The Thomist 74 (2010): 499-513

SOME FUNDAMENTAL ASPECTS OF CATHOLIC
HIGHER EDUCATION IN THE MAGISTERIUM OF
THE VENERABLE POPE JOHN PAUL II
AND POPE BENEDICT XVI 1
RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE
Archbishop Emeritus of Saint Louis
Prefect of the Supreme Tribunal of the Apostolic Signatura

I

WISH TO OFFER SOME reflections on the nature and ends
of Catholic higher education from the Magisterium of
Venerable Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI. These
reflections, I trust, will be both a confirmation of the steadfast
work of the administration, faculty, staff, and student body of The
Thomas More College of Liberal Arts, and all other Catholic
colleges that wish to be true to their Catholic identity, and an
inspiration to continue to put one's hand to plow, not looking
backward but going forward in the mission of the Catholic college
or university for the sake of the Church and society in general. 2
I. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSITY TO SOCIETY
AND THE CHURCH

My first reflection concerns the importance of the Catholic
university to society and the Church. The Declaration on
Christian Education, Gravissimum educationis, of the Second
Vatican Ecumenical Council underlines the importance the
Church has consistently assigned to Catholic higher education, in
1 This address was delivered at the Annual President's Council Dinner for The Thomas
More College of Liberal Arts, Merrimack, New Hampshire, at The Harvard Club of Boston,
Boston, Massachusetts, 4 December 2010.
2 Cf. Luke 9:62.

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

order that "the convergence of faith and reason in the one truth
may be seen more clearly. " 3 It is sufficient to consider the
challenges of a lifetime as a member of the Church and a citizen
of the nation, and the many and significant fields of human
endeavor for which the university student prepares himself, to
know the importance of his receiving a complete education, that
is, an education in which the convergence of faith and reason in
the pursuit of the one truth is consistently taught and exemplified.
Pope Benedict XVI gives clear expression to the irreplaceable
service of Catholic higher education for the attainment of the
necessary unity of faith and reason. In his meeting with Catholic
educators at The Catholic University of America, on 17 April
2008, addressing the fundamental Catholic identity of the
Catholic university, he reminded them:
Clearly, then, Catholic identity is not dependent upon statistics. Neither can it
be equated simply with orthodoxy of course content. It demands and inspires
much more: namely, that each and every aspect of your learning communities
reverberates within the ecclesial life of faith. Only in faith can truth become
incarnate and reason truly human, capable of directing the will along the path
of freedom (cf. Spe salvi, 23). In this way our institutions make a vital
contribution to the mission of the Church and truly serve society. They become
places in which God's active presence in human affairs is recognized and in
which every young person discovers the joy of entering into Christ's "being for
others" (cf. ibid., 28). 4

In a particular way, the Catholic university that is true to her
identity will help students to be strong in giving an account of
their faith in their vocation in life, whether it be the married life,
the dedicated single life, the consecrated life, or the ordained
priesthood, and in whatever field of human endeavor they engage,
3 "altius perspiciatur quomodo fides et ratio in unum verum conspirent" (Gravissimum
educationis 10 [Sacrosanctum Concilium Oecumenicum Vaticanum II, Declaratio de
Educatione Christiana, "Gravissimum Educationis," 28 October 1965, Acta Apostolicae Sedis
58 (1966): 737; English translation: Vatican Council II: The Conciliar and Post Conciliar
Documents, ed. Austin Flannery, O.P., rev. ed. (Northport, N.Y.: Costello Publishing
Company, 1992), 735]).
4 Benedictus PP. XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 17 Aprilis
2008, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 100 (2008): 323; also found in Pope Benedict XVI, Pope
Benedict in America (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 2008), 74.

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res1stmg the secularist dictatorship which would exclude all
religious discourse from the professions and from public life in
general.
Quoting Blessed John Henry Cardinal Newman, Venerable
Pope John Paul II underlined the importance of the service of the
Catholic university to the Church and society in general in his
apostolic constitution Ex corde ecclesiaewith these words:
It is the honour and responsibility of a Catholic University to consecrate itself
without reserve to the cause of truth. This is its way of serving at one and the
same time both the dignity of man and the good of the Church, which has "an
intimate conviction that the truth is (its) real ally ... and that knowledge and
reason are sure ministers to faith". Without in any way neglecting the acquisition
of useful knowledge, a Catholic University is distinguished by its free search for
the whole truth about nature, man and God. The present age is in urgent need
of this kind of disinterested service, namely of proclaiming the meaning of truth,
that fundamental value without which freedom, justice and human dignity are
extinguished. 5

The fact that the Catholic university had its birth "from the heart
of the Church," to quote the beginning of the same apostolic
constitution, demonstrates the importance the Church has always
assigned higher education. 6
During various periods of the Church's history, the service of

the Catholic university has been critical to meeting the challenges
of the time. In a society marked by a virulent secularism which
threatens the integrity of every aspect of human endeavor and
service-for example, medicine, law, government and higher
5 "Sese autem veritatis causae sine ulla condicione devovere et decus Catholicae
Universitatis est et officium. Haec namque ratio ipsius propria est qua tum hominis dignitati
inservit tum Ecclesiae muneri, cui nempe funditus est persuasum «veritatem esse suam sociam
veram ... atque cognitionem esse rationemque fideles fidei ministras».Nihil sane neglegens
utilium cognitionum adeptionem, eminet tamen Universitas Catholica propter liberam suam
totius veritatis inquisitionem de mundo et homine et Deo. Etenim huic nostro tempori valde
est opus hac ratione ministerii suorum commodorum immemoris, quod scilicet ministerium
est proclamandi veritatis sensum, quod est principale bonum sine quo libertas et iustitia et
hominis dignitas pereunt" (Ex corde ecclesiae 4 [Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Constitutio Apostolica
de Universitatibus Catholicis, Ex Corde Ecclesiae, 15 Augusti 1990, Acta Apostolicae Sedis 82
(1990): 14 77- 78; English translation: Apostolic Constitution of the Supreme Pontiff John Paul
II on Catholic Universities (Vatican City State: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1990), 5-6]).
6 Ex corde ecclesiae 1 (MS, 82 [1990]: 1475; Vatican trans., 3).

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

education itself-the service of the Catholic university is more
needed than ever. How tragic that the very secularism which the
Catholic university should be helping its students to battle and
overcome has entered into several Catholic universities, leading
to the grievous compromise of their high mission.
II. THE HARMONY OF FAITH AND REASON AT THE CATHOLIC
UNIVERSI1Y

At the Catholic university, the student will be led to overcome
the prevalent and utterly destructive error of our time, which
holds that somehow faith is contradicted by reason. This error has
hindered and even prevented the essential and irreplaceable
contribution of the Church to the life of society in general, that is,
to the pursuit of the common good. It is only through the meeting
of faith and reason that the deepest truth of the various areas of
study can be uncovered. In Ex corde ecclesiae, Venerable Pope
John Paul II declared:
It is in the context of the impartial search for truth that the relationship between
faith and reason is brought to light and meaning. The invitation of Saint
Augustine, "Intellege ut credas; crede ut intellegas'', is relevant to Catholic
Universities that are called to explore courageously the riches of Revelation and
of nature so that the united endeavour of intelligence and faith will enable
people to come to the full measure of their humanity, created in the image and
likeness of God, renewed even more marvellously, after sin, in Christ, and called
to shine forth in the light of the Spirit. 7

At the Catholic university, students should be equipped, through
their study and research, to address the truth of the Decalogue
and of the Golden Rule to their personal lives and to the life of
7 "Porro intra eos limites, ubi veritas abstinenter pervestigatur, lucem sibi recipit
significationemque necessitudo fidem inter ac rationem. «lntellege ut credas; crede ut
intellegas»: haec Sancti Augustini cohortatio ad Universitates quoque Catholicas adhibetur,
quae invitantur videlicet ut audacter Revelationis et naturae divitias investigent, unde
consociatus intellegentiae fideique conatus homines assequi sinat plenum quidem propriae
humanitatis mod um ad Dei imaginem ac similitudinem conditae mirabiliusque post peccatum
in Christo refectae et destinatae ad splendendum sub Spiritus lumine"(Ex corde ecclesiae 5
[AAS 82 (1990): 1478-79; Vatican trans., 6-7]).

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the society in which they live. At the Catholic university, the very
manner of study and research should manifest the bankruptcy of
the abuse of human life and human sexuality, which has come to
be standard on many university campuses, and the bankruptcy of
the violation of the inviolable dignity of human life, of the
integrity of marriage, and of the right order of our relationship to
one another and to the world in general, which is the trademark
of our culture, a culture of violence and death.
Pope Benedict XVI provided a somewhat lengthy reflection on
the communication of faith with reason at the Catholic university
in his meeting with Catholic educators during his pastoral visit to
our nation in April 2008. In particular, he commented on how the
mission of the Catholic university responds to the highest
aspiration of a nation, namely, "to develop a society truly worthy
of the human person's dignity." 8 Noting the division that secular
society creates between truth and faith, he underlined the
importance of the study of metaphysics which uncovers the nature
of truth which, in turn, necessarily forms us in the pursuit of the
moral good. 9
The Holy Father pointed out that "the truths of faith and
reason never contradict one another." 10 He illustrated the
irreplaceable service of the Church, of the Catholic faith, in man's
pursuit of truth with these words:
The Church's mission, in fact, involves her in humanity's struggle to arrive at
truth. In articulating revealed truth she serves all members of society by purifying
reason, ensuring that it remains open to the consideration of ultimate truths.
Drawing upon divine wisdom, she sheds light on the foundation of human
morality and ethics and reminds all groups in society that it is not praxis that
creates truth but truth that should serve as the basis of praxis. Far from
undermining the tolerance of legitimate diversity, such a contribution illuminates
the very truth which makes consensus attainable and helps to keep public debate
rational, honest, and accountable. Similarly the Church never tires of upholding
8 Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 323; Pope Benedict
in America, 74.
9 Cf. Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 324; Pope
Benedict in America, 75.
10 Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 3 23; Pope Benedict
in America, 75.

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the essential moral categories of right and wrong, without which hope could
only wither, giving way to cold pragmatic calculations of utility which render the
person little more than a pawn on some ideological chess-board. 11

One thinks, for example, of the cold and calculated advance of
the experimentation on human embryos for the sake of supposed
cures in our nation to see the critical need of education in
metaphysics and the doctrines of the faith at the Catholic
university.
Ill. A PLACE TO ENCOUNTER JESUS CHRIST
The first and chief teacher at every institution of Catholic
higher education is Our Lord Jesus Christ Who is the fullness of
the revelation of God to us. A Catholic college or university at
which Jesus Christ alive in His Church is not taught, encountered
in the Sacred Liturgy and its extension through prayer and
devotion, and followed in a life of virtue is not worthy of the
name. Pope Benedict XVI, in his meeting with Catholic educators,
declared:
First and foremost, every Catholic educational institution is a place to encounter
the living God who in Jesus Christ reveals his transforming love and truth (cf.
Spe Salvi, 4 ). This relationship elicits a desire to grow in the knowledge and
understanding of Christ and his teaching. In this way those who meet him are
drawn by the very power of the Gospel to lead a new life characterized by all
that is beautiful, good, and true; a life of Christian witness nurtured and
strengthened within the community of our Lord's disciples, the Church. 12

The presence of Our Lord Jesus Christ on the campus of the
Catholic college and university is not something additional to or
even extraneous to the pursuit of truth. It is, rather, He alone
Who inspires, guides, and disciplines professors and students, so
that they remain faithful in the pursuit and do not fall prey to the
11 Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 323-24; Pope
Benedict in America, 7 5.
12 Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorum Universitatem Americae," 320; Pope Benedict
in America, 70- 71.

ASPECTS OF CATHOLIC HIGHER EDUCATION

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temptations which Satan cleverly offers to corrupt us whenever
we set out to attain a great good.
According to the ancient canonical wisdom, corruptio optimi
pessima est, "the corruption of the best is the worst." Sadly, we
have witnessed the truth of the axiom in so many Catholic
colleges and universities in our nation, which once gave pride of
place to their Catholic identity and the Catholic life of the campus
but now are Catholic in name only, usually qualifying their
Catholic identity by another name, for example, calling
themselves a Catholic university in the Franciscan or Jesuit
tradition. What the "tradition" means in practice can have little,
if anything, to do with Tradition. The word "Catholic" in the
name of a university has its full qualification, that is, it accepts no
modifiers.
In Ex corde ecclesiae, Venerable Pope John Paul II described
the Catholic identity of the Catholic university, using the words
of the Final Document of the 1972 Congress of Delegates of
Catholic Universities. Having noted the four characteristics of the
Catholic university, he concluded:
In the light of these four characteristics, it is evident that besides the teaching,
research and services common to all Universities, a Catholic University, by
institutional commitment, brings to its task the inspiration and light of the
Christian message. In a Catholic University, therefore, Catholic ideals, attitudes
and principles penetrate and inform university activities in accordance with the
proper nature and autonomy of these activities. In a word, being both a
University and Catholic, it must be both a community of scholars representing
various branches of human knowledge, and an academic institution in which
Catholicism is vitally present and operative. 13

13 "«Praefulgentibus porro hisce proprietatibus, patet Catholicam Universitatem, praeter
instituendi et pervestigandi opus nee.non servitia omnium Universitatum communia, ex ipso
officio Instituti proprio afferre in suum opus inspirationem lucemque christiani nuntii. Apud
Universitatem ergo Catholicam proposita ac agenda rationes et principia Catholica pervadunt
et fingunt multiplices Universitatis navitates secundum harum naturam ac autonomiam
proprias. Brevi: cum eodem sit tempore tum Universitas tum Catholica, simul earn oportet
studiosorum esse communitatem in variis scientiae humanae provinciis versantium, simul
academicam quidem institutionem ubi Catholica religio adsit modo vi tali»" (Ex cordeecclesiae
14 [MS 82 (1990): 1483-84; Vatican trans., 14]).

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

In his ad limina address to the United States Bishops of New
York State on 15 October 1988, Venerable Pope John Paul II
made it clear that the critical service of the many Catholic
universities in our nation depends upon the strength of their
Catholic identity. He told the bishops:
Catholic institutions of higher learning, which educate a large number of young
people in the United States of America, have a great importance for the future
of society and of the Church in your country. But the degree of their influence
depends entirely on preserving their Catholic identity. This Catholic identity has
to be present in the fundamental direction given to both teaching and studies.
And it must be present in the life of these institutions which are characterized by
a special bond with the Church-a bond that springs from their institutional
connection with the Catholic message. The adjective "Catholic" must always be
the real expression of a profound reality . 14

Identifying a university as Catholic means identifying every aspect
of the university's life as Catholic.
Earlier, during his visit to our nation in September 1987,
Venerable Pope John Paul II reminded leaders of institutions of
Catholic higher education of their greatest challenge. He
observed:
The challenges that confront you are just as testing as those your forefathers
faced in establishing the network of institutions over which you now preside.
Undoubtedly, the greatest challenge is, and will remain, that of preserving and
strengthening the Catholic character of your colleges and universities-that
institutional commitment to the word of God as proclaimed by the Catholic
Church. This commitment is both an expression of spiritual consistency and a
specific contribution to the cultural dialogue proper to American life. As you
strive to make the presence of the Church in the world of modern culture more
luminous, may you listen once again to Christ's prayer to his Father for his
disciples: "Consecrate them by means of truth- 'Your word is truth'"On 17: 17). 15

14 Pope John Paul II, The Pope Speaks to the American Church: John Paul II's Homilies,
Speeches, and Letters in the United States, ed. The Cambridge Center for the Study of Faith
and Culture (New York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1992), 468.
15 Pope John Paul II, allocutio "Novae Aureliae," 9 (Ioannes Paulus PP. II, Allocutio,
"Novae Aureliae, ad magnorum lycaeorum catholicorum Professores," 12 Septembris 1987,
Acta Apostolicae Sedis 80 [1988]: 768; English trans.: The Pope Speaks to the American
Church, 199).

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Those who have struggled and continue to struggle to maintain
and develop the Catholic identity of The Thomas More College
of Liberal Arts know the truth of Pope John Paul II's words. At
the same time, they know the deep joy of imparting a truly
Catholic higher education, through which students and professors
grow in their love of Christ, and, thereby, of providing to society
a service which only a truly Catholic institution of higher
education can provide.
The Catholic university makes a lifelong contribution to the
formation of the conscience of her students. Through
authentically Catholic studies, the student grows ever more
sensitive and attentive to the voice of God, which we call the
conscience, by which he knows right from wrong, truth from
falsehood, and beauty from ugliness.
It is the conscience, the voice of God, speaking to our souls
that is, in the words of Blessed John Henry Cardinal Newman,
"the aboriginal Vicar of Christ." 16 As such, the conscience is ever
attuned to Christ Himself Who instructs and forms it through His
Vicar, the Roman Pontiff, and the bishops in communion with
him. Blessed Cardinal Newman observed that conscience "is a
messenger of him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us
behind a veil, and teaches and rules us by his representatives. " 17
In accord with the wisdom of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas,
our thoughts and actions should not be conformed to the voices
of men who speak about human and passing things, no matter
how persuasive or powerful they may be, but to the voice of God
speaking to us, through our conscience, about the realities that
pertain to our relationship with Him and are enduring.
The encounter with Jesus Christ, which takes a privileged form
at the Catholic university, naturally requires the active engagement of the bishop, the successor of the apostles, in any Catholic
university within his jurisdiction. The Catholic university, for its
part, will seek the fullest possible communication with the bishop.
16 John Henry Cardinal Newman, "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk," V, in Certain
Difficulties Felt by Anglicans in Catholic Teaching II (London: Longmans Green, 1885), 248.
Quoted in the Catechism of the Catholic Church, no. 1778.

17 Ibid.

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

Regarding the relationship of the bishop with the Catholic
university, Venerable Pope John Paul II, in Ex corde ecclesiae,
observed:
Bishops have a particular responsibility to promote Catholic Universities, and
especially to promote and assist in the preservation and strengthening of their
Catholic identity, including the protection of their Catholic identity in relation
to civil authorities. This will be achieved more effectively if close personal and
pastoral relationships exist between University and Church authorities,
characterized by mutual trust, close and consistent cooperation and continuing
dialogue. Even when they do not enter directly into the internal governance of
the University, Bishops "should be seen not as external agents but as participants
in the life of the Catholic University." 18

When one considers the noble mission of the Catholic university,
it becomes clear that it can only be accomplished within the
Church, within the living Body of Christ, in which the bishop acts
in the person of Christ, Head and Shepherd of the flock in every
time and place.
How much the bishop should be able to depend upon the
Catholic university to be a partner with him in meeting the many
challenges of the new evangelization; teaching the faith in its
integrity; celebrating the Sacred Liturgy as the action of Christ,
uniting heaven to earth; and giving sound discipline by which the
order inherent in the life of the Church is safeguarded and
promoted! The situation in which the Catholic university views
the bishop as a suspect or outright unwelcome partner in the
mission of Catholic higher education-unless the bishop is willing
to betray the duties of his office as the chief teacher of the faith in
the territory in which the Catholic university has its seat by
18 "Officio proprio obstringuntur Episcopi ut Catholicas promoveant Universitates
potissimumque curis prosequantur eas et adiuvent ut indolem suam Catholicam conservent
immo et corroborent etiam coram civilibus Auctoritatibus. Quod convenienter quidem
obtinebitur si vincula generata asservataque erunt arcta et personalia et pastoralia inter
Universitates et ecclesiasticas Auctoritates, quae vincula fiducia mutua e congruens adiutrix
opera et dialogus continuus signent. Quantumvis directo haud ingrediantur Episcopi interius
Universitatis regimen, non ideo tamen «existimandi sunt velut extrarii quidam actores, verum
vitae ipsius Catholicae Universtatis participes»" (Ex corde ecclesiae28 [AAS 82 (1990): 1491;
Vatican trans., 23]).

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endorsing the Catholic identity of the university without regard
for the high demands of such an identity-is totally anomalous.
IV. THE IMPORTANCE OF THEOLOGY TO THE CATHOLIC
IDENTI1Y OF THE CATHOLIC UNIVERSI1Y

The Catholic identity of the Catholic university is defined by
the fullness of the revelation of God's love in His only-begotten
Son Who became man in order that we might know and live the
truth of that love. The study and research that takes place at the
Catholic university finds its ultimate meaning in that revelation
which is the source of all being. The conduct of study and
research in the context of an ever-deepening knowledge of Divine
Revelation helps the teacher and the learner to grow in wonder
before the mystery of God's immeasurable and unceasing love of
man and to return love for love. In the earlier-referenced ad
limina address to the U.S. Bishops of New York State, Venerable
Pope John Paul II reminded the bishops of the stable and
irreplaceable contribution the study of theology makes to the
safeguarding and promotion of the Catholic identity of the
Catholic university. He observed:
What faith teaches is not the result of human investigation but comes from divine
revelation. Faith has not been transmitted to the human mind as a philosophical
invention to be perfected; rather, it has been entrusted to the Spouse of Christ
as a divine deposit to be faithfully guarded and infallibly interpreted (see First
Vatican Council: Dei Filius, ch. IV: DS 3020). In the area of strictly human
knowledge, there is room not only for progress toward the truth but also, and
not infrequently, for the rectification of substantial error. Revealed truth,
however, has been entrusted to the Church once and for all. It has reached its
completion in Christ. Hence the profound significance of the Pauline expression
"deposit" of faith (see 1 Tm. 6:20). At the same time, this deposit allows for a
further explanation and for a growing understanding as long as the Church is on
earth. 19

In this light, one understands the insistence on the importance
of at least a chair, if not a faculty, of Catholic theology at every
19 The Pope Speaks to the American

Church, 469, no. 4.

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

Catholic university. 20 In Ex corde ecclesiae,Venerable Pope John
Paul II set forth the importance of the teaching of Sacred
Theology in the Catholic university. He wrote:
Theology plays a particularly important role in the search for a synthesis of
knowledge as well as in the dialogue between faith and reason. It serves all other
disciplines in their search for meaning, not only by helping them to investigate
how their discoveries will affect individuals and society but also by bringing a
perspective and an orientation not contained within their own methodologies.
In turn, interaction with these other disciplines enriches theology, offering it a
better understanding of the world today, and making theological research more
relevant to current needs. Because of its specific importance among the academic
disciplines, every Catholic University should have a faculty, or at least a chair, of
theology. 21

His insistence on the importance of a solid and profound teaching
of Catholic theology at the Catholic university echoes the
directive of the Fathers at the Second Vatican Ecumenical
Council: "In Catholic universities in which there is no faculty of
Sacred Theology there should be an institute or course of theology
in which lectures may be given suited also to the needs of lay
students. " 22
Given the importance of the teaching of Sacred Theology at
the Catholic university, whether through a faculty or a chair or a
designated course of studies, special care should be given to the
curriculum and the hiring of professors prepared to lead students

°Cf. Gravissimum educationis 10 (AAS 58 [1966]: 736-37).

2

21 "Insignem

partem sustinet theologia in doctrinarum omnium summa sive synthesi
quarenda pariter ac in dialogo inter fidem et rationem. Affert utilitatem pariter suam reliquis
omnibus disciplinis, cum in iis plena significatio conquiritur, quoniam non tantum illis
subvenit ut recte investigent quo pacto inventa propria personas hominum societatemque sint
affectura, verum etiam viam iis praebet iudicandi necnon directionem quandam quae desunt
methodologiis earum. Reciproca haec actio ceteris cum disciplinis earumque inventis
locupletat vicissim theologiam, dum meliorem mundi huius temporis intellectum ei exhibet
atque ipsam theologicam investigationem magis adhaerere cogit praesentes ad necessitates.
Perspecto ergo proprio theologiae pondere inter academicas disciplinas, Facultatem vel saltem
theologiae cathedram habere debebit omnis Catholica Universitas" (Ex corde ecclesiae 19
(AAS 82 [1990]: 1486-87; Vatican trans., 17).
22 "In Universitatibus Catholicis in quibus nulla Facultas S. Theologiae exstet, Institutum
habeatur vel Cathedra S. Theologiae, in qua lectiones laicis quoque alumnis accommodatae
tradantur" (Gravissimum educationis 10 [AAS 58 (1966): 737; Flannery, ed., 735]).

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in the study of the Scriptures and the Tradition, especially the
study of the Fathers of the Church and the approved theologians,
above all, St. Thomas Aquinas.
It should be kept in mind that, today, many young Catholics
are poorly catechized. It may, therefore, be advantageous to
connect the study of the classic texts of Sacred Theology with the
relevant parts of the Catechism of the Catholic Church. Given the
religious illiteracy which marks our time and in fidelity to the
seriousness with which university studies should be undertaken,
there is really no place for engaging in speculative theology that
is not firmly grounded in Tradition and certainly no time to waste
on superficial and tendentious theological writings of the time.
What sense does it make, for instance, to engage students in a
discussion of the possibility of the admission of women to Holy
Orders, when the students have little or no knowledge of the
consistent teaching of the Holy Scriptures and Tradition on the
Sacred Priesthood and on the reservation of priestly ordination to
men. Special care must be exercised in the teaching of moral
theology to correct the numerous and readily available articles
and books which follow a proportionalist or consequentialist
approach to moral questions, and to ground students in the
Aristotelian-Thomistic ethics which, in turn, is grounded in a
sound metaphysics.
CONCLUSION

There are many more aspects of the Catholic university,
compellingly illustrated in the Magisterium of both Venerable
Pope John Paul II and Pope Benedict XVI, which time does not
permit me to address. It is my hope that my little reflection on the
fundamental aspects which I have been able to address will help
us all to see more clearly the critical importance of the Catholic
university and specifically of The Thomas More College of Liberal
Arts to the Church and the world in our time. It is also my hope
that it will inspire us all to a stronger engagement in the
apostolate of Catholic higher education. Pope Benedict XVI, in

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RAYMOND LEO CARDINAL BURKE

addressing Catholic educators during his pastoral v1s1t to our
nation in 2008, emphasized the importance of the engagement of
the entire community in the critical apostolate of Catholic
education. Speaking of the heroic sacrifices made in the past to
provide Catholic schools and universities in our nation, he
observed:
This sacrifice continues today. It is an outstanding apostolate of hope, seeking
to address the material, intellectual, and spiritual needs of over three million
children and students. It also provides a highly commendable opportunity for the
entire Catholic community to contribute generously to the financial needs of our
institutions. Their long-term sustainability must be assured. Indeed, everything
possible must be done, in cooperation with the wider community, to ensure that
they are accessible to people of all social and economic strata. No child should
be denied his or her right to an education in faith, which in turn nurtures the
soul of a nation. 23

What Pope Benedict urges pertains not only to the support of
Catholic elementary and secondary schools, but also to the
support of truly Catholic colleges and universities. They are
critical to the nurture of the soul of our nation.
Saint Thomas More, the patron saint of the College,
steadfastly, in the face of imprisonment and execution, listened to
the voice of God rather than to the voices of men who would
have had him act according to a human way of thinking, alienated
from the wisdom of God. At his trial on 1July1535, St. Thomas
More held firmly to the living Tradition of the Church, which
forbade him, in conscience, to acknowledge King Henry VIII with
the title of Supreme Head of the Church. When, during his trial,
the Chancellor rebuked him, citing the acceptance of the title by
so many bishops and nobles of the land, Thomas More replied:
"My lord, for one bishop of your opinion I have a hundred saints
of mine; and for one parliament of yours, and God knows of what
kind, I have all the General Councils for 1,000 years." 24
23 Benedict XVI, "Ad Catholicam Studiorurn Universitatem Americae," 321; Pope Benedict
in America, 72.
24 Gerard B. Wegemer and Stephen W. Smith, eds., A Thomas More Source Book
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2004), 354.

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513

When the Duke of Norfolk accused him of malice m his
response, Thomas More responded: "What I say is necessary for
discharge of my conscience and satisfaction of my soul, and to this
I call God to witness, the sole Searcher of human hearts." 25
Rightly, Thomas More declared on the scaffold before his
execution: "I die the king's good servant, and God's first." 26 The
saint served his king well by obeying God Who revealed His truth
to him through his conscience, instructed and formed by the
example of the saints of the Church and by her Magisterium.
Let us continue to pray and work so that the College, under
the patronage of St. Thomas More, will form its graduates to
cultivate, throughout their lifetime, the divine wisdom and truth
which they pursue through their studies, so that they place always
first in their lives the truth and love into which God leads them
through their consciences, formed by the Magisterium of the
Church, our Mother and Teacher. My reflection is offered to
assist us all in seeking always the truth and love by which we serve
others and our world well by serving God first.

25

Ibid.

26 Ibid., 357.

The Thomist 74 (2010): 515-61

IHEOLOGIA AND DISPENSATIO:
THE CENTRALITY OF THE DIVINE MISSIONS IN ST.
THOMAS'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY
GILLES EMERY, 0.P.
University of Fribourg
Fribourg, Switzerland

I

N ST. THOMAS'S Summa Theologiae, the doctrine of the
divine missions of the Son and the Holy Spirit is found at the
very end of the section dedicated to "what pertains to the
distinction of the persons" (STh I, q. 43). 1 At first glance, the
placement of the question could (wrongly) suggest that the
question dealing with the divine missions is just an appendix or an
1 My references to St. Thomas's works are taken from the following editions. Summa
Theologiae: Cura et studio Instituti Studiorum Medievalium Ottaviensis, Editio altera
emendata, 5 vols. (Ottawa: Harpell, 1941-45). Scriptum on Book I of the Sentences: ed. P.
Mandonnet (Paris: Lethielleux, 1929); Scriptum on Book IV of the Sentences, dd. 23-50:
Opera omnia, ed. S. E. Frette, vol. 11 (Paris: Louis Vives, 1882). Summa contra Gentiles: ed.
P. Marc, C. Pera, et al., 3 vols. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1961-67). Contra doctrinam
retrahentium a religione: Leonine Edition, vol. 41 C (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1970).
Sententia libri Politicorum: Leonine Edition, vol. 48 A (Rome: Ad Sanctae Sabinae, 1971).
Compendium Theologiae: Leonine Edition, vol. 42 (Rome: Editori di San Tommaso, 1979).
Quaestiones Disputatae De Veritate: Leonine Edition, vol. 22 (Rome, 1975-76). Quaestiones
Disputatae De Potentia: ed. P. Bazzi et al. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1965). Super
evangelium S. Ioannis lectura: ed. R. Cai, 5th ed. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1952). Catena
aura in quatuor evangelia: 2 vols., ed. A. Guarienti (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1953). Super
Epistolas S. Pauli lectura: ed. R. Cai, 2 vols. (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1953). In librum
beati Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus: ed. C. Pera (Turin and Rome: Marietti, 1950). I also
use (with some modifications) the following English translations: Commentary on the Gospel
of John, Part I, trans. J. A. Weisheipl and F. R. Larcher (Albany, N.Y.: Magi Books, 1980);
Part II, trans. J. A. Weisheipl and F. R. Larcher (Petersham, Mass.: St. Bede's Publications,
1999). Summa Theologiae: LAtin Text and English Translation, ed. T. Gilby and T. C. O'Brien
(London: Eyre and Spottiswoode; New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964-73). Summa Theologica,
trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, 5 vols. (New York: Benzinger, 1948).

515

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

afterword in Trinitarian doctrine. In this essay, I will attempt to
show that, on the contrary, the divine missions play a crucial role
in St. Thomas's Trinitarian theology.
After some preliminary clarifications about the "theology" and
the "economy" (I), I will show that the relationship between
theology and economy can be explained by St. Thomas's teaching
on the processions and missions (II). The divine missions are
ordained to a twofold end: they reveal the Trinitarian mystery,
and they effect salvation by giving a share in the life of the Trinity
(III). This teaching implies a Trinitarian understanding of
salvation, and it is grounded in the fact that the mystery of the
eternal Trinity is present within the economy: for St. Thomas,
"theology" is not a theological construct, but it is taught by
Scripture itself (IV). On this foundation, I will suggest that
Trinitarian theology can be taught following three steps: starting
from the economy, the theologian is led to the consideration of
the divine persons in their eternal being and relationships, which
in turn illuminates the creative and salvific work of the Trinity
(V). Finally, I will suggest that St. Thomas's doctrine of the divine
missions and processions offers an insightful alternative to the
scheme of the "economic Trinity" and the "immanent Trinity"
(VI).
This essay deals exclusively with St. Thomas Aquinas (except
in the last section, which considers some modern authors). Such
a focus is by no way meant to suggest that other medieval
theologians neglected the role of the divine missions in Trinitarian
theology. Most of them shared St. Thomas's acknowledgment of
the need for speculative theology, and for linking the missions and
the account of the divine persons. However, a comparison with
other medieval theologians would go beyond the scope of the
present essay.2
2 For a discussion of the divine missions (especially the "invisible missions," with an
extended bibliography) in Alexander of Hales, St. Albert, and St. Bonaventure, see Guillermo
A. Juarez, Dios Trinidad en todas las creaturas yen los santos (Cordoba, Argentina: Ediciones
de! Copista, 2008), 157-86 (Alexander of Hales), 211-36 (Albert the Great), and 259-85
(Bonaventure); see also 77-101 on the divine missions in St. Augustine. The close relationship
between "eternal processions" and "missions" was well underlined by Peter Lombard; see

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517

I. THEOLOGIA AND DISPENSATIO

Saint Thomas does not speak of "theology" and "economy"
exactly as we generally do today. He employs the word theologia
to refer to the divinity, or deity, of the three persons, but this
meaning of the word theologia appears in patristic quotations. 3 He
also employs the word oeconomia, or yconomia, but this word
appears mostly in his commentaries on Aristotle, and it means the
government of household. 4 This being said, St. Thomas has a fine
understanding of the reality we describe, with reference to the
Cappadocian Fathers, as "theology" and "economy." For
theologia, he uses several expressions, for instance "Deus . . .
secundum quod in se est." 5 And for what we call "economy," in
the context of Trinitarian theology, his main word is dispensatio
(together with the verb dispensare). The dispensatio is the
realization, in time, of God's eternal ordinatio or dispositio. 6
"Faith in God's Providence includes all those things which God
dispenses in time [omnia quae temporaliter a Deo dispensantur]

Johannes Schneider, Die Lehre vom Dreieinigen Gott in der Schute des Petrus Lombardus
(Munich: Max Hueber, 1961), 93-111. Those authors who actually commented on Lombard's
Sentences could hardly miss this relationship. The following question is especially worthy of
consideration for future research: how did authors of the late thirteenth century and of the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries integrate the teaching on the inner life of the Trinity within
the doctrine of the divine missions? Put otherwise: to which extent did theologians of the later
Middle Ages (including "Thomists" themselves) grant a central place to the divine missions
as bearing in themselves the eternal mystery of the Trinity?
3 See, for instance, STh III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1 (quoting St. John Damascene). Catena in Lucae
evangelium, c. 9, n. 6 (Marietti ed., 2: 131) (quoting St. John Damascene). Catena in Iohannis
evangelium, prologue (Marietti ed., 2:323) (quoting Eusebius of Caesarea). In librum beati
Dionysii De Divinis Nominibus, c. 2, feet. 2 (Marietti ed., no. 155) (quoting Dionysius). For
these references, and for what follows, I am indebted to Martin Sabathe, La Trinite
redemptrice: Processions et missions trinitaires dans le Commentaire de l'evangile selon saint
Jean par saint Thomas d'Aquin (Paris: Vrin, 2011).
4 See, for instance, I Sent. Politic., lib. I, c. 2 (Leonine ed., 82); In I Epist. ad Tim., c. 2,
lect. 2 (Marietti ed., no. 104).
5 STh I, q. 2, pro!.
6 See, for instance, Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 6:15 (Marietti ed., no. 870):
"Dispositio Dei Patris ab aeterno." Cf. Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 7 :23 (Marietti ed., no.
1049); STh I, q. 22, a. 1, ad 2.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

for man's salvation, and which are the way to beatitude. " 7 In most
cases, the divine dispensatio appears in relationship to the person
of Christ, and especially to his incarnation.
In the Summa Theologiae, following St. John Damascene, St.
Thomas identifies the theologia with the Godhead of the divine
persons, and the dispensatio with the mystery of the incarnation. 8
The dispensatio concerns the divine plan of salvation which is
accomplished through the incarnation of the Word. 9 In Christ, the
eternal mystery and the dispensatio are united: Christ himself is
"the mystery of the Father." 10 The same identification appears in
other works. 11 But St. Thomas has many other ways to express
this. The following example is taken from the commentary on
John 1:1 ("In principio erat Verbum"). This example makes clear
that, in the order of our access to the knowledge of the Trinity,
the dispensatio comes first.
Order is found in learning, and this in two ways: as to nature [secundum
naturam], and as to ourselves [quoad nos]. And in both cases we can speak of a
beginning [principium] . ... As to nature, in Christian doctrine the beginning
and principle of our wisdom is Christ, inasmuch as he is the Wisdom and the
Word of God, that is to say, in his divinity. But as to ourselves, the beginning is
7 STh II-II, q. 1, a. 7 (with explicit reference to Christ's incarnation and passion). See also
Comp. Theo/. I, c. 238: "It was by dispensation [dispensationis fuerit] that he kept the scars
of his wounds in his body, so that the truth of the resurrection might be demonstrated by
them" (Leonine ed., 185). Cf. St. John Damascene,De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions of Burgundio
and Cerbanus, ch. 91, ed. E. M. Buytaert (St. Bonaventure, N.Y.: The Franciscan Institute,
1955), 349: "secundum dispensationem." For St. John Damascene's Greek text, seeExpositio
fidei 4.18 in Die Schriften des Johannes van Damaskos, vol. 2, ed. B. Kotter (Berlin: Walter
de Gruyter, 1973), 217: "kat' oikonomian."
8 "Et in theologia, idest in deitate personarum, et in dispensatione, idest in mysterio
incarnationis" (STh III, q. 2, a. 6, ad 1). Cf. St. John Damascene, De Fide Orthodoxa: Versions
of Burgundio and Cerbanus, ch. 70, p. 272: "et in theologia et in dispensatione." Cf. Expositio
fidei 3.26 (Kotter, ed., 169).
9 In Epist. ad Colossenses 1:25 (Marietti ed., no. 65): "verbum Dei, id est, Dei
dispensationem, et praeordinationem et promissionem de Verbo Dei incarnando."
10 In Epist. ad Colossenses 2:2 (Marietti ed., no. 80): "Vel mysterii Dei Patris, quod est
Christus."
11 See, for instance, Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 11:27 (Marietti ed., no. 1520):
"Martha confesses Christ's dignity, his nature, and the dispensation, that is, of the incarnation
[dispensationem, scilicet incarnationis]."

DIVINE MISSIONS

519

Christ himself inasmuch as he is the Word of God made flesh, that is to say, in
his incarnation. 12

We can use these explanations to identify the two ways
according to which a doctrine of the Trinity may be set forth:
either by beginning with the divine persons in their divinity, or by
beginning with the incarnation of the Son and the mission of the
Holy Spirit. In the Summa Theologiae St. Thomas follows the first
path (which in the prologue of the Summa he simply calls "ordo
disciplinae"). 13 In his commentaries on Scripture he follows both
paths. Quoad nos, priority clearly belongs to the dispensatio, as St.
Thomas makes clear in other places: one must first receive the
nourishment of the "Word made flesh" in order to be able to
grow and become capable of receiving the teaching concerning
"the Word that was in the beginning with God. " 14 For this reason,
Trinitarian doctrine consists in two paths or complementary
movements. The first path is that of our discovery of the mystery.
It starts from the dispensatio, that is, from the divine missions.
The second path is that of "theology." It starts from faith in the
eternal subsistence of the three divine persons in the inmost life
of the Trinity. The relationship between the dispensatio and the
theologia can be explained by St. Thomas's teaching on the
Trinitarian missions and processions.
II. PROCESSIONS AND MISSIONS

By "processions" (i.e., eternal processions), St. Thomas means
the coming forth (origo) of a person from another, that is, the
eternal generation of the Son from the Father, and the eternal
12 "Invenitur ordo in disciplinis, et hie est duplex: secundum naturam, et quoad nos; et
utroque modo dicitur principium. Hehr. V: Deberetis esse magistri propter tempus. Et hoc
modo, secundum naturam quidem, in disciplina christiana initium et principium sapientiae
nostrae est Christus, inquantum est Sapientia et Verbum Dei, idest secundum divinitatem.
Quoad nos vero principium est ipse Christus, inquantum Verbum caro factum est, idest
secundum eius incarnationem" (Lectura in Iohannis evangelium l:l [Marietti ed., no. 34]).
13 STh, prologue.
14 STh II-II, q. 189, a. 1, ad 4; cf. arg. 4. See also Contra doctrinam retrahentium, c. 7
(Leonine ed., 50).

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

procession of the Holy Spirit from the Father and Son. By his
generation from the Father, the Son receives the fullness of the
divine nature, as does the Holy Spirit by his procession. IntraT rinitarian processions, or "origins," must be grasped as "the
drawing out of a reality that has issued from a principle," that is,
as a pure "relation of emanation" within the one Godhead. 15 Since
these processions occur within the Godhead, and since the person
who proceeds remains within the person from whom he proceeds,
such processions or "origins" account for both the consubstantiality of the three (i.e., their being one single God) and
their personal distinction (by virtue of the personal relations
founded on the processions themselves). 16
As for the "divine missions," following a tradition rooted in St.
Augustine, St. Thomas distinguishes between the "visible" and the
"invisible" missions. By "visible missions" he understands the
coming of the Son of God in the flesh, and the manifestation of
the Holy Spirit through visible signs (at Christ's baptism and
transfiguration, at Easter Uohn 20:22-23], and at Pentecost [Acts
2]). The "visible missions" relate to historical events foundational
for salvation, from Christmas to Pentecost. 17 By "invisible
missions" St. Thomas understands the sending of the Son and of
the Holy Spirit into human souls (and angels): "God has sent the
Spirit of his Son into our hearts, crying, 'Abba! Father!"' (Gal
4:6). These missions are called "invisible" because, although their
fruits are manifested exteriorly in the practice of a holy life, they
are accomplished interiorly in the soul of the just. In the invisible
mission as well as in the visible mission, the person is sent by the
one from whom he proceeds. The eternal relation of origin is
included in the mission itself; the person is sent according to his
personal property.

Sent., d. 13, q. 1, a. 1: "eductio principiati a suo princicipo." De Pot., q. 10, a. 1, ad
2: "secundum quod importat quemdam emanationis ordinem."
16 On the "processions," see Gilles Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas
Aquinas, trans. Francesca A. Murphy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51-77.
17 STh I, q. 43, a. 7.
15 I

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521

A) The Concept of "Mission"
A divine person's mission has two constitutive features: (1) the
person's eternal procession and (2) the divine person's relation to
the creature to whom this person is made present in a new way.
One can formulate the two sides in terms either of procession or
of relation. In terms of procession: a mission consists in the
person's procession toward a creature. The mission includes in
itself the eternal procession, to which it adds a created effect that
disposes the creature to receive this divine person himself in a
new way (one thus speaks of the "temporal procession" of the Son
and of the Holy Spirit). 18 In terms of relations or relationships:
"The meaning of 'being sent' includes a twofold relationship: one
is the relationship [habitudo]of the one who is sent to the sender;
the other is the relationship [habitudo] of the one sent to the one
to whom he is sent." 19 The first feature of the mission of the Son
and of the Holy Spirit consists in their relation of origin, or
"procession of origin. " 20 This relation is eternal and uncreated,
like the divine persons themselves. Put otherwise, the person sent
is the person as proceeding, that is, the person himself according
to his eternal procession. The second feature of the mission
consists of the relationship to the term of the mission, that is to
say, to the created being who receives the divine person sent. As
a summary: "A divine person admits of being sent in the sense
that, on the one hand, this implies procession of origin from the
sender and, on the other, a new way of existing in another." 21 As
we shall see, St. Thomas accounts for the mission of the Son and

18

STh I, q. 43, a. 2, ad 3; cf. I Sent., d. 14, aa. 1-2.

