The Thomist 70 (2006): 1-26 DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? STEVEN J. JENSEN Wheeling Jesuit University Wheeling, West Virginia I N HIS COMMENTARY on question 72, article 9 of the Prima Secundae, Cajetan states that Aquinas has changed his mind from a previous view expressed in the Sentences. 1 The issue is whether circumstances give species to sins. When a thief steals a chalice, for instance, what are we to do with the sacredness of the chalice, which Aquinas considers a circumstance? Should we say that this circumstance gives species to the action, making it an act not only of theft but also of sacrilege, or should we say that it remains a circumstance, outside the species of the action, so that the thief commits only the act of theft and not the sin of sacrilege? There is little doubt, in both the Sentences and the Summa, that at least sometimes the thief commits sacrilege. The question is under what conditions this is the case. Consider two thieves who steal a chalice from a church. The first simply wants the gold, and the church happens to be a convenient place from which to take it. The second wants the gold, but in addition seeks to do damage to God through taking what is sacred. Both thieves commit the offense of theft, but what of the sin of sacrilege? Do both commit sacrilege, or only the second? After all, although the first thief is aware that his action "harms" God, it is not this that he seeks; he only wants the profit from the gold. The answer given in the Sentences is unequivocal: both thieves commit sacrilege. The answer that may be derived 1 Cajetan, Commentaria in Summam Theologicam S. Thomas Aquinatis, ed. R. Garroni ยท(Rome: Editio Leonina, 1892), I-II, q. 72, a. 9 1 2 STEVEN J. JENSEN from the article in the Summa, on the other hand, seems to be that only the second thief commits sacrilege. 2 The two texts differ, as Cajetan reads it, over the role of the will. In the Sentences, Aquinas explicitly states that circumstances can give species even when intention does not bear on them. In the Summa, however, he seems to imply that circumstances can give species only when they arise from some new motive for acting. The sacredness of the chalice, for instance, gives species only when the thief intends to steal the chalice precisely because it is sacred. The task here is more difficult than that of reconciling the two texts. Even if they are compatible, it will seem to some that Aquinas should have contradicted the Sentences passage, for it is inconsistent with Aquinas's teaching that moral actions take their species from the end intended. 3 It is necessary, therefore, to give some account of how circumstances can give species even if they are not intended, which in turn requires a treatment of specification through the materia circa quam. In what follows, I will begin by laying out the apparently conflicting texts. I will then develop the interpretation of the Summa text, in which specifying circumstances must be intended. I will next explain how circumstances can give species through the materia circa quam. Finally, I will show that the suggested interpretation of the Summa text is incorrect, and that Cajetan's two texts can be reconciled. 2 We should note that Cajetan himself gets around this conclusion, but his manner of avoiding it will inevitably lead him into difficulties concerning the specification of actions, for he says that in order to give species it suffices for something to be with the end intended. Unless he can provide a clear delineation of what belongs with the end, he will be unable to identify the species of actions, for every circumstance is in some manner with the end intended. 3 For this view see Germain Grisez, The Way of the Lord Jesus, vol. 1, Christian Moral Principles (Chicago: Franciscan Herald Press, 1983), 247 n. 3. Also see Stephen L. Brock's comment on this view (Action and Conduct: Thomas Aquinas and the Theory of Action [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1998], 218 n. 57). DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 3 L THE CONFLICTING TEXTS The unequivocal text of the Sentences reads as follows: Plainly, circumstances sometimes transform an action into a new species of sin; the only question is how they do so. Some have said that circumstances make for a new species only insofar as they are taken as an end of the will, for moral actions receive their species from the end. This view, however, is insufficiently considered, for sometimes the species of sin changes without the sinner's intention bearing upon that circumstance. For example, a thief just as readily takes a gold vessel that is not sacred as one that is sacred, yet the action changes into a new species of sin, namely, from theft simply speaking into sacrilege. Furthermore, according to this view the only circumstance that could change the species of sin would be "that for the sake of which," which is plainly false. We should say, therefore, that all circumstances can change the species of a sin but they do not always do so. 4 Aquinas concludes that circumstances give species to a sin whenever they provide some new disorder in opposition to virtue; it is not necessary for the circumstance to serve as an end of the will. As Cajetan informs us, however, by the time Aquinas writes the Prima Secundae he has apparently changed his mind, for he says: Whenever there is a new motive to sin, there is another species of sin, since the motive for sinning is the end and object. Sometimes in the corruption of different circumstances, the motive may remain the same, for example, the greedy person is propelled by the same motive to take when he should not, where he should not, and more than he should, and similarly with