The Thomist 70 (2006): 481-536

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE
"REMEDIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE"
CORMAC BURKE
Strathmore University
Nairobi, Kenya

T

HE TERMremedium concupiscentiae, proposed up to 1983
as a "secondary" end of marriage, has been seriously
misapplied over the centuries. In practice it was taken to
imply that marriage gives a lawful outlet to sexual concupiscence
(or lust), and hence married couples can legitimately yield to it.
The consequences went further. If concupiscence is "remedied"
by the fact of being married, then it is either automatically
purified of whatever self-centered (and hence anti-love) elements
it entails; or, if these elements remain, they pose no problem to
the living and growth of married love. As regards the conjugal act
itself, the only moral proviso was that its procreative orientation
be respected; given this proviso, the suggestion was that spouses
can give concupiscence free rein, without this posing any moral or
ascetical difficulties for the development of a full Christian life in
their marriage.
While some traces of the term "remedium concupiscentiae" can
be found in Augustine or Thomas Aquinas, those authors did not
use it in the sense that it later acquired. Saint Thomas especially
speaks of marriage as a "remedy against concupiscence" inasmuch
as it offers graces to overcome the self-seeking concupiscence
involves. The subsequent reduction of the term to "remedy of
concupiscence" led to the loss of this understanding.
My purpose in this article is to show that sexual desire and
sexual love are, or should be, good things-not to be confused
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with sexual concupiscence or lust in which self-seeking operates
to the detriment of love.
If the acceptance in ecclesiastical thinking of marriage as a
"remedy" or legitimation of concupiscence has for centuries
impeded the development of a positive and dynamic notion of
marital chastity, John Paul II's "Theology of the Body," if assimilated in depth, leads into a new way of thinking and presents
this chastity as the safeguard to conjugal love and a means to its
growth.

Preliminary Note: Human Nature and Concupiscence
Christianity is the religion of God's greatness and love, and of
man's potential, as well as of his frailty, misery, redemption, and
elevation. In the Christian view, man is a fallen masterpiece of
creation, capable indeed of sinking lower but actually ransomed
and strengthened to rise higher. As a result of original sin, says the
Catechism of the Catholic Church,
human nature has not been totally corrupted: it is wounded in the natural
powers proper to it, subject to ignorance, suffering and the dominion of death,
and inclined to sin-an inclination to evil that is called "concupiscence."
Baptism, by imparting the life of Christ's grace, erases original sin and turns a
man back towards God, but the consequences for nature, weakened and inclined
to evil, persist in man and summon him to spiritual battle. (CCC 405)

Called to surpass ourselves and to attain divine heights, we are
still drawn down by that tendency to lower things which goes by
the name of concupiscence.
Concupiscence, in biblical and theological usage, covers the
unregulated tendency to pursue or adhere to created goods.
Etymologically, "concupiscence" can refer to any intense form of human desire.
Christian theology has given it a particular meaning: the movement of the
sensitive appetite contrary to the operation of the human reason. The apostle St.
Paul identifies it with the rebellion of the "flesh" against the "spirit" (Gal
5:16ff.). (CCC 2515)

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Drawing from the First Letter of St. John, Christian tradition
has seen three forms of concupiscence arising from self-enclosing
attachment to created things. Two of these come from the
sensitive appetite, the third from the intellect "All that is in the
world, the lust of the flesh and the lust of the eyes and the pride
of life, is not of the Father but is of the world. And the world
passes away, and the lust of it; but he who does the will of God
abides for ever" (1 John 2:16-17). The pride of life consists in
taking self-centered satisfaction in one's own talents and
excellence, and springs from intellectual appetition. Thus the
spirit too has its lusts, for not all its desires are upright, many
being vain, mean, vengeful, egotistic: thereby tending to distort
the truth. Hence man is threatened not only by the rebellion of
the flesh, but also by that of the spirit.
These brief introductory remarks lead us to the more limited
scope of our present study: the theological and human evaluation
of [carnal] concupiscence in marriage, and the history-and also
the utility and indeed the validity-of the notion that marriage is,
and is intended to be, a "remedy for concupiscence."
I. CONCUPISCENCE AND MARRIAGE: THEOLOGICAL POSITIONS

A) The "Remedium Concupiscentiae" as an End of Marriage
Prior to Vatican II, the phrase remedium concupiscentiae"remedy for concupiscence" -was customarily used in ecclesial
writing to describe one of the ends of matrimony. The Code of
Canon Law of 1917, crystallizing this view, distinguished between
a single primary end of marriage and a twofold secondary end:
"The primary end of matrimony is the procreation and education
of offspring; the secondary end is mutual help and the remedy of
concupiscence." 1 It is worth bearing in mind that the 1917 Code
was the first magisterial document to use the terms "primary" and

1 "l\/[atrirnonii finis prirnarius est procreatio atque educatio prolis; secundarius rnutuurn
adiutoriurn et rernediurn concupiscentiae" (c. 1013).

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"secondary" in relation to the ends of marriage, so proposing a
notion of these ends as hierarchically structured. 2
The fifty years following the promulgation of the PioBenedictine Code were to witness a growing debate regarding the
ends of marriage. The debate concerned the relative importance
to be attached to procreation on the one hand, and on the other
to a rather (as yet) ill-defined "personalist" end seen as largely or
wholly unconnected with procreation. Taking for granted the
main lines of this debate, which have been considered elsewhere, 3
we pass on here to the presentation of the ends of marriage in the
Second Vatican Council and the postconciliar magisterium.
Gaudium et spes is the main document of the council that
treats of marriage. The only specific end of matrimony mentioned
in the constitution is the procreation-education of children. 4 It
indeed says that marriage "has various ends" (GS 48), and adds
that the natural ordering of marriage towards procreation should
not be taken as "underestimating the other ends of marriage" 5 (GS
50). Surprisingly, however, these other ends are nowhere
specified. It may be that the council fathers did not want_ to
foreclose the ongoing debate about the ends of marriage, and they
may have also prudently felt that further ecdesial reflection would
be necessary before a general consensus might be reached on new
ways of expressing the various ends of marriage and their mutual
relationship.
Peculiarly, it seems to have been as the result (initially at least)
of canonical more than of theological reflection that a new and
very precise expression of the ends of marriage finally emerged.
This becomes less peculiar when one recalls that Pope John
2 "However surprising it may seem, the fact is that canon 1013, 1 [CIC 1917] is the first
document of the Church to list the ends [of marriage] and to set them out in an hierarchical
order. ... This canon is also the first document of the Church to use the terminology of
'primary' and 'secondary"' (U. Navarrete, S.J., Periodica 56 [1967]: 368). cf. A. Sarmiento,
El matrimonio cristiano (Pamplona: EUNSA, 2001), 360.
3 See C. Burke, "Marriage: A Personalist or an Institutional Understanding?" Communio
19 (1992): 278-304.
4 "By their very nature, the institution of matrimony itself and conjugal love are ordered
to the procreation and education of children" (GS 48, repeated in GS 50).
s "non posthabitis ceteris matrimonii finibus."

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XXIII's convocation of the council was accompanied by the
decision to elaborate a new code of canon law. Revising the 1917
Code so that it would more faithfully reflect conciliar thinking
about the life of the Church and of the faithful became a major
postconciliar undertaking. This work of revision, done in depth
and without haste, lasted more than fifteen years, and resulted in
the 1983 Code of Canon Law-described by Pope John Paul II at
its promulgation as "the last document of the Council. " 6
The revision carried out by the pontifical commission entrusted
with the task was guided not merely by the terms of canon law,
but also-and very deliberately-by theological considerations.
This was in conformity with the directive of the council that
canon law should be presented in the light of theology and of the
mystery of the Church. 7 One of the novelties of the 1983 Code is
in fact the inclusion of canons that are simply theological statements of doctrine. 8 Hence, whenever these canons use modified
or new terms in presenting the Church's law, one can legitimately
look to them for a possible development in theological and
magisterial thinking.
With this in mind, let us turn to the opening canon in the
section of the Code that deals with marriage. 9 Canon 1055 says:
The matrimonial covenant, by which a man and a woman establish between
themselves a partnership of the whole of life, is by its nature ordered toward the
good of the spouses and the procreation and education of offspring; this covenant
between baptized persons has been raised by Christ the Lord to the dignity of a
sacrament. (§1; emphasis added).

Our attention centers on the italicized words.
We read, without surprise, that one end of matrimony is the
procreation and upbringing of children. Surprise can arise,
however, when we turn to the other end specified-the "bonum
coniugum/' or the "good of the spouses"-and is justified by the
Pope John Paul II, Address to the Roman Rota, 26 January 1984, AAS 76 (1984): 644.
See Optatam totius 16.
8 See, e.g., cc. 747ff. in book 3; and cc. 849, 879, 897, 959, 998, 1008 in book 4.
9 Book 4, "The Sanctifying Office of the Church," part 1, title 7.
6

7

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fact that an altogether new term is being used in a magisterial
document to describe an end of marriage.
This novel way of expressing the ordering or purposes of
marriage was accepted and given further authority eleven years
later in what may be considered an even more important magisterial document, the 1994 Catechism of the Catholic Church.
Paragraph 1601 of the Catechism repeats the above canon word
for word. 10 Paragraph 2363 expresses this specifically in terms of
ends: "the twofold end of marriage: the good of the spouses
themselves and the transmission of life. " 11
Undoubtedly the most important issue brought up by this new
formulation of the ends of marriage is the nature of the bonum
coniugum or the "good of the spouses." This is not an easy
question, especially when we bear in mind that the term bonum
coniugum is of very recent coinage. It is scarcely ever to be found
in ecclesial writing prior to the Second Vatican Council. Only in
1977 was it first used by the Pontifical Council for the Revision
of the Code to describe an end of marriage. 12 Neither the 1983
Code nor the 1994 Catechism any longer expresses the ends of
marriage in terms of a hierarchy but places them together as, so
it seems, of equal standing. My impression is that we have moved
into a new stage where the Church wishes to emphasize not any
possible ranking ·of the ends, but the interconnection between
them. 13
With regard to the mutuum adiutorium, a former secondary
end, it is not my purpose to study its place in the present scheme
of the ends of marriage. There seems to be little if any disagreement among authors that, even if not specifically mentioned
See also CCC 2201 and 2249.
"[D]uplex matrimonii finis." This point of the Catechism, we can note in passing,
confirms that the expression "is ordered to" (in the Code or in CCC 1601) is simply
equivalent to "has as an end."
12 I have written elsewhere at some length on this, and would refer the interested reader
to these studies: "The "bonum coniugum" and the bonum pro/is: Ends or Properties of
Marriage?" The Jurist 49 (1989): 704-13; "Progressive Jurisprudential Thinking," The Jurist
58 (1998): 437-78.
13 See C. Burke, "Personalism and the 'bona' of Marriage," Studia Canonica 27 (1993):
401-12; Burke, "Marriage: A Personalist or an Institutional Understanding?"
10
11

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487

in these recent magisterial texts, "mutual assistance" is to be
included within the proper meaning of the "good of the
spouses. " 14
A particular point of interest for the present study is the
absence, in the documents of the Second Vatican Council and in
subsequent magisterial teaching, of any direct or indirect mention
of the former remedium concupiscentiae or "remedy of
concupiscence. " 15 That this omission was deliberate cannot be
doubted. Moreover, though the other secondary end, the mutuum
adiutorium, fits simply enough within the new concept of the
bonum coniugum, 16 this is not so of the remedium concupiscentiae. Rather than suggest (as some have done) an implicit
presence of the remedium concupiscentiae within the new scheme
of the ends of marriage-and thus try to show a certain continuity
of ecdesial thinking-I prefer to submit that, despite the long
presence it has enjoyed in much of ecdesial writing and its
acceptance over fifty years in the 1917 Code, the concept of the
remedium concupiscentiae (a) lacks theological and anthropological substance (and, contrary to generalized opinion, has
little if any backing in the thought of St. Augustine or St. Thomas)
and (b) its currency, over centuries, has accompanied (and
possibly explains in large part) the failure of moralists to develop
a theological and ascetical consideration of marriage as a way of
sanctification.
As I seek to develop my argument, I would ask the reader to
bear two things in mind. The first is that sexual concupiscence or
lust, as I use the term, is not to be taken in the sense of simple
sexual attraction or indeed the desire for marital intercourse and
the pleasure that accompanies it. Lust or bodily concupiscence is
the disordered element that in our present state tends to
See Burke, "Progressive Jurisprudential Thinking," 459ff.
As late as 1977 the Pontifical Commission for the Revision of the Code of Canon Law
did consider a draft in which the remedium concupiscentiae appeared among the ends of
marriage (Communicationes [1977]: 123). This passing nod to traditional terminology did
not, however, prevent the consul tors from dropping the notion completely when it came to
the final draft of the new code, approved and promulgated only six years later.
16 Cf. the biblical juxtaposition of bonum and adiutorium in the Jahwist account of the
divine institution of marriage in Genesis 2:18.
14
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accompany marital intercourse, threatening the love it should
express with self-centered possessiveness. On that supposition, my
main point is that the use (however longstanding) of the term
remedium concupiscentiae to signify an end of marriage has had
a profoundly negative effect on married life, inasmuch as it
suggests that lust or concupiscence is "remedied" or at least "legitimised" by marriage, in the sense either of automatically
disappearing or else of being no longer a self-centered element to
be constantly taken into account if married love is to grow. To my
mind the faulty reasoning behind this has been a major block to
understanding how love in marriage stands in need of constant
purification if it is to achieve its human fullness and its supernatural goal of merging into love for God. I will endeavor to
justify my position on both points.
B) Concupiscence: An Evil Present in Marriage?

It is impossible to study the development of Christian thought
on marriage without reference to St. Augustine. The many-faceted
and nuanced character of Augustinian thinking in this field is
probably to be attributed not so much to Augustine's personal
experience in sexual matters as to his having been involved over
some forty years in very particular and very contrasting
controversies concerning matrimony. The earlier part of his
Catholic life saw him engaged in conflict with the pessimism of
the Manicheans; in his later years he combated the naturalistic
optimism of the Pelagians. The Manicheans saw marriage and
procreation as major expressions of material and bodily creation
and hence as evil; Augustine defended the goodness of both. The
Pelagians, in their excessive optimism about man's present state,
took little or no account of the disordered element now strongly
present in sex, also in conjugal sexuality; and Augustine sought to
alert people to this disorder. 17

17

See C. Burke: "St. Augustine and Conjugal Sexuality," Communio 17 (1990): 545-65.

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1. Saint Augustine and the bona of Marriage
The greatest of Augustine's legacies in this field is his doctrine
of the matrimonial bona. He sees marriage as essentially
characterized by three principal elements or properties each of
which shows the goodness and greatness of the marital
relationship. 18 So convinced is he that each of these characteristics
underpins the goodness of marriage that he refers to each not just
as a "property" or "characteristic" but as a bonum, as something
good, as a uniquely positive value: "Let these nuptial goods be the
objects of our love: offspring, fidelity, the unbreakable bond ...
. Let these nuptial goods be praised in marriage by him who
wishes to extol the nuptial institution." 19
This doctrine of the bona is without a doubt Augustine's main
contribution to the analysis of marriage in its divinely instituted
beauty. And it has come down to us over 1500 years of unbroken
tradition. 20
Another important legacy of Augustine has colored ecclesial
reflection on sexuality and marriage: his teaching about the
presence and effect of concupiscence in all sexual activity,
including marital intercourse between spouses themselves. It is
this aspect of his thought that interests us here.
2. Saint Augustine and "Putting Bad to Good Use"
One of many seminal ideas in Augustine's thought is that "bad
can be used to good purpose. " 21 God, he points out, makes
positive use of those aspects of creation which seem to have gone
18 In Augustine's view offspring was certainly the purpose or end of marriage ("Cum sint
ergo nuptiae causa generandi institutae" [De coniugiis adulterinis 12]). Nevertheless this was
not his major point of focus and interest. He took the end of marriage for granted; his interest
and arguments were directed to defending its goodness.
19 "In nuptiis tamen bona nuptialia diligantur, proles, £ides, sacramentum .... Haec bona
nuptialia laudet in nuptiis, qui ]audare vult nuptias" (De nuptiis et concupiscentia 1.17.19; cf.
1.21.23).
20 See B. Alves Pereira, La doctrine du mariage selon saint Augustin (Paris, 1930); A.
Reuter, Sancti Aurel ii Augustini doctrina de bonis matrimonii (Rome, 1942).
21 Of course, this is not the same as saying that one can do bad so as to achieve good.

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wrong; we have to learn to do likewise. The idea is repeatedly
expressed: "God uses even bad things well"; "God knows how to
put not only good things, but also bad things, to good use";
"Almighty God, the Lord of all creatures, who, as it is written,
made everything very good, so ordered them that he could make
good use both of good things and of bad"; "Just as it is bad to
make bad use of what is good, so it is good to make good use of
what is bad. When these therefore-good and bad; and good use
and bad use-are put together, they make up four differences.
Good is used well by whoever vows continence to God, while
good is used badly by whoever vows continence to an idol; evil is
used badly by whoever indulges concupiscence through adultery,
while evil is used well by whoever restricts concupiscence to
marriage. " 22
In his writings on marriage, Augustine refers this principle
particularly to the presence of concupiscence in conjugal
is good, but the carnal
intercourse.
Such intercourse
concupiscence or lust that accompanies it is not. Nevertheless
spouses in their intercourse use this evil well, 23 and he wants them
to be aware of this. "So let good spouses use the evil of
concupiscence well, just as a wise man uses an imprudent servant
for good tasks"; "I hold that to use lust is not always a sin,
because to use evil well is not a sin"; "as for the warfare
experienced by chaste persons, whether celibate or married, we
assert that there could have been no such thing in paradise before
[man's] sin. Marriage is still the same, but in begetting children
nothing evil would then have been used; now the evil of
22 "Deus utitur et malis bene" (De civitate dei 18.51); "non sol um bonis, verum etiam malis
bene uti novit [Deus]" (ibid. 14.27); "Deus omnipotens, Dominus universae creaturae, qui
fecit omnia, sicut scriptum est, bona valde, sic ea ordinavit, ut et de bonis et de malis bene
faciat" (De agone christiano 7); "Sicut autem bono male uti malum est, sic malo bene uti
bonum est. Duo igitur haec, bonum et malum, et alia duo, usus bonus et usus malus, sibimet
adiuncta quattuor differentias faciunt. Bene utitur bono continentiam dedicans Deo, male
utitur bono continentiam dedicans idolo; male utitur malo concupiscentiam relaxans adulterio,
bene utitur malo concupiscentiam restringens connubio" (De peccatorum meritis 1.57).
23 De nupt. et cone. 1.9; 1.27; 2.34; 2.36; De continentia 27; Contrajulianum 3.53; 4.35;
4.65; 5.46, 66; Imperfectum opuscontraiulianum praefatio; 1.65; 2.31; 4.29; 4.107; 5.13;
5.20; 5.23; Contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum 1.33; De gratia Christi et de peccato originali
2.42; De Trinitate 13.23; etc.

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concupiscence is used well"; "this evil is used well by faithful
spouses. " 24
So, for Augustine lust is an evil. Nevertheless, spouses can
nevertheless use it well in their truly conjugal intercourse, whereas
unmarried people who yield to lust sin by using this evil badly. 25
It follows, within this logic, that the married person who engages
in illicit intercourse uses lust badly and therefore sins. Illicit
intercourse obviously comprises adultery, and there is no doubt
that in Augustine's thought, it also covers contraception.
Augustine goes further still and proposes an opinion well set to
clash directly with modern views on married sexuality. He holds
that married intercourse is "excusable" (and wholly conjugal) only
when it is carried out for the conscious purpose of having
children. 26 If it is engaged in just for the satisfaction of concupiscence, it always carries with it some element of fault, at least
of a venial type.
In his view, the intention of spouses in intercourse should not
be pleasure for its own sake but rather procreation, adding that if
in their intercourse the spouses intend more than what is needed
for procreation, this evil (malum), which he refuses to consider as
proper to marriage itself, remains excusable (veniale) because of
the goodness of marriage itself. 27 Elsewhere he puts his view even
more clearly: if pleasure-seeking is the main purpose of spouses
24 "[S]ic utantur coniuges bani malo concupiscentiae,
sicut sapiens ad opera utique bona
ministro utitur imprudente" (Contra Iulianum 5 .60); "Ego enim dico, uti libidine non semper
esse peccatum; quia malo bene uti non est peccatum" (ibid.); "bell um quad in se casti sentiunt,
sive continentes, sive etiam coniugati, hoc dicimus in paradiso, ante peccatum nullo modo esse
potuisse. Ipsae ergo etiam nunc sunt nuptiae, sed in generandis filiis tune nullo malo uterentur,
nunc concupiscentiae malo bene utuntur" (ibid. 3.57); "hoc enim malo bene utuntur fideles
coniugati" (ibid. 3.54) (cf. ibid. 4.1; 4.35; 5.63; etc.).
25 "[W]ith shameful lust to have licit intercourse, is to use an evil well; to have it illicitly,
is to use an evil badly" ("pudenda libidine qui licite concumbit, malo bene utitur; qui autem
illicite, malo male utitur" [De nupt. et cone. 2.36]).
26 "sexual intercourse necessary for begetting is free from blame, and it alone is [truly]
nuptial" ("Concubitus enim necessarius causa generandi, inculpabilis et sol us ipse nuptialis est"
[De bono coniugali 11]); cf. "Only for the cause of procreating is the union of the sexes free
from blame" ("Sola enim generandi causa est inculpabilis sexus utriusque cornmixtio" [Senno
351].
17 "non nuptiarum sit hoc malum, sed veniale sit propter nuptiarum bonum" (De bono
viduitatis 4.5.

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in their intercourse, they sin-but only venially on account of
their Christian marriage. 28
In support of this view Augustine time and again cites the
passage in the seventh chapter of the First Letter to the
Corinthians, where St. Paul "allows" Christian spouses to refrain
from conjugal intercourse by mutual consent and for a time, but
recommends that it not be for too long, "lest Satan tempt you
through lack of self-control," adding that this advice of his is
given not as a command, but secundum indulgentiam, or, as
Augustine translates it, secundum veniam.
3. Saint Paul and 1 Corinthians 7:1-9
The first verses of this chapter have had extraordinary (and
possibly disproportionate) importance in the development of
Christian moral thought concerning conjugal relations. Bringing
the full text before our mind can help us consider to what extent
Augustine's and parallel subsequent interpretations are justified.
Augustine of course wrote in Latin, so for key passages we
reproduce parenthetically the Latin version which has been in
common use over the ages-the Vulgate translation of his
contemporary, St. Jerome.
It is well for a man not to touch a woman. But because of the temptation to
immorality, each man should have his own wife and each woman her own
husband. The husband should give to his wife her conjugal rights, and likewise
the wife to her husband. For the wife does not rule over her own body, but the
husband does; likewise the husband does not rule over his own body, but the
wife does. Do not refuse one another except perhaps by agreement for a season,
that you.may devote yourselves to prayer; but then come together again, lest
Satan tempt you through lack of self-control. I say this by way of concession, not
of command [Hoc autem dico secundum indulgentiam,non secundum imperium].
I wish that all were as I myself am. But each has his own special gift from God,
one of one kind and one of another. To the unmarried and the widows I say that
it is well for them to remain single as I do. But if they cannot exercise self28 "illis excessibus concumbendi, qui non fiunt causa prolis voluntate dominante, sed causa
voluptatis vincente libidine, quae sunt in coniugibus peccata venialia" (De nupt. et cone. 1.27);
"veniale peccatum sit propter nuptias Christianas" (Contra Julianum 4.33; cf. 3.43; contra ep.
Pel. 1.33; 3.30.

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control, they should marry. For it is better to marry than to be aflame with
passion [Melius est enim nubere quam uri]. (1Cor7:1-9 [RSV])

Our attention for the moment centers on the words "Hoc
autem dico secundum indulgentiam, non secundum imperium."
Augustine translates as "secundum veniam" what Jerome renders
as "secundum indulgentiam," and understands "venia" in the
sense of pardon or forgiveness for what carries guilt. 29 Augustine's
argument in fact rests wholly on this rendering, for he holds that
if something requires a "venia'' it necessarily involves a fault that
qualifies as a sin. 30
It is not dear, however, that Augustine is justified in his rendering; if he is not, his whole argument can of course be
questioned. To suggest that in this passage St. Paul proposes to
condone sin seems by all lights to force the original text. The
Greek word used by St. Paul, suggnome, means "allowance" or
"concession." 31 Saint Paul's mind is surely not that concession can
be made to people so as to sin, but rather that allowance can be
made to follow a less perfect way. This is precisely what he goes
on to say in the following verse: "I wish that all were as I myself
am. But each has his own special gift from God, one of one kind
and one of another." It is clear that Paul regards the celibacy he
has chosen as a more desirable way; at the same time, however,
he presents marriage too as a "gift of God."
The thrust of St. Paul's thought seems rather to pass from a
simple ascetical counsel for married people (it could be good to
abstain for a time from conjugal relations), to a clarification that
he regards his own choice of celibacy for God as higher than the

29 Nowhere in the New Testament does the Vulgate employ "venia" in this sense; in the
Old Testament four occurrences are to be found (Num 15:28; Wis 12:11; Sir 3:14-15;
25:34). "Indulgentia" appears three times in the Old Testament (Jdt 8 :14, Isa 61: 1; 63:7); and
once, in the passage we are considering, in the New Testament.
3 ° Contra ep. Pel. 1.33; De nupt. et cone. 16; De gr. et pecc. or. 2.43; cf. Contra Julianum
2.20; 5 .63; Imperf. opus contra Julianum 1.68; etc.
31 The Revised Standard Version has "I say this by way of concession, not of command";
the New American Bible (198 6) also uses "concession"; the Jerusalem Bible renders the whole
passage more loosely: "This is a suggestion, not a rule."

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married state, to the concession (with an "indulgent" outlook)
that those who choose marriage also choose a gift of God.
If we turn to Saint Thomas, we find that he reads 1
Corinthians 7:6 according to the Vulgate "secundum indulgentiam" and not "secundum veniam," but seems to interpret the
passage in much the same way as Augustine. 32 Elsewhere,
however, he modulates his position more. Quietly observing that
the Apostle appears to be expressing himself "a bit carelessly"
(inconvenienter), inasmuch as he seems to imply that marriage is
sinful, 33 Thomas comes up with two possible readings. In one
"secundum indulgentiam" would refer to a permission not for sin
but for what is less good; that is, Paul says it is good to marry, but
less good than to remain celibate. 34 This seems to me the better
interpretation. However, Thomas does allow another reading
according to which sin may be present in marital intercourse:
namely, when it is engaged in out of lust, albeit lust restricted to
one's spouse. In this case there is venial sin, which would become
mortal if one were indifferent whether the object of one's lust
were one's spouse or not. 35

C) Transition: From Marriage Affected by Concupiscence to
Concupiscence "Remedied" by Marriage
How and when did the notion of marriage being directed to
the remedy of concupiscence emerge? While roots of the idea can
be found in Augustine and Thomas, I do not consider that either
32 The spouse who seeks married intercourse simply because he or she will otherwise not
be continent, sins venially (IV Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2).
33 "videtur apostolus inconvenienter loqui; indulgentia enim non est nisi de peccato. Per
hoc ergo quad apostolus, secundum indulgentiam se <licit matrimonium concessisse, videtur
exprimere quad matrimonium sit peccatum" (Super I Car., c. 7, lect. 1).
34 "apostolus hie indulget, id est, permittit matrimonium, quad est minus bonum quam
virginitas, quae non praecipitur, quae est maius bonum" (ibid.).
35 "Alia modo potest accipi indulgentia prout respicit culpam .... Et secundum hoc
indulgentia refertur ad actum coniugalem secundum quad habet annexam culpam venialem
... scilicet cum quis ad actum matrimonialem ex concupiscentia excitatur, quae tamen infra
limites matrimonii sistit, ut scilicet cum sola uxore sit contentus. Quandoque vero est culpa
mortalis, puta cum concupiscentia fertur extra limites matrimonii, scilicet cum aliquis accedit
ad uxorem, aeque libenter vel libentius ad aliam accessurus" (ibid.; cf. STh suppl., q. 40, a. 6).

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of them held or proposed it in the sense that was current for
centuries prior to the Second Vatican Council-a sense advanced
and established by writers of those intervening centuries.
Both Augustine and Thomas are conscious of a sullying and
negative effect of concupiscence, even in married intercourse.
Both try to show that the conjugal act is nevertheless "justified" 36
through its natural connection with the bona of marriage. For
Augustine it is fundamentally the bonum prolis that justifies
conjugal intercourse. Thomas is broader in his outlook and relates
this justification also to the good of fidelity, 37 and to the unique
unbreakable nature of the married bond. 38
Whatever the merit of this viewpoint, it is dearly one thing to
hold that the concupiscence of marital intercourse is "justified" or
"excused" by marriage, and another to hold that it is "remedied"
thereby. My reading of these two doctors is that the idea of
marriage being a remedium of concupiscence is not directly
proposed by either. Hence it should rather be considered a
subsequent development.
The idea of marriage as a "remedy" appears only once or twice
in Augustine's writings, while he never uses the actual phrase
remedium concupiscentiae. In one of his most appealing passages
in defense of the goodness of marriage, he writes: "The goodness
of marriage is always a good thing indeed. In the people of God
it was at one time an act of obedience to the law; now it is a
remedy for weakness, and for some a solace of human nature. " 39
It is true that in another of his works, where he combats
Pelagian viewpoints, one may claim to find a more direct
reference to marriage considered as a remedy to libido or
disordered sexual desire. The Pelagian bishop Julian of Eclanum
had written that holy virginity, in its readiness to fight greater
36 "Justified," as used by these two authors, would seem to have a much more positive
meaning than modern parlance attributes to it. It is not merely that the act is "excused," but
that it is rendered just in the biblical sense, that is, holy and pleasing to God.
37 IV Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 2.
38 See IV Sent., d. 31, q. 2, a. 1.
39 "Nuptiarum igitur bonum semper est quidem bonum; sed in populo Dei fuit aliquando
legis obsequium; nunc estinfirmitatis remedium, in quibusdam vero humanitatis solatium" (De
bono vid. 8.11; cf. Gen. ad litt. 9.7).

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battles, had ignored the "remedy" of marriage. Augustine seizes
on this point, and asks Julian: Against what disorder do you
regard marriage as a remedy? Obviously (he answers) against the
disorder of lust. Then, concludes Augustine, we are both agreed
that marriage is a remedy; so why do you defend the very
disorder of lust against which this "conjugal remedy" is directed? 40
The weight of this passage is debatable, but the context certainly
countenances the view that the idea of marriage as a remedy,
carelessly put forward by Julian, is used by Augustine rather to
score a point against Pelagian logic than to propose his own
considered mind on the subject.
Regarding Thomas, we find him twice briefly expressing the
notion that matrimony exists also for the remedium concupiscentiae. 41 But particular attention should be directed to another
passage where his mind appears more precisely. To the suggestion
that marriage does not confer grace but is simply a "remedy," he
replies,
this does not seem acceptable; for it implies that marriage is a remedy of
concupiscence, either inasmuch as it curbs concupiscence-which cannot be
without grace; or inasmuch as it satisfies concupiscence in part, which it does
from the very nature of the act independently of any sacrament. Besides,
concupiscence is not curbed by being satisfied but is rather increased, as Aristotle
says in his Ethics. 42

Here there is not the slightest hint of marriage being simply in
itself a remedy of concupiscence. Thomas insists rather that either
the remedy in question lies in the curbing of concupiscencewhich is not possible without grace-or else it is to be taken in the
sense of the simple satisfaction of concupiscence, and then it is
not a remedy at all, but tends rather to its increase.
40 "Dixisti enim: 'Sanctam virginitatem confidentia suae salutis et roboris contempsisse
remedia, ut gloriosa posset exercere certamina'. Quaero quae remedia contempserit?
Respondebis: Nuptias. Quaero: Ista remedia contra quern morbum suntnecessaria? Remedium
quippe a medendo, id est a medicando, nomen accepit. Simul itaque videmus ambo remedium
nuptiarum: cur tu laudas libidinis morbum ... si non ei resistat aut continentiae retinaculum,
aut coniugale remedium?" (Contra Jul. 3.21.42).
41 IV Sent., d. 33, q. 2, a. 1, ad 4; Super I Car. c. 7, lect. 1.
42 IV Sent., d. 2, q. 1, a. 1.

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Later, again on the issue of whether marriage confers grace, he
clinches his argument. Taking up again the objection that
marriage, precisely because it tends to increase concupiscence,
cannot be a vehicle of grace, he turns the objection around and
says that grace is in fact conferred in marriage precisely to be a
remedy against concupiscence, so as to curb it at its root (i.e., its
self-absorbed tendency). 43 Clearly, to curb or repress concupiscence is not the same as to "remedy" it.
The attribution to Augustine and Thomas Aquinas of the
teaching that marriage is directed to the "remedy of concupiscence" therefore lacks solid grounds. The simple term
remedium concupiscentiae appears nowhere in Augustine's
writings. He regards concupiscence as an evil factor affecting
human life which married persons can nevertheless use well in
intercourse ordained to procreation. Having given a broad
description of marriage as a "remedy for weakness," he accepts
that it is also a remedy against concupiscence. On a couple of
occasions and speaking in general terms, Thomas does apply the
phrase remedium concupiscentiae to marriage; but the more
precise expression of his mind shows that for him too marriage is
meant to be a remedy against concupiscence. He clearly shares
Augustine's conviction that concupiscence is a negative element,
even in married life, and one to be resisted. Expounding how each
sacrament is given as a remedy against the deficiency of sin, he
says that marriage is given as a "remedium contra concupiscentiam personalem," a remedy against concupiscence in the
individual. 44 Concupiscence remains an enemy of personal holiness; each Christian has to fight against it. Marriage, especially in
its sacramental nature, helps to fight this enemy.
Nowhere in Thomas's teaching do we find any suggestion that
concupiscence or lust is "neutralized," and less still "emancipated,'' by the fact of getting married. It remains a threat to the
married as to the single. Those who marry do have a special grace
to fight against this threat so as to purify their marital intercourse
43
44

IV Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4.
STh III, q. 65, a. 1; cf. IV Sent., d. 2, q. 2; d. 26, q. 2.

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of self-seeking and turn it more and more into an act of loving
self-donation. But concupiscence remains a negative reality, a
malum or evil to be used well, that is, to be purified.
In the century before Thomas Aquinas, Hugo of St. Victor
(1096-1141) follows Augustine in presenting the "good" of
marriage as countering the "bad" of concupiscence, 45 while Peter
Lombard (1100-1160) simply says that marriage is "ad remedium"
or "in remedium," without specifying the operation of this
remedy. 46 Saint Bonaventure (1217-74) is as precise as his
contemporary Thomas in his teaching: "The use of marriage ...
acts as a remedy against concupiscence, when it checks it as a
medicine. " 47 Yet this precision is to be less and less respected and
the importance attaching to it seems to be less and less
understood. Already just before Bonaventure, Alexander of Hales
(1170-1245), had written, "Matrimony is a remedy of lustful
concupiscence. " 48 This, rather than the precision of Thomas, is
the line that will be followed in later centuries. 49 Theologians,
without qualification or comment, state matter-of-factly that
marriage exists (also) for the "remedy of concupiscence."
In the seventeenth century, the Jesuit Hermann Busenbaum
writes that the spouses are united "ad remedium concupiscentiae. "50 Saint Alphonsus Liguori (1696-1787), the patron of
moral theologians, teaches, "The accidental intrinsic ends of
marriage are two: the procreation of offspring, and the remedy of
concupiscence. "51
By the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, this form of
expression is firmly established. The manuals of moral theology
Hugh of St. Victor, De sacramentis 2.11(PL176:494).
Peter Lombard, N Sent., d. 26 (PL 192:908-9).
47 "Est usus matrimonii ... in remedium contra concupiscentiam, dum ilia refrenat ut
medicamentum" (Bonaventure, IV Sent., d. 26, a. 1, q. 1).
48 "Coniugium ... quod est in remedium libidinosae concupiscentiae" (Alexander of Hales,
In lib. IV, d. 26 [Glossa in IV Libras Sententiarum (Quaracchi, 1957), 457]).
49 One of the few exceptions is Robert Bellarmine (1542-1621): "Tertius finis est ut sit
coniugium in remedium contra concupiscentiam" (De sacramento matrimonii 1.10).
50 Hermann Busenbaum, Medulla theologiae moralis., tract. 6, De matrimonio, c. 2.
51 "Fines [matrimonii] intrinseci accidentales sunt duo, procreatio prolis, et remedium
concupiscentiae" (Alphonsus Liguori, Theologiae moralis [Turin, 1888], lib. 6, p. 881).
45

46

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499

m most common use before the Second Vatican Council
unanimously propose the remedium concupiscentiae as one of the
secondary ends of marriage, without subjecting the idea to any
true critical analysis. One finds this not only in all of the Latin
manuals, 52 but also in the best-known vernacular texts. Thomas
Slater's manual speaks of "a lawful outlet for concupiscence" as
does the even better-known manual of Henry Davis. 53 The
Dictionary of Moral Theology says that "the secondary end is the
remedy of concupiscence. "54
Bernard Haring's The Law of Christ, although professedly
updated in the light of Vatican II, repeats the same: "the
sacrament of matrimony has a secondary or subordinate end or
function (finis secundarius): the healing of concupiscence
(remedium concupiscientiae). "55 The 1967 New Catholic Encyclopedia56 restates this traditional doctrine, as does the University of
Salamanca's Biblia Comentada. 57 The 1963 edition of the wellknown Ford-Kelly Contemporary Moral Theology lists the
"remedy of concupiscence" among the essential ends of marriage. 58 The authors observe: "The remedy for concupiscence is
Here is an extensive though not exhaustive list: A. Ballerini, S.J., Opus theologicum
morale (Prati, 1892), 6:167; G. Bucceroni, S.J., Institutiones theologiae moralis secundum
doctrinam S. Thomae et S. Alphonsi (Rome, 1898), 2:334; C. Marc, C.Ss.R., Institutiones
morales Alphonsianae (Lugduni, 1900), 2:447; C. Pesch, S.J., Praelectiones dogmaticae
(Freiburg, 1900), "De sacramentis," pars 2, n. 691; A. Lehmkuhl, S.J., Theologia moralis
(Freiburg im Breisgau, 1914), 2:616; F. M. Cappello, S.J., Tractactus canonico-moralis
(Rome, 1927), 3:39; L. Wouters, C.Ss.R.,Manuale theologiae moralis (Bruges, 1933), 2:542;
E. Genicot, S.J., Institutiones theologiae moralis (Brussels, 1936), 2:410; J. Aertnys, C.Ss.R.
and C. A. Darnen, C.Ss.R., Theologia moralis (Turin, 1950), 2:473; H. Noldin, S.J., Summa
theologiae moralis (Innsbruck, 1962), 429; B. H. Merkelbach, O.P., Summa theologiae moralis
(Bruges, 1956), 3:759; E. F. Regatillo, S.J., et M. Zalba, S.J., Theologiae moralis summa
(Madrid, 1954), 3:582; G. Mausbach, Teologia morale (Alba, 1956), 3:144; Ad. Tanquerey,
Synopsis theologiae moralis et pastoralis (Paris, 1955), 381.
53 T. Slater, S.J., A Manual of Moral Theology (New York, 1925), 200; H. Davis, S.J.,
Moral and Pastoral Theology (New York, 1958), 4:69.
54 Dictionary of Moral Theology (Westminster, Md.: Newman Press, 1962), 732.
55 Bernard Haring, The Law of Christ (Cork: Mercier Press, 1967): translated from the 7th
German edition of Das Gesetz Christi of 1963.
56 New Catholic Encyclopedia (1967), s.v. "MARRIAGE (THEOLOGY OF)."
57 Biblia Comentada 6:403 (Madrid: BAC, 1965).
58 John C. Ford, S.J., and Gerald Kelly, S.J., Contemporary Moral Theology (Westminster,
Md.: Newman Press, 1963), 2:48, 75.
52

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now beginning to be called, or at least partially explained as the
sexual fulfillment of the partners, thus giving it a more positive
content" ;59 "sexual activity and sexual pleasure are now
considered by theologians to have positive values. Formerly the
attitude toward sex was negative and disparaging. Sexual
expression even in marriage was somewhat reluctantly given its
place. It needed to be 'excused' by the tria bona of marriage.
Today Catholic theologians attribute positive values to sex, which
would have surprised St. Augustine, if not St. Thomas. " 60
Nevertheless, the authors state that they prefer to continue using
the traditional expression remedium concupiscentiae. 61
It is right to remark that, rather than in specific teachings of
Augustine or Thomas, this century-old traditional view has sought
its justification in the difficult phrase-"melius est nubere quam
uri"-used by St. Paul in 1 Corinthians 7:7-9. Paul first remarks,
"I wish that all were as I myself am [i.e., celibate]. But each has his
own special gift from God, one of one kind and one of another."
He then addresses those who are not married: "To the unmarried
and the widows I say that it is well for them to remain single as I
do. But if they cannot exercise self-control, they should marry, for
it is better to marry than to burn [with passion]."
The last sentence of this passage seems clearly addressed to
particular persons: not to the unmarried generally, but to those
among them who lack sexual self-control. Nevertheless, a whole
tradition of moral thinking zeroed in on these words and, taking
them out of their limited scriptural context, used them to sustain
a broad and generalized doctrine with a twofold implication:
marriage is for those who lack self-control; 62 hence, self-control
59 Ibid., 2:48.

