The Thomist 73 (2009): 523-91 AQUINAS ON THE NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD: A RELECTURE OF SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES III, c. 25 APRES HENRI DE LUBAC REINHARD HOTTER Duke University Divinity School Durham, North Carolina Thomas ist ein schwieriger Denker, der sich im Licht verbirgt und niemals seinen ganzen Gedanken auf einmal sagt. 1 Josef Pieper l OSEF PIEPER'S apt observation has special pertinence when one approaches the interpretive as well as the speculative challenge of comprehending Aquinas's thought on the natural ire for the vision of God. This teaching was contested among interpreters of Thomas Aquinas long before Henri de Lubac contributed to the debate in 1946 with his influential and controversial study Surnaturel. William O'Connor, in an unjustly forgotten, instructive study from 1947, The Eternal Quest: The Teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas on the Natural Desire for God, 3 argued that since the days of the principal sixteenth-century commentators on Aquinas's thought on the natural desire for the vision of God, one can usefully distinguish between a tradition of minimizing and a 2 1 "Thomas is a demanding thinker who so conceals himself in the light that he never reveals his complete thought at once without remainder." 2 Henri de Lubac, Sumaturel: Etudes historiques, ed. and intro. by Michel Sales, S.J. (Paris: Desclee de Brouwer, 1991). On the background of the controversy that erupted shortly after the publication of Sumaturel, see Aidan Nichols, O.P., "Thomism and the Nouvelle Theologie," The Thomist 64 (2000), 1-19. 3 New York and London: Longman, Green, and Co., 1947. 523 524 REINHARD HUTTER tradition of maximizing interpreters. These two tendencies of interpretation draw in differing ways upon two series of texts in the vast corpus of the angelic doctor. In the first series of texts, Aquinas understands the desire to know the essence of the First Cause as a natural desire; in the second series he holds that the desire to know the divine essence is supernatural. Both series of texts run from the early through the later works and Aquinas sees no need anywhere to reconcile them. 4 O'Connor argues that the tradition of "minimizing" interpretations has its roots in the commentatorial work of the Italian Dominican theologian Thomas de Vio Cajetan (1469-1534) and of the Spanish Dominican theologian Dominicus Banez (15281604), while the tradition of "maximizing" interpretations emerges from the commentaries of the Italian Dominican theologian Sylvester of Ferrara (1474-1528) and the Spanish Dominican theologian Dominicus Soto (1494-15 60). 5 Cajetan and Banez strongly privilege the first series of texts and prefer to interpret the natural desire in terms of an "obediential potency," a nonrepugnance or even a suitability in the created spiritual nature for the vision of God as he is in himself. Sylvester of Ferrara and Soto, on the other hand, read Aquinas as teaching a genuine natural desire for the vision of God, although with the significant difference that Soto understands this desire primarily as a "pondus naturae," a profound, innate natural impulse toward the vision of God as true human beatitude, while Sylvester of Ferrara takes the genuine desire to be not an innate, but an elicited desire that follows upon cognition. All four interpreters of Aquinas react to the profound impact Duns Scotus had on this debate with his strict Augustinian insistence that God in his divine substance is the natural end of the human being. All human volitions, Scotus argues, are ordained 4 O'Connor, The Eternal Quest, 7-23. For a complete listing of all the relevant passages in Aquinas's writings, see Jorge Laporta, La destinee de la nature humaine selon Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: J. Vrin, 1965), 147-61. 5 O'Connor, The Eternal Quest, 24-39, 55-72. For a concise introduction to these eminent interpreters of Thomas Aquinas, see Romanus Cessario, O.P., A Short History of Thomism (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005). NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 525 to the divine substance as to their ultimate end. Scotus's doctrine had such discursive weight that it inevitably impacted the subsequent interpretations of Aquinas's thought, especially in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries when Scotism had become a veritable philosophical and theological school in its own right. 6 Hence, not only did the maximizing and the minimizing interpretations draw differently on two famous series of texts in the corpus of Thomas Aquinas; they also were the result of Thomist commentators "post Scotum" having to consider and respond in their speculative interpretations of Aquinas's doctrine to a subtle metaphysical and theological doctrine at variance with the doctor angelicus.7 It is possible to trace these interpretive traditions of Aquinas's thought through the course of the subsequent centuries, with Cajetan's reading gaining predominance in the Dominican neoThomist revival of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. With the appearance of de Lubac's Surnaturel and the expanded sequels The Mystery of the Supernatural 8 and Augustinianism and Modern Theology,9 the tradition of a maximizing interpretation of Aquinas along the lines of Soto found an unexpected but sustained renaissance. Put in a nutshell, de Lubac reads Aquinas's teaching as establishing that human nature tends in itself necessarily toward God, that is, toward the supernatural end. In Surnaturel he states his thesis-and with it his reading of Thomas Aquinas on this matter-in provocative brevity: "'Natural desire for the supernatural': most theologians who reject this formula, reject together with it the very doctrine of St. Thomas O'Conner, The Eternal Quest, 40-54. For a recent Scotist way of pointing out some of the significant differences, see Richard Cross, Duns Scotus (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 8 Henri de Lubac, S.J., Le mystere du surnaturel (Paris: F. Aubier, 1965) [ = The Mystery of the Supernatural, trans. Rosemary Sheed, introd. David L. Schindler (New York: Crossroad, 1998)]. 