other circumstances, for he does all of these things on account of the inordinate desire to accumulate money. The corruption of these different circumstances does not diversify the species of sins, but they all belong to one and the same species of +IV Sent., d. 16, q. 3, a. 2c: "Ad tertiam esse, est dubium. Quidam enim dicunt, quod hoc accidit inquantum illae circumstantiae accipiuntur ut fines voluntatis, quia a fine actus moralis accipit speciem. Sed hoc non videtur sufficienter dictum: quia aliquando variatur species peccati sine hoc quod intentio feratur ad circumstantiam illam; sicut fur ita libenter acciperet vas aureum non sacra tum sicut sacra tum; et tamen in aliam speciem peccatum mutatur, scilicet de furto simplici in sacrilegium; et praeterea secundum hoc so la illa circumstantia quae dicitur cujus gratia, speciem peccati mutare posset; quod falsum est. Et ideo aliter dicendum, quod omnis circumstantia potest speciem peccati mutare, sed non semper mutat. 4 STEVEN J. JENSEN sin. At other times, on the other hand, the corruption of diverse circumstances arises from distinct motives ... and so leads to diverse species of sins. 5 It seems that the thief commits sacrilege only if he takes the chalice precisely because it is sacred. If he takes it simply because it is gold, then he commits theft without sacrilege. Aquinas makes precisely this application of his new doctrine when he discusses the species of imprudence in the Secunda Secundae. When the corruption of diverse circumstances has the same motive, then the species of sin is not diversified, for example, it belongs to the same species of sin to take what is not one's own, either where one ought not or when one ought not. But if there are diverse motives, then there would also be diverse species, for example, if someone takes from where he ought not in order to do harm to a holy place then the species would become sacrilege; but if someone else takes when he ought not simply on account of an excessive desire for possessions, then the species would be simply greed. 6 Apparently, then, Aquinas did change his mind on the specifying role of circumstances. Formerly, he held the view that 5 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 9: "Respondeo dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, ubi occurrit aliud motivum ad peccandum, ibi est alia peccati species, quia motivum ad peccandum est finis et obiectum. Contingit autem quandoque quod in corruptionibus diversarum circumstantiarum est idem motivum, sicut illiberalis ab eodem movetur quod accipiat quando non oportet, et ubi non oportet, et plus quam oportet, et similiter de aliis circumstantiis; hoc enim facit propter inordinatum appetitum pecuniae congregandae. Et in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones non diversificant species peccatorum, sed pertinent ad unam et eandem peccati speciem. Quandoque vero contingit quod corruptiones diversarum circumstantiarum proveniunt a diversis mo tivis. Pu ta quod aliquis praepropere comedat, potest provenire ex hoc quod homo non potest ferre dilationem cibi, propter facilem consumptionem humiditatis; quod vero appetat immoderatum cibum, potest contingere propter virtutem naturae potentem ad convertendum multum cibum; quod autem aliquis appetat cibos deliciosos, contingit propter appetitum delectationis quae est in cibo. Unde in talibus diversarum circumstantiarum corruptiones inducunt diversas peccati species." 6 STh II-II, q. 53, a. 2, ad 3: "Ad tertium dicendum quod quando corruptio diversarum circumstantiarum habet idem motivum, non diversificatur peccati species, sicut eiusdem speciei est peccatum ut aliquis accipiat non sua ubi non debet, et quando non debet. Sed si sint di versa motiva, tune essent diversae species, puta si unus acciperet unde non de beret ut faceret iniuriam loco sacro, quod faceret speciem sacrilegii; alius quando non debet propter solum superfluum appetitum habendi, quod esset simplex avaritia. Et ideo defectus eorum quae requinmtur ad prudentiam non diversificant species nisi qua ten us ordinantur ad diversos actus rationis, ut dictum est." DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 5 circumstances give species whenever they give rise to some new deformity, whether or not that circumstance is itself intended as an end. But in the Prima Secundae Aquinas holds that circumstances give species only when they are sought by the agent as an end or motive. II. How THE END INTENDED SPECIFIES One might suppose that question 72 of the Prima Secundae, where Aquinas at last recognized that unintended circumstances cannot give species, is the point at which he finally awakened to the full implications of his often-repeated teaching that morals take their species from the end. 7 The new doctrine is already present, in nascent form, in Aquinas's fundamental theory of action; question 72 simply fleshes it out. After all, the specifying role of the end may be readily perceived by considering the very nature of actions, whether human or otherwise, which Aquinas says involve some agent giving rise to a change in some subjectfor example, fire bringing about heat in wax. 8 The action is a certain emanation that arises in the agent and moves to bring about some change in the patient. When we identify the species of an action, we pick out this emanation. The fire's action, for instance, is specified as heating, because it is an emanation of heat from the fire to the wax. If an action is essentially an agent giving rise to some form in a patient, then one action will differ from another depending upon the change that is brought about. The act of heating brings about the change of heat in the patient, while the act of killing brings about the change of death. The end of the action is intimately linked to the form by which the agent acts, even as fire heats by the form of heat that it already possesses. In fact, when Aquinas speaks of the end giving species 7 Amongst others, Servais Pinckaers ("La role de la fin dans !'action morale selon saint Thomas," in Le renouveau de la morale [Paris: Casterman, 1964], 114-43) and John Finnis ("Object and Intention in Moral Jndgments according to Aquinas," The Thomist 55 [1991]: 1-27) have emphasized the specifying role of the end intended. 