zimmermann (Berlin, New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1988), 493. See also Stohr,
"Theologie als 'Sacra doctrina' bei Thomas von Aquin und in neueren Auffassungen," in
VeritatiCatholicae:Festschrift{Ur Leo Scheffczykzum 65. Geburtstag,ed. Anton Ziegenaus,

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The personal encounter between God and human beings
implied by the question is in fact the point of departure for the
argument: "Because our perfection consists in our union with
God, we must have access to the divine to the fullest extent
possible, using everything in our power, that our mind might be
occupied with contemplation and our reason with the investigation of divine realities. "47 Thomas appeals to divine testimony
for his claim by citing Psalm 73. 48 The intellectual pursuit of God,
in both contemplative and argumentative modes, is thus enfolded
in a more comprehensive quest for human perfection realized in
union with God. Moreover, the human yearning for God is
positioned within a yet more inclusive theological vision of desire
which portrays every creature as naturally drawn to become more
and more like God in its own way. 49 In answer, then, to the
moral objection that we should humbly refrain from inquiring
into divine matters, Thomas responds with the moral imperative
to strain after knowledge of the divine on the basis of our natural
bent toward the perfection of our human powers-but let human
inquiry into divine matters avoid the threefold perils of presumption, rationalism, and overweening pride as it forges ahead to
consummate the graced nature's aspiration toward union with
God. A theological epistemology appears in the premise that
knowing God makes the creature more like him insofar as knowing is a way of being. A theological anthropology appears in the
teaching that the human desire to know God represents and
Franz Courth, and Philip Schafer (Aschaffenburg: Pattloch, 1985), 678.
47 "cum perfectio hominis consistat in coniunctione ad Deum, oportet quod homo ex
omnibus que in ipso sunt quantum possibile est ad diuina annitatur, ut intellectus
contemplationi et ratio inquisitioni diuinorum uacet" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1 [93; 37]).
It is clear, then, that Thomas is not reducing the Christian faith to a science or the Christian
life to a rigid academic pursuit. Its epistemological thrust is rather to be understood as simply
one expression of the divine-human encounter, embracing the human desire for a knowledge
of God both clear and certain.
48 "Michi adherere Deo bonum est" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1 [93; 37]). Elders notes
that the sed contra's citation of 1 Peter 3: 15, which counsels readiness to defend one's faith,
was a medieval locus classicusfor justifying the theological enterprise and inquiring into its
nature (Faith, 42).
49 "Set quelibet creatura mouetur ad hoc quod Deo assimiletur plus et plus quantum
potest, et sic etiam humana mens semper debet moueri ad cognoscendumde Deo plus et plus
secundum modum suum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1, ad 7
39)).

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expresses the all-embracing desire of the graced human nature for
intimate kinship with him. Both together offer a theological
propter quid argument ex suppositione finis that justifies the
necessity of seeking understanding of the highest mysteries. 50
Supporting this argument from revelation is a citation from
Aristotle urging us, "so far as we can, [to] make ourselves immortal, and strain every nerve to live in accord with what is best in
us." 51 At first glance, this appeal to philosophical testimony appears surprising since it obscures the distinctively theological turn
of the argument. In any case, Aristotle's counsel was intended to
animate his readers to aim for suprahuman things, not to defend
an inquiry devoutly alert to the sensibilities of a Prime Mover
who just might take offense at being the object of mortal
inquisitiveness. 52 There is, however, a common logic linking the
Christian and Greek teachings: behind Aristotle's assertion lies the
doctrine of humankind's affinity with the divine that is both
reflected and achieved in the search for divine knowledge. 53
Thomas has raised this insight to the status of its revealed
counterpart by marshaling scriptural, theological, and philosophical sources to shape an argument for advancing a quest for
knowledge of God that is based in revelation. Indeed, this
argument both anticipates and advances an integrated notion of
divine science composed of theological and philosophical
premises. At the same time, a supplementary instruction safeguards against any confusion concerning the distinctive modes of
argumentation by distinguishing theology from philosophy as the
discipline that follows upon faith is distinct from the discipline

50 In addition to citing Aristotle to support this argument, Thomas reinterprets benignly
certain passages from Job and Hilary which endorse a certain reticence in investigating divine
questions. See also In De Qzusis, lect. 1. Propterquid demonstration in theology is discussed
in Quodl. 4, q. 9, a. 18; see·also James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of Sacra Doctrinain the
Summa Theologiael, q. 1," The Thomist 38 (1974): 68-69.
51 "in quantum contingit immortale facere, et omnia facere ad uiuere secundum optimum
eorum que in ipso" (Aristotle, Nie. Eth. 10. 7.1177b31-34; quoted in In Boet. de Trin., q. 2,
a. 1 [92; 3 7]). See also Aristotle, Metaphys. 12. 7.
52 Such deference is in fact unnecessary toward a self-contemplating Contemplator who
is blissfully unaware of any human inquiries made into his existence or nature.
53 Aristotle, Nie. Eth. 10.7.1177b26-32; Metaphys. 12.7.1072b14-30.

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that precedes it. 54 When arguments are employed in matters of
faith, it is not a question of reason demonstrating truths of faith,
but of applying persuasive analogies from reason to the truths of
faith. 55
B) Article 2: The Character of Divine Human Science

The foundation of theological reasoning in faith, which
protects inquiry into divine matters from the dangers that arise
when it is mistaken for merely another human science, is
explicated in article 2. Faith as our human entry into a divine
knowledge is made possible solely through God's initiative in
revealing himself; in him the thinking believer finds the source,
motive, exemplar, and illumination for his own quest for divine
knowledge. At the same time, it is faith that creates the major
obstacle for granting theology scientific status. 56 In any case, the
major issue in article 2 is not faith, but the subject, principles, and
ways of knowing divine matters on the part of God, the blessed,
and wayfarers. Knowledge of this knowing is due to God's freely
sharing his knowledge of both his own knowing and creaturely
knowing to us creatures who receive this knowledge according to
our own mode of reception. Despite its concern to distinguish
God's own science from human participation in it, the argument
does not articulate a theology of faith. This is in keeping with
Thomas's method of assuming principles that he will later
justify-a method that will be justified in his teaching on faith. 57
54 "ubi queritur fides, argumenta tolluntur que fidei aduersantur et earn precedere
conantur, non ilia que ipsam modo debito sequntur" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1, ad 3 [93-94;
37-38]; see ialso ibid., resp.). See J. Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the
Development of Doctrine, vol. 4, Reformation of Church and Dogma (1300-1700) (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1984),! 64.
,
55 In
de Trin., q. 2, a. 1, ad 5 (94; 39). The metaphysico-theological justification for
this is given in q. 2, a. 3 and is treated below.
56 For an examination of the obstacles that sacred doctrine must overcome in order to be
recognized as a science, see Chenu's appraisal of Thomas's treatment in the Sentences and
how this is surpassed in the De Trinitate and the Summa Theologiae ("La theologie comme
science au XIIIe siecle," in Bibliotheque Thomiste, ed. M.-D. Chenu [Paris: J. Vrin, 1957]:
63-92); also Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie, 340-43, 380-86.
57 I treat this issue below in the discussion of In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1.

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The responsio of question 2, article 2 is comprised of three
parts: (1) the human approach to divine knowledge is distinguished from the "natural" approach (that is, for God and the
blessed); (2) two distinct sciences are shown to follow from this
distinction: one follows our way of knowing, the other we share
in imperfectly; and (3) theological reasoning grounded in faith is
interpreted as a participation in God's own knowledge. Thomas
begins by stating that the nature of science consists in certain
conclusions necessarily following from known truths. Since this
also holds for the divine things, there can truly be a science of
them.
Now the knowledge of divine things can be interpreted in two ways. First,
from our standpoint, and then they are knowable to us only through creatures,
the knowledge of which we derive from the senses. Second, from the nature of
divine realities themselves. In this way they are eminently knowable of
themselves, and although we do not know them in their own way, this is how
they are known by God and the blessed.58

At this point any human accessibility to this "natural" knowledge
other than an awareness of its being enjoyed by God and the
blessed is only implied. Our way of knowing the divine things is
not natural because the human knower is inadequate to the divine
objects known.
In the second part of the responsio, however, human
participation in the knowledge of God and the blessed even in the
present life is acknowledged and described:
Accordingly there are two kinds of science concerning the divine. One follows
our way of knowing, which uses the principles of sensible things in order to
make the divine things known. . . . The other follows the mode of divine
realities themselves, so that they are apprehended in themselves [se ipsa
capiantur].We cannot perfectly possess this way of knowing in the present life,
but there arises here and now in us a certain sharing in, and a likeness to the
58 "Set diuinorum notitia dupliciter potest estimari: uno modo ex parte nostra, et sic nobis
cognoscibilia non sunt nisi per res creatas, quarum cognitionem a sensu accipimus; alio modo
ex natura ipsorum, et sic ipsa sunt ex se ipsis maxime cognoscibilia, et quamuis secundum
modum suum non cognoscantur a nobis, tamen a Deo cognoscuntur et a beatis secundum
modum suum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 [95; 41)). This argument anticipates the reasoning
of SI'h I, q. 1, a. 2; I, q. 1, a. 3; and I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.

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divine knowledge, to the extent that through the faith implanted in us we
firmly grasp the primary Truth itself for its own sake [propterse ipsam].59

Surprisingly, the point of departure is not the sources of
knowledge rooted in reason as distinguished from those rooted
in faith, but the difference in epistemological perspective between
human knowledge gained through sensible effects and a divine
way of knowing taken from the divine realities themselves. Only
after the articulation of this sharp distinction is a bridge thrown
across the chasm to offer human beings access to the divine
perspective. It is faith that enables us wayfarers to participate, if
imperfectly, in a kind of knowledge that is not natural for us:
God's own intellectual self-possession. Our simple cleaving in
faith to the First Truth corresponds analogically to God's
immediate self-knowledge, 60 but this can only be a very limited
participation in intuitive knowing, as the first part of the
responsio has already prepared us to conclude. 61 To the degree
that we know in a way other than the discursive mode of thought
based on sensible effects, we know in a way that the human
intellect cannot adequately describe, as the argument presumes.
Hence Thomas's elastic and bare language. It is clear from this
obscurity that such an imperfect cleaving to the First Truth is not
59 "Et secundum hoc de diuinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum,
qui sensibilium principia accipit ad notificandum diuina ... alia secundum modum ipsorum
diuinorum, ut ipsa diuina secundum se ipsa capiantur, que quidem perfecte in statu uie nobis
est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu uie quedam illius cognitionis participatio et assimilatio
ad cognitionem diuinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inhaeremus ipsi prime ueritati
propter se ipsam" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 [95; 41-42]). See STh I, q. 79, a. 9 for a similar
formulation.
60 A later statement seems to contradict this: "Vnde quamuis per reuelationem eleuemur
ad aliquid cognoscendum quod alias esset nobis ignotum, non tamen ad hoc quod alio modo
cognoscamus nisi per sensibilia" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 3 [167; 76]). However, the issue
there is the present incapacity of the human intellect to know the essences of immaterial
substances. Hence the formulation that "revelation ... is fundamentally circumscribed: it
alters what we know but not how we know," while pithy, is too facile (DenisJ. M. Bradley,
"Aristotelian Science and the Science of Thomistic Theology," Heythrop Journal 22 [1981]:
168).
61 Later, Thomas will teach that this cleaving through faith rests on the will moving the
intellect to the act of belief under the persuasion of grace: "Actus autem fidei est credere
... qui actus est intellectus determinati ad unum ex imperio voluntatis" (STh II-II, q. 4, a. 1).
The Ottawa edition (1941) is used for all quotations from the Summa Theologiae.

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yet a discursive theologizing. Something more is expected from
the argument.
In the third part of the responsio, Thomas finally arrives at
theology in the sense of a discursive human knowing that is based
in faith:
And as God, by the very fact that he knows himself, knows all other things as
well in his way, namely, by simple intuition without any reasoning process, so
may we, from the things we accept by faith in our firm grasping of the primary
Truth, come to know other things in our way, namely by drawing conclusions
from principles. Thus the truths we hold on faith are, as it were, our principles
in this science, and the others become, as it were, conclusions. 62

In virtue of our analogical sharing in God's knowledge of all
things in himself, we come to divine knowledge in a twofold
manner. First, adhering to the primary Truth in faith, we
participate in God's self-apprehension in our own way; second,
by virtue of this adherence, we come to know other things
discursively, just as God's simple intuition of all things follows
immediately from his self-knowledge. If the second part of the
argument took the human intellect to the extreme limit where it
participates in the highest kind of knowledge it can only image
but hardly grasp, the third part returns the intellect to its
customary horizon. But what are these "other things" that we are
to know in our way?63 That there are other things at all is
something new in the argument, for up to this point the exclusive
concern has been the "divine things." Not only the mode of
knowing but also its content returns us a more familiar world.
More basically, the reason for this new kind of knowing is simply
that there are other beings besides God that are to be known.
Theological epistemology thus presupposes creation and
62 "Et sicut Deus ex hoc quod cognoscit se cognoscit alia modo suo, id est simplici intuitu,
non discurrendo, ita nos ex his que per fidem capimus prime ueritati adherendo, uenimus in
cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum, discurrendo de principiis ad conclusiones,
ut sic ipsa que fide tenemus sint nobis quasi principia in hac scientia, et alia sint quasi
conclusiones" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 [95; 42]).
63 The use of aliorum here should be compared with omnium, the last word of STh I, q.
1, a. 3, ad 3, and participatio et assimilatio in the second part of the responsio (see note 59)
should be compared with impressio in ibid. Also, the use of sigillatio in In Boet. de Trin., q.
3, a. 1, ad 4 (109; 68-69) should be noted in this context.

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367

implicitly directs the created knower back to the very ground he
is standing on.
At this point Thomas makes a significant adjustment. The
grasping of the First Truth is now identified with holding firmly
to the truths of faith, or (to borrow concepts Thomas sharpens
later on) the formal and material objects of faith are here fused.
But by identifying the primary adherence to the First Truth with
adherence to the principles of faith, Thomas is able to reinterpret
the more enigmatic language of human participation in divine
self-knowing by the analogy of the act of understanding
immediately grasping self-evident first principles. Even knowledge
of divine realities that is based in faith can begin to assume a
human form. 64 The discursive knowing based on understanding
principles is properly the work of reason, but now within a
properly theological domain. Insofar as it depends on the
principles of faith, this analogy "humanizes" our participation in
the divine knowing and brings it within the scope of natural
discursive human thinking (secundum modum nostrum discurrendo). Taken together, the two kinds of supernatural
knowing-the primary grasp of faith and the theological
reasoning following from it-image God's own viewpoint first in
terms of object and mode of knowing (first kind), and then in the
extension of this knowledge to other beings (second kind). Thus
Thomas arrives at a knowledge that participates in divine
knowing and assumes a form akin to the human sciences. As a
cleaving to the First Truth, faith mediates between God's own
knowledge and human reflection on this knowledge. It is itself
analogous to both human and divine thinking inasmuch as it
participates in the perfect, simple divine intuition while imitating
reason's assent to the principles presupposed by all of the other
sciences.

64 Since grace observes "the modes of the operations of nature ... the human mind is not
illuminated and stilled by forms from another world, but must wrestle with this one, and
discover what lies behind and beyond by ranging from point to point: this discursus is present
even in the activity of divine faith" ("Appendix 5: SacraDoctrina," 59, in Thomas Gilby, ed.,
Christian Theology, vol. 1 of Saint Thomas Aquinas: Summa Theologiae, ed. T. Gilby
[London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-81]).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

The gap between God's knowledge and human participation
in it is further bridged by the analogy of subalternated sciences. 65
Just as lower sciences presuppose and accept on faith principles
that are self-evident only in higher sciences, so theology
presupposes its principles, the articles of faith, by accepting on
faith the word of those witnesses revealing what is self-evident
only in the "highest science" of God's self-knowledge. The analogical character of this argument is flushed out in the objection
one might make that a musician, for instance, could take the
trouble of learning mathematics in order to acquire first-hand
knowledge of the principles required for musical composition,
whereas no one in this world can see for himself the self-evident
principles that remain accessible only through faith. 66 What
theologians can do, however, is follow the musician's likelier
strategy: go to those who know and trust in their knowledge and
integrity. They can go yet further, as Thomas does, by advancing
reasonable arguments for the necessity and nature of belief. This
is possible because scientia divina, like metaphysics, is charged to
defend and analogically explain its principles, the articles of
faith. 67 It is fitting, then, that Thomas introduces in this teaching
on subalternation the concept of revelation, which supports the
entire argument, in its relation to faith: "what is self-evident in
the knowledge God has of himself is presupposed in our science,
and [the articles of belief] are believed on the word of him who
reveals them to us through his witnesses." 68 Insofar as sacra
doctrina only participates in God's own knowledge through faith
as a response to his revelation, it is incumbent on Thomas to
investigate this ground of faith and revelation. These subjects are
respectively treated in question 3, article 1, and question 5, article
65 "in scientiis subalternatis

supponuntur et creduntur aliqua a scientiis superioribus, et
ilia non sunt per se nota nisi superioribus scientibus. Et hoc modo se habent articuli fidei, qui
sunt principia huius scientie, ad cognitionem diuinam: quia ea que sunt per se nota in scientia
quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia nostra" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad
5 [96; 44)).
66 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).
67 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (96; 43-44).
68 "ea que sunt per se nota in scientia quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur in scientia
nostra, et creduntur ei nobis hec indicanti per suos nuntios" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad
5 [96; 44]).

SACRA DOCTRINA IN THE DE TRINITATE

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4, but the immediate task at hand is to show how divine science
is indebted to natural reason to carry on its work. 69
C) Article 3: The Rational Character of Sacra Doctrina

"Whether philosophical reasoning and authorities may be used
in the science of faith which is from God" concretizes the
conclusions of the first article of this question. 70 That article asked
whether the divine things should be submitted to human rational
inquiry; this article asks how divine science is to be practiced.
Once again rational method is employed in the very resolution of
an exploration of whether it should be permitted. Obviously this
gives the argument an ironic character, but the irony makes a
point: to argue against a human science of the revealed mysteries
requires the deployment of reason to safeguard the revealed
mysteries from reason. Similarly, to forbid philosophical arguments or sources in theology is already to demonstrate the
capacity for distinguishing theology from philosophy adequately.
Hence the gainsayer as well as the patron of scientific theology
must think both theologically and philosophically.
Historically, this question responds to the concrete situation
of the introduction into thirteenth-century Europe of Aristotelian
texts and traditions, and the attendant fear that a scientific
theology would profane a canon of teachings personally revealed
by God. 71 To grasp the force of this question, we should envision
69 The argument for subalternation in ad 5 prefigures STh I, q. 1, a. 2, where Thomas
exploits this analogy to full advantage. Here it is embodied in the fifth response to an
objection; there it comprises the pivotal second article of the entire work. A
of
Thomas's notion of sacred doctrine with that of his predecessors indicates that the originality
of his approach is in large part due to this teaching on subalternation. See Elders, Faith, 47.
70 "utrum in scientia fidei, que est de Deo, liceat rationibus philosophicis et actoritatibus
uti" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, intro. [92; 35]). In fact, q. 2, a. 1 presupposes an affirmative
answer to the question this article poses since, as we have seen, Aristotle was cited as a source
for supporting the proposition that the divine realities should be investigated.
71 For the impact of the Aristotelian textual inundation of Western medieval thought, see
the classic study of Fernand van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West: The Origins of LAtin
Aristotelianism, trans. Leonard Johnston (2d ed.; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1970), esp. 59-126,
147-97. For the background to the development of theology as science, see Chenu, "La
theologie comme science," 9-108; ibid., Toward Understanding Saint Thomas, 298-310;
Congar, History of Theology, 80-91, 95; Elders, Faith, 41; Charles Lohr, "Theologie und/als

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

a science of revealed matters that would not make use of
arguments and sources that do not rely on the truths of faith. But
if only arguments and sources from the Judaeo-Christian tradition
are permitted, one is faced with the difficulty that leading thinkers
of this tradition-indeed, the Scriptures themselves-have made
abundant use of pagan sources. 72 The real issue, then, is not
whether Aristotle, Plato, or other pagan philosophers might be
introduced into theology, but whether human learning from any
source other than revelation has a role to play in divine science.73
By responding in the affirmative, this argument shows how the
conclusions and methods of human inquiry are necessarily constituent of what is now called for the first time sacra doctrina.74
The argument begins with the principle upon which Thomas's
entire theology and his concept of divine science are based: "The
gifts of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy it,
but perfect it. " 75 This oft-stated principle can be just as often
misunderstood, for the relationship of perfect grace to imperfect
nature might suggest that nature is somehow merely tolerated,
and that, like St. Paul's faith and hope, it will one day pass away.
The radical formulation that grace perfects nature, only comprehensible within the horizon of faith, is actually "unnatural" not
simply because grace surpasses nature, but because the higher
principle here is serving the lower. Grace becomes the servant of
Wissenschaft im friihen 13. Jahrhundert," Communio (German edition) 10 (1981): 316-30;
Otto Pesch, Thomas von Aquin: Grenze und Gro{Se mittelalterlicher Theologie (Mainz:
Matthias-Grunewald-Verlag, 1988), 128; Walgrave, "Erkenntnislehre," 27.
72 For example, Wisdom 8:7 favorably identifies the four major virtues of Plato's Republic,
subsequently named the cardinal virtues.
73 The perspective of the university is implied in the positioning of sacradoctrina alongside
the human sciences, apart from which it cannot be adequately grasped. For a discussion of
this perspective within the context of sacra doctrina, see Thomas C. O'Brien, "'Sacra
Doctrina' Revisited: The Context of Medieval Education," TheThomist41(1977):475-99.
74 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, obj. 7 (79; 46) and resp. (99; 48). Noting that scientia divina
is the preferred term in the De Trinitate, Maurer adds that for Thomas, "sacred doctrine is
the teaching revealed by God in sacred Scripture. More generally, it embraces 'whatever
pertains to the Christian religion.' (Summa, prol.)" (Faith, ix). See also his discussion in
Etienne Gilson, ed., A History of Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), vol. 2,
Medieval Philosophy, 164-65.
75 "dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod earn non tollunt set magis
perficiunt" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3 [98; 48]).

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371

nature. 76 As perfective of nature, created grace presupposes,
builds on, and even defers to nature by fitting it for what it is
incapable of achieving by itself. As an instance of this principle,
sacra doctrina presupposes, builds on, and even defers to human
reason. 77 Indeed, just as created grace is in the service of nature,
so sacra doctrina depends on the enduring presence of natural
reason. This becomes clearer if Thomas's foundational axiom is
read in the context of the two principles that enunciate the
purpose of divine science: the pursuit of divine truth advances our
quest for perfection as union with God, and belief is for the sake
of understanding what is believed. 78 Beginning with the final
cause, one can reason backward from human perfection as God
actually intends it to the necessity of faith for setting in motion an
intentional union with divine realities beyond our natural grasp. 79
If the human good embraces intellectual union with God, and the
basis of this union is faith responding to grace, then faith becomes
a necessary instrument in the intellectual perfection of the human
person in transit toward the graced end of life with God. 80 Like
76 This is reflected in the teaching that created grace is, as it were, an accident that inheres
in the soul (STh I-II, q. 110, a. 2). See also In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad 2 (108; 68); q. 6,
a. 4, ad 5 (171; 84).
77 "Only by a correct demarcation of the scope and territory of both nature and grace
could the respective functions of reason and of revelation and the use of each of these in
theology be defined" (Pelikan, Growth of MedievalTheology, 286).
78 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1 (93; 37); q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).
79 STh I, q. 1, a. 1 offers similar reasoning by establishing the need for saCTa doctrina on
the basis of the end of human salus, a form of argument that also responds to the Aristotelian
teaching on teleological argumentation (see Aristotle, Physics 1.4). This approach reflects
both the practical and the theoretical aspects of sacra doctrinainasmuch as human beings are
charged with contributing to the attainment of their divinely appointed destiny, which is a
contemplative gazing on God. I interpret this article along the lines of interpretation offered
by O'Brien, "'Sacra Doctrina' Revisited," 493-99 and J.-H. Nicolas, "Le rapport entre la
philosophie et la theologie," Angelicum61 (1984): 5-7. For an alternative interpretation, see
Weisheipl, "Sacra Doctrina," 68-69. For short, helpful summaries of classical positions on
sacradoctrinaand how they affect contemporary understanding, see Francisco P. Muniz, The
WorkofTheology, trans.JohnP. Reid (Washington,D.C.: TheThomistPress, 1958), 10-13,
and Weisheipl, "Sacra Doctrina," 57-63. Three attempts to remove contemporary hindrances
to understanding Thomas's doctrine are found in Johannes Stohr, "Theologie," 672-73; Brian
Davies, "Is Sacra Doctrina Theology?" Heythrop Journal 22 (1981): 141-47, passim.; and
Brian Shanley, "SaCTa Doctrina and the Theology of Disclosure," The Thomist 61 (1997):
163-87.
80 III Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 1.

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

the created grace it depends on, faith serves human nature by
bringing it to a fulfillment that lies beyond human power. Unlike
created grace, it does not perdure, but dissolves into that highest
understanding which is the light of glory.
In the present state, however, natural reason endures even in
the presence of faith, which illustrates the foundational principle
of grace perfecting nature in the realm of knowledge: "The gifts
of grace are so added to nature that they do not destroy it, but
perfect it. So too the light of faith, which is imparted to us as a
gift, does not do away with the light of natural reason given to us
by God. " 81 The second statement, which places the teaching of
question 1, article 1 within the context of divine science, is not
related to the first statement by way of analogy, but rather is a
precision or instance of it. Faith is a gift of grace, and natural
reason is an expression of nature. Three corollaries follow immediately from this principle. First, the truths of faith exceed the
natural light of the human intellect. Second, no contradiction can
obtain between the findings of reason and the teachings of faith
since both derive from God. Third, with contradiction ruled out,
an alternative relationship of similarity obtains between an unequal faith and reason: "since what is imperfect bears a
resemblance to what is perfect, what we know by natural reason
has some likeness to what is taught to us by faith. " 82
The major question concerning the use of philosophy in divine
science can now be resolved by applying these corollaries to sacra
doctrina:
81 "dona gratiarum hoc modo nature adduntur, quod earn non tollunt set magis perficiunt;
uncle et lumen fidei, quod nobis gratis infunditur, non destruit lumen naturalis rationis
diuinitus nobis inditum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3 [98; 48]). It is instructive to compare this
formulation with the principle of SI'h I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2 which clearly links the relation of
reason to faith with the relation of grace to nature: "Cum igitur gratia non tollat naturam,
sed perficiat, oportet quod naturalis ratio subserviat fidei, sicut et naturalis inclinatio
voluntatis obsequitur caritati."
82 "Et quamuis lumen naturale mentis humane sit insufficiens ad manifestationem eorum
que manifestantur per fidem, tamen impossibile est quod ea que per fidem traduntur nobis
diuinitus, sint contraria his que sunt per naturam nobis indita: oporteret enim alterum esse
falsum, et cum utrumque sit nobis a Deo, Deus nobis esset auctor falsitatis, quod est
impossibile; set magis, cum in imperfectis inueniatur aliqua imitatio perfectorum, in ipsis que
per naturalem rationem cognoscuntur sunt quedam similitudines eorum que per fidem sunt
tradita" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3 [98-99; 48]).

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Just as sacred doctrine is based on the light of faith, so philosophy is based on
the natural light of reason. So it is impossible that the contents of philosophy
should be contrary to the contents of faith, but they fall short of them. The
former, however, bear certain likenesses to the latter and also contain certain
preambles to them, just as nature itself is a preamble to grace. 83

Just as faith is an expression of and response to grace, and natural
reason is an expression of and response to nature, so sacra
doctrina is an expression of and response to faith, and philosophy
is an expression of and response to reason. In short, just as grace
perfects nature, so sacra doctrina perfects reason. For this reason,
we can expect the three corollaries of the superiority of grace, the
noncontradiction between faith and reason, and the relation of
perfect-imperfect likeness to apply to sacra doctrina and philosophy. Although presented in a different sequence, the three
principles in fact are applied. The principle of noncontradiction
is explicitly mentioned and assumed in that the specific yet compatible domains of sacred doctrine and philosophy arise from a
common divine source; the principle of perfect-imperfect likeness
elucidates the hierarchical nature of their complementarity; and
the new formulation of nature as preamble to grace adds a striking restatement of the superiority of grace and the contribution
of nature. As applied to sacra doctrina and philosophy, all three
corollaries help to illuminate their separate-but-complementary
character and define the indispensable role reason plays in the
inquiry into divine matters.
We can link these corollaries, intimated in yet another
sequence, to the three ways that sacra doctrina uses philosophy:
demonstrating preambles, proposing analogies, and building
defenses:
First, in order to demonstrate the preambles of faith, which we must
necessarily know in [the act of] faith. Such are the truths about God that are
proved by natural reason, for example, that God exists, that he is one, and
other truths of this sort about God or creatures proved in philosophy and
83"Sicut autem sacra doctrina fundatur supra lumen fidei, ita philosophia fundatur supra
lumen naturale rationis; uncle impossibile est quod ea que sunt philosophie sint contraria his
que sunt fidei, set deficiunt ab eis, continent tamen aliquas eorum similitudines et quedam ad
ea preambula, sicut natura preambula est ad gratiam" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3 [99; 48]).
See Stohr, "Theologie," 674.

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presupposed by faith. Second, by pointing to the things of faith through certain
analogies.... Third, in order to refute assertions contrary to the faith, either
by showing them to be false or by showing them to be lacking in necessity.84

Demonstrating the preambles of faith manifests the principle of
the superiority of grace, employing analogies engages the
principle of perfect-imperfect likeness, and refuting spurious
reasoning expresses the principle of noncontradiction. The three
principles are now given a "chronological" sequence insofar as
philosophy's threefold assignment refers respectively to the acts
that precede, accompany, and follow upon sacra doctrina in its
precise act of elucidating the mysteries of faith.
Philosophy's first task of demonstrating the preambles of faith
establishes at the outset that natural reason has an indispensable
if secondary role to fulfill in the pursuit of understanding revealed
matters. However, this function anticipates sacra doctrina without
contradicting either the teaching that divine science depends on
faith or the principle that divine science perfects reason. 85
Moreover, the demonstration of the preambles of faith, while
"prior" to sacra doctrina and formally lying outside the scope of
its principles, is nonetheless caught up in its work. Since divine
science participates in God's own intelligibility and "the gifts of
grace are added to nature," 86 the preambles of faith simply profess
that faith presupposes intelligibility. Understanding what faith
proposes precedes faith in the sense that it gives the potential
believer cognizance of the terms of belief and so prepares the way
for grace. In this way the preambles of faith offer a matrix for the
understanding that depends on faith by situating sacra doctrina
within the contours of human discourse and preparing it to speak
84"primo ad demonstrandum ea que sunt preambula fidei, que necesse est in fide scire, ut
ea que naturalibus rationibus de Deo probantur, ut Deum esse, Deum esse unum, et alia
huiusmodi uel de Deo uel de creaturis in philosophia probata, que fides supponit; secundo
ad notificandum per aliquas similitudines ea que sunt fidei, sicut Agustinus in libro De
Trinitate utitur multis similitudinibus ex doctrinis philosophicis sumptis ad manifestandum
trinitatem; tertio ad resistendum his que contra fidem dicuntur, sive ostendendo ea esse falsa,
siue ostendendo ea non esse necessaria" (Jn Boet. de Trin., q. 2,. a. 3 [99; 49]). It should be
noted that sacra doctrina's dependence on reason to proceed scientifically is not mentioned
here, perhaps because this is more properly the concern of logic.
85/n Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 and ad 4 (95-96; 42-44).
86/n Boet. de Trin., q. 2., a. 2 (98; 48).

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a common language with reason by way of analogy. The
preambles as presuppositions of faith thus assume a thematic
continuity of subject matter between natural reason and reason
illumined by faith that is more fundamental than the discontinuity
in their sources of knowledge. Because the actualization of faith
requires the intellectual recognition of an appropriate object, faith
is perfective of reason only by first presupposing reason just as
grace perfects nature only by first presupposing nature. Faith,
then, has two sources: it is fundamentally rooted in grace by
endowing the believer supernaturally with a share in God's selfunderstanding and perspective, but it is also steeped in nature by
enabling the believer to respond to intelligible objects that give
content to belief-hence the conclusion that the teachings of
philosophy have a secondary role in sacra doctrina. 87 When this
teaching on sources is joined to the earlier argument that faith
terminates in knowledge of the divine things based on faith, it
becomes clear that in unique ways faith both begins and ends in
understanding. 88
Philosophy's second function of offering analogies is most
intimate to the faith, marvelously exemplified in Augustine's
deployment of natural reason to explore the supreme mystery of
the Trinity. 89 This function is based on two principles. The first
is that grace perfects nature: the analogical structure obtaining
between the natural and supernatural orders reflects God's
creative fashioning of grace to complement created nature. The
second arises from the structure of human divine science: creaturely participation in God's own knowledge enables human beings to take on God's universal intuitive perspective according to
a human mode of knowing. Thus the entire argument of the preceding article undergirds Thomas's sparse statement here on the

de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 1 (99; 49-50).
In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42) (see text quoted in note 59).
89 See note 84 for St. Thomas's reference to Augustine's De Trinitate (In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 2, a. 3 [99; 49]). "Alors que, pour ce qui est de son premier et de son troisieme role la
philosophie demeure extrinseque a la theologie, par sa vocation de fournir des 'similitudes,'
elle en devient une partie constituante" (Leo Elders, "Les Rapports entre la Philosophie et la
Theologie," Doctor Communis 42 [1989]: 212).
• 7 In Boet.

88

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

analogical use of philosophy. 90 Dependent on grace and nature,
and situated between divine knowing and natural reason, sacra
doctrina mediates God's knowing and human knowing in two
distinct moments. First it discovers analogues by inquiry into the
created order, and then it applies them to the mysteries of faith. 91
Where can analogues be found? In a supplementary argument
building on the concept of subalternated sciences, Thomas enlarges the scope of sacra doctrina by substantially widening the
contribution human knowledge makes to it. Whereas the principle of subalternation permits lower sciences to presuppose
principles proved in a higher science,92 this argument opens up
the possibility of reversing direction by introducing the notion of
prior and posterior sciences in the order of study: "posterior
<JOOn the basis of a general reading of Thomistic texts which bear on this issue (see, e.g.,
ScG I, c. 8; II, c. 3; STh 1, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2; II-II, q. 1, a. 5, ad 2), Congar divides this second
use of philosophy into two further applications: (1) a deductive use of philosophy, "whereby
an unknown or poorly known truth is brought to light through its connection with a better
known truth" (this is its main role in theology); and (2) an "explicative and declarative role
... practiced with regard to the principles themselves," which elucidates them mostly "by
offering analogies and congruent reasons." He then examines how Thomas in fact made use
of all four applications (History of Theology, 97-98; see also ibid., 96-102; and Mark F.
Johnson, "The Sapiential Character of the First Article of the Summa theologiae," in
Philosophy and the God of Abraham: Essays in Memory oflames A. Weisheipl, ed. James R.
Long, 85-99 fforonto: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1991], 92-93). Pesch offers
a somewhat different inventory of tasks (Thomas von Aquin, 138).
A further use of philosophy in sacra doctrina, which may be grouped under Congar's first
application noted above, is the priority accorded to reason in reinterpreting a scriptural
teaching that cannot be accepted at face value (see STh 1, q. 68, a. 3; and Swinburne's
remarks on this (Richard Swinburne, Faith and Reason [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981],
181-82). Thomas's interpretation-an accommodation of the scriptural sense to the
intellectual capacities of Moses' audience--may be profitably compared to Friedrich
Schleiermacher's comments on biblical hermeneutics (On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured
Despisers, trans. Richard Crouter [New York: Cambridge University Press, 1988], 100-101).
Josef Pieper approves a critical use of philosophy: theology needs "the correction inherent
in all things human," the resistance of philosophy to temper it and make it true and
strong-"theology must brave 'this savage current"' (quoting Friedrich von Hiigel) (Guide
to St. Thomas, trans. Richard and Clara Winston [New York: Pantheon Books, 1962],
156-57).
91 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 (100; 51) and ad 5 (100; 50) respectively treat these
moments. With respect to the first, Elders observes that "revealed truth will be a sort of
deepening of natural insights, and is not wholly discontinuous with natural thought: natural
concepts and principles are submitted to the revelation of God" (Elders, Faith, 51).
92In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 (96; 44).

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sciences employ the principles of prior sciences, whether the latter
be higher or lower in dignity" (my translation). 93 Just as metaphysics borrows principles from lower sciences, so "theology, to
which all the other sciences are so to speak ancillary and propaedeutic in its coming into being, though they are of lesser dignity,
can use the principles of all the other sciences." 94 Inasmuch as the
content of any science is virtually contained within its principles,
this is tantamount to stating that the entire domain of human
learning stands ready to serve sacra doctrina. 95 Not simply scattered arguments pressed into the form of preambles of faith or
shaped into analogies, but the entire scope of secular learning can
be assimilated into sacra doctrina's very structure and content. 96
In scattered texts, Thomas bores increasingly deeper to find
the ultimate ground for such an inclusive subject matter for
theology. First, he clarifies that "divine science is not only about
God. It is concerned with other things as well, which are not
beyond the human intellect even in its present state as regards
knowing what they are. " 97 With respect to method, then, sacra
doctrina and the human sciences share in part a common subject
matter although they employ different modes of argument. 98
Another text provides a reason for this overlapping subject
93 "Scientie posteriores utuntur principiis scientiarum priorum, siue sint superiores siue
inferiores" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 [100; 51]).
94 "similiter theologia, cum omnes alie scientie sint huic quasi famulantes et preambule in
uia generationis quamuis dignitate posteriores, potest uti principiis omnium aliarum
scientiarum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 [100; 51]).
95 "Mais la theologie dont ii parle, [Thomas] !'envisage selon tout ce qu'elle est. II
l'etudiera done tantot dans ce qu'elle a de courant, pour ne pas dire de secondaire; tantot
quant ases sources et tantot quanta ses ruisseaux" (P. Sertillanges, quoted in J.-F. Bonnefoy,
"La theologie comme science et !'explication de la foi selon saint Thomas d'Aquin,"
Ephemeridestheologicaelovanienses 14 [1937]: 426-27). For a study of the all-inclusive
meaning of "philosophy" covering the entire corpus of human learning in Thomas's day, see
O'Brien, "'Sacra Doctrina' Revisited," 479-88).
96 For the application of this teaching to a philosophy of God, see Benedict Ashley, "The
River Forest School and the Philosophy of Nature Today," in Long, ed., Philosophyand the
God of Abraham, 14.
97 "scientia diuina non est solum de Deo, set et de aliis que intellectum humanum etiam
secundum statum uie non excedunt quantum ad quid est cognoscendum de eis" (De Trin., q.
6, a. 1, ad 2 [third part] [163; 65]). The context of this remark is a justification of the
primacy of the intellectual mode of reasoning in natural theology.
98 See In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45).

