The Thomist 72 (2008): 1-44

SUBSISTIT IN:
NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?
CHRISTOPHER}. MALLOY
University of Dallas
Irving, Texas

T

HE CONGREGATION FOR THE Doctrine of the Faith
(CDF) published on June 29, 2007, with papal ratification
and confirmation, a brief yet highly significant document
entitled "Responses to Some Questions regarding Certain Aspects
of the Doctrine on the Church. " 1
The document touches a tender issue, the identity of the
Church founded by Jesus Christ. Until the mid 1960s, the vast
majority of Catholic theologians simply presumed that the Church
Jesus Christ founded is the Catholic Church. Vatican II, on the
other hand, in its dogmatic constitution regarding the Church,
Lumen gentium, teaches, "This Church [of Christ], constituted
and ordered as a society in this world, subsists in the Catholic
Church" (emphasis added). 2 It would seem that if the Church of
Christ "subsists in" the Catholic Church it is not fully identical
with that Church and can, moreover, exist elsewhere. Few theologians continued to hold a "full identity" between the Catholic
Church and the Church Christ founded. Lumen gentium was
taken to be a watershed, an irrefragable warrant for one case of
what Pope Benedict XVI has criticized as a "hermeneutic of
rupture. " 3
(2007): 604-8. English translation published in Origins 37 (2007): 134-36.
Ecclesia, in hoc mundo ut societas constituta et ordinata, subsistit in Ecclesia
catholica" (LG 8 [AAS 57 (1965): 12]). Unless otherwise noted, translations of the council
documents are mine.
3 Pope Benedict XVI, "Address of His Holiness Benedict XVI to the Roman Curia" (22
December 2005).
1 AAS 99

2 "Haec

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CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

The CD F's recent document, however, warns theologians away
from such a hermeneutic with regard to "subsistit in" and affirms
a "full identity" of the Catholic Church and the Church founded
by Jesus Christ: "The council did not wish to change, nor is it to
be said to have changed, this doctrine; instead, it wished to unfold
it, to understand it more deeply, and to express it more fruitfully."4 Again, "The use of the terms [i.e., subsistit in], by preserving the full identity fplenam identitatem] of the Church of
Christ and the Catholic Church, does not change the doctrine on
the Church." 5 If the council did teach a "full identity," then many
Catholic ecclesiologists have, for the past forty years, misconstrued a fundamental matter, one that orients the Catholic
ecumenical compass. How could so many have perceived a
"watershed" if there was none? Or is the CDF vainly attempting
to turn back the clock?
In this article, I intend to demonstrate that, in continuity with
the preconciliar magisterial teaching, Vatican II does not mitigate
the full identity of the Church of Christ with the Catholic Church.
First, I will take stock of the textual history of the constitution on
the Church. Second, I will present four ways in which one might
deny a full identity, focusing on the fourth way, which involves
the notion of nonexclusive identity. Third, I will adumbrate the
forceful arguments of one of the most respected English-speaking
defenders of nonexclusive identity, Francis Sullivan. Finally, I will
respond to Sullivan's arguments and offer a number of arguments
that "converge" in favor of full identity.
I. FROM "IS" TO "SUBSISTSIN"

As is well known, the fathers of Vatican II approved a key
change in the wording of an early draft of its decree on the
Church. The first draft, Aeternus Unigeniti, was the schema drawn
4 "Noluit mutare, at evolvere, profundius intelligere it fecundius exponere voluit, nee earn
mutavisse dicendum est" (CDF, "Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church," response
to the first question [AAS 99(2007): 605; my translation]).
5 "Usus vocabuli retinentis plenam identitatem Ecclesiae Christi et Ecclesiae Catholicae
doctrinam de Ecclesia non immutat" (ibid., response to the third question [AAS 99(2007):
607; my translation]).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

3

up by the Preparatory Theological Commission. 6 It taught that
there is only one (unica) Church and that the Catholic Church
alone could by right (iure) be called "Church." 7 The title of this
section of the draft (a. 7) reads, "The Roman Catholic Church is
the Mystical Body of Christ." 8 Here, we have an identification of
the Catholic Church with the Mystical Body of Christ and, hence,
with the Church of Christ. It would seem that no one would
presume that the Mystical Body is to be distinguished from the
Church founded by Christ, for the latter expression certainly
indicates a complex reality, both spiritual and visible, and the
former expression would have done so in the minds of the
drafters. Note 50 of chapter 1 of the draft states plainly, "The
Church is [the] Roman Catholic [Church]," further indicating the
identity of the Catholic Church with the Church founded by
Christ. 9 Although this draft does not explicitly identify the Church
founded by Christ with the Catholic Church, it nevertheless does
not entertain the slightest distinction. 10
As with many of the initial schemata, this first draft was not to
enjoy a long life. 11 One can indeed be thankful, other considerations aside, for the richness and vitality resulting from the fresh
6 Acta synodalia sacrosancti concilii oecumenici Vaticani II, vol. 1.4 (Vatican City: Typis
polyglottis Vaticanis, 1971), 12-91 (henceforth, ASS). For an illuminating narration of the
prehistory of this text, see Alexandra von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in' (LG
8): Zum Selbstverstiindnis der Katholischen Kirche (Munich: Herbert Utz Verlag, 2002), 20277.
7 "Therefore, the Sacred Synod teaches and solemnly professes there to be naught but one
true Church of Jesus Christ .... Therefore only the Roman Catholic Church is by right called
Church" ("Docet igitur Sacra Synodus et sollemniter profitetur non esse nisi unicam veram
Iesu Christi Ecclesiam.... Ideoque sola iure Catholica Romana nuncupatur Ecclesia" [ASS
1/4:15.14-24]). See also Robert Fromaget, "Subsistit In: De Eius Significatione in
Constitutione Dogmatica De Ecclesia Lumen Gentium" (S.T.L. thesis, Angelicum, 2006), 810. In this article, "Church" will signify the universal Church, and "church" or "churches" will
signify particular churches. The Acta frequently use capital "E" (Ecclesiae) in designating
particular churches.
8 "Ecclesia Catholica Romana est Mysticum Christi Corpus" (ASS 1/4:15.16; italics
designating the title of a section). See also ASS 1/4:17 n. 49.
9 "Ecclesia est Catholica Romana" (ASS 1/4:17 n. 50).
10 See Fromaget, "Subsistit in," 9.
11 A good number of theologians and bishops, especially those from central Europe, were
decisively unhappy with the draft (see von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in,' 299310).

4

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

approach of newer drafts. Although common opinion has it that
one of the reasons for the rejection of the first schema was its
identification of the Catholic Church on earth with the Mystical
Body, it seems that in fact few criticized the schema on this
count. 12 Gerard Philips wrote an alternative draft before the
circulation of the initial schema. This draft, although indeed
markedly different in approach and tone, included a similar
identification of the Church founded by Christ with the Catholic
Church. 13 Philips completed another draft in February 1963; this
draft soon became the Urtext of the council. 14 The document was
presented to all on 29 September 1963. It explicitly affirms the
identity of the Catholic Church and the Church founded by Jesus
Christ: "Therefore, this Church, true Mother and Teacher of all,
constituted and ordered as a society in this world, is the Catholic
Church, led by the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops in communion
with him, although outside of her total structure many elements
of sanctification can be found, which, as things proper to the
Church of Christ, impel towards Catholic unity." 15
12 The common understanding is that the majority of bishops rejected the schema's
practical identification of the Catholic Church with the Mystical Body of Christ. Alexandra
von Teuffenbach argues, to the contrary, that no such majority existed (see von Teuffenbach,
Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in,' 303££.). Achille Lienart, indeed, and increasingly, fought the
identification, but Sebastian Tromp noted in his notably impartial diary that none of the 150
fathers involved in the production of the schema, either orally or by writing, argued that this
identification was erroneous (see ibid., 309). Nor were there any but a few who voiced an
objection to the identity.
13 See ibid., 320-23.
14 For this draft, see ASS 2/1:215-81. For brief treatments of the various drafts, see Karl
J. Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," Origins 35 (2006): 515C518B; Fromaget, "Subsistit in," 8-16 and 31-37; and Francis Sullivan, "A Response to Karl
Becker, S.J., On the Meaning of Subsistit In," Theological Studies 67 (2006): esp. 396-402.
15 "Haec igitur Ecclesia, vera omnium Mater et Magistra, in hoc mundo ut societas
constituta et ordinata, est Ecclesia catholica, a Romano Pontifice et Episcopis in eius
communione directa, licet extra totalem compaginem elementa plura sanctificationis inveniri
possint, quae ut res Ecclesiae Christi propriae, ad unitatem catholicam impellunt" (ASS
2/1:219.18-220.23). On the identity of the one Church and the Catholic Church, see also the
Commentarius (ASS 2/1:230) and Cardinal Browne's remarks (ASS 2/1:340). Parente's draft,
following the wording of Philips's first draft, also identifies the Church of Christ with the
Catholic Church (see von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in,' 329). Both drafts
point conclusively to the identification by such appositional connectors as nempe and asavoir
(see ibid., 321 and 329). The French schema and the German schema neither made nor

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

5

Discussions among the fathers of the council provided an
impetus for further changes. As Karl Becker notes, a
subcommission was established in late October to make
emendations. About a month later, the emended draft was
presented to the theological commission in a plenary meeting.
Original draft (February 1963): "Therefore, this Church, true Mother and
Teacher of all, constituted and ordered as a society in this world, is the Catholic
Church, led by the Roman Pontiff and the Bishops in communion with him,
although outside of her total structure many elements of sanctification can be
found, which, as things proper to the Church of Christ, impel towards Catholic
unity."
Emended draft (November 1963): "This Church constituted and ordered as a
society in this world, is present in the Catholic Church governed by the successor
of Peter and the Bishops in communion with him, although outside of its
structure many elements of sanctification are found, which as gifts proper to the
Church of Christ, impel towards Catholic unity." 16

I have underscored the suggested changes or additions ("true
Mother and Teacher of all" is also omitted). Philips offered
explanations for the change most relevant for our purposes, the
change from "is [est]" to "is present in [adest in]": The change
was called for on the floor, and it fits better with the "although"
clause. 17 Becker contends that only one of the written responses
from the floor reflected the desire that est be changed. 18 Sullivan
admits that Cardinals Lienart, Konig, and Bea-who criticized the
original schema for identifying the Mystical Body with the
Catholic Church-did not criticize the February 1963 draft on
this point. He nonetheless points out that a handful of bishops
rejected the identification (see ibid., 330-36). As Tromp records in his diary, once conciliar
discussion of Philips's draft began, Philips stated that he was following Humani generis as a
starting point (see ibid., 350 and n. 218).
16 "Haec Ecclesia in hoc mundo ut societas [constituta] et ordinata, adest in Ecclesia
catholica a successore Petri et episcopis in eius communione gubernata, licet extra eius
compaginem elementa plura sanctificationis inveniantur, quae ut dona Ecclesiae Christi
propria, ad unitatem catholicam impellunt" (recorded in Becker, "The Church and Vatican
II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 517 A).
17 See ibid., 517B.
18 See ibid.

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CHRISTOPHERJ. MALLOY

had desired something of a softening of the identity. 19 Alexandra
von Teuffenbach, who wrote her dissertation under the direction
of Karl Becker, contends that there were few requests for a change
on this point. 20
"Lengthy discussion" 21 among the members of the commission
resulted in the important emendation that concerns us. The text
was emended from the proposed "is present in [adest in]" to
"subsists in [subsistit in]." Becker has helpfully drawn attention to
this double change. Previous presentations of this history tended
to ignore the (at least in this passage) transitory adest in. Subsistit
in is a direct replacement not of est but of adest in. This change
was introduced by a member of the theological commission, none
other than the conservative Sebastian Tromp. The emended draft,
completed July 1964 and presented to the floor 15 September
1964, 22 reads, "This Church, constituted and ordered as a society
in this world, subsists in the Catholic Church, governed by the
successor of Peter and the Bishops in communion with him,
although outside of its structure, many elements of sanctification
and of truth are found, which as gifts proper to the Church of
Christ, impel towards Catholic unity." 23 This sentence was
19 See Sullivan, "Response'', 397f. Becker refers to Bishop Van Dodeward of Haarlem (see
ASS 211 :433-34), but Sullivan remarks that Becker failed to note Cardinal Silva Henriquez of
Chile (see ASS 2/2:137). Sullivan adds that some bishops called for closer reflection on the
non-Catholic communities, in light of the licet clause.
20 See von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in', 358-62. Karl Rahner, in a press
conference in October 1963, affirmed the identity of the Catholic Church and the Church of
Christ (see ibid., 363£).
21 See ASS 3/6:81.
22 The emended 1964 draft is found, side-by-side with a reprint of the original 1963 draft,
in ASS 3/1: 158-366 (see the pages that follow for the final relationes, etc.).
23 "Haec Ecclesia, in hoc mundo ut societas constituta et ordinata, subsistit in Ecclesia
catholica, a successore Petri et Episcopis in eius communione gubernata, licet extra eius
compaginem elementa plura sanctificationis et veritatis inveniantur, quae ut dona Ecclesiae
Christi propria, ad unitatem catholicam impellunt" (ASS 3/1:167B.19-168B.26; the italicized
words show the emendations). Von Teuffenbach suggests that the addition of "et veritatis"
was first suggested by Rahner and Grillmeier sometime in the spring of 1963, although neither
of them at that time objected to the self-understanding of the Church as articulated in Philips's
draft (see von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in', 357). In the fall of that year, the
German bishops and the Scandinavian conference of bishops suggested that et veritatis be
added to the text (see ASS 2/1:293 no. 96).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

7

approved and appears verbatim in the final, dogmatic decree (LG
8). 24 What is the significance of this change?
II. INTERPRETATIONS ALA RUPTURE

At least until the recent intervention of the CDF, the vast
majority of theologians, with several exceptions (e.g., Alfredo
Cardinal Ottaviani, Sebastian Tromp, Leo Cardinal Scheffczyk, 25
Karl Becker, Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger, 26 and others), interpreted
The Latin text is identical, less the italics (see AAS 57 [1965]: 12).
See Leo Cardinal Scheffczyk, Aspekte der Kirche in der Krise: Um die Entscheidung fur
das authentische Konzil, no. 1, Quaestiones non disputatae: Eine theologische Schriftenreihe,
ed. Johannes Biikrnann (Siegburg, Verlag Franz Schmitt, 1993), 142-45.
26 The position of Joseph Cardinal Ratzinger is rather subtle. In one early reflection, he
affirms an identity and rejects the opinion that the Church of Christ is not any of the existing
"Churches" (see Joseph Ratzinger, Theological Highlights of Vatican II, trans. Werner Barze!,
Gerard Thormann, and Henry Traub [New York: Paulist Press, 1966], 70-74). Yet, he does
not spell out the nature of this identity. With his notion of the Church as a "fabric of
worshiping congregations," he highlights the complexion of the Church, its constitution in a
plurality of particular churches (see ibid., 90-92). In a later work, he writes, "No translation
can fully capture the sublime nuance of the Latin text in which the unconditional equation of
the first conciliar drafts-the full identity between the Church of Jesus Christ and the Roman
Catholic Church-is clearly set forth: nothing of the concreteness of the conciliar concept of
the Church is lost.... [B]ut this full concreteness of the Church does not mean that every
other Church can be only a non-Church. The equation is not mathematical because the Holy
Spirit cannot be reduced to a mathematical symbol, not even where he concretely binds and
bestows himself" Ooseph Ratzinger, "Ecumenism at a Standstill? Explanatory Comments on
Mysterium Ecclesiae," in Principles of Catholic Theology: Building Stones for a Fundamental
Theology, trans. Mary Frances McCarthy [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1987], 230f.). Still
later, he states, "With this expression the Council changed Pius XII's formulation .... The
distinction between subsistit and est contains and conceals the entire difficulty of ecumenism"
Ooseph Ratzinger, "The Ecclesiology of the Constitution Lumen gentium," in Pilgrim
Fellowship of Faith: The Church as Communion, trans. Henry Taylor [San Francisco: Ignatius
Press, 2005], 147). Again, "The being of the Church as such extends much farther than the
Roman Catholic Church, yet in the latter she has in a unique way the character of an
independent subject" ("Es scheint mir absurd, was unsere lutherischen Freunde jetzt wollen:
Ein Interview mit Christian Geyer zur Erklarung 'Dominus Iesus'," Frankfurter Allgemeine
Zeitung [22 September 2000]: 51, cited in translation in Maximilian Heinrich Heim, Joseph
Ratzinger, Life in the Church and Living Theology: Fundamentals of Ecclesiology with
Reference to "Lumen gentium," trans. Michael Miller [San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2007],
317). In short, on the one hand the cardinal affirms the full identity of the Church of Christ
and the Catholic Church, and on the other hand he holds that the Church extends beyond the
Roman Catholic Church. How are we to understand this tension?
In his magisterial work on Ratzinger's ecclesiology, Maximilian Heinrich Heim (see ibid.,
24

25

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CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

the decree in harmony with the following claim: There is not a
full identity between the Church of Christ and the Catholic
Church. As is well known, Pius XII, following what was presumed
and not questioned by the tradition, taught a full identity. 27 Paul
VI did not refrain from expressing the identity. 28
For Becker, "the change from est to subsistit in does not mean
that Vatican II ever abandoned or even weakened its original
assertion of total identity between the Church of Christ and the
Catholic Church. " 29 Sullivan and many others have seen things
quite otherwise. Although differences among interpreters are
legion, the possible denials of total identity might be distinguished
into four categories, each of which, in different ways, involves
310-30) stresses the cardinal's metaphysical reading of subsistit with reference to its roots in
the verb subsistere, which indicates the self-standing being of that which is and, hence, its
capacity to act as agent (see ibid., 317f.). Since the Church of Christ subsists only as one, the
Catholic Church alone can claim to be the Church of Christ. Yet, as Heim copiously shows,
Ratzinger emphasizes the genuine ecclesial status of non-Catholic Christian communities,
some of which deserve the name "church." For Ratzinger, Heim suggests, the unique
contribution of subsistit over est is this: The former term indicates the way in which the
Church of Christ is the Catholic Church in a manner that both allows one to affirm the
ecclesial reality of non-Catholic communities and also anchors that ecclesial reality in (i.e.,
from and toward) the Catholic Church. Hence, the cardinal does not to my knowledge affirm,
as do proponents of the "fourth" position (see below), that the Church of Christ is present and
operative in non-Catholic churches in a way that is different from the presence therein of the
mystery (visible and invisible) that is the Catholic Church. For further consideration of
Cardinal Ratzinger's thought and reflections closely related thereto, see notes 108, 152, and
153.
27 Pius XII refers to "this true Church of Christ-which is the holy, Catholic, apostolic
Roman Church" ("hanc veracem Christi Ecclesiam-quae sancta, catholica, apostolica
Romana Ecclesia est" [Pius XII, Mystici Corporis (AAS 35 [1943]: 199); in many English
versions, art. 13]). He later reaffirms this teaching that "the Mystical Body of Christ and the
Roman Catholic Church are one and the same thing" ("corpus Christi mysticum et Ecclesiam
Catholicam Romanam unum idemque esse" [Pius XII, Humanigeneris (AAS 42 [1950]: 571);
in many English editions, art. 27]). See below, note 122, on the magisterial witness to the
absolute and universal primacy of the pope.
28 Turning his attention to the inmost circle of the pope's concern, the Catholic faithful,
Paul VI refers to these as the sons "who are in the house of God, that is, in the one, holy,
Catholic, and apostolic Church, whose mother and head is the Roman Church" ("qui in domo
Dei sunt, hoc est in Ecclesia una, sancta, catholica et apostolica, cuius Romana Ecclesia est
mater et caput" [Paul VI, Ecclesiam suam 113 (AAS 56 [1964]: 657)]). The context shows
clearly that "Catholic" should in English be capitalized.
29 Sullivan, "Response," 397.

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9

some real distinction between the Catholic Church and the
Church of Christ. Some of these positions are compatible with
one another.
First, most radically, one might say that the Church of Christ
exists nowhere on earth. Even if all Christian communities were
taken together and considered in their complementary diversity,
one could not call this totality the Church of Christ. Rather, the
Church of Christ is an eschatological ideal or goal, for which
Christians must hope and labor but which does not or cannot
have a concrete, "subsisting" realization in history. Quite obviously, this position cannot really be counted an "interpretation"
of Vatican II. Whether any Catholic has actually espoused such a
position is another question. The CDF treats this as a position to
be addressed. 30
Second, some say that the Church of Christ consists in all
Christian communities taken together as forming the one Church
of Christ. Thus, the Church of Christ consists in Catholic,
Orthodox, and Protestant communities, all taken together. 31
30 See note 60. Ratzinger, similarly, refers to this position as one to be rejected (see Heim,
Joseph Ratzinger, 320).
31 See Richard McBrien, Catholicism (Minneapolis: Winston Press, 1981), 685. Hans
Kiing, a proponent of nonexclusive identity (see below), also has some sympathy for this view.
For instance, he suggests that whoever proclaims his Church to be identical with the Church
of Christ evades the problem of disunity (Hans Kiing, The Church [Garden City, N.Y.: Image
Books, 1976], 365). He contends that, in the hope for ecumenical progress, members of every
church must suspend any idea that their church is the Church of Christ, keeping in mind that
others could make the same claim. So, Christians must work towards the unity of Christ's
Church (ibid., 373-83). In short, although Kiing wishes to avoid the eschatological "evasion"
of the problem of disunity (ibid., 364f.), he implies the current nonrealization, in any
community, of Christ's priestly prayer. Hence, ecumenism must not be the effort to work for
a return of particular churches to the one true Church of Christ already constituted: "The
road to unity is not the return of one Church to another" (ibid., 379).
For the most part, Ralph Del Colle supports the fourth position, yet he too shares
sympathies with this position. For instance, he asserts that the Lutheran witness to the gospel,
among other non-Catholic witnesses, adds something to the richness of the Christian faith,
without which addition Christian faith would be bereft of something important (Ralph Del
Colle, "Toward the Fullness of Christ: A Catholic Vision of Ecumenism," International
Journal of Systematic Theology 3 [2001]: 205). The point is well taken if Del Colle means to
say that individual Lutherans and particular Lutheran communities can and do penetrate the
gospel truth in ways that augment the expressive riches of the gathering of Christ's disciples.
This is not, however, to add anything integral to the essence of the Church. Similarly, one

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CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

Accordingly, not any "church" on its own but the collection of all
churches forms the Church founded by Christ. For this reason,
some proponents of this idea add, it is beneficial to have contrasting expressions of the faith. Out of diverse witnesses-which
many faithful members of each communion once understood to
be contradictions calling for mutual anathemas-arises the
plenitude of the "Body of Christ." In a somewhat Hegelian way
the contradictions (antitheses) of the past are seen as sublimated
into a higher unity. Another approach would have the antitheses
still conflict and, as such, stand in tense juxtaposition, casting
mutual light through their fruitful discordances. 32 So, too, out of
divergent Christian communities, there arises the Church of
Christ.
A third group claims that the Church of Christ subsists in the
Catholic Church but that this Church of Christ could and/or does
subsist in other, non-Catholic Churches. 33 Leonardo Boff was
criticized by the CDF for holding this view. Boff presupposes a
differentiation between the gospel and its mediations. The gospel
is the very truth and way of life Jesus presents humanity, but his
message and way must be mediated if it is to be communicated.
So, one may distinguish the gospel itself and its mediations;
neither can stand by itself. Boff differentiates, analogously,
between Christianity itself and Catholicism as a realization and
mediation of Christianity. There are, of course, other mediations
might think of John of Antioch's application of homoousios to Christ's being one with us.
John added not to the deposit of faith but to its articulation.
32 Ratzinger offers a lucid critique of this approach (see Ratzinger, "Ecclesiology of the
Constitution," 148).
33 "The intent of this understanding of the Church is to avoid the sociological identification
of the Church with the present structures and formulations of the Roman Catholic
institutions, or to somehow imply that the Eastern Churches not in communion with Rome
were in any way 'not church"' 0 effrey Gros, Eamon McManus, and Ann Riggs, Introduction
to Ecumenism [Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press, 1998], 68). The qualification "in any way"
suggests sympathy with this third position. Joseph Farmeree directly supports this position:
"Is it not the task of ecumenical dialogue, from a Roman Catholic point of view ... even to
acknowledge that the Church of Christ subsists in another Christian Church in which all the
constituent elements of ecclesial or churchly reality can be found?" Ooseph Farmeree, "Local
Churches, Universal Church and Other Churches in Lumen Gentium," Ecclesiology 4 [2007]:
55; see 54-56).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

11

of Christianity. Some persons, then, will find themselves striving
to articulate and defend one side of the polarity (this or that
mediation of the gospel; this or that reception of Christianity),
while others will find themselves critiquing aspects of that side in
the name of the other side (the gospel itself; Christianity itself).
Boff defends both sides of this delicate balance. Support of either
side is warranted, so long as "pathologies" are kept in check.
"Pathology" would emerge from an exaggerated stress on one side
of the polarity to the detriment of the other. There is, thus, an
irreducible tension in Christian life. The relevant upshot for our
investigation is this: "The Roman, Catholic, and apostolic Church
is the Church of Christ on the one hand, and on the other hand,
it is not .... It cannot claim an exclusive identity with the Church
of Christ because the Church may also be present in other Christian churches. "34 Given that Boff conceives of Christian society as
having to hold in tension these two approaches-support for the
gospel itself, which leads to critique of all existing structures, and
support for such-and-such structural mediations of the
gospel-and given that he describes each approach as "half of the
equation" of the Church's life, he risks obscuring the integral
unity of the visible and the invisible aspects of the Church. The
implication of Boff's thought may be the notion of several
"subsistences" of the Church of Christ. 35 George Tavard has
34 Leonardo Boff, Church, Charism and Power: Liberation Theology and the Institutional
Church, trans. John Diercksmeier (New York: Crossroad, 1985), 75. See also Leonardo Boff,
Manifest fur die Okumene: Bin Streit mit Kardinal Ratzinger (Diisseldorf: Patmos-Verlag,
2001), 96 and 99; and Heim, Joseph Ratzinger, 323.
35 Of course, one must interpret Boff's affirmation of a "multiplicity" of subsistences of the
one Church of Christ-a seemingly impossible assertion-against the background of his
ecclesiology "from below." The Church arises as a solidification of Christ's presence among
people. Hence, the "diverse subsistences" of the Church would be one dynamically or
teleologically, though somewhat "disparate" in the order of generation. While this makes the
notion more palatable intellectually, it involves another, more nettlesome, difficulty. For a
prescient corrective to this ecclesiology from below, see Paul VI, Evangelii nuntiandi 58. For
a sympathetic treatment of Boff's ecclesiology, see Kjell Nordstokke, Council and Context in
Leonardo Bo ff s Ecclesiology: The Rebirth of the Church among the Poor, trans. Brian
MacNeil, Studies in Religion & Society 35 (Lewiston, N.Y.: The Edwin Mellen Press, 1996),
esp. 64-67. Paolo Gamberini's critique of the theory of multiple subsistences is very helpful
(see Paolo Gamberini, "'Subsistit' in Ecumenical Ecclesiology: J. Ratzinger and E. Jiingel,"
Irish Theological Quarterly 72 [2007]: 63).

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CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

suggested this position more forthrightly: "The council says
nothing for or against the possibility of [the Church of Christ]
also invisibly subsisting in other ecclesial institutions and other
visible churches. Logic would seem to make this contention
acceptable in the problematic of Vatican IL "36
A fourth group says (a) that the Church of Christ continues to
exist fully in the Catholic Church alone but (b) that the Church of
Christ also exists, in lesser and in varying degrees, in other
Christian churches and communities. What pertains precisely to
the fourth position is the following way of linking these two
claims: There is between the Church of Christ and the Catholic
Church a "nonexclusive identity." There is identity, but it is "not
total," "not full," and "not exclusive." 37 We can pursue the nature
36 George H. Tavard, The Church, Community of Salvation: An Ecumenical Ecclesiology,
New Theology Studies 1, ed. Peter Phan (Collegeville, Minn.: The Liturgical Press, 1992), 86.
Again: "The Church, membership in which is necessary to salvation, is not an empirical
institution. It is the Church 'of God' or 'of Christ' in an absolute sense. In the words of
Vatican Council II, this absolute Church is believed by Catholics to 'subsist' in the Roman
Catholic Church (LG, n. 8). But it is not limited to the visible boundaries of this Church. And
it presumably also 'subsists' in other institutions of salvation" (ibid., 182-83). A later work
appears more hesitant, but still supports the viability of this thesis (see George H. Tavard,
Vatican II and the Ecumenical Way, Marquette Studies in Theology 52, ed. Andrew Tallon
[Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 2006], 138-39).
37 Kung shows some support for this position: "The Catholic Church does not identify
itself exclusively (in spite of some formulas which seem to suggest otherwise) with the Church
of Christ. At one point at any rate a striking revision took place: instead of the definitive
formula originally suggested by the Commission: 'The unique Church of Christ ... is (est) the
Catholic Church .. .' the formulation adopted was 'subsists (subsistit) in the Catholic
Church"' (Kung, The Church, 366-67). I would add to the supporters of this fourth position
Ralphe Del Colle, who offers various perspectives on the matter. Overall, however, he
advocates nonexclusive identity (see Del Colle, "Toward the Fullness of Christ," 206). In
support of his position, he suggests that the mission of the Holy Spirit is wider in scope than
the incarnate mission of the Son (see ibid., 209). He is thus perplexed by Dominus Jesus,
article 16 and note 56, texts in tension with his theory (see ibid., 206-7, including n. 11).
Gamberini speaks of a "formal identity" but quickly adds that the Church of Christ is not
exhausted by the Catholic Church (see Gamberini, "'Subsistit' in Ecumenical Ecclesiology,"
68): "We must acknowledge that the ecclesia catholica non est totum ecclesiae" (ibid.; see also
69). For Gamberini, Vatican II diverges from the teaching of Pius XII, who (he maintains)
taught that "nothing of the Church could be found outside the Catholic Church" (ibid., 62;
see also 71). The vague expression "nothing of the Church" is unhelpful because the genitive
has too vast a potential scope. Pius XII never stated that "nothing of the Church" could be
found outside the Catholic Church. For a helpful theological articulation of the Church's faith
at that time, see Charles Cardinal Journet, The Apostolic Hierarchy, vol. 1 of The Church of

SUBSISTTTIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

13

of this differentiation-in-identity by asking, Do non-Catholic
ecclesial communions and churches have one relation to the
Catholic Church and another relation to the Church of Christ?
According to Sullivan, they do:
Whatever "elements of sanctification and truth" are present and operative in
other Christian churches historically are derived from the one church of Christ
which "subsists in" the Catholic Church. In some way, which the council does
not further specify, their efficacy as means of salvation is also derived from that
fullness which is found in the Catholic Church. 38

Again, this differentiation is implicit in Sullivan's reading of the
following passage from John Paul II:
Insofar as these kinds of elements exist in other Christian communities, the one
(unica) Church of Christ has an efficacious presence therein. On this account, the
Second Vatican Council speaks of a certain, albeit imperfect, communion. The
constitution Lumen gentium highlights that the Catholic Church knows that "for
many reasons she is joined" to these communities in a certain real communion
of unity in the Holy Spirit. 39
the Word Incarnate: An Essay in Speculative Theology, trans. A. H. C. Downes (New York:
Sheed and Ward, 1955), 40-45, esp. 42. The rejection of "total identity" has simply
dominated theological circles from the earliest stages. See, e.g., Gregory Baum, "The Ecclesial
Reality of Other Churches," Concilium 4 (1965): 34-41; Aloys Grillmeier, "Chapter 1: The
Mystery of the Church," trans. Kevin Smyth, in Commentary on the Documents of Vatican
II, vol. 1, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York: Herder & Herder, 1967), 150; and Johannes
Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree [Unitatis redintegratio]," trans. R. A. Wilson, in
Commentary on the Documents of Vatican II, vol. 2, ed. Herbert Vorgrimler (New York:
Herder & Herder, 1968), 68-75. Feiner contends that only on the definition of the Church
as societas can one uphold the strict identity, and, should one do so, one is forced to claim an
ecclesiological vacuum outside of the Catholic Church (see ibid., 69). Congar, similarly,
writes, "There is no strict, that is, exclusive, identification (adequation) of the Church or Body
of Christ and the Catholic Church" (Yves Congar, Le Concile de Vatican II: Son Eglise Peuple
de Dieu et Corps du Christ, Theologie historique 71 [Paris: Beauchesne, 1984], 160; emphasis
in original). By contrast, see Yves Congar, Chretiens desunis: Principes d'un "oecumenisme"
catholique, Unam sanctam 1 (Paris, 1937), 292. Finally, see Jon Nilson, Nothing beyond the
Necessary: Roman Catholicism and the Ecumenical Future (Mahwah, N.J.: Paulist Press,
1995), 56-58.
38 Sullivan, Salvation outside the Church? 149.
39 "Prout eiusmodi elementa sunt in ceteris Communitatibus christianis, unica Christi
Ecclesia praesentiam habet in eis efficientem. Idcirco Concilium Vaticanum II de quadam
loquitur communione, etsi imperfecta. Constitutio Lumen gentium illustrat Ecclesiam
catholicam nosse "semetipsam plures ob rationes coniunctam" his Communitatibus vera

14

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

According to Sullivan, "This papal statement affirming the
effective presence of the Church of Christ in other Christian
communities is obviously hard to reconcile with [Becker's] thesis
that the Church of Christ is totally identified with the Catholic
Church." 40 Sullivan's inference is valid on the presupposition that
the presence and operation of the Church of Christ in nonCatholic churches and communions is not totally identifiable with
the presence and operation of the Catholic Church therein. 41
Accordingly, the Catholic Church is not simply identical with the
universal Church of Christ.
Having adumbrated various ways of denying total identity, I
will now consider Sullivan's considerable arguments in favor of
this negation, in his response to Becker.
III. SULLIVAN'S ARGUMENTS AGAINST TOTAL IDENTITY

First, quite naturally, Sullivan calls to mind the revision of the
February 1963 draft: "The 1963 draft of the Constitution on the
Church, while it no longer affirmed identity between the Mystical
Body and the Catholic Church, still said 'The Church of Christ is
the Catholic Church'. " 42 As we have seen, the est of this draft
became, in the final draft, subsistit in (LG 8). A similar expression
is found in Unitatis redintegratio (UR 4). Sullivan (and most
others) have seen this change as a sign that the council
"abandoned or even weakened" previous teaching. The council
quadam unitatis communione in Spiritu Sancto" (John Paul II, Ut unum sint 11 [AAS 87
(1995): 928]).
40 Sullivan, "Response," 406. See the broader context of the argument (ibid., 405-7).
41 Gamberini holds for a similar differentiation. He insists, first, that the Catholic Church
is not the "source" and "origin" of the mediating reality of non-Catholic communions and
churches. Instead, Christ is (see Gamberini, "'Subsistit' in Ecumenical Ecclesiology," 67). Of
course, no Catholic theologian denies that Christ is the ultimate source of any endowment of
his Bride. Yet it should be noted that it is through this very Bride that Christ communicates
grace: "by which [Church] he pours out grace and truth to all" ("qua veritatem et gratiam ad
omnes diffundit" [LG 8 (AAS 57 [1965]: 11)]). Gamberini portrays the above distinction as
a dichotomy because he has in mind a differentiation between the Catholic Church and the
Church of Christ: "To the Catholic Church is entrusted the fullness of the means of salvation,
but the origin and the source of the means remains the Church of Christ" (Gamberini,
"'Subsistit' in Ecumenical Ecclesiology," 67).
42 Sullivan, "Response," 397.

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

15

was drawing some real distinction between the Catholic Church
and the Church of Christ. Despite a fundamental connection,
there was "no longer ... an exclusive identity. " 43 There was,
therefore, "a very significant difference between what the council
finally said at this point and previous drafts of the Constitution
(and, indeed, previous official statements of Roman Pontiffs). " 44
Second, Sullivan takes the clause in the final draft that succeeds
the subsistit clause as further support:" ... although outside of its
structure, many elements of sanctification and of truth are found,
which as gifts proper to the Church of Christ, impel towards
Catholic unity." What is adumbrated here is drawn out in Unitatis
redintegratio (UR 1-4 ). Sullivan claims that this clause was first
added in the 1963 draft (i.e., that it was not present in the
original schema). 45 As is evident by an examination of its various
versions, this licet clause underwent more than one set of
emendations. Sullivan contends that even the pre-emended addition marked an important shift away fromAeternus Unigeniti. The
heart of Sullivan's contention has to do with the status of the elementa: Are they "only elements" or are they "ecclesial elements"?
Sullivan highlights a critical emendation of another section of
the 1963 draft (art. 9) that involved the addition (in art. 15 of the
1964 draft) of an explicit designation of separated communities
as either "churches" or "ecclesiastical communions. "46 Before this
draft, Sullivan contends, there was merely a recognition of
elements (e.g., the sacraments) outside of the Catholic Church.
With the emendation, "For the first time, a conciliar text uses the
terms 'Churches' and 'ecclesiastical' of the communities in which
those sacraments are received. The relatio given for this text
shows that the doctrinal commission realized that this language,
of which Tromp could hardly have approved, needed to be
justified." 47 The relatio notes that the elements regard com43 Ibid.,

402.

44 Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 21.
45 See Sullivan, "Response," 397; idem, Salvation outside the Church? 142; and idem, The
Church We Believe In, 24.
46 See Sullivan, "Response," 400, identifyingASS 3/1:189.41-42 (art. 9 of the 1963 draft;
art. 15 of the 1964 emended text); see LG 15 (AAS 57 [1965]: 19).
47 Sullivan, "Response," 400.

CHRISTOPHERJ. MALLOY

16

munities, not merely individuals, that the communal character of
the elements serves as the foundation for ecumenism, and that
papal documents regularly refer to the Eastern communities as
"Churches" and to Protestant bodies as "Christian communities. "48 Rebutting Becker, Sullivan links the movement from a
recognition of only elements to a recognition of ecclesial elements, that is, of elements that constitute particular bodies as
churches and communions, with the change to subsistit. 49
The council, approving the conciliar decision to call some nonCatholic communions "churches" and other non-Catholic
communions "ecclesiastical communions," therefore distanced
itself from the opinion of the very person who introduced the
phrase subsistit in, Sebastian Tromp. Becker discovered that it was
Tromp who suggested the novel phrase. 50 Given that Tromp
manifestly held that the Church of Christ was nothing but the
Catholic Church, Becker argues, they are mistaken who use the
phrase subsistit in to deny the strict identity between the Catholic
Church and the Church of Christ. Now we can grasp the power
in Sullivan's response to Becker: Tromp welded his opinion on
the "full identity" to his refusal of the term "Church" to any
separated communion: "[Tromp] strongly insisted [that subsistit
in] meant that the Church of Christ subsists exclusively in the
Catholic Church and that outside it there are only elements.
Obviously this meant that outside the Catholic Church there is
nothing that can be called a church. "51 As Sullivan reads Tromp,
no particular body of Christians outside the Catholic Church can
even be called "a church." Yet, the council accepted the title
"church" for many non-Catholic communions. Further, if one
considers the sense of the final draft, this acceptance was
See ASS 3/1 :204 (D).
See Sullivan, "Response," 401.
50 See Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 517C. Perhaps
such a mode of expression has a faint background in the following statement from Leo XIII:
"Certainly, only she can glory in being the true Church of Christ, in whom the one body and
one Spirit most fittingly cleave together" ("Ea nimirum gloriari unice potest Christi vera esse
Ecclesia, in qua aptissime cohaereat unum corpus et unus spiritus" [Pope Leo XIII,
Orientalium dignitas (Pontificis Maximi Acta, vol. 14 [Rome: Typographia Vaticana, 1895],
368)]). I am grateful to Zachary Keith for tracking down the Latin text for me.
51 Sullivan, "Response," 400 (see the entire discussion, ibid., 399-401).
48

49

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

17

intimately tied with the move from est to subsistit in. 52 Tromp
was correct (Sullivan contends) in welding his opinion on strict
identity to the exclusive use of the title "church"; therefore, the
twofold change of the conciliar document bespeaks a rejection of
the notion of strict identity: "The doctrinal commission that
approved this change must have understood it to mean no longer
claiming an exclusive identity between the Church of Christ and
the Catholic Church. " 53
Third, Sullivan draws on the relatio of the change to subsistit:
The change was made "in order that the expression might
harmonize better with the affirmation concerning the ecclesial
elements which are present outside [the Catholic Church]." 54 In
an earlier work, Sullivan also appealed to the summary provided
by the commission: "There is but one church, and on this earth it
is present in the Catholic Church, although ecclesial elements are
found outside of it. "55 The Acta regarding the change to subsistit
in, then, show the link between Sullivan's first two points.
Sullivan concludes that one cannot affirm the ecclesial reality of
non-Catholic communions unless one denies the full identity
between the Catholic Church and the Church of Christ.
Fourth, Sullivan appeals, as we have seen, to Ut unum sint
(UUS 11 [see above, p. 14]). In the footsteps of Unitatis
redintegratio (UR 3), John Paul presses forward, teaching that the
one Church of Christ is effectively present and operative in nonCatholic churches and ecclesial communions insofar as these enjoy
elements of this true Church. Dominus Jesus reaffirms this
teaching (DJ 17). 56 Moreover, Dominus Jesus states not that the
Church of Christ exists only in the Catholic Church (as might be
suggested by a metaphysical reading of subsistit) but that the
See ibid., 402.
Ibid.
54 " ••• ut expressio melius concordet cum affirmatione de elementis ecclesialibus quae alibi
adsunt" (ASS 3/1:177). See Sullivan, "Response," 401, and idem, The Church We Believe In,
24.
55 Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 26. The Latin reads "Ecclesia est unica, et his in
terris adest in Ecclesia catholica, licet extra earn inveniantur elementa ecclesialia" (ASS
3/1:176).
56 For the Latin text of Dominus Jesus, see AAS 92 (2000): 742-65; for an English
translation, see Origins 30 (2000): 209-19.
52

53

18

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

Church of Christ exists fully only in the Catholic Church. 57 The
same document affirms that non-Catholic communions with valid
orders and a valid celebration of the Eucharist are "true particular
churches" (see below, p. 24). Therefore, the Church of Christ can
exist elsewhere, though not fully. Sullivan finds these teachings
irreconcilable with the thesis of total identity. 58 Putting these and
other data together, Sullivan contends that Catholics are no longer
bound to believe that the Catholic Church is one and the same
thing as the Church of Christ. 59
We may now investigate whether there is any evidence in favor
of the CDF's recent intervention on the meaning of subsistit in.
IV. FULL IDENTITY, OR "HERMENEUTIC OF CONTINUITY"

A number of considerations support the CDF's recent
intervention. These can be divided into arguments directly in
favor of "full identity" and responses to various arguments against
full identity. I will begin with the latter. Given that the fourth
position described above is the most circumspect, a response to
arguments in favor of it will stand duty for responses to the other
three positions, which have in various ways been addressed by
other interventions of the CDF. 60 I will thus respond to Sullivan's
arguments.
57 See Dominus Jesus 16; Sullivan, "Response," 408f.; and idem, "The Meaning of Subsistit
In," 119.
58 See Sullivan, "Response," 406.
59 Sullivan acknowledges that certain magisterial documents are in tension with his reading
of other magisterial documents.
60 "Wherefore, the Christian faithful [meaning here 'Catholics'] are not allowed to suppose
that the Church of Christ is nothing other than a certain sum total of churches and ecclesial
communities, indeed divided but to some extent united as one. Much less are they free to hold
that, today, the Church of Christ does not really subsist anywhere, so that it is considered to
be only the goal that should be sought by all churches and communities" ("Quare
christifidelibus sibi fingere non licet Ecclesiam Christi nihil aliud esse quam summam
quamdam-divisam quidem, sed adhuc aliqualiter unam-Ecclesiarum et communitatum
ecclesialium; ac minime iis liberum est tenere Christi Ecclesiam hodie iam nullibi vere
subsistere, ita ut nonnisi finis existimanda sit, quern omnes Ecclesiae et communitates quarere
debeant" [CDF, Mysterium ecclesiae 1 (MS 65 [1973]: 398)]). These statements exclude the
viability of the second interpretation ala rupture and the first "interpretation." For the CDF's
exclusion of the third position, see below, page 25, and note 87.

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

19

A) Responses to Sullivan
With respect to Sullivan's first observation concerning the
change from est to subsistit in, one should note that the 1963
draft still affirms, albeit by implication, the identity of the
Catholic Church with the Mystical Body. The text stresses the
utter unicity of the Church; 61 it teaches the identity of the visible
society and the Mystical Body; 62 and it affirms the identity of the
Catholic Church and the Church founded by Christ. These three
teachings imply that the Catholic Church is the Mystical Body of
Christ, in the sense in which the term "Mystical Body" points to
a single society both visible and spiritual. 63 Moreover, that
identity is still explicitly affirmed in a note to the text. 64
At any rate, est became subsistit in. Sullivan contends that the
change marked a departure from previous teaching. Becker, who
prefers a "hermeneutic of continuity," suggests that the intention
of the one who introduced the phrase is relevant for an
interpretation of its meaning. Becker's investigation of the
archives illuminates how est was changed to subsistit in, namely,
by way of adest in. I have already treated the first change. As for
the second change, Becker reports, "H. Schauf wished to
substitute adest with est, while S. Tromp responded by proposing
subsistit in." 65 Apparently, Schauf thought adest in imprecise and
wanted to return to the wording of the 1963 draft. Tromp offered
subsistit in for the sake of precision. Obviously, Tromp did not
intend subsistit in to be a denial or softening of exclusive identity.
61 The sacred synod teaches there to be "none but one Church of Jesus Christ" ("non esse
nisi unicam Iesu Christi Ecclesiam" [ASS 2/1:219.13-14]).
62 These "are not two realities but one alone" (non duae res sunt sed una tantum [ASS
2/1:219.6]).
63 Such was the authoritative use of the term at the time (see Pius XII, Mystici corporis
[AAS 35 (1943): 194 and 208]). On this point, Heribert Miihlen is very helpful (see Heribert
Miihlen, "Das Verhaltnis zwischen Inkarnation und Kirche in den Aussagen des Vaticanum
II," Theologie und Glaube 55 [1965]: 182-88).
64 Although the title to the section no longer reads "The Catholic Church is the Mystical
Body," yet note 20 still gives references "On the identity of the Catholic Church and the
Mystical Body" ("De identitate Ecclesiae Catholicae et Corporis Mystici" [ASS 211 :225]). See
Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 10.
65 Becker, "The Church and Vatican H's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 517C.

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

20

Becker reports Tromp's own words in the meeting of the
commission, recorded on tape: "We can say, 'Indeed [the Church
of Christ] subsists in the Catholic Church, and this is something
exclusive [Tromp speaking quite loudly] insofar as it is said that
outside [of her] there are nothing but elements'. " 66 Sullivan
himself, in his work before the publication of Becker's article,
considered the paucity of our knowledge about the intention
behind the change to be regrettable. 67 Upon Becker's publication,
Sullivan refined his view: "The question, however, is whether the
doctrinal commission that accepted [Tromp's] suggestion, and the
council that approved the change from est to subsistit in,
understood it to mean what Tromp insisted it had to mean." 68
This point is well taken; notwithstanding, the interpreter should
not lightly dismiss Tromp's own understanding of the phrase. Of
course, a more significant factor in interpreting subsistit in is
consideration of the structure of the entire sentence finally
approved. I will return to this point at the end of my third
response to Sullivan. 69
Sullivan's most compelling evidence pertains to his second
argument, on the status of the elementa. It should be noted that
Sullivan's remarks regarding the February 1963 draft is not
entirely accurate. Becker expressly indicates that the "although"
clause was not added at this stage. Instead, it was adapted from a
passage in Aeternus Unigeniti concerning ecumenical issues.70
Article 51 of that text affirms that Christians are invited to return
to the Catholic Church, not as individuals (that is, when we speak
of ecumenism) but as united with each other. The reason for the
call for a return as communities rather than simply as individuals
is that in non-Catholic communities there are certain "elements of
the Church ... which, as efficacious means and signs of unity can
Ibid. (my translation).
See Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 24.
68 Sullivan, "Response," 399.
69 It is relevant to mention that, in a presentation of the preceding article (art. 7), those
presenting the draft to the subcommission maintained that only at first glance (primo intuitu),
and superficially (magis superficialis quam realis), might it seem that the new text differs
substantially from the parallel article in the previous draft (ASS 3/1:174).
70 See Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 516A.
66
67

SUBSISTTTIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

21

produce mutual union with Christ, and, of their nature as things
proper to the Church of Christ, impel towards Catholic unity." 71
This passage obviously served as the material for the 1963 licet
clause, itself the basis of the corresponding passage in the final
draft. It also set the trajectory for the conciliar affirmations
concerning the ecclesial efficacy of non-Catholic churches and
communions (LG 15; UR 3). There is confirmation of this
observation in what follows in article 51: "The Sacred Synod does
not deny that [such] elements, as long as they are preserved by
such communities, can be salvific and produce the fruit of
Christian spiritual life therein. "72 It should be clear that Aeternus
Unigeniti supplied much of the raw material for the very relatio
on article 15 of Lumen gentium, concerning the use of the term
ecclesiae, to which relatio Sullivan appeals against Becker.
The presence of these and similar passages in the original
schema is evidence counter to the "hermeneutic of rupture" and,
implicitly, counter to Sullivan's reading of Tromp. To see this all
the more clearly, one may attend, finally, to note 6 of article 51:
"Now, whatever be the nature of such separated communities, it
is certain that in the tradition the name 'church' is attributed often
and constantly to the separated communities of the East: On this,
see the following documents" (emphasis in original). 73 Sullivan's
contention that "for the first time, a conciliar text [i.e., the 1964
draft] uses" the terms "churches" and "communities" for nonCatholic communities is not accurate. 74 Such application appears
in a significant note of the very text that Tromp "played a major
role" 75 in drafting. In fact, note 6 provides an exceedingly lengthy
71 "Christiani autem separati incitamenta inveniunt ut ad Ecclesiae unitatem accedant, non
modo singuli in seipsis, verum etiam inter se uni ti in propriis suis communitatibus. In iis enim
elementa quaedam Ecclesiae existunt ut potissimum Scriptura Sacra et Sacramenta, quae, ut
media et signa unitatis efficacia unionem mutuam in Christo producere possunt et natura sua,
ut res Ecclesiae Christi propriae, ad unitatem catholicam impellunt" (ASS 1/4:82.24-31).
72 "Sacra Synodus, dum elementa ab his communitatibus servata, ibi quoque salutifera esse
atque fructus vitae spiritualis christianae producere posse non denegat" (ASS 1/4:82.35-36).
73 "Quidquid autem sit de natura talis communitatis separatae, certum est quod in
traditione nomen 'Ecclesiae' communitatibus orientalibus separatis saepe et constanter
attribuitur: cf. sequentia documenta Ecclesiae" (ASS 1/4:88 n. 6).
74 See above, note 4 7.
75 Sullivan, "Response," 399.