8 STh I, q. 41, a. 1, ad 2. For an excellent account of the basic elements of action see Brock, Action and Conduct. 6 STEVEN J. JENSEN to the action, he often interchanges it with the form in the agent, which also can be said to give species to the action. 9 If the act of heating is specified by the heat that comes to be in wax, then it might just as readily be specified by the heat in the fire. One form can be substituted for the other, because, says Aquinas, the form in the agent is always similar to the change it brings about in the patient. 10 When this teaching is applied to human actions, which arise from the will, the conclusion that actions are specified by their ends is doubly confirmed, as Aquinas says while addressing this issue in question 1, article 3 of the Prima Secundae. 11 It follows that moral actions receive their species from the end intended. What falls outside intention, being accidental to the action, cannot give species, as Aquinas makes dear in the very first article of question 72, and which he repeats more succinctly in article 8: The species of sin is not taken from its disorder, which is outside the intention of the sinner, but more from the very act itself insofar as it terminates in some object, into which the intention of the sinner is led. Therefore, wherever there occurs a diverse motive inclining the intention to sin, there is a diverse species of sin. 12 One article later Aquinas reaches the natural conclusion that circumstances must be intended as a motive if they are to give species. 9 In STh I-II, q. 72, a. 3, Thomas explicitly states the interchangeability of these two in natural actions, for he says that natural agents are determined to one end. 10 See De Malo, q. 1, a. 3. Most properly, an action is not specified by the form that comes to be in the patient, but rather by this form as it is intended, or planned to be brought about, by the agent. 11 STh I-II, q. 1, a. 3. 12 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 8: "Respondeo dicendum quod, cum in peccato sint duo, scilicet ipse actus, et inordinatio eius, prout receditur ab ordine rationis et legis divinae; species peccati attenditur non ex parte inordinationis, quae estpraeter intentionem peccantis, ut supra dictum est; sed magis ex parte ipsius actus, secundum quod terminatur ad obiectum, in quod fertur intentio peccantis. Et ideo ubicumque occurrit diversum motivum inclinans intentionem ad peccandum, ibi est diversa species peccati." DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 7 III. THE SPECIFYING ROLE OF THE MATERIAL The idea that actions take their species from what is intended, however, when used as an overarching principle, has many inadequacies. Indeed, the ultimate upshot of this reading of question 72, article 9 is the unraveling of morality. Even the sin of adultery becomes inexplicable. As Cajetan himself points out, the adulterer-at least the average adulterer-does not intend to take pleasure in a woman precisely insofar as she is someone else's wife. 13 Rather, he simply seeks pleasure in a woman; what attracts him are certain physical features, not the fact that this woman is another man's wife. Since the woman's marital status falls outside his intention, his action should not be specified as having sexual relations with another man's wife; it might better be specified as having relations with a blonde or a brunette, features that the adulterer very well might intend. Given the nature of adulterous intentions, therefore, it should be no surprise that when Thomas comes to identify the species of lust he does not refer to the end intended but rather to the material of the action. The sin of lust consists in someone using venereal pleasures apart from right reason, which can happen in two ways. First, according to the material in which the sinner seeks these pleasures; second, when the proper material is present but other required conditions are not kept. Since circumstances, insofar as they are circumstances, cannot give species to moral actions, the species of moral actions must be taken from the object, which is the material of the action; therefore, the species of lust must be assigned from the material or object. 14 13 Cajetan, Commentaria I-II, q. 72, a. 9. dicendum quod, sicut dictum est, peccatum luxuriae consistit in hoc quod aliquis non secundum rectam rationem delectatione venerea utitur. Quod quidem contingit dupliciter, uno modo, secundum materiam in qua huiusmodi delectationem quaerit; alio modo, secundum quod, materia debita existente, non observantur aliae debitae conditiones. Et quia circumstantia, inquantum huiusmodi, non dat speciem actui morali, sed eius species sumitur ab obiecto, quod est materia actus; ideo oportuit species luxuriae assignari ex parte materiae vel obiecti." 14 STh II-II, q. 154, a. 1: "Respondeo 8 STEVEN J. JENSEN Thankfully, for the institution of matrimony, the end of the will has dropped from view and the material has taken prominence. The material plays a key role in Thomas's explanation of how circumstances give species. We have seen that in the Sentences Thomas says that circumstances give species when they give rise to some new deformity, a point that he often reiterates. 