60 Ibid., 2:97. Augustine might have been surprised at this comment which fails to grasp
the distinction he makes between sexual pleasure (which is a good accompaniment of marital
intercourse) and lust which is its bad accompaniment: see Burke, "St. Augustine and Conjugal
Sexuality," 551-53.
61 Ford and Kelly, Contemporary Moral Theology, 2:99.
62 The 1950 edition of a much-used manual thus explains the purpose of the remedium
concupiscentiae, as an end of marriage: "so that those who are conscious of their weakness,
and do not want to sustain the attack of the flesh, can use the remedy of matrimony in order
to avoid sins of lust" [Aertnys-Damen, Theologia Moralis, 2:473]).

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501

in marriage, at least in the spouses' sexual relations, is not of
special importance.
It is hard to say which of these two propositions should be
considered the more harmful. The former underpinned the millennial mindset which regarded marriage as a sort of second-class
Christian option. The latter was arguably the strongest obstacle to
the development of a properly conjugal asceticism or spirituality:
that is, a spiritual approach for married persons powerful and
deep enough to help them seek perfection within-and not
despite-the peculiar conditions of their proper way of life.
Over the centuries and up to our times the Church has
unquestionably suffered from a disregard of and neglect towards
the spiritual possibilities of marriage. The scant number of
married persons among declared saints (extraordinarily few in
proportion to celibates) reflected or perhaps provoked the
widespread idea that "getting married" was the normal alternative
to "having a vocation." Marriage was not for those who were
called; it was rather for the disadvantaged.
Not only that. The main handicap that those who chose to
marry apparently suffered from-their lack of self-control-was
considered either to be automatically remedied by the act of
marrying, or in any case to be no longer of great account. It was
not that to marry stopped the "burning" of lust or concupiscence,
but that once married one could yield unconcernedly to this
"burning," whose satisfaction is legitimized by marrying. In this
view, conjugal relations, justified by being oriented to procreation,
were exempt from any further moral or ascetical issue of control
or purification. Lust, having been "remedied," is no longer a
troublesome force for married people, nor need one consider it as
a source of imperfection, or an enemy to the growth of their
married love and their sanctification before God.
In practice, the idea that marriage was the remedium
concupiscentiae seemed to suggest to many-ordinary people and
pastors-that concupiscence in marriage could be given way to
quite freely. The only requirement laid down for the satisfaction
of sexual desire in marriage was that the procreative orientation

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of the conjugal act be respected. If that condition was fulfilled,
neither morality nor spirituality had further guidelines to offer.
It seems to me that the moral evaluation of concupiscence
remained stuck in this standpoint: the indulgence of sexual
concupiscence, being always seriously sinful outside marriage, is
legitimate for spouses, simply provided that the procreative
orientation of the marriage act is respected. This appears as the
almost universal moral analysis of sexual concupiscence: there is
only one proper and licit place for its indulgence, and that is
marriage. In other words, marriage legitimizes sexual concupiscence or lust. This is the understanding of the remedium
concupiscentiae that has established itself among Catholic
theologians and moralists, to the point of being considered wellnigh axiomatic.
Concupiscence in marriage is appraised therefore not as a force
to be resisted, but as something simply "remedied" by marriage
itself. This, I maintain, was the common attitude as late as the
middle of the twentieth century, when the idea of "married
spirituality" was being seriously proposed. Further, despite the
dear teaching of the Second Vatican Council on the universal call
to holiness, including married people in particular, the attitude
remains prevalent today.

D) The Twentieth Century: Unrealistic Optimism (?) And
Pessimistic (?)Realism
With the twentieth century, signs appeared of a desire to renew
theological and ascetical reflection on marriage. Early "personalist" writers such as Herbert Doms and Bernard Krempel sought
to underline the human value of intercourse as an expression of
conjugal love, though on the basis of a very inadequate level of
anthropological analysis. Doms saw the essence of marriage in the
physical union of the spouses, and its end as their fulfillment and
realization as persons. He denied that, in order to be unitive,
married intercourse must retain its intrinsic orientation to
offspring, maintaining that "the conjugal act is full of meaning

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503

and carries its own justification in itself, independently of its
orientation towards offspring. " 63 Krempel ignored offspring as an
end of marriage; its end is the "life-union" of man and woman,
the child being simply the expression of this union. 64
This is an example of personalism working at a very superficial
level. Perhaps it was in reaction that Pius XI's encyclical Casti
connubii (1930), while giving new prominence to the importance
of love in marriage, insisted that "love" is secondary to the main
end of procreation. In line with the accepted tradition, the
encyclical teaches that the satisfying of concupiscence is also an
end which the spouses may seek, but does not broach the issue of
the relationship between concupiscence itself and marital love. In
matrimony, it says, "there are also secondary ends, such as mutual
aid, the cultivating of mutual love, and the satisfying [sedatio] of
concupiscence which husband and wife are not forbidden to
consider so long as the due ordination of intercourse to the
primary end is respected. " 65
As the twentieth century progressed, it ushered in a new (and
perhaps not sufficiently qualified) emphasis on the dignity of the
physical sexual relationship in marriage. This no doubt left many
moralists not too happy with the earlier opinion that there is
venial sin in having conjugal intercourse just for pleasure. Rather
than seeking a possible solution of the matter through a deeper
analysis of the relationship between love and the sexual urge, the
tendency was to side-step the issue. So we read in the last preVatican II edition of a widely used manual:
[I]in practice there is no need to worry spouses if they exercise the conjugal act
in an ordinary and upright way without actually thinking of a particular end. The
reason is that the conjugal act performed in a natural way fosters marital love
and this love favors the good of offspring-in view of which, as all the authors
teach, conjugal intercourse is licit. 66
63 H. Dorns, "Conception personnaliste du rnariage d'apres S. Thomas," Revue Thomiste
45 (1939): 763.
64 See A. Perego, "Fine ed essenza della societa coniugale," Divus Thomas 56 (1953):
357ff.
65 H. Denzinger, ed., Enchiridion symbolorum, 21-23 ed. (Herder, 1937), n. 2241.
66 D. M. Priirnrner, Manuale theologiae moralis (Barcelona: Herder, 1961), 3:504.

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This begs the question of whether intercourse, in order to be a
truly natural expression of marital love, needs to be purified as far
as possible from the concupiscence that accompanies it.
By contrast, the late-twentieth-century magisterium offers
startlingly new perspectives on this whole issue. Pope John Paul
II opened his pontificate with a detailed and surprising weekly
catechesis, now commonly known as the "Theology of the
Body. " 67 This extended from September 1979 to November 1984.
It offered an extraordinarily profound view of the purpose and
dignity of human sexuality and the conjugal union. It also dwelt
on the presence and dangers of lust within marriage.
In July 1982, treating of both virginal celibacy and marriage as
"gifts of God," John Paul II took up those difficult passages in St.
Paul's First Letter to the Corinthians: "it is well for a man not to
touch a woman. But because of the danger of incontinence, each
man should have his own wife and each woman her own
husband"; and "to unmarried persons and to widows I say, It is
good for them to remain as I am. But if they cannot live in
continence, let them marry. It is better to marry than to burn. " 68
The pope posed the question:
Does the Apostle in First Corinthians perhaps look upon marriage exclusively
from the viewpoint of a remedy for concupiscence, as used to be said in
traditional theological language? The statements mentioned ... would seem to
verify this. However, right next to the statements quoted, we read a passage in
the seventh chapter of First Corinthians that leads us to see differently Paul's
teaching as a whole: "I wish that all were as I myself am, [he repeats his favorite
argument for abstaining from marriage]-but each has his own special gift from
God, one of one kind, and one of another'; (1 Cor 7:7). Therefore even those
who choose marriage and live in it receive a gift from God, his own gift, that is,
the grace proper to this choice, to this way of living, to this state. The gift
received by persons who live in marriage is different from the one received by
67 Pope John Paul II, The Theology of the Body: Human Love in the Divine Plan (Boston:
Pauline Books, 1997).
68 1Cor7:1-2, 8-9. Saint Thomas, it should be noticed, is quite critical of St. Paul's phrase,
"It is better to marry than to burn," which he considers an "abusive" way of putting things:
"Est autem hie attendendum quod apostolus utitur abusiva comparatione; nam nubere bonum
est, licet minus, uri autem est malum. Melius est ergo, id est magis tolerandum, quod homo
minus bonum habeat, quam quod incurrat incontinentiae malum" (Super I Cor., c. 7, lect. 1)
(emphasis added).

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505

persons who live in virginity and choose continence for the sake of the kingdom
of God. All the same, it is a true gift from God, one's own gift, intended for
concrete persons. It is specific, that is, suited to their vocation in life. We can
therefore say that while the Apostle, in his characterization of marriage on the
human side ... strongly emphasizes the reason concerning concupiscence of the
flesh, at the same time, with no less strength of conviction, he stresses also its
sacramental and charismatic character. With the same clarity with which he sees
man's situation in relation to concupiscence of the flesh, he sees also the action
of grace in every person-in one who lives in marriage no less than in one who
willingly chooses continence. (Theology of the Body, 295)

The least that can be said from a reading of this passage is that
John Paul II, while not explicitly rejecting the concept of
remedium concupiscentiae, suggests that the traditional teaching
on the matter has remained one-sided precisely because of a
failure to weigh the sacramental implications of marriage.
Some months later in 1982, the pope's catechesis turned more
directly to the sacramentality of marriage. Once again he showed
a clear reserve regarding the concept of marriage as a remedy for
concupiscence, and insisted rather that the sacramental grace of
marriage enables the spouses to dominate concupiscence and
purify it of its dominant self-seeking.
These statements of St. Paul [quoted above] have given rise to the opinion that
marriage constitutes a specific remedy for concupiscence. However, as we have
already observed, St. Paul teaches explicitly that marriage has a corresponding
special "gift," and that in the mystery of redemption marriage is given to a man
and a woman as a grace.

Within this mystery of redemption, as the pope sees it, the
sacramental graces of marriage, sustaining conjugal chastity, have
a special effect in achieving the redemption of the body through
the overcoming of concupiscence.
As a sacrament of the Church, marriage ... [is] a word of the Spirit which
exhorts man and woman to model their whole life together by drawing power
from the mystery of the "redemption of the body." In this way they are called to
chastity as to a state of life "according to the Spirit" which is proper to them (cf.
Rom 8:4-5; Gal 5 :25). The redemption of the body also signifies in this case that
hope which, in the dimension of marriage, can be defined as the hope of daily

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life, the hope of temporal life. On the basis of such a hope the concupiscence of
the flesh as the source of the tendency toward an egoistic gratification is
dominated .... Those who, as spouses, according to the eternal divine plan, join
together so as to become in a certain sense one flesh, are also in their turn called,
through the sacrament, to a life according to the Spirit. This corresponds to the
gift received in the sacrament. In virtue of that gift, by leading a life according
to the Spirit, the spouses are capable of rediscovering the particular gratification
which they have become sharers of. As much as concupiscence darkens the
horizon of the inward vision and deprives the heart of the clarity of desires and
aspirations, so much does "life according to the Spirit" (that is, the grace of the
sacrament of marriage) permit man and woman to find again the true liberty of
the gift, united to the awareness of the spousal meaning of the body in its
masculinity and femininity. (Theology of the Body, 348-49)

This dense passage teaches in summary that through the
specific grace of matrimony, spouses can purify the conjugal act
of the grasping and self-centered spirit inherent in concupiscence,
and so recapture the truly donative experience and pleasure of
marital intercourse. This marks a step forward in magisterial
teaching of extraordinary significance. (We will return to this
below.)
New stances and insights continue to be presented by the
magisterium of these last decades. They show that while the
Church is expressing a deepened appreciation of the dignity of
sexual intercourse in marriage-as an act of love-union and
mutual self-giving-it has not weakened its teaching that our
whole nature, and sexual desire in particular, was seriously
impacted by the Fall.
The Catechism of the Catholic Church teaches clearly and
emphatically that, as a result of original sin, an operative evil is to
be found in human nature-not least in the sexual attraction
between man and woman, also inside marriage. In a section
entitled "Marriage under the regime of sin," the Catechism insists,
Every man experiences evil around him and within himself. This experience
makes itself felt in the relationships between man and woman. Their union has
always been threatened by discord, a spirit of domination, infidelity, jealousy,
and conflicts that can escalate into hatred and separation. (1606)
According to faith the disorder we notice so painfully does not stem from the
nature of man and woman, nor from the nature of their relations, but from sin.

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As a break with God, the first sin had for its first consequence the rupture of the
original communion between man and woman. Their relations were distorted by
mutual recriminations; their mutual attraction, the Creator's own gift, changed
into a relationship of domination and lust. (1607)

A relationship of lust! Strong words indeed, to describe a
distortion that tends to affect relations between the sexes from
adolescence to old age-even, as the context makes clear, in interspousal relations. As is evident, the Catechism gives no support to
the idea that concupiscence is in some way "remedied" -in the
sense of being eliminated or reduced to nonimportance-by the
simple fact of getting married: just the contrary.
With deliberate directness, the Catechism puts forward ideas
not likely to gain easy acceptance among our contemporaries.
Some may take them as showing that the Church is still imbued
with Augustinian (or Thomistic) pessimism about sexuality. That
must be firmly contested: what is being taught here is not
pessimism but realism. In pointing to real difficulties that
accompany and can threaten sexual love, these texts rather call
Christians to deeper reflection on ways of solving these dangers,
so that love itself can grow.
II. CONCUPISCENCE AND MARRIED LOVE: A DEEPER ANALYSIS

A) Lust, Normal [Simple] Sexual Desire, and Conjugal Desire
Fine distinctions need to be drawn here; to begin with,
between lust and 'normal' sexual desire. This may provoke the
reaction: but surely 'normal sexual desire' is inseparable from
some element of lust? The objection itself points to the need for
deeper analyses of sexuality, sexual reaction, and sexual
attraction.
The concept of 'normal' bears reference not first to frequency
but to order. Civil disorder may be frequent in certain situations,
but only an improper use of language would classify it as normal.
In most intersex relations concupiscent lust is just below the

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surface, present and ready to assert itself. Its constant presence
suggests a disorder and indicates in fact a state of abnormality.
The modern difficulty in understanding the Church's teaching
on married sexuality stems in large part from a failure to
distinguish between lust and what is (or should be) normal sexual
desire: that is, between assertive and unregulated sexual desire,
bent foremost on physical self-satisfaction, and simple sexual
attraction, which can include a desire for union and is
characterized by respect and regulated by love. The two are not
to be equated. Pope John Paul II insists on the distinction: "the
perennial call . . . and, in a certain sense, the perennial mutual
attraction on man's part to femininity and on woman's part to
masculinity, is an indirect invitation of the body. But it is not lust
in the sense of the word in Matthew 5 :2 7-28" (Theology of the
Body, 148).
Lust or sexual concupiscence is a disorder and hence always an
evil. Sexual desire (just as sexual pleasure) is not an evil but a
good, provided it is directed and subordinated to conjugal love
and made a proper part of it. Sexual desire is part of conjugal
love; concupiscence, though present also in marriage, is not.
Hence their moral evaluation is totally different. The distinction
should be evident, but only if one carefully ponders and respects
the propriety of terms. 69
69 It is good news to hear of the new translation by Michael Waldstein of Theology of the
Body. However, in one point of his rendering of John Paul H's text, there seems to be room
for disagreement (I follow his comments given in an interview with Zenit, 1June2006). He
considers that the English translations hitherto in use are misleading in speaking of "lust,"
when simple sexual desire is closer to John Paul H's thought ("Desire can be good or bad; lust
is a vice", he rightly says). As a particular example he adduces precisely the passage in Matt
5 :28. Translations up to now have followed the Revised Standard Version according to which
Jesus says, "Whoever looks at a woman lustfully has already committed adultery with her in
his heart." Waldstein considers that "John Paul H's translation is much closer to the Greek
original; it has 'Whoever looks at a woman to desire her' ... ".
It is seldom that translations are not debatable. In this case I would not agree with Michael
Waldstein. The Friburg Greek Lexicon gives three shades of meaning (and three biblical
examples) for the Greek word used here, epithumeo: "(l) gener. of a strong impulse toward
someth. desire, long for (Lk 16.21); (2) in a good sense, of natural or commendable desire long
for, earnestly desire (Lk 22.15); (3) in a bad sense, of unrestricted desire for a forbidden pers.
or thing lust for or after, crave, covet (Mt 5.28; Acts 20.33)" (cf. BibleWorks commentary).
Surely it is indisputable that in this passage Jesus is speaking of desire that is gravely

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1. Sexual Concupiscence
Lust or carnal concupiscence can be described as the engrossing
urge for pleasure and exploitative possession which, in our
present condition, almost always accompanies sexual desire and
tends to take it over. From the moral point of view, it is a
negative force and a powerful enemy of true human and spiritual
growth.
The Christian idea of sexual concupiscence can only be
understood in the light of the Fall. Christians hold that the
original state of man and woman vis-a-vis each other was one of
joyous harmony, particularly in relation to their reciprocal
sexuality with its potential for mutual appreciation and
enrichment, and for unitive and fruitful love. The mutual
attraction between man and woman naturally has its physical
aspect and this too, as the Catechism says, is part of "the Creator's
own gift" (1607).
Sin wrecked this easy and harmonious peace of the manwoman relationship. After the Fall, says the Catechism, "the
harmony in which they [Adam and Eve] had found themselves,
thanks to original justice, is now destroyed: the control of the
soul's spiritual faculties over the body is shattered" (400); and this
disorder can extend to the marital relationship itself: "the union
of man and woman becomes subject to tensions, their relations
henceforth marked by lust and domination" (ibid.; cf. 409).
2. Normal Sexual Attraction
Sexual concupiscence cannot be equated simply with physical
sexual attraction or even with a desire for genital union. The
disordered; otherwise how explain his judgment that the look is equivalent to having "already
committed adultery with her in his heart"? It is clear that John Paul II himself, in his audience
of 17 September 1980, proposes this understanding (Theology of the Body, 148; cf. ibid.,
157).
Randall Colton, in a recent article, shows the philosophical confusion that results from
identifying lust with simple sexual desire (see Randall Colton, "Two Rival Versions of Sexual
Virtue: Simon Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity," The Thomist 70 [2006): 71101).

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romantic or idealistic love between a teenage boy and girl
(frequently still to be found even in our modern sensualized
world) may be accompanied by a desire to show bodily
affection-a desire filled with a tenderness and respect that
operate as a powerful curb, not only on lust if it seeks to assert
itself, but also on bodily expressions of love which would not be
true to the real existential relationship between the couple. This
is part of the chastity natural to incipient adolescent sexuality. Its
power should not be underestimated, not least because natures
fresh to sexuality can have a purer sense of the mystery of the
body and a spontaneous understanding of the true relationship of
bodily actions to human love.

3. Sexual Attraction (Desire), and Conjugal Attraction
In virtue of their complementarity, the sexes naturally
experience an attraction to each other that does not always take
the form of a physical desire (though, as we have mentioned,
unbalanced desire may in our present state be just below the
surface). Ability to appreciate and admire well-developed
masculine or feminine characteristics is a sign of growing human
maturity. As young people meet in the context of normal social
friendships between men and women, more particularized one-toone relationships develop in response to what could be called the
"conjugal instinct" or attraction. In its essence this "instinct" is
more spiritual than physical; in the Christian understanding it
corresponds to the natural desire for forming a committed and
exclusive life-long partnership with a spouse. 70 As the conjugal
instinct inspires two persons in preparation for marriage, it leads
them to avoid any physical relations that would express a
permanent union which they have not yet freely and mutually
70 A rota! sentence quotes St. Thomas, "Man is naturally made for marriage. Hence the
conjugal bond, or marriage, is natural" (STh suppl., q. 41, a. 1), and adds: "Marriage as
proposed by the Church corresponds to the natural understanding which man and woman
have of that exclusive, permanent and fruitful union with a member of the other sex to which
one is naturally led by the human conjugal instinct" (coram C. Burke, 12 December 1994,
Rotae Romanae Decisiones [Rome: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1997], vol. 86, p. 719).

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ratified. This is the human and anthropological sense of
premarital chastity. Once they are married, their physical conjugal
union becomes the conjugal act which, when realized in a human
way, gives true and unique expression to their spousal relationship. In participating in it in its full significance, they express
their marital chastity.
4. When Love and Lust Collide
We mentioned above the pure air of first adolescent love.
Unfortunately sexual attraction finds it more and more difficult to
keep breathing that air. Love needs to be very strong indeed if it
is to remain pure and delicate, generous in gift and not grasping
in possession-even when, ultimately, it has the right to possess.
This applies to the whole of premarital friendship between the
sexes, to courtship, and to marriage itself.
Normal friendship between a teenage boy and girl can only be
sincere and grow if they are on guard against lust. When the
attraction between a boy and girl or a young man and woman
takes the form of a more particularized love, then it is even more
important to keep love free from lust. Clarity of mind and
firmness of purpose are needed to achieve this. If love is sincere,
there is little difficulty in noting the issues or differences that may
arise. On the one hand, the indiscriminate instinct of lust with its
promptings to seek satisfaction with the first appealing person
available; on the other hand, there is the particularized human
instinct (the conjugal instinct already present) urging to keep the
gift of sexuality for one, and to respect that one when found
before there is a mutual conjugal commitment. No one will say
that this instinct of respect is easy to follow; but if true love is
there, the instinct too will be there.
Let us consider now the union of man and woman in
marriage,7 1 which is the fullest setting for human love. It is in
71 Conjugal union is a matter of both body and spirit. To be attracted by the body of one's
spouse and to want to be united in body with the spouse is indeed part of normal conjugal
desire. But another, and more important, part of that desire is to be attracted by the person
of the other and to want to have a union of persons. The importance of this double aspect

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marriage that the collision of love and lust can be most dramatic,
with so much depending on its outcome. We recall the title"Marriage under the regime of sin" -under which the Catechism
insists that the harmony and ease of the original communion
between man and woman have been ruptured by a "disorder [that]
we notice so painfully": the disorder of concupiscence which
takes over when mutual sexual attraction, instead of being filled
with respect and love, is "changed into a relationship of
domination and lust" (1607).
Here our thoughts go naturally back to Augustine and to the
terms in which he described this disorder: the evil of lust that
spouses need to "use well" (i.e., to turn to good use), but which
can frustrate and separate them if they use it badly. Augustine's
view is nuanced and complex, but our reflections may help us see
that it is neither pessimistic nor characterized by an anti-sex
spirit. 72 One might perhaps give a modern 'personalist' expression
to his view by saying that spouses use the sexual attraction
between them well when, through constant vigilance, they raise
it to the level of conjugal vitality and keep it there; and they use
it badly when they let it decline toward the level of mere animal
mating.

becomes clearer if we think in terms of love and not just of attraction or desire. Human
spousal love is directed not mainly to the body but above all to the person of the other. The
two loves-for the body and for the person-should ideally be in perfect harmony. In practice
they often are not. In fact they can be in opposition (i.e., when desire for the body detaches
itself from love for the person). That this can happen is nothing new, but it is certainly
disturbing and a matter to be taken firmly into account.
72 I am seeking to develop an argument in personalist terms, and Augustine can scarcely
be classified as a personalist in the modern sense. He nowhere distinguishes concupiscence
from good sexual attraction, and some of his statements can indeed appear to equate
concupiscence with simple sexual desire or with the pleasure accompanying marital
intercourse. Nevertheless, as I have sought to show elsewhere, this is not his true mind:
concupiscence for him does not mean the physical pleasure accompanying conjugal
intercourse (which he defends), but the tendency to let the urge for that pleasure eclipse its
true purpose and meaning (see Burke, "St. Augustine and Conjugal Sexuality," 551-53). Those
modern commentators who accuse Augustine of pessimism fail at least as much he does to
distinguish between "good" and "bad" sexual desire. My wish is not to present Augustine as
a personalist but rather to draw attention to the depth and realism of his analysis, so
underappreciated today.

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The contemporary magisterium insists time and again that each
human being must be treated as a person and never as a thing.
This is a rule for all human relationships, but for none as much as
marriage. The conjugal instinct-as we have called it-wants to
relate to one's spouse as to a person, never just as to a mere object
to be used for one's own physical satisfaction. Carnal concupiscence, on the other hand, also present in marriage, tends in
its self-centered forcefulness to disturb the loving relationship that
should exist between husband and wife, and so can easily prevent
marital sexuality from being completely at the service of love.
Concupiscence wants to have and use the other person. Possession
and satisfaction, not gift and union, are its concern. "In itself,
concupiscence is not capable of promoting union as the
communion of persons. By itself, it does not unite, but
appropriates. The relationship of the gift is changed into the
relationship of appropriation" (Theology of the Body, 127).

B) A More Comprehensive Moral Evaluation
Intercourse

of Conjugal

At this point in our study the need for a deeper moral appraisal
of conjugal sexuality is apparent. The hitherto prevalent
evaluation of conjugal intercourse-centered almost exclusively
on its procreative function and finality-is both dated and
deficient. Recent magisterial teaching has made it clear that the
evaluation must be made also in view of the unitive function of
the conjugal act, precisely bearing in mind that the two aspects,
procreative and unitive, are inseparable (cf. Humanae vitae 12).
A strong warrant for this broadened moral basis can be drawn
from the personalist emphasis-on the dignity of the person, on
the unity between body and soul and on the union between the
spouses-that is to be found in magisterial teaching over the past
forty years. This is noticeably present in Gaudium et spes,73
especially in the chapter it devotes to marriage. 74 The constitution
73

74

See GS 12, 23, 26, 28-29, 40-46.
GS 47-52.

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proposes a new and important principle governing the evaluation
of the conjugal act: "the acts in marriage by which the intimate
and chaste union of the spouses takes place are noble and
honorable; the performance of these acts in a truly human way
[modo vere humano] fosters the self-giving they signify." 75 The
insistence that the conjugal act must be carried out "in a truly
human way" raises the whole subject of conjugal intercourse
above any merely corporal-physiological analysis. Intercourse is
a physical corporal reality indeed; but depending on "the
humanity" with which it is (or is not) performed, it will truly
express, or may deny, the loving donation of the marital
relationship.
This phrase from Gaudium et spes has taken on new significance with the 1983 Code of Canon Law. These three words,
"modo vere humano," now qualify the juridical understanding of
the consummation of marriage. A marriage is considered
"consummated, if the spouses have in a human manner engaged
together in a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of
offspring, to which act marriage is by its nature ordered, and by
it the spouses become one flesh" (c. 1061, §1). The qualifying
phrase was not present in the corresponding canon of the 1917
Code (c. 1015, §1) and jurisprudence, in line with the general
teaching of moral theology, tended to limit consideration of what
constitutes "a conjugal act in itself apt for the generation of
offspring" to the simple physical completion of intercourse
through natural insemination. This is no longer adequate. The
addition of the phrase "in a human manner" seems to preclude
any consideration of the act limited exclusively to its physical
aspect. 76 The determination of the value of the phrase, for the
purposes of canonical jurisprudence, poses no small problems but,
GS 49.
It is clear that there is no consummation through a copula not carried out "humano
modo," as verified for instance in the case of contraceptive intercourse-where there is no
true unio camuum. It is not so clear to what degree or at what point insistence (short of
physical brute force) of one party overcoming the reluctance of the other to have intercourse
so "dehumanizes" the act that it can scarcely be considered any longer a physical expression
of marital union.
75

76

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515

independently of how canonists deal with these questions, it is
very suggestive from the anthropological and ascetical points of
view, dearly calling for an enriched understanding of the marital
copula. The major implication would be that intercourse is not
done "humano modo" just because it is open to procreation. The
human nature of the act also lies in its being an act of intimate
self-donation to, and of union with, one's spouse: a reconfirmation in the body of one's singular choice of him or her, a
reconfirmation that is humanly expressed not only in the giving
and receiving of pleasure but even more essentially in the care,
respect, tenderness, and reverence accompanying the physical act.
We could already ask whether, in the present state of human
nature, the sexual act tends spontaneously and easily to express all
of this. Most people would agree that it does not-at least not
easily. It can and should express it, but will only do so with an
effort because, so to speak, much of the humanity of the conjugal
act has been lost. It will be recovered only by those who
consciously exercise a control over the self-absorbed mood that
now tends to dominate it. But lest we anticipate conclusions that
should come later, let us continue with the implications of "modo
vere humano exerciti."
The phrase itself suggests the disjunction: while conjugal
intercourse can take place in a "truly human way" that gives it its
dignity as a means of expressing and fostering conjugal love, it can
also be performed in a way that, being less than truly human,
neither properly expresses nor fosters spousal love.
The conjugal act is a physical-corporeal action charged with
human significance which-it must be emphasized-derives from
its unitive as well as its procreative aspects, both in inseparable
connection. Anti-procreative measures destroy the unitive
function of the act, but it is also true that anti-unitive practices,
even if the procreative orientation is respected, undermine the
human significance of the act. A union effected in a mood of
grasping appropriation gives poor expression to the mutual loving
gift that should mark true conjugality; and the same is true of a
union motivated mainly by self-seeking. Here we are touching the

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particularly human dimensions of conjugal intercourse. And the
morality ("morality" here is as much as to say "the truly human
quality") of the act must consider the special moral dimension
that arises from the self-centeredness or the other-centeredness
lived by each of the spouses in conjugal intercourse.
Biology alone is not capable of furnishing the true moral and
human dimension of conjugal intercourse, since it cannot be
exclusively considered as a corporal act directed to biological
procreation. It is a human act of spousal union, not just of the
spouses' bodies but also of their very persons. The bodily act
should in every respect express the loving union of persons. As we
read in Familiaris Consortia:
Sexuality, by means of which man and woman give themselves to one another
through the acts which are proper and exclusive to spouses, is by no means
something purely biological, but concerns the innermost being of the human
person as such. It is realized in a truly human way only if it is an integral part of
the love by which a man and a woman commit themselves totally to one another
until death. The total physical self-giving would be a lie if it were not the sign
and fruit of a total personal self-giving. (PC 11)

The last sentence in this passage suggests the moral goal and
challenge before the spouses: that every aspect of their married
life should be marked by loving participation, by generous giving
and not by selfish taking.
1. What Makes the Conjugal Act Unitive

It is an extraordinary fact that right down to our days there has
been so little attempt to analyze and put in clear light what it is
that turns sexual intercourse into a unique expression of conjugal
love and self-giving. The formidable and widespread contraceptive
movement of the last century, with its pretense that the conjugal
act is fully and singularly expressive of marital love and union
even if its procreative orientation is artificially excluded, forced a
deeper anthropological analysis of why this is simply not so.
The procreative design of the conjugal act is evident and
undeniable. The contraceptive movement proposes various

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517

physical or chemical ways to cancel or negate this procreative
design, claiming at the same time that this can be done without in
any way rendering the act less expressive of the unique
relationship of the partners as husband and wife (i.e., less an act
of spousal union).
Elsewhere I have examined the inherent fallacy of this
contraceptive argument. 77 What makes intercourse between
spouses a unique expression of distinctive conjugal union is
precisely the sharing in their mutual complementary procreative
power. If the procreative orientation of the act is deliberately
frustrated through contraception, then it no longer unites the
spouses in any distinctively conjugal way. It is no longer the
conjugal act-the most distinctive physical expression of full
mutual surrender and permanent loving union. It is in fact no
longer a sexual act in any true human sense, for there is no actual
sexual intercourse or communication. The spouses refuse true
carnal converse with one another, each rather using the other's
body for pleasure. But a mere exchange together of pleasure
neither expresses nor achieves spousal union, for there is nothing
in that pleasure that draws a person out of his or her solitude and
draws each into a greater oneness with the other. This refusal of
union, this voluntary remaining in solitariness, tends inexorably
to the separation of the spouses. Contraception may be mutually
gratifying but is no way unifying, tending rather to shut each
spouse off in individual satisfaction. Hence it is not wholly
exaggerated to speak of it as a mutual experience of solitary sex. 78
2. Self-centeredness, the Enemy of Conjugal Love
Love moves outward toward the loved one; it seeks the good
of the beloved. It is donative and, although it naturally tends
toward union, the simple desire to possess or to take is not of the
nature of true love. Hence the difficulty for the self-centered
C. Burke, "The Inviolability of the Conjugal Act," in John F. Boyle, ed., Creative Love:
The Ethics of Human Reproduction (Front Royal, Va.: Christendom Press, 1989), 151-67.
78 George Bernard Shaw was being perhaps crude, but not flippant nor cynical, when he
commented that contraception amounts to "mutual masturbation."
77

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person (all of us, since the Fall) to learn to love, for she or he
must strive to make other-centeredness take priority over selfcenteredness.
To love another with all one's heart is difficult; it is not in fact
possible without a constant battle to purge one's actions and
motives, since some element of self-seeking tends to remain in the
best of our actions. This applies constantly in married life; it is in
the small details that love is shown, that it grows or dwindles. If
all aspects of conjugal relations need purification, this is also true
for the most intimate conjugal relationship of all.
If self-seeking predominates in sexual relations, then
intercourse, even marital intercourse, is not mainly an expression
of love. The natural satisfaction of the sexual urge is legitimate
within marriage, but even there it may carry with it a degree of
self-seeking that is contrary to love, hindering it rather than
expressing or increasing it. "Disinterested giving is excluded from
selfish enjoyment" (Theology of the Body, 130).
It is necessary to repeat that intercourse can and should be a
maximum human expression of total conjugal love and donation.
It ought to express full self-donation-more centered, ideally, on
what the other receives than on what one gets. But it can be an act
of mere selfish satisfaction. This has always been a main problem
to be faced by conjugal spirituality and the pursuit of perfection
.
.
m marriage.
Lust is one of the most radically self-centered appetites. As
such it impels toward a joining of bodies that in fact causes a
separation of persons, because those who are carried away by it in
their mutual relations are afterwards left more separated from one
another than before.
As a result of the Fall, says John Paul II, bodily sexuality
was suddenly felt and understood as an element of mutual confrontation of
persons ... as if the personal profile of masculinity and femininity, which before
had highlighted the meaning of the body for a full communion of persons, had
made way only for the sensation of sexuality with regard to the other human
being. It is as if sexuality became an obstacle in the personal relationship of man
and woman. (Theology of the Body, 118-19)

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We are brought back to those strong statements of the
Catechism that the original communion between man and woman
was distorted as a result of the Fall, and their mutual attraction
changed into "a relationship of domination and lust" (see pp. 5 078). Pope John Paul II did not hesitate to express the matter in an
even more startling manner. 79 Commenting the words of Jesus
about how adultery "in the heart" (see Matt 5:27-28) is committed by the one who looks lustfully (without any further
exterior action), he points out that this can apply to a man even
in relation to his own wife:
Adultery in the heart is committed not only because man looks in this way
[lustfully] at a woman who is not his wife, but precisely because he looks at a
woman in this way .... A man who looks in this way, uses the woman, her
femininity, to satisfy his own instinct. Although he does not do so with an
exterior act, he has already assumed this attitude deep down, inwardly deciding
in this way with regard to a given woman. This is what adultery committed in
the heart consists of. Man can commit this adultery in the heart also with regard
to his own wife, if he treats her only as an object to satisfy instinct. (Theology of
the Body, 157)

Is this an exaggerated statement? Does it show a pessimistic or
Manichean view of the married sexual relationship? Or is it a real
possibility to be taken into account? Can a man lust after his wife;
or vice-versa? If he or she can, is this a good or a bad thing for
married life? Or is it something to be looked on with
indifference?
Is a spouse not meant to be the object of a different and nobler
sort of desire than simple self-satisfaction? Should we be surprised
then at St. Thomas's opinion that "consentiens concupiscentiae in
uxorem" is guilty not of a mortal sin, but indeed of one that is
venial? 80 One can see this as Manichean if one wishes; yet one can
also see it as a challenge to love and virtue. To the extent that
intercourse is dominated by lust, it is far from virtue. It becomes
79 Countless examples could be cited of the strong reaction the pope's words provoked in
many quarters, revealing just how far our world is from appreciating the true challenges of
married love.
80 Aquinas, Super I Car., c. 7, lect. 1.

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truly virtuous in the measure in which it is a genuine expression
of self-giving.
Concupiscence, with its self-absorbed desire for physical
satisfaction, threatens the full authenticity of conjugal intercourse
intended to be an expression of love-union. Concupiscence has
brought about
a violation, a fundamental loss, of the original community-communion of
persons. The latter should have made man and woman mutually happy by the
pursuit of a simple and pure union in humanity, by a reciprocal offering of
themselves .... After breaking the original covenant with God, the man and the
woman found themselves more divided. Instead of being united, they were even
opposed because of their masculinity and femininity .... [They] are no longer
called only to union and unity, but are also threatened by the insatiability of that
union and unity. (Theology of the Body, 120).

The presence of lust or concupiscence within marriage itself is
undeniable. At this stage in our study, far from being able to
confirm that marriage offers a remedy for concupiscence, we
realize that lust, inasmuch as it introduces an anti-love element
into the sexual relationship, poses a threat to marriage and
particularly to married love itself. How then, within a truly
Christian understanding of marriage as a call of love and as a
vocation to sanctity, should married persons treat the presence of
concupiscence?
3. Abstinence?
Till the present day, spouses who really sought to live their
conjugal relationship as God wished, to sanctify themselves in and
through their marriage, received little orientation from the
teaching of the Church, aside from the idea that a certain
abstinence is a recommendable means not just of family planning
but of positive growth in married sanctity. 81 Abstinence in this
81 Abstaining from or renouncing secular activities and the satisfactions or pleasures that
may derive from them has been central to religious life since its inception. While the roots of
this religious spirituality go back to Jesus' invitation to the rich young man (Matt 19:21), it
is debatable whether it has offered the necessary inspiration and dynamism to guide lay people
in general and married people in particular to the full goal of Christian life. It is true that Jesus

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view often seemed to be presented as the ideal, or at least as the
main means to union with God and the sanctification of one's life.
One senses here (and this is the heart of the problem) a continuing
underlying presumption that marital intercourse is something so
"anti-spiritual" that spouses would do better and grow more in
love for God by abstaining from it than by engaging in it. This
presumption should be firmly resisted.
If marriage is in itself a divine way of holiness, then all of its
natural elements, including of course intimate conjugal relations,
are a matter of sanctification. Certainly (as we will see below)
these relations must be marked by temperance; yet total
abstinence from such relations cannot be proposed as an ideal or
ascetical goal for married people. 82 Total abstinence as a means to
counter the problem of lust is not a practical proposal for married
people, and yet lust has to be countered.
III. MARRIED LOVE AND MARRIED CHASTITY

A) Rediscovering Conjugal Love as It Was 'In the Beginning'
The constant reference point for married life and vocation that
Pope John Paul H presented throughout his 1979-84 weekly
catechesis was "marriage constituted in the beginning, in the state
of original innocence, in the context of the sacrament of creation"
(Theology of the Body, 338), called to be a "visible sign of God's
creative love" (ibid., 379). That original human state was marked
by a perfect harmony, within each one, of body and spirit. 83
said "whoever of you does not renounce all that he has cannot be my disciple" (Luke 14:33),
yet it is also dear that celibacy, whether in religious life or otherwise, is not the only Christian
way and indeed that, despite St. Paul's wish ("I wish that all were as I myself am"), God is not
calling everyone to be celibate. Pope John Paul II recalls how Paul himself acknowledges that
each one "has his own special gift from God."
82 There are various reasons why abstinence may enter periodically into conjugal life, but
it would seem fundamentally flawed to propose abstinence as an ideal, or as a condition for
holiness, in those called to Christian marriage. Saint Paul's suggestion to spouses to abstain
"for a time" (1 Cor 7:5) cannot be broadened into a general norm.
83 Interpersonal harmony, between spirit and spirit, was not a necessary part of that state.
Man and woman had freely to create that harmony between themselves, and each one with
God. How in their first test they failed to do so, and then had to seek to restore it, forms the

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The Creator endowed the body with an objective harmony ... [which]
corresponded to a similar harmony within man, the harmony of the heart. This
harmony, that is precisely purity of heart, enabled man and woman in the state
of original innocence to experience simply (and in a way that originally made
them both happy) the uniting power of their bodies, which was, so to speak, the
unsuspected substratum of their personal union or communio personarum. (Ibid.,
204).