9 Henri de Lubac, S.J., Augustinianisme et theologie moderne (Paris: F. Aubier, 1965) [= Augustinianism and Modern Theology, trans. Lancelot Sheppard, in trod. Louis Dupre (New York: Crossroad, 2000)]. 6 7 526 REINHARD HUTTER Aquinas." 10 His position has become a widely accepted view, if not a majority consensus, among contemporary theologians in the English-speaking world as to how Aquinas should best be understood on this difficult topic. 11 When recently this consensus was challenged by Lawrence Feingold's substantive study The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas Aquinas and His Interpreters, 12 the response was one of considerable irritation. Such irritation in the English-speaking world is only explicable if one assumes that two earlier significant challenges or at least qualifications of this postLubacian consensus, advanced by French Dominicans and Thomist scholars, went largely unnoticed: first, the volume Surnaturel: Une controverse au coeur du thomisme au XX: siecle;13 second, Georges Cottier, O.P., Le desir de Dieu: Surles traces de saint Thomas. 14 In light of these recent substantive contributions to the discussion it is hard to deny that de Lubac's intervention, while arguably unsettling in a possibly irreversible way a once dominant minimizing interpretation of Aquinas, turns out not to have been the last word on this matter. At the same time it is obvious that a renewed consideration of this intricate topic cannot simply go back behind de Lubac's intervention and give in to the temptation of pretending that Surnaturel and its sequels never had been written in the first place. 10 ": la plupart des theologiens qui repoussent cette formule, repoussent avec elle la doctrine meme de saint Thomas d'Aquin" (De Lubac, Sumaturel, 431). 11 For one characteristic representative, see Fergus Kerr, O.P., After Aquinas: Versions of Thomism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2002) 134-61; idem, Twenthieth Century Catholic Theologians: From Neo-Scholasticism to Nuptial Mysticism (Oxford: Blackwell, 2007), 67-86. 12 Rome: Apollinare Studi, 2001 (2d ed.: Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2010). For a beginning conversation around this important work, see the Book Symposium with contributions by Harm Goris, Reinhard Hutter, Steven A. Long, and Guy Mansini in Nova et Vetera, English edition 5 (2007): 67-198; and David Braine, "The Debate between Henri de Lubac and His Critics," Nova et Vetera, English edition 6 (2008): 543-90. 13 Ed. Serge-Thomas Bonino, O.P., Actes du colloque organise par !'Institute SaintThomas-d'Aquin !es 26-27 mai 2000 a Toulouse (Toulouse: Revue Thomiste, 2001); translation published as Sumaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought, trans. Robert Williams, trans. rev. by Matthew Levering (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2009) forthcoming in English translation with Sapientia Press, 2010). 14 Paris: Editions parole et silence, 2002. NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 527 In this article I will attempt not to settle the matter, but to take a step "after Lubac" toward a way of reading as one the two sets of texts of Aquinas on the natural desire for the vision of God. In order to be manageable, such a reading of Aquinas has to be exemplary and paradigmatic and needs to be backed by an equally exemplary and paradigmatic engagement of de Lubac's central thesis. Therefore, the essay falls into two parts. In the first part, I will focus on book 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, since in any maximalizing interpretation of Aquinas this book, and especially chapter 25, tends to play a pivotal role. Consequently, any rereading of Aquinas on the natural desire for the vision of God "after Lubac" will have to attend to Aquinas's exact use of the concept "desiderium naturale" in the context of his overall argument in book 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles. In the second part of the essay, I will reconsider one of the most astute and nuanced early Thomist engagements of Surnaturel. While now largely forgotten, the constructive and critical analysis of Surnaturel by Marie-Joseph Le Guillou, O.P., encapsulates a promising Thomist reception of de Lubac's genuine concern as well as an apt critique of the excessive elements in de Lubac's reading of Aquinas. In short, there is still much to learn from Le Guillou's Thomist engagement of Surnaturel, an engagement as balanced as it is penetrating and astute. I. SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES III, C. 25 IN ITS DISCURSIVE CONTEXT: A RELECTURE Since all creatures, even those devoid of understanding, are ordered to God as to an ultimate end, all achieve this end to the extent that they participate somewhat in His likeness. Intellectual creatures attain it in a more special way, that is, through their proper operation of understanding Him. Hence, this must be the end of the intellectual creature, namely, to understand God. 15 ScG III, c. 25, 1. All citations from the Summa contra Gentiles are taken from the following edition, which offers an improved version of the Leonine text: Thomas von Aquin, Summa contra Gentiles, 5 vols. (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1974 [2d ed., 2001]): book 1, ed. and trans. Karl Albert and Paulus Engelhardt with cooperation by Leo Diimpelmann; book 2, ed. and trans. Karl Albert and Paulus Engelhardt; books 3/1 and 3/2, ed. and trans. Karl Allgaier; book 4, ed. and trans. 