The Thomist 69 (2005): 173-201

IS UNIQUENESS AT THE ROOT OF PERSONAL DIGNITY?
JOHN CROSBY AND THOMAS AQUINAS
STEPHEN L BROCK
Pontifical University of the Holy Cross
Rome, Italy

P

ERSONS ARE INDIVIDUALS that exist for their own sake,
not just for the use or benefit of some other. This truth,
which I shall call the principle of personal dignity, has become so much of a commonplace in our culture that there may
seem no need to defend it. And yet, there is anything but
consensus about its concrete implications-about which ways of
treating persons are and are not consonant with their dignity. This
is evident in the ongoing, sometimes acrimonious debates over
such issues as euthanasia or capital punishment.
No doubt this lack of consensus has many causes, not all of
which are matters for philosophy. But personal dignity itself is
certainly a philosophical matter; and despite the general agreement about it, we cannot simply assume that we understand it
perfectly. If we did, its implications would probably be dearer.
What exactly does being for one's own sake consist in? And just
what is it about persons that gives them this status? These are
metaphysical questions. It belongs to metaphysics to refine our
understanding of principles, by getting at the "ontology" that
underlies them, their basis "in the things themselves."
Some years ago, John Crosby published a broad study of the
person entitled The Selfhood of the Human Person.1 The book's
second chapter, called "Incommunicability," is aimed at
1 John F. Crosby, The Selfhood of the Human Person (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1996); cited hereinafter by page number alone.

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establishing personal dignity in a rigorous way. 2 Its thesis is that
the dignity of persons rests chiefly upon what Crosby terms their
"incommunicable selfhood." The expression is technical. But what
it means, put in plain language, is nearly as much of a commonplace as the principle of personal dignity itself. It is just what it
says on the back of the book: "each person is unique and
unrepeatable." There is something solemn about the pronouncement. It stirs our sense of how precious each of us is.
Crosby's thesis, then, certainly has an initial appeal. Of course
he is not just repeating commonplaces. His task is philosophical.
It is the best effort I know to set forth this special, personal
uniqueness in a precise and publicly verifiable way, and to show
clearly how it makes each person to be, as he puts it, "incommunicably his or her own. "3
In this article I wish both to draw attention to a number of
very valuable points in Crosby's treatment, and to maintain that,
despite these, the true basis of personal dignity must be something
other than the sort of uniqueness that he proposes. I shall first try
to show, partly on Crosby's own grounds, that his argument for
the existence of this uniqueness is unsuccessful {sections I-IV).
Then I shall argue (section V) that while the dignity of personstheir being for their own sake-does mean that they are irreplaceable in a way that other individuals are not, this
irreplaceability is not a function of uniqueness; nor is it the very
basis of the dignity, but rather the result thereof.
My discussion relies heavily on the metaphysics of St. Thomas.
I do not believe that it is therefore alien to Crosby's way of
2 Much of this chapter appeared previously as an article in The Thomist: John F. Crosby,
"The Incommunicability of Human Persons," The Thomist 57 (1993): 403-42.
3 In a recent paper Crosby has returned to the defense of his thesis: "A Neglected Source
of the Dignity of Persons," in John F. Crosby, Personalist Papers (Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 3-32. As I read it, the paper has two main aims:
first, to show that over and above common rational nature, a sufficient account of the dignity
of persons must also include their incommunicability; and second, to resolve certain
difficulties regarding the relation between the incommunicability and the common nature. As
regards the basic argument for the existence of the incommunicability, however, the paper
does not seem to add significantly to the earlier treatment. (On p. 12, n. 8, he refers us to
chapter 2 of the 1996 book.) I shall not, therefore, be discussing it at any length.

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thinking. On the contrary, Crosby regards Thomas as an
important, if insufficient, source for the philosophy of personal
dignity; and in my judgment Thomas upholds the "priority of
persons" even more strongly than Crosby realizes. I do not think
Crosby fully appreciates the nature or the magnitude of the
difference in worth that exists, for Thomas, between persons and
everything else.4 But if we understand this difference in the way
that Thomas suggests, I think we can see that uniqueness has
nothing to do with it.

I. CROSBY: EACH PERSON EXISTS "AS IF THE ONLY ONE"
One very helpful facet of Crosby's discussion is the fact that he
distinguishes between various types of uniqueness and shows how
many of these do not constitute a basis for properly personal
dignity. The most obvious of these is the uniqueness that belongs
to all individual entities, as such: the fact of not being predicable
of many (46f.). In this sense, although it is obviously true that
every person is unique, such uniqueness confers no special value.
Just as there are not and cannot be many beings that are Socrates,
there also cannot be many beings that are the dog Lassie, or many
that are Mount Everest, or many that are the copy of today's
newspaper lying on my coffee table. But of course there are other
copies of today's newspaper, just like this one. And we can at least
imagine another mountain of the same size and shape and makeup
as Everest, and even another dog just like Lassie. The personal
uniqueness that Crosby is looking for is far removed from what
we might call mere "numerical" uniqueness. It is more in the line
of what we could call "formal" uniqueness, being "one of a kind."
However, as Crosby shows well, not just any way of being
"one of a kind" will establish personal dignity. It is not hard to
conceive sets or classes that can have only one member, but do
not indicate any special value: "the last dinosaur," "the only
daughter of the Smiths," "the first book written by Husserl" (65).
Moreover, in each of these examples, the feature making the item
4 See below, n. 22.

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unique is quite accidental to it. There was probably nothing in the
last dinosaur itself that made it have to be the last one. What we
are seeking is a value that is intrinsic to the person.
Not just any unique and intrinsic value will serve. Crosby also
sets aside those sorts of features that do indicate some intrinsic
value, and that would be at least practically impossible to repeat,
but that pertain only to the realm of abilities, achievements, and
so forth: the sort of uniqueness belonging to "great personalities"
(68-70). This is an important point. We do not have to suppose
that every person makes a unique or outstanding "contribution"
to the world-as though, if no category were overlooked, every
person would find his or her way into the book of world records.
Even if this were true, it would not establish the person's value as
one who exists just for his or her own sake. It would only
establish the value of something that the person has-some quality
or work. What we are seeking is something else: the value
pertaining to the very subject, the person himself or herself, in his
or her sheer "selfhood." Crosby says:
In our new personalist perspective it would not only be qualities and excellences

but rather also the subject of them, the one who has them, this or that particular
human being, which would stand before us as worthy, good. Now for the first
time the value datum called the dignity of the human person would appear, and
it would appear as rooted in incommunicable selfhood. . . . Love for other
persons would also become possible for the first time, for it would now be
possible to reach with our love beyond the qualities of persons and to attain to
the persons themselves. (66)

What then is this "incommunicable selfhood," this properly
personal uniqueness, that grounds personal dignity? Crosby sees
it as the absolute version of something that is also found in
qualified ways, and in diverse grades, among certain nonpersonal
beings-that is, the living ones. Looking at these helps us bring it
into focus (47-49).
If we observe any living thing, even a plant, we find that it has
what Crosby calls a kind of "inner center" out of which it exists
and operates. The living being is not just a passive bearer of
"superficial" perfections, perfections that merely "happen" to it

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from the outside, as in the case of the bits of paper that carry
today's news. The organization and growth of a tree derive from
a source within the tree itself. This source is not a bodily part
"inside" the tree. It determines the very unity and order among
the tree's parts and their movements. It is what once went by the
name of 'soul'.
This inner center is even stronger in the case of living things
that also have cognition. In these, the center itself is capable of
enrichment and development. There are things "going on" in
Lassie's soul (e.g., her pleasures and pains). These are what used
to be called "immanent" acts, acts remaining "at the source,"
within the subject, from which they proceed. Through such acts,
Lassie relates in much more diversified and significant ways with
other beings in the world than do things that lack cognition.
When we turn to persons, we find an inner center that is
immeasurably richer and deeper. Much of Crosby's book is
devoted to exploring its various aspects. At this point in the book,
what he wants us to observe is simply the immensity of it. There
is something unconditional about it, a kind of "absoluteness" and
"infinity." The idea is not unfamiliar. It is the person's "unfathomable depth," the "infinite abyss of existence" that Newman
describes so eloquently (52).5
What requires more explanation is the connection between this
idea and that of uniqueness or incommunicability. As Crosby
acknowledges, it might seem as though this "absoluteness" or
'infinity" does not pertain so much to incommunicability as to
another feature of the person, namely, the especially high degree
to which he is a whole of his own and not just a part (50). 6 But
Crosby argues that in the person wholeness and uniqueness come
together. We might say that they converge at infinity. "This
absoluteness or infinity seems almost to coincide. with personal
incommunicability," for it means that each person has "so strong
5 Crosby cites John Henry Newman, "The Individuality of the Soul," ParochialAnd Plain
Sermons (London: Rivingtons, 1869), 81-83.
6 We may recall how St. Thomas understands the meaning of the word 'person': it signifies
"that which is most perfect" -most complete, most whole- "in the whole of nature" (STh I,
q. 29, a 3).

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a being of his own that he exists as if in a sense the others did not
exist" (51; emphasis in original).
This is the crucial notion. Crosby returns to it time and again.
Each person exists "as if there were no other," "as if he or she
were the only one," etc. This would be the special incommunicability or uniqueness that is proper to persons, and
which, unlike the other types of uniqueness, would match with
their personal dignity: to exist as if there were no other. 7
Of course Crosby does not mean that each person literally is
"the only one"; it is "as if," or even (in the case of created
persons) "almost" as if (248). He insists that his formula neither
implies solipsism nor in any way excludes interpersonal
communion (54-58). But to relate to others precisely as persons
is to encounter each of them "in his or her infinity, as if he or she
were the only person" (54-55). He quotes Buber on the Thou:
"with no neighbour, and whole in himself, he is Thou and fills the
heavens. This does not mean that nothing exists except himself.
But all else lives in his light" (55). 8
For Crosby, then, the expression "existing as if the only one,"
rightly understood, conveys a solid truth about persons.
Particularly noteworthy is the rigorous formulation that he gives
to it (49f.): namely, that persons are not subject to the "laws of
finite numerical quantity."
The thought is this. The units in a number are smaller than the
number, parts of a whole; and each is so much the smaller, the
larger the number. But persons, in their infinity, are not lessened
or relativized by any number of others. Even if the supply goes up,
we might say, the value of each stays the same. In this sense, each
is so great as to exist as if there were no other. Crosby takes this
resistance to "numbering" quite seriously. He quotes Guardini:
The one who says "I" exists only once. This fact is so radical that the question
arises whether the person as such can really be classified, or what the
classifications must be in order that man may be placed in them as a person. Can
7 See also Crosby, "A Neglected Source of the Dignity of Persons," 16-17.
8 The quotation

1958), 100.

is from Martin Buber, I and Thou (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons,

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we-to take an elementary form of classification--count persons? We can count
Gestalten, individuals, personalities-but can we, while doing justice to the
concept of "person," speak meaningfully of "two persons"? ... Here reason
balks. (51) 9

Crosby notes that these considerations might lead to an argument for the presence of something immaterial in the being of
persons (52-53). Material things are extended in space, and so
subject to the laws of finite numerical quantity. Two of them are
more than one, four more than two; and if the number is very
great, any single unit is practically negligible. It seems that only
what is immaterial or spiritual can escape those laws.
Similarly, as regards "classification," Crosby suggests that we
might look for a unique "essential content" in each human person,
rather like what St. Thomas holds for in the case of the pure
spirits, the angels. Just as each angel is his own species, so too,
perhaps, each human person is a species of his or her own, a
veritable subspecies of mankind (63-64).
II. OBJECTION: THE ONE TRUE WORLD

Clearly the analysis upon which Crosby bases his theory of the
unrepeatability and incommunicability of the person contains
important elements for the account of personal dignity. In my
opinion, however, the decisive affirmation-that each person
exists as if (or almost as if) he or she were the only one-is simply
not true. Even taking into account all of Crosby's clarifications
and qualifications, it does not seem to me that this is at all how
personhood, and especially human personhood, presents itself.
Several objections might be raised, I think. One of them comes
from Crosby himself.
In a later chapter, entitled "Subjectivity and Objectivity,"
Crosby devotes several fine pages to what he calls the
"transcendence towards a certain infinity" that displays itself in
human subjectivity (161-73). This transcendence is something
9

The quotation is from Romano Guardini, The World and the Person (Chicago: Regnery,

1965), 215-16.

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more than the familiar transcendence of "intentional" acts (i.e.,
directedness toward objects). It consists in a tension toward what
lies even "beyond" the objects surrounding us. Crosby describes
it as a "passion for ultimacy," a "metaphysical" passion. Here
(166) he cites Aristotle's famous description of the intellectual
soul as "in a certain way all things. " 10 He associates this transcendence with the distinctively human concern for relating to
things just as they are in themselves, or in other words, the desire
for truth).
Other animals, Crosby says, dwell in "environments." They do
relate to other things, but only within the horizon of particular
impulses and desires. By contrast, human beings dwell--or at least
have an urge to dwell-in the "world," the totality of all that is.
And while there may be different "environments" for different
animals, he says, "there is only one world" (166).
At the same time, it is not the case that human persons can
"encompass and exhaust" the totality (167). They do not master
the world. The passion for ultimacy is an infinite "need" (164).
Crosby might have quoted Aristotle again: the soul, by itself, is
only "potentially" all things.
Crosby is pointing again, from another angle, to the person's
wholeness and infinite depth.
We can discern a "correspondence" between each person being a whole of his
own and never a mere part ... on the one hand, and each person being open to
the totality of all that is, on the other. That we are wholes and not parts is
somehow expressed and lived whenever we inhabit the world and do not let
ourselves be confined by some environment. (168) 11

Crosby sees this transcendence toward "the world" as an eminently personal characteristic. "We could in fact 'define' personal
10 Aristotle, De anima 3.8.431b20.

11 He continues:

"It is the mark of a non-person to have its whole being in some limited
region of the world, whereas persons can surpass every regional limitation and live in
openness to the totality. St. Thomas makes this point in arguing that God governs human
beings for their own sakes (Summa contra gentiles III, 112); one of his atgurnents is based on
the fact that the soul, as Aristotle said, is in a sense all things. He seems to mean that worldopen beings can only be persons, and must be treated as persons, even by divine providence."

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subjectivity in terms of our directedness to the totality; we could
say that personal subjectivity is that depth of inwardness in a
living being which opens the being to the absolute realm of all
that is" (169). It is proof of the person's dignity (168).
I have no quarrel with this account of the human person's
transcendence. It does indeed suggest some kind of affinity between the human person and the "totality of aU that is." But does
it not also mean that the person is distinct from the totality, and
that, in the final analysis, he is exceeded by it? Surely the implication is that the human person is, after all, some sort of part. Even
if he need not be part of a mere "environment" -a part of a part,
so to speak-he is at least part of the world as a whole. And he is
so qua person. For again, this need for totality is no mere
biological or emotional impulse. It is a strictly personal need.
That it is also a need for truth underscores another fact: the
one world toward which it directs me is not "my" world. I do not
decide its constitution. We may recall Augustine: I find the light
of truth "in" me, but it is not "my" light. It is independent of me
and exceeds me.
In short, it is my very personhood, with its passion for
ultimacy, that convinces me that I am not the only one, not the
whole world; not even almost. It convinces me that not all "lives
in my light." Not even I myself live in my own light. It is surprising that Crosby does not perceive at least a tension here.
This objection may not be positively fatal to Crosby's notion
of the person's existing "as if the only one." Perhaps he could find
a way to resolve it. But in any case, as I shall try to explain in the
conclusion, on Thomas's account of personal dignity, it is not
even an objection. Furthermore, there are other, even graver
objections to Crosby's account. These will be the concern of the
following two sections.
IH. THE UNDERLYING ISSUE: CAN PERSONS BE COUNTED?

Crosby's crucial move, in establishing his notion of personal
incommunicability, is from the infinite depth of the person to the

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person's existing as if he were the only one. Is this move really
valid? The argument is that insofar as a person is a kind of
infinity, he escapes the laws of finite numerical quantity. His
immensity makes him incommensurable with others. Crosby thus
argues that each person is incomparable. Even if there are in fact
many persons, they cannot, qua persons, be grouped together and
counted as so many parts of the group. They can only, as it were,
be viewed one at a time.
I would submit that it is a fallacious argument. The person's
infinity does not necessarily imply that he cannot be compared
with others. The implication can be avoided by doing just what
Crosby suggests: thinking of the infinity as something immaterial.
If we do think of it in a material way-as an infinite mass of
something, an infinite extension-then indeed, we may be led to
imagine something whose presence will monopolize our whole
field of vision, something that will "fill the heavens" for us if we
see it at alL But if it is an immaterial infinity, then this is only a
metaphor. Arguing from metaphors is risky.
It is not that notions of quantity or magnitude have no proper
application to immaterial things. But as St. Thomas teaches,
immaterial "magnitude" is not a question of mass or extension. It
is a question of perfection (STh I, q. 42, a. 1, ad 1). The great
magnitude of the intellectual soul, for example-its capacity to
"take in" all things-is not a power to eat all things. It is a power
to assimilate the "forms," the truths of things. It is indeed great.
Nevertheless, even if a person did succeed in containing the whole
world in this way-even if he knew all truth-there would be no
reason to think of him as "the only one" to do so. For unlike
bodily goods, a spiritual good, such as truth, can be communicated to many subjects without being divided up (SI'h I-II, q. 28,
a. 4, ad 2; III, q. 23, a. 1, ad 3). We do not have to vie for slices
of truth about the world, even though we are many and the world
is one.
Likewise, the fact that a person remains "'immense" even in the
presence of others does not exclude the possibility of comparing

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him, qua person, with others. Guardini says that reason balks in
the face of counting persons. Saint Thomas does not balk at all.
To take the extreme case, Thomas thinks it perfectly reasonable to count the divine persons. Nor does he simply take the
possibility of counting them for granted. In fact he faces the
question of the "laws of numerical quantity" quite squarely.
Against counting divine persons, it is objected that "wherever
there is number, there is whole and part; so if in God there is a
number of persons, then in God whole and part must be posited,
which is repugnant to the divine simplicity" (STh I, q. 30, a. 1,
obj. 4). Thomas answers with a distinction:
number is twofold, viz. simple or absolute number, as two and three and four;
and the number that is in numbered realities, as two men and two horses.
if
the number in the divinity is taken absolutely or abstractly, nothing excludes
there being whole and part in it. And in this way it does not exist except in our
understanding; for number abstracted from numbered realities is only in the
mind. But if number is taken as it is in numbered realities, then indeed in
creatures, one is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two, and
two of three. But it is not so in God; for the Father is as much as the whole
Trinity. 12

This is a dense passage; it is worthwhile to spell it out a little.
Wherever there are numbered things, we can consider their
number absolutely, just by itself. This does not mean thinking that
the number exists just by itself. Numbers exist in reality only by
being attached to things that are not numbers. Pure, unattached
numbers "exist" only in the sense that they are objects of thought.
The mind can entertain a number in an abstract waymathematically-attending only to what pertains to its own ratio
or intelligibility.
u "Ad quartum dicendum quod numerus est duplex, scilicet numerus simplex vel
absolutus, ut duo et tria et quatuor; et numerus qui est in rebus numeratis, ut duo homines et
duo equi. Si igitur in divinis accipiatur numerus absolute sive abstracte, nihil prohibet in eo
esse totum et partem, et sic non est nisi in acceptione intellectus nostri; non enim numerus
absolutus a rebus numeratis est nisi in intellectu. Si autem accipiamus numerum prout est in
rebus numeratis, sic in rebus quidem creatis, unum est pars duorum, et duo trium, ut unus
homo duorum, et duo trium, sed non est sic in Deo, quia tantus est Pater quanta tota Trinitas"
(SI'h I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 4).

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In the ratio of a number, there is always whole and part. The
intelligibility of any number includes that of a single unit, and it
adds to this the intelligibility of another unit or other units.
Hence, in the mathematical consideration, a unit of a number is
always less than and part of the number: two units of three are
always less than and part of three, and so on. And the only way to
speak of whole and part in the pure number is with respect to its
intelligibility.
But if we ask about whole and part in a number as it really
exists, in numbered things, our question no longer concerns the
mere ratio of the number. It concerns the things, and it has to do
with their magnitude, for it pertains to the very intelligibility of
whole and part that a whole be greater than any of its parts.
Even in numbered things, of course, the mathematics of the
number will never positively rule out whole and part. But neither
is there any law of numbers that necessitates the existence of
whole and part in the things. This is so despite the fact that we
first grasp numerical intelligibilities in creatures, and that the
nature of creatures is such that one is always of lesser magnitude
than two, two always less than three, and so on. The mathematics
of the number abstracts altogether from the natures of the things
numbered. It holds even when the number is eventually applied
to realities of divine nature, realities in which there can be no talk
of whole and part. Each one of the three divine persons is an absolutely infinite perfection, to which nothing can be added to
form a greater whole. But, Thomas is saying, it is merely
incidental to this that the intelligibility of "three" adds something
to the intelligibility of "one."
Thomas's distinction between two senses of "number" is particularly significant. We count the divine persons, and we say that
they are a certain number: they are three. But of course we do not
mean that they are the pure number three. We mean that they are
a number of persons, three persons. In other words, counting
them does not mean treating them as abstract units. It does not at
all entail losing sight of their divine personhood. It only entails

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considering that each one of them has unity in himself, and that
each one is distinct from the other ones.
How are they distinct? Not, certainly, as species of a genus.
Each species of a genus adds its own proper perfection-its
differentia-to the common nature of the genus, and it gives that
nature a distinct existence. It would mean that each person is a
distinct God. The existence of a number of Gods is incompatible
with both the simplicity and the infinite perfection of the divine
nature (STh I, q. 11, a. 3). Each divine person must exist, not just
"as if," but really as, the one God. They are distinct from each
other only by the oppositions in their interrelations. 13
We should consider what this means: none of the persons is
even conceivable without the others. It is by the relations among
them that the divine persons are constituted (STh I, q. 40, a. 2).
For the Father to exist is for the Son to exist; they have a single
existence, that of the one God (STh I, q. 30, a. 4, ad 3; I, q. 42,
a. 4, ad 3). If we prescind from any two of the divine persons, the
third simply disappears from view.
I stress this because Crosby goes so far as to assert that from
the point of view of Christian belief, since each of the divine
persons has the whole perfection of the divine nature, which is
absolutely infinite, each of them displays the "personal incommunicability" that he is trying to establish. He says that "each
divine person has the divine nature as if he were the only divine
person" (58; emphasis in original [see also 252]). It seems to me
that from the point of view of Christian belief, this is just what
cannot be said. If anything, Trinitarian theology would seem to be
the most telling counterexample to the notion that a person exists
"as if the only one."
Thomas does grant that the infinity of each divine person
means that he is immeasurable. Only what is determined or finite
can be measured (cf. STh I, q. 7, a. 4; I, q. 14, a. 12, obj. 3). But
to number the persons, and to see each as one of many, is not to
measure them. In this numbering, what is finite and measured is,
13 On the fact that the relations do not introduce composition into the divinity, see STh I,
q. 28, aa. 1-3; I, q. 30, a. 1, ad 2; also I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 3.

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again, only the abstract number (STh I, q. 30, a. 2, ad 5).
Moreover, while it is true that the divine persons, being
immeasurable, are also incommensurable, this does not mean they
cannot be compared. Things need not be finite or measurable in
order to be compared. They need only have something in
common, in terms of which they can be considered together. The
divine persons have the divine essence in common. Thus they can
be counted, and they can even be compared as to magnitude.
Their magnitude, which is their perfection, is nothing other than
their essence; they are one in magnitude. That is, they are equal
(STh I, q. 42, a. 1). Thomas even says that they are one in dignity
(STh I, q. 42, a. 4, ad 2).
N. ANGELIC PERSONS: INFINITE IN MIND BUT FINITE IN KIND

Thomas insists often on the possibility of counting immaterial
realities. To explain it, he draws another distinction concerning
numbers, this time within the domain of number as found "in
numbered things." On this I shall mainly be following question
30, article 3 of the Prima Pars.
Number in numbered things is of two very different types. One
type pertains to the accidental category of quantity. It is formed
by the division of "the continuous," for example, cutting a pie
into a number of slices (see STh I, q. 50, a. 3, obj. 1 and ad 1).
This type of number is found only in material things subject to the
accident of extension. It can apply to immaterial beings, Thomas
says, only metaphorically.
There is another type of number in things that is "transcendental," not a function of any one category. It is "metaphysical," pertaining to being as being, as "one" and "many" do
(see STh I, q. 11, aa. 1and3). This type of number does not presuppose material extension in the things numbered. They need
not possess the accident of quantity, 14 for there is another type of
division, which is not with respect to quantity. Thomas calls it
H Thomas's point in STh I, q. 30, a. 3 is that although the threeness of the persons in God
is really in God, because the persons are really distinct, the threeness is not anything really
distinct from the persons themselves; it does not posit any accident in them.

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"formal" division. This division is not a matter of slicing something up. It is simply the distinction existing among opposite or
diverse forms. 15
This is how not only the divine persons, but also the angels,
which are subsistent forms, can be counted. Angels are highly
perfect beings, the best natures in all creation. For this very
reason, Thomas judges, their number must be very great (STh I,
q. 50, a. 3).
On the other hand, of course, the situation of angelic persons
is not exactly the same as that of the persons of the Trinity. In the
passage quoted earlier, Thomas says that in creatures, one really
is part of two, and two of three, as one man is part of two, and
two men part of three. A whole multitude of creatures is always
greater than any one of them. Even though individual angels are
not slices of an extended mass, they are still parts of a greater,
that is, more perfect, whole. This is because each of them, no
matter how perfect, is essentially finite.
This point is not, I believe, in contrast with the ascription of a
kind of infinity to any person, qua person. The infinity of persons
is in the depth of their capacity for immanent activity. This
capacity is what Crosby calls their subjectivity, and Thomas calls
their minds. But, as Crosby himself argues in the case of humans,
the person's subjectivity is something distinct from his very being
or his essential identity, his "selfhood." Crosby in fact sees in this
distinction a proof that a human person's selfhood is after all
something finite (124-44, 266-68).
For Thomas this point holds of angels too. The angel's mind
cannot be identical with his essential being, for the very reason
that mind is in a way infinite, extending somehow to all that is
(STh I, q. 54, a. 2). Absolutely speaking, according to his essential
being, the angel is a finite entity. He is a creature, and no creature
can have an infinite essence. That would mean that he contains in
himself all the perfection of being, and this is proper to God (STh
I, q. 7, a. 2; cf. I, q. 4, a. 2). The angel's essence is a determinate
This would include the relative properties of the persons of the Trinity, which "signify
in the mode of form." See SI'h l, q. 31, a. 2, ad 2; I, q. 39, a. 3, ad 4.
15

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

species, which is part of a determinate genus. And even the entire
genus of angels is only part of reality as a whole. Only in God is
essence not confined to a genus (STh I, q. 3, a. 5), and only there
are essence and mind identical (STh I, q. 14, aa. 2 and 4; I, q. 54,
a. 2). In a created being, the possession of mind makes for only a
qualified infinity. The intellectual creature is not infinite in
essence or in intrinsic perfection, but only in scope of operation.
We may also note that the fact that an angel is a species of a
genus means that not even the angelic nature is incommunicable
in every respect. The genus is communicable. Each angelic person
is one of a kind, but he does not exist as if he were the only angel
or the only angelic person. Moreover, because the angel's essential
form is determined to a species of a genus, his mind does not
possess its full knowledge of reality in virtue of his own form
alone. It needs additional intelligible forms, ideas infused by the
mind that creates the world (STh I, q. 55, aa. 1and2). Not even
an angel lives entirely "in his own light."
I am dwelling on the status of angelic persons in view of
Crosby's conjecture that in human persons there is something like
the essential incommunicability or uniqueness of angels. Thomas
does of course teach that since an angel's substance is nothing but
its form, each angel exhausts its species. But since the nature of its
species is something other than its mind or subjectivity, the
incommunicability of its species is also something other than the
infinite depth of its mind or its subjectivity. The properly personal
incommunicability that Crosby is trying to establish, the person's
existing as if the only one, would be rather a function of the
person's infinite depth. It is this incommunicability that he is
positing as the basis of personal dignity.
Thus, even if it could be shown that each human person is
unique in species, like an angel, I do not see how this uniqueness
would pertain directly to his or her properly personal dignity,
even in Crosby's own account. The dignity has to do with the
immensity of mind, its infinity. But the created person's species,
whether or not it is communicable, is a strictly finite reality. It is
one species among many. It is only a part of the world as a whole.

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I do not mean that the incommunicability of the angelic species
is totally unrelated to the angel's possession of mind. The angel's
species is incommunicable because its form exists separately from
matter, as a complete substance in its own right. The form is not
received in matter, and so the angel's species cannot be multiplied
by the division of matter. And having a nature that is not
"contracted" according to the conditions of matter, a spiritual
nature, is the very basis, in a substance, for the type of infinity
signified by the word "mind. " 16
However, Thomas's metaphysics also allows for forms that are
spiritual-not absolutely dependent upon matter for their
existence-and yet are not complete substances. They are
naturally ordered to being received in matter. Such forms are
human souls. The spirituality of the soul is what gives human
individuals powers that are "uncontracted" by matter, powers of
mind. It is what makes them personal individuals. Nevertheless
the substance of a human being is not wholly spiritual, 17 and, at
least in Thomas's metaphysics, only a being that is wholly spiritual
can be incommunicable in species. What gives a being its species
is its form, but if its nature also includes matter, then there is
nothing in it to prevent the existence of another being that differs
from it materially but not in species. This holds even if the forms
are spiritual.
The doctrine of matter as "principle of individuation" is not a
popular one. I think it is often misunderstood, 18 but I shall not go
16 See STh I, q. 14, a. 1; for helpful discussion, see Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "St. Thomas
and the Integration of Knowledge into Being," International Philosophical Quarterly 24
(1984): 383-93.
17 The very exercise of the human person's "subjectivity" or mind displays a corporeal
dimension as well. For it always involves operations of the senses, and careful analysis of these
shows that they are exercised by bodily organs (STh I, q. 75, a. 3). It is because the human
mind needs the help of the senses in order to bear well upon its own object that the soul by
nature needs the body (STh I, q. 89, a. 1). See Stephen L. Brock, "The Physical Status of the
Spiritual Soul in Thomas Aquinas," Nova et Vetera (English edition) 3 (2005): 231-58.
18 Crosby distances himself from" Aristotelian hylomorphism, at least in the interpretation
according to which a general form and individuating matter unite to form a concrete
substance" (43 n. 2). This is certainly not how Thomas interprets it. "The proper name of any
person," he says, "signifies that through which that person is distinguished from all the others.
For just as soul and body belong to the definition (ratio) of man, so this soul and this body

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into its details here. I would simply note that, for Thomas, it is
only because human beings do not differ in species that, in their
essential dignity, they can be judged equal. Difference in species
"always entails inequality. " 19 It is not easy to square the thesis of
the essential equality of human persons, which today is as much
of a commonplace as that of their dignity, with the idea that
personal dignity rests on uniqueness. 20
V. THE lRREPLACEABILITY OF PERSONS:
BECAUSE THEY ARE FOR THEIR OWN SAKE

None of the foregoing is meant to gainsay Crosby's ascription
of a kind of infinite depth to the person. This depth is indeed in
the line of what we are looking for as the basis of personal
dignity. What I have tried to show is simply that it is not in itself
grounds for saying that the person is unique, "as if the only one,"
and that essential or specific uniqueness, such as angels have, is
not directly to the point. We also noted that Crosby himself
rejects several other types of uniqueness. This itself leads one to
suspect that uniqueness is not really to the point.
But if we demur on the person's uniqueness or unrepeatability,
are we not inviting the thought that he could be replaced? That is,
if we do not exclude the possibility of another person just like this
one, what is to prevent us from saying that, at least in principle,
this one could simply be eliminated, with the other filling in for
him? Can a being be replaceable and yet exist for its own sake?
Probably not. I would argue, however, that a person's being for
belong to the identification (intellectus) of this man, as it says in Meta. VII; for it is by these
that this man is distinguished from all the others" (STh I, q. 33, a. 2). A little earlier he had
said, "Persona igitur, in quacumque natura, significat id quod est distinctum in natura ilia;
sicut in human natura significat has carnes et haec ossa et bane animam, quae sunt principia
individuantia hominem" (STh I, q. 29, a. 4).
19 STh I, q. 47, a. 2; cf. STh I, q. 75, a. 7. The point is that the differentiation is always by
addition or subtraction of some perfection. Each species constitutes a distinct grade of being.
2°Crosby argues that the very incomparability of persons makes them equal in dignity, by
excluding the possibility that one be greater or lesser in dignity than another (Crosby, "A
Neglected Source of the Dignity of Persons," 22-23). The number three is neither greater nor
less than the color blue; are they therefore equal?

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his own sake is independent of uniqueness; and that, for this very
reason, his being irreplaceable is independent of it too.
What is really involved in being for one's own sake? Crosby's
remark on the "personalist perspective" gives us a lead. 21 If we
had this perspective, he said, "it would not only be qualities and
excellences but rather also the subject of them, the one who has
them, this or that particular human being, which would stand
before us as worthy, good"; and then we could "reach with our
love beyond the qualities of persons" and "attain to the persons
themselves."
Saint Thomas makes this move quite explicitly. Nor for him is
it simply a matter of shifting our appreciation or our love, from
qualities to their subjects. Rather, he distinguishes between a
merely qualified, secondary mode of love, "love of concupiscence," and the unqualified and primary mode, "love of
friendship." The distinction is well known. 22 I only wish to note
how strong it is and to indicate its bearing on the question of
personal dignity.
To love, Thomas says, is to want good for some being, velle
alicui bonum. 23 It thus involves two relations: a relation to the
good that is wanted, and a relation to the being that the good is
wanted for. The latter, the being that the good is wanted for, may
be either the lover himself, or one that he takes as "another self,"

21 Quoted

above, section 1.
in his critical discussion of Thomas's conception of bonum, Crosby
neglects it (177ff.}.For thorough and excellent treaonents of the distinction and of its relation
to Thomas's understanding of the person, see the following studies by David M. Gallagher:
"Person and Ethics in Thomas Aquinas," Acta Philosophica 4/1 (1995): 51-71; "Desire for
Beatitude and Love of Friendship in Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 58 (1996): 1-4 7;
"Thomas Aquinas on Self-Love as the Basis for Love of Others," Acta Philosophica 8/1 (1999):
23-44.
23 STh I-II, q. 26, a. 4. It should be noted that Thomas does not regard this as a complete
definition of love (STh II-II, q. 27, a. 2, c. and ad 1). It only expresses the dimension of
"benevolence" that is found in love. What love adds to benevolence is a certain affective union
(which is an inclination toward real union) with the one loved. However, for our present
purposes, it is sufficient to consider the dimension of benevolence, since our concern is not
precisely with what makes persons to be lovable, but with something that this presupposes:
what makes them to be for their own sake. See also the following note.
22 Nevertheless,

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a friend. 24 To love a being with "love of friendship" is to want
good for that very being.
As for the good that is wanted, this is often something other
than the being for which it is wanted. This is what an object of
"love of concupiscence" is: a good that is wanted for a being other
than itself. The "wine-lover," for instance, wants the good of
wine, not for the wine itself, but for him, and perhaps for his
friends. Good qualities are also loved in this way. We want health
or knowledge or virtue, but not for themselves. We do not "wish
them well." Even happiness is only an object of love of concupiscence (STh I-II, q. 2, a. 7, ad 2). It is not happiness itself that
we want happiness for. We are not wishing happiness to be
happy.
However, it would be a mistake to think that in "wanting good
for some being" what is wanted must always be other than the
being that it is wanted for. This would make little sense. In loving
a friend, one does not just want other goods to exist, for him; one
surely also wants him to exist, for him. One wants his well-being.
A necessary element of this is his simply being. 25 This does not
mean that one also loves him with love of concupiscence; that is
true only if one also wants him for another. What I mean is that
the object of love of friendship, as such, is not only a being for
which good is wanted, but also a good that is wanted-for itself.
24 Crosby too (see previous note) distinguishes between personal dignity and lovableness
(66-68). He finds lovableness to be in some way more concrete or particular than dignity:
whereas personal dignity follows directly upon the general feature of being a person, a
person's lovableness is a function of his being this particular person. Crosby therefore suggests
that lovableness is even more deeply rooted in incommunicable selfhood. Thomas, I think,
would agree that there is something more concrete or particular about lovableness. When
lover and beloved are distinct persons, the beloved's lovableness depends not only on how he
is in himself but also on a relation to the lover, the relation that gives rise to the affective
union of love. This relation is the beloved's status as "another self" for the lover (see STh 1-11,
q. 26, a. 2, ad 2; 1-11, q. 28, a. 1). But far from seeing this as a function of something unique
about the beloved person, Thomas holds it to consist in some sort of likeness(STh 1-11, q. 27,
a. 3; 1-11, q. 28, a. 1, ad 2). Indeed, is it not possible for one person to have some love for
another simply because the other is a person too?
25 Thus Aristotle says that "the man to whom one wishes good to happen for himself, one
must also desire to exist" (Eudemian Ethics 7.2.1236b30, in The Complete Works of Aristotle,
The Revised Oxford Translation, vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes [Princeton: Princeton University
Press, 1984), 1959).

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That which is loved with love of concupiscence is the object of
only one of love's two relations, while that which is loved with
love of friendship is the object of both.
It is clear then that love of concupiscence is a quite secondary
mode of love. It always supposes and refers back to a love of
friendship, and its object is only loved together with, and for, the
object of love of friendship. Love of friendship wants the good for
its own object; and the first good that it wants for its object is
nothing other than the object itself. What is essential to love is
that there be a being that is loved with love of friendship. What
is loved with love of concupiscence is only an accompaniment.
The distinction between the object of love of friendship and
the object of love of concupiscence is thus very strong. It is not
just that the former is loved "more" or that it is valued as a
"higher" good. It is treated as good in a different and
predominant sense. Thomas goes so far as to compare the
difference between the objects of the two loves, as goods, to the
difference between subsistents and inherents, as beings.
'Good' is said in two ways, as 'being' is. For in one way, truly and properly, that
which subsists is called a being, such as a stone or a man. In another way, that [is
called a being] which does not subsist, but is that by which something is; as
whiteness does not subsist, but by it something is white. So then, 'good' is said
in two ways: in one way, as of something subsisting in goodness; in another way,
as of the goodness of another, i.e., as of that by which something fares well. So
then, something is loved in two ways: in one way, as a good subsistent; and this
is loved truly and properly, viz. when we want good for it. And this love is called
by many 'love of benevolence' or 'of friendship'. In another way, [something is
loved] in the manner of an inherent goodness, according as something is said to
be loved, not insofar as we want good to be for it, but insofar as we want good
for something to be by it; thus we say that we love knowledge or health. 26
26 "Bon um dupliciter dicitur, sicut et ens: dicitur enim, uno modo ens proprie etvere, quod
subsistit ut lapis et homo; alio modo quod non subsistit, sed eo aliquid est, sicut albedo non
subsistit, sed ea aliquid album est. Sic igitur bonum dupliciter dicitur: uno modo, quasi aliquid
in bonitate subsistens; alio modo, quasi bonitas alterius, quo scilicet alicui bene sit. Sic igitur
dupliciter aliquid amatur: uno modo, sub ratione subsistentis boni et hoc vere et proprie
amatur, cum scilicetvolumus bonum esse ei; et hie amor, a multis vocatur amor benevolentiae
vel amicitiae; alio modo, per modum bonitatis inhaerentis, secundum quod aliquid dicitur
amari, non inquantum volumus quod ei bonum sit, sed inquantum volumus quod eo alicui
bonum sit, sicut dicimus amare scientiam vel sanitatem" (In De divinis nominibus, c. 4, lect.

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However, the comparison is not quite a strict parallel.
Inherents, such as qualities, can of course only be loved with of
love of concupiscence. But even many subsistents, Thomas
teaches, can only be loved in this way: for example, a bottle of
wine, a horse, and in fact any irrational being. We do not love
these things, he says, "by reason of their substance," or for the
things themselves. We love them for ourselves, by reason of some
perfection that we obtain from them. 27 Even though they are
subsistent beings and the good is "seated" in them, it is not in
them that we want the good to "come to rest." The ones whom
we want the good for are always rational subsistent beings, that is,
persons.
In order to explain this, Thomas looks more closely at what it
is to want a good for someone in the way that love of friendship
does. 28 What love of friendship wants is not just that the good be
"in" or "near" the one loved. One might want that for a horse.
Rather, it wants the one loved to "have" the good, in a specific
sense of "have." It wants him to be in control of its exercise. That
is, the handling of it shall be up to him. He is to be master of its
use. (This does not mean that he must be the sole master.) Not to
9 [Marietti §404]). Similarly: "id quod amatur amore amicitiae, sirnpliciter et per se amatur,
quod autem amatur amore concupiscentiae, non sirnpliciter et secundum se amatur, sed
amatur alteri. Sicut enim ens simpliciter est quod habet esse, ens autem seCW11dum quid quod
est in alio; ita bonum, quod convertitur cum ente, sirnpliciter quidem est quod ipsum habet
bonitatem; quod autem est bonum alterius, est bonurn secundum quid" (STh I-II, q. 26, a. 4).
27 "Nee est inconveniens si hoc etiam modo amemus aliqua quae per se subsistunt, non
quidem ratione substantiae eorum, sed ratione alicuius perfectionis quam ex eis consequimur;
sicut dicimus amare vinum, non propter substantiarn vini ut bene sit ei, sed ut per vinum bene
sit nobis vel inquamurn delectamur eius sapore vel inquantum sustentamur eius humore.
Omne autem quod est per accidens reducitur ad id quod est per se. Sic igitur hoc ipsurn quod
aliquid amarnus, ut eo alicui bene sit, includitur in amore illius quod amamus, ut ei bene sit.
Non est enim alicui aliquid diligendum per id quod est per accidens, sed per id quod est per
se; et ideo oportet quidem diversitatem amorum accipere secundum ea quae sic amamus ut
eis velimus bonum" (In De divinis nominibus, c. 4, lect. 9 [Marietti §405]).
zs "Non autem proprie possum bonum velle creaturae irrarionali, quia non est eius proprie
habere bonum, sed solurn creaturae rationalis, quae est domina utendi bono quod habet per
liberum arbitrium." (STh Il-ll, q. 25, a. 3; cf. STh I, q. 38, a. 1.) So it is not just that irrational
beings ought not to be loved with loved of friendship; insofar as they are irrational, they
cannot be. There is no such thing as "wishing them well" (or, for that matter, wishing them
ill). Aristotle touches upon the idea in the Physics (2.6.197a36-b22): things like happiness and
good fortune and their opposites are ascribed only to beings endowed with choice.

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want the good for someone in this way is simply not to love him
with love of friendship. 29 But only individuals endowed with
freedom of decision can control the use of things. In other words,
only they are even capable of "having" the good. And the root of
free decision is nothing other than mind or intellect, the person's
"infinite depth" (STh I, q. 83, a. 1).
There is a special affinity between intellectual beings and the
good. All things exhibit some tendency to the good, Thomas says,
but the beings endowed with intellect are the ones that are
inclined to it most perfectly and properly, with the kind of
inclination called "will. "30 This is because they can grasp it in an
absolute or unconditional way, according to its "universal ratio."
They alone can relate to the very goodness of what is good,
responding to it in a way that is fully proportionate to it. In other
words, only in a person does the good finds a true home for itself,
one to whom it can really "belong." If goods did not exist for
persons, we might almost say, it could only be because there is
nothing for which anything exists at all. There would be nothing
in which the good could come to rest or function as a true goal.
The good itself would be pointless-no good. Another chapter of
29 It might seem that one can have love of friendship for someone without wanting him
to control the use of the good that one wants for him: for example, when a mother wants
medicine for her infant. But this is only a temporary situation. What she ultimately wants, if
she does love him with love of friendship, is that he eventually grow up and have his life in
his own hands.
30 SI"h I, q. 59, a. 1. Like created intellect, created will is always distinct from its subject's
essence, because it extends to a good that exceeds the subject's own substantial being (STh I,
q. 59, a. 2). Note however that it is still the person himself, not his mind or his will, or even
his freedom, that properly "has" the good, and that the good is properly "for." Mind and will,
and the freedom of will, are only qualities, powers, by which the person relates to the good.
The proper object of love of friendship is the person himself, the subsistent, not some quality
in him. We are not seeing the person as the mere "support" for mind (like the newspaper that
supports today's news); rather, we are seeing what his possession of mind implies about him.
His mind too is for him to have and use; he is related to it, and to all his powers, not only as
their recipient, but also as their end (see SI"h I, q. 77, a. 6, ad 2). Still, the thought is not that
one should love the person "rather than" his mind. "The person" includes not just the person's
substance or essential constitution, but also everything else that pertains to him (see Qucdl.
2, q. 2, a. 2). It is not that the person, the subject, has two "parts," his substance and his mind;
the substance of the person is the person, is himself. The "addition" of mind does not result
in a different subject (see Quodl. 2, q. 2, a. 1, ad 1).

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Crosby's book develops ideas along these very lines.31 My point
is that it is right here that we can find the root of personal dignity.
The idea is very simple. Being free, a person is able to have the
good. The first good that he is fit to have is the good that he
himself is. To see this is to see that he is for his own sake. He
"belongs to himself." He is not there merely for another's use.