19 STh I, q. 43, a. 1: "In ratione missionis duo importantur,

quorum unum est habitudo
missi ad eum a quo mittitur; aliud est habitudo missi ad terminum ad quern mittitur." Cf. I
Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 1.
20 STh I, q. 43, a. 1; cf. ibid., ad 1: "In God, 'mission' means only procession of origin
[processiooriginis], which is according to equality, as explained above."
21 STh I, q. 43, a. 1: "Missio igitur divinae personae convenire potest, secundum quod
importat ex una parte processionem originis a mittente; et secundum quod importat ex alia
parte novum modum existendi in aliquo."

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

of the Holy Spirit by means of their eternal properties, as Word
and Love respectively. 22

B) The "Invisible Missions"
The "invisible missions," that is, the sending of the Holy Spirit
and the Son into angels and into human souls, give us the
fundamental structure of divinization. Here the reference, or
paradigm, is the outpouring of the Holy Spirit who is given. The
invisible mission consists not only of the gift of a created effect,
but first of all of the divine person himself who is sent:
In the very gift itself of sanctifying grace, the Holy Spirit is possessed by man and
dwells in him, and so it is the Holy Spirit himself who is given and sent .... The
invisible mission takes place according to a gift of sanctifying grace; and yet the
divine person himself is given [ipsa persona divina datur]. ... Sanctifying grace
disposes the soul to possess the divine person; and this is signified when it is said
that the Holy Spirit is given according to a gift of grace; nevertheless the gift
itself of grace is from the Holy Spirit; which is meant by the words, the charity

of God is poured forth in our hearts by the Holy Spirit.13

In short: "The grace of the Holy Spirit is given to man in such a
way that the source itself of the grace is also given, that is, the
Holy Spirit." 24 In his Scriptum super Sententiis, St. Thomas
explains that the invisible mission of the Holy Spirit consists of
two elements, or two aspects: first, his eternal procession, which
is really present in the mission itself (the Holy Spirit is sent as
proceeding from the Father and the Son); second, a temporal
22 For a more extended treatment of the divine missions in St. Thomas, see Gilles Emery,
"Missions invisibles et missions visibles: Le Christ et son Esprit," Revue Thomiste 106 (2006):
51-99; idem, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas, 360-412.
23 STh I, q. 43, a. 3, corp., ad 1, and ad 2: "In ipso dona gratiae gratum facientis, Spiritus
Sanctus habetur, et inhabitat hominem. Unde ipsemet Spiritus Sanctus datur et mittitur ....
Missio invisibilis fit secundum donum gratiae gratum facientis, tamen ipsa persona divina
datur .... Gratia gratum faciens disponit animam ad habendam divinam personam, et
significatur hoc, cum dicitur quad Spiritus Sanctus datur secundum don um gratiae. Sed tamen
ipsum donum gratiae est a Spiritu Sancto, et hoc significatur, cum dicitur quad caritas Dei
diffunditur in cordibus nostris per Spiritum Sanctum."
24 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 4:10 (Marietti ed., no. 577): "Ita ipsa gratia Spiritus
Sancti datur homini quod tamen ipse fans gratiae datur, scilicet Spiritus Sanctus."

DIVINE MISSIONS

523

effect in the order of sanctifying grace (this created effect is
appropriated to the Holy Spirit). 25 On this basis, St. Thomas
specifies that the gift of the uncreated divine person has absolute
priority over his created gifts:
A natural ordering between two things can be looked at in two ways. (1) On the
side of the one who receives ... the disposition takes priority over that to which
it disposes: in this sense, the receipt of the gifts of the Holy Spirit has priority
over that of the Holy Spirit himself, since it is by receiving these gifts that we are
conformed to the Holy Spirit. (2) But on the side of the agent and end, priority
belongs to what falls closer to the agent and end: in this sense, the receipt of the
Holy Spirit has priority over that of his gifts ... and this kind of priority is
absolute. 26

The temporal effect, a created gift, is caused by the Holy Spirit
and disposes us to receive the Holy Spirit himself. From the
standpoint of our assimilation to the Holy Spirit, the created gift
of sanctifying grace is primary: it is the priority of a disposition.
But from the standpoint of the cause of grace, and of the end to
which grace disposes us (that is, receiving the Holy Spirit in
person), the reception of the Holy Spirit has priority over that of
his gifts: in this sense, the gift of the Holy Spirit himself is
absolutely primary. This teaching is essential to a correct
understanding of the divine missions.
Saint Thomas's commentary on Romans 5 :5 is perhaps the best
passage on this theme. Here, he shows that the Holy Spirit in
person is given; and when the Holy Spirit is given, he gives us a
participation in his personal property, that is, charity:
The charity of God can be understood in a two-fold way. In one way, as the
charity by which God loves us. "I have loved you with an everlasting love" Uer
31:3). In another way, the charity of God can be said to be that by which we
ourselves love God, below 8:38f.: "For I am certain that neither death nor life
I Sent., d. 16, q. 1 a. 1. I will return to this issue below.
I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 1, qcla. 2: "Ordo aliquorum secundum naturam potest dupliciter
considerari. Aut ex parte recipientis vel materiae, et sic dispositio est prior quam id ad quod
disponit: et sic per prius recipimus dona Spiritus Sancti quam ipsum Spiritum, quia per ipsa
dona recepta Spiritui Sancto assimilamur. Aut ex parte agentis et finis; et sic quod propinquius
erit fini et agenti, dicitur esse prius: et ita per prius recipimus Spiritum Sanctum quam dona
ejus, quia et Filius per amorem suum alia nobis donavit. Et hoc est simpliciter esse prius."
25

26

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

will separate us from the love of God." Nevertheless, in both cases the charity
of God is poured into our hearts through the Holy Spirit who has been given to
us. For the Holy Spirit, who is the Love of the Father and the Son, to be given
to us, is to lead us to the participation of Love, which is the Holy Spirit, from
which participation we are made lovers of God. And the fact that we love him
is a sign that he loves us. Prov 8: 17: "I love the ones loving me." "Not as if we
have loved God first, but because he loved us first," as it is said in 1 Jn 4:10.
Now the charity by which he loves us, is said to be poured into our hearts,
because it is shown clearly in our hearts through the gift of the Holy Spirit
impressed in us. 1Jn3:24: "By this we know, that God remains in us, from the
Spirit which he gave to us." On the other hand, the charity by which we love
God is said to be poured into our hearts because it extends itself to the perfecting
of all habits and acts of the soul; for, as it is said in 1Cor13:4: "Love is patient,
love is kind," etc. 27

At this stage, one might raise the following objection. For St.
Thomas, relations between the divine persons and creatures are
"real" in creatures, but in God they are "relations of reason." 28
Can a relation "of reason" account for the real gift of the divine
person himself? Here it is necessary to recall two aspects of St.
Thomas's teaching on relations. First, in order for relations to be
"real" (relatio realis) in both correlative terms or extremes, these
two terms must belong to the same order (unius ordinis). This is
one of the main conditions for the existence of relations that are
bilaterally real. 29 Because of this, since "God is outside the whole

27 In Epist. ad Romanos 5 :5 (Marietti ed., no. 392): "Charitas Dei autem dupliciter accipi
potest. Uno modo pro charitate qua diligit nos Deus, Ier. XXXI: Charitate perpetua dilexi te;
alio modo potest dici charitas Dei, qua nos Deum diligimus, infra VIII: Certus sum quod neque
mors neque vita separabit nos a charitate Dei. Utraque autem charitas Dei in cordibus nostris
diffunditur per Spiritum Sanctum qui datus est nobis. Spiritum enim Sanctum, qui est Amor
Patris et Filii, dari nobis, est nos adduci ad participationem Amoris, qui est Spiritus Sanctus,
a qua quidem participatione efficimur Dei amatores. Et hoc quod ipsum amamus, signum est,
quod ipse nos amet. Prov. VIII: Ego diligentes me diligo. Non quasi nos primo dilexerimus
Deum, sed quoniam ipse prior di/exit nos, ut dicitur I Io. IV. Dicitur autem charitas, qua nos
diligit, in cordibus nostris diffusa esse, quia est in cordibus nostris patenter ostensa per donum
Sancti Spiritus nobis impressum. Io. III: In hoc scimus, quoniam manet in nobis Deus, etc.
Charitas autem qua nos Deum diligimus, dicitur in cordibus nostris diffusa, id est quia ad
omnes mores et actus animae perficiendos se extendit; nam, ut dicitur I Cor. XIII: Charitas
patiens est, benigna est, etc."
28 See, among many texts, STh I, q. 13, a. 7.
29 Ibid. See also STh I, q. 28, a. 1.

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525

order of creatures," 30 his relations to creatures are "of reason" and
not "real." Ascribing to God a relation "of reason" toward
creatures does not mean that such a relation is a mere mental
fiction, but that God surpasses the relation which we have with
him, because he is its transcendent cause. Second, St. Thomas
distinguishes between two kinds of "relations of reason." In the
first kind, the "order" (ordo) of concepts is posited by our
intellect (inventus per intellectum). This is the case, for instance,
of relations between genus and species (logical relations). In the
second kind, the relation arises from the mode of our
understanding (modus intelligendi), "when the intellect
understands one thing in its reference [ordo] to another, although
that relation is not 'invented' by our intellect but follows by a
kind a necessity its mode of understanding. " 31 This (often
neglected) distinction is important. Relations of the divine persons
to creatures belong to the second kind of relations, namely, those
relations which "are attributed by the intellect not to that which
is in the intellect, but to that which has objective reality .... Our
intellect attributes to God certain relative names, inasmuch as it
considers God as the term of the creature's relation to him. " 32
God's action on our behalf is very much real. It is real to the point
that it is identical with the very essence of God, but it makes no
addition to God. This is why God's action in the world is "God's
30 STh I, q. 13, a. 7: "Cum igitur Deus sit extra totum ordinem creaturae." Cf. STh I, q. 3,
aa. 5 and 8.
31 De Pot., q. 7, a. 11: "Sicut realis relatio consistit in ordine rei ad rem, ita relatio rationis
consistit in ordine intellectuum; quod quidem dupliciter potest contingere: uno modo
secundum quod iste ordo est adinventus per intellectum, et attributus ei quod relative dicitur;
et huiusmodi sunt relationes quae attribuuntur ab intellectu rebus intellectis, prout sunt
intellectae, sicut relatio generis et speciei: has enim relationes ratio adinvenit considerando
ordinem eius quod est in intellectu ad res quae sunt extra, vel etiam ordinem intellectuum ad
invicem. Alio modo secundum quod huiusmodi relationes consequuntur modum intelligendi,
videlicet quod intellectus intelligit aliquid in ordine ad aliud; licet ilium ordinem intellectus
non adinveniat, sed magis ex quadam necessitate consequatur modum intelligendi." For more
on this, see Gilles Emery, "Ad aliquid: La relation chez Thomas d'Aquin," in Saint Thomas
d'Aquin, ed. Thierry-Dominique Humbrecht (Paris: Cerf, 2010), 113-35.
32 De Pot., q. 7, a. 11: "Et huiusmodi relationes intellectus non attribuit ei quod est in
intellectu, sed ei quod est in re .... Et similiter aliqua nomina relativa Deo attribuit intellectus
noster, in quantum accipit Deum ut terminum relationum creaturarum ad ipsum."

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

essence with a relation to the creature" (a relation of reason): it
does not introduce any difference or progressive alteration into
God himself. 33
The interior sending of the Holy Spirit and of the Son into
souls thus consists in two aspects. The first, uncreated aspect is the
divine person himself sent in accordance with his proper mode of
existence. The Son is sent by the Father just as he is begotten by
the Father; the Holy Spirit is sent by the Father and the Son
insofar as he proceeds from the Father and the Son. Under this
first aspect, the invisible mission carries in it the eternal
procession of the divine person who is sent. The person sent is the
begotten Son and the proceeding Holy Spirit. The Son and the
Holy Spirit are sent into hearts in accordance with what they are.
The second aspect that constitutes the invisible mission is a gift
of sanctifying grace that the divine persons give to souls, a created
effect by reason of which the Son and Holy Spirit are present in
a new manner. When the Holy Spirit is sent, this new created
effect consists in the gift of charity. Charity renders souls
conformed to the Holy Spirit who is Love in person. In the

sending of the Son, this effect is the gift of sanctifying knowledge
of God, namely, wisdom (the divinizing gifts that illumine the
intellect, starting with faith), which renders souls conformed to
the Son, the Word of the Father. In the exposition of the divine
missions, we find the same doctrine of the Word and of Love that
St. Thomas developed in his theological account of the eternal
properties of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. The Son is sent
invisibly into souls when he dwells there according to the gift of
wisdom, or sanctifying knowledge, which breaks forth into the
affection of love-since the Son is the Word who breathes forth
Love. And the Holy Spirit is sent into souls when he dwells in
them according to the gift of charity-since the Holy Spirit is
Love. 34 The gift of wisdom is a participation in the personal
STh I, q. 45, a. 3, ad l: "Creatio active significata significat actionem divinam, quae est
eius essentia cum relatione ad creaturam. Sed relatio in Deo ad creaturam non est realis, sed
secundum rationem tantum. Relatio vero creaturae ad Deum est relatio realis, ut supra dictum
est, cum de divinis nominibus ageretur."
34 STh I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2; cf. I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2; I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1.
33

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527

property of the Son, and the gift of charity is a participation in the
personal property of the Holy Spirit. Thus the Son and the Holy
Spirit lead us to the Father according to the way in which they
refer themselves to the Father; they make saints participate in the
way they are in relation with the Father: the Son as the Word of
the Father, and the Holy Spirit as Love. 35 These created gifts
(wisdom and charity, inseparable from one another) are caused by
the divine persons and they dispose us to receive the divine
persons themselves. The missions of the divine persons are, in this
way, the outflowing in grace of their eternal procession.
C) The "Visible Missions"

The visible missions manifest the invisible missions through
visible signs. In his account of the Holy Spirit's visible missions,
St. Thomas explains that they contain three features: (1) the
sending of the Holy Spirit by the Father and the Son from whom
he eternally proceeds (his eternal procession); (2) the divine
person's new presence (by virtue of a created gift that disposes the
soul to receive the Holy Spirit in person); and (3) the disclosure,
or manifestation, of the eternal origin and new presence of the
Holy Spirit through a visible sign.36 This teaching implies that the
mission of the divine person "is not essentially different from the
eternal procession, but only adds a reference to a temporal
effect. " 37 In other words, the mission bears within itself the
eternal procession of the person sent. The mission includes the

35 See I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1.
36 I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1: "Ad rationem ergo visibilis missionis Spiritus Sancti tria
concurrunt, scilicet quod missus sit ab aliquo; et quod sit in alio secundum aliquem specialem
modum, et quod utrumque istorum per aliquod visibile signum ostendatur, ratione cujus tota
missio visibilis dicitur."
37 Ibid.: "Processio temporalis non est alia quam processio aeterna essentialiter, sed addit
aliquem respectum ad effectum temporalem." The phrase "temporal procession" (processio
temporalis) refers to the same reality as the mission (missio), with a nuance: in the concept of
"mission," the relationship to the created effect is put in the foreground, whereas the phrase
"temporal procession" first stresses the relationship to the sender, that is, the coming forth of
the person sent (I Sent., d. 15, q. 1, a. 2).

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

uncreated person according to the relation that eternally
constitutes this person.
The visible missions are oriented toward the invisible missions:
they are ordained to the interior gift of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit, and to the indwelling of the whole Trinity.
III. THE DIVINE MISSIONS: REVELATION AND SALVATION

The invisible missions of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, by
giving a share in the Trinitarian life, procure salvation,
divinization. The visible missions of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit have a twofold function or end: they reveal the Trinitarian
mystery, and they effect salvation.

A) Revelation and Salvation
The mystery of the Trinity in itself, that is, the mystery of the
persons in their common divinity and in their personal properties,
is revealed and made present within the dispensatio itself, since
the eternal generation of the Son, and the eternal procession of
the Holy Spirit, are really included in their mission. Saint Thomas
maintains this truth without confusing the economy with the
theology. The eternal mystery of the Trinity is present and
disclosed in the Son made flesh, and in the Holy Spirit himself
who is given. I will come back to this later. For now, I will look
at St. Thomas's explanations of the revelation of the Trinity.
In his discussion of the visible missions, in the Summa
Theologiae, he explains that
God provides for all things according to the nature of each thing. Now the
nature of man requires that he be led to the invisible by visible things, as
explained above. The invisible things of God must be made manifest to man by
the things that are visible. As God, therefore, in a certain way has demonstrated
himself and his eternal processions to men by visible creatures, according to
certain signs; so it was fitting that the invisible missions of the divine persons
also should be made manifest by some visible creatures. This mode of
manifestation applies in different ways, however, to the Son and to the Holy
Spirit. For it belongs to the Holy Spirit, who proceeds as Love, to be the Gift of

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529

sanctification [sanctificationis donum]; to the Son as the principle of the Holy
Spirit, it belongs to be the author of this sanctification [sanctificationis auctor].
Thus the Son has been sent visibly as the author of sanctification; the Holy Spirit
as the sign of sanctification. 38

Providence uses the mode it has inscribed within human nature:
it takes sensible experience as its point of departure. We are led
to the invisible through the visible (per visibilia ad invisibilia).
In this passage, St. Thomas emphasizes two functions of the
visible missions: (1) revelation (demonstrare, manifestare) and (2)
sanctification (sanctificatio). Regarding the first aspect (revelation), the visible missions of the Son and Spirit manifest their
invisible missions. This means that the visible missions involve a
dual disclosure: they manifest the eternal procession of the Son
and Spirit (they reveal the persons themselves in their eternal
origin), and they manifest the donation of these persons in
grace. 39 A similar connection between the visible and the invisible
is found in St. Thomas's teaching on Christ's miracles: on the one
hand, "it is natural to man to arrive at the intelligible truth
through sensible effects"; 40 on the other hand, "Christ did not
heal a man's body without healing his soul" (since the end of the
outward healing worked by Christ is the healing of the soul). 41
The second end of the missions, namely, sanctification, implies
a difference between the Son and the Holy Spirit. What makes
them differ is something rooted in their personal properties
(relative properties). A person is sent by the one from whom he
proceeds: the eternal relation of origin is included in the mission
q. 43, a. 7.
noted, the visible missions contain three features: the divine person sent
according to his personal procession, the divine person's new presence in grace, and the
disclosure of the eternal origin and of the new presence through a visible sign. See above n.
36 (I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1).
40 STh II-II, q. 178, a. 1. The same statement is made about Christ's incarnation (STh III,
q. 1, a. 1, sc), which is "the miracle of miracles [miraculum miraculorum]" (De Pot., q. 6, a.
2, ad 9). See Charles Morerod, "The Senses in the Relationship of Man with God," Nova et
Vetera (English edition) 5 (2007): 789-816.
41 STh III, q. 44, a. 3, ad 3. For further references on this, see Gilles Berceville,
"L'etonnante alliance: Evangile et miracles selon saint Thomas d'Aquin," Revue Thomiste 103
(2003): 5-74.
38 STh I,

39 As already

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

itself; the person is sent according to his personal property. Since
the Holy Spirit is properly and personally Love within the Trinity,
he is the Gift in person. Under this aspect, the Holy Spirit is not
the Giver but rather is the Gift itself, the "Gift of sanctification"
(sanctificationis donum). The Holy Spirit is interiorly given as the
Gift who sanctifies, and the visible signs (the dove, the bright
cloud, the breath, the tongues "as of fire") manifest him as such.
As for the Son, he is sent in the flesh insofar as he is the Son and
Word, that is to say, insofar as he is the principle of the Holy
Spirit (to be the principle of the Holy Spirit properly belongs to
the Son as Son and Word of the Father), and therefore he is sent
as the "author of sanctification" (sanctificationis auctor): the Son
is the Giver of the Holy Spirit. In this way, St. Thomas links the
incarnation to the fact that the Son, because he is the Son and
Word of the Father, takes on a humanity by which he gives the
Holy Spirit.
The person of the Son ought to [oportuit] be manifested as the author of
sanctification, as explained above. Thus it was right [oportuit] for the visible
mission of the Son to come about in a rational nature to which it belongs to act,
and which is capable of sanctifying [cui potest competere sanctificare];whereas
any other creature could be the sign of sanctification. Nor was such a visible
creature, formed for such a purpose, necessarily assumed by the Holy Spirit into
the unity of his person, since it was not assumed or used for the purpose of
action, but only for the purpose of a sign; and so likewise it was not required to
last beyond what its use required. 42

In the visible missions of the Holy Spirit, the "signs" (the dove,
the bright cloud, the breath, the wind, the tongues "as of fire")
only manifest the abundant gift of the Holy Spirit, whereas in the
visible mission of the Son this "sign" is of a very different order:
"The Holy Spirit did not assume the dove into a unity of person,
42 STh I, q. 43, a. 7, ad 4: "Personam Filii declarari oportuit ut sanctificationis auctorem,
ut dictum est: et ideo oportuit quad missio visibilis Filii fieret secundum naturam rationalem,
cuius est agere, et cui potest competere sanctificare. Indicium autem sanctificationis esse potuit
quaecumque alia creatura. Neque oportuit quad creatura visibilis ad hoc formata, esset
assumpta a Spiritu Sancto in unitatem personae: cum non assumeretur ad aliquid agendum,
sed ad indicandum tantum. Et propter hoc etiam non oportuit quad duraret, nisi quandiu
perageret officium suum."

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531

as the Son of God assumed human nature. The reason for this is
that the Son did not appear only as a manifester, but [also] as the
Savior [Filius apparuit non solum ut manifestator, sed ut
salvator]. "43
The Son co-opts the humanity he takes into the work of human
salvation, because "divine wisdom requires that God takes care of
each thing in a style that is fitting to it. " 44 God saves humanity
with the cooperation of a free humanity. Further, as St. Thomas
explains when dealing with the fittingness of the incarnation of
the Son, the person of the Word has a special affinity to human
nature. 45 "The likeness of the image comes down to the fact that
it is capable of God, that is, capable of attaining God through its
own operations of knowledge and love. "46 This is a reason why it
was fitting for the Word to unite himself to a human nature.
When St. Thomas explains that the visible mission of the Son is
brought about "in a rational nature to which it belongs to act, and
which is capable of sanctifying," he does not mean that a creature
could be capable by itself of sanctifying or giving the Holy Spirit:
only God can sanctify. 47 Instead, it should be understood as the
action of a creature (Christ's humanity) that is endowed with a
proper and free power, and that cooperates instrumentally with
the divine operation in the work of salvation. Christ teaches the
faithful interiorly by sending the Holy Spirit upon them: "Christ
gave his disciples complete teaching when he sent the Holy Spirit

43 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 1:32 (Marietti ed., no. 270). Cf. I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a.
1, ad 1: "the humanity (a 'visible creature') assumed by the Son is not only a sign of the Son's
mission, but it is also the beneficiary of the mission [ad quad fit missio ], insofar as the Son
assumed this humanity into the unity of his own person .. " On this, see Bruno Drilhon, Dieu
missionnaire: Les missions visibles des Personnes divines selon saint Thomas d'Aquin, preface
by Gilles Emery (Paris: Tequi, 2009).
44 ScG IV, c. 55 (Marietti ed., no. 3935): "Divina sapientia exigit ut rebus singulis
secundum earum congruentiam provideatur a Deo." Cf. STh III, qq. 18-19.
45 STh III, q. 3, a. 8: "Habet convenientiam specialiter cum humana natura."
46 STh III, q. 4, a. 1, ad 2; cf. ibid., corp.: "In so far as it is endowed with reason and
intelligence, the human nature is capable of somehow attaining to the Word through its own
operation of knowledge and love."
47 I Sent., d. 14, q. 3: no creature could give the Holy Spirit, unless as a minister or an
instrument of the divine action; cf. STh I-II, q. 112, a. 1.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

upon them. " 48 Christ also procures salvation for his disciples by
sending the Holy Spirit upon them. This sending is accomplished
by Christ as God, but also as man. 49 "To give grace or the Holy
Spirit belongs to Christ as he is God, authoritatively [auctoritative]; but instrumentally [instrumentaliter] it belongs also to him
as man, inasmuch as his manhood is the instrument of his
Godhead. "50 Thus, right in the middle of his treatment of missions
in question 43 of the Prima Pars, Thomas lays out the foundations
of his teaching on the instrumental action of the humanity of the
Son. Question 43 provides the first extended treatment of
missions, which is continued and developed later in the Summa.
As for the visible mission of the Holy Spirit, it is ordered to the
sanctification of human beings, but it is realized in a way different
from the Son's sanctifying mission. The Holy Spirit internalizes
the life of grace in us, bringing about sanctification and the divine
indwelling. He himself is what the Son communicates to human
beings in the mysteries of his flesh. As already noted, the Holy
Spirit is not the Giver but the Gift himself, cast forth into human
hearts. Thus the visible indicators of the Holy Spirit do not
display him as the Giver but as the sanctifying Gift: the Holy
Spirit is present as the "signified is in the sign." 51 Saint Thomas's
commentary on chapter 20 of St. John offers a short but
illuminative example of this teaching:
The Holy Spirit was sent over Christ, first, in the appearance of a dove, at his
baptism On 1:32), and then in the appearance of a cloud, at his transfiguration
(Mt 17 :5). The reason for this appearance is that the grace of Christ, which is
given by the Holy Spirit, was to be distributed to us by being proliferated
through the sacraments [per propagationem gratiae in sacramentis].
48 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 13:12 (Marietti ed., no. 1771): "Christus perfectam
doctrinam discipulis praebuerit, quando Spintum Sanctum eis misit." Lectura in Iohannis
evangelium 14:26 (Marietti ed., no. 1958): " The Son himself, speaking by means of his
human nature, is not successful unless he works from within by the Holy Spirit [nisi ipsemet
interius operetur per Spiritum Sanctum]."
49 In Epist. ad Titum 3:7 (Marietti ed., no. 93).
50 STh III, q. 8, a. 1, ad l: "Dare gratiam aut Spiritum Sanctum convenit Christo secundum
quad Deus, auctoritative: sed instrumentaliter ei convenit secundum quad est homo,
inquantum scilicet eius humanitas fuit instrumentum divinitatis eius."
51 STh I, q. 43, a. 7, ad 5: "sicut signatum in signo."

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533

Consequently, at Christ's baptism the Holy Spirit descended in the form of a
dove, which is an animal known for its proliferation. And since the grace of
Christ comes through his teaching, the Spirit descended in a luminous cloud, and
Christ is seen to be a Teacher [ostenditurdoctor], "Listen to him" (Mt 17:5). The
Spirit descended over the apostles the first time through a breath to indicate the
proliferation of grace through the sacraments fpropagationem gratiae in
sacramentis], whose ministers they were. Thus Christ said, "If you forgive the
sins of any, they are forgiven": "Go therefore and make disciples of all nations,
baptizing them in the name of the Father and of the Son and of the Holy Spirit"
(Mt 28: 19). The second time the Spirit descended on them in tongues of fire to
indicate the proliferation of grace through teaching fpropagationem gratiae per
doctrinam]; and so we read in Acts (2:4) that right after they were filled with the
Holy Spirit they began to speak. 52

The visible missions of the Holy Spirit manifest the fullness of
grace with which Christ's soul was filled from the first instant of
his conception, and which he caused to overflow to others by his
actions, and by his teaching: "by mode of operation" and "by
mode of teaching. " 53 Here again we should note the double mode
by which Christ, in his human operation united to his divine
operation, effected salvation: action (merit, satisfaction, and
instrumental efficient causality) and teaching. Christ's actions and
teaching are intrinsically connected, and inseparable. By these two
modes, a participation in the grace with which Christ's humanity
was filled ("capital grace") is communicated to the faithful. The
visible missions of the Holy Spirit sent upon the apostles are
linked with Christ's deeds and teaching, insofar as the apostles are
filled with the Holy Spirit in order to found the Church by
communicating the fruits of Christ's actions (by the sacraments)
and by transmitting Christ's teaching (by preaching).
This is not the place for a discussion of St. Thomas's
Christology, but it may at least be noted that this discussion
touches on Christ's fullness of grace, that is, the complete
outpouring of the Holy Spirit in the soul of Christ. This
outpouring renders the humanity of Christ capable of "attaining
God himself through knowledge and love" and of "making this
52 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium
53

I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 3.

20:22-23 (Marietti ed., no. 2539).

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

grace flow out upon others." 54 The divine Son is the principle and
giver of the Holy Spirit, and in his visible mission, his incarnation,
the Son acts as the author of sanctification. He does this through
the cooperation of his human action with his divine operation,
such that the former is endowed with instrumental efficient
causality. As man he communicates instrumentally the grace of the
Holy Spirit which he himself possesses in its fullness. Christ is the
author of sanctification, the "principle of all grace. "55 The Holy
Spirit, then, is at the heart of St. Thomas's account of the
incarnation of the Son.
When Trinitarian theology reaches this juncture, it leads
immediately to the consideration of Christ's mystery and of the
sacraments. This is the order St. Thomas follows in the Summa
contra Gentiles: after the Trinitarian doctrine (ScG IV, cc. 2-26),
he moves on to the mystery of the incarnation (ScG IV, cc. 27-55)
and to the sacraments (ScG IV, cc. 56-78). In any case,
Christology, ecclesiology, and sacramentology find their roots in
Trinitarian theology, and more precisely in the discussion of
Trinitarian missions. The same applies to eschatology, as I shall

suggest below.
B) Reading the New Testament
Saint Thomas's commentary on the Gospel of St. John
confirms the centrality of this teaching. Here, he shows that
Trinitarian faith comes from the recognition of the divinity of
Christ and of the Holy Spirit, together with the Father, and it
comes simultaneously from the recognition of the personal
distinction of the three. This revelation is brought about by the
mission of the Son and of the Holy Spirit: the mission of the Son
and the mission of the Holy Spirit reveal their consubstantiality
with the Father, as well as their personal properties. Moreover, as
54 STh III, q. 7, a. 1.
55 De Verit., q. 29, a. 5. On this, see Gilles Emery, "Le Christ mediateur: L'unicite et
l'universalite de la mediation salvifique du Christ Jesus suivant Thomas d'Aquin," in
Christus-Gottes schopferischesWort, Festschrift fiir Christoph Kardinal Schonborn zum 65.
Geburtstag, ed. G. Augustin, M. Brun, et al. (Freiburg im Breisgau.: Herder, 2010), 337-55.

DIVINE MISSIONS

535

they reveal the Trinitarian mystery, the divine m1ss10ns effect
salvation.
First, the action and teaching of the Son and the action of the
Holy Spirit reveal their divinity. "The belief that Christ was God
could be known from two things: from his teaching and from his
miracles .... Our Lord shows his divinity by these two things. "56
The role of Christ's teaching deserves special attention (see
below). For now, it suffices to note that Christ's actions are a
revelation of his divinity: "We should note that Christ is truly
divine and truly human. And so in his actions we find almost
everywhere that the divine is mingled with the human, and the
human with the divine." 57 Here, St. Thomas starts from the
dispensatio (viz., what Christ did in his human flesh) and leads his
reader to the theologia (i.e., Christ's divinity):
When we want to know if a certain thing is true, we can determine it from two
things: its nature, and its power. For true gold is that which has the species of
true gold; and we determine this if it acts like true gold. Therefore, if we
maintain that the Son has the true nature of God, because the Son exercises the
true activities of divinity, it is clear that the Son is true God. Now the Son does
perform true works of divinity, for we read, Whatever he [the Father] does, that
the Son does likewise. 58
It is natural for man to learn of the power and natures of things from their
actions, and therefore our Lord fittingly says that the sort of person he is can be
learned through the works he does. 59
56 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14: 10 (Marietti ed., no. 1893): "Fides autem de Christo
quod esset Deus, poterat ex duobus manifestari: scilicet ex eius doctrina, et ex miraculis...
. Ex his duobus Dominus divinitatem suam ostendit."
57 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 11:33 (Marietti ed., no. 1532): "Notandum est,
Christum verum Deum esse, et verum hominem; et ideo ubique fere in factis suis mixta
leguntur humana divinis, et divina humanis."
58 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 17:3 (Marietti ed., no. 2187). "Constat enim quod cum
volumus scire de re aliqua utrum sit vera, ex duobus scire possumus: scilicet ex natura et ex
virtute eius. Verum enim aurum est quod habet veri auri speciem; quod quidem scimus, si facit
veri auri operationem. Si ergo habemus de Filio quod habeat veram Dei naturam, et hoc per
veram operationem divinitatis, quam exercet, manifestum est quod est verus Deus. Quod
autem exerceat Filius vera opera divinitatis, patet supra V: Quaecumque Pater facit, haec et
Filius similiter f acit."
59 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 5:36 (Marietti ed., no. 817): "Naturale est homini
virtutem et naturas rerum ex earum actionibus cognoscere: et ideo convenienter Dominus per
opera quae ipse facit, dicit se posse cognosci qualis sit."

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The effects lead to the knowledge of the power that produces
them, and through the power we come to know the nature of the
agent (following the sequence: effect-operation-power-nature).
"For the clearest indication of the nature of a thing is taken from
its works. Therefore, from the fact that he does the works of God
it can be clearly known and believed that Christ is God. " 60
This is, for St. Thomas, the central teaching of the Fourth
Gospel. At the beginning of his commentary on the second
chapter of St. John, when explaining the structure of the gospel,
he writes:
Above [in chapter 1], the Evangelist showed the dignity of the incarnate Word
and gave various evidences for it. Now he begins to relate the effects and actions
by which the divinity of the incarnate Word was made known to the world.
First, he tells the things Christ did, while living in the world, that show his
divinity. Secondly, he tells how Christ showed his divinity while dying; and this
from chapter twelve on. 61

This explanation of the structure is recalled at the beginning of
the commentary on chapter 12: "So far the Evangelist had been
showing the power of Christ's divinity by what he did and taught
during his public life. Now he begins to show the power of his
divinity as manifested in his passion and death. " 62 Here, two
remarks should be made. First, St. Thomas constantly underlines
that Christ revealed his divinity by both his deeds and his words.
The role of Christ's teaching in relation to his works is
emphasized from the first words Jesus speaks to his apostles in the
60 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 10:38 (Marietti ed., no. 1466): "Nullum enim tam
evidens indicium de natura alicuius rei esse potest quam illud quod accipitur ex operibus ejus.
Evidenter ergo cognosci potest de Christo et credi quad sit Deus, per hoc quod facit opera
Dei."
61 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 2:1 (Marietti ed., no. 335): "Supra Evangelista ostendit
dignitatem Verbi incarnati, et evidentiam eius multipliciter; hie consequenter incipit
determinare de effectibus et operibus quibus manifestata est mundo divinitas Verbi incarnati,
et primo narrat ea quae Christus fecit in mundo vivendo, ad manifestationem suae divinitatis;
secundo quomodo Christus suam divinitatem monstravit moriendo; et hoc a XII cap. et ultra"
(emphasis added).
62 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 12:1 (Marietti ed., no. 1589): "In praecedentibus
Evangelista ostendit divinitatis Christi virtutem per ea quae in vita fecit et docuit; hie autem
incipit ostendere virtutem divinitatis ipsius quantum ad passionem et mortem eius."

DIVINE MISSIONS

537

Fourth Gospel: "Christ, wishing to raise him [Simon Peter] to
faith in his divinity, begins to perform works of divinity, preaching
things that are hidden." 63 Second, the full revelation of Christ's
divinity takes place at Easter, that is, in his death and resurrection. 64 Saint Thomas does not neglect the mystery of Easter
as a central place of the revelation of Christ's divinity and,
consequently, of the Trinity. It is "after the resurrection that the
apostles clearly understood that Christ was God, through what he
had shown with regard to his passion and resurrection. " 65 Faith in
Christ's resurrection made the apostles firmly believe that he is
true God, 66 when Christ's humanity, by his exaltation, became "a
partaker of divine immortality," 67 that is to say, fully "participant
of the Father's glory." 68
Mutatis mutandis, the same applies to the revelation of the
divinity of the Holy Spirit:
It is clear that the Holy Spirit is God, since he says, unless one is born again of
water and the Holy Spirit, he cannot enter the kingdom of God . ... From this we
can form the following argument: He from whom men are spiritually reborn is

63 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 1:42 (Marietti ed., no. 303): "Ubi Christus, ad fidem
divinitatis eum elevare volens, incipit quae divinitatis sunt opera facere, occulta praedicans"
(emphasis added).
64 When reading St. John's Gospel, St. Thomas sees Christ's passion as his exaltation; see
Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 13:1 (Marietti ed., no. 1734): "The passion of Christ was a
source of benefits and glory fpromotiva fuit passio Christi et exaltativa], not a defeat, because
it was in order that he could depart out of this world to the Father, by making his human
nature a partaker in the glory of the Father: 'I am ascending to my Father and your Father,
to my God and your God' Un 20:17)."
65 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 2:21 (Marietti ed., no. 414): "Sed post resurrectionem,
quando iam plene cognoverant Christum esse Deum, per ea quae circa passionem et
resurrectionem ostenderat, et quando sacramentum resurrectionis ipsius didicerant."
66 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 16:25 (Marietti ed., no. 2151): "During those forty days
during which he appeared to them, he taught them many mysteries and told many things
about himself and the Father, since they had been raised to higher things by their faith in the
resurrection, firmly believing that Christ was true God."
67 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 2:19 (Marietti ed., no. 398): "Humanitas in Christo,
post eius resurrectionem, immortalitatis divinae particeps effecta est."
68 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 13:1 (Marietti ed., no. 1734): "Christ is said to have
returned to the Father insofar as, even in his human nature, he became a sharer in the Father's
glory [consors paternae gloriae]." See above, note 64.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

God; but men are spiritually reborn through the Holy Spirit ... therefore, the
Holy Spirit is God. 69

Second, when commenting on Scripture, St. Thomas pays great
attention to the distinction and relations of the divine persons. In
many passages of his commentary on St. John he notes that
Christ's deeds and words show his personal distinction from the
Father, to the point that "Whenever Christ mentions the unity
and equality [of the Father and Son], he immediately also adds the
distinction of persons according to origin, and conversely. " 70 In
this context, St. Thomas formulates a fundamental principle of his
Trinitarian theology: the mission shows the origin (in missione
demonstratur origo).71 The sending of the Son shows his eternal
origin from the Father, and the sending of the Holy Spirit shows
69 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 3:5 (Marietti ed., no. 444): "Per hoc autem quod hie
<licit Nisi quis renatus fuerit ex aqua et Spiritu Sancto, manifeste apparet Spiritum Sanctum
esse Deum. Supra enim I, <licit: Non ex sanguinibus, neque ex voluntate carnis, neque ex
voluntate viri, sed ex Deo nati sunt. Ex quo sic formatur ratio. Ille ex quo spiritualiter
renascuntur homines, est Deus; sed homines renascuntur spiritualiter per Spiritum Sanctum,
ut hie dicitur: ergo Spiritus Sanctus est Deus." The same "soteriological argument" is given for
faith in Christ's divinity. Since divinization comes about by participation in Christ, Christ must
be God by essence (Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 10:35 [Marietti ed., no. 1460]): "It is clear
that a person by participating in the Word of God becomes 'god' by participation. But a thing
does not become this or that by participation unless it participates in what is this or that by
its essence: for example, a thing does not become fire by participation unless it participates
in what is fire by its essence. Therefore, one does not become 'god' by participation unless he
participates in what is God by essence. Therefore, the Word of God, that is the Son, by
participation in whom we become 'gods,' is God by essence."
70 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 5:23 (Marietti ed., no. 769). Saint Thomas continues
(ibid.): "Thus, because he mentions the origin of the persons when he says, 'the Son cannot
do anything of himself, but only what he sees the Father doing' Un 5:19), then, so we do not
think this involves inequality, he at once adds: 'For whatever the Father does, the Son does
likewise.' Conversely, when he states their equality by saying: 'For just as the Father raises the
dead and grants life, so the Son grants life to those to whom he wishes' Un 5 :21), then, so that
we do not deny that the Son has an origin and is begotten, he adds, 'the Father himself judges
no one, but he has given all judgment to the Son' Un 5:22). Similarly, when he mentions the
equality of the persons by saying, 'so that all men may honor the Son as they honor the Father'
Un 5:23), he immediately adds something about the mission, which indicates an origin,
saying: 'Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent him,' but not
in such a way that involves a separation. Christ mentions such mission below Un 8:29) in
saying: 'He who sent me is with me, and he has not left me alone.'"
71 Ibid.

DIVINE MISSIONS

539

the eternal origin of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son.
An example regarding the Holy Spirit can be found in St.
Thomas's commentary on John 20:22: the risen Christ breathed
on the apostles and said to them, "Receive the Holy Spirit."
Quoting St. Augustine, St. Thomas comments: "This bodily breath
was not the substance of the Holy Spirit, but a fitting sign that the
Holy Spirit proceeds not only from the Father, but also from the
Son. " 72 The relations of the three persons are found in the biblical
text. The Father, Son, and Holy Spirit are made known to us in
their consubstantiality and in their personal relations according to
origin: this revelation takes place through and in Christ's action
and words, and through the Holy Spirit who was sent.
These personal relations ground our return to God through the
mission of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. At this point, three
features of the divine missions deserve attention. First, the mission
of the Son reveals the Father, as the mission of the Holy Spirit
manifests the Son (and, in the Son, the Father himself):
"Everything that is from another manifests that from which it is.
Thus the Son manifests the Father because he is from the Father.
And so because the Holy Spirit is from the Son, it is proper to the
Spirit to glorify the Son. " 73 This is, for St. Thomas, a central
feature of the divine missions: the person who eternally proceeds
from another manifests that other. Commenting on Christ's
baptism, he gives the following summary of his understanding of
the revelation of the Trinity: "As the Son, existing from the
Father, manifests the Father ... so the Holy Spirit, existing from
the Son, manifests the Son. " 74 This work of revelation belongs to
72 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 20:22 (Marietti ed., no. 2538). "Uncle Augustinus <licit
IV De Trinitate: Flatus ille corporeus substantia Spiritus Sancti non fuit, sed demonstratio per
congruam significationem non tantum a Patre sed etiam a Filio procedere Spiritum Sanctum."
See St. Augustine, On the Trinity 4.20.29 (Sancti Aurelii Augustini De Trinitate Libri XV, ed.
W. J. Mountain, vol. 1,"Corpus Christianorum Series Latina, vol. 50 [Turnhout: Brepols,
1968), 199-200).
73 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 16:14 (Marietti ed., no. 2107): "Omne enim quod est
ab alio, manifestat id a quo est: Filius enim manifestat Patrem, quia est ab ipso. Quia ergo
Spiritus Sanctus est a Filio, proprium est ut clarificet eum."
74 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 1:32; Marietti ed., no. 268): "Sicut Filius existens a
Patre, manifestat Pattern ... ita et Spiritus Sanctus a Filio existens, Filium manifestat."