15 Thomas Aquinas, 528 REINHARD HOTTER Besides, a thing has the greatest desire for its ultimate end. Now, the human intellect has a greater desire, and love, and pleasure, in knowing divine matters than it has in the perfect knowledge of the lowest things, even though it can grasp but little concerning divine things. So, the ultimate end of man is to understand God, in some fashion. 16 In the first part of the essay, I will argue that Aquinas's discourse in book 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, as it pertains to our specific topic under discussion, is best understood as a metaphysical enquiry into the ontological structure of created substance. The emphasis of Aquinas's enquiry falls upon created substances, hence substance not absolutely considered, but considered under the perspective of creation, that is, as the contingent effect in relationship to its first and final cause, the Creator. At the same time, however, his analysis pertains primarily to the constitutive structure, that is, the respective nature of particular created substances-first and foremost among them the substantia intellectualis. Book 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles, hence, is to be understood as first and foremost an investigation into the principle of nature in its relative integrity and hence as properly accessible to metaphysical enquiry. 17 Consequently, while this primarily metaphysical enquiry is part and parcel of a wide-ranging consideration of divine providence, Aquinas is not concerned here with the concrete givens of the one obtaining order of providence in which angels 18 and humans de Markus H. Worner. The English citations are taken from Saint Thomas Aquinas, Summa contra Gentiles (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1975): book 1, trans. with introd. and notes by Anton C. Pegis; book 2, trans. with intro. and notes by James F. Anderson; books 3/1and3/2, trans. with intro. and notes by Vernon}. Bourke; book 4, trans. with intro. and notes by Charles J. O'Neil. The English citations follow this edition in its practice of listing in sequence book, chapter, and chapter section, e.g., ScG I, c. 1, 1. 16 ScG III, c. 25, 7. 17 See Lawrence Dewan, O.P., "Nature as a Topic for Metaphysical Inquiry," in idem, Form and Being: Studies in Thomistic Metaphysics (Washington, D.C: The Catholic University of America Press, 2006), 205-28. 18 In the subsequent discussion the existence of angels is simply assumed. A philosophical defense of their existence obviously falls outside the range of this essay. There seems to me to exist not the slightest need to "de-mythologize" the biblical witness to superior subsistent intelligences, even if for most contemporaries superior intelligences without bodies fall into the category of science-fiction movies or New-Age phantasies. Such pervasive contemporary NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 529 facto exist. Any attempt to read particular statements or conclusions from Aquinas's precisely delimited metaphysical argumentation here as prima facie theological claims about the obtaining order of providence as it coincides with the economy of salvation can only obfuscate the status of the conclusions reached. In short, as will be shown, the desiderium naturale visionis Dei as considered in book 3 of the Summa contra Gentiles belongs to the principle of nature in its relative integrity as it pertains to the metaphysical constitution of the intellectus. By insisting upon the fundamentally metaphysical nature of the discourse undertaken here, I do not intend to resurrect the outdated thesis that the Summa contra Gentiles represents Aquinas's "philosophical summa." Far from it-though, as often, there may be a grain of truth in even such a misguided characterization. Indeed, as Jean-Pierre Torrell expresses the current consensus on the matter, "the Summa contra Gentiles is indeed a theological work" -and adopting a rendition fashionable in some contemporary academic circles, I might want to add, "all the way down." 19 However, it is obvious beyond dispute and hence in all likelihood significant for its particular purpose that the organization and mode of discourse of the Summa contra inability to consider angels-and, alas, very widespread among Christians pace the recent New-Age rediscovery of "angels" as a quasi-personalistic transcendence at the expense of God-displays not only a disconcerting lack of theological imagination but metaphysical acumen as well. The present enquiry presupposes Aquinas's argumentation in ScG II, cc. 46ff., and STh I, qq. 99ff., and, more importantly, the Church's unequivocal affirmation that the existence of angels pertains to the Christian faith. The theologically inclined reader might want to consult, next to the indispensable Catechism of the Catholic Church (nn. 327-30; 350), Lateran Council IV, c. 1, De fide catholica (DS 800); Vatican I, Dogmatic Constitution Dei Filius, c. 1 (DS 3002); and Pope Paul VI, Sollemnis professio fidei, 8 (AAS 60 [1968]: 436), known in English as "Credo of the People of God: Solemn Profession of Faith" (30 June 1968). The philosophically interested reader should consult Mortimer J. Adler, The Angelsand Us (New York: MacMillan, 1982), as well as Benedict Ashley, O.P., "The Existence of Created Pure Spirits,' in The Ashley Reader: Redeeming Reason (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2006), 47-59. 