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

22

list of magisterial evidence for this use of the title "church," from
Gregory VII through Pius XII. Among the documents listed are
decrees from the Fourth Lateran Council (1215) and the Council
of Florence (1439). 76 Moreover, well before the appearance of
ecclesiae in article 15 of the 1964 draft of Lumen gentium, it had
appeared, together with the same lengthy list of magisterial
evidence, in two early drafts of the independent document on
ecumenism. Before the change to adest, some non-Catholic
communities were named "ecclesial" in the body of the text on
ecumenism. 77 Eventually, the list of evidence is, understandably,
shortened. 78
We should recall that, according to Sullivan, Tromp welded his
opinion on exclusive identity to the rejection of the title "church"
for non-Catholic churches. It is noteworthy how Sullivan relates
Tromp's position: "[Tromp] strongly insisted [that subsistit in]
meant that the Church of Christ subsists exclusively in the
Catholic Church and that outside it there are only elements.
Obviously this meant that outside the Catholic Church there is
nothing that can be called a church. " 79 There is a slippage from
"Church" to "a church," from a term that is fit to designate the
universal Church to a term more suitable to a particular church
(or set of churches). The text Sullivan has in mind, article 7 of
Aeternus Unigeniti, without doubt refers to the universal Church.
Now, as we have just seen, Aeternus Unigeniti acknowledges that
some non-Catholic communions bear the title "church," teaches
See ASS 1/4:88-90.
See the draft presented November 1963, already approved by John XXIII in April (ASS
2/5:417-18 n. 16). Here, note 16 refers to the use of "ecclesiae" in article 2 (see ASS
2/5 :414.32). An even lengthier note, including references to John XXIII and Paul VI, appears
in a revised draft (see ASS 3/2:303-4 n. 20).
78 See ASS 3/7:16 and 35. See also, UR, note 19.
79 Sullivan, "Response," 400. We find a similar slippage, or inadvertence to the distinction
between the universal Church and particular churches, in Sullivan's latest publication: "It
would follow [from the clarification on Boff] that outside the Catholic Church there can be
no other churches, but only 'elements of church"' (Sullivan, "The Meaning of Subsistit In,"
118). The Catholic Church is not to be compared to "other churches" as though she were
Sister and not Mother; rather, groups of her own particular churches are to be compared with
groups of those non-Catholic bodies called churches or ecclesial communions. See my
argument for an analogous sense of "church" below.
76
77

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23

the existence of ecclesial elements of the Church outside of the
Catholic Church, etc. If Sullivan's reading of Tromp's thought on
the title "church" is accurate, Tromp ought to have objected to
this very schema. Perhaps he meant neither that outside the
Catholic Church there is nothing that can be called "a church"
nor that the elements have no communal character.
We can reconcile Tromp's opinion with the tradition and with
Aeternus Unigeniti, both of which acknowledge the title "church"
for some non-Catholic communions. This reconciliation may be
possible in one or both of two ways. We could suggest (a) that
Tromp (or the authors of Aeternus Unigeniti 7) was denying the
existence of more than one Church on the universal level put not
the applicability of the title "church" to every particular nonCatholic communion. Or (b), we could understand the term
"church" of particular communions in three senses: improper,
proper but analogous, and proper and univocal. An "improper"
use of the term "church" would involve an extension beyond the
bounds of analogy, a use not proper to theology qua scientific.
(Such, for instance, would be its use with respect to those
communions that do not have valid Orders and a valid Eucharist.)
Now, the Acta of Vatican II show the Secretariat for Christian
Unity firmly defending the "proper" use of the term "church" for
some non-Catholic communions (i.e., those of the "East"). 80 In
the official conciliar teachings, the term is several times predicated
of such communions (LG 15; UR 3, 14, and 15; and Orientalium
ecclesiarum 26 and 30). More recently, the CDF has taught that
such communions "merit" the title "church"; 81 in Dominus Jesus,
the CDF declared them to be "true particular churches." 82 In a
document issued the same year, the CDF affirmed that the term
is said of them in a "proper sense. " 83
80 See ASS 3/7:35.
81 "For which reason [i.e., on account of apostolic succession and valid Eucharist, etc.] they

merit the title 'particular churches"' ("[Q]uapropter titulum merentur Ecclesiarum
particularium" [CDF, "Letter to the Bishops of the Church on Some Aspects of the Church
Understood as Communion," 17 (AAS 85 (1993]: 848)]). See also, CDF, "Certain Aspects of
the Doctrine on the Church," response to the fourth question (AAS 99 [2007]: 607).
82 "verae sunt Ecclesiae particulares" (DI 17 [AAS 92 (2000): 758]).
83 CDF, "Note on the Expression 'Sister Churches,"' Origins 30 (2000), arts. 8 and 11.

24

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

From this established teaching, it does not necessarily follow
that the title "church" (when designating a particular church)
must be taken only univocally. 84 A "proper" use of a term,
according to many theologians, can admit of analogous
extensions. On what bases would one deny a univocal use of
"church" to some particular communion? The CDF teaches:
Communion with the universal Church, which is represented by the Successor
of Peter, is not a certain complementing feature of the particular church coming
from the outside but one of her internal principles by which she is constituted.
Therefore, the situation of [being] particular church that these venerable
Christian communities receive is also affected by a wound. 85

This point would seem to affect the way the designation "church"
should be understood when predicated of such communions. 86 We
can connect this observation with an important passage in the
CDF's intervention regarding Boff, relevant to the status of the
84 Miihlen's interpretation of the February schema is in opposition to my suggestion (see
Miihlen, "Das Verhiiltnis zwischen Inkarnation und Kirche," 183 n. 26). Gamberini, following
Kasper, suggests on the other hand a totally open sense of "church," so that even Protestant
communities could be called "church" (see Gamberini, "'Subsistit' in Ecumenical
Ecclesiology," 70). To follow this lead would be to strip the term of its meaning and thus of
its effectiveness.
85 "Quia autem communio cum Ecclesia universali, cuius personam gerit Successor Petri,
non est quoddam complementum Ecclesiae particulari ab extra adveniens, sed unum e
principiis internis quibus ipsa constituitur, conditio Ecclesiae particularis, qua potiuntur
venerabiles illae communitates christianae, vulnere quoque afficitur" (CDF, "Some Aspects of
the Church Understood as Communion," 17 [AAS 85 (1993): 849]). See alsoDI17; and CDF,
"Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church," response to the fourth question (AAS 99
[2007]: 608). The conciliar roots of this teaching are found in UR 3 (Norman Tanner, ed.,
Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils, 2 vols. [Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press,
1990]), 2:910.33-911.7. For purposes of referential precision, I will on occasion make
reference to the Tanner text. See also, Joseph Ratzinger, Called to Communion:
Understanding the Church Today, trans. Adrian Walker (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1996),
94.
86 There is a consonance between this suggestion and the Acta. In a pertinent conciliar
discussion of Unitatis redintegratio, there was a complaint that the decree employs imprecise
and ambiguous terms. The response, as Becker points out (see Becker, "The Church and
Vatican H's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 520B), was that in the movement that is ecumenism,
it is fitting not to employ Scholastic and dogmatic terminology as though one were dealing
with a closed system. Rather, it is fitting to employ pastoral terminology in a descriptive
mode, yet without succumbing to vagaries (see ASS 3/2:335).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

25

elementa: "The council had chosen the word subsistitsubsists-exactly in order to make clear that one sole 'subsistence'
of the true church exists, whereas outside her visible structure
only elementa ecclesiae-elements of church-exist. " 87 As Sullivan
admits, "It seems to me, we do have [here] an interpretation that
corresponds to the way that Tromp understood subsistit in, that
is, that the Church of Christ subsists so exclusively in the Catholic
Church that outside it there are only elements. " 88 Sullivan implies
that such a reading involves a "hermeneutic of re-rupture": "In
fact, however, Vatican II nowhere said that outside the Catholic
Church there are only elements of the church. " 89 Sullivan believes
the CDF returns to the authentic meaning of Vatican II in the
body of Dominus Jesus, which expressly calls some non-Catholic
communions "true particular churches." He finds it "incomprehensible" that note 5 6 repeats the outworn tag from the Boff
intervention. 90 Significantly, the recent CDF "Responses to Some
Questions regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the
Church" includes a reference to this intervention,9 1 and the CD F's
commentary on this document restates the claim. Supposing, pace
Sullivan, that the CDF is not being inconsistent, one can account
for both points by appeal to an analogous use of "church." The
two basic theses that Tromp espoused can be understood
similarly. 92
87 CDF, "Notification on the Book Church: Charism and Power. Essay on Militant
Ecclesiology by Father Leonardo Boff" (11March1985) (AAS 77 [1985]: 758-59; translation
in Origins 14, no. 42 [1985]: 685).
88 Sullivan, "Response," 408.
89 Ibid. See also Sullivan, "The Meaning of Subsistit In," 118.
90 Sullivan, "Response," 409.
91 See CDF, "Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church," response to the second
question, note 8 (AAS 99 [2007]: 606).
92 Sullivan points out (Sullivan, "Response," 401; idem, "The Meaning of Subsistit In,"
118) that the council teaches that non-Catholic churches and ecclesial communions receive
the elements of the Church "in their own churches and ecclesiastical communities" ("in
propriisEcclesiisvelcommunitatibusecclesiasticis" [LG 15 (AAS57 [1965]: 19)]). This appeal
hardly suffices to establish his point. The council also describes particular Catholic churches
as "enjoying their own traditions" ("propriis traditionibus fruentes" [LG 13 (AAS 57 [1965]:
18)]). This is hardly to put a dialectical relation between "own" and "universal." The
expression is also found inAetemus Unigeniti 51 (see note 71).

26

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

Sullivan in this third argument points to the explanations given
for the change: subsistit in was used in order better to
accommodate both the single, full subsistence of the Church of
Christ in the Catholic Church and the reality of ecclesial elements
outside of the Catholic Church, ref erred to in the licet clause. He
takes it that, in contrast to est, subsistit in allows the contents of
the licet clause to be accommodated because it implies the
negation of "total identity" while affirming a mitigated (i.e.,
nonexclusive) identity. Consequently, one can affirm thatthe nonCatholic churches and communions established through these
ecclesial elements (to which the licet clause refers) have two
relations, one to the Catholic Church and another to the Church
of Christ.
Against this common reading of the licet clause, von
Teuffenbach maintains, "The licet clause would be logically
impossible in this form, if the first part of the sentence were intended to imply already that-besides the Catholic Church-there
is also the possibility of other concrete realizations of the
by the pivotal
Church." Instead, the structure-anchored
"although"-logically implies a differentiation of affirmations
between the two clauses. Were the meaning "The Church of
Christ consists mostly in (subsistit in) the Catholic Church," then
the relative licet clause would be redundant and pointless. Better
to replace licet with quia or enim! 93 Von Teuffenbach concludes,
"There is no other concrete realization of the Church of Christ
than the Catholic Church, yet there are also ecclesial elements
outside of this Church. " 94 Of course, one could respond that the
relatio defending the change to subsistit in implies that est was less
apt than subsistit in to account for ecclesial elements that are
present (adsunt) outside of the Catholic Church (see note 54). 95
See von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in', 78-83.
Ibid., 377.
95 Similarly, as Sullivan reads the Acta, the doctrinal commission considered est more
restrictive than subsistit and therefore meant to deny the thesis of total identity (see Sullivan,
"Response," 402; idem, "The Meaning of Subsistit In," 122). He is indicating the
commission's summary response to four requests concerning subsistit in: that the qualifier
integro fnodo be added; that the qualifier iure divino be added; that subsistit in be changed
back to est; and that subsistit be changed to consistit (exists, remains). The commission
93

94

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27

Becker opines, not unreasonably, that this relatio is likely a carryover from the draft containing the adest in. According to Becker,
subsistit in was meant as a precision to the ambiguous adest in, in
order to satisfy Schauf's concerns, and not as a mitigation of est. 96
Becker does not fail to mention that subsistit in adds the crucial
note of permanence. 97 According to Robert Fromaget, subsistit in
is more precise than both est and adest since it specifies the
manner of being of the one Church of Christ, which in its essential character is described throughout chapter 1 of Lumen
gentium. The Church exists in the manner of a self-standing
mystical person. 98
In any case, the relatio does not necessarily imply the
"nonexclusive identity" thesis, and von Teuffenbach's observation
on the very structure of the authoritative sentence has force.
Sullivan's first three arguments, then, offer no sufficient warrant
for denying the full identity. Whether one accepts a historical or
a metaphysical sense of subsistit in, the extra-Catholic ecclesial
reality affirmed by the council should be understood not as selfobserved that the suggestions represented two tendencies, one towards a more restrictive
affirmation and another towards a more open affirmation. Obviously, the first three requests
fall into the first category. The commission replied directly to the first two, giving assurance
that these qualifiers are affirmed elsewhere in the constitution. So, the commission did not set
itself against the first tendency as such but against the specific employment of these
suggestions. Becker suggests the following as a possible motivation for the change from est to
adest in to subsistit in: "It is possible that some saw in the term est the possibility of denying
or of not giving sufficient attention to ecclesial elements in other Christian communities. But
if this hypothesis is granted, then the justification for the change would be terminological and
not doctrinal" (Becker, "The Church and Vatican H's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 518A-B; see
Sullivan's objection in Sullivan, "Response," 401). In any case, responding to the request for
a change back to est, the commission related that the term subsistit in was accepted by all
present after a lengthy discussion. Is it not "unthinkable" that Tromp, who was among those
present, changed his mind on the total identity (Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's
'Subsistit in' Terminology," 518A; see also Sullivan, "Response," 399)? Schauf and Ottaviani
were also present (see von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des 'subsistit in', 379; Fromaget,
"Subsistit In," 22 n. 4 7). In fact, here, the commission affirms the legitimacy of two of the
three concerns favoring a "more restrictive" reading (see ASS 3/6:81). In the discussion on
ecumenism, such identity is explicitly maintained (see note 121). The commission's response
here, then, does not imply a negation of total identity.
96 See Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 517C-518A.
97 See ibid., 519B and C.
98 See Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 34-37. See also the references specified in the next note.

28

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

standing but as both grounded in and oriented towards the
Catholic Church. 99
In his fourth argument, Sullivan appeals to Ut unum sint (UUS
11) and Dominus Jesus (DI 16-17), which affirm that the Church
of Christ is present and operative in non-Catholic churches and
communions. From this he deduces that the Catholic Church is
not totally identified with the Church of Christ. This deduction
is valid only on the presupposition that the presence and
operation of the Church of Christ in these non-Catholic churches
and communions differs from the presence and operation of the
Catholic Church. John Paul nowhere affirms this presupposition.
Dominus Jesus, in fact, subtly guides one away from it:
There is but one Church of Christ, subsisting in the Catholic Church, the
government of which belongs to the successor of Peter and to the Bishops in
communion with him. Those churches which, although not in perfect
communion with the Catholic Church, are yet joined to the same [Church] by
the closest bonds, as apostolic succession and a valid celebration of the Eucharist,
are true particular churches. Wherefore, the Church of Christ is present in and
works in these churches, although in them full communion with the Catholic
Church is wanting, for the reason that they do not accept the Catholic doctrine
of the primacy, which, by the will of God, the Roman Bishop objectively
possesses and exercises over the universal Church. 100

The CDF clearly ascribes the ruling of the one Church of
Christ to the pope and those bishops in communion with him,
namely, to the Catholic hierarchy. 101 Further, the CDF holds the
99 For further reflection on this grounding, see notes 26 and 110, as well as my response
to Sullivan's fourth argument.
100 "Unica ergo est Christi Ecclesia, subsistens in Ecclesia Catholica, cuius moderatio
spectat ad Petri Successorem et ad Episcopos in communione cum eo. Ecclesiae illae quae, licet
in perfecta communione cum Ecclesia Catholica non sint, eidem tamen iunguntur vinculis
strictissimis, cuiusmodi sunt successio apostolica et valida Eucharistiae celebratio, verae sunt
Ecclesiae particulares. Quapropter in his quoque Ecclesiis praesens est et operatur Christi
Ecclesia, quantumvis plena desit communio cum Ecclesia Catholica, eo quod ipsae doctrinam
catholicam non acceptant de Primatu, quern, ex Dei consilio, Episcopus Romanus obiective
possidet et in Ecclesiam universam exercet" (DJ 17 [AAS 92 (2000): 758]; my translation).
101 If one wishes to include non-Catholic bishops in this ascription, one must qualify the
ascription (e.g., "in some way"). If a non-Catholic bishop "in some way" governs a particular
church not in full communion with the Church of Christ, he may be said "in some way" to
govern a particular church not in full communion with the Catholic Church.

SUBSISTITIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

29

Church of Christ to be present and operative in these
communions, although they lack full communion with the
Catholic Church. This "although" is crucial, for it reflects that the
presence of the Church of Christ is hindered precisely by the nonCatholic communion's lack of full communion with the Catholic
Church. Here, Dominus Jesus is simply following Unitatis
redintegratio (UR 3 ), 102 in harmony with Ut unum sint (UUS
11).103

Sullivan pits Dominus Iesus's historical reading of subsistit and
its mere affirmation that the Church of Christ exists fully only in
the Catholic Church against the CDF's metaphysical reading of
subsistit and restrictive affirmation of mere "elements of the
Church" outside of the Catholic Church in the 1985 intervention
on Boff (itself echoed in later CDF documents). Whatever is
meant by the "presence and operation" of the Church of Christ in
non-Catholic churches, this teaching need not imply a denial of
the total identity of the Catholic Church and the Church of
Christ. Becker raises questions about the precision of this manner
of formulating the relation of the Church of Christ to the nonCatholic churches. 104 Notwithstanding such reservations, the
102 "Those who believe in Christ and have received baptism validly [rite], are placed in a
certain communion, albeit imperfect, with the Catholic Church. Indeed, on account of the
discrepancies presently existing between them and the Catholic Church, in various ways,
whether in doctrinal or even disciplinary matters or regarding the structure of the Church, not
a few obstacles, sometimes grave ones, stand in the way of full ecclesiastical communion. The
ecumenical movement has as its aim the overcoming of these obstacles" ("Hi enim qui in
Christum credunt et baptismum rite receperunt, in quadam cum Ecclesia catholica
communione, etsi non perfecta, constituuntur. Profecto, ob discrepantias variis modis vigentes
inter eos et Ecclesiam catholicam tum in re doctrinali et quandoque etiam disciplinari tum
circa structuram Ecclesiae, plenae ecclesiasticae communioni opponuntur impedimenta non
pauca, quandoque graviora, ad quae superanda tendit motus oecumenicus" [UR 3 (AAS 57
[1965]: 93)]).
103 In the paragraph preceding the one to which Sullivan refers, John Paul teaches that the
elements of sanctification and truth found outside the visible structure of the Catholic Church
constitute the objective basis of the communion, albeit imperfect, of non-Catholic churches
and ecclesial communions with the Catholic Church. These elements are present, he adds, in
different degrees (see UUS 11 [AAS 87 (1995): 927]).
104 See Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 520C-521A. His
suggestion-that the text behind John Paul's expression is ASS 3/2:335-is compelling. That
text shows marked caution. See also note 86.

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CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

crucial point is this: The mystery of how the Church of Christ is
"present and operative" in non-Catholic churches is the same
mystery of how the Catholic Church is "present and operative"
therein. Neither Dominus Iesus nor Ut unum sint affirms a
differentiation of presence and operation. Nor is such a differentiation required for the explanation-which remains a
task-of this mystery.
Need a metaphysical reading of subsistit in exclude a historical
reading of the term? At least, may one hold the truth of the
affirmations associated with either reading simultaneously? If so,
one may, following out the implications of the CD F's intervention
on Boff and of its most recent clarification, venture to say that the
Church of Christ has one sole "self-standing" or agential existence
(as dependent Bride, of course). This full and self-standing
existence of the Church of Christ, the actual Catholic Church,
began at Pentecost, continues today, and shall remain forever. By
contrast, extra-Catholic ecclesial reality does not exist as a selfstanding mystical person. By God's will, it remains grounded in
and oriented towards the one Bride; it is properly hers; and thus
it belongs to her by right. 105 Communions endowed with a
sufficient threshold of ecclesial endowments are proximately
disposed to be, in actu pleno, particular churches of the Catholic
Church. Because they lack an internal principle constitutive of
church they can, it seems, bear only the effects of having the
Church's form. At any rate, Dominus Iesus's employment of "only
fully exists" should not be read as allowing for degrees of
metaphysical subsistence, which, as Becker implies, is a
contradiction in terms. 106 Sullivan maintains that the Church of
Christ "subsists-though not fully-in the Orthodox churches. " 107
If "subsists" means simply "it somehow remains" or "something
105 Feiner notes (see Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree [Unitatis redintegratio]," 159 and
161) that, at the last minute, Paul VI requested that "iure" be added to the important line in
UR 3: "All these things, which come from and lead to Christ, pertain by right to the one
Church of Christ" ("[H]aec omnia, quae a Christo proveniunt et ad Ipsum conducunt, ad
unicam Christi Ecclesiam iure pertinent" [AAS 57 (1965): 93]).
106 See Becker, "The Church and Vatican II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 520C.
107 Sullivan, "The Meaning of Subsistit In," 120 (see also 121).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

31

of it remains," one can speak of degrees of more or less, for the
precise manner of "remaining" or "existing" is not in view.
Further inquiry would lead to the metaphysical question. 108 In
sorting all these diverse manners of the "being" of the Church of
Christ, one should compare the existence of non-Catholic
particular or local churches not to the existence of the Catholic
Church, the universal Church of Christ, but to the existence of
Catholic particular or local churches. Only in that way can a
proper comparison be drawn.
Although Becker does not subscribe to a metaphysical reading
of subsistit in, he implies the truth of the affirmation of the
Church's metaphysical subsistence as one integral reality. The
implication of this viewpoint dovetails with the "full identity"
associated with a metaphysical reading. Sullivan contests, "It is
difficult to understand how Becker can claim that the Secretariat
for Christian Unity totally identified the Church of Christ with
the Catholic Church, when it so clearly recognized that nonCatholic churches and communities are used by the Holy Spirit as
means of salvation." 109 James O'Connor provided a response to
this difficulty over two decades ago. In the council's Acta we find
the following important response to an objection to the
description (in UR 3) of non-Catholic churches as "means" of
salvation: "Without doubt, God uses the disjoined communities
themselves, not indeed qua disjoined, but qua informed by the
108 The historical sense of the term subsistit-that the Church of Christ continues to exist
in her fullness here, in the Catholic Church-is of course required by Catholic teaching. So
long as one does not take a metaphysical reading in a crass sense-"something" subsisting "in
something else"-a metaphysical affirmation about the manner of existence of this Church of
Christ need not contradict the doctrine of full identity (cf. Becker, "The Church and Vatican
II's 'Subsistit in' Terminology," 519B, who yet appears to presume the idea as well [ibid.,
520C]). It seems to me that metaphysical reflections on this matter add a certain depth.
Importantly, they establish the theological grounds for the doctrinal affirmation of the real
ecclesial character of non-Catholic churches (see note 26 on Ratzinger's thought on this; see
also Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 38-45). Clearly, the council can employ the term in a merely
historical sense (see UR 13, regarding the perpetuation of Catholic traditions in the Anglican
communion). It would be a mistake, however, to take metaphysically a merely historical
application regarding the enduring existence of "elements" outside the Catholic Church (see,
e.g., Sullivan, "The Meaning of Subsistit In," 120).
109 Sullivan, "Response," 405. See also ibid., n. 29, with reference to ASS 3/7:35

32

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

aforementioned ecclesial elements, for conferring saving grace to
believers. " 110 O'Connor comments:
The elements [of separated churches and communions] are operative here and
now because they belong by right to the Church and presently derive their
efficacy from the plenitude of grace entrusted to the Catholic Church. In other
words, the ecclesial elements are elements of the Catholic Church presently
operative in the separated Churches and Communities because of their real,
although imperfect, unity with the Catholic Church. 111

A number of arguments directly favor the thesis of "total
identity."

110 "Deus procul dubio utitur ipsis Communitatibus

seiunctis, non quidem qua seiunctis,
sed qua informatis praedictis elementis ecclesialibus, ad conferendam credentibus gratiam
salutarem" (ASS 3/7:35). It should be mentioned, first, thatAetemus Unigeniti already stated
something to this effect (see notes 71 and 72). One might object thatAetemus Unigeniti spoke
of the instrumental efficacy of the elements and not of the communities. Yet, second, the Acta
attest that it is on account of the elements that said communities have their efficacy. In
response to worries that Lumen gentium 15, exaggerated the promise of non-Catholic
communions and thus gave license for the Protestant prosyletization of Latin America, the
doctrinal commission made clear that "This entire passage treats of the objective elements
which constitute a certain bond with the Catholic Church. The passage is obviously stated in
general terms" ("In toto textu agitur de elementis obiectivis quae nexum quemdam cum
Ecdesia Catholica constituunt, et sermo evidenter est generalis" [ASS 3/6: 100; the same point
is made in ASS 3/2:335]). Third, John Paul II ascribes the presence and operation of the
Church of Christ in non-Catholic Churches to the presence therein of ecclesial elements (see
note 39). The CDF follows him (see CDF, "Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church,"
response to the second question [AAS 99 (2007): 606]). See, also James O'Connor, "The
Church of Christ and the Catholic Church," in The Battle for the Catholic Mind, ed. William
May and Kenneth Whitehead (South Bend, Ind.: St. Augustine's Press, 2001), 258-59.
111 O'Connor, "The Church of Christ and the Catholic Church," 259. O'Connor is well
aware of the problem that non-Catholic churches cannot be impeded in the validity of certain
exercises of the sacraments on account of a juridical act of Rome (see, e.g., ASS 3/7:35).
Nevertheless, as he notes, the same is true within the Catholic Church (differences of domains
for various canonical norms notwithstanding). A "suspended" bishop can serve the Lord, but
not qua separated (ibid., 260). Moreover, the nota praevia accompanying Lumen gentium
offers preliminary guidelines for the interpretation of some matters, such as the meaning of
"communion" and the question of "juridical determination" of a bishop's power to perform
his sacred function. Diverse answers to questions of liceity and validity do not prejudice the
argument that the Church of Christ is simply the Catholic Church. However, diverse answers
to the question of juridical determination will affect the ways in which one understands the
meaning of "church" when said of non-Catholic communions. See also Leo XIII, Satis
cognitum 14-15; Pius XII, Mystici corporis 42.

SUBSIS'ITTIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

33

B) Arguments for Total Identity
I intend these arguments to be taken as "converging
probabilities." First, a Catholic theologian ought to presume in
favor of the perpetuity of past doctrine, unless he countenances
an explicit revocation, or unambiguous implicit revocation,
thereof. 112 Much more is this the case for a longstanding
teaching. 113 Vatican II nowhere expressly revokes previous
teaching, nor do the conciliar teachings necessarily imply such a
revocation. One therefore presumes the continuity of doctrine
reaffirmed recently in the CDF's "Responses."
Second, as some have pointed out, the council elsewhere
affirms the identity of the Mystical Body of Christ and the
Catholic Church. Orientialium ecclesiarum, which received
conciliar approval the same day as Lumen gentium, reads, "The
holy and Catholic Church, which is the Mystical Body of Christ
••• ". 114 No one, presumably, would differentiate the Mystical
Body from the Church of Christ. This passage, therefore, is
tantamount to an affirmation of identity between the Catholic
112 For a similar contention,

see Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 47.

113 Was the teaching longstanding? Sullivan contends that the total identity of the Catholic

Church and the Church of Christ was not held by the fathers of the Council of Florence. He
indicates the reference in session 6 to a wall that divided the "western and eastern Church"
(in the singular in Latin and Greek). See Tanner, ed., Decrees, 1:524.9-11; and Sullivan, "The
Meaning of Subsistit In," 524. This reading is problematic in the context of that council as a
whole. In session 8, the council portrays the Greeks and the Armenians as having been made
one with the Roman Church (see Tanner, ed., Decrees, 1:535.31-536.2). Session 6 stresses the
primacy of the Roman pontiff over the whole Church (see Tanner, ed., Decrees, 1:528.15-30)
and refers to the Catholic Church as Mother Church and Spouse of Christ (see Tanner, ed.,
Decrees, 1:524.30-31and525.14). How, then, should one understand the passage to which
Sullivan refers? The voice of the council is as it were that of the universal Church addressing
her actual sons, those who were divided. She rejoices that those who are her sons, and who
were once divided though marked by Christ in baptism, are united at last. This is as though
to say that, whereas the objective scope of papal power is and was universal, it suffered in its
reception among some of the Eastern churches, which are now, in actu pleno, particular
Catholic Churches. Who, finally, can forget Florence's very difficult teaching (applicable
formaliter) that no one who does not remain in the bosom of Catholic unity-be he a heretic
or schismatic--can be saved (see Tanner, ed., Decrees, 1:578.7-26)?
114 "Sancta et catholica Ecclesia, quae est Corpus Christi Mysticum" (Orientalium
Ecclesiarum 2 [MS 57 (1965): 76]). See O'Connor, "The Church of Christ and the Catholic
Church," 257.

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CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

Church and the Church of Christ. 115 Another conciliar utterance
implies the same: "Now, the bishops are singly the visible
principle and foundation of unity in their particular churches,
which are formed in the image of the universal Church; it is in
these and from these that there exists the one and only Catholic
Church." 116 The analogy in context is clear: As the pope is to the
universal Church, each bishop is to his particular church. To
designate the universal Church, which is "one and only one,"
Lumen gentium does not hesitate to use the title "Catholic
Church. " 117 Sullivan might explain this statement, as he does the
use of "the one and only Church of God" to designate the
Catholic Church (UR 3), 118 as being applicable only in the first
millennium. 119 Yet, the passage from Lumen gentium occurs in the
context of a discussion of the college of Bishops, which by
definition is constituted only by the pope and those bishops in
hierarchical communion with him. 12 Further, the Acta attest that
the conciliar secretariat affirmed the total identity of the Catholic
Church and the Church of Christ. 121

°

115 The refrain "Christ's Body, which is the Church," evocative of Pius XII and Sebastian
Tromp, appears in various places. See Sacrosanctum concilium 7 (Tanner, ed., Decrees,
2:822.29-30); Lumengentium 7 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:853.24), 14 (Tanner, ed., Decrees,
2:860.13), 48 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:887.37), and 49 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:889.15);
Gaudium et spes 32 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:1088.38-39); and Presbyterorum ordinis 12
(Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:1057.21).
116 "Episcopi autem singuli visibile principium et fundamentum sunt unitatis in suis
Ecclesiis particularibus, ad imaginem Ecclesiae universalis formatis, in quibus et ex quibus una
et unica Ecclesia catholica exsistit" (LG 23 [AAS 57 (1965): 27]).
117 See also Code of Canon Law, canon 368.
118 "[U]na et unica Dei Ecclesia" (UR 3 [AAS 57 (1965): 92]).
119 See Sullivan, "Response," 402-4 and 407.
120 See LG 22-23; and Nata explicativa praevia, no. 3.
121 With respect to the introduction to Unitatis redintegratio, there was a complaint that
non-Catholic communions were being numbered alongside the Catholic Church, giving the
appearance of a false connumeration. The response was: "In this place, only the reality as
perceived by all is being described. Below, it is clearly affirmed that only the Catholic Church
is the true Church of Christ" ("Hie tantum factum, prout ab omnibus conspicitur,
describendum est. Postea dare affirmatur solam Ecclesiam catholicam esse veram Ecclesiam
Christi" [ASS 3/7:12]). The third concern regarding chapter 1 urged the explicit addition of
"Catholic" whenever the use of "Church" was meant to designate the Catholic Church. The
response was that the sense in each case should be obvious from the context (see ASS 3/7:15).
The same bishop desired another change (the fourth listed): That the text explicitly state that

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

35

Third, in various ways, Vatican II presents Peter as the pastor
of the entire Church; similarly, Peter and the bishops united with
him form one college, governing the entire Church. In harmony
with established tradition, this is the constant claim of the entire
council. 122 Now for the argument: When Peter exercises authority
over all the Catholic faithful, he fully exercises his supreme
authority. This exercise of authority is not that merely of bishop
or metropolitan or even "patriarch of all the West." But, at least
objectively, he fully exercises his supreme authority precisely as
pastor of the entire Church of Christ. Therefore, Peter's authority
as pastor of the Catholic Church is coextensive with his authority
as pastor of the Church of Christ. With regard to Peter's
only the Catholic Church is the Church of Christ and that everyone has the duty to seek her
out and enter her in order to obtain eternal salvation. The risk, in not clarifying this matter,
is that Catholics will be exposed to indifferentism. The secretariat's response was, "What is
asked here is sufficiently borne out in the entire text. On the other hand, the text cannot pass
over the fact that revealed truths and ecclesial elements are also found in other Christian
communities" ("In toto textu sufficienter effertur, quod postulatur. Ex altera parte non est
tacendum etiam in aliis communitatibus christianis inveniri veritates revelatas et elementa
ecclesialia" [ibid.]). Other bishops urged that the text more clearly teach that the true Church
is only the Catholic Church and that the pope enjoys supreme authority over all the faithful.
The response was that the text presupposes this doctrine, expounded in Lumen gentium (see
ibid.).
In the discussion of UR 2, there was a desire that the unicity of the Church be more clearly
expressed. The response reads: "(A) From the whole text, the identification of the Church of
Christ with the Catholic Church is evident, although, as is necessary, the ecclesial elements of
the other communities are set in relief. (B) The Church-governed by the successors of the
Apostles with the successor of Peter as their head-is explicitly called the 'only flock of God'
and the 'one and only Church of God' ("[A] Ex toto textu dare apparet identificatio Ecclesiae
Christi cum Ecclesia catholica, quamvis, ut oportet, efferantur elementa ecclesialia aliarum
communitatum. [BJ ... Ecclesia a successoribus Apostolorum cum Petri successore capite
gubernata ... explicite dicitur 'unicus Dei grex' et ... 'una et unica Dei Ecclesia"' [ASS
3/7:17]). It is noteworthy that the CDF, in its responses to questions on "Certain Aspects of
the Doctrine on the Church," cites these texts in its fourth footnote (MS 99 [2007]: 605-6
n.4).
122 LG 8 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:854.21-23, 26-28); 18 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:863.1114); 19 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:863.28-32); 20 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:864.4-6); 22
(Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:865.28-866.11; 866.14-18, 20-24, 25, 32, 34); 23 (Tanner, ed.,
Decrees, 2:867.21, 23, 29-30); and 25 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:869.30-34, 39). Among other
witnesses to the constancy of this tradition, see Fourth Lateran Council, chap. 5 (DS 811);
Council of Lyons, Session 4 (DS 861); Boniface VIII, Unam sanctam (DS 870-75); Council
of Florence, "Decree for the Greeks" (DS 1307); Vatican I, Pastor aeternus (DS 305 0-64); Leo
XIII, Satis cognitum 13-15; and Pius XII, Mystici corporis 40-41.

36

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

authority, what can be defective is not his power but the
acceptance thereof by Christians. But papal authority, which is
supreme, is objectively augmented neither by the consent of the
faithful nor by the cooperation of bishops, even though bishops
receive their power directly from Christ and even though, when
united with the pope in an ecumenical council, they jointly
exercise that supreme authority. Nor should one attempt to
circumscribe papal authority or true conciliar authority by appeals
to "recognition" and "reception. " 123 Given, then, the perpetually
established supreme authority of the Bishop of Rome, there are no
grounds for distinguishing realiter the Catholic Church and the
Church of Christ.
Fourth, as Vatican II teaches, the entire means of salvation, the
full deposit of faith, and the full governing structure of the
Church belongs only to the Catholic Church: "Through Christ's
Catholic Church alone, which is the comprehensive help [generate
auxilium] for salvation, can [potest] the fullness of all the means
of salvation be attained." 124 Clearly, the potest does not allow for
a temporally limited distribution of the predicate. The reason is
this: "that fullness of grace and truth ... is entrusted to the
Catholic Church." 125 Now, if there were a real differentiation
123 We find such an appeal in the Joint International Commission for the Theological
Dialogue between the Roman Catholic Church and the Orthodox Church, "Ecclesiological
and Canonical Consequences of the Sacramental Nature of the Church: Ecclesial Communion,
Conciliarity and Authority" (Ravenna, 13 October 2007).
124 "Per solam enim catholicam Christi Ecclesiam, quae generale auxilium salutis est, omnis
salutarium mediorum plenitudo attingi potest" (UR 3 [AAS 57 (1965): 94]). The elements of
sanctification and truth found outside the Catholic Church, conducive to salvation, draw their
efficacy from the fullness of grace and truth entrusted to the Catholic Church. Lumengentium
teaches that these elements are proper (propria) to the Church of Christ and therefore impel
towards Catholic unity (LG 8). In the Acta, the following response regarding a suggested
change is noteworthy: "When ecclesial elements are said to exist outside of the boundaries of
the Catholic Church, it is by no means affirmed that in the Catholic Church one does not find
all the elements [of the Church]. The fullness of the means of salvation ... is explicitly
ascribed to the Catholic Church alone" ("Eo quod extra saepta Ecclesiae catholicae elementa
ecclesialia exstare dicuntur, nullatenus affirmatur non omnia elementa in Ecclesia catholica
inveniri. Plenitudo mediorum salutis ... explicite soli Ecclesiae catholicae adscribitur" [ASS
3/7:31]). See also John Paul II, Ut unum sint 11(AAS87 [1995]: 927).
125 "[I]psa plenitudine gratiae et veritatis ... Ecclesiae catholicae concredita est" (UR 3
[AAS 57 (1965): 93]). Paul VI requested the insertion of "Catholic" at the end of this
statement (see Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree [Unitatis redintegratio]," 159).

SUBSISTIT IN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

37

between the Catholic Church and the Church of Christ, it would
be possible for a set of non-Catholic Churches to attain full
communion with the Church of Christ, and hence to enjoy the
fullness of grace and truth, without eo ipso becoming particular
Catholic churches. Such a situation is impossible, since the fullness
can be obtained only through Christ's Catholic Church.
Fifth, Vatican II presupposes that, during this "end of the
times," the people of God-which no one would differentiate
realiter from the Church of Christ-is the Catholic Church. This
point can be shown by the following observations. First, the
people of God is said to cling to the word of the magisterial
teaching office. 126 The predicate is, as such, applicable only to the
members of the Catholic Church. Second, the council speaks
equivalently of "The Church, or the people of God." 127 The
context shows that "Church" here means "Catholic Church."
Third, the teaching on incorporation into the people of God
manifests the same. All are called to the Catholic unity of the
people of God, and all people either "belong" (pertinent) or are
"ordered" (ordinantur) to this unity. 128 The distinctions between
belonging and being related are presented more precisely as
follows. Those are "fully incorporated" who accept all the means
of salvation and the entire structure of this society, who are united
with Christ in its visible structure governed by the supreme pontiff
and the bishops (by the ties of the profession of faith, the
sacraments, ecclesial authority, and communion), and who still
have the Spirit of Christ. 129 Those who meet all conditions but the
126 See

LG 12.

Decrees, 2:859.17]; see also LG 28
[Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:873.36-37]).
128 LG 13 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.5-7). For asimilar analysis, see Fromaget, "Subsistit
in," 39-40.
129 See LG 14 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.20-25). Of course, the conditions spelled out
here pertain to the objective order. Whether someone who is commonly assumed not to be
Catholic may in fact be Catholic is another question, which the council chose not to answer.
Hence, the wording in UR 3: "Those who have by faith been justified in baptism are
incorporated into Christ" ("iustificati ex fide in baptismate, Christo incorporantur" [AAS 57
(1965): 93]). The text does not read "into Christ's body," pace the Tanner translation
(Tanner, ed., Decrees,2:910.13-14). The secretariat called attention to the deliberate omission
of the term "body" here, since it was not the council's intention to settle disputed questions
of membership (see ASS 3/7:30). The readings of Feiner (Feiner, "Commentary on the Decree
127 "Ecclesia seu Populus Dei" (LG 13 [Tanner, ed.,

38

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

last (i.e., Catholics who have not persevered in charity) are
nonetheless "incorporated" into this society. 13 Catechumens
desire to be incorporated into the Church. 131 "Mother Church"
thus embraces them as her own. 132 Other Christians are, on
various grounds, "joined" to the Church. 133 Finally, other people
are "ordered" to the people of God in various ways. 134 This
narrative of diverse relations to the unity of the people of God
presupposes the identity of the people of God with the Catholic
Church.135 Fourth, Unitatis redintegratio (UR 3), echoes this
presupposition: For the building up of the one body, Christ
entrusted all the blessings of the New Testament to the apostolic
college alone, over which Peter presides. Into this one body "all
those who already belong in some way to the people of God
ought to be fully incorporated. " 136
Sixth, according to Vatican II, it is precisely the Catholic
Church-not the Church of Christ conceived as extended beyond
the Catholic Church-that is necessary for salvation. It is first
asserted that the pilgrim Church of Christ is necessary for
salvation. 137 From this general principle the council concludes to

°

[Unitatis redintegratio]," 73) and Congar (Congar, Le Concile de Vatican II, 160) concerning
Church membership seem, therefore, to go beyond the text. For a reading alternative to these,
see Karl J. Becker, "The Teaching of Vatican II on Baptism: A Stimulus for Theology," in
Vatican II: Assessment and Perspectives Twenty-five Years After (1962-1987), vol. 2, ed. Rene
Latourelle (New York: Paulist Press, 1989), 62-75. For a good and subtle presentation, see
Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 27-33. Von Teuffenbach argues that Cardinal Lienart failed to
distinguish the question of membership from the question of the relation of non-Catholic
communions to the one and only Catholic Church (see von Teuffenbach, Die Bedeutung des
'subsistit in', 304f.).
130 See LG 14 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.25-27).
131 See LG 14 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.31£).
132 See LG 14 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.33).
133 LG 15 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.34-37).
134 LG 16 (Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:861.14£).
135 Sullivan reads into the constitution the notion of "degrees of incorporation in the
church" (see Sullivan, Salvation outside the Church? 146). He further blurs the subtlety by
contending that since one either belongs (a loose term) or is related to the Church, therefore,
all who belong are members of the Church (see ibid., 153).
136 "cui plene incorporentur oportet omnes, qui ad populum Dei iam aliquo modo
pertinent" (UR 3 [AAS 57 (1965): 94]).
137 See LG 14 (AAS 57 [1965]: 18).

SUBSISTITIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

39

a particular moral precept pertaining to God's will for concrete
man: "Wherefore, those men could not be saved who-not
unaware that the Catholic Church was by God through Jesus
Christ made necessary-nonetheless would not will to enter into
her or to remain in her." 138 If the objective necessity to enter the
Catholic Church follows straightforwardly from the necessity of
the pilgrim Church of Christ for the salvation of wayfarers, then,
as Fromaget argues, the Catholic Church is the very same thing as
the Church of Christ. 139 Or is the Catholic Church some kind of
instrument of the Church of Christ? Of course, it is emphatically
to be added that salvation is possible for individuals who are not
Catholic. 140 Moreover, non-Catholic Christian communities enjoy
ecclesial mediation of the means for achieving this possibility.
Disputes about the denial of the possibility for non-Catholics to
be saved, a la Feeney, are to be distinguished from the issue of
subsistit. Non-Catholics can be saved precisely through a mystical
communion with the Catholic Church. There is no compelling
need for a Catholic theologian to appeal to some other "mystical
communion" with a Church of Christ supposedly not fully
identical with the Catholic Church.
Seventh, the denial of full identity does not accord with the
context of the subsistit clause. The burden of article 8 of Lumen
gentium, as well as that of Mystici corporis, was to maintain the
inseparable unity of the invisible and visible aspects of the one and
138 "Quare illi homines salvari non possent, qui Ecclesiam Catholicam a Deo per Iesum
Christum ut necessariam esse conditam non ignorantes, tamen vel in earn intrare, vel in eadem
perseverare noluerint" (LG 14 [AAS 57 (1965): 18]). Tanner, following a general editorial
decision, capitalizes neither Ecclesiam nor Catholicam (see Tanner, ed., Decrees, 2:860.17).
139 See Fromaget, "Subsistit In," 38 n. 145.
140 LG 15-17. Sullivan argues from the possibility that non-Catholics can be saved, even
though they do not enter into visible union with the Catholic Church, to the denial of total
identity. This is to presuppose what one intends to establish. It is not necessary to deny total
identity in order to save this possibility. As O'Connor has shown, the secretariat found it not
necessary to repeat, in UR 3, the necessity of the Catholic Church for salvation, since the truth
of this necessity was abundantly clear: "The necessity of communion with the Catholic Church
for obtaining the grace of Christ and salvation is sufficiently indicated in the entire context"
("Necessitas communionis cum Ecclesia catholica ad gratiam Christi et salutem obtinendam
sufficienter indicatur in toto contextu" [ASS 3/7:35]). See O'Connor, "The Church of Christ
and the Catholic Church," 259.

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

40

only (unica) Church. The one reality of the Church is constituted
on this earth "as a visible structure. " 141 The Mystical Body of
Christ and the "society arranged with hierarchical organs," 142
therefore, form one complex reality from two elements, a
mysterious analogy for which is Christ, one person composed of
two natures. 143 Insofar as particular gatherings of Christians do
not retain the full scope of the visible order of the Catholic
Church, they fail to be, in actu pleno, particular churches of the
Catholic Church. Given that the Church of Christ is one reality,
visible and invisible, how then could they be, in actu pleno,
particular churches of the Church of Christ? However one
qualifies the status of such churches with respect to the Catholic
Church (e.g., they "participate" in the reality of the Catholic
Church; they "approximate" to being, fully, Catholic particular
churches), one must identically qualify their status with respect to
the Church of Christ. 144 To differentiate these "respects" would
be to render the Catholic Church but a collective sister church,
albeit massive and "full," among the major collective sister
churches of the Church of Christ.
Eighth, only the doctrine of full identity preserves the teaching
that the Catholic Church is Mother of all particular churches and
not a federated sister to any particular church or churches. The
CDF has reaffirmed this constant teaching: "As recalled above,
one cannot properly say that the Catholic Church is the sister of
a particular church or group of churches." The reason (what is
being recalled) is that "The one, holy, catholic and apostolic
141 "ut compaginem visibilem" (LG 8 [AAS 57 (1965):

11]).
"Societas autem organis hierarchicis instructa" (ibid.).
143 Even late in the Acta, the unicity of the Church is repeatedly expressed. See ASS
3/1:176 and 180; and ASS 3/7:12, 15, 16-17, 35 (response to suggested emendation no. 57)
and 36 (response to suggested emendation no. 63). The unicity is, of course, also enshrined
in the conciliar texts themselves: "This is the only Church of Christ" ("Haec est unica Christi
Ecclesia" [LG 8 (AAS 57 [1965]: 11)]); and "In this one and only Church of God" ("In hac
una et unica Dei Ecclesia" [UR 3 (AAS 57 [1965], 92)]). The teaching continues to manifest
itself (see CDF, "Some Aspects of the Church Understood as Communion," 8; UUS 11; and
DI 16-17).
144 If one may in some mode of discourse speak of degrees of being particular churches of
the Church of Christ, one could speak identically of degrees of being particular Catholic
churches. See, e.g., The Catechism of the Catholic Church, 834.
142

SUBSISTITIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

41

[U]niversal [C]hurch is not sister but mother of all the particular
churches." This is not mere semantics. It is a matter "above all of
respecting a basic truth of the Catholic faith: that of the unicity of
the [C]hurch of Jesus Christ. In fact, there is but a single
[C] hurch. " 145 This teaching has no grounds if the Catholic Church
is not, now and always, the Universal Church of Christ, Mother
of all particular churches. 146
How, then, to account for the ecclesial reality of non-Catholic
churches? Non-Catholic churches can be considered "true
particular churches" in a proper but analogical sense. A more
precise accounting of the extension of the sense of "church" is
desirable. Clearly, they are not particular churches in actu pleno.
Would it be accurate to describe them as "true churches" insofar
as they are proximately disposed to the form of the one true
Church?
It seems to me, finally, that the denial of total identity has been
bolstered by an unwitting transposition from one set of ecclesial
polarities to another. The following polarities, each in its own
way, apply to the Church: visible society- mystical reality; perfect
in the means for the attainment of the end - imperfect and sinful
in her members; sign - signified; essential character - variegated
incarnate manifestations; pilgrim wanderer- heavenly victor; etc.
Early conciliar discussions rightly highlighted these polarities.
Problems arise, however, when these as it were eschatological and
vertical polarities are taken to justify a horizontal (geographical)
and present polarity between the Catholic Church and the Church

145 CDF, "Note on the Expression 'Sister Churches,"' 10-11 (Origins 30 [2000]: 224B).
The tradition witnesses that the Catholic Church is Mother of all Churches through the
primacy accorded to her visible head. Accordingly, the tradition does not hesitate to call the
Church of Rome the Mother of all Churches (see Fourth Lateran Council, chap. 5 [DS 811];
Council of Lyons, session 4 [DS 861]; and Leo XIII, Satis cognitum 13). See also the teaching
of Paul VI cited above in note 28. The supremacy of the one Church of Rome over all
particular churches is stressed also at Vatican I, Pastor aetemus (DS 3060).
146 Sullivan insists, however, that the Universal Church of Christ is not simply the-Catholic
Church, and he implies that Paul VI not only permitted one to hold but expressed himself in
such a way as to imply that the Catholic Church is a collective "sister" of the churches of the
East. See Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 63.