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LAWREN CE]. DONOHOO

matter: sacred doctrine considers "divine beings as they subsist in
themselves and not only inasmuch as they are the principles of
things" (emphasis added). 99 Here there is still a secondary focus
on things, although now from the perspective of their principles.
Yet another text expands on this teaching by applying an analogy
between faith and theology:
Just as faith, which is in a way the habit of the principles of theology, has for
its object the First Truth itself, and yet the articles of faith contain certain other
things related to creatures insofar as they have some connection with the First
Truth, in the same way theology is primarily concerned with God as its subject,
but it includes many things about creatures as His effects, or as being in some
way related to him. 100

Creation is now approached from God's perspective insofar as it
is related to him. Because God is the principle of everything that
exists, sacra doctrina in an ancillary scrutiny shares in part a
common subject matter with metaphysics, if from a different
perspective, by considering God as the principle of all that is.
With the subject matter of faith widened in a secondary sense to
include creatures, theology now possesses the same subject matter
as faith in both primary and secondary senses. In this way faith,
already analogical to both divine and human thinking by
imitating the divine intuition and grasping first principles in a
human way, further enables the sacra doctrina based on it to
merge the divine perspective with the human. By serving as the
paradigm for theology even in terms of subject matter, faith's role
as mediator is enhanced. Its contents become more accessible to
the human intellect, which is better suited to understanding
creatures than the Creator, and the transition from the principles
to the conclusions of theology is further smoothed.
99 "per hunc modum tractanrur res diuinae secundum quod in se ipsis subsisrunt et non
solum prout sunt rerum principia" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 [154; 44]). This text is
discussed below.
100 "sicut fides, que est quasi habitus principiorum theologie, habet pro objecto ipsam
ueritatem primam et tamen quedam alia ad creaturas pertinentia in articulis fidei continenrur
in quanrum contingunt aliquo modo ueritatem primam, per eundem modum theologia est
principaliter de Deo sicut de subiecto, de crearuris autem multa assumit ut effectus eius uel
quomodolibet habentia habirudinem ad ipsum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4, ad 8 [156; 49]).
This formulation anticipates the pivotal definition of sacra doctrina in STh I, q. 1, a. 3.

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A final text treating divine science's particular focus on
creatures places the accent directly on knowing creatures for the
sake of knowing God and explicitly expands the subject matter to
include all of being: "Although God is neither universal nor individual in himself, he is nonetheless the universal cause and end of
all things. So our knowledge of him is in a way universal, extending as it does to everything." 101 How far we have come from the
argument of question 2, article 2, which granted sacra doctrina a
modest knowledge of "other things in our way [of knowing],
namely by drawing conclusions from principles"! 102 Now the
subject matter of sacra doctrina is asserted to be all-embracing:
since God in himself and as universal cause and end is its focus,
divine science is concerned with everything. For when human
beings take on the divine point of view, all of being as created and
directed by God, its principle and end, becomes its subject matter.
Hence this last text states most profoundly what the companion
texts more or less point to: analogues may be found anywhere in
creation and brought into the service of divine science.
In sum, these various texts propose that theology shares with
philosophy a common subject matter, although it does so from a
unified perspective based on God's own viewpoint in contrast to
the diversified perspectives of the human sciences based on
natural reason. As a result, the relationship between sacra doctrina
and the human sciences takes on a new complexity. The
introductory remark that faith provides a safer way of knowing
101 "quamuis Deus in se non sit neque uniuersalis neque particularis, est tamen uniuersalis
omnium rerum causa et finis; et sic cognitio que de ipso habetur ad omnia quodammodo
universalis est" (In Boet.de Trin., q. 3, a. 3, ad 1 [113; 77]). In fact, this argument is already
anticipated in q. 2, a. 2, ad 3 (96; 43) and should be studied with it: "partes subiecti in
scientia non solum sunt intelligende partes subiectiue uel integrales, sed partes subiecti
dicuntur omnia ilia quorum cognitio requiritur ad cognitionem subiecti, cum omnia
huiusmodi non tractentur in scientia nisi in quantum habent ordinem ad subiectum." It
should also be compared with a similar statement in STh I, q. 1, a. 7: "Omnia autem
pertractantur in sacra doctrina sub ratione Dei, vel quia sunt ipse Deus, vel quia habent
ordinem ad Deum, ut ad principium et finem," as well as STh I, q. 1, a. 3, resp. and ad 2. All
of these statements represent a considerable advance over the simpler teaching that
philosophy and theology share in part a common content (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 1
[95-96; 42-43]). See Pesch, Thomas von Aquin, 128.
102 "uenimus in cognitionem aliorum secundum modum nostrum, discurrendo de
principiis ad conclusiones" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 [95; 42]).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

than enfeebled reason can muster is now precised to mean that
theology has the right to enter into the realm of reason in order
to complete and correct it on matters in which theology has
expertise. 103 On the basis of its dependence on God's own vision,
divine science not only offers a unique perspective on creation,
but compensates for the fragmentary knowledge that natural
reason yields. 104 Interventions on the part of sacra doctrina in
predominantly philosophical domains can now be justified. This
requires that the student of theology also be a student of
philosophy, conversant in the truths that both disciplines investigate, as well as those truths that exceed yet complement the truths
of natural reason. Sacra doctrina is thus familiar with such natural
inquiries as the search for the ultimate cause of the universe, all
the while knowing through faith that this First Cause, in revealing
himself, reveals as well his relationship to his world and the basis
for this world's yielding itself to natural investigation in the
connatural structure of created knower and known. With respect
to the inquirer, divine science is aware of the rational creature's
infinite longing to know truths that surpass its nature without
prejudice to the nobility of its own share in the divine perspective,
and the human finitude revealed in the very way God makes
himself known. 105 In sum, sacra doctrina may confidently gather
analogues from any science whatsoever because it understands the
analogical relationship between the supernatural and natural
orders and, consequently, its own analogical relationship to the
human sciences.
But now, in view of sacra doctrina's universal compass, the
scope and significance of natural reason have become questionable. Thomas adpresses this concern in the last two questions of
the De Trinitate, on the division and methods of the speculative
103

In Boet. de Trin., prol. (75; 3).

104 J.-F. Bonnefoy, "La theologie,"

431. A parallel can be drawn in Thomas's thought
between grace and revelation: just as grace takes on the character of gratia sanans after the
Fall, so revelation corrects natural knowledge of God. See also In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1
(107-8; 66-67) and my treatment of this below.
105 On the one hand, "set quelibet creatura mouetur ad hoc quod Deo assimiletur plus et
plus quantum potest" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1, ad 7 [94; 39]). On the other, "diuinae
reuelationis radius ad nos peruenit secundum modum nostrum, ut Dionisius dicit" (ibid., q.
6, a. 3 [167; 76]).

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sciences. Once again the resources of first philosophy and divine
science are marshaled, this time for the architectonic assignment
of distinguishing the human sciences from one another and from
divine science. In doing so, philosophy and theology serve the
human sciences by defending the distinctive perspectives of
natural reason against the challenge posed by the apparently
sweeping claims of theology. 106 Moreover, mapping the domains
and methodologies of the various sciences enables the theologian
to define precisely the scope of philosophy. This in turn helps to
isolate the questions commonly explored by the divine and
human sciences as well as those which are exclusively theological.
These inquiries thus enrich sacra doctrina'sself-understanding by
distinguishing it from the various perspectives of natural knowledge107 as well as by providing it with an instrument for selfdefinition. 108 Divine science further relies on metaphysics to
establish immateriality as the basis of intelligibility, and then
collaborates with first philosophy to disclose their common
subject matter in separate substance while respecting their distinct
methods of approach. Even the assistance of natural philosophy
is enlisted to settle issues involving matter and motion relevant to
sacra doctrina's own subject matter. 109 Beyond the services
rendered to philosophy, then, these questions enable sacra
doctrina to know itself by tracing the intimate relationship of
106 In Boet. de Trin., qq. 5 and 6 (133-71; 3-84). Textually, Thomas is responding to issues
raised in Boethius's De Sancta Trinitate, chap. 2. See Maurer's helpful introduction in
Division, vii-xi. For an examination of the impact of these questions on twentieth-century
Thomism, see Gerald A. McCool, Catholic Theology in the Nineteenth Century: The Quest
for a Unitary Method (New York: Seabury Press, 1977), 249, 254-57. In particular, they
provided the basis for Jacques Maritain's seminal work on epistemology, which follows
Cajetan and John of St. Thomas in distinguishing the sciences in terms ofThomas's threefold
division, but broadened to accommodate modern empirical science (Distinguishto Unite, or
The Degrees of Knowledge, trans. Gerald B. Phelan [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,
1959], 35-46). See Ashley's critique ("The River Forest School," 1-15).
107 This work is undertaken especially in In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, and in particular in a. 4
(151-56; 39-49).
108 What is decisive is not the diversity in things, but diversity as an object of knowledge;
not the beings that are known, but rather the beings in terms of the being that knows them
(In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 8 [141; 16]; see also q. 6, a. 1, ad 4 [second part] [162; 62]).
109 "Theologia uero sacre Scripture tractat de separatis primo modo sicut de subiectis,
quamuis in ea tractentur aliqua que sunt in materia et motu, secundum quod requirit rerum
diuinarum manifestatio" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 [154; 45]).

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knower and known back to the connatural structure of an
ordered creation shaped by a creating Intellect itself pursued by
created intellects. From this vantage point sacred doctrine is able
to assist in such tasks as defining the realm and limitations of
reason in question 1. Thus does the De Trinitate reflexively justify
its own method of procedure.11°
With analogues having been shown to be universally available,
they must now be applied to the domain of faith in the form of
analogies. This second moment is a response to those who would
condemn the use of philosophy in theology and compare it to
mixing water and wine. Thomas practices what he preaches by
converting the image: those who bring philosophy into the service
of the faith "do not mix water with wine, but rather change water
into wine." 111 The revised metaphor, however, must be interpreted so that philosophy is not understood to be simply
absorbed by sacra doctrina without in any way changing it. By
interpreting this image strictly in terms of the sign at Cana, one
can conclude that human knowledge makes a difference to
theology insofar as a better wine (not water) emerges from the
transformation. 112 The appeal to Cana also suggests that divine
grace is at work in the recognition that even if the waters of
philosophy potentially contribute to a higher knowledge, they
cannot actuate this potentiality themselves. However, even this
interpretation cannot account for the fact that at least in their
own domain the waters of philosophy remain. Just as different
human sciences share common conclusions while retaining their
proper means of demonstration, so they remain a human kind of

110 See Thomas C. O'Brien, Metaphysics and the &istence of God (Washington: The
Thomist Press, 1960), 4-15.
m "non miscent aquam uino, set aquam conuertunt in uinum" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a.
3, ad 5 [100; 50]).
112 An interpretation that invests too heavily in Thomas's borrowed metaphor risks
concluding that this "language about the 'utilization' of philosophy by sacred doctrine gives
the impression that sacra doctrina is somehow constituted as a reflective reality in human
consciousness prior to and independently of an engagement with natural knowledge" (Hall,
The Trinity, 77). For a more satisfactory understandingofThomas's position, see Wolf-Ulrich
Kliinker, introduction to Uber die Trinitat: Eine Auslegung der Gleichnamigenschriftdes
Boethius, trans. Hans Leintz (Stuttgart: Freies Geistesleben, 1988), 18-20.

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thinking even when theology absorbs their conclusions into its
mode of thoughtful believing. 113
Finally, philosophy's third assignment of refutation and
apology on behalf of sacra doctrina, corresponding to the principle of noncontradiction between reason and faith, follows upon
faith insofar as attacks upon it presuppose its public articulation.
It also follows upon sacra doctrina by defending this science
predicated on faith and by attempting to render a more adequate
account of the divine mysteries in the light of God's word. In
contrast to philosophy's two other duties, the apologetic task
points outward to a conversation with the detractors of the faith
and those who might be impressed by their arguments. Here
Thomas's characteristic optimism about reason appears where he
turns the argument of those who would exclude pagan
philosophy from sacra doctrina on its head. Far from polluting
sacred truth, the arguments of Aristotle and other pagan thinkers,
insofar as they are true, advance the claims of faith against its
willing or unwilling detractors, ancient or contemporary,
Christian or otherwise. The only operative dividing line is that
separating the true from the false, no matter who represents
which side. As if to make the point ironically, Thomas compares
those who defend the principles of faith against their detractors
with Aristotle vindicating the first principles of philosophy
against his opponents. 114
Of the three uses of philosophy in sacra doctrina, the
disputative is most extrinsic to theology inasmuch as its efficacy
requires that it not be confused with strictly theological
argumentation. 115 Indeed, it is theological only insofar as sacra

m In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 3, ad 7 (151; 38). Since sacra doctrina is partly constituted
by its absorption of the human disciplines in any particular epoch, it appears that Thomas's
teaching on the nature of theology has a transhistorical character while the content of
theology is more subject to development. See Congar, History of Theology, 86.
114 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 4 (96; 43-44).
115 "et ideo possibile est ex principiis philosophie huiusmodi errorem refellere, uel
ostendendo omnino esse impossibile, uel ostendendo non esse necessarium" (In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 2, a. 3, [99; 49)).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

doctrina assigns it problems and reaps its conclusions. 116 More
theological are the demonstrations of the preambles of faith,
which provide content to principles of faith and form a common
discourse between theology and philosophy by linking the
mysteries of the Christian faith with human knowledge.
Supremely theological is the use of human knowledge to construct
analogies in order to shed light on the mysteries of faith. In this
last application of philosophy one remains entirely within the
domain of sacra doctrina, which shapes and uses these arguments
for strictly theological ends. In various ways and to varying
degrees, then, all three uses of philosophy serve sacra doctrina by
preparing human knowledge to contribute to the work of penetrating the revealed mysteries. Having first submitted itself to
faith, the human mind now actively serves faith in the pursuit of
wisdom. Thomas will soon put this teaching to work literally by
training divine science's sights on the mystery of faith itself in
question 3. The wisdom of his approach appears in the fact that
natural reason, now given clearance to participate in sacra
doctrina, is solicited to clarify the grounds of faith itself.
IV. QUESTION 3, ARTICLE 1: SACRA DOCTRINA AND FAITH
Boethius provides the occasion for questioning the necessity of
faith for man by a statement on belief that introduces his discussion of the Trinity. 117 What is propaedeutic in Boethius's work,
however, is pivotal to Thomas's argument, for the path of the De
Trinitate has taken us from human knowing, to faith-based
human knowing, through reason's contribution to this knowing,
and now on to the nature of faith itself. Since natural reason is
distinguished from faith and sacra doctrina is wholly dependent
upon faith, the question on the necessity of faith undergirds the
116 Although not a question of defending or proclaiming the faith against or to others, this
third use of philosophy can be subordinated to the first use of demonstrating the preambles
of faith by using reason to clear away the misuse of reason for the sake of establishing its
correct use in sacra doctrina. A contemporary example of this is Richard Swinburne's Faith
and Reason, which apologetically addresses the content of faith to a secular audience by
clarifying the preambles of faith through the lens of reasonableness.
117 Boethius, De Sancta Trinitate, chap. 1. This context is closely studied in Thomas's
literal commentary (exp. capituli primi [103-5; 58-62]).

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arguments that established sacra doctrina as a science and elucidated natural reason's contributions to it. The textual progression
has first established the nature of sacra doctrina as a science, and
then determined its philosophical foundation before placing it
squarely on the foundation of faith.118 This article, then, by
examining the foundation of sacra doctrina and consequently the
function of natural knowledge in articulating it, constitutes one
of the most fundamental inquiries in the entire work. 119 At the
same time, both divine science and natural reason return the favor
by helping to state the case for faith. As to subject matter, sacra
doctrina, wholly dependent on faith, secondarily inquires into its
own nature when it conducts an inquiry into its foundations. As
to method, only sacra doctrina, not faith, is capable of investigating the necessity of faith since a mode of argumentation enlisting
natural reason is needed to conduct a reflection on the reasons
for faith. Reason for its part adopts here its hitherto most
assertive stance by appearing to step outside of faith altogether in
order to question its value. Whereas all four articles of question
2 required reason to vindicate its claims in face of a pious
suspicion of man-made scientific theology and curiosity regarding
divine matters, reason here assumes the initiative by conducting
an interrogation into faith and demanding that it justify
itself-from within faith.
What might appear as sovereign rationalism, however, is in
fact sacra doctrina adopting the role of mediator between confident reason and ingenuous piety. Appearing to assume the
perspective of natural reason, divine science discloses the intelligibility of faith all the more convincingly from a standpoint seemingly outside of it. This emancipation of natural reason does not
disappoint: reason contributes to an acceptance of faith and
"maintains that we should assent to the words of God." 120 At the
same time, sacra doctrina shows that natural reason's indispen118

Respectively, In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42); q. 2, a. 3 (98-99; 48-49); q. 3,

a. 1 (107-8).
119 For a complementary examination of reason's contribution to the understanding of
belief, see Walgrave, "Erkenntnislehre," 32-33.
120 "Quamuis et ipsa fides non omnibus modis sit preter rationem: hoc enim naturalis ratio
habet, quod assentiendum est his que a Deo dicuntur" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1, ad 5 [109;
69-70]).

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sable contribution is limited to pointing to that which surpasses
it without the surety of demonstration. This appears even from an
analysis of the very form of the argument from necessity, roughly
the theological analogue of the an sit question in the philosophy
of science: if faith can be shown to be necessary, not only can its
existence be presumed, but the reason for its existence is knowable. However, the assumption that one can rely on God (here
replacing nature) to supply what is necessary for human benefit
is itself dependent on faith in Providence. Even when it is given
most freedom, then, reason remains firmly within the grasp of
sacra doctrina, which stands as always within the horizon of faith
and is always prepared to show that reason cannot demonstrate
faith. But engaging reason to frame the radical question of the
necessity of faith is intentional, for divine science is thus able to
further its self-understanding as well as an understanding of its
roots. In the very act of justifying faith, divine science shows that
it and only it is capable of this act of justification, which in turn
helps to justify its own derivative existence. Furthermore, its
reflection on faith gives sacra doctrina a deeper awareness of its
own "human" genesis. Like natural knowledge, faith begins
nonreflectively in a rudimentary acceptance and contemplation of
the truths of revelation; only later is it capable of reflecting on its
own act. When formally undertaken, this reflection is exclusively
the achievement of sacra doctrina, which faith depends on, so to
speak, to station itself in a higher intelligibility.
The complexity of the argument for the necessity of faith is
partly due to its intricate use of premises both within and without
the ambit of faith, and partly due to a masterful application of all
three uses of philosophy. Almost immediately, then, we see
Thomas putting the teaching of question 2, article 3 to work.
First, the argument as a whole takes on the form of a preamble of
faith-indeed, the preamble of faith inasmuch as it invites belief
on the basis of arguments taken from human experience and
appealing to faith's reasonableness. Second, this article proceeds
analogically by showing likenesses and differences between faith
in its natural and supernatural modes, and by analogically
applying to faith the principle that what is assumed at the

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beginning is proved later. 121 Finally, the argument, already
presupposing an articulation of the principles of faith in its exposition of sacra doctrina, adopts an apologetic demeanor in its
response to the sophisticated objections of unbelievers who prefer
the safer course of critical reason. 122
Thomas begins with a grand analogy. Like science and understanding and unlike opinion, supernatural faith possesses unerring
and firm assent; like opinion and unlike science and understanding, it concerns matters not evident to the intellect. Some things
are unclear to us due to a shortcoming in the knowable objects
themselves, such as individual and contingent objects far from our
sensible reach. Other things are unclear to us "because of some
deficiency on the part of our mind," or more precisely, due to the
nature of human knowing, which is unequipped to grasp the
beings that are most knowable by nature, namely, those which are
divine and necessary. 123 This distinction taken from Aristotle is
then converted by Thomas into a teaching about natural faith and
supernatural faith that offers in either case an analogy from
human experience. 124 With respect to deficiency on the part of the
known, natural faith in other people is necessary to gain access to
truths not available through personal encounter. With respect to
deficiency on the part of the knower, faith in God is necessary to
gain access to truths not available to natural reason. Thus a
principle that lies at the basis of Aristotle's division of the sciences

121 This principle is discussed below.
122 In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1, obj. 1 (106; 63) presages the false piety of Descartes who,

like Ahaz of old (Isa. 7: 12), dismisses revelation by appealing to its loftiness (Discourse on
Method, part 1).
123 "ex defectu ipsarum rerum cognoscibilium, et ex defectu intellectus nostri" (In Boet.
de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66)). See Thomas's similar formulation in the prologue and my
discussion of it above. A restatement of this principle is provided in ibid., q. 4, a. 3, ad 1
(129-30; 105-6), in which the unintelligibility of a principle is traced back to a deficiency
either in the knower or in the proposition. In the second case-either a contradiction
absolutely speaking or a contradiction for nature considered without divine
intervention-Thomas discusses the remarkable capacity of the human mind to speak about
what cannot be understood.
124 Aristotle, Phys. 1.1.184a17-22); Metaphys. 2.1.993b8-11.

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becomes the foundational principle for a theology of faith and the
sacra doctrina that depends on it. 125
To explain more fully how faith remedies the lack that attends
our knowing, Thomas proposes a principle, based on our
epistemological condition, that paraphrases the opening statement
of the prologue:
Owing to a deficiency [defectus] on our part, divine and necessary realities,
which are most knowable by nature, are not apparent to us. We are not
adapted to examine them from the outset, because we have to arrive at what
is more knowable and prior by nature beginning with what is less knowable and
posterior by nature. 126

Once again human knowers are placed within the field of
superior knowers and objects of knowledge. Adopting this
universal "extra-human" perspective embracing all intellects gives
the human mind leverage by freeing it from the prejudices of
taking human knowing as the natural standard of knowing as well
as assuming that what is most familiar to us is most knowable
simply. By learning how we do not know, we come to understand
better how we do know. Within the larger arena of superior
knowers, the human intellect approaches the necessity of faith by
way of a self-awareness of its limitations and, in particular, its
odd trait of knowing "backwards," namely, knowing first what is
secondary and second what is primary. Once again the recognition of the limits of human knowing is pushed against the principles that our nature finds its fulfillment only in knowing the
125 This principle also governs Thomas's own account of the sciences, adapted further to
take divine science into account. See especially In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 (141; 16-18);
q. 5, a. 3 (144-51; 25-39); q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45); q. 6, a. 1 (157-63; 50-65); q. 6, a. 3
(166-68; 72-79).
126 "Ex defectu uero nostro sunt non apparentia res diuinae et necessarie, que sunt
secundum naturam maxime note; uncle ad harum inspectionem non sumus statim a principio
ydonei, cum oporteat nos ex minus notis et <ap>parentibus secundum naturam in magis
nota et priora naturaliter peruenire" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 (107; 66]). "Naturalis mentis
humane intuitus, pondere corruptibilis corporis aggrauatus, in prime ueritatis luce, ex qua
omnia sunt facile cognoscibilia, defigi non potest; uncle oportet ut secundum naturalis
cognitionis progressum ratio a posterioribus in priora deueniat, et a creaturis in Deum" (In
Boet. de Trin., pro!. [75; 3]). Compare this argument with ibid., q. 1, a. 1, ad 4 (82-83; 18)
and q. 1, a. 2 (84-85; 21-23).

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highest things and that our graced nature reaches understanding
and perfection only by taking on a perspective that is not our
own. 127
Here is where the circle of comprehension enters and justifies
the human approach: "But what we first know is known on the
strength of what we eventually come to know; so from the very
beginning we must have some knowledge of those things which
are more knowable in themselves, and this is possible only by
faith. " 128 It is natural, not supernatural, faith that is at issue here,
as is clear from an immediate application to the order of the
philosophical disciplines: metaphysics, the last of the sciences,
elucidates more fully the principles incipiently assumed by the
inferior sciences which precede it pedagogically. 129 Even natural
reason, then, must take certain principles on faith: "every science
has presuppositions which the learner must believe." 130 Human
knowledge, acquired in this tension between the pedagogical and
"natural" hierarchies of the human sciences, is ineluctably caught
up in this epistemological circle. Even the foundational principles
for knowing anything, as well as those of knowing human
knowing, including what may be called this "principle of subsequent justification," are first believed and later demonstrated.
By justifying a teaching on epistemological justification already
introduced in the prologue, De Trinitate, question 3, article 1 not
only demonstrates what was earlier presumed, but completes a
· textual imaging of the principle of subsequent justification that
spans the text.
127 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42).
128 "Set quia ex ui illorum, que ultimo cognoscimus sunt nota ilia que primo cognoscimus,
oportet etiam a principio aliquam nos habere notitiam de illis que sunt per se magis nota,
quod fieri non potest nisi credendo" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66]).
129 For an argument showing that there is no vicious circle involved in the relationship
between metaphysics and the other sciences, see In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 1, ad 9 (141;
16-18); see also I Post. Anal., lect. 17; Maurer, Division, 9 n. 21.
130 "Unde quelibet scientia habet suppositiones quibus oportet addiscentem credere" (In
Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [107; 66]). Decker traces this statement back to Aristotle's De
sophisticis elenchi 2.165b3 (Sancti Thomae de Aquino: Expositio Super Librum Boethii de
Trinitate, ed. Bruno Decker, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters, ed.
Josef Koch (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1965), 111. For a pedagogical correlate (and exception) to this
principle, see In Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1, ad 3 (second part) (161-62; 61-62).

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LAWRENCE}. DONOHOO

At this point the analogate from the human sciences is applied
to faith:
since the goal of human life is perfect happiness, which consists in the full
knowledge of divine realities, the direction of human life toward perfect
happiness from the very beginning requires faith in the divine, the complete
knowledge of which we look forward to in our final state of perfection. 131

A reasonable basis for divine faith, already suggested by the
analogy taken from ordinary experience, is now offered on the
strength of a second analogy taken from the human sciences. Just
as human beings require natural faith in others to attain knowledge of events not available to their own perception, so they
require supernatural faith in God to attain knowledge of divine
matters not available to their intellect. And just as those sciences
which are posterior in nature (that is, from the viewpoint of the
most superior intellect) but prior for us presume principles that
are only fully justified in the science that is prior in nature and
posterior for us, so we begin our quest for full knowledge of
divine matters with the faith which can only be justified in the
world to come. 132
Knowledge is the framework for faith in both its natural and
its supernatural senses, but it can also supplant faith, as in the
case of individuals who even in this world "arrive by reasoning at
131 "Cum ergo finis humanae uite sit beatitudo, que consistit in plena cognitione
diuinorum, necessarium est ad humanam uitam in beatitudinem dirigendam statim a principio
habere fidem diuinorum, que plene cognoscenda expectantur in ultima perfectione humana"
(In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [107-8; 66)). This pivotal statement, which so perfectly states the
spirit of Thomas's theology as a whole, justifies at least for Thomas the observation of Max
Seckler that "Man kann den Geist and das Wesen der mittelalterlichen Theologie vielleicht
am besten mit Hilfe der vier Stichworte 'Heil,' 'Wahrheit,' 'Weisheit' and 'Wissenschaft'
erfassen" (Im Spannungsfeld von Wissenschaft und Kirche: Theologie als schopferische
Auslegung der Wirklichkeit [Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1980], 151).
132 This contrast of the "knowledge of faith" with full knowledge in the vision of God (as
opposed to God's own science) indicates that this principle is not simply a restatement of the
principle of subalternation (In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44)). Here it concerns
principles insufficiently understood but nevertheless applied, as opposed to principles that,
known to be proved in a higher science, are employed in complete trust without any intent
to clarify them. It is roughly the difference between the use of metaphysical principles in
natural philosophy and, to borrow the example of STh I, q. 1, a. 2, the use of mathematical
principles in music.

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a full knowledge of some divine things." 133 Faith nonetheless is
necessary for some regarding many matters and for all regarding
certain matters. A brief survey of Moses Maimonides' five reasons
for the necessity of faith confirms this: without faith the depth
and subtlety of the divine things would be concealed from human
minds, the initial feebleness of the human intellect only reaches
perfection at the end of its journey, only very few can attain the
comprehensive knowledge of things required for knowledge of
God, many are impeded by physical dispositions from perfecting
their mind by reasoning, and the many occupations of life prevent
many from engaging in prolonged contemplation. 134 For these
people faith offers a minimum knowledge, including matters
which the few are able to grasp through natural reason. 135 It
follows from Thomas's teaching that certain truths of faith are
grasped by some through reason that only the theologian is able
to identify the true objects of faith, for only he is able to evaluate
the actual reach of demonstrative argument and to reserve for
faith the domain that lies beyond it. 136
A theology of faith oriented toward its eventual replacement
reinforces the position of sacra doctrina within the broad movement from rudimentary faith to the ultimate human happiness of
beatific knowledge. We now learn that what we earlier learned
about divine science was known on the strength of what we now
know in this analysis of faith, which undergirds it. Just as
philosophy only gains the perspective of what is prior by nature
at the end of its path of discovery and so retrieves its original
point of departure as provisional and pedagogical, so sacra
doctrina comes to a more complete understanding by elucidating
what it earlier assumed and by reinterpreting its earlier selfunderstanding on the ground of this analysis of a philosophical
principle theologically applied. This explains the reason for the
text's being shaped to reflect the principle only now enunciated
133 "Ad quorum quedam plene cognoscenda possibile est homini peruenire per uiam
rationis etiam in statu huius uite" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [108; 66]).
134 For the limits of understanding with respect to matters of faith, see In Boet. de Trin.,
q. 6, a. 1, ad 4 (third part) (163; 65).
135 "ut [homo] saltem per fidem diuina cognoscat" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 [108; 67]).
136 See In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45); SI'h I, q. 1, a. 1, resp. and ad 2.

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

which teaches that what we first know is known on the basis of
what we eventually come to know. For the inquiry into natural
human knowing in question 1 presupposed sacra doctrina and the
explication of sacra doctrina in question 2 presupposed faith, and
now those principles are justified which were mediately
presupposed in the first question and immediately presupposed in
the second one. We thus needed to come this far to understand
the principle in the light of its application to sacra doctrina and
faith, and to see how the text images its teaching by going back to
and behind the beginning in order to justify what necessarily
preceded it. The order of knowing and the order of being now
merge to explain and teach that the very nature of sacra doctrina
is necessarily pedagogical.
The analysis of faith thus grounds the earlier teachings which
set sacra doctrina on the footing of faith and faith on the footing
of God's own science by accounting for the nature and necessity
of belief. 137 However, this teaching on faith not only provides a
foundation for sacra doctrina, but is itself its achievement since
only science possesses the means to develop analogies based on
the relationship between divine truths and created realities. Yet
the argument for faith, by exploring its very foundation through
the principle of subsequent justification, is only the achievement
of sacra doctrina insofar as this science is grounded in faith. Only
because divine science is based in faith, then, can it explore the
basis for faith and its own basis in faith. In other words, only
reflective faith can ultimately ground faith because the very
essence of faith is such that its transcendence circumscribes its
reasonableness and not the other way around. 138 More exactly,
faith gives us access to sacra doctrina's reflection on this
transcendence out of which faith itself emerges. In the last·
fundamental task of divine science to which we now turn, God's
self-knowledge will be linked with its human participation in
sacra doctrina by revelation, which springs from his selfmanifestation and evokes the response of faith.
q. 2, a. 2 (95; 41-42).
and reasonableness of Thomas's position is anticipated in the
three arguments of the sed contra, which argue that faith is supernatural, necessary, and
natural on the strength of the witness of Scripture, Augustine, and Aristotle respectively.
137 In Boet. de Trin.,

138 The comprehensiveness

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393

V. QUESTION 5: SACRA DOCTRINA AND REVELATION
The De Trinitate's backward trek from the nature of human
knowledge, to sacra doctrina, to natural reason's contribution to
sacred doctrine, to its foundation in faith, is always guided by
God's own divine science as the paradigm, cause, and end of
human knowing. 139 In the programmatic statement elucidating the
notion of subalternation, Thomas links God's own science, sacra
doctrina as its human counterpart, faith as the ground of
theology, and the source of this faith in revelation: "the articles
of faith, which are the principles in this science, are related to
God's knowledge, because what is self-evident in the knowledge
God has of himself is presupposed in our science, and they are
believed on the word of him who reveals them to us through his
witnesses. " 140 God is then both source of the principles that sacra
doctrina literally assumes on faith and guarantor that these
principles may be safely believed. Whereas this earlier statement
views the principles of faith analogically with respect to God's
self-evident knowledge, the later argument for the necessity of
faith approaches faith teleologically as incipient instruction to be
superseded by full knowledge of divine realities. In this complementary view, the principles of faith remain fully dependent on
God's own knowledge, but his knowledge and complete human
participation in it are taken as final cause rather than exemplar
formal cause. In this way the argument for the necessity of faith
amplifies the first half of the programmatic statement on subalternation by exploring more deeply the relationship of faith to sacra
doctrina and to God's own science. It also elaborates on the text's
rare allusion to revelation by showing how God's providential
care for our epistemological needs moves him to grant us the safe
and certain knowledge of faith. Yet revelation is introduced here
only in terms of faith, that is, on the strength of what is less
knowable and posterior by nature. What remains to be shown is
This is most clearly articulated in In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 (95-97; 41-44).
"Et hoc modo se habent articuli fide, qui sunt principia huius scientie, ad cognitionem
diuinam: quia ea que sunt per se nota in scientia quam Deus habet de se ipso, supponuntur
in scientia nostra, et creduntur ei nobis hec indicanti per suos nuncios" (In Boet. de Trin., q.
2, a. 2, ad 5 [96; 44]). This statement was discussed above with respect to subalternation.
139

140

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LAWRENCE J. DONOHOO

the derivation of God's revelation from divine knowledge as its
source according to what is more knowable and prior by nature.
In keeping with the textual imaging of the principle of
subsequent justification, Thomas finally turns to this basis of faith
toward the end of the De Trinitate. Within the context of defining
the various speculative sciences and specifically the subject matter
of natural theology, question 5, article 4 elucidates the distinction
between this science and a knowledge of divine beings that
depends on revelation. The point of departure in natural knowledge marks a contrast to the distinctively theological character of
questions 2 and 3, but it is against the background of nature that
the extraordinary character of revelation-based knowledge most
clearly appears. 141 Thomas highlights this difference by inflecting
the epistemological character of the argument with a highly
personalist approach to revelation in terms of God's act of
self-manifestation.
There is, however, another way of knowing [divine] beings ... not as their
effects manifest them, but as they manifest themselves. The Apostle mentions
this way ... "So the things also that are of God no man knows, but the Spirit
of God. Now we have received not the spirit of this world, but the Spirit that
is of God, that we may understand." And again, "But to us God has revealed
them by his Spirit." In this way are treated divine beings as they subsist in
themselves and not only inasmuch as they are the principles of things. 142

Here Thomas cites Scripture at length in order to let it speak for
itself about speech. A revelatory text reveals the ultimate reason
for revelation: "that we may understand."
141 The perspective of reason as the point of departure for the distinction between natural
theology and revelation-based theology in In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 is indicated by
designating the divine being in the plural form (res diuine) which reflects the categories of
(Aristotelian) natural theology (153; 43).
142 "Est autem alius <modus> cognoscendi huiusmodi res non secundum quod per
effectus manifestantur, set secundum quod ipse se ipsas manifestant; et hunc modum ponit
Apostol us I Cor. II 'Que sunt Dei nemo nouit nisi Spiritus Dei. Nos autem non spiritum huius
mundi accepimus, set Spiritum qui a Deo est, ut sciamus,' et ibidem 'Nobis autem reuelauit
Deus per Spiritum suum.' Et per hunc modum tractantur res diuinae secundum quod in se
ipsis subsistunt et non solum prout sunt rerum principia" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 [154;
44]). Since it was already quoted in part in the prologue, this citation from 1 Corinthians
2:11-12, 10 provides an inclusion for the entire commentary.

SACRA DOCTRINA IN THE DE TRINITATE

395

Two kinds of theology, then, are to be distinguished: one
treats of divine things as the principles of its subject and is
identified with metaphysics; the other "investigates divine things
for their own sakes as the subject of the science. This is the
theology taught in Sacred Scripture." 143 Metaphysics investigates
the same divine beings as divine science, but only to account for
the causal structure of the visible world. Though honored as dea
scientiarum, metaphysics lacks the nobility which arises from a
science that is heir to God's own knowledge. For divine science
does not simply conclude, but begins with divine beings as its
causal principle since it is "non solum de altissimis set ex altissimis
est." 144 Because the divine beings have taken the initiative by
revealing themselves and inviting a response, they are known not
simply from effects that manifest their presence, but from their
own revealing word. The principles, in short, are personal. God
is approached in this science not primarily to account for lesser
beings but above all for his own sake, and not simply by virtue of
human inquisitiveness but by virtue of his own self-manifestation.
Hence God becomes the subject of a new science, and conversely,
a science is established whose subject is personal.
This text further sheds light on the arresting title of question
2, "De manifestatione divinae cognitionis." The primary sense of
manifestation proposed in question S connotes God's revealing
himself, but this expression refers to the manifestation of his
mode of knowing. God's revelation is hence the precondition not
only for an exclusive knowledge of God, but also for knowing
God's own act of knowing and participating in it through faith. 145
The very fact of revelation means that human knowledge of the
divine things, as well as all other human knowledge, is ultimately
143 "alia uero que ipsas res diuinas considerat propter se ipsas ut subiectum scientie, et hec
est theologia que in sacra Scriptura traditur" (In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 [154; 44-45]). The
subsequent argument that distinguishes metaphysics from sacred doctrine does so from the
viewpoint of philosophy. Mcinerny notes that a sharp distinction between natural theology
and sacred doctrine is not to be found in Boethius (Boethius, 130).
144 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 1 (96; 42-43). See ScG II, c. 4. See also O'Brien,
Metaphysics, 172-76.
145 "The title 'de manifestatione divinae cognitionis' is perhaps best understood as meaning
an examination of the way(s) in which God's knowledge appears or manifests itself, but the
words also seem to connote that man must make God's truth manifest" (Elders, Faith, 41).

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dependent not on human knowledge, but on the divine
knowledge of God freely shared with his creatures. Therefore, in
a way utterly unavailable to natural reason, sacra doctrina is able
to account radically not only for the humanly knowable, but for
human knowing by deriving itself from the First Knower as
personal subject. For what God manifests to us is himself as
knower in the mystery of his self-understanding for the purpose
of our sharing in it: "Now we have received ... the Spirit that is
of God, that we may understand." A complementary text
illumines this ultimate reason for sacra doctrina in its relationship
to faith and God's science: "Similarly the proximate starting point
of this [divine] science is faith, but its primary source is the divine
understanding, in which we put our faith. The purpose of our
believing, however, is to arrive at an understanding of what we
believe." 146 Hence the very reason for human divine science is to
return the human intellect to the divine source in a more perfect
imitation. God's knowledge is first revealed to us through his
word, then responded to in faith, and finally reflected on in
theology. Sacra doctrina in turn is consummated in a deeper
knowledge of what faith teaches, and this belief faithfully reflects
God's act of revealing, which discloses first himself and then his
knowledge of all things.
When Thomas's teaching on revelation is linked to that on
God's self-understanding as the exemplar of theology, sacra
doctrina appears as a divinely willed participation in God's
self-understanding through the revelation of his Spirit. Wishing
146 "set finis fidei est nobis ut perueniamus ad intelligendum que credimus" (In Boet. de
Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 [97; 44]). Note that this statement is much stronger than the
Augustinian formula of (ides quarens intellectum and Hilary's admonition quoted in q. 2, a.
1: "'Credendo incipe,' scilicet inquire, 'percurre, persiste'" (ibid. [93; 38]). Rather, one needs
to look to St. Anselm for an equally vigorous sentiment, which he places on the lips of Boso:
"Sicut rectus ordo exigit ut profunda Christianae fidei prius credamus, quam ea praesumamus
ratione discutere, ita negligentia mihi videtur, si, postquam confirmati sumus in fide, non
studemus quod credimus intelligere" (Cur Deus Homo, 1.1 [ed. Franciscus Schmitt; Munich:
Kosel, 1993], 10-12).
"Ainsi le schema meme de la structure de la science est le cadre propose pour analyser le
developpement de la foi en intellectus fidei: cet epanouissement speculatif, apparement
divergent hors de la simplicite contemplative du pur croyant, est, en realite, s'il est bien mene,
une remontee de la foi vers la science de Dieu et la premiere etape sur la voie de la vision
beatifique, scientia Dei et beatorum" (Chenu, "La theologie comme science," 74).