19 Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Saint Thomas Aquinas, vol. 1, The Person and His Work, trans. Robert Royal (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1996) 114. Cf. the whole of chapter 6 (pp. 96-116), and the brief remarks in Jean-Pierre Torrell, O.P., Aquinas's Summa: Background, Structure, and Reception, trans. Benedict M. Guevin, O.S.B. (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 8f. 530 REINHARD HUTTER Gentiles is markedly different from that of the later Summa Theologiae. In the Summa contra Gentiles we find a stronger separation than in the Summa Theologiae between a primarily metaphysical enquiry (in books 1through3), an enquiry in which Aquinas seems to engage head-on the Graeco-Islamic intellectual culture and especially Islamic Aristotelianism-hence an enquiry intelligible and pertinent equally to a broad range of Jewish, Muslim, and Christian theologians and philosophers of Aquinas's day and age-and on the other hand, a properly Christian theological discourse, based on revelation (in book 4). However, a strict and clean separation between these two parts is not possible. 20 Elements of the one are clearly present in the other. The metaphysical enquiry in books 1 through 3 often takes a particular route due to matters that concern the truth of faith; 21 moreover, the theological discourse in book 4 consistently draws upon metaphysical argumentation in order to refute objections raised by unbelievers against revealed truth. 20 It is for this very reason that Michel Corbin, in his massive study Le chemin de la theologie chez Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Beauchesnes, 1974) on the development of Aquinas's theological thought, assigns the Summa contra Gentiles an "intermediary" location between the ingenious, but still youthful Scriptum on Lombard's Sentences and the mature and masterful Summa Theologiae. Corbin comes to this assessment because he takes the conception of theology as the science of faith, as sacra doctrina, to be the perfect end point of an increasingly maturing spectrum, on which the Summa contra Gentiles also must find its place. Why does Corbin see the Summa contra Gentiles as falling short of the conceptual perfection of the Summa Theologiae? Because he finds a tension between Summa contra Gentiles I-III, attending to truths of faith accessible to reason, and Summa contra Gentiles IV, attending to truths of faith unaccessible to reason, he discerns a less-than-perfect integration of the philosophical enquiry into the overarching theological task and hence regards it as a stage beneath the perfect mode of integration to be found in the Summa Theologiae. While Corbin's thesis is complex and argued in great detail {pp. 491-692!), it seems to depend too much on the governing assumption that Aquinas was aiming at one single overarching goal, namely, that of fully integrating philosophical inquiry into an overall theological task of which the Summa Theologiae represents the stage of perfection. Hence, I agree with Rudi te Velde when he avers, "I see no reason why the Contra Gentiles should not be approached as a work in its own right, with an intention different from the Summa theologiae and an intelligible structure adapted to that intention" ("Natural Reason in the Summa contra Gentiles," in Brian Davies, ed., Thomas Aquinas: Contemporary Philosophical Perspectives [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002], 117-40, at 119). 21 See e.g., ScG II, c. 46, 1. NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 531 Aquinas's foreword to book 4, therefore, merits a close reading. Here I can give only a brief adumbration of the aspects most pertinent to our discussion. First, Aquinas opens the specific discourse of book 4 with a succinct summary of the topic that preoccupies us in these pages: The human intellect, to which it is connatural to derive its knowledge from sensible things, is not able through itself to reach the vision of the divine substance in itself, which is above all sensible things and, indeed, improportionately above all other things. Yet, because man's perfect good is that he somehow know God, lest such a noble creature might seem to be created to no purpose, as being unable to reach its own end, there is given to man a certain way through which he can rise to the knowledge of God: so that, since the perfections of things descend in a certain order from the highest summit of things-God-man may progress in the knowledge of God by beginning with lower things and gradually ascending. (ScG IV, c. 1, 1)22 Second, Aquinas sketches two paths of metaphysical contemplation by way of which the human intellect may rise to the knowledge of God: one by a descent of perfections from God, the other by beginning with lower things and gradually ascending to the first cause. However, despite the intellectual rigor required and the insights gained on these different, but ultimately complementary, paths of metaphysical enquiry, Aquinas emphasizes that "because of the weakness of the intellect, we are not able to know perfectly even the ways [of metaphysical enquiry] themselves" (ScG IV, c. 1, 3). 