42

CHRISTOPHER J. MALLOY

of Christ, qua further extended. 147 This leads to a kind of
abstraction of the "universal Church of Christ" from the Catholic
Church: "There is one Church of God that embraces the
particular churches of both East and West, even though at present
they are not in full communion with one another." 148
On the basis of this abstraction, there emerges the conception
of a dual relation: non-Catholic church - Church of Christ; nonCatholic church - Catholic Church. This dual relation, in turn,
entails difficulties for a conception of the universal Church as
both always visible and always ontologically prior to particular
churches. 149 Ontologically prior, the universal Church, as Bridal
Servant and Instrument of Christ, informs this or that particular
church with its ecclesial reality. If the universal Church is always
visible, just what universal Church informs non-Catholic churches
with their ecclesial reality, if not the Catholic Church? If one
appeals neither to the Catholic Church nor to an invisible Church,
one seems to have no recourse but to the notion of the universal
Church as a communion arising out of the many churches. 150 But
the universal Church is not a federation of churches, however
intimately connected. 151 The first set of polarities can be main-

147 See, e.g., Farmeree, "Local Churches, Universal Church and Other Churches in Lumen
Gentium," 54-58. By contrast, the movement from LG 49 to LG 50 ratifies both the
differentiation of the pilgrim status from the heavenly status of the Church and the identity
of the Church with the Body of Christ (AAS 57 [1965]: 55).
148 Sullivan, "The Significance of the Vatican II Declaration," 283. See also idem, The
Church We Believe In, 24f. Again, "The Orthodox Churches can hardly be said to be particular
churches of the Catholic Church. If they are not, of what universal church are they particular
churches? It would seem that they must be particular churches of the church of Christ, which
must then continue to exist beyond the limits of the Catholic Church and not be simply
identical with it" (Sullivan,"The Meaning of Subsistit In," 123). John McDermott's remark
retains its pertinence: "Sullivan's universal Church is hardly an ordered society in this world"
Gohn McDermott, "Lumen gentium: The Once and Future Constitution," in Kenneth
Whitehead, ed., After 40 Years: Vatican Council II's Diverse Legacy [South Bend, Ind.: St.
Augustine's Press, 2007], 158 n. 21).
149 See CDF, "Some Aspects of the Church Understood as Communion," 7 (AAS 85
[1993]: 842). See also Ratzinger, "Ecclesiology of the Constitution," 133-39.
150 See Sullivan, The Church We Believe In, 63-65, and Farmeree, "Local Churches,
Universal Church and Other Churches in Lumen Gentium," 60.
151 See Paul VI, Evangelii nuntiandi 62; and CDF, "Some Aspects of the Church
Understood as Communion," 9.

SUBSISTITIN: NONEXCLUSIVE IDENTITY OR FULL IDENTITY?

43

tained without the addition of a geographical polarity between the
Catholic Church and the further extended Church of Christ.
CONCLUSION

I have attempted to demonstrate (a) that Vatican II does not
mitigate the traditional doctrine on the full identity of the Church
of Christ with the Catholic Church and (b) that therefore on this
point there is no warrant for a hermeneutic of rupture. Conciliar
and postconciliar magisterial teachings leave theologians with the
urgent tasks of articulating the unique contribution of subsistit,
accounting for the ecclesial status of non-Catholic churches and
communities, and unpacking the ecumenical implications of full
identity.
Perhaps advertence to a distinction of manners of consideration may assist in these theological endeavors. On the one hand,
one can consider the essential character and constitutive elements
of the one Church, visible and invisible. From this perspective,
one approaches the Church as such, not prescinding from her
earthly aspects but considering them absolutely, as it were. On the
other hand, one can consider the actual manifestation and concrete life of the Church. 152 From the latter perspective, one
152 By means of this distinction,

one can illuminate the harmony in Cardinal Ratzinger's
claims that the Church of Christ is fully identical with the Catholic Church and that she
extends beyond the Roman Catholic Church. Seen from the material perspective, Catholic
churches and non-Catholic churches and communions have this in common: They are the
particular, ecclesial stuff upon which God through Christ, in the Spirit, works. So, if by
"Catholic Church" one intends to designate the variegated manifestation or complexion of
the Church of Christ, where it is perfect or metaphysically subsistent, then one might say that
the reality of the Church of Christ extends beyond the Catholic Church. (It seems to me that
this is why the cardinal prefixes Roman to "Catholic Church" in affirming such an extension,
as though drawing attention to those temporal aspects of her concrete manifestation that are
not per se necessary to her essential constitution. I thus find Heim's contention that Ratzinger
"does not presuppose a complete identity" [Heim, Joseph Ratzinger, 317] to be misplaced.)
Nevertheless, such an affirmation is not admissible from the perspective that approaches the
Church as such. The Catholic Church, as such, is not a mere set of federated churches but the
universal Church of Christ, totally identical thereto. (Hence, the CDF, in its commentary on
its "Responses to Some Questions regarding Certain Aspects of the Doctrine on the Church,"
describes this total identity as a "substantial identity of essence.") So, it is more proper to
recognize "Catholic Church" as a term designating the very Church founded by Christ, visible
and invisible, divine mystery and ordered society. It is this very Church that can be conceived

44

CHRISTOPHER]. MALLOY

attends directly to the variegated manifold of the one Church,
which exists in particular churches. One attends directly to the
relative strengths and weaknesses-liturgical, theological, pastoral,
etc.-of these churches or those. One attends to the adequacy of
the harmony among the sister churches. In virtue of the real,
albeit imperfect, communion enjoyed by Catholic and nonCatholic particular churches, further, one may simply include the
latter with the former in this estimation of the adequacy of the
ecclesial symphony. Of course, this suggestion involves a
differentiation of considerations, not dual realities. 153 From the
coupling of these perspectives on the unique Church, finally, one
can affirm both the essential fullness of the ecclesial reality of the
Catholic Church and the concrete poverty and woundedness of
her lived life, together with her practical need of the expressive
ecclesial riches found outside her visible boundaries. 154
in this twofold consideration.
153 This consideration opens up space for a Catholic approach to ecumenism that does not
rely on a real differentiation between the Catholic Church and the Church of Christ. It allows
for both of the following assertions: (a) the goal of the ecumenical movement is not the union
of churches in some tertium quid but their union in the Catholic Church herself, conceived
as such, and (b) the Catholic Church as presently manifest, i.e., as conceived from the material
or phenomenological point of view, is not configured in the same way as she was four
hundred years ago and as she shall be in the future. A particular or local church that enters full
communion with the Catholic Church becomes Catholic, while the latter undergoes
reconfiguration in her concrete complexion. Various theologians point in different ways to
something of this distinction. I have noted Cardinal Ratzinger already. Others include Richard
Schenck (Richard Schenk, "The Unsettled German Discussions of Justification: Abiding
Differences and Ecumenical Blessings,'' Dialog: A Journal of Theology 44 [2005]: 161 and n.
30); Gamberini ('"Subsistit' in Ecumenical Ecclesiology,'' 68-69); and, especially, Fromaget
("Subsistit In,'' 80-88). I find particularly promising Thomas Aquinas's meditation on the two
senses in which one can understand forma mixti: as the substantial form rendering many parts
one substance and as the emergent, manifest "quality" of the harmony among these parts (see
Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles IV, c. 81). There is only one substance and one
substantial form; yet, in a composite being, harmony among the parts is a necessary feature.
Disharmony entails sickness, or even death. Approaching a composite entity from the material
point of view, one can consider potential parts together with actual parts as both belonging
to the whole according as it has the character of a balanced interplay of ordered parts. Given
that the Church is a corporate entity, Aquinas's insight on forma mixti could be applied only
analogously.
154 Acknowledging errors as strictly my own, I am grateful to William Brownsberger,
Manfred Hauke, John Lamont, Gregory LaNave, Ansgar Santogrossi, and Thomas Scheck for
their advice concerning this article. I am also grateful to anonymous benefactors.

The Thomist 72 (2008): 45-66

A CERTAIN RECTITUDE OF ORDER:
JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION ACCORDING TO AQUINAS

J. MARK ARMITAGE
Durham, United Kingdom

B

RIAN DAVIES OBSERVES that justification, for Aquinas,
"is a matter of God making us more godly." 1 But how
exactly does Aquinas understand this process of "making us
more godly"? The key concept in Aquinas's teaching on
justification is that justification denotes a movement towards
"rectitude of order":
Justice is so-called inasmuch as it implies a certain rectitude of order [rectitudo
ordinis] in the interior disposition of a human being, in so far as what is highest
in humans is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are subject to
the superior, i.e. to the reason; and this disposition the Philosopher calls 'justice
metaphorically speaking'. 2

In this article I wish to explore the Christological and soteriological significance of Aquinas's understanding of justice as "a
certain rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human
being." Firstly, I intend to examine his treatment of original
justice and original sin, especially in so far as these denote a
relation to "ordinateness." Secondly, in the light of the close
connection between the questions of law and justification in
Pauline theology, I intend to explain why it is for Aquinas that the
1 Brian Davies, O.P., The Thought of Thomas Aquinas (Oxford:

Clarendon Press, 1992),

337.
2 STh I-II, q. 113, a. 1. All quotations from the Summa Theologiae are taken, with
appropriate adaptations, from the translation by the Fathers of the English Dominican
Province, (London: Burns, Oates & Washbourne, 1920-25).

45

46

J. MARK ARMITAGE

Old Law is incapable of justifying-that is, of producing "a certain
rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human being."
Finally, I intend to show how the justice of Christ-Christ's own
personal justification and interior rectitude of order-is the
ground for all human redemption and justification.
Although this study is expository rather than speculative, I do
not plan to offer either a detailed account of the relevant question
from the Summa Theologiae (STh 1-11, q. 113) or an assessment of
whether or not Aquinas's argument there is successful. 3 Neither
do I intend to discuss in great depth the twin issues of justification
by faith and of the relationship of grace and justification. 4 In the
light of the Reformation, these issues have become, together with
the debate as to whether justification is imputed (Lutheranism) or
imparted (Catholicism), central to the discussion of justification
whether this is conceived polemically or ecumenically, and they
are, understandably, issues that feature prominently in the Joint
Declaration on the Doctrine of Justification by the Lutheran
World Federation and the Catholic Church. 5 However, there has
emerged over the last thirty years or so (primarily in the Englishspeaking world) a current of thinking in contemporary Pauline
scholarship to the effect that Paul's teaching on justification needs
to be interpreted not along the customary post-Reformation lines,
but in the light of his understanding of Old Testament covenant
theology and of the shape of biblical narrative. 6 This "new
3 For an analysis of Aquinas's synthesis, see Eleonore Stump, "Atonement and
Justification," in Ronald J. Feenstra and Cornelius Plantinga, Jr., eds., Trinity, Incarnation,
and Atonement: Philosophical and Theological Essays (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre
Dame Press, 1989), 178-209.
4 The classic themes of justification through faith, justificati_onand grace, and justification
as forgiveness are beyond the scope of this study. For a good introduction, see Davies, The
Thought of Thomas Aquinas, 335-39; Daniel A. Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and
Divinization in Thomas Aquinas," in Thomas Weinandy, Daniel Keating, and John Yocum,
eds., Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical Introduction (London: T. & T. Clark, 2004), 139-58.
5 Available on the Vatican web site (www.vatican.va) under the Pontifical Council for
Promoting Christian Unity.
6 See especially N. T. Wright, Paul: Fresh Perspectives (London: SPCK, 2005); also N. T.
Wright, The New Testament and the People of God (London: SPCK, 1992); Ben Witherington
III, The Paul Quest: The Renewed Search for the Jew of Tarsus (Downers Grove, Ill.:
InterVarsity, 1998), 230-62.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

47

perspective on Paul" has recently found a counterpart in what
might be described as the "new perspective on Aquinas. " 7 I hope
to demonstrate that Aquinas's teaching on justification is likewise
grounded in a theology of salvation history according to which
Christ is presented as the fulfillment of Torah and Wisdom.
I. SIN AS DISORDER

Defining original justice, Aquinas writes that
this rectitude consisted in his [Adam's] reason being subject to God, the lower
powers to reason, and the body to the soul; and the first subjection was the cause
of both the second and the third; since while reason was subject to God, the
lower powers remained subject to reason. 8

For Aquinas, the antithesis of justice is sin. Justification, indeed,
is a movement away from sin and towards justice,9 and the
rectitude of order in which justification consists presupposes a
reordering of that which has become disordered. Aquinas explains
that "sin denotes an inordinate act, even as an act of virtue is an
ordinate and due act," while "the vice of a thing seems to consist
in its not being disposed in a way befitting its nature," which is
another way of saying that it represents a "disordered" condition.10 Likewise, human actions are elicited by the will and "a
human act is evil through lacking conformity with its due
The term "new perspective on Paul," which describes an approach to reading Paul in the
light of Jewish history and theology (of which Jesus of Nazareth is, according to Paul, the
fulfillment) rather than in the light of Reformation debates, was coined by James D. G. Dunn
in "The New Perspective on Paul," Bulletin of the John Rylands Library 65 (1983): 94-122.
Major figures associated with the "new perspective" include E. P. Sanders, N. T. Wright,
Richard B. Hays, Ben Witherington III, and Dunn himself. Matthew Levering has recently
proposed what might be termed "a new perspective on Aquinas," according to which Aquinas,
like the Paul described by the new perspectivists, is portrayed as viewing incarnation,
redemption, and the sacraments in terms of the fulfilment of such Old Testament motifs as
Torah and Temple. See Matthew Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple:
Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, IND.: University of Notre Dame Press,
2002).
8 STh I, q. 95, a. 1.
9 STh I-II, q. 113, a. 1.
10 STh I-II, q. 71, a. 1.
7

J. MARK ARMITAGE

48

measure" which in turn depends on a "rule." The two rules of the
human will are human reason and the eternal law "which is God's
reason, so to speak," with the result that sinful actions are those
which do not conform with the twofold rule of human and divine
reason. 11
The inordinate reason itself is the primary cause of sin
first, in so far as it errs in the knowledge of truth, which error is imputed to the
reason as a sin, when it is in ignorance or error about what it is able and ought
to know; secondly, when it either commands the inordinate movements of the
lower powers, or deliberately fails to check them. 12

The will is moved in accord with reason, but the will and reason
may be thrown off kilter either by some disorder within
themselves or by the sensitive appetites in such a way that they
falsely apprehend their good and fail to measure up to the rule of
reason and of the eternal law. 13 When this occurs the consequence
is a lack of order between the body (mediating the sensitive
appetites) and the reason and between the reason and the eternal
law ("God's reason"). This is the precise opposite of the rectitudo
ordinis at which justification aims.
Original sin "is an inordinate disposition, arising from the
destruction of the harmony which was essential to original justice,
even as bodily sickness is an inordinate disposition of the body, by
reason of the destruction of that equilibrium which is essential to
health." 14 Actual sin is "an inordinateness of an act," whereas
original sin is "an inordinate disposition of nature," and, unlike
actual sin, is "a kind of habit. " 15 It destroys original justice and
diminishes the natural inclination to virtue. 16 Aquinas explains
that

11 STh I-II, q. 71, a. 6.
12 STh I-II, q. 74, a. 5.
13 STh I-II, q. 75, a. 2.
14 STh I-II, q. 82, a. 1.
15

Ibid., ad 2.

16 STh I-II, q. 85, a. 2.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

49

As a result of original justice, the reason had perfect hold over the lower parts
of the soul, while reason itself was perfected by God, and was subject to him.
Now this same original justice was forfeited through the sin of our first parent
... so that all the powers of the soul are left, as it were, destitute of their proper
order, whereby they are naturally directed to virtue; which destitution is called
a wounding of nature. 17

In consequence of this the reason, the will and the irascible and
concupiscible powers of the soul (the subjects of fortitude and
temperance respectively) become disordered:
in so far as the reason is deprived of its order to the true, there is the wound of
ignorance; in so far as the will is deprived of its order of good, there is the
wound of malice; in so far as the irascible is deprived of its order to the arduous,
there is the wound of weakness; and in so far as the concupiscible is deprived of
its order to the delectable, moderated by reason, there is the wound of
concupiscence. 18

Original sin, accordingly, introduces disorder-an inordinate
disposition-at every level of the soul, undermining the body's
proper subordination to the soul and the soul's proper
subordination to God.
II. DESIRE AND DISORDER

This "inordinateness" is what Aquinas understands by
"concupiscence." At one level, inordinateness is caused by the loss
of original justice:
Now the whole order of original justice consists in a human's will being subject
to God. This subjection, first and chiefly, was in the will, whose function it is to
move all the other parts to the end ... so that the will being turned away from
God, all the other powers of the soul become inordinate. 19

At another level, however, the "material element" in original sin
is that inordinateness which Aquinas equates with concupiscence:
STh I-II, q. 85, a. 3.
the irascible and concupiscible powers of the soul and their proper relation to
reason, see STh I, q. 81, aa. 2-3.
19 STh I-II, q. 82, a. 3.
17

18 On

J. MARK ARMITAGE

50

Accordingly the privation of original justice, whereby the will was made subject
to God, is the formal element in original sin; while every other disorder of the
soul's powers, is a kind of material element in respect of original sin. Now the
inordinateness of the other powers of the soul consists chiefly in their turning
inordinately to mutable good; which inordinateness may be called by the general
name of concupiscence.

Aquinas notes that "the concupiscible power is naturally governed
by reason" and that "the act of concupiscence is so far natural to
humans, as it is in accord with the order of reason." However, "in
so far as it trespasses beyond the bounds of reason, it is, for
humans, contrary to reason," and it is in that that the
concupiscence of original sin consists. 20 Moreover, "as in good
things, the intellect and reason stand first, so conversely in evil
things, the lower part of the soul is found to take precedence, for
it clouds and draws the reason. " 21 The inordinate reason may be
the primary cause of sin, but the loss of subjection of reason to
God is mirrored within the soul itself in the inordinateness which
sees concupiscence and the lower part of the soul seize the
hegemony from intellect and reason; Aquinas notes that "the
appetitive faculty obeys the reason, not blindly, but with a certain
power of opposition," with the result that "the habits or passions
of the appetitive faculty cause the use of reason to be impeded. " 22
The inordinateness in which original sin consists derives from
pride. Pride (superbia) is the desire to overstep above (supra) what
one really is, and consequently is opposed to "right reason,"
which "requires that every man's will should tend to that which
is proportionate to him. " 23 Instead, "pride makes a man despise
the divine law whieh hinders him from sinning. " 24 Aquinas
explains that "the first inordinateness of the human appetite
resulted from his [Adam's] coveting inordinately some spiritual
good" which "he would not have coveted inordinately if he had
desired it according to his measure as established by the divine
20

lbid.,ad 1.

21 Ibid., ad 3. See STh I-II,

STh I-II, q. 58, a. 2 .
23 STh 11-11, q. 162, a. 1.
24 STh 11-11, q. 162, a. 2.

22

q. 77, aa. 1-2; STh I-II, q. 80, a. 2.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

51

rule." 25 In particular, Adam (like the devil) "coveted somewhat to
be equal to God, in so far as each wished to rely on himself in
contempt of the order of the divine rule." 26 Pride, accordingly,
constitutes an inordinateness within the soul which goes against
the "order of reason," rejects the "divine rule," and so disrupts
the subordination of the body to the lower parts of the soul, of
the lower parts of the soul to the intellect and reason, and of the
intellect and reason to God.
We may note in passing that this coveting of equality with God
represents a disordering both of the vocation to exercise genuine
freedom and of the vocation to exist in the imago Dei. Rudi te
Velde argues that Aquinas understands the disorder that follows
from the loss of original justice as depriving the human self of its
basic freedom. Reduced to a state of disorder and disharmony,
human beings are unable to realize that freedom which is intrinsic
to what it means to be truly human. 27 In particular, because of the
disorder it introduces into the human soul, Adam's prideful
coveting of equality with God deprives human reason of its
freedom to obey the eternal law. At the same time, the coveting
of equality represents a disordering of humanity's creation in the
image of God. 28 Joseph P. Wawrykow accordingly discerns a
number of resonances and structural similarities between
Aquinas's teaching on original justice and his teaching on the
imago Dei, 29 while Romanus Cessario speaks of the "prerogative
of image-perfection in the state of original justice," and goes on
STh II-II, q. 163, a. 1.
11-11, q. 163, a. 2.
27 Rudi A. te Velde, "Evil, Sin, and Death: Thomas Aquinas on Original Sin," in Rik Van
Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame,
Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 143-66, at 157-59.
28 STh I, a. 93, a. 1: "it is manifest that in humans there is some likeness to God, copied
from God as from an exemplar; yet this likeness is not one of equality, for such an exemplar
infinitely excels its copy."
29 Joseph P. Wawrykow, The SCM Press A-Z of Thomas Aquinas (London: SCM Press,
2005), 101. On the imago Dei according to Aquinas, see especially D. Juvenal Merriell, C.O.,
To the Image of the Trinity: A Study of the Development of Aquinas' Teaching (Toronto:
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1990); A. N. Williams, The Ground of Union:
Deification in Aquinas and Palamas (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 68-72.
25

26 STh

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J. MARK ARMITAGE

to present sin in terms of the loss of the divine image. 30 While it
is beyond the scope of this study to explore in detail the equation
between disorder and the loss of authentic human freedom and of
the imago Dei, it is important to bear in mind the full range of
ideas implied by concepts such as ordo and iustitia.
Ill. LAW AND ORDER

We have seen that reason is central to the idea of rectitudo
ordinis, inasmuch as right order consists in the due subjection of
the sensitive part of humans (the flesh and the sensitive appetites
of the soul) to the reason and of the reason to God. For Aquinas,
law is likewise intimately bound up with reason, 31 and has to do
with God's rational ordering of the universe. 32 Natural law is a
participation in the divine law, whereby the eternal law is
imprinted on rational creatures, 33 and natural law, human law,
and divine law (Old Law and New Law) are all determinations of
eternal law by which eternal law is manifested and reflected
within the order of creation. The function of divine law is to
order humanity towards its supernatural end: "since man is
ordained to an end of eternal happiness which is disproportionate
to man's natural faculty ... it was necessary that, besides the
natural and the human law, man should be directed to his end by
a law given by God. " 34 In rational creatures, accordingly, rectitudo
ordinis denotes a natural ordo which is in accord with natural law
and a supernatural ordo which is in accord with divine law, each
of which is a determination of eternal law.
Aquinas is keen to underline the identification of eternal law
with divine reason (ratio) and Wisdom. He explains that "the
ratio of divine Wisdom, as moving all things to their due end,
bears the character of law. Accordingly the eternal law is nothing
30 Romanus Cessario, O.P., The Godly Image: Christ and Salvation in Catholic Theology
from Anselm to Aquinas (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications, 1990), 185.
31 STh I-II, q. 90, a. 1.
32 STh I-II, q. 91, a. 1.
33 STh I-II, q. 91, a. 2.
34 STh I-II, q. 91, a. 4.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

53

else than the ratio of divine Wisdom, as directing all actions and
movements. " 35 If eternal law is the ratio of divine Wisdom, it
follows that all law participates to some degree in that ratio.
Where Sirach equates Torah with divine Wisdom, Aquinas
equates the eternal law in which Torah participates with divine
Wisdom. 36 Aquinas also identifies eternal law with the person of
the Son. 37 Accordingly, eternal law= divine Wisdom= the Word
= the Son. As will become clear, inasmuch as Christ is divine, he
is the divine Wisdom to whom human reason is properly
subordinated, while, inasmuch as he is human, his flesh and the
lower parts of his soul are duly ordered to reason, and his reason
is duly subjected to the divine Wisdom. 38 As incarnate Wisdom,
Christ is just, well-ordered and rational-in the sense that his
human reason is subordinated to the ratio of the divine Wisdom
which he himself incarnates. 39
The problem with Torah-the Old Law-is that, although it
participates in eternal law and hence in the ratio of the divine
Wisdom, it is radically incapable either of reordering what has
been disordered by sin or of ordering the rational creature
towards beatitude. 40 The Old Law was good because it was "in
accordance with reason" - "it repressed concupiscence which is in
35 STh I-II, q. 93, a. 1. Jean Porter rightly emphasizes the equation of eternal law with
divine Wisdom: "Right Reason and the Love of God: The Parameters of Aquinas' Moral
Theology," in van Niewenhove and Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of Thomas Aquinas, l 6791, at 180-86.
36 On Sirach, see Ben Witl1erington III, Jesus the Sage: The Pilgrimage of Wisdom
(Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 2000), 85-86. Torah is a concretization or incarnation of
Wisdom but does not exhaust it. God's Wisdom takes particular location in Zion in the Book
of the Covenant.
37 STh I-II, q. 93, a. 1, ad 2.
38 On the important question of Wisdom Christology, see Levering, Christ's Fulfillment
of Torah and Temple, 31-50; Joseph P. Wawrykow, "Wisdom in the Christology of Thomas
Aquinas,'' in Kent Emery, Jr., and Joseph P. Wawrykow, eds., Christ among the Medieval
Dominicans (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1999), 175-96. On the
biblical background to Wisdom Christology, see Witherington, Jesus the Sage.
39 See, for example, STh III, q. 46, a. 9: "Christ's passion was subject to his will. But his
will was ruled by the divine wisdom which 'orders all things' conveniently and 'sweetly'
(Wisdom 8:1)."
4 For an excellent account of the Old Law, see Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and
Temple: Salvation according to Thomas Aquinas, 21-30.

°

]. MARK ARMITAGE

54

conflict with reason" and "forbade all kinds of sin; and these too
are contrary to reason" -but "the end of the divine law is to bring
humans to that end which is everlasting happiness," and "this
cannot be done save by the grace of the Holy Spirit, whereby
"charity, which fulfills the law ... is spread abroad in our hearts"
(Romans 5 :5). "41 This outpouring of the grace of the Spirit is
reserved to Christ, for which reason one function of the Old Law
is to ordain humans to Christ. 42 Another function was to
overcome pride-the root of original sin:
after man had been instructed by the Law, his pride was convinced of his
weakness, through his being unable to fulfill what he knew. Hence, as the
Apostle concludes (Romans 8:3-4) "what the Law could not do in that it was
weak through the flesh, God sent his own Son to do ... that the justification of
the Law might be fulfilled in us. "43

In the light of original sin, pride abounds and reason is disordered. The Old Law does not solve the problem of disordered
reason but brings it into focus, preparing for the justification that
will be accomplished by Christ. Torah reveals the disorder that
has been introduced into the rational creature by sin, but is unable
to reorder what has been disordered, and unable to subordinate
flesh to reason and reason to God.
IV. SPIRlT AND FREEDOM

That work of reordering is accomplished by the grace of the
Spirit in which the New Law primarily consists. Aquinas explains
that "that which is preponderant in the law of the New
Testament, and on which all its efficacy is based, is the grace of
the Holy Spirit, which is given through faith in Christ.
Consequently the New Law is chiefly the grace itself of the Holy
Spirit, which is given to those who believe in Christ," 44 and
inasmuch as it consists in "the grace of the Holy Spirit bestowed
41
42

STh I-II, q. 98, a. 1.
STh I-II, q. 98, a. 2.
q. 98, a. 6.
I-II, q. 106, a. 1.

43 STh I-II,
44 STh

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

55

inwardly" the New Law justifies. 45 Both Old Law and New Law
have the same end, "namely, the subjection of humans to God,"
but the Old Law works towards this end "like a pedagogue of
children," whereas "the New Law is the law of perfection, since
it is the law of charity." 46 The Old Law encouraged people to live
justly in accordance with right reason by inducing fear of
punishment, whereas the New Law, "which derives its preeminence from the spiritual grace instilled into our hearts,"
inclines them "to do virtuous deeds through love of virtue, not on
account of some extrinsic punishment or reward" by the grace of
the Spirit and by offering spiritual and eternal promises "which
are objects of the virtues, chiefly of charity" in such a way that
they "are inclined of themselves to those objects, not as to
something foreign but as to something of their own. "47
The New Law, in short, orders us towards subjection to God
not out of fear on the basis of legislation but spontaneously and
out of virtue on the basis of Spirit-infused charity. Human beings
are now truly free:
the children of God are led by the Holy Spirit, not as bondsmen, but as free.
They are free, who are a cause unto themselves; and we do that freely which we
do of ourselves, that is, of our own willing; but what we do against our will, we
do, not freely, but after the manner of bondsmen. The Holy Spirit then,
rendering us lovers of God, inclines us to act of our own will, freely, out of love,
not as bondsmen prompted by fear. 48

Jean-Pierre Torrell accordingly attributes to the Spirit the gifts of
freedom and "instinct. "49 This is significant, because one of the
consequences of that loss of ordo that follows from original sin is
the loss of a spontaneous (or instinctive) obedience of the lower
part of the soul to the reason and of the reason to God. The Old
Law does not solve this problem. There is nothing free about
I-II, q. 106, a. 2.
I-II, q. 107, a. 1.
47 Ibid., ad 2.
48 ScG IV, c. 22.
49 Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 2, Spiritual Master, trans. Robert
Royal (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2003), 201-11.
45 STh

46 STh

J. MARK ARMITAGE

56

obeying laws out of fear of punishment, and nothing spontaneous
and instinctive about trying to reorder the soul through
compliance with legislation. The problem is solved only by the
outpouring of the Spirit, 50 who restores us to the imago Dei by
moving us to obey God out of spontaneous love. 51 This
understanding of the grace of the Spirit in terms of freedom and
spontaneity sheds light on what Aquinas means by rectitudo
ordinis. Rectitude of order comprises freedom from disorder and
freedom from the Old Law which is a temporary and contingent
mechanism for dealing with disorder, and brings with it the
spontaneity and instinctiveness which are the corollary of right
order between flesh, reason, and God. 52
Aquinas explains that "the New Law fulfils the Old by
supplying that which was lacking in the Old Law. "53 More
specifically,
the end of every law is to make men righteous and virtuous ... and consequently
the end of the Old Law was the justification of men. The Law, however, could
not accomplish this, but foreshadowed it by certain ceremonial actions, and
promised it in words. And in this respect, the New Law fulfils the Old by
justifying men through the power of Christ's passion. 54

The nonjustifying Old Law is related to the justifying New as
shadow to reality: "it is written (Colossians 2: 17) concerning the
ceremonial precepts that they were 'a shadow of things to come,
but the body is of Christ'; in other words, the reality is found in
Christ. Wherefore the New Law is called the law of reality;
whereas the Old Law is called the law of shadow or of figure."
50

See Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and Divinization," 148-51.

51 See Michael Dauphinais, "Loving the Lord Your God: The imago Dei in Saint Thomas

Aquinas," The Thomist 63 (1999): 241-67. Dauphinais makes the important connection
between image-restoration and the fact that the New Law enables us to do God's will out of
love rather than out of fear.
52 On "spontaneity" and the New Law, see Pedro Rodriguez, "Spontaneite et caractere
legal de la loi nouvelle," in Lex et Libertas, Studi Tomistici 30, ed. Leo Elders and K. Hedwig
(Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1987), 254-64.
53 STh I-II, q. 107, a. 2.
54 This power is applied by means of the sacraments (STh III, q. 62, a. 1). The sacraments
of the Old Law, unlike those of the New, do not possess the power to justify and to confer
grace (STh I-II, q. 103, a. 2; III, q. 62, a. 6).

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

57

Aquinas notes that "Christ fulfilled the precepts of the Old Law
both in his works and in his doctrine," where "fulfilled" means
not so much "observed" as "perfected," "completed," "consummated." In Christ the shadow (which merely prefigures
justification and ordinateness) yields to the reality (which contains
them) "that the justification of the law might be fulfilled in
us"-that is, that the ordinateness that Torah foreshadowed might
be manifested in Christ and hence in us as a reality. Matthew
Levering has argued convincingly that "at the heart of Thomas
Aquinas's scientific theology of salvation lies the narrative of
Scripture-the fulfillment of Israel's Torah and Temple through
the New Covenant of Christ Jesus, "55 and, as we shall see, Christ's
own rectitudo ordinis finds expression in his own fulfillment of
the Old Law.56

V. CHRIST AND THE ORDER OF GRACE
Aquinas addresses in detail the question of Christ's habitual
grace because it is important to him to emphasize that Christ is a
real and complete human being to whose rectitudo ordinis we can
be configured. 57 According to Aquinas the Spirit dwells in Christ
by habitual grace, 58 and habitual grace is in Christ in such a way
that he stands nearest to the inflowing grace of God, attains most
closely to God by that knowledge and love to which human
nature is raised by God, and as mediator between God and human
beings is filled with grace which overflows on others. 59 As God he
is essentially divine, but as human he is divine by participation
through grace. 60 Aquinas notes that
Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple, 3.
Christ's fulfillment of the Law is made possible by his own fullness of grace; see'ibid.,
93-94, 120. It is impossible without grace for a human being (even Christ) to fulfill the
commandments of the Law (STh I-II, q. 109, a. 4).
57 Paul Goudreau, "The Humanity of Christ, the Incarnate Word" in The Theology of
Thomas Aquinas, 252-276.
58 STh III, q. 7, a. 1, sc.
59 STh III, q. 7, a. 1.
60 Ibid., ad 1. Aquinas sees grace as a participation in the divine nature (e.g. STh I-II, q.
110, a. 4). On this theme see Williams, The Ground of Union, 82-89; Keating, "Justification,
Sanctification and Divinization," 151-55. For an overview of this debate, see Fergus Kerr,
55

56

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J. MARK ARMITAGE

The humanity of Christ is the instrument of the Godhead-not, indeed, an
inanimate instrument, which nowise acts, but is merely acted upon; but an
instrument animated by a rational soul, which is so acted upon as to act. And
hence the nature of the action demanded that he should have habitual grace. 61

Christ's mediatorial and instrumental role does not mean that
grace simply flows through him as a passive instrument; rather,
his rational soul acts in addition to being acted upon. The "grace
of Christ" is not just grace that Christ receives and that dwells
within him but something that he shapes by his own actions so
that it truly is the "grace of Christ" -that is, grace that Christ has
not only received but made Christ-formed by the graced acts of
his human soul, and in particular of his reason and will and
intellect.
Christ is said to possess the "fullness of grace" in terms of both
the fullness that he receives and the fullness that he pours out. 62
He possesses the virtues, 63 though he does not possess faith, being
a comprehensor to whom the beatific vision belongs from the
outset as well as a viator, 64 and the gifts of the Spirit. 65
Significantly, he lacks the "fomes" of sin which in other humans
results in inordinateness:
Christ had grace and all the virtues most perfectly. Now moral virtues, which are
in the irrational part of the soul, make it subject to reason, and so much the more
as the virtue is more perfect. Thus, temperance controls the concupiscible
appetite, fortitude and meekness the irascible appetite .... But there belongs to
the very nature of the "fomes" of sin an inclination of the sensual appetite to
what is contrary to reason. And hence it is plain that the more perfect the virtues
are in anyone, the weaker the "fomes" of sin becomes in him. Hence, since in
Christ the virtues were in their highest degree, the "fomes" of sin was nowise in
him. 66

O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002), 149-61.
61 STh III, a. 7, a. 1, ad 3.
62 STh III, q. 7, a. 9.
63 STh III, q. 7, a. 2.
64 STh III, q. 7, a. 3; III, q. 9, a. 2; III, q. 15, a. 10.
65 STh III, q. 7, a. 5.
66 STh III, q. 15, a. 2.

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59

Christ is a complete human being who possesses grace in all its
human fullness in a way in which other humans possess it, except
in so far as he possesses it so fully and perfectly that his humanity
is entirely without inordinateness, and already enjoys the final
outcome of grace, which is beatitude. 67
Christ's habitual grace is the grace to whose fullness human
beings gain access by means of membership of the mystical body.
Aquinas explains that "Christ is called the head of the church" in
virtue of his nearness to God (and thus the preeminence of his
grace), his perfection and fullness of all graces, and his "power of
bestowing grace on all the members of the church. " 68 We are,
accordingly, conformed with, perfected by and filled with Christ's
own habitual grace-that habitual grace of which Christ is not a
passive instrument but an active mediator. Jean-Pierre Torrell
emphasizes the centrality for Aquinas of the idea of conformitas
and configuratio with Christ. 69 The imitatio Christi is fundamental
to the sharing of the Christian in the divinizing grace of the Spirit,
and this "imitation" of Christ the exemplar of perfect humanity
necessarily involves a configuration with his rectitudo ordinis. 70
Finally, it is through the imitation of Christ that the believer
participates in the divine nature by way of likeness, and is
assimilated to the imago Dei through conformity with the one in
whom the image is restored. 71
Aquinas adds that "the personal grace, whereby the soul of
Christ is justified, is essentially the same as his grace, as he is the
head of the church, and justifies others." 72 That is to say, the grace
67 Hence he possesses beatific knowledge rather than faith. On Christ's knowledge, see the
excellent survey in Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple, 31-33, 161-63. Of the
extensive literature cited there, see especially Romaus Cessario, O.P., "Incarnate Wisdom and
the Immediacy of Christ's Salvific Knowledge," in Problemi teologici a/la luce dell' Aquinate,
Studi Tomistici 44 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1991), 334-40.
68 STh III, q. 8, a. 1.
69 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2:140-45.
70 On the imitatio Christi, see Goudreau, "The Humanity of Christ, the Incarnate Word,"
260-62.
71 Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 2: 112-16. Torrell speaks of "imitating God by imitating
Christ."
72 STh III, q. 8, a. 5. "Christ's person ... constitutes a recapitulation of the entire story and
process of human sanctification" (Williams, The Ground of Union, 159).

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]. MARK ARMITAGE

in virtue of which Christ enjoys that rectitude of order-that
proper order of body to soul and soul to God-in which justification consists is also the grace (understood as participation in
the divine nature by way of likeness) that he communicates to
members of his mystical body so that they too might be justified.
What we participate in as members of the mystical body is
nothing other than Christ's own justification-his ordinatio, his
rectitudo ordinis. To be "in Christ" is to participate in his personal
habitual grace (which belongs to him as to his human nature and
which is itself a participation in the divine nature) and to be
justified in conformity with his justification. Daniel Keating
observes that "Aquinas understands justification in rather broad
terms as encompassing various aspects of the New Testament's
depiction of our incorporation into Christ. ,m To use the language
current in English-speaking Pauline scholarship, for Aquinas
justification is a participatory rather than a juridical category. 74

VI. CHRIST'S RECTITUDE OF ORDER
Central to an understanding of Christ's justification is
Aquinas's treatment of the two wills in Christ. 75 Following the
sixth ecumenical council (Constantinople III), he affirms that
"there are two wills in Christ, i.e. one human, the other divine." 76
Christ's human will encompasses both the natural or sensitive and
the rational:
it must be allowed that in Christ there was a sensual appetite, or sensuality. But
it must be borne in mind that sensuality or the sensual appetite, inasmuch as it
naturally obeys reason, is said to be "rational by participation" .... And because
Keating, "Justification, Sanctification and Divinization," 144.
Traditional Lutheran interpretations of justification emphasize the forensic and juridical
dimension. For E. P. Sanders and others the Pauline language of justification is another way
of talking about being "in Christ," and hence is "participatory." See E. P. Sanders, Paul and
Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (London: SCM Press, 1977), 502-8.
For a good overview, see Veronica Koperski, What Are They Saying about Paul and the Law?
(New York: Paulist Press, 2001).
75 Gondreau, "The Humanity of Christ, the Incarnate Word," 266.
76 STh III, q. 18, a. 1.
73

74

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

61

"the will is in the reason," as stated above, it may equally be said that the
sensuality is "a will by participation." 77

From what was said above it is clear that any inordinateness
between the sensitive will and the rational will result in a radical
disordering of the entire person. In Christ, however, what we see
is "a certain rectitude of order" in which "what is highest in
humans is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are
subject to the superior." In Christ, and in Christ alone, the reason
really does obey the divine will, and the sensual appetite really
does obey the rational will.
Aquinas explains that Christ "allowed all the powers of his soul
to do what belonged to them," and adds that "it is clear that the
will of sensuality naturally shrinks from sensible pains and bodily
hurt." Accordingly,
it was the will of God that Christ should undergo pain, suffering, and death, not
that these of themselves were willed by God, but for the sake of nan's salvation.
Hence it is plain that in his will of sensuality and in his rational will considered
as nature Christ could will what God did not; but in his will as reason he always
willed the same as God, which appears from what he says (Matthew 26:39) "not
as I will, but as you will. " 78

Aquinas concludes:
although the natural and the sensitive will in Christ wished what the divine will
did not wish, yet there was no contrariety of wills in him. First, because neither
the natural will nor the will of sensuality rejected the reason for which the divine
will and the will of the human reason in Christ wished the passion .... Secondly,
because neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ was impeded or
retarded by the natural will or the appetite of sensuality. So, too, on the other
hand, neither the divine will nor the will of reason in Christ shrank from or
retarded the movement of the natural human will and the movement of the
sensuality in Christ. For it pleased Christ, in his divine will, and in his will of
reason, that his natural will and will of sensuality should be moved according to
the order of their nature. Hence it is clear that in Christ there was no opposition
or contrariety of wills. 79
77 STh III, q. 18, a. 2. On the human

STh III, q. 18, a. 5.
79 STh III, q. 18, a. 6.
78

will, see STh I, q. 82.

J. MARK ARMITAGE

62

Aquinas presents Christ as one in whom the sensitive or natural
will is properly ordered to the rational will, and in whom the
rational will is properly ordered to the divine will (which, in
virtue of the incarnation, is his own). The harmony between the
two parts of the will and between the human and divine wills is
perfect. In consequence, Christ enjoys perfect freedom, including
the exercise of free will. 80 There is no inordinateness in Christ;
rather, there is order, freedom, and spontaneity. In fine, Christ is
the one in whom original justice is restored, and in whom the
work of justification is already realized.
VII. CHRIST'S WORK OF REORDERING

The implications for human redemption of Aquinas's two-wills
Christology are worked out in his discussion of the passion, where
he affirms that "it was befitting that Christ should suffer out of
obedience. " 81 The primary reason for this is "because it was in
keeping with human justification, that 'as by the disobedience of
one human, many were made sinners, so also by the obedience of
one, many shall be made just', as is written (Romans 5: 19)."
Accordingly, Christ suffers out of obedience in order to justify
human beings. Secondly, "it was suitable for reconciling man with
God: hence it is written
5: 10): 'We are reconciled to
God by the death of his Son,' in so far as Christ's death was a
most acceptable sacrifice to God .... Now obedience is preferred
to all sacrifices.... Therefore it was fitting that the sacrifice of
Christ's passion and death should proceed from obedience."
Finally, "it was in keeping with his victory whereby he triumphed
over death and its author; because a soldier cannot conquer unless
he obeys his captain. And so the human being Christ secured the
victory through being obedient to God." All of this presupposes
a dyothelite Christology, without which the idea of Christ's
obedience would be meaningless.

80 On Christ's free will, see STh III, q. 18, a. 4. On free will in general, see STh I, q. 83.

81 STh III, q. 47, a. 2.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

63

Aquinas is at pains to emphasize that Christ's obedience does
not in any way contradict his freedom of will, but rather reflects
the complete conformity (or ordinateness) of his natural will with
his rational will and of his rational will with his divine will:
Although obedience implies necessity with regard to the thing commanded,
nevertheless it implies free-will with regard to the fulfilling of the precept. And,
indeed, such was Christ's obedience, for, although his passion and death,
considered in themselves, were repugnant to the natural will, yet Christ resolved
to fulfill God's will with respect to the same, according to Psalm 39:9: "I have
desired to do your will, 0 God." Hence he said (Matthew 26:42): "If this chalice
may not pass away, but I must drink it, your will be done." 82

Here Aquinas portrays Christ bringing his natural or sensitive will
into line with his rational will and his divine will in order to fulfill
the will of the Father. The passion thus marks the point at which
Christ's own justification (his rectitudo ordinis), already perfect,
attains its ultimate destiny in obedience through suffering. 83
"Christ received a command from the Father to suffer," 84 and, in
Christ's suffering, obedience and charity come together: "Christ
suffered out of charity and out of obedience because he fulfilled
even the precepts of charity out of obedience only; and was
obedient, out of love, to the Father's command." 85 This
convergence of suffering, obedience, and charity reflects the
perfect rectitudo ordinis that exists within Christ-the
ordinateness between his natural will and his rational will and his
rational will and his divine will.
Christ's loving obedience is specifically that of the New Law,
which is a law of charity rather than of fear, and which brings
humans to fulfill God's will freely and spontaneously and lovingly
Ibid., ad 2.
We might also mention the emphasis on humility that emerges in Aquinas's commentary
on Philippians-a humility that reverses the pride that lies at the heart of original sin. See
Francesca Aran Murphy, "Thomas' Commentaries on Philemon, 1 and 2 Thessalonians and
Philippians," in Thomas G. Weinandy, Daniel A. Keating, and John P. Yocum, eds., Aquinas
on Scripture: An Introduction to His Biblical Commentaries (London: T. & T. Clark, 2005),
167-96, at 177-78.
84 STh III, q. 47, a. 2, ad 1.
85 STh III, q. 47, a. 2, ad 3.
82
83

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J. MARK ARMITAGE

by the grace of the Spirit. 86 Thus Romanus Cessario writes that
"The charity of Christ, 'obedient because of his love for the
Father', inaugurates the new covenant of love. " 87 Aquinas explains
that "because the 0 ld Law was ended by Christ's death, according
to his dying words, 'it is consummated' (John 19:30), it may be
understood that by his suffering he fulfilled all the precepts of the
Old Law." 88 In particular, by his obedient suffering the rightordered Jesus accomplishes what the Old Law could not bring
about and fulfills the moral, ceremonial, and judicial precepts. 89
The convergence in Christ of obedience and charity together with
his fulfillment of the precepts of the Old Law effects the
consummation of the Old Law and the transition to the New Law.
Since all of this is rooted in Christ's own personal
justification-his due order of flesh, natural will, rational will, and
divine will-it makes possible the justification of all by
participatio and imitatio through the grace of the Spirit.
Aquinas further underlines the connection between Christ's
personal justification (the corollary of an authentic two-wills
Christology) and the work of atonement when he writes
Christ's passion, according as it is compared with his Godhead, operates in an
efficient manner; but in so far as it is compared with the will of Christ's soul it
acts in a meritorious manner; considered as being within Christ's very flesh, it
acts by way of satisfaction, inasmuch as we are liberated by it from the debt of
punishment; while inasmuch as we are freed from the servitude of guilt, it acts
by way of redemption; but in so far as we are reconciled with God it acts by way
of sacrifice. 90

Here atonement is presented from the threefold perspective of
Christ's grace-causing divinity, his meritorious will, and his
satisfactory, sacrificial, and redemptive body. Each of the elements
86 On the way in which Christ's passion fulfills the Old Law through obedience and
charity, see Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple, 53-54.
87 Romanus Cessario, O.P., "Aquinas on Christian Salvation," in Weinandy, Keating, and
Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Doctrine, 117-37, at 125.
88 STh III, q. 47, a. 2, ad 1.
89 On Christ's fufillment of the moral, ceremonial and judicial precepts of the Old Law,
see Levering, Christ's Fulfillment of Torah and Temple, 54-66.
90 STh III, q. 48, a. 6, ad 3.

JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION

65

in whose ordo to each other his justification consists exercises a
salvific function precisely in so far at it is aligned with the others
and acts in perfect cooperation and coordination with the others.
Sin, we have seen, is basically a withdrawal from order, with the
result that salvation consists in the restoration of that divine order
in which the human will is ordered towards its ultimate and
supernatural end, 91 with the qualification that in this present life
the "lower parts"-the flesh and the lower powers of the
soul-remain rebellious towards the justified reason. 92 For
Aquinas, this restoration of divine order is accomplished through
loving obedience by the justified, ordinate, right-reasoned
Christ-the Christ whose rectitudo ordinis is the ground of all
justification, and to whom we are conformed sacramentally by the
justifying and reordering grace of the Spirit. 93

VIII. JESUS AND JUSTIFICATION
In Christ's passion the definition of justice as "a certain
rectitude of order in the interior disposition of a human being, in
so far as what is highest in humans is subject to God, and the
inferior powers of the soul are subject to the superior" is lived out
in his loving obedience to his Father through suffering and in his
fulfillment of the precepts of the Old Law. In addition, through
the medium of the mystical body and of the sacraments of the
Church, Christ's own personal habitual grace in virtue of which
he himself attains this rectitudo ordinis is poured out on believers
who, by the grace of the Spirit, are set free from inordinateness

91 See Rik Van Nieuwenhove, '"Bearing the Marks of Christ's Passion': Aquinas'
Soteriology," in van Nieuwenhove and Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,
277-302, at 282-84.
92 STh I-II, q. 109, a. 9. See Joseph P. Wawrykow, God's Grace and Human Action: 'Merit'
in the Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press,
1995), 130-31.
93 Inasmuch as he is the Word and Wisdom of God, Christ restores us to the imago Dei
both by defeating sin though his passion and resurrection and by teaching us and empowering
us (sacramentally) to live the life of grace inaugurated by the New Law. See Wawrykow, The
SCM Press A-Z of Thomas Aquinas, 100.