SACRA DOCTRINA IN THE DE 1RINITA1E

397

to make himself personally known and to give us partial access to
his way of knowing, God graciously reveals himself such that our
faith becomes a grace-infused response designed to flower in a
knowledge, based in faith, that imitates the divine knowing: "We
are endowed with principles by which we can prepare for that
perfect knowledge. " 147 By means of a theology that engages our
human intellects with the divine truth, we advance our own goal
of perfect happiness as well as the work of God's glorification.
Human divine science is now seen as an interest in God for his
own sake on the basis of his own word that furthers his own act
of self-manifestation. Here we are given a far richer response to
the question of whether divine matters should be humanly
investigated. 148 We are enjoined to pursue divine truth not simply
to advance our own perfection as union with God, but to extend
God's own self-manifestation by converting belief into human
knowledge. By investigating God's nature and his knowledge,
sacra doctrina continues the act of divine self-manifestation in
revealing the revealing God. It shows God's knowing.
VI. CONCLUSION

Having come to the end, we can look back and appreciate the
wisdom of the way. Sacra doctrina, resting on God's revelation
and shaped by human reason, gives us partial access to God's
science and situates human knowing within his comprehensive
perspective. Only gradually does human knowing come to a
heightened understanding of the divine perspective as archetypal
and its own perspective as fundamentally backward. This gradual
awareness is reflected in a textual approach whereby divine
science unfolds itself in a progressive articulation of its own
principles. Hence the logic of inquiring at the outset into the
147 This begins the very last statement of the treatise, which understands faith and the sacra
doctrina based on it as preparation for that which lies beyond our nature and attained only
through grace: "nobis sunt indita principia quibus nos possimus preparare ad illam
cognitionem perfectam substantiarum separatarum, non autem quibus ad earn possimus
pertingere: quamuis enim homo naturaliter inclinetur in finem ultimum, non tamen potest
naturaliter ilium consequi set solum per gratiam; et hoc est proper eminentiam illius finis"
(In Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 4, ad 5 [171; 84]).
148 Thus is the teaching of In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 1 confirmed and surpassed.

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

human intellect's nature and limitations, especially respecting the
divine things. This inquiry presupposes and then shapes the
pedagogical entry into the most universal perspective within
which God's self-understanding, the "mixed" knowing of sacra
doctrina, and natural knowing are thematized in terms of their
likenesses and differences. A textual approach is particularly
warranted for uncovering the systematic teaching concerning
divine science because this teaching is suspended between God's
understanding and human inquiry, and only gradually does it
assume the divine perspective without losing its own. The De
Trinitate, then, in order to determine the overarching question of
what the human intellect can know of God, reflects the mode of
human knowing which comes at last to what is first. To this end,
it employs from the start its sharpest instrument, sacra doctrina,
in both its revelation-dependent and reason-punctuated modes,
in order to investigate in turn natural and supernatural
knowledge. This investigation requires that sacra doctrina finally
come to an adequate self-understanding, and when it does, it
reflects God's own self-understanding in keeping with its nature
and destiny.
Theology's first achievement is to give philosophy a deeper
understanding of itself by directing divine science's insights to the
nature and boundaries of human knowing. 149 Because it enjoys
access to God's own science, theology can offer a more
comprehensive understanding of nature than philosophy precisely
because the divine perspective is needed to interpret the world as
created. In this sense reason depends on sacra doctrina to come to
a knowledge of its ultimate causes. Even before it is established,
then, sacra doctrina is already at work, illustrating theologically
the principle of subsequent justification. Once the nature and
limitations of natural knowledge are identified, divine science is
free to turn to itself. Its first task is to justify its lofty ambitions.
Knowledge of the gift retroactively shapes an awareness of the
need for it: the necessity for pursuing a science beyond reason is
established through a faith-based awareness of human fulfillment
and of the existence of this superior science. Sacra doctrina
149 In Boet. de Trin., q. 1, aa. 1and2

(80-85; 13-24).

SACRA DOCTRINA IN THE DE TRINITATE

399

encourages the intellect to pursue the divine truths because the
perfection of the human person embraces intellectual union, and
the desire for divine knowledge is holy. 150 Prepared for an
ambitious career, faith-based reason is immediately assigned the
task of investigating its nature as a divine science. Reason helps to
discover a knowledge that surpasses it, but only with reason's
help can the reflecting faith-shaped mind know what reason is
unable to know without the benefit of faith. 151
It is above all faith, however, that gives the human intellect
access to God's own knowledge and an awareness of a
corresponding relativizing of its own power. Yet faith lends
further hope for human participation in a knowledge that
transcends human nature. Thus both revelation-based and
reason-based knowledge point to each other and acknowledge
their mutual, though analogical, dependence mirrored in the
shifting perspectives of a text now philosophical, now theological.
Reason is explicitly invited to enter into sacra doctrina by
contributing to the resolution of the very question of whether it
should contribute to divine science. It responds by articulating
theology's epistemological principles and by undertaking the
three distinctive tasks which precede, accompany, and follow
upon sacra doctrina. 152 Above all, natural reason, presenting the
notion of analogy, helps divine science to express the analogical
relationship of nature to grace and to appreciate the creative hand
of One who fashions grace to complement the natures he formed.
Then stepping outside of faith in order to recover it, reason
contributes compelling reasons for belief, and derivatively, for the
divine science which depends on belief and the revelation on
which it depends. Turning from divine science to the faith it is
based upon, Thomas offers a reasonable basis for faith and thus
a more solid foundation for sacra doctrina. 153 The reasons that
provide the "reasonableness" of faith, encompassed within a
faith-grounded sacra doctrina, are hence the basis and context for
150 In Boet.
151 In Boet.

de Trin., q. 2, a. 1, esp. ad 7 (93-94; 37-39).
de Trin., q. 2, a. 2 (95-97; 41-44).

152 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3 (98-99; 49).
153 In Boet. de Trin., q. 3, a. 1 (106-9; 63-70).

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LAWRENCE]. DONOHOO

the reasons that establish the need for sacra doctrina. 154 Just as
created grace ultimately serves nature, so human reflection on the
mysteries, having submitted natural knowledge to the service of
belief, is now served by a faith that believes in order to
understand. 155 Faith, in turn, is grounded in God's revelation,
which provides the last critical link back to the overarching divine
science of God-a link that is suspended by sheer grace. Now the
foundation is complete: just as question 1 's inquiry into reason
presupposes sacra doctrina, and question 2's teaching on sacra
doctrina requires faith, so now the articulation of faith in question
3 assumes the instruction on revelation in question 5.
All of the fundamental tasks of sacra doctrina-offering a
"theology of reason"; clarifying the relationship between
revelation and reason through arguments based on revelation and
shaped by reason; providing a reasonable foundation for faith;
and probing the anthropological, epistemological, and theological
presuppositions
of the complementarity
of faith and
reason-constitute a "meta-theology" in which divine science
reflects on its own act. This expresses and furthers sacra doctrina's
urge to replace faith with a knowledge that will only fulfill belief
when faith is ultimately left behind. The nobility and immensity
of this epistemological enterprise leads to the potential inclusion
of the principles of all the sciences within the scope of sacra
doctrina, 156 a conclusion reinforced by an overlapping subject
matter for human science and divine science. 157 Just as grace
serves nature, so revelation serves reason, now in an elevated state
as it seeks to imitate more fully the divine knowing. But patience
is necessary: Thomas's textual unfolding of divine revelation
rooted in God's own self-manifestation images the gradual
character of self-disclosure. 158 Since God reveals divine knowing
to us through faith and bids us believe that our provisional
Similar argumentation is found in STh I, q. 1, a. 1. See Bonnefoy, "La theologie," 433.
In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 2, ad 7 (96-97; 44).
156 In Boet. de Trin., q. 2, a. 3, ad 7 (100; 51).
157 In Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 4 (153-54; 41-45).
158 In this light Thomas's text once again images his subject matter: since human reflection
on human knowledge always remain partial and incomplete, this work, like many other
celebrated texts on first things, is left unfinished and fragmentary.
154

155

SACRA DOCTRINA IN THE DE TRINITATE

401

faith-based knowledge will transform into perfect knowledge,
human divine science, by coming to understand what it believes,
continues the divine act of self-manifestation as a grace-dependent
human achievement on the way to consummation. Sacra doctrina,
in the end, is the time-bound work of glorification, the
understanding of the divine self-manifestation within the
manifestation of the divine understanding. 159

159 I am grateful to Norman Fenton, O.P., and Gracemary Snow, O.P., for their helpful
suggestions in preparing this study. Its earliest inspiration can be traced to Romanus Cessario,
O.P., the late Thomas O'Brien, and the late Thomas Prufer; its more immediate stimulus
comes from a seminar conducted by Ulrich Horst, O.P. of the Grabmann Institute at the
University of Munich in the summer of 1994.

The Thomist 63 (1999): 403-24

THE INDIVIDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING
ACCORDING TO THOMAS AQUINAS
LAWRENCEDEWAN, 0.P.

ru

Dominican College of Philosophy and Theology
Ottawa, Ontario, Canada

CENTLY Timothy Noone 1 and Kevin White 2 have pub-

ished papers touching in different ways on individuation
n Thomas Aquinas. Both express a degree of approval of
the position of Joseph Owens, 3 who holds that for St. Thomas the
"global" 4 explanation of individuation is to be found in the
doctrine of esse, the act of being. In the present paper I wish to
challenge that Owensian view. To do so, I will first criticize the
textual claims of Fr. Owens. Second, I will propose a different
approach to the issue, less focused on individuation as something
1 Timothy B. Noone, "Individuation in Scotus," American Catholic Philosophical
Quarterly 69 (1995): 527-42.
2 Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's Super Boethium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 543-56. White sees himself as expanding on
Owens's line of thinking (545).
3 J. Owens, "Thomas Aquinas (b. ca. 1225; d. 1274)," in Individuation in Scholasticism:
The Later Middle Ages and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650, ed. Jorge J.E. Gracia
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1994), 173-94. Parenthetical page
numbers in the text refer to this essay.
4 This word is from Noone. He tells us: "According to Fr. Owens .•. Aquinas is really a
global theorist on the issue of individuation. What he actually holds, in Owens' opinion, is
that esse is the ultimate ontological principle of individuation, just as it is the ultimate source
of actuality in all created things. If this is so, Thomas escapes immediately from the charge
of failing to develop a general account of individuals as such, whether physical or
non-physical, which is one of the methodic objections Scotus marshals against [William Peter]
Godinus in their debate" (Noone, "Individuation in Scotus," 540).
In a review of the Gracia book containing the Owens essay, Noone says: "Owens'
interpretation of Thomas' many seemingly disparate descriptions of the principle of individuation is unparalleled in its ability to render Aquinas' account of individuation self-consistent
without appealing to awkward genetic hypotheses." He obviously approves of this account.

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

requiring a cause or principle, and more focused on the individual
as a mode of being.
I

Father Owens presents us with the role of the act of being, and
it is one that seems to make things individual: "[Being] is forging
all the various elements of the thing into a unit. It is thereby
making them what we understand to be an individual" (174). He
is basing himself here on a text from Thomas's youthful
Commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. We read: "the
being of the thing composed out of matter and form, from which
[the human mind] obtains knowledge, consists in some composing
of form with matter, or of an accident with a subject [consistit in
quadam compositione formae ad materiam vel accidentis ad
subjectum ]. " 5 Is Thomas saying that the esse itself is a composite?
That is what the reply to the second objection, referred to by
Owens, does indeed say: "But our intellect, whose knowledge
arises from things, which have composite being [esse compositum ],
does not apprehend that esse save by composing and dividing. " 6
Owens provides his own reflection on and interpretation of
what is being said. Taking first the case of a multiplicity of per
accidens accidents (tallness and musical accomplishment) and the
person in whom they inhere (certainly a rather per accidens
unity), he stresses the "existential" character of the bond uniting
them: "they are brought together by real existence in the one
person" (174). And he goes on to make the same point as regards
the substantial components of the concrete substance.
There is no reason in the essence of a person why his or her form (the soul)
should be actuating the particular matter of which the body is constituted at
the moment. Different matter keeps coming and going with the anabolism and
5 I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3 (ed. P. Mandonnet [Paris: Letheilleux, 1929], 903), and ad 2
(Mandonnet, 904); quoted in Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," 189 n. 6. While the Latin word
"consistit" does not always means "is made out of," as English "consists" would suggest, but
can mean "is found with" (cf. STh I-II, q. 2, a. 7: that in which beatitude "consistit" is
distinguished from beatitude itself; the former expression refers to that object in which the
soul finds beatitude), here it does seem to mean something like the English "consists in."
6 I Sent., d. 38, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 904). (Owens transl.)

IND MD UAL AS A MODE OF BEING

405

catabolism of nutrition, yet the soul remains the same. There is no essential
reason, either in the form or the matter, why this particular form should be in
this particular matter at the given instant. The reason is existential. The two
are united in the existence they are actually enjoying at the time. The existence
makes them a unit. (174)

Two points should be made here. One has to do with the
doctrine of esse found in the texts cited. The other has to do with
Owens's conception of the role of esse as related to ens per
accidens and ens per se.
While Thomas in the cited text does make the esse of
composite things a composite, we know that he will subsequently
stress the simplicity of esse.7 In commenting on Boethius's De
hebdomadibus he says that esse is not a composite:
just as esse and quod est differ as to notions, so also they differ really in
composites. Which indeed is evident from the foregoing. For it was said above
that esse itself neither participates in anything such that its intelligibility [ratio]
be constituted out of many, nor does it have anything extrinsic admixed such
that there be in it an accidental composition; and therefore esse itself is not
composite; therefore, the composite thing is not its own esse.8

And in the Summa contra Gentiles we read: "Nothing is more
formal or more simple than esse." 9
7 Noone thinks Owens does well to avoid "awkward genetic hypotheses" (see above, n.
4), but Thomas obviously changes his views on some key issues.
8 Expositio libri Boetii De hebdomadibus 2 (Paris: Cerf; Rome: Commissio Leonina,
1992), lines 204-15 (ed. Calcaterra, no. 32): "sicut esse et quod est differunt secundum
intentiones, ita in compositis differunt realiter. Quod quidem manifestum est ex premissis.
Dictum est enim supra quod ipsum esse neque participat aliud ut eius ratio constituatur ex
multis, neque habet aliquid extrinsecum admixtum ut sit in eo compositio accidentalis; et
ideo IPSUM ESSE NON EST COMPOS/TUM; res ergo composita non est suum esse; et ideo dicit
quod in omni composito aliud est esse ens et aliud ipsum compositum quod est participando
ipsum esse" (small caps added).
The Boethius text has, at line 17: "Omni composito aliud est esse, aliud ipsum est." The
Leonine editors (Louis J. Bataillon and Carlo A. Grassi) have attempted to italicize this in
Thomas's exposition. The "ens" is awkward. Without it, one would think one could underline "et ideo <licit quod in omni composito aliud est esse [ens] et aliud ipsum compositum
quod est participando ipsum esse." See also lines 140-45, onesse as abstract and thus p:itre as
to its "essence."
9 ScG I, c. 23 (ed. Pera, no. 214; Pegis, no. 2): "Ipsum enim esse non potest participare
aliquid quod non sit de essentia sua: quamvis id quod est possit aliquid aliud participare. Nihil
enim est formalius aut simplicius quam esse. Et sic ipsum esse nihil participare potest. Divina

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

And what about the causal role Owens attributes to esse with
the word "makes"? This has much to do with his view of esse as
a "cause of individuation." In the Sentences, it is true, Thomas
seems to affirm that the esse of a caused thing is itself the formal
cause of being of that thing. At least, to an objector who says that
the esse of creatures must be "through itself' and thus not be
caused (and consequently is God himself), Thomas has occasion
to say, "created esse is not through something else, if the word
'through' expresses the intrinsic formal cause; on the contrary
[immo], through it [ipso], formally, the creature is." 10 In this
passage, it is clear that esse is being regarded as the intrinsic
formal cause. However, towards the end of the De Veritate we
read: "God causes in us natural esse by creation, without the
mediation of any efficient cause, but nevertheless through the
mediation of a formal cause: because natural form is the principle
of natural esse."11 And it is this doctrine that will prevail.12
A first point, then, is that Owens is starting us out with a
conception of esse that, with respect to its nature and its causal
role, Thomas does not seem to have retained.
Second, Owens seems to be using the per accidens itself as a
sort of "scope" in which to see actual existence at work. This is

autem substantia est ipsum esse. Ergo nihil habet quod non sit de sua substantia. Nullum ergo
accidens ei inesse potest" (italics added).
Cf. also De Pot., q. 1, a. 1: "Verbi gratia 'esse' significat aliquid completum [Lege:
completivum] et simplex sed non subsistens; 'substantia' autem aliquid subsistens significat
sed alii subjectum. Ponimus ergo in Deo substantiam et esse, sed substantiam ratione
subsistentiae, non ratione substandi; esse vero ratione simplicitatis et complementi, non
ratione inhaerentiae quae [lege: qua] alteri inhaeret" (italics added).
10 I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 198). For a text which goes very much along
the lines of Owens's idea, cf. Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2 [3], ad 2: "sed esse est id in quo fundatur
unitas suppositi: uncleesse multiplex praeiudicat unitati essendi" ("but being is that on which
is founded the unity of the subsisting thing: hence, multiple being precludes unity of being").
11 De Verit., q. 27, a. 1, ad3 (Leonine ed. [Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1976), t. 22/3,
lines 182-86).
12 Cf. e.g., IV Metaphys., lect. 2 (ed. M.-R. Cathala [Turin: Marietti, 1935], no. 558), the
criticism of Avicenna on esse. See my papers "St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the
Formal Cause," in The NewScholasticism 63 (1989): 173-82; and "Saint Thomas, Form, and
Incorruptibility," in Jean-Louis Allard, ed., Etre et Savoir, Philosophica 37 (Ottawa: Les
Presses de l'Universite d'Ottawa, 1989), 77-90.

IND MD UAL AS A MODE OF BEING

407

surprising for many reasons. 13 The one reason I will mention here
is that Thomas himself takes quite a different line in a particularly
prominent text in the Summa contra Gentiles.
Even in those things whose esse is not subsistent, that which is present within
the existent besides its esse is indeed united to the existent, but it is not one
with its esse, save by attachment [per accidens],inasmuch as there is one subject
which has esse and that which is besides esse: as is dear [in this case, viz.] that
in Socrates, besides his own substantial esse, there is present the white, which
is diverse from his substantial esse, for being Socrates and being white are not
the same thing, save by attachment. If, therefore, esse is not in some subject
[the autograph has "substance"], there will not remain any way in which that
which is besides esse can be united to it [viz to esse]. 14

Obviously, in such a doctrine, esse is no bond uniting or "forging
. . . into a unit" all the items. This role rather belongs to the
subject, that is, the subsisting substance as such. This is also the
doctrine one finds in the Tertia pars, written in Thomas's later
years. 15
It might be noted, furthermore, that Owens, in his
presentation of the unity of the concrete substance, composed of
13 This is far from a late

development in Owens's metaphysics. He already has it in his

Doctrineof Being in the Aristotelian"Metaphysics"(2d. ed.; Toronto: PIMS, 1963), 209. See
my paper, "Being per se, Being per accidens, and St. Thomas' Metaphysics," Scienceet Esprit
30 (1978): 169-84, for a criticism of this view.
The per accidenscertainly relates in a special way to the individual, as distinct from the
universal: cf. V Metaphys., lect. 7 (845) and lect. 11 (910), but that does not mean that esse
is the "tie that binds."
14 ScG II, c. 52 (ed. Pera, no. 1274). Pera notes the reading of Thomas's autograph.
15 STh III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1. This article asks whether there is only one esse in Christ. The
first objector makes his case on the basis of form as that upon which esse follows:
"Damascene says in bk. 3 that those things which follow upon the nature in Christ are
duplicated. But esse follows upon the nature; for esse is from form [esseconsequiturnaturam;
esse enim est a forma]. Therefore, in Christ there are two esses." And Thomas replies: "esse
follows upon the nature not as [something] HAVING esse [habentemesse], but as that by which
something is [QUA aliquid est]; but it [esse] follows upon the person or hypostasis as
[something] HAVING esse. And so it rather retains unity in accordance with the unity of the
hypostasis, than that it have duality according to the duality of nature" (italics and small caps
added).
The idea is obviously that when one has to do with something that has all that it takes to
be a complete thing, then esse is on the scene in its proper setting. Rather than simply saying
that esse is what gives unity or individuation to the thing, Thomas sees the unity of esse as
resulting(it "follows") from the unity of subject or hypostasis.

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LAWRENCEDEWAN, O.P.

this matter and this form, complicates matters slightly by taking
the case of the human person, whose soul of course subsists in its
own being. In fact, even in the case of nutrition in general, as
applying to all living things, there is need for a special doctrine of
individuation. In his commentary on Aristotle's De generationeet
corruptione, Thomas, taking the case of any substance that
changes its matter, and raising the question of its enduring
identity, sees the need to provide a special mode of substantial
form, somewhat immaterial, and thus somewhat akin to the subsisting form which is the human soul. It is the form, in such a
case, that guarantees the substantial unity. 16 Thomas does not appeal to esse as Owens does. I submit that the reason is that he has
a different conception of the being of things from that of Owens.
What we must emphasize is that Owens uses this conception
of the role of esse in order to introduce his reader to the whole
issue. Esse is presented as "forging ... a unit," that is, bringing
about unity. While such words can signify formal causality17 (and
even that, as I have said, is not Thomas's mature conception of
the role of esse), Owens's conception of the "accidentality" 18 of
esse seems to make the causality verge on the efficient, a sort of
intrinsic efficient cause binding things together. 19
16 lDegen. et corr., lect. 17 (ed. Spiazzi [Rome and Turin: Marietti, 1952], no. 118). This
work of Thomas is incomplete, ending at De gen. 1.5 .322a33. Aristotle is discussing growth
and diminution, and the nutrition involved with them. The general picture is of a being that
maintains its identity through its form, while its matter changes. The translation of Aristotle
that Thomas is using seems to speak of the form as "immaterial" though in matter. Thomas
thus provides the following explanation: "the power of the form, in living things, does not
determine for itself any designated matter [aliquam materiam designatam], since one part
flows forth and another arrives, as was said above. Nevertheless the power of the form cannot
be without all matter, but [is] indeterminately in this or that: because, as is proved in
Metaphysics7, the power of the generator is the form which is in this flesh and these bones .
. . . Therefore, in this way, the power of the form of flesh or other such things, inasmuch as
it does not determine for itself any designated matter, but at one moment is preserved in this,
at another moment in that, is like an immaterial form [est sicut speciesimmaterialis]."
He also speaks of the form of the living thing as "quodammodo immaterialis."
17 Cf. STh I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 4.
18 See my paper "St. Thomas, Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause" (see note
12, above)
19 Etienne Gilson, in Beingand Some Philosophers(Toronto: PIMS, 1949), 172, explicitly
makes esse an intrinsic efficient cause: "Actual existence, then, is the efficientcause by which
essence in its turn is the formal cause which makes an actual existence to be 'such an
existence'" (italics added). This hardly corresponds to Thomas's conception. If one insists on

INDIVIDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

409

Owens immediately introduces us to the case of God, in whom
esse is itself subsisting. He speaks of the "unifying" feature of
existence as even more striking in the case of God: 20 "It [existence
regarded as a nature] necessarily individualizes itself. Subsistent
existence is its own individuation" (175). We notice that he
maintains the causal conception here. Obviously this is not true
causality, nor does Owens mean it to be taken as such. Nevertheless it is important to specify just which intelligibility is
assigned which role, even in the case of the divine simplicity.
Thus, for example, Thomas specifies that beatitude belongs to
God precisely in function of his intellect, not in function of his
essence or his will. 21 Here, as Owens sees it, it is of the very
nature of existence that it have the task of individuation
attributed to it.
The texts he cites to support his doctrine here merely say that
God has the characteristics that constitute the individual. The
first, taken from the Sentences, does say that the divine esse is
determinate in itself and divided from all others; but it does not
attribute that to esse precisely as esse. It is the case rather because
God is subsistent esse, thus perfect, and so cannot receive any
addition, which pertains to its being an individual. 22
making the esse of the creature a cause, Thomas rather regards it more as a final cause, and
the effect of all the other sorts of causality: cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 10.
In affirming what he does, Gilson refers (172 n. 23; cf. 169) to the doctrine that causes
are causes of each other, but in diverse genera of causality: V Metaphys., lect. 2 (no. 755).
However, in that text, Thomas carefully explains that doctrine in terms of (1) the relation
between efficient and final causality, and (2) the relation between form and matter. Nowhere
does he say anything about efficient and formal causality as reciprocal.
20 Thomas Aquinas, on the other hand, sees substance (in the sense of essence) as playing
the unifying role. Thus, at STh I, q. 11, a. 4, on whether God is maximally one, an objector
holds that since each thing is one through its own essence, and what is by its own essence
such is maximally such, every being is maximally one. Thomas replies (ad 3): "though
admittedly every being is one through its own substance, nevertheless it is not the case that
the substance of each thing relates equally to causing unity; because the substance of some is
composed out of many, but the substance of others [is] not [thus composite]."
21 STh I, q. 26, a. 2.
22 I Sent., d. 8, q. 4, a. 1, ad 1 (Mandonnet, 219). The second text he refers to says that
God, through his essence, is something undivided in himself and distinct from all those things
which are not God (De Pot., q. 8, a. 3). This is "essence" used in a sense which does not
necessarily distinguish between "essence" and "substance"; Thomas is merely contrasting the
essence with the Trinity of Persons, about which he is speaking in the context.

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

There is nothing, as far as I can see, to justify giving the role
of "individuation" to the divine esse as such. I think rather of a
text from the Summa contra Gentiles that shows something of the
variety of intelligible roles of the various items in the metaphysical analysis:
It has been shown in the First Book (ch. 31) that those things which in
creatures are divided are unqualifiedly one in God: thus, for example, in the
creature essence and being [esse] are other; and in some [creatures] that which
subsists in its own essence is also other than its essence or nature: for this man
is neither his own humanity nor his being [esse]; but God is his essence and his
being.
And though these in God are one in the truest way, nevertheless in God
there is whatever pertains to the intelligible role [ratio] of the subsisting thing,
or of the essence, or of the being [esse]; for it belongs to him not to be in
another, inasmuch as he is subsisting;to be a what [esse quid], inasmuch as he
is essence; and being in act [esse in actu], by reason of being itself [ratione

ipsius esse]. 23

"Not to be in another," as we shall see, pertains precisely to the
individual. Accordingly, I am not at all ready to say that, for
Thomas, God is an individual precisely because of his esse as esse.
However, that is Owens's definite meaning, in pointing to the
divine esse as self-individualizing. He says: "This unifying and
individuating feature follows upon existence wherever it is
shared" (175). 24 And again we read: "This individuating function
23 ScG IV, c. 11 (ed. Pera, nos. 3472-73;

italics added).

24 Notice that Owens has practically identified the issues of individuation

and unity. This
in itself is highly questionable, since "one" is said in as many ways as "being" is. Owens
himself wants to see the esse of a thing as the cause of its unity. He points to a problem text
(De Verit., q. 21, a. 5, ad 8: whether the created good is good through essence) which seems
to allow essence, just in itself, a unity, and in this respect contrasts calling a thing "one" and
calling it "a good" or "a being," the latter two names being said of created essence only by
participation. In the context, Thomas rules out an argument that rejects participation in being
and goodness, an argument claiming that this gets one into an infinite regress (an argument
originally used by Averroes to reject unity by participation). Owens explains the unity
involved as something along the lines of the negative unity attributed to primary matter. This
is odd, to say the least. In fact, Thomas later in his career changes his approach in this matter,
himself using the argument of Averroes even to apply to the case of being; that is, Thomas
eventually (IV Metaphys., lect. 2 [555]) treats of both "one" and "a being" as signifying the
essence as such, though he continues to reject the argument as regards the case of "a good"
(STh I, q. 6, a. 3, obj. 3 and ad 3). Notice that, in obj. 2 and ad 2, he allows that "anything
whatsoever is a being [ens] through its essence." The thing is good through its esse, not merely

INDIVIDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

411

of existence may be expressed tersely: 'For everything in accordance with the way it has existence has unity and individuation"'
(175). All that the phrase Owens cites from Thomas 25 need (or
does) mean is that esse, unity, and individuation all have the same
causes or principles. But Owens continues: "Whether as subsistent
in God or as accidental in creatures, existence is, in the order of
being, the basic 'cause of individuation"' (175) This sentence from
Owens includes the item in quotation marks, "cause of individuation." This is because in the footnote to the previous citation
(190 n. 11), he said concerning the statement that existence,
unity, and individuation go together: "The context is the 'causa
individuationis animarum.' The point is that bodies are only in a
way (aliqualiter) the cause of individuation of souls. " 26 The
implication he is leaving with the reader is that Thomas is
referring to esse as the "cause of individuation."
Actually, in the text Owens is using, namely the response to
Johannes de Vercellis, 27 the real argument is that "cause of
through the essence. Moreover, in STh I, q. 11, a. 1, ad 1, he uses the argument of Averroes
for "one," and that in a way that can hardly be reduced to the sort of unity of matter Owens
tried to exploit. In fact, it is a "one" that is explicitly identified with "a being."
25 Responsio ad magistrum Ioannem de Vercellis de 108 articulis (Leonine ed., Opera
omnia, tome 42) a. 108 (lines 1185-87): "unumquodque enim secundum quod habet esse,
habet unitatem et individuationem."
26 Owens here throws in another text, from Com. Theo/. I, c. 71, but it shows neither
more nor less than the other text.
27 The passage is as follows:
The 1 lS'h item proposed: "Souls are individuated by the matters of
bodies, though [when] separated from them they retain individuation,
like wax [retaining] the impression of the seal'', can be understood in
a good way or a bad way. For if it is understood that souls are
individuated by bodies, in such a way that the bodies are the total cause
of the individuation of souls, it is false. But if it is understood that
bodies are in some way the cause of the individuation of souls, it is
true; for each thing according as it has being, has unity and
individuation. Therefore, just as the body is not the total cause of the
soul, but the soul as to its own nature [rationem J has some order to the
body, since it belongs to the nature of the soul that it be unitable to a
body: so also, the body is not the total cause of the individuation of this
soul, but it is of the nature of this soul that it be unitable to this body,
and this remains in the soul even after the body has been destroyed.
(Lines 1177-94)

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

individuation" and "cause of being" go together. Is matter cause
of being? To the extent that it is, it has some claim to be cause of
individuation. Since the former claim is quite limited, so is the
latter. There is no suggestion that the esse is the cause of individuation of the soul. That would require, as per the argument,
that it be a cause of esse of the soul. God, not esse, is the cause of
the esse of the soul (and the soul itself, by virtue of its own
nature, is formal cause of its having esse). 28
Owens continues by claiming that Thomas says that existence
is what "makes one thing differ from another." And he quotes in
proof the example: "As existents, however, they differ, for a
horse's existence is not a man's, and this man's existence is not
that man's" (175; the example is taken from STh I, q. 3, a. 5).
Once more, all it shows is that existence and individuation stand
and fall together. It does not show that existence is a cause of
individuation. The text occurs in an article showing that God is
not in a genus. It says that things in a genus have their generic
essence in common, but differ secundum esse, that is, taken in
function of their existence. This is shown by stating the fact that
the being of man and the being of horse are not the same. And it
is added that the being of this man and that man are not the
same. What this shows is that when a thing has esse, it must have
in it something other than the quiddity itself (and particularly the
quiddity of the genus). That is, there must be a subject which has
esse and the essential nature. The idea is certainly not that esse as
such is intrinsically individual and the cause of individuation. But
that is what Owens's position involves. 29

28 On the subsisting form as formal cause of its being, see my paper "St. Thomas,
Metaphysical Procedure, and the Formal Cause," esp. 178-80.
29 I am reminded of STh I, q. 12, a. 4, where it is said of material things that their natures
do not have esse save in "this individual matter." There can hardly be any doubt that in this
part of the Summa esse is presented as what is most common of all, and as having the nature
of the received and formal: cf. STh I, q. 4, a. 3: all things are like God in function of esse,
which is analogically common to all; and STh I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3: "when I say 'the esse of a
man, or of a horse, or of anything else,' esse itself is considered as formal and received; not
as that item to which esse belongs." It is true that the text used by Owens (viz., STh I, q. 3,
a. 5, main argument 3) is one of the more Avicennian texts in the Prima pars, and requires
very careful handling. Notice that it is the third of three arguments given.

INDMDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

413

Hence, as regards this first section of Owens's paper, so crucial
for his entire outlook, I do not agree that esse is a "synthesis," or
that "it makes each a unit in itself and renders it distinct from all
others" (italics added). He has not shown (nor is it true) that existence is the basic "cause of individuality" in Thomas's philosophical thinking (17 5). However, it is certainly true that individuation
and esse stand and fall together. They have the same causes.
Owens concludes the first part of his paper, the part that
concerns us, with a reference to a text wherein Thomas cites the
Liber de causis on God's individuation. This we will reserve for
the second part of our paper. 30
II

I propose to present Thomas's doctrine of "the individual,"
calling attention to a few rather all-encompassing ("global") texts.
But first I wish to introduce the idea that "the individual" names
a mode of being. We will even say that there are modes of being
an individual, that is, that "individual" is said of many which are
so called only by analogy. 31
First, there are texts that present the contrast between the
universal and the individual (or singular) as pertaining to beings
as beings. Thus, in the Summa contra Gentiles we are told:
The nature of a genus cannot be perfectly known unless its primary differences
and essential accidents [differentiaeprimae et per se passiones]are known: for
one cannot perfectly know the nature of number if the even and the odd remain
unknown. But THE UNNERSALAND THE SINGULAR ARE DIFFERENCESOR ESSENTIAL
ACCIDENTSOF BEING [ENIIS]. If, therefore, God knowing his own essence knows

3° Continuing to prove his point, Owens says: "In the language of the Liber de causis,
God's individuation is his own pure goodness" (175). Here we are referred to two texts, II
Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 90-91) and De ente, c. 5, JI. 23-24. However, I would urge
the reader to see how Thomas handles God's being an individual in his In De causis. For this,
see below.
31 I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2 (Mandonnet, 538-39): "an analogue is divided in virtue
of diverse modes. Hence, since 'a being' is predicated analogically of the ten genera, it is
divided among them in virtue of diverse modes. Hence, to each genus there is owing a proper
mode of predicating." Thomas is here contrasting the analogical, divided by diverse modes,
with the univocal, divided by differences, and the equivocal, divided by signified things.

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

perfectly the common nature of being [naturam communem entis], it 1s
necessary that he perfectly know the univeral and the singular. 32

Thus, in discussing the individual, we may expect to be m a
deeply ontological discussion. 33
If we pursue this view of the individual as related to the nature
of ens or "that which is," we find the Summa Theologiae
discussion of Boethius's definition of the person (viz., an
individual substance of a rational nature), most helpful. Thomas's
main reply, explaining this definition with thoroughgoing
approval, takes the form of a lesson on the individual
(individuum). We begin:
though admittedly the universal and the particular [particulare] are to be found
in all the genera, nevertheless the individual is to be found in a special mode
[speciali quodam modo] in the genus of substance. For substance is individuated
through itself [per seipsam ], whereas accidents are individuated through the
subject, which is substance; for one speaks of "this" whiteness inasmuch as it
is in "this subject." And so also, suitably, the individuals of substance have a
special name, apart from the others: for they are called "hypostases" or
"primary substances." 34

This is certainly a controlling text. Notice that "universal" and
"particular" (interchangeable with "individual") are found in all
the Aristotelian categories of being. This is to say again that this
is a difference which pertains to beings as beings. 35

32 ScG I, c. 65 (ed. Pera, no. 532; Pegis, para. 4; italics and small caps added). Avicenna,
Uber de philosophia prima sive scientia divina (ed. S. Van Riet [Louvain: Peeters; Leiden:
Brill, 1997], I-IV) 1.2 (p. 13, lines 42-44), speaking of the subject of the science, "ens
inquantum est ens," and the items which follow upon it (line 37), says: "Et ex his quaedam
sunt ei quasi accidentalia propria, sicut unum et multa, potentia et effectus, universale et
particulare, possibile et necesse" (italics added).
33 Cf. Jorge J. E. Gracia, Individuality: An Essay on the Foundations of Metaphysics
(Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1988): "My suggestion, then, is that
individuality may be interpreted as one of the two fundamental ontological modes, the other
being universality" (136). Whether or not they are "the two" fundamental modes, they are
surely fundamental ontological targets of attention.
34 STh I, q. 29, a. 1.
35 The fact that "the individual" is found in all the categories itself entails that it is an
analogous term: no predicate is predicated univocally of substance and accident, as St.
Thomas says in De Pot., q. 7, a. 7.

INDMD UAL AS A MODE OF BEING

415

Moreover, we will be primarily considering what takes place
within the genus of substance. Accidents are already excluded
from the issue. As is well known, the accident which is quantity
regularly has attributed to it some sort of individuality and some
role as "principle of individuation." 36 It should be clear from the
above text that such a role must be secondary, at best.
Thomas continues his lesson on the individual, as follows:
But in a still more special and more perfect mode [quodam specialiori et
perfectiorimodo], the particular and the individual [particulareet individuum]
is to be found in rationalsubstances, which have mastery over their own action,
and are not merely acted upon, but rather act by virtue of themselves [per se
agunt]. Now, actions are in singulars.37
And therefore, also, in contrast to other substances, the singulars
[singularia]of rational nature have a special name. And this name is "person."
And therefore in the aforementioned definition of the person is placed
"individual substance," inasmuch as it [the person] signifies the singular in the
genus of substance; but "of rational nature" is added, inasmuch as it signifies
the singular among rational substances.38
STh III, q. 77, a. 2.
the point of view of the building up of human metaphysical
experience, the association of individuals (or subsisting things) and operations should be
related to the experience of composite things as the proper subjects (the "vehicles," one might
say) of both (1) actual existence and (2) motion or change. Thus, in Metaphys.
9.3.104 7a31-b2, Aristotle points out that while we attribute "being thought about" to things
which do not exist, nevertheless we attribute motion only to the existent. Cf. Thomas's IX
Metaphys., lect. 3 (1805-6). Cf. also Aristotle, Metaphysics1.1.981a12-24.
Aristotle's doctrine that the question of the separability of soul turns on its having an
operation ofits own derives from the foregoing considerations: cf. De anima 1.1.403a10-12.
38 STh I, q. 29, a. 1. The same points are made in De Pot., q. 9, a. 1, ad 3 and ad 8.
However, in the reply to objection 3, Thomas is more complete on the relation of the
individual to action.
36 See especially

37 Italics added. From

just as individual substance has it as proper that it exist through itself
[per se existat], so also it has it as proper that it act through itself [per
se agat]: for nothing acts save a being in act [ens actu]; and because of
this, heat, just as it is not through itself, so also neither does it act
through itself; but rather the hot heats through heat. But that which is
to act through itself [per se agere] belongs in a more excellent degree to
substances of rational nature than to others. For only rational
substances have mastery over their own act, such that there is in them
to act and not to act; but other substances are more acted upon than
acting. And therefore it was suitable that the individual substance of a
rational nature have a special name.

