The Thomist 65 (2001): 505-27

THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE1
ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

I

WISH TO DISCUSS the relationship between the human person

and political life. My remarks will be a venture into political
philosophy. This branch of philosophy has been shortchanged in Catholic philosophy in the past century, during the
Thomistic revival following the encyclical Aetemi Patris of Pope
Leo XIII in 1879.
In the departmental structure and the philosophical curricula
that prevailed in many Catholic colleges and universities during
the first two thirds of the twentieth century, political philosophy
would usually be located not in philosophy departments but in
political science. In seminary programs, there was effectively no
political philosophy whatsoever. The philosophy manuals of the
early and middle part of the century covered political philosophy,
if they treated it at all, as a division of ethics. In the great manual
written by Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., for example, entitled Elementa
philosophiae Aristotelico-Thomisticae, 2 one finds extensive treatments oflogic, epistemology, philosophy of nature, philosophical
psychology, metaphysics, theodicy, and ethics, but in the nearly
one thousand pages of the two volumes, there are only some
1 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at a symposium that both honored

Pope
John Paul II and marked the university career of Jude P. Dougherty, Dean Emeritus of the
School of Philosophy, The Catholic University of America. The symposium was held on
November 17-18, 2000, and was sponsored by the School of Philosophy and the Pope John
Paul II Cultural Center.
2 Joseph Gredt, O.S.B., ElementaPhilosophiaeltristotelico-'Ihomisticae,
2 vols. (Freiburg:
Herder, 1953).

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

twenty pages, at the very end of the second volume, devoted to
"civil society," and this brief section terminates with a two-page
treatment de bello, on war. This long philosophical work,
therefore, does not end peacefully, and it clearly does not offer a
solution to the political problem.
It is true that some of the most important twentieth-century
Catholic philosophers devoted much of their work to political
philosophy: Jacques Maritain wrote such books as Man and the
State, The Person and the Common Good, Things that are Not
Caesar's, Integral Humanism, Freedom in the Modern World (the
French title was Du regime temporel et de la liberte}, and Scholasticism and Politics (Principes d'une politique humaniste}, all of
which deal with politics, and Yves R. Simon wrote The Philosophy
of Democratic Government among other titles in political
thought, but these two authors were the exception rather than the
rule. At Louvain's Higher Institute for Philosophy, for example,
there was no representation of political philosophy. Jacques
LeClercq wrote in social ethics and social philosophy, but not in
political thought as such. What was done in political philosophy
added up to a relatively small achievement in this field,
compared, say, with the work that was done in metaphysics,
philosophy of science, ethics, and the philosophy of man. This
lack of interest is rather strange, since political life originally
provided the context for philosophy, in the life of Socrates and in
the writings of both Plato and Aristotle. The lack of concern with
political philosophy should provoke our curiosity and perhaps
even our wonder.
At the end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the
twenty-first, a particularly impressive group of Catholic thinkers
in Paris has addressed issues in political philosophy. Pierre
Manent is the most conspicuous of these, but one must also
mention Remi Brague, Alain
and Terence Marshall.
Their work has been influenced by Raymond Aron and Leo
Strauss. We should also call to mind the work, in the United
States, of Ernest Fortin, A. A. (Boston College}, James Schall, S.J.
(Georgetown}, Francis Canavan, S. J. (Fordham}, and Charles N.

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R. McCoy (Catholic University), but it is interesting to note that
all these persons were or are academically "housed" not in
philosophy but in departments of politics, or, in the case of
Fortin, in theology. There were other thinkers who approached
social and political problems, such as John Courtney Murray, S.J.,
and John A. Ryan in the United States and Denis Fahey and
Edward Cahill in Ireland, but again they tended to discuss these
issues in terms of Church-state relations and moral theology, and
did so in a somewhat more deductive manner than would be
appropriate for political philosophy. 3
I should add that the Holy Father, in his philosophical
writings on the human person, does address the phenomenon of
community in his article "The Person: Subject and Community" 4
and in the last chapter of his book The Acting Person.5 That
chapter is entitled, "Intersubjectivity by Participation," and is
found under the more general heading of "Participation." This
general discussion of community, however, does not develop a
specifically political philosophy, although it certainly points the
way to it. The Holy Father's work in inspiring and promoting the
Solidarity movement in Poland, and the great contribution he
made in bringing down one of the worst tyrannies in the history
of humanity, are further reasons why philosophical and
theological reflection on political life should occur in a cultural
center dedicated to his name. I would also like to commemorate
the work of Jude P. Dougherty, who is being honored by this
conference, and to note the keen interest he has had in political
life and political thought, an interest that has been expressed in
his activities and many of his writings.

3 Political philosophy is treated in a more deductive way when it is approached through
theology and revelation because it is placed in and derived from a moral context that is more
comprehensive than its own. In Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, political philosophy moves
toward its first principles from political life itself.
4 Karol Wojtyla, "The Person: Subject and Community," The Review of Metaphysics 33
(1979): 273-308.
5 Karol Wojtyla, The Jlaing Person, trans. Andrzej Potocki (Dordrecht: Reidel, 1979).

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I. THE PERSON AND POLITICS: ARISTOTLE

The classical and unsurpassable definition of the person was
given by Boethius early in the sixth century: a person is an individual substance of a rational nature. This definition highlights
rationality as the specifying feature of persons; a person is an
individual being that is endowed with reason. 6 According to this
definition, there may be persons-divine or angelic-who are not
human beings; they too could be individual entities invested with
a rational nature, but of course such persons would not enter into
politics. Political life requires body and soul as well as
personhood.
Persons, in Boethius's definition, are individual entities that
possess reason. It is the power of reason, with all that it implies,
that makes us to be persons. Even when we use the word person
in a less technical way, simply to highlight the fact that the
individual in question is a human being and should be treated as
such, we imply that the dignity he has and the respect he deserves
follow from his rationality and not from some other quality. It is
because he is rational, an agent of truth, that he must be "treated
as a person and not a thing."
Human reason and hence human personality are exercised in
speech, in science and the search for wisdom, in ethical conduct,
in friendship, and in religion, and they are also exercised in a
distinctive manner in political life. Political societies are
communities specifically made up of human persons. If we are to
speak about the human person, our discussion would be sorely
deficient if we did not treat the domain of human political
conduct, and if we did not specify how human reason, in thought
and in action, is at work in it.

6 Boethius's definition does not involve a genus and specific difference, because individual
substance could not express a genus except in a purely verbal or logical sense. The term
expresses a particular right from the start, not something common. Persons are essentially
indexical. See Robert Spaemann, Personen:VersucbeUber den Unterschiedzwischen 'etwas'
und 'jemand' (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1996), 32-44. Spaemann shows that the term person is
not a sorta! expression.

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It is not just that human beings live together. Men live together
in families and the kind of extended families we could call villages
or tribes. Such communities come about by natural inclination
and do not need founders. They are not the outcome of
deliberation, reasoning, and argument, as political societies are.
They do not have to be conceived before they come into being.
Political societies need to be established by acts of reason, and
people who succeed in this enterprise bring about a great good
for others: Aristotle says that "the one who first established [such
a community] is the cause of the greatest goods," 7 because
founders make possible for man a civilized and virtuous life, a life
lived in view of the noble, the good, and the just, a life in which
human excellence can be achieved and the worst in man can be
controlled: "For man, when perfected, is the best of all animals,
but when separated from law and justice, he is the worst of all. " 8
One thinks of the benefits that millions of people have enjoyed
because of the acts of reason that achieved the founding of the
United States of America, most conspicuously, the acts of thinking
that took place during the Constitutional Convention in 1787, in
the debates that followed, in the ratification of the Constitution
by individual states from 1787 to 1789, and at the inauguration
of George Washington as the first president in 1789. All these
events were exercises of reason, and they in turn followed upon
the American Revolution itself, as well as the colonial period that
preceded it, when the habits of free political life were established
among the people.
It is an act of reason, and therefore an eminently personal
action, to establish a political society. To underline this point, we
may consider the fact that animals also live together, but their
association is not the outcome of an exercise of reason on their
part. There are no founders in animal societies; Richard Hassing
has asked, ironically, "Would Aristotle say that the first founder
7 Aristotle, Politics 1.2.1253a30-31. I have used the Jowett translation of the Politics,
which is found in McKeon's The Basic Works ofAristotle (New York: Random House, 1941),
as well as the translation by Carnes Lord (Aristotle, The Politics [Chicago: The University of
Chicago Press, 1984)), but have made many revisions of my own.
8 Aristotle, Politics 1.2.1253a31-33.

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of chimpanzee society was responsible for the greatest of
chimpanzee goods?" 9 The question simply does not apply. There
are no founders of animal societies. Also, there are no Washington Monuments or Jefferson Monuments in ape or elephant
society, because there are among apes and elephants no founders
who exercise their reason to establish a society in which reason
flourishes. One of the things that reason does when it prospers in
a civilization is to acknowledge, by the building of monuments,
the founding acts of reason that established the space within
which the monuments could be built. This is not to demean ape
or chimpanzee or elephant or dolphin society, but to highlight the
human difference and the rational character, hence the specifically
personal character, of human political association. Political
society is established by a determination of the noble, the good,
and the just, which is expressed and then desired by reason.
It is important to note, furthermore, that although political life
needs to be established by an act of reasoning, it is not therefore
purely conventional. It remains part of human nature, but of
human nature in its teleological understanding, when human life
is seen at its best; it is not part of human nature in the genetic,
biological sense.10 I doubt that researchers in biology will find a
gene that programs for political constitutions, or even a cluster of
neurons that does so.
Political life is not only founded by an act of reason; it is also
sustained and justified by reason. It is carried on by public
discussion, in which reason itself is elevated into a higher kind of
life than it can reach in familial and tribal community. In the
Politics, Aristotle describes political society as the culmination of
human communities. In cities, he says, there are two irreducible
parts, the wealthy and the poor, and the shape that political life
takes on results from the perennial struggle between these two

9

Richard Hassing, "Darwinian Natural Right?" Interpretation 27 (Winter 1999-2000):

148.
10 When the causality of the telos is denied or abandoned, the mind recoils into simply
mechanical and genetic explanations.

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groups to rule over the whole. 11 The tension between the richer
and the poorer parts of a society makes up the perpetuum mobile
for politics. When the wealthy rule for their own benefit, the city
is an oligarchy; when the poor rule for their own benefit, the city
is literally a democracy, a rule by the people or the many, since
there normally are more poorer than wealthier members of
society. Aristotle says that the best outcome for most people in
most places at most times, the practically best form of the city
generally, is the republic, the politeia, which is intermediate
between oligarchy and democracy. In a republic, a large middle
class-middle in both an economic and an ethical sense-is
established between the rich and the poor, the laws and not men
rule, and they do so for the benefit of the whole city, not for any
particular part. 12 To live this way is a great human accomplishment. It is a truly exalted exercise of reason for citizens to
allow the laws to rule, to have the strength of reason and
character to subordinate themselves to the laws, which they allow
11 The "political triangle" of oligarchy, democracy, and republic is treated in book 4 of
the Politics. The determination of the rich and poor as the irreducible segments of the city
occurs in chapters 3 and 4. Democracy and oligarchy, the most common forms of political
life and the expressions of these two parts of the city, are treated in chapters 4 and 5. Chapter
6 is devoted to the various modifications of oligarchy and democracy. The republic is
discussed in chapters 7 and 8. The fact that it is the practically best form of rule is shown in
chapter 9. Chapter 11 gives advice on how to strengthen the middle class. One reason why
a republic is a good form for political life is the fact that it allows many people to participate
in ruling, to be citizens, but without being partisan in their rule. There is more talent,
judgment, and virtue in many than in one or a few; see Politics 3.11.1281a39-b21. Aristotle
also notes that democracies are particularly vulnerable to demagogues, the "leaders of the
people"; see Politics 4.4.1292a4-38, and 5.5.1304b19-1305a36.
12 It should be noted that in his discussion of the republic in Politics 4.7-9, Aristotle does
not claim that the republic as such promotes virtue or nobility; he presents it rather as a
resolution of the parallelogram of political forces, in which the interests of both the poor and
the rich are best reconciled. The two groups are blended into a middle class that will rule
through the laws for the advantage of the whole. Virtue as the overriding end of the
republican city will arise through that city's participation in aristocracy; see below, note 15.
This "value-free" understanding of the republic is expressed in the brief description given in
4.8.1293b33-34: "For the republic is, to state it simply, a mixture of oligarchy and
democracy." See ibid., 1294a22-25: "It is evident that a mixture of the two--of the wealthy
and the poor-is to be called a republic, while a mixture of the three [wealthy, poor, and
virtuous] should more particularly be called an aristocracy (in addition to the genuine and
first form)."

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to rule for the benefit of the whole. Not all people have the civic
habits and public vision to let the laws and not their own partisan
interests rule over the whole; not all people are immediately
capable of being citizens.
This triad of oligarchy, democracy, and republic is the core of
Aristotle's Politics; the entire work pivots around this triangle. I
would also make the stronger claim that what Aristotle is
describing here is the truth of human political life, and not just his
opinion or a description proper to his time and place. He is
presenting the "mobilities" of political life, and the various
solutions and deviations that are proper to it. What he describes
goes on even now, so long as we continue to have a political life.
Aristotle is describing politics as a human thing, as a human
possibility, not just as a historical fact. If we fail to see this, it is
because we ourselves have become incapable of recognizing
human nature and have fallen into historical storytelling instead.
Aristotle also discusses monarchy and aristocracy, in which
one man or a few virtuous men rule for the good of the whole.
These two forms serve as a kind of norm for what all cities can
be. 13 Because they admit only a few people to rule, however, they
may not be possible once societies become very large (Aristotle
admits this limitation), 14 but they must be kept in mind as part of
how we design and live our politics: when the laws are made to
govern, they should rule as virtuous agents would rule. Also,
there is an important qualification in Aristotle's definition of
aristocracy: aristocracy exists either when the virtuous rule
because of their virtue (the virtuous become the establishment, the
politeuma), or when whoever is ruling exercises his or their rule
13 Kingship is treated and its problems discussed in Politics 3.14-17. In chapter 18
Aristotle says that the virtue of a good king and of true aristocrats would be the same as the
virtue of a good man. Book 7 in its entirety seems to be a more extended treatment of the
best regime, along with remarks wont the material conditions under which it could be
realized.
14 In Politics 3.15.l286b8-10,
Aristotle says, "And it is probably for this reason that
people were originally ruled by kings, because it was rare to find men who were very much
distinguished by their virtue, especially since the cities they inhWited then were so small." See
also 3.17, where Aristotle says that there may be some populations in which it is best if one
individual or one family should rule.

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for the sake of what is best for the city and its members. 15 Because
of this second definition of aristocracy, there can be an aristocratic component to every form of constitution, including a
republic.
On the margin of all these forms of political life stands
tyranny, the catastrophic disaster that is always lurking as the
threat to political life. It is the ever-present sinkhole on the
margin of politics. It will always be there; nothing we can do can
definitively exclude it as a possibility. In tyranny there is no
longer any political life, but only servile subjection to a ruler or
rulers who rule for their benefit alone, without any virtuous
guidance or purpose. To be ruled tyrannically is incompatible
with human nature. 16
In Aristotle's view, the best kind of political community will be
made up of elements from all the good regimes: there will be
monarchic, aristocratic, and popular elements in the various parts
of the government. This variety will provide a kind of tensile
strength for the city. Each type of city has its own proper political
virtue: even the deviant regimes, such as the oligarchic and the
democratic, try to shape the people in the city to fit the
constitution, and for this reason every city is concerned not only
with economic matters, public safety, and defense, but also with
the virtue of its people. 17 This conformity of the upbringing with
the constitution will happen as a matter of course in every
political society, but all regimes have to be measured by the
standard of the virtuous man, and the more closely the virtue of
the city approximates that of the good man, the agent of moral
truth, the better the city will be as a human achievement.
What is common to all cities in which there is a political
life-in opposition, for example, to tyranny, where there is
none-is the fact that people do argue about who should rule,
15 Politics 3.7.1279a35-37.
16 Politics 3.17.1287b37-41;

Aristotle says there is no people that is tyrannikon by nature,
nor is any fit for the other deviant regimes.
17 Each city has to habituate and educate its people to fit the constitution of the city:
Politics 5.9.1310a12-38. Even oligarchic and democratic cities must do this. If the habits of
the people do not fit the laws of the city, Aristotle says, the city will be like the akratic man,
whose reason and passions are at odds with one another.

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that is, they argue about what kind of virtue will set the tone for
the city. People who claim that they should rule are trying to do
more than just get themselves into the public offices; first and
foremost they are also trying to establish a certain way of life, one
that they embody, in the community that they want to rule. There
always are "culture wars" in political life. Oligarchs, for example,
want to live according to the principle that if we are different in
one respect (viz., in regard to wealth), we are different absolutely
and should be treated as such. The "virtue" in oligarchy is
measured by the possession of wealth. Democrats, on the other
hand, want to live by the principle that if we are equal in one
respect (viz., in regard to liberty), we should be considered equal
absolutely. "Virtue" for extreme democrats is the ability to do
whatever one wishes, the liberty to satisfy any impulse; that is the
kind of life they promote. 18 When people argue that they should
rule, they are exercising their reason; this particular exercise of it
is higher than the exercise one finds within the family or the
village, where such argument about rule does not take place, just
as foundings do not take place. Because it is reason that makes us
persons, the people engaged in political life are acting more fully
as persons than they are able to do in their families and villages.
They strive to project and embody a form of human life; they do
not just deal with the necessities of life.
It is also the case that there is no one form of the city that is
the best absolutely everywhere. Much depends on the population,
the circumstances, the lay of the land, the history of the people,
and other things. Aristotle distinguishes four senses of the best in
politics: first, the best "as we might pray for it," when all the
circumstances are favorable (we may not be able to implement
this best form, but we must keep it in mind); second, the best in
particular circumstances; third, the best that we can achieve when
are faced with a city that is already established; and fourth, the
best for most people in most circumstances (effectively, this is the

18 For the understanding of justice proper, respectively, to oligarchs and democrats, see
Politics 3.9 and 5.1.1301a25-b4.

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republic). 19 Political excellence for Aristotle is therefore flexible,
adaptable, and analogous, not univocal. It is the. outcome of
prudential, not mathematical, reason.
Aristotle's description of political life is not relativized by
history. It expresses the political possibilities of human nature,
and it is as true now as it always wa-.. Aristotle's Politics
formulates the substance, the ousia, of political life better than
any other work that has ever been written. 20
II. THE MODERN SITUATION

I wish to claim that in our contemporary exercise of political
life, in our practice, we do conform to Aristotle's analysis, to the
extent that we still have a political life. For example, in the United
States the richer and the poorer are clearly appealed to, respectively, by the Republicans and the Democrats, at least as these
parties have been defined for most of the twentieth century, and
the problem is to fashion a republic, with an inclusive middle
class. There are monarchic and aristocratic elements in our
political life, and there is always the danger of tyranny. The major
difficulty in our modern situation, of course, is the scale of society
and the technology that makes such a scale possible. How can
anyone survey the common good? How can any political form be
embodied in tens or hundreds of millions of people? This is the
great challenge to political prudence in our time.
But although we conform in practice with Aristotle, the idea
we have of political life in our present day is quite different from
The four senses of "best" are found in Politics 4.l.1288b21-39. It is important to note
that the very best form of the city does not signify an "ideal" city, one that would demand
preternatural circumstances or a transformation of human nature. Rather, it is the city one
could bring about if all the circumstances and conditions were the best one could possibly
hope for. Such a city may be practically unrealizable, but not unrealizable in principle. The
wonders of modem technology tempt us to think that preternatural circumstances may in fact
be attainable, and that a utopia may no longer be as distant as once was thought.
in For recent commentaries on the Politics, see Mary P. Nichols, Citizens and Statesmen:
A Study of Aristotle's Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1992); Michael Davis,
The Politics ofPhilosophy: A Commentary on Aristotle's Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1996); Peter Simpson, A Philosophical Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle
(Chapel Hill, N.C.: University of North Carolina Press, 1996).
19

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what we find in his teachings. In our public discussion of political
life, we tend to think that there is one form of government that
ought to be installed everywhere. We call it democracy, and we
are impatient if we find places in which it has not been realized;
we call such places undeveloped countries, implying that they are
politically either childish or stunted.
When we speak this way, our speech is, I think, caught up in
an ambiguity. We confuse the republic and the modern state. The
republic is the form of government in which laws, not partial,
one-sided, self-interested men rule; it is Aristotle's politeia, the
constitution that is generally the best that can be attained by most
people in most places. The modern state, on the other hand, is
something that arose through modern political philosophy. It
claims to be something radically new and radically different from
earlier forms of government. It is meant to be the definitive
solution to the human political problem, not a solution for this
time and place. It was initially visualized by Machiavelli and baptized by Jean Bodin with the name sovereignty. 21 It was comprehensively described by Hobbes, and worked out and adjusted
by subsequent thinkers like Locke, Rousseau, Kant, and Hegel. 22
When we speak of democracy, we tend more or less to think
that we are speaking of a community in which the laws rule, not
men, but usually we are really speaking about a modern state, the
one informed by sovereignty, not a society informed by one of the
political constitutions described by Aristotle. We also tend to
think that the modern state, modern democracy, has arisen as a
perfect, culminating development in human history. It is not seen
Les six livres de la republique(1576).
See the selections in On Sovereignty, ed. Julian H. Franklin, Cambridge Texts in the History
of Political Thought (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). Bodin says, "Sovereignty
is the absolute and perpetual power of a commonwealth" (1 ). He models the sovereign after
God (46, 50). He also admits that the concept of sovereignty is not present in Aristotle (47,
50). As Julian Franklin observes, for Bodin "citiunship does not necessarily imply political
participation as in Aristotle" (1, footnote).
22 0n the concept of sovereignty see Francis X. Slade, "Rule as Sovereignty: The Universal
and Homogeneous State," in John J. Drummond and James G. Hart, eds., The Truthful and
the Good: Essays in Honor of Robert Sokolowski (Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
1996), 159-80.
21 Bodin expressed his concept of sovereignty in his

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as one of the forms of political life among many, the form that we
may be able to achieve if we are lucky and intelligent enough.
Let me express my own value judgment at this point: to the
extent that the word democracy means a republic, it presents a
good thing, a form of political life to which one can properly
dedicate oneself, one that can be in conformity with human
nature and human virtue. The political problem is to determine,
by practical wisdom, how the rule of laws ordered toward human
excellence can be implemented in our day and age, in whatever
part of the world we inhabit. To the extent, however, that the
word democracy means the modern state, the one described by
Hobbes and glorified by Hegel, it presents a great human problem
and an ominous threat to the human person. It is a formula for
organizing deracinated human beings.
The modern Hobbesian state was nurtured in absolute monarchies in the early modern period, it showed its face in the
French Revolution, and it came into full view in the National
Socialist and the Marxist-Leninist-Stalinist totalitarian regimes in
the twentieth century. In this conference, we commemorate the
work of Pope John Paul II, a man who experienced both the Nazi
and the Stalinist horrors. He reacted to them, in his actions and
words, with a courageous defense of the human person in its
dignity before God. His defense of the human person, furthermore, is based essentially on truth, on the human person's ability
to hear and discover the truth about the world, about himself,
and about God. Pope John Paul II reminds us that human beings
are individual substances of a rational nature, and that through
their reason they can attain the splendor of truth, even in the face
of powers that do their best to extinguish the truth and annihilate
the human dignity that flows from it. They truly are powers of
darkness, for whom will triumphs over intelligence, power over
reason, and choice over life. The problem of the modern state,
furthermore, was not resolved by victory in the Second World
War and the end of the Cold War. It continues in the development of the therapeutic and managerial state, and much of the
human drama in regard to the modern state is going on in this
very city and its suburbs. What will we have: a genuine republic

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or a Leviathan masquerading as a republic? The question is still
open, and human success, in the short term at least, is by no
means assured, but it is possible. As this struggle continues into
the future, it is quite appropriate that there be in this city an
embodied presence of John Paul II, shepherd and stubborn
reminder of the dignity of man. 23
III. CONTRASTS BETWEEN REPUBLICS AND THE MODERN STATE

Let us speak further about the choice between a republic and
Leviathan. I would like to bring out three ways in which these
two forms of political life differ. To be more accurate, I should
not call them two forms of political life, but the form of political
life and the form of mass subjection and individualism.
(1) First of all, in the republic, and in all good political
constitutions, reason can be exercised. Men can think and express
themselves. The republic is not possible without active human
reason. Such reason is exercised in the founding of the city, in the
deliberations that go on to determine courses of action, and in
specifying the laws of the city and adjudicating the application of
the laws. All those who are citizens are able to enter into such
exercises of reason; that is what it means to be a citizen, to be able
to enter into political reasoning. But besides these political or
prudential exercises of reason, there is also in the republic the
recognition of the power of theoretical reason, of understanding
for its own sake. Besides the ethical and political life of reason,
there is a life of simple understanding. Aristotle recognizes this in
book 10 of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he says that the
highest human happiness is found in the theoretic life, but he also
acknowledges it in a very dramatic way in book 7 of the Politics,
chapters 2 and 3. 24 He says that the life of thinking is higher than
the political, and he implies that if one does not acknowledge the
excellence of the life of thinking one will try to satisfy one's thirst
for the infinite by ruling over others, and one will therefore try to
23 The conference at which this paper was originally given was held, in part, at the John
Paul II Cultural Center in Washington, D.C.
24 Aristotle's argument is developed in Politics 7.2-3, especially in 1325a31-h32.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE

519

magnify this domination over as many people as possible, at
home and abroad, even over one's neighbors and parents and
children and friends. 25 In other words, the life of ruling is not the
simply highest life; we have to take our bearings from something
higher. This also means that there is something in us that
transcends political life, and only when political life acknowledges
such transcendence can it find its proper place in human affairs.
Only then will there be limited government. What this means is
that a true republic, a city limited by laws, will have respect for
the person as an agent of truth, both in the practical and in the
theoretical order. The reason of the human person has its own
directedness and its own appetite for truth; it is not just a tool in
the service of subrational desires.
The modern state, in contrast, as described by Hobbes and embodied in totalitarian forms of rule, denies the domain of truth.
For it, reason is a tool. The modern state is constituted as a new
reality, as the sovereign, by an act of sheer will by men in the state
of nature, and it exercises its own power simply for its survival
and to prevent the state of nature from returning. The sovereign
state is separate from the people and it lords over them. For
Hobbes, the metaphysical reality of the state is made up of its
own power and its own decisions. There is no truth of human
nature by which it must be measured and to which it must be
subordinated. The state determines even the kind of religion-the
grasp of transcendence-that it will tolerate. The citizens or
subjects are not agents of truth in any way; when they express
their opinions, they are, according to Hobbes, engaged in vain
posturing, not true deliberation:
For there is no reason why every man should not naturally mind his own
private, than the public business, but that here he sees a means to declare his
eloquence, whereby he may gain the reputation of being ingenious and wise,
and returning home to his friends, to his parents, to his wife and children,
rejoice and triumph in the applause of his dexterous behavior. 26
25 Politics 7.3.1325a34-41.
26 Thomas Hobbes, De Cive 10, §15. See also chapter 1, §2: "All free congress ariseth
either from mutual poverty or from vain glory." I have used Hobbes's own translation of this
work; see Thomas Hobbes, Man and Citizen, ed. Bernard Gert (Garden City, N.Y.:

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

For Hobbes, the sovereign's will alone should determine public
affairs, and even the religious opinions of people have to be
segregated into privacy. Such religious beliefs have no public
standing as possible truths and cannot be presented as such. 27
George Orwell was not wrong when in 1984 he has the
totalitarian O'Brien controlling not only what one should do, but
also how and what one should think, even in mathematics. 28
There is nothing to transcend the sovereign; as Hobbes's
predecessor and guide, Niccolo Machiavelli, put it, any ideal or
best kingdoms, whether Christian or Greek, are figments of the
imagination, imaginary kingdoms, that bring about ruin rather
than preservation. 29
In this political viewpoint, intelligence becomes merely
calculation and pragmatic coping with the material needs of life.
Even the social contract is just the work of calculating reason.
Reason is not insight into truth, because there are no natures or
forms of things to be understood. There is only the calculation of
consequences. The epistemological skepticism of modernity is not
unrelated to its metaphysics and political philosophy. Indeed,
Hobbes's understanding of men as machines and thinking as
mechanical motion, which is presented at the beginning of
Leviathan, 30 is also not unrelated to his political philosophy: this
is how human beings must understand themselves if they are to
subject themselves to Leviathan. It is how the philosophical
spokesman for Leviathan wants them to understand themselves.
The mechanistic interpretation of human beings offered to us by
Doubleday, 1972).
27 On the essentially public character of Christian belief, see Francis X. Slade, "Was 1st
Aufldllrung? Notes on Maritain, Rorty, and Bloom, With Thanks but No Apologies to
Immanuel Kant," in Daniel Mcinerny, ed., Tbe Common Things: Essays on Thomism and
Education (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1999), 48-68.
28 On Orwell's insight into the reality of the Soviet system, see Alain Besan1ron, La
falsification du bien: Soloviev et Orwell (Paris: Julliard, 1985). The second part of the book
is entitled, "Orwell ou la justification du mal." Besan1ron'swork abounds in striking phrases.
In describing the radical falsity of modem totalitarian rule, he speaks of "ce mensonge
universe!" (176), and he says, "Un homme sans memoire est d'une plasticite absolue. II est
recree a chaque instant" (183).
2' Machiavelli makes this claim in the famous chapter 15 of The Prince.
30 See the Introduction and first six chapters of Leviathan.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE

521

reductive forms of cognitive science, in which mind is replaced by
brain and human beings are not seen as agents ·of truth, is
teleologically ordered toward the modern state in its pure form.
This then is the first contrast I wish to draw between classical
and modern political philosophy: modern thought subtracts the
issue of truth from the domain of politics, but a republic acknowledges both practical and theoretical truth and the human
person's ability to attain it. We might ask ourselves which of these
two options is characteristic of our political culture.
(2) The second point I wish to make is that modern political
thought considers the state to be an inevitable development in the
history of humanity. For Aristotle, the various constitutions come
and go as events move along and people respond to them. There
is no necessary destiny driving them on and nothing is definitive;
circumstances and choices permit now this form, now that to
prevail, and sometimes the political society falls into tyranny.
Aristotle encourages us to do the best we can in the situations in
which we find ourselves. Political life is an exercise of prudence.
In the modern understanding, and especially in the twist that
German idealism and Hegel have given it, the modern state is a
definitive achievement. No further prudential and philosophical
reflection is necessary concerning political society, because the
final answer has been reached in the evolution of world history.
This is why we take it for granted that what we call democracy
should be installed everywhere, and why we call countries in
which it does not exist "undeveloped" countries, or, more
hopefully, countries "on the way to development." This belief in
the historical necessity of the modern state might also explain
why political philosophy has been studied in departments of
political science, not in departments of philosophy, in Catholic
and non-Catholic institutions alike. The political question is not
open any longer. The state is a necessary thing-generated by
historical if not cosmic necessity-and hence it is an object of
social science, not of fundamental philosophical reflection.
Nature has been overcome by history, and the unsettled arguments about who should rule and what form of government
should prevail, the disputes among parties, can now be put to

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

rest. The declarations of the end of history proposed by Alexandre Kojeve and Francis Fukuyama are related to this understanding of the modern state.
In contrast with this view of modern politics, I would claim
that human nature has not changed, that political life is the same
now as it always has been, and that what is truly civic and
political in modern states is precisely what is still functioning as
a republic, as a rule of laws, in which people are citizens and not
subjects, in which it is still possible to deliberate and voice
opinions about how we should live, where we can still express
ourselves about the noble and the just, and can ask whether the
laws we live under are or are not in conformity with the ends of
human nature and the truth about man.
In order to foster true political life, it is necessary for us to
change our understanding of the history of philosophy. It is
necessary for us to overcome the segmentation of philosophy into
ancient, medieval, and modern. We must avoid thinking that we
can only understand philosophers as the products of their
historical circumstances, the products of their epoch. We must
recover the idea that philosophy is a perennial thing, that there
are philosophical truths that persist throughout all periods and
ages, and that there is a truth about human nature and about
political life that has been there all along. Human nature does not
change, and the nature of political life does not change either.
The thing we have to relativize historically is the modern state,
not the political life that we find described in Aristotle. The
modern state can be explained by its historical circumstances and
it can be transcended. Aristotle has brought to light the nature of
political life, while Machiavelli, Hobbes, and their followers have
described and fabricated a construct, one that is not in keeping
with human nature, human reason, or the human person, one
that can be explained by the historical circumstances of its
emergence.
(3) We have contrasted the republic and the modern state in
regard to the issue of truth and in regard to the issue of historical
inevitability. The third contrast I wish to draw between the
republic and the modern state concerns the relationship each of

THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE

523

these forms of rule have toward other social authorities and other
communities, such as the family, the Church, private associations,
unions, businesses, educational institutions, and the like. The
republic presupposes prepolitical societies. It does not claim to
fabricate men or to make men human. It assumes that families and
neighborhoods, churches and private associations, can all do their
irreplaceable work in forming human beings, and it facilitates and
crowns their work by its own, by establishing the city under laws,
the city that both presupposes such prepolitical societies and
brings them to their own perfection. This assumption of
prepolitical societies is expressed in Aristotle's Politics by the fact
that the household is treated in book 1 as a presupposition of
political life, and in that book Aristotle says, "For the political art
does not make men. "31 The city makes citizens, but it does not
make human beings.
The sovereign state, in contrast, the Leviathan, levels all
prepolitical communities and authorities. It makes a clean sweep.
The only private societies that it tolerates are those that it permits
to exist for its own purposes. Instead of assuming prepolitical
societies and bringing them to a higher perfection, the modern
state is related to individuals, which it takes out of the state of
nature and transforms into a human condition. This change is
vividly expressed by Rousseau, who in On The Social Contract,
describes the legislator or the founder as follows:
The man who makes bold to undertake the founding of a people should feel
within himself the capacity to-if I may put it so-change human nature: to
transform each individual ... into a part of a larger whole, from which he in
a sense draws his life and being. 32

We have seen attempts in twentieth-century regimes to displace
and replace the family itself, as well as neighborhoods,
educational institutions, and charitable entities such as hospitals
by massive governmental bureaucracies and mobilizations. The
Politics1.10.1258a21-22.
Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, trans. Willmoore Kendall (New York:
Henry Regnery Co., 1954), book 2, chap. 7, pp. 57-58.
31

32

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

homo sovieticus was only the most extreme form of this titanic
totalitarian effort, and we can see what it did to people who lived
under it and were its targets. Human cloning and the artificial
conception of human life may be a Western scientific version of
the same thing. But a coherent society is not possible in a
Hobbesian state, because such a state is not in keeping with the
nature of man.

IV. CONCLUDING PRACTICAL REMARKS
I have discussed both classical political philosophy-which I
would characterize not as classical but as perennial-and the
modern state, and I have tried to draw some contrasts between
them. We have discussed them in regard to three issues; first,
whether or not they acknowledge truth and human reason;
second, whether they are the outcome of prudential achievement
or historical inevitability; and third, whether or not they acknowledge prepolitical human beings, societies, and authorities.
It should be obvious that the issues we are discussing are of great
human importance. Human life can be terribly tortured by forms
of association that destroy political life, and political life can be
destroyed by rampant individualism no less than by totalitarian
regimes. Modern individualism-what is called liberal individualism-harms the person slowly and silently through a notion of
freedom as absence of any and all constraints on the individual's
choice; liberal individualism thus undermines its own moral
preconditions of self-control, self-governance, and internal, moral
freedom. At the other extreme, the collectivism of communism
and fascism harms the person suddenly and directly and loudly,
through a violent abuse of power that destroys freedom, both
external and internal. Thus the two seemingly different modern
regimes both destroy the person, although in different ways.
The central question of the last part of my paper is, in what
way can the human person be protected, preserved, and enhanced
in our modern political context? Can we draw up some agenda
items, as tasks for academic life, for the Catholic Church, and for
ourselves?

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525

The practical task is for the Church to continue to be active in
her defense of the human person. She has in fact done so in things
like the Solidarity movement, pro-life causes both in particular
countries and internationally, in her educational system, and in
her health-care institutions. In other words, the Church herself
should continue to act in the public domain. Precisely by
defending and exercising her own right to be independent, she
creates a wider space for political life for others as well. Political
liberty can be preserved only by being exercised.
In a more theoretical domain, the Church can pay greater
attention to issues of political philosophy in her academic
institutions and even in her seminaries and centers that train
people for ministry. It is important to educate people for
citizenship, and this does not just mean informing them about the
procedures of voting and the mechanisms of government. If men
and women are to be citizens, they must be educated about what
is at stake in political life, and they must be made better aware of
how civic life can be lost. They need a vocabulary for political
matters, and the Church can help them acquire it. The clergy and
religious should also be helped to understand the nature of
political life, lest they become unwitting collaborators in the
triumph of the modern sovereign state. 33
In particular, the Church should insist on the role of truth in
human life and the relevance of truth to political society. In this
domain there are a whole cluster of issues of great personal and
political significance. It is important to teach both students and
parishioners about them, but it is also important to deepen our
theoretical understanding of these concepts, and to make room
for them in the contemporary cultural and theological conversation. To be more specific about these theoretical issues, it would
be important, first, to validate the fact that truth is obtainable, to
show that the human mind is able to discover truth, and to spell
out the various kinds of truth and the force and extent of each.
To do this is not a mere exercise in epistemology, but a defense
33 See Alain Besan1;on,La confusion des lang1,1e5: La crise ideologiquede l'Eglise (Paris:
Calmann-Levy, 1978). An earlier, less forceful version of this work appeared as an essay,
"The Confusion of Tongues," Daedalus 108 (Spring 1979): 21-44.

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ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

of the human person as an agent of truth. To defend the
possibility of truth is to defend human dignity. The encyclicals
Fides et ratio and Veritatis splendor, as well as the apostolic
constitution F,x corde &clesiae, are a marvelous charter for this
effort. Second, it would be essential to clarify what is meant by
human nature and to show how we can speak about human
nature. One of the central concepts that needs to be clarified and
defended in this respect is the concept of teleology, not only in
regard to human nature but in regard to things like life, politics,
and religion. Things have ends built into them, and natural ends,
the natural perfections of things, are not overridden by the
purposes we might have, purposes that we might impose on
things. We cannot understand anything unless we know what its
end is, that is, unless we know what it is when it is acting at its
best. 34
These issues of truth, human nature, and teleology lie very
deeply hidden within contemporary political life. They are at the
heart of many current controversies. If the Church were able to
formulate them well, and use her educational institutions to
develop and teach them, she would be engaged in politics in the
best and most appropriate way: not in particular, partisan
political activity, but in what we could call the "higher politics,"
the understanding of human life in its principles and in its
excellence. The Church in her teaching and in her educational
institutions should not measure herself simply by the norms set by
the secular world. She should set her own agenda, drawing on her
own tradition and inspiration. Through her tradition of natural
law, the Church has the resources to redefine the contemporary
political conversation in terms of the ends of human nature. By
witnessing to the truth the Church would be defending the human
person, and would thus make a unique contribution to our
34 For an excellent philosophical treatment of teleology, see two papers by Francis X.
Slade: "On the Ontological Priority of Ends and Its Relevance to the Narrative Arts," in Alice
Ramos, ed., Beauty, Art, and the Polis (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2000), 58-69; and "Ends and Purposes," in Richard Hassing, ed., Final
Causality in Nature and Human Affairs (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1997), 83-85.