Liber est causa sui.32
If this account is correct, then a person's being for his own
sake has nothing to do with whether or not there can be others
just like him. Being for his own sake means, not that he is one of
a kind, but that he belongs to himself. He does so by nature. It is
in this sense that he is "incommunicably his own. "33 Rather than
a matter of how he compares with others, it is a matter of how he
relates to his own good. It is his being such that his good-and
first of all he himself-is for him to have, not just for another. (Of
course it may also be for another.) And this, I believe, is the very
reason for saying that he cannot be replaced.
If a person were only a good to be had by another, then indeed
the existence of a second being just like him in goodness would
mean that he could be eliminated. His double could serve just as
well. The one whom the goodness is for would be equally
satisfied. But if the person's good is for him to have, then to
eliminate him would be to throw the baby out with the bathwater. No substitute could serve, because the one to be served
would not be there. Even in economics, it is not strictly true that
whenever a supply of goods rises, the value of each unit drops.
The value drops only if the demand remains the same. With each
new person, there is not only an additional good, but also a new
demand for the good. And of course no one else can satisfy a
person's demand for himself.
Crosby holds that unless we see a person as unrepeatable or
unique we do not have a sufficient basis for judging him or her to
Chapter 6: "Selfhood and Transcendence in Relation to the Good," 174-217.
1.2.982b26.
33 On "one's own" (suum), with an especially interesting use of liber est causa sui, see STh
I, q. 21, a. 1, ad 3.
31

32 Aristotle, Metaphysics

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be absolutely irreplaceable. 34 It seems to me that to say this is to
stay entirely in the line of things "good for another," objects of
love of concupiscence. 35 It is what is good only in this sense, good
for another, that would need to be unique in order to be
absolutely irreplaceable. Moreover, even then, its irreplaceability
would not be that of a person; it would still not exist for its own
sake in the sense in which persons do. In order for an individual
to have the irreplaceability of a person, what is needed is not
uniqueness, but a rational nature. Between individual substances
that have personal dignity and those that do not, what makes the
difference is rationality. 36
CONCLUSION: THE CREATED PERSONPART OF THE WORLD AND REACHING BEYOND THE WORLD

Personal dignity, then, is indeed a function of the person's
"infinite depth. " 37 This is not because his depth gives him a special
34 Crosby, "A Neglected Source of the Dignity of Persons," 9-13. He is looking for a way
to respond to arguments of the kind proposed by Peter Singer.
35 What I am suggesting is well illustrated by this statement: "When Socrates died, a hole
was left in the world, such that no subsequent person could possibly fill it" (ibid., 11.) True
or not, this is looking upon Socrates from the standpoint of what his existence contributes to
something other than himself-the world. Indeed it is looking upon him as a part of the
world. I am not at all objecting to this way of considering Socrates. I am only saying that it is
other than the consideration in which we see Socrates as existing for Socrates himself.
36 This is not to say that abstract rational nature itself is the proper subject of the dignity.
The proper subject is the individual that subsists in such nature. Individuality certainly does
contribute to the constitution of his dignity, because only individuals subsist. What does not
subsist cannot properly "have" the good. "Rational nature" only expresses the formal
principle, the constitutive feature that completes the determination of the person's status as
one who exists for his own sake. But while a person's individuality, and hence
incommunicability, is thus very much tied to his dignity, it is not by involving something that
makes him somehow "one of a kind." Of course he must be somehow distinct from the others
of his kind, but he does not need to have a proper "differentia," a grade of being that is
exclusively his, in order to claim personhood.
37 This, again, is a function of the spiritual element in his substance. (See above, text at n.
16.) Intellect adds something to the nature of the soul, but it also flows from the soul (STh I,
q. 77, a. 6). Still, the soul is not a "self-contained" principle of its mind. If intellectual light
flows from it, this can only be explained by the fact that it in tum finds its origin in an even
higher intellectual substance, one in which mind and substance are identified (see STh I, q. 79,
a. 4, ad 5). This fits with what I am suggesting in this section: that the created person's dignity

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

kind of uniqueness or unrepeatability, or makes him unlike any
other. It gives him dignity because it gives him a special grade of
perfection-the highest in the whole of nature-and an especially
perfect relation to the good. There may be others like him, but he
is not solely for any other.
My conclusion is that personal dignity is quite compatible with
the person's being a part of the world. That is, there is no tension
between the two. We can look upon him as part of the world
without ceasing to look upon him as a person.
I do not think that personal dignity would be compatible with
being part of a subject that "has" the good; that is, a person
cannot be part of a person. 38 But the world is not a person. This
is so even though it truly exists as "the only one" -there is only
one world-and even though it is a whole and in no way a part.
For the world is one and whole only in the manner of an ordered
multitude (STh I, q. 47, a. 3). It has only a qualified sort of unity
and wholeness. 39 It is not a true subject, that is, an individual
substance, let alone one with an "infinite subjectivity," or a mind,
or free choice. The world is only, so to speak, something "good
to have," not per se an object of love of friendship. It does not
exist for its own enjoyment, even though some of its parts do.
Nevertheless, although nothing in the whole of nature is more
perfect than persons, there is more perfection in nature as a
whole-more "good to be had" -than in the persons alone. 40
is not something self-contained either (see below, n. 41).
33 This is why a human soul is not a person: STh I, q. 75, a. 4, ad 2.
39 It does not have the unity of a single substance. If it does have real unity, real order, this
can only be because there is an extrinsic substantial unity upon which it depends. This
extrinsic principle must be intellectual, because it belongs to intellect to give order. See STh
I, q. 11, a. 3; I, I, q. 47, a. 3.
40 In this respect-in
the line of "goods to be had"-they are ordered to the world's
perfection; this is no detriment to their being for their own sake, since this is a different
"line." See ScG III, c. 112: "Per hoc autem quod dicimus substantias intellectuales propter se
a divina providentia ordinari, non inteiligimus quod ipsa ulterius non referantur in deum et
ad perfectionem universi. Sic igitur propter se procurari dicuntur et alia propter ipsa, quia
bona quae per divinam providentiam sortiuntur, non eis sunt data propter alterius utilitatem;
quae vero aliis dantur, in eorum usum ex divina ordinatione cedunt." The same sort of
discussion would apply to the consideration of the person as part of a common species. A
common species is not a subject or a subsistent, not "for itself' in the sense in which a person

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199

Of course I am speaking of created persons. Although they
have a certain infinity, this is compatible with their being parts of
the world. This is because it is not an "absolute" infinity. I mean
this in two ways. First, as mentioned in the discussion of the
angels, the created person is not infinite in substance-just in himself, in his own essential being. What is infinite about a created
person is his mind or "subjectivity," which is not his substance.
Only the divine persons are an infinite substance, one containing
in itself all the perfection of being, all goodness. This substance is
indeed not part of the world, but rather its origin and ultimate
end.
Second, not even the infinity of the created person's mind is
"absolute." The created mind, taken just in itself, in its own
reality, is finite. It is only a determinate kind of power of the soul,
a particular being and good (see STh I, q. 82, a. 4, ad 1). It does
not consist in all being and all goodness. If infinity pertains to its
nature, this is because its nature is not solely what it is just in
itself, an "absolute" nature; it is not a substance, but an essentially
relative item. It constitutes that "infinite need" that we considered
earlier. Created mind enables its subject to unite himself to all
being and goodness-not so as to be what he consists in, but so as
to be his object, light and nourishment for his life. Only the divine
mind lives entirely in its own light. God alone is fully satisfied just
by being himself.
So the infinity of created mind is in its relation to something
else. Its greatness is indissociable from that of its object. The
dignity that it confers is not "absolute" or self-contained. 41
is. In the line of "goods to be had," the species as a whole may contain more perfection than
any one of its members; and in this line, its members are ordered to it. This would be true
whether or not they are personal beings. But if they are personal, then the perfection of their
species (and of other species as well) is also ordered to them, in the line of "having the good":
it is something for them to apprehend and enjoy.
41 To consider the person's dignity is to consider his status as a "good." But the created
person's dignity does not consist in his being the whole or highest good; the good as a whole,
and the highest good-the origin and ultimate end of the world-transcend him. The dignity
lies rather in the special relation that he has to the good (see SI'h 1-11, q. 1, a. 8; 11-11, q. 2, a.
3). That it is not absolute in the way that the dignity of the divine persons is (see above, n. 13)
seems fitting. As Thomas teaches, "person" as said of God and creatures cannot be univocal;
it is analogical, and is said of God in a prior and more excellent way (SI'h I, q. 29, a. 3).

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STEPHEN L. BROCK

Yet the loss in self-sufficiency is more than compensated. If we
consider the created person just in himself, as to the good that is
intrinsic to or inherent in him-the good that he "contributes"we find that, however noble it may be, it is only a portion of the
good contained in the world as a whole. 42 But if we consider him
in relation to the perfection that he is capable of having and
enjoying, we eventually find that the whole world-to say nothing
of his own selfhood-is too small for him. He is capax Dei.
Nothing short of the divine essence can fully satisfy him. 43
It is not that he wants his own essence to become divine; if it
did, he would no longer be himself (cf. STh I, q. 63, a. 3). But he
can be raised to the rank of one who shares with the divine
persons in the life of beholding and rejoicing in the divine light.
This capacity constitutes an affinity with God that the world as a
whole does not boast. Thomas offers a terse formulation: "the
universe is more perfect in goodness than the intellectual creature
extensively and diffusively; but intensively and collectively there
is more of the likeness of the divine perfection in the intellectual
creature, which is receptive of the supreme good. "44
42 It may very well be that each created person does after all make a "contribution" that
no other does. Indeed it is hard to imagine why else God would create a multitude of us. My
thesis is simply that this contribution would be something other than what gives the person
the dignity of "a person." I would also hold that at least in the case of human persons, it could
not be something that is intrinsically unrepeatable, even if in fact it were never to be repeated
(see above, pp. 187-88}; and, that it would not be an "absolute" or substantial feature, but
rather something pertaining to the person's activity-perhaps his very activity as capax Dei.
C. S. Lewis has some profound pages in which he suggests that each person is distinctive
precisely in the way that he or she is meant to know, love and praise God (C. S. Lewis, The
Problem of Pain [Glasgow: Fount Paperbacks, 1977), chap. 10 ["Heaven"]).
43 SI'h I, q. 2, a. 8, c., ad 2, and esp. ad 3: "bonum creatum non est minus quam bonum
cuius homo est capax ut rei intrinsecae et inhaerentis, est tamen minus quam bonum cuius est
capax ut obiecti, quod est infinitum. Bonum autem quod participatur ab Angelo, et a toto
universo, est bonum finitum et contractum."
44 "Ad tertium dicendum quod universum est perfectius in bonitate quam intellectualis
creatura extensive et diffusive. Sed intensive et collective similitudo divinae perfectionis magis
invenitur in intellectuali creatura, quae est capax summi boni" (SI'h I, q. 93, a. 2, ad 3). In
short, the object of the created person's natural "need" is greater than what he can ever
"contribute"; but it is also greater than what the whole world can contribute, and the world
as a whole does not even have this "need." Still, it may seem paradoxical that a "need"
constitute the greatest natural dignity. Helpful here is one of Thomas's determinations of the
greatest created virtue or excellence. "Aliqua virtus potest esse maxima dupliciter, uno modo,

CROSBYAND AQUINAS ON PERSONALDIGNI1Y

201

I do not mean that we need to know that only union with God
can satisfy human persons before we can say that they are for
their own sake. We can see this just by looking at how they are in
themselves. But if a person's being for his own sake is his being fit
to have the good, and if he is so by nature, then perhaps we can
say that to see the dignity of persons is to catch at least a glimpse
of the fact that they are the targets of the love that moves the one
true world. 45

secundum se; alio modo, per comparationem ad habentem. Secundum se quidem misericordia
maxima est. Pertinet enim ad misericordiam quod alii effundat; et, quod plus est, quod
defectus aliorum sublevet; et hoc est maxime superioris. Unde et misereri ponitur proprium
Deo, et in hoc maxime dicitur eius omnipotentia manifestari. Sed quoad habentem,
misericordia non est maxima, nisi ille qui habet sit maximus, qui nullum supra se habeat, sed
omnes sub se. Ei enim qui supra se aliquem habet maius est et melius coniungi superiori quam
supplere defectum inferioris. Et ideo quantum ad hominem, qui habet Deum superiorem,
caritas, per quam Deo unitur, est potior quam misericordia, per quam defectus proximorum
supplet" (STh II-II, q. 30, a. 4). Charity makes us more like God than mercy does: "per
caritatem assimilamur Deo tanquam ei per affectum uniti. Et ideo potior est quam
misericordia, per quam assimilamur Deo secundum simi!itudinem operationis" (ibid., ad 3).
Thomas draws a similar distinction in explaining why beatitude pertains more to speculative
than to practical intellect: STh HI, q. 3, a. 5, ad 1.
45 I am grateful to Peter Colosi, Kevin Flannery, and the faculty and students of the
International Theological Institute (Gaming) for their comments on earlier versions of this
paper.

The Thomist 69 (2005): 203-50

AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIAN AND DIONYSIAN
DEFINITION OF 'GOD'
DAVID B. TwETIEN
Marquette University
Milwaukee, Wisconsin

I. AN ALTERNATIVE SOLUTION TO A FAMILIAR OBJECTION
AGAINST THE FIVE WAYS

R

EADERS OF THOMAS AQUINAS have long quarreled
over how to address the inadequacy they sense in his
onclusions in the 'five ways'. If, as Gilson famously held,
to prove the 'Christian God' is to prove the creator, 1 why does
not each of Thomas's five ways explicitly conclude to the creator
of the world? Without such a conclusion, how can we be satisfied
with the 'God' at which a given 'way' purportedly arrives?
Four main answers to this question can be found. First is
Gilson's original answer, developed by Joseph Owens: each of
Aquinas's five ways must be reinterpreted in light of his doctrine
of existence so as to conclude, in fact, to the first cause of esse.2
1 Etienne Gilson, The Spirit of Mediaeval Philosophy, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York:
Scribner's, 1936), 72-73: "Whoever undertakes to prove the existence of God per ea quae
facta sunt undertakes in advance to prove His existence as Creator of the Universe; in other
words he is committed to the view that ... the idea of creation is necessarily implied in every
demonstration of the existence of the Christian God." See also Joseph Owens, St. Thomas
Aquinas on the Existence of God: Collected Papers of Joseph Owens, C.Ss.R., ed. J. Catan
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1980), 142-43, 156, 163.
2 Etienne Gilson, Le Thomisme: Introduction ala philosophie de saint Thomas d'Aquin, 4th
ed. (Paris: Vrin, 1942), 111, 116-17; Joseph Owens, An Elementary Christian Metaphysics
(Milwaukee: Bruce, 1963), 341-51; idem, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God, 16263, 173-86.

203

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

For Owens, then, the favored proof is that of Aquinas's De ente
et essentia, to which all other arguments must be reduced if they
are to succeed. 3 But what if such a reinterpretation fails, as Gilson
himself came to admit? 4 A second answer holds that for Aquinas
the proof of God's existence is only completed at some stage
subsequent to the five ways, once many other properties have
been established, such as that God is a personal being, or that
there is only one God. 5 In the Summa Theologiae, for example,
questions 2-11 can be seen as successively establishing a series of
properties that, when taken together, comprise what it means to
be God. Alternatively, according to a third commonly proposed
answer, Aquinas never intended a purely philosophical proof for
the existence of •cod' as such in the first place. 6 To pose the
question "Does God exist?" is to presuppose a God believed in by
faith; the question belongs, therefore, to theology, not philosophy. 7 Finally, the fourth answer insists that Aquinas failed in his
project, and the sooner Thomists realize this fact, the better.
Fernand Van Steenberghen has argued forcefully that the failure
of Aquinas's five ways lies in the uncritical 'nominal definition'
with which they begin, that is, in the definition of the term
·cod'. 8 Nominal definitions such as 'prime mover' or 'necessary
3 Owens, Christian Metaphysics, 349-51. Of course, Gilson came to deny that the De ente
contains a proof of God's existence; see Etienne Gilson, "La preuve du 'De ente et essentia',"
Doctor Communis 3 (1950): 257-60.
4 Etienne Gilson, Le Thomisme,
(Paris: Vrin, 1965), 7, 93-94, 97.
5 See especially William Lme Craig, The Cosmological Argument from Plato to Leibniz
(London: Macmillan, 1980), 159, 170; Norman Kretzmann, The Metaphysics of Theism:
Aquinas' Natural Theology in «Summa contra gentiles I" (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1997), 85-89, 112-13, 169.
6 See Charles J. Kelly, "The Intelligibility of the Thomistic God," Religious Studies 12
(1976): 347-64, at356-58; LuborVdecky,Aquinas' Five Arguments in theSummaTheologiae
la 2, 3 (Kampen, Netherlands: Kok Faros, 1994), 19, 22, 37-38, 41-44, 47.
7 Antonin Finili, "Is There a Philosophical Approach to God?" Dominican Studies 4
(1951): 80-101; Vincent Edward Smith, "The Prime Mover: Physical and Metaphysical
Considerations," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 28 (1954):
78-94, at 86-89; Thomas O'Brien, "Reflexion on the Question of God's Existence in
Contemporary Thomistic Metaphysics," The Thomist 23 (1960): 1-89, 211-85, 315-447, at
364-70, 382, 389-99, 425-26, 436-38, 446-47. See also below, at nn. 47-49.
8 Fernand Van Steenberghen, Le probleme de I'existence de Dieu dans !es ecrits de s.
Thomas t!Aquin (Louvain-la-Neuve: Editions de l'Institut Superieur, 1980), 287-96; cf. also
idem, Dieu cache: Comment savons-nous que Dieu existe? (Louvain-Paris: Nauwelaerts,

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

205

being' could only be convincing in a culture nursed on Aristotelian
science and for whom a widespread belief in 'God' could be
presupposed. In place of such definitions, Van Steenberghen
examines the use of the term 'God' in our monotheist culture, in
which the presence of atheism calls for a serious response. He
concludes that a successful proof must arrive at no less than the
'provident creator of the universe'. To such a being, which would
therefore be personal and unique, no one, theist or atheist, will
refuse the name 'God'.
In my view, Van Steenberghen is correct to reorient the
discussion of the five ways on the question of the nominal
definition of the term 'God'. But his evaluation of Aquinas fails to
take into account the only formula that Aquinas himself expressly
offers for what the word 'God' properly means. The present
article focuses on this formula, as well as on Aquinas's systematic
justification for and development of a nominal definition that
could be targeted by his proofs-a much less ambitious definition
of 'God' than Van Steenberghen's. In what follows I first present
Aquinas's formula, then set forth the principal elements of this
systematic justification as Aquinas came to articulate them (part
II). These elements are based on Aristotle's logic as it was passed
on to Aquinas through the commentary tradition. Next, I sketch
the stages in which Aquinas developed his definitional formula,
the result of an increasingly deep reflection on Pseudo-Dionysius's
account of how we know God (part III). It will become evident
that today we no longer conceive of 'God' and the project of a
proof of 'God's' existence as does Aquinas. Only by recognizing
his simultaneously Aristotelian and Dionysian inheritance can we
rediscover how to read and evaluate his five ways.
I base my reading of Aquinas on a little used passage from the
Summa Theologiae: Prima Pars, question 13, articles 8-10, the
only place in Aquinas's corpus where he systematically discusses
what the divine name 'God' means. Article 8 asks, does the term
'God' name a nature? The second objection answers no, since
humans cannot know the nature or essence of God. In response
Aquinas writes:
1961), 27-44.

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DAVID B. TWETTEN

[A]ccording as we know the nature of something from its properties and effects,
we can signify [the nature] by a name .... But from divine effects we cannot
know the divine nature as it is in itself so that we know what it is; but [we can
know it] only by way of eminence, causality, and negation, as was said above.
And in this way the name 'God' signifies the divine nature. For, this is the name
that has been imposed to signify something that is existing above all things, which
is the principleof all things and is removed from all things. For, this is what they
intend to signify> who name [something] 'God'. 10

The italicized words here constitute the only formula in Aquinas's
corpus for what the word the 'God' properly means, his only
explicit and formal nominal definition of 'God' . 11 Admittedly, the
Sermon on the Creed offers one other express formula, where in
explication of the first article Aquinas writes: "We must consider
what this name 'God' signifies: none other than the governor of
and the one who has providence over all things fgubernator et
9 The body of the same article contains parallel phrasing in discussing the etymological
meaning of 'Deus' (based on imposition a quo versus ad quad): "filhis name is imposed from
the universal providence over things. For, all who speak about God intend to name this 'God':
what has universal providence for things" ("Imponitur enim hoc nomen ab universali remm
providentia, omnes enim loquentes de deo, hoc intendunt nominare deum, quod habet
providentiam universalem de rebus" [STh I, q. 13, a. 8; all quotations from the Summa
Theologiae are taken from the Marietti edition (Turin: Marietti, 1948)]).
10 STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2 (emphasis added): "Ad secundum dicendum quod, secundum
quod nai:Ul"am alicuius rei ex eius proprietatibus et effectibus cognoscere possumus, sic earn
nomine possumus significare. Unde, quia substantiam lapidis ex eius proprietate possumus
cognoscere secundum seipsarn, sciendo quid est lapis, hoc nomen lapis ipsam lapidis naturam,
secundum quod in se est, significat, significat enim definitionem lapidis, per quam scimus quid
est lapis. Ratio enim quarn significat nomen, est definirio, ut dicitur in IV Metaphysicorum.
Sed ex effecribus divinis divinam naturam non possum us cognoscere secundum quod in se est,
ut sciamus de ea quid est; sed per modum eminenriae et causalitatis et negarionis, ut supra
dictum est. Et sic hoc nomen Deus significat naturam divinam. Impositum est enim nomen hoc
ad aliquid significandum supra omnia existens, quod est principium omnium, et remotum ab
omnibus. Hoc enim intendunt significare nominantes Deum."
11 Thus far I have found only two authors who link ihe formula of STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad
2 with the proof of God's existence or wiih the nominal definition of 'God': Jan Aertsen,
"Der wissenschaftstheoretische Ort der Gottesbeweise in der Summa theologiae des Thomas
von Aquin," in Medieval Semantics and Metaphysics: Studies Dedicated to L. M. De Rijk, ed.
E. P. Bos (Nijmegen: Ingenium, 1985), 161-93, at 180; and Timothy McDermott in Thomas
Aquinas, Summa Theologiae: Latin Text and English Translation, Introductions, Notes,
Appendices, and Glossaries (Cambridge: Blackfriars; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-), 2: 18687 (appendix 4). For an exposition of the ad secundum and a defense of this formula as a
nominal definition, see below beginning at n. 104.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

207

provisorrerum omnium]. " 12 Still, as Thomas explains several times
(including in STh I, q. 13, a. 8), the word theos is from the Greek
word 'to behold' as regards its derivation (id a quo imponitur ad
significandum), not as regards its signification (id ad quod
significandum nomen imponitur). 13 And so, we may say, the word
'God' in Aquinas means 'provident being' by etymology, but it
properly signifies 'something that is existing above all things,
which is the principle of all things and is removed from all things'.
Based on this definition, I argue that for Aquinas a proof that
'God' exists need prove nothing more than that there exists an
instance of:
a kind of thing that is (1) a cause of other kinds of things and that is (2.1) beyond
all other kinds of things and/or (2.2) removed from all other kinds of things.

My contention is that because the Summa's five ways prove a
being which fits this definition, each can conclude "and this all
understand to be I all name God" or "and this we call God." That
Aquinas has such a minimal definition of 'God' in mind in the
Summa follows already from a preliminary inductive argument.
12 In Symbolum Apostolorum expositio 1 (Inter omnia), in Thomas Aquinas, Opuscula
theologica, ed. R. Spiazzi (Turin: Marietti, 1954), vol. 2.
13 STh I, q. 13, a. 8, corp., obj. 1, and ad 1; STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 3; I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a.
5, expos. ad 1, in Thomas Aquinas, Scriptum super Sententiis, ed. P. Mandonnet and M. Moos
(Paris: Lethielleux, 1929-47), vol. 1; I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 5, ad 6: "Deus, quamvis significet
essentiam divinam quantum ad id cui imponitur, tamen quantum ad id a quo imponitur
nomen, significat operationem, ut supra dictum est ex verbis Damasceni." for this etymology,
see also ScG I, c. 44 (para.10, "Huius autem"), in Thomas Aquinas, Opera omnia: iussu
impensaque, Leonis XIII. P.M. edita (Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1882-), vol. 13;
Compendium theologiae I, c. 35 (II. 6-11), in Aquinas, Opera omnia, vol. 42; In De Divinis
nominibus, c. 12, lect. 1 (948), in Thomas Aquinas, In librum Beati Dionysii De divinis
nominibus expositio, ed. C. Pera (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1950); STh II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2. For
the source of Aquinas's various etymologies, see John of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 9 (1.9)
(II. 20-24, 29-30), in De fide orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus, ed. E. Buytaert
(St. Bonaventure, N. Y.: Franciscan Institute, 1955). For formulas that reliate etymology and
proper signification, see I Sent., d. 34, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2: "in nomine Dei importatur habitudo
principii creantis et gubemantis"; Thomas Aquinas, Super De causis, prop. 3, in Super Librum
de causis expositio, ed. H. D. Saffrey (Louvain: Nauwelaerts, 1954), 18.13-14: "hoc nomen
'deus' universalem quamdam providentiam et causalitatem importat." The informal formula
from !:he Sermon on the Creed should be read in light of these passages, although it emphasizes
etymology. For imposition and etymology, see below, nn. 102, 105.

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

This is precisely the sort of being that each of the five ways
proves. Each appeals to a different efficiently causal series to
affirm a cause that is beyond all other kinds of things by being
'first' or superlative in its order, and/or that is removed from all
other kinds of things by being 'unmoved', 'uncaused', etc. In
support of my contention, this article shows how Aquinas's
nominal definition of 'God' is consistent with and, in fact, arises
out of his understanding of Aristotle's logic of existential
arguments, arguments best exemplified in Aquinas's corpus by the
five ways. It is not accidental that from the outset Aquinas
understood this logic, as it applies to God, through a Dionysian
lens. Through the lens of the threefold "negative way" to God,
the so-called via negativa, Aquinas is able to put in focus, with a
systematic account, the object of proof in the case of something
whose nature we cannot properly know.
It is not necessary, then, in my view, to prove the existence of
a creator or of a provident or personal being in order to draw the
conclusion 'God exists'. In fact, for Aquinas, it is not even
necessary to prove the existence of the one God. For Thomas,
each of these properties can be shown, and to the extent that they
are entailed by God's 'nature' as 'a cause beyond all other natures'
they can be said to be already implicit in the proof of God's
existence. But they need not be explicitly drawn in a proof. In this
sense, I call Aquinas's nominal definition 'nonprescriptive', since
it establishes only a necessary minimum and allows for a number
of proofs of or 'ways of arriving at' the being thus defined. It is
immediately evident how this definition puts in a new light the
project of Aquinas's five ways. In my view, we have misread them
by looking at the outcome that we as theists desire to prove-or
that we as atheists desire to disprove-instead of at the systematic
logical standards, as Aquinas understood them, for existential
arguments and for their corresponding nominal definitions. This
logic provides the foundational criteria for Aquinas's Dionysian
definition of 'God'. To these logical standards I now turn.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

209

II. AQUINAS'S ARISTOTELIAN INHERITANCE: THE LOGIC OF
EXISTENTIAL ARGUMENTS AND THE NOMINAL DEFINITION

The Summa Theologiae, begun around 1266, is not the place
for a resume of Aristotelian logic. Still, the five ways are preceded
by a pithy statement in question 2, article 2 that contains the
major logical elements presupposed by the proofs:
[W]hen cause is demonstrated through effect, it is necessary to use the effect in
place of the definition of the cause in order to prove that the cause exists, and
this occurs especially in the case of God. For, in order to prove that something
exists, it is necessary to accept as a middle what the name signifies, not what x
is; because the question "What is x?" follows upon the question "Does x exist?"
But the names of God are imposed from effects, as will later be shown. Hence,
in demonstrating that God exists through an effect, we can accept as a middle
term what the name 'God' signifies. 14

In what follows I present these logical elements under three
lemmata drawn from this passage. These elements provide the
ground for whatever nominal definition of 'God' the five ways
use-which definition I link to the express formula quoted earlier
(STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2). Of course, evidence for these elements
can be found also in other works. One finds much discussion of
existential argument in Aquinas's Exposition of the Posterior
Analytics (ca. 1271), yet two other earlier works treat this logic
precisely as applied to God. A dose parallel to question 2, article
2 of the Prima Pars, which also serves as a prologue to a set of
'five ways', is found in the Summa contra Gentiles (I, c. 12),
composed some seven years earlier (1259). Its discussion, as we
shall see, in tum relies on extended reflections on methodology
in On Boethius's De Trinitate, written some two years prior, perhaps in preparation for the magisterial personal works in theol-ogy. We take for granted that both Summae open with the
q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "[D]icendum quod cum demonstratur causa per effectum, necesse
est uti effectu loco definitionis causae, ad probandum causam esse, et hoc ma.'Cime contingit
in Deo. Quia ad probandum aliquid esse, necesse est accipere pro medio quid significet nomen
non autem quod quid est, quia quaestio quid est, sequitur ad quaestionem an est. Nomina
autem Dei imponuntur ab effectibus, ut postea ostendetur, uncle, demonstrando Deum esse
per effectum, accipere possumus pro medio quid significet hoc nomen Deus."
14 STh K,

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DAVID B. TWETI'EN

discussion of whether God exists before considering what God
is-or rather, what or how God is not (STh I, q. 3, prol.).
Nevertheless, no hint of this order can be found in the first book
of Peter Lombard's Sentences or in Aquinas's writings thereon,
whether in the Parisian Scriptum (ca. 1252) 15 or in the Roman
lectura (ca. 1265). Aquinas internalizes and applies to his
magisterial works the methodology that he learns from the Latin
Aristotle, from the commentary tradition, especially from
Grosseteste, from his own teacher Albert, and from others at
Naples and Paris. I present the evidence for Aquinas's appropriation of this methodology from his works, together with the
available commentators, where relevant. As we shall see, in On
Boethius's De Trinitate, question 6, article 3, Aquinas couples this
Aristotelian methodology as applied to the immaterial with
Dionysius's via negativa, and on this foundation he subsequently
develops his unique formula for 'God'.

A) "The Question What Is x?' Follows upon the Question 'Does
x Exist?,,,
Posterior Analytics 2 opens by taking up four questions that
generate 'scientific' reasoning, questions that chapter 2 reduces to
the principal causal inquiry, 'what isx?' Still, this principal inquiry
has a prior condition. One cannot investigate the essence of
'nothing', says Aristotle, that is, of something that is not already
known to exist (Post. Anal. 2.7.92b5-8; 2.8.93a16-20, 27;
2.J0.93b33). 16 For him, we properly have no knowledge of a
15 Nevertheless, the Scriptum does show evidence of the relevant logic; see below, nn. 19,
21, 27, 37.
16 Aquinas holds that if something does not exist, its essence cannot be known-and as
corollaries, that if something's essence is known, it must already be known to exist, and that
it is impossible to know what something is if one does not know that it exists: "[Q]uia necesse
est quod quicunque scit 'quod quid est esse' hominis uel cuiuscunque alterius rei, quod sciat
rem illam esse. Quia enim non entis non est aliqua quiditas uel essencia, de eo quod non est
nullus potest scire 'quod quid est,' set potest scire significationem nominis, uel rationem ex
pluribus nominibus compositam, sicut potest aliquis scire quid significat hoc nomen
'tragelaphus' uel 'yrcoceruus' (quod idem est), quia significat quoddam animal compositum
ex yrco et ceruo; set inpossibile est sciri 'quod quid est' yrcocerui, quia nichil est tale in rerum
natura" (fhomas Aquinas, II Post. Anal., c. 7, lect. 6 [II. 14-26], in Aquinas, Opera omnia, vol.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

211

thing or of an essence unless we first know that it exists (cf. Post.
Anal. 1.1.71a27-71b5; 2.8.93a20-21). 17 Aristotle's logic, unlike
contemporary symbolic logic, is wedded to a correspondence
theory of truth grounded in extramental reality. 18 It follows, as for
our first lemma, that the question an sit?, 'does x exist?', is prior
to the question quid sit?, 'what is x?' (Post. Anal. 2.1-2.89b3290a9; 2.8.93a17-22). This methodological principle is found in an
objection even in Aquinas's earliest work, the Scriptum on the
Sentences. 19 And so, continues Aristotle in the Posterior Analytics,
1.2 •; all line numbers in references to the F.xpositio libri Posteriorum refer to this edition). See
also, in addition to the following note, Aquinas, VIJ.Metaphys., c. 17, lect. 17, (1651), in In
duodecim libros metaphysicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. M.-R. Cathala and R. Spiazzi
(Turin-Rome:Marietti,1950),commentingonMetaphys. 7.17.1041a11-16:"Secundumenim
quod propter quid est idem ei quod est quid, oportet esse manifestum an est..•. Et ideo dicit,
quod cum quaeritur propter quid, oportet existere manifesta entia ista duo: scilicet ipsum quia
et ipsum esse, quod pertinet ad quaestionem an est. Sicut cum quaeritur ... quid est homo?
oportet esse manifestum, hominem esse."
17 That it is impossible to know what something is if one does not know that it exists, see
!Post.Anal., c. 1, lect. 2 (11. 63-65); quoted below, n. 19; II Post.Anal., c. 7, lect. 6 (II. 83-86;
quoted below, n. 24); and II Post. Anal., c. 8, lect. 7 (11. 112-24): "[D]upliciter se habet aliquis
ad cognoscendum 'propter quid:' quandoque enim habemus 'quia' in nostra cognitione, et
querimus adhuc 'propter quid;' quandoque autem simul manifesta sunt nobis utraque; tercium
autem est inpossibile, ut scilicet prius cognoscat aliquis de aliqua re 'propter quid' quam 'quia;'
et similiter est de eo 'quod quid erat esse,' quia aliquando scimus rem esse, nee tam en perfecte
scimus quid sit, aliquando autem simul scimus utrumque, sed tercium est inpossibile, ut scilicet
sciamus quid est, ignorantes si est." VII Metaphys., c. 17, lect. 17 (1665-66): "Si ergo in
quaestione qua quaeritur quid est, non oportet aliquid supponere, et aliud quaerere de illo,
posset ista quaestio fieri et de ente et de non ente. Et ita quaestio quae est quid est, esset
communiter facta et de aliquo et de nihilo .... [V]ero in hac quaestione, qua quaeritur quid
est homo, oportet habere notum existere verum hoc ipsum quod est esse hominem (aliter nihil
quaereretur) ..•. Nam esse est praesuppositum ad hoc quod quaeritur quid est."
18 This point has been made recently by Rudi te Velde, "'The First Thing to Know about
God': Kretzmann and Aquinas on the Meaning and Necessity of Arguments for the Existence
of God," ReligiousStudies 39 (2003): 251-67; see also Gyula Klima, "The Changing Role of
Entia Rationis in Medieval Philosophy: A Comparative Study with a Reconstruction,"
Synthese 96 (1993): 25-59; "Ontological Alternatives vs. Alternative Semantics in Medieval
Philosophy," S - European Journal for Semiotic Studies, 3.4 (1991): 587-618.
19 II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, obj. 1; Thomas
IV Phys., c. 7, lect. 10 (507), in In
octo libros Physicorum Aristotelis expositio, ed. P. M. Maggiolo (Turin-Rome: Marietti,
1950), quoted below, n. 29; !Post.Anal., c. 1, lect. 2 (II. 58-71): " .. • aliauero suntdequibus
oportet praeintelligere quid est quod dicitur, id est quid significatur per nomen, scilicet de
passionibus. Et non dicit: 'quid est' simpliciter, set 'quid est quod dicitur,' quia ante quam
sciatur de aliquo an sit, non potest proprie sciri de eo quid est (non entium enim non sunt
diffinitiones), unde questio 'an est' precedit questionem 'quid est;' set non potest ostendi de

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DAVID B. TWETfEN

first one asks, does a god exist?, then one asks, what is a god?
(Post. Anal. 2.1.89b32-35). The example, it is worth emphasizing,
is used by Aristotle himself, and it is repeated throughout the
commentary tradition. 20

B) "In Order to Prove That Something Exists, It Is Necessary to
Accept as a Middle What the Name Signifies, Not What 'x' Is."
1. Existential Proof through Effects. We have established the
priority in Aristotelian methodology of the question, "Does x
exist?" Now, if as in the case of god, the thing whose existence is
in question is not obvious from experience, that thing's existence
requires proof (cf. Post. Anal. 2.2.90a24-31). As Aquinas's early
Scriptum on the Sentences acknowledges, it is possible to prove
that such an x exists through its effects. 21 This is an application,
aliquo an sit nisi prius intelligatur quid significatur per nomen; propter quad etiam
Philosophus in IV Metaphisice, in disputatione contra negantes principia, docet incipere a
significatione nominurn."
20 See especially Themistius, ParaphrasisAnalyticorum posteriorum 2.1, in M. Wallies, ed.
(Berlin: Reimer, 1900), 42 (II. 7-9), of which the Latin may be found in J. R. O'Donnell,
"Themistius' Paraphrasis of the Posterior Analytics of Aristotle," Mediaeval Studies 20 (19 58):
239-315; Philoponus (or Ps-Philoponus in Book 2; cf. Wallies' preface), In Aristotelis
Analytica Posteriora Commentaria 2.1, in M. Wallies, ed. (Berlin: Reimer, 1909), 336 (II. 127), 337 (13-16); Al-Ghazali in Charles Lohr, "Logica Algazalis: Introduction and Critical
Text," Traditio 21 (1965): 223-90, at 282 (II. 12-26); Robert Grosseteste, Commentarius in
"Posteriorum analyticorum" libros, 2.1 (II. 104-9), in P. Rossi, ed. (Florence: Olschki, 1981);
Eustratius, In Analyticorum posteriorum librum secundum commentarium, 2.1, in M.
Hayduck, ed. (Berlin: Reimer, 1907), 11 (II. 14-15); cf. Paul Moraux, Le commentaire
d'Alexandre d'Aphrodise aux "Seconds analytiques" d'Aristote (Berlin-New York: de Gruyter,
1979), 86. For the ancients, I leave the word 'god' ('the divine') in the lower case, although
the upper case used, not as a proper name, but in my nonprescriptive sense of a "top-most
reality," could be justified for some of the Greek commentators on Aristotle; see below, at n.
113.
21 III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2: "Cognitio autem de re secundurn id quod est potest dupliciter
haberi: scilicet durn cognoscitur quid est et an est ..•. Essentiarn autem alicujus rei, intellectus
noster tripliciter comprehendit. . . . Alio modo essentias rerurn quas non vidernus,
cognoscimus per causas vel effectus eis proportionatos, cadentes in sensu. Si autem effectus
non fuerint proportionati causae, non facient causarn cognoscere quid est, sed quia est tanturn,
sicut patet de Deo .... Similiter an res sit, tripliciter cognoscit. Uno modo quia cadit sub
sensu. Alio modo ex causis et effectibus rerurn cadentibus sub sensu, sicut ignem ex furno
perpendimus. Terrio modo cognoscit aliquid in seipso esse ex inclinatione quarn habet ad
aliquos actus: quam quidem inclinationem cognoscit ex hoc quod super actus suos reflectitur,

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213

familiar in the ancient commentary tradition, 22 of Aristotle's
express procedure in the case of proofs 'of fact [quia]' versus
proofs 'of the reasoned fact fpropter quid]': in absence of the true
cause, namely, x's definition, one may prove x's properties by
using a remote genus, or by arguing from effects to their cause
(Post. Anal. 1.13. 78a22-b30).
2. Nominal Definition in Existential Proof and the Criteria
from Proofs of Fact. But how can we prove the existence of x if
we in no way know 'what x is'? As the early Aquinas puts it, in
language that follows Albert, it is impossible to know 'whether x
exists' without in some way knowing 'what it is', at least by a
confused cognition. 23 Aristotle's answer is that one must use a
formula or definition at least of 'what the term x signifies' to
prove the existence of x (Post. Anal. 2.7.92b12-25; 2.8.93a2231 )24-one uses what Aristotle himself calls the 'nominal formula'
dum cognoscit se operari."
21 See especially Albert, Posteriora analytica 2.1.3, in Albert, Opera omnia, ed. Jammy
(Lyon: C. Prost, 1651), 1:614b; Themistius, In Post. Anal. 2.2 (Wallies, ed., 43.30-44.2). The
application is suggested by Posterior Analytics 2.8.93a17-22, in Aristotle, Analytica priora et
posteriora, ed. W. D. Ross (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1964). Abdelali Elamrani-Jamal,
in "La demonstration du signe (burhiin al-daltl) selon lbn Rushd (Averroes)," Documenti e
studi sulfa tradizione fil-Osoficamedievale 11 (2000): 113-31, has shown the link in Averroes
between proofs of fact and proofs of existence.
23 Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 3 (ll. 114-26), in Aquinas, Opera omnia,
vol. 50: "Et tamen sciendum quod de nulla re potest sciri an est nisi quoquo modo sciatur de
ea quid est, uel cognitione perfecta, uel saltem cognitione confusa; prout Philosophus <licit in
principio Phisicorum quod diffinita sunt precognita partibus diffinitionis: oportet enim
scientem hominem esse et querentem quid est homo per diffinitionem scire quid hoc nomen
'homo' significat. Nee hoc esset nisi aliquam rem quoquo modo conciperet quam scit esse,
quamuis nesciat eius diffinitionem: concipit enim hominem secundum cognitionem alicuius
generis proximi uel remoti, et aliquorum accidentium que extra apparent de ipso." For
'confused cognition', cf. ibid. (II. 129-31, 136-67); Albert, Super Dionysium De divinis
nominibus, c. 1 (pp. 32.12-16, 39.51-52); c. 7, (p. 356.40--45), in Albert, Opera omnia, ed.
Institutum Alberti Magni Coloniense (Miinster i. Westf.: Aschendorff, 1951-), vol. 37.1. Cf.
also Francis Catania, "'Knowable' and 'Namable' in Albert the Great's Commentary on the
Divine Names," in Albert the Great: Commemorative Essays, ed. F. Kovach and R. Shahan
(Norman, Okla.: University of Oklahoma Press, 1980), 97-128, at 99-113.
24 See Aquinas, II Post. Anal., c. 7, lect. 6 (II. 71-86): "Et hoc etiam apparet in processu
scienciarum: geometria enim accipitquid significat hoc nomen 'triangulus,' etdemonstrat quod
sit, puta cum demonstrat super lineam rectam datam triangulum aequilaterum constituere. Si
igitur aliquis demonstraret solum quidest triangulus, praeter morem demonstrationum quibus
utuntur scienciae, non demonstraret hoc totum quod est triangulum esse, set demonstraret

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(ovoµaTWOTt<; Myoc;; 2.10.93b30-35). 25 He gives examples of
preliminary definitions of an eclipse or of the soul, which at least
have 'something of' the thing defined, something sufficient to
affirm 'that it is' in an accidental sense (Post. Anal. 2.8.93a21-22,
24-28). 26 Aquinas's Scriptum refers to this as "the most
incomplete way of defining": what sets forth the signification of
solum hoc quod dico triangulum; sicut enim propter hoc quod esse non est substancia rei, ille
qui demonstrat esse, hoc solum demonstrat, ita si aliquis demonstraret 'quid est,' hoc solum
demonstraret. Sequeretur igitur quod aliquis sciens per diffinitionem quid est, nesciret an est.
Quod est inpossibile, ut ex praedictis patet." See also the texts cited below, n. 29.
25 Aquinas, II Post. Anal., c. 10, lect. 8 (II. 92-114): "[S]upponit [Aristoteles] primo quod
diffinitio sit ratio significatiua ipsius 'quod quid est'. Si autem non posset haberi aliqua alia
ratio rei quam diffinitio, inpossibile esset quod sciremus aliquam rem esse, quin sciremus de
ea 'quid est,' quia inpossibile est quod sciamus rem aliquam esse, nisi per aliquam illius rei
rationem: de eo enim quod est nobis penitus ignotum, non possumus scire si est aut non.
Inuenitur autem aliqua alia ratio rei praeter diffinitionem, que quidem uel est ratio expositiua
significationis nominis, uel est ratio ipsius rei nominatae, altera tamen a diffinitione, quia non
significat 'quid est,' sicut diffinitio, set forte aliquod accidens. Sicut forte inuenitur aliqua ratio,
que exponit quid significathoc nomen 'triangulus'. Et per huiusmodi rationem habentes 'quia
est,' adhuc querimus 'propter quid est,' ut sic accipiamus 'quod quid est'. Set, sicut supra
dictum est, hoc difficile est accipere in illis in quibus nescimus an sint. Et huius difficultatis
causa superius est assignata, quia scilicet, quando scimus rem esse per aliquid rei, non absolute
scimus si est uel non, set solum <secundum> accidens, ut supra expositum est." For the
proposition that one cannot know whether something is without knowing it nominally, see
I Post. Anal., c. 1, lect. 2 (IL 67-69), quoted above, n. 19. Cf. the objection in Thomas
Aquinas, Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate, q. 10, a. 12, sc 4 (II. 84-85), in Aquinas, Opera
omnia, vol. 22: "Praeterea, non potest de aliquo sciri ipsum esse nisi quid ipsum sit
cognoscatur .... "
26 See I Post. AnaL, c. 8, lect. 7 (II. 126-54): "Et <licit [Aristoteles] quod rem aliquam esse
possumus scire absque eo quod sciamus perfecte quid est, dupliciter: uno modo secundum
quod cognoscimus aliquod accidens eius, puta si per uelocitatem motus esrimemus leporem
esse; alio modo per hoc quod cognoscimus aliquid de essencia eius (quod quidem est possibile
in substantiis compositis, ut puta si comprehendamus hominem esse per hoc quod est
rationalis, nondum cognitis aliis que complent essenciam hominis; in suhstantiis uero
simplicibus hoc non contingit, quia non potest cognosci aliquid de substancia simplicis rei nisi
tota cognoscatur, ut patet in IX Methaphisice). Oportet autem quod qui cognoscit aliquam
rem esse per aliquid rei illud cognoscat, et hoc uel est aliquid pret.er essenciam rei, uel aliquid
de essencia ipsius. Et de hoc ponit exemplum, puta si cognoscamus tonittuum esse propter hoc
quia percipimus quendam sonum in nubibus, quod quidem pertinet ad essenciam tonitrui, non
tamen est tota tonitrui essencia, quia non omnis sonus nubium est tonitruum. Et similiter, si
cognoscamus defectum, id est eclipsim solis uel lune, esse, propter hoc quod est quaedam
priuatio luminis, cum tamen non omnis priuatio luminis sit eclipsis. Et eadem ratio est si
aliquis percipiat hominem esse, propt.er hoc quod est quoddamanimal; uel si percipiat animam
esse, propter hoc quod est aliquid se ipsum mouens."