23 And if that were not enough of a blow against the confidence of the all-too-routinized metaphysician, Aquinas adds only shortly afterwards, "and because that source [of these imperfectly known ways of enquiry] 22 ScG IV, c. 1: "Intellectus human us, a rebus sensibilibus connaturaliter sibi scientiam capiens, ad intuendam divinam substantiam in seipsa, quae super omnia sensibilia, immo super omnia alia entia improportionabiliter elevatur, pertingere per seipsum non valet. Sed quia perfectum hominis bonum est ut quoquo modo Deum cognoscat, ne tam nobilis creatura omnino in vanum esse videretur, velut finem proprium attingere non valens, datur homini quaedam via per quam in Dei cognitionem ascendere possit: ut scilicet, quia omnes rerum perfectiones quodam ordine a summo rerum vertice Deo descendunt, ipse, ab inferioribus incipiens et gradatim ascendens, in Dei cognitionem proficiat." 23 "Per has igitur vias intellectus noster in Dei cognitionem ascendere potest, sed, propter debilitatem intellectus nostri, nee ipsas vias perfecte cognoscere possumus." 532 REINHARD HUTTER transcends the above-mentioned ways beyond proportion, even if we knew the ways themselves perfectly we would yet not have within our grasp a perfect knowledge of the source" (ScG IV, c. 1, 3). 24 In short, as Rudi te Velde rightly emphasizes, "[i]t is characteristic of the Contra Gentiles that natural reason, in its search for truth, is constantly reminded of its human point of departure. " 25 It no longer comes as a surprise that Aquinas characterizes the knowledge of God to be reached by these ways of metaphysical enquiry as feeble (debilis cognitio). We would gravely misunderstand Aquinas, however, if we were to take the license to brush aside this feeble knowledge of God gained in books 1 through 3 in a quasi-Barthian fashion as at best irrelevant, outdated rubble (or worse, dangerously misleading natural theology), and expect Aquinas to announce a "new beginning" with book 4, a "post-metaphysical" theology solely based on revelation's grammar as unfolded in the biblical narrative. On the contrary, feeble knowledge is not ignorance, error, or delusion, but still knowledge. And indeed, for Aquinas the feeble knowledge gained by way of the intellectual labors of the first three books is the indispensable precondition for a comprehensive actuation of the intellectus fidei as well as for an effective defense of faith's truth against its philosophical detractors. 26 For Aquinas, 24 "Quod quia sine proportione excedit vias praedictas, etiam si vias ipsas cognosceremus perfecte, nondum tamen perfecta principii cognitio nobis adesset." 25 Te Velde, "Natural Reason in the Summa contra Gentiles," 120. 26 Consider the last remark in ScG IV, c. 10, 15 regarding those who would argue by way of reason against the possibility of a divine generation: "[B]ecause truth is strong in itself and is overcome by no attack, it must be our intention to show that the truth of faith cannot be overcome by reason." ("[Q]uia veritas in seipsa fortis est et nulla impugnatione convellitur, oportet intendere ad ostendendum quod veritas fidei ratione superari non possit.") The emphasis lies here on "the truth that the Catholic faith professes," as te Velde rightly emphasizes. ("Natural Reason in the Summa contra Gentiles," 121). He stresses at another point that "Aquinas proposes to show, to his fellow believers, that the Catholic claim to truth can in fact be understood and self-consciously affirmed, against the numerous alternative claims, as a reasonable claim to truth" (ibid., 122). "It seems to me that Aquinas's immediate aim is not to prove the validity of the Catholic claim before others (infideles) . •.. On the contrary, the office is needed because of the threatening effect the various errors have on the Christian consciousness of truth. Natural reason, according to its historical reality in GrecoIslamic philosophy, calls the Christian perception of truth into question. In this sense, the NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 533 the perfection of wisdom entails both, in the proper distinction and in the right order: wisdom gained by way of human enquiry, an operation essential to an embodied intellect, and wisdom gained gratuitously by way of revelation, a wisdom infinitely surpassing all human knowledge. Only if we remember that the perfection of wisdom is the unifying source and goal of the Summa contra Gentiles are we able to appreciate the subtle synthesis between the predominantly metaphysical enquiry of books 1 through 3 and the primarily theological discourse of book 4. Te Velde captures Aquinas's intention accurately when he states: "It is Aquinas's declared intention to assume the task of someone wise (officium sapientis). With this 'office,' Aquinas creates something new, an intellectual point of view that 1s formally different from theology as well as philosophy. " 27 A) Wisdom Aquinas pursues the officium sapientis by way of the overarching and integrating vision of an order of wisdom. Thomas Hibbs, in his important work Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas, offers the following felicitous characterization of Aquinas's project as he summarizes the achievement of the first book of the Summa contra Gentiles: Wisdom is a way of life, replete with joy, that satisfies all human longing, unites man to God in friendship, and warrants the name of blessed. The first book is itself an enactment of that life of wisdom, an enactment that culminates in a recognition of the pursuit of wisdom as a participation in the exemplary cause of the whole, a sharing in the life of that first and highest cause whose contemplation is the goal of philosophy. The previous arguments on behalf of God's desire to communicate his goodness to creatures provide grounds for an unexplained and audacious assertion of the prologue: the life of wisdom establishes friendship between us and God. 28 Contra Gentiles seems to me comparable to Maimonides' Guide of the Perplexed" (ibid., 123). 