That original harmony was short-lived, however; man sinned
and it was broken. With the sin of Adam and Eve concupiscence
made its appearance. It became present in their marriage
is present in every subsequent marriage), posing a threat to
love and happiness.
"Theology of the Body" catechesis, John Paul II made a
lengthy examination of the discordant presence of lust in spousal
relations (ibid., 111-68). Its fundamental effect is a loss or a
limitation of the full freedom of love.
Concupiscence entails the loss of the interior freedom of the gift. The nuptial
meaning of the human body is connected precisely with this freedom. Man can
become a gift-that is, the man and the woman can exist in the relationship of
mutual self-giving-if each of them controls himself. Manifested as a "coercion
sui generis of the body," concupiscence reduces self-control and places an interior
limit on it. For that reason, it makes the interior freedom of giving in a certain
sense impossible. Together with that, the beauty that the human body possesses
in its male and female aspect, as an expression of the spirit, is obscured. The
body remains as an object of lust and, therefore, as a "field of appropriation" of
the other human being. In itself, concupiscence is not capable of promoting
union as the communion of persons. By itself, it does not unite, but appropriates.
The relationship of the gift is changed into the relationship of appropriation.
(Ibid., 127).

Insatiable desire, 84 appropriation instead of communion, taking
instead of giving, possessive self-love overshadowing donative
love of the other, etc.: all of these are major disruptions that
concupiscence now inflicts on the lost harmony of the sexual
relationship.

background to the whole human drama and to our present study.
84 See John Paul II, Theology of the Body, 122-23.

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523

Is it possible for men and women to return to that original
harmony and respect, or are they lost for ever? They are not
irreparably lost, for they can be recovered in hope and struggle.
In the human person there always remains, however
unconsciously, a longing for the respect inherent in a pure love,
in part because of what John Paul II terms "the continuity and
unity between the hereditary state of man's sin and his original
innocence" which remains a key to "the redemption of the body"
(ibid., 34-35). However, the recovery and maintenance of what
can be repossessed of that original harmony is possible only
through constant effort and with the help of prayer and grace.
A particularly striking part of John Paul H's analysis is the place
he gives to sexual shame in the work of recovering that harmony.
He places shame among the "fundamental anthropological
experiences," 85 but over and beyond mere anthropology, it is for
him a mysterious fact, a sort of due or pointer to the reestablishment (however tentative) of that enviable and joyous
sexual harmony and peace.
In the present human condition, a certain instinct of shame acts
as a guarantor of the mutual respect that is a sine qua non
condition of true love between the sexes. The deeper and truer
the love between a man and a woman, and especially between
husband and wife, the more they will be prompted to pay heed to
shame, and to seek to understand it and to respond adequately to
it. The consequence is a naturally modest behavior between
them-a modesty that has its place even in the relationship of
husband and wife.
In this sense each married couple should turn to the Bible
seeking the lessons of the divine narrative: not just imagining how
the relationship of Adam and Eve must have been before the Fall,
but learning from their reactions afterwards-reactions that show
a desire to preserve, in new and troublesome circumstances, the
purity of that original attraction which they alone had
experienced and which they could still recall.
85 " ••• contemporary
anthropology, which likes to refer to so-called fundamental
experiences, such as the 'experience of shame'" (John Paul II, Theology of the Body, 52).

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Before the Fall, Adam and Eve were naked and not ashamed.
As John Paul II puts it, "the man of original innocence, male and
female, did not even feel that discord in the body. " 86 After the Fall
is when shame appeared as a response to lust, as a sort of
protection against the threat that lust now offered to the simple
joy and appreciation they had experienced in each other's
sexuality "in the beginning." The importance of this sense of
shame is powerfully brought out in the papal catechesis.
On the one hand,
if the man and the woman cease to be a disinterested gift for each other, as they
were in the mystery of creation, then they recognize that "they are naked" (cf.
Gn 3 ). Then the shame of that nakedness, which they had not felt in the state of
original innocence, will spring up in their hearts .... Only the nakedness that
makes woman an object for man, or vice versa, is a source of shame. The fact
that they were not ashamed means that the woman was not an "object" for the
man nor he for her. (Ibid., 74-75)
In the light of the biblical narrative, sexual shame has its deep meaning. It is
connected with the failure to satisfy the aspiration to realize in the conjugal
union of the body the mutual communion of persons. (Ibid., 121)

The reaction of shame before the other, even of wife before
husband or vice-versa, betrays an awareness that the urge to
bodily intercourse is not of the same human quality as the desire
for the communion of persons, and cannot give this desire full
effect.
On the other, while shame
reveals the moment of lust, at the same time it can protect from [its]
consequences .... It can even be said that man and woman, through shame,
almost remain in the state of original innocence. They continually become aware
of the nuptial meaning of the body and aim at preserving it from lust. (Ibid.,
122)

The desire to preserve respect for the loved one is inherent in
every genuine love. So, in John Paul II's analysis, the sense of
86 Ibid., 204. John Paul II is at one with Augustine's analysis of the situation. Original
nakedness provoked no untoward desire and hence no shame in Adam and Eve, "not because
they could not see, but because they felt nothing in their members to make them ashamed of
what they saw" (De nupt. et cone. 1.5.6).

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525

shame becomes not only a guardian of mutual respect between
husband and wife, but also a starting point for the recreation of
a new spousal harmony between body and soul, between desire
and respect, achieved on the basis of united purpose aided by
prayer and grace. The pope does not suggest that this "recreation"
is in any way easy; it obviously is not. But his message for married
people is that it should be attempted. Their mutual love should
reveal the need, and the sacramental graces of their marriage
along with their personal prayer are powerful means they have to
achieve it.

B) The Purification of Conjugal Love from Excessive Sensuality
In contrast to the effects of concupiscence, chastity and a right
sense of shame protect and preserve the "freedom of the gift"
proper to conjugal intercourse. John Paul II insists that this
interior freedom of the gift "of its nature is explicitly spiritual and
depends on a person's interior maturity. This freedom
presupposes such a capacity of directing one's sensual and emotive
reactions as to make self-donation to the other possible, on the
basis of mature self-possession. " 87
This is the proper sense of chastity in marriage: the redirecting
and the refinement of sensual appetite so that it is at the service
of love and expresses it, and the refusal to take advantage of the
married relationship just for egoistic satisfaction. In a real sense,
the task facing married couples is purification of sensual appetite,
so that its satisfaction is sought not mainly for concupiscent selfcenteredness but as an accompaniment to the donation of self that
must underlie every true conjugal union. One can say that this
task engages them in a constant humanizing of their marital love,
facilitating the growth of mutual appreciation of each other as
persons. 88
87 John Paul II, Theology of the Body, 414; cf. 75, 120-22, 127, 349,, etc. Augustine
emphasizes that the desires of concupiscence must be resisted; otherwise they dominate us:
"Est ergo in nobis peccati concupiscentia, quae non est permittenda regnare; sunt eius
desideria, quibus non est oboediendum, ne oboedientibus regnet" (De continentia, 8).
88 See John Paul II, Theology of the Body, 151-52, for the "depersonalizing" effect of
concupiscence.

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True conjugal love is evidently characterized more by caring
for and giving to the other than by wanting and taking for oneself.
This is the classical distinction between amor amicitiae and amor
concupiscentiae. Where the love of concupiscence dominates, the
lover has not really come out of himself or overcome selfcenteredness, and so gives himself at most only in part: "in the
love of concupiscence, the lover, in wanting the good he desires,
properly speaking loves himself. " 89 The dominance of pleasureseeking in marital intercourse means that there is too much taking
of the body and not enough giving to the person; and to the
extent of that imbalance the true conjugal communion of persons
is not realized.
In an age like ours, the difference between lust, sexual desire,
and conjugal love has become progressively obscured. If, in
consequence, many married couples do not understood or
recognize the dangers of concupiscence, and so do not endeavor
to contain or purify it, it can dominate their relationship,
undermining mutual respect and their very capacity to see
marriage essentially as giving and not just as possessing and
enjoying, much less as appropriating and exploiting.
So we return to St. Augustine's invitation to married couples
to purge their good marital intercourse of the evil that tends to
accompany it: that evil which is not the pleasure of conjugal union
but excessive and self-centered absorption with that pleasure. This
is an unescapable task facing all married couples who in some way
wish to restore the loving harmony of a spousal relationship filled
with growing appreciation and respect. We spoke above of how
abstinence or renunciation, as a governing principle of religious
life, was often presented to married couples wishing to grow
spiritually, with the implicit or explicit invitation to apply it to
their conjugal intercourse. We must add here that while
renunciation is certainly a main gospel theme, it is not the only or
even the dominant one. Purification, above all of one's inner
intention and heart, is even more fundamental to the achievement
of the ultimate Christian goal: "Blessed are the pure in heart, for
89

Aquinas, STh I-II, q. 27, a. 3.

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52 7

they shall see God" (Matt 5: 8); "we know that when he appears
we shall be like him, for we shall see him as he is. And every one
who thus hopes in him purifies himself as he is pure" (1John3:23). These verses are of universal application.
This work of purification faces married people in all the
aspects of their lives. It is a particular challenge to them with
regard to their intimate conjugal relations. To purify conjugal
intercourse of the self-absorption that so easily invades it must be
a major concern and point of struggle for spouses who wish their
marriage to be marked by growing love and so also to become a
way of sanctity. 90
Marital intercourse is purified when the urge for selfsatisfaction plays a lesser part in it, intercourse being rather
sought, lived, and felt as participation and particularly as othercentered donative love. Possession and pleasure will then be the
consequence of generous self-giving. As John Paul U says,
a noble gratification, for example, is one thing, while sexual desire is another.
When sexual desire is linked with a noble gratification, it differs from desire pure
and simple .... It is precisely at the price of self-control that man reaches that
deeper and more mature spontaneity with which his heart, mastering his
instincts, rediscovers the spiritual beauty of the sign constituted by the human
body in its masculinity and femininity. (Theology of the Body, 173)

One could note in passing that if pleasure is received with
gratitude-to God, to one's spouse-this is already a positive and
significant step towards purifying it of self-centeredness, for
gratitude is always a coming out of self and an affirmation of the
other. On the other hand, if the seeking of pleasure is mainly selfcentered, it may give momentary satisfaction but not real peace,
the peace that arises from the experience of true donative union.
We may recall here how St. Thomas, invoking Galatians 5:17,
explains that a lack of interior peace is often due to an unresolved
conflict between what one's sense appetite wants and what one's
mind wants (STh II-II, q. 29, a. 1).
90 This certainly implies a restraint, but it is a restraint that should be an expression of love
and consideration, just as when husband or wife restrains his or her temper out of
consideration for the other.

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The goal then, as indicated above, is that spouses humanize
their intimate relations, rather than abstain from them. This is the
work of purification proposed to them; this has to be the tone of
married chastity. 91
Sound Christian thinking has always been aware of the selfabsorbing force of the urge to physical sexual satisfaction. The
constant moral principle that to seek this satisfaction outside
marriage is grievously wrong derives in part from the fact that his
urge is so deeply egoistic. But there has been no parallel
consideration of the possible effect on married life itself of this
self-engrossed power. Moral theology has tended to ignore this
question which is today resurfacing as a major issue facing
theological and pastoral reflection. Simply to find reasons that
"justify" marital sexual intercourse is an approach of the past.
Also dated is the approach that would overstress the idea of
abstention from intercourse as a key to spiritual growth in
marriage. What has to be put to spouses is the need to purify their
intercourse, so that they may more and more find in it the
unmixed character of loving personal gift-acceptance which it
would have had in Eden.
Sensitive married couples who sincerely love each other are
readily aware of this self-absorbed drive which takes from the
perfection of their physical conjugal union. They sense the need
to temper or purify the force drawing them together, so that they
can be united in true mutual giving-not mere simultaneous
91 "In earthly life, the dominion of the spirit over the body--and the simultaneous
subordination of the body to the spirit--can, as the result of persevering work on themselves,
express a personality that is spiritually mature" Gohn Paul II, Theologyof the Body, 241). This
implies not a one-sided victory of the spirit over the body, but a perfect harmony between the
two; so it "does not signify any disincarnation of the body nor, consequently, a
dehumanization of man. On the contrary, it signifies his perfect realization. In fact, in the
composite, psychosomatic being which man is, perfection cannot consist in a mutual
opposition of spirit and body. But it consists in a deep harmony between them, in
safe-guarding the primacy of the spirit" (ibid.). John Paul II, applying the Pauline phrase about
"discord in the body" (1 Cor 12:25) to the phenomenon of bodily shame resulting from
original sin, insists on how a "transformation of this state" can be achieved "to the point of
gradual victory over that discord in the body. This victory can and must take place in man's
heart. This is the way to purity, that is, 'to control one's own body in holiness and honor"'
(ibid., 204-5).

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taking. Their heart calls for this; insofar as they are mainly
yielding to lust, a sense of cheating and of being cheated will
always remain. John Paul II reads this situation well: "I would say
that lust is a deception of the human heart in the perennial call of
man and woman to communion by means of mutual giving"
(Theology of the Body, 148).
It is their very sensitivity to love that makes them troubled by
this disorder they would like to remedy; but they have seldom
been guided as to how to achieve this, or as to why the endeavor
and effort to do so is an integral part of their married calling to
keep growing in love and so, ultimately, to attain sanctity. 92
C) Chastity Gives Freedom to Conjugal Love
In our present condition, concupiscence (or the over-absorbing
desires of the flesh) ranges itself easily against the "spirit," which
also means against love and the desires of love. This is the case
before marriage, and remains so in marriage. Scripture insists on
this, and so it is a truth that every Christian needs to ponder. At
the start of our study we noted how the Catechism of the Catholic
Church (2525) identifies concupiscence with the caro adversus
spiritum of the Letter to the Galatians: "the desires of the flesh
are against the spirit, and the desires of the spirit are against the
flesh" (Gal 5: 17). Pope John Paul II opens part 2 of his Theology
of the Body with detailed consideration of this Pauline passage.
According to the pope, Paul refers here to
the tension existing within man, precisely in his heart ... [which] presupposes
that disposition of forces formed in man with original sin, in which every
historical man participates. In this disposition, formed within man, the body
opposes the spirit and easily prevails over it. (Theology of the Body, 191)

If we let the body prevail in this battle, we lose our freedom and
hence our very ability to love, for freedom is not true freedom
92 Pope John Paul has provided this clear and positive guidance-albeit
in a dense
catechesis whose very length may make it appear inaccessible to the ordinary reader. The
"popularizing" of his teaching, in a form accessible to married couples and those preparing
for marriage, is a pastoral task of immense importance.

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unless it is at the service of love (cf. ibid., 197), Only so, by using
freedom truly and well (and guarding against its false use), can the
battle against concupiscence be gradually won, Only so can we
fulfill our vocation to love in all freedom-in that freedom for
which Christ has set us free.
To understand the vocation to freedom in this way ("You were called to
freedom, brethren" -Gal 5: 13 ), means giving a form to the ethos in which life
"according to the Spirit" is realized. The danger of wrongly understanding
freedom also exists. Paul clearly points this out, writing in the same context:
"Only do not use your freedom as an opportunity for the flesh, but through love
be servants of one another" (Gal 5: 13 ). In other words, Paul warns us of the
possibility of making a bad use of freedom. Such a use is in opposition to the
liberation of the human spirit carried out by Christ and contradicts that freedom
with which "Christ set us free." ... The antithesis and, in a way, the negation of
this use of freedom takes place when it becomes a pretext to live according to the
flesh. Freedom then ... becomes "an opportunity for the flesh," a source (or
instrument) of a specific yoke on the part of pride of life, the lust of the eyes, and
the lust of the flesh. Anyone who lives in this way according to the flesh, that is,
submits ... to the three forms of lust, especially to the lust of the flesh, ceases
to be capable of that freedom for which "Christ set us free." He also ceases to be
suitable for the real gift of himself, which is the fruit and expression of this
freedom. Moreover, he ceases to be capable of that gift which is organically
connected with the nuptial meaning of the human body (Theology of the Body,
197-98)

John Paul H's warning here about "good" and "bad" uses of
freedom brings back to mind St. Augustine's distinction regarding
the use of the body, In one of his sermons, Augustine too invokes
Galatians 5: 17 in particular relation to chastity:
Listen well to these words, all you faithful who are fighting. I speak to those who
struggle, Only those who struggle will understand the truth of what I say. I will
not be understood by whoever does not struggle, . . . What does the chaste
person wish? That no force should arise in his body resisting chastity. He would
like to experience peace, but does not have it yet. 93

Augustine's words are directed to the married as much as to
the unmarried. Both, he is convinced, will understand the truth he
expresses if they are prepared to fight the constant warfare of
93

Augustine, Serrno 128.

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53 l

Christian life. The Church has not changed her doctrine about
this fight.
[A] monumental struggle against the powers of darkness pervades the whole
history of man. The battle was joined from the very origins of the world and will
continue until the last day, as the Lord has attested. Caught in this conflict, man
is obliged to wrestle constantly if he is to cling to what is good, nor can he
achieve his own integrity without great efforts and the help of God's grace.
(Gaudium et spes 37)

D) The "Remedy" of Concupiscence: Chastity
"The problem for [sexual] ethics is how to use sex without
treating the person as an object for use. " 94 A perceptive
observation which brings a properly human focus to bear on the
question of the pleasure of marital intercourse. Pleasure should
not be sought just for its own sake, since self-seeking (and "otherusing") will then tend to dominate. But pleasure can and should
come, as an important concomitant of the union achieved. This in
the truest sense is what is implied in the remedying of
concupiscence. It is a challenge to love and a work of chastity. 95
Earlier we quoted St. Thomas (IV Sent., d. 26, q. 2, a. 3, ad 4) on
how grace is given in marriage as a remedy against concupiscence,
so as to curb it in its root (i.e., in its self-absorbed tendency), and
I have suggested elsewhere that one of the main graces bestowed
by the sacrament of matrimony, as a "permanent" sacrament, is
that of marital chastity in this precise sense. 96
The goal cannot be not to feel pleasure or not to be drawn by
it (both pertain to the instinct of conjugality), but not to be
dominated by its quest (which is the very instinct of lust). Saint
Augustine points out the alternatives: "whoever does not want to
serve lust must necessarily fight against it; whoever neglects to
94 Karol Wojtyla, Love and Responsibility, trans. H. T. Willetts (San Francisco, Ignatius
Press, 1993), 60.
95 Concupiscence is an effect of original sin. What stems from sin can only be remedied by
virtue. So it is not marriage itself but marital chastity that remedies concupiscence.
96 C. Burke, "Marriage as a Sacrament of Sanctification," Annales Theologici 9 (1995): 8586.

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fight it must necessarily serve it. One of these alternatives is
burdensome but praiseworthy, the other is debasing and
miserable. " 97
Marital intercourse is indeed a unique way of giving physical
expression to married love, but it is not the only way. There are
moments in married life (sickness, for instance, or periods just
before and after childbirth) when love will not seek intercourse
but still express itself in many other ways, even on the physical
level. It is commonplace among marriage counselors and
psychologists to assign as much or even more importance to these
"lesser" physical expressions of affection and love as to the
frequency of marital intercourse itself. John Paul II does not pass
over this point. With finely drawn distinctions, he differentiates
"sexual excitement" from "sexual emotion" in man-woman
relationships, and comments:
Excitement seeks above all to be expressed in the form of sensual and corporeal
pleasure. That is, it tends toward the conjugal act. . . . On the other hand,
emotion ... even if in its emotive content it is conditioned by the femininity or
masculinity of the "other," does not per se tend toward the conjugal act. But it
limits itself to other manifestations of affection, which express the spousal
meaning of the body, and which nevertheless do not include its (potentially)
procreative meaning. (Theology of the Body, 413)

Men and women, married or single, who wish to grow in
mutual love cannot adapt themselves passively to the prevalent
modern lifestyle which, especially as reflected in the media, is
permeated with "sexual excitement" and forms a constant
stimulus to it. Purity of heart, sight, and thought is essential if
they are to keep sexual excitement within limits where it is at the
service of sexual emotion and of genuine intersexual love. Their
own intimate consciousness of the real nature of love will be the
best incentive to help them keep firmly clear of all those external
stimuli which necessarily subject a person more and more to the
absorbing power of lust, and so lessen his or her capacity for a
true, freely given, and faithful love.
97 Augustine, Contra ]ulianum

5.62.

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE "REMEDIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE"

533

E) Chastity Is for the Strong; As Is Growth in Love
Among the deceptions of marriage is the experience that what
should so uniquely unite can separate; it can be filled with
tensions and disappointment rather than harmony and peace. The
tensions come from the divisive force of concupiscence which can
only be overcome and purified through a love that is truly
donative rather than possessive. "It is often thought that
continence causes inner tensions which man must free himself
from. [But rather] continence, understood integrally, is the only
way to free man from such tensions" (Theology of the Body, 411).
In fact, the chastity proper to marriage unites, reduces tensions,
increases respect, and deepens spousal love, so leading this love to
its human perfection and preparing the spouses themselves for a
love that is infinite and eternal. "The way to attain this goal,"
Pope Benedict XVI insists, "is not simply by submitting to instinct.
Purification and growth in maturity are called for; and these also
pass through the path of renunciation. Far from rejecting or
'poisoning' eros, they heal it and restore its true grandeur" (Deus
caritas est 5).
"True conjugal love ... is also a difficult love" (Theology of
the Body, 290). Of course: love of another is always a battle
against self-love. That division of the heart between self and
spouse must be overcome: conjugal love gives unity to each heart
and unites the two hearts in one love. Carnal concupiscence is not
the only expression of self-love, but, since it so pervasively affects
the most significant bodily expression of conjugal love, its
tendency to dominate must be specially resisted. If it is not, love
may not survive this battle.
The heart has become a battlefield between love and lust. The more lust
dominates the heart, the less the heart experiences the nuptial meaning of the
body. It becomes less sensitive to the gift of the person, which expresses that
meaning in the mutual relations of man and woman. (Ibid., 126)

The need for this battle, John Paul II insists, will be evident to
those who reflect on the nature of conjugal-corporal love itself,

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CORMAC BURKE

who sincerely face up to the dangers it is subject to, and who wish
to do whatever is necessary to ensure its protection and growth.
Purity ... tends to reveal and strengthen the nuptial meaning of the body in its
integral truth. This truth must be known interiorly. In a way, it must be felt with
the heart, in order that the mutual relations of man and of woman-even mere
looks-may reacquire that authentically nuptial content of their meanings. (Ibid.,
213)

John Paul II is sure of the fundamental optimism and attraction
of the understanding of married sexuality he outlines. His
anthropological analysis becomes moral teaching that is imbued
with human appeal.
Does not man feel, at the same time as lust, a deep need to preserve the dignity
of the mutual relations, which find their expression in the body, thanks to his
masculinity and femininity? Does he not feel the need to impregnate them with
everything that is noble and beautiful? Does he not feel the need to confer on
them the supreme value which is love? (Ibid., 167-68)

And yet, however humanly true and appealing the pope's
analysis is, it is completely inserted into the Christian framework
of Redemption. Love inspires generosity and sacrifice, but if these
remain at the purely human level they are not enough. The help
of God, obtained especially through the sacraments and fervent
prayer, is necessary to attain that conjugal chastity and mutual
loving respect without which the best aspirations of love may fail.
To illustrate this, John Paul II has recourse to two of the more
"romantic" writings of the Old Testament, the Song of Songs and
the Book of Tobit. He sees the well-known verse of the former,
"fortis est ut mors dilectio" ("love is as strong as death," or "as
stern as death" [Cant 8:6]), as perhaps over-idealized in the
Canticle but expressed at the true level of spousal love and of
humble human experience in Tobit.
It is the concupiscent approach that destroyed the previous
marriages of Sarah. Tobiah is well aware of this and leads Sarah
to understand how prayer brings strength to pure love so as to
enable it overcome the deadening power of concupiscence.

A POSTSCRIPT TO THE "REMEDIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE"

535

From the very first moment Tobiah's love had to face the test of life and death.
The words about love "stern as death," spoken by the spouses in the Song of
Songs in the transport of the heart, assume here the nature of a real test. If love
is demonstrated as stern as death, this happens above all in the sense that Tobiah
and, together with him, Sarah, unhesitatingly face this test. But in this test of life
and death, life wins because, during the test on the wedding night, love,
supported by prayer, is revealed as more stern than death"; their love "is
victorious because it prays." (Ibid., 376)

Those who love readily understand the human value and
attraction of pure, chaste, and disinterested love. But to feel the
human attraction is not enough. In the Christian view, chastity
remains a gift of God, one that is only achieved through prayer.
"Since I knew I could not otherwise be continent unless God
granted it to me (and this too was a point of wisdom, to know
whose the gift is), I went to the Lord and besought him" (Wis
8:21). 98 Opening his work on continence or chastity, Augustine
insists that this virtue is a gift of God for both the single and the
married: "Dei don um est. "99 He stresses the same idea elsewhere
with special reference to marriage: "The very fact that conjugal
chastity has such power, shows that it is a great gift of God." 100
CONCLUSION

We have studied the establishment and prevalence over many
centuries of the notion that marriage is ordered to the "remedy of
concupiscence." The practical effect of this, in our view, has been
to create a certain idea that marriage "legitimizes" concupiscence,
an idea which, if further analyzed, amounts to saying that
"marriage legitimizes disorderedsexuality."
I believe that Christian life has suffered from those
longstanding and widely held views which have regarded
concupiscence not as a force to be resisted (and purified) in
marriage, but as simply legitimized by marriage itself where, in
98 "ut scivi quoniam aliter non possum esse continens nisi Deus det, et hoc ipsum erat
sapientiae scire cuius esset hoc donum, adii Dominum et deprecatus sum ilium."
99 Augustine, De continentia l.
100 Augustine, Contra Julianum 3.43.

536

CORMAC BURKE

consequence, it can be given free rein. The understanding of
marriage as an outlet for concupiscence is, I claim, what seems to
be implied in the simple phrase remedium concupiscentiae, and
what has in fact been the well-nigh universal interpretation given
to the term.
From the standpoint of pastoral theology, I have endeavored
to show that the longstanding use of this term has propagated a
narrow and impoverished view of marriage which has consistently
ignored the consideration of matrimony as a sacrament of
sanctification. If so, then the disappearance of the term should
further facilitate the renewed theological, ascetical, and vocational
understanding of marriage which has been emerging in the last
three quarters of a century, and which the current magisterium
has so insistently fostered.
In this renewed understanding, rather than being a "remedy"
or even as an outlet for concupiscence, marriage should be seen
and presented as a call to a particular growth in love-in an
effort, with the help of grace, to recapture the purity and chaste
self-donation of the original human sexual-conjugal condition.
A balanced Christian vision will avoid both naive optimism and
radical pessimism about human nature. It will always see man as
a sick creature made for a divine destiny. This balanced view is
needed also because the pathologies of human nature can only be
properly evaluated by those who both face up to the reality of sin
and, being convinced of the goodness of creation and the nature
of original health, know the means and effectiveness of the
Redemption worked by Christ-which enables us, despite our
ailments, to achieve something much greater still than the fullness
of that original health.

The Thomist 70 (2006): 537-75

THOMAS SUTTON ON
UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY
MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.
Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.

HOMAS SUTTON, O.P., was one of the most forceful and
perceptive proponents of key theological and philosophical
doctrines of St. Thomas Aquinas in the dosing decades of
the thirteenth and opening decades of the fourteenth century. 1
Gilson wrote that he "maintained the doctrine of Thomas Aquinas
against two successive generations of opponents: (1) the representatives of the late thirteenth century Augustinism ... (2) the
new theology of John Duns Scotus." 2 Francis Kelley and Gyula
Klima have examined Thomas Sutton's defense of various of
Aquinas's teachings against the criticism of Henry of Ghent, a
representative of the first generation of opponents to the Angelic
1 For Thomas Sutton's life (ca. 1250-ca. 1315) and works, see D. E. Sharpe, "Thomas of
Sutton, O.P., His Place in Scholasticism and an Account of His Psychology," Revue
neoscolastique de philosophie 36 (1934): 332-54; idem, "Thomas of Sutton," Revue neoscolastique de philosophie 37 (1934): 88-104, 219-33; this second article of Sharpe deals with
Sutton's views on certain metaphysical doctrines, angelology, and natural theology. W. A.
Hinnebusch, The Early English Friars Preachers (Rome: Ad S. Sabinae, 1951), 396-410;
Frederick J. Roensch, Early Thomistic School (Dubuque, Iowa: Priory Press, 1964), 44-51;
Johannes Schneider, "Einleitung," in Thomas Sutton, Quaestiones Ordinariae, ed. Johannes
Schneider (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), 15"'-267";
Gyula Klima, "Thomas of Sutton," in A Companion to Philosophy in the Middle Ages, ed.
Jorge J.E. Gracia and Timothy B. Noone (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2003), 664-65; W.
Senko, "Trzy studia nad spu8cizrn1i pogh1dami Tomasza Suttona dotyczqcymi pro bl emu istoty
i istnienia," Studia Mediewistyczne 11(1970):111-52.
2 Etienne Gilson, History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random
House, 1955), 738; Hinnebusch, English Friars, 397-400, 409-10. See also Roensch,
Thomistic School, 47.

537

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Doctor. 3 In this article, I explore Sutton's defense of a key
doctrine of Aquinas, the analogical concept of being, against the
second generation of opponents, specifically Duns Scotus's
innovative doctrine of the univocity of the concept of being.
In his defense of his fellow Dominican, Sutton also treats the
problem of the divine names, such as 'wisdom' and 'goodness',
stoutly maintaining that they are predicated of God and creatures
analogically, not univocally. But which of the various types of
analogy is Sutton defending? 4 We know that the complexities of
analogy and its use in a number of contexts stimulated Aquinas to
rethink and deepen his theory during his career. While discussing
the problem of the divine names, Aquinas in his early works used
a form of the analogy of attribution, while in De Veritate (125659) he argues for another type of analogy, that of proportionality.
Finally in his later works, such as De potentia and the Summa
Theologiae, he quietly abandons the views of De Veritate and
returns in the main to his earlier opinion. 5 It is no surprise, then,
that those who have studied the texts of Thomas Sutton dealing
with this issue have also found a complex and articulated
teaching. Hence, I examine not only the main reasons and arguments that Sutton brings forward against Scotus's univocal
concept of being, but also Sutton's use of various types of analogy
3 Gyula Klima, "Thomas of Sutton on the Nature of the Intellective Soul and the Thomistic
Theory of Being," in Nach der Verurteilung von 1277: Philosophie und Theologie an der
Universitiit von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. ]ahrhunderts, Miscellanea Mediaevalia 28, ed.
J. Aersten, K. Emery, and A. Speer (Berlin and New York: Walter de Gruyter, 2001), 436-55;
Francis E. Kelley, "Two Early English Thomists: Thomas of Sutton and Robert Orford vs.
Henry of Ghent," The Thomist 45 Ouly 1981): 345-89. Kelley takes up three problems: the
relation of the faculties of the intellect and will to the soul, the possibility of creation of matter
without form, and the distinction between essence and existence in the creature. For Sutton
as author of the completion of two commentaries of Aquinas, see Osmund Lewry, "Two
Continuators of Aquinas: Robertus de Vulgarbia and Thomas Sutton on the 'Perihermeneias'
of Aristotle," Mediaeval Studies 43 (1981): 58-130; and Thomas of Sutton, Expositionis d.
Thomae Aquinatis in libros Aristotelis de generatione et corruptione continuatio per Thomam
de Sutona, ed. F. E. Kelley (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften,
1976).
4 See Schneider, "Einleitung," 241 *-265*.
5 John F. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite Being to
Uncreated Being, Monographs of the Society for Medieval and Renaissance Philosophy
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 543-72.

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

539

in different contexts and how his teaching differs from that of his
Dominican confrere.
To understand Sutton's position, it is necessary to recall that
the Scholastics had two distinct contexts for their discussions of
whether the term 'being' is said univocally, equivocally or
analogically: a philosophical context (i.e., that of the Aristotelian
ten categories), and a theological context concerning language
about God and creatures. In the first, they asked how the term
'being' is predicated of substance and accidents, while in the
second they asked how it is predicated of God and creatures.
Following Cornelio Fabro and others, I refer to these two
contexts as 'predicamental' (or horizontal) and 'transcendental'
(or vertical). 6 It was, of course, in the transcendental context that
they also inquired about the divine names.
Thomas Sutton debated these problems in his Ordinary
Questions, 32, 32A, 33, and 34, 7 and in a short question directed
against Robert Cowton. 8 The editor of the Ordinary Questions,
6 Cornelio Fabro, Participation et causalite selon S. Thomas d'Aquin (Louvain: Publications
Universitaires de Louvain; Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1961), 510-13, 523. This
terminology was adopted in the insightful and influential study, Bernard Montagnes, La
doctrine de l'analogie de l'etre d'apres Saint Thomas d'Aquin (Louvains: Publications
Universitaires; Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1963), 33-41; English translation,
Bernard Montagnes, The Doctrine of the Analogy ofBeing according to Thomas Aquinas, trans.
E.M. Macierowski (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2004).
7 Thomas of Sutton, Quaestiones Ordinariae, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der
BayerischenAkademie der Wissenschaften, 1977), 870-953. The best study of these questions
of Sutton is by E. J. Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thomas Sutton, O.P.," in
Vestigia, Imagines, Verba: Semiotics and Logic in Medieval Theological Texts (XIII-XIV
Century), Acts of the 11th Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics, San Marino, 24-28
May 1994, ed. Costantino Marmo (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997), 289-303. Also see Alessandro
Conti, "La composizione metafisica dell'ente finito corporeo nell'ontologia di Tommaso
Sutton," Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 2, no. 2 (1991): 323-26; and
the earlier study by Joseph Przezdziecki, "Thomas of Sutton's Critique of the Doctrine of
Univocity," in An Etienne Gilson Tribute, ed. Charles O'Neil (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1959), 189-208. This last should be used with caution; see Ashworth,
"Analogy in Thomas Sutton," 290. See finally the section on Sutton in Franco Riva, Tommaso
Claxton e I' analogia di proporzionalita: Indagine sull' analogia nella scuola tomistica tra XIV
e XV secolo (Milan: Pubblicazioni della Universita Cattolica de! Sacro Cuore, 1989), 31-47.
8 Thomas Sutton, "Utrum de deo et creaturis sit aliquid positivum univocum"; see
"Streitschrift gegen Robert Cowton" in Michael Schmaus, Zur Diskussion uber das Problem
der Univozitii.t im Umkreis des Johannes Duns Skotus (Munich: Verlag der Bayerischen

540

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Johannes Schneider, dates them tentatively between 13 05-10 at
Oxford, and the question against Cowton as later. 9 He combines
both 'horizontal' and 'vertical' contexts in the title to question 32:
"It is asked whether this term 'being' is predicated univocally of
God and of all things of whatever category." In fact, in Sutton's
own response to this question, he deals almost exclusively with
the predicamental context, that is, the philosophical question
whether 'being' is said univocally or analogically of substance and
accidents; other than a brief programmatic statement, he devotes
only one short paragraph to the transcendental context, to God
and creatures. 10 This favoring of the categorical context is also
evidenced in the thirty-three initial arguments for univocity and
Sutton's corresponding replies. Questions 33 and 34 both ask
about the divine names. Question 33: "It is asked concerning the
divine names, and firstly, whether names which are said of God
and creatures are said univocally of God and creatures." Question
34: "Secondly, it is asked whether this name 'substance', as it is a
name of a most general genus, is said univocally of God and
caused substances; and this is to ask whether God is in the
predicament of substance. " 11 Hence the very way Sutton poses his
questions, that is, in terms of univocity, evidences the change in
the status quaestionis wrought by Scotus. I believe his devoting
separate questions to each context, predicamental (question 32)
and transcendental (questions 33 and 34), is not accidental, but a

Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1957), 105-23. For a discussion of the authorship, see
Schmaus, Problem der Univozitiit, 11-12. For the text of Robert Cowton (I Sent., pro!., q. 4),
see Stephen F. Brown, "Robert Cowton, O.F.M., and the Analogy of the Concept of Being,"
Franciscan Studies 31 (1971): 5-40.
9 Schneider, "Einleitung," 54*. Schneider has found that question 32A is different from
the rest in structure and style, leading him to propose that it is from a different context than
the other questions and is later (ibid., 53*-54*).
10 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 240-41; and 884, 11. 398-410).
11 "Quaeritur de nominibus divinis, et primo, utrum nomina quae dicuntur de deo et
creaturis, dicantur univoce de deo et de creaturis" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33
[Schneider, ed., 909]). "Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia, prout est nomen
generis generalissimi, dicatur univoce de deo et substantiis causatis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum
deus sit in praedicamento substantiae" (Thomas Sutton,Quaest. ord. 34 [Schneider, ed., 936]).

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

541

deliberate vehicle for his two-part solution, relying on two types
of analogy. 12
Before discussing Sutton's questions, we should recall that a
key source for this medieval debate was a passage at the very start
of Aristotle's Categories as translated by Boethius:
Those that have only a name in common but a different substantiae ratio in accordance
with that name are said to be equivocals, e.g., 'animal' [in relation to] man and what is
painted .... Those that have both a name in common and the same substantiae ratio in
accordance with that name are said to be univocals, e.g., 'animal' [in relation to] man, ox. 13

It was agreed that the crucial terms substantiae ratio of a name
"included all that in some way expressed the essence or quiddity
of a substance or accident. " 14 Although there was disagreement in
the thirteenth century over how these terms were to be specifically translated, whether as an Avicennian nature or an 'inner
word', in the fourteenth century the substantiae ratio of a name
was normally identified with a concept, whatever its ontological
status might be. Hence a key assumption of the discussion was
that a univocal term is subordinated to one nature, concept, or
ratio while an equivocal term is subordinated to more than one. 15
12 We now know that question 32A contains Sutton's response to Henry of Harclay's
criticism of Aquinas, as found in Harclay's Quaestiones Ordinariae, q. 12 (paras. 30-40); see
Henry of Harclay, Ordinary Questions I-XIV, XV-XXIX, 2 vols., ed. M. Henninger, trans. R.
Edwards and M. Henninger (Oxford: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in the Auctores
Britannici Medii Aevi series). This is a very focused debate, centered on Aquinas's arguments
in his Summa contra Gentiles, and merits more attention than can be given here.
13 Aristotle, Categories 1. lal-9: "Aequivoca dicuntur quorum nomen sol um commtme est,
secundum nomen vero substantiae ratio diversa, ut animal homo et quad pingitur .... Univoca
vero dicuntur quorum et nomen commune est et secundum nomen eadem substantiae ratio,
ut animal homo atque bas" (Aristotle, Categoriae vel praedicamenta, Aristoteles Latin us 1.1-5
[Bruges and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961], 5). I use the translation of E. J. Ashworth,
"Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation in Some Early Fourteenth-Century Authors,"
conference presentation in Aristotle in Britain During the Middle Ages, Proceedings of the
international conference at Cambridge 8-11 April 1994 organized by the Societe
Internationale pour l'Etude de la Philosophie Medievale, ed. John Marenbon (Turnhout:
Brepols, 1996), 234.
14 Ashwortl1, "Analogy, Univocation, and Equivocation," 234.
15 Ibid., 234-35; E. J. Ashworth, "Equivocation and Analogy in Fourteenth Century Logic:
Ockham, Burley and Buridan," in Historia Philosophiae Medii Aevi: Studien zur Geschichte
der Philosophie des Mittelalters, ed. Burkhard Mojsisch and Olaf Pluta (Amsterdam and
Philadelphia: B. R. Gruner, 1991), 28-30.