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

We see from the key consideration in the above, namely, the
citation of the dictum "actions are in singulars" that we are on the
trail of what essentially constitutes singularity or individuality. It
is something that is seen in modes or levels, but that is realized
most fully in the extent to which a substance is an agent, a source
of events.
To an objector who claims that the individual cannot be
defined, and thus Boethius cannot be correct, Thomas responds
that "the general character of singularity" [communem rationem
singularitatis] can be defined, and points to the definition of
primary substance given by Aristotle. 39
However, the most important objection and reply for our
present interest come in third place. The objector, criticizing the
Boethian definition, points out that "individual" is not the name
of a thing outside the mind, but is rather a logician's consideration; not the name of a "res," but merely of an "intentio"; and yet
the person is a real thing. Boethius's definitional procedure is
thus, he claims, unsuitable.
Thomas replies, explaining carefully the meamng of
"individual" in the definition.
because substantial differences are not known to us, or else are not named, it
is necessary sometimes to use accidental differences in place of substantial
[differences], for example, if someone were to say: "fire is a simple, hot, and
dry body"; for proper accidents are the effects of substantial forms, and reveal
them. And similarly the names of logical notions [intentiones]can be accepted
in order to define real things [res], inasmuch as they are accepted in the role of
some names of real things which [names] have not been invented. And thus this
name "individual" [individuum]is inserted in the definition of the person in
order to signify the mode of subsisting, which belongs to particular substances

[modum subsistendiqui competit substantiis particularibus].40
39 STh I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1. The reference is to Aristotle, Categories3.2al l: "Substance, in
the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable
of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse" (trans. E. M.
Edghill).
40 Ibid., ad 3. In De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 5, on the same point, we have: "'individual' is
inserted into the definition of the person in order to signify the individual mode of being" [ad

designandumindividualem modum essend1].
At I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1 (Mandonnet, 601), the discussion of Boethius's definition of
"person," note how different is Thomas's handling of "individual" from that in STh I, q. 29,

INDMDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

417

In another objection in the same article, the meaning of the
term "substance," as used in the definition of person, is questioned. The preferred reply of Thomas is as follows: "'substance'
is taken universally [communiter], inasmuch as it is divided into
primary and secondary; and by the addition of 'individual,' it is
narrowed down to stand for primary substance." 41 Thomas's only
slightly earlier De Potentia discussion (q. 9, a. 2) explains more
fully:
when "substance" is divided into primary and secondary, this is not a division
of a genus into species-since nothing is contained under "secondary
substance" that is not contained under "primary [substance]"-but rather it is
a division of the genus in function of diverse modes of being [secundum
diversosmodosessendi].For "secondary substance" signifies the absolute nature
of the genus, just by itself; but "primary substance" signifies it [the nature] as
individually subsisting [ut individualitersubsistentem].Hence, it is more of a
division of an analogue than of a genus [magis est divisioanalogiquamgeneris].
Thus, therefore, "the person" is indeed contained in the genus of substance,
though admittedly not as a species, but as determining a special mode of
existing [ut specialem modum existendi determinans].42

Thus, we see the extent to which the entire discussion is one of
dividing being into modes, relative to what subsists, as having its
own esse.
It is not easy to see just what is meant by this division of "that
which is" into the universal and the individual. Can we say that
universals are beings? Certainly, an argument from the Summa
contra Gentiles maintains that they have less right to this title
than does the individual. Arguing that God's providence extends
to contingent singulars, Thomas says:
Since God is the cause of that-which-is inasmuch as it is that-which-is [entis
inquantum est ens], as was shown above, it is necessary that he be the provider
[provisor]for that-which-is inasmuch as it is that-which-is: for he provides for
things inasmuch as he is their cause. Therefore, whatever is in any degree
[quocumque modo est] falls under his providence. But singulars are beings
[entia], and more so [magis] than universals; because universals do not subsist
a. 1 and De Pot., q. 9, a. 2; in the Sentencescommentary it is still merely the name of an
intention.
41 STh I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2.
42 De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 6.

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LAWRENCE DEWAN, O.P.

by themselves, but are [viz: have being, sunt] only in singulars. Therefore, there
is divine providence even as to singulars. 43

Thus, we see that the universal is viewed as the inherent, in
contrast to the individual which precisely subsists, that is,
properly has its own esse. Inherents are found even in the genus
of substance, as in the case of the substantial forms lower than the
human soul. 44
Having located our topic as the mode of being proper to the
subsisting thing, 45 let us note how Thomas provides a tableau or
panorama of being, viewed as to the different modes of the
subsistent or individual. In terms of subsistence or "having being,"
we get the following:
43 III ScG, c. 75 (Pera, no. 2513; Pegis, no. 13). Cf. also I Post., lect. 37 (Leonine ed.
[Paris: J. Vrin; Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1989], lines 173-87, commenting on Aristotle,
85b15; Spiazzi, no. 330):

And he [Aristotle] says that if the universal is said of many in function
of one intelligibility [rationem] and not equivocally, the universal as
regards what pertains to reason [quantum ad id quod rationis est], that
is, as regards science and demonstration, will not be less of a being than
the particulars, but rather more, because the incorruptible is more of
a being [magis ens] than the corruptible, and the universal intelligibility
[ratio universalis] is incorruptible whereas the particulars are
corruptible, corruptibility happening to them in function of the
individual principles, not in function of the intelligibility of the species,
which is common to all and preserved by generation; thus, therefore,
as regards what pertains to reason, the universals are more than the
particulars, but as regards natural subsistence [quantum uero ad
naturalem subsistenciam], the particulars are more [magis sunt], [and
thus] are called "primary and principle substances."
44 See STh I, q. 45, a. 4. In referring to the substantial forms lower than the human soul
(which subsists), I am trying to be as "realistic" as possible regarding the universal. The substantial form is not the universal, but is its principle. The essence or quiddity of the material
thing is distinct from the material thing itself, and has the role of "formal part": cf. STh I, q.
3, a. 3. For an indication of the problems in discussing quiddity, substantial form, and thing,
see my paper "St. Thomas, Metaphysics, and Formal Causality," Laval theologique et
philosophique 36 (1980): 285-316.
45 "Mode of being" itself deserves prolonged study. The general notion of "mode" here
is one of measure of a formal feature: cf. STh I, q. 5, a. 5. Thus, we are regularly considering
a "receiver" which has some perfection. In the case of God, the simplicity of the divine
essence requires that God be whatever he has; cf. ScG I, c. 23 (no. 218).

INDMDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

419

Now, there are many modes of being of things [modus essendi rerum].
For some things are, whose nature does not have being [habet esse] save in
this individual matter; and of this mode [huiusmodi]are all corporeal [things].
But some things are, whose natures are subsistent by themselves, not in any
matter, which nevertheless are not their own being [esse], but rather they are
[things] having being [esse habentes]; and of this mode are incorporeal
substances, which we call "angels."
Of God alone the proper mode of being [propriusmodus essendi] is that he
be his own subsistent being [suum esse subsistens].46

We should note the use of the word "have" as in "have being,"
which St. Thomas sometimes stresses in order to present the
subsisting thing as such. Thus, for example, in presenting the sort
of thing which is truly "made," he tells us that "being made" is
ordered to "being," and so that is properly made which properly
is. And what is that? "That is properly said to 'be' which itself has
being [quod ipsum habet esse], as subsisting in its own being [quasi
in suo esse subsistens]: hence, only substances are properly and
truly called 'beings' [entia]. " 47
However, we can find the above tableau set out expressly as
regards the individual. Let us consider a text from In De causis,
prop. 9. This is one of the most important lessons in the work,
since it concerns the causality of the highest cause and how it
stands as to being, relative to all the rest. Thomas is presenting
the author's conception of God as pure esse, and the created
separate substance as a composite of form and esse. At the very
end of the discussion, there comes a possible objection. If God is
pure esse, he will not be an individual being; he will rather be that
"esse commune" predicated of all; and since only individuals act
or are acted upon, he will not be a cause. The contention is that
the divine esse, in order to be individuated, must be received in
something. The obvious point is that it does not suffice to posit
esse as such, in order to have something individuated. 48
STh I, q. 12, a. 4, in part.
STh I, q. 90, a. 2.
48 Super Librum de causis expositio, prop. 9, ed. H. D. Saffrey, O.P. (Fribourg: Societe
46

47

philosophique; Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954), p. 64, line 28-p. 65, line 7; italics in the
edition, indicating words from the commented text:
Posset enim aliquis dicere quod, si causa prima est esse tantum, videtur
quod sit esse commune quod de omnibus praedicatur et quod non sit

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Does Thomas answer that esse as such everywhere provides
individuation? Not at all. He rather relates individuation in the
first cause to its not being received in anything.
But to this [the author of the De causis] responds that the very infinity of the
divine esse, inasmuch as it is not limited to some receiver, has in the first cause
the role of the yliatim which is in other things. And this because, as in other
things the individuation of a received common thing is brought about by the
receiver, so the divine goodness and being [esse] is individuated from its very
own purity, i.e. through the fact that it is not received in anything; and from
the fact that it is thus individuated by its own purity, it has it that it can issue
forth in goodnesses [bestowed] upon the intelligence and the other things. 49

One sees that it is very much the receiver that accounts for
individuation in all the common things; one should remember
that esse, in everything other than God, is as something received
aliquid individualiter ens ab aliis distinctum; id enim quod est
commune non individuatur nisi per hoc quod in aliquo recipitur. Causa
autem prima est aliquid individualiter distinctum ab omnibus aliis,
alioquin non haberet operationem aliquam; universalium enim non est
neque agere neque pati. Ergo videtur quod necesse sit dicere causam
primam habere yliatim, id est aliquid recipiens esse.
Cf. St. Thomas Aquinas, Commentary on the Book of Causes, trans. Vincent A.
Guagliardo, O.P., Charles R. Hess, O.P., and Richard C. Taylor (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 72.
Cf. M.-D. Roland-Gosselin, O.P., "Le principe de l'individualite," in Le "De ente et
essentia" de s. Thomas dAquin (Le Saulchoir: Revue des sciences philosophiques et
theologiques, 1926), 49-134. The very first theologian he presents, William of Auvergne, in
his De universo (ca. 1231-36), refers to the Liber de causis without mentioning that name, in
connection with divine individuality. Roland-Gosselin (73 n. 3) cites Guillaume d'Auvergne,
Opera omnia (Orleans, 1674), t. I, De universo I, 2, c. 9 (p. 852 a D): "et posuerunt ei
individuum dicentes quia individuum ejus est bonitas pura."
49 P. 65, lines 7-15: "Sed ad hoc respondet quod ipsa infinitas divini esse,
scilicet non est terminatum ad aliquod recipiens, habet in causa prima vicem yliatim quod est
in aliis rebus. Et hoc ideo quia, sicut in aliis rebus fit individuatio rei communis receptae per
id quod est recipiens, ita divina bonitas et esse individuatur ex ipsa sui puritate per hoc scilicet
quod ipsa non est recepta in aliquo; et ex hoc quod est sic individuata sui puritate, habet
quod possit influere bonitates super intelligentiam et alias res." Cf. Guagliardo, p. 72. The
translation is my own, but this is no reflection on the fine translation of Guagliardo, Hess,
and Taylor. I might note, however, that for "per id quod est recipiens," they have "through
what the recipient is." I think it might be rendered: "by the receiving that-which-is"; that is,
the receiver has always the role of "quod est," or the subsisting thing.

INDMDUAL AS A MODE OF BEING

421

in a receiver. 50 It could hardly serve, in the doctrine of St.
Thomas, as something giving individuation to all else.
Since Thomas has been obliged to work with the text of
someone else, which as he reads it seems to require something
material (or quasi-material) for individuation, he goes on to
provide his own proper account of individuation.
So that this may be evident, it is to be considered that something is called an
"individual" from this fact, that it is not of its nature to be in many: for the
universal is that whose nature it is to be in many.
But that something is not of a nature to be in many can occur in two ways.
In one way, by the fact that it is limited to some one thing in which it is
[present], for example whiteness by the character of its species is of a nature
to be in many, but this whiteness which is received in this subject cannot be
save in this.
But this way [of not being of a nature to be in many] cannot proceed to
infinity, because in formal and material causes one cannot proceed to infinity,
as is proved in Metaphysics2; hence it is necessary to arrive at something which
is not of a nature to be received in something, and from this it has
individuation, as for example primary matter in corporeal things, which is the
principle of singularity.
Hence, it is necessary that everything which is not of a nature to be in
something, by that very fact is individual; and this is the second way in which
something is not of a nature to be in many, i.e. because it is not of its nature
to be in something, as for example if whiteness were existing separately
without a subject, it would be an individual in that way. 51
50 STh I, q. 4, a. 1, ad 3. I am reminded of the way Johannes Capreolus expresses the
doctrine of St. Thomas concerning esse, as that item in the metaphysical analysis of the
creature most remote from the nature of that which subsists as such. He says: "since the esse
of the creature least of all subsists, it is not properly created or annihilated, nor is, nor is not,
nor begins [to be], nor ceases [to be]; but all those things are said of that which is through
that esse, and not of esse itself" ("Cum ergo esse creaturae minime subsistat, non proprie
creatur, aut annihilatur, aut est, aut non est, aut incipit, aut desinit; sed omnia talia dicuntur
de illo quod est per illud esse, et non de ipso esse") Oohannis Capreoli, Defensionestheologiae
diviThomaeAquinatis, ed. C. Paban etT. Pegues [furonibus: Alfred Cattier, 1900], 1:327a).
See my paper, "Capreolus, saint Thomas et l'Etre," in Jean Capreolus et son temps
1380-1444 Colloque de Rodez [special number, no. 1 of Memoire dominicaine],ed. Guy
Bedouelle, Romanus Cessario, and Kevin White (Paris: Cerf, 1997), 77-86.
51 There is a most interesting text in Quodl. 7, q. 4, a. 3 [10] (Leonine ed.; Rome:
Commissio Leonina; Paris: Cerf, 1996), t. 25/1, pp. 22-24. Thomas is asked whether God can
bring it about that whiteness or any other corporeal quality exist without quantity. He
answers that God could do it. One must distinguish, in any quality, between the nature
through which it obtains a specific character and the individuation by which it is this sensible

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LAWRENCEDEWAN, O.P.

And in this way there is individuation in separate substances, which are
forms having esse, and in the first cause itself, which is esse subsisting.52

What could be clearer? Thomas has ample opportunity to bring
in "esse as such"; he does not do so at all.
There is, then, a "global" theory of the individual in St.
Thomas's doctrine, namely, that something does not have a
nature such as to be received in something. In corporeal things,
this derives from the matter. In subsisting forms, the form itself
whiteness distinct from that other sensible whiteness. God could, by a miracle, bring it about
that the nature subsist without any quantity, but that whiteness would not be this sensible
whiteness; it would be an intelligible form, something like the separate forms which Plato
posited. However, that this individuated sensiblewhiteness be without quantity is something
that cannot be brought about. In the reply to objection 1, he describes the hypothetical
miraculously separate whiteness as "a spiritual, not a corporeal, quality."
In this relatively early text, Thomas reserves the word "individuation" for the sensible
whiteness, as found in dimensive quantity, whereas our present text presents as individual the
hypothetical whiteness itself subsisting, and speaks of "individuation" regarding subsistent
form.
52 Ed. Saffrey, p. 65, line 16-p. 66, line 7:
Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est quod aliquid dicitur esse
individuum ex hoc quod non est natum esse in multis; nam universale
est quod est natum esse in multis.
Quod autem aliquid non sit natum esse in multis hoc potest
contingere dupliciter.
Uno modo per hoc quod est determinatum ad aliquid unum in quo
est, sicut albedo per rationem suae speciei nata est esse in multis, sed
haec albedo quae est recepta in hoc subiecto, non potest esse nisi in
hoc. lste autem modus non potest procedere in infinitum, quia non est
procedere in causis formalibus et materialibus in infinitum, ut probatur
in II Metaphysicae;
unde oportet devenire ad aliquid quod non est natum recipi in
aliquo et ex hoc habet individuationem, sicut materia prima in rebus
corporalibus quae est principium singularitatis. Unde oportet quod
omne illud quod [p. 66] non est natum esse in aliquo, ex hoc ipso sit
individuum; et hie est secundus modus quo aliquid non est natum esse
in multis, quia scilicet non est natum esse in aliquo, sicut, si albedo
esset separata sine subiecto existens, esset per hunc modum individua.
Et hoc modo est individuatio in substantiis separatis quae sunt
formae habentes esse, et in ipsa causa prima quae est ipsum esse
subsistens.
Cf. Guagliardo, pp. 72-73.

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423

(not the esse) has the requisite nature. In God, the esse -itself is of
such a nature as to subsist. "The individual" is analogically
common, or is divided into modes.
Thus far I have said nothing about the role of quantity in
individuation. I have focused rather on the mode of being of the
subsisting thing, which obviously cannot stem from quantity or
any accident. In earlier texts Thomas treats individuation as a
kind of package, focusing on the multiplication of beings in the
same species.53 How are the instances of human nature distinct
one from the other? The answer lies neither in form just in itself
nor in matter just in itself, but in matter as subject to dimensive
quantity. Dimensive quantity is presented as following upon the
substantial form, corporeity, a substantial form which is present
in all matter. This general doctrine is never abandoned by
Thomas, but in later presentations it is more carefully
distinguished from the primary metaphysical issue, the mode of
being of the subsisting thing. 54 Dimension serves to limit a form
which can be in many, so that it still has "being in," but has being
in one only. Primary matter serves to remove altogether the
aspect of "being in." This distinction of the two issues is clearest
in STh III, q. 77, a. 2, on whether the dimensive quantity of the
bread or the wine is the subject of the other accidents in the

53 The fundamental
work here is that of Roland-Gosselin mentioned earlier.
Roland-Gosselin (105 n. 2), hunting for discussions of individuation in the first book of the
Sentences commentary, tells us that we have the doctrine of the multiplication of individuals
in a species by "division of matter" in I Sent., d. 9, q. 1, a. 2 (Mandonnet, 248-49). Notice
that we are talking here about the problem of multiplication, and not merely of "not being
in something."
54 I notice that De Pot., q. 9, a. 5, ad 13 gives us the two aspects that I think Thomas
eventually sees have to be carefully distinguished. Notice that in this text the individating
principles are called the "principium subsistendi." This seems right to me, and not the
somewhat Boethian doctrine in STh I, q. 29, a. 2, ad 5. But I cannot deal with that here.
I notice that in Quodl. 2, q. 2, a. 2 [4], on the distinction between nature and supposit in
angels, supposedly a later text, Thomas holds that the angel's nature is not individuated by
matter, but by itself: because such a form is not of a nature to be received in some matter.
However, there is a distinction between nature and supposit, since things are predicated of
the supposit which cannot be predicated of the nature as such. This line of thinking strikes
me as more akin to the earlier approach to individuation, tending to distinguish between
individuation and subsistence. The later view makes subsistence the primary individuation.

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sacrament of the Eucharist. 55 We have seen it above, also, in the
text from the In De causis. I believe that this distinction of issues
is crucial for understanding Thomas on the individual and
individuation.
In the present paper my main objectives have been (1) to
criticize the association of individuation with the act of being,
taken precisely as such; and (2) to show a truly global approach,
on Thomas's part, to the individual as such, the individual
conceived as a mode of being. Enough has been said to alert the
reader of Thomas to the fact that in diverse levels of being there
are diverse "principles" of individuation.

ss The doctrine in STh III, q. 77, a. 2 is the same as in the In De causis. I have used the
latter only because I have actually encountered readers who object to the "theological"
character of the former.

The Thomist 63 (1999): 425-37

THE SPIRIT AND THE LIMITS OF
PRUDENTIAL REASONING 1
CHRISTOPHER].THOMPSON
University of St. Thomas
St. Paul, Minnesota

H

UMAN FULFILLMENT finds its fullest expression in an
eternal friendship with God; such a relationship of friendship, while only completely achieved in the next life,
nonetheless plays a constitutive role in moral reasoning in this
one.
While one might regard what is asserted in the previous paragraph as a simple truism among Thomists, it has nonetheless
recently come under fire in Thomistic scholarship. The aim of this
paper is to address that challenge. The thesis I develop here is
simple and twofold: first, that our friendship with God, as spoken
of under the general notion of "beatitude," is a constitutive component of the moral life; second, that it is St. Thomas's doctrine
of the gifts of the Holy Spirit, the specific indwelling of the Holy
Spirit in the baptized individual, that completes his portrait of
moral decision making. The two aspects of the thesis are related
in that Aquinas's reflections on the gifts of the Holy Spirit supply
a much-needed answer to those interpreters of Aquinas who wish
to minimize the significance of beatitude, or friendship with
Christ, in moral discernment. In sum, the central questions to be
addressed here concern the nature and extent of beatitude ill
Christian moral reflection.
It would seem that beatitude does not play a central role in the
Christian moral life, for a number of reasons. In a recent work,
1 A draft of this paper was delivered at the Missouri Valley Association of Catholic
Theologians, St. Louis, Missouri (Fall, 1998).

425

426

CHRISTOPHER]. THOMPSON

Pamela Hall notes that within her broader account of St.
Thomas's discussion of Christian morality she hopes to argue that
"human prudence cannot steer itself by referring to God as ultimate end, since this is an end of which we do not have sufficient
apprehension here and now." 2 Citing a Thomistic truism regarding the ineffability of the divine essence, Hall suggests that such
an essence cannot function in any useful way in matters of moral
reflection, for one cannot have as one's normative end something
that is utterly incomprehensible.
The claim that divine friendship cannot serve as an end upon
which prudential reasoning might rely seems, despite its initial
plausibility, to fly in the face of all of those well-known passages
in which charity, as precisely that virtue of friendship with God,
is the central virtue, indeed the root virtue of the Christian moral
life. Hall recognizes the primacy of charity in St. Thomas's account, yet reminds her readers that charity is a virtue principally
related to the will, not the intellect. 3 Since charity is related to the
will, and prudence is a virtue of the practical intellect, charity is
unable to illuminate in any constitutive way moral decision making. As Hall says, "Thus an important problem arises: in practical
reasoning we cannot use as a guide an end which we do not-and
cannot-apprehend. " 4
And yet this thesis seems again to fly in the face of St.
Thomas's insistence on the total interior transformation of the
baptized person who now participates in the new law of grace-a
new law that is precisely characterized as one that facilitates a
reformation of the interior life.
Hall recognizes this importance of the new law of grace when
she says, "what the New Law [of grace] contributes uniquely to
morality is a new characterization of morality's end: intimate
union with God, "5 but tempers the function of this intimate union
by noting that the life of infused virtue does not "require a

2 Pamela Hall, Narrative and the Natural Law (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1994), 20.
3 Ibid., 75.
4 Ibid., 79.
5 Ibid., 88.

PRUDENTIAL REASONING

427

cognitive grasp of an end higher than natural reason can
provide. " 6
It is not readily clear, however, how infused prudence,
animated by a newly discovered intimate union with God, does
not require any further grasp than that supplied by natural
reason. Surely the mortal sinner, though he may enjoy a natural
knowledge of God's existence, is at a disadvantage in the exercise
of infused prudence. Hall herself indicates some problems in her
reading of St. Thomas along such lines and in a footnote admits
some difficulties in her analysis.7
Hall's conundrums about the place of God in the Christian
moral life emerge from premises that seem initially true: God is
incomprehensible; an incomprehensible end cannot serve as a
practical end (even for prudence which may be infused); and
charity, while essential in the Christian moral life, is nonetheless
noncognitive in thrust. The question remains: what good is God
in living the moral life?
Followers of Hall's work may rightly note that her reflections
are not limited to the ineffability of God or the noncognitive
status of charity; rather, Hall's overall efforts are an attempt to
defend the enduring significance of the natural law, and especially
the natural inclinationes, even as these are subsumed into, and
indeed help fill in our understanding of, the new law of grace. But
an appeal to natural law is not without its problems. For the
natural law, as is well known by all students of St. Thomas, lends
itself to greater frequency of defect as one descends into the
particulars. Hence, "With respect to particular conclusions come
to by the practical reason there is no general unanimity about
what is true or right, and even when there is agreement there is
not the same degree of recognition" (STh I-II, q. 94, a. 4). 8
Here, it seems, one finds yet another reason that beatitude or
friendship with Christ is essentially impotent in matters of practical reasoning, since even infused prudence, taken up as it is with
6 Ibid., 83.
7 Ibid., 140 n. 108.

Summa Theologiaewill be
taken from the Blackfriars translation, Thomas Gilby, O.P., and T. C. O'Brien, O.P., eds.
(London: Eyre & Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1966).
8 All Latin citations as well as the English translations of the

428

CHRISTOPHER]. THOMPSON

the task of application and implementation of the natural law, not
only lacks a sufficient grasp of God as friend, but lacks a sufficient
precision concerning the matters of particulars. In other words,
it is not only its dependence upon an ineffable God that makes
the exercise of infused prudence problematic in matters of living
the Christian life. Rather it is the very nature of prudential
reasoning itself as functioning among the vicissitudes of the
human condition that makes it fundamentally limited. While one
could solve the problems of the noncognitive character of charity
by noting that one receives in addition to charity the infused
intellectual virtue of prudence, prudence itself seems especially
limited in its ability to secure certain judgments regarding
particulars.
This notion about the limits of prudential reasoning extends
beyond Hall's efforts specifically, bringing us closer to another
influential interpreter of Aquinas, Jean Porter. Porter is the principal source for many of Hall's reflections and extends the critique
of St. Thomas even further.
In The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for
Christian Ethics, Porter supplies one of the clearest examples of
this kind of reading of Aquinas with the following remark.
The supernatural end of human life as such cannot be the subject of direct
knowledge for creatures such as ourselves, since it consists in direct union with
the God who is utterly inaccessible to our conceptual knowledge. For this
reason, it cannot directly serve as the goal by which we evaluate our actions,
since we cannot orient our practical reason by a goal that we cannot conceive.
We can know something about the moral content, so to speak, of the life of
grace. Otherwise, Aquinas could not have detailed the moral qualities
associated with the theological virtues as he does. But that knowledge is based
on our observation of graced lives, interpreted in the light of doctrine and
natural moral wisdom, and does not-could not-derive from our knowledge
of the qualities of the beatific vision toward which the graced life is directed. 9

As is evident, Porter supplies the essential thrust of Hall's
observations concerning the impotence of beatitude in prudential
reasoning. How might one begin to respond?

9 Jean Porter, The Recovery of Virtue: The Relevance of Aquinas for Christian Ethics
(Louisville: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1990), 66.

PRUDENTIAL REASONING

429

One can begin with the claim in the opening sentence, that "it
[our supernatural end] consists in direct union with the God who
is utterly inaccessible to our conceptual knowledge." This
"inaccessible" nature of God, as Porter states, or the lack of a
"sufficient apprehension" or "cognitive grasp," as Hall says, is the
lynchpin for much of their reflections, and deserves special
attention.
It is not clear what Porter and Hall mean by such terms, but
lacking sufficient clarity one might still begin to formulate a
response. If "cognitive grasp" or "conceptual knowledge" is taken
to mean a kind of comprehensive knowledge of God, then God
indeed does escape that kind of knowledge, even in the next life.
But it in no way follows that such knowledge is essential for
illuminating prudential reasoning. "Eudaimonia," as is well
known, supplies a sufficient end for guiding one's prudential
reasoning in the Aristotelian tradition, yet it is not at all clear that
one must require a complete knowledge of its conditions in order
for it to supply a sufficient end for prudential reasoning.
Moreover, while it may be true that by grace we are united to
God as "one who is unknown" (STh I, q. 12, a. 13, ad 1), this
unknowability pertains to the divine essence in its fullness, and in
no way suggests that this notion of the unknowability of God
severs its effective relationship to the living of the Christian moral
life. St. Thomas's apophaticism is not agnosticism. Thus while it
is true that no one can fully comprehend the divine essence, even
in the next life in the full state of beatitude, it is not at all accurate
to say that God is an end which is completely uncognized. Later
on, when we discuss the significance of the infused virtues and
especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit, we will see that St. Thomas
speaks of a kind of connatural knowledge, and will speak of our
fellowship with God as afamiliaris conversatio (STh 1-11, q. 65, a.
5). The incomprehensibility of the divine essence does not banish
God to the regions of moral irrelevance. Rather, St. Thomas
insists that the blessed "see" the essence of God (STh I, q. 12, a.
1), in an intellectual manner (STh I, q. 12, a. 3), through a
supernatural disposition added to the created intellect-the lumen
gloriae (STh I, q. 12, a. 5)-though in a limited fashion.

430

CHRISTOPHER]. THOMPSON

Hall and Porter might respond that such a relationship exists
only in beatitude, not in this life, and thus the objection still
remains. But it should be noted that while the beatific vision is the
reward of the blessed, as comprehensores, in the next
we
nonetheless enjoy an intimate relationship with God as friend
along the way, as viatores. Moreover, Aquinas makes explicit
exceptions to the general rule concerning the limitations of our
knowledge of God and argues elsewhere that St. Paul as well as
contemplatives in a heightened state indeed "see" the divine
essence (cf. STh I, q. 12, a. 11, ad 2; 11-11, q. 175, a. 3; 11-11, q.
180, a. 5). In this heightened state of contemplation, St. Thomas
argues, the person occupies a kind of middle state between the
present life and the life to come. As such it would be wrong to
overstate, as Hall and Porter seem to have done, the distinctions
between our knowledge of God in the state of perfect beatitude
in the next life and our imperfect knowledge of that same God,
however darkened, in this one. God is not so unknowable as
some would contend.
Another mode of response to this apparent deconstruction of
St. Thomas would focus on the account of his doctrine of charity.
What can one say about the noncognitive status of charity and its
relationship to the living of the Christian moral life? If Hall and
Porter are right to recognize that charity is a virtue whose subject
is the will, then how precisely as an essentially nonintellectual
virtue can it be said to illuminate the moral life, especially in that
the essential virtue of prudence is fundamentally intellectual in
character? While the gap may have been closed in our earlier
conversation between our limited selves and the unknowable
character of God, a fissure nonethdess remains within the person
between one's love for God as a matter of the will and the
demands of the moral life as a matter of practical reasoning. A
relationship with the "unknown God" of Christ, though now no
longer an impossibility, remains nonetheless impotent in matters
of morality. As Porter states in a different context, "Thomas'
moral theology presupposes that the content of morality [of the
moral life] can be derived from independent, non-theological
grounds ... [and] that the moral life exists quite well without
special doctrinal underpinnings ... and is intelligible in its own

PRUDENTIALREASONING

431

terms." 10 Beatitude remains essentially irrelevant in moral
reasoning.
One may respond by noting that while charity is properly
related to the will, it is nonetheless part of a trilogy of theological
virtues, one of which (the theological virtue of faith) is precisely
intellectual in thrust. Saint Thomas asks explicitly whether charity
can be had without faith or hope (STh 1-11, q. 65, a. 5) and
answers in the negative, arguing that the essential character of
charity, namely friendship, would be absurd without the attending virtues of believing and hoping in that friend. It should be
noted, too, that the reverse is possible; one can have a kind of
faith and hope, though imperfect, without charity. And thus while
the grasp of love surpasses the reach of knowledge, love does not
abandon all knowing, but indeed points the way-as charity alone
remains in beatitude while faith and hope pass away.
Still, one may counter this observation by recognizing that
while the virtue of faith indeed may accompany all instances of
authentic charity, faith is principally concerned with the higher
truths about God, and thus is essentially speculative in nature.
Thus while it appears that the impassable gulf between charity
and the practical life has been bridged, the impasse is not yet
resolved in that beatitude must penetrate further into the recesses
of the person's life, down from the lofty heights of speculation
and into the more sordid details of the practical life. Friendship
with Christ may indeed be more encompassing than a mere
affective movement of the soul, as St. Thomas's understanding of
faith as an intellectual virtue may suggest, but the moral life is
lived in the details; the light of beatitude does not seem to
penetrate that darkness.
Yet, if grace perfects nature, it would seem that the grace of the
theological virtues can effect an even more radical transformation
of the human person. Friendship with Christ not only can
embolden the will and illuminate one's speculative understanding,
but can, indeed should, penetrate the practical intellect, shedding
light on one's obligations here and now, in this particular
moment. Saint Thomas is determined to illustrate this very point.
10 Jean Porter, "Desire for God: Ground of the Moral Life in Aquinas," Theological
Studies 47 (1986): 65.

432

CHRISTOPHER). THOMPSON

Indeed I would argue that the development of St. Thomas's
thought in the Secunda Pars illuminates this very claim: that
Christ transforms every aspect of ourselves not simply in a kind
of generic, noncognitive way but in practical matters as well. In
an effort to account for this total transformation of the Christian,
St. Thomas argues that along with the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity, one is given all of the infused moral virtues as
well. To live only the theological virtues without the full
complement of the other infused moral virtues would be to live
the life of the stunted child, innocent from the perspective of the
end, yet immature from the perspective of the way.
The nature and function of the infused virtues are not always
dear; yet one must not underestimate their significance in St.
Thomas's account of the moral life. The infused virtues are ordered toward an end that is distinct from that of their natural,
acquired counterparts, and so are considered to be of a different
species from the latter (STh 1-11, q. 63, a. 4). Moreover, they do
not stand in the same manner of the natural virtues in regard to
the mean (STh 1-11, q. 64, a. 4), nor do they mimic the natural
virtues in their development or diminution; they can be gained or
destroyed in a single act (STh 1-11, q. 63, a. 2). St. Thomas's
insistence on the place of the infused virtues within the moral life
is enough to give one pause when scholars are found to be
claiming that God does not function as the goal by which we
orient our practical lives. What are the infused virtues if not those
qualities of one who is capable of ordering his practical life
toward God as friend?
A steadfast interlocutor might continue to argue that St.
Thomas's account of faith, though coupled with charity and the
attending infused virtues, remains nonetheless speculative, in that
it pertains to higher things. Hence while infused virtue seems to
offer some kind of penetration into the practical affairs (in that it
entails prudence), not even infused prudence can be sufficiently
bolstered in practical matters by an insight which remains
speculative. Nor can the natural law be of assistance to infused
prudence, since even an infused sense of the natural law seems
unable to span the seemingly infinite void of particularity.

PRUDENTIALREASONING

433

For example, in an altogether different context and yet with
the similar aim of circumscribing the scope of prudential reasoning, Jean Porter cites STh 11-11, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3, which concerns
why there is no such thing as a "speculative" prudence and says
the following:
In order to fully appreciate the significance of this passage, it is necessary to
realize that prudence, for Aquinas, is an intellectual virtue, grounded in the
practical intellect by which the agent is enabled to choose and act in
accordance with the rational principles of human action (ST I-II 57.5; II-II
47.2). The upshot of this passage is that there is no determinate way to move

from the rational principlesof human action to a specificchoice of a concrete
action. We find a similar sense of the limitations of practical reasoning in
Aquinas' discussion of the precepts of the natural law. 11

As an aside it should be noted that the discussion under question
pertains to the indeterminate, open-textured character of
consilium, not the electio or the imperium, an oversight that is
relevant to Porter's account. Nonetheless, for this discussion it is
enough to note that her point about the nonscientific character of
prudential reasoning holds. As Aristotle reminds us, phronesis is
not episteme; there remains an open-textured character to one's
moral discernment concerning the variety of options for prudent
action.
Does this flexible character of prudence lend itself to the kind
of readings we have found here? I would suggest that it does not;
moreover, Aquinas seems aware of this very element of prudential
reasoning and seeks specific ways to address these concerns. More
precisely, his account of the theological virtues and the gifts of the
Holy Spirit seem especially tailored to closing any such gaps in
the Christian moral life.
First, St. Thomas says that faith, while it is principally
speculative in that it is directed toward God as the First Truth, is
nonetheless practical in its extension in that the First Truth is also
our last end of all our actions and desires. It is, St. Thomas says,
invoking the words of St. Paul (in Galatians), a faith that is not
merely speculative, but one that works through love (STh 11-11, q.
11 Jean Porter, Moral Action and Christian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), 98; emphasis added.

434

CHRISTOPHER J. THOMPSON

4, a. 2, ad 3). As Romanus Cessario, 0. P., says, "The theological
virtue of faith, then, unites the believer to everything which God
discloses about Christian life. In short, there exist no purely
speculative truths of revelation. Every truth ... contributes to the
perfection of the moral life." 12
Second, the theological virtues are accompanied by still
another mode of divine relationship: namely, the gifts of the Holy
Spirit. 13 As necessary for salvation and accompanying all of the
theological virtues, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are those activities
of the divine life whereby the human person is made amenable to
the prompting of the Holy Spirit. Like his discussion of the
infused theological virtues, this dimension of St. Thomas's analysis is one more component of his attempt to demonstrate the radical transformation of the person as the new creature in Christ
precisely in this life. Far from being a mere regulative, though
inert, ideal of moral reasoning, the "vision" or knowledge of God
as friend expresses not merely the promise of future possession,
but the actual, though imperfect, union of the believer with God
in this life. Friendship with the incomprehensible God has begun
in the ordinary, practical life of the believer, though it is
completed in the life to come; despite being "under construction"
it nonetheless plays a constitutive role for us, the viatores of the
Christian life. God moves the believer directly not merely as a
remote final cause but cooperatively in his specific actions.
In the Secunda Secundae, St. Thomas allies the gifts to the
particular infused virtues. 14 The theological virtue of faith is
12 Romanus Cessario, 0.P., The Moral Virtues and Theological Ethics (Notre Dame:
University of Notfe Dame Press, 1991), 69.
13 St. Thomas addresses the nature and function of the gifts specifically in STh I-II, q. 68.
In the Secunda Secundae, he treats each of the seven gifts in its relationship to the infused
moral and theological virtues. Recent treatments of St. Thomas's account of the gifts include
Romanus Cessario, 0. P., Christian Faith and the Theological Life (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1996), especially chap. 5; Benedict M. Ashley, O.P.,
Thomas Aquinas: The Gifts of the Spirit (Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1995); Paul
Wadell, Friends of God: Virtues and Gifts in Aquinas (New York: Peter Lang, 1991); Jordan
Aumann, 0.P., Spiritual Theology (Huntington, Ind.: Our Sunday Visitor Press, 1979);
Antonio Royo, O.P., and Jordan Aumann, O.P., The Theology of Christian Perfection
(Dubuque, Iowa: The Priory Press, 1962).
14 For a discussion of St. Thomas's treatment of the gifts of the Holy Spirit in the Summa
Theologiae, see Edward D. O'Connor, C.S.C., "Appendix 4: The Gifts of the Spirit," pp.
110-30, in vol. 24 of the Blackfriars translation of the Summa.