15 But he also says that circumstances give species only insofar as they provide some condition or modification of the material. 16 By understanding the specifying role of the material, therefore, we will come to see how circumstances, even when not intended, can give species. 17 From what we have seen of actions, the specifying role of the materia circa quam, or the subject of the action, should be no surprise. An action is not the production of some pure form without a subject, as if the act of fire simply brings about heat, and not heat in some subject. Nevertheless, it may be difficult to imagine how wax can specify the act of fire. Surely, there is not some new species of action for each distinct subject, as if heating wax were one kind of action, heating water another kind, and heating wood yet a third species of action. All of these actions seem to be, in kind, simply heating, and the variety of subjects serve as different circumstances. We should not suppose, however, that the wax specifies the act of heating simply insofar as it is wax. Rather, it specifies under some other formality, even as the act of seeing is specified by its object under the formality of being colored. A rock is not seen insofar as it is a rock, or insofar as it is hot or cold, but insofar as it is colored. 18 There are many characteristics of a rock-its weight, its temperature, and so on-but it specifies the act of seeing insofar as it is colored, because only through color is the 15 See, for example, STh I-II, q. 88, a. 5; II-II, q. 154, a. 1, ad 1; II-II, q. 154, a. 6; De Malo, q. 7, a. 4. 16 See STh I-II, q. 18, a. 10; De Malo, q. 2, a. 6, ad 2. 17 Brock (Action and Conduct, 88-93) emphasizes the specifying role of the material, and Kevin Flannery hints at it in "What Is Included in a Means to an End?", Gregorianum 74 (1993): 499-513, at 512-13. 18 STh I, q. 59, a. 4. See also STh I, q. 80, a. 1, ad 2; I-II, q. 54, a. 2, ad 1; Q. de Caritate, a. 4; and Q. D. de Anima, a. 13, ad 2. DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 9 rock visible; the rock specifies seeing, then, precisely insofar as it is able to be seen. Similarly, wax specifies the act of heating precisely insofar as it is able to be heated. The wax does not specify the act of heating insofar as it is soft or round or fragrant; rather, it specifies the act of heating insofar as it is able to undergo the change of becoming hot. And just as diverse objects, such as a rock, a tree, and a dog, all specify the act of seeing insofar as each is colored, so diverse materials such as wax, water, and wood all specify the act of heating insofar as each is able to become hot. We may say, more generally, that the material of any action must be able to undergo the appropriate change. If a billiard ball is to be moved, it must be movable; if a wire is to conduct electricity, it must be "electrocutable." The material specifies an action precisely under this formality-its ability to undergo the change. 19 The disorder of adultery, then, is readily accounted for by its material. The act of sexual intercourse aims to introduce some change in the subject, which Aquinas identifies as the woman. The proper material for the change, however, is a man's own wife; any other woman is unfit material, unable to undergo the change introduced in the rational sexual act. Therefore, intercourse with any other woman must be disordered. Similarly, the act of sacrilegious theft may be explained through unfit material. The thief seeks to introduce some change that cannot be borne by the chalice on account of its sacredness. Regardless of the end 19 See Brock, Action and Conduct, 89. We find this idea-that the material specifies insofar as it is able to undergo the change-in Aquinas's commentary on De Anima. He is concerned with what we might roughly call the act of digestion, of which the material is food. The change that the food undergoes is a transformation into the organism: when I digest an apple I transform the apple into my very being. Food serves as the object of the action because it, unlike poison or a rock, is able to undergo this transformation; the apple is able to be changed into my being. "Food is changed into that which digests it; therefore, food has the capacity to become that which digests it. It follows that food, insofar as it is the object of digestion, is capable of becoming part of a living being" (II De Anima, c. 9): "Alimentum autem est in potentia ad id quod alitur, convertitur enim in ipsum; relinquitur ergo quod alimentum, inquantum est nutritionis obiectum, sit aliquid existens in potentia ad animatum per se, et non secundum accidens"). Just as a rock is the object of seeing insofar as it is visible, so food is the object of digestion insofar as it is able to become the living organism, and so too is wax the object of heat insofar as it is able to become hot. 10 STEVEN J. JENSEN intended by the individual, then, these actions are disordered through their material. Furthermore, the sacredness of the chalice and the marital status of the woman, which are part and parcel of the material, also give species, though they be unintended circumstances. On the one hand, then, Aquinas's emphasis upon the specifying role of the end intended seems to favor the interpretation that he changed his mind in the Summa; on the other hand, his emphasis upon the specifying role of the materia circa quam seems to allow, even later than the Prima Secundae, that sometimes circumstances can give species even when they are not directly intended. IV. THE MATERIAL VANQUISHED? It is not clear, however, that Cajetan's reading of question 72, article 9 is undermined by introducing the materia circa quam. After all, in question 72 itself it seems that the material, as a specifying principle, is absorbed into intention. Article 3 asks whether sins are specified by their causes. The body of the article concludes that only the final cause, that is, the end, can give species; but of even greater interest is the second objection, which reads: Amongst all the causes it seems that the material cause pertains least to the species, but the objects of sins are as their material cause. Therefore, since sins are specified through their objects, it seems to follow that sins will much more be specified through the other causes. 