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

the Son in a special way, because of his personal property: insofar
as the Son is the Word of the Father, he is the perfect expression
of the Father. The Son in person is the "doctrine of the Father," 75
he is the very "face of the Father. " 76 As for the Holy Spirit, his
work of revelation is rooted in his property as Love, insofar as
"knowledge of the truth is given due to the ardor of love:" 77 "To
manifest the truth fits the property of the Holy Spirit, for it is love
that leads to the revelation of secrets. " 78 "The Son, since he is the
Word, gives teaching to us, but the Holy Spirit enables us to grasp
it." 79 "The one who receives the Holy Spirit from the Father and
the Son knows the Father and the Son and comes to them. The
Spirit makes us know all things by inspiring us from within, by
directing us and lifting us up to spiritual things. " 80
Second, the mission of the Holy Spirit not only makes the Son
known by faith, but it assimilates its beneficiaries to the Son:
"Since the Holy Spirit is from the Truth [the Son and Word], it is
appropriate that the Spirit teach the truth, and makes those he
teaches like the one who sent him"; 81 "The Holy Spirit is the Spirit
of the Son .... The Holy Spirit makes those to whom he is sent

75 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 7:16 (Marietti ed., no. 1037): "Sequitur ergo quod
doctrina Patris sit ipse Filius."
76 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 1:4 (Marietti ed., no. 101): "Signatum est super nos
lumen vultus tui, idest Filii tui, qui est facies tua, qua manifestaris."
77 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 5 :35 (Marietti ed., no. 812): "quia per ardorem caritatis
datur cognitio veritatis."
78 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14:17 (Marietti ed., no. 1916): "Manifestare autem
veritatem convenit proprietati Spiritus Sancti. Est enim amor qui facit secretorum
revelationem."
79 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14:26 (Marietti ed., no. 1958): "Fili us ergo tradit nobis
doctrinam, cum sit Verbum; sed Spiritus Sanctus doctrinae eius nos capaces facit."
80 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14:26 (Marietti ed., no. 1959): "Ille qui recipit Spiritum
Sanctum a Patre et Filio, ille Pattern cognoscit, et Filium, et ad eos venit. Facit autem nos scire
omnia interius inspirando, dirigendo, et ad spiritualia elevando." For other passages from St.
Thomas's commentary on St. John, see Gilles Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person:
Thomistic Essays (Naples, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2007), 105-10, a section entitled "The Mode
of the Holy Spirit's Action in Teaching the Truth."
81 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 16: 13 (Marietti ed., no. 2102): "Cum enim sit a veritate,
eius est docere veritatem, et facere similes suo principio" (emphasis in translation added).

DIVINE MISSIONS

541

like the one whose Spirit he is. " 82 This work of "assimilation to the
Son" properly belongs to the Holy Spirit by reason of his personal
property, insofar as the Holy Spirit proceeds from the Son, and
inasmuch as he is Love in person. Further, by making the Son
known through faith, the Holy Spirit manifests the Father himself,
since the Son is the perfect "similitude" of the Father.
Third, both missions, that of the Son and that of the Holy
Spirit, effect divinization by leading their beneficiaries to the
person from whom they proceed: "Just as the effect of the mission
of the Son was to lead us to the Father, so the effect of the
mission of the Holy Spirit is to lead the faithful to the Son. " 83 In
the dispensatio, the person who eternally proceeds from another
manifests that other and leads us to him.
This understanding of the divine missions is fully in line with
the teaching of several Church Fathers. In his Demonstration of
the Apostolic Preaching, St. Irenaeus wrote:
For those who bear the Spirit of God are led to the Word, that is to the Son,
while the Son presents them to the Father, and the Father furnishes them with
incorruptibility. Thus, without the Spirit it is not possible to see the Word of
God, and without the Son one is not able to approach the Father; for the
knowledge of the Father is the Son, and knowledge of the Son of God is through
the Holy Spirit, while the Spirit, according to the good-pleasure of the Father,
the Son administers, to whom the Father wills and as He wills. 84

The same structure of the Christian life (in/from the Spirit to the
Son, and in/from the Son to the Father) is also found in Irenaeus's
Against Heresies: "Here is, according to the presbyters, the
disciples of the apostles, the gradation and arrangement of those
82 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 15:26 (Marietti ed., no. 2062): "Sic ergo quod <licit
Spiritum veritatis, idem est ac si diceret Spiritum Filii.... Consequens est ut Spiritus Sanctus
eos, in quos mittitur, similes faciat ei cuius est Spiritus" (emphasis in translation added). This
"assimilation" properly belongs to the Spirit-Son relationship: St. Thomas never writes that
the Son would assimilate or conform human beings to the Father. Such "assimilation to the
principle" is a proper feature of the Spirit's mission with relation to the Son.
83 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14:26 (Marietti ed., no. 1958): "Nam, sicut effectus
missionis Filii fuit ducere ad Pattern, ita effectus missionis Spiritus Sancti est ducere fideles ad
Filium."
84 St. Irenaeus of Lyons, On the Apostolic Preaching 7 (trans. John Behr [Crestwood, N.Y.:
St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1997], 44). Cf. Sources chretiennes 406:92.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

who are saved, and the steps by which they advance: they ascend
through the Spirit to the Son, and through the Son to the
Father." 85 The same teaching is well summarized in the following
comments by St. Basil the Great: "The way to divine knowledge
ascends from one Spirit through the one Son to the one Father"; 86
"For our mind, enlightened by the Spirit, looks upon the Son, and
in him, as in the Image, beholds the Father. " 87
IV. THEOLOGIA AND DISPENSATIO:
SALVATION AND BIBLICAL EXEGESIS

Given the previous consideration of the relationship between
the theologia and the dispensatio, we should now consider two
facets of the revelation of the Trinity. First, the purpose of the
revelation of the Trinity clearly belongs to the soteriological
order, that is to say, it is for our salvation.
There are two reasons why the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary
for us. First, it was necessary for the right understanding of creation .... In
another way, and chiefly, the knowledge of the divine persons was necessary so
that we may think rightly concerning the salvation of the human race,
accomplished by the incarnate Son and by the gift of the Holy Spirit. 88
85 St. Irenaeus of Lyons, Against Heresies 5.36.2 (cf. Sources chretiennes 153 :458-60). See
also Against Heresies 4.20.5 (cf. Sources chretiennes 100/2: 63 8-4 2): "For God is powerful in
all things, having been seen in the past prophetically through the Spirit, and then seen, too,
adoptively through the Son; and he shall also be seen paternally in the kingdom of heaven, the
Spirit truly preparing man for the Son of God, and the Son leading him to the Father, while
the Father confers upon him incorruption and eternal life, which come to every one from the
fact of seeing God." English translation by Alexander Roberts and William Rambaut, Against
Heresies, Ante-Nicene Fathers, vol. 1 (Buffalo, N.Y.: Christian Literature Publishing
Company, 1885), available on-line at www.newadvent.org.
86 St. Basil of Caesarea, On the Holy Spirit 18.47 (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 1980), 74-75.
87 St. Basil of Caesarea, Letter 226.3, in Saint Basil, Letters, vol. 2: Letters 186-368, trans.
Sister Agnes Clare Way (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1969),
146. Cf. Saint Basile,Lettres, ed. Yves Courtonne, vol. 3 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1966), 27.
88 ITh I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3: "Cognitio divinarum personarum fuit necessaria nobis dupliciter.
Uno modo, ad recte sentiendum de creatione rerum ... Alio modo, et principalius, ad recte
sentiendum de salute generis humani, quae perficitur per Filium incarnatum et per donum
Spiritus Sancti." The last words, "per donum Spiritus Sancti," mean: "by the Holy Spirit who
was given."

DIVINE MISSIONS

543

This statement must be grasped with reference to the first article
of the Summa Theologiae, where St. Thomas explains that a
teaching coming from revelation was necessary for the salvation
of human beings, in order that they might know that they are
directed to God as to their end, an end that surpasses human
reason. The knowledge of the Trinity which is "necessary for us"
refers principally to the work of our salvation performed by the
Son made flesh and by the Holy Spirit who is given, and it refers
to the Son and to the Holy Spirit themselves, insofar as the Son
and the Holy Spirit are, together with the Father, the ultimate end
whose vision makes human beings fully happy. Within this one
final end, the person of the Father is the ultimate personal term
to whom we are led by the mission of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit: "The vision of the Father is the end of all our desires and
actions. " 89 As the Son manifested the Father in his visible mission
during his earthly life, and as he manifests the Father in his
invisible missions (together with the Holy Spirit), 90 he will also
manifest the Father in eternal life: "In our homeland we will see
'face to face,' as we read in 1 Corinthians (13: 12) .... No one can
see the Father in that glory unless the Son reveals him. " 91 The
beatific vision of God's essence takes place in Verba, by virtue of
an action of the Son who makes the Father manifest to the souls
of the blessed.
Second, if we want to read St. Thomas correctly, we should
not think of the Bible as dealing only with the Trinitarian
dispensatio, as if the doctrine of the Trinity in itself (theologia)
were a later construct by the Church. As the mystery of the
eternal Trinity is present within the dispensatio, so the theologia
is taught by Scripture. Here are three examples. When
commenting on John 16:28 ("I came [exivi] from the Father, and
89 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 14:8 (Marietti ed., no. 1883): "Visio Patris est finis
omnium desideriorum et actionum nostrarum."
90 I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 1: "Unde sicut Spiritus Sanctus invisibiliter procedit in mentem per
donum amoris, ita Filius per donum sapientiae; in quo est manifestatio ipsius Patris, qui est
ultimum ad quod recurrimus."
91 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 16:25 (Marietti ed., no. 2150): "Sed quia in patria
videbimus facie ad faciem, ut dicitur I Cor. XIII, 12 ... quia nullus potest Pattern videre in
ilia gloria nisi Filio manifestante."

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

have come [veni] into the world"), St. Thomas explains that the
first part of this sentence refers to the eternal generation of the
Son from the Father (the Trinitarian mystery in itself), whereas
the second part is about his temporal procession, that is, his
mission. 92 Similarly, he understands John 17:8 ("For I have given
them the words which you gave me, and they have received them
and know in truth that I came forth [exivi] from you, and they
have believed that you did send me [tu me misisti]") as teaching
first the eternal generation, and then the temporal mission of the
Son: "For Hilary [of Poitiers], as was said, 'to come forth' [exire]
refers to the eternal generation of the Son, and 'to be sent' [mitti]
refers to the incarnation of the Son. " 93 The truth revealed by
Christ's words pertains to both the theologia and the dispensatio,
so that the object of faith includes the Trinity in itself and the
missions. Again, when commenting on John 15 :26 ("When the
Paraclete comes, whom I shall send to you from the Father, the
Spirit of Truth, who proceeds from the Father"), St. Thomas
explains that the first part of this verse concerns the mission of
the Holy Spirit in time, whereas the second part of the same
verse, beginning with "the Spirit of Truth," teaches his eternal
procession from the Father and the Son. 94 It is noteworthy that,
following the biblical text, St. Thomas's exegesis sometimes begins
with the persons' eternal processions Gohn 16:28, John 17: 8), but
in some other passages it starts with the persons' temporal mission
Gohn 15 :26). In any case, Christ's words teach us both the
mission and the eternal procession of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit.
92 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 16:28 (Marietti ed., no. 2161-2162): "Exivi a Patre, et
veni in mundum ... Est autem duplex processio Filii a Patre: una scilicet aeterna, alia
temporalis. Aeternam quidem designat cum <licit exivi a Patre, ab eo aeternaliter genitus ...
. Temporalem autem processionem eius designat dicens et veni in mundum."
93 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 17:8 (Marietti ed., no. 2204). See Hilary of Poi tiers, De
Trinitate 6.30 (Sources chretiennes 448:232).
94 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 15:26 (Marietti ed., no. 2061-62): "Cum autem venerit
Paraclitus quern ego mittam vobis a Patre, Spiritum veritatis qui a Patre procedit ... . Terrio
ponit processionem Spiritus Sancti duplicem. Primo quidem temporalem, cum elicitquern ego
mittam vobis a Patre. ... Secundo ponit processionem aeternam, ubi similiter Spiritum
Sanctum ostendit pertinere ad Filium, cum <licit Spiritum veritatis; ipse enim est veritas."

DIVINE MISSIONS

545

An example will be illustrative: the exegesis on the foot
washing of the apostles by Jesus in John 13:4. The biblical text
reads: "He Uesus] rose from supper, laid aside his garments, and
girded himself with a towel." Saint Thomas offers two "mystical"
(mystice) interpretations of this action, that is, interpretations
which refer to the disclosure of Christ's own mystery. The first
interpretation is referred to the incarnation (the second one deals
with Christ's passion):
It tells us three things about Christ. First, he was willing to help the human race,

indicated by the fact that he rose from supper. For God seems to be sitting down
as long as he allows us to be troubled; but when he rescues us from it, he seems
to rise, as the Psalm (43:26) says: "Rise up, come to our help." Secondly, it
indicates that he emptied himself: not that he abandoned his great dignity, but
he hid it by taking on our smallness: "Truly, thou art a God who hidest thyself"
(Is 45: 15). This is shown by the fact that he laid aside his garments: "he emptied
himself, taking the form of a servant" (Phil 2:7). Thirdly, the fact that he girded
himself with a towel indicates that he took on our mortality: "Taking the form
of a servant, being born in the likeness of men" (Phil 2:7). 95

According to this exegesis, the whole mystery of Christ is
disclosed in his action: (1) his being true God, with the will to
save men; (2) his kenosis (which does not mean any loss of his
divinity but, rather, the assumption of our humanity); and (3) the
assumption of our mortal condition, in order to accomplish the
mysteries of our salvation in a mortal flesh. In the foot washing of
the apostles by Jesus, St. Thomas finds an expression of the whole
"visible mission" of the Son, which includes, as its starting point,
Christ's divinity. The mystery is disclosed and really given within
the dispensatio. A similar observation can be made on the basis of
several other passages of St. Thomas's commentary on St. John,
notably from his exegesis on the healing of the blind man in John

9:7:
95 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 13:4 (Marietti ed., no. 1746). For the sources of this
exegesis, see Catena in Iohannem XIII, n. 1 (Marietti ed., 2:504). The influence of St.
Augustine's Tractate 55,7 on John (with explicit reference to Phil 2) is obvious; see St.
Augustine, In Iohannis Evangelium Tractatus CXXIv, ed. A. Mayer, Corpus Christianorum,
Series Latina 36 (Turnhout: Brepols, 1954), 466.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

Augustine gives the mystical and allegorical explanation [causam vero mysticam
et allegoricam]. He says that the spittle, which is saliva that descends from the
head, signifies the Word of God, who proceeds from the Father, the head of all
things: 'I came forth from the mouth of the Most High' (Sir 24:3). Therefore,
the Lord made clay from spittle and the earth when the Word was made flesh.
He anointed the eyes of the blind man, that is, of the human race. And the eyes
are the eyes of the heart, anointed by faith in the incarnation. 96

Here again, the mystical and allegorical interpretation
(referring to the mystery of Christ and to our healing by faith in
Christ's incarnation) gives a full account of Christ's mystery as the
incarnate Word of the Father: (1) his divine generation as the
Word spoken by the Father from all eternity, (2) his incarnation
when he took up a human nature, and (3) the gift of illumination
by faith that saves. Christ's action bears within itself his entire
mystery. There is no separation between the eternal mystery of
the Word and his saving action in the flesh. On the contrary, the
mystery itself is disclosed and given within the dispensatio. The
mission bears within itself the eternal procession of the Word,
together with the effect of the saving action that the incarnate
Word performed in the flesh.
V. TEACHING ST. THOMAS'S TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

Following the preceding explanations, which are drawn from
St. Thomas's biblical exegesis, the elaboration of a doctrine of the
Trinity can occur in three stages, or three steps.
The first step consists of the acknowledgment of the revelation
of the Trinity through the sending of the Son and of the Holy
Spirit, listening to and following the witness of Scripture.
Trinitarian theology takes its start from the study of the divine
missions as taught by Scripture. Here, a reading of St. Thomas's
commentaries on Scripture is essential for the understanding of
his systematic treatises. This first step already includes
affirmations about the Trinity in its inner life-the eternal
generation of the Son from the Father, and the eternal procession
96 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 9: 7 (Marietti ed., no. 1311); cf. Catena in Iohannem IX,
n. 1 (Marietti ed., 2:465); St. Augustine's Tractate 54,1-2 on john (Mayer, ed., 381-82).

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of the Holy Spirit from the Father and the Son. A good example
is the soteriological point that the Son and Spirit show us their
divinity by making us participate in divine life, and they show us
their distinction by taking us into the Father's communion,
following the order of their personal relations. It is also important
to recall that St. Thomas's understanding of the relationship
between theology and economy is rooted in the way he received
the teaching of the Scriptures through the Church Fathers: St.
Augustine (not only his De Trinitate, but also his Tractates on St.
John), St. John Chrysostom, St. Hilary of Poitiers, St. John
Damascene, and Origen, 97 as well as St. Athanasius, St. Cyril of
Alexandria, and others. Although St. Basil of Caesarea and St.
Gregory of Nazianzus do not appear very often in St. Thomas's
account of Trinitarian faith (there are exceptions, notably in the
so-called Contra errores Graecorum), given their importance for
his clarification of the relationship between personal properties,
hypostases, and the one divine substance, it is fair to say that these
Cappadocian Fathers are part of his background. 98 Saint Irenaeus
97 These are the Church Fathers most quoted in St. Thomas's commentary on St. John; see
Gilles Emery, Trinity in Aquinas (Ypsilanti, Mich.: Sapientia Press, 2003), 304. They also play
an essential role in the Trinitarian treatise of the Summa Theologiae. For instance, the article
on the equality of power of the Father and the Son (STh I, q. 42, a. 6) is built on St. Augustine
(Contra Maximinum) and St. Hilary (De Trinitate), with implicit references to St. John
Chrysostom and Didymus the Blind (as the commentary on St. John shows). For the
references, see Emery, Trinity in Aquinas, 3 05-7. In this case, the Summa Theologiae organizes
and summarizes the patristic teaching of the Catena aurea which the Lectura on St. John
(posterior in time) presents with greater detail.
98 On the one hand, knowledge of the Cappadocian Fathers is required for the
understanding of St. Augustine himself, St. Thomas's main source. Compare St. Augustine (De
Trinitate 5.5.6-5.7.8) and St. Basil the Great (Against Eunomius 1.10-16) on the negative and
relational meaning of the term "ingenitus" (agennetos). On the other hand, St. Thomas had
some knowledge of the Cappadocians' teaching, especially on the relative properties of the
divine persons. For example, the Libellus de fide Trinitatis (a compilation of Eastern patristic
texts with glosses, which St. Thomas examined at the request of Pope Urban IV) presented the
thought of St. Gregory Nazianzen as follows: "The Father is called 'unbegotten' and 'Father'
not by reason of his essence but in a relative way by reason of his property of paternity; and
the Son, likewise, since he draws his origin from the Principle, is not so called because of his
nature but by reason of his relation to another" (Libellus de fide Trinitatis §23 [Leonine ed.,
40A:127); cf. St. Gregory of Nazianzus, Oration 29.16 (Sources chretiennes 250:210-11);
Oration 31. 7 and 31.9 (Sources chretiennes 25 0:28 6-89 and 290-93); Oration 4 2.15 (Sources
chretiennes 384:80-83).

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

of Lyons is not explicitly quoted, but much of his teaching had
been integrated into the patristic and medieval sources of St.
Thomas. Similarly, St. Thomas's reading of the Scriptures requires
knowledge of the main Trinitarian heresies: Sabellianism,
Arianism, as well as the heresy of Eunonius of Cyzicus and of the
"Pneumatomachi" (the heresy attributed to Macedonius). 99
Patristic Trinitarian theology is necessary to understand St.
Thomas's "pro-Nicene" background, 100 and to grasp the intention
or purpose of his Trinitarian reading of Scripture. 101
In the second stage, the theologian puts forward a speculative
reflection on the persons in their distinction and unity, in order
to account for the teaching of Scripture-that is, in order to make
the teaching of Scripture more articulate and manifest to our
minds. This is where the doctrine of personal distinction through
relations of origin is developed, as well as the understanding of
the divine person as a subsisting relation, and so forth. This
second stage may be said to correspond to what St. Thomas does
in the Summa Theologiae, Prima Pars, questions 2 to 43, but it is
also found in his biblical commentaries. 102 Such speculative
teaching follows the order that St. Thomas observes in the Summa
Theologiae: processions, relations, the concept of person, the
persons "in particular" (Father, Son, Holy Spirit), and the persons
in reference to the divine essence, to properties, to acts, and to
99 See Peter Worrall, "St. Thomas and Arianism," Recherches de theologie ancienne et
medievale 23 (1956): 208-59 and 24 (1957): 45-100; A. Aranda Lomefta, "Santo Tomas
frente a Sabelio: Un modelo de refutaci6n teol6gica," Studi tomistici 13 (1981):145-52; Jose
Antonio Riestra, "El error de Macedonio y la doctrina de Santo Tomas," in Credo in Spiritum
Sanctum, ed. J. Saraiva Martins, vol. 1 (Vatican City: Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 1983), 46171. For Photinus of Sirmium (and earlier heresies), see Gilles Emery, "Le photinisme et ses
precurseurs chez saint Thomas," Revue Thomiste 95 (1995): 371-98.
100 On the meaning and implications of "pro-Nicene" Trinitarian theology, see Lewis
Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2004).
101 I attempted to show some aspects of this purpose in my Trinity, Church, and the
Human Person, 1-72: "The Purpose of Trinitarian Theology in St. Thomas Aquinas," and
"Trinitarian Theology as Spiritual Exercise in Augustine and Aquinas."
102 See Gilles Emery, "Biblical Exegesis and the Speculative Doctrine of the Trinity in St.
Thomas Aquinas's Commentary on St. John," in Reading John with St. Thomas Aquinas:
Theological Exegesis and Speculative Theology, ed. M. Dauphinais and M. Levering
(Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2005), 23-61.

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one another. A special emphasis on the co-immanence of the
Father, Son, and Holy Spirit (STh I, q. 42, a. 5) is quite helpful to
offer a synthesis of this speculative teaching.
A third and final phase uses the results of the speculative
reflection in order to highlight the action of the Son and of the
Holy Spirit as taught by Scripture. This is where a genuine
doctrine of the action of the Trinity (creation, salvation,
eschatology) is conveyed, when doctrinal speculative principles
are applied to the agency of the persons as taught by Scripture. In
this third phase, the economy is set forth in the light of the
doctrine of the inner being of the Trinity. The doctrine of the
action of the Trinity (third step) is achieved when a speculative
reflection on the divine persons (second step) is applied to the
agency of the persons discovered in the reading of Scripture (first
step). 103 In this way, Trinitarian theology moves not only from
Scripture to Scripture, but all three steps move within Scripture
itself. This third step is present in the Summa Theologiae as well
as in St. Thomas's biblical commentaries.
An essential feature of this third step consists of showing that,
in St. Thomas's view, the divine persons act in the world by virtue
of their one essence (they act in the world by a single action, so
that the effects are common to the whole Trinity), and according
to what is proper to each of them, so that each divine person has
a proper and distinct mode of acting in the economy. The distinct
mode of acting corresponds to the distinct mode of subsisting of
each divine person, and it concerns the intra-Trinitarian relation
of divine person to divine person. In sum: in the one action of the
Trinity, each person operates by virtue of the power and nature

103 On this point, I partly agree with David Coffey, Deus Trinitas: The Doctrine of the
Triune God (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 14-16. Coffey
distinguishes between the "Biblical," the "Immanent," and the "Economic Trinity." However,
a disciple of St. Thomas can hardly agree with Coffey on the purely "functional" nature of the
teaching of the New Testament (ibid., 12-14). For St. Thomas, the metaphysical and
speculative doctrine of the Trinity (and of Trinitarian agency) moves within Scripture, and not
beyond it.

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common to the three, and each person acts according to the
distinct mode of his property. 104
Saint Thomas's doctrine of the divine missions also accounts
for the relationship that believers have with each divine person in
his personal distinction: the sanctifying gifts of wisdom and
charity assimilate or conform the just to the Son and to the Holy
Spirit, thus leading them to the Father. Here it is necessary to be
precise. Insofar as the gifts of grace are created effects, they have
the whole Trinity as their cause. Under this ontological aspect (as
created effects in their relation to their cause), the gifts of grace
refer us to the whole Trinity. But under their "objective" or
"intentional" aspect, these gifts of grace (the theological virtues,
together with the gifts of the Holy Spirit) refer us to the three
divine persons inasmuch as these persons are known and loved
not only as one single God, but also as distinct from each other in
their proper singularity, one as Father, the other as only-begotten
Son, the third as Holy Spirit that comes forth from the Father and
the Son. 105 By grace and glory, "we enjoy the property of each
person. " 106
Another task of this third step is to account for the unity of St.
Thomas's theology in the light of Trinitarian faith. Trinitarian
theology has to show how the doctrine of creation, theological
anthropology, ethics, Christology, ecclesiology, and eschatology
are rooted in Trinitarian doctrine. Here again, the doctrine of the
divine missions has an essential role to play in the attempt (an
urgent need today) of "defragmenting" Christian theology. In
what follows, I will limit myself to a few fundamental aspects of
such an attempt.
Saint Thomas's teaching on the divine persons is built on the
doctrine of the Word and of Love. The Fa th er' s personal property
of paternity, and the Son's property of filiation, are manifested by
the doctrine of the Word: it is by means of his doctrine of the
Word that St. Thomas accounts for the Father's property of
104 For an attempt to account for this "personal mode of action" of the Father, the Son,
and the Holy Spirit, see Emery, Trinity, Church, and the Human Person, 115-53.
105 See ibid., 148-52.
106 I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, ad 2: "Proprietate uniuscujusque personae fruimur, ut
paternitate."

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551

paternity (the Father is the one who "says" the Word) and for the
Son's property of filiation (to be the Son, in God, means to be the
Word conceived and born from the one who "says" this Word). 107
In a similar way, it is by means of his doctrine of Love
(understood with the help of the analogy of the "imprint" of love
in the will of the one who loves in act) that he accounts for the
property of the Holy Spirit. The Holy Spirit is Love proceeding
from the principle of the Word and from the Word (Father and
Son).1os
This doctrine is first applied to the Christian understanding of
creation. God creates by his wisdom and by his will. On the one
hand, this truth can be grasped by the light of natural reason,
inasmuch as natural reason can be led from God's effects to the
knowledge of "what must necessarily belong to God as the first
cause of all things, exceeding all things caused by him," 109
including his essential attributes of knowledge and will. On the
other hand, creation finds its full intelligibility in the light of
Trinitarian faith, as we recalled above:
The knowledge of the divine persons was necessary for us. First, it was necessary
for the right understanding of creation. The fact of saying that God made all
things by his Word excludes the error of those who say that God produced
things by a necessity

of nature. And when we say that in him there is a

procession of Love, we show that God produced creatures not because he needed
them, nor because of any other extrinsic reason, but on account of the love of
his own goodness. 110

On this basis, the integration of a philosophical approach to
creation into a Trinitarian account of God's creative act can work
in two ways. The first way consists of showing that God's essential
For references on this, see Emery, The Trinitarian Theology of Saint Thomas Aquinas,
185-92.
108 See ibid., 225-45.
' 09 STh I, q. 12, a. 12.
110 STh I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 3: "Cognitio divinarum personarum fuit necessaria nobis
dupliciter. Uno modo, ad recte sentiendum de creatione rerum. Per hoc enim quad dicimus
Deum omnia fecisse Verbo suo, excluditur error ponentium Deum produxisse res ex
necessitate naturae. Per hoc autem quod ponimus in eo processionem Amoris, ostenditur quod
Deus non propter aliquam indigentiam creaturas produxit, neque propter aliquam aliam
causam extrinsecam; sed propter amorem suae bonitatis."
107

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

attributes (attributes that account for creation) are included in the
divine persons and in the divine processions themselves. The
Summa Theologiae gives prominence to this first way:
The divine Persons, according to the nature of their procession, have a causality
respecting the creation of things. For as was said above, when treating of the
knowledge and will of God, God is the cause of things by his intellect and by his
will, just as the craftsman is cause of the things made by his craft. Now the
craftsman works through the word conceived in his intellect, and through the
love of his will regarding some object. Hence also God the Father made creatures
through his Word, who is his Son; and through his Love, who is the Holy Spirit.
And so the processions of the persons are the reason of the production of
creatures inasmuch as they include the essential attributes, knowledge and will
[inquantum includunt essentialia attributa, quae sunt scientia et voluntas]. 111

As our grasp of a divine person includes the divine nature, 112
Trinitarian doctrine includes God's essential attributes. Trinitarian
theology is not limited to "that which concerns the distinction of
persons," but it also includes "that which concerns the divine
essence."
The

second

way

consists

of showing

how

the

divine

processions account, in a different manner, for creation and for
grace. This second way is not essentially different from the first
one, but it is more clearly built on the concept of "procession"
(intra-Trinitarian
processions, and "processions
toward
creatures"), and uses the exitus-reditus scheme. It receives special
emphasis in St. Thomas's Scriptum super Sententiis: the
procession of the Son and that of the Holy Spirit are the "reason"
for the production of creatures, that is, for the "natural gifts in
which we subsist" (exitus: creation). And, at another level, the
same processions are the reason for the gifts "that unite us to the
111 STh I, q. 45, a. 6.
112 STh I, q. 34, a. 3, ad 1: "The name 'person' includes 'nature' oblique, since a person is
an individual substance of a rational nature. Therefore, as regards the personal relation, the
name of a divine person does not imply a relation to creatures; but the relation to creatures
is implied in what belongs to the nature. And so nothing prevents the name of a divine person
from implying a relation to creatures, insofar as the divine essence is included in the meaning
of this name; for just as it is proper to the Son to be the Son, so it properly belongs to him to
be 'God begotten,' or 'the Creator begotten.' And in this way the name 'Word' implies a
relation to creatures.''

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ultimate end, namely, sanctifying grace and glory" (reditus: the
divine missions}.113 In any case, the centrality of the divine
missions does not imply any "supernaturalism" in the consideration of created beings. The consistency of nature (and of
natural reason), as really distinct from grace (and from knowledge
by faith), is fully safeguarded by a theology centered on the
processions of the divine persons.
The doctrine of the Word and Love, as already observed, is
also the theological key to the divine missions:
Since the Holy Spirit is Love, the likening [assimilatur] of the soul to the Holy
Spirit occurs through the gift of charity and so the Holy Spirit's mission is
accounted for by reason of charity. The Son in turn is the Word; not, however,
just any word, but the Word breathing Love [Verbum ... spirans Amorem] ....
Thus the Son is sent not in accordance with every and any kind of intellectual
perfection, but according to an instruction of the intellect which breaks forth
into the affection of love.114

The teaching on the visible missions showed a similar structure:
the Holy Spirit is sent visibly as the Gift in person (being the Gift
belongs to the Holy Spirit insofar as he is Love), and the Son is
sent in the flesh as the principle of the Holy Spirit. 115
This theological structure is found again in the doctrine of the
image of God in man (theological anthropology): the imago Dei
is explained in terms of "knowing God" and "loving God." The
"image of the Trinity" in the human soul (mens) is explained as
follows:
113 I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2: "Sicut igitur dictum est, quod processio personarum est ratio
productionis creaturarum a primo principio, ita etiam est eadem processio ratio redeundi in
finem .... Processio divinarum personarum in creaturas potest considerari dupliciter. Aut
inquantum est ratio exeundi a principio; et sic talis processio attenditur secundum dona
naturalia, in quibus subsistimus, sicut dicitur a Dionysio, IV De div. nom., divina sapientia vel
bonitas in creaturas procedere. Sed de tali processione non loquimur hie. Potest etiam attendi
inquantum est ratio redeundi in finem, et sic est secundum ilia dona tantum quae proxime
conjungunt nos fini ultimo, scilicet Deo, quae sunt gratia gratum faciens et gloria, et de ista
processione loquimur hie." On this text, see Gilles Emery, La Trinite creatrice (Paris: Vrin,
1995), 390-402.
114 STh I, q. 43, a. 5, ad 2.
115 STh I, q. 43, a. 7.

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As the uncreated Trinity is distinguished by the procession of the Word [Verbum]
from the Speaker [Dicens], and of Love [Amor] from both of these, as we have
seen; so we may say that in rational creatures wherein we find a procession of
the word in the intellect [processio verbi secundum intellectum ], and a procession
of the love in the will [processio amoris secundum voluntatem], there exists an
image of the uncreated Trinity. 116

The emphasis that St. Thomas puts on acts rests on the same basis:
"For this reason, first and chiefly, the image of the Trinity is to be
found in the acts of the soul, that is, inasmuch as from the
knowledge which we possess, by actual thought we form an
internal word; and thence break forth into love." 117 The
theocentrism of the imago Dei in St. Thomas is fully in line with
these explanations:
The divine Persons, as we said above, are distinguished from each other
according to the procession of the Word from the Speaker [secundum
processionem Verbi a Dicente ], and the procession of Love from both [et Amoris
ab utroque]. Now, the Word of God is born of God according to the knowledge
of himself; and Love proceeds from God according as he loves himself ....
Hence the divine image [divina imago] is found in man according to the word
conceived from the knowledge of God [secundum verbum conceptum de Dei
notitia], and to the love derived therefrom [et amorem exinde derivatum]. Thus
the image of God is found in the soul according as the soul turns to God, or
possesses a nature that enables it to be drawn to God. 118

In this way, theological anthropology is directly rooted in
Trinitarian theology, insofar as it rests on the doctrine of the
Word and of Love. The same observation can be made about the
study of the virtues, especially of the theological virtues, and of
the gifts of the Holy Spirit, thus illuminating the fundamental
structure of St. Thomas's moral theology. 119 The doctrine of the
Word and Love thus provides us with a unified understanding of
STh I, q. 93, a. 6.
STh I, q. 93, a. 7.
118 STh I, q. 93, a. 8.
119 See Michael S. Sherwin, By Knowledge and by Love: Charity and Knowledge in the
Moral Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of
America Press, 2005).
116

117

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the Trinity in itself, of Trinitarian action, of the divine missions,
and of theological anthropology.
As noted above, the doctrine of the divine missions grounds
Christology. This can be observed in many places. In the third
part of the Summa Theologiae, for instance, the account of the
"fittingness" of the incarnation of the Son is built (for its main
part) on the doctrine of the Word of God. 120 The understanding
of the relationship between the hypostatic union and the fullness
of Christ's habitual grace is also founded in Trinitarian theology
(the divine missions). 121 Such examples could be multiplied in
great number.
Finally, St. Thomas's eschatology is no exception to this rule.
We already observed that the beatific vision of the Father takes
place in the Word and by the Word (Filia manifestante). 122 The
beatific acts of vision and of fruition must be linked to the Word
and Love: an "invisible mission" of the Son and of the Holy Spirit
is made to the blessed at the beginning of their beatitude. 123
Insofar as the object of fruition is divine goodness, fruition has for
its object the divine essence that is common to the three persons.
But the divine essence subsists in each of the distinct persons; so,
smce
whoever knows a relative term also knows its correlative, and because the whole
fruition derives from the vision ... the [blessed] who enjoys one of the relative
[divine persons] as such, also enjoys the other. ... We enjoy the property of each
person, for instance, paternity. However, "paternity" does not indicate the
reason of fruition. Hence we will enjoy paternity inasmuch as paternity is really

III, q. 3, a. 8.
III, q. 7, a. 13.
122 See above, n. 91.
123 STh I, q. 43, a. 6, ad 3: "Ad beatos est facta missio invisibilis in ipso principio
beatitudinis." The invisible missions of the Son and of the Spirit are inseparable: the one never
takes place without the other. Cf. I Sent., d. 15, q. 4, a. 2: "One mission is never without the
other, because love follows upon knowledge. Perfect knowledge, by which the Son's mission
occurs, always leads into love; therefore, knowledge and love are infused simultaneously."
120 STh
121 STh

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

identical with the supreme goodness, although it differs from it according to
reason. 124

As the formal object of the beatific vision is the divine essence, the
formal object of beatific fruition is the divine goodness. Under this
aspect, there is only one fruition, as there is only one vision of the
three divine persons. However, by one and the same vision and
fruition, each person is seen in his personal distinction, and each
person is enjoyed in his personal property. Moreover, because of
the unique status of the Son's incarnation in the dispensatio
(visible mission: the hypostatic union), "in eternal life we will also
rejoice in the humanity of Christ. " 125 Here St. Thomas's teaching
on the Son's visible mission in the flesh reaches its culminating
conclusion: in heaven, "the corporeal sight [of the blessed] will
consider God's great glory in the bodies, and especially in the
glorified bodies, and most of all in the body of Christ. " 126
A thorough study of the presence and influence of Trinitarian
doctrine throughout St. Thomas's theology is still lacking. But the
few aspects mentioned here are enough to suggest that his
Trinitarian theology (which means the theological account of both
the essential unity of the divine persons and their personal
distinction) shapes the main fields of his theology, and offers a
fundamental structure for grasping his theology as a consistent
whole. The doctrine Of the Word and Love is a key that provides
us with a unified understanding of the Trinity in itself, and of
Trinitarian action (creation and divinization). And, in order to

124 I Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 2, corp. and ad 2: "Qui novit unum relativorum, cognoscit et
reliquum; et sic cum tota fruitio originetur ex visione, ut prius dictum est, qui fruitur uno
relativorum inquantum hujusmodi, fruitur et reliquo .... Proprietate uniuscujusque personae
fruimur, ut paternitate; tamen paternitas non <licit rationem fruitionis: uncle fruemur
paternitate, inquantum paternitas est idem re quod summa bonitas, differens tamen ratione."
125 Lectura in Iohannis evangelium 17:3 (Marietti ed., no. 2188): "In vita aeterna
gaudebimus etiam de humanitate Christi."
126 IV Sent., d. 49, q. 2, a. 2: "Visus corporalis tantam gloriam Dei inspiciet in corporibus,
et praecipue gloriosis, et maxime in corpore Christi" (Vives ed., t. 11, p. 488). This "corporeal
sight" of Christ's glorified body will be a cause of the beatitude of our own body: "Our body
will enjoy a certain beatitude, insofar as it will see God in sensible creatures, above all, in the
body of Christ" (ibid., ad 6 [Vives ed., t. 11, p. 489).

DIVINE MISSIONS

557

understand the connections within this whole, a decisive role
belongs to the divine missions.

VI. MISSIONS AND PROCESSIONS: AN ALTERNATIVE TO THE
"ECONOMIC TRINilY" /"IMMANENT TRINilY" SCHEME

Today, theological reflection on the Trinity is commonly
undertaken in terms of the "economic Trinity" and the
"immanent Trinity," following the "fundamental axiom"
developed by Karl Rahner: "The Trinity of the economy of
salvation is the immanent Trinity and vice versa"; 127 "The

'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity and the 'immanent'
Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity." 128 The first phrase of the
fundamental axiom ("the Trinity of the economy of salvation is
the immanent Trinity") emphasizes that the economy is truly the
manifestation and communication of God the Trinity himself. The
second phrase ("and vice versa") indicates that the Trinity
communicates himself in a complete and definitive way in Christ
Jesus and in the pouring out of the Holy Spirit. Rahner sought
particularly to show that the Trinity is the mystery of salvation
par excellence. In his own "self-communication," God reveals and
gives himself as he is. Salvation consists in the gift that God the
Trinity makes of himself. This gift is accomplished in Christ and
the Holy Spirit. Rahner wished to avoid separating theological
teaching on the Trinity and teaching concerning the other realities
of faith (particularly teaching on the work of Christ). He
emphasized that the divine persons act in a differentiated manner
and that, in grace, each divine person communicates himself to us
according to his personal property: "Both mysteries, that of our
grace and that of God in himself are the same fathomless
mystery. " 129

127 Karl Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate,"' in Theological
Investigations, vol. 4, trans. Kevin Smyth (Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966), 87.
128 Karl Rahner, The Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Herder and Herder,
1970), 22.
129 Rahner, "Remarks on the Dogmatic Treatise 'De Trinitate,'" 98.

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Rahner's axiom on the identity of the economic and immanent
Trinity has been the subject of various interpretations. Some
authors understand it as a simple reformulation of a truth
commonly held by the Church Fathers. 130 Others point out the
risk of collapsing the distinction between God in himself and his
action in time, and thus of collapsing the essential distinction
between God and the world. Understanding this "fundamental
axiom" requires indeed certain precisions. First, it is necessary not
to conflate the eternity of God and the time of the economy. The
history of salvation manifests the Trinity, but it is not the
economy of salvation that gives to the Father, Son, and Holy
Spirit their distinct personality. The economy does not constitute
the Trinity. Second, the eternal being of God is "necessary,"
whereas the economy is absolutely free, gratuitous, and not
necessary. Nothing obligated God the Trinity to reveal himself or
to give himself in grace: it is a purely gratuitous work. Third, we
should not conflate the reality of the Trinity in himself, in his
transcendent mystery, with the human knowledge and experience
that we can have of the Trinity. It is indeed the Trinity in his own
mystery who reveals himself and communicates himself in the
economy, but humans receive this knowledge and this experience
in a limited manner, proportionate to their condition as creatures.
This leads us to a fourth clarification. The participation of humans
in the Trinitarian life will only find its fulfillment beyond history,
in the blessed vision of the Trinity. By reason of this expectation,
a certain "distance" remains. As St. Thomas puts it:
Those who see God are in some way transformed into God. If they see perfectly,
they are perfectly transformed, as the blessed in heaven by the union of fruition:
When he appears we shall be like him (1 John 3:2); but if we see imperfectly,

130 Bernard Sesboiie, Karl Rahner, Initiations aux theologiens (Paris: Cerf, 2001), 80:
"[Rahner's] texts, in their quite formal language, simply re-express the conviction of the entire
ancient tradition of the Church: by the event of Jesus Christ and in the gift of his Spirit, God
revealed himself to us just as he is." For a nuanced explanation and interpretation of Rahner's
axiom, see Luis F. Ladaria, La Trinita, Mistero di communione (Milan: Paoline Editoriale,
2004), 13-86.

DIVINE MISSIONS

559

then we are transformed imperfectly, as here by faith: Now we see in a mirror
dimly (1Cor13:12). 131

The dialectical form of the axiom has given rise to another,
and perhaps deeper, criticism: are we to posit two Trinities? "A
disadvantage of this terminology is that it may give the impression
that there are two trinities, but obviously this cannot be so. It
merely indicates the two perspectives in which the Trinity can be
conceived. " 132 But this just raises the same question: what do these
"two perspectives" mean?
The distinction between the "economic" and "immanent"
Trinity is not a creation of twentieth-century theology. It is
already found in eighteenth-century Protestant theology (Trinitas
oeconomica and essentialis), 133 and perhaps earlier. In the
nineteenth century, Schleiermacher wrote that "we have no
formula for the being of God in Himself as distinct from the being
of God in the world." 134 Whatever the sources may be, today's
scheme of the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity tends
to start with a formal distinction between the two aspects, and
then attempts to reunite them. But why should Trinitarian
theology start with this formal distinction?
Instead, St. Thomas's systematic doctrine of the Trinity begins
with the doctrine of the eternal processions of the persons, and it
understands the divine missions as including the eternal
processions, with the clear statement that the divine persons
themselves are given. His commentary on St. John also shows
131 In II Epist. ad Corinthios 3:18 (Marietti ed., no. 114). Cf. I Sent., d. 14, q. 2, a. 2, ad
2: Human beings can "possess" a divine person either by perfect enjoyment (through the gift
of glory}, or by imperfect enjoyment (through the gift of sanctifying grace).
132 Coffey, Deus Trinitas, 14.
133 See Werner Brandle, "Immanente Trinitiit-ein
'Denkmal der Kirchengeschichte'?
Dberiegungen zu Karl Rahners Trinitiitslehre," Kerygma und Dogma 38 (1992): 185-98, at
188-89.
134 Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart
(Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1928; repr. 1999), 748. For Schleiermacher, however, the
traditional teaching that God is eternally three distinct persons, Father, Son, and Holy Spirit,
does not belong among the essential elements of Christian teaching; see Bruce Marshall,
"Trinity," in The Blackwell Companion to Modem Theology, ed. G. Jones (Malden, Mass.:
Blackwell, 2004), 183-203, at 183-84.