27 Te Velde, "Natural Reason in the Summa contra Gentiles," 121. 28 Thomas S. Hibbs, Dialectic and Narrative in Aquinas: An Interpretation of the "Summa Contra Gentiles" (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1995), 62. Hibbs continues by stating: "Still, the dominant mode of discourse in the first book is via negativa, a mode that accentuates the gap between the human pursuit of wisdom and the divine possession of it (I, 534 REINHARD HUITER Later, in book 3, Aquinas will show how the wise person imitates God in the perfection of wisdom achieved by way of contemplating God's goodness. Hence, unsurprisingly, the whole of the Summa contra Gentiles is structured according to an order of wisdom: the first book treats the perfection of the divine nature, the second book the perfection of the divine power, and the third the perfect authority and dignity insofar as God is the end of all things and executes his government over all of them-in short, as perfect as God is in being and causing, so he is perfect in the ruling of all things, especially in the ruling of the intellectual creatures, angels and humans. Saint Thomas regards this threefold consideration as accessible to natural reason as it rises up in metaphysical contemplation toward God. However, while throughout the Summa contra Gentiles he insists on the validity of this contemplation by way of metaphysical inquiry as belonging to the proper domain of natural reason, he emphasizes with equal insistence the incomplete character of the knowledge thus gained, an imperfection deriving first of all structurally from the weakness of the human intellect, the lowest in the order of spirits. It is for this reason that he finally considers in book 4 a perfection surpassing all other perfections, the perfection of God's goodness. For God offers humanity a path by way of which human beings are elevated to a perfect knowledge of him, the unmediated vision of God that effectively unites human beings to him such that they become "partakers of the divine nature" (divinae consortes 102). As Thomas puts it, 'false and earthly felicity' is nothing but a 'certain shadow' (quandam umbram) of divine blessedness" (ibid.). Hibbs here seems to suggest that the human pursuit of wisdom does fall into the category of "false and earthly felicity." Such a claim-with too narrowly Augustinian a thrust, if I may say-seems to be dubious. For in ScG I, c. 102, Aquinas lists as instantiations of such "false and earthly felicity" only pleasure, riches, power, honor, and fame. These are all forms of felicity refuted in ScG III, cc. 27-32. It is important to note that the philosopher's admiratio, the metaphysical contemplation of the first cause, which is the term of philosophical wisdom, is not contained in either of these lists. Hence, while clearly not identical with the participation in God's own beatitude and therefore a less than perfect felicity, this philosophical wisdom seems to amount to something considerably more than "false and earthly felicity," namely, the fragile realization of that kind of imperfect albeit genuine felicity that results from contemplating God, the first cause, by way of his created effects-via causalitatis, via negativa, via eminentiae. NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 535 naturae [2 Pet 1:4]). And so we find in book 4 the treatment of the revealed mysteries that lie by definition outside the range of the kind of contemplation by way of metaphysical enquiry to which natural reason is able to rise, and that are solely the object of faith. 29 Throughout the following reading of the Summa contra Gentiles it should be kept in mind that the whole argument Aquinas advances in book 3 is (a) part of a consideration of divine providence-God's perfect dominion-(b) in the context of a structural-metaphysical analysis that (c) demonstrates that, and displays in which way precisely, God is the end and good of all things. B) God's Being and Participated Being The axiomatic beginning of such a metaphysical demonstration is, as always with Aquinas, the consideration of God's being: That there is one First Being, possessing the full perfection of the whole of being, and that we call Him God, has been shown in the preceding Books. From the abundance of His perfection, He endows all existing things with being, so that He is fully established not only as the First Being but also as the original source of all existing things. Moreover, He has granted being to other things, not by a necessity of His nature but according to the choice of His will. (ScG III, c. 1,1) 30 Contrary to those who would want to claim that "creator" is an intrinsic characteristic of God-echoes of a Neoplatonic notion of emanationism (reverberating not incidentally in the Origenist 29 It is in book 4 that Aquinas most explicitly inquires into the concrete path that carries with it the promise of leading to the partaking in divine wisdom, a fullness of possession never to be attained by the human pursuit of wisdom. However, even in book 4, for displaying the logical possibility of these mysteries and for their defense against objection and error, metaphysical contemplation and argumentation is still of paramount importance. 