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the term rather than indicating an essence. 27 In On Boethius's De
Trinitate, one finds the most extended discussion of nominal
definition outside of the Exposition of the Posterior Analytics.
There Aquinas infers properties of nominal definitions that
correspond to the aforementioned characteristics of 'proofs of fact
[quia]': where a definition of an essence, such as of 'human',
through genus and specific difference is lacking, a nominal
definition describes it generically by using a proximate or remote
genus, and supplies for differentiae some outwardly perceptible
accidents. 28 And, just as Aristotle takes the definition of 'what x is'
to be the middle term in proofs of the reasoned fact, so Aquinas
makes explicit that the nominal definition serves as the middle
term in existential proofs. 29 Through nominal definitions using a
remote genus or perceptible accidents, proof 'that x is' is possible
without {yet) knowing x's essence. 30
27 II Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1: "[E]arum [privationum et negationum] etiam potest esse
aliquis modus definitionis incompletissimus, qui est quasi exponens nominis significationem,
non essentiam indicans, quam nullam habet." Cf. ill Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 2, qcla. 1, ad 3.
In Post. Anal. 2. 7 [Wallies,
Philoponus speaks of a 'nominal definition' (0p1oµcx;
ed., 360.4]; 2.10 [Wallies, ed., 372.9-19]).
28 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 (II. 114-26, 156-76), quoted in nn. 23, 68.
29 N Phys., c. 7, lect. 10 (n. 2 {507]): "Dicit [Aristoteles] ergo primo quod, cum dictum
sit quod quidam posuerunt vacuum esse, quidam vero negaverunt; ad cognoscendum qualiter
se habeat veritas, oportet accipere tanquam principium, quid significet nomen vacui. Sicut
enim cum dubitatur an aliqua passio insit alicui subiecto, oportet accipere pro principio quid
sit res, ita cum dubitatur de aliquo an sit, oportet accipere pro medio quid significet nomen.
Quaestio enim quid est sequitur quaestionem an est." Aquinas formulates the following
principle as the basis of an objection in ScG I, c. 12 (para. 4): "Item. Si principium ad
demonstrandum an est, secundum artem Philosophi, oportet accipere quid significet nomen .
. . . " See also ibid. (para. 8), and STh I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, quoted in nn. 14, 45.
30 A complete account of Aquinas's logic would show that his doctrine on nominal
definition as a middle term in the proof 'that x is' is an instance of the general principle that
knowledge of 'what x is' is the middle for knowing 'that x is' ("cognoscere quid est est
principium ad sciendum quia est" [III Sent., d. 23, q., 1, a. 2]). The other instance would be
knowing 'that x is' through the real definition, a proof of existence that follows upon the
arrival at a real definition of 'what xis'. In addition to texts quoted in nn. 23 and 37, see
especially VIMetapbys., c. 1, lect. 1 (1151): "[E]iusdem scientiae est determinare quaestionem
an est, et manifestare quid est. Oportet enim quod quid est accipere ut medium ad
ostendendum an est. Et utraque estconsideratio philosophi, qui considerat ens inquantum ens.
Et ideo quaelibet scientia particularis supponit de subiecto suo, quia est, et quid est, ut dicitur
in primo Posteriorum."

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C) 'When a Cause Is Demonstrated through an Effect, It Is
Necessary to Use the Effect in Place of the Definition of the Cause
in Order to Prove That the Cause Exists, and This Occurs
Especially in the Case of God."
We have seen that in Aquinas's appropriation of Aristotelian
methodology, (1) if something's existence is not evident in
experience, it may be possible to prove its existence by reasoning
from effects to causes; and (2) since the question "Does x exist?"
precedes the question "What is x?," such a proof must use a
definition that precedes the proper inquiry into quiddity: it must
use a nominal definition. The question now arises: if one must
prove the existence of something immaterial such as God, how
will the nominal definition be formed?
1. The Proof of God's Existence and Nominal Definition in the
Commentary Tradition. Some discussion of the proof in question
is found in the commentary tradition. Existential proofs of
imperceptible things through nominal definitions are frequently
called proofs through effects or 'signs' of their cause. 31 Themistius, followed by Grosseteste, observes that there is no strict
demonstration of god as of a reasoned fact, since god is without
cause. 32 Instead, according to Themistius, employing Aristotle's
terminology (at Post. Anal. 2.8.93a22-23), the proof of god or
gods is through 'something of' god: namely, through the fact that
there is healing, fulfilled prophecy, or everlasting motion (i.e.,
through effects). 33 In this, as in other cases, the nominal definition
31 See especially Albert, Post. Anal. 2.1.3 Gammy, ed., 1:614b); also Themistius, In Post.
Anal. 2.2 (Wallies, ed., 43.30-44.2); Grosseteste, In Post. Anal. 2.2 (11. 460-71 and 589-617).
The language of "demonstration through signs" is evident in Averroes, with roots in the Greek
commentators; see Elamrani-Jamal, "La demonstration du signe selon lbn Rushd," 113-31;
Donald Morrison, "Philoponus and Simplicius on Tekmeriodic Proof," in Method and Order
in Renaissance Philosophy of Nature: The Aristotle Commentary Tradition, ed. D. Di Lascia,
E. Kessler, C. Methuen (Hampshire, Great Britain: Aldershot, 1997), 1-22.
32 Themistius, In Post. Anal. 2.9 (Wallies, ed., 50.29-51.1); Grosseteste, In Post. Anal. 2.2
(11. 460-71).
33 Themistius, In Post. Anal. 2.8 (Wallies, ed., 49.21-16, on 93a22-23);2.9 (Wallies, ed.,
50.29-51.2). For the proper interpretation ofThemistius in the classical context, see especially
the forthcoming paper by Owen Goldin, "Two Traditions in the Ancient Posterior Analytics
Commentaries."

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217

is for Themistius the principle or basis of all inquiry. 34 Grosseteste
adds that the proof of the first uncaused cause is a 'proof of fact'
from effects, and that it belongs to metaphysics. 35
2. Aquinas on the Nominal Definition of 'God' through an
Effect. Within the commentary tradition, however, Aquinas is the
first to reflect in detail on the contents of a nominal definition in
an existential proof and to apply this reflection to the case of
God. In particular, he infers that such nominal definitions should
contain an effect of what is being defined. We find this inference
first in On Boethius's De Trinitate, and it is reiterated, as we shall
see, in both Summae in preparation for the five ways. I divide my
discussion into three parts, laying out the major texts.
a. On Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 1, a. 2: An Effect as Middle
Term. In question 1 of On Boethius's De Trinitate, Aquinas first
states the general principle: in existential proof of unobservable
things, the cognition of the effect stands as a principle for
knowing whether the cause exists. 36 By contrast, in the typical
case of a thing whose essence is known through abstraction from
experience, the essence serves as the middle term in a 'propter
quid proof' 'that it is'. 37 In unobservable things, however, the
form of the effect serves as middle term. Aquinas writes:
34 Themistius, In Post. Anal. 2.7 (Wallies, ed., 48.11-17). Caution is needed, of course, in
accepting statements from the discussion of the aporetic chapters 3-7 of book 2.
35 Grosseteste, In Post. Anal. 2.2 (II. 460-71, especially 464-66): "Demonstratur tamen in
metaphysica per effectum de prima causa quia est.... "
36 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2 (II. 89-92): "[E]t sic se habet cognitio effectus ut
principium ad cognoscendum de causa an est, sicut se habet quiditas ipsius causae, cum per
suam formam cognoscitur."
37 That the essence is the middle in an existential demonstration, Aquinas presents as part
of an objection: namely, since God's essence cannot be known, it appears that there can be
no middle term in syllogistic reasoning about God: "[Q]uid est est medium demonstrandi an
est et ornnes alias rei conditiones" (Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2, obj. 5 (II. 32-33); cf. q. 6,
a. 3 (II. 52-76). Aquinas follows Grosseteste in affirming two kinds of existential proof, a 'quia
proof through nominal definition prior to knowledge of an essence, and a 'propter quid proof
through the essence as middle term. See III Sent., d. 24, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 2, ad 2; ScG III, c. 50
(para. 4, "Adhuc. Sicut"); II Post. Anal., c. 8, lect. 7 (II. 27-92, 171-80); VI Metaphys., c. 1,
lect. 1 (1151), quoted above, n. 30; Grosseteste, In Post. Anal. 2.2 (II. 488-512 [on 2. 7.92b1525], 589-619 [on 2.8.93a17-22]). Cf. David Twetten, "To Which 'God' Must a Proof of
God's Existence Conclude for Aquinas?" in Laudemus Viros Gloriosos: Essays in Medieval
Philosophy in Honor of Armand Augustine Maurer, C.S.B., ed. R. E. Houser (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, forthcoming), at nn. 64-70.

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

[W]hen something is known, not through its own form, but through its effect,
the form of the effect talces the place of the form of the thing: and therefore
from the effect itself it is known 'whether the cause exists'. 38

b. On Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 3: The Reason Why an
Effect Enters the Nominal Definition. According to the
prescription we have just seen, in existential proof of unobservable things, an effect stands as a middle term. Hence, an effect
enters into the nominal definition used as a syllogistic medium in
such proof. But why must Aquinas resort to this prescription in
the case of the nominal definition of 'God'? Why cannot God's
existence be proved in a 'quia proof' using a remote genus or
accidental differences? Aquinas would allow such nominal
definitions in the case of originally knowing that 'human' exists, 39
or, more plausibly, in the case of a lunar eclipse, what is proved
to exist as the 'privation of the moon's light'. 40 Yet, he argues, if
corruptible and incorruptible bodies for Aristotle do not share the
same genus, much less does God share a genus with other things. 41
Furthermore, God has no accidents since he is simple in nature.
Each of these two points will be properly proved after knowing
that God is. But the fact that they are traditional claims, and that
one may plausibly ask how one might prove the existence of
something that is not in a genus and that lacks accidents, suggests
the need for another approach to defining nominally in such
cases. Aquinas proposes, not the 'way of similitude', as he calls it,
but the 'way of causality'. 42 Although effects that belong to a
different genus from their cause do not suffice to make known
38 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2, ad 5 (II. 183-86): "quando aliquid non cognoscitur per
formam suam set per effectum suum, forma effectus supplet locum forme ipsius rei: et ideo
ex ipso effectu scitur an causa sit." Cf. ibid., q. 6, a. 4, ad 2 (II. 171-74): "[D]iffinito effectus
accipitur ut principium ad demonstrandum causam esse, et aliquas conditiones eius, quamvis
quiditas cause sit semper ignota."
39 According to Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 (ll. 117-29) (quoted above, n. 23), the
investigator into the definition of 'human' presupposes that human exists as known under
some nominal definition through remote genus and accidental difference ("featherless biped?"
cf. VII Metaphys., c. 7, lect. 14 [1599]).
40 II Post. Anal., c. 8, lect. 7 (II. 126-54, 171-82).
41 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 (II. 77-81, 133-59).
42 Ibid. (II. 81-89).

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219

'what is' their cause, nevertheless they do suffice to indicate
'whether it is'. 43 In this life, reiterates Aquinas following John of
Damascus, we do know not 'what God is', but only 'whether he
• ' 44

lS •

c. Aquinas's Summae: Nominal Definition through an Effect.

The claim of On Boethius's De Trinitate regarding the nominal
definition of 'God' is also summarized by Thomas prior to the five
ways in Summa contra Gentiles, induding the comparison to
demonstrations of fact, as in the commentary tradition:
In arguments by which it is demonstrated that God exists, it is not necessary to
take as the middle term the divine essence or quiddity, as the second [objection]
proposed. But in place of the quiddity, an effect is taken as the middle, as
happens in 'demonstrations quia'. And, from such an effect is derived the
meaning [ratio] of this name 'God'. 45

Similarly, before the five ways of the Summa Theologiae Aquinas
twice explains that we use an effect in place of a real definition in
demonstrations about God. The point applies not only to
philosophical demonstrations that are part of the science of
theology, but also to strictly theological demonstrations:
Although we are not able to know about God 'what x is', nevertheless in this
[sacred] doctrine we use an effect of [God], either of nature or of grace, in place
of a definition, for those things that are considered about God in this doctrine;

43 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2 (IL 81-95); q. 6, a. 2 (II. 123-27); q. 6, a. 3 (II. 70-97);
cf. III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, quoted above, n. 21.
44 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2, c. and ad 2 (II. 64-80, 89-95, 105-7, 139-42) (see below,
n. 64); q. 6, a. 3 (IL 93-113) (see below, n. 68). See also I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 1, with the
ascription to Darnascene; III Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2; De Verit., q. 2, a. 1, obj. 9 {II. 61-63); q.
10, a. 12, ad sc 7 (II. 303-11); ScG TI!, c. 50 (para. 4, "Adhuc. Sicut"); STh I-ll, q. 3, a. 8; John
of Damascus, De fide orthodoxa 4 (IL 3-5); Albert:, Super De div. nom., c. 1 (Cologne ed., p.
32.12-22); c. 7 (Cologne ed., p. 356.40-65). For the distinction between knowledge "that
God is" and ignorance of "what is his essence," see John Chrysostom, Sur fincomprehensibilite
de Dieu, 2d ed., ed. A.-M. Malingrey (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1970), 1:1.291-94.
45 ScG I, c. 12 (para. 8): "In rationibus autem quibus demonstratur Deum esse, non oportet
assumi pro medio divinam essentiam sive quiddit:atem, ut secunda ratio proponebat: sed loco
quidditatis accipitur pro medio effectus, sicut accidit in demonstrationibus quia; et ex
huiusmodi effectu smnitur ratio huius nominis Deus." For the comparison of existential proof
to demonstrations of fact, cf. above at nn. 22, 28, and 31-35.

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DAVID B. TWETTEN

just as in some philosophical sciences, something is demonstrated about a cause
through an effect by taking an effect in place of the definition of the cause. 46

D) Resume and Conclusion
Aquinas's Aristotelian method mandates, as we have seen, that
one know 'that x is' before properly investigating x's definition
and demonstrating x's properties. Therefore, if one must prove
'that x is', the proof has to use a notion of x as a middle term that
falls short of a proper definition of 'what x is': the proof uses a
definition of the term 'x', or a nominal definition. And, since the
only proof possible for immaterial things proceeds from
perceptible effects to their cause, the proof of God's existence
uses a nominal definition of 'God' that is expressed through an
effect. Aquinas draws this conclusion by comparing existential
arguments to quia proofs through a remote genus or perceptible
effects.
Thus far we have laid out the logical grounds for the nominal
definition of 'God' in an existential proof. Yet these grounds
contain only a general criterion for what precisely a nominal
definition of 'God' would be: that it be derived from an effect. In
part III we shall see how Aquinas arrives at further specification
on the only occasion when he explicitly and systematically
formulates a definition of 'God' (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2). Still,
one conclusion may already be drawn. Unlike for many Thomists,
the question "Does God exist?" is for Thomas a philosophical
theme and does not necessarily presuppose faith in revelation. 47
The use of a nominal definition of 'God' to initiate a proof, far

46 STh I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1: "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, licet de Deo non possimus
scire quid est, utimur tamen eius effectu, in hac doctrina, vel naturae vel gratiae, loco
definitionis, ad ea quae de Dea in hac doctrina considerantur, sicut et in aliquibus scientiis
philosophicis demonstratur aliquid de causa per effectum, accipiendo effectum loco
definitionis causae." For the limitations on knowing what God is even through revelation, see
Aquinas, Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 (II. 94-113). The other passage on the definition of
'God' through an effect in Summa Theologiae I has already been quoted (see above, n. 14).
47 In addition ton. 7 above, cf. M.-D. Philippe, De I'etre aDieu: De la philosophie premiere
a la sagesse (Paris: Tequi, 1977), 309-15.

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221

from begging the question in philosophy, 48 is precisely the proper
philosophical approach, and only for that reason is it also
appropriated within Aquinas's science of revealed theology. 49
Ill. AQUINAS'S DEVELOPMENT OF A NOMINAL DEFINITION OF
'GOD' AND ITS DIONYSIAN BACKGROUND

Aquinas's formula for 'God' in question 13, article 8 of the
Prima Pars, although a unique instance, does not arise in a
vacuum. Rather, it has at its foundation the Aristotelian logic of
nominal definition, especially for existential arguments. Based on
this alone, it is clear why Aquinas introduces the phrase 'principle
of all' (effects) into his formula 'something that is existing above
all things, which is the principle of all things and is removed from
all things'. But what is curious, and apparently without rationale,
is his use of Dionysius's triplex via50 in the formula: the ways of
eminence, causality, and negation or 'remotion'. 51 In fact, it may
48 For Victor White, the five ways do not and cannot presuppose any conception of what
the word 'God' means, do not and cannot use a nominal definition of 'God' as a middle term.
The meaning of 'God' is only discovered in the conclusion of the arguments. See Victor
White, God the Unknown, and Other Essays (New York: Harper, 1956), 56-60
49 See, by contrast, Finili, "Is There a Philosophical Approach to God?" 81-86; O'Brien,
"Reflexion on God's Existence," 380-91; cf. also Philippe, De fetre a Dieu, 315, 428-29;
Stephane-Marie Barbellion, Les "Preuves" de fexistence de Dieu: Pour une relecture des cinq
voies de saint Thomas tfk]uin (Paris: Cerf, 1999),_278-80.
50 Here I make no attempt, of course, to discuss Dionysius in himself or to defend the Latin
ascription to him of a triplex via. Dionysius usually speaks of two ways of affirmation and
removal, but it is clear that his negative way also involves a negation within an affirmation,
which results in the affirmation of hyper-attributes; see Fran O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and
the Metaphysics of kjuinas (Leiden: Brill, 1992), 14-17, 34. For the triplex via in Albert, see
Albert, Super De div. nom., c. 7 (Cologne ed., p. 358.34-86); Francis Ruello, Les ""Noms
divins" et leurs "raisons" selon Saint Albert le Grand, commentateur du "De divinis
nominibus" (Paris: Vrin, 1963), 90-96; and Catania, "'Knowable' and 'Namable' in Albert,"
120-23.
51 Aquinas presents the three members of the triplex via on some twenty-four occasions in
at least five different orders. See, in addition to nn. 58-59 below, Michael Ewbank, "Diverse
Orderings of Dionysius's Triplex Via by St. Thomas Aquinas," Mediaeval Studies 52 (1990):
82-109. To Ewbank's list one might add: to Order C, Aquinas, De Potentia, q. 9, a. 7, in
Thomas Aquinas, Quaestiones disputatae, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin-Rome: Marietti, 1953),
vol. l; In De Div. Norn., c. 1, lect. 3 (79, 83, 85, 102); to Order E, STh II-II, q. 27, a. 4; to
Order A, Thomas Aquinas, Lectura romana in primum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi, ed. L.

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DAVID B. TWETTEN

seem as if the Dionysian element, so foreign to the Aristotelian,
results from Aquinas's eclecticism, or, at best, from his haphazard
composition. I propose to show, however, that the Summa's
doctrine turns out to be a simplification, consolidation, and
extension of ideas that Aquinas sketched in his earliest works as
a master of theology. I lay out the texts, following an historical
order, in four sections. Aquinas's approach to the divine, at once
Dionysian and Aristotelian,5 2 turns out to be part of a larger
project that, like Albert's, has been difficult for scholars to
identify and evaluate, governed as we are by traditional
historiographical categories. 53
E. Boyle and J. F. Boyle (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, forthcoming), d.
3, q. 1, a. 2, ad 2; also one might subtract STh I, q. 8, a. 1, ad 1; and ScG I, c. 14. Cf. also the
orders in In De Div. Norn., c. 2, lect. 1 (n. 126); Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 4 (ll. 86-94),
quoted below, n. 66.
52 See especially the remarks of Edward Booth, Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology in Islamic
and Christian Thinkers (Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983), 22127, 236-52, 262-65, 269; and Wayne Hankey, God in Himself: Aquinas's Doctrine of God as
Expounded in the "Summa theologiae" (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987), 9-12,46-51;
idem, "Aquinas and the Platonists," in The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages: A
Doxographic Approach, ed. S. Gersh and M. Hoenen (Berlin and New York: Walter de
Gruyter, 2002), 279-324, at 310-319; idem, "Ab uno simplici non est nisi unum: The Place
of Natural and Necessary Emanation in Aquinas's Doctrine of Creation," in Omnia in
Sapientia: Essays on Creation in Honour of the Rev. Dr Robert D. Crouse, ed. W. Otten, W.
Hannam, and M. Treschow (Leiden: Brill, 2002). Booth gives a "Scholastic" reading of
Dionysius; Aristotelian Aporetic Ontology, 54, 77-79; see the forthcoming work of John Do
Jones, "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Understanding Pseudo-Dionysius
Areopagite," The Thomist 69 (2005).
53 For Aquinas and Dionysius on the divine, see also Heinrich Weertz, Die Gotteslehre des
Ps. Dionysius Areopagita und ihre Einwirkung auf Thomas von Aquin (Cologne: Theissing,
1908); Jean Durante!, Saint Thomas et le Pseudo-Denis (Paris: Felix Akan, 1919); Walter M.
Neid!, Thearchia: Die Frage nach dem Sinn van Gott bei Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und
Thomas van Aquin (Regensburg: Habbel, 1976); Rolf Schonberger, Nomina divina: zur
theologischen Semantik bei Thomas von Aquin (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1981);
Ignacio E. M. Andereggen, La metaffsica de Santo Tomas en la "Exposici6n sobre el De divinis
nominibus" de Dionisio Areopagita (Buenos Aires: Universidad Cat6lica Argentina, 1989);
idem, "El conocimiento de Dios en la exposici6n de Tomas de Aquino sabre el De divinis
nominibus de Dionisio Areopagita," Sapientia 45 (1990): 269-76; Harry C. Marsh, Cosmic
Structure and the Knowledge of God: Thomas Aquinas's "In librum beati Dionysii De divinis
nominibus expositio (Ph.D. diss., Vanderbilt University, 1994); Paulo Faitanin, "La huella de
la en6seos tes theias de Dionisio en la doctrina de la incomunicabilidad divina de Tomas de
Aquino, Anuario Filos6fico 33 (2000): 593-605.

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223

A) The "Triplex via" and the Proofs of God's Existence: The
Scriptum on the Sentences
There are four stages to the doctrinal development that
culminates in the above formula for 'God' (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad
2). The first is marked by Aquinas's use of Dionysius's threefold
path to God in book 1 of his Scriptum on the Sentences. We know
from internal and external evidence that Thomas was already very
familiar with the Dionysian corpus by the time he began
composing his Scriptum in Paris in 1252. Albert, while still in
Paris in 1247 or 1248, had taken up his project of commenting on
the corpus prior both to finishing his own commentary on the
Sentences and to starting his Aristotelian paraphrases. Aquinas
copied by hand Albert's commentaries on the Celestial Hierarchy
and the Divine Names, in addition to attending Albert's course in
Cologne on the Divine Names. 54 Aquinas's early works frequently
cite each of Dionysius's five works very closely, and the Scriptum
alone has over seven hundred citations. One passage there gives
striking witness to the early Aquinas's Albertian project:
Dionysius, remarks Thomas, "nearly everywhere follows Aristotle,
as is dear to one who diligently examines his books. "55 Thomas
54 Jean-Pierre Torrell, in Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personrre et son reuvre
(Fribourg: Editions Universitaires, 1993), 31-38; Leonard Boyle, "An Autograph of St.
Thomas at Salerno," in Liuera, Sensus, Sententia: Studia in onore del Prof. Clemente J.
Vansteenkiste, ed. A. Lobato (Milan: Universitas S. Thomae in Urbe, 1990), 117-34.
55 Aquinas, II Sent., cl. 14, q. 1, a. 2. Recall that the early Aquinas takes the Liberdecausis,
as does Albert, to be in some way Aristotelian in origin; see I Sent., d. 8, q. 1, a. 3, sc 1; I
Sent., d. 42, q. 1, a. 2, sc 2; and as late as De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, obj. 6; see also Alain De Libera,
"Albert le Grand et Thomas d'Aquin interpretes du Liber de causis," Revue des sciences
philosophiques et tbeologiques 74 (1990): 34 7-78. Even when the late Aquinas, as in De Malo,
emphasizes Dionysius's Platonic side, this does not mean that he ceases to see him as agreeing
with Aristotle; see Aquinas, De Malo, q. 16, a. 1, ad 3 (II. 388-90), in Aquinas, Opera omnia,
vol. 23; Hankey, "Aquinas and the Platonists," 311, 314; cf. Robert]. Henle, Saint Thomas
and Platonism: A Study of the Plato and Platonici Texts in the Writings of Saint Thomas (The
Hague: M. Nijhoff, 1956), 383-84. For the Liber de causis as Dionysian, including in
Aquinas's eyes, see Cristina D'Ancona Costa, Recherches sur le "Liberde Causis" (Paris: Vrin,
1995), especially 239-52; cf. also Henle, Saint Thomas and Platonism, 384, 424-25; Giinther
Poltner, "The Importance of Dionysius for St. Thomas Aquinas's Comprehension of Being,"
Diotima 23 (1995): 128-32.

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also contrasts Dionysius with Basil, Augustine, and many other
divines, all of whom followed Plato in matters philosophical.
Of particular interest here is Thomas's 'division of the text' of
Peter Lombard's distinction 3 of book 1, where Peter shows 'how
God' or 'how the creator' is known.
The second part in which [Master Peter] sets forth [his] proof is divided into four
according to the four arguments that he sets forth. Their diversity is taken
according to the ways that Dionysius sets forth of arriving at God from creatures.
For, he says that we arrive at God from creatures in three modes, that is, through
causality, through 'remotion', and through eminence. The reason for this is that
the esse of a creature is from another; hence, according to this [fact] we are led
to the cause by which [it] exists. But this can be in two ways: either with respect
to what is received-and so we are led through the mode of causality; or with
respect to the mode of receiving, because [what is received] is received
imperfectly. And in this way we have two modes: according to the removal of an
imperfection from God; and according to the fact that what is received in the
creature is more perfectly and nobly in the creator-such is the mode of
eminence. 56

Aquinas goes on to explain how Lombard's four arguments fit the
three Dionysian ways. In fact, this passage represents the earliest
account of the proofs of God's existence in Aquinas's corpus. 57
The first argument, he explains, follows the 'way of causality'
insofar as the imperfection and potentiality of creatures reveal
that they receive esse from another. The second argument follows
the 'way of remotion', holding that prior to everything
imperfect-whether a body, by being finite and mobile, or a soul
or angel, by being mutable-there must be something perfect
56 I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, pro!.: "Secunda autem pars in qua ponit [Magister Petrus]
probationem, dividitur in quatuor, secundum quatuor rationes quas ponit. Harum autem
diversitas sumitur secundum vias deveniendi ex creaturis in Deum, quas Dionysius ponit. Dicit
enim quad ex creaturis tribus modis devenimus in Deum: scilicet per causalitatem, per
remotionem, per eminentiam. Et ratio hujus est, quia esse creaturae est ab altero. Uncle
secundum hoc ducimur in causam a qua est. Hoc autem potest esse dupliciter. Aut quantum
ad id quad receptum est; et sic ducimur per modum causalitatis: aut quantum ad modum
recipiendi, quia imperfecte recipitur; et sic habemus duos modos, scilicet secundum
remotionem imperfectionis a Dea et secundum hoc quad illud quad receptum est in creatura,
perfectius et nobilius est in creatore; et ita est modus per eminentiam."
57 See Jules Baisnee, "St. Thomas Aquinas's Proofs of the Existence of God Presented in
Their Chronological Order," in Philosophical Studies in Honor of the Very Reverend Ignatius
Smith, 0. P., ed. John K. Ryan (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1952), 29-64.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

225

which is mingled with no imperfection; and this is God. The third
and fourth arguments follow the 'way of eminence', arguing, as
does the later fourth way of the Summae, from degrees of perfection in reality or in our knowledge to something that possesses
that perfection in a superlative way, because of which the others
are perfect.
What is important is that Aquinas here reads Dionysius's
triplex via as applying to the proof of God's existence, not merely
to the consideration of what God is (not) or of divine names. 58
Furthermore, he accounts for the diversity of the three Dionysian
ways by appeal to the principle-which we have seen above is
Aristotelian-that we are led to a cause through its effects. A
proof of God's existence may focus either on the mere fact of
receiving something from a cause (the 'way of causality'), or on
the imperfect reception of that effect subsequently denied of the
cause (the 'way of remotion'), or on the positive character of what
is imperfectly received, which is surpassingly possessed by the
cause (the 'way of eminence'). Thus, the diversity of the triplex
via is explained by reducing it to three successively complex ways
of proving from effects that a cause exists. 59 Aquinas reiterates his
58 Contrast this passage, for example, with I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 1, where Aquinas uses the
three viae to prove, not that God exists, but that God is a knower. In later passages, the triplex
via is used in the main to discuss divine attributes; cf. De Pot., q. 7, a. 5; and q. 9, a. 7.
Sometimes he explicitly distinguishes the project of proving God's existence from the project
of the triplex via (ScG HI, c. 49 [para. 8]; and ITh l, q. 12, a. 12, quoted below, nn. 80, 93).
In one text, only one of the three ways, causality, leads to God's existence: "Potest tamen
homo, ex huiusmodi creaturis, Deum tripliciter cognoscere, ut Dionysius dicit in libro De
Divinis nominibus. Uno quidem modo per causalitatem. Quia enim huiusmodi creaturae sum
defectibiles et mutabiles, necesse est eas reducere ad aliquod principium immobile et
perfectum. Et secundum hoc cognoscitur de Deo an est. Secundo per viam excellentiae. Non
enim reducuntur omnia in prim um principium, sicut in propriam causam et univocam, prout
homo hominem generat, sed sicut in causam communem et excedentem. Et ex hoc
cognoscitur quod est super omnia. Terrio per viam negationis. Quia si est causa excedens, nihil
eorum quae sum in crearuris potest ei competere, sicut eriam neque corpus caeleste proprie
dicitur grave vel !eve aut calidum aut frigidum. Et secundurn hoc dicimus Deum immobilem
et infinitum ... "In Ad Romanos, c. 1, lect. 6, in Thomas Aquinas, In omnes S. Pauli Apostoli
Epistolas Commentaria (8"' ed.; Turin: Marietti, 1953), vol. 1.
59 This is perhaps the only place in Aquinas's works where he justifies a certain order to
the triplex via: causality, negation, and eminence. Cf. Ewbank, "Diverse Orderings of Triplex
Via," 89-92; Hankey, God in Himself, 71-72. The passage supports O'Rourke's contention
that for Aquinas, as for Dionysius, the triplex via is a threefold variation on the theme of

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finding in the subsequent article 3, where he asks "Can God be
known by a human through creatures?" He writes:
I respond that it should be said that since creatures proceed exemplarily from
God himself just as from a cause [that is] in a certain way similar [to them] by
analogy, it is possible to arrive at God from creatures in those three
aforementioned modes, that is, through causality, remotion, and eminence. 60

Finally, Aquinas's Scriptum on the Sentences, as we have
already seen, makes no mention of nominal definition in the
context of the proof for God's existence. But it does lay down, in
an objection, at least, the principle that becomes crucial for the
final stage in his development of a nominal definition of 'God':
we only know God through effects, either by way of causality,
negation, or eminence; therefore we can only name God from
effects. 61
In sum, Aquinas's earliest approach to the project of proving
God's existence is already Dionysian in character. In his Parisian
Scriptum on the Sentences, he reads the proof of God's existence
in light of the triplex via, and he reads the triplex via in light of
the proof of a first efficient cause.

B) The Application of the Triplex via' to the Project of Nominal
Definition: On Boethius's De Trinitate and Summa contra
Gentiles I
The second and the most important stage in Aquinas's
development of his Dionysian formula for 'God' is worked out in
causality; see O'Rourke, Pseudo-Dionysius and the Metaphysics of Aquinas, 32, 36.
60 I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3: "Respondeo dicendurn, quod, cum creatura exemplariter
procedat ab ipso Deo sicut a causa quodammodo simili per analogiam, ex creaturis potest in
Deurn deveniri tribus illis modis quibus dictum est, scilicet per causalitatem, remotionem,
eminentiam." Aquinas's early expression contradicts his later qualification that effects are
similar to God, but not vice versa; see STh I, q. 4, a. 3, ad 4; and below, n. 64.
61 I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 2, arg 2: "Praeterea, Deurn non possumus nominare, nisi secundurn
quod ipsurn cognoscimus. Sed non cognoscimus ipsurn nisi ex effectibus suis, vel per viam
causalitatis, vel per viam negationis, vel per viam eminentiae. Ergo non potest nominari a
nobis nisi ex creaturis." Cf. &GI, c. 12 (para. 8); and STh I, q. 13, a. 1, quoted below, nn.
75, 99.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

227

On Boethius's De Trinitate (ca. 1257). In three different articles,
including two from question 1, Aquinas uses Dionysius's triplex
via to expand on his Aristotelian account of how we reason to
God from effects. In what follows I take up each of these articles
in turn. Then I show how this Dionysian expansion is reflected in
the approach to God of the subsequent Summa contra Gentiles.
1. On Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 1, a. 2: The 'Triplex via' and
Reasoning from Effects. After concluding, as we have seen, that in
this life we only know God as a cause of effects, and therefore
that we only know 'that God is', 62 Aquinas proceeds in question
1 to qualify this conclusion by admitting degrees of this
knowledge. Every effect (in the quia proof 'that God is'), he
observes, is related to God as to its cause. 63 Nevertheless, insofar
as one better apprehends the relation (habitudo) of the cause to its
effect, the cause is more perfectly known from the effect. 64 In
every effect that is not in the same species as its cause, he explains
(in a way reminiscent of I Sent., d. 3), three features can be
noticed in its relation (habitudo) to its cause: the "progression" of
the effect from the cause (or the very fact that the effect proceeds
from the cause), the fact that the effect follows a likeness in its
cause, and the fact that it fails to follow this likeness perfectly. As
a result, argues Thomas, the human mind advances in three ways
in the cognition, not of what God is, but of 'that God is': first,
insofar as God's efficacy in producing things is more perfectly
known; next, according as God is known as cause of more noble
62 See above, nn. 43-44.
63 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2 (II. 92-93). See above, nn. 36-38.
64 Ibid. (II. 96-113): "Et tamen unus cognoscentium quia est, alio perfectius cognoscit:
quia causa tanto ex effectu perfectius cognoscitur, quanta per effectum magis appreenditur
habitudo cause ad effectum. Que quidem habitudo in effectu non pertingente ad equalitatem
sue cause attenditur secundum tria: scilicet secundum progressionem effectus a causa, et
secundum hoc quod effectus consequitur de similitudine sue cause, et secundum hoc quod
deficit ab eius perfecta consequtione. Et sic tripliciter mens humana proficit in cognitione Dei,
quamuis ad cognoscendum quid est non pertingat set an est solum: primo secundum quod
perfectius cognoscitur eius efficacia in producendo res; secundo prout nobiliorum effectuum
causa cognoscitur, qui cum eius similitudinem aliquam gerant, magis eminentiam eius
commendant; tertio in hoc quod magis ac magis cognoscitur elongatus ab omnibus his que in
effectibus apparent. Unde dicit Dionisius in libro De diuinis nominibus quod cognoscitur ex
omnium causa et excessu et ablatione."

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

effects that bear some similitude to him, and thus better
communicate his eminence; and, finally, as he is more and more
known to be distant from all that appears in his effects. Aquinas
concludes that this is why Dionysius affirms that God is known by
being cause of all, by excess, and by 'ablation'. 65
2. On Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 1, a. 4: Three Divine
Designations. In article 2, Aquinas links the Dionysian triplex via
in the path to God's existence (found also in the Scriptum on the
Sentences) with the Posterior Analytics's 'quia reasoning' from
effects to the existence of their cause. A subsequent passage in
article 4 similarly presents the triplex via as a systematic
explication of the relation to effects that results from such causal
reasonmg:
[We] know God in the wayfarer state only from effects, as can be evident from
what has been previously said. And for this reason, by natural reason we are able
to know about God only what is perceived about him from the relation
[habitudo] of effects to him, such as those things that designate his causality and
his eminence beyond caused things, and that remove from him the imperfect
conditions of effects. 66

This passage also contains a new element: it speaks of the terms
known about God ('those things that designate ... ') and divides
them into three groups, each characterized by a different relation
to effects that corresponds to one of the three Dionysian ways. As
we shall see, Aquinas in the next stage explicitly formulates titles
of the Deity linked to each of the three ways.
3. On Boethius's De Trinitate, q. 6, a. 3: Negation, Causality,
and Eminence in the Nominal Definition. The two passages from
question 1 of On Boethius's De Trinitate use the Dionysian triplex
via to expand on an Aristotelian account of the logic for arriving
at God's existence through effects, even mentioning the conse65 Aquinas's words follow John Sarracen's translation of the Divine Names, quoted below,
n. 87.
66 Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 4 (II. 86-94): "Quod patet ex hoc quod Deum non
cognoscimus in statu uie nisi ex effectibus, ut ex predictis patere potest; et ideo naturali
ratione de Deo cognoscere non possumus nisi hoc quod percipitur de ipso ex habitudine
effectuum ad ipsum, sicut ilia que designant causalitatem ipsius et eminentiam super causata,
et que remouent ab ipso imperfectas conditiones effectuum."

AQUINAS'S DEFINffiON OF 'GOD'

229

quences of this on our theological terminology. Still, neither
passage directly applies Dionysius to the project of nominal
definition. This most significant development lies in question 6,
article 3. As we have seen, Aquinas argues there that in order to
know whether an incorporeal thing, such as God, exists, one must
use a nominal definition that is drawn from an effect, rather than
one, as in the case of corporeal things, that contains a remote
genus and a difference drawn from perceptible accidents. 67
Aquinas proceeds to expand on this possibility, using Dionysius.
He proposes that we use broad negations of things in our
experience in the place of a genus, such as 'immaterial',
'incorporeal', etc. 68 And, in the place of a differentia, he makes
two proposals: first, successively narrower negations, each of
which serves to contract the original negation, and so make our
cognition less 'confused' and more 'determinate'. Second, in place
of perceptible accidents, he proposes two relations (habitudines)
to perceptible things: either one that involves a comparison of
cause to effect, or one that involves a comparison of 'excess'.
Aquinas concludes:
In this way, therefore, we know the 'an est' of immaterial forms; and in place of
cognition 'quid est' we have cognition through negation, through causality, and

through 'excess', the very modes that Dionysius affirmed in the book On Divine
Names. 69

See above, at n. 28 and at nn. 36-44.
Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 (II. 156-68, 172-81): "Et ideo non possumus
dicere quod confusa cognitione cognoscantur a nobis substanrie immateriales per cognirionem
generis et apparentium accidentium, set loco cognitionis generis habemus in istis substantiis
cognitionem per negariones, ut cum scimus quod huiusmodi substantie sunt immateriales,
incorporee, non habentes figuras, et alia huiusmodi; et quanto plures negationes de eis
cognoscimus, tanto minus confusa est earum cognitio in nobis, eo quod per negationes
sequentes prior negario contraitur et determinatur, sicut genus remotum per differentias ...
. loco autem accidentium habemus in substantiis predicris habitudines earum ad substantias
sensibiles, uel secundum cornparationem cause ad effectrnn, uel secundum comparationem
excessus. Ita ergo de formis immaterialibus cognoscimus an est, et habemus de eis loco
cognitionis quid est cognirionem per negationem, per causalitatem, et per excessum; quos
etiam modos Dionisius ponit in libro De divinis nominibus."
69 Ibid. (11. 177-81), quoted above, n. 68; on the triplex via, see also ibid., q. 6, a. 2 (Ii.
123-32).
67

68 Aquinas,

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

Thus, it is precisely the Dionysian triplex via that prompts
Aquinas in On Boethius's De Trinitate to develop his notion of the
nominal definition in the case of the proof of God's existence: in
a definition of 'God', negation takes the place of a genus, whereas
further negations and/or relations of causality and eminence take
the place of a specific difference.
4. The Dionysian Project in the Summa contra Gentiles. A
cursory reading might suggest that this elaborate use of Dionysius
in On Boethius's De Trinitate in order to frame a nominal
definition of 'God' has no trace in the subsequent Summae. In the
context of proving God's existence, the Summa Theologiae, for
example, speaks only of drawing the nominal definition from an
effect. 70 Nevertheless, strong marks of this elaborate doctrine are
present in Summa contra Gentiles I-III (1259-63 ). Aquinas retains
the proposal that in place of a genus we use negations, and in
place of a differentia we use successively narrow negations, 71 each
contracting the previous one. 72 Through such a method, even
without knowing 'what x is' we may form a more and more

STh I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1; and STh I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, quoted above, nn. 14, 46.
Cf. also Aquinas, Super De causis, prop. 7 (Saffrey, ed., 49.28-50.2, 50.5-7): "Et ideo
intelligentia quidem notificari potest enarrative sive affirmative quantum ad suum genus, ut
dicatur esse substantia; sed quantum ad differentiam specificam enarrari non potest, sed
oportet quod per negationem nobis notificetur in quantum transcendit totum ordinem
corporalium rerum quibus convenit divisibilitas. . . . Causa autem prima . . . est
supersubstantialis et simpliciter inenarrabilis."
n ScG I, c. 14 (para. 2-3): "Est autem via remotionis utendum praecipue in consideratione
divinae substantiae. . . . [A]liqualem eius habemus notitiam cognoscendo quid non est.
Tantoque eius notitiae magis appropinquamus, quanto plura per intellectum nostrum ab eo
poterimus removere. Tanto enim unumquodque perfectius cognoscimus, quanto differentias
eius ad alia plenius intuemur .... [N. 3] Sed quia in consideratione substantiae divinae non
possumus accipere quid, quasi genus; nee distinctionem eius ab a1iis rebus per affirmativas
differentias accipere possumus, oportet earn accipere per differentias negativas. Sicut autem
in affirmativis differentiis una aliam contrahit, et magis ad completam designationem rei
appropinquat secundum quod a pluribus differre facit; ita una differentia negativa per aliam
contrahitur, quae a pluribus differre facit. Sicut, si dicamus deum non esse accidens, per hoc
ab omnibus accidentibus distinguitur; deinde si addamus ipsum non esse corpus, distinguemus
ipsum etiam ab aliquibus substantiis; et sic per ordinem ab omni eo quod est praeter ipsum,
per negationes huiusmodi distinguetur; et tune de substantia eius erit propria consideratio cum
cognoscetur ut ab omnibus distinctus."
70

71

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

231

'distinct' and 'proper' cognition of a thing. 73 This proposal,
although not used for the project of proving God's existence,
prefaces Thomas's discussion in the Summa contra Gentiles of
'what God is' and gives order to the next fourteen chapters: God
is not in time, not potential, not material, not composite, etc. 74
But what is more, in the project of proving God's existence
Aquinas also retains part of his Dionysian explication of the
nominal definition of 'God'. We have already quoted the passage
from book 1, chapter 12, in which he proposes that in place of
the divine essence the proof of God's existence use as a middle
term an effect, which enters into the nominal definition of 'God'.
Now we may understand the provenance of Aquinas's explanation
of this statement. He writes:
[F]rom such an effect is derived the meaning [ratio] of this name 'God'. For, all
divine names are imposed either from the removal of divine effects from him, or
from some relation [habitudo] of God to his effects.75

Aquinas is merely making a general statement about the origin of
all divine names: all receive their 'imposition to' God in two
ways, either by 'removal', that is, by negating effects as belonging
73 See also ScG ID, c. 39 (para. 1): "Rursus, est quaedam alia dei cognitio, altior quam
praemissa, quae de deo per demonstrationem habetur, per quam magis ad propriam ipsius
cognitionem acceditur: cum per demonstrationem removeantur ab eo multa, per quorum
remotionem ab aliis discretus intelligitur. Ostendit enim demonstratio Deum esse immobilem,
aeternum, incorporeum, omnino simplicem, unum, et alia huiusmodi, quae in libro primo de
Deo ostendimus. Ad propriam autem alicuius rei cognitionem pervenitur non solum per
affirmationes, sed etiam per negationes: sicut enim proprium hominis est esse animal
rationale, ita proprium eius est non esse inanimatum neque irrationale. Sed hoc interest inter
utrumque cognitionis propriae modum, quod, per affirmationes propria cognitione de re
habita, scitur quid est res, et quomodo ab aliis separatur: per negationes autem habita propria
cognitione de re, scitur quod est ab aliis discreta, tamen quid sit remanet ignotum. Talis autem
est propria cognitio quae de deo habetur per demonstrationes."
7• Cf. X Metaphys., c. 3, lect. 4 (1990): "Inde est quod prima rerum principia non
definimus nisi per negationes posteriorum; sicut dicimus quod punctum est, cuius pars non
est; et Deum cognoscimus per negationes, inquantum dicimus Deum incorporeum esse,
immobilem, infinitum."
75 ScG I, c. 12 (para. 8): "[E]t ex huiusmodi effectu sumitur ratio huius nominis Deus. Nam
omnia divina nomina imponuntur vel ex remotione effectuum divinorum ab ipso, vel ex aliqua
habitudine Dei ad suos effectus." For the rest, see above, n. 45.