THE HUMAN PERSON AND POLITICAL LIFE

527

contemporary culture and civic life. She would also continue the
spirit and teaching of one of her greatest figures, Pope John Paul
II.3s

I am grateful to Richard Hassing, V. Bradley Lewis, and Francis X. Slade for comments
made on earlier drafts of this paper.
35

The Thomist 65 (2001): 529-65

ST THOMAS AND THE EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION
STEPHEN L. BROCK
Pontifical Universityof the Holy Cross
Rome, Italy

I

T IS HARDLY POSSIBLE to read the encyclical Fides et ratio
without being struck by its insistence upon the need for
philosophy, and especially metaphysics, in Christian theology.
Among the many reasons cited for this need, one stands out as
fundamental.
The word of God refers constantly to things which transcend human
experience and even human thought; but this "mystery" could not be revealed,
nor could theology render it in some way intelligible, were human knowledge
limited strictly to the world of sense experience. Metaphysics thus plays an
essential role of mediation in theological research. Gohn Paul II, F«Jes et ratio,
§83)

The following study concerns a particular case of this sort of
mediating role of metaphysics in theology. It is a small but
dominant element in St Thomas Aquinas's doctrine of the
Eucharist: his account of the nature of the sacramental
conversion, or what is traditionally called transubstantiation.
What has suggested this study to me is a recent article by
Germain Grisez on Jesus' substantial presence in the Eucharist. 1
Grisez takes issue with St. Thomas's doctrine. Not only his theme,
but also his attacks on Thomas, have much to do with
"metaphysical mediation."
Germain Grisez, "An Alternative Theology of Jesus' Substantial Presence in the
Eucharist," Irish TheologicalQuarterly 65 no. 2 (2000): 111-31; cited hereafter by page
number alone.
1

529

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

Grisez is not accusing Thomas of teaching things contrary to
the faith (113). Rather, he is delivering judgment from the
standpoint proper to the theologian, that of "faith seeking
understanding." His charge is that a number of Thomas's central
positions on Christ's presence in the Eucharist are simply
unintelligible.
Of these positions, all but one have to do with the accidents
found in the sacrament (either those of the bread and wine, or
Jesus' own) and their relation to the substance of Jesus' body and
blood. The other position concerns transubstantiation.
Grisez's objections are all serious and worth pondering, even
if none is actually fatal to Thomas's account. 2 The strongest, I
think, is the one about transubstantiation. 3 With a view to better
understanding Thomas, I also find it the most fruitful to engage.
As I hope we shall see, not least among the results is an
appreciation of the truly theological nature of the account.
I. THE OBJECTION
The purpose of the doctrine of transubstantiation is to specify
the kind of change that takes place when the sacrament of the
Eucharist is performed. Before the priest utters the words of the
consecration-"This is my body," "This is the cup of my
blood" -the host and the contents of the chalice are bread and
wine. Afterwards, they are the body and blood of Christ. As
Thomas sees it, this change must consist in the conversion of the
substance of the bread into the substance of Christ's body, and the
2 Considering them fatal, Grisez goes on to propose a vastly different account of Jesus'
presence in the sacrament. I shall not discuss Grisez's own proposal in any detail. He presents
it only as a hypothesis, and he assures us that if he thought that one could reasonably accept
Aquinas's account, he would not question it (113).
3 This may not be Grisez's view. What he seems to find most problematic is Thomas's view
that the accidents of the bread and wine subsist without a subject. In general this does appear
to be the most controversial aspect of the doctrine. But I find Grisez's particular objection to
it less difficult to resolve than the one concerning transubstantiation. In any case, it seems to
me that the transubstantiation issue should be addressed first. In all ofThomas's systematic
treatments of the sacrament, the discussion of transubstantiation precedes and determines his
positions on the other matters. See IV Sent., dd. 8-12; ScG IV, cc. 63-68; STh Ill, qq. 75-80.

EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

531

conversion of the substance of the wine into the substance of his
blood (STh III, q. 75, a. 4 ). Grisez recognizes that this is in
accordance with conciliar teaching both before and after Thomas
(111-12), and so far he has no objection.
In Thomas's account, however, the sacramental conversion has
something unique about it. In contrast with all other types of
conversion, this one has no "subject," in the proper sense of the
term. There is no underlying substrate that undergoes it, no
material component that belongs first to one term of the conversion and then to the other. This means that nothing in the substance of the bread, not even its matter, is carried over to the
body of Christ. 4 The whole substance of the bread passes away,
leaving the substance of Christ's body in its stead. According to
Thomas, it is in view of this unique feature that the sacramental
conversion is given the special name "transubstantiation" (STh III,
q. 75, a. 4). He judges that such a change exceeds the capacity of
any created agency. It can happen only through the power of
God.
Of course this is in God's power only if it is something
possible in itself, something conceivable or intelligible. What
Grisez finds unintelligible is a conversion in which the first term
contributes nothing of itself to the reality of the second. "The
very idea of converting A into B seems to me to imply that
something of A contributes to the reality of B" (119).
Grisez assures us that he is not simply rejecting the notion of
a conversion of a "whole" substance into another substance. He
thinks it can be meaningful to speak of such a conversion. But he
has his own way of understanding it. He takes it to mean a
"substantial change without residue" (123). In such a change,
nothing having the nature of the first substance remains. The
matter of the first substance, however, does remain. It takes on
the nature of the second substance. The change is a transformation (ibid.). Yet the "whole" first substance is changed, in
the sense that no portion of it stays untransformed. All of its
4 The bread is turned into a body that exists even before the change, with its own matter,
distinct from the matter of the bread. Thomas provides an imaginary illustration: the
conversion of "this finger" into "that finger" (ScG IV, c. 63, §7, Nunc autem).

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

material is integrated into the second substance. None of the first
substance is left. On this account, the Eucharist is not the only
real example of such a conversion. For instance, when the corpse
of Lazarus was brought back to life, Grisez says, "it is surely
meaningful, and it seems correct, to say that the corpse's whole
substance became Lazarus's again-living self. All the corpse's
material was reconstituted into Lazarus's living body, leaving
nothing behind" (118).
In Thomas's conception, the matter of the first substance is not
incorporated into the second substance. It is simply eliminated.
The conversion is not a mere transformation. It is a sheer
succession from one whole substance to another. Grisez does not
think that such a succession can deserve to be called a conversion.
The terms of a conversion must have a common element. Thomas
is emptying the word "conversion" of its meaning.
Aquinas holds that one can rightly say that the body of Christ comes from the
bread and that the substance of the bread is converted into Christ's body. But
in saying these things, one can only mean, on his view, that the bread was the
antecedent for Jesus' coming to be in the sacrament by a process in which the
antecedent contributes nothing whatever to what follows from it. (118-19)

One might wonder why Thomas even employs such language.
Of course, even on Aquinas's view, the bread and wine are necessary
antecedents both because Jesus used them when he instituted the sacrament and
because they leave behind accidents that serve as the sacramental sign under
which Jesus is present and in which he is contained. But those requirements
could have been met by saying that the bread and the wine are annihilated and
replaced by Jesus' body and blood. And this way of putting matters might seem
a more accurate account of what Aquinas thinks is happening: first one reality
is there and then it no longer exists, its place being taken by a second reality
that has nothing whatever in common with the first. (119)

Grisez explains why Thomas insists on speaking of a
conversion.
Aquinas, however, rejects any account involving annihilation. He think such an
account would require that Jesus replace the bread and wine by moving from

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

533

heaven into the elements, with the result that he would be in as many different
places as there are consecrated species-something Aquinas considers
impossible. (119)

This is the decisive point for Thomas: the body of Christ cannot
begin to exist in the sacrament by any change in the body itself
(STh III, q. 75, a. 2). It must do so by a change undergone by
something else. The bread must be changed into it. So he adopts
the language of conversion. The bread is converted into the body
of Christ, by the power of God.
Grisez's charge is that if the bread and the body of Christ have
nothing in common, this language is meaningless. Evidently he
judges that if the bread does not contribute anything, then as far
as bringing about the body of Christ is concerned, it is superfluous. It is no better than nothing. It may as well be annihilated.
Grisez notes that Thomas himself perceives a need to identify
some sort of subject for the sacramental conversion. Thomas
observes that the bread and the body of Christ are not things that
exist in a subject. Hence there can be no subject underlying the
change from one to the other. "So," he says, "since this
substantial conversion implies a certain order of the substances,
one of which is converted into the other, it exists as in a subject
in both substances, in the way that order and number do. "5 Grisez
sees this as a rather desperate attempt to avoid the kind of
problem that he is raising. He counters:
That explanation confuses logic with reality. Logically, the concepts of bread
and of Jesus' body can serve together as the subject of conversion, functioning
as a two-term relational predicate (just as those concepts can serve together as
the subjects of ordering and numbering predicates). But if, as Aquinas
maintains, there is no real continuity between the bread and Jesus' body, the
two substances share nothing that could make them be together the subject of
anything real. Yet transubstantiation is a real conversion. (120)

The issue, then, is whether the very notion of "a conversion"
can be saved in Thomas's conception of transubstantiation. If not,
5 STh III, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1. (fhroughout this paper, translations of passages from St
Thomas are mine.)

STEPHEN L. BROCK

534

then the conception must be judged unintelligible. "And since the
unintelligible is impossible, not even God can do it" (119).
II. THE CONVERSION OF A WHOLE SUBSTANCE

Before examining Thomas's conception, we should say
something about Grisez's own way of understanding a conversion
of one whole substance into another. As he reminds us (112), the
Council of Trent's Decree on the Eucharist uses this language. 6
But I find it quite implausible that the council could have meant
it in his way, or even in a way compatible with his.7
Grisez gives the term "whole" a quantitative sense. It refers to
"every bit" of the substance. A whole substance is converted when
no portion of it is left behind or nothing with its nature remains.
All of its matter takes on the nature of another substance. The
"whole" corpse of Lazarus was converted into living Lazarus in
this sense: no part of the corpse stayed dead.
This way of distinguishing between the conversion of a
"whole" substance and the conversion of only a part or portion
of a substance is certainly intelligible. It can also have useful
applications. For instance, we might point out that in digestion,
normally only a portion of the food is converted into a living
body. Another portion is left over and expelled as residue.
But can this possibly be what Trent means in speaking of the
conversion of the "whole" substance of the bread and wine into
6 "Quoniam

autem Christus redemptor noster corpus suum id, quod sub specie panis
offerebat, vere esse dixit, ideo persuasum semper in Ecclesia Dei fuit, idque nunc denuo
sancta haec Synodus declarat: per consecrationem panis et vini conversionem fieri totius
substantiae panis in substantiam corporis Christi Domini nostri, et totius substantiae vini in
substantiam sanguinis eius. Quae conversio convenienter et proprie a sancta catholica Ecclesia
transsubstantiatio est appellata" (DS 1642, emphasis added). "Si quis dixerit, in sacrosancto
Eucharisiae sacramento remanere substantiam panis et vini una cum corpore et sanguine
Domini nostri Iesu Christi, negaveritque mirabilem illam et singularem conversionem totius
substantiae panis in corpus et totius substantiae vini in sanguinem, manentibus dumtaxat
speciebus panis et vini, quam quidem conversionem catholica Ecclesia aptissime
transsubstantiationem appellat: anathema sit" (DS 1652, emphasis added).
7 I am not addressing Grisez's suggestion thatTrent might be open to the possibility that
the immediate terminus ad quern of the sacramental conversion not be the whole substance
of Christ's body and blood (124). The issue here is what is meant by "the whole substance of
the bread" and "the whole substance of the wine."

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

535

the substance of Christ's body and blood? What would its point
be? It would serve to prevent us from thinking that only a portion
of the bread in the consecrated host has been converted into the
body of Christ, while another portion has remained bread. But
who would think that? Some of the bread is converted, and some
is not? This is not at all the doctrine of "impanation," according
to which the body of Christ comes to exist in the host together
with the bread. On that doctrine, none of the bread is converted.
The Council of Trent was certainly concerned to rule out impanation. But if someone grants that the consecration does convert at
least a part of the bread into the body of Christ, why would he or
she think that another part has to remain unconverted? Has
anyone ever held such a view?
On the other hand, at least one theologian prior to Trent did
hold a view remarkably similar to Grisez's. Early in the 14th
century, the Dominican theologian Durand of Saint
objected strongly to Aquinas's account of transubstantiation. 8 He
held that a conversion in which no component of the first term
remains "is not intelligible. "9 On his view, one thing is convertible
into another only if they have matter in common. The very
notion of a conversion implies an underlying subject. The subject
would be what makes the difference between the conversion of
the bread and its annihilation. 10 Durand also proposed an
alternative much like Grisez's. He suggested that the sacramental
conversion resembles the conversion of food into that which is
fed. It would be a kind of transformation. The matter of the bread
would lose the nature of bread and take on a share in the nature
of the body of Christ. 11
Of course Durand did not think that any portion of the bread
was left unconverted. Yet he did not at all seek to describe
transubstantiation as a "conversion of a whole substance." On the
contrary, taking that expression in Thomas's sense, he argued
8 Durandi a Sancto Porciano, In PetriLombardi SententiasTheologicasCommentariorum
libri IV, vol. 2 (Venetiis: Ex typographia Guerra, 1621; republished by The Gregg Press
Incorporated, Ridgewood N.J., 1964), IV, d. 11, qq. 2-3, pp. 318vb-320ra.
9 Ibid., q. 3, §5 (near the end), p. 319vb; cf. q. 2, §11, p. 319rb.
10 Ibid., q. 2, §6, p. 319ra; q. 3, §4, p. 319va.
11 Ibid., q. 3, §5, p. 319vb.

STEPHEN L. BROCK

536

directly against its application to the Eucharist. He simply did not
feel bound to speak of transubstantiation as a conversion of a
whole substance. While acknowledging that this was what was
commonly said and taught, he insisted that it was licit to take an
opposing view, because the teaching of the Church left the
question open. 12 When Durand was writing, in fact, the Church
had not yet defined transubstantiation as a conversion of a
"whole" substance.
Durand's position did not go unnoticed. Two centuries later,
Cardinal Cajetan, in his commentary on the Summa Theologiae
(at III, q. 75, a. 4), spent a good deal of effort on its refutation. 13
Cajetan's commentary was written thirty or forty years before the
Tridentine Decree on the Eucharist.
In the background of the decree, then, we find that the
description of transubstantiation as a "conversion of a whole
substance" was a matter of some dispute. We also find that both
sides understood the description as Thomas did. No one took it
to refer merely to "all of the bread in the host." It referred to the
whole substance of all of the bread, that is, to everything entering
into the constitution of the bread's substance. The decree's
intended meaning must therefore be at least very close to
Thomas's. It would then have a clear point: to exclude a position
like Durand's (or Grisez's). It would mark the difference between
transubstantiation and mere substantial transformations. It would
mean a substantial conversion that completely eliminates one
substance, leaving a wholly distinct substance in its stead. 14
Ibid., q. 3, §5 (near the end) & §6, p. 319vb.
Cajetan's whole discussion of SI'h III, q. 75, a.4 merits study (Sancti Thomae Aquinatis,
Opera omnia, lussu impensaque Leonis XIII P.M. edita, vol. XIII: Tertia pars summae
theologiae, a Q. 60 ad Q. 90, cum commentariis Thomae de Vio Caietani [Roma: ex
typographia polyglotta S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1906], pp. 168-72). Sections X-XVI concern
Durand. Cajetan's analysis of the conversion is quite technical; I shall not attempt a summary
of it. But in what follows I draw a good deal from it, especially as regards the analogy
between the sacramental conversion and a transformation. There is only one point on which
I would take issue with it (see below, n. 35).
14 Grisez argues that the Fathers of Trent "meant to allow for theological differences
among themselves and their advisers," so that even if in fact most or all of them understood
the canons on the Eucharist in light of Thomas's theology, there would still be room for
dogmatic development (124). I do not wish to quarrel with this. But as Grisez says, "what the
12
13

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537

III. THE "SUBJECT" OF THE CONVERSION
I now turn to the main issue: whether such a succession of
substances can be understood to consist in a conversion of one
into the other. The lack of an underlying subject does raise a
serious question about the possibility of such a conversion. Before
attempting to formulate the question with precision, it is
necessary to correct two points in Grisez's report of Thomas's
account of the conversion.
The first point concerns the subject of the sacramental
conversion. As we saw, Thomas says that the two substances
themselves somehow serve as the conversion's subject. Grisez
thinks he is confusing logic with reality. I see no such confusion.
The text in question is a reply to an objection against the
possibility of the conversion of bread into the body of Christ. The
objection and reply are as follows.
[Objection] Every conversion is a certain change. But in every change there
must be a subject that is first in potency and then in act. For as it says in Physics
III, motion is the act of something existing in potency. But no subject of the
substance of the bread and the body of Christ can be assigned, because, as it
says in the Categories, it pertains to the notion [ratio] of a substance not to
exist in a subject. So it cannot be that the whole substance of the bread is
converted into the body of Christ ....
[Reply] The objection concerns formal change, because it is proper to form
to exist in matter or in a subject. But the objection does not apply to the
conversion of a whole substance. So, since this substantial conversion implies
an order of substances, of which one is converted into another, it exists as in
a subject in both substances, in the way that order and number do. (STh III, q.
75, a. 4, obj. 1 & ad 1)

It is dear that Thomas is not first simply denying that the
conversion has a subject and then simply positing one. He is
denying that it has a subject in the proper sense: a material
substrate, something that is in potency to it. What he goes on to
posit is only something that the conversion exists in "as" in a
Council asserts by those canons should be determined by interpreting them in a way that
accounts reasonably for their text considered in its historical context" (ibid.). I do not think
that he offers a reasonable interpretation of totius substantiae.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

subject (sicut in subiecto). The conversion has a subject only in
some qualified sense. In the next article, in fact, Thomas refers
back to this one and says explicitly that the conversion does not
properly have a subject (STh III, q. 75, a. 5, ad 4).
However, Thomas's procedure does raise a question. Excluding a material substrate, and so answering the objection, only
seems to require invoking the distinction (drawn in the body of
the same article) between a "formal" change, or a transformation,
and a conversion of a whole substance, a transubstantiation.
Having invoked this distinction, why does he go on, seemingly
out of his way or even at cross-purposes, to argue in favor of
some sort of subject?
I do not think he is trying desperately to answer an objection
like Grisez's. Nor is he even really going out of his way. Instead,
he is simply attending to something else mentioned in the
objection. This is that it pertains to the notion of a substance not
to exist in a subject. To have no subject at all is proper to
substances. If the sacramental conversion's nature were such that
it could not have a subject in any sense, then the conversion itself
would be a substance! 15 It must have some sort of subject, even if
not in the unqualified or proper sense.
How then should we understand the conversion's subject?
Thomas seems to follow the rule given at the start of the reply: "it
is proper to form to exist in matter or in a subject." He treats the
conversion as a sort of form. One thing is converted into another.
We analyze the concrete fact in abstract terms and speak of "the
conversion." We treat it in the manner of a form. The conversion
is "of one thing into another." It involves order ("into") and
number (the two things). These are kinds of form. Their subject
is constituted by the terms of the order and the units of the
number. So the conversion's terms, the two substances, are a sort
of subject for it.
15 Cf. IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, obj. 3: "a conversion is in some way [quodammodo]
an accident." Presumably Thomas does not mean by this that conversions are only with
respect to accidental genera of being. He is talking precisely about a certain type of
substantial conversion. But although it regards the genus of substance, it is not itself a kind
of substance. It does not subsist, and neither does it belong to the very essence of any
subsistent thing.

EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

539

Thomas denies that this is a subject in the unqualified or
proper sense. I would suggest that his reason is that it is not even
an unqualifiedly "real" subject. In a way it is only a logical one. 16
The conversion is a kind of succession, which is a type of
relation. 17 The two substances are the subject of this relation.
Now, insofar as things are in succession, they are not
simultaneous. When one is, the other is not. 18 They do not exist
together. Nor then can they form a real unity. Of course, each of
them, in itself, is something real. But their unity, as a subject of
this relation, exists only in the apprehension of reason. Hence
they only constitute a logical subject, a subject of predication.
They are not a subject in the proper sense, because they do not
provide real matter or potency for some form or act. 19
Thomas is not confusing logic and reality; in fact, he is being
especially careful to distinguish them. At the same time, it should
be observed that what I am calling the merely "logical" status of
the subject of the conversion has nothing at all to do with the
absence of material continuity. It is simply a result of the
16 I do not mean by this what Grisez means. He says that Thomas has only shown that
conversion can function as a predicate, with the concepts of bread and of Jesus' body as its
subject. Taken at face value, this is hard to understand. To predicate conversion of the
concepts would be to say that the concept of bread is converted into the concept of Jesus'
body! What Grisez must mean is that on Thomas's account, even if "the bread is converted
into the body of Christ" respects the logic of its terms-it is a well-formed sentence-it
cannot possibly be true. What I mean is that although the real bread and the real body of
Christ are what constitute the subject, they do so only in the apprehension of reason, not in
themselves.
17 See IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad 3.
18 Of course, prior to the conversion, the bread and the body of Christ do exist
simultaneously, somewhere; the nonsimultaneity and the succession between them is with
respect to their existence in the sacrament.
19 Is the relation of succession itself a "real" relation? In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1,
ad 3, Thomas says that it is something real "in the bread, which is changed" (whereas the
body of Christ remains unchanged). Yet previously in the same work he says that "a real
relation requires that both of the extremes be in act" (I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 1). In the later
De Potentia, q. 7, a. 11, one of his examples of a mere relation of reason is that of something
present to something future. (Cf. III Phys., lect. 5, §324. On relations between a being and
a non-being as relations of reason, see Sfh I, q. 13, a. 7 .) At any rate it seems clear that the
succession cannot be a real "form" or "act." It is not even the sort of "incomplete form" or
"imperfect act" that is called "motion" (In IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, ad3). That would
require a material substrate.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

nonsimultaneity of the terms of the conversion. Even in an ordinary change, where there is material continuity; the terms of the
change do not exist simultaneously. There is a relation of succession between them, and they are a "subject" of this relation
only in a qualified sense. To be sure, such a change does have a
proper subject, a real substrate. But that subject is only a
component of the terms, not the terms themselves.
Moreover, the fact that the substances are only a logical subject
of the succession does not at all prevent it from being a real
succession. On the contrary, if the terms were functioning
together as a real subject, then they would not be in real
succession. They would be existing simultaneously. 20
So when Thomas posits a sort of subject for the conversion, he
is not trying to make up somehow for the lack of material
continuity, and he is not confused. And whether or not he is
justified in calling the substantial succession a conversion, there
are hardly grounds for saying that on his account, the bread and
the body of Christ cannot be "the subject of anything real."

IV. A REAL CHANGE UNDER THE ACCIDENTS
The second point that needs to be corrected in Grisez's report
of Thomas's account of the sacramental conversion is a lacuna.
Grisez makes no mention of the role of the sacramental species,
the accidents of the bread and wine. He does note that for
Thomas the species serve as the sacramental sign under which
Jesus is present and in which he is contained (119). But he is
silent about the fact that the species are also indispensable to the
conversion itself. They function, so to speak, as the hinge upon
which it turns.
20 Even if the succession is not a real relation (see previous note), it can still be a real
succession. This is not absurd. Consider, for instance, that God's action of creation is not a
real relation of God to creature, and yet it is certainly a real action (STh I, q. 45, a. 3, ad l;
cf. STh I, q. 13, a. 7). What it means for an instance of something to be "real" depends on
what sort of thing it is. There is real evil, even though evil is not a positive act or a real
"being." A real succession would be one that is neither fictitious nor merely metaphorical
(e.g., the atemporal "succession" of numbers in a series).

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

541

It is not sufficient, in order to understand the succession of
substances as a conversion, to consider the accidents. But for
Thomas, it is certainly necessary. A conversion is a certain kind of
change. The accidents are needed in order make it possible to
speak of any genuine sort of change .in the succession from the
bread to the body of Christ, 21 for they are the only thing that
remains intact throughout the succession.
Thomas insists that there can be a real change (mutatio) only
where something remains the same throughout. "It pertains to the
very notion of a change that something one and the same be now
disposed otherwise than before" (STh I, q. 45, a. 2, ad 2). If one
thing ceases and another begins, that might suffice to speak of
some sort of order of succession between them; but there is not
a genuine change unless there is a constant third item that is
diversified through the succession. This is why the creation of the
world was not a change (ibid.). There was no third thing that first
had non-being and then being. In contrast with creation, Thomas
says, transubstantiation agrees with natural change (transmutatio)
in this, that "in both, something one and the same remains....
But in different ways; for in a natural change the same matter or
subject remains, while in this sacrament the same accidents
remain" (STh Ill, q. 75, a. 8).
Thomas is very clear about the fact that the accidents of the
bread are not a real subject or matter for the sacramental change.
Still, he grants that insofar as they remain throughout, they do
bear a resemblance to a subject of change (STh Ill, q. 75, a. 5, ad
4). They are like a subject precisely in their being "disposed now
otherwise than before." Before the consecration, the sacramental
species contained bread; now they contain the body of Christ. We
can even say that they "undergo" a change, a change in
"contents."
The term "undergo" here does not signify the role of a true
and proper subject of change. The species's relation to the
21 Further on we shall see that the accidents· also play a role in making the change
intelligible precisely as a conversion, insofar as they mediate the reference of the pronoun
"this" in the sacramental formula.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

"contents" is not that of matter to form or potency to act. But it
would be a mistake, I believe, to think that the Eucharistic change
is the only one in which what is said to "undergo" the change is
not a subject of it in the proper sense. Consider these examples:
a house undergoes a change in occupants; a car changes owners;
a dancer changes partners. In each case, that which is spoken of
as the change's subject-the room, the car, the dancer-is not a
proper subject of the change. It is not related to the objects
defining the change-the occupants, the owners, the partners-as
matter to form or potency to act. It is only something that is
"disposed now otherwise than before." Yet these are all real
changes.22
This consideration indicates that just as the lack of material
continuity does not exclude a real succession from the bread to
the body of Christ, neither does it exclude a real change. The
continuity of the accidents suffices to display the succession as
some sort of real change, whether or not it is a "conversion." The
question of the conversion concerns the nature of the relation
between the two substances. But even if the accidents were simply
"emptied" of contents-even if the substance of the bread were
annihilated, and nothing at all took its place-one would surely
have to regard that as a real change.
If anything, the lack of material continuity seems to make for
an especially "real" change. Even where there is material continuity, there is change only if there is also discontinuity. Continuity is the very opposite of change. There is real change only
if there is real diversity between the terms. And a change would
seem to be more "real," just insofar as the discontinuity or
diversity between its terms is greater.

22 This is not to dispute Thomas's remark that "in a natural change the same matter or
subject remains." If we analyze these examples, we find that they are only what we might call
"supervenient" changes, mere results of more fundamental ones. Underlying them are changes
that do have proper subjects. For instance, the dancer's change in parmers is the result of the
first partner's stepping aside and the second parmer's stepping in. By contrast, there is no
more fundamental change or set of changes underlying the shift in the contents of the
sacramental species.

EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

543

It is not nonsense to speak of changes as more or less real. The
term "change" is not univocal. Change is found in various
categories or genera of being, which are not univocally beings.
Aristotle distinguishes four basic kinds of real change: in place, in
size, in quality, and in substance. These are all true and proper
changes. They all yield some real diversity in the thing changed.
But the diversities are not on an equal level, because a thing's
place, size, quality, and substance do not pertain equally to its
identity or sameness. All changes yield some diversity in a thing,
but the result may be more or less truly a diverse thing.
Thus, a change in place diversifies the thing changed only
according to an extrinsic condition, that of its surroundings. In
itself the thing is just the same. By contrast, a change in size or
quality diversifies something intrinsic to it. The diversity is in
something that is more truly its own. And in a substantial
change-a generation or a corruption-the very nature of the
thing is changed. This means that the result is without
qualification a diverse thing. When an animal grows, what results
is still the same individual. But when the animal dies, the
individual that was the animal no longer exists. What remains is
only a part or component, the matter. Substantial change is called
a change in a much more absolute sense than the others are. 23
In transubstantiation, as Thomas conceives it, the substantial
diversity is both in kind and in matter. 24 The substance of one
thing yields entirely to that of another. Only its accidents remain.
This is not a physical kind of change, as Aristotle's kinds are. But
if Thomas's conception is true, then transubstantiation would
seem to be in a way the most real change of all.

23 The subject of substantial change is itself very difficult to grasp. Substantial change has
a proper subject, but the subject is only a very qualified sort of being. It does not have a
complete nature of its own. There is nothing definite that it is per se. Only the terms of the
unqualified beings. It is not perfectly proper to say that
change--what it is from and
one substance "becomes" or comes to be the other, e.g., that Lazarus's corpse "became"
Lazarus (118). See below, n. 53.
·
24 For the sequence "change in place, change in quantity or quality, generation or
corruption, transubstantiation," see IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1.

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STEPHEN L BROCK

So there is a real succession and a real change here. But is there
a conversion?
V. THE TRUE PROBLEM ABOUT THE CONVERSION

Grisez never pinpoints what it is about the notion of a
conversion that makes an enduring material component appear
necessary. I think that there is indeed something, though in the
final analysis the necessity is only apparent.
Even granting the foregoing corrections to his report of
Thomas, Grisez could still argue that if material continuity is
denied, then the only way to conceive the sacramental change is
as the annihilation of the bread and its replacement by Jesus'
body. A conversion would be out of the question. On the
annihilation account, the change in the contents of the
sacramental species would only be a result. Underlying it would
be two changes, simultaneous but distinct: a change in the
bread-its ceasing to exist-and some change in the body of
Christ through which it begins to exist there where the bread
was.25 By contrast, on the conversion account, there is only one
change, the change in the bread. The body of Christ would be the
term of that very change. As Thomas puts it, this succession can
be called a conversion because it agrees with natural change not
only in the fact that something one and the same remains, but
also in the fact that one term "passes away into the other" (transit
in alterum). 26 The bread passes away, not into nothing, but into
25 See above, n. 22. The annihilation of the bread, of course, would not have a proper
subject, any more than creation does.
26 SI'h III, q. 75, a. 8. Creation cannot be called a conversion, because one term does not
upass away into" the other, as it does in a natural change and in the Eucharist. Presumably
annihilation would not be a conversion either; there is nothing that the annihilated thing
passes into. Thomas often employs the verb transireto signify a conversion: see, e.g., SI'h I,
q. 119, a. 1, where he uses it in several places to speak of the conversion of food into the
nature of what is fed. Transire literally means uto go across" or uto pass over," or even uto
pass away." When it is used to refer to a conversion, it does not mean a change in place. The
passage is from what is distinctive about one terrn to what is distinctive about the other,
across what they have in common. In this sense the first term also upasses away." It loses what
distinguishes it from the second, ceasing to be what its name signifies. (fhe passing away may
of course be only a qualified sort, as when an unbeliever is converted into a believer. He or

EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

545

the body of Christ. The coming to be of Christ's body in the host
starts from the bread.
This is what the lack of material continuity seems to exclude.
To say that one thing is converted into another is to say that the
one is a principle of the other's coming to be. Nor is it merely an
indirect principle. It is not just something that must be gotten out
of the way, like the first dance-partner. On the contrary, if it were
not there first, then the second term could not come to be, since
the second's coming to be starts precisely "from" it. Thus,
Thomas says that God uses bread "in order to make thence" (ut
faciat inde) the body of Christ (STh III, q. 75, a. 2, ad 1). Yet this
seems to imply that the first term provides some potency for the
second, something that "can be" the second and "becomes" it.
This in turn would mean that there is continuity between the
terms, since the potency would survive the change. It would be
carried over in the passage from one term to the other. But as
Grisez notes (118), Thomas denies that bread properly "becomes"
the body of Christ (STh III, q. 75, a. 8). In the same place, he also
denies that bread properly "can be" or "will be" the body of
Christ. 27
Hence the question is, in what sense does bread serve as that
from which the bringing about of the body of Christ begins, if it
does not contribute anything to Christ's body? If nothing in the
bread functions as matter or potency for the body of Christ, what
can it mean to say that the coming to be of the body of Christ in
the sacrament starts from the bread? How can the change by
which Jesus' body exists in the host be a change in the bread
alone?
VI. THE CONVERTIBILilY OF THE BREAD (A): A COMMON
NATURE OF BEING

The key text in Thomas is one that Grisez does not consider.
It is a brief and difficult text, and its bearing on the problem, as
she does not absolutely pass away, but only ceases to be an unbeliever.)
27 However, Grisez overlooks an important qualification to this denial; see below, at n.
52.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

I have understood it, is in some respects only implicit. But when
taken together with other parts of Thomas's doctrine of the
Eucharist, I believe it provides the answer.
The text is a reply to another objection against the possibility
of the conversion (STh Ill, q. 75, a. 4, ad 3). The body of the
article concerns the question "whether bread can be converted
into the body of Christ." Thomas of course answers affirmatively.
At the same time, he makes it clear from the start that he does not
mean to ascribe to bread any natural capacity or potential by
which it "can be" converted into the body of Christ. 28 Instead,
citing Ambrose, Thomas insists that this conversion is "not like
natural conversions." It is "altogether supernatural," effected by
the sole power of God. A "natural" conversion, one that occurs
"according to the laws of nature" and by the natural power of a
created agent, is always a "formal" conversion. It always consists
in a succession of forms in one and the same subject. This is
because an agent acts only insofar as it exists in act, and every
created agent is in act according to a determinate genus and
species. What its action can bear upon is therefore only some
determinate act. The determination of a thing in its actual being
is through its form. So a created agent can only effect a variation
of form (in a presupposed subject).29 But God is an infinite
28 See SI'h III, q. 75, a. 8, ad 4: this conversion does not come about through a passive
power of the creature, but solely through the active power of the creator.
29 Thomas is giving a reason why all conversions effected by the natural power of created
agents involve an underlying subject. In his commentary on Aristotle's Physics (I Phys., lect.
12, §107), he remarks that whereas the natural philosopher only proves by induction that all
natural productions have a subject, the metaphysician proves it by a reason. For this he cites
book 7 of the Metaphysics.He seems to be thinking of Metaphysics7. 7 .1032a20-22, where
Aristotle argues that things produced by nature or by art must have matter, because there
must be a potentiality for them to be and also not to be. (Aristotle is in fact resolving the
notion of matter into the more universal, "metaphysical" notions of potency, being and notbeing. In the Summa passage, Thomas is showing precisely what it is about created agencies
that makes such indeterminate potency-potency to be and not to be-a necessary
presupposition.) This is interesting, because it indicates that even from the standpoint of
"natural reason" the need for an underlying subject is not something that is simply taken for
granted, as though it were a universal and self-evident feature of change, just as such. Instead,
the need is reasoned to, as a condition of the types of changes effected by particular types of
agency ("nature or art"). Still, the reasoning is so "elementary" -the conclusion is so close
to "first principles"-that the need for a subject can easily look axiomatic (as it does to

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actuality. His action extends to the "whole nature of being."
Hence he can effect a "conversion of a whole being." By this
Thomas evidently means a variation not only in form but also in
the indeterminate subject, the matter or potency, that a being's
form presupposes and reduces to a determinate act. 30 This is a
conversion of the whole substance of a thing into that of another,
a transubstantiation.
All of the article's objections have to do with what is special or
not "natural" about this conversion, namely, its lack of an
underlying subject. The first objection is the one we examined
earlier. It simply assumes that every change has a subject. The
second objection proceeds as though the sacramental conversion
did have a subject, the matter of the bread. But the third objection
is more interesting for us. It goes deeper, offering a reason why
a conversion of one thing into another seems to need an
underlying subject.
The reason is laid down at the very start of the objection: "of
things that are divided secundumse, one never becomes another."
This principle is explained through the example of two colors.
The color white never becomes the color black. Instead, as
Aristotle says in the first book of the Physics, a subject of white
becomes a subject of black. A white body becomes a black body.
The reason why white does not become black is that they are
contraries. They are principles of a formal difference (the
difference between a white body and a black body). Difference is
a kind of division; and as the very principles of a division, the
objection says, contrary forms must be divided from each other
secundum se, just on account of themselves. The objection then
reminds us that there is also such a thing as material division or
division in subject. The principles of a material division between
two bodies, their "principles of individuation," are their diverse
Grisez); cf. IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 3, ad 1.
3°Cf. ITh I, q. 65, a. 3: "quanto aliqua causa est superior, tanto ad plura se extendit in
causando. Semper autem id quod substernitur in rebus invenitur communius quam id quod
informat et restringit ipsum; sicut esse quam vivere, et vivere quam intelligere, et materia
quam forma. Quanto ergo aliquid est magis substratum, tanto a superiori causa directe
procedit. Id ergo quod est primo substratum in omnibus, proprie pertinet ad causalitatem
supremae causae."

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signate matters. (Signate matter is matter singled out as "this"
matter by way of quantitative dimensions.) So two signate matters, as principles of a division, are also divided from each other
secundum se. Hence one signate matter cannot become another.
Consequently, the signate matter of the bread, this matter of
bread, cannot become this matter by which the body of Christ is
individuated. And whereas forms have a subject, making it
possible for the subject of one form to become the subject of
another, matter has no subject. Therefore, the conversion of the
substance of this bread into the substance of the body of Christ is
impossible.
Clearly we should be interested in this objection. The issue is
precisely the "lack of continuity." The claim is that even though
the terms of any conversion are divided from each other and exist
only in succession, the terms themselves cannot be the very
principles of the division. They cannot be divided secundumse or
just by reason of themselves. Although they are mutually
exclusive, they cannot be so in every respect. There must be
something in one that is compatible with what distinguishes the
other from it. In addition to the principles in them by which they
are divided from each other, there must also be some principle
common to them. The division can only be by reason of their
forms. There must also be an undivided subject.
Thomas's reply is difficult. Here is the Latin, followed by my
translation.
Dicendum quod virtute agentis finiti non potest forma in formam mutari, nee
materia in materiam. Sed virtute agentis infiniti, quod habet actionem in totum
ens, potest talis conversio fieri, quia utrique formae et utrique materiae est
communis natura entis; et id quod entitatis est in una potest auctor entis
convertere ad id quod est entitatis in altera, sublato eo per quod ab ilia
distinguebatur.
By the power of a finite agent, form cannot be changed into form, nor matter
into matter. But by the power of an infinite agent, which has action bearing on
all being, such a conversion can come about, because there is a nature of being
common to the two forms and to the two matters; and the author of being can
convert what there is of entity in one to what there is of entity in the other,
with the elimination of that by which the one was distinguished from the other.