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

And, to anticipate, Sutton holds that the term 'being' is a type of
equivocal term, in that it is subordinated to a plurality of
concepts; more accurately it is an analogous term, since it is
subordinated to a plurality of related concepts.
L BEING IN THE PREDICAMENTAL CONTEXT: QUESTION 32
Sutton begins his own answer (determinatio) to question 32 by
citing at length a key passage of Aristotle's Metaphysics, book 4,
chapter 2:
So too there are many senses in which a thing is said to be. But every being is
related to one first, that is, to substance. For some things are said to be because
they are substances, while others because they are passions of substance, still
others because they are a passage towards substance or corruptions or privations
or qualities or productive or generative of substance, or of those things that are
said relative to substance, or negations of these things or negations of
substance. 16

Sutton cites Averroes with approval that in this passage, 'being' is
not said equivocally, as 'dog' referring to a barking dog and to a
sea dog, nor is it said univocally, as 'animal' is of a human being
and an ass. Rather, Averroes claims, "it [ens] is one of those terms
that are said of things by attribution to one, and they are midway
between equivocal and univocal terms." 17
That 'being' is said analogically and not univocally of substance
and accident was a widely held doctrine at Sutton's time, and
indeed he claims that "all authoritative teachers agree in this."
16 "Ita et ens multipliciter dicitur. Sed omne ens ad unum primum refertur, scilicet ad
substantiam. Haec enim entia dicuntur, quia sunt substantiae, ilia vero, quia sunt passiones
substantiae, alia vero, quia sunt via ad substantiam aut corruptiones aut privationes aut
qualitates aut effectiva aut generativa substantiae aut eorum, quae dicuntur per habitudinem
ad substantiam, aut negationes eorum aut negationes substantiae" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest.
ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 878, II. 231-37]); see Aristotle, Metaphys. 4.2.1003b5-10 (Aristotle,
Metaphysica, Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media', Aristoteles Latinus 25.2 [Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1976], 60-61). All translations of Sutton are my own.
17 "Sed est de nominibus, quae dicuntur de rebus per attributionem ad unum, et sunt
media inter aequivoca et univoca" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 878, II.
226-28]; see Averroes Cordubensis, InAristotelis Metaphysicorum Libras Commentarium, vol.
8 of Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois Commentariis (Venice: apud Junctas, 15 62-74), fol. 65B.

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

543

Further, he claims 'being' is said analogically of God and of all
other things of whatever category. 18 But he claims that many are
deceived about the signification of the term 'being' and take it to
be univocal. Hence Sutton is conscious of adopting the traditional
opinion against the recent innovations of Scotus and his followers,
who in a short time, at least in Sutton's mind, have become
"many."19
The reason many are deceived on this question is the maximal
commonness (maximam communitatem) of the term 'being':
whatever is understood, whether a substance or accident, is
immediately understood to be a being. 20 Even if one does not
know whether, for example, the powers of the soul are accidents
or are to be identified with the substance of the soul itself, still
one knows that they are beings. In this way 'being' is very similar
to genus terms that are common and univocal: when I conceive of
a human being, a horse, or a lion, I always conceive of an animal,
and when I see something moving in the distance, I may not know
specifically what it is, but still I know it is an animal. So, as the
term 'animal' is associated with a concept common to its various
species, which generic concept is included in the concept of each
species, so it seems to many that the term 'being' has one concept
common to all things, and this concept is included in the concept
18 "I respond: it should be said that all authoritative teachers agree in this, that being is not
said univocally about things of different predicaments, but analogically, and this is necessary
to say; and similarly, being is said analogously of God and other things, of whatever
predicament they may be" ("Respondeo: Dicendum quod omnes auctores conveniunt in hoc,
quod ens non dicitur univoce de rebus diversorum praedicamentorum, sed analogice, et hoc
necesse est dicere; et similiter dicitur ens analogice de deo et de rebus aliis, cuiuscumque sint
praedicamenti" [Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 238-41)]). In the
apparatus criticus, 'auctoritates' is found as an alternative reading to 'auctores'. However, if
another work, Contra Quodlibet is indeed by Sutton, as Schneider holds, the sense is clear. In
this latter work, the author writes of the univocity of being: "But that theory is impossible and
against all doctors" ("Sed ilia positio est impossibilis et contra omnes doctores" [Thomas of
Sutton, Contra Quodlibet Iohannis Duns Scoti, ed. Johannes Schneider (Munich: Verlag der
Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, 1978), 81]). Schneider comments that Sutton uses
the term 'doctor' not for just any teacher, but only for one he recognizes as an authority.
Similarly in our text, I take him to mean not the authorities of the past, but the authoritative
teachers of his time.
19 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, II. 242-43).
20 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 878, I. 242-879, I. 268).

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

of every thing. This is especially true since 'being' is thought by
some to be predicated per se of all things in the first way of
predicating per se, just as a genus term is predicated of its species
in the first way of predicating per se. Here Sutton seems to be
alluding to a claim of Scotus that both substance and accidents are
beings per se.21
On the other hand, analogical terms, as 'healthy', do not have
this similarity to genus terms. Whoever conceives of animal, diet,
and urine (of which 'healthy' can be said analogically) need not at
the same time conceive of healthy, nor is 'healthy' predicated of
them in the first way of predicating per se, but rather per accidens
and denominatively. Thus one is not misled into thinking that
'healthy' signifies one concept common to them so that it could
be predicated of them the way a genus term is predicated of its
species. But it does appear, at least to some thinkers, that the term
'being' is predicated with one common concept of all things, God
and creatures of whatever category.
Sutton claims that without a doubt they are deceived, and
offers an argument against them based on the assumption that if
'being' were said univocally of the categories it would be
"contracted" to the various categories in the way a genus, as
animal, is contracted by a difference, for example, rational. 22
(1) If the term 'being' is said uni vocally of all of the categories, then being has
one concept common to the ten categories.
(2) If being has one concept common to the ten categories, being is common
to the categories in the way a genus is common to its species.
(3) If being is common to the categories in the way a genus is common to its
species, it is contracted to various categories by differences in the way a genus is
contracted to its species by differences.
(4) For any genus, its concept is not included in the concept of the difference.
(5) But the concept of being is included in the concept of anything that is
understood, including any purported differences.
(6) Hence, being cannot have any difference that contracts it to various
categories in the way a genus is contracted to its species. (4, 5)
21 See John Duns Scotus, Lectura I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 119 (Ioannis Duns Scoti Opera
Omnia, ed. Commissio Scotistica [Vatican City: Typis Polyglottis Vaticanis, 1960], 16:269);
Ordinatio I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 164 (Vatican ed., 3:101-2).
22 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 879, I. 269-880, I. 299).

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545

[(7) Hence, being is not common to the categories in the way a genus is
common to its species. (Unstated subconclusion, from 3, 6)]
(8) Hence, being cannot have one concept common to the ten categories. (2,

7)
(9) Therefore, the term 'being' is not said univocally of all of the categories.
(1, 8)

Premise 1 assumes the views on univocity found in Aristotle's
opening remarks in the Categories mentioned above, and premise
2 is the key assumption that equates the community of being with
that of a genus. Premise 3 assumes that as the genus animal is
contracted by the specific difference rational, resulting in the
species of human being, so being would be contracted to the category of, say, substance, by one difference, and to the category of
quantity by another difference. Substance, quantity, and the other
categories would therefore be species of being (i.e., contained
'under' being as species are 'under' a genus). 23 In support of
premise 4, Sutton argues ad absurdum that if the concept of the
genus were included in that of the difference, the concept of the
difference would be equivalent to the species, since it is
constituted by the genus and difference. 24 Premise 5 may be
Sutton's interpretation of Scotus's claim, mentioned above, that
both substance and accidents are beings per se.
In premises 2 and 3, Sutton imputes to his opponent a view
that imagines a close parallel between 'being' and 'genus', and this
comparison will have a role in the history of the debate. However,
Scotus himself knew of and responded to this type of argument,
being well aware that whatever community was to be accorded the
concept of being, it could not be that of a genus. His definitive
explanation of the nongeneric character of being, found for
example in his Lectura and Ordinatio, is that being is not
contracted to God and creatures, or to the various categories, by
any positive reality or formal perfection extrinsic to it, as in the
case of a genus, but rather is qualified by intrinsic modes, as it is
contracted to God and creatures by the intrinsic modes of infinity
23
24

Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 880, II. 286-91).
Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 880, II. 274-83).

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

and finitude. 25 Hence the distinction involved is not that between
realities or formalities, but is a lesser distinction between a reality
and its intrinsic mode. 26 It is dear, then, that Scotus would deny
Sutton's premises 2 and 3, a gross simplification in stating baldly
that being is like a genus and is contracted in the way of a genus.
Sutton, however, convinced that he has pinpointed the error
of those who uphold the uni vocal concept of being (i.e., they take
being to be a supergenus over the categories) and that he has
disproven it, concludes:
Since being is not a genus of substance and quantity and the others, therefore in
no way can it be predicated of them univocally. For what is predicated univocally
of many is either their genus or species or difference or property or accident. 27

This last argument, a standard at the time, maintains that if a term
is said univocally, it must be one of the five predicables of Porphyry. The only real candidate for 'being' would be genus, which
Sutton has just eliminated. Scotus's response to this objection had
been that the assumption that a univocal term must be one of the
predicables is valid only for the categories, but it is not for the
transcendentals, as being, which need not be one of the
predicables. 28 Nevertheless, Sutton, for his part, draws a further
conclusion from the fact that being is not a genus: there is no
genus above the ten categories, which categories "are distin25 Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 157 (Vatican ed., 3:95). Scotus does not respond to this
objection (see 3:103 n. 8). See also Ord. I, d. 8, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 39, 136 (Vatican ed. 4:169,
221); Leet. I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 109, 123 (Vatican ed., 16:265, 272).
26 One should also mention that in Scotus's Questions on De anima another explanation
is given: the model for being as contracted to its inferiors is not that of a genus to a species,
but rather that of a species specialissima to its individuals. Stephen Dumont has shown the
difficulties of this theory on Scotus's own principles and raises the possibility that it may be
authored by a scotellus, perhaps Antonius Andreas (Stephen D. Dumont, "The Univocity of
the Concept of Being in the Fourteenth Century: John Duns Scotus and William Alnwick,"
Mediaeval Studies 49 (1987): 10-15). But Scotus's final position on the nongeneric character
of being is that of being and its intrinsic modes.
27 "Relinquitur ergo quad, ex quo ens non est genus substantiae et quantitatis et aliorum,
quad nullo modo potest praedicari univoce de ipsis. Omne enim quad praedicatur univoce de
multis, vel est genus eorum vel species vel differentia vel proprium vel accidens" (Thomas
Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 880-81, 11. 300-303]).
28 Dumont, "Concept of Being," 14-15.

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547

guished according to ten diverse modes of predication, of which
none can be reduced to another, nor can there be found in reality
any other mode of predicating beyond them. " 29
Having eliminated univocity to his own satisfaction, Sutton
says that 'being' is said either equivocally or analogically, and then
proceeds to eliminate equivocity, following a method found in a
number of works of Aquinas. 30 A few clarifying comments on
equivocation and analogy in the medieval context are necessary to
understand Sutton's position. Aristotle's remarks in the first
chapter of the Categories provided an opportunity for later
commentators, both Greek and Latin, to divide and subdivide
various senses of equivocation. 31 The expositores philosophi, 32
such as Boethius and the author of the pseudo-Augustine
Categoriae decem, took from Porphyry the first and largest
division, that between chance equivocals (aequivoca a casu) and
deliberate equivocals (aequivoca a consilio or a proposito). The
first group comprises equivocal terms that are the same for
whatever chance reason, as 'pen' in English happens to designate
things of quite different types. The second group comprises terms
whose meanings are the product of human intention in any
number of ways.
Sutton, in the following question 33, gives this basic division
of equivocal terms, calling the chance equivocals "equivocals
properly so-called." For the deliberate equivocals he gives the four
subdivisions found in Boethius and Simplicius. 33 The first of these
ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 881, II. 303-8).
See the discussion of the chronology of Aquinas's treatment of analogy in Wippel, The
Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 543- 72.
31 Anonymous, Paraphrasis Themistiana (Pseudo-Augustini Categoriae Decem), Aristotelis
Latinus 1.1-5 (Bruges and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1961), 136-37; Boethius, In Categorias
Aristotelis libri quatuor, Patrologia Cursus Completus, series Latina 64 (Paris: J.-P. Mignes,
1847), 166; Simplicius, Commentaire sur /es categories.d'Aristote: Traduction de Guillaume
de Moerbeke, Edition critique, ed. A. Pattin in collaboration with W. Stuyven, Corpus Latin um
CommentarioruminAristotelem Graecorum (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain;
Paris: Editions Beatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1971), 42-44.
32 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 917, I. 227).
33 "But it must be noted that according to the commentators of the Philosopher equivocals
are said in two ways. For some are equivocals by chance and others by deliberation or on
purpose. Equivocals by chance are those to which one name is imposed by chance, as
29 Thomas Sutton, Quaest.

30

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

is secundum similitudinem, or by resemblance, as a human being
and his picture.
'Animal' is predicated of each but equivocally by resemblance .... For 'animal'
is said of the human being according to that ratio which is an animated sensitive
substance, but of the picture it is said according to another ratio, which is the
resemblance to the animated sensitive substance. 34

The second class of deliberate equivocals Sutton calls secundum
proportionem. For Sutton, it is only terms of this class that properly can be called 'analogical'; terms of the other three classes are
analogical only in a broader sense. From Aristotle (Metaphysics,
book 5) 35 he gives the standard example of the term principium
(principle, origin):
... as when 'principle' is said of a unit which is the principle of number, and of
a point that is the principle of a line, of a source that is the principle of rivers,
and of the heart which is the principle in an animal. ... And well are they called
equivocals secundum proportionem and most properly, for they are said
proportionately of diverse things. For as unit is the principle of number, so a
point is the principle of a line, and so for the others. And so such equivocals are
properly called analogous, and the other [deliberate equivocals] are not properly
called analogous, but in a broad sense. For analogy is the same as proportio. 36
Alexander the son of Priam and Alexander the Macedonian, and these properly are called
equivocals. But some are deliberative equivocals and are divided in four ways: some are by
resemblance, some by proportion, some from one and some to one" ("Sed advertendum est
quad secundum expositores philosophi dupliciter dicuntur aequivoca. Quaedam enim sunt
aequivoca a casu et quaedam a consilio vel a proposito. Aequivoca a casu sunt ilia quibus a
casu imponitur unum nomen, utA!exander Priami filius et Alexander Macedo, et ista proprie
dicuntur aequivoca. Quae autem sunt aequivoca a proposito, dividuntur quadrupliciter;
quaedam enim sunt secundum similitudinem, quaedam secundum proportionem, quaedam ab
uno, quaedam ad unum" [ibid. (Schneider, ed., 917, IL 227-34)]).
34 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 917, II. 235-41).
35 Aristotle, Metaphys. 5.1.1012b34-1013a10
(Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media' [Brill ed.,
84]).
36 " ••• ut cum principium dicitur de unitate quae est principium numeri, et de puncto quod
est principium lineae, et de fonte qui est principium fluviorum, et de corde quad est
principium in animali. . . . et istud exemplum aequivocorum posuit Aristoteles in V
Metaphysicae. Et bene dicuntur aequivoca secundum proportionem et propriissime, quia
proportionaliter dicuntur de diversis; sicut enim unitas est principium numeri, ita punctus est
principium lineae, et sic de aliis. Et idea talia aequivoca dicuntur proprie analoga, et alia non
dicuntur analoga proprie, sed communiter. Analogia enim idem est quad proportio" (Thomas

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549

The third type of deliberate equivocals are those called equivocals
ab uno, that is, in relation to one origin:
they descend from some one thing to many, of which things the term is said
equivocally, as from medicine 'medical' is said of a book in which is written the
science of medicine, and 'medical' is said of an instrument used to cut according
to the medical art, and 'medical' is said of a potion which is very good for health
according to the medical art. This equivocation descends to all these from one,
namely from medicine. 37

The fourth type are those equivocals ad unum, that is, in relation
to one end, as
when diverse things are referred to one, and so the same term is said of them, as
'healthy'. For food is said to be healthy, and a potion and exercise to be healthy,
and urine to be healthy, because they are referred to one end, namely, to the
health of an animal. And in this way being is equivocal to substance and to the
other predicaments, for being is said of quantity and quality and the other
predicaments of accidents as they have a relation to one, namely, to substance
which is the first being, but not however as to one end, but as to one subject. 38

In this question 33, then, 'being' is not said of substance and
accident as a "chance equivocal," but as a "deliberate equivocal,"
namely, a deliberate equivocal of the fourth type, an equivocal ad
unum.
Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 [Schneider, ed., 917, l. 243-918, I. 252]). Aristotle's Greek term for
this type of equivocal, avalloy(a, Boethius had translated as proportio, while William of
Moerbeke, in his translation of Simplicius, used analogia. See Ashworth, "Analogy in Thomas
Sutton," 292.
37 "descendunt ab uno aliquo ad multa, de quibus dicitur nomen aequivoce, ut a medicina
dicitur medicinalis liber in quo scribitur scientia medicinae, medicinale ferramentum incisivum
secundum artem medicinae, medicinale pharmacum quod est optimum ad sanitatem secundum
artem medicinae; ad omnia ista descendit haec aequivocatio ab uno, scilicet a medicina"
(Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 [Schneider, ed., 918, II. 253-59).
38 "quando scilicet di versa referuntur ad unum, et ex hoc dicitur de illis nomen idem, sicut
sanum. Nam cibus dicitur sanus et pharmacum sanum et exercitium sanum et urina sana, quia
referuntur ad unum finem, scilicet ad sanitatem animalis. Et hoc modo ens est aequivocum ad
substantiam et ad alia praedicamenta, quia ens dicitur de quantitate et qualitate et ceteris
praedicamentis accidentium, prout habent habitudinem ad unum, scilicet ad substantiam quae
est primum ens, non tamen tamquam ad unurn finem, sed tamquam ad unum subiectum"
(ibid. [Schneider, ed., 918, II. 260-68]).

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

On this point, Sutton is consistent in questions 32 and 33. In
question 32, as we have seen, after eliminating univocity he asks
whether 'being' is said of substance and accidents equivocally or
analogically. Here he identifies equivocity with the "chance
equivocals," the pure equivocals. This is rejected as it is not simply
by chance that 'being' is predicated of substance and accidents. He
reasserts the traditional teaching:
substance is being absolutely and through itself, and others are beings in a
qualified sense, and are said to be beings because of substance .... Because,
therefore, 'being' is said principally of substance and is said of the other
[categories] only in relation to substance, it is necessary to say that 'being' is not
said purely equivocally of them, but is said analogically first and foremost [of
substance] and in a second fashion [of accidents]. 39

This, in other terminology, is the fourth class of deliberate equivocals found in question 33.
This is the teaching of the vast majority of Scholastics and
Sutton argues ably for it, both from the authority of Aristotle and
various commentators and from argument. From this basic
position, he draws further consequences that emphasize the
diversity of the senses of 'being' when said of the individual
categories, in direct opposition to the positing of a univocal
concept for all of the categories. For example, since there is
nothing univocally common to the diverse categories, it is necessary that 'being' is said in as many different ways as there are
categories. Sutton quotes in full another key text of Aristotle:
Those things are said in their own right to be that signify the figures of the
predicaments. For in as many ways is something predicated, in so many ways is
being signified. And so since some of the predicaments signify what something
is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity, others

39 "Substantia enim est ens simpliciter et per se ipsam, et alia sunt entia secundum quid et
propter substantiam dicuntur entia .... Quia igitur ens dicitur principaliter de substantia et
de aliis non dicitur nisi in habitudine ad substantiam, oportet necessario dicere quod ens non
dicitur pure aequivoce de ipsis, sed secundum prius et posterius analogice" (Thomas Sutton,
Quaest. ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 881, 11. 314-15; 881-82, 11. 328-31).

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

551

passivity, others its place, others its time (others its position, others its having),
each signifies the to be (or being) answering to each of these. 40

For Sutton, there are ten different concepts of being, one for
each of the categories:
So it should be said that 'being', as it is said of the things of the ten
predicaments, has ten significations, according to which it ['being'] is said of
them analogically, because first and principally it is said of substance according
to one signification, and in a second fashion it is said of the other categories
according to the other significations, and it is said of them because they belong
to the first being, which is substance. 41

It should not be thought, however, that each of these concepts
of being is identical with the concept of each of the categories.
For if so, then being would be a genus as, for example, substance
is a genus, and as quantity is a genus. But this cannot be, for just
as being cannot be a supergenus to all the categories, so being
cannot be a genus within each of the categories, and this for the
same reason: there can be no difference that could contract being
to the various species of a particular category. 42
How then does the concept of being as it pertains to substances
differ from the concept of substance, and how does the concept
of being as it pertains to quantities differ from the concept of
quantity, and so for the other predicaments? Because of the
importance of this reply, it is worth quoting in full:

40 "Secundum se esse dicuntur,

quaecumque significant figuras praedicamentorum. Quot
modis enim aliquid praedicatur, tot mo dis ens significatur. Quoniam ergo praedicamentorum
alia quid est significant, alia quale, alia quantum, alia ad aliquid, alia facere, alia pati, alia ubi,
alia quando (alia positionem, alia habitum), horum unicuique idem significat (ens vel) esse"
(ibid. [Schneider, ed., 882, 11. 335-41]). The phrases in parentheses in Schneider's edition of
Sutton are not found in the recension and translation of William of Moerbeke nor in the
Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media'.
41 "Dicendum est igitur quod ens, prout dicitur de rebus decem praedicamentorum, habet
decem significationes, secundum quas dicitur de eis analogice, quia primo et principaliter
dicitur de substantiis secundum unam significationem, et posterius de aliis secundum
significationes alias, et de illis dicitur propter hoc quod sunt primi entis quod est substantia"
(ibid. [Schneider, ed., 882, 11. 342-47]).
42 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 882-83, 11. 347-59).

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Being, therefore, is a genus in none of its significations, but according to each of
its significations [with respect to each category] it has a concept other than the
concept of the genus about which it is said. For although being said of substance
does not signify a thing other than the substance, it signifies the same thing
under another aspect. For 'substance' signifies the thing under the aspect of
standing under, but 'being' said of a substance signifies the thing under the aspect
of being per se. And similarly, 'quantity' signifies the thing under the aspect of
measure, but 'being' said of a quantity signifies the same thing under the aspect
of being that pertains to such a thing. And so it is to be understood of the other
categories, that they signify under an aspect other than 'being' which is said of
them. 43

This distinction, between what the terms of the categories (as
'substance', 'quantity', 'quality', 'relation', etc.) signify and what
'being' as said of any of these categories signifies, has a key role
in Sutton's response to a number of arguments for the univocal
concept of being, both in the predicamental and in the transcendental contexts.
For example, in one of the very few passages in question 32
treating the transcendental context, Sutton recites the following
argument in favor of a concept of being univocal to God and
creatures. The only reason some terms are predicated analogically
and not univocally is that as they are predicated of creatures they
imply some imperfection in their formal meanings (rationes),
which imperfection must be removed when they are predicated of
God. 'Being wise' and 'being just', as said of creatures, signify
limited qualities and so imply imperfection, while there is no
quality in God, for all that is in God is identical with his essence;
hence such terms cannot be said univocally of God and creatures.
But this is not true of 'being' which only signifies "having an
essence" and implies no imperfection. Furthermore, since being
transcends all categories, it does not imply any determinate mode
43 "Ens igitur secundum nullam eius significationem est genus, sed secundum omnem eius
significationem habet alium conceptum quam conceptum generis de quo dicitur. Quamvis
enim ens dictum de substantia non significet aliam rem quam substantia, significat tamen
eandem rem sub alia ratione. Substantia enim significat rem sub ratione substandi, ens autem
dictum de substantia significat rem sub ratione essendi per se. Et similiter quantitas significat
rem sub ratione mensurae, ens autem dictum de quantitate significat eandem rem sub ratione
essendi, quod competit tali rei. Et sic intelligendum est de aliis generibus, quod sub alia ratione
significant quam ens quod dicitur de illis" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 883, 11. 359-69]).

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

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of being, neither that of quantity or quality, as 'being wise' and
'being just' imply the determinate mode of being of quality. So,
the term 'being' is predicated univocally of God and all other
beings. 44
Sutton responds that as the term of a most general genus, as
'substance' or 'quantity', implies a limited thing, so also does
'being', since as it is predicated of these most general genera it
implies limitation and so imperfection. 45 Recall that for Sutton,
the one term 'being' is associated with ten different concepts that
signify ten different limited modes of being which characterize the
different categories. For 'being' to be predicated of God, one must
remove any such limited mode of being from the signification of
the term. But once this is done, the term is not said univocally of
God and creatures, since with each of the ten concepts of being a
limited mode of existence is part of its formal meaning, and hence
to remove the limitation is to change the formal meaning. Hence,
when 'being' is said of God and creatures, it cannot be univocal,
since two different concepts are involved.
In another response, Sutton explains further why the term
'being', said of any of the categories, does imply limitation.
'Being' does not imply those imperfect aspects which are signified by the names
of the ten genera. But it signifies the modes of being which pertain to those
genera, and as a consequence it signifies limited and so imperfect modes, of
which none can pertain to God who is an unlimited being. 46

Hence, again, 'being' cannot be said of God and creatures
univocally.
With this understanding of Sutton's basic position, we can
follow a rapid series of arguments and counter-arguments for and
against Scotus's univocal concept of being. The series begins with
the concept of common being (ens in communi):
Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 870, lines 4-15).
Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 884-85, II. 412-16).
46 "ens non importat illas rationes imperfectas, quae significantur per nomina decem
generum. Sed significat modos essendi, qui competunt illis generibus, et per consequens
significat modos limitatos et sic imperfectos, quorum nullus potest deo convenire, qui est ens
illimitatum" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 885, II. 433-37]).
44

45

554

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Furthermore, common being is the object of the intellect. And so common being
is apprehended by the intellect, which requires some concept or ratio of it. So,
common being has some concept according to which it is said of all things, and
hence univocally. 47

Sutton replies, following Aquinas, by denying the main assumption: the proper object of the human intellect, in fact, is not
common being, but the quiddity of a material thing, for whatever
else we come to know, we know through a cognition of a material
thing. 48 The Scotist replies that the object of our intellect is that
which contains all that we know and under whose aspect all things
are known by us, as color, under whose aspect all things are seen
by us, is the object of sight. But whatever is understood by us is
understood under the aspect of being under which are contained
all things. So common being is the object of our intellect. Sutton
replies with his basic conviction: we do not understand everything
under one ratio or concept of being, but under several rationes of
being, "as substances under one ratio of being, and quantities
under another, and the things of diverse predicaments under
diverse rationes of being. " 49
Sutton holds that the commonness in "common being" is not
that of univocity, but rather that of analogy. The difference is that
with univocity, there is not only a common name, but also a
common concept, while with analogy there is only a common
name, not a common concept. Since according to Sutton the term
'being' is analogous, there is no concept common to all things to
be grasped by the intellect, but being is always apprehended under
one of its ten categorical aspects. This can take place in either of
two ways: determinately or indeterminately. In the first way, the
intellect apprehends being under one determinate mode of being,
(e.g., as existing per se). In the second way, the intellect
47 "Praeterea ens in comm uni est obiectum intellectus. Ergo ens in comm uni apprehenditur
ab intellectu, sed non nisi sub aliquo conceptu vel ratione. Ergo ens in comm uni habet aliquem
conceptum, secundum quern dicitur de omnibus, et ita univoce" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 873,
11. 90-93]). See Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, nn. 129, 137 (Vatican ed., 3:80-81, 85-86);
Leet. I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 97-98 (Vatican ed., 16:261).
48 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, 11. 94-96; see also 886-87, 11. 470-79).
49 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, 11. 97-105).

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

555

apprehends being indeterminately (e.g., as existing in one or other
unspecified mode of existing). 50
This latter remark is clarified in Sutton's response to another
argument in the series, an argument for the univocal concept of
being taken from the well-known dictum of Avicenna, "Being is
the first thought by our intellect." If this is so, being is thought
before substance or any other category, that is, before any concept
of substance or any other category. But if so, then being is known
by one concept which is not the concept of any specific category,
but is common to all.51
In his reply, Sutton interprets Avicenna as saying that what is
first understood about anything is that it is. But this does not
occur with one concept common to all the categories, but by some
concept that signifies a mode of being of a thing of one of the
categories, either determinately or indeterminately. This happens
with purely equivocal terms. When the term 'dog' is spoken, one
understands a star (a celestial dog), or Fido (an earthly dog), or a
fish (a sea dog), and this in either of two ways. One can
understand the term "determinately" as signifying, say, Fido. Or
one can understand it "indeterminately," as signifying one of the
three, "either this one or that one or that one." 52 Hence Sutton
can agree with Avicenna that being is understood before all else
according to one concept (ratio)-not, however, according to one
concept of being common to all categories, but according to one
concept of being as it pertains to one category, and this either
determinately to one particular category or indeterminately, that
is, disjunctively to this or that or that category.
50

Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 460-69).

51 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 873, II. 106-12).

See Avicenna, Liber de Philosophia Prima sive
Scientia Divina I-N, Avicenna Latinus (Louvain: E. Peeters; Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1977), tract.
1, cap. 5 (pp. 31-32).
52 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 887, II. 480-86; see also 874, II. 11316; and 887, II. 487-91). A number of thinkers were concerned with whether equivocal terms
signified conjunctively or disjunctively, and it seems that at least in the early fourteenth
century analogical terms were seen by many as disjunctive (as here with Sutton, and also with
Peter Auriol). See "Appendix I: Conjunction, Disjunction, and the Ratio Communis" in E. J.
Ashworth, "Analogy and Equivocation in Thirteenth-Century Logic: Aquinas in Context,"
Mediaeval Studies 54 (1992): 130-32.

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

This response of Sutton also helps him respond to another of
the principal arguments of Scotus for the univocal concept of
being. 53 According to Sutton's formulation:
(1) There is not certainty and doubt about the same concept.
(2) But there is certainty concerning something that it is a being, but doubt
whether it is a substance or an accident.
(3) Hence, 'being' signifies a concept other than that signified by 'substance'
or 'accident'.
(4) Therefore, 'being' signifies a concept common to all the categories.

He recites a standard example in support of the second premise:
all are certain that the concept 'being' applies to the powers of the
soul, but many are unsure whether the concept 'substance' or the
concept of 'accident' applies to them. 54
In the course of his long response to this often-cited argument,55 it becomes clear that he denies the implication between
the subconclusion in step 3 and the conclusion in step 4. He
concedes the subconclusion that there is not one concept of being
that is identical with any one category, as substance or quantity.
For if it were, 'being' and 'substance', for example, would be
synonyms, and by knowing that something is a being, one would
know that it is a substance, which is not the case. But just because
being is not a concept identical with any one particular category,
it does not follow that it is a concept common to all ten
categories. This is a fallacy of the consequent, arguing to one
reason or cause when there are many. The reason there is
certainty that the powers of the soul are beings and doubt whether
they are substances or qualities is that 'being' is said of each thing
according to one of its concepts, which correspond to the
concepts of the ten categories. When a term is subordinated to
many concepts (as with equivocal and analogical terms), there can
be certainty that one or other of its many concepts is predicated
of some determinate thing, but doubt as to which one. So with
53 Scotus, Ord. I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 27-34 (Vatican ed., 3:18-21); Leet. I, d. 3, p. 1,
qq. 1-2, nn. 22-24 (Vatican ed., 16:232-33).
54 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 875-76, 11. 161-67).
55 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 890-92, II. 576-635).

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

557

powers of the soul: it is certain that 'being' is predicated of them,
since it is predicated of everything; but there can be doubt
concerning which of the concepts to which the term 'being' 1s
subordinated should be said of these powers.
For it is certain that 'being' is said of them [powers of the soul], since it is said
of all things, but there is doubt which of the concepts is said of them, namely, as
'being' signifies substance or as it signifies quality; or if I may speak more
properly, there is doubt whether 'being' is said of them as it signifies the entity
of substance or as it signifies the entity of quality, and so there is doubt whether
they are substance or accidents. 56

When Sutton speaks "more properly" of entity, he is referring to
the way of being 57 appropriate to each of the categories: 'being'
and 'substance' denote the same particular object, but under
different aspects: "For 'substance' signifies the thing under the
aspect of standing under (sub ratione substandi), but 'being' said
of substance signifies the thing under the aspect of being per se
(sub ratione essendi per se). "58
The conclusion of his response summarizes his basic opinion:
And so on account of the community of the name [of 'being'] with many
significations, there is that certitude, not because of the community of one
signification. For ['being'] does not signify some concept common to the ten
categories, as has been said, but ten concepts. 59
56 "Certum est enim quod ens dicitur de eis, ex quo dicitur de omnibus, sed dubium est,
secundum quern conceptum dicitur de eis, scilicet an secundum quod ens significat
substantiam, an secundum quod significat qualitatem, vel ut magis proprie loquar, dubium est,
utrum ens dicatur de eis prout significat entitatem substantiae, vel prout significat entitatem
qualitatis, et ideo dubium est, utrum sint substantia vel accidentia" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 89192, II. 617-23; see also 892, II. 629-35)).
57 Compare the following glossary entry of Paul Vincent Spade: "Entity: Throughout the
text from Scotus, 'entity' has a gerundial rather than a participial force. I.e., an 'entity' in this
sense is not something that is, but rather what something that is does. The word might
sometimes be translated 'way of being"' (Five Texts on the Mediaeval Problem of Universals:
Porphyry, Boethius, Abelard, Duns Scotus, Ockham, ed. and trans. Paul Vincent Spade
[Indianapolis: Hackett, 1994], 232).
58 See note 43.
59 "et ideo propter comm uni ta tern nominis sub pluribus significationibus est ista certitudo,
non propter communitatem unius significationis. Non enim significat aliquem communem
conceptum decem generibus, ut dictum est, sed decem conceptus" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest.

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Another often-used argument for the univocal concept of being
is the following:
(1) That according to which a comparison is made is univocal. 60
(2) Substance is more a being than an accident.
(3) Hence, a comparison is made according to being.
(4) Therefore, being is univocal with regard to substance and accident. 61

Sutton responds by denying the key assumption in (1): it is not
true that one can make a comparison only according to what is
univocal. Rather, one can at times make comparisons according
to what is analogical, especially when a form is found in many
things, more in some and less in others, by different degrees of
participation. But when there is no such form found in the things
compared, and they are only spoken of metaphorically or according to some relation one to the other, then no comparison is
possible. It is for this reason that one cannot say, "Urine is more
healthy than medicine," for health is formally neither in urine nor
in medicine. 62
Another argument for univocity concerns the unity of
metaphysics as a science. According to Aristotle, "number as
number has characteristic properties, such as oddness and
evenness, excess and commensurability ... so being as being has
its characteristic properties. " 63 These characteristic properties, it
ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 892, 11. 631-35]).
60 Aristotle, Topics 1.15 .107b17-18: "For every univocal is comparable, for they will be
said either in like manner or else in a greater degree in one case" ("Nam univocum omne
comparabile; aut enim similiter dicetur aut magis alterum" [Aristotle, Topica, Aristoteles
Latinus 5.1-3 (Brussels and Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1969), 26]).
61 "Furthermore, that according to which a comparison is made is univocal. But there is
a comparison according to being, since substance is more being than accident. Therefore being
is univocal with regard to substance and accident" ("Praeterea illud, secundum quod fit
comparatio, est univocum. Sed secundum ens fit comparatio, quia substantia est magis ens
quam accidens. Ergo ens est univocum ad substantiam et accidens" [Thomas Sutton, Quaest.
ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 877, 11. 207-9)]).
62 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 893-94, 11. 677-87).
63 Aristotle, Metaphys. 4.2.1004b10-17:
"quoniam sicut sunt et numeri et in quantum
numeri proprie passiones sunt, ut imparitas paritas, commensuratio equalitas ... sic et enti in
quantum ens est quedam propria et ea sunt de quibus est philosophi perscrutari veritatem"
(Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media' [Brill ed., 1976], 63, 11. 16-22).

SUTTON ON UNNOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

559

is argued, are common to being and proper to no genus of being.
But these properties follow from a subject according to some
concept (ratio) of it, and so being as being has a concept prior to
the concept of any of the predicaments; hence being is said
univocally of the predicaments according to that concept. 64
Sutton's response is true to his basic opinion: as being differs
analogously in the various categories, so its characteristic
properties (passiones entis)-such as act and potency, one and
many, the same and diverse-also. differ analogically in the
various categories. He gives an example taken from Aristotle's
discussion of relations in book 5 of his Metaphysics. Aristotle
distinguishes three types of "relatives" or relata based on differing
foundations. The first type can be characterized as numerical. The
Stagirite includes in this class specific identity, qualitative
similarity and quantitative equality.
For all refer to unity. (i) Those things are the same whose substance is one; (ii)
those are similar whose quality is one; (iii) those are equal whose quantity is one;
and one is the beginning and measure of number, so that all these relations imply
number, though not in the same way. 65

Sutton cleverly adapts this Aristotelian doctrine to his own
purposes, showing that a characteristic property of being, namely,
one, is analogous in the different categories, just as being is
analogous.
For example, to be one in substance is to be the same, and it follows on being as
it is said of substance; to be one in quantity is to be equal, and it follows on
being according to its aspect by which it is said of quantity; to be one in quality
is to be similar, and it follows on being according to the aspect of being by which
it is said of quality. And so it is clear that 'one' is analogous, as also 'being' in
substance, quantity, and quality. 66
Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 875, II. 148-54).
Aristotle, Metaphys. 5.15.1020b25-1021b11 (Translatio Anonyma sive 'Media' [Brill
ed., 1976], 103-5).
66 "Verbi gratia, unum in substantia est idem et sequitur ad ens, secundum quod dicitur
de substantia, unum in quantitate est aequale et sequitur ad ens secundum rationem eius, qua
dicitur de quantitate, unum in qualitate est simile et sequitur ad ens secundum rationem entis,
qua dicitur de qualitate, et patet quod unum est analogum, sicut et ens in substantia, quantitate
et qualitate" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 889, II. 556-61; see also 892,
64

65

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

Another related Scotist argument is based on the necessity of
uni vocal concepts in demonstrations. 67
(1) In every demonstration, the subject of the conclusion, of which a
characteristic property (passio) is demonstrated, is uni vocal.
(2) Common being (ens inquantum ens) is the subject of metaphysics.
(3) The characteristic properties of being are demonstrated of common being
as the subject of the conclusions of demonstrations in metaphysics.
(4) Therefore, common being is univocal. 68

Sutton replies, as in his response to the previous argument, that as
being is analogous, so the passiones demonstrated of being are
analogous. Thus he retorts that the argument is based in the first
premise on a false assumption, for it is not always necessary in
every demonstration that the subject term of the conclusion be
univocal, nor that the terms of the demonstrated passiones be
uni vocal. 69
II. BEING IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONTEXT: QUESTION 32
It seems almost as an afterthought that at the end of his
determination of question 32 Sutton briefly discusses 'being' in
the transcendental context of God and creatures. He dearly
affirms that 'being' is said analogically of God and any creature
whatever. 70 Here, as in his extensive discussion of the divine
names said of God and creatures in the following question, he
appeals to insights that go to the heart of Aquinas's metaphysics
of being.
lines 648-51]).
67 Scotus, Ord. Id. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 26 (Vatican ed., 3:18).
68 "Praeterea in omni demonstratione subiectum conclusionis, de quo ostenditur passio,
est univocum. Sed de ente tamquam de subiecto concluduntur passiones entis, quia ens in
quantum ens est subiectum metaphysicae. Ergo ens in communi est univocum" (Thomas
Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 [Schneider, ed., 876, II. 184-87]). As Schneider points out
("Einleitung," 250*), Scotus does not say that univocity is needed for the subject of the
conclusion of a syllogism, but for the middle term of the syllogism. Similar arguments are
found in Sutton's Contra Cowton; see Riva, Tommaso Claxton, 34-35 n. 22.
69 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 892, II. 648-51).
70 "Ulterius sciendum est quod ens dicitur analogice de deo et de quocumque alio" (ibid.
[Schneider, ed., 884, II. 398-99]).