PRUDENTIAL REASONING

435

wedded both to the gift of knowledge and to the gift of understanding. In both instances St. Thomas explicitly indicates that the
gift is understood to have practical import (STh II-II, q. 8, a. 3;
II-II, q. 9, a. 3). It is as if St. Thomas is determined to demonstrate the total transformation of the Christian's life; Christ will
not abandon the believer in his moment of Christian witness.
Moreover, it should be noted that St. Thomas yokes the gift of
wisdom to charity. With this decision, he seems to advance two
issues related to our project here. First, he recognizes in the
fullness of charity a distinctly intellectual component. Thus while
charity as a theological virtue may be said to reside in the will, in
the fullness of the Christian life it finds its complement in wisdom
(STh II-II, q. 45, a. 2). Second, St. Thomas explicitly affirms that
this gift, unlike its more secular counterpart, has practical import
especially. Since the gift is derived from a union with God that is
especially intimate, "by a kind of union of the soul with Him, it
is able to direct us not only in contemplation but also in action"
(STh II-II, q. 45, a. 3).
Finally, some attention needs to be given to prudential
reasoning. Prudence entails three aspects or moments in its
operation, all pertaining to issues concerning the means of
obtaining the ends already established. In its infused mode, it is
concerned with means that pertain to our supernatural end, life
with God as friend. In this case, the theological virtues of faith,
hope, and charity as well as their attendant gifts are especially
relevant as they supply a kind of connaturality or affinity with the
ends of prudential reasoning (as well as indirectly illuminating the
particulars surrounding the means of our perfection, as indicated
earlier). Technically speaking, prudential reasoning is an opportunity for the viatores, not the comprehensores, who have
achieved the end to which all decision is directed. 15
Counsel, or consilium, is that gift of the Holy Spirit particularly allied to prudence and identifies the activity of discerning
the proper means available to the agent who desires to achieve a
particular end. Aquinas's account of counsel in its supernatural
mode seems especially tailored to address any objection that
15 Cf. Thomas Gilby, 0. P., "Appendix 5: The Subordination of Morals," pp. 142-46 in
vol. 18 of the Blackfriars translation of the Summa.

436

CHRISTOPHER]. THOMPSON

would suggest a kind of inherent impotence in matters of
particulars. One may recall the notion that natural law, as it
extends to particular cases, loses some of its explanatory force in
supplying a rationale for particular actions. When such reasoning
is then guided by an end of which there seems to be no sufficient
apprehension (as Porter and Hall have suggested) a Christian
inspired prudential reasoning seems especially vague in practical
affairs.
And yet I have already identified the ways in which the ends
or principles of Christian moral reasoning may be sufficiently
grasped. Now in dosing it is important to note that Aquinas fills
in the gap in matters concerning the means to various ends and
the particulars as well. Citing counsel as a necessary gift of the
Holy Spirit which aids in the exercise of infused prudential
reasoning, he specifically notes,
Prudence or well-advisedness, whether acquired by practice or shed on us by
grace, directs us in our searchings into matters that our minds can grasp, and
enables us to be of good counsel for ourselves or for others. Yet the outcome
of our mind's inability to grasp all individual and contingent events that can
possibly happen is that the thoughts of mortal men are fearful and our counsels
uncertain. (Wisdom 9.14) Consequently we need in our searchings the
guidance of God, who knows all things. This comes through the gift of counsel,
whereby we are guided by the advice, as it were, of God. 16

The human mind may not be able to grasp all of the particulars
or the contingents, even in the exercise of infused prudence. But
God is able to grasp the particulars and communicates through
the gift of counsel the appropriate means (available here and
now) to the agent's supernatural end.
It is clear that what might plague the open-ended character of
Aristotelian prudential reasoning, namely, its apparent impotence
16 STh II-II, q. 52, a. 1, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo. Dicendum quod prudentia vel eubulia,
sive sit acquisita sive sit infusa, diriget hominem in inquisitione consilii secundum ea quae
ratio comprehendere potest; unde homo per prudentiam vel eubuliam fit bene consilians vel
sibi vel alii. Sed quia humana ratio non potest comprehendere singularia et contingentia quae
occurrere possunt, fit quod 'cogitationes mortalium sunt timidae, et incertae providentiae
nostrae,' ut dicitur Sap. IX. Ideo indiget homo in inquisitione consilii dirigi a Deo, qui omnia
comprehendit. Quod fit per donum consilii, per quod homo dirigitur quasi consilio a Deo
accepto."

PRUDENTIAL REASONING

437

in matters of grasping the singular instance, is not problematic for
the Christian conscience. The baptized, free from mortal sin and
alive in the Holy Spirit, have an ally the non-Christian Aristotelian does not. God enters the life of the Christian in its
minutest details, shaping it for the achievement of beatitude down
to the finest of particulars. Beatitude is neither inaccessible in its
essential outlines nor does that friend, the divine Person, from
whom such friendship finds its origins, abandon us at the critical
moments of decision making. Friendship with Christ is not some
generic concept formulating only the vaguest of simple volitions
or unthematic intentions; it is that personal resource the Christian
agent draws upon in the interiority of his heart, where he draws
upon the Lord for counsel in matters of particular actions. We
can know the moral content of the life of grace not, pace Porter,
through the mere "observation of graced lives," but through our
own participation-full, vigorous, and intimate-in the life of
Christ. This evangelical character of Thomistic prudential
reasoning is an essential feature of St. Thomas's portrait of the
moral life and resolves many of the ambiguities of contemporary
interpretations.
In conclusion, one sees that only a fuller treatment of St.
Thomas's account, a treatment that recognizes the nature and
importance of the trilogy of theological virtues, the role of the
infused moral virtues, and especially the gifts of the Holy Spirit,
provides a complete account of the one taken up with the
mandate to live the Christian moral life. By the Spirit we are led
to see, if only darkly, that practical form of everyday life whereby
we are drawn closer to our ultimate perfection in beatitude.

The Thomist 63 (1999): 439-53

LYING AND SPEAKING YOUR INTERLOCUTOR'S
LANGUAGE 1
ALEXANDERR. PRUSS
Universityof Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh,Pennsylvania

INTRODUCTION

G

IVEN ITS CONSTANT preoccupation with the Church's
stance on sexual issues, it is not surprising that the media
have missed a controversy over lying in the Catechism of
the Catholic Church. In the first English version [CCC1], the
Catechism stated:
Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act
against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the right to know
the truth. (U483)

This formulation of the moral prohibition to lie is exactly the
same one as Kant roundly criticized in his 1799 essay "On a
Supposed Right to Lie because of Philanthropic Concerns." Kant
gave two criticisms. First, he denied that there was a possibility of
a right to truth: for Kant it appears that rights are things that can
be achieved through the will of the person possessing the right,
and it is not always possible to come to true conclusions. Second,
Kant claimed that
an intentionally untruthful declaration to another man ... always harms
another; if not some other human being, then it nevertheless does harm to
humanity in general, inasmuch as it vitiates the very source of right
[Rechtsquelle].(426)
1 I am most grateful to Abigail Tardiff for fascinating discussions on this topic. In
particular, I am indebted to her for so aptly characterizing the basic idea from which this
paper evolved as: "speaking [your interlocutor's] language." Without her contribution, the
paper might have never been written.

439

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ALEXANDERR. PRUSS

The very source of right is rationality, and an untruthful declaration is directed against rationality.
But one can also make another criticism of the CCC1's
principle against lying. To say that it is wrong "to speak or act
against the truth in order to lead into error someone who has the
right to know the truth" is a merely analytic truth, a tautology,
since its validity follows from the very meaning of the word
"right" in "right to know the truth." Evidently one may not act
against someone's right-this is what the word "right" means.
Thus the CCC1 formulation, while not false, is trivial. Moreover,
it does not accurately reflect the full strength of the traditional
prohibitions against lying in the Catholic Church. Perhaps for
these as well as other reasons, the recently released second
English version of the Catechism [CCC2] states instead:
Lying is the most direct offense against the truth. To lie is to speak or act
against the truth in order to lead someone into error.

This formulation is free of our and Kant's criticisms of the CCC1
principle, but now it becomes open to criticisms to the effect that
it is too strong. After all, if one is hiding Jews in one's basement
and the Gestapo asks whether one has Jews in one's basement,
then one might think that to fail to deny the presence of Jews in
one's basement is wrong. Obviously, remaining silent is not an
option since in this case dearly silentium affirmatio est.2 Nor is
any kind of equivocation (equivocation, an assertion of a true
claim that one expects to be misunderstood by the interlocutor,
though it is not dear if
might be compatible with CCC2's
it agrees with Kant's views) a reasonable option (one might well
imagine that the Gestapo insists on an unambiguous yes or no
answer). Kant appears committed to biting the bullet and saying
that there are Jews in his basement. We will argue that in this
case, and perhaps in a few similar cases, both on Kantian grounds
and on the grounds of the CCC2, it is acceptable to say to the
Gestapo, in a dear voice, "No, there are no Jews in my house."
Indeed, we will argue the further claim that to say, ''Yes, there are

2 Or at least, silentium has the same end result as affinnatio.

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441

Jews in my house," would be to lie. We will use this particular
example throughout the argument.
Before we come to the solution, we shall have to examine an
important issue of language. Our general approach will be
inspired by the method of examples and counterexamples so
popular in analytic philosophy, a method ultimately tracing itself
back to the Socratic method of what Aristotle calls "induction
[epagoge]" and which proceeds by proferring a number of cases,
allowing the listener to grasp the general principle.
I. SPEAKING YOUR INTERLOCUfOR'S LANGUAGE

First, consider a rather straightforward case.
Dietrich, a German, is visiting John, an American, in New York. They are
sitting in a cafe. Dietrich knows very well that John is expecting to be spoken
to in English, and Dietrich also knows English quite well. He puts an attractive
unlabelled bottle of poison on the table before John, and says: "Gift." John
takes the bottle with gratitude, and later at home drinks it and dies. What John
did not know is that Dietrich uttered the word "Gift" in German, in which it
means "poison."

Dietrich has not only murdered John, he has lied to him. That
"Gift" means poison in German in no way excuses Dietrich from
the charge of lying, because Dietrich knew that John would interpret the utterance as an English word rather than as a German
word. To speak one language deceitfully when your interlocutor
is expecting another is to lie, because a basic principle of human
language is that one speak in ways that one expects the interlocutor to understand.
In fact, one could say that all human discourse happens in a
single superlanguage, which has a grammar that subsumes the
grammars of all the individual languages. The superlanguage's
grammar and syntax in particular governs discourse in multiple
languages, and describes the normative universal human practice
of linguistic communication. It is a grammatico-syntactic feature
of the superlanguage that in the context of the Dietrich-John
story the meaning of the utterance "Gift" is the English one,
because the context determines that syntactically (in superlanguage syntax) the word is to be understood in English. Thus,

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ALEXANDERR. PRUSS

Dietrich has lied in the superlanguage. He has made the utterance
"Gift" in a context in which it does not truly apply.
Now consider a case that is a little more complicated. This case
trades on the interesting linguistic fact that the Polish word
zapomniec (to forget) has the exact opposite meaning to its
Russian cognate zapomnyet' (to commit to memory). 3
Natasha, a Russian, is visiting her friend Artur, a Pole, in Warsaw. Natasha
knows Polish pretty well. On the last day of the visit, she asks Artur to give her
best regards to some Poles that she knows but whom she did not have time to
meet. She tells Artur their names. However, Artur forgets all the names. An
hour later, she asks Artur in Polish: "Do you know the names of all the people
to whom I asked you to give my kind regards?" Artur does not wish to admit
that he has forgotten the names, and he knows that not remembering the names
is a good excuse for him not to have to talk to certain people to whom he does
not wish to talk. He answers, also in Polish: "Zapomnialem wszystkie
nazwiska." This is perfectly good Polish, and it means, "I have forgotten all the
names." Natasha knows, and Artur knows that she knows, that this is spoken
in Polish. However, Artur also knows that Natasha will misunderstand
"Zapomnialem" to mean "I have committed to memory," because the Russian
cognate of the Polish verb used here means "To commit to memory." Thus,
Artur knows that Natasha will understand him to have said, "I have committed
all the names to memory."

Here, Artur has lied to Natasha. Yet unlike Dietrich's interlocutor, Natasha knows in what language she is being spoken to. We
propose the following analysis of why we can say that Artur has
lied to Natasha. In addition to the broader dividing lines between
individual languages such as Polish, Russian, German, and English, there are finer dialectal divisions within the individual languages. But even in addition to these dialectal divisions, there are
cases where small groups might adopt a variant linguistic form.
Thus, one can imagine a pair of English speakers who have
decided, for fun, that whenever they are speaking to each other,
they will interchange the meanings of the words "cat" and "dog."
These two people are speaking a somewhat different language
from standard English. Now, what Natasha is speaking is in fact
not Polish, but what we might call "Ruspolish," namely, that dia3 And, even more curiously, the Polish opposite to zapomnieC, namely zapami(tac (to
commit to memory), has as its Russian cognate the archaic/colloquial word zapamyatovat'
which means "to forget."

LYING AND THE INTERLOCITTOR'S LANGUAGE

443

lect of Polish which is spoken by a Russian who has not studied
the dangers of Polish-Russian falsely friendly cognates. Given that
Artur knows that Natasha expects to be spoken to in Ruspolish
(though she herself would call it "Polish"), Artur's utterance is a
lie. Superlanguage rules require that you speak in a language that
your interlocutor will understand. In the superlanguage context,
given Artur's knowledge of Natasha's expectation to be spoken to
in Ruspolish, Artur's statement, "Zapomnialem wszystkie
nazwiska," must be taken to be a Ruspolish statement, meaning,
"I have committed all the names to memory," and hence is false
and, indeed, a lie.
Thus, the present case is in fact exactly the same as the
Dietrich-John case, with the exception that Natasha does not
know that her language (Ruspolish) deviates from standard
Polish. But this exception does not make Artur's deceit any less of
a lie.
The strong anti-lying principle is that making a false assertion
in order to lead someone into error is wrong. The question then
arises in the above cases of how utterances are to be understood
as assertions; the right answer appears to be that assertions in
multilinguistic contexts are governed by certain partly contextual
superlanguage rules. The anti-lying principle in multilinguistic
contexts then says that you may not utter an assertion which you
believe to be false when understood in your interlocutor's language
(i.e., the language in which your interlocutor will take your
assertion to have been made), with intent to deceive. 4 One must
speak one's interlocutor's language.
4 The "with intent to deceive" qualification is, of course, intended to rule out cases like
those of jokes mutually understood as such. Alternately, such jokes can be analyzed as not
being assertions, and hence as not falling under the head of the anti-lying principle. Saint
Thomas criticizes the jocose lie which "is not told to deceive, nor does it deceive by the way
it is told" as being "of a nature to deceive" on account of "the very genus of the action" (STh
II-II, q. 110, a. 3). This criticism, however, misses the mark if one can analyze apparently false
sentences not intended to deceive as not being assertions. A proper understanding of language
takes into account contextual and nonverbal factors, including whether the speaker and
listener are taking a given utterance to be literally assertoric. To call jokes that are not
intended to deceive and that do not deceive "lies" is as much a misunderstanding of language
as to say that the Psalmist's quoting the fool's "There is no God" (Ps 10:4; 14: 1) is a lie or
to say that Dostoevskii was a liar when he penned the Brothers Karamazov because there
never was such a person as Ivan Karamazov. Saint Thomas's mistake here is not so much a
philosophical one as one of linguistic theory.

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II. THE GESTAPO AND THE JEWS
Helga is hiding Jews in her basement. The Gestapo comes to her door. The
Gestapo officer knows that Helga is an upright and very honest person, and
Helga knows that he knows this. The officer asks, "Are there any Jews in your
house?" Helga knows that the officer knows that she knows that if she answers
in the affirmative or is ambiguous or remains silent then her house will be
searched and all Jews found therein will be killed. Helga thinks for a moment.
Then she looks the officer straight in the eye and answers clearly, distinctly and
with an air of sincerity: "No, there are no Jews in my house."

At first sight, Helga has lied, transgressing against the CCC2
anti-lying principle (though not against the CCC 1 principle, since
presumably the Gestapo officer has no right to know whether
there are Jews in Helga's house), and against Kant's anti-lying
principle.
However, let us analyze carefully what Helga has asserted. She
said that in her house "there are no Jews." Let us assume that it
is clear to all that her basement is a part of the house. The
grammar of Helga's utterance is clear. What about the meanings
of the words? In ordinary language there is no problem with
words like "no," "are," "in," "my," and "house". But there is one
word that is rather fluid: "Jews." It has religious, ethnic, and
perhaps other meanings. What are "Jews"? Let us assume for the
sake of the argument that all of the Jews in Helga's are both fully
ethnically Jewish (recognizing that ethnic designations are
inherently ambiguous, we need to mean by this something like
that they consider themselves ethnically Jewish and are
considered as such by just about everybody else) and fully
religiously Jewish. They are definitely Jews by our standards.
So it seems that Helga has lied, that she said there were no
Jews in her basement while there were. But actually, Helga did
not say that there were no Jews in her basement. She said that
there were no "Jews" in her basement. 5 To understand this
5 There is a crucial linguistic difference (mention versus use) between a quoted and an
unquoted word. An unquoted (and nonitalicized) word is to be understood as meant in the
language of the surrounding text. A quoted word can be understood in the language of the
original communicative context. (In fact, in the above sentence what one would really like
are not ordinary quotation marks but Robert Brandom's "scare quotes"; see his Making It
Explicit: Reasoning, Representing and Discursive Commitment [Cambridge: Harvard

LYING AND THE INTERLOCUTOR'S LANGUAGE

445

apparent paradox, let us recall the multilinguistic form of the
principle prohibiting lying formulated in the previous section. To
lie is to deceitfully utter something which in one's interlocutor's
language is false. One's utterances are to be interpreted in that
language which one expects one's interlocutor to understand
them as being made in. But language is not defined by dictionaries
(as already seen in the case of Artur and Natasha), but by usage.
The crucial question to ask now is this: What does the utterance
"Jew" mean to the Gestapo officer? Assuming that Helga knows
the Gestapo officer's language, she has lied if and only if within
her house there are entities in the extension of the term "Jew" as
understood in the Gestapo officer's language. Moreover, if there
are no such entities in her house, then it would have been a lie for
Helga to say, ''Yes, there are Jews in my house"-it would have
been exactly the kind of lie that Artur uttered to Natasha.
But now the way to a possible solution is clear. If language is
defined by usage, then the primary meaning of the word "Jew"
must be taken from the linguistic utterances of the community to
which the Gestapo officer belongs-utterances such as the following one from Adolf Hitler's Mein Kampf:
When thus for the first time I recognized the Jew as the cold-hearted,
shameless, and calculating director of this revolting vice traffic in the scum of
the big city, a cold shudder ran down my back.

The language of the Gestapo officer's social milieu was defined by
works such as Mein Kampf and by Goebbels's propaganda. For
the Gestapo officer, the primary meaning of the word "Jew" was
something like "a sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating
trafficker in vices." Thus, when the Gestapo officer asked Helga,
"Are there any Jews in your house?" what his question really
meant in ordinary English was: "Are there any sub-human, coldhearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in your house?"
But of course Helga, as an upstanding citizen, would not have
any such sub-humans in her house, and so after a moment of
thought during which she translated from Gestapo-speak to her
own language and back, she answered with something that when
University Press, 1994], 545.)

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ALEXANDERR. PRUSS

translated from Gestapo-speak to ordinary English would mean:
"No, there are no sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating
traffickers in vices in my house." She could say this with perfect
sincerity while looking the Gestapo officer in the eyes.
In fact, had Helga said, ''Yes, there are Jews in my house," this
would have meant, in the Gestapo-speak in which she was
speaking to the Gestapo officer in accordance to the principle of
speaking your interlocutor's language: ''Yes, there are some subhuman, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices in
my house." This not only would have condemned the Jews in her
house to death, but would also have slandered her house's
occupants.
Thus, by uttering the words, "No, there are no Jews in my
house," Helga spoke truly, and by uttering the words, ''Yes, there
are Jews in my house," she would have been lying, even though
there were Jews in her house. The key point is that "Jews" in
Gestapo-speak does not signify Jews, but a semi-mythical entity. 6
It may be objected that our defense of Helga's action neglects
a Kripkean account of a distinction between essential and nonessential properties. The essential properties of a Jew, from the
Nazi point of view, would have been some genetic qualities. Let
us leave aside the fact that these genetic qualities cannot be fully
defined, and involve an inescapable confusion between ethnic and
religious senses of Jewishness. 7 Call the conjunction of the essential genetic properties G. In addition to G, the Nazi would,
according to this objection, believe there are some nonessential
properties, such as being a sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless,
calculating trafficker in vice (for conciseness call this composite
property S) that are coextensive with the class of all Jews. Then,
when the Nazi asks Helga, "Are there any Jews in your house?"
the objection to be made is that what he is asking Helga is, "Are
there any entities satisfying G in your house?" It is true that the
6 We write semi-mythical, because there probably do exist cold-hearted, shameless,
calculating traffickers in vices. Such traffickers in vices might not be sub-human, but at least
one might find some who act sub-humanly. And of course, since every ethnic group has its
bad apples, there are likely even some Jews (in an ethnic, not religious, sense) who are like
that.
7 Many religious Jews might have been descendants of converts to Judaism in ages past,
though the Nazis would still have counted them as Jews.

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447

Nazi believes that G is coextensive with S, but nonetheless, had
Helga answered, "No, there are no Jews in my house," the Nazi
would have understood this to mean, "No, there are no entities
satisfying G in my house," which would be a lie, even though,
"No, there are no entities satisfying S in my house," would be
true.
Even if we grant the Aristotelian-Kripkean distinction at the
heart of this objection, the objection neglects the fact that when
analyzing the meaning of an actual utterance it is not an essential
vs. nonessential property distinction that matters, but rather a
salient vs. nonsalient property distinction which we must take
account of. Consider the following story:
Margaret lands on the famous Twin Earth that analytic philosophers like to
imagine. Suppose also that XYZ (a liquid that has a different composition-and
hence difference essence-from H 2 0 despite having the same gross qualities)
has exactly the same qualitative properties with regard to the preservation of
Margaret's life as H 2 0 does. Unfortunately, Margaret's water supply has run
out a few days ago, and Margaret is dying of thirst. After Margaret lands on
Twin Earth, not knowing that on this planet there is no H 20 but only XYZ, she
gets thirsty and asks a native standing by a body of XYZ, "Is this water?" Now,
the native, let us suppose, knows all about the H 2 0 vs. XYZ distinction, and he
knows all about the fact that XYZ has the same effects on Margaret's body as
H 20. He also knows that Margaret is not much of a scientist (so she won't
understand that XYZ is harmless) and that unless she is told that there is water
there, she will very soon die of thirst. He also knows that Margaret doesn't
know that what is present on Twin Earth is XYZ and not H 2 0. He answers,
"Yes, this is water."

Did the native lie? If it is the essential vs. nonessential property
distinction that is important to understanding language, then he
did, since he knew that Margaret would understand "Yes, this is
water," in Earth-English rather than in Twin-Earth-English, and
what is present on Twin Earth does not have the essential properties of water (i.e., of H 20). However, Margaret really does not
care about the chemical composition of the liquid in front of her.
What she cares about is that it will satisfy her thirst and save her
life. The salient property of water in her discursive context is not
the essential property that water is H 20 (assuming that Kripke's
account is correct) but rather the nonessential property that it

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ALEXANDERR. PRUSS

satisfies thirst and is beneficial to her. Were Margaret to have full
information and the capacity to understand it, she would not
consider it relevant whether what is present before her is XYZ or
H 2 0. (In fact, she then might not ask whether it is water, but
merely whether it has the thirst-satisfying properties of water.)
The chemical composition is not salient for the analysis of the
meaning of her question and of the answer as understood by her.
The native spoke truly.
Just as the native spoke truly, so did Helga. For the salient
property in the context of the Gestapo seeing Jews for slaughter
is not G, but S. It is not because of Jews possessing G that the
Gestapo wishes to kill Jews, but because of the Jews allegedly
possessing S. It is S that is the salient property in the context of
the Gestapo search, just as from Margaret's point of view it is the
life-preservingness that is the salient property. In fact, the
Gestapo officer might not even understand G very well. He might
not be a geneticist. The reason for seeking Jews to kill was not the
true 8 belief that they possess G, but the false belief that they
possess S (or, at most, the false belief that G entails S).
Another science-fictional example might help to clarify the
point in a different way.
In the year 2600, it becomes possible to enumerate the essential properties of
an individual human being and this has been done for all people by a central
authority. Morton is sought for a brutal murder of which he was convicted, but
after which conviction he escaped. He is so dangerous that he must be killed
on sight. Now, Donna's husband Frank looks exactly like Morton. What is
worse, the police computer has erroneously substituted Frank's data for
Morton's. The policeman comes to Donna's door, reads to her the list of what
he thinks are Morton's essential properties (in suitably abbreviated form, one
presumes, and perhaps reduced to a single number), but which in fact are
Frank's properties, and asks, "Is the person with these properties in the house?"
Donna knows the policeman won't listen to any explanations, because Morton
is too dangerous and too well-armed for the police to have patience for
anything but a quick answer. Donna knows that she has just been handed a list
of Frank's properties, and she knows that if she answers affirmatively or
hesitates, the police will come in, see Frank, and shoot him. She answers:
"No."
8 For simplicity we are assuming the Nazis' genetic criteria made sense. If they did not,
then the whole Kripkean objection falls apart.

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449

Let F be the list of properties of Frank that the policeman has
read to Donna. When the policeman asks, "Is the person
satisfying Fin the house?" it is still not F-ness that is salient, even
though F-ness is an essence, but rather the unstated property of
being a brutal murderer. When the policeman asks, "Is the person
satisfying Fin the house?" he does not really care about F-ness,
any more than Margaret cares whether what is on the planet is
H 2 0 or XYZ (indeed, on this account, Margaret could have just
as well asked, "Is this H 20?" and if the native knew the
motivations behind the question, then he could answer, "Yes, this
is H 2 0"). For the policeman the salient meaning of "person
satisfying F" is a compound noun meaning "brutal murderer
named Morton." This person is not present in Donna's house,
and she is truthful in answering in the negative.
In the same way, the salient meaning of "Jew" from the
Gestapo's point of view in the context of capturing "Jews" for
slaughter is not G but S. Since nobody in Helga's household
satisfies S, she is right to deny there are any "Jews" in her house.
Three more objections may occur rather immediately. First,
supposing that it is true, as the above account alleges, that the
Gestapo is seeking instances of S and not instances of G, are we
able to condemn the Gestapo for being racist murderers? After all,
a person seeking to destroy instances of S, that is, seeking to
eliminate sub-human, cold-hearted, shameless, calculating traffickers in vices, cannot be said to be a racist murderer. That is in part
correct. And indeed, one might argue that out of charity Helga
should assume the Gestapo officer is seeking instances of S rather
than instances of G, since one should assume the best about
people. However, it is also the case that the Gestapo officer might
well be culpably guilty of believing that instances of G are instances of S. It may be hatred that is inspiring him to paint G's as
S's, or to accept the propaganda that paints them thus. He may be
culpably guilty in not questioning the propaganda. He may be
culpably guilty in self-inducing in himself the belief that G's are
S's. After all, we can reasonably say that he should know that at
least most G's are not S's, and so his error is probably a culpable
one, and we can have at least sufficient certainty of the culpability
of his error that a human court might be able to convict him of

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ALEXANDERR. PRUSS

his crimes, unless he were to bring in sufficient evidence to show
that the propaganda brainwashed him in such a way as to make
him invincibly ignorant of most G's not being S's. In the desire to
condemn Nazism, one has to be careful to understand that some
individual Nazis might not have been culpable.
There is a second objection that is more worrying. Suppose
that we have a Gestapo officer who does not believe that G's are
S's. In fact, he knows very well that Jews are ordinary people, no
more and no less prone to vice than others. He does not believe
any of the Nazi propaganda, and thinks that the slander of the
Jews in Mein Kampf is just that-slander. However, out of a sheer
malicious desire to cause pain to others, this officer decides to
murder Jews. When he asks, "Are there any Jews in your house?"
he really means "Are there any instances of G in your house?"
Now, as the story is described, Helga can still answer, "No, there
are no Jews in my house," because she will naturally assume that
a Gestapo officer at her door is of the more usual propagandabelieving kind, rather than of the clear-thinking but demonically
malicious kind that is now under consideration. Indeed, the
principle of charity would lead her to assume that the officer is of
the first kind.
But what if Helga knows this Gestapo officer, and knows the
above facts about him? One could deny this possibility by saying
that no amount of evidence could possibly make it completely
certain that a person is the demonically malicious kind of Gestapo
officer described in the previous paragraph, and that the principle
of charity would still force one to assume (except in circumstances
where prudence requires that one go by the mere no reasonable
doubt standard of the courts, this not being such a circumstance)
that the officer is the propaganda-believer. Alternately, it could be ·
said that malice necessarily distorts one's point of view. Thus, the
Gestapo officer through his malice necessarily comes to believe
that G's have false properties (such as hatefulness or fittingness for
torture), and it is under the description of these false properties
that he seeks "Jews," so that in his linguistic practice, "Jew,"
despite his explicit avowals to the contrary, necessarily takes on
a meaning charged with false properties. This second answer
appears plausible. It is probable enough, we suggest, that in

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451

practice Helga could act on it and say, "No, there are no Jews in
my house," expecting that the Gestapo officer would take this to
mean that there are no hateful persons or persons worthy of
torture in the house (for cases of practical action, one only needs
probabilities, not certainties). Note that this second reply also
may work in other cases of a murderer (other than a Nazi) who
hates a certain person and who comes to the door asking whether
this person is within when in fact he is.
However, if neither of the two replies works, then one must
admit that this is a case of lying, and that Helga has no choice but
to remain silent, equivocate (if equivocation is acceptable when
lying is not, which is very much open to question),9 or die in a
physical attack on the Gestapo officer. To abstain from lying
under these circumstances might strike some as an overvaluing of
the value of truth, but there appears to be no escape from it, given
either the CCC2 principle or Kant's condemnation of lying.
A third objection might be offered to the effect that our
account of why it is acceptable for Helga to say, "No, there are no
Jews here," fails to do justice to the actual motivations that any
particular historical Helga might have had, and so although it
excuses a theoretical Helga from guilt, the historical Helgas in
such situations were all guilty by virtue of not having the correct
motivations, since they did not think in terms of the "speak your
interlocutor's language" principle. But in fact, quite possibly,
something like the principle was in the back of the historical
Helgas' minds. They might have reasoned, "The only reason this
Gestapo officer wants to know whether there are Jews is to kill
them. There's nobody in my house deserving of death." Or else
they might have simply acted on a moral intuition 10 that correctly
states that in such cases one can say, "No, there are no Jews
here."

9 The principle of speaking your interlocutor's
language does appear to rule out
equivocation, though the matter is perhaps not completely certain, since the equivocation
might be within one's interlocutor's language. The detailed examination of this question is
outside the scope of the present paper.
10 And as Christians, we certainly do admit that such a moral intuition might have been
implanted by an inspiration of the Holy Spirit.

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ALEXANDER R. PRUSS

Finally, one might try to formulate an alternate, perhaps
preferable, account. One such account that respects the value of
truth as found in the CCC2 principle and in Kantianism would be
to say that we should maximize the truth-content of our
interlocutor's minds. Now, saying, ''Yes, there are Jews here," will
have many false implications that the Gestapo officer will make.
The Gestapo officer will, for example, come to accept the false
proposition, "There are people worthy of death in the house,"
and maybe even the false normative proposition, "I ought to
arrest some people in this house." Thus, while the statement
implants one truth in the Gestapo officer's mind, it leads him to
believe many falsehoods. However, a principle of maximizing the
truth-content of our interlocutor's minds leads to a breakdown of
the structures of trust in society (and thus is not generalizable in
accordance with the categorical imperative). After all, religious
persons following such a principle might manufacture false
miracles, on the ground that a person's belief in the small
falsehood of some miracle having taken place is far less significant
and outweighed by the value of the true beliefs in the rest of the
religion. It is clear that if the truth-content maximizing principle
were generally followed, then people would trust each other less,
and would become less able to come to true conclusions, and in
fact the principle would be self-defeating when generalized.
CONCLUSION

It has been argued that the principle to speak your
interlocutor's language together with a distinction between the
properties salient and nonsalient in a given communicative context allows one to say that a person who, having Jews in her
basement, answers to the Gestapo, "No, there are no Jews in my
house," is saying the truth, and would be lying if she said, ''Yes,
there are Jews in my house."
The correct principle against lying, compatible with the CCC2
and with Kantianism, then should be read as stating:

LYING AND THE INTERLOCUfOR'S LANGUAGE

453

(L) Never say what is false in your interlocutor's language (i.e., in the
language you expect him to understand your statement within) with the
intention of deceiving him.

Here, "language" must take into account the salient vs. nonsalient
contextual distinction with regard to meaning. Such a distinction
is generally necessary, since persons rarely have a full
understanding of all the facts. If a man on the street asks me,
"What time is it?" I, despite being a philosopher, do not need to
correct his doubtless many incorrect understandings of the nature
of time before telling him that the current time is 4:19 P.M. He
may draw some false inferences from this. He might, for instance,
contrary to relativity theory, conclude that there is an absolute
"now" throughout space that is labeled "4:19 P.M." The philosophical facts about the nature of time are not salient in this
situation, unless I know the man to be a philosopher interested in
the present context not in the ordinary practical sense of "what
time it is" but in the nature of time. Almost every time we are
asked a question and give an answer, it is likely that our
interlocutor misunderstands, in some small way, one or more
properties pertaining to the terms in our answer; we must, in
order to satisfy (L), take care to ensure that in the salient sense
our reply is true, where salience is measured from the point of
view of our interlocutor's language and his present circumstantial
context. 11

11 Kantians, and maybe even some others, will also be pleased to note that (L) is fully
generalizable and hence satisfies Kant's categorical imperative.

The Thomist 63 (1999): 455-60

PREDICATES: A THOMIST ANALYSIS
JOHN PETERSON
University of Rhode Island
Kingston, Rhode Island

A

PREDICATE is not just another name for a set. Some predicates are species and some are genera. Any species is predicable of an individual that belongs to that species but no set
is predicable of an individual member of that set. One can say
that Socrates is human but not that Socrates is the set of humans.
Further, any genus is predicable of its included species but no set
is predicable of any one of its subsets. One can say that humans
are animals but not that the set of humans is the set of animals.
Beyond saying that some predicates are not sets, we may say
that no predicate of any subject is a set. Take any predicate F that
is truly said of a subject a. If F is a set then it follows that a is a
set. But a is evidently not a set but a member of a set. Otherwise
any member of a set is itself a set and the division of set and setmember collapses. Suppose the set of tigers comprises two
members, Josh and Jake. If Josh dies, then it is truly said that the
set is reduced by one member, that it goes from having two
members to having just one. But this makes sense only if it is the
same set that once had a pair of members and now has one. If it
is one set that has two members and another that has one then no
set is reduced by one member. But a set is reduced by one member
and it is evidently not Jake who is so reduced. So the difference
of set and set-member remains even in a set of one.
But what are predicates if they are not sets? Since it is by
definition 'of' or 'about' a subject, a predicate is a relational concept. As a genus is the genus of a species and a species is the
species of a genus, so too, a predicate is the predicate of a subject.
455

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JOHN PETERSON

By the same token, a subject is by definition the subject of a
predicate. With respect to such relational concepts, one cannot
say what they are apart from bringing in their respective correlatives. To try to do so substitutes the abstract for the concrete
and confuses relations with things.
With this as our cue, we consider two puzzles about predication. The puzzles as well as their solutions we owe to Aquinas. 1
The answers to both flesh out the subject-predicate tie. They also
illumine what figures in that relation, including the idea of a
predicate. Aquinas frames the first puzzle as a dilemma; call it the
dilemma of predication. The tiger that is predicated of Jake is
either particular or universal. But in either case predication is
pre-empted. No particular is predicated of a subject. And if it is
the universal tiger that is predicated of Jake, then the particular
thing Jake is said to be a universal. If Jake is a tiger and tiger is a
universal then the absurdity follows that Jake is a universal. 2 Yet
we do truly say that Jake is a tiger. How is that possible?
Aquinas's solution is that the tiger that is here predicated of
Jake is neither particular nor universal. 3 Any thing is either particular or universal, but what the predicate tiger signifies is not a
thing. It is tiger taken in abstraction from the manner in which it
is either in particular things like Jake or in universal things like
concepts. By analogy, suppose that Jones is a teacher by day and
a salesman by night. By day he teaches American history; by night
he sells furniture. Yet it is the same Jones who takes on both
modes. Just as we say that the teacher-mode and the salesmanmode are accidental to Jones so are the particular and universal
modes accidental to the tiger that is said of Jake. That tiger is
something neutral between the two modes just as Jones is
something neutral between his two modes. This neutral core is
full of possibility of which Jake and the concept tiger are two
expressions. It is what Aquinas calls essence.
The second problem is conveniently prefaced by noting the
formality of mathematical concepts. Concepts like twoness and
1 St. Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence, trans. and ed. A. Maurer (Toronto, 1949),
chaps. 2 and 3.
2 Ibid., chap. 3, p. 42
3 Ibid., ch. 3, pp. 40-41.