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549

My object in the rest of this section and the next will be to
interpret this reply. (In section 8, I shall try to show how it leads
to a satisfactory resolution of the Grisez issue.)
The first sentence of the reply reminds us that we are not
dealing with a natural conversion. A finite or created agent
cannot change form into form, or matter into matter, for the
same reason that it cannot produce a whole being out of nothing
(see STh I, q. 45, a. 5). It can produce a new substance only out
of pre-existing matter, that is, by transforming a pre-existing
substance. It cannot produce new matter at all. Nor is it the
immediate source from which a new substantial form proceeds
(see STh I, q. 65, a. 4). Instead, under its influence, a new form is
educed from the potency of the matter. The emergence of the new
form eliminates the previous one. The created agent does cause a
change in form, but since it is not the immediate source of the
form, its action does not consist in a direct conversion of one
form into another.
The rest of the reply is our main concern. Its interpretation is
not easy. On first reading, it might seem to boil down to the mere
claim that God, as "author of being," can convert any created
being into any other. 31 The passage could even be rendered in a
way more favorable to such a reading. Instead of "there is a
nature of being common to the two forms and to the two
matters," one might read "the nature of being is common to the
two forms and to the two matters." In my opinion, however,
Thomas is not speaking here about a single nature common to all
created beings (i.e., about what is called ens commune). Instead,
he is speaking about a certain nature of being common to the two
forms, and a somewhat distinct nature common to the two signate
matters. I say this in view of the role that he is assigning to the
common nature. He is making it account for the possibility of
God's converting one form into another and one signate matter
into another. Ens commune would not immediately account for
this possibility, because, for Thomas, the terms of a conversion
31 Of course there could not be a conversion if the terms were not both beings; see above,
n. 26.

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must be in the same genus. That is, they must have something
uni vocal in common. 32
There is at least one text in which Thomas asserts this
requirement explicitly. It is found in his earliest treatment of the
Eucharist, that of the commentary on the Sentences. He is
addressing the question whether the substantial form of the bread
remains after the conversion.
In any conversion whatsoever, the terminus a quo is in the same genus as the
terminus ad quem. But that in which this conversion terminates is neither form
alone nor matter alone, but a substance existing in act. . . . Hence . . . that
which is converted into the body of Christ must also be a composite substance,
not just the matter of the bread. And so the form of the bread does not remain.
(IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 1, qa. 3)33

Note that he is using the term "genus" here very strictly, to mean
something that is common in a univocal way. Matter, form, and
composite all pertain somehow to the category of substance, but
32 I do not mean to deny that there is such a thing as the "universal nature of being" or ens
commune in Thomas's thought. There obviously is, and God is its agent, the universal cause
of "being qua being." As he says in the body of the article, God has action that extends to the
"whole nature of being," totam naturam entis. But it is well known that for Thomas ens
commune is not univocal. Being is not a single genus. This is so even if we restrict our focus
to "real" being, which is what entitas seems to refer to. Earlier in the Summa, in the course
of distinguishing between being as convertible with "the real" and being as signifyingthe truth
of a proposition, Thomas says that the former "signifies the entity of what is real [entitatem
rez], according as it is divided into the ten categories" (STh I, q. 48, a. 2, ad 2). The categories
are ultimate genera. They do not divide being by adding specific differences to something
whose signification remains constant throughout; they divide it by constituting diverse
significations of being itself ft/ Metaphys., lect. 9, §889-90). Their unity is only analogical.
It consists in the fact that there is one chief signification to which all of the others refer, one
primary nature to which the others are somehow proportioned. Moreover, within each
category, being is also divided analogically according to act and potency (ibid., §897).
33 At IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 3, Thomas also says that the substance of the bread
cannot be converted into the accidents of Christ, because it has no "proportion of similitude"
to them. I take it that he means that even if accidents are in some way proportioned and
assimilated to substance, as effect to cause, the proportion and likeness is not mutual (cf. STh
I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4). There is nothing in which substance and accident are simply equal.
Conversion requires that the terms be in some respect equal or equivalent. This entails their
being in a common genus. (Cf. ibid., obj. 2: there is no comparison between things of diverse
genera.)

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551

they do not do so univocally. Matter is substantial potency; form,
substantial act; and both are substantial parts, whereas the
composite is the substantial whole.
As far as I know, the principle that the terms of any conversion
are in the same genus is not made explicit in the Summa
Theologiae. But its presence there can hardly be denied. For
instance, it evidently figures again in the argument against the
continuation of the bread's form.
If the substantial form of the bread remained, nothing of the bread would be
converted into the body of Christ except the matter alone. And so it would
follow that it would not be converted into the whole body of Christ, but only
into its matter. But this is contrary to the form of the sacrament, which says,
"This is my body." (STh III, q. 75, a. 6)

Why can the matter of the bread be converted only into the
matter of the body of Christ, and not also into its form? Surely it
is because matter and form share in nothing univocal. What is
converted into the form of the body of Christ must be a form.
An objection in the same article involves a similar point. It says
that not even the form of the bread can be converted into that of
the body of Christ, because the form of Christ's body is a soul.
The objection is evidently that the two forms are not univocal.
Thomas replies:
A soul is a form of a body giving to it its whole order of perfect existence, i.e.,
corporeal existence, and animated existence, and so forth. Therefore the form
of the bread is converted into the form of the body of Christ insofar as the
latter gives corporeal existence, not insofar as it gives existence animated by
such a soul. (STh III, q. 75, a. 6, ad 2)34

The form of the bread is convertible into the form of the body of
Christ precisely insofar as a common univocal feature can be
considered in them, that of a "giver of corporeal existence."
So it seems dear that in STh q. 75, a. 4, ad 3, Thomas is not
claiming that God can convert any given being into any other
34

Cf. IV Sent., d. 10, q. 1, a. 2, qa. 1.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

whatsoever. 35 Of course God can perform any possible
conversion. But matter is only convertible into matter, and form
into form. 36 The terms of a conversion must be beings in the same
sense.

VII. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE BREAD (B): AN ANALOGY
WITH TRANSFORMATION

Thomas does not say why there must be something univocal
in the terms of a conversion. Yet it is not difficult to suggest a
reason: namely, the very way in which the terms must be
distinguished from each other, as terms of a conversion, that is,
extremes of a change. The extremes of a change do not and
cannot exist together. They are opposed, incompatible. 37 There
is contrast between them. 38 The contrast explains why the
presence of one entails the absence of the other. But if there is
contrast between them, and if, as is the case in any true
conversion, one term is not simply the negation or the privation
of the other but rather something positive, then there is also

35 It is here that I part from Cajetan. In his commentary on SI'h Ill, q. 75, a.4, he says that
Thomas is speaking of the nature of being that is common to all created beings (section VIII).
This leads him to say that it is possible for any created being to be converted into any
other-an angel into a stone, for example. Evidently he would even have to say that an angel
can be converted into a color! If Thomas meant this, why would he say that the matter of the
bread cannot be converted into the substantial form of the body of Christ, nor the substance
of the bread into the accidents?
36 So Thomas might have said that the nature of matter is common to the two matters, and
the nature of form is common to the two forms. The reason why he chooses to designate each
as a nature of "being," I would suggest, is that he is constructing a very synthetic presentation
of the convertibility as a function of two factors: the presence of some common nature in
each pair, and the universal scope of the action of the author of being. Neither factor alone
is sufficient to display the convertibility.
37 V Metaplrys.,lect. 12, §923: "in quolibet motu vel mutatione, terminus a quo opponitur
termino ad quern. n
38 Not all distinctions involve contrast or incompatibility. Things in diverse genera of
being are not directly contrary. One and the same subject can have potentiality and actuality,
substance and accidents, etc. It is even possible for one and the same subject to have both
humanity and divinity.

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553

something uni vocal in them. 39 Contrary natures belong to the
same genus. 40
If this is what Thomas has in mind, then in observing that the
terms have a common nature of being he would be taking his cue
precisely from the objection. The objection starts with an analysis
of the relation between contrary forms. It then applies this
analysis to the relation between diverse signate matters, justifying
the application by the fact that signate matters resemble contrary
forms in functioning as principles of a division.
Thomas is not denying that they are principles of a division.
But he wants us to notice that the division between them in fact
goes hand in hand with their sharing in a common nature. This
amounts to a refutation of the objection's analysis of the division.
Contrary forms, such as white and black, are indeed opposed to
and divided from each other; and they are principles of the
difference between the things containing them (a white body and
a black body). But they are not quite divided secundum se. That
is, they are not immediately opposed to each other, as though
they agreed only in subject and not in anything in their own
natures. They are both colors. They are divided by reason of that
which distinguishes one from the other in the common genus of
color, that is, by reason of their differentiae. 41 In the same way,
39 The two forms cannot be forms of one and the same body, because they are principles
of species with contrary differentiae. The bread is inorganic, whereas the body of Christ is
organic. (Thus, in line with STh III, q. 7 5, a. 6, ad 2, it is precisely when the form of the bread
and the form of the body of Christ are both considered as forms giving corporeal existence
that they are seen as contraries. The latter gives organic corporeity, the former inorganic.)
As for the two signate matters, we are speaking of each as the matter of a whole body. It
makes no sense for a whole body to have two distinct signate matters. That would mean that
one and the same body could be located in separate places, and thereby subject to contrary
dispositions, at the same time.
40 See Aristotle, On Generationand Co77Uption,I.7.324a1; Aquinas, V Metaphys., lect.
12, S926. There is contrariety even between diverse signate matters, not according to their
"essence" (which is sheer potentiality), but according to the contrasting accidental differences
by which they are designated (cf. ibid., S927).
41 These in turn are divided because one somehow includes in its ratio the negation of the
other. Ultimately at the root of any division there must lie a contradiction; see In Boet. de
Trin., q. 4, a. 1. Cf. IV Metaphys., lect. 15, §719: contraries cannot belong simultaneously
to the same subject, even though each of them is a positive nature, because one of them has

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the forms and the matters of the bread and the body of Christ are
divided by reason of what distinguishes one from the other in the
nature of being that they have in common. 42 There is, after all,
something in the first term of the conversion that is compatible
with what is proper to the second term.
So whereas Grisez at one point says that on Thomas's account,
the bread and the body of Christ have "nothing whatever in
common" (119), Thomas is making a special effort to show us
that they do have something. He is granting, or even insisting,
that the terms of a conversion always have something in common.
What he is denying is that they must always have a common
subject. A subject is needed when the agent of the conversion is
one whose action extends only to a determinate form of being.
But when the agent has action extending to all being, it can
perform a conversion between any two things that share a
common nature of being--even two signate matters, which have
no common subject.
The common nature of being, which Thomas goes on to
designate abstractly as entitas, is not some sort of "metaphysical
substrate." Thomas is not trying to insinuate a proper subject for
the conversion here, any more than he was in the reply to the first
objection. Entitas is only a common ratio.43 The terms of the
attached to it a privation of something in the other. Privation is a kind of negation or
contradiction (see X Metaphys., lect. 6, §2044). The contradictories are what are divided
secundum se. This of course means, as we have already seen, that there can be no conversion
of a being to a non-being or vice-versa.
42 Thus Thomas's very purpose in adverting to a common nature of being would seem to
exclude the ens commune interpretation. He is looking for something that does not divide
or distinguish one term of the conversion from the other. He cannot be seeing the entitas
itself as something by which one term is distinguished from the other. Merely analogical unity
would not suffice for this purpose, since items that are one by analogy are distinguished
precisely in what they have in common.
43 In calling it a ratio, I do not mean that it is a mere "concept," something existing only
"in the mind." Unity under a common ratio is unity in relation to the mind; it is a function
of the mind's capacity to consider the ratio in abstraction from the subjects by which it is
divided and multiplied. But the principle of the unity is in the things themselves. In other
words, the common ratio does not exist in reality as an "individual"; but it does exist in
reality, as something predicated of real individuals. This is because it is an essentialpredicate.
The nature of form is predicated per se of the real form of the bread and the real form of the
body of Christ, and the nature of matter is predicated per se of their respective matters.

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conversion are separate beings, and the entitas in one is divided,
in subject, from the entitas in the other. The entitas in them is the
same in ratio, but it is not numerically the same. If it were, then
the terms would be the very same being, a single individual. The
point is simply that they are not separated or divided according
to the very ratio entis in them. They are divided only according
to their distinguishing rationes.
Yet Thomas does see the community in entitas as setting up
something like a common subject. The resemblance enables him
to construct a kind of analogy or parallel between the sacramental
conversion and natural conversions. 44 It is displayed in the rather
labored formulation, "the author of being can convert what there
is of entity in one to what there is of entity in the other, removing
that by which the one was distinguished from the other." As
Cajetan says, Thomas is here seeking to "lead us by the hand"
from our understanding of natural conversions toward some way
of conceiving this supernatural conversion. 45
The objection had said that the subject of white (which is a
body) becomes the subject of black. In Thomas's formulation,
"what there is of entity" corresponds to "the subject" (we might
say "what there is of corporeity"), and "that by which the one
was distinguished from the other" corresponds to "white." The
basis of the parallel is the indefiniteness or indeterminacy of
"what there is of entity" vis-a-vis the distinguishing item. A
subject is related to the forms existing successively in it as something indeterminate to determinants that diversify it.46
44 Thomas seems to have changed his mind about the way to handle the issue raised in the
objection. A very similar objection is raised at IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, a. 3, qa. 1, obj. 4:
"whatever becomes something takes on that which it is said to become. But every singular is
incommunicable, and so one singular cannot become another." The reply: "communication
implies some sort of conferral, and so it requires something that receives what is conferred
or given; hence it is found only in formal conversions, in which the change is only with
respect to form; and so, given that in this conversion nothing remains to which something can
be conferred, there is no communication in it." By contrast, in the Summa reply he is
presenting something analagous to a recipient that remains throughout.
45 Cajetan, commentary on STh III, q. 75, a. 4 (sect. IX, 115).
46 A genus is related to its differentiae as matter to diverse forms. See VII Metaphys., lect.
12, §1549-50; XMetaphys., lect. 10, §2116.

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The reply does not spell out the analogy with natural conversions any further. The identification of a common nature suffices
to overcome the division and so to resolve the objection.
However, there is a later text in the treatise on the Eucharist
where Thomas again draws attention to a common ratio belonging to the terms of the conversion. The focus is slightly shifted;
this time it is on the nature of being common to the whole terms,
that is, the nature of substance and the common set of accidents
that they are successively under. But we see here how far the
analogy between transubstantiation and natural conversions
extends. There is even something resembling a numerically
identical subject in the terms of the sacramental conversion.
The text is a discussion of the truth of the sacramental formula
by which the conversion is effected, the words "This is my body"
(STh III, q. 78, a. 5). Thomas says that the formula expresses a
conception having practical force, effecting what it signifies. He
then asks what the pronoun "this" is supposed to stand for. It
cannot stand precisely for Jesus' body, since then the words
would mean simply, "This my body is my body." That is true
even before the utterance of the words, and so they would not
effect what they signify. Nor can "this" stand precisely for the
bread, since then the words would not be true; the bread is not
Christ's body. So instead, he says, what the pronoun stands for is
"that which is contained under these species, in general"; or more
precisely, "'the substance contained under the accidents,' which
previously was bread, and afterwards is the body of Christ" (ibid.,
ad 2).
In this last passage, Thomas is presenting the referent of the
singular pronoun "this" in the sacramental formula as somewhat
like a single subject that is first one term and then the other. 47 We
have seen that he regards the accidents of the bread as in some
way like a subject of change, insofar as they are something that is
47 This is another reason for insisting that what the terms of the conversion have in
common, the common entitas, must be something univocal. If there were no common name
belonging univocally to them, then there would be no unambiguous "this" that changes from
one of them into the other. The very meaning of "this" would change too. Although the
pronoun gets its singularity from the accidents, it does not signify the accidents; there must
be something constant not only in that by which it signifies, but also in what it signifies.

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one and the same, disposed now otherwise than before. But "this"
does not signify the accidents. Its signification is mediated by the
accidents, but what it signifies is what the accidents containwhatever it is under the accidents that has the nature of a
substance. In a way this is even more like a subject of change than
the accidents are, because it is substantial. 48 In another way, of
course, it is less like a subject than the accidents are, because the
substance under the accidents is now one, now another. It is not
unqualifiedly "one and the same" throughout. Yet it still
resembles a subject, because there is a qualified sense in which it
is one and the same: it is under the same accidents. The
association with the accidents makes it a singular object of
signification, the referent of "this. "49
Thomas holds that the conversion takes place in an instant, at
the end of the pronouncement of the words of the consecration
(STh III, q. 75, a. 7). But the pronoun "this," which is uttered at
the beginning, retains the very same meaning throughout. What
it signifies is like an enduring subject. Relative to it, what is
proper to the bread and what is proper to the body of Christ are
48 However, it is only a generalsubstantial item. Its nature is such as to be predicated of
something else, something that subsists perse-a determinate individual. This would explain
why Thomas does not appeal to it in STh III, q. 75, a. 4, ad 1. There he is looking for an
ultimate subject of predication, one that is not said perse of something else. He is treating the
conversion as a quasi-form and identifying the subsistent item that serves as its quasi-subject:
both substances together. "This" cannot stand for both substancestogether ("these"), but only
for one or the other, indeterminately. What it signifies functions as a quasi-subject of the
conversion insofar as the conversion is considered, not as a quasi-form, but as a quasitransformation.
49 Readers of Grisez's article will be aware that this "association with the accidents" is
another point in Thomas's account that Grisez finds objectionable. Thomas holds that the
body of Christ is not subject to the accidents of the bread. The accidents do not inhere in it
as they did in the bread. Grisez argues that this excludes any one type of relation to the
accidents that is common to the bread and the body of Christ; that is, he cannot find any
clear sense in which both the bread and the body of Christ are "under" the accidents (see
below, n. 60). I cannot address this objection fully here, but I think it can be shown that
Thomas does have a valid sense for the expression. It is presented at STh 11-11, q. 8, a. 1. It
refers simply to the intelligible existence of the substance of the body there, wherever the
accidents are. This association of the substance with the accidents is something other than
their inherence in the substance and ontologically prior to it. Hence it can obtain even when
the accidents do not inhere.

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like contrary forms. The substance under the accidents cannot be
both bread and Christ's body at once. 50 Being the bread and being
the body of Christ are, to use Thomas's language, opposed
"qualities" or "determinate forms. "51 Each is a "determination of
a proper nature" (ibid, ad 1), applied successively to the
"substance in general" signified by "this."
Thomas is actually rather explicit about the resemblance
between "the substance under the accidents" and a subject. As we
have seen, he denies that the bread can properly be said to
"become" the body of Christ (STh III, q. 75, a. 8).52 This would
mean that at the end of the conversion, the bread (or at least a
part of it) is the body of Christ (or at least a part of it). 53 Verbs
such as "becomes," "is," "will be," and so forth are not properly
used here. But he also adds an important qualification to this
denial. Because a singular item does remain throughout the
conversion-the accidents-such expressions can be admitted
"according to a certain likeness." They are acceptable if the term
50 Thomas observes that if the substance of the bread remained together with the body of

Christ in the host, then the formula would have to be "Here is my body" rather than "This
is my body" (SI'h III, q. 75, a. 2).
51 SI'h Ill, q. 78, a. 5. The treatment of the pronoun in terms of "substance and quality"
stems from Priscian's definition of a noun: proprium est nominis substantiam et qualitatem
significare (Priscian, Institutiones grammaticae, 2.4.18, in Grammatici LAtini, vol. 2, ed. H.
Keil [Leipzig: Teubner, 1855), 55.6). Elsewhere Thomas explains that in this definition of a
noun, "substance" and "quality" are not to be taken properly, as referring to distinct
categories (I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3). They refer only to modes of signifying. A noun
signifies a thing in the manner of a substance, as though subsisting; and it signifies the thing
according to some item by which the thing is known or defined, i.e., some item functioning
as a quality or a form. (On "that by which something is named" as playing the role of a form,
even if it is not truly a form, see SI'h I, q. 37, a. 2.)
52 The objection had said that the subject of one color becomes the subject of the other.
In his reply, Thomas is careful not to say that what there is of entity in one term becomes
what there is of entity in the other. He only says that one is converted to the other. But there
is something like a "becoming" here.
53 In the same article, Thomas notes that even in ordinary substantial changes, it is not
perfectly proper to say that one term "can be" or "becomes" the other. One and the same
body is first this white thing, then this black thing; but there is nothing one and the same that
is first this animal, then this carcass. There is only something that is first a part of this animal
and then a part of this carcass, namely the matter. So in a substantial change, "the substance
subsisting in this matter" is not unqualifiedly the same before and after the change. It is only
the same in matter and in genus.

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

559

"bread" is taken to signify, not the substance of the bread, but "in
a general way, that which is contained under the species of bread,
under which is first contained the substance of the bread, and
afterwards the body of Christ." In the parallel Sentences text,
Thomas uses this analysis to account for a passage from St
Ambrose: "that which was bread before the consecration is now
the body of Christ after the consecration, because the utterance of
Christ changes the creature. " 54 In this passage, "that which"
functions like a subject.

VIII. THE CONVERTIBILITY OF THE BREAD (C): MATIER FOR THE
SACRAMENTAL ACTION

What we must now ask is whether the common nature of
being, or the "substance under the accidents," can provide a
resolution of the issue raised by Grisez. As I have understood it,
this issue is not quite the same as the problem that Thomas
resolves by appeal to common entitas. The latter problem was
whether there is anything in the bread that is even compatible
with the body of Christ. Our question is whether the bread can be
understood to be, or at least to contain, a genuine principle from
which the body of Christ comes to be in the sacrament. Can "the
substance under the accidents" be considered such a principle?
There are reasons to doubt it.
We must not lose sight of the fact that "the substance under
these accidents" does not designate a true and proper subject of
change. It only resembles a subject. For one thing, as we have
seen, the entitas or the substantiality of the bread is not
numerically one with that of the body of Christ. They are diverse
instances of a common ratio. The singularity of "this" is entirely
a function of the accidents, and the accidents are not constituents
of the substances.

54 "Quod erat panis ante consecrationem

iam corpus Christi est post consecrationem, quia
sermo Christi creaturam mutat" (St Ambrose, De sacramentis, 4.4; Aquinas, N Sent., d. 11,
q. 1, a. 4, qa. 1, sol. & ad 1). Cajetan makes much of this text. It is cited in the sed contra of
STh lll, q. 78, a. 4.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

Moreover, the distinction between a being's common entitas
and its proper ratio does not answer to a real distinction of
components in it. Every being is immediately both its own proper
self and a being.55 "What there is of entity" in a thing is not a
genuine "recipient" of what distinguishes that thing from others.
It is whatever there is in the thing that has the nature of a being.
It is the thing itself, considered in a merely indeterminate way.56
This is especially clear if the thing in question is one of the ultimate components of a substance, its matter or its form. Neither
of these is in turn composed of yet another matter and another
form. There are only distinct rationesin them, the common ratio
of matter or form and the ratio proper to this matter or such
form. The distinction between the matter considered indeterminately, as matter, and the same matter considered determinately, as this matter, is a merely logical distinction. So is the
distinction between a substance considered merely as "whatever
substance is under these accidents" and the same substance
considered in its proper nature. The distinction between "this
substance" and bread, or between "this substance" and Christ's
body, does not reflect a real distinction between a substrate and
its form. It is only a distinction in meaning. "This substance" is
not functioning as a proper subject of change.
Now, the logical distinction does suffice to show that there is
no contradiction in saying the following: "the substance under
these accidents, which was bread, is now the body of Christ." The
transition from "the substance under these accidents is bread" to
"the substance under these accidents is the body of Christ" is not

55 Cf. Cajetan, commentary on STh III, q. 75, a. 4 (sect. VIII,
"being" does not add
any further nature to the specific and generic natures of things. This is not to deny the real
distinction between a being (ens) and its act of being (esse). "A being" means a subject of esse,
or at least something that somehow shares in esse. But there is not one nature in a thing by
which it shares in esse, and another nature by which its proper identity is constituted. That
by which its identity is constituted is that by which it shares in esse; it is that by which it is
disposed to be itself. Entitas and esse are not ·synonyms. Entitas is an abstract noun
corresponding to the concrete ens; esse is an infinitive verb corresponding to the finite est.
56 As Cajetan says, to convert what there is of entity in a thing is to diversify the whole
thing (commentary on STh III, q. 75, a. 4 [sect. IX,

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

561

logically or absolutely impossible.57 God can bring about whatever involves no contradiction. So he can make "this substance"
be the body of Christ. And in fact what "this substance" signifies
is not annihilated in the transition, but preserved.
But assuming that there is no temporal gap between the
existence of the bread and the existence of Christ's body under
the accidents, "this substance" would be preserved even if the
bread were annihilated. Nothing from the bread is needed in
order for Christ's body to be "this substance." The possibility that
"this substance" be now bread, now the body of Christ, is only a
logical or absolute possibility, not a natural one. It does not rest
on any underlying potency or matter. It rests on a mere
indeterminacy of signification or ratio. The bread contains an
indeterminate ratio that is compatible with the determinate ratio
signified by "the body of Christ." So why can we not say that, by
sheer divine fiat, the bread ceases to exist, and the body of Christ
simultaneously takes on the role of the substance under the
accidents?58 Why must we say that the existence of the body of
Christ in the sacrament is the very term of the change in the
bread, or in other words, that the bread is converted into the
body of Christ? How does a logical distinction make possible a
real conversion?
We can see the answer, I believe, if we pay closer attention to
an obvious feature of the sacramental conversion: the very fact
that it is sacramental. Although it is an event that only the power
of God is adequate to effect, it is not effected by God alone.
Unlike creation, it is effected through created instruments. Hence
it is in some way conditioned by those instruments and
proportioned to their mode of operating. And the sacramental
mode is rather special.
57 In the sentence, "This substance is bread," the predicate is not contained in the
definition of the subject. It is a per accidenstype of predication (cl. VII Metapbys., lect. 2,
§ 1273). On the legitimacy of "the substance contained under the accidents" as a subject of
predication, see Cajetan, commentary on Sfb III; q. 75, a. 4 (sect. VII).
58 Cf. Durandi a Sancto Porciano, IV Sent., d. 11, q. 1, §14, p. 318vb, II. 2-13. This would
not be a real change in the body of Christ, since it would not involve the loss of any previous
disposition, as, e.g., in the case of a local movement.

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

The created instruments in the sacraments function as signs.
But they are special signs: they effect what they signify, and they
effect it through signifying it. The Eucharistic action is performed
by the utterance of Christ's human words, "This is my body." The
utterance of these words, in the due circumstances, is the action.
The consecration makes the host to be the body of Christ through
signifying it to be the body of Christ. "The power to convert that
exists in the formulae of these sacraments follows upon their
signification" (STh III, q. 78, a. 4, ad 3).
This power is of course only instrumental. The principal
power behind the conversion is God's own. But the action is truly
sacramental, and it has its own mode. Thomas contrasts it with
creation (STh III, q. 78, a. 2, ad 2). Creation is in the mode of a
command, a sheer fiat. The consecration is in the indicative mood
and the present tense. This, Thomas says, is precisely because it
is sacramental. It simply signifies or declares the existence of its
effect.
Normally, the truth of a declarative sentence in the present
tense depends upon the reality of what it is about. But with the
truth of the Word of God, it is the other way round. Whatever
the eternal Word of God says to be the case is the case, just
because he says so. Divine truth is the cause of the reality, the
entitas, expressed in it (STh I, q. 16, a. 6). In the sacraments,
human enunciations share in this power of the Word of God. The
consecration effects what it signifies because its signification is
true, and because its truth is that of the Word of God (STh III, q.
78, a. 5).
Since its power follows upon its signification, the consecration's mode of action also corresponds to the mode of its
signification. Although it shares in the power of the truth of the
Word of God, it is still an utterance in the human mode: a
composite, discursive statement. Hence, even though the effect
takes place in an instant, there is a process in the action by which
it is brought about. 59 The process begins with the utterance of the
59 What the words effect is a simple event, and what they signify is also something
simple-the host's being the body of Christ. Hence, Thomas says, they obtain the power for
the effect only in the simple, final instant of their pronouncement. But he also insists that they

EUCHARISTIC CONVERSION

563

word "this." At that moment, what underlies the object signified
by "this" is bread. If the substance of the bread were not there,
"this" would be meaningless. There would be no substance under
the accidents. The action would not get off the ground. "This"
would be a false start. The action starts from the bread, qua
"this," and terminates in the body of Christ, "my body."
This is how we can make sense of saying that even though the
bread provides no material for the body of Christ, the bringing
about of the body of Christ in the host starts from the bread. It
means that the action by which the existence of the body of Christ
in the host is brought about is an action upon the bread. The
bread is not just gotten out of the way. Although it provides no
potency for the body of Christ, it does provide something needed
for the sacramental action that effects the body of Christ. It is a
direct principle of the coming to be of Christ's body under the
accidents. 60 By sharing in the nature of corporeal substance, the
bread contains something in terms of which the body of Christ
can be understood and signified; and the sacramental action
effects the body of Christ through signifying it. The bread is
required in order for there to be what the action presupposes: a
substance under the accidents, signifiable by "this." It does not
provide matter out of which Christ's body is formed, but it does
provide materia circa quam, an object of action. It provides that
to which the ratio of Christ's body is applied. This application is
a predication, but it is also an action. Its result is the very
existence of the body of Christ under the accidents of the bread.
do so in ordine ad praecendentia-in relation to the preceding instants (STh III, q. 78, a. 4,
ad3).
60 Obviously Thomas does not mean that the substance that is the body of Christ does not
exist at all prior to the sacramental conversion. In itself it exists already. Through the
conversion it is only "communicated" or "applied" to the host. It talces on a new relation to
the accidents of the bread; it begins to "exist under" the accidents. See STh III, q. 76, a. 6:
"it is not the same for Christ to exist in himself, and to exist under this sacrament; for when
we say this, that he exists under this sacrament, a certain relation of him to the sacrament is
signified." In line with these considerations, Cajetan argues that strictly speaking, the
substance of the bread and the substance of the body of Christ, taken absolutely, are not the
terms of the conversion (commentary on STh III, q. 75, a. 4 [sect. V-VI]). Rather, the first
term is the substance under the accidents that is bread, and the second is the substance under
the accidents that is the body of Christ.

564

STEPHEN L. BROCK

IX. UNDERSTANDINGTRANSUBSTANTIATION

The foregoing discussion makes no pretense of fully explaining
transubstantiation. It does not display the nature of the power by
which the change is accomplished. It only shows that it can make
sense to speak of the conversion of one whole substance into
another. The analogy between "the substance under the
accidents" and the subject of a transformation saves the language
of conversion. But fully explaining the event would require
understanding the form and power of the truth of the Word of
God. It would be like fully explaining creation.
Thomas in fact judges that the sacramental conversion is in
some ways even harder to understand than creation (STh III, q.
75, a. 8, ad 3). Part of what makes it so hard is that does not
reflect any agent's "common" way of acting. This does not just
mean that it lies outside our ordinary experience; so does
creation. It means that there is no agent that "normally" acts in
this way. Grasping the coming to be of something out of nothing,
Thomas says, is certainly not easy; but we can at least see that this
pertains to the mode of producing that is appropriate for an
absolutely "first" cause, a cause that presupposes nothing other
than itself. By contrast, a production in which something is
presupposed, and yet nothing of it remains, does not pertain to
the mode of producing that generally responds to any cause,
created or divine.
In transubstantiation, something is presupposed to the
production. The event is a change and a conversion. This pertains
to the creaturely mode of acting.61 Yet nothing presupposed is a
constituent of what is produced. This pertains to the mode of
acting proper to God.
So transubstantiation belongs to an order which is in some way
between the order proper to the nature of created causes and the
61 Thus the very involvement of a creature in the sacramental action suffices to explain
why Thomas takes it for granted that the existence of Christ's body in the sacrament must
be the term of a real change in something. (See above, at n. 58.) On the fact that a creature's
action always consists in applying some nature to a presupposed object, see Sfh l, q. 45, a.
5, ad 1; d. Sfb Ill, q. 78, a. 4, ad 2.

EUCHARISTICCONVERSION

565

order proper to the uncreated first cause. The difficulty seems to
be precisely in grasping that there could be anything between
them. Creatures are involved in the event, but their own natures
are insufficient to explain what goes on; judged in their light, the
event seems impossible. God is using them to produce an effect
for which his nature alone is adequate. But his nature, all by itself,
is perfectly sufficient for producing the effect. Judged in relation
to him, the result certainly seems possible; but the creatures seem
merely superfluous. Our particular problem was that the
substance of the bread seemed superfluous. It seemed to have no
true role to play as the terminus a quo of a conversion.
What lies between the natural order and the strictly divine
order is a created supernatural order, the order of grace. 62 The
creature's involvement in it is not superfluous, but it is
"gratuitous." It is not impossible; the "nature of being," as
gathered from creatures and studied in metaphysics, does
somehow allow for the possibility of a supernatural order. But its
existence and its true shape are known only by revelation (and
then only imperfectly).
If the foregoing interpretation is correct, Thomas's conception
of transubstantiation is formed strictly in light of its supernatural
proximate cause: a human utterance of the Word incarnate. If we
prescinded from the cause, the metaphysical analysis would be
idle. The analogy between "the substance under the accidents"
and a subject of transformation would seem merely irrelevant. We
would indeed find it unintelligible to speak of transubstantiation
as a conversion. But of course this is hardly an objection. It only
means that for all the philosophy involved, Thomas's doctrine of
the Eucharistic conversion is quite formally theological. 63

62 Cf. STh Ill, q. 77, a. 1, ad 1: the subsistem:e of the accidents of the bread without a
subject is against "the common order of nature;" but there is a "special reason" for it
"according to the order of grace."
63 My thanks to Kevin Flannery, S.J., Lawrence Feingold, and David Twetten for their
very helpful comments on drafts of this paper.

The Thomist 65 (2001): 567-81

BALTHASAR ON CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE
CROSS
MATIHEW LEVERING
Ave Maria College
Ypsilanti, Michigan

P

OPE JOHN PAUL Il's recent apostolic letter, Novo millennia
ineunte, contains the following passage:

Jesus' cry on the cross, dear brothers and sisters, is not the cry of anguish of a
man without hope, but the prayer of the Son who offers his life to the Father
in love, for the salvation of all. At the very moment when he identifies with our
sin, "abandoned" by the Father, he "abandons" himself into the hands of the
Father. His eyes remain fixed on the Father. Precisely because of the
knowledge and experience of the Father which he alone has, even at this
moment of darkness he sees clearly the gravity of sin and suffers because of it.
He alone, who sees the Father and rejoices fully in him, can understand
completely what it means to resist the Father's love by sin. More than an
experience of physical pain, his passion is an agonizing suffering of the soul.
Theological tradition has not failed to ask how Jesus could possibly experience
at one and the same time his profound unity with the Father, by its very nature
a source of joy and happiness, and an agony that goes all the way to his final
cry of abandonment. The simultaneous presence of these two seemingly
irreconcilable aspects is rooted in the fathomless depths of the hypostatic
union. (No. 26)

Why does the Pope direct special attention at the turn of the
millennium to the question of Christ's consciousness on the
Cross? While the Pope's intentions surely reflect his pastoral
mission, theologians will recognize that this question is of
systematic import in the work of one of the twentieth century's
most acclaimed theologians, Hans Urs von Balthasar. Read this
way, the apostolic letter serves as an opportune point of entry

567

568

MATTHEW LEVERING

into the task of understanding and assessing Balthasar's theology
of the Cross.
In volume 4 of his Theo-Drama, Balthasar states,
It is all the more terrifying for the Son, therefore, in the darkness of his
anguish, to see that this whole work, which has begun to be realized in Mary,
is pointless (because of his gratuitous suffering) and doomed to failure. The Son
is not simply alone with sinners in that absolute exchange envisaged by Luther:
he is accompanied by a witness to God's activity {which always operates sola
gratia), and this robs the Man of Sorrows of all hope of completing his
mission. 1

Does this mean that Jesus is hopeless on the Cross? Compare a
second text, this time from volume 2 of Balthasar's Theologik
(published five years later): "Jesus must have had before his eyes
the impossibility of accomplishing his earthly mission ... from
the very beginning and, as resistance to him grew, with increasing
clarity. "2 In his experience, therefore,
two things can and must occur together: forsakenness by the Father as the final
radicalness of frustration and failure (Mk 15 :34, Mt 27:46) and the knowledge
(which at the moment is perhaps no longer tangible) that "the hour is coming,
indeed it has come, when you will be scattered, every man to his home, and
will leave me alone; yet I am not alone, for the Father is with me" (Jn 16:32).
Ultimate failure and sure knowledge of ultimate fulfillment are not, as in the
Old Testament, juxtaposed, but contain one another here. 3

1 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 4, The Action, trans. Graham Harrison (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1994), 357.
2 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Ibeologik, vol. 2: Wahrheit Gottes (Einsiedeln: Johannes
Verlag,, 1985), 222. "Die Unvollendbarkeit seiner irdischen Sendung-Sammlung der
zerstreuten Schafe Israels, gar Wiederherstellung des Zwolfstiimmevolkes, ja als der erwahlte
Gesandte das 'Licht der V<>lkerbis zu den Grenzen der Erde' zu sein (Is 49:6; Lk 2:32)-mu«
Jesus von Anfang an und bein dem wachsenden Widerstand immer klarer vor Augen
gestanden haben." Cf. ibid., 305ff.
3 Ibid., 223. "Das hindert nicht,
vielmehr, daB im Enderlebnis beides beisammen
sein kann und muB: das Verlassensein vom Yater als letzte Radikalitiit des Scheiterns (Mk
15 :34; Mt 27:46) und das (vielleicht im Augenblick nicht mehr fa«bare Wissen): 'Es kommt
die Stunde und sie ist schon da, wo ihr euch verstreut, jeder an seinen Ort, und mich allein
lli«t. Und doch bin ich nicht allein, denn der Yater is mit mir' (Jn 16:32). Letztes Scheitem
und letztes Erfllllungswissen liegen hier nicht, wie im Alten Bund, neben-, sondem
ineinander."

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

569

In this second text, Balthasar holds that Jesus would have known
that his earthly mission of gathering Israel was doomed, and yet
would have known (even if not in a "tangible," conscious way)
that the Father would accomplish the mission.
How are we to understand this insistence that the incarnate
Son is both robbed of all hope for his mission and yet still knows
that the Father will triumph? Balthasar's answer is that this
experience of the incarnate Son reveals the unity, in the Spirit, of
removal into the uttermost distance from the Father and the final step towards
and into the Father. The paradox of every Christian mission, that is, movement
away from God as movement towards God, is brought here to a unique,
because most profoundly Trinitarian, fulfillment.4

From this it is clear that Balthasar's theology of Christ's
consciousness on the Cross is intimately tied to all aspects of his
theology. To grasp what is at stake, one must identify the
connections in Balthasar's work between Trinitarian theology,
metaphysics, and the theology of Christ.
Challenging both the psychological analogy (Augustine and
Aquinas) and the intrasubjective analogy (Richard of St. Victor),
Balthasar seeks a new path for Trinitarian theology. His critique
of Augustine's psychological analogy is standard-he suggests that
it tends towards monism 5-but his critique of Richard is more
significant, since most theologians who criticize Augustine's
model seek to embrace Richard's. Balthasar notes that
it is mistaken to take a naive construction of the divine mystery after the
pattern of human relationships (as Richard of St. Victor attempted by way of
4 Ibid. "Damit auch ein Zweites: auGerste Entfemung vom Yater und, in der Erfiillung der
Sendung, letztes Schreiten auf ihn zu, in ihn hinein. Das Paradox jeder christlichen Sendung:
von Gott weg als auf Gott zu, erfiillt sich hier auf einmalige, weil im tiefsten trinitarische
Weise."
5 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 3: The Dramatis Personae: The Person in
Christ, trans. Graham Harrison (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1992): 526. He explains that
Augustine's analogy for the Trinity from the imago dei or the rational soul's memory,
understanding, and will "takes place within the same spiritual being, thus yielding an image
of the inner life of the one divine Spirit; but, at the same time, the sequence closes the created
spirit in on itself and is unable to show how genuine objectification and genuine love-which
is always directed toward the other--can come about."