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GILLES EMERY, O.P.

that, when he deals with the missions, he accounts for them in
light of the divine persons' eternal processions. I would suggest
that St. Thomas's doctrine of divine missions and processions
offers a powerful alternative to the scheme of the "economic
Trinity" and the "immanent Trinity." In St. Thomas, the missions
are in no way separated from the processions. There is no need to
reunite the economic Trinity and the immanent Trinity (after
having started by distinguishing between them), because the
missions bear in themselves the eternal mystery of the divine
persons. In St. Thomas's own words: "processio temporalis non
est alia quam processio aeterna essentialiter. " 135 At the same time,
his doctrine of the missions maintains the essential difference
between God and his created effects, with no danger of confusing
the Trinity and his created gifts. The issue at stake is not just the
foundation of the missions in the eternal processions, or the
missions as a manifestation of the inmost life of the Trinity, but
a fuller understanding of the Trinitarian nature of revelation and
salvation, and of the Trinity itself.
The doctrine of the divine missions, insofar as it integrates the
teaching on processions, on relations, and on persons (the Trinity
in itself), may be considered as the pivot, indeed a real key, of St.
Thomas's Trinitarian theology: the revelation of the Trinity and
the gift of salvation consist in the missions of the divine persons.
The doctrine of salvation is the doctrine of the missions of the
Son and of the Holy Spirit (the missions that we have called
"visible" and "invisible"). This approach presents many
advantages. It invites one to contemplate Christ's person and
actions in his relations to the Father and to the Holy Spirit, that
is to say, to regard Christ and his work in the light of Trinitarian
faith. The doctrine of the missions does not separate the teaching
on God and the teaching on Christ (Christology), but rather it
understands them in their unity. It also does not separate the
teaching on Christ and on the Holy Spirit, but rather it regards
Christ and the Holy Spirit in their unity and in their relations.
I Sent., d. 16, q. 1, a. 1, with the specification: "sed addit aliquem respectum ad
effectum temporalem." See above, n. 37.
135

DIVINE MISSIONS

561

Saint Thomas's teaching on the missions of the divine persons
thus offers a light capable of guiding all Christian theology. 136

136 An impressive testimony to this is the monumental work of Cardinal Charles Journet,
The Church of the Word Incarnate, which is built on the Thomistic doctrine of the missions
of the Son and of the Holy Spirit. This doctrine is especially developed in the first part of the
second book of this work: Charles Journet, Oeuvres completes, vol. 2, L'Eglise du Verbe
Incarne, Essai de theologie speculative: Sa structure interne et son unite catholique (premiere
partie) (Saint-Maurice: Editions Saint-Augustin, 1999). The central place of the divine missions
in Journet's theology has been established by Nicolas Glasson, La doctrine de Dieu dans
l'ceuvre du cardinal Charles Journet: Le traite des missions divines comme fondement de son
ecclesiologie et principe d'unite de sa theologie (S.T.D. diss., University of Fribourg, 2009).

The Thomist 74 (2010): 563-92

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN
THEOLOGY: KARL RAHNER'S CRITIQUE OF THE
"PSYCHOLOGICAL" APPROACH
JEREMY D. WILKINS
University of St. Thomas
Houston, Texas

I

T IS STILL widely taken for granted in contemporary
Trinitarian theology that there exist two fundamentally
divergent traditions aptly characterized as "Greek" and
"Latin," despite a decade of withering criticism. If Augustine is the
villain of this story as the originator of Latin "essentialism,"
Thomas Aquinas is generally considered to have perfected the
type in his Summa Theologiae. Because a judgment of value is
almost invariably implied when these assertions are made, recent
decades have seen numerous efforts to defend Thomas and
Augustine.
This typology has its origins in the monumental work of the
Jesuit historian of doctrine Theodore de Regnon, Etudes de
thiologie positive sur la sainte Trinite. 1 De Regnon discerned a
turning point connected with the Arian, Sabellian, and
Macedonian crises, when, in order to safeguard the revealed
mystery, the Fathers formulated the Trinitarian dogma in terms
of person and nature. 2 He systematized this insight into an
analytic scheme for understanding the historical development of
Trinitarian theology. Since the dogma of the Trinity affirms three
who are distinct as persons but identical in nature, the concepts of
'nature' and 'person' provide two ways into a synthetic account of
1 4 vols. (Paris: Victor Retamc, 1892-98).
2 See ibid., 1:117- 244, esp. 117-28 where he sets up the problem.

563

564

JEREMY D. WILKINS

the mystery, variously realized as the concepts are variously
ordered. 3
Latin philosophy first contemplates the nature in itself, and proceeds to the
supposit; Greek philosophy first contemplates the supposit, and then penetrates
it to find therein the nature. The Latin sees personality as a mode of nature; the
Greek sees nature as the content of the person. There are here two opposed
designs, which project conceptions of the same reality onto different backdrops. 4

According to de Regnon, on the Latin starting point, one
conceives "la nature in recto et la personne in obliquo." On the
Greek starting point, conversely, one conceives "la personne in
recto et la nature in obliquo." 5 Now since in recto and in obliquo
refer to conceptual orderings, the adequacy of the typology clearly
depends on the actual execution of any given author. In other
words, it may have its uses as an ideal type, but it is not itself a
description of anyone's actual theology.
The expectation fostered by this scheme is that Thomas
Aquinas will be typical of the Latin pattern. In fact de Regnon
does not hesitate to say that Latin Scholasticism in general exhibits
this pattern, 6 and he specifically applies it to Thomas: "At the
starting point of St. Thomas's Trinitarian theory, we meet a God
who is single, subsistent, possessing a spiritual nature, a God who
is perfect and presents all the characteristics of a 'personal' God,
of a Person-God." 7 Effectively, he thinks, this means God the
Father, which he tentatively approves as fitting the ancient
pattern, "for during the first centuries of the Church's life, the
3

Ibid., 1:250-51.

4 "La philosophie

latine envisage d'abord la nature en elle-meme et poursuit jusqu'au
supp6t; la philosophie grecque envisage d'abord le supp6t et y penetre ensuite pour y trouver
la nature. Le Latin considere la personalite comme un mode de la nature, le Gree considere
la nature comme le contenu de la personne. Ce sont la des visees contraires, qui projettent Jes
concepts de la meme realite sur des fonds differents" (ibid., 1:433-34). Here and throughout,
translations are my own unless otherwise indicated.
5 Ibid., 1:251-52.
6 Ibid., 1 :252.
7 "Au point de depart de la thforie trinitaire de saint Thomas, on rencontre un Dieu
unique, subsistant, possedant une nature spirituelle, Dieu parfait et presentant tous !es
caracteres d'un Dieu 'personnel', d'une Personne-Dieu" (ibid., 2:212).

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

565

name 'God', unmodified, preeminently meant God the Father,
source of divinity." 8
De Regnon did not consider his typology evaluative in itself.
For him, the two patterns are of equal value and equal adequacy,
though they follow different routes, though they be like two
paintings of the same mountain from two quite different perspectives.9 His project and purposes were different from those of
later scholars who adopted his scheme-often
without
acknowledging him-and applied it to their own ends. 10 The
reception of his typology into contemporary Trinitarian theology
has had far reaching, if unintended, consequences. It has become
very widely taken for granted, not merely as a possibly relevant
set of ideal types but as an actual description of the theology of
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, or the Latin tradition generally. In
the process, it has also taken on an evaluative tone.
Yves Congar, surveying de Regnon's historiography and its
influence, 11 accepts that there is a basic difference between Greek
and Latin approaches, and credits de Regnon with revitalizing
interest in the historical study of the distinctiveness of the Greek
Fathers. "At the same time, however, de Regnon simplified the
difference between the [Greek and Latin] theologies, with the
result that many theologians, especially Orthodox scholars, have
since taken his most clear-cut formulae as they stand." 12 Thus
when de Regnon's hypothesis is linked, as it usually is, to the
assumption that Augustine marks the point at which Latin
theology parted ways with a more ancient, personalist tradition of
Trinitarian theology, it is used to justify a negative judgment on
Augustine specifically and the Latin tradition after him generally.
In these contexts, it is often implied or asserted that Augustine
departed from the sounder biblical and patristic tradition, and
' "car pendant Jes premiers siecles de l'Eglise, le mot 'Dieu' prononce seul, signifiait plus
specialement Dieu le Pere, source de la divinite' (ibid., 2:213; see ibid., 1:491-99).
9 See, e.g., ibid., 1:252, 433-35.
10 See Kristin Hennessy, "An Answer to de Regnon's Accusers: Why We Should Not Speak
of 'His' Paradigm," Harvard Theological Review 100 (2007): 179-97.
11 Yves Congar, I Believe in the Holy Spirit, 3 vols., trans. D. Smith (New York: Seabury,
1983), 3:xv-xxi.
12 Ibid., 3 :xvi.

566

JEREMY D. WILKINS

other traditional authorities are positively evaluated on the basis
of their putative differences from Augustine. 13 For Orthodox
authors with an apologetic or controversial purpose, and for
Catholic and Protestant authors reacting to the real or imagined
evils of Scholastic or neo-Scholastic theology, the prospect is
attractive, because the entire approach stemming from Augustine
can be rejected as a derailment. 14 But conventional wisdom about
Augustine, Thomas Aquinas, or the Latin tradition in general can
and often does stand in the way of serious engagement with the
constitutive questions and goals of that tradition.
I. OVERVIEW OF KARL RAHNER'S CRITIQUE

Karl Rahner's treatise Der dreifaltige Gott was probably the
most influential mediator of de Regnon's typology into Catholic
systematic theology. Rahner regarded Thomas as a kind of terminus ad quern of the "Augustinian" tendency to privilege the unity
13 See, e.g., my discussion of various interpretations of Gregory Palamas in '"The Image
of this Highest Love': The Trinitarian Analogy in Gregory Palamas's Capita 150," in Saint
Vladimir's Theological Quarterly 47.3-4 (2003): 385-414.
14 To note only a few of the more prominent figures who seem to regard the tradition of
Augustine and Thomas as moribund: Colin Gunton, The Promise of Trinitarian Theology
(Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1991); Walter Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, trans. Matthew J.
O'Connell (New York: Crossroad, 1984); Catherine Mowry LaCugna, God for Us: The
Trinity and Christian Life (San Francisco: Harper, 1991); Jurgen Moltmann, The Trinity and
the Kingdom of God, trans. M. Kohl (San Francisco: Harper, 1981); idem, The Crucified God,
trans. R. A. Wilson and John Bowden (New York: Harper, 1974); John D. Zizioulas, Being
as Communion: Studies in Personhood and the Church (Crestwood, N.Y.: St. Vladimir's
Seminary Press, 1985). Others also adopt in various ways the typology of de Regnon, e.g., W.
Beierwalters, "Unity and Trinity in Dionysius and Eriugena," Hermathena 157 (1994): 1-20;
E. Booth, "Hegel's Conception of Self-Knowledge Seen in Conjunction with Augustine's,"
Augustiniana 30 (1980): 221-50. A fuller discussion may be found in Michel Rene Barnes,
"De Regnon Reconsidered," Augustinian Studies 26 (1995): 51-79; idem, "Augustine in
Contemporary Trinitarian Theology," Theological Studies 56 (1995): 237-50; Andre de
Halleux, "Personnalisme ou essentialisme trinitaire chez !es Peres cappadociens?" in idem,
Patrologieet recumenisme. Recueil d'etudes (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1990): 215-68;
Lewis Ayres, '"Remember That You are Catholic' (serm. 52.2): Augustine on the Unity of the
Triune God," Journal of Early Christian Studies 8 (2000): 39-82; Gilles Emery, O.P.,
"Essentialisme ou personalisme dans le traite de Dieu chez saint Thomas d'Aquin ?"Revue
Thomiste 98 (1998): 5-38, at 5-9; Neil Ormerod, The Trinity: Retrieving the Western
Tradition (Milwaukee: Marquette, 2005).

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

567

of the divine substance over the distinction of the divine persons.
His criticisms of Thomas (and more broadly of the "AugustinianLatin" conception) convert de Regnon's categories into
theological value judgments. According to Rahner, the Thomist
and Augustinian approach to Trinitarian theology closes the
Trinity in upon itself so that it loses touch with its sources, on the
one hand, and the realities of religious commitment, on the other.
[T]he treatise on the Holy Trinity occupies a rather isolated position in the total
dogmatic structure. To put it bluntly (and naturally with some exaggeration and
generalization): When this dogmatic treatise is concluded, the subject never
comes up again. Its function in the whole dogmatic structure is only dimly seen.
This mystery seems to have been communicated only for its own sake. Even after
its communication, as a reality it remains locked within itself. 15
[In St. Thomas] the treatise begins not from God the Father as the unoriginate
origin of divinity and reality, but from the nature common to all three persons .
. . . In this way the treatise on the Trinity falls into ever more "splendid
isolation," through which it comes very seriously in danger of being felt a matter
of indifference for religious Existenz. It looks as though everything about God
that matters to us had already been said in the treatise De Dea uno. 16
15 "[D]er Traktat iiber die Heilige Dreifaltigkeit im Gufiige der ganzen Dogmatik ziemlich
isoliert dasteht. Einmal grob (und natiirlich iibertreibend und verallgemeinernd) gesagt: Wenn
dieser Traktat in der Dogmatik einmal abgehandelt ist, kommt er spater dann auch nicht mehr
vor. Mann sieht seine Funktion im Ganzen der Dogmatik nur undeutlich. Dieses Geheimnis
scheint nur um seiner selbst willen mitgeteilt zu sein. Es bleibt, auch nach seiner Mitteilung,
als Wirklichkeit in sich selbst verschlossen" (Karl Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott als
Transzendenter Urgrung der Heilsgeschichte," Mysterium Salutis, vol. 2, Die Heilsgeschichte
vor Christus, ed. J. Feiner and M. Loehrer (Einsedeln: Benziger, 1967), 317-401, at 322.
Translations are my own except where indicated. Rahner's essay is available in English as The
Trinity, trans. Joseph Donceel (New York: Crossroad, 1997), and this passage may be found
on page 14. Donceel's translation is very unreliable. He pays little attention to the technical
terminology of Trinitarian theology. Unfortunately, the selection of English idioms and the
frequent use of emphatic typesetting in the Crossroad edition tend to exaggerate Rahner's
criticisms, compared to tlte original German.
16 "Hier [bei Thomas] wird nicht zuerst von Gott dem Yater als dem ursprunglosen
Ursprung in der Gottheit under der Weltwirklichkeit, sondern zuerst von der alien drei
Personen gemeinsamen Natur gehandelt .... Auf diese Weise gerat der Trinitiitstraktat noch
mehr in eine <<splendid isolation>>, <lurch die er sehr stark in Gefahr kommt, also fiir die
religiose Existenz uninteressant empfunden zu werden: Es sieht so aus, als ob alles, was fiir uns
selbst an Gott wichtig ist, schon vorher im Traktat De Deo uno gesagt worden ware" (Rahner,
"Der dreifaltige Gott," 324 [internal citation omitted]). Donceel's translation (The Trinity, 1617) of this passage leaves much to be desired; where Rahner contrasts the Father as starting

568

JEREMY D. WILKINS

If one starts from the basic Augustinian-Western conception, an a-Trinitarian
treatise De Dea uno comes as a matter of course before the treatise on the
Trinity. In this way, however, the theology of the Trinity must all the more
arouse the impression that only absolutely formal statements can be made about
the divine persons (with help from the concepts of the two processions and the
relations), and even these only concern a Trinity absolutely enclosed, not
outwardly open (and of which we who are shut out know something only by a
peculiar paradox). 17

To help overcome this forgetfulness, Rahner urges a return to the
biblical and Greek understanding of God as a proper name for the
Father. 18 It is a proposal in which he has been widely joined. 19
Rahner's sharp criticisms and enormous influence have perhaps
done more than anything else to create the impression, at least in
Anglo-Atlantic theology, that the tradition of Augustine and
Thomas is moribund. For many, Rahner's reputation as a
"Transcendental Thomist" probably adds to the authority of his
judgment on Thomas. His criticisms are forcefully presented and
frequently repeated. Still, there are good reasons to doubt that
Rahner grasped the strategy and structure of Thomas's mature
treatise on God. He acknowledged that he did not understand
why, in the Summa Theologiae, Thomas "separated" (scheiden) his
treatment into a series of questions on what belongs to the divine
unity, followed by a series on what belongs to the plurality of
point with the essence as starting point, Donceel's rendering contrasts the Father as source
with the Father as essence!
17"Geht man aber von der augustinisch-abendlandischen Grundkonzeption aus, liegt ein
a-trinitarischer Traktat De Deo uno wie selbstverstandlich vor dem Trinitatstraktat. Dadurch
aber muss die Trinitatstheologie erst recht den Eindruck erwecken, es konne in ihr von den
gottlichen Personen nur absolute Formales (mit Hilfe des Begriffs der zwei Prozessionen und
der Relationen) gesagt werden, und selbst dieses betreffe nur eine absolute in sich geschlossene
und in ihrer Wirklichkeit nicht nach aussen geoffnete Dreifaltigkeit (von der wir, die
Ausgeschlossenen, nur in einem seltsamen Paradox doch etwas wiissten)" (Rahner, "Der
dreifaltige Gott," 325 [ = Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 18).
18 See Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 323-24 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 16); K.
Rahner, "Theos in the New Testament," Theological Investigations, vol. 1, trans. C. Ernst
(New York: Crossroad, 1982), 79-148, esp. 145-47.
19 See, e.g., Kasper, The God of Jesus Christ, 299: "The doctrine of the Trinity must start
with the Father and understand him as origin, source, and inner ground of unity in the
Trinity." See too, e.g., Zizioulas, Being as Communion, chap. 1.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

569

persons, or, as Rahner put it, into two separate treatises. 20 In fact,
Thomas revised his presentation of the Trinity several times, and
we might have a better understanding of his mature presentation
if we understood his reasons for doing so. 21
Rahner's alternative program receives its basic formulation in
his famous counter-thesis (Grundthese): "The 'economic' Trinity
is the 'immanent' Trinity, and vice-versa." 22 Rahner did not
himself execute a full-scale Trinitarian theology along the lines of
this proposal. He did, however, sketch out its main lines in explicit contradistinction to the theology of Thomas and, in the
footnotes, to Bernard Lonergan's textbook De Deo trino. 23 It is
not my purpose here to consider Rahner's proposal in all its
dimensions, but rather to focus on a few of the points at which it
seems clear that fundamentally different theological horizons are
operative.
II. METHOD AND ORDER

Rahner accuses the approach of Thomas Aquinas of
forgetfulness of the economy in the development of its ideas:
The classical psychological theory of the Trinity also suffers from another
methodological deficiency. Its speculation does not include knowledge about the

20 Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 323-24 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 15-16). On the
difficulties of reading Thomas's treatment as two separate treatises, see Gilles Mongeau, "The
Spiritual Pedagogy of the Summa Theologiae," in Nova et Vetera (English ed.) 2 (2004): 91114, at 100-107.
21 See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Emanatio intelligibilis in Dea" (Ph.D. diss., Boston College,
2004).
22 "Die 'iikonomische' Trinitiit ist die 'immanente' Trinitat und umgekehrt" (Rahner, "Der
dreifaltige Gott," 328 [= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 22: "The 'economic' Trinity is the
'immanent' Trinity and the 'immanent' Trinity is the 'economic' Trinity"]). The terms of the
thesis are clarified on Rahn er, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 3 27-29 ( = Donceel, trans., The Trinity,
21-24).
23 Bernard Lonergan, De Dea trino, 2 vols. (Rome: Gregorian University, 1964), vol. 2,
Pars systematica (republished as The Triune God: Systematics, Collected Works vol. 12
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 2007).

570

JEREMY D. WILKINS

origin of the dogmas concerning the 'immanent' Trinity. As it begins to develop
its ideas, it has, in a way, forgotten about the 'economic' Trinity. 24

The criticism brings three different problems into view, but
without putting any of them into clear focus: (1) the relationship
between systematic theology and the documents of revelation, (2)
the relationship between systematic theology and the articles of
faith, and (3) the problem of order within systematic theology.
For Thomas the relationship between theological understanding and the documents of revelation was largely
uncomplicated by the encumbrances of historical criticism. Today
it is vastly more complicated by our historical awareness of the
cultural and historical contingencies affecting the formation of the
New Testament documents (individually and as a canon) and the
path from the New Testament to the dogmas of the Church. The
documents of revelation had for Thomas an immediate
application to systematic theology; if we are to be responsible
today, we must acknowledge a series of mediating operations
between the systematic theologian and his or her Bible.25 We
know too well the distance that separates us from the New
Testament authors, and it is therefore we ourselves who are in

24 "Die klassische psychologische Trinitatstheorie leidet auch unter einem anderen
methodologischen Mangel. Sie setzt in ihrer Spekulation <las Wissen um die Herkunft des
Dogmas von der 'immanenten' Trinitat nicht ein. Wenn sie anfangt, ihre Ideen zu entwickeln,
hat sie gewissermaBen die 'iikonomische' Trinitiit vergessen" (Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott,"
396 [= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 119: "The classical psychological doctrine of the Trinity
suffers also from another methodological weakness. In its speculations it does not refer to
what we know about the origin of the dogma of the 'immanent' Trinity. When developing its
ideas it has, as it were, forgotten about the "economic" Trinity"). The footnote observes that
"precisely this impression" is made by Lonergan's De Dea trino. Similar charges about the
psychological analogy are made in Karl Rahner, Grundkurs des Glaubens: Studien zum Begriff
des Christentums, ed. N. Schwerdtfeger and A. Raffelt, Karl Rahner Siimtliche Werke, vol. 26
(Ziirich and Diisseldorf: Benziger; Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1999), 134 (English
translation, Foundations of Christian Faith: An Introduction to the Idea of Christianity, trans.
W. Dych [New York: Seabury, 1978), 135).
25 See Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Historical Mindedness," inA Second Collection,
ed. W. Ryan and B. Tyrell (London: Darton, Longman, & Todd, 1974). What is needed is an
enormous differentiation of method along the lines suggested by Bernard Lonergan, Method
in Theology (New York: Seabury, 1972).

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

571

danger of losing touch with the originating experience behind an
"impenetrable wall" of scholarship. 26
Rahner's objection may be taken in a different way, however,
as pointing to the function of doctrines in relation to systematic
theology. For Thomas the articles of faith (doctrines) are the
principles of theological science, the starting point in the quest for
theological understanding; conversely, the goal of sacra doctrina
in the via disciplinae is a fruitful understanding of the mysteries. 27
Today we know a great deal more than did Thomas or any of his
contemporaries about the "origin of the dogmas concerning the
'immanent' Trinity," if by this is meant the historical process
which led from the New Testament to the reception of the
conciliar dogmas of the fourth century. We are much more
acutely aware of the fact that doctrine develops and, as we take
note of its development, there arise for us questions about the
transitions, the continuity between stages or orderings of doctrine,
the criteria for preferring one ordering to another, and the shift
toward increasingly systematic orderings which inevitably are
further removed from the largely narrative order of the sources. 28
It seems to be contingently true that the process which led
from the New Testament to the Nicene homoousion moved from
the first-for-us to the first-in-itself, that is, from the relations of
Father, Son, and Spirit to us, to the relations they have amongst
themselves. The historical process arrived at a new ordering of
doctrine, expressed incipiently in the Athanasian "whatever is said
of the Father is said of the Son, except the name Father," and
somewhat more systematically in the Cappadocian distinction
between 'common' and 'proper' names in God. This terminus
became the starting point for Augustine in his De Trinitate, which
begins, not from the divine essence, but from the equality of the
26 See Lonergan, Method,

276.
idea-though not, of course, in the differentiated Aristotelian sense
in which Thomas understands it-goes back to the very beginnings of the theological
tradition, when Irenaeus proposed that the aim of theology is to understand the articles of
faith which it takes as its principles.
28 See Frederick Crowe, "Lonergan's Search for Foundations," in idem, Developing the
Lonergan Legacy: Historical, Theoretical, and Existential Themes (Toronto: University of
Toronto Press, 2004), at 185.
27 The fundamental

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

divine persons, and flowers in the various Scholastic formulae to
the effect that in God all is one where there is no opposed
relation. The question raised by Rahner's criticism is whether
these transitions are valid. Still more fundamentally, the question
regards the criteria for judging the validity of transitions from one
ordering of doctrine to another.
To go to the roots of this problem is far beyond the purview of
this present article. For the moment, perhaps, it will be sufficient
to acknowledge that the problem is deeper than Rahner's
criticisms let on. It may be that the fourth-century homoousion is
not an authentic starting point for a subsequent stage of doctrinal
and theological development, but then one has to formulate
criteria for discriminating between inauthentic and authentic. It
is radically insufficient to assert merely that the stage from
Augustine forward is removed from the sources, for the
homoousion itself is removed from the sources (as its fourthcentury critics were delighted to observe). If Thomas did not deal
with these questions-which were not raised in the thirteenth
century-it may be said in his defense that he took the articles of
faith as the starting point of his investigation of sacra doctrina in
the via disciplinae. A functionally differentiated theology able to
deal with the larger historical problems more adequately will not,
in my judgment, do away with ecclesial and theological doctrines
as the proximate norm for systematic theology.
If it is granted that the articles of faith, formulated in ecclesial
and theological doctrines, may authentically serve as the starting
point for systematic theology, there is a still further question
about the internal ordering of questions within systematic
theology itself. Thomas met the problem of order in part with a
distinction between the way of discovery and the way of teaching,
which he took over from Aristotle. 29 The way of discovery begins
from what is first for us-the given in the sensible order-and
proceeds to what is first in itself. The way of teaching proceeds
In Aristotle, see Posterior Analytics l.13. 75a14; Metaphysics 1.1.98 la3 O; Nicomachean
Ethics 3.3.1112b18-20 (the first link in the chain of causes is the last in the order of
discovery).
29

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

573

from a grasp of the reasoned fact to an explanation of the data. 30
Thomas generalized this strategy and applied it, analogically, to
sacra doctrina. The goal of the first movement is certitude, the
removal of doubt, and in matters theological one proceeds to this
end by appeal to recognized authorities. The goal of the second is
to understand not whether but how the truth is true, and to attain
this goal one has to find the reasons that go to the root of the
matter, though in theology these are grasped only analogically. 31
It is on the basis of this distinction that Thomas conceived and
organized the Summa Theologiae "secundum ordinem disciplinae"
(as he says in the Prologue), or "secundum viam doctrinae" (a
phrase that introduces the treatise on the Trinity). 32 This project
became for him the occasion to restructure the entire treatise on
God, and the structure of the treatise must itself be acknowledged
as a fundamental aspect of Thomas' s achievement. 33 It is this very
structure that Rahner finds so perplexing and unsatisfactory.
For Thomas at least, the ordo disciplinae or via doctrinae is
determined by a pedagogical judgment, which is not necessarily a
judgment about the intrinsic connections among the realities
under consideration. This may seem counterintuitive, since in the
previous paragraphs I suggested that the movement from the
symbolic and narrative world of the New Testament to the cool,
propositional world of the Nicene homoousion was also a
movement from the first-for-us to the first-in-itself. Since in the
way of discovery the missions reveal the persons, the persons
reveal the relations, and the relations disclose the originating
processions affirmed in the Nicene creed, it might seem that the
processions are intrinsically prior to the relations and persons in
God. From this vantage point the structure of Thomas's treatise
might be easily misunderstood as expressing a judgment about the
intrinsic priority of essence to processions to relations to persons
in God.
30 See Patrick Byrne, Analysis and Science in Aristotle
31 Thomas Aquinas, Quodlibet

(Albany: SUNY, 1997), 201-4.

IV, q. 9, a. 3.

I, q. 27, pro!.
See Bernard Lonergan, Verbum: Word and Idea in Aquinas, Collected Works, vol. 2
(Toronto: University of Toronto, 1997), 213-22.
32 STh
33

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

This difficulty fades away if we distinguish two different ways
order enters into Thomas's theological project. There is the
functional order in which doctrines-the articles of faithprecede systematic understanding, and Thomas expressed this
order in terms of the subalternation of sacra doctrina to the
knowledge of God and the blessed. But the functional priority of
doctrines to theological understanding is quite distinct from the
question of pedagogical order which is internal to systematic
theology itself. Sacra doctrina "according to the order of
teaching" may presuppose doctrines as determining its basic
problems for understanding, but its own internal ordering is
governed by judgments about the most effective way to develop
explanatory concepts. Questions are ordered so that earlier
questions presuppose the least and later questions build upon the
earlier. In this way the learner is brought to a fruitful and
transformative understanding of the mysteries even though the
realities in themselves are not understood directly in this life. 34
Thomas's decision to handle the questions on the divine being
and operations before dealing with the distinction of persons is
part of a pedagogical strategy. A learner who has not radically
clarified the meaning of 'God' through the kind of process
Thomas initiates in question 2 of the Prima Pars cannot come to
grips with the fundamental Trinitarian problem, nor appreciate
why the key to the problem is discovering a fruitful analogy for
the divine processions, nor grasp the importance of opposed
relations of origin for personal identity in God. The ordering of
these questions is not at all reflective of a judgment about the
priority of the divine essence vis-a-vis the divine persons nor does
it reflect a bias toward essence rather than person. It is a function
of a judgment about the most expedient way to communicate the
material to learners.
This seems to be a fundamental difference between Thomas
and his critics inspired by Rahner. For Thomas, the only real,
intrinsic order in God is the order of the divine persons. The
34 See Bernard Lonergan, "Theology and Understanding," in idem, Collection, Collected
Works, vol. 4 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 1993), 114-32; also Mongeau, "Spiritual
Pedagogy."

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

575

order in which we work out our concepts is not identical to the
order of the realities they mediate, because we come to know
through a discursive process, as Thomas explains in his commentary on the verbum in the Gospel according to John. 35 Hence,
although God is simple and without priority or posteriority, still
we arrive at a mediated understanding of this by gradually
developing our concepts. Because Rahner and other critics are at
best vague about the relationship between developing
understanding and knowledge of the real, they convert de
Regnon's typology into an evaluative judgment: If Thomas
considers the essence of God before he considers persons in God,
he must think there is some real priority of essence to person, etc.
What is at stake here for Thomas, however, is not the order
intrinsic to the realities-he acknowledges no real order in God
other than the order of the persons, and even there denies every
semblance of priority, even to the Father 36-but rather the order
efficacious for developing understanding.
Such pedagogical discipline is not at all a matter of "forgetting
about the economic Trinity." It is rather a reversal of the movement of the way of discovery: as the way of discovery moves from
the historical missions to the affirmation of the mysteries to the
elimination of incoherencies, so the way of teaching resolves the
problem of understanding the mysteries to its component elements, and unfolds the questions in an ordered series so that prior
questions do not presuppose but shed light on later questions.
What is at stake is not a deductive chain, but a process of
developing understanding which grasps that the intelligibility of
the missions is founded on the identity of the persons, that the
identity of the persons is a function of the relations, that the
intelligibility of the relations flows from and presupposes the
conception of the processions, that the conception of the
processions flows from and presupposes-in our thinking-the
divine nature, and orders questions appropriately. 37

35 See Super Ioannem,

c. 1, lect. 1.

36 See STh I, q. 40 a. 3; q. 40, a. 4, esp. ad 1; and q. 42 a. 3.
37

See Lonergan, Triune God: Systematics, 58-66.

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

This is the task of the wise pedagogue: to find the problem that
presupposes the least and illumines the most so as to proceed in
an orderly way through the connected problems. In this way are
avoided the multiplication of useless questions, the occasional and
haphazard mode of proceeding, and the frequent repetition the
Angelic Doctor laments in the prologue to the Summa Theologiae.
Other instances, though not exactly parallel, confirm the
general principle that we cannot make assumptions about the
intrinsic ordering of realities because of the ordering of questions
in the via disciplinae. For example, Thomas treats the creation of
spiritual creatures (angels), then the creation of corporeal
creatures, and only then the creation of the human being who
belongs to both orders, but it would be silly to conclude from this
that he has "privileged" the material order over the human. The
pedagogical significance of this decision is clear: until the
principles of spirit and matter are understood, one cannot develop
an understanding of the being that is a compound of spirit and
matter. Examples could be multiplied: sin is treated before grace
which is its remedy, and, notoriously, God and human beings
before the one who is both, Christ.
It should hardly need to be added that the via disciplinae is not
conceived as the whole of theology. Thomas presupposes the
practices of lectio and praedicatio (conducted, as it were, in the
via inventionis) that were the staples of theological study in his
time and, in fact, constituted his main work. 38 As we find it in
Thomas, then, theological exposition secundum ordinem doctrinae
is one moment in a larger project, albeit a moment of particular
significance in terms of the conception of sacra doctrina as a
science (in the Aristotelian sense). If he says that sacra doctrina is
speculative rather than practical, it is because its ultimate finality
is the vision of God, and for this very reason it also has a
practical, or pastoral, finality. 39
Rahner's criticisms, then, run deeper than a dispute about the
most fruitful way to order theological questions about the triune
38 See Mongeau,

"Spiritual Pedagogy," 91-100.

39 STh I, q. 1, a. 4.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

577

God. They touch upon Thomas's very way of conceiving theology. Thomas has not forgotten religious Existenz, if his
pedagogy is a method of intellectual and spiritual transformation
in preparation for the vision of God. He has not forgotten the
sources, if he is right to complement the via inventionis with a via
disciplinae. He has not forgotten the 'economic' Trinity, if the
development of doctrine sets the basic problem for theological
understanding and if his via disciplinae results in an enriched,
fruitful, and profound understanding of the 'economy' in light of
the 'theology'.
The via disciplinae respects the systematic exigency in
theology, without supposing that it is the whole of theology. This
means that the goal of systematic understanding in theology can
be pursued without prejudice to other goals, such as exegesis,
history, and pastoral application. Although the differentiation
between the ways of discovery and synthesis is not in itself the
solution to the problems posed for theology today by critical
history, it will be part of a successful framework for dealing with
those problems. The problem of history has to be met through
functional differentiation; the radical problem is not simply
finding the fruitful explanatory principle but coming to grips with
the implications of intellectual, moral, and religious conversion.
The way forward in theology will not be along Rahner's route of
neglecting the differentiations already achieved, but must sublate
them into a higher synthesis of theological operations.
III. HYPOTHESIS, VERIFICATION, FITTINGNESS, AND NECESSITY

Rahner points out that the intelligentia fidei yielded by
Thomas's inquiry and Lonergan's is only hypothetical:
That is where, in fact, the difficulties of the classic psychological speculations
about the Trinity set in. They have no evident model from human psychology for
the doctrine of the Trinity (a model known already before the doctrine of the
Trinity), to explain why divine knowledge, as absolute primordial self-presence,
necessarily means the distinct manner of subsisting of that which is "uttered." Or
even why divine knowledge means an utterance, and not simply original selfpresence in absolute identity. Rather it postulates from the doctrine of the

578

JEREMY D. WILKINS

Trinity a model of human knowledge and love, which either remains
questionable, or about which it is not clear that it can be more than a model of
human knowledge precisely as finite. And this model it applies to God. In other
words, we are not told why in God knowledge and love demand a processio ad
modum operati (as Word or as "the beloved in the lover") .... Then it becomes
clear too that such a psychological theory of the Trinity has the character of what
the other sciences call an "hypothesis. "40

What are we to make of these remarkable statements? Does
Rahner mean to suggest that the rational psychology underlying
the analogy is somehow contrived-he says the reasoning is
circular-or only to point out the contingent fact that the psychological theory developed in response to theological questions?
And why does he underscore its hypothetical character? Does he
think its hypothetical status tells against it, or does he wish merely
remind us that no hypothesis can have a special claim on our
allegiance? Is it that the psychological analogy is not modest
enough, that through it theologians try to know too much without
adequately adverting to the merely hypothetical character of their
instrument of analysis?
If we call to mind Thomas's distinction between the two
theological ends of determining the truth and developing
understanding, each with its corresponding procedure, 41 it is clear
that for Thomas the appropriate question is not whether
40 Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 395 (= Donceel, trans, The Trinity, 117-18; it is this
translation that is given in the text). ("Hier beginnen nun tatsiichlich die Schwerigkeiten der
klassischen psychologischen Trinitiitspekulation. Sie hat kein [vor der Trinitiitslehre schon
gewuBtes] einleuchtendes Modell aus der menschlichen Psychologie fiir die Trinitiitslehre, um
verstiindlich zu machen, warum giittliche Erkenntnis also absolutes urspriingliches Beisichsein
notwendig die distinkte Subsistenzweise des 'Ausgesagten' bedeute oder iiberhaupt giittliche
ErkenntnisAussage und nicht blosses urspriingliches Beisichsein in absoluter Identitiit besagt,
sondern postuliert eher von der Trinitiitslehre her ein Modell des menschlichen Erkennens
gerade als eines endlichen, und wendet dieses Modell dann wieder auf Gott an. Es wird,
anders ausgedriickt, nicht verstiindlich gemacht, warum Erkennen und Lieben in Gott auch
eine 'processio ad modum operati' [als Verbum oder als 'amatum in amante'] fordern ....
Dann wird auch deutlich, daB diese psychologische Trinitiitstheorie den Charakter <lessenhat,
was man in der sonstigen Wissenschaft eine 'Hypothese' nennt."). The footnote adds, "Vgl.
z. B. die Aussagen von B. Lonergan, De Deo Trino ... die zuletzt auch nur auf eine
'Hypothese' hinauslaufen." ("Compare, for example, the statements of B. Lonergan, De Deo
Trina ... they too, finally, amount only to a hypothesis.")
41 See n. 31 above.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

579

theological understanding is certain or "merely hypothetical"; it
whether and to what extent the hypothesis illumines and is
confirmed by the data. 42 Thomas did not speak in terms of
hypothesis and verification. But he recognized its foundation in
the duplex operatio mentis and the discursive process of human
reasoning. 43
The development of theological method between the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries effectively brought to light the importance of this structure in the investigation of the mysteries of
faith. Aristotle had conceived science as true and certain
knowledge of things through their causes. Even so, the conception
of sacra doctrina as a science in the Aristotelian sense had to be
expanded to make room for the Augustinian crede ut intelligas for
the simple reason that reasons proportionate to supernatural
mysteries are not proportionate to human intelligence in this life
or even the next. 44 Modern science understands itself to be no
more than the best available hypothesis, indirectly verified;
Thomist sacra doctrina at least acknowledges that there is for us
no certain knowledge of the causes of the mysteries. Accordingly
a theological hypothesis must be indirectly verified, like any
scientific hypothesis; one has to work out its implications and test
them against relevant data. The mysteries are received in faith
though we do not understand them, but a hypothesis in systematic
theology is accepted precisely because it is understood and its
explanatory power appreciated. Where the criteria are set by the
desire to understand, the hypothesis with the greatest explanatory
power for the greatest range of questions will be acknowledged as
the best available. Of course, there are competing desires, and
where they are allowed to set the criteria, political utility or
42 Lonergan expressly stresses the hypothetical character of the analogy: see Verbum, 213-

22; but he also presents compelling reasons to suppose it is the best available hypothesis: see
Triune God: Systematics, 168-8 O; also idem, The Triune God: Doctrines, Collected Works vol.
11 (Toronto: University of Toronto, 2009), 638-84. See too Philip McShane, "The
Hypothesis of Intelligible Emanations in God," Theological Studies 23 (1962): 545-68.
43 See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "A Dialectic of 'Thomist' Realisms: John Knasas and Bernard
Lonergan," American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly 78 (2004): 122-44.
44 See Lonergan, Verbum, 213-22.

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

cleverness or some value other than explanatory power will determine the success or failure of theological hypotheses.
This is not the place for a proper explication of the psychology
underlying the analogy developed by Augustine, Thomas, and
Lonergan, and in any case Lonergan gave a careful exposition of
the historical and theoretic questions in Verbum and Insight. We
should at least take note, however, of the fact that Rahner's grasp
of the psychology and its analogical application is inexact. He
continues the passage introduced above:
The difficulty grows because we cannot say that the actual divine knowledge or
love, insofar as either is the Father's as such (already given with his divine
essence) are formally constituted by the Word. We cannot say, therefore, that the
Father knows through the Word; rather he says the Word because he knows. If
human psychology can demand an operatum (an object of the act of knowing),
it can do so only because and insofar as otherwise spiritual knowledge would not
exist. 45

The implied contrast between the procession of the Word from
the Father because he knows, and the procession of the word in
us as that through which we know, overlooks utterly that while
the word is in us as a species in qua of our knowledge, it also
proceeds from intelligere which is the reception of a species qua.
In other words, it is true in us too that the word proceeds because
we understand. It is precisely this conscious ordering of the act of
understanding to the inner word, and the reciprocal relation of
the word to the act of understanding-that is, the conscious,
intellectual, rational because-that is germane to understanding
the divine processions. 46 More importantly, Rahner's understanding of the application of the analogy assumes the prior
45 Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 395(= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 118; it is this
translation that is given in the text). ("Die Schwerigkeit wiichst, weil ja nicht gesagt werden
kann, daS die aktuelle gottliche Erkenntnis oder Liebe, insofern sie die des Vaters als solchen
ist [und schon gegeben ist mit dem giittlichen Wesen des Vaters ], formal konstituiert sei <lurch
<las Verbum, der Vater also durch <las Wort erkenne [er sagt vielmehr <las Wort, weil er
erkennt]. Wenn aber eine menschliche Psychologie ein 'operatum' fordern kann, dann gerade
nur deshalb, weil und insofern sonst die geistige Erkenntnis also solche nicht gegeben ware.").
46 See Lonergan, Verbum, 46-48, 204-8; Frederick Crowe, "For Inserting a New Question
(26A) in the Prima Pars," The Thomist 64 (2000): 565-80; McShane, "The Hypothesis of
Intelligible Emanations in God"; Wilkins, Emanatio intelligibilis in Dea, chap. 5.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

581

constitution of the Father as unoriginate possessor of the divine
essence, the very difficulty which the whole development of
Thomas's Trinitarian thought moved to overcome. 47
The most important point for the present purpose is that
Rahner's interpretation of the analogy is linked to his criticism
that it is "merely hypothetical." He regards it as a weakness that
the psychological theory cannot explain the necessity (Notwendigkeit) of immanent processiones operatorum in God. He repeats the
same contention in his Foundations of Christian Faith:
ultimately they [the speculations of the psychological theory] are not really all
that helpful. A "psychological theory of the Trinity" ... in the end does not
explain precisely what it is supposed to explain, namely, why the Father
expresses himself in a Word, and with the Logos breathes a Spirit which is
different from him. For such an explanation must already presuppose the Father
as knowing and loving himself, and cannot allow him to be constituted as
knowing and loving in the first place by the expression of the Logos and the
spiration of the Spirit. 48

But Thomas had his necessities too, and one of them was that no
one should pretend to give necessary reasons for mysteries hidden
in God. In this life we know the divine Trinity only by revelation,
and can understand it only analogically. This was one of the
reasons why Thomas rejected the self-diffusive character of the
good as a relevant explanatory principle for the divine
processions; it seemed to prove too much by suggesting we could
grasp the necessity of the plurality of persons in God. 49
Theological mysteries in the strict sense are too high for us to
47 See Lonergan, Verbum, 213-22; Paul Vanier, Theologie trinitaire chez saint Thomas
d'Aquin (Montreal: Institut d'Etudes Medievales, 1953), 15-66; Wilkins, Emanatio
intelligibilis in Deo, chap. 4.
48 Rahner, Grundkurs,
134 (= Foundations, 135) ("[Die Spekulationen einer
'psychologischen Trinitatslehre'] ... im letzten Grunde <loch nicht sehr hilfreich sind. Eine
'psychologische Trinitatslehre' ... erklart am Ende gerade <las nicht, was sie erklaren will,
namlich warum der Yater sich im Wort aussage und mit dem Logos ein von ihm verschiedenes
Pneuma hauche. Denn eine solche Erklarung muss den Yater als sich erkennend und libend
schon voraussetzen und darf ihn nicht <lurch die Aussage des Logos und die Hauchung des
Pneumas erst als erkennend und liebend konstituiert sein !assen."). Here again Rahner does
not appear to have an exact grasp of the underlying psychology.
49 See STh I, q. 32, a. 1, obj. 2 and ad 2. For fuller treatment, see Wilkins, Emanatio
intelligibilis in Dea, chap. 4.