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J. MARK ARMITAGE

and assimilated to the imitatio Christi and imago Dei. 94 Christ,
who stands in perfect rectitudo ordinis thanks to the indwelling
grace of the Spirit, effects the reordering of the universe by
fulfilling the Old Law (which is itself a determination of eternal
law, that is, of God's reason and Wisdom, which in turn is identified with Christ's own person), 95 and by inaugurating the New
Law-the law of charity and freedom and spontaneity-through
his own loving obedience to the Father. In this way he deals with
the disorder of sin and with the inordinateness of fallen humanity,
creating in his mystical body a locus in which the grace of the
Spirit, mediated through the sacraments, can communicate to the
faithful conformity with the ordo of Christ's personal justification,
which brings with it the true freedom and spontaneity of life in
the Spirit and the image-perfection of life in the imago Dei.

94 The Spirit of freedom and spontaneity is poured out through the sacraments. On the
pneumatological dimension of Aquinas's sacramental theology, see Liam G. Walsh, O.P.,
"Sacraments," in van Nieuwenhove and Wawrykow, eds., The Theology of Thomas Aquinas,
326-64, at 331.
95 Discussing the "incarnational 'is'," Thomas Weinandy "Aquinas: God IS Man: The
Marvel of the Incarnation," Aquinas on Doctrine, 67-89, at 83, writes that "Jesus is the Son
of God existing as man." We might also say that Jesus is the Wisdom and reason of God
existing as a perfectly justified human being in whom sensuality is ordered to reason and
reason ordered to the divine reason which he himself is.

The Thomist 72 (2008): 67-106

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF
INDIVIDUATION
STEPHEN A. HIPP
Mount St. Mary's Seminary
Emmitsburg, Maryland

A

CCORDING TO BOTH Albert the Great and Thomas
Aquinas, the problem of the person is fundamentally a
problem of individuation, since individuation-understood
as embracing incommunicability, completeness, and singularityconstitutes personhood. 1 Patristic and medieval reflection on the
Christian doctrine of the Trinity posited the special category of
relation as the formal principle of personal distinction in God. In
this article, I wish to revisit the problem of individuation as
approached by medieval Scholasticism, with special attention to
Thomas Aquinas, Duns Scotus, and Henry of Ghent. My intent is
to advance relation as a candidate, even in the context of
composite substances, for the distinctive (individualizing) aspect
of supposital perfection. 2 I shall here treat the concept of
1 Aquinas, STh I, q. 29, aa. 1-2; III, q. 2, aa. 1-2; III, q. 16, a. 12, ad 2; Quodl.

2, q. 2, a.
2; De Pot., q. 9, a. 2; III Sent., d. 5, q. 2, a. 1, ad 2; Albert the Great, I Sent., d. 23, a. 6, ad
2 (in B. Alberti Magni Ratisbonensis episcopi, ordinis Prtedicatorum, Opera omnia, ed. A.
Borgnet, 38 vols. [Paris: Vives, 1890-99], 25:599; all references to Albert, unless otherwise
noted, are taken from this edition); I Sent., d. 25, a. 1, quaest. 3-4 & ad quaest. 3-4 (Borgnet,
ed., 25:625-28); I Sent., d. 25, a. 3, ad quaest. (Borgnet, ed., 25:632); III Sent., d. 5, a. 15,
sol. (Borgnet, ed., 28:115); see Stephen A. Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition and in the
Conception of Saint Albert the Great: A Systematic Study of Its Concept as Illuminated by the
Mysteries of the Trinity and the Incarnation, Beitriige zur Philosophie und Theologie des
Mittelalters (Munster: Aschendorff, 2001), 343-49.
2 The distinction, however, is somewhat unnecessary for the purposes of this article, which
aims to identify a principle of supposital distinctiveness that can be applied to both material
and immaterial created substances.

67

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

individuality in a broad sense convertible with the notion of
numerical unity or distinctive existence, and not in the restricted
sense of signifying the multiplication of logical inferiors with
respect to a species (i.e., the division of a species into subjective
parts) and the quantitative factors ordinarily associated with that.
The so-called problem of individuation concerns the establishment of the causes and principles of individuality-consisting both
in the relation of distinction from others and indivisibility into a
multiplicity of like natures 3-in an effort to acquire scientific
knowledge of the fundamental makeup of the individual thing. An
enormous amount of literature, ancient and contemporary, is
devoted to this question, and the theories span a broad spectrum
of often incompatible metaphysical standpoints. But their
common objective was to determine which of the essential or
inhering components of a given body is responsible for its being
this individual among many. Is it the matter? the form? the
particular collection of accidents? some combination of the
foregoing? or something else again? A synthetic overview of the
historical development of the problem is not possible within these
3 There is no reason to suppose that the distinctive notion of individuality is opposed to
the unitive (nondivisible) notion, such as it has sometimes been treated (cf. the contrast made
by Jorge Gracia in his introduction to Individuation in Scholasticism, The Later Middle Ages
and the Counter-Reformation, 1150-1650 [New York: SUNY Press, 1994], 2). Godfrey of
Fontaines saw the properties of both divisibility from others of like species (strictly numerical
unity related to quantity} and indivisibility in itself (ontological or transcendental unity) as
rooted in that by reason of which a thing is undivided in itself. Peter of Auvergne likewise
distinguished unity of being from strict numerical unity without excluding the possibility that
the principle of one can, in some cases, be the principle of the other (though neither
necessarily implies the other). Similarly, James of Viterbo treats the cause of both individual
(ontological) unity and numerical unity (pertaining to intraspecific subjective parts) as one and
the same. Cajetan does the same. See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet 6, q. 16 (in Les
quodlibets cinq, six, et sept de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. M. de Wulf and J. Hoffmans, Les
Philosophes Beiges, vol. 3 [Louvain: Institut superior de philosophie de l'universite, 1914],
254-60); Peter of Auvergne, Quodlibet 2, q. 5 (in E. Hocedez, ed., "Une question inedite de
Pierre d'Auvergne sur !'individuation," Revue neoscholastique de philosophie 36 [1934],
370-79); on both authors, J. F. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, and John
Baconthorpe," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 221-56; James of Viterbo,
Quodlibet 1, q. 21 (in E. Ypma, ed., Jacobi de Viterbio O.E.S.A. disputatio prima de quolibet
[Wurzburg: Augustinus-Verlag, 1969], 223); cf. J. F. Wippel, "James of Viterbo," in Gracia,
ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 257-58; Cajetan, In de ente, q. 5, s. 34-37 (in Thomae de
Vio, Caietani, In De ente et essentia D. Thomae Aquinatis commentaria, ed. M.-H. Laurent
[Turin: Marietti, 1934], 50-56); cf. In de ente, q. 28, s. 150 (Laurent, ed., 238-39).

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

69

pages, but I shall address these questions in a limited way, while
referring to several representative Scholastic theories. 4
Like Henry of Ghent, but unlike Scotus, I see the only possibility for ultimate personal individuation in an existential factor
(i.e., something pertaining to existence and the causes of a thing's
existence). 5 Like Scotus, and also like Francis Suarez (though for
different reasons), but unlike Joseph Owens in his modern,
purportedly Thomist theory, I believe that esse actus essendi cannot perform the individuating role. This issue has recently been a
topic of great interest amongst Thomists, with contributions from
Lawrence Dewan, Timothy Noone, Joseph Owens, Kevin White,
and others. 6 I would like to enter into that debate and ally myself
with a position I perceive as consistent with Thomas.
The immediate principle of individuation, I maintain, is bound
up with the creature's unique relation to God as to the cause of its
existence. Henry came close to such a formulation 7 but, faced
with the difficulty of describing what this might mean intrinsically
4 For a comprehensive survey of the problem from an historical perspective, see M.-D.
Roland-Gosselin, Le "De ente et essentia" de S. Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 1948), 49-134;
Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism; Jorge J.E. Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of
Individuation in the Early Middle Ages, 2d ed. (Munich: Philosophia Verlag, 1988).
5 For Henry, the ultimate source of individual distinction for the separated substances lies
in their respective rationes existendi, whereby even pure forms are distinguishable from one
another on the basis of their actual subsistence; see Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 8 (in
Quodlibeta magistri Henrici Goethals a Gandavo doctoris solenis [Paris, 1518], repr.
Biblioteque S.J. [Louvain, 1961], vol. I, f. 165vM-166rM); Quad/. 2, q. 8 (in Henrici de
Gandavo Quodlibet, vol. 2, ed. R. Wielockx [Leuven: University Press, 1983], 50-51); see also
Quad/. II, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 38-43 and 47); Quad/. 11, q. 1 (Paris ed., vol. 2, f. 438r0);
Stephen F. Brown, "Henry of Ghent," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 202-4.
Scotus deals extensively with the problem of individuation and the principal medieval theories
concerning it in In Meta. 7, q. 13; see also Leet. in II Sent., d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n. 1 (in Opera
omnia [Vatican City: Typis polyglottis vaticanis, 1950-] 18:231); Ord. 2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 1, n.
1 (Vatican ed., 7:393).
6 Lawrence Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode of Being according to Thomas Aquinas,"
The Thomist 63 (1999): 402-24; Timothy B. Noone, "Individuation in Scotus," American
Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995): 527-42; Joseph Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," in
Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 173-94; Kevin White, "Individuation in Aquinas's
Super Boetium De Trinitate, Q. 4," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 69 (1995):
543-56.
7 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 50); Quad/. 11, q. 1 (Paris ed., vol. 2,
f. 438/418vQR); Quad/. 5, q. 8 (Paris ed., vol. 1, f. 166rM); see Brown, "Henry of Ghent,''
204.

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for the supposit (fearing the risk of infinite regress), stated his
principle in other terms. 8 I submit that it is the relative formality
of existence (responsible for a unique mode of being) that finally
accounts for the individuality according to which nature is
hypostatized, and therefore also for the formal perfection of
personality.
In order to defend this thesis, I shall briefly present the
insufficiency of historically important contending theories, then
give a more detailed exposition of my own position, and end with
a consideration of a critical difficulty this position must face.
I. ELIMINATION OF "ESSENCE THEORIES"

The first theories one must consider are essence theories.
These are theories that identify the principle of individuation with
something that belongs directly to the order of the essence as
opposed to the order of existence, including the formal or
material parts of the nature, substantial or accidental-that is,
those things discernible within the absolute structure of the
essence.
The object of our investigation is the principle of numerical
unity amongst natural substances. That principle, if we follow
Aristotle, is said to be matter. But matter which is conceived as a
pure potency cannot operate as an actual principle of numerical
distinction just because it is capable of being the matter of
anything. To be such a principle, that matter must be related to
quantity in some fashion. It must have the minimum quantitative
8 Specifically, in terms of a twofold negation (Quodl. 5, q. 8 [Paris ed., vol. I, f. 166rM])
which, as Scotus points out, serves little to explain the problem at hand (Scotus, Leet., d. 3,
p. 1, q. 2, n. 39-53 [Vatican ed., 240-44]; Ord. 2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 2, n. 43-58 [Vatican ed., 41017]). Scotus's criticism of Henry's description seems rather ironic, since Henry expresses the
twofold negation only as an inevitable consequence of the undefinability of the positive
element in his explanation for individuation. Effectively, Henry stands closer to Scotus than
one might think, since Scotus's haecceitas shares the same undefinable and irreducible
property as the causal productive element in Henry. One cannot forget, furthermore, that
Scotus himself will describe the closely related perfection of supposital existence in the
language of a negative modality ascribed to individual substance (Scotus, Op. Ox., III, d. 1,
q. 1; d. 5, q. 2, n. 4-5; d. 6, q. 1; Quodl. 19, a. 3).

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDMDUATION

71

aspect of extension for the divisibility necessary for numerical
multiplicity. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding, matter
as extended allows us to distinguish and indicate-segnarediff erent parts and individuals. In this manner it is able to limit
the acts proper to forms. Precisely how the Thomistic materia
signata is to be understood is open to debate, and we find a
variety of late medieval interpretations on this point. But if
matter's role in individuation is not to be attributed to the fact
that it is already quantified in some fashion (as held, for example,
by Capreolus), 9 then some other disposition inherent in the matter
must account for its ability to individuate (as Cajetan holds). 10
Either scenario presupposes a perfection requiring the act of some
form, taking us beyond the matter alone. 11 In the end, it is either
some corporal formality or the substantial form that provides the
explanation for individuation. Matter itself fails to deliver an
explanation, and one still must account for what makes the form
in question to be the form that it is.
Alternative accounts include: (1) "bundle" or accident theories,
locating a thing's individuality in its unique collection of accidents
(for which the authority of Porphyry, Boethius, and Avicenna may
be cited); 12 and (2) appeals to quantity itself on the basis of its
very notion as divisible or as self-individuating (as in one opinion
of James of Viterbo). 13 But none of these will succeed prima facie.
9 See in particular Aquinas, De Verit., q. 5, a. 9, arg. 6; De Ente, c. 2; STh III, q. 77, a. 2;
see also (though of dubious authenticity) De natura materiae et dimensionibus interminatis,
c. 3 (Opusc. philos., ed. R. Spiazzi [Turin, 1954], n. 378). Cf. Aquinas, STh I, q. 76, a. 6 and
ad 2; In Boet. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2; II Sent., d. 3, q. 1, a. 4; II Sent., d. 30, q. 2, a. 1; III Sent.,
d. 1, q. 2, a. 5, ad 1; IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 3; IV Sent., d. 12, q. 1, a. 2; IV Sent., d.
12, q. 1, a. 3, sol. 1, ad 3; IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 1, sol. 1, ad 3; IV Sent., d. 44, q. 1, a. 2, sol.
5, ad 3; Quodl. 9, q. 6, a. 1.
1 Cajetan, In de ente, q. 5, s. 37 (Laurent, ed., 53-54).
11 Francis Sylvester Ferrara makes the same observation with respect to the Cajetanian
account. See Ferrariensis, ScG I, c. 21, n. 4.
12 On the influence of the Porphyrian and Boethian views of individuality on subsequent
Medieval philosophy, see Gracia, Introduction to the Problem of Individuation in the Early
Middle Ages, 65-121.
13 James of Viterbo, Quodlibet II, q. 1, ed. E. Ypma, p. 5-15. Note that James wavers on
this position in light of the reception of quantity into a more fundamental subject, upon which
it would therefore depend for its own determination. See J. F. Wippel, "James of Viterbo'',
in Individuation in Scholasticism, p. 263-264.

°

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

Accident theories appear unacceptable for several reasons.
First, individuation must be a substantial perfection, lest substantial individuals differ only accidentally. Second, accidents,
from the point of view of their quiddity, as formal perfections,
can be common to many. Third, accidents are naturally posterior
to substance from which they derive their being.
Note that this last fact led some, such as Durandus of St.
to assert that accidents necessarily presuppose the
existence of an already individual substance, since substances exist
only as individuals. 14 The implication is that the individuality of
the substance has to be antecedent to the existence of the
accident. The presupposition, however, is in certain respects
unwarranted, since the existence of substance as naturally prior to
that of an accident is indifferent to the possible causes of the
individuality of the substance. While it is true that no substance
can exist except as individual, it does not follow that what stands
on the existence of the substance also stands on the individuality
of the substance. It is therefore conceivable that something
naturally posterior to the being of the substance would remain
nonetheless prior as regards the individuality of the same
(provided all temporal priority or posteriority is excluded). I will
return to this crucial issue. 15
Quantity theories also appear unacceptable, for several reasons.
First, quantity is itself an accident. Second, quantity can play a
role in the numerical multiplication of specific forms only by
virtue of its residence in matter as ultimate (limiting) subject.
Third, while quantity enables matter to serve as a substrate for the
multiplication of individuals within a species, it cannot (of itself)
account for the ontological unity (indivisibility) and incommunicability of the individual, the consideration of which,
furthermore, precedes that of the multiplication of the species

14 See Durandus, II Sent., d. 3, q. 2 (in Durandi a Sancto Porciano... in Petri Lombardi
Sententias theologicas commentariorum libriN [Venice, 1571 ], fol. 13 6vb, n. 9; 13 7ra, n. 11);
M. Henninger, "Durand of Saint Pourc;ain," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism,
323-24.
15 See below, "Advantages of the Existential Relation Theory."

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

73

into subjective parts. 16 In analyzing the role of quantity in
individuation it is especially important to keep in mind precisely
what one is trying to explain: is it the intrinsic unity (identity) of
the individual, or is it the division of specific nature into
subjective parts? For the latter, quantity may well (and perhaps
necessarily) play a central role insofar as material substances are
distinguished according to dimensive properties. For quantity to
have an explanatory role regarding the former problem, it would
have to be the defining feature (metaphysically constitutive) of an
individual's identity. But this is not conceivable for undefined
quantity, but only for some determinate quantity; and the
determination of quantity obtains not from the nature of quantity
itself, but as the effect of substantial form. Ultimately, a certain
determination of quantity is necessary for it to serve as a
proximate cause of numerical unity, whether that numerical unity
is understood in terms of individual identity or of the division of
the species into its logical inferiorsL But since such a determination
derives from something besides the quantity as such, defense of
quantitative individuation entails recourse to other fundamental
principles.
The only remaining candidate within the order of the essence
is substantial form itself. Many have proposed form as principle
of individuation, including Averroes, Godfrey of F ontaines, Peter
of Auvergne, John Baconthorpe, Richard of Mediavilla, and
Durandus of St.
However, in the system of each of
these thinkers, factors other than form itself are involved in
causing individuation, or are at least added to the essence in
concomitance with its "contraction." 18 This is because, at a
16 See F. Suarez, Disp. Meta. 4, s. 3, n. 12; 5, s. 1 & 3 passim; Cajetan, In de ente, q. 5, s.
34 (Laurent, ed., 50); q. 5, s. 36-37 (Laurent, ed., 52-53).
17 For Durandus, see Henninger, "Durand of Saint Poun;ain," 325-26.
18 With the last qualification, I have in mind, in particular, the teaching of Richard of
Mediavilla, for whom the numerical unity attributed to the essence as such cannot be achieved
in the absence of the additional existential relation to the Creator entailed by real existence
which is implied by being "one." See Richard of Mediavilla, II Sent., d. 3, a. 4, 1-2 (in
Clarissimi theologi magistri Ricardi de Mediavilla super quatuor libros Sententiarum Petri
Lombardi Quaestiones subtilissimae [Brescia, 1591], vol. 2, p. 59a-b); M. Henninger,
"Hervaeus Natalis and Richard of Mediavilla," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism,

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

specific level, form is common to every member of the species and
cannot account for what differentiates them. Therefore something
beside formal quiddity must account for the uniqueness of
individuals. Nevertheless, most proponents of this theory tend to
posit substantial form as the principle of individuation because of
what appears to be the impossibility of attributing individuation
(especially in the sense of ontological unity) to anything
superadded to the nature, given that such additional things appear
to be accidental. 19 While it is correct to affirm a real substantial
difference between the individual natures of two individuals, such
an affirmation is not enough to explain the source of that
difference when confronted with the identity of the essential
structures (specific formal quiddity) of their respective natures.
Thomas explains that, while every real form is something
individual, it is not a "this" (individual) insofar as it is a form. 20
He further argues for the universality of every form qua form:
"Every form is, of itself, something common; wherefore, the
addition of one form to another cannot be the cause of
individuation. " 21 Similarly Albert the Great: "Every nature, and
every form, is communicable of itself." 22 Following Avicenna's
lead, 23 Henry of Ghent also argues that essences hold themselves
304-7.
19 Godfrey of Fontaines provides a fine example: Quodlibet 6, q. 16, (De Wulf and
Hoffmans, eds., 3:254-60); Quodlibet 7, q. 5 (De Wulf and Hoffmans, eds., 3:323-24). For
what concerns an individual's proper identity, John Baconthorpe arrives at the same
conclusion as Godfrey along similar lines; see John Baconthorpe, III Sent., d. 11, q. 2 (in
Questiones in quator librum sententiarum et quodlibetales [Cremona, 1618; repr.
Farnborough: Gregg 1969], 74). See J. F. Wippel, "Godfrey of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne,
and John Baconthorpe," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 221-28, 235-56.
20 Aquinas, In Boet. De Trin., q. 4, a. 2.
21 Aquinas, Quodl. 7, q. 1, a. 3 (Marietti ed., 136): "omnis autem forma de se communis
est; uncle additio formae ad formam non potest esse causa individuationis." See I Sent., d. 4,
q. 1, a. 1; De Verit., q. 2, a. 5; STh I, q. 11, a. 3. "Form of itself, unless something else
prevents it, can be received by many" ("Forma vero, quantum est de se, nisi aliquid aliud
impediat, recipi potest in pluribus" [STh I, q. 3, a. 2, ad 3]), and "What is in many is not a
principle of individuation" ("quod ... in multis est, non est individuationis principium" [ScG
IV, c. 10]).
22 Albert, I Sent., d. 4, a. 3: "omnis natura, omnis forma quantum est de se communicabilis
est."
23 Avicenna, V Metaphysics.

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75

indifferently toward existence of any kind, whether common or
individual (universal or singular), and are of themselves capable,
therefore, of subsisting in a single supposit or in many. 24 Scotus
cites Avicenna's position to the same effect and devotes an entire
question to establishing the multiplicability of angelic forms. 25
Appeal to factual difference (formal unity) leaves the problem of
explaining its principle or principles unresolved-unless one is
willing to adopt a nominalist stance, denying the reality of
common essences altogether, and with it any need for
individuation.
Individuation, it seems, must be located at a metaphysical level
even deeper than these substantial principles of nature.
II. ALTERNATIVES TO ESSENCE THEORIES

In the quest for a principle of individuality, once essence
categories have been discounted (a path followed in different ways
by various medieval authors including Henry of Ghent, Godfrey
of Fontaines, Peter of Auvergne, and John Baconthorpe), 26 one
naturally turns either to the properly existential order (pertaining
to esse) or to principles of the supposit. Theories rooting
individuation in what pertains to the supposit can follow a
number of paths. Four domains have traditionally been identified
24 See Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 38-43 and 47); Quad/. 11, q. 1
(Paris ed., vol. 2, fol. 438r0).
25 Scotus, Leet., d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 28-30 (Vatican ed., 18:236-37); q. 7, n. 196-229
(Vatican ed., 18:293-301); Ord. 2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 7, n. 212-54 (Vatican ed., 7:495-516); see
In De an., q. 22, resolutio (a) (Wadding, ed., 3:629).
26 Henry argues emphatically that neither matter nor form is sufficient to account for the
individuality of substances. Godfrey of Fontaines, who wishes to posit substantial form as
principle of individuation for composite substances, argues against the possibility of any other
substantial or accidental factor accomplishing that role-matter serving at best as a correlative
principle of strict numerical division (Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. 6, q. 16 [De Wulf and
Hoffmans, eds., 3:324]), and quantity operating in this respect only as a dispositive cause
(ibid. [De Wulf and Hoffmans, eds., 3:325, 328-29]), while other accidents are understood
as presupposing the individuation of the substance in which they inhere (ibid. [De Wulf and
Hoffmans, eds., 3:320-21]). Peter of Auvergne and John Baconthorpe likewise reject the
theory that matter as such could individuate, and John provides strong arguments against
quantity as well; see Peter of Auvergne, Quodlibet 2, q. 5 (Hocedez, ed., 374); John
Baconthorpe, III Sent., d. 11, q. 2, a. 3 (Cremona ed., 74-75).

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

as pertammg to the supposit as such: accidents, the act of
existence, individuality, and the formal principle of supposital
perfection (called in some theories the principle of habitual
subsistence). 27
Accidents properly speaking, it seems, cannot perform the task
at hand, lest individuality itself be subject to coming and going or
be merely accidental to an individual, to the detriment of all
subjective identity. However, we cannot exclude accidents simplistically and shall have to come back to a consideration of them,
since we have not yet taken into account the predicable modes
according to which necessary, proper, and accidental accidents
may be distinguished. 28
Among the remaining domains of the supposit, it would be
senseless to appeal to individuality, for that is what we are trying
to explain. That leaves only the act of existence or subsistence, the
latter understood not in the sense of being as such (which would
be equivalent to the act of existence), but rather as a particular
mode of being. 29
If a supposital theory of individuation appeals to the act of
existence as the principle of individuation, we simply come back
to the existential order through the medium of the supposit, and
the cause of individuality will have to be sought either in (1) what
is formal to the existence of a complete concrete nature or (2)
something dealing with the efficient causes of the existence of the
nature. Option (1)-currently in vogue among some Tho mists,
such as Joseph Owens-is, in my opinion (as well as from the
metaphysical perspective of Thomas, as I intend to argue),
fundamentally problematic. Option (2), dealing with the efficient
27 The fact that we are not directly concerned here with "persons" but with all supposits
in general does not render a consideration of "habitual subsistence" out of place. Originally
put forward as an explanation of personality, "habitual subsistence" ultimately functioned as
nothing more than a rudimentary suppositizing (concretizing) principle always requiring the
additional qualification of rationality to draw it into the realm of the personal.
28 See Thomas Aquinas, De princ. nat., c. 2; V Metaphys., lect. 22 (Cathala-Spiazzi, eds.,
nn.1139-43); STh I, q. 77, a. 6; Despir. creat., a.11; DeEnte, c. 6; Q. D. Deanima, q.12,
ad 7. See below, "Advantages of the Existential Relation Theory."
29 It makes no difference if one wishes to call the formal principle of the supposit "habitual
subsistence," "subsistence," a "substantial mode," or "mode of being."

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

77

causes of esse, however, introduces an entire set of elements that
broaden the scope of our discussion and is able, I believe, to point
us in the right direction for rendering an account of individuality.
I shall return to this.
Finally, a supposital theory of individuation might look for the
source of individuality in the very source of supposital/hypostatic
perfection or subsistence. The difficulty here lies in one's concept
of the supposit. If the supposit is understood to consist in nothing
other than the concrete individual nature, 30 then the appeal made
is circular (and begs the question). If, on the other hand, the
supposit is conceived as adding something to concrete individual
nature, then attention to the formal principle of the supposit as
such passes right over the problem of individuation, leaving it
unexplained. 31
Thus the solution comes down to either the formal actuality of
an individual essence or something related to the efficient
principles of the nature's existence.
III. THE PROBLEM WITH "ESSE"
The first solution, locatingindividuation in the formal actuality
of an individual essence, cannot be accepted. For Scotus, the
reason for this is rooted in the undifferentiated character of esse
itself which, having no distinctness as such, cannot be the cause of
distinction in another. 32 The determination of esse derives only
30 Note that this position enjoys the universal support of philosophers and theologians until
the fourteenth century. It is only afterwards that the theologically dictated need to distinguish
the supposit from individual nature as such (occasioned primarily by Christological
considerations) finally gave rise to the contrary opinion. The theological tradition prior to the
fourteenth century was fully capable of maintaining the necessary distinction without further
introducing any real distinction between a supposit and its concrete individual substantial
nature qua particularized/individualized (effectively recognizing two distinct manners of
signifying concrete individual nature). For a detailed and historical treatment of the naturesupposit distinction in Christian tradition, see Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition.
31 Suarez makes the same observation when rejecting the third interpretative opinion
concerning Thomas's doctrine of what the supposit is understood to add to the notion of the
nature in Quodl. 2, q. 2, a. 2; see Suarez, Disp. Meta. 34, s. 3, n. 1-13.
32 Scotus, Leet., d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n. 55-57 (Vatican ed., 18:245); Ord. 2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 3, n.
59-65 (Vatican ed., 7:418-21).

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

from its reception in, its becoming the actuality of, a determinate
form. Suarez contends that esse cannot be the source of
individuality lest nothing could be individual which did not exist,
which would be incompatible with the notion of an individual
possible being. 33 Of course, the notion of a properly individual
possible being is problematic in its own way. As a pure possibility
in the mind of God, the individuality of that being concretely
considered, given the simplicity of everything in the divine mind,
would be identical to that of the divine nature with which its esse
is one. However, a certain proper mode of individuality (i.e.,
other than the simplicity of the divine mode of being) could still
be ascribed to the pure possible considered in its potential
relationship to being, where the latter is understood to enter only
obliquely into its notion. This is analogous, mutatis mutandis, to
the Capreolist notion of the "common supposit," though it
pertains not so much to a common nature qua concrete or
concretely signified as to an individual nature qua possible or in
abstraction from its being. 34 Other Scholastic authors and various
Thomists have similarly argued for the impossibility of esse
performing the individualizing function. 35
Against these positions, however, and intending to represent
the teaching of Thomas, Joseph Owens claims that, with respect
to the distinguishable parts and attributes of a thing, it is esse that
"is forging all the varied elements of the thing into a unit ... they
are brought together by real existence in the one person . . .
existence makes them a unit," and speaks of "the unifying feature
of existential actuality. " 36
33 Suarez, Disp. Meta. 5, s. 5, n. 2-5. See also Disp. Meta. 34 ("De prima substantia seu
supposito eiusque a natura distinctione").
34 See Capreolus, Defensiones Theologiae Divi Thomas Aquinatis (ed. Ceslai Paban and
Thomae Pegues, 7 vols. [Turin, 1900-1908], 1:228a-38a (I Sent., d. 4, q. 2, a. 1); 5 :84a-110b
(III Sent., d. 5, q. 3, a. 3). I shall return to the problem of "possible individuals" at the end of
this article.
35 See, for example, John Baconthorpe, III Sent., d. 11, q. 2 (Cremona ed., 72). John's
objection is based on the fact that existence comes to an essence or nature (in the order of
nature) only after the nature is fully constituted according to its intrinsic principles. Cajetan
constructs his theory of personal subsistence on the basis of the same conviction (In III, q. 4,
a. 2; q. 4, a. 3, ad 1).
36 Owens, "Thomas Aquinas," 174-75 and 187.

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79

A number of serious objections can be brought against this
thesis. First of all, it seems that Owens makes the error of confusing the order of knowing with the order of being, moving from
existence as responsible for our perception of unity to existence as
cause of the same unity. Coming into contact with and
experiencing the unique act of existence of a thing reveals-to our
understanding (and through a special act of judgment)-not only
that it has being, but also that it is "this," that is, an individual.
But revealing that something is one is not the same as causing the
unity we are compelled to admit on the basis of being's
(phenomenological) effect. 37
Epistemic questions aside, there remains a nontrivial ambiguity
in Owens's position. This existence which "always individualizes
as an actuality" and which "gives the thing its thoroughgoing
individuation by synthesizing everything in the thing into a single
unit," 38 it seems, can no longer be the act of the essence in a
formal sense as Thomas himself understood it. Owens has
implicitly treated esse in these passages after the manner of an
efficient cause. To say, moreover, that being unifies is to give it a
unifying power, which is to "naturalize" being as it were, giving
it a certain nature. But being is no natural thing or nature; it is
purely the act of a nature, and wholly distinct as such from nature
considered as such, as act is distinct from potency.
Naturally, any alternative to esse understood as the formal
actuality of a thing (which, as we have seen, cannot individuate)if that alternative likewise refuses to consider the existential order
in efficient terms-would result in reducing the cause of unity to
a function of the essence (even if it must be acknowledged that
this is the actual essence). 39 Owens correctly represents Thomas
as holding this last position (especially with respect to form) while
nevertheless identifying the ultimate unifying factor in esse. To be
37 The act of judgment is the synthesizing act here. Owens practically says so himself: "As
directly attained through the synthesizing act of judgment, it is forging all the varied elements
of the thing into a unit" (ibid., 174).
38 Ibid., 186-87.
39 Note that to consider the existential order in efficient terms is not equivalent to treating
esse itself in efficient terms and involves additional factors very different from esse as such.

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sure, the essential principles of a nature cannot operate without
existing. But, if the fact that the actuality of a principle is
necessary for it to exercise its function is all that lies behind
Owens's insistence upon existence as cause of individuation, then
his theory makes little headway and simply begs the question. He
is right to seek the explanation of individuation in the existential
order, but errs by moving too far in that direction.
The very texts cited by Owens do, in fact, show that the cause
of a thing's subsistence is the cause of its incommunicability or
individuality. 40 Despite the inconsistency in the above noted
treatment of the term esse, the rest of Owens's article serves to
confirm this last affirmation and closely associates the causes of a
thing's existence with individuality. 41 However, the principal
conclusions he wishes to draw from that important association go
beyond the meaning and intention of Thomas's texts. An analysis
of these limitations is beyond the scope of this article, 42 but I
would like to examine the relationship of the causes of a thing's
existence to its principle of individuality.
IV. EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

Henry of Ghent conjectures that individuation has to be
brought about not through the principles of the nature, but
through the causal action of the divine agency whereby the nature
receives its existence as a supposit. 43 The notion of subsistence,
proper to the supposit, is always really distinct from that of the
nature as such. And it is subsistence alone, understood as joined
to the nature absolutely considered, that, for Henry, ultimately
sets one individual off from another.
40 Dewan's critique of Owens concedes this as well; see Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode
of Being," 411-13.
41 As regards these actuating causes, moreover, Owens does an excellent job of
demonstrating the role ascribed by Thomas to both form and quantified matter in bringing
about the existence of an individual.
42 With sound argumentation and broad textual support, Dewan opposes Owens's
interpretation; see Dewan, "The Individual as a Mode of Being," 403-24.
43 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 38-43, 47, 50-51); Quodl. 5, q. 8 (Paris
ed., vol. 1, f. 165vM-166rM); Quodl. 11, q. 1 (Paris ed., vol. 2, f. 438r0).

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Because the actual joining of these two principles cannot be
accomplished by the principles themselves, an extrinsic agentnamely, God-is invoked to provide the causal explanation for
the unique subsistent act by which concrete natures differ. While
this is fine at the level of efficient causality, it leaves unsettled the
question of what intrinsically distinguishes the supposit from the
absolute nature that makes it formally to be this individual. It is
precisely at this point in the inquiry that Henry's response
becomes most interesting. Henry (working with Avicennian
principles) appeals to something joined to the nature in an
accidental fashion, inasmuch as it does not belong to the notion
of the essence, but without thereby being separable from the
existing nature. 44 He also speaks of this additional element as a
certain disposition of the supposit as supposit, which means qua
subject to the "accidental" feature just mentioned. 45
Henry was unable to carry his explanation further. But, keeping in mind that his entire discussion refers to the productive
agency responsible for the above factors (i.e., that it repeatedly
refers to the determination in question as possessed by a form
only through that agency which brings it into and holds it in
existence), 46 one is justified in seeing in his accidental feature 47 the
only factor in creative causality yet to be mentioned, namely, the
relation existing between the divine agent and the subsisting

44 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 49); cf. Quodl. 11, q. 1 (Paris ed., vol.
2, fol. 438/418vQR). The determination had from the additional element which is extra
rationem speciei cannot be accidental to the supposit: the supposit, formaliter dicitur, is the
determinate thing (thus the concept of the supposit formally considered necessarily includes
the notion of its existing). The determination (and existence itself), however, is accidental to
the essence as such (i.e., absolutely considered).
45 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 5, q. 8 (Paris ed., vol. 1, fol. 166rM). This "quasi dispositio"
is described as belonging to the (specific) form in the supposit, i.e., as belonging to the form
insofar as it is a supposit (and not to the form qua form), while the supposit is precisely that
which has the form along with this ratio determinationis.
46 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 11, q. 1 (Paris ed., vol. 2, fol. 439/419rT); see Quodl. 5, q. 8
(Paris ed., vol. 1, fol. 165vM-166rM).
47 Henry of Ghent, Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 49-50).

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supposit. 48 From this perspective, moreover, there is room to
interpret the "quasi dispositio" proper to the supposit as such in
terms of the same relation, but with respect to the subject of the
relation-effectively acknowledging that Henry thereby identifies
the foundation of the causal relation rather than the relation itself.
Such then is the position that I would like to propose: the
immediate formal principle of individuation is nothing other than
the creature's relation to God as to the cause of its existence. 49
V. ADVANTAGES OF THE EXISTENTIAL RELATION THEORY

Identifying the principle of individuation with such a relation
has powerful advantages. This relation is not a mere "accident";
it is what we might call today a "transcendental" relation. It is
"extrinsic" to the nature as such (and in some respects adds to the
individual nature only an extrinsic reference, from the point of
view of its esse ad), and thus is able to be "added" to the nature
absolutely considered in such a way as to operate as its
distinguishing principle. At the same time, however, it is intrinsic
to the very constitution of the nature in its individuality, and thus
is able to serve as its intrinsic principle of identity. While the
substance supplies the being for the predicamental accident from
the point of view of its esse in, it is the esse ad of the relation (or
what is expressed by the esse ad: that is, the formal perfection of
the relation itself) 50 which actualizes the nature from the point of
view of its individual identity (i.e., distinctiveness). Something
48 Although I have not explicitly found this teaching in Henry's texts, in which Henry
appears to reduce the principle of determination exclusively to esse (even if he concedes great
importance to the productive cause of that esse), Stephen Brown asserts that the positive
feature Henry ultimately sought to define "adds to a particular essence a real relation to the
Creator as the efficient cause of the individual's actual existence" (Brown, "Henry of Ghent,"
205). Mark Henninger makes the same observation: see Henninger, "Hervaeus Natalis and
Richard of Mediavilla," 306.
49 Note that the relation here is precisely that of depending or undergoing causal
production. Naturally, one's doctrine of relation dramatically affects the success or failure of
the position here endorsed.
so In every predicamental genus besides substance, we distinguish between
accidentality-which is the predicament's inessendi mode of being-and the ratio or difference
according to which one predicament is distinct from another.

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83

proper to the entirety of the substance serves as the foundation
for the relation; indeed, this foundation is the substance itself
considered as a potency with respect to esse. As a result, the constitutive being of the relation (pertaining to its esse in) and that of
the substantial nature in its proper "entitas"51 are distinguishable
only according to mode of signification (or virtually)-one as
distinguishing, the other as distinct. 52
Let us clarify this complex series of relationships. A thing's
creative relation to God is integrated into the individual according
to the esse in of the relation as it inheres in the creature according
to the passive dimension of creation (founded upon and identical
to the contingency-reality or "undergoing" of the creature as
such), in contrast to active creation, which, identical to the
universal cause of being (God), is the term of the referential esse
ad of the same relation. If what individuates me is the existential
relation, it can do so only by entering into my constitution; but
the relation penetrates me only according to its esse in and insofar
as there is a real foundation in the subject of the relation. The
foundation of that relation is the contingency of the entire
essence, which is identical to the accidental being of the relation
(i.e., its esse in) and therefore identical in mode of being to that
which individuates the essence. Note that I call the generic being
of the relation "accidental" and "inherent" following the
51 The expression is taken from Suarez (see Disp. Meta. 5, passim, and especially s. 6).
Suarez's entitate solution bears certain similarities to the present proposal. For Suarez, the
entirety of a simple essence and the irreducible principles of a composite substance serve
themselves as the cause of the individuality of the nature in question ("omnem substantiam
singularem [se ipsa, seu per entitatem suam, esse singularem] neque alio indigere
individuationis principio praeter suam entitatem, vel praeter principia intrinseca quibus eius
entitas constat" [Disp. 5, s. 6, n. l]). Moreover, his individuating "entitas"-which is only
logically distinct from the nature (Disp. 5, s. 2, n. 9)-signifies the nature as it is posited in
existence ("entitas rei nihil aliud est quam realis essentia extra causas posita" [Disp. 7, s. 1, n.
12]). The differences, however, are greater than the similarities: amongst other things, in the
present thesis, a nature's entitas stands for the entirety of the concrete nature qua nature, that
is., in its potency for being, (which is really distinct from the essence), and it plays a role in
individuating only as the foundation for the properly distinctive relation.
52 The distinction operative here is analogous to the "ut approprians"-"ut
appropriata"
distinction between proprietates personales and personae as explained by Albert and Thomas;
see Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition, 297, 433-37, 443-44, 455-56, and especially46167, all of which is directly concerned with individuation.

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

conventions of logic, 53 though it may equally be called
nonaccidental because of its identity with the foundation,
precisely to the extent that such a foundation (the contingency
reality in question) is nonaccidental). According as the being of a
relation is determined by that of its foundation, if its foundation
is not an accident, we may describe the being of the relation, its
esse in, not as an accidental being, but as something other than
accidental. The foundation here is the essence itself insofar as it
is contingent or limited (which is the entirety of the essence, not
some partial dimension of it). As a result, the being of the relation
must be identical to that of the actual essence. But the fact that the
inesse of the relation is identical to the being of the existing
essence does not mean that the essence is the same as the relation
simpliciter. The relation includes the aspect of esse ad as well as
its esse in. Moreover, the intrinsic relativity of the essence, due to
the fact that, as a foundation, it is identical to the being of the
relation, does not necessarily mean that the essence is itself a
relation, but only that it is relative. In general, the fact that the
esse in of a relation is identical to that of its foundation does not
mean that the foundation is a relation: in the relation of
similarity, for example, between two white bodies, the whiteness,
which serves as the foundation for the relation of similarity,
remains an absolute accident. Thus the contingency in question is
the very essence, and the "accidental" being (esse in) of the
relation is identical to the existing essence which is entirely
referred to God as to its cause. The accidental being of the esse
relation is not in the essence as in a distinguishable subject, but it
is identical to the essence. To say, therefore, that the relation to
God individuates a substance is the same as to say that the existing
substantial essence (understood precisely according to the
dynamism of its ex-sisting, i.e., as an actual potency in its
relationship to esse actus essendi)individuates the substance from
the perspective of the actuality of the distinctiveness. But we
cannot lose sight of the said relation's esse ad, formally accounting
53 Every relation is signified as in a subject, even when the mode of its predication implies
nothing in the subject (but only reference ad alio) and is, as in the case of divine supposits, one
of identity.

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85

for the distinctiveness of the actuality of the same substance. We
thus keep before our eyes a relationship of mutual actualization
between the relation and its substantial subject, each determining
the other in differing respects. 54
The various criticisms launched against accidental theories of
individuation, including the well-known objections raised by
Scotus in his commentary on the Metaphysics, 55 are thus warded
off. The fact that accidents are posterior to substance in the order
of nature is no longer problematic, since the accident in question
is an inseparable, necessary accident that reciprocally actualizes
the nature with respect to its concrete, indivisible mode of
instantiation, though without actualizing it in the order of esse.
Both the relation and the substance stand toward one another as
potency and act in different respects. 56 The relation possesses a
certain priority of nature regarding the essence it determines with
respect to individuality (and the individual modality of existence
which that signifies) even if the essence enjoys a natural priority
with regard to the relation in respect of being simpliciter. Neither
exists in temporal priority with respect to the other. 57
The underlying problem, it seems, is that whatever makes
something to be individual must itself be individual. But
everything that is individual is so on account of a principle of
individuality, and so we embark on an infinite regress-unless
these two entities are co-principles simultaneously, mutually

54 This is exactly how Thomas resolves the paradox of the creature's "transcendent
ordination" to another (i.e., toward its First Cause) understood as a predicamental relation but
nonetheless responsible for the very being of the creature: Aquinas, STh I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3.
See J.-H. Nicolas, Synthese dogmatique: Complement: de l'Univers a la Trinite (Fribourg:
Imprimerie Saint Paul, 1993), §41.
55 See Scotus, In Meta. 7, q. 13, nn. 20-30.
56 On the manner in which act is determined by potentiality and potentiality by act, see
Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9; see also De spir. creat., a. 8, ad 9. These principles are
judiciously applied to the problem of substantial unity in material substances and to the
subjective differentiation of genera and species in Nicolas, Synthese dogmatique: Complement,
§153 2 -153'.
57 See in this regard, and with respect to the identity between creation, conservation, and
the creature itself insofar as it is dependent, A. D. Sertillanges, Foundations of Thomistic
Philosophy, trans. G. Anstruther (Springfield, Ill.: Templegate Publishers, 1931), 100-104.

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

determining one another in different respects. This is precisely
what we must affirm.
An analogy might illuminate this point. In the realization of a
being (ens), both the essence and its existence are necessary
principles. Created esse can only be realized in a limited way, that
is, through the determining/limiting role of essence; and essence
is nothing without its act which esse supplies (or, more precisely,
for which esse is another name). The obvious question is: how can
essence exercise a limiting function with regard to being when it
is nothing prior to the possession of that being? The response is
simply that no antecedent actuality on the part of the essence is
required for it to exercise its limiting function, for it performs
that role (and can only perform such a role) in its potentiality.
The actualizing principle is determined by the potential principle
only in its potentiality. 58 To make sense of this, it seems we should
affirm that what is potential can determine what is actual because
what is actual is limited by the producing agent to the distinctive
contours of the potentially real thing considered in the mind of
the agent. Thus the essence qua potential really performs no
limiting role at an efficient level, but only as a determinant of the
productive cause, somewhat like a final cause for the production
of this act of being. The actual potency (which is the existing
essence), however, certainly limits the act of being (which it
possesses) to itself, and the two are perfectly and uniquely
proportioned to one another. It is in this sense that the actual
essence, according to its potency for being, that is, according as it
is an actual potency (for, even the real essence does not possess its
being of itself or necessarily), is actually determining the being it
possesses. It is in this sense that a potency can be said to
determine an act. This general rule for co-principles related to
each other according to potency and act might help to explain
what takes place between an essence and its individuating relation
of dependence for being.
(A) The relation of dependence, in one sense, is only potential
with respect to (the actuality of) the essence of which it is the
58

See Aquinas, De Pot., q. 7, a. 2, ad 9.

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87

relation, since it cannot be actual without the actuality of the
essence. But if this relation determines the individuality of the
essence, it seems it could only do so as an actual potency. Given
the above observations, this means that the agent producer
restricts the essence (which, in the case at hand, is actual with
respect to the relation depending upon it for its being) to this
particular relation of dependence, and henceforth that relation
actually determines the essence, even though it does so in its
potentiality for existing (i.e., for being the relation of the essence).
There is, however, no temporal priority between the two, just as
in the case of an essence and its esse actus essendi. What is
required is an exterior agent capable of circumscribing his
production of the active principle to the natural limits of the
potential principle.
(B) In another sense, the relation of dependence is rather like
an active principle with respect to the essence it individuates,
while the essence is potential, inasmuch as it cannot be individual
without such a relation (which actualizes individuality). Again, the
agent produces the relation in respect of the essence to which it
must conform (and, of course, as always united to and supported
in being by the essence, since absolutely no temporal priority is
involved). Then the essence can serve, in its actuated potency for
individuality, as a foundation for the individuating relation. Only
as an actuated potency for individuality-by virtue of which the
essence is indeed individual (though not so of itself)-can the
essence serve as a real foundation for the individuating relation.
(C) Finally, either the essence or the relation can be viewed
from the point of view of determining the other after the manner
in which an act determines a potency. However, taking the
relation as an actual form determining the essence to be this
individual (the essence, as it were, in potency to such a perfection)
only makes sense if the existence of the essence-as an individual
(since only individuals exist)-is already taken for granted, on the
basis of which the relation itself may exist as an actual form.
Taking the essence as the actual principle of the existence of the
dependence relation by which the essence is numerically one (or

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

individual) only makes sense if the essence already possesses being
(and as an individual), on the basis of which the essence may truly
found the relation in order that that relation (in potency to being)
may itself be this determinate relation. Such necessary preconditions, however, cannot be explained except in terms of (a)
and (b) above, and by appealing to the agent cause responsible for
the concomitant production of the individual and the intrinsic
principle of its individuation, analogous to (and immediately
connected with, if not a virtual translation of) the production of
an essence and its actuality.
Albert the Great speaks of the composition of an essence with
its existential relation, a composition said to effect the very
concreteness of the subject. 59 He also speaks of an "ultimate
composition" intrinsic to the constituents of every supposit and
inseparable from the relation of dependence by which they exist. 60
For every created reality, composition of an at least extrinsic sort
must be admitted due to its dependence on the efficient cause
from which its esse is received. 61 Furthermore, Albert explicitly
defends the notion of a relation and its subject as mutually prior
59 Albert, I Sent., d. 2, a. 13 (Borgnet, ed., 25:68): "Because it is created, it necessarily has
a relationship to the Creator, and this relation is something in the creature, even if it is but a
respect toward another; wherefore, this relation produces with the created thing a
composition and something concrete" ("quia creatum est, de necessitate ponit habitudinem
ad creantem, et haec habitudo aliquid est in ipso, licet sit respectu alterius; unde haec habitudo
cum ente creato facit concretionem et compositionem").
60 See Albert, Sum. theol. II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, ad quaest. 2 (Borgnet, ed., 32:37); II,
tr. 4, q. 13, m. 1, ad 1-2 (Borgnet, ed., 32:160); I Sent., d. 8, a. 25, ad 3 (Borgnet, ed.,
25 :258); II Sent., d. 3, a. 4, sol. (Borgnet, ed., 27:68-69); De quidecim problematibus, n. 15.
61 "There is that kind of simplicity which does not have the implication of relation
according to being with respect to interior components, though it has dependency with respect
to an exterior cause, which gives it being.... According to the dependency a thing has with
respect to the principles of its being ... it always depends according to being upon the
efficient cause from which it receives being" ("Est simplicitas quae non habet plicam
habitudinis secundum esse ad componens intra, licet habeat dependentiam ad causam extra,
cujus est dare esse, et facere debere esse in omnibus quae sunt .... Secundum dependentias
quas habet ad principia sui esse... semper dependet secundum esse ad causam efficientem a
qua accipit esse" [Albert, Sum. theol. II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, ad quaest. 1 (Borgnet, ed.,
32:35)]). Note that Albert resolves the related problem of an apparent infinite regress and duly
acknowledges the priority of the composite with respect to its components (including the fact
that the matter-form composite alone is the proper object of creation); see Sum. theol. II, tr.
1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, ad quaest. 2, ad obj. 1 (Borgnet, ed., 32:38).

