The Thomist 67 (2003): 157-95

THEOLOGICAL PRINCIPLES THAT GUIDED THE
REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970) 1
LAUREN PRISTAS
Caldwell College
Caldwell, New Jersey

I

N THE LAST THREE DECADES there has been much discussion,
even heated debate, about the liturgical texts currently in use,
or proposed for use, in English-speaking countries. Articles in
the popular press and in scholarly journals have centered almost
exclusively on the texts produced by the International Commission on English in the Liturgy (ICEL)-that is, on the quality of
translations, the linguistic theories undergirding them, the
competence of a mixed commission to compose original texts,
and the respective roles of the bishops' conferences and the Holy
See in approving vernacular translations. 2 These matters are vitally
1 I am grateful to the Intercultural Forum for Studies in Faith and Culture at the Pope
John Paul II Cultural Center, Washington, D.C., for the support that enabled me to complete
this article.
2 See, for examples, Robert Speaight, "Liturgy and Language," Theology: Monthly Review
74 (October 1971): 444-56; Ralph A. Kiefer, "The Eucharistic Prayer," Worship 50 (1976):
316-23; Richard Toporoski, "The Language of Worship," Communio 4 (Fall 1977): 226-60;
Ansgar J. Chupungco, "The English Translation of the Latin Liturgy," Notitiae 18 (1982): 91100; Cuthbert Johnson, "Prefaces: Shaping a New Translation," PastoralMusic 16 (April-May
1992): 34-37; Erasmo Leiva-Merikakis, "The Catechetical Role of the Liturgy and the Quality
of Liturgical Texts: The Current ICEL Translation," Communio 20 (Spring 1993): 63-83;
Eamon Duffy, "Rewriting the Liturgy: The Theological Issues of Translation," New Blackfriars
78 (January 1997): 4-27, reprinted in Stratford Caldecott, ed., Beyond the Prosaic (Edinburgh:
T&T Clark, 1998), 97-126; Donald Trautman, "Rome and ICEL," America 182 (March 4,
2000): 7-11; Letter to the Editor written in response to Bishop Trautman's article by the
Prefect for the Congregation for Divine Worship and the Discipline of the Sacraments,
entitled "Cardinal Jorge A. Medina on the ICEL Controversy," America 182 (April 14, 2000):
17-19; Ad Hoc Committee on the Forum on the Principles of Translation, The Voice of the
Church: A Forum on liturgical Translation (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic
Conference, 2001).

157

LAUREN PR!STAS

158

nothing is more
expressive
the
than
each day.
popular controversy swirling
Nevertheless, the scholarly
the
texts has distracted us from
for the
Latin texts themvery same reason,
selves, their
The work of
vvas

little over five years.
prayers over the gifts, and
Paul
has about one
mately
the number
orations
new
some are from the

.... .,.

3 Some studies have been
For information about the sources themselves, see A.
Dumas, uLes sources du nouveau missel mmain," Notitiae 7 (1971): 37-42, 74-77, 94-95,
134-36, 276-80, 409-10; Anthony Ward and Cuthbert Johnson,
Sources of the Roman
Missal (1975)," Notitiae 22 (1986): 445-747; 23 (1987): 413-1009; and 32 (1996): 7-179.
For works that examine elements of the Latin typical edition of the Missal of Paul VI in
relation to their sources see Thomas A. Krosnicki, Ancient Themes in Modem Prayer
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of A.merica Press, 1973); Anthony Cekada, The
Problems with the Prayers of the Modem Mass (Rockford, Ill.: Tan Books and Publishers,
1991); Gerard Moore, Vatican II and the Collects for Ordinary Time: A
in the Roman
Missal (1975) (San Francisco: The Scholars Press, 1998); Lorenzo Bianchi, "A Survey of the
Theology, Historf, Terminology and Synta'L in the Prayers of the Roman Missal," in
Theological and Historical Aspects of the Roman Missal, The Proceedings of the Fifth
of Historical, Canonical and ne«i)logica1 Studies on the Roman
International
Catholic Liturgy (Kingston and Surbiton: Centre International
Liturgiques, 2000),
127-64.
4 The alphabetical listing of all the orations in the present Roman Missal in Thaddaus A.
Schnitker and Wolfgang A.
eds., Concordantia verbalia missalis romani: Partes
euchologicae (Miinster: Aschendorff, 1983), col. 2865-2910 contains 1,479 orations,
exclusive of blessing prayers. Annibale Bugnini, The Reform of the Liturgy (1948-1975), trans.
Matthew J. O'Connell (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1990), 396 states that the
new missal has "sixteen hundred prayers," which must be a round number that includes all the
blessing prayers. Matias Auge, "Le collete del proprio de! tempo nel nuovo messale,"
Ephemerides Liturgicae 84 (1970): 275 states t.hat the new missal has "about two thousand
prayers" (duemilla preghiere circa), a nu..mberthat, based on Schnitker's list, is hard to explain.
Both Bugnini and Auge state that the number of orations in the new missal is more than twice
the number in the 1962 Missal.
5 That is, the last edition of the Roman Missal prior to the reforms mandated by Vatican
H. The 1962 Missal is the last typical edition of the Missal of Pius V, also called the Tridentine
Missal, which was commissioned by the Council of Trent and first appeared in 1570.

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

159

sacramentaries or collections of liturgical formularies; still others
are new compositions. Many of the orations that were taken from
earlier missals or codices were edited. The newly composed texts
are woven from threads of two or three ancient orations;
constructed of phrases from biblical, patristic, or ecclesiastical
texts; or composed in their entirety by those who produced the
new missal. Therefore, many of the orations of the Paul
Missal
are not ancient prayers in the strict sense, but modern redactions
of ancient prayers or entirely new compositions.
At the time the new missal appeared, those involved in the
work of the reform published articles in v.rhich they set forth the
principles that guided
selection, arrangement, redaction, and
creation of texts, and explained how the principles were
concretely applied. 6 Frequently they offered examples. These
articles have received little scholarly attention though they are
great reservoirs
information about the practical decisions made
by the reformers. Because these decisions were often subjective,
of a new generation.
they invite reappraisal by competent
More important, however, than scholarly evaluation of the particular judgments, even those with widespread application, is the
objective review of the philosophical and theological principles
that drove the reform. This has not
been undertaken. A
thorough evaluation of these principles
distinguish those
from those embraced by the
stipulated by the council
Consilium 7 the course of the revision process, and evaluate the
See, for example, Henry Ashworth, "The Prayers for the Dead in the Missal of Pope Paul
VI," Ephemerides Liturgicae 85 (1971): 3-15; Auge, "Le coliete del proprio de! tempo nel
nuovo messale," 275-98; Carlo Braga, "II nuovo messale romano," Ephe<meridesLiturgicae 84
(1970): 249·74; Carlo Braga, "II 'proprium de sanctis,"' Ephemerides Liturgicae 84 (1970):
401-3; Antoine Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," Questions Liturgiques 25
(1971): 263-70; Walter Ferretti, "Le orazioni 'post communionem' de tempore nel nuovo
messale romano," Ephemerides Liturgicae 84 (1970): 321-41; Vincenzo Raffa, "Le orazioni
'post communionem' de tempore nel nuovo rnessale rom:mo," Ephemerides Liturgicae 84
(1970): 299-391.
7 The task of implementing the reform of the liturgy mandated by Vatican II was given to
a group named the Consilium ad exsequendam Constitutionem de Sacra Liturgia (Consultation
to carry out the Constitution on the Sacred Liturgy)" The Consilium was comprised of
members, consuhors, and advisors" AJl but three of the forty members were bishops" Members
were not responsible for producing the revised texts themselves, but for deciding matters of
policy and approving schemata proposed by the various coetus (study groups)" The study
6

160

LAUREN PR!STAS

the

definitively
renewal that was entirely
departed
a reform
tradition
inaugurated something
new, or a
is more accurately
between the preceding two
possibilities.
Perhaps the most
though by no means the most
connection with
Missal was written by Antoine
promulgation of the
9
the time
was a member of
groups were made up of several consuhors; one consultor, called the relator, was in charge.
Consultors worked together to review the missal and draw up the various schemata. Drafts
of schemata were sent to advisors for review before being presented to the members for
approval (Bugnini, The Reform of the Liturgy, 65-66).
Each study group was assigned a particular task. Coetus 18bis was responsible for the
prayers and prefaces. It had seven members. Five of these are listed as consultors and
functioned at such. Two are listed as advisors but one of these, Antoine Dumas, seems to have
functioned as a consultor for he eventually became relator of the group. See Consilium ad
exsequendam Constitutionem de Sacra Liturgia, Elenchus membrorum - consultorum
consiliariorum coetuum a studiis (Vatican: Typis Polyglotris Vaticanis, 1964), passim.
Three of the other authors cited in the preceding footnote are named in the same
membership list. Ashworth and Raffa were consul tors; Braga was attached to the office of the
Consilium secretary, Annibale Bugnini.
" For instance, Auge, "Le co!!ete de! proprio del tempo nel nuovo messale," 275-77,
explicitly notes that the Fathers of Vatican II did not envision a reform or enrichment of the
orations of the missal. Rather, he explains, the qualities and limitations of the euchologica!
texts became more evident in the light of the decision to introduce the use of the vernacular
and of the call in Sacrosanctum Concilium 21 that the liturgical texts "express more clearly
the holy things which they signify, and that the Christian people, as far as possible, be able to
understand them with ease and to take part in them fully, actively, and as it befits a
community." Bugnini, The Refoim of the Liturgy, 398, names certain principles agreed upon
by the Consilium in October 1966, that is, a year after the council had ended and six months
after study group 18bis had begun its work (on the preceding page, Bugnini reports that the
group's first task, reviewing and revising all the orations of the temporal cycle, had been
undertaken at a meeting in Louvain, April 5-11, 1966).
9 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 263-70.

THE REDACTION OF THE ROl\iAN MISSAL (1970)

161

Earlier he had been
the Sacred Congregation
responsible
the
charge
the
study
10 He was therefore
orations of the Paul VI Missal, Coetus
,
'
intimately involved in the decisions
discusses.
though his
article is, it offers a more comprehensive introduction
others because it
upon nearly every type of oration found
in the new missal. Dumas's
is divided into two
The first lays out the principles followed in selecting,
Missal, and
composing the orations
these
The second illustrates
'-'""'""'••vu by citing specific examples.
VI
conclusion, Dumas recommends that the
he
studied in the light
My essay follows

Dumas,
attention.
of

these
directing the
were implemented. Precisely because
us to start.
these examples are a

10 Bugnini, The Reform of the Liturgy, 397 n. 10 lists Dumas as a member of Coetus 18bis
and states that A. Rose became its relator when P. Bruylants died in October, 1966. This
appears to be an error. See Bernard Botte, From Silence to Participation: An Insider's View of
Liturgical Renewal, trans. John Sullivan (Washington, D.C: The Pastoral Press, 1988), 151;
and Piero Marini, "Elenco degli 'schemata' del 'consilium' e della congregazione peril culto
divino (Marzo 1964-Luglio 1975)," Notitiae 18 (1982): 668-69.

162

LAUREN PRJ:STAS

in presenting this
is not to assess
character
new missal,
to demonstrate the
importance of studying it
specific relation to its
sources. The scope of the present investigation is so limited
it can
identify
not
revised missal,
the
examples of revision themselves. Since these tendencies are
pronounced, and therefore may
characteristic of the
as
areas for further scholarly investigation.
a whole,

L EXAMPLES

We will examine ten
the eight numbered examples
that
Wherever
I introduce the example with an
Dumas's comments on the revision or type
English
of revision, and in every case
the
texts of
orations he cites. Dumas's citations identify the source prayers as
well as the redaction
appears in the
Paul
These
versions are set side-by-side
and English so
the
reader can see exactly
was deleted, retained, and changed.
A
of
most noteworthy features of
follows. I examine
examples cited by
of presentation is
taken from ancient codices, Latin
and
have been reguauuuau""''
or transcription errors
both of Dumas's text and
orations, are my own.
A) Revised Orations
Example 1: Accommodation to

Modern Mentality

first example is of a change made in order
accommodate modern sensibilities. Dumas writes:

to

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

163

Other texts, having become shocking for the man of today, have been frankly
corrected while respecting the structure of the text and the movement of the
phrase. For example, the former secret for Saturday of the second week of Lent,
which has become the prayer over the offerings for the third Sunday of Lent, 11
changes the expression: non gravemur externis, difficult to understand, to:
fraterna dimittere studeamus, decidedly more evangelical. 12
1962:SECRET
SATIJRDAY OF THE SECOND WEEK OF

PAUL Vl: 13 OVER THE OFFERINGS
THIRD SUNDAY OF LENT

LENT

His sacrificiis, Domine, concede
placatus,
ut, qui propriis oramus absolvi
delictis,
non gravemur externis.

His sacrificiis, Domine, concede
placatus,
ut, qui propriis oramus absolvi
delictis,
fraterna dimittere studeamus.

Appeased, 0 Lord, by these
sacrifices,
grant that we who pray to be set free
from our own sins
may not be oppressed by the sins of
those outside.

Appeased, 0 Lord, by these
sacrifices,
grant that we who pray to be set free
from our own sins
may be eager to forgive those of the
brethren.

The change from non gravemur externis to fraterna dimittere
studeamus creates an entirely different petition. The 1962 oration
asks God to grant, through the efficacy of Christ's sacrifice, which
is about to be re-presented liturgically, that the members of the
11 Before the liturgical reform of Vatican II, the oration prayed by the priest directly before
the Preface of the Mass was called the secreta (secret) because it was prayed in a soft voice. In
the new missal the same oration is prayed aloud and its name has been changed to superoblata
(over the offerings). In the ICEL sacramentary it is called the "prayer over the gifts."
12 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 267-68: "D'autres textes, devenus
choquants pour l'homme d'aujourd'hui, ont ete franchement corriges, tout en respectant la
structure du texte et le mouvement de la phrase. Par exemple l'ancienne secrete du samedi de
la 2me semaine de Careme, devenue la priere sur les offrandes du 3me dimanche de Careme,
change !'expression : non gravemur externis, difficilement comprehensible, en : fraterna
dimittere studeamus, decidement plus evangelique." Somewhat puzzling is Dumas's initial
presentation of this oration as "shocking to the man of today" and his later description of the
shocking bit as only "difficult to understand."
13 The Missal of Paul VI has appeared in three typical editions dated 1970, 1975, and
2002. All the orations identified as "Paul VI" in this study are identical in all three editions.

164

LAUREN PRISTAS

Christian community not be oppressed or burdened by the sins of
those outside the Church (presumably pagans, heretics, and so
forth). The revision asks God to make the members of the
Christian community eager to forgive the sins of one another. The
original, then, distinguishes the Church community as a whole,
with the sins of its own members, from the sum of all those who
do not belong to the Church, with their sins, whereas the revision
makes mention only of the sins of Christians and distinguishes
them according to whether, from the perspective of each
individual member of the Christian community, the sins are one's
own or those of one's brothers and sisters in Christ.
The 1962 text is not indifferent toward those who are
separated from Christ and from us. Rather, it expresses a deep
confidence in the power of his saving death and resurrection.
Those who pray it acknowledge that no matter what sins are
committed by those outside the Church, or how her members may
suffer as a result of these sins, those who have been redeemed in
Christ are not to be weighed down because faith assures them that
God has already granted them victory in his Son.
The 1962 petition expresses both a thoroughly orthodox
understanding of the nature of evil and a realistic sense of ironic
possibility. Only our own sins necessarily do true harm to us. The
sins of others, which we suffer as physical evil, cannot truly harm
us unless we permit them to engage our will so that a moral lapse
follows. It would be a lamentable irony if those whom Christ has
set free from the sins for which they are personally responsible
were to be brought low by sins for which they bear no
responsibility.
Dumas describes the original oration as "shocking for the man
of today" and "difficult to understand." Perhaps it seemed so to
him. At first glance many might think the prayer strange. Since
September 11, 2001, however, its petition is easily understood by
Christians of every stripe who have thought about the attacks on
the United States on that date in religious terms. There are two
points that flow from this.

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

165

First, the relevance of a particular oration for the Church
universal is not something that can always be judged by persons
of any one time or place. The prudent course is to trust the
wisdom of our liturgical tradition to beg for what we need even
when we cannot comprehend or imagine it. If changed historical
circumstances give fresh relevance to this oration, perhaps no
generation should permit itself to reject as unsuitable a petition
that has enjoyed long use. 14
Second, limiting the content of orations to what editors think
can be easily understood by the majority of the faithful unduly
limits the capacity of the prayers to enlighten and inspire. It seems
fitting that the corpus of orations include prayers that present
deeper mysteries of faith so that by meditating upon them the
faithful may grow in wisdom and love.
Dumas asserts that the revised oration is "decidedly more
evangelical" than its source. Certainly the revised text conforms
closely to gospel instruction: its petition echoes the fifth petition
of the Lord's prayer. But the original oration brings us more
deeply into the mystery of Christ and causes us to internalize
aspects of it that familiar gospel verses do not make plain. The
difference between the two is that the revision petitions that we
do something that everyone who has heard the gospel knows we
are obliged to do, namely, forgive the sins of the brethren, while
the original asks something that only those who have drunk
deeply of the mystery of Christ would see for themselves. Neither,
in my judgment, is more or less evangelical than the other.
Lastly, the literary artistry of the 1962 text is manifestly
superior to that of the revision. Propriis, in the original version,
forms an overlapping double inclusion with delictis and externis,
14 Eugenio Moeller and Ioanne Maria Clement, Corpus Christianorum Series Latina 160,
t. 4 (Turnholt: Brepols, 1994), 256-57 lists forty-nine ancient manuscripts in which the 1962
prayer is found. It appears in Masses in times of tribulation (tempore tribulationis), for the
security of places <pro stabilitate locorum), for charity (pro caritate), for the concord of the
brothers <pro concordia fratrum), for rogation days, in Lent and in the time after Pentecost.
It seems to have been used both continuously and widely from the eighth century until the
reforms following Vatican II. A fiftieth codex has a variant according to which we ask not to
be grieved by eternal punishment (poenis non gravemur aetemis).

166

LAUREN PRISTAS

and the result clause, propriis oramus absolvi delictis, II non
gravemur externis, presents a perfectly balanced chiasm:
propriis/externis (sins belonging to us/the sins of outsiders) and
oramus absolvi/non gravemur (we pray to be set free/we may not
be burdened). On account of our own sins, we send prayer up to
heaven; on account of the sins of those outside the Church, we
are in danger of being weighed down. Also, a slight rhyme
produced by the unstressed ablative endings runs through the
1962 oration from beginning to end. The new prayer lacks the
literary sophistication of the older prayer: there is neither double
inclusion nor chiasm, and the rhyme scheme, because it is not
picked up in the revised ending, is abandoned midway through
the text.
Example 2: Exchanging a Negative for a Positive
Dumas's second example consists of two orations in which
positive phrases were substituted for negative ones. Dumas
explains:
Frequently the direction of the phrase has been turned around, going from a
negative to a more dynamic positive. Thus in the prayer after communion for the
fourth Sunday in Paschal time, the text (Gelasian 272) referring to the Good
Shepherd no longer reads: diabolica non sinas incursione lacerari,15 but: in
aeternis pascuis collocare digneris. In an analogous manner: nostrae fragilitatis
subsidium (prayer over the offerings for the tenth Sunday per annum) moved
from the eleventh Sunday after Pentecost, has become nostrae caritatis
augmentum. 16

15 Gelasian 272 actually reads "lacerare" (see full text below), but Dumas is clearly correct
in presenting the passive, rather than the active, infinitive.
16 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 268: "Souvent, le sens de la phrase
ete retourne, passant du negatif a un positif plus dynamique. Ainsi, dans la priere apres la
communion du 4me dimanche de Paques, le texte (Gelasian 272) relatif au hon Pasteur ne se
lit plus : diabolica non sinas incursione lacerari, mais : in aeternis pascuis collocare digneris.
D'une maniere analogue : nostrae fragilitatis subsidium (priere sur les offrandes de 10me
dimanche per annum, venue du 1 lme apres la Pentec6te) devient : nostrae caritatis
augumentum."

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

167

GELASIAN17 272: ORATION OVER THE PEOPLE
WEDNESDAY, FIFTH WEEK OF LENT

PAUL VI: POSTCOMMUNION
FOURTH SUNDAY OF PASCHAL TIME

Gregem tuum, pastor bone, placatus
intende,
et oves quas praetioso sanguine filii tui
redemisti,
diabolica non sinas incursione lacerare.

Gregem tuum, pastor bone, placatus
intende,
et oves quas praetioso filii tui
sanguine redemisti,
in aeternis pascuis collocare digneris.

Appeased, hearken to your flock, 0 Good
Shepherd,
and do not allow the sheep that you have
redeemed with the precious blood of
your Son
to be wounded by diabolical attack.

Appeased, hearken to your flock, 0
Good Shepherd,
and vouchsafe to place the sheep
that you have redeemed with the
precious blood of your Son
in eternal pastures.

1962:SECRET
ELEVENTH SUNDAY AFTER PENTECOST

PAUL VI: OVER THE OFFERINGS
TENTH SUNDAY PER ANNUM

Respice, Domine, quaesumus, nostram
propitius servitutem,
ut quod offerimus sit tibi munus
acceptum,
et sit nostrae fragilitatis subsidium.

Respice, Domine, quaesumus, nostram
propitius servitutem,
ut quod offerimus sit tibi munus
acceptum,
et nostrae caritatis augmentum.

Look mercifully upon our service, 0
Lord, we beseech you,
that what we offer may be a gift
acceptable to you
and a support to our frailty.

Look mercifully upon our service, 0
Lord, we beseech you,
that what we offer may be a gift
acceptable to you
and an increase of our charity.

In the first of the sets presented above, those who pray the
original version are aware of danger and ask for God's continual
17 All orations from the Gelasian Sacramentary are found in Leo Cunibert Mohlberg, Liber
sacramentorum romanae aeclesiae ordinis anni circuli (Rome: Herder, 1960) where they are

arranged in numerical order. The sacramentary that Dumas calls the "Gelasian" is also called
the "Old Gelasian." It is a unique Frankish recension of a Roman Mass book whose actual title
is that used by Mohlberg. The original manuscript is preserved in the Vatican Library (Codex
Vaticanus Reginensis latinus 316). The ancient sacramentary was the presider's book. It
contained all the texts he personally needed to celebrate Mass, administer the sacraments,
preside at the Hours and so forth. See Cyrille Vogel, Medieval Liturgy: An Introduction to the
Sources, trans. and rev. by William Storey and Niels Rasmussen (Washington, D.C.: The
Pastoral Press, 1981) 64-65.

168

LAUREN PRISTAS

assistance; those who pray the revised version request only the
attainment of their final goal. The oration in the Gelasian Sacramentary is a Lenten super populum, while the version in the Paul
VI missal is a postcommunion in Paschal time. The change in both
setting and use gives rise to several questions. What, for example,
is the exact nature of the super populum prayers in the ancient
missals? in other words, what sort of oration has been adapted? 18
Next, would a traditional Paschal postcommunion mention
attacks of the devil, ask for protection in more delicately worded
terms, or not mention any need at all?19 Finally, is there an
antecedent use for the expression "aeternis pascuis" that
recommends its adoption here?
In the second set presented above, the revised version requests
an increase in charity. Such a gift is a worthy object of petition,
for an increase in charity is an increase in our participation in
God's own life. It is an increase in grace. However, by their
essential nature all the sacraments, and especially the Eucharist,
18 The Missal of Pius V has prayers super populum only for the weekday Masses of Lent.
The Gelasian Sacramentary and other ancient Mass books have prayers super populum for
Masses throughout the entire year. Prayed at the end of Mass, these seem to be blessing
prayers that ask that the fruits of the mysteries just celebrated be given to the faithful under
an aspect that particularly befits the season or feast. In this setting, they connote far more than
would be the case if the same prayer were used as the collect in the same Mass.
However, Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 264, comments concerning
the super populum: "We note, finally, that certain prayers over the people formerly used in
Lent, have retaken their place as collects" ("Notons, enfin que certaines prieres sur le peuple,
autrefois utilisees en Careme, ont repris leur place de collectes"). He is thinking, evidently,
only of the super populum of the 1962 Missal and, on the evidence of the Gelasian
Sacramentary, his judgment that these prayers were originally collects appears to be wrong.
Missale Romanum (1970) reintroduces "orationes super populum." Under this title the
third typical edition presents twenty-four prayers any one of which may be used at the
discretion of the priest at the end of any celebration of Mass, or of the liturgy of the Word,
or of the Office, or of a sacrament (Orationes sequentes adhiberi possunt, ad libitum sacerdotis, in fine celebrationis Missae, aut liturgiae verbi, aut Officii, aut Sacramentorum). The
broad range of uses stipulated for these prayers "over the people," and the fact that whether
they are used at all lies at the discretion of the celebrant, distinguishes them from the super
populum of earlier missals wherein specific prayers are assigned to particular celebrations and
are not optional.
19 Certain of the Paschal postcommunions in the Gelasian Sacramentary do ask for
protection: no. 477, Tuesday in the octave of Easter, asks for protection in general terms; no.
503, Sunday of the octave of Easter, begs that we be spared entanglement in the traps of error;
no. 555, the third Sunday of Easter, asks that we be purged of vice and delivered from every
danger.

THE REDACTION Of THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

169

are rites in which God is worshiped and charity or divine life is
either bestowed
Penance) or increased (all the rest,
including Penance when it is received devotionally). A petition for
an increase
to be theologically precise, asks
for
what we believe
whenever the mysteries are
celebrated or
The 1962 version, on the other hand, asks
support for our weakness.
specific assistance:
of a phrase from "'negative" to
Changing the
"positive" inevitably entails a change
meaning, a
that is
Dumas although he makes no
verified in
cited
mention of it.
does, however, describe positive
as
"more
" The
when a positive phrase replaces one
is negative varies
the particular change made in
In
according to the prayer
general, however,
tension in
orations
excising mention
threaten well-being
Christ. In
sense, the
less
than the source orations.
More important than
however, is
fact that
texts
a
over
course of each year. Dumas tells us
tian life that
that negative phrases were "frequently" made positive. If
is
of Christian
therefore of
the liturgical
Christian spirituality,
have been
mention
those
struggle in
editorial practice raises questions
competencies to pursue: whether
revised
if so,
those)
Example 3:

a Restored Text

next
is another
m
editors
replaced a negative
with a
oneo In this case,
however, the substitution was made only
the prayer was
restored to its earliest known form.
teHs his readers:

LAUREN PRISTAS

170

It happened sometimes that beautiful texts, retained after a rigorous selection
that suits them best, still
process or even perfectly restored, and put in the
do not give complete satisfaction. In this case a slight adaptation remained
necessary. The most typical case is that of the collect of Easter Sunday that,
rescued from the Gregorian deformation in which it passed into the Missal of
Pius V and, made to conform to the best witness (Gdasian 463), ended with a
regrettable collapse evoking death for the second time in a few words. Vie
believed it good to put the ending in
with paschal
by replacing a
morte animae with in lumine vitae. 20

1

GELASIAN 463: COLLECT

PAUL VI: COLLECT

SUNDAY OF THE PASCH

SOLEMNITY OF THE RESURRECTION

Deus,

per Unigenitum tuum

aeternitatis nobis aditum devicta
morte reserasti,
da nobis, quaesumus,
ut, qui resurrectionis sollemnia
cohmus,
per innovationem tui spiritus a
morte animae resurgamus,

0 God, who unlocked for us the
gate of eternity through your
Only-begotten Son who
conquered death,
grant, we beseech you,
that we who celebrate the solemnity
of
resurrection,
may, through renewal of the Holy
Spirit, rise from death of soul.

Deus, qui hodierna die, per
Unigenitum tuum,
aeternitatis nobis
devicta
morte reserasti,
da
quaesumus,
ut, qui resurrectionis dominicae
sollemnia colimus,
per innovationem tui Spiritus in
lumine vitae resurgamus.

0 God, who on this day unlocked
for us the gate of eternity
through your Only-Begotten Son
who conquered death,
grant, we beseech you,
that we who celebrate the solemnity
of the Lord's resurrection,
may,
renewal of the Holy
Spirit, rise in the
of life.

20 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," 268: "II est arrive parfois que de
beaux textes, retenus apres une selection severe ou meme parfaitement restaures, et mis a la
place qui leur convenait le mieux, ne donnent pas encore entiere satisfaction. Dans ce cas, une
!egere adaptation demeurait necessaire. Le cas plus typique est celui de la collecte du dimanche
de Paqnes qui, degagee de sa deformation gregorienne passee clans le Missel de Pie Vet rendue
conforme au meilleur temoin (Gelasien 463), se terminait par lli1e chute regrettable evoqmmt
la mort pour la deuxieme fois en qudques mots. On a cru bon de mettre la finale en harmonie
avec la joie pascale en rempla<;ant a morte animae par in lumine vitae." The Pius V Easter
collect of which Dumas speaks is: "Deus, qui hodierna die per Unigenitum tmnn aetemitatis
nobis aditum, devicta morte, reserasti: vota nostra, qnae praeveniendo aspiras, etiam
adjuvando prosequere" ("O God, who on this day has unlocked for us the gate of eternity
through your Only-begotten Son who conquered death, attend our vows, which you inspire
by your grace, also with your assistance").

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

171

The poetic parallelism of the Gelasian text is the literary
expression of a theological truth: the bodily resurrection of Christ
from physical death is the source of our spiritual resurrection
from the death of sin. Therefore, what Dumas describes as a
"regrettable collapse evoking death for the second time in a few
words" is in fact something else entirely. It is an explicit
acknowledgment that Christ's victory over physical death makes
our escape from spiritual death possible.
One wonders, on this account, whether the criteria for
"complete satisfaction" were not a little too subjective or even
narrowly ideological. It seems likely that the editors saw the
further "slight adjustment" to the Easter collect as nothing more
than changing a negative to "a more dynamic positive." In this
case, however, the revision is inconsistent with the essence of the
celebration itself. The life we celebrate with Paschal joy is
available only through the destruction of death and is simply not
conceivable otherwise. To shy away from the mention of death's
death is to blur the character of the life being celebrated. The
good news of the Paschal mystery is definitive victory over death
and all that belongs to its realm.
The "slight adjustment" that disrupts the theological
parallelism of the oration also disturbs the parallelism of its
compositional structure. From a purely poetic perspective,
preserving the literary parallelism requires that the change
introduced by the editors be accompanied by a like change in the
first part of the oration whereby the Only-Begotten Son, instead
of conquering death, rises to life. Here, as in example 1 above,
the literary form of the original is attenuated in the revision.
Example 4: Changing Perspective
Durnas's next example concerns changes made to the collects
of two saints. He writes:
[l]t is easy to understand why, in certain collects for Christian leaders, the
expression: cu/mine imperii was changed to cura regiminis(Saint Henry), while

172

LAUREN PRISTAS

terreno regno gave way to terreni regiminis cura (Saint Louis): a simple change
of perspective for the same reality. 21

1962: COLLECTFOR ST. HENRY
QULY 15)

PAUL VI: COLLECTFOR ST. HENRY
QULY 13)

Deus, qui hodierna die beatum
Henricum confessorem tuum e
terreni cu/mine imperii ad
regnum aeternum transtulisti:
te su1212licesexoramus;
ut, sicut illum, gratiae tuae ubertate
12raeventum, illecebras saeculi
su12erarefecisti,
ita nos facias eius imitatione,
mundi huius blandimenta vitare, et
ad te 12uris mentibus 12ervenire.

Deus, qui beatum Henricum, gratiae
tuae ubertate 12raeventum,
e terreni cura regj_minisad su[!erna
mirabiliter erexisti,
eius nobis intercessione largire,
ut inter mundanas varietates

0 God, who on this day brought
blessed Henry, your confessor,
from the summit o( earthly
sovereignty into the eternal
kingdom,
humbly we im[!lore you,
that, as you, going before him with
the abundance of your grace,
granted him to overcome the
enticements of the age,
so may you grant us, throuiili
imitation of him, to shun the
allurements of this world and
attain unto you with 12ure minds.

0 God, who having gone before
blessed Hena with the
abundance of your grace
wondrously raised him from care o(
earthly government unto things
caelestial,
grant, through his intercession,
that amid the diverse things of this
world

12uris ad te mentibus festinemus.

we may hasten towarQLunto you
with [!ure minds.

21 Ibid.: "D'autre part, ii est aise de comprendre pourquoi, clans certains collectes de chefs
chretiens, !'expression: culmine imperii s'est change en: cura regiminis(saint Henri), tandis
que terreno regno faissait place a terreni regiminiscura (saint Louis) : simple changement de
perspective pour une meme realite."

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

1962: COLLECT FOR ST. LOUIS
(AUGUST 25)

173

PAUL VI: COLLECT FOR ST. LOUIS
(AUGUST 25)

Deus, qui beatum Ludovicum
confessorem tuum de terreno
regno ad caelestis regni gloriam
transtulisti:
eius, quaesumus, meritis et
intercessione,
Regis re gym Iesu Christi Filii tui
facias nos esse consortes.

Deus, qui beatum Ludovicum, e
terreni regiminis cura ad caelestis
regni gloriam transtulisti,
eius, quaesumus, intercessione
concede,
ut, 12er munera tem12oraha quae
gerimus,
regnum mum guaeramus aeternum.

0 God, who brought blessed Louis,
your confessor, from an earthly
kingdom into the glory of the
heavenly kingdom,
we beseech you through his merits
and intercession,
grant us to be 12artakers of Iesus
Christ, your Son, the King of
kings.

0 God, who brought blessed Louis
from care o[ earthly government
into the glory of the heavenly
kingdom,
we beseech you, grant through his
intercession,
that, through the earthly
res12onsibilities that we bear,
we may seek your eternal kingdom.

The actual revisions to the two collects were far more
extensive than Dumas reports. The revisions as a whole are
underscored; those of the kind that Dumas mentions are also
italicized. We will begin with the small change in each prayer that
Dumas names.
Henry, a German king who became Holy Roman Emperor,
died in 1024; Louis, king of France, died in 1297. The original
collect for Henry describes his rule as it was understood in his
own day. The revised version describes it in terms that reflect
modern democratic sensibilities. It is anachronistic. The original
collect for Louis does not explicitly mention his rule as king. This
is supplied in the revision-but, again, terms more reflective of
our historical circumstances than his own. The revision may have
been designed to accommodate a modern mentality. Its effect,
however, is to obscure the truth that holiness is found in persons
of every age and social rank. Henry and Louis were not simply

174

LAUREN PRISTAS

entrusted with the care of earthly government; they were
Christian rulers who became holy as they ruled because of the
Christian way in which they ruled.
In order to appreciate the nature of the other changes made to
the collect for Henry, we need to know what the editors sought
to achieve in their revision of the sanctoral orations. Dumas tells
us:
In the sanctoral prayers we ... put greater emphasis on the personality of the
saint, his mission in the Church, the practical lesson that his example gives to
men of today. All the corrections or new compositions in the new missal proceed
in this direction. 22

When the editors excised mention of Henry "overcoming the
enticements of his age" by the grace of God, they created a prayer
that tells us nothing about Henry's personality or his way of
holiness. The failure of the corrections to this prayer to proceed
in the direction established for all the sanctoral orations suggests
that the editors of the new missal did not view Henry's example
of freedom from worldly enticements as something suitable for
imitation by modern Christians, or that they thought the original
collect posits too great an opposition between heaven and earth,
or possibly both. Since these themes recur and become more
explicit in later examples, we shall consider them as they reappear
below.
There are three other differences that a more extensive
treatment would examine that can only be identified here. The
new text (1) omits the reverential formula "humbly we implore
you," (2) asks that Henry intercede for us rather than that we
imitate him (a change that flows directly from the decision to omit
reference to Henry's particular virtue), and (3) severs the
connection between purity of mind and freedom from the
attractions of this world established by the original prayer.
22 Ibid., 264-65: "Dans le sanctoral, on ... mieux mettre en valeur la personnalite du saint,
sa mission dans l'Eglise, la le<;;on pratique que donne son exemple aux hommes d'aujourd'hui.
C' est dans ce sens que vont toutes !es corrections ou creations qu'il sera facile de relever dans
le nouveau Missel."

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

175

The change in the petition of the revised collect for Louis is
striking and shares common features with the new oration for
Henry. The 1962 prayer for Louis begs that we may have
partnership with Christ who is the King of kings-here,
particularly, the King of King Louis-whereas the revised text
asks that we may seek, but does not specify that we also find,
"your eternal kingdom." The petition of the revised text,
therefore, is stunningly effete in comparison to that of the original
collect which seeks nothing less than full incorporation into
Christ. Similarly, the old collect for Henry begs that God make us
attain unto, or reach (pervenire), himself, whereas the new version
asks only that we hasten (festinimus) unto him. The verb pervenire
stipulates arrival, festinare does not.
A second feature common to both revised collects is a new
emphasis on the things of this world which, in addition, are
presented in a wholly positive light. In the revised prayer for
Henry, we hasten "amid the diverse things of this world," instead
of asking, as in the original version, to be able to shun its
allurements. In the somewhat convoluted revised collect for Louis,
we ask God to grant, through the intercession of the saint, that we
may seek his eternal kingdom "through the earthly responsibilities
that we bear." In the source text we ask to be granted partnership
with Christ "through the merits and intercession" of the saint.
The changes to these prayers, which are much more extensive
than Dumas indicates, highlight the methodological importance
of returning to the sources. Those who desire to gain a full and
accurate understanding of the work of the Consilium must
examine all the pertinent primary texts, and not rely exclusively
upon even those articles, like Dumas's own, that were written by
the reformers themselves for the express purpose of describing
and explaining their work. The number of changes is too great,
and their nature too substantial, for even the most thorough
summary to be adequate.

176

LAUREN PRISTAS

B) Centonized

In the section devoted to the creation of new texts, Dumas
describes a practice he
"centonization," whereby new prayers
are composed by stitching together phrases from t<No or more
ancient orations. Dumas explains: "This is a method that allowed
a revival of the ancient euchological treasury by using
best
texts so as to present them in a new form in the traditional
Roman style. " 23 The rest of our examples present the centonized
texts cited by Dumas so that the reader can see the process
firsthand and judge the success of particular instances.
Example 5
Dumas
us that the truth of the text was the first concern
of the redactors, 24 and that care
the
manifested itself in
changes to a great many prayers. Among these were those that
were thought to posit too great an opposition between heaven and
earth. The following remarks of Dumas are cited to introduce the
first centonized prayer because it seems also to illustrate how the
editors dealt with texts that they judged to place heaven and earth
unfitting opposition:
Concern for the truth required adaptation in the case of numerous orations, as
we have said above. For example, many texts, for a long while too well-known,
put heaven and earth into radical opposition: from whence the antithetical
couplet oft repeated in the old missal: ter1enadespicereet amare caelestia,which,
though a right understanding is possible, is very easily badly translated. An
adaptation was imperative that, without harming the truth, took account of the
modern mentality and the directives of Vatican Il. Thus the prayer after
communion for the second Sunday of Advent says quite justifiably: sapienter
perpenderein place of the word despicerewhich is so often poorly understood. 25
23 Ibid., 263: "C' est lli1 procede qui a permis de renouveler le tresor euchologique ancien,
en utilisant !es meilleurs textes pow- !es presenter sous une forme nouvelle, dans le style
romain traditionnel."
24 Ibid., 263-65.
25 Ibid., 267: "Le besoin d'adaptation s'est revele necessaire clans le cas de nombreuses
oraisons, par souci de verite, comme nous l'avons dit ci---dessus.Par exemple, plusiers textes,
depuis longtemps trop comms, mettaient en opposition radicale la terre et le ciel ; d' ou le

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

177

VERONESE26 173:
COLLECT
AsCENSION

VERONESE 105 3:
SECRET
MONTH OF SEPTEMBER

PAUL VI:
POSTCOMMUNION
FIRST SUNDAY OF
ADVENT

Da nobis, Domine,
non terrena sapere sed
amare caelestia
et, inter praetereuntia
constitutos,
iam nunc inhaerere
mansuns.

Prosint nobis, Domine,
frequentata mysteria,
quae nos a
cupiditatibus
terrenis expediant
et instituant amare
caelestia.

Prosint nobis,
quaesumus,
Domine,
frequentata
mysteria,
quibus nos, inter
praetereuntia
ambulant es,
iam nunc instituis amare
caelestia et
inhaerere mansuris.

Grant us, 0 Lord,
not to savor of what is
earthly, but to love
what is heavenly,

0 Lord, may the
mysteries we have
celebrated profit
us,

0 Lord, we beseech
you, may the
mysteries that we
have celebrated
profit us,
by which you now
already cause us,
who walk in the midst
of passing things,
to love heavenly things
and to cling to what
is lasting.

and, placed in the
midst of passing
things,
already now to cling to
what is lasting.

which free us from
earthbound desires
and cause us to
love the things of
heaven.

couple antithetique, souvent repete dans l'ancien Missel : terrrenedespicereet amare caelestia
possible de bien comprendre mais tres facile de mal traduire. Une adaptation s'imposait done
qui, sans nuire a la verite, tenait compte de la mentalite modeme et des directives de Vatican
II. Ainsi, la priere apres la communion du 2me dimanche de )'Avent dit tres justement :
sapienter perpendere,au lieu du mot : despicere,si souvent ma! compris."
26 All Veronese orations are found in Leo Cunibert Mohlberg, Leo Eizenhiifer, Petrus
Siffrin, eds., SacramentariumVeronense,Rerum Ecclesasticarum Documentas, Series maior,
Fontes 1 (Rome: Casa Editrice Herder, 1956) where they appear in numerical order. The socalled Veronese Sacramentary (or Leonine Sacramentary) is not a true sacramentary, for it was
never used in public worship. Rather, it is a private collection of Roman formularies. The
manuscript dates from the first quarter of the seventh century but the prayers in it are dated
variously from 400-560 AD (Vogel, Medieval Liturgy,38, 43). See ibid., 38-45 for a
description of the codex (Cod. Bibi. Capit. Veron. LXXXV [80]) and a survey of scholarly
opinions concerning it.