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

understand in this life, and it is rationalism or semi-rationalism to
suppose we can assign necessary reasons for them.
For Thomas, the goal of Trinitarian theology is much more
modest. He aims simply to "save the appearances," that is, to
account for the known facts without pretending to understand the
mysteries in themselves. The methodological differentiation of the
twofold mode of truth, evident in the whole structure of the
Summa contra Gentiles, is likewise brought to bear in the
elaboration of Trinitarian theology.
Reason can be brought to bear on a matter in two ways. In one way, to
sufficiently establish a principle, as in natural science sufficient reason can be
given to establish that the movement of the heavens is always of uniform
velocity. In another way, reason is brought to bear not to sufficiently prove the
principle, but to show how the effects fit the established principles. Thus in
astronomy, the theory of eccentricities and epicycles is accepted because it can
explain the sensible appearances of the heavenly movements; but not as though
this were sufficient proof, because another theory might also do. In the first way,
reason can be applied to establish that God is one, and so forth. But it is in the
second way that reason is applied to manifest the Trinity, because, granted the
Trinity, reasons of this kind fit; but it is not as though the Trinity of persons is
sufficiently established by these reasons. 50

Different kinds of reasons are available for different kinds of
questions. One may prove the existence and attributes of God, for
which creation furnishes sufficient proof; but let there be no
pretence of proving the mysteries or discovering necessary reasons
for them. Sacra doctrina as a subalternate science of the mysteries
so "[A]d aliquam rem dupliciter inducitur ratio. Uno modo, ad probandum sufficienter
aliquam radicem, sicut in scientia naturali inducitur ratio sufficiens ad probandum quod motus
caeli semper sit uniformis velocitatis. Alio modo inducitur ratio, non quae sufficienter probet
radicem, sed quae radici iam positae ostendat congruere consequentes effectus, sicut in
astrologia ponitur ratio excentricorum et epicyclorum ex hoc quod, hac positione facta,
possunt salvari apparentia sensibilia circa motus caelestes, non tamen ratio haec est sufficienter
probans, quia etiam forte alia positione facta salvari possent. Primo ergo modo potest induci
ratio ad probandum Deum esse unum, et similia. Sed secundo modo se habet ratio quae
inducitur ad manifestationem Trinitatis, quia scilicet, Trinitate posita, congruunt huiusmodi
rationes; non tamen ita quod per has rationes sufficienter probetur Trinitas personarum" (STh
I, q. 32, a. 1, ad 2). See too Quodlibet IV, q. 9, a. 3, where Thomas explains that, in theology,
one appeals to authority to establish the articles of faith, and gives reasons to understand how
the articles of faith are true.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

583

takes its principles as true on the authority of God. The sole
sufficient and necessary reason-not only in the sense of the causa
essendi but also in the sense of the causa cognoscendi-for the
divine Trinity is the nature of God, and in this life we know God
only by remotion. The articles of faith are the starting point of the
way of understanding in theology. For Thomas, the enterprise of
sacra doctrina is too humble, and its subject too high, to abide the
conceit of necessity. He sets himself to the homelier task of
developing an obscure, indirect, but fruitful and reverent
hypothesis to manifest or illumine the contingent revelation of the
divine persons through the missions of Word and Spirit.
While Rahner faults Thomas for erecting an immodest
theology on the basis of the psychological analogy, his own
proposal in Der dreifaltige Gott betrays a predilection for
necessary intelligibilities which in the end seems far less modest
than the approach it sets itself over against. This tendency is
already intimated in the formulation of his Grundthese ("the
'economic' Trinity is the 'immanent' Trinity"), which glosses over
the very basic problem of contingent predication in the theory of
the missions. 51 On this question, too, Rahner's Trinitarian
theology pursues the path of de-differentiation. 52
Contingent predication is a much more obvious and pressing
problem when theological intelligibility is not a matter of
necessity and impossibility but of the possible and conveniens, as,
for example, in dealing with the motives for the incarnation. In a
systematic theology conceived in terms of the procedure of
hypothesis and verification, the intelligibility to be sought will not
be necessary but conveniens, appropriate, fitting. By convenientia
here is meant, not just a nice example, but a proper intelligibility
that is contingent and not fully understood in this life. It denotes
51 On the conditions for the missions, see Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 382-83 (=
Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 100-101). Cf. STh I, q. 13 a. 7; q. 43 aa. 1-3; Lonergan, Triune
God: Systematics, 436-42.
52 Patrick Burke, Reinterpreting Rahner: A Critical Study of His Major Themes (New York:
Fordham University, 2002), though very sympathetic to Rahner's project, recognizes
something of this problem in terms of a weak role for concepts in Rahner's epistemology. The
difficulties seem to be more fundamental than Burke appreciates.

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

the concrete intelligibility of the actual economy of salvation
which is necessary neither in its essence nor in its actuality. 53 A
grasp of convenientia is not a grasp of necessity or impossibility,
but rather of a probably verified intelligibility, or, more precisely,
of a hypothesis indirectly verified in the measure that its
implications can be worked out, tested against the available data
(the "appearances" in Scripture and tradition), and shown to
answer the relevant questions. Because this understanding pertains
to the mysteries of faith which exceed the proportion of human
knowledge-mysteries received, in the present life, in faith-it is
based on analogy with realities naturally known, the
interrelationships among the mysteries, and their connection to
our final destiny. 54
Rahner's criticisms of the Augustinian-Thomist approach and
his own counterproposal give the sense that insight regarding
convenientia, as opposed to necessity, is no understanding at all.
For instance:
[S]tarting from Augustine, and as opposed to the older tradition, it has been
among theologians a more or less foregone conclusion that each of the divine
persons (if God freely so decided) could have become man, so that the
incarnation of precisely this person can tell us nothing about the property of this
person within the divinity. 55

53 See Lonergan, "De ratione convenientiae eiusque radice, de excellentia ordinis, de signis
rationis systematice et universaliter ordinatis, denique de convenientia, et fine incarnationis.
Supplementum schematicum," with Appendix: "Aliqua solutio possibilis" (Rome: St. Francis
Xavier College [Gesu], 1953-54), 14pp. (unpublished manuscript). See also Gilbert Narcisse,
Les raisons de Dieu: Argument de convenance et esthetique theologique (Fribourg: Editions
Universitaires Fribourg Suisse, 1997), esp. 101-13. Narcisse's sympathy to Hans Urs von
Balthasar sometimes unbalances his work so that the epistemological validity of rationes
convenientiae in theology is not adequately assessed.
54 This is in accordance with Vatican I's formulation of the task of theological
understanding, (DS 3016 I DB 1796).
55 Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 320 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 11; translation
modified). ("Es ist ja unter den Theologen seit Augustinus [gegen die ihm vorausgehende
Tradition] eine mehr oder weniger ausgemachte Sache, daB jede der gottlichen Personen
[wenn es von Gott nur frei gewollt werde] Mensch werden konne und somit die
Menschwerdung gerade dieser bestimmten Person iiber die innergottliche Eigentiimlichkeit
gerade dieser Person nichts aussage").

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585

If we admit that every divine person might assume a hypostatic union with a
created reality, then the fact of the incarnation of the Logos "reveals" properly
nothing about the Logos himself, that is, about his own relative property within
the divinity. 56

These statements are very forceful: the mission of the Word
"declares nothing," allows us to know "properly nothing" about
the proprium of the Word.
What is at stake on these points for Thomas is the difference
between abstract (or absolute) and verified possibility. It is
abstractly possible for any divine person (or all three) to become
incarnate,5 7 for the peremptory reason that each of the divine
persons is God, God is infinite, and what is infinite is not subject
to any conditions whatsoever. Thomas might fairly bid anyone
who fails to grasp this point to return to question 2 of the Prima
Pars and work through the enstiing questions to clarify the
meaning of the name 'God'. On the other hand, in the concrete
order of salvation the Word is incarnate as author of salvation,
and the Spirit is poured forth to change hearts of stone to hearts
of flesh. Thomas's theology is able to acknowledge the abstract
possibility of any person becoming incarnate without losing sight
of the concretely verified possibility of the actual order of the
economy. It is this concretely verified possibility that Thomas is
interested in understanding. Hence in the Tertia Pars he asks, first,
why it was appropriate that God be incarnate, and second, why it
was appropriate that it be the person of the Word. 58
In contrast to this is Rahner's proposal, in Foundations of
Christian Faith, that the Son be understood as God's ability to
manifest himself.
If by three persons, or, more precisely, by the formalities which form the
'person' and distinguish the 'person', we understand three modes of subsistence
Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 332 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 28; translation
modified in the text above). ("Wenn man annimt, daB jede gottliche Person eine hypostatische
Union mit einer geschopflichen Wirklichkeit eingehen konnte, so 'enthiillt' die Tatsache der
Incarnation des Logos von ihm selbst, das heiBt von siener innergottlichen eigenen relativen
Eigentiimlichkeit eigentlich nichts").
57 STh III, q. 3, aa. 1-6.
58 STh III, q. 1; and q. 3, a. 8.
56

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

in the one God, and the second of these is exactly identical with God's ability to
express himself in history, which ability precisely as such belongs immanently
and essentially to God and is inner-Trinitarian, then we can and also have to
speak of a pre-existence of the subject who expresses himself in Jesus Christ. 59

Here we encounter two significant problems, from the standpoint
of the traditional theological and dogmatic framework, regarding
(1) the conception of the Son's proprium in terms of an absolute
divine attribute, and (2) the personal identity of the 'subject' in
Jesus Christ.
First, the Son is conceived as a divine 'ability', the divine
capacity for historical self-revelation (Aussagbarkeit). It was not
necessary that God be incarnate; but if God be incarnate,
necessarily the incarnate God is the Son. Thus Rahner proposes
a necessary (as opposed to conveniens) intelligibility both for the
eternal identity of the Son, and for the structure of the economy
as spelled out in his "transcendental Christology." 60 It is not
immediately clear, however, how this proposal avoids the
purported immodesty of the theory it aims to supplant. Where
Augustine and Thomas had acknowledged something inscrutable
in divine wisdom, will, and power, Rahner postulates a contingent
necessity in God which, moreover, is at least vaguely modalist. 61
On Rahn er' s account, the proprium of the Son is to be the
"geschichtlichen Aussagbarkeit Gottes," the possibility of divine
revelation in history. But the possibility of divine revelation in
history has its sole sufficient condition in divine wisdom and
59 Rahner, Grundkurs, 289 ( = Foundations, 3 04) ("Versteht man unter den drei Person en,
d. h. genauer unter den 'Person'-bildenden und 'Person'-unterscheidenden Formalitiiten drei
Subsistenzweisen des einen Gottes, von denen die zweite gerade identisch ist mit der
geschichtlichen Aussagbarkeit [sic] Gottes, die gerade so, Gott immanent und wesentlich
zugehorig, immanent-trinitarisch ist, dann kann und muss von einer Priiexistenz des sich selbst
in Jesus Christus aussagenden Subjekts gesprochen werden"). Cf. Rahner, "Der dreifaltige
Gott," 330-32 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 24-28).
60 Rahner, Grundkurs, chap. 6 (=Foundations,
chap. 6). This has also been raised by
Ormerod, The Trinity, 127.
61 This is an ancient problematic: see, for example, Augustine, De Trinitate 2.9, where he
considers the position that the Son is distinguished by his "visibility." Earlier examples could
be multiplied. The whole of book 2 of De Trinitate constitutes an argument against something
like Rahner's suggestion, that the divine Son might be distinguished from the Father precisely
in his capacity for manifestation to human beings.

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

587

power, and its consequent term in history. God revealing or not
revealing in history makes a real difference, not in God, but in
history; it is a contingent predicate. Failure to come to grips with
contingent predication has real consequences. On the other hand,
the divine attributes are not contradistinguished from one another
in reality, but only in our thinking; there is no real distinction in
God except on the basis of relations of origin: "all is one, except
where there is opposition of relation. " 62
Hence, Rahner's proposal seems to assign an absolute, rather
than relational, reality as the proprium of the Son. On Thomas's
account, distinguishing the divine persons on the basis of absolute
realities is either Arian or Sabellian. If the Son is really distinct on
the basis of an absolute reality, the position is Arian, "for
whatever is predicated absolutely of God, signifies the divine
essence; whence it would follow that the divine persons were
distinguished by essence, which is the heresy of Arius." 63
Alternatively, if the distinction is absolute but merely of reason,
the position is Sabellian. 64 Of course, Rahner knows this dilemma
and intends to transcend it by asserting that the distinctions are
real (contra Sabellius), but they are within God and not extrinsic
to God (contra Arius). This is quite correct, from a dogmatic
standpoint, but the bare assertion itself merely restates the
traditional problem, without shedding any light upon it.
In point of fact, Rahner's effort to reconstitute the tradition
while avoiding the traditional dilemmas has some fairly awkward
consequences. Consider the Christological implications of his
regular insistence that God is Absolute Subject. 65 By three
'persons' in the Trinity, Rahner understands three 'modes of
subsistence' (Subsistenzweisen), apparently within the one
62 "omnia sunt unum, ubi non obviat relationis oppositio" (Decretum pro Iacobitis [DS
1330 I DB 703]).
63 "quia quidquid absolute in divinis praedicatur, Dei essentiam significat; unde sequeretur
quod personae divinae per essentiam distinguerentur, quod est haeresis Arii" (De Pot., q. 8 a.

1).
64 See STh I, q. 27, a. 4, ad 1; I Sent., d. 32, q. 1, a. 1.

See Rahner, Grundkurs, 122, 132, 133-34, 202, 207, 289 (=Foundations, 122, 133,
134-35, 209, 215, 304); idem, "Derdreifaltige Gott," 364-66, 385-93 (= Donceel, trans., The
Trinity, 75-76, 103-15).
65

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

Absolute Subject. We leave to one side the reasonable question
how this conception of God as Absolute Subject puts Rahner in a
position to criticize Thomas's treatment of "what pertains to the
divine essence" 66 in order to put a different question, regarding
the coherence of Trinitarian theology with Christology. Who is
the pre-existent divine subject that expresses himself in Christ? 67
Who is the center of Christ's ontological and psychological
identity? Who prays to the Father in Gethsemane? Is it the
'Absolute Subject'? Is it a 'mode of subsistence'? It cannot be a
created person, a human person, for this is excluded by the
dogmas: it is Nestorian, if there are two subjects, and Ebionite, if
there is only one, a human, subject. 68
Rahner argues that we cannot take it for granted that "person,
when this concept comes to be used in Christology, means simply
what it does in the Trinity. " 69 If there is undoubtedly something
in this, I am inclined to think it is because progr,ess in theological
understanding and the development of dogma are linked but not
identical processes. On the problem of Christ's personhood,
theological understanding did not progress in a straight line, and
there is plenty of confusion in the historical record. Yet the
fundamental meaning of the Christological dogma is not obscure.
Again and again, we read in Leo and the Chalcedonian definition
that "one and the same," our Lord Jesus Christ, is the single and
sole subject of two distinct and unconfused sets of predicates. The
"one and the same" of the Chalcedonian definition is the person
of the Word. Union "in person" and not "in nature" means that
"not God the Father, not the Holy Spirit, not the Trinity itself,
66 STh I, q. 2, pro!.
67 See Rahner, Grundkurs, 287-89

(=Foundations, 302-4).

68 Roger Haight, Jesus, Symbol of God (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis, 1999), seems to fall into

the latter position. I venture some criticisms of his project in my "The 'I' of Jesus Christ,"
Josephinum Journal of Theology 12 (2005): 18-29.
69 Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 331 ("'Person', wenn dieser Begriff in der Christologie
verwendert wird, einfachin dasselbe wie in der Trinitat meine"). Donceel's translation of this
paragraph (The Trinity, 27) is completely inattentive to the technical meanings of terms;
Rahner's 'Eigenart' is rendered variously "peculiar nature," "peculiarity," "proper nature," but
it corresponds to the Latin "proprium" and so, in the context of Trinitarian theology, ought
to be rendered "property" and never conflated with "nature."

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

589

but only the Son, the Word of God, became flesh. " 70 What there
are three of in God, there is one of in Christ: "one of the Trinity
died for us." This might seem to be the obvious meaning of a
Grundaxiom affirming the identity of the economic with the
immanent Trinity, but it is not so for Rahner. His affirmation that
God is Absolute Subject raises grave questions about the personal
identity of Christ, and I do not find that he has faced them
squarely. 71
Rahner, for his part, contends that the psychological analogy
isolates Thomas's account of the Trinity from the rest of his
theology. But precisely the opposite is the case. In the Summa
Theologiae, Thomas's conception of the triune God fundamentally
shapes his thinking about the Trinitarian imago and its perfection,
and the fittingness of the incarnation of the Word and the Spirit's
gift of grace and charity. Created persons are brought into
communion with divine persons through contemplative
knowledge and love which is a created communication of the
Trinitarian life. 72 It is more than false to say that Thomas's
"psychological" approach isolates Trinity from economy; it is
precisely by this theory that Thomas profoundly manifests the
integration of Trinity and economy. Perhaps he should have done
more to spell out the connections for his readers, but it might
have been difficult for him to anticipate the relentless skepticism,
the loss of differentiation (about contingent predication,
convenientia, etc.), and the short attention span that has greeted
his project in recent decades.
70 Augustine, De Trin. 15.11.20 (ML 42: 1073) ("non Deus Pater, non Spiritus sanctus, non
ipsa Trinitas, sed solus Filius, quod est Verbum Dei, caro factum est").
71 Compare the texts on Absolute Subject noted above to the following statements about
Christ as subject: Rahner Grundkurs, 203-4 (here the possibility of Nestorianism seems
especially acute), 211-14, 227, 239-44, 273-79, 287-89 (=Foundations, 211, 219-23, 236,
249-55, 286-93, 302-5). Person, subject, subjectivity are terms of notable obscurity in
Rahner's use: see Grundkurs, 273-79 (=Foundations, 286-93); "Der dreifaltige Gott," 36466 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 73-76).
72 See Jeremy D. Wilkins, "Trinitarian Missions and the Order of Grace according to
Thomas Aquinas," in K. Emery, R. Friedman, and A. Speer, eds., Philosophy and Theology in
the Long Middle Ages: A Tribute to Stephen F. Brown, Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters 105 (Leiden: E. ]. Brill, 2011), 689-708.

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

When Rahner leaves off asserting necessary intelligibilities for
Trinity and economy, his better angels reassert themselves.
Indicating that his fundamental objection to the psychological
analogy is its lack of modesty, he explains the limits within which
an hypothesis of intelligible emanations might meet his criteria. 73
To meet his requirements, a reformed "psychological" account
would have to be subordinated to the modest necessities he posits,
with kataphatic certitude, as the indispensable safeguards of
apophatic humility. Nevertheless, he grants that such an account
could yield fruitful insight into the economy. So, in a statement
more rhetorically effective than precise, he suggests that "a
revelation of the Father without the Logos and his incarnation
would be like speaking without a word. " 74 It is a familiar insight.
CONCLUSION

The Trinitarian theologies of Thomas Aquinas and Karl Rahner
manifest divergence along a series of points: on how to order
questions about God, on the kinds of intelligibilities to be sought
in systematic theology and how they are to be verified, and on the
content of theology itself. The evidence suggests that Thomas and
Rahner are separated by more than differences of theological
opinion. Their theological projects diverge because their
theological horizons diverge.
The range of data surveyed from the works of Rahner is
insufficient to lay bare the roots of this divergence. If I were to
venture an opinion about where the roots may be found, I should
say that Rahner and Thomas have fundamentally opposed
conceptions of the goal of theological understanding, which in
turn suggests still deeper points of dialectical opposition. Rahner's
goal is a grasp of necessity and impossibility. For Thomas, this
cannot be the standard for theological investigation. Systematic
Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 396 (= Donceel, trans., The Trinity, 119-20).
Rahner, "Der dreifaltige Gott," 333 ("eine Offenbarung des Vaters ohne den Logos und
seine Inkarnation dasselbe wie ein Reden ohne Wort ware")(= Donceel, trans., The Trinity,
29 ["A revelation of the Father without the Logos and his incarnation would be like speaking
without words"]).
73

74

METHOD, ORDER, AND ANALOGY IN TRINITARIAN THEOLOGY

591

theology deals with the contingent and the fitting. The
understanding it achieves is hypothetical.
Fundamentally different conceptions of the goal of theological
understanding result in differences in the conception of how the
goal should be achieved and how its fruit should be presented.
These fundamental differences also account for many of the
disagreements on particular theological questions, and probably
explain Rahner's failure to grasp how Thomas integrated Trinity
and economy in his Summa Theologiae.
In my judgment, Rahner's critique of Thomas reflects a dedifferentiation and regression in both the method and content of
Trinitarian theology. The treatise on God in the Prima Pars is an
achievement of breathtaking genius, as Lonergan and others have
showed. Unfortunately, Rahner's criticisms seem to have been as
influential as they are superficial and inaccurate. He did not begin
to come to terms with the deeper ramifications of Thomas's
achievement in ordering the questions on God, refining the
analogy of intelligible emanations, clarifying the problem of
contingency in the economy, and manifesting its Trinitarian
structure.
In all this, Thomas was receiving and building upon a
longstanding and generally cumulative tradition of Trinitarian
theology. This tradition achieved a high degree of differentiation
on questions regarding unity and distinction in God and
contingent predications about God. Rahner neglects this tradition
and glosses over its constitutive questions, with bad results for the
coherence of his theological program. His Grundaxiom
identifying Trinity and economy is too compact to found a serious
project, and his identification of God as Absolute Subject creates
unresolved difficulties for his Christology.
From time to time I have linked Augustine, Thomas, and
Lonergan in a series. They are operating in genetically linked
horizons, though I cannot substantiate that claim here. Their
theological accounts of Trinity and economy are cumulative and
progressive because their horizons are in a genetic sequence. The
progress is not merely linear or accretive. There is also genuine

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JEREMY D. WILKINS

transposition to successively more differentiated contexts. Thomas
and Lonergan each received the achievement of his predecessor in
the sequence and inserted it into a more differentiated
methodological and theoretical context to form a dynamic, open,
and expansive theologia perennis of the mystery of the Trinity. 75
Let me conclude by recalling Rahner's remark to the effect
that, when Thomas is finished with it, the Trinity "seems to have
been communicated for its own sake. " 76 If the remark in its
intended sense reflects an oversight, still it points to deep mystery.
In the theological understanding of St. Augustine, St. Thomas
Aquinas, and Fr. Lonergan, the Trinity is an eternal order of
giving and receiving, of divine self-communication. The order of
grace is a created communication of that same order. Divine
intersubjectivity consists in an ordered, contemplative love of the
divine Good and all things in that Good, and human
intersubjectivity is fulfilled in the created communication of that
same ordered, contemplative love. In the deepest and most
important sense, this is indeed the one and only reality
"communicated for its own sake." Divine self-communication is
fathomless mystery, in itself and in our receiving it, not only here
but even in the heavenly Jerusalem where "our love shall pass
over into him, that as God willed all things to be for his own sake,
so we too may will neither ourselves or anything else to have been
and to be, except equally for his sake, on account of his will alone
and not our pleasure. " 77
75 For an example of what I mean by transposition to a more differentiated horizon, see
Lonergan's account of how Thomas differentiated Augustine's theology of grace and freedom,
in Bernard Lonergan, Grace and Freedom, Collected Works vol. 1 (Toronto: University of
Toronto, 2000), 14-20, 181-91.
76 Text and context at note 15 above.
77 Saint Bernard of Clairvaux, De diligendo Dea 10.28 (PL 182:990D-991A) ("Oportet
proinde in eumdem nos affectum quandocunque transire: ut quomodo Deus omnia esse voluit
propter semetipsum, sic nos quoque nee nosipsos, nee aliud aliquid fuisse, vel esse velimus,
nisi aeque propter ipsum, ob solam videlicet ipsius voluntatem, non nostram voluptatem").
The translation is my own. The passage is quoted and discussed in E. Gilson, The Mystical
Theology of St. Bernard, trans. A. H. C. Downes (N.Y.: Sheed and Ward, 1940), 131.
I wish to acknowledge an anonymous reviewer for The Thomist whose valuable suggestions
improved this article.

The Thomist 74 (2010): 593-626

AD BONA GRATIAE ET GLORIAE:
FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8
GREGORY VALL
Ave Maria University
Ave Maria, Florida

A

CCORDING TO ITS MUNDANE USAGE in the GrecoRoman world, the word u1o0rn(a denotes the adoption of
a son, especially in order to secure an heir and to provide
for one's old age. 1 The Apostle Paul seems to have coined the
theological usage whereby u1o0rn(a denotes the grace by which
God brings human beings into a filial relationship with himself. 2

1 In this sense the word occurs with some frequency in inscriptions, literature, and
nonliterary papyri, beginning in the second century B.C. See Henry George Liddell and Robert
Scott, eds., A Greek-English Lexicon, revised and augmented by Henry Stuart Jones and
Roderick McKenzie (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), 794b-795a, 1846b; and James Hope
Moulton and George Milligan, The Vocabulary of the Greek Testament, Illustraied from the
Papyri and other Non-Literary Sources (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1930; repr. 1972),
648b-649a.
2 W. Bauer, F. W. Danker, W. F. Arndt, F. W. Gingrich, A Greek-English Lexicon of the
New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature, 3d ed. (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 2000), 1024 (hereafter BDAG); W. von Martitz and E. Schweizer, "uio0rn(a" in G.
Friedrich and G. W. Bromiley, eds., Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, vol. 8
(Grand Rapids. Mich.: Eerdmans, 1972), 397-99. On the Old Testament background, see
especially James M. Scott, Adoption as Sons of God: An Exegetical Investigation into the
Background of Huiothesia in the Pauline Corpus, WUNT 2/48 (Tiibingen: Mohr-Siebeck,
1992). The twentieth-century debate over whether we should look to the Greco-Roman world
or to the Old Testament for the background to Paul's use of this word is resolved in the
recognition that both backgrounds are operative but on two different levels of discourse. Paul
is using the term uio0Ea(a metaphorically, applying the Greco-Roman concept of one human
being's adoption of another to the biblical reality of God's establishment of a covenant
relationship with human beings, his "adoption" of sons and daughters. The Greco-Roman
background is thus relevant to the term's literal semantics, while the Old Testament
background is relevant to its metaphorical usage. Whether or not the Old Testament contains
references to the practice of literal adoption comparable to what we find in the Greco-Roman

593

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GREGORY VALL

In Romans 9:4 Paul uses this term to refer to God's election of
Israel to a covenant relationship, placing it at the head of a list of
Israel's divinely bestowed prerogatives. The remaining four New
Testament occurrences of ulo8Eafa, which are likewise in the
Pauline corpus, refer to the new covenant grace by which God
makes us his sons and daughters in Christ (Rom 8:15, 23; Gal
4:5; Eph 1:5}.3
In Romans 8, Paul uses the word ulo8rnfa ("filial adoption")
in two different contexts. In verse 15 he speaks of "the Spirit of
filial adoption" (lTVEOµa ulo8rnfac;;) as something Christians have
already received and by which we cry out "Abba, Father." In verse
23 he refers to ulo8rnfa as something that we still await and
identifies it with "the redemption of our bodies. " 4 Douglas Moo,
world is therefore irrelevant. Nor is it really telling that the Old Testament itself never actually
uses a word meaning "adoption" to refer to God's election of Israel or of the house of David.
That Paul can metaphorically apply the Greco-Roman term uio0rn(a to Yahweh's election of
Israel in an intelligible manner is clear from his use of the term in Rom 9:4, which recalls a
whole trajectory of Old Testament passages, beginning with Exod 4:22. A similar conclusion
is reached, after a helpful sketch of the history of interpretation, in James I. Cook, "The
Concept of Adoption in the Theology of Paul," in idem, ed., Saved by Hope: Essays in Honor
of Richard C. Oudersluys (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1978), 133-44.
3 Etymologically uio0rn(a is a compound noun formed of two elements: uio-, which is the
root of the word
("son"); and -0rn(a (a modification of
derived from the verb
Ti0riµ1), which means "adoption." As Paul uses the term, both parts of the compound are
important. The first element, uio-, associates our adoptive sonship with Jesus' status as "Son
of God" (6
mu 0rnu). Paul is emphatic that Christians are "sons of God" (uiol 0rnu) and
"coheirs with Christ" (Rom 8:14, 17; Gal 3:26; 4:6-7). His use of the Aramaic word "Abba"
(Rom 8:15; Gal 4:6) suggests that we are invited to share something ofJesus' intimacy with,
trust in, and affection for, God (cf. Mk 14:36). At the same time, the second element, -Brn(a,
is crucially important inasmuch as it distinguishes our adoptive sonship from the divine
Sonship of Christ. According to the axiom, Christ is Son of God by nature, while we are sons
and daughters of God by grace. The Vulgate consistently renders uio0rn(a with the phrase
adoptio filiorum, a translation that nicely captures both truths. We are filii in Filia, but ours
is a filiatio adoptiva, to borrow a phrase that Thomas Aquinas sometimes employs (e.g. STh
III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3).
4 The biblical translations throughout this essay are my own. In verse 23 the word
uio0rn(av (accusative of uio0rn(a) is missing from some Greek manuscripts and other textual
witnesses, especially representatives of the Western Text. Joseph Fitzmyer would omit it on
the grounds that, according to verse 15, "Christians are already [in this life] adopted children
of God" Uoseph A. Fitzmyer, Romans: A New Translation with Introduction and
Commentary, Anchor Bible, vol. 33 [New York: Doubleday, 1993], 510). But this apparent
contradiction is no doubt the reason for the omission of uio0Ea(av from some witnesses,

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

595

an exegete in the Reformed tradition, explains that the Spirit of
filial adoption to which Paul refers in verse 15 is received "at the
moment of justification" but that "this adoption is incomplete and
partial . . . until the body has been transformed. " 5 Moo further
observes that Paul's double use of u1o8w(a in Romans 8 is typical
of "the 'already-not yet' tension that pervades his theology." 6
Thomas Aquinas's explanation is similar. Verse 15 refers to our
filial adoption as "initiated by the Holy Spirit justifying the soul,"
whereas verse 23 indicates that this adoption "will be
consummated by the glorification of the body itself. " 7 There is,
then, a two-stage realization of u1o8w(a, since by adopting
human beings God admits them "to the goods of grace and glory"
(ad bona gratiae et gloriae).8
The present essay aims to consider the nature of filial
adoption, its relation to the infusion of grace and charity at
justification, and the dynamics of the believer's progress from the
initiation of adoption to its consummation. Parts I and II will
examine the treatment of these issues in Douglas Moo's Epistle to
the Romans and in Thomas Aquinas's Super epistolam ad
Romanos lectura respectively. While the former will serve as
something of a foil for the latter, it is not merely such. Moo
brings the tools and methods of modern biblical scholarship to the
service of a serious theological attempt to grasp Paul's argument
as an integral whole, avoiding the atomistic and superficial
treatment of the biblical text that is characteristic of some
historical-critical exegesis. He thus proves to be a more able
dialogue partner for Thomas than even many Catholic exegetes
might be. Thomas's commentary, for its part, sheds considerable
whereas Fitzmyer himself admits that "it is difficult to explain how it got into the text of most
of the other Greek MSS" (ibid.). Cf. C. E. B. Cranfield, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary
on the Epistle to the Romans, vol. 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1979), 419 n. 1.
5 Douglas J. Moo, The Epistle to the Romans, New International Commentary on the New
Testament (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1996), 521.
6 Ibid.; cf. ibid., 501. Similarly, Cook, "Concept of Adoption," 139.
7 In Rom., c. 8, lect. 5. The translations of Thomas's works throughout this essay are my
own and are based on the Latin texts as presented by Enrique Alarcon at the University of
Navarre website (www.corpusthomisticum.org).
8 Cf. STh III, q. 23, a. 1, corp. and ad 1.

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light on Paul's teaching on filial adoption, especially with regard
to its nature and its relation to the infusion of grace and charity,
but leaves insufficiently illuminated Paul's teaching on
"sanctification" (aytacrµoc;). To begin to fill this lacuna, part III
will consider Thomas's discussion of the increase of charity in the
Secunda Secundae, question 24. Like all good exegesis and
theology, Thomas's interpretation of Paul does not constitute an
end in itself but sends us back to the sacred text with new insights
and further questions. Accordingly, part IV will take a fresh look
at Paul's teaching on filial adoption in Romans 8 (with reference
also to other parts of the Pauline corpus). Here I wish especially
to expound the dynamics by which the believer makes progress
toward the consummation of filial adoption in glory, and in doing
so to account for the particular accent that Paul places on the role
of the body and the place of suffering in the Christian life. My
purpose throughout is to illuminate not simply the thought of
Thomas or of Paul but the thing itself, namely, the grace of filial
adoption which has been bestowed on us in Jesus Christ.
I. DOUGLAS Mao's EPISTLE TO THE ROMANS

As we have seen, Douglas Moo and Thomas Aquinas agree that
Paul's references to ulo8rn(a in Romans 8: 15 and 8 :23 point to
two distinct moments in the redemption of the human person: the
initiation of filial adoption and its consummation. However, once
we begin to consider the precise nature of filial adoption and its
relation to other dimensions of redemption such as justification,
moral transformation, and the hope of attaining heavenly glory,
major differences emerge between these two exegetes, both in
their interpretation of the Epistle to the Romans and in their
overall understanding of the mystery of redemption. We can
arrive rather quickly at the heart of these differences between
Moo and Thomas if we begin in each case with the interpretation
of Romans 5: 1-11, a passage which, as all agree, anticipates and

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lays the groundwork for chapter 8. 9 In particular we need to
attend to the way in which each exegete understands Paul's
statement that "the love of God has been poured into our hearts
through the Holy Spirit" (5 :5) as well as his teaching on "the hope
of the glory of God," that is, the assurance we have in Christ of
attaining final salvation (5 :2, 9-10). Moving on from this starting
point, we shall consider how each exegete interprets Paul's
teaching on filial adoption in Romans 8.
In his comment on Romans 5 :5, Moo notes that the phrase
aychn1 TOU ernu) can denote either God's
"the love of God"
love for us (subjective genitive) or our love for God (objective
genitive). Moo considers it "certain" that we should construe
Paul's grammar in the former manner, and he by no means
understands Paul to refer to divine love as an infused virtue. What
we are given is, rather, "the subjective certainty that God does
love us." 10 The Father has demonstrated his love for us "in the
objective, factual event of Christ's death on the cross," and by the
action of the Holy Spirit this love is "experienced 'in the heart' by
the believer. " 11 While Moo does not deny that this gift includes an
"intellectual recognition of the fact of God's love," he accents the
"internal, subjective-yes, even emotional-sensation within the
believer. " 12 This interpretation fits the context of Romans 5: 1-11
tolerably well and also has the merit of harmonizing nicely with
8:15-16, where Paul identifies the Holy Spirit as "the Spirit of
filial adoption" who "bears witness with our spirit that we are
children of God," thus prompting us to "cry out, 'Abba, Father."'
It is important to note, however, that Moo does not attempt to
relate the Holy Spirit's gift of "the love of God" to the same
9 Modern commentators, including Moo, recognize a strong thematic and structural link
between Romans 5:1-11 and 8:1-39, but this link is especially obvious in the Latin text upon
which Thomas is commenting. In 5 :2, where the Greek text says that we boast "in the hope
of the glory of God" (br' O.n(lit Tfjc; 1i6s11c; wu 8rnu), the Vulgate reads: "in the hope of
the glory of the sons of God" (in spe gloriae filiorum Dez), a phrase which anticipates 8: 18-25
in particular. Not surprisingly, Thomas's commentary on chapter 8 refers back to 5:1-11
several times.
10 Moo, Epistle to the Romans, 304.
11 Ibid., 309.
12 Ibid., 304-5.

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Spirit's work of delivering the regenerate believer from the power
of sin, though he readily acknowledges that such deliverance takes
place. 13 In Mao's reading of Paul these two components of the
Christian life seem to be extrinsically related, even though they
both come from the Holy Spirit.
Mao's interpretation of "the love of God poured into our
hearts" correlates with his dual conviction that justification by
faith is a strictly forensic matter-not to be confused with the
transformative
power of the Spirit that accompanies
justification-and that the justified believer possesses the absolute
certainty of attaining salvation. Justification is God's "past
declaration of acquittal pronounced over the sinner who believes
in Christ," and there is an "unbreakable connection between the
believer's justification and his or her salvation from the wrath of
God still to be poured out in the last day." 14 The "already-not
yet" tension characteristic of Christian existence in this life
derives from the fact that on the one hand the "believer's
acceptance of salvation" is "absolute and final," while on the
other hand "salvation is not complete until the body is redeemed
and glorified." 15 The "love of God poured into our hearts"
mediates between justification and final salvation only in the sense
of providing the subjective assurance that one has been justified
and will be saved. It is not an infused virtue or principle of moral
progress which moves one qualitatively closer to one's goal. While
a certain level of "holy living" is made possible by the Holy Spirit
and is in fact a "precondition" for attaining salvation, it is not in
any sense a grounds or cause of salvation. 16 In other words,
"justification" and "sanctification" are not only quite distinct but
extrinsically related.
As for filial adoption, Moo interprets the u'io0rn(a referred to
by Paul in Romans 8: 15 to be a status of sonship conferred at the
moment of justification-a status that gives the believer subjective
"peace and security" -while the completion of adoption spoken
Ibid., 494.
Ibid., 310-11.
15 Ibid., 311.
16 Ibid., 494-95.
13

14

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of in 8 :23 is nothing less than the redemption of the body and
thus tantamount to final salvation. 17 And just as Moo understands
the Holy Spirit's work of pouring God's love into our hearts (5 :5)
in terms of "subjective certainty," so his exegesis of the phrase
rrw:Gµa ulo0rn(ac; in 8: 15 emphasizes the "comforting conviction that we are God's own children." He explains: "Paul stresses
that our awareness of God as Father comes not from rational
consideration nor from external testimony alone but from a truth
deeply felt and intensely experienced. " 18 While the justified
believer is "sadly conscious" of moral failings, he or she has no
anxiety about whether final salvation will be achieved, and so the
inward "groaning" of which Paul speaks in 8 :23 is only the
"frustrated longing for final deliverance" from sin, death, and
wrath. 19 While Moo occasionally refers to salvation, or adoption,
as a "process," it is so only inasmuch as it consists of two
moments of transition-justification and glorification-with the
latter in some sense "completing" the former. 20 Though the
period in between these two moments may include any number of
vicissitudes, it is a steady state with respect to one's eternal
destiny. Moral progress or regress does not affect one's qualitative
proximity to salvation, and still less is there any possibility of
falling from grace or being restored to grace.
The exegetical strength of Moo's interpretation lies in the way
it does justice to the accent Paul places, both in Romans 5 and in
Romans 8, on the specific activity whereby the Holy Spirit
touches the human "heart" or "spirit" in order to bestow upon the
believer the subjective assurance of salvation and the confidence
to call upon God as Father. A weakness in his interpretation is
that it does not adequately account for the way Paul closely relates
this interior work of the Spirit both to the believer's death to sin
and to his or her endurance of afflictions. Why does Paul choose
to discuss filial adoption within that portion of the letter which is
most intensely concerned with moral transformation and suffering
Ibid., 501, 521.
Ibid., 502.
19 Ibid., 519.
20 Ibid., 519-20.
17

18

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(chapters 5-8)? That he perceives these dimensions of Christian
existence to be linked organically is especially clear in 8: 12-17,
and this is precisely where Moo's exegesis runs into serious
difficulties.
Having exhorted the Roman Christians to consider themselves
"dead to sin and alive to God" in chapter 6, and having
established a diametric opposition between living "according to
the flesh" and living "according to the Spirit" in the first part of
chapter 8 (verses 1-11 ), Paul now sternly warns his readers: "If
you live according to the flesh you will die, but if by the Spirit you
put to death the deeds of the body you will live" (8:13). This
mortification of sinful drives "by the Spirit" is rephrased
positively in terms of being "led by the Spirit," and Paul explains
that those so led-and only they-are "sons of God" (8: 14 ). This
statement leads directly into the description of the Holy Spirit as
the nw:uµa ulo0rn(ac; (8: 15-16). It seems tolerably clear therefore
that the mortification of sinful habits "by the Spirit" is at least one
integral component of being "led by the Spirit," and Moo grants
as much. Further, since Paul specifies that "as many as [oaot] are
led by the Spirit of God are sons of God," the conclusion seems
inescapable that death to sin is an intrinsic and essential
dimension of filial adoption. But it is precisely this conclusion that
Moo fails to draw. According to him, death to sin is one aspect of
being "led by the Spirit," and the latter is "a distinguishing sign"
of filial adoption, but filial adoption is not per se a matter of
dying to sin. 21 The two are extrinsically related. Those who enjoy
the status of filial adoption are the very same people as those who
put sin to death, but it is not one and the same grace that
accomplishes both, even though Paul ascribes both to the activity
of the Holy Spirit. Clearly Moo's concern is to guard against the
idea that one's ongoing status as son or daughter of God-and
thus one's prospects for attaining the completion of filial adoption
in the glorification of the body-is in any respect determined by
one's moral condition. He bolsters this interpretation by resisting
the idea that the theme of adoptive sonship is central to Romans
21 Ibid., 499.