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and posterior to one another. In the first book of his commentary
on the Sentences, Albert refutes an argument which claims that
substances can be relative not only by reason of relation but also
by themselves, as though, abstracting from the relation, the
substance nevertheless remains related. The example used is that
of creation (implying the relation of a substance to its total
principle) where, according to the argument, if the relation is
removed, the substance of the creature remains and is, nevertheless, still relative to its Creator. In his response, Albert observes
that certain relations are, in a certain respect, anterior to the
subject of relation, namely, when they enter into the constitution
of the substance. If, therefore, such relations were to be removed
from the substance, the substance itself would disappear. Such is
the situation with regard to the relation of creation (or
conservation, if we tie the signification of "creation" to the
concept of "beginning"), which cannot be separated from the
creature lest the creature cease to exist. 62 Albert also argues for
the mutual and simultaneous dependence of the constitutive
principles of supposits (whether in the realm of composite
substances or that of the separated substances). 63 These coprinciples are unified according to an entitative dependency, and
neither is consistent without the other. This interdependence is
reflected in the fact that neither is produced without the other,
but both are simultaneously produced in and for the supposit.
Thomas will argue in a similar way. 64 Interpreting the classical
Thomist theory of individuation by matter along analogous lines,
invoking the same principles, J.-H. Nicolas notes the necessary
interdependency between matter and form as mutual principles of
individuation/specific multiplication (due to the sheer potentiality
of matter as such). 65 Hervaeus Natalis likewise appeals to such a
See Albert, I Sent., d. 26, a. 6, ad. 6 (Borgnet, ed., 26:14).
See, for example, Albert, Sum. theol. II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, sol. and ad 1 (Borgnet, ed.,
32:33; II, tr. 1, q. 3, ad 1 (Borgnet, ed., 32:34).
64 Aquinas, STh I, q. 45, a. 3, ad 3; I, q. 77, a. 6.
65 Nicolas, Synthese dogmatique: Complement, §15 J2. In the order of material substances,
matter is understood to individuate insofar as it is in potency to a certain kind of form
(whence its character as interminate, since it is not yet determined by this or that particular
form). But what would allow such a potency to operate as the principle of individuality for
62

63

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

metaphysics when advancing his position regarding individuation
through quantity (where quantity is a dispositive cause of subjective plurality and antecedent secundum quid to the individual
substance). 66 None of this could stand, of course, except within a
properly Aristotelian metaphysical framework such as that of
Thomas, where the analogical diversity of the causes and the
notion of reciprocal and total causal principles constituting a per
se unity of causation intrinsic to a single res (or single operation)
is upheld. 67
The further concern that the frequent change of accidents and
their coming and going renders them incapable of accounting for
substantial identity over time is also overcome in light of the
inseparability and immutability of the relation in question, any
change of which would require a corresponding change on the
part of one of its terms. But God cannot change, and the requisite
a given form? Nothing could distinguish one form from another were they not received by
diverse potencies, wherefore the diversity of the potencies founds individuation. But their
diversity is owed to the fact that each is "this" or "that" potency, a thisness (or thatness) that
must itself be accounted for and that directs us to the "designated" aspect of matter, explained
by matter's subjection to the determining act of form. It is noteworthy that Nicolas's entire
discussion of the relationship between matter and form in individuation focuses exclusively
on the multiplication of individuals within a common species, effectively ignoring the question
of an ontological unity antecedent to and independent of the numerical unity consequent upon
subjective multiplication. This is not an oversight on the Dominican's part, since, as John
Baconthorpe had firmly argued in the mid-fourteenth century (III Sent., d. 11, q. 2 (Cremona
ed., 73), Thomas may never have intended to explain the principle of individuality strictly
speaking, but only the multiplication of individuals within the same species.
66 Hervaeus Natalis, Quodl. III, q. 9 (in Subtilissima Hervei Nata/is britonis theologi
acutissimi quolibeta undecim [Venice, 1513; repr. Ridgewood, N.J.: Greg Press, 1966], fol.
81ra-82va); see Quodl. VIII, q. 11, ad 4 (Venice ed., fol. 153ra); Henninger, "Hervaeus
Natalis and Richard of Mediavilla," 302, 309-10. It should be pointed out that Hervaeus's
doctrine of the dispositive role of quantity in the plurification of material substances, as well
as the position of Nicolas regarding the role of matter in the same process (referred to above),
are entirely in keeping with my own position on individuation which is open-ended for what
concerns an explanation of strict numerical multiplication of substantial forms for material
substances.
67 Scotus's own treatment of causality abandons this metaphysical route so critical to the
Aristotelian account of substantial (and operational) unity (especially evident in De Anima 3
and Physics 3). See Scotus, Ord. l, d. 3, p. 3, q. 2, n. 498, 500, 503 and 545; Ord. 2, d. 3, p.
2, q. 1, n. 271, 278, and 280-81; 2, d. 25, q. un., n. 22. For an insightful evaluation of the
consequences of this, see A. De Muralt, L 'enjeu de la philosophie medievale (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1993), 34-46, 82-84, 101-5, 112-18, 321-23, 331-51.

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91

change on the part of the substance would have to involve a
complete substantial change, since the foundation for the relation
in the substance is identical to the entire reality of the substance
in itself.
Finally, the "something added" to the nature is not something
accidental to the nature qua individual, so the individuating
principle is not accidental to the existing primary substance. Note
that this also circumvents the various objections raised by Godfrey
of Fontaines against the possibility of anything superadded to the
essence performing the individuating role. 68 The numerical unity
achieved through such a relation, moreover, cannot be lost
through bodily death, as it is not tied to quantitative
considerations.
VI. NO INFINITE REGRESS OR MULTIPLICATION OF "THINGS"

But what makes the relation in question to be this and not
that? There is no need to pursue this line of questioning, since this
relation (along with the existence of the substance) is an
immediate formal effect of God's creative causal action which
produces the entirety of the individual nature (which is the
terminus of all creative action as well as of all natural generative
action) 69 according to its intrinsic and mutually related principles
of potency and act. These principles are matter and form at the

68 See Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodl. 7, q. 5 (de Wulf, ed., 3:319-23). More will be said
about the ontological inseparability of the existential relation and the individual essence
below, when dealing with the divine ideas and the epistemological question of the extent to
which existence can be abstracted from the notion of the individual.
69 This fact is consistently stressed by Roger Bacon, Henry of Ghent, and Peter of
Auvergne. See in particular Roger Bacon, Communia naturalium, bk. 1, p. 2, d. 3, c. 7 (in R.
Steele, ed., Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, fasc. 2 [Liber primus Communium
naturalium Fratris Rogerz] [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1905], 92-96); bk. 1, p. 2, d. 3, c. 9
(Steele, ed., 99); bk. 1, p. 2, d. 3, c. 10 (Steele, ed., 105-6); see J. M. G. Hackett, "Roger
Bacon," in Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism, 117-39. See Henry of Ghent, Quodl.
5, q. 8 (Paris ed., vol. 1, f. 165vM-166rM}; Quodl. 2, q. 8 (Wielockx, ed., 50-51). For Peter
of Auvergne, see Quodl. 2, q. 5 (Hocedez, ed., 372); see Wippel, "Godfrey ofFontaines, Peter
of Auvergne, and John Baconthorpe," 229-30.

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essential level, and, at the level of individuality as such, 70 the
entire composite substance and existential relation to God,
principles that come into existence only together, and in
reciprocal causal coordination, in such a way that only one
"thing" (res) is produced. 71 The relation in question is not an
additional res the individuality of which needs to be explained.
Again, the nature of its esse in, as identical to the substantial
foundation, reveals the unity of the being involved in this
production, the singularity of ens. The case is analogous to (and
intimately tied up with, if not indistinguishable from) the relation
of creation. Creation is essentially a relation, real on the part of
70 In speaking of the essential level here, I am referring to the essence of the individual
substance, the forma totius individualis, consisting of this form and this matter. The level of
individuality as such considers the individual substance precisely according to its individuality,
as opposed to its natural constitution as such. All of the intrinsic constituents of a primary
substance can be viewed in either of two ways: (1) according as they are constitutive of the
individual's nature, which is to view them in terms of the individual's natural makeup; or (2)
according as they refer the substance to others or to other nonessential factors such as an
extrinsic agent cause. The twofold level of mutually coordinated principles related to one
another as potency and act suggests the presence of a more fundamental composition within
the structure of created nature beside that (in material substances) of matter and form and
distinct from the relationship of essentia and esse (proper to material and immaterial
substances alike). As alluded to above, Albert the Great puts forward such a doctrine in the
context of discussing the various kinds of composition and simplicity distinctive of created
beings whose esse is received: Albert, I Sent., d. 8, a. 24 (Borgnet, ed., 25 :254); I Sent., d. 8,
a. 25 (Borgnet, ed., 25:257-58); Sum. theol., II, tr. 1, q. 3, m. 3, a. 2, ad quaest. 2 (Borgnet,
ed., 32:37).
71 This understanding, at home within Thomistic Aristotelianism, would be foreign to a
Scotistic metaphysics grounded on the distinctio formalis ex natura rei where each of the
distinguishable components is credited some sort of proper individuality (even its own
haecceitas) and where to each conceptually distinguishable form adequately corresponds a
certain ens, one separable from the other (at least de potentia asboluta Dei). See Scotus, Ord.
1, d. 2, p. 2, q. 1-4; 1, d. 4, p. 1, q. un; 1, d. 8, p. 1, q. 4, n. 192; Ord. 2, d. 1, q. 4-5, n. 203;
2, d. 3, p. 1, q. 4, n. 91-92; Ord. 4, d. 11, q. 3, n. 46; Rep. l, d. 12, q. 2, n. 6; 1, d. 33, q. 2,
n. 8; 1, d. 45, q. 2, n. 9. Then again, Scotus's own understanding of the ultimate individuating
principle refuses to treat the differentia individualis as a "this something" (hoc aliquid), but
views it rather as that whereby something else is a "this" (quo aliud est hoc). See Scotus VII
Metaphys., q. 13, n. 112; Peter King, "Duns Scotus on Singular Essences," Medioevo 30
(2005): 111-37. Furthermore, "thing" has various meanings for Scotus and does not always
name something capable of existing independently of a determination relative to another. It
is enough for something to be mind-independent for it to count as a "thing" in a realist sense.
See Scotus, Quad. q. 3, n. 2-3 and the excellent article by G. Pini, "Scotus' Realist Conception
of the Categories," Vivarium 43 (2005): 80-83.

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the creature, logical on the part of God. But traditional teaching
holds that this relation is not itself created in the proper sense of
the term and needs no additional causal explanation for its own
being (which too is rooted in the potency of the substantial subject
brought into existence).
In the end, what emerges is a highly ordered picture of the
intrinsic structure of the supposit, consisting of a harmonious
interdependency between essence and existence, matter and form,
quantity and matter, and the relative and the absolute, while
acknowledging a metaphysically significant role for each of these
factors in accounting for the ontological unity of the individual
and/or the numerical distinction of many individuals within a
common species. But it all ultimately and beautifully comes down
to the productive agency of God, and to the existential relation
binding us to him.
VII. WHAT ABOUT GOD'S KNOWLEDGE OF
"POSSIBLE INDIVIDUALS"?

At least one fundamental problem, however, confronts the
theory, namely, the problem of explaining "possible individuals"
or "individual possibles." Scotus and Suarez both argue against the
possibility of esse functioning as principle of individuation because
(among other reasons) nothing could then be individual which did
not exist. 72 The implication would preclude the possibility of
God's knowing individual things prior to their actually existing.
First of all, it must be stressed that the principle I have posited
is not esse, but the relation involved in the communication of esse
to an essence. Nevertheless, the problem raised by Scotus and
Suarez apparently remains, inasmuch as there is no such relation
in abstraction from esse. However, it would be premature and
overly simplistic to confound the two notions to the point of
denying that a certain kind of knowledge of one (viz., the
relation) can be had without knowing the other (the esse). While
no such relation can exist in abstraction from esse, this does not
72

See Scotus, VII Metaphys., q. 13, n. 50; Suarez, Disp. Meta. V, s. 5, n. 2-5.

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mean that a concept (or knowledge) of such a relation cannot
exist without a concept (or knowledge) of the esse naturally
associated with it. The relation in question contains within its
concept exactly two terms, the essence and God, along with the
notion of dependence (rooted in the essence). But must esse itself,
properly speaking, enter into the very concept of that relation?
The dependency alluded to has its ratio directly in the realized
potency of the essence, and only indirectly in the correlative
notion of actuation (esse) necessary for the potency to be real.
If the above comments about the essentiality of the existential
relation with respect to individuality are true, then at least the
relational aspect of existence cannot be said naturally to follow
individuation. To the extent, moreover, that that relation entails
a thing's actuality, even the formal actuality of a thing appears to
be (at least indirectly) built into the individual as such. In the
intentional order, the complete notion of an individual substance,
then, is certainly not without its unique causal relation to God and
includes at least an oblique reference to the esse by which it exists
(or could exist). On the one hand, the quiddity of the individual
form is, for the human intellect, virtually inconceivable since it
depends upon (or includes a reference to) an apparently
nonquidditative element for its quiddity, making quidditative
what is seemingly nonquidditative. On the other hand, one should
perhaps not jump to the conclusion that merely oblique
intentional reference to the nonquidditative (existential) order
effectively imports that very order into a proper intention of the
quidditative (i.e., into our concept of the essence). Nevertheless,
if for an individual essence there is no difference between its
ultimate individuality and its existential relation, and if the
inclusion of that existential relation in the notion of the individual
implies the inclusion of esse itself (a conclusion which, as noted,
would require further justification), then it would follow that its
essence and existence are inseparable notions.
Concerning specific unity, Thomas states that "being does not
enter into the definition of the creature, since being is neither a

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95

genus nor a difference. " 73 If, however, the existence relation
constitutes the individuality of a thing, then it functions like a
difference with respect to the common species and thus belongs
to the definition of the individual as such. 74 For this reason we
cannot abstract from the causal relation by virtue of which a thing
receives existence and still have a concept of the individual
essence. But (and here is the potential force of the objection), if
esse itself is wrapped up in our notion of the causal relation
responsible for it, then an individual's very existence would be a
principle of its individuality and, arguably, function like a
"difference" with respect to the species. In this case, we could not
abstract from being at all and still have a concept of the individual
essence, 75 since the individual essence would be an individual
essence only through existence.
The apparent inseparability of existence and individuation
when the latter is conceived as consisting in a thing's existential
relation to God, though it does not reduce esse itself to the
principle of individuation, nevertheless makes the event of
individuation unintelligible without the act of existence. Their
necessary correlation, we observed, is unmistakably evident in the
73 Aquinas, Quodl.

2, q. 2, a. 1: "ens autem non ponitur in definitione creaturae, quia nee
est genus nee differentia"; cf. ScG II, c. 53; De Pot., q. 5, a. 4, ad 3; IV Metaphys., lect. 1.
74 The relation of the existential relation to the individual is one of essentiality, because it
belongs to its intelligible structure. It is with respect to the species that the existential relation
(and esse too for that matter) is accidental-falling, that is, outside of its definition. But
because the existential relation determines the species in regard to its singulars, it may be
designated "essentially (or, more precisely, 'individually') determinative" of the species. That
is, its respect to the common nature is analogous to that of a difference to the genus, the latter
relation defined as "essentially determinative." Thus it is not accidental in the fullest sense of
the term (in the sense of neither in a thing's definition nor determinative of any of its essential
principles) even with respect to the species, the concrete realization of which depends upon
that existential relation (though it is always accidental with respect to the species absolutely
considered).
75 The result would supply an additional reason why individuals cannot properly be
defined. One would be unable to form a proper concept of the individual not only because no
universal or common idea of an individual nature may be formed, but also because it would
transcend the order of the essence itself, including in its "notion" an element from the
existential order. It is important to note, however, that, even were esse inseparable from the
individual (formaliter accipitur), this would not imply the necessity of the existence of the
individual since there is no necessity at all that there be this individual. Given this individual,
however, esse necessarily belongs to it.

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passages of Thomas cited by Joseph Owens. The doctrine of their
inseparability can be traced as far back as Boethius, for whom the
individualization of the complete substantial entity is a simultaneous event with being posited in existence/receiving being and
amounts in the final analysis to nothing other than a "mode of
existence. " 76 Within the Boethian structure, the reception of esse
and the determination accomplished by the particularizing
principles are a simultaneous event. They are two distinguishable
aspects of the same realization of a thing's actuality, the former
(esse) being "conditioned" or specified by the latter, stamping a
particular modality upon the manner in which a subsisting thing
exists. That a substance's actuation extra causisis inseparable from
its individuation, however, does not mean that esse is equated
with the formal principle of individuality. In fact, individuality is
here depicted as a mode of existence-having a principle,
therefore, distinct from existence as such. The strength of the
above objection, of course, lies especially in the fact that there is
more than a mere correlation between esse and the existential
relation: the notion of the latter and, therefore, the notion of the
individual essence, seems to include the former.
Nevertheless, there is a sense in which the individual essence
remains abstractable from esse (and, in a certain manner, even
from the existential relation bound up with it), as long as the
individualizing causal relation to God is still retained within its
notion as potential. (Indeed, the possibility of this thing's relation
to God cannot be abstracted from, otherwise it could not be
conceived as this thing.) While the possibility for a relation is
certainly not the same as the actual relation, the inclusion of the
notion of such a possibility-because of its direct reference to the
(hypothetical) actuality with respect to which it is a possibilitywould nevertheless suffice for cognition of an "individual
76 See Boethius, Contra Eutychen, 3; Quomodo sub., 1-8; De Trin., 2; see Hipp, "Person"
in Christian Tradition, 115-19. In this last work, a chapter devoted to Boethius develops (in
dialogue with Cajetan) a notion of individuality conceived as a mode of being; the thesis is
expanded and defended in various places throughout the remainder of the book (see in
particular part 2, chaps. 1 and 7; part 3, chap. 1, discussing Cajetan and Suarez; and part 3,
chap. 2).

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possible," that is, cognition of a possible thing according to such
a relation (inasmuch as it is known with reference to such a
relation). We can consider it, then, according to its possible act of
existence, leaving behind as it were its actual act of existence. To
do so is to consider the causal relation in its potency-that is,
according as an essence's existence is contingent and according as
it is not necessary that such a causal relation (by which it would
exist) be actual to it. In this sense, we may speak of a possible
essence. That possibility translates as a potency with respect to the
act of esse, that is, as a potentiality for the causal relation to God.
Not that a possible essence is anything with an actual or real
potency in itself, but our concept of a possible essence signifies the
essence according to its receptive potency (i.e., according to the
receptive potency which the real essence is or would be) with
respect to the act of existence.
The very notion of a potential inclusion of being in the
individual substantial entity abstracted from the proper act of the
supposit is proposed by Capreolus. 77 Suarez maintains a similar
position, recognizing an extrinsic order to actuality or being on
the part of the substantial entity signified as distinct from the
subsistent, a distinction he explains in terms of modal distinction. 78 One might also add that, in speaking of the essence's
potency for being, we are effectively signifying the essence (as
earlier explained) according as it is the foundation for the relation
in question. Thus, the relation is virtually and indirectly imported
by such a manner of conceptualizing the essence (even if the
relation be viewed here only from the perspective of its
dependence upon its subject, i.e., according to its generic being). 79
77 Capreolus, Def. theol. (Paban-Pegues, eds.), 1:241, 325b-328, 359•-b; 5:22•-h, 105, 110b,
325'-b, 359·-b.
78 Suarez, Disp. Met. 34, s. 4, n. 23, 25, 32, 40-41; see E. Forment, Ser y Persona (2d ed;
Barcelona: Publicacions i Edicions de la Universitat de Barcelona, 1983), 319-25, 339-57,
383-86, 391-94.
79 In other words, the aspect of relation intended here concerns only its esse in, with
respect to which it is wholly dependent upon the substance (by which we acknowledge that
the substance itself is a co-principle of the actual individual). Nevertheless, the identity of the
relation's foundation (the very essence according to its contingency) with the generic being
of the relation should have implications for our notion of the possible essence-which is, in

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Despite these reflections, some will still object that existential
factors cannot make something unique because, contrariwise, the
uniqueness of the existential factors themselves are a consequence
of or follow upon the numerical identity of the thing. 8 For
nothing but some distinct thing can exist, and existence does not
come to nothing. However, this is to speak of existence as
"coming to something," as if there was something to come to
without existence. What is meant is that existence comes to the
idea of the essence had in the mind of God. But what makes that
"idea" individual? Its individual intention, of course. And what
makes that individual intention individual? One of its
conceptually distinguishable components? If we are not to be led
to an infinite regress, we shall be pushed to consider being
again-but in this case either the essence's intentional being in
God, or its objectively possible being. Given the nature of divine
intellection, an essence's intentional being in God is substantially
identical to the divine essence. While this gives the intention a
certain "individuality" (in an analogical sense of the term), it has
nothing to do with the structure of the intention objectively
considered, with respect to which some factor among others
intrinsic to the possible must account for the individuality of the
intention. 81 I argue for its possible being (which, moreover,
cannot be absent from its intentional being), since the possible
being (directly for what concerns the existential relation, and
indirectly for what concerns esse) cannot be abstracted from the
concept of the individual essence. Possible being is necessary for
(intrinsic to) quidditative or essential individuality. Someone may
object that even unicorns have possible being. They do indeed,
and they have an essential individuality, the ultimate conceptual
explanation for which is possible being. But they are not therefore

°

fact, nothing other than the essence qua contingent, i.e., according to its capacity to be.
80 See Duns Scotus, Leet., d. 3, q. 3, 56-57.
81 In God, of course, any such factors, our way of understanding notwithstanding, do not,
when known, correspond to several intentions, but to one simple intellective act, within which
he nonetheless attains to each of these factors according to its distinction. See Aquinas, De
Verit., q. 2, a. 4, c. and ad 4, 6-7, 9.

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individuated in reality. Real being is necessary for real
individuality-that is, for a thing to become an existing individual.
Note that "possible being" does not mean the mere possibility
that something may be, but rather refers to the being (and, more
precisely, the existential relation) that would have to be intrinsic
to the thing in order to account for its thisness, and considers it
as potentially in the essence being conceived. This possible being
is absolutely essential to the thing being conceived. Capreolus
reasons much the same way in his explanation of the formal
constitutive of the supposit, where he distinguishes the common
concrete thing or "concrete supposit" from the singular concrete
thing or simply "supposit," precisely in terms of the being that is
"potentially," "implicitly," or "indirectly" contained in an individual's notion. The former corresponds to our notion of the
forma totius individualis somehow abstracting from actual
existence but not from possible existence, while the latter
corresponds to our concrete existent in possession of its actual
being. 82
Another way around the entire problem might be to suggest
that the notion of divine knowledge of "possible individuals,"
when the latter is understood as signifying a potentially real thing
according to its proper individuality, is contradictory. God knows
every possible thing only as a possible, and therefore as
instantiable. Anything truly individual necessarily exists (and,
therefore, for God to know it would be to know it in its
existence). God has an idea of the manner in which he would like
to create Socrates, but this remains an idea, potentially
multipliable in many until he actually creates an individual
according to that idea. Such an idea is therefore not really an
individual idea (a complete/perfect idea of the individual
Socrates), but an idea of how God could in fact make a Socrates.
I do not deny that God can also have an idea of the possible
Socrates (which I discuss below), but I distinguish the idea of
Socrates from the idea of Socrates as possible. God's knowledge
82 See Capreolus, Def. theol. (Paban-Pegues, eds.), 1:241, 325b-28, 359'\ 5:22•-h, 105,
llOh, 325•-h, 359•·\ see Forment, Ser y Persona, 156, 195-97, 319-25.

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of the individual Socrates (if it is indeed knowledge of Socrates
the individual) must presuppose the individual Socrates (at some
time in the past, present or future for what concerns our temporal
perspective). Thus.God knows the individual only as existent (at
some time)-which is equivalent to saying that God knows the
individual only as individual. This does not make divine
knowledge dependent upon something besides God; it simply
denies that there can be knowledge of some distinct thing that
does not exist at some time, lest there be knowledge without an
object. 83 Such a stance should not be understood as excluding the
scientia simplicis intelligentiae by means of which purely possible
entities are also known by God; it merely maintains that such
knowledge is not really knowledge of the individual, but only of
the potential individual (i.e., knowledge of the individual only as
it is in potentiality). Thus Thomas: "those things that are not
actual have truth according as they are in potentiality, for it is true
that they are in potentiality; and as such they are known by
God." 84 The possibility for this, notwithstanding the fact that "a
thing is known according as it is in act" ("unumquodque
conoscitur secundum quod est actu"), is explained by the fact that
the conditions for the existence of all things exist in God as in
83 The late thirteenth and fourteenth centuries saw unprecedented intellectual debates over
the possibility, in the act of knowing, of an objective representation without an object. That
discussion-preeminently represented by Henry of Ghent, Duns Scotus, Peter Aureolus,
William of Ockham, William of Alnwick, Robert Holcot, Nicholas of Autrecourt, and Gregory
of Rimini-witnessed an evolution, passing by way of the Scotistic separation of subject and
extramental object in the formal act of knowing, to the Ockhamist extreme of a purely
subjective act of knowing. Scotus's innovation meant postulating an ulterior esse
repraesentatum, intermediary between that of the knowing subject (in its act of knowing) and
that of the object known (in esse cognitum). In God, the creature's esse objectivum becomes
a product of the divine intellection, with its corresponding esse diminutum or esse secundum
quid. The Ockhamist revision, for its part, reaches the paradoxical idea of a notitia intuitiva
rei non existentis, and banishes the necessity of every intermediary in human and divine
knowledge alike. I have but touched on the surface of this complex issue; but the present
thesis intends to stand on Thomistic soil, far removed from any of the above. Excellent studies
are provided by E. Gilson, Jean Duns Scot: Introduction ases positions fondamentales (Paris:
Vrin, 1952), 279-316; Muralt, L'enjeu de la philosophie medievale, etudes 3-4 and 8.
84 Aquinas, STh I, q. 14, a. 9, ad 1: "secundum quod sunt in potentia, sic habent veritatem
ea quae non sunt in actu: verum est enim ea esse in potentia. Et sic sciuntur a Deo." See III
Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2.

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their active cause. 85 From this perspective, one may continue to
defend the perfection of God's knowledge of every logically
possible thing-whether realized or yet to be realized (corresponding to his scientia visionis) or merely contained within his
or another's power (corresponding to his scientia simplicis
intelligentiae). For God does not know the possible individual as
existing, but only as being able to exist: "it is in the knowledge of
God not that they be, but that they can be. " 86
Considering knowledge of a thing only as potentially existing
(which, it should be noted, is not really knowledge of the thing in
itself), God could know not only a possible Socrates, but even the
possible Socrates, provided, of course, that the determinate
existential relation in its potentiality enters into the notion. It is
a question of conceptualizing Socrates according to the relation he
would have were he to exist as this individual. Such a notion is
possible because the individuating factor (the existential relation)
is cognizable (* realizable in actuality) without the inclusion of
actual existence-that is, without having to equate its notion with
that of actually existing, even if it implies a reference to actually
existing. The relation itself, moreover, is known only as possible.
While it is true that the real/actual existential relation is what
formally individuates the individual Socrates, it is not necessary to
know that relation in its actuality in order to have knowledge of
the possible Socrates, for the relation in its potentiality uniquely
delimits the possible Socrates (which is the individual Socrates
only according to its intentional existence in the mind of God).
The intentional individuality imported by the notion of the
relation in its potentiality suffices for knowledge of the possible
individual. This is particularly the case in God, given the
perfection of the divine intentionality. While our notion of
intentional individuality admits of a certain abstraction, from both
esse and the actual individuality of the individual being conceived,
and thus fails to capture the true individuality of Socrates, in God
the very intention of Socrates' individuality (and the very notion
See De Verit., q. 2, a. 4, c. and ad 7; q. 2, a. 5.
Aquinas, STh I, q. 14, a. 9, ad 3: "non est in scientia Dei ut ilia sint, sed quod esse
possint."
85

86

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of the possible Socrates) fully contains the real perfection of the
singularity Socrates would enjoy were he to exist. 87 Though the
determinate existential relation be known only as possible, and
though it be known in its cause, and not in itself, it is known
perfectly in its cause because the divine perfection contains every
participated perfection pre-eminently.
The fact that knowledge of this relation (whether possible or
actual) necessitates knowledge (correspondingly possible or
actual) of the subject to which it belongs (and vice versa) nowise
precludes the presence of its idea in God. 88 An "idea" strictly
speaking signifies the form of something that could be produced. 89
But even co-principles of a composite entity (which alone has a
complete and per se act of existing, and to which alone corresponds the perfect notion of an idea in God), 90 have their idea
(taken in a looser sense as notion or similitude) in the divine
essence, as the principle of every principle constituting the
composite. 91 Just as God can know the singular understood as
singular through a potential co-principle (i.e., a co-principle that
is purely potential with respect to the formal actuality of the
nature) and therefore can also know the principle of that
87 "God not only knows that things are in himself; but by the fact that they are in him, he
knows them in their own nature" ("Dicendum est quod Deus non solum cognoscit res esse in
seipso; sed per id quod in seipso continet res, cogniscit eas in propria natura" [Aquinas, STh
1, q. 14, a. 6, ad 1]). Cf. Aquinas, I Sent., d. 35, q. 1, a. 3, ad 1: "the more perfecta medium,
they more perfectly a thing is known in it: and therefore, to the degree that his being exceeds
our own, to the same degree his understanding of the being of the thing, which he knows
through his own being, exceeds our own understanding which regards the being of the thing
and which is received from the thing itself" ("quanto autem medium perfectius est, tanto in
eo res perfectius cognoscitur: et ideo quanto esse suum excedit nostrum, tan to scientia sua de
esse rei, quod cognoscit per esse suum, excedit scientiam nostram, quae est de esse rei accepta
ab ipsa re"). Cf. also I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 1; d. 36, q. 2, a. 1, ad 3; d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 3. See
also Aquinas, De Verit., q. 2, a. 4; ScG I, c. 50.
88 See Aquinas, STh I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3-4; De Verit., q. 3, a. 7.
89 Aquinas, De Verit., q. 3, aa. 5 and 7.
90 Aquinas, I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2-4.
91 "If we take 'idea' in the broader sense as meaning an intelligible character or likeness,
then those things which can be distinctly considered are of themselves able to have distinct
ideas, even though they cannot exist separately" ("Si autem large accipiamus ideam pro
similitudine vel ratione, tune ilia possunt distinctam habere ideam quae possunt distincte
considerari quamvis separatim esse non possint" [Aquinas, De Verit., q. 3, a. 5; cf. q. 3, a. 8,
ad 2]). See STh I, q. 14, a. 11.

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singularity even if that principle is by itself neither realizable nor
intelligible to us, 92 in the same way he can know the individual
(possible or real) through an equally complete understanding of
the existential relation (possible or real).
Following what Thomas seems to affirm in book 1 of his
commentary on the Sentences, it should not be denied that a
potential co-principle has a certain intrinsic intelligibility to God
even when it is taken in precision from its correlative active
principle. Potential principles (even prime matter), to the extent
that they are or can be, are fully intelligible to God, 93 whose mode
of knowing is neither abstractive nor limited by the imperfect
metaphysical state of such objects, since he knows all objects in
knowing himself. 94 This does not mean that God can know actual
prime matter without knowing the composite, nor does it mean
that a perfect "idea" of prime matter (possible or actual) exists in
God, but only that some representation of possible prime matter
is possible in God and that some representation of any other
possible potential or relative principle considered even secundum
se is possible in God in light of the superior mode of being the
intrinsic perfection of that principle (and its intelligible species)
enjoys in God. Whatever perfection is implied in the notion of
such a principle exists absolutely in God and can, therefore, be
known in the divine essence, precision from its correlative
notwithstanding. Of course, it can be so known only according as
it is in God and the unique mode of being this implies, 95 whence
an idea of such a principle considered by itself-and which, to
repeat, cannot be considered by itself except according to its
mode of being in God-intentionally captures that possible
principle less according to the possible mode of being it would
enjoy were it to be created than according to the eternal being it
See Aquinas, I Sent., d. 36, q. 2, a. 3, ad 2 and 4; I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 2, ad 3.
See, in addition to the indicated passages from the commentary on the Sentences,
Aquinas, De Verit., q. 2, a. 5; q. 3, a. 5; De spir. creat., a. 1; De Malo, q. 1, a. 2; De Anima,
q. 7 (end); Comp. theol., c. 19. Cf. (as a balance) STh I, q. 15, a. 3, ad 3; De spir. creat., a. 3;
De princ. nat., c. 1.
94 Aquinas, STh I, q. 14, a. 11, c. and ad 1.
95 See Aquinas, I Sent., d. 36, q. 1, a. 3, ad 2.
92

93

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

has in God. 96 All of this serves simply to confirm the presence in
God of distinct ideas for an individual nature, its individuating
relation (or any other principle of individuation) and the
foundation for that relation (or any other principle correlative of
the individuating factor). 97
Thus God can fully know-"vel per ideas distinctas, vel per
cognitionem suae potentiae" -both the existential relation
(according to all of its perfection) and the foundation for that
relation. And this foundation, although nothing other than the
individual nature according to its potentiality for being, is
logically distinct from the natura individualis as such, since it
signifies that essence differently than it is signified by the name
"individual." Both of these come together either in actuality to
constitute the individual nature or logically to constitute the
"possible individual."
VIII. DEEP SIGNIFICANCE OF THE ISSUE

Considerations of a substance's objective possibility and of the
divine ideas are not only important for replying to objections
against positing an existential factor as the formal principle of
individuation, but also are necessary for a deeper understanding
of the dynamic relationship between potency and act interior to
the coordinated causes that make the individual. Earlier I
96 This last point holds a fortiori for what concerns pure possibles: "But those things which
are not, nor were, nor will be, and which nevertheless could be, could have been, or could be
in the future, given that they do not exist in themselves, do not in themselves have any
distinction, nor exist except in the power of God himself ... therefore God does not know
these things by way of distinct ideas, but through the knowledge of his power, in which they
are found" ("sed ea quae nee sunt nee fuerunt nee erunt, et tamen potuissent esse vel fuisse
vel futura esse, cum in seipsis non sint, nullam in seipsis distinctionem habent, nee sunt nisi
in potentia ipsius Dei... ideo haec Deus non cognoscit per ideas distinctas, sed per
cognitionem suae potentiae, in qua sunt" [Aquinas, III Sent., d. 14, q. 1, a. 2, sol. 2]).
97 It is obviously also the case that God can have an idea not only of the individual nature
but also of all of its constitutive principles when the latter are considered in the composite,
i.e., according to their unity in the subject. In this connection, see Aquinas, STh I, q. 15, a. 3,
ad 3-4; and De Verit., q. 3, a. 8, ad 2 on the unity of the idea of an individual, its species, and
any particularizing features and the plurality of ideas which each represents from the
perspective of pure intelligibility.

EXISTENTIAL RELATION AS PRINCIPLE OF INDIVIDUATION

105

addressed a concern that, because the foundation, and therefore
the esse in (generic being) of the relation, is in the substance (and
even identical to the latter when properly signified), it might seem
that the principle of individuation (or at least its ultimate
condition) reduces to nothing other than the substance. The
difficulty was resolved by affirming a reciprocal determination
between the individual's existential relation to God and the
(substantial) subject of that relation. But it is worth noting here
again, as a way of illustrating the relevance of the divine ideas to
our understanding of the dynamics of the existential relation, that
the foundation in question is the potentiality of the substance, that
is, its potency for being. This potency, considered in itself, and
not insofar as it is equivalent to the actual essence considered in
relation to its actuality, is nothing other than the possibility that
God's infinite perfection be imitable in a manner corresponding
to the individual essence in question. 98
CONCLUSION

In light of the forgoing considerations, I submit that it is
precisely a particular relation to God that ultimately individuates
every individual res (meaning every individual substance, only
substances being truly individual in the full sense). That relation
is responsible for each substance's thisness, while the individual's
form (jorma totius individualis) as such is what makes the
substance not to be "this here," but rather to be what it is. Being
what it is implies something other than just being distinct from
some other thing and indivisible; it means to be distinct and one
in a particular way, by being this particular (and this individual)
"kind" of substance (such a substance), this individual quiddity. 99
98 This also testifies to a certain mysterious continuity between "possible individuals" in
the mind of God and the corresponding individuals existing in the extramental order.
99 The various aspects just identified-namely,
distinction from others, indivisibility, and
quiddity-which are proper to every individual substance, correspond (in the language of
Thomas) to the notions of aliquid, unum, and res, each of which, though convertible with
being in general, expresses a different mode of being in general. It is the principle of
individuation that explains the former two (which differ from one another only according to
the manner in which transcendental unity is signified: as relative to others or absolutely),

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STEPHEN A. HIPP

For better or for worse, it follows from this understanding of
individuation by transcendental relation that the coming to be of
substances by way of generation or eduction implies the coming
to be of new existential relations to God. Furthermore, when
sodium and chlorine, for example, unite to form a new substance
in the universe of created reality, the result is that two distinct
relations to God have disappeared and been replaced by a single
relation to God on the part of the now single substance called salt,
or sodium chloride. Therefore, in the change observed in nature
whereby several substances combine to form one, or one
substance is broken into many substances, we are witnessing a
constant and continual reduction and multiplication, respectively,
of existential relations to God. God himself never changes in this
respect. But the real relations to God are constantly changing in
this world, ceaselessly coming to be and disappearing, in exact
correspondence with-and directly and formally (albeit not
independently) responsible for-the coming to be and
disappearing of individuals. 100

while the name res is ascribed to being on account exclusively of the essence. See Aquinas, De
Verit., q. 1, a. 1.
100! wish to express my gratitude to Dr. Charles Merrill for his many hours of invaluable
editorial work.

The Thomist 72 (2008): 107-46

ALBERT THE GREAT AND THOMAS AQUINAS ON
PERSON, HYPOSTASIS, AND HYPOSTATIC UNION

COREY L. BARNES

Oberlin College
Oberlin, Ohio

A

NY DISCUSSION OF Albert the Great on the hypostatic
union must account for his occasional references to two
hypostases or to a purely human hypostasis in Christ,
together with Albert's insistence on the truth of the Lombard's
second Christological opinion, the subsistent or composite-person
theory. Such accounts were offered by V.-M. Pollet and M. Lamy
de la Chapelle. 1 Since then, much relevant research into late
twelfth- and early thirteenth-century views on the hypostatic
union 2 and into Albert's extensive reflections on personhood 3 has

1 See V.-M. Pollet, "Le Christ d'apres S. Albert le Grand," La vie spirituelle 34 (1933): 78108; "L'union hypostatique d'apres S. Albert le Grand," Revue thomiste 38 (1933): 502-32,
689-724; M. Lamy de la Chapelle, "L'unite ontologique du Christ selon saint Albert le
Grand," Revue thomiste 70 (1970): 181-226, 534-89. Pollet, "L'union hypostatique d'apres
S. Albert le Grand," offers the most direct and extensive treatment of Albert's references to
two hypostases.
2 Most obvious in this regard are W. H. Principe, The Theology of the Hypostatic Union
in the Early Thirteenth Century, 4 vols. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1963-75); L. 0. Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy in the Twelfth Century: A Study of Gilbert
of Porreta's Thinking and Theological Expositions of the Doctrine of the Incarnation during
the Period 1130-1180, Acta theologica danica 15 (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1982); and M. Colish,
Peter Lombard, 2 vols. (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 1994).
3 S. Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition and the Conception of Saint Albert the Great:
A Systematic Study of its Concept as Illuminated by the Mysteries of the Trinity and the
Incarnation, Beitriige zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie im Mittelalter (Munster:
Aschendorff, 2001). Hipp's remarkably detailed study provides much of the background for
Albert's characterization of personhood and will be relied upon heavily here. See also A.

107

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COREY L. BARNES

appeared. Informed by this research, it is possible to set Albert's
references to two hypostases within the context of early
thirteenth-century Christological debates and Albert's own
presentation of 'person' and 'hypostasis'.
The import and potential dangers of Albert's formulations
come into sharp focus in comparison to Thomas Aquinas's
presentation of 'person', 'hypostasis', and 'hypostatic union'. This
comparison also sheds light on Thomas's Christology as it reveals
a shift in perspective from that of early thirteenth-century
Christologies. More specifically, examination of this issue helps
to explain why Thomas does not share his teacher Albert's
understanding of 'person', yet develops the basic lines of Albert's
presentation of unity and duality in Christ, particularly in terms
of Christ's esse. Reading Thomas in light of Albert's Christology
provides a valuable and underutilized perspective for examining
various issues in Thomas's Christology. This essay will offer interpretations of Albert and Thomas that highlight the continuities
and discontinuities between these learned Dominicans.
This investigation will begin with the background of late
twelfth- and early thirteenth-century presentations of 'person'.
Particular attention will be given to any distinctions made between
'person' and 'hypostasis'. This background well frames Albert's
definition of 'person' in terms of per se unity, per se singularity,
and per se incommunicability. The focus here will be on the three
types of incommunicability distinctive of persons. Thomas
Aquinas rejects any distinction of 'person' and 'hypostasis' based
upon any type of incommunicability. This disagreement largely
relates to the Lombard's three opinions on the mode of union in
the Incarnation: the homo assumptus theory, the subsistent or
composite-person theory, and the habitus theory (III Sent., d. 6).
This essay will argue that Albert's affirmation of two hypostases
or of a purely human hypostasis in Christ is intended to combat
the habitus theory and the (in Albert's mind) related view that
Christ according as man was not something (Christus secundum
Hufnagel, "Das Person-Problem bei Albertus Magnus," in Studia Albertina: Festschrift fur
Bernhard Geyer zum 70. Geburtstage (Munster: Aschendorff: 1952), 202-33.

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATIC UNION

109

quad homo non est aliquid), otherwise known as Christological
nihilianism. When Albert directs his attention to the homo
assumptus opinion, he stresses the unity of person and hypostasis
in Christ through a discussion of Christ's esse. These various
affirmations are best reconciled by accepting Albert's use of
'hypostasis' both as a term of first intention or first imposition
(i.e., a name for a thing) and as a term of second intention (i.e.,
a name for an abstraction). Albert's equivocal use of 'hypostasis'
corresponds to similar understandings of the term in other early
thirteenth-century Christologies and so corresponds to the
perception of the habitus theory and Christological nihilianism as
urgent Christological concerns.
Thomas rejects any equivocal use of 'hypostasis', fearing that
affirmation of it as a name of second intention allows for positing
two hypostases in Christ. Such equivocal use thus risks sliding
toward Nestorianism. We can thus see a shift in perception
between Albert and Thomas as to the most pressing Christological
concerns. For Thomas, shades of Nestorianism coloring popular
formulations of the Lombard's second opinion represents the
greatest Christological danger. Though he rejects Albert's language of two hypostases, Thomas repeats Albert's reformulation
of Christological questions in terms of esse. Albert's discussion of
Christ's esse stresses the union of two natures in Christ and seeks
to avoid the first and third opinions through the formula of unum
duplex esse. Thomas follows Albert's logic but does not employ
the formula of unum duplex esse, perhaps due to fears that this
formula could be misinterpreted in support of a two hypostases
view. Thomas's adherence to Albert's method of Christological
unity through unity of esse also casts doubt upon contemporary
interpretations of Thomas as supporting two esses in Christ.
I. LATE MEDIEVAL CONCEPTIONS OF PERSON

Twelfth- and thirteenth-century discussions of 'person' built
upon the foundation laid by Boethius (ca. 480-ca. 524 ). Boethius's
definition of 'person' as an individual substance of rational nature

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COREY L. BARNES

("persona est rationalis naturae individua substantia") 4 set the
basic terms for Scholastic reflections on personhood. 5 The
overriding question for later theologians concerned the meaning
of 'individual substance' in Boethius's definition. As Boethius
knew from Aristotle, substantia could be taken for primary
substance (the existing individual or hypostasis) or secondary
substance (essence or nature). An 'individual' secondary substance
seems an obvious contradiction. If, however, 'substance' in
Boethius's definition of person indicates primary substance, the
addition of 'individual' seems unnecessary. 6 The very use of
substantia in the
of person is curious as well. Boethius
generally recognizes a distinction of substantia and subsistentia
according to which the subsistent subsists "on account of an
essence's reception of its actuality" and may exist either as a
substance (through the medium of its particularizing aspect) or as
4 Boethius, Liber contra Eutychen et Nestorium, c. 3, with the common variant "naturae
rationabilis individua substantia" (Boethius, The Theological Tractates [New York: G. P.
Putnam's Sons, 1926]). Boethius notes that the Greeks can this hypostasis: "What the Greeks
can hypostasis we designate with this definition" ("Sed nos hac definitione earn quam Graeci
upostasiV dicunt terminauimus" [ibid.]). "The Greeks designate the individual subsistence of
rational nature with the far more expressive name hypostasis, but we lacking such an
expressive term have retained the common name, caning person what they can hypostasis; but
Greece, more skinful with words, calls an individual subsistence a hypostasis" (ibid.).
5 For more on Boethius's definition of person and understanding of individuation, see
Hipp, "Person" in the Christian Tradition, 115-35; B. Wald, '"Rationalis naturae individua
substantia': Aristo tel es, Boethius und der Begriff der Person im Mittelalter ," in Jan A. Aertsen
and Andreas Speer, eds., Individuum und Individualitat im Mittelalter (Berlin: Walter de
Gruyter, 1996), 371-88; J. J.E. Gracia, "The Legacy of the Early Middle Ages," in J. J.E.
Gracia, ed., Individuation in Scholasticism: The Later Middle Ages and the CounterReformation, 1150-1650 (New York: State University of New York Press, 1994), 21-38; M.
Nedoncene, "Les variations de Boece sur la personne," Revue des sciences religieuses 29
(1955): 201-38.
6 Gracia notes that Boethius presents diverse accounts of 'substance' and 'individual'. "A
third important area where Boethius's thought on individuality had a marked impact upon
subsequent discussions has to do with the extension of 'individual'. For, although Boethius
does not seem to adopt a clear position on this in an instances, there are many places where
he makes comments relevant to this issue. In some works he clearly accepts not only
Aristotelian primary substances but also their features as individual. In other places, however,
he seems to speak as if some features of substances, and indeed substances themselves, were
not individual. In the area of the ontology of individuality, Boethius does not say anything
very clear, but he speaks of the 'property' and 'quality' of individuals" (Gracia, "The Legacy
of the Early Middles Ages," 24).