178

LAUREN PRISTAS

Because the English cognate
is "despise" we are
disposed to find the Latin expression terrena
et amare
caelestia rather harsh"
fact terrena
is better
away
or refuse to
earthly
despise the things
vocabulary of
things"' than
the two orations
coHection
the prayers
transcribed above, like
collect for Saint Henry already
so
even though
three texts do
examined, is not
present earthly and heavenly things as potentially or actually
competition for our affections"
they go so far as to
suggest an opposition that is inconsistent with orthodox
Christianity is a subject
a more extensive treatment
can
be provided here" What is dear, however, is
the reformers
made the antithetical
of the Veronese texts synthetic
omitting tvvo phrases:
non terrena sapere,
"not to take on
smell/flavor of the things of earth"; 27
"they may set
cupiditatibus terrenis
things of
"
[us] free from disordered desires for
The
in the Paul
postcornmunion are those
and instituis are
supplied by the revisers" The words
itaHdzed even though different grammatical forms of the same
Veronese
because the
appear
change in
significantly
the theological contours of
prayero The new theology must be credited to the revisers.
In Veronese
the mysteries cause us to love the
heaven. In the Paul
text, the mysteries become instruments
which God causes us to
heavenly things. The new wording
to do justice to the
belief
sacraments actually
signify" The new oration is ambiguous, permitting
cause what
not requiring a purely symbolic view of sacrament.
composing this postcommunion prayer, the revisers began with an
oration that unambiguously expresses the Catholic understanding
of sacramental efficacy and changed it to an oration
which
few Reformation Christians
disagree. 23
Meaning that we are not to take our inspiration or character from them.
issue here is not whether sacraments are insllrumental causes, but whether the
oration affirms their efficacy. Aquinas's understanding of the instrumental causality of
sacraments does not preclude their having power to
sacramental effect-indeed, just
27

28 The

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

179

The modern editors also substituted ambulantes, a present
participle active, for constitutos, a perfect participle passive. This
exchanges explicit acknowledgment of a divinely willed condition
(placed) for a self-description (walking, living). Like the new
collects for Saints Henry and Louis, this new postcommunion calls
greater attention to our situation in this world. Here, however, an
infelicity is introduced. Those who pray the new prayer inform
God about his actions and their own: "by which you cause us,
who walk in the midst of passing things, to love heavenly things."
Example 6
Dumas tells us that the present prayer over the offerings for
December 22 was centonized from three different orations, all
found in the Veronese collection.
VERONESE666:
COLLECT
MONTH OF JULY

VERONESE 1261: SECRET
BIRTH OF THE LORD

VERONESE 146: SECRET
MONTH OF APRIL

Auxiliare, Domine,
supplicibus tuis, ut
opem tuae gratiae
consequantur, qui
in tua pietate
confidunt.

Exsultantes, Domine, cum
muneribus ad altaria
ueneranda concurrimus:
quia et omnium nobis
hodie summa votorum et
causa nostrae
redemptionis exorta est.

Tribue nos, domine,
quaesumus, donis tuis
libera mente servire, ut
purificante nos gratia
tua, iisdem, quibus
famulamur, mysteriis
emundemur.

Aide, 0 Lord, your
suppliants that
they may obtain
the help of your
grace who trust in
your mercy.

Rejoicing, we hasten with
gifts to your holy altar, 0
Lord, for today, the
highest of all desires and
the cause of our
redemption has appeared.

Grant us, 0 Lord, we
beseech you, to wait
upon your gifts with a
free mind, that, through
your grace purifying us,
we may be cleansed by
the same mysteries which
we serve.

the opposite: "if we hold that a sacrament is an instrumental cause of grace, we must needs
allow that there is in the sacraments a certain instrumental power of bringing about the
sacramental effects" (STh III, q. 62, a. 4).

180

LAUREN PRISTAS

PAUL VI: PRAYER OVER THE

OFFERINGS
DECEMBER22

In tua pietate confidentes, Domine,
cum muneribus ad altaria veneranda
concurrimus
ut, tua purficante nos gratia,
iisdem quibus famulamur mysteriis
emundemur.

Trusting in your mercy, 0 Lord,
we hasten with gifts to your holy
altar,
that, through your grace purifying
us,
we may be cleansed by the same
mysteries which we serve.

Phrases from each of the Veronese orations were cut and
pasted to form the new prayer over the offerings. Only one word
underwent a change of form (confidunt to confidentes) and not a
single new word was introduced.
Veronese 1261 contains no petition. Those who pray it state
their motive for running to the altar with gifts: the highest of all
desires and the cause of redemption has appeared. Still, they ask
for nothing. Nor is there an ut clause: there is nothing that the
faithful expect as they bring their gifts. The Savior's birth and the
joy of it have left them both breathless and wanting for nothing;
the oration is a burst of pure delight. The Paul VI oration is also
without a petition, though the presence of the ut clause gives it a
somewhat different character. Those who pray the new oration
seem more to be informing God of their purpose than to be
carried away by sentiments proper to the liturgical moment.
Example 7
The new prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday was
centonized from two ancient sources, a Gelasian secret and a
Bergamese preface. 29 The Gelasian oration appears at the
beginning of Lent, the Bergamese preface in the Mass immediately
before Palm Sunday.
29 The Bergamese Sacramentary is a ninth- or tenth-century Ambrosian or Milanese rite
text-that is, it is a Western, non-Roman sacramentary. The manuscript is cited as Bergamo,
S. Alessandro in Colonna, Codex 242 (Vogel, Medieval Liturgy, 109, 437).

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

GE1ASIAN106:

BERGAMESE 454: 30 PREFACE

SECRET
SUNDAY AT
BEGINNING OF LENT

181

PAUL VI: PRAYER
OVER THE OFFERINGS
ASH WEDNESDAY

Sacrificium,
Domine,
quadragesimalis
initii sollemniter
immolamus te,
Domine,
deprecantes, ut
cum epularum
restrictione
carnalium a noxiis
quoque
voluptatibus
temperemur.

Vere dignus ... aeterne Deus,
cuius nos misericordia praevenit
ut bene agamus subsequitur ne
frustra agamus, accendit
intentionem qua ad bona opera
peragenda inardescamus tribuit
efficaciam qua haec ad
perfectum perducere valeamus.
T uam ergo clementiam
indefessis vocibus obsecramus,
ut nos ieiunii victimis, a peccatis
mundatos, ad celebrandam
unigeniti filii tui domini nostri
passionem facias esse devotos,
per quern maiestatem.

Sacrificium
quadragesimalis
initii sollemniter
immolamus, te,
Domine,
deprecantes, ut per
paenitentiae
caritatisque labores
a noxiis
voluptatibus
temperemus, et a
peccatis mundati,
ad celebrandam
Filii tui passionem
mereamur esse
devoti.

0 Lord, we
solemnly offer
unto you this
sacrifice at the
beginning of Lent,
imploring, 0 Lord,
that with the
restriction of
carnal feasting we
may also abstain
from sinful
pleasures.

Truly ... eternal God, whose
mercy goes before us that we
may act well, follows after lest
we act in vain, sets afire
intention, by which we may be
roused unto the performance of
good works, grants power by
which we are able bring these to
completion. We, therefore,
implore your clemency with
unwearied voices, that cleansed
from sins through the sacrifices
of fasting, you may cause us to
be faithful in celebrating the
passion of your Only-begotten
Son our Lord through whom ...

We solemnly offer
this sacrifice at the
beginning of Lent,
imploring you,
Lord, that through
the labors of
penitence and
charity we may
abstain from sinful
pleasures, and,
cleansed from sin,
we may be able to
be faithful in
celebrating the
passion of your
Son.

30 Angelo Paredi, Sacramentarium

Bergomense: Manoscritto de/ secolo IX de/la bib/ioteca
di S. Alessandro in Colonna in Bergamo, VI (Bergamo: Edizioni "Monurnenta Bergomense,
1962), 146. The text is from the Mass entitled "Sabb. in tradit. symbol" (Saturday for handing
on the Creed).

182

LAUREN PRISTAS

The Gelasian secret begs
God that the fast from food may be
accompanied by a like fast from sin. The first half
the
Bergamese preface is a
to God's mercy
provides the
motive for the petition
God cause us, by the fast his mercy
inspires and makes possible, to
cleansed from sin
faithful
Son. If we look at what the Paul
celebrating the passion of
prayer omits or adapts, as weH as what it adopts from the
Gelasian Sacramentary, we see that restraint in the matter of food
is replaced by the
of penitence and charity,
the
preposition "cum" by the preposition "per." In the Gelasian
prayer, it is God who gives the grace of abstaining from
pleasures; in the Paul VI text, this comes about through our
ascetical labors. Similarly, the word "facias" has been omitted
from the portion of text adapted from the Bergamese prefaceo In
the preface, God causes us, cleansed of sin, to be faithful in the
celebration of his Son's passion;
the Paul VI oration, again it is
our ascetical efforts that produce these effectso
The crucial question is whether the Bergamese preface and the
Paul VI prayer express the same understanding
agency, or to
put it another way, whether the efficacy accorded our labors
the new prayer is the same as that which is
to sacrifices
of fasting in the older text. The tvvo statements are grammatically
equivalent, but do not carry the same weight in their respective
contextso The first part of the Bergamese preface unequivocally
affirms that God's grace precedes and accompanies every
meritorious deed. The text as a whole acknowledges that salutary
acts are both from God and
their human agents.
Paul
oration, which makes no mention of our need for God's grace, is
vague about the graced origins of our striving and its every result
Compared to the source prayers, the Paul
text has a much
weaker and less precise theology of grace.
Example 8
Dumas's last example of a centonized prayer is the new
postcommunion for
Sunday. Its sources are a collect and

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

183

postcommunion from the Mass for Palm Sunday in the Gelasian
Sacramentary.
GELASIAN332:
POSTCOMMUNION
PALM SUNDAY

GELASIAN330:
COLLECT
PALM SUNDAY

PAUL VI:
POSTCOMMUNION
PALM SUNDAY

Sacro munere satiati
supplices te,
Domine,
deprecamur,

Deus, quern diligere et
amare iustitia est,
ineffabilis gratiae tuae
in nobis dona
multiplica;
ut qui fecisti nos morte
Filii tui sperare
quod credimus,
fac nos eodem
resurgente
pervenire quod
ten dim us.

Sacro munere satiati
supplices te, Domine,
deprecamur,

0 God, whom to love
and esteem is
justice,
increase in us the gifts
of your ineffable
grace,
that you who have
made us, by the
death of your Son,
to hope for what
we believe,
make us, by the rising
of the same, to
reach that toward
which we aim.

Sated with sacred gift,
humbly we beseech
you, Lord,

ut qui debitae servitutis
celebramus officio,
salutationis tuae
suscipiamus
augmentum.

Sated with sacred gift,
humbly we beseech
you, Lord,
that we who celebrate
in the duty of
bounden service
may receive an increase
of your salvation.

ut qui fecisti nos morte
Filii tui sperare
quod credimus,
facias nos eodem
resurgente
pervenire quo
ten dim us.

that you who have
made us, by the
death of your Son,
to hope for what
we believe,
may make us, by the
rising of the same,
to reach whither we
aim.

The verb "aim" is an acceptable but weak rendering of the
Latin verb tendere which means "to direct oneself" or "to direct
the course of one's life," as well as to "to stretch" or "to bend."
As such the new and old orations do not simply ask that we reach
our goal, but assume that we are applying ourselves to reaching it

184

LAUREN PRISTAS

consciously
consistently. The new text is a
demonstrates
centonization, risky
itself, can
impressive results when the theology, not simply the words, of the
into
new composition.
texts is
The revisers also composed new orations
transposing
biblical, patristic, and
texts, and,
instances,
wrote entirely new orations themselves. Dumas's article cites
it
be too great an undertaking
examples of these also,
to examine them here.
PRINCIPLES UNDERGIRDING THE DECISIONS OF THE
REDACTORS

Mentality
correctly identifying the primary
that directed the decisions
the reformers,
then accurately assessing
the principles
.and their application, is a matter of the highest importance.
foremost principle
·Dumas never explicitly
however, repeatedly speak of the
guided the redactors. He
accommodating
the modem person,
reforms
contemporary sensibilities, or current historical drcumstances. 31
31 See for examples in Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," " ... of a Missal
that, while it must remain faithful to the Roman style characterized by the complementary
qualities of clarity, density, and sobriety, had to open itself to contemporary
aspirations-according
to the very fruitful directives of Vatican H" (263); "At a more
profound level, liturgical texts, no longer failing to recognize the horizontal dimension, have
opened themselves to the human preoccupations which constitute the major concern of the
Church today" (264); "Without doubt, because of the complexity of our life dominated as it
is
industrial technology, these values exert a greater attraction upon our contemporaries
for whom the sober hannony of Roman art is prized above the artificial elegance of the
Baroque" (265); "In the litm'gical renewal, in particular, concern for the truth and simplicity
was, for the revisers, imperative from the outset that the texts and the rites may be
perfectly--or at least much better-accommodated to the modern mentality to which it must
give expression while neglecting nothing of the traditional treasury to which it remains the
conduit" (266); "In the oration after the third lesson of the Paschal vigil, slavery 'in Egypt' has
become 'slavery under Pharaoh' for reasons one can imagine" (268). Also, statements
presented eadie1 in the essay pertain in the present context: "Other texts, having become
shocking for the man of today, have been frankly
(267); "On the other hand, it is

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAI'\J MISSAL (1970)

185

His remarks suggest that the revisers labored under the conviction
that changes
us and our world had rendered
forms and
words of our liturgical rites somewhat obsolete and that these,
therefore, needed to be changed. Further, examination of the
examples he cites seems to verify this: phrases that were thought
to be difficult or shocking for modem persons were corrected or
adjusted. Dumas's constantly reiterated concern that the liturgy be
"'accommodated to the modem mentality" raises the question of
whether the primary referent governing the work of the reformers
was, in fact, the modern person, or, to express the same
possibility in a somewhat different way, whether the reformers
understood the task of reform to consist
reshaping the liturgy
the modem age as they ,.,,,,.,.,.'""''"'
according to the suppositions
them ..
To be dear, the issue is not whether liturgy is historically and
conditioned; inevitably it is. 32 Nor is
issue whether
the liturgy must
the human beings who celebrate
surely it
must. The liturgy communicates divine realities, the saving fruits
of the Paschal Mystery, to
beings in S3.cramental
and fully
celebrations
are, like Christ, fully
both the
Liturgical or sacramental rites, therefore, must
divine mysteries
their
recipients. This requires fidelity
to the truth
Christ and to what he himself has revealed to us
about our
nature. That is, liturgy must embrace
express a view of the human person that accords with gospel
revelation.
If the reformers gave
to the
of
age rather
than to the justification and sanctification that is accomplished
through liturgical incorporation into Christ, or if uncritical
person led
acceptance of modern philosophy's view of the
them to set
modes of ritual expr-ession
easy to understand why, in certain collects for Christian leaders, the expression: culmine
imperii [at the summit of sovereignty] was changed to cura regiminis [care of government] (St.
Henry), while terreno regno [earthly kingdom] gave way to terreni regiminis wra [care of
earthly government] (Saint Louis): a simple change of perspective for the same reality" (268).
32 Indeed, certain prayers and even whole celebrations, for example the Feast of the Most
Holy Rosary, had their origins in historical events.

186

LAlJKEN PRISTAS

The

33 Timothy Vaverek, "Cardinal Newman and Liturgical
3, no. 2
(1998): H-17, at 14. Vaverek's article discusses Newrliii2n's seven notes for a1!;t1r1glusit1u1g
development from corruption and applies them to liturgical development.
34 See, for examples, in Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missd romain," under the
su bh•ea<1mg "historical truth": "[the revisers] of the missal discarded without appeal the
recollections of hagiographical legends: the dove of Saint Scholastica, the maritime exploit of
Saint
the mirncuious
of Saint Peter
(264); under me
subheading "truth of inspiration and style": "It suffices to dedare that we no longer find in
the orations mention of fasts that are no longer observed, nor of torrents of tears that were
never shed. Many superlatives and excessive adverbs, even if tolerable in Latin, have been
pitilessly eliminated (ibid.); under the subheading "simp!iciry'': "It suffices, therefore, that
each prayer express the main point of its content without repetition or detours, submissive to
the principles
for a
homily: to have something to say, to know how to say it,
and to stop after it has been said" and "the elimination of ... types of prayers which in other
respects are inclined to be obscure or tedious when accurately rendered into modern
languages" (265); under the subheading "adaptation," something we quoted above: "from
whence the antithetical couplet oft repeated in the old missal: terrena
et amare
caelestia, which, though a
understanding is possible, is very easily badly t-ranslated"
(267); and "changes the expression: non gravernur extemis, difficult to understand, to:
1

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

187

unrelated to, the matter addressed in the preceding section.
Indeed, some of the same sentences could be cited in both
connections. Here, however, we are interested not in why texts
were changed but how they were changed-that is, what kinds of
things were included and excluded, and what modes of expression
were accepted and rejected.
After remarking that the list of things emended out of concern
for the "truth of inspiration and style" is too long for him to
itemize, Dumas gives two examples: "we no longer find in the
orations mention of fasts that are no longer observed, nor of
torrents of tears that were never shed. " 35 The two, evidently, are
representative types of a great number of different changes. In
presenting them together under a single heading Dumas, I believe,
conflates two issues. The first is whether the truth of an oration
depends upon its reflecting the actual situation of those who pray.
The second is whether truth requires that language always be used
literally.
Paul VI changed the laws on fasting so that those between the
ages of 21and59 ceased to be bound under pain of mortal sin to
fast on all the weekdays of Lent. 36 Only two days of obligatory
fast remain: Ash Wednesday and Good Friday, though according
to the Catechism of the Catholic Church fasting itself remains one
of the principal forms of penance in Christian life. 37 The word
"fast," whether appearing as a noun or a verb (ieiunium and
ieiunare), is found three times in orations of the Paul VI Missal;
two of these are in texts used exclusively on Ash Wednesday. 38
The new missal uses the word solely in reference to fasting from
fraterna dimittere studeamus" (268).
35 Ibid., 264: "Qu'il suffice d'assurer que !'on ne trouve plus, dans Jes oraisons, mention
des jefines qui ne sont plus observes ni des torrents de larmes qui ne furent verses."
36 "Paenitemini" (Apostolic Constitution on Penance, 17February1966),ActaApostolicae
Sedis 58, no. 3 (31March1966): 184.
37 Catechism of the Catholic Church, 2d ed. (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana,
2000), para. 1434. The other two are almsgiving and prayer.
38 Schnitker and Slaby, eds., Concordantia verbalia missalis romani, col. 1138. "Ieiunium"
appears in the collect and postcommunion for Ash Wednesday; it also appears in the collect
for the third Sunday of Lent. In addition, "ieiunium" is found in two prefaces: the proper
preface for the first Sunday of Lent and the fourth Lenten preface.

188

LAUREN PRISTAS

food. The word "fast" appears thirty-six times in the orations of
the 1962 Missal, where it is used in reference to both fasting from
food and fasting from vice.39
Dumas sees the change as required by "concern for the
truth. " 40 He evidently assumes that truth requires orations to
reflect the circumstances of the praying community. It is not the
nature of liturgical prayer, however, simply to reflect the
congregation's situation. Rather, the prayers of the liturgy place
appropriate sentiments on our lips and in our hearts and minds,
and present us with ideals to which we are meant to aspire, and
which we are called by God to attain, even as they give us words
to plead from God the grace of attaining them.
Therefore, to omit mention of fasting in our liturgical texts
simply because we are no longer obliged to rigorous fasting under
pain of serious sin seems not to be a matter of truth, but of
excessive literalism. The twofold effect is that liturgical prayer
fails to present us with a full picture of how we ought to be living
and permits us to forget that a supererogatory fast is a great good.
According to Dumas, "concern for the truth" manifested itself
in changes to a great many texts besides those that contained
references to fasting. His declaration invites further examination
of the missal so that we may become aware of all the ways in
which the orations have been adjusted to fit the circumstances of
the faithful and of how these adjustments, in turn, have changed
the liturgical depiction of Christian life and practice.
Dumas also tells us that the editors excised the mention of
"torrents of tears that were never shed." Weeping is a physical
act, but it also describes a spiritual state-namely, that of
contrition and repentance. "Torrents of tears" is a figurative way
of naming that state. Similarly, Dumas tells us that "In the oration
39 Andre Pflieger, Liturgicaeorationisconcordantiaverbalia,prima pars: Missaleromanum
(Rome: Herder, 1964), 293-94. The actual number of prayers is thirty-four, but two of them
are used twice. A prayer that speaks of fasting from vice follows the lesson from Micah on
Ember Saturday in September: "Grant us, we beseech you, 0 Lord, so to abstain from bodily
feasting that we may likewise fast from (our) besetting vices" ("Praesta quaesumus, Domine,
sic nos ab epulis abstinere camalibus: ut a vitiis irruentibus pariter jejunemus").
40 For another explanation see Auge, "Le collete de! proprio de! tempo nel nuovo messale,"
288-89.

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

189

after the third lesson of the Paschal vigil, slavery 'in Egypt' has
become slavery 'under Pharoah' for reasons that one can
imagine. "41 This prayer is the eleventh and last that we shall
examine. It reads:
1962 MISSAL: ORATION AFTER THE FOURTH PROPHECY OF THE PASCHAL VIGIL 42

Deus, cuius antiqua miracula
etiam nostris temporibus coruscare
sentimus,
dum, guod uni populo a
persecutione Aegyptiaq
liberando dexterae tuae potentia
contulisti,
id in salutem gentium per aquam
regenerationis operaris,
praesta, ut in Abrahae filios et in
Israeliticam dignitatem totius
mundi transeat plenitudo.

0 God, whose miracles of old
we perceive to shine forth even in
our own times,
since what you granted to
people in freeing them from
Egyptian persecution with the
power of your right arm,
that you worked unto the salvation
of the nations through the water
of regeneration;
grant that the fullness of the whole
world may pass into the sons of
Abraham and the honor of Israel
[literally Israelite worthiness].

The actual phrase
the 1962 Missal, then, is
persecutione
Egyptian persecution, not "slavery in
Aegyptiaca," that is,
Egypt." In the Paul VI Missal, it becomes "a persecutione
Pharaonis," from the persecution of Pharaoh. The images of the
national and are played off against one
original oration are
another
couplets: one people/the nations // Egyptian/Israelite.
God's act that sets one people free from another people is
repeated, in a greatly heightened sense, for aH nations in the
waters of baptism. The prayer recalls that salvation passed from
one nation to the whole world, and begs that the fullness of
salvation granted in Christ may now pass, as it were, back into the
to experience God's saving acts: the
people who were the
41 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 268: "Dans les oraisons de la Vigile
pascale, apres la 3me lecture, la servitude 'en Egypte' est devenue la servitude 'sous Pharaon'
pour !es raisons que l'on devine."
42 The third lesson of the Paschal Vigil in the Paul VI iectionary and the fourth lesson in
the 1962 Missal are both from Exodus 14-15. Both are followed, except for the differences
noted in the body of the essay, by the same oration.

190

LAUREN PRISTAS

people of Israel. To change "Egyptian" to "of Pharaoh" not only
disturbs the parallelism and poetry of the prayer, it betrays a
literalism that expects very little of the faithful by way of
knowledge of salvation history, spiritual imagination, or capacity
for nonliteral modes of expression. If the faithful are so poorly
prepared for full, active, and conscious participation in liturgical
celebrations, the appropriate remedy is sound catechesis.
Lowering the level of a liturgical text only lowers the level of
participation that it makes possible because it correspondingly
diminishes the capacity of the text to engage us.
Dumas's remarks about both tears and Pharaoh, as well as the
fact that the new missal restricts its use of the word "fast" to the
physical fast from bodily nourishment, 43 raise the question of
whether the reformers shied away from symbolic forms of
expression to a significant degree. 44 If so, a great number of
questions arise in consequence. Fully exploring the ramifications
would require the help of scholars with diverse areas of expertise:
anthropology, liturgy, philosophy, theology, art, and literature, to
name the most obvious.
CONCLUSION

Our examination of the revisions to the Roman Missal has
been confined to the orations that Antoine Dumas, an advisor to
the Consilium and member of the Sacred Congregation for Divine
Worship, presented to us for study. In examining only eleven of
approximately fifteen hundred orations, and these somewhat
43 Use of the word "fast" in reference to vice has a long history; it is prominent already in
the writings of the fifth-century monk John Cassian (e.g., De institutis V.10-11and21-22).
44 The likelihood of this seems confirmed by two other examples, although they are of a
different order because they do not involve orations and are not mentioned by Dumas. One
pertains to the lectionary and the other to the psalter. In the 1962 Missal, the first Scripture
lesson in the Masses for the evangelists Matthew and Mark is Ezekiel 1:10-14, the text that
names the four living creatures, man, lion, ox, and eagle, that became the symbols of the four
evangelists. In the new lectionary, Ezekiel 1:10-14 is not used at all-even though the
lectionary was specifically designed to broaden the faithful's liturgical exposure to the Word
of God, and the passage itself continues to exert noteworthy iconographic influence in our
churches. The second example is the decision to remove the "cursing psalms" from the psalm
cycle of the Liturgy of the Hours.

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

191

rapidly, we have not, obviously, established anything at all about
the character or quality of the orations in the new missal. These
eleven orations, however, were put forward by Dumas as
illustrative of the principles of revision, and for this reason merit
close attention.
Common to all eleven is a presentation of Christian life in
which nothing threatens well-being in Christ or casts a shadow of
any sort. Only two words in the revised orations suggest that
things are sometimes difficult. The first is "studeamus" of
"fraterna dimittere studeamus" in the prayer over the offerings for
the third Sunday of Lent (example 1, above). The verb studere has
a range of meanings extending from "try" and "strive" to "be
eager to" and "be zealous for." The second is the word "labores"
in the prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday (example 7,
above). Labor in Latin is a strong word which the English cognate
"labor" does not quite equal, for the Latin generally describes
work that brings forth sweat. Apart from these two examples,
about which it could be argued that functional equivalents are
supplied in the revisions, all the actual or potential difficulties of
Christian life named in the source texts have been excised from
the new ones. For the prayers we have examined these are:
spiritual dangers posed by the sins of non-Christians, attacks from
diabolic incursions, human frailty, worldly enticements, and
disordered desires.
Authentic Christian life is never without its hardships in this
world. We have promised in Baptism to die with Christ, and
dying is not easy. The tendency to exclude mention of difficulties
that we all experience in the nature of things seems especially illadvised because the matter at issue is not polite conversation, in
which it is sometimes wiser not to mention unpleasant things, but
prayer to our Lord. If we fail to speak of such things to him, we
also fail to seek his help with them.
Excising mention of things that pose dangers to spiritual wellbeing includes the practice of editing orations so that they present
the things of this world in a neutral or wholly positive light.
Dumas, in his discussion of "terrena despicere et amare caelestia,"

192

LAUREN PRISTAS

identifies "the modem mentality and the directives of Vatican II"
as the two reasons for revisions of this kind. Nowhere in his essay,
however, does he explicitly name either the directives of the
council or the aspects of the modem mentality that he judges to
have required such revisions. This raises an important question for
further study: whether the Fathers of Vatican II actually modified
Church teaching about the Christian's relationship to the things
of this world in a way that required amendment to our liturgical
texts, and, if so, whether the actual changes made to the prayers
implemented the revised teaching with appropriate nuance.
An important doctrinal issue presents itself in the new
postcommunion for the first Sunday of Advent. Comparison with
its source (Veronese 1053) reveals that the Paul VI oration
forsakes a clearly worded Catholic sacramental theology for
something that, in its vagueness, is utterly consistent with much
Protestant sacramental thought. This raises a question that has
significant pastoral implications and, therefore, merits further
investigation: whether the fullness of Catholic truth expressed in
the original orations was preserved in the revisions. Orations
which are found to have suffered losses in this respect need to be
restored, and their deficiencies supplied by sound catechesis in the
meantime.
The centonized prayer over the offerings for Ash Wednesday
is a second example in which the fullness of Catholic truth is not
preserved in the new oration. The theological issue here is the
Catholic doctrine of grace. In his essay, Dumas writes: "We are
able to say that henceforth liturgical prayer helps us better to
understand that the kingdom of God is constructed here below
out of humble human realities. "45 This statement, while amenable
to orthodox interpretation, does not tell the whole story. Humble
human realities cannot attain to, never mind be the raw material
for, the kingdom of God unless God's grace, as the Bergamese
preface puts it, "goes before us that we may act well, follows after
lest we act in vain, sets afire intention, by which we may be
45 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau rnissel rornain," 264: "On peut dire que, desorrnais,
la priere liturgique aide rnieux a cornprendre que le royaurne de Dieu se construit ici-bas, a
partir des humbles realites hurnaines."

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

193

roused unto the performance of good works, and grants power by
which we are able bring these to completion." Christian faith tells
us that humble human nature is called to an end infinitely beyond
the scope of its natural powers, nothing less than everlasting
interpersonal communion with the Blessed Trinity, and that it is
made capable of reaching this end solely by divine grace. Dumas's
failure to mention God's grace is the more grave in the context we
cite precisely because he is stipulating a principle that guided the
reform. Furthermore, this principle, with its theological defect
uncorrected, seems to have guided the centonization process that
excised mention of God's work as the new prayer over the
offerings for Ash Wednesday was stitched together from the older
texts. The very important question that arises in this connection
is to what extent the failure to give due acknowledgment to the
need for God's grace permeates the new missal, for the faithful
are ill-served by prayers of a Pelagian hue.
In three of the examples we saw that the literary devices that
give depth, beauty, and polish to the original orations-indeed,
that draw us into their abundance-do not appear in the revised
texts. Nor were we able to discover comparable compositional
sophistication in the new orations. This is no small matter. Form
and content are intrinsically united in all literary composition;
together they are the text and, because we are incarnate spirits,
together they engage us. On this account, it seems likely that
redactions which lower the literary quality of liturgical texts
correspondingly diminish their capacity to draw the faithful into
full, active, and conscious participation. 46 This, together with the
editorial practice of excising phrases or concepts that are "difficult
to understand," raises several questions for scholars to pursue:
whether the faithful are drawn to fuller participation by prayers
of unexceptional literary quality or by those of greater
sophistication and beauty; whether the faithful are more actively
engaged by prayers whose full meaning is immediately
comprehensible or by those whose depths continue to unfold as
they are heard again and again; whether the prayers of the new
46

Cf. Sacrosanctum Concilium 14.

194

LAUREN PRlSTAS

elementary as
however,
us
principles

theological
scholars to evaluate.
the changes he cites a .. ...

1-;r.a,..,,.,-.;.

of shifts are dearly discernible:
rationalism,
an
modern
at the
miraculous events 49 and symbolic or
47 Edmond Bishop, "The Genius of the Roman F.ite," in Liturgica Historica: Papers on the
Liturgy and Religious Life of the Western Church (Oxford: Clarendon, 1918), 3. I am grateful
to NeilJ. Roy of The Catholic University of America for suggesting that I quote Bishop in this
context.
48 Dumas, "Les oraisons du nouveau missel romain," 265: "obeiss::mtaux principes requis
pour une bmme homelie: avoir quelque chose adire, "'1voir le dire, s'an:eter apres l'avoir dit."
49 For example, "the revisers ... of the missal discarded without appeal the recollections
of hagiographical legends: the dove of Saint Scholastica, the maritime
of Saint
Raymond, the miraculous designation of Saint Peter Chrysologus" ("les reviseurs ... ont

THE REDACTION OF THE ROMAN MISSAL (1970)

195

tendencies, clearly evident in such a small sampling of texts,
reflect Enlightenment preoccupations and presuppositions. They
raise the question of whether Enlightenment presuppositions have
shaped our new liturgical books and rites, and, if so, in what
ways, to what extent, and with what effect-all issues that merit
exploration by scholars with the requisite philosophical and
theological competencies.
It is likely that, for those who have the eyes to see such things,
every liturgical text manifests the grace and glory, and bears the
smudge and smell, of the age that produced it. The Paul VI Missal
presents an anomaly for, as we have seen, the reformers revised
the texts of every age. In consequence, and this needs to be
confirmed or contradicted by careful objective examination, it
may be the case that nearly all the texts of our missal reflect the
strengths and weaknesses, the insights and biases, the
achievements and the limitations of but one age, our own-as the
anachronistic collects for Saints Henry and Louis certainly do. If
this is indeed so, then Catholics of today, in spite of the access
made possible by vernacular celebrations, have far less liturgical
exposure to the wisdom of our past and the wondrous diversity of
Catholic experience and tradition than did the Catholics of earlier
generations.
The work of the liturgical reform, as Dumas reminds us, was
enormous beyond imagining and accomplished in a very short
period of time. We owe those who labored to produce the new
texts a debt of gratitude. One way to express that gratitude is to
study their work well-not only the final product of their labors,
but the work itself-so it might be better understood and
appreciated, as well as refined, corrected, and perfected.

ecarte sans appel !es reminiscences de legendes hagiographiques : colombe de saint
Scholastique, exploit maritime de saint Raymond, designation miraculeuse de saint Pierre
Chrysologue") (ibid., 264); and "In the sanctoral prayers we have avoided all excessive
justification, all recalling of famous feats which are common to many (foundations, miracles,
etc)" ("Dans le sanctoral, on a evite toute apologie excessive, tout rappel de faits notiores et
communs a plusieurs [fondations, miracles, etc]") (ibid.).

The Thomist 67 (2003): 197-219

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS:
WHAT WAS ST. THOMAS'S INTENTION AT
DE VERITATE 1.1?
MICHAEL M. WADDELL
Augustana College
Sioux Falls, South Dakota

CHO LARS HA VE LONG BEEN interested in the first article of
Thomas Aquinas's Disputed Questions on Truth (De
Veritate). Most of this interest has been focused on Thomas's
discussion of the general modes of being
entis genera/es
consequentes omne ens), which later thinkers have come to refer
to as "the transcendentals." Indeed, influential commentators like
Umberto Eco, 1 Armand Maurer, 2 and Francis Kovach 3 have
turned to this text primarily-and sometimes only-for its insights
about the transcendentals.
The most important recent contribution to this exegetical
tradition was made by Jan Aertsen in his Medieval Philosophy and
the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas. While Aertsen
admits that Thomas "never wrote a separate treatise on the
transcendentals," 4 he also claims that Thomas left «three texts [I
Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3; De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1; and De Veritate, q.
21, a. 1] ... that have a more general character and present the
See Umberto Eco, The Aesthetics of Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard
University Press, 1983), 20, 22.
2 See Armand Maurer, About Beauty: A Thomistic Interpretation (Houston: Center for
Thomistic Studies, 1983), ch. 1, n. 26.
3 See Francis Kovach, Philosophy of Beauty (Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma
Press, 1974), 240-42.
4 Jan Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thotnas Aquinas
(Leiden: Brill, 1996), 71.
1

197

198

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

doctrine
the
its entirety." 5
these
texts, Aertsen takes the
article of De Veritate to
"Thomas's most complete account and afford insight into the
interests motiving transcendental thought. " 6 It is therefore
unsurpnsmg that Aertsen reads De
q. 1, a, 1 as a
and epistemological discourse
privileges
transcendental modes of being. 7
There are, of course, scholars
resist reading the first
as though it were primarily a discussion
article of De
the transcendentals. In 1989, Adrian Reimers published an
entitled "St. Thomas's Intentions at
Veritate 1," in
argued that "St. Thomas's a..nalysis
these transcendentals is
logical in nature, rather than ontological. . . . The ultimate
purpose of De Veritate 1, 1 is to define a word, namely, 'truth'." 8
Even stated in these broad terms, Reimers's claim has met
objection from
leading contemporary expositor of Thomas's
doctrine of the transcendentalso Aertsen writes:
This approach yields too limited a picture of Thoma.s's intentions. The question
is "What is truth?", and Thomas looks into the conditions for every investigation
into what something is. As we observed earlier, it is evident from the arguments
pro and contra that the question actually disputed in 1.1 is whether truth is
altogether the same as being. If Thomas were
interested in a logical

definition of truth, we are left with no explanation as to why he unfolds the
doctrine of the transcendentals in precisely this text. 9

The argument between these exegetes is complicated,
part
because their dispute is over Thomas' s mode of discourse as well
as the question he intended to investigateo Thus, one aspect of the
controversy derives from
that Reimers believes that
5 Ibid., 72.

Ibid., 73. See i!so ibid., 261, 336.
Indeed, Aertsen finds such a rich source of Thomas's ontology and epistemology there
that he attempts to construct the entire edifice of medieval philosophy upon his reading of the
transcendentals as the prima of human conception in De Verit., q. 1, a. 1.
3 Adrian Reimers, ast. Thomas's Intentions at De Veritate 1,
Doctor Communis 42, no.
2 (1989): 175-83. The tide of the present article, of course, refern to Reimers's suggestive
piece.
9 Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 106-7 (emphasis added).
6

7

TRU1H OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

199

Thomas's aims in this text are logical, whereas Aertsen maintains
that they are more ontological and epistemological. The other
aspect of the dispute arises from differing assessments of
Thomas's central intention in the text. Reimers thinks Thomas
intended primarily to discern a definition of truth, but Aertsen
holds that Reimers's interpretation of the text does not have the
resources to explain one of the most striking features of the text,
namely, Thomas's discussion of the general modes of being.
In this paper, I wish to address the latter, more fundamental
aspect of this controversy: what was Thomas's intention at De
Veritate, q. 1, a. 1? I contend that his primary intention was to
define truth. 10 This thesis can be supported both by close reading
of the first article itself and by analysis of the larger organizational
structure of the De Veritate. Thus, I will first examine the text of
De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 in order to explain how the discussion of
the transcendentals fits into Thomas's attempt to define truth
(section I). I will then pause to consider two objections against my
reading of this text. The first is the objection raised by Aertsen:
why would Thomas discuss the transcendentals in a text where his
primary aim was to define truth (section II)? The second objection
is a more powerful modification of the first: even if one can
account for Thomas's discussing the transcendentals as part of his
attempt to define truth, how are we to explain the striking detail
of this discussion-detail that does not seem to be demanded by
the task of defining truth (section Ill)? After addressing these two
objections, I will sketch the structure of the entire De Veritate in
order to show how this larger structure emphasizes the primacy
of truth, not the transcendentals, in the first question (section IV).
Thus, I will attempt to produce both "microscopic" and
"macroscopic" textual evidence for construing question 1, article
1 primarily as an attempt to define truth. Finally, to defray any
concerns that this dispute might be just a minor exegetical
10 This contention is obviously more consonant with Reimers's reading than Aertsen's. I
do not mean, however, to imply complete agreement with all aspects of Reimers's
interpretation nor complete disagreement with all aspects of Aertsen's interpretation. I only
mean to defend the claim that Thomas's primary purpose in the article was to define truth,
against Aertsen's objection to the contrary.

200

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

a few words about the significance
of Aquinas's
indeed,
medieval thought in general (section V).
L THIE SCHEMA OF DE VERITATE

Since the question of Thomas's central intention here is
primarily a matter of textual interpretation, it must be resolved by
turning to the text. To save time, I
focus my consideration of
the
artide on the corpus, examining it schematicaHy rather
line
line. However, we should at least note the question,
objections, and objections sed contra that set the context for
Thomas's response.
Thomas begins the first article of the De Veritate with a simple
announcement: "The question concerns truth. And first it is
'what is truth?' ["quid est veritas?"]. " 11 The question speaks
it seems dear
directly to the exegetical dispute at hand,
Thomas means to investigate the nature of truth. Indeed, the
"quid est" formulation suggests
the investigation wiH
culminate in a
of
However, the
is no sooner undenway
Thomas
seems to shift
In the first objection, he writes:
seems
that
true is altogether the same as being. In
book The
true is
which is'; but that
Soliloquies, Augustine says
which is is
other than being. Therefore, 'true' signifies
altogether
same thing as 'being.'" 12 Thomas's first argument
sed contra clarifies the
at issue
the objections: "On the
'useless repetition of the same thing is meaningless'
H, therefore,
true were the same as being, it would
be meaningless when a being is called 'true,' which is false;
ll "Quaestio est de veritate. Et primo quaeritur quid est veritas?" Latin quotations from the
Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate are taken from the Leonine Edition (in Opera Omnia 22
[Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1970-76]). English translations of the De Veritate text are my
own.
12 "Videtur
autem quod vemm sit omnino idem quod ens: Augustinus in librn
Soliloquiorum dicit quod «verum est id quod est"; sed id quod est nihil est nisi ens; ergo
verum significat omnino idem quod ens."

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

201

therefore they are not the same." 13 Notice that the question
disputed in these arguments is not precisely "what is truth?" but
rather "whether truth is altogether the same as being?" At first
blush, it is not dear how the dispute about the relationship
between being and truth is relevant to the announced question
regarding the quiddity of truth. On the other hand, if Thomas
were primarily interested in truth as a transcendental property of
being, the question of the relationship between truth and being
would be more obviously germane.
Since the announced question and the objections provide
ambivalent testimony, we must turn to the corpus of the article
for clarification ofThomas's purpose. Thomas begins his response
in a remarkable way: "Just as it is necessary to make a reduction
to per se nota principles in matters of demonstration, so too when
investigating the definition of any thing, lest there be an infinite
regress, and science and cognition perish altogether. " 14 The claim
that demonstrations must be reduced (or at least reducible) to first
principles is commonplace, but Thomas's application of this
demand to definitions is more striking. One would normally
expect a definition to be reduced only to a genus and a specific
difference. Nevertheless, Thomas begins his response by suggesting that all quiddities must in fact be reducible to that which the
intellect first conceives. Following Avicenna, he states that this
first concept is being (ens). Thus,
other concepts must be taken
from some addition to being.
Therein lies the rub. For, as Thomas points out, "nothing can
be added to being as though it were extrinsic to it, in the manner
in which a difference is added to a genus or an accident to a

13 "Sed contra, 'nugario est eiusdem inutilis repetitio'; si ergo verum esset idem quod ens,
esset nugatio dum dicitur ens verum, quod falsum est; ergo non sunt idem."
14 "Dicendum quod sicut in demonstrabilibus oportet fieri reductionem in aliqua principia
per se inteilectui nota ita investigando quid est unumquodque, alias utrnbique in infinitum
iretur, et sic periret omnino scientia et cognitio remm; illud autem quod primo intellectus
concipit quasi notissimum et in quod conceptiones omnes resolvit est ens, ut Avicenna <licit
in principio suae Metaphysicae; uncle oportet quod omnes aliae conceptiones intellectus
accipiantur ex addirione ad ens" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 1; emphasis added).