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to him, or by relating effects to him in some way. 76 Nevertheless,
the mention of' divine names', 'removal', and 'relation' (habitudo)
to 'effects' makes us think of the three Dionysian ways. And it
follows, although Aquinas does not make this explicit, that the
'meaning' of the name 'God', or the nominal definition, will
consist of an effect negated of and/or related to God; for 'God' is
one of the names that is 'imposed to' God. We naturally
understand behind 'relation' both relations of causality, already
implied by 'effects', and relations of 'eminence'. In fact, Aquinas
proceeds in chapter 12, in response to a third objection, to speak
of God's exceeding all perceptible things. 77 Later in book 1,
moreover, Aquinas observes that we can only name God's mode
of 'supereminence' by using a negation, or by using a relation
(relatio), such as in 'first cause' or 'highest good'. 78
In sum, On Boethius's De Trinitate proposes an elaborate
Dionysian expansion on the Aristotelian logic, first, for the quia
proof of God's existence, and second, for the content of the
nominal definition of 'God': negation takes the place of a genus,
whereas further negations and/or relations of causality or
eminence take the place of a specific difference. This expansion is
decidedly mitigated though still strongly reflected in the Summa
contra Gentiles, especially in the apophatic account of the divine
nature, but also in the context of the proofs of God's existence.
According to Aquinas there, the meaning of the term 'God' is
76 For the principle elsewhere that we only name God as we know him, through three
Dionysian ways, see nn. 61, 66, 99.
77 ScG I, c. 12 (para. 9): "Patet etiam ex hoc quod, etsi Deus sensibilia omnia et sensum
excedat, eius tamen effectus, ex quibus demonstratio sumitur ad probandum Deum esse,
sensibiles sunt. Et sic nostrae cognitionis origo in sensu est etiam de his quae sensum
excedunt."
78 ScG I, c. 30 (para. 4): "Modus autem supereminentiae quo in Deo dictae perfectiones
inveniuntur, per nomina a nobis imposita significari non potest nisi vel per negationem, sicut
cum dicimus Deum aeternum vel infinitum; vel etiam per relationem ipsius ad alia, ut cum
dicitur prima causa, vel summum bonum. Non enim de Deo capere possumus quid est, sed
quid non est, et qualiter alia se habeant ad ipsum, ut ex supra dictis patet." Cf. also In De Div.
Norn., c. 2, lect. 1 (126), where Thomas describes one of two kinds of essential names as "ea
quae dicuntur de Deo, remotive per excellentiam quamdam, utsuperbonum, supersubstantiale,
supervivum, supersapiens et quaecumque alia dicuntur de Deo per remotionem, propter sui
excessum."

AQIBNAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

233

taken from an effect: as in all divine names, an effect is 'removed'
from-that is, denied as belonging to-its cause, and/or related in
some way to its cause. As we shall see, the Dionysian expansion
on the nominal definition of 'God' is inherited by the Summa
Theologiae, but in a new systematic context. 79
C) The Formulation of a Triad of Divine Titles: The Summae and
On Dionysius's Divine Names

What is most important about the second stage, for the
purposes of this paper, is that Aquinas links the nominal
definition of 'God' to the triplex via of Dionysius, just as he does
in the later Summa Theologiae (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2). But
unlike in the latter text, Aquinas in On Boethius's De Trinitate
does not use the triplex via to formulate a triad of divine titles for
the definition. The formulation of such a triad, without their
being explicitly incorporated into a definition, marks a third stage
of development. We find this principally in On Dionysius's Divine
Names (ca. 1261-68), but perhaps first in book 3 of the Summa
contra Gentiles (ca. 1262-63). There Aquinas writes: "[T]hrough
effects we know that God exists and that he is the cause of other
things, 'supereminent beyond' other things, and 'removed' from
all things. " 80 He adds that according to Dionysius's Mystical
Theology, this knowledge is the most sublime attainable in this
life, even though 'what God is' remains all the while deeply
unknown. 81
79 See below, at n. 108.
80 ScG ill, c. 49 (para.

8): "Cognoscit tamen substanria separata per suam substantiam de
Deo quia est; et quod est omni um causa; et eminentem omnibus; et remotum ab omnibus, non
solum quae sunt, sed eriam quae mente creata concipi possunt. Ad quam eriam cognitionem
de Deo nos utcumque pertingere possumus: per effectus enim de Deo cognoscimus quia est
et quod causa aliorum est, aliis supereminens, et ab omnibus remotus. Et hoc est ultimum et
perfecrissimum nostrae cognitionis in hac vita, ut Dionysius dicit, in libro De mystica
theologia, cum Deo quasi ignoto coniungimur: quod quidem contingit dum de eo quid non sit
cognoscimus, quid vero sit penitus manet ignotum." A parallel expression is found also among
the deletions in Aquinas's autograph of the same chapter; see Aquinas, Opera omnia, 14: 16b.
81 Cf. III Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. le, where Aquinas refers to the same text of the
Mystical Theology.

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We are not surprised to find an increase in Dionysian formulae
in Aquinas's On Dionysius's Divine Names, where, in apparent
imitation of his master Albert, Thomas comments on Dionysius
prior to launching into his own series of Aristotelian commentaries (ca. 1267-74). In five passages Aquinas presents three titles
for God, titles that correspond to the triplex via, although he uses
varying terminology: (1) 'cause of all'; (2) 'existing beyond all' or
'supereminently'; and (3) 'distinct', 'segregated', 'separated', or
'removed from all'. 82 In at least one of these passages, Aquinas
consciously presents the titles together as a triad: "And the one,
divine itself is cause of all ... and is beyond all by the sublimity
of its nature ... and existing separate from all. " 83 In a second of
these passages, Aquinas follows Dionysius in combining the three
into one formula: "the cause segregated from all according to
complete excess" (unEpoxtj).84
A sixth passage from On Dionysius's Divine Names perhaps
best points to the ultimate source of Aquinas's doctrine on the
triplex via:

82 In addition to the passages quoted in the following two notes, see In De Div. Nam., c.
1, lect. 2 (72): "sicut in causa primordiali, modo ineffabili nobis, propter suam eminentiam .
. . . ab omnibus distinctus et ... super omnia existens." Three other texts list two of the three
titles, following the lemma of Dionysius: In De Div. Nam., c. 1, lect. 3 (98); c. 7, lect. 4
(729); c. 11, lect. 4 (938); see also ill Sent., d. 35, q. 2, a. 2, qcla. 2c. Cf. also In De Div.
Nam., c. 5, leer. 1 (623), where something like the triplex via is programmatic for Dionysius's
discussion.
83 In De Div. Nom., c. 13 (990): "Et ipsum .unum divinum est causa omnium . .. et est
super omnia sublimitate suae naturae et .. '. ab omnibus separatum existens."
84 In De Div. Nam., c. 2, lect. 4 (180): "illi causae quae est segregata ab omnibus rebus
secundum totalem excessum." For the Greek text, see Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita, Corpus
dionysiacum, ed. B. Suchla (Berlin-New York: Walter de Gruyter, 1990-), vol. 1. In two of
the five passages, Aquinas's three titles correspond to three terms found in the lemma from
Dionysius: "qui Deus, cum sit amnium existentium causa, ipse nihil est existentium, non quasi
deficiens ab essendo, sed supereminenter segregatusab omnibus" (In De Div. Nom., c. 1, leer.
3 [83]). "[Qlui est omnium causa, supereminenter omnibus, habet plenitudinem bonitatis
super omnia alia. ••• Designatur etiam quidam excessus, secundum quern Deus ab omnibus
segregatur, quasi superior omnibus existens, •.. ita collocatur super amnia existentia, ille qui
est superior omnibus existentibus, eo quod est causa quaedam imparticipabilis amnium
participantium et participationum: causa enim excedit causata" (In De Div. Nom., c. 12, lect.
1 [955)).

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

235

[Dionysius] says that because we ascend to God from creatures in the ablation
of all and in the excess [of all] and in the cause of all, therefore God is known in
all, just as in effects, and without all, just as removed from all and exceeding
all.85

This text is found in chapter 7, on divine wisdom, where Thomas
himself sees Dionysius systematically raising and answering the
question, How is God known? 86 Dionysius writes:
[W]e must ask how we know God, who is neither intelligible nor perceptible ..
. . Not from his nature, for it is unknown and exceeds all reason and every mind;
but from the order of all things ... to that which is beyond all, we ascend in
power, by a way and an order, in the ablation of all and in the excess [of all] and
in the cause of all.87

In chapter 1, Dionysius had offered the following description of
the Deity known through his apophatic ways: "what is the cause
of all existents, whereas it itself [is] nothing [of them], as
separated supersubstantially from all. "88 Similarly, the Mystical
Theology had spoken of what is the "cause of all," and "superexisting beyond all," corresponding to the threefold ways of
affirmation, negation, and what is beyond both affirmation and
85 In De Div. Norn., c. 7, lect. 4 (731): "Di cit ergo primo quod quia a creaturis in Deum
ascendimus et in omnium ablatione et excessu et in omnium causa, propterea Deus cognoscitur
in omnibus, sicut in effectibus, et sine omnibus, sicut ab omnibus remotus et omnia excedens."
Though this passage technically has only two of the titles in question, the most important two
are present, and the third may be inferred immediately from "cognoscitur in effectis."
86 In De Div. Norn., c. 7, lect. 4 (727, 729).
87 "Praeterea inquirere oportet, quomodo nos cognoscimus deum neque intelligibilem
neque sensibilem neque aliquid universaliter existentium existentem .... /DI Non ex natura
ipsius; ignotum enim est hoc et omnem rationem et mentem excedens; sed ex omnium
totorum ordinatione, sicut ex ipso proposita et imagines quasdam et assimilationes divinorum
ipsius exemplarium habente, ad illud quod est super omnia, via et ordine secundum virtutem
ascendimus in omnium ablatione et excessu et in omnium causa" (Dionysius, Nomina divina
7.3 [869CD, trans. John Sarracen], ed. P. Simon, in Albert, Super De div. nom., c. 7 [Cologne
ed., p. 355.80-84]).
88 "[L]audant ipsum proprie maxime per ablationem a cunctibus existentibus, hoc vere et
supernaturaliter illuminatione docti ex beatissima ad ipsum unitione, quod omnium quidem
est existentium causa, ipsum autem nihil, ut ab omnibus supersubstantialiter segregatum"
(Dionysius, Nomina divina 1.5 (593C), in Albert, Super De div. nom., c. 1 [Cologne ed., p.
30.54-58]). My translation of the Latin finds confirmation in the Greek: "but it itself is no one
[of them] (&Kiev)"

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negation. 89 Thus, Aquinas naturally takes the Divine Names itself
to present a set of titles that correspond to the triplex via.
Aquinas's triad of titles in question 12, article 12 of the Prima Pars
simply picks up this same line of thinking. But it is best to
examine this article 12 after locating it within the theological
context of the Summa Theologiae, and therefore within the
consideration of the fourth and final stage of development.

D) The Tripartite Nominal Definition of 'God' Suited to the
Divine Names: The Summa Theologiae
We begin to see that the quotation from the Prima Pars with
which we began (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2) is not the isolated
passage that it at first appears to be. Beginning with the Scriptum
on the Sentences, Aquinas's project of proving God's existence has
a Dionysian character. In On Boethius' s De Trinitate, Thomas uses
Dionysius to expand on his Aristotelian account of the logic for
the proof of God's existence and the nominal definition of 'God'.
This expansion is reflected in the Summa contra Gentiles, where,
as in On Dionysius's Divine Names, Aquinas also formulates a
Dionysian triad of titles for God. It remains only for the passage
in question (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2) to incorporate such a triad
into a definition. Before returning to this response to the second
objection, we must locate question 13, article 8 in its doctrinal
setting and examine two passages in questions 12 and 13 that
provide particularly important background.
1. The Division of the Prima Pars and the Triplex via' ofSTh
I, q. 12, a. 12. The Prima Pars of the Summa Theologiae presents
itself as concerned with "God according as he is in himself
[secundum quod in se est]" (q. 2, prol.), and therefore, first, with
"what pertains to the divine essence," as distinct from "what
89 "Oportet enim in ipsa [causa omnibus superposita] et omnes existentium ponere et
affirmare positiones, sicut omnium causa, et omnes ipsas magis proprie negare, sicut super
omnia superexistente, et non opinari negationes oppositas esse affirmationibus, sed multo
prius ipsam super privationes esse, quae est super omnem ablationem et positionem"
(Dionysius, Mystica theologia 1.1 [1000B, trans. John Sarracen], ed. P. Simon, in Albert, Super
Dionysii Mysticam theologiam 1 [Albert, Opera omnia, vol. 37.2, p. 457.75-78]).

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

237

pertains to the distinction of persons" (q. 27) and "to the
procession of creatures" (q. 44). Aquinas continues in the same
introductory prologue: "But concerning the divine essence, first
we should consider whether God is; second, how he is, or rather
how he is not; third, we should consider what pertains to his
operation" (q. 2, prol.). Recall, as we have seen, that Aquinas
introduces the criteria for the nominal definition of 'God', as
drawn from an effect, in the context of the question "Does God
exist?" in question 2. 90 By contrast, question 3 begins a new
inquiry, which culminates in question 13. As Aquinas puts it,
"Once it is known 'whether x is', it remains to be inquired 'how
x is' [quomodo sit], in order to know 'what x is'" (q. 3, prol.).
This description could rightly be described as Aristotelian: one
examines the properties of an x that is already known to exist in
order to arrive at its definition. Of course, Aquinas must
immediately qualify such a description in this case: "But because
we cannot know about God 'what x is', but 'what x is not', we
cannot consider about God 'how x is' but rather 'how x is not'"
(quomodo non sit; q. 3 prol.). Aquinas proceeds to subdivide this
inquiry into the threefold consideration: how God is not (qq. 311),91 how he is known by creatures {q. 12), and how he is named
(q. 13).

The central claim of question 12 is a familiar one, which is
developed in a new way in article 4. Aquinas there asks whether
a created intellect can see the divine essence through what is
natural to it. Since what is known, he answers, is in the knower
according to the mode of the knower, no knower by its own
nature can know something that has a higher mode of being than
its own. Hence, what is subsistent esse, namely, God, can be
known naturally only by itself, not by any creature, which receives
esse from another. Since our human mode of knowing is related
to our mode of being, that of a form in individual matter, we by
contrast naturally know only (1) forms that are in individual
90 STh I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, quoted above, nn. 14; see also STh I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1, in n. 46
above.
91 Aquinas can later still refer to this as the consideration of "in what way [qualiter] God
is in himself [secundum seipsum]" (STh I, q. 12, pro!.).

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

matter, through the corporeal sense powers; and (2) universal
forms that are abstracted from individuals given in sensation,
through the incorporeal intellectual powers.
Arride 12 of question 12 asks, then, can we know God in this
life through natural reason? Again, answers Aquinas, our natural
knowledge, talcing its origin from sense, can only extend as far as
it can be led through perceptible things, and therefore not as far
as seeing the divine essence. The reason he now gives is one that
we have seen in On Boethius's De Trinitate: perceptible creatures
are not effects that are sufficient to make known the power of
their cause. 92 But, continues Aquinas,
because [perceptible things] are [God's] effects depending on a cause, we can be
led from them to this: that we know about God 'whether x is', and that we know
about him what necessarily belongs to him [ea quae necesse est ei convenire]
according as he is the first cause of all things, exceeding all of his effects. Hence,
we know about him his relation [habitudo] to creatures, that is, that he is the
cause of aH things; and the difference of creatures from him, that is, that he is
not one of the things that are caused by him, and that these are not removed
from him because of a defect on his part, but because he super-exceeds [them]. 93

This passage now appears remarkable as both a continuation
of and a development beyond passages that we examined in the
previous two stages. First, in continuity with the third stage,
Aquinas alludes to each member of the triplex via, and he lists
three divine tides that correspond to the three Dionysian ways:
(1) "first cause of all" or "cause of all," "not one of the things that
are caused"; (2) "super-exceeding" or "'exceeding aU effects"'; (3)
which are said to be "removed from him. '"94 Second, in continuity
with the second stage, Aquinas singles out two things that are
known about God through effects and that subsume all of the rest
92

See above, n. 43. Cf. also STh I, q. 4, aa. 2-3.

ST'h I, q. 12, a. 12:
quia sunt eius effectus a causa dependentes, ex eis in hoc
perduci possum us, ut cognoscarrms de Deo an est; et ut cognoscamus de ipso ea quae necesse
est ei convenire secundum quod est prima omnium causa, excedens omnia sua causala. Uncle
cognoscimus de ipso habitudinem ipsius ad creaturas, quod scilicet omnium est causa; et
differentiam creaturarum ab ipso, quod scilicet ipse non est aliquid eorum quae ab eo
causantur; et quod haec mm removenttrr ab eo propter eiru; defectwn, sed quia superexcedit."
94 Regarding Aquinas's terminology, compare, for example, the quotation from ihe Divine
Names, above, n. 88.
93

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

239

that is known: relation (habitudo) to creatures, and the
"difference of creatures from God," which includes differences by
way of negation and eminence. Similarly, the Summa contra
Gentiles (I, c. 12) had singled out relation to and removal of
effects, thereby encapsulating the expansion on 'relation'
(habitudo) of cause to effect in triadic terms that was initiated in
On Boethius's De Trinitate (q. 1, a. 2, a passage whose roots lie,
in turn, in I Sent., d. 3). 95
The third point regards, by contrast, what is novel. Aquinas
places the three divine titles and this expansion on effects within
a new context, one reducible neither to the question "Does x
exist?" nor to 'what is x?' No longer does Aquinas insist that all
that we can know about God is an sit, or that we only know 'what
God is not'. 96 Instead, he introduces a phrase for what can be
known positively about God beyond knowing 'that he is': we can
know also 'what necessarily belongs to him' (ea quae necesse est
ei convenire). At the same time, 'what necessarily belongs to God'
is understood precisely in light of knowing through perceptible
effects 'that he is': namely, 'what necessarily belongs to him
according as he is the first cause of all things, exceeding all of his
effects'. Even this latter, argues Aquinas, and not only 'that God
is', is naturally knowable to us through perceptible things. 'What
necessarily belongs to him', in turn, is said to include (1) relation
(habitudo) to effects, such as that he is their cause; (2) difference
from effects, including negations, such as that he is not among
them; and (3) super-affirmations, such as that he surpasses these
effects. The latter affirmations will turn out to include
unparticipated perfections predicated of God substantialiter, as
spoken of in articles 2-6 of question 13, but defended originally
in the Fourth Way of question 2 and in questions 4-6. 97 Thus,
'what necessarily belongs to [God] according as he is the first
cause of all things, exceeding all of his effects' turns out to cover
all of the propositions proved about God in questions 3-11: these
See above, nn. 64, 66-68, and 75.
By contrast, see above, nn. 44, 64.
97 See especially STh I, q. 13, a. 3, ad 1.
95

96

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

questions represent a summary of what can be known naturally
about God in himself, besides that he exists. 98
2. STh I, q. 13: Article 1 as Background for the Question in
Article 8. In light of question 12's conclusions regarding how God
is known by us, question 13 investigates how God is named.
Aquinas, after first analyzing the divine names in general, takes up
two particular names: 'God' and 'I am who am'. The first and in
several ways the most important of these is the former, to which
Aquinas devotes three of the twelve articles of question 13. Article
8 opens the three articles with the question, Does 'God' name a
nature? The question seems out of place, as the second objection
observes, since we name things as we know them, and we do not
know the divine nature or essence. Aquinas responds that the
name 'God' "has been imposed to signify something that is
existing above all things, which is the principle of all things and
is removed from all things" (STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2). But should
this be taken to be a definition of 'God' given that Aquinas makes
no mention there of nominal definition, and, as he has
established, a real definition of 'God' is impossible? What room
is there, we may ask, for a consideration here of a definition of
'God' beyond that of the nominal definition already treated in
question 2 in the context of the proof of God's existence?
The answer to this question is embedded in the response to the
second objection, as we shall see, but it has its grounds in article
1 of question 13. Aquinas poses there the general question, Does
any name belong to God? He responds that, according to Peri
hermeneias 1, names are related to the things that they signify
through the mediation of concepts of the intellect. Therefore-as
the prologue to question 13 had already stated in a principle that
98 In fact, one can already see in the Summa contra Gentiles the contrast between knowing
'that God is' and knowing "other things of this kind which it is necessary to attribute to the
first principle" (ScG I, c. 3 [para. 4, "Cum enim "]), such as knowing that he is causal, eminent,
and removed (ScG ill, c. 49, quoted above, n. 80; cf. Super Boet. De Trin., q. 6, a. 3 [II. 17680], quoted above, n. 68). In Super Boet. De Trin., Aquinas distinguishes knowing that
separate substances exist from knowing their conditiones, such as that they are intellectual and
incorporeal; and, he contrasts the latter conditiones with the proprietates proved of material
things and their causes (ibid., q. 6, a. 4, c. and ad 2 CTI. 136-46, 159-75]).

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

241

governs the entire inquiry-according as something is known
intellectually by us, it can be named. Aquinas continues:
It has been shown above, however, that God cannot be seen by us in this life
through his essence, But he is known by us from creatures according to a relation
[habitudo] of principle and through the mode of excellence and of remotion. In
this way, therefore, he can be named by us from creatures, , , ,99

This passage contains a back reference to question 12, article 11,
and it resumes the theme of the threefold way of knowing God set
out in question 12, article 12. God is named according as he is
known. He can be known in three ways from his effects, and, it
follows, he can be named accordingly in three ways. Notice that
the conclusion applies to all the divine names, without singling
out the name for the divine essence itself, that is, 'God'. But there
is more:
In this [threefold] way, therefore, he can be named by us from creatures,
nevertheless, not in such a way that the name signi.fying him expresses the divine
essence according as it is, in the way that the name 'human being' [homo]
expresses in its signification the essence of human being according as it is, For,
it signifies the definition that declares its essence, since the ratio which a name
signifies is the definition. 100

Aquinas's explicit point is negative: divine names, unlike names
of created species, do not express the essence of the thing named
according as it is as such. Again, this remark applies to all of the
divine names. Still, the name 'human being' is in tacit opposition
99 STh I, q. 13, a. 1: "Ostensum est autem supra quod Deus in hac vita non potest a nobis
videri per suam essentiam; sed cognoscitur a nobis ex creaturis, secundum habitudi.nem
principii, et per modum excellentiae et remotionis. Sic igitur potest nominari a nobis ex
creaturis, non tarnen ita quod no men significans ipsurn, exprirnat divinam essentiam secundum
quod est, sicut hoc nomen homo exprimit sua significatione essentiarn horninis secundum
quod est; significat enim eius definitionem, declarantern eius essentiarn; ratio enirn quam
significat nomen, est definitio." For knowing through the triplex via as a basis for our naming,
see also SI'h I, q. 13, a. 10, ad 5; I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3, quoted above, n. 60.
100 Aquinas frequently cites this tag, whose source, as he indicates in SI'h I, q. 13, a. 8, ad
2; and in ScG I, c. 12 (para. 4), is Aristotle, Metaphysics 0.7,l012a23-24; cf. ibid.
OA.1006a29-b12; Posterior Analytics 2.7,92b25-34. In the latter passage, Aristotle argues that
the definition of a thing named and any formula for what the name means (nominal
definition) cannot be the same.

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DAVID B. TWETTEN

to the name that signifies the divine essence, namely, 'God', as
becomes dear when reading article 1 in light of article 8.
In sum, Aquinas's important innovation in his response to the
second objection in article 8, question 13 of the
Pars is not
located within the treatment of the existence of God (or of 'what
God is', which is unknowable to us), but within the subsequent
consideration of 'what necessarily belongs' to God as such
according as he is the first cause exceeding all effects; within the
consideration, that is, of (1) God's causal relation to creatures and
of his difference from creatures-whether it be a difference of (2)
negation or (3) eminence (q. 12, a. 12). Question 13 reflects on
the divine names that attend this consideration, since God can be
named according to these three ways of knowing him-and
according to these three ways alone (q. 13, a. 1). Article 8
subsequently considers a putative name for the divine essence:
'God'. But we already know that if there is a name for the divine
essence-which is unknowable as it is in itself-that name must
foHow the threefold way in which it can be known.
3. The Dionysian Answer of Summa Theologiae I, q. 13, a. 8,
ad 2. The rest of question 13 is, in effect, an expansion on the
position of article 1: God is named according to the threefold way
in which he is known. According to article 2, God is named not
only (1) by names signifying a relation to creatures (for example,
'lord', 'creator' [STh I, q. 13, a. 7, ad 1]), and (2) by names said
negatively ('uncreated', 'infinite'), but also (3) contra Maimonides
and Alan of Lille, by names said absolutely and affirmatively. The
latter names, such as 'wise' and 'good', are even said to "signify
the divine substance," to be "predicated substantially" (STh I, q.
13, a. 2). or "essentially" of God (STh I, q. 13, a. 6). Nevertheless,
as Aquinas explains in articles 5 and 6, such names are only said
analogously of God and creatures; they are, in fact, denied of God
both according to their 'mode of signifying' and according to 'the
thing signified' insofar as they fail to circumscribe and comprehend it. Furthermore, 'wise', 'good', 'living', and 'a being' (STh I,
q. 13, a. 3, ad 1) are imposed for the sake of signifying these
perfections absolutely (STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 3), that is, they signify
God "under the ratio" of wisdom, goodness, etc. (STh I, q. 13, a.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

243

4). Hence, "they are not imposed for the sake of signifying the
divine nature" (STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 3). In other words, they are
imposed to signify God, not "from the side of the divine nature"
itself as such (cf. STh I, q. 13, a 9), but from the side of
perfections that proceed from him into creatures: they signify the
principle of things according as a given perfection preexists in it,
although in a higher mode than is understood or signified (STh I,
q. 13, a 2, ad 2). 101 Only one name is imposed for the sake of
signifying the divine nature itself as such, according to articles 89: 'God' .102 Unlike the Tetragrammaton, 'God' is not a proper but
a common noun. 103
Still, we have just seen in article 1 that none of the divine
names signifies by expressing the divine essence according as it is.
In this respect, the divine essence is not named in the way that
human essence is named by 'homo', so that the definition of the
essence is the very concept signified by the term. We cannot know
the essence of God. How then does 'God' signify the divine
nature? In answer, the response to the second objection in article
8 returns to the theme of article 1, citing the same passage of
Aristotle to the effect that the concept signified by a name is the
101 According to STh I, q. 13, a. 1, God is known and named in three ways. Aquinas uses
a similar triad in his most complete description of the ground of such perfections as wisdom
and goodness: each creature insofar as it has such a perfection represents God as a principle
that excels over it, from whose form all effects fall away, although they possess some
similitude to it (STh I, q. 13, a. 2). Similarly, the most complete description of the signification
of such perfections itself hints at the three ways of arriving at them: each of these signifies "the
principle of all things according as the perfection named preexists in it in a more eminent way
than can be understood or signified" (ibid., ad 2).
102 "He who is" is the most proper name of God "according to its signification" (that is,
it is more proper even than 'God' according to "that from which the name is imposed" [STh
I, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1]); for, God's essence is 'to be', and every other name signifies form and
so fails to signify this (STh I, q. 13, a. 11). Nevertheless, even "He who is" is less proper as
regards "that to which [ad quod] the name is imposed for the sake of signifying" than the
name imposed for the sake of signifying the divine nature itself, namely, Deus (ibid., ad 1).
Elsewhere Aquinas affirms that, as regards imposition to which (cui), the name 'God' is
beyond all other names: "quantum ad id cui nomen imponitur ... hoc nomen Deus est super
omne nomen, quia imponitur sibi secundum divinam naturam" (ID Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 4,
qcla. 3, ad 2).
103 STh I, q. 13, a. 9, ad 2: "[D]icendum quod hoc nomen Deus est nomen appelativum,
et non proprium, quia significat naturam divinam ut in habente; licet ipse Deus, secundum
rem, non sit nee universalis nee particularis."

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

definition. 104 But now Aquinas's example is lapis, lapidem rather
than homo: namely, something that is originally known and
named through properties or effects (it strikes the foot: laedit
pedem), although the name comes to signify the very essence of
the thing "according as it is in itself." Similarly, 'theos• or 'deus'
is taken from the first cause's operations in relation to effects, so
that 'that from which the name is imposed' is the 'consideration'
of (cf. obj. 1) or providence over all things; whereas 'that to
which it is imposed in order to signify' is the divine nature
itself. 105 Nevertheless, unlike in the case of lapis-continues
Aquinas's response to the second objection-we cannot know the
divine nature "according as it is in itself" (secundum quad in se
est) so that we know about it 'what x is', that is, its very
definition.
As in the case of lapis, we know and name the divine nature
from effects. Yet, in this case we know a nature only from effects
that are not proportional to their cause, and through a mode of
knowing that is not proportional to an immaterial and uncreated
mode of being (STh I, q. 12, aa. 4, 12). We know the divine
nature from effects, then, not so as to know it as it is in itself, but,
continues Thomas, once again, "through the modes of eminence,
causality, and negation." And, it is precisely in this way that the
name 'God' signifies the divine nature. For, it is imposed in order
to signify "something that is existing above all things, which is the
principle of all things and is removed from all things." For, this is
what those who use the name 'God' intend to signify.
104 SI'h l, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2 is quoted

above, n. 10; SI'h l, q. 13, a. 1 is quoted inn. 99.
For the distinction between imposition a quo and ad quod, see, in addition to SI'h I, q.
13, a. 8; I Sent., d. 23, q. 1, a. 2, ad 1; SI'h I, q. 13, a. 2, ad 2; and SI'h I, q. 13, a. 11, ad 1.
Park notes the distinction between imposition ad quod and cui, identifying the latter with
supposition; Seung-Chan Park, Die Rezeption der mittelalterlichen Sprachphilosophie in der
Theologie des Thomas van Aquin: Mit besonderer Berikksichtigung der Analogie (LeidenBoston: Brill, 1999), 116, 124. This distinction is operative in texts where imposition a quo
is taken, not as etymology, but as a quality in the thing (cf. De Verit., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8); e.g., I
Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 3; III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 3; cf. I Sent., d. 22, q. 1, a. 1, ad 3; SI'h Ill, q. 37,
a. 2. But in texts on 'God', where imposition a quo is taken as etymology, the distinction does
not appear to be operative; e.g., I Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 5, e%fJos. ad l; I Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 5,
ad 6, quoted above, n. 13; III Sent., d. 18, q. 1, a. 4, qda. 3, ad 2, quoted above, n. 102.
105

AQIBNAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

245

It is worth emphasizing, with Aquinas, that this formula for
'God' is not, properly speaking, a definition of the divine essence,
in the way that 'bipedal, rational animal' is the definition of the
human essence signified by 'homo'. This formula for 'God' does
not properly make known 'what x is'. It follows that in this case
Aristotle's tag is, strictly speaking, false: the ratio signified by the
name 'God' is not the definition expressing 'what x is'. Instead,
the tag must be modified in this case, in a way that Aquinas
himself has previously indicated in the same question 13: "the
ratio which the name signifies is the intellect's conception
concerning the thing signified by the name" (STh I, q. 13, a. 4). 106
Accordingly, the formula in question, if not a real definition, must
be a nominal definition of x-not of x as it is in itself, but as it is
conceived by our intellect, namely, according as it "is known by
us from creatures according to a relation [habitudo] of principle
and through the mode of excellence and of remotion" (STh I, q.
13, a. 1).
Is this nominal definition, then, the same as the one discussed
in question 2 of the Prima Pars in order to show 'that God exists'?
Recall that Aquinas had there observed that to demonstrate the
existence of a cause one must use, instead of a real definition as
the middle term, a nominal definition drawn from an effect. 107
We may answer in the negative, thanks especially to the precise
formulations of question 12, article 12 discussed above. By
question 13, we have already answered the question "Does God
exist?," and we are aware that we can never know 'what God is'.
Questions 3-11 consider, therefore, not 'what x is', but 'what
necessarily belongs to' x according as it is already known to exist
as the cause of all things (STh I, q. 12, a. 12). Through these
questions, in brief, we know about x that it is related to effects,
that it is removed from them, and that it exceeds them. As a
result, we name x in questions 3-11 through such terms as
'infinite', 'creator', and 'surpassingly good'. Question 13 offers
general reflections on these names for x taken as a group. Then in
article 8 it focuses on one name that signifies the very nature of
106

Cf. also De Verit., q. 4, a. 1, ad 8.

107 STh I, q. 1, a. 7, ad 1; and STh I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, quoted above, nn. 14, 46.

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this x: 'God'. It offers a nominal definition of 'God' that sums up
what this name means in this context: 'something that is existing
above all things, which is the principle of all things and is
removed from all things'. The definition is very formal, expressing
three general titles for x based on the only ways of knowing x's
essence in this case, that is, by causality, negation, and eminence.
Article 1 had already indicated that these are the only ways of
knowing and naming God, and it had tacitly suggested that they
must enter into the ratio of the name for the divine essence. 108
Such a definition, then, amounts to a formal expression of all that
can be known about 'what necessarily belongs to x as a cause',
while it retains the marks of any good definition: primacy of
order and universal commensurability with the definiendum. Such
a nominal definition is proper, not to the consideration of
'whether God is', but to the consideration of the divine names. 109
4. F.isume. The ad secundum of question 13, article 8 remains
a unique text because it places the Dionysian titles that
correspond to the triplex via into a nominal definition of God that
is drawn from effects, as prescribed by Aquinas's Aristotelian
logic. In seven places, however, Aquinas had already spoken of
these three titles together, 110 and in six places he had already
linked the proof of God's existence through effects to the triplex
via of Dionysius. 111 As early as the Scriptum on the Sentences,
Aquinas had understood there to be three successively complex
ways of proving a cause from effects, and, therefore, as in On
Boethius's De Trinitate, three ways of knowing the cause by
168 STh I, q. 13, a. 8, ad 2 applies to the nominal definition of 'God' the Dionysian strategy
that STh I, q. 13, a. 1 (above, n. 99) had proposed for any divine name: we know and name
God only from effects and by way of remotion and eminence. So also rwo passages, &G I, c.
12 (para. 8); and STh I, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2, had drawn consequences for the nominal definition
of 'God'-in that case a definition proper to the proof of God's existence-from the fact that
we name God from effects (although only the former passage mentions the triplex via); see
above,nn. 14,45, 75.
109 I am grateful to Lawrence Dewan for this insight.
110 In addition to the five texts from the In De divinis nominibus in rm. 82-85, see rm. 80
and 93 for &G ill, c. 49 (para. 8); and STh I, q. 12, a. 12.
Ill I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, pro!. (cf. I Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 3); Super Boet. De Trin., q. 1, a. 2 (II.
96-113); q. 6, a. 3 (II. 156-81) (cf. q. 1, a. 4 [II. 86-94]); ScG I, c. 12 (para. 8); ill, c. 49 (para.
8); STh I, q. 12, a. 12. See above, nn. 45, 56, 64, 68, 75, 80 and 93.

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

247

relation to effects. These three ways even enter into the technique
prescribed there-and reflected in the Summa contra Gentilesfor how to formulate a nominal definition of 'God': in place of
genus and difference, one uses an effect, negating it of its cause
and/or relating it to its cause, whether by a relation of causality or
eminence. Accordingly, in question 13, article 8, Thomas for the
first time formulates a nominal definition of 'God' that employs
the Dionysian three tides and that belongs to the consideration of
what God is (not), rather than of whether God is.
IV CONCLUSION: RETURN TO THE PROOF OF GOD'S EXISTENCE

I have shown how Aquinas came to develop a formula for what
'God' means that corresponds to his Aristotelian criteria for
nominal definition as wen as to his Dionysian account of how
God is known and named: 'something that is existing above all
things and is removed from
things, which is the principle of
things'. Does Aquinas's proof for God's existence, then, arrive at
God under this formula? I have argued, no. This formula is
proper to the consideration of the divine names. Nonetheless, it
helps us see Aquinas's criteria for what the target in the proof for
God's existence must minimally be. In the context
the five
ways, the Summa Theologiae states simply that a nominal
definition of 'God' must be taken from an effect. For Aquinas,
contrary to Anselm and Bonaventure, for example, the only way
that we can know that immaterial. reality exists is as a cause of
effects. According to a further darification in the Summa contra
Gentiles, such effects are found in a definition by being removed
from or related to what is defined. Aquinas has dropped the
elaborate doctrine of his On Boethius's De Trinitate on negations
in the place of a definition's genus, together with successively
narrower negations or relations of cause and eminence in the
place of a differentia. Negation, in particular, is no longer given
primacy in the nominal definition. In fact, I argue, causality
should be the primary or quasigeneric feature of a nominal definition of 'God' based on an effect. Next, the difference between
God and all other kinds of things could be preserved either by

an

an

248

DAVID B. TWETIEN

negation or by eminence. To express both, as in the formula of
question 13, article 8 of the Prima Pars, is unnecessary. Similarly,
it is unnecessary, as in the same formula, to express God's
universal causality, to express that God is the cause of all other
kinds of things, as long as God's distinction from ali other kinds
is expressed by negation or eminence.
A nominal definition of God, then, that is proper to the proof
of God's existence must, for Aquinas, express causality and must
differentiate the cause from its effects by negation or through a
relation of eminence. Aquinas appears reluctant to attempt to
isolate or codify a precise formula, and his five ways do not
themselves make such a formula explicit. Still, in light of the
criteria that he does provide, a nonprescriptive definition can be
formulated, at an instance of which each of his proofs can be seen
to arrive. This is what I express in saying that Aquinas concludes
to an instance of
a kind of thing that is (1) a cause of other kinds of things and that is (2.1) beyond
all other kinds of things and/or (2.2) removed from all other kinds of things.

Will such a formula be universally commensurate with God?
The proof of God's existence will fail if it does not arrive at what
could only be God. Not any cause is God, but only a first (2.1),
unmoved (2.2) mover (1) (assuming that it can be shown that such
a cause can in no way be caused); or a first, uncaused cause; or a
first uncaused being that cannot be otherwise and that is the cause
of necessity and contingency in other things; or something that is
truest, best, and most noble, and consequently maximally a being,
and so is the cause of being, goodness, and any perfection
whatever in all other beings; or a first intelligent cause of the
order of things. Aquinas, in effect, offers each of these formulae
as nominal definitions of •God' in his five ways. Aquinas's proof
in De ente 4, if it succeeds, arrives at God as an uncaused cause of
esse. Any precise formula would succeed as long as the cause
thereby identified is distinguished from the effect, and there is
nothing beyond it, or nothing that in any way causes it. Thus, a
variety of proofs of God's existence are possible, proceeding

AQUINAS'S DEFINITION OF 'GOD'

249

under a variety of nominal definitions. Each definition, precisely
as a definition, must single out one kind of being as distinct from
all other kinds. As Aquinas puts it in question 13 of the Prima
Pars, the word 'God' names a nature. An adequate nominal
definition of 'God', then, must express causality, but need not
express both negation and eminence except in order to distinguish
one nature, or one kind of cause, from all other natures, from aH
other kinds of things. Admittedly, one needs to do a great deal of
work to explain how Aquinas's first way arrives, even on the
grounds of his own cosmology, at such a minimal notion of the
divine nature. 112 And, the fifth way appears simply to rely on
earlier ways for some of the premises needed for drawing even
such a minimal conclusion. Nonetheless, there does seem to be a
common denominator targeted in the five ways that fits well with
Aquinas's only explicit and systematic nominal definition of
'God'.
What is omitted from Aquinas's project of a proof of 'God's
existence is as important for us to observe as what is contained in
it. Aquinas does not target all and only what is an uncreated cause
of esse, or an infinite, omniscient, omnipotent, and omnibenevolent reality, or a personal and provident creator. Aquinas
does not even insist that a proof expressly arrive at a kind of
which there is only one instance, namely, at 'the one God'. Of
course, he would not exclude a proof that in one feB swoop
proved all of the properties of the 'God' of classical theism. But
for him it is conceivable that a person not think of a 'God' in
these terms yet take an interest in or even accept as a belief or as
the conclusion of an argument that 'a God exists'. 'God' may
mean here merely 'some kind of thing that is a cause of other
kinds and that is beyond and/or removed from all other kinds of
things'. In precisely this sense the word still deserves a capital 'G'
as opposed to 'god' used of Poseidon, or of a Hollywood actor or
star athlete. 113 That for Aquinas one proves 'a God', not
112 See David Twetten, "Clearing a 'Way' for Aquinas: How the Proof from Motion
Concludes to God," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 70
(1996): 259-78.
113 Cf. Sfh I, q. 13, aa. 9-10.

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DAVID B. TWETIEN

necessarily 'the one God', may be indicating by use of the indefinite article: we may speak of 'proofs of a God's existence'. 114
Aquinas is not attempting to prove what can only be the
'Christian God', the 'omni-God' of classical theism, let alone the
protagonist of the Scriptures whose proper name is 'God'. He is
targeting 'a God' as minimally a 'top-most causal reality',
something also targeted in classical philosophy (even if, as I
believe, Aquinas is wrong that Plato and Aristotle used theos in
this sense). Assuredly, some of his proofs, such as the Fourth Way,
go well beyond this. Yet, for Aquinas, one who affirms that there
exists a God under this notion of a minimal, nonprescriptive,
'top-most reality' may have in mind that such a God admits of a
plurality of equals, and that such realities are merely impersonal
though highly effective causal forces. Aquinas, of course, will go
on to argue that such a God must be infinite, creative, omniscient,
providential, and unique. He may even argue that a person who
denies this does not actually assent to a God as a top-most causal
reality. But he would concede that one can accept that a God
exists without necessarily believing or knowing how to draw such
further conclusions. The project of proving a God's existence is
distinct from the project of proving 'what necessarily belongs to
a God (according as he is the first cause of all things, exceeding all
of his effects)'. We have difficulty making such distinctions, and
therefore difficulty understanding the project of Aquinas's five
ways, because we do not follow, and perhaps are not cognizant of,
Aquinas's Aristotelian logic for existential proof through nominal
definition based on effects. In Aquinas's mind this logic was
entirely consistent with and, in the case of the definition of 'a
God', was completed by a Dionysian account of naming through
causality, eminence, and negation. 115

114 I follow the suggestion of Lawrence Dewan.

A first version of this paper was given at the Thomas Instituut in Utrecht. I would like
to thank especially Enrique Alarc6n, Steven Brock, Juan Cruz Cruz, Lawrence Dewan, Owen
Goldin, Harm Goris, Rollen Houser, Sebastian Kaufmann, John D. Jones, Alejandro Llano,
Fran O'Rourke, Andrew Peach, and Henk Schoot for help at various stages of this paper.
115

The Thomist 69 (2005): 251-77

THOMAS ON THE PROBLEM OF
THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA, EXEGETE
DANIELE. FLORES
St. Mary's Seminary
Houston, Texas

A

T SOME POINT toward the close of his teaching career,
probably after his lectures on the Pauline corpus, but before
his lectures on the Gospel of Matthew, Thomas became
aware of the teaching attributed to Theodore of Mopsuestia on
prophetic signification. He became aware also of the condemnation that teaching incurred at the time of the Second Council of
Constantinople. 1 Based upon his sources, Thomas engages Theodore the exegete on four occasions, each discussion occurring in
the context of Thomas's own scriptural expositions. Since these
expositions represent the fruit of Thomas's classroom work with

1 Thomas makes reference to Theodore of Mopsuestia in connection with the problem of
Nestorianism as early as &G N. Theodore on scriptural exposition, however, does not appear
until the Matthew commentary. Weisheipl, following Mandonnet, suggested that the
exposition of Matthew belongs to Thomas's first teaching period in Paris, ending around
1259. Torrell, however, favors dating the Super Matthaeum to the second Parisian period
(1268-72). Torrell's position is persuasive on the grounds that the intervening years in Italy,
between the Paris teaching assignments, would have provided Thomas with the opportunity
to gather the wealth of Greek patristic sources, including the acta of the Ecumenical Councils,
that begin appearing in his works during the 1260s. Further, had Thomas known of
Theodore's condemned teaching on prophetic signification before 1268, we might reasonably
expect some reference to the problem in the initial exposition of the Pauline corpus, generally
agreed to have been completed by that year. It seems plausible, therefore, to hold that Thomas
discovered sources surrounding Theodore's exegesis some time after 1268, and that he
included reference to it in the three scriptural expositions that he taught at the end of his life,
beginning with the Super Matthaeum in 1269 or 1270. See Weisheipl, Friar Thomas
D'Aquino: His Life, Thought and Works (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 1983), 121-22; and Torrell, Initiation a saint Thomas d'Aquin: Sa personne
et son oeuvre (Fribourg: Editions Universitaires de Fribourg Suisse, 1993), 80-86.

251

252

DANIEL E. FLORES

students who would be preachers of the gospel and teachers of the
faith, we can safely infer that he considered the issues raised by
Theodore to be relevant to the preaching mission of the Church.
Thomas characterizes Theodore as one who taught a consistent
though erroneous approach to the exposition of the sacred text.
I aim to give a summary account of the problem as Thomas saw
it. Whether or not Thomas had reliable sources that reflected the
actual teaching of Constantinople II is a related, important, but
not identical issue.2 Whether or not the documentation surrounding Constantinople II accurately conveyed what Theodore of
Mopsuestia actually taught is another matter entirely. 3 Both
questions merit serious theological attention. Here I seek only to
examine Thomas's view of Theodore's teaching for its typical
implications, that is to say, in the interest of identifying what
2 Thomas seems to be the first Latin theologian after patristic times to take up the teaching
of the council on Theodore's exegetical method. The manuscript tradition flowing into the
Renaissance preserved two collections of Theodore's scriptural commentaries translated into
Latin. The acta of the council provide Latin translations without commentary, appending
them to the decrees of the council. The conciliar documentation also preserves a decree from
Pope Vigilius containing the same excerpts, only with commentary from the pope
characterizing the errors they contain. Vigilius's constitution predates the council. The pope
never cites Theodore by name, ostensibly because he opposed the pressure to condemn
Theodore posthumously. For the received Latin texts from both the acta of the council and
the constitution of Pope Vigilius, see J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum conciliorum nova et amplissima
collectio (Florence, 17 63), vol. 9, coll. N and V). Morard proposes that Thomas saw the acta
of the council, but does not think he relied upon the Constitutum Vigilii. See Martin Morarcl,
"Une source de saint Thomas d'Aquin: Le deuxieme concile de Constantinople (553)," Revue
des sciences philosophiques et theologiques 81 (1997): 21-56. I suggest that the papal
commentary is the principal source for the 'way Thomas characterizes Theodore's mode of
exposition. A detailed textual comparison would be needed to secure the point either way.
3 For a review of the debate concerning the degree to which the excerpts found in the
documentation surrounding the council fairly reflect Theodore of Mopsuestia's teaching on
scriptural exegesis, see the following: J. M. Voste, "L'oeuvre exegetique de Theodore de
Mopsueste au Ile concile de Constantinople," Revue Biblique 38 (1929): 382-95 and 542-54;
R. Devreesse, "Par quelles voies nous sont parvenus Les Commentaires de Theodore de
Mopsueste?" Revue Biblique 39 (1930): 362-77; P. Parente, "Una riabilitazione de Teodoro
Mopsuesteno," Doctor Communis 3 (1950): 3-15; B. de Margerie, An Introduction to the
History of Exegesis, vol. 1, The Greek Fathers (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications,
1995), 165-187. See also the reference to Theodore in L'interpretation de la Bible dans
l'F,glise, III, B, 2 (in the Enchiridion Biblicum [Bologna: Dehoiane, 1993] ,nos. 1457-58);
finally, see Manlio Simonetti's special contribution on Theodore in Charles Kannengiesser's
Handbook of Patristic Exegisis: The Bible in Ancient Christianity (Brill: Leiden, 2004), 2:799828.