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATICUNION

111

a nonsubstantial subsistent (such as God). 7 Stephen Hipp notes
that subsistentia differentiates this particular subsistence from
other essences and indicates independence from accidents while
substantia "designates being placed under accidents as a
substrate. " 8 Subsistence is thus a general designation realized in
two ways, the substantial and the non- or supra-substantial.
Granting Hipp's characterization of this distinction, Boethius's
definition of 'person' seems restricted to those individuals of
rational nature that stand under accidents and so would not apply
to the divine persons.
For these and other reasons, subsequent theologians found it
necessary to elaborate upon or replace Boethius's definition in
order for it to serve the requisite tasks of Trinitarian theology and
Christology. Richard of St. Victor (d. 1173) thought the
definition, especially its formulation in terms of substance,
inadequate in a Trinitarian context. 9 Literally applying Boethius's
definition of 'person' to God would yield the absurd conclusion
that the divine substance is not one alone or that the Trinity is a
Hipp, "Person" in the Christian Tradition, 115.
Ibid., 121; see also 119, 124-27. Nedoncelle disputes the perceived tension between
defining person according to substance or subsistence. "If the reader pays attention to the
words we have just emphasized, he will no longer wrongly insist upon the antithesis of
subsistentia and substantia; on the contrary he will notice the equivalence between individua
subsistentia and substantia, and he will affirm that this chapter, though reputedly obscure, is
perfectly consistent, if not transparent" (Nedoncelle, "Les variations de Boece sur la
personne," 220).
9 ]. Ribaillier describes the issue and Richard's solution to this difficulty. "Richard, who
restricts the word substantia to its abstract sense, proposes to substitute the words
incommunicabilis existentia for individua substantia; he intends to justify the use of the word
'person' as applied to the Trinity, a term/usage Augustine admits only ex necessitate for lack
of anything better, and which seems to the Victorine to have been inspired by the Holy Spirit.
If one appeals to etymology, the word existentia in effect signifies two things: substance, quad
est, and origin, unde habeat esse. The divine Persons, who belong to the class of existents, as
do all other persons, can then be distinguished according to origin, without, however, being
differentiated according to substance. Within the standard Augustinian [framework], Richard
produced an original work" (Ribaillier, "Introduction," in Richard de Saint-Victor: De
Trinitate [Paris: J. Vrin, 1958], 24). For a discussion of Richard's definition of person geared
toward contemporary Trinitarian theology, see N. Den Bok, Communicating the Most High:
A Systematic Study of Person and Trinity in the Theology of Richard of St. Victor ( + 1173)
(Paris: Brepols, 1996). Den Bok discusses Richard's definition of person within the context
of other twelfth-century views on 203-42.
7

8

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COREY L. BARNES

person, which conclusions lead Richard to reject Boethius's
definition. 10 Richard holds that "a divine person is an incommunicable existence [incommunicabilis existentia] of the divine
nature" (De Trinitate, 4.22) and later adds that a person must
exist through itself alone (De Trinitate, 4.24).11 These
formulations stress incommunicability and a per se mode of
existence. Richard's Trinitarian specifications of personhood
enriched the larger discussion of personhood and exercised a
decisive influence on subsequent Trinitarian and Christological
discussions.
William of Auxerre (d. 1231) provided a bridge from twelfthto thirteenth-century theology. 12 William's Summa aurea (121520), which develops themes from the Lombard's Sentences along
more Aristotelian lines of rational demonstration, enjoyed vast
popularity in the thirteenth century. The Summa aurea's
investigation of Christology reflects the lines of development
begun in the late twelfth century, and these lines encourage
William to specify the meaning of 'person' and 'hypostasis'. 13
10 "In order for the [definition] to be universal and complete, it is necessary that every
individual substance of rational nature be a person, and, conversely, that every person be an
individual of rational nature. Consequently, I ask about the divine substance. Since it is not
but one alone, I ask whether it is individual. That the divine substance indeed is the Trinity
of persons, which is believed without doubt, manifestly disproves what was approved above.
If, therefore, the divine substance must be called individual, there is some individual that is
not a person, for the Trinity is not a person nor can it rightly be called a person" (Richard of
St. Victor, De Trinitate, 4.21).
11 "Perhaps it will be more straightforward and more useful for comprehension if we say
that a person is existing through itself alone as [iuxta] a certain singular mode of rational
existence. Enough was noted above about how 'existing' should be accepted. Therefore, we
add 'through itself alone' because person is never rightly said expect about a specific and single
one discrete from all others by a singular property" (De Trinitate, 4.24).
12 Little is known of William's life. See C. Ottaviano, Guglielmo d'Auxerre (d.1231): La
vita, le opere, ii pensiero (Rome: L'Universale Tipografia Poliglotta, 1931), 7-29; J. A. St.
Pierre, "The Theological Thought of William of Auxerre: An Introductory Bibliography,"
Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 33 (1966): 147-55; B. T. Coolman, Knowing
God by Experience: The Spiritual Senses in the Theology of William of Auxerre (Washington,
D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004). Coolman's analysis of the spiritual
senses in the Summa aurea sheds much light on the general tone of William's theology.
13 As will be discussed below, late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Christologies came
to concentrate on questions of the unity or duality of Christ and of whether Christ secundum
quod homo est aliquid. "The importance of following the evolution in the twelfth-century

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATIC UNION

113

Expanding upon Boethius's definition, William argues that
personhood requires a threefold distinction: singularity, incommunicability, and dignity. Particularly relevant here is William's
application of this threefold distinction to the Incarnation, for he
holds that the Word's human nature, which William often
designates as "Jesus," lacks only the third distinction. 14 Based
upon this distinction, William can deny that the Word assumed a
person or a man while affirming that Christ according as he is
man is something (secundum quod homo est aliquid), namely, the
individual human nature or subject "Jesus."
Alexander of Hales (ca. 1186-1245) plotted the course
followed by much of later Scholastic theology when he began to
lecture from the Lombard's Sentences. 15 Alexander offers three
definitions of 'person': Boethius's, Richard of St. Victor's, and a
third anonymous definition that highlights the property of dignity
("persona est hypostasis distincta proprietate ad dignitatem
theology of the union in Christ becomes clear from an examination of William of Auxerre's
investigation of this mystery. For it is evident from the beginning-and the whole question
De Incamatione confirms this-that for him even more than for his predecessors the more
recent problem of the unity or duality of Christ is both his way of access to this mystery and
one of his main concerns in analyzing it. Thus his brief presentation of the three opinions is
put in terms of aliquid and non-est-aliquid on the one hand and unum and duo on the other"
(W. H. Principe, William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union [vol. 1 of The
Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century], 71).
14 "Solution: We say that Jesus, in as much as Jesus, is not a person. To be a person,
something must fulfill three requirements: singularity, incommunicability, and dignity.
Singularity is in the soul of Socrates as well as in Socrates, who by his singular existence differs
from every other thing, because he is distinguished from the universal. The distinction of
incommunicability is in Socrates from the fact that he is not communicable as a part, because
he cannot come as a part into composition with another.
Such distinction [of
incommunicability] is not [found] in the soul or body. So, neither the soul nor the body is a
properly a person, because neither is per se unum or per se sonans. As Boethius says in De
Duabus Naturis et Una Persona Christi, neither of those [soul or body] is a person. Socrates
possesses dignity from the fact that his humanity is not mixed with a more dignified form but
is distinct from any more dignified form. In just the same way, Peter is truly a person and Paul
is truly a person, because in them the three distinctions concur. The last distinction is not
[found] in Jesus as Jesus, because his Jesuitas is joined to a more dignified form in the Son of
God and so is not distinguished from a more dignified [form]" (William of Auxerre, De
Incamatione 8.10, in Principe, William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 27576).
15 On Alexander's use of the Lombard's Sentences, see I. Brady, "The Distinctions of
Lombard's Book of Sentences and Alexander of Hales," Franciscan Studies 25 (1965): 90-116.

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COREY L. BARNES

pertinente") (Glossa 1.23.9). 16 The distinction of dignity, as
Alexander explicates it, precludes the individual human nature
assumed into union with the Word from being a person. The
specific characteristics of the property of dignity are never fully
clarified but do involve a moral dimension. 17 In short, Alexander
presents three definitions of 'person' and uses the distinction of
dignity noted in the third definition to defend the Lombard's
second opinion together with the affirmation that Christ is aliquid
secundum quad homo. The definition of 'person' in terms of
dignity put forth by William of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales
and its use to deny personhood of the individual human nature
assumed to the person of the Word provide the backdrop for
interpreting Albert the Great's presentation.
II. ALBERT THE GREAT AND THOMAS AQUINAS
ON PERSON AND ITS RELATION TO HYPOSTASIS

Albert the Great (1200-1280) earned the designation
"Universal Doctor" through the staggering breadth of his
learning. 18 This breadth was not at the expense of depth, a fact
particularly evident in Albert's conception of 'person'. As did his
predecessors, Albert begins with Boethius's definition and
elaborates upon it in service of specific Trinitarian and Christological requirements. In his Commentarii on the Lombard's
Sentences (completed in 1249), Albert explicates Boethius's
16 Alexander of Hales, Glossa in quatuor libros sententiarum Petri Lombardi, Bibliotheca
Franciscana Scholastica Medii Aevi, 12-15 (Quaracchi: Collegium S. Bonaventurae, 19 51-57).
The Summa halensis attributes this third definition to the Magistri.
17 "Thus Alexander distinguishes person, individual, and subject by saying that person is
referred to the moral
individual pertains to the rational order, and subject belongs to
the natural order [Glossa I, 25, 4]" (W. H. Principe, Alexander of Hales' Theology of the
Hypostatic Union [vol. 2 of The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth
Century], 60).
18 On Albert's life, see G. Schwaiger, "Albertus Magnus," in "Nimm und lies": Christliche
Denker von Origenes bis Erasmus von Rotterdam (Stuttgart: Verlag W. Kohlhammer, 1991),
171-81; J. Weisheipl, "The Life and Works of St. Albert the Great," inAlbertus Magnus and
the Sciences: Commemorative Essays 1980 (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies,
1980), 13-51. On the universal character of Albert's knowledge, see M.-D. Chenu, "The
Revolutionary Intellectualism of St. Albert the Great," Blackfriars 19 (1938): 5-15.

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definition in terms of per se unity, per se singularity, and per se
incommunicability. 19 These three types of perseity indicate the
same basic reality but differ according to our mode of
understanding. Per se unity indicates a subsisting whole and
"means that a thing is indivisible in itself and divisible from
others. " 20 Per se singularity indicates the singular mode by which
an individual exists as a supposit. This means that every person is
a person in a unique manner, even persons within the same
species. Albert employs this principle to explain how Christ holds
humanity in common with all other human beings while
expressing that human nature through the divine personality of
the Word. 21 My focus here will be on per se incommunicability,
19 "TO THIS it should be said that person, according to the very meaning of the term,
requires something per se unum. Person requires also per se incommunicability to another,
because it is not in the potency of another, nor is it predicated of another, as was said above.
Similarly, person requires something of itself singular. And so, there are three [requirements],
namely, unity, singularity, and incommunicability" (Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in III
Sententiarum, d. 5, a. 15 [Opera Omnia, vol. 28 (Paris: Borgnet, 1894)]). In his De
Incarnatione, Albert's definition of person clearly reflects the influence of Alexander. Albert
writes: "Person is a supposit of rational nature distinct by a property pertaining to dignity,
either natural or moral" (De Incarnatione III, q. 3, a. 4 [Opera Omnia, vol. 26 (Munster:
Aschendorff, 1958)]). De Incarnatione was likely completed prior to Albert's Commentarii on
book 3 of the Lombard's Sentences. On the dating of these works, see I. Backes, "Das zeitliche
Verhaltnis der Summa De incarnatione zu dem dritten Buche des SentenzekommentarsAlberts
des GroGen," in Studia Albertina: Festschrift fur Bernhard Geyer zum 70. Geburtstage
(Miinster: Aschendorff, 1952), 32-51; 0. Lattin, "Commentaire des Sentences et Somme
theologique d'Albert le Grand," Recherches de theologie ancienne et medievale 8 (1936): 11753.
20 Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition, 240. Hipp argues that in human beings the per
se unity derives from substance, while in God it derives from the properties of origin (ibid.,
282).
21 For persons that differ in the ontological order, "different modes of distinction
constitute personal singularity" (ibid., 299-300). Individuation in human beings derives from
particular matter and the proper accidents deriving from that matter (ibid., 303). Among
human beings there is a community of universality (as particulars of the universal rational
nature). However, the community shared by human beings as concrete subjects "is a
community of the notion of supposit" (ibid., 323), consisting of a common relation to a
universal nature. This community is had in the supposital act, which is similar though not
identical for all human persons. The Christological benefit of this view is precisely in the
community of the notion of supposit. Since every supposit of a common nature is an
individuation of that nature in a unique way, no two supposits are supposits in precisely the
same way. That the person in Christ is the divine person of the Word thus poses no grave
problem for Christ's community with humanity.

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particularly as expressed in Christology. The language of per se
incommunicability offers the greatest detail and so is most
revealing of Albert's thought. The distinction of person based
upon incommunicability is also Thomas's point of greatest
contention with Albert's view of 'person'.
For Albert, personhood excludes three types of communicability: the communicability of the universal, the communicability of the substantial part, and the communicability of
assumptability or of union into the singularity of another. 22
Christ's human nature displays all the necessary characteristics for
personhood except this third type of incommunicability, which
is proper to Christ's human nature and prevents the individual
human nature assumed from being a person. 23 In other words, this
third. type of incommunicability, of which there are no other
examples, functions in Albert's Christology much as the
distinction of dignity functioned in the Christologies of William
of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales.
Thomas Aquinas (1225-74) spent his formative years as a
theology student (1245-52) under the guidance of Albert, first in

22 "Thus persona involves a greater completion [est majoris concretionis], namely that in
its natural dignity from rational nature it is distinct by a property making it incommunicable
in three ways (according to three modes). Person is not communicable as a part, as is a soul
or a body. It is not communicable as a universal, such that it could be predicated of many.
It is not communicable through union in the singularity of another, as we said in the preceding
distinction. This should be conceded" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 2). "It should be said that, in truth,
the Master's approach does not agree with the meaning of substance. He intends to show that
the things posited do not suffice to define person, because person is not sufficiently defined
when it is called a substance of rational nature unless individual is added. When individual
is added, the definition does not befit this man Uesus], according as man (secundum quod
homo), in that sense by which according as notes the cause or condition of nature. This is so
because individual posits a triple incommunicability. It names something incommunicable to
many, incommunicable through opposition to the communicability of a part in composition,
and incommunicable through opposition to the communicability through assumption into the
singularity of another, as was made clear above" (III Sent., d. 10, a. 3).
23 "Although the human nature of Christ is distinguished from all other things only
through its particular 'collectio accidentum', and although it also possess a spiritual nature
[geistige Natur], nevertheless it lacks its own personal property, through which it becomes
incommunicable in the above-mentioned sense" (Hufnagel, "Das Person-Problem beiAlbertus
Magnus," 224).

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Paris and then in Cologne. 24 Albert's influence on Thomas was
considerable. Thomas followed Albert on many points and only
adhered to an opposing position cautiously and with strong
reasons. Debates over the definition of 'person' illustrate this well.
Albert finished his Commentarii in 1249, so the young Thomas
would have been familiar with Albert's elaboration of Boethius's
definition in terms of per se unity, per se singularity, and per se
incommunicability. Thomas, in a manner surprising given the
regular practice of expanding upon the various definitions of
'person', begins and ends with Boethius's definition, defending it
with explanations but few supplements. More to the point,
Thomas rejects defining 'person' according to incommunicability
and rejects differentiating 'person' and 'hypostasis' according to
the incommunicability of assumptability. Though this is clear
already in his Scriptum on the Lombard's Sentences (1252-56), 25
it is most evident in the disputed questions De Potentia (126566).26 The objections of question 9, article 2 of De Potentia
challenge every word of Boethius's definition. Thomas defends
24 The best introduction to Thomas's life and works is J.-P. Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas:
vol. 1, The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic
University of America Press, 1996); see 18-35 on Thomas's years as a student under Albert.
See also J. Weisheipl, Thomas d'Aquino and Albert His Teacher (Toronto: Pontifical Institute
of Mediaeval Studies, 1980).
25 In response to a criticism of Boethius's definition based upon the use of substantia,
Thomas presents and dismisses Albert's own presentation of person. "Some say that substance
[in the definition of person] is taken for hypostasis and that there is a triple incommunicability
to the definition [ratio] of person. The first type of incommunicability frees [person] from
the community of the universal. The second frees [person] from the community of particulars
that belong in the constitution of a whole. The third frees [person] from the community of
assumptability of being conjoined to a more dignified thing, as we say. This third type of
incommunicability prevents the human nature in Christ from being a person. [Proponents of
this view] say that the name hypostasis removes the ratio of the universal and particular and
that the addition of individual removes the communicability of assumptability. The first
[interpretation] is better, because [the interpretation of three types of incommunicability]
cannot be dragged out of the signification of these words. Beyond that, the objection remains
how substance is taken in the definition of hypostasis, since we say that hypostasis is an
individual substance" (Thomas Aquinas, I Sent., d. 25, q. 1, a. 1, ad 7 [Opera Omnia, vol. 6
(Parma, 18 5 6)]).
26 For the dates of these works, see Torrell, Saint Thomas Aquinas, 1:36-53, 161-64. The
disputed questions De Potentia date from Thomas's first year teaching in Rome and slightly
precede the beginning of the Summa Theologiae's Prima Pars.

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COREY L. BARNES

each word and explains its meaning. The seventh objection argues
that 'individual' was unnecessary in the definition because the
'substance' referred to is clearly primary substance, in which case
individual adds no useful specification. Aquinas responds:
It should be said that some say that substance is posited in the definition of
person just as it signifies hypostasis, but since individual belongs to the ratio of
hypostasis according as it is opposed to the community of universals or of
parts-because no universal, nor any part, such as a hand or foot, can be called
a hypostasis-individual belongs in a higher degree to the ratio of person,
according as 'it is opposed to the community of assumptability. For they say that
human nature in Christ is a hypostasis but not a person. And therefore [they say
that] individual is added to the definition of person in order to exclude
assumptability. 27

The 'some' (quidam) mentioned by Thomas equate substance and
hypostasis and define these as incommunicable in terms of universals and parts. They further argue that 'individual' adds to
substance the incommunicability of assumptability. Distinguishing
'hypostasis' and 'person' according to the incommunicability of
assumptability allows for the assumption of a hypostasis. Thomas
fears the distinction is made for the very purpose of specifying the
Word's assumption of a hypostasis though not a person. 28 This
27 "Ad septimum dicendum, quod quidam dicunt, quod substantia ponitur in definitione
personae prout significat hypostasim, sed cum de ratione hypostasis sit individuum, secundum
quod opponitur communitati universalis vel parti-quia nullum universale, nee aliqua pars,
ut manus vel pes, potest dici hypostasis-ulterius de ratione personae est individuum,
secundum quod opponitur communitati assumptibilis. Dicunt enim, quod humana natura in
Christo est hypostasis, sed non persona. Et ideo ad excludendum assumptibilitatem additur
individuum in definitione personae" (Thomas Aquinas, De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 7 [Quaestiones
disputatae, vol. 2 (Turin: Marietti, 1949)]).
28 Thomas repeats this argument in the Summa Theologiae. "It should be said that
according to soq:1e substance is posited in the definition of person for primary substance,
which is the hypostasis. Nevertheless, they say the addition of individual [in the definition of
person] is not superfluous, because by the name hypostasis or primary substance the ratio of
universal and of part is excluded, for we do not say that universal man (homo communis) is
a hypostasis, nor a hand, since it is a part. The addition of individual excludes assumptability
from the ratio of person, for the human nature in Christ is not a person, since it was assumed
by a more dignified [form], namely by the Word of God. - But it is better to say that
substance is taken commonly, just as it is divided through primary and secondary. Through
the addition of individual, [substance] is assumed to stand for primary substance" (Thomas
Aquinas, STh I, q. 29, a. 1, ad 2 [Summa Theologiae (Ottawa: Commissio Piana, 1941)]).

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119

fear seems to be directed toward or at least to include Albert's
view of 'person' and the question of the Word's assumption of a
human hypostasis.
III. THE MODE OF UNION IN CHRIST
ACCORDING TO ALBERT THE GREAT

Peter Lombard's (1095/1100-1160) Sentences exerted immense
influence on late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century theology. 29
The general framework for thirteenth-century discussions of
Christology was provided by three opinions enumerated by the
Lombard in distinction 6 of the third book: homo assumptus,
subsistent or composite-person, and habitus. 30 The first opinion
(homo assumptus) holds that a rational soul and human body
were united to constitute a true human being and that this human
being began to be God through its assumption to the person of the
Word. The second opinion (subsistent or composite-person) holds
that the human being Jesus Christ is composed of two natures
(divine and human) and three substances (divinity, soul, and
body). This opinion holds that before the Incarnation the person
of the Word was simple but that after the Incarnation he was
composite. The third opinion (habitus) holds that Christ's body
and soul were not united so as to form a substance but were
29 On Peter's life and works, see Colish, Peter Lombard, 1:15-32; and P. Rosemann, Peter
Lombard (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 34-53. One underappreciated influence
of the Lombard was in his use of John Damascene's De fide orthodoxa as an authoritative
source. "The second redaction of the Collectanea contains revisions informed by the teachings
of John Damascene, whom Peter was the first Latin theologian to use in 1154 after his
translation from Greek; he draws on this authority even more extensively in the Sentences,
especially in Trinitarian theology and Christology" (Marcia Colish, "Peter Lombard," in The
Medieval Theologians: An Introduction to Theology in the Medieval Period, ed. G. R. Evans
[Oxford: Blackwell, 2001], 168-83, at 169). Peter quotes the Damascene according to
Burgundio's translation, undertaken at the request of Pope Eugene III, which Peter had
perused during his trip to Rome in 1154. Curiously, Peter only quotes those portions of the
Damascene also available in the earlier and partial translation by Cerbanus (De fide orthodoxa
III.1-8). See E. M. Buytaert, ed., De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio and Cerbanus (St.
Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute, 1955).
30 The Lombard presents these three· opinions in distinction 6 of book 3 of the Sentences.
See Peter Lombard, Sententiae in N Libris Distinctae, Cure PP. collegii S. Bonaventurae ad
Claras Aquas (Grottaferrata, 1981).

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united to the person of the Word in the mode of a habitus, preserving the Word from any change and precluding two persons in
Christ. 31
The Lombard's second opinion (subsistent or composite-person
theory) had received virtually unanimous assent by Albert's time. 32
In Thomas's view, however, aspects of a homo assumptus
Christology had crept into the prevailing understanding of this
opinion. His concern with this trend only increased with his
recovery of the acts of the councils of Ephesus, Chalcedon, and
Constantinople II and III.33 Through these councils, Thomas
learned the orthodox statement of Christological doctrine as
formulated by the Church meeting in council and gained a more
thorough knowledge of Nestorius's arguments. 34 Learning the
31 N. M. Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porree Bishop of Poitiers (1142-1154),"
Medieval Studies 13 (19 51): 1-40, attempts to describe these opinions as they were understood
in the twelfth century. Nielsen examines the three opinions as presented by the Lombard and
uses that examination to identify sources for each theory and the Lombard's own preference
(Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy, 243-64). Nielsen attributes the first opinion to Hugh of
St. Victor and the second, though filtered through the Lombard's own theological framework,
to Gilbert Porreta (ibid., 25 6-67). This reconfiguration of Gilbert's Christo logy, Nielsen
argues, reflects the Lombard's preference for the third opinion (ibid., 257-64). See also Colish,
Peter Lombard, 1:398-438. Colish disputes Nielsen's conclusion and maintains that the
Lombard did not clearly favor any of the three opinions. "In coming to the conclusion that
all three positions, despite their biblical and patristic warrants, were problematic, Peter had
before him the arguments of contemporaries who espouse one or another of the positions and
whose terminology was so unclear or inconsistent that they did not, in his estimation, succeed
in making their case" (ibid., 1:404). See also W. H. Principe, "Some Examples of Augustine's
Influence on Medieval Christology," in CollectaneaAugustiniana (Louvain: Leuven University
Press, 1990), 955-74.
32 Albert asserts that "Virtually all the modern doctors hold the second opinion and not
the first" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 3).
33 On Thomas's historical research while at Orvieto and his resultant knowledge of patristic
texts otherwise unused in the thirteenth century, see M. Morard, "Thomas d'Aquin lecteur
des conciles," Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 98 (2005): 211-365; G. Geenen, "En
marge du concile de Chalcedon. Les texts du quatrieme concile clans les ceuvres de saint
Thomas," Angelicum 29 (1952): 43-59; idem, "The Council of Chalcedon in the Theology
of St. Thomas," in From an Abundant Spring: The Walter Farrell Memorial Volume of 'The
Thomist' (New York: P. J. Kennedy, 1952), 172-217; I. Backes, Die Christologie des hi.
Thomas von Aquin und die griechischen Kirchenviiter (Paderborn: Schoningh, 1931).
34 Common knowledge of Nestorius's views derived from Boethius'sLibercontra Eutychen
et Nestorium, c. 4. Albert even seems to confuse Nestorius and Eutyches in III Sent., d. 5, a.
12.

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motivations and arguments of Nestorianism allowed Thomas to
equate a homo assumptus Christology with Nestorianism and so
to label the homo assumptus view a heresy condemned by the
Church meeting in council. 35 This equation of a homo assumptus
view and Nestorianism made more dangerous the disguised
presence of elements of a homo assumptus Christo logy in popular
interpretations of the Lombard's second opinion. Thomas taught
that assuming a man or a hypostasis is equivalent to assuming a
person (Nestorius's view), 36 which results in an accidental union
of natures in Christ. The habitus theory falls prey to the same
critique of positing an accidental union. 37 Thomas counters that
the union was substantial rather than accidental.

35 "Some of those conceded one person in Christ but posited two hypostases or two
supposits, saying that a certain man, composed from soul and body, was, from the beginning
of its conception, assumed by the Word of God. This is the first opinion posited by the
Master in the sixth distinction of the third book of the sentences. Others, however, wishing
to preserve the unity of person, posited that the soul of Christ was not united to the body, and
that these two, separated from each other, were accidentally united to the Word, so that the
number of persons would not increase. This is the third opinion the Master posits there.
Each of these opinions, however, falls into the heresy of Nestorius. The first indeed because
it posits two hypostases or two supposits in Christ, which amounts to positing two persons,
as was said above. And if the name person should be emphasized, it must be kept in mind that
even Nestorius admitted unity of person on account of unity of dignity and honor. Whence
the fifth synod pronounced anyone anathema who said one person according to dignity, honor,
and adoption, just as Theodore and Nestorius insanely wrote" (STh III, q. 2, a. 6 [Opera
Omnia (Roma: Leonine, 1903)]). Haring argues that Thomas correctly views the first opinion
as a lapse into Nestorianism but that Thomas's association of the second opinion with
Chalcedonian orthodoxy resulted from a failure to interpret correctly the second opinion
(Haring, "The Case of Gilbert de la Porree," 38).
36 It was a common criticism of the first opinion that assuming a man amounted to
assuming a person. See William of Auxerre, Summa aurea III, tract. 1, q. 1, c. 1.
37 Thomas stresses that the habitus theory posits an accidental union, though the twelfthcentury proponents of the habitus theory did not posit an accidental union. On the accuracy
of Thomas's understanding of the motivations of the positive formulations of the habitus
theory, see W. H. Principe, "St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of the Incarnation," in Saint
Thomas Aquinas, 1274-1974, Commemorative Studies (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of
Mediaeval Studies, 1974), 381-418. Richard Cross somewhat reduces Thomas'sconcern with
an accidental union in Christ to consideration of the habitus theory (R. Cross, The
Metaphysics of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus [Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2002], 51-64). The argument defended here puts far greater stress on Thomas's concern
to refute the homo assumptus theory.

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To what extent do Thomas's worries and corrections apply to
Albert? The Universal Doctor does not defend the incommunicability of assumptability on the grounds of distinguishing
'person' and 'hypostasis'. 38 This by itself does not answer the
question. Albert does occasionally refer to a purely human
hypostasis in Christ or to two hypostases in Christ. 39 He writes:
"It should be said that human nature is properly and per se
assumed, and also united by a certain mode [aliquo modo]: but it
was assumed first and per se, and it was united in its hypostasis to
the divine hypostasis" (III Sent., d. 5, a. 10). 40 Later in the same
article he writes that "it suffices for assumption that the hypostasis
of human nature participates in the [personal, individuating]
properties of the Son of God and of the divine nature, and
conversely the divine hypostasis accepts the properties of the
human hypostasis" (ibid., ad 4). 41 In these passages, Albert seems
38 In his discussion of the Trinity, Albert does affirm that 'individual' in Boethius's
definition of person clarifies that 'substance' stands for hypostasis (I Sent., d. 25, a. 1, qcla.
2). He later adds that if 'substance' signifies 'hypostasis', then 'individual' signifies the ratio
distinctionis not included in the meaning of hypostasis (I Sent., d. 25, a. 1, qcla. 3).
39 Pollet recognizes the Nestorian overtones of Albert's references to two hypostases.
"Albert's language is in places very defective and hardly comprehensible: certain sentences are
so clumsy that they appear tinged with colorings of Nestorianism" (Pollet, "L'union
hypostatique d'apres S. Albert le Grand," 506). Pollet attributes Albert's clumsy phrasing to
his refutation of Abelard's Christology read into the Lombard's third opinion (ibid., 509-10).
Albert's concern with the third opinion was conditioned by the development of Christological
debates at the end of the twelfth century and the beginning of the thirteenth. Pollet's insight
can be usefully expanded with reference to those debates.
40 "Dicendum, quod humana natura est assumptum proprie et per se, et etiam uni ta aliquo
modo: sed assumpta est primo et per se, unita autem in hypostasi sua ad hypostasim divinam"
(III Sent., d. 5, a. 10).
41 Albert also seems to refer to two supposits. "The proposition is true in those in whom
the entire esse of the supposit is from one nature. This is not true in Christ. That opinion errs
in this, because the esse of this or that supposit is not from one nature, but from two. This is
so because that man has esse of man united, and not confused or mixed" (Ill Sent., d. 6, a. 3,
ad 3). Lamy de la Chapelle suggests this last quotation is a faulty text in so far as it doubles
the supposit but that the Borgnet edition can be made intelligible. "However, the reading of
d.6, a.3, ad 3 the Borgnet edition proposes to us remains partially intelligible. In splitting the
supposit, -hujus vel hujus suppositi, - but in continuing to affirm that each of them obtains its
esse by two substantial [natures], Albert brings the pseudo-duality of hypostasis taught by the
first opinion back into a unity. In other words, when I consider the Word incarnate, 'this man
is God, and God is this man,' because the supposit of his humanity does not have as its unique
and first principle the nature assumed. This explication is evidently inoperative when one

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to affirm the view attacked by Thomas, namely, that the
hypostatic union is a union of two hypostases in the one person
of the Word. Albert rarely uses the expression 'hypostatic union'
and does not use the expression 'substantial union', but more
reservedly he admits that the union in Christ was not a union of
persons and did not take place in the natures. His willingness to
leave matters defined negatively opens his position to varying
interpretations. Even if he does not add the incommunicability of
assumptability to the definition of 'person' in order to distinguish
'person' from 'hypostasis', his definition of 'person' seems to
support the distinction.
Clarifying the meaning of Albert's affirmations of two
hypostases requires examining their proximate context within the
Commentarii and the more remote context of early thirteenthcentury presentations of the hypostatic union and the Lombard's
three opinions. Albert's affirmations of two hypostases in Christ
occur in his commentary on distinction 5 of the third book of the
Sentences. The lengthy commentary on this distinction is divided
into 16 articles, with topics ranging from a comparison of union
and assumption (a. 1) to querying whether the Word assumed a
man or this man or some man (homo, vel hie homo, vel aliquis
homo) (a. 11). This latter topic is of particular interest here.
Albert denies that the Son of God assumed a man, on the grounds
that persons are undivided in themselves and divided from others.
The Son did not assume a man because the Son did not and could
not assume a person. Noteworthy here is that Albert does not
present this article in terms of the Lombard's three opinions. So,
while this denial that the Son assumed a man contradicts the
homo assumptus view (first opinion), Albert does not explicitly
make that point in distinction 5 but delays analysis of the three
opinions till distinction 6.
Albert focuses in distinction 6 on refuting the Lombard's first
opinion (homo assumptus). In article 2, he distinguishes the
meaning of 'a thing of nature' (res naturae), 'suppositum',
considers the Word as such" (Lamy de la Chapelle, "L'unite ontologique du Christ," 209 n.
94).

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'substance', 'hypostasis', 'individual', and 'person'. Albert here
reiterates the three modes of incommunicability definitive of
personhood, culminating the progressive specification of the
various terms. 'Substance' is "distinct through this matter,
distinguishable through accidents, and not distinct through itself"
(III Sent., d. 6, a. 2). Albert presents 'hypostasis' as the Greek
equivalent of 'substance', implying that hypostases are not distinct
through themselves and so lack the incommunicability proper to
persons, seemingly allowing for the assumption of a hypostasis. 42
Such an interpretation gains credibility in light of the third
article's rejection of the Lombard's first opinion. Albert denies
that Christ assumed a man or a suppositum but makes no mention
of hypostasis. 43 This all seems evidence that Albert allowed for
two hypostases in Christ, distinguished a two-hypostases view
from a homo assumptus view, and found a two-hypostases view
compatible with the second opinion.
The evidence against this reading of Albert's Christology is
found largely, though by no means exclusively, in article 5 of this
distinction, where Albert expressly states that there is only one
hypostasis in Christ. The article concerns the number of esse
simpliciter in Christ; Albert argues there can be only one esse
simpliciter in Christ because there is only one hypostasis. Note
that affirmation of one hypostasis in Christ functions here as
premise rather than conclusion. Other explicit affirmations of
only one hypostasis in Christ are found in nearby texts. 44 Does
42 On individual as specifying incommunicability beyond hypostasis, see Hufnagel, "Das
Person-Problem bei Albertus Magnus," 215.
43 "And so I say that Christ did not assume a man or a supposit, etc., but this all was united
to him in singularity of person. And I say that the thing of nature (res naturae) is not distinct
from the Son of God through esse, but rather it is incommunicable with the incommunicability
of the Son of God and is not another in Christ. In others, however, the thing of nature (res
naturae) is incommunicable through this matter, just as a suppositum, and individual, and
person" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 3, ad 1).
44 "Whence Christ is not two but one (unum}, because he is not two persons nor two
hypostases, as is clear from what was said before" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 4, ad 2). Albert writes
that" it does not follow that Christ is two hypostases but that he is one hypostasis existing in
two natures, one of which relates to his mother and the other to his Father" (III Sent., d. 7,
a. 3, ad 3). "Without prejudice I say that there is not but one filiation of Christ the Son of
God, because it is not intelligible how two [individuating] properties of the same type

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125

Albert flagrantly contradict himself or is there some other
explanation for these seemingly contradictory affirmations? Does
Albert, despite his express approval of the second opinion,
support some version of the first opinion? The development of
late twelfth- and early thirteenth-century Christological reflection
helps to untangle these knots.
Walter Principe has traced the progression of early-thirteenthcentury Christological debates, showing their emphasis on
questions of whether Christ as man is something (an Christus
secundum quad homo est aliquid) and whether Christ is one
(unum) or two. 45 The question of aliquid or non est aliquid served
to distinguish the first and second opinions from the third, or at
least from the popular interpretation of the third opinion as
supporting Christological nihilianism, a position condemned by
Pope Alexander III in 117 0 and 1177. 46 Questioning the unity or
duality of Christ revealed a difference between adherents of the
first opinion and those of the second and third opinions. In short,
answering these two questions identified one's position on the
Christological spectrum reported by the Lombard. William of
Auxerre, Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great all treated
Christological nihilianism as a pressing concern. Concern to refute
determine one hypostasis" (III Sent., d. 8, a. 2).
45 For a general characterization of the evolution of. Christological reflection in this period,
see Principe, William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 64-70. "It must be
emphasized from the very beginning that by the time William of Auxerre wrote his Summa
Aurea the presentation of the teachings of the three opinions had become schematized in ways
that often failed to reproduce the opinions as they were originally stated about the middle of
the twelfth century" (ibid., 64). "These thirteenth-century authors themselves reflect the
evolution that had gone on in the presentation of each opinion by both its adherents and
opponents. A reading of the theologians of the late twelfth and early thirteenth century reveals
that there were not three uniform positions but rather three general groupings or tendencies,
each with certain common presuppositions and each with general agreement on answers to
the various questions proposed. Within each tendency or grouping, however, individual
authors provided different explanations and theories in response to the new positions and
explanations of others" (ibid., 64-65).
46 By the beginning of the thirteenth century, the non est aliquid position was associated
squarely with the third opinion, but in the twelfth century some proponents of the second
opinion also supported this position (ibid., 67-70). See also Principe, "St. Thomas on the
Habitus-Theory of the Incarnation," 398-405; Nielsen, Theology and Philosophy, 243-64;
Colish, Peter Lombard, 1:399-427.

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the habitus theory and its perceived assertion that Christ as man
non est aliquid largely colored these theologians' presentation of
the human nature assumed.
William of Auxerre sought to deny both the Word's assumption of a man (homo assumptus) and Christological nihilianism. 47
William argued that a homo assumptus view amounted to
affirmation of two persons in Christ, the rejected position of
Nestorius (De Incarnatione 1.5). The challenge for William was
to hold this denial together with the proposition that Christ as
man is aliquid. William's elaboration of 'person' in terms of
singularity, incommunicability, and dignity provided the terminological and conceptual means for asserting that the Word
assumed an individual human nature (which is a 'something') and
that this individual human nature lacked the dignity proper to
persons. 48 Principe explains the distinction as follows:
Thus the distinction of dignity, connected with perseity in power or operation
and more fundamentally with perseity in being, is lacking to Jesus as Jesus. His
humanity is singular rather than universal; it is not part of a nature, but a whole
nature; but the 'nobler form' in the Son of God replaces the constituent of
human personality in Christ's human nature. Therefore Jesus precisely as Jesus
is not a person. 49

William explains this replacement of personality and the affirmation that Christ is one (unum) by proposing that the individual
human nature degenerates into an accident. so This infelicitous
47 On William's presentation of the three opinions, see Principe, William of Auxerre's
Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 71-78.
48 "William of Auxerre's analysis of the distinction between individual human nature and
personality, based on the distinction of dignity, enabled him to accept, without fear of positing
a human personality, the teaching that Christ as man is an 'individual of this species "man",'
and therefore aliquid secundum quad homo (Deinc 8,12)" (ibid., 93).
49 Ibid., 82-83.
50 "To the second we say that in truth there is an essential binarity in Christ. One of the
united things of that binarity, namely the humanity, although it is essential, nevertheless
degenerates into the accidental. Therefore that binarity does not number the subject but the
natures, just as a binarity of accidents does not number the subject but its forms" (William of
Auxerre, De Incarnatione 3.7, in Principe, William of Auxerre's Theology of the Hypostatic
Union, 257).

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phrase would be reverentially interpreted or altogether dropped
by subsequent authors, even those heavily indebted to William. 51
Alexander of Hales developed William's insights using more
precise, though not necessarily more felicitous, terminology.
Alexander's precision, however, does not exclude all ambiguities,
a fact evident in his diverse understandings of 'hypostasis'. This
diversity extends into Albert's use of 'hypostasis' and so clarifies
his meaning. Alexander often equates 'hypostasis' and 'subsistence', distinguishing these from 'person' according to a property
of dignity. 52 While Alexander normally conceives of 'hypostasis'
as a term of second intention (i.e., an abstraction or logical concept) akin to 'individual', the ambiguity emerges from his
occasional references to 'hypostasis' as "a concretely existing
individual thing, not as the individual within a species. " 53 The
relevance of this ambiguity comes into sharper focus with
Alexander's discussion of Christ as aliquid secundum quad homo.
In his attempts to stress the reality of the individual human nature
assumed to the Word, Alexander makes mention of a purely
human hypostasis in Christ. Principe writes:
An important element in the doctrine of Alexander of Hales on the mode of
union is his acceptance in Christ of a human hypostasis that is not identical with
the person of the Son of God. Although Alexander does not state this in so many
words in Redaction A [of the Glossa], several texts have already been seen in
51 For examples of such reverential interpretation, see Summa halensis III, inq.1, tr. 1, q.
4, tit. 1, d. 4, c. 4; Bonaventure, III Sent., d. 6, a. 1, q. 3.
52 On Alexander's view of hypostasis and subsistence as equivalents, see Principe, Alexander
of Hales' Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 52-57. "When it comes to distinguishing the
hypostasis or individual substance from person, it is usually this 'property of dignity' or this
'excellent property' found in the person, but not in the hypostasis, that serves to distinguish
the two" (ibid., 68).
53 Ibid., 64. Principe holds that Alexander prioritizes hypostasis as a term of second
intention rather than a term of first intention. Principe's interpretation helps to smooth over
some of Alexander's statements that otherwise verge toward the first opinion. "In summary,
for Alexander of Hales the individual, considered in relation to the principles of individuation
and as distinct from subject and person, is a being of the logico-metaphysical order, an order
in which thought and reality coalesce. At times, however, Alexander speaks of the individual
hypostasis in the order of physical reality; then it is closely akin to, if not identical with, the
subject. As will be seen, in Alexander's theology of the Hypostatic Union the former notion
of individual and of individual hypostasis prevails" (ibid., 65).

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which he says that because an individual hypostasis is not necessarily a person,
the individual human nature in Christ does not have to be a person. Clearly,
Alexander envisages a human hypostasis in Christ lacking the property of dignity
that would make it a human person but sharing the personal property of the
Word in the union. 54

Principe goes on to argue that references to a purely human
hypostasis in Christ refer to 'hypostasis' as a term of second
intention and so affirm nothing more than the individuality and
singularity of Christ's human nature with respect to its species. 55
This, in Principe's estimation, removes any concern that Alexander's Christology slides toward Nestorianism or a homo
assumptus Christology. 56 Principe's interpretation requires a
similarly charitable reading of Alexander's affirmations of two
supposits in Christ and (seemingly) of a purely human subject in
Christ. 57 These affirmations indicate a performative fluidity in the
Christological opinions that permits Alexander to adhere
expressly to the second opinion while incorporating aspects of the
first opinion. 58 Albert the Great inherited from Alexander this
Ibid., 122.
"The reply of Redaction L is clear: the human hypostasis is an individuum rationis, an
individual within a logical species: it is a name of second intention" (ibid., 124).
56 "Thus the human hypostasis of Christ is an entity of the logical order, the center of
reference for the logical properties and accidents that constitute an individual. When the
hypostasis is understood as belonging to this level of being (esse logicum, one text says of the
being of the individual), it need not be feared as if it were some kind of crypto-person in the
human nature of Christ" (ibid., 125).
57 "What is said about two supposits [Glossa III, 6, 25 (L)] is a rather surprising concession
in view of other statements, but it must be remembered, as is said here explicitly, that
suppositum is understood as natura supposita or natura subjecta: this is true throughout the
tract on the Incarnation. To admit two supposita in this sense is thus to admit in Christ two
natures but not two independent centers of activity or of attribution, as one might suspect
from the ordinary use of the term suppositum by other authors, especially regarding the first
opinion on the Incarnation. Nevertheless, to say as Redaction L does that Christ is 'duo
neutraliter' comes very close to certain views of that first opinion and leaves open to
misinterpretation a teaching that otherwise strongly defends the unity of Christ" (ibid., 19091). Principe discusses Alexander's references to a human subject in Christ in ibid., 211-12.
58 This fluidity is evident as well through Principe's analyses of Hugh of St. Cher and Philip
the Chancellor. Hugh, following the lead of William and Alexander, names the individual
human nature composed of soul and body 'Jesus' in order to avoid an accidental inherence of
humanity in the Word (W. H. Principe, Hugh of Saint-Cher's Theology of the Hypostatic
Union [vol. 3 of The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the Early Thirteenth Century], 103 ).
54

55

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ambiguous use of otherwise precise terminology in the context of
fluid Christological positions.
Returning now to Albert, the influence of William and
Alexander becomes clear. Albert explicitly affirms two hypostases
in Christ or a purely human hypostasis in Christ when combating
the Lombard's third opinion, the habitus theory. The habitus
theory, as Albert understands it, denies that Christ's soul and body
were joined to each other, but says that they were rather put on
individually by the Son of God. This prevents the assumption of
a man but at the expense of Christ's true humanity or that Christ
was aliquid secundum quad homo. Albert wishes to deny that the
Word assumed a man while affirming that Christ was aliquid
secundum quad homo. 'Hypostasis' serves Albert as a middle
term, marking Christ's human nature as an individual distinct
according to its particular unity of body and soul though not a
man or a person. 59 When Albert's attention turns to the first
"Hugh intends to distinguish his position from that of the first opinion on the Hypostatic
Union: this is clear from his description of what its proponents understand by the name
'Jesus.' The first opinion holds, he says, 'that this name "Jesus" is imposed from a created
form and on a created thing only; it has supposition only for a created thing' [III Sent., 6, 14].
Hugh disagrees with this position in that for him the name 'Jesus' has an accidental
supposition by which it stands for the divine person" (ibid., 130). Albert's Christology reflects
many aspects of Philip's. Philip stresses the perfection of personality as derived from the
particular esse that individuates it as a being per se (W. H. Principe, Philip the Chancellor's
Theology of the Hypostatic Union [vol. 4 of The Theology of the Hypostatic Union in the
Early Thirteenth Century], 66-67, 94-97, 144).
59 Albert's understanding of hypostasis as a middle term plausibly derives from Philip the
Chancellor. Philip writes: "If it is asked which of those is more proper, 'Those two natures are
united in hypostasis' or 'are united in person,' I respond that it is more proper to say 'in
hypostasis' than 'in person.' They are said to be united in unity of person on account of the
heretics who posited a plurality of persons in Christ just as a diversity of natures. There is a
difference between person and hypostasis, because person names a property of excellence, but
hypostasis holds a middle place between person and individual. On the divine side, there is
a person. From the side of human nature, there is an individual that has the universal nature
in itself and is individuated by a twofold individuation, as was said. In the union made of the
Word to human nature, the hypostasis there was a person in respect to a property of
excellence, and an individual, for Jesus is an individual, and that individual was founded upon
the hypostasis of the Son of God" (Quaestiones de incarnatione, q. 2, b, 11, in Principe, Philip
the Chancellor's Theology of the Hypostatic Union, 172; see also 66). Hipp identifies two
basic senses of hypostasis for Albert. In one sense, hypostasis is an inherently relative term
signifying "the substance according as it stands under the common nature and the proprietas,"
yet abstracted in so far as possible from personality (Hipp, "Person" in Christian Tradition,

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opinion (as in III Sent., d. 6, a. 5), he affirms only one hypostasis
in Christ. Albert's use of 'hypostasis' follows closely the pattern
established by Alexander, employing it both as a name of first
intention and as a name of second intention depending on the
context and purpose. When 'hypostasis' names a thing, Albert
affirms only one hypostasis in Christ against the homo assumptus
theory. When 'hypostasis" names a logical abstraction, Albert
affirms a purely human hypostasis in Christ against the habitus
theory. Whether or not this implies any self-contradiction, it
certainly opens itself to various interpretations. The risks involved
with such interpretive openness no doubt prompted Thomas's
rejection of this equivocal use of 'hypostasis'.
Stress on the fact that Christ was aliquid secundum quod homo
inched William, Alexander, and Albert toward aspects of a homo
assumptus view or at minimum suggested to them language reminiscent of a homo assumptus view. The second major Christological question in the early thirteenth century regarded whether
Christ was one (unum) or two. Albert's reflections on Christ's
unity inch his position on this spectrum of Christological opinions
back toward the subsistent or composite-person theory, yet the
urgency of preventing Christological nihilianism remains evident.
Albert frames the question of Christ's unity or duality in terms of
esse, which framing highlights the delicate balance of preserving
unity without sacrificing the truth of Christ's humanity. The
union in Christ is a union in esse rather than in essences, a union
in which the one person is a supposit for two natures. Albert
concludes that "the esse in Christ is one in comparison to the
hypostasis whose esse it is, although this esse is of two essences
which remain distinct, such that the esse of one [essence] is the
259). It signifies determinable substance without properly signifying the proprietas.Hypostasis
thus signifies the same reality as person but according to a different mode of signification
(ibid., 246). In a different sense, hypostasis is logically convertible with the proprietas. "The
hypostasis is formally dependent upon the proprietas for its hypostatic being. At the same
time, every instance of perfect and complete (i.e. ontologically independent) distinction entails
a unique hypostatic being" (ibid., 466). Hufnagel emphasizes the hypostasis as logically prior
to the personal property determining a being as incommunicable (Hufnagel, "Das PersonProblem bei Albertus Magnus," 231-32).