570

MATIHEW LEVERING

a counterblast to Augustine) and make it absolute; for it fails to take into
account the crude anthropomorphism involved in a plurality of beings.6

For Balthasar, however, Richard's mistake is not tritheism-he
remarks that four of the six books of Richard's De Trinitate are
devoted to the one divine essence, in order "to exclude all
suspicion of tritheism" 7-but rather lies in Richard's grounding
of his analogy upon three human persons rather than upon the
trinitarian event of the incarnate Son's Passion, death, and
Resurrection. Indeed, Balthasar argues that in order to gain more
than "the faintest glimmer of an elucidation of the superabundant
triune life resident within the divine unity, " 8 one must look
beyond all creaturely analogies and focus upon the revealed
archetype, Jesus Christ. 9
On these grounds, Balthasar identifies the incarnate Son of
God's Paschal mystery (itself the ultimate expression of the entire
keno tic existence of the incarnate Son) as an economic Trinitarian
6 Ibid., 526-27.
7 Hans Urs von Balthasar, Theo-Drama, vol. 5: The Last Act, trans. Graham Harrison (San
Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1998): 82; cf. Theologik 2:39.
8 Balthasar, Theologik 2:39. "Natnrlich hat kein Vertreter des Modells
vor
allem von Alexander von Hales und von Bonaventura iibernommen und weitergefiihrt
wird--daran gedacht, in Gott drei Personen im modemen Sinn, das bei8t drei
Bewu8tseinszentren anzunehmen; Richard hat selber vier von seinen sechs Biichem iiber die
Dreieinigkeit dem Problem der Einheit Gottes gewidmet. Flir ihn und seine Nachfolger hat
einzig die Logik der Caritas Bedeutung, die den 'Andern', Geliebten und den 'Drinen',
gemeinsam Geliebten in Gott fordert, unbeschadet der gottlichen Wesenseinheit. Aber das
Augustin erglinunde Gegenbild bleibt ebenso unfabig wie das augustiniscbe Bild, die der
Einbeit innewohnende dreieinige Liebesfiille mehr als ahnungshaft zu verdeudichen. Durch
die unvereinbare Polaritit beider innerweldicher Bilder hindurch haben wir zum
unbegreiflichen Urhild emporzublicken."
9 Cf. Balthasar, Tbeologik 2:35-42. Balthasar describes Augustine's analogy as
"dialectical," beginning from knowing, and Richard's as "dialogical," beginning from loving.
Regarding both analogies, he concludes, "Augustine and Richard, and thus Scheeben as well,
were fully conscious of the fragility of their undertakings .... The images remained as such
unconnected and juxtaposed in the created realm-those most clearly of all which consciously
presented themselves as imaginesTrinitatis:the point of intersection where the lines projected
by Augustine, Richard and Scheeben would have to meet was infinitely beyond construction.
They are-and here Hegel's method can be included as well-images which look upwards
from below and (what might be surprising at first glance) which Christ does not utili;re when
he undertakes to exposit the divine aspect of his person into the language of his humanity"
(Theologik 2:61).

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

571

analogy for the immanent Trinity. 10 Because of the "identity of
unity and difference" in Jesus (whose divine and human natures
are united in the Person of the Son), his metaphysical constitution
already points to the unity and distinction of the divine Trinity. 11
The suffering, death, and resurrection of the incarnate Son reveal
analogously the eternal mutual kenosis of the Father and the Son
in the ecstasis of love. 12 The Father's kenotic begetting of the Son
is imaged by the Son's kenotic handing-himself-over to the
Father; the intradivine kenosis means that every intradivine relation involves mutual kenosis. Balthasar posits (working "backwards" from the atemporal order of the processions) "the Son's
antecedent consent to be begotten and the Spirit's antecedent
consent to proceed from Father and Son. " 13 In this mutuality he
finds "the way in which the Persons of the Trinity 'make room'
('space') for one another, granting each other freedom of being
and action." 14 Since the kenotic "distance" between the Father

°

1 For further analysis, from various perspectives, see Thomas Krenski, Passio Caritatis:
Trinitarische Passiologie im Werk Hans Urs vonBaltbasars (Freiburg, 1990); Anne Hunt, The
Trinity and the Paschal Mystery: A Development in Recent Catholic Theology (Collegeville,
Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1997); idem, "Psychological Analogy and Paschal Mystery in
Trinitarian Theology," Theological Studies 59 (1998): 197-218; Margaret Turek, "Dare We
Hope 'That All Men Be Saved' (1 Tim 2:4)?: On von Balthasar's Trinitarian Grounds for
Christian Hope," Logos 1 (1997): 92-121; idem, "'Asthe Father Has Loved Me' On 15:9):
Balthasar's Theodramatic Approach to a Theology of God the Father," Communio 26
(1999): 295-318; Gilles Emery, O.P., "L'immutabilire du Dieu d'amour et les problemes du
discours sur la 'souffrance de Dieu,'" Nova et Vetem 74 (1999): 5-37; J.B. Quash, "'Between
the Brutely Given, and the Brutally, Banally Free': Von Balthasar's Theology of Drama in
Dialogue with Hegel," Modern Theology 13 (1997): 293-318; Steffen Lose!, "Murder in the
Cathedral: Hans Urs von Balthasar's New Dramatization of the Doctrine of the Trinity," Pro
Ecdesia 5 (1996): 427-39; John Milbank, "The Name of Jesus: Incarnation, Atonement,
Ecclesiology,'' Modern Theology 7 (1991): 332-33; David B. Burrell, C.S.C., "Incarnation
and Creation: The Hidden Dimension," Modern Theology 12 (1996): 216-17; Brian J.
Spence, "The Hegelian Element in Von Balthasar's and Moltmann's Understanding of the
Suffering of God," Toronto Journal of Theology 14 (1998): 45-60; Bertrand de Margerie,
S.J., "Note on Balthasar'sTrinitarian Theology," trans. Gregory F. LaNave, 1be1bomist64
(2000): 127-30; Edward Oakes, S.J., Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs von
Balthasar (New York: Continuum, 1994): 242££.
11 Balthasar, Theologik 2:117-18.
12 Balthasar acknowledges his debt to the Trinitarian metaphysics of Gustav Siewerth,
Clemens Kaliba, Wilhelm Moock, and Klaus Hemmerle. See Theo-Drama 5:66-76.
13 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:93; cf. Theologik 2:126-28.
14 Ibid.

572

MATIHEW LEVERING

and the Son spans (as mediated by the Spirit) the greatest
separation, no matter how "bitter," the incarnate Son receives
(out of love) the Father's wrath against sinners without thereby
causing the Godhead to break apart. 15
Quoting the mystical theology of Adrienne von Speyr,
Balthasar further holds that the intradivine kenosis means that the
Father in a certain sense "conceals" knowledge in order to make
room for the freedom of love. 16 He states,
"The Father shows the Son less his total knowledge than his total love, which
conceals something whose concealment lets love radiate even more brightly."
In God there are things that exist "only to provide love with every opportunity
for development, to give it the room which it would lack if everything were
stale foreknowledge-room which it needs, for it cannot exist without selfsurrender, movement and flight. " 17

Again following von Speyr, Balthasar speaks of faith, analogously
understood, as a "divine virtue." He explains that
faith as it exists in God ... is in harmony with "irrefragable knowledge" but
is not swallowed up by it, because the love that grants freedom to the other
[divine person] always offers him something "that transcends his capacities of
knowing," something that has an utterly unique origin, springing from the
"hidden depths of the one and communicated to the hidden depths of the
other." 18

Divine knowledge is muted in order to allow for the fuller
expression of the ecstatic interplay of love.
The metaphysical suppositions of this kenotic theology of the
Trinity deserve notice. Drawing upon the work of Gustav
Siewerth, Balthasar argues that love-as self-surrender--encom-

15 Balthasar, Theo-Drama

4:325; Theo-Drama 5:98.
Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:96. Cf. Guy Mansini, O.S.B., "Balthasar and the
Theodramatic Enrichment of the Trinity," The 1bomist 64 (2000): 499-519; Thomas G.
Dahell,The Dramatic Encounter of Divine and Human Freedom in the Theology of Hans Urs
von Baltbasar (New York: Peter Lang, 1997).
17 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:96.
18 Ibid., 5:97.
16

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

573

passes the other transcendental categories. 19 The self-emptying or
self-surrender that distinguishes (and unites) the Persons in God
accounts for all real distinctions, including that of the multiplicity
of creatures and that of the creature and God: "Without this
personal distance in the circumincessio of the Persons it would be
impossible to understand either the creature's distance from God
or the Son's 'economic' distance from the Father-a distance that
goes to the limit of forsakenness. "20 All creatures bear the
Trinitarian mark of kenotic distinction, that is, self-surrendering
love (simultaneously letting the other "be" to the point of
complete self-surrender and full communio ),21 and this Trinitarian
mark is most profoundly realized in the incarnate Son, Jesus
Christ. The metaphysical priority of love is demonstrated
experientially by the example of the child, who is awakened to
the fullness of its (human) being through "being received into the
space of the parent's love. " 22 Balthasar adds that "though it
remains true that fully realized love also presupposes a fully
realized knowledge ..... the unpreconceivability of the selfsurrender or self-expropriation which first makes the Father
Father cannot be ascribed to knowledge but only to groundless
love, which fact proves the identity of love as the 'transcendental
par excellence,'" more fundamental than being or knowing. 23
19 Balthasar, Theologik 2:127; cf. Theo-Drama5:68ff. For discussions of kenotic love in
Balthasar's metaphysics, see, e.g., John O'Donnell, S.J., Hans UTs von BaltbQSllT(Collegeville,
Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 7; Aidan Nichols, No BloodlessMyth: A Guide through
Baltbasar'sDramatics(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000),
especially 197; Angela Franz, "Trinitarian AnalogiaEntis in Hans Urs von Balthasar," The
Thomist 62 (1998): 533-59; M. Lochbrunner, AnalogiaCaritatis:Darstellungund Deutung
der TheologieHans UTs von Baltbasars(Freiburg, 1981); Mark Mcintosh, MysticalTheology
(Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1998), 107.
20 Balthasar, Theo-Drama5:98.
21 Referring to the poetry of Paul Claude}, Balthasar speaks of the "communion of all
particularized things in being" (Theologik2:34)
22 Balthasar, Theologik 2:162.
23 Ibid., 2:162-63: "Wenn die Transzendentalien
jedes, auch das untergeistige Sein
durchwalten, so erlangen sie ihre Flllle doch erst, wo das Sein sich innerlich zum Geistsein
lichtet, und wenn es wahr bleibt, daB vollendete Liebe auch eine vollendete Erkenntnis
voraussetzt (und in diesern Sinn die augustinische Ordnung der Prozessionen nicht aufgegeben
zu werden braucht), dennoch die unvordenkliche Selbstmtiu8erung des Vaters zum Sohn hin
selbst einer Liebe sich verdankt, die gedanklich iiber das Sein and seine Selbsterkenntnis

574

MATIHEW LEVERING

Balthasar's theology of the Trinity and his corresponding
Trinitarian metaphysics lead him, when he focuses his attention
specifically upon the Cross, to develop the substitutionary aspects
of Luther's theology. 24 In the economy of salvation, the forsakenness of the incarnate Son involves the pouring-out of the
Father's "wrath" upon Jesus Christ. As Balthasar states, "Can we
seriously say that God unloaded his wrath upon the Man who
wrestled with his destiny on the Mount of Olives and was
subsequently crucified? Indeed we must. "25 Yet, he argues that the
"exchange of places" in Luther is rendered in overly formal
categories. According to Balthasar, Luther
wants nothing to do with the one, unifying hypostasis in Christ, or with the
humanity as an imago Dei (the humanity touches the divinity only at a
mathematical point, as it were), or, finally, with a theandric operation of the
united natures and therefore with an obedience to mission which accompanies
the suffering Christ into his Godforsakenness. 26
hinausgeht. . . . Deshalb kann die Unvordenklichkeit
der Selbsthingabe oder
SelbstentiiuRerung, die den Vater allererst zum Vater macht, nicht der Erkenntnis, sondem
nor der grundlosen Liebe zugeschrieben werden, was diese als das 'Transzendentale
schlechthin' ausweist." This theme is a central argument of Tbeologik 2.
24 For further analysis, see Roch Kereszty, "Response to Professor Scola," Communio 18
(1991 ): 227-36; Michele M. Schumacher, "The Concept of Representation in the Theology
of Hans Urs von Balthasar," Theological Studies 60 (1999): 53-71; Gerard Remy, "La
substitution: Pertinence ou non-pertinence d'un concept theologique," Revue Tbomiste 94
(1994): 559-600; idem, "La dereliction du Christ: Terme d'une contradiction ou mystere de
communion?" Revue Tbomiste 98 (1998): 39-94; Michel Beaudin, Obeissanceet solidarite:
Essai sur la christologie de Hans Urs von Baltbasar (Montreal: Fides, 1989); Karl-Heinz
Menke, Stellvertretung(Einsiedeln: Johannes Verlag, 1991); M. Imperatori, S.J., "Heidegger
dans la 'Dramatique divine' de Hans Urs von Balthasar," Nouvelle revue tbeologique 122
(2000): 191-210; David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: Tbe Doctrine of the Triune God (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1999): 105-50; Gilbert Narcisse, O.P., "Participer a la vie
trinitaire," Revue Tbomiste 96 (1996): 107-28; Guy Mausini, O.S.B., "Rahner and Balthasar
on the Efficacy of the Cross," Irish Theological Quarterly 63 (1998): 232-49.
zs Balthasar, Theo-Drama 4:345; cf. 4:348.
26 Balthasar, Tbeologik 2:310. "Aber Luther beharrt-freilich
nicht immer bis zum Ende
konsequent-auf der grundsatzlichen Trennung der Spharen: im Menschen von gratia und
donum (fauschereignis und nachtraglichem kampfendem Wirken), in Christos von jeder
inneren Verbindung der Naturen; weder will er von der einen und einigenden Hypostase in
Christos etwas wissen, noch von der Menschheit als Imago Dei (die Menschheit berfihrt die
Gottheit gleichsam nor in einem mathematischen Punkt), noch schlieffiich von einem
theandrischen Wirken der vereinigten Naturen und deshalb auch nicht von einem den

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

575

Luther did not recognize that the substitutionary act of Christ on
the Cross expresses a reality in the Trinitarian life. Simply put,
the kenosis by which the Father begets the Son implies "such an
incomprehensible and unique 'separation' of God from himself
that it includes and grounds every other separation-be it never
so dark and bitter." 27
Man's (and Christ's) separation from God is experienced
within human consciousness. For this reason, Balthasar's Christology, which he identifies as a "Christology of consciousness,"
focuses upon "the individual human consciousness of Jesus." 28 He
argues that Jesus' human consciousness coincides with his
consciousness of mission. Jesus' mission-consciousness is always
absolute: as his human consciousness develops over time, his
mission-consciousness likewise increases in clarity, and so there is
never a distinction between his (non-static) human consciousness
and his mission-consciousness. 29 His human "I" is identical with
his mission. His mission-consciousness is his "fundamental
intuition concerning his identity" as the one sent from the
Father. 30 In this way, Jesus' consciousness is more than merely
human, since his mission-consciousness is of his being sent from
the Father to accomplish salvation (his mission is thus both
particular and universal, and expresses in a human way his divine
Sonship). Balthasar explains that "Jesus is aware of an element of
the divine in his innermost, indivisible self-consciousness; it is
intuitive insofar as it is inseparable from the intuition of his
mission-consciousness, but it is defined and limited by this same
mission-consciousness. "31
Christ's human consciousness is entirely delimited by his
consciousness of mission. This perfect accord differentiates Christ
from other human beings, and indicates his divinity. Balthasar
leidenden Christus bis in die Gottverlassenheit begleitenden Sendungsgehorsam."
:rr Balthasar, Theo-Drama 4:325.
28 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 3:166. Balthasar explicitly rejects, as impossible, the quest to
uncover a "psychology of Jesus." Yet, his purpose is to show that Jesus' human consciousness,
insofar as we can know of it from the biblical data, is identical with his mission-consciousness.
29 Balthasar's debt to Schleiermacher
is clear, although he radically re-works
Schleiermacher's theory.
30 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 3:166.
31 Ibid.

576

MATTHEW LEVERING

states, "The qualitative difference between his faith and ours is
this: we only receive our mission on the basis of our coming to
faith, whereas Jesus always has and is his mission; in his mission,
he has utterly abandoned himself to the Father who guides him
and in whom he has complete trust." 32 Jesus' will perfectly
accords with the Father's from the beginning; over the course of
time, Jesus learns what his mission entails. His absolute obedience
(as Son) to the Father, in the Holy Spirit, allows the Holy Spirit
to teach him what he has to learn (beyond the fact that he is "the
one sent"), when he has to learn it. 33
What Jesus learns is described by Balthasar in terms of intuitive
"initiation," "opening up," and "becoming explicit," rather than
as new knowledge. He learns that his mission, as the one sent to
reveal the Father, requires him to descend to the uttermost point
of not-knowing, of abandonment by the Father: the Word is
revealed precisely in its opposite, the silence (non-Word) and
death of the Cross. 34 Balthasar explains that
the outcome is that he is forsaken by God on the Cross. Yet this "infinite
distance," which recapitulates the sinner's mode of alienation from God, will
remain forever the highest revelation known to the world of the "diastasis"
(within the eternal being of God) between Father and Son in the Holy Spirit. 35

Jesus' "knowing" of divine realities, for Balthasar, is a more and
more explicit intuitive grasp of the divine "diastasis," or
separation, that Jesus (as the incarnate Son revealing the Father)
is called to enact, ultimately, upon the Cross.
32 Ibid., 3: 170-71. The question of how Christ's human knowledge corresponds with his
divine knowledge is thus placed to the side. Rephrasing the question in terms of
consciousness, rather than of knowledge, enables Balthasar simply to affirm that Christ's
mission-consciousness "totally occupies his self-consciousness and fills it to the very brim. He
sees himself so totally as 'coming from the Father' to men, as 'making known' the Father, as
the 'Word from the Father', that there is neither room nor time for any detached reflection
of the 'Who am I?' kind" (ibid., 3:172)
33 Ibid., 3:179-80; cf. 182-83; 227.
34 For further discussion of this point, see especially Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory
of the Lord, vol. 7: Theology: The New Covenant, trans. Brian McNeil (San Francisco:
Ignatius Press, 1989), 130-61.
35 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 3:228.

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

577

In the last volume of his Theo-Drama, Balthasar takes pains to
affirm that "it is an indispensable axiom that the Son, even in his
human form, must know that he is the eternal Son of the
Father. "36 Jesus must, Balthasar says, enjoy "the immediate vision
of the Father. "37 He explains that Jesus' knowing "that he is the
eternal Son of the Father" means that Jesus "must be aware of the
unbreakable continuity of his processioand his missio, or, in other
words, he must know of his transcendental obedience, which
upholds his entire earthly existence (Theo-Drama III, 165 ff.,
515ff.)." 38 In other words, Jesus' "knowing" of his eternal Sonship is in fact his absolute mission-consciousness, his knowledge
of his "transcendental obedience." Balthasar' s insistence that Jesus
must enjoy the immediate vision of the Father is likewise
qualified. He emphasizes that "in the Lord's Passion his sight is
veiled, whereas his obedience remains intact. "39 This veiling holds
for Jesus' entire life, if not to the same degree as the ultimate notknowing Jesus experiences on the Cross: his mission "presupposes
{right from the Incarnation) a certain veiling of his sight of the
Father: he must leave it in abeyance, refrain from using it; this is
possible because of the distance between Father and Son in the
Trinity. "40
We are now able to interpret more precisely Balthasar's
position on whether Jesus possessed "hope" on the Cross. By
following the path of absolute obedience to the Father, Jesus {the
Son) is infinitely separated from the Father. This separation is not
that of will {as if he joined sinners in hating the Father), but is
constituted by lack of conscious knowledge that makes his
obedience to the Father blind, without thereby becoming
disobedience. In obedience to his mission of "being sent," Jesus
36 Balthasar, Tbeo-Drama 5: 124. It is worth noting that volume 5 was published five years
after volume 3. In the later volume, Balthasar is taking the opportunity to clarifysome of the
positions adopted in the earlier volume, and he goes over much of the same terrain again in
volume 2 of the Tbeologik.
37 Ibid., 5:123.
38 Ibid., 5:124.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 5:125; cf. Balthasar, Tbeologik 2:261-65, 322££., where Balthasar, generally
following Adrienne von Speyr, describes the incarnate Son's "super-obedience"
("Ubergeborsams").

578

MATTHEW LEVERING

"distances" himself to such a degree that he has absolutely no
knowledge of the Father's love. Balthasar states,
The Son bears sinners within himself, together with the hopeless
impenetrability of their sin, which prevents the divine light of love from
registering in them. In himself, therefore, he experiences, not their sin, but the
hopelessness of their resistance to God and the graceless No of divine grace to
this resistance. The Son who has depended [sich verlas.sen] entirely on the
Father, even to becoming identified with his brothers in their lostness, must
now be forsaken [verlas.sen]by the Father. He who consented to be given [vergeben] everything from the Father's hand must now feel that it was all "for
nothing" [vergebens].41

Thus Jesus' lack of hope, his conscious not-knowing, is total. Yet
his will is still perfectly in accord with the divine will; his missionconsciousness remains intact, and in this there resides an implicit
"hope." His union with sinners means not a perversion of will,
but rather that at the moment when his mission is most fully
"opened up" and made explicit to him, he knows absolutely
nothing. His depth of not-knowing (as the not-knowing of the
Son, the Word) goes infinitely beyond any mere human
separation from truth. Balthasar affirms, "In his dereliction [on
the Cross], the Father gives no word of answer to the Son; and
his Word, that is, the Son himself, sinks into the silence of
death." 42
This death is enormously fruitful because it is located within
the Trinitarian life. Balthasar holds that "the Son's eternal, holy
distance from the Father, in the Spirit, forms the basis on which
the unholy distance of the world's sin can be transposed into it,
can be transcended and overcome by it." 43 The Son's holy
distance is intellectual, whereas the unholy distance of the world's
sin is moral. As Balthasar states, "This [the free rejection of God's
41 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 4:349; cf. Balthasar, Theologik 2:294££.Balthasar indicates that
Jesus' experience on the Cross is what John of the Cross describes as the "dark night of the
soul." In Novo millenio ineunte, the Pope takes up the same theme, but the Pope, drawing
upon Catherine of Siena and Therese of Lisieux, insists upon "the paradoxical blending of
bliss and pain," without suggesting that the bliss is no longer experienced (no. 27).
42 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 4:359; cf. Balthasar, Theologik 2:294££.
43 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 4:362; cf. Balthasar, Theologik 2:314ff., where Balthasar
summarii.es Adrienne von Speyr's theology of Holy Saturday.

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

579

will] cannot be said to be an element that is present as a
possibility in the Son's relationship with the Father." 44 Yet the
Son's holy distance, in the divine plan, encompasses the unholy
Goddistance: "These two forms of timelessness-the
forsakenness of the damned and the God-forsakenness of the Son
on the Cross-are not simply unrelated. The latter is because of
the former. "45 Father and Son mutually surrender themselves and
are abandoned by the other, and this abandonment goes infinitely
beyond the condition of finite sin.46 Moreover, "because of the
energy that man has invested in it, sin is a reality, it is not
'nothing.'" 47 Sin is the "refuse" or "chaff" that is consigned by
Jesus to hell.48 It follows that the incarnate Son can truly bear all
Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:502.
cf. 257 and elsewhere. For further elucidation of this point, see Nichols,
No BloodlessMyth, 216.
46 The problem nonetheless remains: how does a fundamentally "intEllectual" distance-it
has to be such, since the divine Persons never hate each other-encompass a willful distance
constituted by hatred of God? Balthasar affirms that Adrienne von Speyr solves this problem:
"The mention of the Father here opens up a new and significant dimension of Adrienne von
Speyr's theology which supplies what is lacking in Luther's theology. For here Hell is a
trinitarian event. She portrays at length the trinitarian form of sin, a matter which cannot be
presented here. However, a fundamental statement is that on Holy Saturday the Son (as man
and redeemer) is initiated into the dark mystery of the Father, something which itself can
happen only in secret and in silence. This presupposes a motion (not potentiality) in the
eternal life of the Trinity. This is already true of the Cross: 'The Father is never more present
than in this absence on the Cross.' Hell is described as a 'preserve' of the Father, in the sense
that, as creator (indeed, already as generator of the Son, in whom every possible universe is
always already co-projected) he foresaw and took responsibility for the possibility of the
creature's freedom and, on the basis of the abuse of its freedom, the possibility of its eternal
perishing: 'a chaos of sin ... like a mirror image of the chaos at the beginning of creation.'
And now there is something like a 'retraction' of the Father, in order to admit the incarnate
Son into this ultimate darkness, which the Father discloses to him, as the redeemer of sinners,
only here at the end of the way of redemption" (Balthasar, Theologik 2:321-22, emphasis
added).
47 Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:314.
48 Cf. Balthasar,Ibeologik 2:324: "In his passage through hell, Christ encounters not only
sin, which has now become an amorphous mass, but also figures which Adrienne has called
'effigies' [Effigien). These effigies consist of what of his own substance a man has lent to the
sin he has committed: 'This lost piece of man goes into hell with sin.' The Son replaces what
has been lost by his personalgrace: 'So the erstwhile sinner is indeed now closer to the Lord,
but at the same time, as sinner, he is copied, in negative, in hell. An effigy of him ... lies
buried and rejected in hell.' The effigies are like a hollow impression, as when a body has lain
in the sand." The quotations are from Adrienne von Speyr's Kreuz und Holle, vol. 1.
44

45 Ibid., 5:311;

580

MATIHEW LEVERING

sin-in its hypostasized form, stripped of its association with
particular disobedient persons-without perverting his own will.
Quoting Adrienne von Speyr, Balthasar notes, "'The Son presents
to the Father, in his own person, the sin of the world that he has
taken away', at the same time presenting to him 'in his Body, his
Bride, the living sinner now stripped of sin.'" 49
For Balthasar, then, the Son's obedience on the Cross, in order
to bear sin fully, must be characterized by two elements: absolute
faithfulness, and absolute lack of grounding in knowledge. Jesus
only moves to the pinnacle of obedience (the pinnacle of union
with the Father's will) by simultaneously entering the abyss of
not-knowing. The highest obedience-the highest charity-is that
which obeys without (conscious) knowledge or hope. This highest
charity expresses the self-abandoning that characterizes absolute
Love, namely, the Trinity: "This obedience alone exegetes God as
Trinitarian love, and that precisely by the Father's exposing his
Son out of love for the world to the contradiction of the
contradivine. " 50
In light of Balthasar's theology, the Pope's affirmation that
"Jesus' cry on the cross ... is not the cry of anguish of a man
without hope" takes on particular significance. Balthasar's ideas
about Trinitarian diastasis,inner-Trinitarian faith, and Trinitarian
metaphysics depend largely upon his interpretation of Christ's
consciousness on the Cross. Were this thread withdrawn from his
theology, much else would have to be revised. For Balthasar the
Son's abandonment, his supreme not-knowing, is the pinnacle of
love, the revelation of the infinite inner-Trinitarian "spaces" of
divine kenosis. If, on the contrary, the incarnate Son experienced
his abandonment as perfect knowing-supreme awareness of
Balthasar, Theo-Drama 5:314-15.
Balthasar, Theologik 2:331. "Dieser Wahnsinn offenbart sich nicht im Wesen
Gottes-er wiirde es, falls Gott der Welt bediirfte, um Gott zu sein--, sondem in Dem, der
in einem einzigen Akt das absolut G<>ttliche und das absolut Widergottliche zu einen
vermocht hat, nicht im Wahnsinn einer titanisch-iibermenschlichen Gebarde, sondem in der
Schlichtheit seines Gehonams. Dieser Gehonam allein legt Gott als die trinitarische Liebe
aus, und zwar gerade dadurch, daB der Vater ·seinen Sohn aus Liebe zur Welt dem
Widenpruch des Widergottlichen ausliefert. Krenz und T rinitat beweisen sich gegenseitig,
wobei Krenz in all seinen oben angedeuteten und menschlicher Logik unventandlichen
Dimensionen genommen wird."
49

50

CHRIST'S CONSCIOUSNESS ON THE CROSS

581

man's sin in the midst of conscious "[seeing] the Father and
[rejoicing] fully in him," to quote the Pope again-then the Cross,
the divine being, and the Trinitarian processions of wisdom and
love (along with the creaturely being that flows from these
processions), would not be adequately characterized by
Balthasar's dialectic. In affirming that "not even the drama of his
passion and death will be able to shake his serene certainty of
being the Son of the heavenly Father" (no. 24), Pope John Paul
II has thus brought to our attention-whether intentionally or
not-a theological debate fundamental to how the Church will
understand its most profound mysteries in the new millennium.

The Thomist 65 (2001): 583-92

TRUTH AND DIVINE IDEAS
JOHN PETERSON
Universityof Rhode Island
Kingston, Rhode Island

T

RUTH IS IN MIND either as conformed to something or as

conformed to by something. As conformed to something,
truth is passive knowledge. It is knowledge that is measured
or caused by something else. This source of passive or received
truth might be an individual, a property or universal, or a fact. In
sense knowledge, my image of a half-submerged oar is false
because it fails to conform to the oar's real shape. My subsequent
image of the uplifted oar is true because it does conform to the
oar's shape. In intellectual knowledge, my concept of a triangle
as a three-sided plane figure is true because it conforms to the
definition of a triangle. And my knowledge that the angles of a
triangle total one hundred eighty degrees, expressed in the true
judgment to that effect, conforms to and is measured by the
corresponding fact.
These three types of measured truth are not on a par.
Philosophers rightly say that only judgment is strictly speaking
true. This is because only judgments, and not either concepts or
percepts, make claims about existence. And those claims either
correspond to the facts (are true) or not. When they do and they
are subject-predicate judgments, the judger not only knows reality
but also knows his judgment's own conformity to reality. 1 In
judging that S is P, I compare the subject to my idea of it in the
predicate, affirming that the former conforms to the latter. So
when my judgment is true, I know both reality itself and my
1 St. Thomas Aquinas,

Summa TheologiaeI, q. 16, a. 2.

583

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JOHN PETERSON

mind's conformity to reality. Thus, the truth of judgment is
always more comprehensive knowledge than the truth of either
concepts or percepts.
By contrast, as conformed to by something, truth is measure
and not measured, active and not passive. This is ontological as
opposed to logical truth. It is knowledge that measures or causes
something else. Here, truth is a model. Jefferson's plan for
Monticello is what measures and is conformed to by the actual
Monticello. The ideal Monticello as archetype is said to be the
truth of the artifact, the real Monticello. The latter is called true
because it measures up to its truth. Thus, in the mind that conforms, what is known is true and what is true is known. But in
mind that is conformed to, what is known is truth and what is
truth is known. Thus, knowledge and truth are equivalent
notions. Not only is something true (or truth) when it is known
but something is also known when it is true (or truth).
But is truth in the first instance primarily speaking in mind?
And if it is, is it primarily in mind that conforms or in mind that
is conformed to? Does it strictly speaking characterize passive
mind or active mind? Is it in mind as modeled or in mind as
model? In the first section I argue that truth is primarily
something conformed to and not something that conforms. It is
primarily a measure and only secondarily something measured.
That means that propositional truth is truth only in a secondary
sense. For here statements or propositions conform to facts and
not vice versa. In the second section I argue that truth is in mind
and not in things and that it is primarily in God's mind. 2
I

Consider the relation between 'true' and 'truth' on the one
hand and 'good' and 'goodness' on the other. One can say that
the predicates 'true' and 'good' always have a sense that includes
and hence depends on the sense of 'truth' and 'goodness'
respectively. Things are called true after truth and things are
2 St. Thomas Aquinas,

De Veritate, q. I, a. 2.

TRlITH AND DMNE IDEAS

585

called good after goodness. When they are, they are always so
called in a secondary sense. The same goes for all abstract nouns
and their corresponding adjectives. Recall Plato's idea that things
are called F after F-ness. The sense of the adjective feeds off the
sense of the noun. It does so, with some difference, the way in
which, in Aristotle's celebrated example, 'healthy' feeds off
'health'. 3 The sense of 'healthy' as predicated of food, complexion, exercise, etc., includes and hence depends on the sense
of 'health'. Where 'health' means "physical well-being," food is
called healthy only because it is conducive to physical well-being
in an animal. Complexion is called healthy only because it is a
sign of physical well-being in a person, and so on. Similarly,
suppose that by the truth of anything x is meant its ground or
measure (as the fact that snow is white is the ground or measure
of the true statement "Snow is white"). And suppose that by the
goodness of anything y is meant the end of y. Then if xis called
true because it conforms to some ground or measure and y is
called good because it tends to its end, then x and y are called
true and good respectively in derived senses of those terms. For
here, the concept of a ground or measure enters into the derived
sense "conforms to some ground or measure" and the concept of
an end enters into the derived sense "tends to its end." This
parallels the case of health. The concept of physical well-being
enters into the concept of "being conducive to physical wellbeing" and not vice versa. Thus, "conforming to a ground or
measure" and "tending to its end" are derived senses of 'truth'
and 'goodness', respectively. That is why, when it is just these
senses that are meant, 'truth' is reduced to 'true' and 'goodness'
to 'good'. Reflecting these derived senses, 'true' and 'good' are in
all cases predicated of things in which truth and goodness are
secondarily found.
All this assumes that truth has the sense of a ground or
measure and that goodness has the sense of an end. Both notions
are relational. Anything that is a measure is necessarily the
measure of something, and anything that is end is necessarily the
3 Aristotle,

MetaphysicsK.3.1060b36-1061a7.

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JOHN PETERSON

end of something. But why say in the first instance that truth is a
measure and that goodness is an end? Why not say instead that
truth is correspondence to a measure and that goodness is
tendency to an end?
As for good, no end is called good because the tendency
toward it is good. On the contrary, the tendency is called good
because what it tends to is good. A seedling is called good because
it shows promise of reaching its natural end as a healthy, mature
plant. Otherwise we should not choose it over others. Recall
Aquinas's point that desires are called good only because the ends
to which they tend are good. 4 My desire for peace is good because
peace is good. Thus, since good passes over from end to tendency
or desire and not vice versa, goodness is primarily end and only
derivatively tendency toward end.
As for truth, take the correspondence view that "Snow is
white" is true if and only if snow is white. Under this view, iron
pyrite is called false gold only in a derivative sense-that is, only
because it elicits the false belief or statement, "That is gold."
Under both this view and the view that truth is a measure, the
derived sense of 'true' includes its primary sense, as was
previously seen in the case of 'health'. When 'truth' means "being
a measure" something is called true gold only because it conforms
to the measure of gold. The derived sense of 'true' here (i.e.,
"conforms to some ground or measure") includes its primary
sense (i.e., the concept of a ground or measure). And when 'truth'
means "the conformity of statement to fact" the derived sense of
'true' in 'true gold' (i.e., "elicits the statement, 'That is gold'
which corresponds to the fact") once again includes the primary
sense of 'true' (i.e., the concept of correspondence to fact).
With this in mind, recall our question. Why not say that truth
consists in the correspondence-relation between measured and
measure (hereafter, C) and not in being the measure itself (hereafter, M) by conformity to which the measured is called true?
To answer, compare two secondary senses of M and C,
respectively. Call them m and c. If m is logically prior to c then
4

STh I, q. 16, a. 1.

TRUTH AND DIVINE IDEAS

587

it follows that M is logically prior to C. M therefore wins out
over C so far as being the primary sense of truth is concerned.
This strategy turns on the following principle, P.
p

No actual primary sense of a term r has a derived sense that includes a derived
sense of some alleged primary sense of r.

Thus, suppose that Y is the primary sense of r while Z is
alleged to be the primary sense of r. P states that if y is a derived
sense of Y then y does not include z, a derived sense of Z.
Otherwise Y has a derived sense y that comes not from Y but from
Z. And then, as against the supposition, y comes from Z and not
from Y. For if y depends on z and z depends on Z then y depends
onZ.
An example will make this clear. Suppose Smith and Jones
hold rival definitions of 'goodness'. Smith says that goodness
consists in being an end while Jones claims that goodness consists
in tending to an end. Call these definitions E and T, respectively.
From Smith's standpoint, when something is called good because
it tends to its end, 'good' is used in a derived sense. For "tending
to its end" (hereafter, e) includes the idea of an end, which for
Smith is the primary sense of 'goodness'. Thus, when a seedling
that overall looks promising is called good, it is so called,
according to Smith, in sense e. By the same token and from
Jones's standpoint, when something is called good because it is a
sign of something's tending to its end, 'good' is also used in a
derived sense. For "being a sign of something's tending to its end"
(hereafter, t) includes "tends to its end," what for Jones is the
primary sense of 'goodness'. Thus, suppose that our seedling's
sprouting buds overnight is called good. Since that event is called
good because it is a sign of the seedling's tending to its end, it is
so called, according to Jones, in sense t. Nowt here evidently
depends on e since t includes e. But since, under P, no actual
primary sense of a term r has a derived sense that depends on a
derived sense of some alleged primary sense of r, it follows that
E and not T is the primary sense of 'goodness'.

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JOHN PETERSON

As it is with goodness so is it with truth. Suppose that Smith
adopts M and says that truth consists in being a measure while
Jones favors C and says that truth is the conformity to a measure.
From Smith's perspective, when x is called true because x
conforms to a measure, 'true' is used in a derived sense. For "x
conforms to a measure" (hereafter, m) includes the idea of a
measure, which for Smith is the primary sense of 'truth'. Thus,
when a nugget is called true gold because it conforms to goldness,
it is so called, according to Smith, in sense m. By the same token
and fromJones's perspective, when the same nugget is called true
gold because it elicits a belief that conforms to a ground or
measure (in this case the fact behind the belief), 'truth' is also used
in a derived sense. For c, "x elicits a belief that conforms to some
ground or measure" includes C, the idea of conforming to a
ground or measure (i.e., a fact) which for Jones is the primary
sense of 'truth'.
Now it is evident here that c includes and hence depends on
m. "Eliciting a belief that conforms to some measure" includes
and hence depends on the idea of conforming to a measure. Once
again, then, let us apply P. If c which hangs on C includes m
which in turn hangs on M, then C is not the primary sense or
definition of 'truth'. Otherwise, by P, c does not include m.
The same goes, pari passu, for falsity. If for Smith truth is a
measure and for Jones it is conformity to a measure, then for the
former falsity is absence of a measure (not-M), while for the latter
it is lack of conformity to a measure (not-C). From Smith's
standpoint, then, when something is called false because it fails to
conform to a measure, 'false' is used in a derived sense. For the
idea of x's failing to conform to a measure (hereafter, not-m)
includes the idea of the absence of a measure, which for Smith is
the primary sense of 'falsity'. To say that x lacks conformity to R
is to say that, so far as x is concerned, R is not its measure. Thus,
when for Smith a nugget of iron pyrite n is called false gold
because it lacks conformity to goldness, it is so called in sense notm. To say that n lacks conformity to goldness is to say that
goldness is not n's measure or definition. That shows how the

TRUTH AND DIVINE IDEAS

589

idea of the absence of a measure enters into the idea of the lack
of conformity to a measure.
The same goes for false beliefs. False beliefs are those that lack
a corresponding fact as their ground or measure. But that is to say
that the facts that would make those beliefs true are absent or
missing. Again, sprinters say that they made a false start just
because the way they left the starting line lacks conformity to
some mental model for race-starting. In these as well as in all
other cases of falsity, the lack of conformity of x to some measure
R means that, so far as x is concerned, R is missing or absent.
By the same token and from Jones's standpoint, when n is
called false gold because it elicits a belief that lacks conformity to
a measure (i.e., the supposed fact that n is gold), 'false' is also
used in a derived sense. For not-c, "x elicits a belief that lacks
conformity to a measure," includes not-C, "lacks conformity to a
measure," which for Jones is the primary sense of 'false'.
Now it is evident that not-c includes and hence depends on
not-m. "x elicits a belief that lacks conformity to a measure"
includes and hence depends on the idea of lacking conformity to
a measure. To apply P once more, then, if not-c which hangs on
not-C includes m which in turn hangs on not-M, then not-C is
not the primary sense or definition of 'falsity'. Otherwise, going
by P, not-c would not include not-m.
From this it follows that 'truth' no more means the conformity
of something to a ground or measure than 'goodness' means the
tendency of a thing to its end. These are senses of 'true' and
'good' and not the senses of 'truth' and 'goodness'. But then no
one correctly defines 'truth' as the conformity of a belief or
statement to a fact. For if the conformity of a belief or statement
to a fact is not a case of the conformity of something to its ground
or measure then nothing is. It follows that M wins out over C as
the primary sense or definition of 'truth'. Truth is primarily
measure or ground and only derivatively the conformity of
measured to measure or grounded to ground. When we mean the
latter, the appropriate word to use is 'true' and not 'truth'. And
falsity is primarily the absence of measure or ground and only
derivatively the lack of conformity to some measure or ground.