THOMAS ON THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

253

exactly Thomas found theologically objectionable in an exegetical
stance bearing the contours of what Thomas identified with
Theodore. For my limited purposes it seems reasonable to
proceed apart from engaging directly the character of Thomas's
sources.
L THE TEXTS

The texts wherein Thomas discusses Theodore the exegete are
not readily accessible in either Latin or English. I will begin, then,
by presenting the four descriptions of Theodore's position found
in the Thomistic corpus, together with some brief contextual
remarks. 4 Thomas' s first comments on Theodore of Mopsuestia,
exegete, appear in his exposition of St. Matthew's gospel; he
discusses it again in his later exposition of St. John's gospel.
Finally, in his comments on the Psalter, in what is accepted to
have been his last lecture series, Thomas engages Theodore's
views two more times, once in the prologue, and once in his
exposition of Psalm 21. The account in the exposition of Matthew's Gospel and the discussion in the prologue to the Psalter
commentary also contain brief remarks outlining what Thomas
thinks a proper expositional stance looks like.
The four characterizations are quite diverse in form, focus, and
emphasis. To account for this, it is sufficient to note that Thomas
discusses Theodore's exegetical method while himself commenting on Sacred Scripture. He comments with an eye attentive to the
way the issue affects the proper interpretation of the particular
scriptural text at hand. Taken together, though, the four descriptions provide a fairly nuanced picture of what Thomas perceived
to be at the heart of the problem vexing Theodore's exegesis.

A) Super Matthaeum 1:22-23
Thornas's exposition of Matthew 1:22-23 attends to the
evangelist's citation of Isaiah 7:14. The evangelist says that the
4 Translations from Latin are my own. When referencing the psalms, I follow the Vulgate
numbering, both in the translations and throughout.

254

DANIEL E. FLORES

prophet's announcement that "the virgin shall conceive and bear
a son," is fulfilled in the events surrounding the conception of the
Lord. Thomas takes the occasion to describe and then to refute
Theodore's approach to prophetic texts.
And another was [the error] of Theodore saying that nothing of those things
which are brought forth from the Old Testament are literally said about Christ,
but they are adapted, as [for example] when they bring forth that [text] of Virgil:
recalling such things, he hung suspended, and affixed he remained. 5 Now, this
[text of Virgil] is adapted concerning Christ; and next [it is said by Theodore],
that [the text of Matthew] that it might be fulfilled, ought to be thus explained,
as if the evangelist were saying and this can be adapted. 6

Immediately following upon his account of Theodore's error,
Thomas gives a terse refutation of it rooted in theological
authority, both scriptural and ecclesiastical. Without citing a
particular pope or council, Thomas references for his students the
fact that the opinion of Theodore is a condemned heresy.
And it should be known that in the Old Testament there are certain things which
refer to Christ, and are said about him alone, like that [text which says] Behold
a virgin shall conceive in the womb, and bear a son, Isaiah 7 [14]; and also that
[text of] Psalm 21 [2]: God, my God, look upon me, why have you forsaken me?
etc. And if anyone should put a different literal sense [on these texts], he would
be a heretic, and the heresy is condemned. Against which [can be adduced the
text] from the last chapter of Luke: It was fitting that all those things which were
written in the Law of Moses, and the Prophets, and the Psalms about me be
fulfilled. 7

Thomas then briefly adds a theological notation about how the
notion of fulfillment extends to Old Testament texts that are
5 Virgil, Aeneid

2.650.
Super Matt., c. 1, lecL 5 (Marietti, no. 148): "alius foit theodori dicenris, quod nihil
eorum quae inducuntur de veteri testamento, sunt ad litteram de Christo, sed sunt adaptata,
sicut quando inducunt illud virgilii talia pendebat memorans, fixusque rnanebat hoc enim
adaptal:Um est de Christo; et tune illud ut adimpleretur, debet sic exponi, quasi diceret
evangelista: et hoc potest adaptari."
7 Ibid.: "et sciendum quod in veteri testamemo aliqua sunt quae referuntur ad Christum,
et de eo solo dicuntur, sicut illud ecce virgo in utero concipiet, et pariet filium, is. vii, 14; et
illud ps. xxi, 2: Deus, Deus meus, respice in me, quare me dereliquisti? etc .. et si quis alium
sensum litteralem poneret, esset haerericus, et haeresis damnata est. contra quod le. ult., 44:
oportet impleri omnia quae scripta sunt in lege moysi, et prophetis, et psalmis de me."
6

THOMAS ON THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

255

known to bear some relation to events contemporaneous to the
prophets:
But because not only the words of the Old Testament, but also the things done,
signify about Christ, sometimes some [words] are said literally about certain
other things, but they [i.e. the words] are referred to Christ, inasmuch as those
things [spoken about] bear the figure of Christ, as when it is said of Solomon:
And he will rule from sea to sea, etc. This was not fulfilled in him [i.e. Solomon]. 8

B) Super Ioannem 12:41

The second time Thomas chooses to deal with the teaching of
Theodore occurs in the exposition of John 12:41. 9 The evangelist
invokes Isaiah 6:10 in order to teach that the resistance Jesus
encountered in his public ministry was foreseen by the prophet. 10
Concluding his references to Isaiah, John summarizes the
condition under which the prophet saw what he prophesied:
"Isaiah said these things, when he saw his glory, and he spoke
about him." The second half of the verse ("and he spoke about
him"), Thomas says, effectively exdudes both the error of the
Manichaeans and that of Theodore.
Through that indeed which is said secondly, and he spoke about him, is excluded
the error of the Manichaeans, who said that no prophecies in the Old Testament
preceded about Christ, as Augustine related in Contra Faustum. And [also is
excluded the error] of Theodore of Mopsuestia, who said that all prophecies of
the Old Testament were said about some matter [or other], and were
nevertheless cited by the apostles and evangelists to the ministry of Christ
through a certain [kind of] appropriation: like those things which are said in
[reference to] one thing done, can be adapted to another thing done. All [of
these], however, are excluded through this which is said, and he spoke about
him. [So, it could be said] about me [i.e. Isaiah] as [it was said] about Moses, as
chapter 5 [46], above [indicates] Christ said: about me, indeed, he wrote.11
8 Ibid.: "sed quia non sol um verba veteris testarnenri, sed eriam facta significant de Christo,
aliquam:lo dicuntur aliqua ad litteram de aliquibus aliis, sed refemntur ad Chrisrum,
inquantum ilia gerunt figuram Christi, sicut de salomone dicitur: et dominabitur a mari usque
ad mare etc.; hoc enim non fuit impletum in eo."
9 Super Ioannem, c. 12, iect. 7 (Marietti, nos. 1703-5).
10 See John 12:37-41.
11 Super Ioannem, c. 12, lect. 7 (Marielti, no. 1705): "per illud vem quod secundo dicitur
et locutus est de eo, excluditur error manichaeorum, qui dixen.rnt nullas propherias in veteri
tesramento praecessisse de Christo, ut augustirms narrat in lib. contra faustum, et theodorum

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DANIEL E. FLORES

C) Prologus super Psalmos

In the prologue to the expos1t1on of the Psalter, Thomas
provides a general framework for understanding the Book of the
Psalms. In this inaugural lecture, he proposes to arm his students
with the tools needed to begin to read the Psalms properly. He
treats, among other things, the issue of proper exposition. 12
Concerning the mode of exposition, it must be noted that in the Psalter, as in
[the exposition of] the other prophets, we ought to avoid one error condemned
in the Fifth Synod. Theodore of Mopsuestia, indeed, said that in Sacred Scripture
and the Prophets, nothing is expressly said about Christ, but rather [these words
were said] about certain other things, and, in fact, they [i.e. these words said
about certain other things] adapted to Christ. Like, [that text of] Psalm 21 [19]:
they divided among themselves my vestments, etc. [is said] not about Christ, but
literally said about David. This mode [of exposition] was condemned in that
Council, and whoever asserts such a thing in expounding the Scriptures is a
heretic. 13

Thomas moves immediately to elaborate the "rule of Saint
Jerome" as a guide to proper exposition of the prophets. The rule
amounts to a detailed explication of the position Thomas staked
out at the conclusion of his comments on Theodore in the
Matthew commentary.
Blessed Jerome, therefore, [in his commentary] on Ezechiel handed on to us a
rule which we will use in the Psalms: namely, that concerning things done, they
are to be explained thus, as figuring something about Christ or the Church. As,
mopsuestenum, qui dixit omnes prophetias veteris testamenti esse de aliquo negotio dictas,
per quamdam tamen appropriationem esse adductas ab apostolis etevangelistis ad ministerium
Christi: sicut ea quae dicunt in uno facto, possunt adaptari ad aliud factum. omnia autem
excluduntur per hoc quod dicitur et locutus est de eo, de me sicut de moyse, supra v, 46, dixit
Christus: de me enim ille scripsit."
12 The Latin texts from the Super Psalmos exist neither in a critical Leonine Edition nor
in the Marietti editions; I have relied upon the F.ditio Parmensis, dating to 1863.
13 Super Psalmos, prologus: "circa modum exponendi sciendum est, quod tam in psalterio
quam in aliis prophetiis exponendis evitare debemus unum errorem damnatum in quinta
synodo. theodorus enim mopsuestenus dixit, quod in sacra scriptura et prophetiis nihil
expresse dicitur de Christo, sed de quibusdam aliis rebus, sed adaptaverunt Christo: sicut illud
psalm. 21: diviserunt sibi vestimenta mea etc., non de Christo, sed ad literam dicitur de david.
hie autem modus damnatus est in illo concilio: et qui asserit sic exponendas scripturas,
haereticus est."

lHOMAS ON lHEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA

257

indeed, it is said in 1 Cor. 10 [11]: all these things happened to them in figure.
Prophecies, moreover, were sometimes said about things which were of the time
then, but [the prophecies] were not principally said about those things, but, in
fact, [the prophecies were said about those things] inasmuch as they are figures
of future things: and thus the Holy Spirit ordered that when such things are said,
certain things are inserted which exceed the condition of that thing done, so that
the soul might be raised to the thing figured. Like in [the book of] Daniel many
things are said about Antiochus in the figure of the anti-Christ: hence, certain
things are read there which were not completed in him; they will be fulfilled,
indeed, in the anti-Christ; as also certain things are read about the kingdom of
David and Solomon, which were not to be fulfilled in the reign of such men, but
were to be fulfilled in the kingdom of Christ, in whose figure they were said: as
[for example] Psalm 71 [2]: God, your judgment etc. which is according to the
title about the reign of David and Solomon; and [he] places something in it that
exceeds its capacity, namely [in verse 7], justice will arise in his days and
abundance of peace, until the moon be taken away: and again [in verse 8], he will
rule from sea to sea, and from the river to the ends [of the earth] etc. Therefore,
this Psalm is expounded about the reign of Solomon, inasmuch as it is a figure
of the reign of Christ, in which all the things there said will be completed. 14

D) Super Psalmum 21
Finally, in his introductory comments on the exposition of
Psalm 21, Thomas orients his students toward the proper reading
of the psalm. Comments at the outset of the exposition focus
exclusively upon Theodore's teaching on literal prophecy; no
mention is made of the closely allied problem of adaptation.
H Ibid.: "beatus ergo hieronymus super ezech. tradidit nobis unam regulam quam
servabimus in psalmis: scilicet quod sic sunt exponendi de rebus gestis, ut figurantibus aliquid
de Christo vel ecclesia. ut enim dicitur 1 cor. 10: omnia in figura contingebant illis. prophetiae
autem aliquando dicuntur de rebus quae tune temporis erant, sed non principaliter dicuntur
de eis, sed inquantum figura sunt futurorum: et ideo spiritus sanctus ordinavit quod quando
talia dicuntur, inserantur quaedam quae excedunt conditionem illius rei gestae, ut animus
elevetur ad figuratum. etideo spiritus sanctus ordinavit quod quando talia dicuntur, inserantur
quaedam quae excedunt conditionem illius rei gestae, ut animus elevetur ad figuratum. sicut
in daniele multa dicuntur de anthioco in figuram antichristi: unde ibi quaedam leguntur quae
non sunt in eo completa, implebuntur autem in antichristo; sicut etiam aliqua de regno david
et salomonis leguntur, quae non erant implenda in talium hominum regno, sed impleta fuere
in regno Christi, in cujus figura dicta sunt: sicut psal. 71: Deus judicium etc. qui est secundum
titulum de regno david et salomonis; et aliquid ponit in eo quod excedit facultatem ipsius,
scilicet, orietur in diebus ejus justitia et abundantia pacis, donec auferatur luna: et iterum,
dominabitur a mari usque ad mare, et a flumine usque ad terminos etc. exponitur ergo psalmus
Christi, in quo omnia complebuntur ibi
iste de regno salomonis, inquantum est figura
dicta."

DANIEL E. FLORES

258

And among others, specifically this Psalm treats about the passion of Christ. And
thus, this is its literal sense. Hence, specifically, he spoke this Psalm in the
passion when he cried out Heli Heli Lammasabactani: which is the same as God,
my God, etc. as this Psalm begins. And thus, granted this Psalm is said
figuratively about David, nevertheless specifically it refers to Christ ad litteram.
And in the Synod of Toledo a certain Theodore of Mopsuestia, who explained
this Psalm about David ad litteram was condemned, and [he was condemned] on
account of this and many other things. And, thus, [this Psalm] is to be explained
as being about Christ. 15
II. PROPHETIC INTENTIONS AND APOSTOLIC ADAPTATIONS

Thomas's account of Theodore's teaching identifies two principal problematic elements. The first involves Theodore's denial
that prophetic texts ever had Christ as their literal referent.
Closely allied to this, but clearly distinct in Thomas's mind, is the
fact that Theodore is said to hold a theory of adaptation to
account for New Testament citation of Old Testament prophetic
texts. Both aspects of Theodore's teaching fall under Thomas's
reading of the intentions governmg Constantinople H's
condemnation of Theodore. 16

A) Literal Intentionality
Thomas consistently begins his account of Theodore's teaching
by noting his denial of the existence of ad litteram Christological
15 In Psalmum 21, introduction: "et inter alia specialiter iste psalmus agit de passione
Christi. et ideo hie est ejus sensus litteralis. unde specialiter hunc psalmum in passione dixit
cum clamavit, heli heli lammasabactani: quod idem est quod Deus Deus meus etc. sicut hie
psalmus incipit. et ideo licet figuraliter hie psalmus dicatur de david, tamen specialiter ad
litteram refertur ad Christum. et in synodo toletana quidam theodorus mopsuestenus, qui
hunc ad litteram de david exponebat, fuit damnatus, et propter hoc et propter alia multa; et
ideo de Christo exponendus est."
16 It is fair to surmise that Thomas has Constantinople II in mind throughout his
discussions of Theodore. He references "the Fifth Synod" in his prologue to the exposition
of the Psalter. In the exposition of Psalm 21, Thomas seems to refer to the Synod of Toledo.
Morard thinks this is a corruption of the text. See Martin Morard, "Une source," 49.
Stroobant, though, thinks the reference is to the third Council of Toledo (589). See J.-E.
Stroobant, Thomas d'Aquin Commentaire sur les Psaumes (Paris: Cerf, 1996), 256. That
Thomas never cites a particular conciliar text is perplexing.

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prophecies in the Old Testament. This denial is the root, so to
speak, of Theodore's teaching on adaptation. In the Matthew
commentary, the characterization of Theodore's teaching is
sweeping: "nothing" in the Old Testament is literally about
Christ. The Johannine commentary states the matter positively,
but amounts to the same appraisal: "all prophecies" from the Old
Testament, Theodore said, were aimed at something other than
Christ and his ministry. The prologue to the Psalter formulates the
issue using equivalent phraseology: "'nihil expresse dicitur de
Cristo."
Thomas approaches Theodore as one who takes it as a textual
"given" that Old Testament words were always composed with an
Old Testament person, event, and circumstance immediately in
view. The literal referent present to the prophet involves his
immediate historical situation, and this situation exhausts the
prophet's capacity intentionally to signify. Thomas makes this
point plainly while commenting on the text of John 12:41. In that
text he says that Theodore limited all prophecies to some
particular affair ("de aliquo negotio dictas"). These particular
affairs were decidedly not about the ministry of Christ.
"Quibusdam aliis rebus" in the prologue is equivalent to the
characterization Thomas uses in the Johannine commentary. In
Psalm 21, either David spoke about his persecution by one of his
many enemies, or he spoke about Christ. Since for Theodore it
was obvious that David refers to himself, and had someone like
Absalom on his mind when composing the psalm, it could not be
that Christ was intended in that text. According to Theodore, Old
Testament intentionality is "discrete," that is to say, limited to the
immediate and local historical circumstance of the author.

B) Theodore's Version of Adaptation

If the Old Testament prophets did not, on particular occasions,
intend to say something literally about the coming Christ, then the
only way to account for New Testament citation of such texts is

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DANIEL E. FLORES

to suggest that the New Testament authors adapted the prophetic
words to fit New Testament circumstances.
Thomas points out in the Matthew commentary that according
to Theodore New Testament phraseology involving "fulfillment"
of prophecies should be understood to mean that "they can be
made to fit" a Christological referent. In the prologue to the
Psalter, Thomas describes the activity in similar terms:
"[Theodore taught that these words were said] about certain other
things, and, that in fact, they [i.e., these words] adapted to
Christ.,, The exposition of the Gospel of John describes this
adaptation as an active readjustment of textual sense: "[Old
Testament prophecies] were cited by the apostles and evangelists
to the ministry of Christ through a certain [kind of]
appropriation." "Appropriation" suggests "taking for oneself"
what belonged to another. It would seem then that Old Testament
words intended to signify one thing were taken up by New
Testament authors without respect for the original intentions of
the prophetic authors. All three of the texts that mention
adaptation focus attention upon the act of taking words intended
for one context and applying them to a foreign context.
The sharp illustration of adaptation found in the Matthew
commentary, taken from Aeneid 2, illustrates the gravity of the
problematic as Thomas saw it. 17 Thomas does not say that
Theodore knew of or used this example. He does say that
Theodore taught that New Testament citation of Old Testament
texts involved a kind of adaptation that is comparable to what is
done in the example cited.
Martin Morard has identified Jerome's Letter 53 to Paulinus
of Nola as the source of the example. 18 Jerome rebukes those who
17 Beryl Smalley (The Gospels in the Schools [London: Hambledon Press, 1985], 267-68)
suggested that the text from Virgil was probably adapted to Christ in that he would not be
dissuaded from his purpose, which is more in keeping with the poetic sense. Morard is aware
of Smalley's reading, though he does not advert to its specifics. The more literal reading of
Virgil's words, evoking images of the Crucified, in this context seems incontrovertible, based
on Morard's identification of the origin of the example, something Smalley admitted had
eluded her.
18 Morard locates the reference in Saint Jerome, Epistola 53.7.2-3, which, he notes, was
variously transmitted through the tradition of the Vulgate manuscripts and the glosses. See
Morard, "Une source," 32-33.

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contort the sense of a classical text in order to find a Christian
reference; the activity involves imposing (by will of the reader) a
meaning on a text that is at variance with the original author's
intentional use of words. Thomas was obviously aware of the
tradition of reading Aeneid 2.650 as a reference to Christ, and he
shares Jerome's negative evaluation of the practice. 19 Thomas cites
Virgil, though, for the sake of indicating the force of what
Theodore teaches about apostolic reading of the Old Testament.
In the light of the example, to say that the apostles and evangelists
adapted prophetic texts to Christ implicates them in a falsification
of textual integrity of the kind Jerome harshly ridiculed.
The example from Virgil confirms that Thomas understands
Theodore to hold a theory of discrete prophetic intentions,
limiting intentionality to only one historical circumstance. Virgil
had no intention of writing about the Christ, so to push his words
into a Christological prophecy does violence to his text; on this
point Jerome and Thomas (and presumably Theodore) agree. But
Theodore sees the same violence being done to Isaiah and David
by Matthew and John whenever prophetic texts are cited in the
New Testament. As we shall see, Thomas energetically disputes
such a characterization; the novelty of divine revelation enhances
the intentional capacity of the scriptural authors of both
testaments.

C) Thomas's Sense of the Authority
In the Matthew commentary, Thomas first counters
Theodore's teaching by identifying the special character of certain
prophetic announcements that refer to Christ ad litteram. He
provides two specific examples. The first is Isaiah 7:14, cited in
19 Jerome, Epistola 53.7.2-3, (see CSEL 54:453-454): "Qui si forte ad scripturas sanctas
post saeculares litteras venerint . . . quicquid dixerint, hoc legem Dei putant nee scire
dignantur, quid prophetae, quid apostoli senserint, sed ad sensum suum incongrua aptant
testimonia, quasi grande sit et non vitiosissimum dicendi genus depravare sententias et ad
voluntatem suam scripturam trahere repugnantem. Quasi non legerimus Homerocentonas et
Virgiliocentonas ac non sic etiam Maronem sine Christo possimus dicere christianum, quia
scripserit ... verba Salvatoris in cruce: talia perstabat memorans fixusque manebat. Puerilia
sunt haec et circulatorum ludo similia."

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Matthew 1:22. The second is taken from Psalm 21:2, the text
uttered by Christ upon the cross. If someone attempts to place "a
different literal sense" on these two texts, Thomas says, he would
have fallen into a condemned heresy. Heresy is not a term
Thomas uses lightly or loosely; his reference to a condemned
heresy indicates that he has understood that the highest Church
authority has definitively prohibited an Old Testament historical
referent for either of the two texts cited. Thomas is careful here.
He does not say that all New Testament citations of Old Testament texts necessarily signify according to the literal sense; he
has, however, identified texts that Constantinople II seems to have
singled out as literal prophecies aiming intentionally at Christ. 20
Thomas understands the authoritative condemnation of Theodore's teaching to require that these texts be understood
intentionally to signify Christ according to a direct word-to-res
relation. "De eo [Christo] solo dicuntur" summarily expresses
Thomas's sense of the authority. By this phrase he means that the
virginal conception of the Lord and the cry of Christ from the
cross are historically unique events; the prophet Isaiah and King
David had these events in mind while enunciating their respective
prophecies.
Thomas expresses himself less strenuously in the prologue to
the commentary on the Psalter. He does not say that the text from
Psalm 21 refers to Christ alone; nevertheless, he affirms that the
words are literally about Christ, indicating thereby that the text
refers principally to Christ through the prophet's intentional use
of words. He also says that explaining the prophetic text of the
psalm as one adapted by New Testament authors without regard
for its original prophetic intention is a condemned heresy.
Thomas also perceives in the condemnation of Theodore a
further implication. His comments at the outset of the exposition
of Psalm 21 suggest that he recognizes that the adjudications of
20 Thomas consistently defended the literal Christo logical sense oflsaiah 7: 14. See his early
exposition of Isaiah (Super Isaiam ad Litteram, c. 7, v. 14 [Leonine ed., II. 311-13]); he
teaches similarly in Super ad Ephesios, c. 5, lect. 10 (Marietti, no. 335). The Isaiah exposition
surely predates Thomas's awareness of Theodore's exegetical stance, and the Ephesians
exposition most likely does.

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Constantinople II have an impact on the traditional distinction
between the literal and the mystical senses. The tradition of the
mystical senses, upheld by Thomas throughout his teaching life,
relies upon the explicit recognition of an Old Testament historical
referent which itself signifies a New Testament reality. 21 Thomas
will frequently comment on a psalm by referencing first the
historical circumstance of David's life, referring subsequently to
the mystical meaning. 22 When setting forth the mystical sense,
Thomas describes how the Davidic res itself figures Christ. He
then points his students toward discerning how the history of
David bears a divinely intended resemblance to the life of Christ.
Reading this way, he takes the history to be the literal referent,
and the life of Christ to be figured in the history. Thomas is
particularly careful not to grant for Psalm 21 this kind of relation
between the literal referent and the future reality it figures. He
understands the conciliar teaching so to insist upon a literal
reading of the psalm according to its Christological sense that to
read it as referring literally to David, and mystically to Christ
through the figuration of the res, is also inadmissible.
Thomas, then, does not take Theodore's teaching on prophetic
signification to be directed initially against a mystical or allegorical reading of the Old Testament. He does not characterize
Theodore as one who denied that Psalm 21 (or Isaiah 7:14, for
that matter) referred to the mysteries of Christ according to a
spiritual signification. In fact, Thomas never directly adverts to
what Theodore thought about the spiritual sense; Theodore,
Thomas insists, has a problem with Old Testament texts that are
claimed to be ad litteram about Christ. 23

21 See Thomas's earliest formulation of the traditional teaching in Quodl. 7, q. 6, a. 2; and
his last in SI'h I, q. 1, a. 10.
22 See, for example, his comments on Psalm 3.
23 On this point, I differ with Morard's assessment of Thomas's reading of Theodore's
error. Thomas's description of the error does not place the onus upon an assimilation of the
spiritual sense of Scripture into a purely extrinsic adaptation, but rather-and more
deeply-on the assimilation of literal Old Testament Christological prophecy into purely
extrinsic relation to the New Testament. See, Morard, "Une source," 33.

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III. THOMAS'S RESPONSE

Against the theory of adaptation, Thomas argues that
Theodore undermines the New Testament's understanding of
itself as an authoritative disclosure of Old Testament intentionality. Responding to Theodore's denial that prophetic texts
ever intentionally signified a New Testament fulfillment, Thomas
offers a nuanced theological account of prophetic intentions.
A) Adaptation and the Self-Understanding of the New Testament
From the earliest days of his teaching career, long before we
find him jousting with Theodore, Thomas distinguished between
explaining an author's intention and adapting an author's text. He
characteristically enjoined his students to keep focused upon
explaining the intelligible authorial intention governing the
textual composition. 24 In his commentary on the fourth book of
Peter Lombard's Sentences, for example, Thomas makes the point
that St. Jerome occasionally adapted a text; he "not inconveniently adjusted" its sense to one that was not according to the
intention of the author. 25 The telling characteristic of adaptation
is its lack of conformity to the principal sense intended by the
author. For Thomas the exegete, adapted senses, even if not at
odds with the author's intention, are not the primary interest of
scriptural commentators. The kind of adaptation Thomas
associates with Theodore, however, is not the benign type utilized
by Jerome and many other Fathers. Indeed, as the example cited
from Virgil illustrates, Thomas's Theodore attributed to the New
Testament authors the consistent and unseemly practice of
quarrying prophetic texts and, through a kind of imaginative
construction project, refashioning their original sense to suit a

24 Thomas's handling of Galatians 4:9 exemplifies this stance. See Super ad Galatas, c. 4,
lect. 4 (Marietti, no. 223).
25 IV Sent., d. 21, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3: "ad tertium dicendum, quod in sacra scriptura praeter
principalem sensum quern auctor intendit, possunt alii sensus non incongrue aptari. et sic
hieronymus per adaptationem quamdam loquitur, et non secundum intentionem apostoli."

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new circumstance. Thomas will allow for Jerome's having done
what he will not admit possible for New Testament authors. 26
Thomas, commenting on Matthew 1:22-23, counters Theodore's claim that the evangelist adapted the prophecies by offering
the text from Luke 24:44 as his theological authority: "It was
fitting that all those things which were written in the Law of
Moses, and the Prophets, and the Psalms about me be fulfilled."
The onus of the citation of Luke 24:44 rests upon the sense of the
word "fulfilled," as used by the Lord, and linked to Matthew's use
of the term. Matthew referring to the fulfillment of Isaiah could
not have intended to teach that "the text can be thus adapted,"
because he only conveyed what he knew from Christ, namely, that
"all these things" written in the Law, the prophets, and the psalms
were written about the Lord. According to Thomas, Luke 24:44
teaches that the evangelists and apostles conveyed the intentions
of Old Testament prophecy authoritatively, based upon what the
Lord himself knew and revealed to them about the intentions of
the prophetic authors. Luke 24:44 meets the immediate need at
hand, namely, to instruct students in the basis of the New
Testament use of Old Testament texts as testimony to Christ. This
basis is Christ's knowledge of the authorial intent of the Old
Testament, an intent culminating (fulfilled) in his own coming. 27
Thomas's line of argument manifests itself differently in the
exposition of the Gospel of John, but it converges on the same
point. In his comments on John 12:41, he teaches that the gospel
text provides a sure refutation of Theodore's entire account of
prophetic intentions. Thomas understands John to mean that
Isaiah, in his vision of the six-winged seraph, saw the One who
would become flesh; this same One manifested himself and taught
the evangelists in his incarnate state. 28 The words of John refer to
alternate apprehensions, one belonging to Isaiah, and one
26 For reasons Thomas succinctly outlines in SI'h I, q. 1, a

8, ad 2.

27 Thomas does not cite the text of Luke to argue that all New Testament

use of the Old
Testament is based upon the literal sense. His focus is upon intentionality, not modus. As I will
discuss presently, Thomas includes the spiritual senses within the divine intention
communicated to the prophet.
28 See Super Ioannem, c. 12, lect. 7 (Marietti, no. 1703).

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belonging to John. These are diverse according to modality, but
identical with regard to the res encountered. And it is the res
himself who authoritatively affirms this identity. Thus, focusing
the text toward the issue of authoritative disclosure of prophetic
intentionality, Thomas draws the parallel between John 12:41 and
John 5 :46. In that earlier text, Jesus speaks about Moses'
intentionality. What Jesus says about Moses' intent, John says
about Isaiah's intent. Through this comparison, linking the text
before him with John 5:46 (de me enim ille scripsit), Thomas
roots the authority for New Testament interpretation of the Old
Testament in what Christ knew and revealed about himself as the
res intended by the prophet.
Explaining the Johannine text in this way, Thomas makes it
dear that his dispute with Theodore centers on the character of
the human author's intention. He does not place the burden of
refutation on the intention of the divine author considered apart
from the intention of the human prophet; on the contrary, he
insists that the intentionality of the words of the prophet who
received what Thomas calls the "imaginative vision with
understanding" be the sense referenced by the apostles and
evangelists. 29
Given the character of the refutation of Theodore in both
gospel commentaries-a reduction to Christ's knowledgeThomas sees Theodore's error on the exposition of the prophets
as resting upon a deeper Christo logical error. Christological error,
it is good to remember, ultimately rests upon a misreading of the
New Testament. This explains why Thomas treats Theodore as
one who misreads Matthew and John. He misinterpreted what the
New Testament authors understood about themselves as recipients
of a revelation encompassing specific awareness of prophetic
intentions. Misreading Matthew's ut adimpleretur, for example,
Theodore did not take sufficiently into account what the apostles
said about the source of their awareness of Old Testament
intentionality. Theodore misread the New Testament in a most
serious way, for his error could not do injury to the apostolic
29

See ibid. (Marietti, no. 1704).

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hermeneutics of the Old Testament without threatening the New
Testament teaching on the identity and authority of Christ.
Thomas is not concerned to offer a refutation of the theory of
adaptation ascribed to Theodore in the prologue to the commentary on the Psalter. Instead, he offers a kind of monition
concerning how not to interpret the scriptural text. The reference
to the conciliar teaching of the fifth synod is sufficient to mark for
the students that such an approach is inadmissible in commenting
on the Psalter. Still, it is one thing to affirm that it is of the faith
to hold that Jesus knew himself to be the fulfillment of Old
Testament messianic prophecies, that he disclosed this mystery to
his disciples, and that the highest organs of Church teaching have
prohibited a retreat from this New Testament datum. It is another
thing, however, to indicate in what way those prophecies signified
the Savior. On this issue, Thomas counters Theodore's limited
sense of how texts could signify with his own more expansive
account.

B) Complex Intentionality and the Rule of Saint Jerome
In the commentary on Matthew and in the prologue to the
exposition of the Psalter, Thomas turns the discussion toward the
discernment of the principal sense of a text, a sense he identifies
with the author's literally intended sense. As already noted,
Theodore's position implies that the local literal sense exhausts
the possibilities of prophetic intention. Thomas disputes this view,
and proposes an alternative approach. Thus, in the commentary
on Matthew, after making specific room for Old Testament texts
that signify Christ only, that is to say, literally and singularly,
Thomas enunciates a compound principle that reconfigures the
discussion about the literal sense of a prophetic text.
The first part of the principle involves a reference to the way
a prophecy can intentionally signify two circumstances at the same
time. The principle indudes a kind of signification involving
words naming things, and things signifying other things: "sed quia
non solum verba veteris testamenti, sed etiam facta significant de

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Christo." The reference to how things can be made to signify
other things invokes the classic teaching on the way God chose to
accommodate Old Testament history in order to signify New
Testament events. Thomas's reference here to the spiritual senses
serves primarily to highlight the fact that prophetic intentions are
not limited to the simple literal word-to-res relation. This first
aspect of the principle serves as the basis for proposing a further
elaboration involving the existence of something other than either
a straightforward literal sense, limited to an ancient historical
circumstance, or a classic spiritual sense signifying the future
through the prophet's attending to the local res.
Because things signify, Thomas says, words can sometimes be
said about Old Testament things ad litteram which nevertheless
are referred primarily to Christ: "dicuntur ad litteram de aliquibus
aliis sed referuntur ad Christum." Thomas describes a real and
direct relation between the verba of the Old Testament and the
facta of the New, while admitting the existence of Old Testament
facta also at play in the intentionality governing the words. Thus,
the second part of the principle involves specification to what we
could call "the principle of exceeded conditions." In the Matthew
commentary Thomas adduces the example of Psalm 71, focusing
on one of those lines Thomas says was not fulfilled in Solomon.
The example confirms that the focus of Thomas's attention rests
upon a principally intended sense that is Christological yet not
devoid of relation to the ancient historical context.
Thomas articulates his description of this kind of prophetic
signification much more formally in his prologue to the
exposition of the Psalter. He repeats substantially the same
teaching he briefly proposed in the exposition of Matthew; here,
though, the whole proposal comes under the patristic authority of
Jerome. His phraseology merits comparison to what we have from
the Matthew commentary. On Matthew Thomas says that the
prophecies were ad litteram about ancient events and yet are
properly referred to Christ; speaking about the Psalter, Thomas
says they were said non principaliter about events from the
prophet's times. Thomas's last and presumably most mature
treatment focuses exclusively upon discerning a principal sense

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distinct from the prophet's local circumstances. Such a refined
distinction can be sustained only if the prophetic intentions can be
complex, that is to say, capable of signifying more than one thing
at a time.
Clearly Thomas wants to say that the text of Psalm 71 is
principally about the reign of the Messiah; and he has no trouble
admitting that the words bear some relation to the kingship of
Solomon. Still, if Thomas's sources locate Psalm 21 as a principal
text of contention with Theodore, it is remarkable that he does
not propose the premier passion psalm as exemplary in his
positive formulation. It may be the case that Thomas wishes to say
no more than he has to about Psalm 21's mode of signification,
given the weightiness of his sources on what Constantinople II
had to say about the psalm. 30 Another reason may be at work
here, though. Jerome's rule comes independently to Thomas, that
is to say, from a theological tradition distinct from his sources on
Constantinople II and the imbroglio with Theodore. He considers
the rule commensurate to the task at hand, countering Theodore's
narrow account of inspiration with a theologically more expansive
account. Tracking down the source of Thomas' s summary of
Jerome's rule will help clarify what he means by invoking the
principle in response to Theodore.
C) Aristotle and Theodore meet Jerome

Long before his encounter with Theodore, Thomas had spent
a great deal of time considering how best to handle the issue of
prophetic signification. Evidence of this can be found as early as
the response to the Aristotelian objector in question 6, article 1 of
Quodlibetum 7. 31 In fact, a citation of Jerome in that text
30 Thomas does read the other literal passion psalms according to this rule. For example,
he discerns the mode of signification operative in parts of Psalm 2, and parts of Psalm 15 in
this manner. He is, I think, noticeably circumspect in discussing Psalm 21.
31 Quodl. 7, q. 6, a. 1, ad 5. Ranging from the last considered opinion of Fr. Mandonnet
in 1926 to Fr. Gauthier's opinion in 1992, none of the modern commentators date
Quodlibetum 7 later than Advent 1257. Torrell provides an expanded version of Boyle's
summary of the proposed dates corresponding to all the quodlibetal disputes (Initiation, 3 05.
6).

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DANIEL E. lFLORES

provides us with the best source for understanding what Thomas
comes to develop as the "rule of Jerome" in the later prologue.
First the objection:
Besides, whatever sense is drawn forth from the words of some writing, which
an author does not intend, is not the proper sense [of that writing]; for an
author, through one thing written, cannot understand any but one thing, because
it does not happen that [we] understand many things at the same time, according
to the Philosopher. Therefore, there cannot be many senses proper to the Sacred
Seri ptures. 32

The Aristotelian objector anticipates the problematic later raised
by Theodore's Hmited sense of prophetic intentionality. The
objector's argument centers on the definition of the proper sense
of a written text. That sense must be in accord with what the
author understood and intended to signify. The force of the
objection rests on the Aristotelian contention that an author can,
in reality, have only one proper understanding at any one time,
and hence only one governing intention while putting thoughts to
words. The objector, therefore, identifies the proper sense of
words with the literal sense, the sense by which words
intentionally convey knowledge of a single thingo If signifying
intention is rooted in and limited to what the author understands
prior to the use of expressive words, and if an author can
understand only one thing at a time, then it follows that the
expositor should seek only one sense, properly literal, of the
words found in a text. Thomas contests the consequent.
To the fifth, it must be said that the principal author of Sacred Scripture is the
Holy Spirit, who in one word of Sacred Scripture understands many things more
than are expounded by the expositors of Sacred Scripture, or are discerned [by
them]. Nor is it unfitting that a man, who was the instrumental author of Sacred
Scripture, understand many things in one word: because as Jerome says [in his
commentary] on Hosea, the prophets thus spoke about present things done,
which they also intended to signify future things. Hence, it is not impossibie to
Quodl. 7, q. 6, a. 1, obj. 5: «praeterea, quicumque sensus ex verbis alicuius oc:riprurae
ttahirur quern auctor non intendit, mm est sensus proprius; quia auctor per unam scripturam
non potest imelligere nisi u.mum, quia non contingit plura simul intelligere, secundum
philosophmn. ergo non possum esse plures sensus proprii sacrae scripturae."
32

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understand many things at the same time, inasmuch as one is the figure of the
other. 33

The second part of the reply proves most relevant to our
understanding of Thomas's later articulation of the rule of St.
Jerome. The human author of a prophetic text spoke about
present things done, which were themselves intended to signify
future realities. It is not impossible, then, that a human author
understood more than one thing, as long as he was aware that
what he intended to signify was itself a figure of something
further: the intentionality of the author's words extends beyond
the present things done. Thomas thus argues that there is no
anthropologically rooted reason prohibiting the prophet from
intending to signify series of realities related through a continuum
of signifying words and things.
It appears that Thomas here appeals to Jerome's comments on
Hosea 1:3. The text Jerome comments on involves God's command to the prophet to marry Gomer, and the prophet's
explication to the people of the significance of the action in the
context of their infidelity to God. Jerome calls attention to the
significance of the events narrated for that time, events which
themselves point to the future calling of the nationso In this
context, Jerome states the following principle:
The prophets promised about the coming of Christ after many centuries and the
calling of the Gentiles in this way, in order that they [i.e. the prophets] might not
overlook the present time, lest they seem not to teach the assembly-convoked
by reason of some event-about the things that occur [then], but instead seem
to rejoice about obscure and future things. 34
33 Ibid., ad 5: "ad quinrum dicendum, quod auctor principalis sacrae scriprurae est spiritus
sancrus, qui in uno verbo sacrae scripturae intellexit multo plura quam per expositores sacrae
scriprurae exponantur, vel discemanrur. nee est etiam inconveniens quod homo, qui fo.it
auctor instrumencalis sacrae scripturae, in uno verbo plura intelligeret: quia prophecae, ut
hieronymus <licit super osee, ita loquebantur de facris praes.entibus, quod etiam intenderunt
futura significare. uncle non est impossibile simul plura intelligere, in quantum unum est figura
alterius."
34 In Osee Prophetam, 1.1.3.4 (CCL 76: 10, II. 148-52): "Prophetae sic multa post saecula
de aduentu Christi et uocarione genrium pollicentur, ut praesens tempus non neglegant:, ne
concionem ob aliud conuocatam non docere de his quae stant:, sed de incertis ac futuris ludere
uideantur."

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Jerome does seem here to teach that the prophets both
addressed present conditions-for the pedagogical benefit of their
contemporaries-and
promised future realities in a single
prophetic instance. Jerome orders the intended signification in
terms of the direct relation between words, present realities
addressed by the words, and future realities signified by the Old
Testament realities.
In his response to the objector, Thomas applies this element of
Jerome's teaching about the prophet's intention to signify.
Thomas's nee est etiam inconveniens allows that the prophet knew
and intended his words to have a terminus in the New Testament
through the mediation of an Old Testament pedagogical event or
circumstance. Inasmuch as the prophet knew and intended the
announcement of the Old Testament event as a figure of a future
event, "it is not unfitting" that several things be understood at the
same time. His knowledge of the future significance derives from
his understanding of the vision granted him. In short, the prophet
understands the divinely intended mystical sense accruing to the
historical circumstance of his own time. The unity of the
signification is rooted in God's Wisdom and shared with the
prophet; his participated knowledge allows him to speak properly,
while intending to signify distinct but related realities.
Thomas appears over time to have deepened his appreciation
for the principle enunciated by Jerome. 35 Elements of Thomas's
developing work on the issue appear in the Pauline commentaries,
presumably prior to his encounter with Theodore's adaptation
theory. 36 All of his treatments rest upon the notion that the
35 The received textofThomas's prologue to the commentary on the Psalter reads "Jerome
on Ezechiel" not Hosea. There appears to be no other reference to Jerome on Ezechiel in the
entire Thomistic corpus, and the principle enunciated in the prologue mirrors too finely the
text referenced in Quodlibetum 7, where the citation is clearly and accurately to Hosea.
Stroobant, in his French translation of the Super Psalmos, corrects the text to read "Jerome
on Hosea," but I think he has incorrectly identified the specific text Thomas has in mind; he
cites comments Jerome makes in his prologue In Osee Prophetam (Stroobant, Commentaire,
37).
36 In the exposition of the Letter to the Hebrews, Thomas, without mentioning Jerome,
anticipates his remarks on the Rule of Saint Jerome in the prologue to the Psalter (Super ad
Hebraeos c. 1, lect. 3 [Marietti, no. 51]): "sciendum est autem, quod in veteri testamento

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prophetic author could signify a continuum of realities through
one set of words, so long as he was privy to the way God used the
contemporary circumstance to signify future realities.
D) Literal Prophecy and the Principally Intended Sense
By the time Thomas encounters Theodore, he frames the
principle with the added reference to exceeded conditions; the
principle allows him to discern what the human author had
principally in mind. Put another way, excessive descriptions signal
that the prophet beheld a future that his particular circumstance
opaquely adumbrated.
Granted a continuum of related and intended significations,
the expositor must do his best to follow the lead of the author,
letting the words he left signal what he held principally in view. 37
Through excessive descriptions, the prophet signals to the
expositor that he principally intends (sees and understands) the
future reality. Thomas's comments at the outset of his exposition
of Psalm 21 help illustrate his meaning here. The psalm sings the
history of the Passion, and is about Christ; the one figured,
Thomas says, is David. This is the meaning of the phrase "licet
figuraliter de David, specialiter ad litteram refertur ad Christum.""
David saw himself figured in Christ, not Christ figured in himself.
This distinction is a vital one for Thomas, for it reverses the
traditional order governing mystical significations. Instead of the
quaedam dicuntur de eo quod est figura, non inquantum quaedam res, sed inquantum est
figura, et tune non exponitur de illo, nisi inquantum refertur ad figuratum. verbi gratia in ps.
lxxi quaedam dicuntur de david, vel de salomone, inquantum figurabant Christum tantum.
quaedam vero etiam secundum quod sunt homines quidam, et istomm dicta de ipsis possunt
exponi et de Christo; sicut illud: Deus, iudicium tuum regi da: quia illud potest convenire
salomoni. ilia vero quae dicuntur de ipsis inquantum sunt figura, numquam de ipsis possunt
exponi, sicut illud: et dominabitur a mari usque ad mare, etc.; quia nullo modo verificari
po test de salomone." See also Thomas's comments Super ad Ephesios, c. 5, !ect. 10 (Marietri,
no. 335).
37 Thomas's
articulation of a theology of prophetic signification in his scriptural
commentaries is consonant with his teaching on prophetic inspiration in the treatise on
prophecy in the Summa Theologiae. To illustrate this adequately, however, would require a
distinct essay.