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esse of the other [essence]" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 4). 60 Article 5
clarifies the relationship of esse to hypostasis and to nature. Albert
writes:
Preserving the truth of the union made in the hypostasis, as is true, the second
opinion says the wholly one esse is the one esse simpliciter of Christ: but the esse
of this simpliciter is one thing, the esse of this according to this or that nature is
another thing, and the esse of this or of that nature is another thing. For the esse
simpliciter of this is the esse of the person or hypostasis, according as it is a
hypostasis: and this is not but one in Christ. It stands clear from this that the
Catholic faith says the union was made in esse. For if it is made in esse, it will be
in some esse, and not but in the esse of the hypostasis: therefore, the esse of this
hypostasis is one from that union: for whatever things are united are one.
Likewise, there is not but one esse of one hypostasis: but Christ is not but
one hypostasis: therefore, Christ does not have but one esse simpliciter: because
the esse of the thing of nature or hypostasis is the esse of the whole: and this is
the esse simpliciter.
The esse according to this or that nature, however, is the esse taken in
comparison to the nature making the esse in the hypostasis, and from that part
the esse in Christ is doubled. For, the esse of the nature of humanity is in that
one, as well as the esse of the nature of deity. If we wish to speak properly, then
we would say that according to this consideration [the hypostasis] would not
have two esses but rather one twofold, constitutive esse [unum duplex in

constituente esse].
The esse of the nature is the esse that the nature has in itself: for every thing
has its own esse. The esse of the human nature in Christ is not the esse of God's
nature, but the esses are not by that way two as the natures. (III Sent., d. 6, a. 5) 61
60 "Sic igitur secundum praedicta dico, quod unum est esse in Christo secundum
comparationem ad hypostasim cuius est esse, licet hoc esse sit duarum essentiarum quae
distinctae manent, eo quod hoc esse istius est hoc esse alterius: et est mirabile ut unio fiat in
esse, et non essentiis" (III Sent., d. 6, a. 4).
61 "Tenendo veritatem unionis factam esse in hypostasi, sicut est veritas, et secunda opinio
<licit unum tantum esse, simpliciter est unum esse Christi: sed aliud est esse hujus simpliciter,
et aliud esse hujus secundum naturam hanc vel illam, et aliud est esse natura hujus vel illius.
Esse enim hujus simpliciter est esse personae vel hypostasis, secundum quod est hypostasis:
et hoc non est nisi unum in Christo. Et hoc patere potest ex hoc quod fides Catholica <licit
unionem illam factam in esse. Si enim in esse facta est, erit ipsa in esse aliquo, et non nisi in
esse hypostasis: ergo esse hujus hypostasis ex unione ilia est unum: quaecumque enim
uniuntur, sunt unum.
"Item, unius hypostasis non est nisi unum esse: sed Christus non est nisi hypostasis una:
ergo Christus non habet nisi unum esse simpliciter: quia esse rei naturae sive hypostasis, est
esse totius: et hoc est simpliciter esse.
"Esse autem secundum naturam hanc vel illam, est esse acceptum in comparatione ad
natura facientem esse in hypostasi, et a parte ilia geminatur esse in Christo. Est enim in eo esse

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The argumentation here is dense, but this article well encapsulates
Albert's understanding of the mode of union in Christ. In
response to the third opinion, Albert affirms the substantial reality
of the human nature assumed by noting that the esse of Christ's
human nature is not the esse of the divine nature. When esse is
viewed in terms of the nature as a formal cause of esse in the
hypostasis, Albert affirms one twofold esse in Christ. 62 Albert
subordinates this duality to the greater unity of Christ in terms of
esse simpliciter, which is one as the hypostasis in Christ is one.
Stressing the unity of esse simpliciter in Christ while noting the
duality of natural esse according as the hypostasis subsists in
human nature is an attempt to strike a proper balance between the
reality of Christ's singular human nature and the ultimate unity of

naturae humanitatis, et esse naturae deitatis. Et si vellemus proprie dicere, tune diceremus,
quod haberet tali consideratione non duo esse, sed unurn duplex in constituente esse.
"Esse naturae est esse quod habet natura in se: omnis enim res habet suum esse. Esse
naturae humanae in Christo non est esse naturae Dei, neque illa esse sunt duo sicut naturae"
(III Sent., d. 6, a. 5).
62 "To the fourth we say that constitutive differences only produce [non faciunt nisi]
formal esse. Whence they pertain to logical considerations, which consider form. The esse
of the supposit or person, however, is not only formal esse but also the esse that results from
both components [quad relinquitur ex utroque componentium]. This is one in Christ.
Although formal esse is twofold on account of the difference [of natures], the esse of the
supposit or person is not but one. And so it does not follow that Christ is two, because he is
neither two supposits nor two persons. It does follow that he is one [unum] having esse in
himself from two different opposites" (De Incamatione, III, q. 3, a. 4, ad 4). Lamy de la
Chapelle focuses on the role of esse actualizing the essence in the hypostasis. "It is the esse that
gives essence to the hypostasis. All the actuality of the essence, in the order of the effectuation
of being, comes from the esse. From this perspective, the esse plays the role of cause (as the
supreme act of the existing thing), and essence plays the role of effect: different sicut effectus
et causa" (Lamy de la Chapelle, "L'unite ontologique du Christ," 216). He also notes the
accommodations to the first opinion present in Albert's allowance that the natures double the
esse in Christ. "[Albert] accepts the principle put forward by the supporters of the first
opinion: natura facit esse in hypostasi. Far from exhausting the meaning, he seeks an
intermediary interpretation that offers the possibility of maintaining the full substantiality of
the nature assumed without, for all that, conferring to it the value of a distinct supposit.
Moreover, he does not innovate. Certain defenders (convinced they are right) of the second
opinion were already trying to reconcile the two points of view, as implied by the pivotal text
dedicated to the unique esse simpliciter of Christ, which closes article 4 and introduces article
5" (ibid., 223-24).

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hypostasis. 63 Albert inherited ambiguous terminology with which
to address Christological questions along a fluid spectrum of
opinions. His great triumph was to recast pressing questions and
concerns in terms of Christ's esse, a maneuver that allowed
affirmation of Christ's personal unity without undermining the
integrity of his two natures.
IV. THOMAS AQUINAS ON THE MODE OF UNION IN CHRIST

Thomas Aquinas preserves many of Albert's insights while
simultaneously tidying the ambiguous terminology Albert
inherited from William and Alexander. The focus here will be on
Thomas's presentation of the union in Christ in terms of 'person'
and 'hypostasis', a focus that highlights the differences between
Thomas and Albert. 64 Thomas rejected adding the incommunicability of assumptability to the definition of 'person', noting
that advocates of such an addition distinguished 'hypostasis' and
'person' on the grounds of incommunicability in order to affirm
two hypostases in Christ but only one person. Thomas counters
that 'hypostasis' and 'person' indicate the same reality and that

63 This view is clear also in Cod. Vat. lat. 4245, where Albert distinguishes esse suppositi
and esse naturae. Albert affirms a unity in esse suppositi and a duality of esse naturae. This
unity and duality of esse allows for a twofold predication of the one supposit. "I say without
prejudice that the divine power uniting makes the supposit of this nature to be substantially
the supposit of another nature, with the distinction of natures remaining. Since the union is
according to the esse of the supposit and not of nature, there is one esse of the supposit in as
much as the supposit is of two natures. The esse of the natures remains distinct, because the
uniting is united, as Boethius holds. Whence the union is made in the unity of the supposit;
the distinction of natures according to their esse, which remain in one and the same supposit,
allows for the predication of a twofold property, so that it may properly be said: This one is
a man and this one is God" (F. Pelster, "Die Quaestio Alberts des GroBen iiber das Eine Sein
in Christus nach Cod. Vat. lat. 4245," Divus Thomas 26 (1948): 3-25, at 25).
64 For an excellent summary and discussion of Thomas on the hypostatic union, see J.
Wawrykow, "Hypostatic Union," in Rik Van Nieuwenhove and Joseph Wawrykow, eds., The
Theology of Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 2005), 22251. See also M.-V. Leroy, "L'union selon l'hypostase d'apres saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue
thomiste 74 (1974): 205-243. On Thomas' Christology in relation to the Lombard's second
opinion, see M. Raschko, "Aquinas's Theology of the Incarnation in Light of Lombard's
Subsistence Theory," The Thomist 65 (2001): 409-39.

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'person' simply adds the specification of rational nature. 65 The
clarity and certitude with which Thomas attacks not only the
homo assumptus view but also the elements of a homo assumptus
view that had been incorporated into early thirteenth-century
articulations of the subsistent-person theory indicate a shift from
Albert to Thomas in their perceptions of which Christological
opinion represented the most pressing challenge.
In question 9, article 1 of De Potentia, Aquinas investigates the
meaning of the terms 'essence', 'subsistence', and 'hypostasis' in
preparation for the second article's discussion of Boethius's
definition of 'person'. As discussed previously, Albert identifies
'hypostasis' as the Greek equivalent of 'substance'. Thomas
repeats this identification with the qualification that 'hypostases'
name substances as substanding. 66 "Person, though, adds to
hypostasis a determinate nature, for it is nothing other than a
hypostasis of rational nature" (De Pot., q. 9, a. 1).67 In the reply
to the first objection, Thomas holds that because "person adds
nothing beyond hypostasis save rational nature, it is necessary that
hypostasis and person are completely the same in rational nature"
(ibid., ad 1).68 These assertions implicitly affirm what article 2
65 Hufnagel argues that a rough equivalent to this is Albert's final position: "Albert's
thinking seems obviously to have developed in the following direction: he finally defined
hypostasis to include every individual being, but he defined person to include only hypostases
of a spiritual [geistigen]nature" (Hufnagel, "Das Person-Problem bei Albertus Magnus," 232).
The Summa halensis expresses the same view. "A hypostasis is an incommunicable existence
or substance distinguished from all others. This definition is taken from Richard of St. Victor,
who sometimes takes person for hypostasis. Person, according the definition and name of
person, is an incommunicable rational substance distinct through a property of dignity. From
this it is clear that every person is a hypostasis but that the converse is not true. In rational
natures, which import dignity, the hypostasis is a person. In other natures, the hypostasis is
not a person unless when speaking of person grammatically" (Summa halensis III, inq. 1, tr.
1, q. 4, tit. 1, d. 3, mem. 4, c. 3, a. 3 [Summa theologica seu sic aborigine dicta "Summa fratri
Alexandri," (Quarrachi, 1948)]).
66 Substances also exist quasi per se, being sustained in themselves rather than in an
external foundation. According to this, a substance is said to subsist and is called subsistentia
or OUOIWOLC; (De Pot., q. 9, a. 1).
67 "Persona vero addit supra hypostasim determinatam naturam: nihil enim est aliud quam
hypostasis rationalis naturae" (ibid.).
68 "Ad primum ergo dicendum quod, ex quo persona non addit supra hypostasim nisi
rationalem naturam, oportet quod hypostasis et persona in rationali natura sint penitus idem"
(ibid., ad 1).

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states explicitly, that 'individual substance' in Boethius's definition
of 'person' designates nothing other than 'hypostasis'. Thomas
discredits the separation of 'individual' and 'substance' in
Boethius's definition as a misguided attempt to distinguish
'person' and 'hypostasis' (De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 7). Equally
important is Thomas' s insistence that 'person' and 'hypostasis' are
names of first imposition (names of things) rather than names of
second intention (logical abstractions) (De Pot., q. 9, a. 2, ad 2).
In these two articles, many of the terminological ambiguities
characteristic of early thirteenth-century Christologies have been
eliminated.
The value of terminological clarity is apparent in the Summa
Theologiae's discussion of the hypostatic union. The second
question of the Tertia Pars analyzes the mode of union in Christ,
arguing that the union takes place not in nature (a. 1) but rather
in person (a. 2). 69 All the theologians considered here would
unhesitatingly assent to this conclusion. Article 3 raises the less
common and more difficult question of whether the union takes
place in the supposit or hypostasis. Based upon Thomas's abovenoted identification of 'person' and 'hypostasis' in rational
natures, his response in article 3 predictably defends a union in
the one hypostasis of the Word. Thomas notes, however, "that
some, ignorant of the relation [habitudinem] of hypostasis to
person, although they concede there was only one person in
Christ, nevertheless posited one hypostasis of God and another
hypostasis of man, as if the union were made in person but not in
hypostasis" (STh III, q. 2, a. 3). 70 Three arguments follow that
reduce this view to some position condemned at Ephesus or
Constantinople II. The first and now familiar argument equates
69 For a critical appraisal of Thomas's distinction between person and nature as applied to
Christology, see M. Gorman, "Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in Thomas'
Christology," Recherches de theologie et philosophie medievales 67 (2000): 58-79.
70 "Respondeo dicendum quod quidam, ignorantes habitudinem hypostasis ad personam,
licet concederent in Christo unam solam personam, posuerunt tamen aliam hypostasim Dei
et aliam hominis, ac si unio sit facta in persona, non in hypostasi." "Dicendum quod quidam
volentes evitare Nestorii haeresim, ponentis in Christo unam personam, sed duas hypostases,
sive duo supposita" (De Unione Verbi incarnati, a. 2 [Quaestiones disputata, vol. 2 (Turin:
Marietti, 1949)]).

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'person' and 'hypostasis' in such a way that assigning a purely
human hypostasis to Christ amounts to recognizing a purely
human person (STh III, q. 2, a. 3; De Unione, a. 2). The second
argument is more interesting. If 'person' adds anything to the
definition of 'hypostasis', that can be nothing but a property of
dignity. Thomas here cites the definition of 'person' as "a
hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to dignity" (STh III, q.
2, a. 3). 71 Granting this distinction, a union in person but not in
hypostasis would be an accidental union in dignity alone, a view
condemned at the Second Council of Constantinople. The third
argument concerns the subject of predication in Christ. If there
were a purely human hypostasis in Christ, everything true of the
human nature would be true of the human hypostasis as its
subject. It would then be false to affirm that the Son of God was
born of the virgin, suffered, was crucified, and was buried. This
would undermine the truth of the Incarnation.
The Scriptum on the Lombard's Sentences also rejects any
attribution of two hypostases in Christ. Its treatment reflects more
closely the questions that were of greater import in the early
thirteenth century, particularly whether Christ is one (unum) or
two. Thomas, even at this early stage in his career, stresses
'hypostasis' as a name of first imposition and individuum,
'singular', and 'particular' as names of second intention. 72 This
clear and firm distinction provides the terminological resource for

71 "Second, because if it is granted that person adds something beyond hypostasis in which
the union was made, this something is nothing other than a property pertaining to dignity,
according as it is said by some that person is a hypostasis distinct by a property pertaining to
dignity. If therefore the union is made in person and not in hypostasis, it will follow that the
union was made only according to a certain dignity" (STh III, q. 2, a. 3). Thomas offers nearly
identical argumentation in De Unione, a. 2.
72 "Accidents follow nature; therefore every name designating a particular thing with
respect to its properties designates it also with respect to the common nature. This can be
done in two ways. In one way it can be done through a name of first imposition, and thus
hypostasis is taken commonly in ever substance but person only in rational substances. In
another way it can be done through a name of second imposition, and thus it is an individual
in as much as it is undivided in itself, but it is singular in as much as it is divided from others;
whence singular is the same as what is divided [from others]" (III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 1, qcla.

1).

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATIC UNION

137

specifying what in Christ is one and what is two. 73 Since
'hypostasis' is a name of first imposition, allowing two hypostases
in Christ is tantamount to allowing two persons. This equivalence
of 'person' and 'hypostasis' renders unintelligible any attempt to
posit one person but two hypostases in Christ, a position Thomas
identifies with the first opinion or homo assumptus theory. 74
Though he believes affirmation of two hypostases or of homo
assumptus ultimately leads to Nestorianism, in the Scriptum he
characterizes these affirmations as unintelligible or erroneous but
not heretical. 75
Throughout his career, Thomas rejected a two-hypostases view
of Christ. In the Scriptum he identifies the position of one person
73 "Nevertheless, just as we say the union was made in person, so we say [it is made] in
hypostasis, supposit, thing of nature, individual, singular, and particular. This is said of the last
three because although they can be predicated of things that do not subsist through
themselves, nevertheless they are also predicated of things that do subsist through themselves.
We say that a hypostasis is an individual; whence, in as much as the union is made in
hypostasis, it is also made in the individual. So we can say that Christ is one individual and
also that in him there are two individuals or many individuals, as also happens for every other
man. This applies the same for singular and particular" (ibid.).
74 "It should be known that although the first opinion posits two hypostases, it does not
posit two persons. For, from the fact that person is an individual of rational nature, which
is most complete, and where the total intention of nature is present, person signifies the most
complete thing by the final completion, beyond which there is no other. Whence, since they
posit one man assumed [hominem assumptu unum] to the Word, they do not grant to it the
ratio of person but only the ratio of hypostasis, in as much as it is subsisting" (ibid.).
75 "Whence it should in no way be conceded that a man was assumed. It should be known,
nevertheless, that the first opinion posited none of the aforementioned modes of union,
whence it is not heretical. It did posit that the union was made according to this, that the
person of the Word began to be that substance. This, indeed, is not intelligible, that one of
two is made another, unless through the conversion of one into another. Rather, it is
impossible, as was said before, and therefore it cannot be sustained" (III Sent., d. 6, q. 1, a. 2).
Bonaventure similarly equates a two-supposita view with the first opinion, noting that this
view is not heretical. "It can be understood in a third way that Christ is two in a middle sense,
not because Christ is of two natures or of two persons, but because he is two supposits or two
things of nature, which hold a middle place between duality of nature and duality of person.
This mode of speaking pertains to the first opinion and is not heretical, but has much
probability. For since diverse natures correspond to diverse things of nature, and diverse
substances correspond to diverse supposits, therefore they wish to say that Christ, who is God
by reason of the divine nature, and man by reason of human nature, is two things of nature,
one of which is predicated of the other on account of the unity of person. But although this
position has some probability, nevertheless it says something even more improbable and so
has few or no supporters" (Bonaventure, III Sent., d. 6, a. 1, q. 1).

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and two hypostases in Christ as the homo assumptus view, a view
he finds unintelligible. In the Summa, he addresses these positions
separately and in each case reaps the fruits of his research into
patristic and conciliar sources. Article 6 of question 2 of the Tertia
Pars is justifiably famous for its clear statement that the Lombard's
first and third opinions are not opinions but heresies long condemned by the Church and that the second opinion is not an
opinion but the orthodox faith. Less famous but equally
interesting is the assertion in article 3 that "it is a heresy long
condemned to say that in Christ there are two hypostases or two
supposita or that the union is not made in hypostasis or supposit"
(STh III, q. 2, a. 3). By the time of the Summa, Thomas was no
longer content to suggest the incoherence of a one-person, twohypostases view or its affinity with the first opinion; he makes
explicit that such a view is heretical. To the extent that several
prominent thirteenth-century theologians, including Thomas's
illustrious teacher Albert the Great, at times affirmed two
hypostases in Christ, these theologians left their views open to
heretical misinterpretations. The same holds true for affirmations
of a purely human subject in Christ occasionally made by William
of Auxerre and Alexander of Hales. What seems to preserve safely
the orthodoxy of these early thirteenth-century Christologies is
their consistent defense of Christ's unity. Albert's ardent support
of one esse simpliciter in Christ makes it clear that the Universal
Doctor defended Christ's fundamental unity and only affirmed
two hypostases in opposition to the habitus theory and due to his
ambiguous understanding of 'hypostasis'. This is to suggest not
that Albert's Christology is unproblematic but rather that Albert
groped for adequate language to express the mode of union in
Christ while responding to the Christological questions of his
time. Thomas undoubtedly benefitted from Albert's advances.
Thomas returned to the question of whether Christ was one
(unum) or two in his later works. For him, the question of
whether Christ is unum relates closely to unity of hypostasis and

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATIC UNION

139

unity of esse.76 Albert raised to prominence the question of
Christ's unity of esse; Thomas learned from Albert the significance
of this question as well as the basic lines for developing a
response. De Unione has garnered much attention for its
affirmation of a secondary esse in Christ furnished by the human
nature assumed, an affirmation seemingly at odds with Thomas's
regular presentation of only one esse in Christ (III Sent., d. 6, q.
2, a. 2; Quodl. IX, q. 2, a. 2; STh III, q. 17, a. 2; Comp. theol., c.
212). His presentations of Christ's esse have generated a
substantial body of secondary literature and raise many questions
beyond the scope of this discussion. 77 Even if only in a limited
manner, it will prove useful to examine some aspects of Christ's
unity of esse. The question of whether Christ is unum vel duo well
introduces the question of esse and so will be briefly sketched
here.
76 The Scriptum

treats together the questions of unum vel duo (III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1),
esse (III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 2), and composite person or hypostasis (III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 3).
De Unione follows its discussion of unum vel duo (De Unione, a. 3) with discussion of esse (De
Unione, a. 4). The Summa Theologiae examines the issue of composite person under the
heading of the mode of the union (STh III, q. 2, a. 4) and the issues of unum vel duo and esse
together under the heading of consequences of the union (STh III, q. 17, aa. 1 and 2). On
Thomas's interpretation of persona composita, see M. Gorman, "Christ as Composite
according to Aquinas," Traditio 55 (2000): 143-57.
77 See V. Salas, "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's esse: A Metaphysics of the Incarnation," The
Thomist 70 (2006): 577-603; T. Weinandy, "Aquinas: God IS Man: The Marvel of the
Incarnation," in T. Weinandy, D. Keating, and J. Yocum, eds., Aquinas on Doctrine: A Critical
Introduction (London and New York: T&T Clark, 2004), 67-89; R. Cross, The Metaphysics
of the Incarnation: Thomas Aquinas to Duns Scotus; J. L. A. West, "Aquinas on the
Metaphysics of esse in Christ," The Thomist 66 (2002): 231-50; S. Brown, "Thomas Aquinas
and His Contemporaries on the Unique Existence in Christ," in K. Emery, Jr., and J.
Wawrykow, eds., Christ among the Medieval Dominicans (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of
Notre Dame Press, 1998), 220-37; R. Cross, "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the
Metaphysics of the Incarnation," The Thomist 60 (1996):171-202; T. Morris, "St. Thomas
on the Identity and Unity of the Person of Christ: A Problem of Reference in Christological
Discourse," Scottish Journal of Philosophy 35 (1982): 419-430; E. Gilson, "L'esse du Verbe
incarne selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Archives d'histoire doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age
35 (1968): 23-37; J. H. Nicholas, "L'unite d'etre dans le Christ d'apres saint Thomas," Revue
thomiste 65 (1965): 229-60; A. Patfoort, L'unite d'etre dans le Christ d'apres s. Thomas. A la
croisee de l'ontologie et de la christologie (Paris: Desclee, 1964); H. Diepen, "L'existence
humaine du Christ," Revue thomiste 58 (1958): 197-213; M. Corvez, "L'unicite d'existence
clans le Christ," Revue thomiste 56 (1956): 413-26; A. Hastings, "Christ's Act of Existence,"
Downside Review 73 (1955): 139-59.

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COREY L. BARNES

Positing two persons in Christ would render Christ two in the
masculine, a position rejected by each of the three opinions. The
first opinion affirms that Christ is one in the masculine but two in
the neuter. Proponents of this affirmation sought to avoid the
view that Christ non est aliquid secundum quod homo and
reasoned that the human aliquid made Christ two in the neuter.
The Scriptum offers a somewhat more accurate appraisal of the
issue from a purely historical standpoint (III Sent., d. 6, q. 2, a. 1).
De Unione and the Summa Theologiae argue that some held Christ
to be two in the neuter because they posited two hypostases or
supposita in Christ (De Unione, a. 3; STh III, q. 17, a. 1).
Thomas's slight reworking of the motivations for affirming Christ
as two in the neuter separates this issue from the question of
Christ as aliquid secundum quod homo, a separation that makes
more comfortable the assertion that Christ is one in the neuter.
The neuter (unum), according to Thomas, designates the
indistinct or imperfect; the masculine (unus) designates the
distinct and complete. Natures, save in God, do not exist of
themselves but are that by which something exists (the id quo in
Boethius's terminology). Christ subsists as man through humanity.
Humanity indicates the nature according to which Christ exists as
man, while man indicates the existing reality. Since the existing
reality (the id quod in Boethius's terminology) is none other than
the hypostasis of the Word, 'man' designates not simply the
nature but the concrete instantiation of that nature in a subject. 78
78 It is worth explaining two distinctions Thomas often resorts to in his explorations of
Christo logical predication (e.g., STh III, q. 16). Some names predicate natures abstractly (e.g.,
humanitas or divinitas), while others predicate natures concretely (e.g., homo or Deus). Aside
from the case of God, names designating nature abstractly cannot be truly predicated of an
individual possessing that nature. It is not true that "Peter is humanity (humanitas)." Rather,
only concrete names of the nature can be truly predicated of an individual. It is true that
"Peter is a human being (homo)." A further differentiation, in some sense a subdivision of
concrete predication, can be made between distinct and indistinct predication. The term
human being (homo) can be applied to every individual of human nature and so predicates
human nature of the individual indistinctly. Personal names (e.g., Peter) predicate human
nature distinctly or under the determination of individual properties. For a discussion of
abstract and concrete predication, see Gorman, "Uses of the Person-Nature Distinction in
Thomas' Christology." Thomas derives this use of the concrete and abstract distinction from
Bonaventure, III Sent., d. 6, a. 1, q. 1.

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141

There is only one subject in Christ, so 'man' and the human
aliquid designate in Christ the one hypostasis of the Word under
the determination of humanity. Thomas has, following Albert,
reformulated the question of Christ as unum vel duo in terms of
the number of supposits or hypostases in Christ such that
affirmation of two natures in Christ does not lead to Christ as two
in the neuter, which disrupts the logic of the first opinion, and
that affirmation of Christ as unum does not lead to the view that
Christ non est aliquid secundum quad homo, which avoids the
pitfalls of the third opinion.
A similar logic governs Thomas's presentation of Christ's esse,
namely, that everything pertaining to hypostasis in Christ is one
while everything pertaining to nature is two. Following Albert,
Thomas acknowledges that esse "pertains to hypostasis and to
nature, to hypostasis as to that which [id quad] has esse; to nature
as to that by which [id quo] something has esse" (STh III, q. 17, a.
2). So, granting that esse pertains both to hypostasis and to nature,
according to which should it be numbered? Albert proposed unum
duplex esse, a simple and compelling formula. Thomas's
sympathies remain ever loyal to Albert's intent, yet not even in De
Unione does Thomas repeat Albert's formulation. The general line
of thought developed here suggests a plausible reason for
Thomas's more reserved terminology, namely, that unum duplex
esse could be misinterpreted in terms of one person and two
hypostases. Thomas counters any notion of two hypostases or
supposits in Christ by stressing, even in De Unione, that esse "is
properly and truly said of the subsisting supposit" (De Unione, a.
4 ), which in Christ is one. 79 Affirmation of only one esse has
generated many concerns and critiques in Thomas's readers, most
serious of which is the charge of Monophysitism. 80 At minimum
79

"Esse enim proprie et vere dicitur de supposito subsistente"; cf. STh III, q. 17, a. 2, ad

1).

°

8 Cross argues that Thomas's one-esse position amounts to Monophysitism or avoids
Monophysitism only through internal inconsistencies (Cross, The Metaphysics of the
Incarnation, 57, 67-68; "Aquinas on Nature, Hypostasis, and the Metaphysics of the
Incarnation"). Weinandy argues that if Thomas truly restricted Christ's esse to the divine esse
of the Word, then such a view would be a version of Monophysitism. Weinandy holds that
Thomas did not so restrict Christ's esse but allowed for a finite created human esse (Weinandy,

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it seems to raise the question of the ontological status of Christ's
human nature.
Christ is aliquid secundum quad homo, namely, a hypostasis or
person of human nature. 81 Thomas casts the aliquid or non est
aliquid debate as fundamentally a question about the number of
hypostases in Christ. Even terms predicating nature predicate in
the concrete and so refer to the hypostasis, whether distinctly or
indistinctly. A critical reader of Thomas's explanatory strategy
might judge that his solutions more conceal than solve questions
about the ontological status of Christ's human nature. Does not
ref erring the aliquid in aliquid secundum quad homo to the
hypostasis of the Word undermine the most basic logic of the
affirmation? Is such a reference meaningful or problematically
circular? Though these questions are serious in their own right,
they do not pose serious challenges to Thomas's Christology.
Underlying these concerns rests the notion that the truth of the
Incarnation and the Word's assumption of an individual, perfect
human nature require that the human nature assumed possess
some reality, some basic act of existence on its own or of itself.
Thomas stresses that hypostases are what truly and properly exist.
Christ's human nature exists only insofar as it is a particular
human nature, the concrete human nature of the divine Word.
When questioning whether Christ is aliquid secundum quad homo
or the number of esses in Christ, Thomas reminds us that the
"Aquinas: God IS Man," 80-83). For a response to Cross, see West, "Aquinas on the
Metaphysics of esse in Christ." For a response to Weinandy, see Salas, "Thomas Aquinas on
Christ's esse."
81 As Principe notes, in the Summa Thomas does not explicitly address the question of
whether Christ is aliquid secundum quod homo but his views on the matter are relatively clear
from his position on the question of whether Christ secundum quad homo is a person or
hypostasis (STh III, q. 16, a. 12) (Principe, "St. Thomas on the Habitus-Theory of the
Incarnation," 414-18). Leroy seems wrongly to distinguish suppositum and person in his
denial that for Thomas there is a human person in Christ. "This man has a human nature: he
is the supposit of a human nature (suppositum humanae naturae), but he is not a human
person. That by which he is man does not constitute a new human person nor does it turn the
Word into a human person(!). Rather, it makes Jesus the Word incarnate to be a divine
Person in a human nature" (Leroy, "L'union selon l'hypostase d' apres saint Thomas d' Aquin,"
206). A human person is nothing other than a person of human nature. The person of the
Word, by virtue of the Incarnation, is a person of human nature and thus a human person.

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143

aliquid and the esse indicate that the hypostasis of the Word is the
subject of predication in Christ. This does not lessen the truth of
the Incarnation or of Christ's human nature, no more so than it
would lessen the truth of Peter's human nature to note that
predications concerning Peter's human nature are true of the
hypostasis rather than humanity.
If this goes some way toward clarifying Thomas' s defense of
one esse in Christ, the question remains how this can be reconciled with De Unione's provision for a secondary esse supplied by
Christ's human nature. The camp against such reconciliation
includes a large and diverse group of interpreters. 82 Some have
attempted to harmonize De Unione with Thomas's other presentations of Christ's esse. Thomas Weinandy argues that "Aquinas
implicitly held two esses from the start (and so was never a
Monophysite), but only explicitly stated this position on the one
occasion in the De unione Verbi incarnati." 83 Victor Salas
articulates the opposite position, folding De Unione's secondary
esse into the metaphysics grounding the one-esse view. "Simply
put, the human esse introduced in De Unione seems to be none
other than the divine esse when considered from the point of view
82 Cross argues that De Unione's account is coherent, unlike the remainder of Thomas's
accounts of Christ's esse, but lacks all explanatory value (Cross, "Aquinas on Nature,
Hypostasis, and Metaphysics," 172-73, 198-201). Patfoort regards De Unione, aa. 3-4 as
circular and so incautious if not unsuccessful (Patfoort,L'united'etre, 168-69). West describes
De Unione's two-esse view as an aberration that leans toward either a homo assumptus or
habitus view (West, "Aquinas on the Metaphysics of esse in Christ," 233-37).
83 Weinandy, "Aquinas: God IS Man," 80. Weinandy suggests that Thomas's normal
emphasis on one esse stems from a concern to oppose Nestorianism and that he became
increasingly aware of the need for a created esse. Weinandy understands Thomas's most basic
Christological insights to demand this created esse. "If the Son of God actually did assume the
substantial nature of manhood and so come to exist as an authentic man, then the authenticity
of that substantial manhood demands a human created esse" (ibid., 81). "The humanity is in
act (exists) as a man and thus its act is human. If it did not have a finite created human esse,
it would simply not be because it, obviously, only is because it has been created" (ibid.).
Weinandy is careful to add the qualifications that this "finite created human esse" does not
entail any existence independent of the Word. "The created esse is more than accidental
because the humanity is an authentic substance in its own right (manhood), and thus it
possesses its own integral created human esse. However, the created human esse is not the
principle esse because the humanity does not exist independently of the Son as a separate
supposit/reality" (ibid., 82).

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COREY L. BARNES

of its subsisting in a human nature. " 84 This articulation fits well
with the interpretation of Thomas described here. Thomas
consistently states that esse properly belongs to the hypostasis as
that which (id quad) exists. In the Incarnation, the id quad of the
Word gains a new id quo such that the Word newly subsists as a
hypostasis of human nature. De Unione highlights the esse of the
Word as determined by the form of human nature. While
Thomas's other treatments more narrowly highlight the one esse
of the Word, this is not to the exclusion of the nature's role in
forming that esse.85
SUMMARY

Early thirteenth-century Christologies staked out their
positions along the spectrum of the Lombard's three opinions by
answering the questions of whether and how Christ was aliquid
secundum quad homo and of whether Christ was unum vel duo.
Though near unanimous assent was given to the second opinion,
this assent often concealed aspects of a homo assumptus view.
Late medieval reflections on person developed Boethius's
definition in terms of incommunicability, unity, singularity, and
dignity. These reflections produced remarkably refined notions of
'person', a fact most evident in Albert the Great' s thought. Armed
with a long list of qualifications determining personhood, latetwelfth- and early-thirteenth-century theologians combated the
habitus and homo assumptus theories by arguing that the Word
84 Salas, "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's esse," 592. Salas's interpretation rests heavily on
Thomas's understanding of the incarnate Word as a composite person (see Gorman, "Christ
as Composite"). Salas criticizes Weinandy for essentializing Thomas's notion of esse by
insisting that the created human esse must be substantial (Salas, "Thomas Aquinas on Christ's
esse," 593-94).
85 "To the third it should be said that the temporal generation does not terminate in the
esse of the eternal supposit, such that it would simply through itself begin to be, but rather that
it began to be a supposit possessing that esse of a supposit of human nature" (Quodl. IX, q.
2, a. 2, ad 3 [Quaestionesde quodlibet (Rome: Marietti, 1956)]). "To the first it should be said
that esse follows nature, not as having esse but as something by which it is. A person or
hypostasis, however, follows as [something] having esse. Therefore Uesus] more retains unity
according to unity of hypostasis than possesses duality according to duality of nature" (STh
III, q. 17, a. 2, ad 1).

ALBERT AND THOMAS ON HYPOSTATIC UNION

145

assumed an individual human nature but that this individual
human nature did not meet the requisite qualifications for
personhood. Such a proposal verges toward a homo assumptus
view when the individual human nature assumed is characterized
as a hypostasis or subject. To varying degrees, William of Auxerre,
Alexander of Hales, and Albert the Great affirmed a purely
human hypostasis or subject in Christ.
These affirmations, incautious though they may be, do not
inevitably lead to a homo assumptus Christology or to Nestorianism. Albert, as did Alexander, uses 'hypostasis' both as a term of
first imposition and as a term of second intention. References to
two hypostases or to a purely human hypostasis in Christ should
be read, at least in Albert's case, as indicating an individual human
nature composed of body and soul, lacking nothing save independent existence. This human hypostasis indicates a logical
abstraction conceived as a refutation of the habitus theory and
Christological nihilianism. Albert defends the unity of Christ
through consideration of esse. Christ is unum because he is one
supposit or person, to which esse properly belongs as that which
exists. Since the one hypostasis or person of the Word subsists in
two natures, Albert proposes one, twofold (unum duplex) esse in
Christ. Albert's reflections on Christ's esse calm fears that his
Christology amounts to a homo assumptus view, though the
language of two hypostases in Christ remains open to heretical
misinterpretation.
Thomas Aquinas steadfastly refused any distinction of 'person'
and 'hypostasis' in rational nature. This refusal reflects Thomas's
concern to eliminate the traces of a homo assumptus view lurking
within popular interpretations of the second opinion, a concern
that itself reflects a change of perspective from earlier thirteenthcentury figures. While William of Auxerre, Alexander of Hales,
and Albert the Great worked diligently to combat any affinity
between the second and third of the Lombard's Christological
opinions, Thomas devotes greater attention to distinguishing the
first and second opinions. He explicitly rejects distinguishing
person and hypostasis through the incommunicability of

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COREY L. BARNES

assumptability, a distinction perhaps supported by Albert's
understanding of 'person'. Though Thomas declines to reproduce
Albert's conception of 'person', he follows his learned teacher in
connecting the question of Christ's unity with Christ's esse. Albert
and Thomas both link esse with 'person' and maintain one esse
simpliciter in Christ. Thomas does not repeat Albert's formula of
unum duplex esse, but he does adhere to Albert's basic intuition.
This reading of Thomas helps account for the views of De Unione
in light of Thomas's other treatments of Christ's esse and advances
our understanding of Thomas's reformulation of Albert's
Christology.
The conclusion remains that Albert the Great refined his
conception of 'person' to confront the Christological questions of
his time, questions largely inherited from the early thirteenth
century. Thomas Aquinas approached Christological questions
from a slightly different perspective. Not content to reject the
Lombard's first and third opinions, Thomas sought to root out
any semblance of the first opinion in expositions of the mode of
union in Christ. The surface differences between Albert's and
Thomas' s Christo logical language sometimes indicate deeper
differences and other times mask deeper continuities. My aim
here has simply been to begin the process of discerning the
differences and the continuities so as to better understand each
theologian's Christology.

BOOK REVIEWS
A Short History of Thomism. By ROMANUS CESSARIO, 0.P. Washington, D.C.:
The Catholic University of America Press, 2005. Pp. 106. $19.95 (paper).
ISBN 0-8132-1386-x.
In this fine little book, which features a foreword by Ralph Mclnerny,
Romanus Cessario traces the history of Thomism from the end of the thirteenth
century to the middle of the twentieth century, adding a few comments in the
brief concluding chapter about the last few decades. His aim is duly
circumscribed:
While the present study purports only to fulfill a provisional
objective, it nonetheless provides a sketch of the history of Thomism
that will be useful until that day when some scholar with the required
time and resources undertakes to research and write the
multi-volume history of Thomism that this important school of
thought both merits and requires. Perhaps this modest effort to draw
together the many diverse strands of a complicated history into a
single narrative might even prompt the undertaking of such a
full-length study. (33-34)

Even though the recent past does not figure prominently in Cessario's account,
another of the book's salutary effects is that it provokes the reader-at least it
provoked me-to reflect on post-Vatican II Thomism and on the future of
Thomism, over which some of us may have at least a bit of influence. I will
return to this point below.
Cessario begins by sketching St. Thomas's scholarly career and describing the
Angelic Doctor's aspiration to fashion a unified and systematic articulation of
Christian wisdom that "does not emerge from" but rather "embraces each of the
subordinate and ancillary disciplines within its transcendental unity" (9). He
notes that St. Thomas would find the contemporary fragmentation of theological
inquiry "very odd" and "would be repelled by the cacophony of competing truth
claims advanced by point-of-view theologians claiming hegemonic expertise in
one or another theological discipline" (ibid.). Interestingly, this fragmentation
has recently been on display in the academic reviews, even the sympathetic ones,
of Joseph Ratzinger's Jesus of Nazareth (Doubleday, 2007). Reviewers strain to
classify this remarkable work, which combines, in the manner of the Summa

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Theologiae, scriptural exegesis, rabbinic and patristic commentaries on various
parts of Scripture, insight into Jewish, Greek, and Roman history and culture,
the history of Catholic doctrine, metaphysics, moral theory, philosophical
anthropology, and the fruits of thousands of hours of mental and contemplative
prayer. "After all," they protest in effect, "no one can be an up-to-date expert in
all the relevant sub-disciplines, and so this must be some sort of 'popular' or
'catechetical' tract rather than a serious work of theology."
Something has surely gone amiss when the very idea of an integrated
theoretical and practical wisdom baffles many of the 'scientific' theologians of
our day. And, mutatis mutandis, the same sort of fragmentation and loss of
direction afflict philosophy, too, as a contemporary academic discipline. In fact,
to my mind one of the most destructive effects of academic fragmentation among
Catholic thinkers is the sharp dichotomy many presuppose between being a
philosopher and being a theologian and between the academic disciplines of
philosophy and systematic theology. In short, we need St. Thomas now more
than ever, both for his teaching and for his method.
Cessario spends the rest of chapter 1 setting the stage for the catalogue of
historically important Thomists that fills chapters 2 and 3. This stage-setting
involves three separate tasks. The first is to indicate how he will be using the
term 'Thomist' in his catalogue. Saint Thomas is such an important figure in
Western thought, and especially in the thought of the Catholic Church, that after
his time nearly all major Catholic thinkers-and many others as well (Leibniz,
to name but one)-have felt the need to come to terms with him. Inevitably,
most of them either depart from St. Thomas in ways deemed by some to be
important or extend his system in ways deemed by some to be unfaithful to his
intentions. The variations are seemingly endless, so much so that some have even
suggested that there is no such thing as a peculiarly Thomistic tradition. Cessario
rightly dismisses this perverse suggestion, but is still faced with a tricky
conceptual problem. In the end, he settles for a set of recognizably Thomistic
positions in metaphysics, philosophical anthropology, and moral theory as
roughly definitive of Thomism until the time of Descartes, and then, for more
modern times, he invokes the twenty-four Thomistic theses that found their way
into St. Pius X's Doctoris Angelici (1914), the motu proprio that prescribed these
theses for Catholic college and seminary education.
Needless to say, this invocation of sets of Thomistic positions does not
automatically take care of the second task, namely, specifying just who should
count as a Thomist for the purposes of this book. The reason is that there is a
veritable continuum of degrees of participation, so to speak, in St. Thomas's
thought, and if we stubbornly insist on perfect conformity to full sets of these
theses, then there will have been no Thomists other than St. Thomas-and,
presumably, only the later (or, perhaps, earlier) St. Thomas at that. But there is
no reason to insist on such a rigorous standard.
Cessario follows James Weisheipl in distinguishing three groups of thinkers:
(a) mere eclectic Thomists, who borrow from St. Thomas but feel no particular
allegiance to him, (b) wide Thomists, who give "the principles and conclusions

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of Thomas Aquinas a privileged place in the development of [their] own proper
philosophical or theological reflections" (16), and (c) strict Thomists, who are
engaged, as Weisheipl puts it, in "a systematic attempt to understand and
develop the basic principles and conclusions of St. Thomas Aquinas in order to
relate them to the problems and needs of each generation" (13-14). This
taxonomy, taken as a broad rule of thumb, is tolerable, though not without its
pitfalls. For instance, Cessario classifies the sixteenth-century Jesuits as eclectic
Thomists (17), even though it seems clear that Molina and Suarez, to name the
two with which I am most familiar, give "the principles and conclusions of
Thomas Aquinas a privileged place," even when disagreeing with them. Indeed,
the great bulk of the works of both Jesuits takes the form of extended
commentaries on one or another part of the Summa Theologiae, and there is no
question that they treat St. Thomas with much more deference than they do any
other author. For instance, in a particularly poignant passage in part 4 of his
Concordia, Molina agonizes over the fact that a crucial text from St. Thomas
cannot in all honesty bear the interpretation he would like to give it. I do not
mean to quibble here, so much as to underscore the rhetorical dimension of any
such broad-stroked taxonomy.
In general, however, identifying the strict Thomists is not all that difficult, as
long as this identification is made by ostension, as it were, rather than strictly by
definition. Most Thomists before the time of Descartes were Dominicans who
not only identified themselves as Thomists but were also identified as Thomists
by other Catholic writers who found themselves in conversation with them.
(There were, to be sure, a few "wayward" Dominicans who had only the most
tenuous claim to be called Thomists of any stripe. In the most entertaining
sentence in the book, Cessario dryly notes concerning Durandus of SaintPoun;:ain: "His status [as a bishop] however did not preserve him from the
scrutiny of the Dominican Order, whose authorities considered his Commentary
on the Sentences to contain more than a few-235 altogether-positions that
were opposed to Aquinas's teaching" [56].) A similar point holds for the
post-Cartesian era, though here things get a bit murkier because, in addition to
straightforward Thomism, there were various attempts to extend St. Thomas's
thought in order to make it answer questions that arise only within the general
context of the "new way of ideas." So, for instance, Cessario (perhaps unfairly)
classifies the Transcendental Thomists as eclectic Thomists, noting (accurately)
that they have had virtually no impact on "the way that the Church authentically
expresses the Catholic faith" (88). On the other hand, Karol Wojtyla's extension
of Thomism via phenomenology is more difficult to classify and obviously has
had an impact on the teachings of the Church.
The third task is to make a determination about whether or how to divide the
history of Thomism into distinct chronological periods. The standard division
is tripartite, marking (a) an initial period that reached its high point in the work
of such fifteenth-century thinkers as John Capreolus and Denis the Carthusian;
(b) the sixteenth and seventeenth century revival that took place mainly on the
Iberian peninsula and produced the likes of Francis Sylvestri of Ferrara,

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Francisco de Vitoria, Cardinal Cajetan, Dominigo Soto, Domingo Banez, and
John Poinsot, to name just a few; and (c) the nineteenth and twentieth-century
revival that began in Germany and Italy with the likes of the Jesuit Josef
Kleutgen, was enshrined in Leo XIII's Aeterni patris, and then spread in earnest
to North America. There are subtle variations on this scheme from author to
author, but all of them focus on the temporal waxing and waning of Thomism
over the centuries. While ascribing a rough accuracy to such accounts, Cessario
is reluctant to codify historical divisions of this sort, in part because the story
could just as easily be told geographically, in which case it would take on a
different character, and in part because the ups and downs of Thomism are
traceable to, as much as to anything else, "external" factors such as the Black
Plague, the Reformation, and a long series of ecclesiastical, political, social, and
cultural upheavals.
What follows in chapters 2 and 3 is a sketchy and yet fascinating narrative
about the most prominent Thomists of the last seven centuries, highlighting the
salient issues they have dealt with and, in some cases, their roles in promoting
the study of St. Thomas for the good of the Church. I will give just a brief sample
of interesting tidbits from these chapters.
Although St. Thomas did not actively cultivate disciples during his own
lifetime, the controversies surrounding his writings galvanized leading
Dominicans-most notably, St. Albert the Great, Peter of Conflans, and Giles of
Lessines at first and, later on, Robert Orford, Thomas Sutton, and John Quidort
-to come to his defense forcefully within a few years of his death. This
established Thomism "as a legitimate school of theology within the Christian
Church" (43) even before St. Thomas's canonization in 1323. Another early hero
was the English Dominican Richard Knapwell, who was excommunicated by the
Franciscan archbishop John Peckam in 1286 for arguing that the rational soul is
the sole substantial form of a human being-a position later endorsed by the
Council of Vienne.
Thomism continued to flourish amid opposition until the later fourteenth
century, when the Black Plague and the Great Western Schism severely disrupted
European life in general and ecclesial life in particular. But because of the
expansion of the Dominican Order, the movement was still alive at the beginning
of the fifteenth century not only in the university centers of England, France, and
Italy, but also in lands as far separated as Spain and Armenia. (This highlights the
role that Dominican houses of study have played, and are likely to continue to
play, in the history of Thomism; a modicum of independence from the
universities is a definite advantage for any intellectual movement.) The bestknown figures of this period were John Capreolus, the Dominican expositor of
St. Thomas's Commentary on the Sentences, and the incredibly prolific Denis the
Carthusian.
The sixteenth century remains perhaps the most interesting in the history of
Thomism. Cessario cautions us not to exaggerate the opposition between the
Scholastics and the humanists (66-67). However, it is undeniable that the tension
between them was exacerbated once the Reformation occurred, and this made

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it more socially acceptable for the Reformers to heap scorn on St. Thomas and
his successors. But as with all the other many crises that have marked the history
of the Church, God's grace abounded, and one of its most obvious effects was
the proliferation of outstanding theologians, most of them Thomists and all of
them heavily influenced by St. Thomas, during the Tridentine and
post-Tridentine period. (Cessario dismisses as "a popular but erroneous rumor"
[74] the widespread belief that the Summa Theologiae was enshrined next to the
Bible on the altar by the Fathers of the Council of Trent.) Near the end of
chapter 2 Cessario gives a rendition of what he takes to be the distinctively
Thomistic theses that played an important role in the sixteenth-century debates
with other traditions in Catholic theology (69-72 ), followed by a more specific
characterization of some key differences between the Thomists and the Jesuits,
especially Francisco Suarez and, to a lesser extent, Luis de Molina (77-78).
Without going into detail, I will simply note that in both cases there were
junctures at which I felt a bit uneasy, either because certain points being touted
as distinctively Thomist did not seem to me peculiar to Thomism or because the
positions being attributed to the Jesuits were not articulated as carefully as I
would have liked. This is a minor complaint, given the severe space restrictions
under which Cessario is operating. But it is a reminder that writing an extensive
history of Thomism will be a philosophically and theologically, as well as
historically, demanding task.
As Cessario's narrative enters into the eighteenth and nineteenth century we
find him providing an interesting measured defense of so-called manual
Thomism, which began to develop as early as the late seventeenth century "in
order mainly to meet the pedagogical requirements of students preparing for the
ministerial priesthood" (83-84). He is well aware of the limitations of the
manuals and of the perspective that disdains them, but suggests that this is not
the last word:
Some intellectual historians have criticized the manual tradition on
the basis that it replaced critical engagement in philosophical
dialogue, such as that practiced by Aquinas and his first disciples,
with a synthesized presentation of principles and conclusions ....
Canon [Vincenzo] Buzzetti, who began his intellectual life as a
disciple of John Locke, learned his Thomism and became convinced
of its value, by reading the manuals of [the Dominicans Antoine]
Gaudin and [Salvatore] Roselli. His personal experience illustrates
that the Thomist manuals could serve to open up to well-disposed
persons an alternative vision of philosophy ... that would keep
Catholic theology from tumbling into eclecticism. (84)

The manuals represented an attempt to solve a problem that is still with us,
namely, how to give at least a modicum of sound philosophical training to a
large group of men who will play an important ministerial role in the Church
and yet cannot in fairness or in fact be assumed to be prospective philosophers
or theologians. Predictably, it was precisely the budding philosophers and

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theologians among them who found the manuals most frustrating. Some felt
most keenly the absence of those classical philosophers and Fathers of the
Church with whom St. Thomas had carried on a constant dialogue in his own
proper works; others felt most keenly the lack of intellectual contact with more
contemporary modes of thought. In the years leading up to Vatican II the first
type of frustration led to a demand for resourcement in Catholic intellectual life,
whereas the second type engendered a demand for aggiomamento.
It is at this point that Cessario's narrative invites reflection on the recent past
and the future of Thomism. The demands for resourcement and aggiomamento
were acceded to in the wake of the council, but in the process strict Thomism,
along with Scholasticism in general, was largely jettisoned by mainstream
Catholic intellectuals, especially by theologians but also by most philosophers.
As Mclnerny brought out well in his now-classic work, Thomism in an Age of
Renewal (Doubleday, 1966), this widespread rejection of Thomism was more a
matter of the heart than of the mind. But it has had profound intellectual
consequences as well. The most obvious is the parlous condition of the vast
majority of large Catholic universities in Europe and North America. A more
subtle consequence is that the most influential preconciliar Catholic theologians
of the aggiornamento wing have a very sparse following nowadays, forty years
after the council. And why? In his perceptive review (First Things, May 2007) of
Fergus Kerr's Twentieth-Century Catholic Theologians: From Chenu to Ratzinger
(Blackwell, 2006), R. R. Reno notes that these theological giants are now barely
intelligible to the present generation of new Catholic theologians, in large
measure because the neophytes lack a solid grounding in the standard Thomistic
philosophy and theology in which the great theologians had been trained (in part
through the manuals) and against which they had in various ways rebelled.
The fact is that, love him or hate him, St. Thomas provides contemporary
Catholic philosophers and theologians, even those who choose in the end to
deviate from him in one way or an0ther, with the philosophically most plausible
starting points in metaphysics, philosophy of nature, moral theory, and
philosophical anthropology, along with the deepest and most thoroughly worked
out account of the relation between faith and reason. As a result, given that
familiarity with the Angelic Doctor's thought has ceased to be a central aim of
Catholic higher education, many aspiring Catholic philosophers and theologians
find themselves adrift as Catholic philosophy and theology "tumble into
eclecticism," to use Cessario's phrase. For instance, even philosophy and
theology majors in contemporary Catholic universities are unlikely to have
anything approaching a refined grasp of St. Thomas's views about the relation
between faith and reason-and this at a time when these views could bring
considerable light to the current confused cultural debate about the interplay
between Christian faith and natural science.
Nor are the prospects bright for a reinstatement, or even a mere modest
revival, of Thomism in the flagship Catholic universities of Europe and North
America. When my own department conducted a search for a Thomist a few
years ago, it turned out that some of my younger colleagues had never even