202

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

subject, since every nature is essentially a being [ens]." 15 When
defining a thing, we usually distinguish the species by adding a
specific difference to the genus. But when the term to be defined
transcends all genera-as truth does-there is no genus to which
the species can be reduced; the only "category" sufficiently broad
to contain it is being, and (as Aristotle noted) nothing can be
added to being in the manner of a genus because there is no
difference outside of being to specify it. 16
Fortunately, as Thomas points out, there are other ways of
adding to being. For while nothing can add to being in the
manner of something extrinsic to it, a term can express a "mode
of being" that is not made explicit by the term "being" itself,
thereby adding to being in ratione if not in re. 17 This logical
addition to being can happen in two ways, as Thomas explains. 18
The first type of addition results in the "special modes" of being,
namely, the categories of substance and the nine accidents. But
15 "Sed enti non possunt addi aliqua quasi extranea per modum quo differentia additur
generi vel accidens subiecto, quia quaelibet natura est essentialiter ens, unde probat etiam
Philosophus in III Metaphysicae quod ens non potest esse genus; sed secundum hoc aliqua
dicuntur addere super ens in quantum exprimunt modum ipsius entis qui nomine entis non
exprimitur" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 1).
16 Aristotle argues that being cannot be a genus (and thus that nothing can add to being as
a specific difference adds to a genus) because the difference must be outside the nature of the
genus. Since every difference is a being, if being were a genus, it could never be differentiated
into species. See Aristotle's Metaphysics 3.3 (998b14-17); cf. Thomas's IIIMetaphys., lect. 8,
par. 433. See also Aristotle's Topics 4 (122b20). Strictly speaking, the facts that truth is
reducible only to being and that being cannot be a genus make it impossible to define truth;
one must be content with a description of its ratio. I use the locution "defining" truth
throughout this essay because it is handier than "describing the ratio"; the simpler phrase
should not, however, be allowed to obscure the facts of the matter.
17 Another way to express this distinction would be to state that one can add to 'being'
even though one cannot add to being. In this paper, I have eschewed the convention of setting
off concepts with single quotation marks because there are no equivalent markings in the Latin
text. This occasionally leaves ambiguity about whether Thomas means to discuss an
extramental reality, a concept, or a word, but the ambiguity ultimately derives from Thomas's
own text.
18 " ••• quod dupliciter contingit. Uno modo ut modus expressus sit aliquis specialis modus
entis; sunt enim diversi gradus entitatis secundum quos accipiuntur diversi modi essendi et
iuxta hos modos accipiuntur diversa rerum genera; substantia enim non addit super ens
aliquam differentiam quae designet aliquam naturam superadditam enti, sed nomine
substantiae exprimitur specialis quidam modus essendi, scilicet per se ens, et ita est in aliis
generibus" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 1).

TRUTII OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

203

each of these categories has a more restricted scope than being, so
this manner of addition cannot produce a term (or concept) that
is coextensive with being. The second manner of addition,
however, results in concepts that are coextensive with being, or as
Thomas states: "such that the expressed mode be a general mode
consequent upon all being" ("ita quod modus expressus sit modus
generalis consequens omne ens"). 19 Now, something can be said
of every being either in itself (in se) or in relation to another (in
ordine ad aliud), and one can speak in each of these ways either
affirmatively or negatively. Thus, the terms "being" (ens) and
"thing" (res) are said affirmatively of every being in itself with
respect to its act of being and its essence, respectively. The term
"one" (unum) is said negatively of every being in itself inasmuch
as it is not divided from itself. Thomas then turns to the modes of
being taken in relation to another, stating that we call every being
"something" (aliquid) inasmuch as it is divided from other beings.
It is noteworthy that Thomas seems to have reversed his previous
order here, mentioning what might be construed as the negative
relational mode of being before the positive. Of course, in order
for there to be a positive relational mode of being, there must be
some thing capable of being related to every being ("quod natum
19 The full quotation reads: "Alio modo ita quod modus expressus sit modus generalis
consequens omne ens, et hie modus dupliciter accipi potest: uno modo secundum quod
consequitur unumquodque ens in se, alio modo secundum quod consequitur unum ens in
ordine ad aliud. Si primo modo, hoc est dupliciter quia vel exprimitur in ente aliquid
affirmative vel negative; non autem invenitur aliquid affirmative dictum absolute quod possit
accipi in omni ente nisi essentia eius secundum quam esse dicitur, et sic imponitur hoc nomen
res, quod in hoc differt ab ente, secundum Avicennam in principio Metaphysicae, quod ens
sumitur ab actu essendi sed nomen rei exprimit quidditatem vel essentiam en tis; negatio autem
consequens omne ens absolute est indivisio, et hanc exprimit hoc nomen unum: nihil aliud
enim est unum quam ens indivisum. Si autem modus entis accipiatur secundo modo, scilicet
secundum ordinem unius ad alterum, hoc potest esse dupliciter. Uno modo secundum
divisionem unius ab altero et hoc exprimit hoc nomen aliquid: dicitur enim aliquid quasi aliud
quid, unde sicut ens dicitur unum in quantum est indivisum in se ita dicitur aliquid in quantum
est ab aliis divisum. Alio modo secundum convenientiam unius entis ad aliud, et hoc quidem
non potest esse nisi accipiatur aliquid quod natum sit convenire cum omni ente; hoc autem
est anima, quae «quodamrnodo est ornnia», ut dicitur in m De anima: in anima autem est vis
cognitiva et appetitiva; convenientiam ergo entis ad appetitum exprimit hoc nomen bonum,
uncle in principio Ethicorum dicitur quod «bonum est quod omnia appetunt», convenientiarn
vero entis ad intellectum exprimit hoc nomen verum" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 1).

204

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

according to Aristotle,
sit convenire rum omni ente"). This
it
has two faculties through
relates to
the
and
appetite (vis cognitiva et
21 The relation between being
appetite is expressed
the term "good"
The relation between being
intellect is expressed
For the most
of the so-called
«transcendentals" is now complete.
yet (following the line
numbering
the Leonine
nearly forty percent of the
corpus remains
out of 105
These remaining lines
should be of great interest m assessing the role of the
the
as well as Thoma.s's
transcendentals
intention
the text.
Thomas's next step is rather
explained that
term "true" bespeaks a
between being and intellect,
Thomas goes
some detail
the cognitive
and
22 He notes that
it relates to the
of
rn
perfected through the assimilation of the
thing
known,
such a way that this assimilation rn
"cause of
cognition." Thomas
this
of
intellect and thing
the

pointed fashion,
conformity as its
relation
3.!l (431b20); cf. m De Anima, lect. 13, par. 787-88.
that Thomas does not actually say there are two faculties: he says that "in the
soul there is a force cog-11.itiveand appetitive" ("in anima autem est vis cognitiva et appetitiva").
This might suggest that Thomas was thinking in terms of one soul relating to the world in two
differem ways rather than two faculties relating to the world separately. The differences need
not ttouble us here, though.
22 "Omnis autem cognitio perficitur per assimilationem cognoscentis ad rem cognitarn, ita
quod assimilatio dicta est causa cognitionis, sicut visus per hoc quod disponitur secundum
speciem coloris cognoscit colorem: prima ergo comparatio entis ad intellectum est ut ens
inteliectui concordet, quae quidern concordia adaequatio intdlectus et rei dicitur, et in hoc
formaliter ratio veri perficitur. Hoc est ergo quod addit vernm super ens, scilicet
conformitatem sive adaequationem rei et intellectus, ad quam conformitatern, ut dictum est,
sequitur cognitio rei: sic ergo entitas rei praecedit rationem veritatis sed cognitio est quidam
veritatis effectus" (De Verit., q. 1, a. 1).
20 See .Aristotle, De Anima
21 Notice

TRUIH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

205

conformity does not actually exist until cognition occurs;
nevertheless, Thomas insists on it. He is also careful to point out
that the entitas rei (the "real existence") of the known object
precedes the ratio of the true.
The purpose of this foray into the metaphysics of cognition
becomes dear when we reach the culmination of Thomas's
response. Thomas states that ..according to this ... truth or the
'true' is found to be defined in three ways." 23 In the first way, it
is described according to that which precedes the formal
perfection of truth, namely, the extramentai existent. (Thus,
Thomas notes, the definitions of Augustine and Avicenna speak of
truth as though it were equivalent to being.) In the second way,
truth is defined according to that which formally completes the
ratio of truth, namely, the adaequatio intellectus et rei. (Thus, the
definitions Thomas attributes to Isaac Israeli, Anselm, and
Aristotle posit a
of understanding and thing.
F inaHy,
truth has been defined according to that which is, properly
23 "Secundum hoc ergo veritas sive verum tripliciter invenitur diffiniri" (De Verit., q. 1, a.
1). The quotation continues: uuno modo secundum illud quod praecedit rationem veritatis
et in quo verum fundatur, et sic Augustinus diffinit in libro Soliloquiorum «Verum est id quod
est», et Avicenna in sua Metaphysica «Veritas cuiusque rei est propries:as sui esse quod
stabilitum est ei», et quidam sic «Verum est indivisio esse et quod est>>. Alio modo diffinitur
secundum id in quo formaliter ratio veri perficitur, et sic dicit Ysaac quod <Neritas est
adaequatio rei et intellectus», etAnselmus in libro De veritate «Veritas est rectitudo so la mente
perceptibilis», - rectitudo enim ista secundum adaequationem quandam dicitur -; et
Philosophus dicit IV Metaphysicae quod diffinientes vemm dicimus 'cum dicitur esse quod est
aut non esse quod non est'. Terrio modo diffinitur vemm secundum effectum consequentem,
et sic <licit Hilarius quod «Verum est dedarativum et manifestativum esse», et Augustinus in
libro Devera religione «Veritas est qua ostenditur id quod est», et in eodem !ibro «Veritas est
secundum quam de inferioribus iudicamus»."
24 Scholars dispute Thomas's attribution of the adaequatio rei et intellectus formula to
Isaac. See, for example, J. T. Muckle, "Isaac Israeli's Definition of Truth," Archives d'histoire
doctrinale et litteraire du Moyen Age 7 (1933): 5-8. Some take this definition to be
"magisterial," that is, to have been me opinion of the masters in the Parisian schools (see
Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 244, esp. n. 3). The definition is found,
among other places, in the writings of Alexander of Hales (Summa Theologica pars I, inq. 1,
tract. 3, quaest. 2 [in Summa Theologica (Florence, 1924-48), vol. 1, p. 142, n. 89]), Albert
the Great (De bono K, q. 1, a.8 [in Opera Omnia (Monasterii Westfalorum: Aschendorff,
1951), vol. 28, sect. 28, I. 62]), and Bonaventure (I Sent., d. 40, a. 2, q. 1 [in Opera Omnia
(Quaracchi, 1882), vol. 1, p. 707, esp. n. 5]). The editors of these works also point to the
Islamic Aristotelians, especially Avicenna, as possible sources of the definition.

206

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

of
presumably,
consequent upon the
Thomas means that
group of definitions speaks to cognition
as the effect of truth, following
analysis he provided in his
discussion of cognition.
locates the definitions attributed
to Hilary and Augustine's De vera religione this third category.)
The
is, then, roughly as follows. First,
Thomas states that all concepts must be reducible to
lest
knowledge be unfounded.
reduction
concepts to being actually
constructing
concepts, he notes the
which one cannot
to being and gestures toward a
general way in which one can add to being. Third, he mentions
first precise way in
one can acrnaHy add to being, a
procedure
produces the special modes
being" Fourth, he
explores the second precise way in which one can add to being, a
procedure that produces general modes of being; this exploration
the description
truth as a general mode of being
culminates
said in relation to intellect. Fifth, he offers a tripartite analysis of
the metaphysics of
situates truth more precisely as
a
between extramental being (the cause of truth) and
cognition (the effect of
Sixth, Thomas reconciles
preferred definition of
as a conformity
and thing
with other authoritative statements
using a taxonomy of
analogous senses
derived from the tripartite
of
cognition he just
spite of the fact
objections emphasize the
adds to being, the
corpus concludes precisely where
opening question would
seem to lead, namely,
a consideration of the
of
truth. Indeed, the rather elaborate structure of the corpus appears
to be ordered
articulating Thomas's definition of truth as
a general mode
being said
relation to intellect and
harmonizing this definition with others Thomas has inherited
authoritative thinkers. Thomas's comments about the
transcendental modes of being occur en route to accomplishing
these more primary tasks,

TRUfH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

207

II. OBJECTION 1: WHY DISCUSS THE TRANSCENDENTALS HERE?

With the schema of the entire corpus in view, we are now
positioned to see whether the presence of the transcendentals in
question 1, article 1 is consistent with the notion that Thomas's
central intention there was to define truth. It has been shown that
the article begins in search of the quiddity of truth and ends with
a discussion of the same topic. But how are we to meet Aertsen's
objection concerning the middle of the article: Why does Thomas
discuss the transcendentals here if his purpose was merely to
define truth? 25
It seems to me that the unity of this text is best appreciated
from the vantage point of its final lines. The corpus of the article
culminates in a discussion of the proper and received definitions
of truth. Looking backward from this discussion, we can see that
there are perfectly natural connections amongThomas's treatment
of the problem of adding to being, his survey of the
transcendental modes of being, his sketch of the metaphysics of
cognition, and his ultimate concern to discern the quiddity of
truth. Truth is, after all, transcendental; it transcends all genera.
Thus, it cannot be defined according to the normal formula of
"genus+ specific difference," but must be reduced to something
more general than the categories themselves. Since the most
fundamental concept we possess is being, Thomas reasonably
begins his attempt to define truth by making a resolution to being
as that which the intellect first conceives. But there is a problem
with trying to form definitions by adding to being-at least if one
expects to proceed in the manner according to which a species is
formed by adding to a genus-for there can be no difference that
lies outside the nature of being, and thus no species can be formed
from being as a genus. To distinguish truth from being, then,
Thomas must explain the ways in which we can in fact add to
being, namely, by constructing terms that express modes of being
25 One might also address the related question:

How do we account for the fact that the
objections (and the sed contra) focus on the problem of how truth adds to being? I take it that
by explaining how the problem of adding to being is an integral part of Thomas's attempt to
define truth, my interpretation of the corpus also addresses this concern.

208

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

not made explicit by the term "being" itself. This can happen in
two ways, and Thomas examines both. The first way results in the
formation of the categories; but since each category has a more
restricted scope than being itself, Thomas must eschew this
manner of addition as a means for generating a transcendental
term. The second way, however, can produce general modes of
being. Thomas explores certain possibilities for forming such
modes en route to articulating the one that is said of being in
relation to intellect, namely, truth.
It is worth noting that even while sketching these transcendentals Thomas seems to have the definition of truth in sight:
for, when discussing the relational transcendentals, he reverses
both his initial order of treating "positive" modes before
"negative" ones and (perhaps more importantly) the proper
ontological order whereby true precedes good. One might assume
he does this so that his discussion will culminate with the ratio of
truth as a gen-eral mode of being consisting in the adaequatio
intellectus et rei.
This hypothesis is borne out in the lines that follow the
discussion of general modes of being, where Thomas sketches the
tripartite metaphysics of cognition in order to establish a
taxonomy for the received definitions of truth. This taxonomy is,
of course, arranged according to the logic of analogy. Properly
speaking, truth consists in the adaequatio intellectus et rei; but
"true" can also be said per posterius of both the cause of truth
(extramental being) and the effect of truth (cognition). While
Thomas uses this logic to reconcile his description of truth as
adaequatio intellectus et rei with others he inherits from
philosophical and theological authorities, we should not lose sight
of the fact that the focal point of the taxonomy is still the ratio of
truth. Thus, taken in one glimpse, the various parts of the article
do cohere. And if Thomas devotes a fair amount of consideration
both to the problem of adding to being and to transcendental
modes of being, it is because these topics are integral to his
attempt to answer the question "quid est veritas?"

TRUTII OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

209

III. OBJECTION 2: WHY DISCUSS THE TRANSCENDENTALS IN
SUCH DETAIL?

Even if one allows that the task of defining truth calls for a
discussion of how general modes of being can be formed by
adding to being, it is not immediately clear that the detail with
which Thomas carries out this discussion is demanded by the goal
of defining truth. Would it not have sufficed for Thomas simply
to have noted that truth adds to being a relation to intellect? Or
perhaps that there are two ways in which one can add to being,
and that one of these ways produces general modes of being such
as truth, which is a general mode of being in relation to intellect?
But Thomas goes to the trouble of listing and characterizing as
many as six transcendentals. One might use this fact to formulate
a second, more powerful objection against my reading of
Thomas's intention in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1: Why would Thomas
describe the general modes of being in such detail unless he were
interested in them for their own sake?
In response to this objection, one might note that Thomas' s
description of truth as a relation between being and intellect
(convenientia entis ad intellectum) seems to have embedded
within it certain alternative (onto )logical possibilities that Thomas
considers in an orderly manner as he approaches the description
of truth. 26 His description of truth, taken in its context, can be
glossed as 'a mode of being generally consequent on every being
in relation to intellect' (modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens
in ordine ad intellectum). We can parse this description into the
following parts: modus entis - genera/is consequens omne ens - in
ordine -ad - intellectum. I suggest that each of these components
is one of at least two (onto)logical options from which Thomas
chooses in order to form his description of truth.
To begin with, every concept is either definable within the
genera of the ten categories or it is not. If not, then the concept
can only be described as a modus entis and not by a
26 I use the term "(onto)logical" in order to highlight the fact that the options Thomas is
here navigating do not seem merely to be logical categories, although the passage has a fairly
disjunctive structure; rather, Thomas seems to see these options as real metaphysical niches.

MICHAEL M. 'Vi7ADDELL

210

rnln'i!P'l·nu'<;:

omne ens,
consequent on
something can
There can be

it is
(HA2). It has
distinguished by relations
something else
These
speaking,
affirmatively 1C>e1A/1-J'Hu1tnt
Latin pr•ep:os1ncms

appetite,
betv.reen being
the intellect,
formalization induded in these
description of truth as a general mode
convenientia en.tis ad znz:eti:er:tu1n
mo.aus entis [(!I)
coi<tse.01u1ms
[(2) ad]

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

211

In retrospect, Thomas's list of transcendental properties looks
strikingly like a sketch of the options through which Thomas must
navigate in order to formulate "IIB2b." If this is in fact how the
list emerges, then the transcendental terms included in this
discussion are by and large nothing more than the names of the
options Thomas faces as he attempts to describe truth in this way.
Moreover, the "list" of transcendentals Thomas offers in this
article would have to be regarded as being deeply influenced by
his goal of articulating the formulation "IIB2b. " 27
One benefit of this interpretation is that it nicely highlights
how the middle of the article is in fact the middle and not the
goal. By looking backward from Thomas's definition of truth, we
can see how deftly he navigates modi entis genera/es consequentes
omne ens to move from the foundational concept of being to the
mode of being genera/is consequens omne ens in ordine ad
intellectum. It is precisely en route to describing this latter mode
of being (truth) that Thomas elaborates other (onto)logical
possibilities for modi entis genera/es consequentes omne ens.
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that the preceding
explanation of the options implicit in Thomas's description of
truth is not entirely sufficient to account for the detail of
Thomas's discussion of general modes of being. Thomas could
have generated the classification of truth as a modus entis
genera/is consequens omne ens in ordine ad intellectum simply by
noting that modes of being can be distinguished by relations, or
certainly by noting that they can be distinguished either according
to being in se or by relation to something else. Why, then, does
Thomas mention the negative possibilities, unum and aliquid?
Moreover, what leads him to draw the apparently ultrafine
distinction between ens and res?
The transcendentals were obviously on Thomas's mind when
he penned this article. This is understandable, since he clearly
assumes truth to be transcendental in this text. What is more, one
would be hard pressed to find thirteenth-century discussions of
the transcendentals that did not acknowledge unum as a property
27

The significance of this fact will be made explicit in the last section of this essay.

212

MICPJ\EL M. WADDELL

roots of
run as deeply as Aristotle's
fact, unum was the model transcendental for
some of the earliest thirteenth-century treatises on the subject. 28
Thomas's
milieu, it
been customary,
even expected, to
dental properties.
explained by two factors.
'-'"'"""'""·'v••,Thomas maintains
practice
transcendentals negatively. This practice,
placed alongside the
of relational transcendentals,
suggests the possibility of a negatively defined relational transcendental (that
a
defined
division rather
correspondence). Thus,
might have
in
logical option of a relational
his discussion merely to articulate
Avicenna describes aliquid and ens
analogue to unum. In
as two names for the same concept. 29 Since Thomas cites
Avicenna's
the
one might reasonably
suspect
this text has informed Thomas' s thought
on
various modes
being and that aliquid's presence in
artide is a manifestation
Finally,
presence
might be
three ways.
Avicenna lists res as one of the
explained
three first impressions. 30 Thus, as with
Thomas might
included res
way of articulating a thought he
gleaned from
of Avicenna. A second possibility
Thomas's response to the
objection sed
emerges
contra. 31 The
depends on an
of
28 first among these was
the Chancellor's Summa de bono. See Henri Pouillon, "Le
premier ttaite des proprietes transcendentales: La «Summa de bono» du cham:elier
42 (1939): 40-77.
Revue Neoscolastique de
29 See Avicenna's Metaphysics I. 5:
vero et a!iquid sunt nomina multivoca unius
intentionis." See also Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 102.
30 See Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals, 81-82.
31 The third objection sed contra reads: "Praeteria, secundum Boetium in libro de
Hebdomadibus in omnibus creaturis «diversum est esse et qnod est»; sed verum significat esse
rei; ergo verum est diversum a quod est in crearis. Sed quod est est idem quod ens; ergo vemm
in creatw:is est diversnm ab ente." Thomas's response states: "Ad tertium dicendnm quod cum
dicitur 'diversum est esse et quod est' distinguitur actus essendi ab eo cui ille actus convenit;
nomen autem entis ab actu essendi sumitur, non ab eo cui convenit actus essendi, et ideo ratio

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

213

"quod est" and "ens." Thomas refutes the argument by noting that
"ens" is taken with respect to a thing's esse, not its essence (quod
est); as we learn in the corpus, "res" is said with reference to a
thing's essence. Thus, Thomas's response to this argument
depends on the distinction between "ens" and "res. " 32 It is entirely
plausible that he draws this distinction in the corpus in
anticipation of invoking it in his responses to the objections. The
third explanation is more philosophically loaded. If all modi entis
generates consequentes omne ens are concepts that can and must
be resolved into ens, then ens itself might not be a modus entis
genera/is consequens omne ens. In other words, ens might not be
a mode of being so much as it is being itself. If this is right,
another term must be found to hold the place of something said
affirmatively of every ens in se. "Res" is precisely such a term, and
it is therefore possible that Thomas included "res" not as a second
modus entis genera/is consequens omne ens in se dicitur
affirmative, but as the only one.
To admit that Thomas fills out his sketch of modi entis
generates consequentes omne ens a bit more fully than his task of
defining truth might demand is not, however, to yield that the
article aims primarily at discussing the transcendentals, much less
that it is a treatise on the transcendentals. Consider an example.
If I were to give someone directions for driving from Sioux Falls,
South Dakota to South Bend, Indiana, I might say: "Take
Interstate 90 east through Minnesota, Wisconsin, and Illinois. As
you come into Chicago, you will pass O'Hare International
Airport; soon you'll be able to see the Sears' Tower, which some
say is the world's tallest building; then you'll pass Comiskey Park,
home of the Chicago White Sox. About 90 miles past Chicago,
you'll see the exits for South Bend." Now, even though my longwinded directions say things about the windy city, it would be
peculiar to call them a description of Chicago, and even more
peculiar to say that the whole thing is a treatise on Chicago. These
non sequitur."
32 Thomas does not invoke the term "res" in his reply to the objection, but the conceptual
distinction between "res" (which is taken from quod est) and "ens" (which is taken from esse)
is at work.

214

MICHAEL M. WAD DELL

directions unquestionably
information
Chicago than
essential
one's way to South
Bend;
they also omit many matters one would want to include
when discussing Chicago in its own right. Thus, the whole
discussion is
construed as a set
Sioux Falls
to
Bend. The directions elaborate on a few points
interest along the way;
even these elaborations are influenced
by the goal of getting to South Bend. 33 Similarly,
best way to
describe the corpus of
Veritate, q.
a.
including every
is as an attempt to
mention it makes of transcendental
define truth. To be sure, the artide contains interesting
being that we
sometimes nonessential comments about modes
recognize as transcendentals. Indeed, the transcendentals
to
set the context from which Thomas's definition of truth emerges.
The significance of that context
not be underestimated;
but it should also not obscure the fact that the entire discussion is
ordered toward defining truth.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE DE VERITATE

attention to the first artide is essential for
While
understanding Thomas's intentions there, it is not the only textual
evidence that bears on the issue. For just as a thorough
understanding of the first article provides a foundation for
interpreting the rest of the De Veritate, so too analysis of the
structure of the entire
reveals those features of the first
artide that Thomas meant to bear most weight As we shall soon
see, the larger structure provides additional evidence that
Thomas's purpose in the
was primarily to investigate
34
the
of
33 For example, we might note that the only Chicago landmarks described in the directions
are visible from interstate 90. But there are many other Chicago landmarks one would want
to see if one were not constrained by the task of driving to South Bend via interstate 90.
34 Before examining the structure of the De Veritate, I should offer a caveat. The genre of
the disputed question is nnusual by modern standards. On the one hand, as a record of what
were originally oral disputation sessions, the text is neither so polished nor so well organized
as a work like the Summa Theologiae. On the other hand, there are indications that the text
Thomas left to us comprises a revision of the actual oral sessions. (!am thinking, for example,

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

215

In order to discern the structure of the work, let us survey the
twenty-nine questions that comprise the Disputed Questions on
Truth. 35 The first question is entitled "De veritate," and the larger
work takes its name from here. Questions 2 through 20 aH deal,
in one way or another, with matters of inteHect (divine, angelic,
human, speculative, practical, before the fall,
heaven, etc.). 36
Question 21 is concerned with the good. And questions 22
through 29 all deal with the appetites (e.g., divine and human
wills, passions, etc.). The pivotal questions in the structure of the
disputation are questions 1 and 21. As it happens, these texts also
speak most directly to the transcendentals, so they have shared the
fate of being isolated in order to examine that doctrine.
within the context of the entire set of disputations, questions 1
and 21 mark the beginnings of more extended and more
prominent discussions in questions 2 through 20 and questions 22
through 29, respectively. The discussion of
question 1 is
of De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1, obj. 2, where the objector seems to have knowledge of the replies
that will be given and, in fact, anticipates them. Of course, this phenomenon could also be
explained by actual give-and-take during the initial session of the disputation or by the fact
that some of these solutions were already common knowledge at the time of the disputation.)
In addition, the fact that Thomas had control over the topics to be disputed means that he
could also have shaped the broad contours of the disputations according to a larger
organizational plan for the work. Thus, it would be foolish to expect the organization of a set
of disputed questions to be as fine-grained as, say, the Summa contra Gentiles; but it is
reasonable to expect more organization than one would find in a set of quodlibetal questions.
35 The twenty-nine questions disputed in the De Veritate are: 1. Truth; 2. God's
Knowledge; 3. Ideas; 4. The Divine Word; 5. Providence; 6. Predestination; 7. The Book of
Life; 8. The Knowledge of Angels; 9. The Communication of Angelic Knowledge; 10. The
Mind; 11. The Teacher; 12. Prophecy; 13. Rapture; 14. Faith; 15. Higher and Lower Reason;
16. Synderesis; 17. Conscience; 18. The Knowledge of the First Man in the State of
Innocence; 19. Knowledge of the Soul After Death; 20. The Knowledge of Christ; 21. Good;
22. The Tendency to Good and the Will; 23. God's Will; 24. Free Choice; 25. Sensuality; 26.
The Passions of the Soul; 27. Grace; 28. The Justification of Sinners; 29. The Grace of Christ.
36 Questions 2-7 are straightforwardly related to the divine intellect; questions 8-9 concern
angelic knowledge; question 10 discusses the (human) mind, especially in relation to the
Trinity; question 11 investigates the acquisition of knowledge; questions 12-14 examine
various modes of supernatural (human) knowledge; question 15 explains how the higher and
lower reason are really one and the same power considered in relation to different objects
(perhaps bridging Thomas's discussions of speculative and practical inteliect); questions 16-17
deal with matters of practical intellect; and questions 18-20 all deal with human knowledge
in unusual states (viz., before the fall, after death, and in the person of Christ).

MICHAEL M. WADDELL

216

to the

consideration
intellect in
nineteen
follow,
the discussion of goodness
prepares for Thomas's treatment of appetite in the eight questions
that foHow it.
The model for this structure is the Aristotelian account of the
relationships between
of
soul and their objects. As the
Philosopher notes
we must consider
object before we can investigate
act and the faculty that are
(the
actualized by k 37 Accordingly, Thomas must discuss
object of the intellect)
turning to the intellect itself,
must discuss goodness
object of the appetite) before turning
to
appetite itself. Indeed, when the metaphysical
psychological backdrop of the work is appreciated, it becomes
dear
the entire structure
the disputed questions rests on
the account of
as object
Thomas proposes
question 1. It is interesting to note that Thomas brought the
underpinnings
structure to our attention in the
artide, where the interaction among powers of
extramental beings is the sine qua non of his attempt
to distinguish
as a relational transcendental Thus, the first
artide provides an
key to the rest of the work by
calling to mind the Aristotelian metaphysics
cognition and
that shapes the entire disputation; at the same time, the
larger structure of the De Veritate lays stress on
investigation
of truth as the
1. Ultimately, the
same condusion seems to emerge
dose reading
the
article
analysis
the larger structure
the disputed
questions: Thoma.s's primary intention
q. 1, a. 1 was to
examme
not the transcendentals.

37 Aristotle, De Anirrui, 2.4 (415a14-22). A similar principle can be drawn from Plato's
Timaeus (61c). This dialogue was, of course, one of the few Platonic texts known to the Latinspeaking world in the High Wtiddle Ages and was enormously influential. It is not dear,
however, that the relevant section of the Timaeus would have been known to Thomas:
Chakidius's commentary on the Timaeus-the primary means thrnngh which the Timaeus was
conveyed in the Middle Ages--stops around section 52c.

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

217

V. THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE DISPUTE

There is, then, both microscopic and macroscopic textual
evidence that Thomas's primary intention at De Veritate, q. 1, a.
1 was to investigate the nature of truth. Aertsen' s question about
this interpretation must be taken seriously, for the transcendentals
are prominent in the article. But the discussion of general modes
of being is not at odds with the endeavor to define truth; it is part
of it. Lest the reader think this dispute has no significance beyond
the exegetical debate, though, I shall conclude by mentioning
three ways in which a proper understanding of Thomas's
intentions at De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 is important for larger issues.
First, for Thomas, metaphysics is the science that studies ens
inquantum ens and its attributes. 38 Inasmuch as the transcendentals are attributes of being, they are of obvious importance for
metaphysics. Now, De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1 has often been treated
as a kind of systematic treatise on the transcendentals, leading
scholars to take the article's "list" of general modes of being as
canonical. Thus, if a term does not appear on this "list" (and
especially if it does not appear on similar "lists"), that term is
often assumed not to be a transcendental. However, if Thomas's
purpose in this article was not to exposit the transcendentals
systematically but rather to define truth, merely sketching some
of the possibilities for constructing transcendental modes of being
along the way, then it would be imprudent to deny that a mode
of being is transcendental simply because it does not appear here.
I am thinking, of course, of beauty in particular. Misconstruing
38 See IV Metaphys., lect. 1, par. 529: "Now because a science should investigate not only
its subject but also the proper accidents of its subject, he therefore says, first, that there is a
science which studies being as being, as its subject, and studies also 'the attributes which
necessarily belong to being,' i.e., its proper accidents" (Commentary on Aristotle's
Metaphysics, trans. John Rowan [Notre Dame, Ind.: Dumb Ox Books, 1995]). Strictly
speaking, the transcendentals cannot be "proper accidents" of being because proper accidents
are outside the essence of their subject. See also Metaphys., prologue ("It is called metaphysics
inasmuch as it considers being and the attributes which naturally accompany being"), and In
Boet. de Trin., q. 6, a. 1. Cf. Jorge Gracia, "Critical Study: Medieval Philosophy and the
Transcendentals: Aertsen's Characterization of Medieval Thought and Thomistic Metaphysics," Recherches de Theologie et Philosophie Medievales 64 (1997): 455-63 (esp. 459).

218

MICHAEL M. WA.DDELL

upon an
we have
a "systematic"
to regard it as
that

39 Jan Aertsen raises this objection in v.Beauty in the Middle Ages: A Forgotten
Transcendental?", Medieval Philosopby
1 (1991): 68-97, esp. 75 (see also 73).
It is also acknowledged as a difficulty by Francis Kovach, Die Aesthetik des Thornas von Aquin
(Berlin: De Gmyter, 1961) 75-76, 183; and Eco, Aesthetics, 30, 34.
Imporrant works like me Summa contra Gentiles, each of the Aristotelian commentaries,
and the Scriptme commentaries are all less expansive than the De Veritate. Indeed, the De
Veatate is almost as large as all of the other
questions combined.
41 It is even somewhat overstated to suggest that this work treats the entire De Veritate. See
Wilhelm Schneider, Die Quaestiones Disputatae de Veritate des Thomas von Aquin in lhrer
Philosophiegeschichtlichen Beziehung zu Augt'.stinus (Miiru;ter: A.<chendorff, 1930).
"'2 Because Thomas's commentary on the Sentences was consttained
both the order of
Lombard's work and the expectations of the schools, the De Veritate represents his first largescale, independent work. As such, it is interesting to read alongside Thomas's Summae as an
early attempt to organize large amounts of doctrine according to his own mind.

''°

TRUTH OR TRANSCENDENTALS?

219

good first step toward understanding and evaluating the Disputed
Questions on Truth as an integrated work.
Finally, two recent books have made rather sweeping claims
about St. Thomas's thought-and indeed medieval thought in
general-based largely on their authors' readings of the Disputed
Questions on Truth. In Medieval Philosophy and the Transcendentals: The Case of Thomas Aquinas, Jan Aertsen suggests that
the transcendentals are the hallmark of medieval philosophy
(which, incidentally, he means to distinguish quite sharply from
medieval theology). Moreover, Aertsen's appropriation of
Thomas's doctrine of the transcendentals, and thus of medieval
philosophy more generally, is grounded firmly in his interpretation of De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1. More recently, in their book
Truth in Aquinas, 43 John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock have
attempted to appropriate Thomas's teaching on truth as an
antidote to modern rejections of correspondence theories and
realism; interestingly, they claim that Thomas's doctrine of truth
is theological through and through, and they too ground their
claims (at least in part) in a reading of De Veritate. 44 It seems,
then, that contemporary appropriations of Thomas' s thought and
even medieval thought are being forged against De Veritate. We
should make our best effort to appropriate these texts according
to Thomas's own intentions.
Thus, for the sake of metaphysical speculation, for the sake of
an historical appreciation of Thomas's various attempts to
organize large bodies of doctrine, and for the sake of producing
accurate appropriations of Thomas's thought, it is important to
understand Thomas's intention in De Veritate, q. 1, a. 1. From
beginning to end, his intention was to answer the question "quid
est veritas?"45
43 See John Milbank and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (London: Routledge,
2001).
44 I examine the question of whether or not Thomas's doctrine of truth is theological in
«Natural Theology in St. Thomas's Early Doctrine of Truth," in Restoring Nature: &says in
Thomistic Philosophy and Theology (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, forthcoming).
The article includes detailed discussion of the positions of Aertsen, Pickstock, and Milbank.
45 I would like to thank Peter Adamson for his comments on an earlier draft of this paper.
The research for this project was supported by an ARAF grant from Augustana College.

The Thomist 67 (2003): 221-48

CHRIST IN AQUINAS'S SUMMA THEOLOGIAE:
PERIPHERAL OR PERYASIVE?
JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.
Regis College
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

B

orn THOMASAQUINAS and Bonaventure, having completed
their doctoral cursus in the 1250s, could leave the Sentences
of Peter Lombard behind and apply their own theological
acumen to the organization of sacra doctrina. Since Bonaventure
was elected Minister General of his order in the same year he was
recognized as a master by the University of Paris, his academic
career was curtailed. He did manage in that same year, in
response to the request of many students, to compose his
Breviloquium, universally recognized as an attractive, accessible,
and profound work of doctrinal synthesis. 1 Aquinas had the
opportunity to teach for many years before he began around
1265-66 to write his Summa Theologiae, his crowning achievement. Though unfinished, this work, far more extensive than the
Breviloquium, made available to students of his era and to us the
fruit of his mature thought in a carefully devised pedagogical
order. 2
In this essay we are principally concerned with the Summa and
its ordering of topics, but to help us highlight its distinctive
features we will contrast it with the Breviloquium. As our title
1 In the general prologue to his Breviloquium (hereafter Brev.), Bonaventure gives the
following title to the chapter that surveys the plan of his work: "De illis septem, de quibus est
theologia in summa" (Brev. 1.1.1) This shows that he is conscious of at least schematically
covering the entirety of theology.
2 Aquinas's Compendium Theologiae corresponds more closely to the Breviloquium in
length and purpose. We will refer to it when we examine the creedal roots of the Summa.

221

JEA."-T-MARCLAPORTE, S.J.

222

suggests, the place given to Christ in these two syntheses offers a
first reading, Christ is dearly
locus of significant comparison.
at the center of
appears not to be at the
center of the
does Christ
the
organization of the Summa? That is
question
our investigation.
To begin,
us
evoke the Breviloquium. That work
stays much doser to
structure
Lombard's four books than
does Aquinas's Summa. Nonetheless the changes Bonaventure
appear slight on the surface,
makes to Lombard's
of his work
result in major improvements. The
companson to that of
is presented in the following
diagram:
Bonaventure

Lombard

Prologue

On Scripture and theology

Parr 1

The
of God, followed by
appropriated attributes: efficiency and
power to the Father, exernplarity and
wisdom to the Son; finality and will to
the Spirit (Brev. L6.9).

Part 2

The World
Crearure of God

God as Origin
(appropriated to
Father: Brev.
2.5.5)

Part 3

The Coirrnptio1.1
of Sin

Part 4

Incru.uation of
ilie Word

God as Restorer
(preceded by an
account of the
need for
restoration);
Sending of the
Word as Exemplar

Part 5

The Grace of
the Holy Spirit

Part 6

S2cramental
Medicine

Part 7

Fina! judgment

God as End;
Sending of the
Spirit to achieve
the return of
human creatures to
God.

Book 1: Introduction;
God as One arid God as
Triune

Book 2:
Creation;
Original Justice;
Grace

Book 3:
Incarnation;
Redemption;
Virtues, Gifts, Precepts

Book4:
Sacraments;
Last Things

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

223

Two major differences need to be brought out. First, the
Breviloquium brings out the tacit Trinitarian structure of
Lombard's work. In part 1, after a brief conspectus of the whole
work, Bonaventure immediately goes to the heart of the matter
which is God as triune, whereas Lombard begins his treatment
with the existence of God. Bonaventure also tightens up
Lombard's subsequent consideration of attributes of God by
selecting those that can be seen in a dear relationship of
appropriation to the persons of the Trinity and in their role in the
Trinitarian unfolding of the rest of his treatise. 3
Second, Bonaventure aligns his Trinitarian structure more
closely to the Trinitarian structure of the creeds. The rteatment of
grace and the virtues is somewhat scattered in Lombard (partly in
book II and partly
book HI). Bonaventure goes back to the
order of his own teacher, Alexander of Hales, and deals with both
together after his treatment of the incarnate Christ, presenting
them as the gift of the Spirit flowing from the risen Christ and
poured out in Pentecost. 4 This sequence is pedagogically simpler,
more attractive, and, most importantly, doser to the basic pattern
of salvation history articulated in the creeds, in which forgiving
grace is affirmed after the artide that prodaims belief in the Holy
Spirit. Thus Bonaventure's Trinitarian pattern is not a speculative
whim but his way of articulating the profoundly imbedded
economic pattern according to which the Father sends the Son
and the risen Christ imparts the grace of the Holy Spirit (Brev.
4. 10.4 ). In this sequence the second person occupies the middle
position. Christ was already in a middle position within
3 This unfolding is depicted in the third coillilfln, beginning with part 2. It is recapimlated
in Brev. 7.1.2:
first principle produces according to the sublimity of his power, governs
according to the rectitude of truth (the Incarnate Word as teacher and exemplar), brings to
completion according to the fullness of goodness." Aquinas demonstrates a simiiar approach
in his Commentary: "tria opera tribus personis appropriantur: creatio, quasi prima, Patri, qui
est principium non de principio; glorificatio, quae est ultimus finis, Spiritui Sancto, ratione
bonitatis; recreatio, quae media est, Filio, qui est media in Trinitate persona" (K Sent., d. 1, q.
2, a. 2, ad 3). Cf. G. Emery, "Le Pere et !'oeuvre de creation selon le Commentaire des
Sentences de S. Thomas d'Aquin" in Ordo Sapientiae et Amoris, ed. C.-J. Pinto de Oliveira
(Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993), 85-117, esp. 106.
4 Cf. Brev. 4.10.4-8.

224

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.j.