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561

For God is said 'being essentially', for he is his subsistent being, having all
perfection of being. But all else is said 'being by participation', since nothing else
is its being nor has all perfection of being, but participates in that being and
partially has some perfection of being according to a determinate grade
according to genus and to species. 71

There is another reason why 'being' cannot be said univocally of
God and creatures. Since there is a greater distance between God
and creatures than between substance and accidents, a fortiori, if
'being' is not said univocally in the predicamental context, much
less will it be said in the transcendental context. 72
It is not clear what type of analogy is to be used for 'being' in
the transcendental context, especially given Sutton's belief in
God's transcendence over and distance from creatures. We could
be led to the following conclusion, based on what we know of his
ideas on analogy in the categorical context. He is advocating an
analogy of attribution, a 'one to another' type of analogy, based
on a relation of prior and posterior. 'Being' is said first of
substance and secondly of an accident that depends on it. In the
context of Aquinas's metaphysics of being, God is subsistent
being, identical with his act of existence; therefore, 'being' is said
first of God and secondly of creatures since they participate in the
act of being in different grades according to genus and species. In
arguing for the 'one to another' analogy in both the categorical
and transcendental contexts, Sutton would show himself to be a
faithful follower of Aquinas.
But it turns out that Sutton's views on this question are more
subtle and, in fact, not easy to discern. Recall that the titles of
questions 33 and 34 show that they are both treating the divine
names. Question 33 says, "It is asked concerning the divine
names, and firstly, whether names which are said of God and
creatures are said uni vocally of God and creatures." Question 34
71 "Deus enirn dicitur ens essentialiter, quia est suurn esse subsistens habens ornnern
perfectionern essendi. Sed ornne aliud dicitur ens per participationern, quia nullurn aliud est
suurn esse nee habet ornnern perfectionern essendi, sed participat ipsurn esse et partialiter
habet aliquarn essendi perfectionern secundurn gradurn deterrninaturn ad genus et ad speciern"
(ibid. [Schneider, ed., 884, lines 399-404]).
72 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 884, lines 404-10).

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

says, "Secondly, it is asked whether this name 'substance', as it is
a name of a most general genus, is said univocally of God and
caused substances; and this is to ask whether God is in the
predicament of substance. " 73 In the latter question, Sutton argues
that while 'substance' cannot be predicated of God, the term
signifying the mode of being taken from created substances (i.e.,
ens per se), can be predicated of God analogically. Hence to
answer our question concerning the type of analogy to be used in
the transcendental context with the term 'being', it is wise first to
follow Sutton in his discussion in question 33 of the divine names
(e.g., 'wise' and 'good') and then return finally to his discussion
in question 34 about 'ens per se' said analogically of God and
creatures.
III. THE DIVINE NAMES: QUESTION 33
When discussing the divine names in question 33, Sutton again
is guided by Aquinas's method of elimination. That is, he first
eliminates the use of univocity in this context, arguing that
'wisdom' and 'goodness' when said of creatures signify a perfection contained in a category (i.e., that of quality), and as such
include in their formal meaning some limitation, for an imperfect
mode of being is implied. But God has no such limited quality of
goodness or wisdom, but is his goodness and wisdom. Sutton
continues his reasoning, eliminating the chance equivocals
(aequivoca a casu).
Therefore the formal meanings of such names, as they are said of God and
creatures, are not totally the same, and so they are not said univocally; nor even
purely equivocally, such that they be chance equivocals. For those names had
first been imposed to signify the perfections of creatures, and then intentionally

73 "Quaeritur de nominibus divinis, et primo, utrum nomina quae dicuntur de deo et
creaturis, dicantur univoce de deo et de creaturis" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33
[Schneider, ed., 909]). "Secundo quaeritur, utrum hoc nomen substantia, prout est nomen
generis generalissimi, dicatur univoce de deo et substantiis causatis; et hoc est quaerere, utrum
deus sit in praedicamento substantiae" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 34 [Schneider, ed., 936]).

SUTTON ON UNNOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

563

attributed to God. Hence they are not chance equivocals. It remains, therefore,
that they are deliberate equivocals, which are called analogicals. 74

He then proceeds to discuss in detail and very clearly the type of
deliberate equivocals or analogical terms the divine names are.
But since deliberate equivocals are said in four ways, as has been said, we must
find out in which of those ways those names are said analogically. And it is held
commonly that they are said according to an order or respect to one, as 'health'
is said of diverse things according to a relation to one. 75

Here, reciting the "common opinion," he states the position of
Aquinas, found in his most representative works on this question,
such as the Summa contra Gentiles, De Potentia, and the Summa
Theologiae. In these works, Aquinas had distinguished two types
of analogical predication, 'many to one' and 'one to another'. 76
The first predicates something of two things because they are
related to a third thing, as being is predicated of, say, quality and
74 "Rationes igitur illorum nominum non sunt totaliter eaedem, prout dicuntur de deo et
prout dicuntur de aliis, et ita non univoce dicuntur, nee etiam pure aequivoce, ita quad sint
aequivoca a casu. Ista enim nomina primo imposita fuerunt ad significandum perfectiones
creaturarum, et ex proposito sunt attributa deo. Non igitur sunt aequivoca a casu. Relinquitur
igitur quad sint aequivoca a consilio, quae vocantur analoga" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord.
33 [Schneider, ed., 922, II. 370-76]).
75 "Cum autem aequivoca a consilio dicantur quattuor modis, ut dictum est, videndum est,
quo illorum modorum ista nomina dicantur analogice, et ponitur comm uniter quad dicuntur
secundum ordinem vel respectum ad unum, sicut sanum dicitur de diversis secundum
habitudinem ad unum" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 922-23, II. 377-81]).
76 "And so it should be said otherwise that nothing may be predicated univocally of God
and a creature, but not that those things that are commonly predicated are predicated purely
equivocally, but rather analogically. But there are two modes of this type of predication. One
by which something is predicated of two things with respect to some third thing, as being [is
predicated] of quality and of quantity with respect to substance. With the other mode,
something is predicated of two with respect of one to the other, as being [is predicated] of
substance and of quantity" ("Et idea aliter dicendum est, quad de Deo et creatura nihil
praedicetur univoce; non tamen ea quae communiter praedicantur, pure aequivoce
praedicantur, sed analogice. Huius autem praedicationis duplex est modus. Unus quo aliquid
praedicatur de duobus per respectum ad aliquod tertium, sicut ens de qualitate et quantitate
per respectum ad substantiam. Alius modus est quo aliquid praedicatur de duobus per
respectum unius ad alterum, sicut ens de substantia et quantitate" [Thomas Aquinas, De
Potentia, q. 7, a. 7]). See Wippel, TheMetaphysicalThoughtofThomasAquinas, 565; Fabro,
Participation et causalite,523.

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MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

quantity, because both are related to a third, namely, substance.
The second predicates something of two things because one of
them is directly related to the other. In this way, being is
predicated of quantity and substance, because quantity is related
to substance. In these works, Aquinas argues for the second mode
of analogical predication as that holding between creatures and
God.
Sutton also makes this distinction and seems to be about to
decide, with Aquinas, for the 'one to another' analogy. 77 But at
this point in his discussion, he makes a crucial distinction, that
between things and the signification and imposition of names.
And that is well said considering the things about which these names are said, for
created things have an order to God as their cause. But considering the
signification of names, according to which analogy is principally considered, it
is not in this way that names are said of God and other things. For a man is not
said to be just or wise because he has an order to the justice or wisdom of God,
as being is said of quantity because it is of a being that is a substance. 78

The distinction is between the order of reality, how extramental
things are related to each other, and our imposition of names for
these realities, a distinction Aquinas himself makes in some of his
discussions of analogy. For example, in the Summa Theologiae
(STh I, q. 13, a. 6), he says that regarding the thing signified by
the name, the names are first said of God, then of creatures. But
as to the imposition of names, they are first imposed by us on
creatures which we know first. 79 In all the cases in which Aquinas
Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 923, II. 380-91).
ad res de quibus dicuntur haec nomina; omnes
enim res creatae habent ordinem ad deum sicut ad suam causam. Sed considerando ad
significationem nominum, secundum quam principaliter attenditur analogia, non isto modo
dicuntur nomina de deo et rebus aliis. Non enim ideo dicitur homo iustus vel sapiens, quia
habet ordinem ad iustitiam dei vel sapientiam, sicut ens dicitur de quantitate propter hoc,
quod est entis quod est substantia" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 923, II. 389-96]).
79 "as to the thing signified by the name, they [common perfections] are said firstly of God,
then of creatures, for from God such perfections flow into creatures. But as to the imposition
of the name, first they are imposed by us onto creatures which we first know" ("quantum ad
rem significatam per nomen, per prius dicuntur de Deo quam de creaturis, quia a Deo
huiusmodi perfectiones in creaturas manant. Sed quantum ad impositionem nominis, per prius
a no bis imponuntur creaturis, quas prius cognoscimus" [Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
77 Thomas

78 "Et illud bene dictum est, considerando

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

565

makes this distinction, it does not affect his affirmation that the
analogy between God and creatures is that of 'one to another'.
Not so for Sutton, who accords a crucial importance in his
theory of analogy to imposition. Since analogy is principally
concerned with the signification of names, he believes that
secondary imposition characterizes analogy, not the fact that one
thing is related in reality to another in some particular way. 80 The
term 'being' was first imposed to signify substances, and then
secondarily was imposed to signify accidents. This type of
secondary imposition is a necessary condition for the analogy of
attribution. But the order of imposition of the divine names in the
transcendental context is different from that of 'being' in the
predicamental context.
'being' is said analogously of substance and accident because first and foremost
it is imposed on substance and secondly on accident, insofar as accident is of that
substance. But it is not so with names said of God and other things, for they are
not imposed first and foremost on God and secondly attributed to other things,
but rather the reverse: first and foremost they were imposed on the other things,
then they were attributed to God, but not so that they would be said of God to
signify his relation to the other things. 81
I, q. 13, a. 6]). See also Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles I, c. 34; and Compendium

Theologiae I, c. 27.
80 "a name is not analogous for this reason, namely, because one of the things of which the
name is said has an order or dependence to another, but because the name that is imposed on
one is deliberately transferred to others to signify the relations of them to the one to which
it is first imposed, in such a way that analogy comes from the imposition of a name on diverse
things having an order and does not arise from this, that they have a real order or
dependence" ("nomen non est analogum propter illam causam, quia scilicet unum eorum, de
quibus dicitur nomen, habet ordinem vel dependentiam ad aliud, sed quia nomen, quod
imponitur uni, transfertur ex consilio ad alia ad significandum habitudines eorum ad unum,
cui primo imponitur, ita quod analogia est ex impositione nominis ad diversa habentia
ordinem, et non est ex hoc quad habent ordinem vel dependentiam real em" [fhomas Sutton,
Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 889-90, IL 562-68); see also 872, IL 78-79: "Nomina quae
attribuuntur deo, primo imponuntur ad significandam perfectionem in creaturis" ("The names
that are attributed to God are imposed first to signify the perfection in creatures")]).
81 "dicitur ens analogice de substantia et accidente, quia per prius imponitur substantiae et
per posterius accidenti, in quantum accidens est ipsius substantiae. Non sic autem nomina
dicta de deo et rebus aliis; non enim sic imponuntur prius deo et posterius attribuuntur rebus
aliis, sed potius e converso: prius imposita fuerunt rebus aliis, deinde fuenmt attributa deo,
non tamen sic quad dicerentur de deo ad significandum habitudinem eius ad res alias"
(Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 [Schneider, ed., 923-24, II. 397-403]).

566

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

They are firstly imposed to signify creaturely perfections for the
same reason given by Aquinas: "For according as things are more
known by us, they are first named. " 82 Hence the terms 'wise' and
'good' were first imposed to signify virtuous qualities in human
beings, and secondarily were transferred to signify the divine
attributes. Sutton immediately draws his own conclusion,
distancing himself from the "common opinion": "And so it seems
that properly speaking those [divine] names are not said
analogically in that way, that is, to one. " 83
Having broken with the "common opinion" and rejected
equivocals ad unum (i.e., in relation to one), Sutton proceeds to
reject two other types of deliberate equivocals. The divine names
are not said analogously ab uno (i.e., in relation to one origin):
though it is true that a human being's goodness is from God, he
"is not said 'good' because his goodness is from God." 84 Nor are
they said by resemblance: although a human being does in fact
resemble God insofar as he is wise or good, this is not the reason
for the attribution of the name to the person. 85 "It remains,
therefore, that the names are said of God and other things in the
fourth way, that is, according to proportion. " 86 These, it will be
recalled, are for Sutton the only terms that can properly be called
'analogical', any other being called 'analogical' only in a broader
sense.
With this type of analogy, Sutton is proposing a likeness based
on two proportions: the number six is like four in that four is
82 "Secundum enim quod res sunt nobis magis notae, secundum hoc prius nominantur."
See also Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 921, II. 343-44).
83 "Et ideo videtur quod proprie loquendo non dicuntur ista nomina analogice illo modo,
scilicet ad unum" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 [Schneider, ed., 924, 403-5]).
84 "quamvis bonitas creaturae descendat a bonitate dei quantum ad esse, non tamen
quantum ad attributionem nominis. Non enim ideo dicitur homo bonus, quia sua bonitas est
a bonitate dei, et similiter est aliis nominibus" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924, lines 407-10]).
85 "Quamvis enim omnes res habeant aliquam similitudinem ad deum, ut sapientia hominis
ad sapientiam dei et bonitas hominis ad bonitatem dei, non tamen propter hoc dicitur homo
bonus vel sapiens, quia habet similitudinem bonitatis dei et sapientiae dei" (ibid. [Schneider,
ed., 924, II. 412-16]).
86 "Relinquitur igitur quod nomina dicta de deo et de rebus aliis dicantur quarto modo,
scilicet secundum proportionem, prout hoc nomen principium dicitur de unitate et de puncto
et de fonte" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924, lines 418-20]).

SUTTON ON lJNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

567

related to two as six is related to three, Sutton gives numerous
examples, showing the proper way of speaking analogically of
God and humans:
For as a man knows the highest causes, and so is called wise, so God knows the
highest causes perfectly, and so deservedly ought to be called wise .. , . Likewise,
as a man has understanding of a thing through its proper cause, and so is called
a knower, so God understands in a most perfect way the order of all causes and
effects, and so, because of such a proportion, ought to be called a knower, . , .
Also similarly, as a man has understanding of principles without discoursing, so
God knows all things without discoursing; so as a man is called intelligent, so is
God, ... And even further, as a man has a correct pattern in his mind of things
to be made (which idea in the mind of the artisan is called art), so also God has
the patterns of all things which are made in his intellect And so, according to
such a proportion, a man is called 'artisan' as also is God .... Again, as man is
called 'just' who gives to each one what is his, this, however, maximally pertains
to God, for if he wishes something to be done, he wills to that person those
things necessary for that thing to be done, for those things are as if owed to the
person that he may have them. So, according to such a proportion, God is called
'just'. , .. Again, a man is called generous since he gives without expecting from
the donation anything for himself. But God gives all good things without gaining
for himself anything from it. And so according to this proportion, as man is
called 'generous', so also God. 87

As is well known, Aquinas in De Veritate (De Verit., q, 2, a. 11)
had proposed such an analogy for the divine names used of God
and creatures. After concluding that 'knowledge' is not said of
God and creatures univocally or equivocally, he concludes it is
87 "Sicut enim homo cognoscit altissimas causas et ideo dicitur sapiens, ita deus cognoscit
altissimas causas perfecte et ideo merito debet dici sapiens, ... Similiter sicut homo habet
cognitionem rei per propriam causam et ideo sciens dicitur, ita deus omnium causarum et
effectuum ordinem cognoscit modo perfectissimo, et ita propter talem proportionem debet
dici sciens. , . , Similiter etiam sicut homo habet cognitionem principiorum absque discursu,
ita et deus omnia cognoscit absque discursu, et ideo sicut homo dicitur intelligens, ita et deus.
, .. Adhuc autem sicut homo habet rectam rationem factibilium in mente, quae ratio in mente
artificis dicitur ars, ita et deus rationes omnium quae fiunt habet in intellectu suo, Secundum
igitur talem proportionem homo dicitur artifex et deus, . , , Adhuc sicut homo dicitur iustus,
qui tribuit unicuique quod suum est, hoc autem maxime deo convenit, quia ex hoc quod vult
aliquid, vult ei omnia quae ad ipsum requiruntur; illa enim sunt quasi debita ei, ut habeat Sic
secundum proportionem talem deus dicitur iustus. Adhuc homo ex hoc, quod dat non propter
aliquod commodum, quod exspectet ex datione, dicitur liberalis, deus autem omnia bona dat
absque hoc, quod aliquid exinde sibi accrescat; secundum hanc igitur proportionem, sicut
homo dicitur liberalis, ita et deus" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 924-25, 11. 421-43]).

568

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

said analogically, that is, "according to a proportion." He
continues by making a distinction between two types of agreement
in proportion. The first is that two things are proportioned to one
another in such a way that there is a determinate relation or
distance between them, as the number two is related to a unit as
its double. The second is that two things are proportioned to one
another in such a way that there is no such determined relation to
one another; rather, the agreement is based on the similarity of
two proportions to one another. As mentioned above, the number
six is like four in that four is related to two as six is related to
three. Aquinas describes the first as an analogy of proportion, and
the second as an analogy of proportionality. 88 Finally, it is clear
that here he argues that only the second is appropriate to
predication of God and creatures, since there can be no
determinate relation between God and creatures. 89
Sutton's terminology is different from that of Aquinas in De
Veritate: Sutton uses "analogy of proportion" (analogia secundum
proportionem) 90 for Aquinas's "analogy of proportionality"; both
terms refer to an agreement based on the similarity of two
proportions to one another. It is clear that Sutton uses this type of
analogy when treating the divine names, but not for the reason
given by Aquinas in the De Veritate passage. It is not in order to
protect the transcendence of God that the analogy of proportionality is upheld, 91 but rather because of the fact that, for
Sutton, all other types of deliberate equivocals are inappropriate.
Again, Aquinas held this position on the analogy of proportionality only in this passage of De Veritate, and in subsequent
discussions of the analogy of the divine names (in, e.g., the
Summa contra Gentiles, the Compendium Theologiae, De
Potentia, and the Summa Theologiae) he abandons all mention of

Thomas Aquinas, De Veritate, q. 2, a. 11.
Ibid.
90 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 918, I. 247).
91 We should perhaps not rule this out entirely in the case of Sutton. In question 3 2, when
he briefly discusses the transcendental context, as we have seen, he points out an asymmetry
between that context and the categorical context. See note 72, above.
88

89

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

569

this type of analogy, and returns to that of his earlier work,
namely, the analogy of 'one to another'.
Hence, in his final and considered position, Aquinas uses the
analogy of 'one to another' with regard to 'being' in the
categorical context and also with regard to 'being' and the usual
divine names as 'wise' and 'good' in the transcendental context.
Sutton uses the analogy of 'one to another' for 'being' in the
categorical context, and for the usual divine names he uses his
analogy of proportion in the transcendental context. What,
finally, of 'being' in the transcendental context?
IV. BEING IN THE TRANSCENDENTAL CONTEXT REVISITED:
QUESTION 34

In question 34, Sutton asks, "Secondly, it is asked whether this
name 'substance', as it is a name of a most general genus, is said
univocally of God and caused substances; and this is to ask
whether God is in the predicament of substance." He replies that
'substance' cannot be predicated of God, since, as we have seen,
'substance' signifies the thing under the aspect of standing under,
while 'being', said of substance, signifies the thing under the
aspect of being per se. 92 Since God can in no way be said to 'stand
under' anything, 'substance' cannot be said of God, and God
cannot be in the genus of substance. 93 On the other hand, 'being
per se' can be said both of God and created substances, not
however univocally.
To the nineteenth [objection] it should be said that God is a being per se and a
caused substance is per se a being, but it is not said univocally: God is a per se
being with caused substances, but analogically. For God is aper se being not only
formally, as he is not a being in another, but also causally, because he is not a
being through any cause, as other substances are beings through God causally. 94

92 "Substantia enim significat rem sub ratione substandi, ens autem dictum de substantia
significat rem sub ratione essendi per se" (ibid. [Schneider, ed., 883, 11. 363-65]).
93 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 34 (Schneider, ed., 951, II. 425-47).
94 Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 950-51, 11. 418-23).

570

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

In addition, Sutton, following a Thomistic metaphysics of
being, divides being per se in two: that of a being that is its esse
and that of beings that differ from their esse.95 But what type of
analogy is appropriate when both God and created substances are
said to be per se? Unfortunately, in question 34 he says only that
'being per se' is said of God and created substances analogically,
without stating explicitly which type of analogy.
E. J. Ashworth suggests that it is not a type of analogy that we
have mentioned so far, but rather what Thomas Aquinas and
Albert the Great called the "agreement or analogy of imitation."
This was a type of analogy not discussed by the logicians, but
introduced by theologians to grapple with the difficult case of
creatures imitating God without sharing any kind of common
nature, genus, or species. 96
Alessandro Conti, however, is right to remark that it is Sutton's
analogy of proportion, Aquinas's analogy of proportionality of De
Veritate. All the divine names, including being, are said of God
with this type of analogy. 97 Question 33, which Conti quotes in
support, does not explicitly talk of 'being', but only of the other
divine names, as 'wisdom' and 'goodness'. Nevertheless, he is
right to treat 'being' as a divine name, for as we have seen from
their titles, Sutton intends to treat the divine names first in
question 33 and then in question 34. Also, in question 33 he
extends his use of the analogy of proportion to "all those names
which absolutely signify perfection," 98 which I take to include
'being'.
Ibid. (Schneider, ed., 952-53, II. 469-78).
Ashworth, "Analogy in Thomas Sutton,'' 296.
97 "So Sutton specifies that 'being' (as every other name that one wishes to attribute to God
or to creatures) is analogous to them [i.e., God and creatures] in the second way (that is,
according to proportion), and [being is analogous] to the ten categories in the fourth way [that
is, to one]" ("Orbene, precisa Sutton, l'ente [come ogni altro nome che si voglio attribuire sia
a Dio che alle creature] e analogo rispetto ad essi nel secondo senso [cioe secundum
proportionem], e rispetto alle dieci categorie nel quarto [that is, ad unum]" [Conti, "La
composizione metafisica,'' 326]).
98 "Similiter intelligendum est de omnibus aliis nominibus, quae absolute significant
perfectionem. Omnia dicuntur de deo et rebus aliis secundum proportionem, et ideo
propriissime dicuntur analoga et non sunt univoca" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33
[Schneider, ed., 925, 11. 445-48J). See also Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 34 (Schneider, ed.,
949-50, 11. 386-99).
95

96

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

571

There are two further reasons to believe Sutton is talking here
about his analogy of proportion. First, the same problem for the
analogy of attribution, namely, that of the order of imposition,
applies to 'being' as to the other divine names: as 'wise' is first
imposed to signify a creaturely perfection and then is transferred
to God with a second imposition, so also is 'being'.
To the seventh it should be said that this name 'being' is attributed to God, as it
is taken from creatures, according to that signification with which it is said of
substances; for thus it signifies the same as being per se. It is said, however,
analogically of God and other substances. 99

On Sutton's own principles, the analogy of attribution is inappropriate for predicating 'being' of God and created substances.
Secondly, we can easily construct a sentence that illustrates the
analogy of proportion for being on the model of Sutton's
sentences for the other divine names: "As a caused substance, not
being in another, is being per se formally, so God, neither being
in another nor being caused by another, is being per se formally
and causally." As an ontological basis for such an assertion, Sutton
appeals to the Thomistic metaphysics of being, with God as
subsistent being and creatures as participants in being according
to the limitations of genus and species. 100
In sum, when Sutton discusses briefly in question 32 the
transcendental context and claims that 'being' is said of God and
creatures by analogy, he is only concerned to show that univocity
and equivocity are inappropriate and analogy is appropriate for
the divine names. It is only in questions 33 and 34, where he
explicitly treats the divine names at length, that he spells out
which specific type of analogy is appropriate for all these names:
the analogy of proportion.
His reliance on the analogy of proportion helps him explain
once again why some of his contemporaries have been misled to
99 "Ad septimum dicendum quod hoc nomen ens attribuitur deo, prout accipitur a creaturis
secundum illam significationem qua dicitur de substantiis; sic enim significat idem quod ens
per se. Dicitur tamen analogice de deo et aliis substantiis" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 34
[Schneider, ed., 948, II. 335-38]).
100 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 884, II. 398-410).

572

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.].

think the "divine names" are univocal. 101 Basing himself on a text
of Aristotle's Physics (Phys. 7.4.249a21-25), he holds that there
is a gradation among equivocals. The chance equivocals are
farthest from univocal terms, for there is only a community of
name. Among the deliberate equivocals, those said according to
a similitude, as a person and the picture of the person, or a house
in the mind of the builder and the real house, can be said to be
partly univocal, though not totally, for the ratio of the name is
partly the same and partly diverse. 102 Other equivocals are near to
the univocals, namely, those that have a similarity either in genus
or in proportion. An example of the first is 'body' said of celestial
bodies and corruptible bodies. Although a natural scientist
recognizes that the term 'body' is equivocal, since the types of
matter involved in the two cases are different and so they are not
in the same physical genus, they do agree insofar as the same
logical genus, 'body'; because of this agreement, the term 'body'
as said of them seems to be univocal. Finally, some equivocals are
said "according to proportion," as the person who presides at a
school is said to be a magister, as also one who presides over a
house: "for as this one is the rector of school children, so that one
is the rector of a house." Because the nearness of the proportion
is so close, the term seems to some to be univocal, when it is not.
Sutton gives the standard example of principium for this type of
equivocal according to proportion, the closest to uni vocals. Hence
he can summarize this view on the analogy according to
proportion:
All [such names] are said of God and other things according to proportion, and
so most properly are they called analogical and not univocal, for they are not
said of God and other things altogether according to the same ratio. However,
such names as are properly analogical, among all analogicals [i.e., other
deliberate equivocals] maximally recede from the ratio of pure equivocals and
maximally approach the ratio of univocals. And so it is not surprising if some say

101 Thomas Sutton, Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 920-22,

II. 315-59).
Sutton, Quaest. ord. 32 (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 458-59); Thomas Sutton,
Quaest. ord. 33 (Schneider, ed., 920, ll. 308-14).
102 Thomas

SUTTON ON UNIVOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

573

that they are univocal, for what is not far from some species seems to be of that
species, even if it is not, 103

Nevertheless, there seems to be some tension in Sutton's
doctrine. He holds that names that are "properly analogical" (i.e.,
said according to the analogy of proportion) are, of all equivocals,
closest to univocal names, and hence more like univocal names
than are equivocals ad unum, which are used for substances and
accidents, as we have seen. But in question 32, he had stated that
there is a much greater distance between the being of whatever creature and the
divine being than between the being of whatever accident and the being of
substance, and so much less can being be said univocally of God and a creature
than of substance and accident For with respect to God, others are more nonbeings than beings. 104

In this passage, he claims that 'being' said of God and creatures is
further from univocal terms than 'being' said of substance and
accident, based on the greater dissimilarity holding between God
and creatures. 105
CONCLUSION

Despite these ambiguities, Sutton's pos1t10n on analogy is
nuanced and many-faceted. It is true that his defense of analogy
against Scotus's univocal concept of being does not take into
103 "Omnia dicuntur de deo et rebus aliis secundum proportionem,
et idea propriissime
dicuntur analoga et non sunt univoca, quia non secundum ration em omnino eandem dicuntur
de deo et de rebus aliis, Talia tamen quae sunt proprie analoga, maxime recedunt a ratione
pure aequivocorum inter omnia analoga et maxime accedunt ad rationem univocorum; et idea
non est mirum, si aliqui dicant ea esse univoca, quia quod non multum distat ab aliqua specie,
videntur esse illius speciei, cum tamen non sit" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest, ord, 33 [Schneider,
ed., 925-26, II. 446-53]),
104 "Et multo longius distat esse cuiuslibet creaturae ab esse divino, quam esse accidentis
cuiuscumque ab esse substantiae, propter quad multo minus potest ens dici de deo et creatura
univoce quam de substantia et accidente, Respectu enim dei alia sunt magis non-entia quam
entia. Unde Augustinus <licit VII De trinitate, c, 32: 'Fortasse solum deum oportet dici
essentiam, Est enim vere solus, quia incommutabilis est'" (Thomas Sutton, Quaest, ord, 32
[Schneider, ed,, 884, II. 404-10).
105 See also ibid. (Schneider, ed., 886, II. 451-59).

574

MARK G. HENNINGER, S.J.

consideration the full rationale or arguments the Subtle Doctor
had marshaled for his new position. This may be because Scotus's
thinking on this topic was not fully available at Oxford at the time
of Sutton's disputes; it is more likely Sutton, being among the first
to confront such novelty, was not in a position really to grasp
Scotus's doctrine, so complex and multifaceted, and so very unlike
that of the Angelic Doctor. 106
In presenting his own position on analogy, he shows himself an
able 'continuator' of Aquinas, to use Lewry's term. 107 Sutton is
indeed a true and passionate follower of Aquinas. But to
appreciate his own teaching, we need to understand it in two
distinct contexts: in the predicamental context, he argues for the
"common opinion," an analogy of attribution of 'one to another',
while in the transcendental context, he argues for the analogy of
proportion. His reasons for this latter are not, principally, those
of Aquinas in De Veritate, that is, to safeguard the transcendence
of God. Nor are they to be seen as foreshadowing Cajetan's
championing of the "analogy of proportionality" as the only true
analogy; nor are Sutton's the well-known preoccupations of
Cajetan concerning intrinsic and extrinsic denomination. The
reason for his taking of his position in the transcendental context
can be traced to a characteristic that helps us understand the
novelty and peculiarity of his commentary on the Categories.
There he used the theory of supposition in an attempt to deal with
particular problems that arose in the context of a generally
nominalist approach to the treatise while still maintaining on
many points a common medieval reading that is realist. 108 In our
case, Sutton takes very seriously the demands of an order of
imposition of names, so that in the case of God and creatures, the
"common opinion," that of an analogy of attribution, is ruled out.
106 See the very helpful remarks on Sutton's relation to Aquinas, Henry of Ghent, Giles of
Rome, and Duns Scotus in Conti, "La composizione metafisica," 359-60.
107 Lewry, "Two Continuators of Aquinas."
108 Alessandro D. Conti, "Thomas Sutton's Commentary on the Categories According to
MS Oxford, Merton College 289," in The Rise of British Logic: Acts of the Sixth European
Symposium on Medieval Logic and Semantics. Balliol College, Oxford, 19-24 June, 1983, ed.
P. Osmund Lewry (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1985), 177-81.

SUTTON ON UNNOCATION, EQUIVOCATION, AND ANALOGY

575

Hence in both his commentary on the Categories and in these
Ordinary Questions, Sutton shows himself very sensitive to
linguistic and semantic questions, whether they deal with
supposition, signification, or imposition. It was a question of this
type, rather than a strictly theological or metaphysical question,
that forced him to find his own response, modifying, critically, the
"common opinion" on analogy.

The Thomist 70 (2006): 577-603

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE:
A METAPHYSICS OF THE INCARNATION
VICTOR SALAS, JR.
Saint Louis University
Saint Louis, Missouri

T

HE FOURTH ARTICLE of Thomas Aquinas's Quaestio
disputata De Unione Verbi incarnati has for centuries
perplexed and frustrated the interpretive efforts of his most
earnest and faithfol commentators. The difficulty stems, in part,
from Aquinas's introduction of a second, human esse (in addition
to the divine esse) into the metaphysical constitution of Christ. He
thus departs from and even seems to contradict his standard
account of Christ's esse, for, time and again, he insists that Christ
has only one esse, the divine and eternal esse of the Word. 1 This
difficulty is compounded by the fact that De Unione itself offers
little to no explanation as to what metaphysical status Aquinas is
willing to grant Christ's human esse. He does state that the human
esse is not accidental, but neither is it, he adds, the primary or
substantial esse whereby Christ subsists. 2 This leads to the obvious
questions: what is the human esse, what role does it serve, and
how is this account compatible with what Aquinas says elsewhere?

1 See Summa Theologiae III, q. 17, a. 2; III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Quaestiones de quolibet
9, q. 2, a. 2; Compendium Theologiae, c. 212.
2 Quaestio disputata De Unione Verbi incamati, a. 4: "Which being, although it is not
accidental-since 'man' is not predicated accidentally of the Son of God, as is shown
above-is not, however, the principle being of its supposit, but secondary" ("Quod esse, etsi
non sit esse accidenrale--quia homo non praedicatur accidentaliter de Filio Dei, ut supra [art.
1] habitum est--non tamen est esse principale sui suppositi, sed secundarium" [Quaestiones
Disputatae, ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin: Marietti, 1949), 2:432]).

577

578

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

In what follows I shall offer a way of reading De Unione that
agrees both with Aquinas's other Christo logical texts and with his
standard metaphysical account of Christ's esse. But, mindful that
one cannot expect more certainty than his subject allowsespecially when it involves offering a textual interpretation of an
exceedingly vague text-in the present case I can only propose a
plausible interpretation, one developed, moreover, in conjunction
with texts other than De Unione itself. Indeed, given the vague
character of this text, it seems to me that no interpretation of it
can boast of apodictic certainty; and so, if my account casts even
the dimmest light upon what seems to be a contradiction, it is
worthy of consideration.
I submit that, contrary to appearance, there is no contradiction
involved in Aquinas's treatment of the Incarnation in De Unione
with respect to esse. Ultimately, I shall argue that the key to resolving the above-mentioned difficulty rests in Aquinas's notion
of Christ as a composite person. This very notion has allowed
him, as Michael Gorman has shown, 3 to escape a number of
criticisms launched at his Christology, especially by contemporary
thinkers. My contention is that Aquinas's understanding of Christ
as a composite person can also shed some light-in a manner
consistent both with his metaphysical commitments and with his
other Christological writings-on the human esse introduced in
De Unione. 4

I
The easiest way to overcome the present difficulty would
simply be to dismiss the problematic text or to disavow it as

3 Michael Gorman, "Christ as Composite according to Aquinas," Traditio 55 (2000): 143-

57.
4 For a discussion on De Unione Verbi incamati-its
authenticity, dating, and the
scholarship concerning it-see Marie-Helene Deloffre, Thomas d'Aquin: Question Disputee
L'Union Du Verbe Incame (De Unione Verbi incamati) (Paris: J. Vrin, 2000). See also A.
Patfoort, L'unite d'etre dan le Christ d'apres S. Thomas: A la croisee de l'ontologie et de la
Christologie (Paris: Desclee, 1964).

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

579

spurious. This is what some, such as Louis Billot,5 do, whereas
others, Cajetan for instance, being more conservative in their
assessment of the text's authenticity, argue that De Unione is an
early text eventually rejected by a more mature Aquinas. 6 However, as Jean-Pierre Torrell reports in his grand survey of the
Angelic Doctor's opera omnia, the Leonine commission, through
a careful examination of the manuscript tradition, demonstrates
the work's authenticity beyond any shadow of a doubt. 7
Moreover, the commission judges De Unione to be a mature
Thomistic text. Torrell, along with James Weisheipl and Palemon
Glorieux, places the text's composition in the spring of 1272,
relatively concurrent with that of the Summa Theologiae's Tertia
Pars, in which is located (q. 17, a. 2) one of Aquinas's parallel
treatments on Christ's being. 8 The historical evidence, then, will
not support dismissing De Unione as either spurious or
"youthful."
However, recent scholarship, following Cajetan's approach,
has in fact appealed to the chronology of Aquinas's works to
develop a solution to our present difficulty. Donald Goergen, for
instance, suggests that De Unione was written only a few months
prior to Aquinas's authoritative solution, which can be found in
the Tertia Pars. "Thomas' opinion in the Tertia Pars of his Summa
shows a development in his own thinking on the incarnation,"
Goergen writes. "In the De Unione, article 4, Thomas is still
groping toward an adequate solution, and there he allows Christ
to have a human esse."9 In other words, De Unione must ultimately be dismissed, not as spurious, or as immature, but as a
work in progress, so to speak.
Yet this position seems highly problematic. Goergen's
argument depends upon the extraordinarily difficult, and not to
5 Jean-Pierre Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas: The Person and His Work (Washington, D. C.:
The Catholic University of America Press, 1996), 206.
6 Ibid.
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid., 146-47, 206.
9 Donald J. Goergen, O.P., The Jesus of Christian History (Collegeville, Minn.: The
Liturgical Press, 1992), 220.

580

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

mention controversial, task of fixing the date of De Unione to
within a matter of months prior to the composition of the
relevant question in the TertiaPars. Furthermore, Goergen's claim
that the Tertia Pars represents a "development" in Aquinas's
thought seems untenable in light of the fact that in his other
works, both youthful and more mature, 10 he advances arguments
similar to the one found in the Tertia Pars. Far from representing
a development in Aquinas's thought, the Tertia Pars, according to
Goergen' s reasoning, suggests instead a regression. It seems to me,
then, that Goergen does not take seriously the difficulty that De
Unione poses since he fails to offer an account of why Aquinas
vacillates back and forth on this issue.
Other scholars, however, such as Richard Cross and Jason
West, have taken Aquinas's introduction of a human esse seriously
yet have held that he only introduces this notion experimentally. 11
Cross sees it as Aquinas's attempt to move from a whole-part
model of the Incarnation to a substance-accident model. West is
unable to account for Aquinas's "experiment" at all and eventually
rejects the human esse of De Unione as incompatible with an
overall Thomistic metaphysics of esse. I am fundamentally in
agreement with West concerning his criticisms of Cross's
interpretation of Aquinas's whole-part model of the Incarnation
as incoherent (of which I speak more bellow) and concerning his
insistence upon Aquinas's "one-esse view" with respect to Christ's
being. Be that as it may, I do believe that if one considers Christ's
being from the perspective of his composite personhood, then,
without doing violence to the unity of his divine and eternal esse,
there remains open to Aquinas a way to consider Christ's esse as
a human esse.

10 See, e.g., III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; and Quad!.

9, q. 2, a. 2.
See Richard Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incamtion: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), 64 n. 46. Cross accepts the same chronology of De
Unione; however, unlike Goergen he does offer a careful analysis of Aquinas's metaphysical
development with regards to the Incarnation in order to account for what is at issue in his
introduction of a human esse; see J. L. A. West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in
Christ," The Thomist 66 (2002): 231-50.
11

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

581

II

The point has been made before, 12 and is well worth making
again, that Aquinas develops his metaphysics of the Incarnation
according to the parameters set forth in the Council of
Chakedon, which, put very succinctly, held that Christ is one
person subsisting in two distinct natures, human and divine. 13 By
the thirteenth century, the three Christological opinions (the
assumptus homo, subsistence, and habitus theories) summed up in
Peter Lombard's Sententiae would also play a crucial role in the
development of Aquinas's metaphysics of the Incarnation, for, as
he saw it, only one opinion (viz., the subsistence theory) escapes
the charge of heresy. 14 His reason for rejecting the other two
theories was that each in its own way led to a kind of
Nestorianism condemned by the Church's councils. 15
With these theological considerations firmly in hand, Aquinas
begins the delicate task of developing a metaphysics that could
safely navigate a minefield of potential heresy but also illuminate,
as far as possible, the doctrine of the Incarnation. It is in this
context, then, that the unity of Christ's being (esse) becomes a
significant issue for Aquinas, for in developing his metaphysics of
the Incarnation the question "how many esse are there in Christ?"
arises. To understand his treatment of this question, it may first
be helpful to determine his understanding of esse as it pertains to
the issue at hand. In both his Commentary on the Sentences and
his Quaestiones Quodlibetales Aquinas follows his familiar
practice of making a distinction between being as true and being
12 See Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 143-44; Michael B. Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology
of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's Subsistence Theory," The Thomist 65 (2001): 40939; Eleonore Stump, Aquinas (New York: Routledge, 2003), 407ff.
13 See G. Bardy, "Le «Brigrandage d'Ephese'» et le Concile de Chalcedoine," in Histoire
de l'eglise: Depuis !es origines jusqu'a nos jours, vol. 4, De la mort de Theodose a!'election de
Gregoire le Grand (Paris: Bloud & Gay, 1945), 228-40, esp. 235.
14 Thomas Aquinas, STh III, q. 2, a. 6; see Walter Principe, "St. Thomas on the HabitusTheory of the Incarnation," in St. Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies
(Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies Press, 1974), 1:381; Raschko, "Aquinas's
Theology of the Incarnation," 414-19; West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ,"
232-33.
15 STh III, q. 2, a. 6.