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JOHN PETERSON

Here again, when it concerns the latter, the correct word to use
is 'false' and not 'falsity'.
II

It remains to determine whether truth is in minds. If it is, the
question is whether the mind is human, suprahuman, or both.
Since truth has the nature of a measure, this comes down to
asking whether the measures or standards by comparison to
which things are called true are in minds or not.
In at least some cases the measure is doubtless mental and the
mind is ours. The measuring source of a work of art is some
model in the mind of an artist. Having abandoned several false
starts, a sculptor calls his latest cut "the true one" only because it
conforms to his ideal model. It is true because it conforms to
what, for it, is its truth. Here, truth is evidently ideal measure.
The ideal exemplar is the truth of its exemplatum. So too is it
ideal standard in the crafts when products such as boats, houses,
furniture, etc., are by craftsmen called true when they conform to
their ideal models. This is productive as opposed to artistic truth.
Here, the model is again the truth of the product.
Truth, however, is not just in these but in all cases mental
model. For suppose that truth is the end of the intellect and that
the end of anything is its full realization or good. Suppose further
that the function of any intellect is to know. Then it follows that
truth is both the good of the intellect and the end or good of
knowing. Moreover, since what measures is prior to what is
measured, then, other things being equal, knowledge that
measures is prior to knowledge that is measured. Therefore the
good or full realization of the intellect is knowing that measures
things as opposed to knowing that is measured by things. From
all this it follows that truth is primarily in intellect as a priori
model and measure of things. Thus,
1 Truth is the end of intellect.
2 The end of anything is its full realization or good.
3 So truth is the full realization or good of intellect.

TRUTH AND DMNE IDEAS

591

4 But the function of intellect is to know.
5 So truth is the end, good, or full realization of knowing.
6 But knowledge is fully realized when it measures as opposed
to being measured by things. Otherwise the measured is prior
to the measure.
7 So the end and good of intellect is knowing that is the model
and measure of things as opposed to knowing that is measured
by things.
8 Therefore, truth is primarily knowledge in intellect that is the
a priori model and measure of things.
What applies to the definition applies to any instance. Hence,
truth is ideal model and measure in propositional truth no less
than it is in artistic and productive truth. In the truth of
propositions, the thing measured is some statement, proposition,
or judgment (the difference here makes no difference) and the
measure is some fact to which the latter corresponds. The
statement "Snow is white" is true because in fact snow is white.
The former is patterned after the latter which is its ideal model
and measure. Like artifacts, then, statements are called true
because they conform to their ideal measures. A fact is the truth
of a true statement no less than the plan of Monticello in
Jefferson's mind is the truth of Monticello. In propositional truth
these standards are objective facts and not subjective models. But
in both cases, truth is the model and measure of the true. As
artists work for the sake of copying their ideal models, so too do
persons judge and make statements for the sake of mirroring the
facts. Artists look to their mental models as a guide for what they
make with a view to copying those models. Just so do honest
persons look to facts as a guide for what they say in order to
mirror those facts in language. In both, then, the model or
measure functions as final cause.
The difference is that the facts that serve as final causes of
statements in propositional truth are not found in our minds.
Otherwise in making true statements our intellect always
conforms to itself. It is difficult to see in that case how true
judgments are distinguished from false ones. For false statements

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JOHN PETERSON

too, when sincerely made, conform to the minds of those who
make them. One's false statement that whales are fish conforms
to one's belief that whales are fish. It is also difficult, if
propositional truth is housed in our minds, to see how solipsism
is skirted. For all knowledge of fact is in that case knowledge of
self. It follows, therefore, that the fact which is the ground,
measure, and model of a true statement exists a priori or ante rem
in God's mind.

The Thomist 65 (2001): 593-611

PLANTINGA ON BELIEF
jOHNR. T. LAMONT
Oxford, England

A

Warranted Christian Belief is an
important book about an important subject. 1 During most
of the history of analytic philosophy of religion, discussion
about the rational grounds for religious belief, or lack thereof, has
been understood as discussion of the grounds for belief in the
existence of God. It has been pointed out that most believers,
philosophers included, do not hold a simple theism independent
of any other religious commitment, but rather accept belief in the
existence of God as part of belief in a specific religion like
Judaism or Christianity. But analytic philosophers have not
concentrated on the nature of rational justification for belief in a
religion that claims to be revealed. 2 When one of the most
eminent analytic philosophers of religion produces a major work
on the rational grounding of Christian belief, it is therefore a
significant event.
Part of the significance comes from the fact that Plantinga is
the Christian philosopher who is best known and respected by the
secular philosophical world, at least in English-speaking countries. His views are thus liable to be taken as the best rational
defense that Christians can offer for their belief. It is therefore
LVIN PLANTINGA'S

1 Alvin Plantings, WarrantedChristianBelief(Oxford: Oxofrd University Press, 2000). Pp.
xx + 508. ISBN 0-19-513192-4 (cloth), 0-19-513193-2 (paper). Page numbers in the text
refer to this book.
2 This is not an exceptionless generalization; the principal exception to it is Richard
Swinburne, whose work has had the object of giving good reasons for accepting Christian
belief. Nonetheless it is broadly true.

593

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

important that Christians evaluate whether or not he succeeds in
his aim of showing that Christian belief is reasonable.
I

Plantinga's book builds on his previous two books, Warrant:
The Current Debate and Warrant and Proper Function, which
examined and criticized current views on knowledge and
justification and argued for his own position on these subjects.
His object in Warranted Christian Belief is to use the conclusions
of these books to address the question of whether Christian belief
is rationally acceptable. 3
He distinguishes between two kinds of objections that can be
raised to the rationality of Christian belief. The first kind are de
facto objections, which assert that some or all Christian beliefs are
false. The second are de jure objections, which claim that
Christian belief lacks rationality in some way (i.e., that it is
unjustified, irrational, or unwarranted). His object in the book is
to argue that there are no good de jure objections to the
rationality of Christian belief that do not depend on de facto
objections.
Before embarking on this task he addresses objections to the
view that Christian belief is possible. He argues convincingly
against the positions of Gordon Kaufman, John Hick, and (on
some interpretations) Immanuel Kant, who have claimed that it
is impossible to refer to God or make affirmative predications
about him, and hence that Christians cannot hold the beliefs that
they purport to hold.
Having dealt with this preliminary issue, Plantinga asks how
the de jure question is to be understood. He first considers the
evidentialist view, as found in John Locke. Evidentialism
embodies classical foundationalism and deontologism. Classical
foundationalism holds that a belief is acceptable for a person if
and only if it is either self-evident, incorrigible, or evident to the
senses, or else is believed on the evidential basis of propositions
3 By Christian belief he means what is common to the great creeds of the main branches
of the Christian church.

PLANTINGA ON BELIEF

595

that are acceptable and support it deductively, inductively, or
abductively. Classical deontologism holds that we have a moral
duty to regulate our beliefs in this way. A belief is justified if the
believer has followed this duty in forming it. The de jure question
for the evidentialist will be whether Christian believers follow
their duty by proportioning their belief to the evidence available
to them. Plantinga rejects this view of the de jure question,
because he holds that classical foundationalism can be seen to be
false. It is self-refuting, because it is not itself either self-evident,
incorrigible, evident to the senses, or based on propositions that
are; and it does not fit most of the beliefs that we quite reasonably
hold, as for example that the world is round. When classical
foundationalism is rejected, it becomes clear that deontologism is
inadequate as a basis for posing the de jure question. We do have
a duty to be responsible in forming our beliefs, but it is clear that
an average Christian believer lives up to this duty if he has made
reasonable efforts to inform himself about the objections to
Christianity and still finds himself sincerely convinced of its truth.
If we understand justification in a deontological sense, as meaning
satisfaction of our duties towards the truth, it is obvious that
Christian belief can be justified. The de jure question ought not
therefore to be understood as asking whether belief is justified in
this sense, because the answer is too easy.
We approach a right formulation of the question when we
look at the objections to belief given by Freud and Marx. Freud
sees religious belief as resulting from wish-fulfilment, and Marx
sees it as resulting from a perverted world view that is produced
by a perverted social order. Both these objections, in Plantinga's
view, amount to the complaint that belief lacks warrant. Warrant
is the property that distinguishes knowledge from mere true
belief, if it is present in sufficient amounts. The right de jure
question to ask about Christian belief is whether it lacks warrant.
Plantinga here makes use of the account of warrant he has
developed in his two previous books. A belief is warranted, in his
view, when it is produced by cognitive faculties that are aimed at
truth, and that are functioning properly according to a good
design plan in an environment for which they have been

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

designed. A design plan specifies a way of working that subserves
the purpose of a thing; it is a good plan if a thing achieves its
purpose when working according to that plan.
In attempting to answer this de jure question, Plantinga
distinguishes between belief in God's existence and belief in the
teachings of the gospel. He offers a model of how we might come
to have warranted belief in God's existence, which he calls the
Aquinas/Calvin (A/C) model because of its supposed resemblance
to the views of those thinkers. He then extends this model to give
an account of belief in the gospel. He explains how these models
satisfy the conditions for warrant that he has set out, and
considers arguments against their providing warrant. The proposal of these models is not intended to show that Christian belief
actually is fully warranted, since that would mean establishing
that it is true and hence going beyond the de jure question; it is
only meant to show how such belief could be warranted, and to
establish that if Christian belief is true then it probably is
warranted.
Plantinga claims that Aquinas and Calvin agree that there is a
natural knowledge of God. He cites Summa contra Gentiles III,
c. 38, and Summa Theologiae I, q. 2, a.1, ad 2 for Aquinas's
position, but bases his model on Calvin's account. He uses
Calvin's term sensusdivinitatis to name the cognitive faculty that,
on this model, produces belief in God in humans. The sensus
divinitatis is a faculty that belongs to humans by nature. The
belief in God that it produces is basic; it is not inferred from other
beliefs.4 Certain circumstances trigger the operation of the sensus
divinitatis. It takes these circumstances as input, and produces as
output belief in God. An example of such a circumstance would
be an experience of the glories in nature, which would produce
in us the belief that there is a God who has created them. These
circumstances are not reasons for the belief in God produced by
the sensus divinitatis; they are occasions of its formation. Belief
produced by the sensus divinitatis is properly basic with respect
to justification, in that a person is not behaving irresponsibly in
4 Plantinga thinks that it is possible to establish that God exists using inference from other
beliefs that are known, but this is not, he says, how the sensus divinitatis works.

PlANTINGA ON BELIEF

597

believing in God in this way. Most importantly, belief produced
by the sensus divinitatis is warranted. The purpose of the sensus
divinitatis is to enable us to have true beliefs about God-that is
why he created us with it. When it functions properly, it produces
true beliefs about God. So, the belief it produces is warranted.
One is naturally inclined to ask why not everyone holds true
beliefs about God, if we all possess the sensus divinitatis by
nature. Plantinga holds that its operation is impeded by sin,
which interferes with or even suppresses its functioning, and
makes us unwilling to accept its deliverances. This sin is original
as well as personal. God's remedy for human sin and its effects is
given in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ. He
needed to inform us about this plan of salvation, which he did
through a three-part process. The first part is the production of
the Bible, which informs us about this plan, and has God himself
as principal author. The second is the sending of the Holy Spirit,
which repairs the ravages of sin in our hearts. The chief effect of
this sending is the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, which
produces the third part, faith. Faith involves both mind and will.
Its intellectual aspect is knowledge of God's plan of salvation.
The part of the will in faith is both affective (loving and being
grateful to God) and executive (accepting the offered gift of
salvation and committing one's self to the Lord).
The internal instigation of the Holy Spirit, unlike the sensus
divinitatis, does not belong to humans by nature. Rather, it is the
result of a supernatural divine intervention, which is made
necessary by sin.5 The belief in the gospel produced by the internal instigation of the Holy Spirit is basic, not the result of
inference. It is properly basic, and thus warranted, because the
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit has the function of producing true beliefs, operates in an appropriate cognitive environment, and succeeds in carrying out its function.
Plantinga does not think that ordinary human faculties can
produce warranted belief in the gospel, because the historical
s Plantinga differs here from Aquinas, who thinks that faith is an essentially supernatural
grace that surpasses the power of any created being, and hence that grace would have been
necessary for faith even in unfallen man.

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

evidence for the Bible's being divinely inspired is too weak. He
considers the claim that there are defeaters for the beliefs
produced by the sensus divinitatis and the internal instigation of
the Holy Spirit. The principal candidates for such defeaters are
the findings of contemporary biblical scholarship, the positions of
postmodernism and pluralism, and the existence of suffering and
evil in the world. He argues that none of these candidates can
succeed in defeating Christian belief, and concludes that there are
no good de jure objections to such belief. The question of whether
such belief is in fact true is beyond the scope of philosophy,
whose role is merely to clear away obstacles to faith.
II

Plantinga's substantial book contains many valuable discussions that cannot be considered here. But his main positions,
which are sketched out above, must be judged wanting, for both
philosophical and theological reasons.

A) Sensus divinitatis
Two problems arise for his account of the sensus divinitatis.
The first is whether such a thing really exists; the second is
whether, if it exists, it can be said to provide knowledge.
The idea of an intuitive, non-inferential knowledge of the
existence of God or gods is originally a pagan one. In Cicero's De
natura deorum, the Epicurean Velleius asserts that
[Epicurus] alone perceived, first, that the gods exist, because nature herself has
imprinted a conception of them on the minds of all mankind. For the belief in
the gods has not been established by authority, custom, or law, but rests on the
unanimous and abiding consensus of mankind; their existence is therefore a
necessary inference, since we possess an instinctive or rather an innate concept
of them [intelligi necesse est esse deos, quoniam insitas eorum vel potius
innatus cognitionis habemus]. 6

Cicero, De natura deorum, tr. H. Rackham (Cambridge, Mass.: Loeb, 1933), 45-47.
Epicurus describes these innate notions by the Greek term npOATJIJllt;.
6

PLANTINGAON BELIEF

599

One may speculate that Calvin was influenced by Greek sources
in devising his notion of the sensus divinitatis. 7 Aquinas, unlike
Calvin (and in spite of Plantinga's talk of an "Aquinas/Calvin
model"), did not accept the idea of a basic knowledge of God of
the kind that Plantinga postulates. This was probably a conscious
rejection, since he had read the De natura deorum. He did think
that we have a confused innate knowledge of God through having
an innate grasp of the concepts of being, truth, and goodness, but
this is not a knowledge that Plantinga-who denies that God is
identical with being, truth, or goodness-could accept. The
natural knowledge of God to which Aquinas refers in ScG III, c.
38, is not a basic belief, but the result of inference from the order
observable in nature.
The trouble with the claim that there is such a thing as the
sensus divinitatis, which is a part of human nature and gives us a
correct understanding of God, is that such a correct understanding is not to be found among humans generally. The only
people who have held a conception of God that Plantinga would
accept as more or less accurate have been those who belonged to
religions that were based on or influenced by God's revelation to
the Jews, and (questionably) a few who have arrived at a right
view of God through lengthy philosophical investigation. If the
sensus divinitatis really exists, why is it that every instance of a
correct understanding of God can be explained as due to a cause
other than its operation? Why are there no examples of its
undoubtedly working on its own? This fact makes the idea of the
sensus divinitatis doubtful.
Plantinga might reply that those people who are not
Christians, Muslims, Jews, or philosophers do not have an adequate knowledge of God because in them the operations of the
sensus divinitatis are corrupted by sin. But a large proportion of
people who have correct beliefs about God live lives that are
devoted to serious sin. It thus cannot be the case that sin
7 Probably Stoic rather than Epicurean; he was interested in Stoicism, and translated some
of Seneca's works. For a discussion of Seneca's views on innate knowledge of God, see Myrto
Dragona-Monachou, The StoicArgt4ments for the Existence and the Providence of the Gods
(Athens, 1976), 185££.; and Seneca, Letters 41, 90, 120.

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

invariably distorts or silences the sensus divinitatis. It can only be
said to do so for the majority of sinners, while the sense is able to
operate for a substantial minority. Why is it then that outside the
group of philosophers and believers in theistic religions, there is
no such minority?
The sorts of innate knowledge of God postulated by Aquinas
and Epicurus would not suffice for Plantinga's sensus divinitatis,
because the knowledge of God given by the sensus divinitatis is
supposed to be a religiously sufficient one, which provides us with
the information we need to enter into a proper relationship with
God. A necessary component of such knowledge would be that it
enables us to distinguish between God and created things, thus
making it possible for us to keep the second commandment. 8
Epicurus's conception, which says that there are many gods,
obviously will not do this.
Moreover, the account of God that Plantinga provides, and
that he would presumably hold to be furnished by the sensus
divinitatis, is not religiously adequate. Plantinga's own account of
God fails to distinguish adequately between God and creation,
because he rejects the doctrine of divine impassibility. His
characterization of this doctrine is partly mistaken, because he
thinks that it excludes God's feeling joy or delight, but he sees
rightly that it excludes God's suffering, longing, or desire. He
insists by contrast that God can and does suffer, and experiences
longing and desire. In doing so, he attributes to God properties
that are incompatible with the divine nature, and that can only
exist in creatures. 9 He defends his rejection of this doctrine by
claiming that it is incompatible with the Scriptures, which
attribute these properties to God (319). This scriptural argument
is insufficient. There are a few passages in the Scriptures that
could be said to ascribe suffering to God if taken literally, but
8 Here I am following Peter Geach in his "On Worshipping the Right God," in God and
the Soul (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969).
' This point could also be made about his Does God Have a Nature? (Milwaukee:
Marquette University Press, 1980), where he maintains that there is composition in God, but
I will confine myself to discussing the assertions about God that he makes in the book under
review.

PLANTINGA ON BELIEF

601

there are also many more passages that describe him as feeling
hatred, fury, and vengeance. We do not and cannot take the latter
passages at face value, so Plantinga cannot demand that we take
the former ones at face value without further consideration. Such
consideration shows that we ought not to think that God literally
suffers. God is infinitely good, and enjoys infinite happiness and
bliss. The evils on account of which Plantinga claims that God
suffers are evils that occur in the world, and hence finite,
although enormous. God can feel either a finite or an infinite
suffering on account of these evils. An infinite suffering over finite
evils would be infinitely disproportionate, so God would not feel
it. But finite suffering would make no difference to a being already enjoying infinite bliss, and thus would not matter to God;
it would be pointless and unimportant. But suffering that is
unimportant will not do for Plantinga, because the whole point
of divine suffering, for him, is that it is of account to God. The
attribution of suffering to God results from a certain anthropomorphism on Plantinga's part, from neglecting to think of God as
the infinite and perfect being that he is. It is deeply perverse to
insist that suffering must be found in the source of all joy,
goodness, beauty, and love.
There is however a more serious argument against divine
impassibility that could be extracted from Plantinga's remarks on
faith (319ff.). He rightly says that the love of God involved in
faith resembles God's own love. He might argue thus: possession
of saving faith involves a certain participation in the divine
nature; the love involved in faith includes an element of longing
and desire; therefore, the divine nature includes an element of
longing and desire. But this argument is invalid, because it does
not include the premise that the longing and desire involved in
faith is part of what makes this faith a participation in the divine
nature. This premise will not be accepted by those who hold a
traditional view of the divine nature. They will point out that
although some kinds of love involve longing for an absent good,
other kinds involve enjoyment of a good possessed, and it is the
presence of a love of God of the latter sort that makes faith a
participation in the divine nature. This love is brought about by

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

the fact that in saving faith we possess the good of God's
friendship through charity. The longing for God felt by those
who have faith reflects the fact that their participation in the
divine nature has not been brought to fulfilment. In Heaven,
where it is brought to fulfilment, this participation is greater, but
all longing is replaced by enjoyment. We cannot therefore say that
participation in the divine nature includes longing and desire.
The existence of the sensus divinitatis is thus doubtful. But
even if it were to exist, it would not provide us with knowledge
of God's existence. The difficulty with claiming that the sensus
divinitatis provides knowledge can be seen from the following
example. Suppose God creates a person S with a mental constitution that causes S to come noninferentially to believe,
whenever he meets a man with blue eyes, that that man is an
used-car salesman. God arranges that all the blue-eyed men in S's
vicinity are used-car salesmen, and whenever S meets a blue-eyed
man, he forms his belief accordingly. (To avoid confusing the
issue, suppose that he never gets independent evidence of these
men being used-car salesmen.) God forms S's mental constitution
and arranges S's environment in this way in order to bring it
about that S forms a true belief about the used-car-salesman status
of the particular blue-eyed men that he meets. S's belief would be
exactly parallel to the belief in God produced by the sensus
divinitatis, and it would be warranted and constitute knowledge
in Plantinga's view, because it is true, results from the operation
of a design plan aimed at true belief that is operating in the
environment for which it is designed, and its design plan is a
good design plan for the environment in which it is designed,
indeed a perfect one since it can never produce false belief. But
obviously S's belief would not in fact be knowledge, and would
not even be reasonable.
Connected with this counterexample is a flaw in Plantinga's
general view of knowledge and warrant. He confuses the purpose
a thing has with the motivation for bringing it into existence that
prompted the person who made it. If we allow that things have
functions or purposes by their nature, we cannot identify these
two. Suppose, for example, that an orange-growing company uses

PLANTINGA ON BELIEF

603

genetic engineering to create a species of insects that will destroy
all orange trees except the strain of tree that they have specially
developed. The company's motivation for creating the species will
be to make money, but the natural purpose of the insects will not
be to make money for the company; it will be to live and reproduce, as with all breeds of animal. It is thus illegitimate to
infer, as Plantinga does, that because the sensus divinitatis and the
internal instigation of the Holy Spirit were supposedly created by
God so that they could provide us with true beliefs, they therefore
have this function by nature.
B) Internal Instigation of the Holy Spirit

Evaluating Plantinga's conception of the internal instigation of
the Holy Spirit is less straightforward than evaluating his
conception of the sensus divinitatis. This is because he does not
really have a single consistent position on the nature of the
former. Rather, he expresses two different positions, which are of
different merit.
The difference lies in whether or not Christian faith is belief in
God's testimony. On the one hand, Plantinga frequently asserts
that it is. He states,
On the model, there is both scripture and the divine activity leading to human
belief. God himself (on the model) is the principal author of Scripture.
Scripture is most importantly a message, a communication from God to
humankind: scripture is a word from the Lord. But then this just is a special
case of the pervasive process of testimony, by which, as a matter of fact, we
learn most of what we know. 10

Elsewhere Plantinga says something different about the way in
which we come to believe. He describes an encounter with the
Scriptures, or with a report of what is said by the Scriptures, as an
occasion for belief, rather than as furnishing reason for belief. He
asserts that when we read Scripture or are told of it, or in some
other way encounter a scriptural teaching,
10

Plantinga, Warranted Christian Belief, 251.

JOHN R. T. LAMONT

604

What is said simply seems right; it seems compelling; one finds oneself saying
'Yes, that's right, that's the truth of the matter; this is indeed the word of the
Lord.' I read 'God was in Christ, reconciling the world to himself'; I come to
think: 'Right; that's true; God really was in Christ, reconciling the world to
himself!' And I may also think something a bit different, something about that
proposition: that it is a divine teaching or revelation, that in Calvin's words it
is 'from God'. What one hears or reads seems clearly and obviously true and
(at any rate in paradigm cases) seems also to be something the Lord is intending
to teach. 11

Here, faith is described as being produced by something other
than belief in God's testimony. It is simply an immediate conviction of the truth of the Christian message. Plantinga does not
clearly say whether or not this immediate conviction and the recognition that the message is from God can both be said to give
rise to belief in the Christian message, but he implies in some
passages that it is the immediate conviction that produces belief,
not the recognition of its divine origin, and that this recognition
is a concomitant of belief in the message rather than a ground for
it. He says,
[Calvin] does not mean to say, I think (at any rate this is not how the model
goes), that the Holy Spirit induces belief in the proposition the Bible (or the
book of Job, or Paul's epistles, or the thirteenth chapter of First Corinthians)
comes to us from the very mouth of God. Rather, upon reading or hearing a
given teaching-a given item from the great things of the gospel-the Holy
Spirit teaches us, causes us to believe that that teaching is both true and comes
from God. So the structure here is not: what is taught in Scripture is true; this
(e.g., that in Christ, God was reconciling the world to himself) is taught in
Scripture; therefore, this is true. It is rather that, on reading or hearing a
certain teaching t, one forms the belief that t, that very teaching, is true and
from God. 12

It is quite right to deny that belief artsmg from accepting
someone's testimony is produced by inference, 13 and thus it is true
that belief in God's testimony will be a basic belief (and a
11 Ibid., 250.
12 Ibid., 260.

13 For argument supporting this position, see C. A. J. Coady, Testimony: A Philosophical
Study (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992).

PLANTINGAON BELIEF

605

properly basic belief, since it will be believing someone who is
knowledgeable and truthful). But Plantinga, in asserting in the
above passage that the belief involved in faith is properly basic,
does not seem to have in mind the proper basicality that belongs
to belief in the testimony of a truthful knowledgeable person.
Rather, this proper basicality attaches to the immediate conviction
that believers possess of the truth of the great things of the gospel.
Since in this immediate conviction the Holy Spirit causes us to
believe that the teachings of the gospel are true, the conviction
that God teaches these things cannot form part of our grounds for
believing in their truth, because this belief has already been
produced by the immediate conviction.
We may call these two different accounts of how Christian
faith is produced the testimony account and the immediateconviction account. The immediate-conviction account is not a
tenable one; it is open to a number of insuperable objections.
First, it does not explain why faith should constitute
knowledge or reasonable belief. Why should the fact that
believers have immediate conviction of the truth of their beliefs
make this conviction reasonable? Many people have firm
unshakable convictions that are completely unwarranted. Plantinga would presumably reply that this immediate conviction is
rational and provides knowledge because it is produced by the
inner inspiration of the Holy Spirit, and a conviction so produced
satisfies the conditions he has laid down for a belief to be
warranted. It is brought about by God, our designer, with the
purpose of getting us to believe truths, and operates in the
environment-hearing the truths of the gospel announced to
us-in which it is designed to operate; and since it is brought
about by God it cannot fail in achieving its purpose.
But the counterexample to Plantinga's account of the sensus
divinitatis that is given above also shows that the immediate
conviction that he describes as giving rise to faith would produce
irrational belief. The production of S's belief about the blue-eyed
man being an used car salesman happens in the same way as the
production of belief in Christian teaching does on the immediateconviction account. Since S's belief is irrational, Christian belief

606

JOHN R. T. LAMONT

would be irrational as well if it was formed in the way the
immediate-conviction account describes.
Second, most Christians have as a matter of faith held that
Christian faith rests on belief in God's testimony. Why would
God produce or allow this conviction, if-as the immediateconviction account implies-it is mistaken?
Third, Christians disagree over important matters of faith.
Why would such disagreements exist, if God immediately
produces belief in the truths of the gospel in the minds of
Christian believers? And how, on the immediate-conviction view,
can these disagreements be resolved, if the basis for faith is simply
a feeling of conviction that is held by believers on all sides of such
disputes?
One reply to this objection might be that most Christians do
not disagree over important matters of faith; they agree on the
essentials of faith, and only disagree over nonessentials. But this
is not so. One example among very many would be over the
permissibility of divorce for Christians. Roman Catholics hold
that Christ's teaching absolutely forbids divorce between baptized
Christians, and that a Christian who divorces his or her Christian
spouse and marries someone else commits adultery. Other
Christians hold that it is indeed permissible for Christians to
divorce. Another example is the doctrine of the Real Presence of·
Christ in the Eucharist. If Christ is really physically present in the
Eucharist, it is obligatory to worship the Eucharistic elements as
divine; but if he is not, such worship will be idolatry.
Another reply would be that disagreement is due to sin on the
part of people who hold wrong beliefs about the faith, and that
the way to make sure that one's convictions about faith are the
right ones is to refrain from sinning. I do not want to deny that
disagreements over the content of the faith are sometimes, even
often, the result of mistaken beliefs about faith, when the
existence of these beliefs is due to the sin of the believer. But it is
unreasonable to say that this is always the case. It is dangerous as
well, because it tends to give rise to the following line of thought.
If sin is the only explanation for mistaken belief, it must be that
everyone who holds a mistaken belief does so out of sin. Since sin

PLANTINGA ON BELIEF

607

deserves punishment, it follows that those who hold mistaken
beliefs deserve to be punished. On the contrary, history teaches
us that people can hold mistaken views about the teachings of the
Christian faith in complete innocence.
Plantinga could (and I suspect would) hold that the way to
settle doubts or disputes about the faith is by appealing to the
Scriptures, whose content believers accept as being spoken by
God. But any answer that will emerge from such an appeal will be
accepted because it is spoken by God, and therefore not because
of immediate conviction, which is incompatible with his
immediate-conviction understanding of faith.
For these reasons the immediate-conviction account should be
rejected. Such a rejection would actually improve Plantinga' s view
of faith, because he would then be left with his testimony account,
according to which God speaks in the Scriptures and the inner
action of the Holy Spirit leads us to recognize and believe this
speech. This account is simply the position of Christian tradition
on this subject. It is not affected by the problems with his theory
of warrant and knowledge, because he does not need this theory
in order to say that testimony provides us with knowledge; we
know that testimony can be a source of knowledge, independently
of any philosophical theorizing about what knowledge is.14
Plantinga's testimony account suffers nevertheless from both
a negative and a positive flaw. The negative flaw is that he does
not explain how the Holy Spirit enables us to recognize and
believe God's speech in the Scriptures. He may have intended the
immediate-conviction account to serve that purpose, but it does
not do so.
The positive flaw is that for him believing God when he speaks
is a component of the virtue of Christian faith, rather than the
whole of the virtue. (We should distinguish between believing
God when he speaks, and believing what God says.15 One can
believe a proposition that is asserted by God, without believing it
because we are trusting God's testimony; the latter is the sort of
14 See ibid.

ts On this see Elizabeth Anscombe, "What It Is to Believe Someone," in C.F. Delaney, ed.,

Rationalityand ReligiousBelief (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1979).

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

belief involved in Christian faith.) The full virtue, on Plantinga's
view, the virtue possession of which means that the person who
possesses it is justified (in the religious rather than the epistemic
sense), consists in belief plus something else. The something else
is an act of the will that is different from the act of believing God
when he speaks (e.g., love of God, a feeling of trusting confidence
in Christ's redemptory work, living a good life, or a combination
of all of these).
The trouble with such a conception is that the aspects of faith
that redeem us and make us acceptable to God turn out all to be
concentrated in the something else. Someone who loves God and
lives a good life is by that very fact saved and acceptable to God.
Since the redeeming aspects of faith are separate from belief in
God's testimony, whence comes the use or necessity of such belief
for our redemption? 16 The only function that belief can have in
our salvation, on this view, is an instrumental one, that of being
helpful or necessary for the achievement of the plus-componentas, for example, by providing us with information that we require
in order to perform the actions that will bring about our salvation. This is how Plantinga seems to think of it.
But this view of the function of belief is not consonant with
the Scriptures. The Scriptures praise belief itself, not just actions
that we perform as a result of believing God or concomitantly
with believing God. Not only is belief itself praised, it is described
as bringing about our salvation. The noun 'faith' (tnOTl<;) and the
verb 'to believe' (tnOTEUW) have more than one sense in the New
Testament. In some cases, 'faith' refers to something other than
the act of believing someone's testimony (as for example Rom
3:3, wheretno-n<; describes God's trustworthiness rather than the
16 Luther made this criticism in rejecting the possibility of a formless infused faith.
Commenting on Galatians 5:6, he said that "the sophists [sc. the scholastic theologians) ...
say that even when faith has been divinely infused-and I am not even speaking of faith that
is merely acquired-it does not justify unless it has been formed by love.... They even
declare that an infused faith can coexist with mortal sin. In this manner they completely
transfer justificationfrom faith and attribute it solely to love as thus defined" (Luther, Works,
vol. 27 [Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1964), 28). Luther's criticism should not
he confused with his rejection of formless faith on the grounds that all infused faith must
justify; the two criticisms of formless faith are distinct.

PLANrINGA ON BELIEF

609

act of believing); and there are many cases where it could be
disputed whether mun c; should be understood as the act of
believing testimony. There are, however, many passages where it
clearly means trusting someone's testimony.17 The absence of
belief of the latter kind is blamed, while its presence is praised.
Clear instances of blame are found in Mark and 1 John. In Luke
24:25, Christ rebukes the disciples for not having believed what
the prophets had spoken. 1John5:10 states "He who does not
believe in God has made him a liar, because he has not believed
in the testimony that God has borne to his Son."
Belief in God's testimony is described by St. Paul in his letter
to the Romans as a worthy act that brings God's favor. Paul says
that Abraham was justified on account of his believing God when
God promised that Sarah would bear a child in her old age, and
that he would have many descendants: "In hope he believed
against hope, that he should become the father of many nations;
as he had been told, 'So shall your descendants be'. . . . No
distrust made him waver concerning the promise of God, but he
grew strong in his faith as he gave glory to God, fully convinced
that God was able to do as he had promised. That was why his
faith was 'reckoned to him as righteousness'" (Rom 4:18, 20-22
[RSV]). Paul makes the same point in Galatians: "Let me ask you
only this: Did you receive the Spirit by works of the law, or by
hearing with faith? ... Does he who supplies the Spirit to you
and works miracles among you do so by works of law, or by
hearing with faith? Thus Abraham 'believed God, and it was
reckoned to him as righteousness'" (Gal 3:2, 5-6.)
Advocates of a 'belief-plus' conception of the Christian virtue
of faith have sometimes tried to square their views with the
Pauline texts cited above by interpreting the faith referred to in
them as being something more than simply believing God when
he speaks. But this interpretation does unacceptable violence to
these texts. It is clear in the passage from Romans cited above, for
example, that Paul is saying that Abraham was justified by the
17 Examples include Matt 9:28-29; Mark 13:21, 16: 11-13; Luke 22:67; John 2:22, 3: 12,
4:21, 4:50, 5:24, 5:46, 8:46-47, 10:24-25; Acts 8:12, 27:25; Rom 10:16-17; 2Thess1:10;
2 Tim 1:12; 1John5:10.

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JOHN R. T. LAMONT

simple act of believing God's promise to him. Texts like those in
James 2:27, which state that "faith without works is dead," do
not provide support for a 'belief-plus' conception. The fact that
committing sin deprives faith of its salvific value does not mean
that faith is not the sole cause of salvation when sin is absent.
The claim that faith on its own justifies us might be met with
the objection that charity on its own justifies us, and that charity
is distinct from faith. The answer to this objection is that charity
is a love, and love is exercised in acts. As Aquinas conceived it,
formed faith, the faith that justifies, does not consist in choosing
to believe God when he speaks and also in a separate act of
choosing to love God in himself above all created things. Rather,
in formed faith there is only one act, the act of choosing to
believe God; and the love of God is what motivates this act. That
is how Aquinas's view of faith avoids a 'belief-plus' view. For
him, formed faith is an act of charity. It is moreover a privileged
act of charity, because it is the act that opens the door to all other
acts of charity. For Christians, faith is the first act of charity,
upon which all other acts of charity are built, and without which
no charity is possible.18
These criticisms of Plantinga should not be taken to mean that
his book fails in its stated goal of showing that there is no de jure
objection to Christian belief that is independent of de facto
objections. He succeeds in this simply by pointing out that if
Christian belief is true, it probably is warranted. (This is not hard
to establish, since on most construals of faith it is part of
Christian faith that faith is warranted.) But his ambitious attempt
to show how it could be warranted does not work out. His failure
to show that belief in God's existence is properly basic is not of
much consequence from a believer's point of view, since, as he
remarks, there are lots of sound arguments available to justify
such belief. His failure to show how the Holy Spirit can enable us
to recognize that God is speaking is a more serious theological
and apologetic shortcoming. It is but justice, however, to
18 Although Aquinas avoids the positive flaw in Plantiuga's account of faith, he shares the
negative flaw. He does not explain how the Holy Spirit brings us to recognize and believe
God's speaking.

PLANTINGAON BELIEF

611

recognize that he fails where previous Christian thinkers have
generally not succeeded.

The Thomist 65 (2001): 613-37

FOR THE CHURCH AND WITHIN THE CHURCH:
PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION
LAWRENCEJ. WELCH
Kenrick-Glennon Seminary
Saint Louis, Missouri

S

OME RECENT ARTICLES that

have summarized the state of
current research on the subject of priestly representation
have come to the conclusion that the priest is capable of
acting in the person of Christ the Head because he first represents
the Church. 1 These articles have drawn from David Coffey's 1997
essay on the common and the ordained priesthood. 2 The work of
Coffey has proved to be an important one for theologians
interested in the theology of priestly representation. What has
been lacking until now is any study of whether his central claims
are well founded.
Coffey's article aimed at developing a pneumatological
understanding of the priesthood of Christ, and what Coffey calls
the "priesthood of the Church" as a "distinct category," in the
interest of reaching a new clarity with regard to the relation of
the ordained and the common priesthood. 3 In the course of his
article, one of the conclusions that Coffey reaches is that there is
1 Most notably Thomas Rausch, "Priestly Identity: Priority of Representation and the
Iconic Argument," Worship 73 (March 1999): 169-79; see also Paul Philibert, "Issues for a
Theology of Priesthood: A Status Report," in The Theology of Priesthood, ed. Donald
Goergen and Ann Garrido (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 2000): 30-31. Both
Rausch and Philibert draw on an earlier essay by David Coffey, "PriesdyRepresentation and
Women's Ordination," in Priesthood: The Hard Questions, ed. Gerald P. Gleeson (Newtown,
New South Wales, Australia: E.J. Dwyer, 1992): 79-99.
2 David Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," Theological Studies 58
Uune 1997): 209-36.
3 Ibid., 213.