Lombard's Sentences,
the
gives this centrality a
firmer and more systematic basis.
Before moving on to Aquinas's Summa and its structure, let us
clarify certain hermeneutical assumptions. In various passages of
the Summa, notably the prologues to its three parts, Aquinas left
how he conceived its
Though these
us an account
not set a limit to our
passages are of capital importance, they
efforts to understa."1d this
Like other dassic theological
works, the Summa is singularly able to evoke the mystery of God
for human minds in their present pilgrim state, and thus has
interpretation around itself.
attracted an ongoing community
While this community seeks to unearth signs of Aquinas's intent
in devising a plan for his
it also, as instanced by many
recent scholarly attempts, considers
text as it stands on its
own,
looks for other fruitful patterns and correlations not
dearly intended by Aquinas
that may have been part of the
habitual texture of his mind. We
no intention of reviewing
the Summa and
different attempts at grasping the structures
pronouncing all of them, or all of them but one, to be wrong. Our
keynote is complementarity and muh:ivalence rather than
exdusion and univocity.
is to single out helpful
interpretative dues that are more explicit and stimulate further reits community of interpretation. Our
reading of the text
responsibility is to be as respectful of the Mystery as are
Bonaventure and Aquinas themselves.
We wiH begin with the
sequence proposed by
Albert Patfoort, which emerges from a straightforward narrative
reading of the Summa's text, similar to our reading of the Breviloquium. We wiH then attempt to probe the text with the help of
Michel Corbin, Yves Congar, P. E. Persson, and Jean-Pierre
then relate their efforts, which yield sets of concenT onrdl,
tric sequences, to the earlier exitus-reditus pattern proposed by
M.-D. Chenu. We will then assess the role played by the creeds in
shaping the Summa, and finaHy seek a context for the Summa's
plan in Aquinas's view of the way in which the theological
we will
endeavor of the Summa constitutes a science. At

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

225

have moved from what is explicitly evoked by Thomas to what
unobtrusively but powerfully animates the Summa from within.
L THE SUMMA'S PLAN AS TRINITARIAN:
THE FATHER/SPIRIT/SON SEQUENCE

The Breviloquium is faithful in its broad systematic lines to the
sequence of Father-Son-Spirit suggested by the creeds. The
classical salvation-historical approach of the creeds which
Bonaventure follows is narrative and linear: it presents in
succession the events of creation, fall, incarnation, redemption,
effusion of the spirit, grace, sacraments, and final beatitude. This
narrative is subsumed into a Father-Son-Spirit sequence, in accord
with the Johannine pattern of the Father sending the Son, and the
Son in turn promising us an Advocate, his Spirit.
By contrast, Aquinas's Summa seems to take a significantly
different tack: what in these earlier syntheses is found under the
aegis of the Son is found in the Summa's Tertia Pars, and what is
under the aegis of the Spirit is found in the Secunda Pars. Thus the
sequence appears to be changed to Father-Spirit-Son, with Christ
losing his central position. Albert Patfoort is a dear interpreter of
Thomas on this sequence:
The rest of the la Pars (qq. 44-119) naturally comes under the aegis of the
Father, from whom all "proceeds," including the Son and the Holy Spirit, whose
processions, Aquinas states in an almost untranslatable formula, are ratio and
causa of the procession of creatures (cf. Ia, q. 45, aa. 6-7). We can further state
that, aU things considered, the Ila Pars in tum presents the dynamism of what St.
Thomas, after St. Augustine, likes to call the gratia Spiritus Sancti (cf Ia llae, q.
106, passim; q. 109, a. 9, ad 2; q. 114, a. 3, etc.), whose role is to give life to our
free disposition of ourselves and of things, and, finally, the Illa Pars is manifestly
the domain of the Son. 5

The SecundaPars contains Thomas' s moral theology, and in his
view that moral theology is intrinsically pneumatological. 6 Christ
5 Albert Patfoort, Thomas d'Aquin: Les cles d'une theologie (Paris: FAC-editions, 1983),
66 {translation mine).
6 Ibid., 71-102.

226

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.

redemption comes later, in the
core
God's salvific
is
the Spirit
earthly Christ, who is more contingent, more
space and
It is
that the Summa does not
more usual narrative structure
m
facets need to be explored.
his

than the
up with
...nn

U. THE SUJViMA'SPLA..1\f AS CONCENTRIC
As we continue our scmtiny, there emerges a complex pattern
of narrowing concentric cirdes with Christ and his
in the
center.
will explore three related sequences. The first, taken
the prologues to the three parts
the Summa, may well
express some
Aquinas's intention
organizing his materials.
The
two are based on textual correlations that have
emerged among later interpreters.
The first sequence has been thoroughly
by Michel
Corbin. In sum,
studies
and his work (creation)
the Prima Pars; in the Secunda Pars he singles out among the
creatures of God human beings
their work,
is to
those acts that
to
beatitude in God; in the
Tertia
he singles out among human beings Jesus Christ, the
God-Man, and his work,
is to
human beings to their
beatitude. Corbin is careful to highlight this dynamic perspective. 8
Aquinas does not deal with
essences
seeks faithfully to
reflect God's initiating freedom and our responsive freedom,
which are at the heart of salvation history.
The prologue texts
manifest this dynamic perspective. The
This sequence easily dovetails with a contemporary approach in which one discerns the
Spirit invisibly at work in the world, in the lives of men and women before the coming of
Christ, and the earthly Christ as the supreme visible manifestation in the fullness of time of
God's reaching out to his creation" In this sequence ilie Spirit is the one who, prior to the
Word, prepares the way for the Word to be recognized in his human manifestation. In
Rahner's terms God constitutes us as hearers of the word before speaking to us. Similarly
Lonergan attributes centrality to the gift of love flooding our hearts (Rom 5 :5) and sees in
Christ the supreme articulator of a Spirit-suffused relation with God that otherwise remains
tacit. See F. E. Crowe,
of God, Holy Spirit, and World Religions: The Contribution of
Bemard Lonergan to the Wider Ecumenism," Chancellor's Address, Regis College, 1984.
& Michel Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesne,
1974), 782-806, esp. 785.
7

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

227

Prima Pars considers not just God but creation as the work of
God, the Secunda Pars not just human beings but also the human
actions that lead them to or away from beatitude, the Tertia Pars
not just Christ but also his benefits, that is, his redemptive work
on our behalf.
The second sequence is found in the work of P. E. Persson. He
builds on an insight of Yves Congar into the relevance of III Sent.,
d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2 for the plan of the Summa. 9 This sequence
begins with the most general presence of God in creation per
essentiam, potentiam, et praesentiam (Prima Pars), through a more
special presence in those sanctified through grace (though the
Secunda Pars deals with man and his work, what makes that work
possible is grace, the consideration of which constitutes the climax
of the Prima Secundae), and ending with God's unique presence
to Jesus Christ through hypostatic union (dealt with in the
opening of the Tertia Pars).
The third sequence, which is similar to the second, is evoked
by Jean-Pierre Torrell when he presents STh I, question 93, article
4 on the various ways in which human beings image God and
relates these ways to the exitus-reditus theme. In the broadest
sense all humans are the image of God in their aptitude to know
and love God: this the Prima Pars deals with. This image is
enhanced in the just who actually love and know God through the
new creation of grace (Prima Secundae), and comes to its
fulfillment in the glorified who know and love God perfectly. We
find here again a similar pattern of narrowing concentric circles,
with a narrower beginning (all human beings as created by God,
rather than all creation) and a broader ending (all the glorified,

9 P. E. Persson, Sacra Doctrina: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas (Oxford: Blackwell,
1970), esp. 259. Here is the III Sent., d. 4, q. 3, a. 2, qcla. 2 text to which he refers: "ad id
quod ulterius quaeritur, dicendum quod plenitudo divinitatis dicitur corporaliter habitare in
christo tripliciter: •.. secundo per similitudinem ad tres dimensiones corporis, quia divinitas
est tribus modis in christo: uno modo generali, sicut est in omnibus creaturis, per essentiam,
praesentiam et potentiarn, et in hoc consistit quasi longitudo; alio modo speciali, prout est in
sanctis per gratiam, per quam est latitudo caritatis; tertio modo in proprio filio, scilicet per
unionem, in quo est sublimitas et profundum." Aquinas evokes this sequence in the STh III,
q. 2, a. 10, ad 2.

JEAN-lMARCLAPORTE, S.J.

228

complexity of
has a dearer textual

and recalling
we get

First Seguem:e:
The prologues to
the Prima,
and Tertia Partes
(Corbin)

Third Sequence:

The presence of
God
(Persson & Congar)

Trinitarian
I, q. 93, a. 4:
am2ro1:1riation
The image of God · (Patfoort)
(Torrell)

Ia

God and his work,
which is creation"

God's presence to
creation per
essentiam,
potentiam,

The image of God
in all humans as
created by God
(exitus)

Father

Ha

(within creation):
Man and his work,
which is acts
leading toward
beatitude 12

God's presence to
the just
per gratiam

The im.age of God
in those who are
sanctified through
grace (beginning
of the

Spirit

ma

· (among humans):
Christ and his
redemptive work,
leads to tI1e
glory of the blessed

God's presence to
Christ
per unione'rtl

The image of God
come to its
perfection in the
glorified (end of
the reditus).

Son

10 Torrell analyses this text in his Saint Thomas
maltre
(Paris and
Fribourg: Cerf, 1996), 115 ff. He does not explicitly relate it to the structure of the Summa
but he connects the image of creation vvith the exitY.S, the image of new creation (grace) with
the beginning of !:he reditus, and the image of glory with the reditus accomplishect
11 "primo namque considerabimus ea quae ad essemiam divinam pertinent; secum:io, ea
quae pertinent ad disrincrionem personamm; terrio, ea quae pertinent ad processum
creaturarnm ab ipso" (STh I, q. 2, prol.). The work is that of creation, of which God is
efficient cause. That creation is seen as a procession, an exitus.
12 "postquam praedictum est de exemplari, scilicet de deo, et de his quae processerunt ex
divina potestate secundum eius voluntatem; restat ut consideremus de eius imagine, idest de
homine, secundum quod et ipse est suorum operum principium, quasi libemm airbitrium
habens et suorum operum potestatem" (STh I-II,
Note the parallelism between God as
voluntary principle of his work of creation and human beings who are voluntary principles
of their works. Note also the role played by the doctrine that human beings are created in the
image and likeness of God. God is exemplar, and human beings are image, inasmuch as God
shares with them the power of free self-disposition.

CHRIST IN THE SUit1MA

229

Let us comment on each of the parts of the Summa, focusing on
differences in the way each of the sequences treats them.
Prima Pars. The third sequence differs from the other two, in
that it begins not with creation in general
with the creation of
human beings and their powers. The
offers a basis for
Pars describes
creatures and their powers
this: the
in great detail as a prolegomenon on
activity (Secunda
Pars), whereas the rest of creation is given a somewhat briefer
treatment.
Secunda Pars. Here the
sequence appears to be out
harmony with the others: rather
stressing God's work of
grace, it stresses the human work of free acts leading to beatitude.
Let us address
apparent
the context
a more
detailed comment on
Secunda Pars, which is longer
more
complex than the other two parts of the Summa.
purpose
the
as a manual for beginners
Given
preparing for sacerdotal ministry as Dominicans, the large place
given to what Aquinas himself refers to as res moralis is not
surprising. The outline of
Secunda Pars leads up to and away
from the treatise on the gratia
sancti, which empowers us
on our journey toward the
for
we are created.
(1) The Prima Secundae begins with beatitude and with the
basic structures and intrinsic principles of the human activity by
which we journey toward
(2) Under the heading
intrinsic principles i.t turns to sin and
its effects on the human race, above
moral impotence. This sets
the stage for the organization of the rest of the Prima Secundae in
terms alluding to Augustine's De Spiritu et Littera 13 (STh
q.
90, proL): God is the extrinsic principle of our good acts,
teaching us by the law (STh I-II, qq. 90-108), and enabling us
through grace (STh
qq. 109-14).
(3) The treatise on grace which brings
Prima Secundae to
a dose is the high point
Secunda Pars as a
What
becomes dear in this treatise is
the
beings
toward beatitude featured in
prologue to the Secunda
rn
13 Augustine,

De Spiritu et Littera, c. 5.

230

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.j.

empowered
permeated
operates
the human
and cooperates
acts
I-II,
q. 111, a. 2). Thus we can say without contradiction that the
Secunda Pars deals with
God's work
grace and the
beings toward their beatitude.
on the
Secunda Secundae
develops in great detail specific features of
grace: theological and
states of
we move to consider these offices and states, the focus
consideration in the
begins to narrow and the stage is set for
Tertia
a particular
his particular salvific
mission and the graces that pertain to
Tertia Pars. The
sequence features Christ himself a.'1d
the
glorified
him,
the first sequence
contains both of these aspects, thus suggesting that there is no
contradiction here" Indeed
particularity of
Jesus Christ is to be found the greatest universality. More
specifically,
grace that endows
nature of Christ is
at once the grace of a singular
being
q. and the
grace of the one
because of his identity, is head of absolutely
every human
(STh
q. esp. aa. 3
as the
Tertia
the being to the
of Jesus, it leads
the earthly Christ to the aHindusive mystical
risen Christ, of
he is
head
in which he dispenses the sacraments, preparing us for glory,
presence among us. 14 This part of the
thus continuing
is
Aquinas intended to take,
executed
the compilers
was toward
risen glory to which humans
To sum up
foray beyond the narrative
Father/Spiirit/Son reading suggested by Patfoort invites us to
consider an alternative way
viewing the structure of the
14 Cf. Torell, Saint Thomas d'Aquin, mattre spirituel, 195. For him the Summa ends with
Christ, but with Christ seen in his fullness as body including its members and the means of
salvation, forming with them one mystical person (see STh m, q. 48, a. 2, ad 1).

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

231

Summa. Patfoort's narrative reading is linear and diachronic,
considering the first part, then the second, and finally the third.
The alternative reading is retrospective and synchronic: having
come to the end of the Summa we look back at the parts and how
they relate to each other. In this perspective the Summa can be
depicted as a cone with three slices. The bottom and foundational
one depicts the creation-wide scope of the Prima Pars, the middle
one the human scope of the Secunda Pars, and the narrowest one
the Christ-related scope of the Tertia Pars. Looking at the cone
from the top down suggests to us a concentric articulation of the
themes of the Summa. In this view Christ, while treated last, is
within the narrowest drde, and in this sense a point of
convergence, a center, rather than an appendix awkwardly tacked
on to the Summa.
III. THE SUl!lIMA'S PLAN AS CYCLIC: EXITUS AND REDITUS

Since 1940, Chenu's application to the Summa of the cydic
exitus-reditus pattern explicitly
Aquinas in his
Commentary on the Sentences 15 has been a quasi-obligatory point
of reference in scholarly discourse on this topic. It has been
accepted by most, albeit with modifications, and rejected by some
others. 16 The main evidence for the application of this cyclic
15 M.-D. Chemi, Introdv.ction a l'etude de Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1950), esp.
ch. 11. An earlier sketch of this material is found in "Le plan de la Somme theologique de S.
Thomas,» Revue Thomiste 45 (1939): 93-207.
16 Two early critics, A. Hayen and H. Schiliebeedcx, are featured in Max Sedder's review
of the plan of the Summa in Le salut et l'histoire (Paris: Cerf, 1967), 28ff. (a translation of
Das Heil in der Geschichte: Geschichtstheologisches Denken bei Thomas von Aquin [Munich:
Kosel, 1964]). Corbin is another critic of Chenu. However while there is clear textual
evidence for his own view, set forth earlier, there is also dear textual evidence for Chenu's.
We should keep both views in tension rather than eliminate one. Wilhelm Metz, Die
Architektonik der Summa Theologiae des Thomas von Aquin (Hamburg: Meiner, 1998), is a
more recent critic of Chenu. In this book, his Habilitationschrift, he claims that Chenu's
scheme is merely material and misses the formal basis for distinguishing the parts of the
Summa. Really its three parts correspond to theoria, praxis, and poiesis respectively (89-96,
200-204). Theory and praxis can help explain the difference between the Prima and Secunda
Partes, but H. 0. Pesch (in a critical review in Theologische Revue) correctly rejects the
application of poiesis to the Tertia Pars as unfounded and confusing. Any attempt such as

232

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.

Pars:
deals with God's governance
which is Godsdf
STh I, q.
m this prologue, Aquinas is "'V'""''"'"
creatures. This
as they n1"<";r••Pn
UMUA<UW

corresponding
Sentences (I
Does
as a
the Prima
abstract and necessary structures
that govern creatures' egress from
the
Tertia
is scarcely
an
reflecting the
a salvation history which
thought would at best have
In response we must note that in
passage in the
on the
Metz's to come np with a grand explanatory scheme that excludes all others deeply
underestimates the richness and multiva!ence of this text.
17 G. Lafont, Structures et miithode dans ia Somme theologique de Saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961), 150-71.

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

233

Sentences Aquinas makes a dear link with a scriptural text: "I am
the alpha and the omega" (Rev 2:2). In addition, rather than
speak of exitus, the Prima Pars uses the scriptural language of
processio-the processions internal to the Trinity and their
prolongation in the procession of creatures from their maker (STh
I, q. 2, prol.; and I, q. 44, prol.). These scriptural references are
crucial. They suggest that in the end exitus-reditus is not a neoPlatonic structure imposed on Christian revelation but one that
facilitates the clearer expression of a fundamental scriptural
pattern.
For Aquinas the use of philosophy is ancillary, and ultimately
philosophical categories of whatever provenance are judged and·
reshaped by revealed doctrine (STh I, q. 1, a. 6, ad 2). How are
the categories of exitus and reditus reshaped by their use within
this theological context? Rather than being imbued with a
necessitarian world view, they are, as we have seen, permeated
through and through by freedom. This is clear from the fact that
God's work is not necessary emanation but free creation (Prima
Pars); the work of human beings is not necessary return but the
intersection of divine and human freedom in graced acts (Secunda
Pars); and the work of Jesus Christ is not an unavoidable
incarnation and redemption but the expression of God's supreme
freedom (Tertia Pars). In sum, the application of exitus-reditus to
the Summa offers a broader context for the concentric patterns
articulated earlier, and in turn these patterns help to validate
exitus-reditus as part of the theological patrimony rather than as
a philosophical intrusion. Interrelated with these concentric
patterns, it remains a valuable contribution to the conversation.
IV. THE SUMMA'S PLAN AS CREEDAL

We saw earlier how in key respects the Breviloquium adheres
more closely to the flow of the creeds than does Lombard's
Sentences. In our effort to probe the rationale for the Summa's
plan, we need to explore more closely how this plan relates to the
creedal articulation of faith, foundational in any Christian

234

JEAl'J-IvIARCLAPORTE, S.J.

the
pertains to God
pertains to
(Tertia
Pars): 20

18 The term Thomas uses is s-ymbolum, of 'Nhich there are Il:"No, the Symbol of the Apostles
and the Symbol of the Fathers,
in me Mass (SI'h ll-Il, q. 1, a. 9, ad 4-6).
·we would refer to these as the Apostles's Creed and the Nicene-Constantinople Creed. For
a succinct presentation of the arrides of faith as understood by the Dominicans of Aquinas's
time, see J. Goering, "Christ in Dominican Catechesis: The Artides of Faith," in Kent Emery,
Jr., and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., Christ among the Medieval Dominicans (0-Totre Dame, Ind.:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 127-38.
19 Cf. STh I, q. 1, a. 7. These theological principles have their conclusions, and De Verit.,
q. 14, a. 11 clarifies the reiationship between principle§ and conclusions: If I affirm a principle
from which other truths derive, in affirming that principle explicitly (e.g., God is provident
I also
accept the conclusions that are drawn from it (e.g.,
toward human
God sends His Son into the world).
20 This distinction occurs elsewhere, for instance in I Comp. Theo/., c. 2:
bearificantem cognitionem circa duo cognita dominus consistere docillt, scilicet circa
divinitatem trinitatis et humanitatem
(based on the words of Christ as reported in Jn
17:3); see alsoDeArticulis Fidei 1 (based on john 14:1).

235

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA
The Divinity of God

The Humanitv of Christ

Comments

1

He that comes to God
must believe that He
exists

and rewards those who
seek Him

This the text of Heb
11:6, quoted in STh IIII, q. 1, a. 7

2

God's existence

God's providence over the
salvation of human beings

These are the primary
matters of faith in
which all articles of
faith are implicitly
found

3

that they may know Thee and Jesus Christ whom
Thou hast sent

John's description of
eternal life in John
17:3, quoted in STh III, q. 1, a. 8

4

the secret of the
Godhead, to see which is
beatitude

the mystery of Christ's
humanity, by which we
have access to beatitude

Both of these mysteries
are objects of the
beatific vision

5

unity of the Godhead;
trinity of the persons (3 );
works proper to the
Godhead:
-of nature (creation);
-of grace (sanctification);
-of glory (resurrection
and life everlasting);

incarnation or conception;
virginal birth;
passion, death, burial;
descent into hell;
resurrection;
ascension;
corning for the judgement

Aquinas puts the 7
articles referring to the
majesty of the Godhead
before the 7 on the
humanity of Christ.
Aquinas also provides
for an alternate
configuration that
would give 6+6 rather
than 7 + 7 articles

Rows 1-2 pertain to STh II-II, question 1, article 7, and rows 3-5
to STh II-II, question 1, article 8. Article 7 deals with the increase
in the articles of faith from Old Testament times to the coming of
Christ. The scriptural base for this article is provided by the
Hebrew text (row 1), which includes Christ implicitly under the
rubric of God's providential care for humanity. Article 8 deals
with the explicitation of the articles of faith after the coming of
Christ. Here Aquinas brings in the text from John (row 3), which
in its second member alludes specifically to the mystery of Christ
rather than generally to providence. 21 The beginning of the corpus
21 In other cases where Thomas sets out Christian doctrine according to the order of the
creeds, this is the text he uses rather than the one from Hebrews. It leads more directly into
the articles of the creed, whereas the Hebrews text is more generic and allows one to move

236

JEA.N-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.

article 8 recapitulates
row
which shows
Row
the

here 5 shows how the articles
t".vo members of
John 17 :3

back further in the quest of foundational principles for a scientific theology.
22 We find the sarne systematic order in ill Sent., d. 25, q. 2, a. 2,
1, but with more
detail, suggesting that the first work is
to the Father, the other two w the Spirit
(Aquinas is silent on this in the Summa). The same is found in Bonaventure's m Sent., d. 25,
a. 1, q. 1 and in the Summa Fratris Alexandri, pars m, inq. 2, tract. 2, quaest. 2, tit. 1, cap. 1
(in Summa Fratrisillexandri [Florence: Quarrachi, 1948], 4: 1122). (In the latter text one finds
this reordering.) An earlier and less developed form of !this
order is found in Philip the Chancellor's Summa de Bono, ed. N. Vicki (Bern: Francke, 1985),
2:627. Aquinas was not breaking new groun.d in this systematic exposition of the creeds, but
following a received tradition.
23 The 1954 Marietti edition (Opuscuia Theologica, vol. 1) is being used here. Generally
occurring as recapitulations rather than as prologues, the structure markers in the
Compendium are looser than those of the Summa. This tends to favor the view of Lafont and
Torrell that the first book of the
written around 1265-67, may have been a
sketch on which the Summa builds. I suggested such a relatively early dating on other grounds
in my Structures dynamiques de la grace: Grace medicinale et griice elevante selon Thomas
d'Aquin (fom-nai: Desdee, 1973), 163 n. 132.

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

237

Comp. Theo/., c. 14 7). The work of glory in the Compendium
begins in chapter 148 when Aquinas moves on to the
consummation of human beings, and through them of the whole
creation, and then deals with resurrection, eternal life, and the
remuneration of both good and evil.24 Having fully dealt with the
topics under the rubric of God's divinity, Aquinas then goes on to
Christ's humanity in chapters 185-246.
The Summa contains the same elements and follows the same
basic pattern as the Compendium, but with some differences.
First, the Prima Pars, like the beginning of the Compendium,
covers the unity of God, the trinity of Persons, and the work of
creation, in that order. 25
Second, the Secunda Pars, the focus of which is anthropological
and moral, begins with an extensive development on human
activity and its principles, comes to a climax in its consideration
of the work of grace, and is followed in the Secunda Secundae by
a thorough study of virtues, states, and offices. Some of this
anthropological material (e.g., on human beatitude) is subsumed
in the Compendium under the work of creation. Some of it is
missing from the Compendium, but may have been intended for
the unfinished book 2 on hope (and good intention) and the
projected book 3 on charity (and good behavior). It is clear that
humanity's graced journey to God offers a clear thematic focus in
the Summa which it does not in the Compendium. 26
24 At the very end of the first book of the Compendium (c. 246) Aquinas looks back and
offers an explicit account of the structure of this book in slightly variant terms: the three
effects of God are creation, pertaining to nature; justification, to grace; and remuneration, to
glory.
25 Unity of God: STh l, qq. 2-26; I Comp. Theo/., cc. 2-36; Trinity: STh I, qq. 27-43; I
Comp. Theo/., cc. 37-67; Work of creation: STh I, qq. 44-102; I Comp. Theo!., cc. 68-143,
including governance (gubernatio or providentia) of creatures in general terms. In the
Compendium a special providence (I Comp. Theo!., c. 143) or government (I Comp. Theo!.,
c. 147) extended to rational creatures, who receive grace and the forgiveness of sins, is
considered to be the second effect of God.
26 This appreciation of the role played by human beings created in God's image and free
agents of their own return to God was present already in the Compendium. A revealing text
is found in I Comp. Theo/., c. 201, where Aquinas argues for the appropriateness of the
incarnation: "[through the incarnation] the universality of the entire divine work is perfected,
since man, the last to be created, returns in a certain cycle to his origin, united to the very

238

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.

Third, unlike the Breviloquium, both the Compendium and the
Summa put the humanity of Christ in their final part. However,
in one vital respect the Summa follows the order of the creeds
whereas the Compendium follows the systematic ordering we
have described: the humanity of Christ precedes the work of glory
in the Summa (and in the creeds) but follows it in the
Compendium. The work of glory, together with the sacraments
not dealt with in the Compendium, is seen in the Summa as a
benefit conferred by Christ, the via ad beatitudinem:
Breviloquium: closest to
the creedal narrative

Compendium: closest to
the systematic reordering
of the articles of the
creed

Summa: a further
reordering by Thomas

God, triune and one

God, one and triune

God, one and triune

work of creation

work of creation

work of creation

Christ

work of grace

work of grace /humans

work of grace

work of glory
(sacraments omitted)

Christ

work of glory (preceded
by sacraments)

Christ

work of glory (preceded
by sacraments)

The treatment of the humanity of Christ comes across more as an
appendix in the Compendium than it does in the Summa. The
Summa maintains the humanity of Christ as a block to be dealt
with in its final part, but subsumes it into the overall exitus-reditus
pattern identified by Chenu by making it precede the treatise on
the consummation of all things. The Summa also maintains a clear
parallelism between its three parts, each developing one of the
three works of God featured in the creeds: creation (Prima Pars),
origin of things through the work of the incarnation" (my translation). See also I Comp.
Theol., c. 149: "the consummation of the entire physical universe depends on the
consummation of human beings." What the Summa adds to the Compendium is the
embodiment of this heightened appreciation of the theological role played by the human
journey to God in its very structure, and a close linking of that journey with G<ld's work of
grace which empowers it. These new insights may have been triggered by Thomas's intention
to provide a complete treatment of res moralis in the Summa.

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

239

grace (Secunda.Pars), and glory (Tertia Pars). At the same time it
provides a process of concentration in which Christ is clearly the
consummation of the work of theology (Tertia Pars, prol.)
through the sequence that leads from God and creation to humans
and grace and finally to Christ and glory. The themes of the
Summa are deeply rooted in the creeds, but their ordering
represents a significant step by Aquinas toward greater clarity and
harmony.
V. THE STRUCTIJREOF THE SUMMA:
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

We have developed a variety of perspectives on how Aquinas
organized the themes of Christian doctrine in his Summa and how
this organization is rooted in the creeds. We have discovered a
rich network of meanings and have opted for multivalence rather
than seeking one absolutely clear and all-sufficient interpretation.
Does the theological methodology Aquinas uses in the Summa,
articulated in STh I, question 1, help us understand more deeply
his use and reconfiguration of the creedal articles in that work?
Sacred doctrine is to be scientific (STh I, q. 1, a. 2) and
argumentative (STh I, q. 1, a. 8). Scientific argumentation in the
Aristotelian sense moves deductively from causes to effects, from
principles to conclusions, but argumentation can be taken more
widely to mean any discursus of the mind moving from one truth
to another (De Verit., q. 2, a. 4, ad 5), including the opposite
movement of induction, from effects to causes (STh I, q. 1, a. 7,
ad 1). Aquinas does not want to lock sacra doctrina into the category of strict deductive science. There is room for movement not
only from causes to effects but also from effects to causes, as well
as for the use of metaphor and image to lead one into the mystery
which rational categories cannot exhaust (STh I, q. 1, a. 9).
Unlike the sciences known to Aristotle, sacra doctrina proceeds
from principles established by the light of a higher science, that of
God and the blessed (STh I, q. 1, a. 2), transmitted to us through
revelation. That revelation is expressed in the canonical

240

JEAl'J-1\AARCLAPORTE, S.J.

I, q. 1, a.
summarize what
H-H, q. 1, a.

i:ne:ce1ne:a1fashion """""'"''"''""""'
God reveals to us. 28
way they
us
imperfectly approximate the
and comprehensiveness of
vision of which faith is a
A key
for a
task is the identification of appropriate
as all-encompassing as possible.
netvvork of intelligible
What are
more
and generative
doctrines that can
other
how can
process of derivation take
Building on a tradition
concemmg
way
the articles of the creed can
summed up, recapitulated, and structured, Aquinas developed his
adapting
answer to these questions
patterns of Aristotelian science as
with his endeavor
both

Science in
the elucidation-Aquinas
uses the term
(STh I, q. 1, ao 5, ad 2)--of the
articles of
other as tool to be used
purpose
to be achieved. Like other J\Jistotelian tools
categories used
by
this tool is
even transformed,
the process
being used. Indeed philosophical texts, even those of Aristotle,
are the least of the authorities used in
I, qo 1, a. 8,
2). Moreover, sacred doctrine sits in judgment on the
principles, condusions,
methods of philosophical science.
27 This argument, from I Cor 15: 12, recurs a number of times in his works, and is found
in Sfh I, q. 1, a. ll. It occurs in Scripture, not in a subsequent theologiail elaboration.
28 Sfh I, q. 1, a. 5, ad 1 and 2; I, q. 1, a. 9.

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

241

Thus we ought not to expect Aquinas univocally to apply the
principles of Aristotelian science to his theological enterprise.
The ideal of Aristotelian science is to know not just what is in
fact the case but also why it is the case: one seeks to grasp the
necessary and universally
connection of facts with the causal
principles from which they are derived and which are better
known. 29 The more powerful and probative the principles, the
more scientific the knowledge. Because the principles of sacra
doctrina derive from more certain and more comprehensive
knowledge, that of God, this science differs from the sciences
known to Aristotle not as a deficient instance but as a higher
realization. The more scriptural and creedal principles play a role
theology,
more scientific it is. 30
A problem, however, arises from the fact that some articles of
faith are contingent and/or singular rather than necessary and/or
universal as
to
as Aristotdian principles.
Creation and
depend upon the freedom of
the
stories recounted
testaments are shot through
freedom both human and divine. 31 In his scientific search Aquinas
necessary articles
faith,
singles out the most
which, including the other articles implicidy, can serve as
29 Chapter 1 of John Jenkins's Knowledge and Faith in Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1997), offers a good summary oft.he Aristotelian approach to
sacred doctrine has features which distinguish it from other
science. Jenkins argues that
human scientiae, it is nevertheless fully a PA [Posterior Analytics] scientia and it shares with
other human uienti<W centtal featuresn (51). He upholds this against Chenu and many other
interpreters of Thomas.
30 I intend here to be restating part of the argument made by Eugene Rogers in his Thomas
Aquinas and Karl Barth (Notte Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 199 5) 17-70. He
rightly stresses the role of Scripture, which permeates the entire Summa, but because of my
concern ·Nith the structures of the Summa, I stress the complementary role of the creeds,
which encapsulate scriptural revelation into the dear principles needed for pedagogical
organization.
31 STh I, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 2 raises this issue in terms of the particular deeds of Abraham,
Isaac, and Jacob, and offers a response that appears somewhat perfunctory. Why would
Aquinas not have raised what for us would seem a much more significant objection in terms
of the particular and contingent deeds of Jesus Christ? This suggests that for Aquinas and
schoiars of his day Christ's deeds, for a!! their particularity and contingency, play a privileged
and essential role in theology, but one that somewhat remained in the penumbra. It is that role
that we are trying to articulate.

242

JEMJ-MARC LAPORTE, So].

to
principles.
or explicates more
and contingent
the universal and necessary ones, he is careful not to
that
this procedure yields
necessary knowledge it
might in Aristotelian science.
wants us to grasp is
truth that is seen as a condusion
light of faith
is appropriate,
and linked
with other articles of
cannot pierce the myster1
the
pretending to understand how God could not have acted
otherwise than he
but our contemplative
of
has done
revealed to us enables an
emerge.
to
the harrn.ollltY

faith, and

the

32
we sense the
dimension of this scientific approach is that the "u:wuna
consistently treats complex topics after it has considered
"'"'"!-'''"'principles
they can be readily seen to
For
the study
nature in the
Pars is preceded
by a study
angelic
creation,
we might better
comprehend the composite of
spiritual and the corporeal
is the
Likewise the
of Christ
is the
God-Man (Tertia Pars) is preceded by a study
God
and of man
Christ comes at the end not because
because key
blocks
he is relatively unimportant
to
place
the
undertaken. 33
Godself,
as efficient
m
considering human beings

32 The srudy of Gilbert Narcisse, Les raisons de Dieu: Argument de co11111Hmanceet esthetiqv1e
theologique sek,n saint Thomas J:Aquin et Hans Urs von Balthasav (Fribourg: Editions
Universitaires, 1997), brings out both the centrality of convenientia in the argumentation of
Thomas Aquinas and the role the tmnscendenral beauty plays in his thought-secondary to
transcendental truth, but still of crucial import. In addition to making room for finely honed
argument, sacred science must deal with metaphor and images, which through their
attractiveness drnw people into the unfathomable mystery: see SYh I, q. 1, a. 9; and I Sent.,
d. 1, a. 5, ad 3.
33 CL Seckler, Le salut dans l'histoire, 35, where he presents Schillebeeckx's views on the
organization of the Summa"

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

243

their free, graced actions are in the image of God; having dealt
with God and God's human image, we can study Christ. Just as in
the Trinity the Son proceeds from the Father, and the Spirit from
the Father and the Son, so too in the Summa the study of the
human image in the Secunda Pars flows from the study of the
divine exemplar in the Prima Pars and the study of Christ in the
Tertia Pars flows from the study of both divine exemplar and
human image.
(2) The Prima Pars does not present God abstractly, but God
in his desire to share his life with creatures, and the Secunda Pars
does not present man abstractly, but man in his orientation
toward God. 34 Thus the Christology of the Tertia Pars yokes
together a God already wanting to share in human nature, and a
human nature already in its depths oriented to God. Just as the
Spirit is the bond of unity of Father and Son, so too Christ is the
bond of unity between God and man.
These two points allow yet another pattern to emerge out of
the text of the Summa. This pattern mirrors the processions of the
Trinity and in it the humanity of Christ plays the bonding role the
Spirit plays within the Trinity.
B) The Summa's Plan as Scientific: Background

The scientific order of presentation, which begins with the
broadest and most generative principles and deductively moves
toward detailed exposition, presupposes that one has discovered
what those principles are. Thus prior to a pedagogically ordered
scientific exposition (ordo disciplinae), there is a process of
discovery (ordo inventionis). To discover the principles of sacra
doctrina, accessible in their clarity only to God and to the blessed,
but revealed to us in Scripture and summarized for us in the
articles of faith, a sure guide is needed. As Aquinas tells us in the
Tertia Pars, this sure guide is Christ, the via veritatis, the teacher
par excellence.
34 A. N. Williams, "Mystical Theology Redux: The Pattern of Aquinas's Summa
Theologiae," Modem Theology 13 (1997): 67.

244

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S.J.

Let us not, however, unduly limit the scope of Christ's teaching
activity. The Tertia Pars deals not just with the Jesus who
ministered in Galilee and Judea but also with the totus Christus,
head and members, who through the Church continues to teach
to this day. During his earthly ministry Jesus himself taught the
Jews of his day, but he entrusts the task of teaching the Gentiles
to his apostles (STh III, q. 42, a. 1, c and ad 2); he himself teaches
in such a way as to imprint his teaching in the hearts of his hearers
rather than on paper (STh III, q. 42, a. 4), and he follows a certain
order, teaching his disciples that they in turn might teach others
(ibid.), 35 orally and in writing. Thus we have a process of
doctrinal communication beginning with Christ who teaches
orally and empowers his disciples to preach and to write, and so
on down through the ages. There accumulates a body of materials
accessible to the theologian, beginning with Scripture, followed by
the articles of faith which summarize the Scriptures, followed by
the councils, followed by approved patristic sources, followed by
theologians, followed by philosophical sources whose authority is
least (cf. STh I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2). The theologian uses them all
within the Church, which has the power to regulate them.
These sources stimulate a lengthy process of discovery in which
various elements of the truth, communicated to us in the narrative
sequence of the Scriptures, are collected, analyzed, and brought
to a point where they can cohere in a suitable pedagogical order.
In the Summa that order begins with God, continues with man,
and culminates in the God-man incarnate, who leads humankind
through the vicissitudes of history toward God. As Aquinas tells
us, God is at the beginning of the theological project and animates
it throughout: all theological topics are such because of their
relationship to God. But if we look at the Summa not just in its
content but also in its performance, not only does it end with the
total Christ in whom we have access to eternal life, but it also
35 A key text: "Christ is constituted by God as the head of the Church, indeed of all human
beings, as was said above, such that all should not only accept grace through him, but also
receive from him the teaching of truth. As he himself said (Jn 18:37): 'I was born for this, and
came into the world for this, that I might give testimony to the truth'" (STh Ill, q. 12, a. 3;
translation mine). See also STh Ill, q. 3, a. 8; and ScG IV, c. 54.

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

245

begins with the same total Christ who teaches us down through
the centuries, giving to us the principles we need for the
systematic elaboration of sacra doctrina. The order of scientific
pedagogy leads from God to Christ; the order of discovery leads
from Christ to God.
This links up with two related articles that deal with the formal
object (STh I, q. 1, a. 3) and with the subject matter (STh I, q. 1,
a. 7) of sacra doctrina. 36 More foundational and pertinent to the
order of discovery, STh I, question 1, article 3 tells us that the
science which is sacra doctrina deals with particular topics
inasmuch as they are revealable, just as the eye sees things
inasmuch as they are colored. This unifies a multitude of topics
under the formal object of revealability. But is there a more
immediate and concretely discernible way in which they can be
seen to constitute one subject matter? Derivative and more
pertinent to the order of pedagogy, STh I, question 1, article 7
tells us that these topics are all treated under the aspect of God:
they either are God or refer to God as beginning and end. 37 This
last phrase summarizes the pedagogical order of the Summa.
The formal object and the subject matter of sacra doctrina are
intimately related: revealable truths are precisely those that relate
to God and to our journey to God (STh I, q. 1, a. 1). In a variant
formulation, God reveals to us what we cannot know by
ourselves, namely, God's own self-knowledge, and all else known
in the unifying perspective of that self-knowledge (STh I, q. 1, a.
6).38

Where does Christ fit into this? It is clear that the total Christ
is not the unifying subject matter of sacra doctrina (STh I, q. 1, a.
7). Yet, as we have seen, that science unfolds from God in the
direction of the total Christ in which all humans find their way to
God. Moreover, if we return to the perspective of STh I, question
36 Two helpful articles: J.-P. Torrell, "Le savoir theologique chez saint Thomas," Revue
Thomiste 96 (1996): 355-96, esp. 381-82; and T. C. O'Brien, "Sacra Doctrina Revisited: The
Context of Medieval Education," The Thomist 41 (1977): 475-509.
37 See also STh I, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1.
38 This is amply developed by Corbin, Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin,
767ff.

246

us to have a science whose
article 3,
subject matter is God
to God is
as we
revelation
Christ. Again we
more Christoform
Rogers: the more
39
it is.
sum,
sequence
of pedagogy)
we have analyzed in different facets throughout this paper can
expanded. As we
just seen, in
order
discovery Christ
revelation is prior to
doctrine
God. That doctrine
is both the
of the order of discovery and the beginning
the
of scientific exposition. This gives us a sequence of
Christ-God-Christ. A further expansion is possible as well, if we
go back to the broadest context set by STh I, question
article 1
and articulated
Chenu's exitus-reditus pattern. Christ's
revelation us grounded
God's salvific choice from all eternit"/ to
offer men a destiny
beyond their ken.
destiny
through the way which is Jesus
God,
"""'''"'"''""""isnow expanded to God-Christ-God-Christbegins
ends
This sequence can be expressed in the following diagram:

..

Order of Discovery: God I total Christ I God
1 God who
chooses to
reveal Godself
as the destiny
of human
beings

2 The total
Christ as the
vehicle for
this
revelation

3 Doctrine of
God as providing
. the principles
and ratio
formalis of
sacred doctrine
as science

I
4 Christ the
revealer as the

goal toward
which sacred
doctrine is
headed

5 God as the
one toward
whom Christ
leads human
beings

Order of Discipline: God I total Christ
39 See note 30. O'Brien makes a similar point: uBy origin it [i.e., stJCra doct:rina] rests on
the ro!llti.ngellltfact of God's revealing at :i.11, ;md on the contingently chosen, historical events
of salvation, the divinely intended meanings of both the words describing those events and of
the events themselves. That gives sacra doctrina its paradoxical character: it is a science of the
contingent. The de facto divine economy must always be the final me21Sure of the loftiest of
theological speculations. Concretely the mystery of Christ is decisive as criterion of every
intelligible construct» (O'Brien, "Sacra Doctrina Revisited," 499-500).

CHRIST IN THE SUMMA

247

Thus Christ plays a twofold role in sacred doctrine. In the order
of discovery his role is that of actually revealing God to us. He
taught us during his earthly ministry but also continues to teach
us as the total Chris4 body and members, through the Church
down through the ages (column 2). In the order of scientific
exposition he is the summit and culmination of the whole
theological enterprise as Aquinas conceives it in the Summa
(column 4). But then in the broadest sense, before Christ the
revealer there is God's project of inviting us into intimacy with
himself (column 1), and after Christ the culmination there is the
God to whom Christ leads us (column 5), completing the circle.
In this approach, Christ continues to be a culmination, as Corbin
claims, but within an exitus-reditus context, as Chenu reminds us.
VI. CONCLUSION

If nothing else, our exploration of the Summa has established
that it is indeed a classic text, multidimensional, with many facets
and perspectives, worth returning to over and over again because
each time one struggles with it one is blessed with new insight. A
number of organizing patterns for the Summa have emerged in
the course of this essay. Priority must be ascribed to those which
stem directly from the prologues in which Aquinas expresses his
own intentions, but clustering around them are others that emerge
from a scrutiny of the text, which at most were part of the
habitual texture of Aquinas's mind. The point of this exercise is
not to single out the one pattern that excludes all others but to
disclose the richness of thought available to us when they are all
held together.
There is an obvious sense, from the narrative ordering by
Patfoort of the three parts in their diachronic sequence, that the
Spirit occupies the middle position in the sequence of the Summa
that Christ occupies in the Breviloquium. But as we continued to
probe how the themes of the Summa are related to one another
synchronically, especially through a study of the prologues, we
found a variety of concentric schemes, which show us how

248

JEAN-MARC LAPORTE, S,J.

gets to the final part of
whose
is Christ
after he has developed the broader themes
benefits,
it. The
converges
that contextualize and prepare
on and culminates in
The doctrine
Christ occupies a
This position may be less
central position in the
it is the
but nonetheless it is
conspicuous
powerfully operative.
This is
in the
sections of the essay in
we
Aquinas proceeded as he did in organizing
into the creedal roots of the Summa
unearthed another pattern,
on a systematic exposition of
the creeds that goes back to Philip
Chancellor,
which the
treatment of the incarnate Christ is found in a second part parallel
to the first part which deals
God and God's works. This
notion that Christ was treated as an afterthought
precludes
the Summa. We then probed the method of the ;:;uinmia
role Christ plays in binding
discovered in the foreground
together
pairts. A further scrutiny disclosed the background role
by Christ as the revealer of the principles required for the
proper scientific unfolding of sacra doctrina.
The Spirit, and
as beginning and end, play a key
m
so does Christ. His role is
the structuring of the
pervasive and does not
itself to be encapsulated
a simple
formula.