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heard of a Thomist! One of them, a cradle non-practicing Catholic, asked in
astonishment, "Why would we want to hire someone who believes all and only
what Aquinas believes?" As I sorted through the confusion about Thomism and
Catholic philosophy implicit in this question, it occurred to me that one
effective, though admittedly flippant, response might be, "Well, we hired
someone who believes all and only what you believe. Which is worse?" The
bottom line, unfortunately, is that my department and others like it harbor very
little sympathy for the idea of serving the Church by cultivating the thought of
St. Thomas. They are more concerned with their standing in the secular
academic world. Perhaps they will claim, and in some cases sincerely believe, that
this concern, far from being sycophantic, is equivalent to an aspiration for
intellectual excellence. But any Catholic philosopher who has experience in
contemporary Catholic universities and has thought deeply about matters
pertaining to faith and reason is likely to have a multitude of good reasons for
dismissing this claim.
Despite all this, there are many encouraging signs for the future. The last
fifteen years have witnessed a resurgence of interest in the works of St. Thomas
among a small but significant group of gifted Catholic undergraduates. (I find
nothing in my professional life quite as exhilarating as being thanked effusively
by students for having recommended to them the works of-who would have
believed it?-Reginald Garrigou-Lagrange.) Indeed, many of these young people
are now beginning to make a name for themselves as Thomists in the academy.
I have participated in some of their tenure reviews and been greatly edified by
the experience. Some of them have been able to study the works of St. Thomas
both as undergraduates and as graduate students; others have received solid
Thomistic training as undergraduates and put St. Thomas aside temporarily
during their graduate studies. But all have nurtured the aspiration to contribute
in one way or another to Catholic philosophy and theology in general and to the
Thomistic tradition in particular. In addition, there are several excellent journals
devoted to fostering Thomism, along with the other Scholastic traditions.
Cessario mentions The Thomist and Revue thomiste, as well as the recent
inception of the English-language edition of Nova et Vetera (91-93). What's
more, the advent of the Internet and the consequent easy access to texts,
research, and intercommunication will at least partially offset the loss of those
Catholic universities that can no longer be counted on to foster the study of St.
Thomas systematically. And there is a lot more good news beyond this.
I especially recommend Cessario's little book in tandem with Mclnerny's
Thomism in an Age of Renewal to the younger generation of Thomists and
prospective Thomists. Each of these books in its own way transmits a sense of
the nobility and depth of an intellectual tradition which has served the Church
well over the centuries and which is worthy of intellectual allegiance even today.
Together they provide a historical context within which we can face with
equanimity the claim, reported by Cessario, that Thomism is not at this time one
of the "active theological traditions at work in the Church" (12). As both its

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remote history and its proximate history demonstrate, even if Thomism is not
fully flourishing at present, it soon enough will be, once again.
ALFRED J. FREDDOSO

University of Notre Dame
Notre Dame, Indiana

Reason and the Reasons of Faith. Edited by PAUL J. GRIFFITHS and REINHARD
HOTTER. New York: T. & T. Clark, 2005. Pp. ix+ 373. $60.00 (cloth).
ISBN 978-0-567-02830-3.
This book is a fruit of the seed that John Paul H's encyclical Fides et ratio
planted. Mindful of the current crises of reason and of faith, the contributors
focus their attention on theological reasoning, especially in light of modern and
postmodern attacks on its legitimacy. It is rare to find a collection of essays in
which authors so different in their starting-points engage one another so well.
The essays that constitute this volume come from meetings held over the
course of three years at the Center of Theological Inquiry in Princeton. Although
inspired by the work of a pope, the authors of these essays include Orthodox,
Anglican, Lutheran, and Reformed voices as well as Roman Catholics. The
organizers inform us that they made no effort to assure homogeneity in
theological method or in philosophical preferences, but simply trusted in a
common commitment to investigate resources of reason for theology in the face
of current challenges.
As systematic theologians, they frequently had recourse to philosophy and
decided to invite the renowned Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor to join
them for the final meeting. His postscript ("Engaging the Citadel of Secular
Reason") clearly anticipates his latest blockbuster, A Secular Age (2007), with its
musings on the prospect that it is the simultaneous presence of mutually incompatible but equally plausible world views that paralyzes contemporary intellectual
culture, including theological reasoning. Resolving Taylor's perplexities will be
no easy task, but this volume helps to make clear that what is needed is vigorous
epistemological and metaphysical reflection, for it is not clear that all these world
views are equally plausible, and some may be the result of intellectual mistakes
or perhaps even willful decisions that are only disguised as discoveries.
The collection has four parts. The first set of papers inquires into the nature
of theological reasoning; the second, the assessment of reason's powers by
theologians; the third, the significance for theology of philosophical shifts during
the passage into modernity and postmodernity; and the fourth, the inexorable
necessity and ongoing importance of philosophy for theological inquiry.
Throughout the authors show respect for John Paul H's Fides et ratio and

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broadly agree with his concern about the contemporary crisis of reason. But the
contributors by no means agree with the course suggested by the encyclical for
the resolution of that crisis.
Much of the debate in this book is really about whether there are praeambula
fidei that can be known by reason independently of faith that could thereby
enhance the credibility of faith-claims. In the tradition of {ides quaerens
intellectum, the first group of essayists examines the "reasons of faith" typical of
specific areas of expertise within systematic theology. Alan J. Torrance writes on
revelation, Bruce D. Marshall on the Trinity, Colin Gunton and Robert W.
Jenson on Christology, and Lois Malcolm and Mark Mcintosh on the Cross.
Torrance is typical of those disinclined to allow for any such praembula. In
his essay on the criteria by which Christianity claims to recognize when God has
spoken in genuine revelation, he insists that Christians must avoid judging the
authenticity of the Word of God not only by some extrinsic standard of what
makes worldly sense but also by the tests of "Socratic immanentism" (as if
resonance with truths already within us could serve to differentiate genuine
revelation from false claims in a fashion comparable to the doctrine of
recollection in the Platonic dialogues). An adequate theological understanding
of how God speaks requires a conversion of reason under the influence of the
Holy Spirit, not the presumption that the canons of reason are culturally neutral
and beyond any particular world view. Torrance insists that the testimony of
Jesus is self-authenticating. Even when believers articulate their own reasons for
thinking that their particular religious beliefs are "properly basic," they should
never imagine that their faith-claims could be "demonstrable" to others. For
Torrance, reason itself seems to suggest that reason, left to its own devices, never
constitutes an indubitable ground for certainty. For this reason he remains
skeptical about the ways in which Fides et ratio in effect reiterates the claims of
Vatican I that faith and reason are in harmony and that compelling proofs for
some faith-claims are in principle possible.
Bruce Marshall's wonderful essay about what epistemic difference believing
in the Trinity might make to any other truth claim is a helpful counterweight
here. By distinguishing the idea that the Trinity is the cause of everything else in
the universe from the idea that beliefs about the Trinity might be the reason for
anything else that we might believe, Marshall affirms the instinct behind the
praeambulafidei: there are truths about the world and about the creator of the
world that one can know quite independently of any religious beliefs. But
whether one takes the more spare naturalism of an Aquinas or the richer semiotic
metaphysics of a Bonaventure, faith in the Trinity can well bring us to see any
number of things about the Creator and creation that would likely never have
occurred to us otherwise.
Of the three essays in the section dedicated to the theological assessment of
reason, Reinhard Hiitter's study of Aquinas on the relation between intellect and
will is particularly insightful. To confront the skepticism of modernity and the
nihilism of postmodernity, he urges the cultivation of precisely the sort of
intellectual virtues that Nietzschean deconstructionism most holds in suspicion:

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humility and receptlVlty. The intrinsic orientation of the intellect toward
grasping reality ought to lead to habits of philosophical reflection that are
appreciative of a world created ex nihilo and entirely dependent on God for its
being. But the postmetaphysical privileging of the will's rule over reason and the
relentless voluntarism of an age dominated by the instrumental use of reason can
easily mask reason's teleological character and even lead one to forget why
Christian tradition often thought of curiosity as a vice.
The other essays of section 2 show less optimism about reason's prospects.
Paul Griffith's quasi-Augustinian explanation of error begins strongly enough as
exegesis of the problem of volitional depravity but allows an unwarranted
pessimism about reason to engender doubts about the prospect of ever appealing
to natural law in public debates on morality. In embracing the anthropology of
Martin Luther, Ernstpeter Maurer reflects on the structural problems facing
reason "under the condition of sin" that invariably distort its self-perception and
make reason prone to forget its status as a created reality, dependent on its
Creator.
The historically focused essays in section 3 concentrate on the challenges that
theological reasoning has encountered with modernity. Carver T. Yu shows how
the ultimate groundlessness of autonomous reason tends toward nihilism as its
logical conclusion. He analyzes the gradual evaporation of being that results
from Hume's reduction of cognitive intentionality to the habits of consciousness,
and Kant's reduction of understanding to the a priori structures of the mind.
Janet Martin Soskice uncovers an unstated commitment to a univocal concept of
being in Locke's strategy for identifying the attributes of God, and shows how
it leads to Hume's radical skepticism about God and Kant's dialectical projection
of God as a moral necessity while simultaneously denying the possibility of ever
knowing God by speculative reason. David Bentley Hart takes up the theme of
the analogy of being that Soskice proposes as an alternative to Locke's
metaphysical univocity and criticizes Heidegger for a "willful misreading" of
Christian metaphysics.
In the final section, Martin Bieler and Romanus Cessario ask not only why
philosophy matters for theology but whether any one particular philosophy is
needed. Like Hart, Bieler clearly appreciates the forcefulness of the problem that
Heidegger's critique of ontotheology presents to contemporary theology. In
response he affirms the ecclesial tradition of not declaring any one particular
philosophy to be official, but presents Aquinas's views on the interrelationships
between faith and reason and between philosophy and theology as particularly
well suited for meeting the Heideggerian challenge. Cessario dares to name the
elephant in the room: the historical trend of Protestant theological formation to
proceed without requiring philosophical training and the recent trend within
Catholic theological formation to marginalize philosophy, or even to make
skepticism more rather than less likely by presenting a potpourri of philosophies
to seminarians. His essay makes a forceful case for realistic metaphysics and
epistemology as an indispensable support to the acquisition of the truths of faith
and all the other tasks of theology.

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The range of views in this volume thus covers a wide spectrum, but even their
differences shed some light on the fundamental project of (ides quaerens
intellectum.
JOSEPH W. KOTERSKI, S.J.

Fordham University
Bronx, New York

Aristotle East and West: Metaphysics and the Division of Christendom. By DAVID
BRADSHAW. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004. Pp. 297.
$75.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-521-82865-1.
In his preface, David Bradshaw invites his readers to expect a helpful contribution to East-West ecumenism that will outline the historical development of
both Christian traditions. His purpose, he says, is to describe "the formation of
the two traditions, eastern and western, in parallel with one another" (x). From
the start he prepares us for a discussion of two broad and important topics: (1)
the development of ancient Greek thought and (2) the alternative appropriations
of that heritage by the Christian East and West. Promising that his epilogue will
consider "what light the comparison of the two traditions can shed on our
current situation" (xiii), he also seems to offer a balanced consideration of both
sides of this discussion. As he notes, "It is only by seeing both the eastern and
western traditions as developments out of a shared heritage in classical
metaphysics that they can be properly understood" (xii). Bradshaw proposes,
then, not the more common historical reviews of the two traditions, but a careful
analysis of the philosophical roots from which both have emerged.
It soon becomes apparent, however, that Bradshaw means to catalogue
various theological failures of the West, particularly those that stem from its
inability to strike a proper balance between reason and revelation. That balance,
he insists, was fully achieved in the East. He identifies this lack of harmony
between philosophy and theology as "the shipwreck of faith and reason [which]
was strictly a western phenomenon" (x). So while he might suggest that his
volume will further the theological discussion between the Christian East and
West, his more deliberate aim seems to be, first, to identify the failure of the
West in order to appreciate its Greek philosophical heritage and, second, to
consider how this failure has hindered its theological development.
Even if we were to accept Bradshaw's identification of the cause of the West's
"shipwreck" as the Enlightenment, full agreement with him would require us to
suppose that only the East is fully equipped to avoid the theological issues of
modernity, and that it has encountered no comparable difficulties of its own. It
is not clear that either claim is defensible. Further, lest we suppose that the
Western malaise is solely a modern phenomenon, Bradshaw further asks us to

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consider how "all the bloody wars and revolutions, the hatred, the arrogance,
and philosophical despair of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries" (277)
ultimately derive from the Enlightenment's revolt against Scholasticism-a
revolt, he emphasizes, that never arose in the East. While such remarks might
provoke impassioned retorts, a more studied consideration recognizes that it is
futile to engage the book in this way.
One of the greatest challenges facing readers of Bradshaw's work, then, is to
pass over the various remarks that distract from an otherwise informative
discussion of the influence of Greek philosophy on the two Christian traditions.
Such remarks are, fortunately, mostly limited to the preface and epilogue. For
example, after tracing the development of various intellectual themes from
Aristotle through Thomas Aquinas and Gregory Palamas, Bradshaw asks us to
consider how "major institutions and movements embodied [persecution and
religious wars] in the West, such as the Crusades, the military orders, and the
Inquisition, [which] all arose after the schism" (276). How ought we to connect
this theological tradition to these historical developments? If there is a direct
link, Bradshaw declines to provide it himself. Moreover, after having encouraged
us to shift our focus "from dogma and ecclesiology to questions of fundamental
metaphysics" (xii), this seems an unfortunate and questionable leap. If
Bradshaw's aim is to impugn western Christendom (e.g., "the long movement of
the West toward unbelief" [275]), we might wonder why he bothers to review
the shared intellectual history as thoroughly as he does.
Fortunately, most of Bradshaw's argument is less forced. Each of the
intervening chapters offers a more balanced consideration of the historical
developments introduced in the preface. While each is intended to support his
ultimate endorsement of the East versus the West, each is drawn with sufficient
balance and depth to afford genuine insight into a specific topic that warrants its
own consideration. Further, though Bradshaw does not actually propose to
advance the East-West ecumenical cause, he does identify ecumenism as a
possible vantage from which to review his results. To the extent that readers of
either tradition can approach his project with a less polemical spirit, they stand
to gain a more informed appreciation of the shared history, and from that, a
broader foundation from which to consider the East-West ecumenical exchange.
Bradshaw chooses the concept of energeia to illustrate his understanding of
the contrast between East and West (xi-xii). Chapter 1 identifies and develops
two main thematic senses of the term in the Aristotelian corpus. First, energeia
is contrasted with physical movement (kinesis): where the latter is for the sake
of an end, the former is an end in itself. Second, energeia is described as
actuality, understood, in part, as "a more fully realized stage of natural
development" (20). Chapter 2 describes the Prime Mover as the means by which
Aristotle unites these two strands of energeia. Imparting motion to the cosmos
without being moved, the Prime Mover exemplifies pure actuality (26),
Bradshaw's first theme. He identifies the "traditional view" with this particular
theme, as only noting its transcendence (42). Bradshaw then invites us to
consider the Prime Mover's immanence which it enjoys as the end sought by all
natural objects (his second theme) in virtue of its supreme intelligibility (38).

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Bradshaw's reading of Aristotle essentially grounds the rest of his argument:
where the East sets forth both the divine transcendence and the divine
immanence, the West so focuses on the former that it overlooks the latter.
Although Bradshaw intends to show that the theology of the West failed to
blossom as fully as in the East (in a way that is analogous to the difference
between the "traditional view" and his own) we might appraise his results
differently. That is, we might view Aristotle as a common resource that was
mined differently by the two traditions according to their own concerns.
In chapter 3 Bradshaw confirms that Aristotle was not considered a theological touchstone by East or West. Here he identifies a number of different sources
who either do not consider energeiaaccording to the range of possibilities he has
identified or who hardly treat it at all. He almost seems to allow that his reading
of Aristotle does not necessarily lead to the claims of his preface and epilogue.
Chapter 4 describes Plotinus's development of energeia, understood as
actuality, in terms of two modes: internally, a thing's "peculiarly intimate
relationship to [its] own being" (76) and externally, that which it imparts to
others. Through the latter, all things are said to be a form of contemplation and
"intrinsically productive" (77). The general point is that, in Plotinian terms, the
One is the cause of the being of all things, not directly, but as the telos of their
internal act toward which their external energeia naturally strives (94). This
bequeaths the intellectual resources by which subsequent interpreters, including
Christians, might explicate God's immanence. Here again Bradshaw's
interpretation lends itself to a broader reading than emerges in his final
conclusion: his complaints about Plotinus's "inconsistent terminology" and
"second thoughts" suggest that the Enneads do not immediately comport with
his ultimate interpretative ends.
In chapters 5 and 6 Bradshaw's argument seems the most tenuous, as it limns
various historical factors outside the direct development he has proposed. As
such, they might be said to encourage more ecumenically motivated conclusions,
since they permit a less deliberate interpretation. For example, we see how
Porphyry appropriated energeiafor more practical purposes; this might indicate
that the term had broader use than as a description of the divine nature. Chapter
6 describes various interpretations of energeiathat would raise difficulties for its
Christian appropriation. It was associated with magic through the Hermetica
(131 ), as revealed in the writings of Iamblichus, who "proved essential to pagans
such as the Emperor Julian in their efforts to turn back the new religion
[Christianity]" (136). We may also note Bradshaw's concession that some
interpretations were troubling enough to be rejected by the Council of
Constantinople (127). The chapter concludes with a review of Proclus, who
describes how the soul perfects itself by cultivating the trace of the Plotinian One
by "bringing itself into a state of primeval silence" (150). With these points in
mind, we might wonder if the West's hesitancy to endorse energeia in the
manner Bradshaw suggests might have been a matter of caution than of failure
(Proclus's recommendation, for example, perhaps sounding a bit Pelagian).
Chapters 7 and 8 are perhaps the most generally useful part of Bradshaw's
text. They describe the East's achievement on its own terms, rather than as an

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indictment of the West. Bradshaw first reminds us that most of the historical
texts reviewed in the preceding chapters remained unknown to the West during
the Middle Ages (153). He then summarizes Gregory of Nyssa's distinction
"between the divine energeiai, which are known and can be named, and the
divine ousia which has no name and is known only through the energeiai of
which it is the source" (164). Bradshaw contends that this allows the East to
preserve God's transcendence, while explicating God's immanence, as manifested
in prophecy and glossolalia (172). By means of this distinction, he invites us to
appraise the Eastern claims that God is "beyond being" and "beyond voricrts"
(191). These claims refer not merely to conceptual knowledge, but to "direct
personal knowledge attained only by cleansing the divine image within" (ibid.).
Bradshaw then describes St. Maximus's elaboration of this distinction in terms
of logoi, roughly equivalent to energeiai, which are various divine (immanent)
processions into individual beings (205), and the logos, not only the creator and
sustainer of creatures but also their meaning and purpose (206).
Chapter 9 contrasts the theological achievements of the two traditions
according to Bradshaw's basic thesis: the East's balance of immanence and
transcendence versus the West's overemphasis on the latter. Bradshaw describes
Augustine's theology as one whose "fundamental point remains that the divine
being as such is innately suited to the human intellect" (227). In contrast, he
proposes Palamas's synthesis, which counsels a cessation of intellectual activity
so as to acquire the Spirit of God through purity of heart. He indicates that
Palamas uses energeia to refer to divine realities "that can be known and
participated by creatures" (ibid.). So, according to the Eastern view, the highest
activity of the soul lies in its divinization by gifts of the Spirit who is immanently
present. Highlighting the prominence of God's transcendence in the West,
Bradshaw describes how, for Aquinas, God's esse is not esse commune, from
which it follows that we "cannot say precisely what the likeness between God
and creatures is" (245). This, in turn, leads to Aquinas's mistaken transformation
of "what for Dionysius had been a means of ascent toward God [divine names]
into a semantic device for clarifying the limitations of theological language"
(ibid.). I suggest that one could just as well consider how Aquinas's use of
analogy might explicate the Eastern claim that while God is beyond voricru:;, he
can be "participated by creatures" (237). This would also invite a fuller
consideration of Aquinas's understanding of participation than Bradshaw
provides. However, in view of his contention that "the western tradition was
already unsound as far back as Augustine" (275), we might also require a study
that affords a more generous handling of such points than this volume allows.
BRIAN CHRZASTEK, 0.P.

Dominican House of Studies
Washington, D. C.

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Light in Darkness: Hans Urs van Balthasar and the Catholic Doctrine of Christ's
Descent into Hell. By ALYSSA LYRA PITSTICK. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Wm.
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2007. Pp. 458. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN 978-08028-0755-7.

Alyssa Pitstick's Light in Darkness is the most recent in a spate of books and
articles calling into question the thought of Hans Urs von Balthasar from the
more traditional and specifically Thomistic side of Catholic theology. What sets
this book apart, however, is both the severity of the questioning and the
significant publicity which it has received since its publication. Ostensibly the
book is concerned with Balthasar's theology of Christ's descent into hell, clearly
the most controversial aspect of his theology, but soon enough the reader
realizes that Pitstick sees the descent as the tail that wags the theological dog of
Balthasar's entire project. Furthermore, Pitstick maintains that Balthasar's
rejection of the traditional theology of the descent is both knowing and
intentional, thereby casting a shadow over his entire contribution to twentiethcentury Catholic theology.
Light in Darkness is divided into three parts: the first presents the traditional
theology of Christ's descent into hell; the second offers a thoroughgoing analysis
of Balthasar's theology of the descent, especially as this comes to bear upon his
Trinitarian theology; and the third raises some general conclusions concerning
Balthasar's theology as a whole in the light of what has gone before. To restate
the thesis with greater specificity: Balthasar's theology of descent is out of
keeping and incompatible with that of the Catholic tradition insofar as it sees the
descent, not so much in terms of a victory tour into the "limbo of the Fathers"
after the triumph over sin accomplished on the cross, but as the final step of
Christ's entering into the human condition in order to heal it from within.
In the first part, Pitstick offers a reading of the traditional theology of the
descent based on Scripture, the Eastern Fathers (and Eastern iconography),
Augustine, Aquinas and, much more briefly, Nicholas of Cusa. Her contention
is that the tradition understood "the harrowing of hell" in two ways, both of
which are incompatible with the approach of Balthasar. First, in the traditional
view, hell is already divided into areas so that, even before the death and
resurrection of Christ, there is a "hell of the damned" and a "limbo of the
[righteous] Fathers." Christ only descended into the limbo of the Fathers.
Second, Christ's suffering for and victory over sin is accomplished already on
Good Friday, so that the descent is simply an announcement of that victory-a
victory that leads to rejoicing for the righteous and further shame for the
damned. It is also important, according to Pitstick, that the descent is seen as
glorious in the "face value" sense of that word. In all of these areas, it is
concluded, Balthasar fails to uphold the traditional doctrine of the descent.
The middle section of the book is much longer and involves a thorough
reading of Balthasar on the descent, first in general, but then in terms of the role
of each person of the Trinity. The Father, out of love for the world, sends his
Son precisely in order to heal the human condition from within, including its

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state of godforsakeness. In order to do this full justice, Balthasar must take the
claim in the Second Letter to the Corinthians that "[God] made Him to be sin
... "more radically than the tradition has been typically willing to take it. The
Father's role, in Pitstick's reading, is to place the sin of the world onto the Son
so that he can overcome it through obedient love. The Son's role is willingly to
consent to this mission, which extends even to the godforsakeness of those in
hell. Because the Son's mission is rooted in his prior procession within the
Trinity-to which he also must consent, in Balthasar's view-he is able to enter
into the human condition in this radical way, without in any way jeopardizing
the divine immutability or his status as Son of God. In other words, because the
Son's pathos in the face of sin is rooted in a prior free and immutable decision
within the immanent Trinity, Balthasar can go farther than the patristicThomistic approach, which wants to limit the suffering of Christ to his
humanity. This willingness to suffer the human condition, even to the point of
becoming sin, dying, and entering into hell, is not a threat to the immutability
of God or the divinity of the Son insofar as God is in no way constrained from
without to enter into such a condition. In this way, Balthasar thinks that he can
do justice to the proper patristic concern for the divine apatheia.
Furthermore, all of the events in the life of Jesus that might normally be
relegated, in a potentially Nestorian fashion, to the humanity of Jesus are rooted,
in Balthasar's approach, in the Trinitarian relations. For instance, if Jesus'
existence is marked by kenosis-the putting aside of the divine attributes in
order to enter into the human condition-this is rooted in a prior kenosis within
the Trinity in which the Son eternally disposes himself to the will of the Father.
Or if Jesus is able to experience death, it is because already in the Trinity there
is something like a "supra-death," capable of subsuming finite death, which is
rooted in the fact that the Trinitarian persons have already done something like
lay down their lives for each other from all of eternity. Such an approach enables
Balthasar to root the virtues of the Kingdom, such as those outlined in the
Sermon on the Mount, in the very essence of a God who is by his very nature
self-giving love. Finally, there is the role of the Spirit, which consists in
maintaining the love between the Father and the Son, even as the Son enters into
the realms of sin, death, and hell.
Pitstick will have none of this, and she is determined to show that none of it
corresponds to the mainstream of the Catholic tradition. Indeed, the book can
be quite bracing insofar as one is not typically accustomed to seeing Balthasar's
approach on all of these questions lined up so relentlessly with the views of
Aquinas or other significant voices in the tradition. The third part of the book
is little more than a driving home of this point: that Balthasar's entire theology
diverges from the tradition both because of and in order to sustain his
idiosyncratic reading of the descent. Moreover, on each of the points outlined
above, Pitstick works hard to demonstrate not only that the traditional answers
were different, but that they were better, that they were not broken and, so,
were in no need of fixing. She sees sinister influences upon Balthasar's theology
which help to account for his divergence from the tradition, and here we are

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confronted with the usual suspects: Martin Luther, John Calvin, Hegel, Karl
Barth, and Adrienne von Speyr, to name the most important, none of whom
qualifies as a normative source of Catholic theology.
This book is a very engaging read. It is, furthermore, a well-written,
thoroughly researched and clearly argued book, which will provide a great deal
of fodder for the much-needed dialogue between admirers of Balthasar and those
of a more traditionalist bent. Besides providing an excellent refresher course in
a neglected aspect of Catholic theology, the book offers one of the more
thorough treatments ofBalthasar's eschatology and Trinitarian theology than this
reviewer has seen. Most importantly, the relentless and close comparison of
Balthasar's positions with those of the Fathers and Aquinas will have to be kept
in mind in future works dealing with Balthasar's theological contribution.
However, it may very well be that what makes the book so interesting-the
relentlessness of its central thesis-is the very thing that makes it questionable
in the final analysis. Beneath the entire argument lies an either/or-in fact, there
are several-which is very likely false. Namely, either Balthasar did not know the
traditional position and, so, neglected it out of ignorance (and Pitstick rightly
shows that this is highly improbable), or he knew it and disregarded it out of a
sort of hubris which cannot be forgiven in a Catholic theologian. If this latter is
the case, and it is furthermore the case that the descent drives Balthasar's entire
project, it is almost impossible to account for the reception of Balthasar's
theology by the past two popes. Surely they knew/know enough about past
Christian thought and about Balthasar to understand that his theology is not a
mere mechanical repetition of the former. Perhaps there is a greater awareness
on their part of the mystery that marks all attempts at theological retrieval.
I would like to raise three questions in particular in order to round out this
basic criticism. First, I wonder if Pitstick's treatment of the tradition is sufficiently nuanced. It seems almost certain that the differences, even if subtle, in the
theologies of descent of the Eastern Fathers, Augustine, Aquinas, and Nicholas
of Cusa point to tensions that allow, and even beg for, further development. Not
only is it doubtful that the Tradition (now with a capital "T") has spoken on this
matter in anything like a final or definitive way, it is also doubtful whether the
position is as simply unanimous as Pitstick's account suggests. And if this is true
regarding her account of the descent, it is even clearer in her approach to the
Trinity. Here "the Tradition" is simply reduced to Thomas Aquinas, so much so
that a figure as important as Richard of St. Victor (whose social analogy of the
Trinity is closer to Balthasar's approach) is never even mentioned. Second, there
seems to be no appreciation on Pitstick's part for the fact that doing theology at
any given time always involves a retrieval of past thought that is never a matter
of mere repetition. It is never, "either one is traditional or one is not," but is
always, rather, a matter of "testing everything and holding fast to that which is
good." As I read the book, I could not help but wonder what would happen to
John Paul H's theology of the body under such an approach. Finally, there is
never a genuine attempt on Pitstick's part to understand Balthasar's thought as
he understood it himself. For instance, to go back to the either/or mentioned

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above, Balthasar would not have seen his thought either in terms of an ignorance
of Church teaching, or in terms of a simple rejection thereof. Rather, Balthasar's
genius lies precisely in his ability to circumvent certain impasses by asking the
question in a different way or by beginning with a different starting point.
Indeed, he provides numerous hermeneutical keys to his thought in works such
as Love Alone Is Credible. It seems strange in a book of this nature not to have
looked more closely at how Balthasar sees his own work in the light of the
history of Christian (or even Western) thought.
Still, this book is to be recommended for engaging in the sort of high-level,
re-theologized theology which Balthasar himself would have surely relished. One
can only look forward to the debate that this book is sure to elicit.
RODNEY HOWSARE

DeSales University
Center Valley, Pennsylvania

Ecstatic Morality and Sexual Politics. A Catholic and Antitotalitarian Theory of
the Body. By G. J. MCALEER. New York: Fordham University Press, 2005.
Pp. 237. $55.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-8232-2456-2.
This is a intriguing work. Cognizant of the fact that there exists "no booklength study of Thomas on the body," McAleer offers this work as a "return to
Aquinas," or as an "engaged Thomism" in the arena of a general theory of the
human body (xi-xii). What follows is tour de force of sorts, wherein Aquinas is
put in dialogue with several contemporary thinkers, chiefly Pope John Paul II,
on the meaning of the human body in general, and then on the body as it relates
more specifically to human sexuality and to political theorizing.
The chief notion running throughout, suggested by the unusual title of the
work, is what McAleer terms "ecstatic Thomism." Rather innovatively, he takes
this creative mode of expression as the key to defending traditional Catholic
moral thought, and as the key to unlocking the "extremely elaborate
metaphysical conception of the body [that] is at the root of Humanae Vitae and
[of] its recent defense in Woytyla's philosophical theology" (137). Grounded in
the Pseudo-Dionysian maxim bonum est diffusivum sui, "ecstatic Thomism"
signifies a "metaphysics of the body as a self-diffusive good" (ibid.). McAleer
shows the central importance of such a metaphysics by juxtaposing it with the
fact that the body, and more specifically human sexuality, is ridden with
"violence" on account of original sin, that is, is subject to tension, lust,
domination (125ff.). The norms of Catholic sexual morality give us the best
chance of reducing this violence, or the best opportunity for realizing the body's
self-diffusive goodness. So when we look, say, at the use of artificial

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contraceptives, we see an act that "cannot escape violence," or an act that stands
opposed to "ecstatic sex," as ecstatic sex is only where "spouses act so as to serve
the good of the other" (128). Rather than serving the good of the other, artificial
contraception feeds the tension, the lust, the domination to which human
sexuality has been enchained since the original fall.
With the assertion that a metaphysics of the body as a self-diffusive good is
central to Karol Wojtyla's philosophical theology, McAleer betrays his firm
conviction that there runs a deep Thomist undercurrent throughout the whole
of Wojtyla's works and that, indeed, Pope John Paul II stands out as "a leading
contemporary Thomist" (138). Whether most Thomists, or even most
proponents of John Paul II's personalist theology of the body (who often exhibit
little interest in Aquinas), would agree with this assertion is open to debate. But
McAleer does not fail to deliver a strong attempt to corroborate it.
The book concludes with a critique of what the author terms a "liberal
conception of the body" and of "the liberal political thinking that accompanies
it" (157). More specifically, McAleer attempts to show that Catholic social
thought has taken a "wrong turn" in its employment of the language of human
rights. This is due chiefly to the influence of Jacques Maritain, who for his part
sought to place liberal democratic principles on a Thomistic foothold. The result,
according to McAleer, is ruinous: "[bolstered by the language of human 'rights,']
our liberal democracies are structured by a tyranny of the stronger over the weak
[as seen, for instance, in the 'right' to abortion that most liberal democracies
have embraced]" (171).
McAleer's project of reinserting Aquinas back into contemporary discourse
on the body, especially as it relates to matters of human sexuality, constitutes a
worthy, and long overdue, endeavor. For this he is to be commended. The same
may be said of his attempt at recovering the Thomist strain of the late pontiff's
thought, particularly since many adherents of John Paul II' s theology of the body
seem to overlook or downplay this strain. It is not uncommon to find theology
of the body proponents too dismissively casting Aquinas aside as a bygone author
whose natural-law account of the meaning and purpose of human sexuality has
been eclipsed by the new Christian personalism spearheaded by John Paul II.
McAleer's engagement with modern philosophy, sustained throughout the
entirety of the work, offers a constructive example of the way in which Aquinas
remains relevant for contemporary thought. The breadth of McAleer's
scholarship and vision to which this engagement testifies is most impressive. But
let the neophyte be forewarned: this engagement assumes a proficient familiarity
with continental and phenomenological philosophers (e.g., Schopenhauer,
Nancy, Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Kant, Descartes, Hobbes, Foucault, Wojtyla),
as well as with Aquinas himself. This assumption is encumbered by the fact that
on more than one occasion the author fails to explain what I think are brilliant
insights but that remain, for all of that, obscure glimpses into a vast yet hazy
horizon. (E.g., McAleer suggests there is a Tridentine moment in the thought of
Nancy, which brings Nancy close to Thomas and to John Paul II [31], but he
does not follow with an explanation of what he means by this.)

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While there is much about this work that merits well-deserved praise, it is not
without its shortcomings, or at least its problematic elements. For instance,
McAleer offers a "Christoform" view of Aquinas's doctrine of the natural law
(80ff.). Defining the natural law, somewhat peculiarly, as "the love that wounds
the lover," McAleer insists that, on Thomas's account, Christ is the foundation
of the natural law, as the natural law calls us to ecstasy. While I wish to stay
sympathetically open to such an argument, it is unclear precisely what McAleer
means by "Christoform natural law" (152), and I fear that such a view departs
from both the letter and the spirit of Aquinas in that, quite possibly, it collapses
the New Law of Christ into the natural law.
Aquinas of course maintains a clear distinction between the natural law and
the New Law of Christ. At bottom, law is a dictate that instructs us of our end
(STh I-II, q. 90, pro!.). The natural law instructs of our end as proportionate to
our reason; it instructs us of a good we can attain on our own. But since our
ultimate good, our true end, lies beyond a purely natural good proportionate to
our nature, we stand in need of a law that directs or proportions us to our higher
supernatural good, a law that instructs us of our supernatural end. This the New
Law of Christ accomplishes. Seen in this light, Christ is the culmination, not the
foundation, of the natural law. If the natural law begins the process of our
legislative ordering to the true human good, the New Law of Christ completes
and perfects this ordering by attaining God himself. Put in slightly different
terms, in ordering our humanity, or more particularly our bodies, to the natural
good of reason, the natural law prepares our bodies for the perfecting,
supernaturalizing work of Christ himself. McAleer's argument strikes me as
inverting this order, and of thereby blurring the distinction between the natural
law and the Evangelical Law.
Another problematic issue comes by way of a rather bizarre argument for the
all-male priesthood (152-55). McAleer argues, rightly I think, that the office of
the ministerial priesthood is based not on a natural right but on a divine
privilege. But he proceeds to tie this privilege to the phenomenon of domestic
violence (!). Because domestic violence is committed much more by men than by
women, he reasons, the ministerial priesthood is more appropriately offered to
men, since a male priest is continually reminded, via the Eucharistic sacrifice, of
his duty "to conform (his) sensuality to the Deposed Lover [Christ]" (155). The
obvious difficulty with this argument is that it implies nothing intrinsic to the
ordained priesthood which would make it exclusive to men. Rather, it ties the
all-male priesthood to an historical, existential accident, and from this accident
of history a universal principle is derived. McAleer fully admits as much: "It will
certainly be time for women to have access to the privilege of the priesthood
once more men turn up in hospital emergency rooms as the result of domestic
battery than women" (ibid.). McAleer deserves credit for defending the all-male
priesthood with a unique and unusual argument, but I fear few shall find it
convincing. I for one would hope that Christ chose only male apostles for some
deeper reason (such as, say, his own maleness, which the priest vicariously

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represents, albeit implicitly, through the words of the Eucharistic consecration)
than that of a mere accident of history.
These criticisms aside, McAleer deserves our gratitude for endeavoring to
recover the wisdom of Aquinas on the meaning of the body. The central and
resounding theme of the book, that the body enjoys an integral participation in
the self-diffusive nature of the good, is both illuminating and profound. That this
work offers an opening salvo on the self-diffusive nature of the good means an
invitation to pick up and carry on this important reflection by other scholars in
the field has been issued. We can only hope that those Thomists who wish to
take up the cause are as well attuned to the need for showing the ongoing
relevance of Aquinas for modern thought as is McAleer.
PAUL GONDREAU
Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of Jurisprudence. By JAMES
BERNARD MURPHY. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2005. Pp. 256.
$40.00 (cloth). ISBN 0-300-10788-9.
James Bernard Murphy's exquisitely learned volume concerning some
episodes in the history of jurisprudence aims at evaluating the "philosophy of
positive law"-which is, he tells us, distinct from legal positivism (21). We know
what legal positivism is: it is the thesis that the existence of law is a matter of
social fact, and as a result there are no necessary constitutive constraints on law
set by morality. What, though, is this philosophy of positive law with which legal
positivism is contrasted? The philosophy of positive law is not a thesis or a
theory but rather a project, or research program: that of distinguishing a certain
sort of law-that which we pick out in terms of its being enforced by the
courts-from other sorts of law, and in which this distinction is carried out by
characterizing that law as posited, laid down, deliberately imposed. This is a
project on which, for all of their other differences, Thomas Aquinas, Thomas
Hobbes, and John Austin were engaged. Indeed, not only is this project to be
distinguished from the theory of legal positivism, it is only once this project was
set to the side that legal positivism really took off as a successful theory.
That legal positivism took off when the project of the philosophy of positive
law was abandoned suggests that there was something about that project that was
dooming jurisprudence to frustration. This is, I take it, Murphy's view. The
project of distinguishing the law that our courts are concerned to enforce from
other sorts of law-most preeminently in Aquinas, Hobbes, and Austin, natural
law-failed repeatedly within these theories. Further, given the heterogeneity of

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the sorts of norms enforced by courts-statutes, precedents, customs, opinions
of learned authorities, etc.-the attempt to absorb all of these into a common
pattern, in which these norms are deliberately imposed by some governing
authority, was doomed to fall short.
Murphy's argument begins with a discussion of philosophy of language
centered on Plato's Cratylus. His view is that the themes of the opposition of
nature and convention, custom and stipulation that appear in that dialogue and
are from there taken up into the philosophical tradition influence the course of
the jurisprudential debate. As far as I can tell, this suggestion is not made good
in the rest of the book: these philosophy-of-language issues are never really at
the center of things, and when they do appear (e.g., in the chapter concerned
with Hobbes's views, which I will consider below), they raise more questions
than they answer, and are used to forward implausible theses. Murphy's
argument is, I think, largely independent of any of these reflections on language,
and nothing of the main argument is lost by turning directly to the first of three
rich historical investigations, that on Aquinas's view.
In this chapter, Murphy presents a well-worked-out account of Aquinas's
theory of positive law, emphasizing that positive law is for Aquinas not simply
a matter of human law but divine law as well. Here we have the first critique of
the project of philosophy of law: on Murphy's view, Aquinas falls prey to a
confusion that infects his whole project for he vacillates between a notion of
positive law as what is deliberately imposed and a notion of it as what is morally
contingent in content. This involves a serious error: confusing the truth that it
is possiblethat what is deliberately imposed has morally contingent content with
the falsehood that it is necessary that what is deliberately imposed is morally
contingent in content. One will be rightly suspicious of the claim that Aquinas
fell prey to such gross error. Surely Aquinas could recognize that a positive law
could be imposed whose content simply forbade the murder of the innocent,
which is morally noncontingent, on Aquinas's view. It must be admitted that
Murphy draws out passages from Aquinas in which he seems committed to the
claim that the content of what is positive law is not naturally authoritative, and
so Murphy at the very least brings out the fact that many of us who teach
Aquinas's views are cleaning it up a bit as we go along. But the stronger claim,
that there is a deep confusion here that vitiates the project of the philosophy of
positive law, is not sustainable. There is nothing in Murphy's argument that
precludes our noting that Aquinas has two concerns at play, and that he uses a
common term in working out these concerns. On one hand, he is concerned to
classify sorts of law: here one relevant differentiating factor is that some law
exists only when, and in part because, there is a speech-act performed (Summa
Theologiae I-II, q. 92, a. 2). (Aquinas treats all positive law in this speech-act
way; more on this below.) On the other hand, he is concerned to understand the
extent to which such speech-acts make practically binding particular abstractly
considered norms, such as "do not wear a garment of wool and linen" or "do not
kill the innocent." In one context, he uses 'positive' to classify those laws that
come into existence only in that way. In another context, he uses 'positive' to

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classify those abstract norms which must be the object of the relevant speech-act
to be binding. These are exercises in analytical versus normative jurisprudence,
respectively. The fact that Aquinas was not particularly interested in keeping a
clear distinction between these enterprises is not a particularly damaging point.
It thus seems false that within Aquinas's view we find the "ultimate
indeterminacy of the positivity because ... the two dimensions of positivity [do
not] coincide" (87). There is a concept employed to distinguish types of law and
there is a concept employed to distinguish the kind of authority possessed by a
norm. These concepts are related via analogy, like the concept of 'healthy' as
applied to a human and the concept of 'healthy' as applied to a human's eating
habits. Not all of the humans healthy in one sense are healthy in the other sense,
but the concepts are intelligibly related, and it does no harm to use the same
term for both. I do not find, then, the sorts of indeterminacies and confusions
in Aquinas that Murphy finds.
The other strike against Aquinas as a practitioner of the philosophy of positive
law is that this project requires the assimilation of all human laws to rules
deliberately imposed, including, prominently, customary law. Here Murphy
seems just right: Aquinas's argument that custom can acquire the force of law
feebly attempts to turn it into more a matter of intentional imposition than is
plausible, and treats action that is not for the sake of imposing norms implausibly
as if it were (66). On the other hand, it seems to me that Murphy overstates the
extent to which Aquinas's affirmation of a top-down sovereign-subject model
(69) is what makes problems for him on custom. It is a benefit of Aquinas's view
that it does not require (like Hobbes's or Austin's views) the legality of custom
to have to flow through some sovereign authority distinct from those who
practice the custom. Aquinas affirms, for example, that the people (or at least a
"free" people) can change laws through their habits of observance (Summa
Theologiae I-II, q. 97, a. 3, ad 3), regardless of statutory imposition to the
contrary.
Murphy's view is that Hobbes and Austin, through sharing Aquinas's project
with respect to positive law, find themselves in the same confusions. Murphy
begins his account of Hobbes's theory of law by giving an account of Hobbes on
language-an account which is in itself a plausible characterization of Hobbes's
very implausible views, on which words have private significations (private
mental states) and public significations (public objects), but in which these two
need not be logically related. Murphy claims that this is crucial for Hobbes's
theory of law, so that the sovereign can deal with the differences in private
significations of moral words among subjects by stipulating what the public
meaning will be. (Why a subject should have any interest in the such stipulations
by the Hobbesian sovereign is not discussed by Murphy.) This appeal to
Hobbes's theory of language is not needed to do work in Murphy's argument:
he relies on it solely to argue, deeply implausibly in my view, that Hobbes's
argument that subjects may deny Christ if so ordered by their sovereigns turns
on Hobbes's theory of meaning and reference (165-68), rather than his explicit
responsibility-shifting argument that "Whatsoever a subject ... is compelled to

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[do] in obedience to his sovereign, and doth it not in order to his own mind, but
in order to the laws of his country, that action is not his, but his sovereign's"
(Leviathan, ch. 42, 1111) , an argument that rests not on Hobbes's theory of
language but his theories of authorship and personation (Leviathan, ch. 16).
Murphy thinks that Hobbes finds himself with the same problems
distinguishing natural and positive law that Aquinas finds himself, and embroils
himself even more explicitly in attempts to characterize all valid legal norms as
commands of some single authority. Indeed, there is more: for Hobbes has
imported a conception of sovereignty into his view that is a "jealous" conception
(156), seeming to imply that for any given person, only one party can be
sovereign over that person, thus entailing that for any human subject, it is
possible for God or some human ruler to be sovereign over that person, but not
both. Again, it is unclear whether this is a deep problem with Hobbes's view or
an infelicity. Hobbes's essential points are that no one can have two distinct
human sovereigns and that one can never justify rebellion against one's earthly
sovereign by appealing to the commands of one's heavenly sovereign. If
Hobbes's view allows this result, then whether he goofed in defining sovereignty
a particular way does not seem much to the point. The same sort of reply seems
appropriate when Murphy criticizes Austinian sovereignty on a similar basis. If
Austin's aim is to demarcate various sorts of law and legal system, it seems
perfectly satisfactory that people can have a heavenly as well as an earthly
sovereign so long as this does not destroy the possibility of characterizing distinct
earthly legal systems in terms of distinct habits of obedience to distinct earthly
sovereigns.
That Austin is concerned with such questions of divine sovereignty is made
clear by Murphy, who emphasizes that Austin's aim of interrelating human with
divine and natural law, and making clear the sorts of positivity involved with
each, is continuous with the aims of Aquinas and Hobbes. Austin is explicit about
the theoretical aim of distinguishing questions about what law is from what it
ought to be, at least in cases of positive law. Murphy thinks that Austin strays
from this constraint, noting that he tries to argue that there are positive laws the
content of which appear in every legal system, and that they not only do appear
but must appear. Murphy argues that Austin's argument here requires appeal to
moral judgments about their value and human capacities to respond to them, and
thus undercuts his objective of a value-free science of positive law (185). We
might wonder, first, whether the appeal to moral judgments is useful but
dispensable-it might simply be a useful placeholder and shorthand for a whole
pattern of tendencies of judgment and sentiment that belong to human
nature-and second, whether even a science that had to include moral truths as
evidence for its claims about what laws must exist, but only causally as opposed
to constitutively, would violate Austin's dictum. (After all, do we want to say that
Hart's account of the "minimum content of natural law" [of which Murphy duly
takes note] violates Hart's own positivist constraints? [185]).
As in the case of Aquinas and Hobbes, then, I am not persuaded by Murphy's
claim that there is a deep difficulty in Austin's project regarding positive law.

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Extremely valuable is Murphy's discussion of the conclusion of Austin's Province
of Jurisprudence Determined, in which Austin concedes (though seemingly
underestimating the depth of this concession) that his account of sovereignty has
to be succeeded by an account of jurisdiction. No doubt this is a large
concession. But I am not sure that it is a large concession for the reason that
Murphy thinks it is, that is, that jurisdiction is an essential judicial rather than
legislative notion (209). I would have thought that it is neither: regardless of
etymology, we employ the concept of jurisdiction both to characterize those over
whom a norm is authoritative (e.g., the universal jurisdiction of the moral law,
the limited jurisdiction of the statutes of the commonwealth of Virginia) and to
characterize the reach of the authority of some judge or judges in the application
of those norms.
Murphy's book concludes with lessons for contemporary jurisprudence.
Contemporary jurisprudence has, for the most part, already learned these
lessons. As Murphy notes, the contemporary project does not typically concern
itself with distinguishing positive law from other sorts; there is just law, and so
no need to distinguish various sorts (218); and the top-down sovereign-subject
model has been supplanted by more supple views that can incorporate more
easily various sources of law, such as Hart's account of the rule of recognition.
And while Hart famously noted the American jurisprudential community's
preoccupation with the courts, his own view takes on board Murphy's suggested
focus on the courts, characterizing the rule of recognition primarily in terms of
the acceptance of legal officials, especially judges. I take it, then, that the true
lessons that need to be learned have already been learned, though I doubt that
the predecessor project of positive law failed at all of the points that Murphy
suggests.
I have taken issue with a number of Murphy's arguments and conclusions. I
want to conclude by noting how important and interesting this book is. The
argument for the strong continuity in animating concerns among Aquinas,
Hobbes, and Austin is persuasive and illuminating, and there is much to learn
from Murphy not only about these continuities but also about the fine details of
the individual legal theories of these eminent figures. We are in Murphy's debt
for this doing this deep scholarly work, when so much jurisprudence that makes
reference to these figures does no more than to stay on the surface.
MARK C. MURPHY

Georgetown University
Washington, D.C.