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8. According to Moo, Paul's discussion of filial adoption in verses
15-16 is "somewhat parenthetical," and his references to sonship
in verses 19, 21, and 23 are "incidental" to his argument. 22
Moo's commitment to "the finality of justification" and to
keeping moral sanctification extrinsic both to justification and to
sonship leads to a rather strained exegesis of Romans 8:13: "If
you live according to the flesh you will die, but if by the Spirit you
put to death the deeds of the body you will live." Moo recognizes
that Paul here is saying that "his readers will be damned if they
continue to follow the dictates of the flesh," but insofar as Paul's
readers are "regenerate believers," Moo must suppose that Paul's
threat is merely theoretical. Damnation is not a real possibility for
the justified, for "the truly regenerate believer" is "infallibly
prevented from living a fleshly lifestyle by the Spirit within. " 23
Further, Paul's teaching-as Moo understands it-that God's
work in Christ is "the sole and final grounds for our eternal life"
and Paul's insistence on "the indispensability of holy living as the
precondition for attaining that life" are two things "we cannot
finally synthesize in a neat logical arrangement. " 24 Since Moo
admits that "this problem is basic to Reformed theology," 25 one
might reasonably wonder whether it is not so much the elements
of Paul's teaching as those of Calvinist doctrine that resist
synthesis.
II. THOMAS AQUINAS'S SUPER EPISTOLAM AD ROMANOS LECTURA

Turning now to the Super epistolam ad Romanos lectura
(supplemented by pertinent passages from the Summa
Theologiae), we may observe how differently Thomas Aquinas
deals with the same set of exegetical and theological issues. In
taking up the question of whether "the love of God" (caritas Dei)
in Romans 5 :5 should be understood as God's love for us or our
love for God, Thomas maintains that both loves are poured into
Ibid., 496.
Ibid., 494.
24 Ibid., 495.
25 Ibid., 495 n. 120.
22
23

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our hearts. He explains that, since the Holy Spirit is the eternal
"love [amor] of the Father and of the Son," the gift of the Spirit
brings us "into a participation of the love [amor] who is the Holy
Spirit," and that by this participation we are made "lovers of
God" (Dei amatores). Further, he notes that "the love [caritas] by
which we love [diligimus] God is said to be poured into our
hearts" because "it reaches to the perfecting of all the moral habits
and acts of the soul." 26 Four features of this richly illuminative
comment deserve our special attention.
First, Thomas judges that the grace of redemption bestows
upon the human person a real participation in God's inner life.
The Holy Spirit is the eternal love of the Father and the Son, or
as Thomas says elsewhere, the "bond" (nexus) between the Father
and the Son. 27 Thomas is able to develop this point with particular
clarity precisely in the context of explaining what is meant by
filial adoption. By "grace and charity" the rational creature is
"assimilated to the eternal Word according to the unity which the
Word has with the Father." 28 Filial adoption is thus "a certain
similitude of the eternal Sonship, just as all things which occur in
time are certain similitudes of those things which have been from
eternity." 29 It is evident from these passages that Thomas's
interpretation of Paul's doctrine of filial adoption is grounded on
metaphysical principles and on Trinitarian theology properly
speaking (i.e., not simply on a vague economic Trinitarianism), a
grounding that is absent from Mao's interpretation. While many
biblical scholars and theologians might view this hermeneutical
difference as a point in Moo's favor, I think that metaphysics and
Trinitarian theology enable Thomas to give an interpretation of
Romans that is, on balance, more penetrating and coherent than
that offered by Moo.
26 In Rom.,

c. 5, lect. 1.

STh II-II, q. 1, a. 8, ad 3. Naturally, Thomas distinguishes between the Holy Spirit as
eternal reality (aliquid aeternum) and grace as an effect in time (effectus temporalis}, so that
27

"the love of God poured into our hearts" signifies the latter insofar as it gives us a
participation in the former (cf. STh I-II, q. 111, a. 3, ad 1).
28 STh III, q. 23, a. 3.
29 STh III, q. 23, a. 2, ad 3.

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Second, Thomas is able to hold that "both loves" are poured
into our hearts because he understands that, while these two
infused loves are distinguishable, they are aspects of a single grace,
namely, gratia gratum faciens or "sanctifying grace." Indeed, the
grace by which we are justified, sanctified, and glorified is
numerically one, 30 such that moral transformation is an intrinsic
component of redemption and may be seen to mediate, in a
certain sense, between justification of the soul and glorification of
the body, and therefore between the beginning of adoption (Rom
8:15) and the consummation of adoption (Rom 8:23). Gratia
gratum faciens is the grace by which a rational creature is united
to God "through the effect of love" (secundum effectum
dilectionis) and is nothing other than "the grace of adoption." 31
One might say that to view the effects of sanctifying grace, from
justification to glorification, under the aspect of filial adoption is
to grasp something of their unity.
Third, Thomas (like Moo) recognizes that Paul's references to
the Holy Spirit's action upon the "heart" and "spirit" of the believer (Rom 5:5 and 8:16 respectively) point to an interior,
affective dimension of Christian existence. This is suggested
already in the way Thomas expounds the phrase caritas Dei (5 :5)
in terms of amor and dilectio, but it is all the clearer in his
comment on the phrase in quo clamamus Abba Pater (8:15). We
make this cry "not so much with the sound of the voice as with
the intention of the heart," and the ardor of this intention proceeds "from the feeling of filial love" (ex affectu filialis amoris).
Like the seraphim, whose name means "burning" (ardentes) and
who "cried out" (clamabant) in the prophet's vision (Isa 6:3), we
pray this way because we burn "as with the fire of the Holy
Spirit. " 32 The difference between Moo and Thomas in this regard
is that, whereas the former is concerned with the believer's
"comforting conviction" that he or she is loved by God, the latter
accents the believer's love for God. These two emphases
complement each other nicely. Moo perceives, in a way that
q. 111, a. 3.
In Rom., c. 1, lect. 3.
32 In Rom., c. 8, lect. 3.
30 STh I-II,
31

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Thomas seems not to, the close correlation Paul is drawing
between the objective historical demonstration of God's love for
sinners in Christ's death on the cross (5 :8) and the subjective
appropriation of that demonstration which the Spirit works in the
heart of the believer (5:5;8:16). 33 Thomas, for his part, notes that
the Spirit's interior testimony to God's love for us immediately
produces affection for God in us. He goes as far as to say that the
Spirit "speaks his testimony by the effect of filial love [per
effectum amoris filialis] which he produces in us. " 34 Apart from
this effect, the believer might remain turned in on himself or
herself in the "comforting conviction" of God's love.
Fourth, Thomas relates Paul's reference to the "heart" not only
to our dilection of God but also to "all the moral habits and acts
of the soul," thus indicating the intimate connection between love
of God and love of neighbor. 35 The same grace by which God
convinces us of his love for us and turns us away from ourselves
to love him heals and perfects the powers of the soul for Christian
charity. The effectus amoris filialis-the specific effect of infused
grace by which we love God-is the crucial link between God's
love for us and our love for neighbor, a link that is conspicuously
missing between "justification" and "sanctification" in Mao's
Reformed doctrine. It is not coincidental that Moo refuses to see
any reference to our love for God in Romans 5 :5 and that when
he comes to Paul's undeniable reference to "those who love God"
in 8 :28 he merely offers the bland comment that this is a way of
summing up "the basic inner direction" of Christians. Absent a
robust notion of infused and inhering grace, love for God can
hardly be more than "our response" to grace and thus can make
no real contribution to the process of redemption.
When we turn to Thomas's commentary on Romans 8, we find
that he discerns a greater coherence among the elements of Paul's
discussion in that chapter than Moo does, and that his
interpretation is closely linked to what he has already said about
the caritas Dei in Romans 5. The gratia gratum faciens by which
33

Moo, Epistle to the Romans, 309.

34 In Rom., c. 8, lect. 3.
35 In Rom., c. 5, lect. 1.

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"we have been justified" (5: 1) and by which "the love of Gqd has
been poured into our hearts" (5 :5) is the same grace by which we
"walk according to the Spirit" (8 :4 ), "mortify the deeds of the
body" (8:13), are "led by the Spirit" (8:14), "cry out, 'Abba,
Father"' (8: 15), "suffer with" Christ (8: 17), and finally attain "the
freedom of the glory of the children of God" (8:21). Unlike Moo,
Thomas does not treat Paul's discussion of filial adoption as
"parenthetical" or "incidental" to the argument of Romans 8, and
he is able to give full exegetical weight to the equation Paul makes
between those who are "led by the Spirit" and those who qualify
as "sons of God" (8:14). Thomas paraphrases Paul: "Only those
who are ruled [reguntur] by the Holy Spirit are sons of God. " 36 To
be ruled by the Spirit is to be ruled by love, and love is the key to
understanding how all the effects of grace, from justification to
glorification, fit together.
To see why this is so, it is crucial to recognize that, according
to Thomas, redemption essentially is the healing and perfection
of human nature. Commenting on Romans 5:6 ("when we were
still weak [infirmi], at the right time, Christ died for the
impious"), Thomas notes that here Paul compares sin to bodily
illness. "For just as by bodily infirmity the due harmony of the
humors is destroyed, so by sin the due order of the affections is
excluded." 37 Now, since justice is "a certain rectitude of order in
a man's interior disposition, namely, inasmuch as what is superior
in man is subject to God, and the inferior powers of the soul are
subject to the superior, namely, to reason," 38 the justification of
the ungodly cannot simply be God's "declaration of acquittal
pronounced over the sinner," as Moo would have it, but requires
an infusion of inhering grace if it is to restore man to the right
order that is the very essence of justice. That is why Thomas says
that "the remission of guilt is meaningless unless it includes the
infusion of grace. " 39
In Rom., c. 8, lect. 3.
In Rom., c. 5, lect. 2; cf. STh I-II, q. 82, a. 1.
38 STh I-II, q. 113, a. 1; cf. J. Mark Armitage, "A Certain Rectitude of Order: Jesus and
Justification according to Aquinas," The Thomist 72 (2008): 45-66.
39 STh I-II, q. 113, a. 2; cf. q. 110, a. 1, ad 3: "The remission of sins does not take place
without some effect divinely caused within us."
36
37

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Commenting on Romans 8: 19 (nam expectatio creaturae
revelationem filiorum Dei expectat), Thomas says that the word
"creature" may be understood here to refer to human nature
itself, "which is the substratum of grace," and which in the
unjustified man is "not yet justified but as though without form. " 40
If we read this statement from within the interpretive framework
of modern New Testament scholarship (which has been
determined to a significant extent by the agenda and categories of
Protestant theology), it seems tautologous to say that the
unjustified man is "not yet justified," and in any case a distortion
of Paul's doctrine of grace to make human nature the proper
object of justification. But if we remember that for Thomas
justification is not only the remission of sins but the infusion of
grace, we see that he means that the grace of justification restores
nature to that rectitude of order that is justice and that this justice
is a kind of form. Thomas goes on to say that in those who have
been justified human nature is "partially formed by grace but
nevertheless still unformed with respect to the form which it will
receive by glory. " 41 Further, since the "expectation" of justified
human nature is "the revelation of the sons of God," we may
suppose that the "form" to which Thomas refers here is none
other than filiatio adoptiva.
Recalling that adoptive sonship is "a certain similitude to
eternal Sonship" inasmuch as "the creature is assimilated to the
eternal Word according to the unity which the Word has with the
Father," and that this assimilation "is accomplished by grace and
charity," we may conclude that the gratia gratum faciens by which
"the love of God has been poured into our hearts by the Holy
Spirit" brings human nature to this intermediate state of being
"partially formed" (partim formata). At this stage, which Paul
elsewhere refers to as sub gratia (Rom 6:14), nature is iustificata
and thus "formed" with respect to its prior iniusta and
"unformed" condition, but it is "not yet formed" (adhuc informis)
with respect to the form which it will receive per gloriam. Thomas
40
41

In Rom., c. 8, lect. 4.
Ibid.

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insists that, while the rational creature is by nature capax
adoptionis, only those who possess charity are adopted sons. 42 In
the Lectura on Romans, as we have seen, Thomas says that
adoption "is initiated" (inchoata est) in justification and "will be
consummated" (consummabitur) with the glorification of the
body. 43 But in the Summa Theologiae he explains that the
assimilation of the rational creature to the eternal Word, insofar
as this is accomplished by the infusion of grace and charity,
already in this life gives adoption a kind of formal completeness
(talis assimilatio perficit rationem adoptionis). 44 What is
"inchoate" in one respect is already "perfect" in another respect.
It is inchoate inasmuch as the transformation of human nature
which filial adoption entails cannot really be complete short of the
glorification of the body, but it is perfect inasmuch as the caritas
Dei poured into our hearts at justification really is, already in this
life, a participation in eternal love which "reaches to the
perfecting of all the moral habits and acts of the soul. " 45
Moreover, the grace by which charity and the other theological
and moral virtues are infused is not simply one ingredient in a
recipe but is sufficient to bring us all the way to our goal. As
Thomas explains in another context: "Grace that is subsequent
according as it pertains to glory is not numerically other than the
prevenient grace by which we are now justified," and so "the
charity of the way is not voided in the fatherland but perfected. " 46
In still another place Thomas makes this point even more plainly:
"Grace is nothing other than a certain beginning [inchoatio] of
glory in us. "47
STh III, q. 23, a. 3, ad 3.
c. 8, lect. 5.
44 STh III, q. 23, a. 3. Jeremy Holmes has noted to me in a personal communication that
in Thomas's writings perficit rationem (or perficitur ratio) is a technical expression indicating
that all the necessary elements of a form are made present, not that the form has been brought
to its ultimate perfection (personal communication). Cf. II Sent., d. 1, q. 2, a. 5, expos.
(delectatio quae perficit rationem fruitionis); and STh I-II, q. 73, a. 3, ad 2 (in qua perficitur
ratio mali).
45 In Rom., c. 5, lect. 1.
46 STh I-II, q. 111, a. 3, ad 2.
47 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2.
42

43 In Rom.,

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One ramification of this understanding of redemptionaccording to which iustificatio means the infusion of a grace that
not only remits sin but heals and perfects nature-is that the
justified believer can forfeit grace and charity, and thus his or her
salvation, through subsequent mortal sin. Thomas draws out this
implication frequently and in no uncertain terms in the Lectura on
Romans. Glossing the phrase spes autem non confundit (5 :5), he
writes that hope "does not fail, unless a man fail it. " 48 Similarly,
in his comment on Romans 8: 9, he explains that Paul appends the
conditional clause si tamen Spiritus Dei habitat in vobis ("if
indeed the Spirit of God dwells in you") because, although his
readers received the Holy Spirit in baptism, "they might have lost
the Holy Spirit through an ensuing sin." 49 To cite but one further
example, Thomas expounds Paul's argument in Romans 8:13-14
in the form of a syllogism. Major premise: "All who are sons of
God attain the eternity of a glorious life." Minor premise: "But
only those ruled by the Holy Spirit are sons of God." Conclusion:
"Therefore only those ruled by the Holy Spirit attain the
inheritance of a glorious life. " 50 Douglas Moo would accept this
conclusion, but only after entering the caveat that justified
believers are infallibly ruled by the Holy Spirit and thus in no real
danger of losing their salvation.
III. THE PROCESSUS VIAE

It will be obvious from the foregoing presentation that I regard
Thomas Aquinas as providing overall a more theologically
cohesive account of Paul's doctrine of adoption than does Douglas
Moo. In particular, Thomas's recognition that justificationwhich both commentators identify as the beginning of filial
adoption-is not merely a declaration of acquittal but the infusion
of sanctifying grace enables us to grasp the coherence of all the
effects of grace and thus something of the inner logic of
redemption. Important aspects of Paul's thought, and of the
In Rom., c. 5, lect. 1.
In Rom., c. 8, lect. 2.
so In Rom., c. 8, lect. 3.

48
49

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saving mystery to which he refers, remain unilluminated to this
point in our analysis, however. I am especially interested in the
dynamics of the justified believer's "progress along the way"
(processus viae). 51 This seems to be at the forefront of Paul's mind
in Romans 5-8 and generally throughout his corpus. In the Second
Letter to the Corinthians, for example, he says that "we are being
transformed from glory to glory" (2 Cor 3: 18), that "our inner
self is renewed day by day" (2 Cor 4:16), and that we "bring
sanctification to perfection in the fear of God" (2 Cor 7:1). Apart
from acknowledging in passing that "the saints progress daily in
purity of conscience and in the understanding of divine things,"
Thomas does not give such expressions a great deal of attention
in the Lecturae on Romans and Second Corinthians. 52 Because he
binds justification and sanctification so closely together, his
interpretation of Paul may seem at first glance to minimize the
importance of making gradual progress in sanctity. And when we
view redemption in terms of filial adoption, it is even more
difficult to discern any room for "progress along the way" in
Thomas's interpretation of Paul. If the infusion of grace and
charity at justification already completes the ratio of adoption,
what is left for the believer but to await the consummation of
adoption in bodily glory?
In Paul's letters "righteousness" (btKmoauvTJ) and "sanctification" (ayiaaµoc;) are clearly distinct secundum intellectum and
are to a certain extent also distinct secundum esse. The latter term
designates a moral quality of life-often with special reference to
sexual purity-which admits of increase in those to whom "God
has given his Holy Spirit" (1 Thess 4:1-7; cf. 'fva m:ptaaEUTJTE
µCiA/iov). In Romans 6: 19-22 aytaaµoc; seems to be a middle term
between the btKatoaUVTJreceived at justification and the TEAO<; of
eternal life. This is perhaps also true in 1Corinthians1:30, where
Paul says that Jesus Christ has become our "righteousness and
sanctification and redemption" (btKatoauvTJTE Kai aytaaµoc; Kai

51

STh II-II, q. 24, a. 4.

52 In II Car., c. 4, lect. 5; cf. c. 6, lect. 3.

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). 53 No doubt, Paul's distinction between 8t Katom.)vri
and
has contributed to the Protestant doctrine of
imputed righteousness. Commenting on Romans 6:19, Moo
defines
as "the process of becoming holy," whereas
Thomas takes the corresponding Latin term (sanctificatio) to
mean "the execution and increase of sanctity. " 54 While both
commentators understand Paul to refer to a processus, the subtle
but important difference is that Thomas speaks of putting into act
(exsecutio) a sanctity already possessed, whereas Moo implies that
one becomes holy only subsequent to justification.
If we turn to Thomas's discussion of the increase of charity in
question 24 of the Secunda Secundae, we find that in fact he gave
a great deal of thought to the dynamics of the processus viae, even
if this is not always reflected in the Lecturae on the Pauline
epistles. Christians are called "wayfarers" (viatores) because they
are on the way to God, to whom they draw near "not with bodily
steps but by affects of the mind." Infused charity makes this
approach to God possible, since it is by love that the mind is
united to God, and so it is of the essence of the caritas viae that
it should increase. Since charity is a virtue ordained to act, its
increase is virtual (not dimensive) and consists in "the efficacy to
produce an act of more fervent dilection." 55 Because charity is
formally complete when it is infused, it increases not by addition
but by an intensification of its form. And since charity is an
accident, "its being is to be in" its subject (eius esse est inesse), and
so its essential increase or intensification of form is nothing other
than a deeper radication in the subject. 56 Thomas explains:
53 The word drroAUTpwcr1c; would in that case refer to the consummation of salvation, as
it does in Rom 8:23 and Eph 1:14 and 4:30. Modern commentators are generally dismissive
of any attempt to find a systematic arrangement in this passage: "These are not three different
steps in the saving process; they are rather three different metaphors for the same event (our
salvation that was effected in Christ)" (Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians,
New International Commentary on the New Testament [Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans,
1987], 86; cf. Hans Conzelmann, 1 Corinthians: A Commentary on the First Epistle to the
Corinthians, trans. James W. Leitch, Hermeneia [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975], 52).
54 Moo, Epistle to the Romans, 405; Thomas Aquinas, In Rom., c. 6, lect. 4.
55 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 4, corp., and ad 3.
56 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 4, ad 3; q. 24, a. 5.

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

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Thus charity increases only by way of the subject's greater and greater
participation of charity, that is, the subject's being more reduced to its act and
more subject to it .... Each act of charity disposes one to an increase in charity,
inasmuch as by a single act of charity a man is rendered more ready to act again
according to charity; and as this aptitude grows, a man breaks forth into a more
fervent act of dilection. 57

Citing 2 Corinthians 6: 11-cor nostrum dilatatum est-Thomas
explains that there is no limit to how much charity can increase
in the subject in this manner since "whenever charity grows, the
aptitude for a further increase grows," and so "the capacity of the
spiritual creature is increased by charity, for by it the heart is
dilated. " 58
Next Thomas takes up the question of whether charity can be
perfected in this life. Since God is infinitely good and therefore
infinitely lovable, while no creature is capable of infinite love, the
only absolutely perfect love is that by which God loves himself.
Nevertheless, one can speak of "perfect charity" in the human
subject when a person loves as far as he or she is able (secundum
totum suum posse); and this happens in three ways. First, there is
the perfection common to all who possess grace and charity,
whereby a person "habitually places his whole heart [cor] in God"
and "neither thinks nor wills anything contrary to the dilection of
God. " 59 As this would apply even to the tepid soul who barely
avoids mortal sin, it might seem a stretch to refer to it as
"perfection" at all. But doing so is entirely consistent with, and in
a sense even required by, Thomas's high view of infused charity
as a participation of eternal love, his recognition that sanctifying
grace is the inchoatio gloriae, and his affirmation that by grace
and charity filial adoption is already formally complete at
justification. 60 We might refer to this level as the perfectio caritatis
iustitiae or perfectio caritatis habitualis since, strictly speaking, it
implies no progress beyond the infusion of grace at justification
(e.g., it is possessed by the baptized infant). A second and higher
q. 24, aa. 5 and 6.
STh II-II, q. 24, a. 7, corp. and ad 2.
59 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 8.
60 In Rom., c. 5, lect. 1; STh II-II, q. 24, a. 3, ad 2; STh III, q. 23, a. 1.
57 STh II-II,

58

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GREGORY VALL

state of perfection is reached when "a man makes an earnest
endeavor to devote himself to God and divine things, setting aside
all else except insofar as the necessity of the present life requires."
This perfection of charity is possible in this life but is not achieved
by all who have charity. Thomas calls it the perfectio caritatis viae,
and he notes that the Apostle Paul evidences this perfection when
he says, "I desire to be dissolved and to be with Christ" (Phil
1:23). Third, there is the perfectio caritatis patriae, by which "a
man's whole heart [cor] is always actually borne to God." This
occurs only in heaven, since the infirmity of this life makes it
impossible "always in act to think about God and to be moved by
dilection for him. " 61
Finally, on the basis of the distinction between the first two
modes of perfection-the perfectio caritatis iustitiae and the
perfectio caritatis viae-Thomas specifies three degrees of charity
according to the principal pursuits (studia) which are
characteristic of three distinct stages in the processus viae. First,
there is caritas incipiens, whereby the Christian is principally
concerned to withdraw from sin and to resist concupiscence.
Second, once the onslaught of sin and concupiscence has become
somewhat less violent, there is caritas proficiens, whereby one is
primarily occupied with the more positive task of progressing in
virtue. Third, there is caritas perfecta, whereby one's principal
care is to be united to God and to delight in him. 62 Each of these
degrees implies some progress beyond the sheer possession of
infused charity. That the third degree is identical to the perfectio
caritatis viae discussed in the previous article is apparent from the
fact that Thomas once again cites Philippians 1:23: "Cupio
dissolvi et esse cum Christo. " 63 Thomas recognizes that these
three pursuits overlap (e.g., even the beginner has some concern
to make progress in virtue and to be united to God), and he
explicitly states that all of the many discernable advances in

61 STh II-II, q. 24, a. 8.
62

63

STh II-II, q. 24, a. 9.
Ibid.

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

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charity which one might make sub gratia are comprised within
these three principal stages. 64
Thomas's schema is thus quite compatible with Paul's notion
of being "renewed day by day" (2 Cor 4: 16). It is therefore
somewhat surprising that Thomas's understanding of the increase
and perfection of charity plays such a minor role in his exegesis
of Romans 5-8 and 2 Corinthians 3-6. With some justification, for
example, Thomas might easily have found the three degrees of
charity reflected in Romans 8: 13-15, as follows. Caritas incipiens
is primarily concerned to "mortify the deeds of the flesh by the
Spirit"; caritas proficiens is "led by the Spirit" to ever-increasing
virtue; and caritas perfecta expresses its desire to be united with
God when it cries out in the Spirit, "Abba, Father!" Significantly,
this very passage constitutes the heart of Paul's teaching about
what filial adoption means for this life. Whether or not one
accepts the specific correlation I have just drawn between Paul's
words in Romans 8 and Thomas's teaching on the increase of
charity in the Summa, the latter holds some promise for probing
further the relationship between the beginning of adoption in
justification and its consummation in glory, which is the central
concern of this essay.
Especially striking about both Thomas's treatment of filial
adoption and his teaching on the increase of charity is the strong
accent he places on affectivity. Naturally, no one supposes that his
view of the Christian life, broadly speaking, shortchanges the role
of faith as the perfection of the intellect or the role of the infused
moral virtues! Still, when Thomas approaches the mystery of
redemption under the aspect of filial adoption, he views the
Christian primarily as amator Dei and describes prayer as
proceeding ex affectu {ilia/is amoris. Similarly, his explanation of
how charity increases and comes to perfection is decidedly
nonmoralistic. The perfection of charity is fundamentally a
question of "a man's heart being borne to God" (cor hominis
feratur in Deum)-whether this be habitualiter, as is true of all
those in the state of grace; or actualiter insofar as the limitations
64

Ibid., ad 1 and ad 3.

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GREGORY VALL

of this life permit, as is the case with those who have achieved
perfectio caritatis viae; or actualiter semper, as is possible only in
heaven. 65 In defending the position that charity can be perfect in
this life (whether in the sense of perfectio caritatis iustitiae or in
the sense of perfectio caritatis viae), Thomas is not at all troubled
by the seemingly compelling objection that we can never be
entirely free of venial sins prior to death. These, he explains, are
not incompatible with perfectio viae since, though they are
contrary to the act of charity, they do not touch the infused
habit. 66 Charity is defined as "a certain friendship of man for
God," which "has for its object the ultimate end of human life,
namely, eternal happiness." 67 And the closer one comes to this
end, the more one finds oneself saying with Paul: "Cupio dissolvi
et esse cum Christo."
This link back to Paul's letters is important. What still remains
insufficiently illuminated in the apostle's understanding of
redemption is the role of the body-its suffering, its dissolution
in death, and its glory. The accent Paul places on the body
throughout his epistles (not least in Romans 5-8 and 2
Corinthians 3-6) is truly remarkable and raises difficult questions
with which neither Moo nor Thomas deal directly in their
commentaries. One such question, an important one for our
purposes, is why Paul virtually identifies ulo0rn(a as "the
redemption of the body" (Rom 8:23). It is fine to say, as both
commentators do, that the glorification of the body is the
consummation of filial adoption, but that merely begs the
question why this should be so. If the ulo0rn(a that is received at
justification is a status of sonship and an "awareness of God as
Father" which gives the believer "peace and security," as Moo
maintains, what does this have to do with the body? Why should
the glorification of the body be identified as the consummation of
this aspect of redemption in particular?
Thomas's more cohesive understanding of the various effects
of grace at least paves the way for an answer to this question. If
II-II, q. 24, a. 8.
Ibid., ad 2.
67 STh II-II, q. 23, a. 1; q. 23, a. 4, ad 2.

65 STh
66

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

615

the grace of filial adoption is the grace of justification, and if
justification is the healing and perfection of human nature, it
makes perfect sense to say that adoption is not complete in every
respect until the entire human person, body and soul, rests in
heavenly glory. Furthermore, if filial adoption is a participation
of eternal love which makes the believer amator Dei, filial
adoption is perfect exactly insofar as charity is perfect, and it is
precisely the mortal condition of the body and the concomitant
limitations of this life which prevent the human heart from being
"borne to God" actualiter semper, which is the ultimate perfection
of charity. The "groaning" of those who await the consummation
of adoption is not merely "frustration at the remaining moral and
physical infirmities" of this life, as Moo would have it, but
something much more positive: "affliction due to the delay of
what is anticipated with great desire," namely, union with God,
as Thomas explains. 68 In other words, the "groaning" referred to
in Romans 8:23 is identical with the longing expressed in the
words "cupio dissolvi et esse cum Christo" in Philippians 1 :23.
Once again, Thomas appreciates the importance of the Christian's
love for God in Paul's doctrine of filial adoption, whereas Moo
does not.
One should not, however, draw the conclusion that Paul views
the mortal body merely as a hindrance to final beatitude. On the
contrary, as we shall see momentarily, he looks upon the
body-precisely in its weakness and mortality-as playing an
integral role in the believer's union with Christ already in this life.
While Thomas has laid the groundwork for appreciating this
positive somatological dimension of the processusviae, it is not an
aspect of Paul's thought to which he pays much attention in the
Lectura. Accordingly, I would like to devote the remainder of this
essay to a fresh look at Paul's teaching. Building on what we have
learned from Thomas, and by attending carefully to Paul's
anthropology, I hope to expound further some of the dynamics
involved in the believer's progress from the present possession of
the nw:Oµa ulo0rn(ac; to the eschatological consummation of
68 Moo,

Epistle to the Romans, 519; Thomas Aquinas, In Rom., c. 8, lect. 5.

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GREGORY VALL

uio0Eata constituted by the redemption of the body. My focus
will be on Romans 8, drawing other Pauline texts into the
discussion insofar as this seems helpful.
IV. ANOTHER LOOK AT PAUL'S TEACHING

A) Spirit and Body
Douglas Moo objects to those interpretations that "seek to
relieve the tension" between Romans 8: 15 and 8 :23 by pressing
the distinction between TTVECiµa uio0rnf rn; in the former verse and
uio0rn(a by itself in the latter. According to these interpretations,
Christians now possess only the Spirit of filial adoption, whereas
at the resurrection on the last day they will possess filial adoption
itself. 69 Moo is right to resist any implication that the gift of the
Holy Spirit is somehow insufficient or that the believer's cry of
"Abba, Father" expresses anything less than real adoption. Indeed,
Paul makes it clear that the same indwelling Spirit by which
ulo0rn(a is begun in us at justification brings this gift to its
eschatological consummation: "If the Spirit of the one who raised
Jesus from the dead dwells in you, he who raised Christ from the
dead will give life also to your mortal bodies through his Spirit
which dwells within you" (8: 11). To say that we now possess "the
Spirit of filial adoption" is to say that we possess exactly what we
need to get us all the way to our goal: the consummation of filial
adoption in glory.
On the other hand, Paul's choice of TTVECiµa uio0rn(ac; for
verse 15 and uio0rn(a by itself for verse 23 is not arbitrary. The
terms are not simply interchangeable. He includes the word
TTVECiµa in verse 15 not only to indicate the principle of our filial
adoption-the Holy Spirit-but also in order to suggest the
specific mode in which we possess uio0Ea(a throughout the
pilgrimage of this life. Ours is a filial adoption on the way to
glory, lived by faith, love, and hope. Accordingly, Paul refers to
our present possession of the Spirit as "first fruits" in verse 23,
69 Moo,

Epistle to the Romans, 521.

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

617

and elsewhere speaks of the gift of the Spirit as an
a
"deposit" or "first installment" (2 Cor 1 :22; 5 :5; Eph 1: 14).
We must likewise note that the contrast between Romans 8:15
and 8 :23 is not only in terms of the "already" and the "not-yet,"
but also in terms of "spirit" and "body," or inner man and outer
man. The Holy Spirit is not the only nw:uµa referred to in
Romans 8. Paul also speaks of "our spirit," when he locates the
specific activity of the divine Spirit in the interior core of the
human person: "The Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit that
we are children of God" (8:16). The work of the Spirit begins in
the spiritual dimension of the human person and is completed in
the glorification of the somatic dimension. The Christian must
live out the rest of this life in a body subject to mortality-which
is the penalty of sin-but at the same time possesses a new
principle of life within: "If Christ is in you, though the body is
dead on account of sin, the spirit is alive on account of
righteousness" (8: 10). As Paul puts it in 2 Corinthians: "Though
our outer man is decaying, our inner man is being renewed day by
day" (4:16). In other words, we experience the tension between
the "already" and the "not-yet" in large part as a tension between
enlivened spirit and dying body. And it is this tension that
prompts "groaning" within those who possess the first fruits of
the Spirit while they await the consummation of ulo0rn(a, the
redemption of their bodies (Rom 8:23).
By granting a certain priority to the interior life of the believer,
Paul neither denigrates the body nor suggests its relative
unimportance. On the contrary, the precise tension to which he
refers would not obtain at all if the body were not integral to the
human person and to Christian redemption. Paul does speak in
this context of redemption as emancipation from the "bondage to
decay" (8:21), a condition which our mortal bodies share with all
organic matter. But the "glorious freedom of the children of God"
is by no means deliverance from the body or from the realm of
matter. As Paul says elsewhere, "while we are in this tent we
groan under its weight, not because we wish to be unclothed but

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further clothed, so that what is mortal may be swallowed up by
life" (2 Cor 5:4).
Must the body, then, wait for the general resurrection before
it can play a positive role in the mystery of redemption? Not at
all. If we ask Paul how it is that one gets from here to there, from
pilgrim u1o0rn(a to the consummation of u1o0rn(a in glory, he
gives us an uncharacteristically straightforward answer: We must
"suffer with" Christ "in order that we may also be glorified with
him" (Rom 8: 17). As we live with the tension between decaying
body and enlivened spirit, the body, precisely in its mortality, is
an important locus of union with Christ. "We always bear about
in our body the dying of Jesus . . . in order that also the life of
Jesus may be manifested in our mortal flesh" (2 Cor 4:10-11).
Note that it is not simply his "death" (0avarnc;) that we bear
about in our bodies, but his "dying" (YEKpwcrtc;).70 Our whole
Christian existence usque ad mortem is a process of dying with
Christ. Note also that at the same time his life is to be manifest
"in our mortal flesh," that is, even in this life prior to glory.

B) Death to Sin
Before developing those last two points, we need to consider
more precisely what this "suffering with" Christ entails and how
Paul's accent on the body might be compatible with the priority
we have already seen him give to the "spirit" or "inner man." In
Romans 8 Paul specifies two crucial dimensions of our suffering
with Christ: death to sin, and the endurance of afflictions and
persecution. In 6: 10-11 Paul makes the remarkable assertion that
Jesus' own death was a death "to sin" and his risen life a life "to
God," and on that basis he exhorts the Romans to reckon
themselves dead to sin and alive to God. This underscores the
point that Paul views our death to sin as an integral aspect of our
imitation of Christ.
The relationship between the inner man and the outer man
with respect to the death to sin is illuminated especially in the first
70 BDAG, 668.

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

619

part of Romans 8, where Paul locates the power of sin in "the
flesh" and speaks of habitual sin as "walking according to the
flesh" (8:4). The claim is frequently made that Paul does not use
the term
("flesh") here to refer to man's material dimension
as distinct from his mind or soul, but rather in a specialized sense,
to denote a basic attitude or disposition of the whole person as
opposed to God and dominated by sin. 71 The important grain of
truth in this claim ought not, however, to obscure the fact that in
several passages in Romans Paul explicitly locates sin and the
power of sin in the physical body, as distinct from the inner man.
For example, in chapter 7 he writes: "I take pleasure in the law of
God according to the inner man, but I see another law in my
members making war against the law of my mind and taking me
captive by the law of sin which is in my members" (7:22-23).
Whether this passage refers to regenerate or unregenerate man, 72
it is an expression of Pauline anthropology, and it is surrounded
in the letter by similar statements. In chapter 6, Paul reminds us
that "our old man was co-crucified that the body of sin might be
nullified" (6:6) and exhorts us not to let sin "reign" in our
"mortal bodies" and not to present our "members" as "weapons
of unrighteousness for sin" (6:12-13). In chapter 8, as we have
seen, he tells us that we must "by the Spirit put to death the deeds
of the body," and he presents this practice as the opposite of
living "according to the flesh" (KaTa aapKa [8: 12-13]).
At the same time, it is clear from Paul's letters that the power
of sin works upon the life of the mind and that moral
transformation can only take place through the renewal of the
mind (Rom 12:2; Eph4:17-24; Phil 1:9-11; 4:8; Col 1:21; 2:2-3;
3: 10). The mind is the primary battleground between vice and
virtue, and so it is the place where the grace of filial adoption
must take deep root if it is to transform the whole person. As
71 "Nevertheless, in many instances in Paul 'flesh' has a fuller meaning not found in the
Old Testament. Then it designates man's being and attitude as opposed to and in contradiction
to God and God's Spirit" (Gunther Bornkamm, Paul, trans. D. M. G. Stalker [Minneapolis:
Fortress Press, 1995], 133). Bornkamm cites Rom 8:4 as his first example of this usage.
72 On the history of interpretation of the "I" in Rom 7:7-25, see Moo, Epistle to the
Romans, 424-27; Fitzmyer, Romans, 463-65.

GREGORY VALL

620

Thomas puts it, spiritual generation "comes about by spiritual
seed transmitted to the place of spiritual generation, which is a
man's mind or heart, for we are begotten sons of God by the
renewal of the mind. " 73
Ground zero in the spiritual battle is what Paul refers to as the
<j>povriµa. This term designates the preoccupation of the mind, the
set of concerns that dominate the conscious life of the mind. 74
According to Paul, "the <j>povriµa of the flesh is death, but the
<j>povriµa of the spirit [TTvEuµaToc;] is life and peace" (8 :6). Here
TTVEGµa should probably be translated "spirit" (with a lower-case
s), and we should understand the <j>povriµa as mediating between
"flesh" and "spirit." The word "spirit," in other words, can
designate the deepest inner core of the human person (roughly
equivalent to the "heart"), where the Holy Spirit intercedes "with
inexpressible groanings" (8:26). It is not the case, however, that
Paul had a tripartite anthropology, nor that "spirit" designates an
irrational element in man. The <j>povriµa and the TTVEGµa are two
aspects of a single spiritual soul (with faculties of reason and will).
But these terms represent "levels" of the soul's life. The <j>povT]µa
lies nearer the surface, so to speak, near the soul's interface with
the physical body. At this level the mind may be occupied with
either speculative or practical concerns-though the latter tend to
dominate, both because the needs of the body are so many and so
persistent, and because this is precisely the level at which the
thoughts of the mind, governed by the will, are translated into
bodily actions. 75
Now, when the drives of the body, disordered by sin, dominate
the conscious life of the mind or <j>povriµa, they press down into
the deeper dimensions of the soul and suffocate the life of the
spirit (lower-case s). This is what Paul means by saying, "The
<j>povriµa of the flesh is death" -spiritual death. He expands on
73

In Gal., c. 4, lect. 3.

74 BDAG, 1066. While

this word is etymologically related and semantically proximate to
<j>p6
Paul's use of <j>p6v1iµa is closely related to his use of the verb <j>pov£w in 8 :5 and elsewhere
(especially Phil 2:5; 3:19; and Col 3:2).
75 Therein lies the aforementioned semantic proximity between <j>p6v!]µa and <j>p6v!]ot<;.

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

621

this statement by indicating that "the cppovriµa of the flesh is
enmity with God, for it does not submit to the law of God, nor
can it" (8:7). But when the human nw:Oµa is enlivened by the
divine TTVEOµa and the will allows the promptings of the Holy
Spirit to inform, illuminate, and even preoccupy the conscious life
of the mind in both its speculative and its practical dimensions,
the desires (so closely identified with the life of the body) are
gradually purified, and the interior transformation of the
personality manifests itself on the somatic level in concrete bodilyhistorical actions. This is what Paul has in mind when he speaks
of the moral sanctification of the person "in perfect wholeness"
(oAoTEAdc;),a sanctification that begins in the inner core of the
personality and works its way outward: "spirit, soul, and body" (1
Thess 5:23). 76 The union of body and soul in the human person
is so intimate that the presentation of one's body to God as a
"living sacrifice" constitutes one's "rational worship" (Rom 12: 1).

C) The Love of God
In Romans 8, Paul refers to the manner of life that brings
about this sanctification as "walking according to the Spirit" (8:4)
or being "led by the Spirit of God" (8: 14 ). These expressions, like
the entire thrust of his parenesis here and in chapter 6,
presuppose that this mode of life is not forced upon the Christian.
It is not inevitable that those who have received the quickening
gift of the Holy Spirit will in fact cooperate with grace and
experience transformation. That is why Paul exhorts the Galatians
in these words: "If we live by the Spirit, let us also walk in step
with the Spirit" (Gal 5 :25).
The crucial question, then, is: What exactly can induce the will
to pursue this spiritual way of life? And it is this question that
brings us back to u1o9w(a. Paul expounds what it means to be
"led by the Spirit of God" by calling our attention to the specific
character of sanctifying grace as filial adoption and by contrasting
76 Naturally this is not a strictly linear progression. The process of sanctification also
involves a dialectical or back-and-forth movement between inner man and outer man.

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this grace with the dynamic operative under the Mosaic Law.
Under the old covenant, one might "delight in the law of God in
the inner man," but this was not sufficient to emancipate fallen
man from captivity to "the law of sin" that operates in one's
"members" (7:22-24). The Mosaic Law could not justify because
it did not "vivify" (Gal 3:21). To the extent that it was effective
in modifying behavior, it was so largely by means of fear, the fear
of forfeiting a blessing or incurring a punishment. By contrast, the
baptized "have received not a spirit of slavery back into fear, but
a Spirit of filial adoption, by which we cry out, 'Abba, Father"'
(Rom 8:15).
The grace described here in terms of ulo9Ecrfa is, as we have
seen, identical to the grace spoken of earlier in the letter in terms
of ciyam1: "The love of God has been poured out into our hearts
through the Holy Spirit who has been given to us" (5 :5). The
death of Jesus Christ for us "while we were still sinners" is the
definitive historical demonstration of "God's own love for us"
(5 :8), while the interior gift of the Spirit bears personal witness to
that demonstration of love and to the filial adoption that it brings
about: "The Spirit itself bears witness with our spirit that we are
children of God" (8:16). The "joint mission" of the Son and the
Spirit is "manifested in the children adopted by the Father in the
Body of his Son. " 77
The infusion of divine ciyam1 into the inner man is the only
force that can break the power of sin, and it does this, not by
means of servile fear, but by means of a powerful attraction to the
good. "The love of Christ compels us," not by violating our
freedom, of course, but by means of the theological virtues, which
enable us to recognize in Christ's Passion God's love for us and,
further, to realize that the supreme good of our existence is "no
longer to live for [ourselves] but for the one who died and rose
for [us]" (2 Cor 5:14-15). 78 The enmity with God that is original
Catechism of the Catholic Church, §690.
Thomas explains that a man "judges" (diiudicat) concerning what is to be done
according to the habitual disposition of his mind, because a habit "makes what is suitable to
it appear good" (STh II-II, q. 24, a. 11). The theological virtues thus enable us to "judge"
{Kpivw) rightly concerning Christ's death on the cross and the sort of life we should lead in
77
78

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

623

sin consists in large part in a profound lack of trust in God and his
goodness. 79 The wound of sin begins to heal when Christ's
merciful death for us sinners convinces us that God is after all a
loving Father who can be trusted and who wants what is best for
us. The Spirit's interior witness to this love begins a
transformation of our wounded personality by means of a
reformation of our deeply disordered desires. According to
Thomas, "we cry 'Abba, Father' when we are kindled affectively
by the warmth of the Holy Spirit to desire God. " 80 This
purification of desire moves through the levels of the personality
and manifests itself somatically in concrete-historical acts
expressive of love of God and love of neighbor. This is the aycfori
that Paul identifies as the "fullness of law" (Rom 13: 10). Love
accomplishes what fear never could, so that "the righteous
requirement of the law might be fulfilled in us who walk not
according to the flesh but according to the Spirit" (8:4).
The process of sanctification that is driven by divine love
cannot be completed prior to death, for only in death can one
give oneself to God totally in reciprocal love. Our life is
embedded in temporality, our freedom is realized in history, our
soul acts through a body that is subject to death-and so the
process of sanctification is determined (to some extent) by the
structure of human life as vita usque ad mortem. Our "obedience
of faith" must imitate Jesus' obedience "unto death" (Rom 1:5;
16:26; Phil 2:8; cf. Heb 5:8-9). Within such a structure every
authentic act of obedience and love along the way anticipates and
prepares for the opportunity for self-oblation that biological death
will present us with. Even at a merely human level, aging and the
deterioration of the body constitute a kind of daily proleptic
participation in one's own death. Under the grace of filial
adoption, this ineluctable experience of mortality serves as the
material and occasion of our "suffering with" Christ. The daily
reckoning of ourselves as dead to sin imitates Christ's once-for-all
death to sin (Rom 6:10-11). The presentation of our members to
response to it (2 Cor 5: 14-15).
79 Catechism of the Catholic Church, §397.
80 In Gal., c. 4, lect. 3.