582

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

in the categories. 16 "According to the first way," he explains,
"[esse] is what signifies the truth of a proposition, what is a copula
... and this esse is not in reality [in re] but in the mind, which
joins a predicate with a subject. " 17 In this sense being (esse)
pertains to the knower and is attributed to the mind's activity of
forming propositions or enunciations (enuntiationes). 18 Hence, it
is not necessary for something to be in reality (in rerum
natura)-which is to say, extramental or having some ontological
constitution outside the knower-in order to attribute being (esse)
to it. It need only be something about which a true proposition
can be formed. Accordingly, even privations or negations may be
said 'to be'. 19
In another way, however, esse pertains to the object known, in
which case it refers to the act of being (actus entis), that whereby
something is in reality (in rerum natura). "In another way, esse is
said to be the act of being inasmuch as it is being [actus entis in
quantum est ens]," Aquinas explains, "that is, that by which
16 Thomas finds the source of this distinction often enough in Aristotle's Metaphysics (e.g.,
D.7.1017a22-22-35). However, Aristotle himself does not divide being simply into two
divisions but four. In condensing the four divisions into two, Aquinas reveals his own
metaphysical approach to the question of being in which being is seen as something both
essential but also acci<\lental.See Joseph Owens, "The Accidental and Essential Character of
Being in the Doctrine St. Thomas Aquinas," in St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God:
The Collected Papers oYJosephOwens, C.Ss.R., ed. John Catan (Albany, N.Y.: State University
of New York Press, 1r80), 78-90. See also Scott Youree Watson, Esse in the Philosophy of
Saint Thomas Aquinas (Rome: Gregorian, 1972); and John Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought
of Thomas Aquinas (Wfighington, D. C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2000), 3135.
17 III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "Uno modo, secundum quad significant veritatem propositionis,
secundum quad est copula .... Et hoc esse non est in re, sed in mente quae coniungit
subjectum cum prredicato" (Scriptum super sententiis, ed. R. P. Maria Fabianus Moos, O.P.
[Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933], 3:238); cf. Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2, "Vno modo secundum quad est
copula uerbalis significans compositionem cuiuslibet enuntiantionis quam anima facit, uncle
hoc esse non est aliquid in rerum natura, set tantum in actu anime componentis et diuidentis"
(Quaestiones de quolibet, Leonine ed., vol. 25.1 [Rome: Commissio Leonina, 1996], 94, 11.
34-38); cf. De Ente et Essentia, c. 1.
ig Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2: "[Being is said in a twofold manner.] In one way, according as it is
the verbal copula signifying the composition of whatever judgment the mind makes" ("[Esse
duplicter dicit.] Vno modo, secundum quad est copula uerbalis significans compositionem
cuiuslibet enuntiationis quam anima facit" [Leonine ed., 25.1:94, 11. 34-36]).
19 De Ente., c. 1.

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

583

something is denominated an actual being in reality. " 20 In this
sense esse refers to the ultimate principle or cause of a being's
reality, that by which something is designated as a being (ens) and
thus located within the categories. Aquinas writes, "And thus esse
is not attributed to things unless they are contained within the ten
categories; whence being [ens], of which such esse is said, is
divided into the ten categories. " 21 It is esse taken in this second
sense, as the actus entis, that pertains to the question of the unity
of Christ's being. 22
Aquinas adds further precision to this notion of esse before
addressing the question of the number of esse in Christ. His
distinctions, which we will describe below, are found in his
Commentary on the Sentences and Quaestiones Quodlibetales.
Indeed, as we shall see in what follows, these two works set the
foundation for what is subsequently proposed in the Compendium
Theologiae, Summa Theologiae, and De Unione Verbi incarnati. In
those two early works, Aquinas identifies the relationship between
esse and suppositum, which relationship is presupposed and of
paramount importance in the later writings.
First, concerning esse taken as the actus entis, he distinguishes
between subsistent and nonsubsistent esse.23 With respect to
subsistence, he suggests, in the Summa Theologiae, a twofold
understanding. In a reply to an objection concerning the
subsistence of the human soul, he states that subsistence refers to
(1) anything subsistent or (2) anything subsisting in its whole or
complete nature. 24 According to the first sense, neither accidents
nor material forms may be said to subsist since they do not have
20 Quad!. 9, q. 2, a. 2: "In another way, being is said to be that which pertains to the
nature of a thing .... And this being indeed is in the thing, it is the act of being resulting from
the principles of the thing" ("Alio modo esse dicitur actus entis in quantum est ens, id est quo
denominatur aliquid ens actu in rerum natura" [Leonine ed., 25 .1 :94, II. 43-46]). Cf. III Sent.,
d. 6, q. 2, a. 3: "Alia mada dicitur esse quad pertinet ad naturam rei. ... Et hoc quidem esse
in re est, et est actus entis resu!tans ex principiis rei" (Paris ed., 238).
21 Quadl. 9, q. 2, a. 2: "et sic esse non attribuitur nisi rebus ipsis quae in decem generibus
continentur, uncle ens a tali esse dictum per decem genera diuiditur" (Leonine ed., 25.1:94,
II. 43-46); cf. De Ente, c. 1.
22 III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2.
23 Cf. III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2; Quad!. 9, q. 2, a. 2.
24 STh I, q. 75, a. 2, ad. 1.

584

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

their own independent existence (the former always existing in
some subject, and the latter always informing some designated
matter). Yet this notion of subsistence does not exclude parts.
"[F] or a thing to exist per se," he notes, "it suffices sometimes that
it be not inherent, as an accident or material form; even though
it be part of something. " 25 Thus, even parts may be called
subsistent in the manner just described. 26
However, when discussing the manner in which esse-taken as
the actus entis-relates to subsistence, it is clear that Aquinas has
in mind primarily the second sense of subsistence, namely, that
which pertains to a complete whole, for he writes, "[N]either the
nature of a thing nor its parts are properly said to be [esse], if
being [esse] is taken in the accepted sense; but similarly neither are
accidents, but the complete suppositum, which is in virtue of all
these [i.e., by virtue of its constitutive principles]." 27 Thus when
referring to subsistence, taken as a complete whole, he means it to
coincide with the notion of a suppositum. In contrast to
supposita-that is, complete, subsistent wholes-are those things
that lack completion, and that therefore do not subsist through
themselves, but through another. "All [else] which does not subsist
per se but in another and with another, be they accidents,
substantial forms, or whatever parts do not have esse as if they
truly were," Aquinas argues, "but esse is attributed to these in
another way, that is, as that by which something is [quo aliquid
est]." 28 (It remains to be seen whether or not esse may be
attributed to these nonsubsisting things, even if only improperly.
This, as I point out below, bears significantly on the ontological
situation concerning Christ's human nature.)

25 Ibid., ad. 2.
26 See also De Unione, a. 2.
27 III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "nee natura rei nee partes eius dicuntur esse proprie, si esse
prredicato modo accipiatur; similiter autem nee accidentia, sed suppositum completum est,
quad est secundum omnia ilia" (Paris ed., 239).
28 Quodl. 9, q. 2, a. 2: "Omnibus vero que non per se subsistunt set in alio et cum alio, siue
sint accidencia siue forme substanciales aut quelibet partes, non habent esse ita quad ipsa uere
sint, set attribuitur eis esse alio modo, id est ut quo aliquid est" (Leonine ed., 25.1:94, IL 5155).

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

585

Given the aforementioned consideration, Aquinas is prepared
to offer a determinate answer concerning the number of esse in
Christ. It is relevant to note, here, that wherever Aquinas attempts
to answer this question in his Christological works, it is the
relationship obtaining between esse and suppositum that is
operative. Since the union of the divine and human natures takes
place in the person of the Word, 29 we should say that the
Incarnation takes place in the divine suppositum or hypostasis of
the Eternal Word. 30 The reason is that a person is simply a kind
of suppositum or hypostasis, namely, a rational, self-mastering
kind. 31 Simply put, if there were two persons, there would be two
supposita. However, given that there is only one person in Christ,
the second Person of the Trinity, there is only one corresponding
suppositum.
Furthermore, given that there is only one suppositum in Christ,
Aquinas argues, there is, likewise, only one esse. Being and unity
are transcendentally convertible: "It is impossible that something
should have two substantial beings [esse], since unity is founded
upon being [ens]: whence if there were a plurality of esse,
according to which something is said to be being [ens] simply, it
would be impossible for it to be called one [unum]." 32 That is, to
the degree that something is, it is one. A suppositum is a complete
whole, which is to say a single substance subsisting through itself.
Now, that in virtue of which a suppositum is a substance, Aquinas
maintains, is its esse, specifically that esse which brings about its
substantial unity (to which he refers as a substantial esse, as
opposed to any kind of accidental esse). He writes, "esse is
29

See STh III, q. 2, a. 2.

30 See STh III, q. 2, a. 3.

31 STh I, q. 29, aa. 1 and 2; STh III, q. 2, a. 3.

d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "For it is impossible that some one thing should have two
substantial beings; since one is founded upon being. Hence, if there were a plurality of being,
according to which something is called a being simply, it would be impossible that it be called
one" ("Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse substantiala; quia unum
fundatur super ens. Uncle si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid dicitur ens simpliciter,
impossibile est quod dicatur unum" [Paris ed., 239]); cf. De Unione, a. 4: "It is the same for
something to be called one and [for it to be called] a being" ("eodem dicitur aliquid esse
unum, et ens" [Marietti ed., 2:432]).
32 III Sent.,

586

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

attributed [to a suppositum] in a twofold way. In one way, [it is
the] esse resulting from the principles out of which a thing's unity
comes about, which is properly the substantial esse of the
suppositum. In another way, esse is attributed to the suppositum
in addition to that itself which brings about its unity, which is a
superadded esse, that is, accidental. "33
In other words, since substantial esse is responsible for bringing
about a single, complete substance, that is, a suppositum, if there
is only one suppositum, then there can only be one esse. On the
other hand, if there were indeed two substantial esse, then there
would be two substances, that is, two supposita. But, again, if
there were two supposita-given the relationship between person
and suppositum, in which the person is understood as a kind of
suppositum-then there would be two persons, which is the
Nestorian heresy and the assumptus homo theory that Aquinas
sought to avoid. Of course, this does not preclude the possibility
of a multiplicity of accidental esse. What is at issue, however, is
not the number of accidental esse, but the number of substantial
esse. "[It] is necessary to say that there is one substantial esse in
Christ, the proper esse of the suppositum, even though there
might be in him a multiplicity of accidental esse. "34 Therefore, in
Christ, since there is only one subsistent suppositum, there is
necessarily only one personal esse, the eternal esse of the Word.
And, Aquinas explains, it is this divine esse that actualizes Christ's
human nature, so that Christ's humanity receives its being from
his divine person. 35

33 Quad!. 9, q. 2, a. 2: "Huie autem attribuitur esse duplex. Vnum scilicet esse quod
resultat ex hiis ex quibus eius unitas integratur, quod est proprium esse suppositi substanciale.
Aliud esse est supposito attributum preter ea que integrant ipsum, quod est esse superadditum,
scilicet accidentale" (Leonine ed., 25.1:95, 11. 83-86).
34 Ibid.: "oportet dicere quod in Christo est unum esse substanciale, secundum quod esse
proprie estsuppositi, quamuis sit multiplex esse accidentale" (Leonine ed., 25 .1:95,11. 83-86).
35 STh III, q. 17, a. 2, ad. 2: "It must be said that the eternal being of the Son of God,
which is the divine nature, becomes the being of a human, inasmuch as the human nature is
assumed by the Son of God into the unity of person" ("[D]icendum quod illud esse aeternum
Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio
Dei in unitate personae" [Leonine ed., 11:222]).

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

587

A similar line of argument is evident in both the Compendium
Theologiae and Summa Theologiae (as well as in De Unione). In
the Compendium Theologiae Aquinas writes, "[W]hatever belongs
to the suppositum or hypostasis must be declared to be one in
Christ. "36 In the Summa Theologiae he states, "things belonging to
the nature in Christ must be two; and ... those belonging to the
hypostasis [i.e., suppositum] in Christ must be only one." 37 Thus,
since in Christ there is only one suppositum, it follows that there
can be only one esse whereby that suppositum subsists. And this
esse, Aquinas maintains, is that of the Word, the divine esse, since
the single suppositum of which we are here speaking is that of the
Word: "in Christ the subsisting suppositum is the person of the
Son of God." 38 To this he adds, "being [esse] pertains ... to the
hypostasis as that which has being. " 39 Since Aquinas understands
hypostasis to be convertible with suppositum (see STh I, q. 29, a.
2), one can take from this claim that esse pertains to suppositum.
And so he concludes, "if existence is taken in the sense that one
suppositum has one existence, we are forced, it appears, to assert
that there is but one existence [esse] in Christ. " 40
From what we have seen thus far, it is clear that in his
Christological writings Aquinas articulates his metaphysics of the
Incarnation in terms of only one substantial esse. Any other
account of Christ's being would do violence to the unity of his
personhood. I therefore agree with West when he argues that
Aquinas's standard metaphysics of the Incarnation holds to
Christ's having only one substantial esse.41 What, then, are we to
36 Comp. Theo!., c. 212: "Ea uero que ad suppositum siue ypostasim pertinet, unum
tantum in Christo confiteri oportet" (Compendium Theologiae, Leonine ed., vol. 42 [Rome:
Editori di San Tommaso, 1979], 165, 11. 26-28).
37 STh III, q. 17, a. 2.
38 De Unione, a. 4: "In Christo autem supposin1m subsistens est persona Filii Dei" (Marietti
ed., 2:432).
39 STh III, q. 17, a. 2.
4 ° Comp. Theo!., c. 212: "Vnde si esse accipiatur secundum quod unum esse est unius
suppositi, uidetur dicendum quod in Christo sit unum tantum esse" (Leonine ed., 42:165, 11.
28-30).
41 West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ," 232, 250. Although I agree with
West on this point, I do not think it commits one to rejecting the human esse introduced in
De Unione for reasons I shall describe shortly.

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

make of the suggestion in De Unione, which seems contrary to
what has just been described concerning the relationship between
esse andsuppositum? There, Aquinas states: "There is another esse
of [Christ's] suppositum, not in as much as it is eternal, but in so
far as it was made human temporally. " 42 That is, in addition to the
divine esse, which Aquinas describes throughout all his texts on
the Incarnation, there is also a created human esse. But, given the
aforementioned, how can this be? If there are two esse, then
clearly there would be two beings, two things; but Christ is one.
Could it be, perhaps, that the human esse is some sort of
accidental esse that the divine esse accrues through the hypostatic
union? Maintaining that this other esse is accidental would,
indeed, preserve the unity of Christ's personal esse. Yet, Aquinas
makes it clear that this is precisely what he does not have in mind,
for he adds, "Which being [esse] ... [is] not an accidental
esse-since man is not predicated accidentally of the Son of
God. " 43 He emphasizes more than once that human nature is not
united to the Word accidentally. This would destroy the unique
relationship that God has to man, one which is more than
accidental, and it would commit Aquinas to a habitus theory of
the Incarnation, which he sought to avoid. 44 Still, even though this
esse is not accidental, Aquinas hastens to add that it is not the
primary esse of the suppositum, but is, instead, secondary. 45 The
question remains: secondary in what way? 46
42 De Unione, a. 4: "Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum,
sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum" (Marietti ed., 2:432).
43 Ibid.: "Quod esse, etsi non sit esse accidentale-quia
homo non praedicatur
accidentaliter de Filio Dei" (Marietti ed., 2:432).
44 See STh III, q. 2, a. 6.
45 De Unione, a. 4.
46 A number of contemporary commentators have offered solutions to the present
difficulty. Jacques Maritain, for instance, in the fourth Appendix of his The Degrees of
Knowledge (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), draws a distinction
between esse as received and esse as exercised, arguing that to exist an essence must not only
receive its act-of-existence but then exercise it, for it is in the exercise of esse that something
actually exists. Maritain writes, "Since existence [esse] is by its very notion an exercised act,
the essence can be so held outside the realm of simple possibility only on condition of being
at the same time carried by the subsistence to the state of subject or supposit capable of
exercising existence" (462). He also adds, "it must be said that (substantial) essence or nature

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

589

m
In attempting to provide some sort of answer to this question,
let us begin with the fact that it is clear that Aquinas himself holds
that there is only one unqualifiedly subsistent esse in Christ, that
of the eternal Word. He maintains this thesis constantly
throughout his Christological works, as we have seen, and even in
the problematic De Unione Verbi incarnati. In the latter work he
once again insists upon the transcendental convertibility of unity
and being, saying "whatever is one simply is one according to
being [esse]. But Christ is one simply ... therefore in him there is
one being [esse]. " 47 Of course, this quotation is from a sed contra,
and, since Aquinas does, from time to time, disagree with the
arguments to be found in such sections, one should, of course,
approach what is held in these sections with reserve. Yet, it is
worth noting that Aquinas does not gainsay anything in the sed
can receive existence only by exercising it" (461). Thus, esse is, as Marirain describes it, an
exercised act and cannot be thought of otherwise. Yet, when he comes to describe the created
esse of Christ's human nature, Maritain writes, "But this esse [viz., the human one] is only
received by the human nature, it is not exercised by it" (ibid.). This leads to the obvious
question: how can esse-even if it is not the primary esse whereby Christ subsists-only be
received and not exercised? After all, does not Maritain say that esse must be understood, if
it is to be understood at all, as an exercised act? Granted, the human esse is not that of a
suppositum, yet the question still facing Maritain is: What role does the human esse of Christ
have? Indeed, can it have a role at all if it is only received and not exercised? Furthermore,
some scholars, for example, West ("Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ," 250, n.
9), have even suggested that Maritain's view turns out to be a variation on the assumptus
homo theory, clearly at odds with the subsistence theory Aquinas wants to embrace.
Some (e.g., Charles Rene Billuart) have even suggested that the human esse is the esse
essentiae of Christ's human nature. But as West points out (ibid., 235, 236), this suggestion
is untenable, especially in light of the interpretive efforts of Thomists such as E. Gilson and
J. Owens, who argue convincingly that, for Aquinas, esse is not to be understood as a thing
distinct from essence, itself considered as a thing. Put briefly, owing to the real distinction that
Aquinas describes, esse is to be understood not as a thing, essence, or form, but as an act, the
act of the essence, one might say. To regard esse and essence as two distinct things (res) is an
unfortunate misinterpretation of Aquinas extending as far back as Giles of Rome. See, in
particular, Etienne Gilson, Being and Some Philosophers (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Philosophy, 1952); Owens, St. Thomas Aquinas on the Existence of God; idem, An
Elementary Christian Metaphysics (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York Press, 1980).
47 De Unione, a. 4, sed contra: "quidquid est unum simpliciter est unum secundum esse.
Sed Christus est unum simpliciter, ut supra habitum est. Ergo in eo est unum esse" (Marietti
ed., 2:432).

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

contra of the fourth article in De Unione with respect to the
transcendental convertibility of being and unity, this particular sed
contra mirroring what he holds elsewhere within the very corpus
of his argument. 48
In article 4 of De Unione, Aquinas holds that in Christ there is
only one subsisting suppositum, that of the Son of God, and
"therefore as Christ is one simply according to the proper unity
of the suppositum, and two according to his two proper natures,
he has one esse simply and properly, the one eternal esse of the
eternal suppositum. "49 Thus, Aquinas, even in De Unione, is
consistent in his teaching on the singular esse in Christ. The
problem arises, as mentioned, when he claims that, in addition to
the divine esse, there is also a human esse, which, though not the
primary esse of Christ, still is not accidental.
It seems to me that Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite
person can serve as a hermeneutic principle by means of which De
Unione can be interpreted in a way that is consistent with his
other Christological texts. As mentioned above, I shall focus upon
a text to which Michael Gorman has also directed attention,
namely, Summa Theologiae III, question 2, article 4. 50 There,
Aquinas writes:
The person or hypostasis of Christ may be viewed in two ways. First as it is in
itself, and thus it is altogether simple, even as the nature of the Word. Secondly,
in the aspect of person or hypostasis to which it belongs to subsist in a nature;
and thus the person of Christ subsists in two natures. Hence though there is one
subsisting being in him, yet there are different aspects of subsistence, and hence
he is said to be a composite person, insomuch as one being subsists in two. 51
48 See STh I, q. 11, a. 1; De Verit., q. 1, a. 1; q. 21, a. 1; De Pot., q. 3, a. 16, ad 3; q. 9, a.

7; Quodl. 10, q. 1, a. 1.
49 De Unione, a. 4: "Et ideo sicut Christus est unurn simpliciter propter unitatem suppositi,
et duo secundurn quid propter duas naturas, ita habet unurn esse simpliciter propter unum esse
aeternum aeterni suppositi" (Marietti ed., 2:432).
50 Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 143.
51 "persona sive hypostasis Christi dupliciter considerari potest. Uno modo, secundum id
quod est in se. Et sic est omnio simplex: sicut et natura Verbi.-Alio modo, secundurn ratione
personae vel hypostasis, ad quam pertinet subsistere in aliqua natura. Et secundurn hoc,
persona Christi subsistit in duabus naturis. Uncle, licet sit ibi unurn subsistens, est tamen ibi alia
et alia ratio subsistendi. Et sic dicitur persona composita, inquantum unurn duobus subsistit"
(Leon. 11.31).

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It seems that there are two ways in which Christ's being may be
considered. One may regard Christ simply as a subsisting being,
without concern for the nature (or natures) in which he subsists.
In this way Christ is purely simple. 52 Considered from this perspective (i.e., from the perspective of Christ as a divine person),
then, one must say, as Aquinas does so consistently throughout his
works, that Christ has only one esse, for what is described here is
the subsistence corresponding to the suppositum, that complete
and integral whole whereby 'that which is' subsists. And, since
there is only one suppositum in Christ, that of the Word, there is
only one esse whereby that suppositum subsists, namely, the divine
esse.
Yet there is another way in which something's subsistence may
be considered: we may also take into account the nature in which
it subsists. That is, there is no being (esse) without being some
kind of thing, and there is no nature without being. To use
Aquinas's terminology, there is no esse without essentia and no
essentia without esse. Thus, if something subsists, it subsists as
something, which is to say that it subsists in some nature. In
Christ, however, there are two natures, and therefore it may be
said that Christ's subsistence is composite, subsisting as it does in
these two natures. 53
Viewed in this second way, then, Christ's being, his esse, may
be considered from the perspective of his compositeness, that is
to say, in light of his divine and human natures-in terms of that
by which he subsists. Before the Incarnation, the Word eternally
subsisted only in its divine nature, but since that union, the Word
subsists not only in its divine nature but also in a human nature,
by reason of which God is said to "become human." To describe
this same situation in terms of esse, one could say that the divine
52 "Christ subsists, he exists in himself, and it is because he is the Word that he does so. He
has his absolute subsistence ... not from being human but instead from being the divine
Word" (Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 146).
53 "[W]e consider a supposit as existing in its substantial nature. For example, we can think
of Christ as something that exists as divine and human. When we look at Christ in the second
way, that is, with regard to the principles by which he subsists, we must say that he is
composite" (ibid., 145).

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

esse has from eternity subsisted only in its divine nature. But, after
assuming a human nature through the Incarnation, the divine esse,
the Word, no longer subsists only in its divine nature, but also
through a human nature. "[T]hrough [its] human nature," Aquinas
writes, "[the Word] is constituted to be human." 54
After the Incarnation, then, and considered from the perspective of Christ's humanity, the divine esse subsists in a human
nature whereby it is, as it were, made to be a human esse-"there
is another esse of this suppositum, not inasmuch as it is eternal,
but inasmuch as it was made human temporally" 55 -which is to
say, God is made human. 56 Simply put, the human esse introduced
in De Unione seems to be none other than the divine esse when
considered from the point of view of its subsisting in a human
nature. One could say, then, that the divine esse of the Word
becomes Christ's human esse. Aquinas himself admits as much
when he says, "The eternal being [esse] of the Son of God, which
is the divine nature, becomes the being [esse] of man, inasmuch as
the human nature is assumed by the Son of God to unity of
person." 57
Aquinas's introduction of the human esse as secondary begins
to make sense in light of his notion of Christ as a composite
person. The human esse, understood as the divine esse subsisting
through a human nature, is not that whereby Christ exists simply
(simpliciter), but stems from his subsisting as a human being.
54 III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4, sol. 3, ad 1, "per naturam humanam [Verbum]
constituitur quad sit homo" (Paris ed., 229); cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 149.
55 De Unione, a. 4: "Est autem et aliud esse huius suppositi, non in quantum est aeternum,
sed in quantum est temporaliter homo factum" (Marietti ed., 2:432; emphasis added).
56 Edward Schillebeeckx seems to have in mind something very similar to what I am here
describing. See Christ the Sacrament of the Encounter with God (New York: Sheed and
Ward1963), 13, 14, "The second person of the most Holy Trinity is personally man; and this
man is personally God. Therefore Christ is God in a human way, and man in a divine way.
As a man he acts out his divine life in and according to his human existence. Everything he
does as man is an act of the Son of God, a divine act in human form; an interpretation and
transposition of a divine activity into a human activity. His human love is the human
embodiment of the redeeming love of God."
57 STh III, q. 17, a. 2, ad. 2, "illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quad est divina natura, fit esse
hominis, inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filia Dei in unitate personae" (Leonine ed.,
11:222; emphasis added).

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"[T]he Word is not constituted by [its] human nature such as to be
simply [simpliciter], however through [its] human nature [the
Word] is constituted to be human. "58 Aquinas also writes, "human
nature does not make the Son of Man to be simply, since he was
from eternity, but only to be man. It is by the divine nature that
a divine person is constituted simply." 59 In other words, the
human esse, understood as the divine esse subsisting through a
human nature, cannot be said to be that whereby Christ,
understood as a subsisting whole, subsists in the first way of
considering his composite personhood as described above (see STh
III, q. 2, a. 4). It is purely and simply the divine esse that is said to
be responsible for the subsistence of Christ's suppositum
simpliciter. And, therefore, the divine esse, considered not as
subsisting through a human nature but as it is in itself, is said to be
primary, whereas Christ's human esse is said to be secondary. One
might also say that Christ's human esse comes about temporally
once the divine esse begins to subsist in a human nature. Christ's
human esse, it seems, is secondary both with respect to time and
in terms of metaphysical priority.
Accordingly, I find Thomas Weinandy' s solution to the present
difficulty unacceptable. He argues that there are, in fact, two esse
in Christ and, moreover, that Aquinas consistently held such a
position, only making it explicit in De Unione. 60 Weinandy
correctly holds that the second, created human esse is not
accidental-the text of De Unione makes that much clear-but he
goes too far when he suggest that it is substantial. "The created
esse is more than accidental," he writes, "because the humanity is
58 III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla. 4, sol. 3, ad 1: "verbum non sit constitutum per naturam
humanam ut sit simpliciter, tamen per naturam humanam constituitur quod sit homo" (Paris
ed., 229); cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 149.
59 STh III, q. 3, a. 1, ad 3, "natura humana non constituit personam divinam simpliciter:
sed constituit earn secundum quod denominatur a tali natura. Non enim ex natura humana
habet Filius Dei quod sit simpliciter, cum fuerit ab aeterno: sed solum quod sit homo. Sed
secundum naturam divinam constituitur persona divina simpliciter" (Leonine ed., 11:53-54);
cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 150.
60 Thomas Weinandy, "Aquinas: God JS Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation," in Thomas
Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical
Introduction (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004), 80.

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

an authentic substance in its own right (manhood), and it
possesses its own integral created human esse. " 61 As Weinandy
sees it, in order for God to subsist as man, he must have assumed
a substantial human being. "If the Son of God actually did assume
the substantial nature of manhood and so come to exist as an
authentic man, then the authenticity of that substantial manhood
demands a human created esse." 62 I appreciate Weinandy's concern for preserving Aquinas from any semblance of Monophysitism; 63 however, to insist that Aquinas must posit two esse
suggests, to me, a reduction of his existential understanding of
esse to an essentialistic conception of being. That is, if there is a
desire to maintain two esse so that Monophysitism-which holds
that the divine and human natures become one in a kind of
commingling resulting in a tertium quid-can be avoided, then it
is clear that Weinandy views Thomistic esse as itself a kind of
nature. I find this somewhat surprising given Weinandy's
sensitivity to the "existential" character of Thomistic esse in his
earlier work, Does God Change?64
Weinandy's thesis should also be questioned in light of
Aquinas's own insistence that Christ's human nature is not a
substance, that is, it is not its own suppositum or hypostasis.
Since the human nature in Christ does not subsist in itself separately but exists
in another, that is, in the hypostasis of the Word of God (not as some accident
in a subject, nor properly as a part in a whole, but through an ineffable
assumption), therefore the human nature in Christ can be said to be some
individual, particular, or singular; however, it cannot be called a hypostasis or
suppositum, as it cannot be called a person. 65

61 Ibid., 82.

Ibid., 81.
Ibid., 80.
64 Thomas Weinandy, Does God Change? The Word's Becoming in the Incarnation (Still
River, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1985), 89.
65 De Unione, a. 2: "quia humana natura in Christo non per se separatim subsistit sed
existit in alio, id est in hypostasis Verbi Dei (non quidem sicut accidens in subiecto, neque
proprie sicut pars in toto, sed per ineffabilem assumptionem), idea humana natura in Christo
potest quidem dici individuum aliquod vel particulare vel singulare, non tamen potest dici vel
hypostasis vel suppositum sicut nee persona" (Marietti ed., 2:427).
62
63

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Indeed, were Christ's human nature its own suppositum or
substance, then it would subsist as a person, which is simply, as
Aquinas says, an individual substance of a rational nature. 66 But
there is only one person in Christ, that of the Word; to insist
otherwise would lead, as Aquinas sees it, to a kind of
Nestorianism. Philosophically speaking, to suggest that within
Christ there are two substantial esse can only result in two
substances and, therefore, two distinct ontological entities or
beings. But again, as Aquinas writes, "It is impossible that
something should have two substantial beings [esse], since unity is
founded upon being [ens]: whence if there were a plurality of esse,
according to which something is said to be being [ens] simply, it
would be impossible for it to be called one [unum]." 67 The unity
of Christ would be shattered given two substantial esse. 68
Thus, one should not interpret the human esse that Aquinas
introduces in De Unione Verbi incarnati as an entirely new
principle for the substantial, subsistent being of Christ's
suppositum, as something other than the divine esse-which is the
sole principle for the substantial being of Christ-for to do so
would lead to obvious difficulties or, more bluntly, metaphysical
contradictions. In other words, Aquinas does not suggest that
Christ is a combination of a substantial divine esse and a
substantial human esse. He addresses this very misunderstanding
in the form of an objection to his article on Christ's being in the
Summa Theologiae. "[T]he being [esse] of the Son of God is the
Divine Nature itself, and is eternal," the objection argues,
"whereas the being [esse] of the Man Christ is not the Divine
Nature, but is a temporal being." Therefore, the objection

STh I, q. 29, a. 1.
Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2: "Impossibile est enim quod unum aliquid habeat duo esse
substantiala; quia unum fundatur super ens. Unde si sint plura esse, secundum quae aliquid
dicitur ens simpliciter, impossibile est quod dicatur unum" (Paris: P. Lethielleux, 1933; 239);
cf. De Unione, a. 4.
68 See pp. 585-88 above for my reasoning as to why, given Aquinas's understanding of esse,
there can only be one substantial esse in Christ. See also West's own similar argumentation for
the same position ("Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ," 232, 250).
66

67 III

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

concludes, there are two beings (esse) in Christ. 69 Aquinas replies
along the lines I have just described, and again I quote this same
passage to emphasize my point: "The eternal being [esse] of the
Son of God, which is the divine nature, becomes the being [esse]
of man, inasmuch as the human nature is assumed by the Son of
God to unity of person. " 70
Now, however, a question arises: In what way can God be said
to become human, indeed, how can God become anything if, like
Aquinas,7 1 one understands God to be immutable? This same
concern faces Aquinas in the form of the following objection (STh
III, q. 16, a. 6, obj. 2): "to be made man is to be changed. But
God cannot be the subject of change, according to Mal. iii. 6: I
am the Lord, and I change not. Hence this is false; God was made
man." 72 However, as Gorman points out, the solution to this
difficulty stems, once again, from Aquinas's notion of Christ as a
composite person. 73 That is, the difficulty that this objection poses
comes about only if one considers Christ to be completely simple.
Given such an understanding, suggesting that the Word becomes
human would necessitate a change in the Word itself, for here
change is predicated absolutely of the Word. 74 "If Christ is now
simple, if he is simply divine, then indeed he cannot have come to
be other than he is except by his divine nature having come to be
other than it is," explains Gorman; "on that supposition, if Christ
became human, his divinity became human. " 75

III, q. 17, a. 2, obj. 2: "esse Filii Dei est ipsa divina natura, et est aeternum. Esse
autem hominis Christi non est divina natura, sed est esse temporale. Ergo in Christo non est
tantum unum esse" (Leonine ed., 11:222).
70 Ibid., ad 2: "illud esse aeternum Filii Dei quod est divina natura, fit esse hominis,
inquantum humana natura assumitur a Filio Dei in unitate personae" (Leonine ed., 11:222;
emphasis added).
71 See, for example, STh I, q. 9, a. 1, wherein Aquinas argues against any notion of divine
mutability.
72 "fieri hominem est mutari. Sed Deus non potest esse subiectum mutationis: secundum
illud Malach. III: Ego Dominus, et non mutor. Ergo videtur quod haec est falsa: Deus factus
est homo" (Leonine ed., 11:206).
73 Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 151.
74 See STh III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2.
75 Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 152.
69 STh

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However, since the relationship between the divine and human
natures of Christ is what might be called a "mixed relation" -that
is, a relationship that is real in one term and logical or rational in
another 76 -the change, Aquinas holds, must be understood to take
place not on the side of the Word, but on the side of Christ's
humanity. 77 Here, Aquinas appeals to his understanding of the
doctrine of relation to extricate himself from any undesirable or
contradictory conclusions. Since the doctrine of relation as he
articulates it cannot be fully explored here, I shall only describe
its main features so as to gain some intellectual traction in
understanding what he means by 'becoming'.
Aquinas frequently appeals to three main kinds of relation, 78
one of which we have already mentioned (viz., mixed relations)
the other two being 'logical' or 'rational' relations and 'real'
relations. 'Logical' relations are constituted through the intellect's
ordering of (at least) two terms to one another so that their
relation arises, not from any reality within the terms themselves,
but from an act of reason. 79 'Real' relations, by contrast, are those
in which the terms themselves have in their very reality an
ordering to one another independent of the intellect's
operations. 8° Finally there are relations-mixed relations-in
which one term is logical while the other is real. In this kind of
relation, the real term is constituted as such through its relation to

Cf. Weinandy, Does God Change?, 89.
STh III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2. See STh I, q. 13, a. 7 for Aquinas's threefold division of the
kinds of relation: logical, real, and mixed. Cf. Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 147-48. For
a discussion of Aquinas's teaching on relation in general see A. Krempel, La doctrine de la
relation chez saint Thomas (Paris: J. Vrin, 1952). On the matter of mixed-relations as it
pertains directly to the relationship between God and creation and especially in the
Incarnation, see Weinandy, Does God Change?, 88-98; cf. Thomas Weinandy, Does God
Suffer? (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2000), 206-8. In this latter work,
Weinandy is more concerned with the subject of divine impassibility than he is with divine
immutability strictly speaking. That is, he is more concerned with arguing that God cannot,
as God, suffer, grieve, experience pain or death, etc., than he is with arguing that God is
immutable; cf. Weinandy, "Aquinas: God IS Man: The Marvel of the Incarnation," 75-79.
78 See STh I, q. 13, a. 7.
79 Ibid.
80 Ibid.
76

77

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VICTOR SALAS, JR.

the logical term. 81 So, for example, it is because a creature is really
related to God as its creator that the creature is constituted as a
being, that is, exists. God himself, in his act of creating, does not
change. 82 He does not change because, as Aquinas sees it, the act
of creation is unlike any other "change" we experience. 83 All
change that we experience is relative, that is, a change from some
thing to some other thing. With creation, however, there is the
absolute bringing into existence of some thing from no-thing, or,
if one prefers, an absolute change. Such an absolute act of creation
requires something that is itself absolute being, something that is
being itself (ipsum esse). But this is precisely what God is.
Weinandy correctly points out that "if the act of creation demands
that God act by no other act than by the act that he is as ipsum
esse then obviously creation does not change or affect God. " 84
There is between God and creature, then, a mixed relation. The
creature is really related to God because in its relation to God the
creature is constituted and sustained in being; however, God in so
sustaining the creature through his creative act, an act that is
identical with that which he is, ipsum esse, undergoes no change
and so is only logically related to the creature.
In his treatment of the Incarnation, Aquinas uses his
understanding of mixed relations to account for the relationship
between the Word and Christ's human nature. He insists that the
Word, being the logical term of a mixed relation, does not
change. Rather, Christ's human nature has a real relation to the
Word, whereby it is sustained in existence. There is no mediating
act between the Word and humanity whereby the union between
the two occurs. Quite the contrary, the Word, through its own
esse personale, which is its very act of being, relates humanity to
itself. 85 Still, in this act of relating, which is simply that of a logical
term's relating a real term to itself, the Word undergoes no
change. One might say, perhaps, that the Word does change-not
81 Ibid.

I q. 45, a. 3, ad 1.
ScG II, c. 18.
84 Weinandy, Does God Change?, 92.
85 Cf. Weinandy, Does God Suffer?, 207, 208.
82 STh
83

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absolutely (for then the Word would change in its very divine,
immutable being), but only relatively, that is, relative to Christ's
humanity, for now there is a new relation on the part of Christ's
humanity to the pre-existing esse personale of the Word. 86 That is
to say, it is Christ's humanity that changes absolutely, in the same
way in which an act of creation results in an absolute change of
the creature from nonexistence to existence. "[W]hatever is
predicated relatively can be newly predicated without its change,"
says Aquinas, "as a man may be made to be on the right side
without being changed, and merely by the change of ·him on
whose left side he was." 87 Again, Christ's composite nature
provides some intelligibility, Gorman insists, to the Word's
immutability within the incarnational act: "Christ is a composite
of humanity and divinity. He became human by coming to possess
the humanity as a constituent, and because its coming to be a
constituent was the coming-to-be of a mixed relation, the divine
nature remained untouched. " 88
Furthermore, Aquinas points out that, as a result of the
composition of two natures in Christ, whatever pertains to the
human nature can now be predicated of God. 89 Since there is only
one suppositum subsisting in two natures, the single suppositum
is signified by either nature. Thus, "[W]hether we say man or
God, the hypostasis [i.e., suppositum] of divine and human nature
is signified. And hence, of the man may be said what belongs to
the divine nature, as of a hypostasis of the divine nature; and of
God may be said what belongs to the human nature, as of a
hypostasis of human nature. " 90 Thus, one may say that 'humanity',
in its fullest sense, may be attributed to God, to the divine esse,
whereby the Word, now possessing two constituent principles, is
86
87

STh III, q. 17, a. 2.
STh III, q. 16, a. 6, ad 2: "Ea vero quae relative dicuntur, possunt de novo praedicari de

aliquo absque eius mutatione: sicut homo de novo fit dexter absque sua mutatione, per motum
illius qui fit ei sinister" (Leonine ed., 11:207).
88 Gorman, "Christ as Composite," 152.
89 STh III, q. 16, a. 4.
90 Ibid.: "Sive ... dicatur homo, sive Deus, supponitur hypostasis divinae et humanae
naturae. Et ideo de homine dici possunt ea quae sunt divinae naturae: et de Deo possunt dici
ea quae sunt humanae naturae" (Leonine ed., 11:204).

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said to be (esse) human. Christ's human esse, then, represents the
new relation that the Word has to Christ's humanity-not an
absolute change in the Word itself but an entering into a new
relation wherein it subsists now as a humap being, as a human
esse. 91
Michael Raschko seems to have in mind something similar.
However he does not explicitly derive his position from the
metaphysical implications of Aquinas's notion of Christ as a
composite person, but rather from what one might call-for lack
of a better description-his
semantics of the Incarnation
(especially as it is spelled out in STh III, q. 16, aa. 10-12). Raschko
writes:
If one can say Christ as man has esse, it must be in the same manner that one says
Christ as man is person. This can be done one by reference to the one supposit
of both predicates, the person of the Word. Thus one can no more speak of a
duality of esse in Christ than one can speak of a duality of person. There is a
person, an esse, an aliquid in the human nature of Christ, but it is that person,
esse, and aliquid of the divine person subsisting in human nature. 92

Again, the notion of a human esse can only make sense, at least
according to Aquinas's metaphysical principles, when considered
as the divine esse's subsisting through a human nature, whereby it
is said to be human. Thus, one need not posit two substantial esse
in Christ.

IV
Given Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person, one
finds that what the Angelic Doctor presents in De Unione Verbi
incarnati is entirely consistent with views espoused in his other
Christological works. Consequently, there is no need to
suggest-as does Goergen-that Aquinas, in De Unione,
contradicts himself. Nor should we think, as does Richard Cross,
that Aquinas adopts an entirely different metaphysical model to
91 Cf. STh III, q. 17, a. 2.

Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's Subsistence
Theory," 437.
92

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render an account of the Incarnation. In The Metaphysics of the
Incarnation Cross argues, partly in effort to explain Aquinas's
introduction of a human esse, that Aquinas abandons his earlier
"whole-part model," wherein the divine and human natures are
seen in an analogous way as parts 93 constituting the whole Christ,
in favor of what seems to be a substance-accident model. 94
According to Cross, Aquinas consistently maintains throughout all
of his Christological works (save De Unione) that Christ's human
nature can be regarded analogously as a part. The reason for this
is that parts do not possess any esse of their own but share in the
substantial esse of the whole. Moreover, since parts do not
contribute any esse to their whole, they cannot be said to actualize
their whole. 95 Now, given that Aquinas maintains throughout his
opera that there is only one esse in Christ, the divine esse, one may
conclude that Christ's human nature has no esse of its own to
contribute and should therefore be regarded along the lines of a
part.
However, continues Cross, in De Unione Aquinas seems to
suggest something different. Now it seems as though he argues
that Christ's human nature does in fact have its own esse to
contribute, making it appear to be more analogous to an accident,
which actualizes its subject through the contribution of its own
esse. Given this, and also given the fact that Cross finds Aquinas
unable to maintain that parts do not actualize their wholes while
accidents do, he argues that Aquinas, in De Unione, is shifting
metaphysical gears, so to speak. "On Aquinas's standard account,
the human nature is a truth-maker in virtue of its dependence on
93 Strictly speaking, Christ's human nature, as Aquinas sees it, is neither an accident nor
a part (De Unione, a. 4). Aquinas maintains that the union of the two natures is made, not
through a composition of parts, but through an "ineffable assumption" (ibid., a. 2). It is the
nature of a part to be imperfect, inferior to the perfection of the whole. Such imperfection
cannot be attributed to the divine nature, for, as Aquinas maintains, "this is against the very
concept of divine perfection" (Comp. Theo!., c. 211). The notion of part is also contrary to
the specific perfection of human nature since it too is in its own right complete. The two
natures in Christ, then, cannot be called parts since each is complete in its own right, lacking
none of its own essential, or natural, perfection. Cf. STh III, q. 2, a. 4, ad 2.
94 Cross, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation, 62-64.
95 Ibid., 53.

602

VICTOR SALAS, JR.

the divine suppositum [much in the same way that a part is]; in
the De Unione, the nature is a truth-maker in virtue of its
communicating esse to the divine suppositum. " 96
In treating the human esse of Christ as if it were something
added or contributed to the divine suppositum after the manner
of an accident, however, Cross is left with the difficulty of how it
can be said (along any line remotely Thomistic) that anything can
be related to the divine suppositum-which Aquinas maintains
without exception is pure act-in such a way that the latter stands
in a relation of potency to the former. Cross is himself aware of
the difficulty but offers no solution. "[De Unione's] account is
agnostic to the extent that it is unclear how, given Aquinas's
general emphasis, something can communicate esse to a
suppositum without thereby actualizing any passive potency in the
suppositum. " 97
Given this rather perplexing aporia, it seems to me that Cross's
principle of interpretation with regard to De Unione is
wrongheaded. Indeed, the aporia disappears if one recognizes that
the human esse of which Aquinas speaks is not really something
other than the divine esse, is not something that is contributed to
the divine suppositum as if it were completely other. Again, the
human esse is the divine esse. They are the same in reality but
different when one views them from the perspective of Christ's
compositeness as a person. What causes Cross his difficulty is that
he separates the two in reality, hypostatizes the human esse (one
might say), and then does not quite know what to do with it. 98
However, as I hope to have shown, it can be argued that even
in the troublesome De Unione Verbi incarnati Aquinas maintains
consistently with his other Christological treatments that there is
Ibid., 63.
Ibid., 64.
98 Against Cross's overall claim that Aquinas's so-called whole-part model of the
Incarnation ultimately reduces into incoherence, I would simply point out West's insightful
critique of Cross's position (see West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ," 24041). Put very briefly, Cross's difficulty, West contends, stems from his confusion and
misunderstanding of the various senses in which Aquinas speaks of parts-namely, parts of a
form or species as opposed to parts of matter-which he then foists upon Aquinas's
Christological whole-part model (ibid.). See Aquinas, Super Boet. de Trin., q. 5, a. 3.
96
97

THOMAS AQUINAS ON CHRIST'S ESSE

603

only one personal esse in Christ. I also hope to have shown that
the key to resolving the difficulties pertaining to De Unione rests
in Aquinas's notion of Christ as a composite person. For, as he
points out, one may consider Christ as composite inasmuch as he
subsists in two natures. In his compositeness, then, Christ subsists
not only as the Word (i.e., as the divine esse) but also as a human
being. Thus, the Word becomes flesh; the divine esse, through the
assumption of a human nature, becomes-in the sense described
above-a human esse, by which we can say that "God became
man."

The Thomist 70 (2006): 605-15

THE BEATIFIC VISION AND THE INCARNATE SON:
FURTHERING THE DISCUSSION
THOMAS G. WEINANDY, 0.F.M., CAP.
Capuchin College
Washington, D.C.

T

HERE IS NOTHING more stimulating than to ponder the
mysteries of the Catholic faith in an attempt to conceive
them more dearly and to articulate them more precisely.
To my mind, no mystery is more challenging than the mystery of
the Incarnation-even that of the Trinity itself. My good and
longstanding Dominican friend Thomas Joseph White has taken
up this exhilarating challenge in his thoughtful article on the
Incarnation and the necessity of the earthly Jesus possessing the
beatific vision. 1 Jean Galot and I were the primary catalysts that
impelled him to do so, for we have argued that a proper
understanding of the Incarnation does not warrant maintaining
that the earthly incarnate Son of God possessed the beatific vision,
despite the venerable, and to some extent magisterial, tradition to
the contrary. Although White has marshaled a formidable array of
scholarly arguments in support of his position, I believe that his
arguments actually undermine what he ardently wants to achieve,
that is, to uphold and articulate an authentic understanding of the
Incarnation.
White argues that his position is in keeping with the Angelic
Doctor. Here, Thomist though I am, I will not address the
validity of Aquinas's arguments or White's interpretation of them.
1 "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the Necessity of the Beatific Vision,"
The Thomist 69 (2005): 497-534. Parenthetical page numbers in what follows refer to this
article.

605

606

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M.Cap.

My response will be threefold. First, I will briefly summarize
White's position. I will then offer an assortment of critiques of his
position. Finally, I will attempt to sort out the whole issue by
briefly articulating how I believe it must be addressed.
I. WHITE ON THE INCARNATION AND THE BEATIFIC VISION

The answer to the question of whether or not the earthly Jesus
possessed the beatific vision must be found in discerning the
incarnational principles or rules that govern the earthly, human
life of the Son of God. Given that within the Incarnation it is the
Son of God who exists as man, what necessarily follows regarding
the manner or type of human life that the Son of God lived?
White and I disagree on the ariswer to this question, that is, as to
what does or does not necessarily ensue from the Incarnation as
to the human life of the Son of God.
White argues that the very nature of the Incarnation demands
that the Son of God as man must possess the beatific vision if he
is properly to live out his human life. For White, the beatific
vision ensures not only that the human intellect is cognizant of
"his" divine filial identity, but also that the human intellect knows
and the human will acts in complete conformity with the divine
intellect and will of the Son. (I have written the above sentence in
conformity to White's manner of speaking. I would not articulate
the issue in such a manner, as will be seen.) As White states at the
onset:
[T]his unity of personal action in Jesus requires a perfect cooperation between
the human will of Christ and his divine will. In effect, Christ's will and
consciousness must act as the instruments of his divine subject, being directly
specified at each instant by his divine will. For this, knowledge of his own filial
nature and will is necessary. The virtue of faith, or a uniquely prophetic
knowledge (by infused species), is not sufficient. The unity of activity of the
Incarnate Word requires, therefore, the beatific vision in the intellect of Christ,
so that his human will and his divine will may cooperate within one subject.
(507)

RESPONSE TO THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE

607

White argues that without the beatific vision the human
intellect and will of Christ would exercise an autonomy that
would undermine the unity of subject, that is, the Son, acting
through the instrumentality of his humanity. The Son can act
through the instrumentality of his humanity only if his human
intellect and especially his human will are in complete accord with
his divine intellect and will, and this assurance is only obtained if
the human intellect of Christ possesses the beatific vision. As
White, again, states:
If Jesus is truly the Son of God, and therefore a divine person, then his divine
will is present in his person as the primary agent of his personal choices. This
means that, necessarily, his human will must be continually subordinate to,
informed by, and indefectibly expressive of his personal divine will in its human,
rational deliberation and choice making .... [I]t is only if Christ's human
intellect is continuously and immediately aware of his own divine will (by the
beatific vision, and not merely by infused knowledge and by faith), that his
human will can act in immediate subordination to his divine will as the "assumed
instrument" of his divine subject. (516)

White illustrates the incarnational need for the beatific vision
by way of the examples of Christ's obedience and prayer. As seen
above, only the beatific vision guarantees that the human will of
Christ is conformed to his divine will, for only through the
beatific vision is his human intellect conformed to his divine
intellect. Equally, the beatific vision empowers Christ to pray to
the Father fully aware that he is the divine Son (see 523-33). For
White, this is only possible "due to the correspondence between
the human and divine wills of Christ within his unified personal
action, effectuated by means of the beatific vision" (522).
From the above, I think it is obvious how White conceives the
incarnational principles or rules that necessarily govern how the
Son orders and regulates his earthly life. Simply put, the Son of
God comes to exist as man and in so doing now possesses a divine
and human intellect and a divine and human will. These two
distinct intellects and wills interact practically within Jesus'
everyday earthly life through the beatific vision: the human
intellect possesses the knowledge of the divine intellect and thus

608

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M.Cap.

the human will is able to be conformed to the divine will by
means of the divine knowledge, now resident within the human
intellect.
This mutual conforming of intellects and wills also ensures that
the Son is the sole acting subject. Through the beatific vision,
everything the Son does humanly is performed in accordance with
his divine knowledge and will. Thus, the beatific vision mediates
between the Son existing as God and the Son existing as man so
as to ensure that the Son as God and the Son as man are both "on
the same page." Without the beatific vision, for White, the Son of
God as man would not, with certainty, but only by faith or
prophetic infused knowledge, be able to be on the same page as
the Son of God as God because the Son as man would not know
with certainty what the Son as God knows and so would not be
certain as to what the Son as God wills.
II. A SLIGHT WHIFF OF NESTORIANISM

Eyebrows may have been raised at the above words "are both"
and rightly they should have been. Despite the fact that White
wants to guarantee, through the beatific vision, a unity of subject
and a unity of action between the divine and human natures, and
so avoid Nestorianism, his conception of the "mechanics" of the
Son's incarnational life bears the odor of Nestorianism be it ever
so slight. We need to examine his argument more closely.
White rightly wants to hold, and often states, that in the
Incarnation the Son of God came to exist as man, and therefore
he is the one acting subject within his human life as man. Yet,
when it comes to the inner dynamics of the Son's incarnational
life as man, White's articulation becomes somewhat imprecise.
For White, within the Incarnation, the manner in which divine
knowledge and with it the divine will come to the human Jesus is
through the beatific vision. The beatific vision mediates between
the human intellect and will of the Son and the divine intellect
and will of the Son and thus allows the human intellect to know
and the human will to will in unison with the divine Son.

RESPONSE TO THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE

609

However, in conceiving the inner workings of the earthly life of
the Son incarnate in this manner, White gives the impression that
the human intellect had a mind of its own and that the human will
had a will of its own apart from the Son and that it is only if the
human intellect and the human will are tamed by the beatific
vision that we (or for that matter, the Son of God) are assured
that they will not run autonomously wild on their own. White's
understanding of the Incarnation is here faulty.
Because the Son is the sole person or subject within the
Incarnation, what he knows and wills as man is done by him and
so, from the very ontology of Incarnation, the human intellect and
will are never autonomous "things" in need of being "brought
into line," whether by the beatific vision or by any other means.
It is the Son of God who exists as man and, like every human
being, personaily acts through his human intellect and his human
will, for they are personally his own. They are ontologically
constitutive of who the Son of God is as man and thus are
incapable of having a "self" life of their own.
Without realizing it, White, in his attempt to find a necessary
reason why Christ must possess the beatific vision, first had to
rend asunder the human intellect and will from the divine Son
with his divine intellect and will and then he had to impose, the
beatific vision as the necessary means for uniting the human
intellect and will with the divine intellect and will within the one
Son of God. White really does not want to disconnect the human
intellect and will from the divine Son, as he himself argues
profusely in his article, but his arguments on behalf of the beatific
vision of Christ have forced him to do so. This is why the
articulation of his position always bears the slight whiff of
Nestorianism, and why he is also forced at times to articulate his
position in an imprecise manner.
III. THE AMBIGUOUS USE OF THE TERM "Hrs"

White often employs the term "his" in relation to "the man,"
"the human intellect," and "the human will" in a fascinating, but

610

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M.Cap.

highly ambiguous, way. He states that through the beatific vision
"the man Jesus knows immediately that he receives his divine will
from the Father, and his human acts of obedience bear the imprint
of this unique filial certitude" (526). But within the Incarnation,
there is no "man" Jesus apart from the Son who "knows," there
is no human "he" who receives, and there is no human "who"
who possesses the certitude of "his" filial human acts. Within the
Incarnation there is only the Son of God existing as man and thus
there is only one "he" and one "his," that of the divine Son.
Again, as quoted previously, "Christ's will and consciousness
must act as the instruments of his divine subject, being directly
specified at each instant by his divine will. For this, knowledge of
his own filial nature and will is necessary" (507). Who is the
subject/person (the "who") of all of these various uses of the term
"his"? The first "his" refers to Christ, but this gives the impression
that Christ is a different human subject from the later designated
"divine subject." But how can there be a "his" that differs from
the divine subject to which the "his" refers? The second "his"
appears to shift from referring to the human subject of "Christ"
to, presumably, referring to the Son of God as God, since it
speaks of "his divine will." This may be an attempt at employing
the communication of idioms, but it fails for, within the
communication of idioms, divine and human attributes are
predicated of one and the same subject, namely, that of the divine
Son.
The first "his" refers to a human subject other than the Son as
God and the second "his" refers to the Son as God. The third use
of the term "his" does not appear to have any incarnational logic
whatsoever ("knowledge of his own filial nature"). This "his"
implies a human "who" who comes to know that "who" he really
is is the Son of God. However, within the Incarnation one does
not have a man who comes to know that he is God, but rather,
within the Incarnation, the Son of God humanly comes to know
or humanly becomes conscious, within his human intellect and
human consciousness, that he is the Son of God. Again, the reason
White is forced to employ such strained terminology and to state

RESPONSE TO THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE

611

his position in such a tangled fashion is that, in a Nestorian
manner, he has separated the human intellect and will from the
Son of God with the intention of glueing them back together by
means of the beatific vision,

IV. GIVING "SUBJECTIVITY" TO THE
HUMAN INTELLECT AND WILL

This can equally be seen in the way White speaks of the divine
and human wills as if they could act apart from the person of the
Son, so implying that they possess their own distinct subjectivities.
In a passage already quoted, White speaks of "Christ's human
intellect" being "immediately aware of his divine will" and it is
the beatific vision that ensures that "his human will can act in
immediate subordination to his divine will" (516). But an
"intellect" is not aware, nor does a "will" act; only a person
knows and only a person acts and he does so through his will.
Later White speaks of the "divine will" moving the "human will"
(519) as if these were wills of different subjects. It is the Son of
God who wills either with his divine will or with his human will,
but the wills themselves do not interact apart from the one who
is willing, the divine Son.
Within the same passage, White states that "the human will of
Christ acts 'instrumentally,' that is to say, through an immediate
subordination to his divine will" (ibid.). As man, the Son's
humanity is the personal instrument through which he acts, in a
similar way as I personally act through the use of my hand.
However, my hand does not act "instrumentally" and neither does
Christ's "human will." Moreover, a "will" does not act apart from
the one whose will it is, nor does a "will," as if it were an acting
subject, subordinate itself to another will. Only persons
subordinate their will to another person. To say that one will
subordinates itself to another will implies two persons.
One also finds rather peculiar statements such as: "His human
will cooperates indefectibly with his divine will in the unity of one
personal subject" (520). "Wills" do not "cooperate"; persons

612

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M.Cap.

cooperate through a mutual agreement of their wills. To say that
the divine and human wills cooperate "in the unity of the personal
subject" implies two willing subjects being united to a third. What
White wants to say is that, when the Son of God wills and acts as
man, his human will and action are always in conformity with his
divine will because there is only one willing and acting subject, the
Son of God. The reason he cannot simply say that is that, again,
within his conception of the Incarnation the human intellect and
will would be in competition with the divine intellect and will
unless the beatific vision is imposed so as to ensure their unity.
For White, it is not the hypostatic union, the ontological union
whereby the Son of God exists as man, that guarantees the unity,
and so conformity, of the human intellect and will with the divine
intellect and will, but the beatific vision. 2
V. SORTING OUT THE lNCARNATIONAL CONFUSION

The reason White has gotten himself in this incarnational
tangle is that he has misconceived the incarnational principles that
must be operative within the incarnate Son. For White, the
manner in which the Son of God as man becomes conscious of
who he is as God and the manner in which he comes to know the
divine will and so act in accordance with it is through the beatific
vision. For White, this all takes place within what might be called
an inner-dialogue between the divinity of the Son and the
humanity of the Son. Through the beatific vision, the human
intellect and will are "hot wired" to the divine intellect and will.
The incarnate Son comes to know who he is and he comes to
know what to will and to do in relationship to his own divinity
mediated through the beatific vision. This, to my mind, is

2 Part of the problem may reside in White's ambiguous us of the term "Christ." One is not
sure at times whether such a designation refers to the Son of God incarnate or to the man
Jesus who is distinct from the Son of God. For example, White can state that without the
beatific vision the "the human mind of Christ would no longer be moved by the will of the
divine person" (320). This implies that "Christ" is a human subject possessing a human mind
who is different from the "divine person" who possesses a divine will.

RESPONSE TO THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE

613

contrary to the very nature of the Incarnation and to the human
life that the Son of God lived.
How then does the Son of God as man come to know who he
is within his incarnate state? 3 The Son of God as man comes to
know who he is through his incarnate relationship to his Father
and he comes to know what to will and to do through his
incarnate relationship to the Father, The Son incarnate becomes
conscious of who he is and so knows who he is not in relationship
to his own divinity mediated through the beatific vision, as White
would argue, but through what I have termed his human
"hypostatic vision" of the Father, Through his human prayer, in
conjunction with his pondering the Scriptures, the person of the
Son as man has a vision, though not beatific, of the Father and in
so coming to know his Father he comes to know, he becomes selfconscious, that he is indeed the only-begotten Son. 4 White holds
that if the Son of God does not possess as man the beatific vision,
his divine identity and knowledge of what he should will and do
would be reduced to an act of faith or prophetic infused
knowledge. This is not true. The Son of God, in coming to know
who he is in a human manner through his human hypostatic
vision of his Father, humanly comes to know the will of the
Father and so humanly acts in accordance with it. This, I believe,
3 Here I am not afforded the space to give a complete account of my argument. I would
refer readers to my article: "Jesus' Filial Vision of the Father," Pro Ecclesia 13/2 (2004): 189201.
4 In my above noted article I gave two reasons why I believe Jesus did not possess the
beatific vision. The first is that the beatific vision is traditionally understood as a heavenly
vision and thus a vision that is resurrectional in nature. Such a vision would then be contrary
to Jesus' being able to live an authentic earthly life. Moreover, because the beatific vision has
traditionally been understood as an objective vision of God obtained by someone who is other
than God, to say that Jesus possessed the beatific vision implies Nestorianism, as if the man
Jesus, who possessed the beatific vision, were a different subject/being from that of the Son.
It is the Son of God as man who has a personal/hypostatic vision of the Father and, within that
vision, not only does he humanly come to know the Father as his Father, but he also
simultaneously becomes humanly conscious of his divine Sonship in relation to his Father.
I would like to note as well that White gives the impression that I agree with Galot that the
beatific vision gives a Monophysite skew to the Incarnation. I do not think that such would
necessarily be the case. I hold that the traditional understanding of beatific vision is simply
contrary to the very nature of the Incarnation and the incarnational principles that are literally
embodied within it.

614

THOMAS G. WEINANDY, O.F.M.Cap.

is in keeping with the Incarnation and the incarnational principles
that govern it. Everything concerning the Son of God within his
human state as man must be conceived and articulated within that
incarnate state, and, thus, not in relationship to his own divine
nature but in his human relationship to his Father and to the
earthly . human life that he authentically lives. Thus, my
understanding of the incarnational principles that govern the
earthly life of the Incarnate Son radically differs from that of
White.
VI. CONCLUSION

Let me conclude by adding a new argument that I have not
articulated before, one that may help clarify the issue. Within the
life of the Trinity, the Son of God did not come to know who he
is as the Son of God, homoousios with his Father, within his own
self-contained knowledge of himself (similar to the way White
wants the Son of God as man to know who he is in relationship
to his own divinity through the beatific vision). Rather, the Son of
God is eternally conscious of himself, and so knows who he is, as
Son only in relationship with his Father and so eternally
conforms, as Son, his will to the Father's will. Similarly, the
eternal Son of God, through his human hypostatic vision of the
Father, is humanly conscious of, and so knows, who he is as the
Son, homoousios with the Father, in relationship to his Father,
and in humanly knowing who he is as Son in relationship to his
Father he humanly wills and does what the Father wills and does
(see John 5:17-20). The principles that govern the Son's
incarnational life are the same principles as those that govern his
divine life.
I ardently hope that my critique of White has been fair and to
the point. White is too good a theologian to dismiss lightly.
Nonetheless, I hope that the clarifications I have attempted to
offer will further the debate, though I am certain it will continue.
Moreover, as I said at the onset, there is no greater joy than to
contemplate, in unison with the angels and their Doctor, the

RESPONSE TO THOMAS JOSEPH WHITE

615

divine mysteries. To ponder, and to debate, the mystery of the
Incarnation with my Dominican brother Thomas Joseph will, I am
confident, bear much intellectual fruit, and hopefully abundant
grace, for the both of us.

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUME 66-70 (2002-2006)
AUTHORS OF ARTICLES
Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"
..............................
' ....... 68 (2004) 105-41
Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" ......... 66 (2002) 535-75
Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion"
......................................
70 (2006) 203-35
__ ,"Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter" .......... 68 (2004) 431-67
Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine and
Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction for
Its Future" .............................
68 (2004) 69-104
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae: Metaphysics and
Ethics in Stump's Aquinas" ................
69 (2005) 593-620
__ , '"To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal Human Soul"
........................................
68 (2004) 1-39
__ , "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of Aquinas's
Moral Theory" ..........................
67 (2003) 119-31
Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"
......................................
70 (2006) 311-66
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John Crosby
and Thomas Aquinas" ...................
69 (2005) 173-201
Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital
Punishment"
............................
68 (2004) 41-67
Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul H's Moral Theology on
Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ........ 69 (2005) 279-312
Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas
Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ........... 68 (2004) 287-314
Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the 'Remedium Concupiscentiae"'
.....................................
70 (2006) 481-536
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .......... 66 (2002) 101-32
Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love"
......... ' ............................
68 (2004) 343-73
Caponi, Francis]., 0.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of Participation"
.....................................
67 (2003) 375-408
Cole, Basil, O.P., "Catholic Bioethics: Three Recent Studies"
......................................
66 (2002) 133-47
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn
and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" ........ 70 (2006) 71-101

617

618

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"
.....................................
68 (2004) 375-429
Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels" ...............
68 (2004) 205-58
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"
.....................................
66 (2002) 275-309
DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love: Aquinas on
the Vice of Acedia" .....................
68 (2004) 173-204
Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister Eckhart"
......................................
67 (2003) 409-38
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint Thomas
Aquinas" ...............................
69 (2005) 31-77
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas
Aquinas" ................................
69 (2005) 1-30
__ ,"Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology" 67 (2003) 249-78
__ , "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 95-118
Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia,
69 (2005) 251-77
Exegete" ..............................
Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the Confessions"
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 607-22
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" ..... 70 (2006) 103-23
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian Natural
Science" ...............................
66 (2002) 519-33
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic View
of Entropy and Evolution" .................
66 (2002) 251-66
Guevin, Benedict M., 0.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of
Ethical Context" ........................
66 (2002) 267-74
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever
70 (2006) 367-93
Mathematical?" .........................
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation, and
Analogy" ..............................
70 (2006) 537-75
Hill, William J., O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas: Teacher" ..... 66 (2002) 9-13
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in Aquinas
in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"
......................................
70 (2006) 23 7-65
Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's Interpretation
of Thomism" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 607
Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ...... 70 (2006) 1-26
___ , "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's Interpretation of the
Moral Species" ..........................
67 (2003) 623-43

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

619

Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading Pseudo69 (2005) 371-406
Dionysius Areopagite" ...................
__ , "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99
Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity Is
the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa'" ........ 70 (2006) 421-55
Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an ancilla theologia nova: Alister E.
McGrath's A Scientific Theology" ............ 69 (2005) 127-52
Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of
Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ......... 67 (2003) 335-74
Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae: Peripheral or
Pervasive?" .............................
67 (2003) 221-48
Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place" . 67 (2003) 439-62
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McAleer" .....................
__ , "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs, Fowl, and Aquinas"
......................................
69 (2005) 407-67
__ , "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology"
.....................................
66 (2002) 395-420
Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"
......................................
70 (2006) 267-88
__ , "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object of the Moral
Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" ......... 67 (2003) 45-71
Mahoney, Edward P., "The Accomplishment of Jean Capreolus, O.P."
......................................
68 (2004) 601-32
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Sacerdotal Character at the Second Vatican Council"
......................................
67 (2003) 539-77
__ , "Episcopal Munera and the Character of Episcopal Orders"
......................................
66 (2002) 369-94
Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church" ....... 67 (2003) 463-80
May, William E., and E. Christian Brugger, "John Paul H's Moral Theology on
Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ........ 69 (2005) 279-312
McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human Action"
......................................
66 (2002) 421-56
McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue" . 69 (2005) 535-55
McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"
.....................................
66 (2002) 499-517
__ , "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin"
......................................
66 (2002) 201-29
O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny"
.......................................
66 (2002) 15-59
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral
67 (2003) 279-305
Theory" ..............................
Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"
......................................
68 (2004) 545-75

620

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"
......................................
68 (2004) 259-86
Pristas, Lauren, "Theological Principles That Guided the Redaction of the
67 (2003) 157-95
Roman Missal (1970)" ....................
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double
Effect?" ...............................
69 (2005) 341-70
__ ,"Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?"
......................................
66 (2002) 337-67
Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 505-38
Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the
Truth of Subjectivity" .......................
67 (2003) 1-44
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
70 (2006) 577-603
Incarnation" ...........................
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Funeral Homily for William J. Hill, O.P."
.........................................
66 (2002) 1-7
Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses"
.......................................
70 (2006) 27-69
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
68 (2004) 507-29
Ends" ................................
St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"
......................................
69 (2005) 557-92
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and Neo-Aristotelian
68 (2004) 531-43
Realism" ..............................
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125
Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of 'God'"
......................................
69 (2005) 203-50
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction
and Aristotle's
66 (2002) 457-71
Epistemological Realism" ..................
Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology of
St. Thomas" ...........................
68 (2004) 577-600
Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and Men
in Christ" ............................
67 (2003) 579-606
__ , "Psalm 22: Vox Christi or Israelite Temple Liturgy?"
.....................................
66 (2002) 175-200
Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's
67 (2003) 197-219
Intention at De Veritate 1.1?" ..............
Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate
Son: Furthering the Discussion" .............
70 (2006) 605-15
West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ"
......................................
66(2002)231-50
White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom" ..............
66 (2002) 577-605

AUTHORS OF ARTICLES

621

White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and the
Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ............ 69 (2005) 497-534
Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"
.....................................
70 (2006) 395-419

TERMS IN TITLES
ACED IA
DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love:
Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia" ............ 68 (2004) 173-204

ACT/ACTION
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint
69 (2005) 31-77
Thomas Aquinas" ........................
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas
Aquinas" ................................
69 (2005) 1-30
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"
......................................
70 (2006) 237-65
Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71
McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human
Action" ...............................
66 (2002) 421-5 6
White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and
the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ......... 69 (2005) 497-534

AETHER
Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"
.....................................
68 (2004) 375-429

AGENT
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"
......................................
70 (2006) 237-65

ANALOGY
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,
70 (2006) 537-75
and Analogy" ...........................

ANGEL/ANGELIC
Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels" ............ 68 (2004) 205-58
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125

APPETITE
McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human
Action" ................................
66 (2002) 421-56

622

TERMS IN TITLES

623

ARISTOTELIAN
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian
66 (2002) 519-33
Natural Science" ........................
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and NeoAristotelian Realism" .....................
68 (2004) 5 31-43
Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of
'God"' ................................
69 (2005) 203-50

AUGUSTINIANISM
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral
Theory" ..............................
67 (2003) 279-305

AUTHORITY
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
Fowl, and Aquinas" ......................
69 (2005) 407-67

BIOETHICS
Cole, Basil, 0.P., "Catholic Bioethics: Three Recent Studies"
......................................
66 (2002) 133-47

CHAOS
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic
66 (2002) 251-66
View of Entropy and Evolution" ............

CHARACTER
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Sacerdotal Character at the Second Vatican
Council" ..............................
67 (2003) 539-77

CHASTITY
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon
Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

CHRIST/CHRISTOLOGICAL
Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae:
Peripheral or Pervasive?" ..................
67 (2003) 221-48
McMahon, Kevin A., "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on
Original Sin" ............................
66 (2002) 201-29
Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"
......................................
68 (2004) 259-86
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
70 (2006) 577-603
Incarnation" ...........................
West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ"
.....................................
66 (2002) 231-50
White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and
the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ......... 69 (2005) 497-534

CHRISTIANITY
Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"
......................................
68 (2004) 259-86

624

TERMS IN TITLES

CHURCH
Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church"

... 67 (2003) 463-80

CIRCUMSTANCES
Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ... 70 (2006) 1-26

COGNITION/COGNITIVE
Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 505-38
Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the
Truth of Subjectivity" .......................
67 (2003) 1-44

CONDOM
Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses"
.......................................
70 (2006) 27-69

CREATION
Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas
Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ........... 68 (2004) 287-314

CUSTOM
White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom"

...........

66 (2002) 577-605

DIGNITY
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John
Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..............
69 (2005) 173-201
Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and
Men in Christ" .........................
67 (2003) 579-606

DIONYSIAN
Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of
'God"' ................................
69 (2005) 203-50

DISCLOSURE
Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of
Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ......... 67 (2003) 335-74
Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"
.....................................
70 (2006) 395-419

DOUBLE EFFECT
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double
Effect?" ...............................
69 (2005) 341-70

ECCLESIAL
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
69 (2005) 407-67
Fowl, and Aquinas" ......................

EMBRYOLOGY/EMBRYONIC
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology"
......................................
67 (2003) 249-78
Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"
......................................
70 (2006) 267-88

TERMS IN TITLES

625

END
Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" ...... 66 (2002) 535-75
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
Ends" .................................
68 (2004) 507-29

ENTROPY
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic
66 (2002) 251-66
View of Entropy and Evolution" .............

EPISTEMOLOGY/EPISTEMOLOGICAL
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's
66 (2002) 457-71
Epistemological Realism" ..................

EQUIVOCATION
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,
70 (2006) 537-75
and Analogy" ...........................

ESSE
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
Incarnation" ...........................
70 (2006) 577-603
West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ"
.....................................
66 (2002) 231-50

ETERNITY
Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"
......................................
70 (2006) 311-66

ETHICS/ETHICAL/ETHICIST
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae: Metaphysics
and Ethics in Stump's Aquinas" ............ 69 (2005) 593-620
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .......... 66 (2002) 101-32
Guevin, Benedict M., 0.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of
Ethical Context" ........................
66 (2002) 267-74
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"
.....................................
70 (2006) 237-65
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's
66 (2002) 337-67
Ethics?" ................................
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125

EUCHARIST/EUCHARISTIC
Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology
of St. Thomas" .........................
68 (2004) 577-600

626

TERMS IN TITLES

EVIL
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .......... 66 (2002) 101-32

EVOLUTION
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic
View of Entropy and Evolution" ............ 66 (2002) 251-66

.EXEGESIS/EXEGETE
Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia,
Exegete" ..............................
69 (2005) 251-77
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
69 (2005) 407-67
Fowl, and Aquinas" .......................
Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"
.....................................
70 (2006) 395-419

FATHERS, GREEK
Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"
......................................
70 (2006) 311-66

FORM
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian
Natural Science" ........................
66 (2002) 519-33

FREEDOM
McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human
Action" ...............................
66 (2002) 421-56

GOD
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology
Ever Mathematical?" .....................
70 (2006) 367-93
Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading
Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite" ..............
69 (2005) 371-406
Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of
'God"' ................................
69 (2005) 203-50

GOOD
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .......... 66 (2002) 101-32

HIV
Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses"
.......................................
70 (2006) 27-69

HUMAN
Bradley, Denis]. M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal
Human Soul" .............................
68 (2004) 1-39
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94

TERMS IN TITLES

627

Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99
McCluskey, Colleen, "Intellective Appetite and the Freedom of Human
Action" ...............................
66 (2002) 421-56
McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"
...................................
66 (2002) 499-517
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
Ends" ................................
68 (2004) 507-29

HYDRATION
Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine
and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction
for Its Future" ..........................
68 (2004) 69-104

IMAGINATION
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and NeoAristotelian Realism" .....................
68 (2004) 5 31-43

INCARNATION/INCARNATE
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
Incarnation" ...........................
70 (2006) 577-603
Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate
Son: Furthering the Discussion" .............
70 (2006) 605-15

INCLINATIONS
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
Pinckaers, McAleer" .....................
70 (2006) 155-201

INDIVIDUATION
Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"
....................................
68 (2004) 545-75

INSTINCT
White, A. Leo, "Instinct and Custom"

...........

66 (2002) 577-605

INTENTIONALITY
Kelly, Anthony ]., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of
Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ......... 67 (2003) 335-74

KILLING
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double
Effect?" ...............................
69 (2005) 341-70

LANGUAGE
Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and
Men in Christ"
........................
67 (2003) 579-606

LAW
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"
...................................
66 (2002) 275-309
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McA!eer" .....................

628

TERMS IN TITLES

Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the
Truth of Subjectivity" .......................
67 (2003) 1-44
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
68 (2004) 507-29
Ends" .................................
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's
Epistemological Realism" ..................
66 (2002) 457-71

LIE
Guevin, Benedict M., O.S.B., "When a Lie Is Not a Lie: The Importance of
Ethical Context" .........................
66 (2002) 267-74

LIFE
Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99

LITURGY
Vall, Gregory, "Psalm 22: Vax Christi or Israelite Temple Liturgy?"
.....................................
66 (2002) 175-200

LOVE
Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love"
.....................................
68 (2004) 343-73
DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love:
Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia" ............ 68 (2004) 173-204

LUST
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon
Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

MARRIAGE
Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"
......................................
70 (2006) 267-88

MATHEMATICAL
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology
Ever Mathematical?" .....................
70 (2006) 367-93

MATTER
Baldner, Steven, "Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter"
......................................
68 (2004) 431-67

MEDICINE
Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine
and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction
68 (2004) 69-104
for Its Future" ...........................

MEN
Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and
Men in Christ" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 579-606

METAPHYSICS/METAPHYSICAL
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae: Metaphysics
and Ethics in Stump's Aquinas" ............ 69 (2005) 593-620

TERMS IN TITLES

629

Caponi, Francis ]., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of
67 (2003) 375-408
Participation" ..........................
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic
View of Entropy and Evolution" ............ 66 (2002) 251-66
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
Incarnation" ...........................
70 (2006) 577-603
West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ"
.....................................
66 (2002) 231-50

MIND
O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny"
......................................
66 (2002) 15-59

MISSAL, ROMAN
Pristas, Lauren, "Theological Principles That Guided the Redaction of the
Roman Missal (1970)" ....................
67 (2003) 157-95

MORAL
Bradley, Denis ]. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's
Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31
Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital
68 (2004) 41-67
Punishment" .............................
Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul H's Moral Theology
on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ...... 69 (2005) 279-312
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas
69 (2005) 1-30
Aquinas" ................................
__ , "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 95-118
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Jensen, Steven ]., "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's
Interpretation of the Moral Species" .......... 67 (2003) 623-43
Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas"
.......................................
67 (2003) 45-71
McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue"
......................................
69 (2005) 535-55
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., ''The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral
Theory" ..............................
67 (2003) 279-305

MOTION
Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion"
.....................................
70 (2006) 203-35

MUN ERA
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Episcopal Munera and the Character of Episcopal
Orders" ................................
66 (2002) 369-94

630

TERMS IN TITLES

NATURE/NATURAL
Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"
....................................
68 (2004) 105-41
Augros, Robert M., "Nature Acts for an End" ...... 66 (2002) 535-75
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ........... 66 (2002) 101-32
Dewan, Lawrence, 0.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"
...................................
66 (2002) 275-309
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian
Natural Science" ........................
66 (2002) 519-33
Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an ancilla theologia nova:
Alister E. McGrath's A Scientific Theology" ..... 69 (2005) 127-52
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McAleer" .....................
Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
Ends" .................................
68 (2004) 507-29

NECESSITIES
Jones, John D ., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99

NON-CONTRADICTION
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's
Epistemological Realism" ..................
66 (2002) 457-71

NUTRITION
Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine
and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction
for Its Future" ...........................
68 (2004) 69-104

OBJECT
Flannery, Kevin L., S.]., "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas
67 (2003) 95-11
Aquinas" ...............................
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71

OBLIGATION
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" .......... 66 (2002) 101-32

ORDERS
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., "Episcopal Munera and the Character of Episcopal
66 (2002) 369-94
Orders" ................................

TERMS IN TITLES

631

ORIGINS/ORIGINAL
McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"
...................................
66 (2002) 499-517
__ ,"The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on Original Sin"
......................................
66 (2002) 201-29

PARTICIPATION
Caponi, Francis J., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of
Participation" ..........................
67 (2003) 3 75-408

PERSON/PERSONAL
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John
Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" .............
69 (2005) 173-201
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint
69 (2005) 31-77
Thomas Aquinas" ........................

PHILOSOPHY
Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"
....................................
68 (2004) 105-41

PLACE
Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place"
......................................
67 (2003) 439-62

PRUDENCE
McKay,
"Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue"
......................................
69 (2005) 535-55

PUNISHMENT, CAPITAL
Brugger, E. Christian, "Catholic Moral Teaching and the Problem of Capital
68 (2004) 41-67
Punishment" ............................

PURPOSES
Sokolowski, Robert, "What Is Natural Law? Human Purposes and Natural
Ends" .................................
68 (2004) 507-29

REALISM
St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"
......................................
69 (2005) 557-92
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and NeoAristotelian Realism" .....................
68 (2004) 531-43
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's
Epistemological Realism" ..................
66 (2002) 457-71

REASON
Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister
Eckhart" ..............................
67 (2003) 409-38

REMEDIUM CONCUPISCENTIAE
Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the 'Remedium Concupiscentiae'"
....................................
70 (2006) 481-536

632

TERMS IN TITLES

REPORTING
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and NeoAristotelian Realism" .....................
68 (2004) 531-43

REVELATION
Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister
..............................
67 (2003) 409-38
Eckhart"

SCIENCE/SCIENTIFIC
Augros, Michael, "Reconciling Science with Natural Philosophy"
......................................
68 (2004) 105-41
Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"
.....................................
68 (2004) 375-429
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian
66 (2002) 519-33
Natural Science" ........................
Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an ancilla theologia nova:
Alister E. McGrath's A Scientific Theology" .... 69 (2005) 127-52
Tkacz, Michael W., "Scientific Reporting, Imagination, and NeoAristotelian Realism" .....................
68 (2004) 531-43

SEMI OS IS
Deely, John, "The Semiosis of Angels" ............