613

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LAWREN CE J. WELCH

a priority of the ecclesial to the Christological in the priestly
representation of Christ's Headship. To represent Christ as Head
is primarily the ability to represent the totus Christus, the Head
and members. 4 This conclusion is undergirded, it seems to me, by
two claims Coffey makes in his 1997 essay. These amount to the
following: (1) Vatican II wrongly assumed the ordained priesthood could be understood directly in Christological terms and
thus gave the mistaken impression that the common priesthood
was understandable first in ecclesiological terms,5 and (2) if the
ordained priesthood is understood immediately in terms of the
Headship of Christ, then the priest appears as above the Church
or apart from the Church. 6 In other words, if the ordained
priesthood is understood first in terms of a new configuration to
Christ, then the priest is elevated to some position outside of the
rest of the Church. As a consequence, the rest of the baptized,
though called priestly and regarded as "members" of Christ, are
effectively envisioned as "other" than Christ, that is, "simply" the
Church.
I will limit my criticism to these two central claims and the
conclusions that Coffey deduces from them. I maintain that these
claims cannot be reconciled with the council documents and the
intentions of the council fathers as evidenced in the official Acta.
Furthermore they are not congruent with how recent Church
teaching has interpreted Vatican II. Sara Butler7 and Samuel
Aquila8 have shown how crucial it is to consult the Acta in order
to interpret Vatican II's teaching on the ordained priesthood and
priestly representation. The Acta of a council is of prime importance in determining what a council intended to teach and why it

4 Ibid. He also comes to this conclusion in his earlier essay "Priestly Representation and
Women's Ordination," 88.
5 Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211.
6 Ibid., 235.
7 Sara Butler, "Priestly Identity: 'Sacrament' of Christthe Head," Worship 70Uuly1996):
290-306.
8 Samuel Aquila, The Teaching of Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine
&clesiae" in Relation to the Ministerial Priesthood in the Light of the Historical Development
of the Formulae (Licentiate tessina, Pontificium Athenaeum Anselmianum, Rome, 1990).

PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION

615

intended to teach what it did. 9 A careful reading shows that
Vatican II affirmed a Christological priority for both the common
and the ordained priesthoods while strongly asserting the
ecclesiological dimensions of both priesthoods. Far from separating the ordained priesthood from the Church, the council
envisioned it as something for the Church but within the
Church-a visible sign of Christ the Head who fills up his Church
with life.
Lay persons are presented in the documents of Vatican II not
as passive recipients of Christ's activity but as active participants
in his threefold office. It is through this participation that the
baptized mediate Christ's gift in their own way. The baptized,
united with Christ and made sharers in his priesthood in their
own condition, must carry out his threefold office in the Church
and in the world. The priesthood of the baptized is not a matter
of simple union with Christ or simple belonging to Christ because
the common priesthood is ordered to mission.
This essay will unfold in five parts. First, I will compare the
idea that the priest acts in persona Christicapitis because he first
acts in the name of the Church with recent Church teaching after
Vatican II, especially Pastores dabo vobis, Pope John Paul II's
1992 postsynodal apostolic exhortation. 10 Second, I will give a
brief description of Coffey's position. Third, in the longest part,
I will show how Coffey's interpretation of Vatican II's teaching
on the ordained priesthood and the common priesthood cannot
be sustained. Fourth, I will show that what Vatican II teaches
concerning the priest representing the Headship of Christ does
not somehow place the priest apart from or above the Church.

9

Francis A. Sullivan, S.J., Creative Fidelity: Weighing and Interpreting Documents of the

Magisterium (New York and Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1996), 170. Sullivan observes "One

of 'the norms of theological interpretation' is that very often considerable light can be shed
on the intentions of a Council from the study of its acta. In the case of Vatican II, the
interpreter has available the thirty volumes of the Acta Synodalia Sacrosancti Conciliii
Oecumenici Vaticani Secundi, in which to follow the progress of any text through the
Council."
10 This exhortation was issued after the Eighth Ordinary General Assembly of the Synod
of Bishops (1990), which treated the topic of the formation of priests.

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Last, I will conclude with a summary of my argument and a
suggestion for the direction of further research.
I. PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION AND RECENT CHURCH TEACHING

A number of theologians hold that there is a priority of the
ecclesial over the Christological in priestly representation. 11 These
theologians contend that a priest can act in persona Christi
because he first acts in persona ecclesiae.
It should be pointed out that recent magisterial teachings-by
both the ordinary universal magisterium 12 and the papal
magisterium 13-have taught the opposite. The Catechism of the
Catholic Church teaches that "It is because the ministerial
priesthood represents Christ that it can represent the Church. " 14
While strongly affirming that reference to the Church is necessary
in defining priestly identity, Pastoresdabo vobis teaches that there
is a Christological priority in the ordained priesthood. It explains,
in its second chapter, that
The priest's relation to the Church is inscribed in the very relation which the
priest has to Christ, such that the "sacramental representation" to Christ serves
as the basis and inspiration for the relation of the priest to the Church .... And
so the priest, on account of his very nature and sacramental mission, appears
in the structure of the Church as a sign of the absolute priority and gratuity of
that grace which is conferred by the risen Christ on the Church. 15

At the same time, one of the strengths of Pastoresdabo vobis is its
statement that the nature and the mission of the ministerial
11 For example, Susan Wood, "Priestly Identity: Sacrament of tlte Ecclesial Community,"

Worship 69 (March 1995): 109-27; Rausch "Priestly Identity"; Paul Philibert, "Issues for a
Theology of Priesthood"; David Power, "Representing Christ in Community and Sacrament,"
in Being a Priest Today (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 97-123.
12 For example, Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1553.
13 Most recently, Pastores dabo vobis; Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith,
"Declaration on the Question of the Admission of Women to the Ministerial Priesthood"
(Inter insignores)(197 6) promulgated during the pontificate of Paul VI; and Pope Pius XII's
encyclical Mediator Dei (1947).
14 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 1553.
15 Pastoresdabo vobis 16 (translation mine). For the Latin text see ActaApostolicaeSedis
84 (1992): 682.

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

617

priesthood must be defined in light of the "multiple and rich
interconnection of relationships which arise from the Blessed
Trinity and are prolonged in the communion of the Church, a
sign and instrument of Christ, of communion with God and of
the unity of all humanity. " 16 In the light of this, it must be
admitted that those theologians who are not convinced by the
Church's teaching on the priority of the Christological dimension
for priestly representation nevertheless share an important
concern with recent magisterial teaching: that the ordained priest
is not be understood or seen as existing apart from the Church. 17
Pastoresdabo vobis also states that the synod's summary of the
nature and mission of the ordained priesthood-which the second
chapter of Pastores dabo vobis itself claims to summarize-is a
faithful presentation of the council's teaching. 18 If this is true, it
is hard to see how the idea that the priest can act in persona
Christi because he can first act in persona ecclesiae can be
reconciled with the teaching of Vatican II.
II. COFFEY ON THE PRIORilY OF PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION
Coffey is of the opinion that Vatican II left us with the
mistaken impression that the ordained priesthood is
Christological, while the common priesthood, rooted in baptism
and communicating an orientation to worship, is ecclesiological.19
He makes this claim on the basis of what he thinks are the
pneumatological and ecclesiological dimensions of the common
and ordained priesthood. He argues that Presbyterorumordinis2,
which speaks of the priest as acting in the person of Christ the
Head, "assumes" that the ordained priesthood should be
Pastoresdabo vobis 12 (Eng. trans. from Origins 21 (16 April 1992]).
Pastoresdabovobis16 also states thattheordained priesthood "arises with the Church"
and that "Consequently, the ordained priesthood ought not to be thought of as existing prior
to the Church, because it is totally at the service of the Church. Nor should it be considered
as posterior to the ecclesial community, as if the Church could be imagined as already
established without this priesthood" (Eng. trans. from Origins).
18 The Pope refers here to the summary of the work of the synod collected in the
"propositions" that were forwarded to him at the conclusion of the synod.
19 Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 211-12 and 235.
16

17

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LAWRENCE]. WELCH

understood immediately in Christological terms. Subsequent
magisterial documents, he says, make the same assumption. 20
However, according to Coffey deeper reflection shows that this.
assumption is mistaken. The Headship of Christ is an ecclesial
function and can only be exercised in the Church. In Coffey's
words: "therefore statements about it, even one invoking Christ
the priest, whether they be magisterial or simply theological are
directly ecclesiological and only indirectly Christological." 21
Similarly, Coffey says that the common priesthood is directly
ecclesiological and indirectly Christological because the common
priesthood "is that of the members of the Mystical Body" and the
Mystical Body is the Church. 22 Each priesthood "possesses
20 Ibid., 211.
21 Ibid.

22 Ibid. Coffey tries to correct Vatican II with Mediator Dei. He cites the following English
translation by the Catholic Truth Society of Mediator Dei, no. 88: "by reason of their baptism
Christians are in the Mystical Body and become by a common title members of Christ the
Priest; by the character that is graven upon their souls they are appointed to the worship of
God, and therefore, according to their condition, share in the priesthood of Christ himself."
Coffey interprets this to mean that the encyclical makes an ecclesiological statement about
the faithful-by baptism they are members of the Body of Christ-and infers from it the
Christological statement that the faithful are members of Christ the Priest. This passage of
the encyclical, in the eyes of Coffey, gives an unambiguous ecclesiological reference for the
common priesthood--one that Vatican II did not embrace as a conclusion. The serious
problem with this claim is that Coffey relies on a faulty English translation. It only partially
translates the phrase "generali titulo christiani in Mystico Corpore mernbra effi.ciuntur Christi
sacerdotis." The original Latin text does not allow a disjunction between the Mystical Body
and Christ the Priest. Rather according to Mediator Dei baptism makes the faithful members
of the Mystical Body of Christ the Priest. The American English translation in the Vatican
Library translation series released by the National Catholic Welfare Office (Washington D.C.,
1947) is more faithful to the Latin: "By the waters of Baptism, as by common right,
Christians are made membersof the Mystical Body of Christ the Priest, and by the 'character'
which is imprinted on their souls, they are appointed to give worship to God. Thus they
participate, according to their condition, in the priesthood of Christ." For a similar
translation see Gerald Ellard, EncyclicalLetter Mediator Dei of Pius XII (New York: America
Press, 1948), 44. See also, Gerald Treacy, Mediator Dei on the Sacred Liturgy (New York:
Paulist Press, 1948), 41. There is nothing in the encyclical that somehow places the Mystical
Body in an antecedent position to Christ the Priest. Furthermore, Coffey's interpretation
seems to require us tD thinkthat the encyclical supposes the sacramental character of baptism
to be ecclesial rather than Christological. On the contrary, there is no reason to believe that
Mediator Dei conceived of the character as having an ecclesial priority over the
Christo logical.

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

619

properly an ecclesiological nature" 23 because "they exist and
operate as God's gifts to the Church, " 24 albeit as different and
distinct gifts. Both forms of priesthood, however, do have
"Christ's priesthood as their ontological ground. "25
Coffey urges us to understand the common priesthood as "a
dynamism of faith, of divine sonship or daughterhood," and the
ordained priesthood as "a charism, of official witness, which the
common priesthood is not. "26 Vatican II was not able to reconcile
the two priesthoods in the person of Christ owing to what Coffey
believes was an incomplete pneumatological understanding of the
priesthood of Christ. The upshot is that the council clung to the
understanding that the ordained priesthood refers immediately to
the Headship of Christ and this did "nothing to correct the
popular perception of the priest as above the Church rather than
as part of it. " 27 For Coffey, only on the foundation of a sound
pneumatology is it possible to reconcile the common priesthood
and ordained priesthood and describe their intrinsic relation.
Thus, on the basis of the anointing of the Spirit of Sonship, the
common priesthood is said to be a "dynamism of incorporation
into the Church" and the ordained priesthood is a particular
charism. 28 Coffey describes the intrinsic relation between the
ordained priesthood and common priesthood as "the relation of
sharing in Christ's Headship over against simple union with him
through faith, or the relation of official witness (apostolic
leadership) in the Church over against simple belonging to it
through faith and baptism. " 29 The Headship of Christ is a gift for
the Church. It is not exercised above the Church, and must be
seen as directly ecclesiological.

Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 225.
Ibid, 212.
25 Ibid.
16 Ibid, 235.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
23

24

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LAWRENCEJ. WELCH

Ill. PRIORilY OF PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION:THE DOCUMENTS
OF VATICAN II

Having described Coffey's interpretation of Vatican II, I will
now examine two of his primary claims: (1) that Vatican II
assumed that the ordained priesthood should be understood directly in Christological terms, and (2) that it thus gave the impression that the common priesthood was directly ecclesiological.
A) The Common Priesthood

The conciliar texts and the Acta show that the fathers regarded
the common priesthood and the ordained priesthood both as
directly Christological. Both priesthoods participate in Christ's
priesthood, mission, and triple office. The problem that faced the
fathers at Vatican II was how to specify and identify the difference between the priesthoods, given the fact that both were
presented as directly Christological. They did so by specifying the
differentiation of roles and functions between the two priesthoods. The diverse roles and functions are rooted in a particular
sharing in Christ's life, or, to put it differently, in a particular
ontological participation in Christ's life. The distinction that is
made between the two priesthoods in Lumen gentium 10-that
they differ essentially and not only in degree-should not be isolated from the explanation of it that is given in chapters 3 and 4.
Careful observation of chapter 4 of Lumen gentium will show
that the council fathers clearly taught that the common
priesthood was directly Christo logical. Lumen gentium 34 teaches
that "since the supreme and eternal Priest, Christ Jesus, wills to
continue his witness and service through the laity too, He vivifies
them in His Spirit and unceasingly urges them on to every good
and perfect work. "30 Thanks to the outpouring of the Spirit, in
baptism, the laity share in the mission of Christ as priest, prophet,
and king. The lay faithful's activity in this threefold office is
possible because of their profound union with Christ. It is telling
30 All quotations from Lumen gentium and Presb-yterorum ordinis are taken from The
Documents of Vatican II, ed. Walter M. Abbott (New York: America Press, 1966).

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

621

that paragraphs 34, 35, 36 affirm that Christ continues his
priestly, prophetic, and royal witness and service through the
laity. Thus Christ himself continues his priesthood through the
spiritual sacrifices of the laity who consecrate the world to God.
Christ is said to "fulfill" (adimplet) his prophetic office not only
through the hierarchy who teach in his name but also through the
laity who witness and proclaim the Gospel in word and action
(LG 36). The Lord desires to spread his kingdom through the
laity who must "learn the deepest meaning and the value of all
creation and how to relate it to the praise of God" (ibid.). The
laity are said to be charged with the responsibility to permeate the
world with the Spirit of Christ and to conform the conditions and
institutions of the world to the norms of justice. There can be no
doubt here that Vatican II understood that the laity, anointed by
the power of the Spirit, act because of their union with Christ, the
priest. He alone is the origin of the lay faithful's priestly activity.31
Coffey objects that even if we can conclude that through their
common priesthood the lay faithful act because of their union
with Christ, "this would still not be readily recognized as a
Christological reference, since in the body-metaphor that it
implies only the Head was identified as Christ, and therefore the
members almost by definition would be other than him. "32 He
also contends that even if Lumen gentium did teach that the
common priesthood is a participation in the priesthood of Christ,
this is not sufficient to place the common priesthood into a
Christological framework. According to Coffey this was due to a
failure to put forth a model for the common priesthood
comparable to that of the ordained priest who acts in the person
of Christ the Head.
In reply, it should be pointed out that the head-body symbol
must read in its context and should not be abstracted from the
31 The apostolic exhortation Christifideles laici calls attention to this very point.
Commenting on Lumen gentium's affirmation of the laity's participation in the triple office
of Christ, Christifideleslaici 14 states: "Clearly we are the Body of Christ becausewe are all
'anointed' and in him are 'christs,' that is, 'anointed ones,' as well as Christ himself, 'the
anointed one.' In a certain way, then, it happens that with the head and body the whole
Christ is formed" (emphasis added; Eng. trans. in Origins 18 [9 Feb. 1989]: 562-95).
32 Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 225.

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LAWRENCEJ. WELCH

careful presentation in chapters 3 and 4 about the differentiation
of the two forms of priesthood. It does not do justice to the text
of Lumen gentium simply to assert that it taught that the common
priesthood is a participation in the priesthood of Christ. The
council clearly spells out in chapter 4 that Christ acts through the
lay members of his Body because he continues his life, his mission,
and his threefold office through them. It is true that the laity do
not share in the Headship of Christ, but this does not mean that
they are almost by definition other than Christ. It is because the
lay members, by the power of the Spirit, are conformed and
likened to Christ in baptism that they can be the mystical and
historical extension of his Body. The conception of the Church as
the Body of Christ, Head and members must be understood in
light of Lumen gentium's repeated affirmation that there is a
differentiation of roles in the building up of Christ's body and in
the continuation of his mission.
A careful reading of the texts of Lumen gentium cannot sustain
the interpretation that Vatican II presented the common
priesthood as directly ecclesiological and only indirectly Christological. The council fathers taught that the common priesthood
is directly Christological, having its origin in Christ, in its own
distinct way. The baptized are active participants in Christ's
threefold office. United with Christ and made partakers of his
priesthood, the baptized actively carry out his threefold office in
the Church and especially in the world where they mediate
Christ's gifts. It is not sufficient to describe the common priesthood as a matter of simple union with Christ or simple belonging
to him because the priesthood of the baptized is ordered to
Christ's mission.
B) The Ordained Priesthood
Coffey's claim that Vatican II "assumed" that the ordained
priesthood should be understood directly in Christological terms
is focused especially on the texts that deal with Christ's Headship.33 I contend that these texts should not be read in isolation
33

Ibid., 211.

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

623

from what is said about the ordained priesthood being rooted in
Christ. It is not the case that the texts on Headship "assume" that
the ordained priesthood is directly Christological because these
texts, such as LG 28 and PO 2, are grounded upon what is taught
in the entire third chapter of Lumengentium (esp. 18-21). In this
chapter, the ordained priesthood is presented, step by step, as
rooted in a unique participation in the priesthood of Christ or, in
other words, as "directly Christological."
According to LG 18, "Jesus Christ, the eternal Shepherd,
established His holy Church by sending forth the apostles as He
Himself had been sent by the Father (cf. John 20:21). He willed
that their successors, namely the bishops, should be shepherds in
His Church." LG 20 asserts that whoever listens to them listens
to Christ. LG 21 explains that the bishops possess the fullness of
the ordained priesthood and that "In the bishops, therefore, for
whom priests are assistants, the Lord Jesus Christ, the supreme
High Priest, is present in the midst of those who believe. " Thanks
to their ordination, bishops exercise the triple office of Christ in
eius persona. Morever, LG 21 states "it is clear that, by means of
the impositions of hands and the words of consecration, the grace
of the Holy Spirit is so impressed, that the bishops in an eminent
and visible way undertake Christ's role as Teacher, Shepherd, and
High Priest, and that they act in His person." LG 25 explains that
bishops are "authentic teachers, that is, teachers endowed with
the authority of Christ."
In these ways, the bishop, and thus the ordained priesthood,
has the unique capacity of representing Christ to the Church. It
is Christ who continues his work and service of teaching,
sanctifying and shepherding through the ordained priesthood. It
is true, of course, that this activity of the ordained priest is a gift
of service for the Church, and in the Church, but the council
understands that the origin of this activity and service is Christ.
Butler's research is helpful here. She calls attention to the fact
that Vatican H's strong statements about the participation of the
laity in Christ's priesthood necessitated a further specification of
the distinctiveness of the ordained priesthood. This further
specification of the ordained priesthood in terms of the formulas

624

LAWRENCE}. WELCH

in persona Christi and in persona Christi capitis, served not only
to clarify its distinctiveness but also to illuminate "the sacramental
ordering of the Church as a body in which diverse functions bring
about a vital unity. "34
The text of LG 28 presents the ordained priesthood's
participation in the priestly office of Christ as encompassing the
three munera of teaching, leading, and sanctifying. Furthermore,
the relatio clarifying the final text explains something of how the
council fathers understood the relation between the Head and
Body of the Church. The passage from LG 28 reads:
Although priests do not possess the highest degree of the priesthood, and
although they are dependent on the bishops in the exercise of their power, they
are nevertheless united with the bishops in sacerdotal dignity. By the power of
the sacrament of orders, and in the image of Christ the eternal High Priest (Heb
5: 1-10; 7 :24; 9: 11-28), they are consecrated to preach the gospel, shepherd the
faithful, and celebrate the divine worship as true priests of the New Testament.
Partakers of the function of Christ the sole Mediator (1Tim2:5) on their level
of ministry, they announce the divine word to all. They exercise this sacred
function of Christ most of all in the Eucharistic liturgy or synaxis. There, acting
in the person of Christ, and proclaiming His mystery, they join the offering of
the faithful to the sacrifice of their Head. Until the coming of the Lord (cf. 1
Cor 11:26), they re-present and apply in the Sacrifice of the Mass the one
sacrifice of the New Testament, namely the sacrifice of Christ offering Himself
to His Father as a spotless victim (cf. Heb 9:11-12).

Butler points out that this text is particularly important because,
according to the Acta, the editing of it forced a clarification of the
phrase in persona Christi.35 The first draft of the text did not
present priest-presbyters as participating in the muneraof teaching
and leading when they acted in persona Christi. The use of the
term in personaChristiin regard to priest-presbyters was restricted
to the munus of sanctifying, that is, offering the Eucharistic
Sacrifice of the Mass and administering the sacraments. As for the
other munera, priest-presbyters were said to be under the
authority of the bishop and are to cooperate with the bishop in his
shepherding of the people.
34 Butler, "Priestly Identity,"

35 Ibid., 298.

305.

PRIESTLYREPRESENfATION

625

The second draft, on the other hand, related the munera of
teaching and guiding the faithful with acting in the person of
Christ. This connection was solidified and expanded in the final
draft, quoted above, which became the approved text. Acting in
persona Christi is not restricted to the celebration of the Eucharist.
Priest-presbyters are said to be consecrated "to preach the Gospel,
to shepherd the faithful and celebrate the divine worship." The
sacrament of Orders which gives the priest-presbyter a share in
the priestly office of Christ includes the three munera of teaching,
leading, and sanctifying. Butler writes: "The Council connects
Eucharistic presidency and pastoral leadership on the grounds
that in both the priest acts in the person of Christ. "36 Still, having
made this strong connection, the council fathers teach that it is in
the Eucharistic liturgy that priest-presbyters exercise their sacred
functions in a preeminent way. The text of Lumen gentium, at
this point, footnotes the twenty-second session of the Council of
Trent (Denzinger 1743) and the encyclical Mediator Dei, no.84
(Denzinger 3 85 0). 37 After warning against certain errors 38 the text
from Mediator Dei states: "But we deem it necessary to recall that
the priest acts for the people only because he represents Jesus
Christ, Who is Head of all His members and offers Himself in
their stead."
The citation of this passage from Mediator Dei also discloses
something about how the fathers at Vatican II understood the
relationship between the ordained priesthood and the common
priesthood, as well as the relationship between the Head and
body of the Church in the Eucharist. The priest can act for the
people, for the common priesthood, only because he represents
36 Ibid., 298, citing also Acta Synoda/ia, v. 2, pars 2, 213; see Aquila, The Teaching of
Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae," 91.
37 The relatio on LG 28 and 29 explains "the office by which the priest acts 'in persona
Christi' especially in Eucharistic worship is shown by the words of Trent and confirmed by
the words of the encyclical 'Mediator Dei. '"The Council of Trent taught in its twenty-second
session that it is Christ who offers the Eucharistic sacrifice for us. For the text of the relatio
see Acta Synodalia, v. 2, pars 2, 213. I give the translation in Aquila, The Teaching of Vatican
II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae," 91.
38 Mediator Dei 83 warns against the error of thinking that a "priest only acts in virtue of
an office committed to him by the community."

LAWRENCE J. WELCH

626

Jesus Christ, who is Head of all the members. It is Christ who
speaks for us to the Father and draws us by the power of the
Spirit into his worship of the Father. The ordained priest in the
Eucharist sacramentally represents Christ presenting his Body, the
Church, to the Father. He represents Christ doing for us what we
cannot do by ourselves alone. Thus, it is because the priest acts in
the person of Christ as Head that he can speak in nomine

ecclesiae.
Aquila notices that there was another addition to the final text
of LG 28 that contributed to the clarification of the term in
persona Christi: "Exercising within the limits of their authority
the function of Christ as Shepherd and Head, they gather
together God's family as a brotherhood all of one mind and lead
them in them Spirit, through Christ, to God the Father." Aquila
notices, rightly, that this addition is important because it connects
the munus of the priest to Christ's function as shepherd and Head
of the Church. 39 This emphasis is further developed in

Presbyterorumordinis.40
Summing up thus far: Careful study guided by the Acta shows
that LG 28 clarified the phrase in persona Christiby teaching that
the priest-presbyter acts in the person of Christ not only in
Eucharistic presidency but in pastoral leadership as well. In both
instances, the priest-presbyter shares in the function of Christ the
sole Mediator. It is in the Eucharist that the priest-presbyter acts
in the person of Christ par excellence.There, he re-presents the
sacrifice of Christ and acts for the faithful joining their sacrifices
to the sacrifice of Christ the Head. Priest-presbyters participate in
the function of Christ as Head and shepherd, gathering together
the faithful into God's family and leading them in the Spirit
through Christ to the Father.
In LG 28 the essential difference between the ordained
priesthood and the priesthood of the baptized cannot simply be
39 Aquila,

The Teachingof Vatican II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae,"

93.
40 Understood in this context, the reference to Headship in LG 28 is far more important
than Coffey thinks. He dismisses it as "theologically insignificant" (Coffey, "The Common
and the Ordained Priesthood," 211).

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

627

distinguished by its "public" character. The ordained priest has a
different relationship to Christ. He shares i.n the mediatorship of
Christ in a special way because he represents Christ facing the
Church announcing the word of the gospel and joins the sacrifice
of the faith to Christ's sacrifice. In this way, LG 28 understands
the ordained priesthood as directly Christological and as a gift for
the Church.
Presbyterorumordinis builds upon what is taught about the
ordained priesthood in LG 28. The first paragraphs of PO 2 state
that all the baptized share in the consecration and mission of
Christ and that in Christ all the baptized are made into a holy
nation and a royal priesthood. It is recalled that the Lord, in
order that the baptized might be joined together into one body,
set up certain ministers and gave them the power to offer sacrifice
and forgive sins. This priestly office is carried out for the faithful
in the name of Christ.
Butler points out that the Acta show that the fathers of Vatican
II were concerned to clarify further still the theological nature of
the distinctiveness of the ordained priesthood. PO 2 sets out to do
precisely this. It declares that priests share in the authority of
Christ to build up his Body, the Church, and act in persona
Christi capitis:
Inasmuch as it is connected with the episcopal order, the priestly office shares
in the authority by which Christ Himself builds up, sanctifies, and rules His
Body. Therefore, while it indeed presupposes the sacraments of Christian
initiation, the sacerdotal office of priests is conferred by that sacrament
through which priests, by the anointing of the Holy Spirit, are marked with a
special character and are so configured to Christ the Priest that they act in the
person of Christ as Head. . . . Through the ministry of priests, the spiritual
sacrifice of the faithful is made in perfect in union with the sacrifice of Christ,
the sole Mediator. Through the hands of priests and in the name of the whole
Church, [nomine totius ecclesiae]the Lord's sacrifice is offered in the Eucharist
in an unbloody manner until he Himself returns.

The council fathers were not satisfied with simply saying that
the priest represents Christ; they wanted to specify how the priest
represents Christ differently from the rest of the baptized. The

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LAWRENCE J. WELCH

specific difference between priesthood of the baptized and the
ordained priesthood is that the priest acts in the person of Christ
the Head. But the fathers went even further, clearly affirming that
the participation in Christ's Headship is given for the purpose of
building up the Church and directing its growth.
By the time this text reached its final form, it had undergone
several revisions. Butler calls attention to the official relatio,
which explains that the presbyter "is configured in a special way
to Christ the priest, so that, having become a sharer in the
episcopal mission, he is able to act in the person of Christ the
Head, Teacher, Priest, and Ruler ... in the building up of his
Body, which is the Church. "41 The connection between Headship
and mission here is clear.
The next revision of the text and the accompanying relatio
supply further insight into how the council fathers understood in
persona Christi capitis. The revision-pertinent to the second
sentence of the text quoted above-relates and differentiates the
sacraments of initiation and the sacrament of Orders. The
ordained priesthood is grounded in the sacraments of initiation,
but it is bestowed by the distinct sacrament of Orders. Thanks to
the anointing of the Holy Spirit, the priest-presbyter is given a
unique character which configures him to Christ. It is this special
sacramental character, which is Christological, that enables the
ordained man to accomplish his mission in personaChristicapitis.
In other words, if priests are marked with a special configuration
to Christ, then this is basis of their action for the Church.
Understood in this way the ordained priesthood cannot be spoken
of as first ecclesial, because the source of priestly action comes not
from the Church but from Christ.
The relatio notes the addition of the phrase nomine totius
ecclesiae.The final text asserts that the faithful participate in the
Eucharistic sacrifice through the ministry of the ordained priest.
This is, of course, affirmed elsewhere in the documents of Vatican

41 Acta Synodalia, v. 4, pars 6, 390. I give Aquila's translation (The Teaching of Vatican
II on "In Persona Christi" and "In Nomine Ecclesiae," 106).

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

629

II,42 but here the spiritual sacrifices of the faithful are said to be
consummated in union with Christ's sacrifice which is offered
through the hands of priest-presbyters in the name of the whole
Church (nomine totius ecclesiae).The priest can pray in the name
of the Church because he represents Christ, the Head of the Body,
who gathers together the prayers and sacrifices of the members,
joins it to his prayer and sacrifice, and presents it to the Father.
It is this relationship of Christ to the Church that is sacramentalized in the ordained priesthood in which the priest stands
in persona Christicapitis. Thus, when the priest prays in nomine
eccleisae, he does so not only in the name of the local church
community, but also in the name of the whole Church because he
represents Christ, the Head who presents his Body, the Church,
to the Father. The relatio sheds additional light on how in
personaChristicapitiswas understood because it explains that the
mission of the priest-presbyter is distinct from the one given to
the laity: the former has its source in the mission Christ gave to
the apostles and through the apostles to the bishops. 43
The understanding of Headship, in persona Christi capitis, in
the documents of Vatican II is different from the conception that
Coffey proposes. He understands Headship to be directly ecclesiological and indirectly Christological because it is an ecclesial
function and can only be exercised in the Church. The difference
between the ordained and common priesthood for Coffey
ultimately rests upon an ecclesiological difference. He thinks of
Headship as the ability to represent the members of the Church.
In the documents of Vatican II, on the other hand, the
essential difference between the ordained priesthood and the
common priesthood is not simply ecclesial but Christo logical. The
42 See for instance LG 10; Sacrosanctumconcilium 48. Here we can appreciate the logic
of the latter document which teaches that since the faithful offer "the immaculate victim, not
only through the hands of the priest, but also with him, they should learn to offer themselves
too. Through Christ the Mediator, they should be drawn day by day into an ever closer union
with God and with each other, so that finally God may be all in all." The point of the text is
not to assert some narrow approach to the liturgy that would monopolize it in favor of the
priest but rather to affirm the priority and gratuity of Christ who wants to unite the Church
to his worship.
43 Acta Synodalia, v. 4, pars 6, 342.

LAWRENCE J. WELCH

630

ordained priesthood and the common priesthood each involve a
different participation in the priesthood of Christ and a different
participation in Christ's mission. The council fathers could affirm,
deliberately, this Christological difference while at the same time
asserting that both the common priesthood and the ordained
priesthood, each in its own way, are given for the service of the
Kingdom of God and the Church. But again, this service issues
from a certain participation in Christ's priesthood-something
that not even the Church can give by her own power or ability
alone. 44
N. THE MEANING OF HEADSHIP

We turn now to Coffey's other claim, that if the ordained
priesthood is understood immediately in terms of the Headship
of Christ, then the priest appears as above the Church or apart
from the Church.
It is certainly true, as we have seen above, that Vatican II
understands the source of the ordained priest's action for the
Church as a participation in Christ's Headship. However, this
does not isolate the priest from the Church or put him in a
position above the Church. The share of the ordained priest in
the Headship of Christ is given for the Church and is ultimately
intelligible only in reference to the Church. In the documents of
Vatican II Headship is an inherently relational concept. Recall
how Lumen gentium and Presbyterorum ordinis describe and
explain the munera of the ordained priesthood in terms of
It is interesting to note that Vatican H's understanding of the common priesthood and
the ordained priesthood bears a certain correspondence with what St. Thomas teaches about
the sacramental character being the character of Christ in Summa TheologiaeIII, q. 63, a.3.
After stating that a character marks something as being ordained to a specific end, St. Thomas
says: "Secondly, each of the faithful is deputed to receive, or to bestow on others, things
pertaining to the worship of God. And this, properly speaking, is the purpose of the
sacramental character. Now the whole rite of Christian religion is derived from Christ's
priesthood. Consequently, it is clear that the sacramental character is specially the character
of Christ, to Whose character the faithful are likened by reason of the sacramental characters,
which are nothing else than certain participations of Christ's Priesthood, flowing from Christ
himself" (translation taken from the English Dominicans [Chicago: Benziger Bros., 1947]).
44

PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION

631

sanctifying, shepherding, leading, preaching, and teaching. These
things only make sense in relation to the Church-not apart from
or outside of it. In other words, the priest understood as in persona Christicapitis represents Christ the Head in his relationship
to the Church. This relationship-thanks to the indissoluble
union between the Head and members of the Body-is not
outside of the Church but within the Church. The Church lives in
her Head and from her Head who is the source of her life. Christ
the Head lives with her and in her. 45 Headship is constitutive of
the Church and therefore cannot be other than within it.
It is because Vatican II affirms the Christological priority of
Orders-in terms of in personaChristicapitis-that it understands
the ordained priesthood as "for others." The ordained priesthood
is "for others" because it is a special participation in Christ's
priesthood which, by its very nature, is ordered to the common
good of the Body, the Church. 46 Thus, Vatican II understands
that when a man is ordained a priest-presbyter he is given a new
relationship to the Church within the one Body because he
participates in a new way in the priesthood of Christ. The new
relationship, which occurs within the Church, makes visible and
effective sacramentally the reality of Christ's priestly office for the
baptized.
This presentation of Headship in the documents of Vatican II
is consistent with the council's profound sacramental
understanding of the Church and Orders. Christ's ongoing love
for the Church in which he calls, gathers, sanctifies, builds up,
and unifies his Body, the Church-that is, his activity as Head
and Shepherd-should be recognizable in a visible sign. This
Headship, whereby Christ faces the Church, is visible and
identifiable in the ministry of the ordained priesthood. It is a sign
45 Cf. Catechism of the Catholic Church, 708.
46 Although he did not use the later terminology of in persona Christi capitis, Augustine
saw something of this relationship of the priesthood to the baptized as one of "with and for"
in a sermon marking one of his anniversaries as a bishop: "Where I'm terrified by what I am
for you, I am given comfort by what I am with you; For you I am a bishop, with you after all,
I am a Christian" ("Sermon 340," in The Works of Saint Augustine: Sermons, tr. Edmund
Hill, ed. John E. Rostelle, v. 3/9 [Hyde Park, N.Y.: New City Press, 1990] 292; emphases
added).

632

LAWRENCEJ. WELCH

of the sheer gratuity and priority of the grace of Christ. It is
Christ with the power of the Holy Spirit who unites and fills up
the Church with the divine life.47
In the concern to present the ordained priesthood as existing
within the Church, it is easy to confuse the question of context
with that of representation. To be sure, both the common and the
ordained priesthoods exist within the Church, not outside of it.
To that extent, they are both ecclesial. It is also true, as we have
seen, that both priesthoods have Christ the Priest as their origin.
To that extent they are both Christo logical. But only the ordained
priesthood, not the common priesthood, requires the sacramental
representation of Christ.
A further difficulty is that Coffey fails to apply to his
understanding of the ordained ministry the truth that Christ is the
source of life in the Church. This failure leads to a faulty
understanding of Headship that equates Headship with leadership
or "official witness. "48 A fully sacramental understanding of
47 It is also worth noting that Vatican H's understanding of the Headship of Christ-as the
source of growth, order, and life--reflects something of what the Letter to the Ephesians and
the Letter to the Colossians proclaim about the Headship of Christ. Heinrich Schlier
commenting on the term kephale in Eph 1:22f; 4:14; 5:23; Col 1:18; 2:10; 2:19, observes
that Christ is presented as Head of the Church "in the sense that from this Head the body
grows up to this Head." In this schema, Schlier states, "the Head is not present without or
apart from the body, nor the body without or apart from the Head. The Church is the earthly
body of the heavenly Head." Moreover: "In this unity of Christ and the Church the Headship
of Christ is manifested in the fact that He directs the growth of the body to Himself. The
kephale determines not merely the being of the body but also the fulfilment of its life.•.. He
is the effective "whence" of the activity of the body whereby it edifies itself though gifts given
to its members. As the kephale He is thus the concrete principle of the bodily growth of the
Church. He is the arche, Col 1:18." See Heinrich Schlier, s.v. "kephale," Theological
Dictionary of the New Testament, v. 3., ed. Gerhard Kittle, trans. Geoffrey W Bromiley
(Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1964-76): 680. Schlieralso comments that "kephale implies
one who stands over another in the sense of being the ground of his being. Paul could have
used arche if there had not been a closer personal relationship in kephale" (ibid., 679). The
exegete Markus Barth observes that Paul preferred to employ the verb "to fill" to describe
how Christthe Head governed the body. "If Christ is the head then he is the 'greatest power,'
the 'source', the 'beginning' or the 'rule' (arche), the 'acropolis' of all members. Thus it is
impossible to assume that they 'fill' him. He alone fills them" (Markus Barth, Ephesians:
Introduction, Translation and Commentary [Garden City,N.Y.: Doubleday, 1974], 190-91).
48 For example, recall Coffey's description of the relationship between the ordained
priesthood and the common priesthood. "Depending on whether christological or
ecclesiological terms of reference are chosen, it can be called the relation of sharing in

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

633

Headship is of a different kind. It is exercised only by the
authority of Christ and in his person. It involves a special
participation in the mission and mediatorship of Christ whereby
Christ, the source of life, nourishes and builds up the Church.
The ordained priesthood is a gift to the Church, instituted by
Christ, neither prior or posterior to the Church but within it. The
rest of the baptized may designate the one to occupy this office,
but they do not confer on him the authority to act in persona

Christi capitis.
Coffey does, at one point, appear to come close to a
sacramental understanding of Headship that represents Christ as
the source of the Church's life. After quoting some comments
Christ's Headship over simple union with him through faith, or the relation of official witness
(apostolic leadership) in the Church over against simple belonging to it though faith and
baptism. While both possibilities are correct, the second is the more appropriate, as it is
expressive of the actual context in which the priesthood exists and operates" (Coffey, "The
Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 235). David Power runs into a similar difficulty
when he writes: "Hence his [the priest's] action in personaF.cclesiaeis a cultic action wherein
the Church's devotion and spiritual sacrifice is expressed. This distinguishes the action of the
Church in giving homage from its action, through a minister, as instrument of Christ's
sanctifying power, though the latter properly occurs in the context of the former
("Representing Christ in Community and Sacrament," 101). Here are contrasted two
situations. In the first, the Church through the priest gives homage to the Father, and the
priest acts in personaFcclesiae.In the second, Christ acts through the Church and the Church
acts through the priest to sanctify. The difficulty with this is that it camouflages an
equivocation with respect to "Church." In the first situation, the assembly expresses its
devotion through the prayers said by the priest. In the second situation does the assembly
moved by Christ express its sanctifying action through the priest? On the contrary, Christ
acts for the people through the priest. It is true that the action of the priest is an action of the
Church but in a different sense than in the first situation. Sanctifying the elements is not an
action of the congregation. To be sure, the Church regulates the exercise of the priest acting
as Christ's instrument. Still, the sanctifying action of Christ does not pass as it were from
Christ to the assembly and then to the priest. Nor does the liturgy signify anything like this.
It is relevant to note that during the discussion of the drafting of PO 2 the relatio explains
that the addition of the words nomine totius ecclesiae,in reference to the priest, was made
to show forth the nature of the sacrifice of the Mass. A council.father proposed that the text
should be emended so as to describe presbyters as "ministers of the Church." The theological
commission responsible for overseeing revisions to the text rejected the request explaining
that the text already spoke of the priest-presbyter speaking "nomine totius ecclesiae."
Furthermore, the relatio replied, "Presbyters act not as ministers of the Church but as
ministers of Christ." The relatio cited LG 10 and 28: in persona Christi agentes. See Acta
Synodalia, v. 4, pars 7, 123-24. Here again we see the council's intention to affirm the
Christological priority of the priest representing Christ as Head.