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DANIEL E. FLORES

present res adumbrating for the prophet a future res, the future res
illuminates for the prophet the significance of his present res,
thereby making the prophet's present a figuration in the
contemplated reality. The prophet is not focused principally upon
his local circumstance, even though he may hold it in view.
Literally, the prophet sees himself in light of the revealed nexus
of intelligibility; in that light the prophet could hardly be the
principal focus. 38
Exposition follows intention. In his discussion of Theodore
Thomas directs our attention toward what the prophet has
principally in mind; this is for him the best way to discuss the
literal sense. Thomas can maintain that Psalm 21 is a literal
prophecy because the direct character of David's mode of
apprehension secures the literality of his mode of speaking. 39 The
presence of an Old Testament referent in the text, and in the view
of the prophet, is not the decisive issue.
In response to Theodore, therefore, Thomas argues for a
variety of prophetic modes of intentional signification. He
identifies particular ways by which this intentionality manifests
itself in Old Testament texts. Sometimes the prophets spoke with
no Old Testament referent in view; Thomas consistently proposes
Isaiah 7: 14 as such a text. Sometimes the prophets intend to
signify through a local circumstance in a straightforward mystical
signification involving the prophetic intuition that the present
figures the future; this seems to be predominant mode in the
Psalter. Sometimes, however, the prophetic intentions involve an
Old Testament res considered as figured in a future more directly
beheld by the prophet.
38 In that sense, David and the post-New Testament reader of the psalm have something
in common. Both can see themselves figured in the Lord. This is a higher mode of perception
than that of seeing the Lord figured in oneself.
39 David's prophetic grace is of the highest kind, without admixture of outwardly
manifested images. Speaking of David earlier in the prologue, Thomas says of him, "solius
Spiritus Sancti instinctu sine omni exteriori adminiculo suam edidit prophetiam, ... iste nude
doctus fuit de veritate." In STh 11-11, q. 174, a. 4, ad 1, comparing the prophecy of David to
that of Moses, he says, "visio tamen Moysi fuit excellentior quantum ad cognitionem
divinitatis, sed David plenius cognovit et expressit mysteria incarnationis Christi."

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275

CONCLUDING REMARKS

Theology has much work to do before it can find a balance
between respecting the historical integrity of the Old Testament
and respecting New Testament self-understanding as an
authoritative disclosure of prophetic orientation toward Christ.
Thomas's encounter with Theodore, even if fraught with
historical and textual ambiguities, may offer us a way to
appreciate some of the principal issues in play.
First, Thomas's dispute with Theodore occurs within the
context of his own unified view of revelation. He takes it as given
that the God who revealed himself in visions in the Old
Testament is the same God who manifests himself in the person
of the Word made flesh. This is not a Thomistic presupposition;
according to Thomas, it is a New Testament datum. Issues of
prophetic intentionality, therefore, are properly theological issues;
they cannot be cohesively explicated in isolation from the
Church's faith in the identity, mission, and authority of the Lord
Jesus. This in tum is directly a matter of understanding the
intention with which the New Testament authors wrote their
account of Jesus as fulfillment.
Second, a great deal of work remains to be done in order to
discern the binding character of Constantinople II. Admittedly,
this is a thorny issue. Still, Thomas understood himself bound to
respect the council's teaching regarding the literal sense of certain
key Old Testament texts. He is particularly careful to protect
Psalm 21 and Isaiah 7:14. What did the council intend to teach,
and what is its binding force? How have subsequent adjudications
by the Church's teaching authority clarified what the council
intended? These are questions that must be pursued as an aid to
modern discussions of scriptural interpretation.
Thomas's appreciation of Jerome is decisive as he unties the
knot Theodore represents. Thomas proposes that an exegetical
stance before the two Testaments cannot rely only upon a
hermeneutical theory merely framed by anthropological
presuppositions uninformed by the revelation itself. The Church

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DANIEL E. FLORES

cannot read the text of the prophets in exactly the same way a
Latin scholar reads the text of Virgil; and an Aristotelian account
of the capacities of human authors is not adequate to the modes
of revelation. The revelation itself involves new modes of
apprehension that expand without vitiating human modes of
perception and communication. Thomas views the prophetic
modes of apprehension as operating within human perimeters
"opened up," so to speak, by the novelty of a word or vision
granted by God. These new modes of apprehension in turn leave
a written record requiring new modes of exposition, modes
commensurate with the character of the revelation received by the
sacred authors responsible for the sacred text. 40 The distinction
Thomas draws between the sense touching upon the prophet's
local circumstance and the principal sense intended by the author
involves just such an appreciation of complex modes of
perception, signification, and exposition. 41
Finally, Thomas dearly understands that dispute about how to
discern the literal sense necessarily involves a theological
estimation of the tradition of the mystical sense. Disciplined as he
was in focusing upon the literal sense of a scriptural text, he treats
the mystical sense as part of a patrimony that cannot be jettisoned.
He includes the mystical sense within the original prophetic
intention of the human author, and understands it to play an
important part in the overall unfolding of the biblical revelation.
The mystical sense may not ordinarily be the stuff of Thomas's
argumentative theology, but neither does he think it a method
developed by expositors to lie fancifully on top of the literal
sense. Thomas thinks that in its purest form it issues from a divine
40 This issue seems to be on the mind of Pope John Paul Il when in Fides et ratio 93-95 he
urges theologians to work toward developing a properly theological hermeneutic, informed
by but not limited to the insights of the lower sciences.
41 Joseph Fitzmyer, commenting on the Pontifical Biblical Commission's 1993 report On
the Interpretation of the Bible in the Church notes that the document deliberately retreats from
identifying the literal sense with the sense intended by the human author, limiting it rather to
the sense expressed by the text. This is a notion that Thomas would likely find ominous on
a number of counts. See Joseph Fitzmyer, The Biblical Commission's Document "The
Interpretation of the Bible in the Church": Text and Commentary (Rome: Editrice Pontificio
Instituto Biblico, 1995), 120, wherein he comments on section II, B, 1, of the report.

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277

intention shared with the prophetic authors, and suited to the
divine purposes. He may be taken as a witness to an ecdesial
intuition on this point, an intuition echoing significantly through
liturgical tradition. 42 It remains for us, therefore, to re-examine
the issue of the tradition of the mystical sense relative to the
intentions governing the literal sense, its theological relevance to
discussion about the progressive character of revelation, and its
theological import for the overall pedagogical. intent of the
Scriptures.

42 Roland Murphy, speaking about the tradition of the mystical senses ("What is Catholic
about Catholic Biblical Scholarship?-Revisited," Biblical Theology Bulletin 28 [1998], 114),
says the following: "A rather rare taste is required for a modern reader to appreciate those
time-honored approaches. They are part of Catholic tradition, but they cannot be identified
as the Catholic approach. Indeed, they play a relatively insignificant role outside the liturgy,
which keeps their memory alive. They are hardly a vivid part of the current 'living tradition,'
since they force the earlier Testament into the mold of the later," Thomas esteemed the
theological import of the tradition of the mystical senses much more generously.

The Thomist 69 (2005): 279-312

JOHN PAUL H'S MORAL THEOLOGY ON TRIAL:
A REPLY TO CHARLES E. CURRAN
WILLIAM E. MAY

E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

John Paul II Institute for
Studies on Marriage and Family
Washington, D.C.

Institute for Psychological Sciences
Arlington, Virginia

HARLES CURRAN'S The Moral Theology of Pope John
Paul 111 contains an introduction, six chapters, and an
afterword. In the introduction Curran stresses that he will
address the moral teaching and moral theology of John Paul H "as
pope" and thus will not consider his prepapal moral writings (5).
Successive chapters consider the following aspects of the pope's
moral theology: theological presuppositions; theological methodology; ethical foundations and method; conscience, human acts,
and human life; marriage, sexuality, gender, and family; and
social teaching. Curran's analysis is principally concerned with the
pope's most authoritative writings, that is, his fourteen encydical
letters, although he also considers less authoritative documents
such as apostolic exhortations and per se nonauthoritative documents such as his Wednesday audiences known as "The Theology
of the Body."
His first purpose, he says, is to "analyze and criticize the moral
theology of John Paul II" on the basis of Curran's own "'understanding of the Catholic moral tradition today" (5). In the afterword he says that he thinks that John Paul H's "major failure" was

1 Charles E. Curran. The Moral Theology of Pope John Paul II. Washington, D.C.
Georgetown University Press, 2005. xii+262 pages. $26.95. ISBN 1-58901-042-6. In Moral
Traditions Series, James F. Keenan, S.J., series editor.

279

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

not emphasizing or at times even recognizing the Catholic
approach "as a living tradition" (253).
In the course of his work Curran makes more than a score of
extremely serious charges that, if true, would be sufficient
thoroughly to discredit John Paul II as a moral teacher. Here we
will consider eight of Curran's principal criticisms in order to
show their inaccuracy and falsity. The same could be done for his
other charges.
According to Curran, John Paul II (1) adopts a deductive,
"classicist" moral method and fails to acknowledge the role of
"historical consciousness;" (2) fails to recognize the significance
of "change" in Church teaching on moral questions; (3) misuses
Scripture in Veritatis splendor; (4) seriously misunderstands the
teaching of Dignitatis humanae on the use of coercive power by
the state; (5) presents a seriously flawed natural law method; (6)
has a legalistic notion of conscience; (7) advances a "theology of
the body" irrelevant to many persons; and (8) so emphasizes
sexual complementarity that one is led to conclude that "men and
women who are not married are not complete and lack something
about their humanity."

I. A "CLASSICIST" MElHOD VS. "HISTORICAL CONSCIOUSNESS"
An overarching criticism of the pope's ethical method is that
it is "classicist." By this Curran means a deductive method of
moral reasoning which moves from abstract, unchanging,
universal principles to concrete and particular conclusions. Classicism sees reality "in terms of the static, the immutable, the
eternal, and the unchanging," assumes the existence "of a
universal human reason that all have," and pays little attention to
"experience, finitude, and sin as affecting how we know and act"
(107).

Curran juxtaposes this method to what he judges to be the
more adequate moral method of "historical consciousness." By
this he means an inductive method of moral reasoning that begins
with the particular, the historical, and the concrete and moves to

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moral general conclusions. Historical consciousness occupies itself
with "the subject-the person who knows and decides":
We all bring with ourselves the experience that has shaped our persons. People
look through different lenses as they seek truth and try to do good. In addition,
our own finitude and sinfulness color our knowing and acting. (Ibid.)

Curran's "classicist" charge against the pope's theology deserves
careful consideration, since in the past thirty-five years magisterial
teaching has frequently been charged with the same deficiency. 2
The deficiency, Curran says, is most pronounced in the 1993
encyclical Veritatis splendor. Among a list of seven problems with
the natural-law method employed in the encyclical, Curran
in dudes
the failure to give enough importance to history and to recognize a more
historically conscious approach. According to Veritatis splendor, we find moral
truth about the human being written in human nature. The inclinations of nature
are morally determinative. Moral truth is thus given in human nature and not in
history. And because human nature remains basically the same, there is no real
change or development. The methodology ... does not give that much attention
to the signs of the times and the historical developments and diversity existing
at present time. (117-18)

Such an unreasonably static conception of human nature has reinforced a false overconfidence on the part of the Church's
magisterium: "None of us is ever able to see the total picture-we
2 See for example Charles E. Curran, "Anthropological Bases of Catholic Social Teaching,"
in Change in Official Catholic Moral Teachings, ed. Charles Curran (New York: Paulist Press,
2003), 181-82; Richard M. Gula, Reason Informed by Faith: Foundations of Catholic
Morality (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1989), 32-33; Richard P. McBrien, Catholicism, rev.
edition (San Francisco: Harper Collins Publisher, 1994), 148-49, 609-11; for origins of the
idea of historical consciousness, see Bernard Lonergan, "The Transition from a Classicist
World-View to Historical-Mindedness," A Second Collection (London: Darton, Longman &
Todd, 1974), 1-9; referenced in John Finnis, "Historical Consciousness" and Theological
Foundations, The Etienne Gilson Series 14 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1992), 1-2. Christine E. Gudorf charges magisterial moral teaching with ignoring the
relevance of "biological evolution" and hence working from a "static" view of human nature;
see Gudorf, "Contraception and Abortion in Roman Catholicism," in Sacred Rights: The Case
for Contraception and Abortion in World Religions, ed. Daniel Maguire (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2003), 67, 76 n. 45.

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

only have a partial and limited perspective" (119); "one cannot
claim absolute certitude for these approaches [used in Vertiatis
splendor]" (120); "one cannot claim to exclude all possibility of
error" {ibid.); "But moral judgments about the nature and role of
these inclinations by their very nature cannot claim absolute
certitude" (ibid.).
What specifically troubles Curran about the papal method?
Although Curran's "classicist" criticisms appear to be cast
widely-he mentions not only Veritatissplendorbut all the pope's
encyclicals dealing with "personal morality" and "social morality"
(107)-they nevertheless are focused on a particular contentious
issue: the method's tendency to reinforce "hierarchical teaching
on intrinsically evil acts and the existence of negative absolute
norms, especially in the area of sexuality" (109). Curran explicitly
questions the papal reassertion of the intrinsically evil nature and
derivative condemnation of contraceptive acts (174-76, 111, 11617, 130, 131, 132, 181-82), abortion (51, 132, 133, 140, 15253), homosexual genital relations (131, 140, 168), masturbation
(140), artificial insemination (130, 140), premarital sex (140), and
euthanasia (140, 154-55); he mentions as well the condemnations
of female ordination (192) and divorce and remarriage (173-74,
140, 181-82). On these and other difficult moral issues "there is
less certitude than the pope is willing to admit" (156). Hence, the
hierarchy's moral teaching has been a source of disagreement for
"those who have been called revisionist or dissenting Catholic
theologians" (140). Curran's argument is clear: certitude in our
moral judgments is not possible; classicism, either denying or
unaware of the historically provisional nature of human moral
judgments, tends to formulate its conclusions in unreasonably
certain terms; the moral teaching of John Paul II is marked by
classicism; therefore, the authoritative judgments he sets forth on
some of the most controversial moral issues of our day lack
certitude. Historical consciousness, on the other hand, implies
epistemological modesty in our moral reasoning; it implies that
the moral judgments of a given time and place are always provisional and should never be held or taught as if they were certain.

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Curran's conclusions presuppose a premise, unstated in his
text, but made explicit in antecedent authors writing on historical
consciousness upon whom he relies (principally Lonergan and
Rahner), that "'concrete" and "'categorical" human nature is
subject over time to changes so extensive as to deprive human
moral judgment of any claim to being transtemporal and
universally valid. 3
Several theologians have shown this claim to be false. We
quote here John Finnis's rather lengthy refutation:
In its historical actualisations human nature of course changes, for the worse by
way of sin and corrupt cultures, for the better by putting on the new man in
grace. But the relevant question, never confronted even historically, let alone
philosophically,
Rabner and Lonergan and the exponents of historical
consciousness in moral theology, concerns not human nature in its de facto
actualisations, but human nature in its basic possibilities of fulfillment,
possibilities which are adequately known only by adverting to the basic forms of
human flourishing which are understood in our grasp of fundamental reasons for
action. Is there, then, anyone for whom it was not or is not or will not be the
case that life and health, knowledge of truth and beauty, excellence in work and
play, the harmony in friendship with others, the procreative friendship of
marriage with another, personal harmony in interior integrity and peace and
outer authenticity, and harmony with the source of all meaning and value, are
the basic reasons for action, the basic forms of the human fulfilment in which he
or she would wish to share and outside of which no benefit or goal could seem
really worthwhile? No. No such human person can be identified, and the talk of
human nature's changeability . . . fails to impinge on the foundations of
morality. 4
3 For Rahner on the changeability of human nature, see Karl Rahner, "Basic Observations
on the Subject of Changeable and Unchangeable Factors in the Church," in Theological
Investigations 14 (New York: Crossroad, 1976), 15; Rahner sets forth his view that the
"objective structures of human nature" are limited to those which are "implicitly affirmed by
a transcendental necessity even in the act of their denial" in "Natural Moral Law," in Karl
Rahner and Herbert Vorgrimler, Concise Theolog'.cal Dictionary (Fribourg: Herder, 1965),
305; Lonergan uncritically follows Rabner in this: see, Lonergan, "The Transition from a
Classicist World-View to Historical Mindedness," in Bernard Lonergan, A Second Collection
(London: Darton, Longman & Todd, 1974), 6. Jean Porter confidently asserts that "the
critiques of [by] Karl Rahner and Bernard Lonergan [led] most Catholic scholars to reject socalled classical natural law theories"; Jean Porter, Natural and Divine Law: Reclaiming the
Tradition for Christian Ethics (Ottawa: Novalis; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 54.
• Finnis, "Historical Consciousness" and Theological Foundations, 24-25; cf. Grisez,
Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 183; see also 202 n. 21.

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

He writes again,
General discourses about the changeability of human nature need not be taken
seriously unless and until they [the revisionists] get down to the serious business
of considering someone for whom life (bodily life, including bodily health) or the
transmission of life, or play, or aesthetic enjoyment, or speculative knowledge,
or friendship, or religion ... are not really good. Not surprisingly, such
considerations are not to be found in the literature. 5

In these two passages, Finnis is referring to the goods perfective
of human persons toward which we are naturally inclined. These
goods were goods for our first parentS and for those living at the
time of Christ, and they are so for us today. And it is on respect
for these goods that morality, as Veritatis splendor teaches, is
based.
Moreover, as Finnis again notes in criticizing this "historicism"
(which John Paul II himself criticized),
Against such loose talk about changing human nature, we should set the
Christology affirmed by Vatican II, "Christ fully manifests man to man"
(Gaudium et spes, 22) .... He is the "perfect man" (Gaudium et spes, 22, 38, 41,
45). "In Him, human nature is assumed, not annulled" (Gaudium et spes, 22) ..
. . For "all human beings . . . have the same nature and the same
origin"(Gaudium et spes, 29; Lumen gentium, 19), a single nature (Lumen
gentium, 13 ), which is "more fully manifested by the experience of past ages, the
advance of the sciences, and the treasures hidden in the various forms of human
culture" (Gaudium et spes, 44); and all have the "same calling and divine
destiny," and so, fundamentally equal both in nature and in supernatural calling
(Gaudium et spes, 29) can be citizens of the one People of God regardless of race
or place or time (Lumengentium, 13). 6

II. "CHANGE" IN CHURCH TEACHING
The evidence Curran most frequently adduces to demonstrate
the historically conditioned character of Catholic moral teaching

5 John Finnis, "The Natural Law, Objective Morality, and Vatican II," in Principles of
Catholic Moral Life, ed. William E. May (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1980), 113-50,
esp. 140
6 Ibid., 141.

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285

is this: over the centuries the Catholic Church has "changed" its
position on authoritative moral teachings:
History reminds us that over the centuries and the years the church has changed
its teaching on a number of significant issues-such as slavery, usury, freedom,
religious freedom, human rights, democracy, torture, the right of the defendant
to remain silent, the death penalty, the intention and role of procreation in
marital sexuality, the nature of the family, and the role of women in society. (42)

"Thus," he continues later,
at some time in its formulation, papal teaching has been wrong. Thus, history
bears out that even the papal teaching office itself has experienced the limitations
of reason and even to some extent the sinfulness that affects all human reason
and human decision making. (120; see also 130-33, 183-84) 7

Curran thinks that we thus have reason to conclude that Catholic
moral teaching on issues like contraception, abortion, and artificial insemination lacks certitude and that Catholics are warranted to dissent from such teaching: " [my reasons are adduced
as] supporting the fact ... that Catholics might in theory and
practice disagree with such teaching" (132).
The question of change in the Church's moral teaching, and
the relationship of the concept of "change" to the concept of
"development of doctrine," is very important and cannot be done
full justice here. But an adequate answer to Curran's argument can
be presented and now follows. He says the Church has "changed
its teaching" on the twelve important moral issues stated above
(i.e., slavery, usury, freedom, religious freedom, human rights,
democracy, torture, the right of the defendant to remain silent,
the death penalty, intention and role of procreation in marital
sexuality, nature of the family, role of women in society). This
means that the judgment of the magisterium on those issues was
erroneous. Curran's claim is that if this is true for these twelve
issues it follows that the Church's judgment on the issues Curran
7 "John Paul H's encyclicals," Curran writes, "fail to recognize that the church not only
teaches the truth about humankind but must also learn it. The church is both learner and
teacher" (42).

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

is interested in changing (i.e., contraceptive acts, artificial
insemination, abortion, homosexual acts, euthanasia, masturbation, premarital intercourse, and divorce and remarriage) might
also be erroneous and subject to change.
Is Curran's argument from "change" sound? For many good
reasons the answer is no. First, most of the kinds of acts specified
as having been "changed" are not analogous in a necessary respect
to those that Curran would like to see changed. The latter (i.e.,
contraceptive acts, artificial insemination, abortion, homosexual
acts, euthanasia, etc.) are all acts whose objects have been judged
by the magisterium to be intrinsically evil because in each case
what is freely chosen radically contradicts the good of the human
person; to freely will any such act is to freely will contrary to
someone's good and hence is to have a bad will. Of the issues
Curran lists as having "changed," only slavery, usury, and torture
are acts that can be condemned ex objecto as violating a good of
human persons. But precisely what moral object is being condemned when the subject concerned is freedom, religious freedom, human rights etc.? (We take up the question of usury
below.) Most of these acts are political concepts with varying
construals, not all of which are compatible with Catholic faith. To
condemn a particular construal of religious liberty (e.g., liberty to
carry out harmful behavior in the name of religion), or rights
(e.g., as unrestrained moral license), or democracy (e.g., as
affirmed by the French Revolution denying the traditional
liberties of the Church), is not incompatible with affirming the
same concept construed in more adequate ways. This is one way
Catholic teachings associated with these concepts have changed.
The Church was critical of assumptions (atheistic, relativistic, antiecclesiastical) associated with Enlightenment rationalism. It therefore distanced itself from concepts such as subjective rights, 8

8 For an analysis of the classical Greek and medieval Catholic philosophical antecedents
to the modem concept of subjective rights ("my rights," "his rights") and the development of
that concept in the Church's moral teaching, see E. Christian Brugger, "Bioethical
Controversies and the Language of Rights," Global Virtue Ethics Review 5, no. 1 (April 2004),
electronic journal <www.spaef.com/GVER/v5nl/ gver5-1-5-brugger.htm>.

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religious liberty,9 and democracy until it was possible to
disentangle these concepts from the erroneous assumptions of the
political theories to which they were attached or upon which they
depended. 10
Addressing the question of apparent contradictions in the
Church's teaching on religious freedom, Cardinal Renato Martino
was asked: "Is the papal magisterium of the 19th-century Popes
in the matter of religious freedom in contradiction with the
deliberations of Vatican II?" The Cardinal confidently replied:
Not at all. In Mirari Vos [of Gregory XVI, 1832] and in the Syllabus [of Pius IX,
1864] [both of which condemned a conception of religious freedom] in fact,
religious freedom was not condemned, but rather a certain philosophical
conception of religious freedom, which prevailed at the time. This conception
entailed relativism, syncretism and even indifference in religious matters, with
an equating in essence of truth and error. It is totally obvious that these positions
are incompatible with the nature of the Church. 11

Second, the kinds of ethical judgments specifying the morality
of the acts in the two lists are not analogous. Curran's examples
of change are meant to provide warrant for concluding that the
Church's judgments on the controversial fifth and sixth commandment issues he mentions are provisional and uncertain. For this
argument to work the moral judgments whereby the Church
taught on those other issues in the past must have relevant
analogies with the moral judgments of the magisterium on the
9 John Courtney Murray, the most significant theological contributor to the drafting of
Vatican II's document on religious liberty, argues that the changes introduced by Vatican II
in the teaching on religious liberty did not proceed from fundamental changes in the Church's
moral affirmations, but rather were due to "a progress in the understanding of the tradition";
Vatican II discarded "an older theory of civil tolerance in favor of a new doctrine of religious
freedom more in harmony with the authentic and more fully understood tradition of the
church." The chief stimulus for the development was the changing sociological relationship
in modem societies between political communities and religion: see John Courtney Murray,
"The Declaration on Religious Freedom," in Change in Official Catholic Moral Teaching, 3-12
(quotations on 12, 9); see also John Courtney Murray, "The Problem of Religious Freedom,"
Theological Studies 25 (1964): 503-75.
10 Grisez examines "some examples of alleged errors in Catholic teaching" in chapter 36,
appendix 1 of Grisez, Christian Moral Prin.ciples(899-901).
11 'Zenit, Daily News Dispatch, Thursday, 30 June 2005.

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latter acts. All the judgments in the latter list are condemnations
of acts ex objecto. Changing any one of them would mean
beginning to teach that a particular act whose moral object has
been clearly characterized as incompatible with love for persons
insofar as it violates a good intrinsic to persons and condemned
under that characterization is now legitimate to choose precisely
under that formerly condemned characterization. None of the
examples Curran lists except usury even remotely fits this
description. 12 But even usury does not provide a satisfactory
example. While practices of borrowing, lending, and profiting
from lending have changed vastly in the past five hundred years,
the fundamental affirmation of the medieval and postReformation condemnation of usury is still maintained today.
John T. Noonan, Jr., states it well: "the old usury rule, narrowly
construed, still stands: namely, that no profit on a loan may be
taken without a just title to that profit. " 13 On the issue of
12 "Slavery" was not condemned but tolerated; "torture" was formerly judged useful for
extracting confessions and later judged not to be so; "freedom," "religious freedom," "human
nature of the family," "the role of women in society" are not acts
rights," "democracy,"
as such that can be condemned or approved but rather concepts with multiple possible
construals, each of which can be accepted or rejected on its own terms; "the intention and role
of procreation in marital sexuality" relates to a development that has brought greater
specificity to the teaching of the nature of the procreative good in marriage, but has not
entailed tolerating much less accepting something authoritatively condemned by the Church
in the past; the "death penalty" is something that magisterial teaching has in the past
defended, and now still apparently defends in principle, but says is no longer needed in
practice; the "right of the defendant to remain silent" is a point of juridical order and not an
act whose object has once been judged intrinsically evil, and now tolerated.
13 John T. Noonan, Jr., "Development in Moral Doctrine," in Change in Offrcial Catholic
Moral Teaching, 287-305 (quotation on 288); this point has been repeated over the years in
response to the charge that the Church "changed" its teaching on usury. John Gilchrist, a
leading historian of economic activity in the Middle Ages, wrote back in 1969: "The failure
of modern historians to understand [the relevance of the development of just economic
markets to the moral issue of charging interest on a loan] leads them to make such bald and
unqualified statements as that the taking of interest was forbidden in the middle ages or that
the Church came to change its doctrine" (Gilchrist, The Church and Economic Activity in the
Middle Ages [New York: Macmillan, 1969], 64). For two fine discussions of the correct
understanding of the Church's medieval teaching on usury and how that teaching is
compatible in principle with interest-bearing loans in modern economic structures, see:
Rodger Charles, Christian Social Witness and Teaching, vol. 1 (Herefordshire: Gracewing,
1998), 199-203; John Finnis, Aquinas: Moral, Political, and Legal Theory (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 205-10.

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marriage, the fact that ecclesiastical teaching on marriage and the
family in the past forty years has elaborated aspects of the
institution implicit but not emphasized in the ancient teaching
(e.g., broadening our understanding of the purposes or goods of
the marital relationship beyond the procreation and education of
children to include the "good of the spouses") illustrates indeed
the depth and richness of the revealed teaching insofar as new
aspects of the ancient doctrine still emerge into the consciousness
of the Church. But it hardly justifies the conclusion that intrinsically evil acts like the intentional killing of unborn children or
homosexual genital actions are no longer radically incompatible
with the good of the human person.
Third, Curran's argument begs a very important question: on
the twelve issues he says have changed, is it truly the case that the
fundamental philosophical affirmation of the magisterium on each
issue (or even on any one them) has changed? Has the magisterium taught proposition X at one time, then not-X at a later
time? It is not enough for proposition X to undergo an organic
development (say proposition X develops into complex assertion
XAB) while maintaining consistency with its antecedent (X). It is
not enough for the change to be a rejection of one construal of a
concept (say X construed as A) in favor of a more adequate
construal that does not entail the element that led to its rejection
(say X as B). It is not enough for action X (e.g., charging interest
on a loan), whose object by definition entails condition Y (e.g., in
the context of an economy lacking a just market able to establish
market rates of interest in the loaning of money), at one time to
be authoritatively
and later to be accepted because
condition Y no longer prevails (i.e., an economic market able to
establish market rates of interest does exist). 14
For Curran's argument to work, the so-called changed teaching
must assert a proposition once authoritatively rejected. Curran
14 It is not the case that the Catholic Church condemned ex objecto all charging of interest
on capital without regard to the conditions in which the practice was being done; see Pope
Callistus III's interesting defense in 1455 of receiving profit from "the selling of revenues" and
rejection of the allegations that the enforcing of such contracts was usurious; Callistus III,
Constitution Regimini universalis (6 May 1455), DS 716.

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argues that since the twelve teachings he names have changed, we
are warranted in expecting that the sex and life teachings too can
change. But if one of those latter teachings changed, as Curran
suggests it might, it would entail a rejection of a proposition
formerly authoritatively taught. For example, if the magisterium
taught that it was legitimate (under specific circumstance) to
intend to kill an unborn child, that act of teaching would entail a
denial of the proposition that it is never legitimate to intend to
kill the innocent. As we noted above, the concept of development
of doctrine is beyond the scope of this essay. But this much should
be said. No one, including the former Holy Father, means to deny
that doctrine develops in the Church; that there are assertions in
the creeds and other authoritative ecclesiastical teachings that are
not found explicit in Sacred Scripture or the apostolic deposit;
that under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, and facilitated by the
contingencies of history and culture, new aspects of ancient
teachings become dear to the mind of the Church that before had
not been dear. The notion of development of doctrine was
elaborated and defended by John Henry Newman in his famous
Essay on the Development of Christian Doctrine, first published
in 1845, 15 and endorsed in varying degrees by both Vatican 116
and Vatican II, 17 as well as Popes Pius Xl 18 and Pius XIl. 19 This
concept of development is entirely compatible with the papal
teaching that certain authoritatively taught moral judgments are
certainly true. For Curran to answer the question whether the
magisterium has in fact changed its fundamental moral
affirmations, his examples of change would need to be carefully
examined; the former magisterial teaching would need to be
dearly formulated; in particular, the moral object once rejected
and now accepted would need to be dearly specified; this would
need to be set alongside the dearly formulated later teaching with
15 JohnHenryNewman,AnEssayontheDevelopmentofChristianDoctrine(NotreDame:
University of Notre Dame Press, 1989).
16 Vatican I, Dei Filius, ch. 4.
17 Vatican II, Dei Verbum 8; Gaudium et spes 62.
18 Pius XI, Mortalium animos, in Acta Apostolicae Sedis (1928): 14.
19 Pius XII, Humani Generis (1950), DS (30'h ed.) 2314.

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its moral object carefully specified, and the disparity between the
two teachings-the "change"-identified.
Curran provides no
such philosophical, much less historical, examination and comparison of any of the twelve issues stated above. He merely asserts
that they have changed and adduces that change as evidence of his
thesis that the pope's categorical reassertion of certain moral
condemnations lacks credibility.
Our purpose has not been to discredit the idea of historical
consciousness, but rather to demonstrate that Curran's use of the
concept to discredit papal teaching is unsuccessful. The term
historical-consciousness in philosophy (or historical-mindedness,
as used by Bernard Lonergan, who first used the concept in
Catholic philosophy) 20 proceeds from the premise that truth exists
only in the mind of knowing subjects. Things known, to be sure,
exist apart from knowers. But knowers have limitations; hence
too does their knowing. They are conditioned by their history,
and have particular perspectives and points of view because of
their historical situationso 21 All this may be admitted without
concluding what Curran does about human ability to arrive at
certitude with respect to moral knowledge. The atheistic historian
of the Enlightenment, Carl Becker, whose ideas influenced
Anglican theologian Alan Richardson, 22 to whom Lonergan
attributes the origin of the idea of historical-mindedness, expresses systematically what Curran argues for throughout his
book. Becker writes:
Because we [i.e., those at Yale Law School to whom he was speaking in 1932] are
nowadays historically minded, we can understand an idea or a doctrine only
20 Bernard]. F. Lonergan, S.J.,. "The Transition from a Classicist World-View to Historical
Mindedness" in A Second Collection, ed. William Ryan, S.J., and Bernard J, Tyrell, S.J.
(Philadelphia: The Westminister Press, 1974), 1-9.
21 Benedict M. Ashley, O.P., develops the idea in a defense of Thomism against a classicist
charge in The Ashley Reader: Redeeming Reason, 18-25 (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press,
forthcoming); for an earlier version of the essay see "Thomism and the Transition from the
Classical World View to Historical Mindedness," in The Future of Thomism, ed. Deal W.
Hudson and Dennis W. Moran (South Bend, Ind.: American Maritain Association, 1992),

109-21.
22 For Richardson's use of the term "historical-mindedness" see Alan Richardson, History,
Sacred and Profane (London: SCS Press, 1964), 253.

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when we relate its history; we can identify a concept only by regarding it, not as
something static ... but as a living, developing reality." 23

The insinuation is that those who are not historically minded
wrongly think that at least some concepts are not "living, developing realities," but rather unchanging principles. Becker's statement, like Curran's, begs critical questions. Does he mean there
are no universal
no concepts in any field of inquiry or
knowledge that transcend the flux and particularity of history?
The moral judgments of the magisterium derive from the data of
sense experience, imagination, natural inclinations, and witness of
the Church throughout the ages; and it is a dogma of faith that
the magisterium is assisted in its teaching by the Holy Spirit. Can
there be no induction from such principles warranting firm
assent? 24 Those who look in Curran's book for answers to these
questions will be disappointed. His only reply is: the Church has
changed its moral principles on basic ethical issues in the past,
from which it follows that we have good reason to be uncertain
about allegedly irreformable teaching in the present.
Uncritical defenders of historical consciousness need to avoid
the mistake of placing too much faith in their method. What
assurance is there that the novel beliefs of a particular "social
location" are anything more than regurgitated errors from the
past? We must not talk as if the filter of history is a guarantee
against the contamination of ideas: "We cannot assume that every
belief that emerges in the historical consciousness of modern man
affirms a genuine human value and establishes a valid human
right. " 25

23 Carl Becker, The Heavenly City of the Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven;
Yale University Press, 1932), 19; quoted in Finnis, "Historical Consciousness" and Theological
Foundations, 7.
24 Finnis, "Historical Consciousness" and Theological Foundations,3.
25 Francis J. Canavan, S.J., "The Concept of Religious Freedom as a Human Right," in
Religious Liberty; An End and a Beginning, ed. John Courtney Murray, S.J. (New York: The
Macmillan Co: 1966), 67.

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III. THE "MISUSE" OF SCRIPTIJRE IN VERITATIS SPLENDOR
Curran faults John Paul H's use of Scripture in Veritatis
splendor on three counts:
First, it distorts the meaning of the story of the rich young man as found in
Matthew 19.... the thrust of the story ... is the question of riches and not the
question of all Christians being called to obey the commandments found in the
Old Covenant. Second, the encyclical distorts the meaning of Christian morality
as found in Scripture. The encyclical makes primary the insistence on obedience
to the commandments. But morality, as portrayed throughout scripture, involves
much more than obedience to commandments. Morality involves a change of
heart, conversion, response to a loving God, and the virtues, attitudes and
dispositions that characterize the Christian person. . . . A third distortion
concerns the attempt to use scripture to support what the pope is proposing
today based on philosophical and ethical concepts that were not known in
biblical times .... Veritatis splendor explicitly uses scripture to support the
notion of intrinsic evil proposed by the contemporary hierarchical magisterium
in its arguments against proportionalism and consequentialism. But scripture
does not know any of these concepts. (52-53)

These accusations explicitly contradict what is said in the
encyclical. Here the first two will be considered (space limitations
prevent consideration of the third).
First, John Paul II makes it clear, in his reflections on Jesus'
dialogue with the rich young man, that the moral life is not a
matter of obeying rules. Throughout the encyclical the pope
vigorously rejects a legalistic understanding of the moral life. The
pope insists that "for the young man the question is not so much
about rules to be followed, but about the meaning of life . . . the
question is ultimately an appeal to the absolute Good which
attracts and beckons us; it is the echo of a call from God who is
the origin and goal of man's life" (VS 7). It is, he goes on to say,
"an essential and unavoidable question for the life of every man"
(VS 8) and is indeed "a religious question . ... The goodness that
attracts and at the same time obliges man has its source in God
and ... is God himself" (VS 9).
It is an existential question about the meaning of our lives as
persons gifted with freedom of choice, the freedom to give to

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ourselves our identity as moral beings, a truth emphasized later in
the encyclical. Thus John Paul II states that human freedom is
rightly regarded as being "not only the choice for one or another
particular action" but "is also, within that choice, a decision about
oneself' (VS 65). In connection with this the Holy Father quotes
a marvelous passage from St. Gregory of Nyssa:
All things subject to change and becoming never remain constant, but continually
pass from one state to another, for better or for worse .... Now human life is
always subject to change; it needs to be born ever anew. But here birth does not
come about by a foreign intervention, as is the case with bodily beings; it is the
result of free choice. Thus we are, in a certain sense, our own parents, creating
ourselves as we will, by our decisions. (Quoted in VS 71) 26

The essential link between obedience to the commandments
and eternal life that John Paul II sees is not a matter of obeying
rules but rather a matter of love of persons. After noting that
God's commandments show us the path to life and lead to it and
that Jesus, "the new Moses," definitively confirms and proposes
them to us "as the way and condition of salvation" (VS 12), the
Holy Father emphasizes that the negative precepts of the Decalogue, of which Jesus reminds the rich young man, are rooted in
the commandment that we are to love our neighbor as ourselves,
a commandment expressing "the singular dignity of the human
person, the 'only creature that God has wanted for its own sake"'
(VS 13). 27
The pope emphasizes that we can love our neighbor and
respect his dignity as a person only by cherishing the goods
perfective of him and by steadfastly refusing to damage, destroy,
or impede these goods. Appealing to the words of Jesus, John Paul
II stresses that
the different commandments of the Decalogue are really only so many reflections
on the one commandment about the good of the person, at the level of the many
different goods which characterize his identity as a spiritual and bodily being in
relationship with God, with his neighbor, and with the material world .... The
26
27

Thecitationfrom St. Gregory of Nyssa is from hisDevitaMoysis 2.2.3 (PG 44:327-28).
The internal citation is from Gaudium et spes 22.

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commandments of which Jesus reminds the young man are meant to safeguard
the good of the person, the image of God, by protecting his goods. (Ibid.)

He stresses that the negative precepts of the Decalogue "express
with particular force the ever urgent need to protect human life,
the communion of marriage" and so on (ibid.).
Moreover, John Paul II goes on to emphasize that Jesus not
only reconfirms the law given to Moses-the "ten words"-he
also is the one who gives us the Sermon on the Mount, the
"magna carta of Christian morality" (VS 15). In the Sermon on
the Mount Jesus said that he had not "come to abolish the Law
and the Prophets," but rather "to fulfill them" (Matt 5: 17). John
Paul says, "'Jesus brings the commandments to fulfillment ... by
interiorizing their demands and by bringing out their fullest
meaning" (VS 15). The Beatitudes of the Sermon on the Mount
"'speak of basic attitudes and dispositions in life and therefore do
not coincide exactly with the commandments. On the other hand,
there is no separation or opposition between the Beatitudes and
the commandments: both refer to the good, to eternal life" (VS
16). They are "above all promises, from which also indirectly flow
normative indications for the moral life. ... they are a sort of selfportrait of Christ ... and ... invitations to discipleship and to
communion of life with Christ" (ibid.). The moral life, John Paul
II emphasizes, means ultimately the following of Christ. But we
follow him not by any outward imitation but "by becoming
conformed to him who became a servant, even to giving himself
on the Cross" (cf. Phil 2:5-8) (VS 21). Following Christ means
"holding fast to the very person of Jesus" (VS 19).
And it is possible to be conformed to Jesus, to hold fast to him,
to love as he does, "only because of God's grace" (VS 22; cf. VS
11 ). "To imitate and live out the love of Christ is not possible for
man by his own strength alone. He becomes capable of this love
only by the virtue of a gift received" (VS 22; cf. VS 24).

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IV. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE: PUBLIC ORDER VS. COMMON GOOD
Curran claims in chapter 2 and again in chapter 6 that the
papal teaching on the proper role of civil law and legitimate use
of coercive force by civil authority (see Evangelium vitae 68-77)
departs from the teaching of Vatican II. John Paul II's
understanding "follows the traditional Thomistic approach" while
Vatican II "proposes a different theoretical framework," which
Curran calls "the religious freedom approach" (231). The
Thomistic approach sees the proper role of civil authority as
"ensuring the common good of people through the recognition
and defense of their fundamental rights" (61; EV71); Vatican H's
approach adopts the principle, "as much freedom as possible and
as little restraint as necessary" (232). 28 The Thomistic approach
justifies coercive intervention for the sake of "the common good";
Vatican II justifies intervention "to protect and promote public
order" (ibid.). In other words, the concept of the "common good"
implies something different from civil authority, something more
than the concept of "public order." "Public order is a more
restrictive concept" (ibid.). By employing the concept of the
common good, papal teaching implicitly concedes more power to
public authority than Vatican II is willing to concede:
Dignitatis humanae 7 refers to these three aspects of fundamental rights, peace,
and public morality as 'public order' not common good. Public order is a
narrower concept than common good. In discussing civil law in Evangelium
vitae, the pope never refers to public order, the term used in Dignitatis humanae.
By emphasizing the common good as the purpose of civil law, he proposes a
criterion that gives greater scope to law and a lesser scope to freedom .... The
pope giveii more emphasis to truth and less to freedom than does the Vatican II
declaration .... he is unwilling to accept the narrower criterion for civil law as
proposed in that document. . . . he does not follow what was proposed by
Vatican II. (61)

28 Dignitatis humanae teaches "that principle of full freedom is to be preserved in society
according to which people are given the maximum of liberty, and only restrained when and
in so far as is necessary" (DH 7).

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Curran writes later: "Throughout his writings, he invariably refers
to the common good as the end of the state and does not invoke
the narrower concept of public order as proposed in the
Declaration on Religious Freedom" (233). In preferring a greater
scope for the state's coercive law, the pope rejects the concept of
political liberty defended by Vatican II: "he has not accepted the
understanding of political freedom found in the Declaration on
Religious Freedom" (ibid.).
To say John Paul Il's teaching on the proper role of civil law
and the state's coercive authority is inconsistent with the teaching
of Vatican II is false. It is true that the pope consistently invokes
the concept of the common good as the justifying framework for
the exercise of public authority. 29 But by doing this he is doing
nothing more than handing on the teaching of Vatican IL The
primacy of the common good in shaping the duties of civil
authority is at the heart of Dignitatis humanae's conception of
state authority, notwithstanding Curran's claim that the document
has abandoned the concept in favor of the "more restrictive"
concept of public order. The document teaches plainly that the
"proper purpose" of "civil authority fpotestas civilis] ... is to
provide for the temporal common good [bonum commune]" (DH
3 ). It defines the common good as the sum "of those conditions of
social living which enable people to develop their own qualities
most fully and easily"; the common good "consists chiefly in the
safeguarding of the rights and duties of the human person."
Protecting these rights, especially the right to "religious liberty"
(libertatem religiosam), "lies with individual citizens and with
social groups, with the civil authorities fpotestates civiles], with
the church and other religious communities, each in their own
way in view of this obligation towards the common good [bonum
commune]" (DH 6; emphasis added). In addition, "civil authority
must ensure that the equality of citizens before the law which is
itself part of the common good [bonum commune] of society,
should never be impaired either openly or covertly for religious
reasons" (ibid.). Not only political authority, but the exercise of
29

See Evangelium vitae 71, 90; Centesimus annus 11.