PREDICATES

457

circularity signify those properties to the exclusion of anything
that is two or circular. That is why they are closed concepts, signifying form alone apart from matter. And just because they are
closed (formal) and not open (material) concepts (i.e., taken as cut
off from any things that exemplify them), these mathematical
concepts denote but do not connote. Circularity denotes that by
which something is a circle to the exclusion of anything that
happens to be circular. Moreover, they are not just formal but
purely formal concepts, because matter is not included in their
definitions.
Suppose, then, that 'tiger', by means of which tiger is
predicated of Jake, signifies tiger to the exclusion of those things
that are tigers. Then, like 'twoness' and 'circularity', 'tiger'
signifies form alone apart from matter. It signifies the property of
being a tiger as severed from individual tigers. To keep the parallelism with twoness and circularity, call it the concept tigerness.
Because it is taken in precision from the things that exemplify it,
tigerness denotes without connoting, just as in the case of
'twoness' and 'circularity'. The difference is that, unlike 'twoness'
and 'circularity', 'tigerness' is not a purely formal concept. Matter
evidently enters into its definition.
What follows from this is that all formal concepts, mathematical or other, are impredicable. They are decent enough concepts, but they are closed and not open concepts. And just for that
reason do they fail to be logical concepts. One can no more say
that this number is twoness or that that shape is circularity than
one can say that Jake is tigerness. The reason is that, having denotation only, 'tigerness' signifies a part and not the whole of the
subject Jake. That is because it signifies the form of the subject cut
off from its matter. So predicating tigernessof Jake is nonsensical
because it says that a whole is one of its parts.
The solution is predictable. It is to identify predicates with
open and not with closed concepts. Open concepts are the five
predicables of classical logic: genus, species, difference, property,
and accident. We can say "Jake is a tiger" but not "Jake is
tigerness" because 'tiger' is a predicable, in this case a species.
Like 'tigerness', 'tiger' signifies the form tiger. But it does so as a

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JOHN PETERSON

whole and not as a part. 4 Taken in this way 'tiger' is not cut off
from the things that exemplify it. Rather does it inchoately
include those things. That is what is meant by saying that it has
connotation. Even as it denotes the form tiger, the concept 'tiger'
connotes Jake, Josh, Jerry, and every other tiger. They are
included in the extension of 'tiger'. Therefore, 'tiger' is predicated
of Jake without predicating a part of a whole. Because 'tiger'
includes the whole of what Jake is and 'tigerness' does not, 'tiger'
but not 'tigerness' is predicable of Jake.
How do these solutions help to explain the subject-predicate
relation? The answer to the first problem shows that true subjectpredicate judgments are tools of analysis. Since the P that is pulled
out of S is some concept or essence, the copula signifies conceptual analysis-the 'is' of essence. Under the first solution, a
predicate is some form that is extracted from matter. Here, the
neutral form tiger is predicated of Jake. It is said to be Jake's
form. But to be a neutral form (i.e. the form of tiger taken as
such), it must have in the first instance been abstracted from the
individual matter of Jake. It follows that all true subject-predicate
judgments mirror the relation of a property to that of which it is
the property. Aquinas calls it the form-matter tie in any material
thing. Predicate is to subject as form is to matter. Predicates, says
he, are taken formally and subjects materially. 5
The answer to the second problem shows that true subjectpredicate judgments are simultaneously tools of synthesis. Since
it synthesizes being and essence the copula in 'S is P' is opposed
to conceptual analysis. Instead of separating P from S, it joins P
with S. This is the 'is' of being. Recall Locke's account of what he
called the second act of the mind (judgment). It not only keeps
two ideas apart, says Locke, but it also brings them together. 6
Here, Locke evidently reflects the Scholastic logic he learned at
Oxford, according to which judgments are simultaneously both
tools of analysis and tools of synthesis. In any case, it is because
predicates connote the whole subject that they are said to be what
4 Ibid., ch. 2, pp. 37-38.

5 St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa TheologiaeI, q. 13, a. 12.
6 John Locke, An Essay ConcerningHuman Understanding,ed. A. S. Pringle-Pattison
(Oxford: 1960), 93.

PREDICATES

459

their subjects are. In Fregean words, one can say that subject and
predicate have the same reference even though they have a
different sense. Recall that this synthesis is blocked when concepts
are not predicates, that is, when they do not connote the whole
but only denote the part. We cannot say that Jake is tigerness
because 'tigerness' is a closed and not an open concept.
The copula in subject-predicate judgments like "Jake is a tiger"
is therefore systematically ambiguous. As the 'is' of essence, it signifies the relation between Jake and the property he has of being
a tiger. This relation of property to subject is one of form to
matter. Jake is something that is specified by the property of being
a tiger. But as the 'is' of being, the copula runs in the opposite
direction. Subjects are taken formally and predicates materially. 7
Taken as connoting the individuals by whose existence the
possible thing, tiger, is actualized, 'tiger' expresses something
possible with respect to the actual, in this case the subject Jake.
To bring this out, compare the 'is' of predication and the 'is'
of identity. "Washington is our first president" exemplifies the
latter and "Washington is a president who came from Virginia"
exemplifies the former. These statements are evidently of a
different type. Yet they are alike in that in each one subject and
predicate are the same in reference but different in sense. How,
then, do they differ?
The answer is that the predicate in the latter implicitly includes
presidents besides Washington while the predicate in the former
does not. That is why the latter is convertible simpliciter and the
former is not. But to say that the predicate 'a president who came
from Virginia' includes in its extension other presidents besides
Washington is to say that it is an open concept. It stands to those
subjects as something possible or potential stands to its actuation.
To echo Frege again, it is unsaturated with respect to what
saturates and completes it. 8 Thus, when it concerns the 'is' of
being as opposed to the 'is' of essence, predicate stands to subject
not as form to matter (act to potency) but as matter to form
(potency to act).
Aquinas, STh I, q. 13, a. 12.
and Concept," in Geach and Black, eds., Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford, 1960), 31-32.
7

8 G. Frege, "Function

460

JOHN PETERSON

To sum up, this double meaning of the copula implies that true
subject-predicate statements simultaneously signify both identity
and difference. They are a logical identity-in-difference. As the 'is'
of essence, the copula signifies the difference of subject and
predicate, while as the 'is' of being it signifies their identity. As
the 'is' of essence, the copula signifies the matter-form relation
between Jake and the property he has of being a tiger. Here, it is
the difference of subject and predicate within the concept that is
featured. Since a predicate unfolds some character of the subject,
it is the sense and not the reference of the predicate that is
concerned. The question of existence is thus bracketed.
But as the 'is' of being, it is the other way around. Since a
predicate is now a possible which the subject, as existence, actualizes, a predicate is no longer seen as conceptually unpacking the
subject. Instead, subjects are viewed as realizing and completing
their predicates. Unlike the first case in which the predicate
signifies some abstracted part of the concept, the predicate now
signifies the whole concept. It signifies it as something potential
and incomplete with respect to the subject which actualizes and
completes it as existence completes essence. So under the 'is' of
being existence is featured and essence bracketed. That is why it
is the reference and not the sense of a predicate that is here
concerned. To the extent that it refers to the same individual that
is named by the subject, a predicate is united with its subject in
being even as it is distinguished from it in concept.

The Thomist 63 (1999): 461-80

HAS THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE
BEEN MISSED?
AN ANALYSIS AND A FUTURE DIRECTION FOR
CATHOLIC BIOMEDICAL ETHICS
JOHN BERKMAN
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

O

N MARCH 3, 1999, on the eve of the fourth anniversary of

the promulgation of Pope John Paul H's encyclical
Evangelium vitae ("The Gospel of Life"), John Cardinal
O'Connor and Bernard Cardinal Law convened a conference
entitled "In God's Image: Called to Build a Culture of Life." In
honor of the occasion, the Holy Father sent his greetings and a
four-page letter. Included in the letter was the following:
At the end of the twentieth century we are witnessing a strange paradox: the
sanctity of human life is being denied by an appeal to freedom, democracy,
pluralism, even reason and compassion. As the Bishops' Statement points out,
words have become unmoored from their meaning (e.g., Living the Gospel of
Life, 11), and we are left with a rhetoric in which the language of life is used
to promote a culture of death .... The language of human rights is constantly
invoked while the most basic of them-the right to life-is repeatedly
disregarded .... So great is the confusion at times that for many people the
difference between good and evil is determined by the opinion of the majority,
and even the time-honored havens of human life-the family, the law and
medicine-are sometimes made to serve the culture of death.

At such a time, Christians must act.
Your action needs to be both educational and political. There must be a
thorough catechesis on the Gospel of Life at all levels of the Catholic
community. Catholics imbibe much of their surrounding culture, and therefore
this catechesis needs to challenge the prevailing culture at those points where
461

462

JOHN BERKMAN

human dignity and rights are threatened. Such a catechesis has as its goal that
shift of perception and change of heart which accompany true conversion (cf.
Eph 4:23). The call to conversion must ring out in your homes, in your
parishes and in your schools, with complete confidence that the Church's
teaching about the inviolability of life is deeply in tune with both right reason
and the deepest longings of the human heart. This educational effort will
increasingly open the way for Catholics to exercise a positive influence as
citizens of their country, without false appeals to the separation of Church and
State in a way that consigns the Christian vision of human dignity to the realm
of private belief. The choice in favor of life is not a private option but a basic
demand of a just and moral society. 1

Drawing on the United States Catholic Conference's recently
released Living the Gospel of Life: A Challenge to American
Catholics, the Holy Father here emphasizes that for the Gospel of
Life to be truly gospel, to be truly 'good news', it must be lived in
its fullness by American Catholics. It is not an easy time to do so.
For it is a time when that most basic moral imperative-innocent
human lives are to be considered inviolable-is being undermined
by what the Pope calls a "culture of death." In this time of
Orwellian politics, the Pope notes that appeals to freedom and
rights are increasingly reinterpreted through the lenses of utility
and cost-effectiveness, so that the defenseless and the marginalized can be ignored or dispatched, and traditional virtues of love
and compassion are being reconfigured to justify death-dealing.
It is in this context that the Pope wrote Evangelium vitae,
urging a new catechesis of our culture in which Catholics and all
people of good will work together to "ensure that justice and solidarity will increase and that a new culture of human life will be
affirmed, for the building of an authentic civilization of truth and
love. " 2 He also specifically urged Catholic intellectuals to "place
themselves at the service of a new culture of life by offering
serious and well documented contributions, capable of command1 This letter, dated February 20, 1999, was addressed to "My Venerable Brother, Cardinal
William Henry Keeler, Archbishop of Baltimore, Chairman of the Bishops' Committee for
Pro-Life Activities", and "sent with the assurance of my prayers for the success of this
important meeting jointly organized by the Bishops' Committee for Pro-Life Activities and
the Pontifical Council for the Family." All underlined passages are underlined in the original.
2 Pope John Paul II, The Gospel of Life ("Evangeliumvitae") (Washington, D.C.: United
State Catholic Conference, 1995), §6. Henceforth cited as EV.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGEUUM VITAE

463

ing general respect and interest by reason of their merit. " 3 Of
course, in order to do so, these intellectuals must understand the
encyclical and recognize its authority. Yet despite the glut of
perfunctory reviews in a large number of periodicals shortly after
its release, there has been little sustained reflection on the meaning or significance of this encyclical, at least in English.
There have been two collections of essays published in English
that engage Evangelium vitae. These are Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, edited by Kevin Wildes, S.J., and Alan
Mitchell, 4 and Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics: Protestants Engage
Pope john Paul II's Moral Encyclicals, edited by Reinhard Hutter
and Theodor Dieter. 5 Unfortunately, neither volume as a whole
captures and responds to the central theme of Evangelium vitae.
Neither volume as a whole highlights the urgent crisis in contemporary Western society, nor how Catholics are called to
respond to it.
Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics bills itself as "the first sustained
Protestant engagement of Veritatis splendor and Evangelium vitae
in the English-speaking world." 6 It is in fact a significantly
narrower project, being largely a Lutheran response, both to core
moral notions of "law " "nature " and "freedom;' in these encyc'
'
licals, and to issues like abortion, euthanasia, and capital punishment. It hopes to instruct Lutherans as to what they can learn
from the Holy Father (and vice versa) in theological ethics in the
1990s. It is an attempt at ecumenical dialogue in theology at a
high level and for the most part it succeeds. Reinhard Hutter
notes that the appropriate telos of such dialogue is to "learn how
to speak 'with one voice' in matters of morals and ethics, particularly in a society that is increasingly alienated from the moral
orientation that the biblical wimess and the churches' traditions
provide. " 7 However, since Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics devotes
3

EV, §98.

Wildes, S.J., and Alan C. Mitchell, eds.,Choosinglife: A Dialogue on
EvangeliumVitae (Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 1997). Henceforth CL.
5 Reinhard Hiitter and Theodor Dieter, eds., EcumenicalVentures in Ethics: Protestants
EngageJohn Paul II's Moral Encyclicals(Grand Rapids: Wm B. Eerdmans Publishing Co.,
4 Kevin Wm.

1998). Henceforth EVE.
6 EVE, 2.
7 EVE, 3.

464

JOHN BERKMAN

the majority of its attention to Veritatis splendor, its focus tends
more towards metamoral questions and less towards the broader
cultural issues that I take to be the heart of Evangelium vitae.
Choosing Life: A Dialogue on Evangelium Vitae, a conferencegenerated collection of nine essays and seventeen responses, is the
first (and so far only) collection of essays in English devoted
entirely to Evangelium vitae. However, while twenty-five of its
twenty-six contributors are faculty members at a Catholic
university or have some other clear Catholic affiliation, the essays
do not provide a straightforward analysis of what is new, noteworthy, significant, and extraordinary in this encyclical, nor how
its message on the "value and inviolability of human life" might
be communicated appropriately and effectively to the Church and
to all people of good will. Surprisingly, none of the essayists
seems to have been asked to give an overview of the encyclical,
and while some of the essays refer to the broad vision of
Evangelium vitae, it is not central to any of them. It would have
been helpful if the editors had provided such an overview.
The essay in these two volumes that best captures the central
thrust of Evangelium vitae is Edmund Pellegrino's essay on
euthanasia and physician-assisted suicide. Pellegrino notes that
"Evangelium vitae implicitly and explicitly sets out a particular
way of 'doing' medical ethics in the domain of human-life issues,
much in the same way Veritatis splendor did in a more formal
manner for ethics generally." 8 Pellegrino here refers in compact
form to what I take to be the two central themes of the encyclical.
First, Evangelium vitae does indeed offer a distinctive methodological approach to moral theology; that is, the very form and
structure of the encyclical constitutes a recommendation of an
approach to moral matters from a Catholic theological perspective. This methodological approach, which a number of the essays
touch on briefly, is thoroughly theological, thoroughly Christological. While it might appear paradoxical or even contradictory,
John Paul II insists that "from the Cross, the source of life, the
"people of life" is born and increases."9 An adequate response to
8 CL, 241.
9

EV, §51; italics in original.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE

465

Evangelium vitae must address and illuminate this theological
vision which undergirds and drives this encyclical.
Second, Evangelium vitae offers a critique of particular practices of medicine, particularly abortion and euthanasia, situating
these objections in the context of its theological vision of the
goodness and inviolability of human life.
While these are not the only two themes of Evangelium vitae,
and parts of Choosing Life and Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics
address other issues of significance, my analysis of these two
volumes will concentrate on those essays which address these two
themes.
I. EVANGEUUM VITAE AND METHODOLOGY IN MORAL THEOLOGY

Referring to Evangelium vitae, Leslie Griffin notes that "the
author prefers a distinctively Catholic, theological argument to a
natural law style of reasoning. The analysis is predominantly
scriptural and theological, not philosophical or scientific." 10 Now,
while one might assume that a Pope would make "Catholic"
arguments and do "scriptural and theological" analysis, Griffin's
point is not entirely without significance. For Griffin is correct to
see in encyclicals like Evangelium vitae (and for that matter
Veritatis splendor) a departure from a particular kind of naturallaw reasoning for moral matters prevalent in papal documents in
much of the last century, and a recovery of a more explicitly
theological point of departure for reflection on Catholic morals.
John Conley makes this contrast somewhat starker, arguing
that a significant methodological shift has taken place within the
corpus of John Paul H's encyclicals. In contrast to earlier social
encyclicals, Evangelium vitae and Veritatis splendor "employ a
biblical logic of argumentation and an apocalyptic tone that
diverge sensibly from the rhetoric of the earlier social treatises." 11
In methodological terms, Conley is arguing that in Veritatis
splendor and Evangelium vitae the Pope "establishes scriptural
10

CL, 160.

11 CL,4. While one might argue that Conley's point-that

John Paul H's earlier encyclicals
also have a significantly more developed theological sensibility than many earlier papal
encyclicals-is somewhat overdrawn, it is significant and important.

466

JOHN BERKMAN

narrative as the point of departure of Christian moral
interrogation. . . . Such narrative dialogue, which becomes
mimetically the dialogue between God and every attentive
disciple, provides the framework of moral discernment concerning particular acts and political applications. " 12 In his response to
Conley, David Hollenbach reiterates this point, noting that the
Holy Father is "unabashed" in locating this vision of the human
good, including the sacredness of human life, in God's love,
which is revealed in the death and resurrection of Jesus Christ,
and that overcoming the "sullen disengagement" of our contemporary society will take a far greater vision of the human good
than can be gleaned from moral principles.
Conley's and Hollenbach's emphasis on the centrality of
narrative for understanding the Pope's moral methodology in
Evangelium vitae is not shared by all of the contributors to
Choosing Life. James Keenan claims that the Pope's "new"
defense of the sanctity of life appeals only to the doctrine of creation. Contrary to past "positivistic" formulations, where the sanctity of life is found in the brute fact that God wills it, because our
lives are "divine possessions," 13 John Paul H's new approach finds
the sanctity of life lies in our status as created in God's image.
Whereas the former "traditional" view is "extrinsic" and "voluntaristic," the new view, where the sanctity of life is "within the
human, the image of God," is presumably "intrinsic." Although
Keenan argues that the "created status" view here actually constitutes "reasoned argumentation," 14 and that this is a major
breakthrough, it is not clear that the view that God has somehow
"built" the sanctity of life into created human nature is more
profound than the view that is content to say that God wills it,
since our very created nature is indeed the will of God as well.
Perhaps Keenan would emphasize that God's will in creation has
a particular "covenantal" character, but that is also arguably true
of God's will in all situations. However, claims about the character of God's will are based on and can only be fully understood
CL, 18.
This positivistic "divine possession view" is attributed toHumanae vitae. See CL, 52-53.
14 I infer from this that the lack of "reasoned argumentation" is what Keenan considers
to have been the problem with the "traditional" view. See CL, 55.
12

13

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE

467

in the light of the narrative of God's faithful relationship with the
world from creation through to the eschaton.
A difficulty of Keenan's approach-that is, not locating his
understanding of creation and redemption in the context of the
biblical narrative-is highlighted near the end of his essay when
he says "I confess a certain confusion ... Does the 'life' that we
have as a sharing in the divine life come from God's act of
Creation ... or from Redemption?" 15 Keenan notes that while
Antonio Autiero roots the sanctity of life in the imago Dei (i.e., a
"creation" argument), Cardinal Ratzinger insists that the Pope
roots the sanctity of life soteriologically (i.e., a "redemption"
argument). 16 But Keenan's puzzle is resolved once one locates
these doctrines in the divine drama of fulfillment, where our dignity as humans, given to us in creation, is renewed and restored
in our redemption, and moves toward its true fulfillment in an
eschatological perspective. Any attempt to understand our status
as creatures independently of our status as redeemed by Christ or
as creatures pursuing fulfillment in the kingdom of God cannot
help but remain a puzzle.
The philosopher Joseph Boyle adverts to this point in his
response to Keenan. After noting that "sanctity of life" is developed in Evangelium vitae from a number of different scriptural
sources, he says,
but if part of the story about the inherent dignity of humans and their bodily
lives emerges in the creation accounts and the image-of-God statements and if
a further part emerges in what John and Paul say about the destiny each person
has because of Jesus' redemptive activity and God's response to it, perhaps the
full story needs to depend on all of what Scripture teaches and all of what the
Church believes about these matters. 17

While certainly not a wholesale endorsement of a narrative
approach to theological ethics, these comments from one of the
foremost contemporary natural-law ethicists shows that even
"ahistorically minded" Catholic ethicists seek some basis for unity
in the scriptural accounts.
15 CL, 55.
16

CL, 55.

17 CL, 72.

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JOHN BERKMAN

While John Conley is appreciative of the exegetical starting
point of the Pope's moral methodology, he too is less confident
that the narrative of the person of Christ, to which the scriptural
narrative bears witness, can function as the starting point for
Christian reflection on the moral life. Thus, Conley argues that
Evangelium vitae's "exegetical focus remains fixed upon the universal truth regarding the divine nature, human nature, and moral
values that may be gleaned by a careful meditation of the
narrative and its subacts. " 18 But is the Pope's scriptural exegesisthe encounter of Christ with the rich young man, or the narrative
of the affirmation of life in Evangelium vitae-merely an
entryway towards "universal truths" and "moral values" that are
supra-narrative?
The Pope's emphasis on the temporal character of human life
would seem to indicate not. At the beginning of Evangelium vitae,
in the section describing the basis for the fundamental worth of
the human person, the Pope emphasizes the temporality of all
human life on earth, that "life in time, in fact, is the fundamental
condition" of earthly life. Although it is sacred, earthly life is not
an "ultimate" but a "penultimate" reality. The penultimate
character of earthly life is fully understood only in the light of our
supernatural calling, and it is this calling that "highlights the
relative character of each individual's earthly life." 19
To what, then, is human life relative? To atemporal "universal
truths" and "human values"? To some transhistorical or transnarratival earthly reality? Not according to Evangelium vitae.
Human life is relative, according to the encyclical, to the gospel
of Jesus Christ, which is the transhistorical and yet fully historical
"source of invincible hope and true joy for every period of
history. " 20
The meaning and significance of every human life, and of all
that is, is to be discovered in a realization of God's narration of
the world-its creation, redemption, sanctification, and final
consummation in Christ. All of earthly reality exists in time: at
one time it came to be; at another time it was transformed by its
18

CL, 5.

19 EV, §2; italics in original.
20 EV, §2.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE

469

fallenness; still again at another time redeemed; and one day shall
be no more. That the dignity of human life is to be located in a
timeful narrative of our relationship to God is illustrated in the
following:
Here the Christian truth about life becomes most sublime. The dignity of this
life is linked not only to its beginning, to the fact that it comes from God, but
also to its final end, to its destiny of fellowship with God in knowledge and
love of him. 21

The Pope continues by noting that this narrative truth about our
lives conditions how we are to think about our earthly state.
Although we may instinctively see life as a good, life's goodness
and loveliness is only adequately appropriated when we understand our earthly life as the place where
God manifests himself, where we meet him and enter into communion with
him. The life which Jesus gives in no way lessens the value of our existence in
time; it takes it and directs it to its final destiny: "I am the resurrection and the
life ... whoever lives and believes in me shall never die (Jn 11: 25-26)." 22

Even the apparently transhistorical notion of "eternal life" is
located historically, as the adjective "eternal" "does more than
evoke a perspective which is beyond time." 23 Eternal life is with
all who believe in Jesus and enter into communion with him. The
mystery of how eternal life can be both transhistorical and
historical at the same time is also discussed in the same section:
"Eternal life is therefore the life of God himself and at the same
time the life of the children of God. " 24
The most notable way in which Christians have witnessed to
the "relative character" of earthly life, a witness that has immortalized them in the Christian community, has been to accept
martyrdom rather than compromise something more important
than earthly life. Thus, in the context of pointing out that earthly
life is not an absolute good for the Christian, Evangelium vitae
EV, §38.
EV, §38.
23 EV, §37.
24 EV, §38.

21

22

470

JOHN BERKMAN

evokes the witness of the martyrs John the Baptist and Stephen.
What is more important than earthly life? Fidelity to Christ is
more important, "remaining faithful to the word of the Lord even
at the risk of one's life." 25
The best articulation of the Pope's narratological understanding of human life and how this shapes Christian discipleship
is provided by the Lutheran Lois Malcolm in her article in
Ecumenical Ventures in Ethics on the Pope's understanding of
theonomy. In discussing the Pope's existential starting place in
Veritatis splendor-that he begins with the encounter between the
young man and Christ, which is a type for how the "beginning"
point for each of us is where our life narratives meet ChristMalcolm speaks of this "exegetical context as a kind of 'fundamental ontology' for the pope's ethics ... Christian morality
finds its center and criterion in the person of Jesus." 26 Malcolm
goes on to note that what is called for is a total commitment to
the person of Jesus, and the renunciation of anything that gets in
the way of such discipleship. This scheme collapses any sharp
distinction between justification and sanctification. As she puts it
most helpfully:
On the one hand, it is about gift-the call to encounter with Christ, who is the
origin and goal of human life, the source and saving power of Christian
morality. On the other hand, it is also a call to obedience, a command to live
life in a certain way. If it offers a vision of life that inspires and
empowers-that responds in a profound way to the aspirations of the human
heart-then it also presents a mandate and an imperative. 27

Living in response to the call of Christ is what Malcolm calls
"theonomous freedom," and Malcolm takes this to be the "first
principle" or "root conceptual pattern" for the Pope's moral
methodology. This approach to the moral life rejects the dichot25 EV, §47. Lois Malcolm elaborates insightfully on this point when discussing Veritatis
splendor's understanding of freedom: "This personalist conception of freedom is situated

within the broader context of a meditation on Christian martyrdom. Such martyrdom is
rooted neither in human heroism nor the constancy of good intentions, but in the crucified
Christ. We might say that the crucified Christ is the nature and locus of the good of this
personalist conception of freedom" (EVE, 174).
26 EVE, 164.
27 EVE, 164-65.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUMVITAE

471

omy between autonomy and heteronomy which presupposes that
the will follows either its own law or one fundamentally strange
and external to the self, but rather proposes a "participated
theonomy," where the self-in the light of the natural law and
revelation which are fundamentally harmonious-"participate[s]
in [its] own finite way in the wisdom and providence of divine
law, the divine pattern or exemplar that governs the ordering of
existence. "28
In the light of the Church's identity as those who cling to the
very person of Christ, who see freedom as participated theonomy,
an identity based in an irreducibly theological narrative which
fully embraces the natural law and the pursuit of the true Good,
the Church looks at its surrounding culture, discerns the particular
ways it fails to embrace the Good, and witnesses to the true Good.
This connection between the Church's fundamental theological
identity and the moral lives of the members of its body as
signifying their identity is part of the very structure of Evangelium
vitae, as it is for Veritatis splendor.
The significance of the structure of Evangelium vitae and
Veritatis splendor for moral methodology is worth highlighting,
since little attention has been paid to the deeper methodological
structure they both share. The three chapters of Veritatis splendor
suggest a threefold movement of reflection on how the Christian
faith is to be thought and lived which I take to be a model for
methodology in Catholic moral theology.
The first movement is existential. It is reflection upon the
fundamental questions of human life, the encounter with Christ,
and how Christ answers the fundamental existential questions
concerning the good and end of human life. We have this
presented in the first chapter of Veritatis splendor, where the
young man's encounter with Christ is located in the context of the
narrative of his life, and the narrative of the young man's life is in
turn determined by his response to his encounter with Christ.
Similarly, the second chapter of Evangelium vitae 29 presents the
EVE, 168.
The first chapter of Evangelium vitae serves as an extended introduction to the
particular issue being addressed by the encyclical, namely, our culture's increasingly
threatening posture towards innocent human life.
28

JOHN BERKMAN

472

gospel of life in narrative form, as both a proclamation of the very
person of Jesus, and as a drama of fulfillment from its roots in
Genesis and Exodus through to its fulfillment in Christ, highlighting the Cross, which "is revealed as the centre, meaning and goal
of all history and of every human life." 30
The second movement is engagement. Moral theology takes its
roots in the gospel of Jesus Christ and engages in a critique of
culture. Thus the second chapter of Veritatis splendor engages
"some trends of theological thinking and certain philosophical
affirmations [that] are incompatible with revealed truth." 31 Similarly, the corresponding third chapter of Evangelium vitae engages
in a critique of the view that "permit[s] the killing of an innocent
human being, whether a fetus or an embryo, an infant or an adult,
an old person, or one suffering from an incurable disease, or a
person who is dying. "32
The third movement is evangelical or catechetical. Here moral
theology instructs believers on how to live out their faith wisely
in the light of the gospel as applied to their particular cultural
issues and problems. Thus the third chapter of Veritatis splendor
calls the Church to go beyond its task of cultural criticism and to
catechize, to educate. It tells us that the "secret power" of the
Church's education is not in improved doctrinal or moral formulations, but "in constantly looking to the Lord Jesus." 33 In this
movement, attending to the saints and martyrs and adhering to
absolute moral norms are not seen primarily as ends in themselves, but as signs of faithfulness to Christ. Similarly, the corresponding fourth chapter of Evangelium vitae teaches Catholics how
to evangelize: to proclaim, celebrate, and serve the gospel of life.34
II. EVANGELIUM VITAE AND CATHOLIC BIOMEDICAL ETHICS

Having built on the existential identity of Christians as those
who see their discipleship to Christ as a narrative of fulfillment,
30 EV, §50.

Veritatissplendor, §29.
§57.
33 Veritatissplendor, §85; italics in original.
31

32 EV,

34 EV, §80-91.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGEUUM VITAE

473

of eternal life in Christ, 35 Evangelium vitae moves on to an
engagement with specific bioethical questions that challenge this
fundamental Christian identity. John Paul II's favorite way of
expressing the fact that human existence is given its ultimate
significance in being part of a type of what Christ has done in
time 36 is to quote Gaudium et spes §22: "By his incarnation the
Son of God has united himself in some fashion with every human
being. " 37 This passage is quoted at both the beginning and the end
of Evangelium vitae, its purpose being to describe where the
ultimate significance and dignity of human life is to be found. 38
When the Pope quotes from Gaudium et spes at the end of
Evangelium vitae, the connection to medical ethics is made
explicit. The Christ child himself was caught up in the great
struggle between life and death, at the time when Mary, along
with Joseph and the child, had to flee to save the life of her Son.
In terms of how we are to struggle against the forces of evil and
darkness "that child is a figure of every person, every child, every
helpless baby whose life is threatened. "39
As noted earlier, Pellegrino's essay in Choosing Life captures
the spirit of Evangelium vitae particularly well, conveying the
Pope's sense of urgency and emphasizing the encyclical's importance for society generally and medical ethics specifically. Unlike
many of the other essays, Pellegrino has a clear sense of the big
picture: Evangelium vitae is fundamentally a Christian response to
a world that, as it becomes increasingly post-Christian, sees less
and less difficulty with intentionally killing innocent persons in a
variety of situations and contexts. Pellegrino also notes that
35

EV, §37.

36 The starkness of this point is put

most strongly in §80, when the Pope quotes St.
Gregory of Nyssa to emphasize the point that life is "one with Jesus himself': "Man, as a
being, is of no account; he is dust, grass, vanity. But once he is adopted by the God of the
universe as a son, he becomes part of the family of that Being, whose excellence and greatness
no one can see, hear or understand. What words, thoughts or flight of the spirit can praise
the superabundance of this grace? Man surpasses his nature: mortal, he becomes immortal;
perishable, he becomes imperishable; fleeting, he becomes eternal; human, he becomes
divine" (St. Gregory of Nyssa, De Beatitudinibus, Oratio 7; PG 44:1280).
37 This quotation may be seen as a "signature" of the present Pope, as he cites it in, I
believe, every one of his encyclicals.
38 EV, §§2 and 104.
39 EV, §104.

474

JOHN BERKMAN

Evangelium vitae's response to attacks on innocent persons begins
not with appeals to natural law, but to "Scripture, divine law, and
revelation." 40 While Pellegrino himself begins with Scripture to
ground the inviolable dignity of innocent human life and draws
on Evangelium vitae's philosophical engagement with contemporary culture, he spends the lion's share of his essay responding
to the arguments of "sincere and conscientious proponents of
euthanasia and assisted suicide" that appeal to autonomy,
compassion, the evil of suffering, and the loss of dignity. 41
While only one essay in Choosing Life is explicitly concerned
with abortion, it is actually a central theme in three essays-one
from a historian, Kathryn Olesko, and two by law professors,
Leslie Griffin and Cathleen Kaveny. Unfortunately, none of these
three authors shows an eagerness to appropriate directly the
explicitly theological vision of Evangelium vitae that has been
outlined in this review; Olesko and Griffin also fail to consider
the Pope's appeals to the true human good, and the practices and
virtues that tend toward such good. Kaveny's article, by contrast,
makes clear the relevance of such an appeal to discussions of the
function of the law in contemporary American society.
Olesko criticizes the Pope for being inconsistent in denouncing
as part of the culture of efficiency certain forms of the rational
control of the natural while supporting natural family planning,
the practice of which she believes to presuppose the legitimacy of
these forms of rational control. What she fails to see is that the
Pope indicts "the culture of efficiency" for failing to consider
human practices in the light of the reasoned ends of persons,
namely, the true individual good and the common good. Since she
makes no distinction between techne and phronesis, between
techniques where one pursues external goods through instrumental reasoning and practices where the goods pursued are
"internal, " 42 Olesko has a much broader conception of what kinds
CL, 241.
CL, 236-37
42 On the notion of a 'practice', see Alasdair Macintyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), chap. 15. See also Joseph Dunne, Back to the Rough
Ground: 'Phronesis' and 'Techne' in Modern Philosophy and Aristotle (Notre Dame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1993).
40
41

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUMVITAE

475

of actions are to be understood as 'techniques' than does the Pope.
For instance, Olesko notes that the Pope "condemns techniques of
abortion, contraception, and euthanasia outright (EV, 13-14,
22)." 43 However, abortion (or for that matter natural family
planning) are not techniques, but practices. 44 Olesko thinks the
Pope condemns various techniques per se, but in fact the Pope
always critiques techniques in the light of the good pursued,
particularly when techniques, which are properly means, come to
be seen as ends.
Since Olesko acknowledges no conception of the human good,
she predictably reads the Pope's criticism of the culture of
efficiency as one element of his "vilification of democracy" and
the liberal ideals of freedom and autonomy. 45 Again, the Pope
never criticizes democracy per se, but only when it comes to be
seen as an end in itself rather than a means to the pursuit of true
individual good and the common good.
Democracy cannot be idolized to the point of making it a substitute for morality
or a panacea for immorality. Fundamentally, democracy is a "system" and as
such is a means and not an end .... in other words, its morality depends on the
morality of the ends it pursues and of the means which it employs .... the value
of democracy stands or falls with the values it embodies and promotes. 46

According to the Pope's analysis, in a political system without
such ends, efficiency necessarily becomes the default 'virtue' that
drives societal decisions.
In her essay on Evangelium vitae's analysis of abortion, which
cites the document somewhere between seventy-five and a
hundred times, Leslie Griffin neither ever agrees with the Pope's
substantive criticism of abortion, nor does she ever defend the
43 CL, 106; italics added.
44 Contra Olesko's claims about the Pope's affirmation of "technological reasoning" with
regard to natural family planning, Karol Wojtyla's Love and Responsibilityargues that natural
family planning is not a technique of birth regulation, but an application of the virtue of
continence, which is one dimension of the virtue of chastity (Wojtyla, Love and
Responsibiliity,trans. H. T. Willetts [London: Farrer, Strauss and Giroux, 1981], 240-42).
45 CL, 106.
46 EV, §70. Furthermore, this is not the entire 'story' about democracy in Evangelium
vitae. In §20, the Pope contrasts the "democratic ideal" with totalitarianism as he does the
culture of life with the culture of death.

476

JOHN BERKMAN

view that abortion may be good or justified in some instances. She
simply does not directly engage abortion as a moral question.
Instead, her main conceptual move is to draw a sharp distinction
between theological arguments and natural-law arguments, and to
argue that only natural-law arguments have potential for being
part of a "public" conversation about the law. Thus she has no
sympathy with Evangelium vitae's approach, which, in "accentuating the theological argument ... urges Catholic moral principles
upon all persons, non-Catholic as well as Catholic. It also
recommends that Catholic moral teaching be ascribed into law. "47
What is Griffin's goal? It seems she is interested in making
Catholic morality safe for American liberal democracy, keeping it
as a private issue, or making it an issue of at best an eviscerated
notion of natural law separate from theology. The Church has no
business putting forward its theological vision of the true and the
good in the public square of America, at least not when the issue
is abortion. Why not? Because ecclesially specific beliefs do not
merit the status of "public reason." The final footnote of Griffin's
essay quotes John Rawls's 1993 book Political Liberalism as
follows:
Public reason "means that in discussing constitutional essentials and matters of
basic justice we are not to appeal to comprehensive religious and philosophical
doctrines-to what we as individuals or members of associations see as the
whole truth .... " Instead, public reasoning should "rest on the plain truths now
widely accepted, or available, to citizens generally." 48

With these Rawlsian commitments, Griffin also misses the Pope's
fundamental philosophical point, that the dignity and inviolability
of innocent human life is the precondition and basis for all other
human goods to be rightly pursued and for human laws which aim
47 CL, 160. Of course, Griffin's dichotomy between "theological" and "natural-law"
arguments is deeply problematic. For example, Aquinas's understanding of natural law is
theologically rooted, and many contemporary commentators on natural law are stressing its
properly theological character. See, for example, Russell Hittinger, "Veritatis splendor and
the Theology of Natural Law" in Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology, ed.
J. A. DiNoia, O.P., and Romanus Cessario, O.P. (Chicago: Midwest Theological Forum,
1999), 97-127.
48 CL, 173 n. 18. See also Leslie Griffin, "Good Catholics Should Be Rawlsian Liberals,"
Southern California Interdisciplinary Law journal 5 (1997).

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE

477

to protect and promote such goods. As Lois Malcolm rightly
notes,
The pope's argument is that the modern constriction of morality to the rights
and freedoms of individuals undercuts the very bases for protecting those rights
since it offers no other reference point for making moral choices than the
choices-the acts of power-for individuals. 49

The pope is trying to provide a basis for a morality which precisely cannot be reduced to the imposition, enactment, enforcement, or inscription of some persons' acts of power over and
against the lives of other members of a society. The pope does not
bring forth a campaign to guard the lives of innocent human
beings because he "wants to enforce the Church's moral teaching,"
but because it is a necessary foundation for any authentic social
and political life. As long as Griffin refuses to entertain such
notions of the good, I am not sure she can provide what she
undoubtedly wants, namely, an adequate basis for a good and just
society.
This brings into sharp relief the difference between the articles
by Griffin and Cathleen Kaveny in terms of the appropriate functions of the law. Having imbibed a Rawlsian view, Griffin refuses
to bring a substantive view of the good into the public realm, and
thus appears to understand the function of law to be primarily
regulatory. 50 In contrast, drawing on a Thomistic theory of law,
Kaveny argues that law should not be limited to punitive and
protective functions, but can and should have the purpose of leading potential wrongdoers to virtue, "albeit slowly and haltingly."
This is law's pedagogical function.
Kaveny is well aware that to attribute to law a pedagogical
function also requires one to acknowledge the necessity of a
substantive account of the good, an account of human flourishing.
She is also aware that such accounts of the good, while necessary
for her "virtue-based" legal theory, are very difficult to defend in
our contemporary fragmented society. However, Kaveny argues
EVE, 183.
so Kaveny's citation of Feinberg's view that the function of law is essentially negative is
pertinent (CL, 143).
49

478

JOHN BERKMAN

that she is no worse off than typical proponents of the currently
dominant rights-based theories of law. For such rights-based
theories, if they are sufficiently detailed enough to furnish a concrete legal system, also draw on an account of human flourishing,
even if it is a tacit one. 51
However, Kaveny does not simply want a more "honest"
rights-based theory, for rights language simply "does not provide
a basis for fruitful moral conversation about controverted moral
issues, especially in a pluralistic society. "52 Focusing their attention
on the victim rather than the perpetrator, rights-based theories are
ill-equipped to address key elements of criminal law, such as the
subjective culpability of the perpetrator. Furthermore, Kaveny
believes-with good reason-that emphasis on rights language has
led to the withering of the fundamental action theory central to
the Catholic tradition. While obviously not the whole story,
Kaveny's drawing a connection between the rise of rights-based
legal theories and the increasing rejection of the distinction
between intended and foreseen consequences of an action is well
taken.
Further, Kaveny argues that rights-based theories generally fail
to make the necessary connection between negative duties (e.g.,
never make direct attacks on innocent life) and positive duties of
care. Kaveny fears that by appealing so strongly to rights in its
heroic defence of innocent life, Evangelium vitae may be in danger
of failing to keep the intimate connection between negative and
positive duties clear. Again, Kaveny thinks that a more
thoroughgoing appeal to Aquinas would serve Evangelium vitae
well on this score. The encyclical rightly appeals to Aquinas's
point that laws which contravene the moral order are not laws but
"acts of violence." However, Aquinas also notes that laws which
place burdens unequally on the community, even with a view for
the common good, are also acts of violence rather than laws.53 In
Thomistic theory, law functions well when the appropriate
negative and positive duties are viewed as complementary and
function in tandem.
51 CL, 142-43.