30 "Unum esse primum entium, totius esse perfectionem plenam possidens, quod Deum dicimus, in superioribus est ostensum, qui ex sui perfectionis abundantia omnibus existentibus esse largitur, ut non solum prim um entium, sed et principium omnium esse comprobetur. Esse autem aliis tribuit non necessitate naturae, sed secundum suae arbitrium voluntatis." 536 REINHARD HUITER tradition) 31-because as essentially self-diffusive summum bonum God ineluctably emanates an inexhaustible surplus of participated being, Aquinas holds rightly that creation, that is, the totality of partipated being, is a surpassingly gratuitous act of the divine will. 32 God is not captive to some intrinsic aspect of his essence, the infinite act of being itself, but remains in his essence transcendently free, such that even if there were an eternal creation, it would still subsist as contingent relation to God, a relation originating from the divine will. This relation constitutes the internal structure as well as the overarching purpose of creation: Now, each of the things produced through the will of an agent is directed to an end by the agent. For the proper object of the will is the good and the end. As a result, things which proceed from will must be directed to some end. Moreover, each thing achieves its ultimate end through its own action which 31 See Sergius Bulgakow, The Bride of the Lamb, trans. Boris Jakim (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2002) for a subtle defense of such a notion: "God is both God in Himself and the Creator, with a completely equal necessity and freedom of His being. In other words, God cannot fail to be the Creator, just as the Creator cannot fail to be God. The plan of the world's creation is as co-eternal to God as is His own being in the Divine Sophia. In this sense (but only in this sense), God cannot do without the world, and the world is necessary for God's very being. And to this extent the world must be included in God's being in a certain sense. (But by no means does this inclusion signify the crude pantheistic identification of God and the world, according to which God is the world and the world is God)" (45f.). While the fundamental difference between Bulgakov's account and pantheism might readily be granted, attentive readers of his undoubtedly brilliant speculation, noting his characterization of the Scholastic differentiation between God in se and God as creator as "utterly alien to Scripture," will nevertheless be unable to dismiss the all-too-strong impression that they might be witnessing the wedding feast of Origenist intuition with Schellingian speculative daring-a phenomenon hardly more scriptural than is Scholastic conceptual precision. 32 Rudi te Velde, in his important study Aquinas on God: The "Divine Science" of the "Summa Theologiae" (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2006) puts the matter succinctly: "Against the Neoplatonic doctrine of necessary emanation, Aquinas argues that the infinite essence of the first cause cannot express itself with natural necessity in any finite creature. Creation cannot be a matter of divine natural self-expression. God produces the universe of creatures according to the manner in which He wills them to exist, distinct from his own manner of existence" (176). NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 537 must be directed to the end by Him Who gives things the principles through which they act. (ScG III, c. 1,2) 33 While the principle of an all-encompassing teleology must strike many a contemporary reader as utterly counterintuitive and outright strange, Aquinas calmly enunciates it as one of the first metaphysical principles of creation as an order of participated being brought about as the result of the will of a transcendent, infinitely intelligent first cause. Everything that is (i.e., that has participated being) is directed to an end. As Georges Cottier puts it quite succinctly: "The universality of the final cause, without which any action were to remain inexplicable, is a principal given of reality. " 34 Based on the universal teleology established in the first chapter of book 3, Aquinas unfolds in the subsequent sixtytwo chapters what is entailed in understanding God as the end of all things: if God has created everything because of his will, there must be an ultimate end to what God has willed; but the only possible ultimate end is God himself. The perfection of every participated being-being an effect of the First Cause-is achieved by reaching its ultimate end, which is nothing but its proper return to its source. In the second book of the Summa contra Gentiles, where Aquinas considers creation, he lays the groundwork for this all-encompassing teleology: An effect is most perfect when it returns to its source; thus, the circle is the most perfect of all figures, and circular motions the most perfect of all motions, because in their case a return is made to the starting point. It is therefore necessary that creatures return to their principle in order that the universe of creatures may attain its ultimate perfection. Now, each and every creature 33 "Eorum autem quae per voluntatem producuntur agentis, unumquodque ab agente in finem aliquem ordinatur: bonum enim et finis est obiectum proprium voluntatis, uncle necesse est ut quae ex voluntate procedunt, ad finem aliquem ordinentur. Finem autem ultimum unaquaeque res per suam consequitur actionem, quam oportet in finem dirigi ab eo qui principia rebus dedit per quae agunt." 