20 Thomas replies: Objects, insofar as they are compared to exterior acts, have the notion of materia circa quam; but insofar as they are compared to the interior act of the will they have the formality of ends, and it is from this formality that they give the species to the act. And even as they are materia circa quam they have the formality of 20 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 3, obj. 2: "Praeterea, inter alias causas minus videtur pertinere ad speciem causa materialis. Sed obiectum in peccato est sicut causa materialis. Cum ergo secundum obiecta peccata specie distinguantur, videtur quod peccata multo magis secundum alias causas distinguantur specie." DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 11 terms, from which motion is specified, as is said in V Physics and X Ethics. But even the terms of motion give species to the motion insofar as they have the formality of an end. 21 Furthermore, in question 73 we find Aquinas making the following statement: Even if the object is the material in which the act terminates, nevertheless, it has the formality of an end insofar as the intention of the agent bears upon it. But the form of moral actions depends upon the end. 22 Evidently, then, the material specifies only insofar as it is intended. The material can hardly liberate circumstances from the dominance of intention, if the material itself falls under intention's reign. The same conclusion can be reached by recognizing that the specifying role of the materia circa quam, as befits the material cause, is merely potential: it specifies only as a potential for receiving the end. Indeed, the material adds nothing beyond what the end already provides. The endpoint of heat, for instance, is built into the very formality under which wax specifies the fire's act-the ability to become hot. If we already know that the activity of the fire is directed towards heat, then the material's potential toward heat is redundant. We may grant, then, that circumstances give species insofar as they provide some condition of the material, but it does not follow that unintended circumstances give species, for the material itself specifies only insofar as it is intended. Whatever specification the material provides is better provided through the end of the will. 21 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 3, ad 2: "Dicendum quod obiecta, secundum quod comparantur ad actus exteriores, habent rationem materiae circa quam; sed secundum quod comparantur ad actum interiorem voluntatis, habent rationem finium, et ex hoc habent quod dent speciem actui. Quam vis etiam secundum quod sunt materia circa quam, habeant rationem terminorum, a quibus motus specificantur, ut dicitur in V Phys. et in X Ethics. Sed tamen etiam termini motus dant speciem motibus, inquantum habent rationem finis." 22 STh 1-11, q. 73, a. 3, ad 1: "Dicendum quod obiectum, etsi sit materia circa quam terminatur actus, habet tamen rationem finis secundum quod intentio agentis fertur in ipsum, ut supra dictum est. Forma autem actus moralis dependet ex fine, ut ex superioribus patet." 12 STEVEN J. JENSEN V. MATERIAL AND REASON Cajetan's reading of question 72, article 9, however, is not yet secure, for this explanation of the specifying role of material is not entirely accurate. In a certain sense, of course, the material does specify potentially, insofar as we recognize its specifying role only in relation to some actual form. We have already seen that the specifying role of the end refers back to the form in the agent, even as the heat that comes to be in the wax specifies the act of the fire only insofar as it arises from the form of heat already present in the fire. Similarly, the formal aspect under which the material specifies depends upon the form in the agent. The same material of wax, for instance, might be the object both of the act of heating and of the act of seeing, but it will specify these actions under different formalities. Which formal aspect we look to, whether the ability to be seen or the ability to be heated, depends upon the form in the agent. Or, as Aquinas says, we must look to the principle of an action to determine what aspects of an object . . give species. When it is compared to one active principle an act will be specified according to some formality of an object, but when it is compared to another active principle it will not be specified by that same formality. For to know color and to know sound are different species of acts if they are referred to the senses, because these are sensible in themselves. But if they are referred to the intellect, they will not differ in species because the intellect comprehends both of them under one common formality, namely, being or truth. Similarly, to know white and to know black differ in species if they are referred to sight but not if they are referred to taste. One may conclude that the act of any potency is specified according to that which per se pertains to that potency, not by that which pertains to it per accidens. 