624

GREGORY VALL

God as instruments of righteousness constitutes a "living sacrifice"
(6:13; 12:1). Note the oxymoron!
D) Power Per(ected in Weakness

The recognition of this dynamic of "dying daily" (1Cor15 :31)
is even more illuminative when we turn from our consideration
of death-to-sin in order to look at the other element of "suffering
with" Christ that Paul highlights in Romans 8, namely, the
endurance of afflictions and persecution. Jesus Christ "knew no
sin" (2 Cor 5:21). The sin he "died to" was outside of himself. It
was the sin of the world, which surrounded him and pressed in
upon him (Rom 6: 10; cf. 1Pet2:22-23). Therefore our "suffering
with" Christ is more perfect to the degree that, having gained
some level of victory over personal sin and having proclaimed the
gospel with our life and words, we incur afflictions and
persecution for the sake of the gospel. As Ignatius of Antioch puts
it, "Christianity achieves its greatness when it is hated by the
world" (Romans 3:3). It is in this context especially that Paul
speaks in terms of proleptic death and living sacrifice. To the
Corinthians he writes: "We always bear about in our bodies the
dying of Jesus ... we the living are always being handed over to
death on account of Jesus" (2 Cor 4:10-11). And in Romans 8 he
quotes the Psalter in reference to the Christian life: "For your
sake we are put to death all the day; we have been reckoned as
sheep for the slaughter" (Rom 8:36; cf. Ps 44:22).
In the context of his apostolic ministry Paul experienced not
only participation in the suffering and death of Jesus but also a
paradoxical anticipation of bodily glory. Christ's risen life was
manifest already in Paul's "mortal flesh" (2 Cor 4:10). When he
was beaten down by afflictions, attacks, and infirmities of every
sort, the power of Christ overshadowed him (2 Cor 12:9). He
pummeled his own body and made it his slave (1 Cor 9:27); he
worked with his hands indefatigably "night and day" (1 Thess
2:9); he traveled thousands of miles, often going without proper
food, sleep, or shelter (2 Cor 6:5); he performed "signs and

FILIAL ADOPTION IN ROMANS 8

625

wonders and powers ... with all endurance" (2 Cor 12:12); and
he carried on this way with indomitable energy for decades (Col
1:29). "Power is perfected in weakness ... when I am weak, then
I am strong" -this was the mystery revealed to Paul by means of
the "thorn in the flesh" (2 Cor 12: 7-10). Living this mystery filled
him with confidence that Christ would always be "magnified in
[his] body, whether through life or through death" (Phil 1:20).
Paul, in other words, knew "Christ and the power of his
resurrection," not only in the inner man, but also overflowing into
his body. Far from providing Paul with a life of physical ease,
however, this power flowed through him only in the midst of
tireless apostolic labor and great affliction. Paul's experience of
resurrection power was inextricably linked to his "communion"
(Kot vwv(a) in the sufferings of Christ; at the same time this
mystery of power-in-suffering was a real anticipation of glory.
Paul yearned to be "conformed to [Christ's] death, that [he] might
somehow attain to resurrection from the dead" (Phil 3:10-11).
This may explain why Paul speaks of glorification in the past tense
in Romans 8:30: "Those he called he also justified, and those he
justified he also glorified." That which takes us all the way to
glory has already been conferred upon us in justification.
As we have seen, Paul refers to this grace in several ways in
Romans. It is "the love of God ... poured into our hearts through
the Holy Spirit" (5 :5), "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ
Jesus" (8 :2), "the Spirit of filial adoption" (8: 15), "the first fruits
of the Spirit" (8 :23 ), and "the love of God which is in Christ Jesus
our Lord" (8:39). Still another phrase for the same
reality-"newness of life"-is found in Paul's description of the
sacrament of baptism: "We have been buried with him through
baptism into his death, in order that, just as Christ was raised
from the dead through the glory of the Father, we might walk in
newness of life" (6:4). The parallelism between Christ's
resurrection through the Father's glory and our newness of life
suggests that the latter is a real participation in the former.
Paul reminds us that "we hope for what we do not see" (8 :25).
But this does not mean that Christian hope amounts to a blind

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GREGORY VALL

leap of the will with no intellectual or experiential basis. On the
contrary, "affliction produces steadfast endurance, steadfast
endurance proven character, and proven character hope" (5 :3b4). This rhetorical sorites (or staircase device) expresses the truth
that the infused virtue of hope is built up in us as part of a moral
and intellectual transformation that finds its material and occasion
in suffering. As Thomas puts it, "tribulation prepares the way for
hope." 81 The ultimate basis for hope is, of course, the love of
God. "Hope does not disappoint, because the love of God has
been poured into our hearts" (5 :5). But we know this love and
grow in it through the mystery of "suffering with" Christ, with all
the elements that this entails, including death to sin, the
endurance of afflictions and persecution, and the experience of
power perfected in weakness. The Christian who dares to imitate
Paul in the appropriation of these graces will be "transformed into
the image" of God's Son "from glory to glory" (2 Cor 3:18; cf.
Rom 8:29).

81

In Rom., c. 5, lect. 1.

BOOK REVIEWS
The Disciples' Jesus: Christology as Reconciling Practice. By TERRENCE W.
TILLEY. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 2008. Pp. 320. $38.00 (paper).
ISBN 978-1-57075-796-9.
It is difficult to know how to review a book whose theological style and
commitments are so disjunctive with one's own as almost to belong to a different
discipline. This is precisely the challenge that faces the present writer in assessing
Terrence Tilley's The Disciples' Jesus. The challenge is worth taking up not only
because the author is a major American Catholic theologian who carries out his
work with high theological seriousness and enviable erudition, but also because
the sullen silence that reigns between the distant camps of contemporary
Catholic theology ill serves the Church we share. The best way to proceed is to
begin with an exposition.
In brief, Tilley wants theologians to rethink how they do Christology. Most
conceive of their work as primarily theoretical: to present within their own
context an intellectually and spiritually satisfying account of what the Church
teaches about Jesus Christ as the Word incarnate and humanity's savior from the
death-dealing power of sin. In other words, theologians attempt to explicate the
meaning of Peter's answer to the question, "Who do you say that I am?" Yet this
approach mistakenly assumes, Tilley argues, that we can give the same answer
as Peter and mean the same thing. Peter's answer belongs to him as a disciple just
as much as Romeo's identification of Juliet as "the sun" belongs to him as a
lover. The primary Christological issue, therefore, is "not 'what' Jesus is and
does but 'who' he is for us who follow him"(18). Christology belongs in the
practical, not the theoretical, realm.
If Tilley is right about this, his assertion that Christology arises from the
"imaginative practice of his disciples" follows swiftly and sweetly. This
imaginative practice, however, cannot be read off the pages of the New
Testament but must be reconstructed by critical methods. Tilley's reconstruction
depends on three scholars in particular: Elizabeth Schussler-Fiorenza, James
Dunn, and Larry Hurtado. Tilley is influenced by Schilssler-Fiorenza's view that
in seeking a "great man" who stands above his interpersonal context the
traditional quests for the historical Jesus serve to legitimate the dominance of
privileged males over the disempowered, as well as by her counter-portrait of
Jesus as a member of a larger "emancipatory Divine Wisdom movement." Tilley,

627

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BOOK REVIEWS

however, has a higher view of Jesus' relative standing within the movement
based on the fact that he alone suffered crucifixion at the hands of the Romans;
Jesus was, therefore, "the first among equals" and the movement is properly
described as "the Jesus-movement." Dunn also highlights the inseparability of
Jesus and his disciples in Jesus Remembered (2003). According to him, the gospel
accounts of what Jesus said and did began as the disciples' orally transmitted
remembrances and were consequently shaped within various Christian communities prior to being written down. Thus, the only Jesus we can know is the
Jesus remembered by the people he most directly affected. Hurtado adds another
dimension: the disciples' worship of Jesus was rooted in their conviction that he
was a uniquely saving agent sent from God and, therefore, worthy of being
addressed in ways previously reserved for the God of Abraham. While Tilley
credits Hurtado's account with being a likely historical reconstruction of the first
claims regarding Jesus' divinity, he finds Hurtado's description of early Jesus
worship as overly "cultic" and insufficiently informed by the fact that the
disciples' view of Jesus as divine arose primarily from their experience of being
"empowered" by Jesus to "live in and out the reign of God" (65). At this point,
Tilley returns to Schiissler-Fiorenza's concern with the political implications of
uncovering a Jesus who was both "first among equals" and "divine agent" by
raising the possibility that "Jesus as Lord can empower resistance to the lords of
this world" (68).
If Christology must start with what the disciples remembered, it must pay
special attention to those biblical passages in which they identify Jesus as "the
Christ." These texts are not to be mined for "beliefs that Christians may accept"
but "patterns that Christians are to reenact to be part of the 'running
performances' of discipleship" (76). Not surprisingly, Tilley begins with Peter's
confession of Jesus as "the Christ" in the Gospel of Mark, a confession that
results in Peter's being rebuked for thinking as human beings do and not as God
does. Peter was unable to rightly name Jesus "the Christ" because his imagination
was insufficiently disciplined by the practices distinctive to the Jesus-movement
and he was unprepared to live out a story ending in persecution and death rather
than earthly power and glory. In contrast to Peter's rebuke Tilley notes the praise
Martha and Mary receive after accepting Jesus' own understanding of what it
means to be the Christ. Together these stories show that "doing Christology is
impossible without properly practicing the wisdom of God's ways" (108). This
nexus is especially clear in the response Jesus gives when asked by John's
disciples if he is "the one who is to come." While the question seems to require
a yes or a no, Jesus instead recites a list of reconciling practices associated with
his ministry, for example, the healing of the blind, the raising of the dead, and
the preaching of the good news to the poor. The list not only serves to
distinguish Jesus' message of salvific reconciliation and restoration from John's
warnings of impending divine judgment, but also highlights those practices that
constitute what it means for Jesus to be the Christ. As Tilley insists many times
throughout the book, Christology properly conceived does not lead to or even
arise from certain practices, rather it is these practices.

BOOK REVIEWS

629

In order to get more specific Tilley turns to what he calls the "politics of the
Jesus-movement" or what the disciples remembered being empowered by Jesus
to do: they exorcised, they healed, they offered forgiveness, and they preached.
The first three are essentially the same for Tilley because each seeks to overcome
hurtful separation through reconciliation into a community. When it comes to
teaching, however, we begin to see how radical Tilley intends his equation of
Christology with practice to be. Since historiography can tell us very little about
what Jesus or his disciples actually taught about God and his coming reign, we
must shift our focus toward the practical: "If Jesus is indeed God's agent who
empowers people to engage in such practices when they are his disciples, then
that empowerment consists in his teaching the disciples how to engage in these
practices. What is crucial about Jesus' teaching is not what content he teaches but
what he teaches to do and what attitudes Jesus is remembered as finding to be
proper for disciples" (151).
Jesus' parables or exhortations are, therefore, a call to act with compassion
for those in need of reconciliation, whether in physical distress, in need of
material help, or internally wounded by the divisive power of sin. Tilley
interprets the various accounts of table fellowship found in the Gospels,
including the Last Supper, along the same lines. What is essential in these events
is not what was said, what was eaten, or who took which role, but the sheer fact
that all were invited. To be able to recognize Jesus as the Christ is to be able to
see in these inclusive, reconciling meals overflowing with food and drink a
foretaste of the reign of God.
The final section of the book is entitled "Implications" and allows Tilley to
address traditional Christological loci: the divinity of Christ, the doctrine of the
atonement and the Church's missionary task. Although worth inclusion, these
essentially theoretical questions are secondary to practical ones and can only be
assessed by their "appropriateness for the contemporary community that seeks
to be faithful in the present to the practice of the Jesus-movement" (195). Tilley
begins with a critical analysis of the Congregation of the Doctrine of Faith's
"Notification on the Works of Fr. Jon Sobrino, S.J." (2007) and, in particular,
its misguided attempt to overturn the Jesuit's historical assertion that "Jesus was
a believer like ourselves" with the "faith statement" that "the filial and messianic
consciousness of Jesus is the direct consequence of his ontology as Son of God
made man." For Tilley this is evidence that the CDF is seriously out of sync with
contemporary theologians who are "conscious of the contributions of historical
methods" and "treat reflective doctrines as based on, not the basis of, claims
about actual, historical events and persons" (198). In other words, it is the Jesus
uncovered by historical methods, not the Jesus described in the New Testament,
or even less in authoritative Church teaching, that is ultimately determinative for
saying what is true of Jesus Christ. Tilley differs from Sobrino, however, in
finding a basis for his description in "the historic Jesus" rather than "the
historical Jesus." I return to this distinction below.
Prior to developing his own account of Jesus' divinity, Tilley clarifies his
position that Christological doctrines are essentially rules for what is and is not

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BOOK REVIEWS

properly Christian discourse and can claim no "ontological status." The teachings
of the early councils concerning the nature of Christ, therefore, need not be
repeated as if they were truths to be believed by modern Christians; they should
be understood as important benchmarks for reformulations appropriate to time
and place. Indeed, repetition is impossible since modern speakers cannot retrieve
the meaning of the conciliar definitions by employing the same words. Terms
like "person" or "nature" mean something quite different today; further, any
attempt to speak of Christ's "two natures" only confuses by giving the very unThomistic impression that God and world belong to the same superclass of being
instead of operating as nonconstrastive and noncompetitive dimensions of
reality. Tilley himself explains Jesus as "truly human, truly divine" by taking the
reader back to Peter and characterizing his mistakes as a refusal to understand
that for Jesus to be the Christ means that his ways are God's ways. As first
among equals and divine agent, Jesus "wants and wills finitely in particular
situations what the infinite God wants and wills in those situations" (227).
Accordingly, the divinity in Jesus operates in nonviolent harmony with the
human, and both are perfectly expressive of God's desire for the human
flourishing that is the reign of God on earth. The disciples he empowers,
therefore, become "secondary agents" of God's salvific will through carrying out
practices of reconciliation in whatever context they find themselves. From this
notion of salvation, Tilley offers a theory of atonement admittedly very close to
Peter's Abelard's "exemplar" theory but differing in that Jesus not only "shows"
his followers what to do but empowers people "to live in God's reign" (248).
What does this belief mean for how Christians should relate to those who are
not followers of Jesus Christ? To answer this, Tilley offers a quite novel
interpretation of the Great Commission that concludes Matthew's Gospel: "The
injunction to teach should then be understood as an injunction not to teach what
to believe but to teach how to engage in the practices Jesus empowered the
disciples to perform" (255). The Church's outreach should, therefore, no longer
be seen as missio ad gentes but missio inter gentes. The book ends with an
epilogue in which Tilley discusses topics that he admits play little role in his
Christology: divine revelation and resurrection.
A critical assessment of Tilley's proposal to equate Christology with the
reconciling practices Jesus empowers in his followers must begin with an
acknowledgement of its intentional distance from any Christology viewed as
properly theoretical and based upon revealed truths entrusted to the Church.
Such an approach, according to Tilley, is outmoded not only because it confuses
historical and dogmatic claims but also because it fails to give proper priority to
practices to be done over doctrines to be believed. Instead of detailing the many
baleful consequences entailed in Tilley's rejection of traditional Christology, I
would like to concentrate on his effort to give the findings of historical methods
concerning Jesus priority over dogmatic claims.
To begin with, it must be conceded that Tilley is touching upon an unsettled
question in theology. The possibility that historical truths about Jesus might be
discovered apart from direct reliance upon the gospel portraits is a thoroughly

BOOK REVIEWS

631

modern notion and one absent from the great theological systems of the Catholic
tradition. The issue cannot be avoided, however, since whatever Jesus actually
said and did is without question determinative for Christian theology. It is to
Tilley's credit, therefore, that he boldly seeks to integrate an historical reconstruction of Jesus and his disciples into his Christology. That said, Tilley's
insistence that the reconstruction that serves as the basis for his proposal is "the
historic Jesus" rather than "the historical Jesus" comes with a number of
problems. The term itself is reminiscent of Martin Kiihler's der geschichtliche
Christus, but is employed for the very different purpose of giving an historiographically reconstructed Jesus epistemic priority over the Christ of faith. Yet
what could justify giving a conceptual construct such sway apart from some reason to believe that "the historic Jesus" gets us closer to Jesus as he actually was
than the New Testament itself? Dunn, in fact, employs such arguments for his
Jesus Remembered based on the oral character of first-century Palestinian Jewish
culture, but Tilley inexplicably does not pursue this line of historical reasoning.
A much greater problem arises when we note the non-Jewish character of the
historic Jesus to which Tilley assigns such theological significance. Apart from
raising the possibility that the disciples' Jesus worship was an instance of a "two
powers in heaven" theology existent in Second Temple Judaism, Tilley neglects
the influence of distinctively Jewish theological themes-for example, creation,
covenant, the Mosaic Law, the Messiah's role in the fulfillment of God's
promises to Israel and the nations-on Jesus' ministry, the disciples attraction to
him, or the hostility of their opponents. Tilley can claim, of course, that there is
little agreement among historians on these matters, but he cannot deny that
Jesus' preaching and practice was informed by some firmly held set of
convictions concerning God's ongoing history with Israel. Indeed, a Jesus apart
from such beliefs cannot be historical in any sense of that word. However, the
problem goes much deeper, for an acknowledgement of the theological
convictions at play in Jesus' ministry undermines Tilley's equation of Christo logy
with reconciling practices. Once it is acknowledged that Jesus and his followers
carried out their activities in light of a collection of beliefs concerning the God
of Israel's present purposes, it is permissible to describe the Jesus-movement and
its reconciling practice as theory-laden from the beginning. This would mean,
moreover, that attempts by latter Christians to give doctrinal expression to the
full meaning of what had happened in Jesus' life, death, and resurrection would
be in essential continuity with the ways of the "historic" or the "historical" Jesus.
To be true to Jesus, therefore, means to unite theological theory and the
practices that identify the Christian believer. This is not to say that traditional
Christologists have nothing to learn from Tilley's proposal, but only that they
need not follow him in disconnecting practice from doctrinal theory.
JAMES F. KEATING

ProvidenceCollege
Providence,Rhode Island

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BOOK REVIEWS

Surnaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought.
Edited by SERGE-THOMASBONINO,0.P. Translated by ROBERTWILLIAMS.
Ave Maria, Fla.: Sapientia Press, 2009. Pp. xiii + 362. $32.95 (paper).
ISBN 978-1-932589-52-8.
Sapientia Press of Ave Maria University has published an English translation
of a symposium examining the controversy surrounding Henri de Lubac's
Surnaturel (1946), held in May 2000 at the Institut Catholique of Toulouse and
originally published in French in the Revue Thomiste 101 (2001). Although
lacking a unitary character in subject matter and perspective, the essays in the
book are representative of the Toulouse school of Thomism, which seeks to
combine a historical-critical exegesis of St. Thomas and his school with a
theological emphasis and a dialogue with contemporary theological currents. The
work is divided into four sections: the historical context of Surnaturel, nature
and grace in St. Thomas, the Scholastic development, and contemporary
perspectives.
In the first section, Henry Donneaud's "Surnaturel through the Fine-Tooth
Comb of Traditional Thomism," offers an interesting view of three very different
types of critiques of Surnaturel, represented by the works of Charles Boyer, S.J.,
Rosaire Gagnebet, O.P., and Marie-Joseph Le Guillou, O.P. This essay is
welcome for calling attention to these three fine Thomists whose profound and
complementary critiques of the thesis of de Lubac tend today to be completely
overlooked.
After presenting the position of Le Guillou, Donneaud gives a brief criticism
of it for not solving an apparent contradiction in the texts of St. Thomas himself,
which frequently assert both that (a) every intellectual creature has a natural
desire to see God, and (b) the vision of God transcends all natural inclination
(citing 1 Cor 2:9). Donneaud also observes that de Lubac downplayed the
second line of texts. Following Jorge Laporta, Donneaud holds that the solution
lies in differentiating two senses of natural desire, innate and elicited, and
understanding the natural desire to see God as innate rather than elicited (55).
Marie-Bruno Borde, in a later article in the book on the Salmanticenses (254),
holds the same position. While I agree on the necessity of this distinction, I think
that Donneaud, Borde, and Laporta err in reversing the roles of these two forms
of natural desire. Saint Thomas affirms an elicited natural desire to see God that
is aroused by knowledge of God's existence. Once we know that God is, we
spontaneously seek to know who God is. However, when St. Thomas frequently
denies that there is a "natural inclination" for the vision of God, he is denying
an innate natural desire for the supernatural, because natural inclination is based
on proportionality and the capacity of man's faculties, which clearly cannot of
themselves attain the vision of God.
Chaintraine's article, "The Supernatural: Discernment of Catholic Thought
according to Henri de Lubac," gives a good summary of de Lubac's position, but
without critical discernment. For example, Chaintraine repeats de Lubac's claim
that the defense of the possibility of a state of pure nature on the part of Suarez

BOOK REVIEWS

633

and others was motivated by purely philosophical reasons (29). The historical
context and the texts of Suarez (Opera omnia, 4:153-54; 26:154), however,
show that the principal concern was theological. After the condemnation of
Michael Baius, it became necessary to show the gratuitousness of our
supernatural end also with respect to Adam and Eve before the Fall.
The attitude of Jacques Maritain to Surnaturel is addressed by Rene Mougel
in his essay, "The Position of Jacques Maritain Regarding Surnaturel: The Sin of
the Angel, or 'Spirit and Liberty.'" Mougel centers his attention on the question
of whether the angels would have been able to sin had they been created in a
purely natural order. This hypothetical question is of great interest for moral
theology, and drew forth some very interesting essays in the mid-twentieth
century, including a fine article by Maritain, in which he argues that the angels
would have been able to sin in such an order.
Although the peccability of the angels is a question in which Maritain and de
Lubac came to hold the same position, it would have been good to bring out the
fundamental difference between them on the interpretation of the natural desire
to see God. Maritain argued (rightly, I hold) that the natural desire to see God
is an elicited and conditional natural desire, whereas de Lubac viewed it as innate
and absolute. This difference has many very important consequences.
Furthermore, Maritain was perhaps the foremost twentieth-century defender of
the possibility of a state of pure nature from the perspective of philosophy, and
his study of the sin of the angel is a perfect example of this. Maritain wished to
show that even in a state of pure nature, the angel would have had a moral trial
in which he could sin by making himself his final end. Thus Maritain maintained
the natural peccability of the angels to reinforce the coherence of the natural
order.
Another example of the way the two men's views on the supernatural
radically diverge concerns the notion of limbo. De Lubac's interpretation of the
natural desire to see God as innate and absolute implies that limbo would be
impossible because the lack of the vision of God would radically frustrate man's
nature (see The Mystery of the Supernatural, 54). Maritain, by contrast,
vigorously defended, from the philosophical point of view, the plausibility of the
state of limbo, conceived basically after the manner of St. Thomas (see "Idees
eschatologiques" in Approches sans entraves).
Saint Thomas's texts on limbo are the subject of an excellent contribution by
Serge-Thomas Bonino in the second section of the book. These texts have great
relevance for the debate concerning the natural desire to see God, for they
address a key question: How is the deprivation of the vision of God in limbo
compatible with the absence of any spiritual suffering? In a first text (II Sent., d.
33, q. 2, a. 2), Saint Thomas stresses that the natural desire to see God in these
souls would only be a conditional desire (velleitas) whose frustration would not
cause suffering (ibid., ad 2). In a later text (De Malo, q. 5, a. 3), he solves the
problem by distinguishing between natural and supernatural knowledge of man's
final end. The souls in limbo would have only natural knowledge, and thus
would know that they were made for happiness, but would not know of the

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supernatural beatitude lost on account of Adam's sin and their lack of baptism,
and therefore would not mourn its loss. They would thus be possessors of a
natural happiness for which they would think they were made. Bonino rightly
concludes from these texts that "human nature of itself does not entail" the
vision of God, and that "the doctrine of limbo pleads in favor of the relative
consistency of a natural order defined by its own finalities, [and] by the
immediate ordering to the natural end" (145). It can be seen that St. Thomas's
texts on limbo are at odds with de Lubac's interpretation of the natural desire to
see God as innate and his hostility to the thesis that God could have made man
with a final end within the limits of the natural order (contemplating God
through creation).
Jean-Pierre Torrell offers a very fine study of original justice and the effects
of original sin as understood by St. Thomas in his essay, "Nature and Grace in
Thomas Aquinas." Torrell nicely elucidates the fact that the nature of original
justice was determined by man's destination to the supernatural end of the
beatific vision. He also rightly affirms that St. Thomas holds that it would have
been possible to create man without ordering him to the supernatural end. This
affirmation serves above all, as Torrell rightly notes, to delineate the distinction
between nature and grace. I would add that it also illuminates the question of
man's connatural end. However, a key element in this distinction is the notion
of proportionality and debitum naturae, which the author does not discuss.
The third section of the book, less successful than the second, focuses on
Scholastic developments after St. Thomas. The doctrinal history of the natural
desire to see God after St. Thomas is examined by Laurence Renault in "William
of Ockham and the Distinction between Nature and Supernature." This article
begins well by presenting the positions of Scotus and Ockham and the
differences between them. However, it fails to note the significant distinction
between Scotus and St. Thomas. Scotus rejects the existence of elicited natural
desires of the will, departing from St. Thomas and the preceding tradition (St.
John Damascene, the Summa fratris Alexandri, and St. Bonaventure), thereby
equating natural desire with innate appetite. Ockham goes still further by also
denying the existence of an innate appetite of the will, accentuating the freedom
of the will while weakening the concept of nature.
Thus the three positions are as follows: St. Thomas affirms an elicited natural
desire of the will for the vision of God, but does not affirm an innate appetite for
that end, which would require proportionality with that end. Scotus affirms an
innate appetite (not based on proportionality with the end, but on perfectibility
by the end), but denies an elicited natural appetite for the beatific vision.
Ockham denies both an elicited and an innate appetite for the vision. Renault's
analysis here is incomplete because he neglects the distinction between Scotus
and St. Thomas. Renault then errs, it seems, by implying that Cajetan and Suarez
were influenced by Ockham in their interpretation of the natural desire to see
God. On the contrary, Cajetan and especially Suarez are very much opposed to
Ockham in their emphasis on the importance of proportionality and debitum
naturae in rightly dividing the natural from the supernatural orders, for "nature's

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due" has no place in Ockham's system. In reality, de Lubac has much more in
common with Ockham than Suarez does. This can be seen in Surnaturel (487-88)
and The Mystery of the Supernatural (236-37), where de Lubac quotes Ockham
to the effect that whatever God does is purely gratuitous.
The fourth section of the book examines the question of the supernatural in
contemporary theology. Georges Cardinal Cottier, in his essay, "On Natural
Mysticism," speaks of one of the great dangers of contemporary theology:
phobia of nature and "pan-supernaturalism" (282), although he does not directly
connect it with de Lubac's Surnaturel. Instead, he explores a rectification of some
of the dangers of "pan-supernaturalism" in Maritain's study of natural mysticism.
The connection of "pan-supernaturalism" with Surnaturel is explored in some
depth by Gilbert Narcisse in "The Supernatural in Contemporary Theology."
Narcisse nicely shows how de Lubac's understanding of a natural and absolute
desire for the supernatural is further radicalized in various sectors of
contemporary theology, as in Karl Rahner's supernatural existential. In the wake
of de Lubac, human existence has tended to become a principal theological
source.
Archbishop Andre-Mutien Leonard, in "The Theological Necessity of the Pure
Nature Concept," eloquently asserts the necessity of the concept of pure nature,
along the lines of Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, and Juan Alfaro. He criticizes
de Lubac for failing to maintain the gratuitousness of the supernatural and for
failing to sufficiently respect Humani generis 26. This last point needs to be more
qualified by acknowledging the refinement of de Lubac's position in his 1949
article and in his 1965 book, The Mystery of the Supernatural.
I fully agree with Archbishop Leonard in the utility of the defense of the
possibility of pure nature as a thesis necessary to maintain the full notion of grace
and the supernatural. However, I think that it is upside-down to look at the
notion of nature simply as a "remainder concept" after grace has been subtracted
(as in Rahner and Balthasar). Our knowledge starts with the natural order, and
not with grace, which is not directly subject to our ordinary experience. Thus
there exists a philosophical order that analyzes human nature as such and its
connatural end, independently of the supernatural.
The contributions in the volume are prefaced by an excellent introduction by
Serge-Thomas Bonino that sets de Lubac's contribution to Thomism in its
historical context. He gives a good summary of the state of the question by
stressing the importance of maintaining a "difficult equilibrium" (xi) that brings
out both the innate openness of human nature to being elevated to the
supernatural and the coherence of the natural order in itself, which provides the
foundation for its gratuitous elevation.
De Lubac emerges in this volume as a figure whose work deeply affected the
practice of Catholic theology, and Thomism in particular, by focusing attention
on the historical development of the theology of the supernatural and the natural
desire to see God, and discrediting the Thomistic commentatorial tradition
beginning with Cajetan. Nevertheless, this contribution is not without quite
significant problems, both historical and doctrinal, for which reason

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contemporary theology must critically rethink the issues raised by Surnaturel to
better achieve the "difficult equilibrium."
LAWRENCEFEINGOLD
Institute of Pastoral Theology of Ave Maria University
Ave Maria, Florida

Natura Pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace. By STEVENA.
LONG. New York: Fordham University Press, 2010. Pp. 282. $65.00
(cloth). ISBN 978-0-8232-3105-8.
The sifting and resifting of Henri de Lubac's Surnaturel, its implications and
its consequences, proceeds apace. The subtitle of Long's book, On the Recovery
of Nature in the Doctrine of Grace, aptly tells us the aim of its first two chapters,
where Long deals directly first with de Lubac and second with Hans Urs von
Balthasar. However, Long goes on to say something about how the recovery of
nature is to be effected (chap. 3) and the need for its recovery in thinking out in
what terms the Church is to stake out her place in the public square (chap. 4).
Long defends two theses against de Lubac. First, human nature has and must
have a proportionate natural end if it is to be a nature at all. Second, God need
not have called our actually existing and divinely chosen human nature to a
strictly supernatural end. As to the first thesis, Long faults de Lubac for being
insufficiently philosophical to see the wreck he makes of any nature in denying
it a proportionate end. As to the second, de Lubac is wrong to see the assertion
of this thesis as severing a real openness to and genuine suitability for the
supernatural end of the vision of God. De Lubac thinks this, according to Long,
because he reduces all obediential potency to the general potency whereby God
can perform miracles, making bread from stones. He ignores the notion of a
specific obediential potency, whereby what is in potency is not abolished, but
perfected and according to the way (albeit superabundantly) it is perfected by its
own proportionate natural end.
Long thinks it incumbent upon him also to discern and honor the theological
intention motivating de Lubac's position. He does this by noting the ideological
circumstances in which de Lubac worked. Modern philosophy had already
denatured Aristotle's physis by scrapping teleology and relegating what remained
of it to a world in which the writ of God's providence no longer ran. Much of
modern theology, culminating with Luis de Molina, had severed human freedom
from divine causality. It was these things that separated man from God, not
nature understood as St. Thomas understood it, ordered to a proportionate
natural end naturally attainable. Since the natural connections of human nature
to God had been severed in early modernity, de Lubac, in Long's telling of the

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story, makes them supernatural from the outset, "hot-wiring" nature to grace by
proposing vision as the only end of human nature as it de facto exists. In this
way, alas, de Lubac joins in modernity's attack on nature when the true solution
is the restoration of nature.
In all this, Long does good work, and his reading of St. Thomas is largely
supported by the magisterial work of Lawrence Feingold. In one important way,
however, Long disagrees with Feingold. Long follows Cardinal Cajetan in
reading question 12, article 1 of the Prima Pars, on the natural desire to see God.
It is, for Long, not a natural desire to know the essence of God, but rather a
desire to know the essence of God as cause of the world, where these two
specifications of object are supposed to declare a real distinction. Feingold,
following Domingo Banez, Francisco Suarez, and many others, makes the object
of the desire the knowledge of the essence of God indeed, but has it that the
desire for that object is conditional. This seems to me to have the advantage of
moving nature closer to grace than does Long, and therefore of supplying de
Lubac's desiderata more fully (which is not to forget that de Lubac dashed cold
water on both positions).
What becomes of nature once de Lubac has "hot-wired" it to grace by
replacing its proportionate end with the supernatural vision of God? As Balthasar
said in his book on Barth, it is reduced to the bare minimum required in order
for revelation to have an addressee; it has no material content isolable from its
relation to and ordination to grace; it is "createdness as such." Long is at his best
in showing how this position puts unbearable pressure on other parts of
theology. Created things are no longer things necessarily related to God but are
wholly relations, and we move from St. Thomas to Hegel. What is assumed in
the hypostatic union is "createdness as such," and the instrumentality of the
assumed nature seems to disappear because the tool itself has no form and does
not keep its edge; the natural virtues by analogy with which we gain some
understanding of supernatural faith, hope, and charity become indiscoverable.
Like Feingold, Long has some illuminating things to say about the conceptual
mess de Lubac and Balthasar land us in speaking of "concrete" and "abstract"
nature. However, Long also tries to show how certain other pieces of Balthasar'
theology flow from this mistake, for instance, his attribution of passion and
receptivity and limit to the Trinitarian relations and his view of analogy. In this,
I think, he is less successful. On the other hand, Long is surely correct in pointing
out the difficulty of the Church pretending to declare the natural law where
nature has been evacuated of material content. And Long is right to point out
how the teaching of Vatican I on the natural knowability of God and on miracles
has suffered from the evisceration of nature.
At the end of the discussion of Balthasar, it is evident that nature cannot play
any role in theology unless it is a "full" nature, not something that is a limit
concept for grace. The nature we need is, in Long's apt phrase, "theonomic
nature," where the relation of created things to their Creator as both first cause
and last end is worked out in some detail. Only then will we conceive the
addressee of revelation and the subject of grace adequately, and only then will

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we have an analogatum sturdy enough to support an (imperfect) understanding
of a host of theological realities-the knowledge of faith, the theological virtues,
revealed divine law, the assumed nature, etc. This means that nature that is in
proximate potency to theological utility is nature that is philosophically understood. The third chapter is a long but probably necessary warning that expecting
the contemporary Anglo-American analytic tradition to deliver the desired goods
is quixotic. Beyond a common commitment to logic of a certain variety and to
logical form and to reading the history of its own failed revolutions, there is no
substantive philosophical core to this tradition. In this chapter, Long examines
I. M. Bochenski's attempt to make logic more comprehensive than ontology as
a sort of illustration of what analysis can and cannot do. The upshot of the
chapter is that nature will not be appreciated in itself except by the traditional
philosophy of nature whose point of departure is the Physics of Aristotle, nor
will it be theonomically appreciated absent a metaphysical context that does
more than nod at Plato, Aristotle, and Plotinus.
In theology, the theses that human nature has a proportionate natural end and
that providence could have left us to pursue this end alone were supposed-in
de Lubac's account-to make grace only accidentally and extrinsically connected
to nature. The idea that human nature is in specific obediential potency to grace
addresses this concern, at least in part. But in political theology, and in the
Church's engagement with state and society, the theses were supposed also to
have the unhappy consequence of fostering a secularist minimalism scrubbed
bare of any regard for the law of God. Long addresses this issue and argues the
contrary in his last chapter by considering how three thinkers have approached
the question of what the Church should propose as the basis for a just public
order. Jacques Maritain maintained that a sufficient basis could be secured by
common agreement on the subjective rights of the citizens. This does not address
St. Augustine's teaching that not only private thanks but public worship of God
is due him. Moreover, it ignores our practical need to take public account of the
results of the Fall and the availability of redemption, which Maritain otherwise
acknowledges in subalternating moral philosophy to moral theology. Jean
Porter's proposal of a common agreement on the natural law as a capacity for
knowing good and evil is also found wanting: the natural law is more than a
capacity for knowledge-it is an actual ordering of man to natural ends, an
ordering inscribed in our nature, and, contrary to Porter, it yields immediate
knowledge as to the goodness and badness of actions bearing on each of the
ensemble of natural goods we are ordered to. She, too, proposes a common
acknowledgement of subjective rights. Long observes that such acknowledgment
does not provide a way to adjudicate conflicting rights claims in the absence of
a framework of commonly acknowledged natural ends. Last, and from quite
another perspective, David Schindler worries whether the First Amendment is
a Trojan horse for liberal atheism, and wants our Christian discourse about
public things to proceed from nature understood as intrinsically ordered to
grace.

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To all three, to Maritain and Porter who are willing to settle for too little, and
to Schindler who wants too much, Long proposes that we consider nature uncut
and untrimmed, and take as the basis for state and society both the speculative
and the practical truths imbedded therein. It will be nature that renders up a
knowledge of its provident First Cause and beneficent Last End. It will be a
nature that delivers the practical guidance of the natural law within a known
hierarchy of natural ends. And it will be a nature that is open to the news of its
fallen condition and beatific end.
In order even to have sufficient Catholic voices who could mount the
arguments in the philosophy of nature and metaphysics that Long thinks
required, we should have to refashion the universities-I mean Catholic
universities-in the way Alasdair Macintyre has proposed in God, Philosophy,
Universities. One therefore feels the same sense of not quite knowing what world
we are in at the end of Long's book as at the end of Maclntyre's, with the same
doubt whether there is anything to be done, with the same awareness of there
being no rational or Christian alternative to their programs worth aiming at.
I regret to say that Long's diction can be recondite and his syntax rococo. I
confess there are some places where I don't know what he is saying. I wish that
in charity he would make it easier for us rustics to share his great learning and
timely insight.
GUY MANSINI, 0.S.B.

Saint Meinrad School of Theology
Saint Meinrad, Indiana

Deconstructing Theodicy: Why fob has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering.
By DAVID B. BURRELL, C.S.C., with A.H. JOHNS. Grand Rapids, Mich.:
Brazos Press, 2008. Pp. 144. $20.00 (paper). ISBN: 978-1-58743-222-4.
The provocative subtitle of this book is slightly misleading. This eclectic work
shows that Job does have something to say to the puzzle of human suffering, but
not in the form of a post-Leibnizian theodicy. The aim of the book is revealed
in the main title: to deconstruct the modern project of theodicy.
The first four chapters of the book provide a reflection on the nature and
strategies of the Book of Job. Burell argues that the Book of Job was written in
order to deconstruct the Deuteronomic assumption that God would reward
observance of the covenant and punish deviation. Job's interlocutors all
formulate some version of the prevailing view that Job must be guilty of some
sin in order to have merited his affliction from God as punishment. They attempt
to defend forensically the justice of God by speaking about God. In stark contrast
to his interlocutors, Job's speeches are neither propositional arguments nor

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forensic in nature. Job's words are primarily performative in nature-they speak
directly to God rather than about God. Job, the outsider from the land of Uz,
speaks directly to the agent of his affliction seeking an answer to the question of
why God is afflicting him when he has done nothing to deserve it. What is
ultimately most remarkable about the Book of Job is that God accepts Job's
challenge to respond to him in the voice from the whirlwind. It is the personal
response of God to dialogue with Job that relieves his deepest and unarticulated
affliction: a feeling of alienation from God as a result of suffering. As many
commentators have remarked, God never gives Job an "explanation" for his
suffering. God instead reminds Job that he is the transcendent, free Creator of
the world whose agency is unfathomable to a creature. God's response to Job is
not theodicy in the modern sense. It suggests instead that what human sufferers
need most from God is a renewed sense of being in a loving, personal, and
dialogical relationship with the God who is the transcendent Creator rather than
a theoretical explanation. The Book of Job is in a sense an argument against
argument-it is futile to seek an explanation from God or about God, when
what is needed is speech directly to God. It is the very act of speech from God
to Job in response that lifts the suffering.
The middle of the book is like a musical interlude. Burrell adapts a previously
published article by Anthony Johns on the way the figure of Job is portrayed in
the Qu'ran. The Qu'ran itself has nothing comparable to the Book of Job. Job
takes his place instead as a minor prophet whose example of patient endurance
of undeserved suffering prefigures the Prophet's trials. Johns's own conclusion
ably sums up the heart of this chapter: "Together these four pericopes show Job
as a member of the community of prophets with a distinctive place and a special
charism: that he should suffer without knowing why, and instead of despairing,
cry to God for relief, trusting in God as the Merciful" (80). Parallel to the Book
of Job, there is no explanation for suffering: there is only the patient endurance
of suffering in response to the personal mercy of the Creator God.
The sixth chapter of the book mines the medieval commentaries of
Maimonides, Aquinas, and Gersonides for insights into the Book of Job. Burrell
argues that all three commentators read Job too much along the lines of classical
wisdom treatises on the value of temporal goods in human flourishing and so
miss the main point of the biblical narrative (although he does allow that Aquinas
came closest to finding it). What is more valuable in these commentaries,
however, is the way that they situate the puzzle of suffering within sophisticated
treatments of divine providence. Maimonides recognized that one of the errors
we easily fall into is to think that God's knowledge and providence are like our
own. Maimonides argues that we cannot understand the final cause of creation,
or how things are ordered; there is no functional explanation for transcendent
providence from an emanationist standpoint. Gersonides tries to give one from
an Averroistic perspective that ends up compromising divine providence by
denying God's knowledge of material particulars as such. Burrell presents
Aquinas as steering between the extremes of equivocation and univocation on
providence by marrying the model of practical intelligence with the doctrine of

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divine eternity. Aquinas's doctrine of creation, with its emphasis on God's
creative and intentional immediacy to all that exists, provides the metaphysical
foundation for the human sufferer's ability to engage the Creator in intimate
dialogue. The eternal God who created us is always immediately present to us
and we to him.
The seventh chapter of the book argues that a proper reading of the Book of
Job can make a valuable contribution to the contemporary debates in analytic
philosophy of religion. In different veins, both Terence Tilley's Evils ofTheodicy
and Marilyn McCord Adams's Horrendous Evils have called into question the
traditional strategies of theodicy. Tilley argues that the very project of theodicy,
of justifying the ways of God to man, is untenable. McCord Adams stresses the
need to recall the transcendence of the Creator God and God's relationship to
those who suffer horrendous evils. In their treatments of the Book of Job, both
Tilley and McCord Adams emphasize the contrast between Job and his
interlocutors: the interlocutors speak about God, while Job speaks to God. It is
precisely in the renewed enactment of one's relationship to the Creator that a
sufferer can "go on" without explanation. The voice from the whirlwind reminds
us that God is the transcendent Creator in the manner that Robert Sokolowski
has articulated in his "Christian distinction." Faced with the transcendent
Creator, we should give up the very project of theodicy. What the human
sufferer may come to understand retrospectively is not the justice of God, but
rather his grace, allowing them to "go on."
The conclusion of the book stresses the contrast between the semantics of
explaining and addressing. Theodicies attempt to explain the justice of God,
when what the sufferer really needs is a loving dialogue with God wherein the
relationship is deepened and by which some deeper mode of understanding
beyond theoretical explanation might be achieved. The good news of the Book
of Job is not the explanatory value of what God says in the whirlwind, but that
God accepted Job's plea to speak with him directly in response. It is the renewed
relationship that enables Job to "go on." Finally, Burrell suggests that Augustine's
Confessions models the kind of dialogue between us and God that enables us to
bear the unexplained hardship of suffering. The Confessions teaches us that it is
only in dialogue with God that our divided selves find healing and order. At the
same time that the dialogue is intimately personal, Augustine comes to interpret
it in the context of his new community, the Church. The Confessions discloses
the importance of narrative for personal identity and the centrality of dialogue
and friendship to that identity.
One of the singular gifts of the writings of David Burrell is that he manages
to bring into fruitful dialogue so many different figures. This book is another
example of that gift. In the course of a rather short work, he manages to shed
new light on the puzzle of human suffering by weaving together biblical exegesis,
the Qu'ran, medieval thinkers from all three Abrahamic traditions, contemporary
philosophy of religion, and Augustine! While the remarkable ken of this book
reveals the creativity and capacity of Burrell's mind, it will challenge a reader
with a different kind of mind to keep up with all the sources. I believe Burrell

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succeeds in deconstructing theodicy. What Job and we need from the Creator
God is not an explanation, but rather a renewed dialogical relationship.
BRIAN}. SHANLEY, 0.P.