634

LAWRENCE}. WELCH

from an essay by Georg Hintze 49 about priestly representation,
Coffey argues that the ordained priest sacramentally represents
Christ's Headship and that this Headship is drawn not from the
members of the Church but from Christ.
It is necessary to add only that the priest does not represent Christ and the
Church in exactly the same way. He represents Christ in that he sacramentally
makes visible and active in the Church an invisible reality, Christ in his
headship. This is not the case with his representation of the Church, for in a
real sense the Church is visible already. But in this case he adds headship,
apostleship, or leadership to the action of this group of believers, in order to
constitute them as Church in the full sense. Apart from his presence and
ministry they are only a group of believers, unable of themselves to represent
the Church. But at the same time, the fact that he represents them by no means
renders their presence and action superfluous, for just as their faith is positive
and active, so too is their priesthood. Thus it can be seen that, even though the
priest represents a reality that is already at least partially visible, his is truly a
sacramental, and not merely juridical, representation. (If, per impossibile, it
were only of the latter kind, his priesthood would differ only in degree, not in
kind, from theirs.) But what he adds is drawn not from them, but from Christ.
And it is precisely this contribution that, along with theirs, truly constitutes the
Church, and therefore the Church at prayer, i.e. the priesthood of the
Church. 50

This affirmation that the ordained priest's sacramental
representation of Headship is derived directly from Christ does
not seem to be integrated into Coffey's wider analysis of the
nature of the ordained priesthood. Throughout his article, 51
except for the passage quoted above, he claims,
For the headship of Christ as exercised in the only place where it can be
exercised, namely the Church, is clearly an ecclesial function, and therefore
statements about it, even ones invoking Christ the priest, whether they be

49 Georg Hintze, "Das gemeinsame Priestertum aller Glaubigen und das besondere
Priestertum des Dienstes in der okumenischen Diskussion," Catholica 45 (1991): 44-77.
5°Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood," 233-34.
51 He comes to the same conclusion in his earlier essay "Priestly Representation and
Women's Ordination," 96. Here Coffey states: "However, the priest's primary and direct
representation is of the earthly church, and it is only insofar as he represents it that he is able
to represent Christ and the whole Church."

PRIESTLYREPRESENTATION

635

magisterial or simply theological, are directly ecclesiological and only indirectly
Christological. 52

But how can this Headship, which the ordained priesthood sacramentally represents, be only indirectly Christological and directly
ecclesiological if, as Coffey says, Headship is drawn from Christ
and if it is precisely this contribution that, together with the
common priesthood, constitutes the Church, particularly the
Church at prayer? There seems to be a failure, as described above,
to grasp Vatican II's point that the sacramental representation of
the Headship of Christ has to do with representing Christ as
source of the life of the Church evident in the actions of sanctifying, teaching, and shepherding the Church. 53 Or in the words
of Pastoresdabo vobis, "And so the priest, on account of his very
nature and sacramental mission appears in the structure of the
Church as a sign of the absolute priority and gratuity of that grace
which is conferred by the risen Christ on the Church. "54 A closer
reading of the documents of Vatican II together with the Acta
would have assuaged Coffey's entirely legitimate fear that the
sacramental representation of Christ's Headship might be seen as
isolating the ordained priest from the Church and placing him in
a position apart from the Church or above it. Lumen gentium and
Presbyterorumordinis present the ordained priesthood (and the
common priesthood) in a strong relational and Christological
framework, understanding the ordained priest as sacramentally
representing Headship within the Church and for the Church.
V. CONCLUSION

Vatican II successfully avoided a juridical interpretation of
priestly identity as well as a juridical understanding of the term in
52 Coffey, "The Common and the Ordained Priesthood,"

211.

53 Here again, Vatican II's view of Christ's Headship seems to be well-informed by the

Pauline understanding. Markus Barth argues that "Paul could ascribe to the head more than
a representative and dominating function. He coulq attribute to it the power to perceive, to
interpret, to coordinate, and to unify all that went on in the body and its several members.
Because the head is the 'greatest power' of the body, causation and coordination can be
ascribed to nothing else" (Barth, Ephesians, 190).
54 Pastoresdabo vobis 16 (translation mine).

636

LAWRENCEJ. WELCH

persona Christi that would isolate the priest from the Church. It
affirmed a strong Christological priority of priestly identity in
terms of a sacramental representation in persona Christi capitis.
This inherently relational sacramental imaging of Christ in terms
of Headship firmly placed the ordained priest within the one
body, the Church, and thus made reference to the Church
absolutely necessary for defining priestly identity. The ordained
priesthood is a gift to the Church, instituted by Christ, neither
prior nor posterior to the Church. The concern that scholars such
as Coffey have for the ecclesial dimension of a contemporary
theology of priestly identity is well-placed. While not denying
these concerns, this article has called attention to the priority of
the gratuity of the grace of Christ and the gift of communion that
Christ gives to the Church.
In persona Christi capitis is understood in the documents of
Vatican II as a sacramental representation of the priority of
Christ's activity whereby he gathers and builds up his Body, the
Church, and draws the Church into his worship and his sacrifice.
The ordained priest's ability to represent the Church and to pray
in the name of the whole Church is based on his participation in
this function of Christ as sole mediator. The priest's representation of the Church and speaking in nomine ecclesiae is situated
within in persona Christi capitis. The former has its foundation
and its reason in the latter. It is Christ who first offers himself;
the Church is only able to offer herself because of his offering.
The Church gives homage and offers its sacrifice of praise
through Christ. In this way, Christ, the Head of the Body, acts in
the name of the whole Church and represents the whole Church
to the Father. It is on this basis that we can distinguish two
distinct forms of representation-distinct but always united. On
the one hand, the priest represents Christ the Head who sanctifies
his body the Church and directs its growth. On the other hand,
the priest represents the whole Church by speaking in nomine
ecclesiae, just as Christ does, representing her faithful response to
the Father through the sacrifice of Christ.
The Christological priority of priestly representation is well
established in Church teaching. I would suggest that the direction

PRIESTLY REPRESENTATION

637

of further research might be well served if it moved beyond the
issue of the priority of priestly representation. In Pastores dabo
vobis 12 we read that priestly identity, "like every Christian
identity, has its source in the Blessed Trinity, which is revealed
and is communicated to people in Christ, establishing, in him and
through the Spirit, the Church." The exhortation goes on to
observe that both
the nature and the mission of the ordained priesthood cannot be defined except
through this multiple and rich interconnection of relationships which arise
from the Blessed Trinity and are prolonged in the communion of the Church,
as a sign and instrument of Christ, of communion with God and of the unity
of all humanity.

I believe scholars might find it fruitful to take up the task of
probing the interconnection of these relationships that constitute
the identity of the ordained priest.

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUMES 61-65 (1997-2001)
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P., and Eric A. Reitan, O.P., "On William A. Wallace,
The Modelingof Nature" ........................
61(1997)625
Baxter, Michael J., C.S.C., "Notes in Defense of Ex corde Ecclesiae:Replies to
63 {1999) 629
Three Typical Objections" ......................
Beards, Andrew, "Christianity, "Interculturality," and Salvation: Some
64 (2000) 161
Perspectives from Lonergan" ....................
Beiting, Christopher, "The Idea of Limbo in Thomas Aquinas" 62 {1998) 217
Berkman, John, "Has the Message of Evangelium Vitae Been Missed? An
Analysis and a Future Direction for Catholic Biomedical Ethics"
.........................................•.
63 (1999) 461
Boyle, John F., "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Potentia Generandi"
...........................................
64 (2000) 581
Boyle, Joseph, John Finnis, and Germain Grisez, "'Direct' and 'Indirect': A
Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory" .............. 65 (2001) 1
Bracken, W. Jerome, C.P., "Of What Benefit to Himself Was Christ's
Suffering? Merit in Aquinas's Theology of the Passion" 65 (2001) 385
Brock, Stephen L., "St. Thomas and the Eucharistic Conversion"
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 {2001) 529
Butler, Sara, M.S.B.T., "Women's Ordination and the Development of
Doctrine" ...................................
61 (1997) 501
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
...........................................
61 (1997) 425
Cavanaugh, Thomas A., "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect" 61 (1997) 107
Chapp, Larry S., "The Dying of the Light and the Contemporary Catholic
University" ..................................
63 (1999) 643
Clarke, Norris, S.J. "A Reply to Steven Long" ............. 61 (1997) 617
Cote, Antoine, "The Five Ways and the Argument from Composition: A Reply
61 {1997) 123
to John Lamont" ..............................
Cross, Richard, "A Recent Contribution on the Distinction between
Monophysitism and Chalcedonianism" ............ 65 (2001) 361
Crowe, Frederick E., "For Inserting a New Question {26A) in the Prima Pars"
...........................................
64 {2000) 565
Culpepper, Gary M., "Ecclesial Being and One Theologian: Pannenberg's
Doctrine of Faith in Its Sacramental Context" ....... 63 (1999) 283
Dauphinais, Michael A., "Loving the Lord Your God: The Imago Dei in Saint
Thomas Aquinas" .............................
63 (1999) 241
Decaen, Christopher, "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color Realism"
..........................................
65 {2001) 179
639

640

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

_,"Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas" ......... 64 (2000) 271
Dewan, Lawrence, 0.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the .Political Good"
...........................................
64 (2000) 337
_, "The Individual as a Mode of Being according to Thomas Aquinas"
...........................................
63 (1999) 403
_,"Torrell on Aquinas" ..........................
62 (1998) 623
_, "St. Thomas, Physics, and the Principle of Metaphysics"
...........................................
61 (1997) 549
_, "St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin" .............. 61 (1997) 279
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P., "The Nature and Grace of Sacra Doctrina in St.
Thomas's Super Boetium de Trinitate" ............. 63 (1999) 343
Doolan, Gregory, "The Relation of Culture and Ignorance to Culpability in
63 (1999) 105
Thomas Aquinas" .............................
Dulles, Avery Cardinal, S.J., "John Paul II on Religious Freedom: Themes from
65 (2001) 161
Vatican II" ..................................
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God in
Saint Thomas Aquinas?" ........................
64 (2000) 521
Finnis, John, Germain Grisez, and Joseph Boyle, "'Direct' and 'Indirect': A
Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory" .............. 65 (2001) 1
Franks, Angela Franz, "Trinitarian Analogia Entis in Hans Urs von Balthasar"
..........................
' ................
62 (1998) 533
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on Intelligent Extra-Terrestrial Life"
...........................................
65 (2001) 239
Gonzalez, Ana Marta, "Depositum g/adius non debet restitui furioso: Precepts,
Synderesis, and Virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas" .... 63 (1999) 217
Grisez, Germain, John Finnis, and Joseph Boyle, '"Direct' and 'Indirect': A
Reply to Critics of Our Action Theory" .............. 65 (2001) 1
Grygiel, Wojciech P., "Quantum Mechanics: A Dialectical Approach to
65 (2001) 223
Reality" .....................................
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "Aquinas's Use of Ulpian and the Question of
Physicalism Reexamined" .......................
63 (1999) 613
Haggerty, Donald F., "A Via Maritainia: Nonconceptual Knowledge by
Virtuous Inclination" ............................
62 (1998) 75
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Heidegger's God" ............ 62 (1998) 373
Hibbs, Thomas S., "Kretzmann's Theism vs. Aquinas's Theism: Interpreting the
62 (1998) 603
Summa contra Gentiles" ........................
Jackson, Timothy P., "Must Job Live Forever? A Reply to Aquinas on
Providence" ....................................
62 (1998) 1
Jensen, Steven J., "A Defense of Physicalism" ............. 61 (1997) 377
Johnson, Mark, "Apophatic Knowledge's Cataphatic Dependencies"
...........................................
62 (1998) 517
Kaczor, Christopher, "Proportionalism and the Pill: How Developments in
Theory Lead to Contradictions to Practice" ......... 63 (1999) 269
_, "Exceptionless Norms in Aristotle" ................
61 (1997) 33

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

641

Keaty, Anthony W., "Thomas's Authority for Identifying Charity as Friendship:
Aristotle or John 15?" ..........................
62 (1998) 581
Kelly, Thomas A F., "Ex Possibili et Necessario: A Re-examination of
Aquinas's Third Way" ...........................
61 (1997) 63
Knasas, John F. X., "Aquinas's Metaphysics and Descartes's Methodic Doubt"
...........................................
64 (2000) 449
Kondoleon, Theodore J., "The Argument from Motion and the Argument for
Angels: A Reply to John F. X. Knasas .............. 62 (1998) 269
Kwasniewski, Peter A, "St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved"
...........................................
61 (1997) 587
65 (2001) 593
Lamont, John R. T., "Plantinga on Belief" ...............
_, "On the Functions of Sexual Activity" ............. 62 (1998) 561
Le Grys, James, "Names for the Ineffable God: St. Gregory of Nyssa's
62 (1998) 333
Explanation" .................................
Lee, Patrick, "The Goodness of Creation, Evil, and Christian Teaching"
...........................................
64 (2000) 239
Levering, Matthew, "Balthasar on Christ's Consciousness on the Cross"
...........................................
65 (2001) 567
__ , "Israel and the Shape of Thomas Aquinas's Soteriology" 63 (1999) 65
_, "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian Theology"
...........................................
64 (2000) 593
Long, Steven A., "St. Thomas Aquinas through the Analytic Looking-Glass"
...........................................
65 (2001) 259
_, "On the Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man" 64 (2000) 211
__ , "Evangelium vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Death Penalty"
...........................................
63 (1999) 511
__ , "Nicholas Lobkowicz and the Historicist Inversion of Thomistic
Philosophy" ...................................
62 (1998) 41
_, "Reply [to Kenneth Schmitz]" ...................
61 (1997) 373
_,"Personal Receptivity and Act" .....................
61(1997)1
Loughlin, Stephen, "Similarities and Differences between Human and Animal
65 (2001) 45
Emotion in Aquinas's Thought" ...................
Madigan, Kevin, "Aquinas and Olivi on Evangelical Poverty: A Medieval
Debate and Its Modern Significance" .............. 61 (1997) 567
Malloy, Christopher J., "The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in the joint
Declaration" ..................................
65 (2001) 93
Mankowski, Paul, "The Necessary Failure of Inclusive-LanguageTranslations:
A Linguistic Elucidation" ........................
62 (1998) 445
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the
64 (2000) 499
Trinity" ....................................
_, "Representation and Agency in the Eucharist"
62 (1998) 499
_, "On Affirming a Dominical Intention of a Male Priesthood"
...........................................
61 (1997) 301

642

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Margerie, Bertrand de, S. J. "Note on Balthasar's Trinitarian Theology"
.•........................................
• . 64 (2000) 127
Marshall, Bruce, "Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on
63 (1999) 1
Deciding What Is True" ..........................
May, William E., "Recent Moral Theology: Servais Pinckaers and Benedict
62 (1998) 117
Ashley" .....................................
McAleer, Graham J., "Matter and the Unity of Being in the Philosophical
Theology of Thomas Aquinas" ...................
61 (1997) 257
Melina, Livio, "The Role of the Ordinary Magisterium: On Francis Sullivan's
61 (1997) 606
CreativeFidelity" •.•••.•.....•.••..•...•••..••
Meyer, John R., "Striving for Personal Sanctity through Work" 61 (1997) 85
Michalson, Gordon E., Jr., "God and Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"
............................................
65 (2001) 67
Miner, Robert C., "Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the Prima secundae"
...........................................
64 (2000) 401
Mirkes, Renee, O.S.F., "Aquinas's Doctrine of Moral Virtue and Its
61 (1997) 189
Significance for Theories of Facility" ....•..........
Nichols, Aidan, O.P., "Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie" . 64 (2000) 1
Nolan, Michael, "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas's Denial that
"Woman is a Defective Male" ....................
64 (2000) 21
Nowacki, Mark R., "Whatever Comes to Be Has a Cause of Its Coming to Be:
A Thomist Defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason"
...........................................
62 (1998) 291
Pagan-Aguiar, Peter A., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality: Paradox or
Mysterium fu:lei?" .........................•..
64 (2000) 375
Parker, Michael G., "Transcendental Methods and Transcendental Arguments:
A Criticism of Rahner's Transcendental Theology" ... 63 (1999) 191
Pedrozo, Jose M., "The Brothers of Jesus and His Mother's Virginity"
............................................
63 (1999) 83
Pellitero, Ramiro, "Congar's Developing Understanding of the Laity and Their
65 (2001) 327
Mission" ....................................
Peterson, John, "Truth and Divine Ideas" ...............
65 (2001) 583
_, "Reductionism in Metaphysics: A Mistake in Logic?" .. 64 (2000) 301
__ , "Predicates: A Thomist Analysis" ................
63 (1999) 455
_, "The Interdependence of Intellectual and Moral Virtue in Aquinas"
...........................................
61 (1997) 449
Pruss, Alexander R., "Christian Sexual Ethics and Teleological Organicity"
............................................
64 (2000) 71
_,"Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor's Language"
63 (1999) 439
Pugh, Matthew S., "Maritain, the Intuition of Being, and the Proper Starting
61 (1997) 405
Point for Thomistic Metaphysics" .................
Raschko, Michael B., "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of
Lombard's Subsistence Theory" ..................
65 (2001) 409

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

643

Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The Centrality
of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Maclntyre's Argument for Thomism"
...........................................
62 (1998) 419
Reitan, Eric A., O.P., and Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., "On William A. Wallace,
The Modeling of Nature" ........................
61 (1997) 625
Rioux, Jean W., "Cantor's Transfinite Numbers and Traditional Objections to
Actual Infinity" ..............................
64 (2000) 101
Schmitz, Kenneth L, "Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the
Concrete" ...................................
61 (1997) 339
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue" ........ 63 (1999) 553
_, "Analytical Thomism" .........................
63 (1999) 125
_, "Eternity and Duration in Aquinas" ...............
61 (1997) 525
_, "Sacra Doctrina and the Theology of Disclosure" .... 61 (1997) 163
Smith, Timothy L., "The Context and Character of Thomas's Theory of
63 (1999) 579
Appropriations" ..............................
Smith, Wolfgang, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology"
............................................
63 (1999) 49
Sokolowski, Robert, "The Human Person and Political Life" . 65 (2001) 505
Stevenson, William B., "The Problem of Trinitarian Processions in Thomas's
64 (2000) 619
Roman Commentary" ..........................
Still, Carl N., "'Gifted Knowledge': An Exception to Thomistic Epistemology?"
...........................................
63 (1999) 173
Sullivan, Denis F., "The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of Moral
64 (2000) 423
Responsibility" ...............................
Thompson, Christopher J., "The Spirit and the Limits of Prudential Reasoning"
...................................•.......
63 (1999) 425
__ _, "Moral Theology in a Sapiential Mode: Veritatis Splendor and the
65 (2001) 465
Renewal of Moral Theology" .....................
Tkacz, Michael W., "Neo-Darwinians, Aristotelians, and Optimal Design"
...........................................
62 (1998) 355
Wallace, William A., O.P., "Science and Religion in the Thomistic Tradition"
........................................
65 (2001) 441
_,"Thomism and the Quantum Enigma" ............. 61 (1997) 455
Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap., "The Symbolic Theology of Roger Haight"
..............•............................
65 (2001) 121
Welch, Lawrence J., "For the Church and within the Church: Priestly
65 (2001) 613
Representation" ..............................
Wilcox, John R., "The Five Ways and the Oneness of God" .. 62 (1998) 245
Williams, A. N., "Deification in the Summa Theologiae: A Structural
61 (1997) 219
Interpretation of the Prima Pars" ..................
Williams, David, "The Immutability of Natural Law according to Suarez"
............................................
62 (1998) 97
Williams, Thomas, "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral
Philosophy" ..................................
62 (1998) 193

644

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life: Prolegomena
to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis.Sp/endor" .... 62 (1998) 163

TERMS IN TITLES
ANALOGY
Boyle, John F., "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Potentia Generandi"
.........................................
64 (2000) 581
Franks, Angela Franz, "Trinitarian Analogia Entis in Hans Urs von
Balthasar" .................................
62 (1998) 533

ANALYTIC/ANALYTICAL
Long, Steven A., "St. Thomas Aquinas through the Analytic LookingGlass" ...................................
65 (2001) 259
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Analytical Thomism" ......... 63 (1999) 125

ANGEL
Kondoleon, Theodore J., "The Argument from Motion and the Argument
for Angels: A Reply to John F. X. Knasas ......... 62 (1998) 269

ARISTOTELIAN
Decaen, Christopher A., "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color
65 (2001) 179
Realism" ..................................
Miner, Robert C., "Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the Prima secundae"
.........................................
64 (2000) 401
Nolan, Michael, "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas's Denial that
"Woman is a Defective Male" ...................
64 (2000) 21
Tkacz, Michael W., "Neo-Darwinians, Aristotelians, and Optimal Design"
.........................................
62 (1998) 355

BEING
Culpepper, Gary M., "Ecclesial Being and One Theologian: Pannenberg's
Doctrine of Fatih in Its Sacramental Context" ..... 63 (1999) 283
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "The Individual as a Mode of Being according to
Thomas Aquinas" ...........................
63 (1999) 403
McAleer, Graham J., "Matter and the Unity of Being in the Philosophical
61 (1997) 257
Theology of Thomas Aquinas" .................
Pugh, Matthew S., "Maritain, the Intuition of Being, and the Proper
Starting Point for Thomistic Metaphysics" ........ 61 (1997) 405

CHALCEDONIANISM
Cross, Richard, "A Recent Contribution on the Distinction between
Monophysitism and Chalcedonianism" ........... 65 (2001) 361

CHARITY
Keaty, Anthony W., "Thomas's Authority for Identifying Charity as
Friendship: Aristotle or John 15?" ...............
62 (1998) 581

645

646

TERMS IN TffiES

CHRIST
Bracken, W. Jerome, C.P., "Of What Benefit to Himself Was Christ's
Suffering? Merit in Aquinas's Theology of the Passion"
.........................................
65 (2001) 385
Levering, Matthew, "Balthasar on Christ's Consciousness on the Cross"
.........................................
65 (2001) 567

COLOR
Decaen, Christopher A., "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color
Realism" ..................................
65 (2001) 179

CREATION
Lee, Patrick, "The Goodness of Creation, Evil, and Christian Teaching"
.........................................
64 (2000) 239

CULTURE
Doolan, Gregory, "The Relation of Culture and Ignorance to Culpability
63 (1999} 105
in Thomas Aquinas" .........................

DOCTRINE
Butler, Sara, M.S.B.T., "Women's Ordination and the Development of
Doctrine" .................................
61 (1997) 501
Culpepper, Gary M., "Ecclesial Being and One Theologian: Pannenberg's
Doctrine of Fatih in Its Sacramental Context" ..... 63 (1999) 283
Mirkes, Renee, O.S.F., "Aquinas's Doctrine of Moral Virtue and Its
Significance for Theories of Facility" ............. 61 (1997} 189
Sullivan, Denis F., "The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of
Moral Responsibility" ........................
64 (2000) 423

DOUBLE EFFECT
Cavanaugh, Thomas A., "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect"
.........................................
61 (1997} 107
Sullivan, Denis F., "The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of
Moral Responsibility" ........................
64 (2000} 423

ETERNITY
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Eternity and Duration in Aquinas"61 (1997) 525

ETHICS/ETHICAL
Berkman, John, "Has the Message of Evangelium Vitae Been Missed? An
Analysis and a Future Direction for Catholic Biomedical Ethics"
.•......................................
63-(1999) 461
Michalson, Gordon E., Jr., "God and Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"
..........................................
65 (2001) 67
Pruss, Alexander R., "Christian Sexual Ethics and Teleological Organicity"
..........................................
64 (2000) 71

EUCHARIST
Brock, Stephen L., "St. Thomas and the Eucharistic Conversion"
........................................
65 (2001) 529

TERMS IN TITLES

647

Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Representation and Agency in the Eucharist"
.........................................
62 (1998) 499

EVANGELIUM VITAE
Berkman, John, "Has the Message of Evangelium Vitae Been Missed? An
Analysis and a Future Direction for Catholic Biomedical Ethics"
........................................
63 (1999) 461
Long, Steven A., "Evangelium vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Death
Penalty" ..................................
63 (1999) 511

EX CORDE ECCLESIAE
Baxter, Michael J.; C.S.C., "Notes in Defense of Ex corde Ecclesiae:
Replies to Three Typical Objections" ............ 63 (1999) 629

FAITH
Culpepper, Gary M., "Ecclesial Being and One Theologian: Pannenberg's
Doctrine of Faith in Its Sacramental Context" ..... 63 (1999) 283
Marshall, Bruce, "Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on
Deciding What Is True" ........................
63 (1999) 1

FIVE WAYS
Cote, Antoine, "The Five Ways and the Argument from Composition: A
61 (1997) 123
Reply to John Lamont" .......................
Wilcox, John R., "The Five Ways and the Oneness of God"62 (1998) 245

FRIENDSHIP
Keaty, Anthony W., "Thomas's Authority for Identifying Charity as
Friendship: Aristotle or John 15?" ...............
62 (1998) 581

GOD
Dauphinais, Michael A., "Loving the Lord Your God: The Imago Dei in
63 (1999) 241
Saint Thomas Aquinas" .......................
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God
64 (2000) 521
in Saint Thomas Aquinas?" ....................
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Heidegger's God" ......... 62 (1998) 373
Le Grys, James, "Names for the Ineffable God: St. Gregory of Nyssa's
62 (1998) 333
Explanation" ...............................
Michalson, Gordon E., Jr., "God and Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"
..........................................
65 (2001) 67
Wilcox, John R., "The Five Ways and the Oneness of God"62 (1998) 245

GOOD/GOODNESS
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good"
.........................................
64 (2000) 337
Lee, Patrick, "The Goodness of Creation, Evil, and Christian Teaching"
.........................................
64 (2000) 239

GRACE
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P., "The Nature and Grace of Sacra Doctrina in
St. Thomas's Super Boetium de Trinitate" ......... 63 (1999) 343

648

TERMS IN TITLES

Malloy, Christopher J., "The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in the
Joint Declaration" ........................
, ... 65 (2001) 93
Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life:
Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor"
............................•............
62 (1998) 163

HAPPINESS
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
.........................................
61 (1997) 425

INCARNATION
Raschko, Michael B., "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of
65 (2001) 409
Lombard's Subsistence Theory" .................

INTERCULTURALITY
Beards, Andrew, "Christianity, "Interculturality," and Salvation: Some
Perspectives from Lonergan" ..................
64 (2000) 161

KNOWLEDGE
Haggerty, Donald F., "A Via Maritainia: Nonconceptual Knowledge by
Virtuous Inclination" ..........................
62 (1998) 75
Johnson, Mark, "Apophatic Knowledge's Cataphatic Dependencies"
.........................................
62 (1998) 517
Still, Carl N., "'Gifted Knowledge': An Exception to Thomistic
63 (1999) 173
Epistemology?" .............................

LAITY
Pellitero, Ramiro, "Congar's Developing Understanding of the Laity and
65 (2001) 327
Their Mission" .............................

LAW
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
.........................................
61 (1997) 425
Williams, David, "The Immutability of Natural Law according to Suarez"
..........................................
62 (1998) 97
Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life:
Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor"
.........................................
62 (1998) 163

LIMBO
Beiting, Christopher, "The Idea of Limbo in Thomas Aquinas"
.........................................
62 (1998) 217

LOGIC
Peterson, John, "Reductionism in Metaphysics: A Mistake in Logic?"
.........................................
64 (2000) 301

LYING
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin"
.........................................
61 (1997) 279

TERMS IN TmES

649

Pruss, Alexander R., "Lying and Speaking Your Interlocutor's Language"
.........................................
63 (1999) 439

MAGISTERIUM
Melina, Livio, "The Role of the Ordinary Magisterium: On Francis
Sullivan's Creative Fidelity" ....................
61 (1997) 606

MERIT
Bracken, W. Jerome, C.P., "Of What Benefit to Himself Was Christ's
Suffering? Merit in Aquinas's Theology of the Passion"
.........................................
65 (2001) 385

METAPHYSICS
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, Physics, and the Principle of
61 (1997) 549
Metaphysics" ...............................
Knasas, John F. X., "Aquinas's Metaphysics and Descartes's Methodic
Doubt" ...................................
64 (2000) 449
Peterson, John, "Reductionism in Metaphysics: A Mistake in Logic?"
.........................................
64 (2000) 301
Pugh, Matthew S., "Maritain, the Intuition of Being, and the Proper
Starting Point for Thomistic Metaphysics" ........ 61 (1997) 405
Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The
Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Maclntyre's Argument for
Thomism" ................................
62 (1998) 419

MONOPHYSITISM
Cross, Richard, "A Recent Contribution on the Distinction between
Monophysitism and Chalcedonianism" ........... 65 (2001) 361

MORAL
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
.........................................
61 (1997) 425
May, William E., "Recent Moral Theology: Servais Pinckaers and Benedict
Ashley" ...................................
62 (1998) 117
Mirkes, Renee, O.S.F., "Aquinas's Doctrine of Moral Virtue and Its
Significance for Theories of Facility" ............. 61 (1997) 189
Peterson, John, "The Interdependence of Intellectual and Moral Virtue in
Aquinas" ..................................
61 (1997) 449
Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The
Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Maclntyre's Argument for
62 (1998) 419
Thomism" ................................
Sullivan, Denis F., "The Doctrine of Double Effect and the Domains of
64 (2000) 423
Moral Responsibility" ........................
Thompson, Christopher J., "Moral Theology in a Sapiential Mode:
Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology"
.........................................
65 (2001) 465
Williams, Thomas, "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral
Philosophy" ................................
62 (1998) 193

650

TERMS IN TITLES

Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life:
Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor"
.........................................
62 (1998) 163

NATURE
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P., and Eric A. Reitan, O.P., "On William A.
Wallace, The Modeling of Nature" ...............
61 (1997) 625
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P., "The Nature and Grace of Sacra Doctrina in
St. Thomas's Super Boetium de Trinitate" ......... 63 (1999) 343
Malloy, Christopher J., "The Nature of Justifying Grace: A Lacuna in the
joint Declaration" .........................•..
65 (2001) 93

NOUVELLE THEOLOGIE
Nichols, Aidan, 0.P., "Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie"
...........................................
64 (2000) 1

ONTOLOGY
Smith, Wolfgang, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology"
..........................................
63 (1999) 49

ORDINATION
Butler, Sara, M.S.B.T., "Women's Ordination and the Development of
Doctrine" .................................
61 (1997) 501

PERSON
Sokolowski, Robert, "The Human Person and Political Life"
.........................................
65 (2001) 505

PHILOSOPHY
Long, Steven A., "Nicholas Lobkowicz and the Historicist Inversion of
Thomistic Philosophy" .........................
62 (1998) 41
Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The
Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Maclntyre's Argument for
62 (1998) 419
Thomism" ................................
Schmitz, Kenneth L., "Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the
Concrete" .................................
61 (1997) 339
Williams, Thomas, "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral
Philosophy" ................................
62 (1998) 193

PHYSICALISM
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "Aquinas's Use of Ulpian and the Question
of Physicalism Reexamined" ...................
63 (1999) 613
Jensen, Steven J., "A Defense of Physicalism" .......... 61 (1997) 377

PHYSICS
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, Physics, and the Principle of
Metaphysics" ...............................
61 (1997) 549

POLITICAL
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good"
.........................................
64 (2000) 337

TERMS IN TITLES

651

Sokolowski, Robert, "The Human Person and Political Life"
..........................................
65 (2001) 505

PRECEPTS
Gonzalez, Ana Marta, "Depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso:
Precepts, Synderesis, and Virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas"
..........•..............................
63 (1999) 217

PRIESTHOOD/PRIESTLY
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "On Affirming a Dominica! Intention of a Male
Priesthood" ................................
61 (1997) 301
Welch, Lawrence J., "For the Church and within the Church: Priestly
Representation" .............................
65 (2001) 613

PROPORTIONALISM
Kaczor, Christopher, "Proportionalism and the Pill: How Developments
in Theory Lead to Contradictions to Practice" ..... 63 (1999) 269

PROVIDENCE
Jackson, Timothy P., "Must Job Live Forever? A Reply to Aquinas on
62 (1998) 1
Providence" .................................

PRUDENCE/PRUDENTIAL
Miner, Robert C., "Non-Aristotelian Prudence in the Prima secundae"
.........................................
64 (2000) 401
Thompson, Christopher J., "The Spirit and the Limits of Prudential
63 (1999) 425
Reasoning" ................................

QUANTUM
Grygiel, Wojciech P., "Quantum Mechanics: A Dialectical Approach to
65 (2001) 223
Reality" ...................................
Wallace, William A., 0.P., "Thomism and the Quantum Enigma"
.........................................
61 (1997) 455

REALISM
Decaen, Christopher A., "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color
Realism" ..................................
65 (2001) 179

REASON/REASONING
Marshall, Bruce, "Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on
63 (1999) 1
Deciding What Is True" ........................
Nowacki, Mark R., "Whatever Comes to Be Has a Cause of Its Coming to
Be: A Thomist Defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason"
.........................................
62 (1998) 291
Thompson, Christopher J., "The Spirit and the Limits of Prudential
Reasoning" ................................
63 (1999) 425

RECEPTMTY
Long, Steven A., "Personal Receptivity and Act" .......... 61 (1997) 1
Schmitz, Kenneth L., "Created Receptivity and the Philosophy of the
Concrete" .................................
61 (1997) 339

652

TERMS IN TmEs

SACRA DOCTRINA
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P., "The Nature and Grace of.Sacra Doctrina in
St. Thomas's Super Boetium de Trinitate" ......... 63 (1999) 343
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Sacra Doctrina and the Theology of Disclosure"
.........................................
61 (1997) 163

SALVATION
Beards, Andrew, "Christianity, "Interculturality," and Salvation: Some
64 (2000) 161
Perspectives from Lonergan" ..................

SEXUAL
Lamont, John R. T., "On the Functions of Sexual Activity"
.........................................
62 (1998) 561
Pruss, Alexander R., "Christian Sexual Ethics and Teleological Organicity"
..........................................
64 (2000) 71

SIN
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin"
.........................................
61 (1997) 279

SOTERIOLOGY
Levering, Matthew, "Israel and the Shape of Thomas Aquinas's
Soteriology" ................................
63 (1999) 65

THEISM
Hibbs, Thomas S., "Kretzmann's Theism vs. Aquinas's Theism: Interpreting
62 (1998) 603
the Summa contra Gentiles" ...................

THEOLOGY
Bracken, W. Jerome, C.P., "Of What Benefit to Himself Was Christ's
Suffering? Merit in Aquinas's Theology of the Passion"
.........................................
65 (2001) 385
Levering, Matthew, "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian
64 (2000) 593
Theology" .................................
Margerie, Bertrand de, S. J. "Note on Balthasar's Trinitarian Theology"
.........................................
64 (2000) 127
May, William E., "Recent Moral Theology: Servais Pinckaers and Benedict
Ashley" ...................................
62 (1998) 117
McAleer, Graham J., "Matter and the Unity of Being in the Philosophical
Theology of Thomas Aquinas" .................
61 (1997) 257
Parker, Michael G., "Transcendental Methods and Transcendental
Arguments: A Criticism of Rahner's Transcendental Theology"
.........................................
63 (1999) 191
Raschko, Michael B., "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of
Lombard's Subsistence Theory" .................
65 (2001) 409
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Sacra Doctrina and the Theology of Disclosure"
.........................................
61 (1997) 163

TERMS IN TmES

653

Thompson, Christopher J., "Moral Theology in a Sapiential Mode:
Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology"
.........................................
65 (2001) 465
Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap., "The Symbolic Theology of Roger
Haight" ..................................
65 (2001) 121

THOMISM!IHOMIST/THOMISTIC
Decaen, Christopher A., "The Viability of Aristotelian-Thomistic Color
65 (2001) 179
Realism" ..................................
Levering, Matthew, "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian
64 (2000) 593
Theology" .................................
Long, Steven A., "Nicholas Lobkowicz and the Historicist Inversion of
62 (1998) 41
Thomistic Philosophy" .........................
Nichols, Aidan, O.P., "Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie"
...........................................
64 (2000) 1
Nowacki, Mark R., "Whatever Comes to Be Has a Cause of Its Coming to
Be: A Thomist Defense of the Principle of Sufficient Reason"
.........................................
62 (1998) 291
Peterson, John, "Predicates: A Thomist Analysis" ...... 63 (1999) 455
Pugh, Matthew S., "Maritain, the Intuition of Being, and the Proper
Starting Point for Thomistic Metaphysics" ........ 61 (1997) 405
Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The
Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Madntyre's Argument for
62 (1998) 419
Thomism" ................................
Shanley, Brian J., 0.P., "Analytical Thomism" ......... 63 (1999) 125
Smith, Wolfgang, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology"
..........................................
63 (1999) 49
Still, Carl N., "'Gifted Knowledge': An Exception to Thomistic
63 (1999) 173
Epistemology?" .............................
Wallace, William A., O.P., "Science and Religion in the Thomistic
...............................
65 (2001) 441
Tradition"
_,"Thomism and the Quantum Enigma" ........ 61(1997)455

TRINITY/TRINITARIAN
Franks, Angela Franz, "Trinitarian Analogia Entis in Hans Urs von
Balthasar" .................................
62 (1998) 533
Levering, Matthew, "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian
64 (2000) 593
Theology" .................................
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the
Trinity" ..................................
64 (2000) 499
Margerie, Bertrand de, S. J. "Note on Balthasar's Trinitarian Theology"
.........................................
64 (2000) 127
Stevenson, William B., "The Problem of Trinitarian Processions in
Thomas's Roman Commentary" ................
64 (2000) 619

654

TERMS IN TmES

VATICAN II
Dulles, Avery Cardinal, S.J., "John Paul II on Religious Freedom: Themes
from Vatican II" ............................
65 (2001) 161

VERITA11S SPLENDOR
Thompson, Christopher J., "Moral Theology in a Sapiential Mode:
Veritatis Splendor and the Renewal of Moral Theology"
.........................................
65 (2001) 465
Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life:
Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor"
.........................................
62 (1998) 163

VIRTUE
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
.........................................
61 (1997) 425
Gonzalez, Ana Marta, "Depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso:
Precepts, Synderesis, and Virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas"
.........................................
63 (1999) 217
Mirkes, Renee, O.S.F., "Aquinas's Doctrine of Moral Virtue and Its
Significance for Theories of Facility" ............. 61 (1997) 189
Peterson, John, "The Interdependence of Intellectual and Moral Virtue in
Aquinas" ..................................
61 (1997) 449
Shanley, BrianJ., O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue" ..... 63 (1999) 553

WISDOM
Levering, Matthew, "Wisdom and the Viability of Thomistic Trinitarian
64 (2000) 593
Theology" .................................