23 23 De Malo, q. 2, a. 4: "Ad cuius evidentiam considerandum est, quad cum actus recipiat speciem ab obiecto, secundum aliquam rationem obiecti specificabitur actus comparatus ad unum activum principium, secundum quam rationem non specificabitur camparatus ad aliud. Cognoscere enim colorem et cognoscere sonum sunt diversi actus secundum speciem, si ad sensum referantur; quia haec secundum se sensibilia sunt; non autem si referantur ad intellectum; quia ab intellectu comprehenduntur sub una communi ratione obiecti, scilicet en tis aut veri. Et similiter sen tire album et nigrum differt specie si referatur ad visum, non si DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 13 The position that seeks to absorb the material into intention supposes that the principle of human actions is the will, so the form in relation to which the material specifies is the motive of the will. Aquinas, on the other hand, does not refer to the will. Rather, he says that the principle of human actions is reason, so the material specifies insofar as it refers per se to reason. He continues: If we consider objects of human actions that differ in something pertaining per se to reason, then the acts will differ in species insofar as they are acts of reason, but they might not differ in species insofar as they are acts of some other power. For example, to know one's wife and to know one who is not one's wife are two actions whose objects differ in something pertaining to reason, for to know one's own and to know what is not one's own are determined by the measure of reason. This same difference, however, is related per accidens in comparison either to the power of generation or to the sexual desire. Therefore, to know one's own and to know what is not one's own differ in species insofar as they are acts of reason but not insofar as they are acts of the generative power or of the sexual desire. An act is human, however, insofar as it is an act of reason. Clearly, then, the two differ in species insofar as they are. human actions. 24 What refers per se to the act of sensing, whether the color of a rose, its odor, or some other aspect, depends upon which power of sensation one is considering. Similarly, what aspects of a woman refer per se to the sexual act depends upon which power one is considering, reason or the power of generation, for the single act of sexual intercourse arises from multiple active referatur ad gustum; ex quo potest accipi quod actus cuiuslibet potentiae specificatur secundum id quod per se pertinet ad illam potentiam, non autem secundum id quod pertinet ad earn solum per accidens." Also see STh I-II, q. 18, a. 5; and I, q. 77, a. 3. 24 De Malo, q. 2, a. 4: "Si ergo obiecta humanorum actuum considerentur quae habeant differentias secundum aliquid per se ad rationem pertinentes, erunt actus specie differentes, secundum quod sunt actus rationis, licet non sint species differentes, secundum quod sunt actus alicuius alterius potentiae; sicut cognoscere muherem suam et cognoscere mulierem non suam, sunt actus habentes obiecta differentia secundum aliquid ad rationem pertinens; nam suum et non suum determinantur secundum regulam rationis; quae tamen differentiae per accidens se habent si comparentur ad vim generativam, vel etiam ad vim concupiscibilem. Et ideo cognoscere suam et cognoscere non suam, specie differunt secundum quod sunt actus rationis, non autem secundum quod sunt actus generativae aut concupiscibilis. In tantum autem sunt actus humani in quantum sunt actus rationis. Sic ergo patet quod differunt specie in quantum sunt actus humani." 14 STEVEN J. JENSEN principles, and each of these principles may aim to introduce its own form into the material. If the woman is one's wife, then the material is able to take on the form introduced by reason, even as wax can take on heat, but if the woman is not one's wife, then the material is unable to take on the form introduced by reason. These same aspects of the woman, however, are irrelevant to the power of generation, for any woman is capable of taking on the form introduced by the power of generation. Everything hinges, then, on the form that reason seeks to introduce into the materia circa quam. Those aspects by which the material is able or unable to bear this form will give species to human actions. All other aspects of the material will be circumstantial. 25 But what form does reason seek to introduce? Clearly, the power of generation aims to introduce the form of new life. Since a woman is in potential to bring about new life, whereas a man is not, this difference of male and female refers per se to the power of generation. It also refers per se to reason, for homosexual activity is a distinct moral species. 26 In the act of sexual intercourse, then, reason also seeks to introduce the form of new life. But in addition, reason seeks to order the action to the education or maturity of the child, as Aquinas's account of fornication makes clear, for he says that fornication is evil precisely because an unwed woman is not of herself in potential to raise the child well. 27 Reason, then, aims to introduce new life as ordered to maturity. While any woman is in potential to life, only one's wife has the inherent capacity to bring this new life to maturity. 28 25 Theo Belmans (Le sens objectif de l'agir humain: Pour retire la moral conjugate de Saint Thomas [Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1980], 163-70) attributes almost all error in moral theology to the view that the object of the human act is a thing. Perhaps he is expressing the idea that the object of an action is not simply a thing but a thing insofar as it relates to the principle of the act. The material of an act is considered not simply as a physical object; it is considered insofar as it relates to the order of the action arising from reason. 26 STh II-II, q. 154, a. 11. 