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all personal and social liberties, Dignitatis humanae teaches, is
limited by the requirements of the common good: "The moral
maxim of personal and social responsibility must be followed in
the exercise of all liberties: in the use of their rights individuals
and social groups are bound by the moral law to have regard to
the rights of others, to their own duties towards others and to the
common good of all [boni omnium communis]" (DH 7).
The document does use the expression "public order" (publicus
ordo) four times. In the first three instances, its use of public order
is not in the context of a discussion of civil law, or the nature of
civil authority's coercive prerogatives, but rather in the context of
a general statement about the nature of the right of religious
liberty. Because that right derives from human nature itself, it
persists inviolable "as long as due public order is preserved" (DH
2), "within the limits set by due public order" (DH 3), "as long as
they [i.e., religious believers] do not disturb the proper
requirements of public order" (DH 4 ). Public order is used in
these instances as an application of the general requirements of
the common good to the particular question of the scope of the
free public exercise of religion. In other words, the common good
requires the free exercise of religion as long as public order is
preserved. It does not mean that public order is itself the universal
standard for the scope for civil law and the exercise of public
authority. The fourth instance makes this clear. Dignitatis
humanae teaches that civil society has the right to defend itself
against harms that might come to it in the name of religion; civil
authority provides the relevant safeguards; its rules should not be
arbitrary but rather in conformity "with the objective moral
order," should provide adequate protection and taken into
consideration "the rights of all citizens," should be the basis for a
peaceful and orderly community that enables people to "live
together in true justice," and should provide "due protection of
public morality." The next sentence states: "These factors
constitute a fundamental part of the common good, and are
included in the idea of public order." To extrapolate from this the
conclusion that Vatican II has set aside the traditional concept of

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the common good for the more restrictive concept of public order
as the normative term defining the scope of civil law and
authority's legitimate scope is a serious misreading of the council
documents. 30
The assertion that "the pope gives more emphasis to truth and
less to freedom than does the Vatican II declaration" implies a
misunderstanding of the moral teachings of both Vatican II and
John Paul II. In its fifteen short numbered sections, Dignitatis
hum.a.nae refers to "truth" (veritas) thirty-two times. In fact the
document's main thesis is built around the proposition that "all
men are bound to seek for the truth, especially about God and his
church, and when they have found it to embrace and keep it" (DH
1). The libertas that the document refers to dozens of times
indeed implies an immunity from interference, but the immunity
is seen as a condition for seeking and finding the truth. Its
emphasis on truth implies no minimizing of freedom, and its
emphasis on freedom implies no minimizing of truth. The
concepts are not adversarial. To imply that they are is to miss the
point of the document.
Such an assertion also implies a misunderstanding of the
traditional way Catholic theology has conceived of the relationship between truth and freedom. In the opening paragraph of
Veritatis splendor, the pope restates this conception: "Truth
enlightens man's intelligence and shapes his freedom, leading him
3° Further support for our contention that Vatican II firmly maintains the traditional view,
against Curran's novel reading, is found in other conciliar documents (see Gau.dium et spes
74; cf. no. 73), and in the teaching of John xxm, who called the council (see Mater et
magistra 65, 151; Pacem in terris 54, 60, 84, 85, 55, 56), as well as Paul VI, in whose name
its sixteen documents were published (see Octogesima adveniens 46; Populorum progressio
24); the teaching is so universally and firmly a part of Catholic moral teaching that there is
good reason to judge that it has been infallibly taught by the ordinary and universal
magisterium (see Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Compendium of the SocialDoctrine
of the Church [Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Varicana, 2004], no. 168; cf. nos. 409, 567;
Catechism of the Catholic Church, nos. 1898, 1903, 2236, 2241; Congregation for the
Doctrine of the Faith, mDoctrinal Nore on Some Questions Regarding the Participation of
Catholics in Political Life" [Nov. 2002], no. 1; Leo XIII, Immortale Dei 5, 18, 44; Libertas
praestantissimum 16, AAS 18 [1887-88]; Pius II, Summi pomificatus 59; "Christmas Radio
Message" 1941,AAS 35 [1943]: 9-24; "Christmas Radio Message" 1944,AAS 37 [1945]: 15;
Pius XI, Divini redemptoris 31; Mit brennender Sorge 30).

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

to know and love the Lord." In other words, truth and freedom
are correlative. Choice and action in accordance with moral truth
is defining not restrictive of human moral freedom. The pope says
a chief reason for writing Veritatis splendor is to respond to
currents of theological dissent "which end by detaching human
freedom from its essential and constitutive relationship to truth"
(VS 4). The pope calls this false conception of freedom "an
illusory freedom" (VS 1).
Curran's concept of freedom is legalistic. It conceives moral
norms as rules that restrict freedom, rather than rational guides
opening possibilities for the creative, fulfilling expression of
human freedom. Ironically, Curran concludes that the moral
theology of Veritatis splendor, with its reassertion of the existence
of irrevocable moral norms, is shot through with legalism (60-61,
127-28). This turns the pope's theology on its head. In Veritatis
splendor, moral norms represent, not arbitrary rules, but rather
signposts, as it were, pointing towards human fulfillment: "The
commandments thus represent ... the first necessary step on the
journey towards /reedom" (VS 13). 31 Saint Augustine sums up this
traditional notion well:
The beginning of freedom is to be free from crimes ... such as murder, adultery,
fornication, theft, fraud, sacrilege and so forth. When once one is without these
crimes (and every Christian should be without them), one begins to lift up one's
head towards freedom. But this is only the beginning of freedom, not perfect
freedom. 32

Curran fears that conceptions like the pope's that link freedom
and truth might lead to policies or laws that unreasonably restrict
the scope of people's behavior. This is illustrated when he asks
whether civil law ought to restrict abortion. Curran replies:
"Some Catholics, including myself, use the religious freedom
31 "Those who live 'by the flesh' experience God's law as a burden, and indeed as a denial
or at least a restriction of their own freedom. On the other hand, those who are impelled by
love and 'walk by the Spirit' (Gal 5:16), and who desire to serve others, find in God's Law the
fundamental and necessary way in which to practise love as something freely chosen and freely
lived out" (VS 18).
32 Quotation is from Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus, 41.10.

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approach to give more emphasis to the benefit of the doubt
favoring freedom from law, especially where there is no societal
consensus against abortion" (232). It should be noted that Vatican
II includes abortion among a number of "infamies" against the
human person, "unspeakable crimes," actions that when permitted
"poison human society" (Gaudium et spes 27, 51), and teaches
that "from the moment of its conception life must be guarded
with the greatest care" (GS 51). The religious liberty teaching of
Vatican II simply cannot be construed as being consistent with
permissive abortion laws.

V. NATURAL LAW
Curran finds "seven problems in John Paul II's understanding
of natural law as presented in the 1993 encyclical Veritatis
splendor" (113). Some have already been addressed. Here we
consider two closely related ones.
Curran contends that John Paul II's use of the expression
"natural inclinations" in the encyclical indicates "acceptance of
the Thomistic understanding of human nature as involving the
inclinations that we share with all living things, with animals, and
those that are proper to us as human beings." Curran claims that
this involves a three-layered anthropology with a bottom layer of what we share
with all living things, 33 a second layer of animality added on top of that, and a
third layer of rationality on the top .... This ... is the ultimate reason why I
judge the papal teaching to be guilty of physicalism-the identification of the
physical or biological act (e.g., the act of sexual intercourse) with the moral.
(113-14)

This criticism is rooted in a flawed understanding of St. Thomas.
Thomas recognized that some of our "natural inclinations" are
shared by all substantive entities (e.g., the inclination to preserve
33 It is worth noting that Curran mistakenly claims that the first kind of "natural
inclinations" that we have as human beings we share with other "living things." In the relevant
Thomistic text, referred to in the next foomote, Aquinas speaks of inclinations we share "with
other substances."

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

our being), that others are shared by other animals (e.g., the
inclination to mate and have offspring), and that some (e.g., the
inclination to know the truth about God and to live in fellowship
with other persons) are unique to human beings, are "natural"
only to humans. 34 But he did not think that human beings have
three anthropological layers superimposed on each other, as
Curran indicates. For Aquinas, and for John Paul II, human
persons have one human nature. As Aquinas notes, these
inclinations orient us to the goods perfective of us as human
persons, goods such as life itself, marriage and the procreation
and education of children, knowledge of the truth, action in
accordance with reason, etc. 35 It is because these inclinations
orient us toward the goods perfective of us that they are so
important, particularly in the eyes of John Paul II (see VS 12, 13).
Curran also raises "the problem of physicalism as found in
papal teaching, especially in the area of sexuality" (115). Papal
teaching "insists" that marital intercourse must always remain
open to new life, that is, remain a "natural sexual act": "one
cannot interfere with the sexual act either to prevent procreation
or even to encourage it. Thus the Catholic position condemns
both artificial contraception and artificial insemination, even with
the husband's semen" (ibid.). "From my perspective," Curran
responds, "'human sexuality . . . must be seen in relation to
persons .... For the good of the person or the relationship, one
can interfere with the sexual faculty and its act. The physical

conjugal act cannot and should not become a moral absolute"
(116; emphasis added).
The charge of physicalism is empty. According to Curran's
own description, physicalism consists in the "identification of the
physical or biological act (e.g., the act of sexual intercourse) with
the moral" (114). But this is precisely what John Paul II explicitly
rejects. With Thomas Aquinas, he insisted that ''the morality of

the human act depends primarily and fundamentally on the
Aquinas, STh HI, q. 94, a. 2.
Ibid. See STh HI, q. 94, a. 3, for the good of acting in accord with reason or the moral
good. On this entire matter see Finnis, Aquinas, 79-102.
34

35

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303

'object' rationally chosen by the deliberate will" (VS 78). In an
important passage, he then says:
In order to be able to grasp the object of an act which specifies that act morally,
it is therefore necessary to place oneself in the perspective of the acting person.

The object of the act of willing is in fact a freely chosen kind of behavior. To the
extent that it is in conformity with the order of reason, it is the cause of the
goodness of the will; it perfects us morally .... By the object of a given moral act
... one cannot mean a process or an event in the merely physical order, to be
assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a given state of affairs in the
outside world. Rather, that object is the proximate end of a deliberate decision
which determines the act of willing on the part of the acting person. (Ibid.)

Note here the statement: "By the object of a given moral act ...

one cannot mean a process or an event in the merely physical
order, to be assessed on the basis of its ability to bring about a
given state of affairs in the outside world" (emphasis added). But
on Curran's own account physicalism identifies the moral
meaning of a human act with the physical event. Sexual
intercourse is an illuminating example. According to Curran,
physicalists, among them Paul VI and John Paul II, identify "the
act of intercourse with the moral" (114 ). Yet Paul VI explicitly
denies this in Humanae vitae, where he notes that a conjugal act
"'imposed upon one's spouse with no consideration given to the
condition of the spouse or to the legitimate desires of the spouse,
is not a true act of love. They understand that such an act opposes
what the moral order rightly requires from spouses" (HV 13).

VI. A LEGALISTIC NOTION OF CONSCIENCE
Curran criticizes the pope's
operating on a "legal model":

account

of conscience

for

There can be no doubt John Paul Il develops his understanding of conscience in
terms of a legal model. ... The emphasis on a legal model in Veritatis splendor
is to be expected because the whole thrust of the encyclical is to insist on
universal and absolute moral norms .... But a legal model of conscience is not
adequate. (127-28)

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

Curran misunderstands the papal account. Because the encyclical
refers to "law" often in its discussion of conscience (e.g., "the
relationship between man's freedom and God's law is most deeply
lived in the 'heart' of the person, and his moral conscience" [VS
54]; "conscience is the application of the law to a particular case"
[VS 59]; numerous other examples could be cited [see VS 54-64]),
therefore he calls it a "legal model." But what Curran means by
"legal" and the encyclical by "law" are quite different. Legal to
Curran means legalistic. Law in the encyclical means the rationally
intelligible moral order that guides human action in accord with
human fulfillment. Grisez defines legalism as "thinking about
moral norms as if they were simply rules to be obeyed by someone
who wants to get along." 36 This characterizes Curran's conception. Curran says the pope's model is inadequate because "the
most important decisions in life-marriage partner, vocation,
friends, coping with limitations, shortcomings, and sufferings of
human existence-are not made in response to law" (128). Law
here is conceived as a rule; and there are no certain rules to
follow in discerning a vocation or choosing a spouse, no easy
answers, no "laws" telling me what I should do. This is undoubtedly correct.
But Veritatis splendor never enjoins a legalistic conformity to
rules or laws. Rather, it teaches that the dignity of conscience
derives from the truth. Conscience therefore has the duty to seek
the truth, and to adhere to it when it is found. The truth which
conscience seeks is moral truth, or the moral law, or the principles
of the natural law, established by God as the rational standard for
human goodness. Conscience does not establish the moral law; it
rather bears witness to it (VS 60). It is able to bear witness to it
because the moral law is intelligible. In bearing witness to the
moral law the subjectivity of conscience and the objectivity of
moral truth correspond. They unite in the judgment of conscience
and allow the human person to shape his acts and himself in
accord with truth: "the truth about moral good, as that truth is
36 Germain Grisez and Russell Shaw, Fulfillment

in Christ: A Summary of Christian Moral

Principles(Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1991), 5.

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305

declared in the law of reason, is practically and concretely
recognized by the judgment of conscience" (VS 61); "it is always
from the truth that the dignity of conscience derives" (VS 63).
John Paul H's account of conscience is an elaboration of
Vatican H's famous and lovely paragraph on conscience from
Gaudium et spes:
In the depths of his conscience man detects a law which he does not impose on
himself, but which holds him to obedience. Always summoning him to love good
and avoid evil, the voice of conscience can when necessary speak to his heart
more specifically: 'do this, shun that'. For man has in his heart a law written by
God. To obey it is the very dignity of man; according to it he will be judged (cf.
Rom 2:14-16). (GS 16; emphasis added)

Veritatis splendor's account (along with Vatican H's) can be called
"legal" only to the extent that it conceives the natural moral law
as the rationally intelligible norm directing conscience to its
proper object, which is moral truth. But the account is not
legalistic. The law to which it refers is not imposed from the
outside but arises from the requisites of human nature and its
fulfillment: "a law written on the heart." It is an ordinance @f
reason enjoining conformity for the sake of human flourishing.
Curran insinuates that the pope's emphasis on the normativity of
truth for conscience is restrictive:
John Paul H's penchant for the legal model goes much deeper. . . . His
fundamental and all-embracing emphasis on the role of truth in the moral life
means that conscience must always be seen in terms of obedience to truth ....
But a legal model of conscience is not adequate. (127-28)

Does Curran mean to suggest that moral truth is not the proper
object of conscience? Or that the imperative to obey the truth
when it is found is restrictive? To what then is conscience
accountable? Or is it accountable at all to anything outside the
agent?
Curran contrasts the legal model with what he calls the
"relationality-responsibility model" (128). This model, he says, is
grounded in the insight that there is a "connaturality" between the

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

human person's natural inclinations and "the true and the good"
(129). 37 Curran is vague on the nature of this connaturality but he
seems to mean the following: over time, as a Christian strives to
live well a life of discipleship, his subjective emotional inclinations
correspond increasingly to the good; when such a person is faced
with a moral decision, his feelings and emotions will incline
towards what is good; should he act in accord with the object of
his inclinations, such a person acts in accord with a good
conscience. The testimony of that conscience (which he calls
elsewhere a "true" conscience) wiH be an experience of joy and
peace:
Connaturality or congeniality grounds the criterion of the joy and peace of
conscience as indicating that the conscience is true .... When a proposed course
of action is placed before such a person, if the action is in accord with his or her
basic thrust, one's inclination will have found its proper object. The person then
experiences the joy and peace of having found what she is searching for. 38

"How can I be sure," Curran asks, "that my conscience is not
wrong?" 39 He replies: "the most adequate criterion in my
judgment is the peace and joy of a good conscience"; 40 or again,
"the criterion of a good conscience (is) the peace and joy of
conscience" (129). In other words, having come to a moral
judgment on a particular course of action, if I experience peace
and joy at that judgment, then I can be sure I have a good and true
conscience. Is there a danger that in appealing to the subjectivity
of feelings and emotions to establish the objective veracity of
moral judgments our conclusions will be subject to the same
inconsistencies to which human emotions are subject? ''Yes,"
Curran replies, "there is the danger of abusing the criterion, but
authentic subjectivity and tme objectivity coincide" (ibid.).

37 He develops the model in Charles Curran, "Conscience in the Light of the Catholic
Moral Tradition," in Conscience, ed. Charles E. Curran (New York: Paulist Press, 2004), 19.
JS Ibid.
39 Ibid., 18,
4-0 Ibid.

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Veritatis splendor's concern is more serious than Curran's.
Criticizing "radically subjectivistic" conceptions which "exalt
freedom to such an extent that it becomes an absolute," the
encyclical states "in this way the inescapable claims of truth
disappear, yielding their place to a criterion of sincerity, authenticity and 'being at peace with oneself'" (VS 32; emphasis added).
VII. A "THEOLOGY OF THE BODY" IRRELEVANT TO MANY BODIES
Curran claims that John Paul H's "theology of the body"
cannot serve as a theology for all bodies .... what the pope develops in terms of
the nuptial meaning of the body really does not apply to people who are single
or those who are widows or widowers .... Implicitly, John Paul II's theology of
the body maintains that heterosexual marriage is the only context of human
sexuality. (168)

He says that John Paul II so emphasizes concupiscence and lust
that he ignores the fact that "sexual passion is basically a good
that is often disturbed by sin. . . . The impression given by The
Theology of the Body is that passion and sexual pleasure are
totally suspect and in need of control. The pope does not seem to
acknowledge a fundamental goodness about sexuality" (171).
"These talks for all practical purposes ignore the positive aspect
of sexual pleasure ... [which] itself is a good .... The failure to
develop the proper role of sexual pleasure seems to be associated
with a fear of such pleasure and a tendency to see it primarily in
a negative way" (172).
Curran chose not to consider pre-papal works such as Love and
Responsibility. However, we think it pertinent to cite some
passages from that work. In it Karol Wojtyla Gohn Paul II) affirms
that "sensuality" is a response to the person as a "potential object
of enjoyment" and thus has a "consumer orientation." 41
Nonetheless, he emphasizes that sensuality is "a sort of raw
material for true, conjugal love," and he insists that "an exuberant
41 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. Willetts (New York: Farrar, Straus,
Giroux, 1981), 105.

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

and readily roused sensuality is the stuff from which a rich-if
difficult-personal life may be made. "42
It is improbable that the same person who wrote these lines
could have the negative attitude toward human sexuality, sexual
passion, and sexual pleasure that Curran attributes to John Paul
II as author of the addresses on the "theology of the body." It
appears that Curran failed to read carefully the audiences making
up the theology of the body. In addresses 4 7 and 48, entitled, in
English, "'Eros' and 'Ethos' Meet and Bear Fruit in the Human
Heart" and "Spontaneity: The Mature Result of Conscience,"
John Paul II has much to say about the goodness of sexual
passion. 43 Thus he writes:
"Eros" must not be confused with lust. For Plato it "represents the interior force
that drags man toward everything good, true, and beautiful" [47 .2]. It refers also
to the natural and hence "good" desire experienced in the attraction of men for
women and vice versa. However "erotic" desire is often identified with lust
[47.3]. A proper interpretation of the Sermon on the Mount, taking into account
the multiple meanings of "eros," allows room "for that ethos, for those ethical
and indirectly even theological contents which, in the course of our analyses,
have been seen from Christ's appeal to the human "heart" [47.4]. Christ's appeal
is "the ethos of redemption. The call to what is true, good, and beautiful ["eros"
in the Platonic sense] means, at the same time, in the ethos of redemption, the
necessity of overcoming what is derived from lust in its three forms .... H the
words of Mathew 5 .2 7 -28 represent this call, then they mean that, in the erotic
sphere, "eros" and "ethos" do not differ from each other, are not opposed to
each other, but are called to meet in the human heart, and in this meeting to bear
fruit. [47.5]

John Paul II thus recognizes that the sexual desire of man for
woman and vice versa is itself something good, although "lust,"
sinful desire, is not. He explicitly recognizes that sexual desire can
have a "noble" fulfillment, in other words, a joyful, pleasurable,
• 2 Ibid, 108-9.

In sections VII and VIII of this article the text of John Paul II's "Theology of the Body"
employed is that found in The Original Unity of Man and Woman: Catechesis on Genesis
(Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1982); and in Blessed Are the Pure of Heart: Catechesis on the
Sermon on the Mount and Writings of St. Paul (Boston: St. Paul Editions, 1983). This text is
preferred because it provides the paragraph numbers for each address.
H

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sinless sexual union between husband and wife in the conjugal act.
He declares:
Ethos must become the "constituent form" of eros. Ethos is in no way hostile to
"spontaneity." The person who accepts the ethos of Matthew 5.27-28 "must
know that he is called to full and mature spontaneity of the relations that spring
from the perennial attraction of masculinity and femininity. This very
spontaneity is the gradual fruit of the discernment of the impulses of one's own
heart" [48.2]. "This discernment ... has an essential relationship with
spontaneity . . . a noble gratificationis one thing, while sexual desire is another;

when sexual desire is linked with a noble gratifu:ation,it differs from desire pure
and simple" [48.4; emphasis added]. Only by self-control can man attain "that
deeper and more mature spontaneity with which his 'heart,' mastering his
instincts, rediscovers the spiritual beauty of the sign constituted by the human
body in its masculinity and femininity" [48.5].

VIII. SEXUAL COMPLEMENTARITY

The claim that the pope's understanding of sexual
complementarity "means that men and women who are not
married are not complete and lack something about their
humanity" (192-93) is rooted in Curran's understanding of sexual
complementarity as a "fractional" complementarity, as if a male
person or a female person is only one-half a full human being and
becomes "whole" only in some kind of androgynous union. 44 For
John Paul II, the sexual complementarity between man and
woman is integral and asymmetrical. In his thought man and
woman are gifts to each other; they are called to "give" and
"receive" each other, but each does so in complementary and
asymmetrical ways.
In a remarkable passage concerned with the way in which man
and woman "give" and "receive" each other, the Holy Father
said:
If the woman, in the mystery of creation, is the one who was 'given' to the man,
the latter, on his part, in receiving her as a gift in the full truth of her person and
+< On this point see Sr. Prudence Allen, "Integral Sexual Complementarity and the
Theology of Communion," Communio: International Catholic Review 17 (1990), an essay
commenting on John Paul ll's "theology of the body."

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

femininity, thereby enriches her, and at the same time he, too, is enriched. The
man is enriched not only through her, who gives him her own person and
femininity, but also through the gift of himself. The man's giving of himself, in
response to that of the woman, is an enrichment of himself. In fact, there is in it,
as it were, the specificessence of his masculinity, which, through the reality of the
body and of sex, reaches the deep recesses of the "possession of self.,, thanks to
which he is capable both of giving himself and of receiving the other's gift. The
man, therefore, not only accepts the gift, but at the same time is received as a gift
by the woman, in the revelation of the interior spiritual essence of his
masculinity, together with the whole truth of his body and sex .... Subsequently,
this acceptance, in which the man finds himself again through the "sincere gift
of himself," becomes in him the source of a new and deeper enrichment of the
woman. The exchange is mutual, and in it the reciprocal effects of the "sincere
gift" and of the "finding oneself again," are revealed and grow. ("The Theology
of the Body," 17.6; emphasis added)

John Paul H's position here harmonizes with the view taken by
Robert Joyce concerning the complementarity in the way men and
women "give and receive" each other. According to Joyce, both
the man and the woman are called both to give and to receive, but
the man is the one who emphatically gives in a receiving way,
whereas the woman is the one who emphatically receives in a
giving way. 45 This is beautifully illustrated in the conjugal act. In
it the man-person, precisely because of his complementary
sexuality, is able personally to enter into the body-person of his
wife, giving himself to her and in doing so receiving her.
Moreover, his wife, precisely because of her complementary
sexuality, is uniquely able to receive his body-person into her body
and in doing so to give herself to him.
That the woman is called on to "receive in a giving way" and
that the man is summoned to "give in a receiving way" is also
illustrated in the "gift" of new human life. John Paul II noted that
new life is entrusted "to each and every other human being." But
45 See Robert Joyce, Human Sexual Ecology: A Philosophy and Ethics of Man and Woman
(Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1980), 67-71; see also William E. May,
"Marriage and the Complementarity of Male and Female," Anthropotes: Rivista di Studi sulla
Personae la Famiglia 8, no. 1 Gune 1992): 41-60. A shorter version of this essay was
published as chapter 2 of May's Marriage: The Rock on Which the Family Is Baseti (San
Francisco: Ignatius, 1995), 39-66, at 50-54.

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it is entrusted "in a special way to woman, precisely because the
woman in virtue of her special experience of motherhood is seen
to have a specific sensitivity towards the human person and all
that constitutes the individual's true welfare, beginning with the
fundamental value of life. "46 Indeed, he declared:
Motherhood involves a special communion with the mystery of life as it develops
in the woman's womb. The mother is filled with wonder at this mystery of life
and "understands" with unique intuition what is happening inside her. In the
light of the "beginning," the mother accepts and loves as a person the child she
is carrying in her womb. This unique contact with the new human being
developing within her gives rise to an attitude toward human beings-not only
towards her own child, but every human being-which profoundly marks the
woman's personality. It is commonly thought that women are more capable than
men of paying attention to another person and that motherhood develops this
predisposition even more. The man--even with all his sharing in
parenthood-always remains "outside" the process of pregnancy and the baby's
birth; in many ways he has to learn his own "fatherhood,, from the mother . ...
the mother's contribution is decisive in laying the foundation for a new human
personality. 47

In other words the woman is disposed to receive her husband and
others in a giving way. The husband-father, to exercise his
fatherhood, must give himself in a receiving way, something he
learns from the wife-mother, to his child, just as he is summoned
to give himself in a receiving way to his wife in the conjugal act.
CONCLUSION

We hope that in these pages we have succeeded in showing
how false are major criticisms Charles Curran levels against the
moral thought of John Paul IL Other criticisms he levels in his
book can likewise be shown to be gratuitous and rooted in a
laici 51. See also Mulieris dignitatem 30: "The moral
and spiritual strength of a woman is joined to her awareness that God entrusts the human
being to her in a specialway. Of course, God entrusts every human being to each and every
other human being. But this entrusting concerns women in a special way-precisely because
of their femininity-and this in a particular way determines their vocation."
47 Pope John Paul II, Mulieris dignitatem 18.
• 6 Pope John Paul II, Christifideles

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WILLIAM E. MAY and E. CHRISTIAN BRUGGER

profound failure to read carefully the texts he criticizes and also
to a failure on his part even to consider criticisms his views have
met from other theologians on such issues as physicalism and
historicism.

BOOK REVIEWS
Trinity in Aquinas. By GILLES EMERY, 0.P. Ypsilanti, Mich.: Sapientia Press,
2003. Pp. xxix + 361. $44.95 (cloth). ISBN 0-9706106-9-6.
According to its author, Gilles Emery-Swiss Dominican priest and professor
of theology at the University of Fribourg-Trinity in Aquinas does not supply a
comprehensive treatment of Aquinas's Trinitarian doctrine but seeks to present
some of its major themes. The book comprises seven chapters, six of which were
written previously as independent studies, and together they provide a trusty
guide into the heart of Thomas's often difficult Trinitarian theology, situating it
in its medieval milieu and illumining its central themes and insights from various
perspectives.
The book is a combination of historical and speculative theology, offering us
a colorful palette ofThomas's doctrinal sources and contemporary interlocutors
while hewing closely to the framework and terminology of the master's own
thinking about the Trinity. Emery displays expert knowledge of the medieval
environment in which Thomas's thought finds its home, and his understanding
of Aquinas's Trinitarian themes is nuanced and correct; the reader may feel
secure under the guidance of one who knows every contour of the land he has
chosen to survey. Topically, the book distills itself into four main areas of
inquiry: it begins with an overview of the threeness and oneness of God in
medieval Scholasticism; chapters 2-4 and 7 discuss and compare Thomas's
Trinitarian doctrine in the commentary on the Sentences, the Summa contra
Gentiles, the Summa Theologiae, and the commentary on St. John's gospel;
chapter 6 shows why Aquinas deems it necessary to hold that the Holy Spirit
proceeds from the Son as well as from the Father; and chapter 5 concerns itself
with the contemporary debate about whether Aquinas's treatise on God is
essentialist or personalist.
Latin Scholasticism's investigation of plurality within God takes place in an
ambience of strict monotheism, and its treatment of the relationship between
God's threeness and oneness coalesces into two discussions. The first gauges the
epistemological connection between our knowledge of God's oneness and our
awareness of God's threeness. Anselm had transmitted to the medieval
Scholastics the expectation of finding certain "necessary reasons" which would
discover the threeness in the oneness: for Richard of St. Victor and Bonaventure,
God's charity and God's goodness, respectively, are those facets of God's

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oneness that necessarily plurify into threeness. Aquinas takes a more modest,
"apologetic" tack: although no necessary reasons can conclusively affirm the
Trinity, reason under the guidance of faith can disprove any arguments advanced
against belief in the Trinity. The second discussion explores the notions of
relation and person as the best ways to articulate the divine plurality and also
synthesize that plurality with the divine oneness. Trinitarian plurality exercises
a creative causality and, antithetical as it may be to certain monist strains of
Greek philosophy, even bestows upon created plurality the exalted status of a
transcendental.
Thomas's three great theological syntheses hold that natural reason cannot
conclusively know the Trinity, but only God's unity of being. There can be no
"necessary theological reasons" allowing one to deduce the Trinity from the
fecundity of the divine being, although human understanding can help to make
the Trinity "reasonably thinkable." These syntheses also ground God's plurality
in a theory of relation, though the Trinitarian theology of the Summa contra
Gentiles does not investigate the meaning of the word person (nor does the
commentary on John) or use hypostasi$ at all. The Summa Theologiae is clearest
and most insightful about Thomas's relational understanding of the divine
persons: the inner divine processions of understanding and loving are the
foundations of the mutual divine relations, and these relations, as subsisting, are
the three divine persons, who are endowed with the three defining marks of
personhood: individuality, subsistence, and understanding. On the one hand,
Thomas protects a strict Trinitarian monotheism by proving that the divine
essence, relations, and persons are all identical in reality; on the other hand, he
upholds faith in the Trinity by showing that the divine relations are really
distinct vis-a-vis one another.
According to Emery, Aquinas avoids any prerelational conception of the
Father or of any other divine person. Thus, he disagrees with Bonaventure about
how to understand the doctrine of the Father's innascibility, which Bonaventure
sees as a positive nucleus tending to constitute the Father as a divine person prior
to any relation to the Son. Aquinas understands the Father's innascibility only
negatively, as a "not-being-begotten." In order to comprehend the Son, he uses
the concept of the word or interior mental concept (the commentary on John
especially stresses the Son as God's Word), which, unlike his contemporaries
according to Emery, he distinguishes from the intelligible species by which the
intellect is first informed through abstractive cognition. There is a difference in
emphasis between the Sentences, the Summa contra Gentiles, and the Summa
Theologiae as to how they view the Holy Spirit: while the pneumatology of the
first focuses on the Holy Spirit as a subsisting act of love proceeding in God as
a mutual bond between Father and Son, the latter two see the Holy Spirit as the
fruit of the Father and Son's act of love, that is, as the impression, surge, or
dynamic impulse that comes to pass in the loving will of the Father and the Son.
Although building in the Sentences on the contributions of his predecessors
Albert the Great and Bonaventure, Aquinas is nevertheless entirely original in his
systematic use of the thesis, unparalleled in the commentaries of the other two,

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that the Trinitarian processions exercise-at the nexus of exemplary, efficient,
and final causality-a deep influence over creation: "processiones personarum
aeternae sunt causa et ratio productionis creaturarum" (I Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 1).
Paying special attention to the personal dimension of divine actions outside of
God, Aquinas states that the Trinitarian processions cause the multitude of
creatures to be distinct both from each other and from their Creator: "ex
processione personarum distinctarum causatur omnis creaturarum processio et
multiplicatio" (I Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).
Closest in style to the Summa contra Gentiles, the commentary on John is for
Emery a clear testament to the biblical and patristic bases of Thomas's
Trinitarian theology. Emery refers to this commentary to show that Thomas's
Trinitarian theology combines biblical exegesis and speculative reflection into a
complex unity, although Thomas's style of speculative biblical exegesis, however
much Emery tries to justify it, often looks more like eisegesis than exegesis to
contemporary theologians and biblical exegetes. He also uses the commentary
on John to show that Thomas, pace his critics, does indeed possess a rich
understanding of the economic Trinity. Emery argues, moreover, that Thomas's
economic Trinity does not spontaneously arise from his reading of the Bible but
is rather the third and last stage of a speculative Trinitarian theology, which
begins with the scriptural revelation of the Trinity through the economy of
salvation and progresses in its second stage to a reflection on the immanent
Trinity.
Emery has written a rich, detailed, and well-balanced chapter on Aquinas's
attempt to show that the filioque's inclusion in the creed of the Roman Catholic
Church is consonant with the faith expressed by the Scriptures, the patristic
writers, and the early Church councils. Although Aquinas has no trouble
accepting the Cappadocian formulations (through Augustine's Latin) that the
Holy Spirit proceeds principaliter from the Father (because of the Father's
auctoritas within the Trinity), and per {ilium, he still argues that it is necessary
to hold that the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Father and the Son. He lines up
an impressive array of scriptural texts which speak of the Son sending the Spirit,
but his explaining away of the Greek-leaning John 15 :26 ("the Spirit of truth
who comes from the Father") is weak and unconvincing. He also lays before us
an extensive Latin patristic dossier in favor of the filioque, and even does some
investigation of the Greek dossier, but he has a limited understanding of
Cappadocian and Byzantine Trinitarian theology, and does not really grasp that,
for the orthodox East, ekporeusis(processio)is a term reserved for the Father's
notional acts within the Trinity. Moreover, to the biblical, patristic, and
historical records, Thomas adds the considerable weight of his speculative
Trinitarian theology. He first eliminates all forms of distinction between the
divine persons (including the Cappadocian diversity of origin from the Father)
except the distinction based on relative opposition, and then argues that the only
way there can be more than one set of mutually opposed relations within the
Trinity is if the Holy Spirit proceeds simultaneously from the Father and the
Son. Indeed, he cannot really comprehend, according to his Latin medieval logic,

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how the Greeks can believe in a relational and personal Trinity and yet not grasp
the necessity of the filioque to protect and bolster that faith. For Emery, what
Aquinas's treatment shows us is that the Roman Catholic Church cannot without
great loss simply jettison all that is involved in the affirmation of the filioque, no
matter what happens to the official creedal status of the filioque in the future.
Responding to the wave of criticism from Rabner and Kasper and many
others, Emery devotes a chapter to the question of whether Aquinas's treatise on
God is essentialistic or personalistic. His answer is that it contains both elements,
and that the real issue is how well the essentialistic and personalistic elements are
integrated together, and in what order they appear in the treatise. The original
question can be broken down into two others: Does Aquinas's use of Augustine's
"psychological" analogies for the Trinity manage to posit in God some properly
personal acts that go beyond the acts of the divine essence? And does the fact
that Aquinas discusses the one God before the triune God mean that his overall
treatise on God is essentialistic?
As to the first question, Emery shows that for Thomas there can be no
derivation of divine persons from an essential divine act, and that even if he
explains the divine processions of the second and third persons by reference to
acts of the divine mind and will, which belong to God's essence, the resulting
names of the divine persons and our understanding of them (e.g., Word and
Love), must be taken personally and not essentially. In other words, even if
Thomas must include the divine essence whenever he considers the Trinity's
processions and notional acts-after all, these are identical to the divine
essence-it is still true that the divine relations and persons must be understood
personally and not essentially.
As to the second question, Emery correctly emphasizes that Aquinas's whole
treatise on God is not to be seen as a treatise De Deo trino tacked on to a treatise
De Deo uno, but that the whole treatment concerns the one and only triune God,
but from differing perspectives. Thomas is following a long tradition in using the
two perspectives to discuss the triune God, one which goes back to Basil of
Caesarea, who in order to challenge the Arian Eunomius distinguished between
what is commonly held by all three persons because of their common divinity
and what properly distinguishes them one from the other. Acutely conscious of
the distinction between the proper and the common in God, Thomas realizes it
is always necessary to bring in the double perspective of the common divine
essence and the proper personal relations if one wants to give a full account of
the Church's Trinitarian faith. It is also eminently clear that in questions 27-43
of the Prima pars, where the pedagogical order progresses from processions to
relations to persons, he is totally oriented toward what is personal in God.
Would not Thomas have better emphasized the personalism of his Trinitarian
theology, as his critics have asserted, if he had begun his treatise on God with the
person of the Father and not with the essence of the one God? Emery realizes
there are benefits to both approaches but offers two reasons why Aquinas chose
the order of presentation he did. First, there is the epistemological principle that
one should treat of what is common before one treats of what is proper. The

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second and deeper reason is that to begin the treatise on God with the person of
the Father would be to treat the Father in an extensive manner before having
grasped the Father in his relation to the Son, which would be tantamount to
thinking about the person of the Father prerelationally. In Emery's eyes, then,
since Thomas's theology of God is resolutely relational, it is only fitting that he
should begin his treatise on God with the one divine essence.
Emery's second reason is quite ingenious and turns the tables on Thomas's
critics, though it is perhaps a tad too ingenious to argue that in order to
emphasize God as personal one should begin with God as essential. I would like
to recommend a third possible reason for Thomas's order of presentation, which
as a Christian monotheist he may have felt congenitally though he never adverts
to it explicitly: from the perspective of a Christian religion that grew out of a
revealed Jewish monotheism, it would appear quite fitting that a speculative
treatment of God should mirror the historical course of revelation about that
God. The revelation of monotheism had to come first, with good reason, for to
think about Trinity before monotheism is firmly entrenched in the human mind
would almost certainly end up inviting in the multiple divinities of polytheism.
Thomas has to show that the confession of the Trinity is the Christian form of
monotheism, and the best way to do this is to start off with the one God and
then introduce the divine subsistent relations as both identical with the one God
and distinct from one another. From this viewpoint, Aquinas's order of
presentation turns out to be more historically astute than his historical-minded
critics have imagined.

GREGORYROCCA, 0.P.
Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California

Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher. By ANN HAR.lLE. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2003. Pp. 296. $60.00 (cloth}. ISBN 0-52182168-1.
Howsoever great Montaigne's standing as a man of letters, he occupies a
negligible place in most standard "histories" of philosophy. Even as compared
with the other philosophers of his age-that the historians should name it the
"Renaissance" provides as clear an indication as any to just how derivative a
group of thinkers they suppose them to be-the author of the Essays is generally
ranked in the second tier. While many of his contemporaries dreamed of the
rebirth of a "Platonism" of one form or another, he seemed to proselytize for
one of the lesser schools of philosophical antiquity-scholarly opinions vary as
to whether his ultimate allegiances were to Stoicism, Epicureanism, or

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skepticism- which all have in common, despite or because of the differences
between them, the propensity to reduce philosophy to a moral doctrine. Or if
the attempt is not made to reconcile Montaigne's endless borrowings from
ancient writers of every stripe by alleging some sort of development on his part,
they are taken as proof of an eclecticism lacking all rigor or consistency. It is
generally agreed, in any case, that he is not a philosopher in the strict or highest
sense of the word, notwithstanding his exceptional ability to wield a pen.
In Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher, Ann Hartle seeks to set
straight this piece of the record. On her view, Montaigne was a philosopher of
the very greatest stature, whose writing "takes up the most philosophical
questions in a profoundly original, comprehensive, and coherent way" (1). Her
thesis should make her book of interest to any philosophically inclined reader,
and especially to those who desire better to grasp the great temporal or rather
argumentative fault lines of philosophy's course through history. It ought also
to earn for the book the particular attention of Thomists and other friends of
high Scholasticism, who better than most ought to know how much can be
learned about one's friends from their foes. For whatever else we might say
about Montaigne the philosopher, he has few rivals in the breadth and depth of
his opposition to medieval philosophical theology, which he had experienced at
fairly close quarters, having published, at his father's behest, a translation of
Theologia naturalis sive liber creaturarum by Raymond of Sabunde, a deservedly
obscure Spanish Scholastic. Hartle believes that Montaigne's philosophy
continues to merit serious consideration; but given her own very real sympathies
for Christian Aristotelianism, as also for the school of Plato, she is well equipped
to lead into the Essays many who will have hitherto been inclined to leave them
behind.
The title of her book is drawn from a statement that appears, as if in passing,
in what is by far the longest and easily the best known of the essays, "The
Apology of Raymond Sebond," wherein Montaigne makes clear how little he
really shares with the theologian whom he had translated some dozen years
earlier (the first edition of the Essays appeared in 1580; more or less the
definitive edition appeared in 1595, three years after his death). Roughly half
way through that essay, he purports to discover himself, by happenstance and
after the fact, as a "new figure: a philosopher unpremeditated and accidental."
Hartle, then, takes the author at his word. Michel de Montaigne: Accidental
Philosopher attempts to demonstrate that Montaigne is not really a
"Renaissance" philosopher at all, that he affords us a dramatically new
understanding of philosophy and the philosopher. Just how new, though, is
Hartle's Montaigne?
The jibes against the schoolmen that are scattered throughout the Essays are
not of themselves especially memorable; much worse was written by others in
the century and a half or more during which Christian Aristotelianism was the
philosophical stalking horse of choice; but those barbs do not really begin to
convey the extent of his quarrel with Scholasticism, signs of which may be found
at every level of his work. Far more telling in this regard is his astonishing

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announcement, in the last of his essays, that study of himself constitutes both his
"metaphysics" and his "physics." And lest we be tempted to construe the point
in an unduly spiritual way, Montaigne devotes a great deal of the concluding
essay to a consideration of his various bodily functions, which are discussed with
a candor that is poles apart from the modus loquendi formalissimus perfected by
St. Thomas Aquinas. It is to Hartle's great credit that she does not treat such
passages as mere effrontery. By entertaining the possibility that they actually
mean what they seem to say, she is led to argue in the second and the sixth of the
book's nine chapters that Montaigne does not so much abandon traditional
metaphysics as "bend" and "stretch" its categories.
The direction of his conceptual manipulations is, as she readily allows,
unilaterally downward (29, 40). She holds, however, that notwithstanding his
drastic lowering or hobbling (61) of the old metaphysical standards, Montaigne
is not a genuinely "modern" philosopher. In his constant debunking of earlier
positions, as in the repeated claims he makes to his own originality, he surely
bears some kinship to Machiavelli, Bacon, Descartes, and Hobbes, none of whom
ever balked in his efforts to put philosophy on a lower but putatively more solid
footing than it had enjoyed in either antiquity or the Mi.ddle Ages, at calling
attention along the way to his virtues as an innovator. What distinguishes
Montaigne from the early modern thinkers, Hartle claims, is that his break with
medieval philosophy and theology is not for the sake of rule over human affairs
by an allegedly autonomous "reason," a quasi-political ambition that she takes
to be the defining feature of modern philosophy as such (1, 8, 77, and 217-39).
Otherwise stated, although her Montaigne does have in view a certain
"reformation" not only of philosophy but of human affairs, he is not at all a
"progressive" thinker. But if his critique of Scholastic metaphysics does not
principally look forward, must we not conclude that he is an advocate of a
philosophical "Renaissance" after all?
Certainly he cannot rightly be deemed a "skeptic" in the traditional sense. If
ancient skepticism is defined by the denial that knowledge of the nature of things
is accessible, by the counsel on the basis of that denial to suspend aH judgment
in one's ongoing engagement with the world, by the desire fueled by that
suspension to attain to a state of imperturbability, and, as a consequence of all
three premises, by the readiness to accept the laws and customs of one's place at
face value, then, Hartle observes, Montaigne was no skeptic (14-15). Although
his diffidence about our prospects for kno11vingcertain kinds of things can hardly
be denied, he manifests throughout the Essays a very high degree of confidence
in his ability to distinguish what is good by nature from what is not.
Furthermore, his ultimate "end or goal" cannot be imperturbability or
indifference, for he "insists on his changeability and the consistency that he does
display is not dependent on his being unaffected by the accidents of life" (16).
And while he is respectful of the common moeurs of his country, he does not
blindly submit to them (104-5), because he has reason to believe that they
contain but thereby also veil truths that are not commonly acknowledged (21017). In general, Montaigne deems the skeptic's impassibility to be excessively

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high flown or unrealistic, and for this and other reasons he cannot really be
counted a Stoic either, or even an Epicurean for that matter, as Hartle notes
astutely (27-28, 57-58, 94-97,116, 196).
Our author also makes clear that in the measure that the ancient philosophers
were given to voicing moral exhortations or encomia, Montaigne wants little or
no part of them. Having argued, in the first part of the book, that the ontological
ground so to speak of the "accident" that is his philosophical existence is
"contingency," which she terms "the most fundamental category" of his
"metaphysics" (172; cf. 7, 38, 123, 157-59), she goes on in her final three
chapters to characterize the stance he assumes and perhaps also recommends in
the face of the world's, and his, radical contingency. She aptly summarizes this
stance, following Montaigne himself, as a combination of the laughter of
Democritus and the compassion of Heraclitus, with fellow feeling tempering
Democritean scorn, and guffaws ultimately prevailing over sobs (172). More
elaborately stated, his "magnanimity without pride" joins a keen appreciation for
the fragility of every human life to an exalted sense of his independence, a rare
self-detachment to an even rarer self-affection, a preference for the "idleness" of
private life to an extraordinary willingness to "go public" in writing, a shameless
indifference to ordinary moral sensibilities to an uncompromising defense of the
existing social order.
Montaigne's reconfiguration of virtue is paradoxical in numerous ways, as
Hartle indicates, and one must agree with her that those paradoxes point to the
extent to which Montaigne diverges from most traditional conceptions of virtue.
That is not to say, however, that his "moral philosophy" is entirely without
ancient precedent, for many, though of course not all (see 176, 227), of the
characteristics just mentioned call the Platonic Socrates to mind. This is scarcely
surprising, given his admiration for the Athenian philosopher, whom he
describes as "the most perfect soul that has come to [his] knowledge." To be fair
to Hartle, though, it is not her view that Montaigne's rejection of Scholasticism
means to effect a complete break with the philosophical tradition. It would be
more accurate to say that he "carries the tradition forward by deepening it" (2).
She grants, accordingly, that there are significant affinities between Socratic
dialectic and Montaigne's rendering of the relation between philosophy and
prephilosophical life (see especially chap. 4 ). And this brings us to the most novel
feature of her interpretation of the Essays, or rather, the very heart of it.
Hartle's is a decidedly Christian reading of Montaigne. It is Christian in the
sense that she interprets his thought in the very best light available to her, and
thus with a keen desire to put it to the test, not so much for the sake of refuting
his errors as in order to secure whatever is good in it. Yet it is also Christian in
the sense that she regards the Essays as itself the expression of a thoroughgoing
Catholic piety or "outlook" (123). That Montaigne regards his philosophizing
as an "accidental" consequence of the world's "contingency" is entirely of a
piece, she believes, with his deepest conviction, namely, that the world is created
by God ex nihilo. The Christian doctrine of creation illumines every aspect of his
philosophy, as she understands it.