34 Georges Cottier, Le desir de Dieu: Surles traces de saint Thomas (Paris: Editions parole et silence, 2002), 190. 538 REINHARD HUTTER returns to its source so far as it bears a likeness to its source, according to its being and its nature, wherein it enjoys a certain perfection. (ScG II, c. 46, 2) 35 C) Primary and Secondary Per(ection As soon as Aquinas has established the overarching teleology of participated being, he reintroduces a crucial distinction: the primary perfection of every created being by virtue of its nature and the secondary perfection of every created being by virtue of its operation. While distinct, the perfections are inherently related to each other. Every being, in virtue of its nature, is intrinsically oriented toward its proper operations. Aquinas puts the matter most succinctly in the discussion of divine providence: "Each thing appears to exist for the sake of its operation; indeed, operation is the ultimate perfection of a thing" (ScG III, c. 113, 1).36 A longer and more important instantiation of this distinction is to be found in the second book of the Summa contra Gentiles-with immediate implications for the opening argument of book 3: A thing's second perfection ... constitutes an addition to its first perfection. Now, just as the act of being and the nature of a thing are considered as belonging to its first perfection, so operation is referred to its second perfection. Hence, the complete perfection of the universe required the existence of some creatures which return to God not only as regards likeness of nature, but also by their action. And such a return to God cannot be made except by the act of the intellect and will, because God Himself has no other operation in His own regard than these. The greatest perfection of the universe therefore demanded the existence of some intellectual creatures. (ScG II, c. 46, 3) 37 35 "Tune enim effectus maxime perfectus est quando in suum redit principium: uncle et circulus inter omnes figuras, et motus circularis inter omnes motus, est maxime perfectus, quia in eis ad principium reditur. Ad hoc igitur quod universum creaturarum ultimam perfectionem consequatur, oportetcreaturas ad suum redire principium. Redeunt autem ad suum principium singulae et omnes creaturae inquantum sui principii similitudinem gerunt secundum suum esse et suam naturam, in quibus quandam perfectionem habent." 36 "Omnis enim res propter suam operationem esse videtur: operatio enim est ultima perfectio rei." 37 "Perfectio secunda in rebus addit supra primam. Sicut autem esse et natura rei consideratur secundum primam perfectionem, ita operatio secundum perfectionem secundam. Oportuit igitur, ad consummatam universi perfectionem, esse aliquas creaturas quae in Deum redirent non solum secundum naturae similitudinem, sed etiam per operationem. Quae NATURAL DESIRE FOR THE VISION OF GOD 539 We can see this distinction at play in the following, easily overlooked section at the beginning of book 3, which is central to all that follows. Aquinas emphasizes that as God is perfect in being and causing, so he is also in ruling. The result of this rule is, however, diverse: [T]he result of this rule is manifested differently in different beings, depending on the diversity of their natures. For some beings so exist as God's products that, possessing understanding, they bear His likeness and reflect His image. Consequently, they are not only ruled but are also rulers of themselves, inasmuch as their own actions are directed to a fitting end. If these beings submit to the divine rule in their own ruling, then by virtue of the divine rule they are admitted to the achievement of their ultimate end; but, if they proceed otherwise in their own ruling, they are rejected. (ScG III, c. 1, 4) 38 Aquinas posits a direct relationship for beings possessing understanding (i.e., angels and humans) between submitting to the divine rule and achieving one's ultimate end. Concerning the manner of this rule, he states, "as regards those intellectual beings who are led by Him to their ultimate end, which is Himself, the Psalmist uses this expression: 'For the Lord will not cast off His people"' (ScG III, c. 1, 8). 39 Aquinas establishes here three claims of paramount importance: (1) God is the infallible agent of that rule by virtue of which intellectual beings can achieve their ultimate end. (2) Whatever is constitutive of intellectual beings (i.e., inherent to their primary perfection, their nature) is not in and of itself efficacious in achieving their final end, for intellectual beings are, quidem non potest esse nisi per actum intellectus et voluntatis: quia nee ipse Deus aliter erga seipsum operationem habet. Oportuit igitur, ad perfectionem optimam universi, esse aliquas creaturas intellectuales." 38 "Huius vero regiminis effectus in diversis apparet diversimode, secundum differentiam naturarum. Quaedam namque sic a Deo producta sunt ut, intellectum habentia, eius similitudinem gerant et imaginem repraesentent: unde et ipsa non solum sunt directa, sed et seipsa dirigentia secundum proprias actiones in debitum finem. Quae si in sua directione divino subdantur regimini, ad ultimum finem consequendum ex divino regimine admittuntur: repelluntur autem si secus in sua directione processerint." 39 "Et quidem quantum ad intellectualia, quae, eius regimen sequentia, ab ipso consequuntur ultimum finem, qui est ipse: et ideo