WOMAN/WOMEN
Butler, Sara, M.S.B.T., "Women's Ordination and the Development of
61 (1997) 501
Doctrine" .................................
Nolan, Michael, "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas's Denial that
64 (2000) 21
"Woman is a Defective Male" ...................

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

AQUINAS
see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.

ARISTOTLE
Kaczor, Christopher, "Exceptionless Norms in Aristotle" .. 61 (1997) 33
Keaty, Anthony W., "Thomas's Authority for Identifying Charity as
Friendship: Aristotle or John 15?" ...............
62 (1998) 581

ASHLEY
May, William E., "Recent Moral Theology: Servais Pinckaers and Benedict
62 (1998) 117
Ashley" ...................................

BALTHASAR
Franks, Angela Franz, "Trinitarian Analogia Entis in Hans Urs von
62 (1998) 533
Balthasar" .................................
Levering, Matthew, "Balthasar on Christ's Consciousness on the Cross"
.........................................
65 (2001) 567
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Balthasar and the Theodramatic Enrichment of the
Trinity" ..................................
64 (2000) 499
Margerie, Bertrand de, S. J. "Note on Balthasar's Trinitarian Theology"
.........................................
64 (2000) 127

CANTOR
Rioux, Jean W., "Cantor's Transfinite Numbers and Traditional Objections
64 (2000) 101
to Actual Infinity" ...........................

CON GAR
Pellitero, Ramiro, "Congar's Developing Understanding of the Laity and
65 (2001) 327
Their Mission" .............................

DESCARTES
Knasas, John F. X., "Aquinas's Metaphysics and Descartes's Methodic
64 (2000) 449
Doubt" ...................................

FINNIS
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good"
.........................................
64 (2000) 337

GREGORY OF NYSSA, ST.
Le Grys, James, "Names for the Ineffable God: St. Gregory of Nyssa's
62 (1998) 333
Explanation" ...............................

HAIGHT
Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap., "The Symbolic Theology of Roger
65 (2001) 121
Haight" ..................................

655

656

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

HEIDEGGER
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Heidegger's God" .........

62 (1998) 373

JOHN PAUL II
Dulles, Avery Cardinal, S.J., "John Paul II on Religious Freedom: Themes
from Vatican II" ............................
65 (2001) 161

KANT
Michalson, Gordon E., Jr., "God and Kant's Ethical Commonwealth"
..........................................
65 (2001) 67

KNASAS
Kondoleon, Theodore J., "The Argument from Motion and the Argument
for Angels: A Reply to John F. X. Knasas ......... 62 (1998) 269

KRETZMANN
Hibbs, Thomas S., "Kretzmann's Theism vs. Aquinas's Theism: Interpreting
62 (1998) 603
the Summa contra Gentiles" ...................

LAMONT
Cote, Antoine, "The Five Ways and the Argument from Composition: A
Reply to John Lamont" .......................
61 (1997) 123

LOBKOWICZ
Long, Steven A., "Nicholas Lobkowicz and the Historicist Inversion of
62 (1998) 41
Thomistic Philosophy" .........................

LOMBARD
Raschko, Michael B., "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of
Lombard's Subsistence Theory" .................
65 (2001) 409

LONERGAN
Beards, Andrew, "Christianity, "Interculturality," and Salvation: Some
Perspectives from Lonergan" ..................
64 (2000) 161

LONG
Clarke, Norris, S.J. "A Reply to Steven Long" .........

61 (1997) 617

LUTHER
Marshall, Bruce, "Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on
63 (1999) 1
Deciding What Is True" ........................
Yeago, David S., "Martin Luther on Grace, Law, and Moral Life:
Prolegomena to an Ecumenical Discussion of Veritatis Splendor"
.........................................
62 (1998) 163

MACINTYRE
Reames, Kent, "Metaphysics, History, and Moral Philosophy: The
Centrality of the 1990 Aquinas Lecture to Madntyre's Argument for
Thomism" ................................
62 (1998) 419

MARITAIN
Haggerty, Donald F., "A Via Maritainia: Nonconceptual Knowledge by
Virtuous Inclination" ..........................
62 (1998) 75

PROPER NAMES IN TITIES

657

Pugh, Matthew S., "Maritain, the Intuition of Being, and the Proper
Starting Point for Thomistic Metaphysics" ........ 61 (1997) 405

OLIVI
Madigan, Kevin, "Aquinas and Olivi on Evangelical Poverty: A Medieval
Debate and Its Modern Significance" ............. 61 (1997) 567

PANNENBERG
Culpepper, Gary M., "Ecdesial Being and One Theologian: Pannenberg's
Doctrine of Fatih in Its Sacramental Context" ..... 63 (1999) 283

PINCKAERS
May, William E., "Recent Moral Theology: Servais Pinckaers and Benedict
Ashley" ...................................
62 (1998) 117

PLANTINGA
Lamont, John R. T., "Plantinga on Belief' ............

65 (2001) 593

RAHNER
Parker, Michael G., "Transcendental Methods and Transcendental
Arguments: A Criticism of Rahner's Transcendental Theology"
.........................................
63 (1999) 191

SCHRODINGER
Smith, Wolfgang, "From Schrodinger's Cat to Thomistic Ontology"
..........................................
63 (1999) 49

SCOTUS
Williams, Thomas, "The Libertarian Foundations of Scotus's Moral
Philosophy" ................................
62 (1998) 193

SUAREZ
Williams, David, "The Immutability of Natural Law according to Suarez"
..........................................
62 (1998) 97

SULLIVAN
Melina, Livio, "The Role of the Ordinary Magisterium: On Francis
61 (1997) 606
Sullivan's Creative Fidelity" ....................

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.
Beiting, Christopher, "The Idea of Limbo in Thomas Aquinas"
.........................................
62 (1998) 217
Boyle, John F., "St. Thomas and the Analogy of Potentia Generandi"
.........................................
64 (2000) 581
Bracken, W. Jerome, C.P., "Of What Benefit to Himself Was Christ's
Suffering? Merit in Aquinas's Theology of the Passion"
.........................................
65 (2001) 385
Brock, Stephen L., "St. Thomas and the Eucharistic Conversion"
........................................
65 (2001) 529
Carl, Maria, "Law, Virtue, and Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Theory"
.........................................
61 (1997) 425

658

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

Cavanaugh, Thomas A., "Aquinas's Account of Double Effect"
.........................................
61 (1997) 107
Dauphinais, Michael A., "Loving the Lord Your God: The Imago Dei in
63 (1999) 241
Saint Thomas Aquinas" .......................
Decaen, Christopher, "Elemental Virtual Presence in St. Thomas"
.........................................
64 (2000) 271
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis, and the Political Good"
.........................................
64 (2000) 337
__, "The Individual as a Mode of Being according to Thomas Aquinas"
.........................................
63 (1999) 403
_, "Torrell on Aquinas" .......................
62 (1998) 623
_, "St. Thomas, Physics, and the Principle of Metaphysics"
.........................................
61 (1997) 549
_, "St. Thomas, Lying, and Venial Sin" ........... 61 (1997) 279
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P., "The Nature and Grace of Sacra Doctrina in
St. Thomas's Super Boetium de Trinitate" ......... 63 (1999) 343
Doolan, Gregory, "The Relation of Culture and Ignorance to Culpability
in Thomas Aquinas" .........................
63 (1999) 105
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "Essentialism or Personalism in the Treatise on God
in Saint Thomas Aquinas?" ....................
64 (2000) 521
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on Intelligent Extra-Terrestrial Life"
.........................................
65 (2001) 239
Gonzalez, Ana Marta, "Depositum gladius non debet restitui furioso:
Precepts, Synderesis, and Virtues in Saint Thomas Aquinas"
.........................................
63 (1999) 217
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "Aquinas's Use of Ulpian and the Question
of Physicalism Reexamined" ...................
63 (1999) 613
Hibbs, Thomas S., "Kretzmann's Theism vs. Aquinas's Theism: Interpreting
the Summa contra Gentiles" ...................
62 (1998) 603
Jackson, Timothy P., "Must Job Live Forever? A Reply to Aquinas on
Providence" ..................................
62 (1998) 1
Keaty, Anthony W., "Thomas's Authority for Identifying Charity as
Friendship: Aristotle or John 15?" ...............
62 (1998) 581
Kelly, Thomas A. F., "Ex Possibili et Necessario: A Re-examination of
Aquinas's Third Way" .........................
61 (1997) 63
Knasas, John F. X., "Aquinas's Metaphysics and Descartes's Methodic
64 (2000) 449
Doubt" ...................................
Kwasniewski, Peter A., "St. Thomas, Extasis, and Union with the Beloved"
.........................................
61 (1997) 587
Levering, Matthew, "Israel and the Shape of Thomas Aquinas's
Soteriology" ...............
, ................
63 (1999) 65
Long, Steven A., "St. Thomas Aquinas through the Analytic Looking65 (2001) 259
Glass" ....................................

PROPER NAMES IN TmES

659

__ , "Evangelium vitae, St. Thomas Aquinas, and the Death Penalty"
........................................
'63 (1999) 511
Loughlin, Stephen, "Similarities and Differences between Human and
Animal Emotion in Aquinas's Thought" ............ 65 (2001) 45
Madigan, Kevin, "Aquinas and Olivi on Evangelical Poverty: A Medieval
Debate and Its Modern Significance" ............. 61 (1997) 567
Marshall, Bruce, "Faith and Reason Reconsidered: Aquinas and Luther on
Deciding What Is True" ........................
63 (1999) 1
McAleer, Graham J., "Matter and the Unity of Being in the Philosophical
Theology of Thomas Aquinas" .................
61 (1997) 257
Mirkes, Renee, O.S.F., "Aquinas's Doctrine of Moral Virtue and Its
Significance for Theories of Facility" ............. 61 (1997) 189
Nolan, Michael, "The Aristotelian Background to Aquinas's Denial that
64 (2000) 21
"Woman is a Defective Male" ...................
Pagan-Aguiar, Peter A., "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality: Paradox
64 (2000) 375
or Mysterium fidei?" ........................
Peterson, John, "The Interdependence of Intellectual and Moral Virtue in
Aquinas" ..................................
61 (1997) 449
Raschko, Michael B., "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of
Lombard's Subsistence Theory" ...•.............
65 (2001) 409
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue" ..... 63 (1999) 553
_,"Eternity and Duration in Aquinas" ........... 61(1997)525
Smith, Timothy L., "The Context and Character of Thomas's Theory of
Appropriations" ............................
63 (1999) 579
Stevenson, William B., "The Problem of Trinitarian Processions in
Thomas's Roman Commentary" ................
64 (2000) 619

TORRELL
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Torrell on Aquinas" .........

62 (1998) 623

ULPIAN
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "Aquinas's Use of Ulpian and the Question
of Physicalism Reexamined" ...................
63 (1999) 613

WALLACE
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P., and Eric A. Reitan, O.P., "On William A.
Wallace, The Modeling of Nature" ...............
61 (1997) 625

BOOKS REVIEWED
Adams, Marilyn McCord. What Sort of Human Nature? Medieval Philosophy
and the Systematics of Christology. (Michael Gorman) . 64 (2000) 486
Aertsen, Jan A. Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case
of Thomas Aquinas. Uohn Tomarchio) ............. 63 (1999) 146
Alberigo, Giuseppe, and Joseph A. Komonchak, eds. History of Vatican
II, vol. 2, Formation of the Council's Identity, October
1962-September 1963. Uohn F. Kobler, C.P.) ....... 63 (1999) 142
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. Justice in the Church: Gender and
Participation. (Sara Butler, M.S.B.T.) .............. 62 (1998) 323
Auer, Johann. Dogmatic Theology, vol. 6. (Richard C. Hermes, S.J.)
...........................................
61 (1997) 334
Baseheart, Mary Catharine. Person in the World. (Philip Blosser)
...........................................
63 (1999) 490
Bastit, Michel. Les principes des choses en ontologie medievale (Thomas
d'Aquin, Scot, Occam). (Timothy B. Noone) . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 313
Behe, Michael J. Danuin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to
62 (1998) 493
Evolution. (Marie I. George) .....................
Berger, David. Thomas vonAquin und die Liturgie. (Aidan Nichols, O.P.)
...........................................
65 (2001) 499
Bertram, Jerome, trans. The Monastic Institutes. (Lauren Pristas)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 154
Bobik, Joseph. Aquinas on Matter and Form and the Elements: A
Translation and Interpretation of the De Principiis Naturae and the
De Mixtione Elementorum of St. Thomas Aquinas. (Stephen
..................................
63 (1999) 659
Baldner)
Boland, Vivian, O.P. Ideas in God according to Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Sources and Synthesis. (Timothy B. Noone) ......... 63 (1999) 481
Bond, H. Lawrence, ed. Nicholas of Gusa: Selected Spiritual Writings.
(Peter J. Casarella) ............................
62 (1998) 637
Bonino, Serge-Thomas, O.P. De la vbite, ou La science en Dieu. (Brian
62 (1998) 133
J. Shanley, O.P.) ..............................
Bowlin, John. Contingency and Fortune in Aquinas's Ethics. (Mark
65 (2001) 492
Johnson) ....................................
Boyle, John P. Church Teaching Authority: Historical and Theological
Studies. (Thomas Guarino) ......................
62 (1998) 469
Bradley, Denis J. M. Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and
Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral Science. (Ralph Mcinerny)
...........................................
62 (1998) 486

661

662

BOOKS REVIEWED

Brady, Jules M., S.J. New Approaches to God. (Dean A. Kowalski)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 638
Brock, Stephen L. Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory
of Action. Uohn R. Bowlin) .....................
63 (1999) 655
Brodie, Thomas L. The Quest for the Origins of John's Gospel: A
Source-Oriented Approach.
__ . The Gospel According to John: A Literary and Theological Commentary.
(Gerard S. Sloyan) .............................
61 (1997) 660
Brown, Montague. The Quest for Moral Foundations: An Introduction to
61 (1997) 664
Ethics. Uohn W. Crossin, O.S.F.S.) ................
Buckley, Michael J. The Catholic University as Promise and Project:
Reflections in a Jesuit Idiom. (Michael J. Baxter, C.S.C.) 64 (2000) 476
__ . Papal Primacy and the Episcopate: Toward a Relational Understanding.
(Avery Dulles, S.J.) ............................
63 (1999) 307
Casarella, Peter J., and George P. Schner, S.J., eds. Christian Spirituality
and the Culture of Modernity: The Thought of Louis Dupre. (Roger
Kimball) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 149
Cessario, Romanus, O.P. Le thomisme et les thomistes. (Timothy B.
Noone) .....................................
65 (2001) 137
__. Christian Faith and the Theological Life. (Servais Pinckaers, O.P.)
...........................................
62 (1998) 145
Clayton, Philip. God and Contemporary Science. (Edward T. Oakes, S.J.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 140
Cole, Basil, O.P., and Paul Conner, 0. P. Christian Totality: Theology of
the Consecrated Life. (Gabriel O'Donnell, O.P.) . . . . . 64 (2000) 147
Colish, Marcia. Peter Lombard. (W. Becket Soule, O.P.) ..... 61 (1997) 317
Conway, Pierre, O.P. Aristotelian Formal and Material Logic.
---·Metaphysics of Aquinas: A Summary of Aquinas's Exposition of
Aristotle's Metaphysics. (Mark Johnson) ............ 62 (1998) 490
Crosby, John F. The Selfhood of the Human Person. (Philip Blosser)
...........................................
62 (1998) 308
Crowe, Frederick E., and Robert M. Doran, eds. The Collected Works of
Bernard Lonergan, vol. 1: Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in
the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas. Uason King) ..... 65 (2001) 500
Davenport, Anne Ashley. Measure of a Different Greatness: The Intensive
Infinite, 1250-1650. Oohn Tomarchio) ............. 65 (2001) 141
Davis, Stephen T. God, Reason, and Theistic Proofs. (Michael J. Dodds,
63 (1999) 334
O.P.) ......................................
Davis, Stephen, David Kendall, S.J., and Gerald O'Collins, S.J., eds. The
63 (1999) 504
Resurrection. Oohn P. Galvin) ...................
Denton, Michael J. Nature's Destiny: How the Laws of Biology Reveal
Purpose in the Universe. (Marie I. George) .......... 65 (2001) 323
Dodd, Tony. The Life and Thought of Siger of Brabant,
Thirteenth-Century Parisian Philosopher: An Examination of His

BOOI<S REVIEWED

663

Views on the Relationship of Philosophy and Theology. (Thomas
Bukowski} ..................................
63 (1999} 666
Dupuis, Jacques, S.J. Toward a Christian Theology of Religious Pluralism.
62 (1998} 316
(Paul J. Griffiths} ..............................
Emery, Kent, Jr., and Joseph Wawrykow. Christ among the Medieval
Dominicans: Representations of Christ in the Texts and Images of
the Order of Preachers. (Gilles Emery, O.P.} . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 136
Emonet, Pierre-Marie. God Seen in the Mirror of the World: An
Introduction to the Philosophy of God.
__ . The Greatest Marvel of Nature: An Introduction to the Philosophy
of the Human Person.
___ . The Dearest Freshness Deep down Things: An Introduction to the
Philosophy of Being. (W. Norris Clarke, S.J.) . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 648
Eschmann, Ignatius Theodore, O.P. The Ethics of Saint Thomas Aquinas:
Two Courses. (Desmond J. FitzGerald} . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000} 332
Fackre, Gabriel. The Doctrine of Revelation: A Narrative Interpretation.
(John R. T. Lamont) .........•..............•..
63 (1999) 670
Farrelly, M. John. Faith in God through Jesus Christ: Foundational
Theology II.
__ . Belief in God in Our Time: Foundational Theology I. (Louis Roy, O.P.)
...........................................
63 (1999} 338
Field, Lester L., Jr. Liberty, Dominion, and the Two Swords: On the
Origins of Western Political Theology (180-398). (James V. Schall,
65 (2001) 157
S.J.) ........................................
Flint, Thomas P. Divine Providence: The Molinist Account. (Joseph W.
Koterski, S.J.) ................................
63 (1999) 663
Fortin, Ernest. Collected Essays, 3 vols. (Patrick G. D. Riley} . 62 (1998) 319
Gal, Gideon, O.F .M., and David Flood, O.F .M., eds. Nicolaus Minorita:
Chronica. (Timothy B. Noone) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 489
__ . Peter of john Olivi On the Bible: Principia quinque in Sacram
Scripturam: Postilla in lsaiam et In I ad Corinthios. (Timothy B.
Noone) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000} 492
Gallagher, David M., ed. Thomas Aquinas and His Legacy. (Steven A.
Long) ......................................
61 (1997} 137
Gallin, Alice, O.S.U. Negotiating Identity: Catholic Higher Education
65 (2001} 481
since 1960. (Larry S. Chapp} .....................
Gaukroger, Stephen. Descartes: An Intellectual Biography. (Desmond
FitzGerald) ..................................
62 (1998} 157
Gauthier, Rene Antoine, et al., eds. Quaestiones de quolibet in Sancti
Thomae de Aquino Opera Omnia. (Mark F. Johnson) . 63 (1999) 319
Gestrich, Christoph. The Return of Splendor in the World: The Christian
Doctrine of Sin and Forgiveness. (Thomas Weinandy, O.F .M.Cap.)
...........................................
63 (1999) 501

664

BOOKS REVIEWED

Gonzalez-Ayesta, Cruz. El don de sabiduria sequin santo Tomas:
Diviniuicion, filiacion y connaturalidad. (Luc-Thomas Somme,
O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 482
Goodman, Lenn E. God of Abraham. (David B. Burrell, C.S.C.)
...........................................
62 (1998) 327
Goris, Harm J. M. J. Free Creatures of an Eternal God: Thomas Aquinas
on God's Infallible Foreknowledge and Irresistible Will. (Brian J.
Shanley, O.P.) ................................
62 (1998) 312
Gormally, Luke, ed. Moral Truth and Moral Tradition: Essays in Honour
of Peter Geach and Elizabeth Anscombe. (Mark Johnson)
...........................................
61 (1997) 493
Greene-McCreight, Kathryn. Feminist Reconstructions of Christian
Doctrine: Narrative Analysis and Appraisal. (Sara Butler, M.S.B.T.)
...........................................
65 (2001) 153
Guagliardo, Vincent A., O.P., et al., trans. Commentary on the Book of
Causes of St. Thomas Aquinas. Uohn Tomarchio) ..... 61(1997)477
Harak, G. Simon, ed. Aquinas and Empowerment: Classical Ethics for
61 (1997) 480
Ordinary Lives. (Charles Pinches) .................
Hassing, Richard F. Final Causality in Nature and Human Affairs.
62 (1998) 645
(Laura Landen) ...............................
Hauerwas, Stanley, and Charles Pinches. Christians among the Virtues:
Conversations with Ancient and Modern Ethics. (Christopher J.
Thompson) ..................................
63 (1999) 156
Helm, Paul. Faith and Understanding. (Carl N. Still) . . . . . . 64 (2000) 143
Hibbs, Thomas S. Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Intrepretation
of the "Summa contra Gentiles." (Mark Johnson) ..... 62 (1998) 141
Hilkert, Mary Catherine. Naming Grace: Preaching and the Sacramental
62 (1998) 137
Imagination. (Kevin W. Irwin) ....................
Himes, Michael J. Ongoing Incarnation: Johann Adam Mohler and the
Beginnings of Modern Ecclesiology. (Bradford E. Hinze) 62 (1998) 472
Inglis, John. Spheres of Philosophical Inquiry and the Historiography of
Medieval Philosophy. (Mark Johnson) ..............
65 (2001) 301
Jenkins, John I., C.S.C. Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas. (Brian
63 (1999) 314
J. Shanley, O.P.) ..............................
Johnson, Luke Timothy. Religious Experience in &rliest Christianity: A
Missing Dimension in New Testament Studies. (Francis Martin)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 495
__ . LivingJesus: Leaming the Heart of the Gospel. (William F. Murphy, Jr.)
...........................................
63 (1999) 672
__ . The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and
the Truth of the Traditional Gospels. (Francis Martin) .. 61 (1997) 645
Jones, L. Gregory. Embodying Forgiveness: A Theological Analysis.
61 (1997} 150
Uoseph L. Mangina) ...........................

BOOKS REVIEWED

665

Keenan, James F., S.J., and Thomas A. Shannon, eds. The Context of
Casuistry. (Michael J. Baxter, C.S.C.) ..............
61 (1997) 647
Kent, Bonnie. Virtues of the Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the
Late Thirteenth Century. (Romanus Cessario, O.P.) ... 61 (1997) 473
Kretzmann, Norman. The Metaphysics of Creation: A£juinas's Natural
Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles II. (Thomas S. Hibbs)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 309
Lash, Nicholas. The Beginning and End of "Religion." (Edward T. Oakes,
62 (1998) 150
S.J.) ........................................
Leget, Carlo. Living with God: Thomas AIJuinason the Relation between
Life on Earth and 'Life' after Death. (R. E. Houser) ... 63 (1999) 485
Lehmann, Karl, Michael Root, and William G. Rusch, eds. Justification
by Faith: Do the Sixteenth-Century Condemnations Still Apply?
(Mark E. Chapman) ...........................
62 (1998) 650
Lubac, Henri de. Theology in History. (Mark D. Napack) .... 62 (1998) 481
Macintyre, Alasdair. Dependent Rational Animals: Why Human Beings
Need the Virtues. (Servais Pinckaers, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 473
Mamie, Pierre, Msgr., and George Cottier, O.P., eds. CharlesJoumet et
Jacques Maritain: Correspondance, 3 vols. (Gregory M. Reichberg)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 131
Marenbon, John. The Philosophy of Peter Abelard. (W. Becket Soule,
O.P.) .......................................
62 (1998) 642
Marshall, Bruce. Trinity and Truth. (Geoffrey Wainwright) . 64 (2000) 635
Martin, C. F. J., trans. Robert Grosseteste: On the Six Days of Creation.
(Steven P. Marrone) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 (1999) 163
Maurer, Armand. The Philosophy of William of Oclwam in the Light of
Its Principles. (Kent Emery, Jr.) ...................
65 (2001) 475
McGinn, Bernard. The Flowering of Mysticism: Men and Women in the
New Mysticism (1200-1350). (Aidan Nichols, 0.P.) ... 63 (1999) 323
Mcinerny, Ralph. A£juinasand Analogy. (Gregory P. Rocca, O.P.)
...........................................
62 (1998) 303
Mcinerny, Daniel, ed. The Common Things: Essays on Thomism and
65 (2001) 489
Education. (William A. Frank) ...................
Mcintosh, Mark A. Mystical Theology. (Ralph Del Colle) . . 64 (2000) 324
__ . Christology from Within: Spirituality and the Incarnation in Hans
Urs von Balthasar. (Ralph Del Colle) .............. 63 (1999) 330
Milbank, John. The Word Made Strange: Theology, Language, and
62 (1998) 633
Culture. (Michael L. Raposa) ....................
Miller, Monica Migliorino. Sexuality and Authority in the Catholic
62 (1998) 659
Church. (Francis Martin) .......................
Mohler, Johann Adam. Symbolism: Exposition of the Doctrinal
Differences between Catholics and Protestants as Evidenced by
Their Symbolical Writings. (Bradford E. Hinze) ....... 62 (1998) 472

666

BOOKS REVIEWED

Nachef, Antoine E., B.S.O. The Mystery of the Trinity in the Theological
Thought of Pope john Paul II. (Morris W. Pelzel) . . . . 64 (2000) 651
Nichols, Aidan, O.P. No Bloodless Myth: A Guide through Balthasar's
65 (2001) 319
Dramatics. (Matthew Levering) ...................
__ . The Service of Glory: The "Catechism of the Catholic Church"on
Worship, Ethics, Spirituality. Oohn E. Pollard) ....... 62 (1998) 654
__ .Dominican Gallery: Portrait of a Culture. (Benedict T. Viviano,
O.P.) ......................................
63 (1999) 507
__ .The Splendor of Doctrine. Oohn E. Pollard) ......... 61(1997)331
O'Daly, Gerard. Augustine's "City of God": A Reader's Guide. (Michael
65 (2001) 146
Heintz) .....................................
O'Meara, Thomas F. Thomas Aquinas, Theologian. (Thomas S. Hibbs)
...........................................
63 (1999) 139
Oakes, Edward T., S.J. Pattern of Redemption: The Theology of Hans Urs
von Balthasar. (Mark Napack) ....................
61 (1997) 652
Peterson, John. Introduction to Scholastic Realism. (Anthony J. Lisska)
..........................................
) 64 (2000) 643
Pieper, Josef. Werke in acht Biinden, vol. 3, Schriften zum
Philosophiebegriff; vol. 4, Schriften zur Philosophischen
Anthropologie und Ethik: Das Menschenbild der Tugendlehre.
63 (1999) 167
(Bernard Schumacher) .........................
Placher, William C. The Domestication of Transcendence: How Modern
Thinking about God Went Wrong. Oames F. Keating) .. 61 (1997) 469
__ . Narratives of a Vulnerable God: Christ, Theology, and Scripture.
61 (1997) 328
(Francis Martin) ..............................
Porter, Jean. Moral Action and Christian Ethics. (Christopher J.
61 (1997) 488
Thompson) ..................................
Pottmeyer, Hermann J. Toward a Papacy in Communion: Perspectives
from Vatican Councils 1 & 2. (Avery Dulles, S.J.) ..... 63 (1999) 307
Power, Dermot. A Spiritual Theology of the Priesthood: The Mystery of
Christ and the Mission of the Priest. (Guy Mansini, 0.S.B.)
...........................................
63 (1999) 494
Preston, Geoffrey, 0.P. Faces of the Church: Meditations on a Mystery
63 (1999) 326
and Its Images. (Lawrence B. Porter) ..............
Ramsey, Boniface, O.P.john Cassian: The Conferences. (Lauren Pristas)
...........................................
64 (2000) 154
Rogers, Eugene F., Jr. Thomas Aquinas and Karl Barth: Sacred Doctrine
and the Natural Knowledge of God. Oames J. Buckley) . 61 (1997) 320
Royal, Robert. The Virgin and the Dynamo: Use and Abuse of Religion in
Environmental Debates. (Kevin W. Irwin) . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 328
Ruse, Michael. Monad to Man: The Concept of Progress in Evolutionary
63 (1999) 159
Biology. (Edward T. Oakes, S.J.) .................

BOOI<S REVIEWED

667

Saint Thomas c!Aquin et le sacerdoce. Actes du colloque organise par
l'Institut Saint-Thomas-Aquin les 5 et 6 juin 1998 a Toulouse.
(Guy Mansini, O.S.B.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 320
Schindler, David. Heart of the World, Center of the Church: Communio
(Christophe
Ecclesiology, Liberalism, and Liberation.
Potworowski) ................................
61 (1997) 641
Schmitz, Kenneth L. At the Center of the Human Drama: The
Philosophical Anthropology of Karol Wojtyla/Pope John Paul II.
(Philip Blosser) ...............................
61 (1997) 142
Somme, Luc-Thomas, O.P. Fils adoptifs de Dieu par Jesus Christ. UeanPierre Torrell, O.P.) ...........................
62 (1998) 477
Stewart, Columba. Cassian the Monk. (Lauren Pristas) ...... 64 (2000) 154
Suso, Bl. Henry. Wisdom's Watch upon the Hours. (Sr. Mary Ann
61 (1997) 154
Follmar) ....................................
Swinburne, Richard. Is There a God? (Michael J. Dodds, O.P.) 63 (1999) 334
Tavuzzi, Michael. Prierias: The Life and Works of Silvestro da Prierio,
1456-1527. (Guy Bedouelle, O.P.) ................
63 (1999) 498
Thompson, William M. The Struggle for Theology's Soul: Contesting
Scripture in Christology. (Roch Kereszty, 0. Cist.) .... 61 (1997) 133
Torchia, N. Joseph, O.P. "Creatio ex nihilo" and the Theology of St.
Augustine: The Anti-Manichaean Polemic and Beyond. Uohn C.
65 (2001) 496
Cavadini) ...................................
Torrance, Thomas. Divine Meaning: Studies in Patristic Hermeneutics.
61 (1997) 146
Ueremy Driscoll, O.S.B.) ........................
Torrell, Jean-Pierre, O.P. Le Christ en ses mysteres: La vie et /'oeuvre
de Jesus selon saint Thomas d'Aquin. Uohn F. Boyle) .. 64 (2000) 631
Tracey, Gerard, ed. The Letters and Diaries oflohn Henry Newman, vol.
7. (Edward Jeremy Miller) ......................
61 (1997) 325
Valkenburg, Wilhelmus G. B. M. Words of the Living God: Place and
Function of Holy Scripture in the Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas.
(Lawrence J. Donohoo, O.P.) ....................
65 (2001) 484
Velde, Rudi A. te. Participation and Substantiality in Thomas Aquinas.
61 (1997) 159
(Desmond A. Fitzgerald) ........................
Volf, Miroslav. After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the
63 (1999) 326
Trinity. (Lawrence B. Porter) ....................
Ward, Keith. Religion and Creation. (M. John Farrelly, O.S.B.)
...........................................
61 (1997) 656
__ .Religion and Revelation. Uohn Lamont) ............ 61(1997)491
Watson, Francis. Agape, Eros, Gender: Toward a Pauline Sexual Ethic.
65 (2001) 304
Uoseph C. Atkinson) ...........................
Wawrykow, Joseph T. God's Grace and Human Action: "Merit" in the
Theology of Thomas Aquinas. Q. Michael Stebbins) .... 62 (1998) 153
Weinandy, Thomas G., 0.F.M.Cap. Does God Suffer? (Robert P.
Imbelli) .....................................
65 (2001) 311

668

BOOI<S REVIEWED

Williams, A. N. The Ground of Union: Deification in Aquinas and
65 (2001) 315
Palamas. Uames Le Grys) ...•...................
Wood, Allen B. Kant's Ethical Thought. (Riccardo Pozzo) .... 65 (2001) 149
Woods, Walter J. Walking with Faith: New Perspectiveson the Sources
and Shaping of Catholic Moral Life. (Dennis J. Billy, C.Ss.R.)
...........................................
63 (1999) 152
Zagano, Phyllis, and Terrence W. Tilley, eds. The Exercise of the
Primacy: Continuing the Dialogue. (Avery Dulles, S.].) . 63 (1999) 307
Zagzebski, Linda. Virtues of the Mind: an Inquiry into the Nature of
Virtue and the Ethical Foundations of Knowledge. (Thomas S.
Hibbs) .....................................
61 (1997) 485

REVIEWERS
Atkinson, Joseph C. . ...............................
65 (2001) 304
Baldner, Stephen ..................................
63 (1999) 659
Baxter, Michael J., C.S.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 476; 61 (1997) 647
Bedouelle, Guy, O.P. . ..............................
63 (1999) 498
Billy, Dennis J., C.Ss.R. . ............................
63 (1999) 152
63 (1999) 490; 62 (1998) 308; 61(1997}142
Blosser, Philip ............
Bowlin, John R. . ..................................
63 (1999} 655
64 (2000} 631
Boyle, John F. . ...................................
Buckley, James J. ..................................
61 (1997) 320
63 (1999) 666
Bukowski, Thomas .................................
Burrell, David B., C.S.C. ............................
62 (1998} 327
Butler, Sara, M.S.B.T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 (2001) 153; 62 (1998} 323
62 (1998) 637
Casarella, Peter J. . .................................
Cavadini, John C...................................
65 (2001) 496
Cessario, Romanus, O.P ..............................
61 (1997} 473
62 (1998) 650
Chapman, Mark E. . ................................
Chapp, Larry S. . ..................................
65 (2001} 481
Clarke, W. Norris, S.J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 648
61 (1997) 664
Crossin, John W., O.S.F.S............................
Del Colle, Ralph . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 324; 63 (1999) 330
Dodds, Michael J., O.P. . ............................
63 (1999) 334
65 (2001) 484
Donohoo, Lawrence J., O.P. . ........................
Driscoll, Jeremy, O.S.B. . ............................
61 (1997) 146
63 (1999) 307
Dulles, Avery, S.J. . ................................
Emery, Gilles, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 136
65 (2001} 475
Emery, Kent, Jr. . ..................................
Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B. . ...........................
61 (1997) 656
Fitzgerald, Desmond ...... 64 (2000) 332; 62 (1998) 157; 61 (1997) 159
Follmar, Sr. Mary Ann ..............................
61 (1997) 154
Frank, William A. ..................................
65 (2001) 489
63 (1999} 504
Galvin, John P. . ...................................
George, Marie I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 (2001) 323; 62 (1998} 493
Gorman, Michael ..................................
64 (2000) 486
62 (1998} 316
Griffiths, Paul J. . ..................................
Guarino, Thomas ..................................
62 (1998) 469
Heintz, Michael ...................................
65 (2001) 146
61 (1997} 334
Hermes, Richard C., S.J. ............................
Hibbs, Thomas S.......... 64 (2000) 309; 63 (1999) 139; 61 (1997} 485
Hinze, Bradford E..................................
62 (1998) 472
669

670

REVIEWERS

Houser, R. E. . ....................................
63 (1999) 485
: . 65 (2001) 311
Imbelli, Robert P. . ...............................
Irwin, Kevin W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 328; 62 (1998) 137
Johnson, Mark ........... 65 (2001) 492; 65 (2001) 301; 63 (1999) 319
-- ......•............
62 (1998) 490; 62 (1998) 141; 61 (1997) 493
Keating, James F. . .................................
61 (1997) 469
Kereszty, Roch, 0. Cist..............................
61 (1997) 133
Kimball, Roger . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 149
65 (2001) 500
King, Jason .......................................
63 (1999) 142
Kobler, John F., C.P. . ..............................
Koterski, Joseph W., S.J. . ...........................
63 (1999) 663
Kowalski, Dean A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 638
Lamont, John R. T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 (1999) 670; 61 (1997) 491
Landen, Laura ....................................
62 (1998) 645
Le Grys, James ....................................
65 (2001) 315
Levering, Matthew .................................
65 (2001) 319
Lisska, Anthony J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 643
61 (1997) 137
Long, Steven A. ...................................
61 (1997) 150
Mangina, Joseph L. ................................
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 320; 63 (1999) 494
Marrone, Steven P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 (1999) 163
Martin, Francis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 495; 62 (1998) 659
-- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 (1997) 645; 61 (1997) 328
Mdnerny, Ralph ..................................
62 (1998) 486
61 (1997) 325
Miller, Edward Jeremy ..............................
Murphy, William F., Jr ...............................
63 (1999) 672
Napack, Mark .......................
62 (1998) 481; 61 (1997) 652
Nichols, Aidan, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 (2001) 499; 63 (1999) 323
Noone, Timothy B. . . . . . . 65 (2001) 137; 64 (2000) 492; 64 (2000) 489
-- ..............................
64 (2000) 313; 63 (1999) 481
O'Donnell, Gabriel, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 147
Oakes, Edward T., S.J. ..... 64 (2000) 140; 63 (1999) 159; 62 (1998) 150
Pelzel, Morris W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 651
61 (1997) 480
Pinches, Charles ...................................
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 473; 62 (1998) 145
Pollard, John E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62 (1998) 654; 61 (1997) 331
63 (1999) 326
Porter, Lawrence B. . ...............................
Potworowski, Christophe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61 (1997) 641
Pozzo, Riccardo ...................................
65 (2001) 149
64 (2000) 154
Pristas, Lauren ....................................
Raposa, Michael L. .................................
62 (1998) 633
Reichberg, Gregory M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 131
Riley, Patrick G. D. . ...............................
62 (1998) 319
Rocca, Gregory P., O.P. . ............................
62 (1998) 303

REVIEWERS

671

Roy, Louis, O.P. . ..................................
63 (1999) 338
65 (2001) 157
Schall, James V., S.J...............................•.
Schumacher, Bernard ..............................
63 (1999) 167
Shanley, Brian J., O.P ....... 63 (1999) 314; 62 (1998) 312; 62 (1998) 133
Sloyan, Gerard S. . .................................
61 (1997) 660
Somme, Luc-Thomas, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . • . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 482
62 (1998) 642; 61 (1997) 317
Soule, W. Becket, O.P. . ................
Stebbins, J. Michael •........•....•..................
62 (1998) 153
Still, Carl N. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 143
Thompson, Christopher J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 (1999) 156; 61 (1997) 488
Tomarchio, John ......... 65 (2001) 141; 63 (1999) 146; 61 (1997) 477
Torrell, Jean-Pierre, O.P. . ...........................
62 (1998) 477
Viviano, Benedict T., O.P. . ..........................
63 (1999) 507
Wainwright, Geoffrey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64 (2000) 635
63 (1999) 501
Weinandy, Thomas, O.F.M.Cap. . .....................