52 CL, 136.
53 CL, 141. Kaveny cites STh I-II, q. 93, a. 3, ad 2; and STh I-II, q. 96, a. 5.

THE MESSAGE OF EVANGELIUM VITAE

479

Kaveny believes the inadequacy of rights-based moral theories
is revealed in a particularly profound way on the issues of
abortion and euthanasia. With issues like these, one cannot in any
meaningful way sharply separate the negative duties regarding
direct killing from positive duties of care. Thus Kaveny notes "as
the Pope himself recognizes, the persons most tempted to kill the
weak and the innocent are those upon whom the positive duties
of continuing to care for them rest most heavily." 54 If the law is to
address these questions in a more fruitful way than has been the
case in the recent past, Kaveny believes that increased attention
must be paid to the law's pedagogical function.
While Kaveny is clear about the grave wrong of abortion, she
thinks that any legislative initiative to limit abortion must be part
of a wider effort to "inculcate virtue" in our society regarding the
inviolability of human life, or such efforts are doomed to failure.
To her fellow lawyers who wish to develop an account of law that
encourages its "pedagogical" function, she warns them that they
"need to develop a way of honoring the honest, although mistaken, moral beliefs of others that is not reducible to pluralistic
relativism or a callous disregard of the harmful effects of those
beliefs when put into practice. " 55 This is a monumental task; we
can hope to hear more about it from Kaveny before too long.
In conclusion, while Choosing Life and Ecumenical Ventures in
Ethics provide many valuable insights into Evangelium Vitae, they
do not in the end focus our attention on the message at the heart
of this encyclical. Evangelium vitae calls us to be fully human, and
a full and adequate recognition of our human dignity rests in a
timeful narrative of our encounter with Christ. Our encounter
with Christ "in no way lessens the value of our existence in time;
it takes it and directs it to its final destiny." 56 Precisely by
embracing the irreducibly theological drama of fulfillment which
Christ offers to us, we find it possible to live in harmony with the
demands of right reason and the deepest longings of the human
heart.
54 CL, 141.
55

56

CL, 146.
EV, §38.

480

JOHN BERKMAN

This theological vision can certainly inform more fully the
work of moral theologians concerned with medical ethics. In the
letter quoted at the beginning of this essay, John Paul II presents
moral theologians with a vision of service to their world, part of
which involves "challeng[ing] the prevailing culture at those
points where human dignity and rights are threatened." This is in
no way "anti-" or "against" culture, but a true service to any "just
and moral society." While one element of challenging the prevailing culture is "dialogue," it is only one element. The kind of
moral formation needed at this time involves catechesis and conversion. This catechesis and conversion begins with ourselves,
and must also go on in our Church and in our society. For our
society to commit itself to the protection of every innocent life
will certainly require more than dialogue, it will require conversion. It will require a reshaping of many of our practices which
follow a conversion of heart. Where do we turn to find such
practices? Evangelium vitae suggests that we turn to the Church's
outstanding history of charity, a history which has brought into
being in the Church and society many forms of service to life
which evoke admiration from all unbiased observers. Every
Christian community, with a renewed sense of responsibility, must
continue to write this history through various kinds of pastoral
and social activity. 57
There is much concrete practical wisdom embodied in these
forms of service which continuously needs to be creatively
integrated into the life of all of the Church's institutions, especially its hospitals, clinics, and convalescent homes. Discovering,
encouraging, and promoting our "history of charity" is perhaps
one of the most pressing tasks for the moral theologian at this
time. 58

57 EV, §87.
58 Thanks to M. Baxter,$. Donahue, and J. Grabowski for comments on an earlier draft
of this paper.

BOOK REVIEWS
Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas: Sources and Synthesis. By
VIVIANBOLAND, 0.P. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1996. Pp. 353. $128.50 (cloth).
ISBN 90-04-10392-9.
In this remarkably wide-ranging book, Fr. Boland has presented scholars of
medieval philosophy with a compact history of the doctrine of divine ideas in
Western philosophy, as well as a study of the scope of that doctrine in the
thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. To accomplish both of these tasks, Boland
divides his presentation into two parts, the first comprising four chapters and
the second three. In the first part of the book, he is successful in setting forth
the major figures and their key, historically influential theses, though some of
the analyses are more protracted than would be required simply in order to
provide the background to Aquinas. The second part of the book addresses
Aquinas's own theory and outlines its main features by analyzing texts from
various periods of Aquinas's literary career.
The book opens with an introduction laying out the conflicting interpretations of divine ideas given by Thomists in the twentieth century. Such
notable scholars as Gilson and Sertillanges claim that Aquinas's account of the
divine nature, especially that found in Summa contra Gentiles I, does not
necessitate any doctrine of divine ideas and that Thomas's emphasis on divine
simplicity militates somewhat against endorsing divine ideas. According to
Thomists of this outlook, Aquinas simply held on to the theory of divine ideas,
historically speaking, out of respect for the theological authority of St.
Augustine and not out of any theoretical commitments of his own. On the
other hand, such a leading authority as Geiger maintains that the doctrine of
divine ideas is integral to Aquinas's theological thinking-indeed, so integral
that Thomas needs to posit divine ideas in order to sustain the divine simplicity
while simultaneously allowing for God's intimate awareness of each aspect of
his creation. Boland's work, through its detailed examination of the sources for
Thomas's doctrine of divine ideas and the texts that present that doctrine
constitutes, in effect, a response in favor of Geiger's position and opposed to
the minimalist approach to divine ideas characteristic of Gilson and
Sertillanges.
Each of the first four chapters focuses on a different group of prominent
figures. The first treats of Plato and the tradition of Academic speculation
leading to and including middle Platonism. Regarding Plato himself, Boland
undertakes an analysis of the Timaeus with its characteristic doctrine of the
481

482

BOOK REVIEWS

Demiurge. Although he acknowledges the problematic enterprise of interpreting the professedly mythic aspects of the doctrine, Boland nonetheless
presents a fairly straightforward reading of the Timaeus: the Demiurge is not
the supreme principle of the Platonic universe, though it is prior to soul and
the physical universe, while the Forms are prior to the Demiurge and are
certainly not the thoughts of a divine mind. Observing that this way of
understanding the Platonic account of creation, though perhaps justified on
textual grounds, leaves Plato subject to many of the criticisms later voiced by
Aristotle, Boland adds that the Timaeus so understood is open as well to two
philosophical developments: (1) identifying the Demiurge with the supreme
principle of the universe and (2) placing the Forms within the mind of the
supreme principle as its thoughts. These two developments cannot be precisely
traced historically, but clearly the second can be seen already in the works of
Antiochus of Ascalon, the middle Platonist of the first century B.C., whose
thought was continued and amplified by such notable figures as Albinus. The
first of the developments would seem to be found in Platonic tradition prior to
Antiochus, but is clearly judged to be commonplace Platonic doctrine by
Roman philosophers such as Cicero and Seneca in their summary renderings of
Greek philosophical teachings. A final figure of importance in the transmission
of early- and middle-Platonic doctrine is Philo Judaeus whose discussion of a
divinely spoken Word containing an intelligible world provided much stimulation for later Christian speculation.
The second of the background chapters deals with Plotinus, Augustine, and
Boethius. Plotinus is seen as bringing to fulfillment a certain tendency in
Platonic thinking as an effort to respond to Aristotelian criticisms of the Forms.
By positing Forms as the very thoughts of vouc;;, Plotiims locates the Forms as
intelligibles in the divine mind, borrowing extensively from Aristotle's quite
similar doctrine of divine mind in Metaphysics book A. Furthermore, Plotinus's
approach allows the divine mind to function as the measure of the dependent
and subsequent items in the process of cosmological emanation, thereby making
room for a doctrine of providence much richer than that found in the
Aristotelian writings. Yet, as Boland notes, the fact that the Plotinian vouc;;, is
not the ultimate, but penultimate, principle of reality meant that no Christian
philosopher could take over Plotinus's theory in its original form, despite its
many advantages in terms of synthesizing the Platonic and Aristotelian accounts
of supersensible reality. In his interpretation of Augustine, Boland proposes,
interestingly enough, that Augustine's speculation about divine ideas remains
more indebted to the middle Platonist than to the Plotinian account of divine
mind. The classic text in Augustine's corpus, De 83 quaestionibus q. 46, speaks
of a plurality of rationes that are different for each type of created thing yet
identical to God, the first principle, being the very thoughts of the divine mind.
When such terminology is combined with Augustine's treatment of the divine
Word in the De Trinitate, what emerges is something more readily reconcilable
with Philo Judaeus or Seneca than with Plotinus. Boethius, on the other hand,
is believed by Boland to have undergone considerably more Plotinian influence,

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something that Boland finds revealed in Boethius's constant concern to safeguard the divine unity and simplicity.
The third chapter gives detailed overviews of Pseudo-Dionysius and Proclus.
The importance of Pseudo-Dionysius lies in his identification of the divine
ideas with the divine attributes of life-itself, wisdom-itself, and being-itself.
These auto-realities are rooted in God's causal activity, his overflowing
generosity and perfection. Such a direct linkage to divine attributes provided
later Western thinkers with an occasion to consider the relationship between
the various attributes and the divine ideas, a framework independent of and
differing markedly from the Augustinian tendency to locate the ideas in the
attribute of knowledge and the procession of the divine Word. Boland's
extensive treatment of Proclus is partially an effort to place into sharper relief
the Christian elements in the Pseudo-Dionysian synthesis and partially an
attempt to sketch out the pagan speculation underlying the Pseudo-Aristotelian
Liberde causisso often commented upon by medieval philosopher-theologians.
The final chapter on Aquinas's sources focuses upon Aristotle and his account of divine knowledge. Acknowledging the difficulty of distinguishing the
account of mind in general in the Aristotelian corpus from that given for divine
mind, Boland opts for an interpretation that sees the statements about mind in
the De anima as being generically true about mind insofar as it is something
divine, while holding that the claims advanced in the Metaphysicsdescribe the
uniquely Divine Mind. Since Aristotle's thought is noncreationist, Boland
rightly understands the Stagirite's metaphysical explanations to terminate in
supersensible reality as an effort to explain the intelligibility and order of the
universe rather than its existence. Yet he portrays Aristotle's God, curiously
enough, as "the model rather than its [the world's] goal and the exemplar but
not the cause of its being" (173). The present reviewer would think that the
Aristotelian God could quite rightly be described as the goal and final cause of
the universal cosmic motion, but not in any way its model or exemplar; indeed,
the standard interpretation of Aristotelian theology sees it as being distinguished from other theologies by its denial of exemplarity. At the end of this
chapter on Aristotle, Boland quickly reviews some key figures in the transmission of Aristotelian learning, including ancient Aristotelians such as Alexander
of Aphrodisias, Islamic Aristotelians such as Al-Farabi, Avicenna, and Averroes,
and Christian Aristotelians such as John Philoponus and Albert the Great.
While characterizing Albert as "the enthusiastic leader of [the] fresh attempt
to integrate the philosophy of Aristotle with Christian theology" (187) beginning in the Latin West during the thirteenth century, he seems to overlook
entirely the notable efforts of such predecessors to Albert as Alexander of
Hales, Jean de la Rochelle, Phillip the Chancellor, and Richard Rufus.
Turning to the main subject of the book, Boland begins his analysis of
Aquinas's position on divine ideas with a study of the doctrine of his early
Scriptum on the Sentences. The main lines of Aquinas's teaching are already
present in this early work: God's knowledge of creatures is rooted in his
knowledge of his own essence as imitable and things are related to their

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respective ideas in accord with the manner that they are produced by God.
Although the doctrine of the Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate q. 3, a. 2, and
Summa Theologiae I, q. 15 introduces a clearer distinction between types of
divine ideas as objects of quasi-speculative knowledge (rationes) and quasipractical knowledge (exemplaria), Thomas is obviously committed to allowing
divine ideas for a wide range of objects: species, supervenient accidents,
individuals, and possibles, since he emphasizes the importance of God's
knowledge of singulars. The most problematic text of Thomas's mature literary
activity is, of course, Summa contra Gentiles I, cc. 50-54 with its various
redactions wherein Thomas deliberately suppresses a draft text that makes
extensive use of the doctrine of divine ideas. Boland's efforts to lessen the
impact of this piece of evidence which lends apparent support to those who
would minimize the significance of divine ideas for Aquinas are hampered on
two scores. First, Boland does not make the rather obvious reply that to argue
from the doctrine's absence in the Summa contra Gentiles to its secondary
status is tantamount to an argument from a lack of evidence and that, in any
event, Thomas certainly included the divine ideas in his magisterial, and later,
Summa Theologiae. Second, Boland does not exploit sufficiently the Islamic
context of the Summa contra Gentiles; Thomas's tendency to be in dialogue
with Avicenna and Averroes in that work may help to explain the difference
between its approach and that found in his other writings.
In his sixth chapter, Boland outlines Aquinas's account of divine ideas as
they relate to the divine Word. Since Aquinas allows two ways in which things
may be in the Word, as that which the Word knows and that which is said in
the Word, he seems keen to allow a role for the divine will in the speaking of
the divine ideas bearing upon creata as opposed to creabilia, though Boland
never fully explicates precisely how this role is to be rendered consistent with
the necessity of the procession of the Word.
In his final chapter, Boland attempts a retrospective analysis of precisely
how Thomas's overall theory of divine ideas aligns with the various sources
that the Angelic Doctor read and utilized. Emphasizing that Thomas does not
assign the divine ideas the same epistemological role as that given them by
Augustine, Boland contrasts the Thomistic doctrine of agent intellect with its
naturally efficacious enlightenment rendering sensible items actually intelligible
to what he describes as (284) "the occasionalist type" of enlightenment "associated with medieval Augustinianism." Here Boland does not seem to fathom
that the ultimate grounds for Aquinas's rejection of Augustinian epistemology
lie in Thomas's revision of the term of human intellectual knowledge to
encompass only necessary truths about created things rather than to include
awareness of immutable, eternal truths, the view associated with Bonaventure
and other illuminationists of the thirteenth century.
On balance, the book is a fine effort at trying to solve a problem within
Thomistic secondary scholarship by a careful examination of the sources at
Aquinas's disposal for his doctrine of the divine ideas and his appropriation of
those sources. The book suffers at times from a tendency to become so bogged

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down in fleshing out the precise meaning of the doctrines of earlier figures
such as Plotinus and Pseudo-Dionysius that the main object of study is temporarily lost from view; shorter sketches of the historical background would
probably have sufficed, even if at times questionable interpretations would
have to be taken on matters controversial among specialists working in ancient
philosophy. Furthermore, a strictly chronological order of presentation would
probably have improved the clarity of the treatment since Aristotle's views had
to be referred to extensively prior to their formal study in the fourth chapter.
On the other hand, much more could, and should, have been made of the
impact of near-contemporaries and contemporaries on Aquinas's thought; St.
Bonaventure, for example, is doubtless one of the contemporary theologians
with whom Thomas is in dialogue in the Sentencescommentary and elsewhere,
yet Bonaventure is mentioned only in passing. But, despite its faults, Boland's
book remains a solid achievement. It gathers together a wealth of material,
both secondary and primary, dealing with divine ideas in Aquinas and the
doctrinal tradition leading to him. Any future scholar treating of the topic of
divine ideas will, doubtless, benefit enormously from the study of Boland's
treatment of the problems involved and his impressive command of the
relevant primary literature.
TIMOTHY B. NOONE

The Catholic Universityof America
Washington,D.C.

Living with God: Thomas Aquinas on the Relation between Life on Earth and
'Life' after Death. By CARLO LEGET. Publications of the Thomas Instituut
te Utrecht, n.s. 5. Leuven: Peters, 1997. Pp. 304. 1100 BEF (paper).
ISBN 90-6831-966-3.
Skipping directly to the author's concluding chapter is an occupational
hazard for readers, but what is death for mystery novels can breathe life into
academic books, and I found myself moving directly to the last of Leget's five
chapters after struggling with his first. The first chapter, called "In Search of
an Appropriate Perspective: Aquinas on God and Life," opens with the nature
of theology (STh I, q. 1). Leget then turns to "life" and "death" as they apply
to creatures. The focus of chapter 1, however, is on "life" as a divine name
(STh I, q. 18), and Leget concludes by considering "life" among the Trinity of
Persons in God.
Two points initially made it difficult for me to follow the "search" in
chapter 1. First, the presentation of the nature of theology, though clear, is too
brief and lacking in argument. Leget's main conclusion is that sacra doctrina is

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broader than its three distinct "parts": Scripture, the articles of faith, and
theology proper, defined as "scientific reflection on the content of faith." This
view is intriguing but not without problems. Leget's textual warrant to buttress
the claim that theology is only "part of the sacred doctrine" is "Unde theologia
quae ad sacram doctrinam pertinet differt secundum genus ab illa theologia
quae pars philosophiae ponitur." But to say that theology "pertains" to sacred
doctrine is not necessarily to make theology merely a part of sacred doctrine.
While admitting that "Aquinas considers the Articles of Faith as the principles
of theology" Leget does not draw what seems to be the logical consequence of
this admission, namely, that such principles and the conclusions drawn with
their aid are both contained within one Aristotelian science, the science of sacra
doctrina, for which theology is but another name, not merely a part.
The second stumbling block concerned the "central question" of the book,
"the relation between vita naturae and vita aeterna." Leget explains that he
"will use the word 'relationship' for what Aquinas means with [by?] conversatio, 'life' in the sense of 'living together with someone'." But he neglects to
give a thorough explanation of conversatio, neither appealing to Busa nor
pursuing its rich relations with its linguistic twin conversio. Here is a lost
opportunity. And in the explanation he does give (64 n. 151), though he
correctly denies that God has a "real relationship" with creatures, he neglects
to define this rather arcane Scholastic expression or explain the difference
between 'real relations' and 'relations of reason' in a way that would throw
light on his central topic.
Such difficulties led me to the brief and illuminating final chapter. Its
title- "Living with God as Meaning of Life"-fits the whole work into a genre
which became popular in the twentieth century and might be called 'meaning
of life' literature, most memorably exemplified by the psychologist Viktor
Frankl's classic, Man's Search for Meaning. Leget points out that while the
word 'meaning' traditionally referred to the sense of some specific term,
beginning in the mid-nineteenth century it took on a more general intention,
referring to "human existence as such," as in the now familiar phrase "the
meaning of life." Against the backdrop of two World Wars, the Cold War,
existentialism, and its offspring deconstruction and postmodernism, Leget
thinks that "the quest for meaning" in the wider sense "has become symptomatic for contemporary North-Atlantic culture" (256). No less a figure than
John Paul II has recently agreed, describing philosophy itself as a "dramatic"
quest for truth which begins with the "question: 'Does life have a meaning?'"
(Fides et Ratio 26).
Leget attempts to answer a twentieth-century question by turning for help
and advice to a thirteenth-century Dominican friar. Turning to Aquinas sends
Leget off in a different direction from Frankl, who focused on his own deathcamp experiences and said that for an existentialist "what matters is not the
meaning of life in general but rather the specificmeaning of a person's life at
a given moment." By contrast, Leget turns to Aquinas to give a generalaccount
of the meaning of human life as such, one that could undergird any individual

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account. For Aquinas, God is not merely a creator; humans have a teleological
relation to him. To understand any relation one must look at three things: the
subject of the relation, the relation itself, and the term of the relation. Roughly
speaking, Leget organizes his book around these three parts of the relation
between humans and God. Chapter 2, entitled "Foundations of Life with God,"
focuses on the subject, the human agent. Chapter 3, called "Dynamism of Life
with God," is devoted to the kind of human activity that develops the relationship between humans and God in the present life. Chapter 4 concerns the terminus of that relation: eternal life, and is called "Perfection of Life with God."
The topics that could be treated within this framework are virtually
unlimited, but in chapter 2 Leget, like Frankl, concentrates on death, that great
evil standing between "the life of nature" and "eternal life." To understand the
condition of facing death, Leget takes up three topics: death itself, Christ, and
the sacraments. He begins with God, who, though "other" than creatures, is
their "final end." The death humans face can be understood in two ways, which
leads Leget to an important methodological aside:
Eventually, I take the theologicalinterpretation of death as being the
most comprehensive framework in which all other levels and orders fall
into their proper place. Before this theological interpretation is studied,
the level of natural philosophy will be considered, since here, the
consequences which follow from Aquinas' doctrine of the unity of the
soul are worked out. (77)

When taken philosophically death is "defined" as the separation of soul from
body. The fact that Leget does not go into Aquinas's arguments for the
existence, spirituality, or immortality of the soul indicates how separate
theology and philosophy are for him, and that he thinks the present work
theological rather than philosophical. On a second definition, death is "the
privation of life," which leads immediately to the question "why death?" and
to the properly theological answer that death is punishment for original sin.
Hope for a life beyond death comes through Christ, and in particular from the
suffering and death of Christ, which is "the heart of the matter" because Christ
alone restores the relation of human to God and provides an exemplar for
human life. Humans "participate" in the "work of Christ" through the
sacraments, which are the "foundation and framework of life with God."
The most important part of the study is chapter 3, concerned with actively
living out one's teleological relation to God, or, in Leget's words "the dynamism of life with God." Leget follows the order Aquinas took in the "moral
theology" of the second part of the Summa, though very selectively. Beginning
with God as the ultimate end of human life, this chapter encompasses the
theological virtues of faith, hope, and charity as the means of attaining that
end, then the evangelical counsels of poverty, chastity, and obedience as
"directed at one's own spiritual perfection." After treating such states of
character, Leget turns to the act of martyrdom, which requires "a degree of
moral perfection which outreaches that of the Evangelical Counsels" in "giving

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up corporal life for the sake of spiritual life," and he ends by considering the
morality of the act of killing (STh 11-11, q. 64). In this chapter both the promise
and the problems of Leget's enterprise are clearly on display.
He correctly points out that even though "eternal life" with God consists
in the contemplative act of beatific vision, the "way of life" Aquinas recommends for our journey in the present life is the active life. A sign of the priority
of active over contemplative life for humans in via is that "Aquinas considers
the vita activa" of the friars "to be more perfect than the vita contemplativa of
those [the monks] who are committed solely to prayer." Leget is also correct
in stating that the present active life requires the full perfection of the
theological virtues; living out the four cardinal virtues is simply not enough.
The most interesting part of chapter 3 is the treatment of the morality of
killing. Older Neoscholastics tended to suppress the religious elements of
Aquinas's argument or to call "philosophical" what was actually based on faith.
More recently the Grisez 'school' has rejected capital punishment, for instance,
on the grounds of an absolute right to life, a conclusion now also embraced by
Pope John Paul II. While Leget does not directly take on these contemporary
views, his way of approaching the texts of Aquinas is illuminating about what
Thomas himself actually meant, and could provide the basis for helpful
interventions in contemporary discussions. His fundamental point is to insist
on interpreting "Aquinas' discussions about the killing of human beings" in
terms of the human journey to God which involves "the proportion between
vita naturalis (vita animae et corporis), vita gratiae and vita gloriae." Consequently, he distinguishes arguments about killing into those set "within the
social context of a community," which are purely philosophical, and those set
in "relation with life with God (vita gratiae)," which involve faith. In the first
perspective, Leget finds that Aquinas uses two criteria for exceptions to the
general rule that killing humans is forbidden: (1) the person killed must be "a
sinner who is a danger to the community" and (2) the killing must be "done by
the public authority charged with the care for the common good." He astutely
notes that these criteria "are the same as Thomas formulates" for "waging
war," and that "a pattern emerges" from comparing homicide and war, namely
that they are justified only based on "the well-being of innocent people."
The fact that well-being involves more than bodily life provides Leget with
a point of transition to the perspective of faith. What Aquinas says about killing
heretics and killing oneself may be difficult for our contemporaries to accept,
but Leget does us a favor by pointing out that Aquinas's arguments in
important ways rest on faith. For example, he notes that "killing oneself is a
double murder: not only corporal life is destroyed, but spiritual life as well,"
a conclusion based on seeing human life as vita gratiae moving to vita gloriae.
The magnitude of the evil involved in suicide cannot be seen apart from this
perspective. In addition, the perspective of faith gives Leget a solid reading of
Aquinas on what is perhaps the most difficult biblical story about killing: "The
story of the sacrifice of Isaac confirms the central position of the life of grace
for dealing with corporal life and death." This case may seem impossible when
considered from the perspective of the human "social context" as seen in the

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precepts of the second tablet of the Decalogue. But when looked at in light of
the first tablet, and seen through faith, "Abraham is no more than the executor
of God's death sentence, which is passed on each human being from the
moment of birth" because of original sin.
Leget's account in chapter 3, however, could be improved in one important
way. It is too narrowly 'theological'. He undervalues the role of rational
arguments in the dialectical interplay of faith and philosophy found in
Aquinas's theology. Thus, for example, in treating happiness Leget begins
where Thomas did, with the fact that human action is teleological. But he
simply passes over the many philosophical arguments Aquinas offers, in moving
from the end of a given act to all acts having ends to a hierarchy of ends to one
ultimate end. Most important is what justifies identifying the one ultimate end
with God. Aquinas devotes the whole of question 2 to a series of arguments
modeled on Boethius's Consolation which are designed to lead the mind
rationally to the conclusion that such an ultimate end cannot be something
other than God. Such an argument may fall short of demonstrating that God
is the source of happiness, but it shows that Aquinas does not think the
identification of the highest end with God obvious, as Leget does: "This
[ultimate end], of course, is none other than God." Perhaps it is obvious
because it is a theological assumption. But theological assumptions, if indeed
this is one, need not be arbitrary or irrational, and reason can open us to them,
a point of capital importance for the contemporary reader.
Another example of this problem is as follows. Virtue is "the central element
in Aquinas' consideration of moral action and life of grace." Though St.
Thomas himself used seven virtues-the four cardinal as well as the three
theological virtues-to structure his presentation of our 'return to God' in the
Secunda Secundae, Leget limits himself to the theological virtues and devotes
but two paragraphs to the cardinal virtues. The reason seems to be a misconception that the cardinal virtues are irrelevant to the journey to eternal life.
What little Leget says about them bears out this point. He correctly notes that
the term 'cardinal' comes from "the hinge (cardo) of the door," but then
confuses this metaphor by adding that the door leads "to human life." But if
the door leads to human life, what is the door itself, metaphorically speaking?
Later in the very text Leget quotes Aquinas clarifies the metaphor: "Moral
deeds are the door through which one enters into the contemplation of
wisdom" in heaven (De vir. card., q. un., a. 1, ad 4). The reason why getting
the metaphor right is important is that on Aquinas's construction the cardinal
virtues are called "cardinal" precisely because they lead us to the perfect
happiness of eternal life. Leget, by contrast, holds that the four cardinal virtues
only "contribute to the happiness man can reach by his natural powers
(beatitudoimperfecta)."In so passing over the cardinal virtues as irrelevant to
the topic of "life on earth leading to 'life' after death," Leget neglects to follow
his own sage advice: "In Aquinas' account of happiness, imperfect and perfect
beatitudo should not be played off against each other."

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After chapter 3 takes the reader through the present life, chapter 4 turns to
the heavenly goal. Here the way Leget divides up "eternal life" into consideration of the glorified soul, glorified body, and glorified creation puts what is
normally conceived purely personally into a communal context, and sets up a
clever treatment of "the 'logic' of hell," where "Aquinas' account of mors
aeterna is in every respect the reverse of heaven." Certainly Dante understood
that while God is the center of heaven, "in hell everything is sought in accordance with one's own profit." Leget points out that there is an analogy between
"eternal punishment" and "capital punishment on earth, which is not directed
at the emendation of the one sentenced, but to the profit of the community,"
which perhaps shows why our contemporaries find them equally objectionable.
Leget's work bears the marks of a first effort, and includes some blemishes.
Apart from problems of substance such as those mentioned above, it reads too
much like a dissertation, though one rather skimpy in the use of secondary
sources. The ethical works of Grisez, Finnis, and Mcinerny are not even listed
in the bibliography. It also includes minor distractions like using Deferrari's
now fifty-year-old Lexicon (22 n. 4 7), even though the author clearly knows
Busa, and using Weisheipl's biography (4) rather than Torrell, whose 1993
work is not mentioned. But looking at Aquinas's moral thought by paying close
attention to its explicitly religious dimension, especially introducing the nowpopular "narrative" approach in a way that is quite faithful to the thought of
Aquinas, as Leget does, makes for an intrinsically worthwhile, if less than
perfect, book. One hopes that when Dr. Leget turns again to this topic he will
look more carefully at the wide variety of fine work now being done in
Thomistic ethics by Anglo-American philosophers, and that he will enter into
discussion with more of them.
R.E.HOUSER
Center for Thomistic Studies
Houston, Texas

Person in the World. By MARY CATHARINE BASEHEART. Dordrecht: Kluwer,
1997. Pp. 204. $99.00 ISBN 0-7923-4490-1.

Almost anyone who has heard of Edith Stein knows that she was a
German-Jewish Carmelite nun who was put to death at Auschwitz by the Nazis
and recently canonized by Pope John Paul II. Many will also recall that she was
an intellectual, a feminist, and a student and associate of the philosopher
Edmund Husserl. But few, unless they have a working acquaintance with the
phenomenological movement and the German language, are likely to be
familiar with her significance as a philosopher in her own right.

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Person in the World was written to redress this need. It is the first
comprehensive introduction to Stein's philosophy in English. This fact alone
makes it a major achievement. Much of it is based on Baseheart's doctoral
dissertation, "The Encounter of Husserl's Phenomenology and the Philosophy
of Thomas Aquinas in Selected Writings of Edith Stein," written at Notre Dame
almost forty years ago, in 1960. The reason for the delay in publication is that
immediately after completing her dissertation, Baseheart was pressed into
administrative duties as dean at Spalding University, a position she occupied for
nearly twenty years. Tragically, she died in 1994, just before receiving word
that the manuscript of Person in the World, the culmination of her scholarly
life's work, had been accepted for publication. We owe a debt of thanks to
John R. Wilcox and the Edith Stein Center for Study and Research, which
Baseheart founded at Spalding University in 1990, for seeing her magnum opus
through to its final publication.
Despite its comparative brevity, Person in the World is a large accomplishment, offering an overview of Stein's entire philosophical development. Starting with a synopsis of her life and thought, it proceeds with a careful analysis
of her ideas that progresses through chapters that are divided in a topical and
chronological sequence. Beginning with Stein's study On the Problem of
Empathy, which she wrote as her doctoral dissertation under Edmund Husserl
in 1916, it follows her use of the phenomenological method to examine such
topics as the foundations of psychology, the nature of the state, the nature of
woman, and the philosophy of education. Baseheart's book then follows Stein's
later philosophical development, where Stein turns the phenomenological
method toward the study of Aquinas, drawing points of comparison with
Husserl on such topics as intuition, essence, and finite and eternal being.
As Baseheart herself declares, Person in the World is an expository book and
does not aim to criticize Stein, either directly or by bringing her into discussion
with other philosophers, except for those that she herself is concerned with
(Husserl, Scheler, Aquinas, et al.): "My purpose in this book is to remove the
wrapping and lid from the gift that Edith Stein has given us and to say: 'Look!
See what is inside.'" Baseheart's aim was to provide an accurate summary of
Stein's work, which others may use in taking the further steps necessary toward
criticism and comparative analysis.
Stein's philosophical vocabulary presents obstacles similar to those of Karol
Wojtyla (Pope John Paul II) to readers without some background in
phenomenology. Even such an able exposition as Baseheart's, perhaps because
she was so closely focused upon presenting an accurate representation of Stein's
thought, provides very little to help the reader who is unacquainted with the
work of phenomenologists such as Husserl or Scheler. Baseheart undoubtedly
intended her book as a testament to Stein's highly technical skill, as well as her
breadth and profundity, as a phenomenologist.
Person in the World is divided into nine chapters: (1) "Light in Darkness:
Edith Stein's Life," (2) "Overview of Her Philosophy," (3) "The Human
Person," (4) "Community and State," (5) "Woman and Education," (6)

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"Essence and Existence," (7) "Intuition of Essence," (8) "Finite and Eternal
Being," and (9) "Concluding Postscript." An appendix contains Baseheart's
translation of extended sections of Stein's essay "Husserl's Phenomenology and
the Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas: Attempt at a Comparison," which Stein
contributed to a Festschriftpublished in honor of Husserl's seventieth birthday
in 1929. Baseheart also presents the reader with extensive explanatory and
documentary notes throughout her volume, as well as a thorough bibliography
of books and articles by and about Stein.
Stein began her studies at the University of Breslau where she became briefly
enamored with empirical psychology, but soon became persuaded that this
science was still in its infancy and rested on unclarified methodological
principles. It was during that time that she encountered Husserl's Logical
Investigations (1900-1901), which led to her decision to go to Gottingen to
study with Husserl. She was attracted both by the labor of conceptual
clarification she saw in his phenomenological method, and by the promise it
offered of surmounting the dominant psychologism of the day by means of the
analysis of essences and essential structures of phenomena.
The heyday of the Gottingen school of phenomenology was over by the time
Stein arrived, since most of the original members of the philosophical society
there (Adolf Reinach, Conrad and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Dietrich von
Hildebrand, Alexander Koyre, and Jean Hering) were no longer students of
Husserl. But Stein became good friends with a number of the members in her
time, including Hans Lipps and Fritz Kaufmann. Reinach's character and conversion had a profound effect on her, as did Scheler's lectures, which destroyed
her earlier rationalistic prejudices against the philosophical possibility of
religious faith. Her own conversion occurred in 1921 after a night of reading
St. Teresa of Avila's autobiography.
After completing her dissertation in 1916 under Husserl, who called her his
"best pupil," Stein served as his assistant, editing the manuscript of his Ideas
(vol. 2). Her letters to Roman Ingarden reveal her growing frustration with
Husserl's work habits and lack of time for her own work, which led her to
resign in 1918. In a succession of experiences that undoubtedly helped to
solidify her feminist outlook, she unsuccessfully sought university professorships (unheard of for women in her day) at Gottingen, Freiburg, and Breslau,
but managed to secure only a modest position as a secondary-school teacher at
a convent school for girls, St Magdalena's, in Speyer (1922-32).
Stein's strictly phenomenological work from this period includes, in addition
to her dissertation on empathy, a study of the philosophical foundations of
psychology and the social sciences (1922) and an investigation concerning the
nature of the state (1925). But it was also during this period that, without
ceasing to cooperate in the research of the phenomenologists, she began working with a small group of Catholic intellectuals formed around von Hildebrand,
Daniel Feuling, and Erich Przywara, who were collaborating on a German
edition of Cardinal Newman's works. She translated the volume of Newman's
letters and journals written before his conversion to the Catholic Church. Her

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most ambitious project during this time was her translation of Aquinas's
Disputed Questions on Truth (1931).
In 1931, Stein gave up her post at St. Magdalena's with its "piles of essays"
to devote her time to lecturing and writing. Already in 1927 she had started
lecturing in leading European cities on the subjects of women and education.
She had also been working on a massive treatise on potency and act, which she
later revised after her entry into the Carmelite order, under the title of Finite
and Eternal Being (1936). Like Karol Wojtyla, who was also a student of
Roman Ingarden and Scheler, and wrote his first work on St. John of the Cross,
Stein also wrote a work on St. John of the Cross, Science of the Cross, which
remained unfinished at the time of her martyrdom in 1942.
Baseheart, recognizing Stein's insistence that philosophy calls for completion
by theology without becoming theology, confines her study to Stein's
philosophy. The unifying thread she finds running throughout Stein's work is
the on tic structure of the person-already evident in her interest in psychology
at Breslau, as well as in her dissertation on empathy. In fact, Roman Ingarden
suggested that she was particularly receptive to the subject of empathy because
it offered a way of clarifying the ontical structure not only of the individual but
also of the community, as evidenced in her later studies of the philosophical
foundations of the social sciences and of the state.
In her study of empathy, Stein focuses on the existential, lived experience
of empathy, in contrast to Husserl's narrower epistemological concerns. She
distinguishes between what is experienced primordially and what is experienced non primordially in order to contrast how one's own self and other selves
are constituted in experience. The unity of the self constitutes itself in primordial acts (perceiving, recollecting) that link the present and past self. As the self
is constituted in primordially experienced acts, so other selves are constituted
in nonprimordially experienced acts of empathic consciousness. Like Husserl
(and Merleau-Ponty), Stein holds that our recognition of other selves is
founded on perceptual bodily experience. We experience our own bodies from
the "inside" and see ourselves from the "outside" as "other" in a world of
others. We see others from the "outside" as well, our perceptions generating
an empathic cognition transcending those perceptions themselves. Our experience of another's joy is nonprimordial, though it is evoked by the other's
primordial experience. Accordingly, Stein rejected Scheler's theory that we
perceive other selves from the "inside" as we perceive ourselves. In her view,
empathy functions constitutively to reveal not only the inner life of the other,
but also the self as other to its others, and thus as a means of self-knowledge
amidst one's relations to others.
A few summary observations concerning other dimensions of Stein's
philosophy covered by Baseheart will have to suffice. Stein's analysis of woman
follows the general structure of her theory of the constitution of the person,
but enters into an intricate synthesis of phenomenological and AristotelianThomistic conceptualizations. Each person has not only universal essence but
individual essence, embodying human essence through freely chosen individual

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acts. In two conceptually dense chapters on "Essence and Existence" and
"Intuition of Essence," Baseheart examines Stein's phenomenological conceptions of individual and universal essences and their relation to empirical
perception and Husserl's "categorical intuition."
In her later works, such as Finite and Eternal Being, Stein increasingly
turned her phenomenological approach to focus on issues raised by her intense
study of Aristotle, Augustine, Bonaventure, Scotus, and especially Aquinas.
Religious concerns become more central. She took issue with Heidegger's
emphasis on Angst, calling his work the philosophy of bad conscience and
suggesting that the experience of "security"-based on the feeling of being
supported in one's received being-rather than "anxiety" is the more typical
human experience.
But as Baseheart notes, it would be a mistake to suppose that Stein ever
turned her back on her phenomenological approach in her later work. It is true
that even in her dissertation she exhibited a marked independence in the way
she appropriated Husserl's ideas. It is also true that she sided with the phenomenological realists (Reinach, Scheler, Conrad-Martius, lngarden, Hering)
against Husserl in rejecting both his turn to transcendental idealism and his
transcendental reduction (though not his eidetic reduction). Indeed, Stein's
abiding commitment to metaphysical realism is apparent throughout Baseheart's book, in Stein's accent on the primacy of natural belief in the reality of
the world, as in her theory of truth as conformity of intention to real object
and objective being. Yet in all of this, Stein remained a true phenomenologist.
PHILIP BLOSSER
Lenoir-Rhyne College
Hickory, North Carolina

A Spiritual Theology of the Priesthood: The Mystery of Christ and the Mission
of the Priest. By DERMOT POWER. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1998. Pp. 178. $19.95 (paper). ISBN
0-8132-0916-1.