68 (2004) 205-58

SIN
McMahon, Kevin A., "The Christological Turn in Recent Literature on
Original Sin" ............................
66 (2002) 201-29
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125

SOUL
Bradley, Denis J.M., '"To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal
Human Soul" .............................
68 (2004) 1-39

SPECIES
Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ... 70 (2006) 1-26
__ , "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's Interpretation of the
Moral Species" ..........................
67 (2003) 623-43

SUBJECT/SUBJECTIVITY
Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the
Truth of Subjectivity" .......................
67 (2003) 1-44

SUBSTANCE/SUBSTANTIAL
Goyette, John, "Substantial Form and the Recovery of an Aristotelian
Natural Science" .........................
66 (2002) 519-33

THEOLOGY/THEOLOGICAL
Berkman, John, "Medically Assisted Nutrition and Hydration in Medicine
and Moral Theology: A Contextualization of Its Past and a Direction
for Its Future" ..........................
68 (2004) 69-104

TERMS IN TITLES

633

Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology
on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ...... 69 (2005) 279-312
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology
Ever Mathematical?"
.....................
70 (2006) 367-93
Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an ancilla theologia nova:
Alister E. McGrath's A Scientific Theology" .... 69 (2005) 127-52
Kelly, Anthony ]., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of
Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ......... 67 (2003) 335-74
Levering, Matthew, "Beyond the J amesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology"
.....................................
66 (2002) 395-420
McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"
.....................................
66 (2002) 499-517
Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology
of St. Thomas" .........................
68 (2004) 577-600
Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"
.....................................
70 (2006) 395-419

THEORY
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's
Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral
Theory" ..............................
67 (2003) 279-305

THOMISM/THOMISTIC
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"
.....................................
66 (2002) 275-309
Grygiel, Wojciech P., F.S.S.P., "The Metaphysics of Chaos: A Thomistic
View of Entropy and Evolution" ............
66 (2002) 251-66
Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's
Interpretation of Thomism" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 607

TIME
Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers"
......................................
70 (2006) 311-66

TRANSCENDENTALS
Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's
Intention at De Veritate 1.1 ?" ..............
67 (2003) 197-219

TRINITY/TRINITARIAN
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint
Thomas Aquinas" .........................
69 (2005) 31-77
Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity
Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa"' ...... 70 (2006) 421-55
Levering, Matthew, "Beyond the Jamesian Impasse in Trinitarian Theology"
.....................................
66 (2002) 395-420

TRUST
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" .. 70 (2006) 103-23

TERMS IN TITLES

634

TRUTH
Cahalan, John C., "Natural Obligation: How Naturally Known Truth
Determines Ethical Good and Evil" ........... 66 (2002) 101-32
Rhonheimer, Martin, "The Cognitive Structure of the Natural Law and the
Truth of Subjectivity" .......................
67 (2003) 1-44
Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's
Intention atDe Veritate 1.1?" ..............
67 (2003) 197-219

UNIQUENESS
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John
Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..............
69 (2005) 173-201

UNIVOCATION
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,
and Analogy" ...........................
70 (2006) 537-75

VICE
DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love:
Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia" .............
68 (2004) 173-204

VIRTUE
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon
Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101
McKay, Angela, "Prudence and Acquired Moral Virtue"
......................................
69 (2005) 535-55
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125

VISION, BEATIFIC
Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate
70 (2006) 605-15
Son: Furthering the Discussion" .............
White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and
the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ......... 69 (2005) 497-534

VOLUNTARY
White, Thomas Joseph, "The Voluntary Action of the Earthly Christ and
the Necessity of the Beatific Vision" ......... 69 (2005) 497-534

WAR
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's
66 (2002) 337-67
Ethics?" ................................

WELL-BEING
Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99

WOMEN
Vall, Gregory, "Inclusive Language and the Equal Dignity of Women and
Men in Christ" .........................
67 (2003) 579-606

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES
AQUINAS
see THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.

ABELARD
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
67 (2003) 73-94
0

••

0

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0

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0

ALBERTUS MAGNUS
Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion"
70 (2006) 203-35
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
67 (2003) 73-94
•••

0

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0

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ARISTOTLE
Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas
Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ............ 68 (2004) 287-314
Decaen, Christopher A., "Aristotle's Aether and Contemporary Science"
68 (2004) 375-429
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "Applying Aristotle in Contemporary Embryology"
67 (2003) 249-78
Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the Confessions"
67 (2003) 607-22
Larson, Thomas R., "Aristotle's Understanding of Place"
67 (2003) 439-62
Upton, Thomas V., "The Law of Non-Contradiction and Aristotle's
Epistemological Realism" ..................
66 (2002) 457-71
0

0

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0

0

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0

0

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0

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0

0

0

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0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

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0

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0

0

0

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0

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0

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0

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0

0

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0

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0

0

•

0

•

AUGUSTINE
Cahall, Perry J., "Saint Augustine on Conjugal Love and Divine Love"
68 (2004) 343-73
Foley, Michael P., "Augustine, Aristotle, and the Confessions"
67 (2003) 607-22
0

0

•

0

•

0

0

0

0

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0

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0

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0

0

0

0

BLACKBURN
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon
Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

CAPREOLUS
Mahoney, Edward P., "The Accomplishment of Jean Capreolus, O.P."
68 (2004) 601-32
0

0

0

0

0

0

0

0

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•••

635

0

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••

0

0

0

•

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

636

CHILDS
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
Fowl, and Aquinas" .......................
69 (2005) 407-67

CROSBY
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John
Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..............
69 (2005) 173-201

CURRAN
Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology
on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ...... 69 (2005) 279-312

ECKHART
Dobie, Robert J., "Reason and Revelation in the Thought of Meister
Eckhart" ...............................
67 (2003) 409-38

FLANNERY
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's
Reconstruction of Aquinas's Moral Theory" .... 67 (2003) 119-31

FOWL
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
Fowl, and Aquinas" .......................
69 (2005) 407-67

GILSON
St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"
......................................
69 (2005) 557-92

GRACIA
Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"
......................................
68 (2004) 545-75

GUITMUND OF AVERSA
Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology
of St. Thomas" .........................
68 (2004) 577-600

HERVAEUS NATALIS
Iribarren, Isabel, "The Scotist Background in Hervaeus Natalis's
Interpretation of Thomism" .................
66 (2002) 607-27

HILL
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., "Funeral Homily for William J. Hill, 0.P."
.........................................
66 (2002) 1-7

JOHN PAUL II
Brugger, E. Christian, and William E. May, "John Paul II's Moral Theology
on Trial: A Reply to Charles E. Curran" ...... 69 (2005) 279-312
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon
Blackburn and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" 70 (2006) 71-101

KENNY
O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny"
.......................................
66 (2002) 15-59

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

637

LINDBECK
Massa, James, "Lindbeck's Vision of the Church" .... 67 (2003) 463-80

LONERGAN
St. Amour, Paul, "Lonergan and Gilson on the Problem of Critical Realism"
......................................
69 (2005) 557-92

LONG
Jensen, Steven J., "A Long Discussion regarding Steven A. Long's
Interpretation of the Moral Species" .......... 67 (2003) 623-43

MCALEER
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McA!eer" .....................

MCGRATH
Keating, James F., "The Natural Sciences as an ancilla theologia nova:
Alister E. McGrath's A Scientific Theology" ..... 69 (2005) 127-52

NEWTON
Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas
Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ............ 68 (2004) 287-314

PASNAU
Bradley, Denis J.M., '"To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal
Human Soul" ..............................
68 (2004) 1-39

PETER LOMBARD
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94

PINCKAERS
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McAleer" .....................

PORTER
Dewan, Lawrence, O.P., "Jean Porter on Natural Law: Thomistic Notes"
.....................................
66 (2002) 275-309

PSEUDO-DI ONYSIUS
Jones, John D., "An Absolutely Simple God? Frameworks for Reading
69 (2005) 3 71-406
Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagite" .............

RAHNER
Caponi, Francis J., O.S.A., "Karl Rahner and the Metaphysics of
Participation" ..........................
67 (2003) 375-408
Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity
Is the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa"' ...... 70 (2006) 421-55
McMahon, Kevin A., "Karl Rahner and the Theology of Human Origins"
.....................................
66 (2002) 499-517

638

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

RHONHEIMER
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
70 (2006) 155-201
Pinckaers, McAleer" .....................

SCOTUS
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125

STUMP
Bradley, Denis J. M., "Ephemerides Thomisticae Analyticae: Metaphysics
and Ethics in Stump's Aquinas" .............
69 (2005) 593-620

THEODORE OF MOPSUESTIA
Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia,
69 (2005) 251-77
Exegete" ...............................

THOMAS AQUINAS, ST.
Baldner, Steven, "Thomas Aquinas on Celestial Matter"
.....................................
68 (2004) 431-67
Bradley, Denis J.M., "'To Be or Not To Be?' Pasnau on Aquinas's Immortal
Human Soul" .............................
68 (2004) 1-39
___ , "Reason and the Natural Law: Flannery's Reconstruction of
Aquinas's Moral Theory" ..................
67 (2003) 119-31
Brock, Stephen L., "Is Uniqueness at the Root of Personal Dignity? John
Crosby and Thomas Aquinas" ..............
69 (2005) 173-201
Bukowski, Thomas P., "Beyond Aristotle ... and beyond Newton: Thomas
Aquinas on an Infinite Creation" ............ 68 (2004) 287-314
DeYoung, Rebecca Konyndyk, "Resistance to the Demands of Love:
Aquinas on the Vice of Acedia" .............
68 (2004) 173-204
Emery, Gilles, O.P., "The Personal Mode of Trinitarian Action in Saint
69 (2005) 31-77
Thomas Aquinas" .........................
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J., "The Field of Moral Action according to Thomas
69 (2005) 1-30
Aquinas" .................................
__ , "The Multifarious Moral Object of Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 95-118
Flores, Daniel E., "Thomas on the Problem of Theodore of Mopsuestia,
Exegete" ...............................
69 (2005) 251-77
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" .. 70 (2006) 103-23
Hill, William]., O.P., "St. Thomas Aquinas: Teacher" .. 66 (2002) 9-13
Hoffmann, Tobias, "Moral Action as Human Action: End and Object in
Aquinas in Comparison with Abelard, Lombard, Albert, and Scotus"
.......................................
67 (2003) 73-94
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?"
......................................
70 (2006) 237-65

PROPER NAMES IN TITLES

639

Jones, John D., "Aquinas on Human Well-Being and the Necessities of Life"
.......................................
66 (2002) 61-99
Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R., "A Multidimensional Disclosure: Aspects of
Aquinas's Theological Intentionality" ......... 67 (2003) 335- 7 4
Laporte, Jean-Marc, S.J., "Christ in Aquinas's Summa Theologiae:
67 (2003) 221-48
Peripheral or Pervasive?" ...................
Levering, Matthew, "Ecclesial Exegesis and Ecclesial Authority: Childs,
Fowl, and Aquinas" .......................
69 (2005) 407-67
Long, Steven A., "A Brief Disquisition regarding the Nature of the Object
of the Moral Act according to St. Thomas Aquinas" 67 (2003) 45-71
O'Callaghan, John P., "Aquinas's Rejection of Mind, contra Kenny"
.......................................
66 (2002) 15-59
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., "The Augustinianism of Thomas Aquinas's Moral
Theory" ..............................
67 (2003) 279-305
Payne, Andrew, "Gracia and Aquinas on the Principle of Individuation"
......................................
68 (2004) 545-75
Reichberg, Gregory M., "Aquinas on Defensive Killing: A Case of Double
Effect?" ................................
69 (2005) 341- 70
__ ,"Is There a 'Presumption against War' in Aquinas's Ethics?"
......................................
66 (2002) 337-67
Reynolds, Philip L., "Spiritual Cognition in Thomas Aquinas"
......................................
67 (2003) 505-38
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
Incarnation" ...........................
70 (2006) 577-603
Toner, Christopher, "Angelic Sin in Aquinas and Scotus and the Genesis of
Some Central Objections to Contemporary Virtue Ethics"
......................................
69 (2005) 79-125
Twetten, David B., "Aquinas's Aristotelian and Dionysian Definition of
'God'" .................................
69 (2005) 203-50
Waddell, Michael M., "Truth or Transcendentals: What Was St. Thomas's
Intention at De Veritate 1.1 ?" ..............
67 (2003) 197-219
Vaillancourt, Mark G., "Guitmund of Aversa and the Eucharistic Theology
of St. Thomas" .........................
68 (2004) 577-600
West, J. L.A., "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of Esse in Christ"
......................................
66 (2002) 231-50

THOMAS SUTTON
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,
and Analogy" ............................
70 (2006) 537-75

VOEGELIN
Poirier, Maben Walter, "Eric Voegelin on Christ and Christianity"
......................................
68 (2004) 259-86

BOOKS REVIEWED
Bagchi, David, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
Reformation Theology Gared Wicks, S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 289
Baglow, Christopher, "Modus et Forma": A New Approach to the Exegesis of St.
Thomas Aquinas with an Application to the "Lectura super Epistolam ad
Ephesios" (Steven C. Boguslawski, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 499
Barrera, Albino, O.P., Modern Catholic Social Documents & Political Economy
(Andrew V. Abela) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 652
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, Holy Teaching: Introducing the "Summa
Theologiae" of St. Thomas Aquinas (Matthew Levering) 70 (2006) 140
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, and Jim Fodor, eds., Aquinas in Dialogue:
Thomas for the Twenty-First Century (Robert Barron) 70 (2006) 296
Bedouelle, Guy, The History of the Church Gohn Vidmar, 0.P.)70 (2006) 478
Bellitto, Christopher M., Renewing Christianity: A History of Church Refomi
from Day One to Vatican II Gohn Vidmar, 0.P.) . . . . . 66 (2002) 654
Blanchette, Oliva, Philosophy of Being: A Reconstructive Essay in Metaphysics
(Michael]. Dodds, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 469
Bonino, S.-Th., et al., Thomistes ou de l'actualite de saint Thomas d'Aquin
(Aidan Nichols, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 636
Boyle, Leonard E., O.P., Facing History: A Different Thomas Aquinas (Brian].
Shanley, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 154
Burke, Patrick, Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical Study of His Major Themes
(Stephen M. Fields, S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 628
Burrell, David, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Mary Beth
Ingham) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 125
Centore, F. F., Theism or Atheism: The Eternal Debate (Michael]. Dodds, O.P.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 335
Cessario, Romanus, 0.P., Introduction to Moral Theology (Thomas Hibbs)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 629
__ , The Virtues, or the Examined Life (Matthew Levering) 67 (2003) 143
Clarke, W. Norris, S.J., The One and the Many: A Contemporary Thomistic
Metaphysics Gohn Goyette) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 490
Coda, Piero, II Logos e ii nulla: Trinita, religioni, mistica (Robert P. Imbelli)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 472
__ ,Teo-logia: La Paro/a di Dia nelle parole dell'uomo (Robert P. Imbelli)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 472
Coolman, Boyd Taylor, Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the
Theology of William of Auxerre (Kevin L. Hughes) ... 70 (2006) 137
Cross, Richard, The Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns
Scotus (Thomas G. Weinandy, O.F.M.Cap.) . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 637

640

BOOKS REVIEWED

641

Dahlstrom, Daniel 0., Heidegger's Concept of Truth (Richard L. Velkley)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 488
Deely, John, The Four Ages of Understanding: The First Postmodern Survey of
Philosophy from Ancient Times to the Turn of the Twenty-First Century
(Benedict M. Ashley, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 133
Doig, James C., Aquinas's Philosophical Commentary on the "Ethics": A
Historical Perspective (Tobias Hoffmann) . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 485
Dupre, Louis, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Culture (William Desmond) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 304
Elders, Leo, The Ethics of St. Thomas Aquinas: Happiness, Natural Law and the
Virtues (Jorgen Vijgen) .........................
69 (2005) 641
Emery, Gilles, O.P., Trinity in Aquinas (Gregory P. Rocca, 0.P.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 313
Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B., The Trinity: Rediscovering the Central Christian
Mystery (Anthony J. Kelly, C.Ss.R.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 133
Fields, Stephen M., S.J., Being as Symbol: On the Origin and Development of
Karl Rahner's Metaphysics (Michael G. Parker) ...... 67 (2003) 147
Flood, David, O.F.M., ed., Peter of john Olivi On the Acts of the Apostles
(Timothy B. Noone) ..........................
67 (2003) 154
Fodor, Jim, and Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, eds., Aquinas in Dialogue:
Thomas for the Twenty-First Century (Robert Barron)
70 (2006) 296
Foster, David Ruel, and Joseph W. Koterski, S.J., eds., The Two Wings of
Catholic Thought: Essays on "Fides et ratio" (William L. Portier)
..........................................
68 (2004) 325
Fowler, C. F., O.P., Descartes on the Human Soul (Desmond J. FitzGerald)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 163
Franklin, James, The Science of Conjecture: Evidence and Probability before
Pascal (Barry Miller) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 152
Gaine, Simon Francis, Will There Be Free Will in Heaven? Freedom,
Impeccability, and Beatitude (Tobias Hoffmann) ..... 68 (2004) 643
George, Marie I., Christianity and Extraterrestrials: A Catholic Perspective
(Ernan McMullin) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 143
Gerson, Lloyd P., Knowing Persons: A Study in Plato (Joe McCoy)
..........................................
68 (2004) 659
Gondreau, Paul, The Passions of Christ's Soul in the Theology of St. Thomas
Aquinas (Leo J. Elders, S.V.D.) ..................
67 (2003) 498
Grabowski, John S., Sex and Virtue: An Introduction to Sexual Ethics (Michael
Sherwin, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 157
Gracia, Jorge ]. E., Metaphysics and Its Task: The Search for the Categorial
Foundation of Knowledge (Michael Gorman). . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 651
Graham, Mark, Josef Fuchs on Natural Law (James Keating) . 68 (2004) 336
Greer, Rowan A., Christian Life and Christian Hope: Raids on the Inarticulate
(Jody Vaccaro Lewis) ..........................
66 (2002) 647
Guarino, Thomas G., Foundations of Systematic Theology (Paul J. Griffiths)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 467

642

BOOKS REVIEWED

Guevin, Benedict M., Christian Anthropology and Sexual Ethics Gohn S.
Grabowski) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 492
Gunton, Colin E., Act & Being: Towards a Theology of the Divine Attributes
(Michael A. Hoonhout) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 639
Gyulai, Emery De Gaal, The Art of Equanimity: A Study on the Theological
Hermeneutics of Saint Anselm of Canterbury (Paschal Baumstein, O.S.B.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 501
Hare, John E., God's Call: Moral Realism, God's Commands, and Human
Autonomy (Thomas Williams) ...................
66 (2002) 477
Hart, James G., and Guy Mansini, O.S.B., eds., Ethics and Theological
Disclosure: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski (Philip Blosser)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 161
Hartle, Ann, Michel de Montaigne: Accidental Philosopher Gohn C. McCarthy)
..........................................
69 (2005) 317
Hauser, Daniel, Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage
70 (2006) 148
Gulie Hanlon Rubio) .........................
Healy, Nicholas M., Thomas Aquinas: Theologian of the Christian Life (Robert
Barron) ....................................
68 (2004) 498
Hemming, Laurence Paul, Heidegger's Atheism: The Refusal of a Theological
Voice (Michael L. Raposa) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 306
Hemming, Laurence Paul, and Susan Frank Parsons, eds., Restoring Faith in
Reason (Paul J. Griffiths) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 472
Hipp, Stephen A., "Person" in Christian Tradition and the Conception of Saint
Albert the Great: A Systematic Study of Its Concept as Illuminated by the
Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation (Michael W. Tkacz)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 161
Bittinger, John P., Liberty, Wisdom, and Grace: Thomism and Democratic
Political Theory (V. Bradley Lewis) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 329
Hoffmann, Tobias, Creatura intellecta: Die Ideen und Possibilienlehre bei Duns
Scotus mit Ausblick auf Franz van Mayronnes, Poncius und Mastrius
(Ansgar Santogrossi, O.S.B.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 643
Houser, R. E., ed., Medieval Masters: Essays in Memory of Msgr. E. A. Synan
(Desmond J. FitzGerald) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 331
John Paul II, Pope, Memory and Identity: Conversations at the Dawn of a
Millennium (Paul Conner, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 636
Kaczor, Christopher, Proportionalism and the Natural Law Tradition (Michael
Sherwin, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 481
Kanaris, Jim, Bernard Lonergan's Philosophy of Religion: From Philosophy of
God to Philosophy of Religious Studies (Louis Roy, O.P.) 68 (2004) 340
Kerr, Fergus, After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Brian J. Shanley, 0.P.)
..........................................
67 (2003) 318
Knasas, John F. X., Being & Some 20'h Century Thomists (Oliva Blanchette)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 148
Kupczak, Jaroslaw, 0.P., Destined for Liberty: The Human Person in the
Philosophy of Karol Wojtyla/]ohn Paul II Gean Butler) . 66 (2002) 493

BOOKS REVIEWED

643

LaNave, Gregory, Through Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology
according to St. Bonaventure Gohn F. Boyle) ....... 70 (2006) 471
Langlois, John, A Catholic Response in Sixteenth-Century France to Reformation
Theology: The Works of Pierre Dore Gared Wicks, S.J.) 68 (2004) 662
Lawler, Michael G., What Is and What Ought to Be: The Dialectic of Experience,
Theology, and Church (Thomas G. Guarino) ........ 70 (2006) 129
Levering, Matthew, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple: Salvation
according to Thomas Aquinas (Francis Martin) . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 321
Libera, Alain de, Metaphysique et noetique: Albert le Grand (Michael W. Tkacz)
..........................................
70 (2006) 474
Lucker, Raymond A., and William C. McDonough, eds., Revelation and the
Church: Vatican II in the Twenty-First Century Games Massa)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 479
Ludlow, Morwenna, Universal Salvation: Eschatology in the Thought of Gregory
of Nyssa and Karl Rahner (Kevin Mongrain) . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 167
Macswain, Robert, andJeffrey Stout, eds., Grammarand Grace: Reformulations
of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (Terrance Klein) . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 479
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., and James G. Hart, eds., Ethics and Theological
Disclosure: The Thought of Robert Sokolowski (Philip Blosser)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 161
McGinn, Bernard, The Mystical Thought of Meister Eckhart: The Man from
Whom God Hid Nothing (Leonard P. Hindsley) ...... 68 (2004) 333
McGrade, A. S., ed., The Cambridge Companion to Medieval Philosophy (R.
James Long) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 632
Mcinerny, Ralph, The Very Rich Hours of Jacques Maritain: A Spiritual Life
(Ronald E. Lane) .............................
68 (2004) 654
McPartland, Thomas J., Lonergan and the Philosophy of Historical Existence
(David Fleischacker) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 325
Milbank, John, Being Reconciled: Ontology and Pardon (Michael L. Raposa)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 322
Milbank, John, and Catherine Pickstock, Truth in Aquinas (Bruce D. Marshall)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 632
Milem, Bruce, The Unspoken Word: Negative Theology in Meister Eckhart's
German Sermons (Leonard P. Hindsley) . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 328
Miller, Barry, The Fullness of Being: A New Paradigm for Existence Gohn
Peterson) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 485
Miner, Robert C., Truth in the Making: Knowledge and Creation in Modern
Philosophy and Theology (Grant Kaplan) . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 165
Mojsisch, Burkhard, Meister Eckhart: Analogy, Univocity, and Unity (Robert J.
Dobie) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 482
Moss, David, and Edward T. Oakes, S.J., eds., The Cambridge Companion to
Hans Urs von Balthasar (Peter J. Casarella) . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 292
Murphy, Francesca Aran, Art and Intellect in the Philosophy of Etienne Gilson
(Peter A. Redpath) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 484

644

BOOKS REVIEWED

Murphy, Mark C., An Essay on Divine Authority (Philip E. Devine)
..........................................
67 (2003) 314
__ ,Natural Law and Practical Reasoning (V. Bradley Lewis) 67 (2003) 310
Murphy, Mark C., ed., Alasdair Macintyre (Christopher Stephen Lutz)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 646
Nash-Marshall, Siobhan, Participation and the Good: A Study in Boethian
Metaphysics (John Marenbon) ...................
66 (2002) 481
Nichols, Aidan, O.P., Say It Is Pentecost: A Guide through Balthasar's Logic (D.
C. Schindler) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 325
Noonan, John T., Jr., A Church That Can and Cannot Change: The
Development of Catholic Moral Teaching (Guy Mansini, O.S.B.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 624
Noriega, Jose, "Guiados par el Espiritu": El Espiritu Santo y el conocimiento
moral en Tomds de Aquino (Abelardo Lobato, O.P.) . . 66 (2002) 170
O'Callaghan, John P., Thomist Realism and the Linguistic Turn: Toward a More
Perfect Form of Existence (Gavin T. Colvert) ........ 68 (2004) 319
O'Callaghan, John P., and Thomas S. Hibbs, eds., Recovering Nature: Essays in
Natural Philosophy, Ethics, and Metaphysics in Honor of Ralph Mcinerny
(Steven Baldner) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 320
O'Donovan, Oliver, The Ways of Judgment (Thomas W. Smith) 70 (2006) 300
O'Meara, Thomas F., O.P., Erich Przywara, S.j.: His Theology and His World
(Robert Masson) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 153
Oakes, Edward T., S.J., and David Moss, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
Hans Urs van Balthasar (Peter]. Casarella) . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 292
Peddicord, Richard, O.P., The Sacred Monster of Thomism: An Introduction to
the Life and Legacy of Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange, 0.P. (BenoitDominique de la Soujeole, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 621
Perler, Dominik, Theories de l'intentionnalite au moyen age (Jack Zupko)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 469
Pinckaers, Servais, O.P., Morality: The Catholic View (John Corbett, 0.P.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 166
Pope, Stephen J., ed., The Ethics of Aquinas (Paul]. Wajda) . 67 (2003) 140
Potworowski, Christophe F., Contemplation and Incarnation: The Theology of
Marie-Dominique Chenu (Aidan Nichols, O.P.) ...... 67 (2003) 137
Radcliffe, Timothy, O.P., I Call You Friends (Basil Cole, O.P.) 66 (2002) 333
Resnick, Irven M.,Albert the Great: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography (19002000) (Michael W. Tkacz) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 152
Rhonheimer, Martin, Natural Law and Practical Reason: A Thomist View of
Moral Autonomy (Stephen L. Brock) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 311
Rico, Herminio,John Paul II and the Legacy of "Dignitatis humanae" (Jaroslaw
Kupczak, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 662
Rocca, Gregory P., O.P., Speaking the Incomprehensible God: Thomas Aquinas
on the Interplay of Positive and Negative Theology (W. Norris Clarke,
S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 633

BOOKS REVIEWED

645

Rowland, Tracey, Culture and the Thomist Tradition: After Vatican II (Brian J.
68 (2004) 143
Shanley, 0.P.) ...............................
Roy, Louis, O.P., Mystical Consciousness: Western Perspectives and Dialogue
with Japanese Thinkers Qames A. Wiseman, O.S.B.) .. 68 (2004) 486
___ , Transcendent Experiences: Phenomenology and Critique (M. John
Farrelly, 0.S.B.) .............................
68 (2004) 163
__ ,Le sentiment de transcendence, experience de Dieu? (M. John Farrelly,
O.S.B.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 163
Ryan, Thomas F., Thomas Aquinas as Reader of the Psalms (Theresa Gross-Diaz)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 329
Schockenhoff, Eberhard, Natural Law and Human Dignity: Universal Ethics in
an Historical World (Mary C. Sommers) . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 153
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., The Thomist Tradition (Gregory M. Reichberg)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 157
Shanley, Brian J., O.P., ed., One Hundred Years of Philosophy Qames Ross)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 488
Sherwin, Michael S., O.P., By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge
in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Michael Dauphinais)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 306
Simpson, Peter Phillips, Vices, Virtues, and Consequences: Essays in Moral and
Political Philosophy (Bruce Williams, O.P.) . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 4 73
Smith, Timothy L., Thomas Aquinas' Trinitarian Theology (Gilles Emery, O.P.)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 645
Sokolowski, Robert, Introduction to Phenomenology (Richard Cobb-Stevens)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 159
Springsted, Eric 0., The Act of Faith: Christian Faith and the Moral Self
(Michael Dauphinais) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 649
Steck, Christopher, The Ethical Thought of Hans Urs van Balthasar (Frederick
Christian Bauerschmidt) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 494
Steinmetz, David C., and David Bagchi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
Reformation Theology Qared Wicks, S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 289
Stickelbroeck, Michael, Christologie im Horizont der Seinsfrage: Uber die
epistemologischen und metaphysischen Voraussetzungen des Bekenntnisses
zur universalen Heilsmittlerschaft ]esu Christi (Emery De Gaal)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 666
Stout, Jeffrey, Democracy and Tradition (V. Bradley Lewis) . 70 (2006) 462
Stout, Jeffrey, and Robert Macswain, eds., Grammar and Grace: Reformulations
of Aquinas and Wittgenstein (Terrance Klein) . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 4 79
Suarez-Nani, Tiziana, Les anges et la philosophie: Subjectivite et fonction
cosmologique de substances separries a la fin du XIIIe siecle (Marie I.
George) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 491
__ , Connaissance et langage des anges (Marie I. George) . . 68 (2004) 491
Theron, Stephen, Natural Law Reconsidered: The Ethics of Human Liberation
(Christopher Kaczor) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 169

646

BOOKS REVIEWED

Thiel, John E., God, Evil, and Innocent Suffering: A Theological Reflection
Goseph L. Mangina) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 476
Tracey, Gerard, ed., The Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, vol. 8
(Edward Jeremy Miller) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 655
Van Huyssteen, J. Wentzel, The Shaping of Rationality: Toward
Interdisciplinarity in Theology and Science Games Keating)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 315

Van Nieuwenhove, Rik, and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of Thomas
70 (2006) 457
Aquinas (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) ............
Venard, Olivier-Thomas, 0.P., Litterature et theologie: Un saison en enfer
(David B. Burrell, C.S.C.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 651
Veto, Miklos, La naissance de la volonte (D. C. Schindler) . . 69 (2005) 329
Wawrykow, Joseph, and Rik van Nieuwenhove, eds., The Theology of Thomas
Aquinas (Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P.) ............
70 (2006) 457
Wiercinski, Andrzej, Inspired Metaphysics? Gustav Siewerth's Hermeneutic
Reading of the Onto-Theological Tradition (Sean McGrath)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 332

Williams, Thomas, ed., The Cambridge Companion to Duns Scotus (Mary Beth
Ingham) ....................................
68 (2004) 315
Williams, Thomas D., Who Is My Neighbor? Personalism and the Foundations
of Human Rights (Kevin L. Flannery, S.J.) . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 4 7 6
Wippel, John F., The Metaphysical Thought of Thomas Aquinas: From Finite
Being to Uncreated Being (W. Norris Clarke, S.J.) .... 66 (2002) 149
Wisnovsky, Robert, Avicenna's Metaphysics in Context (Therese-Anne Druart)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 326

Woodward, P.A., ed., The Doctrine of Double Effect: Philosophers Debate a
67 (2003) 149
Controversial Moral Issue Gohn Berkman) ..........

REVIEWERS
Abela, AndrewV ..................................
67 (2003) 652
Ashley, Benedict M., O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 133
Baldner, Steven . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 320
70 (2006) 296; 68. (2004) 498
Barron, Robert .......................
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 494
Baumstein, Paschal, 0.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 501
Berkman, John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 149
Blanchette, Oliva . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 148
Blosser, Philip . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 161
Boguslawski, Steven C., 0.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 499
Bonino, Serge-Thomas, O.P ..........................
70 (2006) 457
Boyle, John F. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 471
Brock, Stephen L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 311
Burrell, David B., C.S.C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 651
Butler, Jean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 493
Casarella, Peter J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 292
Clarke, W. Norris, S.J. ..................
68 (2004) 633; 66 (2002) 149
Cobb-Stevens, Richard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 159
Cole, Basil O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 333
68 (2004) 319
Colvert, Gavin T..................................
Conner, Paul, 0.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 636
Corbett, John, 0.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 166
Dauphinais, Michael ...................
70 (2006) 306; 67 (2003) 649
Desmond, William . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 304
Devine, Philip E. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 314
Dobie, Robert J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 482
Dodds, Michael]., O.P ..................
69 (2005) 335; 68 (2004) 469
69 (2005) 326
Druart, Therese-Anne ..............................
Elders, Leo J., S.V.D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 498
67 (2003) 645
Emery, Gilles, 0.P .................................
Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 163
Fields, Stephen M., S.J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 628
FitzGerald, Desmond]. . ...............
67 (2003) 331; 66 (2002) 163
Flannery, Kevin L., S.J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 476
Fleischacker, David . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 325
Gaal, Emery De ...................................
67 (2003) 666
George, Marie I. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 491
66 (2002) 651
Gorman, Michael .................................
Goyette, John ....................................
67 (2003) 490
Grabowski, John S. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 492
647

648

REVIEWERS

Griffiths, Paul]. ......................
70 (2006) 467; 68 (2004) 472
Gross-Diaz, Theresa . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 329
Guarino, Thomas G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 129
Hibbs, Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 629
Hindsley, Leonard P. . .................
68 (2004) 333; 67 (2003) 328
Hoffmann, Tobias .....................
68 (2004) 643; 66 (2002) 485
Hoonhout, Michael A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 639
70 (2006) 137
Hughes, Kevin L. ..................................
Imbelli, Robert P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 472
Ingham, Mary Beth ....................
70 (2006) 125; 68 (2004) 315
Kaczor, Christopher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 169
Kaplan, Grant . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 165
Keating, James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 336
Keating, James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 315
Kelly, Anthony J., C.Ss.R. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 133
Klein, Terrance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 479
Kupczak, Jaroslaw, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 662
Lane, Ronald E....................................
68 (2004) 654
70 (2006) 140; 67 (2003) 143
Levering, Matthew ....................
Lewis, Jody Vaccaro . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 647
Lewis, V. Bradley .......... 70 (2006) 462; 68 (2004) 329; 67 (2003) 310
Lobato, Abelardo, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 170
Long, R. James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 632
Lutz, Christopher Stephen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 646
Mangina, Joseph L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 476
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 624
Marenbon, John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 481
Marshall, Bruce D. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 632
Martin, Francis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 321
Massa, James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 479
Masson, Robert . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 153
McCarthy, John C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 317
McCoy, Joe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 659
McGrath, Sean . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 332
McMullin, Ernan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 143
Miller, Edward Jeremy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 655
Miller, Barry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 152
Mongrain, Kevin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 167
68 (2004) 636; 67 (2003) 137
Nichols, Aidan, O.P ....................
Noone, Timothy B.................................
67 (2003) 154
Parker, Michael G. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 147
Peterson, John . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 485
Portier, William L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 325
69 (2005) 322; 67 (2003) 306
Raposa, Michael L.....................
Redpath, Peter A. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 484

REVIEWERS

649

Reichberg, Gregory M. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 157
Rocca, Gregory P., O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 313
Ross, James . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 488
Roy, Louis, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 340
Rubio, Julie Hanlon . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 148
Santogrossi, Ansgar, 0.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 643
Schindler, D. C........................
69 (2005) 329; 66 (2002) 325
Shanley, Brian]., O.P ....... 68 (2004) 143; 67 (2003) 318; 66 (2002) 154
Sherwin, Michael, O.P ..................
69 (2005) 157; 67 (2003) 481
Smith, Thomas W. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70 (2006) 300
Sommers, Mary C. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 153
Soujeole, Benoit-Dominique de la, O.P. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 621
Tkacz, Michael W. . ....... 70 (2006) 474; 70 (2006) 152; 68 (2004) 161
Velkley, Richard L. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 488
Vidmar, John, O.P .....................
70 (2006) 478; 66 (2002) 654
Vijgen, Jorgen . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 641
66 (2002) 637
Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap ....................
Wicks, Jared, S.J. .....................
70 (2006) 289; 68 (2004) 662
Williams, Bruce, O.P ...............................
66 (2002) 473
Williams, Thomas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 (2002) 477
Wiseman, James A., 0.S.B. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68 (2004) 486
Wojda, Paul J. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67 (2003) 140
Zupko, Jack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 (2005) 469

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUME 70 (2006)
ARTICLES
Baldner, Steven, "Albertus Magnus and the Categorization of Motion" .. 203
Bradshaw, David, "Time and Eternity in the Greek Fathers" .......... 311
Burke, Cormac, "A Postscript to the 'Remedium Concupiscentiae'" ..... 481
Colton, Randall G., "Two Rival Versions of Sexual Virtue: Simon Blackburn
71
and John Paul II on Lust and Chastity" ....................
103
George, Marie I., "Aquinas on the Nature of Trust" ................
Hemming, Laurence Paul, "Giving a Good Account of God: Is Theology Ever
367
Mathematical?" .....................................
Henninger, Mark G., S.J., "Thomas Sutton on Univocation, Equivocation,
and Analogy" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 37
Horner, David A., "Is Aquinas an Act-Ethicist or an Agent-Ethicist?" .... 237
Jensen, Steven J., "Do Circumstances Give Species?" ..................
1
Jowers, Dennis W., "A Test of Karl Rahner's Axiom, 'The Economic Trinity Is
the Immanent Trinity and Vice Versa"' ........................
421
Levering, Matthew, "Natural Law and Natural Inclinations: Rhonheimer,
Pinckaers, McAleer" ......................................
155
Long, Steven A., "An Argument for the Embryonic Intactness of Marriage"
......................................................
267
Salas, Victor, Jr., "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's Esse: A Metaphysics of the
Incarnation" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 577
Smith, Janet E., "The Morality of Condom Use by HIV-Infected Spouses" 27
Weinandy, Thomas G., O.F.M.Cap., "The Beatific Vision and the Incarnate
Son: Furthering the Discussion" . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 605
Wright, William M., IV, "The Theology of Disclosure and Biblical Exegesis"
......................................................
395

REVIEWS
Bagchi, David, and David C. Steinmetz, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
289
Reformation Theology Gared Wicks, S.J.) ................
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, Holy Teaching: Introducing the "Summa
Theologiae" of St. Thomas Aquinas (Matthew Levering) . . . . . 140
Bauerschmidt, Frederick Christian, and Jim Fodor, eds., Aquinas in Dialogue:
296
Thomas for the Twenty-First Century (Robert Barron)
Bedouelle, Guy, The History of the Church Gohn Vidmar, O.P.) ....... 478
Burrell, David, Faith and Freedom: An Interfaith Perspective (Mary Beth
125
Ingham) .........................................
Coolman, Boyd Taylor, Knowing God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in
the Theology of William of Auxerre (Kevin L. Hughes) ....... 137
Dupre, Louis, The Enlightenment and the Intellectual Foundations of Modern
Culture (William Desmond) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 04
Farrelly, M. John, O.S.B., The Trinity: Rediscovering the Central Christian
133
Mystery (Anthony]. Kelly, C.Ss.R.) .....................
Fodor, Jim, and Frederick Christian Bauerschmidt, eds., Aquinas in Dialogue:
296
Thomas for the Twenty-First Century (Robert Barron)
George, Marie I., Christianity and Extraterrestrials: A Catholic Perspective
143
(Ernan McMullin) ..................................
Guarino, Thomas G., Foundations of Systematic Theology (Paul]. Griffiths)
................................................
467
Hauser, Daniel, Marriage and Christian Life: A Theology of Christian Marriage
148
Gulie Hanlon Rubio) ................................
LaNave, Gregory, Through Holiness to Wisdom: The Nature of Theology
471
according to St. Bonaventure Gohn F. Boyle) ..............
Lawler, Michael G., What Is and What Ought to Be: The Dialectic of
Experience, Theology, and Church (Thomas G. Guarino) ..... 129
Libera, Alain de, Metaphysique et noetique: Albert le Grand (Michael W.
474
Tkacz) ...........................................
Moss, David, and Edward T. Oakes, S.J., eds., The Cambridge Companion to
292
Hans Urs van Balthasar (Peter J. Casarella) ...............
O'Donovan, Oliver, The Ways of]udgment (Thomas W. Smith) ....... 300
Oakes, Edward T., S.J., and David Moss, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
292
Hans Urs van Balthasar (Peter ]. Casarella) ...............
Resnick, Irven M., Albert the Great: A Selectively Annotated Bibliography
(1900-2000) (Michael W. Tkacz) ......................
152

INDEX OF REVIEWS (con.)

Sherwin, Michael S., O.P., By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and
Knowledge in the Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Michael
Dauphinais) .......................................
306
Steinmetz, David C., and David Bagchi, eds., The Cambridge Companion to
289
Reformation Theology Oared Wicks, S.J.) ................
Stout, Jeffrey, Democracy and Tradition (V. Bradley Lewis) .......... 462
Van Nieuwenhove, Rik, and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of
Thomas Aquinas (Serge-Thomas Bonino, 0.P.) ............ 457
Wawrykow, Joseph, and Rik van Nieuwenhove, eds., The Theology of
Thomas Aquinas (Serge-Thomas Bonino, 0.P.) ............ 457