Providence College
Providence, Rhode Island

Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great. By STANLEY
B. CUNNINGHAM.Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America
Press, 2008. Pp. 294. $79.95 (cloth). ISBN: 978-0-8132-1540-2.
In Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of Albert the Great,
Stanley B. Cunningham sets himself the challenge of mapping Albert the Great's
contribution to moral philosophy, which he sees as a largely uncharted region of
Albert's otherwise well-sounded "humanism." It is uncharted, Cunningham
argues, because scholars have for the most part denied it even existed, preferring
to see Albert as the polymath with wide-ranging scientific interests famously
sparked by the recovery of the full Aristotelian corpus, rather than as the
architect of an integrated theological or philosophical system of his own. But in
Cunningham's view Albert did elaborate a coherent moral theory, and, what is
more, he-and not his student Thomas Aquinas-was the first medieval thinker
to do so, because he was the first medieval truly to accept the premise that man
has a natural capacity for moral goodness, achievable without the aid of
supernatural grace. This led Albert to explore the notion of natural law, to ask
such questions as how virtue is naturally acquired and what the means of
attaining natural happiness are and, in the end, to produce, yes, a systematic
moral philosophy. Cunningham thus hopes to achieve two things with his book:
first, to focus deserved attention on Albert's undeservedly neglected moral
theory, especially as revealed in his treatise De bona and his commentary on the
ten books of the Nicomachean Ethics, and, second, in so doing to reclaim for
Albert some of the spotlight that scholars have always granted instead to his
more famous student.
Cunningham's study is divided into five parts. The first situates Albert's
contribution in relation to developments in thirteenth-century moral philosophy,
and also in relation to modern virtue theory. The second teases out Albert's understanding of the domain of "moral science" and the procedures for investigating it. With the third Cunningham's discussion turns to the content of Albert's
thought, outlining the Swabian's understanding of the nature and causes of virtue
in human behavior. The fourth part treats Albert's conception of natural law and
morality's relationship to it. The fifth examines what Cunning-ham terms
"virtue's rewards"-friendship,
happiness, and our final end. Throughout,
Albert's treatise De bona forms the main focus of Cunningham's attention.

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That emphasis on De bona is worth considering, for it witnesses to an
important aspect of the author's argument. Unlike Albert's commentary on the
first ten books of the Ethica Nicomachea, in which he was forced to pursue
topics in the order and from the angles that Aristotle's text dictates, in De bona
Albert was free to "work out his own principles of order" (72). This, Cunningham suggests, makes De bona the surer indicator of Albert's independent
conceptualization of moral theory and of his own ideas, and thus the more
significant text within the Albertine corpus. While this is a fairly commonplace
observation in the scholarship, Cunningham pushes the argument for the
significance of De bona further by showing the extent to which it marks a
departure from the approach to man's moral behavior taken by earlier Scholastic
authors, who had been similarly constrained by the traditional context within
which such questions were raised. Before Albert, man's capacity for virtuous
behavior had been treated as a pendant to discussions of grace, because virtue
was seen to be possible only with supernatural assistance, not as something
attainable by human efforts alone. And this textual reality, this organization of
material, Cunningham insists, is one very important reason why most authors,
including Peter Lombard, Abelard, and Philip the Chancellor, tended to deemphasize, if not to negate, the importance of naturally acquired virtue in their
moral doctrine: the structure of their texts conditioned their responses. Albert,
says Cunningham, was the first to pick up on this and to take the radical step of
considering natural virtue in its own right. Even if modern scholarship, as
epitomized by the work of Dom Lottin, has recognized the originality of the
thinking in De bona, the author insists that little consideration has been given to
the overall organization of this text, which reveals Albert's broader
conceptualization of the subject when he had a free rein to explore it. And this
Cunningham means to rectify here.
All this does lead to a study that generally follows the same sequence of topics
and works through the same material in the same order as Albert does in De
bona. This is something that the reader needs to be aware of as Cunningham's
analysis proceeds. To a certain degree it reads as an expositio textus that belies
the study's origin in a dissertation originally dedicated specifically to assessing
De bona. The author does admit that Super Ethica, which postdates De bona by
about ten years, cannot be written off as a simple commentary ad litteram and
therefore not part of the calculus: Albert punctuates Super Ethica with disputed
questions, meaning that the text of Aristotle is not only expounded, but
thoroughly explored in a dialectical encounter, and also that we are allowed to
see exactly what Albert's opinion is when he provides his determinations of these
questions as the genre demanded. The author admits, too, that on some points
Super Ethica provides "the most refined and representative philosophical
treatments in Albert's corpus" (74), of which he will take account. But for all
that, Cunningham does tend to use Super Ethica (and also Albert's earlier De
natura bani and his Aristotelian paraphrases) as a gloss on De bona, ever
bringing his discussion back to this other text. To an certain extent, then,
Cunningham allows his appraisal of De bona as the most free-flowing and

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comprehensive of Albert's examinations of moral theory to become an argument
for its being the most mature statement of his conclusions.
Having said that, this is a book that has much to commend it. It does shed
light on the place of Albert within (and without) the larger currents of moral
philosophy in the thirteenth century. It clarifies some important aspects of
Albert's understanding of ethics, when, in the book's central chapters, the author
takes us stepwise through Albert's moral doctrine. Guided by the order of
proceeding in De bona, Cunningham first recounts Albert's metaphysical analysis
of the good, then turns to consider the causes of virtue, the nature of virtue
itself, the classification of the virtues, and the relationship between the passions
and virtue, and focuses finally on the matter of natural law, to which Albert
sometimes refers, tellingly, as ius rationis-that which is seen to be right
according to reason. For each topic Cunningham provides not only his reading
of what he believes Albert actually says, but some insight into how the issues
were treated by earlier thinkers of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries-with the
emphasis again on the Lombard, Abelard, Philip the Chancellor, William of
Auxerre-and where the lines of demarcation between them and Albert lie.
Indeed, Cunningham does not shirk the responsibility of taking the longer view
and tracing the lineage of many postulates back to their early medieval and
classical roots in Augustine, Boethius, Macrobius, and Cicero. There is also an
ongoing conversation with some of the current scholarship designed to highlight
Cunningham's sense of how his analysis of Albert moves the discussion forward,
topic by topic. The cumulative effect of this threefold presentation of each issue,
treating text, context, and historiography, is to build up quite a comprehensive
picture for the reader. In sum, Reclaiming Moral Agency provides a wealth of
historical information and perceptive interpretation clearly born of a long
familiarity with the writings of Albert the Great and their setting.
Those who approach Cunningham's study looking for some new insight into
the internal dynamics of the intellectual history of the Dominican order are left
ever-so-slightly disappointed, however. While Cunningham is very thorough in
placing Albert's thought against the backdrop of the contribution made by other
Scholastics, he does very little to move beyond comparing him to other
Schoolmen, at Paris, in particular. But a good deal of the more recent scholarship
on Albert's Order has been at pains to point out that most of the teaching
activity, and most of the textual production, of the Dominicans took place
outside of the universities and secular schools and through genres of writing that
are too easily ignored by intellectual historians because they are not overtly
products of the schoolroom. Given that Cunningham's focus is upon Albert's
moral philosophy, and how Albert answers questions regarding the nature of
virtue and human ethical behavior, his study might have benefitted from at least
a passing glance at the many practical handbooks, the summae of the virtues and
vices, the confessors' manuals that increasingly incorporated sections on human
intentionality as means of assessing the moral freight of particular acts, which
formed such a prominent part of the Dominicans' literary output in the
thirteenth century. At the very least, this would have made possible some more

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nuanced observations about the reception and application of Albert's moral
teaching precisely in the environment that Albert himself desired to make the
most impact-amongst his own confreres and in their dealing with real-life
ethical quandaries. To a degree, Cunningham is guilty of the same Aquinascentrism that he rails against, when virtually his sole touchstone and point of
comparison for Albert's thought within the Dominican order is that of his more
illustrious student.
In fairness, Cunningham's is a more philosophical project. He is attempting
to show that Albert did indeed stand alone in his time in looking at moral
doctrine from a purely philosophical point of view, not as something
conditioned by theological assumptions about man's behavior or final end. The
opposite of virtue for Albert is not sin, but action contrary to natural law. Still,
it is with regard to Cunningham's general premise, rather than his particular
readings, that one might raise the most pertinent question, namely, whether he
has actually succeeded in demonstrating that Albert did devise a completely new
philosophically, as opposed to theologically, coherent system of ethical doctrine.
There is no doubt that Cunningham's study has shown Albert to have reached
some original conclusions that earlier Scholastics had shied away from, and that
he pursued Aristotle's thought with an exceptionally clear-sighted rigor. But one
is not altogether convinced that it all adds up to a new system. Arguably, what
Albert achieved was the first thoroughgoing exposition of Aristotle in the
medieval West that did what Cunningham claims it did, which is that it left
Christian theological assumptions to one side as it teased out the implications of
the natural moral theory Aristotle presents. Where Albert systematically diverges
from Aristotle-what makes this something other than an Aristotelian ethical
universe-is not nearly so clear in Cunningham's appraisal.
But it is an appraisal worth reading.
M. MICHELE MULCHAHEY
Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies
Toronto, Ontario, Canada

We Speak because We Have First Been Spoken: A Grammar of the Preaching Life.
By MICHAELPASQUARELLOIII. Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2009. Pp.
viii+ 158. $18.00 (paper). ISBN 978-0-8028-2917-7.
Michael Pasquarello, who holds an endowed professorship in preaching at
Asbury Theological Seminary, summarizes the major concern of his book as
follows: "The person of the preacher is now a mere technician, a
'communicator,' whose task is to produce results, rather than a truthful witness
to the wisdom and virtue of the incarnate Word, whom we are called to follow

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and proclaim as the source and end of things" (vi). Admittedly, the best
preachers do tend to be exceptional communicators who can fill the pews and
inspire others to give of their time and talents. But the focus on numerical results
forgets that spiritual acts such as repentance, conversion, and growth in faith and
love cannot be empirically measured. Furthermore, truthful witness to Christ
crucified is often not popular.
The book ably defends a non-empirically driven, non-technique-oriented
homiletics. The first two chapters explore truthful speech in the context of
conformity to the crucified and risen Lord. Pasquarello insists upon the
importance of theological formation for good preaching. Preaching requires
doctrinal training in order to be appropriately "directed toward God" (18). Yet
what doctrinal training reveals is that Christian truth cannot simply be learned
intellectually; faith's knowledge is embodied in charity, as is manifested most
clearly by the truth of the gospel, "the wisdom of Christ's cross and resurrection"
(19). The grace of the Holy Spirit, who gives us the gift of faith, transforms not
only our minds but our whole way of life-despite our sinful weakness. We
discover that doctrinal truth is embedded in, and requires, embodied praise of
the God who reveals himself in Christ and the Holy Spirit.
Truthful speech is not simply a matter of knowing the truth, rather, it also
involves an entire way of life, rooted in the Church's liturgy and able to be
described as "faithful performance" (20). Pasquarello emphasizes the need for
the "congruence between the one of whom we speak and the one who speaks"
(21). As he puts it in the title of the book, "We speak because we have first been
spoken." Speech can therefore never be merely "a verbal tool or empty vehicle,
a possession rather than a gift" (22). Truthful speech cannot be separated from
truthful ways of life. These ways of life cannot be reduced to formulaic programs
based on a set of principles.
The relevance of preaching, Pasquarello adds, can only be measured in
relation to its source and end: the triune God. Rather than requiring that Jesus
Christ be made relevant to us, we must allow Jesus Christ (revealed in the whole
of Scripture) to judge our lives and transform them. The credibility of Scripture,
its truthfulness, is manifested in lives transformed by the Holy Spirit to be
embodiments of self-giving service rather than manipulative power. Since the
triune God is self-giving love, the power or relevance of preaching depends on
the preacher's receptive attunement to self-giving love rather than on his
technical skills.
Homiletics, then, is a properly theological discipline. Since no human
technique can control the effectiveness of preaching the truth of God's Word,
formation in preaching should concentrate upon the ways in which we learn to
contemplate and to receive from the triune God. Only in this way can preachers
become the kind of people who can communicate, rather than distort by
attempting to control, the wisdom of the crucified Lord. Truthful speech is
fundamentally a response to God, not something that we originate or control.
Exploring the "preaching life," Pasquarello emphasizes its place within the
Trinitarian economy of gifting. It is through the gift of the Holy Spirit that the

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preacher proclaims Christ Jesus and that the congregation is transformed by this
proclamation. Formation for preaching primarily involves nourishing the
preacher's immersion in the triune life. This immersion is not triumphalistic, for
it requires following the way of the Cross. Formation for preaching thus means
formation in radical self-giving love, so as "to become a living sacrificeof praise
to the God of Jesus Christ" (45). For this reason, teaching homiletics should
involve (as it did for Augustine) communicating "a participating way of knowing
that unites thought and life and unfolds in devotion to God through the
apprehension of Christian wisdom" (53). Far from being fundamentally
pragmatic or utilitarian, the preaching life aims at contemplating and adoring
God from within the Spirit-filled body of Christ. Pasquarello concludes that the
preacher must seek practical wisdom, which unites faith and life and enables the
preacher to embody the love of Christ in concrete words and deeds.
As his source for the meaning of "practical wisdom," Pasquarello turns to St.
Thomas Aquinas, to whose theology he devotes the three chapters that comprise
the bulk of the book. Noting the centrality of preaching for St. Dominic's Order
of Preachers, Pasquarello commends the Dominicans' combination of "theological inquiry and preaching" (70). Rather than training young Dominicans in
the latest techniques, Dominican formation involves intensive theological study
within the context of a rigorous liturgical and prayer life.
For Pasquarello, the structure of Aquinas's Summa Theologiae suggests the
proper pattern of homiletics: the contemplative focus on the Trinity (Prima
Pars), from which flows the "practical theology" (Secunda Pars) that attains its
end through Christ Jesus and the sacramental mediation of the grace of the Holy
Spirit (Tertia Pars). The Summa Theologiaeshows how virtuous Christian action
arises from contemplation of the triune God, who unites us to himself by
knowledge and by love. The various modes of sacra doctrina, including the
communication of the Scriptures through preaching, proclaim "the saving truth
of God's knowledge and love in Jesus Christ" (84). By proclaiming this saving
truth and embodying it, the preacher draws closer to God "by service to others
and strenuous intellectual activity" (87).
Pasquarello also finds Aquinas's emphasis on happiness to be significant. The
preaching life, when undertaken for the glory of God, should render us joyful
and happy in the deepest sense. Preaching has to do not with temporal goods
such as fame, power, or money, but with "the enjoyment of God" (92). Since
God wills to heal our fallen imago by uniting us to him by knowledge and by
love, the proclamation of the gospel is far more than a set of rules; it
corresponds to the interior activity of Christ and the Holy Spirit in our minds
and hearts. The joy of the preaching life thus has its foundation in the graced life
of virtue and the gifts of the Holy Spirit. The happy preacher is not the one with
the smoothest tongue.
Happy preachers will be known by their practical wisdom, which serves to
embody the theological virtues in concrete words and deeds. Pasquarello
combines Michael Sherwin's treatment of practical wisdom (or prudence) with
Stanley Hauerwas and Jim Fodor's emphasis on "performing" the gospel. If the

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preaching life is a "performance" of the gospel, then it is a performance rooted
in wisdom rather than in extrinsic techniques or strategies for effectiveness.
Preaching also responds to the beauty of Christ's holiness. The analogy of art
provides Pasquarello with yet another way of saying that homiletics must move
away from pedagogically "reductive, instrumentalist tendencies" (134) and that
preachers must "become what we do and say" (136) by lives rooted in
contemplation, prayer, and worship. As Pasquarello puts it, "By following in the
way of Jesus Christ, a preacher's whole way of being is transformed by the Spirit
to become a 'living sermon,' moved and moving others to worship God in 'the
beauty of holiness"' (151). The preaching life, like the Christian life as a whole,
is entirely a response to the Word and Spirit who lead us to the Father.
It will be apparent that, like many good preachers, Pasquarello has a tendency
frequently to repeat his favorite insights and phrases. Especially in the early
chapters, he also fills his pages with quotations from so many contemporary
authorities that at times the book reads almost like a medieval catena. Yet these
minor criticisms should not obscure his achievement. Rather than a study of
Aquinas on preaching, this book is something arguably even more valuable: a
theology of preaching that discerns in the Summa Theologiae the resources for
a contemplative and nonutilitarian understanding of the practice of preaching
and a sapiential, virtues-based understanding of the preaching life. Like many
others over the centuries, Pasquarello finds particularly instructive Aquinas's
theocentric theology, his Trinitarian and Christological sensibility, his scriptural
insight, and his appreciation for the union of knowledge and love and the role
of practical wisdom in the Christian life. As Pasquarello ably demonstrates from
a Methodist perspective, it is not for nothing that Aquinas is both the Church's
"common doctor" and the outstanding representative of the Order of Preachers.
MATTHEW LEVERING

University of Dayton
Dayton, Ohio

Wesley, Aquinas and Christian Perfection: An Ecumenical Dialogue. By EDGARDO
CoL6N-EMERIC. Waco, Tex.: Baylor University Press, 2009. Pp. 330.
$49.99 (cloth). ISBN: 978-1-60258-211-8.
John Wesley and Thomas Aquinas are surely not the most obvious pair of
individuals to bring into touch with each other, separated as they are by five
centuries in time and vastly different cultural and ecclesiastical circumstances. Yet
it is their respective positions in relation to two traditions in Christian
history-themselves long ignorant of each other but now brought into mutual
contact and attention by the modern ecumenical movement-that lends interest

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to a comparison between the two figures, standing as they do in formative
theological positions at the head of Methodism and, in the other case, of a strand
in that movement's more remote ancestry, with the elder Catholic indeed a most
distinguished medieval member of the Order of Preachers and the younger
Protestant an eighteenth-century evangelist committed to "the general spread of
the gospel" (to quote the title of Wesley's programmatic Sermon 63). In the
broadest sense, a conversation between Aquinas and Wesley could contribute to
that "mutual reassessment" which the Joint Commission for Dialogue between
the World Methodist Council and the Roman Catholic Church has declared to
be necessary and possible in the "new context" of ecumenism since the Second
Vatican Council, as well as furnishing matter for both the "exchange of ideas"
and the "exchange of gifts" which Pope John Paul II in Ut Unum Sint (1995) saw
as belonging to the nature of ecumenical dialogue: so the Joint Commission's
Seoul Report of 2006 under the title "The Grace Given You in Christ."
An initial difficulty in comparing the thought of the two subject figures of this
book resides in what its author detects as the difference in their exercise of the
metier of the theologian. Edgardo Col6n-Emeric characterizes Aquinas as a
"speculatively practical" theologian and Wesley as a "practically practical"
theologian. Much of Thomas's work was conducted in the role of a scholarly
teacher, and his writings follow an orderly structure. John Wesley, on the other
hand, taught and wrote in the more "occasional" mode of an annual "conference" of preachers, a few ordained but many lay, in "connection" with
himself. Nevertheless, there is a large measure of substantial coherence among
his literary remains in the shape of sermons, letters, "minutes of conference" and
"rules" of conduct for his "societies." Wesley, of course, has nothing to compare
with the Summa Theologiae of Aquinas, but his positions on the various topics
of theology stay pretty well consistent, and they are maintained in structural connection by virtue of what Wesley calls precisely the analogia fidei, or "the general
tenor of Scripture" or "the grand design of doctrine"-which is enacted at the
anthropological end in repentance, faith, and holiness as divinely assisted
response to the creative, redemptive, and perfective work of "the Three-One
God."
Col6n-Emeric takes the respective teaching of Aquinas and Wesley on
perfection as his focus, without however losing sight of the other moments in the
story or features in the pattern. According to Aquinas, God-himself perfect in
the strictest sense-is the source and goal of all perfection, while for the
creatures there is a first and a second perfection, a perfection of form and a
perfection of operation whereby the Creator guides his creatures to the proper
goal of their kind, which can also be called their final perfection. In the case of
human beings, this takes the route of knowing and loving the triune God by
means of intellect and will, a completion of their original creation ad imaginem
Dei. According to Aquinas, the perfection of form is never lost, although it is
"wounded" by the Fall. The perfection of operation requires the illuminating and
redemptive incarnation of the Word and the sanctifying and energizing descent

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of the Spirit, which allows humans to imitate Christ and participate in him as the
efficient and exemplary cause of their incipient and final perfection in holiness.
A difference appears between Wesley and Aquinas, which may not be as
serious as confessional oppositions between Protestants and Catholics have made
it. For Wesley, the original perfection of the human creature-its "first
perfection" in Aquinas' scheme-was lost at the Fall, so that Wesley shares the
Protestant suspicion of an alleged Catholic "optimism of nature." Yet Wesley
does not swing to the "pessimism of grace" that has marked some extremes of
Protestantism. According to Wesley, no human being is left alone in an unaltered
state of fallen nature. Rather the universally sufficient work of Christ makes
available to all our race the possibility of a free and positive response to God by
virtue of a prevenient grace-so that E. Gordon Rupp can characterize Wesley's
position as an "optimism of grace" (Principalities and Powers [London: Epworth,
1952]), which (I think) places Methodism towards the Catholic end of the
spectrum. That prevenience of assisting grace extends-according to Wesley's
Sermon 43, "The Scripture Way of Salvation"-"from its first dawning in the
soul," on through conscience, repentance, faith, and initial and growing
sanctification, "till it is consummated in glory." So, then, let us maximize our
confessional similarities, which is precisely what Col6n-Emeric succeeds in doing
between Wesley and Aquinas.
sometimes
The author is able to demonstrate correspondences-albeit
nuanced-between Wesley and Aquinas in several areas where contrasts are often
drawn between Protestants and Catholics. One example of this has to do with
human cooperation with God, or the question of "works." Col6n-Emeric calls
attention to Wesley's repeated quotation of the Augustinian saying: "He who
made us without ourselves will not save us without ourselves" (47, 174, 226 n.
29; but cf. 264 nn.19-20 for questions of attribution and use, also in Aquinas).
The Thomistic gratia operans and gratia cooperans is matched by Wesley's
teaching as he expounds Philippians 2:12-13 in his Sermon 85, "On Working
out Our Own Salvation": "God works, therefore you can work; God works,
therefore you must work." To this may be linked the resemblance between
Aquinas's "habits" and "infused virtues" and Wesley's "holy tempers" or
"dispositions" in the process of growth in grace, which removes any danger of
punctiliousness in ethical conduct or personal sanctity and even makes it possible
for Wesley, in the "1770 Minutes," "ever so cautiously to crack a window to the
value of merits in salvation" (172). Again, this is a framework which allows both
Aquinas and Wesley to reckon with-though not, of course, condoneinfirmities, and even backsliding, along the pilgrim path to perfection.
In an entirely positive mode, both Aquinas and Wesley are shown to agree in
the centrality of Christ-himself both viator and comprehensor-as both the way
and the goal of perfection. Jean-Pierre Torrell's work on the structure of the
Summa is neatly quoted for the deferral of Christology to the Third Part as "a
deliberate decision to reclaim Christ's role in the creature's movement of return
toward God and in the fulfillment of the history of salvation"; and Col6n-Emeric
is able to cite Wesley's favorite use of "having the same mind that was found in

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Christ Jesus" (Philippians 2:5) and "walking as Christ walked" (1John2:6). The
teaching of Christ is displayed in a "Dialogue on the Beatitudes" between Wesley
and Aquinas, for both of whom-again with nuances-"perfection, happiness,
and holiness are correlative." As already stated, the Christocentrism is properly
Trinitarian. Wesley declares his vision of the end at the conclusion of his Sermon
64, "The New Creation": "Hence will arise an unmixed state of holiness and
happiness far superior to that which Adam enjoyed in paradise .... And to
crown all, there will be a deep, an intimate, an uninterrupted union with God;
a constant communion with the Father and His Son through the Holy Spirit; a
continual enjoyment of the Three-One God, and of all the creatures in him."
Exposition of the Sermon on the Mount allows both Wesley and Aquinas to
bring out the social dimension of holiness under several aspects. For Wesley, love
of neighbor-whether friend or enemy-is a means whereby "whatever grace
you have received of God may be communicated to others" or "every holy
temper and word and work of yours may have an influence on them also"
(Sermon 24, "Fourth Discourse upon our Lord's Sermon on the Mount"); or, as
Colon-Emeric sums it up for Aquinas: "The saint is not simply good, but a
bonum diffusivum sui" (131). Ecclesially, the Church-as the gathering of the
faithful before God-is the primary locus for the learning, bestowal, and exercise
of sanctity, without neglecting its part in the missionary task. According to
Aquinas, the bishop has the special ministry of being a "perfecter" among his
flock. Wesley would not make that hierarchical point, although he attributes a
properly effective role to ordained ministers and other appointed teachers, while
in the "Rules" he characteristically also names "watching over one another in
love" as a responsibility of all the members in the Methodist "societies" (14144). Both Aquinas and Wesley give all due value to the Eucharist as the
sacramental meal of the Christian community. Wesley ranks the Lord's Supper
in the top category both among "the means of grace" and among "the works of
piety." Early Methodism is reckoned, historically, as not only an evangelistic but
also a eucharistic revival by virtue both of more frequent celebration of the
sacrament ("constant communion" is John Wesley's phrase) and of the deeply
patristic Hymns on the Lord's Supper of the Wesley brothers (see 145-46).
Reverting to the opening observation that Wesley and Aquinas form an "odd
couple," one may note the recurrent ploy of Col6n-Emeric whereby their
soteriologies or ecclesiologies are described under the respective and related
figures of "house" and "cathedral." Wesley characterizes the Methodist structure
thus: "Our main doctrines, which include all the rest, are three-that of
repentance, of faith, and of holiness. The first of these we account, as it were, the
porch of religion; the next, the door; the third, religion itself" (5). To Col6nEmeric this metaphor suggests that the Methodist "house of doctrine" is no
Thomist "cathedral"; it is "simpler and plainer, its proportions are not as
majestic and soaring as those of the great medieval Summae" (5-6). As he
pictures it, both the house and the cathedral are needed to make "Church" (see
145-46, 179-80). I might risk adapting the scenario a little and imagine the day
when the cathedral would accommodate within itself a modest chapel dedicated

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to the Wesley brothers, John and Charles (for all the occasional differences
between them), where the invocations might run "Sancte Thoma, ora pro nobis .
. . . Sancti loannes et Carole, orate pro nobis," and where the entire space might
resonate with the hymns of Aquinas as well as those of the Wesleys; and all that
might not be too far away from what Col6n-Emeric himself calls "kneeling
ecumenism" (183-85). Whatever the outcome of my particular flight of
architectural fancy, the dialogue between Methodists and Catholics must
continue on its way towards its stated goal of "full communion in faith, mission,
and sacramental life." And certainly Col6n-Emeric, as a theologian of the
upcoming generation, has important contributions to make from the Methodist
side.
GEOFFREY WAINWRIGHT

Duke University Divinity School
Durham, North Carolina

Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence. Edited by KURT PRITZL. Studies in
Philosophy and the History of Philosophy 51. Washington, D.C.: The
Catholic University of America Press, 2010. Pp. 368. $79.95 (cloth). ISBN
978-0-8132-1680-5.
.
The present volume seeks to respond to the important "return to truth" that
is evident throughout the work of a number of contemporary philosophers. The
articles included offer multiple perspectives that take as their focus a "robust
theory" of truth. This robust theory sets itself in contrast to modern deflationary
theories (common to the contemporary analytic tradition), denials of truth
(found in the postmodern deconstructionist approach), and relativist theories
found in both.
The volume brings together two sides of the truth question, namely, that of
the being of objective truth and that of the human capacity to know the truth.
Despite the numerous contemporary debates and studies that have dealt with the
importance of truth and the power of philosophical argumentation, serious
doubt appears on both sides of the question. The doubt surrounds the possibility,
first, that objective truth can be obtained and shared and, second, that truth has
any hold "over the lives of persons whose rationality is subordinate to will or
desire" (2). In taking on this question, in both these aspects, and in recognizing
its contemporary relevance and importance, the collection advances our
understanding in two important ways. First, it seeks to go beneath the current
debate to uncover what assumptions about truth may in fact obstruct a proper
approach and resolution to the question. Second, it offers historical studies that
are not a simple rehearsing of past arguments. Each article deals concretely with

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the question and contributes to our deeper understanding of philosophers who
have taken the question of truth seriously.
Pritzl's opening study, "Aristotle's Door" presents and defends Aristotle's
"exuberant account of truth" over against contemporary thin or dismissive
accounts of truth. Understanding truth as "The proverbial door, which no one
can fail to hit" (Metaphysics 2.1), Pritz! offers a consideration of the expression
of noetic and dianoetic truth in Aristotle's Metaphysics and De anima as two
sides of a teleological account of truth, both of which offer an explanation of
how human knowing, despite its limitations, has real contact with reality.
Mitchell Miller's "A More Exact Grasp of the Soul?" complements the study
of Aristotle with that of Plato. This essay offers a close and compelling reading
of the two approaches to the soul that are found in Plato's Republic (a tripartite
soul) and in the Philebus (the dialectic approach). Miller's fascinating and dense
contribution sets the stage for a fuller understanding, not just of Socrates and
Plato, but of the domain of human existence. He does this by means of an
intertextual analysis. His study demonstrates what the "fuller path" to truth
about the soul requires of the philosopher. This article offers a stand-alone study
of Plato's texts as well as contributing to the overall purpose of the volume.
In "Truth, Creation and Intelligibility in Anselm, Grosseteste, and
Bonaventure," Timothy Noone presents the development of the medieval
position on truth, in light of the Christian commitment to creation. While
attempting to preserve the Greek notion of truth as the unity of being and what
the intellect knows about what is, all three medieval thinkers contextualize the
philosophical within the domain of revelation, in particular the role of God as
source of the created order and as foundation for human powers of knowing.
Noone's essay demonstrates the important and nuanced ways that medieval
approaches to a particular question build up and correct earlier authorities.
Jan Aertsen's "Truth in the Middle Ages: Its Essence and Power in Christian
Thought" continues the thrust of Noone's study and, importantly, draws back
to view the question from a broader and modern historical lens, thus offering a
bridge to later articles in the volume. Against an opening discussion that evokes
critiques of Nietzsche and Heidegger, Aertsen considers three approaches to
truth, each building upon the earlier: Anselm, Aquinas, and Nicholas of Cusa. All
three medieval thinkers deal with the absoluteness of truth and the plurality of
truths. They contribute to a reflection on truth in its ethical dimension (Anselm),
in its metaphysical dimension (Aquinas), and in its critical precision (Cusa). The
study also shows that to deny that the precision of truth is unattainable to us is
not to embrace relativism.
Daniel Garber's "Religion and Science, Faith and Reason: Some Pascalian
Reflections" moves the volume into modernity, directly addressing the existential
dimension of the question of truth. Garber uses Pascal's insights to consider the
contemporary debate between science and religion not as a doctrinal issue, but
as a reflection of the deeper conflict between theism and agnosticism/atheism.
Because of this, any attempt to reconcile the two purely on the basis of doctrine,
such as Ian Barbour attempts, is, according to Garber, beside the point. Pascal's

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writings on religious epistemology offer a way to consider two distinct ways of
seeing the world, two mindsets, whose gap can only be bridged by a "conversion
experience." Garber's conclusion is slightly disappointing: that, perhaps, the two
worldviews should be allowed to coexist as a reminder that the world might be
very different from what either party imagines. It is, however, a modern response
to the modern question he seeks to address.
Continuing the trajectory into the modern era, with its attendant focus on
subjectivity and the conditions of truth, Sean Dorrance Kelly offers an interesting
consideration in "On Time and Truth." Against the backdrop of Augustine, Kant,
and Heidegger, Kelly focuses carefully on the question of the temporal nature of
experience and studies two traditions on notion perception: the tradition of
Retention, where intentionality retains elements of the past (Locke, Hume, and
later Kant/Husserl) and that of the Specious Present which asserts a direct perception of duration (William James and, later, C. D. Broad). Kelly's comparative
analysis offers a critique of the Specious Present and points to the advantages of
Husserl's method in characterizing the temporal nature of all experience and to
Heidegger's more radical analysis of the temporality of everyday existence.
Daniel Dahlstrom's "The Prevalence of Truth," similar to Miller's contribution, deals directly and textually with the work of one major philosopher over
a lifetime of philosophical reflection on a particular question. Dahlstrom takes
up Heidegger's attempt to provide a substantial account of truth and to account
for thinner versions, using the distinction between ontic and ontological truth.
At the close of the article, Dahlstrom directly engages what appears to be a later
recanting of Heidegger's early position on truth as the disclosure of being.
Because of Heidegger's importance for modernity, this article is particularly
informative and engaging. And, like Miller's contribution, Dahlstrom's piece is
a stand-alone study well worth the reading.
In "Will versus Reason: Truth in Natural Law, Positive Law and Legal
Theory," Brian Bix moves (as will the final articles) into fields whose relationship
to the question of truth bring the second purpose of the volume, the existential
question, more centrally to the fore. His study explores the elements that make
the nature of truth, especially as it relates to law and legal reasoning, so difficult
and paradoxical. He concludes that all law and all morality can be reduced either
to a dependence on reason or a dependence on will. Without proper attention
to this distinction, understanding truth in the legal realm is hopelessly confused.
The essential and important relationship between art, truth, and being is
explored in Robert Wood's study, "Art and Truth: From Plato through
Nietzsche to Heidegger." The historical exploration of these three philosophical
visions is made possible thanks to their shared insight about truth as not limited
to particular truths or logical rectitude, and about art in its distinctive role in
coming into relationship with such an encompassing truth. This article brings the
purpose of the volume full circle. Art, in fact, offers that experience of the whole
that the consideration of truth, especially a deflationary consideration, may miss
altogether. This article touches upon a question of contemporary interest and
importance: that is, how might art and a reflection upon art help to reintroduce

BOOK REVIEWS

655

and ground a fuller understanding of being and truth. And, since for each
thinker, art's role operates at "the limits of conceptuality" (2 76), the implications
for mystery and transcendence are even more compelling for a contemporary
discussion.
John Millbank's provocative study "Truth and Identity: The Thomistic
Telescope" treats the question through a much broader historical lens. Although
the article ends with a discussion on Balthasar and the role of beauty, its location
in this volume is puzzling. Millbank neither focuses on a particular text, nor does
he engage one thinker to the degree found in the earlier contributions. Moving
through the history of philosophy very quickly and at a (dizzyingly) high level,
Millbank traces out development and decline, to bring the reader to the
reductionist program of modernity. This article could have functioned as the
final contribution to the volume, rather than the penultimate. Like many
authors, Millbank argues for the reality of truth that opens to contemplation of
the infinite, disclosing an infinite integral identity only insofar as it begins "to
realize in our finitude the measured exchanges of hope and love which
ceaselessly and incomprehensibly blend the same with the different" (309).
After Millbank's tour de force, Susan Haack's contribution, "Truth and
Progress in the Sciences: An Innocent Realist Perspective," seems a bit out of
place. She brings together the question of truth today and its relationship to
scientific inquiry, defending a Innocent Realist metaphysics grounding her
Critical Common Sense epistemology. Arguing that the goal of science is in fact
the sort of substantial, significant, and explanatory truth that the entire volume
has explored, her assessment of the potential for success, particularly in the
sciences, is not an optimistic one.
This volume offers a variety of positions on the central question of truth,
understood in its richest and most robust reality, both as being in reality and as
being as it is known. Combining textual and historical approaches, the study as
a whole provides the reader with a sense of how compelling and complex the
question of truth is today, and how important it is that such questions are raised
and, to the degree that one is able, how well they are answered. It is a study that
will interest both the historian and the specialist in philosophy. With an excellent
bibliography and index, it opens numerous avenues for continued reflection and
discussion, rather than attempting to settle the question. More proper for
academics and advanced graduate students, the volume brings together the major
voices and traditions in the conversation about truth, a conversation that is as
old, and as important, as philosophy itself. Scholars and friends of Kurt Pritz!
mourn his recent passing into the presence of that Truth beyond all
understanding. The publication of this volume remains a lasting tribute to the life
and the mind of a remarkable scholar and human being.
MARY BETH INGHAM, C.S.J.

Loyola Marymount University
Los Angeles, California

GENERAL INDEX TO THE THOMIST
VOLUME 74 (2010)
ARTICLES
Burke, Raymond Leo Cardinal, Some Fundamental Aspects of Catholic Higher
Education in the Magisterium of the Venerable Pope John Paul II and
499
Pope Benedict XVI ..................................
Emery, Gilles, O.P., Theologia and Dispensatio: The Centrality of the Divine
Missions in St. Thomas's Trinitarian Theology .............
515
Hutter, Reinhard, Theological Faith Enlightening Sacred Theology: Renewing
Theology by Recovering Its Unity as sacra doctrina .......... 369
Keating, Sandra Toenies, "Say Not Three": Some Early Christian Responses to
Muslim Questions on the Trinity .........................
85
Keiser, Kevin F., The Moral Act in St. Thomas: A Fresh Look ......... 237
LaNave, Gregory F., Bonaventure's Arguments for the Existence of God and an
"Independent" de Dea uno . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
__ , Why Holiness Is Necessary for Theology: Some Thomistic Distinctions
.................................................
437
Macdonald, Paul A., Jr., Original Justice, Original Sin, and the Free-Will
105
Defense ...........................................
Mansini, Guy, O.S.B., Are the Principles of sacra doctrina per se nota? .. 407
Marshall, Bruce D., The Unity of the Triune God: Reviving an Ancient Question
...................................................

1

Mattison William C., III, Thomas's Categorizations of Virtue: Historical
189
Background and Contemporary Significance ...............
Oakes, Kenneth R., Three Themes in Przywara's Early Theology ...... 283
Osborne, Thomas M., Jr., Thomas and Scotus on Prudence without All the
Major Virtues: Imperfect or Merely Partial? ...............
165
337
Reichberg, Gregory M., Aquinas on Battlefield Courage .............
Sokolowski, Robert, God the Father: The Human Expression of the Holy
Trinity .............................................
33
Vall, Gregory, Ad bona gratiae et gloriae: Filial Adoption in Romans 8 .. 593
Wilkins, Jeremy D., Method, Order, and Analogy in Trinitarian Theology: Karl
Rahner's Critique of the "Psychological" Approach .......... 563

REVIEWS
Adams, Marilyn McCord, Christ and Horrors: The Coherence of Christology
148
(Ralph Del Colle) ...................................
Berger, David, and Jorgen Vijgen, eds., Thomistenlexicon (Reinhard Hutter)
.................................................
326
Boersma, Hans, Nouvelle theologie and Sacramental Ontology: A Return to
Mystery (Bryan Kromholtz, O.P.) .......................
471
Bonino, Serge-Thomas, O.P., ed., Sumaturel: A Controversy at the Heart of
Twentieth-Century Thomistic Thought (Lawrence Feingold) ... 632
Burrell, David B., C.S.C:, with A.H. Johns, Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job
Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (Brian J. Shanley, O.P.)
.................................................
639
Col6n-Emeric, Edgardo, Wesley, Aquinas and Christian Perfection: An
Ecumenical Dialogue (Geoffrey Wainwright) ...............
648
Cunningham, Stanley B., Reclaiming Moral Agency: The Moral Philosophy of
Albert the Great (M. Michele Mulchahey) .................
642
Dobie, Robert J., Logos and Revelation: Ibn 'Arabi, Meister Eckhart, and Mystical
485
Hermeneutics (David Burrell, C.S.C.) ....................
Durand, Emmanuel, 0.P., Le Pere, Alpha et Omega de la vie trinitaire Oohn
Baptist Ku, O.P.) ....................................
476
Edwards, Mark, Catholicity and Heresy in the Early Church (Andrew Hofer,
O.P.) .............................................
322
Emery, Gilles, O.P., The Trinitarian Theology of St. Thomas Aquinas Oohn M.
143
McDermott, S.J.) ....................................
Feingold, Lawrence, The Natural Desire to See God according to St. Thomas
Aquinas and His Interpreters (Thomas Joseph White, O.P.) .... 461
Franks, Christopher A., He Became Poor: The Poverty of Christ and Aquinas's
Economic Teachings (G. J. McAleer) .....................
329
Jaki, Stanley L., Justification as Argued by Newman (Christopher J. Malloy)
.................................................
318
Johns, A. H., and David B. Burrell, C.S.C., Deconstructing Theodicy: Why Job
Has Nothing to Say to the Puzzle of Suffering (Brian J. Shanley, O.P.)
.................................................
639
Letters and Diaries of John Henry Newman, vol. 32, Supplement (Edward
Jeremy Miller) ......................................
311
Long, Steven A., Natura pura: On the Recovery of Nature in the Doctrine of
Grace (Guy Mansini, O.S.B.) ...........................
636
Macdonald, Paul A., Jr., Knowledge and the Transcendent: An Inquiry into the
494
Mind's Relationship to God (Nathan R. Strunk) .............

INDEX OF REVIEWS (con.)

McDermott, Thomas, O.P., Catherine of Siena: Spiritual Development in Her
157
Life and Teaching (Gabriel B. O'Donnell, O.P.) .............
Miner, Robert, Thomas Aquinas on the Passions (Edgardo Col6n-Emeric) 481
Nauta, Lodi, In Defense of Common Sense: Lorenzo Va/la's Humanist Critique
of Scholastic Philosophy (Trent Pomplun) .................
467
O'Reilly, Kevin E., Aesthetic Perception: A Thomistic Perspective (Brian
Chrzastek, O.P.) ....................................
332
Pasquarello, Michael, III, We Speak because We Have First Been Spoken: A
Grammar of the Preaching Life (Matthew Levering) ......... 645
Pritzl, Kurt, ed., Truth: Studies of a Robust Presence (Mary Beth Ingham, C.S.J.)
.................................................
652
Rhonheimer, Martin, Vital Conflicts in Medical Ethics: A Virtue Approach to
Craniotomy and Tubal Pregnancies (Basil Cole, O.P.) ........ 160
___ , Ethics of Procreation and the Defense of Human Life: Contraception,
Artificial Fertilization, and Abortion (Christopher Tollefsen) ... 489
Rziha, John, Perfecting Human Actions: St. Thomas Aquinas on Human
Participation in the Eternal Law (Reinhard Hiitter) .......... 152
Tilley, Terrence W., The Disciples' Jesus: Christology as Reconciling Practice
Games F. Keating) ...................................
627
Vijgen, Jorgen, and David Berger, eds., Thomistenlexicon (Reinhard Hiitter)
.................................................
326