The Thomist 67 (2003): 249-78

APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY
EMBRYOLOGY
KEVIN L. FI.ANNERY,S.J.
Pontifical Gregorian University
Rome, Italy

I

N HIS BOOK When did I begin?, Norman M. Ford argues that,

because up until about the fourteenth day a single human embryo can split in such a way that twins (or other sibling groups)
result, the embryo during this period cannot be considered a
human individual. 1 In historical support of this thesis, he cites
Aristotle, who, according to Ford, holds that the sensitive
soul-which is a prerequisite for the presence of the rational or
properly human soul--enters the embryo some forty days after
conception for males, ninety days for females. 2 Ford has been
challenged on his interpretation of Aristotle by the prominent
Aristotelian Enrico Berti, who argues that, if we bear in mind
especially Aristotle's application of the doctrine of first act to the
beginnings of human life, we must acknowledge that for him the
human soul is present from conception. 3
1 See N. M. Ford, When Did I Begin? Conception of the Human Individual in History,
Philosophy and Science (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press., 1989), 19-52. Ford has now
another book on this topic (The Prenatal Person: Ethics from Conception to Birth [Oxford:
Blackwell, 2002]), to which I did not have access as I was writing this essay. Henceforward,
when I speak of twinning, I mean the production of monozygotic sibling groups-cleaving
aside, that is, polyzygotic twins and ignoring the possibility that more than two fetuses might
be the result of a single embryo's splitting.
2 Ford, When Did I Begin?, 27-28, 32. At Pol. 7.15 (1335b19-26), Aristotle suggests that,
once the sensitive soul is present, abortion is not permissible. He seems, however, in the same
passage to countenance the exposure of infants.
3 E. Berti, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza? La tesi di Aristotele," in Nascita e morte
dell'uomo: Problemi filosofici e scientifici, ed. S. Biolo (Genoa: Marietti, 1993), 115-23. The
same essay appears in Quale statuto per l'embrione umano? Problemi e prospettive, ed. M.

249

250

T

'

however? the former. I:n. an Italian
Molfi {Milan: Blib!iotech_ne.,1992)., 52-5ft I wiH
Ford has published a reply to sor:ae of }tis critics'.' in.eluding
translation of Wlhen Did I

cornincio io? conce[Ji:vnentoneUa storia, nella
e nella
Berti
Ivt Ford
scienza [IVU!an: Baldini & Castoldi, 1997], 310-22).
9.7 (1048b37-Hl49a18).
I discuss first act bdow"
4! use ;J1e text of GA edited by 1-L J. Dmssaart Lulofa and published in 1965 mnong the
Oxford Classical Texts.

APPLYINGiLRlSTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

251

For
would put down the
(736a32)] as soulless or in
every sense bereft of life
both the semen and the
[Ta TE OTIEpµcna
of animals live no less than those of
and
up to a certain
That then they possess the nutritive soul is
is it from the discussions elsewhere about soul [De an. 2.4
this soul must be
As
develop they also
acquire the sensitive soul in virtue of which an animal is an animal ... 5 For, e.g.,
an animal does not become at the same time an animal and a man or a horse or
any other
and the peculiar
in each individual.
character of the
of the greatest
which we must strive to
and as far as possible. When and how and whence
is a share in reason
those animals that
in this ..,,..,,,,r·u-.11,.,1
It is
that the semen and the
not yet separate, must be assumed to
but not
until
those
1)]
se1pairntea from the
it absorbs nourishment and performs the
function of the nutritive soul. For at first all such
seem to live the life of
a plant. 6
And it is dear that we must be
the rational soul. For all three kinds of
must be
before
are
it is necessary
should all come into
without existing
outside it, or that
should aH exist
or that some should
so exist and others not.
in the material 0u1vP""'"
or come from the male and be
to the material in the female.
then either all of
or none, or some must come into
m
the male from
Now that
is dear from this
IS
cannot exist
cannot enter from outside. For neither is it IJ'-""'m·''"for them to enter
from a
for the semen is
for the
5 Drossaart Lu!ofs marks a lacuna in the text here, suggesting that it should be filled by the
words KC!t
Ka()'
6 The Platt translation {also as given in]. Bame&,. ed., The Complete Works of Aristotle: The
Revised
Translation [Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1934], 1143) renders this
added). But the
as, "For at first all such embryos seem to iive the life of a
Greek is, rrpliiTOV l.lEv yap cmcwr' EO!KE (_;ijv Ta TOWOm <!>!JTOO pfov (GA 23 [736b12-13]);
amxvr' clearly refers to Ta crm'°pµcnaKai Ta
at GA 23 (736b8-9). !3erti's translation
(taken from D. Li.nza) gives the correct understanding' In un primo tempo sembra che tutti
silfatti esseri vivano la vita del!e piaute.

252

reason alone so to enter and alone to be divine, for no
connection with the activity of reason, 7

Berti understands

activity has any

asserting that the embryo
",,,.,,,.1-,-u·,,,.it cannot have received
the

7 GA 2.3 (736a32-b29); Berti leaves out (with the apprnpriate indications) what I give in
brackets, that is, 736b16-22. Like other Aristotelian translations mthis essay, this one is &om
the Revised Oxford Translation (Barnes, ed.), occasionally (as here) slightly revised, The
translation of GA has as its base an earlier translation by A. Platt, who translated To icu11µa in
line 736a32 (and ;a Kutjµam at 736b9 and '736b11) as "unfertilized embryo." Berti takes
exception to this translation (Berti "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 117); it does not
appear in the Barnes version.
8 Berti, "Qoondo esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 117.
9 Ibid., 118.
10 Ibid.

APPLYINGARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

253

Satisfied that Aristotle is saying in GA 2.3 that right from the
beginning the embryo is possessed of a nutritive soul in act and
the other two souls in potency, Berti introduces the passage from
De an. 2.3. His intention in doing so is to show that the type of
potency attaching to the rational soul is such that we can say that
the rational soul is present in the embryo right from the
beginning.
The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed
under the common name in both cases-figures and living beings--constirute a
series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e.g., the
square the triangle, the sensory power the self-nutritive. Hence we must ask in
the case of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e., What is the soul of
plant, man, beast? ... For the power of perception is never found apart from the
power of self-nutrition .... Again, among living things that possess sense some
have the power of locomotion, some not. Lastly, certain living beings-a smaH
minority-possess calculation and thought, for (among mortal beings) those
which possess calculation have all the other powers above mentioned, while the
converse does not hold .... Reflective thought [Si:wp11n1<(x_;
presents a
different problem. 11

It is dear, notes Berti, that Aristotle holds that in any living being
there is just one souL 12 In human beings, that soul is rational;
thus, when Aristotle says
GA 2.3 that the rational (and the
sensitive) souls are in the embryo in potency, even at that point
we must assume that the real soul is the rational,
that it
contains the other two (or, at least, the corresponding faculties).
To quote Berti, "Here, as one sees, Aristotle affirms that the
superior soul contains in itself the inferior, and not vice-versa.
Thus, in the human embryo, one must suppose that there is
already contained the soul superior to all, i.e., the rational, which
however possesses in act only the nutritive faculty, and in potency
the sensitive and rational. " 13 Berti also acknowledges that, for the
rational fac. .dty to be
to operate, there is required intelletto
teoretico
flE<J.1Pl1TlKO<;voGi;), an issue that Aristode remands
to another forum.
De an. 2.3 (414b28-415a12). The ellipses correspond to the pieces left out by Berti.
Berti,
esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 118.
13 Ibid., 119.
11

11

254

KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

How is this possible? How can a soul that is only in potency in
the embryo contain the soul (or the faculty) that is already there
in act? This is possible by means of the Aristotelian conception
that the soul is "first act of a body which has life in potency. " 14
When a person knows a language but is asleep, the language is
both in act (first act) and in potency. Before he learned the
language, it was (in another sense) in potency; now that it is
learned, it is in act. But it can, so to speak, be put in act in a more
perfect sense: the person can wake up and use the language. This
is sometimes called second act. Thus, right from the beginning,
the embryo can be said to have a rational soul in act (i.e., in first
act), although this will only be put in act fully (i.e., in second act)
once the necessary organs develop, etc.
Berti's third passage, from Metaph. 9.7, is offered in
confirmation of the former argument. In it Aristotle is explaining
what it means to be in potency for something. That which is
potentially a house is not such until all the material is gathered
and there is present someone who wants to build a house.
Similarly, a doctor cannot cure just any material-he cannot, for
instance, cure a dead body; he needs a body that is disposed to be
healed. Aristotle discusses here also semen (or seed, cmtpµa). "But
we must distinguish when a thing exists potentially and when it
does not; for it is not at any and every time. E.g., is earth
potentially a man? No-but rather when it has already become
seed, and perhaps not even then, as not everything can be healed
by the medical art or by chance, but there is a certain kind of
thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy." 15
This is not the passage quoted by Berti in support of his thesis that
the embryo contains the rational soul in (first) act; that passage is
the following, which comes a few lines later:
E.g., the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something
other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive
principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already
14 010 ii ljluxTf lonv EVTEAEXEtaii npuin1 <JWµaTO<; cpuatKoO Suv<lµEt l,;wl]v exovTO<; (De
an. 2.1 [412a27-28]; Berti, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 119).
15 Metaph. 9.7 (1048b37-1049a5).

APPLYINGARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

255

potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle,
just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to
become brass). 16

This passage demonstrates, according to Berti, the difference
between the semen and the embryo. The former is not yet a man,
the latter is: a man in potency, by which is to be understood a
man in first act. The difference between the former and the latter
is that the latter has its own "motive principle" (apxtj). Like the
material for the house in the presence of the builder and the
properly disposed body in the presence of the doctor, from the
man in potency a full-grown man will result if no impediment
presents itself. Berti condudes, "if the embryo is already in
potency, it must already possess act, as first act, the soul that is
proper to the
species, even if it is not capable of exercising
immediately aH the faculties-that is, it possesses in act only
nutritive faculty and in potency the others." 17

n
In order to deal with Berti's general understanding of
Aristotle's embryology, we need now to go back to the first
passage, that is, the passage from GA 2.3. We have seen that Berti
interprets the remark that, before they are separate, "the semen
and the embryo [Ta mrtpµcna 1<al Ta
(736b8-9)]" have
the nutritive soul potentially as saying that the relevant change
occurs "after the union of the seed furnished by the father with
the material furnished by the mother." Berti rather slides over the
fact that in GA 2.3 Aristotle speaks of two types of embryo-or,
perhaps better, two stages of
same embryo. The first stage he
associates closely with the semen, not only in the piece just
16 o'l:ov TO cm£pµa oonw (8£1 yap EV @J.'{l <nrndv> Kai µna!'kXAA£1v),OTCTV r:; i\811 l'i1a
Tfj<; athoO apxfi<; TOIOUTOV, ijori TOUTO 8uvciµn. EK£1vo 8£ h£pm; apxij<; odrn1, WITT!Ep

u

ii yfj ourrw

iiuvciµE1 (µna!3a71o0cra yap £mm XaAKo<;) (Metaph. 9.7 [1049a14-18]).
The word nEcrElv is inserted by Ross; in the Jaeger text it does not appear (nor is it tnnslated
in the Barnes volume [p. 1656]). Since Berti's translation presupposes n£crdv, for the moment
I use Ross's older translation of Metaph. rather than the Barnes revision.
17 Berri, "Quando esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 121.

256

KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

referred to (where he speaks of both the semen and the embryo
as "not yet separate") but also at the beginning of the passage:
"since both the semen and the embryo [Ta TE 01TEpµaTa Kai Ta
KutjµaTa (736a33-34)] of animals live no less than those of
plants." It is only at the second stage, with respect to which
Aristotle mentions the embryo and not the semen, that we have
that which "absorbs nourishment and performs the function of the
nutritive soul." This is the embryo that has become "separate"
from the mother, in the sense that it has bodily integrity and
movement of its own. 18 This is consistent with what he says
elsewhere in GA, where the embryo requires some time in the
presence of the semen--or, more precisely, in the presence of that
which it brings: its pneuma-before it launches out on its own.
During this time the pneuma is working upon the embryo, but in
an external way-that is, in such a way that the embryo cannot be
said to have its own "motive principle" or dpxtj and therefore
cannot be a man in first act.
In GA 1.21and22, Aristotle insists that in the life of the early
embryo the action of the pneuma is external. At the beginning of
GA 1.21, he asks a number of crucial questions about the
relationship between the semen and the menses (the female
contribution to animal generation). 19 He wants to know "how it
is that the male contributes to generation and how it is that the
semen from the male is the cause of the offspring"; and he asks:
"Does it exist in the body of the embryo as a part of it from the
first [trOTEpovw<; EVUTTclpXOVKai µ6ptov ov Eu0u<;],mingling with
the material which comes from the female? Or does the semen
communicate nothing to the material body of the embryo but only
to the power and movement in it?" (GA 1.21 [729b2-6]; emphasis
added). His answer is quite emphatic: "the latter alternative
appears to be the right one both a priori and in view of the facts.
For, if we consider the question on general grounds, we find that,
whenever one thing is made from two of which one is active and
18 See GA 2.1 (735a20-22);

2.4 (740a37-b2); 2.6 (742a2-3); 2.7 (746a22-28).
At GA 2.4 (739a7-8), Aristotle notes that there is a part of the menses that is less fluid;
see also 2.4 (739b26). So the female contribution is not just any part of the menses.
19

APPLYING ARISTOTIE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

257

the other passive, the active agent does not exist in that which is
made" (GA 1.21 [729b8-11];emphasisadded). He acknowledges,
of course, that the formation of the embryo does take place within
the female, not the male (GA 1.22 [730a32-bl]); but even this, he
says, can be accounted for in terms of his standard examples of
crafts: "the carpenter must keep in close connection with his
timber and the potter with his clay, and generally all
workmanship and the ultimate movement imparted to matter
must be connected with the material concerned, as, for instance,
architecture is in the buildings it makes" (GA 1.22 [730b6-8]). A
craftsman nonetheless always remains external to his artifact (see
Metaph. 9.7 [1049a11-12]).
In GA 2.1 Aristotle comes back to this issue, suggesting at first
that the operation of the semen must be internal to the embryo:
"Now it would appear irrational to suppose that any of either the
internal organs [O'lTliayxvwv(734a2)] or the other parts is made by
something external, since one thing cannot set up a motion in
another without touching it, nor can a thing be affected in any
way by anything that does not set up a motion in it" (GA 2.1
[734a2-4]). (The parts of the body mentioned here would include
the so-called homoeomerous parts such as blood, flesh, and the
material of bones. )20 After mentioning some possible objections,
he says that it is necessary to make some distinctions; in
particular, we must determine in what sense it is impossible that
the parts might be generated by something external (GA 2.1
[734b4-7]): "For if in a certain sense they cannot, yet in another
sense they can."
It is possible, then, that A should move B, and B move C; that, in fact, the case
should be the same as with the automatic toys. For the parts of such toys while
at rest have a sort of potentiality of motion in them, and when any external force
puts the first of them in motion, immediately the next is moved in actuality. As,
zo See GA 1.1 (715a9-l 1): mwrl. µ£v T«jl OAfp Ta dvoµotoµEpfj,
o' dvoµotoµEpfot Ta
6µo1oµepfj,
of: Ta Ka>.oUµeva0T01xda Tuiv owµ<l-ruiv. This passage depicts a sort of
hierarchy of parts: whole animals contain nonhomoeomerous parts, such as hearts and brains;
the homoeomerous (such as flesh and blood, but also including gold, wood, stone, etc.)
contribute to the nonhomoeomerous parts; the elements (earth, air, fire, and water) contribute
to the homoeomerous parts. See also GA 1.18 (722a16-18, 28-33); and Mete. 4.12.

KEVIN L FLA.""<1-lERY,S.J.

258

in these automatic toys the external force moves the parts in a certain sense
any part at the moment, but
touched one
in like manner also that from which the semen comes, or in other words that
which made the semen, sets up the movement in the
and makes the parts
first touched
to touch it.
a
of it
way it is the innate motion that does
(GA 2.1

by

21 See GA 1.21

(730b19-22).

22 See Aristotle's

from II. 1-3), trans. D. M. Balme, Clarendon Aristotle series (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972),
157; and D. M. Balme, Av&pu.rITo;;avSpwnov
Hui:nan is Generated by Human," in
The Human
Aristotle and the Arabic and European Traditions, ed. G. R, Dunstan
(Exeter, Devon: Exeter University Press, 1990}, 23; see also G.4 2.5 (741b7-9); and MA 7
(701b2-3). Kn his translation, Balme uses uthe automata in the 'mar;els"'; but in his 1990 essay
he suggests that 'automatic toys' would be the best translation, even better than the 'automatic
puppets' often found (in, for instance, the Barnes volume). uHe [Aristotle] dearly refers not
to puppets worked
external strings but to automatic toys like t.lie modern ones whleh, af<.er
a simple pVJSh, will walk along by moving legs
waggle head, tail, ears, etc.,
while containing no motive power (other than gravity}" (Bahne, uHuman ls Generated by
23). I have altered the Barnes translation accordingly.

APPLYINGARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

259

(741b12)] (such as softness, hardness, color, and the other
differences of the homoeomerous parts)" (GA 2.5 [741b9-14]). It
is not at all clear why Aristotle is conceding anything here to "the
natural philosophers" (he has just earlier rejected the utility of the
principle "like is brought to like" (GA 2.4 [740b12-14]); but it is
clear that he does not understand the action of the semen as
sheerly mechanical. It is external but it does bring about a real
alteration (dA/io(wcrt<;;)in the material provided by the mother, not
just a shifting of parts. The alteration of which he speaks is again,
and significantly, alteration of the characteristics of the
homoeomerous parts. These are, of course, to be distinguished
from the nonhomoeomerous parts such as the heart, brain, eyes,
etc., which are, according to GA 2.3, required for the presence of
certain faculties of the soul: "Plainly those principles whose
activity is bodily cannot exist without a body, e.g. w:alking cannot
exist without feet" (736b22-24). Nothing that Aristotle says
excludes, however, the possibility that the semen's work upon the
maternal material might result in the formation of organs
(cm/iayxvwv; see GA 2.1 [734a2]).
But the most important piece of evidence for the present
interpretation comes in GA 2.4. Having explained that the action
of the semen upon the female material is like the way that rennet
acts upon milk in order to curdle (or "set": ouvtOTT]crt [739b24])
it, Aristotle again makes the point that, at the beginning, the
embryo has the life of a plant (GA 2.4 [739b34]). The plant,
which contains a "motive principle" (apxr)), only eventually
produces the analogues of organs: the shoot, the root, etc. In an
animal, it is with one of these organs that come along eventually
that one is to associate the motive principle of the organism itself:
the heart.
So also in the embryo all the parts exist potentially in a way, but the first
principle is furthest on the road to realization. Therefore the heart is first
differentiated in actuality. This is clear not only to the senses (for it is so) but
also on theoretical grounds. For whenever the young animal has been separated
from both parents it must be able to manage itself, like a son who has set up
house away from his father. Hence it must have a first motive principle [15£1

260

KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

cipxl\v EXElV (740a7-8)] from which comes the ordering of the body at a later
stage also, for if it is to come in from outside at a later period to dwell in it, not
only may the question be asked at what time it is to do so, but also we may
object that, when each of the parts is separating from the rest, it is necessary that
this principle should exist first from which comes growth and movement to the
other parts. (GA 2.4 [740a1-13])
Notable in this passage are the words "whenever the young animal
has been separated"; they correspond to the remark in GA 2.3
about the semen and the embryo which, "while not yet separate,
must be assumed to have the nutritive soul potentially, but not
actually, until (like those embryos that are separated from the
mother) it absorbs nourishment and performs the function of the
nutritive soul" (GA 2.3 [736b8-12]). Aristotle says in the passage
we are now examining that only once this separation, which
coincides with the formation of the heart, has occurred do we
have the all-important motive principle. A couple of chapters
later, Aristotle says that it is the heart that organizes the whole
subsequent life of the organism: "if there is anything of this sort
which must exist in animals, containing the principle and end of
all their nature [To TTacrri<; £xov Tij<; <j>ucrt::w<; dpxfiv Kal TEl.o<;
(742b1)], this must be the first to come into being-first, that is,
considered as the moving power, but simultaneous with the whole
embryo if considered as a part of the end" (GA 2.6 [742a37-b3]).
Putting all these ideas together, the scheme that forces itself
upon us is one in which the animal embryo has initially the life of
a plant, although with this difference: a plant has an internal
motive principle, whereas an embryo is moved along by the
continued action of the semen, which is only internal in the way
that the motion of automatic toys is internal. Eventually, however,
the principle of the animal's own nutritive life is constructed out
of the material provided by the mother. This principle is the
heart. Aristotle very clearly associates it with the animal's nutritive
life in lines coming shortly after the longer passage just quoted:
Therefore it is that the heart appears first distinctly marked off in all the
sanguinea, for this is the first principle [cipxiil of both homoeomerous and
nonhomoeomerous parts, since from the moment that the animal or organism

APPLYING AR1STOTI.E IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

261

needs nourishment, from that moment does this deserve to be called its principle
[dpxtjv (740a19)]. For that which exists grows, and the nutriment, in its final
stage, of an animal is the blood or its analogue, and of this the blood-vessels are
the receptade, and that is why the heart is the principle of these also. (GA 2.4
[740a17-23])

We are not therefore to associate the nutnt1ve life of the
animal with the nutritive life one sees in the early developing
embryo. The former is related more to plant life, and the nutritive
faculty in animals is quite different. As Aristotle says in De an.
2.3, "It is ... evident that a single definition can be given of soul
only in the same sense as one can be given of figure .... Hence
we must ask in the case of each order of living things, What is its
soul, i.e. What is the soul of plant, animal, man?" (De an. 2.3
[414b20-33]). It is true that the nutritive faculty of a plant can be
said to fall under the same definition as the nutritive faculty of
man, but this would only be a logical definition: the nutritive life
of a plant is radically different from that of a man (similar to the
way that a triangle is radically different from a square). 23 fact,
it is difficult even to say that the early embryo has a nutritive soul,
although it does, as we have seen, "seem to live the life of a plant"
(GA 2.3 [736b12-13]). Immediate after the passage about the
automatic toys in GA 2.1, Aristotle says of the pneuma, "Plainly,
then, while there is something [i.e., the pneuma] which makes the
parts, this does not exist as a definite object [TobE Tl], nor does it
exist in the semen at the first as a complete part. " 24 If the early
embryo had a soul, it would inform its body and together they
would constitute a TObE n in such a way that also the form could
be said to be a TOSE n (see Metaph. 7.3 [1029a27-30]). As things
are, according to Aristotle, the pneuma never really enters into the
material presented by the mother.
genuine Toa£ n-and a

23 See Thomas Aquinas, Quaestio disputata de spiritalibus creaturis, a.1 ad 24: "Anima
autem alterius animalis dat ei solum esse animal; unde animal commune non est unum
numero, sed ratione t:anturn; quia non ab una et eadem forma homo est animal et asinus." See
also ScG H, c. 90.
24 GA 2.1 (734b17-19): YOTI µEv o()v fon Tl 0 nmd, oox ooow<; 1)£ w<; TOOE Tl 00()'

EVU1TclpXOV

ws TflEAEaµtvov TO llflWTOV, ofjAov.

262

KEVIN L FLANNERY, S.J.

the appearance of
scene
soul-arrives on
the heart.
happen? In Historia animalium,
When
children the first movement
side of
about
be a female then on
left-hand side
[583b3-5]). "About
about the

warns us not to look
precise
questions,
is, answers that apply acrnss
answers to
board (HA 73 [583b5-9]).
here in Historia u."'"""'·"'"'
he
that, in these first days of the quickened
limbs are plain to see, in.duding the penis, and the eyes also,
areofgreatsize"
73[583b18-20]),
whichas other
we have also seen him say that, although "all the
exist
potentially
a way at the same time ... the first principle is
furthest on the road to realization. Therefore the heart is first
differentiated in
2A [740a2-4]; see also
he says that the
[666a20-23]), Two chapters
followed immediately by
head: "that part which
first principle comes into being
next to this
the
This is
the parts about the head,
particularly
the eyes, appear largest
the
at an early stage, while the
the umbilicus, as
legs, are small; for the
parts are
the sake
upper,
are neither parts of the
end nor able to
2.6 [742b12-17]).
various functions of the animal
So, the organs necessary for
appear more-or-less at the same time: the heart first, but
head
and the eyes follow
thereupon.
have already seen that
the
is associated with nutrition, but it is also
up with
sensation: ..the motions of pain
pleasure, and generally of all
their source in the heart, and find in it
sensation,
their ultimate termination"
3A [666a11-13]; see also GA 2.6
[742a32-33], regarding locomotion). Indeed, as we have already

APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

263

seen, the heart is in animals the "principle and end of all their
nature" (GA 2.6 [742b1]; emphasis added). And the organ
corresponding to the sense of touch is the body itself (GA 2.6
[743b37-744a1]), which would seem to have its human beginning
simultaneously with the heart.
This is all evidence in support of Berti's thesis that the various
faculties arrive at one time. Even if the primary sense organs
appear after the heart, the heart is involved not just in nutrition
but also in sensation. As for the rational part, since it requires no
physical organ (although in men it presupposes the sensitive
functions), there is no difficulty locating its inception also at this
beginning, that is, when the heart is first formed. This would be
consistent with Aristotle's remark in De an. 2.3, comparing the
functions of the soul to geometrical figures: "for the particulars
subsumed under the common name in both cases-figures and
living beings--constitute a series, each successive term of which
potentially contains its predecessor" (414b29-30). 25
The present interpretation also partially supports Berti's use of
Metaph. 9. 7, regarding the embryo as first act. This becomes more
apparent, however, if we make a slight revision to the text that
Berti gives us. In his translation, the seed is said not to become
25 It has been suggested to me that Aristotle's remark at GA 2.3 (736b2-3), where he says
that the embryo does not become at the same rime animal and man nor animal and horse
counts against the thesis that all the faculties arrive at one rime. But it seems to me that that
passage is talking about the eventual development of things already contained in potency (i.e.,
first act) within the embryo once the heart has developed. Aristotle says just after the remark
about being animal then man, animal then horse, "For the end [To TiAcx;] is developed last,
and the peculiar character of the species is the end of the generation in each individual" (GA
2.3 [736b3-5]). But surely the end is the natural consequence of that which the animal already
is. Later on in GA, Aristotle makes clear what he means by saying that the fully specified
animal arrives only later. He has in mind monstrosities that develop only up to the point of
what is most general since the material of the embryo is not fully mastered by the movements
that continue the development of the various organs (GA 4.3 [769b11-13]). "Then people say
that the child has the head of a ram or a bull, and so on with other animals, as that a calf has
the head of a child or a sheep that of an ox" (GA 4.3 [769b13-16]). But Aristotle will have
none of this---clearly because he knows that the human monstrosity is still human: as he notes,
the misshapen heads are just similarities such as happen naturally also when there is no
deformity. That the complete development of the embryo regarding sexual differentiation and
other characteristics, including possible monstrosity, depends on the heart can be gathered
from GA 4.1 (766a30-b4); and 4.3 (769b3-10).

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KEVIN L FLANNERY, S.J.

a man in first

it is first "deposited
[undergoes] a change." The
in something other
than itself"-which suggest that
man is there
first act (in
Berti's words) "after the union of the seed fumished by the father
the
furnished
the mother" 26-corresponds to the
Greek
m::adv inserted by Ross at
It appears in no
manuscript, although pseudo-Alexander includes it in a
paraphrase
passage. 27 Read
the word nic:adv, the

[f]he seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must further undergo a change in
a foreign medium. But when through its own motive principle it has already got
such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the
former state it needs another motive principle.
9.7 [1049a14-17])

Ross argues that here
"is not
account
own
view
the an£pµa forms no part of the matter
the offspring
is its formal
cause"; 28
another explanation
that Aristotle is using the
"'seed"
Metaph.
the generic sense
does not exclude the
female contribution or
embryo itself. 29 any case, the passage
the
nEcrr1v no longer suggests that the cmdal
moment
the seed fails onto the menses
it
more
must "undergo
says
a change" -sometime or anothero This moment is to associated
the first presence
this latter is
to be associated
which becomes
esiste l'uomo in potenza?", 118.
(and pseudo-PJexander), Commentaria inAristotelem Graeca,
vol. 1, In Aristotelis Metapbysica Commentaria, ed. M. Hayduck {Berlin: Reimer, 1891),
582..33.
and
2ll See W. D. Ross, Aristotle's Metaphysics: A JRwised Text with Introduction
Commentary, 2d ed (Oxford: Clarendon, 1953), 2:255.
29 Balme notes that m[s]eed' (crntpµa) may refer to (i) seed of a plant; (ii) the male semen
(strictly
(iii) the female conttil:mtion to generation; (iv) the first stage of the foetus
(strictly, Kul'jµa, foetus or conception)" (Baime, trans., Aristotle's 'De partibus animalium' I
and 'De generatione animaiium' l {with passages from n. 1-3}, 131). For (iv), see GA 1.18
(724b14-15).
26 Berti, "Quando

27 Alexander of Aphrodisias

APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

265

sometime around the fortieth day in males, the ninetieth in
females (HA 73; GA 2A, 6). Berti is correct to apply the
Aristotelian idea of first act and Metaph. 9. 7 in particular to the
question of the onset of the human soul; he errs, in my opinion,
regarding the timing of this onseL

m
Does aH this play into Norman Ford's hand? Can Ford call
thesis that the human individual is not
Aristotle
support of
present at conception? In a way yes,
a way no. In order to
understand the impact of Aristotle's embryology (both biological
and metaphysical) on Ford's theory, we need to understand why
Aristotle puts the onset of the motive principle at forty days (or
so) rather than earlier.
Let us go back to Aristotle's "crucial questions" asked at the
beginning of GA 1.21 about the relationship between semen and
menses. As we have seen, he says there that we must ask
how it is that the male contributes to generation and how it is that the semen
from the male is the cause of the offspring. Does it exist in the body of the
embryo as a part of it from the first, mingling with the material which comes
from the female? Or does the semen communicate nothing to the material body
of the embryo but only to the power and movement in it? (GA 1.21 [729b1-6])

It may not be immediately apparent, but in this passage Aristotle
is peering down the aHey where eventually genetic theory was to
be discovered, and turning away for lack of light. He is asking
whether there is something physical in the male semen that
combines with the female element to form the embryo. He has in
mind theories of his day, collectively known as "pangenesis,"
according to which the semen contained something drawn from
body that would, after copulation, grow into a
every part of
full-sized animal. 30 Its advocates sometimes spoke
a small
30 Aristotle offers a succint definition of 'pangenesis' at GA 1.18 (724a12-13): O:rro TiavTwv
arroKpivnm To cmipµa Twv µopiwv. He tells us at GA 1.18 how his own approach differs
from this: "For whereas they said that semen is that which comes from all the body, we shall
say it is that whose nature is to go to all of it" (oi µ[v yap TO arro rravToc; amov, i'jµdc; OE TO

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KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

animal (l;4>ov µtKp6v [722b4-5]) (or, in humans, the so-called
homunculus) passed along in the semen. 31 Aristotle had no
evidence that there was any such object in the semen, nor any
such resulting articulation in the embryo itself, up until at least the
fortieth day. Until that point, he says, the embryo is "fleshlike"
(KpEWOE<;, HA 7.3 [583b10-11]), which puts it among the
homoeomerous parts (Mete. 4.10 [388a16]; PA 1.1 [640b18-20]).
It is "without distinction of parts" (avap0pov, HA 7.3 [583b9]).
Aristotle does say that within the female element are found all the
parts of the animal in potency (GA 2.4 [740b18-21]), even those
that distinguish the sexes (GA 2.3 [737a24-25]); but this must
mean that they are found in potency the way that a bed is found
in potency in the wood that stands before the carpenter, for
Aristotle denies elsewhere that sex is determined at conception
(GA 1.18 [723a23-b3]; 4.1 [763b26-27]). For him, sex
differentiation depends upon the strength of heat in the semen
(GA 4.1 [766a16-22]), which goes to work on the menses, only
eventually producing organs, as we have seen.
Most interestingly, there were theories available in the
intellectual culture within which Aristotle worked that, at least in
npOi; ruravr' ifvm 1TE$UKOi; arrepµa (po()µEv) (725a21-23). In fact, Aristotle propounds his
own version of pangenism in GA 1.19. He says that semen is "a residue of the nutriment when
reduced to blood, being that which is finally distributed to the parts of the body" (726b9-11);
then he says, "for this reason also it is natural that the offspring should resemble the parents,
for that which goes to all the parts of the body resembles that which is left over" (726b 13-15).
But he immediately places these ideas within the context of his own theory, speaking of
potency and indeterminacy (726b15-19). One finds a version of pangenesis also in Darwin:
see A. L. Peck, trans., Aristotle, Generation of Animals (Cambridge, Mass., and London:
Harvard University Press, 1953), 50 n. a.
31 That such theories of "pangenism" are on his mind in GA 1.21 is apparent from his use
of the same (spurious) example to refute both pangenesis and this later idea that the semen
contributes something physical to generation. I mean the example of certain insects whose
females, during copulation, supposedly extend part of themselves into the male rather than
vice-versa; this allows them to extract the ouvaµt<; from the male without any matter.
According to Aristotle, this shows that also in cases where the male injects semen into the
female the important thing is that he transfers Mvaµt<;. The example occurs both at GA 1.18
(723b19-27) (as an anti-pangenism argument); and at GA 1.21 (729b22-25) (as an antiphysical-contribution argument). Indeed, in the former argument (at 723b27}, he makes a
forward reference to the general argument in favor of the notion that the male contributes
nothing physical. See also GA 1.18 (724b4-6 and 724b23-30).

APPLYINGARISTOTLEIN CONTEMPORARYEMBRYOLOGY

267

certain respects, come closer than his own to modern genetic
theory. Aristotle himself is our best source regarding these
theories. He recounts, as we have seen, that "some say that [the
semen] comes from the whole of the body" (GA 1.17 [721bll12]). (Since some such thinkers were open to the idea that semen
was produced by both parents [GA 1.17 (721b6-8)], "semen" here
need not mean male semen.) One of their reasons for believing
this was that children resemble their parents: "for the young are
born like them part for part as well as in the whole body; if then
the coming of the semen from the whole body is cause of the
resemblance of the whole, so the parts would be like because it
comes from each of the parts" (GA 1.17 [721b20-24]). Since the
semen comes from all parts of the body, it would contain
somehow all the traits that are passed on to the children.
Empedocles even had a theory that exploited the idea of a part
corresponding to a companion part, the two contributing to the
whole progeny; he held, that is, that "there is a sort of tally in the
male and female, and that the whole offspring does not come
from either, 'but sundered is the fashion of limbs, some in the
man's, <some in the woman's seed hidden>"' (GA 1.18 [722b1012])32 This is not a bad way of representing the way in which the
male and female gametes both contribute to the genetic material
of the zygote.
There is much that is correct in such theories. As we now
know, there does exist right from the beginning in the embryo
that which determines individual traits of the eventual progeny:
DNA. It is not drawn from the whole body, originating rather in
the appropriate organs of the parents' bodies, but it does contain
information and "instructions" corresponding to every part of the
32 The quotation is Empedocles's fragment 63 (H. Diels and W. Kranz, eds. and trans., Die
Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 6th ed. [Dublin and Zurich: Weidmann, 1951], 31 B 63): .Prial
yap f.v Tlji appEVI Kai Tlji 0tjAEI ofov cruµf:!ol.ov EVElVat, OAOV o' dn' OUOETEpOU cimevat,
"fila 01foTiacrm1 µEl.ewv <j>1km;· ii µf:v f.v civop&; ... "(GA 1.18 [722b10-12]). It isnot clear
how it is to be completed, but the continuation must certainly speak about the female
contribution. Diels and Kranz, in their translation, complete the phrase in this fashion: der
eine liegt in dem miinnlichen, <der andere in dem weiblichen Samen verborgen>; I have
followed them.

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KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

parents' bodies. Moreover-and

this is important-DNA

is

physicallypresent in the gametes and then in the embryo from the
moment of conception. Thus, when Aristotle asks his "crucial
question" about how the male contributes to generation-"Does
it exist in the body of the embryo as a part of it from the first [we;
£vundpxov Kat µ6ptov], mingling with the material which comes
from the female?" (GA 1.21 [729b2-4])-and subsequently
answers no, the semen "communicates nothing to the material
body of the embryo but only to the power and movement in it"
(GA 1.21 [729b4-6; see also 729b8-9]), he is wrong, at least
regarding the existence of something of the semen in the body of
the embryo.
But Aristotle also had good reasons for rejecting the pangenesis
of his day. It was often quite crudely physicalist. Anaxagoras, an
exponent of the theory, asks, "How can hair come from nothair ?" ;33 so he evidently thought that hair somehow found its way
into the semen. Moreover, Aristotle, displaying not a little genetic
sophistication, argues that the proponents of pangenesis had no
way of explaining how a child can resemble a remote ancestor:
"for the resemblances recur at an interval of many generations, as
in the case of the woman in Elis who had intercourse with a
negro; her daughter was not negroid but the son of that daughter
was" (GA 1.18 [722a8-11]). 34 They have no way of explaining
either, says Aristotle, how a full plant can grow from just a cutting
(ibid. [722al 1-14 ]).
Aristotle offers many other such arguments, some stronger
than others, but his basic one is this: the proponents of pangenesis
had no concrete evidence for their theory (see GA 2.1 [734a2025]). When one takes a look at the early (aborted) embryo, one
sees no differentiation (HA 7.3 [583b20-21]). Nor did Aristotle
see such articulation in the semen or in the menses (GA 1.20
33 Diels and Kranz, eds. and trans., Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, 59 B 1O; see also GA
1.18 (723a6-7); and Peck, trans., Aristotle, Generation of Animals, 62.
34 Aristotle mentions also that Herodotus held that the semen of Ethiopians was black: "as
if everything must needs be black in those who have a black skin, and that too when he saw
their teeth were white" (GA 2.2 [736a10-13]).

APPLYINGARISTOTLEIN CONfEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

269

[729a20-33]; 2.1 [734a33-b3]). Therefore, he sought a theory
that would explain how from unarticulated matter a fully
articulated fetus and human person could grow. The theory
involved, naturally enough, a number of his favorite concepts:
potency and act, passion and motion, matter and form. The semen
contributes nothing physical to the embryo but only form and
movement, in the transmission of which it serves (along with
pneuma) as tool of the father. To use a standard Aristotelian
example (see, for instance, GA 1.18 [722a30-b1]), think of a
word. It can be broken down into syllables and ultimately letters
(which we can assume are purely physical). That which the semen
passes on is the arrangement (cruv0£aa1'<;[722a35]) of the letters,
not the letters. In the passage where he asks his "crucial
questions," he speaks of the semen's bringing shape or form
(µop<j>r)v) to the menses, as well as "power and movement"
(&uvaµtc; Kal Ktvrimc;, GA 1.21 [729b4-8]). In the succeeding
chapter, comparing the action of the semen to the work of a
carpenter, he says that it transfers to the material "the shape and
the form" (ft µop<j>r) Kai TO d&oc;, GA 1.22 [730b14]).
We now know that DNA also involves a certain arrangement
of its various constituent elements (the nucleotide pairs, adeninethymine and guanine-cytosine), which play the primary role in
relaying genetic information. Neither an arrangement nor
information is, strictly speaking, physical. Aristotle had this right.
What he did not know was that, in actual fact, the genetic
information that enters into the embryo from the father is
attached to physical objects: nucleotides and amino acids.
According to Aristotle, the father's contribution is just form,
combined somehow with propulsion; the female contribution, as
we have already noted, is (relatively) undifferentiated matter. The
organs of the embryo arrive-but only eventually-because the
power and movement passed along by the semen (and pneuma)
impose form-human form-upon this matter.
But had Aristotle known what modern scientists know, what
would he have said? He would certainly have had no trouble with
the idea that genetic information is attached to matter; if

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I'EV!N L FUU\.TJ:.;fERY,S.J.

,H See
I (with passages from II. 1-3), 161.

animalh-tnz and

generatione animalium'

APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN COJ\,T'fEMPOR.4.i"lYEMBRYOLOGY

271

lS

self-nutrition, ""'·"""'"n''
whether such
In the case of certain of these povJers, the answers to these
are easy,
what to say.
as in the case of
in the case of others we are
which when divided are observed to comirme to live
from one
another
was
one,
so
notice a sim.Har
in other varieties of
i.e. in insect..swhich have been cut in tvm; each of the segn1ents possesses
both sensation and local movement; and
also
and
for, where there is sensation, there is also p!1ea<;u1·e
where these,
also desire.

36

Some ofthe relevant passages: De cm. 1.4 (409a6-1 O;

5 (467a18-22).