27 STh II-II, q. 154, a. 2; ScG III, c. 122; De Malo, q. 15, a. 1. 28 The power of generation and the order of reason have to do with types or with what happens for the most part, not with what may occur on occasion. It does not matter, therefore, that some woman may on occasion be able to raise the child to maturity well, since DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 15 What the power of generation lacks, but reason includes, is the order to some human good, namely, the education of the child. In general, Aquinas says that the role of reason is to order to the end, for with our reason we can see the relationship between the end and that which is for the sake of the end. 29 Indeed, if we consider merely the new life, abstracting from the need for education, reason still adds something above the power of generation, for reason aims at new life not simply as new life, but as a human good, as ordered to the end of human life. Reason, then, seeks to introduce not simply some form, as do other powers; it seeks to introduce a form insofar as it is ordered to the human good. The material refers per se to reason, then, insofar as it is able or not able to bear the order to the end. Those aspects of the material that give moral species are those that allow or do not allow the form to be ordered to the end. Just as a rock refers per se to the power of sight insofar as it is visible, so a woman refers per se to deliberate sexual acts insofar as she is able to be ordered to the end. Evidently, then, the material specifies without reference to the end of the will, but rather in relation to reason ordering to the end. As Aquinas himself says, "the good or evil that an exterior action has in itself, on account of required material and required circumstances, is not derived from the will but more from reason. " 30 As such, the specifying role of the material cannot be reduced to the specifying role of the end, and the circumstances that serve as conditions of the material, thereby giving species, need not be intended as an end. for the most part both parents are needed. Nor does it matter that some woman might be infertile, and therefore unable to generate new life, for a woman is the type of thing that generates new life in relation to the male power of generation. See De Malo, q. 15, a. 2, ad 12; STh II-II, q. 154, a. 2. See STh I, q. 18, a. 3; I-II, q. 12, a. 1, ad 3; I-II, q. 90, a. 1. STh I-II, q. 20, a. 1: "Bonitas autem vel malitia quam habet actus exterior secundum se, propter debitam materiam et debitas circumstantias, non derivatur a voluntate, sed magis a 29 30 ratione." 16 STEVEN J. JENSEN VI. THE ACTION PERFORMED Is INTENDED What are we to make of the texts that claim that the materia circa quam gives species only insofar as it is intended? 31 We must acknowledge that the action an individual actually performs is some particular kind of action because the will moves to bring about this particular change in this particular material. The fornicator commits an act of fornication because he wills to do so. There is no pure act of fornication existing merely by material and reason; there are only individual acts of fornication that exist because certain individuals choose to perform an act of sexual intercourse with certain women. The point, then, must be conceded: the material is an end of the will, and only as such does it specify human actions. Granting that the material of any given action depends upon the will moving to act in it, we are still left with the question of which characterizes which. Does the will give character to the material, or does the material give character to the will? The material, it seems, gives character to the will. The end of the will does not precede the specifying role of the material; rather, the specifying role of the material to some extent determines the end of the will. 32 Precisely because the material of the act of fornication is unable to be ordered to the end of educating the child, the fornicator cannot intend, in his action, the good proposed by reason. By his choice to perform this action in this material, he has excluded the possibility of ordering his action to the human good. Whatever his end might be, it will have joined to it a privation, namely, the lack of the true good presented by reason. If he seeks pleasure, for instance, then his end is best described not simply as pleasure, but as pleasure apart from the order of 31 A more complete treatment of the specifying relationship between the exterior and interior actions is found in Steven J. Jensen, "A Defense of Physicalism," The Thomist 61 (1997): 377-404. 32 See STh 1-11, q. 20, aa. 1 and 4; De Malo, q. 2, a. 3. DO CIRCUMSTANCESGIVE SPECIES? 17 reason. 33 The good sought by the will, then, is identified and characterized in part by the material. The fornicator must seek some good apart from the end of reason, because he has chosen to perform this action in unfitting material. 34 In what sense, then, must the material serve as an end before it can give species? The agent must, as Aquinas says, "intend to do such and such a voluntary action in such and such material. " 35 Only in this manner is his action directed to this material; if it were directed to some other material, then it would be another action. It does not follow that the agent's intention must be directed to every detail of the specifying material. The adulterer may well intend to direct his activity to a particular woman because of certain bodily features, and not at all because the woman is married to another man. Nevertheless, it remains that he does direct his activity to this particular woman, who is married to another man. The material specifies because it is intended, but those aspects of it that serve to specify depend not upon intention but upon their relation to reason. 