Dermot Power's Spiritual Theology is very much and in the first place a
theology, for he is mindful that priestly life depends on prior conviction about
priestly existence. He finds this prior conviction challenged by such writers as
E. Schillebeeckx and J. Martos such that, were the challenge to prevail, the
result would not be some merely questionable change of priestly spirituality,
but its disappearance-there would no priests in the required sense to need it
or have it or practice it. Power therefore thinks to strengthen this prior
conviction about the existence and nature of Catholic ministerial priesthood

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by gathering a theology of the priesthood from the voluminous work of Hans
Urs von Balthasar. By that very fact, moreover, the theology will be a
spirituality, since it was one of Balthasar's chief glories to make these two
recover their original unity.
The priest is the "transparency" of Christ and his representative (3, 19). This
is what is today contested, and this is what Balthasar both holds in common
with the theology of the Church (13-15) and yet gives new depth to. And this
is why Power begins with Balthasar's Christology in chapters 1 and 2.
The priest is the transparency of Christ. The structure of priestly identity
therefore reproduces the structure of the identity of Christ. And the identity
of Christ is constituted by a twofold transcendence: a transcending relation to
his Father (i.e., a love for, a gift of self to, the Father); and a transcending
relation to the world, to sinful humanity, that makes the Church (2, 20). Just
so, priestly identity is a matter of a twofold transcendence: first to Christ and
with Christ to the Father; second with Christ to Church and world. The purpose of a spiritual theology of the priesthood, in fact, is nothing except to keep
these two transcendences alive (5).
But why should doing so constitute a properly priestly spirituality? Jesus is
rightly called a priest by the later theology of the New Testament, for his
surrender of himself to his Father on the cross, and for our sake, is par excellence sacrificial and so priestly (22, 24). The cross, moreover, is the culmination and manifestation of the incarnation as a whole event, and therefore, it
turns out that the fundamental relations of Christ's entire life-transcendence
of self toward Father and toward the world-and so that life and that person,
are rightly described as priestly, according to Power (32). Christ is Priest
because also Victim, and the self-offering is life long.
We encounter here the now-familiar Balthasarian thesis that the person
theologically considered is mission. The Person Christ is the mission as incarnate to surrender to the Father who sends him and so to give himself for the
world-to sacrifice himself. The mission is priestly, and therefore this Person
is through and through and preeminently Priest (35). The sacrifice-obedience
of the Son (34-37), as well as the kenosis of the Son in priestly service to us
(337-42), provide the context for understanding talk of "substitution" and
"expiation" (Power himself defends Balthasar's own defense of this point as
abidingly significant [42-45]), and Power repeats the terms of Balthasar's
understanding of the atonement: on the cross, the estrangement between God
and man due to sin is swallowed up in the separation of Father and Son which
is nonetheless their nearness (46).
At this point, Power turns to the ecclesiology of Balthasar and begins to
close on the issue posed more narrowly by the title of his book: the idea of a
priestly spirituality requires one to relate the personal, as it were, the interior
life of a Christian ("spirituality"), to a public office ("priesthood"). He makes
this issue the central issue of the book, taking it up in chapters 3 and 4. Just as
the identity of Christ cannot be abstracted from the Church, so the identity of
the Church cannot be abstracted from the differentiated network of relations,

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all centered on Christ, that constitute her. The relations in question are original, originating, ever contemporary, and form the immediate matrix in which
the office of the priesthood is to be located. The relations in question are those
instantiated by Mary, John, Peter, and Paul.
For Balthasar, the fundamental relation of the Church to Christ is that of
Mary, and is nuptial (50, 57-60); the priest is wholly in service to this nuptial
relation, showing the love of the Groom for his Bride (50, 63). If both John
and Peter figure in their own way the dedication of office to love (Peter by way
of humiliation), it is with Paul that Balthasar, and so Power, finds the clearest
expression of the solution of the relation of person and ecclesial office (chap.
4). The resolution is to see that office in the Church is personal, and personmaking. If priestly "office" requires the transcendence of self unto Christ and
the Church, it is precisely these donations of self to and for the sake of others
that make the person, and that constitutes the "space" of the priest's spiritual
interiority. As for Paul, then, to live was Christ and to die was gain, so also for
the contemporary priest: he aspires to live, no longer him, but Christ in him,
manifesting the love of God to Church and world. This is to find his soul/self
in losing it.
Following the resolution of the central issue, chapter 5 presents what is for
Balthasar a spirituality and style of life congruent with and even demanded by
priestly office, namely one informed by the evangelical counsels. In poverty
and simplicity of life, the priest represents the one who though rich became
poor for us. In obedience, the priest imitates the obedience of the Son, and
moreover enters into a perfect disponibiliterelative to the demands of pastoral
charity. In celibacy, the priest figures the fruitfulness of the Bridegroom of the
Church. This spirituality is applied in chapter 6 under some of the usual
headings of priestly identity-preacher, reconciler, etc. It is only here, I think,
that Power registers a major reservation about Balthasar. While Power grants
the appropriateness of the counsels to priestly life, he thinks Balthasar too
closely identifies them with what is necessary for priestly life (155).
The book is to be commended for its fundamentality: Power does not
proceed blithely to the question as to what a priestly spirituality might be
today, but realizes that he must first show there is such a thing, or better, that
he must first show, and against the view of someone like Schillebeeckx (26),
that such a thing has a right to exist in the Church. He does this, or rather
indicates how this is to be done, by outlining an argument for the dominical
institution of the priesthood and for the legitimacy of priestly language to
characterize both our Lord and the apostolic ministry. It is this, an historical
foundation, that allows him to lay the ontological foundation of a priestly
spirituality that he alludes to in his preface, which consists in the identifications
reviewed above: of the mission and person of Christ, of the mission and
priesthood of Christ, and of the continuing priestly presence and action of
Christ in the action and presence of the ordained "official" priest.
In executing his project, Power's good use of Pastoresdabo vobis will also
be welcome to many readers.

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Naturally, the book has some of the strengths and weakness of the theology
on which it is based (i.e., Balthasar's). The main strength is nothing but the
grounding of priestly identity in the theological synthesis of Trinity, Christ, and
Church that Balthasar offers us, a strength that Power justly and often points
to. But there are weaknesses, as well. For instance, there is the implication that
priesthood is in itself a Trinitarian reality: if Christ's priesthood consists in the
donation of himself to his Father, and if that donation simply manifests in the
created order the eternal donation of the Son to the Father, then priesthood
turns into an eternal and Trinitarian reality. The same thing happens when
"thanksgiving" and "obedience" turn likewise into Trinitarian realities for
Balthasar. At this point, we seem to lose the axiom established by St. Augustine
that Christ is a priest in virtue of his humanity. It is not that Power, or
Balthasar for that matter, denies this in so many words, but the question does
anse.
There is also a weakness that, I think, is Power's alone. In chapter 4, he
seems to reverse the traditional functions ascribed on the one hand to the
characterindelibilisimparted by sacrament of order and on the other to the
grace given by this sacrament. The grace of orders is personally sanctifying; it
does not ensure the objectivity of the priest's sacramental acts, as Power seems
to suggest (84). That is precisely the role of character, which indeed calls for,
but does not constitute or even ensure, personal holiness.
The book is also marred by sloppy copy editing and imprecise citations (e.g.,
of Schillebeeckx [64] and Balthasar [95]).
The major difficulty of SpiritualTheology, however, is that it has two books
inside it. The first is a monograph on the theology of the priesthood of Hans
Urs von Balthasar. The second is a book on the priesthood in Power's own
voice. It may be that some readers will think this package a bargain, but my
impression is that neither project is fully realized. For a book on the spirituality
of the priesthood, there is too much Balthasar. For a book on Balthasar, there
is not enough orientation to the various texts Power adduces. It is best to take
the book, then, as what Power thinks we should know about the foundations
of priestly spirituality, where what he thinks is, as he informs us, largely what
he has learned from Balthasar.
Notwithstanding the above criticism, Power's book is important and should
be read just because both he and Balthasar are correct about these foundations,
and because Power (no fool he) knows both how necessary they are if we are
to have a structure that can stand up to the winds of post-Christian culture, and
just how difficult they are to lay, given contemporary theological building
codes. In view of the current "crisis" of priestly identity and spirituality, Power
has a nice sense of the limitations of purely functional and "horizontal," not to
say Congregationalist views of priestly ministry. The ramshackle theologies of
priesthood built on such lines in the last thirty years give no real shelter to the
priest-that is, they make no sense of his identity such that it seems worthwhile
to sacrifice anything for it-in the post-Christian, postmodern, end-of-history

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winds that are blowing. For any priest feeling left out in that cold, there is
some shelter to take in this book.
GUY MANSINI, 0.S.B.

Saint Meinrad School of Theology
St. Meinrad, Indiana

Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro da Prierio, 1456-1527. By MICHAEL
TAVUZZI. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997. Pp 190. $39.95. ISBN
0-8223-1976-4 (cloth).

Michael Tavuzzi, O.P., has previously published studies on Italian
Dominican theologians at the beginning of the sixteenth century which bring
to light some forgotten contemporaries of Luther and Erasmus: "An unedited
Oratio by Tommaso Rodini Tedeschi, OP (1488-1527)," Archivum Historiae
Pontificiae 32 (1994): 43-63 (with edited text); "Valentino da Camerino, OP
(1438-1515), Teacher and Critic of Cajetan," Traditio 49 (1994 ): 287-316; and
"Gaspare di Baldassare da Perugia, OP (1465-1531)," The Thomist 60 (1996):
595-615. Tavuzzi has recently presented the work of Prierias from the particular perspective of the interest which Prierias showed in the princeps
Thomistarum: "Capreolus in the works of Silvestro da Prierio, OP (14561527)," in jean Capreolus en son temps, 1380-1444, Memoire Dominicaine,
special number 1 (Paris: Le Cerf, 1997), 229-58. Though this article was
published prior to this latest work, it is not mentioned here.
This new work on Prierias fills a gap and will render a great service to
researchers. The analyses are precise but are often put back into the context;
the style is sober and concise to the point of being a bit dry; the texts are
clearly presented and are largely cited in notes at the end of the volume.
The plan is strictly biographical, tracing the brilliant but laborious career of
the Dominican theologian, a career much different from that of the extraordinarily gifted Cajetan (92). Tavuzzi divides the life of Silvestro Mazzolini
da Prierio into four chapters whose titles correspond to roles he filled: "Friar
Preacher, 1456-1487"; "Regent Master, 1487-1502"; "Prior and Vicar General
of the Reformed Lombard Congregation, 1503-1515"; "Master of the Sacred
Palace, 1515-1527." After examining the contradictory historiography on the
circumstances and date of his death, the author concludes: "Nothing is known
of the manner of Silvestro's death in mid-1527. Taurisano (Hierarchia ordinis
praedicatorum, 1916) suggested that Silvestro probably died during the Sack
of Rome. This conjecture is extremely plausible, for it is only the chaotic
conditions of Rome during that event which can explain why the death of the

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Magister Magistrorum passed unnoticed and without leaving any precise
record" (130).
A very useful list of Prierias's works published in Latin and Italian between
1496 and 1523 or 1524 is given in an appendix, along with indications of
subsequent editions. This list permits the reader to determine the Dominican's
best-sellers: Aurea rosa, an exposition on the gospel pericopes for all the
Sundays of the year and saints' feasts, published in Bologna in 1503 with eighteen later editions, particularly at Bologna, Lyon, and Venice; and the celebrated Summa summarum, also known as the Summa Silvestrina, similarly
published for the first time in Bologna in 1513 with twenty-eight subsequent
editions during the sixteenth century, sixteen of which were published in Lyon.
The diverse works against Luther also knew a certain success, but T avuzzi
refers us to the work of P. Fabisch and E. Iserloh, who have made an inventory
of these editions (Dokumente zur causa Lutheri (1517-1521) [Munster, 1988]).
Those who are interested in Dominican history will find this book very
useful, especially for its description, its particular perspective on the career of
Prierias, and its discussion of the rivalries between the reformed friars and the
conventuals. The book also throws light on the theological debates that
opposed this theologian to Cajetan, especially with respect to the position the
latter adopted on the doctrine of the immortality of the soul put forth by
Pomponazzi. This debate is the object of the Conflatum ex angelica doctore S.
Thoma (Perugia, 1519) from which Tavuzzi has chosen an illustration as the
frontispiece of his own work. But it is the Prierias we encounter in the works
on the Church in the sixteenth century whom I would like to present briefly
here, the adversary of Reuchlin, Luther, and Erasmus.
We know precious little concerning the role Prierias played in the
conclusion of the great debate that pitted the humanist Johann Reuchlin against
the Jewish convert Pfefferkorn and his Dominican friends at Cologne. Reuchlin
had opposed the systematic destruction of Jewish books such as the Talmud
which contradicted Christianity. As Master of the Sacred Palace, Prierias had
to intervene in the proceedings and was without doubt a member of the
commission in Rome that had to render a final judgment. Passions ran so high
in the "republic of letters" that it is difficult to discern what comes out of the
propaganda, false rumors or solid facts. It is certain that Luther, in his own
defense, reproaches Prierias for his unfavorable judgment of Reuchlin ..
However, the Dominican theologian responds that his behavior in office has
always been that of "a just and merciful man" (91).
Tavuzzi also discusses Prierias's immediate response to the Ninety-Five
Theses of the Wittenberg Augustinian, a very sensitive subject because it has
been much studied by Luther scholars. Beginning with the four small works
Silvestro produced very quickly between 1518 and 1520, the investigation is
well carried out. While it is true that he highlighted the ecclesiological
dimension of what was relatively implicit in Luther's theses, it must also be said
that he became fixated on this issue and condemned what were after all but
theses proposed for debate (granted that they were written to be provocative).
The provocation certainly hit its mark with the Master of the Sacred Palace.

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T avuzzi sums up his impression this way: "While it would be difficult to argue
that [Silvestro's moves] can justify the accusation of theological incompetence
in a narrowly technical, professional sense, there can be little doubt that, taken
together, they did constitute a serious mishandling of the Luther affair at its
very beginning" (112). Tavuzzi provides the ingenious hypothesis that Prierias's
decision to denounce Luther's positions so vigorously arose out of his
unpleasant experience with Savonarola. "Perhaps Silvestro believed that if his
erstwhile confrere had been disciplined more promptly to begin with, his case
might not have ended in the tragic way it did" (113).
In 1519, Erasmus is careful to make clear that he does not intend to pass
judgment on Luther, for as he says: "nee accusator sum nee patronus nee
judex" (Letter 1041). However, he does not agree with the Dialogus of
Prierias, which he has read and knows well, essentially taking issue with the
papalist ecclesiology found therein. Yet, as Tavuzzi clearly points out: "Erasmus stressed on several occasions that his criticisms of Silvestro concerned
pragmatics and not Silvestro's theological acumen and erudition" (119).
It is in 1523, when Erasmus has turned against Luther, that he begins to
draw closer to Prierias, who writes to the humanist in 1523. A new exchange
of letters between the prince of humanists and the Master of the Sacred Palace
took place as a result of the criticisms leveled against Erasmus's commentaries
on the New Testament by the Spanish theologian Zuniga. Silvestro's letter is
no longer extant, but we do possess Erasmus's response, which Tavuzzi dates
from the end of January 1524 (120). In speaking to Beda concerning Prierias
in June 1525, Erasmus describes him as having an "animus praefractum et
intractabilem." I admit that I do not understand the following commentary by
Tavuzzi: "Erasmus added a few more words in favor of Silvestro's character"
(122), unless it is meant to be ironic. What is more, it is well known that
Erasmus's judgments are very subjective and dependent upon what he believes
the other person thinks of him. Thus, he would not be an infallible witness to
the personality of the Dominican theologian.
It is impossible to broach a discussion in this review on the Consilium super
reformatione ecclesiae, dated 1522, which historians of the Catholic
Reformation consider to be a foundational text for the growing consciousness
of the need for a profound reform within the Church. Tavuzzi advances arguments making it "reasonable" to attribute this work to Silvestro and most
certainly not to Cajetan as was previously thought (115-19).
Despite some minor errors (for example, at several points "Shinner" in place
of "Schiner," and "Obermann" for "Oberman"), this work is on the whole very
well presented. In treating the personality of Prierias with clarity and precision,
the book is useful for all those who are interested in this decisive period in the
history of Christianity. (Translated by John Langlois, 0.P.)
GlNBEDOUELLE,

Albertinum
Fribourg, Switzerland

O.P.

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The Return of Splendor in the World: The Christian Doctrine of Sin and
Forgiveness. By CHRISTOF GESTRICH. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm. B.
Eerdmans Publishing Company, 1997. Pp. xxiv + 344. $40.00 (paper).
ISBN 0-8028-4164-3.

At a time when sin is little discussed either among the general public or even
within ecclesial and theological circles, Professor Christof Gestrich of Humboldt University in Berlin has set himself the task to write a major study on the
topic. He stresses that it is this very absence of discussion and knowledge of sin
that closes us off from "the meaning and hope for our future" (xiii). "Invariably
the knowledge of sin is no longer pursued by anyone, by any group that could
act as a representative of society as a whole: it is this lack of knowledge that
seals our doom. This is the main reason I am writing this book" (170).
What is important to grasp already at this juncture is that, for Gestrich, only
a proper and comprehensive understanding of sin, in all of its sociological,
psychological, philosophical, and theological dimensions, can provide humankind with hope. Unless and until humankind regains a right understanding of
sin, there is little, if any, hope for God's response to sin in Jesus Christ to
achieve its goal-that is, the return of splendor. Gestrich sees his book then not
as a gloomy study narrating humankind's desperate plight in the face of sin, but
rather as an attempt to uncover the means whereby, in recognizing the truth
of sin, humankind is able to appropriate the salvation offered in Jesus Christ.
Here, I believe, Gestrich is absolutely correct. The splendor of the cross and
the glory of the resurrection are only thoroughly manifested against the somber
backdrop of sin.
According to Gestrich, contemporary men and women tend to think that the
evil they are suffering comes from "outside themselves," instead of discovering
that their suffering is due to "their own 'sin'" (36). Thus "forgiveness of sins
seems to have become an embarrassment for theology and a vague experience
among Christians, who desire it in declining numbers" (36-37). But how did
such a situation develop? Gestrich is convinced that present-day theology, in
its understanding of sin, is "paralyzed" by the Enlightenment's religious agenda
(11). Modern theological hamartiologies consider sin only in relationship to
"the human pursuit of freedom and identity," and as such are modeled after
various eighteenth-century philosophies (75). To confirm this point, as well as
to bring new clarity to the truly biblical concept of sin, Gestrich devotes a
substantial portion of his book to examining the notion of the Fall and sin
within the writings of such men as Herder, Rousseau, Fichte, Holderlin,
Schiller, Freud, and especially Kant. While this makes, at times, for some rather
dry and heavy reading, Gestrich is quite insightful in his commentary.
However, it is his conclusion that is significant. He judges that Kant and
Schiller (though similar judgments could be made of many of the above
named),
understood the conquest of evil as a task exclusively for man himself.
They ignored the key religious event of evil and sin: human separation

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from God. They also read the stories in Genesis 2-3 not as explanations
of the relationship between man and God but as coded statements
about man becoming mature that must be judged from a purely
anthropological perspective. Thus they also fail to appreciate God's
essential part in overcoming evil and its consequences. (127-28)

How then does Gestrich himself define sin? His answer to this question,
with its psychological, philosophical, and theological implications, is where he
is most perceptive and creative. Human beings, from the dawn of their existence, have desperately sought their own justification: to be affirmed and sanctioned in their worthiness to exist. "Man's hunger for his own justification is
that primeval place in human existence where sin first cast its shadow on all
that is human" (173 ). In order to obtain such justification and approval human
beings demand it of others, and so use and abuse others, including God.
Whenever one demands that others validate the justification of one's existence
and endorse one's present worthiness of affirmation, one "is looking for something from them that human beings, animals, plants, and things cannot
reasonably do, nor want to do" (176). One has made oneself an idol. Only God
is justified in his own existence. Only God is worthy to be affirmed in his own
righteousness. For Gestrich, only God can then affirm the worthiness of each
individual to exist and bestow righteousness upon each individual. These are
all free gifts that come forth from a loving God. This he did in the act of
creation itself and has done so again through redemption in Christ. However,
sin is precisely that attitude and act which seeks justification and righteousness
within oneself and demands that others, including God, recognize and confirm
the truth of such self-righteousness. "I have elevated myself to inhuman
proportions; indeed I have made myself into an idol to the extent that I strive
to procure my own justification through trickery, cunning, or power" (176).
In so doing sin is primarily against God, and thus the primary consequence of
sin is separation from God.
Gestrich's analysis of the nature of sin should be welcomed both because of
its biblical basis and, because of this, for once more locating sin where it
properly belongs: in the context of humankind's relationship to God. In a sense
God, not man, is at the heart of sin for sin strikes at the very heart of who God
is, that is, simply ... God. Equally, Gestrich clearly perceives how we as
individuals, in our frantic pursuit of self-justification, not only bring evil and
suffering upon others, but also destroy ourselves in the process. Likewise, as
seen from the above, Gestrich believes that sin, as humankind's unbridled selfcenteredness, is the cause of present-day consumerism with its devastating
ecological consequences. The whole of creation, minerals, plants, and animals
alike, are despoiled and abused to advance our self-aggrandizement.
Original sin, for Gestrich, cannot then, as some modern theologians have
proposed, be reduced to "biological evolution" or to the "sinful situation" into
which all are born (231). It is not just our sociological environment that is
sinful. Sin reaches to the very depths of the individual person. Yet, Gestrich
does not wish to portray original sin as merely the past act of a long-deceased

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ancestor, which in turn has some contemporary ramifications. Rather, original
sin replicates itself in every actual sin. What Gestrich says is true and important, but here I believe he does not see clearly that the reason each sin
imitates the original sin is that every human person is born with an inner
propensity (concupiscence) for self-justification. Becauseof Adam and Eve's sin,
we are now born without a proper relationship to God, and thus we are born
with a mind and heart that are already (de)formed and predisposed to do what
they did.
Gestrich argues that "sin is the kind of wrongdoing against our fellow men
and fellow creatures and also against God that we can never make up for. Sin
can only be atoned for and forgiven, but cannot be cleared up by compensatory works" (216). God, in his love, has sent his Son into the world in order to
make vicarious and substitutionary atonement for our sins. Gestrich maintains
that substitutionary action is inherent within human relations. Everyone is
burdened and sometimes overwhelmed by his or her responsibilities, problems,
and concerns. Others must relieve such a person from his or her burdens. Such
a person "needs members of the same species who treat him so kindly that they
temporally free him from his basic social commitments. The person who lets
man have time for his specifically human needs is the one who takes ethical
substitutionary action" (299).
Following Bonhoeffer, Gestrich then argues that Jesus performed such a
substitutionary action on behalf of the whole of humanity. He did what we
could not do. He took upon himself our sinfulness and offered his life to the
Father in atonement for our sins, thus freeing us from a burden that we could
not carry or overcome. We appropriate the forgiveness that Jesus obtained for
us through faith and the sacraments, especially baptism and the Eucharist, for
in these we no longer seek self-justification, but obtain it freely from God.
Thus God restores to us our splendor.
However, this free gift of God should not be interpreted as "cheap grace."
Rather, Gestrich rightly insists that the Christian life places responsibilities
upon the Christian, and the Church, as it does not in its present often lax
attitude, should insist upon these. For Gestrich, the chief among these
mandates is a full participation in the life of Christian community.
Despite its strengths, it is this latter portion of Gestrich's book, where he
treats of the salvation offered to us in Christ and so the return of our splendor,
that is somewhat disappointing. It is not that I would radically disagree with
much of what he says. For the most part I am very sympathetic with the basic
outlines of his soteriology. The difficulty is that, after treating the nature of sin
in such depth and clarity, he does not follow through with a like treatment of
salvation. He does acknowledge at the onset of his study that "at the end of my
book I could only allude to why the reality of forgiveness is closely connected
to the reality of substitutionary action" (xxii). This is to be pitied, since without a fuller understanding of salvation, we are left with a somewhat unfinished
story. I would only hope that Gestrich would follow up this book with a fuller
soteriological study, and that, if he does so, he would root it more biblically.

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Absent within this present offering is a clear and developed understanding of
the biblical notion of sacrifice, as well as the specific role of the Holy Spirit
within the work of redemption.
Nonetheless, Gestrich has written a good book and one that deserves a wide
reading. He has treated a sensitive and important topic, and he has done so
with philosophical and theological precision. Moreover, one cannot help but
perceive from reading this book that Gestrich is a theologian of faith. He
possesses an authentic concern for the pastoral needs of the Church and a deep
desire that God's splendor would return to a world that has been contaminated
by sin.
THOMAS WEINANDY,0.F.M.CAP.
Greyfriars
Oxford, Great Britain

The Resurrection. Edited by STEPHENDAVIS, DANIELKENDALL,S.J., and GERALD
O'COLLINS, S.J. New York: Oxford University Press, 1997. Pp. 367.
$35.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-19-815091-1.

Beginning on April 7 (Easter Sunday), 1996, a five-day "Resurrection
Summit" organized by the editors of this volume was held at St. Joseph's
Seminary, Yonkers, New York. Designed (perhaps dubiously) to attract media
attention as a kind of orthodox counterpart to the peripatetic Jesus Seminar,
the program nonetheless provided serious presentations by a number of
reputable theologians, exegetes, and philosophers of religion. Each of the major
papers was followed by a response which initiated more general discussion.
Twelve major papers (the preface [p. x] incorrectly speaks of thirteen) and
three responses have been incorporated into this volume, which may best be
classified as the proceedings of a conference; other responses were excluded
due to constraints of space. The papers are rather disparate, for the conference
apparently did not envisage comprehensive coverage of issues relating to Jesus'
resurrection. As is usual with publications of this genre, the value of the
individual contributions varies widely; the three published responses are of
uniformly high quality, each superior to the paper to which it is appended.
Prefatory material composed by the three editors provides an account of the
summit's planning and procedures, a summary of the papers contained in this
volume, and capsule biographies of the summit's participants (including some
who did not contribute to this book). A judicious account of the summit's
papers and discussions by John Wilkens, editor of the London Tablet, is
followed by Gerald O'Collins's "The Resurrection: The State of the
Questions," which appears to have functioned as a keynote address. Far from

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providing the thorough overview its title promises, this paper offers brief
remarks in an apologetic tone on the meaning of resurrection language, the
appearances, the empty tomb, and the foundations of Easter faith; particular
attention is devoted to criticizing the tendency of John Hick and Sallie
McFague to reduce the resurrection to the emergence of faith on the part of
the early disciples. A concluding section proposes several historical, theoretical,
practical, and liturgical questions related to the resurrection as an agenda for
future exploration. Archbishop Peter Carnley's response finds O'Collins imprecise in his critique of Hick and inclined to assume what needs to be proved;
placing less emphasis on historical knowledge, Carnley advocates greater
appeal to the present experience of the Spirit as foundational for faith in
Christ's resurrection.
The papers that follow address diverse aspects of the theology of the
resurrection from a variety of perspectives. In her well-crafted plea against
reduction of the resurrection to more privatized considerations, Janet Martin
Soskice links faith in the resurrection to hope for the New Jerusalem. Carey
Newman, the author of Paul's Glory-Christology (Leiden: Brill, 1992), argues
that the resurrection triggered a close association of Jesus with God's glory; in
substance, this identification amounted to a profession of his equality with
God. The resurrection thus necessitated a redefinition of monotheism and led
ineluctably to a rapid rupture between Jews and Christians. Allen Segal, for his
part, offers an informative discussion of beliefs concerning life after death in
the Hebrew Bible and such later Jewish sources as Josephus, the Mishnah, and
the Talmud.
Turning to the resurrection appearances, Stephen Davis distinguishes
between normal vision (as in everyday seeing), subjective vision (equivalent to
a hallucination), and objective vision (seeing what is really there but visible
only to one specially enabled by God to do so). Davis argues at length that the
appearances narrated in the Gospels-all conceived (unlike reports of Jesus'
predictions of passion and resurrection) as substantially accurate historical
reporting-were instances of normal vision, such that they could have been
captured in a photograph. William Alston, a distinguished analytic philosopher
of religion, provides a detailed critical analysis of Reginald Fuller's The
Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (New York: Macmillan, 1971). In
response, Sarah Coakley draws judiciously on Alston's earlier writings to raise
important hermeneutical questions and suggest concerns similar to those of
Janet Soskice. Another eminent philosopher of religion, Richard Swinburne,
analyzes the evidence regarding the resurrection. After weighing the evidence
needed to affirm the occurrence of miracles, he concludes that, while the
historical evidence taken in isolation is insufficiently probative for such an
unusual event, reflection on the existence and character of God provides a
background theory making the modest historical evidence "quite strong enough
... to make it considerably more probable than not that Jesus Christ rose from
the dead on the first Easter Day" (207). An unusual appendix to this chapter
appeals to the early Christian adoption of Sunday worship as a further

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argument in favor of the resurrection and as a basis for positing specific
instructions on this subject from the risen Lord.
In the most stimulating paper of the collection, Francis Schussler Fiorenza
expresses with greater clarity, and develops further, an approach to the
theology of the resurrection originally adumbrated in his Foundational
Theology:Jesus and the Church (New York: Crossroad, 1984 ). After succinctly
summarizing the current state of the question and critiquing the prevailing
options for their tendencies toward foundationalism, he advocates an approach
that emphasizes the importance of testimony. Fiorenza analyzes the various
genres in which New Testament witness to the resurrection is to be found.
Arguing that the ground of faith must not be confused with the historical
genesis of faith and that the meaning of biblical texts is impoverished when
they are adduced solely as sources to be quarried for purposes of historical
reconstruction, he concludes that the New Testament testimonies as such, when
received in conjunction with the appropriate background theories and with due
attention to subsequent Christian praxis as a warrant for their authenticity,
provide in their disclosive power the basis for Christian faith. Perusal of this
thought-provoking though at times obscure study will repay even readers
favorable to the alternatives that Fiorenza criticizes and rejects.
The remaining papers are, on the whole, of less significance. William Craig
provides a needed, though sometimes overstated, critique of John Dominic
Crossan's denial of the resurrection; Paul Eddy's response reaches a similar
conclusion after a more incisive analysis of Crossan's work. A meandering and
repetitious essay by Alan Padgett criticizes modern historical research on Jesus
for abstracting from faith, but fails to succeed in making his own position clear.
Marguerite Shuster examines the preaching of the resurrection in Augustine,
Luther, Karl Barth, and Helmut Thielicke. Lastly, Brian Johnstone, in dialogue
with Emanuel Levinas and John Milbank, probes the possible implications that
orientation on the resurrection could have for Christian consideration of
central ethical questions. While perceptive and very informative on the state
of moral theology, this chapter seems somewhat out of place in the present
volume. The book concludes with an index of names.
A collection of this sort is difficult to assess as a unit, since its chief value lies
in the individual contributions, each of which can and will be read by itself.
The major gaps in the study of the pertinent New Testament texts (by
competent exegetes) and the lack of detailed consideration of the thought of
major modern theologians (Hans Urs von Balthasar, Wolfhart Pannenberg, Karl
Rabner, Edward Schillebeeckx) make the work unsuitable as a general
introduction to its chosen topic. The important discussion of the resurrection
in recent German Catholic theological literature (Georg Essen, Hans Kessler,
Hansjiirgen Verweyen) is mentioned only tangentially and, to judge from the
argumentation, is familiar to only a small minority of the contributors. Even
apart from these deficiencies, it may be wondered if it is wise to engage the
Jesus Seminar on its own chosen turf, the superficiality of which is in principle
inimical to serious discussion of the Christian faith.

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Nonetheless, some contributions are of genuine value. Direct critique of
Crossan's publications (Craig, Epps) is of unquestionable pastoral importance.
The attention drawn (in different ways) to the relevance of background
theories (Swinburne, Fiorenza) and of Christian experience and praxis (Carnley, Fiorenza) for faith in the resurrection is of lasting value, for the resurrection cannot be appropriately treated in isolation. So too is the insistence of
Soskice and Coakley that faith in the resurrection not be reduced to a
minimalistic, reified content. In this regard, the sage observations of the outside
observer at the symposium, John Wilkens, provide more food for thought than
several of the lengthier presentations.
Some smaller points and printing errors should also be noted. Like many
contributions that strongly accent the resurrection, Newman's essay in places
sounds adoptionist (80, 82; but see by way of contrast 88). A "not" is missing
on page 102 (line 11). The German exegete Oberlinner is named both Lorenz
(correctly) and Ludwig on the same page (219). On page 236 (line 6 from
below), read "to" for "of." There are five errors in the untranslated German
citation of Georg Essen's important critique of an earlier version of Fiorenza's
proposal (244). On page 262 (line 18), read "copying" for "coping." On page
312 (line 19), read "avers" for "averts."
JOHN P. GALVIN

The Catholic Universityof America
Washington,D.C.

DominicanGallery:Portraitof a Culture. By AIDANNICHOLS,O.P. Leominster,
Herefordshire, U.K.: Gracewing/Fowler Wright Books, 1997. Pp. 443.

£ 30. ISBN 0-85244-3935.
This weighty work is both a delightful surprise (a biographical study of
seven English Dominicans active in the period 1930-65) and a major
contribution to fundamental theology. The seven figures portrayed are Victor .
White, Gerald Vann, Thomas Gilby, Sebastian Bullough, Gervase Mathew,
Kenelm Foster, and Conrad Pepler. Photographs of all seven are included,
preceded by one of Fr. Bede Jarrett-included because one of the author's
theses is that these seven friars were all recruited during Jarrett's long
provincialate and/or inspired by his particular vision of English Dominican life.
That vision may be described as a sort of historically informed Thomism
building bridges to contemporary art and culture, and present in the ancient
universities. It is this concern to touch and to transform contemporary culture
that makes this book much more than a family album; it is a work of readable,
attractive fundamental theology.

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There are seven chapters devoted to the seven friars. Each of these chapters
begins with a short biography (too short for my taste) of one of these rather
original characters, followed by a systematic summary or digest of his main
books and articles. The thought of each man, already dense, is made even more
so by this process of condensation. This inconvenience is justified, I think, by
the useful service the digest renders to the reader, who is free to explore
further once the seven doors have been opened. These seven chapters are
framed by three others and two appendices. The first framing chapter sketches
the English Dominican background in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
century, its houses, its program of formation, and its quarrels over observance,
apostolates, and the relation to the English universities. The second, more
original, framing chapter treats the English Catholic setting of this Dominican
activity. Here we learn of the London "salon" of Charles Bums, doctor and
psychologist, in St. Leonard's Terrace, Chelsea. Here the reigning intellect was
the cultural historian Christopher Dawson. Here too met the poet David Jones,
the philosopher E. I. Watkin, H. Grisewood of the BBC, and the priests M.
D'Arcy, S.J., and Ronald Knox. Among the novelists J. R.R. Tolkien, Graham
Greene, and Evelyn Waugh were the best known. Cardinal Hinsley exercised
a positive influence, as did T. S. Eliot from outside the Church. The final
chapter consists of a brief epilogue in which the author finds the common
element in the seven men he examines to consist in "a rational and spiritual
intelligence which has come successfully to grips with the concrete"through the
search for specifically English metaphors and examples. The first appendix
treats of the English Dominicans from 1221 to 1850. The second reproduces
and comments on two letters of David Jones to Fr. Gilby which, in their
difficult language, summarize the message of the entire book.
The seven friars included a Jungian, a calligrapher and printer, a biblical
scholar, a Byzantinist, a logician, and a Dante scholar. They were all intensely
English, with the result that they are not so well known on the Continent. It
might be well therefore to list them again, with their years of birth and death,
their academic level (they were often gifted amateurs) and specialization,
analogy with a better-known French Dominican or two, and the number of
pages the book devotes to them. (1) Victor White (1909-60; 70 pp.; Louvain
lectorate), the only full-time systematic theologian in the group. For his efforts
at the renewal of Thomism he could be compared to Chenu (but he was more
introverted and depressive than Chenu, interested in a dialogue with Jung, not
Marx), and for his pioneer ecumenism, with Congar. (2) Gerald Vann
(1906-63; 60 pp.; Angelicum lectorate), comparable to the early Louis Bouyer
for his work in a secondary school, to Bernadot, Carre, Bouchet, or Bro for his
efforts in spirituality. (3) Thomas Gilby (1902-75; 43 pp.; Louvain doctorate),
moralist, logician, estheticist, comparable to the Chenu of the Summa of the
Revue des ]eunes, and to Pie and Pohier for the dialogue with Freud. (4)
Sebastian Bullough (1910-67; 45 pp.; Cambridge M.A.), somewhat comparable
to Benoit as a biblical scholar. (5) Gervase Mathew (1905-76; 36 pp.; Oxford
M.A.), lecturer at Oxford University in Byzantine Studies, patrologist and

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historian, with elements of Festugiere, de Menasce, and Fiey. (6) Kenelm
Foster (1910-86; 38 pp.; Cambridge doctorate), reader in Italian studies. (7)
Conrad Pepler (1908-93; 60 pp.; Angelicum lectorate), comparable to Roguet
or Gy for liturgy, to Lebret for social thought, to Garrigou-Lagrange in his
concern for mysticism and spiritual theology.
Common traits would be an esthetic Thomism; a desire for integration, to
offer people a total vision of life (often aided by Jung); and the search for a
sane social order in view of the Second World War. Common lacuGae would
be an avoidance of Hegel and Johannes Weiss. Thus while they were culturally
very rich, there is something rather static and socially conservative about their
thought. Their theology was concentrated on the kerygma and the sacraments,
not on a future eschatology for this world.
Nichols minimizes certain things: the remoter influence of John Ruskin and
William Morris; the harm done to biblical studies by antimodernism (especially
from 1907 to 1912), which explains the biblical thinness among the seven; the
negative effect of Humani Generis (1950) on Victor White's explorations. He
does allow the dark shadow of the provincial Hilary Carpenter to be glimpsed.
Carpenter blocked White's promotion to regent, closed Blackfriars Press, and
almost closed the review of the same name.
Due to the complex, rich subject and perhaps to haste, this ambitious project
is marred by many misprints and some minor errors of detail. For example,
Denifle was an Austrian, not a German; Van Ackeren was an American, not a
Dutchman; the etymology of education (66); the Anglicans at Kelham were not
monks; Pourrat was a Sulpician, not a Jesuit. The author misses the role of Fr.
Pepler at Wittgenstein's deathbed, now fully told in Ray Monk's biography of
the philosopher. The blemishes are understandable given the sweep and range
of this wonderful book, for which we can only feel grateful.
BENEDICT T. VIVIANO, 0.P.

Albertinum
Fribourg, Switzerland