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KEVIN L FLANNERY, S.J

stands

a part;
part"
too is rejected by
Parmenides.
Aristotle's
an. 2.2 is, effect, a response to this
apona. Whereas
on account of
is forever
forms
"'Ideas")
into a separate
inclined to
suprasensible realm, Aristotle insists that in material substances,
in any case, although form is distinct from matter, it is nonetheless
tied to it in such a way that it follows its appropriate matter in its
entirety. h: can do this since form is not subject to the same causal
processes as matter. It is neither generated nor does it corrupt
(Metaph. 7.9
8.3
12.3 [1069b35]); it is
in short, it is not potentially
indivisible (l\Aetaph. 7.8
something and then that something
act. It is rather composites
of matter and form that are generated
corrupt
are subject
to other changes.
One of the advantages of this theory is that, using it, Aristotle
whens; for instance, an
can explain what is
is split in two and suddenly becomes two earthworms-two
different substances. This is not a problem
him since form is
not the sort
can split. In order for splitting to occur,
obviously, there
have to be something that cm
first one
and later two;
a form,
form, is always one:
form of
man recognized in Socrates is the same form recognized in
Parmenides. Now,
Socrates and Parmenides are thus one
in species, they are two in number, as Aristotle never tires of
saying (e.g., Metaph. 5.6 [1016b32-33];
[1034a7-8]).
Number, however, pertains to their matter, not to their form as
the above passage)
in the
such. Thus, Aristode can say
case of plants and certain divisible animals, each individual fa
"actually one, potentially many."' After a split occurs-which splits
can only occur on
material level-the whole of the
(Le.,
the "whole nature" of the form) is found in both pieces, now

APPLYING ARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

273

spatially separated. This is no more mysterious than when we
divide a lump of gold in two and notice that the resulting pieces
are entirely gold. When we divide a material substance, we divide
material, not form. We effect two composites sharing fully in the
same form; we do not split a form.
Our second passage is taken fromMetaph. 7.16. In it Aristotle
is explaining that the actuality-the act-of a substance excludes
there being other acts within it. His examples have mostly to do
with parts that, because of the complexity of their governing
substance, can never have independent existence; but he also
mentions divisible animals.
Evidently even of the things that are thought to be substances, most are only
potentialities,-e.g. the parts of animals (for none of them exists separately; and
when they are separated, then too they exist, all of them, merely as matter) and
earth and fire and air; for none of them is one, but they are like a heap before
it is fused by heat [m:<j>9ij (1040b9)] and some one thing is made out of the bits. 37
One might suppose especially that the parts of living things and the
corresponding parts of the soul are both, i.e. exist both actually and potentially,
because they have sources of movement in something in their joints; for which
reason some animals live when divided. Yet all the parts must exist only
potentially, when they are one and continuous by nature-not by force or even
by growing together, for such a phenomenon is an abnormality. (1040b5-16)

Obviously, in this passage unity is a key concept. Something can
only be in act as a substance if it is a unity of its parts. This unity
prevents the parts from being substances in their own right-that
is, from being substances in act; they must remain in potency.
Most such parts do not in fact become substances in act when the
unity of the original substance is lost. When a man dies, his
disparate parts become not individual men but "a heap." But in
some cases the potentiality in the part does become act. What is
it that allows this to happen? There are present in the parts, such
as the parts of earthworms, sources of movement (TQ apxa<; EXEtv
Ktvtjcri::w<; [1040b12-13]), that can survive a division. While still
within the body of the original earthworm, they are in potency;
37 The word TTETTf!V (m:<j>0ij [1040b9]) plays a role in GA. It is one of the words Aristotle
uses to describe the action of semen upon the menses. It "cooks" the menses: see GA 1.19
(726b5-6); 1.20 (729al8); see also 2.4 (738al3); 5.1 (780b9-12).

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KEVIN L. FLANNERY,S.J.

after a division, the ancillary sources of movement become central
sources and we have new substances.
We have now a number of Aristotelian doctrines before us; we
must see whether they can be applied in the analysis of the early
embryo. There is a prima facie case against such an application:
Aristotle himself does not speak of twinning as occurring in this
fashion. This is easily dealt with. Knowing little about the true
nature and functioning of the early embryo, he had no idea that
embryos might split in the early days of gestation. For him, in
other animals, twins resulted from large amounts of menses; in
man, "because of the moisture or heat of his body" (GA 4.4
[772a18-22, b3-4]). Taking into account what we now know
about monozygotic twinning, we can do what Aristotle did not
know how to do: apply his account of how some animals can be
divided to the early human embryo.
In De ;uventute et senectute 2, Aristotle remarks: "Divisible
animals are like a number of animals grown together, but animals
of superior construction behave differently because their
constitution is a unity of the highest possible kind" (Juv. 2
[468b9-12]). Among "animals of superior construction" Aristotle
no doubt includes man, but we now know that the clause
excluding them from division and survival applies only once the
embryo gets passed its first fourteen days or so (past the
"primitive streak stage"). 38 Before that period we can indeed say
that men are "like a number of men grown together. " 39 As we
38 W. J. Larsen, Human Embryology, ed. L S. Sherman, S. S. Potter, and W. J. Scott (New
York: Churchill Livingstone, 2001), 69-74.
39 In II Sent., d. 18, q. 2, a. 3, Thomas actually says that after the semen goes off separately
to work upon the menses, it is like the piece of the worm divided from another part, but with
this difference: the worm part is a worm in act and similar to the whole; the sperm has only
the potency to becomes this: "Ante vero quam resolvatur per actum virtutis generativae
separatum a reliquo sui generis, est in eo potentia ilia indistincta sicut forma totius non est in
parte nisi in potentia: quando autem separatur, efficitur actu habens talem potentiam vel
formam: sicut etiam videmus in animalibus annulosis, in quibus, secundum Philosophum, una
est anima in actu, et plures in potentia; unde quando dividuntur, efficitur quaelibet pars
animata habens animam distinctam: in hoc tamen differunt, quia propter parvam differentiam
organorum in illis animalibus pars est fere tori consimilis; et ideo in parte remanet anima
perfecta, sicut erat in toto: semen autem decisum nondum est actu simile tori, sed in potentia
propinqua: et ideo non remanet post divisionem animae in actu, sed in potentia: propter quod

APPLYINGARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

275

have seen, in saying this of dividing animals, Aristotle does not
mean that there are many actual animals in the original; he is
referring rather to potential animals. All the elements required to
produce a fully grown animal out of a part are present in that
part. Once a split occurs, that part is an animal in first act. So also
with the early human embryo. Before the split, it is one, but
potentially two (or more) since at least certain of its parts have
within them that which is required to become unities with motive
principles of their own. In response to Ford, therefore, we can say
that there are no Aristotelian reasons independent of his primitive
biology to say that the earliest human embryo is not a human
being. If an earthworm is split, resulting in two earthworms, we
do not deny that the original earthworm was an earthworm.

v
This still leaves a large number of difficulties to be dealt with.
I will address just one of them, an important one, which is
partially theological in character. Does not this approach
constitute traducianism, that is, the belief that the soul is passed
on from one human individual to another rather than created by
God? Traducianism has long been an issue associated with
Aristotelian embryology due to statements in Aristotle suggesting
that the soul of the embryo comes from the father (see, for
instance, GA 2.4 [738b25-26]). For those who wish to combine
Aristotle's properly philosophical ideas with modern biology,
however, traducianism with respect to progenitor and conceptus
is no longer an issue. It is now clear that the male and female
gametes are involved equally in conception-that is, in the
production of the genetically structured entity to which, on
Aristotelian grounds, one can assign a human soul in first act.
Even if someone should still want to say that both male and
female contribute somehow to the embryo's soul, the latter is, at
the moment of conception, undoubtedly a "new thing," coming
into existence, to a significant extent by chance, when the oocyte
dicitur ii de Anima, quod semen in potentia vivit et non actu."

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KEVIN L FlLA!'\!NERY,S.J.

we have a
specter of tradudanism. Let
,,,.,,'"""'''""'"embryo-1";
too that it is

a
embryo "by transmission" -that
1s, m
an acceptable sort of
traducianism.
these souls enter the "''"'"'"'·,.,,'"'
parts
a succession: nutritive, sensitive,
his
on
Sentences,
instance,
second book
other philosophers
dtesAristode'sDe
an.
GA and says,
is much more
reasonable, for
begins or comes about or is generated
has
except according to
are
we concede
occurs

m worms

40 J. Hal! and et al.,
Cloning of Hmnan
Embryos Using an
Artificial Zona Pellucida, Ahe;i:ractsof the Scientific Oral and Poster Sessions, Abstract 0-001,
Sl in The American Fertility Society Conjointly with the Canadian Fertility and Amirology
Society, Program supplement (1993).
41 STh I, q. 118, a. 2, ad 2.
42 TI Se-flt., d. 18, q. 2, a. 3: "Sed positio Aristotelis muho rationabilior est: quia nihil incipit
vel fit vd generatm nisi se<.-undum rnodum quo esse habet: et ideo concedimru; animam
sensibilem et vegeubilem ex traduce esse.n Perhaps ex traduce cocld even be translated "by
graft."

APPLYINGARISTOTLE IN CONTEMPORARY EMBRYOLOGY

277

animalibus anulosis) that live after being divided. 43 Exploiting
these ideas, a philosopher intent on avoiding traducianism could
acknowledge that, when ernbryo-1 splits, it transmits nutritive and
sensitive souls to embryo-2 and embryo-3. He could then employ
another type of explanation
the rational soul, perhaps arguing
that the operations of the rational soul "do not come about by
c. 68) and that, therefore,
means of any corporeal organ" (ScG
the rational soul's generation must be of a different, nonphysical
order. 44 Since the
the rational soul is independent of
the physical development
the embryo, except that the rational
cannot be present before
sensitive, such a philosopher could
say that, when the
creates two new souls. These
new souls are,
course,
souls; and, since a man is
possessed of just one soul, the nutritive and the sensitive souls are
present
these
souls as faculties (we recall De an.
23 [414b28-415a12],
second passage).
the nutritive
and sensitive faculties were
transmitted by embryo·-1.
As I have said, there remain a number of difficulties to be dealt
with, having to do especially with the relationship of the rational
soul of embcyo-1 to
of its two "progeny" and with the threat
of an unacceptable type of dualism, given that we are suggesting
that a new soul (for instance, the soul of ernbryo-3) comes to
inhabit a body--or at least part of a
occupied
by
soul (that
embryo-1). But I must leave these issues
to another occasion. For the present, however, I believe we can
say that, with a number
adjustments made necessary by

43 ScG II, c. 86:
:mima nuttitiva et sensitiva esse incipiunt per seminis traductionem,
non autem intdlectiva. Ad!mc. Si :mima !mman3 per traducrionem seminis esse inciperet, hoc
non posse< esse nisi dupliciter.--Uno modo, ut ime!iigeretur esse in semine acru, quasi per
accidens &visa ab :mima generantis, sicut semen dividitur a corpore: ut videmus in animalibus
anulosis, quae decisa vinmt, in quibus est anima una in acru et mukae in potentia; diviso
autem corpore animalis praedicti, in quaiibet parte vivente incipit anima esse actu. See also
STh I, q. 118, a. 1.
.,.. The idea, of course, is of Aristotelian origins: see, for instance, De an. 2.2 (413b24-27);
2.3 (415a11-12); and GA 2.3 (736b27-29).
0

'

278

KEVIN L FLANNERY, S.J.

scientific advances, Aristotle
contemporary embryology. 45

can be applied

fruitfully m

45 I am grateful to Stephen L Brock and Paul W. McNellis, S.J., for their comments on an
earlier draft of this essay. All errors are, of course, my own responsibility.

The Thomist 67 (2003): 279-305

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF THOMAS AQUINAS'S
MORAL THEORY
THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.
University of Nevada-Las Vegas
Las Vegas, Nevada

I

N RECENT YEARS two scholars have attacked

the thesis that
Thomas Aquinas has an Augustinian view of pagan virtue.
Bonnie Kent argues that according to Thomas an individual
can fully possess acquired moral virtues even without the virtue
of charity. 1 These natural virtues are directed towards purely
natural happiness. According to her interpretation, even though
there are moral virtues that cannot be acquired without grace,
such as charity and religion, these virtues are supernatural and not
natural. Consequently, a naturally virtuous agent need not be
correctly ordered to God through charity. Similarly, Brian Shanley
stresses the difference between Thomas and Augustine, but from
the standpoint of political virtue. 2 According to Shanley, Thomas
thinks that the pagans were able completely to possess the
1 Bonnie Kent, "Moral Provincialism," Religious Studies 30 (1994): 269-85; Virtues of the
Will: The Transformation of Ethics in the Late Thirteenth Century (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 1995), 27-33. Kent attacks the interpretation of Alasdair
Macintyre, Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame
Press, 1988).
2 Brian J. Shanley, O.P., "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," The Thomist 63 (1999): 553-77.
Shanley contrasts his position primarily with that of Jacques Maritain, Science and Wisdom,
trans. Bernard Wall (London: Lowe and Brydone, 1940), 138-61, and also that of John of St.
Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, d. 17, a. 2, in De Virtutibus, ed. Armand Mathieu and Herve
Gagne (Quebec: Laval, 1952), 419-81. The position of Maritain and John of St. Thomas is
held by many Thomists and Commentators. See Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, The Three Ages
of the Interior Life: Prelude of Eternal Life, trans. M. Timothea Doyle (St. Louis: Herder,
1951), 1:58-59; idem, "L'instabilite dans l'etat de peche mortel des vertus morales acquises,"
Revue Thomiste 42 (1937): 255-62.

279

280

THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

political virtues
grace even
not
a
right
to
Kent
Shanley disagree over the
of grace in Thomas's
moral theory.
Kent's
thinks
ends of moral action. 3 The
to that imperfect happiness
nature. In
the
happiness
exceeds our natural ""'"'v"'°'.n"
Christians may possess
supernatural virtues, anyone can
acquire the
virtues.
rn more
4
Augustinian. He understands Thomas to
there is only
one end for humans, namely,
of God. Being
ordered to
was first
through
original sin. Nevertheless, Shanley does interpret
as
saying
through their
powers alone pre-Christian
virtues,
pagans were able completely to acquire the
ordered
to the political common good. Consequently,
interpretation resembles
of
insofar as
thinks that some humans were

of God over self are
conditions
acquisition of the
virtues.
general, they both
cont.TastAugustine's
assessment of pagan virtue with
5
Thomas
In
artide I
argue
although
understanding of
virtue is more developed
agree on tiNo central
Augustine, they
humans without grace are
to
even their
obligations,
someone without grace cannot possess
the same type of perfect acquired moral
that can be
someone
grace,
article is
three
possessed
parts" the first, I will show
are
281; Virtues of the Will, 30-31.
Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 554-55, 567-72.
5 Kent, "Provim:ialism," 277-79; Virtues of the Will, 25-28; Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan
Virtue," 563-64.
3 Kent,

4

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

281

similar to the above two theses. In the second, I will show that
according to Thomas there are obligations based on human nature
that cannot be fulfilled by the unassisted abilities of fallen humans.
In the third, I will argue that Thomas's political virtue is simply
acquired moral virtue, which indirectly depends on grace for its
full possession.
I

Augustine's remarks about pagan virtue are scattered
throughout his writings, and there is no scholarly agreement on
how the various passages can be reconciled. Nevertheless,
Augustine consistently distinguishes between Christian virtue,
vice, and an intermediate state that can be identified with pagan
virtue. 6 It seems that the moral habits of bad Christians would also
fall into this intermediate state. Although Augustine does not
describe pagans as truly virtuous, neither does he think that they
are all equally vicious.
Augustine's most famous treatment of pagan virtue is in De
civitate dei, in which he argues that those qualities which we
identify as virtues are in fact vices if they are not directed toward
God. The purpose of the De civitate dei is to defend Christianity
against the criticisms of pagans. Consequently, it seems plausible
that Augustine would disparage pagan virtue in this work.
Nevertheless, he distinguishes sharply between the moral status of
the good Romans and that of the wicked. Although some Romans,
such as Nero, acted out of a desire for domination, other Romans
restrained their lower appetites so that they might win the praise
of men. 7 Moreover, Augustine praises Cato because he did not
seek glory to the extent that Julius Caesar did. Cato received
6 My interpretation of Augustine in large part follows John M. Rist, Augustine: Ancient
Thought Baptized (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 168-73. This
interpretation may conflict with that of Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 563. Domingo
Banez lists Augustine's relevant texts in his Commentaria in Secundam Secundae, q. 10, a. 4
(Salamanca, 1583), 587.
7 Augustine, De civitate dei 5.19, ed. Bernard Dombart and Alphonus Kalb, CCSL 47
(Turnhout: Brepols, 1955), 154-55.

282

THOklAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

Ibid., 5.12 (CCSL 47:142-46).
qW pro suo modo bnni e!Lant, n-nagna adrniillst--rabanturat-que
cre:sc<,lx1t"(ibid., 5.12
[CCSL 47:146]).
10 For Augustine's famous disparagement of pagan virtue, see ibid., 19,25 (CCSL 48:696).
"Augustine, Contra Julianum 4.3.21, PL 44 (Paris: Migne, 1841), 749.
12 Ibid., 4.3.22. (PL 44:749).
13 Ibid,, 4.3.25 (PL 44:751). CL Augustine, De spiritu et littera 28, in Charles Urba and
Joseph Zycha, eds., CSEL 60 (Vienna:
Leipzig: Freytag, 1913), 203.
14 Augustine,
138, in Al Goldbacher, ed., CSEL 44:144. This
is listed as
5 by Banez (see above, note 6).
8

9 "Sed per quosdam

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

283

because they are directed towards the final end, which is God.
Although this distinction does not exactly correspond to the
threefold distinction in De civitate dei, it does show that
Augustine does not merely dismiss pagan virtue.
In his refutation of Pelagianism, Augustine is concerned not
just with pagan virtues, but also with the claim that someone can
fulfill moral obligations without the assistance of grace. One of
the effects of original sin is to limit the range of free choice.
Although Augustine seems to think that the obligation to love God
can be known apart from divine revelation, he also thinks that
pagans are unable properly to love God. 15 In De gratia et libero
arbitrio, he discusses the command to love God "with the whole
heart, the whole soul, and the whole mind." 16 He agrees with the
Pelagians that it is possible to fulfill this commandment at least
partially. The dispute is over how this commandment can be
fulfilled. Augustine writes, "from where is this love [caritas] of
God and neighbor in men, unless from God himself? For if it is
not from God, but from men, the Pelagians prevail; if however
from God, we prevail over the Pelagians. " 17 He dearly thinks that
there are moral precepts that cannot be fulfilled without the
assistance of grace.
There is a connection between Augustine's position that loving
God requires grace and his cautiousness about pagan virtue. If the
obligation to love God is not at least partially fulfilled, then there
can be no right order to God. There can be no true virtue without
this order. Therefore, grace is a necessary condition for virtue. It
will be shown that Thomas remains basically faithful to this
Augustinian position.

15 For the love of God over self in Augustine's moral thought, see especially John Burnaby,
Amor Dei: A Study in the Religion of St. Augustine (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1938);
Oliver O'Donovan, The Problem of Self-Love in St. Augustine (New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press, 1980).
16 Matt 22:37-41; see also Deut 6:5; Lev 19:18.
17 "unde est in hominibus charitatis Dei et proximi nisi ex ipso Deo? nam si non ex Deo,
sed ex hominibus, vicerunt Pelagiani : si autem ex Deo, vicimus Pelagianos" (Augustine, De
gratia et libero arbitrio liber unus 18.37 [PL 44:903]). Cf. Augustine, De peccatorum meritis
et remissione 2.5.5 (CSEL 60:75); De natura et gratia 59.69 (CSEL 60:285).

284

THOMAS M, OSBORNE, JR,

II

Although Thomas Aquinas emphasizes
even sinners and
infidels can perform many good actions, he agrees with
it is impossible
someone to
a
grace.
understand Thomas' s
natural powers are unassisted
position on this question, it is helpful to make some distinctions
about
understanding of human nature. I wiH
this by
showing that there is at least one
(and perhaps more)
that can never
because of the weakness of
human nature. Last, I will show
to Thomas,
someone without grace will commit bad actions which order him
away from his last end.
whether Adam
In Thomas's time there was a discussion
Eve were originally created with grace, or whether there was
a time
which they lived only according to their natural
18
abiliries. Thomas relies on the authority of the Fathers and the
original rectitude of the soul to argue
Adam and Eve were
created with grace in the state of
justice, 19 Nevertheless,
God could have created humans
a purely
state. Thomas
that it is worthwhile to discuss what humans can do out of
20 Since Thomas
their
abilities alone (ex
makes this remark in
context of
humans were created
without grace, it seems
a
about natural abilities
state of pure nature.
is a discussion about the
Even though
not create man without grace, he
have, and by
about such a state we can fruitfully discuss
L

..

18 For a discussion of these issues, see jean-Pierre Torrd!, "Nature et grace chez saint
Thomas
Revue Thomiste 102 (2001): 167-202, See also Steven A. Long, "On the
Possibility of a Purely Natural End for Man," The Thomist 64 (2000): 211-37.
19 Quodl. I, a. 8, in Opera Omnia (Rome: Leonine Commission, 1882-), 25.2:187-88; STh
I, q. 95, a, 1. For the Summa Theologiae I have used the Leonine edition as reprinted in
Summa Theologiae, 4 vols. (Turin: Marietti, 1948). For the background to this debate, see
Artur Michael Landgraf, Dogmengeschichte der Fiuhscholastik (Regensburg: Pustet, 1952),
1.1, 43-50,
20 "Set, quia possibile fuit Deo ut hominem faceret in puris naturalibus, utile est
considerare ad qwnrum se dilectio naturalis extendere possitv (Quodl. l., a. 8 [Leonine
25.2:188]).

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

285

our natural abilities. However, one could also follow the
sixteenth-century commentators Thomas de Vio Cajetan and
Domingo Banez in holding that the phrase "ex puris naturalibus"
refers to the state of original justice, but abstracting the influence
of grace. 21 The important doctrine here is that according to either
interpretation Thomas is discussing a human nature that is
unharmed by the Fall. He describes human nature in this state as
integral human nature, which is to be contrasted with the fallen
human nature which is transmitted after the sin of Adam. This
fallen human nature can be healed through the influence of
grace. 22
Although in his earlier writings Thomas does not emphasize
the influence of original sin on free choice, in his later writings he
clearly states that after the Fall it is impossible for man to fulfill
certain precepts of the law. In his early Scriptum super libros
sententiarum (1252-56), he discusses whether God's precepts can
be fulfilled in the context of a distinction between the act that
falls under the precept and the intention of the lawgiver. 23
Without grace someone can perform the substance of a required
act, but he cannot perform the act in the way in which God wants
it to be performed, namely, through charity. In the Quaestiones
disputatae De Veritate (1250), Thomas again distinguishes
between the substance and the mode of an act, although in this
discussion he focuses not on the lawgiver but on the different
goods tl:iatare involved, namely, that good which is proportionate
to human nature and that good which exceeds it. 24 The difference
21 Thomas de Vio Cajetan, Commentaria in Primam Secundae, q. 109, a. 2 (Leonine
7:293); Domingo Banez, Commentaria in Primam Secundae, q. 109, a. 2 (Madrid, 1948),
3:34.
22 For the development of Thomas's understanding of gratia sanans, see Bernard J. F.
Lonergan, Grace and Freedom: Operative Grace in the Thought of St. Thomas Aquinas, ed. J.
Patout Burns (London: Darton, Longman and Todd; New York: Herder and Herder, 1971),
46-55.
23 Thomas Aquinas, II Sent., d. 28, q. 1, a. 3, in Scriptum super Libros Sententiarum, ed.
R. P. Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929), 724-26. For the dating of Thomas's works, I
follow Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, The Person and His Work, trans.
Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996).
24 De Verit., q. 24, a. 14 (Leonine 22:722-24).

286

THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

between the goods is not connected to the substance of an act, but
to the way it is performed. Without grace someone can perform
a required act, but not according to the way in which God wants
to elevate it to a supernatural good. In both of these early
passages, Thomas emphasizes that grace is necessary for merit, but
he does not mention that it is needed to heal the effects of original
sin and to make possible the very performance of some actions.
These early treatments contrast with the clearer and more
mature discussion of the Prima Secundae (1271), in which
Thomas asks, "Whether a man without grace through his natural
abilities is able to fulfill the precepts of the law. "25 In his response
to the question he again makes the distinction between the
substance of the work and the mode of acting, but he also sharply
distinguishes between integral human nature and corrupt human
nature. In a state of integral nature it is possible for someone to
fulfill the law according to the substance of the work commanded,
but not according to the mode, since this requires charity. In
contrast, in the state of corrupted nature it is impossible to fulfill
even the substance of the divine command without healing grace.
Here Thomas's conclusion in the earlier works is applied only to
a state of integral nature and not to actually existing human
nature. This emphasis on fallen nature's weakness is reflected in
the In Epistolam ad Romanos (1271-73 ). 26 In this commentary on
St. Paul he explicitly adverts to Pelagius's error, that is, the belief
that someone can obey the law through natural powers. Although
the Gentiles could naturally know the law, they could fulfill it
only if they converted to the faith. In his discussion of Thomas's
doctrine of justification, Henri Bouillard argued that whereas
earlier in his teaching Thomas shared his contemporaries's
ignorance of Augustine's anti-Pelagian polemics, he later shows a
deep knowledge of them. 27 As a result of his reading, Thomas
25 "Utrum homo sine gratia per sua naturalia legis praecepta implere possit" (SI'h I-II, q.
109, a. 4).
26 In Epistolam ad Romanos, c. 2, lect. 3, n. 216, in Super Epistolas S. Pauli Lectura, ed.
Raphael Cai (Marietti, 1953), 1:39.
27 Henri Bouillard, Conversion et grdce chez S. Thomas d'Aquin, Theologie 1 (Aubier:
Monatigne, 1944), 92-122.

THE AUGUSTINIAl'l"ISMOF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

287

adopted an Augustinian anti-Pelagian stance
was unusual for
his time. It is at any rate dear that
years he
that
on account of original sin humans are unable to fulfill the
unless they are healed by God's grace.
the
to love
Thomas thinks
a
is an example
fallen

1 • STh I-H, q. 109, a. 3. For the importance of this issue, see M-R. Gagnebet, "L'amour
nature! de Dieu chez saint Thomas et ses contemperains," Revue Thamiste 48 (1948): 294446; 49 (1949): 31-102; David M.
"The Role of God in the Philosophical Ethics
of Thomas Aquinas," in Was
im Mittelalter?, ed. Jan. A. Aertsen and Andreas
Speer, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 26 (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1998), 1028-31. For a discussion of
Thomas's various texts, see especially Gregory Stevens, "The Disinterested Love of God
according to St. Thomas and Some of l:-lis Modem Interpreters,» The Thomist 16 (19 53): 3 07 33, 497-541.
29 STh H-H, q. 2.6, a. 3.
30 "Nam qu"'1edam sunt certissima, et adeo manifosi:a quod editione non indigent; sicut
mandata de dilectione Dei et proximi" (STh I-II, q. 100, a. 11). CL STh I-U, q. 100, a. 3, ad
1; I-H, q. 94, a. 4. For more on God and the natural law, see Gallagher,
Role of God,"
1031-33.

288

THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

fallen humans
reason, it cannot
receive
assistance.
unless
Thomas does not separate religious obligations
the moral
31
Hfe. Religion is a
and not a theological
Its basis is
not in revelation,
rather in the honor that
humans naturally
the
object is not the
owe to God. 32
end directly,
is God,
means to
such as
sacrifices
devotions. Nevertheless, since it is about those
the
things which are ordered to God, it is more
other moral virtues. 33 Thomas is dear that
are required
to offer sacrifice to God because
natural law. 34 This
obligation is based not: on a special divine "'"''""'""""'""'
the natural inclination
all ,. .... .. "'..."'·
about the necessity of grace for
to
love God, he does not explicitly state
grace is necessary
performing such
as sacrifices. 35
like Augustine,
and indeed most ancient
medieval moralists, Thomas
that
virtue of religion is a necessary condition for a good
Thomas's early discussion of
difference between Christian
and pagan contemplation
the specifically Christian
Contemplation is a cause of
religion is necessary for the
devotion, which is a religious act. 36 Even
his early Scriptum
super
sententiarum, Thomas dearly distinguishes between
the contemplation
philosophers and
the saints"37 The
31 For the natw"al virtue of religion, see especially Gallagher,
Role of God," 1025-28.
Kent, «Moral Provincialism," 282; Virtues of the Will, 32, states t.'1at the virtue of religion is
a supernatural and not a natural virtue. In this she partially follows Etienne Gilson, The
Christian Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas, trans. L K. Shook (Notre Dame, Ind.: University
of Notre Dame Press, 1994), 333-50. For the possibility that Gilson might have been deceived
by the word "political," see below, note 44.
32 STh ll-H, q. 81, a. 5.
33 STh H-H, q. 81, a. 6.
34 STh H-H, q. 85, a. 1.
35 STh H-H, q. 85, a. 4.
36 STh ll-ll, q. 82, a. 3"
37 m Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, qda. 3, sol. 1, in Scriptum super Sententiis, vol. 3, ed. Maria
Fabianus Moos (Paris: Lethidleux, 1933), 1177. See R-A. Gauthier, "Tmis Commentaires
'Averroistes' sur l'Ethique aNicomaque, "Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littbaire du mayen
age 22-23 (1947-48): 268-69; G. Mansini, "Similit&'.do, Communicatio, and the Friendship

THE AUGUSTINIANISMOF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

289

philosophers love God as their own perfection, and consequently
their act proceeds from self-love. In contrast, through
contemplation the saints are able to love God more than
themselves. Whereas Aristotle makes philosophical contemplation
the highest act, Thomas argues that the philosopher's
contemplation is inferior to that of a Christian. Both Augustine
and Thomas argue that even the philosophers were unable to
order properly their activities towards God. 38
Although the love of God may be the only natural duty that
can never be fulfilled without healing grace, Thomas does argue
that without grace someone will eventually fail even with respect
to other obligations. The Fall has affected the entire moral life. In
the Prima Secundae, Thomas states that in the state of integral
nature someone could avoid all sin with merely the natural help
of God. 39 However, one result of original sin is that reason is
submissive not to God but rather to the lower appetites. Although
a fallen human without grace can avoid a particular mortal sin, he
will eventually commit one. In his parallel discussion in the
Summa contra Gentiles, Thomas states that Pelagianism errs in its
rejection of this point.
Like Augustine, Thomas thinks that grace is a necessary
condition for the complete fulfillment of moral duties. This
necessity can be understood in two ways. First, there is at least
one natural moral obligation that cannot be fulfilled unless the
agent has been healed by grace. Since it is necessary for the agent
to love God more than himself in order to have a proper order to
his own last end, without grace someone cannot be directed to
either his supernatural or his natural end. Second, an agent
without grace will eventually commit seriously bad acts.
According to Thomas, grace is necessary for the moral life because
of the harmful effect of original sin on human nature.

of Charity in Aquinas," in Thomistica, Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale,
Supplementa, 1 (Leuven: Peeters, 199 5), 11.
38 For the importance of this position in Augustine's thought, see Rist, Augustine, 173.
39 STh I-II, q. 109, a. 8. See also ScG III, c. 160 (Leonine 14:466).

290

TI-IOivl:ASML OSBORl'!E, JR.

40 Odon Lott-in,
el: morale au xii" et Jciil siecles, vol. 3 (lLouvaim Abbaye du
Mont Cesar; Gembloux: Drn::u!ot, 1949), 105-9.
41 William
of Auxerre, Summa Aurea 3.11.1, ed. Jean Ribai!lier, Spicilegimn
Bonavenrurianum 16-19 (Paris: Editions du Centre National de la Rechen;he Scienrifique;
Rome: Collegium Bonaventurae, 1980-85), 3:172; Summa Aurea 2.13.1 (2:470-75). See
et morale, 142-46.
Lottin,
42 WiHiam of Auxeme, Summa Aurea 3.11.3.1 (3:185).
43 William appearn to think that the obligation to perform an act implies a corresponding
ability to
it. Nevermeless, it is not dear to me whether William could agree with
to the
Thomas that "ought" implies "can" only before the FalL See for his example his
objections in Summa Aurea 2.2.1 (2:34-35). But see also Summa Aurea 2.10.5.1 (2:286-91).

THE AUGUSTINIANISMOF AQUINAS'SMORAL THEORY

291

As Shanley observes, Thomas does describe acquired moral
virtue as political virtue, and he states that this virtue is concerned
with the political common good. This language can be misleading
if two facts are not kept in mind. First, as I have stated, the
identification of moral virtues as political virtues is standard for
medieval thinkers. Thomas is merely repeating common usage. 44
Thomas at no point claims that the acquired virtues are political
in the sense that their full possession is possible even without a
proper ordering to God. Second, for ancient and medieval
thinkers, and perhaps especially for Thomas, the common good
encompasses much more than it does in later politics and political
philosophy. 45 According to Thomas, each individual is a part of
the political community and as such becomes good only in the
context of the community. 46 An individual's private good cannot
exist apart from the family and the political unit. Many of the acts
that Thomas attributes to the acquired moral virtues would not
seem political to us. For example, a pagan can exercise the virtues
of temperance and justice by rendering his marriage debt. 47
Moreover, we have seen that religion is an acquired moral virtue.
Thomas does not oppose the religious to the political. Secularism
is a contemporary phenomenon that Thomas would find not only
irreligious, but also unnatural and politically harmful.
Furthermore, although religion and politics are distinct, there is
an important sense in which the political community can enact
laws for religious acts insofar as they are related to the political
common good. 48 Consequently, although Thomas distinguishes
44 For the danger of reading too much into the word "political," see Gauthier, "Trois
Commentaires 'Averroistes' sur l'Ethique a Nicomaque," 312 n. 2.
• 5 For Thomas's theory in context, see M. S. Kempshall, The Common Good in Late
Medieval Political Thought (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999). For Thomas himself, see
especially Charles de Koninck, De la primaute du bien commun contre !es personalistes
(Quebec: Laval; Montreal: Editions Fides, 1943); idem, "In Defence of St. Thomas: A Reply
to Father Eschmann's Attack on the Primacy of the Common Good," Laval theologique et
philosophique 1.2 (1945): 9-109; Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Thomas, John Finnis and the
Political Good," The Thomist 64 (2000): 337-74.
46 Sfh II-II, q. 47, a. 10, ad 2.
47 IV Sent., d. 39, q. 1, a. 2, ad 5, in Opera Omnia (Paris: Vives, 1871-1872), 11:226.
48 Sfh I-II, q. 99, a. 3, ad 2. See Dewan, "St. Thomas, John Finnis and the Political Good,"
364 n. 34.

292

between
good, he does not
were able
whether " ....
are

THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

end of man

....
The pagans
The issue is
that

and the

states
some virtues
are
imperfect because
are merely
to good actions,
whereas perfect virtues are indinations to performing
actions in a good manner.
perfect
virtues
morales perfectae) are connected to each
One reason for
this connection is
exercise of perfect moral virtues
requires prudence
chokes for the sake
the
The virtues are inclinations
an
prudence
can be no perfect virtue
chooses
means to the end. 50
prudence.
In artide 2, Thomas discusses
the moral virtues can
exist without charity. "''51
artide
distinguishes between
acquired and infused virtues. Since the moral virtues are
does not
to an end
even pagans can possess
virtues.
are perfectly
virtues
which are
actions directed
the last

49 Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 565; Maritain, Science and Wisdom, 147-54; For
John of St. Thomas, see especially Cursus Theologicus, d. 17, a. 2, 53-71 (De Virtutibus, 46381).
50 "ad rectam autem e!ectionem non solum sufficit im:linario in debirum finem, quod est
directe per habirum virmris moralis; sed etiam quod aiiqllis directe eligat ea quae sunt ad
fin em, quod fit per prudenriam" (Sfh I-ll, q. 65, a. 1).
51 "Utmm virtutes morales possint esse sine caritate" (STh HI, q. 65, a. 2).

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

293

supernatural end of man. 52 This ordering to the end shows that
there must be a connection between the virtue of prudence and
charity.
Shanley's interpretation of Thomas does not give proper
emphasis to this connection. Prudence is more concerned with the
correct order to the last end, which comes through charity, than
with those particular ends which are brought about through the
exercise of the other virtues. 53 Since the last end is supernatural,
the infused moral virtues are more perfect than the merely
acquired virtues. Consequently, Thomas states that only the
infused virtues are perfect virtues simpliciter, since they order a
man towards the final end simpliciter.
contrast, the acquired
moral virtues are virtues secundum quid, since they order a man
only to the last end in some genus (respectu finis ultimi
aliquo
generi), and not to the last end simpliciter. Shanley understands
the perfect/imperfect distinction in this second article to be very
different from the perfect/imperfect distinction in the firsto
According to Shanley, the moral virtues that are acquired by the
pagans are imperfect in the sense that they do not direct someone
towards the last end simpliciter (ao 2), but perfect in the sense that
they are connected through prudence (ao 1). Consequently, when
in the beginning of article 2 Thomas says that the acquired moral
virtues existed in many pagans (in multis gentilibus), Shanley
understands him to say that many pagans possessed moral virtues
that were connected with each other. In contrast, Maritain and
John of St. Thomas argue that in the state of fallen nature there
can be no ordering to the natural end without an ordering to the
supernatural end. Consequently, although acquired and infused
prudence are distinct, there cannot even be perfect acquired
51 For the historical context of the question of whether acquired moral virtues are "tme"
virtues, see Odon Lottin, "Les vertus morales acquis sont-elles de vraies vertus? La reponse
des theoiogiens de Pierre Abelard asaint Thomas d' Aquin," Recherches de theologie ancienne
et medievale 20 (1953): 13-39; idem, "Les vertus morales acquis sont-elles de vraies vertus?
La reponse des theologiens de saint Thomas a Pierre Auriol," Recherches de theologie ancienne
et medievale 21(1954):101-29.
53 "Ad rectam autem rationem prudenriae multo magis requiritur quod homo bene se habet
circa ultimum finem, quod fit per caritatem, quam circa alios fines, quod fit per virtutes
morales" (STh I-II, q. 65, a. 2).

THOlV1AS M. OSBORI\,TE,JR.

294

prudence
and

an
who does not
virtues
actions are not ordered to his supernatural end.
without perfect
prudence it is impossible fully
to possess the
Therefore, without
there is no
virtues are not
connected.
unqualifiedly
'l!Jif:rt(::ct:" is used to describe acquired

virtues
other through prudence,
this
to describe the infused virtues which
Shanley makes an
been discussed
in the
to condude
from
new
perfect/imperfect
charity there can be
that they are not infused and
acquired virtues
are imperfect
yet perfect in the sense that
are connected
each other
through prudence.
contrast, John of St Thomas
deny that there can even be connected acquired virtues
someone who lacks
their interpretation can
found
the Secunda Secund,.ae,question 23, article
which
Thomas asks,
without chariry there can be some true
virtue." 54 This
contains a more complete description of
ways in which different
order someone to different goods.
Thomas distinguishes
last end and a proximate end.
There are
goods, namely, the last
is the enjoyment of
and the proximate good. A
new distinction is then
between
proximate end
is a true good
that
is a false
A habit
orders
someone to a
is not a
rather a false similitude
of virtue. A
orders someone to the final end of man is
true virtue in an unqualified sense (virtus vera simpliciter)oThe
remaining kind of virtue is that which orders someone to a
proximate good which is orderable to the finai good,

54

"Utmm sine caritate possit esse aliqua vera virtute" (STh H-H, q. 23, a. 7)

THE AUGUSTINIANISMOF AQUINAS'SMORAL THEORY

295

for example the conservation of the political community. 55
Thomas argues that this virtue is true because it orders someone
to at true good. Nevertheless, it is imperfect if these true goods
are not referred to the last supernatural end.
The point in this discussion is not just that acquired virtues are
imperfect because they do not directly order the agent to the
supernatural end. It seems that Shanley overlooks Thomas's
distinction between true goods that are referred to God and those
that are not. In the response to the objection that those without
charity can produce good acts, Thomas distinguishes between
those acts which are incompatible with charity and those which
are compatible with charity but performed by someone who lacks
charity. 56 Someone can make an act of faith or of hope without
charity, just as in this condition someone can perform certain
naturally good acts. These acts will be good in their genus, but
they will not be perfectly good. Even though they are capable of
being ordered to God, they are not in fact so ordered. 57 A
disordered agent can have a habit or disposition to perform good
actions; 58 nevertheless, this disposition or habit does not make the
agent good. 59 Both Kent and Shanley seem to conflate the
following two positions: (1) that agents without charity can
perform good acts, and (2) that there can be good agents who lack
charity. But Thomas denies this latter position. Someone who
does not care much for God may do good by giving alms to the
55 "Si vero illud bonum particulare sit verum bonum, puta conservatio civitatis vel aliquid
huiusmodi, erit quidem vera virtus, sed imperfecta, nisi referatur ad finale et perfectum
bonum. Et secundum hoc simpliciter vera virtus sine caritate esse non potest" (ibid.).
56 "Unus quidem secundum hoc quod caritate caret: utpote cum facit aliquid in ordine ad
id per quod caret caritate. Et talis actus semper est malus: sicut Augustinus <licit, in N Contra
Julianum ... Alius autem potest esse actus carentis caritate non secundum id quod caritate
caret, sed secundum quod habet aliquod aliud donum Dei, vel fidem vel spem, vel etiam
naturae bonum ... Et secundum hoc sine caritate potest quidem esse aliquis actus bonus ex
suo genere: non tamen perfecte bonum quia deest debita ordinatio ad ultimum finem" (ibid.,
ad 1).
57 For the different ways in which an act can be referred to God, see Banez, In II-II, q. 10,
a. 4 (Salamanca, 589-90).
58 For the difficult question of whether without grace such a virtue would be a habit or
merely a disposition, see especially Garrigou-Lagrange, "L'instabilite," 260-62.
59 STh I-II, q. 65, a. 2, ad 2.

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THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

poor. His frequent almsgiving may even become a sort of habit.
Nevertheless, despite his good actions, such a person will never be
good. His very imperfect true virtues will be disconnected and not
ordered to his proper last end, which is God.
The distinction between being capable of being ordered and
actually being ordered is also invoked in a discussion of whether
some infidels are able to be chaste and just. Thomas emphasizes
that they can never possess true justice or chastity because they
lack the correct order to God. 60 Shanley thinks that Thomas is
stating that certain infidels who have not deliberately rejected
God and Christian belief are able to perform good acts. But
Thomas seems to be making a completely different point, which
is that those who are turned away from God can perform good
actions even while they are turned away from him. Thomas is not
thinking about a neutral state in which an individual has not yet
decided for or against God.
Thomas emphasizes the distinction between an infidel's good
acts and the good acts of a Christian in Secunda Secundae,
question 10, article 4, which asks, "whether every action of an
infidel is a sin. "61 The disagreement over whether there can be a
neutral state affects the interpretation of this discussion.
According to Shanley, Thomas is discussing only a secundum quid
infidel, who would seem to be a person who has not yet believed
and is not guilty of unbelief. 62 Such persons can perform good acts
because they occupy a middle state in which they are not ordered
to or away from God, but rather to or away from a more
proximate good. But the statement that an infidel can perform
good acts is meant to show that even a disordered agent can
perform good actions. So long as an infidel is not referring the act
to the end of disbelief, he is able to perform a good act. It seems
to me that Thomas would classify pre-Christian pagans as either

60 "ita non potest esse simpliciter vera iustitia aut vera castitas si desit ordinatio debita ad
finem; quae est per caritatem, quantumcumque aliquis se recte circa alia habeat" (STh II-II,
q. 23, a. 7, ad 3).
61 "Utrum omnis actio infidelis sit peccatum" (STh II-II, q. 10, a. 4).
62 Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 564.