36 Given that the will (or the person through his will) has directed itself to this material, it is itself constrained in the good that it can seek; whatever it aims to achieve must be sought apart from the order of reason. 33 This account, therefore, may already be reconciled with STh I-II, q. 72, a. 9. When a circumstance indicates some new deformity, the will is constrained to seek one less aspect of the good of reason, and therefore must have a new motive. As we will see, however, Aquinas seems to have something else in mind in STh I-II, q. 72, a. 9; rather than a circumstance demanding some new depleted motive, the circumstance accompanies a new motive. 34 See STh I, q. 48, a. 1, ad 2. Also see ScG III, c. 9; De Pot., q. 3, a. 6, ad 11and12; De Malo, q. 1, a. 1, ad 12; De Virt. in Comm., q. 1, a. 2, ad 5. 35 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 1: "Qui intendit talem actum voluntarium exercere in tali materia." 36 Strictly speaking, intention does not specify human actions; rather, actions take their species from that which is intended. Aquinas often refers to what is praeter intentionem as not giving species. When he speaks of the relation between species and intention (as opposed to praeter intentionem), he does not say that intention gives species; he prefers to say that the species is taken from what is intended (see STh I-II, q. 72, a. l; II-II, q. 64, a. 7; II-II, q. 109, a. 2, ad 2; II-II, q. 150, a. 2). 18 STEVENJ. JENSEN VII. UNANSWERED QUESTIONS We began this discussion by noting two texts evidently so in conflict with one another that Cajetan judged Aquinas had changed his mind. We have left these conflicting texts largely untouched in order that we might first understand more clearly Aquinas's general teaching on the moral specification of human actions. It is now time to see how the two texts can be reconciled. Our difficulty arises from the article of the Summa, or at least from Cajetan's reading of it, for it seems to say that circumstances give species only insofar as they arise from a new motive, thereby excluding the possibility, asserted in the Sentences, that circumstances can give species even when they are not intended by the will. A more careful reading of the Summa article, however, reveals that Aquinas concludes that circumstances do not give species. Hardly a consolation, one might suppose. On Cajetan's interpretation, at least the two articles agree that circumstances sometimes give species; they differ only in their explanation of how circumstances give species. Now I am suggesting that the Summa article claims that circumstances do not give species. This strong claim seems difficult to reconcile with the closing statement of question 72, article 9, which reads, "Sometimes, on the other hand, the corruption of diverse circumstances arises from distinct motives ... and so leads to diverse species of sins. " 37 In order to read this passage correctly, however, we must forget what we know from other texts of Aquinas, namely, that he thinks circumstances sometimes do give species to human actions; otherwise, we are apt to suppose that Aquinas must be saying the same thing here. But if we approach the text without any such supposition, then we can see that all of the objections argue that sometimes circumstances do give species. The sed contra, on the other hand, argues that circumstances do not give species. Both the objections and the sed contra, then, prepare us for a negative 37 SI'h 1-11, q. 72, a. 9. DO CIRCUMSTANCES GIVE SPECIES? 19 answer; Aquinas should conclude that circumstances do not give species. This negative answer, however, remains opaque unless we examine the immediately preceding articles. The general principle that moral actions take their species from the motive is implied, but not explicitly stated, in articles 6 and 7. It is stated for the first time in article 8, which asks whether excess and defect diversify sins. Not surprisingly, Thomas answers that they do, as wanting too much pleasure is distinct from wanting too little pleasure. The true source of the specification, however, lies with the distinct motives that underlie excess and defect. Wanting pleasure too much arises from the love of pleasure, while wanting pleasure too little arises from the hatred of pleasure. In the reply to the first objection he clarifies the point. Even if more and less are not the cause of diversity of species, nevertheless they sometimes follow upon the species insofar as they arise from diverse forms, for example, as when it is said that fire is lighter than air. Therefore, the Philosopher says in book 8 of the Ethics that those who thought there were not diverse species of friendship, because they are said to be more or less, based their belief upon an insufficient indication. In the same way, to exceed reason or to fall short of it pertains to diverse sins according to species insofar as they follow upon diverse motives. 38 It turns out, then, that excess and defect do not themselves give species; rather, they follow upon a new species. We might identify fire as the element that is lighter than air, but the lightness itself does not give species; rather, it follows upon the form of fire, which does give species. Similarly, we might identify sins through excess and defect, but these quantities do not in fact give species; they follow upon the form that does give species, namely, the new motive. 38 STh I-II, q. 72, a. 8, ad 1: "Ad prim um ergo dicendum quod magis et minus, etsi non sint causa diversitatis speciei, consequuntur tamen quandoque species differentes, prout proveniunt ex diversis formis, sicut si dicatur quod ignis est levior aere. Uncle philosophus