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Of course, many readers take Montaigne to be a "fideist," but Hartle is not
one of them. To the contrary, she argues-quite convincingly I think-that it
staggers all belief to hold that such a compulsively reflective writer could
"deliberately keep himself from thinking about the truths that are most
important to him" (136), to say nothing of the internal incoherence that infects
every fideistic "faith" (see 266 n. 26). She dispatches a second common
interpretation of Montaigne's relation to Christian belief in an analogous
fashion. To those who ascribe a "mild" or "tepid" religiosity to the author of the
Essays, Hartle bluntly but reasonably counters that no "serious" human being can
be so indifferent as to "leave the most important questions of human life
unexamined" (135). Montaigne is worth reading only on the supposition that he
is not a thoroughly shallow pate. By far the most venerable approach to the
question of his piety is to take it with a grain of salt. This appears to have been
the view of the libertins erudits, so called, who together constituted the closest
approximation to a school of Montaigne (Charron, La Mothe le Vayer, Naude,
and others). But it was also the view of quite another sort of reader entirely,
namely, Pascal, who is on record as saying that "for those who have any
inclination to impiety or vice Montaigne is absolutely pernicious" (Entretienavec
M. de Saez), though he himself never hesitated to acknowledge his debts to him.
Hartle is perfectly aware of this approach to the Essays (134-36, 233-34), and
grants that it enjoys some textual support, for example, "the highly ambiguous
character of the 'defense' of natural theology found in the 'Apology"' and his
open acknowledgment of "the tradition of the 'noble lie'" (134), although one
might also mention, among other things, the numerous assertions throughout the
work that are on their face at odds with Christian orthodoxy. She argues, all the
same, that the phenomena are better saved if we treat him as no more but also
no less than a Christian philosopher. How she elaborates this thesis defies easy
summary for, as indicated, it informs the book's every page. It is especially
prominent, however, in the fifth chapter's account of "the dialectic" and "the
harmony" of faith and reason in the "Apology," and in the ninth and final
chapter, wherein Hartle claims that the practical political implication of
Montaigne's philosophizing is a "Christian republic."
One need not be persuaded by Hartle's attempt to reconcile Montaigne's
reason to Christian faith to be grateful to her on that account. Those who
construe his understanding of Christianity exclusively in function of his
"prudence" are easily tempted to reduce him, in effect, to a pamphleteer of
unbelief, albeit a long-winded one. Hartle never makes that mistake.
Montaigne's one hundred and seven essays add up to what is undoubtedly one
of the most perplexing books ever written. In its parts and as a whole Michel de
Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher is faithful to the insight that persistence in
perplexity is a sign, or the sign, of philosophical activity. H its leading thesis
should give rise to disputation, that can hardly be counted a stroke against it,
especially if it moves the reader to reexamine for himself Montaigne's own
words, the questions they pose, and the answers they attempt.

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It should be noted, by way of conclusion, that Hartle's scholarship is a model
of its kind. Her footnotes afford the reader a clear, synthetic, and fair-minded
survey of an impressively large sample of a voluminous secondary literature.
JOHN C. MCCARlHY

The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon. By JOHN MILBANK. London and New
York: Routledge, 2003. Pp. 232. $24.95 (paper). ISBN 0-415-30525-X.

From a certain theological perspective, anything that exists, if is to be
properly and completely understood, ought to be conceived as a gift. John
Milbank's new book is the first in a series of writings designed to articulate such
a perspective. At the same time, he identifies it as a sequel to the collection of
essays published in 1997 as The Word Made Strange. The present volume guides
its readers on an intellectual journey across a wide theological terrain: creation
and fall, Incarnation and atonement, sin and grace, Church and Spirit are all
among the topics explored here in relation to the core set of insights being
developed in the book. The result is a work that is both significant in scope and
penetrating in its analysis, an important contribution to contemporary
theological conversation.
The focus of Milbank's concern is reconciliation or "for-giveness"-not
primarily with the original act of giving, bur rather, "with the restoration of a
refused and ruptured gift" (xi). Importantly, Milbank's God is one who "is
eternally for-giving as well as giving," a claim that he will press without
sacrificing the priority of God's goodness over evil (xii). Nevertheless, it is with
an extended meditation on evil that the book begins, followed immediately by
a chapter portraying evil as a form of violence. Milbank's first argument is a
critique of the theory of "radical evil" which he traces to its origins in Kant's
philosophy. Rather than conceiving of evil as something positive, Milbank
defends a traditional Augustinian perspective on evil as privation, as lacking "any
positive foothold in being" (1).
This argument is by no means a simple one, nor is it easily summarized
Milbank's contention that "evil as positive is evil's own fondest illusion" (22} is
buttressed by a subtle analysis of the nature of volition, one that contrasts a
Kantian view of the will as "self-bound" and of freedom as something "given"
with the preferred Augustinian view of freedom as a gift of grace, and of the will
as something that one cannot truly "possess." The upshot of this analysis is
Milbank's remarkable conclusion that evil is itself "radically without cause," thus

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inexplicable, so that "there has never been for theologians a 'problem of evil'"
(18). That is to say, Milbank links the problem of evil to its roots in modern
philosophy, "roughly, the time of Leibniz," much as he perceives the theory of
radical evil as being a modern, Kantian invention. Augustine and the medieval
theologians were thoroughly innocent of such misconceptions, although the fall
into modernity, on Milbank's account, begins already with Duns Scotus, more
precisely with a "post-Scotist univocity of Being." From such a perspective, "if
the finite equally is, as much as the infinite, then even the lacking that is evil
equally is, along with the good," and thus its existence must be accounted for in
terms of the original purpose of creation.
This last argument, consistent with Milbank's treatment of Scotism elsewhere,
seems to me to be a caricature and dangerously misleading. It seems equally a
caricature of modern "liberalism" to identify it as a nascent form of totalitarianism, as the author does in the final pages of the chapter. (I tend to agree
with Jeffrey Stout, in his recent book on Democracy & Tradition, that the
continued use of the term "liberalism" by contemporary theorists may actually
be blocking the road to inquiry.) His insistence that the modern theory of evil
is not only wrong-headed but also partially responsible "for the modern actuality
of evil" (4) is overkill, not necessary in order for him to expose that theory as
problematic. Nevertheless, the chapter does supply a forceful argument for
conceiving of evil as essentially privative; evil is substantively, albeit "not purely
and simply," nothing (see 213 n. 14).
Milbank regards evil and violence as "convertible but not identical: exactly
like a couple of malign transcendentals" (28). For the privation theorist, peace
is a positive reality, not the mere absence of conflict. Evil not only disturbs the
peace but also conceals the Good. Violence is really violence, in Milbank's view,
only to the extent that it removes or destroys something good, that is, only to
the extent that it is evil. Consequently, an act cannot simply appear as violent but
must be interpreted or diagnosed as such; not every use of force will constitute
an act of violence. Indeed, evil insofar as it is "predatory upon the positive"
ought to be opposed with force. And the pacifist who passively gazes on violence
without intervening ought also to be judged as violent.
Evil and violence are ultimately to be overcome by forgiveness, conceived not
as "negative gesture" but as "positive gift," not as something essentially human
but as divine (50). On Milbank's account, forgiveness is as positive as evil is
negative; it is not the mere removal of a debt, but an actual gift given for
someone, a "for-giving" moved by charity and with the aim of reconciliation.
Augustine's meditations on time and memory are central to that account. In
order for any evil to be forgiven, whatever is deficient in the past must be
"revised out of existence" (54). The past as remembered can be redeemed, much
as the meaning of a musical note can be shaped by its relationship to other notes
that fall later in a sequence. Meaning is a relationship between events rather than
the property of some discrete event isolated in the past. Now while this work of
redemption is the gift of an "infinite eternal memory" (55), it must somehow be

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mediated to us, thus the significance of the Incarnation as "the prime paradigm
for positive forgiveness" (60).
In his chapter on the Incarnation, Milbank once again identifies Duns Scotus
as a favorite target of criticism. The essential link between Incarnation and
forgiveness in Thomism is severed by Scotus, for whom Christ represents the
"ontological completion of the Creation" (67). Post-Scotus, forgiveness is
conceived increasingly as something negative, in legalistic terms, as the removal
of a debt, rather than the "sustained giving of the original gift despite its refusal"
through sin (68). It is interesting to note that Hans Urs von Balthasar, while also
suspicious of the Scotistic doctrine of the univocity of being, nevertheless leaned
toward affirming Scotus's view that the Incarnation was presupposed in the act
of creation and not simply a consequence of human sin. Milbank rejects Scotus
wholesale and actually links the two doctrines. It is precisely his teaching about
univocity that infects Scotus's theology of the hypostatic union, with its
"reduction of God to one ontic pole within a common univocalized being" (78).
For Milbank, "the Scotist God has become more like a bestowing tyrant ... and
positive forgiveness has begun to be dissolved"
Once again, it seems to me that Duns Scotus has become a whipping boy and
the principle of univocity a wand that Milbank waves in order to account for
much of what he regards as problematic in modern thought. Without denying
altogether the revolutionary features of Scotus's philosophy, I perceive him as
standing much more in continuity with Augustine and with the medieval
Scholastics who came before him.
I remain convinced that it is most productive to trace the trajectory of Scotus's
thought to its modem development in the philosophy of Charles Peirce. For
Peirce, it was precisely his discovery of Duns Scotus and the Scholastics that
supplied him with the intellectual resources he needed in order to repair what
he regarded as most defective in Kantianism. Further, a more generous reading
of Scotus's theology would portray him as articulating some of the perspectives
that Milbank is anxious to affirm. Scotus actually offers a compelling argument
for the coincidence of God's justice and mercy in the forgiveness of sins
(Ordinatio N, d. 46). Nor should Scotus's theology of the Incarnation be
interpreted as irrelevant to his understanding of the Atonement and of
reconciliation, revealing instead the special quality of divine love as steadfast
<firmitas).All of this is to say that it is possible to reject this consistently negative
critique of Scotus while nevertheless embracing some of the basic features of
Milbank's own constructive theological position.
Chapters on the crucifixion and Atonement develop some of the insights
introduced earlier in the book. It is Christ crucified who "overcame violence and
restored peace" (79). But this Atonement is not achieved as a sacrifice, in
compensation to God for sins committed; rather it is to be viewed as God's own
continuous "giving in and through our refusals of the gift, to the point where
these refusals are overcome" (100). Our dying with Christ is a dying to evil-asnothing, simultaneously the passing into a new kind of life. That life is always

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one lived in community, a Church nourished and sustained by the Eucharist.
Consequently, Milbank's meditations on the Atonement lead naturally to his
reflections on ecclesiology.
Milbank wants to affirm both the hierarchical and the democratic aspects of
the Church, contending that they exist not in tension but as logically dependent
upon one another. This is an interesting claim with important implications for
understanding theological method and the proper answer to the question "what
authorizes theology?" (109). In exploring this question, Milbank returns the
reader yet again to Scotus and the fading of the thirteenth century. Not only Karl
Rahner but also Balthasar is faulted for engaging in the "enterprise of 'natural
theology', which historians have now shown to go back at the very furthest only
to Scotus" (117). Milbank is not proposing a return to the thirteenth century,
but rather to "an unknown future that we have missed and must seek to rejoin"
(119). I share his concern about the corrosive effects of nominalism on modern
thought. But that concern is mediated to me by Peirce who advocated a return
to Scholastic realism, albeit of a Scotistic variety, modified and updated in the
light both of healthy nominalistic criticisms and insights supplied by modern
science. This does not rule out for me the sort of philosophical or "natural
theology" in which both Rahner and Balthasar engaged. It does for Milbank,
who looks to Nicholas of Cusa in his attempt to recover "what might have been"
if the history of thought had not been interrupted by nominalism en route to
modernity. Despite my discomfort with Milbank's narrative of events post-1300,
his treatment of Cusanus is laced with insight. His account of the bishop as "the
true theologian" and "the original President of the Eucharist" (123) is also
illuminating, and wonderfully "radical" in its "orthodoxy." This chapter is
typical of much of Milbank's writing: aggressively argued, it is easy to find
something with which one might disagree, yet one cannot fail to be impressed
by the intelligence of the argument or neglect to admire the brilliance of some
of its details.
The final three chapters, from this reader's perspective, radiate a very special
brilliance. Without abandoning his grand narrative concerning the origins of
modernity, Milbank nevertheless devotes a more sustained attention to his
concept of "gift," and to the theological vision that enables it. Opposing Patocka,
Levinas, Derrida, and others, Milbank rejects the notion of gift as pure selfsacrifice without hope of reward. This austerely other-regarding ethic, as
Milbank's subtle argument suggests, is not only "impossible" but also peculiarly
self-absorbed. I am inclined to resist some of the details of that argument's
formulation; for example, I would contend that there are alternative concepts of
"indifference" and of "self-control"--different from the ones that Milbank
eschews (e.g., on 141-42) and worth preserving. But the overall argument is a
compelling one, with its portrayal of the moral life as endless and reciprocal giftexchange, understood as absolute surrender to the divine gift of grace (Milbank's
theological appropriation of the idea of "moral luck"). This reciprocity is not
contractual but is characterized by a certain indeterminacy or asymmetry. Here

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the ethical is not grounded in a hope for death (necessary for the purest form of
self-sacrifice), but in hope for community (because every true gift presupposes
a mutual exchange of gifts), as well as in hope for the Resurrection (where giving
and receiving coincide in a perpetual and ecstatic feast of love).
MICHAEL L. RAPoSA

Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania

Avicenna's Metapbysics in Context. By ROBERTWISNOVSKY.Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell
University Press, 2003 Pp. xii+ 305. $65.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-8()14-4178-

1.
As Whitehead claimed that all philosophies are footnotes to Plato, too many
histories of philosophy reduce Avicenna's metaphysics to a summary of and
commentary on Aristotle, with some footnotes and adaptations. In fact, Avicenna
offers a powerful new synthesis, which critically assesses the work of previous
philosophers and theologians and courageously rethinks many issues. Its
originality and the interest of its philosophical moves can only be understood in
context. For Wisnovsky the context has to do with (1) the Greek and early
Arabic commentators' efforts to reconcile Aristotle not only with himself but also
with Neoplatonism and (2) the works and discussions of the "Mutakallimfm,"
the practitioners of Kalam or Islamic theology.
Beginning with the first context, that of the various commentators, Wisnovsky
shows how Alexander of Aphrodisias and others tried to reconcile Aristotle's
texts, in particular the view of "entelechia" in the definition of the soul in De
anima 2.1 and in the definition of change in Pbysics 3 .1. In order to do so they
introduced various distinctions which affected the way these Aristotelian
passages were translated and understood in the Arabic tradition. The Ammonian
synthesis went further and attempted to reconcile Aristotle with Neoplatonism.
Wisnovsky contends that Avicenna follows the Ammonian synthesis in shifting
the focus from the question of the relation of soul to body to the question of
how the soul causes the body. Such a shift, which makes the soul the final cause
of the body, allows commentators to find a way to argue for the immortality of
the soul, which many passages in Aristotle seem to exclude. Wisnovsky shows,
by going painstakingly through various commentators and their terminological
shifts, that Avicenna mainly inherits the Ammonian synthesis on this issue. His
originality shines in other purely metaphysical themes.
A second issue, which in fact is a double one, that of the distinction of essence
and existence and of necessity and possibility, then takes center stage. This

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double issue likewise takes its origin in the commentators and the terminological
choices of the Arabic translators but leads to a new synthesis, which displaces
that of Ammonius, thanks to an integration of sophisticated Kalam notions. The
clear distinction between essence and existence takes its origin in an integration
of the Kalam concept of "shay," that is, "thing" or "res" in Latin, as a
concomitant of "being," the primary metaphysical concept. This also ensures that
no multiplicity ensues from considering God as both an efficient and a final
cause. As for the famous development of a matrix of distinctions based on
"necessary in itself" and "possible in itself," the latter being equated with the
"necessary through another," we have to consider Kalam discussions about God's
attributes and the need for Avicenna to find a way to distinguish God from any
other eternal realities, such as Intelligences, Heavenly Spheres, and their Souls.
For each of these issues Wisnovsky indicates various stages of development in
Avicenna's own works, though he considers them more as determined by the
specific readership and the length of the various works than by what one could
call a distinctive evolution. Wisnovsky also alludes to how much these two
elaborations of distinctions influenced the Latin West (a fact very well known,
though not always much explored) as well as post-Avicennian philosophy (as
illustrated in the Philosophy of Illumination), and also Kalam, a discovery
Richard Frank already adumbrated with his emphasis on the way Avicenna
influenced al-Ghazali. Wisnovsky is now working on a systematic exploration of
Arabic postclassical philosophical commentaries in order to develop and ground
this claim (see, for instance, his essay "The Nature and Scope of Arabic
Philosophical Commentary in Post-classical [ca. 1100-1900 AD] Islamic
Intellectual History: Some Preliminary Observations," in Philosophy, Science and
Exegesis in Greek, Arabic and Latin Commentaries, ed. Peter Adamson, Han
Baltussen, and M. W. F. Stone, vol. 2 [London: Institute of Classical Studies,
School of Advanced Study, University of London, 2004], 149-91).
Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context is compact and cites many texts for which
the author kindly provides an English translation, highlighting the technical
terminology in both Greek and Arabic, and based on the Arabic translations or
original of these texts. In each case the author delineates the philosophical
advantages of making a certain distinction or shift in terminology, as well as its
problems. It is a great example of a successful and happy marriage between
philology and philosophy. If some readers lose the forest for the technical trees,
they may find it useful to look at Wisnovsky's presentation of Avicenna in The
Cambridge Companion to Arabic Philosophy (ed. Peter Adamson and Richard C.
Taylor [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005], 92-136), which lays out
the three principal issues without going through the various texts.
This rich book is a great contribution to the study of Avicenna's metaphysics.
The author is fully aware that such a grand project at this stage of our knowledge
of the field is somewhat daring and that future research will certainly bring
correctives to it. However, such a project does allow us to correct some previous
assumptions, such that "falsafa" or philosophy and "Kalam" were mortal

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enemies, and to develop new research to check and develop some of the avenues
opened by Wisnovsky.
Wisnovsky, whose knowledge of both the Greek commentators and Avicenna
is truly extensive and nuanced, wisely limits himself to three issues, all of them
focused on a study of immaterial beings such as the rational soul, God as both
efficient and final cause, and God as distinct from other eternal realities. He
examines themes diachronically. Such an approach leads to interesting
perspectives and discoveries, but it may also lead the reader to assume
(mistakenly) that Avicenna's main concern in metaphysics is a study of
immaterial beings and God in particular (i.e., rational theology). Yet, Wisnovsky
takes Avicenna's daims in his autobiography very seriously; he is reluctant to
speak too hastily of an evolution in Avicenna's thought, since Avicenna there
denies it. He also accepts the claim that initially and even after forty readings
Avicenna could not make head or tail of Aristotle's metaphysics up to the time
he read one of al-Farabi's treatises, which cleared up the mystery of its purpose.
He also seems to accepts the view that Avicenna's problem was his confusing
metaphysics with rational theology or a form of Kalam, instead of realizing that
it is mainly a study of being and it> attributes. The diachronic approach prevents
Wisnovsky from highlighting how much these issues emerge from a study of
being and its attributes and are consequent and subordinate to ontology.
The careful reading of so many Greek commentators in Arabic translation is
very impressive, but one may wonder how much the translators and the
commentators themselves were aware of the fuU philosophical import of their
terminological shifts. Besides, Avicenna was mainly self-taught and if, indeed, his
basic philosophical insights were already reached when he was eighteen or
nineteen, one may wonder how many of these texts he himself had already
studied. Avicenna refers to commentaries on books 2 and 12 of Aristotle's
Metaphysics, and it is not clear whether or not he had access to much more even
if he praises the quality and richness of Sultan Nfih ibn Mansur's own library in
Bukhara in which he worked up to around 1002 and where he claimed to have
found titles unknown to most and texts he had never seen before and would
never see again. At times the development through the commentators and
terminological shifts seems somewhat too tidy to me, but this is one of the
avenues for research so well opened for us, thanks to the immense and careful
work of Wisnovsky.

THEREsE-ANNEDRUART
The Catholic University of America
Washington, D.C.

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La naisstlncede la volonte. By MIKLOSVETO. Paris: L'Harmattan, 2002. Pp. 332.
26,50 €(paper). ISBN 2-7475-3776-5.

Miklos Veto, a Christian philosopher from Hungary who teaches in France,
brings together a number of his areas of interest in his most recent book. While
he is no doubt best known for his studies in German Idealism-Schelling, in
particular-he has also written on the problem of evil in Christian thought, and
provided philosophical interpretations of figures outside the mainstream (Simone
Weil and Jonathan Edwards). As the title of the latest book suggests, it recounts
the genesis of the notion of will in intellectual history. Veto's aim in this account
is above all philosophical: rather than trace the complex web of historical
influences in the ideas of a particular thinker or school of thought, he intends to
unfold the concept of will "through thinkers that do not necessarily have
historical connections to each other" (7). In this regard, one might compare his
approach to Hannah Arendt's work on the Life of the Mind, which Veto himself
cites as an early inspiration.
Such an approach, of course, always begins with a precise destination in mind.
For Veto, "at the end of its more than two-thousand year history, the notion of
Will finds its fulfillment in Kant" (304). To understand why requires an
understanding of what Veto means by the "birth" of the will. As he explains in
the introduction, the story of the birth of the will is a story of its gradual
"purification," by which he means its dissociation from a number of related
orders and its emergence into a sphere proper to itself alone, a sphere that Veto
insists possesses a sui generis intelligibility. On the one hand, this entails a
separation of the will's activity from its effects in the world, and on the other
hand it requires the more difficult, but for Veto the more essential, dissociation
of the will from both the natural desire for the good and the order of the
(theoretical) intellect. The confusion of these orders accounts, according to Veto,
for both the impoverishment of some notions of will-for example, the varieties
of classical naturalism and intellectualism--and the monstrous exaggerations of
the will in more modern thinkers such as Schopenhauer and Nietzsche. The story
of the will's "birth," then, is the story of the increasingly decisive articulation of
its autonomy, a story that thus reaches its climax in eighteenth-century
Konigsberg.
The story unfolds in stages. The book's first chapter, "Commencements,"
covers the broad stretch from Greek thought to the Reformation. While it is
Stoicism that first "discovers" the will, Aristotle prepares the way by making a
distinction in the practical realm between immanent action (praxis) and
production (poesis); the former designates an action whose end lies in itself and
thus already marks a certain independence from external effects. Seneca carries
this movement a step further by dissociating the will's immanent intention from
action. The reduction of will to intention, in fact, is what inaugurates the will's
autarchy, that is, its sovereign independence from the vicissitudes of the outside
world (28). Nevertheless, the Stoics' internal world is still the world of cosmic
(and therefore natural) reason. It is Augustine, according to Veto, who

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introduces a division within that internal world itself (39), which leads him to
draw the crucial distinction "between what is natural in the will and what is
spiritual" (40), that is, between what Augustine eventually calls potestas or
facultas, and what he calls voluntas proper (45). Later Christian thinkers specify
this distinction and its implications further: Anselmrealizes that the will's proper
object is not the (appetible) good, but justice (51); Duns Scotus extracts the
"non-naturality" of the properly free will, which transcends all creatures and is
inferior only to God (53); Calvin, finally, succeeds in formalizing the will by
subordinating the multiple material instances of its acts to its general orientation
or permanent intention (68). Aquinas, according to Veto, represents a regression
in this development insofar as he "resolutely subordinates [the will] to the
intellect" (50).
As the book progresses, the historical scope of the chapters begins to narrow.
The second chapter weighs the philosophical import of a certain Christian
mystical tradition for the notion of the will. The figures that stand out most of
all here are John of the Cross and Fenelon, and their contribution concerns the
purification of the will. The goal of mysticism, as Veto reads it, is the creature's
union of will with the Creator. To attain this goal requires a detachment from
sensible desires, a transcendence of the discursive power of the intellect, and
ultimately the perfect disappropriation of self. In this disappropriation-the
paradigm of which Veto finds in Fenelon's notion of disinterested love-the will
acquires for the first time a pure spontaneity, insofar as it is no longer moved in
any sense by desire, but wills the good, so to speak, utterly gratuitously (100).
Next comes Malebranche, whom Veto acknowledges as having provided the
pivotal insight that shaped his own thinking regarding the will. Radicalizing and
generalizing the classical view that traces the choice of evil to a deficient cause,
Malebranche identifies the essence of freedom-in contrast to the (natural)
will-as nothingness (le rien). The most significant "actions" a person takes,
whether they be a consent to sin or a consent to grace, are ultimately "nothing"
(118). What Veto interprets Malebranche to mean by this provocative assertion
is that, while the particular goods to which the natural will adheres in a positive
way are substantial realities, goodness per se, which transcends these multiple
goods in its formal absoluteness, is not itself a positive entity of any sort, and
thus neither is the freedom that determines itself in relation to this goodness.
Freedom, one might say, is-like the Good-"beyond being."
The pure spontaneity of freedom raises the question of its relation to the
moral law. Jonathan Edwards sets into relief a further dimension in Veto's
attempt to address this question. His analysis of Edwards is-in this reader's
opinion-one of the book's highlights. Edwards vehemently attacks the notion
of freedom of indifference (that is, the identification of freedom with sheer
indeterminacy), which makes the determination of moral responsibility
problematic. According to Edwards, the freedom of indifference can escape the
logical absurdity of an infinite regress only by becoming a perverse imitation of
creatio ex nihilo, the introduction into the world of something without any
prevenient cause (155). Edwards's response is to reject the Newtonian view of

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causality, which would reduce all determination to the temporal sequence of
efficient cause and effect, and would thus make freedom and necessity dialectical
opposites. In its place, Edwards proposes what he refers to as "the necessity of
a proposition" (157)-what we might call formal causality-which makes
freedom and necessity simultaneous. This perspective allows us to judge the
morality of the will not merely in terms of sincerity (i.e., according to the
disposition {Jriorto choice) but in terms of the objective content of the will in the
actuality of its operation: Edwards locates "the good and evil of an act of the will
not in its cause, i.e., that which precedes it, but in the act itself" (171).
Rousseau is a bit of an anomaly in Veto's account; his contribution to the
notion of will lies not in the sphere of anthropology, but in that of politics.
Nevertheless, Veto insists on an analogy between the two. He reads Rousseau's
rejection of any extemal representation in the political realm as providing the
will's final formalization. This rejection implies a view of the will as a power of
legislation in and for itself (214). One suspects that Rousseau appears in this
book primarily because of his well-known influence on Kant. However that may
be, the step from the rejection of representation to the notion of the autonomy
of practical reason is dear.
Veto offers a thorough treatment of Kant's practical philosophy in two fuH
chapters. While there is little that is new in his presentation, the fundamental
aspects do acquire a distinctive character when viewed as the flower of a certain
movement in history. The only thing that remains after the climax of the story
in Kant is a final chapter-a denouement, as it were-in which Veto presents
Hegel's notion of the reciprocity of wiHs as the unfolding of an insight left
implicit in Kant: here the "heteronomous" classical problem of the will's
effective causality in the world of objects is replaced by the will's effect simply
on another will, for which the external world provides nothing but an occasion.
With this final step, the will's separation from all that is not itself comes to
completion.
The biggest weakness of Veto's book is that it makes no argument for the
normative statuS it accords Kant's practical philosophy. Kant's notion is the
culmination of the history of the will because that history is a progressive
attempt to articulate a Kantian notion of will. Indeeo, there are a number of
fundamental questions one could raise regarding the book's governing
presuppositions. For example, Veto takes for granted that a genuine distinction
must be a separation, that is, that orders must be strictly unrelated if they are to
possess their own integrity. In other words, he excludes the possibility of
metaphysical complexity, which perhaps explains why Aquinas has nothing to
offer to the notion of will in his telling of the story. Moreover, the separation of
goodness and being that Veto insists on, and his assertion, with Kant, that the
goodness or evil of things is due solely to the wiH's spontaneous activity (278),
arguably justifies Nietzsche's accusation of nihilism since it empties nature of any
intrinsic significance. In this respect, his assertion of the goodness of reality
seems gratuitous (275). Further, if all receptivity is removed from the will's
proper activity, and by the same token all desirability removed from the

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goodness at which it aims, in what sense is the foundation of morality anything
but "arbitrary"? (Surely, even the pure formality of the Categorical Imperative
must be seen as desirable in some sense in order to have any binding force.)
Along the same lines, one can ask how what Veto refers to as the sui generis
intelligibility of the will differs from irrationality. In short, there would be many
grounds for raising concerns about the twofold dissociation that Veto takes at
the outset to be an ideal, and his treatment provokes such questions without
providing answers.
Whether or not one is willing to accept this ideal, there is a great deal to be
learned from Veto's book. Among other things, the notion of will that governs
his analyses sets into relief an unusual constellation of figures in intellectual
history, introduces surprising affinities, and shows the philosophical significance
of figures normally left out of philosophical discussions. His suggestion, for
example, that the structure of the mystical experience of John of the Cross
anticipates in decisive ways Husserl's phenomenological reduction (91, 93, 103)
is excellent, and the insights he draws from Puritan theology offer a new solution
to an old philosophical problem. Even a reader more inclined to espouse a
classical understanding the will in relation to the intellect and natural desire will
find the story stimulating and provocative, and certainly anyone interested in the
history of ideas will find this an exceedingly rich and illuminating book.

D. C. SCHINDLER
Villanova University
Villanova, Pennsylvania

Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermeneutic Reading of the
Onto-Theological Tradition. By ANDRZEJ WIERCINSKI. Toronto: The
Hermeneutic Press, 2003. Pp. 214. ISBN 0-9525333-3-2.
Andrzej Wiercinski has written the first English monograph on Gustav
Siewerth (1903-63), the twentieth-century German thinker whom Hans Urs von
Balthasar regarded as the greatest philosopher of the contemporary age. In
numerous major works, in which he negotiates a precarious synthesis of Hegel,
Heidegger, and Aquinas, Siewerth constructs some of the most original
speculative philosophy of the contemporary period. Yet notwithstanding a
significant readership in Germany, Siewerth remains largely unknown in North
America.
Wiercinski's book, Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermeneutic
Reading of the Onto-Theological Tradition, represents the culmination of twenty
years of work on Siewerth. Wiercinski presents Siewerth as an example of the

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hermeneutic vitality of Thomism. Criticized for his speculative departures from
the texts of Aquinas, Siewerth in his relationship to Aquinas has methodologically much in common with Bernard Lonergan, Max Miiller, Johann Baptist
Lotz, and to a lesser extent, Joseph
and the young Karl Rahner. With
these thinkers, Siewerth regards the dialogue with modernity as the essential task
for Thomism. Yet Siewerth is critical of Thomist appropriations of Kant, as
Wiercinski points out in his well-researched chapter "The Transcendental Turn
in the Thomist Revival." Siewerth's emphasis on the irreducibility of being, the
act of existence (esse) grasped by the intellect as a pure positivity, aligns him with
Gilson and the existential Thomists and distances him from the "transcendental
Thomists." Siewerth however does not engage in the close textual analysis
characteristic of the Gilson school. He retains from his years studying under
Martin Heidegger in the 1930s the method of directly engaging the matter of the
text (die Sache), even if this requires rethinking it in new terms.
While Wiercinski appears to distance himself from Siewerth (hence the
question mark in the title), the central contribution of this volume is not
Wiercinski's critique but his thorough exposition of Siewerth's ontology,
accompanied by numerous translated quotations from Siewerth's works. After
setting the stage by introducing the idea of "hermeneutic reading" ("the situation
of the interpretation, of the appropriation of the past in understanding, is always
the situation of the living present," Wiercinski writes, "the text has something
to say to me, something which requires my attentive response"), Wiercinski
deftly guides us through Siewerth's extremely difficult speculative ontology. He
argues that Siewerth cannot be understood without a knowledge of the history
of medieval philosophy, German idealism, and Heidegger, and carefully
illustrates the significance of each of these. Particularly helpful is the examination
of Siewerth's understanding of the relationship of Scotus's metaphysics to what
Heidegger calls the forgetfulness of the ontological difference between being and
beings. Scotus's univocatio entis denies the "mediating mediation" between the
Creator and creatures, precipitating both late medieval nominalism and modem
idealism.
Siewerth's first attempt at interpreting Aquinas through Hegel and Heidegger
was his 1930-31 doctoral dissertation, "Die Metaphysik der Erkenntnis nach
Thomas von Aquin." He followed this with his 1937 Habilitationsschrift, "Die
transzendentale intellektuelle Anschauung bei Thomas von Aqnin. Der Grund
der Moglichkeit der Gotteserkenntnis." All but banished from the academy by
the Nazis (and his revered teacher Heidegger did nothing to help), Siewerth
continued his research without an academic post. Siewerth owes much to Hegel,
but, as Wiercinski shows, he does not share Hegel's idealization of being and
nothingness. He substitutes a notion of "exemplary identity" for Hegel's
dialectical identity. A is not not-A; rather it is imaged in not-A, as God is imaged
in being. Even more essential than the appropriation of Hegel is Siewerth's more
intimate connection with the later Heidegger. Siewerth singles out Heidegger
and Aquinas as the only figures in the history of Western philosophy who

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endeavored to think being in its difference from beings. According to Siewerth,
Heidegger's critique of the forgetfulness of being indicts everyone except
Aquinas. That Heidegger seems to have missed this in Aquinas-Heidegger is far
more interested in Scotus, Suarez, and Luther than he is in Aquinas-does not
stop Siewerth from drawing this surprising connection. For Siewerth the
question of what Heidegger calls "the ontological difference" is the beginning of
every genuine metaphysical inquiry. Metaphysics inevitably takes one of two
directions with respect to the question of being: either a monism in which the
ontological difference is reduced to appearance (Platonism, conceptualism,
essentialism, Scotism), or a pluralism, in which the difference is held to be
irreducible (Aquinas, Heidegger}. Only in the latter does the difference become
a creative spur for philosophy.
The modern forgetfulness of being begins with Scotus, for whom being is
exhausted in essentia. The Scotistic denial of the real distinction of essentia and
existentia, and the related denial of the inconceivability of God in the notion of
univocatio entis, gives birth to the essentialism of modern philosophy and the
subjectivism of German idealism. Against this trend Siewerth unfurls a set of
hermeneutically revised Thomistic concepts. He shows how Aquinas
distinguishes being (esse) from beings (entia) on the grounds that the latter
possess essentia, quidditas, which can be abstracted and conceptualized, where
the former is pure nonessential act. The "existentialist" formulation of the
distinctio realis, however, is not enough to meet the challenge of Heidegger, for
both whatness (essentia) and thatness (existentia) belong to the being of
substance. Siewerth argues that, in order to answer Heidegger's critique, we must
retrieve Aquinas's distinction between act and subsistence: the former is the
pure, nonsubstantive, dynamic energy of coming into presence; the latter is the
stasis of that which has come to be. The act of being subsists in a being while
remaining distinct from it. The distinction underscores Aquinas's often
overlooked distinction between the being of God (ipsum esse subsistens)and the
being of beings (ipsum esse non-subsistens). The being of a being is a
nonsubsistent act, the event of the sheer upsurge of beings from nothingness. It
cannot be abstracted into a concept. As Siewerth says, it can be thought (there
is a conceptio entis) but not abstracted (there is no conceptus entis).
Neither a being nor God, the being of beings is the perfect image of God, a
pure reflection of divine kenosis. It empties itself into beings and comes to
realization in them. Hence it depends upon the subsistent being of God as much
as beings depend upon it. By distinction, the being of God is subsistent act, that
which resides in itself, infinite, eternal, self-sufficient, excluding all potency and
requiring nothing else in order for it to be. As the first creation, the being of
beings is horizoned by the nothingness of primordial potency; it is "complete
and simple, but not subsistent." Just as the triune God is a mediation through
otherness (the Father is Father by virtue of the relation to the Son, etc.), being
is an identity-in-difference, an identity that realizes itself through its other. It was
this Hegel-inspired Trinitarian ontology that proved so fertile for Balthasar. In

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the act of creation, the self-emptying Trinity images itself in that which only
exists insofar as it empties itself into a being. Being is kenosis. As nonsubsistent,
being is not identical with itself: it is only real insofar as it has poured itself out
and allowed a being to be.
Siewerth believes that this nonsubstantive notion of being can accommodate
Heidegger's retrieval of the pre-Socratic notion of physis, "self-blossoming
emergence," while preserving the Scholastic principle of the subsistence, eternity,
and infinity of God. The First and Absolute Being remains the eternal ground of
all that is; it excludes time. The being of beings is the condition of the possibility
of time. The being in which all things participate, the being the horizon of which
is time, to speak Heidegger's language, is not the being of God, but the first act
of God, the donation of the energy of his presence in the othering by which
creation becomes possible. It is the simple unlimited being of every thing that
exists, "das einfache, nicht begrenzte Sein des Seienden." However near to us,
it is "a profound mystery," for it includes within itself all possible conceptual
determinations, while remaining "uncircumscribed" by any concept. It is the act
that actualizes every thing that is, but is "captured and consumed" by none of
them.
Siewerth refers to many texts of Aquinas in constructing his central points.
One might question whether this metaphysics is true to Aquinas. One cannot,
however, question that it is in its own right an important contribution to
contemporary metaphysics. That Wiercinski has gone to such lengths to make
this contribution better known forgives some of the idiosyncrasies of Inspired
Metaphysics? Wiercinski has recently announced the publication of a translation
and commentary of Siewerth's seminal treatise, Das Sein als Gleichnis Gottes. Let
us hope that these valuable works are the first of many studies of Siewerth.
SEAN MCGRATH

Mount Allison University
Sackville, New Brunswick, Canada

Theism or Atheism: The Eternal Debate. By F. F. CENrORE. Aldershot, Hants,
England and Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2004. Pp. 206 + xiii. $94.95
(cloth). ISBN 0-7546-3670-4.
F. F. Centore begins his book with a playful account of his Thomistic
academic pedigree: "It is not too much to say that Gilson begot Owens, who
begot Azar, who begot Centore" (xi). A note "About the Author" on the
following page observes that Centore died on 24 August 2003, and that the work
is being published posthumously. It recalls that "his love of teaching and

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interaction with his students" became "his whole life, second only to his family."
The author's love of Aquinas as well as his devotion to his students is evident
throughout. The work shows all the fervor of a true disciple of Aquinas along
with the occasional outrageousness of a college philosophy classroom.
The book aims to examine rational arguments for the existence of God (vii).
It comprises nine chapters. The first serves as a prologue, showing the compatibility of faith and reason and reviewing some ways in which arguments about
God can go wrong. The next three deal with atheism and various types of
theism. The remainder of the work examines arguments for God's existence by
presenting the thought of representative philosophers for various types of
arguments and then using other thinkers to critique them. The historical
situation of each philosopher is presented, though with uneven detail.
Atheism (chap. 2) is divided into "naive atheism," represented by Bertrand
Russell, who tried to affirm the reality of evil without affirming the reality of
God, and "sophisticated atheism," represented by Nietzsche, who denied the
reality of God, good and evil, repudiating "all value, meaning and desirability"
(16). Theism, in contrast, affirms the existence of God and recognizes that the
"unchanging divine standard" is essential for distinguishing good from evil (22).
Theism is divided into "naturalistic theism" (chap. 3), in which God is "the
same as the world or some fundamental aspect of the world" (25), and
"supernaturalistic theism" (chap. 4), in which God is "separate from the natural
world" (35). Examples of naturalistic theism are Hinduism, Buddhism, Stoicism,
and Epicureanism. Supematuralistic theism is divided into polytheism
(Zoroastrianism, Manichaeism, Confucianism, and classical paganism) and
monotheism, which comprises deism and traditional theism ijudaism, Islam, and
Christianity). The latter religions are mentioned but not formally discussed (36).
The rational arguments for God's existence which comprise the rest of the
book are of two fundamental types: "as-if' and "for-real." "As-if' arguments
(chap. 5) do not prove the existence of God but only "the need to believe in the
existence of God" (45). Examples include Blaise Pascal's wager, Immanuel Kant's
postulate of practical reason, and William James's pragmatism. The critique of
the "as-if' approach is provided through Voltaire, who recognizes that "even
though someone might sincerely want to believe in something, such a desire in
no way shows the real existence of the thing in question" (58).
The "for-real" way to God can employ either a priori or a posteriori
arguments. Saint Anselm's ontological argument exemplifies the a priori
approach (chap. 6). A posteriori arguments may begin with either internal or
external experience. The "internal" approach is represented by such historically
and theologically diverse thinkers as Augustine, Boethius, Descartes, Hegel, and
Newman (chap. 7). Each argues in some way from inner knowledge or
experience to the existence of God. The thought of Schopenhauer and Freud is
used to critique this approach. The conclusion is that, while inner experience
may bring some to affirm God as a being existing independently of the world,

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it leads others to see God as identical with the world and fails to provide any
objective grounds for deciding between the two (115).
A more secure approach is through "external" experience, which may be
based on either essence (chap. 8) or existence (chap. 9). Newton, Paley, and
proponents of the "anthropic principle" are presented as examples of the former,
which argues from the presence of order in nature to the existence of a designer
God. These arguments are critiqued through the thought of David Hume and
Charles Darwin. Hume contends that arguments from causality cannot get to
God and, even if they could, they would not require the all-perfect God of
religion, but only a less-than-perfect "designer" (132). Darwin's theory of
evolution requires no designer or creator to explain the complex order of
biological life. The ethical and social consequences of these different positions
are also reviewed.
For Centore, the best way to argue for the existence of God is the "a
posteriori external experience method based on existence," which he identifies
as the way of Thomas Aquinas (chap. 9). In distinguishing Aquinas's philosophy
from that of his Greek predecessors, Centore argues that "Aquinas could not
accept the Greek doctrine of the unintelligibility of matter, for the very simple
reason that it conflicted with the biblical book of Genesis. If God produced the
universe, then matter ... must be knowable because God knows what he makes"
(171-72). Apart from the rather fideistic cast this gives to Aquinas's philosophy,
the argument ignores the distinction between matter as pure potency
(unintelligible for both Aquinas and Aristotle in that it has no actuality) and
material substances (intelligible both for Aquinas and Aristotle in virtue of their
actuality). He contends that for Aquinas God's existence "must be proven" in the
"science of metaphysics (natural theology) and not in the ... lower science of
physics" (173), and so seems to ignore Aquinas's own claim, at the conclusion
of his commentary on Aristotle's Physics, that Aristotle "ends his general
discussion of natural things with the first principle of the whole of nature, who
is over all things, God, blessed forever. Amen."
Centore spends only five pages on Aquinas' actual arguments, concentrating
on what he calls "Aquinas' core argument for the existence of God" which he
finds in On Being and Essence (180). He presents this as a series of three
syllogisms, but does not specify from what part of the text he is extracting his
arguments. If he is referring to the paragraph in chapter 4 where Aquinas shows
"there must be something which causes all things to exist inasmuch as it is
subsistent existence," his arguments (which includes such premises as "Any
existentially dependent being that has completely exhausted every possible other
already really existing external explanatory cause is caused by an existentially
independent being") are far more complicated and less clear than those of
Aquinas.
Centore makes no reference to the controversy over whether the argument
in On Being and Essence is truly a demonstration of the existence of God and
whether it was intended as such. Gilson, for instance, contends in his later

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writing that the work "contains no proof of the existence of God" (Le thomisme,
[6th ed.; Paris: J. Vrin, 1965], 97 n. 85), quoted in L. Dewan, "St. Thomas and
the Existence of God: Owens vs. Gilson, and Beyond," in God and Argument
[Ottowa: University of Ottowa Press, 1999], 116).
Aquinas's "five ways" to show God's existence are covered in a brief
paragraph, with less than complete accuracy. The fifth is said to conclude to God
as "the final cause of all existence and change" (184), though it actually
concludes to God as an efficient cause: the "intelligent being by whom all natural
things are directed to their end."
It is not clear what audience Centore has in mind for his work. Some insights,
such as his analysis of how contemporary issues in the divine action debate find
their roots in Descartes, might be useful even to advanced readers (89, 117-18,
133). Aspects of his humor might appeal to many. I enjoyed, for instance, his
definition of "panentheism" as "pantheism with an extra syllable in the middle
to indicate that [it] is not the usual sort of pantheism" (153). Not infrequently,
though, the humor seems odd. Noting that Augustine died in 430, for example,
he quips, "a good union man always quits at 4:30" (76). The work is sprinkled
with little factoids, such as Darwin's wife taking piano lessons from Chopin
(139), Hegel's love for dancing (91), Kant's distress at a delayed delivery of dried
fruit (63), and Descartes's practice of sleeping late, the violation of which seems
to have caused his death (82, 86). There is also a mistaken reference to the
Dominican Catherine of Siena as a "Benedictine saint" (166).
One gets the impression Centore is speaking to undergraduates, where the
wise teacher assumes nothing. So he somehow finds it necessary to inform his
readers that "[t]o this day, Augustine himself is the subject of many books and
articles" (77) and that the Council of Trent was called "to reform the Church
from head to toe" (165). He sometimes slips into a rather preachy mode,
attacking contemporary "pseudo-liberals" (94-96) or lamenting today's sexual
mores in which "the only purpose of sex is fun" (152). In this context, feminism
is a recurrent theme and is presented with little nuance.
Centore also offers spiritual advice to his readers which, laudable in itself,
seems somehow misplaced in a work whose goal is to review rational arguments
for the existence of God. He assures us, for instance, that God "created things
for our good and demands our love and obedience. Yet, when we fail to do his
will, he is always ready to forgive and welcome home the truly repentant sinner,
especially if approached through the Second Person of the Holy Trinity, as when
someone sincerely says, 'Lord Jesus Christ, Lamb of God, I trust in your mercy,
have mercy on me, a sinner"' (190).
To its credit, the book allows a considerable number of philosophers to speak
to one another and so to the reader about the question of the existence of God.
As guide in this, Centore shows considerable skill in arranging the conversation,
but is often obtrusive in pressing his own point of view. In its tone, the work
seems less a discussion of arguments for or against the existence of God and
more a polemic on where the modern world went wrong. This takes the form of

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a philosophical romp through the history of ideas, where historical tidbits and
snatches of poetry are shaken together with philosophical opinions to produce
a montage of arguments roughly centered on the question of the existence of
God. For those in the mood for such an adventure and willing to tolerate a
certain amount of "attitude" from the author, it's not a bad ride.
MICHAEL}. DODDS, 0.P.

Dominican School of Philosophy and Theology
Berkeley, California