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297

those who have implicit faith and are ordered to God or as those
who have turned away from him.
Support for my view may be seen in the fact that Thomas's
argument for the possibility of an infidel's good actions is similar
to his argument for the possibility of a sinner's good actions.
Thomas is considering a real infidel and not a basically good
pagan who as yet does not know the Christian God. Thomas's
concern with real infidelity can be especially seen in his discussion
of Cornelius. 63 When it is argued that Cornelius was an infidel
and yet able to perform good acts, Thomas states that Cornelius
was not an infidel since he had implicit faith. Here Thomas is
clearly describing an infidel as someone who is turned against
God. Nevertheless, even though an infidel is turned against God,
it does not follow that all of his acts are referred to his infidelity.
Although the infidel is not acting for the sake of the last end, his
action could be performed by someone who so acts. The infidel
acts well by performing a good action that is not referred to his
final end, which is himself; inversely, the Christian sins by
performing an action that is not referred to the end of faith. 64 A
basically bad person can perform some good actions, and a
basically good person can perform some bad actions. In the De
Malo, Thomas similarly discusses how a good act can be
performed by someone who lacks charity. 65 Every human action
is either good or bad. For someone who has charity, a good action
is meritorious and a bad action is demeritorious. Someone who
lacks charity can commit bad and therefore demeritorious acts.
Nevertheless, he can also perform some good acts. These good
acts will not be demeritorious, but neither will they be
meritorious, since the agent lacks charity. Consequently, there are

63 "De Cornelio tarnen sciendum est quod infidelis non erat: alioquin eius operatio accepta
non fuisset Deo, cui sine fide nullus potest placere. Habeat autem fidem implicitam, nondum
manifestata Evangelii veritate" (STh II-II, q. 10, a. 4, ad 3).
64 "Sicut enim habens fidem potest aliquod peccatum commitere in actu quern non refert
ad fidei finem, vel venialiter vel etiam mortaliter peccando; ita etiam infidelis potest aliquem
actum bonum facere in eo quod non refert ad finem infidelitatis" (STh II-II, q. 10, a. 4).
65 De Malo, q. 2, a. 5, ad 7 (Leonine 23:45).

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THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

some human acts that are neither meritorious nor demeritorious:
namely, good but not meritorious acts.
These passages show that when Thomas mentions the good
actions of an infidel or a sinner, he is discussing acts that can be
referred to God even though they in fact are not. Consequentiy,
there is a problem only with ordering such an act to its last end.
But this disorder means that the relevant moral habit will be
imperfect, since the agent does not have a unified moral life.
Unlike Augustine, Thomas carefully distinguishes between the
goodness of an act, which comes from the act's object, and the
end of an act. 66 Thomas at times is much more concerned with the
goodness or badness of an isolated act. Augustine is almost always
concerned with the fundamental orientation of the agent towards
God or towards his own self. Nevertheless, as both John of St.
Thomas and Maritain note, Thomas never repudiates the basically
Augustinian position that a correct ordering to God through
charity is a necessary condition for perfect acquired virtue.
Part of the contrast between Shanley's view and the traditional
one may lie in his view of the relationship of the acquired virtues
to the last end. 67 He seems to reject the notion of a natural end of
man and states that acquired natural virtue is concerned with the
best good that can be obtained apart from grace. But, as we have
shown, because of the Fall it is impossible without grace even to
66 "Ubi Augustinus uidetur reiicere communem scholasticorum sententiam, qui asserunt,
opus bonum morale ex obiecto cui non opponitur mala circumstantia finis, simpliciter esse
bonum opus" (Bafiez,In II-II, q. 10, a. 4 (Salamanca, 587)). Banez (Salamanca, 587-92) makes
a good attempt at harmonizing Thomas and Augustine. For Thomas's position, see Ralph
Mcinerny ,Aquinas on Human Action: A Theory of Practice (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1992), 80-83.
Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 554-55, seems influenced by Denis J. M. Bradley,
Aquinas on the Twofold Human Good: Reason and Human Happiness in Aquinas's Moral
Science (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997). Bradley seems
to argue that since the natural end of humans cannot be completely obtained through natural
powers, humans are naturally endless. For criticisms of Bradley, see Long, "A Purely Natural
End for Man," passim; Peter A. Pagan-Aguiar, "St. Thomas Aquinas and Human Finality:
Paradox or Mysterium Fidei,"The Thomist 64 (2000): 211-37. I follow Jean-Herve Nicolas,
Les profondeurs de la grace (Paris: Beauchesne, 1969), 375-99, who argues that the
supernatural end is a further determination (surdetermination) of the natural end of man,
continuous although not identical with it.

THE AUGUSTINIANISM OF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

299

obtain many connatural goods, including the most important one,
which is God. Thomas does emphasize that God is the natural last
end. When the acquired moral virtues are connected with each
other through prudence they are ordered to this last end. Without
this ordering to God they can be habits or dispositions to good
actions, but they will not be the perfect acquired virtues which
make the agent good. 68
Shanley finds support for his position that those without
charity can have connected acquired virtues in Thomas's De
virtutibus cardinalibus, article 2, in which Thomas asks, "Whether
the virtues are connected; so that he who has one, has all?" 69 In
this passage Thomas distinguishes between three grades of virtue.
According to the first grade, the virtues are natural inclinations to
the good and are not connected by prudence. Thomas states that
these virtues are altogether imperfect. According to the second
grade, virtues order someone to the good properly speaking
(bonum simpliciter), but insofar as it is found in those things
which pertain to the rule of human actions and is known through
prudence. These virtues are connected through prudence.
According to the third grade, the virtues order someone to the
good properly speaking (bonum simpliciter) and as it is obtained
through charity. These virtues are connected through charity.
According to Shanley, this threefold distinction shows that pagans
can have those virtues which belong to the second grade even
though they cannot have charity and the infused moral virtues. He
seems to infer the position that the acquired virtues can fully exist
without charity from the fact that the acquired virtues are
connected through acquired prudence. To the best of my
knowledge, neither John of St. Thomas nor Maritain denies that
the acquired moral virtues are connected through prudence. 70 The
"L'instabilite," 260.
"Utrum virtutes sint connexae; ut qui habet unam, habeat omnes." (De virtutibus
cardinalibus, q. un., a. 2, in Quaestiones disputatae, ed. P. Bazzi et al. [furin: Marietti, 1965),
68 Garrigou-Lagrange,

69

1:817).
70 "The natural virtues are indeed connected in prudence but prudence concerns the order
of means to the end, and presupposes rectitude in willing the end" (Maritain, Science and

Wisdom, 148).

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THOI\11\S M. OSBORNE, JR.

real issue is whether the
prudence can exist someone
who lacks charity. Thomas
not address the issue in this
is about the
article, which is not surprising since the
ways
the
are connected and not about whether
For Shanley's
the moral virtues can exist
interpretation to be correct, Thomas
have to be arguing not
that the
virtues are
through prudence,
but also that someone who does not have
can
prudence. There are no hints
the text that Thomas so argues.
Prima
as we have seen, Thomas's discussion
Secundae, question 65, article 2, would contradict that conclusion.
to possess
acquired
According to Shanley, pagans were
to God as their last end. But
virtues without being
Thomas thinks that each person must make a choice
71 This choice
being ordered to
and being ordered to
has been much discussed in the literature on whether nonargues
upon
the
Christians can be saved. 72
age of reason everyone must be ordered either to the due end
or away from
Those
are ordered to
have grace, and those who lack this order lack grace.
pre-Christian pagans this due end
Shanley argues that at
73 Since
can be any sort of genuine
passage is about
whether someone has grace or not, his interpretation appears to
entail the condusion that someone
orders himself towards a
grace. But according to
genuine good must be in a state
Sfh HI, q. 89, a. 6.
See Louis Caperan, Le probleme du salut des infideles, vol.1,
(Toulouse,
1934), 186-99.
73 Shanley,
on Pagan Virtue," 573. Shanley (ibid., 573-75), seems to give a semil:'eiagian interpretation to the phrase faciens quad in se est. He does explicitly state that he is
trying to avoid semi-Pelagianism, but it is not dear to me how he does it. His assmnption here
is that pagan virtue is a preparation for grace. If he is assuming that grace is a necessary
condition for the pre-Christian development of political virtue, then it is not dear to me how
this belief is consistent with the earlier sections of his paper. If he is assuming that such virtue
can be acquired without grace, then he is stating that through his unaided natural efforts a preChrisrian pagan can perform acts which are acceptable to God. For Thomas's rejection of this
latter position, see Bouillard, Conversion et grace. For the passage under discussion, see also
Joseph P. Wawrykow, God's Grace and Human Action: "Merit" in the Theology of Thomas
Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 38 n. 84.
71

72

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301

Thomas, even someone who lacks grace and is turned away from
God can be ordered to some genuine goods. Consequently, the
due end in this passage requires an ordering of goods to God.
Whereas Shanley suggests that the infidel may have never made a
choice for or against God, Thomas thinks that this choice must be
made. Anyone who makes the wrong choice is not ordered to
God. Consequently, although disordered agents may have habits
that direct them to goods that are referred to God, these acts in
fact are not so referred. These habits or dispositions are not
connected virtues. The infidel cannot have perfect acquired
prudence because he does not direct his activities towards the last
end.
What is Thomas's view of "pagan" virtue? A moral habit or
disposition is possessed by an agent who either is or is not ordered
to God, his natural and supernatural last end. A non-Christian
may be so directed only if he has implicit faith and the theological
virtue of charity. Only when an agent has grace can he can possess
acquired virtues that are directed to God in different ways by both
acquired and infused prudence, and unified by charity. Someone
without charity can consistently perform good actions and it is in
this sense that he can be said to have true virtue. Nevertheless,
this true virtue will be very imperfect even on only a natural level.
On my reading of them, both Kent and Shanley think that at
least some agents can develop the same virtues as Christians and
in the same manner. By "same virtues" I mean "virtues with the
same formal object." By "in the same manner" I mean "connected
through prudence." The acquired virtues differ from the infused
virtues on account of their formal object and rule. 74 On the views
of Kent and Shanley, it seems that a Christian and a pagan could
perform the same brave action and develop the same habit of
bravery. According to Kent, this habit of bravery orders the nonChristian to his natural end; according to Shanley, it orders the
74 STb -1-11, q. 63, a. 4. See Shanley, "Aquinas on Pagan Virtue," 558-59. Shanley's
understanding of the relationship between the acquired and infused virtues is unclear to me.
He may think that Christians can posses only the infused moral virtues, whereas the preChristian pagans possessed the acquired ones. But it is not clear how one would support such
an interpretation of Thomas.

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THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

agent to the poHticai good. Since, as Thomas states, virtues are
distinguished by their own
objects
not only
the last
end of the agent, it follows that Christians
pagans could have
the same
moral virtue. Moreover, if
pagans have
other acquired moral virtues, including prudence, they will
that are possessed by Christians. Both
possess the same
have moral virtues
are connected
Christians and pagans
through prudence. According to my interpretation, no agent can
be ordered to the natural end without at the same time being
ordered to the supernatural end through charity. Moreover, this
ordering to the natural end is a necessary condition for acquired
prudence
unity' of
acquired moral virtues.
Consequently, if a pagan possesses acquired moral virtues that are
connected with each other
prudence, it follows that he
must be ordered to even the supernatural
end,
requires
charity. In short, such a pagan must have implicit faith"
Thomas agrees with Augustine on two
First, those who
are not ordered to God can have a sort of virtue that is distinct
from vice. Second, those who are so disordered cannot fully
possess the acquired virtues. Thomas differs from Augustine in
emphasizing
even these
agents can perform good acts and
have corresponding habits or dispositions.
this difference is
deeper agreement. Thomas and
because of the different contexts
which
they wrote and developed their thought. Augu§tine never
which he discussed the
developed a §ystematic moral theory
goodness of an act as opposed to the goodness of the agent. His
concerns were more doctrinal and polemicaL He was fighting
Pelagians and pagans. In contrast, Thomas was concerned with
incorporating Aristotle's
theory into a Scholastic
for
him increasingly Augustinian framework. Nevertheless, Thomas
Augustine agree on the central
that an agent can never
be good without being ordered to God through grace. As we
the first part, Thomas's position on pagan virtue seems
to have developed in the same direction as his views on
justification" Unlike many medieval theologians, Thomas

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303

thoroughly adopted Augustine's anti-Pelagian stance. Both
Augustine and Thomas emphasize not only the weakness but also
the insufficiency of fallen human nature.
IV

Both Kent and Shanley seem to contrast an Augustinian
position in which pagan virtues are really vices and a Thomistic
position in which at least some persons can lead a morally
virtuous life without the assistance of grace. I think that neither
Augustine nor Thomas holds the views that are attributed to them.
Although Augustine does say that pagan virtues are only similar to
true virtues, he does distinguish carefully between pagans who
perform good actions and those who are vicious. Thomas's
position is especially complex. The dispute between the nonAugustinian reading of Thomas and the more traditional version
is not over whether Thomas says that pagans can have "true"
virtues. Everyone admits that he does. The question is whether
without grace someone can be good by the fact that he has
acquired virtues that are perfect-that is, connected with the
other virtues through prudence. Although Thomas thinks that
pagans without charity can have true virtues, he does not think
that they can lead morally virtuous lives. By "true virtues" he
means only habits or dispositions for performing good actions.
Without charity someone can perform good actions, but he can
never be good.
One advantage of rejecting the Augustinian interpretation of
Thomas is that it would make possible the existence of a
Thomistic moral philosophy that is completely independent of
revelation. By emphasizing the weakness of fallen human nature
Thomas makes it difficult for moral philosophy to be entirely
independent of moral theology. 75 Kent follows Cajetan in thinking
that moral philosophy is about nature and has no need of

75 For a criticism of Maritain on similar grounds, see Bradley, Aquinas on the Twofold
Human Good, 495-506.

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THOMAS M. OSBORNE, JR.

revelation. 76 Moreover, she argues for the further point that a
naturally moral life is possible without the virtue of religion.
Shanley's claim is much narrower and more in tune with
Thomas's Augustinian heritage. Although Shanley seems to think
that Thomas's moral philosophy cannot be separated from moral
theology, he does think that for pre-Christian pagans all the
acquired virtues, even the virtue of prudence, can be possessed
without charity and the infused moral virtues. But, as John of St.
Thomas observed, there is a difficulty in this position. 77 In a state
of pure nature it would be possible to be ordered to a purely
natural last end. However, since we do not live in a state of pure
nature, it is impossible for us to be ordered to the last natural end
and away from the last supernatural end. Consequently, anyone
who lacks the supernatural virtue of charity is ordered away from
the last natural end. Although someone in this state can perform
good acts, he cannot possess even the acquired moral virtues in
the same way that they are possessed by someone who is ordered
to God through charity.
Both Kent and Shanley neglect Thomas's position that original
sin has destroyed our ability to acquire fully even the natural
virtues without grace. The Augustinianism of Thomas's moral
theory is not just in his belief that all men are called to an end
whose attainment exceeds the natural abilities of human nature,
but also in his position that these natural abilities have themselves
been corrupted. Both Augustine and Thomas can explain why
most humans fail to attain their last end. Many animals flourish;
few humans do. Aristotle recognized that few are virtuous but he
did not give a complete explanation of why this is so. 78 According
76 Kent, "Moral Provincialism," 279; Virtues of the Will, 28. Cajetan, Commentaria in
Secundam Secundae, q. 23, a. 7 (Leonine 8:172).
77 "Difficultas ergo est in hoc statu presenti, in quo non potest quis carere gratia et
charitate nisi propter peccatum, et consequenter cum aversione ab ultimo fine, quae aversio
non potest esse ab ultimo fine supernaturali quin sit etiam a fine ultimo naturali, siquidem
omne peccatum est contra naturam rationalem, quod non esset, si maneret peccator conversus
et conjunctus Deo fini naturali, qui est finis rationalis naturae, ex cujus recto amore maneret
rectificatus in ordine naturali" Uohn of St. Thomas, Cursus Theologicus, d. 17, a. 2, 55 [De
Virtutibus, 465-66]).
78 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics 7.7 (1150a1015).

THE AUGUSTINIANISMOF AQUINAS'S MORAL THEORY

305

to Thomas, few of us attain our last end because we need God's
grace to heal our corrupted natural powers and to raise us to our
supernatural end. 79
Thomas's moral theory is more nuanced and consistent than
that of Augustine. Nevertheless, Thomas agrees with Augustine
that the virtuous life is impossible without the assistance of grace.
Some duties are impossible to fulfill on account of the corruption
of human nature through sin. Consequently, grace is needed to
heal human nature. Moreover, the virtue of charity is necessary
for a correct ordering to God. Someone who does not have
charity can only have imperfect acquired moral virtues which are
not directed to either the natural or supernatural last end of man.
Although such a person may perform good actions, he will never
possess the perfect acquired moral virtues. 80

l, q. 23, a. 7, ad 3.
the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies for granting me a
Gilson Fellowship, which made it possible for me to write this article. Brian J. O'Donnell and
an anonymous reader made helpful criticisms. Fr. Brian Shanley gave gracious advice and
assistance.
79 STh

80 I would like to thank

Heidegger's Atheism: The

a

Voice.

L\URENCE PAUL

HEMMING. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 2002. Pp. 344.
$45.00
ISBN 0-268-03058-8.
Readers of Laurence Paul
recent book on
should not
neglect to recall the extent to which Heidegger himself radically transformed our
understanding of what it means to give an "interpretation." Hemming's
discussion displays a constant awareness of our indebtedness to Heidegger in this
regard. His book is best conceived as a careful
to and thinking with
Heidegger rather than as a more traditional exegesis of the
This is not to imply that Hemming is unconcerned about Heidegger's
meaning. But from a Heideggerian
itself has an event-like
be "fixed" or determined once and for all.
character, so that it can never
Moreover, it is revealed as much in what Heidegger suggested
but
left unsaid as in what he actually wrote
had to say.
Readers of The Thomist wi!l be familiar with Hemming's
essay on
"Heidegger's God,"
in 1998; this new hook on
Atheism
of the argument sketched in that
represents an amplification and a
article. Here the juxtaposition of titles is itself
informative about the
author's original
Heidegger's atheism is the portal
which any
interpreter must peiss in order to have the opportunity even for a glimpse of
Heidegger's God.
Regeirded separately, neither title would seem to represent a
that
is particularly startling or
A number of
have insisted that
Heidegger is best understood as an atheist
even as a
and that
he
said so for anyone who has ears to hear.
been those commentaries
with Heidegger's God;
Heidegger
as a thinker of great
significance, eJnd few
,,.,,,,,,,,.,,,,..exercised as powerful an influence over developments in
twentieth-century Christian theology. Hemming, however, wants to mainteiin
both perspectives at once. It is
to describe Heidegger as an atheist, while
also regarding him eis a deeply religious thinker, albeit as one whose God does
not appear in those places where his
have been inclined to
look.

306

BOOK REVIEWS

307

Heiddegger's writings embody a lifelong meditation on the history of the
concept of being. Hemming notes that the Heideggerian corpus "reeks of God"
without actually saying very much about the Deity. Some scholars-most notably
Karl Lowith-have tried to account for this peculiar fact by suggesting that
Heidegger "supplanted God with being" (2); and many readers who discern in
Heidegger's works a perspective friendlier to theology than the one that LOwith
delineated are nevertheless inclined to conflate Heidegger's idea of God with his
concept of being. Hemming emphatically rejects all such readings. Being, for
Heidegger, is always finite and can never be spoken of God. Moreover,
Hemming's account "decidedly overlooks the understanding of the holy that
Heidegger develops, particularly in relation to Holderlin" (17). Consequently,
his discussion either rebuts or circumvents the two most common strategies for
explaining Heidegger's religious significance.
Hemming's own strategy is to argue that "Heidegger's atheism ... is an
explicitly Christian affair"; moreover, that his atheism consists precisely in his
refusal of "the way the Christian God has been woven into human thinking"
(18). Atthe same time, Heidegger's refusal is conceived as a "vibrant pedagogy,"
one that brings the reader to address the question of God in the very process of
exposing "the extent to which so much which claims to speak of God does not
do so" (50). This is a clearing away of the God of metaphysics in order to make
room for the God of faith, but not at all in the sense that Kant proposed. It is not
essentially an epistemological move, exposing a gap in the order of knowledge
that only faith can fill. The atheistic refusal of God as being (highest being,
ground of being, first cause, etc.) is simultaneously the coming to myself as this
being, my being, grounded in nothing; and "this groundlessness is the
ontological grounding possibility of discovering (in faith) myself to have been
created by God" (59). The rejection of a "God already known to me as what
grounds me" (162) is the preparing of a space within Dasein to meet the God
who speaks to me, the God revealed in faith, not as pure presence but as an
"event in being" (73).
This strategy is enacted in Hemming's own prolonged meditation on the full
range of Heidegger's writing, from the earliest pronouncement of his atheism in
1921 to his most mature reflections. After an extended introduction that supplies
a useful summary of the book's structure and basic argument, Hemming proceeds
to explore the early work, Heidegger's youthful theological inquiries and the
original development of his philosophical atheism against that theological
background. This discussion culminates in a consideration of Heidegger's
Phanomeno/ogie und Theo/ogie, the publication of a lecture originally delivered
at Tiibingen in 1927. There theology is identified explicitly as the "science of
faith," as Hemming explains, "in no sense concerned with a disclosure of the
essence of God or of God's being as such, but only my being in its comported
faithfulness to God" (65).
Already in this second chapter, Hemming eschews the standard account
(again, originating with Lowith) of an "early Heidegger" who stands in
opposition to the "later Heidegger," the contrast being marked in terms of an

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BOOK REVIEWS

of Dasein to the
as such"
In the next three
Hemming presents his own
understanding of the meaning of the "turn" (Kehre) in Heidegger's philosophy,
as well as its relation to the "event" (Ereignis). These pages are laced with
insight; while the detailed analysis there resists neat summary, the upshot of this
discussion is Hemming's insistence on the basic
of Heidegger's thought. On
Hemming's account, the "turn" does not refer to something
representing a basic
in Heidegger's thinking; rather, it
refers to Heidegger's own
about time and
That ui'""'rn"'
the event of Nietzsche's pronouncement of the death of
is
God, so that the turn is manifested in the
of Western
as a turning
away from
from God as
o:r highest being. With Nietzsche,
the "ground becomes
and weightless,,, so that
being, everything,
is now "secured in terms of v"""""·"i'i
With these
Hemming sets the stage for the analysis in the second
half of the
where he more
articulates his understanding of
Heidegger's God. This
negatively, in
6, with a review of
Heidegger's
of traditional Christian theology, but condudes more
in chapter 9, with a brilliant and enormously stimulating set of
deliberations on the challenge that Heidegger's atheism represents for
contemporary theologians.
Hemming has already begun to respond to
that challenge
In between, there is important material dealing with
Heidegger's consideration of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, the relationship between
Heidegger and medieval
Aquinas), aI1d
own
sharply critical evaluation of Jean-Luc Marion's theological appropriation of
certain Heideggerian insights. These last two topics are linked since, in
Hemming's
Marion's somewhat ambivalent interpretation of Aquinas is
related to his
of Heidegger's
difference. It is his
failure
to situate the experience of faith within the finite structures of
Dasein that leads Marion l:o attempt to think God without the "I," that is,
without "the very self that Heidegger's atheism has painst21kingly
light
and elaborated so
as a
While trying to think of "God
without
" Hemming contends, Marion remains
within a notion of
that is "resolutely
""-''1Ul"'01" avoids such a trap to the extent that his doctrine of analogy is
regarded as playing a
and is not construed as a metaphysical
claim
Hemming explains that this was Heidegger's understanding of how
n"'"""'"' both conceived and
the concept of analogy. Hemming's
of Heidegger on this issue is
persuasive; it is another matter to
persuade the reader that Heidegger's understanding of Aquinas is the correct
one, that Aquinas himself was not involved in the very sort of metaphysical
project that makes Marion so nervous. This is a complex issue, certainly not to
be resolved in a few brief remarks-perhaps not likely to be resolved even in a
series of lengthy discussions. I raise the issue only because some readers
(including myself) will not be so disturbed
the prospect of Aquinas (or anyone

an

BOOK REVIEWS

309

else) engaging in the sort of traditional metaphysical inquiry that tends to be
labeled as "ontotheology." The claim that "being and God are the same" (167)
is a worrisome claim only to the extent that one has a very precise sense of what
extraordinarily vague terms like "God" and "being" are supposed to mean. I am
not attempting here to echo Carnap's famous/infamous critique of Heidegger's
philosophy, a critique that I regard as being massively insensitive to Heidegger's
most valuable insights. But I do think that some of Heidegger's talk about
metaphysics as "ontotheology" results in a kind of unfortunate caricature, that
he (and so perhaps Hemming) has paid insufficient attention to the logic of
vagueness and to how it needs to be applied to such considerations.
I raise the issue, also, because Hemming has established (now in this book, but
also in numerous other publications) a highJy original and fiercely independent
viewpoint, but one that obviously bears a discernible resemblance to the
theological perspective of Radical Orthodoxy. Yet Hemming's remarks here
about Heidegger and nihilism display a distinctive tone of voice that dearly sets
him apart not only from Marion but also from the Radical Orthodox
theologians. Nevertheless, like the latter, he seems invested in the project of
demonstrating the extent to which Aquinas got things right, no matter how
confused Aquinas's contemporaries, successors, and most prominent interpreters
may have been. Moreover, he appears to share the perspective defended by these
theologians that things began to go especially and disastrously wrong when Duns
Scotus appeared upon the scene, with the promulgation of his doctrine of the
univocity of being. It is only a short step from Scorns through Suarez to
Descartes. Nominalism rears its ugly head and the truth of being is forgotten,
obscured in a cloud of ontotheological dust.
This evaluation of Scorns and Scotism is inferred from what Hemming writes
in the book, not a careful summary of what he actually has to say. (Hemming
addresses Scotus more directly in the 1998 Thomist essay that forms the precis
for this extended argument.) But even the relative silence about Scorns is curious
here, not just because Heidegger began his career by thinking/writing about
(albeit spurious) Scotistic texts, but because Scotus's historically prominent
theory of univocity, his idea of God as "infinite being," have him lurking
everywhere in the shadows of Hemming's (and Heidegger's) argument as it
unfolds.
The fact that Hemming evaluates the claims that Heidegger refused to voice,
organizing his interpretation around what Heidegger left unsaid, makes me feel
a bit more comfortable about observing Hemming's silence on certain issues. He
is also silent about the potential influence of non-Christian, specifically East
Asian religious ideas on the development of Heidegger's "atheistic" theology. In
what sense would Hemming want to insist that Heidegger's atheism is an
"explicitly Christian affair"? In terms of its origin? Or in terms also of its
philosophical development and enduring religious significance?
The most important things that Hemming leaves unsaid, of course, are those
things that go beyond saying, sometimes shattering language like a fragile vase,
sometimes hidden in the "babble" of our metaphysical saying. I was moved by

BOOK REVIEWS

310

he articulates a
of care, one that reveals lo,re as a "mode of kn.O,iV!!1>r----a£:am.
""""''m" of finite creatures
out for but never
thing,
thinking v11ith ri<:Wegger, wants to turn our attention back to the self as "the
horizon vvhere God is
" the finite space where
this God who
This God can be named in prayer

c

f'

•

tor (sOCL

MICPIAEL L RAPOSA

Natural Law and Practical1was1mi1nf!.

lVlARKC. MURl'iHY. Cambridge Studies

University

in

2001.

284. $54.95. ISBN 0-521-80229-6.
Recent moral

seen a great interest m

'rn""'"'"'· There is a sense among many that the basic
have led to interminable disagreement,
and
formulations of
Put another way, the achievements of
have tended to show vvith
the snortc•Jrr11r1gs
ethics (I
but also the various forms of
whHe
better models. This has led many
trained in
methods to reexamine ancient and medieval
accounts, among them the tradition of natural law most
but not
associated with the
Much of this work has been
more suggestive than
but there are several large-scale constructive
the most prominent
The
recovery of natural. law
in analytical terms is dms an obvious and
necessary
of contemporary moral
There are,
obstacles. The best-known obstacle is the thesis associated with Hume and
Moore that one cannot derive morally
statements. There is also the
first
most modem moral
associated with premodern
But natural law
has often aimed to

BOOK REVIEWS

311

do precisely that. There are also well-known problems concerning the role in
natural law theory of the sort of teleology largely rejected by modern science. All
of this suggests that perhaps there is simply too much disagreement at too basic
a level between anything like traditional natural law and modern analytical
philosophy. Finnis's work has aimed to meet these challenges, but has remained
controversial among more traditional Thomists on account of its own
peculiarities. Mark C. Murphy's Natural Law and PracticalReasoning thus enters
a controversy already in progress. The book aims to do what others have either
merely gestured at or attempted to do without garnering great acceptance, that
is, to present a natural law theory that is expounded largely in the language and
techniques of analytical philosophy, but that is grounded in the main theoretical
commitments of the tradition.
Murphy offers a natural law account that aims to be a theory of practical
reason, that is, one that explains the intelligibility and reasonableness of action.
He begins by specifying the necessary elements in any plausible natural law
theory: it must offer a catalogue of basic goods grounded in human nature and
it must offer standards of practical rationality justified by reference to those
goods (1-3). Accordingly, Murphy first offers an account of the basic goods that
constitute reasons for action connected to human nature and then proposes
standards of practical reasonableness. In approaching the first task Murphy
confronts a disagreement internal to recent natural law theory: namely, the
disagreement between those who see the principles of practical reason as derived
from an account of human nature ("derivationists") and those who see them as
indemonstrable and not derived from speculative judgments ("indinationists").
The first view, common among more traditional Thomists and Aristotelians, is
represented by Anthony Lisska in his 1996 book, Aquinas's Theory of Natural
Law: An Analytic Reconstruction; the latter mainly by John Finnis. Murphy
argues for what one might call a modified inclinationism. He quickly rejects
derivationism for, first, violating Hume's law and, second, for making it difficult
to see how ordinary persons could have access to basic moral knowledge. He
criticizes Finnis's inclinationism, however, for failing to reconcile the claim that
basic moral principles are self-evident with the claim that the goodness of such
goods is explained by human nature (14-17). Murphy's own inclinationism aims
to solve this problem by defending an account of practical reasoning that relates
moral principles to human nature without committing the naturalistic fallacy. He
pursues this task by proposing two large arguments upon which the rest of the
account-which mainly consists of defensive arguments for his own approach
and a more detailed spelling out of actual principles of practical reasoning-rests.
The first of these two arguments is called the "real identity thesis" and is
intended to provide the epistemic basis of a natural law theory that does not run
afoul of Hume's law. The thesis proposes an understanding of the relationship
between speculative and practical judgments based on an analogy between
different types of indexical statements. Just as one cannot derive statements like
"Murphy is in his office" from statements (made by Murphy) like "I am in my
office" or vice versa, so one cannot derive judgments about how one should act

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BOOK REVIEWS

from statements about the human
as such. Nevertheless, there can be a
"tight correspondence" between the content of the two statements. So the
content of
judgments of what one should do is logically independent
and underivable from speculative judgments about the human good, but also
identical.
working dialectically between the t\1\lo, one can recognize
their logical difference, but stiU find them mutually illuminating
The second argument, called the "functional composition thesis," concerns
daims about the human good itself. Murphy defends the notion that there is a
(CC)mpou111aor inclusive) function that can be ascribed to human beings as such
and that such a function can be related to goodness. The thesis itself is explained
by way of an interpretation of Aristotle's function argument in Nicomachean
Ethics L 7,
the function of parts in a whole to the notion that the whole
itself has a function. Function is then related to flourishing with the help of
Mark Bedau's defense of a teleological account of functioning and his
classification of teleology into three groups, one of which is the sort of fullblooded teleology advocated
Aristotle. This describes human flourishing; a
lesser grade of teleology describes other nonhuman parts of nature.
sets about formulating and
Having proposed these two theses,
defending an account
like Finnis's theory, is grounded in a set of basic
goods that constitute reasons for action. Murphy's list is, however, somewhat
different from Finnis's. He proposes the following basic goods: life, knowledge,
aesthetic experience, excellence in play and work, exceUence in agency, inner
peace, friendship and community, religion, and happiness. This last concerns the
formation
agents of rational Hfe
through which to realize the good. The
goods are analyzed dialectically by means of both speculative judgments about
flourishing and practical
With respect to practical reason, however,
the goods are, as the real
thesis states, fundamental reasons for action.
From them
derives principles of practical reason that govern both plans
of action and agems. The
of these preclude dismissing or
devaluing basic goods or
persons
the context of
goods). Like Finnis,
also holds that the basic goods are
incommensurable,
unlike Finnis, he thinks it may be possible to order
them hierarchically. A defensible hierarchy among goods, however, would not
add much to the formulation of practical principles (198). Murphy's theory then
is one based on the notion that the human good is objective, concerned with
human welfare, and anti-consequentialist.
Finally, Murphy argues that specifically morni imperative force is added to the
principles of
reason when it is impossible to decide on some opposed
course of action without a practical error. Generalizing from this leads to
specifically moral principles that preclude inter alia discrimination, lying, and
callousness.
There is a great deal to chew overr· in Murphy's account and no one can accuse
him of being too stingy with arguments. He responds in great detail to a dizzying
number and variety of
to his various proposals and formulations
relating to his claims about the objectivity of well-being and alternative

BOOK REVIEWS

313

contemporary views. This book should and will be a focus of debate among
those who advocate various versions of natural right in moral, political, and legal
philosophy. What I want to offer is not so much criticism as observations and
questions of the sort that seem to me natural from an Aristotelian-Thomistic
perspective. They all are related to what seem to me the distinctly modern
elements in Murphy's natural law theory.
First, Murphy's dismissal of what he calls "derivationism" is based on what
seems a rather casual acceptance of Hume's and Moore's views about the
naturalistic fallacy. There have been a number of proposals advanced, even
within analytical philosophy, to explain away the so-called fallacy of deriving
values from facts: one thinks of Geach, Searle, and Prior, not to mention
Macintyre. So why does Murphy adopt Lisska as the only representative of
derivationism worth refuting? One reason is perhaps that Lisska, unlike most of
those mentioned above, argues against Hume's law as an explicit proponent of
natural law theory, but the question is broader than just natural law and Murphy
chooses his opponents more broadly elsewhere in the book. Moreover, it does
not seem to me that Lisska makes the strongest case.
From a more explicitly Thomistic perspective there are questions about the
"functional composition thesis" and about the catalogue of and relationship
between the basic goods. On the first point, Murphy is clearly concerned that a
defense of a naturalistic account of flourishing looks too teleological for modern
natural science. His adoption of Bedau's grades of teleology manages only to put
this question off by proposing a kind of modified dualism: human flourishing
manifests full teleology, while other parts of nature manifest lower grades of it.
Perhaps that is the best we can do, but it seems unlikely that many proponents
of anti-teleological science will be persuaded by it. On the second point,
Murphy, like Finnis, holds that the basic goods are incommensurable. He does
allow that there may be room for the notion of hierarchy among the goods (19098); however, he evinces considerably more caution about this than either
Aristotle or Aquinas, both of whom clearly defend the superiority of
contemplation.
There are two other issues concerning the character of Murphy's account visa-vis traditional natural law theory that bear a somewhat paradoxical
relationship to one another. Murphy criticizes derivationism for making it
unclear how plain persons have access to basic moral knowledge. On finishing
Natural Law and Practical Rationality, however, one wonders just how much
easier plain persons have it on the basis of Murphy's account. At the same time,
the actual cache of specific moral knowledge one carries away from the book
may appear rather small. Murphy writes that he arrives at "thinner conclusions
than those reached by a number of writers in the natural law tradition" on the
basis of the principles of practical reason his theory generates (216), and a bit
later confesses that those principles are "highly abstract," but that this is not so
worrisome since working through the "more interesting moral requirements that
can be generated from these fundamental principles would be extremely
tedious," adding that his study is not primarily concerned with "the more

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BOOK REVIEWS

casuistical questions that arise within natural law theory" (230). It is fair enough
that one cannot do everything in one book; however, a very large part of the
controversy over natural law theory surely concerns the specific moral judgments
about controversial questions that the tradition has proposed and the modern
rejection of them. Murphy confines himself to brief discussions of
discrimination, lying, and callousness. In the first of these discussions he actually
mentions the controversy over discrimination against homosexuals by the
military (231). The question of same-sex marriage, however, is of far greater
moment and involves (in part, at least) the same principle. One may wonder if
the thinness of these conclusions is related to Murphy's acceptance of Hume's
law at the start.
These questions notwithstanding, Natural Law and Practical Rationality is an
important book and one that should be studied by all contemporary students of
the issues it treats. The book succeeds in advancing the project of an analytical
natural law theory where others have failed, and contains many illuminating
discussions of various related and subsidiary questions. The writing is clear and
the quality of philosophical argument is very high. There has been a virtual
rebirth of interest in and contribution to moral, political, and legal philosophy
in the natural law tradition in recent years. Murphy's contribution to this
increasingly lively and important conversation is among the most noteworthy
and valuable.
V. BRADLEYLEWIS
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

An Essay on Divine Authority. By MARK C. MURPHY. Cornell Studies in the
Philosophy of Religion. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2002. Pp.
x +198. $39.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8014-4030-0.
In this book, Mark C. Murphy explores the question of God's rule over
created beings. He challenges the view-widely held by theists and non-theists
alike-that, if G<Jd exists, human beings must be bound by obligations of
obedience to Him. He argues that this view-what he calls the 'authority
thesis'-is not sustained by any of the arguments usually made in its behalf,
including those drawn from Scripture and tradition. In fact, he goes so far as to
maintain that the authority thesis in all of its forms is not merely rationally
unsupported but false (150).
What disturbs Murphy is the claim that divine commands are 'constitutive':
"When authority A issues a dictate that B 0, B typically cites the reason that A
told B to Oas at least part of the reason to do Othat B has" (12). In other words,

BOOK REVIEWS

315

the authority's command provides a reason for action as
knowledge of the consequences and of other
features of the
action, and his power to alter the practical situation
(e.g., by attaching good or bad consequences to our choices. One concern that
seems to underlie
rejection of universal divine
in this sense
is the 'Wicked Bible'
could God have commanded
without
at the same time altering the
or social. dimensions of
sex and
Another concern is respect for the autonomy of rational
which in his view supports a presumption against belief in
relations (sec.
The apparent radicalism of
conclusion is an iHusion. He supports
'the
thesis': "it is a necessary truth that if God commands a rational
creature to do 0, then this creature has decisive reasons to do 0' (21). As he
sums up the practical
of this view, "orthodox theism holds that if
one holds that a command really is from
the
to do is to adhere to it,
to have absolute trust that following the command is the
to do"
Murphy not
defends the
thesis, he also defends divine
auth•or;rty in the strict sense,
as a contingent matter. Rational beings have
to the extent that
decisive reasons
themselves to divine
have chosen to let God's decrees take the
of their own

•re·mPnt.:

law and conventional
sometimes
force to broad and
Thus a man
to drink to excess may
when your wife teHs you to do so"'
will allow God to specify the
transformation of the

but with little argument, that natural reason
demands of Christian love
as he
n. 11). A touchier
Finnis think otherwise
annro21ch works concerns homosexual practices.
on Thomas Nagel's account of
and. sexual
differences
he criticizes the natural
nracnc:es '-''""'u'"'·""'"•' by Germain Grisez and

316

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view, rnther like playing a
or rather engaging in a friendly wrestling match,
with no referee to intervene if the parties
to anger and do one another
permanent damage; in any case, it is not a manifestation of mere hedonism.
(That there is nothing to some form of activity but pleasure seems unprovable
anyv,ray.)
Murphy holds that Christians can accept this view of sexuality while
their traditional condemnation of homosexual sodomy. For
homosexual behavior is
problematic even on natural law grounds (182),
and God specifies the relevant moral principles so as to forbid it. In other words,
"homosexual sodomy is wrong because it is contrary to the divine command, not
because it is contrary to the principles of natural practical reasonableness" (ibid.).
"On this account, the sin of those [if culpable] who engage in homosexual
sodomy outside the range of divine authority is not unchastity, but pride"
d. n.
This is not as liberal a doctrine as some readers might think, since
Christian ethics regards pride as a far more serious matter than sins of the flesh.
Its implications for the policies of the secular state
be a different matter,
however (cf. 177 n. 5).
The whole book is argued with admirable courage, rigor, and thoroughness.
refusal to strain natural law reasoning to reach theologically correct
conclusions is
and his solution to the question of homosexual practices
is worthy of serious attention. Following his difficult argument is, however,
impeded by his insistence on "politically correct" pronouns-in one case she for
And his argument concerning
Moses, though in the context of a
homosexuality concedes too much, on the strictly philosophical
to the
contemporary prejudice against taking sexual difference seriously, even w·hen
dealing with sexual behavior, in which the distinctively male or female features
of the human body are most prominent.
Moreover, in my judgment, he has not confronted the case for divine
authority in its most radical and most credible form, aH of whose elements can
be found in his
The ethics of divine authority at its best is a
metaethical thesis
chap.
Like most such theses, it forms a part of a larger
metaphysical perspective-in this case, theism. Like all such theses, it works
from, and tries to make sense
a
'gut' morality resting on the
mutual understandings and convergent emotional responses of the members of
society. Hence adherents of the ethics of divine authority can agree with
naturalists about the immorality of terrorism and child abuse, and debate them
about sexual morality or assisted suicide, even while disagreeing with them about
questions of moral theory (see 79). Naturalists do not necessarily fail to be
"masterful users of deontic concepts" (ibid.): they merely hoid a metaphysics,
and consequently a metaethics, that theists regard as in error, and this may
distort their use of deontic concepts at least upon occasion.
Doubts about whether we, in fact,
to obey God ran be taken as
showing "that one's relationship with God has somehow gone awry" (82). For
such a person is on the way to abandoning theism, and with it the most natural
theistic metaethical doctrine. And, like metaethical doctrines generally, a

BOOK REVIEWS

317

metaethics of divine authority makes some forms of moral argument easier and
others more difficult, but does not uniquely determine the resulting moral code.
The ethics of divine authority has two pillars. First, God is a perfect being, so
there will be no incoherencies or other flaws in His decrees (see chap. 3).
Second, God is "creator of all things visible and invisible," and this includes both
the requirements of morality and the human beings to which these requirements
apply. This conjunction disposes of the 'Wicked Bible' problem: some moral
requirements flow from the divine nature in the, admittedly obscure, way both
necessary truths and lesser necessary beings do. (This consideration means that
'divine command ethics' is not the most accurate expression for the view in
question, but does not militate against the term 'divine authority'.)
Nor is the problem of human autonomy serious. We are right to accept a
presumption against authority relations among human beings (see sec. 6.5),
because other human beings are finite, fallible, and sinful like ourselves; and
more fundamentally because they too are created beings. (I pass over the messy
problems created by the doctrine of the Incarnation.) But if God is our creator
in a radical sense, then these considerations do not apply to His authority.
Moreover, we can see inadequate formulations such as that we owe God a debt
of gratitude for our very being (sec. 5.4) and that we are His property (sec. 5.3)
as partial expressions of the fact that we are wholly His creation. As for the
importance of voluntary submission to God's will (see sec. 7.4), there is
profound spiritual wisdom in consenting to what one already is.
Though this form of the ethics of divine authority meets Murphy's critique,
it is not necessarily problem-free. We have, first, to defend its underlying theism
against the charge of meaninglessness or incoherence. Second, that morality
issues from God tells us very little about the actual requirements of morality, or
how we are to find out what they are. An important issue is one Murphy only
mentions in passing, that one might be "imprudent in deciding what sources
should be recognized as correctly containing the content of God's commands"
(170). The relative roles of Scripture, tradition, contemporary religious leaders,
and independent moral reasoning remain to be defined.
I conclude with a discussion of Murphy's account of the (almost) sacrifice of
Isaac (41-45). In what must be something like the most hairsplitting argument
on record, he maintains "that God intends that Abraham kill Isaac, yet that God
does not intend Isaac to be killed by Abraham, but also that God's perfect
rationality is thereby left intact" (43). A divorced husband, he argues, might
intend that his daughter respect her mother, but not that his former wife, whom
he hates, be respected by her daughter (42). But to save the father's rationality
in this case, we need to suppose that he wants his daughter to respect her mother
for the sake of her own moral character, and not for any benefit his ex-wife
might gain from such respect. Such complex intentions could cover all his desires
without his having incompatible intentions about logically equivalent states of
affairs.
On the view of divine authority suggested here, a smoother if less
fundamentalist reading of Genesis 22 is possible. The passage dramatizes two

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BOOK REVIEWS

up your most central moral
you to do so.
PHILLIP E. DEVIl'\fE

Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

Versions of Thomism. By FERGUS KERR.
Oxford: Blackwell
2002.
viii + 254.
ISBN 0631213139.
After Aquinas is a survey of "non-standard"
of topics in the thought of Thomas Aquinas that is ae:s1gneo
subvert the "standard" account derived from a "Leonine Thomism" infected by
"arid Aristotelianism." Those conversant with contemporary trends in
wiH perhaps wonder if the "standard account" is still
of the name and
whether the book's target is not a corpse
Perhaps,
1t ;s a
:ipecter still alive in some theological cirdes, in which case Kerr's book is a
rhis
salutary remedy. Even if the "standard" account no longer exists as
book
an interesting and
wur nu·""''
in Thomism; it should prove especially
to
carried out as a
dialogue with Barth and his followers.
After an overview of
life and times, Kerr
in the Leonine
of aoonJrnnaW:J:!!:
basic misreadings that
as an antidote to '""'"<i"rc1n,•v
Epistemology" occasioned
Thomas as an ally in an
conceived struggle to defeat
Kerr argues that Aquinas does indeed provide a way to subvert
modernity"
the Cartesian problematic, just not in the way envisioned by Transcendental
Thomists or Neoscholastic realistso As Kerr describes his own
the
best way to exorcize Descartes is with a heavy dose of
(as he
showed in his masterful Theology
Underlying \Wittgenstein's
of the human soul" is an intuition
claim that "the human body is the best
about human nature very dose to
such that "the
discipline of being
to
exposure of the absurdities of
assuming that the interior life is radically private
us to understand
Thomas Aquinas's pre-Cartesian account of the human mind and will"
Against the "subjectivist-individualist"
that characterizes modernity
(including
Aquinas operates within a --01-...,rt11vP-n:>rt•
that sees the intelligibility of the world realized in mind-world
function of the collaboration of knower and known. Ultimately Aquinas's
6

"

BOOK REVIEWS

319

confidence about human knowing derives not from a prophylactic argument
against skepticism/solipsism, but rather from a theological conviction that we are
created in the image and likeness of an intelligent God and set in a world
designed for us to realize that identity.
The second major misreading of Aquinas stems from assimilating his approach
to apologetic responses to Enlightenment skepticism. It is precisely this reading
of Aquinas that led Barth to denounce natural theology and analogy as the work
of the anti-Christ because of the way in which it supposedly subordinates the
living Triune God to a monolithic idol. The role and nature of the famous
quinquae viae in Aquinas lie at the heart of this debate. In a chapter that is a
"Prolegomena to Natural Theology," Kerr argues that we cannot begin to
understand Aquinas if we see him as operating within modern philosophical
categories. Aquinas presupposes a much broader notion of causality that does not
map on to the modern tendency to reduce causality to mechanism and matter.
Instead, he has a rich notion of agent causation wherein the Creator's
omnicausality is not a monocausality wiping out genuine creaturely causality;
there is double agency without rivalry. Aquinas's notion of substance is likewise
unmodern insofar as it is dynamic and relational (as per Norris Clarke) rather
than static and monolithic. Kerr next offers "Ways of Reading the Five Ways"
as an exercise in securing divine transcendence against broadly Anselmian claims
about God's existence being per se nota rather than as an answer to a modern
atheisitic evidentialist challenge. God is not available as a natural object of
human cognition except obliquely on the basis of a posteriori argumentation that
leaves God's transcendence intact. Aquinas himself was well aware of the
cognitive and religious gap between the limited conclusions of the five ways and
the triune God, but nonetheless he was confident on the basis of the doctrine of
creation that the world provides some kind of cognitive purchase on its Maker.
Kerr devotes a chapter to "Stories of Being," designed to unpack Aquinas's
notion of God as lpsum esse subsistens. After noting that Aquinas's doctrine of
what we can know about God is fundamentally ordered towards its completion
in beatific deification, Kerr explores some of the major attempts to come to
terms with the doctrine of God as subsistent existence. As Kerr notes, the "seas
of language run high" in any attempt to explore this doctrine, and he ultimately
evinces little sympathy for Gilsonian, Heideggerian, and Balthasarian readings
of Aquinas's metaphysics. In the end they offer incommensurable and often
barely intelligible readings of Aquinas.
· Kerr devotes two chapters to Aquinas's moral thought. The first explores the
problems involved in treating Aquinas as a natural law ethicist. Building on the
work of Russell Hittinger, Pamela Hall, and Servais Pinckaers, Kerr shows that
it is wrong-headed to extract Aquinas's doctrine of natural law from its broader
theological context of providence, beatitude, virtue, sin, and grace as if it could
stand on its own as a putative ethics. Indeed there is no modern "ethics" to be
found in Aquinas because his concern is explicitly theological. In a companion
chapter on "Theological Ethics," Kerr argues (obviously influenced by Pinckaers)
that Aquinas's moral theology is best characterized as an ethics of divine

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BOOK REVIEWS

beatitude. The Secunda Pars is dominated by the idea that we are created in the
image and likeness of God for the sake of beatific union. In this life the focus is
how human beings become disposed in the right way (virtues, gifts, and
beatitudes) so as actively to grow into the kind of persons who find fulfillment
in God. This conformity of images to the divine requires the redeeming action
of the Image, so that Aquinas's ethics is Christological as well, insofar as the only
way to beatitude is through the redeeming work of Christ. In a penultimate
chapter on "Christ in the Summa Theologiae," Kerr explores some further
themes in Aquinas's Christology, focusing on his personal devotion to the
crucified Christ and his discussion of the motive for the Incarnation.
The discussion of ethics leads to a chapter on the "Quarrels about Grace"
occasioned by de Lubac's Surnaturel. Kerr rightfully notes that the quarrel
attempted to find answers to a nature-grace problematic that was foreign to
Aquinas because he never worried about a hypothetical "nature" and its
relationship to a grace coming to it from outside; for Aquinas, there was only the
one divine economy that had never known a nature apart from grace. Aquinas
views creation as ordered to its consummation in grace, and the human person
as being made for a share in divine life or divinization. Hence his central axiom:
grace does not destroy nature, but perfects it. This fit between nature and grace,
however it is parsed by the participants in the quarrel, is deeply disquieting to
Barthians, who view sinful nature as needing to be destroyed and recreated by
grace and so see in Aquinas's doctrine a thinly disguised Pelagian optimism. Kerr
argues that Aquinas was faithful to the Augustinian tradition's emphasis on the
need for grace, but with a parallel and compatible fidelity to the Greek Patristic
tradition of deification. Kerr thus devotes an entire chapter to the theme of
"Deified Creaturehood" Aquinas was a realist about grace and took seriously the
claim in 2 Peter 1:4 that grace makes us partakers in the divine nature. Kerr
relies heavily on the work of A. N. Williams on deification, arguing that
Aquinas's theological anthropology is best understood as a mystical theology
focused on the condition for the possibility of union with God.
The final chapter considers "God in the Summa Theologiae." In response to
the standard Reformed complaint, voiced vigorously by Barth, that Aquinas's
God is a static monad constrained by Greek essentialism, Kerr explores how
Aquinas's doctrine of God is biblical, Trinitarian, relational, and dynamic (it is
puzzling why this chapter did not follow the earlier discussion of God's nature).
His most novel claim is that Aquinas's God is better conceived as a verb and an
event than a noun and an entity, if the former couplet is conceived as connoting
activity and the latter is conceptually tied to stasis. At the very heart of the triune
God is the procession of persons in knowing and loving; thus the activity of
lpsum esse subsistens is nothing other than relational knowing and loving. There
is no nature of God antecedent to or independent of Trinitarian personal
activity, even if that nature is first approached intellectually in abstraction from
the Trinity. The very persons of the Trinity are constituted by their activity and
relations with each other; borrowing from Thomas Weinandy, Kerr notes that
because the names that designate the persons do so on the basis of their

BOOK REVIEWS

321

relational activities, they are best seen as verbs rather than nouns. Thus whether
we think of God as Ipsum esse subsistens or Trinity, as one nature or threepersoned, God is defined by activity.
Kerr concludes his survey with this observation: "Thomas's thought, perhaps
over a range of issues, contains within itself the Janus-like ambiguities that
generate competing interpretations that can never by reconciled .... all along the
line Thomas's work, we may surely say, offers readers today little of the
'synthesis' and 'equilibrium' for which it was widely admired 50 years ago, but,
on the contrary, reveals a loose-endedness in its constantly repeated discussions
of finally unresolvable problems" (210) Herein lies the central problem of this
work: Is this unresolved ambiguity really in Aquinas or is it rather more a
reflection of the author's inability or unwillingness to adjudicate competing
interpretations? It is both the strength and, in my view, the weakness of this
book that it leaves the reader with all sorts of unresolved questions. It is a
strength of the book that it reviews competing interpretations of Aquinas's
theology in an undogmatic, fair-minded, and perspicuous manner; not only
beginning theology students but also specialists will learn much from such an
approach. Yet the weakness of this approach is that it leaves competing
interpretations unresolved in a way that implies that the problem is in Aquinas
rather than in his interpreters. Kerr's intuitions are generally on the mark and it
is clear that he has more sympathy for some views than others, but he
consistently balks at taking an explicit stand in favor of one line of
interpretation. Aquinas's thought hangs together much better than Kerr leads the
reader to believe, despite the loose-endedness of his interpreters. While it was
perhaps a fault of Leonine Thomism to treat Aquinas as having straightforward
answers to all the questions, it was right to attribute to him a unified view of the
whole. There may be versions of Thomism, as Kerr's book discloses, but that
does not mean that there are versions of Thomas.
BRIAN J. SHANLEY, 0.P.

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation according to Thomas
Aquinas. By MATTHEW LEVERING. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame
Press, 2002. Pp. 264. $44.00 (cloth), $24.00 (paper). ISBN 0-268-022720 (cloth), 0-268-02273-0 {paper).
The Vatican II declaration Nostra Aetate placed interreligious dialogue at the
center of Catholic theology in our day. In many ways, the most important
dimension of that dialogue is with the Jewish people. Carried on in the shadow
of the Shoah and yet with the elan given to Catholic-Jewish dialogue by the

322

BOOK REV1EWS

Nostra Aetate has been
Paul
the direction set
words and actions of
"'°""'"'n'"" and has enabled a type of honest interaction that would have seemed
u"''·"'""""-'°before its
on October
1965.
difficulties lie
ahead, of course, but some of the means of
these have become
apparent in recent years.
One of the most '1!'1,.,•..,,,-r"'nJ-means of
serious and mutual
reflection on the natl.lle of the relation benveen
who do not believe in Christ and Christians. How can we understand
Paul H's
delivered in the synagogue at
November
the
"the people of God of the Old Covenant that has never been
revoked
God"?
·we are
invited to um:lertake a work of retrieval
that wiH force us out of famHiar
and
the energy and
we
need to look at the
of farad in our own
and to begin to work toward
a
of doctrine.
"""""'"''" of the type of research and reflection
needed if we are to recover in greater fullness the robust
of the past, in
this case th21t of Thomas
to the
mystery of IsraeL As
the tide
wishes to see how
understands Christ's
fulfillment of both Torah a."'1d
The first part of the book is dedicated to
the first
and is followed
the second part
Christ and the
Temple. Each part is made up of three
and the book ends with a
chapter.
1, Level'ing offers a response to Michael wvs1:h1Jigiro1:n
division of the Law into three
uu•u<H--.1u1;:> not respect the
of the Torah as understood
see in its every aspect an expression of the one will of God.
that for
the Mosaic Law is the rWin{'ln"I

and
who
out

was a means of grace th1:ou1gh
ancient
sacraments of the
were
towards
Christ through the same faith and love
which we are still
towards
him"
q. 8, a. 3, ad
2 disrusses some of the consequences
""''"'·'"'"draws from the fact that Jesus, as the Incarnate Wisdom of God, acts out
that Wisdom in his life, his teaching, his observance of the
and va'""".a'
in the
events of his life.
In chapter 3, Levering links Christ's threefold office of
and
especially as these are
to their consummation on the cross, as
another way of
how
understands Christ's
fulfillment of the whole Law. While it is true that there are two '"""u·""''"
178 n. 73), this
sentences in the Tertia Pars that refer to this threefold office

BOOK REVIEWS

323

does not seem to have been an operating organizing principle in Aquinas's
treatment of the Incarnation and Redemption. Nevertheless, Levering makes
good use of these dimensions of Christ's person and activity to return once again
to the notion of fulfillment of the Law according to Aquinas's division of the
Law into ceremonial (priest), judicial (king), and moral (prophet). In regard to
the first two of these Levering cites STh ID, q. 35, a. 7, ad 1: "Christ's priesthood
and kingdom were consummated principally in his passion." The last lines of
chapter 3 speak of the one reality and activity of Christ in its threefold
manifestation: prophet-the source of the Inner Teacher, the Spirit who mediates
the will of the Father; priest--continuing to be the one who sanctifies believers
and brings them into the presence of the Father; king-governing his Church
according to the perfection of the Divine law whose principal intention is to
"establish man in friendship with God" (STh I-II, q. 99, a. 2). While the heavenly
state of Christ will be considered in relation to the new Temple, his Body, these
lines invite further study regarding the fact that the Law is being fulfilled now by
the heavenly action of Christ and the share that believers have in this activity.
In part 2, Levering considers Christ's fulfillment of the Temple. At this point
his Jewish dialogue partner is Jon Levenson, who develops a theology of the
relation between Sion, the Law, and Zion, the place of David's city and the
Temple, utilizing the theme of the "cosmic mountain" as outlined by Mircea
Eliade. According to Levenson the Old Testament, and particularly Rabbinic
theology, looks upon the Temple as located on the "cosmic mountain," thus
manifesting God transcendent "presence." This presence is not dependent upon
the existence of the physical Temple; even now it is the mysterious center of
Jewish life, that "place" of holiness outlined and effected by observance of the
Torah in such a way that it can be said that people become the Temple of
YHWH.
Levenson derives much of his thought from the theology of the "name"
present in the dedicatory prayer of 1 Kings 8 and elsewhere. So too, in the
opinion of Aquinas, "God's 'name' dwelt in Israel's Temple because the Temple
was the place where the holy sacrificial liturgy, which God had instructed Israel
to perform, manifested God's 'name'" (95). Aquinas, of course, goes on to
develop this in terms of the whole Christ, Head and members, the Blessed Virgin
Mary, and each individual Christian, each in his own interconnected way being
a place of the worship of the Trinity in sacrificial holiness. The consummation
of this worship, proleptically manifested at the Transfiguration and realized in
the Resurrection of Christ, is seen to be the eternal and glorious liturgy of the
whole Body of Christ in heaven.
After acknowledging, at the beginning of chapter 5, that an account of the
Christian life that illustrates how it is meant to fulfill the Torah is necessary for
a complete presentation of Aquinas's notion of fulfillment, Levering goes on to
concentrate on the Mystical Body of Christ and the sacraments as the place
where the Temple worship is fulfilled. This fulfillment is not complete, of course,
since for Aquinas and the biblical tradition he adheres to both the worship and
sacramenta of the Old Law and in another way those of the New Law are

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BOOK REVIEWS

consummated in the beatific vision. The perfection of worship and the perfect
fulfillment of the covenant are found in the passion of Christ. Thus, relying on
Aquinas's teaching, Levering states: "In both Israel and the Church, inclusion in
the
Body is achieved through the
realities of faith and charity,
but these spiritual realities cannot be rut off from corresponding
'signs'
or sacraments-Israel's Temple and its fulfillment in the Church's sacramental
structure and worship"
In the final chapter
treats of what he calls "the liturgical
consummation of
(129): the beatific vision, the ultimate sacrifice of
shared and offered by all in the heavenly Jerusalem who make up one
Body, one Temple of the Messiah. It is here that, in and through Christ, the
Temple worship, which reached its
fulfillment in the Passion of Christ
prolonged and participated in
his
finally reaches its consummation. In
STh
q. 103, a. 3, Aquinas sketches out the three stages of worship: "One
state was in respect of faith and hope and in the means of obtaining them [the
Old Law] .... Another state of the interior worship is that in which we have
New Law] ..
faith and hope in heavenly goods, a:; in things present or past
. . The third state is that in which both are possessed as present; wherein nothing
is believed in as lacking, nothing hoped for as being yet to come. Such is the state
of the Blessed. In this state of the
nothing in regard to the worship
of God will be figurative; there will be
but thanksgiving and voice of
praise (Isa 51:3)"
This fine work makes a serious contribution to the kind of retrieval theology
that must be done before we Christians can approach Jewish-Christian relations
in our own
with a genuine spiritual and theological understanding of what
the Scriptures and Tradition
teach. Terms like "supersessionism" and
"evangelization" are used with little understanding of what the New Testament
and the great theologians and mystics of our tradition actually teach. The
undoubted and manifold sins of the past, to speak only of the Christian side,
must be
of and never repeated, but there is as well the golden thread
of genuine teaching that must be joined to our modern efforts if the dialogue is
to be honest and fruitful.
In regard to Aquinas
more work is needed to develop his thought
regarding what we call now the "unrevoked covenant." His views on the ways
in which Christians should relate to Jews, often misunderstood and confused
with those of his contemporaries, must be darified; a study in this hne of
;-i-,.-,,,.,ntis soon to be
Aquinas's teaching on the Beatitudes as
the Christian activity that fulfills the Torah must be set forth, and indeed lived
in a public and widespread way, before our claim to be the heirs of God's
revelation to Israel will be credible.
FRANCIS MARTIN

Intercultural Forum,
Paul II Cultural Center
Washington, D.C.

325

BOOK REVIEWS

Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence. By

THOMAS

J.

MCPAR1LAND. Columbia, Mo.: University of Missouri Press, 2001. Pp.
303. $37.50 (cloth). ISBN 0-8262-1345-6.

Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence reveals the ongoing
maturation of those scholars who continue to appropriate Lonergan's work and
explore its ramifications. More specifically McPartland's book participates in a
serious discussion on the integration of Lonergan's notions of metaphysics,
culture, and history, and his relationship to such modern and contemporary
figures as Descartes, Hume, Kant, Hegel, Husserl, Dilthey, Heidegger, Polanyi,
Gadamer, Ricoeur, Habermas, and especially Eric Voegelin.
McPartland's objective is to articulate a philosophy of history that is a
differentiated form of wisdom and is capable of mediating historical existence.
The result is both personal and communal. As personal, it is an authentic
subjectivity that is a love of wisdom and a species of religious love that is
differentiated by functional specialization and a personal existential attunement
to the in-between. As communal, it is a community of lovers of wisdom,
collaborating in a functionally specialized community called Cosmopolis.
McPartland develops his view of wisdom by rooting it in a restoration of a
metaphysics of historical existence an analysis of the horizon of a subject. As the
summary presentation of Lonergan's notion of the person (chap. 1) and of
metaphysics expressed as generalized emergent probability (chap. 2) reveals, only
the human being who has undergone an adequate development in the great
achievements of the past and the present can supply the context for this analysis.
This analysis, subsequently, provides a heuristic tool that McPartland uses to
reveal both what can be appreciated in various authors on philosophy and
history and their limits and distortions. He sets up the heuristic in chapter 1 by
identifying two opposed theories of knowledge, the confrontational view and the
isomorphic. In Lonergan's Insight, the confrontational view of knowledge and
reality is based on the senses, and is summarized by Lonergan's phrase "alreadyout-there-now-real." The isomorphic view is based on the questions for
understanding, which seek insights, and questions for reflection, which seek
judgments. Thus, reality is not something "out-there." It is what is grasped or
mediated in the human person by a compound of experience, understanding, and
judging. Experience constitutes the cognitive appropriation of the potency of
reality, understanding mediates the intelligibility of reality, and judgment
mediates the truth of reality as understood. This is not to say that this compound
creates the real. It is not to say that the reality that is known is not distinct from
knowing. It is not to say that cognition is not a part of reality. Rather, it is an
epistemological articulation of the relationship between cognition and reality,
which is precisely what prompted the modern and postmodern questions that
resulted in a rejection of metaphysics and, in the end, promoted historicism.
McPartland makes the two opposed theories of cognition fundamental in his
dialectical analysis, and crucial in his method for the analysis of historical

326

BOOK REVIEWS

which McPartland caHs a "dialectical
" is
existence. This
used to engage various modern and
authors
3) and to recover
a notion of
that rejects historicism
In
5, it effects an
of reason and
of those who live in openness to the "'inm1terpretilt1•:m match the "basic horizon" of
a human existence incarnate with a
is necessary for the
realization of a
of historical existence mediated by a dialectical
devoted to that community called
must be open to the transcendental norms
that caU
of
and the
of counter7, McPard:md sets foHh the differentiated wisdom that will
a wisdom that is more than
cognitive
and in fact is a form of
love. This

further nuances w the meaning of authentic subjectivity
and authentic historical existence.
It must be noted that this
has a significant limit not adequately
reveals in
the concrete
It is rare to find "lovers of wisdom," even rarer to find
lovers, even rnrer yet to find persons and communities with
tu1aci:io:na1a1
differentiation of
and
""V'-"""'"''"'
Cosmopolis that fa effective in
as a steward of historical
of "philosophies" as illustrations of this
existence.
On its own, the
philosophy will lack effective
«nth,r>ir11ru among the
McPartland's att1mement to the Transcendent and the in-berNeen, to this
"'"''V'"">'"'""" form of
needs to be
by
cornpJ,emlenited by a
that constitutes a higher form of
is expressed
Lonergan as a type
trnnscendent
In Method in Theology, it
becomes a hope for a Divine "entrance into the world mediated by meao.-;,ing."
This
is for more than a
attunement to the T rnnscendent, a self
which then ex-presses in
and
Rather, it is a hope for the
Transcendent to become incarnate, and to enter into a communal mediation of
self-transcending """'Ui'-"<·>·
for
effective in its mediation of historical
transcendent hope already mentioned is
fulfillment in an actual Divine entrance into history.
The inner-word needs to be mediated
a truly effective outer word that is

BOOK REVIEWS

327

constituted in some manner by the Beyond, the Transcendent, or the one whom
we commonly identify as God. And in becoming a recurring fixture of historical
existence, this hope for a Divine entrance combined with the actual Divine
entrance itself must also include a further hope and realization: a hope for a
permanence of the meaning of that outer-word, carried in particular kinds of
roles and tasks that comprise a divinely constituted community in which
Cosmopolis can be truly actuated. This would be the step that takes
McPartland's impressive and worthwhile integration to the next stage, and
beyond the limits ofVoegelin's own rich and insightful project.
McPartland's book reveals the power of authentic subjectivity in healing the
cultural and social rifts caused by the intellectual dialectic of the two positions
on knowledge, and the historical supremacy of the confrontational view of
knowledge in many modern and postmodern versions of life and history. The
method of self-appropriation that Lonergan espouses and McPartland utilizes
facilitates a restoration of metaphysics and a hermeneutic that grounds a
metaphysics of development, which in turn becomes a powerful tool for rejecting
historicism while maintaining both historicity and normativity.
McPartland's integration of metaphysics into the philosophy of history is
encouraging on its own terms. Metaphysics is one of the topics that has been
somewhat neglected in studies of Lonergan's writings over the years, perhaps
because its fullest treatment arises in the second half of Insight, and many are
only beginning to penetrate the significance of that second half. Yet Lonergan
apparently wished in his last days that he had spent more time emphasizing
metaphysics. In his earlier days, he had been consumed by the formulation of a
metaphysics of history. Many outside of Lonergan circles or those who never
took any classes with him would probably be surprised to discover that he had
said anything extensive on metaphysics. To many, he is a Transcendental
Thomist or a neo-Kantian Thomist, and this usually means attention to the
subject and ignorance of the object. Yet Lonergan's notion of metaphysics
restores the validity of that science in the face of a modern world that has
converted it into a treatment of angels and strange phenomena. It is a welcome
sign to see that Lonergan's notion of metaphysics is introduced into
McPartland's discussion of historical existence.
On a number of minor points and one or two major ones, I would raise
questions about McPartland's position on the human subject, on metaphysics,
and on Cosmopolis; however, as he repeatedly asserts, the real issue is the
project of human life and that project has its roots in the primordial question
seeking the ultimate answer. This book and the solutions it offers to a plethora
of persistent philosophical and cultural deformations of soul and society merits
serious consideration by philosophers and historians. Complement this analysis
of the deformations both with the ineptitude of those deformed souls at
reversing counter-positions and with a hope for a Divine solution and the result
would be a more complete account of historical existence. Then complement it
with the actual Divine solution and the result would give Cosmopolis a solid

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hope for a real effective participation in the stewardship of historical existence
by a wisdom that is both functionally specialized and ordained by the Divine
entrance into the world mediated by meaning.
DAVID FLEISCHACKER
Mount Marty College
Yankton, South Dakota

The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's German Sermons.
By BRUCE MILEM. Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2002. Pp ix+ 192. $44.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-8132-1019-4.

Meister Eckhart's life and works continue to fascinate scholars, religious
people, non-Christians, and even atheists. His texts, both in Latin and in his
elegantly expressive Middle High German, have received much academic
attention on both sides of the Atlantic and indeed worldwide. The interpretation
of his treatises and sermons depends to a great extent upon the
interpreter-scholars, Christians, Buddhists, etc. All seem to find some basis for
their own beliefs or a connection to their opinions in the writings of the Master.
The effort to unearth the riches of his teachings has produced some bizarre
conclusions. In this book, Bruce Milem makes an effort to place Eckhart's use of
negative theology in a broader context and succeeds in reminding any interpreter
of Eckhart's writings of some essential facts which, if ignored, lead to very
strange interpretations of the Master's theology and method.
According to the title, Milem is presenting to the scholarly community a study
of negative theology in Meister Eckhart's German sermons. However, it seems
that he relegates this goal to a place of secondary importance. Instead, he
proposes to describe "a new way of reading Meister Eckhart's sermons" (4).
Milem argues that "instead of stating doctrine or describing mystical experience,
Eckhart ... primarily involves his audience in a complex interpretive exercise by
deliberately giving difficult sermons that emphasize their own status as products
of language. The sermons' self-referential quality opens the door to thinking
about the relation between the sermons and the divine truths they claim to
articulate" (ibid.).
As a starting point, Milem considers Eckhart's own agenda, using the famous
quotation from German sermon 53 (Misit Dominus) and from which the title of
this study derives: "God is a word, an unspoken word." He concludes that "any
consideration of [Eckhart's] preaching must begin with the problems raised by
God's ineffability" (5), and goes on to pose a very important question: "If divine
nature is truly unspeakable and ineffable, how can Eckhart even name it, let
alone say something about it?" (6). To grapple with this issue he makes use of

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329

Michael A. Sells's Mystical Language of Unsaying. In using Sells's theory
regarding any possibility of using human language to speak of the utterly
transcendent, he returns to Eckhart's sermon and asks: "What does it mean to
call God an ineffable, unspoken word? What kind of word is this, and why is it
unspoken?" (8). Milem employs this use of interrogative technique throughout
his study to do exactly what he claims Eckhart is up to in his sermons. Eckhart
wanted to get the hearers of his sermon to think, to be actively engaged in the
sermon and to be challenged by its difficulties. He wanted "to transform their
understanding of themselves and God" (150). Milem takes his readers along the
same path by constantly posing multiple questions in order to engage the reader's
mind in the difficulties of Eckhart's thought. He wants the reader to think of
Eckhart's teachings according to his own methodology so that they will
understand Eckhart, his method, and his message in a new way.
Surprisingly, Milem also uses the drama theory of Bertolt Brecht (1898-1956)
to conclude something about Eckhart's preaching method. Both authors,
operating within the limits of their creative works, had a primarily didactic
purpose in mind. According to Milem, an appreciation of Brecht's use of an
.alienation effect (Verfremdungseffekt) helps the modern reader understand the
sermons in a new way. "Eckhart wanted his audience to remember that they [the
sermons] were being given by a human being in time" (12). He continues this
comparison: "Strange though it may seem, Eckhart's sermons are like dramatic
performances, where one focuses not only on what the actors say, but also on
what they do and how they interact with each other" (15). This intrusion of the
theatrical into the homiletic moment seems far more Brechtian than Eckhartian.
From Eckhart we have nothing but texts, no description of his sermon delivery
that would support any comparison to Brecht's carefully crafted stage directions
to achieve the desired alienation effect. This may apply, however, in a merely
verbal sense as when Eckhart seems almost to shout "Now understand me
correctly!" in Sermon 16b or "And now see and pay heed!" in Sermon 2, and as
at the conclusion of Sermon 52, where he seems even dismissive. Eckhart
delivered highly complex and theological sermons to a congregation of learned
individuals-<>therwise they would be pointless, for no ordinary person would
have a chance of understanding his message. The ordinary man in the pew would
take Eckhart's admonition not to worry about it quite seriously. Brecht addresses
all levels of society and by the use of various alienation techniques he keeps his
audiences thinking (so the theory goes) and hopes to accomplish his didactic
purposes. The other function of the Brechtian alienation technique is to prevent
the audience from identifying or sympathizing with the characters precisely to
force the members of the audience to concentrate solely on the didactic,
propagandistic message. Such a function clearly shows the deficiencies of Marxist
anthropology, for it reduced human beings to the status of mere rational
creatures without any affective or emotional lives.
Regarding methodology, the author offers reasons why he has chosen German
sermons and not Latin: "But I believe the best way to proceed is to treat the
Latin and German halves of his work separately and to examine his activity in

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each before asking how the two halves fit together. Only in taking them
separately at first can one be reasonably sure of discovering their true
relationship" (17). That makes sense since this is really about the methodology
of four German sermons rather than a study of negative theology that would
automatically entail the use of all of Eckhart's writings pertinent to the topic.
Even though Milem adamantly limits his study to four German sermons, his
analysis and discussion prove to be quite interesting.
Milem devotes a chapter each to four German sermons: 52 (Beati pauperes
spiritu), 2 (lntravit Jesus), 16b (Quasi vas auri so/idem), and 6 (justi vivent in
aeternum). Before he begins consideration of each sermon in turn, he makes a
statement about Eckhart's method: "Eckhart speaks as he does to get his listeners
started on thinking about themselves in relation to the divine, a process that
ideally should arrive at the mystery that God is both one with and distinct from
all creatures, including sermons and their interpreters" (21). Sermon 52
"functions as a sort of image of the soul" (19) that is both caught in time and yet
has an eternal destiny. Eckhart seeks to explain the paradoxes inherent in human
existence by using the image as a way of being able to speak of the soul as both
united to and separate from God. Milem continues this consideration of
paradoxes in his analysis of Sermon 2, where he discusses the critical use of
images as being necessary. In Sermon 16b he writes of the image and claims that
an image clearly reveals its dependence on its source rather than accurately
reproducing its source (20). Jesus is the image of the invisible God, the Word
made flesh who reveals the Father, for whoever sees Jesus sees the Father. The
complexity of the proper ways of speaking of Jesus' nature and his relation to the
other persons of the blessed Trinity offers a paradigm for speaking about the
human person as the image of God. In discussing Sermon 6 Milem asserts "the
understanding of the image affects his notion of justice by which he means ideal
Christian practice" (20).
Milem devotes his final chapter to Eckhart's preaching and modestly asserts
that his conclusions "must be tentative" (143) precisely because he has
considered only four of possibly 120 sermons. The four sermons focus on three
topics: "the relationship between God and other beings, whether and how
humans can know God, and the shape and rationale of Christian practice and
action" (144). Here Milem considers the maelstrom of paradoxes produced from
the sermons of the Meister-paradoxes that intentionally force the listener to
grapple with the sometimes outrageous assertions of the preacher. The goal of
Eckhart's methodology had to do with getting the "listeners to transform their
understanding of themselves and God" (150).
Milem deftly makes use of all the sources one would expect in a study of
Meister Eckhart. Clearly the topic has caused him to become immersed in the
scholarship and to think deeply about Eckhart's sermons "that even now make
one wonder what was going on when he preached" (160). This results in a
careful study that places the varied readings of Eckhart's theology-from
incomprehensible Christian mystic to atheistic Zen practitioner-into its true
context. One can really wonder at God as the "unspoken word" and pursue a

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331

course of negative theology only after God has spoken the word. The paradoxes
that Eckhart preaches come out of the inherent paradoxes of Christian truths. It
took the Church centuries to formulate anything accurate, incomplete as the
Nicene Creed may be, about the identity of Jesus, who is both tme God and tme
Man, born in time and yet eternal, God from God, Light from Light, true God
from true God, begotten, not made, one in being with the Father, etc. The
Fathers of the early ecumenical councils produced a creedal statement of tmth
expressed, believed, and affirmed while acknowledging that there is much more
that cannot be expressed about God. God has revealed himself through his
Word, Jesus Christ, and through the inspired texts, and yet remains shrouded in
transcendent mystery, unable to be grasped completely by human knowing.
This interesting study could have been improved by the inclusion of complete
new translations of the German sermons considered here. The quotations used
to illustrate the author's point differ enough from any text available that a
complete translation would have been very useful. The conclusion of Sermon 6
illustrates the difference in translation and therefore in interpretation. Eckhart's
conclusion, in Middle High German, runs "Daz wir die gerehticheit minnen
<lurch sich selben und got ane warumbe." Milem translates this as, "That we love
justice through itself and God without why." By contrast, the translation
contained in Meister &khart: The Essential Sermons, Commentaries, Treatises,
and Defense reads, "That we may love justice for its own sake and for God,
without asking return." A complete text of the four sermons also would have
allowed the reader to experience Eckhart's style and wonder about the effects
the sermon would have had on Eckhart's congregation. It would have permitted
the reader to place each sermon in its own context so that the power of Eckhart's
words, the flow of his logic, and the impact of his shocking statements may have
their full effect. The challenges of the original delivery for a congregation that
knows that the Word was spoken at and in creation, that the Word became flesh
and dwelt among us, and yet hears Eckhart proclaim that God is a word-an
unspoken word--can impact the modern reader as well.
LEONARD P. HINDSLEY

Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgr. E. A Synan. Edited by R. E.
HOUSER. Houston: Center for Thomistic Studies, 1999. Pp. 287. $15 .00
(paper). ISBN 0-268-04214-4.
Edward A. Synan (1918-97), while a praelatus honorarius, was generally
addressed by his students as Father Synan. At the time of his sudden death on 3

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August 1997 he was a senior Fellow Emeritus of the Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Stidies, Toronto and a Professor Emeritus in the Department of
Philosophy, University of Toronto. He began his thirty-eight-year career at
Toronto in 1959 and he served as President of the Institute from 1973 to 1979,
and again as
president in 1989 and 1990. A native of New Jersey, and
graduate of Seton HaH, he studied at Louvain and then contirmed studies at
Toronto under Etienne Gilson and Anton C. Pegis, earning a Ph.D. and a
Licentiate in Mediaeval Studies in 1951. Before coming to Toronto he held a
chair of philosophy at Seton Hall (1952-59) and became associated there with
Msgr. John Oesterreicher in the promotion of Christian-Jewish relations, His
first book, in 1965, was The Popes and the Jews in the Middle Ages, and he went
on to produce a number of other specialized mediaeval studies.
Such details fail to depict the man his :students remember as a person who was
a charming conversationalist as well as an exciting preacher, and a friend who
supported them through their graduate studies. These eleven essays
Synan's
former students are an offering of tribute to their beloved teacher. M. Jean
Kitchel, in "'Remembering Synan," offers her personal reminiscences of the
numerous times Fr. Syn2ln befriended her when she was a beginning
student. Her account of his many generosities to her reflects the kind of person
he was to his many students. The remaining ten essays are more technical pieces.
fo most cases they were probably b21Sed on the specialized doctoral research of
their authors, often less-well-known masters of mediaeval thought.
Jorge J. E. Gracia, in his "Metaphysical Epistemological a.'1d Linguistic
Approaches to Universals: Porphyry, Borethius, and Abaila1rd,"' studies the
treatment of universals. He shows the conventional interpretation of the history
of philosophy, according to which it developed over the centuries from an
emphasis on the metaphysical to the epistemological to the linguistic in the
contemporary times is inaccurate since the early medieval work of the authors
he studies involved aU three approaches. For Gracia the mettaphysical is the basic
and primary way.
David Twetten examines" Albert the Great's Early Conflations of Philosophy
and Theology on the Issue of Universal Causality." He shows how Albert
changed his position with respect to the roles of
and theology,
reflecting the situation in the early thirteenth century as the writings of Aristotle
and his Arabian commentators were beoowing better known and having their
impact on the work of the Christi.an d1.eologians.
Timothy B. Noone contrasts the thought of Bonaventure and Scorns, both
Franciscans, on the theory of knowledge. He shows there was a movement from
Bonaventure's use of Augustinian illumination to the moderate realism of Scotus,
who had to take into account the work of Henry of Ghent. "One must condude
that Scorus's epistemology is in fundamerntal rontirmity with that of Thomas
Aquinas, although the focus of ScoW!S's own thought is the doctrine of Henry
Ghent."
R, E. Houser, the editor of this volume, contributes a lengthy examination of
"Bonaventure's Three-Fold Way to God." He shows that Bonaventure used

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333

different approaches to the demonstration of the existence of God. Well aware
of the logical requirements presented by Aristotle, Bonaventure had a certain
enthusiasm for the approach of Anselm which Houser prefers to call the
"noetilogical" rather than the Kantian "ontological." He shows Bonaventure
working to present a more effective version of Augustinian illumination as well
as a cosmological argument (effect to cause) which Houser calls "aitiological,"
using transcendental Truth as the starting point. The argument reminds one of
Aquinas's fourth way, since it concludes via a theory of participation in a God
who is Truth Itself, and consequently Being Itself.
Richard C. Taylor examines" Averroes' Epistemology and Its Critique by
Aquinas." Those familiar with the De Unitate Intellectus contra Averroistas will
find the essay gives a more sympathetic treatment of Averroes, especially on
there being one "material intellect" for all men. Taylor shows an extraordinary
command of primary and secondary sources relating to Averroes, and his essay
is a challenge to those who believed Aquinas had achieved victory in interpreting
Aristotle's De Anima.
In "Creation, Numbers, and Nature: On Aquinas's Quodlibet 8, 1.1." Kevin
:white shows how a challenging question asked at a session of disputed questions
can lead to the most profound metaphysical analysis. The question was whether
the number six is the Creator or a creature. A perfect number is one that is the
sum of all its factors (as, e.g., six is the sum of one, two, and three). Moreover,
six was the subject of some reflection since Genesis tells us God created
everything in six days. This essay leads us into an investigation of the being of
natures, and how they exist in creatures, in God, and in themselves.
Barry F. Brown, in "Act, Potency and the Real Distinction of Essence and
Existence in Aquinas," reviews this basic topic of Thomistic metaphysics and
how we came to know this distinction-and whether or not it is a first principle.
The essay is an interesting examination also of how actuality is limited by the
potency it actualizes and how this relates to the metaphysics of participation. It
is one of the most readable papers in the series.
In "Love of Friendship and the Perfection of Finite Reasons," Janice L.
Schultz undertakes an analysis of Aquinas' amor amicitae, "love of friendship,"
and argues against a paper by David Gallagher that only a moral love is faithful
to St. Thomas's understanding of that love. "But essential to true self-love is
setting aside self-indulgence as the criterion of behavior, which must be
accompanied by the acceptance of a moral standard to which the self is
subordinate." Only a morally ordered love of friendship can further our
perfection as persons.
R. James Long takes up the topic of" Aquinas and the Cosmic Christ," which
leads to an examination of whether Christ, as the Second Person of the Trinity,
would have become incarnated as a human if Adam had not sinned. Did Christ
come because he chose to redeem mankind for the sin of Adam, or would he
have become incarnate had there been no original sin? Long studies the texts of
Aquinas relating to this question and finds him responding in the negative.

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Mary Catherine Summers examines "Walter Burley: A Student of John Duns
Scorns?" and in doing so explores the early fourteenth century, a period so often
neglected by those who judge that medieval thought pea.Iced in the thirteenth
century. An odd tradition held that Burley had been a student of Scotus, and
then later came to oppose him. Summers judges that Burley "'heard" Scorns
lecture at Oxford early in his student career, was influenced by him, but when
in his own professional career he came to consider the limits of what can be
known
natural reason (exduding revelation), his conclusion reflected more
the influence of Henry of Ghent than that of Scotus.
This coUection of essays does honor to Fr. Synan and is another fine
contribution to the series of Thomistic Papers published by the University of St.
Thomas Center fo:r Thomistic Studieso
DESM01'11DJ. FITZGERALD

University
Francisco
San Francisco, California